optimal discretionary monetary policy in a model of asymmetric central bank preferences this paper considers optimal monetary policy in the context of the central bank adopting an asymmetric objective function our results show that under asymmetric preferences many of the extant results on the time consistency problem need no longer hold

labor unions and the adoption of new technology the paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor saving techniques this is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number of firms some of which are unionized we find that unionization can actually encourage the adoption of labor saving technology provided that the technological improvement is mild and that demand is sufficiently high or demand elasticity sufficiently low if there is an effective threat of entry that causes the union to moderate its wage demands then unionization may encourage the adoption of new technology even at low levels of demand

input market price discrimination and the choice of technology recent concerns over the effects of the robinson patman act and so called priceprotection policies such as most favoredcustomer clauses mfc s 2 on market performance have given economists new reasons to examine the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in order to assess these effects correctly it is imperative that one understand how price discrimination influences market behavior joan robinson s 1933 work launched the formal inquiry into the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination building on the intuition presented by arthur pigou 1932 she showed that if a monopolist faces two independent linear demand curves the use of price discrimination will not affect industry output but will reduce welfare richard schmalensee 1981 extends these results to nonlinear demand curves and shows that an increase in total industry output is a necessary condition for price discrimination to be welfare improving hal varian 1985 broadens these results by deriving upper and lower bounds on the welfare change due to the use of price discrimination he shows that these results can be applied to markets in which there are nonzero cross price effects all of this work examines how the ability of a monopolist to price discriminate will affect the market outcome when all other characteristics of the market are treated as exogenous recently two lines of research have extended this inquiry beyond the case of a monopolist in a market with exogenously fixed parameters the first line considers the case of oligopoly the work of charles holt and david scheffman 1985 and thomas cooper 1986 has shown that restrictions on price discrimination imposed by the use of mfc s can facilitate collusion between oligopolists attempting to restrict output this implies that third degree price discrimination can be welfare improving the second line of research shows that price discrimination by a firm can affect nonprice decisions made by other market participants thus affecting the market outcome michael katz 1987 presents a model in which a large firm s ability to vertically integrate backward into the production of an input allows it to obtain a lower per unit price from the supplier of the input than can be obtained by smaller firms without this ability he shows that third degree price discrimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration degraba 1987 shows that the use or nonuse of price discrimination by a national firm can affect nonprice decisions made by local firms that compete with the national firm in this situation third degree price discrimination is welfare reducing because it induces local firms to produce a product that is overly differentiated from the product of the national firm in all of the work cited above price discrimination is important when sellers set prices in separate markets or charge different prices to different customers in the same market the following analysis which can be considered a contribution to the second line of research suggests that price discrimination can be important even when a seller faces a single market in which all customers are identical the intuition behind this result is that nonprice decisions made by downstream producers such as the choice of technology can be affected by the use or johnson graduate school of management cornell university ithaca ny 14853 i thank robert frank robert smiley richard thaler and the participants of the jgsm applied microeconomics workshop for their helpful comments see william baldwin 1987 pp 438 40 for a good summary of the debate 2see john kwoka and lawrence white 1989 pp 196 7

the monetary policy of the european central bank the first six years of ecb monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation output and the interest rate from their reference values the empirical analysis on synthetic euro area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric whereas the objectives of real activity and interest rate stabilizations are not output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high the hypothesis of m3 growth rate targeting is rejected

the inflation bias when the central bank targets the natural rate of unemployment abstract this paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more or less severely than negative deviations in the central banker s loss function the bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment the time series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from g7 countries econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related

are monetary policy reaction functions asymmetric the role of nonlinearity in the phillips curve abstract this paper investigates the implications of a nonlinear phillips curve for the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules combined with a quadratic loss function the optimal policy is also nonlinear with the policy maker increasing interest rates by a larger amount when inflation or output are above target than the amount it will reduce them when they are below target specifically the main prediction of our model is that such a source of nonlinearity leads to the inclusion of the interaction between expected inflation and the output gap in an otherwise linear taylor rule we find empirical support for this type of asymmetries in the interest rate setting behaviour of four european central banks but none for the us fed

multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly abstract this paper develops a model of wage bargaining between an industry wide trade union and firms in an oligopoly and considers the circumstances under which the union prefers pattern bargaining that is negotiating contracts in a sequential manner to simultaneous bargaining with the firms the paper goes on to consider the importance of the bargaining order in pattern bargaining when the firms are asymmetric the analysis shows that the union gains by first targeting a firm which is in a relatively weak bargaining position i e impatient to settle or a firm with relatively large profits

does the barro gordon model explain the behavior of us inflation a reexamination of the empirical evidence abstract this paper tests the predictions of the barro gordon model using us data on inflation and unemployment to that end it constructs a general game theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the barro gordon model and a version of cukierman s model as special cases likelihood ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the barro gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of cukierman s model is not reduced form estimates are consistent with the view that the federal reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate

inflation targeting under asymmetric preferences this paper develops and estimates a game theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker s preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate specifically positive deviations from the target can be weighted more or less severely than negative ones in the central banker s loss function it is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences estimates of the central banker s preference parameters for canada sweden and the uk are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function

macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining an international perspective this paper critically reviews the research on how collective bargaining systems influence macroeconomic performance in industrialized countries the review considers effects of bargaining level coordination and corporatist institutional arrangements key empirical results turn out to be quite fragile and much of the paper explores issues of measurement and specification that account for the fragility the paper concludes that complementarities between key institutions and between institutions and the economic environment may be more important for macroeconomic performance than the effects of individual institutions and it suggests research strategies

industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly abstract we show that contrary to the key result of the standard cournot nash oligopoly model industry profits can increase with the number of firms if input prices are not exogenous but are determined by bargaining in bilateral oligopoly

trade unions investment and employment the implications of long term wage contracts and investment in capital on non cooperative wage bargaining between a firm and a union are analysed the union maximises a utilitarian utility function and the firm faces a neoclassical investment problem with internal adjustment costs the monopoly union outcomes with binding contracts is time inconsistent because the union has an incentive to renege on announced low wage strategies once the capital stock has been accumulated the monopoly union outcome without binding contracts leads to credible strategies which correspond to higher wages and lower levels of employment investment and the capital stock efficient contracts give rise to higher employment than monopoly union outcomes whether with or without long term wage contracts the results are illustrated with a numerical example finally when the game between the union and firm is repeated reputational equilibira provide a solution to the problem of time inconsistency

robust monetary policy structural breaks and nonlinearities in the reaction function of the central bank of brazil abstract in this work we seek to investigate the existence of nonlinearities in the reaction function of the central bank of brazil arising from this policymaker s uncertainties about the effects of the output gap on inflation theoretically we follow tillmann 2011 to obtain a nonlinear optimal monetary policy rule that is robust to uncertainty about the output inflation trade off of the phillips curve in addition we perform structural break tests to assess possible changes in the conduct of the brazilian monetary policy during the inflation targeting regime the results indicate that i the uncertainties about the slope in the phillips curve implied nonlinearities in the central bank of brazil s reaction function ii we cannot reject the hypothesis of a structural break in the monetary rule parameters occurring in the third quarter of 2003 iii there was an increase in the response of the selic rate to output gap and a weaker response to the current inflation gap in meirelles tombini s administration and iv the central bank of brazil has also reacted to the exchange rate in meirelles tombini s administration

to be unionized or not to be a case for cost raising strategies under cournot oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the decision by firms under cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs considering classical models of union firm bargaining namely right to manage rtm and efficient bargaining eb we show that for a sufficiently low level of union power eb firms might adopt cost raising strategies this theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of eb and adds to the theoretical finding that eb might dominate rtm under unionized cournot nash oligopoly it also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel like services to oligopoly firms allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers

robust monetary policy in a small open economy abstract we study how a central bank in a small open economy should conduct monetary policy if it fears that its model is misspecified using a new keynesian model of a small open economy we solve analytically for the optimal robust policy rule and the equilibrium dynamics and we separately analyze the consequences of central bank robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation output and the exchange rate we show that an increase in the preference for robustness makes the central bank respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

optimal interest rate smoothing this paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions it shows in the context of a simple model of optimizing private sector behaviour that assignment of an interest rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable even when reduction of the magnitude of interest rate changes is not a social objective in itself this is because a response of policy to irrelevant lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private sector expectations of future policy

on a non cooperative theory of technology transfer abstract this paper shows that it might be profitable for a firm with advanced technology to sell the knowledge to a competing firm with less efficient technology and still remain in the business a non corperative equilibrium with technology transfer may pareto dominate the initial equilibrium without technology transfer in this paper it is shown that technology agreement is likely to occur between firms which are reasonably close in terms of their initial technologies such an equilibrium is an interesting possibility in the absence of credibly sustainable collusive outcomes

optimal monetary policy with a nonlinear phillips curve abstract the analysis of optimal discretionary monetary policy under a non linear phillips curve is shown to yield results that are in marked contrast to conventional results that are drawn from the linear paradigm specifically we show that there exists a deflation bias in expected output while the inflation bias cannot be signed preference uncertainty however adds to expected inflation

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

estimating the linear quadratic inventory model maximum likelihood versus generalized method of moments abstract we compare generalized method of moments gmm and maximum likelihood ml estimators of the parameters of a linear quadratic inventory model using nondurable manufacturing data and monte carlo simulations data based gmm estimates for five normalizations vary widely generally rejecting the model the ml estimate generally supports the model monte carlo experiments reveal that the gmm estimates are often biased apparently due to poor instruments statistically insignificant economically implausible and dynamically unstable the ml estimates are generally unbiased even in misspecified models statistically significant economically plausible and dynamically stable asymptotic standard errors for ml are 3 to 15 times smaller than for gmm

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

the determination of r d empirical evidence on the role of unions abstract this paper examines the empirical evidence of the role of union bargaining on innovation we review the existing empirical evidence and emphasis some of the problems with the theoretical assumptions we outline a simple model of strategic rd b the union bargains only over wages

welfare reducing licensing abstract in this paper we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two part tariff contracts a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty reduces social welfare we show that it occurs if i the firms compete in prices ii the innovation is large enough but not drastic and iii the goods are close enough substitutes moreover we show that regardless of the type of competition first the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and second even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous

note the capital asset pricing model and strategic planning response to wernerfelt a response to wernerfelt b 1983 the capital asset pricing model and strategic planning unpublished paper graduate school of business administration university of michigan october

unionization incomplete contracting and capital investment this article examines empirically the hypothesis that incomplete contracts and resulting opportunistic behavior over the return to sunk assets reduces investment union firm contracts are incomplete because they 1 do not prevent all actions aimed at changing the existing contract 2 cover a relatively short time period and 3 do not extend to union members yet to be hired the primary response of firms is to reduce investment in specific durable assets and also to reduce employment growth and increase debt the authors find fairly strong evidence of these effects in a sample of large publicly traded firms using firm specific measures of unionization copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

the fed s monetary policy rule and u s inflation the case of asymmetric preferences abstract this paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which the decision makers are allowed but not required to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values the estimates of the central bank s euler equation indicate that the preferences of the fed had been asymmetric only before 1979 with the interest rate response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude we show that this asymmetry on output implied an average inflation bias around 1 5 while the implicit inflation target also declined the asymmetric preferences induced inflation bias appears to account for a sizable fraction of the historical decline in the inflation mean

inflation targeting in brazil constructing credibility under exchange rate volatility abstract this paper assesses the challenges faced by the inflation targeting regime in brazil the inflation targeting framework has played a critical role in macroeconomic stabilization we stress two important challenges construction of credibility and exchange rate volatility the estimations indicate the following results i the inflation targets have worked as an important coordinator of expectations ii the central bank has reacted strongly to inflation expectations iii there has been a reduction in the degree of inflation persistence and iv the exchange rate pass through for administered or monitored prices is two times higher than for market prices

testing asymmetries in central bank preferences in a small open economy a study for brazil abstract in this paper we extend surico s 2007a model to an open economy and test if the brazilian central bank s loss function is asymmetric with regard to positive and negative deviations of the output gap and of the inflation rate from its target furthermore we use tests for structural breaks to investigate changes in the conduct of policy and monetary authority s preferences the results revealed that the central bank reacted more strongly to deviations of inflation from the target and the output gap after 2003 with regard to the monetary authority s preferences estimates indicate only an asymmetric preference over an above target inflation rate until mid 2003 after this period the evidence obtained by estimating the reaction function with inflation expectations showed that the central bank has been more averse to positive deviations of inflation from its target

labour markets bargaining and innovation much of the recent empirical work on the impact of unions on rd ii under some circumstances an increase in union strength can make both firms and unions worse off we survey a more recent theoretical literature which takes account of the fact that r d is often undertaken for strategic reasons by firms that are in competition with one another we show that in this framework the prevailing theoretical paradigm may be overturned thus when firms and unions can enter into long term bargains then an increase in union strength will increase decrease r d spending if successful innovation causes employment to rise respectively fall however when r d falls then this increase in union strength can cause both firms and unions to be better off when firms and unions engage in short term bargaining then an increase in union bargaining strength will cause r d to fall when bargaining is over wages alone however when bargaining takes place over wages and employment then if unions care a lot about employment the relationship between union strength and r d is inverse u shaped

unionization structure licensing and innovation we show the effects of the unionization structure viz decentralized and centralized unions on a firm s incentive for technology licensing and innovation the incentive for technology licensing is stronger under decentralized unions we identify circumstances under which the benefit from licensing creates a stronger incentive for innovation under decentralized unions if the union s preference for employment is high the benefit from licensing may create higher incentive for innovation under decentralized unions however if the union s preference for wage is high enough the incentive for innovation is higher under a centralized union irrespective of licensing ex post innovation if the centralized union decides whether or not to supply workers to all firms the possibility of higher innovation under decentralized unions increases we further show that perfectly substitutable workers can be better off under decentralized unions if the labor productivity depends on the unionization structure which occurs in our analysis when e g licensing after innovation occurs only under decentralized unions or innovation with no licensing occurs only under a centralized union