technology is changing lending implications for research abstract costello down and mehta 2020 trace their slider intervention to deviations from the credit line amount recommended by a credit scoring model the deviations are followed by larger delinquency declines and bigger sales orders and costello et al interpret these results using discretion based theories however incremental deviations are concentrated on newer clients rather than those the lender has accumulated soft information about deviations also appear larger for public than private borrowers my discussion evaluates whether these results align with discretion based theories and explores alternative interpretations based on salience and unique aspects of the trade credit setting differences in interpretation aside the evidence is informative about technological advances in commercial lending i conclude with an overview of several recent advances and discuss the implications for lending research

two remarks on the property rights literature we first point out that the recent property rights literature is based on three assumptions 1 that contracts are always subject to renegotiation 2 that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and 3 that parties are risk neutral building on hart moore 1999 we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights we also examine the robustness of some of the literature s standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties ex post willingness to pay for the assets such as options or financial markets to illustrate the issue we revisit the hart moore 1990 proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

thinking ahead the decision problem we propose a model of costly decision making based on time costs of deliberating current and future decisions we model an individual decision maker s thinking process as a thought experiment that takes time and let the decision maker think ahead about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature by formulating an intertemporal state contingent planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state we attempt to capture the basic observation that individuals generally do not think through a complete action plan instead individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise

delinquency model predictive power among low documentation loans abstract using data from a major mortgage bank we examine the predictive power of mortgage delinquency models as an aggregate measure of the quality of information recorded at loan origination we measure model predictive power using an out of sample prediction criterion and compare predictive power of delinquency models over time and across loans of different documentation levels and origination channels we found that model predictive power declined over time throughout the housing boom further predictive power is attenuated in delinquency models for low documentation loans providing suggestive evidence that loan and borrower characteristics used in the delinquency predictions may be inaccurate or falsified for such loans we do not find differences in model predictive power when comparing bank versus third party broker originated loans

the case for restricting fiscal policy discretion this paper studies the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on output volatility and economic growth using data for 91 countries we isolate three empirical regularities 1 governments that use fiscal policy aggressively induce significant macroeconomic instability 2 the volatility of output caused by discretionary fiscal policy lowers economic growth by more than 0 8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in volatility 3 prudent use of fiscal policy is explained to a large extent by the presence of political constraints and other political and institutional variables the evidence in the paper supports arguments for constraining discretion by imposing institutional restrictions on governments as a way to reduce output volatility and increase the rate of economic growth

regulating a model abstract we study a situation in which a regulator relies on risk models that banks produce in order to regulate them a bank can generate more than one model and choose which models to reveal to the regulator the regulator can find out the other models by monitoring the bank but in equilibrium monitoring induces the bank to produce less information we show that a high level of monitoring is desirable when the bank s private gain from producing more information is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low when public models are more precise banks produce more information but the regulator may end up monitoring more

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

securitization and loan performance ex ante and ex post relations in the mortgage market this study examines the relation between securitization and loan performance using a comprehensive dataset from a major national mortgage lender loans remaining on the bank s balance sheet ex post incurred higher delinquency rates than sold loans contrasting the negative relation between screening efforts and ex ante probability of loan sale explored by prior studies moreover the performance gap between sold and retained loans was wider among the subsample of loans that were perceived as easier to resell the investors seeming advantage over the originating bank can mostly be explained by information revealed during the time between loan origination and sale

incomplete written contracts undescribable states of nature this paper extends the classic two armed bandit problem to a many agent setting in which n players each face the same experimentation problem the difference with the single agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others thus experiementation produces a public good and a free rider problem in experimentation naturally arises more interestingly future experimentation by others encourages current individual experimentation the paper provides an analysis of the set of markov equilibria in terms of the free rider effect and the encouragement effect

screening peers softly inferring the quality of small borrowers this paper examines the performance of new online lending markets that rely on nonexpert individuals to screen their peers creditworthiness we find that these peer lenders predict an individual s likelihood of defaulting on a loan with 45 greater accuracy than the borrower s exact credit score unobserved by the lenders who only see a credit category moreover peer lenders achieve 87 of the predictive power of an econometrician who observes all standard financial information about borrowers screening through soft or nonstandard information is relatively more important when evaluating lower quality borrowers our results highlight how aggregating over the views of peers and leveraging nonstandard information can enhance lending efficiency this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

shrouded attributes consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets bayesian consumers infer that hidden add on prices e g the cost of ink for a printer are likely to be high prices if consumers are bayesian firms will not shroud information in equilibrium however shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers such shrouding creates an inefficiency which firms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors customers however if add ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms will not be able to profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add ons in equilibrium two kinds of exploitation coexist optimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high priced add ons in turn sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing schemes it is not possible to profitably drive away the business of sophisticates it is also not possible to profitably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonexploitative firms we show that informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets even in markets with costless advertising and even when the shrouding generates allocational inefficiencies

issuer credit quality and the price of asset backed securities following the financial market crisis of the past few years critics and scholars have identified numerous problems related to all parties associated with securitization including investors rating agencies issuers underwriters and borrowers some of this research focuses on the rating process itself adam ashcraft paul goldsmith pinkham and james vickery 2009 show that observable credit fundamentals deteriorated relative to ratings between 2005 and 2007 efraim benmelech and jennifer dlugosz 2009 find that collateralized debt obligations cdos rated by only one rating agency are more likely both to be downgraded and to suffer more severe downgrades than cdos rated by more than one agency joshua coval jakub jurek and erik stafford 2009a point out that ratings of cdos were highly unreliable due to models that were highly sensitive to even small errors in economic projections or losses and that underestimated the correlation of risks across various debt securities other research focuses on the conflicts of interest between parties who participate in the underlying processes of originating and bundling loans and collecting payments from delinquent borrowers chris downing dwight jaffee and nancy wallace 2009 find that some residential mortgage backed securities trade in a market for lemons where originators can use private information to determine which mortgage issuer credit quality and the price of asset backed securities

induced innovation and energy prices this paper uses u s patent data from 1970 to 1994 to study the impact of energy prices on energy efficient innovations theories of technological change have focused both on demand side factors which spur innovative activity by increasing the value of new innovations and supply side factors such as scientific advancements that make new innovations possible data on demand side factors are easily obtained but data on supply side factors that influence innovation are not readily available this paper uses patent citations as a measure of the usefulness of the existing base of scientific knowledge citations to previous patents are used to construct productivity estimates which measure the usefulness of the existing stock of knowledge to inventors in a given energy field for any given year these estimates are then combined with data on demand side factors to estimate a model of induced innovation in energy technologies the results indicate that both energy prices and the supply of knowledge have strongly significant positive effects on innovation the paper concludes with a discussion of the implication of this work for environmental policy

loan sales and the cost of bank capital this paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers bank regulation together with competitive deposit and equity financing can give banks an incentive to sell loans but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral hazard problem a solution is given for the optimal design of the bank loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral hazard problem an explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased banks practice of making loans and then selling them to other institutions and individuals has grown in popularity an important example in the development of loan selling has been the increase in banks mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority of the government national mortgage association gnma and then sold to secondary market investors recently however there has been a dramatic rise in the volume of other types of loans being sold especially by money center banks portions of commercial loans originated by these larger banks are being sold to smaller banks foreign banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in addition banks car loans and credit card receivables have also been pooled and sold to institutions and individuals selling loans that were once considered nonmarketable assets a process that has been termed asset securitization may be signalling the start of a fundamental change in the commercial banking business the leading banks in loan selling operations now view themselves more as originators and distributors of loans rather than as institutions holding loans as assets the potentially large impact of loan sales on the future of commercial banking naturally evokes the question of what incentives exist for banks to sell loans in this paper we show that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and

predicting loss severities for residential mortgage loans a three step selection approach abstract this paper develops a novel framework to model the loss given default lgd of residential mortgage loans which is the dominant consumer loan category for many commercial banks lgds in mortgage lending are subject to two selection processes default and cure where the collateral value exceeds the outstanding loan amount we propose a three step selection approach with a joint probability framework for default cure i e zero lgd and non zero loss severity information the proposed methodology demonstrates improved performance in out of time predictions compared to widely used ols regressions

securitization and lending competition we study the eects of securitization on interbank lending competition when banks see private signals of local applicants repayment chances if banks cannot securitize the outcome is e cient they lend to their most creditworthy local applicants with securitization banks lend also to remote applicants with strong observables in order to lessen the lemons problem they face in selling their securities this reliance on observables is ine cient raises the mean default risk and may lead to a deceptive rise in credit scores

the influence of perceived uncertainty on entrepreneurial action in emerging renewable energy technology biomass gasification projects in the netherlands emerging renewable energy technologies cannot break through without the involvement of entrepreneurs who dare to take action amidst uncertainty the uncertainties that the entrepreneurs involved perceive will greatly affect their innovation decisions and can prevent them from engaging in innovation projects aimed at developing and implementing emerging renewable energy technologies this article analyzes how perceived uncertainties and motivation influence an entrepreneur s decision to act using empirical data on biomass gasification projects in the netherlands our empirical results show that technological political and resource uncertainty are the most dominant sources of perceived uncertainty influencing entrepreneurial decision making by performing a dynamic analysis we furthermore demonstrate that perceived uncertainties and motivation are not stable but evolve over time we identify critical factors in the project s internal and external environment which influence these changes in perceived uncertainties and motivation and describe how various interactions between the different variables in the conceptual model internal and external factors perceived uncertainty motivation and previous actions of the entrepreneurs positively or negatively influence the decision of entrepreneurs to continue entrepreneurial action we discuss how policymakers can use these insights for stimulating the development and diffusion of emerging renewable energy technologies

lawyers in venture capital contracting theory and evidence real world financial contracts are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to understand their exact payoff consequences we develop and test a theoretical model of a venture capitalist vc negotiating with an entrepreneur who may overweigh or underweigh the payoff consequences of contractual downside protection dp a lawyer with expertise in venture capital can inform the entrepreneur about these consequences but less expert but otherwise high quality lawyers cannot we determine how a vc s decision to include dp is affected by the expected quality of the entrepreneur s project the entrepreneur s experience and the vc expertise of his her legal counsel we show that the vc s incentive to include unnecessary dp declines in expected project quality indeed for inexperienced entrepreneurs involved with high quality projects vcs prefer that the entrepreneur s counsel has vc expertise this implies that when negotiating with inexperienced entrepreneurs vcs who invest in high quality companies should be more likely to negotiate with entrepreneurs who employ lawyers with vc expertise we document broad empirical support for the model and provide evidence against competing explanations jel l24 g24 k12 l14 l24

monetary uncertainty and investment in an optimizing rational expectations model with income taxes and government debt the effect of monetary growth on an economy s investment has long been of interest to economists and monetary growth models provide a convenient tool for the analysis of this question the standard optimizing growth model postulates that money is injected into the private sector through transfer payments which typically either are of lump sum form or are proportional to wealth income or money holdings see for example brock 1974 calvo 1979 fischer 1979 and gertler and grinols 1982 in these models monetary changes are tied directly to changes in subsidy or tax rates and greater expected money growth generally either has no effect on investment or increases it through a tobin 1965 effect in this paper we analyze the effects that a stochastic monetary policy has on investment in an economy with individual optimization rational expectations and a government which makes expenditures and finances them through borrowing money creation and proportional income taxes with such a formulation money can be injected into the private sector through government purchases and open market operations as well as through transfers and the link between money growth and subsidy or tax rates is weakened or nonexistent we assume that the nominal income tax rates are constant over time given tax rates and stochastic government consumption the stochastic monetary growth rule followed by the government induces a stochastic government debt policy the effects that changes in the stochastic monetary growth rate have on investment depend on the nature of the depreciation deduction and on the relationship between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the tax rate on production income when depreciation deductions are based on historical costs an equilibrium is unique so long as the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than the tax rate applicable to production income in this case an increase in the mean rate of money growth decreases equilibrium investment while a mean preserving spread in the money growth rate increases investment given friend and blume s 1975 finding that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is substantially greater than one this seems to be the empirically relevant case if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is less than the tax rate on production income multiple equilibria are possible and the effects on investment of changes in the stochastic money growth rate are generally indeterminate when depreciation deductions are based on replacement costs investment is independent of the stochastic money growth rate the paper is organized as follows section 2 develops the optimization problem of the representative individual when depreciation deductions are based on historical costs section 3 describes the behavior of the government and develops the rational expectations equilibrium for this economy section 4 examines the effects on investment of changes in the stochastic money growth rate section 5 briefly reconsiders the model when depreciation deductions are based on replacement costs

growth and the effects of inflation abstract in this paper we study the relationship between the rate of increase of the money supply and the rate of growth of output in an economy we show that in some models of endogenous growth inflation has direct effects on the growth rate of the economy despite this the estimated welfare cost of inflation from calibrated examples is similar to that found in exogenous growth models

demand pull technology push and government led incentives for non incremental technical change abstract rising expectations about future demand for new technologies increase the incentives for investments in innovation by enlarging payoffs to successful innovations how well does this notion of demand pull apply to non incremental technological change when demand is largely attributable to actions by governments in this case inventors of the most important inventions did not respond positively to strong demand pull policies filing of highly cited patents declined precipitously just as demand for wind power created a multi billion dollar market three explanations for this apparent inconsistency with the demand pull hypothesis played a role 1 the rapid convergence on a single dominant design limited the market opportunity for non incremental technical improvements 2 even though the policies implemented were stringent enough to stimulate demand uncertainty in their longevity dampened the incentives for inventions that were likely to take several years to pay off and 3 alternative explanations such as declining r d funding and weakening presidential engagement on energy appear to have been important

wall street and the housing bubble we analyze whether mid level managers in securitized finance were aware of the housing bubble and a looming crisis in 2004 2006 using their personal home transaction data we find little evidence of them timing the bubble or exercising cautious behavior in purchasing homes relative to two uninformed control groups one composed of non housing equity analysts and the other of non real estate lawyers to the extent that the practice of securitization may have led to lax screening of subprime borrowers the average person in our sample did not expect it to lead to problems in the wider housing market our findings suggest the need to expand the incentives based view of the crisis to incorporate a role for distorted beliefs

risk the financial market and macroeconomic equilibrium growing recognition of the importance of stock market phenomena to the real economy underscores the need for models linking exogenous uncertainty asset market performance and the rest of the economy in an optimizing framework without certainty equivalence this paper constructs a three agent model with continuous time stochastic variables uncertain private production and government expenditure and forward looking rational agents the growth rate of output physical capital accumulation financial asset returns and uncertain inflation are determined as functions of the exogenous uncertainty in the economy analysis of the model finds that increased risk associated with government policy often reverses in an explainable way the conventional comparative static predictions of nonstochastic macro models

contract duration and relationship specific investments empirical evidence from coal markets this paper examines the importance of specific relationship investments in determining the duration of coal contracts negotiated between coal suppliers and electric utilities data for 277 coal contracts are used to perform the analysis the results provide strong support for the view that buyers and sellers make longer commitments to the terms of future trade at the contract execution stage and rely less on repeated bargaining when relationship specific investments are more important

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

credit rationing income exaggeration and adverse selection in the mortgage market we examine the role of borrower concerns about future credit availability in mitigating the effects of adverse selection and income misrepresentation in the mortgage market we show that the majority of additional risk associated with low doc mortgages originated prior to the great recession was due to adverse selection on the part of borrowers who could verify income but chose not to we provide novel evidence that these borrowers were more likely to inflate or exaggerate their income our analysis suggests that recent regulatory changes that have essentially eliminated the low doc loan product would result in credit rationing against self employed borrowers abstract from author

money inflation and investment abstract this paper analyzes an infinite horizon optimizing monetary growth model with endogenously determined income tax rates the technology is linear and random and preferences exhibit unitary relative risk aversion and a constant elasticity of substitution between real money balances and consumption an explicit solution for the rational expectations equilibrium is derived the relationship between the money growth rate and investment depends on the elasticity of substitution moreover maximizing welfare is inconsistent with choosing a money growth rule to maximize investment

distance and private information in lending we study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information leading to a trade off in the availability and pricing of credit which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus analyzing loan rates and firms decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks strategic use of private information however distance erodes our lender s ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

which renewable energy policy is a venture capitalist s best friend empirical evidence from a survey of international cleantech investors governments around the world have adopted ambitious targets to increase the share of renewable energy and reduce greenhouse gas emissions they pursue a variety of policy approaches to achieve these targets it has been a popular theme for contributions in energy policy to investigate the effectiveness of such policies this article adds a new perspective to the debate namely looking at the policy preferences of private investors in innovative clean energy technology firms we surveyed 60 investment professionals from european and north american venture capital and private equity funds and asked them to assess the effectiveness of various policies in terms of stimulating their interest to invest in innovative clean energy technologies in addition to quantitative rankings we use qualitative interview data to capture additional information on why investors prefer some policies over others the combined analysis compensates for the inherent limitations of a quantitative ranking using generic policy types the results of this exploratory analysis demonstrate that all other things being equal investors in our sample perceived feed in tariffs to be the most effective renewable energy policy the overall preference for feed in tariffs is even more pronounced among investors based in europe and with higher exposure to clean energy

macroeconomic modeling for monetary policy evaluation we describe some of the main features of the recent vintage macroeconomic models used for monetary policy evaluation we point to some of the key differences with respect to the earlier generation of macro models and highlight the insights for policy that these new frameworks have to offer our discussion emphasizes two key aspects of the new models the significant role of expectations of future policy actions in the monetary transmission mechanism and the importance for the central bank of tracking of the flexible price equilibrium values of the natural levels of output and the real interest rate we argue that both features have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy

imperfect information transmission from banks to investors macroeconomic implications abstract our goal is to elucidate the interaction of banks screening effort and strategic information production in loan backed asset markets using a general equilibrium framework asset quality is unobserved by investors but banks may purchase error prone ratings the premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of banks screening effort the fact that rating strategies reflect banks private information about asset quality helps keep this premium high conventional regulatory policies interfere with this decision margin thereby reducing signaling value of high ratings and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem we propose a tax subsidy scheme that induces efficiency

on the value of commitment with asymmetric information several recent papers have emphasized that long term relationships can be efficiently governed by short term contracts provided that there is no asymmetric information at the contracting dates this excludes not only adverse selection problems but also moral hazards problems in which hidden actions generate private information over the future in this paper we show in the context of a multiperiod principal agent relationship with adverse selection that renegotiable short term contracts can be as efficient as long term renegotiation proof contracts on the other hand spot contracting may fail to achieve long run efficiency not only because of intertemporal smoothing as with symmetric information but also because of ratchet effects and time inconsistency in the optimal structure of informational rents thus some limited commitment seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve long run efficiency

long term short term and renegotiation on the value of commitment in contracting spot contracting generally involves efficiency losses relative to long term contracting it is proved here that short term contracting and renegotiation allow to achieve long run efficiency when transfers are not limited objectives are conflicting and no relevant asymmetric information appears at recontracting dates this last assumption excludes adverse selection but not moral hazard when technologies and preferences are time separable copyright 1990 by the econometric society

loan sales and relationship banking firms raise money from banks and the bond market banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms optimal financial structure the endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal there is excessive trade in highly rated names and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds we provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets and bond markets further we posit that risk based capital requirements may be socially desirable the term collateralized loan obligations clos was coined in 1989 when corporate loans were first used as collateral in collateralized debt obligations cdos 1 since then the growth in loan sales has been enormous according to lucas et al 2006 1 1 trillion of cdos were outstanding as of 2005 and 50 of their collateral was comprised of loans in addition to pooled securities banks also trade first loss positions on single names through direct sales of individual loans in the united states loan sales have grown from 8 billion in 1991 to 154 8 billion by 2004 2 if a bank securitizes or sells a loan that it originated it is buying insurance on credit events over which it has either more control or more information than the buyer in the face of this informational friction why did the secondary market for corporate loans develop in the 1990s what effect has this had on relationship banking in this paper we characterize when a liquid secondary market for loans arises when a liquid secondary loan market is socially desirable and we provide testable predictions on the effect of the emergence of this market on prices and quantities in bond and primary loan markets our predictions are based on both changes in the parameters that lead to higher loan liquidity and changes in the contracts that are written between banks and firms given this higher liquidity

equity bonds and bank debt capital structure and financial market equilibrium under asymmetric information this paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance with asymmetric information and no taxes where equity issues bank debt and bond financing coexist in equilibrium the relationship banking aspect of financial intermediation is emphasized firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks are good at helping them through times of financial distress this financial flexibility is costly since banks face costs of capital themselves which they attempt to minimize through securitization to avoid this intermediation cost firms may turn to bond or equity financing but bonds imply an inefficient liquidation cost and equity an informational dilution cost we show that in equilib rium the riskier firms prefer bank loans the safer ones tap the bond markets and the ones in between prefer to issue both equity and bonds this segmentation is broadly consistent with stylized facts

banks incentives and inconsistent risk models this paper investigates banks incentive to bias the risk estimates they report to regulators within loan syndicates we find that banks with less capital report lower risk estimates consistent with an effort to mitigate capital requirements the sensitivity to capital is robust to bank fixed effects and greater for large risky and opaque credits also low capital banks risk estimates have less explanatory power than those of high capital banks with regard to loan prices indicating that their estimates incorporate less information our results suggest banks underreport risk in response to capital constraints and highlight the perils of regulation premised on self reporting received september 21 2016 editorial decision september 18 2017 by editor philip strahan authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

uncertainty in future government spending and investment this note examines the effect that uncertainty about future levels of government spending has on an economy s private investment the analysis is based on a simple two period neoclassical model both lump sum and proportional income taxes are considered in the case of lump sum taxes increased uncertainty about the future level of government spending tends to increase investment this disagrees with the rather widespread view that such uncertainty has a deleterious effect on investment the result however does arise for a straightforward reason uncertainty about future government spending introduces uncertainty into individuals future tax liabilities and this in turn induces uncertainty in their future disposable incomes leland 1968 and sandmo 1970 have shown that under very plausible conditions such uncertainty has a positive effect on savings chan 1983 has used this fact in analyzing the effect of uncertainty about the incidence of a lump sum tax for the model here this leads to an increase in investment the situation is more complicated with proportional income taxation since uncertainty in future government spending also may induce uncertainty in the after tax rate of return on investment in this case the effect of the uncertainty is generally ambiguous but with what are reported to be realistic parameter values the increased uncertainty does in fact increase investment in the next section the basic model is presented and the case of lump sum taxation is analyzed in section iii a proportional income tax is analyzed the final section contains some brief concluding comments

mortgage modification and strategic behavior evidence from a legal settlement with countrywide abstract we investigate whether homeowners respond strategically to news of mortgage modification programs we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in modification policy induced by settlement of us state government lawsuits against countrywide financial corporation which agreed to offer modifications to seriously delinquent borrowers using a difference in differences framework we find that countrywide s monthly delinquency rate increased more than 0 54 percentage points a 10 percent relative increase immediately after the settlement s announcement the estimated increase in default rates is largest among borrowers least likely to default otherwise these results suggest that strategic behavior should be an important consideration in designing mortgage modification programs jel d14 g21 k22 r31

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

the failure of models that predict failure distance incentives and defaults statistical default models widely used to assess default risk fail to account for a change in the relations between different variables resulting from an underlying change in agent behavior we demonstrate this phenomenon using data on securitized subprime mortgages issued in the period 1997 2006 as the level of securitization increases lenders have an incentive to originate loans that rate high based on characteristics that are reported to investors even if other unreported variables imply a lower borrower quality consistent with this behavior we find that over time lenders set interest rates only on the basis of variables that are reported to investors ignoring other credit relevant information as a result among borrowers with similar reported characteristics over time the set that receives loans becomes worse along the unreported information dimension this change in lender behavior alters the data generating process by transforming the mapping from observables to loan defaults to illustrate this effect we show that the interest rate on a loan becomes a worse predictor of default as securitization increases moreover a statistical default model estimated in a low securitization period breaks down in a high securitization period in a systematic manner it underpredicts defaults among borrowers for whom soft information is more valuable regulations that rely on such models to assess default risk could therefore be undermined by the actions of market participants

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

estimating the effect of hierarchies on information use theory suggests that greater hierarchical distance between a subordinate and his boss makes it more di cult to share abstract and subjective information in decision making a novel data set put together from credit dossiers of large corporate loan applicants enables us to observe the information collected by loan o cers and also how it is used by the ultimate loan approving o cer we flnd that greater hierarchical geographical distance between the information collecting agent and the loan approving o cer leads to less reliance on subjective information and more on objective information by exploiting non linearities in the assignment rules that determine an applicant s hierarchical distance and using information collecting agent flxed efiects we show that our result cannot be driven by endogenous assignment of applicants we also flnd that higher frequency of interactions between the information collecting agent and loan approving o cer both over time and through geographical proximity helps mitigate the efiects of hierarchical distance on information use our results show that hierarchical distance in uences information use and highlights the importance of human touch in communication

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

toward a theory of regulation for developing countries following jean jacques laffont s lead the efficient operation and expansion of infrastructures in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction however recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors have had limited success evidence suggests that in many instances this was because the traditional regulatory theory relied on by policymakers was not suitable for the institutional context in developing countries this article surveys more recent theoretical work focusing on problems with regulation in these countries at the heart of the survey is the work of jean jacques laffont who in the last decade of his life set about developing a theoretical framework for regulation in developing countries we consider the implications of his work which focused on the key institutional limitations faced in developing countries we then discuss where experience suggests that there are important omissions from this modeling bringing in extensions and alternative approaches pursued by other authors we conclude by summarizing the key ways in which regulatory policy will be different when institutions are weak overall we find that an understanding of the institutional context and its implications are crucial when designing a regulatory framework for developing countries

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

bank integration and co movements across housing markets this paper investigates whether bank integration measured by cross border bank flows can capture the co movements across housing markets in developed countries by using a spatial dynamic panel model the transmission can occur through a global banking channel in which global banks intermediate wholesale funding to local banks changes in financial conditions are passed across borders through the banks balance sheet exposure to credit currency maturity and funding risks resulting in house price spillovers while controlling for country level and global factors we find significant co movement across housing markets of countries with proportionally high bank integration bank integration can better capture house price co movements than other measures of economic integration once we account for bank exposure other spatial linkages traditionally used to account for return co movements across region such as trade foreign direct investment portfolio investment geographic proximity etc become insignificant moreover we find that the co movement across housing markets decreases for countries with less developed mortgage markets characterized by fixed mortgage rate contracts low limits of loan to value ratios and no mortgage equity withdrawal

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable assets theories of financial intermediation predict that bank loans should not be marketable because of moral hazard problems banks will not conduct credit risk analysis or monitor borrowers if they are not at risk for failing to perform these services throughout most of history bank loans have not in fact been marketable yet by the end of the 1980 s the amount of commercial and industrial loan sales outstanding had grown to over 250 billion from trivial amounts at the beginning of the decade to explain the opening of this loan sales market we present a model of incentive compatible loan sales that allows for implicit contractual features between loan sellers and loan buyers we then test for the presence of these features using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales

a critical assessment of the incomplete contracts theory for private participation in public services the case of the water sector in ghana this paper provides a critical analysis of the recent developments in the incomplete contracts theory and its conclusions for privatisation of public services drawing on a case study of management contract for urban water services in ghana and highlighting the flaws in the theory the article argues that contractual incompleteness does not provide a uniform guidance on efficient forms of ownership we argue that methodological individualism utilised in the theory is particularly ineffective for its application to public services where direct or indirect contractual role of the state cannot be eliminated the sterility of the theory with respect to political institutional and distributional context of public service delivery is identified as an important weakness copyright oxford university press

assessing and managing regulatory risk in renewable energy contrasts between canada and the united states abstact a challenge for energy firms when considering new investments is to balance expected financial gains against potential risks however while investment opportunities in different jurisdictions are often straightforward to identify the policy or regulatory risks for investors are more difficult to accurately ascertain here i provide a novel conceptual framework for how firms can assess regulatory risk that focuses on the institutional processes governing policy making risks are lower and policies will subsequently be more stable in jurisdictions where regulatory agencies have greater autonomy from politicians and where policies are formulated through more rigid policy making processes the contrasting development patterns of renewable energy policies in ontario and texas offer support for the framework i further develop strategies for how firms can successfully manage regulatory risks in different types of environment

the u s and irish credit crises their distinctive differences and common features although the 2007 2008 us credit crisis precipitated it the subsequent irish credit crisis is an identifiably separate one which might have occurred in the absence of the u s crash the distinctive differences between them are notable many of the apparent causal factors of the u s crisis are missing in the irish case and the same applies vice versa at a deeper level we identify four common features of the two credit crises capital bonanzas asset price bubbles regulatory imprudence and moral hazard the particular manifestations of these four deep common features are quite different in the two cases

credit induced boom and bust this paper exploits the federal preemption of national banks in 2004 from local laws against predatory lending to gauge the effect of the supply of credit on the real economy first the preemption regulation resulted in an 11 increase in annual lending in the 2004 2006 period which is associated with a 3 3 rise in annual house price growth rate and a 2 2 expansion of employment in nontradable sectors this was followed by a sharp decline in subsequent years furthermore we show that the increase in the supply of credit reduced delinquencies during boom years but increased them in bust years received june 7 2015 editorial decision december 22 2016 by editor robin greenwood

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

mortgage mis pricing the case of co borrowers abstract this paper provides evidence for a performance differential between loans with one borrower and loans with two borrowers we argue that the choice of observables considered during the rate adjustment process may lead to mortgage mispricing for loans with co borrowers our findings offer an example of borrower level information that mortgage lenders collect which is not used in pricing but is predictive of performance

cognition and incomplete contracts thinking about contingencies designing covenants and seeing through their implications is costly parties to a contract accordingly use heuristics and leave it incomplete the paper develops a model of limited cognition and examines its consequences for contractual design

bank skin in the game and loan contract design evidence from covenant lite loans in a model of dual agency problems where borrower lender and bank nonbank incentives may conflict we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness as bank participation declines covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread we find support for the hockey stick relation with bank s stake in covenant lite loans averaging 8 0 median we also find that covenant lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high

robust incentives and the design of a climate change governance regime in building a governance regime to address climate change should we prioritize the development of global institutions or national ones this paper focuses on two neglected characteristics to inform the governance problem the incentives for investment in low carbon energy technology and the influence of historical policy volatility examining a case study of an important low carbon energy technology wind power this study finds 1 policy volatility has been substantial 2 policy changes were uncorrelated across jurisdictions suggesting that 3 investors could have substantially reduced their exposure to the risk of policy volatility by operating globally while it also has downsides a poorly coordinated international policy regime has the advantage of reducing the risk associated with a global policy failure beyond this case study the importance of this positive effect depends on the probability of policy failures in each country the correlations among them and the probability of a global policy failure

the mirrlees approach to mechanism design with renegotiation with applications to hold up and risk sharing the paper studies the implementation problem first analyzed by maskin and moore 1999 in which two agents observe an unverifiable state of nature and may renegotiate inefficient outcomes following play of the mechanism we develop a first order approach to characterizing the set of implementable utility mappings in this problem paralleling mirrlees s 1971 first order analysis of standard mechanism design problems we use this characterization to study optimal contracting in hold up and risk sharing models in particular we examine when the contracting parties can optimally restrict attention to simple contracts such as noncontingent contracts and option contracts where only one agent sends a message

the hedge value of international emissions trading under uncertainty this paper estimates the value of international emissions trading focusing on a here to fore neglected component its value as a hedge against uncertainty much analysis has been done of the kyoto protocol and other potential international greenhouse gas mitigation policies comparing the costs of achieving emission targets with and without trading these studies often show large cost reductions for all parties under trading compared to a no trading case we investigate the welfare gains of including emissions trading in the presence of uncertainty in economic growth rates using both a partial equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost curves and a computable general equilibrium model we find that the hedge value of international trading is small relative to its value in reallocating emissions reductions when the burden sharing scheme does not resemble a least cost allocation we also find that the effects of pre existing tax distortions and terms of trade dominate the hedge value of trading we conclude that the primary value of emissions trading in international agreements is as a burden sharing or wealth transfer mechanism and should be judged accordingly

evaluating the power investment options with uncertainty in climate policy abstract this paper uses a real options approach roa for analysing the effects of government climate policy uncertainty on private investors decision making in the power sector it presents an analysis undertaken by the international energy agency iea that implements roa within a dynamic programming approach for technology investment choice case studies for gas coal and nuclear power investment are undertaken with the model illustrative results from the model indicate four broad conclusions i climate change policy risks can become large if there is only a short time between a future climate policy event such as post 2012 and the time when the investment decision is being made ii the way in which co 2 and fuel price variations feed through to electricity price variations is an important determinant of the overall investment risk that companies will face iii investment risks vary according to the technology being considered with nuclear power appearing to be particularly exposed to fuel and co 2 price risks under various assumptions and iv the government will be able to reduce investors risks by implementing long term say 10 years rather than short term say 5 years climate change policy frameworks contributions of this study include 1 having created a step function with stochastic volume of jump at a particular time to simulate carbon price shock under a particular climate policy event 2 quantifying the implicit risk premium of carbon price uncertainty to investors in new capacity 3 evaluating carbon price risk alongside energy price risk in investment decision making and 4 demonstrating roa to be a useful tool to quantify the impacts of climate change policy uncertainty on power investment

cultural proximity and loan outcomes we present evidence that shared codes religious beliefs ethnicity cultural proximity between lenders and borrowers improves the efficiency of credit allocation we identify in group preferential treatment using dyadic data on the religion and caste of bank officers and borrowers from a bank in india and a rotation policy that induces exogenous matching between officers and borrowers cultural proximity increases lending on both intensive and extensive margins and improves repayment performance even after the in group officer is replaced by an out group one further cultural proximity increases loan dispersion and reduces loan to collateral ratios our results imply that cultural proximity mitigates informational problems that adversely affect lending which in turn relaxes financial constraints and improves access to finance

incomplete contracts and signaling this article presents a principal agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness i show that in the presence of transactions costs incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal s type two types of transactions costs are considered those incurred ex ante drafting costs and those incurred ex post enforcement or verification costs i prove that in the presence of either of these costs asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does

debt relief and slow recovery a decade after lehman abstract we follow a representative panel of millions of consumers in the united states from 2007 to 2017 and document new facts on the long term effects of the great recession there were about six million foreclosures over this period only a quarter of foreclosed households regained homeownership taking an average four years to do so this persistent loss of homeownership accounts for most of the decline in the u s homeownership rate despite massive stimulus and debt relief policies house prices consumption and unemployment remained below precrisis levels in about half of the zip codes in the united states regions that recovered to precrisis levels took on average four to five years regional variation in the extent and speed of recovery is strongly and persistently associated with frictions affecting the pass through of lower interest rates and debt relief to households

skin in the game and moral hazard what determines securitization levels and should they be regulated to address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling abs to rational investors absent regulation originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high effort incentives are below first best absent regulation optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

accuracy of mortgage portfolio risk forecasts during financial crises abstract this paper explores whether factor based credit portfolio risk models are able to predict losses in severe economic downturns such as the recent global financial crisis gfc within standard confidence levels the paper analyzes i the accuracy of default rate forecasts and ii whether forecast downturn percentiles value at risk var are sufficient to cover default rate outcomes over a quarterly and an annual forecast horizon uninformative maximum likelihood and informative bayesian techniques are compared as they imply different degrees of uncertainty we find that quarterly var estimates are generally sufficient but annual var estimates may be insufficient during economic downturns in addition the paper develops and analyzes models based on auto regressive adjustments of scores which provide a higher forecast accuracy the consideration of parameter uncertainty and auto regressive error terms mitigates the shortfall

informational frictions and the credit crunch in this paper i estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected i show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships quantitatively these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the u s syndicated corporate loan market

credible carbon policy the paper sets out the credibility problem in carbon policy provides a number of examples of non credibility in recent energy policy and identifies the costs of failing to address it the time inconsistency of carbon policy arising because of multiple objectives the irreversibility of energy investments and the scope for ex post reneging on ex ante commitments to set policy instruments such as carbon taxes or emission permits at appropriate levels is set in a conceptual framework analogies with monetary policy are drawn and a solution to the time inconsistency problem is proposed through the establishment of an energy carbon agency

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

policy interactions risk and price formation in carbon markets carbon pricing is an important mechanism for providing companies with incentives to invest in carbon abatement price formation in carbon markets involves a complex interplay between policy targets dynamic technology costs and market rules carbon pricing may under deliver investment due to r d externalities requiring additional policies which themselves affect market prices also abatement costs depend on the extent of technology deployment due to learning by doing this paper introduces an analytical framework based on marginal abatement cost mac curves with the aim of providing an intuitive understanding of the key dynamics and risk factors in carbon markets the framework extends the usual static mac representation of the market to incorporate policy interactions and some technology cost dynamics the analysis indicates that supporting large scale deployment of mature abatement technologies suppresses the marginal cost of abatement sometimes to zero whilst increasing total abatement costs however support for early stage r d may reduce both total abatement cost and carbon price risk an important aspect of the analysis is in elevating risk management considerations into energy policy formation as the results of the stochastic modelling indicate wide distributions for the emergence of carbon prices and public costs around the policy expectations

a model of add on pricing this paper examines competitive price discrimination with horizontal and vertical taste differences consumers with higher valuations for quality are assumed to have stronger brand preferences two models are considered a standard competitive price discrimination model in which consumers observe all prices and an add on pricing game in which add on prices are naturally unobserved and firms may advertise a base good at a low price in hopes of selling add ons at high unadvertised prices in the standard game price discrimination is self reinforcing the model sometimes has both equilibria in which the firms practice price discrimination and equilibria in which they do not the analysis of the add on pricing game focuses on the chicago school argument that profits earned on add ons will be competed away via lower prices for advertised goods a conclusion is that add on practices can raise equilibrium profits by creating an adverse selection problem that makes price cutting unappealing although profitable when jointly adopted using add on pricing is not individually rational in a simple extension with endogenous advertising practices and costless advertising several models that could account for add on pricing are discussed

statistical default models and incentives the likelihood that a bank loan will default is of interest to both regulators and investors under the basel ii regulatory guidelines a bank must hold capital in proportion to the riskiness of its assets the probability of default is a pri mary determinant of the riskiness of a loan investors in turn price a loan in the secondary market based on its expected cash flow which again depends on the default probability how should market participants assess the default probability on a pool of bank loans it is natural to consider historical data on loan condi tions and default rates and to estimate a statisti cal model that can be used to predict defaults going forward such statistical models have been widely used across the financial markets to enhance market liquidity and impose capital requirements on financial institutions the accuracy of predictions from statistical models was especially poor in the subprime mortgage market in the period from august 2007 onwards 1 we argue that one cause for this failure was that these models relied entirely on hard information variables and ignored changes in the incentives of lenders to collect soft infor

international technology oriented agreements to address climate change much discussion has surrounded possible alternatives for international agreements on climate change particularly post 2012 among these alternatives technology oriented agreements toas are perhaps the least well defined we explore what toas may consist of why they might be sensible which toas already exist in international energy and environmental governance and whether they could make a valuable contribution to addressing climate change we find that toas aimed at knowledge sharing and coordination research development or demonstration could increase the overall efficiency and effectiveness of international climate cooperation but are likely to have limited environmental effectiveness on their own technology transfer agreements are likely to have similar properties unless the level of resources expended is large in which case they could be environmentally significant technology specific mandates or incentives could be environmentally effective within the applicable sector but are more likely to make a cost effective contribution when viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute for flexible emissions based policies these results indicate that toas could potentially provide a valuable contribution to the global response to climate change the success of specific toas will depend on their design implementation and the role they are expected to play relative to other components of the policy portfolio