labor force participation interest rate shocks and unemployment dynamics in emerging economies abstract emerging economies emes have highly volatile unemployment and real wages standard models with interest rate shocks can generate higher unemployment volatility but still fall quantitatively short of matching the empirical volatility of unemployment a small open economy search model with endogenous participation and self employment a feature of emes generates 90 percent of the volatility of unemployment in the data highly volatile wages and quantitatively consistent cyclical aggregate dynamics amid productivity and interest rate shocks of plausible magnitudes endogenous participation amplifies shocks and plays a critical role in overcoming a key limitation of standard search models for emes

information acquisition and under diversification if an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests which assets should he learn about the best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold but the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes we build a framework to solve jointly for investment and information choices with general preferences and information cost functions although the optimal research strategies depend on preferences and costs the main result is that the investor who can first collect information systematically deviates from holding a diversified portfolio information acquisition can rationalize investing in a diversified fund and a concentrated set of assets an allocation often observed but usually deemed anomalous copyright wiley blackwell

explaining cross country differences in participation rates and aggregate fluctuations abstract the empirical evidence shows that there exists a negative relationship between the ratio of employment to population and the standard deviation of log of gdp in this paper we build a real business cycle model with an underground economy sector in order to quantitatively address this issue the existence of an alternative to registered market activities for providing tradeable goods and services implies that population will be switching sectors in response to aggregate productivity shocks amplifying the response of registered output the level of participation in registered market activities will then be negatively related to fluctuations this feature does not arise in a standard one sector model

why do farmers have so little interest in futures markets a farm financial model with leverage and investment in two farm enterprises is specified the model is extended to incorporate futures hedging and the separation theorem is used to show that optimal hedging is zero the assumption of a risk free asset is relaxed and while this leads to a violation of the separation theorem the result that optimal hedging is zero is maintained providing that futures markets are efficient it is concluded that if capital markets are efficient then farmers will have little interest in futures markets except to speculate

on the accuracy of the mean variance approximation for futures markets abstract simple approximate fomulae for the volume and gains from futures trading are derived using the mean variance model the errors involved are exactly quantified and shown to be negligible for the futures price and welfare gains though potentially larger for volumes

firing costs and business cycle fluctuations this article considers a real business cycle model with establishment level dynamics and uses it to analyze the effects of firing taxes it finds that firing taxes can have significant consequences on business cycle fluctuations that the largest effects are on aggregate employment and that even relatively small firing taxes have substantial effects a significant contribution of the article is computational it describes how to use standard linear quadratic methods to solve for a stochastic equilibrium of an s s economy with tax distortions

how does the stock market absorb shocks abstract using a comprehensive set of news stories we find a stark difference in market responses to positive and negative price shocks accompanied by new information when there is a news story about a firm positive price shocks are followed by reversal while negative ones result in drift this is interpreted as the stock market overreaction to good news and underreaction to bad news these seemingly contradictory results can be explained in a single framework considering the interaction of retail investors with attention bias and arbitrageurs with short run capital constraints consistent with this hypothesis we find that both patterns are stronger when the attention bias is stronger and when the arbitrage capital is scarce

security analysis and trading patterns when some investors receive information before others in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time this article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others the model implies that under some conditions investors will focus only on a subset of securities herding while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics in addition the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft cited trading strategies such as profit taking short term position reversal and following the leader mimicking earlier trades in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time while these models provide many important insights in reality some investors either fortuitously or owing to superior skill acquire pertinent information before others by being first an investor can exploit this information to great advantage information that is uncovered only slightly later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed we show in this article that the sequential nature of information arrival has a significant effect on both the trading decisions and the types of information collected by investors the model we develop describes the investment choices of a set of competitive risk averse investors who investigate the long term prospects of firms lucky or high ability investors uncover the

the relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation we calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents actions we characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs if the private learning channel is present convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of the mean arrival rate of public information and the mean rate at which individual agents are randomly matched with other agents if however there is no private information sharing then convergence is exponential at a rate strictly lower than the mean arrival rate of public information c 2009 elsevier inc all rights reserved

job destruction and propagation of shocks this paper considers propagation of aggregate shocks in a dynamic general equilibrium model with labor market matching and endogenous job destruction cyclical fluctuations in the job destruction rate magnify the output effects of shocks as well as making them much more persistent interactions between capital adjustment and the job destruction rate play an important role in generating persistence propagation effects are shown to be quantitatively substantial when the model is calibrated using job flow data incorporating costly capital adjustment leads to significantly greater propagation

the rationale of the mean standard deviation analysis skewness preference and the demand for money publisher summary this chapter discusses the rationale of the mean standard deviation analysis skewness preference and the demand for money in january 1969 issue of the review of economic studies karl borch and martin feldstein separately criticized the widely used mean variance analysis of portfolio selection borch contended that any system of upward sloping mean standard deviation e s indifference curves can be shown to be inconsistent with the basic axiom of choice under uncertainty he pointed out that one can always pick any two points on an upward sloping indifference curve to represent two bernoulli distributions with probability 1 p of gaining the same amount x in both the cases and probability p of gaining y1 in the case of one distribution and y2 in the case of the second distribution with y2 y1 if the second distribution represents the point to the northeast of the other point then by the dominance axiom the second distribution must be preferred to the first which contradicts the basic meaning of indifference curves feldstein by using a log utility function and a lognormal distribution for investment outcome showed that e s indifference curves for a risk averter need not be convex downwards though upward sloping they would change from convex to concave once the standard deviation of the outcome exceeds the mean multiplied by on the face of it this seems to suggest that risk aversion might decrease as risk is increased beyond a certain extent

the value of diffusing information abstract how does the speed by which information diffuses affect its value to a stock market investor in a structural model solved in closed form this speed has two opposing effects on the empirically dominant term of the value of information faster diffusing information means quicker and less noisy profits but also increases competing informed trading impounding more information into prices and eroding profits structural empirical analysis of stock market reaction to drug approvals using media coverage as a proxy for the transmission rate of information finds that the value of information is hump shaped in its future transmission rate moreover the estimated amount of noise trading is small

theory of the firm with joint price and output risk and a forward market expected utility maximizing farmers facing just price risk or both price risk and quantity risk behave similarly in the absence of a forward market if forward contracting is possible that is not true because variation in the commodity price affects a farmer s wealth through the value of his futures position the value of his output and through the covariance between price and output this covariance affects a farmer s optimal scale of production his optimal forward position and the interrelationship between the scale of production and forward trading

does mean variance portfoliomanagement deserve expected utility s approximative affirmation abstract this article is a comment on the paper by harry markowitz on mean variance approximations to expected utility european journal of operational research 234 2014 436 355 this comment is followed by the reply of harry markowitz

skewness preference risk aversion and the precedence relations on stochastic changes this paper provides a general choice theoretic characterization of the trade off between risk and skewness whose importance in understanding risk taking behavior is well documented in empirical studies the condition under which the prudence measure kimball 1990 characterizes the strength of an individual s downside risk aversion against his own risk aversion is identified and interpreted in a unifying framework based on the concept of one stochastic dominant change preceding another and that of the desirability of a stochastic change the framework is also shown to be useful for a better understanding of the arrow pratt measure the stronger ross measure and the coincidence of the characterizations of downside risk aversion and prudence as well as the relationship between stochastic dominances of different degrees

simplified risk analysis in agricultural extension abstract attention is given to the major methods of assessing risk in order to make choices the literature frequently reports studies on mean variance e v analysis and stochastic dominance rules both of these methods are compared in an agricultural application with the approach outlined by hanoch and levy the empirical results suggests that hanoch and levy s criterion appear to reduce the size of the risk efficient set and that the sets of recommendations from the methods under comparison were consistent the two recommendations generated by hanoch and levy s rule were found to be reasonable for this particular decision process

the cyclicality of separation and job finding rates this paper uses cps gross flow data to analyze the business cycle dynamics of separation and job finding rates and to quantify their contributions to overall unemployment variability cyclical changes in the separation rate are negatively correlated with changes in productivity and move contemporaneously with them while the job finding rate is positively correlated with and tends to lag productivity contemporaneous fluctuations in the separation rate explain between 40 and 50 percent of fluctuations in unemployment depending on how the data are detrended this figure becomes larger when dynamic interactions between the separation and job finding rates are considered

determination of the recommended hedging ratio the traditional literature on commodity futures markets defined a hedge as a futures market position which is equal but opposite to the individual s cash market position more recent studies have recognized that the futures market position need not equal the cash market position to constitute a hedge many researchers have theoretically solved for the optimal futures and cash market positions for example heifner johnson ward and fletcher and telser determined the optimal futures and cash market positions simultaneously peck determined the optimal futures market position assuming that the cash market position was given the formulas for the optimal futures and cash holdings differ from study to study because of the different underlying assumptions however general implications can be deduced from these studies concerning the size of the optimal hedging ratio i e the ratio of the optimal futures position to the optimal cash position in this paper it is argued that the optimal hedging ratios consistent with the results obtained by johnson ward and fletcher and telser are identical to the optimal hedging ratio derived byheifner 1972 1973 the exercise provides a major implication for hedging strategy which is consistent with all of these studies that the optimal hedging ratio is independent of the individual s risk aversion even though the optimal positions are themselves not independent of the risk parameter this implication is also valid for the minimum risk hedging ratio derived by johnson ederington and mckinnon finally the optimal hedging ratio in peck remains dependent on the risk parameter because the cash market position is assumed to be given

estimating the value of information we derive a general expression for the value of information to a price taking investor in a dynamic environment and provide a framework for its estimation we study the value of both private and public information and break it into its instrumental and psychic parts to illustrate we estimate and rank the values of leading macroeconomic indicators gdp employment etc using variations in option prices we find that consumer investors with conventional preference parameters would pay 3 to 5 bps of their wealth for a one time private peek into these indicators such signals provide substantial instrumental value but a minor psychic value received august 29 2016 editorial decision june 6 2018 by editor itay goldstein authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

conversations among competitors conversation is a central part of economic life a wide range of information gets passed from one person to another via word of mouth communication and a number of authors argue that the nature of connections between people i e the structure of social networks can have a

optimal hedge ratios with risk neutral producers and nonlinear borrowing costs a new theory of hedging is derived assuming producers are risk neutral forward pricing is costly and borrowing costs are nonlinear the standard risk minimizing hedge ratio is derived when forward pricing is costless when the assumption of costless hedging is dropped high leveraged firms are shown to hedge more than do low leveraged firms if the value of capital is uncorrelated with output price firms are shown to hedge more as cash price variability increases thus the model can be consistent with what firms actually do

a monopolistic market for information abstract we analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller which is subsequently used in a speculative market in order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has moreover to obtain higher profits it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices one way of doing so which does not require discrimination is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders

asset pricing in large information networks we study asset pricing in economies with large information networks we focus on networks that are sparse and have power law degree distributions in line with empirical studies of large scale social networks our theoretical framework yields a rich set of novel asset pricing implications we derive closed form expressions for price volatility profitability and trading volume as functions of the network topology we also study agent welfare and show that the network that optimizes total welfare is typically a uniform one with an intermediate degree of connectedness

gender differences in marketing styles recent research has found that men trade stocks more frequently than women and receive a lower price as a result the behavioral finance literature attributes this greater trading activity to men s overconfidence women s lack of overconfidence and past agricultural economics research suggest the possibility that women may be better at marketing grain than men this article uses actual transactions of farmers marketing wheat and also finds that men trade more often than women women also sell two weeks later in the marketing year there is no direct effect of gender on price received but by storing longer women receive 1 4 cents bushel less than men on average in contrast to the arguments in previous research we argue that men s greater number of trades can be better explained by men enjoying trading rather than by overconfidence

information immobility and the home bias puzzle many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can but why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry we model investors endowed with a small home information advantage who choose what information to learn before they invest surprisingly even when home investors can learn what foreigners know they choose not to investors profit more from knowing information others do not know learning amplifies information asymmetry the model matches patterns of local and industry bias foreign investments portfolio outperformance and asset prices finally we propose new avenues for empirical research

more reasons why farmers have so little interest in futures markets the use by farmers of futures contracts and other hedging instruments has been observed to be low in many situations and this has sometimes seemed to be considered surprising or even mysterious we propose that it is in fact readily understandable and consistent with rational decision making standard models of the decision about optimal hedging show that it is negatively related to basis risk to quantity risk and to transaction costs farmers who have less uncertainty about prices and those with a diversified portfolio of investments have lower optimal levels of hedging if a farmer has optimistic price expectations relative to the futures market the incentive to hedge can be greatly reduced and finally farmers who have low levels of risk aversion have little to gain from hedging in terms of risk reduction in that the certainty equivalent payoff at their optimal hedge may be little different than the certainty equivalent under zero hedging these reasons are additional to the argument of simmons 2002 who showed that if capital markets are efficient farmers can manage their risk exposure through adjusting their leverage obviating the need for hedging instruments

informality labor regulation and the business cycle abstract we ask how labor regulation and informality affect macroeconomic volatility and the propagation of shocks in emerging economies for this we propose a small open economy business cycle model with frictional labor markets endogenous labor participation and an informal sector our own calculations from the enoe national household survey reveal that these three margins are important to account for the labor market dynamics in mexico the model is calibrated to the mexican economy in particular to business cycle moments for employment and informality we show that interest rate shocks which affect specifically job creation in the formal sector are key to obtain a countercyclical informality rate in our model the presence of an informal sector might help to mitigate the impact of a stringent labor regulation on employment and consumption fluctuations in that sense it adds flexibility to the economy in its adjustment to shocks but at the cost of a lower productivity and an excess tfp and output volatility reducing the burden of labor regulation to the formal sector might achieve the goal of reducing output volatility while improving at the same time the efficiency in the allocation of resources

gross worker flows over the business cycle we build a hybrid model of the aggregate labor market that features both standard labor supply forces and frictions in order to study the cyclical properties of gross worker flows across the three labor market states employment unemployment and nonparticipation our goal is to assess the relative importance of frictions and labor supply in accounting for fluctuations in labor market outcomes our parsimonious model is able to capture the key features of the cyclical movements in gross worker flows and indicates an important role for both frictions and labor supply

information linkages and correlated trading in a market with informationally connected traders the dynamics of volume price informativeness price volatility and liquidity are severely affected by the information linkages every trader experiences with his peers we show that in the presence of information linkages among traders volume and price informativeness increase moreover we find that information linkages improve or damage market depth and lower or boost the traders profits according to whether these linkages convey positively or negatively correlated signals finally our model predicts patterns of trade correlation consistent with those identified in the empirical literature trades generated by neighbor traders are positively correlated and trades generated by distant traders are negatively correlated

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

news droughts news floods and u s disaster relief this paper studies the influence of mass media on u s government response to approximately 5 000 natural disasters occurring between 1968 and 2002 these disasters took nearly 63 000 lives and affected 125 million people per year we show that u s relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the olympic games which are obviously unrelated to need we argue that the only plausible explanation of this is that relief decisions are driven by news coverage of disasters and that the other newsworthy material crowds out this news coverage

information tradeoffs in dynamic financial markets abstract in dynamic financial markets the stochastic supply of risky assets has a significant informational role contrary to static models where it acts as noise in dynamic markets stochastic supply contains information about risk premiums acquiring private dividend information helps investors disentangle dividend information from discount rate information contained in prices for uninformed investors however as more informed investors enter the economy prices become more informative about dividends but less informative about discount rates this tradeoff creates complementarities in information acquisition and multiple equilibria in the information market

household portfolio diversification a case for rank dependent preferences the proliferation of novel preference theories in financial economics is hampered by a lack of non experimental evidence and by the theories additional complexity which has not been shown to be critical in applications in this article i present arguments in support of preferences with rank dependency using the survey of consumer finances data i document two widespread patterns inconsistent with expected utility i many households simultaneously invest in well deversified funds and in poorly diversified portfolios of stocks and ii some households with substantial savings do not invest anything in equities i show that portfolio choice models with rank dependent preferences plausibly parameterized and under fully rational assumptions are quantitatively consistent with the observed diversification these results call for further efforts to integrate the models of rank dependent preferences in portfolio theory and asset pricing the decision theoretic literature has long acknowledged the shortcomings of the expected utility theory of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 several generalizations of the theory are inspired by the experimental evidence and aimed at improving its descriptive accuracy however there are few applications of new models of preferences in finance and expected utility continues to dominate the field 1 two principal hurdles slow the proliferation of novel preferences in financial economics first the lack of empirical non experimental or field data confirming that the behavior motivating non expected utilities is widespread outside the laboratory settings second the additional and often significant complexity of the alternative preferences which has not been shown to be critical in applications where the models based on expected utility fall short of reasonable predictions this article presents empirical and theoretical this paper was previously circulated under the title household portfolio diversification the paper has benefited from the comments of shlomo benartzi luca benzoni markus brunnermeier john dickhaut maria perozek raj singh hersh shefrin and workshop participants at minnesota finance bag lunch 2003 wharton conference household financial decision making and portfolio choice and 2003 summer meetings of econometric society i would like to thank cam harvey the editor and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions a special thanks to jack kareken for comments and editorial help on an earlier draft i am grateful to donna zerwitz for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author address correspondence to valery polkovnichenko finance 3 122 csom 319 19 th

a model of competitive stock trading volume a model of competitive stock trading is developed in which investors are heterogeneous in their information and private investment opportunities and rationally trade for both informational and noninformational motives i examine the link between the nature of heterogeneity among investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics it is found that volume is positively correlated with absolute changes in prices and dividends i show that informational trading and noninformational trading lead to different dynamic relations between trading volume and stock returns

futures hedging under price basis and production risk we consider the hedging problem of a firm that has three sources of risk price basis and yield uncertainty an exact solution for the optimal futures hedge is derived under the assumption that the three random variables are jointly normally distributed and that utility is of the cara type unlike the mean variance approximation applied in previous research we show that the optimal hedge does depend on risk attitudes even when the agent perceives the futures price as being unbiased the theoretical results are applied empirically to the problem of hedging soybean production in iowa the exact solution relying on cara and normality is compared with numerical solutions under lognormal distributions and crra utility

information acquisition in financial markets tions agents have exponential utility and random variables are normally distributed these assumptions are often necessary to obtain closed form solutions we present an example with alternative assumptions and demonstrate that some of the conclusions from previous literature fail to hold in particular we show that in our example as more agents acquire information prices do not necessarily become more informative and agents may have greater incentive to acquire informatioln learning can therefore be a strategic complement allowing for the possibility of multiple equilibria

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

the effects of labour market policies in an economy with an informal sector in this article we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector our model extends mortensen and pissarides 1994 by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal sector productivity we use the model to analyse the effects of labour market policy on informal sector and formal sector output on the division of the workforce into unemployment informal sector employment and formal sector employment and on wages finally we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy specifically we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal sector matches in this article we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the effects of labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector what we mean by an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly affected by labour market policies such as severance or payroll taxes we find that labour market policies that apply only to the formal sector nonetheless affect the size and the composition of employment in the informal sector this is important since there is substantial economic activity in the informal sector in many economies particularly in developing countries estimates for some latin american countries put the informal sector at more than 50 of the urban work force 1 the informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some developed economies 2 although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a segmented labour market framework this interpretation is not consistent with recent empirical evidence from latin america under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the secondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal sector jobs maloney 2004 presents evidence for several latin american countries that challenges this view and instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector similarly using data from the argentinian household survey pratap and quintin 2006 reject the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater buenos aires area concluding that there is no evidence of a formal sector wage premium after controlling for individual and establishment we thank mauricio santamaria for stimulating conversations that inspired our interest in this topic we also thank bob hussey and fabien postel vinay as well as our editor steve pischke and two anonymous

survey evidence on diffusion of interest and information among investors abstract questionnaire surveys of institutional and individual investors were undertaken to learn about patterns of communications it was found that direct interpersonal communications are very important in investor decisions questions elicited what fraction of investors were unsystematic and allowed themselves to be influenced by word of mouth communications or other salient stimuli randomly sampled investors were studied as well as investors in stocks whose price had recently increased dramatically contagion or epidemic models of financial markets are proposed in which interest in individual stocks is spread by word of mouth the survey evidence is interpreted as supporting such models

portfolio theory and the demand for futures the case of california cotton this paper examines the simultaneous choice of cropping patterns and futures positions it derives the demand for hedging as a function of the price of a hedge and the crop choice set it estimates these functions for california cotton farmers it finds that both the costs of hedging and the opportunity to diversify risk by growing other crops substantially change the optimal hedge for california cotton farmers

economic behavior under uncertainty a joint analysis of risk preferences and technology a method is developed to estimate jointly risk preferences and technology under general conditions the approach is illustrated in an application to the analysis of u s corn soybean acreage decisions over time the results provide useful information on the nature of farmers risk preferences and on the influence of price risk and production risk on acreage allocation and farmers welfare copyright 1996 by mit press

revisiting the determinants of futures contracts success the role of market participants the chicago mercantile exchange introduced a futures contract for distillers dried grains ddgs in early 2010 but the market became inactive only four months after its inception while many new futures contracts do not develop into high volume traders interest from ddg cash market participants indicated that this contract could be successful prompted by the unexpected lack of trading activity in this new futures market we empirically revisit the question of what factors contribute to a futures contract s success and extend the literature by investigating the roles of market participants and the significance of supporting futures markets estimation results indicate that the market participant type hedger or speculator affects futures contract trade volume more importantly we find that the viability of new futures contracts for commodities that are jointly produced with other commodities is impacted by hedgers trade volume of the related futures contract these results provide important additions into the portfolio of indicators used by commodity exchanges to more cost effectively evaluate new futures contract products

information percolation in large markets we introduce a simple model of the percolation of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter each other over time and reveal information to each other some of which they may have received earlier from other agents we are particularly interested in the evolution over time of the cross sectional distribution in the population of the posterior probability assignments of the various agents we provide a market example based on privately held auctions and obtain a relatively explicit solution for the cross sectional distribution of posterior beliefs at each time our results contribute to the literature on information transmission in markets hayek 1945 argues that markets allow information that is dispersed in a population to be revealed through prices grossman s 1981 notion of a rational expectations equilibrium formalizes this idea in a setting with price taking agents milgrom 1981 pesendorfer and swinkels 1997 and reny and perry 2006 provide strategic foundations for the rational expectations equilibrium concept in centralized markets a number of important markets however are decentralized these include over the counter markets and private auction markets wolinsky 1990 and blouin and serrano 2002 study information transmission in decentralized markets in contrast to these two papers equilibrium behavior in our market example leads to full revelation of information we happily acknowledge conversations with manuel amador frank kelly jeremy stein and pierre olivier weill and research assistance from sergey lobanov rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 and gale 1986a 1986b study decentralized markets without asymmetric information satterthwaite and shneyerov 2003 study decentralized market with private value asymmetric information amador and weill 2006 study a more abstract setting regarding transmission of common and private i nformation

wealth information acquisition and portfolio choice i solve with an approximation a grossman stiglitz economy under general preferences thus allowing for wealth effects because information generates increasing returns decreasing absolute risk aversion in conjunction with the availability of costly information is sufficient to explain why wealthier households invest a larger fraction of their wealth in risky assets one no longer needs to resort to decreasing relative risk aversion an empirically questionable assumption furthermore i show how to distinguish empirically between these two explanations finally i find that the availability of costly information exacerbates wealth inequalities copyright 2004 oxford university press

information percolation with equilibrium search dynamics we solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information when two agents meet they share their information the information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings and so on equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally a tax whose proceeds are used to subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can in some cases increase welfare on the other hand endowing agents with public signals reduces information sharing and can in some cases decrease welfare

trading volume and serial correlation in stock returns this paper investigates the relationship between aggregate stock market trading volume and the serial correlation of daily stock returns for both stock indexes and individual large stocks the first order daily return autocorrelation tends to decline with volume the paper explains this phenomenon using a model in which risk averse market makers accommodate buying or selling pressure from liquidity or noninformational traders changing expected stock returns reward market makers for playing this role the model implies that a stock price decline on a high volume day is more likely than a stock price decline on a low volume day to be associated with an increase in the expected stock return

selecting a portfolio with skewness recent evidence from us european and latin american equity markets abstract polynomial goal programming in which investor preferences for skewness can be incorporated is utilized to determine the optimal portfolio from latin american us and european capital markets the empirical findings suggest that the incorporation of skewness into an investor s portfolio decision causes a major change in the resultant optimal portfolio the empirical evidence indicates that investors do trade expected return of the portfolio for skewness