a multiperiod theory of corporate financial policy under taxation this paper examines multiperiod corporate financial policy in a world where the only market imperfection is taxation the optimal financial policy determines the firm s capital structure and debt maturity structure two implications of this policy are 1 there can be a set of debt asset ratios that is consistent with firm value maximization and 2 debt maturity structure is irrelevant to firm value

macroeconomic equilibrium and reform in a transitional economy we build a general equilibrium macro model of a transitional economy to reflect four stylized facts among these are that central planning has left a legacy of highly concentrated industry and a residue of price controls and rationing an almost classical dichotomy obtains in the model monetary expansion leaves output and employment unchanged despite the existence of unemployment though leisure time declines however the economy displays a high degree of complementarity between the state controlled and private sectors giving rise to keynesian multiplier effects we also analyse the effects of price liberalization and privatization on the properties of the economy

macroeconomic policy in a large unionised economy this paper models an economy with many sectors in each sector a monopoly union sets the nominal wage and then firms choose output the economy is large in that all agents treat the general price level as fixed the paper focusses on policy effects on employment an increase in government expenditure in one sector will increase decrease total employment as sectoral employment is above below average a general increase in government expenditure in fixed proportions will have a positive employment multiplier below unity policy which increases employment will lead to higher welfare

tax adjusted discount rates this paper develops models for discount rates that are adjusted for the interest tax shields of an infra marginal firm in a general tax equilibrium where there is cross sectional variation in corporate tax rates under the assumption that the firm optimally maintains a predetermined debt ratio a tax adjusted riskless discount rate model is given for valuing certainty equivalents and a tax and risk adjusted discount rate model is given for valuing expected cash flows for the latter case the asset equity debt and tax shield betas are derived and a weighted average cost of capital interpretation is given the tax adjusted capm apt security market lines for expected returns in stock and bond markets both have the same slope but different intercepts a formula is also provided for the present value of the interest tax shield when the firm optimally maintains a predetermined debt level the analysis here also differs from the existing literature in the following respects it allows for cross sectional variation in corporate tax rates and personal tax rates it shows that the market values of risky and riskless interest tax shields differ only to the extent that tax laws provide for nonlinear taxation of gains and losses it also shows that interest tax shields should be discounted at a tax adjusted discount rate that reflects the fact that they accrue to equity investors rather than debt investors continuous time simplifications of the formulas in this paper and the previous literature are also given

one to many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non renegotiable abstract we study a model where a central player the principal bargains bilaterally with each of several players the agents to create and share the surplus of a coalitional game it is known that if the payments that were previously agreed with each of the remaining agents are renegotiated in case any bilateral negotiation permanently breaks down then the shapley value is the unique efficient and individual rational outcome consistent with bilateral nash bargaining here we show that when instead the agreed payments cannot be renegotiated the outcome is also unique but it now coincides with the nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy problem we provide a strategic foundation for this outcome then we study how such renegotiation affects the principal s payoff according to the properties of the surplus function we find for example that renegotiation benefits the principal when agents are complements and it hurts him when they are substitutes situations with respectively increasing and decreasing marginal contributions

unions and profitability over the 1980s some evidence on union firm bargaining in the united kingdom in this paper an attempt is made to assess the behaviour of the rate of return on sales of unionised firms as compared to the non unionised ones in the late 1980s in the united kingdom the main aim is to examine what has happened to the relationship between unionisation and profitability after the changes in the union legislation competition environment and cyclical variations that took place over this period the impact of different forms of union firm bargaining on the union profitability effect is also examined the data reveal that the negative union effect on profitability exists even after controlling for firm specific fixed effects but that it has been sharply reduced over the 1980s

the effect of business risk on corporate capital structure theory and evidence under corporate and personal taxation we demonstrate that the relation between optimal debt level and business risk is roughly u shaped this result follows from the fact that the tax liability is an option portfolio that is long in the corporate tax option and short in the personal tax option therefore the net effect of a change in business risk on the optimal debt level depends upon the relative magnitudes of the resultant marginal changes in the values of these two options results of empirical tests offer support for the predicted u shaped relationship

organizational design and technology choice under intrafirm bargaining comment the authors consider a wide number of applications of an intrafirm bargaining game within organizations where employees and the firm engage in wage negotiations under their presumption that contracts cannot bind employees to the organization the resulting stable wage and profit profiles give rise to an objective function for the firm that places weight on inframarginal profits in an economically significant manner the authors in turn employ this methodology to explore applications of organizational design hiring and capital decisions training and cross training the importance of labor and asset specificity managerial hierarchies preferences for unionization responses to competition and internal capital budgeting copyright 1996 by american economic association

sequencing strategically wage negotiations under oligopoly abstract should an industry wide union in a unionized oligopoly e g the united auto workers in the us negotiate new contracts by bargaining with firms simultaneously or should it strategically sequence its bargaining partners the models presented isolate two key factors affecting this decision pre existing contracts and the post negotiation product market game the better the preexisting contracts for the union the more attractive is the option of sequencing moreover a high wage negotiated with the first firm reduces product market competition increasing other firms ability to pay higher wages as well this adds to the attractiveness of strategic sequencing for the union

bargaining binding contracts and competitive wages in a model where many workers bargain with one firm and sign binding contracts we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if the production function satisfies decreasing return

endogenous incomplete contracts a bargaining approach in this paper we argue that by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts this point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once for all bargain over the entire stream a long term contract or through a series of bargaining rounds a short term contract within this structure short term contracts arise as equilibrium outcomes under very general conditions because a short term contract implies reduced bargaining costs for one of the agents in essence reduced transaction costs produce a short term contract jel classification l14 c78

equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections abstract we evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union we find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high and low skilled workers when the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy it will dampen this tendency further higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high skilled workers whereas it will reduce it among the low skilled workers overall outsourcing will reduce economy wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high skilled workers is sufficiently low

unions oligopoly and the natural range of employment a simple two sector general equilibrium macromodel is presented wi th oligopolistic price determination in the product market and a unionized labor market in the first stage unions set the nominal wage and in the second stage firms choose outputs given wages by altering the balance of fiscal policy between the two sectors the government can achieve a continuum of aggregate employment levels the natural range of employment a unique natural rate will occur only i f one requires fiscal policy to be the same in both sectors this indicates that the natural rate property of some single or representative sect or macromodels is a special case

trade unions and regional development abstract we focus on the role that labour unions play in the context of a two region dual economy we show that unskilled unions will increase the wage of unskilled workers and depress growth in both the backward and the advanced regions the growth effects will be felt more strongly in the relatively poor region if skilled workers are allowed to migrate and unions recognize that a more aggressive wage setting policy may foster migration unions will moderate their wage requests however regional unions would then have a strong incentive to coordinate their wage demands across regions this would further raise the unskilled wage and more so in the backward region we conclude that labour market policies designed to foster regional convergence should seek both to discourage centralized wage setting and favour skilled labour mobility

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

buyer symmetry in monopoly abstract for a price setting monopolist the aggregate demand curve sufficiently summarizes the demand environment the distribution of demand namely how the demand is distributed among the buyers is not relevant but intuitive notions of strong versus weak buyers suggest that the distribution of demand should be relevant to a monopolist this paper provides a formal justification for such notions using cooperative game theory to model monopoly without an a priori assumption of price setting power the paper shows that a seller will always prefer unitary demand thus implying that the demand distribution does affect how a monopolist assesses the demand environment furthermore if the number of buyers is kept fixed a seller always prefers that when feasible the buyers be symmetric namely that they have the same individual demand curves this result holds for all capacity choices of the seller implying that buyer symmetry is always the most preferred distribution of demand

countervailing power revisited abstract the paper uses the nash bargaining concept to study the predictions of the theory of countervailing power within two theoretical models a cournot model and a model of perfect competition within the cournot model a decrease in the number of retailers unambiguously leads to an increase in equilibrium consumer prices in the model of perfect competition the reverse is true one may thus conclude that countervailing power can have positive effects for the consumers only if competiton at the retail level is very fierce

the structure and incentive effects of corporate tax liabilities this paper describes situations in which tax liabilities assume the form of a negative position in a call option this structure motivates an examination of the investment decisions of taxed corporations in the presence of risk it is shown that the structure of the tax liability creates an incentive to underinvest in more risky projects and an incentive for conglomerate merger these effects are then evaluated in the presence of conflicts of interest between stockholders and bondholders and under alternative assumptions about the tax code and about the timing of investment and financing decisions this paper makes an observation regarding the functional form assumed by the tax liabilities of corporations with potentially redundant deductions and evaluates its consequences for investment incentives interest and other deductions against taxable income can be taken for the most part only to the extent of that income in a single period model this gives the net tax liability a familiar structure it can be viewed as a call option where the exercise price on the call is the allowable deductions the tax paying entity holds a positive position in the assets which generate the taxable income and a negative position in a call option on those assets the analogy between options and the structure of tax liabilities calls attention to some interesting incentive effects concerning risk using their model of option valuation black and scholes 5 showed that the value of an option is increasing in the variance of the asset it is written on other authors have generalized this result and studied its implications for corporate financing see jagannathan 16 jensen and meckling 17 and green 15 the importance of the risk attributes of the underlying asset in option valuation suggests that taxation may have important incentive consequences for investment decisions involving risk it has been recognized in the public economics literature for some time that asymmetries in the tax schedule can affect risk taking behavior early papers by mossin 20 and stiglitz 25 studied individual portfolio decisions over a riskless and a risky asset our analysis differs from these in a number of respects the most important of these is our use of market valuation rather than expected utility in the decision maker s objective function this is surely a more appropri

the structural determinants of union bargaining power this paper investigates the structural determinants of variation in union power across manufacturing industries using a pooled sample of unionized establishments from the expenditure on employee compensation surveys of 1968 72 the author estimates wage equations augmented with measures of product market structure bargaining structure and the size distribution of unions the results suggest that union wage gains are greatest where discretionary pricing power enhances employers ability to pay and where unions achieve high coverage practice centralized bargaining and avoid union fragmentation on the other hand centralized bargaining provides no advantage in competitive industries

an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework this paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model in a more general framework it does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs as well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model a new class of models is also discovered this framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency the empirical analysis of trade unions and the effects of trade union legislation copyright 1987 by royal economic society

macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining an international perspective this paper critically reviews the research on how collective bargaining systems influence macroeconomic performance in industrialized countries the review considers effects of bargaining level coordination and corporatist institutional arrangements key empirical results turn out to be quite fragile and much of the paper explores issues of measurement and specification that account for the fragility the paper concludes that complementarities between key institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions and it suggests research strategies

breakdown in multilateral negotiations abstract we analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions in contrast to preexisting literature we do not normalize the parties reservation utilities to zero we show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome even if only two sellers are present

some indirect evidence on effective capital gains tax rates this paper presents estimates of effective marginal tax rates on capital gains excluding housing between 1960 and 1978 in the united states concern that the inflation of the 1970s may have worked through the tax system to reduce incentives to produce and save has focused attention on the effective marginal tax rates that apply to various sources of income joines 1981 sheds light on this issue by calculating the historical effective marginal tax rates on factor incomes for the united states part of the recent debate however has focused specifically on capital gains taxes and the desirability of reducing them to enhance incentives for saving and investment the effective marginal tax rate on capital gains henceforth emtg may be the most difficult rate to measure in addition to the usual problems of how to attribute deductions exclusions and tax credits further adjustment must be made because investors pay taxes only when they realize their capital gains 1 the expected emtg this paper reports estimates of effective marginal tax rates on capital gains by comparing reported capital gains with total capital gains on an annual basis the estimates show that the effective marginal tax rates on capital gains fluctuated between 3 4 and 6 6 between 1960 and 1978 and that capital gains are held on average between 24 and 31 years before they are reported

is it harmful to allow partial cooperation in economics politics and society examples abound in economics politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes i e they can collude with a subset of agents several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no cooperation situation our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results we find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods

union cooperation and nontraded goods in general equilibrium a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods and sector specific trade unions is set up wage formation is either noncooperative or cooperative egalitarian union wage policy is shown to be the equilibrium under cooperation important asymmetries are encountered and an alternative model of cooperative behavior called bargaining cooperation is proposed bargaining cooperation is shown to have qualitatively different implications than simple cooperation the welfare and employment effects of bargaining cooperation compared to simple cooperation are ambiguous

worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation a strategic three party bargaining model is developed in which one distinguished party the firm has to reac h agreements with the other two each of which is a group of workers in the prebargaining stage the two worker groups decide whether to organize jointly or separately the main observation relates the equi librium pattern of unionization to the substitutability in production between the two groups the outcome is joint or separate unions acco rding to whether the two groups are substitute or complementary facto rs of production the analysis also considers possibilities for firm s strategic intervention in the unionization process copyright 1988 by royal economic society

selected works of michael wallerstein centralized bargaining and wage restraint the literature on corporatism has presented much evidence associating highly centralized systems of collective bargaining with wage restraint and relatively successful macroeconomic performance in addition centralized bargaining is associated with relatively small wage differentials this paper presents a model of the impact of centralized wage setting on both real wages and relative wages the central assumption is that the centralization of wage setting at the national level unites unions who are complements in production since a wage increase for one group of workers negatively affects the welfare of other workers who are complements in production centralized wage setters choose wages below the equilibrium of decentralized wage setting it is also shown that if the union confederation maximizes a utilitarian welfare function with equal weights centralized wage setting decreases wage dispersion while low paid workers clearly gain from centralized bargaining high paid workers may prefer that bargaining be decentralized

decentralized one to many bargaining we study a one to many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project the order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs we also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium the rotating protocol is in general not self enforcing

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

a note on three player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings abstract a three player bargaining game where only the central player can negotiate with two different partners has a unique perfect equilibrium outcome we discuss when the a priori favored position of the central player is really advantageous in terms of equilibrium payoffs

managed care s price bargaining with hospitals research has shown that managed care mc slowed the rate of growth in health care spending in the 1990s primarily via lower unit prices paid however the mechanism of mc s price bargaining has not been well studied this article uses a unique panel dataset with actual hospital prices in massachusetts between 1994 and 2000 to examine the sources of mc s bargaining power i find two significant determinants of price discounts first plans with large memberships are able to extract volume discounts across hospitals second health plans that are more successful at channeling patients can extract greater discounts patient channeling can add to the volume discount that plans negotiate

bilateral oligopoly the efficiency of intermediate goods markets abstract we show that intermediate goods markets may be efficient despite the presence of commonly accepted signs of market failure such as high concentration both among sellers and buyers sparse trading networks price dispersion and externalities the results are derived in an extensive form model of bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers and multiple sellers and with externalities between the negotiations we also characterize the structure of the endogenous trading network i e how firms choose trading partners prices are dispersed and depend on both the concentration of capital and the concentration of sales consistent with some stylized facts on buyer power

relative prices in monetary union and floating we analyse a small open economy with a tradable and a sheltered sector if the unions that operate in each sector coordinate their wage demands sectorwise the choice of monetary regime floating cum inflation target vs emu may affect the relative wages and prices of the economy we show that emu results in lower prices for tradable goods and lower real wages in the traded sector while opposite results hold for sheltered sector prices and wages thus if large unions behave strategically the choice of monetary regime has far reaching structural implications

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

tax induced clientele effects in the market for british government securities abstract this paper develops a new methods for measuring tax effects in bond markets and presents empirical results for british government securities the basic idea is to construct a least cost portfolio which for investors in a given tax bracket dominates a given bond a portfolio is said to dominate a bond if it provides cash flows which are at least as great in every period and has a lower price in effect our method calculates an upper bound on the value of a bond to investors in a given tax bracket the results demonstrate i the existence of clientele effects and ii the absence of an effective tax rate

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information abstract this paper analyzes a complete information infinite horizon multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies we characterize the set of equilibria for the game we show that when players are sufficiently patient significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the number of involved parties rises indeed when the number of bargainers is large perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d23 d62

bargining bundling and clout the portfolio effects of horizontal mergers we examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate goods market served by a downstream monopolist if the merged firm can bundle transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger absent cost efficiencies consumer and total welfare do not change if the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger absent cost efficiencies welfare typically falls we evaluate the profit effects of mergers for the case of two part tariff contracts rival firms gain lose from mergers that raise lower downstream prices contrary to conventional wisdom a merger that harms the retailer may increase welfare

coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities abstract building on genicot and ray g genicot d ray contracts and externalities how things fall apart j econ theory 131 2006 71 100 we develop a model of non cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal allowing for agent coordination we show that the outcome of our bargaining procedure may differ remarkably from those of the offer and the bidding games in particular we find that bargaining can break agents coordination and that the principal s payoff can be decreasing in his own bargaining power

miller s equilibrium shareholder leverage clienteles and optimal capital structure the purpose of this paper is twofold first we examine the individual portfolio decisions when income from stocks and bonds is taxed at different rates second a rationale for the existence of risky debt in the presence of leverage related costs and differential personal income taxation is provided previous studies on capital structure with differential personal income taxation have ignored either the portfolio risk consideration and or the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable earnings e g 8 2 3 14 13 6 7 1 9 19 20 21 23 in section i of this paper both the portfolio risk consideration and the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields are explicitly introduced this enables us to provide a rationale for the shareholder leverage clientele phenomenon within a mean variance framework we also demonstrate a non corner solution for the optimal corporate capital structure in a tax environment similar to that of miller s debt and taxes 14 in sections ii and iii of this paper miller s world is further modified to include risky debt and the attendant costs we re examine and synthesize recent studies on the theory of optimal capital structure which have appeared since the publication of debt and taxes e g 4 6 7 13 19 20

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

staggered vs synchronised wage setting in oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the dynamic equilibrium which emerges when wages are bargained upon at different times in the various firms operating in an oligopolistic industry unions set wages the management of the firms the output level and the outcome of this interaction is captured by the game theoretic concept of markov perfect equilibrium the steady state equilibrium is compared with that which would emerge if all wage negotiations occurred simultaneously it is shown that staggered wage setting leads to higher steady state levels of wage and unemployment than synchronised wage setting it is also shown that a longer duration for wage contracts leads other things equal to lower wages and higher employment the final part of the paper shows that allowing for nash bargaining between union and management and for risk averse unions does not alter the conclusions of the paper

the value of the tax subsidy on risky debt the effect of corporate taxes on the market value of a levered firm continues to be a central issue in recent contributions in finance theory e g miller 1977 deangelo and masulis 1980 kim 1982 modigliani 1982 in these and other studies e g krause and litzenberger 1973 scott 1976 brennan and schwartz 1978 kim 1978 the relationship between market value and capital structure is established by formulating a tax subsidy function that specifies the partial effect of debt on the expected tax savings at the corporate level under the existing u s tax code a working assumption in most of these studies is that both principal and interest are tax deductible this assumption is made in the spirit of the original modigliani and miller 1963 formulation in which debt is taken to be perpetual and riskless indeed it is well known that the tax shield provided by the deduction of principal in a singleperiod framework has the same value as the tax shield from interest deductions in the case of perpetual and riskless debt under this assumption it is shown that in the absence of non debtthis paper examines the relationship between leverage and the value of the firm when non debt related tax shields are available and the corporate tax is levied as an income tax in a previous paper de angelo and masulis argue that in the presence of nondebt related tax shields the relationship between debt and firm value is concave resulting in an interior optimal capital structure when there is a tax induced differential in the cost of corporate debt their result derives from the fact that they assume the payment of debt principal and non debt related depreciation charges are deductible however the former deduction is consistent with a wealth tax while the latter is consistent only with an income tax we show that if the interest alone is deductible the debt firm value function is convex resulting in corner solutions to the capital structure problem the authors wish to thank richard castanias richard green lemma senbet and especially an anonymous referee for helpful comments and richard green and robert dammon for computational assistance

relative wages under decentralized and corporatist bargaining systems in studying the relationship between wage inequality and centralization in collective bargaining we distinguish central from local systems of wage determination by assuming that a central union takes the employment effects of negotiated wages into account whereas unions disregard these effects in decentralized systems two different sources of wage differentials are studied separately i heterogeneous workers with different skills and ii heterogeneous firms with varying levels of economic rent per employee with respect to skill levels the impact of centralization is ambiguous whereas inter firm wage differentials are likely to be lower in corporatist systems

optimal fiscal policy in open economies with labour market distortions abstract we set up a general equilibrium model with unemployment owing to distortions in the labour market it is shown that a public expansion financed by a distortionary income tax may give rise to a decrease in unemployment even if public goods are pure waste such an expansion may give rise to an increase in welfare if it is associated with a decrease in unemployment since part of the gain from a fiscal expansion is achieved at the expense of welfare in other countries non cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary

the rise in unemployment a multi country study one of the most remarkable features of recent economic history has been the remorseless rise in unemployment throughout the industrialized countries however while the trend to higher unemployment is universal the experience of individual countries also differs widely the increase is especially marked within the european community where unemployment rates rival those reached in the interwar years by contrast in the scandinavian countries and japan unemployment is lower and has risen very much less experience in the united states lies somewhere between these extremes and in the last few years unemployment there has fallen sharply

should trade unions appreciate foreign direct investment abstract it is often argued that fdi hurts workers in the home country because jobs are moved abroad contrary to that view businessmen often argue that fdi benefits home workers because there will be an expansion in the firm we show that both views may be correct and whether home workers gain or lose on fdi depends on which kinds of activities the firm moves to the host country if there is a big degree of substitutability complementarity between activities in the home country and activities in the host country it is likely that the workers lose gain on fdi

the role of buying consortia among smes in the electricity market in italy we model the electricity market in italy focusing on the impact of buying consortia among smes on the behaviour of the large electricity producers and sellers we show that consortia may in certain circumstances produce a pro competitive result i e they may induce a reduction of prices not only for consortia members but also for firms not in the consortia

the effects of union owned shares on the outcome of wage bargaining abstract the paper investigates the consequences of employee stock ownership in firms where the local union determines the purchase of shares who wins and who loses depends on the type of conflict threat that is used by the union however no employee share arrangement can simultaneously benefit all union members and external owners on the contrary there may be a total loss to be shared due to overmanning egalitarian employee stock ownership may therefore not be viable inegalitarian employee ownership may be viable paradoxically all union members are better off the more weight the union gives to the members with no shares

the critical implicit tax rate and capital structure in a miller world firms are indifferent between debt and equity when the tax rate that isimplicitly used to price a bond is equal to the statutory corporate tax rate in this paper we derive the implicit tax rate that makes a firm marginally indifferent between debt and equity when debt related tax savings are uncertain we analyze the functional relationship between this critical tax rate and the amount of debt issued by a firm and discuss the implications for a firm s optimal capital structure

taxes capital structure and bondholder clienteles despite much recent progress financial theory has yet to explain the connection if any between the u s tax code and many observed characteristics of corporate bonds empirically why is there no single tax rate equating yields on corporate bonds with yields on tax exempt municipal bonds of apparently identical risks and maturities 2 specifically why does the spread in yields between corporate and municipal bonds divided by the yield on corporates a conventional measure of the marginal tax rate on corporates decrease with increasing risk and maturity more generally why are different types of bonds evidently held by clienteles of investors in tax clienteles for corporate bonds are identified in a competitive financial equilibrium under an asymmetric corporate income tax with interest preceding principal state contingent bonds with higher coupon yields are issued by firms with higher pretax cash inflows per dollar of nondebt tax shield purchased by investors in lower tax brackets and implicitly priced at lower marginal tax rates on these bonds all investors earn tax induced surpluses by contrast all other bonds have implicit tax rates typically equal to the corporate rate and yield for many investors no tax induced surpluses we gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of george constantinides kose john merton miller jim scott marti subrahmanyam and participants in seminars at baruch chicago columbia houston michigan nyu rutgers usc washington wharton the american finance association the western finance association and the johnson symposium on taxes and finance at wisconsin george constantinides was especially helpful 1 the most notable contribution is miller 1977 other recent papers include chen and kim 1979 kim lewellen and mcconnell 1979 deangelo and masulis 1980a 1980b taggart 1980 kim 1982 auerbach and king 1983 and talmor haugen and bornea 1985 black 1971 anticipates an equilibrium with clienteles 2 schaefer 1982a identifies tax induced clienteles of bondholders in the british gilt market van horne 1982 reports that implicit tax rates vary over time as the supply of discount bonds changes additional evidence is cited in trczinka 1982

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

wage interdependence through decentralized bargaining abstract the idea that sector specific unions are influenced by the wages obtained by other unions has mainly been used to support the empirical observation that wages are highly correlated among industries the sources of wage interdependence can mainly be found in unions preferences in the nature of technology and in price and demand determination the presence of externalities and of strategic complementarity among unions leads to suboptimal equilibria which generates non desired inflation unemployment and possibly also trade balance deficit this enforces the idea that part of current unemployment can be eliminated by improving the cooperation between social actors

expected inflation and interest rates reply vito tanzi s comment on my earlier study 1982 is based upon his belief that the mundell effect alone could not likely account for the ex ante negative real rates observed in his simulations his suggestion is that perhaps a mundell effect together with a fiscal illusion provides the best explanation p 502 nowhere did i argue that the mundell effect was all encompassing the nominal interest rate is determined by many factors besides expected inflation x my reducedform nominal interest rate equation includes inflation uncertainty the current and lagged money stock and the lagged price level as well as expected inflation as arguments thus at any point in time the nominal rate will shift with a movement in any of these variables one way of looking at this is that holding s constant i will vary with the other predetermined variables so that the real rate changes since tanzi and previous researchers have used partial equilibrium analysis to highlight the relation between 1t and i we tend to forget that the level of the real rate depends upon all the predetermined variables of the system to concentrate on the partial derivative of i with respect to sr we must take as given some initial i holding constant the other factors influencing i tanzi s simulations set the real rate of interest r initially equal to 03 then by assuming different values for di d7r and v he generates implied values for the after tax real interest rate r since the after tax real rate turns negative at quite low rates of 7r tanzi concludes that fiscal illusion is present as interest rates did not adjust for the effect of taxes p 502 the simple fact that the after tax real rate turns negative need imply nothing regarding whether or not investors are cognizant of taxes there is nothing inherently unusual about negative real rates of interest in the short run during inflationary periods clearly if money can be costlessly stored the nominal rate of interest cannot be negative but this in no way rules out negative real rates in a world of incomplete markets there may be inflationary periods when a negative real rate of interest is the best that optimizing agents can earn if there was a suitable asset available that guaranteed a zero return we would not expect to observe ex ante negative real rates benjamin friedman 1980 emphasizes the limited nature of portfolio substitution possibilities by arguing that if holding goods was a feasible portfolio alternative then the expected rate of inflation could be viewed as simply the return from holding such real assets in such a case higher expected inflation would reduce the lenders supply of loans directly via portfolio substitutions from loans bonds to real goods the problem with this scenario as stated by friedman is in practice however the available opportunities for such portfolio substitutions involving consumption or other real commodities are usually extremely limited purchasing the consumer price index basket of goods is not a feasible portfolio alternative p 34 the lack of such a real asset allows market instruments to offer a negative yield of course with no inflation and costless storage one could hold money so that we don t expect to observe negative rates in noninflationary periods frederic mishkin provides corroborating evidence in this area as he finds the real rate whether adjusted or unadjusted for taxes is negatively correlated with inflation 1981 p 191 emphasis added and the real interest rate appears to have been positive in the 1950s and 1960s but has since turned negative in the midand late 1970s p 192 regarding tanzi s simulations i do not believe that they correctly assess the path of the real rate following an exogenous change in inflationary expectations nw a major theme of my earlier paper was the emphasis arizona state university i thank don schlagenhauf john schroeter and richard l smith for helpful discussions

the competition effects of industry wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly this paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry wide resale price maintenance rpm arrangements such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against rpm a bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining we do not find rpm to be universally undesirable however where retailer power is strong the social effects of rpm are likely to be adverse since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising

bargaining frictions bargaining procedures and implied costs in multiple issue bargaining the paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players bargaining costs in multiple issue bargaining settings when bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached issue by issue negotiation can generate bargaining costs different from those that occur if all issues are bargained simultaneously these cost differences result in differences in allocations across bargaining procedures such that players disagree on the desired method of bargaining similar results hold for certain fixed cost bargaining friction specifications this analysis provides a potential explanation of both agenda bargaining and incomplete contracts

nash in nash bargaining a microfoundation for applied work a nash equilibrium in nash bargains has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly this paper proposes a non cooperative foundation for nash in nash bargaining that extends the rubinstein 1982 model to multiple upstream and downstream rms assuming there exists gains from trade for each rm pair we prove that there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement and negotiated prices that correspond to rubinstein prices if and only if the marginal contribution of a set of agreements is weakly greater than the sum of the agreements marginal contributions we provide stronger conditions under which equilibrium prices are unique

wage setting under different monetary regimes in an economy with large wage setters like industry unions the monetary regime affects the trade off between consumer real wages and employment and profits faced by the wage setters this paper shows that an exchange rate target including participation in a monetary union is likely to involve lower wages in the traded sector and higher wages in the non traded sector than does a price target an exchange rate target also involves higher prices on non traded goods relative to on traded goods overall welfare is likely to be higher under a price target

why unions reduce wage inequality a theory of domino effects numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences i demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages and still not sacrifice higher wages much if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency enhancing wage differences if these domino effects are strong enough then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage

on the economic effects of multiple unionism in a recent paper stephen machin mark b stewart and john van reenan 1993 using establishment level data for the united kingdom find that ceteris paribus plants with multiunionism and separate bargaining arrangements pay higher wages than either those in which different unions bargain jointly or those in which there is a single union in this paper the author offers a theoretical interpretation of this result within the framework of the henrik horn and asher wolinsky 1988 analysis of worker substitutability and patterns of unionization copyright 1995 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

tax clienteles and optimal capital structure under uncertainty this article demonstrates that investors heterogeneous tax status implies that they value bonds differently at the margin due to asymmetric personal taxes high risk bonds generate a higher amount of taxable income than low risk bonds and are therefore held by investors in low tax brackets in such a setting firms can increase their value by choosing a capital structure that attracts a particular bondholder clientele the author analyzes how bondholder clienteles change as the uncertainty about a bond s final payoff is resolved over time and shows how tax clientele effects influence firms capital structure decisions copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

learning in sequential wage negotiations theory and evidence when union firm pairs bargain sequentially and when unobserved components of firms abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry we derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among followers than leaders in wage negotiations considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of canadian contract negotiations

the interaction of corporate and government financing in general equilibrium this article develops a general equilibrium model for analyzing the in teraction of corporate financial and production decisions consumers behavior and government financing the authors use the model to inv estigate how changes in income tax rates and government debt policy a ffect production interest rates and consumer welfare they also sho w how changes in the different tax rates affect other tax rates in ge neral equilibrium copyright 1988 by the university of chicago