war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

entrepreneurial drain under moral hazard a high yield sector curse we describe a two sector general equilibrium model of productive sorting under output risk and incomplete information risk neutral entrepreneurial individuals can either produce alone or acting as employers insurers team up with risk averse non entrepreneurial individuals although the latter option has the potential to generate more surplus when effort is unobservable and risk is high the moral hazard problem in mixed matches may be too severe for mixing to be attractive to both risk aversion types leading to a segregated equilibrium in which risk averse individuals select low risk low yield activities an increase in the profitability of the riskier sector can then trigger a switch from a mixed to a segregated equilibrium and cause aggregate output to fall evidence from a panel of non oecd countries showing that the presence of uninsured small scale mining firms has a negative impact on the relationship between natural resource exports and agrarian productivity suggests that this high yield sector curse might be present in natural resource rich low income countries

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

the sustainability of government deficits implications of the present value borrowing constraint this paper introduces a new methodology for evaluating the sustainability of fiscal policy the new methodology is distinguished from most existing tests in two important respects first it allows for stochastic real interest rates and second it is both necessary and sufficient results from the application of the new test suggest that recent fiscal policy in the united states has not been sustainable the paper contrasts its findings with those of james d hamilton and marjorie a flavin 1986 copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

geopolitics and international organizations an empirical study on imf facilities there is growing awareness that the distribution of imf facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers this paper focuses on the fact that the imf may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of imf loans differentiating between concessional and non concessional facilities to carry out the empirical analysis we construct a new database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 imf countries over 1990 2003 focusing on emerging and developing economies we use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients while controlling for economic and political determinants our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are non concessional whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans this study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping imf lending decisions potentially affecting the institution s effectiveness and credibility

secession with natural resources we look at the formation of new indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources we argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources we describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post breakup local outcomes

budget deficits and national saving are politicians exogenous during the thirty five year period following world war ii the federal budget deficit averaged less than one percent of net national product never once exceeding five percent for the five year period from 1982 86 the budget deficit never once fell below five percent of net national product there have been some modest cutbacks recently and the deficit is likely to fall to about four percent of net national product in 1988 further declines are now projected in the congressional budget office 1988 baseline forecast of the implications of present policies but both 1988 presidential candidates suggested many more policies that would increase than decrease the deficit these numbers indicate that after years of relative abstinence the united states has experimented with persistent budget deficits on a rather massive scale in the 1980s economists have generally been quite critical of this fiscal policy though there are at least three respectable minority views arguing that federal deficits are not so bad and quite possibly better than likely corrective measures the rationale for economists general opposition comes from those who hold what is called the neoclassical view of deficits according to this view if the united states should be treated as a closed economy persistent deficits will raise interest rates and lower investment if the united states should be treated as a small open economy persistent deficits will leave real interest rates and investment unchanged but the drop in national saving would be financed by higher foreign borrowing accomplished through a rise in the dollar and a drop in net exports either way net national saving falls and consumption rises at the expense of some combination of investment and net exports as a result living standards are higher in the present but lower in the future compared to what they would be in a world of no deficits

leadtime reduction in a q r inventory system an agency perspective abstract we examine the problem of designing and implementing a continuous review q r inventory system from an agency perspective in which the agent s effort influences the item s replenishment leadtime our results are as follows if the agent is risk neutral a linear or quadratic contract achieves first best for a risk averse agent with an exponential utility function assuming a normal leadtime distribution we determine the optimal linear contract extensive numerical experiments suggest that ignoring the possible influence of the agent on the replenishment leadtime can be costly but that the cost penalty of ignoring agency can be significantly reduced by a simple contract

the capital gains and losses on u s government debt 1942 1987 the capital gains and losses on u s treasury securities are calculated and reported on a quarterly basis over the 1942 87 period these data are then used to calculate an adjusted measure of the federal budget deficit for the years 1975 87 whereas the rising trend in interest rates over the 1975 81 period substantially reduced the federal deficit this study shows that the reversal of that trend over the 1981 86 period contributed even more greatly to an increase in the deficit also calculated and reported are holding period rates of return on overall marketable treasury debt providing a contrast to existing interest rate series copyright 1989 by mit press

distinguishing limited liability from moral hazard in a model of entrepreneurship we present and estimate a model in which the choice between entrepreneurship and wage work may be influenced by financial market imperfections the model allows for limited liability moral hazard and a combination of both constraints the paper uses structural techniques to estimate the model and identify the source of financial market imperfections using data from rural and semiurban households in thailand structural nonparametric and reduced form estimates provide independent evidence that the dominant source of credit market imperfections is moral hazard we reject the hypothesis that limited liability alone can explain the data

resource curse or not a question of appropriability this thesis presents three self contained essays focusing on empirical questions in growth and development economics each article addresses specific questions on why countries perform differently in particular i analyse the effect of democracy on economic development the relationship between natural resources and growth and the efficiency of foreign development assistance in the first essay democracy consolidation and growth i analyse the effect of democracy on economic growth in this context i argue that an important aspect to consider is how consolidated political systems are put simply i find that it is not only a question of how democratic countries are but also how long they have been democratic in other words economic performance tends to improve with the duration of uninterrupted democracy the performance of autocracies on the other hand tends to deteriorate over time however for newly established political systems there seems to be a cost of being democratic this implies that democracies only bear their fruit after some time the analysis has important policy implications to overcome initial straits international assistance focused on democratic consolidation may be important and a very good investment in fostering long run development the second essay resource curse or not a question of appropriability together with anne boschini and jesper roine is concerned with the relation between natural resources and economic development for most laymen as well as for most economists it would seem reasonable that countries richly endowed in natural resources also benefit from this wealth however a large literature has found a systematic negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth we suggest that this so called resource curse is not determined by resource endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources a country possesses and the quality of institutions in the country this combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource the concept of appropriability captures the likelihood of natural resources leading to rentseeking corruption or conflicts which in turn will harm economic development our results suggest that if institutions are good enough the curse may be turned into a blessing this may explain why some countries such as norway and botswana tend to benefit from their resources while others such as angola and sierra leone do not the third and final essay of this thesis foreign sectoral aid fungibility growth and poverty reduction is a contribution to the aid efficiency literature which is concerned with the question of whether aid helps or hinders economic development foreign development assistance is often targeted on specific public expenditure sectors if this aid is not used in the sector for which it was granted e g health education it is said to be fungible and donors may end up financing something completely different from what they intended e g military expenditures the major concern about sectoral fungibility is that the alternative use of aid may be less productive or less socially useful however measuring fungibility is not sufficient to determine whether foreign sectoral aid fungibility is actually harmful what is important is how the funds treated as fungible are used the essay starts by obtaining estimates of fungibility for 57 countries the results suggest that sectoral aid is indeed largely treated as fungible by recipient countries next to assess the economic and health effects of fungibility these estimates are incorporated into an empirical model of aid and growth as well as into a model of aid and infant mortality altogether i find no evidence of more fungible sectoral aid leading to worse performance

optimal dutch disease growth models of the dutch disease such as those of krugman 1987 matsuyama 1992 sachs and warner 1995 and gylfason et al 1999 explain why resource abundance may reduce growth however the literature also raises a new question if the use of resource wealth hurts productivity growth how should such wealth be optimally managed this question forms the topic of the present paper in which we extend the growth literature on the dutch disease from a positive to a normative setting we show that the assumptions in the previous literature imply that the optimal share of national wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down however some dutch disease is always optimal thus lower growth in resource abundant countries may not be a problem in itself but may be part of an optimal growth path the optimal spending path of the resource wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time and we discuss why this is the case

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

do natural resource revenues hinder financial development the role of political institutions we hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak as poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development resource revenues may hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions we provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on within country variation in our sample covering the period 1970 2005 and 133 countries our results are robust to the use of additional control variables different samples and alternative measures of financial development and political institutions

from eoq towards zi zero inventory zi is a new and powerful concept to improve production efficiency underpinning zi is set up reduction and this paper examines what eventuates when set up costs are cut the folklore is that set up reduction lowers inventory and costs we obtain results contrary to that reducing set up costs need not reduce inventory for example likewise lowering set up costs need not necessarily lower total production and inventory costs furthermore most investments produce marginally decreasing returns set up cost reduction prompts the opposite it produces marginally increasing not decreasing returns a parametric algorithm that calculates the benefit of set up cost reduction is provided most presentations of zi have been descriptive with very few mathematical models of it yet untaken by modeling certain zi concepts mathematically we scrutinize their validity and sometimes invalidity

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

the ricardian approach to budget deficits persistent budget deficits have increased economists interest in theories and evidence about fiscal policy this paper develops the ricardian approach and contrasts it with standard models the discussion considers from major theoretical objections to ricardian equivalence finite lifetimes imperfect capital markets uncertainty about future taxes and incomes and the distorting effects of taxation the paper then considers empirical evidence on interest rates consumption and saving and current account deficits the conclusion is that the ricardian approach is a useful first order approximation and that this approach will probably become the benchmark model for assessing fiscal policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the economic lives of the poor in what turned out to be a rhetorical master move the 1990 world development report from the world bank defined the extremely poor people of the world as those who are currently living on no more than 1 per day per person measured at the 1985 purchasing power parity ppp exchange rate in 1993 the poverty line was updated to 1 08 per person per day at the 1993 ppp exchange rate which is the line we use in this paper poverty lines have always existed indeed 1 per day was chosen in part because of its proximity to the poverty lines used by many poor countries 1 however the 1 a day poverty line has come to dominate the conversations about poverty to a remarkable extent

land and the transition from a dual to a modern economy tenurial contracts in agriculture can be an initial source of wealth accumulation for dynasties of poor credit constrained individuals the income from such contracts can be invested in education of offspring who then can find work in the formal manufacturing sector this process allows the economy to develop into a modern economy with a large manufacturing sector an excessive number of poor individuals competing for scarce land however drives up the rental price of land which then slows the process of accumulation and forces the economy to converge to a less efficient dual equilibrium in such cases a policy of land redistribution coupled with a temporary education subsidy may be needed to push the economy to a modern equilibrium

resource intensity institutions and development summary we examine the relationship between resource abundance and several indicators of human welfare consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth we find that given an initial income level resource intensive countries tend to suffer lower levels of human development while we find only weak support for a direct link between resources and welfare there is an indirect link that operates through institutional quality there are also significant differences in the effects that resources have on different measures of institutional quality these results imply that the resource curse is a more encompassing phenomenon than previously considered and that key differences exist between the effects of different resource types on various aspects of governance and human welfare 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

the dutch disease a disease after all many third world oil producers are encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base while west european oil and gas producers netherlands united kingdom are suffering a decline in their traded goods manufacturing sector induced by real wage pressures it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil revenues may be somewhat ora mixed blessing the quip of the economist notwithstanding the mechanism behind this unbalance is clear enough part of the oil revenues is spent on non traded goods which leads to a real appreciation i e a rise in the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods this in turn draws resources out of the non oil traded sector into the non traded goods producing sector corden and neary 1982 van wijnbergen 1980 one may say that this is an efficient response to the increase in income from oil production the united kingdom mexico egypt simply should move into oil derived industries and non traded goods and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are exhausted however many developing countries are hesitant to take this advice after all the post world war ii success stories in economic development involve without exception countries that promoted their traded goods sector aggressively moreover it is a well established stylised fact that technological progress is faster in the traded non sheltered sectors of an economy than in the non traded sector balassa 1964 is an early reference considering the hypothesis that technological progress rather than taking place exogenously with the passage of time is a function of accumulated experience the concern of countries like egypt mexico or indonesia is much easier to understand since solow 1957 and denison 1962 it is known that capital accumulation explain only a small part of economic growth if most of economic growth is caused by learning by doing induced technologica

the return to capital in ghana we show that the real return to capital in ghana s informal sector is high for farmers we find annual returns ranging from 205 350 in the new technology of pineapple cultivation and 30 50 in well established food crop cultivation we also examine the relative prices of durable goods of varying durability and estimate a lower bound to the opportunity cost of capital of 60 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

public investment and its effects on the burden of the public debt few problems in economics have been so thoroughly debated without being resolved as the question about whether the burden of the public debt is passed on to the future the key issue in the debate is whether taxation and debt are equivalent in their real effects as methods of raising public revenues the question in this form is an old one and both sides of the debate were eloquently discussed by ricardo 2 the purpose of this paper is to present a framework within which the choices facing the many different individuals in the society can be analyzed as is explained below the nature of the economy s adjustment to debt issue cannot be fully understood without first understanding that different individuals will adjust differently to the issuance of additional debt it is unlikely that a single paper could end a debate that is well over two centuries old hence our goal is more modestly to extend the framework of the debate adding some more realistic features to a barro like model illustrates that there are areas of commonality that unite both sides of the debate this study extends the current debate in two ways first it examines the intergenerational transfer of public sector wealth by including the effects of intergenerational bequests of assets in addition to the intergenerational transfer of debt after all when individuals consider the well being of their heirs they must consider the value of the assets that are passed from one generation to the next in addition to the stock of public debt 3 second it

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

effective foreign aid following civil war the nonstrategic desperation hypothesis when does aid foster development after civil war a testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development this article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic desperation hypothesis an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals paradoxically incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income ten year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970 96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis by focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals the nonstrategic desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war when institutions are weak

does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth theory and evidence from 75 aid recipient countries foreign aid transfers can distort individual incentives and hence hurt growth by encouraging rent seeking as opposed to productive activities we construct a model of a growing small open economy that distinguishes two effects from foreign transfers i a direct positive effect as higher transfers allow the financing of infrastructure ii an indirect negative effect as higher transfers induce rent seeking competition by self interested individuals in this framework the growth impact of aid is examined jointly with the determination of rent seeking behavior we test the main predictions of the model for a cross section of 75 aid recipient countries there is evidence that aid has a direct positive effect on growth which is however significantly mitigated by the adverse indirect effects of associated rent seeking activities this is especially the case in recipient countries with relatively large public sectors

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

budget deficits rhetoric and reality w v t hatever the real or imagined ills of the economy the news media most politicians and a fair proportion of the economics profession are quick to point to the culprit the budget deficit no matter that few appear to know or care precisely what deficit they are talking about or how it is measured no matter that few bother to explain in terms of a relevant model just how government deficits may be expected to impact the economy no matter that few offer any empirical data to sustain their judgments so budget deficits cause inflation budget deficits raise interest rates budget deficits bring on the trade deficits budget deficits crowd out investment budget deficits are an irresponsible mortgage on the future and budget deficits caused the october 1987 stock market crash and now threaten further financial cataclysms is there truth in any of these assertions or does it all depend budget deficits do matter and their effects contrary to barro s ricardian equivalence theorem can be substantial as most economists have recognized for at least half a century budget deficits can however be too small as well as too large to know which you have to measure them right and you have to analyze their role in the world in which we live pure walrasian and rational expectation market clearing models may prove more useful for academic advancement than for promotion of economic health i need not repeat many of the objections to the equivalence theorem raised by bernheim and gramlich and addressed by barro in this symposium however there is

the welfare costs of deficit finance we analyze the welfare consequences of deficit finance in a general equilibrium model fit to the us economy current spending may be financed with current and or future distortionary taxes the economy is open to international capital flows the welfare costs of financing marginal current spending are substantial and are sensitive to the timing of the required taxes postponing a tax on labor income is advantageous but postponing a tax on asset income is not ricardian equivalence poorly approximates the economy we consider

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

gold exploitation and socioeconomic outcomes the case of burkina faso abstract in the early 2000s burkina faso launched several legal reforms aimed at increasing gold production this resulted in a gold mining boom making gold the main export product and the main source of economic growth of the country we hypothesize that gold extraction improved population living standards this paper investigates how the gold boom in burkina faso which began in 2007 has affected socioeconomic outcomes we use a simple theoretical model to motivate the testing of several hypotheses regarding these impacts employing a difference in differences strategy as well as panel data models we estimate the impacts using data from household surveys undertaken in 2003 and 2009 and administrative data consistent with our model the results suggest that areas hosting gold extraction have better average living standards in terms of headcount ratios poverty gaps and household expenditures than do areas without gold however the gold boom is also shown to have potentially increased local inequality and child labor in areas with these income gains these results demonstrate the importance of proactive government policy in mitigating negative welfare impacts

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

rates of return on physical and human capital in africa s manufacturing sector in this paper two sets of issues are addressed using panel data from the manufacturing sector of five african countries first how high are the returns to human relative to physical capital second what is the relative importance of technology and endowments of human and physical capital in determining differences in earnings and productivity across the countries evidence from earnings functions shows that the private returns to both experience and education rise with the level of education private returns rise from 3 per cent at the primary level to 10 per cent at the secondary level and 35 per cent for tertiary evidence from the production function gives lower returns on education than from the earnings function rates of return on physical capital exceed 20 per cent and greatly exceed the average return on human capital data is available on the stocks of human and physical capital across the countries productivity and earnings differentials are shown to be large between cameroon and ghana these differences are due almost entirely to differences in physical not human capital endowments this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

oil and regime type in latin america reversing the line of causality abstract in its first generation the literature on the resource curse typically posited that resource dependence shapes a country s economy and politics more recent work posits that the effects are mediated by institutions we take this newer approach further by arguing that economic and political institutions not just mediate but actually shape resource dependence our focus is on performance across national oil companies nocs in latin america we explain performance variation by invoking variations in regime and market features nocs that operate in contexts of greater independence from the executive branch stronger checks and balances within and outside the sector and greater market forces though not necessarily private actor dominance exhibit better performance institutions thus influence sector conditions rather than the other way around we advance this argument using original data from colombia and venezuela and supplementary data from mexico brazil and argentina our study focuses on the oil boom bust cycle of 2003 2016

booming sector and de industrialisation in a small open economy this paper presents a theoretical analysis of the dutch disease the phenomenon whereby a boom in one traded goods sector squeezes porfitability in other traded goods sectors both by directly bi

increasing returns and the genesis of american resource abundance the usa became the world s leading mineral producing nation between 1870 and 1910 a development paralleled by the rising resource intensity of american manufacturing this paper challenges the premise that resource abundance simply reflected the country s geological endowment of mineral deposits instead in the century following 1850 the usa exploited its natural resource potentials to a far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial minerals the paper argues that natural resource abundance was an endogenous socially constructed condition that was not geologically preordained it examines the complex legal institutional technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the us supply responses to the expanding domestic and international industrial demands for minerals and mineral products it suggests that strong positive feedbacks even in the exploitation of depletable resources were responsible for the explosive growth of the american minerals economy

corruption and reduced oil production an additional resource curse factor prominent contributions to the resource curse literature suggest weak governance and corruption are important factors behind the wide welfare variations observed among oil producing countries how weak governance and corruption influence revenue management and expenditure decisions as well as the possible welfare benefits derived from oil are broadly discussed how they impact upon volumes of oil produced has however attracted little attention this paper combines a review of the resource curse and oil production literatures with findings from qualitative interviews with oil sector experts to appreciate the feasibility of connections between corruption and oil production below its potential we make particular reference to environments where regulatory institutions or political accountability are weak and focus primarily on producer government and oil firm relations drawing on insights from geology political science and economics we suggest suboptimal production solutions can impact volumes of oil actually produced and create constraints on long term revenues for oil producing countries we argue greater disclosure of information on oil production efficiency on a field by field and country by country basis will assist further investigation of the relationships between corruption and volumes of oil produced

imf bailouts and moral hazard this paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with imf bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the perceived probability of imf bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis we do not find strong evidence that the extent of investor moral hazard changed after the non bailout of russia in august 1998 that signaled a modification to imf intervention policy in contrast we find evidence that investor moral hazard is intensified for those countries that have stronger political connections to the imf and that are thereby more likely to be bailed out by the imf this pattern prevailed even after the russian crisis

the effects of a natural gas boom on employment and income in colorado texas and wyoming improvements in technology have made it profitable to tap unconventional gas reservoirs in relatively impermeable shale and sandstone deposits which are spread throughout the u s mostly in rural areas proponents of gas drilling point to the activity s local economic benefits yet no empirical studies have systematically documented the magnitude or distribution of economic gains i estimate these gains for counties in colorado texas and wyoming three states where natural gas production expanded substantially since the late 1990s i find that a large increase in the value of gas production caused modest increases in employment wage and salary income and median household income the results suggest that each million dollars in gas production created 2 35 jobs in the county of production which led to an annualized increase in employment that was 1 5 of the pre boom level for the average gas boom county comparisons show that ex ante estimates of the number of jobs created by developing the fayetteville and marcellus shale gas formations may have been too large

are windfalls a curse abstract a puzzling feature of temporary terms of trade booms is that some countries have responded to such windfalls by running current account deficits furthermore those countries that ran current account deficits failed to attain greater post boom growth rates indicating the deficits were consumed or invested in low quality projects the point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in determining outcomes if fiscal control is unitary then the consumption smoothing effect is operative and representative agent models of the current account have predictive power however if control is divided among several fiscal claimants a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption smoothing effect leading to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive temporary shock we model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself this results in a deterioration of the current account we also show that all the windfall is dissipated with the country experiencing no increase in welfare 1998 elsevier science b v

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

oil and women a re examination abstract in a seminal article ross 2008 reports a negative correlation between oil production and women s representation in the labour force and politics across countries this article re examines these relationships exploiting variations in oil endowments to address endogeneity concerns we confirm that oil production causes decline in women s representation additionally we show that consistent with dutch disease effects oil production decreases women s employment in the traded sector however it also leads to an increase in women s employment in the nontraded sector we explore some social consequences of oil production and show that it results in women marrying earlier and having more children

avoiding the resource curse indigenous communities and canada s oil sands summary concerns about a resource curse in canada have been raised in response to rapid growth in the petroleum sector in northern alberta in previous research there has been little consideration of how symptoms of the resource curse are experienced and managed at a regional scale and by indigenous communities an analysis of effects and responses is offered using a natural financial human and social capitals framework without consideration of how to manage the symptoms of the resource curse oil and gas activity is likely to further disadvantage indigenous populations already living on the margins of canadian society

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

social divisions and institutions assessing institutional parameter variation this paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions it argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness which in turn should depress institutional payoffs absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income the empirical results support this hypothesis and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large

insecure resources bilateral trade and endogenous predation a game theoretic analysis of conflict and trade this article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries we identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary s arming affects domestic welfare in three different ways the first is an export revenue effect which increases welfare because arming causes export revenue to go up i e there is an arming induced terms of trade improvement the second is a resource predation effect which increases welfare because arming increases the appropriation of a rival country s resource input to produce a consumption good the third is an output distortion effect which reduces welfare because arming lowers the domestic production of civilian goods based on these effects we show circumstances in which greater trade openness reduces the intensity of arming we also discuss the implications of resource security asymmetry for conflict and trade

lead time variability reduction in stochastic inventory models abstract this research is motivated by the realization that japanese manufacturers have devoted much time and effort to establish a long term partnership with their suppliers in order to reduce lead time uncertainty it is very common for a japanese manufacturer to advance money to finance its suppliers and help them meet the rigid delivery standards imposed however there have been very few mathematical analyses of the advantages of investing in such efforts the main objective of this paper is to provide an analytical model to quantify the tradeoffs associated with lower lead time uncertainty in particular we consider the option of investing in order to reduce the lead time variance in an inventory model with stochastic lead time the paper also considers the option of investing in both setup cost and lead time variability reduction numerical results are presented to demonstrate the use of the models sensitivity analysis is performed to indicate under what conditions investment is warranted

cointegrating institutions the time series properties of country institutional measures abstracta country s political and economic institutions are critical for economic prosperity the literature abounds with institutional measures precisely because institutions are multidimensional we use panel unit root and cointegration tests to examine the time series properties of several institutional measures to answer two questions first do institutional changes tend to be permanent second which subsets of institutions tend to converge or move together these answers have important implications for whether permanent institutional reform is possible and whether reforms can be undertaken one institutional area at a time or instead must simultaneously encompass multiple institutional areas

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

minerals institutions openness and growth an empirical analysis competing explanations of the resource curse are tested using panel data the data support the existence of a mineral resource curse for developing countries with weak institutions consistent with the hypothesis that owners of mineral resources use weak institutions and openness to trade to stifle the development of human capital to the detriment of growth in other sectors of the economy manufacturing imports substitute for the development of domestic production so openness to trade correlates with lower growth in mineral dependent economies the dutch disease and debt overhang explanations of the resource curse are not supported

investing in reduced setups in the eoq model this paper is motivated by the observation that the japanese have devoted much time and energy to decreasing setup costs in their manufacturing processes and that there has been little in the way of a formal framework available to use to think about such efforts the object of this paper is to begin to provide such a framework the framework developed identifies only one aspect of the advantages of reducing setups namely reduced inventory related operating costs the other advantages such as improved quality control flexibility and increased effective capacity are not accounted for in this paper nevertheless substantial reductions in setups may be warranted based solely on the benefits identified in this paper the approach taken here introduces an investment cost associated with changing the current setup level and adds a per unit time amortization of this cost to the other costs identified in the standard eoq model the general problem becomes that of minimizing the sum of a convex and a concave function in two special cases the minimization can be carried out explicitly in one of these cases numerous interpretations of the results are made including comparisons of japanese and american practices for example holding other parameters constant there is a critical sales level such that investment is made in reducing setups if and only if the sales rate is above that level when such investment is made the optimal lot size is independent of the sales rate the paper also addresses the joint selection of the setup cost and the sales rate selection of the sales rate is seen as incorporating explicit production and holding costs into the classical monopolist s pricing problem an explicit solution is obtained for the model postulated

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

how do mineral states learn path dependence networks and policy change in the development of economic institutions summary based on case study methods i draw lessons from the political economy of macroeconomic management in chile and peru to explain how mineral states learn to think long term and eventually escape the resource curse i give an institutionalist account of the rise of countercyclical funds showing how the long term development of elite networks qualifies the contemporary making of curse escapes policy networks compose one central avenue of institutional development for both the reproduction of path dependence and the making of institutional change the exposition challenges political economy of development frameworks which over emphasize structural initial conditions and assume steady rent seeking behavior of state agents

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

funds from non renewable energy resources policy lessons from alaska and alberta abstract we document the use of energy natural resource funds in alaska and alberta and analyze theirs characteristics for further implementation in resource rich countries such funds allow dealing theoretically with intergenerational equity issues corruption and more general institutional problems the performance of both funds is very different depending on the management and composition choices but some policy lessons can be drawn from these two examples importantly the role of a public dividend policy is highlighted as a way to bypass corrupted institutions and to enhance quality of life for poorest people we also emphasize the need to deal with inflation to make the fund sustainable

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

volatility and development why is gdp growth so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones we identify four possible reasons i poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors ii poor countries specialize in fewer sectors iii poor countries experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks e g from macroeconomic policy and iv poor countries macroeconomic fluctuations are more highly correlated with the shocks of the sectors they specialize in we show how to decompose volatility into these four sources quantify their contribution to aggregate volatility and study how they relate to the stage of development we document the following regularities first as countries develop their productive structure moves from more volatile to less volatile sectors second the level of specialization declines with development at early stages and slowly increases at later stages of development third the volatility of country specific macroeconomic shocks falls with development fourth the covariance between sector specific and country specific shocks does not vary systematically with the level of development we argue that many theories linking volatility and development are not consistent with these findings and suggest new directions for future theoretical work

trade matters in the fight against poverty narratives perceptions and lack of evidence in the case of fish trade in africa two opposing views exist in the literature on the potential role that international fish trade plays in economic development while some claim that fish trade has a pro poor effect others denounce the negative effect of fish export on local populations food security and doubt its contributions to the macro economy in this paper we explore this debate in sub saharan africa our analysis did not find any evidence of direct negative impact of fish trade on food security neither did it find evidence that international fish trade generates positive pro poor outcomes this paper discusses the possible reasons for this apparent lack of development impact and highlights the unsupported assumptions underlying the current discourse about international fish trade we suggest that given lack of evidence for the development benefits of fish trade between africa and developed countries fisheries policy could consider support for regional africa to africa trade that meets the growing african demand for lower value fish means of overcoming barriers to intra african trade in fish are discussed

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

fiscal deficits and long term interest rates further evidence from annual data much debate has recently centered on the popular view that large u s budget deficits financed by the sale of bonds cause high interest rates if valid this view implies that deficits crowd out efficient private investment and adversely affect economic growth however bailey 2 and barro 3 have challenged this conventional view on theoretical grounds based on the ricardian equivalence proposition bailey and barro contend that rational economic agents interpret government deficits as postponed tax liabilities and thus will have no effects on private wealth or interest rates such theoretical ambiguity in regards to the impact of budget deficits has also been matched by an equally conflicting empirical evidence for example barth iden and russek 4 deleeuw and holloway 8 hutchison and pyle 20 makin 24 makin and tanzi 25 and zahid 35 have found a positive and significant effect of deficits on interest rates on the other hand evans 11 12 13 hoelscher 17 motley 28 and plosser 29 30 have all failed to find any systematic support for a significant positive impact of deficits on interest rates it should be observed that the above empirical studies have employed either monthly or quarterly data however some researchers e g hoelscher 18 have recently charged that monthly or quarterly data bias the results in favor of finding no significant linkage between deficits and interest rates they reasoned that portfolio adjustment lags are too long for monthly or even quarterly observations to reflect the actual correlation between deficits and interest rates to eliminate this problem of periodicity annual data was instead advocated 2 using annual data hoelscher 18 concluded that deficits have caused positive and significant changes in long term interest rates in the united states