nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

credit supply and the housing boom an increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market is the key force behind four empirical features of the housing boom before the great recession the unpreced

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

do banks overstate their value at risk abstract this paper is the first empirical study of banks risk management systems based on non anonymous daily value at risk var and profit and loss data using actual data from the six largest canadian commercial banks we uncover evidence that banks exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their var estimates the data used in this paper have been extracted from the banks annual reports using an innovative matlab based data extraction method out of the 7354 trading days analyzed in this study there are only two exceptions i e days when the actual loss exceeds the disclosed var whereas the expected number of exceptions with a 99 var is 74 for each sample bank we extract from historical vars a risk overstatement coefficient ranging between 19 and 79 we attribute var overstatement to several factors including extreme cautiousness and underestimation of diversification effects when aggregating vars across business lines and or risk categories we also discuss the economic and social cost of reporting inflated vars

monte carlo computation of optimal portfolios in complete markets we introduce a method that relies exclusively on monte carlo simulation in order to compute numerically optimal portfolio values for utility maximization problems our method is quite general and only requires complete markets and knowledge of the dynamics of the security processes it can be applied regardless of the number of factors and of whether the agent derives utility from intertemporal consumption terminal wealth or both we also perform some comparative statics analysis our comparative statics show that risk aversion has by far the greatest influence on the value of the optimal portfolio

zombie lending and depressed restructuring in japan this paper explores the role that misdirected bank lending played in prolonging the japanese macroeconomic stagnation that began in the early 1990s the investigation focuses on the wide spread practice of japanese banks of continuing to lend to otherwise insolvent firms we docu ment the prevalence of this forbearance lending and show its distorting effects on healthy firms that were competing with the impaired firms the paper by hoshi 2000 was the first to call attention to this phenomenon and its ramifi

evolutionary portfolio selection with liquidity shocks insurance companies invest their wealth in financial markets the wealth evolution strongly depends on the success of their investment strategies but also on liquidity shocks which occur during unfavourable years when indemnities to be paid to the clients exceed collected premia an investment strategy that does not take liquidity shocks into account exposes insurance companies to the risk of bankruptcy when liquidity shocks and low investment payoffs jointly appear therefore regulatory authorities impose solvency restrictions to ensure that insurance companies are able to face their obligations with high probability this paper analyses the behaviour of insurance companies in an evolutionary framework we show that an insurance company that merely satisfies regulatory constraints will eventually vanish from the market we give a more restrictive no bankruptcy condition for the investment strategies and we characterize trading strategies that are evolutionary stable i e able to drive out any mutation

a monte carlo method for optimal portfolios this paper proposes a new simulation based approach for optimal portfolio allocation in realistic environments with complex dynamics for the state variables and large numbers of factors and assets a first illustration involves a choice between equity and cash with nonlinear interest rate and market price of risk dynamics intertemporal hedging demands significantly increase the demand for stocks and exhibit low volatility we then analyze settings where stock returns are also predicted by dividend yields and where investors have wealth dependent relative risk aversion large scale problems with many assets including the nasdaq sp500 bonds and cash are also examined the question of optimal portfolio allocation has been of long standing interest for academics and practitioners in finance while the mean variance analysis of markowitz 1952 is still commonly used among portfolio managers it has been well understood since merton 1971 that long term investors would prefer portfolios that include hedging components to protect against fluctuations in their investment opportunities prompted by the seminal papers of merton 1969 1971 and samuelson 1969 studies have explored various aspects of the dynamic portfolio problem when asset prices follow diffusion processes e g richard 1975 this literature has relied for the most part on a dynamic programming approach to the problem more recent contributions by pliska 1986 karatzas lehoczky and shreve 1987 and cox and huang 1989 have proposed an alternative resolution method based on martingale techniques in the context of this approach an optimal portfolio formula was derived by ocone and karatzas 1991 this expression involves expectations of random variables depending on j6erme b detemple is at boston university school of management and cirano rene

the lender of last resort a twenty first century approach the classical bagehot conception of a lender of last resort lolr that lends to illiquid banks has been criticized on two grounds on the one hand the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is not clear cut on the other a fully collateralized repo market allows central banks to provide the adequate aggregate amount of liquidity and leave to the banks the responsibility of lending uncollateralized the object of this paper is to analyze these issues rigorously by providing a framework in which liquidity shocks cannot be distinguished from solvency ones and then asking whether there is a need for a lolr and how it should operate in the absence of systemic threats determining the optimal lolr policy requires a careful modeling of the structure of the interbank market and of the closure policy in our setup the results depend upon the existence of moral hazard if the main source of moral hazard is the banks lack of incentives to screen loans then the lolr may have to intervene to improve the efficiency of an unsecured interbank market in crisis periods if instead the main source of moral hazard is loan monitoring then the interbank market should be secured and the lolr should never intervene jel e58 628

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

survive another day using changes in the composition of investments to measure the cost of credit constraints abstract we introduce a novel empirical strategy to measure the size of credit shocks theoretically we show that credit shocks reduce the value of long term relative to short term investments empirically we can therefore compare the reduction of long term relative to short term investments within firms allowing for firm times year fixed effects using spanish firm level data we estimate the credit crunch to be equivalent to an additional tax rate of around 11 on the longest lived capital to pin down credit constraints as the underlying cause we apply triple differences strategies using foreign ownership or precrisis debt maturity

equilibrium impact of value at risk regulation abstract we study the asset pricing implications of value at risk var regulation in incomplete continuous time economies with intermediate expenditure stochastic opportunity set and heterogeneous attitudes to risk our findings show that because of an anticipatory effect of var constraints on the optimal hedging demand the partial equilibrium incentives of var regulation can lead banks to increase their risk exposure in high volatility states in general equilibrium var constraints can produce unambiguously lower interest rates and higher equity sharpe ratios the var impact on equity volatility and equity expected returns is ambiguous

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

target2 and central bank balance sheets the euro area s target2 payments system has featured heavily in academic and popular discussions of the euro crisis some of this commentary has described the system as being responsible for a secret bailout of europe s periphery another common theme has been that the system has built up large credit risks for germany should the euro break up this paper discusses the target2 system focusing in particular on how it impacts the balance sheets of the central banks that participate in the system it discusses the factors driving target2 balances considers some counterfactual cases in which euro area monetary policy operated differently examines the risks to germany and considers proposals for settlement of these balances

monetary policy as financial stability regulation this paper develops a model that speaks to the goals and methods of financialstability policies there are three main points first from a normative perspective the model defines the fundamental market failure to be addressed namely that unregulated private money creation can lead to an externality in which intermediaries issue too much short term debt and leave the system excessively vulnerable to costly financial crises second it shows how in a simple economy where commercial banks are the only lenders conventional monetary policy tools such as open market operations can be used to regulate this externality while in more advanced economies it may be helpful to supplement monetary policy with other measures third from a positive perspective the model provides an account of how monetary policy can influence bank lending and real activity even in a world where prices adjust frictionlessly and there are other transactions media besides bank created money that are outside the control of the central bank

choosing an appropriate alliance governance mode the role of institutional cultural and geographical distance in international research development r d collaborations we identify a variety of r d alliance modes in a knowledge intensive industry e g pharmaceuticals and classify them into four ordered categories which go beyond the traditional binary equity vs non equity alliance classification this enriches our understanding of alliance governance structures and broadens the application of alliance modes in what is today a more complicated international r d collaboration setting we then explore national industry and firm factors that determine the selection of an appropriate r d alliance governance mode using a sample of 237 international alliance deals the likelihood of using a more integrated alliance governance mode decreases as the difference or distance between nations of the partner firms increases in terms of human capital and cultural distance on the other hand a greater geographic and institutional difference is positively associated with the selection of more integrated alliance governance modes furthermore firms in the research stage are more likely to use a more integrated governance mode as opposed to firms in the development stage these findings advance research on alliance governance structure they reveal the factors affecting the r d alliance governance mode choice

fear of fire sales illiquidity seeking and credit freezes is there any need to clean up a banking system in the midst of a crisis for instance by closing some weak banks and forcing others to sell bad assets or can one wait till the crisis is over we argue that an overhang of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets in the future can increase the private returns to holding illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them anticipating a potential future fire sale cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding cash which also reduces their incentive to lock up money in term loans the potential for a worse fire sale than necessary as well as the associated decline in credit origination could make the crisis worse which is one reason it may make sense to clean up the system even in the midst of the crisis we discuss alternative ways of cleaning up the system and the associated costs and benefits

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

financial panics the seasonality of the nominal interest rate and the founding of the fed after the founding of the fed in 1914 the frequency of financial panics and the size of the seasonal movements in nominal interest ratesboth declined substantially this paper establishes that the fed by carrying out the seasonal open market policy that eliminated the seasonal in nominal interest rates caused the decrease in the frequency of panics since seasonal movements are anticipated and financial panics are probably real events the results show that an anticipated monetary policy had real effects on the economy copyright 1986 by american economic association

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

financial instability reserves and central bank swap lines in the panic of 2008 in this paper we connect the events of the last twelve months the panic of 2008 as it has been called to the demand for international reserves in previous work we have shown that international reserve demand can be rationalized by a central bank s desire to backstop the broad money supply to avert the possibility of an internal external double drain a bank run combined with capital flight thus simply looking at trade or short term debt as motivations for reserve holdings is insufficient one must also consider the size of the banking system m2 here we show that a country s reserve holdings just before the current crisis relative to their predicted holdings based on these financial motives can significantly predict exchange rate movements of both emerging and advanced countries in 2008 countries with large war chests did not depreciate and some appreciated meanwhile those who held insufficient reserves based on our metric were likely to depreciate current account balances and short term debt levels are not statistically significant predictors of depreciation once reserve levels are taken into account our model s typically high predicted reserve levels provide important context for the unprecedented u s dollar swap lines recently provided to many countries by the federal reserve this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

financial crises payment system problems and discount window lending in a developed economy financial crises are rapidly conveyed to the payment system which tends to rely on private credit extensions in most countries while many authors recommend that the central bank do no more than provide adequate aggregate liquidity during a crisis this policy requires well functioning private credit markets to channel liquidity to solvent but illiquid firms this paper presents a model of private lending which defines a crisis as a time when lenders become uncertain about how to assess financial risks and therefore rationally withdraw from making new loans in such an environment a government lender of last resort can improve social welfare copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence