do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

risk adjustment and prevention widespread integration of market based incentives into healthcare systems calls for and has elicited increasing adoption of risk adjustment by deterring selection risk adjustment helps to assure fair and efficient payments among health insurers or capitated provider groups however since conventional risk adjustment allocates funds among regions or insurers according to current population health status it does not reward indeed it penalizes preventive efforts that improve population health this prevention penalty of risk adjustment represents a hidden cost of unclear magnitude undermining provider incentives for health promotion we develop a theoretical model of selection and prevention demonstrating this problem with conventional risk adjustment and suggesting a simple alternative risk adjustment should be linked to pay for performance for prevention l integration generalisee d incitatifs mercantiles dans les systemes de soins de sante appelle et a engendre l adoption croissante d ajustements au risque en decourageant la selection l ajustement au risque aide a assurer des paiements justes et equitables entre les assureurs ou les groupes de fournisseurs finances par capitation cependant comme les ajustements conventionnels au risque allouent des fonds entre les regions ou les assureurs selon le statut sanitaire present de la population ils ne recompensent pas et meme penalisent les efforts de prevention qui ameliorent la sante des populations cette penalisation de la prevention dans les ajustements au risque represente un cout cache d une magnitude mal etablie qui mine l incitation des fournisseurs a s occuper de promotion de la sante on developpe un modele theorique de selection et de prevention mettant en lumiere ce probleme dans l utilisation de l ajustement au risque conventionnel et on suggere une solution de rechange ou l ajustement au risque est reliea une remuneration a la performance pour la prevention

spatial and temporal marketing considerations under marketing loan programs marketing assistance loan mal and loan deficiency payment ldp programs differ in their treatment of transportation costs marketing decisions are analyzed under these programs when producers are differentiated by location with respect to the terminal market under certain conditions a complete characterization of equilibrium is developed the proposed model broadly fits several stylized facts about producer enrollment in these programs if ldps are uniform at all locations ldp programs do not interfere with marketing decisions mal programs distort the optimal marketing pattern by providing incentives to store for producers who should be among the first ones to supply the market

strategic entry deterrence and terrorism theory and experimental evidence using a two stage rent seeking framework we present a simple model of strategic entry terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers the theory illustrates that relative to a cooperative outcome negative externalities lead to over spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under spending on deterrence our experimental results are broadly consistent subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures in contrast to theoretical predictions participation decisions while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest were influenced by a subject s ability to participate in multiple contests

incentive effects in the demand for health care a bivariate panel count data estimation this paper contributes in three dimensions to the literature on health care demand first it features the first application of a bivariate random effects estimator in a count data setting to permit the efficient estimation of this type of model with panel data second it provides an innovative test of adverse selection and confirms that high risk individuals are more likely to acquire supplemental add on insurance third the estimations yield that in accordance with the theory of moral hazard we observe a much lower frequency of doctor visits among the self employed and among mothers of small children copyright 2002 john wiley sons ltd

conciliation counterterrorism and patterns of terrorist violence what causes the increase in terrorism that reportedly often follows gov ernment concessions given this pattern why do governments ever conciliate terror ists i propose a model in which terrorist organizations become more militant following concessions because only moderate terrorists accept them leaving extremists in con trol governments nonetheless are willing to make concessions because their coun terterror capabilities improve because of the collusion of former terrorists former terrorists undertake this collusion to insure the credibility of government promises the model also yields hypotheses regarding the level of government investment in counterterror when moderates accept concessions the terms of negotiated settle ments the duration of terrorist conflicts incentives for moderate terrorists to radical ize their followers and incentives for governments to encourage extremist challenges to moderate terrorist leaders the model is illustrated with an application to the israeli0 palestinian conflict

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

switching costs price sensitivity and health plan choice we investigate the extent to which sensitivity to health plan premiums differs across individuals according to characteristics related to the cost of switching plans our results indicate substantial variation in price sensitivity related to expected health care costs younger healthier employees are between two and four times more sensitive to price than employees who are older and who have been recently hospitalized or diagnosed with cancer we also find evidence of status quo bias estimated premium elasticities are significantly higher for new hires than for incumbent employees simulations combining our results with actuarial data illustrate the cost implications of risk related differences in price elasticity

two stage team rent seeking experimental analysis this paper presents a two stage team rent seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among winning team members when early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort early actors can free ride on their late moving teammates however when early and late efforts are complements all team members exert positive effort levels asymmetries in early effort reduce effort choices for all late movers the theory is tested with laboratory experimental methods although subjects overinvest relative to the nash equilibrium in all treatments chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model early movers exerted higher effort in the complement treatment and second stage effort choices were broadly consistent with best response functions surprisingly in both single shot and repeated play environments early movers in the substitute treatment did not free ride choosing effort levels similar to those of late movers

on the existence of predatory pricing an experimental study of reputation and entry deterrence in the chain store game a single monopolist plays a sequence of eight periods against a series of different entrants there are two types of monopolists weak monopolists whose single period best response is to acquiesce after entry and strong monopolists whose dominant strategy is to fight entry data show high levels of predatory pricing defined as weak monopolists fighting all entrants in early periods both with and without experimenter induced strong monopolists we reject a number of predictions of the asymmetric information sequential equilibrium model of kreps and wilson 1982 and find important deviations from more general sequential equilibrium models as well

employee choice of health insurance a new specification of health insurance plan choice is developed that uses a nonparametric functional form for the loss function used to evaluate insurance premiums and uncertain out of pocket expenditure the approach is implemented on data resulting from one firm s implementation of a new health plan with three distinct health insurance options health expenditure differences greater than 500 percent are observed indicating extremely strong biased selection plan choices are consistent with a convex loss function for small losses which suggests that consumers underweight high loss low probability outcomes relative to low loss high probability ones copyright 1989 by mit press

counterterrorism strategies in the lab we conduct experiments to test the collective action dilemmas associated with defensive and proactive counterterror strategies defensive policies are associated with creating public bads e g a commons whereas proactive policies are akin to the voluntary provision of public goods when combined the inefficiency of collective action is exacerbated resulting in a situation known as a prisoner s dilemma squared pd2 deterministic versus probabilistic equivalent versions of the associated externalities are compared within a laboratory setting experimental results reveal that the collective action problem associated with counterterror strategies is deepened in uncertain environments and is indeed a robust regularity that is not easily overcome as individuals gain more experience they become even more self interested

medical care costs how much welfare loss hardly a week goes by without a front page newspaper article on rising health care costs and the uninsured in this article i focus mainly on costs arguing that the issue has been somewhat misconceived while the level of medical care spending in the u s is a cause for concern the welfare losses associated with rises in that level of spending may not be as large as the public rhetoric can make them seem in fact cost containment may not be as urgent as is widely supposed and some proposed cost containment policies may result in welfare losses for the insured and even increase the number of uninsured

incentive compatible guaranteed renewable health insurance premiums theoretical models of guaranteed renewable insurance display front loaded premium schedules such schedules both cover lifetime total claims of low risk and high risk individuals and provide an incentive for those who remain low risk to continue to purchase the policy questions have been raised of whether actual individual insurance markets in the us approximate the behavior predicted by these models both because young consumers may not be able to afford front loading and because insurers may behave strategically in ways that erode the value of protection against risk reclassification in this paper the optimal competitive age based premium schedule for a benchmark guaranteed renewable health insurance policy is estimated using medical expenditure data several factors are shown to reduce the amount of front loading necessary indeed the resulting optimal premium path increases with age actual premium paths exhibited by purchasers of individual insurance are close to the optimal renewable schedule we estimate finally consumer utility associated with the feature is examined

preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance the case of australia a basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that if consumers have private information about their risk of suffering a loss there will be a positive correlation between risk and the level of insurance coverage we test this prediction in the context of the market for private health insurance in australia despite a universal public system that provides comprehensive coverage for inpatient and outpatient care roughly half of the adult population also carries private health insurance the main benefit of which is more timely access to elective hospital treatment like several studies on different types of insurance in other countries we find no support for the positive correlation hypothesis because strict underwriting regulations create strong information asymmetries this result suggests the importance of multi dimensional private information additional analyses suggest that the advantageous selection observed in this market is driven by the effect of risk aversion the ability to make complex financial decisions and income

managed care s price bargaining with hospitals research has shown that managed care mc slowed the rate of growth in health care spending in the 1990s primarily via lower unit prices paid however the mechanism of mc s price bargaining has not been well studied this article uses a unique panel dataset with actual hospital prices in massachusetts between 1994 and 2000 to examine the sources of mc s bargaining power i find two significant determinants of price discounts first plans with large memberships are able to extract volume discounts across hospitals second health plans that are more successful at channeling patients can extract greater discounts patient channeling can add to the volume discount that plans negotiate

are medical prices declining evidence from heart attack treatments we address long standing problems in measuring medical inflation by estimating two types of price indices the first a service price index prices specific medical services as does the current cpi the second a cost of living index measures a quality adjusted cost of treating a health problem we apply these indices to heart attack treatment between 1983 and 1994 more frequent reweighting and accounting for price discounts lowers the measured price change for heart attacks by three percentage points annually accounting for quality change lowers it further we estimate that the real cost of living index fell about 1 percent annually

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

u s farm policy and the volatility of commodity prices and farm revenues a dynamic three commodity rational expectations storage model is used to compare the impact of the federal agricultural improvement and reform fair act of 1996 with a free market policy and with pre fair policies results suggest that fair did not lead to significant increases in long run price volatility or revenue volatility the main impact of pre fair relative to the free market regime was to substitute government storage for private storage in a way that did little to support prices or to stabilize farm incomes results also indicate that u s grain market volatility in 1995 2000 was due to fundamental market forces and not to fair copyright 2002 oxford university press

what causes commodity price backwardation a recently proposed explanation for futures price backwardation is examined an equilibrium model with spatial heterogeneity leads to the interpretation of backwardations as mismeasurement by the analyst however the model predicts that backwardations are more affected by the location of stocks than by their aggregate level empirical examination of the united states corn market fails to support this result

aggregate price indices new goods and generics this paper examines the appropriate treatment in the cost of living index of the appearance of new varieties of old goods existing theory here applies to individual households thus we first show in what sense laspeyres and paasche indices for groups of households can be considered approximations to theoretically desirable group indices and then go on to the case of new goods we apply our results to the case of the introduction of generics in pharmaceuticals and show that proper treatment can make a considerable difference

optimal storage and marketing over space and time borrowing from the theory of optimal resource extraction we develop the mechanism guiding efficient commodity storage and marketing over producing regions through the crop year optimal storage occurs at producing areas and time in storage varies directly with distance to market prices grow with interest rates in locations where storage is efficient but more slowly elsewhere which explains why market prices i e prices at the market grow more slowly than interest rates the model is empirically supported by examining storage in the corn belt rates of price growth at various points and quarterly grain marketings

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

paying for health insurance the trade off between competition and adverse selection we use data on health plan choices by employees of harvard university to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection moving to a voucher type system induced significant adverse selection with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending but increased competition reduced harvard s premiums by 5 to 8 percent the premium reductions came from insurer profits so while harvard was better off the net effect for society was only the adverse selection loss adverse selection can be minimized by adjusting voucher amounts for individual risk we discuss how such a system would work governments are increasingly turning to market forces as a way to limit the cost of social insurance traditionally social insurance programs were operated as nonmarket goods governments mandated participation in a central program collected revenues to finance the program and ran the insurance system there was no role for competition among suppliers in providing the basic benefit as the costs of social insurance have increased however the centralized model of social insurance is coming under increasing strain in the united states for example recent proposals have called for replacing the medicare program with a health care voucher for the elderly aaron and reischauer 1995 cutler 1996 the voucher would guarantee people a basic insurance plan but the plans would be privately run competition among plans would generate plan premiums and enrollments similarly longstanding proposals for social security reform have called for replacing the current system with a system of individual accounts where people would make saving investment and annuitization decisions on their own advisory council on social security 1996 feldstein 1996 the trend is not just domestic in the united kingdom the national health service has moved to encourage more competition in recent years with the establishment of hospital trusts that bid for patients and partially fixed payments to physicians

why do hmos spend less patient selection physician price sensitivity and prices abstract cost control incentives have become an important part of the health insurance landscape in the united states these incentives are the strongest in capitated managed care organizations especially hmos because such organizations are paid a fixed amount regardless of the spending they generate using a sample of insurance claims from about 500 plans i find that in hmos spending on anti cholesterol drugs is 19 lower than in other insurance plans this spending difference could reflect the strong cost control incentives generated by capitation but it could also reflect the selection of healthy price sensitive patients into hmos or it could simply reflect lower prices to understand the difference i estimate a model of physician prescribing and patient refill decisions patients in hmos are nearly twice as sensitive to copays as are other patients consistent with selection of healthy patients into hmos even after adjusting for this selection however hmo physicians remain highly sensitive to drug procurement costs this high sensitivity explains about a 20 of the spending difference combined with lower prices it explains about 25 55 of the difference i find no evidence that these spending reductions result in fewer patient refills or the prescribing of less effective statins

valuing morbidity an integration of the willingness to pay and health status index literatures placing dollar values on human health has long been a controversial aspect of policy analysis and remains difficult given the relatively small number of morbidity valuation studies available by combining both the economic and health literature this paper offers an alternative approach to morbidity valuation and provides estimates for a wide range of short term health conditions

enrollee mix treatment intensity and cost in competing indemnity and hmo plans abstract why do indemnity insurance plans cost substantially more per capita 77 more in our study than hmos we answer this question using data from a large organization s insurance pool covering 215 000 lives we decompose cost differences for eight major medical conditions into four sources demographics incidence within demographic groups treatment intensity and prices per service greater incidence of disease in the indemnity plan both from demographics themselves and within demographic groups and higher prices each explain nearly 50 of the difference contrary to conventional wisdom indemnity plans do not have greater treatment intensity

collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism global terrorism presents collective action issues for targeted nations proactive measures e g preemptive strikes against terrorists create external benefits for all at risk nations in contrast defensive actions deflect attacks to softer targets thereby giving rise to external benefits to protected foreign residents and external costs to venues abroad coordinated antiterrorism measures are particularly difficult to achieve when many nations must participate and nonparticipants can undo the efforts of others thus freezing terrorists assets or abiding by a no negotiation pledge pose difficult collective action problems these same concerns do not plague decisive action against domestic terrorism

politics and the suboptimal provision of counterterror i present a model of interactions between voters a government and a terrorist organization the model focuses on a previously unexplored conceptualization of counterterrorism as divided into tactic specific observable and general unobservable tactics when there is divergence between voters and government preferences strategic substitution among different modes of attack by terrorists and agency problems between the voters and government create a situation in which the politically optimal counterterrorism strategy pursued by the government in response to electoral and institutional incentives is quite different from the security maximizing counterterrorism strategy in particular in response to electoral pressure the government allocates resources to observable counterterror in excess of the social optimum this problem is particularly severe when governments put great weight on rent seeking or care less about counterterror than do voters and when terrorists have a large set of tactics from which to choose voters can decrease the magnitude of the agency problem by increasing the benefits of reelection by for example slackening requirements for nonsecurity related public goods i have received valuable comments and advice from bruce bueno de mesquita randy calvert martin cripps james fearon amanda friedenberg robert powell matthew stephenson and barbara walter i thank the weidenbaum center on the economy government and public policy at washington university for financial support

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

monotone comparative statics under uncertainty this paper analyzes monotone comparative statics predictions in several classes of stochastic optimization problems the main results characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for comparative statics predictions to hold based on properties of primitive functions that is utility functions and probability distributions the results apply when the primitives satisfy one of the following two properties i a single crossing property which arises in applications such as portfolio investment problems and auctions or ii log supermodularity which arises in the analysis of demand functions affiliated random variables stochastic orders and orders over risk aversion