where do markets come from production markets have two sides producers are a fully connected clique transacting with buyers as a separate but aggregated clique each producer is a distinctive firm with a distinctive product each side continually monitors reactions of the other through the medium of a joint social construction the schedule of terms of trade each producer is guided in choice of volume by the tangible outcomes of other producers not by speculation on hypothetical reactions of buyers to its actions each producer acts purely on self interest based on observed actions of all others summarized through a feedback process the summary is the terms of trade schedule which reduces to constant price only in limiting cases the market emerges as a structure of roles with a differentiated niche for each firm explicit formulae both for firms and for market aggregates are obtained by comparative statics methods for one family of assumptions about cost structures and about buyers evaluations of differentiated products not just any set of firms can sustain terms of trade with any set of buyers there prove to be three main kinds of markets and three sorts of market failure within a parameter space that is specified in detail one sort of market paradox has a madison avenue flavor another is more conventional grind and a third crowded is a new form not included in any existing theory of markets current american industrial markets are drawn on for 20 illustrations of which three are presented in some detail inequality in firms market shares measured by gini coefficients is discussed

the impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the french legislative elections of 1993 we use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the french legislative assembly incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1 01 of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals the regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals these results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding

estimating the effect of campaign spending on senate election outcomes using instrumental variables o examine the traditional view that challenger spending is more effective than incumbent spending 7 i reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate s ability to raise campaign funds such as candidate wealth levels hhen the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal in contrast to previous research showing that because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending the incumbent s spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates this article shows that in an average senate election the incumbent s spending advantage yields a 6 increase in the incumbent s vote share that incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform my findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers in american congressional elections incumbents routinely win reelection even in the 1994 republican landslide change in the partisan makeup of congress occurred mainly through open seats switching from the democrats to the republicans a common explanation for high congressional reelection rates is the large campaign spending advantage enjoyed by incumbents it is widely believed that challenger spending is very important but there is surprisingly little evidence in the academic literature that incumbent campaign spending has an important effect on congressional election outcomes in light of the substantial effort incumbents devote to fundraising as well as some nagging methodological questions about existing academic studies the effect of incumbent spending on election outcomes remains an unresolved issue accurately measuring how incumbent spending leads to votes is of obvious importance politicians want to win elections and so if money matters then this will influence their behavior if campaign spending effects are trivial then concerns about politicians being

assets and actions firm specific factors in the internationalization of u s internet firms by providing a nearly instant connection among parties at opposite corners of the world and enabling a variety of commercial exchanges the internet emerged as the technology expected to create a truly global market space internet firms faced the challenge of capitalizing on this development in this paper we examine what firm specific factors are associated with the propensity of pure u s based internet firms to enhance their international presence on the internet by developing country specific websites despite the assertion that all internet firms are born global our findings show that the pursuit of internationalization by internet firms is related to the levels of their intangible assets and strategic activity two types of intangible assets reputation and website traffic are positively related to the degree of internationalization so are the levels of competitive and cooperative activity and the interaction effects between reputation and competitive and cooperative activity these findings suggest that ideas from both resource based theory and research on competitive dynamics can contribute to understanding the internationalization of internet firms

prior conditions and early international commitment the mediating role of domestic mindset our study investigates why some firms engage in low international commitments such as exports in the early phases of internationalization whereas others leapfrog the internationalization process and start with high international commitments in the form of foreign direct investment fdi process models of internationalization propose that firms start with low commitment activities and gradually increase their commitments to international markets however recent empirical evidence has shown that many firms make high international commitments from the start our findings suggest that domestic resources and competitive action propensity affect early international commitments indirectly through domestic mindsets a domestic mindset refers to the knowledge structures of the top management team prior to starting international activities based on their managerial experience and learning in domestic markets our results suggest that knowledge and learning gained in domestic markets through diverse resource and competitive activities may be crucial in early international commitments

you are close to your rival and everybody hates a winner a study of rivalry in college football we use a recent survey of college american football fans to study rivalry where we find the most intense rivalries occur between in state teams relatedly within a conference fans are more likely to target rivalrous feelings toward the winningest teams and in bowl championship series conferences teams who have been conference members for a longer proportion of time while the stakes are different from other settings such as warring nations college football teams compete for resources and often have loyal followings with strong emotional ties thus examining rivalrous feeling in this setting provides insights into rivalry more generally besides being of interest in its own right as college football is a multi billion dollar industry jel l22 l83 i introduction for millions of americans saturdays in the fall are synonymous with college american football college football has a pageantry all its own as people gather in groups sometimes in excess of 100 000 to cheer for their team and socialize even though many fans have no real connection to the university on the field the teams compete to win games and over the course of a season teams compete to win their conference title however many fans do not view all opponents in the conference in the same way games against some opponents are considered more important irrespective from their impact on conference standings for example the university of arizona and arizona state university have played for the territorial cup for over 100 years 1 similarly the university of wisconsin and the university of minnesota compete for paul bunyan s axe while the university of alabama and the university of tennessee play on the third saturday in october 2 sanford and scott 2014 find that fans are willing to pay higher ticket prices for rivalry games and these games generate significant television revenue despite the amateur status of the players college football is an 8 billion industry 3 several high profile teams are valued at over 100 million dollars each brewer et al 2011 team revenue comes from a variety of sources television rights merchandising fan support etc and on the field success and profit are connected through these channels in addition teams find themselves repeatedly battling over the resources needed to compete on the field namely players and coaches in this sense football rivalries are similar to rivalries between siblings firms or nations sibling rivalries form when children compete for scarce resources financial attention etc from their parents garg and morduch 1998 morduch 2000 the cola wars between coke and pepsi and the diaper wars between kimberly clark and procter gamble arise because these comparable companies offer slightly differentiated products in the same markets rivalries between warring nations also often involve prolonged competition over scarce resources goertz and diehl 1993 klein goertz and diehl 2006 rivalry is a subjective phenomenon kilduff elfenbein and staw 2010 but it has an identifiable set of antecedents geographical proximity is typically an important determinant of conflict even in the context of firm level rivalries as argued for instance in yu and canella 2007 identity also plays an important role in the creation of a rivalry menon thompson and choi 2006 finally history and the outcomes of previous interactions are another key determinant of rivalries kahneman and miller 1986 miller and chen 1996 all three of these factors are at play in college football conferences are typically comprised of comparable schools in a particular region fans identify with their team by wearing certain clothes and in more extreme cases with body paint and other adornments despite periodic conference realignment many teams play each other year after year thus we believe that in addition to being interesting in its own right examining what drives rivalrous feelings in college football can provide insight into rivalry more generally

union management cooperation in the united states lessons from the 1920s this paper presents an analysis of several experiments in union management cooperation that took place during the 1920s the author examines the economic and social factors that influenced the form

nonresponse and delayed response to competitive moves the roles of competitor dependence and action irreversibility competitive moves that are unchallenged or to which response is delayed are important weapons in a strategist s arsenal so variables that discourage or delay response are of great interest using

an analysis of congressional voting on legislation limiting congressional campaign expenditures congressional voting on proposed floor amendments concerned solely with setting the level of the election campaign expenditure ceiling provision of the house administration committee s broad campaign finance reform bill of 1974 is analyzed for consistency with either the public interest or economic theories of regulation the benefit or cost to the individual congressman of a given ceiling is defined as the implied increase or decrease in his probability of reelection under the ceiling logit regression analysis provides the preponderant support for the economic theory of regulation by indicating that the likelihood of voting for a given ceiling varies directly with the implied change in reelection probability under the ceiling and is quite sensitive to the implied change

will a second mouse get the cheese learning from early entrants failures in a foreign market we examine the conditions that can facilitate or hinder the effectiveness with which a new entrant learns from the failures of prior entrants by analyzing the experiences of 822 japanese subsidiaries in china founded between 1979 and 2000 our conceptual arguments and empirical findings demonstrate that learning from the failure experiences of prior entrants increases a new entrant s survival chances when entering china further we find that the value of this learning is less effective when there is a greater level of heterogeneity in the causes of these failures however this learning is more effective when a new entrant s parent firm has ownership ties with investors who had ventures that failed previously in china

campaign finance reform a public choice perspective the federal election campaign act as passed in 1971 and amended in 1974represented landmark federal legislation it imposed new restrictions oncampaign contributions and contained path breaking provisions for the useof public funds to partially finance the campaigns of qualifyingpresidential candidates the nominal intent of the legislation was torestrain the skyrocketing campaign costs and the feared abuses thatgrowing dependencies on such money engendered three decades later withthe campaign spending arms race still raging congress sought toimpose further constraints on campaign spending with enactment of thebipartisan campaign reform act of 2002 bcra competing theories ofgovernment regulation are reviewed to better understand the intent andlikely consequences of the 2002 legislation in particular and campaignfinance regulation in general a simple model of the campaign spendingprocess highlights the likely causes of the rapid growth in campaignspending data and evidence are presented to test hypotheses concerningthe timing of and underlying motivations for bcra

a critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature after substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal changes in budgetary and employment levels it is clear that the size and scope of the federal leviathon had not been reduced over 1982 83 it is also clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were of minor importance in terms of the total u s budget future research on why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better understanding of the budgetary process

political power and the market for governors the statistically insignificant results for the budget power and veto power variables suggest that for some reason these power characteristics are not particularly salable to consumers of governmental favors it may simply be the case that political competition pushes governors to adopt median voter public policy outcomes despite the existence of discretionary budget and veto powers which permit them to behave otherwise this suggests that discretionary powers may only be of value in those states where political competition is weak or where deviations from the wishes of the median voter are relatively costless in terms of the value of votes lost to the party or candidate in power however attempts to test this hypothesis using an interaction term between measures of inter party competition and the governors budgetary and veto powers proved unsatisfactory perhaps intra party competition in one party states makes candidates just as responsive to the preferences of the median voter as are candidates in states with strong inter party competition

presidential campaign expenditures evidence on allocations and effects this paper analyzes the impact of presidential campaign spending on election results analyses of expenditures and voting are often plagued by simultaneity between campaign spending and expected vote share however game theoretic models of resource allocation decisions made by a central actor i e a presidential campaign suggest that candidates will spend more in close races and in races likely to be pivotal we provide empirical support for this theory using federal communications commission data from the 1972 presidential election we find that expenditures were higher in states where the election was expected to be closer and in states likely to be pivotal we use these two factors as instruments in a two stage least squares model to estimate the effect of spending on votes we find that contrary to previous theory and research presidential campaign spending significantly increases a candidate s vote share

determinants of cross national knowledge transfer and its effect on firm innovation this study examines the determinants of international knowledge flow from a resource based perspective it evaluates the impact of cross national knowledge transfer on firm innovative performance based on 56 027 us patents owned by 53 selected firms in the us based pharmaceutical industry the results suggest that innovative performance is a curvilinear function of the international knowledge content used by a firm to innovate as hypothesized it was found that at 1 low and moderate levels of international knowledge content a firm s strategy to transfer international knowledge improves its innovative performance and at 2 higher levels of international knowledge content there are diminishing marginal returns to transferring knowledge from overseas

the determinants of campaign spending the role of the government jackpot a slave has but one master the ambitious man has as many masters as there are persons whose aid may contribute to the advancement of his fortune jean de labruyere des ouvrages de l esprit i introduction this paper builds a model of elections in which contributors give money to candidates in return for promises of government favors each candidate spends to increase his chances of victory the candidate s probability of winning and the value of government resources that would be his to distribute if he won the jackpot determine the amount he can raise the model suggests a way to measure the influence of the jackpot on spending while controlling for other effects such as the probability of winning the search for this result is interesting because we wish to know what influences the resources devoted to courting politicians is the growth of government truly to blame why if government is for sale do contributors give so little relative to the size of government to control so much and why as abrams and settle 1978 found does campaign spending sometimes not grow even though government grows do official limits on public debt reduce the politician s discretionary control over government resources and hinder his ability to sell favors how does ideology interfere with the candidate s demand for contributions empirical models of contributions that can serve as a guide have been of two sorts abrams 1981 following the work of crain and tollison 1977 crain deaton and tollison 1977 and gifford and santoni 1978 regressed campaign spending on several proxies for the jackpot and found a positive effect a more popular approach to explaining campaign outlays pioneered by jacobson 1978 has been to regress spending or contributions on the candidate s probability of victory and to ignore the role of the jackpot the implicit assumption in such models is that the candidate s net worth to contributors determines spending the candidate cares only about winning and raises as much as he can the greater his chances of winning the more he can raise and the more he will spend i call this the supply side view because spending depends only on the supply of contributions this approach goes some way to explaining contributions but neglects the role of the jackpot and cannot explain why some strong candidates who are sought after by contributors accept little or nothing such as former senator william proxmire of wisconsin the present study takes something from both approaches but argues that candidates may not wish to spend all they can raise because contributions do not come free of charge as baron 1989 pointed out the candidate s demand albeit bounded by potential supply determines contributions candidates probably run for election to control government wealth and must ponder how much of the jackpot to auction for contributions the candidate s demand for contributions can be derived from a utility function that rises with his probability of victory but diminishes with the contributions he accepts how much a candidate demands depends on the size of the bernoulli variance of the outcome which i call closeness and the size of the jackpot the greater the closeness and the larger the jackpot the greater the candidate s demand a close race is defined here not by the number of rivals or the margin of victory but as one in which the outcome is very uncertain the typical candidate does not spend all he is able to raise but the effect of closeness fades if the candidate wishes to win greatly the model describes the simultaneous relationship between spending and closeness and imposes identifying restrictions i carry out tests on samples drawn from the 1978 and 1986 contests for u s state governorships and find that jackpots affect election spending but that closeness is less important in addition i find that in states where the legislature is constitutionally required to balance the budget governors sell less of the jackpot

the impact of union management cooperation on productivity and employment this study examines the effects of union management cooperative programs on productivity and employment the author collected productivity and employment data for each of nine manufacturing plants at monthly time intervals over a period of four to five years from two years before to at least two years after the introduction of the cooperative program regression analysis of these time series data is supplemented by qualitative data from personal interviews and relevant records the results show that after introduction of the cooperative programs productivity increased in six of the eight firms in which it could be measured and employment remained stable in eight of the nine firms

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

relationships between concession bargaining and labor management cooperation in the last few years much attention has been focused on collective bargaining s adaptation to severe economic adversity the recent recession has prompted union negotiated concessions of unpreced

campaign spending in congressional elections campaign spending in congressional elections i introduction empirical studies of the effects of campaign spending on the outcome of congressional elections have found that campaign spending by incumbents is not as effective as that of their challengers indeed kau and rubin 1982 and jacobson 1985 1987 find that incumbent spending reduces the number of votes they receive and netter 1983 that it increases the challenger s votes incumbents seeking reelection however are very successful winning nine times out of ten in the postwar era if their campaign spending is so inefficient why do incumbents continue to outspend their challengers in a majority of elections we argue that these researchers counterintuitive findings are the result of using models which do not adequately correct for the simultaneous determination of the election outcome and campaign contributions and which do not include an electoral check on incumbent behavior 1 in their studies jacobson and netter as well as lott 1986 and laband and lentz 1985 assume the incumbent s ability to repel challengers is independent of his or her behavior while in office few would agree that the electoral check is so ineffective we develop a simultaneous model to correct these deficiencies it captures the effects of campaign expenditures tenure the consistency of the incumbent s votes with his constituents preferences and the size of the voter turnout on the votes received by incumbents and challengers in four congressional elections between 1978 and 1984 the model is very robust over these four elections the use of primary election data insures model identification ii model and empirical measures we assume that the platforms of any two candidates for a political office can be measured along a single left right spectrum voters know their preferred position on the dimension but cannot observe the positions of the two candidates with certainty because of rational ignorance a theory accepted since downs 1957 following congleton 1986 we assume voters are risk averse and receive more utility from candidates with positions closer to the voters preferred position but lose utility as the candidate s position becomes more uncertain voters compare the candidates and vote for the one that provides them greater expected utility voters can observe the incumbent s performance and are thus less uncertain of his views and credibility uncertainty should decrease with an incumbent s tenure in office tenure provides voters with knowledge of the incumbent s position and the incumbent with political capital this accumulation of political capital may make it more difficult for challengers to mount a successful campaign in this sense tenure acts as a barrier to entry 2 if all incumbents were at the same point on the spectrum as the median voter of their districts all incumbents would win reelection if all potential challengers were aware of this fact they would not challenge since campaigns are costly but one observes many challengers and some defeated incumbents so we proceed from the hypothesis that challengers enter the race when they perceive a gap between the position of the incumbent and that of the median voter and assume this position as their platform a large difference between the incumbent s position and the median voter s position increases the likelihood of a successful challenge if voters were certain of the positions of both candidates and the challenger s assessment was correct the challenger would win but challengers are usually less well known than incumbents and this additional uncertainty gives incumbents an advantage thus the challenger must convince the voters that his or her position is closest to the median voter s position and advertising is the primary means to that end 3 repetition of the message reduces the voters uncertainty over a challenger s position

the evolution of collective strategy frames in high and low velocity industries we argue that the collective assumptions of firms drive their actions and practices and create the conditions of industry velocity in our view cognitive construction by firms is the primary driver of industry velocity this is in contrast to the contingency views common in the literature which hold that industry velocity plays a role by constraining and shaping firm strategies specifically we suggest that firms develop unique assumptions social networks and feedback mechanisms that these mechanisms perpetuate patterns of changes in collective beliefs and aggregate actions and that these patterns in turn shape high and low velocity conditions we examine these assertions by tracing the collective beliefs of three aircraft low velocity and semiconductor high velocity firms over a 20 year period 1977 1997 our results suggest that the cognitive construction view of industry velocity is reasonable

organizational capabilities and the economic history of the industrial enterprise in my book scale and scope 1990 i focused on the history of the modern industrial firm from the 1880s when such firms first appeared through world war ii i did so by comparing the fortunes of more than 600 enterprises the 200 largest industrial firms at three points in time world war i 1929 and world war ii in each of the three major industrial economies those of the united states britain and germany in this paper i first describe the similarities in the historical beginnings and continuing evolution of these enterprises and then outline my explanation for these similarities next i relate my explanation of these empirical regularities to four major economic theories relating to the firm the neoclassical the principal agent the transaction cost and the evolutionary finally i suggest the value of the transactions cost and evolutionary theories to historians and economists who are attempting to explain the beginnings and growth of modern industrial enterprises

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

the simplicity of competitive repertoires an empirical analysis this research explores the notion of competitive simplicity a tendency of some firms to concentrate intensely on just a few central activities our focus here is the simplicity inherent in the repertoire of concrete market oriented actions used by companies to compete these actions include product introductions pricing or advertising decisions and changes in market scope the simplicity of a competitive repertoire can be assessed by its range of actions and its degree of concentration on one or a few dominant types of actions we argue that competitive simplicity is largely a function of organizational and environmental properties that attenuate managerial search or restrict knowledge of competitive alternatives these properties include good performance munificent homogeneous or certain markets a lack of breadth in competitive experiences and the complacency that may accompany age and size paradoxically although good past performance may contribute to simplicity simplicity can hurt subsequent performance especially during periods of uncertainty and growth many of these ideas were borne out in a study of the major carriers of the post deregulation domestic airline industry

a simple explanation for why campaign expenditures are increasing the government is getting bigger abstract this paper shows that most of the large recent increases in campaign spending for federal and state offices can be explained by higher government spending this result holds for both federal and state legislative campaigns and gubernatorial races and across many different specifications the irony is that those who seem most concerned about the level of campaign expenditures are also frequently the ones who most strongly support increasing the size of government evidence is also examined on whether it is the composition and not just the level of expenditures that determines campaign expenditures and whether higher government expenditures similarly results in more candidates competing for office finally by focusing on the symptoms and not the root causes of ever higher campaign expenditures this paper argues that the current public policy debate risks changing the form in which payments are made rather than actually restricting the level of competition

learning patterns in venture capital investing in new industries using an organizational learning perspective we link the decision by venture capital vc firms to invest early in a new high technology industry to three experiential learning mechanisms the familiarity associated with accumulation of early funding decisions the shaping or imprinting effect of the firm s very first such decision and the decay or forgetting associated with the dormancy of prior such decisions we find support for these learning patterns using data on the investments made by us vc firms between 1962 and 2004

contribution limits and transparency in a campaign finance experiment we experimentally compare electoral outcomes when donor contribution limits are varied the effect of contribution limits is studied under three levels of transparency one where donors preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public and one where they are observed by all we find that a combination of stricter contribution limits and full transparency is most successful at limiting donors influence on policy choice we also find that stricter contribution limits improve social welfare in some treatments we further find that the partial and no anonymity settings lead to centrist bias whereby implemented policies on average are more centrist than the candidate s preferences in most treatments

does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents the theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name the existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate s stock of brand name this simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent s campaign spending and how well he does

the mne as a portfolio interdependencies in mne growth trajectory we conceptualize the mne as a portfolio of interdependent sub units and examine its growth trajectory in relation to its existing portfolio the empirical testing is based on a unique dataset that details all the location moves of us legal services mnes during 1949 2006 these mnes evolve in directions that follow from their past their portfolios affect their subsequent moves speaking for the impact of interdependencies among sub units on the evolution of mnes the portfolio exercises stronger impact on entry than on exit suggesting that different forces affect mnes expansion and contraction we outline strategic and organizational implications of the conceptualization of the mne as a portfolio

a median voter model of economic regulation a basic median voter model is developed and extended to analyze issues of economic regulation and public policy outcomes the model is used to generate comparative static results relating changes in public policy outcomes to changes in relative group sizes total population information costs and population heterogeneity the model is also used to explore the issue of optimal group size the size of the special interest group that maximizes the group s per capita public policy gains comparative static analysis reveals how optimal group size and gains per capita are affected by changes in population heterogeneity the size of the total population and relative knowledge levels

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district