fully absorbing dynamic compromise abstract i consider a repeated divide the dollar voting model with rejections leading to the implementation of the previous period s allocation see kalandrakis 14 i show that if proposals can be non exhaustive then equal division can be achieved as an absorbing steady state from any initial allocation given a large enough discount factor as a part of a markov perfect equilibrium this result is robust to changes in voting thresholds and persistence in proposal power outside of unanimity or total persistence

distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

valuing option existence and bequest demands for wilderness to assess the relative importance of current costs and future benefits of nuclear waste storage we develop a simple model of bequest value the basic model of nonparternalistic altruism is extended to account for the uncertain nature of the externality

comparative advantage in demand and the development of rice value chains in west africa summary national rice development strategies in africa are often supply focused and implicitly assume that consumers will readily substitute imported for domestic rice however due to increasing import dependency urban consumer preferences for rice have become biased toward asian export quality standards against which african rice has difficulties to compete anecdotal evidence suggests that this import bias is higher in cities close to the port and remote from the geographical centers of cultural heritage where african rice was domesticated more than 3 000 years ago we purposely select a sample of five west african urban markets which are supplied by both foreign and domestic rice value chains and which are located at varying distances from the nearest ports and centers of cultural heritage and conduct framed field experiments based on auctions to analyze the drivers of urban demand for domestic rice with upgraded quality characteristics we find that west african rice has increasing difficulties competing against imported rice on urban markets the more consumers appreciate characteristics of imported asian rice the closer to the port and the further the geographical and genealogical distance from rice cultural heritage these challenges provide crucial insights into value chain upgrading in policy makers struggle to achieve rice self sufficiency in west africa our findings suggest that the optimal portfolio of investment in value chain upgrading is a function of the targeted end market and its distance from the port and rice cultural heritage the closer the end market is located toward the port the more investment is needed in lifting demand of domestic rice through quality upgrading branding and promotion to enable it to compete against imported rice proximity to centers of cultural heritage on the other hand endows rice value chains with a comparative advantage in demand requiring less investment in demand lifting and leaving more room for supply shifting investments

home biased gravity the role of migrant tastes in international trade abstract immigrants tend to buy products from their home countries as a result the more immigrants of a given ethnicity a country has the more it will tend to import from those immigrants countries of origin this effect of migrant heterogeneity is ignored by the standard gravity literature that assumes homogeneous preferences among resident consumers this paper embeds that observed regularity into a structural gravity model gravity derived from the almost ideal demand system generates bilateral trade shares with three distinct components ethnic composition of the resident population bilateral trade cost and per capita income using international trade and transnational migration data among 40 countries this paper estimates the home bias of each ethnic group in tastes the results show that consumers tastes for products from their country of origin deviate from unbiased levels by 35 percent on average ethnic taste bias is found to explain half of the trade bias counterfactuals suggest that anti immigration policy significantly impedes trade with immigrants countries of origin

vertically summing public good demand curves an empirical comparison of economic versus political jurisdictions fiscal equivalence for efficient provision of a public good requires perfect correspondence between political and economic jurisdictions however the spatial extent of the economic jurisdiction is an empirical question drawing on four survey based valuation studies we measure the relative public good benefit gradient as a function of residential location from six natural resource public goods the results indicate commonly used state political jurisdictions reflect an average of 13 of total benefits in the economic jurisdiction although with a logarithmic form for distance the upper confidence interval of state benefits can include 100 for some species

comparative reliability of the dichotomous choice and open ended contingent valuation techniques abstract the comparative reliability of dichotomous choice and open ended contingent valuation methods cvm is evaluated by resurvey of the same households 9 months after their original survey test retest correlations on willingness to pay are statistically significant at the 1 level and range from 0 57 for the dichotomous choice cvm to 0 62 for the open ended cvm the test retest correlations were not statistically different between dichotomous choice and open ended cvm a likelihood ratio test for temporal stability of each method s willingness to pay functions indicates stability half of the time for both methods

estimation of distance decay functions to account for substitution and spatial heterogeneity in stated preference research in a site selection choice experiment various hypotheses are tested related to spatial heterogeneity in willingness to pay wtp for environmental improvements spatial heterogeneity is measured through distance decay effects substitute sites inside and outside the experiment s choice set and spatial trend variables we demonstrate that distance decay functions differ between users and nonusers and across study sites also the distance to substitutes outside the choice set explains spatial variation in wtp we show that further extending the model with spatial trend variables reveals additional spatial heterogeneity in choices accounting for spatial heterogeneity patterns results in significantly different wtp estimates for environmental improvements jel q25 q51

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

it s what you say not what you pay an experimental study of manager employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure we study manager employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak link game in the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure to overcome a history of coordination failure managers have two instruments at their disposal increasing employees financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees we find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps examining the content of managers communication the most effective messages specifically request a high effort point out the mutual benefits of high effort and imply that employees are being paid well

bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard baron ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement in standing committees however existing agreements can be amended this article studies an extension of the baron ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees in each of an infinite number of periods the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy which is in turn the default for the next period the model provides a number of quite different predictions i from a positive perspective the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity in that case patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy markov perfect equilibria in contrast the unique markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding baron ferejohn framework ii if players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria including all markov perfect equilibria are inefficient

a satisfactory benefit cost indicator from contingent valuation abstract standard economic concepts are used to develop a model of individual behavior when subject to the constraints of the contingent valuation choice context the model yields refutable consequences that are consistent with previously reported empirical findings including some that have been thought to be anomalous the model is used to show that different contingent valuation formats have predictably different performance characteristics notably the hicksian compensating measures are satisfactory benefit cost indicators when elicited using any one of several formats identified in the text of the formats examined one form of a policy referendum appears to have the most satisfactory characteristics overall we conclude that contingent valuation is a progressing research program

generalized additive models for nonmarket valuation via revealed or stated preference methods single site recreation demand and dichotomous choice contingent valuation analyses are typically conducted by implementing models containing strong parametric assumptions which are rarely underpinned by theoretical arguments this work illustrates how these assumptions can be relaxed and the estimation conducted semiparametrically by using generalized additive models gams this approach directly estimates the degree of the variables nonlinearities from the data thereby avoiding subjective choices on the smoothing parameters and offering many advantages when compared to the conventional modeling techniques that dominate the environmental economics literature additionally this paper illustrates how gams can be specified to construct theoretically consistent willingness to pay measures jel c14 q51

modeling spatial patchiness and hot spots in stated preference willingness to pay stated preference analyses often impose strong assumptions regarding spatial welfare distributions that can influence the validity of welfare analysis and aggregation these include spatial homogeneity and continuous distance decay global assumptions such as these are increasingly questioned by non economics disciplines in favor of approaches that allow for local patchiness drawing from this literature this article proposes methods to identify and evaluate hot spots in stated preference welfare estimates using local indicators of spatial association methods are illustrated using geocoded choice experiment data addressing river restoration results suggest the presence of statistically significant non continuous patterns overlooked by current approaches

growing their own unobservable quality and the value of self provisioning abstract many important food quality and safety attributes are unobservable at the point of sale particularly in informal markets with weak reputation effects through a framed field experiment conducted in western kenya we show that farmers place a large premium on maize they have grown themselves relative to that available for purchase providing information on the origin of maize and on its taste and safety reduces this gap we conclude that information which is unavailable during typical market transactions is important to how consumers value maize and that imperfect information may contribute to the prevalence of agricultural production for subsistence needs in developing countries

insecurity and the pattern of trade an empirical investigation corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade this paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade we find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do we also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods finally we argue that cross country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and the consequent variation in the prices of traded goods offer a simple explanation for the stylized fact that high income capital abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other

continuous attribute values in a simulation environment offshore energy production and mid atlantic beach visitation abstract there is a large and growing offshore energy distance siting disamenity literature we offer a new approach to understanding public preferences for renewable wind turbine and conventional oil platform siting which uses an original stated preference response choice in the form of distance rather than referendum style willingness to pay distance preference data are collected from beach visitors and analyzed in part by adapting a duration model where time is modeled as distance at which utility indifference occurs the results show that the public consists of two highly contrasting groups one large group that views wind turbines as a substantial disamenity while another large group views them as an amenity when pooled these groups tend to wash out their impacts revealing that average preference results suggesting that wind turbines might not be amenities or disamenities however when viewed in this new model one finds that policy is much more complicated and no single siting strategy far or close will satisfy the public because the two main groups have largely irreconcilable preferences

durable coalitions and communication public versus private negotiations abstract we present a laboratory experiment to study the effect of communication on durable coalitions coalitions that support the same allocation from one period to the next we study a bargaining setting where the status quo policy is determined by the policy implemented in the previous period our main experimental treatment is the opportunity for subjects to negotiate with one another through unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is made and comes to a vote we compare committees with no communication committees where communication is public and messages are observed by all committee members and committees where communication is private and any committee member can send a private message to any other committee member we find that the opportunity to communicate has a significant impact on outcomes and coalitions when communication is public there are more universal coalitions and fewer majoritarian coalitions with private communication there are more majoritarian coalitions and fewer universal coalitions with either type of communication coalitions occur more frequently and last longer than with no communication the volume and content of communication is correlated with coalition type these findings suggest a coordination role for communication that varies with the mode of communication

trade tastes and nutrition in india this paper introduces habit formation into an otherwise standard model of international trade household tastes evolve over time to favor foods consumed as a child the opening of trade causes preferred goods to rise in price as these were relatively inexpensive in autarky neglecting the correlation between tastes and agro climatic endowments overstates the short run nutritional gains from agricultural trade liberalization and masks potential caloric losses for laborers i examine the predictions of this model of trade with habit formation using household survey data from india both by looking across indian regions and by examining the consumption patterns of inter state migrants

enhanced geospatial validity for meta analysis and environmental benefit transfer an application to water quality improvements meta regression models are commonly used within benefit transfer to estimate willingness to pay wtp for environmental quality improvements theory suggests that these estimates should be sensitive to geospatial factors including resource scale market extent and the availability of substitutes and complements valuation meta regression models addressing the quantity of non market commodities sometimes incorporate spatial variables that proxy for a subset of these effects however meta analyses of wtp for environmental quality generally omit geospatial factors such as these leading to benefit transfers that are invariant to these factors this paper reports on a meta regression model for water quality benefit transfer that incorporates spatially explicit factors predicted by theory to influence wtp the metadata are drawn from stated preference studies that estimate per household wtp for water quality changes in united states water bodies and combine primary study information with extensive geospatial data from external sources results find that geospatial variables are associated with significant wtp variations as predicted by theory and that inclusion of these variables reduces transfer errors

the contingent valuation debate why economists should care t he contingent valuation method involves the use of sample surveys questionnaires to elicit the willingness of respondents to pay for generally hypothetical projects or programs the name of the method refers to the fact that the values revealed by respondents are contingent upon the constructed or simulated market presented in the survey a spirited and occasionally mean spirited battle over such methods is currently being waged involving competing factions within the federal government economists and lawyers representing business and environmental groups and interested academics as well at issue is a seemingly quite specific question should environmental regulations currently under development at both the department of the interior and the department of commerce sanction the use of the contingent valuation method in estimating the damage done by spills of oil chemicals or other substances covered by federal law more generally the debate raises broad questions about what economists have to say about the values that individuals place on public or private goods the two papers that follow this one make cases for and against the use of the contingent valuation method my aim here is to provide an overview of the technique and the debate surrounding it i also want to suggest why this debate should matter to economists both professionally and in their roles as citizens and consumers

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

social motives in bilateral bargaining games how power changes perceptions of fairness abstract power a fundamental characteristic of social interactions characterizes one s ability to influence others fairness inherently a type of social preference impacts distributive decision making how does power shape the perceptions of fairness in economic interactions while previous research finds that power holders tend to take more it remains unclear whether they are driven by selfish motives to exploit weaker counterparts or act upon the belief that powerful individuals deserve more with an innovative modified ultimatum game we analytically and experimentally study how power interplays with fairness consideration to affect bilateral bargaining we concentrate on behaviors by the responders to elicit their fairness preferences in response to shifts in power we find strong evidence that changes in power can modify what is perceived as a fair division in the modified ultimatum game and thus influence the distributive behaviors and outcomes however such an effect only arises when there is common knowledge about the power distribution between the two parties prior to their decision making in addition we find that while feedback on past decisions and outcomes can help players fine tune their choices to avoid money left on the table in bargaining learning from experience is not required for power to take effect

cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting in light of the extensive theoretical evidence suggesting absence of equilibrium in voting models tullock 1981 asks why so much stability our results suggest the following answer political agents engaged in long term relationships can sustain highly stable allocations if there are strongly held norms for punishment of defectors 1

gamson s law versus non cooperative bargaining theory we compare gamson s law a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining with two noncooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does gamson s law we also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non cooperative bargaining models namely proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted under the baron ferejohn model and a significant number of bargaining rounds tend to take more than two steps under demand bargaining and more than one stage under baron ferejohn counter to the models predictions regressions using the experimental data provide results similar to the field data but fail to do so once one accounts for predictions regarding coalition composition under gamson s law

on dynamic compromise abstract most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal so why don t legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority we show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient and initial allocations are not too unequal the compromise is only sustainable if starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise we find that the range of discount factors for which the equilibrium exists increases as the number of legislators increases in this sense compromise is easier in larger legislatures

directional heterogeneity in wtp models for environmental valuation many studies in the stated preference literature on environmental valuation do not include the effects of substitutes and distance in willingness to pay wtp models in spite of the relevance of these effects in aggregation and benefit transfer heterogeneity in the availability of substitutes over space may cause multidirectional distance effects in wtp as a result disregarding this spatial heterogeneity may lead to biased estimators of the distance effect and associated wtp values cameron 2006 in this paper we demonstrate that distance decay is subject to significant directional effects which tend to be related to differences in the availability of substitutes across the study area we apply a straightforward methodology to account for such spatial heterogeneity in choice experiments and assess the effect on wtp for improvements in ecosystem services in a lake district we model distance decay effects whilst controlling for heterogeneity between users and non users and non use related wtp reasons the directional effects result in significantly different wtp estimates different market sizes reflecting the population with positive wtp and differences in total wtp up to 32

spatial aggregation and the value of natural capital abstract location matters for the value of capital assets the value of changes in natural capital wealth can depend on whether natural capital asset prices are measured locally and then aggregated or whether average values are applied over aggregate representative areas spatial heterogeneity of resource characteristics and institutions impact approximations of the intertemporal welfare function and accounting price function because when spatial aggregation precedes valuation it implies greater arbitrage opportunities leading to more inelastic shadow accounting price functions than when valuation is done locally and then aggregated aggregation of observed values across varying resource and institutional characteristics can lead to omitted variables bias we illustrate these results in the context of groundwater in the kansas high plains aquifer and demonstrate that the accounting price function is less elastic when the accounting price is measured locally failure to measure locally and then aggregate could lead to undervaluing scarce resources and overvaluing plentiful ones which biases wealth accounts in favor of passing the non declining wealth sustainability test

behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining an experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers alternating offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs as well as in the role of the order of play the experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models we compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

one off subsidies and long run adoption experimental evidence on improved cooking stoves in senegal free technology distribution can be an effective development policy instrument if market driven adoption is socially inefficient and hampered by affordability constraints yet policy makers often oppose free distribution arguing that reference dependence lowers the willingness to pay wtp and thus market potentials in the long run for improved cookstoves this paper studies the wtp six years after a randomized one time free distribution in 2009 we demonstrate that the cookstoves were intensely used by the treatment group households in the years after randomization until they reached their designated lifetime using a real purchase offer we find that both treatment and control households reveal a remarkably high wtp in 2015 the estimated confidence interval suggests that we can exclude a substantial negative effect on the treatment group the policy implication is that one time free distribution does not necessarily undermine future market establishment and thus can be an effective policy instrument if rapid dissemination is the objective

preferences and the home bias in trade abstract why is there less observed trade than is predicted by neoclassical trade models a home bias in consumption due to preferences can partially explain this using data from a randomly assigned auction mechanism and survey conducted in madagascar respondents willingness to pay for rice of varying quality and origin is investigated by imposing a novel structure on traditional valuation collection methods one finds that consumers will pay approximately 8 more for home grown rice the key result is that consumers place greater value on an item produced in their own country without any tangible reason to do so other than the product s origin this preference based explanation is one piece of the mosaic of factors that cause disproportionate consumption of domestically produced goods this paper provides concrete evidence in favor of structuring trade models to allow for an explicit home bias in preferences

testing the influence of substitute sites in nature valuation by using spatial discounting factors this paper investigates the effect of nearby nature substitute sites on preferences for nature restoration contrary to prior studies we use a respondent centric approach to control for substitute sites we assess each respondent specific spatial context by computing densities of nature substitute sites within various ranges from each respondent s home this approach considers the use and non use values of nature together data from three similar discrete choice experiments carried out in flanders belgium are compared different spatial discounting factors are tested to explore how the substitution effect behaves with regard to distance latent class analyses are performed to account for preference heterogeneity among respondents we observe divergent behaviours across groups of respondents the distance to substitutes affects how respondents gauge substitute sites we find a significant influence of the squared average buffer distance but this effect varies in sign across case studies and classes of respondents our results demonstrate that individual specific gis data can significantly improve the representation of the spatial context and the transferability of value functions however the roles played by preference heterogeneity and nature perception on respondents capacity to value nature still deserves further attention in future research

exploring welfare implications of resource equivalency analysis in natural resource damage assessments abstract resource equivalency analysis rea has become the dominant method for calculating natural resource damages for biological injuries from pollution incidents this methodology compares resources lost as a result of an incident to benefits that can be gained from a habitat or wildlife restoration project compensation is evaluated in terms of resource services instead of market currency recently this approach has been questioned regarding its ability to provide adequate compensation based on economic welfare principles the following paper examines these critiques and develops a model to quantify the welfare implications of using rea when some of its implicit assumptions are violated we focus on the situation where compensatory restoration projects provide services that are comparable to those lost as a result of an incident we examine simulation scenarios where the public has heterogeneous preferences for resources and where resource values change over time using the hicks kaldor criterion we find that the traditional rea provides an acceptable approximation of aggregate compensation for a reasonably wide range of economic and biological parameter combinations

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price

a contingent valuation estimate of the benefits of wolves in minnesota in this paper we estimate the willingness topay for a wolf management plan and a wolfdamage plan in minnesota using the contingentvaluation method the theoretical definition ofwillingness to pay for wolf protection iscomposed of use and non use values weincorporate a don t know response option in thedichotomous choice valuation questions a largenumber of respondents answered don t know themultinomial logit model is used todifferentiate between don t know and noresponses non use motives are importantfactors that explain willingness to pay we usethese benefit estimates in combination with twoalternative cost estimates to consider theefficiency of the wolf management and damageplans both plans have estimated benefitsgreater than costs