online and official price indexes measuring argentina s inflation abstract prices collected from online retailers can be used to construct daily price indexes that complement official statistics this paper studies their ability to match official inflation estimates in five latin american countries with a focus on argentina where official statistics have been heavily criticized in recent years the data were collected between october 2007 and march 2011 from the largest supermarket in each country in brazil chile colombia and venezuela online price indexes approximate both the level and main dynamics of official inflation by contrast argentina s online inflation rate is nearly three times higher than the official estimate

price setting in online markets does it click using a unique dataset of daily u s and u k price listings and the associated number of clicks for precisely defined goods from a major shopping platform we shed new light on how prices are set in online markets which have a number of special properties such as low search costs low costs of monitoring competitors prices and low costs of nominal price adjustment we document that although online prices are more flexible than offline prices they nevertheless exhibit relatively long spells of fixed prices large size and low synchronization of price changes considerable crosssectional dispersion and low sensitivity to predictable or unanticipated changes in demand conditions qualitatively these patterns are similar to those observed for offline prices a finding that suggests a need for more research on the sources of price rigidities and dispersion

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

asymmetric information auditing commitment and economic growth we analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences arising from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification specifically two endogenous growth models of which one allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies to identify borrowers investment returns and the other does not are compared we show that the inability to commit acts as an additional source of informational friction that leads to more stringent contractual terms which in turn result in lower capital accumulation growth and welfare in addition when a tax on capital is considered the tax induced investment distortions are amplified by the absence of auditing commitment from the policy perspective our analysis can be interpreted as suggesting a new micro economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare

central banks inflation forecasts under asymmetric loss evidence from four latin american countries we study the rationality of the inflation forecasts of the central banks of argentina brazil chile and mexico we reject rationality under a symmetric chile is an exception but not under an asymmetric loss function an overprediction implies a larger loss than an underprediction we also analyze alternative rationality tests growth forecasts and private sector forecasts

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

is inflation persistence different in reality this study examines the inflation persistence using both online and official price indexes in argentina brazil china japan germany south africa the uk and the us using fractional integration technique the main results suggest that the degree of persistence estimated by the long memory parameter is smaller when using online price indexes believed to be a more realistic measure of inflation mainly in the cases of argentina brazil china and the uk monetary policy implications are discussed

altruism within the family reconsidered do nice guys finish last this paper criticizes the view that altruism either increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families the authors identify a variety of circumstances in which members of a group would prefer to interact with less altruistic individuals and in which the efficiency of resource allocation is inversely related to the prevailing degree of altruism reasons that altruism might be a counter productive social force include 1 it can alter the social utility possibility frontier in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways 2 it can entail exploitability causing family members to behave in ways that leave all parties worse off 3 altruists may take inefficient actions to preempt exploitation and 4 family members may establish efficient resource allocation by punishing selfish behavior a rise in the level of altruism may lead to the exclusion of certain punishment strategies on the grounds of credibility 1 general positive result is that sufficiently high levels of altruism almost always lead to efficient resource allocation one should not necessarily expect to find strong altruistic linkages between spouses nor should altruism necessarily contributed to marital stability in addition to the connections between this work and the literature on family behavior this analysis has broader implications concerning the role of altruism in society and the evolution of social conscience

discounting and altruism to future decision makers is discounting of future decision makers consumption utilities consistent with pure altruism toward those decision makers that is a concern that they are better off according to their own likewise forward looking preferences it turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature in particular hyperbolic discounting of the form used by phelps and pollak rev econ studies 35 1968 201 and laibson quart j econ 112 1997 443 is consistent with exponential altruism towards future generations more generally we establish a one to one relationship between discount functions and altruism weight systems and provide sufficient as well as necessary conditions for discount functions to be consistent with pure altruism

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

reputation and discretion in financial contracting the authors explain the use of legally unenforceable discretionary financial contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracts are feasible a discretionary contract allows a contracting party to choose whether or not to honor the contract it is shown that such a contract liquefies reputational capital by permitting it to be depreciated in exchange for the preservation of financial capital and information reusability in financially impaired states in addition discretionary contracts foster the development of reputation this explains discretion among highly confident letters holding company relationships mutual fund contracts bank loan commitments and other financial and nonfinancial contracts copyright 1993 by american economic association

on the economics of nonmarket transfers the role of altruism abstract we examine altruistically motivated consumption transfers in an effort to account for nonmarket transfers we find that altruistic linkages lead to autonomous negotiation free transfers and that such transfers positively respond to stronger altruism we also find that given fairly natural assumptions concerning the altruism parameters mutual altruism does not necessarily result in group social harmony even though its rise narrows the conflict range in spite of enhanced transfers prompted by such a rise both parties may end up worse off these results help explain why in some social environments a shift toward market oriented transfers and exchanges may be quicker than in others as the disadvantages decline in utility associated with intragroup altruistic linkages outweigh the advantages

price setting under uncertainty about inflation abstract we analyze the manipulation of inflation statistics that occurred in argentina starting in 2007 to test the relevance of informational frictions in price setting we estimate that the manipulation of statistics was associated with a higher degree of price dispersion this effect is analyzed in the context of a quantitative general equilibrium model in which firms use information about the inflation rate to set prices reporting inaccurate measures of the cpi entails significant welfare losses especially in economies with volatile monetary policy

skill premium labor supply and changes in the structure of wages in latin america earnings inequality declined rapidly in argentina brazil and chile during the 2000s a reduction in the experience premium is a fundamental driver of declines in upper tail 90 50 inequality while a decline in the education premium is the primary determinant of the evolution of lower tail 50 10 inequality relative labor supply is important for explaining changes in the skill premiums relative demand trends favored high skilled workers during the 1990s shifting in favor of low skilled workers during the 2000s changes in the minimum wage and more importantly commodity led terms of trade improvements are key factors behind these relative skill demand trends

how inheriting affects bequest plans we present and test the idea that bequest planning is linked with the experience of inheriting we consider a family tradition of bequeathing as a channel through which the intention to bequeath is moulded by and is positively correlated with the experience of inheriting using data from the survey on health ageing and retirement in europe share we find that the experience of inheriting enhances the intention to bequeath independently of the positive impact of wealth we also find that the expectation of inheriting has a positive impact on the intention to bequeath controlling for the expected increase in wealth on account of future inheritances

comparative statics of altruism and spite abstract the equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players payoffs or more generally on some social payoff that depends on everyone s actions a positive negative or zero weight represents altruism spite or complete selfishness respectively as it turns out even in a symmetric interaction the equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or spiteful groups in particular a concern for others payoffs may paradoxically lower these payoffs however this can only be so if the equilibrium strategies involved are unstable if they are stable the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism in these results stability stands for a general notion of static stability which includes a number of established ones such as evolutionarily stable strategy as special cases

efficiency enhancing signalling in the samaritan s dilemma suppose an altruistic person a is willing to transfer resources to a second person b if b comes upon hard times if b anticipates that a will act in this manner b will save too little from both agents point of view this is the samaritan s dilemma this paper shows that the undersaving result is mitigated if we relax the standard assumption of complete information because if a is uncertain about how big b s need for support is b will have an incentive to signal that he is in great need by saving more than he otherwise would have done

gift exchange incentives and heterogeneous workers by incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal agent model i investigate the relation between monetary gift exchange and incentive pay while allowing for worker heterogeneity i assume that some but not all workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them the principal can be egoistic or altruistic absent worker heterogeneity an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation however the latter is not always required to credibly signal altruism furthermore since some workers do not reciprocate the principal s altruism the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types such a contract is characterised by excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

costly state verification with varying risk preferences and liability abstract in the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification we examine how the properties of the set of states different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments in particular we show that with risk averse debtors a general set of states a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states if the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral this non monotonicity of consumption disappears moreover given the loan size there is more monitoring under debtor risk aversion than risk neutrality we present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability finally we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework

loan size as a commitment device the authors model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy the borrower underreports with a positive probability in the successful state and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure under lack of commitment to audit probabilities an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit this reduces the probability of underreporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commitment case however there is underinvestment relative to the level under full information copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets abstract this paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type insurers can at some cost verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out however insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy the paper analyzes the relationship between second best pareto optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework it characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium the individuals contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists

the supply of children s time to disabled elderly parents i introduction in recent years economists have become increasingly interested in intergenerational transfers of both time and money 1 such transfers may be motivated by altruism or exchange models of altruism assume that a person s utility depends on the consumption or utility of other family members and her own consumption for example children may supply unpaid informal care to aging parents because their utility increases when their parents are happier one of the most striking predictions of models of altruism is that public subsidies tend to crowd out transfers by altruistic individuals especially if the subsidy is financed by taxing the altruistic individual becker 1974 in exchange models there is typically altruism but one family member such as a parent can induce a relative such as a child or kid 2 to provide more services or money than the relative would normally provide by threatening to withhold a bequest to the extent that this is so one would plausibly expect more care and attention to be provided to wealthy parents when there is more than one kid more care should be provided because the threat of disinheritance is more credible when there is competition between kids for bequests in a well known article bernheim shleifer and summers 1985 hereafter referred to as bss found empirical support for the strategic bequest motive based on an observed positive relationship between children s visits and telephone calls to elderly parents per child as the measure of attention and bequeathable wealth per child as the measure of the financial motivation for providing such attention one might expect this result to extend to decisions about direct provision of help informal care that kids may provide to parents the marginal benefit of such care is plausibly greater than the benefit derived from a visit or telephone call in a recent article however we found no evidence that the strategic bequest motive is an important determinant of the amount of informal care kids provide or a related decision whether or not to place the parent in a nursing home sloan hoerger and picone 1996 we focused on the distinction between cognitively aware parents who can threaten to disinherit their kids and cognitively unaware parents who cannot disinherit and examined whether this distinction had any effect on the probability that the parent entered a nursing home or on amounts of formal and informal care received if the parent remained in the community any strategic effects were swamped by the greater marginal benefit of care to the parent when the parent was cognitively unaware moreover among the cognitively aware richer parents actually received less informal care contrary to the strategic model s predictions unfortunately in past research on intergenerational transfers of time and money it was not possible to control for the wealth wage and other characteristics of kids to the extent that kid s wealth and wage were positively correlated with parent s wealth which was observed the parameter estimates on parent s wealth may be negatively biased although parent s wealth and kid s wealth and wage rates are plausibly positively correlated they have opposite effects on the supply of kid s time according to the strategic bequest model that is potential bequests from a parent may be less attractive to rich kids and therefore induce less care we test the strategic bequest model using information on elderly parents and their children from two linked surveys the 1989 national long term care survey nltcs for elderly individuals and the survey of informal caregivers sic for a subsample of the elderly s children using these data we can include explicit measures of kid s wealth and wage rates thereby avoiding the possible bias introduced by a correlation between parent s and kid s wealth and wages also the data sets provide information on several pertinent health cognitive and functional status variables which are not typically observed in surveys of financial status

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

costly verification of cost performance and the competition for incentive contracts this article analyzes the optimal linear incentive contract to offer to would be agents competing for a principal s project when the principal finds it costly to observe an agent s cost performance ex post and cannot commit to monitoring policy ex ante cost sharing reduces the winning bidder s informational rents but creates an incentive for the agent to pad costs ex post to slacken his effort the optimal cost sharing parameter generally differs from that when monitoring is costless and it is higher the fewer the number of bidders and the larger the variance of their idiosyncratic cost

signaling in credit markets in this paper we show that under a variety of alternative assumptions about the private information of loan applicants a competitive market for loans is characterized by screening banks separate out loan risks by offering higher loans at higher interest rates depending on the nature of the informational asymmetry it may be that applicants with less risky projects select larger rather than smaller loans comparative statics implications are also examined in particular we explore the effects of an increase in banks cost of funds on average loan quality

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

prices inflation and smoking onset the case of argentina this article examines the effect of tobacco prices on the decision to start smoking in argentina argentina is an interesting case to explore given its high smoking rates its recent experience with periods of very high and hyperinflation and the mixed evidence of the effect of prices on smoking onset particularly in low and middle income countries we used data from four cycles of two large national surveys conducted between 2005 and 2011 and discrete time hazard models we found that tobacco prices had a statistically significant and fairly large impact on the hazard of smoking onset and these findings were robust to alternative specifications we also found that prices had little effect on the hazards of smoking onset during periods of hyper and very high inflation which provide some support for the notion that prices lose their informational role in such periods governments need to be cognizant that their most important policy tool to reduce tobacco use taxes that increase real tobacco prices is likely no longer effective during these times jel c41 h20 i12 i18

correlated default and financial intermediation financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state i show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex post incentives to enforce payments from defaulted loans and borrowers payoffs are correlated when projects have correlated outcomes learning the state of one project via enforcement provides information about the states of other projects a large correlated portfolio provides ex post incentives for enforcement as a result intermediation dominates direct lending intermediaries are financed with risk free deposits earn positive profits and hold systemic default risk

commodity booms and busts in emerging economies abstract emerging economies particularly those dependent on commodity exports are prone to highly disruptive economic cycles this paper proposes a small open economy model for a net commodity exporter to quantitatively study the triggers of these cycles the economy consists of two sectors one of which produces commodities with prices subject to exogenous international fluctuations these fluctuations affect both the competitiveness of the economy and its borrowing terms as higher commodity prices are associated with lower spreads between the country s borrowing rate and world interest rates both effects jointly result in strongly positive effects of commodity price increases on gdp consumption and investment and a negative effect on the total trade balance furthermore they generate excess volatility of consumption over output and a large volatility of investment besides explicitly incorporating a double role of commodity prices the model structure nests the various candidate sources of shocks proposed in previous work on emerging economy business cycles estimating the model on argentine data we find that the contribution of commodity price shocks to fluctuations in post 1950 output growth is in the order of 38 in addition commodity prices account for around 42 and 61 of the variation in consumption and investment growth respectively we find transitory productivity shocks to be an important driver of output fluctuations exceeding the contribution of shocks to the trend which though smaller is not negligible

scraped data and sticky prices i use daily prices collected from online retailers in five countries to study the impact of measurement bias on three common price stickiness statistics relative to previous results i find that o

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts