information quality and crises in regime change games abstract when crises potentially originate from coordination failures does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability we address this question in a general global game of regime change with a unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application we show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime change thus reducing stability when the net payoff in the case of a successful attack is more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payoff in the case of status quo survival we also discuss welfare implications

what are the consequences of initiative taking in multinational subsidiaries the phenomenon of subsidiary initiative has received increasing attention in recent years but the consequences of initiatives and the associated dynamics of headquarters subsidiary relationships have received much less research attention building on resource dependence theory and self determination theory we argue that two basic goals subsidiary managers pursue are to achieve autonomy vis a vis corporate headquarters and influence over other units we investigate how a subsidiary s past initiatives contribute to its bargaining power and how headquarters response through granting attention or monitoring affects the realization of the subsidiary s goals using structural equation modeling our hypotheses are tested by drawing on a sample of 257 subsidiaries located in three different countries australia canada and the united kingdom our results show that subsidiaries are not able to increase their influence through initiatives unless they get headquarters attention we also find that subsidiary initiatives have a direct effect on subsidiary autonomy but the caveat is that initiatives also evoke headquarters monitoring which in turn decreases the subsidiary s autonomy in addition to providing insights into how subsidiaries can achieve their goals the paper also sheds light on the critical role headquarters plays in leveraging initiatives and the influence of individual subsidiaries in the multinational enterprise

speculative attacks and the information role of the interest rate this paper models currency attacks as carried out by speculators who condition their actions on private signals about the state and on the market clearing interest rate besides affecting speculators payoffs this interest rate also provides an endogenous public signal for a plausible type of investment strategies the dual role of the interest rate allows the model to explain abrupt and intense speculative attacks solely via economic fundamentals without resorting to sunspot variables this result underlies a novel policy implication an official intervention in the foreign exchange market may reinforce a currency peg by influencing the precision of public information jel d82 d84 f31

self fulfilling currency crises the role of interest rates abstract we develop a stylized currency crises model with heterogeneous information among investors andendogenous determination of interest rates in a noisy rational expectations equilibrium our modelcaptures three key features of interest rates the opportunity cost of attacking the currency respondsto the investors behavior the domestic interest rate may influence the central bank s preferences fora fixed exchange rate and the domestic interest rate serves as a public signal which aggregatesprivate information about fundamentals we explore the payoff and informational channels throughwhich interest rates determine devaluation outcomes and examine the implications for equilibriumselection by global games methods our main conclusion is that multiplicity is not an artifact ofcommon knowledge in particular we show that multiplicity emerges robustly either when adevaluation is triggered by the cost of high domestic interest rates as in obstfeld 1996 or when adevaluation is triggered by the central bank s loss of foreign reserves as in obstfeld 1986 providedthat the domestic asset supply is sufficiently elastic in the interest rate and shocks to the domesticbond supply are sufficiently small christian helliwigdepartment of economicsuniversity of california los angelesbox 951477los angeles ca 90095 1477arijit mukherjiuniversity of minnesotaaleh tsyvinskidepartment of economicsharvard universitylittauer centercambridge ma 02138 3001

large versus small players a closer look at the dynamics of speculative attacks what is the role of large players e g hedge funds in speculative attacks recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack however many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest rate differentials we propose a model in which large players can do both using data on currency trading by foreign large and local small players we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the norwegian krone during the 1990s during the attack on the swedish krona after the russian moratorium in 1998 foreign players moved early gains by delaying attack were small however because interest rates did not increase

sentiments and aggregate demand fluctuations we formalize the keynesian insight that aggregate demand driven by sentiments can generate output fluctuations under rational expectations when production decisions must be made under imperfect information about demand optimal decisions based on sentiments can generate stochastic self fulfilling rational expectations equilibria in standard economies without persistent informational frictions externalities nonconvexities or strategic complementarities in production the models we consider are deliberately simple but could serve as benchmarks for more complicated equilibrium models with additional features

defending against speculative attacks the policy maker s reputation abstract this paper studies how speculative attacks and regime change arise from the interaction between a policy maker s reputation for defending against speculative attacks and speculators learning of the policy maker s type if speculators receive conditionally independent and identically distributed private signals about the policy maker s type in every period then no matter how precise their per period private signals are there can be no equilibrium with attacks if the speculators receive private signals whose precision increases as a power function of the time with the power strictly greater than two there exist infinitely many equilibria with attacks but this equilibrium multiplicity arises from the timing of the attacks only in such a case the set of status quos surviving in any equilibrium is strictly larger than in the case of a short lived policy maker

party brands and partisanship theory with evidence from a survey experiment in argentina scholars disagree about the nature of party attachments viewing partisanship as either a social identity or a rational maximization of expected utility empirically much of this debate centers on the degree of partisan stability findings of partisan fluctuations are taken as evidence against the social identity perspective but drawing such conclusions assumes that the objects of identity parties are fixed if we instead allow party brands to change over time then partisan instability is consistent with a social identity conception of partisanship to demonstrate this i develop a branding model of partisanship in which voters learn about party brands by observing party behavior over time and base their psychological attachment to a party on these brands the model suggests that convergence by rival parties making their brands less distinguishable should weaken party attachments i test this implication using a survey experiment in argentina and find evidence consistent with the model

modeling hidden alternatives in random utility models an application to don t know responses in contingent valuation wedevelop a multinomial logitmodel with missing information that can be used to test for hidden alternatives in random utility models and contingent valuation analysis to illustrate our latentchoice technique we focus on the don t know responses in dichotomous choice contingent valuation questions in this version of the latent choice model we probabilistically reassign don t know responses to either the yes or no categories or leave them in the don t know category if indicated by the data we find that in our two studies a statistically significant number of the don t know responses are actually no responses

coordinating regime switches the canonical model of strategic complementarities between individual actions which exhibits multiple equilibria under perfect information is extended with heterogeneous agents and imperfect information agents observe their own cost of action and the history of the levels of aggregate activity the distribution of individual characteristics evolves through a random process and individuals are rational bayesians under plausible conditions there is a unique equilibrium with phases of high and low activity and random switches applications may be found in macroeconomics and revolutions

conflict and deterrence under strategic risk we examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict we contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk where players have different information about their environment these two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict in our model weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information in contrast under strategic risk we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation we also show that under strategic risk asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior

treatment of don t know responses in contingent valuation surveys a random valuation model abstract this paper provides a utility theoretic interpretation of don t know dk responses in contingent valuation surveys using a referendum elicitation procedure the random valuation model in this paper assumes that each respondent of a contingent valuation survey has an implicit valuation distribution rather than a single true value as traditionally assumed in his her mind if an offered referendum bid is not clearly different from the mean value of one s valuation distribution the respondent may give a dk answer to the cv referendum question based on this model a maximum likelihood procedure is proposed for estimating respondents willingness to pay for a nonmarket good with referendum contingent valuation data which include dk responses an empirical illustration of this estimation procedure is also provided

information acquisition in global games of regime change abstract we study costly information acquisition in global games of regime change that is coordination games where payoffs are discontinuous in the unobserved state and in the agents average action we show that only symmetric equilibria exist and provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness we then characterize the value of information in these games and link it to the underlying parameters of the model we investigate equilibrium efficiency complementarities in information choices and the trade offs between public and private information we show that information acquisition can be inefficient and that strategic complementarities in actions do not always translate into strategic complementarities in information acquisition finally we find that public and private information can be complements these results contrast findings in linear quadratic models where payoffs depend continuously on both the unobserved state and the agents average action

treating respondent uncertainty in contingent valuation a comparison of empirical treatments this research examines the impact of uncertainty on contingent valuation responses using 1 a survey of canadian landowners about willingness to accept compensation for converting cropland to forestry and 2 a survey of swedish residents about willingness to pay for forest conservation five approaches from the literature for incorporating respondent uncertainty are used and compared to the traditional random utility model with assumed certainty the results indicate that incorporating uncertainty has the potential to increase fit but could introduce additional variance while some methods for uncertainty can be an improvement over traditional approaches it is imperative to exercise caution when making systematic judgments about the effect of uncertainty on contingent valuation responses

testing models with multiple equilibria by quantile methods this paper proposes a method for testing complementarities between explanatory and dependent variables in a large class of economic models the proposed test is based on the monotone comparative statics mcs property of equilibria our main result is that mcs produces testable implications on the small and large quantiles of the dependent variable despite the presence of multiple equilibria the key features of our approach are that i we work with a nonparametric structural model of a continuous dependent variable in which the unobservable is allowed to be correlated with the explanatory variable in a reasonably general way ii we do not require the structural function to be known or estimable iii we remain fairly agnostic on how an equilibrium is selected we illustrate the usefulness of our result for policy evaluation within berry levinsohn and pakes s 1999 model

coordination and delay in global games abstract what is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game we address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions those that delay have access to accurate private information at the second stage but receive lower payoffs we show that as noise vanishes as long as the benefit to taking the risky action early is greater than the benefit of taking the risky action late the introduction of the option to delay reduces the incidence of coordination failure in equilibrium relative to the standard case where all agents must choose their actions at the same time we outline the welfare implications of this finding and probe the robustness of our results from a variety of angles

does don t know mean no analysis of don t know responses in dichotomous choice contingent valuation questions the don t know response option in contingent valuation dichotomous choice questions is analysed using data from both willingness to pay and willingness to accept studies an empirical analysis is conducted to determine whether respondents are stating a response similar to yes or no responses or a middle response it is found that don t know responses are similar to no responses in the willingness to pay study in the willingness to accept study it is found that the don t know responses are similar to a middle response it is further suggested that researchers consider calculating ambivalence bounds when a don t know response is a middle response

managing the mne subsidiary advancing a multi level and dynamic research agenda abstract multinational enterprise mne subsidiaries abroad are important organizations in their own rights they typically hold some of the mne s most critical resources and operate at the forefront of complex international environments in this review we identify and organize theoretical and empirical research on subsidiary management based on over 600 articles in leading academic journals we develop a conceptual framework that integrates complementary streams of theoretical and empirical research with the subsidiary as its focal unit of analysis in particular we review six lines of research on subsidiary scope practices knowledge management engagement with local market and nonmarket actors performance and individuals within subsidiaries we highlight theoretical perspectives that have contributed to and been advanced by research on mne subsidiaries based on the review we explore future research agendas linking the contemporary research themes with two main thrusts first subsidiary management is a multi level phenomenon that would benefit from more microfoundational research second subsidiary management operates at key interfaces of technology paradigm shifts and of disruptions in the political and institutional environment research into the dynamics of subsidiary management would thus enhance our understanding of international business in a volatile global economy

imperfect information multiple shocks and policy s signaling role abstract in multiple shock models when agents have imperfect information they attempt to infer a shock s type in addition to its size in this environment monetary policy plays an important signaling role this paper highlights this signaling role by showing that conclusions from imperfect information monetary models are sensitive to the number of shocks included with multiple shocks contractionary monetary policy can initially increase inflation and delay the eventual disinflation moreover multiple shocks can result in destabilizing price flexibility while optimal policy s response to one shock will depend on the existence of other shocks contrary to a typical linear quadratic framework

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

do countries falsify economic data strategically some evidence that they might we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their economic data in a strategic manner among those suspected are countries with fixed exchange rate regimes high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model we also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in africa middle east eastern europe and latin america release economic data of questionable veracity our evidence calls for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing independent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data

market microstructure information aggregation and equilibrium uniqueness in a global game abstract speculators contemplating an attack e g on a currency peg must guess the beliefs of other speculators which they can do by looking at the stock market as shown in earlier work this information gathering process may be destabilising by creating multiple equilibria this paper studies the role played by the microstructure of the asset market in the emergence of multiple equilibria driven by information aggregation to do so we study the outcome of a two stage global game wherein an asset price determined at the trading stage of the game provides an endogenous public signal about the fundamental that affects traders decision to attack in the coordination stage of the game in the trading stage placing a full demand schedule i e a continuum of limit orders is costly but traders may use riskier and cheaper market orders i e order to sell or buy a fixed quantity of assets unconditional on the execution price price execution risk reduces traders aggressiveness and hence slows down information aggregation which ultimately makes multiple equilibria in the coordination stage less likely in this sense microstructure frictions that lead to greater individual exposure to price execution risk may reduce aggregate uncertainty by pinning down a unique equilibrium outcome

breaking the law when others do a model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities abstract a standard assumption in the economics of law enforcement is that the probability of a violator being punished depends only on the resources devoted to enforcement however it is often true that the productivity of enforcement resources decreases with the number of violators in this paper an individual who violates the law provides a positive externality for other offenders because the probability of being punished decreases with the number of individuals violating the law this externality explains the existence of correlation between individuals decisions to break a law the model evaluates the implications when determining the socially optimal enforcement expenditure focusing specifically on the case of neighborhood crime in particular using a parametrized functional form i show that neighborhood externalities will enhance or impede enforcement depending on the crime rate

information manipulation coordination and regime change this article presents a model of information manipulation and political regime change there is a regime that can be overthrown but only if enough citizens participate in an uprising citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime s ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that taken at face value makes the regime seem stronger than it truly is this coordination game with endogenous information manipulation has a unique equilibrium and the article gives a complete analytic characterization of the equilibrium s comparative statics holding fixed the number of signals available to citizens if the per unit signal precision is sufficiently high then the regime is harder to overthrow in contrast if the number of signals increases so that both total signal precision and the regime s costs of manipulation rise together then the regime is easier to overthrow unless there are strong economies of scale in information control

dueling policies why systemic risk taxation can fail abstract two policy instruments for the banking sector are investigated namely systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity about bailout policy bailout expectations can induce moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking by banks systemic risk taxation induces banks to prefer uncorrelated investments leading to lower systemic risk formation constructive ambiguity generates uncertainty about bailout prospects however systemic risk taxation also may inform banks about the regulator s concern for financial stability and thereby its bailout policy this result leads to a trade off between systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity and highlights the need to consider interdependence across policies when evaluating their effectiveness

alternative approaches for incorporating respondent uncertainty when estimating willingness to pay the case of the mexican spotted owl abstract this paper explores the sources and patterns of respondents uncertainty regarding their willingness to pay wtp and presents alternative approaches for incorporating this uncertainty into estimation of the logit model recently proposed approaches are compared to methods proposed in this paper which allows for incorporation of uncertainty regarding both yes and no responses these approaches are evaluated by comparing the goodness of fit and variability of mean wtp extreme recoding of uncertain yes responses as no responses reduces the logit goodness of fit and the precision of the wtp estimate incorporating the degree of uncertainty of yes responses results in the highest goodness of fit and the smallest variability of mean wtp among the various models addressing uncertainty a regression model is used to determine the significant determinants of respondent uncertainty

a comparison of alternative certainty calibration techniques in contingent valuation abstract a field test of two types of certainty calibration techniques in contingent valuation of public lands indicated that a 10 point certainty scale reduced wtp estimates by about half adjusting for uncertainty via a not sure option did not reduce wtp estimates but the variance increased there are several differences between these two ways of accounting for respondents uncertainty which may suggest why they provide different wtp value estimates and variances

collective action and constraints on repression at the endgame how can human rights abuses be prevented or reduced using a simple game theoretic model we demonstrate that repression can become a coordination game when the potential for abuses is greatest when dissent against a regime has grown sufficiently powerful in such scenarios repression depends on how the leader s agents coordinate on implementing a repression order if and to the extent agents believe other agents will not comply with an order to repress leaders can expect agents to disobey orders and will be less likely to order repression this logic of expectations constitutes a third mechanism for constraining repression in addition to sanctioning i e the logic of consequences and normative mechanisms i e the logic of appropriateness we formally explore how the logic of expectations can constrain the implementation of repression and also show that the logic of expectations has the greatest potential to constrain repression in middle regimes or anocracies in turn this has broader implic

innovation in multinational subsidiaries the role of knowledge assimilation and subsidiary capabilities subsidiaries of multinational firms play an important role in the globalization of innovation yet we have an incomplete idea of the influences on their innovative activity drawing on prior research in international business and strategy we identify two sets of factors that influence the absorption and utilization of knowledge in multinational corporation subsidiaries a the range of external and internal knowledge sources available and b the subsidiary capabilities associated with knowledge absorption and utilization we find that knowledge absorbed from the host country is useful to subsidiary innovation we also find support for the role of subsidiary capabilities both sourcing capability and combinative capability have a significant influence on the scale and quality of innovation

runs versus lemons information disclosure and fiscal capacity we study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs in our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons a fiscal backstop mitigates the cost of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests and paradoxically how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained

do high interest rates deter speculative attacks evidence and some theory abstract this paper presents the first empirical evidence on the efficacy of raising interest rates ex ante as a deterrent to speculative attacks using a dataset that covers 54 countries from march 1964 through december 2005 we find strong evidence that raising interest rates in advance has significantly different impacts in different country groups it significantly reduces the probability of attacks in countries that have a de facto hard peg but increases it in de facto soft pegging countries this finding is robust to alternative measure of monetary policy and to different specifications and samples we then present a simple two stage signaling model to offer a theoretical explanation for our empirical findings

a dynamic capabilities based entrepreneurial theory of the multinational enterprise this paper develops a dynamic capabilities based theory of the multinational enterprise mne it first reviews scholarship on the mne with a focus on what has come to be known as internalization theory one prong of this theory develops contractual transaction cost informed governance perspectives and another develops technology transfer and capabilities perspectives in this paper it is suggested that the latter has been somewhat neglected however if fully integrated as part of a more complete approach it can buttress transaction cost governance issues and expand the range of phenomena that can be explained in this more integrated framework dynamic capabilities coupled with good strategy are seen as necessary to sustain superior enterprise performance especially in fast moving global environments entrepreneurial management and transformational leadership are incorporated into a capabilities theory of the mne the framework is then used to explain how strategy and dynamic capabilities together determine firm level sustained competitive advantage in global environments it is suggested that this framework complements contract based perspectives on the mne and can help integrate international management and international business perspectives

the role of question format for the support for national climate change mitigation policies in germany and the determinants of wtp this contingent valuation survey examines the willingness to pay wtp for climate change mitigation in germany willingness to pay is assessed by using a classic dichotomous choice referendum format and a two way payment ladder in a split sample design we find that mean wtp under the referendum format is more than twice the wtp in the payment ladder format but median wtp does not differ moreover we test the possible effect of different determinants on wtp determinants that considerably influence wtp are personal norm climate change scepticism agreement with the german renewable energy law and individualistic cognition income and gender are also important predictors

information choice and amplification of financial crises we propose an amplification mechanism of financial crises based on the information choices of investors information acquisition makes investors more likely to act against their prior deteriorating public news under an initially strong weak prior increases reduces the value of private information and induces more less information acquisition deteriorating public news increases the probability of a crisis since the initially strong weak prior induces no attacks attacks this effect is amplified with endogenous information choices to enhance financial stability a policy maker affects information acquisition via taxes and subsidies we derive and discuss testable implications for the magnitude of amplification

flexible mixture distribution modeling of dichotomous choice contingent valuation with heterogenity abstract this paper considers the performance of a model of mixture normal distributions for dichotomous choice contingent valuation data which allows the researcher to consider unobserved heterogeneity across the sample the model is flexible and approaches a semi parametric model since the normality assumption can be removed by augmenting the number of mixture distributions bayesian inference allows for simple estimation of the model and is particularly appropriate for conducting inference with finite data sets the proposed model is compared with other semi parametric and parametric approaches using monte carlo simulation under alternative assumptions regarding heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity in sample observations it is found that the mixture normal model reduces bias and improves performance with respect to an alternative semi parametric model particularly when the sample is characterized by heterogeneous preferences the application of the model to empirical data on the recreational value of natural areas in the canary islands confirmed the expected results

exchange rate manipulation and constructive ambiguity i consider dynamic models in which investors are heterogeneously informed about both foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate fundamentals and show that transparency sometimes exacerbates misalignment between the exchange rate and fundamentals although transparency reveals information about fundamentals it also increases the precision of the exchange rate as a signal of those fundamentals that remain unknown the signal precision effect of transparency if a central bank announcement reveals little information about fundamentals then this effect dominates and transparency magnifies misalignment one implication is that ambiguity can increase the effectiveness of intervention to support a declining currency during times of crisis

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

a basic new keynesian dsge model with dispersed information an agent based approach abstract the aim of this paper is to bridge macro agent based models with mainstream macroeconomic models by agentifying the baseline new keynesian dsge model the model features multiple boundedly rational optimizing agents and is analyzed through numerical simulations we exploit the flexibility of agent based modeling to explore the effect of dispersed information on the learning process and on macroeconomic outcomes we find that with dispersed information monetary and fiscal policy acquire the role of public signals

strategic merger waves a theory of musical chairs this paper proposes an explanation of merger waves based on the interaction between competitive pressure and irreversibility of mergers in an uncertain environment a set of acquirers compete over time for scarce targets at each point in time an acquirer can either postpone a takeover attempt or raid immediately by postponing the takeover attempt an acquirer may gain from more favorable future market conditions but runs the risk of being preempted by rivals first a complete information model is considered and it is shown that the above tradeoff leads to a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria in monotone strategies that are strictly pareto ranked all these equilibria share the feature that all acquirers rush simultaneously in merger waves the model is then extended to a dynamic global game by introducing slightly noisy private information about merger profitability this game is shown to have a unique markov perfect bayesian equilibrium in monotone strategies and the timing of the merger wave can thus be predicted last the comparative dynamics predictions of the model are related to stylized facts

referendum design and contingent valuation the noaa panel s no vote recommendation this paper considers the effects for offering a would not vote option in contingent valuation cv questions framed using the referendum format this approach arises from a suggestion made by the national oceanic and atmospheric administration s noaa panel on contingent valuation the noaa panel was asked to evaluate the use of this method for estimating the economic value of nonmarketed environmental resources in the context of natural resource damage assessments this test used the cv questionnaire developed for the study of the exxon valdez oil spill conducted by the state of alaska with in person interviews the findings suggest that when those selecting the would not vote response are treated as having voted against the program a conservative coding offering this option does not alter 1 the distribution of for and against responses 2 the estimates of willingness to pay derived from these choices or 3 the construct validity of the results

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

look before you leap market opportunity identification in emerging technology firms entrepreneurs play a fundamental role in bringing new technologies to market because technologies are often configurable to serve a variety of different markets it is possible for entrepreneurs to identify multiple market opportunities prior to the first market entry of their emerging firms and if they elect to do so to therefore have a choice of which market to enter first the empirical results presented in this paper offer three new insights regarding this important early stage choice in new firm creation first they reveal that serial entrepreneurs have learned through prior start up experience to generate a choice set of alternative market opportunities before deciding which one to pursue in their new firm creation second the analysis indicates that entrepreneurs who identify a choice set of market opportunities prior to first entry derive performance benefits by doing so third the positive relationship between the number of market opportunities identified prior to first entry and new firm performance is nonlinear and subject to decreasing marginal return the research literature has yet to acknowledge the notion of multiple opportunity identification prior to entry and the related idea of selecting the most favorable market opportunity for the creation of a new technology firm

uncertainty and currency crises evidence from survey data this paper studies empirically how uncertainty aects speculation in the foreign ex change markets we use the dispersion of survey forecasts of key macroeconomic variables to measure uncertainty about fundamentals we nd that uncertainty has a non monotone eect on exchange rate pressures namely uncertainty heightens speculative pressures when expected fundamentals are good and eases them when they are bad we prove that this prediction arises from a broad class of currency crisis theories ranging from rst generation to global game models we also show that the proposed empirical strategy remains valid in the presence of forecasters with strategic objectives and use a novel set of instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity bias

host country environment and subsidiary competence extending the diamond network model we extend the centers of excellence concept to address the diversity and multidimensionality of subsidiary competence using rugman and verbeke s diamond network model we hypothesize the contingencies influencing the links between host country environments and subsidiary competence configuration and provide evidence from more than 2000 subsidiaries in seven european countries our results provide new insights into how multinational enterprises can overcome unbalanced national diamonds by acquiring complementary capabilities across borders

preference uncertainty in non market valuation a fuzzy approach in this article we consider uncertain preferences for non market goods but we move away from a probabilistic representation of uncertainty and propose the use of fuzzy contingent valuation we assume that a decision maker never fully knows her own utility function and we treat utility as a fuzzy number the methodology is illustrated using data on forest valuation in sweden fuzzy contingent valuation provides estimates of resource value in the form of a fuzzy number and includes estimates obtained using a standard probabilistic approach

the origins of human rights regimes democratic delegation in postwar europe the e ftieth anniversary of the un universal declaration on human rights marks an appropriate moment to reconsider the reasons why governments construct international regimes to adjudicate and enforce human rights such regimes include those established under the european convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms echr the inter american convention on human rights and the un covenant on civil and political rights these arrangements differ from most other forms of institutionalizedinternational cooperation in both their ends and their means unlike international institutions governing trade monetary environmental or security policy international human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities in contrast to most international regimes moreover human rights regimes are not generally enforced by interstate action although most arrangements formally empower governments to challenge one another such challenges almost never occur the distinctiveness of such regimes lies instead in their empowerment of individual citizens to bring suit to challenge the domestic activities of their own government independent courts and commissions attached to such regimes often respond to such individual claimsby judging that the applicationof domestic rules or legislationviolates international commitments even where such legislationhas been

an empirical evaluation of explanations for state repression the empirical literature that examines cross national patterns of state repression seeks to discover a set of political economic and social conditions that are consistently associated with government violations of human rights null hypothesis significance testing is the most common way of examining the relationship between repression and concepts of interest but we argue that it is inadequate for this goal and has produced potentially misleading results to remedy this deficiency in the literature we use cross validation and random forests to determine the predictive power of measures of concepts the literature identifies as important causes of repression we find that few of these measures are able to substantially improve the predictive power of statistical models of repression further the most studied concept in the literature democratic political institutions predicts certain kinds of repression much more accurately than others we argue that this is due to conceptual and operational overlap between democracy and certain kinds of state repression finally we argue that the impressive performance of certain features of domestic legal systems as well as some economic and demographic factors justifies a stronger focus on these concepts in future studies of repression

uncertainty co ordination and path dependence abstract our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co ordination in a game with strategic complementarities we study two dynamic aspects different agents make decisions at different points in time and extra information about a payoff relevant state of nature becomes available over time we find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium this is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs we also analyse how successfully agents co ordinate when there is a unique equilibrium finally we show that path dependence occurs the order in which signals arrive matters as well as the total amount of information received

qualified immigrants success exploring the motivation to migrate and to integrate high quality employees with international experience bring valuable advantages to internationally operating organizations the growing number and importance of immigrants and particularly qualified university educated immigrants deserves more attention from international business practitioners and scholars the market for highly qualified people within mncs is increasingly becoming international and ever more of them have migrated to a new country to advance their career such employees can be a source of competitive advantage for international firms we use qualitative research with qualified immigrants qis in france to argue that the success of qis depends in large part on their motivation to integrate into their host country which is largely explained by their motivation to migrate from the qualitative data we derive four different types of qualified migrant and suggest that the type will determine the success of the immigrant within and outside the organization the relationship between the motivation to migrate and the motivation to integrate is moderated by met expectations and organizational integration policies such that the effects of these in turn vary with type recognition of the types of qi and the moderating factors will be valuable for practitioners as well as opening up research avenues for scholars

signaling in a global game coordination and policy traps this paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs while exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium we show that the endogenous information generated by policy interventions leads to multiple equilibria the policy maker is thus trapped into a position in which self fulfilling expectations dictate not only the coordination outcome but also the optimal policy this result does not rely on the freedom to choose out of equilibrium beliefs nor on the policy being a public signal it may obtain even if the policy is observed with idiosyncratic noise

is knowledge power knowledge flows subsidiary power and rent seeking within mncs in recent years as multinational corporation mnc subsidiaries have become more closely linked to international networks their knowledge intensity has risen and some of their r d has gained a more creative role simultaneously and often connectedly many subsidiaries have acquired considerable strategic independence in all aspects of their operations and therefore are able to exercise considerable intra firm bargaining power to influence the distribution of the firm s resources in this context we suggest that intra mnc knowledge flows are a key determinant of subsidiary bargaining power we argue that subsidiary managers can exploit such power to pursue their own ends such rent seeking behavior is implicit in much of the literature on managerialism but our analysis suggests that such behavior can now occur in headquarters subsidiary and subsidiary subsidiary relations thus subsidiary strategic independence designed to enhance the competitiveness of outputs market knowledge and inputs asset seeking and learning can be corroded when the pursuit of subsidiary objectives encourages rent seeking empirical analysis of a sample of high technology subsidiaries in the uk provides strong support for the theory we examine several avenues whereby the incentives of units within the mnc can be aligned

protest beliefs in contingent valuation explaining their motivation abstract the definition and treatment of protest responses in contingent valuation cv can have a significant influence on the estimated values of the good in question if these responses are censored in order to understand how protest responses are motivated in a cv about forest biodiversity in germany we used an item battery to identify respondents protest beliefs the items were measured for all respondents irrespective of their willingness to pay wtp in principle then a scale based on these beliefs is taken as a dependent variable of regression analyses in addition to environmental concern we used norms the warm glow of giving and dilemma concern as further explanatory variables the latter focuses on cooperation problems in protecting the environment our results show that protest beliefs are significantly influenced by the explanatory factors furthermore the protest beliefs themselves have a significant effect on the decision to be wtp as well as on the amount of money stated by those who are wtp the censoring of protest responses may therefore be indefensible

dynamic capabilities what are they this paper focuses on dynamic capabilities and more generally the resource based view of the firm we argue that dynamic capabilities are a set of specific and identifiable processes such as product development strategic decision making and alliancing they are neither vague nor tautological although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in their emergence they have significant commonalities across firms popularly termed best practice this suggests that they are more homogeneous fungible equifinal and substitutable than is usually assumed in moderately dynamic markets dynamic capabilities resemble the traditional conception of routines they are detailed analytic stable processes with predictable outcomes in contrast in high velocity markets they are simple highly experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes finally well known learning mechanisms guide the evolution of dynamic capabilities in moderately dynamic markets the evolutionary emphasis is on variation in high velocity markets it is on selection at the level of rbv we conclude that traditional rbv misidentifies the locus of long term competitive advantage in dynamic markets overemphasizes the strategic logic of leverage and reaches a boundary condition in high velocity markets copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

dynamic capabilities for hire how former host country entrepreneurs as mnc subsidiary managers affect performance mnc subsidiaries benefit from managers with entrepreneurial skills for finding superior combinations of mnc and host country resources however such management skills are scarce we reason that subsidiaries can improve their performance by hiring host country entrepreneurs as managers since they develop similar skills in start ups our theoretical model integrates mechanisms from entrepreneurial experience into theory on the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities we test and support our prediction using longitudinal employer employee data for 5587 foreign mnc subsidiaries in portugal further we show that performance effects are weaker when a subsidiary s management is internationally diverse and stronger in dynamic host country environments

dynamic interventions and informational linkages abstract we model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and study how endogenous government interventions mitigate coordination failures we establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness and we show that one intervention can affect another through altering the public information structure a stronger initial intervention helps subsequent interventions through increasing the likelihood of positive news but also leads to negative conditional updates our results suggest optimal policy should emphasize initial interventions when coordination outcomes tend to correlate neglecting informational externalities of initial interventions results in over or under interventions moreover saving smaller funds disproportionally more can generate greater informational benefits at smaller costs

signalling effects of monetary policy we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the policy rate signals the central bank s view about macroeconomic developments to price setters the model is estimated with likelihood methods on a u s data set that includes the survey of professional forecasters as a measure of price setters inflation expectations this model improves upon existing perfect information models in explaining why in the data inflation expectations respond with delays to monetary impulses and remain disanchored for years in the 1970s u s monetary policy is found to signal persistent inflationary shocks explaining why inflation and inflation expectations were so persistently heightened the signalling effects of monetary policy also explain why inflation expectations adjusted more sluggishly than inflation after the robust monetary tightening of the 1980s

dichotomous choice contingent valuation with dont know responses and misreporting a new approach is presented that simultaneously deals with misreporting and don t know dk responses within a dichotomous choice contingent valuation framework utilising a modification of the standard bayesian probit framework a gibbs with metropolis hastings algorithm is used to estimate the posterior densities for the parameters of interest several model specifications are applied to two contingent valuation datasets one on wolf management plans and one on the us fee demonstration program we find that dks are more likely to be from people who would be predicted to have positive utility for the bid therefore a dk is more likely to be a yes than a no we also find evidence of misreporting primarily in favour of the no option the inclusion of dk responses has an unpredictable impact on willingness to pay estimates since it impacts differently on the results for the two datasets we examine copyright c 2009 john wiley sons ltd

discrete choice under preference uncertainty an improved structural model for contingent valuation abstract this paper is concerned with discrete choice contingent value estimation in the presence of response errors we attempt to extend the theoretical frameworks developed by hanemann 1984 amer j agric econom 66 332 341 and cameron 1988 j environ econom management 15 355 379 by introducing preference uncertainty with individual respondents we assume that respondents have incomplete knowledge about their true valuation of a nonmarket resource and thus may give wrong yes no answers on whether or not to pay a given bid amount for the resource a post decisional confidence measure for each observed yes no answer is elicited for characterizing the degree of preference uncertainty with the help of this confidence measure we develop an improved structural model for deriving value estimates data from a forest environment valuation survey are used for the empirical estimations

foreignness and exit over the life cycle of firms received wisdom indicates that owing to a liability of foreignness foreign firms exit with greater likelihood than do comparable domestic firms and that the difference attenuates as firms age and overcome the liability we posit that foreign firms are also intrinsically more volatile and footloose than domestic ones and that this leads to an increasing divergence between the exit rates of foreign and domestic firms empirically we find that the difference between exit rates of foreign firms and domestic firms increases with age as exit of foreign firms increases with age while that of purely domestic firms decreases exit rates of domestic based multinationals do not change significantly with age they are between those of foreign and purely domestic firms but are closer to the latter this suggests that the footlooseness observed for foreign firms is due to foreignness more than to multinationality

the signaling role of policy actions abstract in an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank s assessment to firms because mark up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion recognizing the signaling role of its instrument the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms beliefs while providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms coordination is highly valuable

efficient ex ante stabilization of firms abstract distressed firms are vulnerable to inefficient panic based runs of their workers suppliers and customers a policymaker may try to prevent such a run by pledging to protect the interests of these stakeholders should a firm cease to do business however this promise also enables the firm to demand better terms of trade from its stakeholders which blunts the policy s effectiveness we show how to avoid such an adverse response by the use of partial countercyclical insurance under certain conditions such a scheme costlessly implements the first best outcome in the limit as the stakeholders information becomes precise we also identify least cost efficient schemes in the cases of large noise learning and duopoly

rational and self fulfilling balance of payments crises speculative attacks on a pegged exchange rate must sometimes occur ifasset price paths are to be free of abnormal profit opportunities suchattacks are fully rational as they reflect the market s response to aregime breakdown that is inevitable the authors shows that under someexpectations about policy balance of payments crises can also be purely self fulfilling events in such cases even a permanently viableregime may collapse and the economy will possess multiple equilibriacorresponding to different subjective assessments of the probability ofa crisis the behavior of the domestic interest rate will naturally reflect the possibility of a speculative attack copyright 1986 by american economic association

characteristics of foreign subsidiaries in industry clusters this paper examines the characteristics of foreign owned subsidiaries in export intensive leading edge industry clusters as defined by porter 1990 using a sample of 229 subsidiaries from three countries we show that subsidiaries in such clusters are more embedded more autonomous and more internationally oriented than subsidiaries in other industry sectors we also show that there are significant differences in the roles of foreign owned subsidiaries from one leading edge cluster to the next that are associated with the dynamism of the cluster and the overall level of foreign ownership the results indicate 1 that typologies of subsidiary roles should give increased consideration to environmental factors and 2 that thinking on industry clusters instead of treating them identically should recognize that they have heterogeneous characteristics

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

closure and divestiture by foreign entrants the impact of entry and post entry strategies we analyze the longevity of foreign entrants explicitly considering two possible ways of exit firm closure and capital divestiture we find that entry and post entry strategies affect the longevity of firms and of foreign equity holdings but in different manners while the ownership arrangements and organizational structure affect the likelihood of divestment they exert no significant effect upon closure the entry mode exerts opposite effects on the two modes of exit greenfield entrants being more likely to shutdown but less likely to be divested only human capital affects closure and divestment in the same manner firms with large endowments of human capital are less likely to exit irrespective of the exit mode considered copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

a contingent valuation estimate of the benefits of wolves in minnesota in this paper we estimate the willingness topay for a wolf management plan and a wolfdamage plan in minnesota using the contingentvaluation method the theoretical definition ofwillingness to pay for wolf protection iscomposed of use and non use values weincorporate a don t know response option in thedichotomous choice valuation questions a largenumber of respondents answered don t know themultinomial logit model is used todifferentiate between don t know and noresponses non use motives are importantfactors that explain willingness to pay we usethese benefit estimates in combination with twoalternative cost estimates to consider theefficiency of the wolf management and damageplans both plans have estimated benefitsgreater than costs