trustworthiness and interest rates an empirical study of italian smes trust is expected to reduce transaction costs and agency costs and thus influence the cost of credit for small businesses assessments of trustworthiness are based on the ability benevolence and integrity of the owner manager the study examines whether lending managers assessments of the trustworthiness of small and medium sized enterprise sme owner managers are associated with the interest rate charged data were obtained from a survey of lending managers from small banks in north east italy control variables and a vector of trustworthiness factors were collected on a random sample of customers resulting in data for 365 small firms 74 response rate multivariate regression analyses provided evidence of a negative association between trustworthiness and interest rates banks owner managers policy makers and researchers should recognise the potential of trust to influence lending decisions and behaviour

new issues in corporate finance flow of funds data are used to compare methods of finance in 5 countries over the period 1970 to 1985 many of the problems associated with previous studies are avoided by estimating net instead of gross financing proportions the degree of consolidation of accounts reciprocal arrangements between borrowers and lenders and compensating deposit requirements on borrowers no longer distort financing patterns corrections for inflation are provided by employing flow rather than stock figures and using own aggregation procedures to derive stock measures significant variations in financing emerge these are not readily explained by traditional descriptions of corporate finance in particular taxation as an alternative the paper suggests that relationships between borrowers and lenders establish forms of commitment that are conducive to the provision of long term finance the separation between investment and finance which has been the starting point of corporate finance theory is untenable in a multiperiod context in which terms of finance define future allocation of control

does trade credit play a signalling role some evidence from smes microdata using micro data on small and medium sized enterprises this paper empirically investigates the signalling hypothesis formulated on the role of trade credit biais and gollier in rev financ stud 10 903 937 1997 burkart and ellingsen in am econ rev 94 569 590 2004 the research method adopted allows evaluation of the impact of suppliers credit on bank debt accounting for the strength duration of bank firm relationships our main finding is that trade credit seems to have an information content for banks especially when the latter do not dispose of adequate soft information on firms which is likely the case at the beginning stages of bank firm relationships an implication of our results is that the availability of suppliers credit might be crucial to foster access to institutional funding for new firms entering the market our evidence also suggests that banks seem to consider suppliers a reliable source of information on firms financial conditions even after several years of lending relationships

vive la difference social banks and reciprocity in the credit market social banks are financial intermediaries paying attention to non economic i e social ethical and environmental criteria to investigate the behavior of social banks on the credit market this paper proposes both theory and empirics our theoretical model rationalizes the idea that reciprocity can generate better repayment performances based on a unique hand collected dataset released by a french social bank our empirical results are twofold first we show that the bank charges below market interest rates for social projects second regardless of their creditworthiness motivated borrowers respond to advantageous credit terms by significantly lowering their probability of default we interpret this outcome as the first evidence of reciprocity in the credit market

does ict adoption improve access to credit for small enterprises using data at the bank firm level collected through the 9th unicredit survey conducted in 2012 on a large sample of small businesses we investigate the extent to which a large international bank offers better credit conditions to enterprises that use ict more extensively the results which are robust to selection and endogeneity issues show that banks tend to grant increasing volumes of credit to such enterprises we interpret this evidence as the ceteris paribus effect of ict adoption by small businesses on the quality of information transmitted to banks another possible interpretation is that banks consider ict adoption as a signal of firms willingness to innovate we also discuss implications concerning the key role that technology plays in changing the arm s length versus relationship lending paradigms

a micro data approach to the identification of credit crunches this article presents a micro data approach to the identification of credit crunches using a survey among german firms which regularly queries the firms assessment of the current willingness of banks to extend credit we estimate the probability of a restrictive loan supply policy by time taking into account the creditworthiness of borrowers creditworthiness is approximated by firm specific factors e g the firms assessment of their current business situation and their business expectations after controlling for the return on the banks risk free investment alternative which is also likely to affect the supply of loans we derive a credit crunch indicator which measures that part of the shift in the loan supply that is neither explained by firm specific factors nor by the opportunity costs of providing risky loans

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

bargaining power and information in sme lending small and medium sized enterprises smes are informationally opaque and bank dependent in sme lending banks largely rely on soft information because the scale and scope of hard information are limited we analyze whether and how hard and soft information affects the borrower s bargaining power vis a vis its bank we use the fact that for a given credit rating certain borrowers obtain better loan terms than others to define measures of relative bargaining power using sme loan data from the usa and germany we find that more favorable soft information management skills and character increases borrower bargaining power we also show that more favorable soft than hard information improves borrower bargaining power the results are not driven by manipulation or statistical limitations of the credit ratings our study suggests that soft information represents an important and direct determinant of borrower bargaining power affecting the outcomes of the loan contracting process

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

overcoming information asymmetries in low income lending lessons from the working wheels program without access to transportation the welfare to work transition is nearly impossible yet little is known about the effectiveness of programs designed to improve credit access since 1998 vermont s tanf funds have provided automobile loans through the working wheels program we use microlevel data from this program to explore how to cost effectively provide loans to clients who cannot obtain affordable loans elsewhere our results verify the importance of relationship lending particularly among those without documented credit histories in the presence of information asymmetries about credit history our results justify the increased trust placed in clients with whom the bank has a stronger relationship such clients ceteris paribus are less likely to default we conclude that in the current climate of welfare reform policymakers should consider programs that encourage welfare recipients to establish and maintain relationships with financial institutions in order to facilitate access to credit and minimize the risk of default

firm value illiquidity risk and liquidity insurance abstract our interest here concerns liquidity supply to firms we first examine the relation between firm value and access to liquidity supply and then we investigate the existence conditions and efficiency properties of financial contracts with a liquidity covenant in a continuous time infinite horizon stochastic model of a repeated firm investors relationship where the key problem is the mutual commitment between the two parties to model this problem we consider liquidity supply as a stochastic regulator mechanism that prevents the firm s ability to pay from falling below a predefined threshold here the market fixed coupon and we then apply recent developments in dynamic programming techniques for regulated processes to obtain a close form solution for the firm s value our main finding is that efficient i e actuarially fair and renegotiation proof contracts emerge in the absence of perfect commitment as the firm and the investor can exert mutual threat of termination

equilibrium loan pricing under the bank client relationship abstract we determine the loan interest rate policy of a lender who is better informed about a client than other potential lenders the informational advantage possessed by the informed lender derives from the durability of information acquired as a result of an extant relationship given heterogeneous potential loan rate offers to the client by competitive lenders and client search costs the incumbent lender s policy of loan interest rate offers is examined we show that the optimal loan rate will exceed the incumbent lender s cost of funds and will exceed the average offer of competing lenders the potential lenders will offer loan rates that are exceeded by their cost of funds implying immediate losses in order to attract the client and to thereby earn expected profits in the future finally we show that the expected remaining duration of a lender client relationship is decreasing in the existing length of the relationship thus clients that have been with a particular lender longer will be more likely to leave and establish a relationship with another lender

lending to small businesses the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems we investigate what determines the maturity of lines of credit to small businesses our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that shorter loan maturities serve to mitigate the problems associated with borrower risk and asymmetric information that are typical of small business lending we find that maturity is shorter for firm owners that have poor credit histories are older and less experienced and for firms that are more informationally opaque supporting the notion that collateral and maturity are substitute mechanisms in mitigating agency problems we also find strong evidence that maturity increases with collateral pledges that personal collateral is associated with longer maturities than business collateral and that collateral types that better mitigate agency problems reduce the sensitivity of loan maturity to informational asymmetries and risk finally while it is argued that relationship lending may mitigate information asymmetry we find no relation between loan maturity and stronger firm creditor ties

financial systems financing constraints and investment empirical analysis of oecd countries this paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 oecd countries we find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm s length bank firm relationships at the same time we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment and that close bank firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance

explaining loan rate differentials between small and large companies evidence from switzerland the lending rate differentials between loans to small and large companies are striking according to several studies these disparities of loan rates are primarily a result of a lower informational efficiency at small companies this study examines to what extent such differences in loan rates are caused not only by informational inefficiencies but also by operational costs and the borrower s negotiation power by using unique hand collected data from the credit pricing models of 15 swiss regional banks we provide new empirical evidence that operational costs are a key factor in explaining differences in lending rates between small and large enterprises furthermore we also found that the lack of negotiation power of small enterprises expressed in the profit margin amount of the bank has significant explanatory power

the countercyclical role of italian local banks during the financial crisis abstractthe article analyses the role of local banks in italy during the 2008 2009 crisis from the perspective of the relationship lending model during the crisis the risk of cascading failures of financial organizations has dramatically increased thus causing a return of attention to local banking as a possible source of countercyclical behaviours in the financial markets thanks to their ability to establish fiduciary long term relationships with small businesses the purpose of this article is to test this hypothesis and to disentangle the response of local banks during the financial turmoil according to their governance structure and location our results show that non independent local banks and to a limited extent cooperative banks located in the rural area actually played a significant countercyclical role across the crisis policy implications suggest that prudential supervision should rethink the indicators of systemic risk in order to differentiate banks according to their capability of mitig

banks lending decisions after loan acquisitions do banks favour pre existing relationships this article examines the lending decisions of korean banks after they acquire loan portfolios from failed banks we find that a firm s pre existing relationships positively affect the continuation of those relationships and that pre existing relationships negatively impact increases in loan size once those relationships are maintained these results suggest that banks have a conflict of interest that comes with pre existing lending relationships and that bank quality does not necessarily convey the risk classes of its client firms

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

monitoring loan renegotiability and firm value the role of lending syndicates abstract the positive response in capital markets to announcements of private financings is well documented and typically rationalized as a reflection of valuable monitoring and screening services provided by banks and other private lenders this paper investigates the hypothesis that the capacity to renegotiate private debt contracts relatively inexpensively complements monitoring as a source of value to borrowers the context for our study is lending by syndicates of private lenders as the number of lenders increases contracting costs increase and the value associated with the capacity to renegotiate should decline our evidence supports this hypothesis we conduct additional tests to determine whether our results are robust to alternative interpretations such as information leakage or the prospect that syndicate size proxies for information related variables syndicate size remains related to the scale of the market s reaction after taking various borrower and loan characteristics into account

multiple lenders and corporate distress evidence on debt restructuring multiple banking is a common characteristic of the corporate lending particularly of medium sized and large firms however if the firms are facing distress multiple lenders may have serious coordination problems as has been argued in the theoretical literature in this paper we analyse the problems of multiple banking in borrower distress empirically we rely on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit file information on distressed lending relationships in germany in particular it includes information on bank pools a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in distress we find that the existence of small pools increases the probability of workout success and that this effect reverses when pools become large we identify major determinants of pool formation in particular the number of banks the distribution of lending among banks and the severity of the distress copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

is relationship lending special evidence from credit file data in germany the german financial market is often characterized as a bank based system with strong bank customer relationships the corresponding notion of a housebank is closely related to the theoretical idea of relationship lending it is the objective of this paper to provide a direct comparison between housebanks and normal banks as to their credit policy therefore we analyze a new data set representing a random sample of borrowers drawn from the credit portfolios of five leading german banks over a period of five years we use credit file data rather than industry survey data and thus focus the analysis on information that is directly related to actual credit decisions in particular we use bank internal borrower rating data to evaluate borrower quality and the bank s own assessment of its housebank status to control for information intensive relationships the major results of our study support the view that housebanks are able to establish a distinct behavioral pattern consistent with the idea of long term commitment we find that housebanks do provide liquidity insurance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings with respect to loan pricing we find no evidence for intra or intertemporal price differentiation related to housebanking

relationship lending during a financial crisis this paper studies whether relationship lending mitigates the transmission of the lehman default shock to the supply of credit in italy exploiting the presence of multiple banking relationships we control for banks and firms unobserved characteristics results show that the growth of credit itself is higher and its cost lower the shorter the distance between the bank and the firm the longer the relationship and the higher the share of credit held by the bank credit growth by relationship lenders is 4 6 higher than that by transactional lenders the increase in the cost of credit is 50 basis points lower the positive effect of relationship lending on credit supply increased during the crisis compared to a pre crisis period the beneficial effect of relationship lending is weaker if the relationship lender is more exposed to the financial crisis especially when lending to weaker borrowers

bank behavior based on internal credit ratings of borrowers abstract this study examines the relation of bank loan terms to borrower risk defined by the banks internal credit rating the analysis is not restricted to a static view it also incorporates rating transition and its implications on the relation money illusion and phenomena linked with relationship banking are discovered as important factors the results show that riskier borrowers pay higher loan rate premiums and rely more on bank finance housebanks obtain more collateral and provide more finance caused by money illusion in times of high market interest rates loan rate premiums are relatively small whereas in times of low market interest rates they are relatively high there was no evidence for an appropriate adjustment of loan terms to rating changes

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

small bank comparative advantages in alleviating financial constraints and providing liquidity insurance over time we use novel monthly survey data from 1993 to 2012 on small business managerial perceptions of financial constraints and other conditions matched with information on banks in their local markets the data suggest that small banks have comparative advantages in alleviating these constraints these advantages tend to be greater during adverse economic conditions and do not appear to decrease or increase secularly small banks also appear to have comparative advantages in providing liquidity insurance to small business customers of large banks experiencing liquidity shocks during financial crises our findings suggest a source of social costs from ongoing consolidation of the banking industry received december 28 2015 editorial decision january 13 2017 by editor philip strahan

relationship lending accounting disclosure and credit availability during the asian financial crisis we examine whether lending relationships benefit firms by making credit more available during periods of financial stress our main finding is that during the asian financial crisis of july 1997 through the end of 1998 relationship lending increased the likelihood that korean and thai firms would obtain credit but it had no effect on indonesian and philippine firms we ask if accounting disclosure might explain the observed differences among the three countries for which audit information is available we find that for indonesian firms with weak lending relationships banks replace relationship lending technology with a financial statement lending technology such a result does not hold for korean and philippine firms

the effect of lender identity on a borrowing firm s equity return previous research demonstrates that a firm s common stock price tends to fall when it issues new public securities by contrast commercial bank loans elicit significantly positive borrower returns this article investigates whether the lender s identity influences the market s reaction to a loan announcement although we find no significant difference between the market s response to bank and nonbank loans we do find that lenders with a higher credit rating are associated with larger abnormal borrower returns this evidence complements earlier findings that an auditor s or investment banker s perceived quality signals valuable information about firm value to uninformed market investors previous studies show that certain types of loan announcements generate significantly positive abnormal returns to the average borrower s equity 1 this finding contrasts with the negative equity returns generally associated with a corporation s issuance of public securities smith 1986 this difference in market reactions indicates that private and public securities are not perfect substitutes for the average firm in this sense lender identity defined as public versus private lender significantly impacts the borrower s abnormal equity return the standard theoretical explanation for this difference is that private lenders either obtain private information about the firm s value or they have the incentive and ability to monitor firm behavior more effectively than other outside monitors can although the empirical literature on private lending has evaluated primarily commercial bank loans and lines of credit these theoretical arguments apply equally to any type of private

credit reporting relationship banking and loan repayment how does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior we show in a laboratory credit market that information sharing increases repayment rates as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit this incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third party enforceable and lending is dominated by one shot transactions if however repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders ability to extract rents from relationships copyright 2007 the ohio state university

capital market information and industrial performance the role of west german banks in orthodox theory external capital markets play a dual role supplying various forms of investment finance and disciplining firms which are inefficient or fail to pursue profit goals an extensive literature speaks of the efficiency of external capital markets meaning that firms can make production investment decisions and investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms activities under the assumption that security prices at any time fully reflect all available information fama i970 1 however this concept of efficiency is purely technical it depends critically on what information is available and we know there are problems of appropriability and failure in information markets deriving ultimately from certain peculiarities of information as a commodity arrow i962 thus another growing literature focusses on problems of achieving equilibrium in markets where agents are imperfectly or asymmetrically informed amongst other things this literature shows that informational failures of the kind in question can lead to capital rationing in loan and credit markets and the use of strict collateral requirements as screening devices jaffee and russell i976 stiglitz and weiss i98i cable and turner i983 these may then be expected to affect the efficiency of individual firms and the system as a whole capital shortage implies that some profitable investment opportunities are foregone and production choices may also be distorted by the need to satisfy additional financial constraints contrived to elicit signals of creditworthiness of the firms undertaking them similarly the disciplining role of external capital markets can be impaired by information impactedness williamson i975 and the costs of mobilising and giving effect to shareholders preferences thus in the principal agent framework developed by jensen and meckling i976 and fama i980 the degree of constraint on managerial pursuit of non profit goals as posited by managerial theorists depends on the transactions costs of stock owner intervention the result is an optimal degree of departure from cost minimising profit maximising behaviour determined by the level of transactions costs institutional factors which affect the way information is distributed amongst agents can therefore have an important bearing on allocative and technical efficiency and the west german system of industrial finance provides an in

creditor concentration an empirical investigation most of the literature on multiple banking assumes equal financing shares however unequal asymmetric or concentrated bank borrowing is widespread and creditor concentration is only weakly correlated with the number of bank relationships this paper therefore investigates the determinants of creditor concentration for german firms using a comprehensive firm bank level dataset for the time period between 1993 and 2003 we document that corporate borrowing from banks is very often concentrated even for the largest firms in our sample leveraged firms and firms with more redeployable assets concentrate their borrowing from banks as are firms dealing with a relationship lender that is profitable that has lower monitoring costs or that operates in a concentrated regional lending market

short term loans and long term relationships relationship lending in early america recent banking theory holds that durable firm bank relationships are valuable to both parties this paper uses the contract specific loan records of a 19th century u s bank and shows that firms with extended relationships received three principal benefits first firmswith extended relationships had lower credit costs second long term customers provided fewer personal guarantees which were an alternative to collateral third long term customers were more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during a credit crunch these findings support theories that banks realize cost advantages through the use of proprietary information

estimating demand elasticities using nonlinear pricing abstract nonlinear pricing is prevalent in industries such as health care public utilities and telecommunications however this pricing scheme introduces bias into estimating elasticities for welfare analysis or policy changes i develop a local elasticity estimation method that uses nonlinear price schedules to isolate consumers expenditure choices from selection and simultaneity biases this method improves over previous approaches by using commonly available observational data and requiring only a single general monotonicity assumption using claims level data on health insurance with two nonlinearities i am able to measure two separate elasticities and find that elasticity declines from 0 26 to 0 09 by the second nonlinearity these estimates are then used to calculate moral hazard deadweight loss this method enables estimation of many policies with nonlinear pricing which previous tools could not address

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching abstract we analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition in the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition since the poaching activities can be targeted towards more creditworthy borrowers we find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits and therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets

relationship lending and sme financing in the continental european bank based system this paper analyzes the relationship between banks and smes in the continental european bank based system we find that smes with longer bank relationships have enhanced access to loans but at the same time they bear a higher cost for their debt we also find that firms maintaining two bank relationships get the cheapest debt which establishes a limit for the degree of concentration of bank relationships our results also show that the existence of trust between firm and bank improves access to financing and reduces the borrowing costs whereas it increases the likelihood that guarantees will have to be provided as a consequence it seems that a relationship based on trust is a better strategy to improve smes access to finance than the establishment of longer or more concentrated relationships

long term supply side implications of the great depression we compare the experiences of the us and uk during and after the great depression with particular attention to overall productivity growth industrial organization the growth of human capital and protectionism we discover many implications of the great depression experience and policies for post war economic activities we conclude that one should never waste a good crisis in the implementation of one so wn economic policies labour market policies should encourage the formation of human capital and it is dangerous to assume that other countries will not change in an economic crisis

an examination of the factors associated with bank switching in the u k small firm sector previous research has consistently shown that a large number of firms are sufficiently dissatisfied with their bank relationship to have considered switching to an alternative bank in practice however the number of firms which actually switch banks is relatively low this paper examines empirical evidence from a postal survey of small firms in order to investigate this paradox binomial and multinomial logistic regression is used to identify the characteristics which discriminate between a group of firms considering switching banks and two other groups namely those which had switched banks in the previous three years and those which had not switched banks and were not considering doing so the paper tests the hypothesis that some small firms may be informationally captured in that they are tied into their current bank relationship due to difficulties in conveying accurate information about their performance the results provide some evidence in support of the hypothesis in that rapidly changing information particularly changing technology was a characteristic associated with firms which were considering switching but had not switched however there was no significant evidence to support the hypothesis that superior performing firms are more likely to be informationally captured growth and perceived business success were both associated with firms which switched banks there was strong evidence that the main drivers of the decision to switch or consider switching banks were difficulties obtaining finance and dissatisfaction with the service provided the results also showed that firms which were considering switching banks tended to use more alternative non banking sources of finance it is concluded that some firms will resolve difficulties obtaining finance by switching banks whereas others will use alternative sources of finance depending on the balance between the benefits of switching such as increased finance and switching costs including information provision

is relationship lending still a mixed blessing a review of advantages and disadvantages for lenders and borrowers relationship lending is a common lending technology that is assumed to bring several benefits to small medium enterprises smes and to financial institutions that adopt it notably it could reduce information asymmetries permitting banks to offer better credit terms to the borrower however it also entails some costs for both sides the empirical evidence so far has not been conclusive in determining under what conditions relationship lending can be beneficial or harmful most of the studies suggest that smes that engage in relationship lending benefit from more credit availability especially during a financial crisis and lower interest rates this occurs when they are served by small banks are geographically close to the lender when the bank is adequately decentralized and when it is the dominant creditor of the firm however under certain circumstances banks can extract rents from the borrower or be captured by him in addition the consequences and the future of relationship lending will be remarkably affected by the level of competition among banks their ownership structure the regulatory framework and the business model that banks will have to adopt accordingly

on the rationale of bank lending in pre crisis thailand evidence from credit files is provided to examine bank lending determinants of thai commercial banks their lending practice follows reasonable patterns as a standard set of variables including indirect risk variables explains much of the variance in interest rate spread reflecting institutional differences with mature markets we find a higher importance of relationship banking and risk control via credit availability information about later default reveals prudent relationship lending however banks could have made better use of available information about borrowers riskiness these findings do not support a general verdict of bad banking but indicate room to improve lending decisions

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

the costs and returns of agricultural credit delivery borrower level data from 963 agricultural lending relationships are used to examine how several factors influence the costs and returns of extending agricultural credit the results provide estimates of the costs and returns of agricultural lending and the extent to which these costs and returns are influenced by factors such as loan volume lender borrower relationship factors and contract terms the findings indicate that economies of size exist in agricultural credit delivery and that lenders pass most of these benefits on to borrowers through lower interest rates in addition the impacts of lender borrower relationship factors were relatively small

bank lending technologies and credit availability in europe what can we learn from the crisis abstract using a unique sample of european manufacturing firms we empirically investigate how bank lending technologies nd soft information adoption affected firms credit availability during the 2007 2009 financial crisis estimation results indicate that transactional lending technologies increased firms credit rationing whereas soft information mitigated asymmetric information problems and improved firms access to credit by looking at the combined effect of bank lending technologies and soft information we also provide evidence about the complementarity between transactional lending techniques and soft information adoption when soft information was incorporated in transactional lending technologies firms credit rationing significantly reduced this result is especially strong for small borrowing firms and for companies matching with large financial institutions

new findings on firm investment and monetary transmission in the euro area in this paper we present comparable results on the determinants of firms investment and their link to monetary policy the results have been obtained by the eurosystem monetary transmission network this network has produced a series of papers in which the use of micro data permits estimating and quantifying the relevance of two channels of monetary policy transmission the interest rate and the broad credit channel the research findings provide evidence of an operative interest rate channel in all countries examined moreover the results indicate that variables which proxy firms financial conditions play a role firms characterised by weaker balance sheets show higher liquidity sensitivity

on the profitability and cost of relationship lending abstract we provide evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by banks we derive bank specific measures of loan rate smoothing for small business borrowers in response to exogenous shocks to their credit risk and to interest rates and then estimate cost and profit functions to examine how smoothing affects bank costs and profits our results suggests that in general loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is not part of an optimal long term contract between a bank and its borrower while loan rate smoothing in response to an interest rate shock is

volumes of evidence examining technical change in the last century through a new lens abstract new indicators of technical change based on titles included in the catalogue of the library of congress and on amazon com s website are presented along with evidence that they do capture technological innovation the indicators are used to chart the pattern and nature of technical change over the last century a strong causal relationship is found to exist between these indicators and changes in tfp and output per capita moreover innovations in some subgroups have had a greater impact on output and productivity than in others and the key players change over time information technologies are currently the dominant subgroup jel classificatiion e32 o3 o4 n1

the role of demographics in small business loan pricing demographic change influences the structure of the entrepreneurially active population which may affect credit risk and financing conditions of small firms using bank internal data of small business loans in germany we find that the lending relationship plays a larger role for loan prices than demographics loan rates decrease with soft information gained through longer loan processing time and a larger number of accounts at the same bank they increase with hard information about repayment arrears and reminders late payments have the largest influence on loan prices older entrepreneurs do not seem to be discriminated rather the younger have to pay more because their loans and businesses are smaller and they lack liquidity to pay in time marital status and population density of the business district do not matter this is good news for aging economies with a rising share of elderly and singles and growing disparities between peripheral and agglomerated regions

the effect of information sharing between lenders on access to credit cost of credit and loan performance evidence from a credit registry introduction abstract using a rich dataset from a commercial bank in albania we utilize the introduction of a public credit registry by the albanian central bank in january 2008 as a natural experiment to analyze the effect of information sharing between lenders on 1 access to credit 2 cost of credit and 3 loan performance our results suggest that information sharing by means of a credit registry does not affect access to or cost of credit but improves loan performance specifically loans granted after the introduction of the credit registry are 3 points less likely of turning problematic representing a 35 reduction of the overall sample average arrear probability we further find that the effect is more pronounced for repeat borrowers and in areas where competition is weak this indicates that information sharing among lenders improves loan performance mainly by disciplining borrowers to repay in their concern about future access to credit

the role of collateral in a model of debt renegotiation this paper studies the effect of debt renegotiation on the design of optimal loan arrangements in a model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information renegotiation may occur because bankruptcy involves costly asset liquidation which is ex post inefficient the author shows that the extent of the entrepreneur s liabilities in the optimal loan contract depends upon the creditor s commitment to impose bankruptcy should default ever occur a limited liability arrangement is optimal whenever the creditor is precommited not to forgive any portion of the outstanding debt otherwise debt may efficiently be secured by outside collateral copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

a theory of banks industry expertise market power and credit risk the author analyzes banks incentives to acquire expertise in judging the creditworthiness of borrowers in an industry with uncertain business conditions the analysis shows that industry expertise enables banks to extract rents proportional to their exposure to industry specific credit risk this exposure is in turn determined by the number of banks aiming to focus on lending to an industry in equilibrium the industry receives funding from a limited number of banks with industry expertise as well as from a competitive fringe of financiers without such expertise the equilibrium yields testable predictions about the concentration of bank lending to an industry and about the correlation between this concentration and the recovery rates default rates and interest rates of bank loans

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

regional free trade areas sorting out the tangled spaghetti as a result of the difficulties in negotiating the liberalization of trade globally countries seek liberalization among smaller groups we describe open regionalism as one such attempt to do this and show why after a decade of success it ran into the ground as a strategy the formation of discriminatory regional free trade areas ftas is sometimes seen as another response to this problem this paper point outs what is wrong with this response that it distorts trade patterns and thereby sets up an unpleasant prisoner s dilemma and suggests some ways forward we propose the formation of open trading arrangements otas and the establishment of a trade transparency commission in each country that is participating in an ota we also suggest global regulation of trade diversions caused by all ftas whether otas or not ultimately the return to health of the global trading system will require expanded understanding of the basic insight of economics that liberalization enhances the welfare of citizens of the liberalizing country

the benefits of relationship lending in a cross country context a meta analysis relationship lending may create benefits for borrowers by reducing information asymmetries however empirical evidence is mixed we conduct a meta analysis to summarize and explain the heterogeneity in the results in the literature using hand collected information from 101 studies in the united states europe asia and latin america from 1970 to 2010 we find that strong relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers but lending outcomes differ across the relationships dimensions long lasting exclusive and synergy creating bank relationships are associated with higher credit volume and lower loan rates these benefits are more likely in the united states and in countries where bank competition is high they are not related to the importance of small and medium sized enterprises in an economy suggesting that prevalence of relationship lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits our inferences are robust when we control for observed systematic heterogeneity in the original

lending competition and credit availability for new firms empirical study with the price cost margin in regional loan markets abstract in this paper i present statistical evidence of the impact of lending competition on credit availability for new firms a discrete time duration analysis with respect to the years from the start up to the first loan approval by a commercial bank or a cooperative bank which is collected from survey data in japan shows that the higher price cost margin pcm of banks which reflects the existence of a quasi rent for a bank improves the credit availability for younger firms additional analysis to detect the regional determinants of the pcm of banks shows that the share of larger banks in each local credit market has a negative and significant impact on the pcm in light of the existing empirical finding that smaller banks are more likely to provide relationship banking these findings provide indirect evidence for the hypothesis that the intensity of relationship banking in each local credit market increases the pcm and this encourages banks to extend a loan to new firms so that they can pre empt the opportunity to establish lending relationships that are expected to yield such quasi rents

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

financial liberalisation in emerging markets how does bank lending change financial liberalisation has often failed in the past due to underestimated problems of structural change we analyse such changes in lending behaviour of thai commercial banks during a liberalisation phase by way of unique micro data liberalisation has expected positive effects such as lowering the interest rate spread and collateral requirements liberalisation causes structural change such as a decline in collateral based and relationship banking however the liberal isation evidence is consistent with more risk taking such as lending to more risky projects and less protection against default the thai experience suggests obvious policy lessons

relationship lending hierarchical distance and credit tightening evidence from the financial crisis abstract this paper examines the firms credit availability during the 2007 2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank firm relationships provided by borrowers credit folders of three italian banks it aims to test whether a strong lender borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period the results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing we also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis a new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information

credit relationships evidence from experiments with real bankers relationship banking is a growing area of research indeed relationships are important for lenders to gather information about the creditworthiness of th e borrowers in this paper we contribute to the existing literature by experimentally examining to what extent long term lender borrower relationships allow moral hazard to be mitigated t he originality of our research lies in the introduction of variability in socio demographic ch aracteristics by recruiting real people includin g not only students the typical subject pool but al so bankers from both commercial banking and social lending institutions consistent with previous work we find that the opportunity to engage in bilater al long term relationships notably improves market per formance by mitigating the repayment problem ex post moral hazard nonetheless our results also sugge st that lenders take advantage of their long term situation by increasing their rates as a cons equence borrowers may have an incentive to take more risk to pay back their loan ex ante moral hazard improving information disclosure ameliorates the repayment level but does not incite lenders to offer more credits finally we find that students behavior does not differ significantly in any respe ct from that of the commercial bankers we however report that social bankers exhibit a higher probabi lity of granting a loan to their incumbent borrower s and make fairer credit offers to borrowers than the two other subject pools do