global factors and emerging market spreads this paper shows that a large fraction of the variability of emerging market bond spreads is explained by the evolution of global factors such as risk appetite as reflected in the spread of high yield corporate bonds in developed markets global liquidity measured by the international interest rates and contagion from systemic events like the russian default this link has remained relatively stable over the history of the emerging market class is robust to the inclusion of country specific factors and helps provide accurate long run predictions overall the results highlight the critical role played by exogenous factors in the evolution of the borrowing cost faced by emerging economies

how efficiently is capital allocated evidence from the knitted garment industry in tirupur this paper studies the effect of community identity on investment behaviour in the knitted garment industry in the south indian town of tirupur we document very large and systematic differences in both levels of capital stock and the capital intensity of production in firms owned by people from two different community groups we argue that the differences in investment cannot be explained by productivity differences alone we suggest that the most likely explanation is that the two communities differ in their access to capital

subcontractors for tractors theory and evidence on flexible specialization supplier selection and contracting abstract buyer seller networks are pervasive in developing economies yet remain relatively understudied using primary data on contracts between the largest tractor assembler in pakistan and its suppliers we find large variations in prices and quantities across suppliers of the same product surprisingly tied suppliers those that choose higher levels of specific investments receive lower and more unstable orders and lower prices these results are explained by developing a simple model of flexible specialization under demand uncertainty a buyer faces multiple suppliers with heterogeneous types to supply customized parts specific investments raise surplus within the relationship but lower the seller s flexibility to cater to the outside market higher quality suppliers have a greater likelihood of selling outside and so this cost is greater for them therefore even if a buyer typically prefers high types some low type suppliers might be kept as marginal suppliers because of their greater willingness to invest more in buyer specific assets further empirical examination shows that the more tied suppliers are indeed of lower quality

debt maturity and the international financial architecture this paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture the analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks the paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates such as international lending in last resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries jel f34 o19

excessive volatility in capital flows a pigouvian taxation approach this paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective of a pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle it presents a model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during busts this mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes when tightening financial constraints on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects in our model capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of consumer welfare

nonstationary relational contracts with adverse selection i develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics workers are heterogeneous and each worker s ability is both private information and fixed for all time learning therefore occurs within employment relationships the inferences however are confounded by moral hazard incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long term contracts relational contracts which must be self enforcing must therefore be used the wage dynamics in the optimal contract which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement are intimately related to the learning effect

macroeconomic policies and performance in latin america abstract this paper provides new evidence on macroeconomic policies and results in latin america and the caribbean results are i credibility allows adoption of counter cyclical macroeconomic policies ii accuracy in meeting inflation targets depends on central bank independence and country risk iii intermediate exchange rate er regimes have become less persistent iv er regimes matter for inflation and growth v real er trends are not explained by productivity growth and supply reforms do not resolve real er misalignments vi financial integration has increased significantly vii foreign shocks are a major growth determinant and viii composition of foreign capital inflows matters for growth

u s real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies we empirically analyse the appropriateness of indexing emerging market sovereign debt to us real interest rates we find that policy induced exogenous increases in us rates raise default risk in emerging market economies as hypothesised in the theoretical literature however we also find evidence that omitted variables which simultaneously increase us real interest rates and reduce the risk of default dominate the hypothesised relationship we can only conclude that it s not a good idea to index emerging market bonds to us real interest rates

the declining talent pool of government we consider a government for which success requires high performance by talented ministers a leader provides incentives to her ministers by firing those who fail however the consequent turnover drains a finite talent pool of potential appointees the severity of the optimal firing rule and ministerial performances decline over time the lifetime of an effective government is limited we relate this lifetime to various factors including external shocks the replenishment of the talent pool and the leader s reputation some results are surprising an increase in the stability of government and the exogenous imposition of stricter performance standards can both shorten the era of effective government and an increase in the replenishment of the talent pool can reduce incumbent ministers performance

collective moral hazard maturity mismatch and systemic bailouts the paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy when everyone engages in maturity transformation authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing in turn refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity the key ingredient is that monetary policy is non targeted the ex post benefits from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the number amount of leverage while the distortion costs are to a large extent fixed this insight has important consequences first banks choose to correlate their risk exposures second private borrowers may deliberately choose to increase their interest rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for liquidity third optimal monetary policy is time inconsistent fourth macro prudential supervision is called for we characterize the optimal regulation which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets we establish the robustness of our insights when the set of

financial globalization and debt maturity in emerging economies this paper studies how financial globalization affects debt structure in emerging economies we find that by accessing international markets firms increase their long term debt and extend their debt maturity in contrast with financial liberalization long term debt decreases and the maturity structure shifts to the short term for the average firm these effects are stronger in economies with less developed domestic financial systems the evidence is consistent with financial integration having opposite effects on the firms that are able to integrate with world markets and obtain financing globally relative to the firms that rely on domestic financing only

emerging local currency bond markets in this article the authors assess local currency bond markets in emerging market economies emes supported by policies and laws that helped improve macroeconomic stability and creditor rights local currency eme bond markets have grown substantially over the past decade and have provided usd based investors with attractive returns u s investors have responded by sharply increasing their holdings of eme local currency bonds especially in emes with investor friendly institutions and policies

dynamic policymaking with decay it is often said that the only constant is change itself as time passes the population grows new technologies are invented and the skills demographics and norms of the populace evolve these changes whether in isolation or in aggregate influence the effectiveness of policy in particular policies designed for today s world are unlikely to provide a perfect fit tomorrow we develop a notion of policy decay that captures this impact formally we introduce policy decay into a paradigmatic model of legislative policymaking and show that it leads to a starkly different perspective on legislative politics our results upend the classic notion of gridlock and bear implications more broadly for the practice of politics we show how a changing world impacts the power of agenda control how it drives the dynamic path of legislation how it reveals a novel conception of policy expertise and how it ultimately provides a foundational logic to the design of bureaucracy

sudden stops are global and local investors alike the main goal of this paper is to characterize the determinants of sudden stops caused by domestic vis a vis foreign residents are the decisions of domestic investors to invest abroad or of foreign investors to cut off funds from the domestic economy governed by the same set of determinants given the distribution of different types of sudden stop episodes over time and its different macroeconomic consequences the authors argue that the determinants may not be alike using an effective sample of 82 countries with annual information over the period 1970 2007 the analysis finds that global investors are less likely to stop bringing their capital when their economy is growing and the world interest rate is lower domestic agents are more willing to invest abroad if the macroeconomic performance of the domestic economy is poor high inflation the financial system is weak and there are high external savings current account surpluses increasing financial openness makes the domestic country more vulnerable to sudden stops caused by either local or global investors finally countries with higher shares of foreign direct investment are less prone to inflow driven sudden stops whereas the opposite holds for outflow driven sudden stops

the federal reserve the emerging markets and capital controls a high frequency empirical investigation in this paper i use weekly data from seven emerging nations four in latin america and three in asia to investigate the extent to which changes in fed policy interest rates have been transmitted into domestic short term interest rates during the 2000s the results suggest that there is indeed an interest rates pass through from the fed to emerging markets however the extent of transmission of interest rate shocks is different in terms of impact steady state effect and dynamics in latin america and asia the results also indicate that capital controls are not an effective tool for isolating emerging countries from global interest rate disturbances changes in the slope of the u s yield curve including changes generated by a twist policy affect domestic interest rates in emerging countries i also provide a detailed case study for chile

labor tying in a poor agrarian economy a theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper we show how tied labor contrary to its common characterization as a feudal relic and as a symptom of economic stagnation may actually be strengthened by capitalist agricultural development we construct a simple two period theoretical model of a two tiered labor market to show how the proportional importance of voluntary labor tying contracts may increase with yield increasing improvements and with a tightening of the labor market we then provide in support of these hypotheses some general historical as well as more detailed econometric evidence from a variety of cross sectional data in rural india

banks debt maturity and financial crises abstract we develop a model in which the maturity of external debt of banks their level of international reserves and the term structure of interest rates are jointly determine self fulfilling runs may occur and banks take this possibility into account when choosing the structure of their assets and liabilities if the probability of a run is sufficiently small banks will deliberately choose an illiquid asset liability position and expose themselves to a run in that case short term debt will be cheaper than long term debt and the maturity structure of foreign debt will depend on attitudes towards risk

the cyclical properties of disaggregated capital flows abstract we analyze the second moment properties of the components of international capital flows and their relationship to business cycle variables output investment and the real interest rate in 22 industrial and emerging countries total inward flows are procyclical with respect to all three macro variables net outward flows are countercyclical with respect to output and investment in most industrial and emerging countries disaggregated inward flows positively comove with output in industrial countries and with investment and the real interest rate in the g7 economies inward foreign direct investment is the only non procyclical type of inward capital flows with respect to output in the developing economies formal statistical tests based on nonparametric bootstrap techniques detect significant variance increases in all g7 countries disaggregated capital flows over exogenous and endogenously estimated breaks

investment and time to plan and build a comparison of structures vs equipment in a panel of italian firms time to build models of investment expenditures play an important role in many traditional and modern theories of the business cycle especially for explaining the dynamic propagation of shocks we estimate the structural parameters of a time to build model using annual firm level investment data on equipment and structures for expenditures on equipment we find no evidence of time to build effects beyond one year for expenditures on structures by contrast there is clear evidence of such effects in the range of two to three years the contrast between equipment and structures is intuitively reasonable and consistent with previous results the estimates for structures also indicate that initial period expenditures are low and increase as projects near completion these results provide empirical support for including time to plan effects for investment in structures more generally these results suggest a potential source of specification error for q models of investment and production based asset pricing models that ignore the time required to plan build and install new capital jel d24 g31 c33 c34

mutual funds flows and the geography of contagion abstract this paper studies the dynamics and geography of investments made by international mutual funds located in advanced markets i identify precise global and regional dynamics in equity and bond flows very few countries receive or lose funding in isolation i also find strong evidence of global contagion when financial conditions in developed markets change emerging markets funding is heavily affected i illustrate this finding by deriving contagion maps showing where contagion spreads and with what intensity in general the results suggest that push effects from advanced market investors affect massively developing countries and expose them to sudden stops and surges

an international comparison of capital structure and debt maturity choices this study examines how the institutional environment influences capital structure and debt maturity choices of firms in 39 developed and developing countries we find that a country s legal and tax system corruption and the preferences of capital suppliers explain a significant portion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios specifically firms in more corrupt countries and those with weaker laws tend to use more debt especially short term debt explicit bankruptcy codes and deposit insurance are associated with higher leverage and more long term debt more debt is used in countries where there is a greater tax gain from leverage

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

gridlock and delegation in a changing world fixed statutes and regulations often have variable consequences over time if left unattended such drift can severely erode the performance of government as an institution of representation to better understand the mechanics of policy making in a changing world we develop a positive theory that captures political drift in a dynamic separation of powers system we show analytically that a distinctive combination of legislative supermajoritarianism and agency discretion institutional features that in isolation elicit widespread criticism can effectively ameliorate policies susceptibility to the vicissitudes of exogenous change the critical mechanism for governmental accommodation of drift is delegation which increases all decision makers well being by reducing fluctuations in outcomes although the complete smoothing of outcomes is attainable in a separation of powers system we show that this is typically not achieved in equilibrium the presence of drift provides an opportunity for self interested legislators to extract a distributional benefit from their fellow legislators at the expense of overall policymaking efficiency

does the u s economic policy uncertainty connect financial markets evidence from oil and commodity currencies abstract we provide novel insight to the emerging literature on the role of u s monetary policy as a driver of a global financial cycle by examining the possible causal effect of u s economic policy uncertainty on the connectedness of crude oil and currency markets using a sample of commodity currencies from advanced and emerging nations a battery of linear and nonlinear granger based causality tests indicate the presence of a causal relationship between economic policy uncertainty and the connectedness of oil and currency markets particularly at low frequencies and more significantly after the outburst of the global financial crisis while crude oil generally serves as a net transmitter of shocks to currencies across all frequency bands the spillover effects from oil are largely concentrated towards the g10 currencies of australian and new zealand dollar that are often used as investment currencies in global carry trade strategies overall our findings suggest the presence of a significant pass through effect of economic policy uncertainty via oil prices spilling over to the currency market in line with the emerging evidence that the monetary policy by the u s fed serves as a major driver of a global financial cycle that describes patterns in global capital flows credit activity and asset prices across financial markets

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

inefficient foreign borrowing a dual and common agency perspective studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate it then revisits the original sin debate analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment international portfolio diversification domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries access to international lending the paper thereby relates a country s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings their location the extent of control rights held by political authorities and the interests of dominant domestic political forces

ethnicity and credit in african manufacturing abstract this paper investigates whether market interaction can by itself perpetuate the lack of ethnic diversity that is observed in the business communities of many developing countries using case study data on manufacturing firms in kenya and zimbabwe we find no evidence that blacks or women are disadvantaged in the attribution of bank credit once we control for firm size and other observable characteristics in contrast an ethnic and gender bias is noticeable in the attribution of supplier credit although we cannot rule out the presence of discrimination the bulk of the evidence indicates that network effects play an important role in explaining this bias

dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade the j curve the authors provide a theoretical interpretation of two features of international data the countercyclical movements in net exports and the tendency for the trade balance to be negatively correlated with current and future movements in terms of trade but positively correlated with past movements they document the same properties in a two country stochastic growth model in which trade fluctuations reflect in large part the dynamics of capital formation the authors find that their general equilibrium perspective is essential the relation between the trade balance and the terms of trade depends critically on the source of fluctuations copyright 1994 by american economic association

relational contracts and the value of relationships this article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known i consider a principal agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option i show that if the principal has the bargaining power she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus i characterize how information is revealed how the relationship evolves and how this depends on bargaining power jel c78 d82 d83 d86

maturity mismatch and financial crises evidence from emerging market corporations substantial attention has been paid in recent years to the risk of maturity mismatch in emerging markets although this risk is microeconomic in nature the evidence advanced thus far has taken the form of macro correlations we evaluate this mechanism empirically at the micro level by using a database of over 1500 publicly traded firms from fifteen emerging markets with special focus on latin america and east asia while east asia corporates have tended to issue more debt at short maturities than their latin american counterparts we show that this is generally matched by greater holdings of liquid assets as a result the distribution of net shortterm exposure is remarkably similar across regions we attempt to measure the risk of such exposure by estimating at the firm level the eect on investment of short term exposure under capital account volatility for the whole sample and in both regions individually this eect is statistically zero contrary to the prediction of the maturity mismatch hypothesis this conclusion is robust to using a variety of dierent estimators alternative measures of capital flows and controls for devaluation eects and access to international capital

uncertainty capital flows and maturity mismatch abstract this paper explores a how the financial uncertainty generated by volatile international capital flows interacts with maturity mismatch on the balance sheets of nonfinancial firms to increase the volatility of output investment and total factor productivity tfp in emerging market economies i build a model of a small open economy in which financial frictions force firms to fund long term projects with short term debt in response to changes in the level of uncertainty regarding the availability of foreign borrowing firms adjust their long term investment contributing to the volatility of investment and output as well as generating endogenous fluctuations in aggregate productivity using data from a panel of major emerging markets i show that the volatility of portfolio debt flows negatively affects output by dampening investment while the volatility of equity flows which do not generate maturity mismatch has no effect consistent with the mechanism in the model the negative impact of capital flow volatility is larger at low levels of financial development and in industries with longer time to build lags my estimates imply that shocks to capital flow volatility account for one fifth of the excess output volatility of the emerging markets in my sample relative to a set of small open advanced economies

dynamic government performance honeymoons and crises of confidence we use a formal theoretical framework to explore the interplay between a government s longevity and its performance ministers perform well when their careers are valuable this is so when the government s duration is expected to be long the government s survival depends on its popularity and finally that popularity depends on its ministers performance the feedback loop between performance and longevity means that multiple rational expectations equilibria can arise ministers work hard for a popular government but divert efforts elsewhere if they believe the government is doomed these alternatives are both self fulfilling prophecies however the presence of perhaps small random events that buffet the performance and popularity of a government is sufficient to pin down a unique equilibrium we explore the dynamics that arise a crisis of confidence involving the rapid collapse of a government s performance is sparked when a sequence of negative shocks push the popularity of the government below a unique critical threshold

home bias at the fund level this paper presents new stylized facts on the distribution of the home bias at the fund level we find i a large heterogeneity in the degree of home bias across mutual funds ii a positive correlation between the size of funds and home bias and iii a positive correlation between the size of funds the number of foreign countries and the number of sectors in which they invest these facts constitute a challenge for existing theories this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

sudden stops and output drops in recent financial crises and in recent theoretical studies of them abrupt declines in capital inflows or sudden stops have been linked with large drops in output do sudden stops cause output drops no according to a standard equilibrium model in which sudden stops are generated by an abrupt tightening of a country s collateral constraint on foreign borrowing in this model in fact sudden stops lead to output increases not decreases an examination of the quantitative effects of a well known sudden stop in mexico in the mid 1990s confirms that a drop in output accompanying a sudden stop cannot be accounted for by the sudden stop alone to generate an output drop during a financial crisis as other studies have done the model must include other economic frictions which have negative effects on output large enough to overwhelm the positive effect of the sudden stop this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

searching for good policies policymaking is hard policymakers typically have imperfect information about which policies produce which outcomes and they are left with little choice but to fumble their way through the policy space via a trial and error process this raises a question at the heart of democracy do democratic systems identify good policies to answer this question i introduce a novel model of policymaking in complex environments i show that good policies are often but not always found and i identify the possibility of policymaking getting stuck at outcomes that are arbitrarily bad notably policy stickiness occurs in the model even in the absence of institutional constraints this raises the question of how institutions and the political environment impact experimentation and learning i show how a simple political friction uncertainty over voter preferences interacts with political competition and policy uncertainty in a subtle way that surprisingly improves the quality of policymaking over time

volatility and growth credit constraints and the composition of investment abstract how does uncertainty and credit constraints affect the cyclical composition of investment and thereby volatility and growth this paper addresses this question within a model where firms engage in two types of investment a short term one and a long term one which contributes more to productivity growth because it takes longer to complete long term investment has a relatively less cyclical return but it also has a higher liquidity risk the first effect ensures that the share of long term investment to total investment is countercyclical when financial markets are perfect the second implies that this share may turn procyclical when firms face tight credit constraints a novel propagation mechanism thus emerges through its effect on the cyclical composition of investment tighter credit can lead to both higher volatility and lower mean growth evidence from a panel of countries provides support for the model s key predictions

strength in numbers networks as a solution to occupational traps the new classical theory states that families in low skill occupations with low levels of human capital can stay poor from one generation to the next while families in high skill occupations with correspondingly high levels of human capital stay wealthy despite being endowed with the same level of ability on average this paper proposes an informal institutional mechanism the community based network through which families belonging to the same neighbourhood or kinship group can bootstrap their way out of such low skill occupational traps the insight from the dynamic model that is developed is that once they form new networks providing mutual support to their members and substituting for inherited parental human capital and wealth will strengthen most rapidly in historically disadvantaged communities generating a correspondingly high level of intergenerational mobility these predictions are successfully tested using unique data from india the analysis in this paper coupled with an emerging empirical literature on networks and migration provides a new perspective on mobility in developing countries with restrictive traditional networks decaying even as new networks supporting collective mobility form and strengthen over time

nudging farmers to use fertilizer theory and experimental evidence from kenya we model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertil izer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias such farmers may procrastinate post poning fertilizer purchases until later periods when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer consistent with the model many farmers in western kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profit able fertilizer investments but they do invest in response to small time limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer free deliv ery just after harvest calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez faire policies or heavy subsidies

international and domestic collateral constraints in a model of emerging market crises abstract we build a model of emerging markets crises which features two types of collateral constraints firms in a domestic economy have limited borrowing capacity from international investors they also have limited borrowing capacity with respect to each other we study how the presence and changes in these collateral constraints affect financial and real variables a binding international constraint in the aggregate leads to a sharp rise in interest rates and fire sales of domestic assets while limited domestic collateral can lead to wasted international collateral these two collateral constraints can interact in important ways the first is disintermediation a fire sale of domestic assets causes banks to fail in their function of reallocating resources across the economy leading to wasted international collateral the second is a dynamic effect we show that firms in an economy with limited domestic collateral and a binding international collateral constraint will not adequately precaution against adverse shocks increasing the severity of these shocks

fluctuations in uncertainty this review article tries to answer four questions i what are the stylized facts about uncertainty over time ii why does uncertainty vary iii do fluctuations in uncertainty matter and iv did higher uncertainty worsen the great recession of 2007 2009 on the first question both macro and micro uncertainty appears to rise sharply in recessions on the second question the types of exogenous shocks like wars financial panics and oil price jumps that cause recessions appear to directly increase uncertainty and uncertainty also appears to endogenously rise further during recessions on the third question the evidence suggests uncertainty is damaging for short run investment and hiring but there is some evidence it may stimulate longer run innovation finally in terms of the great recession the large jump in uncertainty in 2008 potentially accounted for about one third of the drop in gdp

capital account liberalization financial development and industry growth a synthetic view this paper synthesizes studies analyzing the effects of capital account liberalization on industry growth while controlling for financial crises domestic financial development and the strength of institutions we find evidence that financial openness has positive effects on the growth of financially dependent industries although these growth enhancing effects evaporate during financial crises further analysis indicates that the positive effects of capital account liberalization are limited to countries with relatively well developed financial systems good accounting standards strong creditor rights and rule of law it suggests that countries must reach a certain threshold in terms of institutional and economic development before they can expect to benefit from capital account liberalization

aid dutch disease and manufacturing growth abstract we examine the effects of aid on the growth of manufacturing using a methodology that exploits the variation within countries and across manufacturing sectors and corrects for possible reverse causality we find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country s competitiveness as reflected in the lower relative growth rate of exportable industries we provide some evidence suggesting that the channel for these effects is the real exchange rate appreciation caused by aid inflows we conjecture that this may explain in part why it is hard to find robust evidence that foreign aid helps countries grow

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

the value of relationships evidence from a supply shock to kenyan rose exports this paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation in the context of the kenyan rose export sector a model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and tested a seller s reputation is defined by buyer s beliefs about seller s reliability we show that i due to lack of enforcement the volume of trade is constrained by the value of the relationship ii the value of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship and iii during an exogenous negative supply shock deliveries are an inverted u shaped function of relationship s age models exclusively focusing on enforcement or insurance considerations cannot account for the evidence jel d86 f14 l14 o13 o19 q17 imperfect contract enforcement is a pervasive feature of real life commercial transactions in the absence of formal contract enforcement trading parties rely on informal mechanisms to guarantee contractual performance e g johnson mcmillan and woodruff 2002 greif 2005 fafchamps 2010 among those mechanisms long term relationships based on trust or reputation are perhaps the most widely studied and have received substantial theoretical attention the theoretical literature has developed a variety of models that capture salient features of real life relationships e g enforcement problems e g macleod and malcomson 1989 baker gibbons and murphy 1994 baker gibbons and murphy 2002 levin

volatility and development why is gdp growth so much more volatile in poor countries than in rich ones we identify four possible reasons i poor countries specialize in more volatile sectors ii poor countries specialize in fewer sectors iii poor countries experience more frequent and more severe aggregate shocks e g from macroeconomic policy and iv poor countries macroeconomic fluctuations are more highly correlated with the shocks of the sectors they specialize in we show how to decompose volatility into these four sources quantify their contribution to aggregate volatility and study how they relate to the stage of development we document the following regularities first as countries develop their productive structure moves from more volatile to less volatile sectors second the level of specialization declines with development at early stages and slowly increases at later stages of development third the volatility of country specific macroeconomic shocks falls with development fourth the covariance between sector specific and country specific shocks does not vary systematically with the level of development we argue that many theories linking volatility and development are not consistent with these findings and suggest new directions for future theoretical work

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

competitive policy development we present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies yet agree on certain common objectives policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals these investments are specific to a given proposal which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power competition undermines this agenda power forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker this beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals jel d72 d73 d78 e61 during the early years of the new deal president franklin delano roosevelt faced an enormous challenge he believed that dramatic policy innovation was urgently needed on a wide range of issues including agriculture trade banking employment and social insurance however although roosevelt was well versed in policy crafting workable proposals for such a far reaching agenda was well beyond his capacity or that of his immediate advisors instead the president had to rely on a broader array of politicians and bureaucrats to develop new policies although these individuals shared some common goals e g ending the great depression they also had deep seated ideological disagreements among themselves and with the president about what policies the federal government should pursue classic and contemporary theories of bureaucratic politics would suggest that this situation was ripe for exploitation and inefficiency weber 1991 famously argued that the typical ruler of a modern state is reduced to being a mere dilettante when dealing with institutionalized bureaucratic actors more recently scholars

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

financial development and openness evidence from panel data abstract this paper addresses the empirical question of whether trade and financial openness can help explain the recent pace in financial development as well as its variation across countries in recent years utilising annual data from developing and industrialised countries and dynamic panel estimation techniques we provide evidence which suggests that both types of openness are statistically significant determinants of banking sector development our findings reveal that the marginal effects of trade financial openness are negatively related to the degree of financial trade openness indicating that relatively closed economies stand to benefit most from opening up their trade and or capital accounts although these economies may be able to accomplish more by taking steps to open both their trade and capital accounts opening up one without the other could still generate gains in terms of banking sector development thus our findings provide only partial support to the well known rajan and zingales hypothesis which stipulates that both types of openness are necessary for financial development to take place