reaction or interaction spatial process identification in multi tiered government structures abstract this paper models horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities in a multi tiered structure of government and implements maximum likelihood and instrumental variables estimation techniques to identify the source of spatial dependence in english local government expenditures the results show that when vertical fiscal externalities among upper tier county authority and lower tier district authority expenditures are explicitly taken into account the estimated magnitude of inter district fiscal interactions is substantially reduced the observed positive spatial autocorrelation among district expenditures can consequently be attributed to a large extent to common reaction to county fiscal policies rather than to actual strategic interaction

a theory of socio economic disparities in health over the life cycle motivated by the observation that medical care explains only a relatively small part of the ses health gradient we present a life cycle model that incorporates several additional behaviours that potentially explain jointly a large part of observed disparities as a result the model provides not only a conceptual framework for the ses health gradient but more generally an improved framework for the production of health we derive novel predictions from the theory by performing comparative dynamic analyses more generally our comparative dynamic method can be applied to models of similar form e g human capital health deficits firm investment to name a few

tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization abstract this paper explores the impact of intensified tax competition within federal systems characterized by the presence of both horizontal tax externalities between the states and vertical tax externalities between states and federal government it shows that although these push tax rates in opposite directions horizontal towards state taxes that are too low vertical towards state taxes that are too high leaving the net outcome unclear intensified tax competition always worsens their combined effect that is intensified lower level tax competition in the form of an increase in the number of lower level jurisdictions is sure to reduce welfare but this is not because as usually supposed it makes excessively low state taxes even lower rather it is welfare reducing either for that reason or because it makes excessively high state taxes even higher

efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

foreign direct investment and the dark side of decentralization countries differ in their government architecture some countries are characterized by a high degree of concentration of fiscal administrative judicial executive and lawmaking powers whereas others have decentralized many functions and responsibilities of government to different jurisdictions and various levels of government the cross country differences in the organization of government are also not static but have been subject to substantial change in many countries the co existence of different organizational patterns of government has created an important debate regarding the determinants of particular government structures as well as questions regarding the optimality of different forms of organization

reassessment of the tiebout model abstract the tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism its emphasis on mobility benefit taxation and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of musgrave and oates this paper reviews the influence that the tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government it is far from compelling as a positive description of or a normative prescription for fiscal federalism at the state level some aspects of alternative approaches are presented which lead to different perspectives than tiebout inspired ones

decentralization and intra country transfers in the great recession the case of the european union empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government viewing the great recession or recessions in general as a shock it is found that a

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

income redistribution in a common labor market when households are mobile among jurisdictions income redistribution by individual jurisdictions creates fiscal externalities a model of interjurisdictional migration is used to study the nature of this redistributive externality analysis of optimal redistribution and optimal corrective subsidies from higher level governments shows that benefit levels for the recipients of income transfers and tax rates on mobile taxpayers should be equalized across jurisdictions a system of jurisdictions with a common labor market can achieve welfare improvements through coordination of domestic redistributive policy or through the intervention of a higher level government copyright 1991 by american economic association

state government cash and in kind benefits intergovernmental fiscal transfers and cross program substitution abstract us states provide both cash and health insurance benefits for the poor partially financed by fiscal transfers from the federal government the 1996 welfare reform drastically reduces federal support for cash transfers at the margin lowering the relative price to states of providing benefits to the poor through medicaid this paper analyzes the comparative statics response of state governments to such changes in intergovernmental transfers showing in central cases that they can contribute not only to reductions in state expenditures on cash benefits but to increases in expenditures on medicaid whether or not beneficiary populations are mobile among states

tax competition and revelation of preferences for public expenditure this paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants tastes for public goods and which finance local public expenditure through a source based tax on capital income the taste for public goods is the private information of local governments the central government seeks an optimal policy in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates the uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption it is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction c 1998 academic press

an empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction the case of business income taxes in canada both federal and provincial governments in canada levy corporate taxes on busi nesses in their jurisdictions which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax exter nalities within the federation using a simple model of interdependent tax choices we estimate tax setting functions for the federal government ontario quebec and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces we find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax inter actions provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces

from theory to practice canadian economists contributions to public finance we survey canadian economists contributions to the field of public finance from the mid 1980s to 2016 we highlight the development and extension of the models and tools of public economics and the empirical studies that have deepened our understanding of the efficiency and distributional issues over a wide range of public finance issues we also highlight contributions to the development of policies through commissioned reports and the important role that canadian institutions the canadian tax foundation the think tanks and the federal and provincial departments of finance have played in shaping tax and fiscal policies de la theorie a la pratique contributions des economistes canadiens a la finance publique on examine les contributions des economistes canadiens au domaine de la finance publique du milieu des annees 1980 a 2016 on souligne le developpement et l extension des modeles et des outils d economie publique et les etudes empiriques qui ont aide a approfondir notre comprehension des enjeux d efficacite et de distribution dans un vaste eventail de questions de finance publique on souligne aussi les contributions des rapports commandites au developpement de politiques publiques ainsi que le role important d institutions canadiennes l association canadienne d etudes fiscales les groupes d experts ainsi que les ministeres des finances du gouvernement federal et des gouvernements provinciaux dans le design des politiques fiscales

relative efficiencies and comparative advantages in job search a model of employed and unemployed job search is estimated from a panel of new entrants into the labor force as well as prime age workers after investigating the relative efficiency of the two mai

vertical externalities in cigarette taxation do tax revenues go up in smoke abstract in federal systems where tax bases are joint property the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other this paper examines the interdependence of us federal and state cigarette tax rates our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate thus a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines and indirectly the state tax rate declines

estimating a market equilibrium search model from panel data on individuals from albrecht and axell 1984 and is based on workers who are homogeneous in terms of market productivity and heterogeneous in terms of nonmarket productivity and on firms which are heterogeneous in terms of productive efficiency the equilibrium model is contrasted in terms of its fit to the data with an unrestricted version of the model which is based on a mixture of negative binomial distributions the equilibrium model fails to conform to the data in exactly the dimension of its major focus namely it implies that measurement error accounts for almost all of the dispersion in observed wages the equilibrium model also does not do well in fitting the unemployment duration distribution compared to the unrestricted model the problem is that the duration distribution itself does not support the existence of significant heterogeneity as evidenced by the estimates of the unrestricted model the paper also illustrates the use of such models for policy analysis by simulating the welfare effects of a minimum wage

incentive equivalence with fixed migration costs abstract if migration between communities is costless and if policy makers in each community anticipate the migration response to policy changes then the interests of the two communities are perfectly aligned decentralization is efficient this incentive equivalence is well known however the first order approach used in virtually all the literature may obscure the fact that no convexity assumptions need be made about technology or tastes this fact underscores the relevance of incentive equivalence even when there are scale economies in the public sector here the consequences of positive migration costs for this incentive equivalence are considered in contrast with much of the literature migration costs are assumed the same for everyone this formulation differs from the more common attachment to home assumption of heterogeneous migration costs conditional on the direction of migration interests of different communities are still perfectly aligned but natives of different communities may prefer different directions of migration weakening incentive equivalence if local policy makers have the power to induce large changes in migration flows however incentive equivalence fails only if economies of scale in population are important so that communities may be under populated

interregional redistribution and mobility in federations a positive approach the paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice we find that paradoxical consequences of inter jurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile while self sufficient regions are nec essarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes thus interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality at the same time however transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region the voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence empirical evidence from panel data from oecd countries and candian provinces is consistent with the theory

inequality in socio emotional skills a cross cohort comparison abstract we examine changes in inequality in socio emotional skills very early in life in two british cohorts born 30 years apart we construct comparable scales using two validated instruments for the measurement of child behaviour and identify two dimensions of socio emotional skills internalising and externalising using recent methodological advances in factor analysis we establish comparability in the inequality of these early skills across cohorts but not in their average level we document for the first time that inequality in socio emotional skills has increased across cohorts especially for boys and at the bottom of the distribution we also formally decompose the sources of the increase in inequality and find that compositional changes explain half of the rise in inequality in externalising skills on the other hand the increase in inequality in internalising skills seems entirely driven by changes in returns to background characteristics lastly we document that socio emotional skills measured at an earlier age than in most of the existing literature are significant predictors of health and health behaviours our results show the importance of formally testing comparability of measurements to study skills differences across groups and in general point to the role of inequalities in the early years for the accumulation of health and human capital across the life course

where should the elderly live and who should pay for their care we consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons elderly care is publicly provided there is one big city where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work and a number of small villages we show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees and we characterize the second best solution decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages

migration and income redistribution responsibilities this study examines whether afdc benefits determine or discourage state to state migration flows in the united states a pooled cross section time series model is developed to estimate afdc benefits in a state and recipients and whether benefits in one state affect benefits in other states a second model using data from the 1980 census and the panel study of income dynamics estimates migration of afdc recipients and the level of benefits in in migration and out migration states both models indicate that small but statistically significant amounts of migration occur which may be quite important but only in the long run movers although small in number are much more likely to move to a state with higher benefits states perceive this migration as important indicating that states should have less control and the federal government more control over income redistribution

tax competition and income redistribution an empirical analysis for switzerland tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because first it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile andsecond such a policy if undertaken in onejurisdiction will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies in this paper the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with swiss subfederal data therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theswiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution

do employers use unemployment as a sorting criterion when hiring evidence from a field experiment the stigma associated with long term unemployment spells could create large inefficiencies in labor markets while the existing literature points toward large stigma effects it has proven difficult to estimate causal relationships using data from a field experiment we find that long term unemployment spells in the past do not matter for employers hiring decisions suggesting that subsequent work experience eliminates this negative signal nor do employers treat contemporary short term unemployment spells differently suggesting that they understand that worker firm matching takes time however employers attach a negative value to contemporary unemployment spells lasting at least nine months providing evidence of stigma effects

a spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses evidence from canada using a model of interdependent tax choices and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers this paper estimates making use of a spatial econometric framework corporate income tax setting functions for all canadian provincial governments the results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements general federal transfers and the federal corporate income tax a robustness check on the fiscal relationship between ontario and quebec verifies the existence of significant bi directional fiscal interdependencies the paper also introduces u s state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with canadian provinces a l aide d un modele de choix fiscaux interdependants et en tenant compte des paiements de perequation et des transferts generaux ce texte calibre a l aide d un cadre econometrique spatial les fonctions de definition de fiscalite des revenus de societes de tous les gouvernements provinciaux canadiens les resultats montrent qu il y a un effet d interaction positif significatif entre un sous ensemble de provinces et entre les provinces dans leur ensemble et le gouvernement federal les impots sur le revenu des societes des provinces sont co relies negativement avec les paiements de perequation les transferts generaux et l impot federal sur le revenu des societes des tests de robustesse montrent qu il y a relation d interdependance fiscale bidirectionnelle significative entre le quebec et l ontario le memoire introduit les impots sur le revenu des societes aux etats unis comme co variables et examine leur interaction avec ce qui se passe dans les provinces canadiennes

a volatility based theory of fiscal union desirability abstract heterogeneous countries may rationally choose to form a currency union first and a fiscal union later we find and illustrate empirically for the emu countries reasonable volatility conditions under which this sequencing in the deepening process is indeed rationalizable changes in the distribution of expected income shocks require a reassignment of political weights to restore unanimous support for an added fiscal dimension the bargaining space depends on countries relative income size and cross correlation of shocks

bouncing back from health shocks locus of control and labor supply abstract many studies have demonstrated a causal effect of ill health on labor supply in this study i explore the personality related heterogeneity measured by differences in control beliefs in the labor supply response to health shocks to identify such behavioral differences i follow the labor supply trajectories of 649 initially full time employed and healthy men who experience at some point in time an episode of ill health when compared with men who have positive control beliefs men with negative control beliefs are on average 100 more likely to drop out of the labor force a drop out unrelated to early retirement and work on average 12 less hours per week the year after the health shock these behavioral differences remain robust to alternative estimation samples and health shock definitions they are strongest for men from low socioeconomic backgrounds who do not have access to private health insurance or who experience high intensity shocks heterogeneous labor supply responses are also observed for conscientiousness and risk tolerance traits that have been linked with willingness to invest and treatment compliance an important conclusion from the findings is that a small set of non cognitive skills produces long term labor market benefits in the advent of adversity

redistribution within and across the regions of a federation the authors reconsider the literature on redistribution within a federation with mobile agents they conclude that redistribution is a function best assigned to the national government local governments with diverse preferences for redistribution distort individual migration decisions the authors also examine the fiscal externality literature which has made an efficiency argument for interregional transfers they show that if local governments have the same preferences for redistribution the nash equilibrium is efficient if preferences are diverse the authors show that nationally imposed interregional transfers do not address the source of the inefficiency nevertheless interregional transfers are shown to be a part of decentralized behavior

optimality free mobility and the regional authority in a federation abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of a federation characterized by strategically competing regions and freely mobile homogeneous individuals analyses of this economy have concluded that achieving a pareto optimal will require intervention by a national authority this paper makes one basic point the nash equilibrium of regional authority behavior is pareto optimal the implication is that there is no role for a national authority in either providing interregional transfers or correcting for decentralized provision of public goods the nash equilibrium involves samuelson public goods provision and regions purchasing preferred population distributions with optimal interregional transfers

interjurisdictional capital mobility fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy abstract recent studies emphasize that local property taxation may result in inefficiently small amounts of local public spending this paper shows that the inefficiency can be traced to a fiscal externality when one jurisdiction increases its taxes it causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions that increases their tax revenues the inefficiency can be corrected with a subsidy that internalizes the externality key empirical parameters determining the magnitude of the externality are identified illustrative calculations indicate that subsidy rates on the order of 40 might be required to achieve efficiency

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

the consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with imperfectly mobile households states implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good a vertical fiscal externality reflecting the effect of state policies on federal revenues provides an incentive for state taxes to be too progressive a horizontal fiscal externality causes nonoptimal state taxes and expenditures because of the migration effect the federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states the federal government can nullify both externalities by appropriate fiscal policies and redistributive taxation can be decentralized to the states c 1998 elsevier science s a

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

assistance to the poor in a federal system abstract this paper explores the roles of different levels of government in assisting the poor using a model incorporating utility interdependence the paper first presents some theoretical results indicating how levels of poor relief vary with the extent of mobility of the poor under both centralized and decentralized systems of support it then provides a survey of the empirical work on migration of the poor along with a brief historical discussion of the experience under the english poor laws the concluding section turns to normative issues and contends that mobility of the poor is a basic source of inefficiency in wholly decentralized systems of support this inefficiency along with certain other equity considerations establishes a role for the central government in assistance to the poor

economic integration and fiscal devolution abstract in this paper we investigate how economic integration influences the political decision of integration and separation of jurisdictions in a model with imperfect capital mobility we consider that not only the redistributive policy itself but also the level of policy centralization is decided by a majority vote we find that the net benefit from integration is not monotonic with the level of world capital market integration and present a case where integration of two regions occurs only for intermediate levels of mobility this conclusion relies on the comparison of the regional majorities utility under the various regimes the benefits from integration arise from the elimination of tax competition across jurisdictions which allows for more income redistribution whereas the costs are linked to the diversity of preferences across regions namely that of the decisive voters we also show that a federal regime is better than complete centralization in keeping a nation united

income redistribution in a federal system the question of the appropriate level of government to undertake income redistribution is receiving renewed attention from economists the standard argument about the issue might be summarized as follows 1 interstate migration of taxpayers and transfer recipients raises the cost to voters of income redistribution at the state level above the cost at the federal level 2 statewide redistribution confers spillover benefits to residents of other states 3 therefore as compared with a national system decentralized responsibility for income redistribution yields both less redistribution and less than the socially optimal amount of income redistribution the purpose of this paper is only to question step 1 of the above argument of course readers who accept the assumptions of the standard argument may conclude that the possible weakening of step 1 of that argument reduces the likelihood that its conclusion holds the paper argues that the cost of redistribution faced by state residents may in fact be lower at the state level than at the national level because their federal tax obligations fall as the state redistributes more income thus part of the cost of redistribution at the state level can be exported to residents of other states the state s federal tax bill falls when taxable incomes in the state are reduced by increased redistribution deductibility of state taxes enhances this result but is not necessary for it to demonstrate the proposition without adding unnecessary complication a simple model of income redistribution is described in which governments at all levels use linear tax transfer schedules to redistribute income the single government case is considered first then two levels of government are introduced and finally migration is allowed it is shown that without migration state costs are never greater than national costs of redistribution as long as redistribution reduces total money income when migration is allowed the result depends on the elasticity of migration responses compared with the elasticity of labor supply responses

a model of welfare competition with evidence from afdc in this paper we test empirically for strategic behavior among the states using the cash support program aid to families with dependent children afdc to motivate the empirical work we adapt wildasin s model of income redistribution 1991 american economic review 81 757 773 to a model of interjurisdictional welfare competition although welfare competition may be generated from different frameworks we choose wildasin s model to illustrate how welfare benefit interdependence is genereated in the context of welfare migration we estimate a representative reaction function for afdc using both cross sections and pooled cross section data after controlling for other determinants of afdc benefit levels and for spatial error autocorrelation we find evidence showing competition 2000 academic press

decentralized income redistribution and immigration abstract we analyze the welfare and other effects of immigration on a system of jurisdictions with a common labor market mobile capital and redistributive tax transfer policies comparative statics analysis of a model of nash non cooperative equilibria in tax transfer policies shows that the welfare effect of immigration depends on whether immigrants are net fiscal contributors or burdens any one jurisdiction s redistribution and immigration policies generate fiscal externalities for others in the system which a central government can internalize by appropriate taxes and subsidies

why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration the role of the modern welfare state abstract according to traditional trade theory heckscher ohlin free trade and free migration are equivalent measures of economic integration leading both to an equalization of factor prices this prediction is in sharp opposition to the observed preference of rich countries for free trade over free migration we provide an explanation for this inconsistency the redistribution policies in the countries social welfare in countries with a relatively small number of low skilled native workers is higher with free trade than with free migration due to redistribution of income towards immigrating workers

new estimates of quality of life in urban areas implicit markets capture compensation for intraurban and interregional differe nces in amenities and yield differences in housing prices and wages these pecuniary differences become preference based weights in a qual ity of life index hedonic equations are estimated using microdata fr om the 1980 census and assembled county based amenity data on climati c environmental and urban conditions ranking of 253 urban counties reveals substantial variation within as well as among the 185 urba n areas the quality of life differences across counties within one s msa is almost one half of the difference between the top and bottom ranked counties in the nation copyright 1988 by american economic association

noncognitive abilities and financial distress evidence from a representative household panel this paper provides evidence of how noncognitive abilities affect financial distress in a representative panel of households we find that people in the bottom quintile of noncognitive abilities are 10 times more likely to experience financial distress than those in the top quintile we provide evidence that this relation largely arises from worse financial choices and lack of financial insight by low ability individuals and reflects differential exposure to income shocks only to a lesser degree we mitigate endogeneity concerns using an iv approach and an extensive set of controls implications for policy and finance research are discussed received september 24 2017 editorial decision september 26 2018 by editor stijn van nieuwerburgh authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

a positive model of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states abstract this paper develops a positive theory of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states the analysis provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium federal and states tax rates as functions of the level of total productivity dispersion between the states the federal rate is increasing in the level of total productivity dispersion between the states even if the income of the decisive voter at the federal level is above the mean income given that the individuals income is endogenously determined there exists a negative trade off between the implemented federal tax rate and the resulting states tax rates regardless of the pre tax income of the decisive voter at the state level thus high levels of productivity dispersion between the states cause a higher than optimal federal tax rate together with low states tax rates it is also shown that a system of overlapping income taxation is not efficient the resulting inefficiency might be exacerbated by the implementation of a federal matching grants program contradicting previous results in the related normative literature

locus of control and technology adoption in developing country agriculture evidence from ethiopia abstract we investigate the implication of farmers locus of control on their technology adoption decisions our empirical analysis is based on two longitudinal surveys and hypothetical choice exercises conducted on ethiopian farmers we find that locus of control significantly predicts farmers technology adoption decisions including use of chemical fertilizers improved seeds and irrigation we show that individuals with an internal locus of control have higher propensity of adopting agricultural technologies we observe these empirical regularities in both datasets and for both revealed measures of farmers technology adoption decisions as well as farmers hypothetical demand for agricultural technology the results hold even in a more conservative fixed effects estimation approach assuming locus of control as time variant and dynamic behavioral trait these findings provide behavioral and psychological explanations for the low rates of adoption of profitable agricultural technologies in sub saharan africa our results highlight that improving farmers non cognitive skills locus of control may facilitate technology adoption and agricultural transformation more generally the results suggest that anti poverty policies that only focus on relaxing short term external constraints including physical access to markets and technologies may not sufficiently alleviate agricultural underinvestment

vertical versus horizontal tax externalities an empirical test abstract we study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base one can observe two types of externalities a horizontal externality working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum and a vertical externality working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates building on the model of keen and kotsogiannis keen michael j kotsogiannis christos 2002 does federalism lead to excessively high taxes american economic review 92 1 363 370 we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables this test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of swiss municipalities that feature direct democratic fiscal decision making so as to maximize the correspondence with the benevolent governments of the theory we find that vertical externalities dominate they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition

vertical fiscal externalities in a federation abstract we examine vertical fiscal externalities in a model where a state government provides a productivity enhancing public input and both the state and the central government tax wages and profits previous literature has emphasized the negative tax externality that occurs when two levels of government impose distortionary taxes on the same tax base we show that an increase in the state government s tax rate on wage income can increase federal revenues if the federal government imposes an ad valorem tax on employees wages and the demand for labour is inelastic we also show that an increase in the provision of the public input can either increase or reduce federal tax revenues leading to either under or over provision of the public input by the state government

multi tier targeting of social assistance the role of intergovernmental transfers albania provides a small amount of social assistance to nearly 20 percent of its population through a system that allows some community discretion in determining distribution this study investigates how well this social assistance program is targeted to the poor relative to other safety net programs in low income countries social assistance in albania is fairly well targeted nevertheless the system is hampered by the absence of a clear objective criterion to determine the size of the grants from the central government to communes as well as limited information that could be used to implement this criterion substantial gains in targeting could be achieved if the central government better allocated transfers to local governments even holding local targeting at base levels

social accounting and the public sector this article contributes to the theory of social accounting as such it tries to extend earlier literature on the welfare equivalence of the comprehensive net national product in two main directions both of which refer to the public sector one is by considering welfare measurement problems associated with public good provision and redistributive policy respectively when the public revenues are raised by distortionary taxes the other is by addressing the consequences of a federation like decision structure where independent tax and expenditure decisions are made both by the central government and by lower level governments

a search model applied to the transition from education to work this paper presents the specification and estimation of a search model applied to the transition from education to work the theoretical search model includes the possibility of variable search intensity the empirical model with a reservation wage relation is estimated using maximum likelihood methods a data set containing information on new law graduates is used for the estimation finally the model is estimated for two separate subperiods to investigate the effects of market changes

economic and social security in the twenty first century with attention to europe a partly heuristic attempt at exploring long run policies aimed at a second best compromise between ex ante risk sharing efficiency and ex post productive efficiency wage subsidies for low skilled workers financed by taxes on high wages are advocated together with improved risk sharing between capital and labour between generations and between the countries belonging to emu the scope of the advocated policies is limited by considerations of moral hazard time consistency and fiscal competition also estimates of some key economic parameters remain very imprecise several avenues of further research are identified

vertical tax competition in brazil empirical evidence for icms and ipi in the period 1995 2009 abstract the main objective of this study is to quantify the impact caused by changes in federal tax on the tax policy of the brazilian states considering the presence of horizontal tax competition between states using panel data covering 26 brazilian states plus the federal district during the period 1995 2009 two models were estimated representing the average reaction of the states in response to changes in federal tax rates in the first model both levels of government act simultaneously whereas in the second model reaction is sequential with the federal government acting as the leader in defining its effective tax rates the results indicate a positive and significant response of states to increases in the federal tax rate resulting in an over taxation of the common tax base and higher tax rates additional tests show that the first model is the most suitable to represent the problem analysed

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

distributive implications of european integration one of the main pitfalls of european construction is undoubtedly the alleged charge that it impedes redistributive policy at the national level this charge is indeed widespread in political circles and in the medias yet it had received little attention among economists up to recently over the last few years an increasing amount of research has been devoted to that accusation or to be more neutral to that conjecture the purpose of our paper is to survey this literature we first present the conventional wisdom according to which mobility makes redistribution difficult if not impossible we also discuss the most important qualifications to this result and the solutions that are generally advocated and that imply some sort of cooperation in a second part we consider a different issue that of redistribution across countries it assumes the existence of some supranational government which is not trivial in addition informational differences between the national and the supranational governments are shown to play a crucial role

can decentralization be beneficial abstract a conventional justification for government hierarchy in the fiscal federalism literature is based upon asymmetry in policy tools or in information access that is available to different levels of government this paper demonstrates that even if these asymmetries are eliminated addition of local regional governments to a one tier central government can be strictly welfare improving

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

excess worker reallocation workers face a trade off between macroeconomic and individual incentives to work in different occupations industries namely between search frictions and personal comparative advantages workers endowed with heterogeneous multi dimensional skills search for jobs that require different skill combinations in equilibrium specialized individuals contact few selected types of vacancies where they are likely to be hired those with weak comparative advantages are seldom chosen among competing applicants thus seek any job type in a tight labour market comparative advantages dominate waiting costs offsetting labour mobility across industries occupations excess worker reallocation is lower and matches are more successful consistently with direct and indirect evidence

competition between employed and unemployed job applicants swedish evidence we use the swedish applicant database to investigate empirically whether being unemployed per se reduces the probability of getting contacted by a firm all searchers looking for a new job are invited to submit their personal details to this database over the internet since we have access to exactly the same information as the firms we can minimize the problems associated with unobserved heterogeneity our results show that an unemployed applicant faces a lower contact probability than an otherwise identical employed applicant thus supporting the notion that firms view employment status as a signal of productivity

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

the impact of fiscal decentralization on the composition of public expenditure panel data evidence from italy grisorio m j and prota f the impact of fiscal decentralization on the composition of public expenditure panel data evidence from italy regional studies this paper is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public expenditure composition it studies the effects of the ongoing decentralization process in italy on the share of different categories of public spending in total expenditure of the italian regional administrations over the period 1996 2008 the data used allow one to go beyond the usual distinction between current and capital expenditures and to present a functional classification of public expenditures through a panel data analysis the paper shows that the level of decentralization influences the composition of expenditure

as ye sweep so shall ye reap the inability of formal skills such as schooling and on the job training to account for most of the valiation in adult labor market success has spurred investigations of other factors cognitive ability as measured by iq type tests such as the armed forces qualifying test has received the bulk of this attention the consensus from research by economists and sociologists is that cognitive ability plays a significant although far from overwhelming role as a determinant of adult success e g christopher jencks 1979 john cawley et al 1997 cognitive skills do not appear to account for more than about one fifth of the association between completed schooling and earnings samuel bowles et al 2000 similar magnitudes emerge in studies examining the strength of parents cognitive ability as a predictor of the intergenerational success of their children meredith phillips et al 1998 the search for key noncognitive factors important in predicting both intraand intergenerational success has been wide ranging jencks 1979 demonstrates that net of background formal schooling and cognitive skills personal traits such as industriousness perseverance and leadership have noteworthy associations with subsequent earnings and occupational status measures of social psychological constructs such as locus of control julian rotter 1966 and self esteem morris rosenberg 1965 have been shown to be predictive of subsequent labor market success in some cases e g rachel dunifon and duncan 1998 arthur goldsmith et al 2000 our focus in this paper is on the role of a different kind of personal characteristic organization and efficiency as operationalized in our data set by the housework hours adjusted score from five annual interviewer assessments of the cleanliness of a respondent s dwelling at the time of the interview we argue that keeping a clean and organized home reflects an overall ability and desire to maintain a sense of order in a wide range of life activities people whose homes appear clean both value order and demonstrate the ability to impose a degree of order at home it is likely that people who are able to maintain such homes carry over the ability and desire to be organized to other aspects of their lives such as work and parenting the ability to maintain a degree of organization may be a skill that would command a reward in the labor market additionally children raised in more organized households may be more successful in school and work the results presented here indicate that net of socioeconomic status background cognitive ability completed schooling housework time and a host of other factors the cleanliness rating of one s home is predictive of i one s own earnings 25 years later ii children s subsequent completed schooling and iii children s earnings measured 25 years later these results suggest the utility of continuing the search for noncognitive factors in intraand intergenerational models of schooling and labor market success

optimal taxation global externalities and labor mobility this paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model we assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the dirty good that is causing damage to the environment the purpose is to compare the globally optimal second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium we show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of i transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments ii interaction effects between environmental and other policies and iii labor mobility

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership this paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers the paper s main result is that ex post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities insulating tax policy from capital mobility federal policy however introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition specifically ex post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare deteriorating relative to tax competition

two economists musings on the stability of locus of control empirical studies of the role of non cognitive skills in driving economic behavior often rely heavily on the assumption that these skills are stable over the relevant time frame we analyze the change in a specific non cognitive skill i e locus of control in order to directly assess the validity of this assumption we find that short and medium run changes in locus of control are rather modest on average are concentrated among the young or very old do not appear to be related to the demographic labor market and health events that individuals experience and are unlikely to be economically meaningful still there is no evidence that locus of control is truly time invariant implying that the use of lagged measures results in an errors in variables problem that could downward bias the estimated wage return to locus of control by as much as 50 percent those researchers wishing to analyze the economic consequences of non cognitive skills should consider i restricting their analysis to the working age population for whom there is little evidence of systematic change in skill levels and ii accounting for error in the skill measures they employ

income redistribution in a federal system of governments abstract though the traditional literature in fiscal federalism argues that the federal government should have primary responsibility for income redistribution u s states are in fact actively engaged in redistribution this paper develops a positive model of the respective roles of state and federal governments that can rationalize this observation redistribution by states creates positive horizontal fiscal externalities to other states due to migration but negative vertical fiscal externalities to the national government due to changes in reported taxable income we forecast that states will engage in at least some redistribution though to a lesser degree the greater are mobility relative to taxable income elasticities the federal government can then choose the degree of federal redistribution to assure that the net externalities are zero given such policies we then estimate the welfare weights and migration elasticities for different income groups that would generate the effective net tax schedules observed in the u s the parameter estimates are broadly plausible suggesting that the model can help explain the division of responsibilities for redistribution between state and federal governments

tax incentives in fiscal federalism an integrated perspective models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy this paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility vertical revenue sharing and fiscal equalization being common features of existing federations encourage local taxation but may discourage federal taxation furthermore the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending we also show that when considering leviathan governments fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government the result is contrary to the cartelization hypothesis brennan and buchanan 1980 finally we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties jel classification h7 hl h20

does a federal country need federal transfers when it has labour mobility sequeira t n and lopes a f does a federal country need federal transfers when it has labour mobility regional studies this work empirically tests optimum currency area theory for members of a given monetary union the united states the united states is recognized as a country where labour mobility between states is high this paper jointly assesses the consequences of having federal transfers and labour mobility in terms of the states cyclical output it is concluded that federal transfers undoubtedly contribute to increase cyclical output however out migration may increase or decrease cyclical output depending on certain conditions as federal transfers proved to be much more important than migration the answer to the question in the paper s title is yes sequeira t n et lopes a f un pays federal a t il besoin des transferts federaux quand il est deja dote de la mobilite du travail regional studies cet article cherche a tester empiriquement la theorie des zones monetaires optimale

personality traits technology adoption and technical efficiency evidence from smallholder rice farms in ghana although a large literature highlights the impact of personality traits on key labor market outcomes evidence of their impact on agricultural production decisions remains limited data from 1 200 ghanaian rice farmers suggest that noncognitive skills polychronicity work centrality and optimism significantly affect simple adoption decisions returns from adoption and technical efficiency in rice production and that the size of the estimated impacts exceeds that of traditional human capital measures greater focus on personality traits relative to cognitive skills may help accelerate innovation diffusion in the short term and help farmers to respond flexibly to new opportunities and risks in the longer term

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

incentive enhancing preferences personality behavior and earnings suppose there is a principal agent relationship between employer and employee in which effort is not contractible but is elicited through employer incentive mechanisms we term preferences that allow the employer to elicit effort at lower cost incentive enhancing we analyze how such preferences affect earnings nd then provide evidence that one of the relevant behavioral traits efficacy as well as other psychological aspects of individuals are significant influences on earnings we conclude that measures of cognitive performance are not sufficient indicators of the effectiveness of schools in promoting student labor market success incentive enhancing preferences are irreducibly heterogeneous incentive enhancing preferences help explain the persistence of poverty over generations within families and unlike cognitive skills incentive enhancing traits need not be welfare increasing for their bearers

the scope for taxation and public expenditure in an open economy in this survey of some central issues of tax and expenditure policy in an open economy we consider the implications for policy of free although not necessarily perfect international mobility of commodities capital and labour we examine the issues both from a positive and a normative point of view trying to identify both the incidence and welfare effects of international mobility one general conclusion is that tax distortions may increase in magnitude in comparison with a closed economy but they may also increase in kind as when otherwise neutral taxes become distortionary because of factor mobility

time preference noncognitive skills and well being across the life course do noncognitive skills encourage healthy behavior a number of prominent diseases are influenced by health behaviors for example it is well known that the decision to smoke comes with considerable risks of developing smoking related ailments such as lung cancer emphysema and heart disease obesity is another health condition that can be costly it is associated with increased risk for diseases such as coronary heart disease and diabetes centers for disease control 2009 nationally it is estimated that about one third of the u s population is obese and estimates suggest that obesity costs society anywhere from 27 to 47 billion in health care expenditures annually centers for disease control 2009 national center for health statistics 2008 research suggests that changing individuals diets and getting them to exercise would help to reduce the prevalence of obesity in society melayne mcinnes and judith shinogle 2009 smoking and obesity provide just two examples of cases in which the nation s burden of disease is influence by behaviors that its citizens engage in because the united states spends a large share of gdp on health care each year understanding the determinants of health behaviors is important as it may allow scholars to identify ways to reduce these costs this paper examines the relationship between individuals health behaviors and the non cognitive skills that individuals possess in the past decade the economics discipline has seen a burst of interest in human capabilities that contribute to labor market productivity beyond the usual foci of attention levels of education and learning by doing the collection of personality traits soft skills incentive enhancing preferences and socio emotional factors that economists are now studying has been loosely grouped together under the heading non cognitive skills 1 while the term may be something of a misnomer because many of the worker attributes that the authors writing in this subfield are interested in require reasoning or cognition the skills of interest have been found to be important determinants of labor market success james heckman jora stixrud and sergio urzua 2006 samuel bowles herbert gintis and melissa osborne 2001 2james heckman 2007 has stated that these socio emotional attributes as non cognitive skills are sometimes called are also likely to affect health behaviors this paper tests this hypothesis it provides a theoretical and an empirical analysis of the connection between socio emotional attributes and the choices that individuals make about health it uses data from a large nationally representative dataset to analyze the relationships

vertical tax competition and consumption externalities in a federation with lobbying abstract we consider a federation with two layers of government in which leviathan policy makers levy an excise tax on a consumption good that generates a negative externality and that is produced in an imperfectly competitive market when both layers of government are allowed to tax policy choices are affected also by vertical tax competition in this setting tax policy in general is not efficient we then examine how special interest groups may influence tax policy by lobbying the policy makers we find that depending on market structure and on the level of the externality lobbying can improve efficiency and that tax base sharing by two layers of government can be more efficient than taxation by a single layer

job matching and occupational choice this paper presents a model of job matching the generalizes the existing literature by allowing for different jobs types or occupations such differences affect the value of job specific experience inducing a career profile where certain types are sampled before others more specifically the analysis shows that it is optimal for the young and inexperienced to gravitate toward jobs exhibiting a certain kind of risk then after deriving the equilibrium job turnover rate for an economy in which people do not switch occupations panel data are used to estimate its underlying parameters the hypothesis that people do not switch occupations is rejected against the alternative that they do thus providing empirical support for the theoretical extension undertaken here

nonlinear income taxation and matching grants in a federation with decentralized in kind transfers we extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation local governments have a cost advantage motivating decentralization of the in kind transfer the cost structure varies across regions and the central government cannot observe which region is which we show that decentralized in kind transfers can in this setting be an even more important instrument for relaxing self selection constraints thus helping redistribution than in single government models we characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants the grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies

gerontocracy revisited unilateral transfer to the young may benefit the middle aged according to conventional wisdom intergenerational transfers can survive in the absence of altruism only if the old are net recipients i prove that this need not hold in an overlapping generations model with a fixed factor for example the middle aged owning land may gain by providing public education even when they cannot tax the young and when the young face no credit market constraints this requires that labor is not mobile furthermore establishing public education may benefit only the generation which pays for education twice first for itself and then for the next generation