new product introduction and incumbent response strategies their interrelationship and the role of multimarket contact in this article the author studies the determinants of both new product introduction and incumbent response strategies in a single integrated framework building on previous research in strategic

analysis of new product diffusion using a four segment trial repeat model a four segment trial repeat model is developed to model sales of a frequently purchased product in the early stage of the product s life cycle the model can be calibrated using aggregate data alone two versions of the model one emphasizing the competitive aspect of marketing communications and another emphasizing the informative aspect are estimated from data on 21 newly launched pharmaceutical products the model provides valuable diagnostics such as an early estimate of the long run market share of the new product a decomposition of total sales into trial sales due to marketing activities trial sales due to word of mouth and repeat sales the changing composition of the trial market and repeat market over time and the time when the trial market is expected to be saturated in addition the effectiveness of the entrant s marketing efforts word of mouth communication and buyers trial experience are analyzed with the model a cross sectional analysis based on the empirical estimation results of our model reveals interesting insights into product introduction strategies we find that 1 the effectiveness of the firms communication activities on trial is related mainly to product quality attributes and market growth whereas that of word of mouth is associated with product class characteristics and market competitiveness and 2 the effect of product trial on repeat purchases is related mainly to product quality attributes and various market characteristics such as size growth competitiveness and familiarity

sticks and carrots two incentive mechanisms supporting intra group cooperation abstract in this note we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra group cooperation in the context of prisoner s dilemma payoffs rewards for cooperating and punishments for defection where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship

on the use of econometric models for policy simulation in marketing abstract in this article the author discusses the properties of useful econometric models for marketing phenomena with particular attention on models for policy simulations the author addresses model diagnostics parameter stability exogeneity and the lucas critique he also presents the results of a search through the 1998 2003 issues of the journal of marketing research finally the author offers practical guidelines

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

collusion in multiproduct oligopoly games under a finite horizon applying recent results on finitely repeated games to oligopoly theory the author finds that there exists a class of finite horizon output games in which collusion can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium trigger strategies prevent defection from the cooperative outcome by credibly threatening that the defector will be forced to exit the industry for the case of a multiproduct oligopoly it is shown that collusion in one market can be enforced by the threat of punishment in a second market if someone defects even though the two markets are structurally independent the firms make them strategically interdependent through their strategies copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

diffusion of renewable energy technologies in south korea on incorporating their competitive interrelationships renewable energy technologies rets have attracted significant public attention for several reasons the most important being that they are clean alternative energy sources that help reduce greenhouse gas emissions to increase the probability that rets will be successful it is essential to reduce the uncertainty about its adoption with accurate long term demand forecasting this study develops a diffusion model that incorporates the effect of competitive interrelationships among renewable sources to forecast the growth pattern of five rets solar photovoltaic wind power and fuel cell in the electric power sector and solar thermal and geothermal energy in the heating sector the 2 step forecasting procedure is based on the bayus 1993 manage sci 39 11 1319 1333 price function and a diffusion model suggested by hahn et al 1994 marketing sci 13 3 224 247 in an empirical analysis the model is applied to the south korean renewable energy market

entry exit and performance in airline markets abstract data from the airline industry indicate that 1 entry generally is not induced by price levels substantially above the norm 2 entry reduces fares and increases output and exit increases fares and reduces output and 3 incumbents cut price and maintain output in response to entry and survivors increase both price and output in response to exit these findings cast doubt on the ability of entry to prevent or reverse price increases from anticompetitive mergers

chapter 4 competitive marketing strategies game theoretic models publisher summary this chapter reviews the key developments in the understanding of competitive marketing strategies product price advertising and distribution competition are all addressed while the emphasis is on models the chapter surveys the empirical literature as well there is a significant amount of empirical work to report but the ratio of theoretical to empirical work is nevertheless unpleasantly large much progress has been made in the last ten years or so in the study of competitive marketing strategies most of this chapter has been theoretical using simple models of firm and consumer behavior these models serve the function of demonstrating rigorously the existence of certain effects factors which need to be considered in analyzing real world competition

multinomial logit market share models equilibrium characteristics and strategic implications we specify and analyze the conditions under which the mnl market share models are appropriate for equilibrium analysis our results show that a linear price response function as is often used in empirical research in conjunction with the typical concavity assumed in a large range of marketing response functions would yield an interior equilibrium solution we then consider the optimal reactions on pricing and marketing spending to entry and potential market expansion in the context of the mnl models we demonstrate that the entry of a new brand evokes a decrease in the equilibrium prices of the existing brands as a defensive reaction this is true in both an expanding market as well as a fixed market however while new entry into a fixed market would trigger the incumbents to lower the marketing expenditure we show that firms tend to raise marketing activities as they experience market expansion consequently there exist distinct possibilities that marketing efforts for the existing brands increase in view of entry in an expanding market further managerial and marketing implications for endogeneity of the number of firms are explored

economies of scale and barriers to entry dixit has recently presented a model in which established firms select capacity to discourage entry but cannot employ threats they would not rationally execute after entry entry deterrence in a slight modification of this model involves the classical limit price output under linear or concave demand however the capital cost of a firm of minimum efficient scale is an upper bound on the present value of the monopoly profit stream that can be shielded from entry it is argued that this suggests the general unimportance of entry barriers erected by scale economies

a prelaunch diffusion model for evaluating market defense strategies this paper describes the development and application of a marketing model to help set an incumbent s defensive marketing strategy prior to a new competitor s launch the management problem addressed is to assess the market share impact of a new entrant in the residential australian long distance telephone call market and determine the factors that would influence its dynamics and ultimate market appeal the paper uses probability flow models to provide a framework to generate forecasts and assess the determinants of share loss we develop models at two levels of complexity to give both simple robust forecasts and more detailed diagnostic analysis of the effect of marketing actions the models are calibrated prior to the new entrant s launch enabling preemptive marketing strategies to be put in place by the defending company the equilibrium level of consideration of the new entrant was driven by respondents strength of relationship with the defender and inertia while trial was more price based continued use of the defender depends on both service factors and price the rate at which share loss eventuates is negatively related to the defender s perceived responsiveness saving money being the only reason to switch and risk aversion prelaunch model forecasts validated six months after launch using both aggregate monthly sales data and detailed tracking surveys are shown to closely follow the actual evolution of the market the paper provides a closed form multistate model of the new entrant s diffusion a methodology for the prelaunch calibration of dynamic models in practice and insights into defensive strategies for existing companies facing new entrants

diversification multi market contact and profitability this paper analyses the relationships between diversification multi market contact and industry profitability it focuses on the link between diversification and multi market contact to show that when diversification establishes or increases the extent to which firms meet in more than one market the effect of such multi market contact is to increase the possibility that collusion emerges as an evolutionary stable strategy as a result multi market contact may increase the potential for tacit collusion and so lead to higher profitability the effects of diversification and multi market contact on the price cost margin and the rate of return to capital are estimated using a specially constructed new database for uk manufacturing industry in 1979 this database provides information on the diversification and multi market contact of 418 firms across 134 manufacturing industries thus linking firm and industry level data the results show a clear positive effect of multi market contact on industry profitability

the value of quality product quality is probably undervalued by firms because there is little consensus about appropriate measures and methods to research quality we suggest that published ratings of a product s quality are a valid source of quality information with important strategic and financial impact we test this thesis by an event analysis of abnormal returns to stock prices of firms whose new products are evaluated in the wall street journal quality has a strong immediate effect on abnormal returns which is substantially higher than that for other marketing events assessed in prior studies moreover there are some important asymmetries in the effect we discuss the research managerial investing and policy implications

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

sales growth of new pharmaceuticals across the globe the role of regulatory regimes prior marketing literature has overlooked the role of regulatory regimes in explaining international sales growth of new products this paper addresses this gap in the context of new pharmaceuticals 15 new molecules in 34 countries and sheds light on the effects of regulatory regimes on new drug sales across the globe based on a time varying coefficient model we find that differences in regulation substantially contribute to cross country variation in sales one of the regulatory constraints investigated i e manufacturer price controls has a positive effect on drug sales the other forms of regulation such as restrictions of physician prescription budgets and the prohibition of direct to consumer advertising dtca tend to hurt sales the effect of manufacturer price controls is similar for newly launched and mature drugs by contrast regulations on physician prescription budgets and dtca have a differential effect for newly launched and mature drugs whereas the former hurts mature drugs more the latter has a larger effect on newly launched drugs in addition to these regulatory effects we find that national culture economic wealth and lagged sales also affect drug sales our findings may be used as input by managers for international launch and marketing decisions they may also be used by public policy administrators to assess the role of regulatory regimes in pharmaceutical sales growth

the trouble with compliance dependence and foreign policy in ecuador the compliance model of dependent foreign policy argues that dependent states will implement the foreign policy preferences of their dominant economic partners despite its failure to deliver strong empirical results compliance remains dominant within the study of dependent foreign policy this article examines compliance s problems and explains its endurance within the subfield of international relations six cases drawn from the hurtado and febres cordero administrations in ecuador during the 1980s are analyzed to evaluate compliance s three critical assumptions about the dependent foreign policy process the unitary actor core periphery bargaining and divergent preferences between core and periphery in only one of the cases do compliance s assumptions hold true and does compliance account for ecuador s foreign policy flaws in the bargaining assumption and the divergent preferences assumption account for the model s poor description of the process behind many dependent states foreign policies

research issues at the boundary of competitive dynamics and market evolution building on the observation that competitive dynamics and market evolution are inextricably linked and underresearched we propose a road map to guide and stimulate future research in the area a number of rationales have been proposed to explain why there is relatively little research directed toward understanding the links between competitive dynamics and market evolution these include the predominance of different research paradigms in each area a lack of data appropriate for analyzing the two areas together and the difficulty of obtaining robust and significant results with analysis that is by definition complex it must consider factors and outcomes both across firms and over time using this last rationale as a starting point we develop a series of research propositions related to key relationships where a insignificant or contradictory results have been obtained in extant research or b researchers have yet to delve the propositions are designed to deepen our understanding of the relationship between the areas throughout the analysis the key to developing the propositions is to recognize the importance of moderating factors mediating factors and covariates in addition where the approach to empirically test a proposition is new we propose categories measures and comparisons that can be used

a new product growth for model consumer durables this article originally appeared in management science january 1969 volume 15 number 5 pp 215 227 published by the institute of management sciences a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables the basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior the model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data a long range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets

defensive marketing strategies this paper analyzes how a firm should adjust its marketing expenditures and its price to defend its position in an existing market from attack by a competitive new product our focus is to provide usable managerial recommendations on the strategy of response in particular we show that if products can be represented by their position in a multiattribute space consumers are heterogeneous and maximize utility and awareness advertising and distribution can be summarized by response functions then for the profit maximizing firm it is optimal to decrease awareness advertising it is optimal to decrease the distribution budget unless the new product can be kept out of the market a price increase may be optimal and even under the optimal strategy profits decrease as a result of the competitive new product furthermore if the consumer tastes are uniformly distributed across the spectrum a price decrease increases defensive profits it is optimal at the margin to improve product quality in the direction of the defending product s strength and it is optimal at the margin to reposition by advertising in the same direction in addition we provide practical procedures to estimate 1 the distribution of consumer tastes and 2 the position of the new product in perceptual space from sales data and knowledge of the percent of consumers who are aware of the new product and find it available competitive diagnostics such as the angle of attack are introduced to help the defending manager this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 4 pages 319 360 in 1983

resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies abstract in this paper we investigate the coordinated use of marketing and manufacturing strategies to formulate a defensive business strategy for an incumbent firm upon market entry while defensive marketing strategies have been researched extensively little has been done on defensive manufacturing strategies and even less on coordinating these two we propose a formulation for the joint formation of a defensive strategy by the marketing and production functions under budget constraint considerations the incumbent firm may allocate its resourcesto advertising and distribution expenditures as well as to manufacturing investments to reduce the unit production cost the incumbent firm has also the option of simply allocating all of its resources purely to advertising and distribution we show that while there exist cases where the optimal reaction to entry involves investments in manufacturing improvements there are also cases where defense is in marketing strategies alone we identify the market conditions that promote such reactions to entry and also provide sensitivity analysis

trade costs and multimarket collusion contrary to conventional wisdom this article argues that trade liberalization may facilitate collusion and reduce welfare with the help of a duopoly model in which firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets we first show that if trade costs i e tariffs transport costs and discount factors are not too high efficient cartel agreements necessitate the cross hauling of goods as that entails lower deviation incentives in this setting we then demonstrate that reciprocal trade liberalization always raises total output when trade costs are within a range whose lower bound exceeds a threshold level but may reduce total output and thus be pro collusive when trade costs are below that threshold level

deconstructing the pioneer s advantage examining vintage effects and consumer valuations of quality and variety several studies have demonstrated an order of entry effect on market share suggesting that pioneers outperform later entrants however other research has pointed out the limitations of these studies and found evidence that many pioneers fail or have low market share given this background the purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which pioneers are more likely and also less likely to have an advantage we propose a game theoretic model that includes important sources of pioneer advantages as well as disadvantages specifically we incorporate a pioneer advantage due to preemption in markets with heterogeneous tastes in addition we incorporate a potential pioneer disadvantage due to technology vintage effects where later entrants utilizing improved technology can have lower costs and higher quality the model allows us to evaluate the extent of vintage effects necessary to overcome a pioneer s advantage key relationships are found between the magnitude of the pioneer advantage or disadvantage and consumer valuations of product attributes e g variety and quality we empirically validate the model with vintage effect data in 36 product categories and measures of consumer valuations of product variety and quality for 12 of these 36 categories the results show that pioneers do better in product categories wherevariety is more important and worse in categories where productquality is more important pioneers in categories with high vintage effects are shown to have lower market shares and higher failure rates similar results appear when analyzing persistence of market leadership over time further validating our model s major implications we also present two case studies that illustrate key elements of the model

an equilibrium analysis of defensive response to entry using a coupled response function model we determine the optimal response to competitive entry in a market characterized by a market share attraction model the response of an incumbent is limited to changes in prices advertising and distribution expenditures brand positions are assumed to be fixed we also assume that the entrant s position is chosen exogenously and that the sales potential of the market is constant after proving the existence of a unique nash equilibrium we show that the optimal response depends on the relative market share of the incumbents the response by nondominant brands with market shares less than 50 mirrors the prediction by decoupled response function models reduce price advertising and distribution spending for the dominant brand having a market share of 50 the response is to reduce price and increase marketing spending this finding explains previous empirical results that could not be addressed by the decoupled models

intra and inter industry externalities from foreign direct investment in the mexican manufacturing sector new evidence from mexican regions summary this paper presents new empirical evidence on externalities from foreign direct investment fdi in several mexican regions in the early 1990s the main findings are threefold first the presence of fdi creates negative externalities within industries and positive externalities between industries through backward linkages second fdi externalities are stimulated by large technological differences between fdi and mexican firms and by geographic concentration of industries third we identify a substantial level of regional heterogeneity of the externality impact of fdi in line with the notion that fdi may have contributed to processes of changing regional prosperity under trade liberalization the findings also imply that maquiladora firms in the border states are generating positive externalities

modeling competitive pricing and market share anatomy of a decision support system even with today s high emphasis on management decision support systems relatively little has been published on the motivations tribulations and post mortems that generally accompany the development of such systems this paper reports in a mixture of narrative style and more formal model exposition how a computerized decision support system for optimal price determination was developed implemented and finally applied to a broad range of industry problems

consensus or compliance foreign policy change and external dependence the foreign policy behavior of weak states conventional wisdom holds is largely determined by a process of bargaining with a dominant state compliance with the dominant state s preferences is viewed as necessary to the maintenance of economic exchange relations that benefit the weak state evidence for such a theory has been found in cross sectional correlations of aid and trade with un voting however such empirical studies have ignored alternative explanations overlooked elements of the statistical record and failed to examine the logic of the bargaining model the assumptions of the bargaining model are vulnerable to criticism an alternative model emphasizes multiple constraints on the behavior of both the strong and the weak nation in an asymmetrical dyad reanalysis of the data uncovers strong evidence of an explanation for foreign policy continuity rooted in dependency dependency permeates and transforms the political system of dependent nations thus bringing about constrained consensus rather than compliance furthermore the data provide strong evidence for an explanation of foreign policy change in both nations that centers on regime change not on bargaining with an external actor

proactive and reactive product line strategies asymmetries between market leaders and followers to what extent do firms engage in product line actions simultaneously with actions in other marketing variables what are the determinants of product line actions to what extent are product line actions proactive to what degree are they reactive how can a firms product line action elasticity percent change in product line length with respect to percent change in competitors past and anticipated actions be decomposed into reaction and anticipation elasticities are product line actions and elasticities symmetric across market leaders and followers to address these questions we develop a conceptual framework comprising determinants of product line and other marketing actions in a single framework we formulate hypotheses about the asymmetries between market leaders and followers regarding product line actions based on extended expectancy valence and competitive demand elasticity theories we develop a simultaneous equation model of demand and supply with product line and other marketing actions which can be used to identify reaction and anticipation elasticities through the rational expectations approach we estimate the model using data from the computer printer market comprising the market leader hewlett packard hp and followers epson canon and lexmark the results show that the market leader practices a product proliferation strategy and rarely fights on price in contrast market followers adopt a price fighting strategy a firm is more likely to engage in product line actions when its competitors changed their product lines in the past when the firm is large and when its price is high product line reaction and anticipation elasticities are asymmetric between themselves and across the firms for the market leader followers product line reaction elasticity is higher lower than product line anticipation elasticity these differences are related to product line demand elasticities which are higher for the market leader than they are for the followers

the compliant foreign policy of the dependent state revisited empirical linkages and lessons from the case of somalia studies of the linkage between economic dependence and foreign policy compliance have been confounded by the difficulties of measuring dependence single indicators of dependence may be inadequate reflections of what appears to be a multidimensional phenomenon but the relative potency of these factors has not yet been weighed the ability to determine the relative salience of dependence factors has been limited by the dominant state centric model employed in prior research which examines a single dominant state and the foreign policies of its many dependencies this model fails to capture what in reality is the norm that most peripheral states find themselves involved in dependent relations with two or more regional and global powers a dependent state centric model one that examines a single dependent state s foreign policies vis a vis its several dominant states thus is theoretically warranted and its application provides an opportunity to compare the relative salience of different types of de

international trade without ces estimating translog gravity this paper derives a micro founded gravity equation in general equilibrium based on a translog demand system that allows for endogenous markups and substitution patterns across goods in contrast to standard ces based gravity equations trade is more sensitive to trade costs if the exporting country only provides a small share of the destination country s imports as a result trade costs have a heterogeneous impact across country pairs with some trade flows predicted to be zero i test the translog gravity equation and find strong empirical support in its favor

note competitive price and positioning strategies brand positioning and brand pricing are important strategic decisions for marketing managers such decisions are interrelated and depend upon competitive brand positions and prices however any unilateral decisions may encourage repositioning and price adjustment by competitors thus leading to either new market equilibria or a price positioning war this paper examines such price and positioning decisions in a competitive environment by extending the defender consumer model to more complex equilibria we assume that the brands are already in the market and that positions are sticky in the sense that brands cannot leapfrog one another among the insights for such incumbent brands are if prices are symmetric and held constant firms seek to reposition toward the center of the market but price advantages by central firms can mediate that central tendency such that an equilibrium exists with positive profits if brand positions are held constant the nash equilibria for prices exist and are unique and category profits the sum of brand profits are maximized for maximum brand differentiation for two and three brand markets the subgame perfect nash equilibrium where positioning decisions are made with foresight on the price equilibria causes firms to unilaterally seek maximum brand differentiation but for four or more brands greater foresight and or cooperation appears necessary to reach the point of maximum brand differentiation these results apply where the defender consumer model is an exact description of consumer response and where the competitive reaction assumptions hold in any empirical situation such forces might be softened resulting in differentiated but not maximally differentiated brands

product and price competition in a two dimensional vertical differentiation model in this paper the one dimensional vertical differentiation model shaked and sutton shaked a j sutton 1982 relaxing price competition through product differentiation rev econom stud 49 3 13 moorthy moorthy k s 1988 product and price competition in a duopoly marketing sci 7spring 141 168 is extended to two dimensions and an analysis of product and price competition is presented a two stage game theoretic analysis in which two firms compete first on product positions and then on price is conducted closed form equilibrium solutions are obtained for each stage in which competitors are unrestricted in their choices of price or product positions a significant finding of this research is that unlike the one dimensional vertical differentiation model firms do not tend towards maximum differentiation although this solution is possible under certain conditions when the range of positioning options on each of the dimensions is equal maxmin product differentiation occurs that is in equilibrium the two firms tend to choose positions which will represent maximum differentiation on one dimension and minimum differentiation on the other dimension

pioneers marketing mix reactions to entry in different competitive game structures theoretical analysis and empirical illustration pioneers marketing mix reactions to new entries are recognized as important determinants of the outcome of pioneerlate mover competition particularly in price inelastic markets such as those for pharmaceuticals cigarettes and luxury goods managers in such markets are interested in better understanding when to accommodate i e decrease marketing spending or retaliate i e increase spending in nonprice marketing variables such as advertising and salesforce in addition the reallocation of marketing resources toward advertising indicated by a pull strategy or salesforce indicated by a push strategy upon entry is strategically important to managers previous theoretical research shows that pioneers should retaliate in both static and growing markets results from empirical research are mixed in that they support both accommodation and retaliation in growing markets empirical research also shows that a pioneer accommodates retaliates with its low high elasticity marketing mix variable contrary to prior research however some pioneers have successfully accommodated late movers in growing markets and in some cases have accommodated with their stronger marketing mix variables and also retaliated with their weaker marketing mix variables for example bristol myers squibb s capoten accommodated the entry of merck s vasotec in the growing ace inhibitors market with its more powerful variable salesforce but also retaliated with its less potent variable advertising moreover not much is known about how the pioneer s marketing mix allocation should change i e toward pull vs push strategies in response to new entries we seek to better explain the pioneer s reactions and predict its shift in marketing mix allocation upon new entry we note that prior research s predictions on the pioneer s reactions are based on a limited number of key factors such as product market characteristics and the pioneer s elasticities prior to a new entry in this paper we extend previous research by adding two other critical factors namely the impact of new entry on the pioneer s elasticities and margin and different competitive game structures to better predict and explain the pioneer s reactions we develop analytical results on the pioneer s reactions in price advertising and salesforce in different competitive games both nash and different leader follower games in these results we identify the conditions under which the pioneer should accommodate or retaliate or not react to a late mover s entry and shift its marketing mix allocation toward pull versus push strategies we empirically illustrate some of the analytical results using data from a pharmaceutical category we show that a pioneer who adopts a follower leader role with respect to a marketing mix variable in a static growing market and witnesses a decrease an increase in own elasticity and margin upon a new entry generally should accommodate retaliate in that variable however we are also able to show that there are cases where these general reactions don t hold thus for example it is possible for a pioneer to find it optimal to accommodate in a growing market or to retaliate even when its elasticity decreases upon entry depending on the combination of competitive game the impact of entry on elasticities and margin and market growth in this way our results point to the fact that it is necessary to look not only at one factor at a time but instead examine the combination of all the factors we explain the empirical support for both accommodation and retaliation in growing markets by showing that the pioneer should accommodate retaliate a late mover with its competitively low high elasticity marketing mix variable competitively high low elasticity variables are not are likely to be significantly reduced by a new entry in the anticipated competitive game with regard to reallocation of the pioneer s marketing mix we show that the change in the pioneer s marketing mix allocation should follow the change in the relative marketing mix effectiveness after new entry this in turn depends on the structure of competition the impact of the late mover on its elasticities and margins and the competitor s marketing mix elasticities in addition to own elasticities the results can guide managers on how factors such as competitive structure changes in elasticities and margin and market growth impact the pioneer s marketing mix decisions and on when to accommodate retaliate or not react to a late mover s entry and shift marketing mix allocation toward pull versus push strategies

anti u s foreign policy of dependent states mexican and costa rican participation in central american peace plans literature on the foreign policy behavior of economically dependent states holds that they will comply with the foreign policy preferences of the united states particularly on cold war issues regional foreign policies of mexico and costa rica defy this view despite significant economic dependence on u s aid and trade both miguel de la madrid and oscar arias developed peace plans for central america that directly countered the objectives of the reagan policy for the area pressures resulting from a regional security threats b the flow of refugees into costa rica and mexico c the foreign policy traditions of each country and d the need to counteract the effects of dependence guided these presidents to accept the risks of a defiant foreign policy in order to satisfy local demands even though heavily dependent and under pressure from the u s government to comply with its regional foreign policy mexico and costa rica implemented policies that served their own national interests and defied wa

measuring the competitive threat from china for other southern exporters abstractin recent years there has been a growing literature which analyses the threat which chinese exports pose to the exports of othe18 developing countries and compared with estimates for the standard measures it is shown that the latter tend to underestimat r developing countries this paper provides a critique of the standard measures of export similarity which have been used to ese the extent to which countries are threatened by china they also distort both the rankings of countries according to the extent to which they face competition from china and the direction of change in the competitive threat over time timate the threat from china in these studies two alternative indices the static and the dynamic index of competitive threat are developed and estimated for 1 introduction c hina s rapid growth and increased openness over the past quarter centuryhas led to it emerging as a key player in the global economy in the early 21stcentury gdp has grown at over 9 per cent per annum since 1980 so that chinais now the world s fourth largest economy at market exchange rates its share ofworld trade has risen over the same period from less than 1 per cent in 1980 toover 6 5 per cent in 2005 making it the third largest trading economy while some developing countries have bene ted from china s growingdemand for raw materials for others the growth of chinese exports has led togrowing concerns over the potential loss of export markets to cheap chinese goods these concerns are particularly acute for countries which developed signi canttextile and garment exports under the multi fibre arrangement mfa s quotasystem and which now face direct competition from china however theproblems are not con ned to countries that have specialised in unskilled labour intensive manufacturing as chinese industry becomes more technologicallysophisticated its range of exports is broadening and is also posing a threat tomiddle income exporters of more capital or skill intensive products such asmexico and malaysia chinese exports of some agricultural products are also onthe rise for example chinese apples affecting markets for countries such as chileand south africa

advertising and post entry oligopoly behaviour this paper uses a two stage methodology to examine the advertising response to new entry by incumbent firms in the first stage time se ries regressions are employed to identify the advertising responses for a sample of forty two companies in consumer goods markets in the second stage cross section analysis is used to model the factors that might explain the post entry increase in advertising the results suggest a systematic response by dominant firms in static markets and support the view that entry deterring behavior is most likely where other entry barriers ar e already present copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

do or die competitive effects and red queen dynamics in the product survival race this study explores the reciprocal relationship between the nature and duration of competition and innovation outcomes we propose that the perpetually driven reciprocal sequence of competitive action and reaction known as the red queen in evolutionary biology is a cardinal force behind the success of innovations we test our hypotheses applying a comprehensive data set of all automobile manufacturers known to compete in the us automobile market at any time between 1946 and 2008 using data composed of 8203 model year pairs 1071 models from 148 different brands we find that recent competitive experiences of models rather than those in the distant past make them more viable competitors additionally superior reputation and market share are found to effectively shield models from the pernicious effects of red queen competition

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

the trade creating effects of business and social networks evidence from france using theory grounded estimations of trade flow equations this paper investigates the role that business and social networks play in shaping trade between french regions the bilateral intensity of networks is quantified using the financial structure and location of french firms and bilateral stocks of migrants compared to a situation without networks migrants are shown to double bilateral trade flows while networks of firms multiply trade flows by as much as four in some specifications finally taking network effects into account divides the estimation of the impact of transport costs and of the effect of administrative borders by around three

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

trade negotiations domestic policies and the most favored nation clause this paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non discrimination links trade agreements to non trade agreements and under certain conditions helps governments further lower tariffs and or domestic standards policies these conditions are i governments objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards policies ii domestic standards are sufficiently valued and iii policies are strategic complements these can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non discrimination ce texte montre comment le fait de restreindre les instruments de politique commerciale a la seule poursuite de liens commerciaux libres de discrimination relie accords commerciaux et non commerciaux et a certaines conditions aide les gouvernements a reduire encore davantage les tarifs douaniers et ou les normes politiques nationales ces conditions sont que i les fonctions objectives soient suffisamment concaves par rapport aux normes politiques nationales ii les normes nationales soient suffisamment valorisees et iii les politiques soient des complements strategiques ces arguments fournissent le rationale pour limiter les mesures de protection a la seule non discrimination

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

conspiracy at the pump abstract on the basis of evidence of price fixing in may 2006 the canadian competition bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of quebec in june 2008 criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets we employ a differences in differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets we find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1 75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation we also briefly discuss how well the stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real world conspiracy

commentary defensive marketing strategies for every new product and service entrant there are usually many incumbents who must defend their positions in the market hence defensive strategy is as least as critical as new product strategy our 1983 article argued that defensive strategy critically depends on the distribution of buyer preferences and the position of the new entrant relative to the position of the incumbent in a multidimensional attribute space since the appearance of our 1983 article in marketing science research in defensive strategy has progressed in both prescriptive and descriptive directions subsequent research on defensive strategy has also addressed empirical methodological theoretical and substantive issues today defensive strategy is more important than ever with shorter new product life cycles persistent service innovation remarkable technological change global competition and the invention of new channels of distributions

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

a novel bass type model for product life cycle quantification using aggregate market data abstract product life cycle plc is a widely accepted concept that has been given significant attention in operations management and marketing literature however its quantification remains a major challenge this study aims to develop a unique and original analytical model for quantifying plcs using aggregate market data the bass diffusion model is used to forecast consumers first purchases of the product next the novelty loyalty based consumer utility nlbcu theory which has a confirmed neuropsychological basis is used to model repeat or replacement purchases the unique contribution of this work is that it synthesizes the prevailing innovation diffusion theory and the nlbcu theory to provide a distinct dynamic and endogenous perspective on consumer purchasing behavior across the entire plc the model s advantages include its simple mathematical formulation its minimal use of data and its harmony with the predominating ideas of the innovation diffusion literature through simulation studies and empirical investigations the descriptive power and data fitting performance of the model are demonstrated

dynamic effects of the order of entry on market share trial penetration and repeat purchases for frequently purchased consumer goods a time series cross sectional analysis of 18 successful later entrants in 8 categories of consumer packaged goods over the period from october 1983 to january 1988 confirms previous empirical findings that after correcting for differences in marketing effort later entrants suffer a long term market share disadvantage new evidence of the penalties associated with later entry are found in statistical estimation of models of cumulative trial first repeat and subsequent repeat purchasing significantly lower asymptotic levels are found in both trial and repeat behavior however based on this data the rate of approach of later entrants to their lower asymptotic performance measures is either equal to or faster than early entrants and provides evidence of a compensating partial effect accrued by later entrants

predicting competitive response to a major policy change combining game theoretic and empirical analyses this research uses procter gamble s value pricing initiative as a context for testing whether actual competitor and retailer response to a major policy change can be predicted using a game theoretic model we first estimate demand functions for p g and competitor brands from the period before value pricing was initiated we then formulate a dynamic manufacturer retailer stackelberg model that includes p g a national brand competitor and a retailer the model takes p g s move as given and prescribes the price and promotion response of the competitors and the retailer we substitute the estimated demand parameters into the model to obtain prescriptions for each competitor and the retailer and see whether these prescriptions are related to the actual response we find that the dynamic game theoretic model calibrated with empirical estimates of demand parameters has significant predictive power we also test the predictive power of two benchmark models the first is based on the reaction function approach of leeflang and wittink leeflang peter s h wittink dick r 1992 diagnosing competitive reactions using aggregated scanner data internat j res marketing9 39 57 and the second is a simplification of our dynamic model where the retailer is not strategic the dynamic game theoretic model performs better than either benchmark

competitive reactions to advertising and promotion attacks how do competitors react to each other s price promotion and advertising attacks what are the reasons for the observed reaction behavior we answer these questions by performing a large scale empirical study on the short run and long run reactions to promotion and advertising shocks in over 400 consumer product categories over a four year time span our results clearly show that the most predominant form of competitive response is passive in nature when a reaction does occur it is usually retaliatory in the same instrument i e promotion attacks are countered with promotions and advertising attacks are countered with advertising there are very few long run consequences of any type of reaction behavior by linking reaction behavior to both cross and own effectiveness we further demonstrate that passive behavior is often a sound strategy while firms that do opt to retaliate often use ineffective instruments resulting in spoiled arms accommodating behavior is observed in only a minority of cases and often results in a missed sales opportunity when promotional support is reduced the ultimate impact of most promotion and advertising campaigns depends primarily on the nature of consumer response not the vigilance of competitors

response to competitive entry a rationale for delayed defensive reaction empirical studies examining responses to new product entries come to the puzzling conclusion that in general an incumbent reacts to a new entrant after a significant delay even easy to implement price cuts are observed after significant lag following entry these findings seem to contradict the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit competitive encroachment when a competing firm enters the market consumers may be uncertain about the entering firm s product quality the incumbent firm through rigorous tests may fully know the entrant s quality suppose the incumbent aggressively lowers price this may cause the consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant s quality is high in other words an incumbent s reaction may cause the consumers to make inferences about the entrant s quality such strategic implications of the incumbent s reactions have to be carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response by the incumbent in this paper we propose a conceptual framework for understanding differences in the magnitude and timing of incumbents responses to competitive entries we consider a model in which a monopolist incumbent firm faces competitive entry the incumbent firm knows the true quality of the entrant with certainty although consumers are aware of the incumbent s product quality through their prior experience they are initially uncertain of the entrant s product quality in such a situation a high quality entrant has the incentive to signal her true quality through her strategic price choice however the uncertainty about the entrant s quality is favorable to the incumbent in the sense that consumers believe with a high probability that the entrant s quality is low as a result the strategic incentives facing the incumbent and the entrant oppose each other while the entrant wants to signal her high quality the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so we demonstrate that one way the incumbent can prevent the quality signaling is to select a higher than his optimal competitive duopoly price in other words the incumbent can prevent or jam the entrant s quality signaling by choosing a price higher than his optimal competitive price when consumers are fully informed about the entrant s true quality though the signal jamming price is lower than the monopoly price the price is substantially higher than the competitive price this marginal reduction in the incumbent s price from the pre entry monopolistic price represents a muted or lack of response by the incumbent to the competitive entry however once the entrant s quality gets revealed in subsequent periods through consumer usage and word of mouth the entrant has no incentive to engage in quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam it therefore the market reverts to the complete information competitive prices and the incumbent lowers his price considerably this temporal pattern of muted price reduction in the first period followed by a sharp price reduction in the second period corresponds to a delayed defensive reaction in our model although the empirical studies suggest that the delayed reaction may arise due to factors such as managerial inertia or indecision we demonstrate that such a behavior is indeed an optimal strategy for a profit maximizing firm thus our model reconciles empirical results with the equilibrium outcome of a strategic analytical framework furthermore in an experimental setting we test the predictive power of our framework and establish that consumers indeed form conjectures about the entrant s quality based on the incumbent s reactions in the first experimental study we find strong support for the notion that the incumbent s price reaction may indicate entrant s quality in a follow up study we observe that whenever the incumbent lowers prices respondents judge the quality of the entrant to be higher as compared to the case when prices are the same or increased the managerial implication of this paper is that well established incumbent firms should be cautious in the implementation of their defensive responses to product introductions of uncertain quality by competitors of particular concern are situations where the reactions are easily observable by consumers a strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously leading consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor s product

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

technology and demand forecasting for carbon capture and storage technology in south korea among the various alternatives available to reduce greenhouse gas ghg emissions carbon capture and storage ccs is considered to be a prospective technology that could both improve economic growth and meet ghg emission reduction targets despite the importance of ccs however studies of technology and demand forecasting for ccs are scarce this study bridges this gap in the body of knowledge on this topic by forecasting ccs technology and demand based on an integrated model for technology forecasting a logistic model and patent network analysis are used to compare the competitiveness of ccs technology for selected countries for demand forecasting a competition diffusion model is adopted to consider competition among renewable energies and forecast demand the results show that the number of patent applications for ccs technology will increase to 16 156 worldwide and to 4 790 in korea by 2025 we also find that the united states has the most competitive ccs technology followed by korea and france moreover about 5 million tco2e of ghg will be reduced by 2040 if ccs technology is adopted in korea after 2020

the structure of competition how competition between one s rivals influences imitative market entry this paper investigates how the pattern of encounters between a firm s competitors affects the firm s inclination to follow its competitors into a new market we theorize that direct encounters between a firm s rivals lead to a herding effect making imitative market entry more likely past mutual forbearance between a firm s competitors resulting from asymmetric multimarket competition further strengthens this herding effect by enhancing the firm s expectations of market attractiveness in contrast aggressive past rivalry between the competitors resulting from symmetric multimarket contact dampens these expectations producing a competition effect that makes herding less probable we test our idea in two distinct contexts the chinese pharmaceutical industry and the taiwanese computer hardware industry and find consistent support in both settings we discuss how our analysis of what we call the structure of competition can be extended to research on other forms of firm behavior

the advantages of entry in the growth stage of the product life cycle an empirical analysis in this article the authors examine how the stage of product life cycle in which a brand enters affects its sales through brand growth and market response after controlling for the order of entry

strategic pricing and detailing behavior in international markets we study three determinants of the levels of price and detailing effort across geographic markets the within market response to each variable the nature of interfirm strategic interactions both within that market and across markets we empirically examine the interactions of prozac zoloft and paxil across the united states the united kingdom germany france and italy our results indicate that all three factors driving marketing mix interactions are at play in this product category the u s market is less price sensitive than the european markets detailing elasticities are comparable across the united states germany and italy while the united kingdom and france show greater elasticity for the u s market we find that almost all deviations from nash pricing and detailing levels are due to within market interactions in the u k market deviations from nash prices come about due mostly to across market interactions both with the united states as well as the rest of europe whereas deviations from nash detailing levels are mainly due to across market interactions with the united states for italy we observe that both within and across market interactions affect price and detailing levels overall the pattern of interactions makes observed prices more similar across countries than prices implied by the estimated elasticities this underscores the importance of considering within and across market interactions in developing multimarket strategy

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

defensive marketing strategies an equilibrium analysis based on decoupled response function models the entry of a new product attacker into a competitive market is likely to provoke responses from some or all of the existing products defenders this paper investigates the development of optimal defensive strategies based on an understanding of the possible reactions of all the defenders to an optimal attack following lane lane w j 1980 product differentiation in a market with endogenous sequential entry bell j econom 11 1 spring 237 260 we assume that n products each enter sequentially with perfect foresight on subsequent entry then based on new technology an unanticipated attacker enters the n defenders respond in price but not position according to lane s model once this equilibrium is obtained advertising and distribution response functions scale sales we show that under these decoupled response function models of advertising and distribution uniformly distributed tastes and nonincreasing market size the optimal defense for all existing brands is to decrease their respecti

beyond the home market effect market size and specialization in a multi country world the standard two country model of international trade with monopolistic competition predicts a more than proportional relationship between a country s share of world production of a good and its share of world demand for that same good a result known as the home market effect we first show that this prediction does not generally carry through to the multi country case as production patterns are crucially affected by third country effects we then derive an alternative prediction that holds whatever the number of countries considered this new prediction takes into account important features of the real world such as comparative advantage due to cross country technological differences and lack of factor price equalization c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

on interdependent supergames multimarket contact concavity and collusion abstract following bernheim and whinston 1990 this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms ability to collude real world imperfections tend to make firms objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent firms payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others then multimarket contact always facilitates collusion it may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any the effects of conglomeration are discussed multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents objective function is submodular in material payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13 l21

competitive positioning in markets with nonuniform preferences we investigate the nature of competitive equilibrium for brands competing in a multi attribute product space when consumer preferences for product attributes follow nonuniform distributions we establish subgame perfect equilibria in a two stage game where firms choose positions in the first stage and prices in the second stage two types of entry scenarios are investigated in the first the number of brands is given exogenously and all of them choose positions simultaneously in the second scenario firms enter in sequence and the early entrants can choose strategies to deter the entry of later entrants we find the equilibria for two three and four brands for consumer preferences that follow a beta distribution nonuniform distributions result in equilibrium configurations that are substantially different from those obtained for uniform consumer distributions in the two brands case for sufficiently concentrated distributions we find asymmetric position equilibria with one firm at the corner of the market and one firm at an interior position in the case of three brands for sufficiently concentrated preferences we find symmetric equilibria that do not yield maximal differentiation we also establish an equilibrium for the case of four competing brands in addition we characterize entry deterring positioning strategies and examine how they vary with the distribution of consumer preferences

multimarket contact economies of scope and firm performance we integrate the efficiency and competitive effects of product market scope choice into a comprehensive model of economic performance and empirically test the model in the context of the u s airli

where at home do exporters produce and export foreign growth can induce changes in production structures across domestic regions through international trade with a two country model with the explicit incorporation of two regions in the home country we show that effects of foreign growth on exports and production to be possibly asymmetric among home regions this foreign growth effect is especially prominent in asia with china emerging as the largest trading country we empirically test our theoretical hypothesis with the data set of japanese regions we find evidence that the growth of asian countries leads to a change in the regional structure of exports and production in japan with respect to an adjacent asian country the growth of a foreign country exerts opposite effects on production among japanese regions

new product diffusion with influentials and imitators we model the diffusion of innovations in markets with two segments influentials who are more in touch with new developments and who affect another segment of imitators whose own adoptions do not affect the influentials this two segment structure with asymmetric influence is consistent with several theories in sociology and diffusion research as well as many viral or network marketing strategies we have four main results 1 diffusion in a mixture of influentials and imitators can exhibit a dip or chasm between the early and later parts of the diffusion curve 2 the proportion of adoptions stemming from influentials need not decrease monotonically but may first decrease and then increase 3 erroneously specifying a mixed influence model to a mixture process where influentials act independently from each other can generate systematic changes in the parameter values reported in earlier research 4 empirical analysis of 33 different data series indicates that the two segment model fits better than the standard mixed influence the gamma shifted gompertz and the weibull gamma models especially in cases where a two segment structure is likely to exist also the two segment model fits about as well as the karmeshu goswami mixed influence model in which the coefficients of innovation and imitation vary across potential adopters in a continuous fashion

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

optimal pricing and advertising policies for new product oligopoly models in this paper our previous work on monopoly and oligopoly new product models is extended by the addition of pricing as well as advertising control variables these models contain bass s demand growth model and the vidale wolfe and ozga advertising models as well as the production learning curve model and an exponential demand function the problem of characterizing an optimal pricing and advertising policy over time is an important question in the field of marketing as well as in the areas of business policy and competitive economics these questions are particularly important during the introductory period of a new product when the effects of the learning curve phenomenon and market saturation are most pronounced we consider first the monopoly case with linear advertising cost exponential demand and three different pricing rules the optimal variable pricing the instantaneous marginal pricing and the optimal constant pricing rules several theoretical results are established for these rules including the facts that the instantaneous marginal pricing rule is a myopic version of the optimal pricing rule and the optimal constant pricing rule is a weighted average over time of the instantaneous marginal pricing rule another surprising result is that after the market is at least half saturated a pulse of advertising must be preceded by a significant drop in price numerical solutions of a number of examples are discussed oligopolistic models are analyzed as nonzero sum differential games in the rest of the paper the state and adjoint equations are easy to write down but impossible to solve in closed form hence we describe how to reformulate these models as discrete differential games and give a numerical algorithm for finding open loop nash solutions the latter was used to solve three triopoly models in each case it was found that optimal prices and advertising rates start high and steadily decline

price discrimination or uniform pricing which colludes more abstract conventional wisdom attributes different economic outcomes of uniform pricing and price discrimination to the heterogeneity in market conditions or market participants such as differences in demand elasticity or production costs we offer a new explanation for the observed differences that relates to behavioral aspects rather than demand or supply side effects in particular in a symmetric bertrand duopoly laboratory experiment for which theory predicts no differences between the two pricing regimes we find that tacit price collusion is systematically higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing

demand and supply dynamics for sequentially released products in international markets the case of motion pictures we develop an econometric model to study a setting in which a new product is launched first in its domestic market and only at a later stage in foreign markets and where the product s performance demand and availability supply are highly interdependent over time within and across markets integrating literature on international diffusion success breeds success trends and the theatrical motion picture industry the focus of the empirical analysis we develop a dynamic simultanenous equations model of the drivers and interrelationship of the behavior of consumers audiences and retailers exhibitors our findings emphasize the importance of considering the endogeneity and simultaneity of audience and exhibitor behavior and challenge conventional wisdom on the determinants of box office performance which is predominantly based on modeling frameworks that fail to account for the interdependence of performance and availability specifically we find that variables such as movie attributes and advertising expenditures which are usually assumed to influence audiences directly mostly influence revenuesindirectly namely through their impact on exhibitors screen allocations in addition consistent with the idea that the buzz for a movie is perishable we find that the longer is the time lag between releases the weaker is the relationship between domestic and foreign market performance an effect mostly driven by foreign exhibitors screen allocations

adjustment costs and the sequencing of trade liberalisation a common feature of trade agreements between countries is that the integration of markets proceeds in stages this paper examin es conceptually the role played by adjustment costs in determining the best way to structure an agreement between two countries when there are multiple sectors to be liberalised adjustment costs to liberalisatio n of industries might influence the timing of liberalisatio n with the analysis bearing similarity to why tariff reductions tend to be phased in over time when two industries have no spillover eff ects trade agreements with sequential liberalisation will be less costly to sustain however if the liberalisation of one in dustry influences permanently the flow of benefits from liberalising the other industry simultaneous liberalisation may be easier to sustain

perceptual position and competitive brand strategy in a two dimensional two brand market brand positioning and competitive reaction are important determinants of optimal brand strategy analyses of brand strategy have focused on optimal pricing and positioning issues using either empirical models of perceptions and preferences game theory to examine competition or both however the important issues of advertising and distribution strategy have not been fully addressed this paper analyzes competition and strategy between two brands that compete in a two dimensional market with advertising and distribution spending in addition to prices and product positions in particular for a unimodal taste distribution of ideal points we show how optimal competitive nash equilibrium marketing mix levels and profits depend on the positions of both brands brands can reposition to increase profit and under what conditions these strategies imply minimum versus maximum differentiation positioning equilibria and how the intensity of advertising and distribution competition affect equilibrium brand positions

collusion at the extensive margin abstract we augment the multi market collusion model of bernheim and whinston 1990 by allowing for firm entry into and exit from individual markets we show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other s markets or territories we characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart specifically it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable finally we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a proportional response enforcement mechanism

modelling the effects of promotion expenditures on sales of pharmaceuticals the successful innovation of pharmaceuticals requires a substantial amount of marketing support despite concerns about the effects of these marketing efforts this study considers prior findings that indicate that higher marketing expenditures for a brand reduce its price elasticity of demand which may lead to higher prices in the context of the dutch pharmaceutical market the authors find that parameters are heterogeneous across brands and that marketing effects differ across product life cycle stages they propose a separate analysis of established and new brands for established brands marketing efforts neither have a positive effect on sales nor do they affect the price elasticity for new brands several proposed models might capture their diffusion pattern the diffusion of innovation models provide the best results marketing accelerates the rate of diffusion and leads to a higher baseline level of sales

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines