credentials and wage discrimination the subject is wage discrimination among workers with differing privately known reservation wages and costs of obtaining credentials that can be observed by a monopsonist firm numerical examples are studied in which workers are equally productive and in the population their reservation wages and credentialing costs have a normal distribution with negative correlation according to these examples wage discrimination is unprofitable

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

the behavior of risk and market prices of risk over the nasdaq bubble period we exploit the information in the options market to study the variations of return risk and market prices of different sources of risk during the rise and fall of the nasdaq market we specify a model that accommodates fluctuations in both risk levels and market prices of different sources of risk and we estimate the model using the time series returns and option prices on the nasdaq 100 tracking stock our analysis reveals three key variations during the period from march 1999 to march 2001 first return volatility increased together with the rising nasdaq index level even though the two tend to move in opposite directions second although the market price of diffusion return risk averages around 1 82 over the whole sample the estimates reached negative territory at the end of 1999 the estimates reverted back to highly positive values after the collapse of the nasdaq market third the market price of jump risk increased with the rising nasdaq valuation and this increase in market price coincided with an increased imbalance in open interest between put and call options

a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one sided incomplete information we characterize the sequential equilibria of a class of infinite horizon bargaining games with one sided incomplete information when the seller the uninformed party makes all the offers we prove a folk theorem every incentive compatible individually rational direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria introducing buyer counteroffers eliminates outcomes which are unfavorable to that party as the proportion of buyer offers increases the set of implementable mechanisms shrinks continuously when the proportion reaches one only the single outcome most favorable to the buyer remains thus depending on the offer structure sequentiality may or may not impose restrictions beyond static incentive compatibility

the variance gamma v g model for share market returns a new stochastic process termed the variance gamma process is proposed as a model for the uncertainty underlying security prices the unit period distribution is normal conditional on a variance that is distributed as a gamma variate its advantages include long tailedness continuous time specification finite moments of all orders elliptical multivariate unit period distributions and good empirical fit the process is pure jump approximable by a compound poisson process with high jump frequency and low jump magnitudes applications to option pricing show differential effects for options on the money compared to in or out of the money copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

the effects of public policy on strike duration hazard function estimates are utilized to analyze the effect of numerous public policy variables on strike duration based on 7 546 strikes in canada between 1967 and 1985 we find that only the mandatory strike vote substantially reduced conditional duration however the policy variables generally had a more favorable effect on reducing strike incidence so that on net they tended to reduce unconditional duration incidence times conditional duration specifically reduced unconditional duration was associated with the existence of conciliation and the requirement of a mandatory strike vote but the prohibition on replacement workers had a perverse effect

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

recovering probability distributions from option prices this article derives underlying asset risk neutral probability distributions of european options on the s p 500 index nonparametric methods are used to choose probabilities that minimize an objective function subject to requiring that the probabilities are consistent with observed option and underlying asset prices alternative optimization specifications produce approximately the same implied distributions a new and fast optimization technique for estimating probability distributions based on maximizing the smoothness of the resulting distribution is proposed since the crash the risk neutral probability of a three four standard deviation decline in the index about 36 percent 46 percent over a year is about 10 100 times more likely than under the assumption of lognormality recently the increasing popularity of derivatives and some highly publicized failures to control risk have led to increased efforts to find reasonable methods to measure the sensitivity of large institutional derivatives portfolios to extreme events merely because such events are rare is not sufficient to ignore them since on the few occasions when they do occur significant amounts of money can change hands potentially wiping out profits accumulated over long prior periods a key assumption behind methods of estimation is the joint probability distribution of constituent underlying asset returns this has long been a concern of financial economists since probability assumptions are critical to much of their research during the last quarter century heretofore probability distributions of stock market returns have typically been estimated from historical time series unfortunately common hypotheses may not capture the probability of extreme events and the events of interest are rare or may not be present in the historical record even though they are clearly possible

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

the effect of charter schools on achievement and behavior of public school students abstract charter schools have seen dramatic growth over the last decade however we know little about how they affect traditional public schools i look at how charters affect student outcomes in public schools using data from a large urban school district in the southwest unlike prior work that relies on school fixed effects i address the endogenous location of charter schools using an instrumental variables strategy that relies on plausibly exogenous variation in local building supply results show that charters induce modest but statistically significant drops in math and language test scores particularly for elementary students however results for middle and high school students show improvements in discipline

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

option pricing with discrete time jump processes in this paper we propose new option pricing models based on class of models with jumps contained in the levy type based models nig levy schoutens 2003 merton jump merton 1976 and duan based model duan et al 2007 by combining these different classes of models with several volatility dynamics of the garch type we aim at taking into account the dynamics of financial returns in a realistic way the associated risk neutral dynamics of the time series models is obtained through two different specifications for the pricing kernel we provide a characterization of the change in the probability measure using the esscher transform and the minimal entropy martingale measure we finally assess empirically the performance of this modelling approach using a dataset of european options based on the s p 500 and on the cac 40 indices our results show that models involving jumps and a time varying volatility provide realistic pricing and hedging results for options with different kinds of time to maturities and moneyness these results are supportive of the idea that a realistic time series model can provide realistic option prices making the approach developed here interesting to price options when option markets are illiquid or when such markets simply do not exist

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

reading the smile the message conveyed by methods which infer risk neutral densities abstract in this study we compare the quality and information content of risk neutral densities obtained by various methods we consider a non parametric method based on a mixture of log normal densities the semi parametric ones based on an hermite approximation or based on an edgeworth expansion the parametric approach of malz which assumes a jump diffusion for the underlying process and heston s approach assuming a stochastic volatility model we apply those models on ff dm exchange rate options for two dates models differ when important news hits the market here anticipated elections the non parametric model provides a good fit to options prices but is unable to provide as much information about market participants expectations than the jump diffusion model

strikes wages and private information private information models of strikes suggest that the strike is used as an information revealing device by the union in the presence of asymmetrical information a testable prediction of these models is that there is a negative relationship between strikes and the unpredicted component of the wage this paper finds evidence of such a relationship in a large sample of u s labor contracts the real wage falls by about 3 percent after a strike lasting one hundred days copyright 1989 by american economic association

imperfect competition in financial markets an empirical study of island and nasdaq the competition between island and nasdaq at the beginning of the century offers a natural laboratory to study competition between and within trading platforms and its consequences for liquidity supply our empirical strategy takes advantage of the difference between the pricing grids used on island and nasdaq as well as of the decline in the nasdaq tick using the finer grid prevailing on their market island limit order traders undercut nasdaq quotes much more than they undercut one another the drop in the nasdaq tick size triggered a drop in island spreads despite the island tick already being very thin before nasdaq decimalization we also estimate a structural model of liquidity supply and find that island limit order traders earned rents before nasdaq decimalization our results suggest that perfect competition cannot be taken for granted even on transparent open limit order books with a very thin pricing grid

strategic quality choice and charter schools abstract proponents of charter schools argue that competition will improve the educational outcomes of both charter and public students a model of quality choice has been used to examine this claim with capacity constraints there is an equilibrium in which the charter school offers a higher quality which the public school will not match competition from charter schools may therefore have only modest effects on public school quality if any

new insights into smile mispricing and value at risk the hyperbolic model the authors investigate a new basic model for asset pricing the hyperbolic model which allows an almost perfect statistical fit of stock return data after a detailed introduction into the theory they use secondary market data to compare the hyperbolic model to the classical black scholes model the authors study implicit volatilities the smile effect and pricing performance exploiting the full power of the hyperbolic model they construct an option value process from a statistical point of view by estimating the implicit risk neutral density function from option data finally the authors present some new value at risk calculations leading to new perspectives to cope with model risk copyright 1998 by university of chicago press

charter school entry and school choice the case of washington d c this paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model of charter school entry and school choice in the model households choose among public private and charter schools and a regulator authorizes charter entry and mandates charter exit the model is estimated for washington d c according to the estimates charters generate net social gains by providing additional school options and they benefit non white low income and middle school students the most further policies that raise the supply of prospective charter entrants in combination with high authorization standards enhance social welfare

logit estimates of strike incidence from canadian contract data logit estimates of strike incidence are made based on a unique and comprehensive data set of 2 437 collective agreements the appropriate level of aggregation since that is where bargaining occurs the results are interpreted through a theoretical framework emphasizing that strikes are more likely when the joint costs of using the strike mechanism are low relative to the cost of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same purposes such functions of strikes are to generate information elicit truth telling establish reputations provide catharsis and solve intraorganizational conflict

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

pricing discretely monitored asian options under levy processes we present methodologies to price discretely monitored asian options when the underlying evolves according to a generic levy process for geometric asian options we provide closed form solutions in terms of the fourier transform and we study in particular these formulas in the levy stable case for arithmetic asian options we solve the valuation problem by recursive integration and derive a recursive theoretical formula for the moments to check the accuracy of the results we compare the implementation of our method to monte carlo simulation implemented with control variates and using different parametric levy processes we also discuss model risk issues

the performance and competitive effects of school autonomy this paper studies a recent british reform that allowed public high schools to opt out of local authority control and become autonomous schools funded directly by the central government schools seeking autonomy had only to propose and win a majority vote among current parents almost one in three high schools voted on autonomy between 1988 and 1997 and using a version of the regression discontinuity design i find large achievement gains at schools in which the vote barely won compared to schools in which it barely lost despite other reforms that ensured that the british education system was by international standards highly competitive a comparison of schools in the geographic neighborhoods of narrow vote winners and narrow vote losers suggests that these gains did not spill over

the impact of charter school attendance on student performance abstract we employ a panel of individual student data on math and reading test performance for five cohorts of students in texas to study the impact of charter school attendance we control for school mobility effects and distinguish movement to a charter school from movement within and between traditional public school districts we find students experience poor test score growth in their initial year in a charter school but that this is followed by recovery in the subsequent years failure to account for this pattern may lead to potentially misleading estimates of the impact of charter attendance on student achievement students who remain in charters largely recover from the initial disruption within approximately 3 years and there is weak evidence that there may be overall gains from charter attendance within this period furthermore students who return to traditional public schools after just 1 or 2 years in a charter do not appear to suffer a lasting negative impact despite their poor average performance in their first year of charter attendance

recovering risk neutral densities from option prices a new approach in this paper we present a new method of approximating the risk neutral density rnd from option prices based on the c type gram charlier series expansion gcse of a prob ability density function the exponential form of this type of gcse guarantees that it will always give positive values of the risk neutral probabilities and it can allow for stronger deviations from normality which are two drawbacks of the a type gcse used in practice to evaluate the performance of the suggested expansion of the rnd the paper presents simulation and empirical evidence

time changed levy processes and option pricing abstract the classic black scholes option pricing model assumes that returns follow brownian motion but return processes differ from this benchmark in at least three important ways first asset prices jump leading to non normal return innovations second return volatilities vary stochastically over time third returns and their volatilities are correlated often negatively for equities time changed levy processes can simultaneously address these three issues we show that our framework encompasses almost all of the models proposed in the option pricing literature and it is straightforward to select and test a particular option pricing model through the use of characteristic function technology

financial market models with levy processes and time varying volatility abstract asset management and pricing models require the proper modeling of the return distribution of financial assets while the return distribution used in the traditional theories of asset pricing and portfolio selection is the normal distribution numerous studies that have investigated the empirical behavior of asset returns in financial markets throughout the world reject the hypothesis that asset return distributions are normally distribution alternative models for describing return distributions have been proposed since the 1960s with the strongest empirical and theoretical support being provided for the family of stable distributions with the normal distribution being a special case of this distribution since the turn of the century specific forms of the stable distribution have been proposed and tested that better fit the observed behavior of historical return distributions more specifically subclasses of the tempered stable distribution have been proposed in this paper we propose one such subclass of the tempered stable distribution which we refer to as the kr distribution we empirically test this distribution as well as two other recently proposed subclasses of the tempered stable distribution the carr geman madan yor cgmy distribution and the modified tempered stable mts distribution the advantage of the kr distribution over the other two distributions is that it has more flexible tail parameters for these three subclasses of the tempered stable distribution which are infinitely divisible and have exponential moments for some neighborhood of zero we generate the exponential levy market models induced from them we then construct a new garch model with the infinitely divisible distributed innovation and three subclasses of that garch model that incorporates three observed properties of asset returns volatility clustering fat tails and skewness we formulate the algorithm to find the risk neutral return processes for those garch models using the change of measure for the tempered stable distributions to compare the performance of those exponential levy models and the garch models we report the results of the parameters estimated for the s p 500 index and investigate the out of sample forecasting performance for those garch models for the s p 500 option prices

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

cyclical fluctuations in strike durations canadian data on strikes between 1946 and 1983 are used to estimate linear regression models for the logarithm of completed duration a thorough investigation of the influence of the business cycle reveals strong support for the hypothesis that strike durations are countercyclical the cyclical effect is shown to be robust to both the choice of cyclical variable and the econometric specification and the magnitude of the effect is quite substantial experimentation with different representations of the cycle reveals that it is difficult to improve on a simple formulation involving a single continuous variable

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

equilibria with communication in a job market example we study costless information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and if so which position to give him we construct equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps or even that no deadline be imposed on the plain conversation the set of communication equilibrium payoffs achieved with the help of a communication device is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs

extracting market information from equity options with exponential levy processes levy processes have been successfully applied in the modeling of financial assets useful information such as implied volatility skewness and risk preferences can be derived from market option prices in this paper we advocate using esscher conjugate levy processes to estimate risk neutral and empirical densities more specifically we employ the exponential meixner and nig processes to calculate in closed form the pricing kernel in the equity market and then study the evolution of equity market behavior between 2002 and 2010 our empirical analysis using s p 500 options shows that the risk preferences of equity investors were signalling an anomaly in the market well before the subprime prime mortgage crisis august 2007 and the crisis of confidence that followed anticipating the downfall in equity markets in 2008 but then returning to normal levels in 2009

mobility targeting and private school vouchers simulations are derived from a three district model of low middle and highincome school districts calibrated to new york data with housing stocks that vary within and across districts in this model it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to nontargeted vouchers but vastly different from vouchers targeted to low income households furthermore strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs jel 122 128 h73 persistent frustration with the perceived low quality of public education exacerbated by concerns over the inherently unequal levels of public school quality across school districts has caused policy makers courts and researchers to investigate modifications and alternatives to the current public school system one idea that has received increasing academic and public attention is that of private school vouchers with proponents arguing that the competitive pressures of voucher programs would cause improvements in the efficiency of the publicschool system while at the same time addressing equity concerns if vouchers can be targeted to low income households or low income school districts but aside from a few limited experiments in some u s cities our experience with vouchers in the united states remains virtually nonexistent this limits the amount of information researchers can derive from standard empirical analysis in that it forces them to rely on only current nonvoucher induced differences in competition despite important suggestive results such work may not anticipate all the impacts from a large scale policy such as the voucher policies currently under discussion at the same time theoretical models of school finance are also limited in that they often either focus on only one particular aspect of the general equilibrium school finance problem or they are too rich and complex to yield crisp predictions

wage contract settlements in u s manufacturing a bstruactusing a large scale longitudinal micro data base this paper tests for the determinants of union wage settlements in manufacturing alternative specifications of wage change relationships were tested in data covering the years 1957 to 1980 among the most important determinants of union wage changes were the expected inflation rate inflationary surprises in indexed agreements incomes policy dummy variables and spillovers from key national agreements catch up effects from lagged inflationary surprises were not important in determining the size of new settlements

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard an empirical study of national football league contract negotiations this paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts using contract and performance data on players drafted into the national football league from 1986 through 1991 we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations in addition our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player s effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

the fine structure of asset returns an empirical investigation we investigate the importance of diffusion and jumps in a new model for asset returns in contrast to standard models we allow for jump components displaying finite or infinite activity and variation empirical investigations of time series indicate that index dynamics are devoid of a diffusion component which may be present in the dynamics of individual stocks this leads to the conjecture confirmed on options data that the risk neutral process should be free of a diffusion component we conclude that the statistical and risk neutral processes for equity prices are pure jump processes of infinite activity and finite variation

dynamic bargaining with action dependent valuations abstract an infinite horizon dynamic bargaining model is presented in which actions affect the expected future value of the buyer seller match because actions directly affect the future surplus to be bargained over the model is unlike other models that tie the dynamic process to nature alone focusing on a subset of weak markov equilibria several results come about that are not found in static bargaining models using similar bargaining protocols in particular optimal price demands can be lower higher than the buyer s lowest highest possible valuation and several empirical features concerning wage settlements and strike incidence from labor union contract negotiations can be explained

repeated bargaining with persistent private information the paper analyses repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent but not fully permanent private information the size of the surplus being divided is specified as a two state markov chain with transitions that are synchronized with contract negotiation dates equilibrium involves information cycles triggered by the success or failure of aggressive demands made by the seller because there is persistence in the markov chain generating the surplus a successful demand induces the seller to make another aggressive demand in the next negotiation since the buyer s acceptance reveals that the current surplus is large rejection of an aggressive demand on the other hand leads the seller to be pessimistic about the size of the surplus in the next contract so the seller makes a soft offer that is sure to be accepted then after several such offers have been accepted the seller is optimistic enough to again make an aggressive demand creating an information cycle an interesting feature of this cycle is that the soft price is not constant but declines as the cycle continues so as to offset the buyer s option value of re starting the cycle when the current state is bad an explicit mapping is given for the relationship between the basic parameters and the equilibrium prices and quantities in particular there is a closed form solution for the threshold belief that makes the seller indifferent between hard and soft offers

an empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product type choices i describe a model of entry with endogenous product type choices these choices are formalized as the outcomes of a game of incomplete information in which rivals differentiated products have nonuniform competitive effects on profits i estimate the model for location choices in the video retail industry using a nested fixed point algorithm solution the results imply significant returns to product differentiation simulations illustrate the tradeoff between demand and intensified competition and the extent to which markets with more scope for differentiation support greater entry

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

revealing the implied risk neutral mgf from options the wavelet method options are believed to contain unique information on the risk neutral moment generating function mgf or the risk neutral probability density function pdf of the underlying asset this paper applies the wavelet method to approximate the implied risk neutral mgf from option prices monte carlo simulations are carried out to show how the risk neutral mgf can be obtained using the wavelet method with the black scholes model as the benchmark we offer a novel method to reveal the implied mgf and to price in sample options and forecast out of sample option prices with the estimated mgf

equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects public service output depends on input expenditures on own personal characteristics and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community the peer group effect in a community model with public expenditures set by voting with migration between communities and with land price differentials capitalization it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and second best inefficient this equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither too strong nor too weak the inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration the land price differential does not play the part of the price of the better peer group but of a transfer payment

dampened power law reconciling the tail behavior of financial security returns this article proposes a stylized model that reconciles several seemingly conflicting findings on financial security returns and option prices the model is based on a pure jump levy process wherein the jump arrival rate obeys a power law dampened by an exponential function the model allows for different degrees of dampening for positive and negative jumps and also for different pricing for upside and downside market risks calibration of the model to the s p 500 index shows that the market charges only a moderate premium on upward index movements but the maximally allowable premium on downward index movements

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

an empirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining these models can be applied to contract negotiations yielding an economic theory of strikes to date however few empirical tests of these models have been carried out in this paper a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm s future profitability these predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major u s contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

a general distribution for describing security price returns this paper introduces a generalized distribution called the gb2 distribution for describing security returns the distribution is extremely flexible containing a large number of well known distributions such as the lognormal log t and log cauchy distribu tions as special or limiting cases and allowing large even infinite higher moments this flexibility allows a direct representation of different degrees of fat tails in the distribution the properties of the gb2 make it useful in empirical estimation of security returns and in facilitating the development of option pricing models and other models that depend on the specification and mathematical manipulation of distributions copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

option pricing where the underlying assets follow a gram charlier density of arbitrary order abstract if a probability distribution is sufficiently close to a normal distribution its density can be approximated by a gram charlier series a expansion in option pricing this has been used to fit risk neutral asset price distributions to the implied volatility smile ensuring an arbitrage free interpolation of implied volatilities across exercise prices however the existing literature is restricted to truncating the series expansion after the fourth moment this paper presents an option pricing formula in terms of the full untruncated series and discusses a fitting algorithm which ensures that a series truncated at a moment of arbitrary order represents a valid probability density while it is well known that valid densities resulting from truncated gram charlier series a expansions do not always have sufficient flexibility to fit all market observed option prices perfectly this paper demonstrates that option pricing in a model based on these densities is as tractable as the far less flexible original model of black and scholes 1973 allowing non trivial higher moments such as skewness excess kurtosis and so on to be incorporated into the pricing of exotic options generalising the gram charlier series a approach to the multiperiod multivariate case a model calibrated to standard option prices is developed in which a large class of exotic payoffs can be priced in closed form furthermore this approach when applied to a foreign exchange option market involving several currencies can be used to ensure that the volatility smiles for options on the cross exchange rate are constructed in a consistent arbitrage free manner

pure jump levy processes for asset price modelling abstract the goal of the paper is to show that some types of levy processes such as the hyperbolic motion and the cgmy are particularly suitable for asset price modelling and option pricing we wish to review some fundamental mathematic properties of levy distributions such as the one of infinite divisibility and how they translate observed features of asset price returns we explain how these processes are related to brownian motion the central process in finance through stochastic time changes which can in turn be interpreted as a measure of the economic activity lastly we focus on two particular classes of pure jump levy processes the generalized hyperbolic model and the cgmy models and report on the goodness of fit obtained both on stock prices and option prices

estimating equilibrium models of sorting across locations while there is growing interest in measuring the size and scope of local spillovers it is well understood that such spillovers cannot be distinguished from unobservable local attributes using solely the observed location decisions of individuals or firms we propose an empirical strategy for recovering estimates of spillovers in the presence of unobserved local attributes for a broadly applicable class of equilibrium sorting models our approach relies on an iv strategy derived from the internal logic of the sorting model itself we show practically how the strategy is implemented provide intuition for our instruments discuss the role of effective choice set variation in identifying the model and carry out a series of monte carlo simulations to demonstrate performance in small samples

strikes and wages a test of an asymmetric information model this paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the profitability of the firm the model posits the existence of a negatively sloped resistance curve between wages and strike duration in addition it offer a series of predictions relating wage and strike outcomes to changes in the expected profitability of the firm and changes in the alternative opportunities of striking workers these implications are tested using data on wage outcomes strike probabilities and strike durations for a large sample of collective bargaining agreements

longitudinal analysis of strike activity this article presents an empirical study of strike activity in a panel of contract negotiations for some 250 firm and union pairs evidence is presented on two sources of variation in dispute rates changes in the characteristics of the collective bargaining agreement that affect subsequent strike outcomes and the effects of lagged strikes on the incidence and duration of subsequent disputes strike probabilities are significantly affected by the duration and expiration month of the previous agreement dispute rates are also increased by the occurrence of a short strike during the previous negotiations and reduced by the occurrence of a long strike

improving the numerical performance of static and dynamic aggregate discrete choice random coefficients demand estimation the widely used estimator of berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 p roduces estimates of consumer preferences from a discrete choice demand model with random coefficients market level demand shocks and endogenous prices we derive numerical theory results characterizing the properties of the nested fixed point algorithm used to evaluate the objective function of blp s estimator we discuss problems with typical implementations including cases that can lead to incorrect parameter estimates as a solution we recast estimation as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints which can be faster and which avoids the numerical issues associated with nested inner loops the advantages are even more pronounced for forward looking demand models where the bellman equation must also be solved repeatedly several monte carlo and real data experiments support our numerical concerns about the nested fixed point approach and the advantages of constrained optimization for static blp the constrained optimization approach can be as much as ten to forty times faster for large dimensional problems with many markets

an investigation into the determinants of u s strike activity this paper outlines the steps involved in constructing a new panel dataset of u s contract negotiations and strike activity this data set has a much broader coverage of firms and unions than micro data sets analyzed to date key findings include the discovery that the variability and not the level of firm profitability affects the probability of a strike personal characteristics of the union workforce also emerge as key determinants of strike activity finally strikes are found to be more likely when the local labor market is tight but less likely when the industry labor market is tight copyright 1986 by american economic association

repeated signalling games and dynamic trading relationships a seller of a nondurable good repeatedly faces a buyer who is privately informed about the position of his demand curve the seller offers a price in each period the buyer chooses a quantity given the price the quantity demanded reveals information about the buyer an equilibrium is characterized with the feature that buyer types separate completely in the first period this equilibrium uniquely satisfies a modified refinement of the cho kreps criterion despite the immediate separation the buyer distorts his behavior throughout the game the requirement to signal types can raise the utility of all types of informed players copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

wage bargaining labor turnover and the business cycle a model with asymmetric information this paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other s reservation wage under specified circumstances the model s equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover in addition aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs these results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity long term contracting or aggregate price misperceptions

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small