walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

does corruption cause encumbered business regulations an iv approach in this research we attempt to understand the effects of corruption on business regulations measured by number of procedures time and costs involved in satisfying governmental requisites using two stage least squares 2sls methods we lessen the problems associated with endogeneity and uncovered the existence of a robust positive statistically significant and quantitatively large direction channel from corruption to encumbered business regulations these results suggest the need to deter corruption in order to improve business regulations the quest to reduce corruption worldwide acquires new relevancy given the findings of djankov et al 2006 that countries with simple and transparent regulations grow faster

matching with contracts comment abstract the matching with contracts model hatfield and milgrom 2005 is widely considered to be one of the most important advances of the last two decades in matching theory one of their main messages is that the set of stable allocations is non empty under a substitutes condition we show that an additional irrelevance of rejected contracts irc condition is implicitly assumed throughout their analysis and in the absence of irc several of their results including the guaranteed existence of a stable allocation fail to hold jel c78 d86

infrastructure and development a critical appraisal of the macro level literature this survey reviews the existing macro level empirical literature on the link between infrastructure and development outcomes in a critical light after providing a general framework that casts the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in the context of an aggregate production function it signals what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed this guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies and the discussion of the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity finally building on related research in particular in contract theory and political economy the paper spells out several promising research avenues

state business relations and economic growth in sub saharan africa abstract this paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of economic growth in sub saharan africa by examining the effect of effective state business relations on economic growth for a panel of 19 sub saharan african countries for the period 1970 2004 we propose a measure that we argue captures the various dimensions of effective state business relations in sub saharan africa we then estimate standard growth regressions using dynamic panel data methods with this measure along with the more conventionally used measures of institutional quality such as degree of executive constraints the rule of law the degree of corruption and the quality of the bureaucracy our results show that effective state business relations contribute significantly to economic growth countries which have shown improvements in state business relations have witnessed higher economic growth controlling for other determinants of economic growth and independent of other measures of institutional quality

the financial development and growth nexus a meta analysis this is the accepted manuscript the final version is available from wiley at http onlinelibrary wiley com doi 10 1111 joes 12086 abstract

corruption s direct effects on per capita income growth a meta analysis corruption is a symptom of weak institutional quality and could have potentially adverse effects on economic growth however heterogeneity in reported findings makes it difficult to synthesize the evidence base with a view to test competing hypotheses and or support evidence based policy and practice to address this issue we have extracted 327 estimates of corruption s direct effect on per capita gdp growth from 29 primary studies following a peer reviewed and pre published systematic review protocol precision effect and funnel asymmetry tests indicate that corruption has a negative effect on per capita gdp growth after controlling for publication selection bias and within study dependence however multivariate meta regression analysis results indicate that the overall effect is not robust to inclusion of moderating variables through a general to specific procedure for model specification we report that the marginal effect of corruption on per capita gdp growth is more adverse when the primary study estimates relate to long run growth are based on low income country data only and extracted from journal papers the effect is less adverse in studies that use the international country risk guide corruption perceptions index and in those reporting estimates from two stage least squares estimations

financial intermediation and endogenous growth an endogenous growth model with multiple assets is developed agents who face random future liquidity needs accumulate capital and a liquid but unproductive asset the effects of introducing financial intermediation into this environment are considered conditions are provided under which the introduction of intermediaries shifts the composition of savings toward capital causing intermediation to be growth promoting in addition intermediaries generally reduce socially unnecessary capital liquidation again tending to promote growth

the family and the state the immaturity of children sometimes precludes efficient arrangements between children and parents or others responsible for child care the difficulty in establishing efficient relations within families provides the point of departure for our interpretation of the heavy state involvement in the family the authors believe that a surprising number of state interventions mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their care many regulations of the family improve the efficiency of family activities these interventions include subsidies to education and training social security and other old age support subsidies to births laws that limit access to divorce and the sale of children and laws that require parents permission for early marriage and other choices of children families that leave bequests can force children to repay parents for investments in human capital by reducing bequests therefore these families do not underinvest in childrens human capital by contrast families that do not leave bequests often poorer families do underinvest in children the state may subsidize schools and other training facilities to raise investments in children by poorer families to efficient levels authors modified

corruption and infrastructure at the country and regional level abstractthis paper examines the relationship between corruption and infrastructure at both the country and regional level using the world bank s enterprise surveys data a statistically significant and considerable relationship is established between the measure of corruption in the macro data and the measures of transportation and electricity infrastructure countries with more corruption tend to have worse infrastructure at the regional level the key result is unchanged the magnitude and significance of this result is shown to vary by global region two stage least squares results using distance from the equator as an instrument at the macro level support the simple ordinary least squares ols finally it is shown that within country variation in corruption has a significant effect on regional infrastructure

on stable and strategy proof rules in matching markets with contracts abstract this paper studies stable and one sided strategy proof rules in many to one matching markets with contracts not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand we obtain the following results first the number of stable and strategy proof rules is at most one second the doctor optimal stable rule whenever it exists is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy proof rule third a stable and strategy proof rule whenever it exists is second best optimal for doctor welfare in that no individually rational and strategy proof rule can dominate it this last result is further generalized to non wasteful and strategy proof rules due to the weak assumptions our analysis covers a broad range of markets including cases where a unique stable and strategy proof rule is not equal to the one induced by the cumulative offer process or the deferred acceptance algorithm

why don t poor countries catch up a cross national test of an institutional explanation early neoclassical analyses predicted that poor countries would grow faster than wealthy countries because of technological advances and diminishing returns to capital in the latter the reverse has occurred poor countries are falling back rather than catching up we suggest here that deficient institutions underlie this divergence employing various indicators of institutional quality including the rule of law the pervasiveness of corruption and the risk of expropriation and contract repudiation we show that the ability of poor countries to catch up is determined in large part by the institutional environment in which economic activity in these countries takes place jel o00 o10

financial markets financial dependence and the allocation of capital abstract we explore one specific channel through which finance promotes growth the allocation of capital using international industrial data we find that countries with developed financial markets invest more in growing industries and pull out more funds of declining ones most interestingly this pattern is more eminent for those industries more dependent on external financing various robustness checks show that the results are not driven by reverse causality omitted variables specific countries or industries

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

substitutes and stability for matching with contracts we consider the matching problem with contracts of hatfield and milgrom 2005 and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes we show that bilateral substitutes is a sucient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework however the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition and there does not necessarily exist a doctor optimal stable allocation under a slightly stronger condition unilateral substitutes the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors preferences but there does exist a doctor optimal stable allocation and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered

what does she see in him the effect of sharing on the choice of spouse all husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs however because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant each may be inclined to provide a suboptimal level of marital inputs the choice of spouse influences the level of distortion and under some circumstances the eficient mating is between individuals of equal value people tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one s desire to capture an ideal partner and one s realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves

on the correspondence of contracts to salaries in many to many matching abstract in this note i extend the work of echenique 2012 to show that a model of many to many matching with contracts may be embedded into a model of many to many matching with wage bargaining whenever 1 all agents preferences are substitutable and 2 the matching with contracts model is unitary in the sense that every contractual relationship between a given firm worker pair is specified in a single contract conversely i show that unitarity is essentially necessary for the embedding result

the effects of competition policy on development cross country evidence using four new indicators abstract over the last two decades many developing countries have introduced competition policies this paper introduces four new indicators on various aspects of competition laws and competition agencies to make competition policies comparable these indicators are used to estimate the effects of competition policies and all four contribute at least marginally to explaining differences in total factor productivity this is also true if developing countries are analysed separately in addition to the direct effects of competition policy on total factor productivity an indirect effect is identified countries scoring high with regard to competition policy suffer less from corruption

stability in large matching markets with complementarities labor markets can often be viewed as many to one matching markets it is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets a stable matching may not exist we study large random matching markets with couples we introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market a stable matching will be found with high probability if however the number of couples grows at a linear rate with constant probability not depending on the market size no stable matching exists our results explain data from the market for psychology interns

a theory of soft capture in this paper wee propose a model for regulatory capture that is based on information transmission and asymmetric information in a three tier model a regulator is charged by a political principal to provide a signal for the type of a regulated firm only the firm can observe his type and the production of a correlated signal with a given accuracy is costly for the regulator the firm can costlessly provide an alternative signal of lower accuracy that is presented to the regulator in a self enforcing equilibrium the regulator transmits the firm produced signal internalizes its own savings in information cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents the main feature of soft capture is that it is not based on a reciprocity of favors but on a congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator

does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit the authors investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks lending spreads for a large cross section of countries they measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at an aggregate level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks the authors find that after controlling for a number of other country characteristics judicial efficiency in addition to inflation is the main driver of interest rate spreads across countries this suggests that in addition to improving the overall macroeconomic climate in a country judicial reforms through a better enforcement of legal contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms

the invisible hand and the grabbing hand evidence from a survey of 105 shop owners in moscow and warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection as well as the burden of regulation and corruption are much greater in moscow the evidence suggests that the invisible hand model of government better fits the warsaw local government and the grabbing hand model is more appropriate for moscow the evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced and that the quality of government may be as essential this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

measuring corruption in infrastructure evidence from transition and developing countries abstract this paper examines what we can say about the extent and impact of corruption in infrastructure using existing evidence there is evidence that most perceptions measures appear to be very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption in the infrastructure sector largely but inaccurately measuring petty rather than grand corruption survey evidence is more reliable but limited as a tool for differentiating countries in terms of access to infrastructure finance or appropriate policy models the paper suggests that a focus on bribe payments as the indicator of the costs of corruption in infrastructure may be misplaced

financial intermediation and economic performance historical evidence from five industrialized countries this paper examines the nature of links between the intensity of financial intermediation and economic performance that operated in the united states the united kingdom canada norway and sweden over the 1870 1929 period after describing the coevolution of the financial and real sectors in these countries vector error correction models vecms establish the quantitative importance of long run relationships among measures of financial intensity and real per capita levels of output and the monetary base granger causality tests then suggest a leading role for the intermediation variables in real sector activity while feedback effects are largely insignificant the results suggest an important role for intermediation in the rapid industrial transformations of all five countries

the measurement and impact of corruption victimization survey evidence from latin america summary does democracy suffer when corruption is high unfortunately most studies of corruption have been descriptive making it difficult to develop a well supported answer to this question there are of course quantitative corruption measures but the most popularly used of them are measures of corruption perception aggregated at the national level rather than corruption experience at the individual level it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the impact of corruption from such data this paper proposes a corruption victimization measure based on a survey research approach to the measurement problem and discusses in a non technical fashion its strengths and limitations the paper then presents data from studies conducted by the vanderbilt university latin american public opinion project lapop and demonstrates the impact of corruption victimization on belief in the legitimacy of the political system a critical element in democratic political stability

property rights and finance which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment weak property rights or limited access to external finance from a survey of new firms in post communist countries we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits even when bank loans are available where property rights are relatively strong firms reinvest their profits where they are relatively weak entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings

celestial marriage and earthly rents interests and the prohibition of polygamy abstract just prior to the civil war the u s government set out on a relentless campaign to eliminate polygamy within the mormon church this paper offers evidence that the political restrictions on the practice of polygamy were the result of rent seeking by potential beneficiaries of such laws the edmonds act of 1882 polygamy created benefits for women but reduced the welfare of most men in a time period when only adult males had the franchise

contracts versus salaries in matching a general result abstract it is shown that a matching market with contracts can be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker conditions than substitutability of contracts in particular the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet to branch matching as an application of the embedding result a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where contracts are unilateral substitutes for firms

financial development environmental quality trade and economic growth what causes what in mena countries this paper examines the relationship between financial development co2 emissions trade and economic growth using simultaneous equation panel data models for a panel of 12 mena countries over the period 1990 2011 our results indicate that there is evidence of bidirectional causality between co2 emissions and economic growth economic growth and trade openness are interrelated i e bidirectional causality feedback hypothesis is validated between trade openness and financial development neutrality hypothesis is identified between co2 emissions and financial development unidirectional causality running from financial development to economic growth and from trade openness to co2 emissions is identified our empirical results also verified the existence of environmental kuznets curve these empirical insights are of particular interest to policymakers as they help build sound economic policies to sustain economic development and to improve the environmental quality

sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions this paper considers a housing market with price restrictions on such markets the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles this vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy proof allocation mechanism the main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps these sequences are demonstrated to play key roles in an english auction and a dutch auction respectively for the considered housing market with price restrictions less

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

financial and legal constraints to growth does firm size matter using a unique firm level survey database covering 54 countries we investigate the effect of financial legal and corruption problems on firms growth rates whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size it is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial legal and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most there is only a weak relation between firms perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth we also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

when arm s length is too far relationship banking over the credit cycle we conduct face to face interviews with bank ceos to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as either relationship or transaction lenders we then use the geographic coordinates of these banks branches and of 14 100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks in the vicinity of firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle we find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom it alleviates such constraints during a downturn this positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn moreover our evidence suggests thatrelationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans

legal environment finance channels and investment the east african example abstract how do legal environments and finance affect investments by firms in the east african community property rights external and internal finance channels key conduits of the transmission mechanism from legal environment to investment individually and interactively affect firms decision to invest firms that perceive secure property rights are more likely to invest in fixed capital the interactions suggest governments in this community would do well to pursue investment growth policies that slant heavily towards financial markets deepening while not ignoring enhancement of legal infrastructures overall property rights external finance internal finance firm size and an export orientation are important determinants of the investment decision

a new database on the structure and development of the financial sector this article introduces a new database of indicators of financial structure and financial development across countries and over time the database is unique in that it combines a wide variety of indicators that measure the size activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets it improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions and constructing measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets this article introduces a new database the first to provide comprehensive measures of the development structure and performance of the financial sector this database is the first to define and construct indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial intermediaries such as insurance companies pension funds and non deposit money banks it is also the first to include indicators of the size of primary equity markets and primary and secondary bond markets in constructing the database authors carefully deflate measures and match stock and flow variables

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

the big push deja vu a review of jeffrey sachs s the end of poverty economic possibilities for our time jeffrey sachs s new book the end of poverty economic possibilities for our time penguin press new york 2005 advocates a big push featuring large increases in aid to finance a package of complementary investments in order to end world poverty these recommendations are remarkably similar to those first made in the 1950s and 1960s in development economics today as then the big push recommendation overlooks the unsolvable information and incentive problems facing any large scale planning exercise a more promising approach would be to design incentives for aid agents to implement interventions piecemeal whenever they deliver large benefits for the poor relative to costs

law property and marital dissolution this paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce but it puts as much emphasis on property rights given for example by the law on alimony as on dissolution rights in the united states the paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage if the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely if the dominant issue is child custody divorce is less likely excerpt

financial development growth and the distribution of income a paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures thus financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the goldsmith mckinnon shaw view on economic development the model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the kuznet hypothesis in particular in the transition from a primitive slow growing economy to a developed fast growing one a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens

contracts versus salaries in matching workers and firms may bargain over general multidimensional contracts they may negotiate over health benefits housing retirement plans etc substitutes on the other hand is the assumption commonly placed on firms preferences to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms in this paper i show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes bargaining over contracts can be embedded into a model of bargaining over wages the economics of the embedding is straightforward except for a small twist when a firm and a worker negotiate over a contract they may bargain over many dimensions however the pareto frontier of contracts is in a sense one dimensional what is better for the worker is worse for the firm so pareto optimal contracts may be viewed as salaries with the better contracts for the firm meaning lower salaries and the better contracts for the worker meaning higher salaries the twist is that a firm s ranking over contracts might be affected by the firm s other hires for example health plan a may be better than b for a firm if it has many employees but b beats a if it has few when contracts are substitutes it turns out that the ranking is not affected in this way hatfield and milgrom 2005 present a model of two sided worker firm matching with contracts a firm will hire a collection of workers and will negotiate a contract with each one of them the model is a generalization of kelso and crawford 1982 where each firm and each worker negotiate a wage 1 kelso and crawford show that when firms demands satisfy gross substitutes the core of the matching market is nonempty hatfield and milgrom show that when the firms preferences over contracts satisfy their notion of substitutes the core of the market is nonempty i show that hatfield and milgrom s model can be embedded into the model of kelso and crawford hatfield and milgrom s assumption of substitutability enables an embedding where firms demands for workers satisfy kelso and crawford s notion of gross substitutes as a result the nonemptiness of the core follows from the argument in kelso and crawford and their salary adjustment algorithm finds a stable matching of workers to firms and a vector of supporting salaries hatfield and milgrom s paper is an elegant analysis of two sided matching it simplifies matching models and makes their relationship to auction models more transpar ent their paper contributes much more than showing the nonemptiness of the core when firms and workers can sign general contracts and my result does not diminish

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

how does corruption affect public debt an empirical analysis summary this paper investigates the relationship between corruption the shadow economy and public debt it additionally examines whether the shadow economy increases the adverse effects of corruption on public debt the model is empirically tested for 126 countries over 1996 2012 using ordinary least squares ols fixed effects system generalized method of moments gmm and instrumental variable estimation and two measures of corruption the transparency international corruption perceptions index and the kaufmann et al corruption index results confirm that increased corruption and a larger shadow economy lead to an increase in public debt results additionally indicate that the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on public debt suggesting that they act as complements results also suggest that a larger shadow economy reduces tax revenues and thus increases public debt similarly higher government expenditure enhances the effects of corruption on government debt hence reducing corruption should be a primary policy goal of governments given the complementarity detected between corruption and the shadow economy reducing corruption would also lead to a fall in the size of the shadow economy and public debt reducing corruption will also minimize the adverse effects of corruption on government debt through government expenditure

competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general utility functions we present an exact characterization of utilities in competitive equilibria of two sided matching markets in which the utility of each agent depends on the choice of partner and the terms of the partnership potentially including monetary transfer examples of such markets include sellers and buyers or jobs and workers demange and gale showed that the set of competitive equilibria in this type of market forms a complete lattice with each extreme point of the lattice representing an equilibrium with the highest utilities for the agents on one side and the lowest utilities for the agents on the opposite side our characterization is based on establishing a connection between the competitive equilibria of a market and the competitive equilibria of certain strict subsets of that market each obtained by removing exactly one agent this characterization captures the effect of competition when agents are added to the market or removed from the market it gives a precise procedure for constructing competitive eq

panel evidence on finance institutions and economic growth this article investigates whether the level of institutional development affects the link between financial development and economic growth using a range of cross sectional and panel approaches we find that the positive effect of banking development on growth is reduced as the level of institutions e g rule of law lack of corruption increases we do not however find a similar result when we examine the joint effect of institutional level and stock market development on economic growth we attribute these results to the ability of banks to perform functions similar to those provided by well operating institutions whereas stock markets do not perform such comparable functions

an inquiry into the state s role in marriage abstract i view state intervention in marriage as a means of avoiding large transaction costs between men and women i define transaction costs as the resources devoted towards wealth capture and protection and i argue that they are high within a cohabitational contract state intervention is successful because marriage creates incentives that make private enforcement relatively costly and because marriages tend to be homogeneous i test the hypothesis by examining state responses to changing divorce laws and i find that these actions are consistent with the state increasing the social value of marriage by mitigating transaction costs

unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many to one matching with contracts abstract we prove that the unilateral substitutability property introduced in hatfield and kojima 2010 implies the substitutable completability property from hatfield and kominers 2014 this paper provides a novel linkage between these two sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable matching in many to one matching markets with contracts a substitutable completion of a preference is a substitutable preference created by adding some sets of contracts to the original preference order we provide an algorithm which when operated on the unilaterally substitutable preferences produces such a substitutable completion thus it provides a constructive proof of the connection between the two properties

tax rights in transition economies a tragedy of the commons abstract this paper develops the concept of tax rights to analyze the impact of fiscal institutions on economic development in transition economies a government s tax rights are poorly defined when it and other governments and agencies can unilaterally levy taxes on the same tax base existing evidence suggests that chinese local governments have gained more clearly defined tax rights than their russian counterparts using the big push model of industrialization murphy k shleifer a vishny r 1989 industrialization and the big push journal of political economy 95 1003 1026 within a common property resource framework we show that this difference in tax rights helps explain why china has been significantly more successful than russia

some further properties of the cumulative offer process we investigate extension resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of the cumulative offer process cop extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be better off whenever others start preferring more contracts to being unmatched resource monotonicity on the other hand requires that no doctor becomes worse off whenever hospitals start hiring more doctors the cop becomes extension and resource monotonic whenever contracts are unilateral substitutes us satisfying an irrelevance of rejected contracts condition irc this result implies that the cop is population monotonic under us and the irc we then turn to the respecting improvements property which states that no doctor should be harmed if some of his contracts become more popular with an additional law of aggregate demand condition we show that the cop respects improvements

corruption and microenterprises in russia abstract in russia compliance with the rules and regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life has created a hostile environment for microenterprises more serious than the regulations per se however is the potential niche they create for opportunistic behavior by regulatory authorities in russia the regulatory state has created a corrupt cadre of government bureaucrats who frequently engage in rent seeking behavior while enforcing regulations firms are not uniformly affected by corruption however this paper shows empirical evidence of differential incidence of extortion based on firm and entrepreneurial characteristics corruption in russia is similar to a regressive tax and acts as a disincentive to innovation and growth it may induce technologically inefficient production decisions and can dilute economies of scale and scope

venture capital and new business creation abstract using a comprehensive database of firms from 21 european countries over the period 1998 2008 we find that venture capital investment has a positive effect on the rate of new business creation this is especially true in countries with higher entry costs higher protection of intellectual property rights and lower taxes on capital gains our results suggest that controlling for country and industry characteristics venture capital is beneficial to bringing new ideas to the marketplace in the shape of new companies

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

corruption in public service delivery experience from south asia s water and sanitation sector summary this paper presents empirical information regarding the types and magnitude of corrupt behaviors documented in water supply and sanitation service provision in several south asian localities it also examines the strengths and weaknesses of current strategies to reduce corruption among several public water and sanitation bureaucracies in south asia drawing on interviews and focus group discussions with more than 1 400 staff customers and key informants where corruption has been reduced two concomitant drivers are observed a shift in the accountability networks of service providers and a change in the work environment that increases the moral cost of misconduct 2003 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

explaining african economic performance africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital in many respects it has been the most capital hostile region we review and interpret the aggregate level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance there is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence pointing to four factors as being important these are a lack of openness to international trade a high risk environment a low level of social capital and poor infrastructure these problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

welfare and the family the canadian experience canada has a universal social assistance program that is almost completely administered through the federal canada assistance program however provinces determine the levels of assistance for various groups eligible for welfare this article exploits the variation in payments and uses microdata to estimate the effect of changes in welfare benefits on welfare participation single parenthood births out of wedlock divorce and labor force participation among low income women in canada it would appear that welfare benefits influence these decisions

understanding preferences demand types and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities we propose new techniques for understanding agents valuations our classification into demand types incorporates existing definitions substitutes complements strong substitutes etc and permits new ones our unimodularity theorem generalises previous results about when competitive equilibrium exists for any set of agents whose valuations are all of a demand type for indivisible goods contrary to popular belief equilibrium is guaranteed for more classes of purely complements than of purely substitutes preferences our intersection count theorem checks equilibrium existence for combinations of agents with specific valuations by counting the intersection points of geometric objects applications include matching and coalition formation and the product mix auction introduced by the bank of england in response to the financial crisis

matching with branch of choice contracts at the united states military academy branch selection is a key decision in a cadet s military career cadets at usma can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement this real life matching problem lls an important gap in market design literature although priorities fail a key substitutes condition the agent optimal stable mechanism is well dened and in contrast to the current usma mechanism it is fair stable and strategy proof adoption of this mechanism benets cadets and the army this new

til death or taxes do us part the effect of income taxation on divorce there is now much empirical evidence that economic incentives affect the divorce decision via their impact on the flow of benefits of divorced vs married individuals however the effect of the individual income tax on divorce has been neglected in this work the income tax in the us is structured so that tax liability often changes with marriage some couples incur a marriage penalty in the form of higher taxes when they marry while others receive a marriage subsidy because their tax burden falls with marriage in this paper the authors examine the impact of the individual income tax on the likelihood of divorce in the us using data from the panel study on income dynamics they estimate a discrete time hazard model of the probability of divorce from the first marriage to test the hypothesis that the probability of divorce rises with the marriage penalty they also examine the role of other economic factors in the divorce decision the authors find that individuals respond to tax incentives in their decision to divorce although these responses are typically small and differ for men and women authors

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

local financial development and growth using a unique sample of net domestic product data for districts in india i investigate the connection between banking sector development human capital and economic growth at the sub national level using disaggregate data avoids many of the omitted variable problems that plague cross country studies of the finance growth connection and facilitates an instrumentation strategy the findings show that the growth of many districts in india is financially constrained due to lack of banking sector development and that the relationship between finance and growth may be non linear for the districts in the sample moving from the 75th percentile of credit net domestic product to the 25th percentile implies an average loss of 4 percent in growth over the 1990s this indicates that the gains from increased banking sector outreach may be large the analysis shows that human capital deepening can reduce the effect of the financial constraint and help decouple growth from financial development in a district at the 25th literacy percentile the implied growth loss due to a constrained banking sector is twice as large as in a district at the 75th literacy percentile thus higher levels of human capital may activate alternative growth and production channels that are less finance intensive

social assistance and conjugal union dissolution in canada a dynamic analysis using statistics canadas general social survey on family and friends carried out in 1990 we piece together the matrimonial and conjugal life history of a large sample of canadian men and women we then estimate duration models coxs proportional hazard models describing the evolutionary laws of marriages and unions which depend on various economic or socio demographic explanatory variables the empirical modelling focuses primarily on estimating the impact of couples earned incomes and of provincial welfare programs on the dissolution rate of first marriages and unions we find that welfare benefits do not have an impact on the hazard of union dissolution and that earned incomes have a positive effect on conjugal stability excerpt summary in fre

using micro surveys to measure and explain corruption summary this paper discusses survey techniques aimed at a better measurement of corruption at the micro level and argues that with appropriate survey methods and interview techniques it is possible to collect quantitative micro level data on corruption public expenditure tracking surveys service provider surveys and enterprise surveys are highlighted with several applications these surveys permit measurement of corruption at the level of individual agents such as schools health clinics or firms they also permit the study of mechanisms responsible for corruption including capture of public funds and bribery 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

marriage and divorce comment the author comments on an article by h elizabeth peters concerning the impact of state laws particularly no fault divorce laws on divorce rates in the united states a reply by peters is included pp 686 93 annotation

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research

relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts in the many to one matching model with contracts i provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation these new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts

bank supervision and corruption in lending abstract which commercial bank supervisory policies ease or intensify the degree to which bank corruption is an obstacle to firms raising external finance based on new data from more than 2500 firms across 37 countries this paper provides the first empirical assessment of the impact of different bank supervisory policies on firms financing obstacles we find that the traditional approach to bank supervision which involves empowering official supervisory agencies to monitor discipline and influence banks directly does not improve the integrity of bank lending rather we find that a supervisory strategy that focuses on empowering private monitoring of banks by forcing banks to disclose accurate information to the private sector tends to lower the degree to which corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to firms raising external finance in extensions we find that regulations that empower private monitoring exert a particularly beneficial effect on the integrity of bank lending in countries with sound legal institutions

are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth abstract while financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively their interaction has not we develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects but act as substitutes in doing so the substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent conversely financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it we test this substitutability by predicting growth of countries and industries using measures of financial development lack of corruption and a key interaction term both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor as well as to a substitutability between them the growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0 63 1 68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th the results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers omitted variables or other theories of growth and convergence

does one size fit all a reexamination of the finance and growth relationship abstract recent research has found a strong positive effect of a country s financial development on economic growth we propose that this relationship may vary according to the level of financial development divided in three regions in the low region countries with very low levels of financial development additional improvements in financial markets have an uncertain effect on growth in the intermediate region financial development has a large positive effect on growth finally in the high region the effect is positive but smaller we examine a panel of 74 countries using generalized method of moments gmm dynamic panel techniques and find support for the different regions

the effect of financial development on convergence theory and evidence we introduce imperfect creditor protection in a multicountry schumpeterian growth model the theory predicts that any country with more than some critical level of financial development will converge to the growth rate of the world technology frontier and that all other countries will have a strictly lower long run growth rate we present evidence supporting these and other implications in the form of a cross country growth regression with a significant and sizable negative coefficient on initial per capita gdp relative to the united states interacted with financial intermediation in addition we find that other variables representing schooling geography health policy politics and institutions do not affect the significance of the interaction between financial intermediation and initial per capita gdp and do not show any independent effect on convergence in the regressions our findings are robust to removal of outliers and to alternative conditioning sets estimation procedures and measures of financial development

financial determinants of domestic investment in sub saharan africa evidence from panel data abstract this study investigates the effects of financial development on domestic investment in a sample of 30 sub saharan african countries it is based on a dynamic serial correlation investment model including various indicators of financial development controlling for country specific fixed effects and nonfinancial factors of investment the results indicate a positive relationship between domestic investment total investment and private investment and various indicators of financial development higher financial development leads to higher future levels of investment implying a potent long run effect of financial development on domestic investment the findings imply that financial development can stimulate economic growth through capital accumulation

finance and the sources of growth the authors evaluate whether the level of development in the banking sector exerts a causal impact on economic growth and its sources total factor productivity growth physical capital accumulation and private saving they use 1 a pure cross country instrumental variable estimator to extract the exogenous component of banking development and 2 a new panel technique that controls for country specific effects and endogeneity they find that banks do exert a large causal impact on total factor productivity growth which feeds through to overall gdp gross domestic product growth the long run links between banking development and both capital growth and private savings are more tenuous

bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth there appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered however on the link between corruption government and growth the paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth balanced growth is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital which engenders growth and accumulating political capital which mainly assures bureaucratic power the analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long term growth under alternative political regimes some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically

bidding for army career specialties improving the rotc branching mechanism motivated by the low retention rates of us military academy and reserve officer training corps graduates the army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could bid 3 years of additional service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired branches the full potential of this incentives program is not utilized because of the rotc s deficient matching mechanism i propose a design that eliminates these shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the army has identified in contrast to the rotc mechanism my design utilizes market principles more extensively and it is a hybrid between a market mechanism and a priority based allocation mechanism