the missing dimension of the political resource curse debate given the methodological sophistication of the debate over the political resource curse the purported negative relationship between natural resource wealth in particular oil wealth and democracy it is surprising that scholars have not paid more attention to the basic statistical issue of how to deal with missing data this article highlights the problems caused by the most common strategy for analyzing missing data in the political resource curse literature listwise deletion and investigates how addressing such problems through the best practice technique of multiple imputation affects empirical results i find that multiple imputation causes the results of a number of influential recent studies to converge on a key common finding a political resource curse does exist but only since the widespread nationalization of petroleum industries in the 1970s this striking finding suggests that much of the controversy over the political resource curse has been caused by a neglect of missing data issues

commodity price shocks and civil conflict evidence from colombia how do income shocks aect armed con ict theory suggests two op posite eects if labor is used to appropriate resources violently higher wages may lower con ict by reducing labor supplied to appropriation this is the opportunity cost eect alternatively a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation this is the rapacity eect our paper exploits exogenous price shocks in inter national commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in colombia to assess how dierent income shocks aect con ict we examine changes in the price of agricultural goods which are labor intensive and natural resources which are capital intensive we focus on coee and oil the two largest exports we nd that a sharp fall in coee prices in the 1990s increased violence dierentially in regions growing more coee by lower ing wages and the opportunity cost of joining armed groups in contrast a rise in oil prices increased violence dierentially in the oil region by in creasing municipal revenue siphoned through rapacity this pattern holds in several other agricultural and natural resource sectors providing robust evidence that price shocks aect con ict in opposite directions depending on the factor intensity of the commodity

violence during democratization and the quality of democratic institutions abstract this paper investigates the impact of violent civil conflicts during the process of democratization on the institutional quality of the emerging democracies we propose a theory of endogenous regime transition in which violent conflict can arise in equilibrium peaceful transitions lead to a social contract that provides all groups with political representation and leads to better protection of civil liberties than violent transitions empirical evidence from the third wave of democratization based on a difference in difference methodology supports the theoretical predictions the findings suggest that compared to peaceful transitions violent conflicts during the democratic transition have persistent negative effects on the institutional quality of the emerging democracies

natural resources curse or blessing are natural resources a curse or a blessing the empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible this paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources these include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate deindustrialization and bad growth prospects and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law corruption presidential democracies and underdeveloped financial systems another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries and keeps in place bad policies finally resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets the survey also offers some welfare based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

rain and the democratic window of opportunity according to the economic approach to political transitions negative transitory economic shocks can give rise to a window of opportunity for democratic change we examine this hypothesis using yearly rainfall variation over the 1980 2004 period in 41 sub saharan african countries we find that a 25 drop in rainfall increases the probability of a transition to democracy during the following two years by around 3 percentage points a 5 fall in income due to low rainfall raises the probability of democratization by around 7 percentage points we also find that rainfall does not affect transitions from democracy to autocracy

the elusive curse of oil abstract our goal is to show that contrary to the claims made in several recent papers the effect of a large endowment of oil and other mineral resources on long term economic growth of countries has been on balance positive moreover the claims of a negative effect of oil and mineral wealth on the countries institutions are called into question

stock markets banks and growth panel evidence this paper investigates the impact of stock markets and banks on economic growth using a panel data set for the period 1976 98 and applying recent gmm techniques developed for dynamic panels on balance we find that stock markets and banks positively influence economic growth and these findings are not due to potential biases induced by simultaneity omitted variables or unobserved country specific effects

hicksian vs marshallian welfare measures why do we do what we do although they are in closely related fields environmental economists often use hicksian exact welfare measures whereas agricultural economists typically use marshallian surplus measures our general objective is to explore the determinants of that choice we begin with an illustration of the bias in marshallian measures based on the linear model then we review the differences in applied welfare economics as conducted by environmental and agricultural economists including differences in the types of data policy problems and parameter estimates that might account for their different approaches we show that correcting a marshallian measure for income effects may involve a loss of precision in order to reduce bias we then turn to a more specific analysis using the mean squared error criterion to evaluate the choice between exact hicksian and marshallian measures based on the semilog model

estimating the permanent income elasticity of government expenditures evidence on wagner s law based on oil price shocks this paper provides instrumental variable estimates of the permanent income elasticity of government expenditures it uses annual variation in the international oil price weighted with countries average oil net export gdp shares as a plausibly exogenous source of within country variation in countries permanent income the short run estimates of the permanent income elasticity are robust across alternative specifications and are below one the estimated elasticity coefficients range between 0 3 and 0 6 and have standard errors of 0 1 and 0 4 respectively point estimates of long run elasticities are somewhat larger but still smaller than unity the investment component of government spending is found to be more elastic than the consumption component whereas elasticity differences between rich and poor countries are insignificant

democracy and development the devil in the details does democracy promote economic development this paper reviews recent attempts to address this question that exploited within country variation it shows that the answer is largely positive but also depends on the details of democratic reforms first the sequence of economic vs political reforms matters countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better second different forms of democratic government lead to different economic policies and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy third it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy

causal relationships between public sector agricultural research expenditures and output allocative decisions concerning public sector agricultural research appear to be driven by both supply and politically mediated demand forces in sample granger tests along with post sample predictive tests suggest that simultaneity issues should not be ignored when modeling the research expenditure output relationship the results also provide strong evidence that the impact of research expenditures on agricultural output may persist for as long as thirty years these lags are substantially longer than those commonly used for agricultural research to date the lagged effect of output on research appears to be shorter though still between ten and twelve years in this article we analyze the empirical relationship between public sector agricultural research and agricultural output our interest in this question was spurred on two fronts first emphasis of the contemporary economic literature has shifted from an analysis of the consequences of technical change to an explanation of the observed rate and direction of inventive activity a substantial proportion of this literature has focused on appropriable technologies originating in the private sector and remained largely silent on related issues in the public sector here we analyze the dynamics of public sector research in particular publicly sponsored agricultural research in the

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

health and democracy in spite of the inexorable march of democracy around the globe just how democratic institutions a ect human well being is open to debate the evidence that democracy promotes prosperity is neither strong nor robust moreover which aspects of policy making and human well being are promoted by democracies is still a subject of debate 1 even if correlations between democracy and outcome measures can be found there is an overriding di culty of interpreting them as causal e ects whether democracy matters per se or simply serves as a proxy for societal and political development presents a di cult problem for research in this area thinkers such as lipset 1959 have argued that democracy can thrive only when conditions are right if this is correct then becoming democratic may only serve as a proxy for these hard to measure cultural and societal preconditions this paper explores these issues further by reconsidering the link between democracy and health using panel data from a cross section of countries the

reevaluating the modernization hypothesis we revisit and critically reevaluate the widely accepted modernization hypothesis which claims that per capita income causes the creation and the consolidation of democracy existing studies find support for this hypothesis because they fail to control for the presence of omitted variables controlling for these factors either by including country fixed effects in a linear model or by including parameterized random effects in a nonlinear double hazard model removes the correlation between income and the likelihood of transitions to and from democratic regimes in addition the estimated fixed effects from the linear model are related to historical factors that affect both the level of income per capita and the likelihood of democracy in a country this evidence is consistent with the idea that events during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political economic development paths some leading to prosperity and democracy others to relative poverty and non democracy

an economic analysis of expenditures on agricultural experiment station research experiment station research expenditures are responsive to economic and institutional forces a four equation model of resources allocation to state agricultural experiment station research consisting of demand and supply equations for research an equation allocating state governmental revenues to station research and an expenditure identity is presented a reduced form expenditure equation derived from this model is fitted to cross sectional data for forty eight u s states pooled together for 1960 1965 and 1970 a large share of the variance in per capita expenditures of state agricultural experiment stations is explained by the variables included in the model

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

evaluating returns to agricultural research a review this paper reviews and compares the most common approaches used to evaluate public agricultural research investment ex post studies fall into two major groups a consumer and producer surplus analyses estimating average rates of return to research and b production function analyses estimating marginal rates of return to research ex ante studies fall into four groups a those using scoring models to rank research activities b those employing benefit cost analysis to establish rates of return to research c those using simulation models and d those using mathematical programming to select an optimal mix of research activities

do giant oilfield discoveries fuel internal armed conflicts we use new data to examine the effects of giant oilfield discoveries around the world since 1946 on average these discoveries increase per capita oil production and oil exports by up to 50 percent but these giant oilfield discoveries also have a dark side they increase the incidence of internal armed conflict by about 5 8 percentage points this increased incidence of conflict due to giant oilfield discoveries is especially high for countries that had already experienced armed conflicts or coups in the decade prior to discovery

estimation with censored regressors basic issues we study issues that arise for estimation of a linear model when a regressor is censored we discuss the efficiency losses from dropping censored observations and illustrate the losses for bound censoring we show that the common practice of introducing a dummy variable to correct for censoring does not correct bias or improve estimation we show how censored observations generally have zero semiparametric information and we discuss implications for estimation we derive the likelihood function for a parametric model of mixed bound independent censoring and apply that model to the estimation of wealth effects on consumption

fuel riots definition evidence and policy implications for a new type of energy related conflict abstract fuel riots are a distinct type of energy related conflict we provide the first fuel riots database and explore their social economic and environmental drivers the analysis demonstrates links between fuel riots and high international crude oil prices in countries characterised by weak state capacity deficient governance fuel scarcity and poor economic performance we suggest a potential causal pathway for fuel riots when international fuel prices spike net fuel importing countries bear higher costs if these countries are politically unstable and their government inefficient the likelihood of fuel riots is high wealthier countries can absorb price increases and maintain subsidies as opposed to poorer societies where fuel riots are more likely our findings demonstrate the role of state capacity and socio economic conditions in enabling conflict and will inform policy by identifying fertile ground for fuel riots i e societies likely to be affected by increases in fuel prices due to scarcity and climate action such as carbon taxes we propose that policies which better control international prices and action designed to reduce political instability in vulnerable countries are key to preventing fuel riots fuel subsidy reform must anticipate popular opposition and mitigate the impact upon vulnerable populations in order to reduce the likelihood of instability and minimise hardship

the uk consumption boom of the late 1980s aggregate implications of microeconomic evidence two competing explanations of the uk consumer boom in the late 1980s are the financial liberalisation imperfect housing market hypothesis of muellbauer and murphy and the expectations hypothesis of king we use 15 years of family expenditure surveys and cohort analysis to investigate to what extent these two hypotheses agree with observed changes in consumption patterns we find that the housing markets explanation accounts for much of the increase by older cohorts but cannot be reconciled with the marked rise in expenditure levels of younger households a simple simulation exercise shows instead that the expectations hypothesis can generate increases of expenditure by young consumers of the magnitude observed in our data

the first law of petropolitics finalversion received19 april2011 we examine empirically the relationship between crude oil prices and the ebb and ow of democratic insti tutions in order to test the hypothesis that high oil prices undermine democracy and sustain autocracy we use a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and timeperiods nding strictly no evidence in favour of this so called first law of petropolitics friedman2006

international commodity prices growth and the outbreak of civil war in sub saharan africa to learn more about the effect of economic conditions on civil war we examine whether sub saharan civil wars are more likely to start following downturns in the international price of countries main export commodities the data show a robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreak of civil wars we also find that sub saharan countries are more likely to see civil wars following economic downturns in their main oecd export destinations

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

measuring poverty in a growing world or measuring growth in a poor world the extent to which growth reduces global poverty has been disputed for 30 years although there are better data than ever before controversies are not resolved a major problem is that consumption measured from household surveys which is used to measure poverty grows less rapidly than consumption measured in national accounts in the world as a whole and in large countries particularly india china and the united states in consequence measured poverty has fallen less rapidly than appears warranted by measured growth in poor countries one plausible cause is that richer households are less likely to participate in surveys but growth in the national accounts is also upward biased and consumption in the national accounts contains large and rapidly growing items that are not consumed by the poor and not included in surveys so it is possible for consumption of the poor to grow less rapidly than national consumption without any increase in measured inequality current statistical procedures in poor

female labour supply and on the job search an empirical model estimated using complementary data sets we develop an empirical model of labour supply that is consistent with on the job search and which is identified and estimated by combining two data sets the u k family expenditure survey which contains information on income and expenditure and the u k labour force survey which has data on hours and job search behaviour we provide statistical evidence on the compatibility of the two samples for the purposes of estimating our model we find that search has a direct negative effect on hours of work and we establish a strong positive effect of wages on hours

natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation summary this paper studies the link between resource abundance and human capital accumulation it reviews the commonly used indicators of resource abundance and human capital accumulation the case for a form of resource curse in human capital accumulation is not robust to reasonable changes in these indicators in fact subsoil wealth and resource rents per capita are shown to be significantly correlated with improved indicators of human capital accumulation if mineral wealth is what authors have in mind when they refer to natural resource abundance then they should choose indicators that measure this concept as accurately as possible

on the incidence and duration of price wars the purpose of this paper is to test some theoretical predictions about the incidence and duration of price wars when these price wars are viewed as an enforcement device to maintain a cooperative or tacitly collusive agreement in an uncertain environment the theoretical model of green and porter i984 and porter i983a predicts that price wars should be triggered by unanticipated demand fluctuations and that they will be more frequent the greater the number of firms in the industry or the greater the degree of market concentration correspondingly the optimal duration of price wars is also affected by the number of firms the tests employ weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel henceforth referred to as the jec from i88o to i886 porter i 983b and lee and porter i 984 previously used this data in order to identify periods in which price wars occurred and to test whether pricing behavior in cooperative periods was consistent with predictions of the theoretical model the present paper will look more closely at the price wars themselves in order to test another set of predictions about their incidence and duration section 2 summarizes the theoretical model in more detail with emphasis on markets with price setting firms the models in green and porter i984 and porter i 983a consider quantity setting firms but the railroads in the jec chose prices not quantities the distinction has some bearing on the econometric work but the basic ideas from the theory still apply there is a brief description of thejec and the data set in section 3 empirical results are covered in section 4 and section 5 contains some concluding comments

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

the impact of declining oil rents on tax revenues does the shadow economy matter abstract we study the association between oil rents and tax revenues highlighting the importance of the shadow economy se as a moderating factor in this relationship declining oil rents may not lead to higher tax efforts in a state if the se is sizable using a sample of 124 countries from 1991 to 2015 our panel data regression analysis illustrates the moderating role of the se in the final effect of negative oil rent shocks on tax revenues a decline in oil rents following negative oil price shocks ceases to have any significant positive impact on tax revenues in countries with an se representing more than 35 of gross domestic product the results are robust after controlling for country and year fixed effects other determinants of tax revenues and using a dynamic model

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

why resource poor dictators allow freer media a theory and evidence from panel data every dictator dislikes free media yet many nondemocratic countries have partially free or almost free media in this article we develop a theory of media freedom in dictatorships and provide systematic statistical evidence in support of this theory in our model free media allow a dictator to provide incentives to bureaucrats and therefore to improve the quality of government the importance of this benefit varies with the natural resource endowment in resource rich countries bureaucratic incentives are less important for the dictator hence media freedom is less likely to emerge using panel data we show that controlling for country fixed effects media are less free in oil rich economies with the effect especially pronounced in nondemocratic regimes these results are robust to model specification and the inclusion of various controls including the level of economic development democracy country size size of government and others

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

the prebisch singer hypothesis four centuries of evidence we employ a unique data set and new time series techniques to reexamine the existence of trends in relative primary commodity prices the data set comprises 25 commodities and provides a new historical perspective spanning the seventeenth to the twenty first centuries new tests for the trend function robust to the order of integration of the series are applied to the data results show that eleven price series present a significant and downward trend over all or some fraction of the sample period in the very long run a secular deteriorating trend is a relevant phenomenon for a significant proportion of primary commodities 2010 the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

asymmetric oil price shocks tax revenues and the resource curse abstract the paper proposes an asymmetric relationship between oil rents and institutions such that only positive oil windfalls adversely affect institutional quality and negative oil windfalls have no impact we test this theory empirically by studying the dynamics of institutional quality in russian regions we find that increases in tax revenues caused by exogenous positive oil price shocks do not change regional income but increase corruption and reduce regional democracy and governance quality declines in tax revenues from negative oil price shocks do not affect institutional quality but decrease regional income

agricultural research effort conceptual clarity and measurement abstract this paper emphasizes the need for basic conceptual clarity regarding the measures of research effort in econometric analyses this conceptual clarity could help reduce the misinterpretation of historical and institutional contexts underlying agricultural research effort after a brief review of econometric studies estimating the returns to and determinants of research the centrality of the conceptual contextual and causal significance of this measure is examined conceptualized and measured at the input frontier of the research process an expenditure measure of research reveals the institutional features and changes in the research process in india over time this basic understanding is essential to develop appropriate econometric specifications and correspondingly effective research policy statements

is the uk balance of payments sustainable the uk current account deficit john muellbauer and anthony murphy the uk has a large and persistent current account deficit policy makers argue that the deficit is easily financed temporary and therefore not a sign of structural weakness we examine the conditions in which it is appropriate for a country to overspend its current income with the intention of repaying loans out of future income these include an increase in international capital mobility larger net holdings of foreign assets and expectations of faster productivity growth all three apply to the uk so official reasoning is in part correct even so for several decades there has been a trend deterioration of uk trade performance most markedly in manufacturing and we detect no underlying improvement in the 1980s we highlight structural deficiencies in both demand and supply on the demand side we show the importance of rising house prices and easier consumer credit in fuelling the consumer boom to an unwarranted extent this we trace to unjustifiable subsidies to house ownership on the supply side we stress vastly inadequate investment in skill formation education and physical capital these structural deficiencies lead us to a less optimistic view than official policy we draw the policy lessons for the uk and consider whether continental europe will face similar problems as financial markets are liberalized

a lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover we consider an autocracy where the ruling elite control both the resource wealth and ed ucation policies education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the elite however education also increases the awareness of citizens capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor market aspirations and forces the elite to ex pand redistribution or handover the power a power handover leads to a more democratic regime where the elite retains at least partially its economic power this trade offis the backbone of our lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover this theory provides new insights on the positive relationship between economic development education and de mocratization and on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization finally we revisit the resources curse hypothesis within our setting

on the timing of political regime changes in resource dependent economies we consider a resource dependent economy initially ruled by the elite the transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite the occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities both being driven by the elite s redistribution and repression policies first we show that when a political transition is inevitable the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office second we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance and how it relates to the elite s policies more resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime which may not be the case of a repressive regime finally we interpret the arab spring sequence in light of our findings

a multiple source of innovation model of agricultural research and technology promotion abstract two models of agricultural research and technology diffusion are described and contrasted the central source of innovation model frequently underlies the theories and rhetoric of agricultural research and extension institutions the multiple source of innovation model places agricultural research and diffusion processes in the historical political economic agroclimatic and institutional context in which technological change takes place the paper discusses the evidence and reasons for the dominance of the central model and reviews the significance of the multiple source model for agricultural research policy

oil price shocks income and democracy he effect of natural resource wealth and income on political institutions is a central issue at the intersection of economics and political sciences we contribute to this research by examining the effect of international oil price fluctuations on democratic institutions over the 1960 2007 period we also exploit the very persistent response of aggregate income to oil prices to study the effect of persistent oil price driven income shocks on democracy our results indicate that countries with greater net oil exports over gdp see improvements in democratic institutions following upturns in international oil prices for example positive oil price shocks lead to improvements in the polity democracy score as well as the subscores for executive constraints executive recruitment and political competition and a higher probability of a democratic transition we estimate that an oil price driven 1 percentage point increase in per capita gdp growth increases the polity democracy score by around 0 2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentage points in the long run the effect on the probability of a democratic transition is around 0 4 percentage points our work relates to the literature on the link between political institutions and natural resource wealth and income an influential early contribution is lipset 1959 who documents that high income countries tend to be more democratic he argues that this positive correlation arises because higher per capita income is a symptom of the modernization of society and that modernization also increases citizens demand for political participation the positive association between income and democracy has also been emphasized by huntington 1991 who holds that higher per capita income was one of the key factors behind the

the emergence of cooperation among egoists this article investigates the conditions under which cooperation will emerge in a world of egoists without central authority this problem plays an important role in such diverse fields as political philosophy international politics and economic and social exchange the problem is formalized as an iterated prisoner s dilemma with pairwise interaction among a population of individuals results from three approaches are reported the tournament approach the ecological approach and the evolutionary approach the evolutionary approach is the most general since all possible strategies can be taken into account a series of theorems is presented which show 1 the conditions under which no strategy can do any better than the population average if the others are using the reciprocal cooperation strategy of tit for tat 2 the necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be collectively stable and 3 how cooperation can emerge from a small cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of unconditional defection

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

democratisation and growth this article challenges cross sectional findings that democracy has a negligible effect on growth we employ a new dataset of political transitions during the third wave of democratisation and examine the within effect of democratisation in countries that abandoned autocracy and consolidated representative institutions the panel estimates imply that on average democratisations are associated with a 1 increase in annual per capita growth the dynamic analysis reveals that while during the transition growth is slow in the medium and long run it stabilises at a higher level this evidence favours development theories of democratic rule and friedrich hayek 1960 s idea that the merits of democracy appear in the long run leading politicians and commentators have argued that democratisation will bring prosperity and growth into pariah and economically poorly performing countries 1 others however remain sceptical pointing to the mixed and inconclusive empirical evidence the old debate dating back to plato and aristotle on which political regime is socially and economically optimal arises again this debate is not purely academic and philosophical as it has important policy implications in the last thirty years the world has experienced an unprecedented move towards democratic institutions influential policy makers and scholars urge western authorities to foster democratic movements in totalitarian countries see the economist article philosophers and kings june 19th 2003 yet the question remains will democratisation bring economic growth to assess the average growth effect of a successful democratic transition we analyse the evolution of annual real per capita gdp growth before and after incidents of permanent democratic reform in the 1960 2003 period in our analysis we exploit a newly constructed dataset of permanent democratisations during the so called third wave of democratisation and the 1990s when many former socialist countries moved towards representative rule the panel results reveal new evidence that contrast with the previous mainly cross sectional work first conditioning on time invariant country characteristics and global shocks a permanent democratisation is associated with approximately a one half to one per cent increment in annual real per capita gdp growth second a dynamic j shaped effect emerges with considerable though not this article is a major revision of an earlier paper titled aristotle was right stable democracy fosters

the informational content of surnames the evolution of intergenerational mobility and assortative mating we propose a new methodology for measuring intergenerational mobility in economic well being our method is based on the joint distribution of surnames and economic outcomes it circumvents the need for intergenerational panel data a long standing stumbling block for understanding mobility it does so by using cross sectional data alongside a calibrated structural model to recover the traditional intergenerational elasticity measures our main idea is simple if inheritance is important for economic outcomes then rare surnames should predict economic outcomes in the cross section this is because rare surnames are indicative of familial linkages if the number of rare surnames is small this approach will not work however rare surnames are abundant in the highly skewed nature of surname distributions from most western societies we develop a model that articulates this idea and shows that the more important is inheritance the more informative will be surnames this result is robust to a variety of different assumptions about fertility and mating we apply our method using the 2001 census from catalonia a large region of spain we use educational attainment as a proxy for overall economic well being a calibration exercise results in an estimate of the intergenerational correlation of educational attainment of 0 60 we also find evidence suggesting that mobility has decreased among the different generations of the 20th century a complementary analysis based on sibling correlations confirms our results and provides a robustness check on our method our model and our data allow us to examine one possible explanation for the observed decrease in mobility we find that the degree of assortative mating has increased over time overall we argue that our method has promise because it can tap the vast mines of census data that are available in a heretofore unexploited manner

does foreign aid corrupt abstract we estimate the impact of foreign aid on corruption using geographical and cultural distance to the donor countries as instrumental variables to assess causality aid decreases corruption our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to different controls

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

effects of international food price shocks on political institutions in low income countries evidence from an international food net export price index we examine the effects of variations in the international food prices on political institutions in low income countries our empirical analysis exploits that the economic impact of changes in the international food prices differs across countries depending on whether countries are net food importers or exporters we construct an international food net export price index that captures this heterogeneity our panel fixed effects analysis yields that in low income countries within country variations in the international food net export price index are significantly negatively related to democratic institutions we further explore the mechanisms driving this relationship along the economic and the conflict dimensions

resource windfalls political regimes and political stability abstract we study theoretically and empirically whether natural resource windfalls affect political regimes we show that windfalls have no effect on democracies while they have heterogeneous political consequences in autocracies in deeply entrenched autocracies the effect of windfalls is virtually nil while in moderately entrenched autocracies windfalls significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of the political system to frame the empirical work we present a simple model in which political incumbents choose the degree of political contestability and potential challengers decide whether to try to unseat the incumbents the model uncovers a mechanism for the asymmetric impact of resource windfalls on democracies and autocracies as well as the the differential impact within autocracies

determinants of democracy a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights the propensity for democracy rises with per capita gdp primary schooling and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment for a given standard of living democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle class share of income the apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant similarly the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation however negative effects from muslim and non religious affiliations remain intact

cooperation in prices and capacities trade associations in brewing after repeal this study s main contribution is examination of the excess capacity held by brewers during a period in which they tacitly cooperated on price the analysis covers the industry in the united states between repeal of prohibition in 1933 and wartime rationing of raw materials in 1942 from april 1933 to may 1935 destructive price cutting among brewers was illegal under the national industrial recovery act subsequent rivalry among trade associations facilitated the development of tacitly cooperative pricing arrangements the trade associations appear to have adopted a different agenda as cooperation spread among all brewers instead of just facilitating cooperation on price the associations may have facilitated cooperation in the distribution of responsibility for enforcement members apparently distributed responsibility by coordinating the allocation of excess capacity these and other results are interpreted to suggest additional avenues for research on the distribution of responsibility for punishme

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

are windfalls a curse abstract a puzzling feature of temporary terms of trade booms is that some countries have responded to such windfalls by running current account deficits furthermore those countries that ran current account deficits failed to attain greater post boom growth rates indicating the deficits were consumed or invested in low quality projects the point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in determining outcomes if fiscal control is unitary then the consumption smoothing effect is operative and representative agent models of the current account have predictive power however if control is divided among several fiscal claimants a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption smoothing effect leading to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive temporary shock we model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself this results in a deterioration of the current account we also show that all the windfall is dissipated with the country experiencing no increase in welfare 1998 elsevier science b v

the resource curse exorcised evidence from a panel of countries abstract this paper evaluates the impact of major natural resource discoveries since 1950 on gdp per capita using panel fixed effects estimation and resource discoveries in countries that were not previously resource rich as a plausibly exogenous source of variation i find a positive effect on gdp per capita levels following resource exploitation that persists in the long term results vary significantly between oecd and non oecd treatment countries with effects concentrated within the non oecd group i further test gdp effects with synthetic control analysis on each individual treated country yielding results consistent with the average effects found with the fixed effects model

household gasoline demand in the united states supported by the mit center for energy and environmental policy research the u s dept of energy and the national science foundation

from education to democracy the conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy this paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on crosssectional correlations which disappear once we look at within country variation in other words there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more likely to become democratic

primary commodity prices manufactured goods prices and the terms of trade of developing countries what the long run shows the authors revisit in this article the empirical foundation of the alleged secular decline in the prices of primary commodities relative to those of manufactures they use a newly constructed index of commodity prices and two modified indexes of manufactured good prices and find that from 1900 to 1986 the relative prices of all primary commodities fell on trend by 0 5 percent a year and those of nonfuel primary commodities by 0 6 percent a year they thus confirm the sign but not the magnitude of the trend implicit in the work of prebisch but even the more limited secular decline shown by their relative price indexes may be magnified by an incomplete account of quality improvements in manufactures they then show that the evolution of terms of trade of nonfuel primary commodities is not the same as that of the net barter terms of trade of non oil exporting developing countries finally they find that despite the decline that has probably occurred during the current century in the terms of trade of nonfuel primary commodities the purchasing power of total exports of these products has increased considerably similarly the fall that may have occurred after world war ii in the net barter terms of trade of developing countries seems to have been more than compensated for by the steady improvement in their income terms of trade

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

a brief review of some problems in using national accounts data in level of output comparisons and growth studies abstract after an initial burst of enthusiasm for establishing their national accounts 30 or 40 years ago some countries have made continuous improvements while others have done little to maintain even their initial system presently most developing countries make their basic estimate of gdp from the production side and most do not have adequate surveys to permit a consistency check of their production and expenditure side estimates the base surveys for expenditures and production are typically over ten years old and the lags in basic surveys for constructing constant price estimates are frequently longer a number of countries estimate their growth from a weighted average of volume indexes and make no attempt at direct deflation many of those that do deflate their current expenditure estimates do so at a very aggregate level users of national accounts should be aware of the varying quality of the estimates across countries and hopefully continual questioning of the numbers will help to encourage improvement

income and population growth do populations grow as countries become richer in this study we estimate the effects on population growth of shocks to national income that are plausibly exogenous and unlikely to be driven by technological change for a panel of over 139 countries spanning the period 1960 2007 we interact changes in international oil prices with countries average net export shares of oil in gdp controlling for country and time fixed effects we find that this measure of oil price induced income growth is positively associated with population growth the iv estimates indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in gdp per capita growth over a 10 year period increases countries population growth by around 0 1 percentage points furthermore we find that this population effect results from both a positive effect on fertility and a negative effect on infant and child mortality

more oil less democracy evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries this article exploits variations in the timing and size of oil discoveries to identify the impact of oil wealth on democracy i find that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil approximately the initial endowment of iraq pushes a country s democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades the estimated effect is larger for oilfields with higher quality oil and lower exploration and extraction costs however the estimates become less precise when oil abundance is measured by oil discovery per capita suggesting politicians may care about the level instead of the per capita value of oil wealth

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

collusion in dynamic oligopolies in the presence of entry threats this paper considers a generalized oligopoly supergame where an endogenous entry decision is included the author proves that strategies based on most severe symmetric punishments can sustain some degree of collusion even with arbitrarily small entry barriers provided that the discount rate is sufficiently small the model provides a justification for a view suggesting that neither substantial barriers to entry nor strategic or informational asymmetries are necessary for an oligopoly with some degree of cooperation to prevail copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

commodity prices and growth in africa a frican economies export primary commodities and most export little else policymakers as well as economists and historians of african economic development have seen these exports as both a hope and a curse the following parable tells the story once upon a time a servant of the ruler discovered a miraculous plant which grew readily in that country and whose seeds could be woven into fine cloth so desirable was this fabric that it became prized all over the world and fetched a high price after two score years the plant accounted for most of the country s trade with the world the ruler ordered the peasants to grow the plant paid them only a fraction of its price and he and his nobles became fabulously wealthy because the ruler wished to be remembered as a great ruler and as the father of his country he used his wealth to build a great army and brought machines from foreign countries to make the fine goods that previously could only be obtained from foreign merchants but the machines often broke down and the goods that they made were of poor quality and after the ruler died they were left to rust under the ruler s successor there was a war in a foreign land where the plant also grew so that there was a great shortage and its price increased threefold in only three seasons the new ruler spent his newfound riches on fantastic extravagance while immense sums were expended on public works after the manner of the east and on productive works carried out in the wrong way or too soon not even the threefold increase in prices could support these expenditures and the country soon found itself deeply in debt when the war ended and the price fell the country could no longer pay the interest on its debt or borrow more money even after it had sold its only useful public work to a foreign power so that power sent a mission to the country the publication of whose report from which the above

technology in a world of national frontiers abstract the accumulation of scientific knowledge and its application to production are accelerating the institutionalization of research in universities and corporate bodies was the first accelerator early in the century nationalism and the intensification of international competition are the current accelerators at the century s end nationalism increasingly drives r d through three mechanisms military rivalry trade rivalry and prestige rivalry the resultant steady rise in oecd countries r d spending as a percentage of gnp is by no means to be automatically applauded in particular it intensifies the problem of the developing countries for technology transfer remains for all the siren talk of alternatives a matter of hard slog learning and the task gets harder and harder

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

why research partnerships really matter innovation theory institutional arrangements and implications for developing new technology for the poor abstract this paper explores the conceptual basis for existing and emergent institutional patterns in the context of partnership approaches to technology development drawing examples from recent studies of private enterprise activity in india smallholder horticulture it suggests that agricultural innovation as a process involves a wider range of organizational types than the conventional policy focus on public sector research organizations would tend to suggest it uses the concept of a national innovation system to argue that a partnership approach is adopted as a core methodology for engaging science and technology development with the livelihood demands of the poor

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

natural resource wealth and the survival of autocracy does natural resource wealth impede transitions to democracy this article revisits this question with an event history design that differs from the approach used in other recent statistical tests of rentier state theory the research confirms that autocracy is typically more durable in countries with substantial resource wealth and the author finds this effect is robust to other measures proposed to explain the dearth of democracy in the middle east or the muslim world along the way the author raises concerns about the use of all countries and all years samples to test theories of democratization arguing that this design can obscure important differences in the forces driving stability and change among different types of political regimes

the long run effects of oil wealth on development evidence from petroleum geology we estimate the long run effects of oil wealth on development by exploiting spatial variation in sedimentary basins areas where petroleum can potentially form instrumental variables estimates indicate that oil production impedes democracy and fiscal capacity development increases corruption and raises gdp per capita without significantly harming the non resource sectors of the economy we find no evidence that oil production increases internal armed conflict coup attempts or political purges in several specifications failure to account for endogeneity leads to substantial underestimation of the adverse effects of oil suggesting that countries with higher quality political institutions and greater fiscal capacity disproportionately select into oil production