incentives productivity and labor contracts the relationship between age earnings profiles and worker incentives is examined by contrasting wage and salary workers with the self employed it is argued that the steepness of wage and salary workers age earnings profiles reflects the desire to provide work incentives to those workers since self employed workers do not face this agency problem they are used as a benchmark to gauge productivity empirical support of the proposition is provided and the effects of human capital accumulation are separated empirically from incentive effects the most important conclusion is that under some strong assumptions most of the slope in age earnings profiles is accounted for by the desire to provide incentives rather than by on the job training

innovations improvements and the optimal adoption of new technologies abstract this paper extends the literature on technology adoption by introducing a distinction between technological breakthroughs innovations and the engineering refinements improvements that follow such a breakthrough firms do not necessarily wait for a future technological breakthrough but instead have an incentive to delay the adoption of a new technology until it is sufficiently advanced we characterize a firm s adoption decision as the solution to a continuous time infinite horizon dynamic programming problem which gives rise to an ordinary differential equation that is highly non linear and does not have a closed form solution we thus employ projection techniques and show how these techniques can be applied to the analysis of optimal stopping problems

an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

efficiency wages interfirm comparison and unemployment the paper presents an efficiency wage model where worker effort depends on own wages relative both to wages of other workers in the firm and to similar workers in other firms first we show how the solow conditions are modified if internal comparison effects are at work second we discuss the effect of internal wage comparison on wage inequality within firms third we study unemployment and relative wage determination within a general equilibrium model and analyze the effect of technological change and various tax policies on equilibrium unemployment and relative wages finally the short run effects of aggregate demand shocks are analyzed a popular argument for the existence of involuntary unemployment is that a worker s effort rises with wages giving employers incentives to set wages above market clearing levels it is often assumed that the worker s effort is a function of the wage level with no reference to the size of the wage in comparison with that received by other workers yet such comparisons are likely to influence an individual in his effort choice if this is the case then it seems equally likely that workers compare themselves with others both internal and external to their place of work this paper contributes to the efficiency wage literature by providing an understanding of wage setting and unemployment determination within a model where workers efforts depend on their wage relative to both the wages of other workers at the same firm and to the wages of similar workers at other firms

technological advancement learning and the adoption of new technology abstract this research focuses attention upon three related issues the persistence of technological progress over time multiple adoption decisions over a long horizon and the impact of production based learning on those decisions we develop a simple economic model for a single product producing firm incorporating continuous technological progress linear product demand linear switching costs and experience based cost reductions a dynamic programming framework is used to evaluate cases where either one or an unlimited number of adoptions are allowed over an infinite horizon both structural and numerical results are presented fundamental results serve to explain several counter intuitive dynamics in the single adoption case faster rates of technological progress as well as growing markets or a steeply sloping demand curve serve to delay adoption while an increased ability to learn may accelerate it when multiple adoptions are allowed the adoption of any particular technology presents a window of opportunity in which future investment will be warranted if for whatever reason this window has passed then maintaining the older technology becomes more attractive than adoption thus seemingly outdated technologies may remain embedded in some settings

investment policy with time to build abstract most capital projects have an implementation lag we examine the effect of implementation lag on a levered firm s investment decision the main finding is that implementation lag can potentially have a substantial effect on a levered company s investment trigger and this effect can be significantly different from that of an unlevered company the exact relationship between lag and investment trigger depends on the level of debt used by the firm for an optimally levered firm a crucial determinant of the lag investment relationship is the fraction of investment cost that has to be incurred upfront if this fraction is small investment trigger is a decreasing function of implementation lag and the effect can be economically significant if this fraction is large investment trigger can be either increasing or decreasing in lag depending on parameter values but the magnitude of the effect is not large optimally levering a firm makes the implementation lag more investment friendly relative to an unlevered firm thus it is possible that the lag has a negative effect on investment if the firm is unlevered but a positive effect if the same firm is optimally levered for an optimally levered firm implementation lag generally has a non negative effect on investment

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

optimal corporate strategy under uncertainty within a dynamic setting optimal corporate strategy management for a multi division corporation involves restructuring a portfolio of strategic business units sbus periodically so as to maximize the firm s market value real option theory has been applied to model and explain managerial flexibility for both project selection and operational decisions in general optimal corporate strategy has focused on strategic environments and characteristics of business units rather than on managerial flexibility in this article we develop a feasible discrete time model for optimal corporate strategy that incorporates both endogenous and exogenous factors and is consistent with the value based criterion for maximizing shareholders wealth

a behavioral theory of r d expenditures and innovations evidence from shipbuilding i base an integrated model of innovation development and launch on the behavioral theory of the firm this model specifies that research and development expenses are increased when low performance causes problemistic search and when excess resources cause slack search innovations generated by search are launched if low performance gives managers high risk tolerance using data from shipbuilding firms i show that high performance reduces r d intensity and innovation launches and high slack increases r d intensity as predicted

warrant valuation and exercise strategy abstract this paper demonstrates that warrant valuation and exercise strategy differ fundamentally from call option valuation simultaneous exercise of warrants is shown to be suboptimal and a monopolist owning all warrants can achieve a higher value unless warrants are perfectly divisible no satisfactory equilibrium exists for the valuation and exercise of widely held warrants the problems encountered appear to be quite general and stem from necessary assumptions about future corporate dividend policy and capital structure such assumptions are necessary for any model of corporate security valuation

optimal risk allocation for regulated monopolies and consumers abstract the model shows how a regulated monopolist s price should change as random cost and demand parameters are revealed the regulator has a ramsey type problem with a linear tariff a trade off between allocative efficiency and risk sharing typically exists the attitudes of the consumer and the firm to both income and price risk determine how the price should move sufficient conditions are found for price adjustment schemes used in practice to be optimal these schemes include full partial and zero pass through of marginal costs and price caps average cost pricing and caps on total revenue for demand risk

warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets abstract we develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block we prove that the warrant bond price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant bond price equals the warrant bond price in the block constrained economy we illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long

sequential investment in renewable energy technologies under policy uncertainty although innovation and support schemes are among the main forces that drive investment in renewable energy re technologies both involve considerable uncertainty we develop a real options framework to analyse the impact of technological policy and electricity price uncertainty on the decision to invest sequentially in successively improved versions of a re technology technological uncertainty is reflected in the random arrival of innovations and policy uncertainty in the likely provision or retraction of a subsidy that takes the form of a fixed premium on top of the electricity price we show that greater likelihood of subsidy retraction provision lowers raises the incentive to invest and by comparing a stepwise to a lumpy investment strategy we show how an embedded option to adopt an improved technology version mitigates the impact of subsidy retraction on investment timing specifically we show how stepwise investment facilitates earlier technology adoption compared to lumpy investment and that under stepwise investment technological uncertainty accelerates technology adoption thus further offsetting the incentive to delay investment in the light of subsidy retraction

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

venture capital staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty abstract our paper presents a dynamic model of entrepreneurial venture financing under uncertainty based on option exercise games between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist vc in particular we analyze the impact of multi staged financing and both economic and technological uncertainty on optimal contracting in the context of vc financing our novel approach combines compound option pricing with sequential non cooperative contracting allowing us to determine whether renegotiation will improve the probability of coming to an agreement and proceed with the venture it is shown that both sources of uncertainty positively impact the vc investor s optimal equity share specifically higher uncertainty leads to a larger stake in the venture and renegotiation may result in a dramatic shift of control rights in the venture preventing the venture from failure moreover given ventures with low volatility situations might occur where the vc investor loses his first mover advantage based on a comparative static analysis new testable hypotheses for further empirical studies are derived from the model

the effects of expectations on technology adoption some empirical evidence n rosenberg 1976 argues that in many markets prospective buyers for an innovation are strongly influenced by expectations concerning the timing and significance of future improvements the primary objectives of this article are to provide a model of the innovation decision process of user firms that expect improvements in current best technology and to offer an empirical study that tests the model s predictions among other results the author finds empirical support for rosenberg s argument and demonstrates theoretically that compared to models without technological expectations and learning the optimal decision process is nonmonotonic copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

employment entrepreneurship and 1992 microeconomic policy and european problems this essay has covered several areas which are not usually regarded as closely interrelated policy conclusions have been discussed briefly at various points and will now be developed more fully in this final section as evidence for the interrelatedness of such disparate fields as corporate finance and employment policy we start from the observation that many large firms are relatively inefficient particularly at product innovation and flexible organization and employment policies in part because top managerial compensation depends mainly on size this creates an incentive for excessive growth and empire building rather than payment to shareholders of the free cash flow which cannot be profitably invested internally more appropriate incentives for top management would increase dividend payments and hence the flow of funds into the capital market available for financing new start ups and small firms as venture capital even in the u s the cost of obtaining external capital often constrains small firms to invest only their internal cash flow fazzari et al 1988

real investment options with multiple sources of rare events abstract we value real investment options when the underlying asset follows a mixed jump diffusion process involving various types sources of rare events jumps these jumps are assumed independent of each other with each type having a log normally distributed jump size and a random poisson distributed arrival time they may represent uncertainties about the arrival and impact on the underlying investment of new information concerning technological innovation competition political risk regulatory effects and other sources an analytic solution is presented for european claims call or put options with multiple sources of jumps a discrete time markov chain methodology implemented within a finite difference scheme is proposed for the valuation of american as well as european options the approach is also applicable to financial options with multiple types of rare events the approach is illustrated through valuing complex real options with compound features involving interactions between optimal investment and subsequent operating decisions specifically we value a growth option and an extension option

an equilibrium model of investment under uncertainty this paper analyzes the optimal investment decisions of heterogeneous rms in a competitive uncertain environment we characterize rms optimal investment strategy explicitly and derive a closed form solution for rm value we show that in the strategic equilibrium real option premia are signi cant as a result rms delay investment choosing optimally not to undertake some positive npv projects the model predicts that rm returns vary over the business cycle with returns negatively skewed during expansions but positively skewed in recessions

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investment in technological innovations an option pricing approach abstract this paper develops a model of the optimal investment strategy for a firm confronted with a sequence of technological innovations we incorporate many of the most important characteristics of real world technology markets for example we permit innovations to be stochastic in their arrival times and their profitability we also incorporate learning so that firms adopting current innovations become better able to benefit from future innovations the model yields four distinct investment strategies the model is then used to predict actual firm policy these implications are discussed and compared with observed firm behavior

a patent race in a real options setting investment strategy valuation capm beta and return volatility abstract in this paper we study financial properties of r d intensive firms through a continuous time real options patent race model numerical analysis in this study shows that intense competition drives a firm to invest more aggressively which then pushes up its cost of capital and return volatility while introducing negative return correlation with its competitor furthermore we find that a firm s position in competition has important impacts on its financial properties for instance a firm s cost of capital is a non monotonic function of its relative position in the race in addition the relationship between cash flow uncertainty and investment can be negative when a firm is far ahead or far behind or positive when firms are close in the race

what does an oligopoly maximize a monopolist maximizes a well defined objective function monetary profit in a competitive industry although each individual pursues selfish objectives the market behaves as if an agent was maximizing an objective function social welfare can we say the same for an oligopoly do firms pursuing selfish objectives and behaving strategically act as if an agent was maximizing a fictitious objective function necessary and sufficient conditions for nash equilibria of static and state space games to be observationally equivalent to single optimization problems are derived nash equilibria of the game that are not maxima of the function are shown to be generically unstable copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

valuing flexibility as a complex option this paper develops an approach for valuing flexible production systems using contingent claims pricing demand curves for our model s underlying assets output products may be downward sloping in contrast with the standard option pricing assumption also our marginal production exercise costs may be increasing in addition we allow for multiple products and a production capacity constraint these elements of the model result in complex exercise decisions for the contingent claims which comprise the production system s value we illustrate our approach by valuing a flexible system that produces two products which have profit margin functions with stochastic parameters

multi stage product development with exploration value enhancing preemptive and innovation options abstract we provide a real options framework for the analysis of product development that incorporates research and exploration actions product attribute value enhancing actions with uncertain outcome as well as preemption and innovation options we derive two stage analytic formulas and propose a general multi period solution using a numerical lattice approach our analysis reveals that exploration actions are more important when the project is out or at the money near zero npv and less important for high project values in a multi stage setting exploration actions are important even for in the money projects when follow on actions exist that can enhance the expected value of the project with path dependency early actions are more valuable since they enhance the impact or reduce the cost of subsequent actions preemptive controls affecting rare event jump frequency and innovations that introduce positive jumps are more valuable for firms with higher frequency of competitive threats involving low volatility

capital budgeting for interrelated projects a real options approach this paper explores the effect of project interrelationships on investment decisions and project values in a real options framework we examine in detail the mutually exclusive case where a firm may invest in the development stage of two projects and then may select only a single project to implement the firm can develop the projects in parallel or in sequence the choice of development policy depends on the relative values of the embedded options for each strategy sequential development is shown to be superior to parallel development when projects have highly correlated values and when they require a large commitment of capital for development are short term in nature and have relatively low volatility we also show that the optimal ordering of sequential projects does not always begin with the most profitable project

pharmaceutical r d spending and threats of price regulation do threats of pharmaceutical price regulation affect subsequent research and development r d spending this study uses the clinton administration s health security act hsa of 1993 as a natural experiment to study this issue we link events surrounding the hsa to pharmaceutical stock price changes and then examine the cross sectional relation between firms stock price changes and their subsequent unexpected r d spending changes re sults show that the hsa had significant negative effects on stock prices and firm level r d spending conservatively the hsa reduced r d spending by about 1 billion even though it never became law

understanding the role of trade ins in durable goods markets theory and evidence the act of trading in a used car as partial payment for a new car resonates with practically all consumers such transactions are prevalent in many other durable goods markets ranging from golf clubs to ct scanners what roles do trade ins play in these markets what motivates the seller to set up a channel to facilitate trade ins intuitively accepting a trade in would appear to stimulate demand for the producer s product but facilitating the resale of these used goods that substitute for new goods might also increase cannibalization although such transactions involve billions of dollars we know relatively little about this practice from the extant research literature this paper develops an analytical model that incorporates key features of real world durable goods markets i coexistence of new and used goods markets ii consumer heterogeneity with respect to quality sensitivity iii firms that anticipate the cannibalization problem arising from the coexistence of new and used goods and iv lemon problems in resale markets whereby sellers of used goods are better informed than buyers about the quality of their particular item in our analysis a trade in policy amounts to an intervention by the firm in the used goods market which reduces inefficiencies arising from the lemon problem it motivates owners to purchase new goods and reduces their proclivity to hold on to purchased goods because of the low price the latter would fetch in a lemon market we also show that trade in programs are more valuable for less reliable products as well as for products that deteriorate more slowly our analysis shows that producers in durable goods markets should consider trade in programs as a matter of routine despite cannibalization concerns arising from a more active resale market a producer s profits will inevitably rise from introducing trade ins given pervasive lemon problems we test the key predictions of the model about price and volume of trade by assembling a data set of transactions of u s automobile consumers and find broad support for our model

investment under uncertainty in information technology acquisition and development projects in this paper we develop two models for the valuation of information technology it investment projects using the real options approach the it investment projects discussed in this paper are categorized into development and acquisition projects depending upon the time it takes to start benefiting from the it asset once the decision to invest has been taken the models account for uncertainty both in the costs and benefits associated with the investment opportunity our stochastic cost function for it development projects incorporates the technical and input cost uncertainties of pindyck s model 1993 but also considers the fact that the investment costs of some it projects might change even if no investment takes place in contrast to other models in the real options literature in which benefits are summarized in the underlying asset value our model for it acquisition projects represents these benefits as a stream of stochastic cash flows

strategic growth options we provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition in a market with strategic competition investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities this strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to make room for the stronger competitor as a result of this strategic effect payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option when the strategic advantage is strong increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk if the strategic effect is weak the reverse is true on the other hand an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment

investment under uncertainty and policy change in this paper the impact of a policy change on the investment behavior of the firm is studied in an incomplete information setting the policy change occurs when a stochastic process describing the state of the economic environment reaches a certain trigger the firm has incomplete information about the trigger and knows only its probability distribution consequently both the firm s conjecture concerning the trigger value as well as the precision of this conjecture serve as input parameters we derive the optimal investment rule maximizing the value of the firm and show that the impact of the trigger value uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold is non monotonic the threshold decreases with uncertainty for its low levels while the reverse is true if uncertainty is high furthermore we provide results concerning the valuation of the firm s investment opportunity and present some policy implications

monopoly regulation under asymmetric information prices versus quantities we compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs fixing either the price or quantity for each instrument we consider sophisticated screening and simple bunching mechanisms we characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance with unknown demand and increasing marginal costs the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease the simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase with unknown costs both instruments are equivalent

the role of technological expectations in a mixed model of international diffusion of process innovations the case of open end spinning rotors abstract in the years following the introduction of open end rotors a major innovation in cotton spinning technological change in spinning has been characterized by fast rates of introduction of incremental innovations this has made possible considerable improvements in the quality of products as well as reductions in the cost of spinning this case seems especially appropriate for analysing the effects of incremental innovations on the rate of diffusion one the one hand expectations of continuing incremental change may have actually slowed the diffusion of open end rotors contrarily increased profitability from their adoption may have reinforced the rate of diffusion a mixed model of diffusion one that is able to evaluate the role of supply forces such as the introduction of incremental innovations and at the same time the role of bounded rationality and learning by imitating has been developed it draws on the behavioural literature and upon the epidemic approach due to mansfield results of an econometric test on international data available for 26 countries confirm that the rate of introduction of incremental innovations has reduced the rate of diffusion this is especially the case in countries where the technological change in spinning was originated and consequently technological expectations were higher

irreversible investment and r d spillovers in a dynamic duopoly investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of rd an increase in uncertainty delaying the equilibrium calls for higher subsidization rates third numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader s and the follower s maximum value functions accordingly our model can help generate realistic market betas

the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies the study of intra firm diffusion has largely been neglected and the limited extant literature overwhelmingly relies upon uncertainty reduction via information spreading or epidemic learning as the main driver in this paper an alternative approach is taken whereby the intra firm diffusion of new process technologies reflects the profitability of new technology adoption as proxied by firm characteristics the approach is tested using data relating to the diffusion of computer numerically controlled machine tools within firms in the uk engineering and metalworking sectors the empirical analysis does not reject the hypothesis that profitability considerations are important with a number of firm characteristics being isolated as of special relevance including firm size and the use of complementary technologies and managerial techniques however there is little support for the traditional epidemic effect

irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly abstract an oligopoly is studied where firms facing a stochastic inverse demand curve use capacity as strategic variable capacity may be adjusted continuously over time with linear cost the analysis uses the technique of a fictitious social planner and the theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty examples indicate that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive equilibrium when firms are nonidentical e g in initial size and even if they are alike in other respects substantial time may pass until they are all the same size much of that time one firm may dominate the market

multiproduct price regulation under asymmetric information we discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions the regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose when there is private information only about costs the firm should always have a degree of discretion over its pricing policy when uncertainty concerns demand whether discretion is desirable depends on how demand elasticities vary with the scale of demands if a positive demand shock is associated with a reduction in the market elasticity discretion is good for overall welfare otherwise it is not

the role of unemployment in wage determination further evidence on the wage curve from turkey this paper presents an empirical estimation of the correlation between wages and regional unemployment rates in turkey more specifically it explores the role of regional unemployment rates in wage determination the analysis builds upon a series of recent empirical studies on the wage unemployment relationship now commonly known as the wage curve a downward sloping curve in wage unemployment space the existing studies are for most part in advanced market economies while this paper presents one of the few attempts at a wage curve analysis within the context of a developing market economy a cross sectional estimation of micro level individual wage data for the turkish labour market in 1994 suggest a statistically significant negative correlation between wages and regional unemployment rates separate regressions for men and women however show a wage curve to exist only in the male labour market the study also presents the results on other variables of wage determination such as returns to school

timing of investment under technological and revenue related uncertainties the effects of two forms of uncertainty on the timing of irreversible investment are considered technological uncertainty is modeled as a poisson arrival process that reduces the cost of investment while revenue uncertainty is modeled as a diffusion process technological uncertainty has no effect on the optimal investment policy when revenue uncertainty is absent however when combined with revenue uncertainty increased technological uncertainty makes investment less attractive relative to waiting the paper also makes a more general point in clarifying the difference in how diffusion type of uncertainty and unidirectional stochastic progress affect investment timing

a dynamic model of the choice of mode for exploiting complementary capabilities this paper examines the choice of mode for a multinational enterprise and a local firm to exploit their complementary capabilities we develop a combined real options and game theoretic model of modal choice by incorporating a range of factors drawn from the dynamic capabilities theory and transaction cost or organizational economics the factors scrutinized in the model include the parties absorptive capacities frictions in knowledge and asset markets and associated incentive problems cost of switching from one mode to another and cost associated with power jockeying the model uses simulation to examine how these factors interact to influence the choice of mode the results identify a number of conditions for one factor to dominate another and help to reconcile different theories that have made contradicting predictions with regard to the effects of such factors as uncertainty and capability divergence on the optimal choice of mode

option exercise games an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of firms under the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal exercise strategies in isolation and ignore competitive interactions however in many real world asset markets exercise strategies cannot be determined separately but must be formed as part of a strategic equilibrium this article provides a tractable approach for deriving equilibrium investment strategies in a continuous time cournot nash framework the impact of competition on exercise strategies is dramatic for example while standard real options models emphasize that a valuable option to wait leads firms to invest only at large positive net present values the impact of competition drastically erodes the value of the option to wait and leads to investment at very near the zero net present value threshold copyright 2002 oxford university press

investment in competitive equilibrium the optimality of myopic behavior there is an extensive literature on the optimal irreversible investment strategy of a solitary firm facing an exogenous price process this paper shows that the investment strategies that this literature derives may be optimal in competitive equilibrium even though the price process is now endogenous this provides a simple means for computing equilibrium investment strategies

the investment strategies for a dynamic supply chain under stochastic demands abstract a successful supply chain management scm should aim to maximize the net present value of joint profits along the supply chain however the volatile market conditions cause the future cash flows along the supply chain more difficult to anticipate to obtain higher supply chain value the supplier and the retailer should cooperatively determine the optimal entry time this paper proposes a two stage dynamic optimization model by using a real option approach and then performs the sensitivity analyses for the option value and the investment threshold the impacts of some critical factors including the growth rate and the volatility of demand shock sunk cost and relating operational costs cost rates fix costs holding costs of inventory and shipping costs are investigated

repeated real options optimal investment behaviour and a good rule of thumb abstract this paper extends the standard investment under uncertainty set up with a single investment option to the case of infinitely repeated options analytical solutions are derived and it is shown that repeated options not only imply a smaller value of waiting than in the case of a single option but also that the optimal stopping rule is affected differently by changes in underlying parameters this is shown to allow for the use of a simple hurdle rate rule as a good and robust approximation to optimal behaviour when investment options are repeated something which is unlikely in the single option case

equilibrium and options on real assets in aggregate options on real and financial assets can have very different properties typically the good or service produced by a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand and developers have finite capacities also the supply of options can be limited and developers can be less than perfectly competitive in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium with these properties the optimal exercise policy and resulting values of developed and undeveloped assets are calculated explicitly the novel comparative statics are discussed in detail article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

dynamic r d investment policies this paper examines dynamic r d investment policies and the valuation of r d programs in a contingent claims framework we incorporate the following characteristics of r d programs into our model learning by doing collateral learning between different projects in the program interaction between project cash flows periodic reevaluations of the program different intensities of investment capital rationing constraints and competition we show that a firm may invest in multiple projects even if only one can be implemented after development is complete furthermore the firm may significantly alter its funding policy over time for example it may simultaneously develop multiple projects for a period of time then focus on a lead project and potentially resume funding of a backup project if the lead project fails to deliver on its early promise we show how a firm can forecast expected r d spending through time for an optimally executed r d program while project volatility plays an important role in determining r d program value we find that for high volatility projects the optimal investment policy is not very sensitive to changes in or misestimation of volatility in considering whether to accelerate development of a project a firm should balance the adverse effects of increased costs and the loss of investment flexibility against the positive effects of rapid uncertainty resolution and accelerated cash flows in the presence of a budget constraint that prevents the firm from simultaneously accelerating projects and developing projects in parallel we find that if one project significantly dominates another early in the development stage the option to accelerate the lead project is likely to be more valuable than the option to exchange projects thus the backup project would be shelved in order to commit extra resources to development of the lead project finally competition from other firms leads to more parallel investment in the early development stages of projects less parallel investment in the latter stages of development and lower overall investment

optimal regime switching under risk aversion and uncertainty abstract technology adoption is key for corporate strategy often determining the success or failure of a company as a whole however risk aversion often raises the reluctance to make a timely technology switch particularly when this entails the abandonment of an existing market regime and entry in a new one consequently which strategy is most suitable and the optimal timing of regime switch depends not only on market factors such as the definition of the market regimes as well as economic and technological uncertainty but also on attitudes towards risk therefore we develop a utility based regime switching framework for evaluating different technology adoption strategies under price and technological uncertainty we assume that a decisionmaker may invest in each technology that becomes available compulsive or delay investment until a new technology arrives and then invest in either the older laggard or the newer technology leapfrog our results indicate that if market regimes are asymmetric then greater risk aversion and price uncertainty in a new regime may accelerate regime switching in addition the feasibility of a laggard strategy decreases increases as price uncertainty in an existing new regime increases finally although risk aversion typically favours a compulsive and a laggard strategy a leapfrog strategy may be feasible under risk aversion provided that the output price and the rate of innovation are sufficiently high

two remarks on cournot equilibria abstract we describe two simple results in the theory of cournot equilibria the first has to do with the effect of taxation in a cournot industry and the second describes under what conditions a cournot equilibrium will implicity maximize an objective function these results are probably known but are not well known and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out

uncertainty and stepwise investment we analyze the optimal investment strategy of a firm that can complete a project either in one stage at a single freely chosen time point or in incremental steps at distinct time points the presence of economies of scale gives rise to the following trade off lumpy investment has a lower total cost but stepwise investment gives more flexibility by letting the firm choose the timing individually for each stage our main question is how uncertainty in market development affects this trade off the answer is unambiguous and in contrast with a conventional real options intuition higher uncertainty makes the single stage investment more attractive relative to the more flexible stepwise investment strategy

developing real option game models by mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a game between firms as firms implicitly take into account other firms reactions to their own investment actions we review two decades of real option game models suggesting which critical problems have been solved by considering game theory and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed we provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications or shortfalls in applications to date and suggest some promising avenues for future research

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

value and risk dynamics over the innovation cycle this paper studies investment in intellectual capital and corresponding value and risk dynamics over the innovation cycle we assume that the innovation cycle consists of three phases r d trial and market introduction phases we use a real option investment model to characterize firm value and risk dynamics over the innovation cycle and find that firm value is the sum of the value of assets in place and non linear option values related to breakthrough exit and market introduction options firm risk over the innovation cycle is highly non linear and quite distinct in different phases during the r d phase risk is high as the firm faces high operating leverage originating from r d fixed costs together with technological uncertainty during the trial phase risk is significantly lower and dominated by option risk to launch the product in the market while after the introduction of the product in the market risk is equivalent to the asset risk of the company our model is consistent with the view that positive excess returns of r d intensive firms are a compensation for risk based on this insight we derive several testable predictions

irreversible investment with price ceilings a model of irreversible investment in a competitive industry under demand uncertainty is developed in the absence of restrictions investment by itself will keep the price from rising above a natural ceiling that exceeds the long run average cost by an option value factor when a lower ceiling is imposed investment is triggered only by the observation of an even higher shadow price as the imposed ceiling is reduced to the long run average cost this shadow price goes to infinity and investment ceases completely because investment is depressed a tighter price ceiling generally leads to a higher long run average price

strategic investment in technological innovations abstract the aim of this paper is to determine the optimal timing of technology investment of a single firm in a duopoly framework as time passes different technologies are invented which after sometime become available for the firm to adopt the question here is not only when a firm should invest but also which technology should be adopted for different scenarios the optimal technology investment decision is determined outcomes range from pre emption equilibria to equilibria with second mover advantages

dynamic r d competition the authors study a simple two stage stochastic patent race involving two firms they examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race the authors find that the leader engages in rd 2 a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results and 3 the effects of research joint ventures whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results copyright 1987 by royal economic society

risk premia and preemption in r d ventures i analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of r d ventures engaged in a multiple stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty after solving in closed form for the case of a two stage race in continuous time i show that a firm s risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead compared to the case where firms collude r d competition erodes the option value to mothball a project reduces the completion time and the failure rate of r d and causes higher and more volatile risk premia numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry

returns on investments in energy saving technologies under energy price uncertainty in dutch greenhouse horticulture conventional net presentvalue calculations evaluating the profitabilityof investments in energy saving technologies indutch horticultural outlays predict a muchhigher rate of adoption of these technologiesthan is actually observed this paper tries toexplain this gap by applying a real optionsframework hurdle rates for investments in twotypes of energy saving technology are estimatedusing simulated future revenue streams givenuncertainty regarding energy prices and energytax policies hurdle rates found in this wayare on average about 1 76 times the hurdlerates that result from net present valuecalculations furthermore this paper tests thepredictive value of the theory by estimating alogit model this model relates the incidenceof having invested in an energy savingtechnology to the difference between the returnon investment and the hurdle rate thepredictive power turns out to be encouraging as the statistical tests indicate that higherhurdle rates tend to reduce rates of technologyadoption

unemployment labor relations and unit labor costs in his seminal 1943 paper on the political business cycle michal kalecki 1971 argued that industrial leaders feared full employment because the economic insecurity created by unemployment was necessary to keep wages low and maintain work intensity and discipline on the shop floor on the basis of this reasoning kalecki concluded that governments would not use demand management policies to achieve permanent full employment in terms of current macroeconomic debates kalecki had sketched the outlines of a theory of the neutral or natural rate of unemployment based on the importance of disciplinary unemployment as a regulator of unit labor costs kalecki s pessimism about the prospects for full employment was premised in part on a view of firms in which the threat of dismissal was the central motivational device used by employers and employees had only a tenuous connection to employers this assumption may have been appropriate when analyzing labor markets in the united states during the 1930 s since that time however the spread of unions implicit employment contracts and large bureaucratically organized enterprises has resulted in a modern u s labor market in which many workers enjoy long job tenure and in which many firms do not appear to rely on dismissal threats as their primary motivational strategy see david gordon richard edwards and michael reich 1982 sanford jacoby 1983 and my forthcoming paper from this perspective it is reasonable to ask whether the presence of long term employment relations alters the regulatory role played by unemployment this paper examines the effect that unemployment and long term employment relations exert on the determination of unit labor costs the central empirical findings can be briefly summarized first as suggested by kalecki movements towards full employment increase the rate of growth of wages and reduce the rate of growth of labor productivity second where long term employment relations are prevalent the effect of unemployment on both wage and labor productivity growth is diminished

a dynamic game of r and d patent protection and competitive behavior a theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to r and d in an n firm industry is developed using differential games this technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem static game theory and optimal control the use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the nash equilibrium in investment rules this paper addresses the problem of resource allocation to research and development among the important issues that a firm engaging in r and d must evaluate are uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation the possibility of a protracted development period the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market in what follows we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of r and d enumerated above we will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis determining the nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms the availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed the impact of increasing rivalry on nash equilibrium investment in r and d depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards if patent protection is perfect then increasing the number of nash rivals results in increased r and d effort however when imitation is rewarded the opposite may be true finally some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below

strategic technology switching under risk aversion and uncertainty abstract firms devising green investment strategies within a deregulated environment must take into account not only economic and technological uncertainty but also strategic interactions due to competition also further complicating green investment decisions is the fact that firms are likely to exhibit risk aversion since alternative energy technologies entail risk that cannot be diversified therefore we develop a utility based real options framework for pre emptive and non pre emptive competition in order to analyse how economic and technological uncertainty interact with risk aversion to impact the adoption of an existing technology in the light of uncertainty over the arrival of an improved version we confirm that greater risk aversion delays investment and show that technological uncertainty accelerates the follower s entry delays the entry of the pre emptive leader and intriguingly does not affect the non pre emptive leader s investment decision also we show how the relative loss in the leader s value due to the follower s entry is affected by economic and technological uncertainty as well as risk aversion and how the risk of pre emption under increasing economic uncertainty raises the value of direct investment in the new technology relative to stepwise investment