labor market institutions and inflation volatility in the euro area despite having had the same currency for many years emu countries still have quite different inflation dynamics in this paper we explore one possible reason country specific labor market institutions giving rise to different inflation volatilities when unemployment insurance schemes differ as they do in emu reservation wages react differently in each country to area wide shocks this implies that real marginal costs and inflation also react differently we report evidence for emu countries supporting the existence of a cross country link over the cycle between labor market structures on the one side and real wages and inflation on the other we then build a dsge model that replicates the data evidence the inflation volatility differentials produced by asymmetric labor markets generate welfare losses at the currency area level of approximately 0 3 of steady state consumption

voter turnout and fiscal policy abstract in this paper we examine whether shocks in voting costs can impact elected representatives quality defined as the capacity to fund projects at the lowest cost using data on french municipalities and local variations in seasonal infections incidence as a shock on voting cost we estimate that higher incidence lowers voter turnout increases subsidies obtained by a municipality decreases harmful financial decisions and increases the municipality s investment in infrastructure we present a model where these predictions would hold in particular for municipalities with a high base level of turnout

consensus building how to persuade a group many decisions in private and public organizations are made by groups the paper explores strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to convince a qualified majority of group members to approve the proposal adopting a mechanism design approach to communication it emphasizes the need to distill information selectively to key members of the group and to engineer persuasion cascades in which members who are brought on board sway the opinion of others the paper unveils the factors such as the extent of congruence among group members and between them and the sponsor and the size and governance of the group that condition the sponsor s ability to maneuver and get his project approved

a model of forum shopping owners of intellectual property or mere sponsors of an idea e g authors security issuers sponsors of standards resort to more or less independent certifiers to persuade potential users buyers or adopters of the worth of their property or idea we analyze the sponsor s choices ofcertifier and design social preferences regarding these choices and the impacts thereon of multiple categories of users of a downstream presence of the sponsor and of certifier market power finally we study strategic forum shopping by sponsors of competing ideas

euler equations and money market interest rates a challenge for monetary policy models standard macroeconomic models equate the money market rate targeted by the central bank with the interest rate implied by a consumption euler equation we use u s data to calculate the interest rates implied by euler equations derived from a number of specifications of household preferences correlations between these euler equation rates and the federal funds rate are generally negative regression results and impulse response functions imply that the spreads between the euler equation rates and the federal funds rate are systematically linked to the stance of monetary policy our findings pose a fundamental challenge for models that equate the two

compulsory versus voluntary voting an experimental study abstract we report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions if voting is compulsory then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely i e against their private information if voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed then sincere voting in accordance with a voter s private information is always rational while participation may become strategic we find strong support for these theoretical predictions in our experimental data moreover voters adapt their decisions to the voting institution in place in such a way as to make the group decision accuracy differences between the two voting institutions negligible the latter finding may serve to rationalize the co existence of compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in nature

media markets and localism does local news en espanol boost hispanic voter turnout the same time the availability of these products reduces the consumption of local news not only because some consumers prefer national and global content to local information but also because local media products that lose a significant number of consumers are forced to cut qual ity and they may even cease to exist if their audience falls below a critical threshold for these reasons some scholars claim that the rise of integrated media markets undermines local civic engagement robert d putnam 2000 against this backdrop many regulatory agencies including the federal communications commission fcc of the united states seek to protect local media and promote localism for instance by limiting ownership concentration 1 however localism is desirable only if there are in fact positive spillovers from the provision of local content that can help justify the loss of private welfare that integrated media markets would provide in this paper we propose a simple test for the existence of spillovers from local news pro gramming asking if the presence of local television news affects civic behavior the ubiq uity of local news programming across all us metro areas makes it impossible to study its effects on the general population in contrast the availability of spanish language news has increased considerably in recent years providing us with an experiment to study the effect of local news on one important measure of civic engagement voter turnout in local elections in particular we use a differencing approach asking whether hispanic voter turnout is higher in relation to non hispanic turnout in metro areas with spanish language local television news our results indicate that spanish language local television news raises hispanic turnout by more than 4 percentage points local news targeted at hispanics has no effect on the participa tion of non hispanics and as one would expect a significantly smaller effect in years with a presidential race in markets with spanish language news about a quarter of hispanics turn to these programs our estimates thus imply that news in spanish caused about a fifth of spanish language news viewers to start voting interestingly hispanics with access to news in spanish do not increase the time they spend watching news content analyses of spanish language news programs in the united states find that these shows are much more likely to report on

tastes and technology in a two country model of the business cycle explaining international trade on international financial markets allows people to insure country specific risk and smooth consumption intertemporally equilibrium models of business cycles with trade on global financial markets typically yield international consumption correlations near one and excessive volatility of investment the authors incorporate nontraded goods in the model and find that the implications for aggregate consumption investment and the trade balance are consistent with business cycle properties of industrialized countries however the model driven by technology shocks alone yields counterfactual implications for comovements between consumption and prices at the sectoral level taste shocks produce price quantity relationships more consistent with the data copyright 1995 by american economic association

media competition and electoral politics we build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout while information pushes up independent turnout partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate and on average they vote less when informed

international business cycles and financial frictions abstract in this study i build a two country dsge model to investigate the impact of financial integration on business cycle co movements with financial frictions in this model the investor can borrow but faces a collateral constraint that is tied to the value of her capital and real estate holdings i show quantitatively that the degree of financial integration and real exchange rate adjustment are important for understanding business cycle synchronization under different types of shocks with the technology shock greater financial integration leads to lower cross country correlations while with the financial shock greater financial integration leads to stronger cross country correlations these findings are consistent with the empirical evidence from the literature

information aggregation and turnout in proportional representation a laboratory experiment abstract this paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyzes voter participation in common interest proportional representation pr elections comparing this with majority rule consistent with theoretical predictions poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed a dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under pr so abstention is higher in pr in contrast with private interest environments and welfare is lower deviations from nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium qre which allows for voter mistakes

electoral competition and politician turnover abstract in this paper we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election we consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates abilities in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information we first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability rather than an established good candidate next we establish that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates i e each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters viewpoint

does the number of countries in international business cycle models matter until the 1980s standard models with two large open economies i e the united states and europe provided plausible representations of the world economy however with the emergence of many developing countries since the 1990s this approach no longer seems reasonable in line with this change to the global economic environment cross country output correlations between the united states and other countries have risen this paper extends the standard two country model to many countries to show that doing so produces closer cross country correlations to the data in particular based on analytical investigation with a simple model and quantitative analysis with a more general model i show that the cross country output correlation rises and the cross country consumption correlation falls as the number of countries in the two models increases jel f40 f41 f44

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

voting blocs party discipline and party formation abstract i study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly coalitions form voting blocs acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome in an assembly with two exogenous parties i show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents the sizes of the parties and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences in a game of fully endogenous party formation i find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc two blocs and multiple blocs

voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information we analyze two candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters each voter has noisy private information about the state variable we show that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity nevertheless elections fully aggregate information in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change if all private information were common knowledge equilibrium voting behavior is to a large extent determined by the electoral rule i e if a candidate is required to get at least x percent of the vote in order to win the election then in equilibrium this candidate gets very close to x percent of the vote with probability close to one finally if the distribution from which preferences are drawn is uncertain then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero

the case for nil votes voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems in an informational voting environment we study the impact of an explicit nil vote option on the ballot when some voters are uninformed and face the swing voters curse we postulate a simple model of strategic voting in which voters entertain heterogeneous thresholds on legitimacy of different voting actions we predict that introducing a nil vote option reduces the number of uninformed and invalid votes increasing expected welfare in both voluntary and compulsory voting we test our model in a pen and paper laboratory experiment and find that the predictions of the model hold in the data for both voting systems

habit formation in consumption and its implications for monetary policy models this paper explores a monetary policy model with habit formation for consumers in which consumers utility depends in part on current consumption relative to past consumption the empirical tests developed in the paper show that one can reject the hypothesis of no habit formation with tremendous condence largely because the habit formation model captures the gradual hump shaped response of real spending to various shocks the paper then embeds the habit consumption specication in a monetary policy model and nds that the responses of both spending and inflation to monetary policy actions are signicantly improved by this modication jel d12 e52 e43

measuring sovereign risk spillovers and assessing the role of transmission channels a spatial econometrics approach abstract we contribute to the literature on international risk spillovers by developing a unified framework based on spatial econometrics that enables us to address the following questions i what are the effective transmission channels real linkages and informational channels of international risk spillovers across countries and or regions ii what are the most dominant ones and iii which countries are most at risk for their environment and which are suffering the most from international exposure our analysis based on 41 advanced and emerging economies from 2008q1 to 2012q4 shows that among the considered channels for explaining international spillovers of sovereign bond spreads the informational channel is of utmost importance our results challenge previous findings from the literature in which the empirical strategy did not accommodate altogether important features of country spillovers such as the co existence of multiple transmission channels in the presence of contemporaneous and time lagged interactions ultimately our stress testing analysis reveals important insights on countries prone either to international spillovers international exposure or both at the regional and the worldwide level

does education improve citizenship evidence from the united states and the united kingdom abstract many studies document an association between schooling and civic participation but none credibly investigate causal links we explore the effect of extra schooling induced through compulsory schooling laws on the likelihood of becoming politically involved in the united states and the united kingdom we find that educational attainment is related to several measures of political interest and involvement in both countries we find a strong and robust relationship between education and voting for the united states but not for the united kingdom our us results approach the uk findings when conditioning on registration possibly indicating that registration rules present a barrier to participation

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

what price accountability the lucas island model and the politics of monetary policy this paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables they observe precisely how monetary policy stimulates their local economies but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker s economic competence from cross sectoral spillover effects the incumbent has incentives to generate preelection monetary surprises that stimulate the local economies and generate cross sectoral spillover effects he thereby creates an impression of economic competence and furthers his reelection prospects his policy manipulations are the price of political accountability on a positive note the incumbent is more likely to survive voter scrutiny if he is more competent than the average political candidate

financial integration and international business cycle co movement international business cycle transmission through integrated financial markets occurs through wealth and balance sheet effects balance sheet effects lead to business cycle convergence but wealth effects lead to divergence this paper shows empirically that debt market integration has a positive effect on co movement implying that balance sheet effects are the main conduit for international transmission through integrated debt markets equity market integration has a negative effect implying that wealth effects are the main channel for international transmission through integrated equity markets distinguishing between wealth and balance sheet effects resolves some key discrepancies between empirical and theoretical findings in international macroeconomics

electoral thresholds as coordination devices this paper studies one person one vote parliamentary elections where voters care both about the winner of elections and about the composition of the parliament parties enter the parliament if and only if their vote share exceeds some predetermined threshold we show a that there generically exist equilibria in which all parties get a non degenerate vote share and perhaps more importantly b that the size of the electoral threshold acts as a coordination device which crucially affects the win prospects of the condorcet winner party in particular we argue that the win prospects of the condorcet winner party are decreasing in the size of the entry threshold

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite

information aggregation and strategic abstention in large laboratory elections this paper compares strategic abstention in ad hoc committees versus standing committees ad hoc committees meet only once and then dissolve while standing committees the central finding from this study is that most of the predictions of swing voter curse theory hold up in large elections conducted under controlled laboratory conditions there is significant abstention and significant balancing of partisans by uniformed voters and vote balancing increases with the partisan imbalance elections with no partisan imbalance successfully aggregate information and lead to efficient outcomes consistent with swing voter curse theory this efficiency falls off as partisan imbalance increases but to a significantly greater extent than is predicted in equilibrium it is instructive to compare these findings in large elections with results from the elections reported in battaglini et al 2007 all of the qualitative results are the same concerning the comparative statics balancing and abstention one slight difference is that there was less irrational voting for in the small elections than in the large elections except for the 5 9 m 0 treatment where we observed 20 voting for in the small elections compared with 10 voting for in the large elections these differences were reflected in slightly different efficiency results between small and large elections with the comparisons mirroring the differences in voting for more irrational voting results in lower e ciency we conclude that this scaled up study successfully replicates the initial swing voter s curse experiment reported in battaglini et al 2007 obtaining very similar findings in laboratory committees that are three times the size of those in the original study the one caveat is that we found evidence of a slight increase in irrational nonequilibrium behavior voting for in the larger elections whether this trend would continue as election size is further scaled up is an open question a swing voter s curse environment

international business cycles with endogenous incomplete markets backus kehoe and kydland 1992 baxter and crucini 1995 and stockman and tesar 1995 find two major discrepancies between standard international business cycle models with complete markets and the data in the models cross country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output while in the data the opposite is true and cross country correlations of employment and investment are negative while in the data they are positive this paper introduces a friction into a standard model that helps resolve these anomalies the friction is that international loans are imperfectly enforceable any country can renege on its debts and suffer the consequences for future borrowing to solve for equilibrium in this economy with endogenous incomplete markets the methods of marcet and marimon 1999 are extended incorporating the friction helps resolve the anomalies more than does exogenously restricting the assets that can be traded

financial frictions and the choice of exchange rate regimes i introduction this article provides a quantitative assessment of the role of financial frictions for the choice of exchange rate regimes in a two country model the standard new open economy model neglects the role that financial frictions can play for the international transmission of shocks and for the optimal choice of exchange rate regimes however several historical episodes such as the global financial crises during the gold standard regime or the exchange rate crisis during the european monetary system ems have shown the dangers of a close association between financial instability and pegged exchange rates in general pegged exchange rates tend to reduce monetary policy flexibility and those constraints become even more stringent when the domestic economy faces credit frictions nowadays those issues have acquired policy relevance for the euro area as some accession countries entered a system of managed exchange rates with the euro zone known as the erm ii central bank agreement 1 the relinquishing of part of their monetary policy flexibility might be a concern as some of those countries are still characterized by unstable financial markets to analyze the above mentioned issues i use an artificial two country economy characterized by imperfect financial integration in the market for international securities and sticky prices in an imperfectly competitive framework the introduction of sticky prices is particularly helpful for comparing different monetary arrangements to this economy otherwise similar to those analyzed in some of the recent open economy macro literature 2 i add borrowing constraints on investment associated with balance sheet effects in both countries 3 doing so adds realism to the model and moves a step forward toward integrating the analysis of the domestic and the international transmission mechanisms i simulate the calibrated economy under monetary and productivity shocks and i compare three different exchange rate regimes that is hard pegs managed exchange rates and floating exchange rates to evaluate the relative performance of the different regimes i rely on the comparison of volatilities for the main macro variables and on a simple welfare metric i first consider shocks originated in the foreign country in the absence of financial frictions floating exchange rates deliver good stability properties under both productivity and monetary policy shocks this result confirms milton friedman s 1953 case for flexible exchange rate he argued that in presence of sticky prices floating exchange rates deliver better insulation properties from foreign shocks as they allow relative prices to adjust faster in presence of financial frictions such insulating property is strengthened further the intuition runs as follows under fixed or managed exchange rates an external shock with devaluation pressures forces the monetary authority to raise interest rates with a consequent increase in the cost of loans the presence of borrowing constraints on investment exacerbates the tightening effect to highlight the impact of borrowing constraints on investment i compare the dynamic properties of the economy with and without agency costs both the absolute value for the volatilities of the main macro variables output investment inflation consumption asset prices and return on capital and the difference in the same volatilities between the two regimes are higher when credit frictions are introduced into the model fixed and managed exchange rate regimes also appear to steepen the typical trade off between inflation and output volatility this effect is shown by illustrating the fact that the sacrifice ratio the output inflation volatility ratio raises when moving from floating to fixed exchange rate regimes and that such an increase is higher in presence of credit frictions i therefore test the robustness of the results by analyzing the model with financial frictions under domestic shocks and under symmetric and correlated shocks

house prices borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle i develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices credit constraints nominal loans and asset prices changes in asset prices modify agents borrowing capacity through collateral value changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction and are amplified and propagated over time the financial accelerator is not constant across shocks nominal debt stabilises supply shocks making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate i discuss the role of equity debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism finally i find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility

financial openness financial frictions and optimal monetary policy increasing financial integration challenges the optimality of inward looking strategies for optimal monetary policy those issues are analyzed in an open economy where foreign net lending and the current account are determined by a collateral constraint durables represent collateral the current account features persistent imbalances but can deliver a long run stationary equilibrium the comparison between floating and managed exchange rate regimes shows that the impossible trinity is reversed higher financial integration increases the persistence and volatility of the current account and calls for exchange rate stabilization in this context the ramsey plan too prescribes stabilization of the exchange rate alongside with domestic inflation

how the electoral college influences campaigns and policy the probability of being florida this paper analyzes how us presidential candidates should allocate resources across states to maximize the probability of winning the election by developing and estimating a probabilistic voting model of political competition under the electoral college system actual campaigns act in close agreement with the model there is a 0 9 correlation between equilibrium and actual presidential campaign visits across states both in 2000 and 2004 the paper shows how presidential candidate attention is affected by the states number of electoral votes forecasted state election outcomes and forecast uncertainty it also analyzes the effects of a direct national popular vote for president

advertising effects in presidential elections presidential elections provide both an important context in which to study advertising and a setting that mitigates the challenges of dynamics and endogeneity we use the 2000 and 2004 general elections to analyze the effect of market level advertising on county level vote shares the results indicate significant positive effects of advertising exposures both instrumental variables and fixed effects alter the ad coefficient advertising elasticities are smaller than are typical for branded goods yet significant enough to shift election outcomes for example if advertising were set to zero and all other factors held constant three states electoral votes would have changed parties in 2000 given the narrow margin of victory in 2000 this shift would have resulted in a different president

financial globalization and real regionalization over the period 1972 1986 the correlations of gdp employment and investment between the united states and an aggregate of europe canada and japan were respectively 0 76 0 66 and 0 63 for the period 1986 to 2000 the same correlations were much lower 0 26 0 03 and 0 07 real regionalization at the same time u s international asset trade has significantly increased for example between 1972 and 1999 united states gross fdi and equity assets in the same group of countries rose from 4 to 23 percent of the u s capital stock financial globalization we argue that these two trends are intimately related we document that the correlation of real shocks between the u s and the rest of the world has declined we then present a model in which international financial market integration occurs endogenously in response to less correlated shocks financial integration further reduces the international correlations in gdp and factor supplies we find that both less correlated shocks and endogenous financial market development are needed to account for all the changes in the international business cycle

patents and cumulative innovation causal evidence from the courts cumulative innovation is central to economic growth do patent rights facilitate or impede such follow on innovation this paper studies the effect of removing patent protection through court invalidation on the subsequent research related to the focal patent as measured by later citations we exploit random allocation of judges at the u s court of appeal for the federal circuit to control for the endogeneity of patent invalidation we find that patent invalidation leads to a 50 percent increase in subsequent citations to the focal patent on average but the impact is highly heterogeneous patent rights appear to block follow on innovation only in the technology fields of computers electronics and medical instruments moreover the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers entry of small innovators suggesting that patents may impede the democratization of innovation

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

elections with privately informed parties and voters this paper studies a situation in which parties are betterinformed than voters about the optimal policies for voters weshow that voters are able to infer the parties information byobserving their electoral positions even if parties have policypreferences which differ substantially from the median voter s unlike previous work that reach opposite conclusions we assumethat voters have some private information of their own if theinformation available to voters is biased parties attempts toinfluence voters beliefs will result in less than fullconvergence even if parties know with certainty the optimalpolicy for the median voter

finance and international business cycles abstract business cycles are more correlated among countries that have similar financial structures we first document this empirical regularity using oecd data and then build a two country dsge model with financial frictions that replicates it alternative monetary policy regimes and parameter values are explored output co movements increase when the countries involved are linked by a credible exchange rate peg and when they open up to trade they decrease when their financial openness increases the model also accounts for a number of stylized facts of international business cycles such as the positive international correlation of output investment and employment

consumption habits in a new keynesian business cycle model consumption habits have become an integral component in new keynesian models however consumption habits can be modeled in a host of different ways and this diversity is reflected in the literature i examine whether different approaches to modeling consumption habits have important implications for business cycle behavior using a standard new keynesian business cycle model i show that to a first order log approximation the consumption euler equation associated with the additive functional form for habit formation encompasses the multiplicative function form empirically i show that whether consumption habits are internal or external has little effect on the model s business cycle characteristics

bayesian learning in social networks we study the perfect bayesian equilibrium of a sequential learning model over a general social network each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the world observes the past actions of a stochastically generated neighbourhood of individuals and chooses one of two possible actions the stochastic process generating the neighbourhoods defines the network topology we characterize pure strategy equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning convergence in probability to the right action as the social network becomes large we show that when private beliefs are unbounded meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded there will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of expansion in observations we also characterize conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning when private beliefs are bounded

global implications of national unconventional policies abstract financial integration in the markets for banks assets and liabilities makes balance sheet constraints highly correlated across countries resulting in a high degree of financial and macroeconomic interdependence likewise under financial integration unconventional policies aimed at stabilizing domestic financial and credit conditions could entail large international spillovers therefore stabilization by one country will also benefit other countries reducing incentives to implement credit policies in a classic free riding problem especially when these policies entail domestic costs we show that this outcome can emerge in an open economy model featuring financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints

continuous decisions by a committee median versus average mechanisms abstract a group of strategic agents with diverse private information and interdependent preferences has to take a continuous collective decision i study the design of the decision making procedure from the viewpoint of a utilitarian social planner for uniformly distributed information the implementation of the average report as decision dominates the implementation of the median report when the set of admissible reports is optimally designed this is true for any number of agents and for any degree of interdependence the result extends to a general class of distributions when the number of agents is large

get out the costly vote institutional design for greater participation institutions designed to increase turnout appeal to democratic sentiments but are highly debated as they entail two potentially countervailing eects while generating more pieces of information they may decrease the average voter s information quality we examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing participation abstention penalties used in 32 countries around the world and lotteries providing a prize to one randomly chosen participant as proposed on the 2006 arizona ballot we analyze a benchmark rational choice model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly we illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes though lotteries are a more eective instrument asymptotically in an array of lab experiments we empirically assess institutional performance we nd strong evidence for selective participation lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced however because subjects vote more often than the equilibrium predictions these institutions entail less welfare benets than theory prescribes lotteries do fare better than nes suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory

estimation of dsge models when the data are persistent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models are often solved and estimated under specific assumptions as to whether the exogenous variables are difference or trend stationary however even mild departures of the data generating process from these assumptions can severely bias the estimates of the model parameters this paper proposes new estimators that do not require researchers to take a stand on whether shocks have permanent or transitory effects these procedures have two key features first the same filter is applied to both the data and the model variables second the filtered variables are stationary when evaluated at the true parameter vector the estimators are approximately normally distributed not only when the shocks are mildly persistent but also when they have near or exact unit roots simulations show that these robust estimators perform well especially when the shocks are highly persistent yet stationary in such cases linear detrending and first differencing are shown to yield biased or imprecise estimates

certifying new technologies we study the role of standard setting organization ssos in the adoption of standards the way the sso balances the interests of sponsor and users is key to its ability to certify the technology proximity to users builds trust in the endorsement but may be unattractive to technology sponsors in a static context we show that the sso is an effective certifier if and only if it puts enough weight on users interests we then tackle the more challenging problem of sso certification in a dynamic setting in which new information will accrue in the future and user choices are irreversible the sso and the users must then both take a dynamic perspective and contemplate the possibility of a second chance that may arise for the standard a key insight is the possibility of multiple self fulfilling expectations it is possible to have an equilibrium with no second chance a lenient sso endorsement policy and high stigma from early rejection it is also possible to have an equilibrium with a second chance a selective sso endorsement policy and low stigma from early rejection finally and in both the static and the dynamic setups we ask whether the sso is too inclined to turn down or to accept the standard from a social viewpoint jel d71 d82 l15 o31

comparing shocks and frictions in us and euro area business cycles a bayesian dsge approach this paper estimates a dsge model with many types of shocks and frictions for both the us and the euro area economy over a common sample period 1974 2002 the structural estimation methodology allows us to investigate whether differences in business cycle behaviour are due to differences in the type of shocks that affect the two economies differences in the propagation mechanism of those shocks or differences in the way the central bank responds to those economic developments our main conclusion is that each of these characteristics is remarkably similar across both currency areas copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

the option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules abstract we consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision voters can either implement the project in the first period or they can postpone the decision to the second period we analyze the effects of different majority rules individual first period voting behavior may become less conservative under supermajority rules and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule we characterize the optimal majority rule which is a supermajority rule in contrast to individual investment problems society may be better off if the option to postpone the decision did not exist these results are qualitatively robust to natural generalizations of our model

international transmission of the business cycle in a multi sector model abstract standard multi country models do not replicate important features of the international transmission of business cycles predicting cross country correlations of output and consumption which are respectively too low and too high in this paper we modify the supply side of a two country model by adding multiple sectors and trade in intermediate goods the model generates a higher cross country correlation of output than standard one sector models it also predicts cross country correlations of employment and investment that are closer to the data we analyze the relative impact of multiple sectors trade in intermediate goods imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods home preference capital adjustment costs and capital depreciation in order to pinpoint the features which move the model s predictions closer to the data

the marginal voter s curse an intuitive explanation for voter abstention is that a voter is uncertain which policy or candidate to vote for and so defers to the rest of the electorate to make the decision in majoritarian elections this has been formally modelled as a strategic response to the swing voter s curse which arises because the rare event of a pivotal vote conveys substantial information in electoral systems other than majority rule however the standard pivotal voting calculus may not apply this paper analyzes one such system namely proportional representation where additional votes continue to push the policy outcome in one direction or the other a new strategic incentive for abstention arises in that case to avoid the marginal voter s curse of pushing the policy outcome in the wrong direction intuitively conditioning on the rare event of a pivotal vote might seem to have a greater impact on behavior but the marginal voter s curse actually presents a larger disincentive for voting than the swing voter s curse this and other predictions of the model are con rmed empirically by a series of laboratory experiments

politics information and the urban bias abstract governments in many ldcs skew public resources towards urban sectors despite a majority of citizens residing in rural areas this paper develops a novel political argument for this urban bias phenomenon in a framework where all voters rural and urban have equal voice but differ in their access to information we argue that this difference is sufficient to give governments an incentive to inefficiently over allocate resources towards urban areas the bias is shown to worsen during adverse economic times leading to increased migration we also examine how voter informativeness affects efficiency of the electoral process in weeding out incompetent governments

on the theory of strategic voting many analyses of plurality rule elections predict the complete coor dination of strategic voting and hence support for only two candidates here i suggest that stable multi candidate support will arise in equilibrium a group of voters must partially coordinate behind one of two challenging candidates in order to dislodge a disliked incumbent in a departure from existing models the popular support for each challenger is uncertain this support must be inferred from the private observation of informative signals such as the social communication of pref erences throughout the electorate or the imperfect observation of opinion polls the uniquely stable voting equilibrium entails only limited strategic voting and hence incomplete coordination this is due to the surprising presence of negative feed back an increase in the degree of strategic voting by others reduces the incentives for an individual to vote strategically the incentive to vote strategically is lower in relatively marginal elections after controlling for the distance from contention of a trailing preferred challenger a calibration of the model applied to the uk general election of 1997 is consistent with the impact of strategic voting and the reported accuracy of voters understanding of the electoral situation it suggests that nearly 50 seats may have been lost by the conservative party due to strategic voting 1 plurality rule elections and strategic voting 1 1 strategic voting and duverger s law plurality rule elections where the winner is the candidate who receives the largest number of votes are vulnerable to strategic voting a voter might well switch away from her preferred candidate and toward a perceived leader in the hope of exerting a greater influence over the outcome of the election this phenomenon has long been the focus of both economic and political scientific study in an influential essay riker 1982b cited droop s 1871 eloquent exposition of the strategic voting problem 1 i oer my grateful thanks to the many friends colleagues seminar participants referees and editors who have oered insightful comments during the long gestation of this paper its antecedents and companion work special thanks go to steve fisher whose empirical analysis of strategic voting raised many of the questions that i seek to answer in this paper and to chris wallace this particular paper brings together much of the analysis previously circulated in the papers a new theory of strategic voting strategic voting under the qualified majority rule and idiosyncrasy information and the impact of strategic voting

information aggregation in polls we study information transmission via polling a policymaker polls constitu ents who differ in their information and ideology to determine policy full rev elation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample but not with a large one in large polls full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists who respond truth fully and extremists who do not we find polling statistics that ignore strate gic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the polvs margin of error we construct estimators that account for strategic behavior finally we compare polls and elections jel c42 d83

choosing not to choose on the link between information and abstention abstract we use a dataset that allows us to circumvent a number of estimation difficulties that have plagued previous studies of the relationship between information and abstention our results show that information is a major determinant of abstention

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

ignorance and bias in collective decisions we study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best but each member can acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule in the experiment as predicted by bayesian equilibrium voters are more likely to acquire information under majority rule and attempt to counter the bias in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule as opposed to bayesian equilibrium predictions however many committee members vote when uninformed moreover uninformed voting is strongly associated with a lower propensity to acquire information we show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs can account for both these phenomena and provides a good overall fit to the observed patterns of behavior both in terms of rational ignorance and biases

party governance and ideological bias abstract informed opinions are essential to a good functioning of democratic institutions political intermediaries such as parties make up the free riding voters informational deficit public opinion and voting outcomes are shaped by those parties whom the voters trust the credibility of parties is fashioned by their internal organization the paper investigates one aspect of party governance namely the allocation of control rights over platform design the party s leadership either selects a platform or simply recommends a platform for adoption by the rank and file under the latter democratic institution the leadership has no formal authority but for informational and procedural reasons may still have substantial real control over the final platform depending on the congruence between leadership and rank and file in particular the rank and file is generally more concerned with the ideological content of the platform than the leadership who is motivated by the benefits from electoral office the paper argues that in centrist parties the high congruence of interest between the rank and file and office seekers leads to systematic rubberstamping of the leadership s electoral platforms the resulting weak internal control mechanism hurts party credibility

euler equations and money market interest rates the role of monetary policy and risk premium shocks we challenge the view that the negative correlation between the federal funds and the euler equation interest rate is linked to monetary policy using monte carlo experiments we show that the negative correlation can be explained by risk premium disturbances