political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

expectations about voter choices a comment the only essential differences in the examples analyzed above are in the assumptions that are used to derive or directly specify the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function when the central behavioral assumption from the traditional models was used the equilibrium was a median outcome a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the corresponding unidimensional traditional voting models when the central behavioral assumptions from the probabilistic voting model developed in coughlin and nitzan 1981 were used the equilibrium was at the maximum of the expected log utility function a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the model in coughlin and nitzan 1981 indeed it was only when the corresponding assumptions from ledyard 1984 were used i e the particular assumptions that ledyard used to derive the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function that the conclusions were substantially different from the conclusions derived from earlier models this reflects the important role these assumptions play in making ledyard s conclusions about candidate strategies substantially different from earlier results in the literature on spatial models of elections

strategic extremism why republicans and democrats divide on religious values party platforms differ sharply from one another especially on issues with religious content such as abortion or gay marriage given the high return to attracting the median voter why do vote maximizing politicians take extreme positions in this paper we find that strategic extremism depends on an intensive margin where politicians want to induce their core constituents to vote or make donations and the ability to target political messages toward those core constituents our model predicts that the political relevance of religious issues is highest when around one half of the voting population attends church regularly using data from across the world and within the united states we indeed find a nonmonotonic relationship between religious extremism and religious attendance

combining risk assessment and economics in managing a sanitary phytosanitary risk the agreement on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary sps measures provides guidelines for countries to protect domestic production from pests and diseases the guidelines permit consideration of consumer welfare we find an optimal set of sps measures considering total welfare and mitigation strategies our model suggests that it is optimal and less restrictive to apply mitigation strategies first and then an additional smaller tariff if necessary relative cost of mitigation determines the amount of the mitigation strategies applied in the importing and exporting countries

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

determinants of world demand for u s corn seeds the role of trade costs the united states is a large net exporter of corn seeds seed trade including corn has been expanding but its determinants are not well understood this paper econometrically investigates the determinants of world demand for u s corn seeds with a detailed analysis of trade costs impeding exports flows to various markets trade costs include costs associated with distance tariffs and sanitary phytosanitary sps regulations imposed by foreign countries on u s corn seed exports sps policy information comes from the excerpt data base of usda aphis the analysis relies on a gravity like model based on an explicit specification of derived demand for seed by foreign corn producers a sps count variable is incorporated as a shifter in the unit cost of seeds faced by foreign users we use data from 48 countries and for the years 1989 to 2004 we find that all trade costs matter and have had a negative impact on u s corn seed exports tariffs matter most followed by sps measures and distance an extensive econometric investigation reveals that qualitative results are robust to specification changes but that sample selection bias is present in log linear specifications based on seed export levels and approximating zero trade data with a small positive number

political parties and political shirking using ada roll call voting scores for the 1947 2006 period i find that senators shirk in their last term the degree of shirking is limited by political parties which constrain the politician in his last term and varies by post senate career choices the results highlight the importance of political parties in the repeated game that is electoral politics

dynamic sanitary and phytosanitary trade policy this paper characterizes the optimal use of sanitary and phytosanitary standards to prevent the introduction of harmful pests and diseases through international trade because established pest and disease infestations grow and spread over time their introduction has intertemporal consequences in a dynamic economic model an efficient trade policy balances the costs of sps measures against the discounted stream of the costs of control and social damages that are avoided by using sps measures where future growth of any established infestation is accounted for we examine when phytosanitary trade policy makes good economic sense when it is efficient to provide full protection against pests and diseases and when restrictive but not fully protective trade policy is efficient

testing limits to policy reversal evidence from indian privatizations abstract we examine the effect of regime change on privatization in the 2004 indian election the pro reform bjp was unexpectedly defeated by a less reformist coalition stock prices of government controlled companies that had been slated for privatization by the bjp dropped 3 5 relative to private firms government controlled companies that were under study for possible privatization fell 7 5 relative to private firms this is consistent with investor belief of a point of no return where advanced reforms are more difficult to reverse further analysis suggests that layoffs combined with the privatization announcement served as a credible commitment to privatize

how important are tariffs and nontariff barriers in international markets for fresh fruit international markets for agricultural products are often subject to a range of trade barriers and horticultural products are no exception this article examines the economic implications of tariffs and sanitary and phytosanitary sps regulations that are applied to global markets for fresh apples and fresh oranges we calculate regional level tariff rates and ad valorem equivalents for sps barriers following the price wedge approach a simulation model is developed and used to assess the price quantity and welfare implications of reducing tariffs removing sps barriers and removing sps barriers that have been identified as a specific trade concern stc by the world trade organization results suggest that a 36 reduction in global tariffs would lead to greater welfare gains than would the elimination of sps measures in apple markets however in orange markets we find that sps measures have much larger economic implications for producers and consumers here a 36 reduction in tariffs would lead to smaller overall welfare effects compared to removal of all sps measures and only slightly larger effects than those from removal of stcs alone

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the impact of regulations on agricultural trade evidence from the sps and tbt agreements according to world trade organization rules countries may adopt regulations under the agreements on sanitary and phyto sanitary sps and technical barriers to trade tbt we analyze the structure of these measures in agricultural trade the inventory approach suggests that european countries have among the lowest coverage ratios of all oecd countries using a gravity equation we also estimate their stringency our results suggest that they significantly reduce developing countries exports to oecd countries but do not affect trade between oecd members furthermore european imports are more negatively influenced by sps and tbts than imports of other oecd countries

protectionism versus risk in screening for invasive species abstract i examine the extent to which enforcement of a biosecurity import restriction us border inspections for foreign pests and diseases is used as a protectionist trade barrier the parameters of a structural model of border inspection are estimated using a detailed dataset documenting the outcome of us agricultural border inspections i find that inspections are conducted in a manner that places an implied welfare weight on domestic producers relative to consumers ranging from 1 to 1 63 i also find evidence that the inspection agency takes terms of trade into account when inspecting agricultural imports these results suggest that border inspections are used as a protectionist non tariff barrier

measuring research benefits in an imperfect market in this paper an imperfect market model is developed for evaluating agricultural research benefits the main finding is that the increases in societal gain and the producer s share of this gain are larger with a monopoly than with a competitive market the paper argues that if the market for an agricultural input or for a commodity is not competitive then use of a competitive model for assessing research benefits could lead to understatements of both producer and total benefits

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

measuring research benefits in an imperfect market second comment this note generalizes a finding about the necessary and sufficient conditions for research to generate greater benefits in the presence of distortions and highlights a significant source of bias in conventional cost benefit calculations

dormancy as a strategic response to detrimental public policy organizations in democratic societies often encounter detrimental public policies that are later reversed through rather predictable political cycles the standard organizational responses to detrimental public policies examined in the literature include exiting the market altogether attempting to change the public policy through various political strategies or passively complying with the policy however these responses might not be suitable when a detrimental policy is likely to be reversed in this paper i consider organizational dormancy which entails a temporary reduction in an organization s level of activity as a viable alternative response i propose that some organizations might be able to undergo a period of strategic inactivity in response to the onset of a detrimental public policy and maintain this inactivity until a favorable public policy returns i also propose that such dormancy is rewarded when the favorable policy returns an investigation of a panel of private commercial banks in the indian banking industry from 1981 to 2004 lends support to this proposal

the politics of persuasion when voters are rational a democratic society is considered where the voters but not the politicians are uncertain about how the economy works the parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient it turns out that the degree of polarization of the political parties is crucial if the parties are very polarized voters will not trust the parties and the policy will not reflect how the economy actually works whereas the opposite is true if the parties are less polarized

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

the combination of gravity and welfare approaches for evaluating nontariff measures this article explores the link between gravity and welfare frameworks for measuring the impact of nontariff measures first an analytical approach suggests how to combine a gravity equation with a partial equilibrium model to determine the welfare impact of nontariff measures second an empirical application focuses on the effects of a standard that caps antibiotic residues in crustaceans in the united states the european union canada and japan while the econometric estimation of the gravity equation reports a negative impact on imports welfare evaluations show that in most cases a stricter standard leads to an increase in both domestic and international welfare

measuring research benefits in an imperfect market second reply in a recent comment on voon 1994 holloway 1999 has made the following conclusions under conditions that are almost identical to ones considered by voon 1994 and by sexton and sexton 1996 pivotal shifts in marginal costs generate strictly greater benefits under monopoly this paper reconsiders the above conclusion a simple geometric approach similar to alston et al 1988 and voon and edwards 1991 is used for the reassessment the analysis shows that a pivotal shift in the marginal costs generates greater benefits under perfect competition than it does under monopoly this is opposite to holloway s finding the model is depicted in fig 1 instead of a parallel shift in the mc curve as in voon 1994 a pivotal shift above the origin is assumed this implies that the supply price elasticity is greater than unity e 1 see voon and edwards 1991 under monopoly

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance the norwegian political business cycle this is the author s final accepted and refereed manuscript to the article the final publication is available at www springerlink com

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

political business cycles and central bank independence this paper develops a dynamic model of rational partisan business cycles in which wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the election result empirical analysis of 20 oecd countries supports the theoretical implication that left wing incumbents increase output but increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it the model is extended to incorporate the effects of alternative measures of central bank independence cbi the measure of objective independence outperforms the other measures and it is found that cbi reduces politically induced business cycles

the politics of ambiguity politicians face a trade off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent this paper analyzes this trade off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent first we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party s ideal policy and his own ideal policy second we show that often the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision thus politicians may prefer to be ambiguous

foot and mouth disease and the mexican cattle industry the objective of this article is to analyze the domestic and international effects of a hypothetical foot and mouth disease fmd outbreak in the mexican cattle industry a discrete time dynamic optimization model of the mexican cattle sector is specified and linked to domestic and international markets economic consequences of fmd outbreaks are simulated over time and under different scenarios specific findings and general policy recommendations are provided the study reports a range of outbreaks from localized to large scale and suggests that changes in economic surplus due to fmd range from a positive net gain of 0 89 to 1 6 billion to a net loss of about 67 billion depending on the specific mitigation strategy and outbreak scenario

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

evaluating the trade restrictiveness of phytosanitary measures on u s fresh fruit and vegetable imports empirically assessing sanitary and phytosanitary regulations has proven difficult because most data sources indicate whether a regulation exists but provide no information on the type or importance of the respective measure in this article we construct a novel database of u s phytosanitary measures and match these to 47 fresh fruit and vegetable product imports from 89 exporting countries over the period 1996 2008 a product line gravity equation that accounts for zero trade flows is developed to investigate the trade impact of different pest mitigation measures while the results suggest that phytosanitary treatments generally reduce trade the actual restrictiveness of these measures diminishes dramatically as exporters accumulate experience and it vanishes when exporters reach a certain threshold the results have important policy implications considering the number of empirical studies that find a negative impact of non tariff measures on trade copyright 2013 oxford university press

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies the effect of increased capital mobility on the national control of macroeconomic policy continues to be a topic of debate empirical contributions to this debate share the assumption that domestic macroeconomic policy is driven by either partisan or countercyclical motivations and that the effects of international financial flows have roughly similar effects in all countries this article reevaluates the integration hypothesis in a framework in which manipulations of the macroeconomy derive from opportunistic motivations the article emphasizes the ways in which prior institutional choices effect the way these motivations are translated into actions evidence from individual country and pooled time series tests suggests that opportunistic cycles are less likely to occur when 1 a government maintains a fixed exchange rate in the presence of highly mobile capital or 2 when the central bank enjoys above average independence

import restrictions in the presence of a health risk an illustration using fmd we present a simple model linking infection risk from imports to a tariff the risk causes the exporter of the infected product to face a higher tariff than would otherwise be the case a numerical example is developed for u s beef imports from nations with foot and mouth disease fmd the additional tariffs are sensitive to the specification of risk and the expected magnitude of loss due to an fmd outbreak for a low risk of importing fmd the tariffs levied against the exporter of fmd infected beef are not prohibitive but become so as the risk or expected output loss rises

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

saving two in a billion quantifying the trade effect of european food safety standards on african exports abstract a growing concern over health risks associated with food products has prompted close examination of sanitary and phytosanitary standards in industrialized countries this paper quantifies the impact of a new harmonized aflatoxin standard set by the eu on food exports from africa we employ a gravity model to estimate the impact of changes in differing levels of protection based on the eu standard in contrast to those suggested by international standards the analysis is based on trade and regulatory survey data for 15 european countries and nine african countries between 1989 and 1998 our results suggest that the implementation of the new aflatoxin standard in the eu will have a negative impact on african exports of cereals dried fruits and nuts to europe the new eu standard which would reduce health risk by approximately 1 4 deaths per billion a year will decrease these african exports by 64 or us 670 million in contrast to regulation set through an international standard

technical regulations and specialization in international trade abstract it is widely acknowledged that while technical regulations can improve welfare and facilitate markets they can also impede trade the trade impeding effects of technical regulations are especially worrisome for developing countries they frequently lack the human and capital resources necessary to satisfy technical measures and thus are more likely to be excluded from markets by technical measures this paper uses highly disaggregated us data on agricultural mining and manufacturing imports to examine the impact of technical regulations on trade patterns using instrumental variables estimation to correct for the potential endogeneity of technical regulations the analysis suggests that technical regulations substantially impinge on poor countries exports their weaker capacities to satisfy technical regulations lead them to specialize away from industries with heavier regulatory burdens

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

empirical evidence on the trade impact of asynchronous regulatory approval of new gmo events abstract this paper focuses on the ex post empirical analysis of the trade impact of asynchronous regulatory approval of new genetically modified organism gmo events we contribute to the literature in three ways first we define indices to assess the extent of asynchronicity and the relative strictness of the gmo approval authorizations of 40 countries considering gmo regulatory developments between 2000 and 2012 regarding cotton maize and soybeans second we introduce indices that are country pair specific product specific and year specific in a gravity model to examine the trade impact of asynchronous regulatory approval across countries by grouping the countries according to the state of their national regulatory gmo frameworks we have an even more differentiated view on the trade impact of asynchronous approval that focuses not only on the existence of regulations but also on their restrictiveness the results from the gravity model show that asynchronous approval has negatively impacted trade flows of cotton maize and soybeans it is observed that both asynchronous approvals and the restrictiveness of importing countries regulations to address the importation of gmo products matter meaning those countries that have already adopted a comprehensive gmo regulatory framework and have policies to manage the importation of gmo crops tend to feel a higher negative impact on trade flows

candidates credibility and re election incentives i study elections between citizen candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re election in each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences the elected candidate chooses the policy to implement and how much rent seeking to engage in when in office as the voter decides both which candidate to elect and subsequently whether the candidate is retained this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability i show that in the best stationary equilibrium when utility functions are concave over policy non median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter in this equilibrium there are two candidates who are elected at some history and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge this divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent seeking increasing voter welfare copyright 2013 oxford university press

measuring research benefits in an imperfect market reply to holloway voon s original claim voon 1994 was that the benefits of generating through research a parallel shift in a monopolist s marginal cost curve exceeded the benefits from generating the same shift if the curve represented the market supply curve for a competitive industry as we noted in a subsequent comment this result was wrong with voon s error being due to the use of incmrect normalization procedures in his simu lation analysis we further articulated the general principle that welfare from an innovation in a mono poly industry would be greater than in a structurally equivalent competitive industry if and only if the deadweight loss due to monopoly decreased as a consequence of that innovation finally we opined that this condition will normally not be met in mono poly or other imperfectly competitive structures because in seeking to capture benefits from the inno vation a monopoly or oligopoly industry will generate less output expansion than would occur under perfect competition thereby causing the deadweight loss to increase

reducing transatlantic barriers on u s eu agri food trade what are the possible gains in recent years the eu and the u s have engaged in discussions to lower trade and investment barriers and strengthen transatlantic integration for food and agricultural trade non tariff measures ntms such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures sps stand out as significant barriers this study combines sector level econometric modeling with an agriculture focused computable generable equilibrium cge model to simulate various transatlantic liberalization scenarios on u s eu agri food trade the simulations quantify the effect from tariff removal and addressing ntms the magnitude of the gains depend upon the level of tariff liberalization the depth of integration and possible consumer demand changes

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

irradiation as a quarantine treatment abstract poor consumer acceptance and large fixed costs have limited the use of irradiation to increase food safety and mitigate pest risks we discuss these challenges to irradiation s use as quarantine treatment and the growth of some irradiated fresh fruits imports since 2006 lower regulatory barriers changes to labeling requirements and the curtailment of other quarantine treatments may de stigmatize irradiation on the demand side while scale economies may reduce costs on the supply side