household saving in ldcs credit markets insurance and welfare some ways in which farmers in ldcs can protect their living standards against fluctuations in income are discussed after considering the theory of consumption under uncertainty when there is no or limited borrowing the case where some borrowing is allowed is also examined empirical evidence from some ldcs is used to look at i household borrowing and lending their importance and timing and their role in smoothing consumption and ii the life cycle behavior of consumption and income the results suggest that hump lifecycle saving is not likely to be a very important generator of wealth in ldcs and provide further evidence on the limited role of credit markets

credit market constraints consumption smoothing and the accumulation of durable production assets in low income countries investments in bullocks in india in this paper we formulate and estimate a finite horizon structural dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior that incorporates the major features of low income agricultural environments income uncertainty constraints on borrowing and rental markets and the use of investment assets to generate income and smooth consumption the model is fit to longitudinal indian household data on farm profits bullock stocks and pump sets the estimated structural parameters are used to assess the effects on the life cycle accumulation of bullocks agricultural profits and welfare associated with complete markets and bullock liquidity and with second best policies that provide assured sources of income to farmers and weather insurance

discount rates and credit markets theory and evidence from rural india three models of credit markets 1 the permanent income model 2 upward sloping credit supply to individual borrowers and 3 constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement are tested using credit market data and an experimental study of individuals discount rates in south india the permanent income model is rejected by both the discount rate and the credit market data the discount rate data are consistent with either of the other two models while the credit market data are consistent with a combination of these two models other explanations are found to be insufficient to explain the results of this study

consumer response to the timing of income evidence from a change in tax withholding in 1992 the income tax withholding tables were adjusted so that withholding was reduced a typical worker received an extra 28 80 in take home pay per month in march through december 1992 to be offset by a lower tax refund in 1993 the change in withholding amounted to 0 5 percent of gdp president bush who proposed this change in his state of the union address intended that it provide a temporary stimulus to demand but the policy change involved only the timing of income so under the life cycle permanent income model it would be predicted to have a negligible effect on consumption and aggregate demand this paper reports consumers responses to the change in withholding the results are based on a survey taken shortly after it went into effect forty three percent of consumers report spending the extra take home pay substantially more than the zero percent predicted by the standard models but substantially less than the one hundred percent upon which the policy was predicated the decision to save the income is not explained by expected income growth therefore while behavior of many households is not fully consistent with the life cycle permanent income model liquidity constraints do not appear to account for this behavior this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

credit as insurance in agrarian economies abstract this paper examines consumption credit as an insurance mechanism in agrarian economies it explains the more rapid adoption of new technology in the green revolution by large farmers who had greater access to consumption credit the paper also demonstrates how the emergence and expansion of consumption credit markets by mitigating the need for hoarding in order to meet consumption contingencies enhances growth by encouraging investment

credit markets in northern nigeria credit as insurance in a rural economy this article addresses the issues of imcomplete markets and imperfect information in the context of credit markets in rural northern nigeria in much recent theoretical literature the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions in contrast it is found that in the four villages surveyed credit transactions take advantage of the free flow of information within rural communities information asymmetries between borrower and lender are unimportant and their institutional consequences the use of collateral and interlinked contracts are absent credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between households through the use of contracts in which the repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random production shocks by both the borrower and the lender

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

risk and insurance in a rural credit market an empirical investigation in northern nigeria credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern nigeria repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders the paper develops two models of state contingent loans the first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts the second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions but that a fully efficient risk pooling equilibrium is not achieved the research is based on a year long survey in zaria nigeria conducted by the author

household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties evidence from cote d ivoire abstract this paper investigates the hypothesis that households in cote d ivoire take part in spatially diversified risk sharing arrangements with members of their own ethnic group empirical tests are presented using several estimation methods to deal with heteroscedasticity measurement error and extreme value problems to examine whether results are robust across estimation procedures the hypothesis of complete risk sharing within ethnic groups is rejected however there appears to be some partial insurance performed by individual households with other members of the same ethnic group particularly for the households residing in the regions least likely to have access to formal financial arrangements

sustainable plans and mutual default this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal taxation in which both private agents and the government can default on their debt as a benchmark we consider ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit to its policies at the beginning of time but in which private agents can default we then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we adapt abreu s 1988 optimal trigger strategies to completely characterize the entire set of sustainable equilibria in particular we show that when there is sufficiently little discounting and government consumption fluctuates enough the ramsey allocations and policies in which the government never defaults can be supported by a sustainable equilibrium by way of an example we show that the larger the variance of government consumption the easier it is to support good outcomes we also show for moderate discount factors that in the best sustainable equilibrium tax rates are more volatile and debt is smaller than in the ramsey equilibrium

protectionary bias in agriculture a pure economic argument abstract empirical evidence suggests that the agricultural sector in the developed countries has enjoyed a greater degree of protection than the import competing manufacturing sectors usually this is attributed to strong farm lobbies and hence on political factors we provide a theoretical model and a possible explanation of this phenomenon based on purely economic arguments two importables are accommodated in a three good three factor model of trade and production one is a labor intensive manufacturing good and the other is an agricultural commodity this captures the trade pattern of a typical industrialized country with an agricultural sector such as europe and the usa we show that uniform tariffs in agriculture and labor intensive manufacturing will definitely hurt the land owners in real terms and may reduce their absolute return hence if there has to be protection it has to be biased in favor of agriculture

income smoothing and consumption smoothing one way that risk averse households protect consumption levels is to borrow and use insurance mechanisms another way common in low income economies is to diversify economic activities and make conservative production and employment choices households thus tend toward limiting exposure only to shocks that can be handled with available credit and insurance typically both types of mechanisms are studied independently but much more can be learned by studying them together first we obtain a more complete picture of risks costs and insurance possibilities second it opens the way to considering biases in standard tests of credit and insurance

is the behavior of hours worked consistent with implicit contract theory this paper examines the determinants of hours worked when employment relationships are influenced by risk sharing considerations the environment considered is an extension of the standard symmetric information risk sharing model that allows for the possibility of enforcement problems on the part of both the employer and the employee we show that this class of risk sharing models unambiguously predicts hours to be influenced by wages only through an income effect using data from the psed we find evidence in favor of this extended version of the risk sharing model

economies of scale household size and the demand for food household scale economies are plausibly attributed to shared household public goods that make larger households better off at the same level of per capita resources larger households should therefore have higher per capita consumption of private goods such as food provided that they do not substitute too much toward the effectively cheaper public goods the evidence shows exactly the opposite data from rich and poor countries indicate that at constant per capita total expenditure the per capita demand for food decreases with household size and that it does so most in the poorest countries where substitution should be the least

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

consumption smoothing in island economies can public insurance reduce welfare abstract in this paper we study the effects of certain types of public compulsory insurance arrangements for aggregate shocks on private allocations in environments with limited commitment we show that this type of insurance can improve the wellbeing of private situations but it can also deteriorate it we also describe how different characteristics of the environment affect the role of public insurance using data on the mexican progresa program we document the impact that some government programs have in crowding out private transfers

ex ante payments in self enforcing risk sharing contracts abstract we analyze a long term risk sharing contract between two risk averse agents facing self enforcing constraints we enlarge the contracting space to allow for an ex ante transfer before the state of nature is realized and we characterize the optimal ex ante and ex post payments we show that optimal ex ante payments are inversely related to the non stationary expected surplus with i i d shocks the dynamics of the optimal contract exhibit experience rating even though there is no private information or learning taking place finally we assess numerically the value of introducing the ex ante payment as well as compare the dynamics of consumption with and without this payment journal of economic literature classification numbers c61 c63 e21 g22 d90

full insurance in the presence of aggregate uncertainty this paper tests implications of full consumption insurance the object is to determine how much mileage can be obtained from a model with complete markets with such features as private information or liquidity constraints omitted the implication exploited is that individual consumption responds to aggregate risk but not to idiosyncratic risk the test involves regressing the change in household consumption onto the change in aggregate consumption and other right hand side variables such as the change in household income and change in employment status all variables other than the change in aggregate consumption are predicted to be insignificant in explaining the change in household consumption with observations on consumption and income for 10 695 households from the consumer expenditure survey the results are mixed the results for one specification exponential utility are mostly consistent with full consumption insurance the results for the other specification power utility are not

a simple test of consumption insurance are consumers effectively insured against idiosyncratic shocks to income or wealth either by formal institutions such as charities private insurance and government programs or by informal mechanisms such as gifts and loans from relatives friends and neighbors under full insurance consumption growth should be cross sectionally independent of idiosyncratic variables that are exogenous to consumers this proposition is tested by cross sectional regressions of consumption growth on a variety of exogenous variables full insurance is rejected for long illness and involuntary job loss but not for spells of unemployment loss of work due to strike and an involuntary move

risk financial markets and human capital in a developing country this paper explores the link between financial market incompleteness and human capital accumulation we examine how child school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households using panel data from rural india to pinpoint market imperfections we study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic as well as to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks our main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self insurance but one which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average

risk sharing and information in village economies arrangements for achieving efficient risk sharing vary depending on the information available to agents in the economy the usual euler equation restricts efficient allocations in an economy which obeys the permanent income hypothesis while efficient allocations in an economy with private information and long term contracts satisfy a symmetric restriction but not the euler equation full insurance arrangements are unique in that they satisfy both restrictions we look at an environment in which it seems likely that long term contracts play a role in mitigating the effects of private information three village economies in south india the evidence that consumption allocations satisfy the private information restriction is quite strong for households in two of the three villages the evidence for the third village suggests that while consumption for some households satisfies the private information restrictions other households consumption obey the permanent income hypothesis

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

an inquiry into quasi credit contracts the role of reciprocal credit and interlinked deals in small scale fishing communities in agrarian village societies beset with many hazards and uncertainties people evolve various means of coping with risk what is perhaps less known is that credit transactions can sometimes serve the function of reducing risk in such societies this article is concerned with examining several insurance motivated credit arrangements in small scale fishing communities a hunger insurance mechanism of reciprocal credit and a system of interlinked contracts aimed at insuring against risks in the spheres of labour and marketing relations will be extensively dealt with moreover the concept of triadic relationships will be shown to have special relevance in the case of traditional insurance arrangements aiming at controlling problems of moral hazard

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval