cooperation against theft a test of incentives for water management in tunisia water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi arid regions cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring using a theoretical model we show that theft is more likely when prices are high punishments are weak and cooperatives are large we also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring we test the model on data from tunisia for the years 2001 2003 relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs the results confirm that well designed incentives can reduce theft and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design

a note on distribution in a vote bidding game with general interest and single issue voters abstract this paper explores the strategies of candidates bidding for votes from a population made up of single issue voters and voters who respond in a probabilistic manner

equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard abstract existence of pure strategy equilibria is studied in health insurance markets that exhibit both ex ante adverse selection of the rothschild stiglitz wilson type and ex post hidden information moral hazard it is found that ex post moral hazard has two offsetting effects on the existence of equilibrium and that in general it is difficult to say whether an equilibrium is more or less likely to exist numerical simulations and an analytical example confirm that moral hazard may increase the likelihood of equilibrium these results are interpreted as evidence that health maintenance organization hmo markets could be less likely to exhibit stable equilibria than are fee for service insurance markets

expectation shocks and learning as drivers of the business cycle psychological factors market sentiments and less than fully rational shifts in beliefs are widely believed to play a role in the economy yet they are rarely considered in macroeconomic models this paper evaluates the empirical role of expectational shocks on business cycle fluctuations the paper relaxes the rational expectations assumption to exploit survey data on expectations in the estimation of a new keynesian model which allows for learning by economic agents expectation shocks affect the formation of expectations and capture waves of optimism and pessimism that lead agents to form forecasts that deviate from those implied by their learning model the empirical results uncover a crucial role for these novel expectations shocks as a major driving force of the u s business cycle expectation shocks regarding future real activity are the main source of economic fluctuations accounting for roughly half of business cycle fluctuations

the conservation reserve program as a least cost land retirement mechanism mechanism design theory is used to characterize the properties of a least cost crp if marginal land rents decrease with acres farmed then a least cost crp is a set of nonlinear price schedules if marginal land rents are independent of acres farmed then an offer system constitutes a least cost crp the least cost offer system gives a useful estimate of the upper bound of a least cost crp empirical results suggest that a 34 million acre crp should have cost no more than 1 billion per year

bertrand competition and cournot outcomes further results the model of kreps and scheinkman where firms choose capacities and then compete in price is extended to oligopoly further capacity is an imperfect commitment device firms can produce beyond capacities at an additional unit cost when is larger than the cournot price the cournot outcome obtains in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium when decreases from the cournot price towards zero the whole range of prices from cournot to bertrand is obtained in equilibrium

expectations learning and business cycle fluctuations this paper explores an alternative theory based on learning dynamics in the con text of an otherwise standard stochastic growth model we consider an environment in which households and firms have an incomplete model of the macroeconomy knowing only their own objectives constraints and beliefs agents are optimizing have a completely specified belief system but do not know the equilibrium map ping between primitive disturbances the aggregate state of the economy and mar ket clearing prices by extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data they approximate this mapping to forecast variables that are exogenous to their decision problems such as the rental rate of capital and the real wage this belief structure has the property that beliefs affect the true data generating process of the economy which in turn affects belief formation the economy is therefore self referential shifts in beliefs about future returns to labor and capital affect current market clear ing prices which in turn can reinforce beliefs in this environment current prices can become less informative about future economic conditions generating fluctuations in real activity this kind of mechanism driving business cycle fluctuations is found in early writ ings on macroeconomic dynamics for example alfred c pigou 1927 on page 122 writes

a continuous logit hotelling model with endogenous locations of consumers this paper analyzes location and price choices of firms and subsequent location choices of consumers in a linear city model when consumers have different perceptions of locations and firms the study utilizes a continuous logit model to describe consumers location and supplier choices a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium exists where firms make positive profits and the minimum differentiation principle applies for identical firms prices converge to marginal costs as heterogeneity of consumers perceptions disappears

equilibrium existence in the linear model of spatial competition this paper considers a generalization of the hotelling model of spatial competition it is shown that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in the two stage location price game exists only under very stringent conditions these conditions are in fact the conditions for profit to be concave in price for any given location pair when the solution concept is extended to allow for mixed strategies there is no symmetric equilibrium involving pure strategies if transport costs are not sufficiently convex the convexity of transport costs is crucial in determining whether there is excessive or insufficient diversity of products copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

debt policy uncertainty and expectations stabilization this paper develops a model of policy regime uncertainty and its consequences for stabilizing expectations because of learning dynamics uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policy is shown to restrict relative to a rational expectations analysis the set of policies consistent with macroeconomic stability anchoring expectations by communicating about monetary and fiscal policy enlarges the set of policies consistent with stability however absent anchored fiscal expectations the advantages from anchoring monetary expectations are smaller the larger is the average level of indebtedness finally even when expectations are stabilized in the long run the higher are average debt levels the more persistent will be the effects of disturbances out of rational expectations equilibrium

price competition for an informed buyer abstract this paper investigates price competition with private information on the demand side two sellers each offer a different variety of a good to a buyer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality the model provides an informational foundation to differentiation in hotelling s price competition game equilibrium comparative statics is performed with respect to the prior belief and the precision of the private information competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are relatively uninformative sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public information and are nonmonotonic in the prior belief journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 d82 l15

the nature of equilibrium in a location model models of location are appropriate in a number of contexts in economics and political science for example firms choose where to position stores and which of a spectrum of goods to produce and politicians select the nature of their platforms in such models it is natural to look for a collection of locations with the property that the location of each individual is optimal given the positions of all other individuals however the pure strategy nash equilibrium provides a solution which is both incomplete and unsatisfactory incomplete because in many cases no such equilibrium exists unsatisfactory because even when it does exist it may not be robust to the specification of the model

the value to a firm of its rival learning abstract in price competition a firm f reduces its rival s r learning about r s cost in quantity price competition f wants r not to learn about f s cost i show that in quantity competition f wants r not to learn about r s cost

product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty we investigate hotelling s duopoly game of location then price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand we characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations contrary to the individual level random utility models location uncertainty is a differentiation force in equilibrium increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation higher expected equilibrium prices and profits and a greater welfare loss

recent advances in oligopoly theory from a game theory perspective abstract this paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory it is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected and this is related to the static nature of the models employed one important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments one way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments for example in production capacity and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment

why competition may drive up prices abstract we show that the expected price of an incumbent firm may increase in response to increasing competition as it may become more profitable to exploit a rather immobile fraction of consumers instead of capturing a larger but more contested segment of the market to derive this result we consider two approaches of modelling the degree of competition first in a duopolistic setting competition is said to be more intense if the entrant s product becomes more attractive to the mobile fraction of buyers in this case we find that all buyers i e both the mobile and the immobile fraction may lose if the market becomes more competitive secondly in a model with two entrants competition is said to become intense if entrants serve an overlapping segment of the market for mobile buyers

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

government debt learning and the term structure abstract does a change in the public s holdings of government debt affect the term structure of interest rates empirical analysis using a var model indicates that a rise in these holdings of the real debt to gdp ratio increases both the three month and ten year u s nominal yields in a statistically significant manner the maturity composition of debt is also found to matter innovations in holdings of long term debt affect the term structure while increases in short term debt affect inflation expectations these effects of changes in holdings of debt on the yield curve can be derived in a general equilibrium model in which the government issues exponentially maturing riskless debt financed by lump sum taxes and the optimizing agents are adaptive learners on calibrating the average maturity of debt in the model to match that of u s treasury debt since the 1980s i find that positive innovations in government debt lead to increases in asset yields this is because agents do not learn the principle of ricardian equivalence exactly and perceive increases in holdings of government bonds as a rise in their net wealth imposing rational expectations on the agents eliminates this channel and changes in holdings of government debt have no effect on yields the learning model also implies that as the real debt to gdp ratio increases and the average maturity of debt becomes longer the agents become less likely to learn that ricardian equivalence holds

convergence of least squares learning in environments with hidden state variables and private information we study the convergence of recursive least squares learning schemes in economic environments in which there is private information the presence of private information leads to the presence of hidden state variables from the viewpoint of particular agents by applying theorems of ljung we extend some of our earlier results to characterize conditions under which a system governed by leastsquares learning will eventually converge to a rational expectations equilibrium we apply insights from the learning results to formulate and compute the equilibrium of a version of townsend s model

elections with platform and valence competition abstract we study a game in which candidates first choose platforms and then invest in costly valences e g engage in campaign spending the marginal return to valence depends on platform polarization the closer platforms are the more valence affects the election outcome consequently candidates without policy preferences choose divergent platforms to soften valence competition moreover exogenous increases in incentives for valence accumulation lead to both increased valence and increased polarization the latter because candidates seek to avoid the costs of extra valence as a result the increase in valence is smaller than it would have been with exogenous platforms finally the model highlights the overlooked substantive importance of common modeling assumptions changing the source of uncertainty in our model from noise around the median voter s ideal point to a shock to one candidate s valence as is common in the literature leads to complete platform convergence for all parameter values

irrigation technology adoption and gains from water trading under asymmetric information we develop a water allocation and irrigation technology adoption model under the prior appropriation doctrine with asymmetric information among heterogeneous farmers and between farmers and water authorities we find that adverse selection reduces the adoption of modern irrigation technology we also show that even with asymmetric information incentives for water trade exist and lead to additional technology adoption with gains to all parties this suggests that under asymmetric information a thin secondary market improves the allocation of water resources and induces additional adoption of modern irrigation technologies

fiscal requirements for price stability maintaining price stability requires not only commitment to an appropriate monetary policy rule but an appropriate scal policy rule as well ricardian equivalence does not imply that scal policy is irrelevant except in the case of a certain class of policies ricardian policies the role of scal developments in inflation determination under a non ricardian regime is illustrated through an analysis of the bond price support regime of the 1940s a monetary scal regime with attractive properties would combine a taylor rule for monetary policy with nominal decit targeting as a scal policy commitment

the science of monetary policy an imperfect knowledge perspective this paper reevaluates the basic prescriptions of monetary policy design in the new keynesian paradigm through the lens of imperfect knowledge we show that while the basic logic of monetary policy design under rational expectations continues to obtain perfect knowledge and learning can limit the set of policies available to central banks rendering expectations management in general more difficult nonetheless the desirability of some form of price level targeting inducing inertia in interest rate policy paramount under rational expectations is robust to the assumption of imperfect knowledge

incentives precision technology and environmental protection abstract this paper calls for a reevaluation of the pollution problem in order to devise efficient strategies for its control it contends that a fundamental cause of pollution is inefficiency in input use during the production process this inefficiency manifests itself as input waste and polluting residues precision technologies can increase the effectiveness of inputs used in production and reduce pollution generation despite their potential economic and ecological benefits adoption of precision technologies has been slow this paper presents a conceptual framework to identify and analyze the specific factors that affect their diffusion among microunits these include various heterogeneous characteristics of microunits prices which do not reflect the relevant scarcities due to distortionary regulatory policies and lack of institutional mechanisms for efficient allocation of inputs and outputs it rationalizes the observed variations in the appropriate choice of technology across microunits and argues for the need to broaden the range of incentive based instruments for environmental protection beyond pollution taxes

current issues in the economics of groundwater resource management the issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource in this article we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity we present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels in particular we critically review economic models of groundwater use examine the potential for groundwater management discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use allocation of this resource finally we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms

anticipated fiscal policy and adaptive learning abstract the impact of anticipated policy changes when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations is considered agents are assumed to combine limited structural knowledge with a standard adaptive learning rule these issues are analyzed using two well known set ups an endowment economy and the ramsey model in our scenario there are important deviations from both rational expectations and purely adaptive learning the approach could be applied to other frameworks

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

conjectural variations and location theory abstract imperfectly competitive markets such as those involving spatial separation of producers and consumers are characterized by interactions between competing firms actions call forth reactions and the possible reactions form an important part of the information set that should be used to determine the initial actions one method for dealing with this is the conjectoral variation approach despite some shortcomings this methodology sheds considerable light on decision making in the space economy equally importantly it sheds light on more general microeconomies modelled as spatial analogs this paper shows that conjectural variations and the nature of competition between rival firms do indeed matter in location choice and more generally in product design in particular we shall be concerned with showing how the conjectured responses of rival firms affect their desire to agglomerate

distributive politics and electoral competition abstract within the framework of pure redistribution dividing one unit of a homo geneous good among identical individuals the paper analyses the redistribution that arises from downsian two party electoral competition it appears that the strategic behavior of vote maximizing parties leads them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d63 d72

location in the hotelling duopoly model with demand uncertainty abstract demand uncertainty is introduced into a hotelling environment with fixed prices by allowing random shocks to the desirability of the firm s product given these random shocks the choice of location affects the average level of demand as well as the riskness of demand reducing the distance to the other firm raises expected demand and payoff but also lowers the degree of differentiation between the firms thus raising demand uncertainty risk averse firms will locate away from the center and depending on degree of risk aversion markup and size of the market may locate on either side of the quartile points

bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions an experimental study abstract we review an asymmetric auction experiment based on plum int j game theory 20 1992 393 private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions one of which first order stochastically dominates the other we test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders preference for first vs second price auctions

the effectiveness of alternative monetary policy tools in a zero lower bound environment this paper reviews alternative options for monetary policy when the shortterm interest rate is at the zero lower bound and develops new empirical estimates of the effects of the maturity structure of publicly held debt on the term structure of interest rates we use a model of risk averse arbitrageurs to develop measures of how the maturity structure of debt held by the public might affect the pricing of level slope and curvature term structure risk we find that these treasury factors historically were quite helpful for predicting both yields and excess returns over 1990 2007 the historical correlations are consistent with the claim that if in december 2006 the fed were to have sold off all its treasury holdings of less than 1 year maturity about 400 billion and use the proceeds to retire treasury debt from the long end this might have resulted in a 14 basis point drop in the 10 year rate and an 11 basis point increase in the 6 month rate we also develop a description of how the dynamic behavior of the term structure of interest rates changed after hitting the zero lower bound in 2009 our estimates imply that at the zero lower bound such a maturity swap would have the same effects as buying 400 billion in long term maturities outright with newly created reserves and could reduce the 10 year rate by 13 basis points without raising short term yields

tax evasion tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies abstract this note extends janeba and peters econ j 109 1999 93 paper on tax evasion and tax competition by allowing for equilibrium mixed strategies it shows that discrimination is still the weakly dominant strategy for both countries

learning and the yield curve two central implications of expectations hypothesis under rational expectations are inconsistent with yield curve data i future expected long yields fall instead of rising when yield spread rises ii long yields are excessively volatile relative to short yields i propose an optimization framework in which boundedly rational agents use adaptive learning to form expectations the belief structure rationalizes pattern of yields observed in the data so that the first puzzle does not arise with subjective expectations intertemporal income and substitution effects are amplified relative to rational expectations the second puzzle is partly accounted for by extra volatility due to parameter uncertainty

firms r d decisions under incomplete information abstract the paper considers a patent race in which firms do not know their relative positions in this setting firms that start in the same position proceed at the highest possible speed and if one firm has an initial advantage it preempts the rival but at the cost of dissipating a significant part of its monopoly rent so the paper shows that incomplete information in a patent race leads to rent dissipation the latter is higher the higher the value of the prize and the lower the cost of r d thus for innovations that provide relatively high profits the time to discovery is shortened but the social losses are likely to be high due to duplication of effort

should countries control international profit shifting we present a fiscal competition model with two policy instruments the level of corporate taxation and the tightness of control of profit shifting by multinational firms mnf we show that a country may optimally decide not to monitor the mnf for two reasons firstly this country becomes an attractive location for mnf activity despite a high corporate tax secondly as the profits of the mnf become mobile the focus of tax competition is shifted taxation then influences both an mnf s location and the place where it declares its profits

government financing decisions and asset returns abstract this paper presents an empirical investigation of the relation between government financing decisions and asset returns in particular the focus is on whether a substitution of debt financing for tax financing of a given level of expenditures is associated with an increase in interest rates the paper brings a different perspective to empirical investigations of government fiscal policies by examining the response of asset prices in an efficient capital market to such policies rather than focusing on aggregate consumption behavior the results are consistent with the idea that asset prices are unrelated to how the government finances its expenditures the results however also indicate that the capital market is not indifferent with respect to the level of government expenditures as higher interest rates are associated with increases in government purchases

symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria abstract it is known that not every symmetric game has a symmetric equilibrium because there are examples of symmetric games that fail to have any equilibria at all but this leads to the following question if a symmetric game has a nash equilibrium does it have a symmetric nash equilibrium in this note we show that the answer to this question is no by providing two examples of symmetric games that have only asymmetric equilibria

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

fiscal foundations of in ation imperfect knowledge this paper proposes a theory of the scal foundations of in ation based on imperfect knowledge and learning the theory is similar in spirit to but distinct from unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the scal theory of the price level because the assumption of imperfect knowledge breaks ricardian equivalence details of scal policy such as the average scale and composition of the public debt matter for in ation as a result scal policy constrains the e cacy of monetary policy heavily indebted economies with debt maturity structures observed in many countries require aggressive monetary policy to anchor in ation expectations the model predicts that the great moderation period would not have been so moderate had scal policy been characterized by a scale and composition of public debt now witnessed in some advanced economies in the aftermath of the 2007 09 global recession