quality disclosure under consumer loss aversion consumers experience a sense of loss when a product s quality does not match their expectations to alleviate consumer loss aversion cla firms can disclose information to reduce consumers uncer

are biofuels a feasible option abstract recently a number of objections have been raised against the use of ethanol produced from agricultural products such as maize sugarcane wheat or sugar beets as a replacement for gasoline despite some of their advantages such as being cleaner and to some extent renewable we address these objections in this paper topics discussed include the corn connection which was theorized to be a cause of deforestation in the amazonia the rise of food prices due to ethanol production and the real possibilities of ethanol in reducing greenhouse gas emissions it has been shown that such concerns are grossly exaggerated and that ethanol from sugarcane as produced in brazil is the preferred option for the production of fuel not only in terms of cost but also as a favourable energy balance finally the possibility of expanding ethanol production to other sugar producing countries is also discussed

competition under consumer loss aversion we address the effect of expectation based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase however some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution whereas others are perfectly informed all the time we show that if firms have symmetric costs a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome the reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large

optimal nonparametric estimation of first price auctions this paper proposes a general approach and a computationally convenient estimation procedure for the structural analysis of auctioni data considering first price sealed bid auction models within the independent private value paradigm we show that the underlying distribution of bidders private values is identified from observed bids and the number of actual bidders without any parametric assumptions using the theoiy of minimax we establish the best rate of uniform convergence at which the latent density of private values can be estimated nonparametrically from available data we then propose a two step kernel based estimator that converges at the optimal rate

is tiger woods loss averse persistent bias in the face of experience competition and high stakes although experimental studies have documented systematic decision errors many leading scholars believe that experience competition and large stakes will reliably extinguish biases we test for the presence of a fundamental bias loss aversion in a high stakes context professional golfers performance on the pga tour golf provides a natural setting to test for loss aversion because golfers are rewarded for the total number of strokes they take during a tournament yet each individual hole has a salient reference point par we analyze over 2 5 million putts using precise laser measurements and find evidence that even the best golfers including tiger woods show evidence of loss aversion jel d03 d81 l83

biofuels what a biopact between north and south could achieve abstract with very few exceptions such as the recent remarks by international energy agency iea head claude mandil commentators on the world s energy issues have yet to recognize the enormous contribution that biofuels producers from the south could make to solving the world s greenhouse gas emission problems and problems to do with the peaking of oil supplies once the equation between biofuels and high cost land intensive cultivation in the north is broken and a quite different scenario involving production in the south is adopted then the possibilities are dramatically changed the argument of this paper is that a transition to substitution of 20 percent of oecd gasoline needs by 2020 could be met from the south by creating the equivalent of 18 brazils over the course of the next decade such an enormous transition will not occur by itself or through the operation of market forces alone it needs an institutional framework one that guarantees for the countries of the north regular supplies of biofuels produced in a responsible manner and guarantees for the countries of the south open markets for the biofuels produced the oecd is in the best position to bring about such an arrangement through taking the initiative of offering developing countries a biopact between north and south thereby creating for the first time a global market for biofuels the launch of an international biofuels forum under the auspices of the un in early 2007 is a step towards the creation of such an international framework where north south issues on biofuels may be fruitfully addressed

reference dependent preferences and labor supply the case of new york city taxi drivers i develop a model of daily labor supply where preferences are dependent on a reference daily income level and i apply this model to data on the labor supply of new york city taxi drivers i find that there may be a reference level of income on a given day that affects labor supply however there is substantial day to day variation in a given driver s reference level and most shifts end before reaching the reference income level this pattern is inconsistent with an important role for reference dependent preferences

sequential negotiations with loss averse buyers abstract this paper analyzes sequential negotiations with exogenous breakdown risk between a risk neutral seller and a loss averse buyer who is privately informed about his valuation i show that compared to the risk neutral benchmark loss aversion on the buyer s side softens the rent efficiency trade off for the seller the reason is that the higher the buyer s valuation is the more he has to lose by rejecting the seller s offer thus in equilibrium the seller s profits and overall efficiency are both higher than in the risk neutral case moreover i also show that loss aversion has a redistributive effect by increasing the equilibrium payoff of some low valuation buyers and decreasing that of high valuation ones

the disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value psychologists have long argued that people are much more averse to a loss than attracted to an equivalent gain this behavior termed loss aversion has been formalized by kahneman and tversky 1979 in their reformulation of expected utility theory prospect theory in prospect theory the utility function is replaced by a value function that evaluates changes in income from the current level increases in income are weighted by a relatively small marginal utility decreases in income are weighted by a much larger marginal utility in effect the value function implies that a kink in the relationship between utility and income occurs at the initial income or reference point and that the slope of the utility function for losses in income is steeper than it is for gains in a recent paper knetsch and sinden 1984 report a series of experiments that demonstrate the existence of a large disparity between willingness to accept wta and willingness to pay wtp measures of value they argue that the psychological theory of loss aversion explains this difference economic theory would suggest that individuals who exhibit a large disparity between wta and wtp are perhaps underperceiving the value of gains or overperceiving the value of losses are behaving in an irrational manner and will consequently achieve a lower level of well being than if they behaved in a true utility maximizing manner this would in contrast to loss aversion usually imply near equal values for wta and wtp see willig 1976 further documentation of a larger than expected disparity between wta and wtp has been obtained in surveys asking for the value of a variety of public goods for example cummings brookshire and schulze 1986 document six

international macroeconomic policy coordination an overview this article which serves as an introduction to the oxford review of economic policy s issue on macroeconomic policy coordination global imbalances and global growth charts the evolution of international macroeconomic policy coordination from the end of the second world war until the present day the arrangements laid out at the bretton woods conference in 1944 provide an intellectual framework with which to assess the evolving need for and feasibility of international coordination across three historical periods the fixed but adjustable exchange rate arrangements of the bretton woods system the subsequent flexible exchanges period of the non system which led into the great moderation and finally the period since the global financial crisis of 2008 increased economic integration particularly through the capital account combined with asymmetries in exchange rate regimes between china and the us have shown that reliance on the automatic adjustment mechanisms of the non system are no longer feasible so that a return to policy cooperation is necessary in order to rebalance the world economy and reduce the adverse spill over impacts that uncoordinated rebalancing would entail the article explores the nature of this coordination and provides a context for other contributions to the issue analysing positive and normative aspects of macroeconomic policy coordination from a global perspective and from the prospective of key global players including china and the european union copyright 2013 oxford university press

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

incomplete contracting renegotiation and expectation based loss aversion abstract we consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation based loss averse buyer and a profit maximizing seller when writing a long term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiation in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post we show that if the buyer expects renegotiation to occur the seller can opportunistically exploit the buyer s attachment to the expected outcome of renegotiation in other words incomplete contracts create a new type of hold up problem if credible the buyer prefers to expect not to renegotiate which gives rise to ex post inefficiencies in a next step we allow the buyer to undertake a non contractible investment we find that loss aversion can mitigate the traditional hold up problem

a test of the theory of reference dependent preferences eight alternative methods of eliciting preferences between money and a consumption good are identified two of these are standard willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures these methods differ with respect to the reference point used and the dimension in which responses are expressed the loss aversion hypothesis of tversky and kahneman s theory of reference dependent preferences predicts systematic differences between the preferences elicited by these methods these predictions are tested by eliciting individuals preferences for two private consumption goods the experimental design is incentive compatible and controls for income and substitution effects the theory s predictions are broadly confirmed

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

a behavioral analysis of stochastic reference dependence we examine the reference dependent risk preferences of k oszegi and rabin 2007 focusing on their choice acclimating personal equilibria concept we relate their model to other existing generalizations of expected utility we demonstrate that linear gain loss choice acclimating personal equilibria is equivalent to the intersection of quadratic utility and pessimistic rank dependent utility however it has only a trivial intersection i e expected utility with other referencedependent preferences we use these relationships to extend our understanding of k oszegi and rabin s model linking their functional form to behavior demonstrating new applications and deriving new tests and looking for support in existing experimental data 98 words

competitive persuasive advertising under consumer loss aversion abstract i present a model to describe the effects of persuasive advertising targeted at consumers with expectation based reference dependent preferences persuasive advertising is competitive and increases the salience of advertised products while decreasing the salience of competing products consumers gain loss utility associated with the expectation to buy the most salient product is inflated while gain loss utility associated with the expectation to buy the least salient product is deflated i show that under moderate levels of loss aversion and product differentiation persuasive advertising has strictly anti competitive effects whenever consumers are aware of prices but uncertain about their individual match value from a purchase

learning to play second price auctions an experimental study abstract existing experimental results in second price auctions show that subjects bid consistently above their valuations experience gained repeating a second price auction does not improve subject s bidding behavior when subjects introspect bidding behavior improves overbidding and underbidding fall significantly

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

expectations as endowments evidence on reference dependent preferences from exchange and valuation experiments while evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to reference points little is known about what determines them we conduct two experiments that show that reference points are determined at least in part by expectations in an exchange experiment we endow subjects with an item and randomize the probability they will be allowed to trade subjects that are less likely to be able to trade are more likely to choose to keep their item in a valuation experiment we randomly assign subjects a high or low probability of obtaining an item and elicit their willingness to accept for it the high probability treatment increases valuation of the item by 20 30 copyright 2011 oxford university press

is the endowment effect an expectations effect a hallmark result within behavioral economics is that individuals choices are affected by current endowments a recent theory due to k szegi and rabin 2006 quarterly journal of economics 121 1133 1165 explains such endowment effect with a model of expectations based reference dependent preferences departing from past work we conduct complementary experiments to disentangle expectations verified probabilistic beliefs held by subjects from other features of endowment such as assignment to a good hence allowing us to compare the effect of expectations with that of other variations while mere assignment can affect choices we do not find a large role in the effect for k szegi rabin expectations

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

is advertising a signal of product quality evidence from the compact disc player market 1983 1992 abstract we study panel data on advertising and pricing in the compact disc player market during 1983 1992 controlling for product features firm heterogeneity and aggregate effects i advertising increases after the player is introduced but at a decreasing rate and ii price falls from the outset and at an accelerating pace these patterns are inconsistent with both the perfect learning in papers by kihlstrom and riordan j polit econ 92 1984 427 and milgrom and roberts j polit econ 94 1986 796 and the imperfect learning in horstmann and macdonald j econ manag strat 3 1994 561 versions of paper by nelson j polit econ 82 1974 729 model of advertising extensions having persistent consumer uncertainty and learning can explain these profiles

how biofuel policies backfire misguided goals inefficient mechanisms and political ecological blind spots abstract the development of an economically viable biofuel industry rests on strong state subsidies for production and processing creation of markets through government procurement fuel blending mandates price controls as well as foreign trade tariffs and quotas and multiple interventions in agricultural ecological and other regulations we use an approach grounded in agrarian political economy to critically analyze the literature on how biofuel policies interact with broader production trade and agro ecological processes we focus on policies involving the most prominent crops in the places where biofuel production has advanced the most i e usa brazil and the eu but also extend analysis to their relations with broader transformations in production commercial and even governance practices around the world we investigate the political and economic interests driving biofuel policies and how these set the terms in which state interventions and policies are conceived and implemented we find that these are not developed and implemented according to environmental or inclusive pro poor development purposes but according to state interests in energy security and its intersection with a tense alliance between corporate sectors rendering many policy mechanisms ineffective or even outright counterproductive to effectively facilitate more socially and environmentally sustainable energy production and agricultural practices

reference dependent subjective expected utility abstract a reference dependent generalisation of subjective expected utility theory is presented in this theory preferences between acts depend both on final outcomes and on reference points which may be uncertain acts it is characterised by a set of axioms in a savage style framework a restricted form of the theory separates attitudes to end states encoded in a satisfaction function from attitudes to gains and losses of satisfaction given weak additional assumptions the restricted theory excludes cycles of choice explains observed disparities between willingness to pay and willingness to accept valuations of lotteries and predicts preference reversal

empirical generalizations from reference price research considerable theoretical justification for consumers use of psychological reference points exists from the research literature from a managerial perspective one of the most important applications of this concept is reference price an internal standard against which observed prices are compared in this paper we propose three empirical generalizations that are well supported in the marketing literature first there is ample evidence that consumers use reference prices in making brand choices second the empirical results on reference pricing also support the generalization that consumers rely on past prices as part of the reference price formation process third consistent with other research on loss aversion consumers have been found to be more sensitive to losses i e observed prices higher than reference prices than gains we also propose topics for further research on reference prices

the g 20 framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth glass half empty or half full the g 20 framework for strong sustainable and balanced growth was launched by the g 20 leaders in 2009 to strengthen coordination of national economic policies as the world emerged from the 2008 9 financial crisis building on earlier attempts at international economic policy coordination the framework has made significant advances in the detailed institutional procedures for policy coordination including information sharing analytical tasking and the development of structured policy discussions to address medium term issues some politically difficult challenges have been overcome using varied techniques including enabling the system of collaboration to evolve incrementally over time however further progress is needed if the framework is to deliver on the remit set by leaders copyright 2013 oxford university press

final and b molasses for fuel ethanol production and some market implications some concern about biofuels has been expressed because the growing demand for biofuels could cause among other potential impacts farming lands to be used for producing biofuel instead of food thus raising food prices such concern is also present when considering the relationship between sugar and fuel ethanol production the sugar market is characterized by a low growth rate of demand volatile prices widespread interventions and recently an increasing surplus production in parallel an emerging world market for fuel ethanol has expanded by 12 annually due to policy support some countries have mandated ethanol gasoline blends while others are looking for ways to introduce them or expand the existing market the aim of this work is to assess the potential in the short term for fuel ethanol production by using intermediate molasses in countries that industrialize sugarcane the following main sugarcane producing countries were taken as example colombia guatemala mexico australia india and thailand the result of this research shows that those countries could together produce an amount equal to approximately 16 5 of the fuel ethanol produced worldwide in 2015 in addition four countries could replace more than 10 of their national gasoline consumption with ethanol produced from a molasses this work however suggest producing fuel ethanol by using final molasses and 20 of b molasses that option would cause a 3 average reduction in sugar production but this decline is nonetheless equivalent to the average growth rate of the global sugar surplus in the last three years moreover the suggested scheme showed a favorable opportunity cost in comparison with the exclusive production of sugar the proposed type of ethanol production could support the development of national ethanol markets in the short term while more sustainable options e g ethanol from residual lignocellulosic materials are not available

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

duopolistic competition with choice overloaded consumers a large body of experimental work has suggested the existence of a choice overload effect in consumer decision making faced with large menus of choice options decision makers often defer or avoid choice a suggested reason for the occurrence of this effect is that the agents attempt to avoid the cognitive effort that is associated with choosing from larger menus building on this explanation we propose and analyse a model of duopolistic competition where firms compete in menu design in the presence of a consumer population with heterogeneous preferences and overload menu size thresholds the firms strategic trade off is between offering a large menu in order to match the preferences of as many consumers as possible and offering a small menu in order to avoid losing choice overloaded consumers to their rival assuming uniformly distributed preferences we focus on symmetric pure strategy equilibria under various assumptions on the overload distribution and product markups we also propose and analyse a measure of consumer welfare that applies to this environment among other things we provide conditions for maximum and minimum variety equilibria to be possible whereby both firms either offer the entire set of available products or the same one product respectively

econometrics of first price auctions in this paper we propose an estimation method for the empirical study of theoretical auction models we focus on first price sealed bid and descending auctions and we adopt the private value paradigm where each bidder is assumed to have a different private value only known to him for the object that is auctioned following mcfadden 1989 and pakes and pollard 1989 our proposed method is based on simulations specifically the method relies on a simulated nonlinear least squares objective function appropriately adjusted so as to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest we illustrate the proposed method by studying a market of agricultural products where descending auctions are used our analysis takes into account heterogeneity of the auctioned objects and the fact that only the winning bid is observed we estimate the parameters that characterize the distribution of the unobserved private values for each auctioned object

incentive design under loss aversion compensation schemes often reward success b ut do not penalize failure fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature yet the standard principal agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance this paper shows that under loss aversion there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is e ndogenous a further benefit of capping losses for example through options is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes jel f3 f4

how not to pay for advice a framework for consumer financial protection abstract this paper investigates the determinants of the compensation structure for brokers who advise customers regarding the suitability of financial products our model explains why brokers are commonly compensated indirectly through contingent commissions paid by product providers even though this compensation structure could lead to biased advice when customers are wary of the adviser s incentives contingent commissions can be an effective incentive tool to induce the adviser to learn which specialized product is most suitable for the specific needs of customers if instead customers naively believe they receive unbiased advice high product prices and correspondingly high commissions become a tool of exploitation policy intervention that mandates disclosure of commissions can protect naive consumers and increase welfare however prohibiting or capping commissions could have the unintended consequence of stifling the adviser s incentive to acquire information more vigorous competition benefits consumers and reduces exploitation but firms have limited incentives to educate naive customers

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

new york city cab drivers labor supply revisited reference dependent preferences with rational expectations targets for hours and income this paper reconsiders whether cabdrivers labor supply decisions reflect reference dependent preferences following botond koszegi and matthew rabin 2006 we construct a model with targets for hours as well as income both determined by rational expectations estimating using henry s farber s 2005 2008 data we show that the reference dependent model can reconcile his 2005 finding that drivers stopping probabilities are significantly related to hours but not income with the negative wage elasticity of hours found by colin camerer et al 1997 and farber 2005 2008 the model yields sensible estimates that avoid farber s 2008 criticism that drivers income targets are too unstable to allow a useful reference dependent model of labor supply

testing for regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty much of the experimental evidence concerning violations of von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory has been collected fr om experiments designed with conventional theory in mind and does not provide direct tests of alternative models such as regret theory and disappointment theory this paper reports and discusses recent evidence produced by an exp erimentspe cifically designed to test for the impacts of regret and disappointment and to indicate their relative importance copyright 1987 by royal economic society

a new meta analysis on the wtp wta disparity abstract this study reports a new meta analysis of papers that elicit willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept compensation wta measures of value for the same good we investigate the effects of type of good and several survey design features on the wtp wta disparity measured as the logarithm of the ratio of mean wta to mean wtp confirming horowitz and mcconnell s 2002 pioneering meta analysis we find the disparity is smaller for ordinary private goods than for public and non market goods that it is not solely an artifact of using hypothetical transactions or other weak experimental or survey methods and that it is smaller for studies using student subjects in addition we find that the disparity is smaller when subjects have experience valuing the good in real markets or through repeated experimental trials in contrast to horowitz and mcconnell we find the disparity is significantly smaller in studies using incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms the disparity is smaller in more recent studies an effect that is attributable only in part to changes in study characteristics

consumer loss aversion product experimentation and tacit collusion abstract two firms compete to attract loss averse consumers that are uncertain about how well the goods on sale fit their needs to resolve valuation uncertainty firms can allow prospective customers to test experiment their products before purchase we investigate firms dynamic incentives to allow experimentation and analyze the resulting effects on the profitability and the stability of tacit collusion depending on the regulatory regime in place i e whether experimentation is forbidden mandated or simply allowed but not imposed laissez faire the degree of loss aversion has ambiguous effects both on the profits that firms can achieve through tacit collusion and on the stability of these agreements while in static environments consumer welfare is always maximized by a policy that forbids experimentation the opposite happens in a dynamic environment

sugar rush prospects for a global ethanol market in 2005 the major economies of the world including the g8 and 5 developing nations mexico india brazil china and south africa along with the united nations the international energy agency and the european union launched the global bioenergy partnership to discuss ways to promote the sustained use and production of biofuels around the globe reflecting growing concerns for finding economically viable substitutes for petroleum this paper examines whether and if a vibrant global market in biofuels based on sugarcane based ethanol is economically feasible the paper finds that while there is already international trading in biofuels it is highly limited compared with its potential in the current climate of accelerating fossil fuel prices biofuels represent an increasingly attractive displacement for some of our fossil fuel addiction not only do they substitute for petrol but they also produce lower emissions the paper finds that sugarcane ethanol could make an important contribution to substituting for a portion of petroleum and also offer potential benefits for international development

paying for prominence we investigate three ways in which firms can become prominent and thereby influence the order in which consumers consider options first firms can affect an intermediary s sales efforts by means of commission payments when firms pay commission to a salesman the salesman promotes the product with the highest commission and steers ignorant consumers towards the more expensive product second sellers can advertise prices on a price comparison website so that consumers investigate the suitability of products in order of increasing price in such a market equilibrium prices are lower when search costs are higher since a firm s benefit from being investigated first increases with search costs finally consumers might first consider their existing supplier when they purchase a new product which suggests a relatively benign rationale for the prevalence of cross selling in markets such as retail banking

uncertain demand consumer loss aversion and flat rate tariffs we consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand possibly consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence we solve for the profit maximizing two part tariff which is a flat rate if a marginal costs are not too high b loss aversion is intense and c there are strong variations in demand moreover we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff this tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two part tariffs

inattentive consumers and product quality this paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone without attention to potential differences in product quality a firm may offer a low quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model firms choose prices with mixed strategies similarly to varian 1980 in which some consumers purchase from a random seller without attention to market prices in our model though firms also choose quality stochastically and there is both price and quality dispersion two stylized policy interventions are considered competition policy which acts to increase the number of sellers and market transparency reforms which act to increase the fraction of attentive consumers with fewer inattentive consumers firms are less likely to cheat i e cut quality which therefore improves welfare but profit and consumer surplus can either increase or decrease when there is a large number of sellers approximately half the sellers cheat regardless of the fraction of inattentive consumers and introducing more sellers boosts consumers surplus and reduces profit while the impact on welfare is ambiguous

viewpoint on the generalizability of lab behaviour to the field abstract we can think of no question more fundamental to experimental economics than understanding whether and under what circumstances laboratory results generalize to naturally occurring environments in this paper we extend levitt and list 2006 to the class of games in which financial payoffs and doing the right thing are not necessarily in conflict we argue that behaviour is crucially linked to not only the preferences of people but also the properties of the situation by doing so we are able to provide a road map of the psychological and economic properties of people and situations that might interfere with generalizability of laboratory result from a broad class of games

binary payment schemes moral hazard and loss aversion we modify the principal agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation based loss averse according to k o szegi and rabin 2006 2007 the optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract the logic is that due to the stochastic reference point increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent s expected utility without providing strong additional incentives moreover for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold

on the theory of reference dependent preferences a theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points it is related to tversky and kahneman s reference dependent preference theory but is simpler and deviates less from conventional consumer theory preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy conventional assumptions apart from a continuity condition the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice the theory is consistent with observations of status quo bias and related effects reference points are treated as subject to change during the course of trade the implications of endogeneity of reference points for behaviour in markets are investigated

consumer information and firm pricing negative externalities from improved information we analyze the effect of consumer information on firm pricing in a model where consumers search for prices and matches with products we consider two types of consumers uninformed consumers do not know in advance their match values with firms whereas informed consumers do prices are lower the greater the proportion of uninformed consumers hence uninformed consumers exert a positive externality on the others in contrast to standard results this leads to socially excessive investment in gathering prior information when aggregate demand is price sensitive

intertemporal incentives under loss aversion this paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model with reference dependent preferences as in k oszegi and rabin 2009 besides consumption utility the agent experiences utility from the change in his beliefs about present and future eort and income when eort plans are rational the prospect of being disappointed by the outcome realization equals that of being pleasantly surprised and hence the loss averse agent is on net hurt by news in contrast to the prediction with classical preferences but consistent with real world contracts if consumption utility is not too concave and news about present income carries suciently larger weight in utility than news about future income a contract setting a current

is tomorrow another day the labor supply of new york city cabdrivers the labor supply of taxi drivers is consistent with the existence of intertemporal substitution my analysis of the stopping behavior of new york city cabdrivers shows that daily income effects are small and that the decision to stop work at a particular point on a given day is primarily related to cumulative daily hours to that point this is in contrast to the analysis of camerer et al who find that the daily wage elasticity of labor supply of new york city cabdrivers is substantially negative implying large daily income effects this difference in findings is due to important differences in empirical methods and to problems with the conception and measurement of the daily wage rate used by camerer et al

de targeting advertising an assortment of products to loss averse consumers we consider product markets in which consumers are interested only in a specific product category and initially do not know which product category matches their tastes using sophisticated tracking technologies an intermediary can make inferences about a consumer s preferred product category and offer advertising firms the possibility to target their ads to match the consumer s taste such targeting reduces overall advertising costs and as a direct effect increases industry profits however as we show in this paper when consumers form reference prices and are loss averse more precise targeting may intensify competition between firms as a result firms may earn higher profits from de targeted advertising i e when the intermediary deliberately informs about some products and their price quotes from outside a consumer s preferred product category

deal or no deal decision making under risk in a large payoff game show we examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular tv game show deal or no deal and related classroom experiments contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes our results point to reference dependent choice theories such as prospect theory and suggest that path dependence is relevant even when the choice problems are simple and well defined and when large real monetary amounts are at stake

the impact of targeting technology on advertising markets and media competition an important component of advertising effectiveness is the quality of the match between advertisers and the intended recipients of ads traditionally media have been able to tighten such matches by providing content tailored for specific groups of consumers for example local media outlets attract audiences from their localities ensuring that when local advertis ers place ads they are mostly viewed by their potential customer base recently online adver tising has afforded new technologies that tar get consumers directly rather than indirectly through tailored content a leading example of such targeting is based on geographic loca tion as inferred from ip addresses so while the boston globe may have had an advantage in selling ads to boston advertisers now the new york times can offer boston based ads to consumers located in boston industry specula tion is that such technologies may spur higher demand for online advertising but that these technologies will benefit general outlets more than local newspapers 1 it may be problematic for the future of the local news industry if gen eral outlets gain at their expense to date there has been little analysis on how the market for advertising might be impacted by targeting 2 intuition suggests that an outlet

expectation based loss aversion and strategic interaction abstract by extending the equilibrium concepts of k szegi and rabin 2006 k szegi and rabin 2007 this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of expectation based loss averse players for loss averse players with choice acclimating expectations the utility from playing a mixed strategy is not linear but convex in the probabilities they assign to their pure strategies as a consequence they are generally unwilling to randomize and an equilibrium may fail to exist for players with choice unacclimating expectations by contrast randomizing over their pure strategies may indeed constitute a credible best response and an equilibrium always exists building upon these insights we delineate how expectation based loss averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected utility preferences derive novel strategic effects discuss equilibrium selection and derive equilibrium play for some simple games

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

european union leadership in biofuels regulation europe as a normative power the rapid emergence of the european union eu as a leader in global environmental politics has led many scholars to argue in favour of the eu being a normative power in international relations this paper critically examines the eu s biofuels policy and evaluates whether its attempts to lead by example and shape international practice in this field could support such arguments europe s biofuel policies are evaluated through a sustainable development lens so as to determine the extent to which it has embraced a holistic approach to sustainability while not dismissing that the identity of the eu is indeed an explanatory factor and that normative intentions may well be regarded as a motivating force this study argues that an interest based perspective on international environmental regulation offers a supplementary view of how an actor s preferences for an international regime are shaped by erecting barriers aimed at shielding its own inefficient domestic biofuels production the eu is in essence placing trade competitiveness and economic growth above environmental protection thus permitting sustainability concerns to be addressed only in part

monetary and fiscal policy in the great moderation and the great recession in this paper we argue for a new approach to monetary and fiscal policy during the great moderation the inflation targeting regime worked well central banks used the interest rate to stabilize inflation and subject to inflation being controlled stabilized the level of demand fiscal policy exerted discipline over the public sector deficits thereby indirectly managing the level of public debt such fiscal housekeeping worked well because the monetary authorities were stabilizing the economy but once private sector deleveraging led to the great recession and interest rates hit their zero bound the outcome could no longer be managed by monetary policy recovery depended on the automatic stabilizers output and tax revenues have fallen public debt has been created and assets have been created which a deleveraging private sector wishes to hold but the effect has been very gradual recovery would have been faster if fiscal policy had been responsible for the restoration of full employment in an environment which tolerated the necessary rises in public debt conversely policies of austerity designed to reduce public debt have slowed the recovery growth will not be resumed until the private sector begins to invest strongly again creating the financial assets which the private sector wishes to hold thereby enabling public debt to be retired this has not yet happened because the private sector correctly does not believe that macroeconomic policy is capable of sustaining a strong recovery

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

portfolio choice in personal equilibrium abstract this paper finds that in portfolio choice where reference point arises endogenously in personal equilibria investors behave as if they had a concave probability weighting function this finding establishes a link between the reference dependent utility and the rank dependent utility theories

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

reference points and effort provision a key open question for theories of reference dependent preferences is what determines the reference point one candidate is expectations what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs in a real effort experiment we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision we find that effort provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models of expectation based reference dependent preferences if expectations are high subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low

contracting with diversely naive agents in standard contract theoretic models the underlying assumption is that agent types differ in their preference or cost parameters and the principal s objective is to design contracts in order to screen this type we study a contract theoretic model in which the heterogeneity among agent types is of a cognitive nature in our model the agent has dynamically inconsistent preferences agent types differ only in their degree of sophistication that is their ability to forecast the change in their future tastes we fully characterize the menu of contracts which the principal offers in order to screen the agent s sophistication the menu does not exclude any type it provides a perfect commitment device for relatively sophisticated types and exploitative contracts which involve speculation with relatively naive types more naive types are more heavily exploited and generate a greater profit for the principal our results allow us to interpret real life contractual arrangements in a variety of industries