activist monetary policy imperfect capital mobility and the overshooting hypothesis abstract the hypothesis of exchange rate overshooting is investigated in the context of a model that incorporates activist monetary policy variable output imperfect capital mobility and slow price adjustment monetary policy which accommodates prices and or interest rates is shown to increase the probability of undershooting using constrained maximum likelihood methods the model is estimated for germany and japan since the advent of generalized floating in 1973 based on the estimated parameter values the mark exhibits overshooting while the yen is characterized by undershooting the constraints implied by the model cannot be rejected at standard significance levels for either country

the choice between market failures and corruption because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another it creates room for corruption as corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention governments will try to prevent it they may create rents for bureaucrats induce a misallocation of resources and increase the size of the bureaucracy since preventing all corruption is excessively costly second best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes when corruption is harder to prevent there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public sector wages also the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income

e government internet adoption and corruption an empirical investigation abstract this study empirically investigates the impact of e government and internet adoption on curbing corruption by utilizing a large panel dataset the results reveal that e government is a powerful tool in reducing corruption via telecommunication infrastructure and the scope and quality of online services which is strengthened by greater internet adoption the interaction effects between e government and internet adoption suggest both as complements in anti corruption programs a dynamic panel data model that addresses the endogeneity problem and considers corruption persistency is employed results of panel granger causality tests indicate a unidirectional causality from e government to corruption while a bilateral causality between internet adoption and corruption

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

racial discrimination in the labor market theory and empirics we review theories of race discrimination in the labor market taste based models can generate wage and unemployment duration differentials when combined with either random or directed search even when strong prejudice is not widespread but no existing model explains the unemployment rate differential models of statistical discrimination based on differential observability of productivity across races can explain the pattern and magnitudes of wage differentials but do not address employment and unemployment at their current state of development models of statistical discrimination based on rational stereotypes have little empirical content it is plausible that models combining elements of the search models with statistical discrimination could fit the data we suggest possible avenues to be pursued and comment briefly on the implication of existing theory for public policy jel j15 j31 j64 j71

aid policy and growth in post conflict societies countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice this paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post conflict growth process it is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars and covers 27 countries that were in their first decade of post conflict economic recovery during the 1990s the authors first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post conflict countries they find that during the first three post conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level so ideally aid should phase in during the decade historically aid has not on average been higher in post conflict societies and it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade the authors then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post conflict countries and in particular whether particular components of policy are differentially important for this they use the world bank policy rating database the authors find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post conflict societies comparing the efficacy of different policies they find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies however historically this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post conflict societies

central bankers in government appointed committees abstract i study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee who are appointed by the government central bankers balance their desire to protect the central bank s reputation against their interest to be reappointed committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures these gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small the former is associated with a low risk of being replaced for not supporting the government s preferred policy the latter meanwhile implies high probability that a single vote affects policy making any individual member more weary of potentially affecting the central bank s reputation through his vote

experts and quacks what happens when type is endogenous in a reputational setting here customers cannot tell experts from imitative quacks but gain information through repeated interaction firm incentives to invest in expertise vary nonmonotonically in how tolerant customers are of bad outcomes more tolerant customers are both more forgiving making expertise less necessary and longer tenured increasing the value of retaining them in equilibrium the proportion of expert firms is bounded away from one some quacks are necessary to keep incentives of experts in line the fraction of experts is decreasing in customers switching costs and the relative cost of expertise over quackery

this time is the same using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises if yes why in this paper we show that a bank s stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis this effect is economically large our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank s risk culture and or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises banks that relied more on short term funding had more leverage and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

a latent structure approach to measuring reputation the present study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation specifically this study seeks to i quantify the reputation of washington apples over time ii study the dynamic nature of reputation and iii analyze the effect of the label washington apple the model adopted in this study is the dynamic multiple indicator multiple cause dymimic modeling approach which is a special case of the general latent variable modeling scheme called state space models both dymimic and hedonic approaches are applied to the data on washington apples and results from the two approaches are compared reputation plays an important role in assuring product quality in markets where consumers can only imperfectly judge the product quality until after consumption if reputation effects are absent in these types of markets there is an incentive for producers to reduce quality and take short run gains before buyers catch on in order to avoid such quality cutting products with good reputations will sell for premium prices shapiro 1983 showed theoretically that price premiums are necessary for producers to invest in quality and reputation there is an extensive theoretical literature on reputation but empirical studies are limited empirical studies on the impact of firm reputation on shareholder wealth or product demand include jarrell and peltzman 1985 borenstein and zimmerman 1988 and karpoff and lott 1993 caves and green 1996 showed that factors that may affect a firm s reputation influence the relationship between price and quality gorton 1996 analyzed how a bank s reputation for default affects the discount rate on its debt the measurement of the value of reputation to producers in terms of price premiums and how a reputation can be built up and destroyed are important issues that have not been empirically analyzed the current study provides estimates of reputation as a dynamic latent variable that is determined by price premiums and market data further it analyzes the effect of extrinsic factors on reputation steenkamp 1990 points out that consumers observe at the moment of purchase the intrinsic and extrinsic product quality cues but not the quality attributes intrinsic cues are characteristics of the product such as color freshness texture and flavor while extrinsic

contract length monetary policy and exchange rate variability abstract this paper investigates the dependence of exchange rate variability on average contract length in the goods market when changes in the money supply are the driving force for movements in the exchange rate it is shown that in general an increase in average contract length will increase the volatility of the exchange rate we then discuss how changes in the money supply process affect average contract length besides providing an explanation for changes in the conditional variance of the exchange rate our results are interesting in the light of the changes in monetary control procedures implemented by the federal reserve board in october 1979 and the consequent increase in exchange rate volatility

how valuable is a good reputation a sample selection model of internet auctions on the online auction site ebay by convention sellers do not ship goods to winning bidders until after they have received payment so there is an opportunity for sellers to take advantage of bidders trust realizing this the designers of ebay created a system that relies on self enforcement using reputation several recent studies have found that bidders give little or no reward to sellers who have better reputations i show that in fact sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports that they have behaved honestly but marginal returns to additional reports are severely decreasing

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

another look at the role of the industrial structure of markets for international diversification strategies abstract this paper re examines the extent to which gains from international diversification are due to differences in industrial structure across countries recent papers by roll 1992 journal of finance 47 3 42 and heston and rouwenhorst 1994 journal of financial economics 36 3 27 investigate this issue and find conflicting evidence using a new database the dow jones world stock index with coverage in 25 countries and over 66 industry classifications we decompose comprehensively both country and industrial sources of variation we confirm that little of the variation in country index returns can be explained by their industrial composition we also uncover differences in the proportion of variation in industry index returns that is captured by country and industry factors and discuss the implications for global diversification strategies

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare

a comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets abstract this paper compares bribery to competitive bidding in a government purchasing context while competitive bidding is one method of procurement bribery is a common alternative in many third world countries although bribery is often considered to be the ethical antithesis of competitive bidding the analysis shows there is a fundamental isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the transaction

entrepreneurship and economic theory this article discusses economic theories of entrepreneurship drawing principally on work conducted in labour economics microeconomics macroeconomics and financial economics the article explains how incentives and constraints of various kinds affect occupational choices and entrepreneurial innovation as well as how entrepreneurial decisions affect macroeconomic performance implications for public policy are drawn

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

an equilibrium queuing model of bribery it is sometimes argued that bribery is inefficient because bureaucrats may cause delays for attracting more bribes this hypothesis is examined in the context of a queue where customers having different values of time are ranked by their bribe payments to the queue s server the nash equilibrium strategies of the customers are derived it is shown that the server is unlikely to slow down the allocation process when bribery is allowed the model does not have stringent informational requirements and the equilibrium outcome minimizes the average value of time costs of the queue it also suggests a useful auctioning procedure

real and nominal shocks in a two country price setting world abstract this paper develops a two country model in which the law of one price does not hold in the short run and which is consistent with the stylized fact that exchange rates respond more quickly to news than prices this is done by assuming that firms face lumpy information costs in determining what price to charge both domestic and imported goods prices are therefore sticky with respect to news and deviations from the law of one price ppp are due to exchange rate surprises the model is used to analyze the domestic and international impact of real and nominal disturbances

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

an equilibrium search matching model of discrimination abstract a model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome even if no agents have a taste for discrimination and groups are ex ante identical groups which are discriminated against e g blacks women earn lower wages and endure longer unemployment spells

competition in bureaucracy and corruption abstract this paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences some bureaucrats are corrupt that is they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe the competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation that is distributing the licences given the firms investment decisions additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats rotation are provided

a game theoretic approach to behavioral food risks the case of grain producers abstract food risks may be caused by malpractice of suppliers who exploit the fact that their production processes and resulting product properties cannot be directly observed by buyers the probability of malpractice increases with the profits that can be earned through opportunistic behavior in this paper we develop a moral hazard model for the empirical analyses of behavioral risks it accounts for the essential fact that incomplete inspection and tracing increase the profitability of rule breaking behavior and that monitoring tracing and sanctioning are costly using the model we first demonstrate how to design efficient contracts in various situations in a case study we then analyze farmers incentives with regard to the minimum waiting period after fungicide use data are gathered in interviews with three large scale german farmers and a grain dealer we find that while their perception of parameters varies widely high temptations for rule breaking arise in some cases we conclude that empirical moral hazard analyses have significant potential to shed light on behavioral risks

managing local commons theoretical issues in incentive design local commons encompass a wide range of resources whose shared feature is the need for some form of collective management in what follows we shall be concerned mainly with the problems of implementing a collective management plan whatever the mechanisms invoked many recent contributions to the literature have stressed that relatively informal collective management of common property resources can in the right circumstances avoid the severe resource degradation predicted by the tragedy of the commons nevertheless both empirical and theoretical arguments suggest that cooperative behavior may be only partial and the incentives of short term self interest only partially held in check under what circumstances then can more formal implementation mechanisms make good the deficiency and given that formal incentives are typically stronger than informal ones are there any reasons why informal incentives might nevertheless sometimes be preferred

policy effectiveness in an open multi market economy with risk neutral exchange rate speculation abstract in an open multi market equilibrium model of the business cycle the informational role of a forward exchange market is that the forward rate aggregates individual perceptions of the aggregate state of the economy in the case of risk neutral exchange rate speculation the forward rate perfectly reveals average expectations of current nominal shocks that hit the economy this paper analyzes the informational implications of forward speculation when markets are structurally diverse the two types of structural diversity considered are heterogeneous price elasticities of output demand and supply and asymmetric information between traders in output markets and traders in asset markets in contrast to previous results the paper shows that risk neutral speculation is not in general sufficient to generate a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium in which monetary policy is ineffective

an analysis of oil production by opec countries persistence breaks and outliers this study examines the time series behaviour of oil production for opec member countries within a fractional integration modelling framework recognizing the potential for structural breaks and outliers the analysis is undertaken using monthly data from january 1973 to october 2008 for 13 opec member countries the results indicate there is mean reverting persistence in oil production with breaks identified in 10 out of the 13 countries examined thus shocks affecting the structure of opec oil production will have persistent effects in the long run for all countries and in some cases the effects are expected to be permanent

is the sticky price assumption reasonable for exchange rate models abstract the testable implications of sticky price exchange rate models are discussed the empirical examples suggest that the predetermined or sticky price assumption employed in recent asset models of exchange rate determination appears to be appropriate for germany japan the united states and the united kingdom

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

social contracts as assets a possible solution to the time consistency problem this paper presents a new solution to the time consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work the solution involves formulating a social contract institution or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy the social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract for the old generation breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it for the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract

bribery inefficiency and bureaucratic delay abstract we examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy the presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants consequently efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses or may never receive licenses as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them an increase in the proportion of honest officials while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions can also induce greater inefficiencies misallocation and delay from corrupt officials as a result social welfare may be non monotonic in the proportion of honest officials and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption competition between officials can hurt efficiency its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants ability to pay bribes

the impact of liberalization on bureaucratic corruption abstract liberalization increases the number of goods available for consumption within a country since bureaucrats value variety this raises the marginal utility of accepting a bribe this benefit effect is counteracted by an increasing cost effect from corruption deterrence activities that arise due to greater international pressure to curb corruption the interaction of these two effects can lead to a non monotonic relation between liberalization and corruption moreover pre commitment to deterrence activities is shown to be more effective in controlling corruption empirical evidence supports the existence of a non monotonic relation between economic openness and corruption among developing countries

competition and corruption in an agency relationship abstract the paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account it is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents namely low powered incentives and greater competition the paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on african data

a note on competitive bribery games abstract within a competitive bribery game in which each player has incomplete information we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium which is symmetric similar results hold for another bribery game form that prevails in the literature implications for corrupt practices in relation to economic development are also discussed

corruption and allocation efficiency abstract in this paper we investigate the possibility of allocation inefficiencies associated with corrupt practices specifically we consider the case in which two firms compete via bribery of a corrupt government official for a to be awarded project the economy may suffer allocation inefficiencies whenever there is some degree of discrimination given additional assumptions it is shown that the possibility of inefficient allocations increases as the degree of discrimination increases although empirical verification of discrimination is difficult due to the observational equivalence of an alternative imperfect knowledge model two possible explanations for the determination of discrimination coefficients indicate that it is a general phenomenon in competitive bribery games

explicating factors for companies inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management an exploratory study in germany abstract the literature on corruption is rich in works focusing on individual and organizational aspects however existing research is void in studies that specifically deal with factors for a company s inclination towards corruption in operations and supply chain management the present paper fills this gap by explicating why some firms are more prone to corruption than others within this context it is our objective to explore the structural and organizational bases for companies especially their purchasing units to engage in corrupt business practices grounding our work in principal agent theory and the fraud triangle we suggest that the factors of organizational complexity corporate culture internationality and functional complexity all influence a firm s inclination towards corruption which in turn should manifest itself in the presence or absence of corruption control and prevention mechanisms this framework is tested with data collected from 104 purchasing managers in germany and implications for both theory and practice are highlighted

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

empirical evidence for the superiority of non us oil and gas investments abstract this paper provides empirical estimates of the return on us and non us exploration investment the estimates are obtained from a polynomial distributed lag model econometrica 33 1965 178 that relates the present value of current period reserve discoveries to current and lagged us and non us exploration investment the empirical evidence presented in the paper indicates that the net present value of 1 invested in non us exploration is larger in a statistically significant sense than the net present value of 1 invested in u s exploration in particular results indicate that the return on non us exploration investment is approximately 3 5 times as large as the return earned on us exploration investment the results reported in this paper provide insights potentially useful to us energy policymakers

the emergence of political accountability when and how do democratic institutions deliver accountable government in addressing this broad question we focus on the role played by political norms specifically the extent to which leaders abuse office for personal gain and the extent to which citizens punish such transgressions we show how qualitatively distinct political norms can coexist because of a dynamic complementarity in which citizens willingness to punish transgressions is raised when they expect such punishments to be used in the future we seek to understand the emergence of accountability by analysing transitions between norms to do so we extend the analysis to include the possibility that at certain times a segment of voters are behaviorally intolerant of transgressions our mechanism highlights the role of leaders offering an account of how their actions can instigate enduring change within a fixed set of formal institutions by disrupting prevailing political norms we show how such changes do not depend on sun spots to trigger coordination and are asymmetric in effect a series of good leaders can and eventually will improve norms whereas bad leaders cannot damage them jel codes d72 p16 c73 copyright 2013 oxford university press

world trade patterns economic disturbances and exchange rate management abstract this paper construct and analyzes a three country stochastic model of world trade the objectives of this paper are to investigate the propagation of economic disturbances worldwide and to analyze the nature of optimal exchange rate management on the part of a single country faced with monetary and real disturbances accurring in all its trade patterns the paper analyzes the roles of bilateral trade patterns the type of underlying stochastic disturbances i e monetary vs real and transsitory vs permanent and of the optimality criterion in determining the optimal exchange rate regime

collective reputation and the dynamics of statistical discrimination previous literature on statistical discrimination explained stereotypes based on the existence of multiple equilibria in which principals have difierent self conflrming beliefs about difierent social groups arrow 1973 coate and loury 1993 however the literature has not provided an account of where the principals prior beliefs come from moreover the static models dominating the literature do not ofier relevant information about the dynamic paths that lead to each equilibrium this paper develops a dynamic version of statistical discrimination in which economic players forwardlooking behaviors determine the dynamic paths to each equilibrium deflning group reputation as the objective information shared by principals regarding the average characteristics of agents belonging to each group this study identifles groups as advantaged or disadvantaged based on their initial reputation states and provides conditions by which a group can switch from one reputation state to another by understanding this dynamic structure of reputation evolution we examine the strategy that well coordinated principals may voluntarily utilize to maximize their proflts helping the group in the reputation trap to improve its skill investment rate

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game abstract we consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency in other cases the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific we present conditions under which each result obtains our results indicate that it is socially optimal to run an unfair contest in order to redress the allocation inefficiency introduced when contestants are asymmetric we show however that a selfish income maximizing bribee will discriminate in the opposite direction to that which society would prefer

breaking free of a stereotype should a domestic brand pretend to be a foreign one consumers in many emerging markets exhibit a pronounced preference for western and global brands while domestic brands are often associated with a cheap but low quality image frustrated with the negative country of origin coo stereotype imposed on them many domestic brands from emerging markets follow a variety of approaches to disguise their coo and pretend to be foreign this paper studies the strategic aspects of this phenomenon we consider an experience good market where consumers learn about each brand s quality using its coo as a prior each firm can invest in product quality or coo dissociation the former generates better quality signals while the latter simply masks the firm s coo identity the analysis reveals a few main insights sharing a reputation leads to a common good problem where firms free ride on each other s quality investments as a high quality firm dissociates itself from the stereotype it ceases to contribute to the coo image but also prevents its low quality peers from free riding on it this incurs a negative direct effect but a positive strategic effect on the group image consequently a country s coo image may actually improve when more high quality brands shun their identities and pretend to be foreign in equilibrium coo image improves monotonically as firms become more efficient in providing quality however the prevalence of coo dissociation may first increase then decrease we discuss the implications of these results for emerging market brands as well as policy makers

corruption as an occupational choice endogenous corruption and tax policy corruption is endemic in many countries and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously we endogenize corruption as an occupational choice workers choose private or public employment public employees can be honest or corrupt corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self esteem those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt when a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate the economy has two self sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue an increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high corruption equilibrium paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low corruption equilibrium

job discrimination market forces and the invisibility hypothesis the invisibility hypothesis holds that the job skills of disadvantaged workers are not easily discovered by potential new employers but that promotion enhances visibility and alleviates this problem then at a competitive labor market equilibrium firms profit by hiding talented disadvantaged workers in low level jobs consequently those workers are paid less on average and promoted less often than others with the same education and ability as a result of the inefficient and discriminatory wage and promotion policies disadvantaged workers experience lower returns to investments in human capital than other workers

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

how corruption may corrupt abstract the incidence of corruption appears to vary strongly across societies even for comparable activities the model highlights how the profitability of bureaucratic corruption may be related to its frequency and points toward a few mechanisms that can be used in explaining the stylized facts of varying incidence of corruption there might be multiple self fulfilling equilibria levels of corruption even when both supply and demand of corrupt acts are considered

tax rights in transition economies a tragedy of the commons abstract this paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies a government s tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base existing evidence suggests that chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their russian counterparts using the big push model of industrialization murphy k shleifer a vishny r 1989 industrialization and the big push journal of political economy 95 1003 1026 within a common property resource framework we show that this difference in tax rights helps explain why china has been significantly more successful than russia

evaluating the net benefits of collective reputation the case of bordeaux wine in this paper we develop an original approach to assess the net benefits associated with a generic promotion program using an application to bordeaux wines the benefit is computed from the marginal impact of the program s collective reputation on the individual reputation for sub regions within bordeaux these different marginal impacts are estimated using detailed survey data about the image of bordeaux wines in seven european countries we find positive and significant spillover effects from the collective reputation bordeaux that moreover increase with the reputation of the sub region these spillover effects when significantly positive vary from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 15 of additional favorable quality opinions we then calculate a measure of the average net benefits earned by producers from the regional promotion program in selected sub regions within bordeaux our results indicate that producers in some sub regions are more likely to benefit from the promotion program and suggest that the current fee structure may not be properly aligned with market conditions

the flexible exchange basket a macroeconomic analysis abstract this paper constructs and analyzes a multi country stochastic equilibrium framework suitable for analyzing the behavior of an economy which pursues a flexible exchange basket policy the framework is general enough to accommodate the special cases of a multilateral floating exchange rates and b rigid basket regimes an important issue that is addressed in the present framework involves the composition of the optimal flexible basket versus that of the corresponding rigid basket such an investigation is carried out for various patterns of multilateral trade for various types of structural disturbances and for alternative optimality criteria

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

red tape and corruption abstract we study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal bureaucrat agent hierarchy the principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best red tape produces information but is costly to the agent and is administered by a corrupt bureaucrat first the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent in exchange for reducing the amount of red tape second the bureaucrat may take bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape even though the former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape we show that the equilibrium level of red tape is above the social optimum

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

reputational comparative advantage and multinational enterprise 1 introduction when cultivating a new export market or attempting to expand its share of an existing market an exporter is likely to find that it has been preceded by its reputation minus a readily identifiable brand name quality reputation may solely reflect the country of origin for example when consumers are presented with a large amount of complex product information they may use the country of origin as a heuristic in forming product impressions without considering other product attributes 1 in this article i show that this heuristic decision making process can affect a firm s quality decision and can therefore become self fulfilling hence any bias that consumers have may be well founded however it is only correct because firms respond rationally to it colombia s garment industry provides an interesting example of a self fulfilling unfavorable quality reputation in international trade as described by morawetz 1981 a single colombian garment firm took a contract for 50 000 men s suits that was beyond its capability the poor quality result so tarnished the american importer s name that other high quality importers become wary of colombian sewn garments with the payoff to high quality production reduced colombian garment firms then concentrated on low quality markets and the newly found unfavorable reputation was justified in the model constructed here consumers see only a noisy signal of the product s quality at the time of purchase therefore their posterior beliefs are based on this noisy signal and the country of origin reputations as will be made clear higher quality firms benefit more from an increase in their country s reputation so that a better reputation generates an increase in the percentage of high quality firms in this way the reputation becomes self fulfilling and ex ante identical countries can be correctly perceived as differing in their percentage of high quality producers i next introduce an economy with two sectors one sector produces more complex goods where high quality is not easily verified and is more essential to the product s performance these may be technology intensive products or they may consist of the design and marketing of the goods produced in the other sector in particular high quality production costs and the consumer s value for high quality goods is greater in this sector i show that this sector becomes more profitable as the country of origin reputation increases hence if one country s equilibrium reputation is low and the other country s equilibrium reputation is high then the pattern of specialization and international trade can be determined solely by reputational comparative advantage 2 finally i show that reputational comparative advantage can overshadow a small technological comparative disadvantage in determining the pattern of international trade given this pattern of trade and specialization based on reputational comparative advantage a high reputation firm may expend resources to establish a multinational enterprise mne in the low reputation country for example many mne products require the differing specializations of both the high and low reputation countries although differing in motivation this result accords well with more traditional models of vertical mne 3 however this impetus for mne as well as its more traditional counterparts does not explain why the mne would choose foreign direct investment fdi over a less costly licensing arrangement 4 the quality uncertainty in this model along with the difference in equilibrium reputations allows us to address this question in particular appropriable reputational rents are generated by fdi when the high reputation parent firm procures and internalizes production with a low reputation host firm this fdi breaks the low reputation equilibrium of the host firm and generates reputational rents

the economics of repeated extortion we provide a simple model of repeated extortion in particular we ask whether corrupt government officials opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations if the choice of technology is left to the entrepreneurs the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce entrepreneurs to pursue a fly by night strategy by adopting a technology with an inefficiently low sunk cost component the unique equilibrium is characterized by a mixed strategy of the government official in future demand our model thus explains why arbitrariness is such a central feature of extortion we also investigate implications of the stability of corrupt regimes for dynamic extortion and discuss alternative applications for our framework

asymmetric information in competitive bribery games abstract in this paper competitive bribery games with incomplete information about the nature of the potential bribee are considered given a common uniform cost distribution function we characterize the closed form nash equilibrium some properties of the equilibrium are derived therein

governance reform in legal service markets this paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets the model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms we identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform focussing particularly on the rent recapture and relationship substitution effects we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service

persistence of corruption some theoretical perspectives summary the paper examines how pervasive corruption can be persistent despite the presence of anti corruption measures and incentives corruption has a strong tendency to persist in the first part we discuss how a high level of corruption or a low level of compliance can be an equilibrium outcome in such a case corruption becomes the social norm in the second part of the paper we use ides from evolutionary game theory to discuss how corrupt behavior can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different individual behavioral norms

public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game abstract this paper investigates the role of guilt aversion for corruption in public administration corruption is modeled as the outcome of a game played between a bureaucrat a lobby and the public there is a moral cost of corruption for the bureaucrat who is averse to letting the public down we study how the behavior of the lobby and the bureaucrat depend on perceived public beliefs when these are constant and when they are allowed to vary over time with time varying beliefs corruption is more likely when the horizon of the game is relatively long and when public beliefs are initially low and are updated fast

semi rational expectations and exchange rate dynamics abstract the rational expectations hypothesis reh asserts that on average the economic agents are accurate in predicting future economic developments the paper demonstrates however that in a world of costly information individual rationality may result in consistent and persistent forecasting biases a distinction is drawn between perfect foresight or efficient forecasting which is consistent with the reh and myopic perfect foresight which is the profit maximizing and thus the rational one from an individualistic point of view even though the latter may result in persistently biased forecasting these concepts are illustrated in a model of exchange rate dynamics which introduces myopic or semi rationality into dornbusch s familiar model

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

reputation effects and the limits of contracting a study of the indian software industry this paper examines evidence of the role that reputation plays in determining contractual outcomes we conduct an empirical analysis of the indian customized software industry using a data set we collected containing detailed information on 230 projects carried out by 125 software firms we propose a model ofthe industry where reputation determines contractual outcomes the evidence supports the view that reputation matters ex ante contracts as well as the outcome after ex post renegotiation vary with firms characteristics plausibly associated with reputation this holds after controlling for project client and firm characteristics

on the strength of corporate cultures abstract we model corporate culture s as production technologies for which employees have to undertake culture specific investments that improve their effectiveness at a later date the organization can adopt cultural changes that make this investment partially redundant this leads to under investment however as agents invest more the organization s opportunity cost of a change increases which in turn increases each agents incentives to invest this externality among agents leads to multiple equilibria otherwise similar organizations can thus exhibit either high investment levels and low probability of changes strong culture or low investment levels and high probability of changes weak culture we also explore some implications for the nature and management of corporate culture

government in transition abstract the speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical survey evidence shows that russia lags significantly behind poland in the transition of its government which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms i argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians may account for the poor performance of the russian government and suggest some strategies for improving the situation

search with learning from prices does increased inflationary uncertainty lead to higher markups aggregate cost uncertainty arising from real shocks or unanticipated inflation reduces the informativeness of prices by scrambling relative and aggregate variations but when agents can acquire additional information such increased noise may in fact lead them to become better informed and price competition will intensify we examine these issues in a model of search with learning where consumers search optimally from an unknown price distribution while firms price optimally given consumers search rules we show that the decisive factor in whether inflation variability increases or reduces the incentive to search and thereby market efficiency is the size of informational costs

the dynamics of corruption with the ratchet effect this paper provides a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect as in shleifer and vishny 1993 we consider the sale of government property entry permit by government officials as the prototype of corruption activities in a dynamic version of the shleifer vishny model corrupt officials have ex post the incentive to price discriminate entrepreneurs based on the entry decisions made in an earlier period we show that the inability of government officials to commit to future money demands induces the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs have incentives to delay entry in order to receive a discount in the permit price later the ex post opportunism erodes the official s extortion power and reduces his revenues from selling permits even though the dynamic setting leaves the corrupt official with less extortion power we cannot rule out the possibility that the official s ability to apply dynamic discrimination decreases the intertemporal aggregate social welfare we also explore the effect of the official s tenure stability on the extent of corruption this allows us to identify circumstances under which the often observed practice of job rotation can help mitigate corruption