discussion of incentives for accruing costs and efficiency in regulated monopolies subject to roe constraint the paper incentives for accruing costs and efficiency in regulated monopolies subject to roe constraint investigates the implicit contracts that are used to compensate executives in the electric utility industry the conference discussion of this paper centered on the economics underlying the contracting issues investigated as well as the research design and econometric approach discussion related to the underlying economics is organized below under the following topics 1 the economics of electric utility regulation which determines the nature of the contract between the regulators and the firm and 2 the structure of compensation schemes in the electric utility industry i e the nature of the implicit contract between shareholders and managers of electric utilities questions raised about the research design and econometric approach are subdivided as follows 3 design questions including potential problems with the time period selected and the paper s crosssectional approach 4 operational definitions of constructs used e g measures of efficiency and 5 econometric issues especially those related to the estimation of cost versus production functions

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

is it worthwhile to pay referees there are puzzles in refereeing scholarly articles why are referees willing to review a paper without payment and is it worthwhile to pay referees in order to raise the review rate two interesting results are found in this article first when reviewing services are driven by reciprocity the equilibrium participation of referees may exhibit the so called self fulfilling feature second the optimal payment may not be zero if the referee receives the benefit of reputation gained by refereeing an article in particular this article will show that those journals whose status quo review rate is lower tend to pay reviewers more while journals whose status quo review rate is higher do not find it worthwhile to pay referees enough this result implies that in order to raise its quality a journal with a low review rate is more likely to adopt a strategy to increase pay and attract a critical mass of referees

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

employment bonuses and labor turnover the purpose of this paper is to illustrate how a two part compensation system composed of a rigid base salary and a flexible bonus can reduce turnover it is shown that bonus pay is an effective retention device if it is risk reducing and is correlated with outside contract offers for the first time to the best of our knowledge a model of bonus payments is tested with u s instead of japanese data the empirical results are suggestive of the conditions that give bonuses an important even dominant role in worker retention

does the form of compensation matter abstract the role of fee contracts in the agency relation between investment bankers and client firms in tender offers is investigated using a sample of offers between 1978 and 1986 different fees have different payoff functions which can be used by firms to create incentives and by bankers to signal differences in abilities the effectiveness of fee contracts in resolving agency problems in tested with mixed results the evidence suggests that fee contracts are used as a tool by both firms and bankers and that contracts influence tender offer outcomes but that contracting is only a partial solution to the agency problem

real aspects of exchange rate regime choice with collapsing fixed rates abstract typical evaluations of the choice of exchange rate regime examine the performance of the real economy and assume that the regimes last indefinitely in contrast actual regimes are quite transitory this paper examines how the predictions of two popular models for the determination of some real economic variables must be modified when agents rationally perceive that a fixed rate regime will be transitory the models studied are simple stochastic versions of the models in dornbusch 1976 and flood and marion 1982

open access and academic journal quality ing from complicated signaling behavior by informed authors lerner and tirole show that adding upstream private information does not alter their basic analysis their proposition 4 454 aea papers and proceedings may 2005

rewards to academia the remuneration of vice chancellors and principals this paper models the financial remuneration to vice chancellors and principals at uk higher education institutions after describing the alternative theoretical underpinnings for the determination of pay an earnings function is estimated utilizing institutional and personal characteristics the model suggests only a partial linkage of managerial and performance related indicators to remuneration levels this suggests substantial scope for reorientation of rewards towards such indicators rather than relying on an efficiency wage this would appear particularly appropriate given the present and continued disclosure of this information together with the increased focus on performance indicators relating to teaching and research within the uk higher education sector

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

evolving standards for academic publishing a q r theory this paper develops models of quality standards to examine two trends academic journals increasingly require extensive revisions of submissions and articles are becoming longer and changing in other ways papers are modeled as varying along two quality dimensions q reflects the importance of the main ideas and r other aspects of quality observed trends are regarded as increases in r quality a static equilibrium model illustrates comparative statics explanations a dynamic model in which referees with a biased view of their own work learn social norms for weighting q and r is shown to produce a long gradual evolution of social norms

is peer review in decline i introduction for the past half century or more peer reviewed journals have played a central role in the evaluation and dissemination of scientific research the internet has enhanced scientific communication in many ways and there is considerable excitement around new institutions for disseminating research 1 a more sobering thought however is that new technologies can also be disruptive this paper begins with some documentation of recent trends in economics publishing roughly the trends involve economists from top ranked departments publishing fewer papers in many top journals this could be a welcome change but is also potentially troublesome one way in which the internet could be disruptive is that it could allow high profile researchers to disseminate their work without subjecting it to peer review which in turn could lead to a broader unraveling of the peer review system the majority of the paper is then devoted to analyses of several additional data sources with the goal of understanding better what may be causing the observed trends the facts part of this paper documents two main facts 1 economists in top ranked departments now publish very few papers in top field journals there is a marked decline in such publications between the early 1990s and early 2000s 2 comparing the early 2000s with the early 1990s there is a decline in both the absolute number of papers and the share of papers in the top general interest journals written by harvard economics department faculty although the second fact just concerns one department i see it as potentially important to understanding what is happening because it comes at a time when harvard is widely regarded i believe correctly as having ascended to the top position in the profession the decline of peer review theory i allude to in the title is that the necessity of going through the peer review process has lessened for high status authors in the old days peer reviewed journals were by far the most effective means of reaching readers whereas with the growth of the internet high status authors can now post papers online and exploit their reputation to attract readers many alternate explanations are possible i focus on four theories the decline in peer review theory and three alternatives 1 the trends could be a consequence of top school authors being crowded out of the top journals by other researchers several such stories have an optimistic message for example there is more talent entering the profession old pro elite biases are being broken down more schools are encouraging faculty to do cutting edge research and the internet is enabling more cutting edge research by breaking down informational barriers that had hampered researchers outside the top schools 2 2 the trends could be a consequence of the growth of revisions at economics journals discussed in ellison 2002a 2002b in this more pessimistic theory highly productive researchers must abandon some projects and or seek out faster outlets to conserve the time now required to publish their most important works 3 the trends could simply reflect that field journals have declined in quality in some relative sense and become a less attractive place to publish this theory is meant to encompass also the rise of new journals which is not obviously desirable or undesirable the majority of this paper is devoted to examining various data sources that provide additional details about how economics publishing has changed over the past decade these are intended both to sharpen understanding of the facts to be explained and to provide tests of auxiliary predictions of the theories two main sources of information are used data on publications and data on citations the publication data include department level counts of publications in various additional journals an individual level dataset containing records of publications in a subset of journals for thousands of economists and a very small dataset containing complete data on a few authors publication records

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

layoffs top executive pay and firm performance this paper examines the connection between layoffs executive pay and stock prices firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their ceos more and give their ceos larger percentage raises than firms which do not have at least one layoff announcement in the previous year however the likelihood of announcing a layoff varies dramatically along other dimensions for example firm size which are also correlated with ceo pay once firm specific fixed effects are controlled for the ceo pay premium for laying off workers disappears in addition there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff announcements copyright 1998 by american economic association

buying and selling attacks on fixed exchange rate systems abstract in this paper we show how rational expectations models of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate systems can be extended to take into account the possibility that the central bank could be forced to either devalue or revalue essential to the analysis are the concepts of buying attack and selling attack by means of which we were able to describe how expectations about the future exchange rate are formed we also provide a discussion on the problem of uniqueness of the equilibrium that may arise in this kind of speculative attack models

indexing and inflation abstract much of the opposition to indexation as a means of adapting to ongoing inflation arises from the view that indexation is itself inflationary this paper examines the basic for that view in a simple macroeconomic model in which budget deficits are in part financed through the printing of money it is shown that all aspects of indexing wage indexation bond indexation and tax indexation tend to increase the impact on the price level of any inflationary shock however this association between indexation and inflation is in large part a consequence of the monetary and fiscal policies being followed by the government evidence from a cross section of forty countries on the effects of indexation on the inflationary impact of the oil price shock of 1973 1974 suggests that indexation did not in general increase the inflationary impact of the oil shock the evidence is further consistent with the view that the absence of an excess inflationary effect of indexation is a result of the countries with substantial indexation not having accommodated the oil price shock as much as other countries

the review process in economics is it too fast rewards for publications in good economics journals are very high and submission fees and other monetary costs associated with submitting an existing manuscript are low consequently the editorial delay especially the first response time the time until the first editorial decision by postponing monetary rewards to publication constitutes the major submission cost from the author s perspective reducing the delay will induce many additional submissions of low quality papers to good journals increasing significantly the workload of editors and referees moreover the rejection rate will increase and cause papers to be rejected more times before publication offsetting at least some of the shorter first response times as a result the efforts of many editors to reduce the editorial delay although attracting more submissions to their journals may have adverse effects from a social perspective and the optimal delay might be longer than the current average of four months

uncertainty risk and incentives theory and evidence uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives we study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager in contrast to the standard negative risk incentive trade off this learning by doing effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives we document empirical support for this prediction this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

evolution of social norms with heterogeneous preferences a general model and an application to the academic review process abstract the article presents a model of social norm evolution that suggests how the increase in optimal and actual first response times frt of economics journals can be related when the optimal frt and the norm about how much time refereeing should take increase it seems that the existence of a norm increases the average refereeing time the model suggests the surprising result that this is not necessarily true i also discuss applications of the model in other contexts differences in the optimal frt between disciplines the effects of the frt on the tenure process and strategic behavior of referees

on non uniqueness in rational expectations models an attempt at perspective abstract many macroeconomic models involving rational expectations give rise to an infinity of solution paths even when the models are linear in all variables some writers have suggested that this non uniqueness constitutes a serious weakness for the rational expectations hypothesis one purpose of the present paper is to argue that the non uniqueness in question is not properly attributable to the rationality hypothesis but instead is a general feature of dynamic models involving expectations it is also argued that there typically exists in a very wide class of linear rational expectations models a single solution that excludes bubble or bootstrap effects one that occur only because they are arbitrarily expected to occur a systematic procedure for obtaining solutions free from such effects is introduced and discussed in addition this procedure is used to interpret and reconsider several prominent examples with solution multiplicities including ones developed by fischer black and john b taylor

the slowdown in first response times of economics journals can it be beneficial the first response time henceforth frt of economics journals has increased over the last four decades from 1 2 months to 3 6 months the optimal frt however is not zero because the frt deters submission of mediocre papers to good journals and consequently saves valuable time of referees and editors the change in the actual frt is in the same direction as the change in the optimal frt which has increased because of the availability of research on the internet prior to publication and because the costs of refereeing a paper have increased

performance fee contract change and mutual fund risk abstract we examine the effect that an exogenously specifically governmentally required change in compensation contract had on a managerial decision we find that a group of mutual funds changed their portfolio risk levels after they were forced to change their performance fee schedules their portfolio risk choices differed predictably from a randomly selected group of nonperformance fee funds and a group of performance fee funds that were not required to change their compensation contracts in addition the affected mutual funds lost both shareholders and assets around the time of the imposition of the restriction while the other funds exhibited little change or gained assets and shareholders

optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices recent developments in economic theory have focused attention on efficient methods for providing incentives within a corporation especially to top management jensen meckling 12 have examined some implications of incentive or agency problems for corporate finance in this paper we combine a simple model of security market equilibrium with that of an optimal managerial incentive contract using results of harris raviv 8 and holmstrom 9 we provide a rationale for including security prices in the managerial incentive contracts of publicly held firms in this model we also show that non systematic diversifiable risks will be considered in the capital budgeting decisions of a managerial firm operated in the interests of its stockholders this is in contrast to the implication of the arbitrage pricing theory a similar result follows from the capital asset pricing model which abstracts from incentive problems and suggests that only systematic risks ought to be considered the optimal contract model of the corporation takes the following view of the firm since decision makers within a firm are not sole owners of the business but employed agents the decisions which they make depend on the incentives which the organization provides these incentives are embodied explicitly in employment contracts and implicitly through the threat of dismissal or effect on reputation the contract whether explicit or not describes the decision maker s anticipation of the consequences to him conditional on various observable outcomes these outcomes are used to provide information useful in determining whether he did his job properly in the simplest optimal contract scenario there is a single principal and a single agent whose decision concerns the level of effort he expends the level of effort affects the level of output of the firm but not unambiguously because the output is also governed by other stochastic elements as a result some information about the agent s level of effort can be inferred

understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance comment abstract himmelberg et al j financial econom 53 1999 353 384 argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance i show that managerial ownership while substantially different across firms typically changes slowly from year to year within a company with rational managers maximising long term utility small one year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within year changes in performance by relying on within variation fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists

managerial reputation and divisional sell offs a model and empirical test abstract this paper presents a reputation model of divestiture activity that yields a sharp cross sectional implication for event studies of sell off announcements a decision to divest a division that is known to be successful conveys good news about the division in contrast a decision to divest a division that is known for underperformance conveys no news about the division we test these hypotheses on a sample of sell off announcements for which we find stories in the wall street journal unambiguously characterizing the division being sold as either a winner or a loser the stock price reaction to the sell off of losers is indistinguishable from zero while the stock price reaction to the sell off of winners is a statistically significant 2 5 these results are strengthened when we expand the sample to include divisions whose profitability was announced in the company s annual report for this expanded sample the average stock price reaction to the announcements of sell offs of losers remains indistinguishable from zero while returns from the sell offs of winners average a highly significant 3 4

are delays in academic publishing necessary researchers perpetually complain about long decision lags glenn ellison 2002a b confirms that delays are being longer he suggests an evolving social norm as a possible explanation with more demands made on authors for their work to be published time delays have the additional effect however of limiting the flow of submissions in the absence of time delays and other significant submission costs the best strategy is to start at the most prestigious journal and work down until the article is accepted better journals are unlikely to welcome this the major submission cost is the long and unpredictable length of time spent waiting for a decision ellison notes that time lags are longer for the top five economics journals at around six to eleven months longer than the rest despite the increasing prestige of top journals the number of submissions remains fairly static

heads i win tails you lose a career analysis of executive pay and corporate performance the paper utilises a novel career perspective to examine managerial theories of organisational control in the context of executive reward principal agent theory managerial power and neo institutionalism are evaluated detailed career histories of boardroom executives in all ftse350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are utilised using both a fixed effects panel and a career based approach rival hypotheses are tested in addition to the payperformance relationship the probability of job loss as a function of performance is also estimated the evidence presented points to the importance of institutional considerations in the standard agency theory and managerial power perspectives and lends support to a social theory of agency the analysis is empirical in nature and an effort is made to draw on qualitative studies to further flesh out the discussion the practical implications of the findings point to the inadequacy of existing arrangements to deliver efficient pay outcomes where performance is poor whilst highlighting dangers of relying on naive policy remedies that ignore the role played by institutional forces in their implementation also highlighted is the distinct advantage of boards adopting a cumulative or career oriented approach when evaluating executive performance from a policy perspective the case is made for truly long term incentives in the form of career shares

market valuation of employee stock options this study investigates whether investors incorporate the value of a firm s outstanding employee stock options into its stock price i estimate the outstanding options value for a sample of firms for which outstanding fixed options exceed 5 of outstanding common shares in 1988 i find a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and a firm s share price the correlation is stronger i for the option s intrinsic value than for the option s time value ii for options that are later in their vesting stage than earlier in their vesting stage and iii for large firms than for small firms in addition the fasb s method for calculating compensation expense has no explanatory power in the presence of this paper s calculation of the options value

taking stock of work family initiatives how announcements of family friendly human resource decisions affect shareholder value this study examines share price reactions to 231 work family human resource policies adopted by fortune 500 companies and announced in the wall street journal between 1971 and 1996 consistent with

output variability under monetary policy and exchange rate rules this paper examines the controversy concerning the relative desirability of fixed versus flexible exchange rates by examining whether a country can achieve a smaller variance of domestic output around its full employment path operating under an exchange rate rule or under a money supply rule the paper finds that neither policy will always dominate the other however it does find that if shocks in one market of the economy are large relative to shocks to other markets then one type of rule can be shown to dominate the other

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

playing for keeps pay and performance in the nba i introduction a basic insight of agency theory is that properly designed incentive contracts can align the interests of agents with those of the principal and recent empirical work shows that workers do indeed respond to financial incentives 1 contractual incentives however are not the only force motivating workers workers also have incentives to vary effort at different points of their contract cycle to increase effort just before a new contract is signed to lock in a more lucrative deal and then reduce it after a multi year contract is secured these types of contract related incentives create clear moral hazard problems but have received little empirical attention the motivating hypothesis in this paper is that imperfect information and multi year contracts create an implicit incentive for workers to strategically alter effort over the contract cycle in the year prior to signing the contract their contract year workers may exert above average effort to convince employers that they are high quality and thus raise long term compensation once the contract is signed however workers may exert less effort because wages are effectively independent of contemporaneous performance an empirical difficulty is that this moral hazard may be obscured by two factors a selection effect may lead only high quality workers to receive contracts and career concerns may provide additional incentives and dampen the post contract decline 2 this paper employs a unique dataset for professional basketball players in the national basketball association nba from 1988 to 2002 to examine the contract related incentive effects the data include contract information year signed length of contract and value of contract for every active player in 2000 and performance measures points scored rebounds assists etc throughout each player s career contract related incentive effects are estimated from changes in individual performance over the contract cycle if performance systematically improves just before signing a new contract and falls afterward some of the fluctuation is likely due to contract related incentives i also examine the traditional link between pay and past performance which is necessary for these types of incentives to be relevant the critical advantage of this data is the detailed information on individual performance individual contract status and individual pay 3 in contrast previous work on individual incentives for example lazear 2000 paarsch and shearer 2000 and shearer 2004 studied changes infirmwide compensation plans while the empirical literature on executive pay and performance for example murphy 1985 1986 jensen and murphy 1990 gibbons and murphy 1992 kaplan 1994 and hall and liebman 1998 typically examined the link between individual pay and firm performance the individual level data constructed here have the critical variation across individuals which is needed to identify the impact of these contract related incentive effects the empirical work begins with a test of the link between pay and performance which is necessary for contract related incentives to be operational not surprisingly better performers in the nba are rewarded with higher salaries and longer contracts more relevant to the incentive issue players are strongly rewarded for improvements in performance in their contract year a one point increase in a player s scoring average for example is associated with an annual salary increase of over 300 000 this link provides the crucial motivation for the hypothesis that players will exert additional effort in their contract year to lock in the better contracts that they expect to follow the data then provide strong evidence of contract related incentive effects as overall performance does in fact improve relative to a player s long run average in the contract year and then declines after a long run contract is signed

submission fees and response times in academic publishing both submission fees and response times enable editors to maintain an acceptable refereeing burden by discouraging the submission of articles with low probability of acceptance when authors differ in their ability or willingness to pay submission fees and deal with delays journal quality is maximized under a combination of moderate fees and moderate delays

management and ownership effects evidence from five countries despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross national sample this study empirically examines the ownership concentration performance relationship across the nations of canada france germany the united kingdom and the united states essentially we argue that the correlation if any between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied 1998 john wiley sons ltd

flexible exchange rates and stabilizing speculation abstract this paper re establishes the superiority of flexible exchange rates in small open economy models characterized by an efficient foreign exchange market and short run imperfections in the product labor market

asymmetric treatment of reported pension expense and income amounts in ceo cash compensation calculations abstract we provide evidence that ceo cash compensation is relatively less sensitive to pension expense than pension income suggesting that compensation committees shield ceo cash compensation from pension expense amounts we also provide evidence that managers use relatively higher expected rate of return estimates when reporting pension income suggesting that managers select income increasing accounting estimates in response to compensation committees greater emphasis on pension income in ceo cash compensation determinations pension cost amounts represent a unique setting to examine such behavior as their effect on ceo cash compensation can be detrimental or beneficial but arise from the same underlying economic activity

the slowdown of the economics publishing process over the last three decades there has been a dramatic slowdown of the publication process at top economics journals a substantial part is due to journals requiring more extensive revisions various explanations are considered democratization of the review process increases in the complexity of papers growth of the profession and cost and benefit arguments changes in the profession are examined using time series data connections between these changes and the slowdown are examined using paper level data there is evidence for some explanations but most of the slowdown remains unexplained changes may reflect evolving social norms

strategic orientations incentive plan adoptions and firm performance evidence from electric utility firms this study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy managerial motivation and control managerial risk bearing and incentive plan characteristics a pooled cross sectional time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms consistent with theory results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with defender strategic orientations in contrast firms with prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance 1997 john wiley sons ltd

the transmission of disturbances under alternative exchange rate regimes with optimal indexing the paper develops a general stochastic macroeconomic model that can be used to study the international transmission of disturbances under four alternative exchange rate systems uniform flexible exchange rates uniform fixed exchange rates and two versions of two tier exchange rates the analysis makes two general points first one cannot assume stability of structure when assessing the consequences of alternative exchange rate regimes for example the slope of the aggregate supply curve and the rationally formed expectations in the asset markets can respond dramatically to the government s choice of exchange rate regime second exchange rate regimes that provide full insulation from foreign disturbances may nevertheless be inferior to other regimes in terms of their ability to maximize social welfare

total board remuneration and company performance using a hitherto neglected source of data this paper combines executive emoluments with executive options to construct a broader measure of executive pay than has been possible in earlier british studies the result of including the long term share option component of pay along with the more commonly utilized short term component of emoluments is to reveal executive pay as being significantly more sensitive to company performance than has previously been thought to be the case the paper questions the current policy stance of british institutional investors and of the greenbury committee with respect to executive share options copyright 1996 by royal economic society

submission demand in core economics journals a panel study i introduction academic economics journals have proliferated to around 1 500 providing economists a large number of outlets for publishing manuscripts econlit n d ideas n d although researchers have examined how the demand for submission for academic economics journals responded to nonprice variables such as an editorial policy change on page limit card and dellavigna 2012 surprisingly the price elasticity of demand for submission remains unknown and becomes the focus of this study the objective of this study was to examine empirically what factors influence authors decisions on which economics journal to submit to focusing on three sets of demand factors manuscript submission fee observed journal quality such as impact factor and ranking and journal usage such as abstract views and library subscriptions similar to most of the literature on economics journals we focused on the economics journals indexed in journal citation reports jcr compiled by the institute for scientific information because jcr journals tend to be viewed as the core or leading academic journals two challenges arose in estimating the demand for journal submission first submission fee may be endogenous if supply and demand are simultaneously determined or if economics journals set the fee based on demand variations that the econometrician does not observe and hence cannot explicitly specify in the demand model to reduce the potential endogeneity bias we surveyed journal editors to obtain and use as an instrument the fee paid to a journal referee for reviewing the reviewer fee might serve as a good instrument in this case because the reviewer fee which is a supply side variable generally is paid by the submission fee there is little evidence to support that paying referees is correlated with unobserved journal quality such as journal reputation indeed a recent study by chetty saez and sandor 2014 found that reviewer fees have little or no effects on quality of the reviewer reports based on an experiment with referees at the journal of public economics casting doubt on the relationship between reviewer fee and referee report the second challenge is that journal quality such as journal reputation or editor reputation is not observed by the econometrician our strategy to address this issue was to use panel data to control for unobserved individual journal effect by supplementing the jcr citation data with other publicly available data and our two rounds of surveys of journal editors we constructed a unique panel dataset that contains various journal characteristics such as submission fee fee paid to a journal referee for reviewing and the number of new submissions for the years of 2008 and 2013 thompson scientific institute for scientific information 2008 and 2013 many researchers have analyzed theoretically the role of submission fee and or response times in academic publishing e g azar 2006 cotton 2013 heintzelman and nocetti 2009 leslie 2005 for a recent example cotton 2013 showed that journal quality could be maximized through a combination of both moderate fees and moderate delays when authors have heterogeneous preferences such a result is obviously based on the assumption that authors respond negatively to a submission fee from an empirical perspective submission fees raise the cost of submitting an article and therefore discourage the submission of papers especially those of marginal quality i e a self selection process regarding the quality of authors own manuscripts however several factors can alleviate the negative impact of submission fees on submissions first azar 2005 pointed out that the rewards for publications in good economics journals are very high compared with the relatively low submission fees second submission fees are sometimes paid by department funds and faculty s grants research contracts

the role of comparative advantage and learning in wage dynamics and intrafirm mobility evidence from germany this article measures the importance of job level assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about workers ability in explaining intrafirm wage and mobility dynamics using survey data from the german socio economic panel the results reveal the importance of nonrandom selection of workers into the rungs of the firm s job ladder measured and unmeasured ability play important roles in workers rank assignment with unmeasured ability being more important at higher levels of the hierarchical job structure there is some evidence of learning effects for workers below age 35 generating mobility between upper and executive levels

delays in new product introductions and the market value of the firm this paper empirically estimates the impact of not meeting promised new product introduction dates on the market value of the firm we estimate the average abnormal change in the market value for

ceo compensation after deregulation the case of electric utilities the 1992 national energy policy act nepa intensified competition in the electric utility industry by allowing nonutility generators to produce and sell power in wholesale energy markets congress expected nepa to lead to improved operating efficiencies by substituting market forces for regulation a data set that is unique to the utility industry allows us to test how and whether utility firms reallocated resources to improve efficiencies and more important for this study whether ceo compensation changed in accordance with agency theory predictions that ceo compensation would become more incentive based and more equity based in the competitive operating environment

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

equilibrium warrant pricing models and accounting for executive stock options under apb opinion no 25 compensation expense arising from executive stock options consists of the excess of the market value of the stock over the exercise price of the options on their grant dates if the exercise price equals the market value of the stock on the grant date which is typically the case no compensation expense is recognized this accounting treatment has been frequently criticized for its bias toward underestimating the cost of an option to the issuing firm and a number of alternative valuation models have been suggested in the accounting literature by and large these valuation models have been borrowed from the finance literature where they were developed to explain the pricing of warrants and traded options the purpose of this paper is to assess empirically how well two of these valuation models perform in providing estimates of the value of traded securities warrants that are similar in many respects to executive stock options 2 this evidence should help calibrate the magnitude of the errors

the effect of accounting procedure changes on ceos cash salary and bonus compensation abstract this paper examines the effect of accounting procedure changes on cash salary and bonus compensation to ceos we estimate whether there is an adjustment to the statistical relation between compensation and corporate earnings following changes that lower earnings fifo to lifo inventory valuation and that raise earnings accelerated to straight line depreciation the results indicate that 1 subsequent to these changes salary and bonus payments are based on reported earnings rather than earnings under the original accounting method and 2 the potential compensation effect of the changes is small compared to the effect of economy or industry wide changes in compensation

on publication refereeing and working hard we present a model for academia with heterogeneous author types and endogenous effort to evaluate recent changes in the publication process in economics we analyze the implications of these developments on research output lowering the precision of refereeing signals lowers the effort choices of intermediate ability authors but invites more submissions from less able authors increasing the number of journals stimulates less able authors to submit their papers the editor can improve the journal s quality pool of submitted manuscripts by improving the precision of refereeing but not by lowering acceptance standards the submission strategy of an author is informative of his ability

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

plant closing decisions and the market value of the firm abstract we investigate the underlying causes and the announcement effects of plant closings the closing in our sample do not appear related to takeover activity instead they appear motivated by declining firm profitability firms announcing closings have lower earnings than market or industry medians earnings typically improve slightly after the announcement we find a negative stock market reaction to plant closing announcements

the dependence of pay performance sensitivity on the size of the firm i analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm s shareholders i use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship estimating this model on chief executive officer ceo compensation data using nonlinear least squares i determine that pay performance sensitivity as defined by jensen and murphy 1990b appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size however measured i also analyze the properties of pay performance sensitivity for teams of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as ceo pay performance sensitivity

enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in this article we extend that model in two ways first we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence second and more important we show that introducing task specific human capital allows us to produce cohort effects we further argue that task specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications we also discuss limitations of our extended approach

optimal wage indexation foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy this paper deals with the design of optimal monetary policy and with the interaction between the optimal degrees of wage indexation and foreign exchange intervention the model is governed by the characteristics of the stochastic shocks which affect the economy and by the information set that individuals possess because of cost of negotiations nominal wages are assumed to be precontracted and wage adjustments follow a simple indexation rule that links wage changes to observed changes in price the use of the price level as the only indicator for wage adjustments may not permit an efficient use of available information and may result in welfare loss the analysis specifies the optimal set of feedback rules that should govern policy aiming at the minimization of the welfare loss these feedback rules determine the optimal response of monetary policy to changes in exchange rates interest rates and foreign prices the adoption of the optimal set of feedback rules results in the complete elimination of the welfare cost arising from the simple indexation rule and from the existence of nominal contracts since optimal policies succeed in the elimination of the distortions issues concerning the nature of contracts and the implications of specific assumptions about disequilibrium positions become inconsequential the analysis then proceeds to examine the interdependence between the optimal feedback rules and the optimal degree of wage indexation it is shown that a rise in the degree of exchange rate flexibility raises the optimal degree of wage indexation one of the key conclusions is the proposition that the number of independent feedback rules that govern a policy must equal the number of independent sources of information that influence the determination of the undistorted equilibrium thus it is shown that with a sufficient number of feedback rules for monetary policy there may be no need to introduce wage indexation it is also shown that an economy that is not this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

event studies in economics and finance the event study is an important research tool in economics and finance the goal of an event study is to measure the effects of an economic event on the value of firms event study methods exploit the fact that given rationality in the marketplace the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices thus the impact can be measured by examining security prices surrounding the event in this paper event study methods are described including some of the potential complications an example is included to illustrate the approach