contract enforcement and trade liberalization in mexico s footwear industry abstract the wave of formal legal system reforms sweeping developing countries provides only a partial solution to the problem of enforcing agreements between firms informal institutions govern the majority of interfirm transactions economic reform also necessitates changes in these institutions this paper examines the evolution of contract enforcement in the mexican footwear industry as trade barriers were removed in the closed economy geographic agglomeration of manufacturing allowed the manufacturers trade associations to maintain information about the behavior of retailers and gave retailers strong incentives to maintain reputations by providing an alternative source for procurement trade liberalization weakened the power of manufacturers

supply chain relationships and contracts the impact of repeated interaction on capacity investment and procurement consider a firm developing an innovative product due to market pressures production must begin soon after the product development effort is complete which requires that an upstream supplier invests in capacity while the design of the product and production process are in flux because the product is ill defined at this point in time the firms are unable to write court enforceable contracts that specify the terms of trade or the supplier s capacity investment however the firms can adopt an informal agreement relational contract regarding the terms of trade and capacity investment the potential for future business provides incentive for the firms to adhere to the relational contract we show that the optimal relational contract may be complex requiring the buyer to order more than her demand to indirectly monitor the supplier s capacity investment we propose a simpler relational contract and show that it performs very well for a broad range of parameters finally we identify characteristics of the business environment that make relational contracting particularly valuable

can we have growth when population is stagnant testing linear growth rate formulas of non scale endogenous growth models abstractwe sub divide scale invariant fully or semi endogenous growth models into six sub categories for formulas relating steady state growth rates of income per capita and the growth rate of the

the allocation and effectiveness of china s r d subsidies evidence from listed firms abstract in this study we investigate the allocation of china s r d subsidies and their effectiveness in stimulating business r d investments for the population of chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2006 with respect to subsidy allocation we find that firm selection is mainly determined by prior grants high quality inventions and minority state ownership market oriented provincial governments distribute grants less frequently and firms located in developed provinces receive grants more often considering effectiveness r d subsidies instantaneously crowd out business r d investment but are neutral in later periods in 2006 one public rmb reduces business r d investments by half an rmb however crowding out is not prevalent for repeated recipients of r d subsidies high tech firms and minority state owned firms

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

for better or forever formal versus informal enforcement this article contrasts supporting partnerships through relational contracting and supporting partnerships through formal legal institutions a large population of players interact in bilateral relationships efficiency requires cooperation but cheating yields a higher short term payoff there is a positive probability that the maximum feasible payoff available to a partnership decreases opportunistic behavior makes it impossible to realize the efficient outcome a legal system can lead to efficient contracting without such a system productive relationships arise in equilibrium if it is costly to initiate new relationships this type of relational contracting tends to make partnerships last longer than is efficient

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

long run growth empirics and new challenges for unified theory annual estimates of productivity are reported for periods over 500 years for eight countries and for five other countries over shorter periods one and two break time series models are used to investigate discontinuities in productivity growth the results support two break models of long run productivity and they favour approaches to unified growth modelling with three epochs however the lessening of productivity gaps and the decisive shifts to higher productivity occurred in the twentieth century chiefly in the years around the world war ii the timing of the breaks and the complexity of the historical record highlights a need for unified models to connect more closely with economic history

dynamics of china s provincial level specialization in strategic emerging industries this paper examines the dynamics of technological specialization in strategic emerging industries seis within each of mainland china s 31 provinces and the likely effectiveness based on the experiences of taiwan and south korea of the provinces strategies for developing these industries grounded in economic decentralization theories the empirical method employed includes analyzing the scores on an sei specialization promotion index per each province alongside several analytics of invention patent data from each province in the seven seis newly designated by the central level government as of 2010 the data is quantitatively analyzed according to four groups of indicators based on the following specialization relevant concepts comparative advantages and technological capabilities economy size and income technological uncertainty and lifecycles and latecomer entry into complex technologies where knowledge is most cumulative the analysis finds that china s system of economic decentralization has partially worked to ensure provincial industrial policymaking is effective whereby a notable number of provinces are seemingly pursuing sei development strategies in terms of sei selection and promotion that may enable catch up however paradoxically at the same time the system appears to sometimes facilitate provincial sei development strategies that are quite risky or even likely ineffective

optimal procurement contracts under a binding budget constraint the traditional literature on agency models predicts that for zero liability contracts it is optimal for the principal to pay for the information he cannot observe however this principle is not valid for a set of contracts mostly used by government agencies whose distinguishing feature is represented by a stringent budget constraint for the principal this paper shows that in this environment the principal will either choose a structure exibiting pooling or a bargaining solution the bargaining solution represents the analytical proof to the intuition of the difficulty in implementing procurement contracts stated by laffont and tirole 1993

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

ostracism and forgiveness many communities rely upon ostracism to enforce cooperation if an individual shirks in one relationship her innocent neighbors share information about her guilt in order to shun her while continuing to cooperate among themselves however a strategic victim may herself prefer to shirk rather than report her victimization truthfully if guilty players are to be permanently ostracized then such deviations are so tempting that cooperation in any relationship is bounded by what the partners could obtain through bilateral enforcement ostracism can improve upon bilateral enforcement if tempered by forgiveness through which guilty players are eventually readmitted to cooperative society

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

development of national innovation policy in small developing countries the case of cyprus abstract this paper analyses the concept of national innovation policy nip and puts forward arguments supporting the need for a nip for small developing economies like cyprus a brief outline is given of the science technology infrastructure and current innovation related policies in cyprus while the attitudes of owners managers of private manufacturing firms towards these policies based on a research survey are examined the survey reveals an ambivalent attitude towards nip which is probably due to unrealistic expectations as well as inefficiency in design and implementation of innovation policy measures case research confirms these conclusions and highlights the importance of nip for private firms despite the rhetoric of their managers against it the formulation of a specific nip for cyprus is then considered from which lessons for other developing countries are drawn

an economic approach to social capital a standard optimal investment model can be used to analyse an individual s decision to accumulate social capital we analyse six facts that support the predictions of this individual based approach 1 social capital first rises and then falls with age 2 social capital declines with expected mobility 3 social capital rises in occupations with greater returns to social skills 4 social capital is higher among homeowners 5 social connections fall sharply with physical distance 6 people who invest in human capital also invest in social capital we fail to find robust evidence that social capital investments fall with the value of time or that geographic religious groups generate social capital complementarities

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

cooperation in community interaction without information flows we study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other s past actions they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship there is incomplete information regarding player types a subset of the population is myopic while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation in principle we define social equilibrium in such communities such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase followed by cooperation if the test is successful it is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation by raising barriers to entry into new relationships we examine the implications of increased patience which takes two forms an increase in the number of non myopic types and an increase in the discount factor of non myopic types these two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained

an arrgh chy the law and economics of pirate organization this article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law economics and organization of pirates to effectively organize their banditry pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation minimize crew conflict and maximize piratical profit pirates devised two institutions for this purpose first i analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation second i examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

productive low morale abstract this paper models employment relationship as a repeated principal agent problem with private evaluation the efficient contracts exhibit correlated movements between lagged wage and current effort that are consistent with the positive feedback between pay and morale in practice low morale therefore is an integral part of a well functioning relationship

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

foreign competition domestic knowledge base and innovation activities evidence from chinese high tech industries using panel data analysis for a sample of chinese high technology industries from 1998 to 2008 this study examines how industry characteristics affect industry innovation activities differing from existing studies our research considers the impact of foreign competition on innovation activities at industry level in a large emerging economy the results indicate that the intensity of competition from foreign invested enterprises fies and domestic skill intensity affect industry buy and make activities foreign competition is positively associated with the intensity of buy activity but negatively affects the intensity of make activity further the findings show that domestic skill intensity weakens the impact of foreign competitive pressure on innovation activities our empirical evidence has important policy implications

the growth and welfare effects of deficit financed dividend tax cuts the dividend tax cut enacted in 2003 with the job growth and taxpayer relief reconciliation act jgtrra has generated a heated public debate and prompted a new wave of research in public and corporate finance supporters argue that the act has reduced the corporate cost of capital and thus raised investment growth and employment critics focus on its distributional implications and on the budget deficits that it has generated given the government s failure to reduce public spending as a large scale experiment in fiscal policy the act provides a unique research opportunity for modern growth economics since one of the central ideas perhaps the central idea driving the field is precisely that policy matters the theory of endogenous innovation in particular has produced novel analytical insights that appear well suited to make a significant contribution to a debate spurred by a drastic change in the taxation of corporate source income and heavily loaded on both sides

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

trust social capital and economic development many argue that elements of a society s norms culture or social capital are central to understanding its development however these notions have been difficult to capture in economic models here we explore ap ossible role for trustworthiness as corresponding to social capital individuals are trustworthy when they perform in accordance with promises even if this does not maximize their payoffs the usual focus on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here instead we emphasize more deep seated modes of behaviour and consider trustworthy agents being socialized to act as they do to model this socialization we borrow from a process of preference evolution pioneered by bisin and verdier 2001 the model developed endogenously accounts for social capital and explores its role in the process of economic development it captures in a simple formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy s productive processes the results obtained caution against rapid reform and provide an explanation for why late developing countries may not easily be able to transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the west

an institutionalized policy making mechanism china s return to techno industrial policy abstract technology and innovation policy in china shifted dramatically in 2003 returning to techno industrial policy that involves direct government interventions to shape specific industrial sectors this article precisely documents the shift and shows that it occurred through two successive waves of policy change this policy shift was formulated through a policy process that like others in china has become increasingly institutionalized the article introduces a general four phase model that describes the structured policy process in china in the case of innovation policy this structured policy process facilitated a shift to a substantially more interventionist policy

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability a case for pay for performance abstract research on subjective evaluation in principal agent models have shown that the optimal contract should give uniform reward with zero money burning at all but the worst performance in a static game involving two independent tasks with only high or low output possible it is shown that when the agent is subjected to limited liability the optimal contract is more likely to exhibit pay for performance full money burning if both tasks yield low outputs partial money burning for mixed performance of low and high outputs and zero money burning following high output in both tasks

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

endogenous institutional selection building trust and economic growth abstract private order market institutions founded on trust based relational contracts suffer adverse selection and moral hazard problems while public order market institutions have a limited capacity to enforce contracts i model agent selection between contract enforcement institutions and demonstrate that the state s contract enforcement capacity is complementary to private order contract enforcement institutions for low to moderate levels of public order enforcement capacity this suggests that initial improvements to public order institutions cause the accumulation of trust and result in economic growth in both institutions however i show that the private order institution must collapse once the public order contract enforcement capacity is too great

effects of government financial incentives on firms innovation performance in china evidences from beijing in the 1990s abstract the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of chinese government financial incentives on firms innovation performance during the nation s initial economic transition period in the mid 1990s through a large scale empirical survey of more than 1000 chinese manufacturing firms the empirical evidences show that whereas the major government financial incentives such as special loans and tax credits were positively influential to innovative economic performance of firms direct earmarks not only failed to enhance innovative economic performance it sometimes negatively affected it surprisingly the findings show that all financial incentives of governments were unrelated to the patents of either high tech or general firms and direct earmarks affected the patents of these firms negatively although not to a significant degree this indicates that the centrally planned funding system of the 1990s was ineffective for enhancing technological progress for chinese manufacturing firms the study results imply that the chinese government should further increase the role of market force in its reforms a more market driven model by developing more s t initiatives to match the strategic directions of different enterprises particularly soes is recommended

from smith to schumpeter a theory of take off and convergence to sustained growth abstract this paper proposes a theory of the emergence of modern schumpeterian growth that focuses on the within industry forces that regulate the response of firms and entrepreneurs to smithian market expansion and thus identifies an amplification mechanism that the literature has neglected because it solves the model in closed form the paper provides analytical insight on the forces that drive the economy s phase transition and the associated qualitative transformation of industrial activity the resulting s shaped path of gdp per capita replicates the key feature of the data an accelerating phase followed by a deceleration with convergence to a stationary growth rate the model also yields predictions for grand ratios like consumption gdp profits gdp and the distribution of income across factors of production

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

china s innovation policies evolution institutional structure and trajectory abstract china has transformed itself from a planning to a market oriented economy over the past three decades and has sustained a fairly long period of rapid economic growth to which the contributions from innovation in science and technology s t have become increasingly important then how have china s innovation policies evolved to reflect the changing and supposedly better understanding of innovation by china s policy makers the paper tries to answer this question through a quantitative analysis of 287 policies issued by china s central government agencies between 1980 and 2005 and of 79 policies introduced between 2006 and 2008 to implement the medium and long term plan for the development of science and technology 2006 2020 china has shifted its s t and industrial policy centered innovation strategy and has pursued a series of better coordinated innovation oriented economic and technology initiatives that give greater attention to a portfolio of policies that include critical financial tax and fiscal measures there has been a gradual departure from the pattern in which innovation policies are formulated by one single government agency therefore steering china to a different and probably more promising innovation trajectory

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

investing to cooperate theory and experiment we study theoretically and in a lab experiment investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent in our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents the investment stochastically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period we show that more volatile returns make investment more difficult in the absence of legal protection and might force the investor to invest more to guarantee cooperation experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings

trade expansion and contract enforcement consider a world of traders separated in geographic economic or social space honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders but frequencies of meetings and information flows about cheating have local bias honesty is self enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world the extent of self enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self governing small community intermediate size worlds fare worst

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

using the law to change the custom the custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity increasing changes in this paper we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can under certain conditions shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a magnet effect on the custom we also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population we illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance marriage and divorce in sub saharan africa and india

robust endogenous growth abstract this paper studies a generalization of the schumpeterian models with endogenous market structure that allows the overall production structure to be more than linear in the growth driving factor and yet generates endogenous growth defined as steady state constant exponential growth of income per capita this version of modern growth theory therefore is robust in the sense that its key result obtains for a thick set of parameter values instead of as often claimed for a set of measure zero the paper moreover pays close attention to transitional dynamics showing not only the existence but also the global stability of the endogenous growth steady state

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

corporate taxes growth and welfare in a schumpeterian economy abstract i take a new look at the long run implications of taxation through the lens of modern schumpeterian growth theory i focus on the latest vintage of models that sterilize the scale effect through a process of product proliferation that fragments the aggregate market into submarkets whose size does not increase with the size of the workforce i show that the following interventions raise welfare a granting full expensibility of rd b eliminating the corporate income tax and or the capital gains tax c reducing taxes on labor and or consumption what makes these results remarkable is that in all three cases the endogenous increase in the tax on dividends necessary to balance the budget has a positive effect on growth a general implication of my analysis is that corporate taxation plays a special role in schumpeterian economies and provides novel insights on how to design welfare enhancing tax reforms

sunk costs market structure and growth the author presents a model of endogenous innovation where firms undertake in house research and development r d the concentration of sales and r d resources determines the scale and efficiency of r d operations and rate of productivity growth in zero profit equilibrium r d expenditure is one component of total fixed costs and determines the number of active firms this feedback generates interdependent pricing investment and entry exit decisions the jointly determined rate of growth and number of firms supported in general equilibrium define the economy s balanced growth path multiple equilibria exist and firms expectations about rivalry determine the economy s performance copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

dynamic business share allocation in a supply chain with competing suppliers this paper studies a repeated game between a manufacturer and two competing suppliers with imperfect monitoring we present a principal agent model for managing long term supplier relationships using a unique form of measurement and incentive scheme we measure a supplier s overall performance with a rating equivalent to its continuation utility the expected total discounted utility of its future payoffs and incentivize supplier effort with larger allocations of future business we obtain the vector of the two suppliers ratings as the state of a markov decision process and we solve an infinite horizon contracting problem in which the manufacturer allocates business volume between the two suppliers and updates their ratings dynamically based on their current ratings and the current performance outcome our contributions are both theoretical and managerial we propose a repeated principal agent model with a novel incentive scheme to tackle a common but challenging incentive problem in a multiperiod s

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval