stochastic stability in a double auction abstract in a k double auction a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with probability 1 k we show that the stable equilibria of a complete information k double approximate an asymmetric nash bargaining solution with the seller s bargaining power decreasing in k note that ceteris paribus the payoffs of the seller of the one shot game increase in k nevertheless as the stochastically stable equilibrium price decreases in k choosing the seller s favorite price with a relatively higher probability in individual encounters makes him worse off in the long run

evolutionary stability in games of communication abstract this paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff relevant action the informed player can communicate at little cost outcomes satisfying a set valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common interest games when there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable the paper introduces a nonequilibrium set valued stability notion of entry resistant sets for games with partial common interest the no communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

privatization in developing countries a review of the issues abstract the theory and early experience of privatization in developing countries are reviewed privatization has been spurred by widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of public enterprises and the need to cut government expenditures unless it is accompanied by liberalization measures privatization of public enterprises is unlikely to result in significant gains in economic efficiency the sequencing of privatization and liberalization reforms will often determine their impact on efficiency but the correct order of implementation is not clear political opposition to privatization is likely to be limited to the state bureaucracy which will often be able to mobilize in order to limit the impact of reforms early implementation experiences suggest technical difficulties are as constraining as political factors

adjustment dynamics and rational play in games when a given strategic situation arises repeatedly the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process we examine myopic adjustment dynamics a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory simple models of imitation models of experimentation and adjustment and some simple learning dynamics we present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable in the sense of kohlberg and mertens this behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs journal of economic literature classification number c72

the dynamic in stability of backwards induction abstract the evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in finite extensive form games with perfect information is examined evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare perturbations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy the criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome we find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process only in very simple games examples of more complex games are given in which this process does not select between the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and alternative nash equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c79

learning dynamics for mechanism design an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms in a repeated interaction public goods economy incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information oneshot game an experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations this provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations these predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice the simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested

frictional labour mobility we build a dynamic model of migration where in addition to standard relocation costs workers face spatial frictions that decrease their ability to compete for distant job opportunities we estimate the model on a matched employer employee panel dataset describing labour market transitions within and between the 100 largest french cities our identification strategy is based on the premise that frictions affect the frequency of job transitions while mobility costs impact the distribution of accepted wages we find that 1 controlling for spatial frictions reduces mobility cost estimates by one order of magnitude 2 the urban wage premium is driven by better opportunities for local job to job transitions in larger cities 3 migration reduces lifetime inequalities by providing insurance against unsatisfactory initial location draws 4 labour mobility policies based on relocation subsidies are inefficient unlike switching from nationwide to local minimum wages

the effect of migration policy on growth structural change and regional inequality in china abstract between 2000 and 2015 china s aggregate income quadrupled its provincial income inequality fell by a third and its share of employment in agriculture fell by a half internal migration is central to this transformation with the number of internal migrant workers reaching 300 million by 2015 combining rich data on migration with a spatial general equilibrium model of china s economy we quantify the size and the impact of internal migration cost reductions in china between 2000 and 2015 during the 15 year period china s internal migration costs fell by forty five percent in addition to contributing substantially to growth these migration cost changes account for the majority of the reallocation of workers out of agriculture and the drop in regional inequality we compare the effect of migration policy changes with other important economic changes including changes in trade costs capital market distortions average cost of capital and productivity while each contributes meaningfully to growth migration policy changes are central to china s structural change and regional income convergence we also find that the recent slow down in aggregate economic growth between 2010 and 2015 is associated with smaller reduction in inter provincial migration costs and a larger role of capital accumulation

evolution population growth and history dependence abstract we consider an evolutionary model with mutations which incorporates stochastic population growth we provide a complete characterization of the effects of population growth on the evolution of play in particular we show that if the rate of population growth is at least logarithmic the stochastic process describing play converges only one equilibrium will be played from a certain point forward if in addition the rate of mutation is taken to zero the probability that the equilibrium selected is the first equilibrium played approaches one thus population growth generates history dependence the contingency of equilibrium selection on historical conditions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 o33

drift effect under timing without observability experimental evidence abstract we provide experimental evidence of binmore k samuelson l 1999 evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection review of economic studies 66 363 393 insights into modelling the process through which equilibrium is selected they proposed the concept of drift to describe the effect of perturbations on the dynamic process leading to equilibrium in evolutionary games with boundedly rational agents we test two versions of the modified dalek game within a random matched population we also impose that the first mover chooses first timing but the second mover is not informed of the first mover s choice lack of observability to emphasize the learning process taking place within the population our results support binmore and samuelson s model

big locational unemployment differences despite high labor mobility considerable labor mobility exists across us states enough that if migration arbitrages local unemployment one might expect very low unemployment differences across states however cross state data reveal large unemployment differences an equilibrium multi location model with stochastic worker location match productivity and within location trading frictions can account for these facts in the model some workers move to or stay in a location with high unemployment because they are more productive there than elsewhere according to the model labor mobility and aggregate unemployment are negatively related this prediction is in stark contrast to standard sectoral reallocation theory but consistent with the us data

public sector wage policy and labor market equilibrium a structural model we develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates a sizable public sector in a labor market with search frictions the wage distribution and the employment rate in the public sector are taken as exogenous policy parameters overall wage distribution and employment rate are determined within the model taking into account the private sector s endogenous response to public sector employment policies job turnover is sector specific and transitions between sectors depend on the worker s decision to accept alternative employment in the same or different sector by comparing the value of employment in the current and prospective jobs the model is estimated on british data by a method of moments we use the model to simulate the impact of various counterfactual public sector wage and employment policies

the logit equilibrium a perspective on intuitive behavioural anomalies costs associated with deviations from the nash equilibrium these payoff asymmetry effects are incorporated in an approach that introduces noisy behavior via a logit probabilistic choice function in the resulting logit equilibrium behavior is characterized by a probability distribution that satisfies a rational expectations consistency condition the beliefs that determine players expected payoffs match the decision distributions that arise from applying the logit rule to those expected payoffs we prove existence of a unique symmetric logit equilibrium and derive comparative statics results the paper provides a unified perspective on many recent laboratory studies of games in which nash equilibrium predictions are inconsistent with both intuition and experimental evidence

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

does evolution solve the hold up problem abstract the paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold up problem at the first stage one agent decides on the level of a relationship specific investment there is no contract so at the second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated we show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargaining game and on the choice of equilibrium concept in particular we prove the following two results i if bargaining proceeds according to the nash demand game any investment level is subgame perfect but only a particular efficient outcome is stochastically stable ii if bargaining proceeds according to the ultimatum game with the trading partner as proposer only the minimal investment level is subgame perfect but any investment level is stochastically stable journal of economic literature classification numbers l14 c78

tenure experience human capital and wages a tractable equilibrium search model of wage dynamics we develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers allowing for human capital accumulation employer heterogeneity and individual level shocks wage growth is decomposed into contributions of human capital and job search within and between jobs human capital accumulation is largest for highly educated workers the contribution from job search to wage growth both within and between job declines over the fi rst ten years of a career the job shopping phase of a working life after which workers settle into high quality jobs using outside o ffers to generate gradual wage increases thus reaping the bene fits from competition between employers

excess payoff dynamics and other well behaved evolutionary dynamics abstract we consider a model of evolution in games in which agents occasionally receive opportunities to switch strategies choosing between them using a probabilistic rule both the rate at which revision opportunities arrive and the probabilities with which each strategy is chosen are functions of current normalized payoffs we call the aggregate dynamics induced by this model excess payoff dynamics we show that every excess payoff dynamic is well behaved regardless of the underlying game each excess payoff dynamic admits unique solution trajectories that vary continuously with the initial state identifies rest points with nash equilibria and respects a basic payoff monotonicity property we show how excess payoff dynamics can be used to construct well behaved modifications of imitative dynamics and relate them to two other well behaved dynamics based on projections

how local are labor markets evidence from a spatial job search model this paper models the optimal search strategies of the unemployed across space to characterize local labor markets our methodology allows for linkages between numerous areas while preserving tractability we estimate that labor markets are quite local as the attractiveness of jobs to applicants sharply decays with distance also workers are discouraged from searching in areas with strong job competition from other jobseekers however as labor markets overlap a local stimulus or transport improvements have modest effects on local outcomes because ripple effects in job applications dilute their impact across a series of overlapping markets

wages and informality in developing countries we develop an equilibrium wage posting model with heterogeneous firms that decide to locate in the formal or the informal sector and workers who search randomly on and off the job we estimate the model on brazilian labor force survey data in equilibrium firms of equal productivity locate in different sectors a fact observed in the data wages are characterized by compensating differentials we show that tightening enforcement does not increase unemployment and increases wages total output and welfare by enabling better allocation of workers to higher productivity jobs and improving competition in the formal labor market jel e26 j24 j31 j46 o15 o17

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three person centipede game the two person centipede game is one of the most celebrated paradoxes of backward induction in complete information extensive form games an experimental investigation of a three person centipede game shows that the paradoxical results are strongly affected by the size of the stakes when the number of players in the game is increased from two to three and the game is played for unusually high stakes with group composition being randomly changed from trial to trial the paradox is considerably weakened as players approach equilibrium play with multiple iterations of the stage game when the game is played with low stakes there is no evidence for equilibrium play or learning across iterations of the stage game an adaptive learning model that assumes updating of the individual probabilities of choice outperforms alternative static and dynamic models in accounting for the major results observed in the high stake experiment

spatial wage disparities sorting matters spatial wage disparities can result from spatial differences in the skill composition of the workforce in non human endowments and in local interactions to distinguish between these explanations we estimate a model of wage determination across local labour markets using a very large panel of french workers we control for worker characteristics worker fixed effects industry fixed effects and the characteristics of the local labour market our findings suggest that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing spatial wage disparities with strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills interaction effects are mostly driven by the local density of employment not controlling for worker heterogeneity leads to very biased estimates of interaction effects endowments only appear to play a small role

the aggregate productivity effects of internal migration evidence from indonesia we estimate the aggregate productivity gains from reducing barriers to internal labor migration in indonesia accounting for worker selection and spatial differences in human capital we distinguish between movement costs which mean workers will move only if they expect higher wages and amenity differences which mean some locations must pay more to attract workers we find modest but important aggregate impacts we estimate a 22 percent increase in labor productivity from removing all barriers reducing migration costs to the us level a high mobility benchmark leads to a 7 1 percent productivity boost these figures hide substantial heterogeneity the origin population that benefits most sees a 104 percent increase in average earnings from a complete barrier removal or a 25 percent gain from moving to the us benchmark

cycles of learning in the centipede game abstract this paper studies the evolutionary properties of the centipede game for this game the use of backward induction as a model of rational behavior has been consistently challenged by the experimental evidence our claim is that backward induction can still accurately predict the players behavior provided that they are given time enough to appreciate the strategic environment in which they operate we support this claim by proving convergence to the backward induction solution for all continuous time monotonic selection dynamics however we also show that this solution is intrinsically unstable and how this instability is positively related to the length of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c79

evolutionary stability of pure strategy equilibria in finite games abstract sufficient conditions for pure strategy nash equilibria of finite games to be lyapunov stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics the regular monotonic selection dynamics are discussed in particular it is shown that in almost all finite extensive form games all the pure strategy equilibria are stable in such games all mixed strategy equilibria close to pure strategy equilibria are also stable journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72

evolutionary drift and equilibrium selection this paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved the differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated instead nash equilibria that specify different out of equilibrium behaviour appear in connected components of stationary states the stability properties of these components can depend critically on the perturbations to which the system is subjected we argue that it is then important to incorporate such drift into the model a sufficient condition is provided for drift to create stationary states with strong stability properties near a component of equilibria applications to questions of forward and backward induction are developed

green investment and coordination failure an investors perspective abstract to achieve the goal of keeping global warming well below 2 c private investors have to shift capital from brown to green infrastructures and technologies and provide additional green investment in this paper we present a game theoretic perspective on the challenge of triggering such investments the question of climate change mitigation is often related to the prisoner s dilemma a game with one nash equilibrium however the authors perceive investment for mitigation and adaptation as a coordination problem of selecting among multiple equilibria to illustrate this we model a non cooperative coordination game related to the stag hunt with a brown equilibrium with lower payoffs that can be achieved single handedly and a green equilibrium with higher payoffs that requires coordination as multiple experiments show in such games actors often fail to coordinate on a payoff dominant equilibrium due to uncertainty thus we discuss how uncertainty could be reduced along two options one that concerns a change in the payoff structure of the game and another that concerns subjective probabilities

mobility and the return to education testing a roy model with multiple markets self selected migration presents one potential explanation for why observed returns to a college education in local labor markets vary widely even though u s workers are highly mobile to assess the impact of self selection on estimated returns this paper first develops a roy model of mobility and earnings where workers choose in which of the 50 states plus the district of columbia to live and work available estimation methods are either infeasible for a selection model with so many alternatives or place potentially severe restrictions on earnings and the selection process this paper develops an alternative econometric methodology that combines lee s 1983 parametric maximum order statistic approach to reduce the dimensionality of the error terms with more recent work on semiparametric estimation of selection models e g ahn and powell 1993 the resulting semiparametric correction is easy to implement and can be adapted to a variety of other polychotomous choice problems the empirical work which uses 1990 u s census data confirms the role of comparative advantage in mobility decisions the results suggest that self selection of higher educated individuals to states with higher returns to education generally leads to upward biases in ols estimates of the returns to education in state specific labor markets while the estimated returns to a college education are significantly biased correcting for the bias does not narrow the range of returns across states consistent with the finding that the corrected return to a college education differs across the u s the relative state to state migration flows of college versus high school educated individuals respond strongly to differences in the return to education and amenities across states

understanding the city size wage gap in 2000 wages of full time full year workers were more than 30 percent higher in metropolitan areas of over 1 5 million people than rural areas the monotonic relationship between wages and city size is robust to controls for age schooling and labor market experience in this paper we decompose the city size wage gap into various components we propose an on the job search model that incorporates latent ability search frictions firm worker match quality human capital accumulation and endogenous migration between large medium and small cities counterfactual simulations of the model indicate that variation in returns to experience and differences in wage intercepts across location type are the most important mechanisms contributing to the overall city size wage premium steeper returns to experience in larger cities is more important for college graduates while differences in wage intercepts is more important for high school graduates sorting on unobserved ability within education group and differences in labor market search frictions and distributions of firm worker match quality contribute little or slightly negatively to observed city size wage premia in both samples

evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies abstract this paper provides sufficient conditions under which regular payoff monotonic evolutionary dynamics a class of imitative dynamics that includes the replicator dynamic select against strategies that do not survive a sequence of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies we apply these conditions to bertrand duopolies and first price auctions our conditions also imply evolutionary selection against iteratively strictly dominated strategies

privatization in theory and practice privatization george yarrow this paper examines the theoretical and empirical case for private versus public ownership privatization usually leads managers to place greater emphasis on the pursuit of profits however whether this is beneficial to society depends on the trade off between possible market failures due to a lack of competition and deficiencies in government control of public firms the competitive and regulatory environment is more important than the question of ownership per se in competitive markets there is a presumption in favour of private ownership where there is a natural monopoly vigorous regulatory action is required the evidence suggests that privatization has led to improved performance by firms such as the national freight corporation and cable and wireless which operate in a relatively competitive environment the benefits are less clear in the case of firms like bp britoil and british aerospace however the most worrying case is that of british telecom and the projected privatization of british gas where little thought has been given to limiting the abuse of monopoly power rather the regulatory environment has been tailored to the needs of the existing management and to ensuring a successful share flotation privatization is also advanced as a weapon for reducing trade union power encouraging wider share ownership redistributing wealth and improving the public finances however there are other policy instruments better suited to achieving these objectives the existing privatization programme has not led to a marked widening of share ownership and has resulted in windfall gains to a small group of investors at the expense of taxpayers in general

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

self confirming equilibrium rium path of play thus if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs even though beliefs about play at off path information sets need not be correct we characterize the ways in which self confirming equilibria and nash equilibria can differ and provide conditions under which self con firming equilibria correspond to standard solution concepts nash equilibrium and its refinements describe a situation in which i each player s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents and ii each player s beliefs about the opponents play are exactly correct we propose a new equilibrium concept self confirming equilibrium that weakens condition ii by requiring only that players beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play thus each player may have incorrect beliefs about how his opponents would play in contingencies that do not arise when play follows the equilibrium and moreover the beliefs of different players may be wrong in different ways the concept of self confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that noncooperative equilibria should be interpreted as the outcome of a learning process in which players revise their beliefs using their observations of previous play suppose that each time the game is played the players observe the actions chosen by their opponents but that players do not observe the actions their opponents would have played at the information sets that were not reached along the path of play then if a self confirming equilibrium occurs repeatedly no player ever observes play that contradicts his beliefs so the equilibrium is self confirming in the weak sense of not being inconsistent with the evidence by analogy with the literature on the bandit problem e g rothschild 1974 one might expect that a non nash self confirming equilibrium can be the outcome of plausible learning processes this point was made by fudenberg and

the fiscal impact of privatization with some examples from arab countries abstract this paper reviews current thinking on the fiscal impact of privatization against the background of developments and prospects for privatization in arab countries it argues that the fiscal impact is likely to be slight in the absence of fundamental structural reforms by arab countries to secure gains in allocative efficiency by the privatized enterprises by itself privatization may simply lead to a change in the government s asset portfolio in the case of loss making enterprises the government may need to pay the private entrepreneur to take on the enterprise particularly when the sources of inefficiency reflect government policy decisions that are not likely to be modified alternatively liquidation of the assets of unprofitable enterprises may be the appropriate policy

evolutionary stability in the finitely repeated prisoner s dilemma game the dynamic evolutionary stability of mutual defection is proven for the repeated prisoner s dilemma game where payoffs are cumulative and the number of repetitions is known this agrees with the classical result that the only nash equilibrium outcome is to defect at all stages of this repeated game moreover it is shown that for any initial polymorphic population the evolutionary dynamic converges to a unique nash equilibrium strategy that depends on the original polymorphism both these results confirm earlier conjectures concerning the application of evolutionary game theory to the repeated prisoner s dilemma journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c70 c72

learning to be fair abstract we study the process of equilibrium selection in games when players have social preferences of the type discussed among others by rabin 1993 and segal and sobel 2007 to this end we employ a standard noisy version of the best response dynamics we obtain several results concerning some popular games such as the prisoner s dilemma and the battle of the sexes we show that reciprocity may have a negative effect on the equilibrium selection process when players are sufficiently concerned with reciprocity the stochastically stable equilibrium in the battle of the sexes is inefficient at the same time the cooperative equilibrium in the prisoner s dilemma is never stochastically stable

evolution and game theory introduced by john von neumann and oskar morgenstern 1944 energized by the addition of john nash s 1950 equilibrium concept and popularized by the strategic revolution of the 1980s noncooperative game theory has become a standard tool in economics in the process attention has increasingly been focused on game theory s conceptual foundations two questions have taken center stage should we expect nash equilibrium play that is should we expect the choice of each player to be a best response to the choices of the other players if so which of the multiple nash equilibria that arise in many games should we expect in the 1980s game theorists addressed these questions with models based on the assumptions that players are perfectly rational and have common knowledge of this rationality in the 1990s however emphasis has shifted away from rationalitybased to evolutionary models one reason for this shift was frustration with the limitations of rationality based models these models readily motivated one of the requirements of nash equilibrium that players choose best responses to their beliefs about others behavior but less readily provided the second requirement that these beliefs be correct simultaneously rationality based criteria for choosing among nash equilibria produced alternative equilibrium refinements strengthenings of the nash equilibrium concept designed to exclude implausible nash equilibria with sufficient abandon as to prompt despair at the thought of ever choosing one as the right concept a second reason for the shift away from rationality based game theory was a change in the underlying view of what games represent it was once typical to interpret a game as a literal description of an idealized interaction in which an assumption of perfect rationality appeared quite

cheap talk coordination and evolutionary stability abstract asymmetric information games where the informed player can send a costless message sender receiver games typically have equilibria where meaningful communication occurs we therefore know such cheap talk can matter still even when there is no conflict of interest there are also equilibria where no information transmission occurs this paper shows that for a class of games with perfectly coinciding interests modeled as asymmetric contests where players are unsure of which role they will have only meaningful communication is evolutionarily stable journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d82

common belief and the theory of games with perfect information abstract the statement it is common belief that player i is bayesian rational where bayesian rational means an expected utility maximizer is defined for two person games with perfect information it is shown that in most such games it is not possible for a theory so postulate the bayesian rationality of all players and to be common belief this bears directly upon the salience of standard solution concepts such as subgame perfect and sequential equilibria as well as upon the extensive form rationalizability theories of d bernheim econometrica 52 1984 1009 1028 and d pearce econometrica 52 1984 1029 1050 which rely heavily on the common belief of bayesian rationality journal of economic literature classification number c72

the empirical content of the job search model labor mobility and wage distributions in europe and the us abstract job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other this paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a three year panel of individual worker data covering 10 european countries and the u s we find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well this also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions our results suggest that cross sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the magnitude of labor market frictions as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model finally we use our results in a cross country comparison of the intensity and nature of job to job turnover we arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity we further show that the nature of job to job turnover is very different between those two groups turnover is predominantly voluntary in low turnover countries whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high turnover countries

equilibrium search and tax credit reform an empirical equilibrium job search model with wage posting is developed to analyze the labor market impact of uk tax reforms the model allows for a rich characterization of the labor market with hours responses accurate representations of the tax and transfer system and both worker and firm heterogeneity the model is estimated with pre reform longitudinal survey data using a semi parametric estimation technique and the impact of actual tax reform policies is simulated the model predicts that the british working families tax credit and contemporaneous reforms increased employment with equilibrium effects found to play a relatively minor role

signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice we consider extensions of games where some players have the option of signaling future actions by incurring costs the main result is that in a class of games if one player can incur costs then forwards induction selects her most preferred outcome surprisingly the player does not have to incur any costs to achieve this the option alone suffices however when all players can incur costs one player s attempt to signal a future action is vulnerable to a counter signal by the opponent this vulnerability to counter signaling distinguishes signaling future actions from signaling types

labour market structure and inequality a comparison of italy and the u s markets with rigid labour regulations and centralized wage setting are often thought to be inefficient but egalitarian using a model of off and on the job search and event history individual level data for italy and the u s we show that while the cross sectional wage distributions of young italian males are much more compressed than are the comparable distributions for young white u s males the estimated search model implies that the distribution of lifetime welfare is no more disperse in the u s than it is in italy our model implies that the high frequency of movements between labour market states leads to both a relatively equitable distribution of long run welfare in the u s and a high level of cross sectional inequality

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

rationality nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect information games we say that a player is certain of an event a if she assigns probability 1 to a there is common certainty cc of a if the event a occurred each player is certain of a each player is certain that every other player is certain of a and so forth it is shown that in a generic perfect information game the set of outcomes that are consistent with common certainty of rationality ccr at the beginning of the game coincides with the set of outcomes that survive one deletion of weakly dominated strategies and then iterative deletion of strongly dominated strategies thus the backward induction outcome is not the only outcome that is consistent with ccr in particular cooperation in rosenthal s 1981 centipede game and fighting in selten s 1978 chainstore game are consistent with ccr at the beginning of the game next it is shown that if in addition to ccr there is cc that each player assigns a positive probability to the true strategies and beliefs of the other players and if there is cc of the support of the beliefs of each player then the outcome of the game is a nash equilibrium outcome