the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

the constitution of economic policy one of the most exciting intellectual moments of my career was my 1984 discovery of knut wicksell s unknown and untranslated dissertation finanztheoretische untersuchungen buried in the dusty stacks of chicago s old harper library only the immediate post dissertation leisure of an academic novice allowed for the browsing that produced my own dramatic example of learning by serendipity wicksell s new principle of justice in taxation gave me a tremendous surge of self confidence wicksell who was an established figure in the history of economic ideas challenged the orthodoxy of public finance theory along lines that were congenial with my own developing stream of critical consciousness from that moment in chicago i took on the determination to make wicksell s contribution known to a wider audience and i commenced immediately a translation effort that took some time and considerable help from elizabeth henderson before final publication this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the transition according to cambridge mass this paper reviews the nber s the transition in eastern europe this book s 18 essays examine privatization stabilization fiscal policies the nascent private sector bankruptcy foreign trade and investment etc individual country performance occupies six studies these essays which are of high quality provide a cross section of the literature on transition however the book s stronger conclusions are not supported by strong evidence two conclusions unemphasized by contributors emerge expectations which reflect the theories used to design standard reforms are often unfulfilled during reforms a plausible explanation for the misplaced expectations is the ahistorical approach of those theories

conflict as a part of the bargaining process this paper investigates the use of conflict as a bargaining instrument it first revises the arguments explaining the role of confrontation as a source of information and its use during negotiations then it offers evidence illustrating this phenomenon by analyzing a sample of colonial and imperial wars the second part of the paper explores a bargaining model with one sided incomplete information parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in an absolute conflict that terminates the game or a limited conflict that only introduces delay and conveys information about the eventual outcome of the absolute one it is shown that confrontation has a double edged effect it may paradoxically open the door to agreement when the uninformed party is so optimistic that no agreement is feasible but it can also create inefficiency when agreement is possible but the informed agent has an incentive to improve her bargaining position by fighting

intimidation linking negotiation and conflict challenger demands a resource from defender in each period challenger chooses whether to attack if attacked defender chooses whether to concede the resource forever each player might be committed to ghting until victory before con ict begins defender can make nitely many offers con ict begins if challenger rejects all offers in equilibrium all offers except the last are unacceptable negotiation cannot eliminate con ict because a larger offer makes con ict increasingly attractive for challenger if negotiation fails prolonged con ict can happen in equilibrium even when uncertainty is vanishingly small we provide comparative statics regarding the probability and length of con ict

the old theory of economic policy and the new institutionalism abstract in economics recent emphasis on institutions suggests new policy dimensions for the traditional theory of economic policy which originated with tinbergen and others at the time of the keynesian revolution the paper presents elements of the traditional view instruments targets and policy models and then considers new aspects of policy especially policy for structural change the discussion emphasizes the implications for institutional design of incomplete knowledge and endogenous politics both public and private actors rely on incomplete policy models and the models themselves can become intermediate targets of policy

the duration of interstate wars 1816 1985 we present a model of war duration which incorporates both realpolitik and domestic political variables we hypothesize that strategy terrain capabilities and government type among other variables will play key roles in determining the duration of war we test these hypotheses using hazard analysis and find empirical support for our key arguments we find that the realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior and type in determining war duration we also find that historically on average mobilization and strategic surprise have little effect on war duration and that wars are not duration dependent

limits to institutional reforms the essay draws on the theory of macro economic policy as it has evolved to discuss implicit policy determinism in the new economics of institutions the extension of rational choice methods to new levels of analysis such as micropolitics macropolitics political macroeconomics and microfoundations of cooperation has apparently reduced the policy choice set and diminished the role of experts all outcomes reflect constrained maximization by rational agents the essay argues however that scarcity of knowledge leads to incomplete and variable policy models and that competition among policy models creates a role for experts in social change

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

testing alternative models of alliance duration 1816 1984 theory at least four models of alliance duration exist namely the capabilityaggregation security autonomy domestic politics and institutionalization models of alliances the independent tests of these models have been underspecified however as no simultaneous comparative testing of the hypotheses from these models has been conducted hypothesis alliance duration may be a function of security threats changes in national capabilities the security autonomy tradeoffs between larger and smaller states in an alliance regime type and changes in regime and the time the alliance has had to become institutionalized methods a hazard model employing time varying covariates applied to 207 alliances from 1816 to 1984 results key elements of the security autonomy and domestic politics models have effects on alliance duration as expected it does not appear however that institutionalization over time has an effect on alliance duration as alliances appear to become more likely to dissolve the longer they last additionally while one hypothesis advanced by the capability aggregation model receives some support a second variable is statistically significant in the opposite direction of the model s expectation suggesting possible problems with the model s validity

bargaining and fighting the impact of regime type on war onset duration and outcomes recent research suggests that democracies have advantages and disadvantages in wars democracies are more likely to win the wars they initiate and the ones in which they are targeted wars initiated by democracies are also uniformly shorter and less costly than wars initiated by nondemocracies however democracies are also less likely to continue fighting and less likely to win as war drags on democracies are also particularly likely to be targeted we present a bargaining model that reconciles these divergent findings the model explains why democracies are more likely to win but are also more likely to settle and more likely to be targeted than other types of regimes the model s explanation of these facts differs in important ways from existing explanations the model also suggests several new hypotheses relating regime type to the terms of settlement and the onset of war

understanding economic policy reform one of the eventual consequences of the global debt crisis was a wave of market oriented economic reforms this paper discusses the state of our knowledge on the political economy of this process why were inefficient and often unsustainable policies maintained for so long why are so many governments reforming now after decades of adherence to policies of an opposite kind have the reformers internalized the correct lessons from the east asian experience finally are there any helpful rules for reformers to follow in guiding their policies through complicated political terrain

presidential approval and macroeconomic conditions evidence from a nonlinear model abstractcontrary to previous empirical studies that find a linear link between economic conditions and presidential approval this study argues for and finds a nonlinear relationship a threshold regression is used to assess potential nonlinear relationships between macroeconomic variables and presidential popularity a quarterly data analysis for the 1960q1 2012q2 time period reveals that domestic factors prevail in shaping presidential approval most compelling is evidence of a threshold relationship involving economic conditions when unemployment is slightly over 7 its decline impacts significantly and favourably on presidential approval an effect that virtually disappears below the threshold value change in consumer sentiment affects presidential approval in a limited way while inflation shows no association at all these results combine to encourage further investigation of nonlinear processes in the nexus of economics and politics

the design of reform packages under uncertainty the authors present a model of large scale economic reforms modeled on the transition process in eastern europe with aggregate and individual uncertainty concerning the outcome of reforms the government is assumed to choose the speed and sequencing of reforms the authors compare big bang strategies with gradualist reform packages they show that gradualist reform packages may be easier to get started optimal sequencing of reforms should aim at creating constituencies for further reforms and gradualism may generate a higher investment response because of a lower option value of waiting than would a big bang approach copyright 1995 by american economic association

economic performance through time prize lecture to the memory of alfred nobel december 9 1993 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

democracy war initiation and victory a study was conducted to examine the effects of nation states political institutions on state relations war fighting and selection effects explanation were compared to explain why democracies were more likely to win wars an analysis of all interstate wars between 1816 and 1982 revealed that democracies that initiate wars often win them results also suggest that domestic political structure is one factor that should not be omitted from the study of international relations copyright 1998 american political science associationrecent empirical scholarship has noted that democracies are significantly more likely to win the wars they fight than are other types of regimes though this finding refutes the general realist claim that regime type is unrelated to foreign policy behavior it also begs the important theoretical question of why democracies are more likely to win wars since different theories of foreign policy behavior provide different answers to this question discerning the real reasons would advance our theoretical understanding of foreign policy behavior scholars offer two different general arguments to explain democracies winning ways first they are perceived as intrinsically more effective at waging war than are nondemocracies hereafter termed the warfighting explanation primarily because it is easier for them to rally their society behind a war effort second as derived from several theories democracies win more often because they are more careful about deciding to initiate war hereafter termed the selection effects explanation significantly the theoretical assumptions of the latter argument are consistent with the structural explanation of the tendency for democracies not to fight one another popularly known as the democratic peace this article explores in detail why democracies are more likely to win wars specifically comparing the war fighting and selection effects explanations our empirical tests discriminate between these explanations by exploring whether democracies are more likely to win all wars in which they participate predicted by the war fighting explanation or just those they initiate predicted by the selection effects explanation our examination of all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 finds that initiating democracies are significantly more likely to win wars than any other kind of belligerent we also find limited support for the proposition that democracies which are attacked are more likely to win wars than are other kinds of targets these results are in noteworthy contrast to previous empirical studies for three reasons we use a more complete sample account for possible interactions between democracy and initiation and include a more complete set of control variables the article has four parts the first presents the theoretical arguments relating domestic regime type to conflict behavior the second discusses hypotheses operationalization and the data set the third presents empirical results the fourth offers conclusions regime type and conflict behaviorare democracies more likely to win wars mainstream thinking during the twentieth century has occasionally doubted the ability of democracies to defend themselves especially during the 1930s and the cold war recently however scholars have examined the entirety of the post napoleonic historical record with quantitative tests and have found that when democracies fight they tend to win and their wars are of shorter duration bennett and stam 1996 lake 1992 stam 1996 what we call the war fighting and selection effects arguments have been advanced to explain this phenomenon the war fighting explanation argues that democracies simply fight wars more effectively than do other kinds of states lake 1992 developed a model of the state as rent seeker and posited three reasons for democracies superior war fighting abilities democracies extract fewer rents from society hence are wealthier and devote more resources to security they form overwhelming countercoalitions against aggressors democratic governments can extract higher levels of support from society for a war effort we discuss each of these arguments in turn we believe the last is the most persuasive the rent seeking argument has logical shortcomings the model assumes that democracies are wealthier because they extract fewer rents from their society than do autocratic states leading to greater wealth which in turn means more american political science review june 1998 v92 n2 p377 13 page 1 reprinted with permission additional copying is prohibited

meso economic filters along the policy chain understanding the links between policy reforms and rural poverty in latin america abstract the paper clarifies the meso economy concept by defining it as comprising both the market mechanisms and administrative procedures through which policy decisions and market signals trickle down to the household level three main bodies of literature are reviewed the policy oriented literature in which the meso economy was initially considered the transaction cost approach analyzing market and policy failures and the micro economy level of agricultural household models the paper develops a synthesis of macro meso and micro economic perspectives which focuses on the roles played by three levels of filters intervening along the policy chain implications for policy and research are drawn

rising hazards an underlying dynamic of parliamentary government this paper undertakes a quantitative examination of underlying rates of government termination in west european parliamentary systems most previous research assumed that these rates remain constant over the lifetimes of governments but this assumption has never been subjected to careful scrutiny a variety of tests is performed on a new data set that covers 16 systems over the 1945 89 period each of which points to a general tendency for the rate of termination or hazard rate to increase with the length of time a government remains in power this information is incorporated into an empirical model of government survival that also includes ideological policy differences within governments and the impact of economic trends

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

efficiency and productivity of the food and beverage listed firms in the pre recession and recessionary periods in greece this study uses data envelopment analysis to examine the liquidity and sales efficiency of the food and beverage listed firms in athens exchange in the period 2006 2012 the liquidity efficiency of the firms is higher than the sales efficiency but the results indicate that there are not statistical significant differences in the rankings estimated by the two models in each period the malmquist productivity index reveals that over the period of the study firms have experienced an annual average increase in productivity of 0 5 a slight progress on examining the components of this productivity change it becomes evident that firms have experienced an annual average of 2 increase in technology combined with a decrease in technical efficiency of 1 5 the results indicate that 52 4 of the firms experienced productivity gains in the examined period and this was mainly the result of technological gain rather than efficiency improvement more than 90 of the firms in the sample shift the efficiency fron