the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

on the equivalence of profit and revenue sharing abstract this paper shows that even in a unionised labour market net and gross profit sharing as well as revenue sharing are isomorphic neither the capital stock nor the wage employment combination depends on the deductibility of base wages and or capital costs from the share base

does adding up of economic capital for market and credit risk amount to conservative risk assessment there is a tradition in the banking industry of dividing risk into market risk and credit risk both categories are treated independently in the calculation of risk capital but many financial positions depend simultaneously on both market risk and credit risk factors in this case an approximation of the portfolio value function separating value changes into a pure market risk plus pure credit risk component can result not only in an overestimation but also in an underestimation of risk we discuss this compounding effect in the context of foreign currency loans and argue that a separate calculation of economic capital for market risk and for credit risk may significantly underestimate true risk

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

underemployment irreversibilities and growth under trade unionism the effects of irreversibility and uncertainty are analyzed in a unionized economy with overlapping generations irreversible decisions about technology and physical and human capital are made under uncertainty and generate underutilization of labor and equipment not only over the convergence path but also at steady state the related inefficiency negatively affects the accumulation process by reducing the per capita capital stock at teady state the effect of union power on capital is ambiguous and depends crucially on the presence of irreversible decisions

risk factor contributions in portfolio credit risk models abstract determining contributions to overall portfolio risk is an important topic in risk management for positions instruments and sub portfolios this problem has been well studied and a significant theory built around the calculation of marginal contributions we consider the problem of determining the contributions to portfolio risk of risk factors this cannot be addressed through an immediate extension of techniques for position contributions since the portfolio loss is a nonlinear function of the risk factors we employ the hoeffding decomposition of the portfolio loss into a sum of terms depending on the factors this decomposition restores linearity but includes terms arising from joint effects of groups of factors these cross factor terms provide information to risk managers since they can be viewed as best hedges of the portfolio loss involving instruments of increasing complexity we illustrate the technique on multi factor portfolio credit risk models where systematic factors represent industries geographical sectors etc

a model of efficiency wages as a signal of firm value we consider performance contracts with firm private information the verifiable components of the contract an up front wage and employment may serve both as a signal and a performance incentive job rent may be necessary for signaling and since efficient signaling is multidimensional there is an inextricable link between job rent and underemployment signaling can explain the lack of explicit bonding in actuality though our basic model is static our underemployment result is not a consequence of firm myopia when the firm is farsighted it will not maximize the joint future surplus if it cannot extract the worker s share at present copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

examining the role of economic opportunity and amenities in explaining population redistribution abstract this paper develops a model of migration integrating equilibrium and disequilibrium components in which individuals and firms form rational expectations about future opportunities levels of migration are derived as functions of variations in factors influencing migrant labor demand economic opportunity and migrant labor supply residential amenities the model is used to estimate the extent to which migration in the united states over the period 1950 1980 is determined by these two classes of exogenous factors

expropriation and control rights a dynamic model of foreign direct investment abstract this paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country we analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of creeping expropriation once his investment is sunk it is shown that this hold up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak and overinvestment if it is too strong we also analyze the impact of spillover effects we give a rationale for tax holidays and we examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country

internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm abstract the transaction cost analysis of the firm has identified asset idiosyncrasy and the risk of ex post opportunism as key determinants of organizational form simultaneously several writers have modeled the distribution of quasi rents among input suppliers as a bargaining game these complementary ideas are used to formalize the notion of strategic innovation where capital and labor attempt to redistribute firm income after specialized assets are in place through unilateral modifications in production technology because strategic behavior can enlarge the quasi rent component of fifirm income this process may persist in equilibrium asset idiosyncrasy therefore creates room for an autonomous theory of organizational dynamics partially insulated from events at the market level of analysis

do unions reduce investment evidence from canada the authors test for a link between unionization and net investment rates in canadian manufacturing analysis of data on 18 industries for the years 1967 87 reveals a negative non linear relationship the presence of unions appears to have reduced investment when the percentage of firms in the industry that were unionized was between 0 and approximately 50 with a plateau or slight positive marginal effect above this level in an industry moving from no unions to the mean level of unionization net investment and gross investment are predicted to fall by 66 74 and 18 25 respectively

productivity and long term growth potential in the uk economy 1924 1968 this paper examines the long term structural determinants of labour productivity for the uk economy using a panel data set from 1924 to 1968 trade union product market competition and human capital explanations are embedded within the model and compared labour quality or human capital is found to be the most important of the explanations considered

skill transferability migration and development evidence from population resettlement in indonesia we use a natural experiment in indonesia to provide causal evidence on the role of location specific human capital and skill transferability in shaping the spatial distribution of productivity from 1979 1988 the transmigration program relocated two million migrants from rural java and bali to new rural settlements in the outer islands villages assigned migrants from regions with more similar agroclimatic endowments exhibit higher rice productivity and nighttime light intensity one to two decades later we find some evidence of migrants adaptation to agroclimatic change overall our results suggest that regional productivity differences may overstate the potential gains from migration

a note on mechanization and wage bargaining abstract collective wage bargaining may bias firms choice of production techniques but not in favour of mechanization it is most profitable to install relatively more equipment which is complementary to labour power than equipment which is a substitute

entry deterrence under trade unions this paper argues for the integration of labor unions in the analysis of industrial organization such a linkage is important for at least two reasons first unions are often concentrated in big firms which tend in general to face an imperfectly competitive environment in their product markets second unions are usually able to extract in the form of higher wages some rents which result from the market power of firms see for example freeman and medoff 1984 on the impact of unions on firm profitability in the u s a firms should thus take union behavior into account and in particular realize that strategies toward rival firms will tend to affect unions ability to extract rents we illustrate here the impact of unions in industrial organization by focusing on the topic of entry deterrence ed in section 2 we first argue that unions tend to lower the profitability of two standard widely studied ed strategies limit pricing under incomplete information and the use of sunk costs section 3 then turns to union contracts as a possible alternative ed strategy available to incumbent tirms finally section 4 assesses the welfare impact of unions in these settings while section 5 suggests directions for research

co determination and innovation this paper examines the effect of the german co determination law of 1976 mitbestg on the innovative activity of german firms co determination applies to firms with 2 000 employees or more data from 1971 1976 and 1981 1990 on 148 firms are used to compare the number of patents granted to co determined firms before and after the introduction of the law several control variables are applied and in particular in order to avoid a possible bias from specific effects of firm size we compare the co determined firms with others before and after 1976 the results do not support the view that co determination slows down technological progress and reduces innovativity

structural adjustment policies and productive efficiency of socialist enterprises abstract the paper uses panel data from a five percent stratified random sample of yugoslav industrial enterprises to test several hypotheses about the determinants of productive efficiency the estimating procedure selects the production function best supported by the data and allows for industry specific production function parameters as well as from firm specific fixed or random effects the instrumental variable estimates suggest that productive efficiency is unaffected by the four structural policy variables whose effect we examine the extent of export orientation joint venture status divisionalization of the firm and the firm s market share

towards a green economy through innovations the role of trade union involvement abstract in this paper we address the overlooked issue of whether and how industrial relations might play a role in the process of greening the economy primarily through the levers of innovation adoption and organisational change we address our objective econometrically assessing the quality of industrial relations as a driver of environmental innovation adoption through the use of micro data on manufacturing firms the results yield two interesting main findings being a unionised firm is not associated with the adoption of environmental innovation however when we consider the industrial relations climate we observe a positive relationship between a cooperative industrial relations climate union involvement and the propensity to introduce environmental innovation two models are relevant a managerially oriented model unions are informed and a participatory model unions bargain on innovation adoption the contents of environmental innovations are also important union involvement is more relevant for adopting more complex and radical innovations to abate co2 and ems and iso practices

an application of a stated preference method to value urban amenities this is a case study analysis of how residents value the amenities of a small us city missoula montana a measure of a community s amenity values is needed in city planning so as to protect those

on the prevalence of labor contracts with fixed duration the prevalence of labor contracts with fixed duration seems surprising why is a fixed duration preferred to a stochastic duration that depends on the consumer price index in this paper the specification of the contract duration is determined endogenously the wage rate can be indexed to the consumer price index but there is a loss since the indexation must be the same for different types of shocks this loss increases with the variability of the contract duration since the loss due to the contracting cost depends on the expected discounted duration only a fixed duration is chosen copyright 1992 by american economic association

local versus central wage bargaining with endogenous investments investment behavior may depend on whether wage bargaining takes place centrally or locally at the firm level the outcome of the wage bargain will in turn depend on previous investments ignoring other differences between the two bargaining regimes endogenous investments imply that wages are lower and profits higher under local wage bargaining than under central bargaining this does not necessarily imply that employment is highest under local bargaining since investments may differ in the two cases with a nash bargaining solution however reasonable assumptions imply that employment is highest under local wage bargaining

unions rent creators or extractors this paper proposes a model of workplace specific unions that integrates two views of what unions do one view holds that unions mainly engage in rent extraction another view holds that unions mainly engage in rent creation by providing agency services that increase workplace productivity we demonstrate that the choice between the two activities is systematically related to the economic and regulatory environment in which the union operates product market competition encourages rent creation while labor market deregulation encourages rent extraction moreover we provide a rationale for why firms may want to subsidize unions the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics 2005

unemployment and the inter regional mobility of labour the relationship between unemployment and interregional labor migration in the united kingdom is explored using data from the labour force survey for 1984 and 1977 the authors conclude that the experience of unemployment increases the likelihood of migration and that households in areas of high unemployment are more likely to move they also find that during periods of higher overall unemployment migration propensities are reduced annotation

capitalists and workers knowledge and the strategic role of investment within the firm does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm the formation of a firm frequently represents an attempt by an individual to secure a return on knowledge and we demonstrate that in this context there can be an incentive to precommit capital before contracting with other members of the firm that is to be the capitalist results are also obtained on the investment level and wage rate the key ingredient of the model is emergence of a product market entry threat from within the firm this contrasts with the anonymous external potential entrant prevalent in the literature

sunk investment bargaining and choice of capital structure this paper shows how a firm might optimally choose debt to affect the outcome of bilateral bargaining with workers or other input suppliers it is shown that debt may alleviate the well known underinvestment problem associated with the inability to write precommitment contracts also in such circumstances debt could be pareto improving over complete equity financing the relationship between the optimal level of debt and asset specificity of investment and bargaining power of the firm vis a vis the workers is explored the williamson conjecture that higher asset specificity will lead to less debt is shown not to be valid in general

the macroeconomics of specificity specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences resources are underutilized factor markets are segmented production suffers from technological sclerosis job creation and destruction are unbalanced recessions are excessively sharp and expansions run into bottlenecks while depending on the shock expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization recessions should typically be softened in the long run institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation technology choice will also be affected with the appropriated factor partially excluding the other from production to reduce appropriation

an economic capital model integrating credit and interest rate risk in the banking book banks often measure credit and interest rate risk in the banking book separately and then add the risk measures to determine economic capital this approach misses complex interactions between the two risk types we develop a framework where these risks are analysed jointly since banking book positions are generally not marked to market our model is based on book value accounting our simulations show that interactions matter and that ignoring them leads to risk overstatement the magnitude of the errors depends on the structure of the balance sheet and on the repricing characteristics of assets and liabilities

does evolution solve the hold up problem abstract the paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold up problem at the first stage one agent decides on the level of a relationship specific investment there is no contract so at the second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated we show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargaining game and on the choice of equilibrium concept in particular we prove the following two results i if bargaining proceeds according to the nash demand game any investment level is subgame perfect but only a particular efficient outcome is stochastically stable ii if bargaining proceeds according to the ultimatum game with the trading partner as proposer only the minimal investment level is subgame perfect but any investment level is stochastically stable journal of economic literature classification numbers l14 c78

investment and learning by doing in this paper we explore the implications of learning by doing for the firm s investment decision we consider the firm s problem of optimal capital accumulation in the face of the adjustment costs of investment a firm facing convex adjustment costs will find it desirable to complete a project in several periods furthermore through repetition of the installation activity proficiency gains are obtained and investment in the later part of the project can be made at a lower cost to make the model tractable we assume that a project can be completed in two periods or stages called the initial stage and the completion stage we also assume that learning is specific to the project without any spillover into other projects or into the industry project specific learning is assumed mainly to guarantee a steady state on the other hand learning is assumed to be specific to the firm because the firm will internalize the externalities associated with learning the marginal cost of investment in the completion stage will depend on the amount of investment already done in the initial stage therefore in equilibrium the marginal cost of initiating an investment project will be equal to the shadow price of capital plus the present value of the future cost reduction

highway robbery complementary monopoly and the hold up problem abstract we analyze the hold up problem in the context of the cournot ellet theory of complementary monopoly the strategic interaction among travelers and two distinct owners of successive segments of a segment road is used as a metaphor for complementary goods that are traded sequentially it is shown that when trade occurs double marginalization is eliminated furthermore allowing for strategic placement of the tollbooths simultaneous trade avoids the hold up problem but not double marginalization thus this analysis suggests the endogenous creation of institutions among complementary monopolistic suppliers that assure their customers of not being held up whenever it is strategically possible

bargaining structures and delay in innovation it is sometimes argued that fears about the employment consequences of introducing new technology may lead unions to wish to delay innovations and this may reduce incentives for firm to carry out r d we explore these issues in a model of two countries that compete over both market share and r d and we restrict attention to cases where unions would wish to delay innovation we show that allowing unions to bargain over the timing of innovation need not reduce the possibility of a firm successfully competing for r d however simulations suggest that for a particular model allowing unions to delay innovation does not help a firm compete over r d

debt and wage negotiations a bankruptcy based approach the role of debt in wage negotiations is considered in a framework where both the entrepreneur and the workforce are indispensable in production when workers and the entrepreneur fail to reach an agreement the firm eventually defaults bankruptcy is represented as a three party bargaining game among the entrepreneur workers and lenders we show that debt financing by reducing workers bargaining power increases the firm s share of surplus and improves the incentives to invest further our model allows for overborrowing the firm borrows more than required by its productive activity as well as underinvestment due to wealth constraints i introduction as asserted by grout 1984 the inability of labour unions to make wage commitments creates an underinvestment problem when wages can be negotiated after investment has been sunk the entrepreneur chooses an inefficiently low investment level in this paper we reconsider grout s underinvestment problem by concentrating on the role of debt in wage bargaining when long term labour contracts cannot be written as we show through an explicit analysis of the threat of bankruptcy the extent of underinvestment depends on whether leverage can influence the distribution of surplus between wages and profits we analyse the relation between debt and wages in a strategic bargaining framework assuming that delays in agreement will reduce the surplus

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

unions in a frictional labor market abstract a labor market with search and matching frictions where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup with full commitment to future wages the union achieves efficient hiring in the long run but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate rents from firms without commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium hiring is too low both in the short and the long run the quantitative impact is demonstrated in an extended model with partial union coverage and multiperiod union contracting

internal vs external financing of r d the empirical evidence suggests that while small firms in united states united kingdom and canada rely on internal funds for financing r d similar firms in japan germany and france have access to bank loans in this paper we analyze the financial decisions of small firms willing to invest in r d we find that their high ratio of intangible assets along with the high risk nature of their investments can explain their inability to raise debt in external capital markets we also show that financing r d with bank loans might be feasible especially if banks are willing to monitor the investment activities of their clients

flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risk models in this paper we specify and estimate a flexible parametric proportional hazards model the model specification is flexibly parametric in the sense that the baseline hazard is non parametric while the effect of the covariates takes a particular functional form we also add parametric heterogeneity to the underlying hazard model specification we specify a flexible parametric proportional competing risks model which permits unrestricted correlation among the risks unemployment duration data are then analysed using the flexible parametric duration and competing risks specifications we find an important effect arising from the exhaustion of unemployment insurance and significantly different hazards for the two types of risks new jobs and recalls

unionization and plant closure in canada this paper examines for the first time the role of unionization as a determinant of plant closings in canada using the 1999 to 2001 canadian workplace and employee survey the paper contributes to the north american evidence by showing that the share of a plant s workers covered by collective bargaining has a robust positive partial correlation with the probability of larger plants closing for smaller plants the extent of unionization tends to be much lower and its variation plays no role in plant closure the study highlights the theoretical and statistical importance of examining closure separately for large and small plants ce memoire examine pour la premiere fois le role de la syndicalisation en tant que determinant de la fermeture d usines au canada a l aide des resultats de l enquete sur le milieu de travail et les employes de 1999 et de 2001 emte le texte contribue a enrichir le dossier qui montre qu il y a correlation positive partielle robuste entre la portion des travailleurs d usines couverts par une convention collective et la probabilite de fermeture des grandes usines pour les plus petites usines le degre de syndicalisation tend aetre plus faible et sa variation ne joue pas de role dans le processus de fermeture d usines cette etude montre l importance theorique et pratique qu il y a aetudier separement les fermetures des grandes et des petites usines

tobin s q and financial policy abstract recent research in macroeconomics has emphasized the importance of linking the financial and real sectors and working with optimizing models tobin s q model of investment would appear to provide a framework satisfying these two criteria in contrast to the original presentation of the q model the formal development has not recognized that the firm actively participates in a number of financial markets in this broader context q may be an uninformative and possibly misleading signal for investment expenditures we then endeavor to turn this negative theoretical result to positive advantage in resolving a number of empirical problems with q models

local economic conditions and wage labor decisions of farm and rural nonfarm couples effects of geographical differences in local economic conditions on wage labor demand and wage labor participation decisions of rural couples are examined for current population survey households 1978 82 wage premiums are shown to exist for localities anticipating labor demand growth higher unemployment rates larger share of employment in services and higher costs of living these effects are stronger for males than females effects of local economic conditions on the probability of wage work are consistent with expected market wage and reservation wage effects and for farm households the probability of wage work increases when expected farm output prices decline or the wage increases

employee share ownership and privatisation some theoretical issues the purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the theoretical issues involved with employee share ownership in the privatization situation the share purchase decision by employ ees is generally a one off decision and there is a sequential aspect to the problem the author concludes that simple theoretical models of the type will generally unambiguously predict that employee share ownership is beneficial in privatizations indeed the results are som ewhat surprising showing that the creation of additional shares for employees actually increases rather than decreases the value of non e mployee shares even though the money paid for the employee shares go es to the government and does not stay in the company copyright 1987 by royal economic society

discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market jobs in the primary sector require firm specific training with wages determined as a result of bargaining firms pay for the training and since they are imperfectly informed about worker productivity they test workers before hiring them the secondary sector is competitive taking a job in the secondary sector signals low productivity and therefore workers in the secondary sector are unable to get jobs in the primary sector open unemployment coexists with unfilled vacancies for low wage jobs

investments and bargaining in a model with positive consumption externalities abstract this paper analyzes the investment decisions of the members of a committee when a subsequent bargaining process determines the distribution of a divisible good among them the shares allocated to investing agents generate positive consumption externalities we show that agents investments improve their bargaining position this induces rent seeking behavior that generates a negative external effect on other investing agents in this setting the effects of rent seeking counterbalance the effects of positive consumption externalities so that equilibria may be efficient or display either over or under investment

the layoff rat race we investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs after investments are made firms may have to lay off workers and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates greater skill investments especially in specific human capital contribute more to a firm s bottom line so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last we show that as long as workers bargaining positions are not too weak workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities indeed workers over invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough even though they only receive a share of any investment more generally we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms the probability that a firm will downsize and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

wages rents and amenities differences among workers and regions what explains persistent regional earnings differences this paper argues that regional differences in amenities can account for the wage differences in contrast cost of living variations do not account for wage differences but actually exacerbate them this conclusion results from a model in which variations in rents and wages are equalizing differences for amenity differences empirical results are consistent with the model

inventory accumulation wages and employment this paper analyzes the effect of inventory accumulation on the outcome of wage and employment agreements between a union and a firm a two period model is set up with bargaining in each period and the paper analyzes under what circumstances inventories will be held even if demand and production conditions are constant it is found that inventories have an important strategic role they bring forward employment and strengthen the bargaining position of the firm in the later period however the firm s strategic use of inventories will generally be to the detriment of both parties copyright 1991 by royal economic society

sluggish institutions in a dynamic world can unions and industrial competition coexist during the 1930s and 1940s collective bargaining emerged as the workplace governance norm in much of the u s industrial sector following its peak in the 1950s union density in the u s private sector fell steadily to only 7 4 percent in 2006 governance shifted from a formalized union norm to one of constrained managerial discretion in competitive and dynamic economic environments a union tax on company earnings and slow response to economic shocks combine to produce poor performance by union companies two industries automotives and airlines are used to illustrate these points if worker based institutions are to flourish they must add value and permit companies to perform at levels similar to those obtained under evolving nonunion governance norms

profit sharing unions and investments the pay parameters in a profit sharing system are likely to be determined by collective bargaining between unions and employers in this case employment will not necessarily be higher under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system for a fixed capital stock the most likely case is that profit sharing is better for unions and worse for employers than a fixed wage system with endogenous investments both parties may be worse off under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system this might be one of the reasons why we in fact do not observe much profit sharing under collective bargaining

permanent differences in unemployment and permanent wage differentials this paper tests for the existence of wage premiums based on geographic and industry unemployment differences these differences are broken down into permanent and transitory components in equations controlling for variation in state generosity of unemployment insurance benefits findings indicate that wage premiums arise for long run unemployment differences but that negative short run shocks to industries generate wage cuts while positive shocks generate wage hikes therefore labor contracts accommodate long term anticipated unemployment and entail sharing of short term unemployment risks

the learning curve and pricing in the chemical processing industries data on 37 chemical products are used to test a number of hypotheses about the learning curve and industrial price behavior the results document a strong and consistent learning effect learning is found to be a function of cumulated industry output and cumulated investment rather than calendar time standard economies of scale appear significant but small in magnitude relative to the learning effect variations in the slope of the learning curve are linked to differences in r d expenditures and capital intensity market concentration is found to be a strong influence on price flexibility and the timing of learningrelated price changes

landscape amenities and local development a review of migration regional economic and hedonic pricing studies abstract with rapid urban expansion and loss of open space attractive local landscapes will continue to gain importance in location decisions and on political agendas the present study reviews the evidence on the local economic role of landscape amenities from two major strands of empirical research migration and regional economic models and hedonic pricing models following common amenity definitions we identify 71 relevant peer reviewed studies and systematically assess the reported effects of the landscape amenity variables the migration and regional economic studies suggest that migrants are attracted by amenities nearly as often as by low taxes reported effects of amenities on income and employment are less consistent the hedonic studies suggest that nature reserves and land cover diversity have mostly open space and forest often and agricultural land rarely positive effects on housing prices studies at larger geographic scales and studies involving urban areas were more likely to identify significant amenity effects some limitations of the evidence may be overcome with better datasets and modeling approaches however in line with other recent work the limitations also highlight the need for complementary information from the analysis of political preferences for land use management

hold up with a vengeance when contracts are incomplete or unenforceable inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold up if individuals care for negative reciprocity these problems may be reduced as revenge becomes a credible threat however negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds we explore this issue analytically deriving predictions for hold up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control we also test and support these predictions in an experiment

the role of amenities and quality of life in rural economic growth a structural model of regional economic growth is estimated using data for 2243 rural u s counties five indices designed to capture specific amenity and quality of life characteristics are constructed using fifty four separate indicators results suggest that amenity characteristics can be organized into consistent and meaningful empirical measures that move beyond ad hoc descriptions of amenities in addition to insights into the influence of local characteristics ranging from tax burdens to income distribution on regional economic growth results suggest that predictable relationships between amenities quality of life and local economic performance exist

migration fixed costs and location specific amenities a hazard analysis for a panel of males this article presents econometric estimates of the adult working age male hazard function of interstate migration fitted to data obtained from migration decisions of adult males over a twenty year period the results show a strong negative effect of the real wage difference between origin and destination and of fixed costs associated with a move on the hazard rate of interstate migration farmers and other self employed males and males who have school age children have unusually low hazard rates of interstate migration although a high crime rate is shown to increase the real wage it also has a separate positive effect on the hazard of migration

an empirical structural model of aggregate demand abstract this paper estimates a structural model of aggregate demand it attempts to avoid two of the shortcomings of most existing macroeconometric models the structure of the model is specified so as to be approximately policy invariant to eliminate the pretesting from which most published estimated models suffer all regression run are reported as the model contains consumption investment and money demand functions close in specification to existing ones it should help the reader judge the reliability of existing estimated functions the estimated model shows a relatively small direct dependence of aggregate demand on the past a much larger dependence on the anticipated future

the economic consequences of labor unionization evidence from stock price crash risk this study investigates the impact of labor unionization on stock price crash risk we find that labor unionization is negatively associated with stock price crash risk such negative relation is more pronounced when firms can intimate more credible evidence on unfavorable prospects and when firms face more powerful labor unions our findings are consistent with the notion that firms take strategic actions to reduce the bargaining advantages enjoyed by labor unions and that labor unions force firms to take less risky investments and discontinue underperformed projects more timely which leads to lower stock price crash risk

wage employment determination and a union tax on capital can theory and evidence be reconciled if unions appropriate quasi rents from relation specific capital observed factor prices no longer reflect effective costs unionism has effects akin to a partial factor tax on capital demand curve settlements need not imply higher k l among union firms

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

investing in a relationship a principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining i study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment when investment returns are observable informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts as they induce higher investment ex ante the principal invests not only to generate direct returns but also to improve relational incentives unobservability of returns increases the principal s ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives the optimal information structure depends on bargaining power

does relationship specific investment depend on asset ownership evidence from a natural experiment in the housing market the classic hold up model grossman and hart 1986 predicts that allocations of asset ownership which expose a party to expropriation reduce relationship specific investments by this party in the empirical context of t he housing market i show that the hold up model predicts more relationship specific investments such as bathroom renovations in owner occupied housing than in rental housing i confirm this prediction for the german housing market to ob tain an exogenous variation of asset home ownership i use the natural experiment of the german reunification under the communist regime ownership exist ed but was economically meaningless it was a quasi random by product of dwelling choice yet after reunification ownership unexpectedly reacquired legal fo rce

rural population growth 1950 1990 the roles of human capital industry structure and government policy human capital raises rural incomes but this effect is swamped by higher returns to human capital in urban markets this leads to brain drain from rural areas populations grow more rapidly in rural counties that have a diversified employment base farm population grows faster or declines more slowly in counties with relatively high farm income and nonfarm populations grow faster in counties with relatively high nonfarm income however higher farm incomes lead to slower nonfarm population growth and vice versa rural county government services financed by local taxes or debt have neutral or negative effects on population growth rural population in the united states increased 53 between 1900 and 1990 this increase is concentrated in the nonfarm rural sector where population has grown to three times its turn of the century level nevertheless there exists a concern that rural areas are threatened by population declines that will gradually erode the ability of communities to provide public services necessary for their citizens eventually the fear is that these communities will become too small to be selfsustaining and will disappear one might ask why these concerns exist in the face of slowly rising rural populations one reason is that the overall rural population increase masks a huge migration of labor off the farm the rural farm population has fallen to one tenth its 1900 level if a strong farm economy is necessary to sustain rural communities then the farm population decline is a threat to the future viability of rural communities on the other hand off farm employment opportunities are increasingly important to the

institutions and short run macroeconomic performance abstract this paper reviews the growing interest in institutions it argues that the explanation for this interest is a fresh awareness of how institutions affect economic performance this connection arises because many economic interaction take the form of one or other of three classic games prisoners dilemma coordination and chicken and the outcome in these games and hence performance of the economy is influenced by the institutional context of these interactions the paper provides a detailed illustration of this argument with a survey of the literature which relates unemployment performances to the institutions of wage setting in oecd countries

wage bargaining and monopsony this paper identifies three possible outcomes of higher relative firm bargaining power in a unionized firm facing an upward sloping labor supply curve the conventional regime with reduced wage and higher employment corresponds to firm bargaining power below a certain critical value a supply constrained regime where increased firm bargaining power reduces both wages and employment occurs when the bargaining power is above another critical level a novel result is that we identify a third regime with firm bargaining power between these critical levels where changes in relative bargaining power does not affect wages and employment

does competition solve the hold up problem in an environment in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers undertake ex ante investments the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies namely hold up and coordination problems this paper shows using an explicitly non cooperative model that when matching is assortative and investments precede market competition buyers investments are constrained efficient while sellers marginally underinvest with respect to what would be constrained efficient however the overall extent of this inefficiency may be large multiple equilibria may arise one equilibrium is characterized by efficient matches but there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures

labor policy and investment evidence from canada some critics of proposed legislative labor policy changes contend that laws favoring labor would adversely affect business investment research on labor policy however often assumes that investme

a new approach to optimal capital allocation for rorac maximization in banks abstract we introduce a new model for optimal internal capital allocation which would allow banks to maximize their return on risk adjusted capital rorac under regulatory and capital constraints we extend the single period model of buch et al 2011 to a multi period model and improve its forecasting accuracy by including the debt effect and bayesian learning innovations the empirical application shows that our model significantly improves the rorac of a sample of banks listed in the s p 500 index

a welfare analysis of convergence to rational expectations abstract this paper investigates a model with intertemporally inconsistent preferences where individuals begin by making mistakes and converge to rational expectations it is shown that the properties of rational expectations do not carry over to paths that monotonically converge to re and that if individuals begin by making mistakes then everyone cannot benefit by convergence to rational expectations

risk capital allocation for rorac optimization abstract this paper considers the financial optimization problem of a firm with several sub businesses striving for its optimal rorac an insightful example shows that the implementation of classical gradient capital allocation can be suboptimal if division managers are allowed to venture into all business whose marginal rorac exceeds the firm s rorac the marginal rorac requirements are refined by adding a risk correction term that takes into account the interdependencies of the risks of different lines of business it is shown that under certain stationarity conditions this approach can guarantee that the optimal rorac will eventually be achieved

employment status and the decision to migrate the purpose of this paper is to examine the demographic and socioeconomic determinants of migration for both the employed and unemployed hypotheses concerning the effects of age education and public services are developed and tested using data on interstate migration of the u s labor force from 1965 to 1970 for individuals at risk to either primary or repeat migration the age and education selectivity of migration were in general confirmed however for unemployed potential primary migrants education selectivity was not observed it was also found that the provision of welfare services have little or no impact on the migration decision of the unemployed however unemployment was shown to significantly affect the role played by educational quality and training accessibility within the migration decision excerpt