pareto improving campaign finance policy this paper argues that campaign finance policy in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing can be pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters the optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen the argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions

the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

the impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the french legislative elections of 1993 we use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the french legislative assembly incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1 01 of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals the regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals these results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding

selling favors in the lab experiments on campaign finance reform campaign advertising can provide benefits to constituencies when used to fund the distribution of useful information but voters can be harmed if candidates finance such advertising by trading policy favors to special interests in exchange for contributions we report data from novel laboratory campaign finance experiments that shed light on this tradeoff and that provide rigorous empirical evidence on formal campaign finance theory our key finding is that voters respond to advertising differently between special interest and publicly financed campaigns and that the nature of this difference is qualitatively consistent with formal models predictions

wage and technology dispersion this paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs stigler 1961 in equilibrium some firms adopt high fixed cost high productivity technologies offer high wages and fill job openings quickly other firms adopt less capital intensive technologies and offer low wages hiring mostly uninformed workers in equilibrium the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice we show that worker search which would appear to be a rent seeking activity in partial equilibrium may be efficiency enhancing in general equilibrium

poverty traps and index based risk transfer products summary a growing literature suggests that in low income countries households with few assets can be trapped in chronic poverty this article reviews relevant threads of the poverty traps literature to motivate a description of the opportunities presented by innovative index based risk transfer products these products can be used to address some insurance and credit market failures that contribute to the persistence of poverty among households in low income countries applications are considered at the micro meso and macro levels 2008 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

some talk money in politics a partial review of the literature the financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study i review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empir ical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions the effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot measure elections are summarized as are the impacts of contributions on contributors welfare many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years and i describe work that exploits variations in these laws a discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors motives

how can safety nets contribute to economic growth the paper provides an up to date and selective review of the literature on how social safety nets contribute to growth the evidence is carefully chosen to show how safety nets have the potential to overcome constraints on growth linked to market failures and is organized into 4 distinct pathways i encouraging asset accumulation by changing incentives and by addressing imperfections in financial markets caused by constraints in obtaining credit and from information asymmetries overcoming such failures helps households to invest into their human capital or productive assets ii failures in insurance markets especially in low income setting safety nets are assisting in managing risk both ex post and ex ante iii safety nets are overcoming failure to create assets and other local economy complementary factors to household level investments iv safety nets are shown to relax political constraints on policy safety nets have a dual objective of directly alleviating poverty through transfers to the poor and of triggering higher growth for the poor however the trade off between the dual objectives of equity and growth is not eliminated by the potential for productive safety nets this remains critical for designing social policies

media proliferation and democratic transition in africa the case of madagascar summary state controlled media have historically dominated press outlets across much of africa yet recently economic and political liberalization together with new communication technologies have triggered rapid growth and increasing private sector involvement changes which hold potentially important implications for development and governance this paper explores the origins and impact of recent private sector media growth in madagascar where over 90 private radio stations and 15 private television stations have begun operation over the past decade the resulting profusion of private media has played a key role in improving governance most recently in the hotly contested presidential election of 2001

countercyclical safety nets for the poor and vulnerable abstract relatively little is known about how government safety net programs insure against low consumption and stabilize asset bases compared to what is known about their role in transferring income the insurance function requires a flexible budget that can be scaled up rapidly to meet unanticipated circumstances safety nets serving an insurance function also differ from other transfer programs in their targeting they need to determine transitory need rather than more chronic correlates of poverty moreover insurance safety nets need a more flexible implementation strategy than do more permanent programs this paper reviews these issues from the perspective of low income countries

do social protection transfers reduce poverty and vulnerability to poverty in pakistan household level evidence from punjab empirical studies in different developing countries have investigated the impact of social protection sp on ex post poverty however few studies analysed the impact of sp on ex ante vulnerability to poverty vtp this paper contributes to the literature by evaluating the impact of sp on vulnerability to poverty vtp and poverty rates among households in the punjab province of pakistan a hierarchical modelling approach is used to analyse the multiple indicator cluster survey mics 2011 data of about 90 000 households matching methods and simultaneous endogenous switching regression are used to control for potential selection bias and estimate average treatment effects our results show that sp has a positive impact in reducing household poverty and vtp but this impact is mainly driven by a short term flood relief cash transfer programme pension of government employees and households regular purchase from utility store network

do local officials know something we don t decentralization of targeted transfers in albania abstract albania provides a small amount of social assistance to nearly 20 of its population through a system which allows a degree of community discretion in determining distribution this study indicates that relative to other safety net programs in low income countries social assistance in albania is fairly well targeted to the poor moreover the poverty targeting exceeds that which could be expected on the basis of proxy indicators of targeting alone communes appear to be using local information unlikely to be obtained on the basis of a questionnaire or formula this remains the case conditional on the level of funding allocated from the central government

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

an equilibrium model of search unemployment this paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with sequential search in which a nondegenerate wage offer distribution is endogenously determined we use this model to analyze the comparati

competition and truth in the market for news in this essay we evaluate the case for competition in news markets from the perspective of economics first we consider the simple proposition that when more points of view are heard and defended beliefs will converge to the truth this concept of competition is several steps removed from market competition among actual media firms but it has played a prominent role in the legal arguments for a free press we then explore three mechanisms by which increasing competition or more precisely increasing the number of independently owned firms can limit bias or distortions that originate on the supply side of the media market first when governments attempt to manipulate news competition can increase the likelihood that the media remain independent second when news providers have an interest in manipulating consumers beliefs diversity in such incentives can reduce the risk of information being suppressed or distorted third competition may drive firms to invest in providing timely and accurate coverage overall we argue that there are robust reasons to expect competition to be effective in disciplining supply side bias next we ask how the effect of competition changes when distortions originate on the demand side of the market when consumers themselves demand biased or less socially relevant news we find that increased competition may or may not improve welfare in these cases though we caution against using this as a justification for concentrating media power in the hands of state controlled or regulated firms

occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism the british industrial revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically dominant group we propose a theory of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for this pattern parents shape their children s preferences in response to economic incentives middle class families in occupations requiring effort skill and experience develop patience and a work ethic whereas upper class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure these class specific attitudes which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape i introduction the industrial revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth it also set off a social and political transformation that redefined hierarchies in society and reshaped the distribution of income and wealth before the onset of industrialization in eighteenth century britain wealth and political power were associated with the possession of land over the course of the nineteenth century a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen emerged as the economic elite for the most part the members of this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social origins in the urban middle classes the landed elite was left behind and eventually lost its political and economic predominance many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to differences in values attitudes and ultimately preferences across social classes there are countless examples both in scholarly and in fictional writing of portrayals of members of the landowning class as averse to work unwilling to save ill disposed tocommercialactivity andunabletoconsidermoneyassomething

electoral contributions and the cost of unpopularity when considering electoral campaigns candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding to offset this unpopularity effect politicians may either demand more money for campaign advertising from these industries in order to persuade less informed voters or shy away from unpopular contributors to avoid losing the support of the informed electorate our model predicts that the first effect dominates and electoral contributions are increasing in industry unpopularity by using u s house elections data and different identification strategies we provide robust evidence in favor of our predictions jel d72 p16

managing food price risks and instability in a liberalizing market environment overview and policy options abstract managing food price risks and instability is a major challenge in the midst of ongoing food market reforms key findings from the papers in this special volume revolve around five broad areas i the sources and magnitudes of food price instability in different country contexts ii the economic and social costs stemming from price instability iii the lessons from food market reforms to date iv the design of policy reforms in ways that promote efficient and stable market development and protect the interests of the poor and v potential policy responses to food price instability in a liberalizing market environment

mass media and public policy abstract if more informed voters receive favorable policies then mass media should influence policy because it provides most of the information people use in voting this paper uses a simple model to analyze the effect of mass media provision of news on a number of policy issues redistribution the size of the government sector rents and corruption the effectiveness of lobby groups and political business cycles it is easy to deal with such a wide range of issues because existing models of political competition often include informed and uniformed voters modelling mass media simply endogenizes who is informed and who is not the paper also discusses empirical evidence and point to areas for future research

the efficiency of search under competition and monopsony this paper compares monopsonistic and competitive search equilibria while the competitive equilibrium is efficient the monopsonistic equilibrium is not there is too much search and the employment rate is too low

revealed community equivalence scales abstract this paper estimates the equivalence scale revealed by discretionary community allocations of welfare benefits to poor households i apply the proposed approach to a subsidized rice program in indonesia in which villages designated program beneficiaries and estimate the equivalence scale implicit in the beneficiaries they selected i find that the revealed community equivalence scale for this program lies much closer to per capita expenditure than traditional demand based equivalence scales particularly in the poorest communities this suggests that per capita expenditure may be closer to how poor communities actually compare households when allocating aid than previously thought

political contribution caps and lobby formation theory and evidence abstract the perceived importance of special interest group money in election campaigns motivates widespread use of caps on allowable contributions we present a bargaining model in which the effect of a cap that is not too stringent on the amount a lobby can contribute improves its bargaining position relative to the politician it thus increases the payoff from lobbying which will therefore increase the equilibrium number of lobbies when lobby formation is endogenous caps may then also increase aggregate contributions from lobbies and increase politically motivated government spending we present empirical evidence from u s states that support various predictions of the model we find a positive effect on the number of pacs formed from enacting laws constraining pac contributions moreover the estimated effect is non linear as predicted by the theoretical model very stringent caps reduce the number of pacs but as the cap increases above a threshold level the effect becomes positive contribution caps in the majority of u s states are above this threshold

media markets special interests and voters abstract this paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence i use the concentration of campaign contributions from political action committees to proxy for special interests capture of us senate candidates from 1980 to 2002 and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets in state media markets and out of state media markets unlike in state media markets out of state markets focus on neighboring states politics and elections thus if citizens punish political capture increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in state counties relative to the out of state counties where the candidate receives less coverage i find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0 5 to 1 5 percentage points in in state counties relative to the out of state counties robustness checks suggest that these results are not driven by omitted senator characteristics or by differences between in state and out of state counties along dimensions other than the media environment

one man one dollar campaign contribution limits equal influence and political communication arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in u s federal elections are limits imposed on individual campaign contributions one of the principal arguments in support of these contribution limits has been that they equalize the influence of individual donors and thereby cause candidates aggregate financial resources to more accurately reflect public support i construct a formal model to evaluate this argument the analysis shows that a necessary condition for it to apply is that a candidate s reliance on large contributions is negatively related to voter preferred characteristics which cannot be credibly revealed through campaign advertisements using data on elections to the house of representatives between 1992 and 2000 i find no evidence that such a relationship exists this result casts doubt on the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits

food security and storage in the middle east and north africa in times of highly volatile commodity markets governments often try to protect their populations from rapidly rising food prices which can be particularly harsh for the poor a potential solution for food deficit countries is to hold strategic reserves which can be called on when international prices spike but how large should strategic stockpiles be this paper develops a dynamic storage model for wheat in the middle east and north africa mena region where imported wheat dominates the average diet the paper uses the model to analyze a strategy that sets aside wheat stockpiles which can be used when needed to keep domestic prices below a targeted price this paper shows that if the target is set high and reserves are adequate the strategy can be effective and robust contrary to most interventions strategic storage policies are counter cyclical and when the importing region is sufficiently large a regional policy can smooth global prices this paper shows that this is the case for the mena region nevertheless the policy is more costly than the pro cyclical policy of a targeted intervention that directly offsets high prices with a subsidy similar to food stamps

persistent wage dispersion and involuntary unemployment it is costly for firms offers to workers to be turned down both because firms must make additional offers and making offers is costly and because capital is underused or unused provided that workers apply to at least two firms for jobs there will be wage dispersion in equilibrium and some workers will randomly fail to receive any wage offers firms in the same industry with access to the same technology may nevertheless choose different levels of capital intensity firms using capital intensive technologies will pay higher wages

radio s impact on public spending if informed voters receive favorable policies then the invention of a new mass medium may affect government policies since it affects who is informed and who is not these ideas are developed in a voting model the model forms the basis for an empirical investigation of a major new deal relief program implemented in the middle of the expansion period of radio the main empirical finding is that u s counties with many radio listeners received more relief funds more funds were allocated to poor counties with high unemployment but controlling for these and other variables the effects of radio are large and highly significant

exposing corrupt politicians the effects of brazil s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes author s finan frederico ferraz claudio abstract this paper examines the extent to which access to information enhances political accountability based upon the results of brazil s recent anti corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally transferred funds it estimates the effect of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re election success of incumbent mayors in municipal elections comparing municipalities which were randomly audited before the elections with those audited after the analysis shows that the disclosure of audit results had a significant impact on the re election rates of mayors found to be corrupt for a one standard deviation increase in reported corruption the audit policy reduced the incumbent s likelihood of re election by 25 percent this effect is more pronounced in municipalities where radio stations are present and higher levels of corruption are identified these findings highlight the value of information and the role of the media in reducing informational asymmetries in the political process thus enabling voters to not only hold corrupt politicians accountable but also to reward non corrupt politicians

between search and walras we present a model in which unemployed workers simultaneously sample n potential employers by varying n we nest search and walrasian type models of the labor market we show that low values of n yield typical search equilibria the wages are dispersed below the marginal productivity of labor interestingly as n exceeds a relatively small threshold the walrasian type equilibrium emerges with the competitive wage quoted by all firms for intermediate values of n the equilibrium is a hybrid of the walrasian and search equilibria the model generates wage rigidity and yields novel predictions regarding the comovement of wages firm turnover and unemployment

credit programmes for the poor and seasonality in rural bangladesh this article examines the effect of group based credit used to finance self employment by landless households in bangladesh on the seasonal pattern of household consumption and male and female labour supply this credit can help smooth seasonal consumption by financing new productive activities whose income flows and time demands do not seasonally covary with the income generated by existing agricultural activities the results based upon 1991 92 survey data strongly suggest that an important motivation for credit programme participation is the need to smooth the seasonal pattern of consumption and male labour supply it is only the extent of lean season consumption poverty that selects household into these programmes in addition the largest female and male effects of credit on household consumption are during the lean season

the political economy of government responsiveness theory and evidence from india the determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive this suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy the ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from india we show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater controlling for shocks where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest

public policy markets and household coping strategies in bangladesh avoiding a food security crisis following the 1998 floods abstract at their peak the 1998 floods covered two thirds of bangladesh causing severe damage to the major rice crop and threatening the food security of tens of millions of households in this paper we first highlight the contribution of government policy interventions including trade liberalization in the early 1990s to stabilization of rice markets during and after the flood then using a panel data set covering 750 households in three rounds over a 13 month period we analyze impacts of the flood on household assets consumption and nutritional outcomes finally we present empirical estimates of the contribution of rice market stabilization and government transfers to household food consumption

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

does food aid really have disincentive effects new evidence from sub saharan africa summary limited empirical evidence exists either to refute or confirm the pervasive belief that food aid has significant disincentive effects on recipient food production using household level data from rural ethiopia we demonstrate that while simple descriptive statistics appear consistent with the disincentive effects hypothesis once one controls properly for the endogeneity of food aid receipt no empirical support remains for the hypothesis that food aid creates disincentive effects among recipient households the macro economic evidence yields similar findings applying vector autoregression methods to national level data controlling for possible confounding variables we find that food aid has no disincentive effect on food production

social protection 2 0 exploring issues evidence and debates in a globalizing world abstract this paper reviews the growing literature on social protection while not new the concept evolved remarkably in recent years it is approached from a multitude of perspectives and intersects with broader bodies of literature particularly around public policy pro poor growth rights humanitarian strategies and aid effectiveness as well as feeding into specific programmatic issues e g conditionality targeting and transfer selection this blend of challenges and approaches has often made debates elusive and polarized the paper examines the evolution and definitions of social protection and unbundles critical policy institutional and implementation quandaries taken together these considerations shape a set of context specific models of social protection the paper s five core conclusions may help chart future directions for social protection research and practice

network structure and the aggregation of information theory and evidence from indonesia abstract we use unique data from over 600 indonesian communities on what individuals know about the poverty status of others to study how network structure influences information aggregation we develop a model of semi bayesian learning on networks which we structurally estimate using within village data the model generates qualitative predictions about how cross village patterns of learning relate to network structure which we show are borne out in the data we apply our findings to a community based targeting program where citizens chose households to receive aid and show that the networks that the model predicts to be more diffusive differentially benefit from community targeting jel d14 d83 d85 i32 o12 z13

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

television and voter turnout i use variation across markets in the timing of television s introduction to identify its impact on voter turnout the estimated effect is significantly negative accounting for between a quarter and a half of the total decline in turnout since the 1950s i argue that substitution away from other media with more political coverage provides a plausible mechanism linking television to voting as evidence for this i show that the entry of television in a market coincided with sharp drops in consumption of newspapers and radio and in political knowledge as measured by election surveys i also show that both the information and turnout effects were largest in off year congressional elections which receive extensive coverage in newspapers but little or no coverage on television

real wage determination in bangladesh agriculture an econometric investigation thsi paper develops and estimates a real wage model for the agricultural sector in bangladesh for the period 1973 2 1985 4 the model is developed within the framework of the market theory of labour demand and labour supply the empirical results are supportive of the market theory of wages

news droughts news floods and u s disaster relief this paper studies the influence of mass media on u s government response to approximately 5 000 natural disasters occurring between 1968 and 2002 these disasters took nearly 63 000 lives and affected 125 million people per year we show that u s relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the olympic games which are obviously unrelated to need we argue that the only plausible explanation of this is that relief decisions are driven by news coverage of disasters and that the other newsworthy material crowds out this news coverage

media capture in a democracy the role of wealth concentration abstract since objective news coverage is vital to democracy captured media can seriously distort collective decisions the current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those effects from the mass media the media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to influence the public opinion in the case of voting over the level of a productivity enhancing public bad it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely although media bias is not always welfare worsening conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive

are campaign contributions a form of speech evidence from recent us house elections this paper investigates the effects of the sources ofcandidates campaign funding on their electoral outcomes withparticular emphasis on whether candidates who rely on a narrowbase of funding suffer adverse electoral consequences anextensive dataset consisting of over 650 000 contributions tohouse candidates in elections from 1980 to 1992 is used theresults reveal a negative relationship between theconcentration of contributions and voteshare for open seatcandidates and challengers this finding appears to havesignificant implications for some of the empirical premisesunderlying the u s supreme court s landmark buckley v valeo decision at the very least it represents an importantstylized fact about us elections that is robust over 1980 1992 period

balanced matching and labor market equilibrium we analyze equilibrium in a labor market model wherein it takes time for the workers to contact firms workers assumed identical repeatedly sell their labor services all through their work lives choosing their search intensity endogenously identical firms attempt to maximize their steady state profit flow we focus on the importance and consequences of balanced matching in which workers are more likely to contact a larger firm a unique equilibrium is shown to exist wherein all firms offer the same wage and select an employment level at which wage equals marginal product the effect of traditional labor market policies and empirical implications are discussed

child growth shocks and food aid in rural ethiopia this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled child growth shocks and food aid in rural ethiopia conducted between 1995 and 1996 in ethiopia the study observed the impact of food aid on child growth and shocks in communities on the child level food aid has a positive significant impact on the growth in height of children the total amount of food aid appears on average to be sufficient to offset the negative effects of plot damage on child growth given the fact there remains a massive amount of child stunting there must be large amounts of mis targeting of aid girls seem to be more resilient to shocks than boys

the impact of group based credit programs on poor households in bangladesh does the gender of participants matter this paper estimates the impact of participation by gender in the grameen bank and two other group based micro credit programs in bangladesh on labor supply schooling household expenditure and assets the empirical method uses a quasi experimental survey design to correct for the bias from unobserved individual and village level heterogeneity we find that program credit has a larger effect on the behavior of poor households in bangladesh when women are the program participants for example annual household consumption expenditure increases 18 taka for every 100 additional taka borrowed by women from these credit programs compared with 11 taka for men

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

inequality and media capture abstract popular support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion even when voters understand that the media can be biased i develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost the model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom this effect is stronger in democratic regimes i find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross country analysis

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

a free press is bad news for corruption abstract this paper tests the proposition that a free press may be a powerful control on corruption we find evidence of a significant relationship between more press freedom and less corruption in a large cross section of countries this result is robust to specification and sample and the relationship is not sensitive to the choice of a particular measure of corruption or of press freedom furthermore we present evidence which suggests that the direction of causation runs from higher press freedom to lower corruption

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

no help wanted signs and the duration of job search in standard job search models the increased duration ofjob search in recessions is the result of workers failure to perceive the downward shift of the wage offer distribution they face an alternative explanation offered by okun i98i argues that the increase in no help wanted signs i e zero wage offers in recessions raises workers optimal duration of search since the increased duration of job search is explained without reference to faulty wage expectations unemployment does not automatically return to the natural rate as workers recognise the new wage offer distribution the effect of an increase in no help wanted signs a reduction in the probability of receiving a nonzero wage offer on the duration of search in sequential job search models is ambiguous in general barron i 975 this paper seeks to discover conditions under which such an increase raises the optimal duration of job search for this purpose a simple job search model with no help wanted signs is developed in the next section 2 section ii shows that if the distribution of wage offers is log concave the optimal duration of job search rises with increases in no help wanted signs other circumstances that yield this result are also examined the final section contains concluding remarks