what drives deregulation economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions this paper investigates private interest public interest and political institutional theories of regulatory change to analyze state level deregulation of bank branching restrictions using a hazard model we find that interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners large banks and small bank dependent firms and losers small banks and the rival insurance firms can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states during the last quarter century the same factors also explain congressional voting on interstate branching deregulation while we find some support for each theory the private interest approach provides the most compelling overall explanation of our results

privatisation around the world evidence from panel data this paper presents new evidence about privatisation processes and their determinants from a panel of 34 countries over the 1977 99 period the empirical analysis shows that privatisation takes place typically in wealthy and democratic countries endowed with deep and liquid stock markets and is affected by the governing political majority and public sector budget constraints but the extent of privatisation in terms of revenues and stakes sold appears more limited in civil law countries where shareholders are poorly protected banks powerful and capital markets less developed

political and economic determinants of the likelihood of privatizing argentine public banks abstract this paper discusses the political economy of bank privatization in argentina following institutional changes related to the implementation of the convertibility plan and to the tequila crisis the empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that political incentives affect the likelihood of privatization we find 1 poorly performing banks were more likely to be privatized 2 overstaffing tended to reduce the probability of privatization 3 large banks were less likely to be privatized and 4 higher levels of provincial unemployment and higher shares of public employees reduced the probability of privatization although the hypotheses were tested for a specific industry in a specific country which makes it possible to control for enterprise performance and institutional characteristics it seems reasonable that similar results might hold in other industries and countries

demand commitment and legislative bargaining a response in this reply i will focus on the implications of montero and vidal puga s finding acknowledging that their result is correct thus what follows should not be interpreted as a defense of the proposition 2 of morelli 1999 but as a clarification of the impact of this correction for the demand bargaining research agenda as a whole

the demand bargaining set general characterization and application to majority games abstract the cooperative solution concept introduced here the demand bargaining set contains the core and is included in the zhou bargaining set eliminating the dominated coalition structures the demand vectors belonging to the demand bargaining set are self stable in the class of constant sum homogeneous weighted majority games the demand bargaining set is nonempty and predicts a unique demand vector namely a proportional distribution within minimal winning coalitions the noncooperative implementation of the demand bargaining set is obtained for all the games that satisfy the one stage property

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

leviathan resists the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in turkey this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance it is found that favorable short run performance weak market potential higher employment lower socio economic development concentrated voter preferences and weaker representation of right wing parties in the firms locality delay the timing of privatization the paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale

a new bargaining set of an n person game and endogenous coalition formation abstract the two most fundamental questions in cooperative game theory are when a game is played what coalitions will be formed and what payoff vectors will be chosen few solution concepts or theories in the current literature provide satisfactory answers to both questions answers are especially lacking for the first one in this paper we introduce a new bargaining set which is the first solution concept in cooperative game theory that provides answers to both fundamental questions endogenously journal of economic literature classification number c71

the effects of privatization on efficiency how does privatization work summary uncovering the effects of privatization is difficult because privatization of a particular firm usually is not an accident this paper tests the effects of privatization on productive and allocative market efficiency using a rich panel data set of 22 privatized cement plants from turkey in the 1983 99 period since all public cement firms were privatized and we have pre and post privatization data for all we are able to avoid the problem of endogeneity associated with sample selection our analysis goes beyond just examining the privatization effects and explores how privatization really works changes in objectives of the firm ownership effect and changes in market structure environment effect may both be responsible for privatization outcomes we find that ownership effects are sufficient to achieve improvements in labor productivity our results on allocative efficiency however are dependent on changes in the competitive environment while all plants seem to improve labor productivity through work force reductions plants privatized to foreign buyers also increase their capital and investment significantly

the determinants of privatization prices evidence from turkey this paper analyses the determinants of privatization prices in a multi industry study using a sample of 68 recently privatized firms from turkey results show that revenue and market characteristics are significant determinants of privatization prices while current cost and profit indicators are not it is argued that potential buyers regard these state firms as inefficient therefore do not take into consideration their current costs and profits in determining their value when the dependent variable is altered by dividing the firm s privatization price by the firm s sales revenues it is found that sales adjusted privatization prices are responsive to firms profit margins however this result does not hold when the sample is restricted to a single industry profit margins along with other profitability and firm efficiency measures are no longer significant determinants of sales adjusted privatization prices in the cement industry analysis unexploited production opportunities measured by capacity ut

implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms abstract we propose two simple mechanisms that implement two bargaining sets in super additive environments the first bargaining set is a close variation of the one proposed by l zhou 1994 games econom behav 6 512 526 and the second is the pareto optimum payoffs of the a mas colell 1989 j math econom 18 129 139 bargaining set we adopt a simple framework in which the cooperative outcomes are realized as non cooperative subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies of a two stage game played by an auxiliary set of individuals competing over the cooperative agents journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets empirical evidence from oecd countries this paper examines how government ideology has influenced deregulation of product markets in oecd countries i analyze a dataset of non manufacturing regulation indicators covering energy transport and communication industries in 21 oecd countries over the 1980 2003 period and employ two different indices of government ideology the results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on the deregulation process market oriented governments promoted the deregulation of the energy transport and communication industries this finding identifies remarkable differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and basic elements of political order

two moment decision models and expected utility maximization two moment decision models are consistent with expected utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent s preferences are restricted this paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models the implications for economic analysis are then derived two different approaches to representing an agent s preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use under the mean standard deviation ms approach the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff while the expected utility eu criterion assumes that the expected value of some utility function defined over payoffs is used instead the fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results or at least approximately so space does not

demand commitment in legislative bargaining morelli 1999 provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party morelli s main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power we provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff furthermore there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves

a theory of the welfare state the welfare state can be seen as an insurance device that makes lifetime careers safer increases risk taking and suffers from moral hazard effects adopting this view the paper studies the trade off between average income and inequality evaluating redistributive equilibria from an allocative point of view it studies the problem of optimal redistributive taxation with tax induced risk taking and shows that constant returns to risk taking are likely to imply a paradox where more redistribution results in more post tax inequality in general optimal taxation will either imply that the redistribution paradox is present or that the economy operates at a point of its efficiency frontier where more inequality implies a lower average income redistribution welfare state

privatization risk taking and the communist firm this paper studies alternative methods of privatizing a formerly communist firm in the presence of imperfect risk markets the methods include cash sales a give away scheme and a participation contract where the government retains a sleeping fractional ownership in the firm it is shown that with competitive bidding the participation contract dominates cash sales because it generates both more private restructuring investment and a higher expected present value of revenue for the government under weak conditions the participation contract will induce more investment than the give away scheme and it may even share the cash sales virtue of incentive compatibility

privatisation and market structure in a transition economy abstract a model is developed in which an industry of n 1 firms is privatised the participation method of privatisation is used whereby firms are sold for cash but the state retains a proportionate share of ownership in each firm the new private owner has the opportunity to make a reorganisational investment before output is produced this investment is unobservable by the state and therefore non contractible there is cournot competition in the product market the welfare maximising retained ownership share for the state is analysed taking into account that potential buyers of firms may have limited access to finance

privatization and economic growth an empirical investigation from a sample of developing market economies this paper explores the economic determinants of privatization programmes and the macroeconomic impact of this institutional reform on the growth rate of the gdp a sample of thirty five developing market economies is considered over the 1988 92 period probit and tobit models are used to identify the determinants of successful privatization programmes then regressions are run where probabilities probit and expected values tobit are successively included as additional regressors beside the potential influence of other economic policy variables a significant positive effect is highlighted giving evidence of the importance of divestiture the economic effect is found to be stronger when this institutional reform took place in industry or infrastructure

ownership versus competition efficiency in public enterprise certainly the introduction of product market competition into potentially competitive or at least contestable markets can improve performance to take just one example morrison and whinston 1986 1986 estimate that even in the imperfectly contestable u s airline industry the annual u s welfare gains from deregulation have been around 6 billion

an econometric analysis of telecom competition privatization and regulation in africa and latin america this paper explores the effects of privatization competition and regulation on telecommunications performance in 30 african and latin american countries from 1984 through 1997 fixed effects regressions reveal that competition measured by mobile operators not owned by the incumbent is correlated with increases in the per capita number of mainlines payphones and connection capacity and with decreases in the price of local calls privatization combined with an independent regulator is positively correlated with telecom performance measures privatization alone however is associated with few benefits and is negatively correlated with connection capacity

when does privatization work the impact of private ownership on corporate performance in the transition economies this paper compares the performance of privatized and state firms in the transition economies of central europe while controlling for various forms of selection bias it argues that privatization has different effects depending on the types of owners to whom it gives control in particular privatization to outsider but not insider owners has significant performance effects where privatization is effective the effect on revenue performance is very pronounced but there is no comparable effect on cost reduction overlooking the strong revenue effect of privatization to outsider owners leads to a substantial overstatement of potential employment losses from postprivatization restructuring

water for life the impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality while most countries are committed to increasing access to safe water and thereby reducing child mortality there is little consensus on how to actually improve water services one important proposal under discussion is whether to privatize water provision in the 1990s argentina embarked on one of the largest privatization campaigns in the world including the privatization of local water companies covering approximately 30 percent of the country s municipalities using the variation in ownership of water provision across time and space generated by the privatization process we find that child mortality fell 8 percent in the areas that privatized their water services and that the effect was largest 26 percent in the poorest areas we check the robustness of these estimates using cause specific mortality while privatization is associated with significant reductions in deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases it is uncorrelated with deaths from causes unrelated to water conditions

a micro econometric model of capital utilization and retirement the case of the u s cement industry the paper presents a micro econometric model of capital utilization and retirement estimates of a firm s discrete decision problem with regard to an existing piece of capital whether to operate hold idle or retire it are obtained in the context of the u s cement industry by solving a discrete choice stochastic dynamic programming model the estimates are then used to simulate the effects of product and input price changes and changes in the size and age of a cement kiln on a firm s propensity to operate hold idle and retire a kiln

partial privatization and firm performance most privatization programs begin with a period of partial privatization in which only non controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market since management control is not transferred to private owners it is widely contended that partial privatization has little impact this perspective ignores the role that the stock market can play in monitoring and rewarding managerial performance even when the government remains the controlling owner using data on indian state owned enterprises we find that partial privatization has a positive impact on profitability productivity and investment widespread privatization in recent decades has generated a large empirical literature concerning the effect of ownership on firm performance most studies find that privatization has a positive impact on the profitability and efficiency of firms see megginson and netter 2001 for a recent survey 1 the firms in these studies have had a majority of their assets privatized and control rights have been transferred from the government to private owners surprisingly little is known about the effect of partial privatization where the government remains the controlling owner this paper seeks to address this gap in the literature by investigating whether the performance of state owned enterprises in india is affected by the sale of non controlling equity stakes on the stock market

income tax deductions for losses as insurance the federal income tax allows deductions for some categories of personal losses notably for casualty losses such as destruction of one s home or car and medical expenses above a threshold the latter even with lower marginal rates and further restrictions brought about by the 1986 tax reform involves more than a 3 billion annual revenue loss office of management and budget 1990 1 deductions like these act as partial insurance individuals receive a tax benefit equal to their marginal rate multiplied by the magnitude of their loss however this form of insurance is unnecessary when private insurance is available moreover as will be emphasized here these deductions have a perverse effect because they are allowed only for the uninsured portion of losses this induces individuals to be less protected against risk in the aggregate than if the implicit insurance provided by the tax system were unavailable if the tax rate is sufficiently high individuals would forgo insurance coverage altogether 2 it will be demonstrated that a tax system with no deductions for personal losses pareto dominates the current system these conclusions are demonstrated in section i using a simple model in which risk averse individuals may purchase actuarially fair insurance against loss and individual behavior does not affect the risk of loss no moral hazard section ii considers the applicability of the results when one allows for moral hazard administrative costs and other imperfections it also discusses the applicability of traditional notions of tax equity

privatisation and economic growth in developing countries this article re examines the relation between privatisation and economic growth previous studies that have attempted to measure this relationship have concluded that privatisation has had a sizeable positive effect on economic growth our study uses data for 63 developing countries over the time period 1988 97 it uses the framework of an extreme bounds analysis eba to conduct a cross country growth regression analysis our findings contradict earlier results but reaffirm the view that effective competition and its regulation may need to accompany privatisation to make a positive impact on economic growth

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining i propose a new majoritarian bargaining model in which more than one implicit proposal can be on the table at the same time institutional differences from system to system affect the order of play the equilibrium majorities and the policy outcome the ex post distribution of payoffs within a winning coalition is however invariant to fundamental institutional differences and it is always proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power the bargaining process is modeled as a sequential demand game in which players are called to propose a policy and to specify their desired share of the private benefits related to being in office the order of play is endogenous and the distribution of payoffs within an equilibrium majority usually does not depend on who is the proposal maker the role of the head of state and the advantages to center parties are also studied

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk abstract we study privatization under moral hazard and adverse selection we show that if the fraction of efficient investors is either insignificant or productivity differences between efficient and inefficient investors are negligible the government would offer a pooling contract and sell the same fraction of equity to both types of investors the lower the productivity difference the greater the equity stake offered to investors on the other hand if the fraction of efficient investors is significant or productivity differentials are large the optimal policy consists of a dual method of privatization in which it offers two methods of privatization to outside investors the first method consists of a sale of 100 equity together with a subsidy and charges higher price under the second option the investor pays a smaller price but buys less than 100 equity without any subsidy efficient investors opt for the first method while inefficient investors prefer the second the dual privatization method screens investors and provides them with maximum incentives to invest while minimizing the risk of post privatization bankruptcy

demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games abstract we study a majoritarian bargaining model in which players make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players that move first forms with payoffs proportional to the voting weights this result advances previous analysis in terms of one or more of the following a the simplicity of the extensive form finite horizon with a predetermined order of moves b the range of the majority games covered c the equilibrium concept subgame perfect equilibrium is sufficient for a unique prediction

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

privatization policies in central and eastern europe privatization in central and eastern europe patrick bolton and gerard roland this paper assesses policies of mass privatization in germany czechoslovakia hungary and poland a central concern stemming from the analysis is that in view of the fiscal crisis facing economies in transition it is crucial for governments to try to maximize the proceeds from the sale of state assets because of the low initial level of private wealth it is important in this respect to let potential buyers borrow from the government or issue claims on future revenues obtained with the privatized assets to the government in order to pay for the privatized firms allowing for such non cash bids removes the government s incentive to delay privatization for fiscal reasons reduces its ability to squander immediately the proceeds from privatization and improves the decentralization of control by allowing less wealthy but more able bidders to buy the firms they are best suited to run

taxation of corporate capital income tax revenues versus tax distortions this paper shows that when uncertainty is taken into account explicitly taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives and individual savings incentives basically unaffected in spite of the sizable tax revenues collected in some plausible situations such taxes can increase efficiency the explanation for these surprising results is that the government by taxing capital income absorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return and the uncertainty in the return while investors as a result receive a lower expected return they also bear less risk when they invest and these two effects are largely offsetting

the taxation of risky assets this paper reconsiders the effects of taxation on risky assets recognizing the importance of variations in asset prices we show that earlier analyses that assumed that depreciation rates are constant and that the future price of capital goods is known with certainty are very misleading as guides to the effects of corporate taxes we then examine the concept of economic depreciation in a risky environment and show that depreciation allowances if set ex ante should be adjusted to take account of future asset price risk some empirical calculations suggest that these adjustments are large and have important implications for the burdens of and nonneutralities in the corporation income tax

privatization and efficiency differentiating ownership effects from political organizational and dynamic effects this paper argues that the private public ownership factor should be differentiated from other factors that also influence the effect of privatization on efficiency this is empirically confirmed in a longitudinal study of 24 spanish firms for which several political and organizational factors are found to influence the estimated effects of privatization on efficiency the analysis of the timing of the effects reveals a strong significance for post privatization years 5 6 negative and 7 8 positive this suggests that the negative effect of these factors is transitional being eventually offset by the positive effects of the change to private ownership 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification l33

productivity growth and firm ownership an analytical and empirical investigation we focus on the effect of state versus private ownership on the rates of firm specific productivity growth and cost decline by developing a model of endogenous firm specific productivity growth and testing its implications against panel data on 23 international airlines of varying levels of state ownership over the period 1973 83 our model and empirical results show that state ownership can lower the long run annual rate of productivity growth or cost decline but not necessarily their levels in the short run observed level differences in productive efficiency across private and state owned firms may thus be a function of the age distribution of the firms being compared these results appear to be independent of whether the firms operate under apparently more or less competitive or regulated markets and whether they differ in production scales the analysis offers new insights concerning the recent trend toward privatizing state owned enterprises that has been observed in many countries