stock option repricing and its alternatives an empirical examination in this paper i examine the likelihood of ceo stock option repricing and its alternatives namely option grant stock grant and do nothing multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility moreover repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important finally i find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing my results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention and not by agency cost considerations

macroeconomic policy in a large unionised economy this paper models an economy with many sectors in each sector a monopoly union sets the nominal wage and then firms choose output the economy is large in that all agents treat the general price level as fixed the paper focusses on policy effects on employment an increase in government expenditure in one sector will increase decrease total employment as sectoral employment is above below average a general increase in government expenditure in fixed proportions will have a positive employment multiplier below unity policy which increases employment will lead to higher welfare

some reflections on insurance pricing we analyse three aspects of the recent evolution of french automobile insurance by use of three simple theoretical models the fantastic development of professional mutuals the growing complexity of tariffs the increasing recourse to product differentiation each of these aspects can be interpreted as a step further in the direction of increasing premiums personalization the question we examine is how far should we go

asymmetric benchmarking in compensation executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad abstract principal agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm s own performance recently it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests that is they can enjoy pay for luck as well as pay for performance we first show that this argument is incomplete the positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk if executives pay is tied to market movements they can only expect to receive the market determined return for risk bearing this argument however assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck if executives can truly influence the setting of their pay they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest namely when the benchmark has fallen using industry benchmarks we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down in which case pay for luck would reduce compensation than when it is up these empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks and they suggest that the average executive loses 25 45 less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck

analysts interim earnings forecasts evidence on the forecasting process existing empirical evidence indicates that analyst forecasts of corporate earnings do not meet the strict rationality standards prescribed by econometric tests of the rational expectations hypothesis 1 in this paper we address the question of whether the expectation formation process underlying analyst forecasts is adaptive or whether these forecasts are influenced by noninformational factors such as incentives arising from the market for their forecasts o brien 1988 lin and mcnichols 1993 francis and philbrick 1993 and dugar and nathan 1992 and interaction between judgmental and or statistical forecasting methods bunn and wright 1991 fan 1990 and hoerl and kennard 1970 the rejection of rational expectations gives rise to two views of the forecasting process of analysts the first based on an informational argument is that the forecasting process is adaptive marcet and sargent

the dating game do managers designate option grant dates to increase their compensation we provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post that is after the board s compensation decision is made back dating picking a date before the board decision date and forward dating waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior consistent with back dating we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag in the promptly reported sample we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward dating our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game

what fraction of stock option grants to top executives have been backdated or manipulated we estimate that 13 6 of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996 2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at the money of which we estimate that 18 9 were manipulated the fraction is 23 0 before the new two day filing requirement took effect on august 29 2002 and 10 0 afterward for the minority of grants that are not filed within the required two day window the fraction of manipulated grants remains as high as 19 9 we further find a higher frequency of manipulation among tech firms small firms and firms with high stock price volatility in addition firms that use smaller non big five auditing firms are more likely to file their grants late finally at the firm level we estimate that 29 2 of firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 and 2005

security analysis and trading patterns when some investors receive information before others in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time this article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others the model implies that under some conditions investors will focus only on a subset of securities herding while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics in addition the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft cited trading strategies such as profit taking short term position reversal and following the leader mimicking earlier trades in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time while these models provide many important insights in reality some investors either fortuitously or owing to superior skill acquire pertinent information before others by being first an investor can exploit this information to great advantage information that is uncovered only slightly later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed we show in this article that the sequential nature of information arrival has a significant effect on both the trading decisions and the types of information collected by investors the model we develop describes the investment choices of a set of competitive risk averse investors who investigate the long term prospects of firms lucky or high ability investors uncover the

the objective demand curve in general equilibrium with price makers objective demand curves in general equilibrium with explicitly modeled price makers have been defined so far in a number of specific cases this paper gives a general definition of such an objective demand curve the associated general equilibrium concept is defined and sufficient existence conditions are given copyright 1987 by royal economic society

barriers against globalizing corporate ethics an analysis of legal disputes on implementing u s codes of ethics in germany global firms need to decide on the correspondence between their corporate ethics and the globalization of their activities when firms go global they face ethical complexities as they operate in different legal and cultural environments that may impact the admissibility and appropriateness of their approach to institutionalize and implement corporate ethics global firms may have good reasons to establish global codes of ethics that are to be obeyed by all employees worldwide however developing and implementing such codes can be rather difficult due to various and partly competing conditions in the countries of operation in this article two legal disputes are analyzed to illustrate some of the difficulties that may emerge when firms globalize their codes of ethics i argue that these conflicts can be mitigated when firms carefully design their codes and the processes of code implementation

the repricing of executive stock options abstract we examine a sample of firms that reset the exercise prices on their executive options these repricings follow a period of about one year of poor firm specific performance in which the average firm loses one fourth of its value no other offsetting changes to option terms or compensation are made and many firms reprice more than once without repricing a majority of the options would have been at the money within two years we find that when faced with circumstances in which repricing might be chosen firms with greater agency problems smaller size and insider dominated boards are more likely to reprice

money new keynesian macroeconomics and the business cycle abstract we show in this paper that the typical modern business cycle cannot be reduced to the real business cycles archetype a monopolistic competition model with price adjustment costs affected by technological and monetary shocks better mimics the economic fluctuations in two countries with very different cyclical properties namely france and the united states in our model monetary shocks are necessary to reproduce the standard deviation of output the money output correlation the labour productivity worked hours relative standard deviation the labour productivity worked hours correlation and the mark up output correlation with two independent shocks one real more specifically defined than the solow residual and one nominal the model gives an answer to some empirical puzzles which were left unexplained by traditional rbc models

security analyst superiority relative to univariate time series models in forecasting quarterly earnings abstract this paper provides evidence of security analyst sa superiority relative to univariate time series ts models in predicting firms quarterly earnings numbers and shows that sa forecast superiority in our sample is attributable to 1 better utilization of information existing on the date that ts model forecasts can be initiated a contemporaneous advantage and 2 use of information acquired between the date of initiation of ts model forecasts and the date when sa forecasts are published a timing advantage

unions oligopoly and the natural range of employment a simple two sector general equilibrium macromodel is presented wi th oligopolistic price determination in the product market and a unionized labor market in the first stage unions set the nominal wage and in the second stage firms choose outputs given wages by altering the balance of fiscal policy between the two sectors the government can achieve a continuum of aggregate employment levels the natural range of employment a unique natural rate will occur only i f one requires fiscal policy to be the same in both sectors this indicates that the natural rate property of some single or representative sect or macromodels is a special case

an information interpretation of financial analyst superiority in forecasting earnings the results of recent empirical tests comparing the accuracy of financial analysts forecasts faf of firm earnings to the accuracy of predictions from univariate time series ts forecasting models are consistent with faf forecast superiority see brown et al 1987a and their references the source of this apparent superiority however is not well understood an issue related to earnings forecast superiority is that of determining the most accurate surrogate for the earnings expectations of capital market participants researchers have compared the association between earnings surprise and stock returns across alternative surrogates for earnings expectations and have argued that the best surrogate is generated from the earnings forecast model whose errors exhibit the highest

earnings skewness and analyst forecast bias abstract we argue that if analysts objective is to provide the most accurate forecast by minimizing the mean absolute forecast error then the optimal forecast is the median instead of the mean earnings forecast bias is observed when the median is different from the mean in a skewed earnings distribution thus part of the observed analyst forecast bias could be a result of analysts efforts to improve forecast accuracy when the earnings distribution is skewed we find that earnings skewness is significantly related to analyst forecast bias we also provide evidence that the market adjusts for part of the skewness induced bias

stock option repricing heads i win tails you lose recent scandals at enron worldcom and global crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before however these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice as professor joseph badaracco of harvard business school points out the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right where both choices can be justified yet one must be chosen over the other whether or not to reprice stock options represents one such ethical dilemma repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance however it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline

valuation of bankrupt firms this study compares the market value of firms that reorganize in bankruptcy with estimates of value based on management s published cash flow projections we estimate firm values using models that have been shown in other contexts to generate relatively precise estimates of value we find that these methods generally yield unbiased estimates of value but the dispersion of valuation errors is very widethe sample ratio of estimated value to market value varies from less than 20 to greater than 250 cross sectional analysis indicates that the variation in these errors is related to empirical proxies for claimholders incentives to overstate or understate the firm s value

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

predisclosure information firm capitalization and security price behavior around earnings announcements several studies on the relationship between earnings reports and security price behavior provide evidence suggesting that a significant portion of the information revealed through earnings reports is reflected in security prices prior to the report month e g ball and brown 1968 and brown and kennelly 1972 this has been attributed at least partly to the existence of other more timely sources of information which allow market agents to forecast earnings prior to their release the evidence above reflects an average finding across all firms one question of interest is whether there are significant systematic crosssectional differences in the security price reactions to earnings announcements of firms which are associated with specific firm characteristics that lead to differential amounts of predisclosure information this study focuses on firm size capitalization as one such characteristic a firm

involuntary unemplyment in imperfectly competitive general equilibrium models this paper is about involuntary unemployment in general equilibrium models with imperfect competition it surveys papers written after the seminal work of d aspremont dos santos ferreira and gerard varet 1984 this unemployment is called involuntary because it exists at any wage it results from imperfect competition in the product markets more specifically from firms excessive market power these papers have focussed their attention on the conditions required for involuntary unemployment in our presentation we characterise this form of unemployment through three elements consumers preferences price expectations and ford effects each element is important because it influences the demand for the good and hence its price elasticity the latter being central in the definition of firms market power jel classification d43 e24

underwater options and the dynamics of executive pay to performance sensitivities we empirically analyze the dynamics of executives pay to performance sensitivities option pay to performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay to performance sensitivity in other ways building a detailed data set on executives portfolios of stock and options we find that the responsiveness of pay to performance sensitivities created by all executive holdings of stock and options to changes in stock price is large the elasticity of pay to performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0 7 and is larger for high option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater the dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay to performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines on average these larger grants restore approximately 40 of the stock price induced pay to performance sensitivity declines option repricings are inconsequential in this regard despite the attention they have attracted in looking at positive returns we find the reverse higher returns both directly increase pay to performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants which raise pay to performance sensitivities further thus option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases

the role of financial analysts in the strategy formation process of business firms increasingly financial analysts are influencing the strategy formation process of corporations but so far little attention has been paid to the complex processes of interaction and the corresponding strategic outcomes this article discusses these influences through different theoretical lenses strategic management finance and accounting theory and economic sociology institutional and systems theory based on case study evidence from three companies we describe how the interactions between financial analysts and business firms take place and formulate several propositions on the relationship between financial analysts and business firms as well as on its influence on the strategic outcome of business firms the results suggest that the influence of financial analysts is indeed significant but depends on a number of contextual factors such as the financial situation of the company or the need for capital practicing managers can learn how to handle a turbulent environment such as the financial analyst community and how they can change their planning processes to absorb as much information as possible

remaining puzzles and neglected issues in macroeconomics this paper analyses the chain of transmission mechanisms of economic policy actions to financial markets output and employment and finally unemployment in an attempt to identify remaining puzzles and neglected issues in macroeconomics the paper emphasizes the consequences of fiscal and monetary policy actions on real variables including real interest rates and real exchange rates an attempt is made to explain why product demand shocks often tend to have faster effects on output and employment than on prices the paper also discusses why demand induced increases in output and employment are not systematically connected with a reduction in the product wage rate the paper ends with a discussion of various supply side considerations in macroeconomics

information expected utility and portfolio choice we study the consumption investment problem of an agent with a constant relative risk aversion preference function who possesses noisy information about the future prospects of a stock we also solve for the value of information to the agent in closed form we find that information can significantly alter consumption and asset allocation decisions for reasonable parameter ranges information increases consumption in the vicinity of 25 information can shift the portfolio weight on a stock from 0 to around 70 thus de pending on the stock beta the weight on the market portfolio can be considerably reduced with information causing the appearance of underdiversification the model indicates that stock holdings of informed agents are positively related to wealth unrelated to systematic risk and negatively related to idiosyncratic uncertainty we also show that the dollar value of information to the agent depends linearly on his wealth and decreases with both the propensity to intermediate consumption and risk aversion

stabilisation policy targets and unemployment in imperfectly competitive economies this paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the central bank in a model where the central bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output money or nominal gdp the intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target we show that this leads to a lower mark up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment

altering the terms of executive stock options abstract we examine the practice of resetting the terms of previously issued executive stock options we identify properties of reset options develop a model for valuing resettable options and characterize the firms that have reset options we find the vast majority of options are reset at the money resulting on average in the strike price dropping 40 our valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex ante value of an option award but the ex post gain can be substantial finally we find resetting has a strong negative relation with firm performance even after correcting for industry performance

founders heirs and corporate opacity in the united states abstract we argue that information about firm activities can vary substantially in the presence of founder or heir ownership thereby influencing the risks borne by minority investors we explore two hypotheses with regard to these controlling shareholders and corporate transparency focusing on their role as monitor in place and their potential to exploit firm opacity to accrue private benefits of control to test these notions we create an opacity index that ranks the relative transparency of the two thousand largest industrial us firms and find founder and heir ownership in 22 and 25 of these firms respectively our analysis indicates that in large publicly traded companies both founder and heir firms are significantly more opaque than diffuse shareholder firms we also find that founder and heir controlled firms exhibit a negative relation to performance in all but the most transparent firms surprisingly additional tests reveal that concerns about divergences in ownership versus control management type dual class shares and board influence appear to be substantially less important than corporate opacity in explaining the performance impacts of founder and heir control finally we decompose corporate opacity into disclosure and market scrutiny components finding that the disclosure quality component appears to be of greater importance to investors however irrespective of whether these controlling shareholders create or stay in the firm because of corporate opacity our analysis suggests that founders and heirs in large publicly traded firms exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority investors

the timing of option repricing we investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company s stock price for a sample of 236 repricing events we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20 day period following the repricing date in addition repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date these findings suggest that ceos opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date

rational fix price dynamics abstract we study a macroeconomic model where stabilization problems arise as the result of a dynamic game of income distribution between capitalists and workers the two agents control the supply sides of the goods and labor markets respectively using price changes as strategic variables and a static fix price model with money labor and one macro commodity to correctly predict the behaviour of the economy at each instant of time the resulting medium run price dynamics is consistent with major stylized facts on business cycles it accounts for an empirical regularity that has been left unexplained by other models and suggests a new relationship between the functional income distribution and the economy s sensitivity to shocks

the association between accounting earnings and security returns for large and small firms abstract the differential information hypothesis advanced by atiase 1980 states that information production and dissemination by private parties for the purpose of identifying mispriced securities is an increasing function of firm size this study examines two corollaries of that hypothesis first security prices of large firms anticipate accounting earnings earlier than security prices of small firms second for a given level of unexpected earnings the cumulative abnormal returns of small firms exceed those of large firms the results are generally consistent with atiase s hypothesis

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

keynesian issues and economic theory recent research helped in clarifying the nature of short run price and quantity adjustments in keynesian macroeconomic models and the possible causes of a persistent excess labour supply it is argued however that theories involving imperfect competition and real wage rigidities generate classical unemployment where multipliers act through supply side effects while nominal inertia seems to be at the root of truly keynesian multipliers the appraisal also contains a nontechnical presentation of recent models of endogenous expectations driven business fluctuations cycles sunspots monetary policy can then have persistent real effects under complete information money as a sunspot

investment analysis and the adjustment of stock prices to common information in this article we are concerned with the effect of the number of investment analysts following a firm on the speed of adjustment of the firm s stock price to new information that has common effects across firms it is found that returns on portfolios of firms that are followed by many analysts tend to lead those of firms that are followed by fewer analysts even when the firms are of approximately the same size many analyst firms also tend to respond more rapidly to market returns than do few analyst firms adjusting for firm size this relation however is nonlinear and the marginal effect of the number of analysts on the speed of price adjustment increases with the number of analysts article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

firm size and the information content of prices with respect to earnings abstract beaver lambert and morse 1980 suggest that prices may be useful in forecasting future earnings we explore the information content of prices with respect to earnings by focusing on firm size and its relation to the predictive accuracy of price based earnings forecasts firm size proxies for the amount of information and for the number of traders and professional analysts processing the available information about an enterprise our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that price based earnings will outperform univariate time series forecasts by a greater margin for larger firms than for smaller firms

the consequences of the fasb s 1998 proposal on accounting for stock option repricing abstract we examine repricing activity surrounding the fasb s 1998 announcement regarding accounting for repriced options we find that repricing increases during and decreases after the 12 day window between the announcement and proposed effective dates consistent with firms timing repricings to avoid recording an expense we find that firms experiencing increasing earnings patterns firms with earnings around zero and growth firms are more likely to reprice in the window but having repriced recently decreases the likelihood of doing so the evidence suggests that firms trade off financial reporting benefits against reputation costs in decisions to time repricings to get favorable accounting treatment

institutional ownership differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates abstract this study examines the relation between ownership structure as revealed by the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors and trading volume at earnings announcement dates we find that volume response as a function of institutional ownership is quadratic with the quadratic curve that reaches a maximum at around 50 institutional ownership when risk tolerances are identical across investor types such a relation is consistent with kim and verrecchia s 1991a proposition that trading volume response to public announcements increases with the level of cross investor variation in precision of private predisclosure information

the impact of cross listing in the united states on the precision of public and private information our study explores the source of improvement in the information environment from cross listing shares on us stock exchanges are the improvements from cross listing in the united states achieved more through public or private information channels while we find evidence that us cross listing is significantly associated with improvements in both public and private information precision the association is stronger between cross listing and improvements in private information precision this suggests that the improvement in the information environment for cross listed firms is largely due to analysts expending more effort on firm specific information discovery as opposed to broader improvements in overall public disclosure this research should influence international business scholars that improvements in the information environment do not occur solely through public information channels they also occur through investors private information search activities

categorizing risks in the insurance industry this paper analyzes the welfare implications of imperfectly categorizing risks in the insurance industry under conditions of asymmetric information firms initially unable to distinguish the risk type of individuals are provided with imperfect information concerning risk membership the paper then compares various wilson type equilibria to determine the welfare implications of firms imperfectly categorizing risks it is shown that only in the case where the initial equilibrium is of the nash no subsidy type is there a pareto type improvement in welfare

why firms issue targeted stock abstract we analyze market reaction to targeted stock issuances and investigate possible motives for their use we find a statistically significant abnormal return of 3 61 within a three day window around the announcement of proposed targeted stock issuances possibly attributable to greater information on targeted stock segments as well as monitoring and motivational advantages we find lower tax loss carry forwards among firms that issue targeted stock compared to those that spin off segments suggesting that tax reasons motivate targeted stock use the return and cash flows of targeted stocks are affected more by their common corporate affiliation although industry influences remain strong

reward for luck in a dynamic agency model this paper studies a continuous time principal agent problem of a rm whose cash ows are determined by the manager s unobserved eort the rm s cash ows are further subject to persistent and publicly observable shocks that are beyond the manager s control while standard contracting models predict that compensation should optimally lter out these shocks empirical evidence suggests otherwise in line with this evidence our model predicts that the manager is rewarded for luck

information trade and derivative securities hellwig s 1980 model is used to analyze the value of improving trading opportunities by more frequent trading in the underlying asset or by trading in a derivative asset with multiple trading sessions uninformed investors behave as rational trend followers while more informed investors follow a contrarian strategy as trading becomes continuous pareto efficiency is achieved with trading in an appropriate derivative security pareto efficiency may be achieved in only a single round of trading all derivative claims are then priced on black and scholes 1973 principles and in the absence of further supply shocks no trading will take place in subsequent trading rounds article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

imperfect competition and the suboptimality of rational expectations abstract this paper investigates whether nonrational expectations can lead to outcomes which other things being equal pareto dominate rational expectations outcomes in order to carry out this investigation we construct an intertemporal micro based macroeconomic model with the two following strong points a it accommodates both rational and non rational expectations b both prices and quantities are determined by optimizing agents in particular prices are determined by explicit price setters using objective demand curves in this model the first theorem of welfare holds so that the walrasian equilibrium with rational expectations cannot be pareto dominated this conclusion is extremely fragile however and we show that as soon as some degree of imperfect competition is present rational expectations are suboptimal in the sense that they are dominated by irrational expectations

endogenous imperfectly competitive business cycles abstract we investigate how imperfect competition affects the occurrence and the properties of endogenous rational expectations business cycles in an overlapping generations model with constant returns to scale in production the model has explicit product and labor markets all characterized by monopolistic competition an implicit assumption of barriers to entry justifies that the number of firms is fixed even when positive profits occur it turns out that both market power of firms on the product markets and market power of unions on the labor markets make the occurrence of cycles more likely in particular imperfect competition on the product markets and the positive profits associated with it may have the effect that there is a cycle even if the labor supply curve is increasing in the real wage rate for competitive cycles is required not only a decreasing labor supply curve but a wage elasticity below 1 2 at stationary equilibrium market power on the labor markets may have the effect that imperfectly competitive cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities some well known some reported in the paper concerning fluctuations in output and involuntary unemployment since involuntary unemployment does not occur under perfect competition such regularities are incompatible with competitive cycles

swinging for the fences the effects of ceo stock options on company risk taking and performance we unpack the concept of managerial risk taking distinguishing among three of its major elements the size of an outlay the variance of potential outcomes and the likelihood of extreme loss we

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

stealth trading which traders trades move stock prices usingaudit trail data for a sample of nyse firms we show that medium size trades are associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and volume this result is consistent with the predictions of barclay and warner s 1993 stealth tradinghypothesis we find that the source of this disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium size trades is trades initiated by institutions this result is robust to various sensitivity checks our findings appear to confirm street lore that institutions are informed traders 2001 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

social capital at the top effects of social similarity and status on ceo compensation this study explored the effects of social capital measured both absolutely and relatively on ceo compensation in a sample of 61 ceo compensation committee chairperson dyads we controlled for var

on the optimality of resetting executive stock options the practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect initial incentives resetting can still be an important value enhancing aspect of compensation contracts even from an ex ante standpoint in fact we find that some resetting is almost always optimal the relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to influence the resetting process greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers

effects of social capital and power on surviving transformational change the case of initial public offerings we examined how social capital and the power of venture capitalists and founderceos affect ipo firm survival using data from 218 u s initial public offerings conducted in 1992 we found that average management team tenure and an ipo deal s network embeddedness decreased the likelihood of failure during a firm s first five years as a public entity founder ceo presence at the time of an ipo interacted with ceo ownership to decrease the likelihood of failure and ceo ownership and venture capitalist ownership concentration also decreased that likelihood evolutionary perspectives on organizations are often accompanied by the presumption that organizations face an increased risk of failure early in their lives owing to liabilities of newness aldrich 1999 stinchcombe 1965 as organizational goals and patterns of activity become routinized over time increased reliability in performance and accountability for actions taken enhance a firm s survival chances hannan freeman 1984 this process however also generates strong inertial pressures that not only discourage organizational change but also because of the potential for disruption to existing internal and external routines make change hazardous research findings suggest that even in older better established firms significant transformational events during their life cycles can effectively reset the clock and reintroduce risks associated with the liability of newness as firms struggle to adapt strategies internal operational and administrative processes and or external ties and relationships amburgey kelly barnett 1993 thus transformational change in organizational operations decreases efficiency and increases failure rates at least in the short term as resources and attention are diverted from normal routinized operating functions to processes involving adaptation and reorientation haveman 1992

corrective tax and subsidy policies in economies with bertrand competition abstract this paper shows how we can correct market failure due to imperfect competition by using taxes and subsidies the analysis is carried out at the general equilibrium level and the importance of objective demand curves is stressed the main conclusions are first it is possible to tax the economy back to the walrasian equilibrium by using linear taxes and subsidies second the welfare theorem holds in an imperfectly competitive economy with corrective taxes and subsidies third a competitive equilibrium can also be achieved by the use of ad valorem taxes and specific output subsidies

cultural diversity on wall street evidence from consensus earnings forecasts abstract we examine how cultural differences among agents influence the aggregate outcome of a common forecasting task using both exogenous shocks to sell side analyst diversity and panel regression methods we find that increases in analyst cultural diversity positively affect the quality of the consensus earnings forecast we further provide evidence on the potential mechanisms underlying this result by showing that cultural diversity is associated with improvements in individual analyst forecasts greater analyst conference call participation and interaction and greater diversity in analyst education backgrounds and professional interests overall our results indicate that greater cultural differences among agents producing an aggregate forecast are associated with a higher quality consensus forecast

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

analyst following and count data econometrics abstract this paper reexamines the determinants of the number of analysts following a firm using econometric models based on count distributions we replicate bhushan s 1989 analyst following study to demonstrate the effects of using count data econometrics in lieu of ols in studying phenomena where the dependent variable ranges among nonnegative integers in contrast with the original paper our findings indicate the number of institutional investors is inversely related with analyst following we also provide econometric evidence to support the preferred use of the negative binomial model in estimating cross sectional analyst following regressions

the efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex age or race in insurance and similar markets we consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency when categorization entails a nonnegligible resource cost however no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible when categorization is costless we demonstrate that government having no better information than market participants can effect redistribution without assuming dictatorial control of the market implying that a market equilibrium with costless categorization is potentially pareto superior to one without it when categorization is costly however the market may categorize when pareto improvements are not possible

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

herding among security analysts the paper shows that the buy or sell recommendations of security analysts have a signi cant positive in uence on the recommendations of the next two analysts this in uence can be traced to short lived information in the most recent revisions in contrast the in uence of the prevailing consensus is not stronger if the consensus accurately forecasts subsequent stock price movements this indicates consensus herding consistent with models in which analysts herd based on little information the consensus also has a stronger in uence when market conditions are favorable the resulting poorer information aggregation could cause bull markets to be intrinsically more fragilea e g bikhchandani et al j political economy 100 5 1992 992 1026 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved jel classixcation g11 g14 g24

financial analysts forecasts of earnings a better surrogate for market expectations abstract the specification of the market expectation of accounting numbers is a common feature of many empirical studies in accounting and finance givoly and lakonishok 1979 found that financial analysts forecasts have information content this study evaluates the quality of analysts forecasts as surrogates for the market expectation of earnings and compares it with that of prediction models commonly used in research results indicate that prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements suggesting that analysts forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time series models the study also identifies factors that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts forecasts the broadness of the information set employed by analysts and to a lesser extent their reliance on information released after the end of the fiscal year appear to be important contributors to their performance

the role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options we explore how ceo power affects the repricing of executive options the spread between an option s exercise or strike price and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing

unemployment and macroeconomics this paper discusses some issues in the theory of unemployment proposes a framework for the analysis of unemployment and applies the framework to the analysis of the rise in unemployment in britain after 1979 the framework is based on bilateral monopoly in the labor market and the explanation for the rise in unemployment in britain rests primarily with a demand side shock which caused the rise in 1980 81 and supply side persistence which has kept unemployment up since then copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

firm characteristics and analyst following abstract this paper examines the major determinants of the number of analysts following a firm a simple model of analyst following is proposed and several firm characteristics are suggested that are likely to influence the extent of a firm s analyst following by either affecting the aggregate demand for or supply of analyst services or both for the firm almost all of these characteristics are found to be strongly significant in affecting the extent of analyst following of firms and the empirical results generally accord well with economic intuition

are company founders underpaid this article examines the relation between founder status and ceo compensation in publicly listed us firms the results suggest that ceo founders receive lower cash pay and total compensation compared to professional managers in contrast ceos who are relatives of the founders receive similar cash pay and total compensation to that of professional managers different compensation levels also emerge in terms of stock option awards the findings underline the importance of distinguishing among these three ceo types when examining the determinants of executive compensation

the impact of imperfectly categorizing risks on income inequality and social welfare the use of imperfect information to categorize risks is a pervasive and controversial phenomenon in the insurance industry although this activity reduces the average extent of vertical price discrimination it is shown in this paper that both highand low risk types may prefer ex ante to knowing the category to which they will be assigned that such information be suppressed furthermore for the lorenz criterion it is shown that under certain restrictive demand conditions the imperfect categorization of risks leads to an increase in inequality the paper employs the wilson e2 equilibrium concept l impact d une categorisation imparfaite des risques sur l inegalite du revenu et le bien etre social l utilisation de renseignements imparfaits pour categoriser les risques est un probleme important qui porte a controverses dans l industrie de i assurance meme si ce phenomene reduit le degre de discrimination verticale par les prix en moyenne i auteur montre que a la fois les personnes dont le coefficient de risques est faible et elev6 et ce avant de savoir a quelle categorie on va les assigner peuvent fort bien preferer que cette information soit supprimee de plus 1 auteur montre que sous certaines conditions de demande restrictives la categorisation imparfaite des risques conduit a un accroissement du degre d inegalite mesure par le critere de lorenz ce memoire utilise le concept d equilibre dit de wilson e2 if insurance firms are unable to distinguish between the risk types of their clients but consumers know their own probability of loss i e if asymmetric information persists then the complication of adverse selection may arise adverse selection occurs when the class of risks or set of classes that purchases insurance differs adversely from that anticipated by the firm for example if a firm offers a contract to low risk types at their actuarially fair rate then high risk types will also purchase it with the result that the firm will earn expected losses hence the problem of adverse selection restricts the ability of firms to offer efficient insurance contracts to low risk types it has been demonstrated by rothschild and stiglitz 1976 that provided the proportion of high risk types in the population is above some critical level a this paper is a revised version of chapter 3 of the author s phd thesis entitled the economics of risk classification in insurance london school of economics and political science 1982 i am indebted to my supervisor lucien foldes and an anonymous referee for useful comments the author alone is responsible for any errors herein canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xvil no 3 august aotlt 1984 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 84 557 568 1 50 c canadian economics association this content downloaded from 157 55 39 215 on wed 31 aug 2016 04 39 57 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

on the effectiveness of economic policy when competition is imperfect and expectations are rational abstract we study the consequences of imperfect competition in a macro model with only one imperfection that of labor market competition otherwise the model is clean agents are optimizers prices are endogenous and expectations are rational we show that although imperfect competition in itself can explain unemployment as is well known it does not in itself give strong support to the use of traditional fiscal policy in fighting unemployment fiscal policy will almost inevitably have real effects but only through a special effect that may be difficult to control in many cases fiscal policy cannot create full employment and it may very well have perverse effects

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed