regulatory reform in britain regulatory reform in britain john kay and john vickers major sectors of the british economy are currently undergoing far reaching regulatory reform deregulation removal of barriers to competition and the introduction of new methods of regulation are occurring notably in financial services some of the professions and in utility industries such as telecommunications gas and electricity this paper gives an economic assessment of these developments the authors examine the root causes of market failure that call for regulation externalities monopoly and information problems and the pros and cons of various regulatory responses a broad distinction is drawn between structural regulation the determination of which firms or types of firms can engage in which activities and conduct regulation the control of how firms behave in their chosen activities recent examples of deregulation plus re regulation in britain are seen in part as a shift from structural to conduct regulation the relative merits of the two modes of regulation are complex to assess but it is argued that some recent regulatory reforms are placing undue reliance on conduct regulation as well as assessing individual industries the authors draw general conclusions about the desirability of regulatory solutions that make full use of market forces

agricultural planning of annual plants under demand maturation harvest and yield risk abstract in this study we present a planning methodology for a firm whose objective is to match the random supply of annual premium fruits and vegetables from a number of contracted farms and the random demand from the retailers during the planning period the supply uncertainty is due to the uncertainty of the maturation time harvest time and yield the demand uncertainty is the uncertainty of weekly demand from the retailers we provide a planning methodology to determine the farm areas and the seeding times for annual plants that survive for only one growing season in such a way that the expected total profit is maximized both the single period and the multi period cases are analyzed depending on the type of the plant the performance of the solution methodology is evaluated by using numerical experiments these experiments show that the proposed methodology matches random supply and random demand in a very effective way and improves the expected profit substantially compared to the planning approaches where the uncertainties are not taken into consideration

pricing the strategic value of putable securities in liquidity crises putable security holders have a de facto rst claim on the rm s liquid assets and can threaten to force solvent issuers to bear nancial distress costs their threatening power implies that the puts have a strategic value larger than their intrinsic value strategic value depends on the issuer s size potential distress costs and the distribution of put ownership relative to the rm s liquidity position the analysis of kmart s put induced crisis in 1995 and a calibration to observed secondary market yield reductions on poison put bonds shows that strategic value is an important determinant of payouts received by bondholders 2001 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

buy lie or die an investigation of chinese st firms voluntary interim audit motive and auditor independence in the chinese stock market special treatment st firms are the firms listed as facing imminent danger of delisting unless they return to profitability after reporting two consecutive annual losses some st firms voluntarily pay substantial fees to their external auditors to conduct interim audits which are not required by regulations in this study we investigate and find that st firms that pay for voluntary interim audits report greater discretionary accrued earnings higher non operating earnings and higher returns on assets in ensuing annual reports as a result these firms are more likely to return to profitability and reduce their delisting risk our results which contribute to the current debate on auditor independence appear to be consistent with the possibility that st firms buy external auditors cooperation to manipulate earnings when faced with the threat of delisting

material interests moral reputation and crowding out species protection on private land we consider how the reputation of being socially responsible works as an effective source of motivation in protecting a public good such as endangered species this paper investigates the mechanism design for endangered species protection on private land under asymmetric information about reputation and land quality we examine optimal monetary transfer by designing an efficient mechanism which takes into account the crowding out effect of monetary rewards on socially responsible behavior we find landowners who have good reputation contribute more than the optimum level landowners with poor reputation sacrifices information rent rather they buy reputation

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

andersen and the market for lemons in audit reports previous accounting ethics research berates auditors for ethical lapses that contribute to the failure of andersen e g duska r 2005 journal of business ethics57 17 29 staubus g 2005 journal of business ethics57 5 15 however some of the blame must also fall on regulatory and professional bodies that exist to mitigate auditors ethical lapses in this paper we consider the ethical and economic context that existed and facilitated andersen s failure our analysis is grounded in akerlof s 1970 quarterly journal of economicsaugust 488 500 theory of the market for lemons and we characterize the market for audit reports as a market for lemons consistent with akerlof s model we consider the appropriateness of the countervailing mechanisms that existed at the time of andersen s demise that appeared to have effectively failed in counteracting andersen s ethical shortcomings finally we assess the appropriateness of the remedies proposed by the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 soa to ensure that similar ethical lapses will not occur in the future our analysis indicates that the soa regulatory reforms should counteract some of the necessary conditions of the lemons model and thereby mitigate the likelihood of audit failures however we contend that the effectiveness of the soa critically depends upon the focus and attention of the public companies accounting oversight board pcaob towards assessing the ethical climates of public accounting firms assessments by the pcaob of public accounting firm s ethical climate are needed to sufficiently ensure that public accounting firms effectively promote and maintain audit quality in situations where unconscious bias or economic incentives may erode the public accounting firm s independence

renewable electricity policies heterogeneity and cost effectiveness abstract renewable electricity policies promote investment in renewable electricity generators and have become increasingly common around the world because of intermittency and the composition of other generators in the power system the value of certain renewable particularly wind and solar varies across locations and technologies this paper investigates the implications of this heterogeneity for the cost effectiveness of renewable electricity policies a simple model of the power system shows that renewable electricity policies cause different investment mixes policies also differ according to their effect on electricity prices and both factors cause the cost effectiveness to vary across policies we use a detailed long run planning model that accounts for intermittency on an hourly basis to compare the cost effectiveness for a range of policies and alternative parameter assumptions the differences in cost effectiveness are economically significant where broader policies such as an emissions price outperform renewable electricity policies

gratitude conscience and reciprocity models of supplier motivation when quality is non contractible abstract standard game theoretic models that apply principal agent problems to analyse buyer supplier relations have postulated that in a single period game the agent will not choose non contractible quality however evidence exists that suppliers or service providers choose costly quality in non contractible dimensions even in absence of reputation concern if they are offered a premium such actions violate the axiom of individual rationality and are not subgame perfect in standard game theory wherein only material payoffs are considered this paper builds three models of supplier behaviour in a single period stackelberg like buyer supplier game by using the framework of psychological game theory and explains supplier motivations to choose quality on non contractible dimensions in absence of any reputation effect if the buyer offers a price higher than the market price the supplier may be motivated to choose non contractible quality due to a sense of gratitude or because of his conscience or in order to reciprocate kindness the results show that maximum possible quality is chosen by the supplier only in the presence of a sufficiently strong sense of gratitude or a sufficiently strong conscience however the buyer is better off with a fair supplier who is motivated to reciprocate than a supplier having a very poor sense of gratitude or one having a weak conscience because the buyer can choose an optimal premium above market price to ensure that a fair and reciprocal supplier chooses an optimal quality

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

what does tax aggressiveness signal evidence from stock price reactions to news about tax shelter involvement abstract we study the stock price reaction to news about corporate tax aggressiveness we find that on average a company s stock price declines when there is news about its involvement in tax shelters we find some limited evidence for cross sectional variation in the reaction for example the reaction is more negative for firms in the retail sector suggesting that part of the reaction may be a consumer taxpayer backlash in addition the reaction is less negative for firms that are viewed to be generally less tax aggressive as proxied by the firm s cash effective tax rate we interpret this as being consistent with the market reacting positively to evidence that a firm is trying to reduce taxes when their financial reports would lead one to believe the firm is not tax aggressive

satisfaction guaranteed or money partially refunded efficient refunds under asymmetric information refunds are modelled as a competitive market response to asymmetric information firms have private information on their choice of product quality and compete by offering price and refund contracts consumers who care about quality draw inferences about the quality offered by the various firms from observed contracts conditions under which a revealing market equilibrium emerges are specified and the equilibrium quality and contract s characterized the model predicts that when product risk is not insurable consumers with higher incomes will pay higher prices for higher quality goods with higher refunds if the product fails

corporate control and real investment in incomplete markets abstract in the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumptions of risk neutrality or perfect capital markets however in most situations corporate executives face incomplete markets either because they receive compensation packages that restrict their portfolios or because cash flows from the firm s investment opportunities are not spanned by those of existing assets the present paper examines the impact of managerial risk aversion on investment decisions when the manager is exposed to idiosyncratic risk and faces the risk of a control challenge in the paper the investment policy selected by the manager reflects a trade off between his incentives to reduce risk and the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges the analysis demonstrates that risk aversion induces the manager to speed up investment leading to a significant erosion of the value of the option to wait

visits to the client when competing for new consulting contracts sourcing information or influencing the client consulting firms cfs sell services on a project basis to many clients and must therefore continuously tender for new contracts one frequently used strategy by cfs is to visit the clients in connection to the tenders the reasons to the visits are 1 to influence the client in his decision making e g marketing bribing and or 2 to source information about the project so that a better proposal can be submitted using a unique database on individual export proposals submitted to emerging markets which of these two reasons is the most important is examined empirically the estimations show that influencing the client dominates as explanation to the visits although it is not possible to determine whether this influence takes the form of bribing or marketing all conditions necessary for bribes to occur are fulfilled

spillovers and governance an analysis of knowledge and reputational spillovers in information technology investigating spillovers potential costs and benefits to a firm that extend beyond an individual transaction i integrate transaction cost theory and the knowledge based view of the firm in an effort to better understand the efficient governance of knowledge contracts with detailed task descriptions were associated with transactions with the potential to generate new and reusable knowledge the risk of a firm s technology spilling over to others and the risk of reputation impairing spillovers were associated with suppliers using their own employees rather than subcontractors thus results suggest that the creation and protection of knowledge are key factors in understanding governance decisions

price advertising and the deterioration of product quality arguments in favour of self enforced bans on advertising by professionals often rely on the stylized fact that advertising can communicate information about price but not about quality this being the case it is argued that allowing professionals to advertise runs the risk that firms will compete vigorously over price at the expense of the quality of their product this paper shows that even if price can communicate no information directly about quality it can do so indirectly because price will be a signal of quality because of this allowing advertising is shown to improve consumer welfare

wind power investment a benders decomposition approach investment in wind power facilities involves a high level of uncertainty to properly model such uncertainty we consider a large number of scenarios and formulate this investment problem as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints the target of this problem is to maximize the profit from wind power investment in a target year and it is subject to complementarity constraints describing a large number of market clearing conditions since the profit as a function of the investment variables has as sufficiently convex envelope the considered problem can be solved by benders decomposition thus we propose describe and analyze a benders decomposition algorithm to efficiently tackle the wind power investment problem

why corporations insure corporations insure to reduce the shirking information problem of joint production insurance encourages specialization in ownership increasing the returns to monitoring and lowering shareholders demand for a more diversified portfolio it enhances the credibility of specific capital as a performance bond and it lowers the cost to shareholders of compensating other members of the team for investing in firm specific assets tax and other factors may further encourage individual corporations to insure

is antitrust enforcement effective in a paper in this journal block nold and sidak 1981 tried to determine the impact of antitrust enforcement on horizontal price fixing after examining data on white bread markups in 20 u s cities they concluded that the enforcement activity of the department of justice against wholesale bakers had both remedial and deterrent effects in this paper i question the authors empirical results for three reasons they used bureau of labor statistics bls retail prices in computing bread markups however the white bread priced by the bureau changed quality over the sample period when a proxy for this quality change is included in the authors specification one deterrent effect disappears second the bread markups are sensitive to the pricing decisions made by grocery retailers when a proxy for retail pricing decisions is included in the model the deterrent effects are weaker finally the significance of the remedial effect depends on a single observation and this observation was affected by the two problems just stated

optimal generation mix with short term demand response and wind penetration demand response defined as the ability of load to respond to short term variations in electricity prices plays an increasingly important role in balancing short term supply and demand especially during peak periods and in dealing with fluctuations in renewable energy supplies however demand response has not been included in standard models for defining the optimal generation technology mix three different methodologies are proposed to integrate short term responsiveness into a generation technology mix optimization model considering operational constraints elasticities are included to adjust the demand profile in response to price changes including cross price elasticities that account for load shifts among hours as energy efficiency programs also influence the load profile interactions of efficiency investments and demand response are also modeled comparison of model results for a single year optimization with and without demand response shows peak reduction and valley filling effects impacting the optimal amounts and mix of generation capacity increasing demand elasticity also increases the installed amount of wind capacity suggesting that demand response yields environmental benefits by facilitating integration of renewable energy

dynamic economic dispatch feasible and optimal solutions dynamic economic dispatch is an extension of the conventional economic dispatch problem that takes into consideration the limits on the ramp rate of the generating units this paper examines the factors that affect the feasibility and optimality of solutions to this problem it proposes two new solution methods the first is guaranteed to find a feasible solution even when the load profile is nonmonotonic the second is an efficient technique for finding the optimal solution the results obtained with these methods are compared with those obtained using previously published methods

excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt abstract this paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders risk taking decisions we show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders it also implies a lower leverage which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields we then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt we find that this option mitigates equityholders risk shifting incentives compared to standard short term debt this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution

two part pricing for experience goods in the presence of adverse selection abstract because customers learn something when they purchase an experience good for the first time a firm selling experience goods may face different demand curves from new and repeat customers the firm can exploit these differences by using a two part pricing strategy to price discriminate between new and repeat customers the firm may also use a two part pricing strategy to mitigate the information problems of adverse selection when its quality is uncertain the analysis is particularly applicable to service markets where customers and firms seek long term relationships and firms maintain customer records which facilitate price discrimination

multicriteria analysis for agricultural resource management a critical survey and future perspectives abstract this paper reviews multicriteria analysis applied to agricultural resource management the applications utilize either methods for selecting multiattribute discrete alternatives including multiattribute utility theory or methods for solving multiobjective planning problems including goal programming our main purpose is to classify and evaluate the criteria attributes objectives used for modeling agricultural systems and to identify the difficulties for practitioners in applying the methodology the fields of study in agricultural decisions requiring further investigation are also discussed

physician price fixing under the sherman act an indirect test of the maricopa issues the expression price fixing usually indicates an attempt by competitors to put a floor under the minimum price they will charge but a recent decision of the supreme court arizona v maricopa county suggests that attempts to fix maximum prices are equally economically objectionable in this paper i propose an explanation of simultaneous minimum and maximum price fixing i also investigate empirically the distribution of physicians fees in a closely related instance of alleged physician price fixing the data reject any inference of successful price fixing and instead conform to the usual predictions of the economics of costly market information

a model of crop planning under uncertainty in agricultural management abstract the crop planning problem is often formulated as a linear programming problem but in many actual cases the profit coefficients for agricultural products are not certain values because of the influence of the future weather so a linear programming model with constant coefficients does not describe the environment of decision making properly therefore we propose a model of crop planning with uncertain stochastic values which may support decision making of agricultural farms in this paper we treat such uncertain elements as the values with the fuzziness and randomness

stochastic utility efficient programming of organic dairy farms opportunities to make sequential decisions and adjust activities as a season progresses and more information becomes available characterise the farm management process in this paper we present a discrete stochastic two stage utility efficient programming model of organic dairy farms which includes risk aversion in the decision maker s objective function as well as both embedded risk stochastic programming with recourse and non embedded risk stochastic programming without recourse historical farm accountancy data and subjective judgements were combined to assess the nature of the uncertainty that affects the possible consequences of the decisions the programming model was used within a stochastic dominance framework to examine optimal strategies in organic dairy systems in norway

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

tailored benders decomposition for a long term power expansion model with short term demand response we present a long term power generation expansion planning model that features a long planning horizon an hourly time resolution multiperiod investment and retirement decisions transmission constraints start up restrictions and short term demand response demand response is the capability of power load to react to short term changes in electricity prices it plays an increasingly important role in today s electricity markets but has not been taken into consideration in long term power generation expansion planning problems which mostly treat demand as perfectly inelastic given mild assumptions for the underlying demand function the resulting model is a large scale concave linearly constrained maximization problem we exploit the model structure by developing a new approach to generalized benders decomposition gbd in particular we present two algorithmic ideas 1 solving the nonlinear benders subproblem as a linear programming lp problem with the aid of dynamic linear overestimation refe

productivity change technical progress and relative efficiency change in the public accounting industry we present evidence on components of productivity change in the public accounting industry toward the end of the 20th century using revenue and human resource data from 64 of the 100 largest public accounting firms in the united states for the 1995 1999 period we analyze productivity change technical progress and relative efficiency change over time the average public accounting firm experienced a productivity growth of 9 5 between 1995 and 1999 we find support for the hypothesis that technical progress rather than an improvement in relative efficiency was the reason for this productivity growth firms that were early movers into management advisory services mas and those that emphasized growth in mas over growth in the traditional audit and tax services enjoyed significantly higher productivity growth than their peers these firms also contributed significantly more to the industry s technical progress

investment and the dynamic cost of income uncertainty the case of diminishing expectations in agriculture this paper studies optimal investment and the dynamic cost of income uncertainty applying a stochastic programming approach the motivation is given by a case study in finnish agriculture investment decision is modelled as a markov decision process extended to account for risk a numerical framework for studying the dynamic uncertainty cost is presented modifying the classical expected value of perfect information to a dynamic setting the uncertainty cost depends on the volatility of income e g with stationary income the dynamic uncertainty cost corresponds to a dynamic option value of postponing investment the numerical investment model also yields the optimal investment behavior of a representative farm the model can be applied e g in planning investment subsidies for maintaining target investments in the case study the investment decision is sensitive to risk

searching for an optimal rotation age for forest stand management under stochastic log prices due to rapid change in timber prices in the japanese market most likely affected by imported timber from countries such as the u s canada and the nordic countries the domestic forest managers have been facing a large degree of future price uncertainty because of this it becomes necessary to take the future price uncertainty into account within the forest management framework in this paper the continuous time stochastic process i e the geometric brownian motion has been used to model the log price process the binomial option pricing approximation was then applied to value the sugi cryptomeria japonica and hinoki chamaecyparis obtusa forested land under stochastic log prices in order to search for an optimal rotation age our experiments with the proposed two state stochastic dynamic programming model showed that when the current log price is high enough to cover all costs an optimal rotation age from the stochastic price and deterministic price models coincides although the total expected present net value from management activities differs also it was shown that as the current log price decreases an optimal rotation age derived from the stochastic price model becomes longer than that from the deterministic price model if the current log price further decreases then forest management will be abandoned and the forest stand will be converted into alternative uses

pleasures of cockaigne quality gaps market structure and the amount of grading the article explores under what circumstances high quality producers would not voluntarily submit to grading when low quality firms would readily do so and under what conditions high quality firms would have a lesser proportion of their output graded than would their low quality counterparts it also investigates how market structure affects the decison to grade establishing that a competitive industry carries out the optimal amount of grading when some firms have finite market shares the industry engages in excessive grading

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

handling uncertainty in agricultural supply chain management a state of the art given the evolution in the agricultural sector and the new challenges it faces managing agricultural supply chains efficiently has become an attractive topic for researchers and practitioners against this background the integration of uncertain aspects has continuously gained importance for managerial decision making since it can lead to an increase in efficiency responsiveness business integration and ultimately in market competitiveness in order to capture appropriately the uncertain conjuncture of most agricultural real life applications an increasing amount of research effort is especially dedicated to treating uncertainty in particular quantitative modeling approaches have found extensive use in agricultural supply chain management this paper provides an overview of the latest advances and developments in the application of operations research methodologies to handling uncertainty occurring in the agricultural supply chain management problems it seeks to i offer a representative overview of the predominant research topics ii highlight the most pertinent and widely used frameworks and iii discuss the emergence of new operations research advances in the agricultural sector the broad spectrum of reviewed contributions is classified and presented with respect to three most relevant discerned features uncertainty modeling types programming approaches and functional application areas ultimately main review findings are pointed out and future research directions which emerge are suggested

finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment abstract this paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncertainty which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates investment typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual however in today s economy firms face a fast changing technology environment implying that investment projects are usually considered to have a finite life the present paper studies investment projects with finite project life and we find that in contrast with the existing theory investments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty it is shown that this particularly happens at low levels of uncertainty and when project life is short

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

methodological aspects of a mathematical programming model to evaluate soil tillage technologies in a risky environment abstract in this work we develop a methodology for the economic evaluation of soil tillage technologies in a risky environment and to capture the influence of farmer behaviour on his technology choice the model has short term activities that change with the type of year and long term activities in which sets of traction investment activities are included although these activities do not change with the type of year they lead to different availability of resources for each type of year since the same tractor has different available fieldwork days under different weather conditions we prove that the model is sensitive to the greater income variability resulting from the use of alternative technologies and to the balance between income and risk accounting for the probability of occurrence of each state of nature and giving an investment solution that considers the best production plan for each type of year

investing to cooperate theory and experiment we study theoretically and in a lab experiment investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent in our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents the investment stochastically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period we show that more volatile returns make investment more difficult in the absence of legal protection and might force the investor to invest more to guarantee cooperation experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings

competition and the incentive to produce high quality previous literature indicates that when quality is a choice variable firms have an incentive to produce high quality to maintain their reputations with consumers the strategic interaction among firms and competition for market share is not considered this paper finds that when firms compete for market share perfect equilibria in which firms produce high quality goods need not exist competition for customers can eliminate the price premium needed to induce firms to maintain a reputation for high quality production in this case economists and policy analysts should pay greater attention to the interaction among firms and the institutions such as professional associations that structure interfirm relations when considering whether firms have an incentive to produce high quality goods

effects of constrained supply and price contracts on agricultural cooperatives planning strategies depend in part on the supply flow structure of a supply chain in food supply chains many firms are constrained by raw material supply e g vegetables and milk this paper first examines the economic consequences of constrained supply in agricultural cooperatives secondly it deals with the effects of adding price contracts to the current cooperative contract this model combines an inventory policy approach and a monte carlo simulation to take into account price uncertainty we illustrate our results using the case of a dairy cooperative c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

a multi objective robust optimization model for multi product multi site aggregate production planning in a supply chain under uncertainty abstract manufacturers need to satisfy consumer demands in order to compete in the real world this requires the efficient operation of a supply chain planning in this research we consider a supply chain including multiple suppliers multiple manufacturers and multiple customers addressing a multi site multi period multi product aggregate production planning app problem under uncertainty first a new robust multi objective mixed integer nonlinear programming model is proposed to deal with app considering two conflicting objectives simultaneously as well as the uncertain nature of the supply chain cost parameters of the supply chain and demand fluctuations are subject to uncertainty then the problem transformed into a multi objective linear one the first objective function aims to minimize total losses of supply chain including production cost hiring firing and training cost raw material and end product inventory holding cost transportation and shortage cost the second objective function considers customer satisfaction through minimizing sum of the maximum amount of shortages among the customers zones in all periods working levels workers productivity overtime subcontracting storage capacity and lead time are also considered finally the proposed model is solved as a single objective mixed integer programming model applying the lp metrics method the practicability of the proposed model is demonstrated through its application in solving an app problem in an industrial case study the results indicate that the proposed model can provide a promising approach to fulfill an efficient production planning in a supply chain

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

the market value of rarity abstract most theories of demand assume that consumers value the characteristics of products but are unconcerned with how many other consumers also consume the product however several theories of demand argue that consumers can value the exclusivity of possessing a rare object we test this implication on a particular collectible rare coins our paper examines the case of coins of a given type and identical quality that have mintages in different quantities this allows us to exclude the common case in which rarity or price itself is an indicator of quality for our sample rarer coins command higher prices rarity in the form of original mintage more strongly influences the market price than does collectibility as represented by the rarest coins of each mint mark or year we also point out that here may be other goods such as automobiles for which rarity may influence market demand

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

imperfect competition and reputational commitment abstract competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality these are self sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment and on current costs of sustaining it competition can affect these three elements at different rates

agricultural supply chain optimization and complexity a comparison of analytic vs simulated solutions and policies abstract with worldwide food security emerging as a major policy issue moving forward the structure and optimization of key agricultural supply chains is of growing importance in turn while many working models of supply chain optimization have been developed to ensure analytic tractability others are building more precise characterizations of a supply chain as a complex system that may not be amenable to analytic solution this research examines an important agricultural supply chain from the perspective of developing effective solutions to complex internal optimization issues that could ultimately affect food security to this end the canadian wheat handling system is a complex export oriented supply chain that is currently undergoing extensive changes with respect to quality control we develop both analytic and simulation models of this supply chain with the ultimate goal of identifying effective wheat quality testing strategies in a complex operational and regulatory environment while the analytic model is founded on limited assumptions about individual behavior agent based simulation allows us to model farmers and handlers as rational and learning individuals who make decisions based on their own experiences as well as the experiences of others around them we then make explicit comparisons between solutions and policies generated using the simulation approach against those generated by the analytically tractable model of the wheat supply chain while the two approaches generate somewhat different solutions in many respects they lead to similar conclusions regarding the overall testing and quality control issue in wheat handling

marital division of labor with risk of divorce the role of voice enforcement of contracts it is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce implicit marital contracts by voice therefore in the present model divorce has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for such voice enforcement is weakened moreover perhaps surprisingly i find that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

fly by night firms and the market for product reviews this paper presents a model that permits third party information provision in a market characterized by information asymmetries and reputation formation the model is used to examine how the market for information provision affects prices and supply in the primary market they find that decreasing the cost of providing and using information 1 increases rather than decreases the margins received by reputable service firms 2 decreases the price of new untested service firms so reputation is more costly to build and 3 leads to more high quality firms and less fly by night firms copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

dynamic investment and capital structure under manager shareholder conflict abstract this paper investigates the interactions between the investment and financing decisions of a firm under manager shareholder conflicts arising from asymmetric information in particular we extend the manager shareholder conflict problem in a real options model by incorporating debt financing we show that manager shareholder conflicts over investment policy increase not only the investment and default triggers but also coupon payments which lead to a decrease in the equity value moreover given the presence of manager shareholder conflicts debt financing increases investment and decreases total social welfare as a result there is a trade off between the efficiency of investment and total social welfare with debt financing these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work in this area

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

modeling farmers response to uncertain rainfall in burkina faso a stochastic programming approach farmers on the central plateau of burkina faso in west africa cultivate under precarious conditions rainfall variability is extremely high in this area and accounts for much of the uncertainty surrounding the farmers decision making process strategies to cope with these risks are typically dynamic sequential decision making is one of the most important ways to cope with risk due to uncertain rainfall in this paper a stochastic programming model is presented to describe farmers sequential decisions in reaction to rainfall the model describes farmers strategies of production consumption selling purchasing and storage from the start of the growing season until one year after the harvest period this dynamic model better describes farmers strategies than do static models that are usually applied this study draws important policy conclusions regarding reorientation of research programs and illustrates how operations research techniques can be usefully applied to study grass root problems in developing countries

asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality in a standard adverse selection world asymmetric information about product quality leads to quality deterioration in the market suppose that a higher investment level makes the realization of high quality more likely then if consumers observe the investment but not the realization of product quality before purchase they can infer the probability distribution of high and low quality that may be put on the market we uncover two effects that may lead the firm to overinvest in quality compared to a market with full information first an adverse selection effect according to which a sufficiently large investment can avoid adverse selection and second an efficiency effect according to which a larger investment reduces the probability of having in the market low quality products that are not socially valuable

the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms our study investigates the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms we argue that in early relationships the level of expected cooperative norms in an exchange is the result of a calculative process facilitated by transaction attributes joint transaction specific investments and observability the greater the level of these two exchange attributes the greater the level of cooperative exchange norms all else being equal we further argue that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms can deviate from the expected level because the development of such norms is the result of social processes that management cannot directly and fully control this gap between realized and expected norms affects exchange performance performance suffers when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms falls below the expected level but overshooting expectations lays a critical groundwork for repeat transactions the analysis of a survey of 182 collaborative r d alliances provides initial support for our theory

environmental ethics and information asymmetry among organizational stakeholders this paper addresses the conflicting environmental interests of a firm and the community an important stakeholder the short term profit maximization objective of a firm may stand in contrast with what the community wants a safe and clean environment this paper argues that the information regarding the environmental impact of a firm s products processes and waste may be asymmetrically distributed between the firm and the community the resultant information asymmetry may influence the probability of a firm acting opportunistically and ultimately a firm s ethical behavior the paper identifies information asymmetry between a firm and community as well as that within the community the perceived information asymmetry across various community segments may perhaps be a determinant of environmental discrimination the paper further contends that information asymmetry may diminish in the long run finally it examines the implications of information asymmetry for firms and government policy

development and the interaction of enforcement institutions we examine how formal and informal contract enforcing institutions interact in a competitive market with asymmetric information where consumers do not observe quality before purchase firm level incentives for producing high quality can be achieved with an informal enforcement mechanism reputation the efficacy of which is enhanced by consumers investing in connectedness or with a formal mechanism legal enforcement the effectiveness of which can be reduced by means of bribes we show that formal and informal enforcement mechanisms do not necessarily substitute each other while high levels of judicial efficiency decrease consumers incentives to connect higher consumers connectedness leads to higher levels of judicial efficiency we then look at how the equilibrium institutional mix evolves with the level of development in doing so we show the presence of a new physical channel that can affect institutions i e the frequency of bad productivity shocks that in less developed settings can impact on firms incentives to cheat c 2010 elsevier b v all rights reserved

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

the economic effects of franchise termination laws we would like to thank blake rhodes and pam schommer for excellent research assistance participants in workshops at arizona state university university of california berkeley the university of chicago dartmouth college iowa state university the justice department the university of rochester and the university of utah as well as jeff coles arnold cowan jim dana franklin m fisher stuart gilson ben hermalin cliff holderness gregg jarrell alan krueger wayne mikkelson walter oi jim poterba ajai singh cliff smith kathy spier david weisbach jamie zender jerry zimmerman and especially kevin j murphy and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft brickley and weisbach thank the managerial economics research center of the university of rochester and the john m olin foundation and dark thanks the college of business at iowa state university for financial support brickley also thanks the garn institute of finance at the university of utah for financial assistance 1 see mark robichaut franchise rules are back off drawing board wall st j july 6 1990 at bl note that in this article we focus on laws that apply to business format franchises for an analysis of state laws in automobile franchising see richard l smith ii franchise regulation an economic analysis of state restrictions on automobile distribution 25 j law econ 125 1982 richard a epstein unconscionability a critical appraisal 18 j law econ 293 314 15 1975 and paul h rubin the theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract 21 j law econ 223 1978 other work on the economics of franchising includes james a brickley frederick h dark the choice of organizational form the case of franchising 18 j fin econ 401 1987 james a brickley frederick h dark michael s weisbach an agency perspective on franchising 20 fin mgmt 1991 in

generation expansion planning with large amounts of wind power via decision dependent stochastic programming power generation expansion planning needs to deal with future uncertainties carefully given that the invested generation assets will be in operation for a long time many stochastic programming models have been proposed to tackle this challenge however most previous works assume predetermined future uncertainties i e fixed random outcomes with given probabilities in several recent studies of generation assets planning e g thermal versus renewable new findings show that the investment decisions could affect the future uncertainties as well to this end this paper proposes a multistage decision dependent stochastic optimization model for long term large scale generation expansion planning where large amounts of wind power are involved in the decision dependent model the future uncertainties are not only affecting but also affected by the current decisions in particular the probability distribution function is determined by not only input parameters but also decision variables to deal with the nonlinear constraints in our model a quasi exact solution approach is then introduced to reformulate the multistage stochastic investment model to a mixed integer linear programming model the wind penetration investment decisions and the optimality of the decision dependent model are evaluated in a series of multistage case studies the results show that the proposed decision dependent model provides effective optimization solutions for long term generation expansion planning

advertising restrictions and concentration the case of malt beverages the relationship between state imposed advertising restrictions and state level market concentration in the malt beverage industry is examined the authors find that the presence of proscriptions on price advertising significantly increases market concentration at the state level both absolutely and relative to a measure of national concentration the evidence also indicates that banning local nonprice advertising in addition to price advertising yields no marginal significant change in either measure of state level concentration analysis of individual brewers market shares suggests that large national brewers gain at the expense of smaller brewers when price advertising is restricted copyright 1995 by mit press

does it pay to change your company s name a stock market perspective a company s name is commonly considered to be an integral part of its image just like the quality of its products or the quality of its technical services changing a company s name is a major policy decision contemplated by many firms and actually implemented by some each year this paper attempts to examine albeit indirectly whether a name change can improve the profit performance of a firm and what type of firm is more likely to succeed in doing so we use the event study methodology developed in finance to examine the above questions with respect to 58 corporations that changed their names in 1981 1985 our findings are that for most of the firms name changes are associated with improved performance and that the greatest improvement tends to occur in firms that produce industrial goods and whose performance prior to the change was relatively poor evidence that industrial good producers are also heavy users of corporate advertising lends further credence to this finding our findings do not support however the contention that the new name per se will enhance demand for the firm s products rather it seems that the act of a name change serves as a signal that other measures to improve performance such as changes in product offerings and organizational changes will be seriously and successfully undertaken the rationale behind why such a signal is sent and why it is believed is discussed

the reputational penalties for environmental violations empirical evidence abstract this paper examines the sizes of the fines damage awards remediation costs and market value losses imposed on companies that violate environmental regulations firms that violate environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity the losses however are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed and in the cross section the market value loss is related to the size of the legal penalty thus environmental violations are disciplined largely through legal and regulatory penalties not through reputational penalties

product complementarities capabilities and governance a dynamic transaction cost perspective the organization and governance of the transactions that comprise a bundling arrangement depend on the distribution of capabilities among firms and the amount of time during which the window of opportunity for earning rents is expected to remain open firms engaged in inter firm collaboration must undertake support transactions related to billing marketing customer support and product repair these support transactions differ from the core transactions that have traditionally been perceived as sufficient to provide a product bundle since support transactions create costs of their own the market may turn out to be an expensive means of governing collaborative arrangements undertaken for bundling purposes the telecommunications service sector provides an illustration copyright 1997 by oxford university press

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

assigning property rights to radio spectrum users why did fcc license auctions take 67 years abstract while leo herzel 1951 and ronald coase 1959 persuasively argued for auctioning licenses issued by the federal communications commission fcc not until 1993 did the u s congress grant the fcc authority to assign wireless operating permits via competitive bidding why were auctions with obvious efficiency and equity advantages so long in coming why were comparative hearings in the public interest first abandoned as assignment tools in 1981 not for auctions but for lotteries and why were radio and tv licenses pointedly excluded from auctions four factors the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the u s constitution the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services and the agency problem embedded in central planning are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms

interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions the effects of agency conflicts abstract we examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder bondholder conflicts over investment policy we find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under and overinvestment however the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage since the firm s initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set the model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity and how these choices interact with a firm s growth opportunities

pesticide use environmental spillovers and efficiency a dea risk adjusted efficiency approach applied to dutch arable farming pesticides are widely used by crop producers in developed countries to combat risk associated with pests and diseases however their indiscriminate use can lead to various environmental spillovers that may alter the agricultural production environment thus contributing to production risk this study utilises a data envelopment analysis dea approach to measure performance of arable farms incorporating pesticides environmental spillovers and output variance as undesirable outputs in the efficiency analysis and taking explicitly into account the effect of pesticides and other inputs on production risk the application focuses on panel data from dutch arable farms over the period 2003 2007 a moment approach is used to compute output variance providing empirical representations of the risk increasing or decreasing nature of the used inputs finally shadow values of risk adjusted inputs are computed we find that pesticides are overused in dutch arable farming and there is a considerable evidence of the need for decreasing pesticides environmental spillovers

production planning for a deteriorating item with stochastic demand and consumer choice abstract this paper concerns inventory control of a deteriorating product with non negligible procurement lead time that perishes after a known number of periods demand for fresh products during each period is represented as a random variable with known probability distribution but only a fraction of this demand is satisfied during any given period due to item deterioration we derive the expected profit function for a two period problem with one production opportunity before the selling season begins and a single product type with two period shelf life for the case in which demand during both periods is uniform independent and identically distributed we identify sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal solution and present a straightforward procedure for obtaining the solution

how the client effect moderates price competition why is unregulated competition supposed to drive price down to ruinous levels in some high fixed cost low marginal cost industries e g railroads but not in others e g hotels we argue that price competition is moderated in high fixed cost low marginal cost industries when the value one consumer realizes from the service is affected by the characterics of other consumers we develop a simple model of this client effect using the example of the demand for hotels and then generalize the implications of our model to other industries

a multistage stochastic programming model for the new zealand dairy industry abstract this paper presents an application of multistage stochastic programming to a production planning problem for fonterra a leading company in the new zealand dairy industry taking into account uncertain milk supply price demand curves and contracting we describe a model for fonterra s supply chain and a model for uncertain milk supply we then present a multistage stochastic quadratic programming model and a decomposition algorithm to compute an optimal sales policy which is tested in simulation against a deterministic policy

earning through learning in legislatures this inquiry applies gary becker s theoretical notions of general and specific training to the experiential learning that occurs within political institutions in particular the u s congress in the process we isolate economic facets of these legislative experiences that influence the rental value of human capital derived from congressional training we identify four factors that structure legislators post elective wages pre congressional salary year of entry tenure and variables closely related to general training in congress specifically assignment to powerful legislative committees acquisition of broad skill packages investment in expanding skill set proficiencies and to a lesser extent life cycle driven declines in such investments