the impact of climate targets on future steel production an analysis based on a global energy system model this paper addresses how a global climate target may influence iron and steel production technology deployment and scrap use a global energy system model etsap tiam was used and a scrap availability assessment model saam was developed to analyse the relation between steel demand recycling and the availability of scrap and their implications for steel production technology choices steel production using recycled materials has a continuous growth and is likely to be a major route for steel production in the long run however as the global average of in use steel stock increases up to the current average stock of the industrialised economies global steel demand keeps growing and stagnates only after 2050 due to high steel demand levels and scarcity of scrap more than 50 of the steel production in 2050 will still have to come from virgin materials hydrogen based steel production could become a major technology option for production from virgin materials particularly in a scenario where carbon capture and storage ccs is not available imposing a binding climate target will shift the crude steel price to approximately 500 usd per tonne in the year 2050 provided that ccs is available however the increased prices are induced by co2 prices rather than inflated production costs it is concluded that a global climate target is not likely to influence the use of scrap whereas it shall have an impact on the price of scrap finally the results indicate that energy efficiency improvements of current processes will only be sufficient to meet the climate target in combination with ccs new innovative techniques with lower climate impact will be vital for mitigating climate change

access pricing and investment with stochastically growing demand abstract this paper examines the effect of access charges on firms incentives to invest in a network facility with a stochastically growing demand an access to bypass equilibrium is characterized in terms of an access charge and a level of network investment cost in the equilibrium a leader first enters a market by building a new network then a follower makes a sequential investment for the construction of an additional network after accessing the incumbent s network in an open access environment we confirm that the incentive for preemption can be enhanced by an increase in the access charge

effects of the change from rate of return to price cap regulation this article focuses on the use of incentive regulation in the telephone industry in the united states we first characterize some of the difficulties that have led regulators to move away from traditional rate ofreturn cost based regulation and toward systems of regulation that provide incentives for increasingly efficient production allowing firms to share in the social gains from efficiency with increased profits we then discuss the basic structure of incentive regulation as it has most commonly been adopted in the telephone industry in the united states the first is price cap pc regulation which typically allows the firm to

liberalisation and r d in network industries the case of the electricity industry abstract electricity sector liberalisation has coincided with a significant decline in r d spending this paper reviews the industrial organisation literature on r d and innovation to explore the likely causes of the decline in r d spending in the electricity sector meanwhile r d productivity and innovative outputs in utilities and equipment suppliers appear to have improved however a lasting decline in r d expenditure can have a negative long term effect on technological progress and innovation in the sector we conclude that the decline in r d could have been predicted from the literature we also discuss the need to reorient the post liberalisation technology policy

price cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment this article shows how scale economies affect regulated firms investment behavior and welfare maximizing regulation of price and quantity regulated firms invest in smaller more frequent increments than social planners with greater investment distortions the greater the economies of scale regulators cap prices at lower levels than planners when economies of scale are moderate and at higher levels when they are substantial when quantity is also regulated the average cost of building capacity increases but the price cap decreases immediately after firms make their initial investment regulators want to transfer surplus from customers to shareholders by raising the price cap to induce additional investment

government failure rent seeking and capture the design of climate change policy climate change has been described as one of the biggest market failures less attention has been paid to the government failures associated with interventions and the implications for the design of climate change policy this paper sets out the main types of government failure and shows how the processes of rent seeking and capture help to explain both why the choice of targets and instruments has been so inefficient and also why the resulting costs of carbon mitigation are likely to be considerably higher than the estimates provided by the stern review and other recent studies two examples are given emissions trading and renewables policy a number of generic conclusions are drawn about how taking account of government failures can help to improve policy design and limit the impact of the climate change pork barrel which existing policies have created copyright 2010 oxford university press

an analysis of the economic determinants of energy efficiency in the european iron and steel industry abstract the iron and steel industry has some of the highest levels of carbon emissions and energy consumption in europe at the same time this sector is of great economic importance for the european union in this paper we investigate the technological market and policy factors that are associated with a reduction in the specific energy consumption in iron and steel production in addition we analyze whether achieving more environmentally friendly production is accompanied by a decrease or an increase in production levels we base our analysis on technical information about cost factors of steel production routes historical data for prices of energy carriers on prices for the feedstock in the iron and steel sector on political framework conditions and the demand for steel as we find out higher energy prices tend to raise energy efficiency or tend to reduce specific energy consumption in the steel sector yet because lower specific energy consumption is related to higher total steel production energy price increases might cause a kind of rebound effect bringing about an increase in total production as a consequence of induced energy efficiency improvements taking this effect into account the negative relation between input prices and total steel production is not very strong in the short run the wages of employees in the steel sector tend to have the biggest influence on total steel production in the long run gdp and investment climate exert the biggest influence

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

new parties and policy outcomes evidence from colombian local governments abstract in many democracies increasing political competition has changed the traditional party system and brought new parties into the political arena this study examines whether the presence of politicians from new parties affects the size of government measured by public spending and tax revenue the study focuses on colombian municipalities where new parties have been numerous and successful in recent years regression discontinuity estimates show that public spending and tax revenues are significantly higher in municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party using information about local politics and the features of the new parties i argue that this result is not associated with new party ideology but instead relates to new parties having lower probability of reelection which raises the incentives to increase short term rent seeking

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies abstract we study the impact of price cap regulation on the level and timing of investment in an oligopolistic cournot industry facing stochastic demand we find that a price ceiling affects investment decisions in two mutually competing ways it makes the option to defer investment more valuable but at the same time it reduces the incentive for firms to strategically underinvest in order to raise prices we show that while sensible price cap regulation speeds up investment a low price cap can be a disincentive for investment there exists an optimal price cap independent of market concentration the competitive investment price trigger that maximizes investment incentives and in the long term increases industry installed capacity this optimal price cap becomes less effective and less robust as the market becomes more competitive and as demand volatility increases errors in estimation of the optimal price cap have asymmetric effects underestimation has more dire consequences than overestimation

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

does tax competition tame the leviathan abstract we study the impact of tax competition on equilibrium taxes and welfare focusing on the jurisdictional fragmentation of federations in a representative agent model of fiscal federalism fragmentation among jurisdictions with benevolent tax setting authorities unambiguously reduces welfare if however tax setting authorities pursue revenue maximization fragmentation by pushing down equilibrium tax rates may under certain conditions increase citizen welfare we exploit the highly decentralized and heterogeneous swiss fiscal system as a laboratory for the estimation of these effects while for purely direct democratic jurisdictions which we associate with relatively benevolent tax setting we find that tax rates increase in fragmentation fragmentation has a moderating effect on the tax rates of jurisdictions with some degree of delegated government our results thereby support the view that tax competition can be second best welfare improving by constraining the scope for public sector revenue maximization

mitigation of adverse effects on competitiveness and leakage of unilateral eu climate policy an assessment of policy instruments the european union eu has developed a strategy to mitigate climate change by cutting greenhouse gas ghg emissions and fostering low carbon technologies however the risk of implementing unilateral policies is that distortive effects are generated at the global scale affecting world energy prices international competitiveness and the geographical allocation of carbon intensive production processes using a dynamic cge model we assess the rate of carbon leakage and adverse impacts on competitiveness in a number of scenarios over the period 2010 2050 according to the model results we highlight two major issues first in the case of a unilateral eu climate policy carbon leakage and negative effects on competitiveness are quite serious anti leakage measures can only mitigate leakage and adverse economic impacts on competitiveness in a limited way on the contrary an optimality analysis addressing the environmental effectiveness cost effectiveness and political feasibility of alternative policy solutions reveals that the eu long term decarbonisation strategy by investing in energy efficiency and renewable energy might ensure protection of vulnerable manufacturing activities while enhancing the competitiveness of technologically advanced industries

environmental policy government and the market environmental policy is made in a context of both market failure and government failure on the one hand leaving environmental protection to the free market relying on notions of corporate social responsibility and altruistic consumer and shareholder preferences will not deliver optimal results on the other hand nationalizing the delivery of environmental protection is likely to fail because nation states rarely have the depth and quality of information required to instruct all the relevant agents to make appropriate decisions thus as for many areas of policy appropriate models of environmental intervention will lie between these two extremes while it is impossible to specify general rules concerning the precise form of intervention in part because the type of intervention depends upon value judgements this paper sets out some of the considerations that are particular to environmental policy and explores several principles for policy design including information coordination and principal agent problems with a particular focus on the international context

commensurability and sustainability triple impact assessments of a tourism event abstract in this study a model for measuring impacts of a tourist event from sustainability perspectives and in a common monetary metric is developed the aim is to achieve commensurability the proposed model is tested on a three day music festival and the results demonstrate a possibility to produce a sustainability impact analysis in a uniform metric measured in monetary terms socio cultural impacts carry weight just as economic impacts do whereas environmental impacts have little importance for the total assessment this illustrates how the low market value of emission rights make environmental concerns negligible from an economic perspective finally issues related to scope of the assessment commensurability and opportunity cost are discussed and possibilities for future studies are suggested

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

optimal regulation of network expansion we model the optimal regulation of continuous irreversible capacity expansion where a regulated firm has private information about capacity costs investments are financed from the firm s cash flows and demand is stochastic the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a revenue tax that increases with the level of the price cap if the asymmetric information has large support then the optimal mechanism consists of a laissez faire regime for low cost firms that is the firm s price cap corresponds to that of an unregulated monopolist and it is not taxed this maximal distortion at the top is necessary to provide information rents as direct subsidies are not feasible

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

political uncertainty and public financing costs evidence from u s gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets this research investigates how political uncertainty around u s gubernatorial elections in uences the borrowing costs of public debt measured by yields of municipal bonds our evidence from both the new issuance market and the secondary market shows that yields of municipal bonds increase sharply by 6 to 8 basis points before elections and then reverse afterward elections have more pronounced impact during economic downturns when outcomes are less predictable and when states have more outstanding debt several state institutions such as gaap budgeting spending limits and tax increase limits help to mitigate the adverse impact of political uncertainty

market power and collusion in the ocean shipping industry is a bigger cartel a better cartel i introduction the ocean shipping industry enjoys certain conditions that are extremely favorable for collusion such as antitrust immunity for explicit pricing agreements known as conference agreements and enforcement of those agreements by the u s government consequently studies 1 purporting to show evidence of price discrimination in ocean shipping were considered by some proof of the obvious the ocean shipping industry exercises market power due to its unique regulatory environment policymakers presume that collusive behavior pervades the industry as evidenced by senator metzenbaum s statement that the american people simply can t afford to give ocean shipping conferences unbridled discretion to raise prices reduce capacity neutralize low cost competitors and eliminate services to ports or other customers 2 thus the conventional view is that liner conferences act as effective cartels if this view is correct then the cartels should become more effective as they face less competition from outsiders that have refrained from joining the cartel we test this hypothesis by examining how liner conferences behave as their competitive position changes ocean shipping has a truly unique regulatory structure reflecting fears about destructive competition and excess capacity that have existed since the late 1800s at that time joint price setting behavior among ocean carriers became a common practice antitrust immunity for joint pricing agreements has been formally provided by u s legislation since 1916 policymakers granted that immunity in exchange for active regulatory supervision 3 under the current regulatory structure defined in the shipping act of 1984 each route contains a conference that consists of all carriers choosing to participate in an explicit joint pricing agreement which is free from antitrust action 4 some carriers typically choose to remain outside the pricing agreement these carriers are known as independent carriers conferences must be open so that any carrier may join or exit a conference with limited notice and without explicit penalties both conferences and independent carriers are required to file their rates with the federal maritime commission fmc an agency of the u s government the fmc is charged with monitoring and enforcing the published rates when the fmc detects secret discounting from published rates by either a conference or independent carrier it punishes those parties involved by assessing fines 5 however conference members are allowed to publicly deviate from the conference rate by publishing their own freight rate on a particular transaction after notifying the conference of their intention to do so with few exceptions to be discussed later conferences prohibit their members from independently entering into contractual arrangements with shippers although the ocean shipping industry s regulatory structure appears conducive to collusion other aspects of the industry are not hospitable to anticompetitive behavior first the absence of statutory restrictions on entry implies that carriers are free to transfer ships from one route to another or to enter the industry de novo secondly many countries subsidize shipbuilding which industry participants claim results in substantial excess capacity lastly the heterogeneity of both carriers and shippers may impede collusive behavior 6 previous empirical studies have argued that liner conferences effectively collude based purely on their finding that freight rates increase as the value of the cargo increases since ocean shipping is now widely containerized i e diverse commodities are shipped in uniform boxes that are handled in a largely uniform manner these value based rate differences are considered evidence of price discrimination by an effective cartel the major flaw in these tests of collusive market power is that they do not account for costs that may be positively related to the product s value such as implied damage liability costs or costs related to the quality of service

european emission trading scheme and competitiveness a case study on the iron and steel industry abstract we quantify the impact of the european emission trading scheme ets on the two dimensions of competitiveness production and profitability for the iron and steel industry among those covered by the scheme this sector is one of the most exposed since it is both highly co 2 intensive and relatively open to international trade we also examine the robustness of these results to various assumptions marginal abatement cost curve trade and demand elasticities as well as pass through rates and updating of allocation rules of which the latter two are scarcely debated we conclude that for this sector competitiveness losses are small we prove this conclusion to be robust hence arguments against tightening the environmental stringency of the ets in phase ii are not justified on grounds of competitiveness loss our systematic sensitivity analysis allows us to identify the important assumptions for each output variable it turns out that pass through rates and updating rules are significant despite being often implicit and least debated in existing analyses

regulation by price adjustment the regulatory price adjustment process originally proposed by vogelsang and finsinger has been shown to be vulnerable to strategic manipulation by the regulated firm this article proposes several modifications to that scheme which improve its performance and broaden its applicability inclusion of a monopoly franchise market and the firm s past prices and earnings in the price adjustment constraints are shown to ensure efficient production by the firm and convergence to ramsey prices regardless of the firm s cost structure

lobbying political competition and local land supply recent evidence from spain abstract we analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition and interpret the findings as indications of the influence wielded by land developer lobbies we use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2 000 spanish municipalities for the period 2003 2007 in spain land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities needing periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans the main policy variable in these plans and the one analyzed here is the amount of land classified for potential development we measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government this variable is however potentially endogenous since not only do votes affect policy but also policy is expected to affect votes to deal with this problem we instrument this variable using the votes at the first national legislative elections following the re establishment of democracy and votes actually obtained regionally at the same type of election the results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development this effect is found to be most marked in suburbs in towns with a high percentage of commuters and homeowners and in municipalities governed by the left

intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty this paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power under uncertainty the unconstrained firm waits longer before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry in the certainty case the imposition of an inter temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution by contrast under uncertainty it cannot even if the price cap is optimally chosen under uncertainty the monopoly firm will generally a under invest and b impose quantity rationing on its customers

forecasting global developments in the basic chemical industry for environmental policy analysis the chemical sector is the largest industrial energy user but detailed analysis of its energy use developments lags behind other energy intensive sectors a cost driven forecasting model for basic chemicals production is developed accounting for regional production costs demand growth and stock turnover the model determines the global production capacity placement implementation of energy efficient best practice technology bpt and global carbon dioxide co2 emissions for the period 2010 2030 subsequently the effects of energy and climate policies on these parameters are quantified about 60 of new basic chemical production capacity is projected to be placed in non oecd regions by 2030 due to low energy prices while global production increases by 80 between 2010 and 2030 the oecd s production capacity share decreases from 40 to 20 and global emissions increase by 50 energy pricing and climate policies are found to reduce 2030 co2 emissions by 5 15 relative to the baseline developments by increasing bpt implementation maximum bpt implementation results in a 25 reduction further emission reductions require measures beyond energy efficient technologies the model is useful to estimate general trends related to basic chemicals production but improved data from the chemical sector is required to expand the analysis to additional technologies and chemicals

lobbying and asymmetric information informational lobbying the use by interest groups of their alleged expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies is often regarded as an important means of influence this paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting on the one hand the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker whilst on the other hand the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to mis report or conceal its private information

optimal price cap regulation the author considers the problem of a regulator who cannot observe the r d expenditures of a firm devoted to reductions in the costs of production it is shown for a finite horizon model that price cap regulation does not only provide stronger incentives for cost reductions than does rate of return regulation but that it is also capable of achieving a higher social welfare level even if the costs of reviewing the current production costs are negligible these conclusions are reinforced in an infinite horizon model copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

network competition ii price discrimination our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing this article relaxes this assumption and allows networks to charge different prices for calls terminating on the subscriber s network and those terminating on a rivals network this creates a price differential between services that are identical for the consumer and generates network externalities despite network interconnection we show that in both the mature and entry phases of the industry the nature of competition is substantially affected by such price discrimination

higher pay worse outcomes the impact of mayoral wages on local government quality in peru abstract in this paper i study how wages earned by local politicians affect local government quality to identify the effects i use caps imposed by the peruvian central government on mayoral wages as an excluded instrument the results show that mayoral wages do not improve government performance in particular there is a negative impact on public investment implementation and on performance goals set by the central government moreover there is no evidence of a positive effect on politician selection municipal bureaucratic capacity and political effort wages do strongly affect the local political landscape increasing political competition and reducing political support for the mayor these changes may help explain the drop in performance as local authorities may face more political obstacles when implementing their policy agenda overall the results show that higher politician wages need not improve local government quality

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

the regulation of multiproduct firms part ii applications to competitive environments and policy analysis abstract this paper extends our companion paper part i laffont and tirole 1990 on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions first it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals with or without market power or other distorted pricing it then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects second it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information

the welfare impacts of discriminatory price tariffs this paper looks at the use of asymmetric tariffs as a regulatory instrument we use a monopolistic market setup with two markets and we introduce price controls in one of the two the purpose of the regulator is to maximise consumer welfare through this price discriminatory practice we consider cases where the welfare of the consumers in the two markets is weighted equally and cases where it is not in some cases we allow for the two markets to be linked through a monopsonistic input market the paper focuses on the welfare implications of this regulatory approach with the firm operating under a profit restriction results suggest that having only one price controlled market is in certain cases a good option from a welfare perspective

the political economy of environmental regulation towards a unifying framework there are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy building on insights from this theoretical work and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation there are two primary contributions of this research the first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy for example there is as yet no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive based mechanisms such as marketable permits and effluent fees the second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy this framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups

nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation abstract this paper analyzes profit maximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to price cap regulation two forms of regulatory constraint are considered i a cap on the firm s average revenue and ii a constraint that the firm must continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at the uniform price optimal nonlinear price schedules in these regimes are shown to have simple characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs that an unregulated monopolist would charge of the regulatory regimes the firm prefers the average revenue constraint to the option constraint and likes uniform pricing least consumers in aggregate prefer the option regime to uniform pricing and like the average revenue constraint least but there are also distributional effects between consumers although the optional tariff regime pareto dominates uniform pricing it is ambiguous whether welfare is higher under uniform pricing or under the average revenue regime an example is used to illustrate the nature of the ambiguity

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

growth and energy nexus in europe revisited evidence from a fixed effects political economy model this is an empirical study on the causal relationship between economic growth and energy for 26 european countries in a multivariate panel framework over the period 1975 2009 using a two way fixed effects model and including greenhouse gas emissions capital fossil energy consumption herfindahl index political competition and number of years the government chief executive stays in office political stability as independent variables in the model empirical results confirm bidirectional causality between growth and political stability capital and political stability capital and fossil energy consumption whether political stability favors the implementation of growth or leads to corruption demands further research

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

standard incentive regulation hinders the integration of renewable energy generation the connection and distribution of growing decentralized electricity generation from renewable energy sources res e is leading tomassive investment needs besides investing in additional conventional assets e g cables grid operators can also invest in innovative smart solutions like local storage capacities or voltage regulation appliances which may be a more suitable way of integrating res e this paper investigates the influence of incentive regulation on the investment decision of grid operators to integrate res e we describe the technical and regulatory background explain the advantages of smart solutions and present an approach for comparing investment scenarios as an example we calculate the profitability of investments in a case study of the german electricity market we apply data envelopment analysis dea and stochastic frontier analysis sfa to show the influence of the investment alternatives on grid operator efficiency objectives we demonstrate that under current standard incentive regulation the grid operators gain profitability by avoiding investments and if they are forced to invest by not implementing smart solutions the results highlight the need to consider innovation in the regulation design further research should investigate specific instruments that can be used to account for innovation our brief discussion of such instruments provides a starting point

to what extent are eu steel companies susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy abstract in recognition of their competitive vulnerability a set of special rules have been devised for managing sectors such as iron and steel within the eu ets under these rules the eu steel sector has received free allocations in excess of their compliance needs to now and will continue to receive some free allowances up to 2020 however perceptions of the sector s competitive vulnerability have been largely based on inherently hypothetical analyses which rely heavily on counterfactual scenarios and abatement cost estimates often provided by firms themselves this paper explores how the three largest steel firms in the eu acerlormittal corus and thyssenkrupp have sought to strategically exaggerate their vulnerability to carbon pricing to the effect of an inefficient policy outcome we conduct a qualitative assessment of two of the key narratives underpinning the competitive vulnerability argument of eu steel companies lack of abatement opportunities and inability to pass through cost increases based on interviews case studies and publicly available data we find that these arguments provide only partial and weak justifications for competitive loss and preferential treatment under the eu ets the strategy however remains successful due to information asymmetry and the peculiar political economy of eu climate regulation

the economic consequences of political donation limits the economic consequences of limits on political donations depend on the degree of political competition donors who are ideologically aligned with candidates decide how much to contribute to their own candidate they may benefit from rent seeking by their own candidate but dislike rent seeking by the opposition increased rent seeking by politicians thus generates campaign contributions for themselves but also mobilizes donations to the opposing candidate potentially to a greater extent this latter effect acts as a deterrent to rent seeking when contributions finance electoral campaigns and positively affect election chances when political competition is low incumbent donors outnumber opposition donors and limits reduce rent seeking when political competition is high donors are equalized and laissez faire reduces rent seeking consistent with these hypotheses data from the us states suggest that limits are associated with better policies and stronger growth performance at low levels of political competition whilst laissez faire is preferred when political competition is high

political competition and economic growth a test of two tales abstract we empirically compare the thesis of acemoglu and robinson 2006 that the impact of political competition on economic growth is non monotonic with that of besley et al 2010 that it is monotonically increasing using data on 119 economies in the period 1980 2010 the results are in accord with acemoglu and robinson 2006

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

political competition with campaign contributions and informative advertising this paper presents a theory of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising policy motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like minded candidates contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates ideologies voters update their beliefs rationally given the information they have received the paper uses the theory to analyze the welfare economics of contribution limits such limits are shown to redistribute welfare from ordinary citizens to members of interest groups jel d72 h40

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

the access pricing problem a synthesis the baumol willig efficient component pricing rule states that it is efficient to set the price of access to an essential facility equal to the direct cost of access plus the opportunity cost to the integrated access provider the authors analyze the relevant notion of opportunity cost under various assumptions about demand and supply conditions including product differentiation bypass and substitution possibilities which all reduce opportunity cost compared to the benchmark case they show that the ramsey approach to access pricing developed by j j laffont and j tirole 1994 is closely related to the efficient component pricing rule provided opportunity cost is correctly interpreted

government size and growth a survey and interpretation of the evidence the literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings this conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied an alternative approach of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to gdp and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time reveals a more consistent picture the most recent studies find a significant negative correlation an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0 5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate we discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation against this background we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth one hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market friendly policies in other areas both explanations are supported by ongoing research

command and control revisited environmental compliance and technological change in swedish industry 1970 1990 this paper addresses the issue of environmental policy instrument choice for achieving deep emission reductions in the industrial sector specifically it provides a a theoretical and empirical

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

low powered vs high powered incentives evidence from german electricity networks abstract we propose a difference in differences approach to estimating the impact of incentives on cost reduction in the context of german electricity networks when subject to a lower powered regulation mechanism relatively more efficient operators pile up more costs in the year used to determine future prices this pattern is consistent with the idea that incentives matter higher powered incentives lead to cost reduction the results are also consistent with an equilibrium where more efficient firms pool with less efficient ones under the threat of ratcheting

optimal regulation of energy network expansion when costs are stochastic abstract we analyze optimal regulation of the gradual investments in energy networks necessary to accommodate the energy transition we focus on a real option problem where costs of new network technology are stochastic and not observable to the regulator we solve for the regulatory scheme that optimally balances timely investments with rent extraction in this dynamic agency context we then apply this methodology to a situation in which investment can be either in traditional network technology with observable costs or using an innovative network technology for which there is asymmetric information on costs the optimal choice trades off the potential benefits of cheaper expansion with the costs of overcoming information frictions