pigou meets ramsey gender based taxation with non cooperative couples abstract this paper explores the implications of gender based income taxation in a non cooperative model of household behavior in a first step we show how gender based taxes can act as pigou taxes and correct the externality induced by a non cooperative household equilibrium we find that the first best pigou tax rules are solely determined by spouses relative marginal rates of substitution between the public household good and private consumption breaking down this general rule into the primitives of the model the spouse with a comparative advantage in home production should be taxed at a higher rate in a second step we embed our non cooperative framework in a standard second best planning problem in which taxes serve a revenue raising purpose in this case the optimal structure of differential taxation by gender is partly determined by a ramsey type inverse elasticity rule and partly by a pigouvian tax element we show that these two forces work in opposite directions in determining whether men or women should be taxed at a higher rate and that either one could be dominant depending on the revenue raising position of the government this result is robust to the introduction of two groups of households that differ in their mode of decision making which can be either cooperative or non cooperative

individual versus joint taxation in models with household production in a recent paper piggott and whalley 1996 challenge the conventional wisdom that says that the individual rather than the household should be the unit of taxation and argue instead for joint taxation their point of departure is a point well taken the literature on which this wisdom is based in particular boskin and sheshinski 1983 ignores the existence of household production the general argument is a nice one in the theory of the second best in the absence of taxation of market wage income the marginal rates of technical substitution between primary and secondary labor in market and in household production would be equal to each other and the marginal rate of substitution between the market and household good would be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between them thus achieving pareto efficiency introduction of income taxation leads to a distortion of the relation between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation which is the focus of concern in the literature 2 and given the differing econo

the tax unit and household production under a progressive income tax conventional wisdom is that taxing individuals rather than households is preferred from an efficiency point of view the reason is that secondary workers whose labor supply elasticity is high will be taxed at a lower marginal rate than primary workers whose labor supply elasticity is low here we argue that once household production is taken into account things are more complicated since tax design should also not distort the input of family members time in household production factor input distortions as well as ramsey considerations thus need to enter the choice of the tax unit we provide a numerical example of an economy for which a move from an individual to a household basis in the income tax can be efficiency improving we then use a general equilibrium model parameterized using australian tax rates and data whose results clearly show that welfare gains can occur under changes from an individual to a household basis for an existing income tax our results th

consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for profit nursing homes this paper develops implications of arrow s hypothesis that nonprofit organizations are prevalent in health care because of quality uncertainty the model analyzes the ability of nonprofits to mitigate market failures created by asymmetric information in an environment characterized by potential competition from both explicitly for profit firms and for profits in disguise profit motivated firms who obtain nonprofit status in order to exploit the perceived trustworthiness of the nonprofit sector under certain conditions it is shown that nonprofit status can serve as a credible signal of quality and that nonprofits can decrease the underprovision of quality both by providing high quality services and indirectly via a spillover effect on quality in the for profit sector applicability to long term care and implications for empirical research and policy towards nonprofits in health care are discussed

inflation risk and international asset returns abstract we show that inflation risk is priced in international asset returns we analyze inflation risk in a framework that encompasses the international capital asset pricing model icapm of adler and dumas 1983 in contrast to the extant empirical literature on the icapm we relax the assumption that inflation rates are constant we estimate and test a conditional version of the model for the g5 countries france germany japan the uk and the us over the period 1975 1998 and find evidence of statistically and economically significant prices of inflation risk in addition to priced nominal exchange rate risk our results imply a rejection of the restrictions imposed by the icapm in an extension of our analysis to 2003 we show that even after the termination of nominal exchange rate fluctuations in the euro area in 1999 differences in inflation rates across countries entail non trivial real exchange rate risk premia

the tax unit and household production comment in a recent paper published in this journal piggott and whalley 1996 challenge the conventional wisdom that taxing individuals rather than households is preferred from an efficiency point of view p 398 they argue that once household production is taken into account things are more complicated since tax design should also not distort the input of family members time in household production they support their view by providing computational results these results seem to demonstrate that welfare can indeed be enhanced if households are taxed as a unit and not as individuals this comment sets out to show however that their analysis contains some quite critical points in our opinion if piggott and whalley s approach is followed through to its end it only enforces the conventional view piggott and whalley work with an extended family labor supply model the extension concerns household production expressed by some function n there are two model variants with different degrees of complexity in the first variant a representative household is considered and producer prices are held constant the model serves to demonstrate piggott and whalley s basic line of argumentation within a simple framework the second variant extends the first one in several respects its functional specification is more complex and it is a general equilibrium model with two household types the model is parameterized using australian tax rates and data it is shown that aggregate welfare gains can occur under well designed income tax reforms the reforms are such that the individual tax base is replaced with a household tax base additionally average and marginal tax rates are proportionally adjusted to preserve revenue

wolves in sheep s clothing is non profit status used to signal quality abstract why do many firms in the healthcare sector adopt non profit status one argument is that non profit status serves as a signal of quality when consumers are not well informed a testable implication is that an increase in consumer information may lead to a reduction in the number of non profits in a market we test this idea empirically by exploiting an exogenous increase in consumer information in the us nursing home industry we find that the information shock led to a reduction in the share of non profit homes driven by a combination of home closure and sector switching the lowest quality non profits were the most likely to exit our results have important implications for the effects of reforms to increase consumer provision in a number of public services

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

on the taxation of trade within and between households abstract tax reform proposals affect individual welfares in ways which strongly depend on the nature of specialisation in household production and the pattern of trade within households variation in the degree of specialisation in domestic production across households strongly influences the impacts on individual tax burdens of a given tax reform the standard models of the economics literature cannot be used to analyse these issues because they ignore the two person nature of households and the existence of household production and trade this paper proposes a simple and tractable model to remedy this and uses it to analyse the impacts of the types of tax reform that have been the subject of recent policy debate

income splitting among the self employed under individual taxation with progressive marginal tax rates households in which the distribution of income is unequal benefit from attributing income to the lower income household member self employment provides greater potential to split income in this way because of the absence of a third party reporting income using the canadian experience as a case study this paper develops a unique estimator of the incidence of illegal income splitting among self employed couples the results suggest that the incidence of income splitting among self employed men in canada is non trivial but no evidence is found that self employed women attribute income to their spouses jel classification h26 h21 h31 j22 le fractionnement du revenu chez les travailleurs autonomes dans un regime fiscal qui a des taux marginaux d imposition progressive des revenus les membres d un menage dans lequel la repartition des revenus n est pas g rien n indique que les femmes qui sont travailleurs autonomes attribuent une portion de leurs revenus a leur epoux

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

quality reputation and the choice of organizational form this paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior we extend the glaeser and shleifer glaeser e shleifer a 2001 not for profit entrepreneurs journal of public economics 81 99 115 framework which studies an entrepreneur s optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non contractible into a repeated interaction setting the main result is that when reputations can be sustained then for profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured this finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer consumer relationship may be inadequate

the optimal income taxation of couples this paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples a multidimensional screening problem each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market but makes an hours of work choice and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work if second earner participation is a signal of the couple being better worse off we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax subsidy on secondary earnings and that the tax subsidy on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically we present calibrated microsimulations for the united kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs

asymmetric information ownership and quality of care an empirical analysis of nursing homes theoretically when asymmetric information exists nonprofit organizations due to the attenuation of the property right provide better quality of service than do the for profits despite extensive theoretical examination of the behavior of nonprofits there has been very little empirical testing of the plausibility of these theories this article addresses the effect of ownership type on the quality of service in the nursing home industry an environment particularly conducive to identifying the existence of asymmetric information the study shows that the differences between for profit and nonprofit homes do become manifest when asymmetric information is present

taxes and time allocation evidence from single women and men the classic model of becker 1965 suggests that labor supply decisions should be analyzed within the broader context of time allocation and market good consumption choices but most empirical work on policy has focused exclusively on measuring impacts on market work this paper examines how income taxes affect time allocation during the entire day and how these time allocation decisions interact with expenditure patterns using the panel study of income dynamics from 1975 to 2004 we analyze the response of single women s housework labor supply and other time to variation in tax and transfer schedules across income levels number of children states and time we find that when the economic reward to participating in the labor force increases market work increases and housework decreases with the decrease in housework accounting for approximately two thirds of the increase in market work analysis of repeated cross sections of time diary data from 1975 to 2004 shows that home production decreases substantially when market hours of work increase in response to policy changes data on expenditures from the consumer expenditure survey from 1980 to 2003 show some evidence that expenditures on market goods likely to substitute for housework increase in response to a greater incentive to join the labor force the baseline estimates imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption of home and market goods is 2 61 the results are consistent with the becker model meanwhile single men show little response to changes in tax policy and we are able to rule out an elasticity of substitution between home and market goods for this group of more than 1 52

the impact of real rents and wages on household formation although the economic literature has analyzed some components of the headship decision study of household formation has been primarily in the realm of demography the authors expand the demographic model to include economic determinants of the decision to remain with parents or not and to live with a group or separately they focus on measuring the effect of spatial variations in rental costs on the probability of forming a household the authors results based on a sample of 2 573 youths in their twenties indicate that the cost of housing and potential labor earnings are important variables in explaining this probability copyright 1993 by mit press

the effects of joint taxation of married couples on labor supply and non wage income abstract the united states changed its tax treatment of married couples in 1948 from a system in which each spouse paid taxes on his or her own income to a system in which a married couple is taxed as a unit the switch from separate to joint taxation changed incentives for labor supply and asset ownership this paper investigates the effects of the conversion to joint taxation taking advantage of a natural experiment created by cross state variation in property laws married individuals in states with community property laws had always been taxed as if each spouse had earned half of the couple s income and thus were unaffected by the 1948 legal change comparing the behavior of highly educated taxpayers in affected and unaffected states indicates that the tax change is associated with a decline of approximately 2 percentage points in the employment rate of married women consistent with the higher first dollar tax rates they faced after 1948 women married to self employed men were also less likely to have non wage income after 1948 reflecting pre 1948 allocation of family assets to wives for tax purposes the effects of joint taxation on married men s labor force participation and non wage income holding are generally not statistically significant

optimal taxation in a growth model with public consumption and home production in a neoclassical growth model with public consumption we show the following pareto optimal tax rules the government should tax leisure and private consumption at the same rate and subsidize net investment at the same rate it taxes net capital income also it should tax capital income more heavily than labor income in an extension for home production the additional rule is to tax investment for home production at the same rate of the tax on private market consumption these tax and subsidy rates should be constant over time except the initial tax rate on capital income

discreteness and the welfare cost of labor supply tax distortions we compare the welfare costs of tax distortions of labor supply in one andtwo memberhouseholddiscreteandcontinuouschoicelaborsupply leisurecon sumption models calibrated to the same aggregate uncompensated labor supplyelasticities in the discrete models taxes induce a large response from a subsetof the population whereas the majority of the population exhibits unchangedbehavior in contrast the majority of the population reacts to tax changes in con tinuous models discrete choice matters as the welfare costs of similar taxes varysigni cantly when individuals face discrete labor supply choices from when theychoose working hours continuously

are price controls necessarily bad the case of rice in vietnam abstract most economists instinctive reaction to price controls is that they are harmful its strong enforcement results in shortages and resource misallocation while weak enforcement often leads to black markets and high transaction costs given these instincts this paper assesses the pros and cons of rice price controls in vietnam using a multi sector multi household general equilibrium model these price controls fix producer prices and allow government marketing agencies to sell at higher prices and hence are in part a revenue raising device as such they may be part of an efficient tax mix particularly so since agricultural incomes and production go untaxed under the formal tax system it is argued that such controls can act to dampen costly domestic adjustments in the face of volatile world prices it is shown that this system can be supported as welfare enhancing under conditions currently prevailing in vietnam

government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market the case of china abstract we show that the many unusual features of china s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function under certain conditions these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income yet should be much easier to enforce the observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries the theory also forecasts however that china will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes

reply to apps rees and gottried richter in our earlier paper in this journal 1996 we argued that in a model with both market and household production each of which has two factor inputs primary and secondary worker labor individualbased taxation will distort the factor input ratio whereas household or joint taxation which has similar tax rates for the two workers will not there is an added distortion of household production under individual taxation that does not appear in a model with only consumption of goods and leisure and in which ramsey labor supply elasticity considerations point toward individual taxation we used 1974 australian data to analyze a possible move from an existing individual based income tax to an alternative household based tax a move from a status quo separate tax regime to joint taxation we suggested that the added distortion of household production under individual taxation made such a move more likely to be welfareimproving we considered pairwise comparisons of model solutions under prevailing nonoptimal individual tax rates and common household member rates calculated in various ways our results showed that if the dispersion in individual tax rates is large enough the tax induced distortion of household production can be the dominant consideration in the comparison we neither computed nor characterized optimal tax rate configurations in this application the lessons from optimal tax design seemed uninteresting and rather trivial a de novo design of an optimal tax structure across household members would almost certainly