career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

state lottery adoptions as policy innovations an event history analysis two types of explanations of state government innovation have been proposed internal determinants models which posit that the factors causing a state government to innovate are political economic and social characteristics of a state and regional diffusion models which point toward the role of policy adoptions by neighboring states in prompting a state to adopt we show that the two are conceptually compatible relying on mohr s theory of organizational innovation then we develop and test a unified explanation of state lottery adoptions reflecting both internal and regional influences the empirical results provide a great degree of support for mohr s theory for the empirical analysis we rely on event history analysis a form of pooled cross sectional time series analysis which we believe may be useful in a wide variety of subfields of political science event history analysis may be able to explain important forms of political behavior by individuals organizations or governments even if they occur only rarely

kick starting diffusion explaining the varying frequency of preferential trade agreements environmental provisions by their initial conditions most recent preferential trade agreements ptas include environmental provisions while a number of these environmental provisions remain rare and are incorporated in just a few ptas others are widely popular and are duplicated in more than 100 ptas we still lack a convincing explanation for this varying frequency while the diffusion literature typically tries to explain how diffusion occurs we investigate why certain provisions diffuse more often than others we hypothesise that the initial conditions under which provisions first emerge determine the scope of their diffusion our results support this hypothesis and indicate that provisions originating from intercontinental agreements diffuse more often than others at the same time provisions first designed by economically powerful or environmentally credible countries are not related to more frequent occurrences of diffusion these findings are of interest for the literatures on international institutions design interaction and diffusion

political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies in this article we evaluate two claims made in recent studies of the welfare states of advanced industrial societies first that welfare states have remained quite resilient in the face of demands for retrenchment and second that partisan politics have ceased to play a decisive role in their evolution addressing the first claim we present analysis from a new data set on unemployment insurance and sickness benefit replacement rates for 18 countries for the years 1975 99 we find considerably more evidence of welfare retrenchment during the last two decades than do recent cross national studies second we examine the end of partisanship claim by estimating the effects of government partisanship on changes in income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment programs our results suggest that contrary to claims that partisanship has little impact on welfare state commitments traditional partisanship continues to have a considerable effect on welfare state entitlements in the era of retrenchment

hierarchical rank and women s organizational mobility glass ceilings in corporate law firms this article revives the debate over whether women s upward mobility prospects decline as they climb organizational hierarchies although this proposition is a core element of the glass ceiling metaphor it has failed to gain strong support in previous research the article establishes a firm theoretical foundation for expecting an increasing female disadvantage with an eye toward defining the scope conditions and extending the model to upper level external hires the approach is illustrated in an empirical setting that meets the proposed scope conditions corporate law firms in the united states results confirm that in this setting the female mobility disadvantage is greater at higher organizational levels in the case of internal promotions but not in the case of external hires

theories of policy diffusion lessons from latin american pension reform what accounts for the waves of policy diffusion that increasingly sweep across regions of the world why do many diverse countries adopt similar changes focusing on the spread of chilean style pension privatization in latin america this article assesses the relative merit of four theoretical explanations that scholars of diffusion have proposed as the principal mechanism driving innovations spread these approaches emphasize external pressures emanating especially from international financial institutions the quest for symbolic or normative legitimacy rational learning and cost benefit calculation and cognitive heuristics respectively the article assesses which one of these frameworks can best account for the three distinctive features of diffusion namely its wavelike temporal pattern its geographical clustering and the spread of similarity amid diversity while several approaches contribute to understanding policy diffusion the analysis suggests that the cognitive psychological framework offers a particularly persuasive account of the spread of pension reform

tax policy in an era of internationalization explaining the spread of neoliberalism i offer an explanation for the widespread diffusion of neoliberal tax policies in the developed democracies after accounting for the policy influences of commonly experienced domestic and international forces i consider several plausible paths of diffusion of neoliberal tax structure my central argument is that the highly visible 1980s market conforming tax reform in the united states should be especially important in shaping subsequent tax policies in other polities there are substantial reasons to believe however that domestic political and institutional forces will shape policymaker assessment of the benefits and costs of neoliberal reforms the strength of right parties and the degree to which the median voter has moved right should condition adoption of neoliberal tax policy the institutions of national and sector coordinated capitalism should also slow the enactment of neoliberal tax reforms i assess these arguments with empirical models of 1981 98 tax rates on capital in sixteen nations i find that changes in u s tax policy influence subsequent reforms in other polities in the long term all nations move toward the u s neoliberal tax structure analysis also shows however that the short term responsiveness to u s tax reforms is notably greater where uncoordinated market institutions are dominant theory and extensive qualitative and quantitative evidence indicate that pressures to compete for mobile assets as balanced against the economic and political costs of adoption anchor the process of diffusion of neoliberal tax policy there is little evidence for the view that systematic policy learning or social emulation drove tax policy diffusion earlier versions of this article were presented at the center for european studies and weatherhead center for international affairs harvard university center for international studies ucla and yale university as well as the 2002 annual meetings of the american political science association an earlier version was published as minda de gunzburg center for european studies harvard university working paper 120 i thank alex hicks rob franzese torben iversen andy martin cathie jo martin participants in the yale ucla and harvard conferences especially geoffrey garrett helen milner dennis quinn and beth simmons and two anonymous referees and the editors of international organization for helpful comments i also gratefully acknowledge the contribution of sven steinmo that comes by way of our past collaborative work on tax policy

who learns from what in policy diffusion processes the idea that policy makers in different states or countries may learn from one another has fascinated scholars for a long time but little systematic evidence has been produced so far this article improves our understanding of this elusive argument by distinguishing between the policy and political consequences of reforms and by emphasizing the conditional nature of learning processes using a directed dyadic approach and multilevel methods the analysis of unemployment benefits retrenchment in oecd countries demonstrates that policy makers learn selectively from the experience of others right governments tend to be more sensitive to information on the electoral consequences of reforms while left governments are more likely to be influenced by their policy effects

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

remodeling the competition for capital how domestic politics erases the race to the bottom this paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital using the analogy of a tournament as a substitute for the race to the bottom model our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms while countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility we examine the capital tax policies in oecd countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform we define two potential sources of political costs of reform transaction costs due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process and constituency costs due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms hat are the policy consequences of the elimination of various barriers to international capital and labor mobility robert frost in mending wall instructed that good fences make good neighbors scholars have increasingly expressed this sentiment s converse i e the pessimistic viewpoint that as the mobility of factors of production increases international competition assumes a beggar thy neighbor character when fences separate countries and make it difficult for factors of production to move from country to country governments can operate essentially as monopolistic suppliers of services governments can extract a price from the owners of productive resources in the form of taxes or can place regulatory restrictions on production without fear that factors of production will emigrate when the fences fall and governments must compete with each other for the same resources a state s or country s ability to tax or regulate diminishes in the extreme countries lose sovereignty over domestic policymaking e g andrews 1994 and lee and mckenzie 1989 the model that most scholars employ implicitly or explicitly to understand international or interstate competition is known commonly by its central prediction the race to the bottom e g oates 1972

drivers of institutional change around the world the case of ifrs today more than ever it is crucial to understand the dynamic and intricate institutional landscape that mnes operate in however the drivers of institutional change are still little understood we focus on a recent fundamental institutional change the worldwide switch to international financial reporting standards ifrs the switch to ifrs was unexpected and not particularly welcomed by mnes given that most national accounting systems in the pre ifrs period were considered to be well aligned to the local cultural and environmental characteristics of each country we test the drivers of this institutional change in a sample of 168 countries between 2002 and 2012 using empirical constructs from policy diffusion theory our findings show that the country level decisions to adopt ifrs are not driven by local determinants but instead by adoption decisions by other neighbouring countries and influential organizations we find evidence for competition learning and emulation as driving forces for the international spread of ifrs we conclude that the switch to ifrs was not driven by an economic rationale only and diffused beyond the influence and interest of mnes understanding these drivers is essential because it enables management to anticipate and respond to institutional changes and consequently enhance performance and create competitive advantage

the political determinants of international trade the major powers 1907 1990 we test three arguments about the effect of international politics on trade flows the first argument states that trade flows are greater between states with similar interests than those with dissimilar interests the second that trade flows are greater in democratic dyads than nondemocratic dyads and the third that trade flows are greater between allies we examine trade flows between the major powers from 1907 to 1990 this period provides variation on all three independent variables of interest and allows us to separate the three arguments empirically we estimate a gravity model of trade with the above political variables added our results demonstrate that joint democracy and common interests increase trade in a dyad but alliances generally do not even when controlling for polarity of the system

diffusion across international organizations connectivity and convergence while extensive research shows that policies and institutions spread across states through processes of diffusion we know little about diffusion among international organizations ios this artic

spatial effects in dyadic data political units often spatially depend in their policy choices on other units this also holds in dyadic settings where as in much of international relations research analysis focuses on the interaction or relation between a pair or dyad of two political units yet with few exceptions social scientists have analyzed contagion in monadic datasets only consisting of individual political units this article catego rizes all possible forms of spatial effect modeling in both undirected and directed dyadic data where it is possible to distinguish the source and the target of interaction for example exporter0importer aggressor0victim and so on this approach enables scholars to formulate and test novel mechanisms of contagion thus ideally paving the way for studies analyzing spatial dependence between dyads of political units to illus trate the modeling flexibility gained from an understanding of the full set of specifi cation options for spatial effects in dyadic data we examine the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing countries building and extend ing on elkins guzman and simmons s 2006 study however we come to different conclusions about the channels through which bilateral investment treaties diffuse rather than a capital importing country being influenced by the total number of bits signed by other capital importers as modeled in their original article we find that a capital importing country is more likely to sign a bit with a capital exporter only if other competing capital importers have signed bits with this very same capital exporter similarly other capital exporters bits with a specific capital importer influ ence an exporter s incentive to agree on a bit with the very same capital importer

a formal model of learning and policy diffusion we present a model of learning and policy choice across governments governments choose policies with known ideological positions but initially unknown valence benefits possibly learning about those benefits between the model s two periods there are two variants of the model in one governments only learn from their own experiences while in the other they learn from one another s experiments based on similarities between these two versions we illustrate that much accepted scholarly evidence of policy di usion could simply have arisen through independent actions by governments that only learn from their own experiences however di erences between the gametheoretic and decision theoretic models point the way to future empirical tests that discern learning based policy di usion from independent policy adoptions

learning from others the diffusion of hospital financing reforms in oecd countries the increase in health care expenditures is a major problem of all welfare states to counter this trend since the early 1980s most oecd countries have changed the way hospitals are financed although these reforms are certainly linked to country specific factors the authors main argument is that they are in part due to a diffusion process policy change in one country is influenced by previous changes in other countries more specifically the authors argue that policy makers learn from the experience of others using an original data set and event history methods to test arguments their results show that policy change is more likely when the existing policy is ineffective and when the experience of other countries suggests that the reform leads to the desired results in addition the authors find that the effects of learning grow over time and that early adopters tend to be countries with few veto players

experimentation in federal systems will decentralization lead to a laboratory in policy experimentation or is centralization necessary to prevent free riding in the innovation process we present a model where experiments have two dimensions all prefer quality but preferences

public information and performance the role of spatial dependence in the worldwide governance indicators among african countries summary the worldwide governance indicators wgi provide transparent and comparable country statistics for different dimensions of governance linked to under development yet does the public availability of governance data actually enhance performance if investors donor agencies and citizens are made aware of relative governance performance competition for inward investment such as fdi and oda and domestic legitimacy become plausible mechanisms for diffusion of good governance we test whether such mechanisms operate using the wgi for africa and find evidence for spatial diffusion of democracy rule of law and corruption control there is no evidence for diffusion of regulatory quality and government effectiveness

diffusion or confusion clustered shocks and the conditional diffusion of democracy scholars observing clustering in transitions to democracy argue that democratization diffuses across borders as citizens in autocracies demand the same reforms they witness in neighboring states we disagree this article demonstrates that diffusion plays only a highly conditional role in democratization we advance and test an alternative two step theory of clustered democratization 1 economic and international political shocks which are clustered spatially and temporally induce the breakdown of authoritarian regimes then 2 democratic diffusion in turn influences whether a fallen dictatorship will be replaced by a democracy or a new autocracy diffusion despite playing an important role is insufficient to explain the clustering of transitions using data on 125 autocracies from 1875 to 2004 we show that economic crises trigger authoritarian breakdowns while diffusion influences whether the new regime is democratic or authoritarian

the globalization of liberalization policy diffusion in the international political economy one of the most important developments over the past three decades has been the spread of liberal economic ideas and policies throughout the world these policies have affected the lives of millions of people yet our most sophisticated political economy models do not adequately capture influences on these policy choices evidence suggests that the adoption of liberal economic practices is highly clustered both temporally and spatially we hypothesize that this clustering might be due to processes of policy diffusion we think of diffusion as resulting from one of two broad sets of forces one in which mounting adoptions of a policy alter the benefits of adopting for others and another in which adoptions provide policy relevant information about the benefits of adopting we develop arguments within these broad classes of mechanisms construct appropriate measures of the relevant concepts and test their effects on liberalization and restriction of the current account the capital account and the exchange rate regime our findings suggest that domestic models of foreign economic policy making are insufficient the evidence shows that policy transitions are influenced by international economic competition as well as the policies of a country s sociocultural peers we interpret the latter influence as a form of channeled learning reflecting governments search for appropriate models for economic policy

competing for capital the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties 1960 2000 over the past forty five years bilateral investment treaties bits have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment the proliferation of bits during the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal these intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute how can we explain the widespread adoption of bits we argue that the spread of bits is driven by international competition among potential host countries typically developing countries for foreign direct investment we propose a set of hypotheses that derive from such an explanation and develop a set of empirical tests that rely on network measures of economic competition as well as more indirect evidence of competitive pressures on the host to sign bits the evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign bits when their competitors have done so we find some evidence that coercion and learning play a role but less support for cultural explanations based on emulation our main finding is that the diffusion of bits is associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign investment we are agnostic at this point about the benefits of this competition for development for useful comments on earlier drafts of this article we thank bill bernhard bear braumoeller frank dobbin robert franzese jeffry frieden geoffrey garrett tom ginsburg jude hays lisa martin bob pahre mark ramsayer steven ratner susan rose ackerman and john sides for research assistance we thank elizabeth burden raechel groom and alexander noonan

party policy diffusion do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems this research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating foreign successful incumbent parties spatial econometric analyses of parties election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed by showing that parties respond to these foreign incumbent parties this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition furthermore we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion as we suggest that political parties are important vehicles through which public policies diffuse

the mechanisms of policy diffusion local policy adoptions provide an excellent opportunity to test among potential mechanisms of policy diffusion by examining three types of antismoking policy choices by the 675 largest u s cities between 1975 and 2000 we uncover robust patterns of policy diffusion yielding three key findings first we distinguish among and find evidence for four mechanisms of policy diffusion learning from earlier adopters economic competition among proximate cities imitation of larger cities and coercion by state governments second we find a temporal component to these effects with imitation being a more short lived diffusion process than the others third we show that these mechanisms are conditional with larger cities being better able to learn from others less fearful of economic spillovers and less likely to rely on imitation

promotion signaling gender and turnover new theory and evidence we extend promotion signaling theory to incorporate gender and across firm mobility within and across job levels evidence from worker firm linked finnish panel data supports our theory for some groups controlling for worker performance inferred from performance related pay within firm promotion probabilities are increasing and wage increases from promotion are decreasing in educational attainment for some educational groups with results stronger for first than for subsequent promotions women have lower promotion probabilities than men and a greater sensitivity of promotion probability to educational attainment across firm promotions are rare but bring wage increases exceeding those for internal promotions and across firm lateral moves

interdependence in comparative politics substance theory empirics substance interdependence is ubiquitous and often central across comparative politics indeed as the authors show first theoretically any situation involving externalities from one unit s actions on others implies interdependence positive or negative externalities induce negative or positive interdependence which spurs competitive races or free riding with corresponding early or late mover advantages and thus strategic rush to act or delay and inaction the authors show next how to model interdependent processes empirically how not doing so risks omitted variable biases favoring domestic and exogenous external accounts over interdependence but how doing so naively risks simultaneity biases with the opposite substantive implications they then discuss how to estimate properly specified interdependence models and finally how to interpret and present estimated spatio temporally dynamic effects response paths and long run steady states with associated standard errors they illustrate by replicating a not

clear and clean the fixed effects of the liberal peace in their article in this issue donald p green soo yeon kim and david h yoon claim contrary to liberal theory and extensive evidence that neither joint democracy nor economic interdependence significantly reduces the frequency of militarized interstate disputes in pooled time series analyses when dyadic fixed effects are taken into account similarly their fixed effects analyses contradict theory and previous evidence that democracies have higher levels of trade with one another than do other types of states our reexamination however refutes both claims and reinforces previous findings their fixed effects analyses of disputes produces distorted results because they consider a relatively short time period 1951 92 in which variation in the binary dependent variable and the key independent variables democracy and trade is limited when we analyze a longer period 1886 1992 the results confirm liberal theory the differences between our analyses of bilateral trade and those of green kim and yoon primarily arise from a seemingly minor methodological decision a more reasonable method confirms that democracies do have higher levels of trade than expected on purely economic grounds though we do not advocate a fixed effects model for analyzing these data and have serious reservations about its general usefulness our findings provide additional confirmation of liberal theories of international relations

energy transition under irreversibility a two sector approach in this paper we analyze the optimal energy transition of a two sector economy energy and final goods with exhaustible oil reserves a renewable source of energy and a pollution threat the latter corresponds to a pollution threshold above which a part of the capital is lost following flooding for instance we show that the optimal energy transition path may correspond to a corner regime in which the economy starts using both resources then crosses the pollution threshold and therefore loses a part of its capital at the end the sole adoption of the renewable energy is optimal only in the long run this result is in line with the asymptotic energy transition arguments stating that the transition to clean energy may happen only in the long run we also show that economy reduces the use of energy resource as long as the productivity of capital and energy services is high therefore public policies should promote investments in energy innovation that targets productive sector home appliances and buildings and helps to save both money and energy we extend the present model to allow for additional investment in energy saving technologies our main results show that this additional investment favours the energy transition in the sense that it increases the time within which the economy may experience the catastrophe and the welfare of the society for policy implications economic instruments such as taxes on dirty energy subsidies on clean energy or incentives for energy saving technologies need to be implemented in order to promote the energy transition this is particularly important for developing countries that mostly rely on polluting energy resources and are the most vulnerable to climate change but those economic instruments should be carefully designed in line with the asymptotic energy transition result

employment wage and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers this article offers an explanation of the postinjury employment wage and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers in particular it argues that the observed tendency of time ofaccident employers to rehire at the preinjury wage accommodate and then perhaps quickly terminate the impaired worker is a manifestation of the worker s preferred contract that contract is characterized by wage inflexibility by removing the opportunity for the postinjury employer to underreport productivity this contract creates an incentive for the worker to attempt to functionally adapt to the impairment thereby increasing expected lifetime utility

improving forecasts of state failure this article offers the first independent scholarly evaluation of the claims forecasts and causal inferences of the state failure task force and its efforts to forecast when states will fail state failure refers to the collapse of the authority of the central government to impose order as in civil wars revolutionary wars genocides politicides and adverse or disruptive regime transitions states that sponsor terrorism or allow it to be organized within their borders are all failed states this task force set up at the behest of vice president gore in 1994 has been led by a group of distinguished academics working as consultants to the u s cia state failure task force reports and publications have received attention in the media in academia and from public decision makers the article identifies several methodological errors in the task force work that cause its reported forecast probabilities of conflict to be too large its causal inferences to be biased in unpredictable directions and its claims of forecasting performance to be exaggerated however the article also finds that the task force has amassed the best and most carefully collected data on state failure to date and the required corrections provided in this article although very large in effect are easy to implement the article also demonstrates how to improve forecasting performance to levels significantly greater than even corrected versions of its models although the matter is still a highly uncertain endeavor the authors are nevertheless able to offer the first accurate forecasts of state failure along with procedures and results that may be of practical use in informing foreign policy decision making the article also describes a number of strong empirical regularities that may help in ascertaining the causes of state failure

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

voting in open economies the electoral consequences of globalization what are the electoral consequences of global market integration although recent discussions of politics and markets have much to say on globalization s implications for policy outcomes the impact of market integration on representative democracy has received scant attention this article addresses this omission we extend the globalization literature to develop two competing hypotheses regarding the influence of open economies on electoral accountability predictions are tested using a new data set covering elections from 75 countries over 27 years results support a government constraint hypothesis exposure to the world economy weakens connections between economic performance and support for political incumbents by redirecting concerns from the policy implications of globalization and toward its electoral consequences findings highlight the influence of voter perceptions and of vote seeking politicians in the politics of globalization

the international diffusion of public sector downsizing network emulation and theory driven learning we examine change in the size of the public sector between 1980 and 1997 across twenty six organization for economic cooperation and development oecd member nations with particular attention to diffusion dynamics general method of moments gmm analyses demonstrate imitation of shifts in government employment within the united states and mutual influence among nations that are geographically proximate and that trade extensively disaggregated analyses show that downsizing is contagious while upsizing is not proximate downsizers but not upsizers are imitated and states act on evidence that downsizing is economically beneficial while ignoring evidence that it is harmful we argue that these asymme tries in emulation and learning are a product of the dominance of neoliberal and managerialist discourses that legitimate and theorize shrinking the public sector the twentieth century as a whole and particularly the three decades after world war ii witnessed steady growth in government size and responsibility states devel oped extensive social safety nets actively managed aggregate demand and regu lated a widening swath of economic and social life this trajectory of expansion was linked to powerful forces of economic development and demographic change and anchored in a broad political consensus 1 the 1980s and 1990s saw a sea change in the rate of public sector growth brit ish prime minister margaret thatcher and u s president ronald reagan led the way with privatization outsourcing and load shedding of public responsibilities but the shift in direction was not limited to radicals on the right country reports