the informational role of stock and bond volume in a kyle 1985 model the sign of the correlation between a firm s debt and equity returns is the same as the sign of the cross market kyle s lambda the sign is positive negative if private information concerns the mean risk of the firm s assets we show empirically that information conveyed by order flows is primarily about asset means the cross market lambdas are quite large consequently the portions of bond and stock returns explained by order flows are highly correlated even though the order flows themselves are virtually uncorrelated

rational panics and stock market crashes abstract this paper offers an explanation for stock market crashes which focuses on the role of rational but uninformed traders we show that uninformed traders can precipitate a price crash because as prices decline they surmise that informed traders received negative information which leads them to reduce their demand for assets and drive the price of stocks even lower the model yields several implications such as that crashes can occur even when the fundamentals are strong and that the magnitude of the crash depends on the fraction of uninformed investors and the amount of unsophisticated passive investing present in the market

trading patterns and prices in the interbank foreign exchange market the behavior of quote arrivals and bid ask spreads is examined for continuously recorded deutsche mark dollar exchange rate data over time across locations and by market participants a pattern in the intraday spread and intensity of market activity over time is uncovered and related to theories of trading patterns models for the conditional mean and variance of returns and bid ask spreads indicate volatility clustering at high frequencies the proposition that trading intensity has an independent effect on returns volatility is rejected but holds for spread volatility conditional returns volatility is increasing in the size of the spread there is a growing body of theoretical studies on the pattern of trading activity in financial markets with implications for the time series behavior of transactions prices and intensity of trading the empirical literature addressing similar concerns using intraday market data appropriate for such tasks is sparse particularly in the area of the trading of currencies the purpose of this paper is to examine both international patterns of intraday trading activity and the time series properties of returns and bid ask spreads for the deutsche mark dollar exchange rate in the interbank foreign exchange market the goal is to provide information useful in the further development of market microstructure models of trading and to compare empirical findings against theoretical results already in existence the foreign exchange market is in operation twenty four hours a day seven

voting and optimal provision of a public good in this paper we study the optimal provision of a costly public good using an average efficiency criterion for every fixed cost we identify a quota mechanism as the optimal mechanism among those that are dominant incentive compatible deficit free and kind moreover we also consider the asymmetric case and demonstrate that a committee mechanism is optimal for a large class of mechanisms in particular this mechanism dominates all vcg pivotal mechanisms

imperfect competition information heterogeneity and financial contagion this study examines how heterogeneity of private information may induce financial contagion using a model of multi asset trading in which the three main channels of contagion through financial linkages in the literature correlated information correlated liquidity and portfolio rebalancing are ruled out by construction i show that financial contagion can still be an equilibrium outcome when speculators receive heterogeneous fundamental information risk neutral speculators trade strategically across many assets to mask their information advantage about one asset asymmetric sharing of information among them prevents rational market makers from learning about their individual signals and trades with sufficient accuracy incorrect cross inference about terminal payoffs and contagion ensue when used to analyze the transmission of shocks across countries my model suggests that the process of generation and disclosure of information in emerging markets may explain their vulnerability to financial contagion jel d82 g14 g15

security analysis and trading patterns when some investors receive information before others in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time this article analyzes trading behavior and equilibrium information acquisition when some investors receive common private information before others the model implies that under some conditions investors will focus only on a subset of securities herding while neglecting other securities with identical exogenous characteristics in addition the model is consistent with empirical correlations that are suggestive of oft cited trading strategies such as profit taking short term position reversal and following the leader mimicking earlier trades in existing models of information acquisition all informed investors receive their information at the same time while these models provide many important insights in reality some investors either fortuitously or owing to superior skill acquire pertinent information before others by being first an investor can exploit this information to great advantage information that is uncovered only slightly later is less valuable even if it has not yet been publicly revealed we show in this article that the sequential nature of information arrival has a significant effect on both the trading decisions and the types of information collected by investors the model we develop describes the investment choices of a set of competitive risk averse investors who investigate the long term prospects of firms lucky or high ability investors uncover the

asymmetric information and options in an extension of the kyle 1985 model of continuous insider trading it is shown that asymmetric information can make it impossible to price options by arbitrage even when an option would appear to be redundant its introduction into the market can cause the volatility of the underlying asset to become stochastic this eliminates the potential for dynamically replicating the option the change in the price process of the asset reflects a change in the information transmitted by volume and prices when the option is traded article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

stationary sunspot equilibria in a finance constrained economy abstract stationary sunspot equilibria are shown to exist in a production economy with infinite lived agents when it is not possible to borrow against future wage income equilibrium fluctuations exhibit persistence over time scales of the same order of magnitude as observed business cycles an active fiscal policy that stabilizes aggregate money expenditures can prevent such fluctuations

foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms wilson 1987 criticizes applied game theory s reliance on common knowledge as sumptions in reaction to wilson s critique the recent literature of mechanism design has adopted the goal of finding detail free mechanisms in order to eliminate this re liance in practice this has meant restricting attention to simple mechanisms such as dominant strategy mechanisms however there has been little theoretical foundation for this approach in particular it is not clear the search for an optimal mechanism that does not rely on common knowledge assumption would lead to simpler mechanisms rather than more complicated ones this paper tries to fill the void in the context of an expected revenue maximizing auctioneer we investigate some foundations for using simple dominant strategy auctions

high frequency lead lag effects and cross asset linkages a multi asset lagged adjustment model motivated by the empirical evidence of high frequency lead lag effects and cross asset linkages we introduce a multi asset price formation model which generalizes standard univariate microstructur

higher order expectations in asset pricing we examine formally keynes idea that higher order beliefs can drive a wedge between an asset price and its fundamental value based on expected future payoffs we call this the higher order wedge which depends on the difference between higher and first order expectations of future payoffs we analyze the determinants of this wedge and its impact on the equilibrium price in the context of a dynamic noisy rational expectations model we show that the wedge reduces asset price volatility and disconnects the price from the present value of future payoffs the impact of the higher order wedge on the equilibrium price can be quantitatively large

public disclosure private information collection and short term trading abstract this paper examines how public disclosure affects private inforamtion acquisition activity in a market economy we analyze a setting where traders with short term investment horizons are allowed to trade on their private information prior to a public disclosure we demonstrate in this setting that public disclosure stimulates investment in private information acquisition this result is shown to have implications for the magnitude of the pre announcement and announcement price reactions to the disclosure

insider trading outside search and resource allocation why firms and society may disagree on insider trading restrictions we show that entrepreneurs may prefer to allow insider trading even when it is not socially optimal we examine a model in which an insider manager allocates resources on the basis of his private information and outside information conveyed through the secondary market price of the firm s shares if the manager is allowed to trade he will compete with informed outsiders reducing the equilibrium quality of outside information while the benefits to production of outside information are the same for society and entrepreneurs we show that the social and private costs are different thus entrepreneurs and society may disagree on the conditions under which insider trading restrictions should be imposed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

prospect theory and market quality abstract we study equilibrium trading strategies and market quality in an economy in which speculators display preferences consistent with prospect theory kahneman and tversky 39 tversky and kahneman 63 i e loss aversion and mild risk seeking in losses loss aversion risk seeking in losses induces speculators to trade less more and less cautiously more aggressively with their private information but also makes them less more inclined to purchase private information when it is costly in order to mitigate enhance their perceived risk of a trading loss we demonstrate that these forces have novel nontrivial state dependent effects on equilibrium market liquidity price volatility trading volume market efficiency and information production

smart fund managers stupid money we develop a model of mutual fund manager investment decisions near the end of quarters we show that when investors reward better performing funds with higher cash flows near quarter ends a mutual fund manager has an incentive to distort new invest ment toward stocks in which his fund holds a large existing position the short term price impact of these trades increase the fund s reported returns higher returns are rewarded by greater subsequent fund inflows which in turn allow for more investment distortion the next quarter because the price impact of trades is short term each subsequent quar ter begins with a larger return deficit eventually the deficit cannot be overcome thus our model leads to the empirically observed short run persistence and long run rever sal in fund performance in doing so our model provides a consistent explanation of many other seemingly contradictory empirical features of mutual fund performance jel classification d82 g2 g14

a unique t 1 trading rule in china theory and evidence abstract unique to the world china adopts a t 1 trading rule which prevents investors from selling stocks bought on the same day we develop a dynamic price manipulation model to study the effects of the t 1 trading rule compared to the t 0 trading rule which allows investors to buy and sell the same stocks during the same day we show that the t 1 trading rule reduces the total trading volume and price volatility and improves the trend chasers welfare when trend chasing is strong an empirical test using data on china s b share stock market supports the model s theoretical predictions

equilibrium price formation and the value of private information an economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets it is a well known paradox that if agents are price takers and prices are fully revealing then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist it is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agnets are not price takers then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

walrasian tâtonnement auctions on the tokyo grain exchange the tokyo grain exchange tge s itayose mechanism provides the opportunity to analyze functioning walrasian t tonnement auctions wta in 15 677 auctions conducted over 1997 1998 for corn and redbean futures contracts price formation is unexpectedly similar to that observed in continuous double auctions provisional prices and pledges are informative in contrast to behavior observed in experiments few pledges are deceptive because the traders participate repeatedly and because the auctioneer has flexibility when changing the provisional price and ending the auction both the risk of the auction ending and the more equitable dispersion of information increase depth and the speed at which information is embodied in price

informed trading and portfolio returns we solve a multi period model of strategic trading with long lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in fundamental values market makers in each asset can only condition their price functions on trading in the that asset but not on trading in the other asset using daily non public data from the new york stock exchange we test the model s predictions on the lead lag relations of institutional order ows and returns within portfolios we flnd support for the model prediction of positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order ow positively predicts future returns and future informed order ow as the model predicts we flnd these relations strengthen for portfolios formed from assets with higher correlation of fundamental values

risk aversion liquidity and endogenous short horizons we analyze a competitive model in which different information signals get reflected in value at different points in time if investors are sufficiently risk averse we obtain an equilibrium in which all investors focus exclusively on the short term in addition we show that increasing the variance of informationless trading increases market depth but causes a greater proportion of investors to focus on the short term signal which decreases the informativeness of prices about the long run finally we also explore parameter spaces under which long term informed agents wish to voluntarily disclose their information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

imperfect competition in a multi security market with risk neutrality the central purpose of this paper is to develop a model of insider trading i e trading based on private information in the context of an imperfectly competitive multi security market with risk neutral agents imperfect competition allows us to consider strategic behavior and a multi security market lets us study the effect of a correlated environment on equilibrium we employ the informational assumption that market makers can observe all order flows and so portfolio diversification arises in this model for strategic reasons given correlated fundamentals market makers can potentially learn about every security from each order flow this causes even a risk neutral trader who does not face short selling restrictions to refrain from determining the demand for each security independently this contrasts with traditional multi asset models which focus on the incentive to reduce portfolio variance or the effect of short selling restrictions or budget constraints under imperfect competition correlation has two effects one ceteris paribus it allows the uninformed to learn from additional variables since each order flow could potentially have information about all payoffs on the other hand it creates an incentive for informed traders to restrict what others can learn from public information thus our analysis can be viewed as an application to the multi security heterogeneous information model in admati 1985 of the imperfectly competitive equilibrium concept which kyle 1985 first applied to the single security homogeneous information model of grossman and stiglitz 1980 our principal results include an explicit characterization of a linear equilibrium as a function of three general covariance matrices associated with payoffs noise trading and errors in private signals under general covariance structures we show that there always exists an equilibrium in which the relationship between the vector of prices and the vector of order flows is governed by a symmetric positive definite matrix the plan of the paper is as follows in section 2 we introduce our model we derive the equilibrium in section 3 and section 4 comments on the properties of the equilibrium the proofs of the results are in the appendix

illiquidity contagion and liquidity crashes liquidity providers often learn information about an asset from prices of other assets we show that this generates a self reinforcing positive relationship between price informativeness and liquidity this relationship causes liquidity spillovers and is a source of fragility a small drop in the liquidity of one asset can through a feedback loop result in a very large drop in market liquidity and price informativeness a liquidity crash this feedback loop provides a new explanation for comovements in liquidity and liquidity dry ups it also generates multiple equilibria

disagreement portfolio optimization and excess volatility disagreement a key factor inducing trading has been receiving ever increasing attention in recent years most research has focused on disagreement about the expected returns several authors have shown that if the average belief coincides with the true expected return in the portfolio context prices are unaffected by disagreement in this paper we study the pricing effects of disagreement about return variances we show that i disagreement about variances has systematic and significant pricing effects more disagreement leads to higher prices and ii prices are very sensitive to the degree of disagreement even if the average belief about the variance is constant tiny fluctuations in the disagreement about the variance lead to substantial price fluctuations this second result may offer an explanation for the excess volatility puzzle when small changes in the degree of disagreement occur they induce relatively large price changes yet the changes in disagreement may be hard to directly detect empirically leading to apparent excess volatility

those who know most insider trading in eighteenth century amsterdam this paper studies how private information is incorporated into prices using a unique setting from the eighteenth century that is closer to stylized models of price discovery than modern day markets specifically the paper looks at english securities traded in both london and amsterdam private information reached amsterdam through sailing boats that sailed only twice a week and in adverse weather could not sail at all results are consistent with a kyle model in which informed agents trade strategically most importantly the speed of information revelation in amsterdam depended on the expected time until the private signal would become public

cross asset speculation in stock markets in practice heterogeneously informed speculators combine private information about multiple stocks with information in prices taking into account how their trades influence the inferences of other speculators via prices we show how this speculation causes prices to be more correlated than asset fundamentals raising price volatility the covariance structure of asset fundamentals drives that of prices while the covariance structure of liquidity trade drives that of order flows we characterize how speculator profits vary with the distributions of information and liquidity trade across assets and speculators and relate the cross asset factor structure of order flows to that of returns

information expected utility and portfolio choice we study the consumption investment problem of an agent with a constant relative risk aversion preference function who possesses noisy information about the future prospects of a stock we also solve for the value of information to the agent in closed form we find that information can significantly alter consumption and asset allocation decisions for reasonable parameter ranges information increases consumption in the vicinity of 25 information can shift the portfolio weight on a stock from 0 to around 70 thus de pending on the stock beta the weight on the market portfolio can be considerably reduced with information causing the appearance of underdiversification the model indicates that stock holdings of informed agents are positively related to wealth unrelated to systematic risk and negatively related to idiosyncratic uncertainty we also show that the dollar value of information to the agent depends linearly on his wealth and decreases with both the propensity to intermediate consumption and risk aversion

public information and uninformed trading implications for market liquidity and price efficiency abstract we develop a rational expectations equilibrium model in which noise trading comes from discretionary liquidity traders the equilibrium quantity of aggregate noise trading is endogenously determined by the population size of liquidity traders active in the financial market by improving market liquidity public information reduces the expected trading loss of liquidity traders and thus attracts more such traders to the market which negatively affects information aggregation analyzing an alternative setting that models noise trading as coming from hedgers yields similar insights in a setting with endogenous information public information can harm information aggregation both through crowding out private information and through attracting noise trading

crowding out and the informativeness of security prices individual investors trade less agressively on any particular piece of information as more investors observe it the trades of the new investors observing a piece of information crowd out some of the trades of the old investors who observe that same piece of information this paper shows that when traders are risk averse these crowding out effects lead the proportions of traders who choose to observe one signal versus another to differ from the proportions that maximize the informativeness of prices one of the principal functions of security markets is to provide incentives for individuals to collect economically relevant information and then to incorporate this information into pricing this paper shows that the presence of multiple types of information can have a major impact on investors incentives to acquire information and the informativeness of the resulting security price specifically the model studies the case in which there are two factors a and b whose sum is the asset s payoff and a fixed pool of investors each of which is about to choose whether to learn a or to learn b the paper addresses the question will the proportion of investors who choose to learn a in equilibrium maximize the security price s ability to predict terminal value the paper finds that when traders are risk averse the answer is no and that there is a clear economic interpretation for the forces which push the equilibrium allocation of information away from the allocation which maximizes price informativeness the paper also finds strikingly different results for risk neutral and riskaverse investors this suggests that intuitions gained from models with risk neutral strategic traders1 may not be robust to situations with riskaverse investors

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

ownership structure speculation and shareholder intervention an institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading speculation and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance intervention increases the value of the institution s existing shareholdings but intervention only increases the institution s trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution s information relative to that of uninformed traders thus the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention we examine key factors that affect the intervention decision the usefulness of short swing provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention and implications for ownership structure across different firms institutional investors hold an ever greater fraction of corporate america s equity traditionally these institutions were stock pickers who tried to beat the market through trading if a firm whose stock they held seemed headed for trouble these investors headed for the door the wall street rule more recently some of these institutions have been using the ownership rights attached to their shares to pressure firms to act in the shareholders interest some have even argued that there is a synergy between gathering information for use in trading shares speculation and intelligently pressuring firms to improve performance intervention we argue that these motives can also conflict analyzing these motives allows us to predict which firms are most likely to attract institutional intervention which in turn has crosssectional implications for firm ownership structure recent examples suggest that institutional investors with large stakes sometimes intervene and sometimes follow the wall street rule so that there is indeed a choice to be studied in the early 1990s there was a wave of activism by a variety of large institutional investors among them calpers the california public employees pension fund putnam management a mutual fund manager and j p morgan a bank holding company these institu

high frequency trading competition we analyze trading dynamics as successive high frequency trading hft firms begin to trade stocks in an equity market entrants compete with incumbents for volume and there is crowding out

on the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation we consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent one dimensional private types we prove that for any bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus the short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to gutmann kemperman reeds and shepp 1991 we also show that the equivalence between bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations

endogenous market thinness and stock price volatility thin equity markets cannot accommodate temporary bulges of buy or sell orders without large price movements the resulting volatility can induce risk averse transactors who face transaction costs to desert these markets thus thinness and the related price volatility may become joint self perpetuating features of an equity market irrespective of the volatility of asset fundamentals if however appropriate incentive schemes are adopted to encourage entry by additional investors this vicious circle can be broken eventually shifting the market to a selfsustaining superior equilibrium characterized by a higher number of transactors lower price volatility and larger supply of the asset a number of empirical studies cohen et al 1976 telser and higimbotham 1977 pagano 1986 tauchen and pitts 1983 have found that thin speculative markets are ceteris paribus more volatile than deep ones a plausible explanation for this finding is that thin markets are generally characterized by small numbers of transactors per unit time and thus their prices are more sensitive to the impact of individual traders demand shocks conversely in deep markets transactors are so many that the uncorrelated demand shocks experienced by individual traders tend to offset each other and leave market prices largely unaffected while this suggests a rationale for the observed relationship between market size and price volatility it does so by taking market size as the exogenous factor however the volatility of a speculative market may feed back on its size in the sense that the high liquidation risk implied by very volatile prices can induce potential entrants to keep out of the market this paper shows that in a stock market with transaction costs this interaction between thinness and volatility can produce multiple steady state equilibria some characterized by low trade and high volatility and others by high trade and low volatility whether the market will settle in one equilibrium or another depends entirely on the expectations held by economic agents sections 2 and 3 the existence of these multiple bootstrap equilibria can be explained heuristically as follows each additional trader generates a positive externality for other actual or potential traders by decreasing the riskiness of the stock lower risk in turn tends to attract more investors with the effect of raising stock prices and inducing corporations to issue additional equity we thus have a feedback loop between market size and price volatility where market size is measured both along the dimension of the number of traders and along that of the total stock of equities if however investors face transactions costs in the stock market this positive feedback may fail to be operative if the volume of trade is expected to be small investors with relatively high transaction costs will abstain from trading thus the market

characterizations of the pivotal mechanism the pivotal mechanism is strategyproof demand revealing in public decision problems where preferences are quasi linear moreover no agent has an incentive to free ride by withdrawing from the committee and consuming whatever decision is taken by the remaining agents strategyproofness plus no free ride characterize the pivotal mechanism this mechanism is anonymous and neutral yet together strategyproofness anonymity and neutrality do not characterize it they will however if reasonable lower or upper bounds on final utilities are imposed our last characterization of the pivotal mechanism uses the no free ride axiom and two mild monotonicity properties but not strategyproofness

government intervention and strategic trading in the u s treasury market we study the impact of permanent open market operations pomos by the federal reserve on u s treasury market liquidity using a parsimonious model of speculative trading we conjecture that i this form of government intervention improves market liquidity contrary to conclusions drawn by existing literature and ii the extent of this improvement depends on the market s information environment evidence from a novel sample of federal reserve pomos during the 2000s indicates that bid ask spreads of on the run treasury securities decline when pomos are executed by an amount increasing in proxies for information heterogeneity among speculators fundamental volatility and pomo policy uncertainty consistent with our model

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed

should speculators be taxed a number of economists have supported the taxation of speculation in financial markets we examine the welfare economics of such a tax in a model of a financial market where some agents have superior information and others have a hedging motive we show that a tax on speculators may actually increase speculative profits this occurs if the speculators benefit from less informative prices offsets the cost of the tax the effect on the welfare of other agents depends on how information revelation changes risk sharing opportunities it is possible for the introduction of a tax to cause a pareto improvement copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

u k and u s trading of british cross listed stocks an intraday analysis of market integration this article analyzes intraday patterns for u k and u s trading of british cross listed stocks for each market the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar non cross listed stocks there is a 2 hour period each day when cross listed stocks are traded both in new york and in london this overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information originating in new york gets incorporated into prices in both markets cross border competition for order flow tends to reduce already declining spreads in london by contrast new york specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap overall the evidence indicates that order flow for cross listed securities is segmented article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

asset pricing in large information networks we study asset pricing in economies with large information networks we focus on networks that are sparse and have power law degree distributions in line with empirical studies of large scale social networks our theoretical framework yields a rich set of novel asset pricing implications we derive closed form expressions for price volatility profitability and trading volume as functions of the network topology we also study agent welfare and show that the network that optimizes total welfare is typically a uniform one with an intermediate degree of connectedness

the effect of public information and competition on trading volume and price volatility in a one period model of market making with many exogenously informed traders we first show that the variance of prices and expected trading volume depend on the public information released at the start of trading this is accomplished by representing beliefs with elliptically countoured distributions for which the form of optimal decision rules does not depend on the specific distribution used second if the model is altered so that the decision to become informed is made endogenous then the decision rules of the market maker and infomed traders depend on the public information third in a multiperiod model with many informed traders and long lived private information recursion formulas similar to those of kyle 1985 hold for all elliptically contoured distributions trading volume is autocorrelated and unless per period liquidity trading is bounded away from zero as new trading periods are added informed traders profits vanish article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

informed speculation with imperfect competition competitive rational expectations models have the unsatisfactory property dubbed the schizophrenia problem by hellwig that each trader takes the equilibrium price as given despite the fact that he influences that price an examination of information aggregation in a non competitive rational expectations model using a nash equilibrium in demand functions shows that the schizophrenia problem is avoided by having each trader take into account the effect his demand has on the equilibrium price given a distribution of private information across traders prices reveal less information than in the competition equilibrium and prices no longer become fully informative in the limit as noise trading vanishes or as traders become risk neutral with small traders the model may become one of monopolistic competition not perfect competition in contrast to the competitive model a reasonable model of endogenous acquisition of costly private information is obtained even when traders are risk neutral

trading and liquidity on the tokyo stock exchange a bird s eye view the trading mechanism for equities on the tokyo stock exchange tse stands in sharp contrast to the primary mechanisms used to trade stocks in the united states in the united states exchange designated specialists have affirmative obligations to provide continuous liquidity to the market specialists offer simultaneous and tight quotes to both buy and sell and supply sufficient liquidity to limit the magnitude of price changes between consecutive transactions in contradistinction the tse has no exchange designated liquidity suppliers instead liquidity is provided through a public limit order book and liquidity is organized through restrictions on maximum price changes between trades that serve to slow down trading in this article we examine the efficacy of the tse s trading mechanisms at providing liquidity our analysis is based on a complete record of transactions and best bid and best offer quotes for most stocks in the first section of the tse over a period of 26 months we study the size of the bid ask spread and its cross sectional and intertemporal stability intertemporal patterns in returns volatility volume trade size and the frequency of trades and market depth based on the response of quotes to trades and the frequency of trading halts and warning quotes the trading mechanism for equities on the tokyo stock exchange tse stands in sharp contrast to the primary mechanisms used to trade stocks in the united states in the united states exchange designated specialists have affirmative obligations to provide continuous liquidity in the market and to maintain a private limit order book with the public s limit orders on the tse exchange designated intermediaries saitori log limit orders and match them to incoming market orders but provide no market making services in the united states specialists offer simultaneous and tight quotes to both buy and sell on the tse public limit orders constitute the available bids and offers in the united states specialists supply sufficient liquidity to limit the magnitude of price changes between consecutive transactions 1 on the tse the market mechanism places limits on the magnitude of consecutive price

price and trading volume reaction surrounding earnings announcements a closer examination the process of information dissemination and interpretation in securities markets is very complex and mostly unobservable while changes in prices and the amount of trading that takes place at the market level provide evidence of information processing verrecchia 1981 demonstrated that these are not sufficient to describe completely the dissemination of information and its interpretation by investors a descriptive study of price changes and trading volume however may still provide some insights into how investors react to information this paper is an empirical investigation of price changes and trading volume during the days surrounding the announcement of quarterly and annual earnings in the wall street journal wsj in the original paper investigating trading volume and price changes surrounding earnings announcements beaver 1968 was primarily concerned with whether the annual earnings announcement had information content i e led to changes in investors assessments of the probability distribution of future returns if there were any significant price changes and or trading volume during the week of the announcement then the annual earnings announcement was assumed to have had

methodological and empirical issues in real business cycle theory abstract in this paper we argue that the major impact of the rbc literature has been to propose a new methodology for macroeconomics this methodology is distinguished first by the importance it attributes to the empirical description of the phenomena to be explained and second by the use of this description in conjunction with quantitative theorizing i e the construction of computable general equilibrium models whose characteristic statistics match those of the data in accordance with this approach we first report on the current state of knowledge concerning business cycle regularities and conclude that additional empirical effort is called for in order to arrive at the appropriate basis for theorizing we then examine the performance of existing models and evaluate the case for integrating monetary factors and demand shocks into them lastly we review the recent efforts to explain the employment variability puzzle and argue that the search for a solution naturally leads to the incorporation of significant non walrasian features into the rbc framework

information sales and insider trading with long lived information fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good hence the eects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow similarly to a durable goods monopolist a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself this forces her to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders conversely an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information comparing market patterns i show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades

labour market institutions liquidity constraints and macroeconomic stability abstract the sensitivity of employment and real wages hence aggregate labour income to short run fluctuations in output varies across countries we develop a simple theoretical model to show that if workers but not capitalists are liquidity constrained the sensitivity of an economy to exogenous expenditure shocks is inversely related to the extent to which capitalists rather than workers bear fluctuations in income we perform an econometric test of this proposition using cross sectional country level data the empirical results support the view that the lower the sensitivity of labour income to output fluctuations the smaller the output fluctuations themselves will be

the speed of information revelation in a financial market mechanism abstract the paper studies the rate at which dispersed private information about the value v of a risky financial asset is incorporated into prices in an information adjustment mechanism the mechanism in the presence of competitive market makers aggregates the information of risk averse agents at a rate of n 1 2 where n is the number of rounds of the adjustment process without market makers convergence of prices to v is much slower in any case the asymptotic precision of prices is negatively related to the degree of risk aversion and the amount of noise in the system journal of economic literature classification numbers d83 g14

information trade and derivative securities hellwig s 1980 model is used to analyze the value of improving trading opportunities by more frequent trading in the underlying asset or by trading in a derivative asset with multiple trading sessions uninformed investors behave as rational trend followers while more informed investors follow a contrarian strategy as trading becomes continuous pareto efficiency is achieved with trading in an appropriate derivative security pareto efficiency may be achieved in only a single round of trading all derivative claims are then priced on black and scholes 1973 principles and in the absence of further supply shocks no trading will take place in subsequent trading rounds article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

stock price manipulation it is generally agreed that speculators can make profits from insider trading or from the release of false information both forms of stock price manipulation have now been made illegal in this article the authors ask whether it is possible to make profits from a different kind of manipulation in which an uninformed speculator simply buys and sells shares they show that in a rational expectations framework where all agents maximize expected utility it is possible for an uninformed manipulator to make a profit provided investors attach a positive probability to the manipulator being an informed trader article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the dartboard column second hand information and price pressure this study analyzes the effect of second hand information on the behavior of security prices and volume using analysts recommendations published in the monthly dartboard column of the wall street journal for the two days following the publication of the recommendations average positive abnormal returns of 4 percent nearly twice the level of abnormal returns documented in previous research on analyst recommendations and average volume double normal volume levels on the two days following publication of the recommendations are documented the positive abnormal return on announcement is partially reversed within 25 trading days the authors conclude that the positive abnormal return on announcement of the recommendations is a result of naive buying pressure as well as the information content of the analysts recommendations

measuring multi product banks market power using the lerner index abstract the aggregate lerner index is a popular composite measure of multi product banks market power based on total assets as the single aggregate output factor we show that the aggregate lerner index only qualifies as a consistently aggregated lerner index if three conditions hold under these conditions the aggregate lerner index reduces to a weighted average of the product specific lerner indices we test the three conditions for a sample of u s banks covering the years 2011 2017 all three conditions are rejected and we show that they may cause an economically relevant bias to the aggregate lerner index depending on the economic context as a general solution we propose using the always consistently aggregated weighted average lerner index whenever a composite lerner index is needed

market response to financial reports abstract a two date rational expectations model is analyzed at the first date traders can privately acquire a costly signal that provides imperfect information about a public report that will be issued at the second date equilibrium characterizations are provided for the fraction of traders that become informed and the informativeness of the first date price as well as the price change variance and the expected trading volume at the second date comparative statics identify how the above variables are influenced by changes in the information content of the public report and in particular how market phenomena at the public release date are influenced by endogenous prior information acquisition and trading in response to the forthcoming public release

the on the run liquidity phenomenon abstract we test the implications of a model of multi asset speculative trading in which liquidity differentials between on the run and off the run u s treasury bonds ensue from endowment shocks in the presence of two realistic market frictions information heterogeneity and imperfect competition among informed traders and a public signal our evidence suggests that i off on the run liquidity differentials are economically and statistically significant even after controlling for several of the bonds intrinsic characteristics such as duration convexity repo rates or term premiums and ii off on the run liquidity differentials are smaller immediately following bond auction dates and larger when the uncertainty surrounding the ensuing auction allocations is high when the dispersion of beliefs across informed traders is high and when macroeconomic announcements are noisy consistent with our model

short term investment and equilibrium multiplicity abstract i study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders horizons in a 2 period nree model where all traders are risk averse owing to risk premia short termism generates multiple equilibria in particular two distinct patterns arise along the low trading intensity equilibrium short termists anticipate a thinner second period market and owing to risk aversion scale back their trades this reduces both risk sharing and information impounding into prices enforcing a high returns volatility low price informativeness equilibrium along the high trading intensity equilibrium the opposite happens and a low volatility high price informativeness equilibrium arises thus in the presence of short term behavior and traders risk aversion periods of high volatility are a signal of poor price informativeness

differential information and dynamic behavior of stock trading volume this article develops a multiperiod rational expectations model of stock trading in which investors have differential information concerning the underlying value of the stock investors trade competitively in the stock market based on their private information and the information revealed by the market clearing prices as well as other public news we examine how trading volume is related to the information flow in the market and how investors trading reveals their private information article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

disclosure decisions by firms and the competition for price efficiency this paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied it is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal this is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure this paper develops a model of the relationship between firms investment decisions and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied the costs of disclosure are twofold first there are costs of producing and disseminating the information included here are opportunity costs of firms employees auditing and legal expenses costs of printing and distribution and costs associated with the release of any proprietary information second there are traders costs of assimilating the information for instance while it is not very costly to obtain a firm s 8 k and 10 k once produced it is quite costly to understand the implications of their contents while the former costs have been recognized in the literature on disclosure the latter costs have not that is while traders are sometimes viewed as having access to some costly information the information contained in firms disclosures is typically taken to be costlessly observed by all see for instance diamond 1985 and dye 1987 1 taking traders costs of learning the information content of firms disclosures into account leads to new conclusions regarding incentives to expend resources on disclosure in particular it is shown that firms may spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal this overdisclosure results from firms competing for the attention of traders this is an interesting result given the public policy concern that firms on their own will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal

herding in delegated portfolio management when is comparative performance information desirable abstract we address the issue of investors asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative doing so allows investors to write an efficiency improving relative performance contract on the other hand herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium we show that herding occurs when the cost of information is high information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse moreover when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager s performance they will not do so

long lived private information and imperfect competition we develop a multi period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long lived information we show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly in the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately these results are in contrast to those of kyle 1985 in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually and when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small market depth is constant over time fama 1970 defines a strong form efficient market as one in which security prices fully reflect all available information including both publicly and privately held information in a pioneering and influential article kyle 1985 develops a model in which a single privately informed trader with long lived information optimally exploits his monopoly power over time kyle s 1985 main results are i the informed trader trades in a gradual manner so that his information is incorporated into prices at a slow almost linear rate and ii when auctions are held continuously the depth of the market is constant over time however kyle s 1985 assumption of a single informed trader is strong in the sense that in actual financial markets it is reasonable to expect that at least a few players will have access to private information and will trade in the knowledge that they will face competition with other informed agents in the market 1 we develop a multi period auction model in which multiple strategic informed traders optimally exploit their long lived informational advantage we thus explore the restrictiveness of kyle s assumption of a single informed trader and also examine

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

the sub optimality of the majority rule abstract we consider collective choice from two alternatives ex ante each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences an environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and neutral across alternatives in many environments the majority voting rule maximizes agents ex ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant strategy implementable choice rules but in some environments where the agents utilities are stochastically correlated other dominant strategy choice rules are better for all agents if utilities are stochastically independent across agents majority voting is ex ante optimal among all anonymous and incentive compatible rules we also compare rules from an interim viewpoint

multimarket trading and market liquidity when a security trades at multiple locations simultaneously an informed trader has several avenues in which to exploit his private information the greater the proportion of liquidity trading by large traders who can split their trades across markets the larger is the correlation between volume in different markets and the smaller is the informativeness of prices we show that one of the markets emerges as the dominant location for trading in that security when informed traders can use their information for more than one trading period the timely release of price information by market makers at one location adversely affects the profits informed traders expect to make subsequently at other locations market makers competing to offer the lowest cost of trading at their location consequently deter informed trading be voluntarily making the price information public and by cracking down on insider trading article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

modelling round the clock price discovery for cross listed stocks using state space methods u s trading in non u s stocks has grown dramatically around the clock these stocks trade in the home market in the u s market and potentially in both markets simultaneously we develop a general methodology based on a state space model to study 24 hour price discovery in a multiple markets setting as opposed to the standard variance ratio approach this model deals naturally with 1 simultaneous quotes in an overlap 2 missing observations in a nonoverlap 3 noise due to transitory microstructure effects and 4 contemporaneous correlation in returns due to market wide factors we apply our model to dutch stocks cross listed in the united states our findings suggest a minor role for the new york stock exchange in price discovery for dutch shares in spite of its nontrivial and growing market share

disagreements among shareholders over a firm s disclosure policy this paper examines the issue of voluntary disclosure of information by firms with heterogeneous shareholders it shows that in a rational expectations setting better iniformed shareholders prefer less disclosure than less well informed shareholders this is due to differences in the adverse risk sharing effect and the beneficial cost saving effect of disclosure among shareholders with differenit risk tolerances aild information acquisition cost functions the presence of individual liquidity shocks is shown to reduce shareholder disagreements regarding a firm s disclosure policy many firms voluntarily disclose information beyond l evels mandated by financial and accounting regulations still other firms seem to disclose as little information as they can the paper seeks to explain this difference prior studies dealing with disclosure typically are concerned with whether firms would disclose too little or too much information in the absence of mandatory rules 1 results differ across models depending on whether positive or negative externalities are considered for example in a model where disclosure only adversely affects shareholders risk sharing opportunities the optimal level of disclosure is zero and mandatory disclosure rules make all shareholders worse off 2 in contrast mandatory disclosure rules are viewed in this paper as a result of conflicts among firms shareholders with different risk attitudes and different access to inside information in general there is no optimal disclosure policy that is best for all shareholders 3 this paper is based on the model of diamond 1985 diamond considers two opposing effects a positive externality and a negative externality of disclosure to explain the existence of voluntary disclosure when acquiring private information is costly first disclosure adversely affects risk sharing

market liquidity hedging and crashes in the absence of significant news hedging strategies were blamed for the stock market crash of october 1987 but traditional models cannot explain how a relatively small amount of selling could cause so large a price drop the authors develop a rational expectations model in which prices play an important role in shaping expectations markets are much less liquid in their model than in traditional models discontinuities or crashes can occur even with relatively little hedging the model is consistent with theories as disparate as keynes beauty contest insights and thom s catastrophe analysis and suggests means to reduce volatility copyright 1990 by american economic association

consumption and capital market imperfections an international comparison the excess sensitivity of consumption to current income fluctuations is higher in countries where consumers borrow less low levels of consumer debt can result either from capital market imperfections or from a low demand for loans the evidence suggests that the former view is more appropriate than the latter and thus supports the hypothesis that excess sensitivity may be attributed to liquidity constraints rather than to other factors copyright 1989 by american economic association

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite

a comparison of stock market mechanisms i analyze a multi asset market under two trading mechanisms in the first the unrestricted system traders demand for each asset depends on all equilibrium prices and prices reflect the information contained in all order flows in the second the restricted system traders demand depends on the traded asset price and prices reflect single order flow information i show that informed traders use of multidimensional private information depends on the number of prices they observe and on the price formation process i then give conditions rendering the restricted system more efficient than the unrestricted system

market microstructure effects of government intervention in the foreign exchange market as asymmetric information model of the bid ask spread is developed for a foreign exchange market subject to occasional government interventions traditional tests of the unbiasedness of the forward rate as a predictor of the future spot rate are shown to be inconsistent when the rates are measured as the average of their respective bid and ask quotes larger bid ask spreads on fridays are documented reliable evidence of asymmetric bid ask spreads for all days of the week albeit more pronounced on fridays are presented the null hypothesis that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate continues to be rejected the regression slope coefficients increase toward unity however indicating a less variable risk premium

risk aversion market liquidity and price efficiency a model of a noncompetitive speculative market is analyzed in which privately informed traders and market makers are risk averse market liquidity is found to be nonmonotonic in the number of informed traders their degree of risk aversion and the precision of their information it is also shown that increased liquidity trading leads to reduced price efficiency and that under endogenous information acquisition market liquidity may also be nonmonotonic in the variance of liquidity trades article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

informed trading investment and welfare this article studies the welfare economics of informed stock market trading we analyze the effect of more informative prices on investment given that this dependence will itself be reflected in equilibrium prices while a higher incidence of informed speculation always increases firm value through a more informative trading process the effect on agents welfare depends on how revelation of information changes risk sharing opportunities in the market greater revelation of information that agents wish to insure against reduces their hedging opportunities on the other hand early revelation of information that is uncorrelated with hedging needs allows agents to construct better hedges