credit constraints equity market liberalizations and international trade abstract this paper provides evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of international trade flows i exploit shocks to the availability of external finance and examine the impact of equity market liberalizations on the export behavior of 91 countries in the 1980 1997 period i show that liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets this result is not driven by cross country differences in factor endowments and is independent of simultaneous trade policy reforms moreover it obtains with equal strength in the full panel of countries as well as in both panel and event study analyses of countries which removed capital controls during the sample period finally the effects of liberalizations are more pronounced in economies with initially less active stock markets indicating that foreign equity flows may substitute for an underdeveloped domestic financial system similarly opening equity markets has a greater impact in the presence of higher trade costs caused by restrictive trade policies

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

off the cliff and back credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis abstract we study the collapse of international trade flows during the global financial crisis using detailed data on monthly us imports we show that credit conditions were an important channel through which the crisis affected trade volumes by exploiting the variation in the cost of capital across countries and over time as well as the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors countries with higher interbank rates and thus tighter credit markets exported less to the us during the peak of the crisis this effect was especially pronounced in sectors that require extensive external financing have limited access to trade credit or have few collateralizable assets exports of financially vulnerable industries were thus more sensitive to the cost of external capital than exports of less vulnerable industries and this sensitivity rose during the financial crisis the quantitative implications of our estimates for trade volumes highlight the large real effects of financial crises and the potential gains from policy intervention

network models and financial stability abstract systemic risk is a key concern for central banks charged with safeguarding overall financial stability in this paper we investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial system we construct banking systems that are composed of a number of banks that are connected by interbank linkages we then vary the key parameters that define the structure of the financial system including its level of capitalisation the degree to which banks are connected the size of interbank exposures and the degree of concentration of the system and analyse the influence of these parameters on the likelihood of knock on defaults first we find that the better capitalised banks are the more resilient is the banking system against contagious defaults and this effect is non linear second the effect of the degree of connectivity is non monotonic i e initially a small increase in connectivity increases the contagion effect but after a certain threshold value connectivity improves the ability of a banking system to absorb shocks third the size of interbank liabilities tends to increase the risk of knock on default even if banks hold capital against such exposures fourth more concentrated banking systems are shown to be prone to larger systemic risk all else equal in an extension to the main analysis we study how liquidity effects interact with banking structure to produce a greater chance of systemic breakdown we finally consider how the risk of contagion might depend on the degree of asymmetry tiering inherent in the structure of the banking system a number of our results have important implications for public policy which this paper also draws out

the real effects of financial integration abstract this paper shows how correlations in gdp fluctuations rise with financial integration finance serves to increase international correlations in both consumption and gdp fluctuations which explains the persistent gap between the two in the data a quantity puzzle the positive association between financial integration and gdp correlation constitutes a puzzle as theory suggests a negative relation if anything nevertheless it prevails in the data even after the effects of finance on trade and specialization are accounted for

rational heuristics expectations and behaviors in evolving economies with heterogeneous interacting agents we analyze the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations and action rules within an agent based model populated by heterogeneous interacting firms agents have to cope with a complex evolving economy characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change imperfect information coordination hurdles and structural breaks in these circumstances we find that neither individual nor macroeconomic dynamics improve when agents replace myopic expectations with less naive learning rules our results suggest that fast and frugal robust heuristics may not be a second best option but rather rational responses in complex and changing macroeconomic environments jel c63 d8 e32 e6 o4

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

trade credit bank lending and monetary policy transmission this paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy most models of the transmission mechanism allow the firm to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion in our model we introduce trade credit as an additional source of funding we predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in market and bank lending and an increase in trade credit this is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16 000 manufacturing firms

when is reputation bad abstract in traditional reputation models the ability to build a reputation is good for the long run player in ely j valimaki j 2003 bad reputation naj econ 4 2 http www najecon org v4 htm quart j econ 118 2003 785 814 ely and valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad this paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds the key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short run players and that every action of the long run player that makes the short run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long run player is bad we allow a broad set of commitment types allowing many types including the stackelberg type used to prove positive results on reputation although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the stackelberg type is too high the relative probability of the stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

distance constraints the limits of foreign lending in poor economies how far does mobility of multinational banks solve problems of financial development using a panel of 80 000 loans over 7 years i show that greater cultural and geographical distance between a foreign bank s headquarters and local branches leads it to further avoid lending to informationally difficult yet fundamentally sound firms requiring relational contracting greater distance also makes them less likely to bilaterally renegotiate and less successful at recovering defaults differences in bank size legal institutions risk preferences or unobserved borrower heterogeneity cannot explain these results these distance constraints can be large enough to permanently exclude certain sectors of the economy from financing by foreign banks

reputation for quality and adverse selection abstract we analyze a dynamic market with a seller who can make a one time investment that affects the returns of tradable assets the potential buyers of the assets cannot observe the seller s investment prior to the trade or verify it in any way after the trade the market faces two types of inefficiency the ex ante inefficiency i e the seller s moral hazard problem and the ex post inefficiency i e inefficient ex post allocations due to the adverse selection problem we analyze how the observability of information by future buyers through which the seller builds a reputation affects the two types of inefficiency as well as the interplay between them

immigration and inequality immigration is often viewed as a proximate cause of the rising wage gap between highand low skilled workers nevertheless there is controversy over the appropriate theoretical and empirical framework for measuring the presumed effect and over the precise magnitudes involved this paper offers an overview and synthesis of existing knowledge on the relationship between immigration and inequality focusing on evidence from cross city comparisons in the u s while some researchers have claimed that a cross city research design is inherently flawed i argue that the evidence from cross city comparisons is remarkably consistent with recent findings based on aggregate time series data in particular cross city and aggregate time series comparisons provide support for three key conclusions 1 workers with below high school education are perfect substitutes for those with a high school education 2 high school equivalent and college equivalent workers are imperfect substitutes with an elasticity of substitution on the order of 2 3 within education groups immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes together these results imply that the average impacts of recent immigrant inflows on the relative wages of u s natives are small the effects on overall wage inequality including natives and immigrants are larger reflecting the concentration of immigrants in the tails of the skill distribution and higher residual inequality among immigrants than natives even so immigration accounts for a small share 5 of the increase in u s wage inequality between 1980 and 2000

bank linkages and international trade abstract we uncover a new channel through which international finance is related to trade the formation of international bank linkages increases exports bank linkages are measured for each pair of countries in each year as a number of bank pairs in these two countries that are connected through cross border syndicated lending using a gravity approach to model trade for 66 countries over 24 years with a full set of fixed effects source year target year source target we find that new connections between banks in a given country pair lead to an increase in trade flows between these countries in the following year and to trade diversions from countries competing for similar imports we conjecture that the mechanism for this effect is the role bank linkages play in reducing export risk and present evidence supporting this conjecture in particular using industry level trade data and controlling for country pair year and industry fixed effects we find that new bank linkages have larger impacts on trade in industries which tend to be subject to more export risk for u s banks we can show that bank linkages are positively associated with foreign letter of credit exposures

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

insecurity and the pattern of trade an empirical investigation corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade this paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade we find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do we also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods finally we argue that cross country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and the consequent variation in the prices of traded goods offer a simple explanation for the stylized fact that high income capital abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other

international shock transmission after the lehman brothers collapse evidence from syndicated lending after lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy in september 2008 cross border bank lending contracted sharply to explain the severity and variation in this contraction we analyze detailed data on cross border syndicated lending by 75 banks to 59 countries we find that banks that had to write down sub prime assets refinance large amounts of long term debt and experienced sharp declines in their market to book ratio transmitted these shocks across borders by curtailing their lending abroad while shocked banks differentiated between countries in much the same way as less constrained banks they restricted their lending more to small borrowers

trade credit and the bank lending channel the bank lending channel theory posits that during monetary contractions banks restrict some firms loans thus reducing their desired investment independently of interest rates previous research finds small firms reduce while large firms accelerate loan growth we find that small firms increase trade credit a substitute credit indicating a strong loan demand it supports the bank lending channel they do not voluntarily cut bank loans since they increase a less desirable alternative using trade credit is propitious since unlike commercial paper investigated by previous researchers it is widely used by the small firms suffering the loan decline surprisingly we also find large firms increase trade credit a puzzle since they are typically assumed to have wide access to other credit using individual manufacturing firm data we find the reasons large firms use trade credit are financial in nature those without a bond rating increase trade credit that is without access to open market credit as relatively few firms have this mark of quality it implies that more firms are affected by credit constraints than previously believed

us trade and inventory dynamics we examine the source of the large fall and rebound in us trade in the recent recession while trade fell and rebounded more than expenditures or production of traded goods we find that relative to the magnitude of the downturn these trade fluctuations were in line with those in previous business cycle fluctuations we argue that the high volatility of trade is attributed to more severe inventory management considerations of firms involved in international trade we present empirical evidence for autos as well as at the aggregate level that the adjustment of inventory holdings help explain these fluctuations in trade

network effects and the dynamics of migration and inequality theory and evidence from mexico international migration is costly and initially only the middle class of the wealth distribution may have both the means and incentives to migrate which can increase inequality in the sending community however the migration networks formed lower the costs for future migrants which can in turn lower inequality this paper shows both theoretically and empirically that wealth has a nonlinear effect on migration and then examines the empirical evidence for an inverse u shaped relationship between emigration and inequality in rural sending communities in mexico after instrumenting we find that the overall impact of migration is to reduce inequality across communities with relatively high levels of past migration we also find some suggestive evidence for an inverse u shaped relationship among communities with a wider range of migration experiences

financial crises and the composition of cross border lending abstract we examine the composition and drivers of cross border bank lending between 1995 and 2012 distinguishing between syndicated and non syndicated loans we show that on balance sheet syndicated loan exposures which account for almost one third of total cross border loan exposures increased during the global financial crisis due to large drawdowns on credit lines extended before the crisis our empirical analysis of the drivers of cross border loan exposures in a large bilateral dataset leads to three main results first banks with lower levels of capital favor syndicated over other kinds of cross border loans second borrower country characteristics such as level of development economic size and capital account openness are less important in driving syndicated than non syndicated loan activity suggesting a diversification motive for syndication third information asymmetries between lender and borrower countries became more binding for both types of cross border lending activity during the recent crisis

are output growth rate distributions fat tailed some evidence from oecd countries this work explores some distributional properties of aggregate output growth rate time series we show that in the majority of oecd countries output growth rate distributions are well approximated by symmetric exponential power densities with tails much fatter than those of a gaussian fat tails robustly emerge in output growth rates independently of i the way we measure aggregate output ii the family of densities employed in the estimation iii the length of time lags used to compute growth rates we also show that fat tails still characterize output growth rate distributions even after one washes away outliers autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

why are distributions of firm growth rates tent shaped abstract recent empirical analyses on different datasets have revealed a common exponential behavior in the shape of the probability density of the corporate growth rates we present new evidence on this topic from the italian manufacturing industry and propose a very simple mechanism that under rather general assumptions provides a robust explanation for the observed regularities

a new approach to business fluctuations heterogeneous interacting agents scaling laws and financial fragility abstract in this paper we discuss a scaling approach to business fluctuations our starting point consists in recognizing that concepts and methods derived from physics have allowed economists to re discover a set of stylized facts which have to be satisfactorily accounted for in their models standard macroeconomics based on a reductionist approach centered on the representative agent is definitely badly equipped for this task on the contrary we show that a simple financial fragility agent based model based on complex interactions of heterogeneous agents is able to replicate a large number of scaling type stylized facts with a remarkable high degree of statistical precision

native internal migration and the labor market impact of immigration this paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of how immigration influences the joint determination of the wage structure and internal migration behavior for native born workers in local labor markets using data from the 1960 2000 decennial censuses the study shows that immigration is associated with lower in migration rates higher out migration rates and a decline in the growth rate of the native workforce the native migration response attenuates the measured impact of immigration on wages in a local labor market by 40 to 60 per cent depending on whether the labor market is defined at the state or metropolitan area level

trade law and product complexity abstract how does the quality of national institutions that enforce the rule of law influence international trade anderson and marcouiller argue that bad institutions located in the importer s country deter international trade because they enable economic predators to steal and extort rents at the importer s border we complement this research and show how good institutions located in the exporter s country enhance international trade in particular trade in complex products whose characteristics are difficult to fully specify in a contract we argue that both exporter and importer institutions affect international as well as domestic transaction costs in complex and simple product markets international transaction costs are a part of the costs of trade domestic transaction costs affect complex and simple products differently thereby changing a country s comparative advantage in producing such goods we find ample empirical evidence for these predictions countries that have good institutions tend to

the financial accelerator in an evolving credit network we model a credit network characterized by credit relationships connecting i downstream d and upstream u firms and ii firms and banks the net worth of d firms is the driver of fluctuations the production of d firms and of their suppliers u firms in fact is constrained by the availability of internal finance proxied by net worth to the d firms the structure of credit interlinkages changes over time due to an endogeneous process of partner selection which leads to the polarization of the network at the aggregate level the distribution of growth rates exhibits negative skewness and excess kurtosis when a shock hits the macroeconomy or a significant group of agents in the credit network a bankruptcy avalanche can follow if agents leverage is critically high in a nutshell we want to explore the properties of a network based financial accelerator

rethinking the area approach immigrants and the labor market in california abstract a framework that uses a constant elasticity of substitution ces production function with skill differentiation and integrated national labor markets has predictions for the employment effect of immigrants at the local level the employment rather than wage response to immigration by skill in a state reveals the production substitutability complementarity between native and immigrant labor this in turn reveals the degree to which immigrants stimulate or depress the demand for native labor to estimate this elasticity i use a novel instrument based on demographic characteristics of total central american migrants or of the mexican population to predict immigration by skill level within california looking at immigration to california between 1960 and 2005 these estimates support the assumption of a nationally integrated labor market by skill and they support the hypothesis that natives and immigrants in the same education experience group are not perfectly substitutable this explains the counter intuitive fact that there is a zero correlation between immigration and wage and employment outcomes of natives in the state

liaisons dangereuses increasing connectivity risk sharing and systemic risk the recent financial crisis poses the challenge to understand how systemic risk arises endogenously and what architecture can make the financial system more resilient to global crises this paper shows that a financial network can be most resilient for intermediate levels of risk diversification and not when this is maximal as generally thought so far this finding holds in the presence of the financial accelerator i e when negative variations in the financial robustness of an agent tend to persist in time because they have adverse effects on the agent s subsequent performance through the reaction of the agent s counterparties 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

foreign banks trends and impact over the past two decades foreign banks have become much more important in domestic financial intermediation heightening the need to understand their behavior we introduce a new comprehensive database made publicly available on bank ownership including the home country of foreign banks for 5 324 banks in 137 countries over the period 1995 2009 we document large increases in foreign bank presence in many countries but with substantial heterogeneity in terms of host and banks home countries bilateral investment patterns and bank characteristics in terms of impact we document that the relation between private credit and foreign bank presence importantly depends on host country and banks characteristics specifically foreign banks only seem to have a negative impact on credit in low income countries in countries where they have a limited market share where enforcing contracts is costly and where credit information is limited available and when they come from distant home countries this shows that accounting for heterogeneity including bilateral ownership is crucial to better understand the implications of foreign bank ownership

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information this article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information bayesian environment an agent faces a hold up situation while making a cost reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal to prevent the hold up the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract the informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment for a large class of cost functions the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a power distribution

information and bargaining in the hold up problem this article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold up problem the optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency the information rent effect and ex post efficiency the bargaining disagreement effect with one shot bargaining it occurs at an intermediate level of information asymmetry when there is repeated bargaining it is attained with perfect asymmetry asymmetric information the parameter that is frequently ignored in the literature turns out to be an important welfare instrument for the hold up problem our results therefore provide a basis for institutional design regarding the optimal control of information flow

dynamic market for lemons with endogenous quality choice by the seller we analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller the seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the beginning of the game which is unobservable to buyers at the interim stage of the game the information and payoff structures are the same as in the market for lemons our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create any efficiency gain if i the common discounting is low and ii the static incentive constraints preclude the mutually agreeable ex ante contract under which the trade happens with probability one our result does not depend on whether the offers by buyers are private or public

global banks and crisis transmission abstract we study the effect of financial integration through banks on the transmission of international business cycles in a sample of 18 20 developed countries between 1978 and 2009 we find that in periods without financial crises increases in bilateral banking linkages are associated with more divergent output cycles this relation is significantly weaker during financial turmoil periods suggesting that financial crises induce co movement among more financially integrated countries we also show that countries with stronger direct and indirect financial ties to the u s experienced more synchronized cycles with the u s during the recent 2007 2009 crisis we then interpret these findings using a simple general equilibrium model of international business cycles with banks and shocks to banking activity the model suggests that the relation between integration and synchronization depends on the type of shocks hitting the world economy and that shocks to global banks played an important role in triggering and spreading the 2007 2009 crisis

credit chains and bankruptcy propagation in production networks abstract we present a simple model of a production network in which firms are linked by supplier customer relationships involving extension of trade credit our aim is to identify the minimal set of mechanisms which reproduce qualitatively the main stylized facts of industrial demography such as firms size distribution and at the same time the correlation over time and across firms of output growth and bankruptcies the behavior of aggregate variables can be traced back to the direct firm firm interdependence in this paper we assume that the number of firms is constant and the network has a periodic static structure but the framework allows further extensions to investigate which network structures are more robust against domino effects and if the network is let to evolve in time which structures emerge spontaneously depending on the individual strategies for orders and delivery

do immigrant outflows lead to native inflows an empirical analysis of the migratory responses to us state immigration legislation i estimate the impact on internal migration for 52 different demographic groups of the recent influx of state omnibus immigration laws targeting undocumented immigrants in the united states i find evidence that while the demographic groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented immigrants certainly experience population and employment outflows from states implementing these immigration laws there is a lack of associated inflows for those demographic groups identified by economic theory as being probable substitutes for undocumented immigrants several segments designated as probable substitutes actually experience an adverse effect on population and employment this finding provides rigorous empirical backing to existing anecdotal evidence of the same cross state migratory phenomenon resulting in clear policy implications in relation to the ongoing debate over immigration

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

financial networks and contagion we study cascades of failures in a network of interdependent financial organizations how discontinuous changes in asset values e g defaults and shutdowns trigger further failures and how this depends on network structure integration greater dependence on counterparties and diversification more counterparties per organization have different nonmonotonic effects on the extent of cascades diversification connects the network initially permitting cascades to travel but as it increases further organizations are better insured against one another s failures integration also faces trade offs increased dependence on other organizations versus less sensitivity to own investments finally we illustrate the model with data on european debt cross holdings jel d85 f15 f34 f36 f65 g15 g32 g33 g38 globalization brings with it increased financial interdependencies among many kinds of organizations governments central banks investment banks firms etc that hold each other s shares debts and other obligations such interdependencies can lead to cascading defaults and failures which are often avoided through massive bailouts of institutions deemed too big to fail recent examples include the us government s interventions in aig fannie mae freddie mac and general motors and the european commission s interventions in greece and spain although such bailouts circumvent the widespread failures that were more prevalent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they emphasize the need to study the risks created by a network of interdependencies understanding these risks is crucial to designing incentives and regulatory responses which defuse cascades before they are imminent in this paper we develop a general model that produces new insights regarding financial contagions and cascades of failures among organizations linked through a network of financial interdependencies organizations values depend on each other e g through cross holdings of shares debt or other liabilities if an

efficient allocations with hidden income and hidden storage we consider an environment in which individuals receive income shocks that are unobservable to others and can privately store resources we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that unlike in environments without unobservable storage the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade riskfree bonds among themselves in this paper we consider an environment in which individuals have random income and can accumulate assets through a storage technology their income realizations and their asset position are private information given these informational frictions we provide a simple characterization of the unique efficient allocation of consumption in cases in which the rate of return on storage is sufficiently high or alternatively in which the worst possible outcome is sufficiently dire we show that the symmetric efficient allocation of consumption is decentralizable through a competitive asset market in which individuals trade risk free bonds among themselves there is a large prior literature which examines the characteristics of efficient risksharing in dynamic settings in the presence of private information unlike our paper this literature generally finds that efficient allocations do not coincide with the equilibrium allocations of any economy with a competitive bond market see atkeson and lucas 1992 in particular the key difference between our paper and these preceding ones is that the earlier literature assumes either that agents cannot accumulate resources over time or that if they can this accumulation is observable in contrast we assume that both agents incomes and their stored resources are private information it is this combination of assumptions that leads to our result our findings are reminiscent of allen s 1985 he considers a dynamic principalagent relationship in which the agent is risk averse and has hidden stochastic income the

trade finance and the great trade collapse pieces of evidence that support the trade finance channel first we show that export prices rose relative to domestic manufacturing prices across a large number of countries second we find that import and export prices of goods shipped by sea which are likely to be affected most by trade finance contractions rose disproportion ately more than those shipped by air or land

unobserved investment endogenous quality and trade a seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset s future returns the potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller s investment prior to trade nor does he receive any signal of it nor can he verify it in anyway after trade despite this severe moral hazard problem this paper shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability the outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining power between the parties with a holdup problem existing if the buyer has the bargaining power a consequence of the holdup problem is surplus reducing distortions in investment level perhaps counterintuitively in many situations this distortion involves an increase in the expected amount invested vis a vis the situation without holdup

loan syndication and credit cycles cyclicality in the supply of business credit has been the focus of a considerable amount of research this cyclicality can stem from shocks to borrowers collateral which affect firms ability to raise capital if agency and information problems are significant ben s bernanke and mark gertler 1989 or it can stem from shocks to bank capital which affect the supply of bank loans if agency and information problems limit the ability of banks to raise additional capital bernanke 1983 both of these channels may have been at work during the financial crisis that started in 2007 ran duchin oguzhan ozbas and berk a sensoy 2010 show that firms with more collateral were better able to withstand the contraction in credit and victoria ivashina and david scharfstein 2010 show that reductions in bank capital had an adverse effect on lending in this paper we examine cyclicality in the supply of credit in the context of modern forms of banking often referred to as the originateto distribute model in particular we are interested in the role of syndicated lending in traditional bank lending the focus of most models of banking banks originate and hold loans on their balance sheets this exposes banks to risk but provides them with strong incentives to screen and monitor borrowers douglas w diamond 1984 over the last 20 years however the development and growth of the syndicated loan market has enabled a bank to originate a loan but retain only a fraction of it on average the originating bank or lead bank retains about a third of each syndicated loan and sells the remaining share to a syndicate of investors which includes banks and institutional investors such as pension funds mutual funds hedge funds and sponsors of structured loan syndication and credit cycles

is immigration enforcement shaping immigrant marriage patterns abstract this paper identifies intermarriage between non citizens and citizens as an important response mechanism to intensified immigration enforcement particularly among mexican non citizens exploiting the temporal and geographic variation in the implementation of interior immigration enforcement from 2005 to 2017 we find that a one standard deviation increase in enforcement raises mexican non citizens likelihood of marrying a u s citizen by 3 to 7 both police based and employment based enforcement contribute to this impact the analysis adds to a growing literature examining how immigrants respond to tightened enforcement and importantly sheds light on the recent growth of intermarriage among mexican immigrants

do immigrant inflows lead to native outflows we use 1980 and 1990 census data for 119 larger metropolitan statistical areas to examine the effect of skill group specific immigrant inflows on the location decisions of natives in the same skill group and on the overall distribution of human capital to control for unobserved skill group specific demand factors our models include lagged mobility flows of natives over the 1970 80 period we also estimate instrumental variables models that use the fraction of mexican immigrants in 1970 to predict skill group specific relative immigrant inflows over the 1980s despite wide variation across cities in the size and relative skill composition of immigrant population changes we find no evidence of selective out migration by natives we conclude that immigrant inflows exert a direct effect on the relative skill composition of cities cities that have received relatively unskilled immigrant flows have experienced proportional rises in the size of their unskilled populations this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item