governmental behavior in representative democracy a synthesis of the theoretical literature what is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates what is preferable a bureaucrat or a partisan politician does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies this article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice 1 the median voter model 2 the leviathan model 3 the slack maximizing model 4 a general model of bureaucracy 5 the partisan politicians model and 6 a general model of lobbying among several results it is shown that the median voter s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good tax package even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter s utility the article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect

electoral politics and the executive veto a predictive theory we argue that winner take all voting in states and the unequal distribution of electoral votes across states in presidential elections makes incumbent presidents rationally place more weight on the preferences of voters in closely contested larger states when making policy decisions this hypothesis is tested by examining whether presidential veto decisions are influenced by the floor votes of senators from these electorally crucial states in a pooled sample of 325 individual bills from 1970 through 1988 we find significant evidence of this behavior by incumbent presidents

union effects on municipal employment and wages a longitudinal approach this article examines municipal union employment and wage effects in a sample of police fire sanitation streets and highways and finance and control departments from approximately 900 u s cities during 1977 80 cross section results for 1980 suggest positive union contract effects on fire fighter and sanitation employment and wages consistent with demand shifts due to union political influence in municipal bargaining i then model potential omitted variables as nonstationary fixed effects and apply longitudinal models to estimation of employment and wage changes between 1977 and 1980 the longitudinal results provide little support for the demand shift hypothesis

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

an interest group model of direct income redistribution an interest group model of the determinants of policies which directly re distribute income to low income persons is developed and tested the model assum es that altruistic taxpayers nonaltruistic taxpayers and needy beneficiaries f orm separate interest groups from which politicians seek support benefit levels depend on variables such as taxpayer income and the price of benefits but unlike median voter models the model also implies a role for interest group strengt h and competition between political parties the author uses latent variable met hods and data on the aid to families with dependent children program to demonstr ate empirical support forthe model copyright 1986 by mit press

the theory of domestic content protection and content preference this paper investigates the resource reallocation effected by content protection and content preference schemes under alternative assumptions regarding the definition of domestic content the number of intermediate goods and the market structure of the domestic intermediate good industry content protection is shown to be equivalent to a combination of more familiar commercial policies however the extent of application of these policies is determined endogenously by parameters of the production functions for intermediate and final goods a number of anomalous and undesirable outcomes that may result from content protection and content preference are discussed

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

property tax limits local fiscal behavior and property values evidence from massachusetts under proposition abstract this paper examines the impact of a specific property tax limit proposition 2 1 2 in massachusetts on the fiscal behavior of cities and towns in massachusetts and the capitalization of that behavior into property values proposition 2 1 2 places a cap on the effective property tax rate at 2 5 and limits nominal annual growth in property tax revenues to 2 5 unless residents pass a referendum allowing a greater increase the study analyzes the 1990 1994 period a time when massachusetts municipalities faced significant fiscal stress because of a 30 cut in real state aid and a demographically driven increase in school enrollments the findings include the following 1 proposition 2 1 2 significantly constrained local spending in some communities with most of its impact on school spending 2 constrained communities realized gains in property values to the degree that they were able to increase school spending despite the limitation and 3 changes in non school spending had little impact on property values

poverty reduction patronage or vote buying the allocation of public goods and the 2001 election in madagascar abstract this article uses data from madagascar to examine how an upcoming election or political patronage might induce governments to deviate from goals such as poverty reduction using a nationwide commune level data set the article tests three competing explanations of how public goods are allocated across districts projects can be allocated on the basis of local need with the goal of reducing poverty or rewarding one s political base or the desire to win votes for an upcoming election the evidence from an analysis of three projects suggests that two of the three projects responded to local needs and a third seemed to be influenced by both election and patronage concerns an analysis of the 2001 presidential election in madagascar shows that voters do appear to reward the incumbent for projects received in their districts

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

trade policy subtleties with multinational firms abstract regional trade blocks must specify domestic content rules that define the conditions under which a good qualifies as domestic and so may be freely traded within the block this paper analyzes such rules focussing on oligopolistic industries in which foreign multinationals rely much more on imported intermediate inputs that do domestic firms in such a situation we argue that domestic content provisions are anti competitive reducing overall final output of the industry and shifting rents to domestic firms these ideas are examined analytically and then numerically using an applied general equilibrium model of the north american auto industry

media proliferation and democratic transition in africa the case of madagascar summary state controlled media have historically dominated press outlets across much of africa yet recently economic and political liberalization together with new communication technologies have triggered rapid growth and increasing private sector involvement changes which hold potentially important implications for development and governance this paper explores the origins and impact of recent private sector media growth in madagascar where over 90 private radio stations and 15 private television stations have begun operation over the past decade the resulting profusion of private media has played a key role in improving governance most recently in the hotly contested presidential election of 2001

political agency government responsiveness and the role of the media abstract the role of mass media in making governments responsive to the needs of citizens is a relatively neglected area in economics we sketch a theoretical example with a role for media in enhancing government responsiveness based on asymmetric information between citizens and government we then use data for the period 1958 1992 on the extent to which indian state governments responded to food shortages via the public distribution of food correlating these with proxies of media political and economic development we find that states that are more responsive tend to also be those with high levels of newspaper circulation electoral turnout and literacy in contrast richer states do not tend to be more responsive than poorer states

interpreting income distributions in a welfare state the case of sweden abstract it is shown in this paper that the distribution of purchasing power and hence probably also economic well being in a welfare state like sweden is not tightly connected with the contribution of households in the production system moreover economic inequality is drastically exaggerated when income statistics are not adjusted for differences in working time and in the time profile of income over life however it is also shown that some important inequalities are not removed even by the very ambitious tax and welfare state system in sweden and that some new inequalities are in fact introduced the paper also tries to highlight the wide wedges which in an advanced welfare state are necessarily driven between factor costs for firms and factor rewards for households all this holds in particular for annual income

the tax revolt and electoral competition this paper explores the effect of electoral competition onstate and local expenditures in the us during the politicalenvironment following the tax revolt of the late 1970s itutilizes a theoretical model in which both electoralcompetition and tax and expenditure limits impact spending empirical results indicate the tax revolt s primary impact wastransmitted through political candidate competition notthrough the adoption of tax or expenditure limitations as iscommonly believed however tax and expenditure limits doaffect public education expenditures

food aid and malnutrition in developing countries evidence from global food aid allocation abstract this study investigates the allocation of dietary energy iron vitamin a and zinc within global food aid the response of us and non us donors to nutritional needs and donor interests is estimated with a dynamic correlated random effects tobit model aid flows of the period 1993 2007 are analysed the empirical results show that nutrient shipments in emergency food aid have been allocated towards poorer countries but also face inertia and media bias project food aid from the us is found to be targeted towards politically stable and rural regions while non us project aid focuses on populations with high nutritional requirements

the effect of property tax limitation measures on local government fiscal behavior abstract previous evidence on the effects of tax and expenditure limitation measures has not been conclusive difficulties arise in characterizing differences in fiscal institutions across states and estimating behavior in the absence of limitation measures a recently enacted tax limitation measure limits the growth in local property taxes in some illinois jurisdictions but not in others such differential treatment of otherwise similar jurisdictions provides a natural experiment for estimating the impact of the tax cap on local government fiscal behavior we find that the cap has been effective in that the fiscal behavior of capped jurisdictions differs from that of never capped jurisdictions

aggregation and social choice a mean voter theorem a celebrated result of black 1948a demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single peaked the social choice follows the preferences of the median voter the median voter s most preferred outcome beats any alternative however this conclusion does not extend to elections in which candidates differ in more than one dimension this paper provides a multi dimensional analog of the median voter result we provide conditions under which the mean voter s most preferred outcome is unbeatable according to a 64 majority rule the conditions supporting this result represent a significant generalization of caplin and nalebuff 1988 the proof of our mean voter result uses a mathematical aggregation theorem due to prekopa 1971 1973 and borell 1975 this theorem has broad applications in economics an application to the distribution of income is described at the end of this paper results on imperfect competition are presented in the companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991

did the tax revolt reduce school performance abstract this paper uses detailed school level data from 49 states to analyze the effects of tax revolt era property tax limitations on school services i find that limitations are associated with larger student teacher ratios and lower cost of living adjusted starting teacher salaries all else equal these results are robust to modelling the results as endogenous and using a variety of measures for whether the limitation binds at particular schools however i find no such evidence that schools subject to limitations have reduced their administrative costs furthermore i find that limitations are associated with lower student performance on mathematics science social studies and reading examinations all else equal

optimal fiscal limits with overrides abstract this paper studies optimal fiscal limits in the context of a simple political economy model a politician chooses the level of taxation for a representative citizen but is biased in favor of higher taxes a constitutional designer sets a tax limit before the citizen s preferred level of taxation is fully known the politician is allowed to override the limit with the citizen s approval the paper solves for the optimal limit and explains how it is impacted by the possibility of overrides the paper also shows that the citizen s welfare can be enhanced if the designer imposes a limit on the politician s override proposals

food safety the media and the information market availability of information has increased rapidly over the past decades yet information on food safety is still considered problematic economists have extensively researched the effects of imperfect information however little attention has been paid to the institutional organization of the supply of information and the incentive schemes in the information market this paper analyzes how and when information is supplied by media organizations and what the implications are we first develop a theoretical framework and afterwards provide empirical evidence from media coverage of two recent food safety crises in europe

performance federalism and local democracy theory and evidence from school tax referenda federal governments are increasingly employing empirical measures of lower level government performance to ensure that provincial and local jurisdictions pursue national policy goals we call this burgeoning phenomenon performance federalism and argue that it can distort democratic accountability in lower level elections we estimate the impact of a widely publicized federal indicator of local school district performance one that we show does not allow voters to draw valid inferences about the quality of local educational institutions on voter support for school tax levies in a u s state uniquely appropriate for this analysis the results indicate that a signal of poor district performance increases the probability of levy failure a substantively large and robust effect that disproportionately affects impoverished communities the analysis employs a number of identification strategies and tests for multiple behavioral mechanisms to support the causal interpretation of these findings

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

environmental protection a theory of direct and indirect competition for political influence how is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying this paper develops a model of direct lobbying the government and indirect persuading the public competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary however an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion or a rise of public environmental awareness induces substitution between the two the findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness the size of its economic stake and hence the associated lobbying effort and the efficiency of its organization in exerting political influence how then can we explain why some environmental groups have been very successful against polluting industries when the latter s economic stakes seem very high and they lobby more and their interests are more efficiently organized some might suggest that the reason for the success of the environmental movement is that environmental groups have large memberships and can provide block votes 2 however according to olson 1965 a large membership of an interest group is not necessarily an advantage and it is still uncertain whether environmental groups are able to mobilize their members to cast votes based on such affiliations this paper suggests an alternative explanation by developing a theory of direct and indirect competition between special interests for political influence rather than marshalling block votes a primary feature of our framework is that two opposing interest groups an environmentalist group and an industrialist group compete directly and indirectly for political influence in a three stage game the indirect competition takes place in the first stage in which interest groups exert effort in persuading the public to indirectly influence government policy the direct competition takes place in the second stage in which interest groups exert effort in

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

government decision making and the incidence of federal mandates abstract this paper analyzes the effects of federally mandated program changes on state spending and revenues incorporating and evaluating the predictive value of several common theories of the state decision making process using several sources of exogenous increases in public medical spending i estimate that the entire state portion of the burden of mandated spending is borne by decreases in other public welfare spending while federal mandates may influence the composition of benefits at the state level it is much more difficult for them to change the total level of state transfers comparison of state reactions to different shocks suggests that these reductions are due in part to the substitutability of programs in the voter utility function but also in part to the stickiness of spending within budget categories states with greater racial differences between recipients and voters and states with less generous neighbors reduce other public welfare spending by even more alleviating the burden the medical expansions imposed on their taxpayers mandates may thus serve only to increase inequality across states

democrats republicans and taxes evidence that political parties matter i estimate the influence of political parties on state tax burdens over a forty year period 1960 2000 holding constant a large number of state and voter characteristic variables i find that i tax burdens are higher when democrats control the state legislature compared to when republicans are in control ii the political party of the governor has little effect after controlling for partisan influences in the state legislature i explain how both findings are consistent with median voter theory my results suggest that after five years of democratic control of the legislature state government would be approximately 3 to 5 percent larger than if republicans controlled the legislature during that same period with the better specifications producing estimates in the higher end of this range

corruption via media capture the effect of competition in this article we compare a government s optimal choice of whether to engage in corruption by capturing the media outlets through bribery in two alternative media market structures monopoly versus duopoly while there is an extra bribe claimant in a media duopoly relative to monopoly it may also be harder for each firm to individually expose corruption when the rival co opts with the government we find that when the latter effect is stronger than the former media is captured at lower bribes under duopoly relative to monopoly and in such instances media competition facilitates rather than hindering corruption

summits riots and media attention the political economy of information on trade and globalisation supply of information has increased rapidly through the growth of commercial media and technological innovations yet economists still blame anti globalists demonstrations and public opposition to trade liberalisation on poor information this paper analyses how the structure of the media industry affects the distribution of information on trade policy and globalisation we present an empirical analysis of belgian media reporting on trade policy and globalisation over the 1999 2002 period supports these hypotheses and finds strong negative bias in media coverage moreover we find that media coverage of trade policy and globalisation is highly concentrated around summit meetings of political leaders media attention in the popular press is heavily influenced by riots and demonstrations at summits the paper points at important implications for public information on trade policy and globalisation and for economists

tax limits and the qualifications of new teachers abstract this paper examines the impact of local tax limits on new teacher quality using data from the national center for education statistics we find that tax limits systematically reduce the average quality of education majors as well as new public school teachers in states that have passed these limits the average relative test scores of education majors in tax limit states declined by ten percent as compared to the relative test scores of education majors in states that did not pass limits this relationship is strengthened if we control for school finance equalization reforms or examine tax limits passed in two different periods

local content requirements versus tariff equivalents how we measure matters this article develops a mechanism to measure the impact of local content requirements as quantitative restrictions we compare effects of the novel quantitative approach to the effects of a tariff equivalent which is more traditionally used to analyse these types of policies local content requirements increase output and value added in the affected sector but at the expense of other sectors leading to declines in gdp and trade across the economy comparing the two modelling approaches the differences in outcomes are shown to be significant

media monitoring and capture of public funds evidence from madagascar summary this paper investigates the role of media and monitoring in reducing capture we analyze data on capture of public expenditures by local officials in madagascar our findings indicate important constraints on decentralization of public service delivery in particular in remote areas capture could be successfully constrained through a combination of media programs and monitoring intensive monitoring and access to media reduce capture however the impact of media is conditional on characteristics of the population with high illiteracy in poor regions the effectiveness of newspaper and poster campaigns is limited and radio and television programs are more important to reduce capture

mass media and special interest groups abstract media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior it is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups however existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias we present a theoretical model that reconciles these results the model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group and media outlets reliance on subscription in addition to advertising revenues

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

reform of police pensions in england and wales we analyse pension reforms for police officers in england and wales using force level data we quantify the impact on overall police pension plan liabilities examining incidence across police officers national and local taxpayers we also examine reforms of retirement rules especially concerning early retirement on grounds of ill health differences in ill health retirement across forces are statistically related to area specific stresses of policing and force specific human resources policies reforms in 2006 impacted primarily on the level of ill health retirement among forces with above average rates of early retirement we find residual differences in post 2006 ill health retirement rates across forces are related to differential capacities to raise revenue from local property taxes

mass media and public policy global evidence from agricultural policies mass media play a crucial role in information distribution and in the political market and public policy making theory predicts that information provided by the mass media reflects the media s incentives to provide news to different groups in society and affects these groups influence in policy making the paper use data on agricultural policy from 69 countries spanning a wide range of development stages and media markets to test these predictions the empirical results are consistent with theoretical hypotheses that public support for agriculture is affected by the mass media in particular an increase in media television diffusion is associated with policies that benefit the majority to a greater extent and is correlated with a reduction in agriculture taxation in poor countries and a reduction in the subsidization of agriculture in rich countries ceteris paribus the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased competition in commercial media reduces transfers to special interest groups and contributes to more efficient public policies

deviations from constituent interests the role of legislative structure and political parties in the states this paper investigates the determinants of state spending over 1960 1990 recent empirical studies suggest that state government expenditure is greater than the electorate desires our main finding is that expenditure was positively related to the number of seats in a state s legislature this is consistent with the hypothesis that logrolling leads representatives to spend more than their constituents would like we also find that political parties do not have a pronounced effect on overall levels of expenditure but do influence the composition of spending in particular democratic control of state government is associated with higher levels of welfare spending

the effects of party competition on budget outcomes empirical evidence from local governments in spain this paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election i e the difference between the vote share and 50 two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper on the one hand the leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector irrespective of the ideology of the party in power on the other hand the partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low i e parties on the left right will increase decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low these hypotheses are tested with information on spending own revenues and deficit for more than 500 spanish local governments over 8 years 1992 1999 and information on the results of two local electoral contests 1991 and 1995 the evidence favors the partisan hypothesis over the leviathan one we found that for left wing governments spending taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases whereas for right wing governments a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables

fiscal institutions and wage bargaining in the local public sector in a theoretical analysis of the properties of different wage setting and financing systems in the local public sector two financing systems are considered a benchmark model with local financing through local taxes is compared with a system of centralized financing through grants where taxes are decided at the national level it is shown that the wage outcomes under centralized financing depend heavily on the order of moves in the budgetary game between the central and local levels jel classification h23 j45

the political economy of the media coverage of the lumber tariff dispute the political economy of groups suggest that policies are more likely to be implemented if the benefits are concentrated and the costs are dispersed the importance of the role of media in society changes the classic models media can awaken the sleeping masses to the dispersed costs of a policy and raise resentment towards the group who benefits thus the content of media coverage can affect policy stromberg s 2001 model shows that the amount of newspaper space devoted to an issue should rise as the square of the number of people affected this paper finds empirical support for stromberg s theoretical findings with content analysis of newspaper coverage of the lumber tariff dispute

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

media freedom and gender equality a cross national instrumental variable quantile analysis we investigate the impact of media freedom on gender equality in education for a sample of 63 countries taken over the period 1995 2004 our analysis is motivated by the idea that the impact of media freedom on gender equality may differ over the conditional distribution of the response variable using instrumental variable quantile regression to control for endogeneity in per capita income we find that greater freedom of the media improves gender equality only in the 0 25 and 0 50 quantiles of the conditional distribution countries with the greatest disparities in gender outcomes experience no significant impact of media freedom

electoral competition in the american states electoral competition is a concept that has played a central role in much of the state politics literature one commonly used indicator of competition in the states is the ranney index we offer an alternative indicator of competition one based on district level outcomes of state legislative elections after evaluating both indicators in terms of validity and reliability the analysis suggests that the district level indicator is both empirically and intuitively superior as a measure of electoral competition the implications of this finding are discussed

a suggested ethical framework for evaluating corporate mergers and acquisitions the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in hostile takeovers in the united states proponents argue that well planned mergers enhance the value of the firm and the value of the firm to society critics typically argue that undesired takeovers ultimately harm society due to external costs not borne by the acquiring firm to be socially responsible the manager must consider the effects of the merger acquisition on all stakeholders different traditional ethical frameworks for decision making are proposed and reviewed a model is proposed

the social and private micro level consequences of homeownership abstract this paper reviews the literature that describes the micro level economic and social consequences of homeownership we adopt an interdisciplinary approach and include studies from economics sociology geography political science psychology and other disciplines our focus is on the set of consequences of homeownership in developed countries our list of potential outcomes of homeownership includes the impact on household wealth and portfolio choice mobility labor force participation urban structure and segregation home maintenance political and social activities health demographics self esteem and child outcomes there is substantial evidence that homeownership has important effects on some household behaviors and outcomes however we find that much of the past 30 year s literature on consequences of homeowning is deficient from a theoretical or econometric perspective we suggest solutions and identify research gaps present in the literature

analysis of perfonnance standards for direct foreign investments within the framework of a duopolistic model we investigate the impact of foreign investment standards on welfare output and employment minimum local content and export requirements reduce world output world welfare and the source country s welfare under certain conditions the decline in host country s consumer surplus resulting from diminished competition outweighs the shift of monopoly rent from the source country s firm to the host country s firm minimum content standards can increase host country s employment but only to a point marginal increases in the content requirement can actually reduce employment as the magnitude of foreign investment declines

can fiscal rules constrain the size of government an analysis of the crown jewel of tax and expenditure limitations abstract fiscal rules attempt to alter budget outcomes by constraining policy makers they have been one of the primary responses to the recent string of fiscal crises around the globe we ask if these rules succeed in altering fiscal outcomes by examining what is arguably the most stringent set of fiscal rules in the u s colorado s taxpayer bill of rights tabor as tabor attempts to constrain both taxes and expenditures we develop a novel approach of estimating treatment effects for multiple outcomes simultaneously using the synthetic control methodology of abadie et al 2010 although there will always be a degree of uncertainty over external validity when a policy is enacted in only a single state our results provide no evidence that tabor affected the level of taxes or spending in colorado and are precise enough to rule out large negative effects thus no support is found for the contention that fiscal rules alter budget outcomes instead tabor appears to have been partly evaded by policy makers and voters despite its stringency and partly nothing more than a ratification of the state s preference over the size of its public sector

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

hunting the whale more evidence on state government leviathans caplan holds that governments are leviathans seeking to extend their power by increasing government expenditures beyond the level preferred by voters we extend caplan s model by examining the real percentage growth rates of government we also examine whether government size increases at an increasing rate as the minority party weakens we find evidence that supports and fails to support the original leviathan hypothesis we also fail to support our extensions of caplan s hypothesis furthermore our significant and contrary results have intuitively appealing interpretations from these results we conclude that the impact of political party power on government spending is ambiguous

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

founding family leadership and industry profitability in this article we argue that firms in high margin industries can benefit from founding family influence specifically in more profitable markets the influence of the founding family provides an additional corporate governance monitoring function the sample consists of 294 firm year observations from 98 publicly traded companies headquartered in sweden representing approximately half of all non financial traded firms our support that the effect of family leadership in publicly held firms should be assessed in relation to the intensity of industry competition

public pension accounting rules and economic outcomes we find a negative association between a state s fiscal condition and the use of discretion in applying governmental accounting standards board gasb rules to understate pension funding gaps we also find that the use of discretion is negatively associated with states decisions to increase taxes and cut spending in addition we find that the funding gap understatement is positively associated with higher future labor costs importantly this association is primarily attributable to the gasb methodology which systematically understates the funding gap this suggests that the gasb approach is associated with policy choices that have the potential to exacerbate fiscal stress

the effects of politics on local tax setting evidence from france this paper investigates the hypothesis that local politics has an impact on local taxation in the french public sector by using a cross sectional dataset on departments in 1999 political variables are included in a tax setting equation to provide empirical evidence whether local governments in france adopt business taxation behaviour closer to the leviathan government hypothesis with higher tax rates when political competition decreases or to the partisan government hypothesis with differences in tax rates according to partisan variables it is shown that the wider the seat s margin the lower the tax rates and that this cut is weaker in the case of a left wing local majority than a right wing majority it is therefore concluded that the partisan government hypothesis is more supported by the french data than the leviathan one even after controlling for tax interdependencies between departments

when is two better than one how federalism mitigates and intensifies imperfect political competition the current paper models power maximizing politicians behavior subject to imperfect political competition and perfect citizen mobility it then analyzes the welfare implications of federal and non federal structures the model abstracts from both heterogeneous preferences the most common argument in favor of federalism and externalities the most common argument against showing that even in this simplified setting federalism has important welfare implications there is one class of equilibria in which more federalism has the purely beneficial effect of offsetting imperfections in the political process however there is also a second class of equilibria in which citizen mobility makes political imperfections more severe by creating safe districts for both political parties 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

inequality and media capture abstract popular support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion even when voters understand that the media can be biased i develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost the model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom this effect is stronger in democratic regimes i find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross country analysis

understanding the tax revolt eight explanations numerous explanations of the tax revolt have been offered since california s adoption of proposition 13 in 1978 unfortunately many of these explanations remain untested or have been tested inappropriately and the explanations are often jumbled together in a fashion that precludes theoretical clarity we extract eight explanations from the literature each of which assumes that the tax revolt is a systematic national phenomenon that is a function of individual level social economic and political factors having tested these explanations by means of a discriminant analysis of data from the 1978 american national election study we find little empirical corroboration for any of them this leads us to consider two alternative research programs one of which interprets the tax revolt within a symbolic politics framework

tax innovation in the states capitalizing on political opportunity this paper assesses the factors that prompt states to adopt taxes during the twentieth century we test five explanations of state tax innovation derived from the literature economic development fiscal health election cycle party control and regional diffusion using event history analysis a pooled cross sectional time series technique while little support is found for the economic development and party control explanations our empirical results are highly consistent with a political opportunity explanation of state tax adoptions 1 the presence of a long time until the next election 2 the existence of a fiscal crisis and 3 the presence of neighboring states that have previously adopted a tax all create opportunities for politicians to shield themselves from the political costs of supporting a tax increase and are all shown by empirical analysis to increase the probability of a tax adoption this empirical evidence is consistent across different tax instruments and different periods of analysis throughout the twentieth century

direct democracy and public employees in the public sector employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage and wages may be inefficiently high because of the strength of public employee interest groups this paper explores whether the initiative process a direct democracy institution of growing importance can control these political economy problems as proponents and some research suggests based on a sample of 650 cities in 2000 i find that when public employees are not allowed to bargain collectively and patronage may be a problem initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages when public employees are allowed to bargain collectively driving up wages the initiative appears to cut wages by about 4 percent but has no measurable effect on employment the employment cutting result is quite robust surviving a number of robustness tests the wage cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests

has leviathan been bound a theory of imperfectly constrained government with evidence from the states this paper develops a formal theory that combines power maximizing leviathan political parties with well defined imperfections in the political process the model implies that both parties tend to make government larger as their likelihood of electoral victory increases empirical tests on state level data confirm this prediction racing the leviathan hypothesis against alternative theories of party motivation indicates that both the leviathan and the contrasting ideologies views have some degree of validity the leviathan motive of politicians to maximize their power is a central assumption of the public choice approach to political economy this approach has been strongly attacked for underestimating the importance of competitive checks on politicians wittman 1989 1995 in particular broadly argues that electoral competition is an effective solution to whatever principalagent problem might exist between politicians and voters yet recent research in political economy dixit and londregan 1995 1996 1998 grossman and helpman 1996 casts renewed doubt on the efficiency of political markets formal models incorporating imperfections in the electoral process show that politicians have the latitude to deviate somewhat from citizen interests although politicians face constraints they retain some measure of monopoly power a conclusion consistent with the public choice literature the main difference between recent political economy and the public choice tradition arises from their assumptions about politicians objective functions the public choice approach tends to view all political parties as power maximizers whereas others see parties as either vote

political economy of the media and consumer perceptions of biotechnology although households are flooded with information through dozens of tv channels plenty of newspapers journals and radio the public is said to be poorly informed on many important issues for example european consumers oppose genetically modified gm foods despite scientists and official institutions claiming those products are safe these reactions are blamed on consumers being poorly informed there is an extensive literature on imperfect information see akerlof stiglitz an important implicit assumption in this literature is that such information problems may be solved by providing more information the problem is that information provision is assumed to be neutral however in reality most information is not provided by institutions whose objective is to foster the public good but by organizations who have an internal incentive to select certain information and certain forms of information over other information it is either provided by private sources with their own profitmaximizing objectives or by public sources that may have the formal goal of providing objective information but administrators and governments may have incentives to bias the information this issue is particularly relevant for consumers risk perceptions about gm foods over 90 of consumers receive information about food and biotechnology primarily through the popular press and television hoban and kendall extensive media coverage of possible risks can lead to decreased demand for example johnson shows how media coverage of product contamination by

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed