hysteresis in international trade a general equilibrium analysis abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of hysteresis in international trade i e temporary exchange rate fluctuations can have persistent effects on trade flows besides supporting earlier partial equilibrium results the analysis bears out a conjecture by baldwin and krugman 1989 that a hysteretic shift in trade flows will cause a hysteretic shift in the equilibrium exchange rate a positive demand shock which leads to a temporary exchange rate appreciation is followed by a persistent depreciation another implication is that equity values in the country with a positive demand shock will ultimately fall below their pre shock level temporarily high profits reduce future profitability by attracting competitors who remain in the market after the shock has receded jel f10

individual transferable quota markets under illegal fishing the use of individual transferable quotas in fisheries has been considered an opportunity to achieve a given total allowable catch with a maximum social benefit one of the assumptions used in obtaining that result is that the system is in perfect compliance the presence of violations and the need for enforcement of tradable property rights systems in fisheries has not received much attention in the literature the incidents of non compliance however may affect the performance of transferable property rights based fisheries in unexplored ways in this paper we adapt previous literature on enforcing emissions trading programs to analyze a positive model of fisherman behavior that operates under a perfectly competitive individual transferable quota system while recognizing the opportunities for violations of quota holdings given incomplete enforcement considering a poorly enforced individual transferable quota system we are able to obtain a number of implications for the current and future equilibrium of the quota market the time paths of the fishery and the proper design of a policy rule on total allowable catch tac

real options approach to inter sectoral migration of u s farm labor the core of the literature on inter sectoral labor migration is based on net present value models of investment in which individuals are assumed to migrate to take advantage of positive wage differentials in this article we argue that a real options approach taken together with the adjustment costs associated with sectoral relocation may provide a basis for explaining the migration of farm labor out of the agricultural sector given the irreversibility of migration decisions and uncertainty in the economy potential migrants might choose to postpone migration even in the face of positive wage differentials using annual u s employment data from between 1948 and 2009 our results indicate that large elasticities between economic incentives and out farm migration are observed after a high threshold of wage differentials between farm and off farm sectors is surpassed

the effects of risk on self employment the effects of sectoral risk on the propensity to become self employed are analysed in contrast to previous studies which assume risk is concentrated only in the self employment sector a general equilibrium model is constructed in which uninsurable risk exists in both the paid and self employed sectors it is shown that when agents wish to mix self employment and employee participation the effects of sectoral risk on the optimal self employment decision is ambiguous this result disappears if agents choose instead to participate in one sector alone

leadership by example in the weak link game we investigate the effects of leadership in a four player weak link game a weak link game is a coordination game with multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria we wanted to see whether leadership by example in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group could help groups do better our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success specifically in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders we did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned

equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games abstract we experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary n player entry games with strategic complementarities in static entry games we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a related global game of incomplete information by contrast in dynamic n period entry games the efficient subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is for all to enter whenever the payoff relevant state variable exceeds a certain threshold the subgame perfect entry threshold of the dynamic game will generally differ from the global game threshold of the static version of the same game nevertheless our experimental findings suggest that entry thresholds are similar between static and dynamic versions of the same game an implication is that the modeling of entry games with strategic complementarities as static one shot games ignoring the dynamic element of such interactions may not be unreasonable

it s what you say not what you pay an experimental study of manager employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure we study manager employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak link game in the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure to overcome a history of coordination failure managers have two instruments at their disposal increasing employees financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps examining the content of managers communication the most effective messages specifically request a high effort point out the mutual benefits of high effort and imply that employees are being paid well

entrepreneurship and economic theory this article discusses economic theories of entrepreneurship drawing principally on work conducted in labour economics microeconomics macroeconomics and financial economics the article explains how incentives and constraints of various kinds affect occupational choices and entrepreneurial innovation as well as how entrepreneurial decisions affect macroeconomic performance implications for public policy are drawn

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

an endogenous timing conflict game abstract we present an endogenous timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity the model predicts multiple equilibria in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game baliga and sjostrom 2004 or a sequential game which improves social welfare we study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender balanced sessions our results suggest that i social welfare is higher in the endogenous timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game ii men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential move games and iii in the endogenous timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs this paper addresses the following question to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost effectively should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target the total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs monitoring costs and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms under common assumptions i show that allowing noncompliance is cost effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty however one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs this last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty in fact the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty and can actually be lower finally tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms abatement costs

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

foreign direct investment exchange rate variability and demand uncertainty variable real exchange rates influence the location of production facilities chosen by a multinational with risk averse investors and fixed productive factors parent companies should not be indifferent to production location even with identical expected costs of production across countries if a nonnegative correlation exists between export demand and exchange rate shocks the multinational optimally locates some productive capacity abroad the capacity share abroad increases as exchange rate volatility rises and becomes more correlated with export demand shocks these results are confirmed using quarterly u s bilateral foreign direct investment flows with canada japan and the united kingdom copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

information manipulation coordination and regime change this article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change there is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime s ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that taken at face value makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is this coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium s comparative statics holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens if the per unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow in contrast if the number of signals increases so that both total signal precision and the regime s costs of manipulation rise together then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control

habitual entrepreneurs in the making how labour market rigidity and employment affects entrepreneurial re entry we investigate the impact of country level labour market regulations on the re entry decision of experienced entrepreneurs whereby they become habitual entrepreneurs multilevel logit models on entry decisions among 15 709 individuals in 29 european countries show that labour market regulations have a positive influence on the decision to re enter into entrepreneurship this positive impact is stronger among individuals holding wage jobs at the time of re entry compared to those that do not our results indicate that novice and habitual entrepreneurs may respond very differently to labour market rigidity we discuss and provide tentative explanations for these differences and outline potential policy implications

business ownership and attitudes towards risk we explore the relationship between business ownership and attitudes towards financial risk using individual level data drawn from the us survey of consumer finances scf the scf includes a measure of individuals attitudes towards risk allowing us to explore the implications of interpersonal differences in risk attitudes for the probability and success of business ownership our empirical findings suggest that willingness to take financial risk is positively associated with both the incidence and success of business ownership we find that this relationship is particularly pronounced in cases where the individual actually started the business

a note on uncertainty and rent capture in an itq fishery abstract this note addresses the effect of uncertainty on the expected resource rent the short run quota equilibrium and the methods of rent capture in an individual transferable quota fishery with heterogeneous fishers it presents some new results on the effects of output price uncertainty on the quota demands the short run equilibrium and the possible choice of a method of rent capture

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

bank runs as coordination failures an experimental study we use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in coordination among a bank s depositors subjects in our experiment decide whether to leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early a bank run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals we explore the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand and of changing the number of opportunities subjects have to withdraw our results show that i bank runs are rare when fundamental withdrawal demand is known but occur frequently when it is stochastic and ii subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple opportunities to do so than when presented with a single decision for the multiple opportunity case we evaluate individual withdrawal decisions according to a set of simple cutoff rules we find that the cutoff rule corresponding to the payoff dominant equilibrium of the game which involves bayesian updating of probabilities explains subject behavior better than other rules

switching costs and sectoral adjustments in general equilibrium with uninsured risk abstract consider a two sector economy subject to recurring technological shocks these affect earnings in the two sectors differently creating incentives for workers to switch occupation switching costs are sunk individuals are risk averse and cannot diversify their income risk we characterize the rational expectations equilibrium of the economy and illustrate the extent to which uncertainty and switching costs increase labor immobility the resulting equilibrium is not even second best optimal even a government that cannot transfer income to achieve insurance can improve matters by speeding up the reallocation of labor across sectors because that reduces relative price variability journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d62 j62

measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games this paper proposes a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting certainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries we apply this method by conducting experiments on a class of one shot coordination games with strategic complementarities and choices between simple lotteries and sure payoff alternatives both framed in a similar way despite the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination games aggregate behaviour is fairly predictable the pure or mixed nash equilibria cannot describe subjects behaviour we present two global games with private information about monetary payoffs and about risk aversion while previous literature treats the parameters of a global game as given we estimate them and show that both models describe observed behaviour well the global game selection for vanishing noise of private signals offers a good recommendation for actual players given the observed distribution of actions we also deduce subjective beliefs and compare them with objective probabilities

terms of trade risk with partial labor mobility abstract we examine the welfare consequences of terms of trade risk in a small open economy in which it is costly for workers to move between sectors relocation costs lead to partial labor mobility sectoral wage gaps and income risk exceeding that of an economy in which relocation is costless using observed wage differentials and standard values for volatility and preferences we find that the welfare cost of partial labor mobility alone is unlikely to be very large even in the absence of self insurance arrangements in addition modest consumption substitution elasticities significantly reduce these welfare costs

who become serial and portfolio entrepreneurs serial entrepreneurs run multiple businesses in sequence while portfolio entrepreneurs run multiple businesses in parallel they differ from novice entrepreneurs who have so far operated only one venture the present paper is the first to model occupational choices between all three entrepreneurial types it goes on to discuss its theoretical predictions in the light of independent evidence about serial and portfolio entrepreneurship from the extant literature

should i stay or should i go bandwagons in the lab abstract we experimentally investigate the impact of strategic uncertainty and complementarity on leader and follower behavior using the model of farrell and saloner 1985 at the core of the model are endogenous timing irreversible actions and private valuations we find that strategic complementarity strongly determines follower behavior once a subject decides to abandon the status quo the probability that other players jump on the bandwagon increases sharply however there is a reluctance to lead when leading is a conditional best response we explain this deviation from the neo classical equilibrium by injecting some noise in the equilibrium concept we also find that cheap talk improves efficiency

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

real exchange rate dynamics the role of elastic labor supply abstract empirical evidence suggests that the flexibility of labor supply is closely related to the dynamic adjustment of the real exchange rate this paper investigates this relationship in a two sector dependent economy model while the long run equilibrium real exchange rate is independent of the elasticity of labor supply our analysis confirms that the nature of the labor supply can be a crucially important determinant of its short run dynamics the extent to which this is so depends to some degree on the source of the underlying structural change that is driving the dynamics of the real exchange rate numerical simulations confirm that this mechanism may help explain the larger short run volatility and more rapid convergence typically associated with developing countries having less flexible labor markets

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

normative and social influences affecting compliance with fisheries regulations economic models of regulatory compliance in fisheries usually assume an instrumental determination of individual behavior in which the decision to comply or to violate depends primarily on the expected monetary costs and benefits policy implications tend as a result to focus only on deterrence that is increasing the expected monetary costs of violation more complete models of compliance behavior take into account factors such a social influence moral values and the perceived legitimacy of regulations and the regulatory authority the paper describes an investigation into the non monetary factors affecting compliance with output quota restrictions among fishermen in the united kingdom

the tradable permits approach to protecting the commons lessons for climate change tradable permit approaches for rationing access to the commons have been applied to many different types of resources in many different countries this essay reviews the experience with three main applications of tradable permit systems air pollution control water supply and fisheries management as well as some unique related programmes the purpose of the review is to draw together what we have learned about tradable permits in practice that might offer some useful insights for the implementation of the three tradable permit mechanisms that are part of the kyoto protocol copyright 2003 oxford university press

saving to overcome borrowing constraints implications for small business entry and exit this paper shows how a dynamic analysis of entrepreneurial choice in which inter temporal savings plans can be adjusted to build up capital allows agents to overcome borrowing constraints this casts fresh doubt on the notion that borrowing constraints deter entrepreneurial entry in the long run impatient agents are shown to voluntarily remain constrained indefinitely whereas patient agents become entrepreneurs the model also explains temporary and permanent closures of viable businesses the model s predictions are consistent with evidence of greater savings behaviour by entrepreneurs

coordination failures and government policy a model with applications to east asia and eastern europe abstract poor countries must specialize in standardized labor intensive commodities middle income countries may have a richer menu of options if their labor force is reasonably well educated and skilled the multiplicity of equilibria is due to a coordination problem inherent in activities that require specialized inputs if no intermediate inputs are presently produced there may be little incentive for any single firm to do so on its own the economy may get stuck in a low wage low tech equilibrium an investment subsidy or a minimum wage policy can enhance welfare by moving the economy to a superior equilibrium

equilibrium with new investment opportunities abstract we develop a general equilibrium model where there are opportunities to abandon existing technologies and adopt new technologies we study how technologies change endogenously in an equilibrium and the effect of technological changes on the equilibrium we find that locally the equilibrium resembles that from cox et al 1985 econometrica 53 363 384 globally the equilibrium can be viewed as the equilibria from cir economies pasted together we also find that while the equilibrium consumption and security price processes are continuous the equilibrium return processes experience jumps at the time of technological changes

self reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution abstract existing environmental regulations frequently require firms to self report their compliance status to regulatory agencies using a principal agent framework i derive and compare incentive compatible regulatory policies with and without self reporting i find the firm needs to be audited less often when self reporting is required but punished more often the sign and magnitude of the gains from self reporting depend on the relative size of audit and sanction costs the accuracy of the regulator s monitoring technology and the desired level of abatement effort

slotting allowances as real options an alternative explanation this article offers an alternative explanation for slotting allowances using contingent claims analysis or real option pricing slotting allowances arise because retailers hold call options on their shelf space while suppliers must buy these options to introduce a new product a simulated model of new product introduction shows that stocking a new product contains a significant imbedded real option component we also show that advertising and promotional support can reduce the real option value

dictators and their viziers endogenizing the loyalty competence trade off the possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history more competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler to avoid this rulers especially those who are weakandvulnerable sacrificethecompetenceoftheiragents hiringmediocrebutloyalsubordinates furthermore any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator s own survival we endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings the dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face jel d72 h00 c72 c82

the effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information an experimental study abstract this paper investigates the role of endogenous timing of decisions on coordination under asymmetric information in the equilibrium of a global coordination game where players choose the timing of their decision a player who has sufficiently high beliefs about the state of the economy undertakes an investment without delay this decision potentially triggers an investment by the other player whose beliefs would have led to inaction otherwise endogenous timing has two distinct effects on coordination a learning effect early decisions reveal information and a complementarity effect early decisions eliminate strategic uncertainty for late movers the experiments that we conduct to test these theoretical results show that the learning effect of timing has more impact on the subjects behavior than the complementarity effect we also observe that subjects welfare improves significantly under endogenous timing

efficiency wages deferred payments and direct incentives in agriculture empirical evidence from agricultural labor markets is consistent with efficiency wage theory and inconsistent with several alternative explanations according to this theory the higher wage or deferred payment benefits that direct hire growers pay relative to that of farm labor contractors is an efficiency wage growers use this extra compensation to lower their monitoring expenses and reduce shirking by workers copyright 2002 oxford university press

hybrid entrepreneurship and public policy the case of firm entry deregulation hybrid entrepreneurs are entrepreneurs who are simultaneously working as paid employees although they constitute a systematic and large part of new firm creation their possibly distinct responsiveness to public policy is not yet studied arguing for the need to consider hybrid entrepreneurs in public policy we analyze the introduction of one stop shops for faster and simplified firm registration in mexico we find that hybrid entrepreneurs are more responsive to changes in entry regulation than full time entrepreneurs while both the best and least educated people respond to the reform the effect is most pronounced for highly educated hybrid entrepreneurs

excess worker reallocation workers face a trade off between macroeconomic and individual incentives to work in different occupations industries namely between search frictions and personal comparative advantages workers endowed with heterogeneous multi dimensional skills search for jobs that require different skill combinations in equilibrium specialized individuals contact few selected types of vacancies where they are likely to be hired those with weak comparative advantages are seldom chosen among competing applicants thus seek any job type in a tight labour market comparative advantages dominate waiting costs offsetting labour mobility across industries occupations excess worker reallocation is lower and matches are more successful consistently with direct and indirect evidence

risk balanced skills and entrepreneurship this paper proposes that risk aversion encourages individuals to invest in balanced skill profiles making them more likely to become entrepreneurs by not taking this possible linkage into account previous research has underestimated the impacts of both risk aversion and balanced skills on the likelihood individuals choose entrepreneurship data on dutch university graduates provide an illustration supporting our contention we raise the possibility that even risk averse people might be suited to entrepreneurship and it may also help explain why prior research has generated somewhat mixed evidence about the effects of risk aversion on selection into entrepreneurship

on the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium the quantal response equilibrium qre notion of mckelvey and palfrey 1995 has recently attracted considerable attention due largely to its widely documented ability to rationalize observed behavior in games played by experimental subjects we show that this ability to t the data as typically measured in this literature is uninformative without ap riori distributional assumptions a qre can match any distribution of behavior by each player in any normal form game we discuss approaches that might be taken to provide valid empirical evaluation of the qre and discuss its potential value as an approximating empirical structure

the cost effective choice of policy instruments to cap aggregate emissions with costly enforcement we study the cost effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits our analysis considers abatement monitoring and sanctioning costs as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters abatement costs under perfect information we find that a the total cost effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced and b the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system except under special conditions this is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not under imperfect information nevertheless it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty

using taxes to deter illegal fishing in itq systems we study the effects of different tax schemes used in fisheries management in combination with an individual transferable quota system we focus on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and on violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly the use of taxes is motivated by the regulator s need to recover costs for enforcement activities we propose the use of a tax on the price of the processed products based on its impact on violations and the information that is required to implement it we also show that this tax has a double pay off for enforcement because it reduces the demand for illegal fishing and increases revenue for enforcement activities without producing a deadweight loss in the quota market we present an application of our model to the case of the red shrimp fishery in chile in our simulation example a tax of 7 on the price of fish exports could sufficiently reduce harvest demand and generate enough funding to completely eliminate quota violations which in the absence of taxes can be more than 100 of the total allowable catch at the same time this tax could increase the equilibrium quota price by 19

information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment we model investment as an n player game with a pure informational externality each player s payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature however because a player s action reveals his private information players wait to see what other players will do equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed we characterize the unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players we establish the following results i when the period length is very short the game ends very quickly and there is a form of herding or informational cascade which results in a collapse of investment ii as the period length increases the possibility of herding disappears iii as the number of players increases the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players adding more players simply increases the number who delay iv in the limit the time profile of investment is extreme a period of low investment followed either by an investment surge or a collapse

non compliance and the quota price in an itq fishery this paper examines the effects of non compliance on quota demands and the equilibrium quota price in an itq fishery i show that whereas lower quota prices are implied unambiguously by expected penalties which are a function of the absolute violation size the expectation of penalties based upon relative violations of quota demands can under certain conditions produce higher quota prices than in a compliant quota market if there are both compliant and non compliant firms in the fishery the result would then be a shift in quota demand from compliant to non compliant firms rather than the reverse the findings are generally applicable to quota markets in other industries including pollution permit markets

dependent self employment as a way to evade employment protection legislation this paper examines whether the strictness of employment protection legislation encourages employers to contract out work to their own paid employees by the formula of dependent self employment while making transitions to independent self employment less likely by altering the relative valuation of risk between salaried work and self employment in favour of the former in conducting this analysis discrete choice models are applied to data drawn from the european community household panel from 1994 to 2001 to test the hypotheses a tentative individual measure of the potential severance payment that a worker would receive in the case of dismissal is included as well as aggregated variables that try to capture differences in labour market institutions and macroeconomic conditions evidence for a positive impact of the strictness of employment protection legislation and the potential severance payment on transitions to dependent self employment is found the opposite effects however are detected for individuals becoming independent self employed

to comply or not to comply pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning in this paper we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard a probability of inspection and a fine for non compliance in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly and the penalty may include gravity and non gravity components at the regulator s discretion under given penalties the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met non compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages interestingly the appropriate structure of the penalty under non compliance is highly progressive while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear if the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance

dynamic coordination with individual learning we study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment players gradually learn about project quality we identify conditions on temporal incentives under which in sufficiently long games players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not dominated roughly speaking this outcome occurs whenever players payoffs are sufficiently tolerant of non simultaneous coordination we also identify conditions under which players coordinate on the risk dominant action we provide foundations for these results in terms of higher order beliefs

sectoral shocks and movement costs effects on employment and welfare abstract in this paper we provide a general equilibrium model of a two sector economy which accounts for low employment due to the incomplete responses of workers to sectoral shocks this model is used to reconcile the seemingly contradictory results of macro and micro evidence namely that sectoral shocks explain fluctuations of employment even though we do not observe cyclical movements of labor across sectors we further find that increasing the frequency of sectoral shocks holding the magnitude of the shocks fixed decreases total employment this allows us to account for the phenomena that the unemployment rate itself has been higher since 1970 a period characterized by an increased frequency of sectoral shocks we also study the theoretical implications of two opposite policies one which subsidizes mobility and the other which eliminates the partial insurance provided in the model the former increases employment and welfare while the latter increases employment but reduces welfare

regional insurance and migration a dynamic model of migration is developed to study whether labor mobility can hedge people against region specific shocks making private or public insurance redundant the model adopts a novel timing for migration which is argued to be the time frame suitable for analyzing risk sharing issues it also innovates on the existing literature by solving individual migration through convexification of the set of actions the results show that the role of migration as an insurance mechanism is small labor mobility cannot fully remove income differentials between regions it is also shown that a fiscal stabilization scheme is in general optimal moreover any pure risk sharing mechanism has no influence on migration flows