uncertainty and species recovery program design abstract this paper explores economic aspects of reintroducing large wide ranging mammalian carnivores such as wolves and grizzly bears to their native habitats the key tension is that such species can inflict transboundary damages for which managers are not liable with certainty we show that this tension can be offset by the manager s judicious choice of habitat as habitat contributes both directly to the likelihood of the species survival from a biological point of view and indirectly as precautionary capital that partially mitigates damages we show how uncertainty over liability for damages affects the likelihood of the species survival and we conclude with a discussion of optimal compensation mechanisms

uncertainty bailouts and the kornai effect abstract we investigate the effects of bailouts on a firm with negative profits the production function is cobb douglas and the firm experiences both revenue and cost uncertainty the effect of bailouts on input demand depends on the technology the variances of the random variables and the correlation between them

the political economy of public income volatility with an application to the resource curse abstract in recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in greece or to unstable oil prices in venezuela we study the political consequences of such public income volatility as is standard in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re election probabilities but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power making policy more efficient yet at the same time it also reduces the re election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future this makes inefficient policy such as patronage public employment less costly our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth in the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices a characteristic of many developing countries we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction jointly interacting with increased patronage employment

the need for enemies we develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage creating an incentive to underperform in the task we test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents using colombian data the main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them especially in electorally salient places we find that after the largest victories against farc rebels the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts especially in politically important municipalities politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

detecting abnormal credit union performance abstract credit unions are an important financial intermediary but little credit union research is done a primary reason for the lack of research is the cooperative nature of the industry making traditional methods of detecting abnormal performance inappropriate this paper proposes two methods of detecting abnormal performance one parametric the other non parametric instead of testing the efficiency of the institution this paper proposes testing the return vector as indicated in the theoretical objective function of the member simulations demonstrate that both methods are correctly specified and powerful

a derivation of the marginal abatement cost curve abstract the relationship between a firm s technology and its marginal abatement cost mac curve is explored even under the simplest specifications the mac curve will be kinked at some point except under a special assumption which in reality could easily be violated the nondifferentiability implies that the choice of instrument under uncertainty may depend on the targeted level of emissions reduction also stability conditions for dynamic tax mechanisms may be violated in the neighborhood of the kink point a policy implication is that in some cases output restrictions are as efficient as emissions restrictions in contrast to previous results

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

marginal abatement costs of co2 emissions in the thermal power sector a regional empirical analysis from china abstract quantifying marginal abatement costs of co2 emissions are beneficial to estimate mitigation potentials and costs of china s regional thermal power sector based on the panel data of 30 provinces from 2004 to 2013 this study estimates the technical efficiency reduction potential and marginal abatement costs of co2 emissions from the thermal power sector in china using a parametric quadratic directional output distance function a regression analysis is undertaken to identify the factors that drive marginal abatement costs the main results are 1 the mean value of directional output distance function in china s thermal power sector is 0 0449 indicating that inefficient production of chinese thermal power sector accounts for 4 49 co2 emissions could be mitigated by accumulated 1 22 billion ton in the past ten year which is approximate 4 49 of total co2 emissions 2 the national weighted average marginal abatement costs of co2 emissions are 316 51 yuan ton which is far higher than carbon price in the current ets emission trading system pilots in china implying that carbon price does not inflect supply and demand of carbon allowance 3 the regression results show that the marginal abatement costs positively connect with regional power scale namely a 1 increase in power scale will result in a 13 8 increase technology level coal supply and power structure are negatively correlated with marginal abatement costs namely a 1 increase in technology level coal supply and power structure will result respectively in a 30 41 4 38 and 77 7 decrease

the effects of bailouts and soft budget constraints on the environment this paper investigates the effects of financial relief programs commonly referred to as bailouts on pollution a partial equilibrium soft budget constraint model of the firm is developed to identify the effect of bailouts on the emission decisions of firms the results from the model indicate that the expectation of bailouts increases ex ante emissions a more stringent emissions tax is required to achieve the same level of emissions if bailouts are available than if bailouts are not available however a tradable permit system will maintain the same emissions level if bailouts are available as when bailouts are not available

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

the toxic intensity of industrial production global patterns trends and trade policy this paper exploits a newly developed data set to investigate recent changes in the international distribution of industrial pollution in particular the authors examine three issues 1 the relationship between the toxic intensity of industrial production and the level of economic development 2 the impact of oecd environmental regulation on global changes in toxic intensity and 3 the relationship between trade policy and the toxic intensity of industrial production in ldc s 10 refs

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

what are the key drivers of mac curves a partial equilibrium modelling approach for the uk marginal abatement cost mac curves are widely used for the assessment of costs related to co2 emissions reduction in environmental economics as well as domestic and international climate policy several meta analyses and model comparisons have previously been performed that aim to identify the causes for the wide range of mac curves most of these concentrate on general equilibrium models with a focus on aspects such as specific model type and technology learning while other important aspects remain almost unconsidered including the availability of abatement technologies and level of discount rates this paper addresses the influence of several key parameters on mac curves for the united kingdom and the year 2030 a technology rich energy system model uk markal is used to derive the mac curves the results of this study show that mac curves are robust even to extreme fossil fuel price changes while uncertainty around the choice of the discount rate the availability of key abatement technologies and the demand level were singled out as the most important influencing factors by using a different model type and studying a wider range of influencing factors this paper contributes to the debate on the sensitivity of mac curves

the price concentration relationship in banking the commonly observed positive correlation between market concentration and profitability may be explained by noncompetitive pricing behavior as argued by the structure performance hypothesis or by the greater efficiency of firms with dominant market shares as argued by the efficient structure hypothesis by examining the price concentration relationship instead of the profit concentration relationship this paper tests the structure performance hypothesis in a manner that excludes the efficient structure hypothesis as an alternative explanation of the results the results strongly support the structure performance hypothesis and are robust with respect to model specification measurement of concentration and econometric technique copyright 1989 by mit press

how effective is green regulatory threat governments use green regulatory threat as an instrument to induce voluntary pollution abatement by firms if threats suffice to induce adequate reductions in emissions they may save considerable implementation and monitoring costs however green regulatory threat can only induce emission reductions when firms find the threat credible and do not free ride on other firms abatement effort the effect of regulatory threat can be backed out from the data by conditioning abatement effort on firm characteristics 1 theory suggests a measure of environmental exposure that combines a firm s 1 composition and toxicity of emissions 2 its size and pollution intensity and 3 its location that determines the size of the population at risk furthermore firms abatement effort is conditioned on whether they meet participation and incentive constraints determined by their unabated pollution intensity and unit abatement cost then firms position relative to other firms their rung on the abatement ladder determines their participation in abatement activity

a political economy theory of the soft budget constraint why do soft budget constraints exist and persist in this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness we develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal we show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do this encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival in consequence even when information is complete politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future we show that maybe somewhat surprisingly dictators who are less likely to lose power are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support

entrepreneurship and economic theory this article discusses economic theories of entrepreneurship drawing principally on work conducted in labour economics microeconomics macroeconomics and financial economics the article explains how incentives and constraints of various kinds affect occupational choices and entrepreneurial innovation as well as how entrepreneurial decisions affect macroeconomic performance implications for public policy are drawn

does centralization increase the size of government abstract are fiscal programs larger or smaller if they are run centrally rather than locally in a prospective federation we abstract completely from well understood economic issues and focus instead on the political effects of centralization for fiscal programs with benefits broadly spread in the population such as redistributive transfer schemes social insurance and general government consumption centralization changes the coalition of voters who favor a large program in a direction that depends on the nature of the redistributive instrument for fiscal programs with localized benefits such as provision of local public goods centralization creates opportunities for rent seeking which increases the size of government

lessons from the past capital markets during the 19th century and the interwar period on friday 13 august 1982 finance minster jesus silva herzog of mexico made a series of visits to the international monetary fund the federal reserve and the u s treasury his message to each was the same mexico could no longer continue to service its debt thus began a dramatic weekend of negotiations that marked the end of the preceding decade s buoyant expansion of developing country debt and the start of a still continuing response to the sudden collapse

environmental innovation and the cost of pollution abatement revisited it is widely assumed in the literature that environmental innovation reduces the marginal cost of pollution abatement in this paper we show that this is not necessarily the case and we provide some unexpected outcomes

central banks and financial stability rediscovering the lender of last resort practice in a finance economy the purpose of our paper is to assess whether central banks have adopted new practices of lending in last resort during the 2007 09 financial crisis we compare the current period with the classical period both featured by a finance economy with developed financial markets and unregulated institutions beyond the differences determined by the monetary regime and concerning the central bank rate policy we find similarities such as the enlargements of the set of counterparties and eligible collateral assets since the credit system is based on financial markets and innovations central banks have a wider involvement that goes beyond a narrow conception of the lender of last resort that prevailed under a regulated banking system we conclude that the historical roots of financial stabilisation by central banks in a finance economy have just been rediscovered and that the functions of lender of last resort and market maker of last resort may be analytically integrated copyright oxford university press

bank commercial loan markets and the role of market structure evidence from surveys of commercial lending abstract this paper seeks to test two tenets that underlie the current practice of antitrust analysis in banking the first is the view that bank commercial loan markets are local in nature and the second is the view that banks in more concentrated markets are more likely to engage in some form of noncompetitive behavior tests of both of these tenets are conducted using an extensive set of loan specific survey information not previously employed to address these issues results consistent with the existence of local banking markets and the dominance of competitive differences as an explanation for observed differences in loan rates are found

the hotspots reference routes and research trends of marginal abatement costs a systematic review abstract as one of the most effective means of evaluating environmental policies marginal abatement costs macs have been adopted in a growing body of research this study characterizes the mac related literature from 1993 to 2018 on web of science based on a systematic review bibliometric analysis and mind mapping the results classify the research hotspots into influential factors methods and empirical applications the three most frequently mentioned influential factors are technical change discount rates and energy prices compared with top down models bottom up models including engineering model and expert based method are the most widely used improvements in the former focus on strengthening market behavior effect while those in the latter aim to overcome the weaknesses of negative costs and lack of interaction across measures mac applications focus on environmental policies with two new research areas recently emerging co benefits and sectoral abatement costs furthermore a reference route is proposed by summarizing the applicability of methods and matching relationships among influential factors methods and empirical problems finally potential research directions are summarized based on the identified research hotspots and a similar co word analysis in marginal cost field such as considering the effects of both multiple influential factors and the interaction among factors on maccs

why do some resource abundant countries succeed while others do not on average resource abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource poor counterparts but the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources but its variation for every nigeria or venezuela there is a norway or a botswana why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others this paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource abundant winners and losers differ in light of this it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse with a particular emphasis on recent developments

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information a case study the purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy using data for a coal fired power plant each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum chosen by a regulator we look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission of an announcement of the tax formula of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility and of a tax cum subsidy scheme our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally we also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes the monetary side payments subsidy bonus required and to look for self financing schemes

a model of lending resumption after default lessons from capital markets during the nineteenth century this paper mines the experience of the nineteenth century capital markets to propose an alternative interpretation of international defaults the standard view that sovereign default entails exclusion from markets was often contradicted by reality in some cases lending ceased but in others it continued this paper claims that lenders responses to default stem from the additional knowledge about borrowers that is acquired during default episodes lending is modelled in a costly state verification environment where sovereigns have private information about their investment projects good or bad after default lenders audit projects and interrupt lending only if the project is believed to be a bad one

the diversification and financial performance of us credit unions abstract for us credit unions revenue from non interest sources has increased significantly in recent years we investigate the impact of revenue diversification on financial performance for the period 1993 2004 the impact of a change in strategy that alters the share of non interest income is decomposed into a direct exposure effect reflecting the difference between interest and non interest bearing activities and an indirect exposure effect which reflects the effect of the institution s own degree of diversification on both risk adjusted and unadjusted returns measures a positive direct exposure effect is outweighed by a negative indirect exposure effect for all but the largest credit unions this may imply that similar diversification strategies are not appropriate for large and small credit unions small credit unions should eschew diversification and continue to operate as simple savings and loan institutions while large credit unions should be encouraged to exploit new product opportunities around their core expertise

technical change and the marginal cost of abatement abstract we address one aspect of the treatment of technical change in the environmental economics literature how technical change impacts the marginal cost of abatement we review a selection of papers that employ a variety of representations of technical change and show that these representations have quite different and sometimes surprising effects on the marginal costs of pollution reductions we argue that these varied representations in fact correspond to a variety of different technology options we then present results indicating that this representation matters the impacts of technical change on the marginal cost of abatement can crucially impact policy analysis

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

allocation under dictatorship research in stalin s archives we survey recent research on the soviet economy in the state party and military archives of the stalin era the archives have provided rich new evidence on the economic arrangements of a command system under a powerful dictator including stalin s role in the making of the economic system and economic policy stalin s accumulation objectives and the constraints that limited his power to achieve them the limits to administrative allocation the information flows and incentives that governed the behavior of economic managers the scope and significance of corruption and market oriented behavior and the prospects for economic reform

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

constitutions and economic policy at the rare moments in history when a nation debates constitutional reform the key issues often concern how the reforms might affect economic policy and economic performance for example italy abandoned a system of pure proportional representation where legislators were elected according to the proportions of the popular national vote received by their parties and moved toward including ingredients of plurality rule where legislators are elected in each district according to who receives the highest number of votes key italian political leaders are now considering proposals to introduce elements of presidentialism where the head of government is elected by direct popular vote rather than the current parliamentary regime a common argument in italy was that the electoral reform would help stifle political corruption and reduce the propensity of italian governments to run budget deficits in the 1990s constitutional reforms have been debated and implemented in a number of other countries too for instance new zealand moved away from a pure system of plurality rule in single member districts to a system mixing elements of proportional representation japan also renounced its special form of plurality rule the so called single nontransferable vote in favor of a system that mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation similar proposals have been debated in the united kingdom in latin america questions have been raised as to whether the poor and volatile economic performance of many countries can be traced to their presidential form of government

international investment and colonial control a new interpretation the impact of economic factors on colonial imperialism in the late nineteenth century has long been a topic of debate this article examines the expected relationship between different forms of international investment and different patterns of political ties between developed and developing countries drawing on the literature on relational contracts and collective action it argues that direct colonial control was likely to be associated with cross border investments whose rents were particularly easy to seize or protect and whose protection did not require multilateral action where such rents were difficult to seize or protect unilaterally colonialism is expected to be less likely the most common example of the former sort of investment is primary raw materials or agricultural investment of the latter multinational manufacturing affiliates the argument is weighed against both a survey of the qualitative evidence and some simple quantitative evaluations the approach also has potential applications to more general problems of international conflict and cooperation

opportunity cost of environmental conservation in the presence of externalities application to the farmed and wild salmon trade off in norway estimation of the opportunity cost is necessary for the economic assessment of environmental conservation policies this paper considers the case where an environmental good is negatively affected in the process of the production of marketable goods in the presence of externalities conservation implies the undertaking of abatement measures by polluters a relevant measure of opportunity cost in these settings is the abatement cost required to preserve or restore a unit of the environmental good in question current economic literature lacks an established methodology for deriving such measures as it commonly focuses on pricing pollutants rather than the natural stocks affected by them this paper uses a non optimal valuation approach suggested by fenichel and abbott jaere 1 1 2 1 27 2014 as a point of departure and develops a framework for deriving the opportunity cost of conservation as the cost of externality abatement per unit of environmental good an empirical illustration is provided for the case of the farmed and wild salmon trade off in norway in light of the current pollution control regulations

resource partitioning and the organizational dynamics of fringe banking we examine the emergence and proliferation of payday lenders fringe businesses that provide small short term but high cost loans we link the organizational dynamics of these businesses to two trends in consumer lending in the united states the continuing consolidation of mainstream financial institutions and the expansion of such institutions in the provision of financial services regarded as similar to payday loans we explain the coexistence in mature industries of large scale organizations in the market center and smaller specialists in the periphery by testing and extending the organizational model of resource partitioning our focus is on two under examined aspects of the model the dynamic underlying the partitioning process and the conditions under which the market remains partitioned the empirical analysis covers payday lenders banks and credit unions operating in wisconsin between 1994 and 2008

political institutions and sovereign borrowing evidence from nineteenth century argentina i study the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing when constitutional constraints are systematically chosen to obtain better credit conditions i argue that the impact of institutional constraints on country risk premia depends on the gov ernment s concern with the country s creditworthiness and its willingness to repay two variables that are hardly observable to properly evaluate the relationship between political institutions and sovereign borrowing i focus on the link between institutional constraints and the risk premia of argentine bonds between 1822 and 1913 specifically i analyze whether a structural break in the government s cost of borrowing time series exists i use the perron volesang test for structural change with unknown break dates the statistical analysis indicates that the adoption of institutional constraints led to significant improve ments in borrowing terms the series has a single structural change and the distinctive break point is associated with the country s adoption of constitutional checks and balances time series regressions and instrumental variables iv estimation reinforce these findings

understanding the soft budget constraint we propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist transitional and market economies our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences in light of this interpretation we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics

the competition for rationed resources abstract the paper considers a model in which firms face an output target and can purchase the input on two dates on the first date unlimited purchases are possible but a carrying cost has to be paid on the second date the input is rationed but by spending specialized managerial resources the firm can influence the rationing density to its own advantage it also faces a quadratic penalty for missing the target and is assumed to minimize expected net costs in an n firm industry a cournot nash equilibrium in expenditures on the specialized managerial labor is defined and the comparative statics of the model are analyzed we also find that under collusion the firms expected costs the total expenditure on the otherwise unproductive managerial labor and the variance of the output are smaller than in the cournot nash equilibrium this provides an insight into why economic planners have tended to prefer to deal with a few very large firms rather than many small ones

banks responses to deregulation profits technology and efficiency the deregulation of interest rates in the early 1980s raised bank funding costs and lowered profits in response banks raised fees for deposit services reduced branch operating costs and shifted to higher earning assets rates of return did not regain their prederegulation levels until the early 1990s our goal is to decompose the change in bank profits following deregulation into i intemal bank initiated adjustments to the new regulatory structure and ii external contemporaneous changes in banks business environment this decomposition will depend in part on the assumed competitive structure of the banking industry with perfect competition output and input prices are part of the external environment and banks responses are limited to changes in output and input quantities an alternative approach assumes imperfect competition where banks have some control over output prices deposit fees minimum balance requirements and interest rates on certain loans and output quantities and input prices comprise the external environment the altemative model is supported by the data using this model large banks but not smaller banks are found to have relied primarily on changing output prices and input use to mitigate and reverse the negative effects of deregulation on profits the adjustment to deregulation was essentially complete after four years following this additional changes in bank profitability during the late 1980s were primarily due to changes in banks business environment

innovation and risk averse firms options on carbon allowances as a hedging tool abstract in a regulated world where government seeks to decarbonize the energy sector firms face both indirect and direct costs of emitting co 2 this study seeks to take the perspective of the firm which needs to maximize profits implying minimization of carbon cost as well in this study the firm can compose the cost optimal portfolio of a investing into carbon saving technology which is currently expensive b investing into carbon saving technology r d and adopt this technology at a later point c buying allowances per ton of emitted co 2 in a carbon market alternatively this could be formulated as a tax and d buying offsets traded in the same market which are based on reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation redd uncertainties in the cost of carbon coming from a lack of commitment in policy making leading to fluctuations in markets and uncertainty in the payoff of r d activities could provide disincentives to incur large up front sunk cost and raise the economic value of being flexible we apply a real options approach with stochastic carbon saving technology costs and stochastic co 2 costs assuming that firms are risk averse they will not only value flexibility but also risk reductions from diversification over the different carbon mitigation options

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

natural resources education and economic development economic growth since 1965 has varied inversely with the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries four main channels of transmission from abundant natural resources to stunted economic development are discussed a the dutch disease b rent seeking c overconfidence and d neglect of education public expenditure on education relative to national income expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrolment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries natural capital appears to crowd out human capital thereby slowing down the pace of economic development

using automatic tax changes to control pollution emissions abstract in the absence of information about abatement costs the level of emissions tax needed to achieve a target level of pollution abatement is unknown this problem can be overcome by using an iterative procedure in which the tax is adjusted when current emissions exceed or fall short of the target this idea has become part of the standard textbook material but there has been no formal analysis of its dynamic properties we find that emissions can be reduced to the target whether firms behave strategically or not but the strategic element changes the welfare properties of the mechanism

the timing of elections in federations a disciplining device against soft budget constraints we introduce political economics into the soft budget constraint problem by asking if the timing of elections has the potential to harden budget constraints specifically we ask under which circumstances the soft budget constraint problem is worse with synchronized elections i e simultaneous central and regional office terms or with staggered elections i e terms of office that do not coincide we find that staggered elections clearly improve fiscal discipline at the local level as well as welfare

are sovereign debt secondary market returns sensitive to macroeconomic fundamentals evidence from the contemporary and interwar markets abstract the insensitivity of sovereign loan secondary market returns to macroeconomic fundamentals has been attributed to market illiquidity and the absence of publicly reported transactional prices during the 1920s and 1930s sovereign bonds were traded in an active market and weekly transactional prices were publicly available this paper shows that price changes from both eras are insensitive to unexpected changes in key external and country specific macroeconomic aggregates but that returns are moved by individual agent announcements that presage changes in future lending the results which contrast with studies of us equities indicate that the sovereignty of the issuer matters more than the type of debt contract

historical research on international lending and debt the parallels between debt crises past and present have attracted a large number of social scientists to the history of foreign lending and default in this article i describe the findings of the recent literature on the subject the questions posed have obvious relevance to the current policy debate over the debt of less developed countries what features of international capital markets have long rendered them vulnerable to generalized crisis what events tend to spawn debt servicing difficulties and to provoke default what have been the consequences of default for lenders and borrowers what approaches historically have proven most effective at clearing away the residue of debt crises i concentrate on 20th century experience on the lending of the 1920s on the debt crisis of the 1930s and on the recovery of capital markets after world war ii

the disadvantage of tying their hands on the political economy of policy commitments incumbents are more likely to be re elected if they have a comparative advantage in the eyes of voters on some central issue this paper argues that incumbents have an incentive to avoid reforms that reduce the government s role in deciding these issues in order to increase their chances of re election this point is illustrated in the context of the choice of an exchange rate regime in an economy characterized by an inflation bias a flexible exchange rate allows the government to use monetary policy as a stabilization tool while fixed exchange rates remove the inflation bias of the economy on the one hand it is shown that a more inflation averse government may refrain from choosing fixed exchange rates in order to capitalize on the inflationary reputation of its opponent this incentive is contrasted with the opposite incentive to tie the hands of the future government should be incumbent be defeated on the other hand it is shown that electoral considerations may reinforce the incentive of the more inflationary government to tie its own hands with fixed exchange rates

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

privatization and efficiency from principals and agents to political economy ad i pavia abstract we survey the theoretical literature on privatization and efficiency by tracing its evolution from the applications of agency theory to recent contributions in the field of political economy the former extend the theory of regulation with incomplete information to address privatization issues comparing state owned enterprises with private regulated firms the benefits of privatization may derive either from the constraints it places on malevolent agents or from the impossibility of commitment by a benevolent government because of incomplete contracts contributions dealing with political economy issues separate privatization from restructuring decisions they either explore bargaining between managers and politicians or analyse the impact of privatization shaped by political preferences on efficiency the theoretical results regarding the relation between privatization and efficiency do not lead to any definitive conclusion privatization may increase productive efficiency when restructuring takes place whereas its effects on allocative efficiency still remain uncertain

lock in effect of emission standard and its impact on the choice of market based instruments abstract a country s existing emission standard policy will lead to a lock in effect when the country plans to adopt new market based instruments to control greenhouse gas emissions it must consider this effect as it chooses among instruments to avoid larger efficiency loss in this paper we find that the lock in effect will cause a kink point to occur on the marginal abatement cost mac curve this change of shape for the mac curve reminds us to be cautious in choosing market based instruments when applying weitzman s rule we also introduce this concept into a dynamic multi regional computable general equilibrium cge model for china and simulate mac curves for all regions after applying weitzman s rule we propose a timeline for introducing price instruments under different marginal benefit mb curve scenarios

the competitive role of credit unions in small local financial services markets although there is a considerable literature on the role of market structure in banking markets no attention has been given to the impact of the competitive discipline provided by credit unions on consumer credit rates offered by banks after presenting a theoretical framework for understanding the impact credit unions should be expected to have this article analyzes a pooled cross sectional time series sample with roughly 1 000 observations on relatively small united states markets with the focus on explaining bank rates for two types of consumer loans results confirm the previously observed role of market structure and suggest a significant role for credit unions in disciplining the exercise of market power by banks

a theory of privatisation public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient primarily because they pursue strategies such as excess employment that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them privatization of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms in this way privatization leads to efficient restructuring of firms moreover privatization is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy and when the new owners of firms are profit maximizing investors rather than their employees or even managers copyright 1996 by royal economic society

fetters of gold and paper we describe in this essay why the gold standard and the euro are extreme forms of fixed exchange rates and how these policies had their most potent effects in the worst peaceful economic periods in modern times while we are lucky to have avoided another catastrophe like the great depression in 2008 9 mainly by virtue of policy makers aggressive use of monetary and fiscal stimuli the world economy is still experiencing many difficulties as in the great depression this second round of problems stems from the prevalence of fixed exchange rates fixed exchange rates facilitate business and communication in good times but intensify problems when times are bad

credit union loan rate determinants in the united states credit union participation in the consumer lending market continues to grow as an increasing number of consumers and small businesses become members and open accounts this study investigates the d

the applicability of marginal abatement cost approach a comprehensive review abstract the marginal abatement cost mac methodology is widely used in climate change policies policy makers rely on mac to assess feasible strategies and related costs to achieve emission reduction goals this paper introduces a variety of mac methodologies aiming at solving diverse problems which utilizes various calculable logic thus producing different results and implications this study applies a mind mapping method to capture differentiation of mac methods and systematically classify mac methodologies the applicability path analysis was proposed based on principles such as stakeholder type decision making objectives cost concept strategy mode and information scope our goal is to assess the applicability of different methodologies to reduce misuse by policy makers and to serve as a guide for subsequent research which might prompt and lead to the derivation of more consequential results in future studies the results of this study suggest that the complex method is not always better than the simplified method because policy makers are required to select the appropriate method according to the type of information needed it may even be suggested that mac could be reliable by ranking relative value of options compared with baseline rather than focusing on the absolute value of individual measures

the determinants of bank rates in local consumer lending markets comparing market and institution level results 1 introductionwith the exception of a few very recent studies the sizeable literature on the impact of market structure in banking markets1 has ignored the potential competitive role played by credit unions this is surprising since the continuing consolidation of the financial services industry in recent years has naturally raised concerns about competitive effects and credit unions would seem to be a likely source of market discipline 2 this paper explores these issues using both market and firm data using a variety of approaches economists have started paying some attention to the interaction between banks and credit unions emmons and schmid 2000 using county level data examine twoway intertemporal linkages between credit union participation rates and market concentration of the commercial banking sector to support the view that the two types of institutions compete in the market for consumer deposits similarly feinberg and rahman 2001 find that credit union and bank rates for two consumer loan products can each be shown to be influenced by the other tokle and tokle 2000 found a competitive influence of credit unions on bank certificate of deposit cd rates offered in idaho and montana while feinberg 2001 explored their impact on consumer loan rates in a broader sample of relatively small local markets3 over the 1992 1997 period the latter article found that both unsecured and new vehicle loan rates offered by banks in these markets were affected in a significant manner by the market share held by the two leading banks implying a competitive role for smaller financial institutions generally and for new vehicle loan rates alone by the share of credit unions in those markets whether these results would generalize to larger metropolitan areas is unclear and is the topic of what follows i focus on the same two loan products 24 month unsecured non credit card loans and 48 month new vehicle loans both of which seem likely to be provided in a local market and empirically explain the determinants of bank loan rates in a sample of 56 markets both large and small for the period 1992 1998 an innovative aspect of this paper is that i analyze both market level data and institution level data for 81 banks in those 56 markets and consider as well the role of multimarket linkages affecting these banks 2 theoretical frameworkvirtually all models of imperfect competition imply that increasing entry and supply from fringe suppliers will lower prices this clearly suggests that an increasing credit union presence should discipline prices in local financial services markets to formalize i employ a modified version of the dominant firm price leadership model the modification involves the notion that while credit unions may generally be thought of as fringe suppliers not all banks and savings and loans sl ii as cu increases the li declines iii as epsilon sub cu increases the li declines and not quite as obvious but easy to derive iv the declines in ii and iii are larger in absolute value as cr2 is larger

output targets the soft budget constraint and the firm under central planning abstract the paper considers the case of an expected profit maximizing firm which has an output target imposed on it by central planners and which may receive partial bailouts if its operating profit is negative the model contains several sources of uncertainty the paper compares the amounts of input use in the pure bailout case the pure output target case the bailout with output target case and the standard competitive case both theoretically and with numerical experiments

an overview of co2 cost pass through to electricity prices in europe this paper investigates the link between wholesale electricity prices in europe and the co2 cost i e the price of european union allowances euas over the two first phases of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets we set up a theoretical framework and an empirical model to estimate to what extent daily fluctuations of co2 costs may have impacted electricity prices regarding estimation results for the first phase of the eu ets about 42 of estimated pass through rates appear to be statistically significant while only one third of them are statistically different from zero in the second phase we try to improve those results by proposing alternative estimates based on the eu ets compliance periods

soft budget constraints and regional industrial policy reinterpreting the rise and fall of delorean the rise and fall of delorean motor cars limited has traditionally been interpreted as either the result either of john delorean s psychological flaws or as confirming the supposed limitations of activist industrial policy however when the episode is examined in greater historical detail neither of these interpretations is compelling the reinterpretation outlined here draws on institutional analysis as well as a range of archival sources much of it previously unreleased the inefficiencies within the original contractual agreement are highlighted the lack of credibility associated with this agreement was in turn traceable to the institutional environment with its associated risk reward implications under which industrial policy operated this environment had a political element it had been distorted by the troubles and the resulting fears policymakers had of a cumulative causation relationship between violence and unemployment officials in belfast against treasury opposition advocated state led entrepreneurship as a policy response

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

messy marginal costs internal pricing of environmental aspects on the firm level abstract internal pricing of environmental aspects is usually not embedded in management accounting systems therefore we first show that pricing from a corporative perspective is possible and applicable contrary to common belief we also show that marginal costs curves of environmental aspects are often not monotonic and price changes are highly context specific we introduce a model that addresses different environmental aspects that translate into constraints or change direct cost factors in the objective function environmental constraints originate from different types of limit values concerning emissions and production processes as well as restraining the potential environmental damage as the outcome of ecological valuation methods direct cost factors include the taxation of emissions and costs stemming from being involved in the emissions trading market our model allows for calculating the marginal indirect costs of these environmental aspects as the constraints might enforce factor and product substitutions we show that the marginal costs differ substantially from the direct costs and do not follow a predictable pattern sensitivity analysis and parametric programming are applied to set up an internal pricing and cost allocation scheme for environmental aspects specifically focusing on the pricing of emissions resources and processes of production and recycling the model s implications on corporate decision making are illustrated by a numerical example that draws on the opportunity of process substitution e g producing a product on different machines even though we cannot use original data for proprietary reasons such settings are highly relevant in industry and the energy sector

fiscal games and public employment a theory with evidence from russia why do some governments both in different countries and in regions within those countries employ more workers than others existing theories focus on the level of economic development political redistribution and social insurance but they raise additional puzzles and do not account for all evidence or for a global trend toward decentralization of public employment the authors propose a new theory inspired by russia s recent experience that locates one motive for subnational public employment growth in a political and fiscal game between central and subnational governments in countries with weak legal systems local and regional officials may deliberately set their employment levels beyond their fiscal capacity prompting bailouts from the central government which fears the political cost to it if wage arrears accumulate and provoke strikes the authors model the logic of such brinkmanship derive several propositions and show that they and the model s assumptions fit empirical evidence from russia in the 1990s deficiencies of that country s overstaffed underequipped irregularly paid ineffective and strike prone public sector appear to result in part from a system of dysfunctional incentives created by the interaction of electoral pressures with the system of fiscal federalism the authors suggest parallels with latin american countries such as argentina and brazil

justifying the incorporation of the materials balance principle into frontier based eco efficiency models frontier based models are an alternative to traditional eco efficiency ratio indicators this paper considers two different types environmentally adjusted production efficiency models and frontier eco efficiency models and tries to find justification for incorporating the materials balance principle mbp in them similar importance is attached to the economic and environmental outcomes of a production process like economic outcomes can be derived from inputs and outputs and respective prices some cases allow for deriving environmental outcomes from the production function with the mbp after an overview of attempts to incorporate environmental issues in production efficiency models and some reflections why mbp has been neglected in environmental economics and production efficiency analysis the paper gives basic principles to incorporate the mbp in conventional production efficiency methods and shows how this adjustment leads to a more diversified diagnosis of eco efficiency finally potentialities and bottlenecks are discussed exploiting the mbp in production efficiency and eco efficiency analysis will facilitate more pro active eco efficiency research

economic structure and strategies for greenhouse gas mitigation abstract greenhouse gas ghg emission mitigation policy impacts the economic system directly in the short term by altering relative prices and indirectly in the long term by shifting the structure of the economy there may also be adjustments to economic structure independent of policy intervention due to changes in population consumption patterns and global markets the overall effectiveness of specific mitigation policy will partly depend on these indirect and exogenous changes to economic structure this study develops a new measure linking economic development with its environmental effects the technical cost of ghg mitigation under economic growth in an economy is calculated by combining traditional input output io analysis and a linear programming based sensitivity analysis the approach is applied to northern ireland ni producing an isoemission matrix that maps emission neutral expansion paths for the economy the measurement provides an indicator of the demand for technical improvement to achieve ghg mitigation at a national or regional level the flexibility and transparency of the approach make it useful for evaluating potential ghg mitigation strategies