economic deregulation days of reckoning for microeconomists economic deregulation of american industry is one of the most important experiments in economic policy of our time 1 in 1977 17 percent of u s gnp was produced by fully regulated industries 2 by 1988 following ten years of partial and complete economic deregulation of large parts of the transportation communications energy and financial industries that total had been cut significantly to 6 6 percent of gnp 3 the political forces behind the decision to change the market conditions under which roughly 600 billion of u s output is produced were strong and varied but according to political scientists martha derthick and paul quirk 1985 p 36 deregulation would never have occurred if economists especially microeconomists had not generally supported it through their research 4 in retrospect it is fair to ask were microeconomists able to develop a theoretical and empirical framework to explain regulation and its effects and to form predictions of deregulation s effects were they able to predict the actual effects of deregulation this paper surveys the evidence to address these questions and of

lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies abstract this paper uses the common agency approach to analyze the joint determination of product and labor market distortions in a small open economy capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages while other factors of production are not organized the paper shows that product and labor market distortions always move in the same direction and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labor it also shows that labor market distortions are second best hence conditionality by foreign organizations should target distortions in product markets but not in labor markets

the introduction of price signals into land use planning decision making a proposal although directed to the british system of town and country planning this paper has relevance for many oecd countries including some with systems of land use regulation which evolved entirely independently of the british the paper starts by characterising the basic features of the british land use planning system viewed from the resource allocation point of view of an economist a conclusion is that the system explicitly excludes any use of price signals from its decisions the paper then summarises the problems which the exclusion of price information has given rise to because the uk planning system has deliberately constrained the supply of space and space is an attribute of housing which is income elastic in demand rising incomes not only drive rising real house prices but also mean that land prices have risen considerably faster than house prices several housing attributes other than garden space are to a degree substitutes for land but the underlying cause of the inelastic supply of housing in the uk is the constraint on land supply the final section proposes a mechanism which would make use of the information embodied in the price premiums of neighbouring parcels of land zoned for different uses such premiums signal the relative scarcity of land for different uses at each location and should become a material consideration in planning decision making if they were above some threshold this should provide a presumption of development unless maintaining the land in its current use could be shown to be in the public interest if combined with impact fees such a change would not only make housing supply more elastic and the system more transparent but would help to distance land availability decisions from the political process

competition and corporate performance are people right to think that competition improves corporate performance my investigations indicate first that there are some theoretical reasons for believing this hypothesis to be correct but they are not overwhelming furthermore the existing empirical evidence on this question is weak however the results reported here based on an analysis of around 670 u k companies do provide some support for this view most important i present evidence that competition as measured by increased numbers of competitors or by lower levels of rents is associated with a significantly higher rate of total factor productivity growth

strikes and political activism of trade unions theory and application to bangladesh the behavior of bangladeshi trade unions is characterized bypolitical activism and momentous strikes called hartalsthere have played a crucial part in most political changes inthis country we offer a theoretical framework for discussingthis fact and we test empirically its main prediction bybringing out the political cycle that characterizes theoccurrence of strikes in bangladesh

a note on the extinction of renewable resources abstract this paper presents two sets of conditions under which a sole owner of a renewable resource stock who maximizes a nonlinear benefit function would find it more profitable to harvest the stock to extinction than follow a continuous harvesting strategy when the minimum viable resource stock is positive extinction is optimal as long as the initial resource stock is sufficiently small regardless of the discount rate when the minimum viable resource stock is zero and the discount rate exceeds the growth potential of the species extinction is optimal for sufficiently small initial stocks

market share market value and innovation in a panel of british manufacturing firms this paper examines the empirical relationship between technological innovations market share and stock market value new developments in the estimation of dynamic count data models are used to control for unobserved firm specific heterogeneity we find a robust and positive effect of market share on observable headcounts of innovations and patents although increased product market competition in the industry tends to stimulate innovative activity furthermore the impact of innovation on market value is larger for firms with higher market shares we argue that our results are consistent with models where high market share firms have incentives to pre emptively innovate

is unemployment lower if unions bargain over employment would there be more employment if unions bargained over employment and not only over wages most economists seem to answer yes 1

deregulation shock in product market and unemployment in a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous markups and labor market frictions we investigate the effects of increased product market competition unlike most macroeconomic models of search we endogenize the labor supply along the extensive margin we find numerically that a model with endogenous labor force participation decision produces a decline in the unemployment rate which is almost three times larger than that in a model with fixed labor force for a calibration capturing alternatively the european and the us labor markets a deregulation episode which lowers the markup by 3 percentage points results in a fall in the unemployment rate by 0 17 and 0 05 percentage point respectively while the labor share is almost unaffected in the long run the sensitivity analysis reveals that product market deregulation is more effective in countries where product and labor market regulations are high unemployment benefits are small and labor force is more responsive

fiscal consequences of structural reform under constrained monetary policy abstract structural reforms in particular reductions in mark ups in product and labour markets can entail short run output costs unless offset by a demand expansion when monetary policy is constrained and cannot carry out this short run expansion there is a potential role for fiscal policy although this idea has received a lot of attention in the policy debate there has been little formal study of the fiscal consequences of reforms under constrained monetary policy this paper uses a model to quantify the short run fiscal costs and long run fiscal benefits of reforms in order to see to what extent the latter justify the former the fiscal costs and benefits of reforms are both generally found to be small although larger reforms entail larger rises in deficit to gdp in the short run results suggest that reforms in labour markets have little effect on public finances in the long run but their short run costs can be ameliorated if combined with product market reforms

the economics of worldwide stagflation the last fifteen years have witnessed dramatic changes in economics not only in the manner in which the economics profession views economics but also in the manner in which the general public views economics and economists by the late 1960 s there had emerged more or less a consensus macroeconomic framework that is an agreed upon structure to be used to study economic problems at the aggregate level robert solow stated as quoted in leijonhufvud 1968

trade related intellectual property rights to biological resources socioeconomic implications for developing countries abstract the uruguay round of the general agreement on tariffs and trade proposed conferring trade related intellectual property rights trips to international firms on a variety of life forms and on biotechnology this proposal has been denounced by developing countries many developing countries have relied heavily on indigenous biotechnology from several decades in the area of high yielding seeds bio pesticides and fertilizers herbal medicines and household consumables this study analyzes the social economic and preservation implications of trips for three types of biological resources physically nonexhaustible resources physically exhaustible resources under current use and physically exhaustible potential future resources the study concludes that each of these resources may require different degrees of intellectual property right ipr protection for their sustained use further establishing ipr to products derived from genetic and biochemical resources is certainly necessary but not sufficient for biodiversity prospecting and the long term survival of these resources along with the ipr protection developing countries have to develop suitable institutions and policies governing the use of their open access biological resources and enabling local communities to receive partial benefits of biodiversity conservation and prospecting

subjective and objective measures of governmental regulations in oecd nations abstract since government regulations may have an important impact on the macroeconomic performance of market economies it is necessary to devise quantitative indicators of the regulatory regime which raises some difficult methodological issues after reviewing some of these problems we compare the results of several recent quantitative studies of regulation in oecd nations some based on an extensive review and quantification of laws and regulations others based on observational data of those familiar with these regulations despite their very different methodologies and coverage of particular types of governmental regulation the results of the three studies are significantly correlated which suggests that they all capture the same underlying reality

endogenous markups and the effects of income taxation theory and evidence from oecd countries abstract existing studies on the effects of fiscal policy under imperfect competition typically treat each firm s price cost markup as fixed this paper examines the implications of endogenising the markup in a simple model of income taxation under monopolistic competition it is demonstrated that an increase in income tax reduces the number of firms lessens competition among surviving firms and raises the optimal markups in the new steady state through this channel the effects of income taxation on the key macroeconomic variables as well as on consumer welfare are unambiguously enlarged the simple model prediction is largely supported by cross section regressions with data from oecd countries

imperfect mobility of labor across sectors a reappraisal of the balassa samuelson effect this paper investigates the relative price and relative wage effects of a higher productivity in the traded sector compared with the non traded sector in a two sector open economy model with imperfect substitutability in hours worked across sectors the balassa samuelson 1964 model predicts that a rise in the sectoral productivity ratio by 1 raises the relative price of non tradables by 1 while leaving the non traded wage traded wage ratio unchanged applying cointegration methods to a panel of fourteen oecd countries over the period 1970 2007 our estimates show that the relative price rises by only 0 78 and the relative wage falls by 0 27 while our first set of empirical findings cast doubt on the quantitative predictions of the balassa samuelson model our second set of evidence highlights the role of imperfect labor mobility the relative price responds more to a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables while the reaction of the relative wage is more muted in countries with higher intersectoral reallocation of labor we show that the ability of the two sector model to account for our evidence quantitatively relies upon two ingredients i imperfect mobility of labor across sectors and ii physical capital accumulation finally our numerical results reveal that the model predicts the relative price response fairly well and to a lesser extent the relative wage response

interpreting sustainability in economic terms dynamic efficiency plus intergenerational equity abstract economists have confined the concept of sustainability to intertemporal distributional equity we propose a broader definition combining dynamic efficiency and intergenerational equity and relate it to two concepts from neoclassical economics potential pareto improvements and inter personal compensation

the cyclical behavior of the price cost markup countercyclical markups constitute the key transmission mechanism for monetary and other demand shocks in new keynesian models this paper tests the foundation of those models by studying the cyclical properties of the markup of price over marginal cost the first part of the paper studies markups in the aggregate economy and the manufacturing sector we use bils s 1987 insights for converting average cost to marginal cost but do so with richer data we find that all measures of markups are either procyclical or acyclical moreover we show that monetary shocks lead markups to fall with output the second part of the paper merges input output information on shipments to the government with detailed industry data to study the effect of demand changes on industry level markups industry level markups are found to be acyclical in response to demand changes

auctions or grandfathering the political economy of tradable emission permits despite the prevalence of grandfathered permits we still observe that a hybrid policy in which a fraction of initial emission permits is distributed through auctions is adopted in some cases we also observe that some polluting industries support auctioned permits and that most environmental groups support grandfathered permits this paper attempts to explain these phenomena from the perspective of political economy and investigates the conditions under which grandfathering auctions or a hybrid instrument will be the equilibrium policy by constructing a two stage lobbying game in which the type of policy instrument auction grandfathering or a hybrid instrument is determined in the first stage and then the number of permits is decided in the second stage we highlight the strategic interaction of the lobbying activities between the two stages in explaining the behavior of the lobbying groups

macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining an international perspective this paper critically reviews the research on how collective bargaining systems influence macroeconomic performance in industrialized countries the review considers effects of bargaining level coordination and corporatist institutional arrangements key empirical results turn out to be quite fragile and much of the paper explores issues of measurement and specification that account for the fragility the paper concludes that complementarities between key institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions and it suggests research strategies

on the intergenerational allocation of natural resources it is known hartwick and others that under standard assumptions a society that invests in reproducible capital the competitive rents on its current extraction of exhaustible resources will enjoy a consumption stream constant in time it is shown here that this result can be interpreted as saying that an appropriately defined stock of capital including the initial endowment of resources is being maintained intact and that consumption can be interpreted as the interest on that patrimony this seems like a useful rule of thumb for policy

the transatlantic productivity gap a survey of the main causes abstract during the last 2 decades europe s economy experienced a productivity slowdown whereas the united states us economy exhibited a marked acceleration the result is that since the early 1990s the relative productivity levels between the two regions have continuously diverged leading to a transatlantic productivity gap much of the explanation for this is the strong performance of the us in the so called new economy or knowledge economy and in particular the underinvestment in r d and as a result productivity and innovation has been at the forefront in the european policy agenda however various explanations for the us european union transatlantic productivity gap suggest that the picture is rather more complex than simply the effects on or the result of particular technology driven sectors

the role of product market regulations in the process of structural change abstract the sectoral allocation of labor differs considerably across developed economies even in the presence of similar patterns of structural change a general equilibrium model that captures the stylized facts of structural change is presented in this framework economy wide product market regulations hinder the development of dynamic sectors such as service industries this is consistent with the negative cross country relationship between product market regulations and the service employment share discussed in the paper additionally the model suggests that higher service prices and rents in regulated economies reduce labor supply providing a rationale for the negative association between product market regulations and the employment rate previously found in the literature

equitable cost benefit analysis of climate change greenhouse gas emissions and vulnerability to climate change show a strong negative correlation this is the moral issue at the heart of the climate problem however little attention has been paid to this in the literature see banuri et al 1996 for an overview the literature on equity issues in climate change is largely confined to the distribution of emissions reduction targets this literature takes the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for granted and takes a parametric approach to the required reductions on the other hand the literature that tries to derive how much emissions abatement is desirable largely ducks the equity issue this paper is an attempt to combine the two problems

putting foxes in charge of the hen house the political economy of harvest quota regulations this paper considers a dynamic common agency model of natural resource harvest quota regulation in which both conservationists and harvesters vie to influence the regulator s quota allocations as well as the choice of regulator conservationists tend to benefit from the adoption of regulation since the regulator will reduce the aggregate harvest quota relative to the unregulated equilibrium harvesters however only support the adoption of regulation if the regulator places sufficient weight on their welfare because harvester s support of regulation is conditional while conservationist s support of regulation is unconditional harvester s interests tend to be over represented in the truthful markov perfect equilibrium

equitable cost benefit analysis of climate change policies the literature of welfare maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity this paper introduces three ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously the first method inspired by kant and rawls maximises net present welfare without international cooperation as if all regions share the fate of the region affected worst by climate change optimal emission abatement varies greatly depending on the spatial and temporal resolution that is the grid at which maximum impact is defined the second method is inspired by varian s no envy emissions are reduced so as to equalise total costs and benefits of climate change over all countries of the world and over all time periods emission reductions are substantial this method approximately preserves the inequities that would occur in a world without climate change the third method uses non linear aggregations of welfare the utilitarian default is linear in a cooperative setting this method cannot distinguish between sources of inequity the higher the aversion to inequity the higher optimal greenhouse gas emission reduction

unions rent creators or extractors this paper proposes a model of workplace specific unions that integrates two views of what unions do one view holds that unions mainly engage in rent extraction another view holds that unions mainly engage in rent creation by providing agency services that increase workplace productivity we demonstrate that the choice between the two activities is systematically related to the economic and regulatory environment in which the union operates product market competition encourages rent creation while labor market deregulation encourages rent extraction moreover we provide a rationale for why firms may want to subsidize unions the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics 2005

how do federal regulations affect consumer prices an analysis of the regressive effects of regulation this study is the first to measure the impact of federal regulations on consumer prices by combining consumer expenditure and pricing data from the bureau of labor statistics industry supply chain data from the bureau of economic analysis and industry specific regulation information from the mercatus center s regdata database we determine that regulations promote higher consumer prices and that these price increases have a disproportionately negative effect on low income households specifically we find that the poorest households spend larger proportions of their incomes on heavily regulated goods and services prone to sharp price increases while the literature explores other specific costs of regulation noting that higher consumer prices are a probable consequence of heavy regulation this study is the first to provide a thorough empirical analysis of that relationship across industries irrespective of the reasons for imposing new regulations these results demonstrate that in the aggregate the negative consequences are significant especially for the most vulnerable households

disaggregated economic impact analysis incorporating ecological and social trade offs and techno institutional context a case from the western ghats of india economic valuation of ecosystem benefits and their aggregation in a benefit cost analysis bca framework is the norm in mainstream environmental economics but valuation and bca have also attracted criticisms internal criticisms point to the absence of alternative scenarios in valuation overlooking of ecological trade offs and dis services and inattention to context others criticize aggregation across diverse stakeholders and the problem of non monetizable benefits and dismiss bca as fatally flawed they suggest approaches such as deliberative decision making and multi criteria analysis we propose a middle path that uses the strengths of economic analysis for decision support while avoiding the pitfalls we disaggregate economic impacts by stakeholder groups link ecosystem changes to benefits as well as dis benefits and examine how socio technological context shapes the magnitude of economic impact we illustrate this approach by studying the impact of creating the biligiri rangaswamy temple wildlife sanctuary in the western ghats forests of southern india our analysis shows that while some stakeholders are net beneficiaries others are net losers changes in forest rights irrigation technologies and ecosystem dynamics influence the magnitude of benefits and sometimes convert gainers into losers such disaggregated analysis can provide useful information for deliberative decision making and important academic insights on how economic value is generated

the welfare economics of land use planning abstract this paper presents an empirical methodology for the evaluation of the benefits and costs of land use planning the technique is applied in the context of the town and country planning system of the uk and examines the gross and net benefits of land use regulation and their distribution across income groups the results show that the welfare and distributional impacts can be large

can imperfect competition explain the difference between primal and dual productivity measures estimates for u s manufacturing it is well known that under the assumptions of constant returns to scale perfect competition and the absence of factor hoarding primal and dual productivity measures should be highly correlated the apparent lack of correlation is usually attributed to fixed factors of production in this paper i propose an alternative explanation by relaxing the assumption of perfect competition by controlling for the presence of a markup component i demonstrate that both productivity measures are in fact highly correlated for u s manufacturing the analysis also provides an alternative method of estimating a markup of prices over marginal cost that avoids certain difficulties inherent in some existing methods of estimation

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

trade related intellectual property rights north south trade and biological diversity in the trade related intellectual property rights trips agreement of gatt 1 january 1995 it was agreed to harmonise intellectual property rights ipr on an international level and to include the option for patent protection for all life forms such as plants and animals article 27 3 b patenting however leads to considerable conflicts between international trade and protection of biological diversity which can be illustrated by the example of seed production we make use of a three stage game to show the strategic incentives for implementation of two different property rights regimes patents and farmers rights on competition and biodiversity we show that the southern government has no incentive to acknowledge international patents even if farmers rights do exist the northern producer will always dominate in the output market if patents are applied but without farmers rights biodiversity will not be maintained by the southern government thus total payoff of the northern firm is maximized if both ipr regimes are implemented however if only farmers rights are valid biodiversity will be maximal

use and misuse of the net present value in environmental studies abstract environmental studies regularly use the net present value npv to value benefits and costs of projects however the npv disregards whether the stream of net benefits is steady or volatile and ignores the distribution of net benefits among different groups of people here we test alternatives to npv building on two example cases 1 we use discounted utility du to evaluate land use projects and calculate opportunity costs for avoided deforestation 2 we simulate decision making on tropical deforestation whereby we use multiple decision criteria to consider the distribution of net benefits between two groups farmers and conservationists results show considerable differences in the ranking of projects between du and npv when projects are not marginal compared to du npv regularly overestimates the value of forest plantations moreover npv tends to overstate the opportunity costs of avoiding deforestation in terms of saved carbon emissions not accounting for the distribution of net benefits when optimizing land use allocation leads to sub optimal simulated deforestation scenarios we therefore suggest that future studies should either also use du to value economic consequences of projects or that they use the npv as only one among several socio economic and ecological decision criteria

education market rigidities and growth the paper exploits macro panel data for oecd countries close to the technological frontier the education level product market rigidities and employment protection legislation would be significantly related to tfp growth with a substantial contribution of the interaction between market rigidities

tax competition and tax coordination in a median voter model this paper analyzes the welfare effects of capital tax coordination in a simple model of fiscal competition where fiscal policy is subject to majority voting and households differ with respect to their labor and capital income it turns out that a coordinated capital tax increase may raise or reduce welfare depending on the relative magnitude of i economic distortions induced by a labor tax and ii political distortions resulting from the influence of the median voter on fiscal policy decisions a negative welfare effect is more likely the smaller the marginal excess burden of the labor tax and the smaller the ratio of the median voter s labor income to average labor income we also use empirical estimates of the marginal excess burden of taxation to determine the welfare effects of tax coordination it turns out that a negative welfare effect of coordinated tax increases may emerge in our model for empirically reasonable parameters

does entry regulation hinder job creation evidence from the french retail industry are product market and entry regulation key sources of low employment growth in many european countries we investigate this question in the context of the french retail trade industry since 1974 approval by regional zoning boards has been required for the creation or extension of any large retain store in france we exploit a unique database that provides time and region specific variation in boards approval decisions we show that stronger deterrence of entry by the boards increased retailer concentration and slowed down employment growth in france

macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution it typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects to study these effects we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions monopolistic competition in the goods market which determines the size of rents and bargaining in the labor market which determines the distribution of rents product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers we show the effects of deregulation we then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation and recent macroeconomic evolutions in europe

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

patterns of work across the oecd market work per person of working age differs widely across the oecd countries and there have been some significant changes in the last forty years how to explain this pattern taxes are part of the story but much remains to be explained if we include all the elements of the social security systems like early retirement benefits sickness and disability benefits and unemployment benefits then we can capture some aspects of the overall pattern but still a lot remains unexplained the story favoured by alesina et al cepr dp 5140 2005 is that the nexus of strong unions generous welfare and social democracy implies both high taxes and pressure in favour of work sharing in response to adverse shocks this story however falls foul of the simple fact that most scandinavian countries now do much more work than the french and germans despite having stronger unions more generous welfare higher taxes and more social democracy ultimately we are forced into the position that there is no simple story some of the broad patterns can be explained but there remain country specific factors which are hard to identify but lead to substantial differences from one country to another

inequality lobbying and resource allocation this paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation a government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors they lobby the government for preferential treatment the government even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies broadly speaking both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation the paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more corrupt jel d72 d78 d82 016 in this paper we propose a particular channel through which wealth inequality distorts the resource allocation process our analysis rests on four premises

vacancy posting job separation and unemployment fluctuations abstract what is the relative importance of hiring and separation in driving unemployment fluctuations this paper presents a framework to decompose the moments of unemployment and study the respective contributions of vacancy posting a measure of firms hiring efforts and separation separation accounts for about 40 of unemployment s variance compared to 60 for vacancy posting and contributes to about 60 of unemployment steepness asymmetry the fact that unemployment increases faster than it decreases further while vacancy posting is on average the most important contributor of unemployment fluctuations the opposite is true around business cycle turning points when separation is responsible for most of unemployment movements

competition and the capital labor conflict abstract this paper analyzes the distributional effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition the focus is on the interaction between imperfect competition in product markets and bargaining in the labor market the main result is that while a uniform intensification of product market competition increases employment it may cause real wages to fall in the short run as well as in the long run this is especially likely if labor market regulations are favorable to workers therefore product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce each other politically and compensatory fiscal transfers may be needed in order to enact employment enhancing deregulation policies

regulation and investment use newly assembled data on regulation in several sectors of many oecd countries to provide evidence that regulatory reform of product markets is associated with an increase in investment a component of reform that plays a very important role is entry liberalization but privatization also has a substantial effect on investment sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are robust jel e22 l5

the influence of regulations on innovation a quantitative assessment for oecd countries abstract regulatory framework conditions have been identified as important factors influencing the innovation activities of companies industries and whole economies however in the empirical literature the impacts of regulation have been assessed as rather ambivalent for innovation different types of regulations generate various impacts and even a single type of regulation can influence innovation in various ways depending on how the regulation is implemented the endogenous growth approach developed by carlin and soskice 2006 and empirically applied by crafts 2006 which determines endogenously the rate of technological progress and therefore innovation allows a conceptual analysis of the influence of different types of regulation on innovation in general the negative effect of compliance costs should be compared with the more dynamic effect of regulations generating additional incentives for innovative activities based on this approach we derive hypotheses on the impact of different specific regulations on innovation we differentiate between economic social and institutional regulations following the oecd taxonomy on regulations existing economic analyses are surveyed which are characterised by rather heterogeneous approaches data bases and results the paper aims to apply a comprehensive and comparative approach to investigate quantitatively the innovation impacts in 21 oecd countries using panel data for the period between 1998 and 2004 in summary the empirical results confirm the hypotheses derived from the conceptual theoretical framework determining technical progress and innovation endogenously and allowing a distinction between short term and long term effects consequently the theoretical approach is an appropriate starting point for the empirical analysis of the influence of different regulations on innovation

determinants of the increase in the number of interest groups in western democracies theoretical considerations and evidence from 21 oecd countries mancur olson s theory of institutionalsclerosis is based on the notion that thenumber of interest groups within a countryincreases with the duration of itspolitical stability the following paperargues that the increase in the number ofinterest groups over time could also be aconcomitant of economic development theoretically both explanations provetenable an empirical cross sectionalregression analysis using data from 21oecd countries finds no evidence for asignificant impact of the duration ofpolitical stability on the number ofinterest groups a significantly positiveeffect is however reported for the degreeof economic development

labour market implications of eu product market integration eu labour markets effects of greater product market integration european labour markets are in a state of flux due to the changing market situation induced by international integration this process affects wage formation through more fierce product market competition and increased mobility of jobs this development is by some observers taken to enforce labour market flexibility while for others it signals an erosion of social standards and in turn possibly the welfare society since labour is not very mobile in europe the effects of international integration on labour markets are mostly indirect via product market integration we review the channels through which product market integration affects labour markets and perform an empirical analysis of the convergence and interdependencies in wage formation among eu countries we find that integration is changing labour market structures and inducing wage convergences as well as stronger wage interdependencies but it is a gradual process moreover the present study does not support the view that international integration will lead to a race to the bottom and rapidly erode domestic labour markets standards nor that it will relieve politicians of the need to consider labour market reforms to improve labour market performance torben m anderson niels haldrup and jan rose sorensen

instrument choice in a fishery abstract this paper considers the choice of regulatory instruments in a fishery fishing captains consumers and input suppliers each attempt to influence the regulator s choice of instruments the regulator chooses among instruments such as input restrictions entry restrictions or individual transferable quotas itqs regulatory instruments that result in zero fishery rents can only occur if the regulator places an extraordinary weight on the welfare of input suppliers relative to fishing captains and consumers indeed heterogeneity of fishing captains is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain regulations that fail to generate fishery rents

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

endogenous markups intensity of competition and persistence of business cycles in order to study the propagation mechanism of business cycles in particular to investigate how the intensity of competition affects market structure and output persistence over business cycles this paper presents a real business cycle model with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale this analysis considers the markups of price over cost to be endogenous with endogenous markups two standard forms of oligopolistic competition bertrand and cournot are considered results show that 1 the propagation mechanism in the sense of output persistence is greater under cournot 2 the propagation mechanism is unequivocally greater with imperfect competition regardless of whether markups are endogenous or not and 3 under imperfect competition the propagation mechanism is greater with endogenous markups than with exogenous markups overall these results suggest that more intense competition produces lower persistence in output growth and thus a weaker propagation mechanism in a calibration exercise these differences were also found to be quantitatively important

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

unemployment at risk the policy determinants of labour market exposure to economic shocks this paper examines the vulnerability of labour markets to adverse economic shocks we define labour market exposure as the cumulated amount of excess unemployment generated by a shock before unemployment returns to steady state we use a panel of 19 countries covering the period 1985 2010 to assess the influence of labour market policies on labour market exposure which is also calculated country by country we find that less generous unemployment insurance more active labour market policies or a lower minimum wage imply a trade off between average unemployment and labour market exposure as they help low skilled workers to get out of unemployment at the cost of increased vulnerability to adverse shocks on the other hand reducing the tax wedge is conducive to both lower steady state unemployment and labour market exposure alain de serres and fabrice murtin

the efficiency of firms what difference does competition make in cournot oligopoly the efficiency of a firm relative to others determines its market share this relationship gives an incentive to improve efficiency the incentives are greater in markets where firm behaviour is more competitive components of firm efficiency are identified by frontier production function techniques in 19 uk manufacturing sectors technical change average efficiency of each firm relative to the frontier and the efficiency of each firm relative to its own best practice in each period short run declines in market shares and profits induce the firm to improve efficiency relative to its best practice long run differences in efficiency are correlated with differences in gross investment

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

environmental equity and sustainability rejecting the kaldor hicks criteria abstract an implementable translation of environmental equity and sustainability is provided for use in benefit cost analysis as such the approach builds on the underlying economic structure of benefit cost analysis while trying to cause it to evolve in ways that take into account issues of greater concern to ecological economists environmental equity and sustainability are interpreted as imposing new decision criteria that require additional benefit cost tests based on actual compensation to identified sub groups of the population this rejects the pre world war ii compromise of economists regarding potential compensation embodied in the kaldor hicks criteria for environmental equity a project is proposed to pass a benefit cost test if the identified group either receives net benefits or is more than compensated for its losses for sustainability a project is proposed to pass a benefit cost test if the compensation is larger than the net value of the resource and the net value of the resource is reinvested

the cost of regulation osha epa and the productivity slowdown the slowdown in productivity growth in the u s economy during the 1970 s has been a matter of great concern to policymakers associated as it is with inflation unemployment and declining real wage growth this paper examines the impact on productivity growth of government regulation specifically worker health and safety regulation by the occupational safety and health administration osha and environmental regulation by the environmental protection agency epa looking at data for 450 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1978 the study finds a large negative relationship between such regulation and productivity growth using these results about 30 percent of the decline in productivity growth in manufacturing during the 1970 s may be attributed to such regulation several previous studies have looked at the contribution of regulation to the productivity slowdown many of these have inferred that the contribution must be small on the basis of the relatively small amount spent on complying with such regulations edward denison 1979 estimates that only about 16 percent of the productivity slowdown in the 1972 75 period was due to regulation 35 percentage points out of a slowdown of 2 17 percentage points paul portney 1981 notes that little of gnp is spent on pollution control under 2 percent concluding that therefore pollution regulations could have little effect on productivity growth norsworthy et al 1979 also find a small impact of pollution abatement capital expenditures on productivity growth studies based on econometric estimation of the regulation productivity relationship have found a wide range of results gregory christainsen and robert haveman 1981 find regulation reduced labor productivity growth by 27 percentage points using time series data and measures of total federal regulation robert crandall 1981 finds a strong relationship between pollution abatement capital and productivity growth but this relationship disappears when a measure of energy intensity is included robin siegel 1979 observes a significant contribution 5 percentage points from pollution control expenditures to the productivity slowdown for 1965 73 but not for later years finally frank gollop and mark roberts 1983 examine data for a set of electric utilities and find that regulation of emissions had a large impact on total factor productivity growth lowering it for regulated firms by 59 percentage points many other factors might help to explain the productivity slowdown including the rise in energy prices the long and severe recession and declines in research and development expenditures there have been a variety of studies examining the contributions of each factor to the slowdown they generally conclude that many factors contributed to the slowdown but that a sizable fraction of the slowdown remains unexplained by the estimated contributions of all the factors considered

sunk capital unions and the hold up problem theory and evidence from cross country sectoral data abstract in this paper we study the hold up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment we develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference in difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of oecd countries during the period 1980 2000 we find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries we refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold up problem our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power

competition imitation and growth with step by step innovation is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth this question is addressed in the context of an endogenous growth model with step by step innovations in which technological laggards must first catch up with the leading edge technology before battling for technological leadership in the future in contrast to earlier schumpeterian models in which innovations are always made by outsider firms who earn no rents if they fail to innovate and become monopolies if they do innovate here we find first that the usual schumpeterian effect of more intense product market competition pmc is almost always outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate in order to escape competition so that pmc has a positive effect on growth second that a little imitation is almost always growth enhancing as it promotes more frequent neck and neck competition but too much imitation is unambiguously growth reducing the model thus points to complementary roles for competition anti trust policy and patent policy

the formation of the european common market and changes in market structure and performance abstract this paper examines the effects of the formation of the common market on changes in seller concentration and price cost margins in the member states using nace 3 digit industry data for west germany france italy belgium and the netherlands the paper first seeks to identify the effect of the removal of intra ec tariffs on changes in national concentration the paper than tests the hypothesis that concentration measured at the ec wide level is becoming a relevant structural variable which affects the national price cost margin

job finding and separation rates in the oecd abstract we provide a set of comparable estimates of average monthly job finding and separation rates for over 20 oecd countries that can be used for the cross country analysis of labor markets

product market reforms labour market institutions and unemployment we analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment and wages and how this depends on labour market institutions we use differential changes in regulations across oecd countries over the 1980s and 1990s to identify the effects of competition we find that increased product market competition reduces unemployment and that it does so more in countries with labour market institutions that increase worker bargaining power the theoretical intuition is that both firms with market power and unions with bargaining power are constrained in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product market we also find that the effect of increased competition on real wages is beneficial to workers but less so when they have high bargaining power intuitively real wages increase through a drop in the general price level but workers with bargaining power lose out somewhat from a reduction in the rents that they had previously captured

regulation and productivity performance the paper reviews theory and evidence on the ways in which regulation affects productivity outcomes in a context of endogenous growth it is argued that traditional measures of compliance costs miss the potentially most important impacts of regulation on productivity which occur through changes in incentives to invest and to innovate recent attempts to measure cross country variations in the strength of product market and employment regulation are considered and some weaknesses are highlighted nevertheless consistent with endogenous growth models there appears to he quite strong evidence that regulations which inhibit entry into product markets have an adverse effect on tfp growth in oecd countries although there are some discrepancies in the evidence on most measures the uk appears lightly regulated relative to france and germany and this may have contributed to a reduction in the recent past in the uk s tfp gap

conflict and cooperation the structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency abstract this paper is a contribution to the theory of common agency initiated by b d bernheim and m d whinston 1986 quart j econ 101 1 31 by common agency we mean the following an agent decides upon an action which affects its well being as well as the well being of n other individuals the principals each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent on the action chosen under complete information bernheim and whinston prove the existence of an interesting subset of nash equilibria they call truthful provide arguments in defense of this refinement and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs this paper provides a set of theoretical results to identify the structure of equilibrium payoffs with special attention to the payoff of the agent by focusing on complete information we are in a position to evaluate the effects of competition per se on the magnitude of the rent obtained by the agent we illustrate this user guide on a wide and diverse family of applications including auctions competition for an input economic influence and private production of public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

lobbying under political uncertainty abstract this paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge we characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence we also offer some results for the general case including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient

labor supply factors and economic fluctuations we propose a new v ar identication scheme that enables us to disentangle labor supply shocks from wage bargaining shocks identication is achieved by imposing robust sign restrictions that are derived from a new keynesian model with endogenous labor force par ticipation according to our analysis on us data over the period 1985 2014 labor supply shocks and wage bargaining shocks are important drivers of output and unemployment both in the short run and in the long run these results suggest that identication strategies used in estimated new keynesian models to disentangle labor market shocks may be misguided we also analyze the behavior of the labor force participation rate through the lenses of our model wend that labor supply shocks are the main drivers of the participation rate and account for about half of its decline in the aftermath of the great recession

campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups abstract regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones are these regulations desirable this paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry in the absence of entry contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field with entry however a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions in particular a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo and even if better policies are chosen the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups creating costly rent seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying

an endogenous policy model of hierarchical government endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents each enjoying some degree of autonomy in this paper policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy a legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups the combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group s depends on the exchange between the same interest group s and the agent at the other tier our results concerning multi tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one tier lobbying in particular the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies moreover the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier it is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures like federations or firms

lobbying for minimum wages using a common agency lobbying framework this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced through lobbying to change the minimum wage specifically when the labor demand elasticity is large lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology however the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business friendly government to increase the minimum wage empirical analysis on a panel data for ten canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions the real minimum wage decreases in skill adjusted union density and political ideology while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying jel j38 d72 d78

revisiting the okun relationship our article revisits the okun relationship between observed unemployment rates and output gaps we include in the relationship the effect of labour market institutions as well as age and gender effects our empirical analysis is based on 20 oecd countries over the period 1985 2013 we find that the share of temporary workers which includes a high and rising share of young workers played a crucial role in explaining changes in the okun coefficient the impact of the output gap on the unemployment rate over time the okun coefficient is not only different for young prime age and older workers but also it decreases with age from a policy perspective it follows that an increase in economic growth will not only have the desired outcome of reducing the overall unemployment rate but it will also have the distributional effect of lowering youth unemployment

employment effects of product and labour market reforms are there synergies this article investigates the effect of product market liberalisation on employment allowing for interactions between policies and institutions in product and labour markets using panel data for oecd countries over the period 1980 2002 we present evidence that product market deregulation is more effective at the margin when labour market regulation is high the data also suggest that product market liberalisation may promote employment enhancing labour market reforms

inefficient equilibria in lobbying lobbying is often represented as a common agency game common agency games typically have multiple equilibria one class of equilibria called truthful has been identified by bernheim and whinston quarterly journal of economics 1986 101 1 1 31 in this paper we identify another class of equilibria which we call natural in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative the alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65 of the matches while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5 of the matches 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

an intertemporal model of saving and investment this paper characterizes a market economy with infinitely long lived consumers and value maximizing firms which face costs of adjustment for capital the temporary equilibrium of this economy is similar to the short run equilibrium of standard macroeconomic models consumption is a function of wealth investment is related to the value of firms equilibrium between aggregate demand and aggregate supply is achieved by the endogenous adjustment of the sequence of current and future interest rates the dynamic behavior of output consumption and investment in this economy is the same as in an optimal growth model with adjustment costs the paper shows this equivalence and then uses it together with the equivalence of taxes to technological shocks to study the dynamic effects of fiscal policy

damned if you do and damned if you don t two masters abstract we study common agency problems in which two principals groups make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent s action our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments for our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium which typically involves randomization by both principals greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition the principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards sometimes strictly with rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups with punishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals we study whether introducing an attractive compromise reduces competition between principals our framework of imperfect monitoring offers a natural perturbation of the standard common agency model of menu auctions which results in sharper equilibrium predictions the limit equilibrium prediction provides support to both truthful equilibria and the competing notion of natural equilibria which unlike the former may be inefficient