formulating research policy on expert advice abstract national research assessments represent the principal policy used by countries with public university systems to improve the quality of their universities research they typically employ expert panels of local academics to assess journal quality and use such assessments to reward publications we propose a model of how experts assess quality and test this model using data from the recent australian assessment controlling for objective quality we show that experts cognitive biases dominate their assessments consequently such assessments exaggerate the quality of the experts research and understate that of their colleagues our model can explain 95 of the variation in assessments

the performance of pivotal voter models in small scale elections evidence from texas liquor referenda abstract this paper explores the ability of pivotal voter models to explain voter behavior in small scale elections using data from texas liquor referenda the findings provide little support for the view that pivotal voter models are a reasonable theory for understanding small scale elections interestingly this is not because they cannot explain the levels of turnout in the data but rather because they cannot explain the size of the winning margins the logic of pivotal voter models implies that elections must be expected to be close even if there is a significant difference between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences with even a relatively small number of eligible voters elections that are expected to be close ex ante must end up being close ex post however in the data winning margins are often significant

in search of the good samaritan estimating the impact of altruism on voters preferences this paper continues the development of a theoretical foundation for measuring altruistic behaviour with respect to tax versus expenditure preferences in three specific spheres health education and welfare payments particular emphasis is placed on analysing the choice theoretic calculus that underlies individual preferences using this theoretical foundation econometric techniques allow progress to be made in measuring the characteristics of the underlying utility function the empirical work relates to the uk and confirms that both self interest and public interest with a slight emphasis on the latter determine overall preferences the implications of this for the public choice school are then examined

tax policy and yardstick voting in flemish municipal elections recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions in these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions this paper reports an analysis of municipal elections in flanders during the period 1982 to 2000 and finds empirical evidence for yardstick voting incumbents are punished for higher tax rates importantly the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents

the factor content of foreign trade in the factor proportions trade theory the heckscher ohlin theory the factor content of the pattern of trade plays a major role both in theoretical and in empirical investigations it is therefore valuable to identify restrictions on permissible vectors of the factor content of trade which necessarily hold in equilibrium if certain restrictions are empirically testable they can be used for preliminary testing of the theory before a more thorough examination is undertaken or they can be used to reject the theory it is my intention to develop in this paper a set of restrictions on the vectors of the factor content of trade which can be used for these purposes it is well known that autarky commodity prices impose restrictions on possible patterns of trade these restrictions provide a precise prediction of the pattern of trade for a two country two commodity world in the sense that the exporter of a good is readily identifiable from autarky price data as the country with the lower relative price of the good i will start by showing that in the presence of factor price equalisation autarky factor rewards impose restrictions on the factor content of trade patterns which are completely analogous to the restrictions imposed by autarky commodity prices on the commodity patterns of trade this result is in line with the view that in the factor proportions model trade in commodities represents indirect trade in factor services unfortunately these restrictions rely on autarky information and they are therefore not very useful for empirical work in order to overcome this difficulty i explore an alternative approach i argue that common predictions of the factor content of trade flows which are based on post trade observable data the data relevant for empirical studies rely on unnecessarily restrictive assumptions i e the assumption that preferences are homothetic and identical across countries and the assumption of factor price equalisation the assumption of identical homothetic preferences seems to be necessary when factor price equalisation is assumed because in this case there is an indeterminancy in the pattern of production nevertheless the two assumptions taken together imply the same factor content of a country s net import vector from the rest of the world for every equilibrium production pattern however in a many country world the factor content of bilateral trade flows depends on the realised production patterns and they cannot therefore be predicted i will show that in the absence of factor price equalisation which many

turnout across democracies world democracies widely differ in legislative executive and legal institutions different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power we explore how these mappings affect voters participation in an election we show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters preferences we uncover a novel contest effect given the preferences distribution turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power sharing system turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing moreover we generalize the competition effect common to models of endogenous turnout given the institutional environment turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing these results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches including ethical voter models voter mobilization models and rational voter models

media competition and electoral politics we build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout while information pushes up independent turnout partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate and on average they vote less when informed

revealed political power this paper adopts a revealed preference approach to the question of what can be inferred about bias in a political system we examine a dynamic environment in which individuals dier by income each period long run preference profiles are unobserved to an outside observer but are known to belong to a well behaved class in which individual preferences are ordered by income in each state policy data is summarized by a markov policy rule the observer makes inferences about the underlying distribution of political power as if political power were derived from a wealth weighted voting system with weights that can vary across states the weights determine the nature and magnitude of the wealth bias positive weights on relative income in any period indicate an elitist bias in the political system whereas negative weights indicate a populist one we ask what class of weighted systems can rationalize a given policy rule as a weightedmajority outcome each period our first result shows that without further knowledge all forms of bias are possible any markov policy rule can be shown to be rationalized by any system of wealth weighted voting an additional single crossing restriction on preferences can however rule out certain weighting systems we then augment policy data with polling data and show that the set of rationalizing wealth weights are bounded above and below in some cases polls can provide information about the change in political inequality across time

social incentives and voter turnout evidence from the swiss mail ballot system this paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior the main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act this incentive is particularly high in small and close knit communities empirically i analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in switzerland optional postal voting decreased the voting costs but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote in spite of the large reduction in voting costs the effect on aggregate turnout was small however voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities this lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people s voting decisions jel h0 z13

a many cone world abstract the breakdown of global factor price equalization or a single cone world is a central concern in various fields of economics this paper examines the empirical validities of the following two claims 1 the multiple cone heckscher ohlin ho model fits better than does the single cone ho model and 2 increases in the number of cones improve the fit of the model one of the contributions of this paper is that it focuses simultaneously on factor endowments production patterns and wage disparities across economies my empirical results support the first claim but not the second claim the results suggest that although the multiple cone model performs better than does the single cone model the increases in the number of cones do not necessarily result in better performance of the ho model

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

the influence of the number of statewide legislative referendums on voter participation in the us this empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the rational voter model so as to include the potential effects of the number of statewide legislative referendums this study tests the hypothesis that greater numbers of such referendums increase voter turnout because they elevate the expected gross benefits egb of voting by empowering voters while not significantly increasing the expected gross costs egc of voting using state level data for the 2006 general election in the us as well as the 2004 us presidential election and after allowing for a variety of economic and demographic factors this study finds compelling evidence that the number of statewide legislative referendums does significantly increase voter turnout

the factor content of international trade without factor price equalization abstract within the basic two factor multi commodity model of a two country world the present paper shows that international factor price equalization is unnecessary for deriving the heckscher ohlin theorem in its factor content version according to which the bundle of goods exported by the capital abundant country will use more capital and less labour than the bundle exported from the labour abundant country the factor content version remains valid when the model is generalized to include trade impediments intermediate goods or additional countries except perhaps if the first of these extensions is combined with either of the other two

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

closeness expenditures and turnout in the 1982 u s house elections students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout this may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization we explore the latter possibility by using fec and state data on campaign expenditures in house senate and gubernatorial races our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels we also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of senate and gubernatorial expenditure on house turnout

altruism within the family reconsidered do nice guys finish last this paper criticizes the view that altruism either increases the benefits of group interactions or improves the allocation of resources within families the authors identify a variety of circumstances in which members of a group would prefer to interact with less altruistic individuals and in which the efficiency of resource allocation is inversely related to the prevailing degree of altruism reasons that altruism might be a counter productive social force include 1 it can alter the social utility possibility frontier in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways 2 it can entail exploitability causing family members to behave in ways that leave all parties worse off 3 altruists may take inefficient actions to preempt exploitation and 4 family members may establish efficient resource allocation by punishing selfish behavior a rise in the level of altruism may lead to the exclusion of certain punishment strategies on the grounds of credibility 1 general positive result is that sufficiently high levels of altruism almost always lead to efficient resource allocation one should not necessarily expect to find strong altruistic linkages between spouses nor should altruism necessarily contributed to marital stability in addition to the connections between this work and the literature on family behavior this analysis has broader implications concerning the role of altruism in society and the evolution of social conscience

the case for nil votes voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems in an informational voting environment we study the impact of an explicit nil vote option on the ballot when some voters are uninformed and face the swing voters curse we postulate a simple model of strategic voting in which voters entertain heterogeneous thresholds on legitimacy of different voting actions we predict that introducing a nil vote option reduces the number of uninformed and invalid votes increasing expected welfare in both voluntary and compulsory voting we test our model in a pen and paper laboratory experiment and find that the predictions of the model hold in the data for both voting systems

redistribution in a model of voting and campaign contributions abstract i propose a framework in which individual political participation can take two distinct forms voting and contributing resources to campaigns in a context in which the negligible impact of any individual s actions on aggregate outcomes is fully recognized by all agents i then use the framework to reassess the relationship between inequality and redistribution the model shows that even though each contribution has a negligible impact the interaction between contributions and voting leads to an endogenous wealth bias in the political process as the advantage of wealthier individuals in providing contributions encourages parties to move their platforms closer to those individuals preferred positions this mechanism can in turn explain why the standard median voter based prediction that more inequality produces more redistribution has received little empirical support higher inequality endogenously shifts the political system further in favor of the rich in equilibrium there is a non monotonic relationship in which redistribution is initially increasing but eventually decreasing in inequality i present some empirical evidence supporting the framework using data on campaign contributions from us presidential elections in particular inequality increases contributions to republicans but not to democrats as predicted by the model

voting and turning out for monetary integration the case of the french referendum on the maastricht treaty this article analyses the voting and abstention patterns in french departments in the 1992 referendum on the maastricht treaty in light of the potential impact of monetary union we observe that departmental characteristics implying either greater benefits or lower costs from monetary union are significantly correlated with the approval rate this supports the view that the voting behaviour of individual agents depended on their self interest the impact of economic characteristics on the abstention rate is less clear indeed the variable that is most significantly correlated with abstention in the referendum is average abstention in other elections

the gains from trade theorem with variable returns to scale in the presence of intermediate goods abstract this paper examines gains from trade theorems in the presence of intermediate goods produced under variable returns to scale vrs the theorems obtained in this paper are nice generalizations of the results obtained from the final good models where final goods are produced under vrs

multiple cones factor price differences and the factor content of trade abstract this paper examines the theoretical predictions of the multi cone heckscher ohlin model and the empirical evidence for it i extend helpman 1984 by identifying additional restrictions that characterize the free trade equilibrium i illustrate that the complete set of restrictions are the building blocks of a multi cone factor content specification which is the factor content dual to alan deardorff s 1979 well known chain of comparative advantage goods prediction the theoretical analysis implies that the existing tests of helpman are incomplete applying the complete set of restrictions to choi and krishna s data set of 8 oecd countries i find limited empirical support this is compatible with previous studies suggesting that oecd countries do not occupy different cones

homo ludens social rationality and political behavior the most straightforward defense of political democracy is grounded in rational choice political democracy gives people power in public life parallel to that afforded by markets in private life the power to turn their preferences into social outcomes however rational choice models of voter behavior dramatically underpredict voter turnout in all but the smallest elections fiorina 1990 has called this the paradox that ate rational choice theory this anomaly is the centerpiece of green and shapiro s 1994 critique of rational choice methodology in political theory this paper proposes a form of social rationality that strengthens the classical rational actor model this concept explains many central statistical regularities concerning voter turnout and the historical regularities concerning collective action

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

diversification cones trade costs and factor market linkages abstract this paper finds non uniform differences in the distribution functions of factor usage intensities among 10 rich oecd countries the 10 countries form three distinct groups such that the between group differences are more pronounced than within group differences and capital abundant countries are in capital abundant groups the estimation works even if the same industry codes represent different goods across countries in the data the finding is consistent with the multiple cone factor proportions theory with zero trade costs with each group being one cone an alternative interpretation is non zero trade costs both interpretations imply weak factor market linkages between the countries in different groups

public protests and policy making technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions public protests and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers to study these phenomena in this article i present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information the key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens through petitions and protests citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker who can then choose to use it or not i first show that if citizens individual signals are not sufficiently precise information aggregation is impossible no matter how large is the population of informed citizens even if the conflict with the policy maker is small i then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation when these conditions are satisfied i show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity when they are not satisfied i show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting we investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models in a generalized costly voting model we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient increasing turnout in small elections is only inefficient if the electorate is evenly divided or if there is already almost complete voter participation finally we argue that the effects underlying our results are robust in a large class of endogenous participation models

a direct test of the theory of comparative advantage the case of japan we exploit japan s sudden and complete opening up to international trade in the 1860s to test the empirical validity of one of the oldest and most fundamental propositions in economics the theory of comparative advantage historical evidence supports the assertion that the characteristics of the japanese economy at the time were compatible with the key assumptions of the neoclassical trade model using detailed product specific data on autarky prices and trade flows we find that the autarky price value of japan s trade is negative for each year of the period 1868 75 this confirms the prediction of the theory

large electorates and decisive minorities there are many instances in which even in a democracy the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes it is shown that for a simple two alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected zealous voters who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating wins with high probability in any equilibrium even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small this is an undersirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria

fiscal effects of the voter initiative in the first half of the twentieth century abstract this paper compares the fiscal policy of initiative and noninitiative states in the first half of the twentieth century states with initiatives had higher combined state and local expenditure after controlling for income and other demographics but a lower ratio of state to local expenditure this together with existing evidence from later in the century suggests that the voter initiative does not have a consistent effect on the overall size of state and local government however it does systematically lead to more decentralized expenditure

get out the costly vote institutional design for greater participation institutions designed to increase turnout appeal to democratic sentiments but are highly debated as they entail two potentially countervailing eects while generating more pieces of information they may decrease the average voter s information quality we examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing participation abstention penalties used in 32 countries around the world and lotteries providing a prize to one randomly chosen participant as proposed on the 2006 arizona ballot we analyze a benchmark rational choice model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly we illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes though lotteries are a more eective instrument asymptotically in an array of lab experiments we empirically assess institutional performance we nd strong evidence for selective participation lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced however because subjects vote more often than the equilibrium predictions these institutions entail less welfare benets than theory prescribes lotteries do fare better than nes suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory

the general validity of the heckscher ohlin theorem despite a number of attempts to extend it the heckscher ohlin theorem remains woefully restricted in terms of the generality of the assumptions needed for its proof in its traditional form as a statement about the commodity composition of trade the theorem is valid only in the highly abstract environment of the two factor two good twocountry model that has been the mainstay of trade theory for half a century a weaker version of the theorem involving the factor content of trade rather than its commodity composition has been proved for any number of factors goods and countries but this generality has so far been bought only at the cost of other and perhaps equally restrictive assumptions 2 the purpose of this paper is to provide statements and proofs of the heckscher ohlin h o theorem that are more general than those currently available the approach taken is similar to that used in my 1980 article for an extension of the theory of comparative advantage in terms of correlations between autarky prices and trade in section i i lay out the assumptions on which the analysis is based these assumptions provide the outlines of a reasonably general model in which there may be any numbers of goods and factors and in which factor prices may be equalized or not trade impediments in the form of tariffs or export taxes are permitted though transportation costs are not 3 in section ii i discuss the difficulty of inferring the factor content of trade in a world of unequal factor prices and i provide several alternative definitions of that concept for use later in the paper these together with the assumptions of section i are used in section iii to prove a theorem on the value at autarky prices of the factor content of trade in section iv this theorem is used to prove a first corollary that makes a more direct statement about the pattern of trade it says that worldwide there must be a negative correlation between the factor content of trade by factor and country and the corresponding autarky factor prices it is precisely these autarky factor prices that constitute the ohlin measure of factor scarcity therefore the corollary provides a formal statement of the general idea that countries tend to export the services of those factors which they have in relative abundance and it may be regarded as a generalization of the factor content version of the h o theorem finally a generalization of the commodity version of the theorem is proved in section v the concept of a covariance is generalized university of michigan i have benefitted greatly from the comments of paul degrauwe wolfgang mayer michael mussa carl simon and robert stern as well as others who participated in seminars at the universities of michigan chicago and cincinnati and at the national bureau of economic research an anonymous referee also made valuable comments with additional goods and factor price equalization the theorem runs afoul of the indeterminacy of production and trade noted by paul samuelson 1953 and james melvin 1968 without factor price equalization trade impediments and intermediate production can cause reversals of the pattern of trade as shown in my 1979 article if additional factors and countries are also added it becomes difficult even to state the theorem let alone to prove it 2melvin stated such a theorem for the three good two factor case and jaroslav vanek 1968 proved it for the general case but only by assuming factor price equalization trent bertrand 1972 and jon harkness 1979 were able to drop the factor price equalization assumption but replaced it with restrictions on consumption of either goods or factors by country of origin it is unclear to me however that these restrictions can ever be met in a model that is otherwise plausible harkness 1978 has also used the factor content version of the theorems as the motivation for a regression equation relating commodity trade to factor intensities this bears some resemblance to my analysis below in section v see however james anderson 1981 and edward leamer and harry bowen 1981 who have criticized his result with a reply by harkness 1981 3for ease of exposition i do not allow here for transportation costs these were included in an earlier version of this paper following the technique in my 1980 article

overconfidence in political behavior this paper studies theoretically and empirically the role of overconfidence in political behavior our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness increased voter turnout and stronger partisan identification the model also makes nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society these predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence and standard political characteristics of a nationwide sample of over 3 000 adults our numerous predictions find strong support in these data in particular we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness voter turnout and partisan identification jel c83 d03 d72 d83

moral bias in large elections theory and experimental evidence in this article we provide evidence that voters in large elections tend to vote against their material self interest and to vote for a morally or ethically appealing alternative it may seem puzzling that voters might behave differently in small elections than they do in large ones however we show that such behavior is a logical consequence of voters having a conflict between obtaining a better material outcome and choosing a moral action we develop a simple model of this conflict and show that decreasing the probability that a single vote is decisive i e pivot probability reduces the importance of outcomes relative to actions in voter decision making because pivot probability is generally small in large elections alternatives that are understood by voters to be morally superior are more likely to win in large elections than in small ones thus compared to the preferences of voters election results will be biased in favor of moral alternatives 1 the model produces a set of predictions that we test in a laboratory experiment to clarify ideas consider a situation in which two outcomes are possible a and b assume that b gives

variable returns to scale and international trade two generalizations abstract the paper provides simple proofs of a gains from trade theorem and a theorem that predicts the pattern of trade for production structures with cross sector and cross country external effects which are more general than those available in the existing literature

a structural model of turnout and voting in multiple elections this paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections the theoretical setting combines an uncertain voter model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior we apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in u s presidential and congressional elections we structurally estimate the model using individual level data for the 2000 elections and quantify the relationships between observed individual characteristics and unobserved citizens ideological preferences information and civic duty we then use the estimated model which replicates the patterns of abstention selective abstention split ticket voting and straight ticket voting observed in the data to assess the effects of policies that may increase citizens information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior

altruism and voting a large turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior abstract i propose a game theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large the model has two key features that jointly drive the result i some agents are altruistic or ethical ii among the agents who prefer any given candidate the fraction of altruistic agents is uncertain when deciding whether to vote or not an altruistic agent compares her private voting cost with the expected contribution of her vote to the welfare of the society under suitable homogeneity assumptions the asymptotic predictions of my model coincide with those of feddersen and sandroni 12 up to potential differences between the respective parameters that measure the importance of the election i demonstrate with an example that these homogeneity assumptions are not necessary for qualitative predictions of my model i also show that when the fractions of altruistic agents are known turnout rates will typically be close to zero in a large election despite the presence of altruism

in search of optimum relative unanimity this paper formulates a simple mathematical framework for the selection of an optimum relative unanimity collective decision rule the approach is first to identify the benefits of moving from a rule of simple majority towards a rule of full unanimity then the costs of moving from simple majority rule towards unanimity are identified finally the issue of an optimal decision rule is mathematically solved

the buchanan tullock model some extensions in their seminal work the calculus of consent 1962 buchanan and tullock develop a decision model which embodies fundamental relation ships relevant to institutional choices however the buchanan tullock model remains general thus inviting others to specify details and to develop extensions the present paper seeks to explicate this important model so as to clarify the framework in certain important ways and then to extend the model by introducing explicit considerations of such dimensions as group size and group preference heterogeneity as explicit variables

rational choice theory and the paradox of not voting at least since downs s 1957 seminal work an economic theory of democracy rational choice theorists have appreciated the paradox of not voting in a large election the probability that an individual vote might change the election outcome is vanishingly small if each person only votes for the purpose of influencing the election outcome then even a small cost to vote like a minor schedule conflict or mildly bad weather should dissuade anyone from voting yet it seems that many people will put up with long lines daunting registration requirements and even the threat of physical violence or arrest in order to vote given the central place of voting within political economy the lack of an adequate rational choice model of large elections with costly voting presents an obvious problem for the most part theorists have bypassed the turnout problem either by eliminating voters as strategic actors or by assuming that the decision to vote is independent of other strategic choices the problem with the first approach is that the empirical literature on voting behavior provides considerable evidence of apparently strategic behavior in primary elections there is evidence that voters condition their vote choice on the viability of candidates abramson aldrich paolino and rohde 1992 in a seminal and comprehensive study cox 1997 shows that voting patterns and election outcomes are broadly consistent with patterns of behavior predicted by strategic voting models for example under plurality rule in which the candidate with the most votes wins the election

an evolutionary analysis of turnout with conformist citizens abstract we propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome multiple equilibria arise and some generate high turnout simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group s choice as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games comparative statics on the voting cost distribution and the groups composition are also done

groups in rational turnout models a model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented if candidates choose different positions positive turnout is possible in partial equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality nevertheless if candidates are probability maximizers and a unique general equilibrium exists the candidates will choose equivalent positions and turnout will be zero even with group rationality but if candidates care about both policy and winning they will choose different positions and cause positive turnout this turnout will be larger than that that would occur without group rationality group rationality alone cannot explain positive turnout in a general equilibrium theory of elections it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior

follow the leader theory and evidence on political participation using state by state voting data for u s presidential elections the authors observe that voter turnout is a positive function of predicted closeness to explain the strategic component of political participation they develop a follow the leader model political leaders expend effort according to their chance of being pivotal which depends on the expected closeness of the race at both state and national levels and how voters respond to their effort structural estimation supports this model for example a 1 percent increase in the predicted closeness at the state level stimulates leaders efforts which increases turnout by 0 34 percent

inferring strategic voting we estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes we adopt a set estimator using japanese general election data we nd a large fraction 75 3 80 3 of strategic voters only a small fraction 2 4 5 5 of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred misaligned voting existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting accordingly while our estimate of strategic voting is high our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies

the swing voter s curse the authors analyze two candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters they demonstrate the existence of a swing voter s curse less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless the swing voter s curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another copyright 1996 by american economic association

ignorance and bias in collective decisions we study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best but each member can acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule in the experiment as predicted by bayesian equilibrium voters are more likely to acquire information under majority rule and attempt to counter the bias in favor of one alternative under unanimity rule as opposed to bayesian equilibrium predictions however many committee members vote when uninformed moreover uninformed voting is strongly associated with a lower propensity to acquire information we show that an equilibrium model of subjective prior beliefs can account for both these phenomena and provides a good overall fit to the observed patterns of behavior both in terms of rational ignorance and biases

political rents and voter information in search equilibrium abstract political parties committed to grab rents may run for election and even win if citizens are uninformed but how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search we propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout we show that i the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies i i the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely u shaped in the information search cost i i i turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system

technology endowments and the factor content of bilateral trade we derive testable restrictions relating the factor content of bilateral trade to bilateral differences in technology and endowments this departs from the heckscher ohlin vanek theorem which compares the factor content of net trade with factor abundance we test the theoretical restrictions using a unique dataset that covers 41 developed and developing countries with disparate endowments and technology we find evidence supporting the predictions in addition 1 the factor content predictions perform best for country pairs with larger endowment differences and 2 for trade between capital abundant countries ricardian international technology differences matter more than heckscher ohlin factor endowment differences

aggregating information by voting the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses this article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common value election with continuous private signals in equilibrium some citizens ignore their private information and abstain from voting in deference to those with higher quality signals even as the number of highly informed peers grows large however citizens with only moderate expertise continue voting so that voter participation remains at realistic levels e g 50 to 60 percent for simple examples the precise level of voter turnout along with the margin of victory are determined by the distribution of expertise improving a voter s information makes her more willing to vote consistent with a growing body of empirical evidence but makes her peers more willing to abstain providing a new explanation for various empirical patterns of voting equilibrium participation is optimal even though the marginal voter may have very little e g below average expertise and even though nonvoters information is not utilized copyright oxford university press

sincere voting in large elections abstract austen smith and banks 1996 showed that sincere informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large here we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a no evidence type the expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small nevertheless if the electorate is large enough then each of the two standard condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type symmetric equilibrium