democracy and human capital formation education spending in latin america 1980 to 1997 this article examines the relationship between democratic representation and spending on education in latin america the authors assess the impact that democracy has on the distribution of resources between different levels of schooling and on total spending on education specifically they test whether democratic governments allocate a greater share of resources to primary education the level that benefits the largest segment of the electorate and that is most critical for human capital formation in developing countries using time series cross sectional analysis the authors find that democracies devote a higher percentage of their educational resources to primary education and that they maintain higher absolute spending levels on education in the aggregate thereby enhancing the prospects of human capital formation

disaggregating china s local political budget cycles righting the u abstract what impact does spending time horizon have on political budget cycles while traditional political budget cycles increase visible spending with immediate gains before political turnover i hypothesize that spending in categories with less immediate gains categories increases when opportunity costs are lower in this article i build on existing literature on budget cycles in both democracies and non democracies to disaggregate types of budget cycles those with long run versus short run benefits in china after central level reforms welfare targets with long run gains became visible to local leaders constituents the central leaders above them local leaders then had an incentive to provide welfare but only when it was the least costly in terms of opportunity costs using fixed effects models panel data from china s 333 municipalities for 1994 2012 i find welfare spending minimizes both relatively and absolutely around year three and maximizes at the beginning and end of a politician s tenure when opportunity costs and probability of political advancement are lowest these cycles are the most dramatic in western provinces where education is a particularly important tool for ideological spread health and social security spending also see expansion at the end of mayor s tenures although the cycles are less pronounced than in education spending this study expands the literature on political budget cycles by disaggregating government spending and considering the impact of timeliness on cycles

disaggregating the developing welfare state provincial social policy regimes in china summary local variation in social welfare provision appears in myriad contexts around the world and yet our attempts at conceptualizing welfare regimes focus on the national level in china local authorities have shaped social policy implementation since economic reforms in this paper i answer three questions about subnational variation in social policy provision in china 1 have chinese provinces diverged in their social policy provision 2 how do provincial social policy regimes differ from one another 3 what explains variation in provincial social policy spending to answer the first question i conduct a cluster analysis of provincial social policy spending data i find that provinces systematically diverge in their social policy priorities while some provinces invest in education to develop human capital and promote economic growth others emphasize poverty alleviation i propose a typology to conceptualize these tendencies i then test for these divergent approaches using between effects regression models of provincial social policy spending although provincial wealth and needs sometimes play a role in allocations for social policy i find that economic development strategy and social instability are associated with distinct approaches to social welfare spending these distinct provincial welfare regimes have implications for the adoption implementation and ultimately effectiveness of social policy in china

multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

corporate income tax competition double taxation treaties and foreign direct investment abstract in the presence of international capital mobility foreign direct investment is influenced by corporate income tax rates and the rules of how taxes paid in the host country are treated at home in this paper the exemption credit and deduction methods are considered as tax rules tax competition is modeled as a non cooperative game with respect to both corporate tax rates and the form of double taxation relief the subgame perfect equilibrium is shown to be independent of the tax rules since capital is inefficiently allocated the feasibility and the content of a cooperative contract between governments are analyzed it is argued that only the credit method requires neither compensatory payments nor fully harmonized tax rates this is consistent with the observation that tax credits are very often adopted in double taxation treaties

foreign ownership and corporate income taxation an empirical evaluation abstract foreign ownership allows countries to effectively export part of their corporate tax burden hence countries with high foreign ownership are expected to impose relatively high corporate taxes the findings of this paper suggest that there indeed is an economically significant positive relationship between foreign ownership and tax burdens in europe already significant foreign ownership levels in europe offer an explanation for the absence of a race to the bottom in corporate tax levels

democracy and social spending in latin america 1980 92 what is the effect of regime type on public expenditures for social programs we investigate the relationship between democracy and the change in social spending controlling for gdp the debt inflation and age structure of the population through a time series cross sectional panel data set for 17 latin american countries from 1980 to 1992 the results show that especially in poor countries during economic crisis democracies increase the allocation of resources to social programs relative to authoritarian regimes this suggests that the latter are more constrained by economic forces whereas democracies are more constrained by popular demands hence calls to abandon broad categorizations of regime type appear to be premature democracy can matter in systematic and substantial ways

optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management we analyze a dynamic auction in which a seller withc units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated intot time periods each group of buyers has independent private values for a single unit buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with buyers in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller the number of buyers in each period as well as the individual buyers valuations are random the model is a variation of the traditional single leg multiperiod revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time for this setting we prove that dynamic variants of the first price and second price auction mechanisms maximize the seller s expected revenue we also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal auctions the optimal auctions are then compared to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which list prices are used in each period together with capacity controls and to a simple auction heuristic that consists of allocating units to each period and running a sequence of standard multiunit auctions with fixed reserve prices in each period the traditional revenue management mechanism is proven to be optimal in the limiting cases when there is at most one buyer per period when capacity is not constraining and asymptotically when the number of buyers and the capacity increases the optimal auction significantly outperforms both suboptimal mechanisms when there are a moderate number of periods capacity is constrained and the total volume of sales is not too large the benefit also increases when variability in the dispersion in buyers valuations or in the number of buyers per period increases

empirical asymmetries in foreign direct investment and taxation abstract this paper assesses the sensitivity of the operations of multinational corporations mncs to host country taxation the empirical analysis is based on two different measures of mnc activity by u s majority owned foreign affiliates panel data for aggregate real gross product in manufacturing that originates in a given host country and micro data for a single year regarding the likelihood of a firm locating in a given host country the empirical estimates indicate that investment geared toward export markets rather than the domestic market is particularly sensitive to host country taxation that this sensitivity appears to be greater in developing countries than developed countries and that it is becoming greater over time

human capital and fdi inflows to developing countries new empirical evidence abstract despite the dramatic increase in total foreign direct investment fdi flows to developing countries in the last few years the bulk of the inflows has been directed to only a limited number of countries it has been argued that developing countries might enhance their attractiveness as locations for fdi by pursuing policies that raise the level of local skills and build up human resource capabilities nevertheless the empirical evidence in the literature in support of this recommendation for a large sample of developing countries is scant this paper evaluates this argument in the light of the evolution in the structural characteristics of fdi and empirically tests the hypothesis that the level of human capital in host countries may affect the geographical distribution of fdi the empirical findings are a human capital is a statistically significant determinant of fdi inflows b human capital is one of the most important determinants and c its importance has become increasingly greater through time

electoral competition and local government responsiveness in brazil summary the empirical literature on the effects of competition on the supply of public goods shows controversial results at the local level the main objective of this paper is to investigate this relationship in a federalist country brazil where the political system places few barriers to the entry of competitors and local governments have the independence to establish their own public policy we show that a higher effective number of candidates running for the executive branch increase the supply of local public goods the number of student enrollments teachers and free immunizations

mechanism design with interdependent valuations efficiency ggagents valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals or types of all agents under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome decision payoffs previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals efficient design is impossible this paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome e g allocation of the goods is determined then the agents observe their own outcome decision payoffs and then final transfers are made

tax competition when firms choose their organizational form should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed we analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings governments are able to commit to long run tax discrimination policies before firms decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non cooperatively whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countries depends critically on the elasticity with which the firms organizational structure responds to tax discrimination incentives a model extension with countries of different size shows that small countries are likely to grant more tax preferences than larger ones along with having lower effective tax rates

capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms abstract this paper establishes optimal rules for capital income and profits taxation in the open economy with or without foreign ownership of domestic firms we show that if there are constraints on the feasibility of profits taxation both saving and investment taxes generally enter the optimal tax package if instead profits can be fully taxed then source based investment taxes vanish if domestic firms are in part owned by foreigners then source based investment taxes can be used to shift income away from these to domestic citizens and they may even be used to finance lump sum transfers to domestic residents

on the genesis of multinational foreign affiliate networks multinational enterprises mnes develop their networks of foreign affiliates gradually over time instead of exploring all profitable opportunities immediately they first establish themselves in their home countries and then enter new markets stepwise we argue that this behavior is driven by uncertainty concerning a firm s success in new markets after entry the firm collects information which is used to update its beliefs about its performance in a market as conditions in different markets are correlated the information gathered in one of them can also be used to update beliefs elsewhere with the degree of correlation depending on issues such as the geographical or cultural distance between markets this correlated learning may render it optimal to enter markets sequentially investment in market a is only followed by entry in market b if the firm was sufficiently successful in a the prediction that firms start their expansion in markets that are closer to their home base and then proceed step by step is supported by our empirical analysis which features the universe of foreign affiliates held by german multinationals based on a rich set of benchmark estimates and sensitivity checks we identify correlated learning across markets beyond alternative explanations as a key driver of gradualism in the genesis of mnes foreign affiliate networks

the location choices of multinational firms the role of internationalisation experience and group affiliation cet article s interesse aux choix de localisation des firmes multinationales et determine dans quelle mesure ces choix dependent de l experience internationale de l investisseur et de celle de son groupe a partir de donnees francaises nous constatons que 95 des nouveaux investissements a l etranger sont precedes d exportations dans le meme pays tandis que 73 sont precedes d importations independamment des caracteristiques observables et inobservables des pays exporter vers un pays donne et dans une moindre mesure en importer accroit significativement la probabilite d investir dans ce pays l annee suivante la phase d exportation est plus systematique pour les investissements dans des pays distants et pour les primo investisseurs tandis que l experience d importation est significativement correlee aux ide dans les pays a bas revenu par ailleurs les choix de localisation ne dependent pas seulement de l experience internationale de l investisseur mais aussi de celle de son groupe les firmes tendent a investir dans les pays ou le groupe detient deja une filiale locale et sont plus enclines a investir dans des pays distants si d autres societes affiliees y exportent deja ces resultats suggerent l existence de strategies coordonnees et ou d un partage d informations entre societes affiliees

the dynamic vickrey auction abstract we study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon buyers arrive randomly over time are long lived and have independent private values the valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way we construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which a there is a single financial transaction with the buyer b ex post participation constraints are fulfilled c there is no positive transfer to any agent and d payments are determined online we exploit that under the efficient allocation rule there is a unique potential winning period for each buyer this reduces the multidimensional type to one dimension and the payment of the winner can be defined as the lowest valuation for the potential winning period with which the buyer would have won the object in a static model this payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the vickrey auction

the merits of horizontal versus vertical fdi in the presence of uncertainty we examine the impact of uncertainty on vertical and horizontal fdi our model shows that greater supply uncertainty reduces the expected income from vertical fdi but increases the expected income from horizontal fdi greater demand uncertainty adversely affects the expected income under both production modes uncertainty about predatory actions by the host country is more costly to the multinational under vertical than under the horizontal mode we examine sales by foreign affiliates of u s parent companies conditioning on host country characteristics thought to influence fdi we find evidence that volatility and sovereign risk have a greater negative impact on vertical fdi than on horizontal fdi

corporate tax elasticities a reader s guide to empirical findings corporate taxes exert a variety of effects on business behaviour a wealth of empirical evidence assesses the magnitude of these behavioural margins of taxation this article offers an up to date review and aims to provide common ground by computing for each distortion the semi elasticity of the corporate tax base we pay particular attention to international investment where it is not a priory clear whether marginal investment decisions or discrete locations are most important using anextension of the meta analysis of de mooij and ederveen 2003 we explore the extent to which existing studies reveal differences in effect size between the intensive and extensive margins of international investment

who cares about corporate taxation asymmetric tax effects on outbound fdi this paper investigates whether different types of fdi are asymmetrically affected by corporate taxation we classify investment projects according to several characteristics such as the general motivation for fdi the type of business activity or the degree of internationalisation of the multinational firm subsequently we analyse how local taxes influence the number of german outbound investments in european countries the analysis reveals significant asymmetries with regard to tax effects vertically integrated investments are more sensitive to host country taxation than horizontal fdi larger tax rate elasticities are estimated if business activities are considered highly mobile and in accordance with profit shifting considerations subsidiaries of more internationalised companies are less tax responsive to host country taxation

venture capital financing moral hazard and learning we consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model the value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project the allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard the optimal contract is a time varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option the option itself is based on the control of the funds the dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project a positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities finally relationship financing including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting

how low business tax rates attract mne activity municipality level evidence from germany most existing empirical evidences on the impact of profit taxation on multinational firm activity are based on cross country data one major drawback of such data is that countries differ not only with regard to taxes but also with other dimensions which might be hard to capture by means of observable characteristics we compile a database of more than 11 000 municipalities in germany to analyze the sensitivity of location decisions of foreign mnes in germany with respect to business tax rates which are levied directly by the municipalities we find that higher business tax rates have a negative effect on three alternative measures of mne activity after controlling for other determinants of firm location decisions the number of foreign mnes mne employment and mne fixed assets our results suggest that tax competition among regional entities for foreign investors is a game of a few in cross section instrumental variable regressions a one percent reduction of the municipal business tax rate equivalent to a decline by about 0 14 percentage points leads to an increase in the number of legally independent foreign owned firms by about 0 45 the average municipality would have to reduce its business tax rate by about 2 2 percentage points or 15 from its average level to attract one foreign mne hence municipalities need to be attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract foreign firms at the margin

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

should countries engage in a race to the bottom the effect of social spending on fdi summary this paper examines the effect of social spending in developing countries on foreign direct investment fdi existing studies on the race to the bottom in social services attempt to discern the extent to which fdi affects social expenditure however it remains an open question whether fdi is actually attracted to lower spending levels we find no indication that fdi is repelled by social spending indeed there is strong evidence that investment is associated with greater programmatic emphases on health and education these findings have important implications for leaders seeking to attract investment and for those attempting to expand social programs

learning about the future and dynamic efficiency we analyze the conditions under which an efficient allocation of resources is achievable in a dynamic private values setting where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents values as an application consider the sequential allocation of scarce spectrum to emerg ing technologies whenever a new technology appears a benevolent designer is faced with a problem should he allocate a valuable chunk of spectrum right now while forfeiting for a long period of time the option of allocating it to a possibly superior future technology it makes sense to assume here that current firms have a better knowledge of their technological prow ess than the designer and that the designer s assessment of future technological possibilities is improved by observing the current technology if technology owners are strategic we show below that the learning process about the future disturbs the ability to extract the information necessary for efficient decision making another good example is hiring by an organization that fills positions at different hierarchy levels over time while all candidates prefer higher level positions some aspect of their ability to perform the needed tasks at each level is privately known to the candidates if contracts with current employees are difficult to adjust the designer must carefully compare the quality of present candidates which can serve as a signal about the market to the expected quality of candidates that may become available in the future finally consider a firm allocating franchises in a country where it did not operate before and where contractual clauses or other impediments prevent reallocation during a significant period of time local potential franchisees may have some superior information regarding future prof itability in the respective market and hence the elicitation of private information is crucial for a franchisor that is supposed to get a share of the future profits

competing for transparency political competition and institutional reform in mexican states why do political actors undertake reforms that constrain their own discretion we argue that uncertainty generated by political competition is a major driver of such reforms and test this argument using subnational data on mexican states adoption of state level access to information ati laws examining data from 31 mexican states plus the federal district we find that more politically competitive states passed ati laws more rapidly even taking into account the party in power levels of corruption civil society and other factors the fine grained nature of our data reflecting the staggered timing of elections inauguration dates and dates of passage allows us to distinguish between different theoretical mechanisms we find the greatest evidence in favor of an insurance mechanism by which incumbent parties who face uncertainty over future political control seek to ensure access to government information and means of monitoring incumbents in the future in case they lose power

the oecd model tax treaty tax competition and two way capital flows model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings this contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient i incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral with symmetric countries credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium this equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium with asymmetric countries the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization with harmonization it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries welfares only if neither uses deductions

tribal mobilization fragmented groups and public goods provision in jordan diversity has been blamed for poor public goods provision in a number of different contexts it is associated with reduced spending on services meager rates of tax collection and poor policies i argue in this article however that in semidemocratic or authoritarian countries where political parties are weak diversity can be an important source of electoral competition leading to better services in diverse communities where multiple identity groups are politically mobilized candidates are forced to seek the support of voters outside of their group who are more likely to vote based on qualifications than on group affiliation resulting in better public officials who provide superior services moreover i find internal group fragmentation to be important in understanding the impact of heterogeneity on public goods provision candidates in areas where only one identity group is politically mobilized but where that group is politically fragmented will also seek votes from other groups within the comm

what do we know about investment under uncertainty recent theoretical developments relating to investment under uncertainty have highlighted the importance of irreversibility for the timing of investment expenditures and their expected returns this has subsequently stimulated a growing empirical literature which examines uncertainty and threshold effects on investment behaviour this paper presents a review of this literature a variety of methods have been used to investigate the empirical implication of irreversibility in investment the majority focusing on the relationship between investment flows and proxy measures of uncertainty a general conclusion is that increased uncertainty at both aggregate and disaggregate levels leads to lower investment rates this suggests that there is an irreversibility effect under which greater uncertainty raises the value of the call option to delay a commitment to investment this effect appears to dominate any positive impact on investment arising from the fact that greater uncertability under certain circumstances increases the marginal profitability of capital the methods used raise a number of issues which call into question the reliability of the findings and these are addressed in the paper however if such irreversibility effects are present then their omission from traditional investment models casts doubt on the efficacy of such specifications jel classification d81 d92 e22

the financing of innovation learning and stopping we consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success we distinguish between two financing modes namely relationship financing where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable and arm s length financing where it is unobservable we find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes the rate at which funding is released becomes tighter over time under relationship financing and looser under arm s length financing the tradeoff in the choice of financing modes is between lack of commitment with relationship financing and information rents with arm s length financing

altered states taxes and the location of foreign direct investment in america this paper compares the distribution between u s states of investment from countries that grant foreign tax credits with investment from all other countries the ability to apply foreign tax credits against home country tax liabilities reduces an investor s incentive to avoid high tax foreign locations state corporate tax rate differences of 1 percent are associated with differences of 9 11 percent between the investment shares of foreign tax credit investors and the investment shares of all others suggesting that state taxes significantly influence the pattern of foreign direct investment in the united states copyright 1996 by american economic association

electoral competition globalization and subnational education spending in mexico 1999 2004 this article examines the determinants of primary education spending among 29 mexican states from 1999 to 2004 there is wide variation in spending despite expectations of policy convergence due to market forces associated with globalization and in spite of the unique potential of education spending to complement economic strategies in achieving equitable growth this study exploits significant advantages of subnational analysis in exploring political and economic variables that have been useful in explaining spending levels cross nationally consistent with these studies this article shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending in contrast to other work however this study finds that exposure to the global economy has distinctly mixed effects on education spending these findings thus further highlight the positive returns to higher quality democracy while underscoring the need to examine the effects of many different aspects of globalization representing a wide variety of strategies employed by governments in engaging the international economy

the effects of capital mobility trade openness and democracy on social spending in latin america 1980 1999 empirical studies measuring the impact of globalization on social spending have appeared recently in leading journals this study seeks to improve upon previous work by 1 employing a more sophisticated and comprehensive measure of financial openness 2 using a more accurate measure of trade openness based on purchasing power parities and 3 relying on social spending data that are more complete than those used by previous studies on latin america our estimates suggest that several empirical patterns reported in previous work deserve a second look we find that trade openness has a positive association with education and social security expenditures that financial openness does not constrain government outlays for social programs and that democracy has a strong positive association with social spending particularly on items that bolster human capital formation t he international integration of markets for goods and services over the past two decades is unprecedented amidst a broader context of international integration latin america has experienced the most dramatic change in its economic policy orientation since world war ii few regions have undergone as rapid and thorough an economic transformation how has economic integration affected the social welfare policies of latin american governments has it forced them to reduce spending on social programs in order to compete in the world economy or has it induced them to provide social safety nets for those hurt by economic competition has democratization in latin america compelled governments to spend more on social programs in relatively open economies

globalization domestic politics and social spending in latin america a time series cross section analysis 1973 97 this study examines the effects of globalization democratization and partisanship on social spending in fourteen latin american countries from 1973 to 1997 using a pooled time series error correction model the authors examine three sets of issues first following debates in the literature on oecd countries they want to know whether social spending has been encouraged or constrained by integration into global markets within this context they examine the extent to which such outcomes might be influenced by two additional sets of domestic political and institutional factors discussed in work on developed countries the electoral pressures of democratic institutions and whether or not popularly based governments are in power the authors show that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital markets this is the strongest and most robust finding in the study neither democratic nor popularly based governments consistently affect overall social spending the authors then disaggregate spending into social security transfers and expenditures on health and education they find that popularly based governments tend to protect social security transfers which tend to flow disproportionately to their unionized constituencies but they have a negative impact on health and education spending conversely a shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending which reaches a larger segment of the population the authors conclude by emphasizing the contrasting political logics of the different types of social spending

searching and learning by trial and error i study a dynamic model of trial and error search in which agents do not have complete knowledge of how choices are mapped into outcomes agents learn about the mapping by observing the choices of earlier agents and the outcomes that are realized the key novelty is that the mapping is represented as the realized path of a brownian motion i characterize for this environment the optimal behavior each period as well as the trajectory of experimentation and learning through time applied to new product development the model shares features of the data with the well known product life cycle jel d81 d83 d92 l26

the location of financial sector fdi tax and regulation policy abstract this paper analyzes how corporate taxation and regulatory requirements affect the location of financial sector fdi we use novel information on new financial services entities established by multinational firms in 83 host countries we find a negative effect of host country taxes on the probability of choosing a particular host location we can also confirm a significant influence of the regulatory environment for example stricter equity capital requirements negatively affect location probabilities our empirical approach allows us to provide new insight in how a policy measure of a given country affects other countries by estimating cross country tax and regulation elasticities

preferential trade agreements and tax competition for foreign direct investment abstract this paper examines how free trade agreements and customs unions affect the location of foreign direct investment fdi and social welfare taking into account that governments may adjust taxes and external tariffs to compete for fdi conditions are identified under which a free trade agreement leads to fdi and under which this improves welfare the welfare effect is shown to depend on the relative size of efficiency gains in production and government revenue losses due to tax competition a free trade agreement may fail to induce welfare improving fdi creating a role for a customs union

measuring the interdependence of multinational firms foreign investments earlier work found evidence for geographic linkages of aggregate foreign direct investment across countries and country pairs from a theoretical point of view such linkages at the macroeconomic level may root in between firm as well as within firm linkages and originate from information spillovers across or within firms in exploring unknown markets and vertical linkages between production plants across different locations within the firm we use data on the universe of german multinational enterprises mnes to empirically explore how marginal investments at one foreign affiliate depend on investments at other affiliates within the same mne the empirical approach employs two channels or modes of cross affiliate interdependence mere geography capturing horizontal linkages through correlated learning and horizontal competition within the firm and input output relationships within or across industries which capture vertical linkages adding to earlier findings at the aggregate level we find evidence of a significant interdependence of investments within the firm in the firm level data at hand vertical linkages appear to be more important than horizontal ones investments at one location tend to stimulate investments at other locations of the same mne particularly if input linkages are strong the opposite seems to be true for output linkages beyond vertical linkages mere geographic proximity matters only to a minor extent this suggests that evidence of linkages through geographic closeness at aggregate data levels accrue mainly to reasons of vertical linkages within networks of affiliates jel c31 d22 f21 f23 f68 g31 h32

trade capital mobility and tax competition this paper examines a system of governments national state or local that finance public expenditures with taxes on mobile capital e g a property tax unlike previous research on tax competition explicit consideration is given to the general equilibrium determination of the prices at which goods are traded between regions the analysis identifies inefficiencies in government behavior that are not apparent in models in which the terms of trade are exogenously given capital taxation is shown to create an inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions accompanied by an inefficient pattern of trade a model is presented in which the chosen levels of public good outputs differ across regions containing identical residents and production possibilities there is a wasteful diversity of public good supplies

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space

buy prices in online auctions irrationality on the internet abstract buy prices are puzzling it makes sense for a seller at auction to set a minimum bidding level i e a reserve price surely but a maximum we explore the use of maximum bidding levels buy prices in online auctions and provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism we show that augmenting an english auction with a buy price can improve the seller s profits by partially insuring and therefore increasing the expected payment from some risk averse bidders perhaps more surprising is that the english auction augmented with a buy price can also be superior even to the first price sealed bid and dutch auctions when bidders are risk averse

dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations research overview current practices and future directions the benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries such as airlines hotels and electric utilities where the capacity is fixed in the short term and perishable in recent years there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries where the sellers have the ability to store inventory three factors contributed to this phenomenon 1 the increased availability of demand data 2 the ease of changing prices due to new technologies and 3 the availability of decision support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing this paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice our focus is on dynamic intertemporal pricing in the presence of inventory considerations

a knowledge and physical capital model of international trade flows foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises abstract this paper addresses two important issues at the nexus of the literatures on international trade foreign direct investment fdi foreign affiliate sales fas and multinational enterprises mnes first the introduction of a third internationally mobile factor physical capital to the standard 2 2 2 knowledge capital model of mnes with skilled and unskilled labor allows us to resolve fairly readily the puzzle in the modern mne literature that foreign affiliate sales among two identical economies completely displace their international trade intra industry trade and intra industry fdi and fas can coexist for national and multinational firms with identical productivities in identical countries second the introduction also of a third country to the model suggests a formal n country theoretical rationale for estimating gravity equations of bilateral fdi flows and fas in a manner consistent with estimating gravity equations for bilateral trade flows

natural resources a curse on education spending abstract in line with the rising interest in harnessing natural resource revenues for economic and human development through productive government investments this paper aims to address an important blind spot in our understanding of the resource curse by contributing innovative insights on how natural resource wealth impacts government priorities and expenditure practices using a large panel dataset of 140 countries covering the period from 1995 to 2009 we find an adverse effect of resource dependence on public education expenditures relative to gdp that is robust to controlling for a range of additional covariates furthermore our findings indicate that this resource curse effect on the government prioritization of education mainly stems from point source natural resources these results are of particular importance for the sustainable management of natural resource wealth in developing countries as they could achieve especially high returns by investing resource revenues in public goods such as education while this paper underlines the importance of institutions and government accountability our findings also raise questions on the role of the private sector as a partner in development as the extractives industry could consider increasing funding for education through corporate social responsibility csr initiatives

vertical multinationals and host country characteristics abstract we inquire into the question of what country characteristics particularly market size and labor force composition attract inward investment this approach is motivated by the empirical observation that the poorest countries attract a far smaller share of world direct investment than their share of income small markets receive less investment per capita than larger ones we develop a model that generates both stylized facts in equilibrium suggesting the existence of a development trap for small skilled labor scarce countries