does direct democracy reduce public debt evidence from swiss municipalities although some countries have managed toobtain balanced budgets or even budgetsurpluses in recent times public debts ofmany oecd countries remain at high levels since structural reforms of public spendinghave only infrequently taken place in mostcountries fiscal pressure will increaseagain in the future due to society s ageingand the accompanying increases in socialtransfer spending constitutionalrestrictions on debt levels and legal rulesof the budgetary process such as a strongrole of the minister of finance aresupposed to be helping against the debtbias inherent in political decision makingprocedures in addition to such top downbudgetary procedures this paperinvestigates the impact of referendumapproval of budget deficits by the voterson the level of public debt in a crosssection of the 134 largest swissmunicipalities in 1990

coordination and crisis in monetary unions we characterize fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets member country fiscal authorities lack commitment to repay their debt and choose fiscal policy independently a common monetary authority chooses inflation for the union also without commitment we first describe the existence of a fiscal externality that arises in the presence of limited commitment and leads countries to over borrow this externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union we then investigate the impact of the composition of debt in a monetary union that is the fraction of high debt versus low debt members on the occurrence of self fulfilling debt crises we demonstrate that a high debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high and low debt members than one where all other members are low debt this contrasts with the conventional wisdom that all countries should prefer a union with low debt members as such a union can credibly deliver low inflation these findings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises

the stability pact more than a minor nuisance stability pact more than a minor nuisance the stability and growth pact will lead member countries to aim for cyclically balanced budgets until this steady state is reached europe will continue its efforts at de cit cutting while so doing politicians are less likely to undertake the dif cult labour market reforms that are really needed is further scal retrenchment wise the paper reviews the reasons that have been advanced in favour of a stability pact and nds them wanting the most serious justi cations such as the systemic risk of bank crisis following a government s failure to service its debt can be better dealt with in other ways for example by prudential limits on banks exposure to public debts moreover our analysis reveals that the macroeconomic costs of the stability pact while sizeable are not as dangerous as often believed the costs will be barely visible once the steady state is reached the true macroeconomic costs are front loaded they concern the next few years after a decade already dominated by convergence efforts barry eichengreen and charles wyplosz

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

local fiscal policies default risk and municipal borrowing costs abstract this paper provides an empirical study of the effects that a local government s fiscal decisions exert on its cost of borrowing using a sample of new jersey municipalities the results are consistent with the view that current period fiscal decisions do impact the cost of borrowing a one standard deviation increase in the amount borrowed is associated with a 66 basis point increase in the annual yield furthermore that the standard approach of treating current period policy variables as exogenous regressors leads to a downward bias in the effect of additional borrowing on the interest rate

federal taxation and the supply of state debt abstract this paper presents a model of debt finance at the sub national level from which municipal bond supply equations are derived federal tax considerations are shown to be important determinants of the price entering the bond supply equation using data on 40 state governments over a seven year period in the 1980s i show that federal tax rates have an important effect on the supply of municipal bonds independent of the demand side effect that is usually considered in the literature this has implications for the measurement of the tax expenditure associated with tax exempt debt

a note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints abstract an important agrument in the current debate over european monetary integration is that a monetary union requires formal fiscal restraints limiting individual member states budgetary powers to reduce the common monetary authority s risk of having to bail out insolvent member governments this note presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the united states nonparametric tests reveal that fiscal restraints significantly affect the probability of fiscal choices and performance without however preventing extreme outcomes fiscal restraints induce substitution of nonrestricted for restricted debt instruments

common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion in a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents in this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperatively select agents name output prices and choose compensation schemes we exhibit an equilibrium in which all strategic variables not merely the marketing choices delegated to agents but prices as well are selected perfectly cooperatively this cooperative equilibrium is very simple and attractive each firm sets the collusive output price and employs a commission scheme to compensate the agent although each

the effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in israel 1989 1998 abstract we discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in israel in the mid 1990s we present empirical evidence that indeed fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns changes in the political environment enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements tougher imposition of hard budget constraints and the development of local media are proposed as explanations the hypotheses that the fiscal variables reflect the income level at the locality or the mayor s success in extracting resources from the central government are tested and rejected

european monetary unification a tour d horizon this article takes stock of the literature and debate over european monetary unification in contrast to other papers where it is argued that the issues and prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty i argue that in a number of important areas a reasonable degree of consensus now exists as the result of a decade of scholarship the subsequent stock taking concentrates on areas where significant questions remain starting with the implications of surrendering the exchange rate and an independent national monetary policy as instruments of adjustment the conduct of fiscal policy under the excessive deficit procedure and the stability pact and how quickly the european union is likely to develop an eu wide system of fiscal federalism to accompany its monetary union turning from fiscal to monetary issues i ask whether the european central bank ecb will be as inflation averse as the bundesbank what exchange rate policy the ecb will pursue and whether the euro will be a leading reserve currency i conclude with what may be the most contentious issue of all namely whether europe s monetary union could collapse after it begins

bailing out expectations and public health expenditure we use a natural experiment the fiscal adjustment of italy in the 1990s to meet the maastricht criteria to test a simple model of soft budget constraint that closely resembles the intergovernmental relationships in the italian public health care sector we show that the link between the ex ante financing by the central government and the health expenditure by regions was stronger when regional expectations of future bailing outs were presumably lower confirming previous research we also prove that more fiscally autonomous regions were more financially responsible and that a political alignment effect was present with friendly regional governments controlling more expenditure than unfriendly ones our results suggest that at least in italy bailing out expectations by regions may be the missing variable emphasised by culyer a j 1988 health care expenditures in canada myth and reality canadian tax papers 82 for empirical models explaining health expenditure our results also raise some worries about the outcome of the current decentralization process in europe

trade taxes and the current account abstract we show that under some conditions a temporary import tariff improves the current account whereas a temporary export tax deteriorates it permanent import tariffs and export taxes have an identical although ambiguous effect on the current account

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes evidence from historical constitutions this paper studies the long run fiscal consequences of balanced budget rules bbr that are enshrined in a country s constitution using historical data dating back to the 19th century and applying a difference in difference approach we find that the introduction of a constitutional bbr reduces government debt to gdp and expenditure to gdp ratios on average by around 11 and 3 percentage points respectively we do not find evidence that bbrs affect tax revenues our analysis indicates that such rules reduce the probability of experiencing a debt crisis and that the effective enforcement of bbrs can be conditional on the quality of democratic institutions in addition we implement an instrumental variable approach by instrumenting the probability of having budget rules on de jure constraints on changing the constitution this and other tests suggest that the relations we find are largely causal going from bbrs to fiscal outcomes

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

fiscal transparency political parties and debt in oecd countries abstract many believe and argue that fiscal or budgetary transparency has large positive effects on fiscal performance however the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling to analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation we present a career concerns model with political parties this allows us to integrate as implications of a single model three hitherto separate results in the literature on deficit and debt accumulation that transparency decreases debt accumulation at least by reducing an electoral cycle in deficits that right wing governments at least for strategic reasons tend to have higher deficits than left wing governments and that increasing political polarization increases debt accumulation to test the predictions of the model we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency on 19 country oecd data simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits independent of controls for explanatory variables from other approaches

slotting allowances as a facilitating practice by food processors in wholesale grocery markets profitability and welfare effects slotting allowances which are lump sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in return for various retail concessions are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets this article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously have been ignored the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements and the effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus slotting allowances motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices and this raises farm surplus increases total producer surplus and improves consumer welfare in the food system

vertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy abstract the idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade this paper considers strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the traded good including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strategic environmental trade policy has substantial qualitative effects when vertical contracts are allowed the optimal policy to levy on a polluting input under both quantity and price competition in the international market is the pigouvian tax

do state balanced budget requirements matter testing two explanatory frameworks balanced budget requirements bbrs affect all aspects of financial operations previous studies relied on characterizations that highlight a constitutional statutory distinction hou and smith public budgeting finance 26 3 22 45 2006 instead propose a political technical construct this article uses probit estimation six measures of balance and long panels to test which framework offers more explanatory power the findings suggest that bbrs matter to varying degrees technical requirements exert bigger effects than political ones the effects are more obvious on narrower than broader measures of balance and in the later phases of the budget cycle and the political technical construct offers more explanatory power than the constitutional statutory distinction

politics institutions and fiscal performance in a federal system an analysis of the argentine provinces abstract we posit that the fiscal behavior of argentine provinces is determined by a common pool game at two levels within each province and across political units in the latter game the national government has a greater incentive than the provincial governments to internalize the negative externality of fiscal imprudence given relatively strong party discipline the president is able to induce governors from his party to internalize a portion of the externality to a greater extent than opposition governors in argentina party matters for fiscal behavior but it does so for reasons different from those identified in studies of oecd countries

endogenous default risk in supply chain and non linear pricing abstract based on incomplete contract theories we studied the strategic behaviors of up stream and down stream manufacturers by option game model and obtain some conclusions first the down stream s pay off function is a concave function of its investment in fixed assets so there is an optimal investment which ensures the down stream s maximal pay off and prevents it from being holdup second in presence of endogenous default risks the up stream can improve its pay off level through non linear pricing last increasing business risks of the down stream may lead to an increased price fluctuation of the up stream while the down stream s technological advancement can make such fluctuation less

nonlinear pricing in vertically related duopolies a vertically separated duopolistic market is analyzed in which manufacturers compete in wholesale price schedules and retailers in quantity under certainty there exists a continuum of equilibria the introduction of an uncertain demand parameter observed only by retailers dramatically reduces the set of equilibria quantity discounts emerge in markets with only moderately decreasing returns to scale in manufacturing and quantity competition downstream with additive shocks to demand the equilibria coincide with those of markets in which vertically integrated firms compete in supply functions before market uncertainty is resolved however generically equilibria in my model are not supply function equilibria

strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts this paper examines strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with publicly observable contracts we analyse both the cases of unilateral and bilateral intervention we find that the requirement of incentive compatibility undermines the strategic precommitment effect when public funds are costly even with no restrictions on the form of the policies second when firms sell substitute goods the introduction of a rival interventionist government may reduce the cost of informational rents to each government third it turns out that under bilateral intervention there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria with levels of output and corresponding levels of welfare in the exporting countries which can be ranked the requirement of ex post participation constraints for the firm limits the set of subsidies which can be offered to the firm in particular under bilateral intervention the equilibrium levels of output which are implemented under adverse selection are below their values under ex ante uncertainty i e below the equilibrium levels of output which are achieved when firms sign their contracts before the realization of their costs ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy with the seminal paper by brander and spencer 1985 economists have been warning that the informational requirements of rent shifting policies are enormous and unlikely to be met in practice because the policy recommendations are highly sensitive to the particularities of the market in response a number of recent papers have begun to address the specific ways that informational failures affect policy and to modify policy recommendations to take such failures into account this paper analyses the implications of asymmetric information for strategic trade policy under both unilateral and bilateral intervention our complete information benchmark is a simple trade policy designed to shift rents similar to brander spencer two firms are competing in a third country and receive export subsidies from their respective governments however we place no restrictions on the form of these export policies previous literature has shown that under complete information a large number of outcomes may be sustained as equilibria of delegation games such as this moreover the introduction of uncertainty about the state of nature on the part of both

federalism fiscal restraints and european monetary union a prominent feature of the maastricht treaty on european union is the restrictions it places on fiscal policy under the provisions of the excessive deficit procedure or edp the success of member states in avoiding excessive deficits during the transition to economic and monetary union emu is one of four criteria governing admission to the monetary union once monetary union has begun member states are unconditionally required to avoid excessive deficits a state has an excessive deficit when it is so declared by the european council upon a report by the european commission and a judgment by the monetary committee the edp is set in motion if a country s deficit and general government debt respectively exceed 3 percent and 60 percent of gdp the justification for these procedures is that member states participating in the monetary union must be restrained from overborrowing to avoid destabilizing the common currency if excessive deficits cause a debt crisis the european central bank ecb will come under pressure to bail out the imperiled government the bailout could be ex post in which case the ecb would monetize the government s debt or ex ante in which case it would keep interest rates low to lighten the debt service burden either way unfettered fiscal policies could create inflationary pressures that the ecb will find difficult to resist

fiscal decentralization a political theory with latin american cases theories of fiscal federalism explain the efficiency and other economic gains from decentralization but do not explain its extent and nature in practice the authors develop a political theory of decentralization that focuses on the lines of political accountability between politicians at different levels of government the more accountable central level politicians presidents and legislators are to subnational politicians the greater the extent of decentralization and the more it will conform to the preferences of subnational politicians for example with respect to the degree of the center s discretion the model is tested on five latin american countries that although formally decentralized in fact exhibit wide differences in the distribution of spending and revenue responsibilities the theory also helps explain a number of problems governments have encountered in decentralizing including subnational debt crises and a mismatch between responsibilities and resources

retailer power recent developments and policy implications retailing is big business ranking firms by revenue retailing includes belgium s largest company delhaize le lion tesco and j sainsbury from the uk top ten the giant metro group in germany and wal mart stores number four in the usa and the eighth largest company in the world with 119 billion turnover and 825 000 employees fortune 3 8 98 retailing is getting more concentrated over time the top ten grocers in europe were 28 of the market in 1992 but 36 by 1997 1 the behaviour of retailers matters for consumers cross country studies of pricing for near identical products e g cars televisions compact discs branded sportswear groceries find big differences between prices across european countries and between europe and the usa 2 the european commission is to start examining why europeans pay substantially more on average than us consumers

do credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers evidence from u s states the degree to which credit markets discipline sovereign borrowers is investigated by estimating the supply curve for debt faced by u s states the results generally support an optimistic view of the market discipline hypothesis with credit markets providing incentives for sovereign borrowers to restrain borrowing while the risk premium on bond yields is estimated to increase only gradually at low levels of debt this effect appears to become much larger as debt rises there is also some evidence that credit markets may withhold access to credit at very high levels of debt copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

on information sharing and incentives in r d i investigate the issue of endogenous spillover of r d information across firms through information exchange between their employees although the firms typically cannot observe and restrict communication between their employees in a direct way they can regulate information flows through the incentive schemes offered to the employees the article focuses on two issues characterization of the optimal incentive schemes and the link between the nature of the firms interaction in the product market and the intensity of information exchange between the employees copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

time inconsistency and free riding in a monetary union in monetary unions a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free rider problem in the setting of non monetary policies the free rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation free riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non monetary policies without a time inconsistency problem the union has no free rider problem then constraints on non monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful this theory is here detailed and applied to several non monetary policies labor market policy fiscal policy and bank regulation

contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact abstract we show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification moreover with sanctions contingent on the observed state of the economy the pact avoids aggravating the situation of a country in recession moral hazard problems arise if the state also depends on unobservable politically costly fiscal effort this could explain why sanctions under the actual stability and growth pact are only automatically waived in extreme recessions and why the procedure linking observed deficits and sanctions involves a long and detailed assessment of a country s situation

a comparison of different quantity discount pricing policies in a two echelon channel with stochastic and asymmetric demand information abstract in this paper we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer the paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter the problem is analyzed as a stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity proposed in the paper are four quantity discount pricing policies regular quantity discount fixed percentage discount incremental volume discount and fixed marginal profit rate discount optimal solutions are derived and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy

law focal points and fiscal discipline in the united states and the european union many studies suggest that strict balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs even if those rules are never enforced in court why might public officials adhere to a rule that is practically never enforced in court existing literature points to a legal deterrence logic in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules in the first place by contrast we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement therefore the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms determines its effectiveness we develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument and we assess this model using data on u s states we then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the fiscal compact treaty

fiscal policy rules and the sustainability of public debt in europe the sustainability of public debt is interpreted as the result of the interaction of fiscal policy with the economic environment and not as a statistical concept as in most of the recent literature if debt is not to explode over time policymakers have to respond to the changing conditions in the macroeconomic environment this article defines the conditions that will ensure compliance of fiscal policy with the intertemporal budget constraint in the context of europe s fiscal policy rules the empirical part of the article reveals that european public debt is sustainable in this respect but questions regarding long run liquidity requirements remain unresolved

sub nationals risk premia in fiscal federations fiscal performance and institutional design the recent debt crisis in europe highlighted the importance of institutional design and in particular bail out clauses in determining states risk premia in fiscal or quasi fiscal federations this paper examines the determinants of sub national governments risk premia in fiscal federations using secondary market data for the usa canada australia and germany it finds that as for central governments fiscal fundamentals matter in the pricing of risk and sub national governments with higher public debt and larger deficits pay higher premia however this relationship is not uniform across federations and it differs with institutional arrangements in particular market pricing mechanisms are less effective in presence of explicit or implicit guarantees from the central government we show that when sub national governments depend on high transfers from the central government i e when there is some form of implicit guarantee from the center markets are less responsive to sub national governments fiscal fundamentals using primary market data the paper also shows that high transfer dependency lowers the probability of sub national governments to borrow on capital markets

output fluctuations and fiscal policy u s state and local governments 1978 1994 abstract we study the cyclical properties of u s state and local government fiscal policy the budget surpluses of both are procyclical over short and medium term horizons procyclical surpluses are the result of strongly procyclical revenue and weakly procyclical expenditure these results hold whether aggregate u s wide fluctuations are controlled for or not federal grants to state and local governments are procyclical but this is due to aggregate output fluctuations with respect to state level output fluctuations federal grants are countercyclical the budget surpluses of trust funds and utilities are also procyclical but there is no evidence that this effect is stronger in states where balanced budget rules are tighter the cyclical patterns of state and local budget surpluses are affected by various political institutions for example budget surpluses are less procyclical in conservative states in an election year that occurs in good times state governments refrain from accumulating a larger surplus in bad times no such asymmetry between election and non election years is apparent

sovereign bond yield spreads a time varying coefficient approach abstract we study the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads across 10 emu countries between q1 1999 and q1 2010 we apply a semiparametric time varying coefficient model to identify to what extent an observed change in the yield spread is due to a shift in macroeconomic fundamentals or due to altering risk pricing we find that at the beginning of emu the government debt level and the general investors risk aversion had a significant impact on interest differentials in the subsequent years however financial markets paid less attention to the fiscal position of a country and the safe haven status of germany diminished in importance by the end of 2006 two years before the fall of lehman brothers financial markets began to grant germany safe haven status again one year later when financial turmoil began the market reaction to fiscal loosening increased considerably the altering in risk pricing over time period confirms the need of time varying coefficient models in this context

uncertainty and the choice of trade policy in oligopolistic industries this paper investigates the design of trade policies in an uncertain world governments in each of two countries select between direct quantity controls and subsidies in an attempt to shift profits in favour of domestic imperfectly competitive firms the equilibrium of this bilateral policy game depends critically on the variability of the environment in a world of certainty both governments would choose to regulate the behaviour of their firms through direct quantity controls with a sufficient amount of uncertainty both governments regulate their firms through subsidies this result reflects an important tradeoff between the strategic advantages of direct quantity controls and flexibility gained by the use of subsidies

trade reform policy uncertainty and the current account a non expected utility approach rapid and comprehensive reduction in barriers to international trade has often been followed by a sharp deterioration in the current account the macroeconomic counterpart of the deterioration has typically been a decline in private savings no clear response pattern has been observed for private investment this article observes anticipated policy reversal may explain a decline in private savings for the same reason gradual tariff reduction causes private savings to go up temporarily low tariffs lower the relative price of current goods in terms of future goods and thus tend to depress private savings an anticipated future tariff increase will increase current consumption if the intertemporal substitution elasticity is larger than 1 if consumers internalize the impact of future tariff revenues on their after tax income the savings impact will always be negative even for an intertemporal substitution elasticity below 1 in the standard expected utility approach risk aversion is low when intertemporal substitution is high because the relevant elasticities are each other s inverse

on the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union the desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on whether the monetary authority can commit to following its policies if it can commit then debt constraints can only impose costs if it cannot commit then fiscal policy has a free rider problem and debt constraints may be desirable this type of free rider problem is new and arises only because of a time inconsistency problem

on intrabrand and interbrand competition the strategic role of fees and royalties abstract we examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition we characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty or wholesale price and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals when the number of downstream firms is endogenous each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm this result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments we discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

the dynamic adjustment of local government budgets does spain behave differently the aim of this article is to analyse whether spanish municipalities adjust in response to budget shocks and if so which elements of the budget they are more likely to adjust the methodology we use to answer these questions is a vector error correction model vecm estimated with data from a panel of spanish municipalities during the period 1988 to 2006 our results confirm that spanish municipalities do indeed make adjustments in response to fiscal shocks i e the deficit is stationary in the long run we compare our results with those obtained for us and germany to evaluate if the viability of local finance depends on the institutional arrangement and to analyse how it affects the adjustment patterns we observe that grants have a more important role in the adjustment process in environments where either they have an equalization objective or where there is no clear rule that determines their distribution this fact can generate a moral hazard problem governments tend to spend more due to the exp

nonresponse in panel data the impact on estimates of a life cycle consumption function if missing observations in a panel data set are not missing at random many widely applied estimators may be inconsistent in this paper we examine empirically several ways to reveal the nature and severity of the selectivity problem due to nonresponse as well as a number of methods to estimate the resulting models using a life cycle consumption function and data from the expenditure index panel from the netherlands we discuss simple procedures that can be used to assess whether observations are missing at random and we consider more complicated estimation procedures that can be used to obtain consistent or efficient estimates in case of selectivity of attrition bias finally some attention is paid to the differences in identification consistency and efficiency between inferences from a single wave of the panel a balanced sub panel and an unbalanced panel

divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty abstract this paper argues that divisionalization and incentive contracting are complementary rent shifting tools in the presence of demand uncertainty the role for divisionalization arises if managers know the state of demand prior to making output decisions and if incentive contracts are linear and non state contingent in this context incentive contracts achieve expected stackelberg outcomes but have no impact on the firm s responsiveness to demand shocks divisionalization on the other hand has the strategically beneficial effect of making the firm more responsive to demand shocks

competing vertical structures precommitment and renegotiation we consider a model where two agents privately informed about their own characteristics play a normal form game on behalf of two uninformed principals we analyze the existence of precommitment effects through public announcements of contracts in a model where agency contracts designed ex ante can always be secretly renegotiated at the ex ante and interim stages we show that the existence of precommitment effects depends both on the strategic complementarity of the agents actions and on the direct effect of the opponents actions on each principal s welfare in our model the possibility of renegotiation is crucial for the existence of precommitment effects the results are introduced through an example of cournot and bertrand competition between firms viewed as vertical structures

interest yields credit ratings and economic characteristics of state bonds an empirical analysis note carosio giovanni and ignazio visco nota sulla costruzione di un tasso di interesse reale estratto dal bollettino della banca d italia 32 ottobre dicembre 1977 797 811 fama eugene f short term interest rates as predictors of inflation american economic review 65 june 1975 269 82 fama eugene f and andre farber money bonds and foreign exchange american economic review 69 september 1979 639 49 fischer stanley the demand for index bonds journal of political economy 83 june 1975 509 34 hartman richard and john h makin inflation uncertainty and interest rates theory and empirical tests national bureau of economic research working paper no 906 june 1982 hess patrick j and james l bicksler capital asset prices vs time series models as predictors of inflation journal of financial economics 2 december 1975 341 60 mundell robert a inflation and real interest journal of political economy 71 june 1963 280 83 nelson charles r and william g schwert short term interest rates as predictors of inflation on testing the hypothesis that the real rate of interest is constant american economic review 67 june 1977 478 86 papadia francesco forward exchange rates as predictors of future spot rates and the efficiency of the foreign exchange market journal of banking and finance s june 1981 217 40 papadia francesco and vittorio basano eec dg ii inflationary expectations surveybased inflationary expectations for the eec countries economic papers of the commission of the european communities directorate general for economic and firlancial affairs no 1 may 1981 pearce douglas k comparing survey and rational measures of expected inflation forecast performance and interest rate effects journal of money credit and banking 11 november 1979 447 56 visco ignazio the measurement and analysis of inflation expectations the case of italy economic papers barik of italy research department june 1979 149 242

tax rate uncertainty and the sensitivity of consumption to income in an overlapping generations model abstract a well documented feature of u s data is that the aggregate consumption is a smoother process than income an overlapping generations model with a time nonseparable utility function is developed to characterize the effect of income tax uncertainty on the degree of consumption smoothness the model predicts that an increased tax uncertainty combined with tax financed production externality makes the aggregate consumption smoother for a plausible range of intertemporal substitution in consumption a calibration experiment indicates that the observed long term smoothness of aggregate consumption is consistent with the model s predicted consumption process