market triggered changes in capital structure equilibrium price dynamics we analyze the internal consistency of using the market price of a firm s equity to trigger a contractual change in the firm s capital structure given that the value of the equity itself depends on the firm s capital structure of particular interest is the case of contingent capital for banks in the form of debt that converts to equity when conversion is triggered by a decline in the bank s stock price we analyze the problem of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium values for a firm s liabilities in this context meaning values consistent with a market price trigger discrete time dynamics allow multiple equilibria in contrast we show that the possibility of multiple equilibria can largely be ruled out in continuous time where the price of the triggering security adjusts in anticipation of breaching the trigger our main condition for existence of an equilibrium requires that the consequences of triggering a conversion be consistent with the direction in which the trigger is crossed for the design of contingent capital with a stock price trigger this condition may be interpreted to mean that conversion should be disadvantageous to shareholders and it is satisfied by setting the trigger sufficiently high uniqueness follows provided the trigger is sufficiently accessible by all candidate equilibria we illustrate precise formulations of these conditions with a variety of applications

whom can we trust to run the fed theoretical support for the founders views abstract the federal reserve has been called a bizarre policymaking structure this paper documents and formalizes a historical argument that the fed s structure was a response to public conflict over inflation s redistributive powers the paper shows that in the face of conflict over redistributive inflation policy by majority can lead to policy that is worse even for the majority than obvious alternatives in balancing the interests for and against surprise inflation the fed s structure can lead to a better outcome

boom and bust cycles external imbalances and the real exchange rate when the current account balance and net capital outflows do not exactly offset each other international payment flows arise payment flows into a country push the real exchange rate up payment outflows push it down this article uses a model of optimal consumption and portfolio choice to determine the factors that drive international payment flows during boom and bust cycles it shows that during such episodes capital inflows first exceed the deficit on current account strengthening the currency later on when the return on domestic capital reverts to its normal level the current account recovers yet the overall decline of the net foreign asset position provokes a fall of the real exchange rate even below its initial level case studies of countries experiencing rapid economic expansions followed by economic and financial meltdowns confirm the article s theoretical predictions

labor migration and risk aversion in less developed countries in this paper we question the pioneering work of todaro which states that rural to urban labor migration in less developed countries ldcs is an individual response to a higher urban expected income we demonstrate that rural to urban labor migration is perfectly rational even if urban expected income is lower than rural income we achieve this under a set of fairly stringent conditions an individual decision making entity a one period planning horizon and global risk aversion we obtain the result that a small chance of reaping a high reward is sufficient to trigger rural to urban labor migration

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

educational homogamy how much is opportunities individuals match on length and type of education we find that around half of the systematic sorting on education is explained by the tendency of individuals to marry someone who went to the same educational institution or to an institution near them this may be due to low search frictions or selection of people with the same preferences into the same institutions the residual half of the systematic sorting on education is a direct effect of partners education which is potentially explained by complementarities in household production in couples with same education

crises and exchange rate regimes time to break down the bipolar view we revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes err using a panel of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980 2009 we find that corner err are not more prone to crises compared to intermediate err this finding holds for different types of crises banking currency and debt and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications consequently we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view countries that aim at preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the err and instead implement sound structural macroeconomic policies

collusion and overlending i introduction for a long time have korean companies been engaged in unbridled expansionism financed through loans inefficient octopus style management and over and duplicate investment thus expediting the structural failure of the economy this failure to concentrate on profits consolidation and efficiency provided the fuse to the bankruptcy bombs that triggered the foreign exchange and economic crises the collusion between the conglomerates financial sector and politicians made this financial monopoly possible chosun ilbo december 26 1997 collusion and overlending in the korean financial sector may be best illustrated by the above editorial highlight of chosun ilbo the most read newspaper in korea its 1997 financial crisis is primarily triggered by continual bankruptcies of chaebols conglomerates which with assistance from politicians had borrowed heavily from financial institutions in financing their investment projects 1 unlike some other asian countries experiencing problems in their financial sector due to shifts in investment projects toward real estates such as japan hong kong and thailand chaebols in korea concentrated mostly on manufacturing activities 2 in this study we establish a tractable model of overlending with three key players namely chaebols financial institutions and politicians as highlighted in chosun ilbo the model is designed to achieve two primary goals that are crucial for matching some key observations during the korean turmoil first we illustrate how overlending can be an equilibrium outcome with collusion between chaebols and politicians when the economic environment is favorable this occurs despite that such a collusion distorts normal borrowing lending operation by causing a discernible shift in loan composition from more to less productive investment projects second we show that as the economic environment gradually deteriorates there can be a shift from a collusion to a no collusion equilibrium the combination of deterioration in fundamentals and expectations of an equilibrium shift can trigger economy wide financial crisis more specifically we construct a simple principal supervisor agent model of corruption and overlending the principal is the formal authority of loan decision making of a financial institution or in short the financial institution the supervisor is a politician who serves as the informational intermediary in the borrowing lending arrangement via his her connections and networking 3 the agent is a chaebol of an unknown type which seeks for external financing of a set of risky projects a politician s favorable signal about the borrowing chaebol s overall performance would grant the approval of the loan to finance an array of risky projects whose returns depend on idiosyncratic shocks that cannot be washed out in aggregation within the chaebol as an outside alternative to making the loan the financial institution can invest in the world capital market where a fixed rate of return is guaranteed this portfolio decision depends on a comparison of the expected average returns on the given set of risky projects with the safe returns on investments in the world capital market while both the chaebol s type and the state of nature are unobservable to the financial institution we for simplicity assume that politician s connections and networking can fully uncover the true type of the chaebol this valuable information possessed by the politician is one that the financial institution has an incentive to purchase but a low type chaebol has an incentive to conceal whether the politician ends up revealing truthfully this information depends on how much to obtain from the lender in terms of general support versus how much to gain from the borrower in terms of bribes or side payments when a low type chaebol has the politician on its side information is distorted and a collusion equilibrium arises

monetary policy committees individual and collective reputations this paper looks at the incentives of individual members of a monetary policy committee to gain a reputation for inflationary toughness i show a policy maker can have more or less incentive to build a reputation when part of a group but group policy making leads to higher expected social welfare not publishing individuals votes raises the temptation to inflate and lowers expected social welfare if the culture or rules of a central bank puts more weight on senior policy makers the incentive to build a reputation is greater but expected social welfare may be higher or lower

central bankers in government appointed committees abstract i study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee who are appointed by the government central bankers balance their desire to protect the central bank s reputation against their interest to be reappointed committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures these gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small the former is associated with a low risk of being replaced for not supporting the government s preferred policy the latter meanwhile implies high probability that a single vote affects policy making any individual member more weary of potentially affecting the central bank s reputation through his vote

recent developments of solar energy in india perspectives strategies and future goals abstract power is the most paramount ingredient of infrastructure for growth in economics and welfare of a nation development for sustaining the growth of the indian economy in the existing infrastructure is crucial the power sector of india is one of the largest expanded power sectors in the world due to the continuous increment in electricity demand day by day indian power sector is interfacing some challenges to maintain the balance between the power generation and demand with suffering from supply constraints and shortages in power for maintaining the ratio of generation and demand of power moving from conventional sources to non conventional sources is not only an option it is a necessity the importance of using solar as an energy source in india s perspectives in not only to increase power generation but also to expand energy reliability with considering the environmental social independent and financial beneficial properties this paper analyzes the recent scenario strategies availability future potential policies and development of solar energy in emerging indian power sector

assets and liabilities and scottish independence scottish independence implies an economic future that is different from remaining in the united kingdom the economic debate largely comes down to whether this would leave scots better or worse off by most measures scotland s current economic standing is very similar to that of an average uk region output per head income and unemployment are almost all exactly the same as the average uk region this is not surprising given the economic and social integration and shared institutions and is consistent with the idea of conditional convergence this suggests that after controlling for differences in institutions and other characteristics so called initial conditions countries tend to converge to similar levels of income 1 however if scotland becomes an independent nation some of the shared uk assets liabilities and institutions would need to be divided up this would change the initial conditions for scotland and the rest of the uk and therefore we would be likely to see a different economic future for both regions see barro and sala i martin 1991

monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences this paper considers monetary policy when policy makers preferences are private information i show that in the first period of a two period term all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less but respond more to shocks than if there were no private information moderately inflation averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most a tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first with t period terms inflation depends solely on the policy maker s time left in office with unchanging preferences and no discounting inflation is lower the longer he has left

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

a new approach to modeling early warning systems for currency crises can a machine learning fuzzy expert system predict the currency crises effectively abstract this paper presents a hybrid causal model for predicting the occurrence of currency crises by using the neuro fuzzy modeling approach the model integrates the learning ability of the neural network with the inference mechanism of fuzzy logic the empirical results show that the proposed neuro fuzzy model leads to a better prediction of crisis significantly the model can also construct a reliable causal relationship among the variables through the obtained knowledge base compared to neural network and the traditionally used techniques such as logit the proposed model can thus lead to a somewhat more prescriptive modeling approach based on determinate causal mechanisms towards finding ways to prevent currency crises

migration theories and evidence an assessment abstract this paper presents a critical survey of theories of migration their welfare and policy implications and their empirical relevance we also develop some extensions to the theory beginning with the harris and todaro ht model in particular the ht model is extended to examine risk averse behaviour within families where the migration of members of families serves to diversify risk the welfare implications of the individual migration decision and government intervention in the form of employment subsidies are examined recent evidence on international migration is presented it is shown that migration does not flow automatically in response to wage differentials characteristics of migrants and the process of self selection are found to be important determinants of the rate of migration

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

seigniorage revenue deficits and self fulfilling currency crises abstract this paper examines potential resolutions to the conflict between a fixed exchange rate and seigniorage revenue requirement of a stylized developing economy that gives rise to a currency crisis the government has an informational advantage and can decide when it is optimal to invoke an escape clause i e to drop the peg and float speculators must guess when the crisis will happen based on their assessment of the probability of collapse and this makes pegged exchange rate equilibria unstable

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

destabilizing effects of exchange rate escape clauses abstract this paper studies policy rules with escape clauses analyzing as an example fixed exchange rate systems that allow member countries the freedom to realign in periods of stress while well designed escape clause rules can raise society s welfare in principle limited credibility makes it difficult to implement such rules in practice an ems type institution that imposes political costs on policymakers who realign may raise welfare but can also produce equilibria far inferior to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate switches between multiple equilibria may have the character of sudden speculative attacks

macroeconomic regime switches and speculative attacks this paper explains a currency crisis as an outcome of a switch in how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated the paper develops a model of an open economy in which monetary policy starts active fiscal policy starts passive and in a particular state of nature monetary policy switches to passive and fiscal policy switches to active the probability of the regime switch is endogenous and changes over time together with the state of the economy the regime switch is preceded by a sharp increase in interest rates and causes a jump in the exchange rate the model predicts that currency composition of public debt affects dynamics of macroeconomic variables furthermore the model is consistent with evidence from recent currency crises in particular small seigniorage revenues

international policy coordination for financial market stability in the asian economies based on the understanding of financial crisis as the self fulfilling crisis of speculators belief system this paper examines the feasibility of introducing the tobin tax system to reduce financial volatility in the asian foreign exchange markets the model analysis in this paper provides the following policy implications to reduce the motivation to deviate from the policy coordination it is required to allow all tax revenues to collecting countries especially to singapore and hong kong even without the participation of the major western countries the start of the tax policy coordination in the asian region can have significant signalling effects to reduce speculative motivation

uncertainty and the timing of taxes abstract this paper uses blanchard s 1985 overlapping generations model to study a current tax reduction followed by a future budget balancing tax increase at an unknown date assuming that the rate of time preference equals the interest rate the tax cut creates a trade deficit which grows before it eventually shrinks with certainty regarding the timing of future taxes the initial deficit immediately improves the former path for the trade deficit is consistent with events in the united states following the 1981 tax cut

delaying the inevitable interest rate defense and balance of payments crises the classical model of balance of payments crises implicitly assumes that the central bank sits passively as international reserves dwindle in practice however central banks typically defend pegs aggressively by raising short term interest rates this paper analyzes the feasibility and optimality of raising interest rates to delay a potential bop crisis interest rate policy works through two distinct channels by raising demand for domestic interest bearing liquid assets higher interest rates tend to delay the crisis higher interest rates however increase public debt service and imply higher future inflation which tends to bring forward the crisis we show that under certain conditions it is feasible to delay the crisis but raising interest rates beyond a certain point may actually hasten the crisis a similar nonmonotonic relationship emerges between welfare and the increase in interest rates it is thus optimal to engage in some active interest rate defense but only up to a certain point i

informational contagion of bank runs in a third generation crisis model abstract this paper highlights the international spread of bank runs in a third generation model of financial crises through an informational channel banks short term liabilities include loans granted by foreign creditors who have imperfect information about the liquidation costs of banks assets a bank panic in a country induces lenders to downgrade early liquidation yields in other countries and thus to require higher interest rates to enable their banks to roll over their maturing debt those banks become therefore more prone to self fulfilling depositors runs the paper then studies the effect on contagion of increased transparency and bailouts

policy boards and policy smoothing partisan politics and random election outcomes generate policy uncertainty and partisan business cycles to reduce policy uncertainty society must design the policy making environment to overcome electoral uncertainty and partisanship i show that delegating policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers will produce substantial policy smoothing and lower policy uncertainty relative to a simple model in which elected officials set policy board members are chosen in a partisan noncooperative environment yet in the benchmark model policy variability is eliminated and the cooperative bargaining solution is replicated

collapsing exchange rate regimes in the presence of a parallel market this paper develops a model of an economy where the fixed exchange rate is overvalued and coexists with a parallel market for foreign currency such a situation persists because the parallel marker is used by the central authorities as an instrument to delay policy changes using the haitian experience this paper estimates a rationing parameter of foreign currency in the official market which translates the extent of tolerance of the parallel market the paper also produces estimates of onestep ahead probability of devaluation rationing has been severe and the probability of collapse has reached high levels during the period studied

designing monetary policy committees we integrate monetary policy making by committee into a new keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee s institutional characteristics for inflation output and welfare our analysis delivers the following results first we demonstrate that transparency about the committee s future composition is typically harmful second we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability third larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization fourth large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low fifth we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society

sovereign default and the euro the introduction of the euro meant that countries with sovereign debt problems could not use monetization and devaluation as a way to prevent default the institutional structures of the euro were also widely thought to prevent a country in difficulties being bailed out by other euro members or having its sovereign debt purchased by the european central bank ecb despite these restrictions there was relatively little discussion about sovereign default in pre economic and monetary union debates among economists and financial markets priced in almost no default risk in the pre crisis years the crisis has seen bailouts and bond purchases by the ecb but there has also been a sovereign default inside the euro and further defaults seem likely the introduction of the euro was intended to bring greater stability by ending devaluations triggered by self fulfilling runs on a currency while this particular scenario can no longer happen this paper discusses mechanisms whereby expectations that a country may leave the euro can lead to this outcome occurring copyright 2013 oxford university press

taking two steps at a time on the optimal pattern of policy interest rates abstract most central banks change interest rates in steps of 25 50 or 75 basis points at scheduled dates this paper models the optimal step size and frequency of policy decisions in contrast to the existing literature we argue that a fixed step size facilitates policy decisions which we assume are taken by a monetary policy committee the step pattern depends on the variability of the optimal interest rate policymakers uncertainty and institutional aspects of the committee the model extends the literature by predicting that interest rates are occasionally adjusted by two or more steps

determinants and costs of current account reversals under heterogeneity and serial correlation using large panel data sets for analysis of determinants and costs of reversals asks for controls of latent heterogeneity among countries this article performs a bayesian analysis which allows for a parsimonious yet flexible handling of country specific heterogeneity via random coefficients and serially correlated errors consideration of persistence within the employed macroeconomic data is important to gauge the impact of explaining variables suggested by theory correctly bayesian specification tests provide evidence in favour of models incorporating heterogeneity and serial correlation the results suggest that costs of reversals are overestimated when country specific heterogeneity is neglected and stress the importance of external variables in explaining current account reversals results are checked for robustness against the underlying reversal definition

distinguished lecture on economics in government what central bankers could learn from academics and vice versa academic writing about monetary policy has been useful to practical central bankers but more of certain aspects of the economists way of thinking could profitably be imported on the other hand academics could improve their analysis and make it more useful to policymakers if they would pay more attention to certain real world aspects of monetary policy the author draws on his experience at the federal reserve board to point out a number of specific lessons for each side

communication by central bank committee members different strategies same effectiveness the paper assesses the communication strategies of the federal reserve the bank of england and the european central bank and their effectiveness we find that the effectiveness of communication is not independent from the decision making process the paper shows that the federal reserve has been pursuing a highly individualistic communication strategy amid a collegial approach to decision making while the bank of england is using a collegial communication strategy and highly individualistic decision making the european central bank ecb has chosen a collegial approach both in its communication and in its decision making assessing these strategies we find that predictability of policy decisions and the responsiveness of financial markets to communication are equally good for the federal reserve and the ecb this suggests that there may not be a single best approach to designing a central bank communication strategy

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

multiple bubbles in the european union emission trading scheme abstract the european union emission trading scheme eu ets is the first large scale co 2 emission trading system in the world carbon allowances are financial assets potentially vulnerable to the behavior of traders and investors in fact the carbon price has been quite volatile since the inception of the market and it has recently hit very low values however to date no work exists to evaluate whether volatility and price spikes are due to episodes of speculation and price bubbles our paper fills this gap we use the recent approaches developed by phillips and yu 2010 phillips et al 2011 and phillips et al 2015a 2015b who propose a recursive right sided unit root approaches to detect and date stamp mildly explosive behaviors and carbon market exuberance we complement this methodology by using the wild bootstrap procedure by goncalves and kilian 2004 to control for the heteroschedasticity of carbon price data analyzing the eu ets front month contract price from 2005 to 2014 we find different episodes of price bubbles these episodes are not explained by similar behavior of the fundamentals but seem related to energy and environmental policy announcements our results can provide insightful policy implications in the context of the actual carbon market reform as well as the implementation of stricter financial regulations rules to co 2 trading

symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union we consider the interaction between the monetary policy in a monetary union and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries we use a barro gordon type model extended to many countries and fiscal policies each country s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries and the common monetary policy has its time consistency problem but if the two types of policymakers agree about the ideal levels of output and inflation then this ideal is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives despite ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy without fiscal coordination without monetary commitment and for any order of moves

economic guideline about financial utilization of flat plate solar collectors fpscs for the consumer segment in the city of eskisehir abstract solar energy systems yield energy savings relative to conventional systems by considering the ecological balance although it still has barriers the most commonly used system of this type is fpsc in turkey which produces hot water by absorbing solar energy through fpscs this study is a kind of guidance about utilization of fpscs in eskisehir that concentrates on a consumer segment the aim of the study is displaying the necessity of transition to renewable energy systems in the local free markets where the place of domestic resources the data is supplied from an original hand collected survey and turkish governmental institutions such as the central bank of the republic of turkey cbrt and the turkish statistical institute turkstat that is used for a possible scenario to show how these systems can become an extensive investment and financed in the city the most significant finding is purchasing a fpsc device which is a rational and profitable investment decision for households in the economic conditions of eskisehir this type of energy system has certain costs including installation credit and annual maintenance costs however after they have been set up fpsc systems yield many ecological advantages that more than offset the associated costs such as fuel savings over the long term and exemptions from tax payments that apply to other types of fuels these advantages benefit both the environment on a global scale and the region in which the system is constructed therefore the global and local economy can improve its structure by utilizing fpscs

two fallacies concerning central bank independence this paper takes issue with two basic conclusions prevalent in the literature on central bank behavior first the paper argues that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any precommitment technology necessarily behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias since there is no functional connection between average rates of money creation or inflation and policy responsiveness to cyclical disturbances it is entirely feasible for the bias to be avoided in other words there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any absolute precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

explaining the duration of exchange rate pegs abstract this paper is an empirical investigation of the duration of exchange rate pegs in 16 latin american countries and jamaica we identify factors that influence peg duration using logit analysis the real exchange rate and the level of international liquidity are significant determinants of the monthly likelihood of devaluation structural variables such as the openness of an economy and its geographical trade concentration and political variables such as changes in the executive also significantly affect the likelihood of a devaluation there is some evidence that the likelihood of a devaluation first rises and subsequently declines during the first year of a peg

currency crises and contingent liabilities a contingent liability is a future spending commitment that is realized with some probability international organizations emphasize the dangers of contingent liabilities when providing advice why one answer is obvious if significant contingent liabilities are realized they commit governments to substantial fiscal costs there is a further reason by taking on a contingent liability the government can increase the probability of the underlying shock taking place this paper describes how the issuance of government guarantees and the methods by which they are financed affect the probability of crises taking place it also discusses the determinants of post crisis inflation and depreciation

reserve accumulation and financial crises from individual protection to systemic risk abstract this paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries international reserve holdings and financial crises while the local view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre which is transmitted globally according to this global view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system since the crisis affects all countries alike the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non accumulating countries we integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves moreover if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves a macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45

the mexican peso crisis sudden death or death foretold abstract we argue that allowing for the possibility of a self fulfilling panic helps to understand several features of the recent mexican crisis self fulfilling expectations became decisive in generating a panic only after the government ran down gross reserves and ran up short term dollar debt we present a simple model to explain how and why multiple equilibria can occur for some levels of reserves or debt but not for others lastly we argue that the imperfect credibility of mexican exchange rate policy made it advisable to follow more contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in 1994 our model formalizes the reasons why this is so

is transparency about central bank plans desirable a central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation to increase the public s perception of its inflation aversion and lower expected future inflation a regime is said to be transparent if planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank s preferences and to be non transparent if planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation a central bank in the non transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation i find several results about transparent and non transparent regimes some are novel and some contrast with the results of earlier papers in particular i demonstrate that in a non transparent regime increased transparency need not improve the public s ability to infer a central bank s private information i show that society and central banks are better off with more transparency my numerical results suggest that society and central banks prefer the transparent to the non transparent regimes

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

on migration and risk in ldcs the authors develop the hypothesis that aversion to risk rather than expectations of higher income is the primary motivation for rural urban migration in developing countries this hypothesis maintains that an optimizing risk averse small farmer family will try to place a family member in the urban sector in order to diversify its income portfolio an additional hypothesis related to risk is also considered at the individual rather than the family level annotation

monetary contracting between central banks and the design of sustainable exchange rate zones abstract an exchange rate system is a contract which commits central banks to intervene in the foreign exchange market the design features of the system include the rules of intervention the limits placed on exchange rates and the crisis scenario describing possible transitions to new regimes this paper considers the various trade offs one faces in designing an exchange rate system one of these pertains to the amount of reserves which the central banks must have on hand in order to forestall a speculative attack and make the system sustainable the amount of reserves needed depends crucially on the assumed crisis scenario

collapsing exchange rate regimes abstract the paper develops models of speculative runs and collapse of fixed exchange rate regimes which result from credit policies that are ultimately inconsistent with a fixed exchange rate while no substantially new results are offered the formulation itself is of interest in highlighting the important ideas that have emerged in this area we modify the flood garber model to make the analysis more comparable with the deterministic case specifically we assume that the money growth process is specified in terms of growth rates rather than absolute increments and as a uniform rather than exponential distribution the modified analysis lends itself to a simple geometric interpretation of the krugman and flood garber models highlighting the important difference between the deterministic and stochastic models in the former the speculative attack run is concentrated in the latter the transition to floating is diffuse reserve losses exceed increases in domestic credit because of a rising probability of transition and reserve depletion accelerates on the way to the regime change

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

migration family and risk diversification this article proposes a formal model of migration in which workers are heterogeneous and markets are stochastically correlated we derive and characterize the optimal migration pattern of a family we show that migration can take place even when migrants earn less abroad and surprisingly when earnings in the foreign country are riskier for every member of the family moreover it may well be an optimal arrangement to have only dependents migrate thus rationalizing the recent dependent oriented migration flows from places like hong kong and taiwan we provide some evidence in support of our theory

speculative attack and the external constraint in a maximizing model of the balance of payments balance of payments models of speculative attack differ from non renewable resource models in that foreign exchange reserves may be borrowed from abroad this paper shows that in an idealized world where all private income is subject to lump sum taxation central bank reserves can become infinitely negative without violating the government s intertemporal budget constraint none the less a growth rate of domestic credit exceeding the world interest rate if maintained indefinitely leads to violation of the constraint in the paper s model given an assumed limit to official external borrowing the paper next analyses inevitable transitions between fixed and floating exchange rate regimes when individual preferences are explicitly specified in a discrete time deterministic model the collapse of a fixed rate may be characterized by two successive speculative attacks

dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions the paper asks whether members of central bank decision making committees should communicate with the public in a collegial manner by conveying the consensus or majority view of the committee or in an individualistic way by providing the diversity of views among the committee members it finds that more active as well as more consistent communication by committee members improves the predictability of monetary policy decisions significantly this effect is sizeable as communication dispersion across committee members accounts on average for one third to one half of the market s prediction errors of fomc policy decisions moreover more active and more consistent communication are found to also reduce the degree of uncertainty about the future path of interest rates these findings suggest that a collegial communication which stresses the consensus view on policy inclinations can enhance the effectiveness of central bank communication

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

current status and analysis of renewable promotional policies in indian restructured power sector a review restructuring has changed the traditional mission and mandates of power utilities in complex ways and had large impacts on environmental social and political conditions for any particular country at the same time new regulatory approaches are being found for reducing environmental impacts in restructured power sectors india has a vast supply of renewable energy resources and it has one of the largest programs in the world for deploying renewable energy based products and systems so this paper attempts to review the various policies and measures undertaken by indian government for promotion of renewable energy the aim of this paper is also to review the current policy mechanisms especially investment or generation based price driven and capacity driven mechanisms ranging from investment incentives for the development of renewable energy projects feed in tariffs production tax incentives tradable green certificates and their effects upon the prospects of encouraging as well as expanding the development of renewable energy in indian restructured power sector this will make renewable more attractive in the indian future electricity market

preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee using bank of england voting data we show empirically that members votes are driven by heterogeneous individual assessments of the economy as well as their individual policy preferences estimates indicate that internal committee members form more precise assessments than externals and are also more hawkish the estimates allow the first quantification of the gain due to information aggregation on monetary policy committees the marginal gain from additional committee members tapers quickly after five members there is no evidence of gains through externals moderating internals preferences a relatively small committee of highly informed internal members emerges as a desirable committee structure

an interest rate defense of a fixed exchange rate defending a government s exchange rate commitment with active interest rate policy is not an option in first generation models of speculative attacks in those models the interest rate is the passive reflection of currency depreciation expectations in this paper we show how to adapt the first generation framework to allow for an interest rate defense it is shown that increasing domestic currency interest rate before the attack makes domestic assets more attractive according to an asset substitution effect but weakens the domestic currency by increasing the government s fiscal liabilities as a result an interest rate defense can be successful only conditional on sound fiscal policy

credibility and flexibility with independent monetary policy committees independent monetary policy committees are a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role for monetary policy if central bankers types are unknown then for a wide range of parameters an independent committee achieves higher social welfare than either a zero inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker a key reason for the committee s superior performance is that committee members are relatively likely to opt for low inflation and building a reputation when shocks are small when large shocks hit the economy the incentive to react outweighs the reputationbuilding benefit

introduction of renewable energy certificate in the indian scenario abstract generation deficit in india is in the range of 9 and the scenario is expected to get grimmer in the context of high growth rate of the country with peak power shortage as high as 15 2 source annual report fy08 mop the nation needs to harness all forms of generation including renewables which currently has a meager share of 8 of the total generation in the country at present shooting price of crude oil reaching up to 135 may 2008 per barrel along with increasing awareness and concerns about environment the stage seems to be set for an increased mix of renewable energy re into the overall energy requirement in the country keeping the concern for environment and energy security for the country in mind government of india has been putting emphasis on promotion of renewable energy sources central and state government policies have always been instrumental in the propagation of capacity additions in renewable energy power one of the main aims of these policies has been on increasing the private sector participation in this sector in the pre reform period the state governments took policy decisions regarding financial incentives buy back tariff and other measures targeting investment in renewable energy however the state electricity regulatory commissions sercs are now responsible for many of these tasks sercs have come up with a host of initiatives inline with their functions laid down in the electricity act 2003 to increase the share of renewable energy inside their respective states despite the efforts of sercs large potential of renewable energy generation remains untapped there is lack of clarity on how to promote renewable energy generation inside states which are not having significant renewable energy generation potential this paper explores the way in which sercs can introduce measures to further promote renewable energy generation inside the country we discuss in detail the framework to promote renewable energy through a framework which puts into place renewable purchase obligation rpo mechanism the framework includes setting of rpo targets provisions for a surcharge levied upon non compliance of rpo targets and also a mechanism to meet rpo through trading of certificates

the international monetary system forty years after bretton woods review essay in may 1984 a distinguished group of central bankers and economists gathered for a conference at bretton woods to consider the evolution of the world monetary system that was born at that location forty years earlier this volume contains nine essays with accompanying discussion on issues of performance and reform of current international monetary arrangements these papers deal with problems facing the industrialized and the lessdeveloped countries and assess the institutions that have been set up to accommodate these problems the major accomplishments of the original bretton woods conference were of course the establishment of the system of payments based on fixed exchange rates and the organization of the world bank and the international monetary fund as the order developed in the late 40 s and early 50 s each central bank saw it as its duty to intervene in foreign exchange markets to ensure an essentially fixed parity of their currency with respect to the dollar the role of the u s was to guarantee the dollar price of gold at 35 an ounce the system has been called a dollar standard because the dollar played the role of a reserve currency one of the paradoxes of the system as robert triffin pointed out in the early 60 s is that in order to produce a continuing and rapid enough expansion of world reserves the u s had to run balance of payments deficits yet continued deficits by the u s threatened the convertibility of the dollar into gold as it happened the system of fixed parities broke down in the early 70 s not because of a lack of reserves but because a glut of dollars made the bretton woods dollar exchange rates untenable the system eventually evolved into one in which most of the industrialized countries currencies more or less are determined by the market while the currencies of most second and third world countries are pegged to a major currency the floating period has been

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

the lifetime of a unilateral target zone some extended results abstract in dumas and svensson journal of international economics 36 1994 467 the lifetime of a krugman quarterly journal of economics 106 1991 669 682 type target zone model is found to be extremely long this paper shows that the lifetime of the identical target zone regime can be much lower when real disturbances occur in particular the mean lifetime is found to be very low when real disturbances occur and the real exchange rate elasticity of the demand for domestic goods is very low it is also shown that allowing for monetary disturbances to have real effects has very little effect on the lifetime the results indicate the conditions under which real disturbances might trigger currency crises

fiscal imbalances and the dynamics of currency crises abstract this paper analyzes links between the fiscal theory of the price level ftpl and the first generation models after krugman journal of money credit and banking 11 1979 311 325 exploring the idea that a synthesis between the two can become a new framework to analyze the fiscal dimension of currency crises working in a simple synthetic framework we show how external nominal shocks can cause a fiscal imbalance and undermine currency stability resolve two well known paradoxes of the first generation model discuss the role of seigniorage revenues and illustrate how fiscal and interest rate policies interact to determine the magnitude and the timing of speculative attacks and devaluations

bank firm relationships and contagious banking crises this paper argues that in an open economy a banking system with close bank firm relationships may be easily subject to contagious banking crises because it is difficult to distinguish between crony capitalism and good main bank relationships 1 show that if international investors cannot distinguish the bank type the distinction between crony capitalism and good main bank relationships becomes very fuzzy in particular the model can explain sequences of bank defaults within a country even if the insolvent banks are very few ex ante as well as sequences of banking crises among countries that are equally rated by international investors but indeed differ in the ex ante solvency of their banking system

capital controls and foreign exchange market crises in the ems abstract it is widely held that capital controls are necessary to prevent foreign exchange market crises in a fixed but adjustable exchange rate system like the ems it was therefore argued that capital market liberalization which came in july 1990 might lead to recurrent crises in the ems events since july 1990 have shown that capital controls were not necessary for the stability of the ems this paper shows that even with capital controls the system might enter turbulent periods and might experience a self fulfilling balance of payments crisis if the authorities are perceived to dislike high domestic interest rates a crisis can then be triggered by any small shock if the authorities are not willing to raise domestic interest rates sufficiently to defend the exchange rate

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis this paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems the expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in asia we articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises we present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis