regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

network externalities technological progress and the competition of market contracts abstract network externalities are used to describe the fact that many modern products become more valuable the more users adopt products of the same technology where network externalities and technological progress exist the various kinds of inefficiencies discussed in the recent literature can be explained by different types of contracts the main categories analysed are simple market contracts update contracts and service contracts it is shown that these types of contract emerge endogenously from the incentive structure of profit maximizing firms competition between these contracts may substantially reduce inefficient allocations caused by network externalities

competition and social influence the diffusion of the sixth generation processor in the global computer industry1 when is a social actor most strongly influenced by its peers this article addresses this question by clarifying when computer firms were most strongly affected by the choices of their structurally equivalent rivals to adopt a well known technology intel s sixth generation processor the core hypothesis is that the effect of adoptions by structurally equivalent firms increases with the competitive pressure that a focal firm faces in its market position the results show that a chosen firm is most strongly influenced by comparable others when it faces scale based competition and is diversified the implications of this study are twofold a social actor s sensitivity to the conduct of others may depend not only on its place in a hierarchy but also on the nature of its ties to an external audience and a contingent theory of social influence may be necessary to characterize diffusion processes correctly particularly when external and time varying nonnetwork factors have significant effects

tipping and concentration in markets with indirect network effects this paper develops a framework for measuring tipping the increase in a firm s market share dominance caused by indirect network effects our measure compares the expected concentration in a market to the hypothetical expected concentration that would arise in the absence of indirect network effects in practice this measure requires a model that can predict the counterfactual market concentration under different parameter values capturing the strength of indirect network effects we build such a model for the case of dynamic standards competition in a market characterized by the classic hardware software paradigm to demonstrate its applicability we calibrate it using demand estimates and other data from the 32 64 bit generation of video game consoles a canonical example of standards competition with indirect network effects in our example we find that indirect network effects can lead to a strong economically significant increase in market concentration we also find important roles for beliefs on both the demand side as consumers tend to pick the product they expect to win the standards war and on the supply side as firms engage in penetration pricing to invest in growing their networks

tying and innovation a dynamic analysis of tying arrangements this paper analyses the effects of tying arrangements on r d incentives it shows that tying is a means through which a firm can commit to more aggressive r d investment in the tied goods market tying also has the strategic effect of reducing rivals incentives to invest in r d the strategy of tying is a profitable one if the gains via an increased share of dynamic rents in the tied goods market exceed the losses that result from intensified price competition in the market the welfare implications of tying and consequently the appropriate antitrust policy are discussed

build or buy strategies in the local loop we provide a dynamic model to study how the presence of the option to buy the incumbent local exchange carrier s ilec facilities via local loop unbundling affects the competitive local exchange carriers clecs incentives to build alternative infrastructures we show that an unregulated incumbent sets a rental path for its local loop which delays technology adoption compared to the case in which there is no unbundling we also characterize the equilibrium rental path set by the unregulated incumbent it is prohibitively high at the initial phases when there is no effective threat of entry with alternative technologies and it is decreasing over time in later phases the decrease in the rental price follows the rise of the entrant s opportunity cost of leasing lines we also argue that neither allowing higher prices for unbundled elements over time nor setting a sunset clause would suffice to induce facility based competition by studying the unregulated ilecs decision regarding unbundling we challenge the implicit assumption behind the sunset clauses which is that the ilec would either deny unbundling or charge too high a price for its network elements in the absence of regulation we claim that the ilecs that initially resist unbundling requirements would tend to charge attractive access prices relative to the entrants alternatives for their infrastructure which become less essential over time this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

promoting network competition by regulating termination charges abstract this paper contributes to the policy debate about the optimal termination charge when penetration rates are explicitly taken into account although lowering termination charges towards cost leads to more efficient usage its impact on consumer surplus is ambiguous since it induces an increase in fixed subscription fee through the so called waterbed effect we show that a reduction in termination charge below cost has two opposing effects on consumer surplus it softens competition but also helps to internalize network externalities hence it can decrease or increase penetration depending on whether or not the first effect dominates the second we show that the first effect dominates the second when networks are weak substitutes or the penetration rate is high

policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities abstract the paper considers a country home in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality we analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies in both cases the equilibrium outcome of the non cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility in combination with either too much or too little trade or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade the paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the wto legal system aimed at minimizing the trade inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility

optimal bundling of technological products with network externality for many high tech and internet related products utility to consumers depends in part on the size of the user base a phenomenon called network externality a firm with a portfolio of these and other products that are often asymmetric in their degree of network externality or marginal cost may have to look beyond the traditional strategies of pure components pure bundling and mixed bundling one such strategic alternative in a two product case would be a so called mixed bundling 1 under which the bundle and product 1 are offered but the other product can only be purchased in a bundled form the purpose of this study is to compare and contrast the impact of such asymmetry or symmetry in direct network externality and cost on the choice of bundling strategies we model a monopolist firm that has a product in each of two categories and faces heterogeneous consumers results suggest that pure bundling is more profitable when both products have low marginal costs or high network externality whereas pure components or mixed bundling 1 is more profitable when the products diverge in their costs and network externality e g only one product has network externality traditional mixed bundling is optimal in other instances

attack defence and contagion in networks sanjeev goyal acknowledges support from a keynes fellowship cambridge inet institute and european research area complexity net resilience and interaction of networks in ecology and economics adrien vigier acknowledges support from a gates cambridge fellowship as well as a core fellowship from universite catholique de louvain

optimal nonlinear policy signal extraction with a non normal prior the literature on optimal monetary policy typically makes three major assumptions 1 policymakers preferences are quadratic 2 the economy is linear and 3 stochastic shocks and policymakers prior beliefs about unobserved variables are normally distributed this paper relaxes the third assumption and explores its implications for optimal policy the separation principle continues to hold in this framework allowing for tractability and application to forward looking models but policymakers beliefs are no longer updated in a linear fashion allowing for plausible nonlinearities in optimal policy we consider in particular a class of models in which policymakers priors about the natural rate of unemployment are diffuse in a region around the mean when this is the case it is optimal for policy to respond cautiously to small surprises in the observed unemployment rate but become increasingly aggressive at the margin these features of optimal policy match statements by federal reserve officials and the behavior of the fed in the 1990s

inflation targeting credibility and non linear taylor rules abstract in this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target we present a stylized new keynesian model in which agents inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target to re establish credibility monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past moreover the central bank responds non linearly to past inflation gaps this is reflected in an additional term in the central bank s instrument rule which we refer to as the credibility loss augmenting a standard taylor 1993 rule with the latter term we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting it economies we find first that past deviations from it feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful deterioration in credibility ceteris paribus forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps second we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses with the latter dominating the former

price competition and compatibility in the presence of positive demand externalities in many cases the benefit to a consumer of a product increases with the number of other users of the same product these demand interdependencies are referred to in the literature as positive demand externalities or network externalities this paper examines the dynamic pricing behaviors of an incumbent and a later entrant with special attention to the impacts of demand externalities compatibility and competition on prices and profits defining market power as the ability to price above a competitor without losing market share we show how demand externalities and installed base combine to confer market power we model optimal pricing as a differential game with the optimal price trajectory established as nash open loop controls for a duopoly durable goods market with strong demand externalities the results show an increasing price trajectory can be optimal as expected a new entrant is better off if its products are compatible with those of the incumbent especially when demand externalities are strong and the installed base of the incumbent is large less intuitively the incumbent as well may be better off agreeing on common standards the comparison of monopoly and duopoly shows that under strong demand externalities and a small installed base the incumbent profits from compatible entry

on the job screening up or out rules and firm growth this paper uses on the job screening to derive a stochastic and dynamic model of hiring promotion and dismissal policies and their impact on total firm employment and output the model provides an explanation of the up or out rule observed in many organizations it also provides an explanation for a cost of adjustment mechanism for the stock of human capital in a firm

diffusion of a new product under network effects the us dvd market we formulate a model that captures the inter dependence between hardware demand and software supply indirect network effect in the dvd industry the identification of the network effect comes from the difference in software availability across two different formats vhs and dvd we find that a 1 increase in the number of dvd titles raises the demand for dvd players by 0 87 simultaneously a 1 increase in video player ownership leads to a 0 14 increase in the variety of video titles our simulations show that hardware manufacturers might be able to internalize the network externality to increase total industry revenues

business to business bargaining in two sided markets abstract bargaining regularly takes place on the business to business side of two sided markets however little is known about the consequences of these negotiations in this paper we allow the platform or a policy maker to choose between a standard design offering posted prices to both sides or a design with bargaining offering a posted price to consumers and negotiating with at least some firms we find that the platform pursues negotiations when it has a strong bargaining position and does so by targeting firms with the largest network effects while this behavior may appear exploitive we show that profits and welfare often align across platform designs this alignment stems from how bargaining incentivizes the platform greater platform bargaining power allows the platform to extract more of the network surpluses since it can convert more of the firm surplus into profits and this incentivizes the platform to draw in greater participation generating greater welfare these results suggest that platform and policy maker preferences often align in this setting

grabber holder dynamics and network effects in technology innovation abstract economists and marketing researchers have examined how network effects can have an impact on the adoption of technology and products and how an intrinsic inferior product or technology may dominate the market however their studies have not explained how a producer could create network effect for a new product and how after successfully creating the network effect for this product the producer could lose it in a short period of time while these studies provide insight into technology innovation after it happened they fail to shed light on understanding many of the surprises that we experience in the process the objective of this paper is to present a fundamental framework that helps us understand most of the surprising outcomes that we have seen in technology innovation processes especially the winners and losers in an innovation process the framework is built on a grabber holder dynamic model that captures how all the intelligent agents involved in an innovation shape the forces that either induce a strong network effect or destroy a network effect that is already in place the model can be used to explain many surprising events that have happened in technology innovation in this paper i apply the model to the personal computer innovation

nairu uncertainty and nonlinear policy rules meyer 1999 has suggested that episodes of heightened uncertainty about the nairu may warrant a nonlinear policy response to changes in the unemployment rate this paper offers a theoretical justification for such a nonlinear policy rule and provides some empirical evidence on the relative performance of linear and nonlinear rules when there is heightened uncertainty about the nairu

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

man bites dog business cycles the newsworthiness of an event is partly determined by how unusual it is and this paper investigates the business cycle implications of this fact signals that are more likely to be observed after unusual events may increase both uncertainty and disagreement among agents in a simple business cycle model such signals can explain why we observe i occasional large changes in macro economic aggregate variables without a correspondingly large change in underlying fundamentals ii persistent periods of high macroeconomic volatility and iii a positive correlation between absolute changes in macro variables and the cross sectional dispersion of survey expectations

entry in monopoly market this paper develops new empirical models of market concentration from game theoretic models of entry we construct our models from inequality conditions that describe entrants equilibrium strategies in simultaneous move and sequential move games and use them to study the effects of entry in isolated monopoly markets for new automobiles from estimates of the market size necessary to support one and two dealers we conclude that monopoly dealers do not block the entry of a second dealer we also find that entry does not cause price cost margins to fall by much

private roads competition and incentives to adopt time based congestion tolling abstract this paper investigates whether time based congestion tolling is profitable for a private toll road operator when competing for traffic with another road despite the fact that congestion tolling boosts revenue by reducing congestion delay it can be unprofitable if it induces a private or public toll road rival to reduce its toll severely the size of the rival s response depends on the price elasticity of travel demand and on whether the rival also employs congestion tolling in a private duopoly adoption may be unilaterally profitable but parallel adoption unprofitable so that a prisoner s dilemma obtains

competing by restricting choice the case of search platforms we show that a two sided matching platform can successfully compete by limiting the number of choices it offers to its customers while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice we develop a stylized model of online dating where agents with different outside options match based on how much they like each other starting from these microfoundations we derive the strength and direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a positive effect due to larger choice but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side agents resolve the trade off between these competing effects differently depending on their outside options for agents with high outside options the choice effect is stronger than the competition effect leading them to prefer an unrestricted choice platform the opposite is the case for agents with low outside options who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice as

cohabitation marriage and divorce in a model of match quality the objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships we develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation marriage and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships jovanovic s journal of political economy 87 1979 972 90 theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior implications of the model reveal what factors influence the decision to start a relationship what form this relationship will take and the relative stability of the various types of unions the structural parameters of the model are estimated using longitudinal data from a sample of female high school seniors from the united states new numerical methods are developed to reduce computational costs associated with estimation the empirical results have interesting interpretations given the structural model they show that a significant cause of cohabitation is the need to learn about potential partners and to hedge against future bad shocks the estimated parameters are used to conduct several comparative dynamic experiments for example we show that policy experiments changing the cost of divorce have little effect on relationship choices

social capital for hire mobility of technical professionals and firm influence in wireless standards committees the movement of personnel between firms has been shown to have important implications for firms yet there has been little direct investigation of the underlying mechanisms we propose that in addition to their human capital mobile individuals carry social capital affecting the outcomes of the firms they join and leave by altering the patterns of interaction between firms in this study we examine how job mobility affects firm influence in a technical standards setting committee for u s wireless telecommunications we hypothesize and find that hiring individuals who are richer in social capital increases firm influence in technical standards setting committees by increasing the hiring firm s social capital we also find the benefits of hiring social capital are attenuated when an interfirm relationship is maintained by multiple individuals in contrast we find that the loss of personnel does not affect a firm s social capital or influence over standards directly but that it does have an effect on firm social capital and influence contingent on changes in the firm s business strategy in advancing these arguments we address the broader question of individuals as carriers of social capital and the conditions under which interpersonal connections are appropriable by firms

waves in consumption with interdependence among consumers this paper presents a model to analyze the development of consumption patterns when there are social interactions among consumers in particular a consumer in this model recognizes three reference groups a peer group of similar consumers with whom the consumer wishes to share consumption activities a distinction group from which the consumer wishes to distinguish him or herself and an aspiration group to which the consumer does not belong but wishes that he she did and with whom the consumer would like to share consumption activities the interplay of aspiration and distinction can lead to waves in consumption these can happen when for example the avant garde consumption of up market pioneers is copied by other types of consumer as the latter aspire to emulate the former the former in turn seek to distinguish themselves from these unwelcome companions by varying their consumption in consequence a particular consumption activity may start up market an then gradually proceed down the social spectrum more complex patterns with continuing cycles in consumption can also be found the paper argues that this model is not only applicable to the consumption behaviour of an elite or would be elite but is relevant in a wide range of consumption settings

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

vanity and congestion a study of reciprocal externalities this paper models a private goods oligopoly market characterized by negative and reciprocal externalities although firms compete in prices and products are undifferentiated in equilibrium the pr

up or out rules in the market for lawyers we examine how up or out rules operate as a screening device in the market for lawyers using data on large new york law firms we show that firm growth is a slow and uncertain process because performance as an associate is not an especially informative signal about whether a lawyer will make a good partner and because the costs of mistaken promotion are relatively high a newly hired associate is unlikely to be a suitable partner and the screening process is relatively imprecise firm growth therefore contributes between 5 7 of the present value of profits of a law firm

globalizing carbon lock in this paper extends the arguments surrounding carbon lock in elaborated in unruh energy policy 28 2000 817 30 2002 317 to countries currently undergoing industrialization it argues that for numerous reasons industrializing countries are unlikely to leapfrog carbon intensive energy development on the contrary carbon lock in may be globalizing and could further constrain climate change mitigation options it is then argued that many policy recommendations ignore carbon lock in possibly limiting their potential for successful implementation the paper then discusses four policy approaches that appear to have advantages given lock in conditions it is recognized however that relative ease of implementation does not necessarily equate with superiority instead it is merely a path dependent outcome of past development decisions pursuing policies on the basis of relative implementation ease may help address the issue of climate change but could also result in sub optimal outcomes along other dimensions of sustainable development

indicator variables for optimal policy the optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward looking variables are derived and interpreted both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment an example of optimal monetary policy with a partially observable potential output and a forward looking indicator is examined the optimal response to the optimal estimate of potential output displays certainty equivalence whereas the optimal response to the imperfect observation of output depends on the noise in this observation

esteem and ignorance abstract we consider how the demand for esteem shapes behavior in the labor market when individuals care about what other people think of them especially fearing bad evaluations they may prefer jobs that hide information about their qualities we see how such a motive can contribute to explanations of wage stickiness high powered incentives search up or out contracts mandatory retirement and related issues

from exogenous to endogenous economic networks internet applications economic agents behaviour is affected by their position in a network either exogenous or endogenous in which they interact with a sub set of neighbours only the network s links which may be generated by vertical and or horizontal relations or by more complex morphologies may explain the transition between dynamic equilibria and the instability of economic aggregates moreover networks shape strategic interaction among agents by determining their strategies the problem of access and interconnection particularly relevant in the internet is perhaps the best example a two way feedback between strategies and network structures arises instead when links are endogenous those features are clearly shown in the mechanism underlying the formation of peering links an dr d networks

profit maximizing clubs abstract we study a nash equilibrium among profit maximizing clubs which choose facility size and admission price the number of clubs is endogenous entry is deterred whenever the symmetric nash equilibrium with one additional firm would yield negative profit equilibrium exists with positive profit the equilibrium price is higher than the congestion price and the equilibrium number of clubs is bounded below by one fewer than the efficient number in general there will be too much entry than too little one can choose an economy sufficiently large that the equilibrium price is within epsilon of the competitive price

a global game with strategic substitutes and complements abstract we study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region an agent s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents if the degree of congestion is sufficiently large agents strategies are non monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental in this case a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action because of the risk of overcrowding

reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information abstract this paper analyses the effect of partial information on optimal policy design for stochastic macroeconomic models incorporating forward looking expectations the main theoretical result is that reputational and nonreputational policies are certainty equivalent as has previously been conjectured and it is also shown that the welfare loss does not necessarily increase with decreasing information of particular additional interest in the analysis of reputational policy design is the issue of sustainability and it is shown using an example that weak sustainability may be information dependent

growth incentives to invest in a network externality environment firms that operate in the telecommunications industry often have to make large and risky investments in digital infrastructure this paper examines how firm size affects the incentive to invest in infrastructure projects in industry environments that incur substantial network externalities we suggest that in the presence of network externalities a firm s rate of growth first declines and then increases with the size of its user base an implication of this result is that firms may benefit from making investments in emerging digital infrastructure early enough to achieve a substantial user base and to gain that user base before other firms investments pre empt them the results mean that firms that undertake earlier successful investment may achieve preemption very quickly the sources of network externalities contribute to the incidence of strategic alliances in network industries particularly when coupled with the pressures of technical uncertainty copyright 1998 by oxford university press

social learning and dynamic pricing of durable goods we analyze the impacts of social learning sl on the dynamic pricing and consumer adoption of durable goods in a two period monopoly consumers can make either early uninformed purchases or late but potentially informed purchases as a result of social learning several results are derived first we identify the market conditions under which ex ante homogeneous consumers may choose to purchase at different times second equilibrium adoption may demonstrate inertia where all adopt late or frenzy where all adopt early in particular adoption inertia appears when sl intensity is reasonably high but may vanish when sl intensity exceeds a certain threshold third firm profits and social welfare first weakly decrease in sl intensity and may then jump up by a lump sum amount at the threshold sl intensity level mentioned above last we show that the firm potentially benefits from informative advertising or investing to cultivate more social learning

speeding up the internet regulation and investment in european fiber optic infrastructure in this paper we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy copper and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure to this end we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous entrants and test its main predictions using panel data from 27 eu member states over the last decade our theoretical model extends the existing literature by among other things allowing for heterogeneous entrants in internet access markets as we consider both other telecom and cable tv operators as entrants in the empirical part we use a novel data set including information on physical fiber network investments legacy network access regulation and recently imposed fiber access regulations our main finding is that more stringent access regulations for both the legacy and the fiber networks harm investments by incumbent telecom operators but in line with our theoretical model do not affect cable tv operators

dynamic models of religious conformity and conversion theory and calibrations abstract this paper develops overlapping generations models to explain and simulate changes in the proportion of secular and religious people the church is modeled as generating an externality associated with conformity enhancing education observed changes in the number of nonbelievers are explained by different birth rates among secular and religious parents and the relative proportion of young nonconformists calibrations for the conformity rates among secular and religious people show that the observed long run increase in the difference between percentage of secular people in europe and the united states can be attributed to lower conformity rates prevailing in europe

coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information abstract a monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types the seller coordinates the buyers adoption decisions based on their reported types and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions we study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion proof and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions and the number of adoptions is maximized subject to the participation constraints

rational incompatibility with international product standards abstract international product standardization enables traditional price based competition but the existence of redesign costs or network effects creates market frictions that diminish the incentive to standardize if there already exists a different technology in an established market this leads to multi attribute competition between products and will generally reduce trade flows not only do incumbent firms using a different technology have an incentive to deviate from an international standard but a host country government concerned for its consumers welfare has no incentive to enforce the international standard and may even value deviation from the international standard through technical barriers to trade

the diffusion of clean technologies a review with suggestions for future diffusion analysis abstract this article gives an overview of the literature on clean technology diffusion followed by suggestions for future analysis findings from diffusion analysis are presented in the form of 10 stylised facts helping the reader to see the forest for the trees the overall conclusion is that the diffusion of clean technology same as the diffusion of normal innovations is governed by endogenous mechanism epidemic learning and learning economies and by exogenous mechanisms policy is important for clean technology diffusion but other factors are important too the characteristics of the clean technology absorptive capacities of potential adopters and the age structure of capital it is often overlooked that companies have a choice they can choose between an end of pipe solution a process change adaptation and a change of process substitution this means that the diffusion and evolution of one clean technology will be at the expense of the diffusion of another clean technology something overlooked in studies on clean technology diffusion further research is needed on the influence of public policy on clean technology choice expectations about learning economies and prices adjustment costs network externalities and complementary innovations on clean technology adoption choices

the insurance effect of groups many people belong to groups which partially identify their characteristics this paper argues that when agents are risk averse and where only group characteristics are visible rather than individual characteristics the pareto optimal construction of groups differs in systematic ways from standard notions of how groups should be formed two applications are considered the assignment of workers to jobs where it is shown the optimal contract does not involve maximizing output and accident insurance where the optimal contract does not involve complete insurance many people belong to groups which serve to partially identify otherwise hidden talents or characteristics for example it is possible to find out that certain authors have written an article but their individual contributions are much more difficult to ascertain similarly it may be easy to determine that a worker is a foreman but much more difficult to tell how much better he is than other foremen or that somebody is employed which tells us something about his talents but not whether he is more talented than the average employed person each of these examples illustrates cases where we can see the group to which an agent belongs author foreman employed rather than an individual s characteristics standard notions of efficiency tell us how these groups should be formed academics should write papers together only if their joint product is greater than if they operated separately a worker should be employer as a foreman only if his productivity is higher as a foreman than elsewhere in the organization and so on the principal result of this paper is that when agents are risk averse and where only groups of the type above are visible to some agents rather than individual characteristics these assignment rules may not be pareto optimal instead for example someone who is less competent as a foreman than as an operative may still be employed as a foreman and this yields higher welfare than employing that worker as an operative let me explain the intuition by a simple example assume that workers who join a firm are uncertain of their ability they are risk averse and seek insurance over that uncertainty untalented workers should be fired on standard efficiency grounds as they have higher productivity elsewhere assume that after a period of production information on ability becomes available to the employer and the employee but that other employers must infer this information from whether the

the market value of rarity abstract most theories of demand assume that consumers value the characteristics of products but are unconcerned with how many other consumers also consume the product however several theories of demand argue that consumers can value the exclusivity of possessing a rare object we test this implication on a particular collectible rare coins our paper examines the case of coins of a given type and identical quality that have mintages in different quantities this allows us to exclude the common case in which rarity or price itself is an indicator of quality for our sample rarer coins command higher prices rarity in the form of original mintage more strongly influences the market price than does collectibility as represented by the rarest coins of each mint mark or year we also point out that here may be other goods such as automobiles for which rarity may influence market demand

local network externalities and market segmentation this paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction it departs from the standard katz shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents it shows that even if rival firms engage in bertrand competition this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits the analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation while for others there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

configuring value for competitive advantage on chains shops and networks building on thompson s 1967 typology of long linked intensive and mediating technologies this paper explores the idea that the value chain the value shop and the value network are three distinct generic value configuration models required to understand and analyze firm level value creation logic across a broad range of industries and firms while the long linked technology delivers value by transforming inputs into products the intensive technology delivers value by resolving unique customer problems and the mediating technology delivers value by enabling direct and indirect exchanges between customers with the identification of alternative value creation technologies value chain analysis is both sharpened and generalized into what we propose as a value configuration analysis approach to the diagnosis of competitive advantage with the long linked technology and the corresponding value chain configuration model as benchmark the paper reviews the distinctive logic and develops models of the value shop and the value network in terms of primary activity categories drivers of cost and value and strategic positioning options 1998 john wiley sons ltd

inflation zone targeting abstract we study optimal monetary policy design in a simple model that deviates from the linear quadratic paradigm and provides a rationale for the practice of inflation zone targeting we show that the presence of either zone quadratic preferences or a zone linear relationship between inflation and economic activity provides strong incentives to deviate from conventional linear policies we calibrate the model based on parameters for the united states and the euro area and employ a numerical dynamic programming algorithm to derive the optimal policies with this algorithm we examine the role of uncertainty model structure and relative preference towards economic stability in determining the width of the implied targeted inflation zone

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

inflation targeting learning and q volatility in small open economies this paper examines the welfare implications of managing asset price with consumer price inflation targeting by monetary authorities who have to learn the laws of motion for both inflation rates the central bank can reduce the volatility of consumption as well as improve welfare more effectively if it adopts state contingent taylor rules aimed at inflation and q growth targets in this learning environment however under perfect model certainty pure inflation targeting dominates combined consumer and asset price inflation targeting

the city network paradigm measuring urban network externalities in recent years network behaviour has been analysed extensively as the emerging model for economic growth by network behaviour a metaphor for co operative behaviour among individuals corporate

theorizing path dependence a review of positive feedback mechanisms in technology markets regional clusters and organizations the concept of path dependence has often been criticized as vague and only narrowly applicable although we can find some very refined definitions of the concept we also find a wide range of empirical phenomena being described as path dependent we argue that more detailed accounts of the positive feedback mechanisms that form paths can take path dependence beyond this state of being overdetermined but under specified reviewing three well described cases of path dependent dynamics in technology markets regional clustering and organizations we define a core set of positive feedback mechanisms that constitute path dependence at different analysis levels and clarify the relationship between positive feedback and increasing returns we show that path dependent processes that is processes driven by positive feedback that veer toward rigidity or lock in can be but do not have to be found under many labels including structural inertia coevolution or institutional persistence we conclude that a precise definition of path dependence does not need to be at odds with the concept s widespread use in understanding organizational and industrial development processes copyright 2013 the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

network effects market structure and industry performance abstract this paper analyzes oligopolistic markets with network externalities exploiting a minimal complementarity structure on the model primitives that allows for pure network goods we prove existence of non trivial fulfilled expectations equilibrium we formalize the concept of industry viability investigate its determinants and show that it improves with more firms in the market and or by technological progress these results enlighten some well known conclusions from case studies in the management strategy literature we also characterize the effects of market structure on industry performance which depart substantially from ordinary markets the approach relies on lattice theoretic methods supplemented with basic insights from nonsmooth analysis

technology choice and timing with positive network effects abstract when two competing and incompatible products coexist in a market potential users face a choice between the two products and the alternative of deferring the decision this paper examines the choice between the two substitutes where each one is subject to a positive network effect that is a user of one of the products experiences an increase in the value for each additional person using the same product we examine this buy or wait problem either for an individual or a manager making the investment on behalf of a firm by formulating and analyzing a decision theoretic model to model the stochastic evolution of market share we build on the generalized polya urn of arthur et al arthur w b ermoliev y m kaniovski y m 1987 path dependent processes and the emergence of macro structure european journal of operational research 30 3 294 303 allowing for composition of the market to affect not just the relative market shares but also the absolute growth rate of the market we show that the optimal strategy is defined by a pair of market penetration thresholds that depend on the market composition looking at the effect of the network effects on the optimal strategy we find that more pronounced network effects can either raise or lower the penetration thresholds

a positive theory of flexibility in accounting standards abstract we develop a positive theory of accounting standards when standards generate network externalities and differ in the amount of reporting discretion or flexibility they provide firms we evaluate expected value maximizing firms preferences between two standards regimes rigid and flexible as the number of firms subject to each standard varies as the organization of the securities market varies and as the mapping from the underlying economics of the firms transactions to the accounting reports produced under the two standards vary we also compare firms preferences between the two regimes to the preferences of profit maximizing traders in the firms securities

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

the creation of plants and firms abstract in most industries existing firms must train enough managers to staff existing plants and new plants of new and existing firms so firms produce and sell output to consumers and managers to themselves this paper studies the creation of plants and firms in the above environment it presents a new branching model of firm growth cross section and dynamic characterizations of plants and firms are presented and shown to be consistent with evidence from the us chemical industry

product compatibility as a signal of quality in a market with network externalities abstract in this paper i consider the compatibility decision as a signaling device of the quality of a newly introduced technology of which users are not informed provided that firms are located sufficiently far apart in hotelling s 0 1 interval i find separating equilibria where low compatibility signals high quality this possible separation is due to the fact that low compatibility is more advantageous to the high quality entrant than to the low quality entrant since it can prevent users of the established technology from enjoying network benefits from the new technology very much

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

implementing high powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply we characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk neutral wealth constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem the optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting the large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment

exclusionary pricing in markets with interdependent demands in this paper i use a simple model to study the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing involving two markets related by a positive demand externality it is shown that below cost pricing on one of these markets can allow an incumbent firm to exclude from both markets a more efficient rival which does not have a customer base yet however when exclusion occurs it is always socially optimal in addition under some circumstances there is inefficient entry the entrant wins both markets while the social optimum would require the incumbent to win them