upward pricing pressure in two sided markets measuring upward pricing pressure upp has recently been proposed by farrell and shapiro 2010 as an alternative screening device for horizontal mergers we extend the concept of upp to two sided markets examples of such markets are the newspaper market where the demand for advertising is related to the number of readers and the market for online search where advertising demand depends on the number of users the formulae we derive depend on four sets of diversion ratios that can either be estimated using market level demand data or elicited in surveys in an application we show that it is important to take the two sidedness of the market into account when evaluating upp

cabinet decision rules and political uncertainty in parliamentary bargaining we investigate how cabinet decision making rules interact with political uncertainty to affect the outcomes of bargaining processes in parliamentary systems our formal models compare two types of decisions rules 1 those that give prime ministers unilateral authority to demand a vote of confidence and 2 those that require prime ministers to obtain collective cabinet approval for confidence motions we examine these models under assumptions of complete information and of political uncertainty that is party leaders lack information about the precise policies that others in the governing coalition will support our analysis suggests that the nature of the cabinet decision rules should influence the distribution of bargaining power the ability to exploit political uncertainty the likelihood of inefficient government terminations the circumstances surrounding such failures and indirectly the political considerations that parties face when choosing prime ministers during government formation simple empirical tests support some of these insights

cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous abstract this paper addresses a neglected question in the literature of cartel stability and the use of trigger strategies to maintain such stability we employ a model in which market demand is linear and involving n firms each operating subject to one of possibly n different cost functions we show that the stability of the cartel may depend crucially upon the relative efficiencies of the firms and argue that in such models explicit attention must be given to this possibility

democratic processes political risk and foreign exchange markets 3i6 foreign exchange markets are among the deepest and widest financial markets in the world technological innovations and market liberal ization have made currency markets enormous by 1992 the vol ume of transactions topped over 1 trillion each day moreover economic agents can trade currencies with shocking speed during the september 1992 e m s crisis british monetary authorities expended over two billion dollars to support the pegged value of the pound in only a few hours the behavior of these currency markets can affect not only trade flows and in ternational investment key determinants of economic performance but also political outcomes consequently exchange rates have become a highly salient issue both at the domestic and international levels indeed some political economists assert that rapidly adjusting international markets may overwhelm the ability of policymakers to control policy and according to the most extreme view thwart any meaningful democracy understanding how currency markets behave therefore is fundamental step to assess accu rately how the internationalization of economic activity influences demo cratic politics we investigate how democratic political events affect currency markets by focusing on the relationship between the spot and forward exchange rate markets the efficient markets hypothesis implies that the forward ex change rate the price of the currency deliverable thirty days in the fu ture should be an unbiased predictor of the future spot exchange rate that is today s thirty day forward rate should on average accurately pre dict the spot exchange rate one month from today empirical studies how ever conclude that the forward rate is often a biased predictor of future ex change rate changes many economic models attribute this bias to a risk premium where currency traders demand a higher return for holding the currency

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

the distortive effects of antitrust fines based on revenue in most jurisdictions antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits and in some others caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce we uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate propose simple models to characterise their comparative static properties and quantify them with simulations based on market data we conclude by discussing the obvious need to depart from these distortive rules of thumb that appear to have the potential to substantially reduce social welfare how competition authorities cas should set fines and how they actually do so in practice is a highly debated issue among antitrust practitioners in europe where fines are often set directly by the cas appeal courts have often slashed cas decisions precisely on the grounds of how they set the fines an illuminating example is the uk competition appeal tribunal cat decision in 2011 to cut the fines set by the office of fair trading oft for members of the construction recruitment cartel substantially on the grounds that the wrong measure of affected commerce was used

resale price maintenance and collusion the article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude we analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance rpm when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs in the absence of rpm retail prices react to retailers information and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect by eliminating retail price flexibility rpm facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short run gains from a deviation overall rpm can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it

strategic judgment proofing a liquidity constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may harm bystanders the entrepreneur raises senior secured debt to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy for a fixed level of borrowing senior debt creates better incentives for precaution taking than either junior debt or outside equity the entrepreneur s level of borrowing is however socially excessive giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents overleveraging but leads to suboptimal incentives lender liability exacerbates the incentive problem even further a limited seniority rule dominates these alternatives shareholder liability mandatory liability insurance and punitive damages are also discussed

cartel unity over the business cycle in this paper cartel behavior in business cycles when some firms are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the downturns is investigated this vulnerability would restrict the set of collusive equilibria that are feasible in a repeated game and possibly result in a breakdown in recessions of all collusive agreements it is demonstrated however that the existence of a low cost producer in the cartel could prevent this breakdown by adjusting market shares across the business cycle and thereby eliminating the possibility of bankruptcy for its inefficient rivals this swing producer could enlarge the set of self enforcing collusive equilibria the results of this paper are seen to be consistent with a wide range of observations on the behavior of cartels over the business cycle

rank effects in bargaining evidence from government formation theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties seat shares determine their bargaining power we present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction but consistent with a norm prescribing that the most voted party should form the government we first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design based evidence from twenty eight national european parliaments we then focus on 2 898 spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats we find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor since tied parties should on average have equal bargaining power this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted this effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat and is also present when a right wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left wing parties who can form a combined majority a model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors

collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms in a repeated duopoly with heterogeneous firms i ask which enforceable collusive arrangement is likely to prevail i propose the equilibrium at which both firms are just indifferent between colluding and defecting for discount factors not exceeding a critical level i show this equilibrium is pareto optimal possibly even the unique pareto optimum i then apply bargaining theory and show that the proposed equilibrium is the likely outcome of explicit negotiations finally i argue that the proposed equilibrium is an obvious focal point on which firms may tacitly coordinate the proposed equilibrium promises to be useful for comparative statics analysis of collusive oligopoly

endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms in the context of an infinitely repeated capacity constrained price game we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities when firms are sufficiently patient there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms a firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel when a cartel is not all inclusive colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity contrary to previous work our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate sized firms rather than the largest or smallest firms

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

the competitive effects of resale price maintenance the competitive effects of resale price maintenance rpm are theoretically diverse rpm can cause allocation distortions or promote productive efficiencies in the distribution process moreover extant cross sectional empirical evidence is incapable of distinguishing among the potentially disparate effects of rpm this paper conducts hypothesis tests of the alternative theories of rpm the empirical framework relates estimates of the effects of rpm for a cross section of observations to necessary conditions of the alternative models this analysis indicates that rpm is used both to foster cartels and promote efficiencies in the distribution process this result is consistent with the growing body of case study analysis that suggests that rpm is used for a variety of reasons this result also questions the current per se illegal status of rpm in the antitrust laws evidence is also provided concerning the strategic interaction between manufacturers and dealers in the distribution process and the use of financial data in analyzing propositions in industrial organization

a note on holding excess capacity to deter entry in a labour managed industry in this paper j zhang s 1993 investigation on whether an established labor managed firm carries capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur is reconsidered to analyze the use of excess capacity as an entry deterrent the author presents an extended model with a general constant returns to scale production function instead of the leontief production function assumed by zhang it is shown that the result of zhang that the labor managed firm lmf carries excess capacity also holds for the constant returns to scale production function furthermore the author examines the global stability of the labor managed firm postentry nash equilibrium

resale price maintenance an empirical analysis of uk firms compliance empirical evidence on resale price maintenance rpm is scarce this paper provides novel empirical evidence based on a unique database of rpm complaints lodged in the uk to the office of fair trading oft between 2007 and 2009 we describe the characteristics of the commodity being traded and of the relevant upstream and downstream firms and their sectors we then present an econometric analysis to assess how the probability of compliance to the oft request to withdraw the rpm can be affected by the specific features of the relevant economic context in which this restraint has taken place

computing cournot nash equilibria this paper examines convergence criteria of an algorithm for the computation of cournot nash economic equilibria the method is based on formulating the equilibrium problem as that of finding a solution to a nonlinear complementarity problem solved by sequential linearization and lemke s algorithm conditions for local and global convergence are developed and the technique is applied to homogeneous segmented and differentiated product markets

bargaining complexity and the duration of government formation evidence from flemish municipalities government formation processes have attracted a substantial amount of scholarly attention yet only few scholars try to explain the duration of government formations this article extends the latter literature by examining the relation between the complexity of the bargaining environment and the duration of government formations at the local government level we show that increased bargaining complexity reflected in parties ideological similarity a larger number of potential bargaining partners and an election result allowing for a larger set of mathematically feasible governments is associated with longer bargaining delays

endogenous mergers and collusion in asymmetric market structures recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion including an indivisible cost of cartelization we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion since they balance the small firms incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders indivisible cartelization cost using an endogenous merger model we also show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion current antisymmetry merger policy can thus be counterproductive

the conditional impact of incumbency on government formation previous research on coalition politics has found an incumbency advantage in government formation but it has provided no clear explanation as to why this advantage exists we classify existing theories as either preference based or institutions based explanations for why incumbent coalitions might be likely to form again and we integrate these explanations into a coherent theoretical argument we also claim that it is possible to some extent to distinguish these explanations empirically by taking into account the historical context of coalition bargaining using a comprehensive new data set on coalition bargaining in europe we show that coalitions in general are more likely to form if the parties comprising them have worked together in the recent past and that incumbent coalitions are more likely to re form if partners have not experienced a severe public conflict while in office together or suffered a recent setback at the polls the incumbency advantage disappears completely if partners have become mired in conflict or have lost legislative seats even after accounting for the impact of seat share on coalition size moreover in certain circumstances institutional rules that grant incumbents an advantage in coalition bargaining greatly enhance their ability to remain in office

optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority the dynamic behavior of a price fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed consistent with preceding static theories the cartel s steady state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection however contrary to those theories it is independent of the level of fixed fines it is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages

the cournot oligopoly and competitive equilibria as solutions to non linear complementarity problems abstract the cournot oligopoly and competitive equilibria are identified with solutions to non linear complementarity problems which leads to integration of the existence and stability proofs of these equilibria

cartel contract duration empirical evidence from inter war international cartels a formal cartel organization sets up a multilateral relationship between firms in a given industry while standard contracting literature has studied bilateral monopoly relationships in detail there are horizontal relationships like cartels that also have contractual aspects to shed light on how these contracts work this paper takes a sample of legal formal cartel contracts and examines their structure and durability borrowing from industrial organization theories and transaction cost theories the empirical model tests for the importance of demand uncertainty and cartel organizational characteristics in determining cartel contract duration the results show that the more uncertain the environment within which the cartel operates the shorter the expected cartel duration other industry structure characteristics and cartel organization variables included in the empirical model have a much weaker influence on duration copyright 2005 oxford university press

barometric price leadership abstract barometric price leadership refers to situations in which a price leader acts as a barometer of prevailing market conditions for other firms in the industry in this paper a model of price setting with costly information acquisition is analyzed it is shown that the unique equilibrium outcome is for one firm to acquire information and become a price leader while the other firm does not purchase information and becomes a follower in contrast to most previous work leadership in this model is due to the informational setting not the price setting mechanism as with symmetric information the unique outcome is the symmetric bertrand equilibrium

ringleaders in larger number asymmetric cartels the concept of a cartel ringleader has specific legal meaning but has received relatively little attention in the economic literature of cartels this article draws on a sample of 89 european cartels to identify how often ringleaders exist who they are and what they do it argues that ringleaders are more likely where the traditional cartel problems are likely to be most acute i e with larger numbers of members exhibiting substantial size asymmetries this is confirmed for price fixing and bid rigging cartels and is especially pronounced where the ringleader displays aggressive as opposed to merely organisational behaviour

resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of rpm we analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers we show that rpm indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry wide monopoly pricing the impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties influence in determining the terms of the contracts our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies

endogenous cartel formation experimental evidence in a bertrand oligopoly experiment firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel like communication and if so they may get fined by a cartel authority we find that the four firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption

penalizing cartels the case for basing penalties on price overcharge yannis katsoulacos acknowledges that this research has been co financed by the european union european social fund esf and greek national funds through the operational program education and lifelong learning of the national strategic reference framework nsrf research funding program aristeia coleg

fines and reputational sanctions the case of cartels abstract in this article we revive an old debate in the law and economics literature the relative role of public and reputational sanctions in deterring misconduct we propose an empirical framework which accounts for public sanctions in our case cartel fines and a more direct measure of reputational sanctions harnessing recent developments in opinion mining we use the intensity and the sentiment of media exposure of misconduct as a measure of reputational effect and thus approximation of the reputational sanction as a demonstration we combine an event study approach sentiment analysis and econometric techniques on a sample of 339 listed cartel member firms prosecuted by the european commission between 1992 and 2015 our results offer evidence that in the context of cartels public and reputational sanctions act as substitutes where there is a reputational penalty increasing this penalty reduces the effect of the public sanction one the other hand in the absence of a reputational punishment the effect of the cartel fine steps in

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

collusion under monitoring of sales collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms prices are private information and their quantities are public information such an information structure is consistent with several recent price fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins for a class of symmetric oligopoly games it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion an asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas in practice cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members

denying leniency to cartel instigators costs and benefits abstract a large number of countries have introduced successful leniency programs into their competition law enforcement to encourage colluding firms to come forward with evidence that will help detect cartels and punish price fixers this paper studies a feature of some of these programs that has received relatively little attention in the literature the inclusion of no immunity for instigators clauses niics these provisions deny leniency benefits to parties that instigate cartel behavior or function as cartel ringleaders our results show that niics can lead to increased or decreased levels of cartel conduct by removing the instigator s benefit from cooperating with the authorities a niic undoes some of the destabilizing benefit the leniency program was intended to generate and thereby furthers cartel stability on the other hand the instigator faces an asymmetrically severe punishment under a niic and this can reduce the incentive to instigate in the first place

free riding and sales strategies for the internet for many products internet sales can free ride oi of the promotional eiort exerted by brick and mortar retailers leading manufacturers to attempt to control the availability and pricing of their products over the internet we examine three categories of products fragrances dvd players and side by side refrigerators our evidence suggests that manufacturers that limit distribution in the physical world use various mechanisms to limit distribution online in particular these manufacturers generally prevent the sale of their products by internet retailers that oier deep discounts furthermore manufacturer websites tend to charge high prices suggesting that manufacturers may internalize free rider issues i introduction while internet sales total only about 1 0 of all retail sales in the united states 1 the rapid growth of internet commerce suggests that this sales channel will become a signi cant factor for many goods managing channel con ict between brick and mortar retailers and internet retailers is an important and growing problem faced by many manufacturers of branded goods manufacturers of branded goods have placed a variety of restrictions on their brick and mortar retailers in an eiort to control freeriding on the sales and promotional eiorts of retailers the emergence of the internet as a new distribution channel requires manufacturers to develop restrictions on internet retailers to control free riding in this paper we investigate empirically the extent to which manufacturers of three types of branded goods appear to control the pricing and

bargaining delays in the government formation process in parliamentary democracies the transfer of power from one government to the next is sometimes characterized by long periods of negotiations in which party leaders bargain over the composition and policy objectives of a new cabinet although these delays can have substantial political and economic consequences surprisingly little is known about their determinants moreover the few studies that exist reach contradictory conclusions in this article the author examines how factors relating to uncertainty and bargaining complexity influence the duration of the government formation process in 16 west european countries from 1944 to 1998 in line with the article s theoretical expectations the author finds that factors increasing uncertainty over the type of cabinet that is acceptable always lead to delays in forming governments but that factors increasing bargaining complexity such as the number of parties and ideological polarization in the legislature only do so when there is sufficient uncertainty

resale price maintenance output increasing or restricting the case of distilled spirits in the united states theories of resale price maintenance rpm differ strongly on the pro and a nti competitive effects on rpm there are few tests of the welfare ga ins or losses from rpm in industry case studies this paper tests rpm s welfare effects in the retail sale of distilled spirits in the u s using regression analysis to estimate demand comparing liquor stor e license values over time and analyzing political contributions th e study finds that efficiency arguments for rpm are unsupported with rpm leading to a reduction in distilled spirits consumption evidenc e shows substantial wealth transfers from consumers to retail liquor store owners due to rpm copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

price fixing the probability of getting caught the authors estimate the probability that a price fixing conspiracy will be indicated by federal authorities to be at most between 0 13 and 0 17 in a given year the authors estimate is based on conspiracy durations calculated from data reported for a large sample of department of justice cases and a statistical birth and death process model describing the onset and duration of conspiracies copyright 1991 by mit press

cartel overcharges survey and meta analysis abstract the article presents a novel meta regression analysis of the size of cartel overcharges from a sample of more than 800 observations collected from a wide variety of published sources the analysis of a subsample of 395 cartel episodes finds that duration legal environment and organizational characteristics of cartels explain variation in overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of calculation overcharges tend to be significantly higher for durable international cartels secular decline is observed as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened

mergers and the market concentration doctrine evidence from the capital market the last 3 decades of vigorous enforcement of u s antimerger laws is based on the market concentration doctrine one of the oldest and most controversial propositions in industrial economics this doctrine which is an implication of oligopoly models in the tradition of cournot 1838 1927 and nash 1950 holds that the level of industry concentration is a reliable index of the industry s market power the empirical implication is that a relatively high level of industry concentration which in the presence of entry barriers is believed to facilitate intraindustry collusion or dominant firm pricing should be associated with relatively large industrywide monopoly rents following bain 1951 numerous the market concentration doctrine predicts that a horizontal merger is more likely to have collusive anticompetitive effects the greater the merger induced change in industry concentration since a collusive anticompetitive merger generates an increase in the industry s quality adjusted product price or a decrease in factor prices it also follows from the doctrine that the mergerinduced expected benefits to the product market rivals of the merging firms should be an increasing function of the concentration change the empirical results of this paper which are based on the industry wealth effect of a large sample of horizontal mergers including cases found in violation of antimonopoly laws fail to support this prediction this conclusion is robust with respect to assumptions concerning the probability that a proposed merger will be prevented by the law enforcement agencies and it continues to hold after transforming the industry wealth effect into a hypothetical constant expected change in the industry s product price the results imply that the levels of concentration and market shares found in the department of justice s merger guidelines are unlikely to identify truly anticompetitive mergers i wish to thank paul asquith gregg jarrell rex thompson walter vandaele the participants of the economics workshop at the antitrust division of the u s department of justice and a referee of this journal for helpful comments earlier drafts were presented at the 1983 meetings of the european association for research in industrial economics and at the 1984 meetings of the western finance association financial support from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada grant no 494 83 0091 and the u s federal trade commission is also gratefully acknowledged 1 a closely related but somewhat less general prediction is that high levels of concentration should be associated with relatively high supracompetitive product prices although

collusive price leadership with capacity constraints abstract in this paper collusive price leadership in homogeneous good capacity constrained repeated price competition is examined in the stage game firms choose their timing of price setting although setting a price early is disadvantageous per se a large firm has an incentive to move early in order to demonstrate its commitment not to deviate if the discount factor is not too large this behavior raises the collusive price compared to that arising in collusion with simultaneous moves as a result all firms obtain strictly higher profits

imperfectly competitive equilibria in international commodity markets the simple model of perfect competition in spatial markets has been widely applied in analyzing international agricultural trade yet many markets do not appear to be perfectly competitive this paper offers a new and efficient method for computing spatial equilibrium in oligopolistic or oligopsonistic markets the authors apply the technique to an analysis of several hypotheses of market conduct in the international wheat market that have been put forward by other authors they conclude that a cournot nash duopsony model does not perform well in explaining trade

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

unique non boundary equilibria in the morishima system abstract in the extensive literature on the morishima system the issue of the uniqueness and positiveness of equilibria has been neglected it is shown that three conditions known to be sufficient for local stability also imply unique non boundary equilibria other implications of these three conditions such as numeraire independence and global stability are also discussed

a price setting supergame between two heterogeneous firms when firms attempt to tacitly collude they inevitably face a market sharing problem this problem is further complicated when firms have asymmetries this paper studies a price setting supergame between two firms with different costs the paper investigates sustainability of tacit collusion and solves the market sharing problem under tacit collusion the resulting equilibrium from the supergame is used to study limit pricing government policies toward entrants and welfare change due to technological progress and a change in the time discount rate the paper shows that even costlessly achieved technological progress can decrease social welfare

some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric bertrand supergames abstract optimal penal codes in asymmetric bertrand supergames exhibit security level punishments for the largest firm if no firm has sufficient capacity to service the market then collusion that is barely sustainable by optimal penal codes entails higher capacity utilization by the largest firm than by the other firms collusion supported by optimal penal codes in models with a large firm facing a competitive fringe can result in the large firm having low capacity utilization and thus providing a price umbrella for the fringe firms which have high capacity utilization journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 l11 l13

antitrust penalties and the implications of empirical evidence on cartel overcharges research for this paper was supported by a grant from the economic and social research council res 062 23 2211

the competition effects of industry wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly this paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry wide resale price maintenance rpm arrangements such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against rpm a bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining we do not find rpm to be universally undesirable however where retailer power is strong the social effects of rpm are likely to be adverse since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

collusion among asymmetric firms the case of different discount factors abstract this study investigates collusive behavior among asymmetric firms for this purpose we develop a selection criterion for deriving a unique collusive outcome and apply it to the case when firms have different discount factors our analysis reveals that for collusion to be self enforcing it is unnecessary that all firms have sufficiently high discount factors but rather only that firms on average have a sufficiently long run view the optimal collusive outcome entails a strict ordering of output quotas in which firms with relatively low discount factors receive a disproportionate share of market demand as found in the case of a common discount factor a fall in a firm s discount factor reduces the likelihood of successful collusion this effect reduces firm profits on the other hand in the event that firms can collude a lowering of a firm s discount factor increases its output quota so that its profits rise

existence of competitive equilibria via smith s non linear complementarity result abstract it is well known that competitive equilibria are identified with a solution to a non linear complementarity problem however the standard existence results for this class of problems are overly restrictive in their assumptions on the excess demand functions this note illustrates the use of smith s 1984 existence result to generalize the conditions under which a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in the non linear complementarity framework

who wins determining the party of the prime minister the prime ministership is the preeminent political post in parliamentary democracies yet few studies examine pm party choice perhaps under the assumption that the choice is a simple function of party size in this article we argue that key strategic actors and the context in which government negotiations take place can play a critical role in pm party choice we test our hypotheses using a mixed logit with random coefficients on an original data set comprising pm selection opportunities in 28 european countries our methodological approach allows us to incorporate qualitative concerns about heterogeneity and causal complexity into our analysis contrary to conventional wisdom we find that the largest party is often disadvantaged when it comes to pm party choice that some presidents play an influential role in choosing the pm and that the value of being the incumbent depends on one s performance in office and how the previous government ended

resale price maintenance an economic assessment of the federal trade commission s case against the corning glass works this article examines the economic explanations for the use of resale price maintenance rpm by the corning glass works using empirical evidence developed from the federal trade commission s case challenging the practice three classes of rpm theories are tested the supplier and dealer anticompetitive theories and the class of principle agent theories the article uses both ex ante and ex post tests to distinguish the theories including tests based on structural evidence as well as data on sales advertising and stock market reactions for the company and its competitors around critical events in the case the evidence most convincingly rejects the anticompetitive theories and points toward a principle agent explanation in which rpm helped increase sales of corning s products the case is of interest in part because the simple products at issue in the case are not the types of products most often associated with potential efficiency explanations for rpm

in which industries is collusion more likely evidence from the uk i examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price fixing across uk manufacturing industries in the 1950s the econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising intensive than in low advertising industries there is also some evidence of a non monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion there is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion

sustainable collusion in oligopoly with free entry we investigate the stability of collusion in a market where firms cannot prevent entry in a symmetric homogeneous oligopoly there are collusive long run equilibria under which the colluders obtain positive economic rents while they do not prevent entry of firms up to a maximum equal to the largest number of firms sustainable at a single shot equilibrium the collusion is not generous to new entrants their profits are a little better than those associated with the discounted single shot equilibrium eventually entrants obtain profits equal to the incumbent firms we extend the results to asymmetric differentiated oligopolies

the determination of price and output quotas in a heterogeneous cartel applying a selection criterion that uses both subgame perfection and the nash bargaining solution this paper investigates the relationship between firms cost functions and collusive behavior it is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price that the low cost firm would set if it was a monopolist comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low cost firm s unit cost but is decreasing in the high cost firm s unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a unified model of cabinet dissolution in parliamentary democracies the literature on cabinet duration is split between two apparently irreconcilable positions the attributes theorists seek to explain cabinet duration as a fixed function of measured explanatory variables while the events process theorists model cabinet durations as a product of purely stochastic processes in this paper we build a unified statistical model that combines the insights of these previously distinct approaches we also generalize this unified model and all previous models by including 1 a stochastic component that takes into account the censoring that occurs as a result of governments lasting to the vicinity of the maximum constitutional interelection period 2 a systematic component that precludes the possibility of negative duration predictions and 3 a much more objective and parsimonious list of explanatory variables the explanatory power of which would not be improved by including a list of indicator variables for individual countries

quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement this paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti cartel policy it develops a conceptual framework which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification this is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred our best estimate is two thirds and even on conservative assumptions at least half of all harms or seven times the detected harm is deterred

collusion and leadership abstract the paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion it extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially it is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader in case of pure bertrand competition price leadership restores the scope for perfect collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise when firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion in case of asymmetric costs the less efficient firm must act as the leader finally such leadership is less effective in case of cournot competition since following an aggressive deviation by the leader the follower would rather limit its own output making it more difficult to punish the deviation still quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting

optimal corporate leniency programs this study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward it is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony