a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

the democratic political economy of progressive income taxation why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two dimensionality of the issue space to give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two dimensional nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two party game whose players have complete preferences over a two dimensional policy space generically fails to exist i introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games based on the fact of factional conflict within parties each party is supposed to consist of reformists militants and opportunists each faction has a complete preference order on policy space but together they can only agree on a partial order nash equilibria of the two party game where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions and each party is represented by its partial order exist and it is shown that in such equilibria both parties propose progressive income taxation

a solution concept for majority rule in dynamic settings we define and explore the notion of a dynamic condorcet winner dcw which extends the notion of a condorcet winner to dynamic settings we show that for every dcw every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games existence of dcws is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient we characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes study the effects of changes in the discount factor investigate efficiency properties and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation proof outcomes we apply this solution concept to a standard one dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single peaked preferences as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate payoff

a positive theory of social security based on reputation we construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay as you go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium we alalyze the welfare implictions of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measure to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

intergenerational redistribution with short lived governments we study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping generations model with short lived governments the successive governments who care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributions are unable to pre commit the future course of redistributive taxation in a stationary politico economic equilibrium the intergenerational transfer in each period depends on the current value of the state variable and all expectations about future political outcomes are fulfilled we find that there exist multiple stationary equilibria in many political settings steady state welfare is often lower than it would be in the absence of redistributive politics

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

a wavelet analysis of capital markets integration in latin america the continuous wavelet transform analysis may provide a rich and flexible framework for the analysis of time series which exhibit less stable statistical properties such as the ones describing the dynamic trajectory of capital markets in contrast to the fourier analysis wavelet transform preserves information on both time and frequency we provide a summary of the most important features of this framework by involving the concept of coherence as well as its partial and multiple forms we analyse the connections between santiago stock exchange mexican stock exchange and bm fbovespa sao paulo stock exchange for a time span which covers the 23 september 2003 12 march 2014 period we highlight the existence of several significant forces of regional integration and of a short to medium run synchronization process between these markets we conclude that deeper structural and institutional reforms are required in order to enhance the sustainable development and more profound integration of these markets

bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard baron ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement in standing committees however existing agreements can be amended this article studies an extension of the baron ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees in each of an infinite number of periods the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy which is in turn the default for the next period the model provides a number of quite different predictions i from a positive perspective the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity in that case patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy markov perfect equilibria in contrast the unique markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding baron ferejohn framework ii if players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria including all markov perfect equilibria are inefficient

the power of the last word in legislative policy making we examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves we demonstrate that these institutions select condorcet winners when they exist provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals in policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics where a condorcet winner does not exist the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near dictator under relatively weak conditions

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

international economic policy uncertainty and stock prices revisited multiple and partial wavelet approach abstract this paper introduces a new dimension to the relationship between economic policy uncertainty epu and stock prices sp by extending the contributions of ko and lee 2015 by using multiple and partial wavelet coherence techniques the vulnerability of sp due to combined and isolated impact of international us epu and domestic policy uncertainty depu is investigated the main findings are a the combined effect of depu and us epu is more significant for developed market s sp b the emerging market s sp are more sensitive to depu and c amongst developed markets japan and european countries are more sensitive to us epu than depu

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

can policy and financial risk predict stock markets abstract since higher risk should be rewarded with higher expected returns more risky time periods are expected to predict rising stock markets this paper focuses on implied volatility as a measure of financial risk and economic policy uncertainty epu which includes also regulatory risk we analyze twelve stock markets for which epu indices exist and find that even though there is no concurrent relationship between epu and market movements high epu indeed predicts subsequent stock market growth on the other hand implied volatility is high when markets are falling but is less informative about future market movements the economic significance of our results is illustrated by a highly profitable trading strategy which yields abnormal returns of 15 per year on average across countries

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

dynamic co movements of stock market returns implied volatility and policy uncertainty we examine time varying correlations among stock market returns implied volatility and policy uncertainty our findings suggest that correlations are indeed time varying and sensitive to oil demand shocks and us recessions

on discounting and voting in a simple growth model abstract in dynamic resource allocation models the non existence of voting equilibria is a generic phenomenon due to the multi dimensionality of the choice space even if agents are heterogeneous only in their discount factors nevertheless at each point in time there may exist a median voter whose preferred instantaneous consumption rate is supported by a majority of agents based on this observation we propose an institutional setup intertemporal majority voting in a ramsey type growth model with common consumption and heterogeneous agents and show that it provides a microfoundation of the choice of the optimal consumption stream of the median agent while the corresponding intertemporal consumption stream is in general not a condorcet winner among all feasible paths its induced instantaneous consumption rates receive a majority at each point in time in the proposed intertemporal majority voting procedure we also provide a characterization of stationary voting equilibria in the case where agents may differ not only in their time preferences but also in their felicity functions

does economic policy uncertainty in the u s influence stock markets in china and india time frequency evidence this paper uses continuous and discrete wavelet tools to evaluate the dynamic correlation and causality between the u s economic policy uncertainty epu and stock markets in china and india from

economic policy uncertainty in the us does it matter for the euro area abstract we investigate the effects of a us economic policy uncertainty shock on some euro area macroeconomic aggregates via structural vars we model the indicators of economic policy uncertainty recently developed by baker et al 2013 jointly with the aggregate price indexes and alternative indicators of the business cycle for the two above indicated economic areas according to our svars a one standard deviation shock to us economic policy uncertainty leads to a statistically significant fall in the european industrial production and prices of 0 12 and 0 06 respectively the contribution of the us uncertainty shock on the european aggregates is shown to be quantitatively larger than the one exerted by an euro area specific uncertainty shock

cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting in light of the extensive theoretical evidence suggesting absence of equilibrium in voting models tullock 1981 asks why so much stability our results suggest the following answer political agents engaged in long term relationships can sustain highly stable allocations if there are strongly held norms for punishment of defectors 1

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates it is known that multidimensional downsian competition fails to admit an equilibrium in pure strategies unless very stringent conditions on the distribution of voters bliss points are imposed plott 1967 this paper revisits this problem considering that the two vote share maximizing candidates are dierentiated that is candidates strategically decide po sitions only in some of the n dimensions while in the rest their positions are assumed to be xed these xed dimensions may be viewed as candidates immutable characteristics race religion culture etc we nd that if candidates are su ciently dierentiated if in the xed dimensions their positions are su ciently dierent then a unique nash equilibrium in pure strategies is guaranteed to exist for any distribution of voters bliss points perhaps more importantly we show that this is true even if there exists a unique xed dimension and candidates instrumentally decide their positions in all other n 1 dimensions

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

spectrum property law 101 abstract regulatory doctrine holds that radio spectrum licensees do not have private property rights in their licenses in fact as shelanski and huber show most of the basic attributes of private property are possessed in some measure by all licensees this practical reality has been obscured by the official ideology of public interest obligation attached to spectrum use however public interest regulation has always been marginal in practical effect but public interest ideology reinforced by interest group politics has prevented full realization of the market efficiencies that could be achieved from explicit recognition of spectrum property rights the true public interest lies in removing obstacles to efficient use of the radio spectrum and allowing it to seek its highest valued use to the public spectrum auctions may help to move us in the direction of a less burdened market system but they are only a step not the destination

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

international economic policy uncertainty and stock prices wavelet approach this paper examines the link between economic policy uncertainty and stock price in both a time and frequency domain wavelet analysis reveals that the relationship is generally negative but changes over time exhibiting low to high frequency cycles moreover the timing of frequency changes overlaps when us policy uncertainty comoves with other countries policy uncertainty

international spillovers of policy uncertainty using the baker et al 2013 index of policy uncertainty for six developed countries this paper estimates spillovers of policy uncertainty we find that spillovers account for slightly more than one fourth of the dynamics of policy uncertainty in these countries with this share rising to one half during the financial crisis the us and uk are responsible for a large fraction of the spillovers since the financial crisis while the remaining countries are all net receivers of policy uncertainty shocks during and after this period