inefficient credit booms this paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks in particular it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post even though from a first best perspective the equilibrium always displays under borrowing from a second best point of view excessive borrowing can arise the inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market this generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts the model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention we develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term safe asset when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility in such a situation a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate it can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand

commodity price risk management and fiscal policy in a sovereign default model abstract commodity prices are an important driver of fiscal policy and the business cycle in many developing and emerging market economies we analyze a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign default featuring endogenous fiscal policy and stochastic commodity revenues the model accounts for a positive correlation of commodity revenues with government expenditures and a negative correlation with tax rates we quantitatively document the extent to which the utilization of different financial hedging instruments by the government contributes to lowering the volatility of different macroeconomic variables and their correlation with commodity revenues an event analysis illustrates how financial hedging instruments moderate fiscal adjustment in response to significant falls in the price of commodities we evaluate the conditional and unconditional welfare gains for the representative household generated by financial derivatives and commodity indexed bonds

global imbalances and financial fragility the united states is currently engulfed in the most severe financial crisis since the great depression the crisis was triggered by the crash in the real estate bubble and amplified by the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector conventional wisdom is that both the bubble and the risk concentration were the result of mistakes in regulatory policy an expansionary monetary policy during the boom period of the bubble and failure to reign in the practices of unscrupulous lenders in this paper we argue that while correct in some dimensions this story misses two key structural factors behind the securitization process that supported the real estate boom and the corresponding lever age first over the last decade the us has experienced large and sustained capital inflows from foreigners seeking us assets to store value caballero emmanuel farhi and pierre olivier gourinchas 2008 second especially after the nasdaq tech bubble and bust excess world savings have looked predominantly for safe debt investments this should not be surprising because a large amount of the capital flow into the us has been from foreign central banks and governments that are not expert investors and are merely looking for a store of value krishnamurthy and annette vissing jorgenson 2008 in this paper we develop a stylized model that captures the essence of this environment the model accounts for three facts observed during the boom and bust phases of the current crisis first during a period of good shocks which we interpret as the period up to the end

news sovereign debt maturity and default risk abstract leading into a debt crisis interest rate spreads on sovereign debt rise before the economy experiences a decline in productivity suggesting that news about future economic developments may play an important role in these episodes an empirical var estimation shows that a news shock has a larger contemporaneous impact on sovereign credit spreads than a comparable shock to labor productivity a quantitative model of news and sovereign debt default with endogenous maturity choice generates impulse responses and a variance decomposition similar to the empirical var estimates the dynamics of the economy after a bad news shock share some features of a productivity shock and some features of sudden stop events however unlike during sudden stop episodes long term debt does not shield the country from bad news shocks and it may even exacerbate default risk finally an increase in the precision of news allows the government to improve its debt maturity management especially during periods of high stress in credit markets and thus face lower yield spreads while increasing the amount of debt

debt maturity without commitment i analyze how lack of commitment afiects the maturity structure of sovereign debt governments balance beneflts of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default their choice of short versus longterm debt afiects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers the equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that re ect the price impact of these decisions the model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high output low or a cross default more likely these predictions are consistent with empirical evidence

default settlement and signalling lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt this paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments this implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement but after varying periods of exclusion copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

bankruptcy and delinquency in a model of unsecured debt this article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default we observe that for individuals 60 90 days late on payments i 85 make payments during the next quarter and ii 40 reduce their debt to understand these facts we develop a quantitative model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers typically offering partial debt forgiveness instead of a blanket imposition of the penalty rates most unsecured credit contracts specify

voluntary sovereign debt exchanges we show that some recent sovereign debt restructurings were characterized by i the absence of missed debt payments prior to the restructurings ii reductions in the government s debt burden and iii increases in the market value of debt claims for holders of the restructured debt since both the government and its creditors are likely to benefit from such restructurings we label these episodes as voluntary debt exchanges we present a model in which voluntary debt exchanges can occur in equilibrium when the debt level takes values above the one that maximizes the market value of debt claims in contrast to previous studies on debt overhang in our model opportunities for voluntary exchanges arise because a debt reduction implies a decline of sovereign default risk this is observed in the absence of any effect of debt reductions on future output levels although voluntary exchanges are pareto improving at the time of the restructuring we show that eliminating the possibility of conducting voluntary exchanges may improve welfare from an ex ante perspective thus our results highlight a cost of initiatives that facilitate debt restructurings

quasi fixity and multiproduct firms abstract a short run model for the supply response and input demand of a multiproduct firm is developed based on the differential production approach a simple parameterization of the model is provided

sovereign debt sustainability in advanced economies we develop a measure of maximum sustainable government debt for advanced economies how much investors are willing to lend to a country s government depends on the country s expected primary surplus the level and volatility of its rate of growth and how much debt the government expects to be able to raise in the future for the purpose of servicing the debt it seeks to raise today we provide a simple formula that computes a country s maximum sustainable debt msd as a function of four easy to estimate parameters we further compute a country s theoretical probability of default pd as a function of its debt to gdp ratio we nally calibrate our measures for 23 oecd countries and test the relation between sovereign yield spreads and our theoretical pd at prevailing debt levels we nd it to be strongly statistically signicant jel h63

the pecking order of segmentation and liquidity injection policies in a model of contagious crises we study a two country setting in which leveraged investors generate fire sale externalities leading to financial crises and contagion governments can affect the incidence of financial crisis and the degree of contagion by injecting public liquidity and additionally by segmenting the countries liquidity markets we show that segmentation allows a country to avoid contagion and fend off mild financial crises caused by a small shock to its liquidity demand at the cost of exposing it to more severe financial crises caused by a large shock we derive a pecking order result whereby segmentation is a second best measure that coordinated governments should use only when tax capacity constrains them from injecting liquidity even when segmentation is welfare enhancing it should be applied to public liquidity alone never restricting the free flow of private liquidity across countries uncoordinated governments tend to use segmentation excessively

the estimation of product supply and input demand by the differential approach this paper makes use of the differential approach to the theory of the multiproduct firm in order to empirically analyze input demand and product supply in italian agriculture estimation of the parameters of the model with annual 1961 80 data for a sector model of fourteen products and three factors of production suggests possibilities for farmers to change their output mix in response to changes in the expected prices of products on the input demand side the derived demand functions seem to satisfy the integrability conditions but turn out to be quite inelastic

non defaultable debt and sovereign risk abstract we quantify gains from introducing limited financing through non defaultable debt into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk for an initial sovereign spread of 4 2 introducing the possibility of issuing non defaultable debt for up to 10 of aggregate income reduces immediately the spread to 1 5 and implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0 8 nevertheless the spread reduction achieved by the introduction of non defaultable debt is short lived our findings shed light on different aspects of proposals to introduce common euro area sovereign bonds that could be virtually non defaultable

discretionary monetary and fiscal policy with endogenous sovereign risk abstract how does the presence of sovereign risk affect the conduct of public policy to answer this question this paper studies optimal monetary and fiscal policy without commitment for a model economy with nominal public debt and strategic sovereign default compared to an economy without the possibility of default economies with sovereign risk experience more volatile interest rates which impedes the government s ability to smooth tax rates across states risk of default also limits public debt accumulation reducing the government s incentive to use surprise inflation on average when calibrated to the united states the model predicts that a counterfactual increase in the average annual default probability from 0 to 1 lowers average inflation by 33 raises the standard deviation of inflation by 18 and increases the standard deviation of the labor income tax by 73 the transmission of exogenous shocks to real aggregate quantities is however almost unaffected by the possibility of default for example the presence of sovereign risk would increase the standard deviation of log real gdp by less than 1 in the experiment above similarly the welfare consequences of sovereign risk are found to be of negligible size as well

sovereign and private default risks over the business cycle abstract sovereign debt crises are often accompanied by deep recessions with sharp declines in external credit to the private sector in a sample of emerging economies we find that both sovereign and private interest rate spreads are countercyclical this paper presents a model of a small open economy that accounts for these empirical regularities it includes private firms which finance a fraction of imports by external debt and are subject to idiosyncratic productivity risk and a government which borrows internationally and taxes firms to finance public expenditures the model gives rise to endogenous private and sovereign interest rate spreads and a dynamic feedback mechanism between sovereign and private default risks through the endogenous response of fiscal policy to adverse productivity shocks

debt dilution and sovereign default risk we measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and study debt covenants that could mitigate these effects we calibrate a baseline model with endogenous debt duration and default risk in which debt can be diluted using data from spain we find that debt dilution accounts for 78 percent of the default risk in the baseline economy and that eliminating dilution increases the optimal duration of sovereign debt by almost 2 years eliminating dilution also increases consumption volatility but still produces welfare gains the debt covenants we study could help enforcing fiscal rules

self fulfilling debt crises what can monetary policy do this paper examines the potential for monetary policy to avoid self fulfilling sovereign debt crises we combine a version of the slow moving debt crisis model proposed by lorenzoni and werning 2014 with a standard new keynesian model monetary policy could preclude a debt crisis through raising inflation and output and lowering the real interest rate these reduce the real value of outstanding debt and the cost of new borrowing and increase tax revenues and seigniorage we determine the optimal path of inflation required to avoid a self fulfilling debt crisis stronger price rigidity implies more sustained inflation

beliefs and long maturity sovereign debt abstract a novel form of strategic complementarities is explored in a standard quantitative model of long maturity sovereign debt discrepancies in long run beliefs dilute current prices differently negative long run beliefs become self fulfilling if the sovereign optimally borrows more and defaults more frequently in the face of worse prices a strong curvature in the flow utility is an important ingredient in generating this response the intuition bears out both through a multiplicity of markov equilibria and in sunspot equilibria that mimic trigger strategies in repeated games in the benchmark model average spreads are roughly 67 higher 200 basis points and debt to gdp ratios are roughly 9 higher 5 percentage points when beliefs are pessimistic the model also reveals limitations to third party coordination of expectations as a policy tool

consumer bankruptcy a fresh start consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck but by driving up interest rates makes life cycle smoothing more difficult we argue that to assess this trade off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features life cycle component idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty and expense uncertainty exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets we find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules more persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect our findings suggest the current us bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values jel d14 d91 k35

welfare implications of the bankruptcy reform act of 1999 abstract in recent years personal bankruptcy has become an important issue to consumers creditors and legislators alike over 40 billion dollars of unsecured debt were discharged in 1998 by 1 44 million households these losses have led legislators to propose a variety of changes in bankruptcy law the most important and recent of which is the bankruptcy reform act of 1999 ba99 i develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of personal bankruptcy to investigate the trade off between the consumption smoothing role of bankruptcy and the interest rate and deadweight costs it imposes i find that stringent means tests would reduce filing rates only slightly and would have only modest welfare consequences on the other hand the elimination of bankruptcy altogether is found to have substantial benefits this result is robust to income shock persistence and to stringency in the application of means tests

synthetic or real the equilibrium effects of credit default swaps on bond markets we provide a model of nonredundant credit default swaps cdss building on the observation that cdss have lower trading costs than bonds cds introduction involves a trade off it crowds out existing demand for the bond but improves the bond allocation by allowing long term investors to become levered basis traders and absorb more of the bond supply we characterize conditions under which cds introduction raises bond prices the model predicts a negative cds bond basis as well as turnover and price impact patterns that are consistent with empirical evidence we also show that a ban on naked cdss can raise borrowing costs

an empirical input allocation model for the cost minimizing multiproduct firm laitinen and theil 1978 derive a theoretical input allocation model for a multiproduct firm that first minimizes cost and second maximizes profit however its empirical counterpart is not available we linearize the model and derive a general empirically estimable model

sovereign defaults information investment and credit abstract why would a sovereign government immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default ever repay foreign creditors and correspondingly why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns this paper finds general conditions under which even in the absence of sanctions lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game furthermore it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria in this way it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations the two classical explanations are necessary to enforce repayment information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results the repayment default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy governments repay to affect agents expectations about them a default through its effect on expectations about fundamentals can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets governments repay to avoid these costs but may default in equilibrium when hit by a negative shock

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

financial integration and liquidity crises this paper analyzes the effects of financial integration on the stability of the banking system financial integration allows banks in different regions to smooth local liquidity shocks by borrowing and lending on a world interbank market we show under which conditions financial integration induces banks to reduce their liquidity holdings and to shift their portfolios toward more profitable but less liquid investments integration helps reallocate liquidity when different banks are hit by uncorrelated shocks however when a correlated systemic shock hits the total liquid resources in the banking system are lower than in autarky therefore financial integration leads to more stable interbank interest rates in normal times but to larger interest rate spikes in crises these results hold in a setup in which financial integration is welfare improving from an ex ante point of view we also look at the model s implications for financial regulation and show that in a second best world financial integrati

sovereign debt and reserves with liquidity and productivity crises during the recent financial crisis emerging economies have kept accumulating both sovereign reserves and debt to account for this empirical fact we model the optimal portfolio choice of a sovereign that is subject to liquidity and productivity shocks we determine the equilibrium level of debt and its cost by solving a contracting game between sovereign and international lenders although raising debt increases the sovereign exposure to liquidity and productivity crises the simultaneous accumulation of reserves can mitigate the negative effects of such crises this mechanism rationalizes the complementarity between debt and reserves

efficient sovereign default in this article i show that the key aspects of sovereign debt crises can be rationalized as part of the efficient risk sharing arrangement between a sovereign borrower and foreign lenders in a production economy with informational and commitment frictions the constrained efficient allocation involves ex post inefficient outcomes that resemble sovereign default episodes in the data and can be implemented with non contingent defaultable bonds and active maturity management defaults and periods of temporary exclusion from international credit markets happen along the equilibrium path and are essential to supporting the efficient allocation furthermore during debt crises the maturity composition of debt shifts towards short term debt and the term premium inverts as in the data

financial globalization and real regionalization over the period 1972 1986 the correlations of gdp employment and investment between the united states and an aggregate of europe canada and japan were respectively 0 76 0 66 and 0 63 for the period 1986 to 2000 the same correlations were much lower 0 26 0 03 and 0 07 real regionalization at the same time u s international asset trade has significantly increased for example between 1972 and 1999 united states gross fdi and equity assets in the same group of countries rose from 4 to 23 percent of the u s capital stock financial globalization we argue that these two trends are intimately related we document that the correlation of real shocks between the u s and the rest of the world has declined we then present a model in which international financial market integration occurs endogenously in response to less correlated shocks financial integration further reduces the international correlations in gdp and factor supplies we find that both less correlated shocks and endogenous financial market development are needed to account for all the changes in the international business cycle

sovereign debt renegotiation and credit default swaps abstract a credit default swap cds contract provides insurance against default this paper incorporates the contract into a sovereign default model and demonstrates that the existence of a cds market results in lower default probability higher debt levels and lower financing costs for the country uncertainty over the insurance payout when the debt is renegotiated explains why in the data as the output declines the cds spread becomes lower than the bond spread finally my results show that the 2012 cds naked ban that decreased the levels of cds for european countries is a welfare reducing policy

financial integration and international risk sharing abstract conventional wisdom suggests that financial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyncratic risk there is little evidence however that countries have increased risk sharing despite widespread financial liberalization we show that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international financial markets while actual markets are far from frictionless financial contracts are incomplete and contract enforceability is limited when countries remove official capital controls default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital flows if default risk were eliminated capital flows would be six times greater and international risk sharing would increase substantially

decompositions of corn price effects implications for feed grain demand and livestock supply this article examines how corn prices affect the demand for feed grains and the supply of livestock outputs the differential approach to the theory of the multiproduct firm is employed to examine ex ante decisions about feed grain demand and livestock supply the estimation results suggest that livestock producers have little flexibility in adjusting the demand for corn in response to an increase in corn prices the substitutable relationship between corn and distillers grains contributes to alleviating pressures on feed costs in response to high corn prices in addition the estimation results highlight that the composition of livestock supply can be altered by changes in livestock prices on the basis of the estimated elasticities the decompositions of profit maximizing input demand are conducted to examine the effects of changes in corn prices on feed grain demand and livestock supply the decomposition results reveal that an increase in corn prices reduces corn demand but raises the demand for distillers grains mainly due to the substitution effects of corn price changes the decomposition results also show that an increase in the price of corn reduces cattle supply but raises the supply of chicken and pork due to the output relationships in supply

decentralized borrowing and centralized default abstract in the past foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely of government borrowing however private firms and individuals in developing countries now borrow substantially from foreign lenders it is often asserted that this surge in private sector borrowing generates excessive borrowing and frequent sovereign defaults in developing countries this paper analyzes the impact of decentralized borrowing using a quantitative model in which private agents decide how much to borrow and the government decides whether to default relative to a model in which the government determines both the level of borrowing and whether to default decentralized borrowing drives up aggregate credit costs and sovereign default risk and reduces aggregate welfare interestingly decentralized borrowing may lead to either too much or too little debt in equilibrium depending on the severity of default penalties

asset backed contracts and sovereign risk abstract a fundamental problem with sovereign default is the lack of a legal enforcement mechanism since the 1920s there have been an ongoing set of initiatives undertaken by the league of nations and the unctad to set international laws on borrowing and lending standards all of which have failed to address the unenforceability problem this paper proposes to use asset backed contracts where the usufruct of the asset transfers to the asset holder unlike conventional sovereign borrowing there are international laws governing asset backed contracts which allow the international assets of a country to be seized this paper exemplifies on the idea that asset backed contracts which are also widely practiced in islamic finance can provide a solution to unenforceable sovereign debt contracts the paper focuses specifically on argentina which has defaulted twice in 13 years if argentina had utilized asset backed contracts prior to its 2001 debt default it would have gained from the following advantages higher debt to gdp ratios larger welfare gains lower probability of default and thus lower borrowing costs

consumption savings decisions with quasi geometric discounting we study the consumption savings problem of an infinitely lived rational consumer who has time inconsistent preferences in the form of quasi geometric discounting the consumer operates a weakly concave production function and must simply divide current resources into current consumption and savings there is no uncertainty a solution to the consumer s problem is a subgame perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game between the consumer s successive selves we show that this game has a continuum of equilibria in stationary markov strategies not only is the stationary point of the consumer s asset holdings indeterminate but each stationary point has a continuum of dynamic paths converging to it the savings policy rules underlying these dynamic paths are step functions

unique equilibrium in the eaton gersovitz model of sovereign debt abstract a common view of sovereign debt markets is that they are prone to multiple equilibria we prove that to the contrary markov perfect equilibrium is unique in the widely studied model of eaton and gersovitz 1981 and we discuss multiple extensions and limitations of this finding our results show that no improvement in a borrower s reputation for repayment can be self sustaining thereby strengthening the bulow and rogoff 1989 argument that debt cannot be sustained by reputation alone

liquidity coinsurance moral hazard and financial contagion we study the propagation of financial crises between regions characterized by moral hazard problems the source of the problem is that banks are protected by limited liability and may engage in excessive risk taking the regions are affected by negatively correlated liquidity shocks so that liquidity coinsurance is pareto improving the moral hazard problem can be solved if banks are sufficiently capitalized under autarky a limited investment is needed to achieve optimality so that a limited amount of capital is sufficient to prevent risk taking with interbank deposits the optimal investment increases and capital becomes insufficient to prevent excessive risk taking thus bankruptcy occurs with positive probability and the crises spread to other regions via the financial linkages opening the financial markets is nevertheless pareto improving consumers benefit from liquidity coinsurance although they pay the cost of excessive risk taking finally we show that in this framework a completely connected deposit structure is more conducive to financial crises than an incompletely connected structure

sovereign debt restructurings preemptive or post default sovereign debt restructurings can be implemented preemptively prior to a payment default we code a comprehensive new dataset and nd that preemptive restructurings i are frequent 38 of all deals 1978 2010 ii have lower haircuts iii are quicker to negotiate and iv see lower output losses to rationalize these stylized facts we build a quantitative sovereign debt model that incorporates preemptive and post default renegotiations the model improves the t with the data and explains the sovereign s optimal choice preemptive restructurings occur when default risk is high ex ante while defaults occur after unexpected bad shocks empirical evidence supports these predictions jel f34 f41 h63

in efficient interbank networks we study the efficiency properties of the formation of an interbank network banks face a trade off by establishing connections in the interbank market on the one hand banks improve the diversification of their liquidity risk and therefore can obtain a higher expected payoff on the other hand banks not sufficiently capitalized have risk shifting incentives that expose them to the risk of bankruptcy connecting to such risky banks negatively affects expected payoff we show that both the optimal and the decentralized networks are characterized by a core periphery structure the core is made of the safe banks whereas the periphery is populated by the risky banks nevertheless the two network structures coincide only if counterparty risk is sufficiently low otherwise the decentralized network is underconnected as compared to the optimal one finally we analyze mechanisms that can avoid the formation of inefficient interbank networks

an empirical input allocation model for the multiproduct firm laitinen 1980 derives an input allocation model for a multiproduct firm that first maximizes revenue and second maximizes profit while theoretically elegant the model has never been formulated empirically because of the complexity of the model s price deflated terms this paper derives the linear parameterization of the input allocation model that can be used for empirical estimation

sovereign default and maturity choice abstract this study develops a novel model of endogenous sovereign debt maturity that rationalizes various stylized facts about debt maturity and the yield spread curve first sovereign debt duration and maturity generally exceed one year and co move positively with the business cycle second sovereign yield spread curves are usually non linear and upward sloped and may become non monotonic and inverted during a period of high credit market stress such as a default episode finally output volatility impatience risk aversion and especially sudden stops are key determinants of maturity both in our model and in the data

credit default swaps and the empty creditor problem the empty creditor problem arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy we analyze this problem from an ex ante and ex post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment by comparing contracting outcomes with and without insurance through credit default swaps cds we show that cds and the empty creditors they give rise to have important ex ante commitment benefits by strengthening creditors bargaining power they raise the debtor s pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default however we also show that lenders will over insure in equilibrium giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy we discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance jel g30 g32 g33 one of the most significant changes in the debtor creditor relationship in the

heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default we extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power we show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions under high political stability political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions a higher and more volatile spread and lower borrowing levels after a default episode

u s consumer bankruptcy choice the importance of general equilibrium effects abstract we study the implications of u s personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare our analysis shows that general equilibrium considerations along with bankruptcy chapter choice and production matter crucially for the effects of policy reform contrary to previous work we find that completely eliminating bankruptcy provisions causes significant declines in output and welfare by reducing capital formation and labor input furthermore subjecting chapter 7 filers to means testing as suggested by recent legislative proposals would not improve upon current bankruptcy provisions and at best leave aggregate filings output and welfare unchanged however we do find that an alternative tightening of chapter 7 in the form of lower asset exemptions can increase economic efficiency

should i default on my mortgage even if i can pay experimental evidence abstract we study strategic default in the laboratory i e in a controlled experiment subjects are initially endowed with a house and a mortgage we use neutral wording in the experiment and must decide at each period in which their mortgage is alive among three options making the mortgage payment selling the house or walking away from their house and defaulting on their mortgage at each point in time we can observe whether defaulters can afford to make the mortgage payment and thus directly compute the number of strategic defaulters subjects default in the right periods and quite fast learn what they should consume we find experimental support for the double trigger hypothesis individuals faced with low income and low house prices are more likely to default we observe that subjects default less than optimal and this decision is significantly affected by social norm concerns in the context of the experiment individuals under consume in the first periods of life they are cautious when indebted both introducing a 50 probability of recourse and a responsible homeowner reward are very effective in preventing default in the lab especially by individuals receiving a bad shock to income when house prices are low

the stock of external sovereign debt can we take the data at face value abstract the stock of sovereign debt is typically measured at face value defined as the undiscounted sum of future principal repayments face values are misleading when debts are issued with different contractual forms or maturities in this paper we construct alternative measures of the stock of external sovereign debt for 100 developing countries from 1979 through 2006 that correct for differences in contractual form and maturity we show that our alternative measures 1 paint a very different quantitative and in some cases also qualitative picture of the stock of developing country external sovereign debt 2 often invert rankings of indebtedness across countries which historically defined eligibility for debt forgiveness 3 indicate that the empirical performance of the benchmark quantitative model of sovereign debt deteriorates by roughly 50 once model consistent measures of debt are used 4 show how the spread of aggregation clauses in debt contracts that award creditors voting power in proportion to the contractual face value may introduce inefficiencies into the process of restructuring sovereign debts and 5 illustrate how countries have manipulated their debt issuance to meet fiscal targets written in terms of face values

long duration bonds and sovereign defaults abstract this paper extends the baseline framework used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default by assuming that the government can borrow using long duration bonds this contrasts with previous studies which assume the government can borrow using bonds that mature after one quarter we show that when we assume that the government issues bonds with a duration similar to the average duration of sovereign bonds in emerging economies the model generates an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile than the one obtained assuming one quarter bonds this narrows the gap between the predictions of the model and the data which indicates that the introduction of long duration bonds may be a useful tool for future research about emerging economies our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets

interbank lending and systemic risk systemic risk refers to the propagation of a bank s economic distress to other economic agents linked to that bank through financial transactions banking authorities often prevent systemic risk through an implicit insurance of interbank claims or by reducing interbank transactions and centralizing banks liquidity management this paper investigates whether the flexability afforded by decentralized bank interactions can be preserved while protecting the central banks from the necessity of conducting undesired rescue operations it develops a model in which decentralized interbank leading is motivated by peer monitoring in this context the paper derives the optimal prudential rules and in particular looks at the impact of interbank monitoring on the solvency and liquidity ratios of borrowing and lending banks last it provides conditions which a too big to fail policy is or is not justified and studies the possibility of propagation of a bank s liquidity shock throughout the financial system copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

credit risk transfer and contagion some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises using a model with banking and insurance sectors we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity however when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare it can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises

income inequality and sovereign default abstract in this paper we study how income inequality matters for government borrowing and default decisions we extend a standard endogenous sovereign debt default model to allow for heterogeneous agents and stochastic variability in the dispersion of income we calibrate the model to match a number of stylized facts for argentina we show that i rising income inequality within a country increases the probability of default significantly ii the effect of output shocks is larger than the effect of inequality shocks iii the joint effect of these two shocks can generate a high default probability consistent with the argentine data iv the model can match the high volatility of consumption by the poor relative to the rich and v more progressive income taxes lead to lower default risk

fiscal rules and government borrowing costs international evidence we find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985 2010 we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets the results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the risk premium on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility jel e43 g12 h60

holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring a theory of negotiation in a weak contractual environment negotiations between a country in default and its international creditors are modeled as a dynamic game in an environment of weak contractual enforcement the country cannot borrow internationally until it settles with all creditors delay arises in equilibrium as creditors engage in strategic hold up the model a rms the conventional wisdom that delay increases with more creditors and with the advent of vulture creditors contrary to conventional wisdom putting collective action clauses into bond contracts may increase delay via free riding on negotiation costs even while preventing strategic holdup and reducing total negotiation costs secondary debt markets consolidate debt with high and disperse debt with low creditor bargaining power whether secondary markets reduce or increase delay depends on the interaction between strategic holdup and debt

sovereign default interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets abstract a large body of the empirical literature shows that high turnover rates length of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affects sovereign spreads debt and default rates we help to rationalize such claims by including these political features in a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign debt and default in this way we offer a complementary approach to the econometric analyses in the literature consistent with the data the quantitative analysis shows that politically unstable and more polarized economies experience higher default rates and larger level and volatility of sovereign interest rate spreads

credit default swaps and risk shifting credit default swaps cdss are thought to ease borrowing by protecting lenders against default this paper develops a model of the demand for cds when borrowers choose the riskiness of investment and verification is imperfect the model shows that cdss may lead to risk shifting increasing the probability of default our model provides new insights into the role of cds during the recent financial crisis