what drives health care expenditure baumol s model of unbalanced growth revisited the share of health care expenditure in gdp rises rapidly in virtually all oecd countries causing increasing concern among politicians and the general public yet economists have to date failed to reach an agreement on what the main determinants of this development are this paper revisits baumol s baumol w j 1967 macroeconomics of unbalanced growth the anatomy of urban crisis american economic review 57 3 415 426 model of unbalanced growth showing that the latter offers a ready explanation for the observed inexorable rise in health care expenditure the main implication of baumol s model in this context is that health care expenditure is driven by wage increases in excess of productivity growth this hypothesis is tested empirically using data from a panel of 19 oecd countries our tests yield robust evidence in favor of baumol s theory

does health plan generosity enhance hospital market power we test whether the generosity of employer sponsored health insurance facilitates the exercise of market power by hospitals we construct indices of health plan generosity and the price and volume of hospital services using data from truven marketscan for 601 counties from 2001 to 2007 we use variation in the industry and union status of covered workers within a county over time to identify the causal effects of generosity although ols estimates fail to reject the hypothesis that generosity facilitates the exercise of hospital market power iv estimates show a statistically significant and economically important positive effect of plan generosity on hospital prices in uncompetitive markets but not in competitive markets our results suggest that most of the aggregate effect of hospital market structure on prices found in previous work may be coming from areas with generous plans

sources of intra industry wage dispersion how much do employers matter observed human capital explains less than half of wage variation in bls industry wage surveys establishment based wage differentials controlling for occupation account for 20 70 percent of intra industry wage variation this corresponds to a standard deviation in wages of 14 percent of the mean almost as large as interindustry wage variation investigation suggests that establishment wage differentials are not random variations or returns to usual measures of human capital

collective bargaining firm size and pensions in canada abstract the following paper analyzes the provision of job related pensions in canada the empirical results indicate that both unions and firm size have significant effects on the distribution of pensions the significance of unions on the provision of pensions does decline as firm size increases

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

union nonunion compensation differentials and industry structure abstract this paper examines the impacts of industry output and labor input market structures on workers total compensation in u s manufacturing for empirical analysis cps may 1983 data were matched with 1982 census of manufacturing results indicate that employees in highly concentrated product markets proxied by four firm concentration ratio crr earn more independent of their union membership second union members in the smaller plant sizes have the most to gain and the union advantage disappears for medium to large plants third and perhaps most important the joint effects of unionism and crr on earnings depend on the size of the manufacturing plant in conclusion the paper finds support for dowrick s 1989 conjecture that profits enhancing product market conditions generally tend to increase earnings

the effect of labor unions on investment in training a dynamic model control over the amount of training required of new entrants is a potentially important tool available to many craft unions this is often exercised through licensing based on schooling and apprenticeship requirements and on passing special examinations the standards are to a large extent determined and monitored by the incumbent practitioners thus physicians are required to train in various forms of schooling internship and residence for up to eight years architects need five years of schooling and three years of apprenticeship accountants require four years of college and one year of apprenticeship less widely known are the schooling and apprenticeship requirements of barbers plumbers and mine foremen which require up to five or six years of investment finally most craft unions require apprenticeship periods of two to four years see kolberg 1976

from the fringe to the fore labor unions and employee compensation conventional wisdom suggests that labor unions raise worker wages while the newer empirical literature finds only negligible earnings effects i reconcile this apparent contradiction by arguing th

signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly firms signal quality through prices even if the market structure is very competitive and price competition is severe in a symmetric bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality and each firm s product quality is private information unknown to consumers and to other firms there exist symmetric fully revealing perfect bayesian equilibria where low quality firms randomize over an interval of prices and high quality firms charge high prices signaling requires that the market power and rent of low quality firms be large enough and often this requires that high quality firms exercise sufficient market power there is a unique symmetric fully revealing equilibrium satisfying the d1 criterion in this equilibrium too both low and high quality firms may exhibit considerable market power market power of high quality firms may persist even as the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large every d1 equilibrium involves some revelation of information

price advertising and the deterioration of product quality arguments in favour of self enforced bans on advertising by professionals often rely on the stylized fact that advertising can communicate information about price but not about quality this being the case it is argued that allowing professionals to advertise runs the risk that firms will compete vigorously over price at the expense of the quality of their product this paper shows that even if price can communicate no information directly about quality it can do so indirectly because price will be a signal of quality because of this allowing advertising is shown to improve consumer welfare

prices and qualities in markets with costly information this paper extends the seminal work of akerlof and salop and stiglitz in two directions i the sellers can select both the selling prices and quality levels of their good and ii the buyers can acquire price quality information about individual sellers at a cost we observe multiple price quality combinations in equilibrium which depend upon the distribution of information costs of consumers and upon whether quality or price or both are costly observable welfare comparisons of equilibrium are considered we show that welfare will be greater when price advertising is permitted

estimating the probability of trade union membership a study of men and women in britain the paper examines the determinants of the individual decision to unionize for british employees and uses micro data from the 1975 national training survey the unionization probability is estimated separately for manual and non manual men and full time and part time women an interesting finding is that personal characteristics of both men and women generally do not affect the unionization probability this result run counter to the common perception that family responsibilities explain low female trade union density

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

employers provision of pensions and sick pay evidence from the 1990 workplace indistrial relations survey this paper examines the determinants of pension and sick pay provision using data on some 1100 private sector establishments with 25 or more employees it also compares the wages of employees eligible for a pension or for sick pay with the wages of those for whom no such provision was made using ordered probit techniques three levels of provision were examined with respect to each type of benefit no provision provision for white collar employees only and provision for all employees benefit provision was found to be associated with work place size and with the extent to which employment was white collar it was negatively associated with the level of part time working new establishments were slightly less likely to offer pensions than older ones but age had no impact on sick pay provision perhaps because it is less complex and costly than pension provision establishments which recognized trade unions were more likely to offer fringe benefits than those which did not however blue collar unions se

high and declining prices signal product quality high and declining prices signal a high quality product high prices are the efficient means of signaling because the consequent loss of sales volume is most damaging for lower cost lower quality products as time passes and the number of informed consumers increases the signaling distortion lessens resulting in a declining price profile the prediction of high and declining prices is robust across a variety of dynamic models and is consistent with recent empirical findings copyright 1991 by american economic association

job satisfaction trade unions and exit voice revisited many studies have found that unionized workers express less job satisfaction than nonunion workers the exit voice explanation of this phenomenon is that dissatisfied nonunion workers tend to qui

oligopolistic competition in price and quality abstract we consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered some know only the prices and some know neither we show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality this equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and pareto inefficiency of the price quality offers where better price quality combinations are associated with lower prices

union nonunion wage differentials in the public administration educational and private sectors 1970 1983 over the past thirty years union membership and bargaining activity in the united states has been declining in the private sector and rising in the public sector the authors use two large micro databases to estimate changes in the union wage premium among public administration education and private sector workers for the decade of the 1970s and early 1980s their empirical analysis indicates that the union relative wage effects continue to be lower in the public sector than in the private sector despite the relative gains in public sector union membership and bargaining activities copyright 1987 by mit press

the structural determinants of union bargaining power this paper investigates the structural determinants of variation in union power across manufacturing industries using a pooled sample of unionized establishments from the expenditure on employee compensation surveys of 1968 72 the author estimates wage equations augmented with measures of product market structure bargaining structure and the size distribution of unions the results suggest that union wage gains are greatest where discretionary pricing power enhances employers ability to pay and where unions achieve high coverage practice centralized bargaining and avoid union fragmentation on the other hand centralized bargaining provides no advantage in competitive industries

unions pension wealth and age compensation profiles this paper examines the effect of unions on both the magnitude and distribution of pension benefits an analysis of experience during 1973 79 under a sample of defined benefit plans shows that beneficiaries retire at an earlier age under collectively bargained plans than under other plans receive larger benefits when they retire and receive larger increases in their benefits after they retire also benefit differentials within and across cohorts of retirees are smaller among union than nonunion beneficiaries the average union nonunion differential is therefore greater in total compensation wages plus pension benefits than in wages alone because pension benefits grow more rapidly with years of service in the nonunion sector however the total compensation differential narrows with age more quickly than the wage differential

union effects on nonunion wages evidence from panel data on industries and cities the authors test for threat and crowding effects of unions on non union wages at the industry and city levels using panel data on the percent organized and nonunion industry and city wage differentials constructed from current population surveys over the period 1973 89 at the industry level increases in the percent organized were associated with decreases in the nonunion industry wage differential suggesting that crowding effects were the predominant union effect on nonunion industry wage differentials in contrast at the city level increases in the percent organized were associated with increases in the nonunion city wage differential suggesting that threat effects predominated the authors also find evidence of negative cross occupation union effects on nonunion industry wage differentials supporting their hypothesis that the industry level results were partly driven by complementarity between union and nonunion labor

can baumol s model of unbalanced growth contribute to explaining the secular rise in health care expenditure an alternative test in a recent paper i argued that baumol s model of unbalanced growth offers a ready explanation for the observed secular rise in health care expenditure hce in rich countries baumol s model implies that hce is driven by wage increases in excess of productivity growth i tested this hypothesis empirically using data from a panel of 19 organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries and found robust evidence in favour of baumol s theory an alternative way to test baumol s theory is to check whether its implication that variations in the relative price of medical care contribute significantly to explaining variations in health expenditure in the same direction has an empirical grounding earlier studies although mostly not in an explicit attempt to test baumol s theory have occasionally rejected this hypothesis despite poor data quality of the available medical price indices i perform the alternative test using data for nine oecd countries my findings suggest that the relat

government employment and the provision of fringe benefits this study uses individual level data from the united states to examine the influence of government employment on the provision of five major fringe benefits four of the five benefits are more likely to be provided to government workers than to their private sector counterparts unlike wage comparisons which typically find substantial overpayment only for federal workers the findings suggest that past wage differentials underestimate the true compensation advantage enjoyed by government workers

unions and workers welfare in chinese firms based on a survey of 1 268 firms in 12 cities this article empirically studies unions effects on worker welfare in china regressions carried out on a rich set of specifications show that unionization is significantly associated with higher hourly wages and larger pension coverage and weakly associated with lower monthly working hours further econometric analysis finds that unions promote individual and collective contracts the effect of collective contracts vanishes when unions are present whereas individual contracts have independent and positive effects in addition unions have effects on workers welfare independent of collective and individual contracts

population aging in healthcare a minor issue evidence from switzerland our study shows that population aging substantially affects healthcare expenditure hce this conclusion supports the popular but recently strongly contested view that the coming population aging will threaten the fiscal sustainability of health systems we contribute to this debate first by estimating the determinants of swiss healthcare expenditure hce with outlier robust dynamic regressions and second by projecting swiss hce based on the estimates produced and new population scenarios medical advances and gdp per capita also play a decisive role governments can mitigate hce growth by improving the health status of the population and by stimulating cost effective and productive medical advances

the effect of teachers unions on education production evidence from union election certifications in three midwestern states using a unique data set on teachers union election certifications from iowa indiana and minnesota i estimate the effect of teachers unions on school district resources and on student educational attainment my empirical strategy allows for nonparametric leads and lags of union age i find no impact on teacher pay or per student district expenditures but that unions increase teacher employment by 5 i find no class size effect because of enrollment increases in unionized districts and i estimate that unions have no net effect on high school dropout rates these findings highlight the importance of correctly measuring unionization status

overtime pay overtime hours and labor unions this article analyzes the effect of labor unions on overtime compensation and overtime hours estimates from may 1985 current population survey data indicate that unionization increases the prevalence of premium pay for overtime and reduces the incidence and extent of overtime hours along with the finding of previous research that unionized workers are more susceptible to temporary layoffs these results are consistent with a model in which unions use overtime pay to stabilize working hours and expand membership

medical care costs how much welfare loss hardly a week goes by without a front page newspaper article on rising health care costs and the uninsured in this article i focus mainly on costs arguing that the issue has been somewhat misconceived while the level of medical care spending in the u s is a cause for concern the welfare losses associated with rises in that level of spending may not be as large as the public rhetoric can make them seem in fact cost containment may not be as urgent as is widely supposed and some proposed cost containment policies may result in welfare losses for the insured and even increase the number of uninsured

transparency in markets for experience goods experimental evidence we propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good the market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy we compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality contrary to theoretical predictions firms do not differentiate quality under full information rather both tend to offer products of similar high quality entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory under no information we observe a lemons outcome where quality is low at the same time firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost in two intermediate treatments quality is significantly higher than the no information level and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect jel l15 c91 d82

the impact of the minimum wage if workers can adjust effort abstract in traditional models a binding minimum wage creates a excess supply of low skilled workers for minimum wage jobs employment falls and some jobs are reallocated from high to low rent workers this disequilibrium cannot persist competition to secure the property rights to now scarce jobs undoes most of the effects of the minimum wage workers who attach the highest value to the jobs are willing to work harder to keep them marginal workers are squeezed out of the market as high rent workers ratchet up effort level this process erodes the rent conferred by the minimum wage but also increases the value of marginal product which reduces the size of the employment effect the minimum wage confers more money income on low skilled workers and creates some distortion in the optimum combination of wage rate and effort level under plausible conditions the minimum wage has little effect on rent employment output and profits

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

union effects on health insurance provision and coverage in the united states during the past two decades union density has declined in the united states and employer provision of health benefits has changed substantially in extent and form using individual survey data spanning the years 1983 97 combined with employer survey data for 1993 the authors update and extend previous analyses of private sector union effects on employer provided health benefits they find that the union effect on health insurance coverage rates has fallen somewhat but remains large due to an increase over time in the union effect on employee take up of offered insurance and that declining unionization explains 20 35 of the decline in employee health coverage the increasing union take up effect is linked to union effects on employees direct costs for health insurance and the availability of retiree coverage

what occupational safety tells us about political power in union firms this article tests hypotheses on the distribution ofpower within unionized firms by measuring which workers preferences determine the level offirm supplied occupational safety an egalitarian model in which all workers have equal impact can be easily rejected as can a medianworker model the dominant groups appear to be the most senior workers with more than ten years of seniority and recently hired workers with three or fewer years of seniority this suggests that unions pursue the objectives of the most senior workers while management tries to set a safety level that is attractive to the more mobile workers

do unions contract for added employment the efficient contract model predicts unions will contract for added employment that is a level of employment higher than would be predicted by the demand curve for labor using three data sets on canadian industries in 1971 81 u s industries in 1972 and u s construction projects in 1973 74 and several estimation techniques the author estimates and compares labor demand equations for both union and nonunion firms some regressions that control for few variables support the added employment hypothesis but those with more complete specifications reject it

product quality and imperfect information this paper considers markets in which consumers are imperfectly informed about both product prices and quality levels offered by firms we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of the various equilibrium configurations of price and quality that can arise in two paradigm cases when all consumers prefer higher quality and when all consumers prefer lower quality our results suggest that firms will exploit imperfect information by charging noncompetitive prices as well as by offering other than ideal quality in the former case but only by changing noncompetitive prices in the latter case

information in cournot signaling with incomplete control abstract we embed signaling in the classical cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good the quality is known to all the firms but only to some buyers the quantity setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous good each firm incompletely controls the price signal through the quantity decision we characterize the unique signaling cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the uninformed buyers we then compare the signaling cournot equilibrium with the full information cournot equilibrium signaling is shown to increase the equilibrium price moreover under certain conditions regarding the composition of buyers the number of firms and the distribution of costs across firms the effects of signaling and market externality cancel each other in other words the profits under signaling cournot equal the profits of a cartel in a full information environment

the effect of unionism on fringe benefits this study analyzes the impact of unionism on fringes paid to production workers using data on individual establishments it compares fringe expenditures in establishments having the same level of compensation per hour and finds that unionism raises the share of compensation allotted to fringes particularly to pensions vacation pay and life accident and health insurance in addition since unionism also raises the straight time wage rate itself a prime determinant of expenditures on fringes unionism has a very sizeable impact on total fringe expenditures as well as on the fringe share of compensation the union fringe effect exceeds in percentage terms the union wage effect and is sufficiently large to suggest that standard union wage studies understate the union effect on total compensation the study also compares the fringe expenditures of production and non production workers within the same establishment controlling for within establishment pay policies the findings suggest that the pres

inattentive consumers and product quality this paper studies a model in which some consumers shop on the basis of price alone without attention to potential differences in product quality a firm may offer a low quality product to exploit these inattentive consumers in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the model firms choose prices with mixed strategies similarly to varian 1980 in which some consumers purchase from a random seller without attention to market prices in our model though firms also choose quality stochastically and there is both price and quality dispersion two stylized policy interventions are considered competition policy which acts to increase the number of sellers and market transparency reforms which act to increase the fraction of attentive consumers with fewer inattentive consumers firms are less likely to cheat i e cut quality which therefore improves welfare but profit and consumer surplus can either increase or decrease when there is a large number of sellers approximately half the sellers cheat regardless of the fraction of inattentive consumers and introducing more sellers boosts consumers surplus and reduces profit while the impact on welfare is ambiguous

union nonunion compensation differentials across plant sizes evidence from cps 1983 previous empirical work on the relationship between plant size and union nonunion differentials has focused either on wages podgursky 1986 or benefits bramley wunnava and robinson 1989 freeman 1981 this note extends this research by simultaneously focusing on both wages and benefits there are several arguments that can be made in explaining union nonunion differentials across plant sizes 1 union threat effects 2 efficiency wage effects and 3 wage dispersion effects our study focuses on measuring the union nonunion differential in total compensation for this end estimates of total compensation are obtained using mellow s suggestion 1982 for combining hourly wage information with qualitative data on pensions and health insurance and ross s imputations 1989 for holidays and vacations benefits our results based on the may 1983 cps supplemented by bls data on pensions health insurance holidays and vacation benefits indicate significant union nonunion total compensation differentials exist only for workers in establishments with less than 500 workers these results are consistent with podgursky s wage differential findings

prices product qualities and asymmetric information the competitive case recent developments in the economics of information emphasize the informational content of prices we examine the degree to which prices convey information on product quality to uninformed agents under perfect competition we show that a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist when an equilibrium does exist the information on quality conveyed by prices depends on the shape of the average cost curves and the relative numbers of informed and uniformed agents

competition and confidentiality signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information abstract we model non cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers assuming each consumer has private information about the intensity of her preferences for the firms respective products and each firm has private information about its own product s quality we characterize a symmetric separating equilibrium in which each firm s price reveals its respective product quality we show that the equilibrium prices the difference between those prices the associated outputs and profits are all increasing functions of the ex ante probability of high safety if horizontal product differentiation is sufficiently great then equilibrium prices and profits are higher under incomplete information about quality than if quality were commonly known thus while signaling imposes a distortionary loss on a monopolist using price to signal quality duopolists may benefit from the distortion as it can reduce competition finally average quality is lower since signaling quality redistributes demand towards low quality firms

the implications of job matching for retirement health insurance and leave benefits this paper focuses on potential reasons for variations in benefit packages in particular variations in the availability of retirement health insurance and leave an important feature of our analysis is that we do not start with heterogeneity in workforces to explain fringe benefit differences across employers it would be straightforward to say that differences across employers in fringe benefit packages simply represent differences in the preferences of their workforces rather we focus on heterogeneity across employers as an important source of differences in fringe benefit packages preliminary evidence is found supportive of the predicted differences in the likelihood of such fringe benefits as retirement health insurance and leave based upon two variables the extent of on the job training offered by the employer and the size of the employers we also examine the implied links between these fringe benefits and such variables as average tenture and the proportion of the workforce that is female

nominal and real union wage differentials and the effects of industry and smsa density 1973 83 many studies have examined the influence of union density union members as a percentage of all workers on earnings in the private sector but few such studies have looked at the public sector using data from the 1991 current population survey this

the effects of union membership on wages and employee benefits the case of australia in australia pay awards by government tribunals cover nearly the entire work force and those awards set equal pay for comparable union and nonunion workers union members may however secure higher compensation through plant level bargaining this study uses 1984 88 panel data to estimate the magnitude of union effects on compensation by examining changes in the compensation of employees who enter and leave union jobs relative to changes in the compensation of workers who remain union or nonunion the results show that union workers in australia enjoy 7 18 higher wages than comparable nonunion workers and are also more likely to have access to a pension plan

taxes fringe benefits and faculty the growth of employee benefits in academe has closely paralleled their economy wide growth this study estimates a complete system describing the demand for benefits and wages using panel data on 1477 institutions of higher learning the demand for benefits is very responsive to changes in real income and the tax price of benefits these conclusions are robust with respect to varying definitions of the tax price treating it as endogenous and accounting for unmeasured individual effects on demand simulations suggest that the tax reform act of 1986 sharply reduced the demand for benefits extrapolating the impact to the entire economy the annual flow of compensation shifted away from benefits by at least 15 billion copyright 1992 by mit press

robust determinants of health care expenditure growth our aim is to disclose robust explanatory variables for health care expenditure hce growth by introducing to this field of research a method that is especially well suited for situations of model uncertainty the extreme bounds analysis eba we analyse data for 33 oecd countries over the period 1970 2010 and include as far as it is statistically feasible all macroeconomic and institutional determinants of hce growth in the eba that have been suggested in the literature furthermore we analyse to what extent outliers in the data influence the results our results confirm earlier findings that gdp growth and a variable representing baumol s cost disease theory emerge as robust and statistically significant determinants of hce growth depending on whether or not outliers are excluded we find up to six additional robust drivers the growth in expenditure on health administration the change in the share of inpatient expenditure in total health expenditure the lagged government share in gdp t

do workers accept lower wages in exchange for health benefits compensating wage theory predicts that workers receiving more generous fringe benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer fewer fringe benefits this study tests this prediction for employer provided health insurance by modeling the wages of married women employed full time in the labor market husband s union status husband s firm size and husband s health coverage through his job are used as instruments for his wife s own employer health insurance benefits the estimates suggest wives with own employer health insurance accept a wage about 20 lower than what they would have received working in a job without benefits

an empirical model of employed search unemployed search and nonsearch the 1969 1971 national longitudinal surveys data on young men were used to study the employed worker s choice among employed search unemployed search and not searching for a new job we assume that an unobserved variable search intensity governs this choice such that unemployed search involves a greater intensity than employed search which of course is associated with greater intensity than nonsearch the principal results are that current wages seniority collective bargaining coverage employment outside construction and employment by government are each ceteris paribus negatively associated with search intensity further each of these variables lowers the probability of not searching and raises the probabilities of employed and unemployed job search

does the u s health care sector suffer from baumol s cost disease evidence from the 50 states this study examines if health care costs in the united states are affected by baumol s cost disease it relies on an empirical test proposed by hartwig 2008 and extended by colombier 2010 and uses a panel data set of 50 states over the 1980 2009 period the results suggest that health care costs grow more rapidly when economy wide wage increases exceed productivity gains the findings are fairly robust with respect to time and state fixed effects individual state time trends and two stage least square estimation consequently this study suggests that the u s health care sector suffers from baumol s cost disease

substitution between wage and nonwage benefits you gotta be kidding ollie you re just robbing yourself schuylkill mutual offers a terrific deal on keogh and we could plug you in in fact we advise plugging you in on the corporate end so not a nickel comes out of your personal pocket it comes out of the corporate pocket and there s that much less for uncle to tax these poor saps carrying their own premiums with no company input are living in the dark ages there s nothing shady about rigging it this way we re just using the laws the government has put there they want people to take advantage it all works to up the gross national product you know what i mean by keogh don t you you re looking kind of blank john updike p 296

baumol s cost disease and the sustainability of the welfare state if productivity increases more slowly for services than for manufactured goods then services suffer from baumol s cost disease and tend to become relatively more costly over time since the welfare state in all countries is an important supplier of tax financed services this translates into a financial pressure that seems to leave policymakers with a trilemma increase tax distortions cut spending or redistribute less under the assumptions underlying baumol s cost disease we show that these dismal implications are not warranted the welfare state is sustainable and there is even scope for pareto improvements under baumol s cost disease