studying optimal paternalism illustrated by a model of sin taxes the classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices a great deal of evidence suggests however that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices we propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents about the available policy instruments and about the government s information about agents and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes in other words economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational this approach has many advantages first and foremost by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don t pursue their own best interests economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates to contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions we must study whether financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and whether self control problems lead people to borrow too heavily to contribute to debates over teenage smoking we must study whether teenagers become smokers against their long run best interest economists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulating consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do it a second advantage of our approach is that it forces us to look for the best feasible policy our

tax incidence when individuals are time inconsistent the case of cigarette excise taxes abstract one of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups we argue that traditional quantity based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive time consistent model of consumption of sin goods a model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot this self control function benefits lower income groups more since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking calibrations show that as a result cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values

taxing sin goods and subsidizing health care we consider a two period model in the first period individuals consume two goods one is sinful and the other is not the sin good brings pleasure but has a detrimental effect on second period health and individuals tend to underestimate this effect in the second period individuals can devote part of their saving to improve their health status and thus compensate for the damage caused by their sinful consumption we consider two alternative specifications concerning this second period health care decision either individuals acknowledge that they have made a mistake in the first period out of myopia or ignorance or they persist in ignoring the detrimental effect of their sinful consumption we study the optimal linear taxes on sin good consumption saving and health care expenditures for a paternalistic social planner we compare those taxes in the two specifications we show under which circumstances the first best outcome can be decentralized and we study the second best taxes when saving is unobservable

public goods self selection and optimal income taxation using the self selection approach to tax analysis this paper derives a modified samuelson rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal nonlinear income tax this approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area generalises it and provides a simple characterisation of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances the analysis also emphasises and clarifies the significance of the choice of numeraire for the optimality of decentralising public spending decisions it is well known that the famous samuelson rule for the provision of public goods may not be applicable when the tax revenues used to finance the public goods come from distorting taxes the principle was recognized as long ago as pigou 1947 long before the samuelson rule was devised pigou saw that in addition to the resource cost involved in transferring funds from the private to the public sector there was a deadweight loss involved from this insight he suggested that the criterion for providing public goods should be more stringent than the samuelson rule would later suggest in particular one might expect that the inclusion of the deadweight loss of taxes as part of the cost of providing a public good would lead to a reduction in its optimal provision relative to a situation in which lump sum taxes were available the problem was investigated more systematically by atkinson and stern 1974 who considered the case in which a public good is financed by a set of optimal commodity taxes all individuals were assumed to be identical so efficiency alone dictated the objective they found that no prima facie case could be made for the pigou position that the use of distortionary taxes called for a reduction in the supply of the public good their analysis clearly showed that there were two influences at work when the financing of a public good was by distorting taxes on the one hand

majority voting with single crossing preferences we clarify and extend a number of sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on one dimensional choice domains these conditions variously stated in the previous literature all impose order restrictions on voter preferences for instance monotone marginal rates of substitution which we show to imply or be equivalent to a general ordinal version of the single crossing condition this simple property is economically intuitive and easily checked in applications this ease of application is demonstrated through an examination of voting models of redistributive income taxation and trade union bargaining behaviour

sin licenses revisited abstract we analyze personalized regulation in the form of sin licenses to correct the distortion in the consumption of a harmful good when consumers suffer from varying degrees of self control problems we take into account preference uncertainty which generates a trade off between flexibility and commitment provided by sin licenses we also account for the possibility that consumers may trade the sin good in a secondary market which partially erodes the commitment power of sin licenses we show that if sophisticated consumers are allowed to choose any general individualized pricing scheme for sin goods they will choose a system of sin licenses nevertheless sin licenses do not implement the social optimum in our general setting we derive a simple criterion for assessing whether switching to a system of sin licenses improves welfare over linear sin taxes

are risk aversion and impatience related to cognitive ability is the way that people make risky choices or tradeoffs over time related to cognitive ability this paper investigates whether there is a link between cognitive ability risk aversion and impatience using a representative sample of the population and incentive compatible measures we conduct choice experiments measuring risk aversion and impatience over an annual time horizon for a randomly drawn sample of roughly 1 000 german adults subjects also take part in two different tests of cognitive ability which correspond to sub modules of one of the most widely used iq tests interviews are conducted in subjects own homes we find that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion and more pronounced impatience these relationships are significant and robust to controlling for personal characteristics educational attainment income and measures of credit constraints we perform a series of additional robustness checks which help rule out other possible confounds

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

the political economy of sin taxes we analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self control problems we show that under reasonable assumptions the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self control problems further we analyse how individuals with self control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level when the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful

taxing education in ramsey s tradition abstract assuming a two period model with endogenous choices of labour education and saving it is shown to be second best efficient to deviate from ramsey s rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour furthermore if the earnings function displays constant elasticity the choice of education should not be distorted with the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity

direct versus indirect taxation the design of the tax structure revisited this article studies the optimal direct indirect tax mix problem when individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics productivity and endowments it presents general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to atkinson and stiglitz s 1976 result differential commodity taxation remains a useful instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced goods when cross substitution effects are zero the expressions resemble traditional many households ramsey rules in a cobb douglas illustration where endowments differ only in good 1 interpreted as wealth the tax on good 2 provides an indirect way to tax the unobservable wealth

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

does bank efficiency matter market value relevance of bank efficiency in australia the stochastic frontier analysis is employed to investigate efficiency of publicly listed australian banks over the period 1985 to 2008 the results suggest that technical cost and profit efficiency of australian banks have improved over time large banks have attained a higher level of cost efficiency but a lower level of technical efficiency compared to small banks no substantial difference between the two groups is found in terms of profit efficiency a panel regression of bank stock return on bank efficiency suggests that an improvement in technical cost or profit efficiency contributes to the market value of a bank thus the shareholder wealth maximization goal is aligned with the goal of maximizing bank efficiency in the australian context

the incidence of sin taxes abstract we show that the burden of sin taxes does not necessarily fall most heavily on individuals with the highest level of consumption and derive a condition for cases where sin taxes improve individual welfare we further argue that taxes on goods such as unhealthy food can be progressive when consumers have time inconsistent preferences

voting over type and generosity of a pension system when some individuals are myopic this paper studies the determination through majority voting of a pension scheme when society consists of far sighted and myopic individuals all individuals have the same basic preferences but myopics tend to adopt a short term view instant gratification when dealing with retirement saving and labor supply consequently they will find themselves with low consumption after retirement and regret their insufficient savings decisions henceforth when voting they tend to commit themselves into forced saving we consider a pension scheme that is characterized by two parameters the payroll tax rate that determines the size or generosity of the system and the bismarckian factor that determines its redistributiveness individuals vote sequentially we examine how the introduction of myopic agents affects the generosity and the redistributiveness of the pension system our main result is that a flat pension system is always chosen when all individuals are of one kind all far sighted or all myopic while a less redistributive system may be chosen if society is composed of both myopic and far sighted agents furthermore while myopic individuals tend to prefer larger payroll taxes than their far sighted counterparts the generosity of the system does not always increase with the proportion of myopics

the investment profits nexus in east asian industrialization abstract both orthodox and heterodox interpretations of east asian industrialization have concentrated on questions of resource allocation and neglected overall capital accumulation and the role of government in accelerating it this paper argues that corporate profits and other profit related incomes were the main source of investment in the most successful east asian economies government policies played a major role in promoting capital accumulation by creating rents and animating the dynamic interactions between profits and investment this was achieved through a broader set of measures than those usually identified as selective industrial policies

choice and procrastination author s o donoghue ted rabin matthew abstract recent models of procrastination due to self control problems assume that a procrastinator considers just one option and is unaware of her self control problems we develop a model where a person chooses from a menu of options and is partially aware of her self control problems this menu model replicates earlier results and generates new ones a person might forego completing an attractive option because she plans to complete a more attractive but never to be completed option hence providing a non procrastinator additional options can induce procrastination and a person may procrastinate worse pursuing important goals than unimportant ones

voting for environmental policy under income and preference heterogeneity we examine the design of policies for promoting the consumption of green products under preference and income heterogeneity using organic food products as an example two instruments are considered a price subsidy for the organic food products and a tax on the conventional products under income disparity consumers with high income always prefer a socially optimal subsidy to a socially optimal tax while low income consumers prefer a tax on conventional products when environmental policy is determined by the median voter the policies implemented tend to be stricter than socially optimal policies if income differences are large

news droughts news floods and u s disaster relief this paper studies the influence of mass media on u s government response to approximately 5 000 natural disasters occurring between 1968 and 2002 these disasters took nearly 63 000 lives and affected 125 million people per year we show that u s relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the olympic games which are obviously unrelated to need we argue that the only plausible explanation of this is that relief decisions are driven by news coverage of disasters and that the other newsworthy material crowds out this news coverage

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

the demand for alcohol the differential response to price although several studies indicate that drinking is responsive to price little work has focused on whether prices have a differential effect on light moderate or heavy drinking this study examines the price responsiveness of the demand for alcohol whether heavy drinkers are less sensitive to price than light or moderate drinkers the study uses data on alcohol consumption on the 1983 national health interview survey the results indicate that both light and heavy drinkers are much less price elastic than moderate drinkers further we cannot reject the hypothesis that the very heaviest drinkers have perfectly price inelastic demands

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

sampling equilibrium with an application to strategic voting we suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players the concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population and responds optimally to this prediction we apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates