the vcg auction in theory and practice abstract we describe two auction forms for search engine advertising and present two simple theoretical results concerning i the estimation of click through rates and ii how to adjust the auctions for broad match search we also describe some of the practical issues involved in implementing a vcg auction

borrowing constraints human capital accumulation and growth abstract borrowing constraints increase aggregate savings and therefore may increase growth this paper argues however that by reducing human capital accumulation borrowing constraints also have negative effects on growth these effects are discussed in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth empirical evidence for oecd and developing countries lend support to the main predictions of the model

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

inflation financial markets and long run real activity abstract empirical evidence suggests that real activity the volume of bank lending activity and the volume of trading in equity markets are strongly positively correlated at the same time inflation and financial market activity are strongly negatively correlated in the long run as are inflation and the real rate of return on equity inflation and real activity are also negatively correlated in the long run particularly for economies with relatively high rates of inflation we present a monetary growth model in which banks and secondary capital markets play a crucial allocative function we show that at least under certain configurations of parameters the predictions of the model are consistent with these and several other observations about inflation finance and long run real activity

can enforcement constraints explain the patterns of capital flows after financial liberalizations abstract a standard small open economy model would have problems accounting for the pattern of capital flows into capital poor economies that open to the rest of the world such types of models would predict extremely large and very sudden capital flows putting these predictions at odds with the data while the bulk of the literature has focused on the role of inputs frictions to produce slower capital flows this article presents an exploration into the role of financial frictions in particular enforcement constraints to produce endogenously slow capital flows we are left with three main findings first enforcement constraints are helpful frictions for producing slow capital flows however these flows do not exhibit the degree of persistence observed in the data finally when we extend our model to mimic declining values of financial autarky the model is able to produce more persistent capital inflows that are more in line with the data although these deficits revert into surpluses more quickly than in the data we are left with a finding that leads to a promising line of research models that include endogenously increasing costs of defaulting are better suited to reproduce the patterns of capital flows into opening economies

financial development and financing constraints international evidence from the structural investment model this article provides evidence that financial development impacts growth by reducing financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment the financing constraints are inferred from the investment euler equation by assuming that the firm s stochastic discount factor is a function of the firm s financial position specifically the stock of liquid assets the magnitude of the changes in the cost of capital is twice as large in a country with a low level of financial development as in a country with an average level of financial development the size effect business cycles and legal environment effects are also considered copyright 2003 oxford university press

bank ownership and performance does politics matter this paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries it finds that state owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts and that the opposite is true for foreign owned banks the paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries next in order to test whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years it finds strong support for this hypothesis

asymmetric information and loan contracts in a neoclassical growth model the authors consider a neoclassical growth model with risky investment projects in which a borrower s an investor s risk type is private information their innovation is to determine jointly the equilibrium loan contract and the economy s growth path and the steady state capital stock the authors show that as capital accumulates credit rationing may fall as an increasing number of lenders choose to acquire costly information to separate borrowers as to type this transition from credit rationing to screening in turn results in a higher capital accumulation path and a higher steady state capital stock they also investigate the effects of a decrease in the cost of information on the economy s capital accumulation path and steady state capital stock the authors show that the cost of information must fall below a threshold level before the economy moves from a credit rationing equilibrium to a screening one thus a threshold must be crossed before the steady state capital stock is increased with a decrease in the cost of information copyright 1997 by ohio state university press

bank commercial loan markets and the role of market structure evidence from surveys of commercial lending abstract this paper seeks to test two tenets that underlie the current practice of antitrust analysis in banking the first is the view that bank commercial loan markets are local in nature and the second is the view that banks in more concentrated markets are more likely to engage in some form of noncompetitive behavior tests of both of these tenets are conducted using an extensive set of loan specific survey information not previously employed to address these issues results consistent with the existence of local banking markets and the dominance of competitive differences as an explanation for observed differences in loan rates are found

solving the feldstein horioka puzzle with financial frictions unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model long term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries a puzzle first identified by feldstein and horioka 1980 we quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation one is limited enforcement w here contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties the other is limited spanning where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds we find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data to solve the puzzle the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level when combined the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the feldstein horioka puzzle

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives if banks have an informational monopoly about their clients borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders the fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks but provided banks retain an initial informational advantage their current profits are raised by the borrowers higher effort this trade off determines the banks willingness to share information their decision affects credit market competition interest rates volume of lending and social welfare article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the disciplinary role of takeovers this paper presents a theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial incentive problems stemming from asymmetric information it is argued that an informed raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation more sensitive to information unavailable to shareholders the paper also highlights the importance of specifying the source of contractual inefficiencies when analyzing the effect of takeovers on incentives

the direction of causality between financial development and economic growth abstract this paper employs the geweke decomposition test on pooled data of 109 developing and industrial countries from 1960 to 1994 to examine the direction of causality between financial development and economic growth the paper finds that 1 financial development generally leads to economic growth 2 the granger causality from financial development to economic growth and the granger causality from economic growth to financial development coexist 3 financial deepening contributes more to the causal relationships in the developing countries than in the industrial countries 4 the longer the sampling interval the larger the effect of financial development on economic growth 5 financial deepening propels economic growth through both a more rapid capital accumulation and productivity growth with the latter channel being the strongest

the coevolution of the real and financial sectors in the growth process the role of debt and equity changes over time and with the level of development what are these changes and why should they systematically occur across different countries and time periods this article characterizes financial innovation as a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by the development of the real sector it focuses on the emergence and development of equity markets using a model that allows for growth and for capital accumulation that is financed externally through a combination of debt and equity as an economy develops the aggregate ratio of debt to equity will generally fall yet debt and equity remain complementary sources for the financing of capital investments the results suggest how various government policy actions might affect capital accumulation and equity market activity

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

financial development and economic growth the role of stock markets utilizing time series methods and data from five developed economies we examine the relationship between stock market development and economic growth controlling for the effects of the banking system and stock market volatility our results support the view that although both banks and stock markets may be able to promote economic growth the erects of the former are more powerful they also suggest that the contribution of stock markets on economic growth may have been exaggerated by studies that utilize cross country growth regressions

financial development and economic growth evidence from panel unit root and cointegration tests abstract in this paper we investigate the long run relationship between financial depth and economic growth trying to utilize the data in the most efficient manner via panel unit root tests and panel cointegration analysis in addition we use threshold cointegration tests and dynamic panel data estimation for a panel based vector error correction model the long run relationship is estimated using fully modified ols for 10 developing countries the empirical results provide clear support for the hypothesis that there is a single equilibrium relation between financial depth growth and ancillary variables and that the only cointegrating relation implies unidirectional causality from financial depth to growth

financial markets development and economic growth tales of informational asymmetries abstract the development of financial systems is very often characterised by the development of innovative financial contracts which allow a more efficient allocation of resources and a higher level of capital productivity and economic growth by exploiting the microeconomic theory of the optimal financial contract under asymmetric information economists have recently managed to shed new light on the well studied issue of the relationship between financial market development and economic growth this paper reviews the most recent progress of this literature which shows that the amount of information asymmetry in the credit market and the degree of heterogeneity between borrowers typically firms and lenders typically workers or savers determine the nature of the financial system differences in endowments and in the level of information distribution can give rise to very different financial contracts which affect and in turn are affected by capital accumulation and growth

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

financial dependence and growth revisited we revisit an earlier highly influential paper on financial dependence and growth by rajan and zingales 1998 we re examine their assumptions and the robustness of their results to alternative theories and interpretations we first show that they may be implicitly testing whether financial intermediaries allow firms to better respond to global shocks to growth opportunities rather than the extent that financial intermediaries allow firms to grow in industries with an inherent technological financial dependence we propose a more direct measure of growth opportunities if u s capital markets are perfect then actual growth in the u s is a good proxy for global growth opportunities we test this directly by including u s industry growth in rajan and zingales s original specification and find that our direct growth measure outperforms their financial dependence measure and is less vulnerable to controlling for outliers and level of development this still suggests an important role for finance in the allocation of resources but shifts the emphasis from financial dependence to global growth opportunities jel f3 g1 o4

information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching abstract we analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition in the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition since the poaching activities can be targeted towards more creditworthy borrowers we find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits and therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets

limited enforcement financial intermediation and economic development a quantitative assessment we present a model of economic development where the importance of financial differences caused by limited enforcement can be measured economies where enforcement is poor direct less capital to the production sector and employ less efficient technologies calibrated simulations reveal that the resulting effect on output is large furthermore the model correctly predicts that the average scale of production should rise with the quality of enforcement finally we find that the importance of limited enforcement rises with the importance of capital in production

institutions and economic growth an historical introduction abstract in this essay the interdependence of political and economic institutions is examined against premises in neoclassical theories of economies which maintain that population and savings are the principal determinants of economic growth that institutions matter in the development of economies is the difference in assumptions i examine i look at the institutional frameworks that preceded adoption of the united states constitution and the northwest ordinance in early america i then trace the precedents of these american institutions to the evolution of common law in england where interests unconcerned with the crown coalesced to form competing political units i then contrast england s institutional development with the comparatively centralized enforcement mechanisms of spain to examine the hypothesis that institutional differences produce economic consequences

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

should central banks respond to movements in asset prices in recent decades asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries in light of this experience how if at all should central bankers respond to asset price volatility we have addressed this issue in previous work bernanke and gertler 1999 the context of our earlier study was the relatively new but increasingly popular monetary policy framework known as inflation targeting see e g bernanke and frederic mishkin 1997 in an inflation targeting framework publicly announced medium term inflation targets provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy while allowing the central bank some flexibility to help stabilize the real economy in the short run the inflation targeting approach gives a specific answer to the question of how central bankers should respond to asset prices changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent that they affect the central bank s forecast of inflation to a first approximation once the predictive content of asset prices for inflation has been accounted for there should be no additional response of monetary policy to assetprice fluctuations in use now for about a decade inflationtargeting has generally performed well in practice however so far this approach has not often been stress tested by large swings in asset prices our earlier research employed simulations of a small calibrated macroeconomic model to examine how an inflation targeting policy defined as one in which the central bank s instrument interest rate responds primarily to changes in expected inflation might fare in the face of a boom and bust cycle in asset prices we found that an aggressive inflationtargeting policy rule in our simulations one in which the coefficient relating the instrument interest rate to expected inflation is 2 0 substantially stabilizes both output and inflation in scenarios in which a bubble in stock prices develops and then collapses as well as in scenarios in which technology shocks drive stock prices intuitively inflation targeting central banks automatically accommodate productivity gains that lift stock prices while offsetting purely speculative increases or decreases in stock values whose primary effects are through aggregate demand conditional on a strong policy response to expected inflation we found little if any additional gains from allowing an independent response of central bank policy to the level of asset prices in our view there are good reasons outside of our formal model to worry about attempts by central banks to influence asset prices including the fact that as history has shown the effects of such attempts on market psychology are dangerously unpredictable hence we concluded that inflationtargeting central banks need not respond to asset prices except insofar as they affect the inflation forecast in the spirit of recent work on robust control the exercises in our earlier paper analyzed the performance of policy rules in worst case discussants robert shiller yale university glenn rudebusch federal reserve bank of san francisco kenneth rogoff harvard university

welfare gains from international risksharing abstract this paper uses consumption data to compute yet unexploited welfare gains that can be achieved through risksharing among twenty oecd countries there is both aggregate national consumption risk and nondiversifiable individual specific risk countries engage in an optimal risksharing arrangement to pool risk associated with the aggregate consumption endowment streams welfare gains are associated with reduced consumption variability and with the international pricing of the consumption streams of individual countries the paper considers the standard vnm time additive preferences as well as nonexpected utility and habit formation preferences large unexploited gains are found under all sets of preferences leading to an international risksharing puzzle

the legal environment banks and long run economic growth this paper examines the relationship between the legal system and banlding development and traces this connection through to long run rates of per capita gdp growth capital stock growth and productivity growth the data indicate that countries where the legal system 1 emphasizes creditor rights and 2 rigorously enforces contracts have better developed banks than countries where laws do not give a high priority to creditors and where enforcement is lax furtherrnore the exogenous component of banking development the component defined by the legal environment is positively and robustly associated with per capita growth physical capital accumulation and productivity growth this paper addresses two questions first do crosscountry differences in the legal rights of creditors the efficiency of contract enforcement and the origin of the legal system explain cross country differences in the level of banking development second do better developed banks cause faster economic development that is is the component of banking development defined by the legal environment positively associated with long run rates of economic growth capital accumulation and productivity growth examining the relationship between the legal system and banking development is valuable irrespective of issues associated with long run growth first banks may influence the level of income per capita and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations bernanke and gertler 1989 1990 second many economists stress that understanding the evolution of legal and financial systems is essential for understanding economic development north 1981 engerman and sokoloff 1996 consequently quantitative information on the relationship between the legal environment and banks will improve our understanding of business cycles and the process of economic development furthermore examining the causal links between banks and economic growth has both conceptual and policy implications on the conceptual front a long literature debates the importance of banks in economic development starting as early as bagehot 1873 economists have argued that better banks banks that are better at identifying creditworthy firms mobilizing savings pooling risks and facilitating transactions

optimal bankruptcy law and firm specific investments in this paper we characterize an optimal bankruptcy law that takes into consideration the incentives of managers to invest in firm specific human capital we show that the optimal bankruptcy law is biased towards the management team and may be implemented by the use of a restricted auction mechanism in which creditors have the right to refuse bankruptcy but are not allowed to bid for the firm the bankruptcy law is needed as a commitment device to implement the optimal outcome

china s regional natural resource allocation and utilization a dea based approach in a big data environment abstract china s economic reform and opening policy has resulted in china s rapid growth especially in terms of economy the growth however is mainly based on huge consumption of natural resources and that consumption should be reduced by significant amounts to protect global ecosystems emerged in 1980s big data has developed very quickly in recent years bringing new perspectives and opportunities for all kinds of academic fields especially in dea since it is a research highly based on data in this paper we propose a sbm dea model based on natural resource input orientation to evaluate the efficiency of natural resource utilization for 26 provincial regions in mainland china from 2005 to 2012 a dea based approach is developed to allocate a reduced total of natural resources among the 26 provincial regions drawing support from the developments of big data we use each provincial region s previously observed production data to characterize its own production technology which allows a better analysis of how the production will change after allocations of natural resources are reduced our empirical study shows that most provincial regions perform well in terms of efficiency in utilizing natural resources but that is based on huge consumption of natural resources from an area perspective the eastern area of china achieved the highest average efficiency value followed by the central and western areas our study also indicates that the most effective allocation of the natural resources requires about half of the 26 provincial regions to reduce their natural resource consumption while the remaining ones can maintain their original consumption

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

volatility and growth credit constraints and the composition of investment abstract how does uncertainty and credit constraints affect the cyclical composition of investment and thereby volatility and growth this paper addresses this question within a model where firms engage in two types of investment a short term one and a long term one which contributes more to productivity growth because it takes longer to complete long term investment has a relatively less cyclical return but it also has a higher liquidity risk the first effect ensures that the share of long term investment to total investment is countercyclical when financial markets are perfect the second implies that this share may turn procyclical when firms face tight credit constraints a novel propagation mechanism thus emerges through its effect on the cyclical composition of investment tighter credit can lead to both higher volatility and lower mean growth evidence from a panel of countries provides support for the model s key predictions

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

institutions for financial development what are they and where do they come from abstract among the fundamental causes of long run economic performance differences in institutions have received considerable attention in recent years at the same time a large body of theoretical and empirical work shows that financial development can have a big effect on economic performance this raises the more fundamental question as to why some countries have developed financial markets while others do not this paper reviews the theoretical and empirical research on this issue and shows that one of the channels whereby better institutions may have an effect on economic development is through the consolidation of larger and better financial markets an issue that is left aside in this paper relates to what regulations and policies lead to better functioning capital markets at some level one can think of regulations and policies as particular types of institutions nonetheless institutional problems are deeper causes leading to poor economic performance bad policies might simply be part of the channels through which they influence performance thus addressing the question of what determines the emergence of good institutions i e institutions that promote financial development seems particularly important recent research providing some answers to this question is also reviewed

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

transactions costs technological choice and endogenous growth abstract hicks a theory of economic history clarendon press oxford 1969 argues that an important aspect of industrial development is the adoption of technologies requiring highly illiquid capital investments the adoption of such technologies becomes economically viable in the presence of low cost financial markets that provide liquidity to investors this observation provides a mechanism by which the costs of transacting in financial markets affect the equilibrium choice of technology productive efficiency and by implication growth we analyze how the costs of financial market transactions affect the set of technologies in use and the equilibrium growth rate transactions cost reductions may depending on the capital structure enhance or reduce growth journal of economic literature classification numbers d90 e13 g14

capital control liberalization and stock market development the authors address two questions what happens to stock market size liquidity volatility and integration with world capital markets after capital controls are liberalized and what is the relationship between those indicators of stock market development and regulations about information disclosure accounting standards and investor protection an analysis of data on stock markets in 16 developing countries suggests the following a stock markets become larger more liquid more integrated internationally and more volatile after controls on capital and dividend flows are liberalized b easy access to information about firms is positively associated with the size and liquidity of stock markets and c countries that officially establish internationally accepted accounting standards and laws to protect investors do not have substantially better functioning stock markets than countries that do not adopt those official standards

capital mobility in developing countries some measurement issues and empirical estimates an economy s financial integration with the outside world the extent of capital mobility across its borders is a key determinant of some of its most important macroeconomic properties yet little is known about this characteristic of many developing economies an important stumbling block in the empirical assessment of financial integration openness is the many approaches to measuring it the author describes and evaluates different tests of capital mobility surveys existing evidence and applies four tests of capital mobility to assess the degree to which the many developing countries tested have achieved integration with the world financial markets the four tests are the 1 magnitude of gross capital flows 2 uncovered interest rate parity 3 strength of saving investment correlations and 4 behavior of domestic consumption over time the evidence suggests that most developing countries can be considered to be financially open in only 18 of the 57 developing countries classified did the data fail to show financial openness and that many countries may be experiencing an increased degree of integration with world financial markets

on finance as a theory of tfp cross industry productivity differences and economic rents we develop a theory of capital market imperfections to study how the ability to enforce contracts affects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of different productivities and across industries with different needs for external financing the theory implies that countries with a poor ability to enforce contracts are characterized by the use of inefficient technologies low aggregate tfp large differences in labor productivity across industries and large employment shares in industries with low productivity these implications are supported by the empirical evidence the theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

the effect of financial development on convergence theory and evidence we introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multicountry schumpeterian growth model the theory predicts that any country with more than some critical level of financial development will converge to the growth rate of the world technology frontier and that all other countries will have a strictly lower long run growth rate we present evidence supporting these and other implications in the form of a cross country growth regression with a significant and sizable negative coefficient on initial per capita gdp relative to the united states interacted with financial intermediation in addition we find that other variables representing schooling geography health policy politics and institutions do not affect the significance of the interaction between financial intermediation and initial per capita gdp and do not show any independent effect on convergence in the regressions our findings are robust to removal of outliers and to alternative conditioning sets estimation procedures and measures of financial development

public debt and financial development abstract we examine the role of public debt in financial development the literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark we contrast this safe asset view to a lazy banks view developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly because it could make banks profitable but inefficient results from country level and bank level regressions are more supportive of the lazy banks view but the safe asset view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks there is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991

financial development and openness evidence from panel data abstract this paper addresses the empirical question of whether trade and financial openness can help explain the recent pace in financial development as well as its variation across countries in recent years utilising annual data from developing and industrialised countries and dynamic panel estimation techniques we provide evidence which suggests that both types of openness are statistically significant determinants of banking sector development our findings reveal that the marginal effects of trade financial openness are negatively related to the degree of financial trade openness indicating that relatively closed economies stand to benefit most from opening up their trade and or capital accounts although these economies may be able to accomplish more by taking steps to open both their trade and capital accounts opening up one without the other could still generate gains in terms of banking sector development thus our findings provide only partial support to the well known rajan and zingales hypothesis which stipulates that both types of openness are necessary for financial development to take place