time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

interpreting the great moderation changes in the volatility of economic activity at the macro and micro levels most advanced economies have experienced a striking decline in the volatility of aggregate economic activity since the early 1980s volatility reductions are evident for output and employment at the aggregate level and across most industrial sectors and expenditure categories inflation and inflation volatility have also declined dramatically previous studies offer several potential explanations for this great moderation we review evidence on the great moderation in conjunction with evidence about volatility trends at the micro level we combine the two types of evidence to develop a tentative story for important components of the aggregate volatility decline and its consequences the key ingredients are declines in firm level volatility and aggregate volatility most dramatically in the durable goods sector surprisingly this has occurred without a decline in household consumption volatility and individual earnings uncertainty our explanation for the aggregate volatility decline stresses improved supply chain management particularly in the durable goods sector and less important a shift in production and employment from goods to services we provide evidence that better inventory control made a substantial contribution to declines in firm level and aggregate volatility consistent with this view if we look past the turbulent 1970s and early 1980s much of the moderation reflects a decline in high frequency short term fluctuations while these developments represent efficiency gains they do not imply nor is there evidence for a reduction in economic uncertainty faced by individuals and households

why voters may prefer congested public clubs governmental facilities for such services as education health and transportation are often small of poor quality and overcrowded even when the costs are spread among all taxpayers we also find that governments may subsidize private facilities providing the same services or may charge admission fees at public facilities we explain these phenomena with a model which considers two types of people rich and poor a majority consisting of poor people may purposely build small and low quality facilities to discourage use by the rich thereby lowering taxes for the same reason the poor may benefit from an admission fee at public clubs or even from a subsidy to private clubs they do not use

on price taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding abstract competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry for two reasons first there may be an integer problem as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding second optimal groups may have different compositions from the population and then even if there is no integer problem it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups i define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium always exists in a sufficiently large economy i focus on the optimal size of the economy rather than of clubs

the provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork barrel spending we compare a winner take all system where all the spoils go to the winner to a proportional system where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote in a winner take all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable we then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

assistance to poor households when income is not observed targeted in kind and in cash transfers abstract policymakers frequently design self targeting programs or target poor areas to assist poor families when income is not observed self targeting schemes take advantage of differences in participation costs in assistance programs across households geographic targeting assumes that transfers are solely determined by the region of residence to receive the benefits households not initially present in the targeted areas must relocate away from their original place of residence and live with the poor which entails a cost that can also be interpreted as a participation cost in the assistance program the paper shows that a combination of in kind and in cash transfers tied to the consumption of a publicly provided private good targeted to the poor becomes very useful when non poor households have different participation costs by distinguishing users and non users of public facilities additional in cash transfers can be directed to the poor more effectively the paper demonstrates that the publicly provided good ends up being undersupplied and the distortion becomes less important as participation costs rise more importantly it shows that this kind of redistributive program dominates a pure in cash scheme

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

the welfare cost of free public schools the welfare cost of free public schools is the difference between the cost of those schools and the maximum parents would be willing to pay to send their children to those schools estimates based on data from california school districts in 1970 indicate that this welfare cost is substantial mostly because private schools are cheaper per unit of quality than public schools

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

the political economy of school choice linking theory and evidence abstract we derive an improved methodology for linking theoretical parameters of a political economy model of school choice to empirical values estimated by regressing local private enrollment shares on mean income the median to mean ratio religious and ethnic composition and other variables this leads us to reject the commonly maintained assumption that a coalition of ends against the middle determines local school funding and to conclude instead that the median income voter is decisive it also allows us to estimate the perceived relative efficiency advantage of private schooling which we find to be about 30 at the margin

quality and congestion in environmental goods the road to the wangapeka abstract an increasing complaint heard among new zealand residents is that their enjoyment of local environmental resources is being diminished by increased congestion from foreign visitors this paper considers a model of vertical differentiation in which foreign high value and domestic low value consumers incur congestion costs in using a common resource we demonstrate that reducing quality in the face of increased foreign demand is optimal absent discriminatory prices but not otherwise we also consider the provision of multiple environmental goods and demonstrate that providing differential qualities may be optimal even if domestic consumers do not use the high quality resources at all

the dynamics of government abstract we model income redistribution with dynamic distortions as determined by rational voting without commitment among individuals of different types and income realizations we find that redistribution is too persistent relative to that chosen by a planner with commitment the difference is larger the lower is the political influence of young agents the lower is the altruistic concern for future generations and the lower is risk aversion furthermore there tends to be too much redistribution in the political equilibrium finally smooth preference aggregation as under probabilistic voting produces less persistence and does not admit multiple equilibria which occur under majority voting aggregation

capital taxation under political constraints this paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform a policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform thus sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or u shaped so that savings are subsidized for the poor and or the middle class but are taxed for the rich u shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals political behavior is purely determined by economic motives

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

the melting pot and school choice abstract in the united states parents are offered free public education in the mainstream culture but must pay the full cost of tuition if they educate their children privately this creates strong economic incentives for remaining within the public system which promotes the assimilation of minorities a pareto improvement can be achieved by subsidizing private education in exchange for modifying its social content so as to reduce polarization popular opposition to voucher programs that facilitate school choice without regulating cultural content may partly reflect voters concerns that such programs threaten to erode the common ground created by public education