revealing space in spatial externalities edge effect externalities and spatial incentives abstract this paper analyzes the spatial incentives created by distance dependent negative spatial externalities titled edge effect externalities it illustrates standard externality results in a spatial context and derives several new results while the externality creates an incentive for a recipient to distance himself from the externality generating land use this distance is too small from a social standpoint rationalizing buffer zones imposed by regulatory authorities further the market rental rate of land for the externality recipient is higher than socially optimal resulting in a potential barrier to entry for the impacted land use finally although the recipient understands and can geographically avoid externality damage standard market failure occurs results are demonstrated using graphical and land rent interpretations of familiar aspatial general equilibrium conditions the paper thus strives to provide a more thorough exposition of the spatial impacts of this class of externalities than provided elsewhere in the literature

price dumping in intermediate good markets abstract we analyze price dumping and anti dumping duties in the context of a model with a vertical industry structure dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country specific final good production costs the price differential or dumping margin is shown to increase as the productivity difference increases an anti dumping duty designed to reduce the equilibrium price differential has two effects on welfare a welfare loss from reduced final good production and a contrasting gain achieved by producing the lower output level more efficiently

trade and protection in vertically related markets abstract we consider home country tariff and subsidy policies in a setting where a home firm is partially dependent on a foreign vertically integrated firm for supplies of a key input the firms are cournot competitors in the home market for the final product we show that a tariff on final product imports may cause the foreign vertically integrated firm to reduce the price charged for the input under circumstances where a simple monopoly supplier of the input would increase its price supply conditions for the input significantly affect whether imports of the input should be taxed or subsidized

why do suppliers charge larger buyers lower prices the phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms relative to smaller buyer firms lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale supplier competition for larger buyers and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers this paper provides an alternative explanation and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market this result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

are judges leading economic theory sunk costs the threat of entry and the competitive process in this paper we attempt to bring theoretical form to a particular entry argument that has found favor in the courts we suggest that sunk costs may not be a major impediment to entry when a group of customers can commit to an entry enhancing strategy buyers have strong incentives to adopt such strategies because they benefit directly from the resulting lower prices the simplest example involves a large buyer that is able to guarantee an entrant a market for its product long term contracts or even informal purchase commitments backed by customer reputation may also allow the entrant to obtain a guarantee of sufficient business to make the entry profitable once entry is thought likely to occur the existing competitors may be unwilling to attempt a price increase of any magnitude thus the threat of entry can maintain competitive prices even in the presence of sunk costs in section ii we motivate the analysis by discussing the current controversy over the role entry conditions play in an antitrust merger review then we discuss the necessary assumptions for a model of how the threat of entry can deter any price increase in the presence of sunk costs we note that these conditions are different from those commonly used in the economic literature

price discrimination and investment incentives abstract we examine a model of a monopolist selling to two segments of consumers with different preferences for quality we show that if the firm is unable to price discriminate between the segments then there is less investment in quality we find that both consumer segments and society overall may suffer if the firm is unable to price discriminate we extend the model to duopoly competition and find that our results still hold

production externalities and urban configuration abstract we formally explore jacobs idea that uncompensated knowledge spillovers are crucial for agglomeration by modeling location dependent interfirm production externalities in a general equilibrium linear city framework good and factor allocation firms and households locational choice and wages and land rents are all endogenously determined the unique equilibrium urban configuration may be concentrated with monocentric firm locations dispersed with completely mixed firm household locations or a combination depending on the population of firms transportation cost and firm interaction parameters due to distance dependent production externalities firms will be clustered together in any equilibrium thus ruling out the possibility of any multicentric urban configuration journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 r12

hospital systems and bargaining power evidence from out of market acquisitions competition analyses generally restrict their attention to how mergers alter concentration in the relevant consumer market studying hospital competition by focusing on the local patient market may be misleading however as multi market hospital systems often play an important role in the price negotiations of their members with managed care organizations we focus on out of market hospital mergers to investigate the cross market effects of system membership on member hospital reimbursement rates based on acquisitions occurring across the united states during 2000 2008 we find that hospitals exhibit significant increases of around 14 in their net reimbursement rates after becoming affiliated with an out of market system compared to independent stand alone hospitals we find no evidence that the price effect results from changes in patient case mix the cost of providing care generally or hospital quality the findings reveal that systems can impact the market power of hospitals in ways that have not been considered in recent antitrust analysis

insurer hospital bargaining negotiated discounts in post deregulation connecticut this paper uses unique data from the state of connecticut to examine discounting patterns in the state s hospital industry for the years following deregulation 1995 1998 the data provide a rare opportunity to study payer level differences in negotiated discounts for hospital services in addition to presenting descriptive evidence on how discounts vary across payers payer types and hospital types this study uses matched revenue data to analyze the economic determinants of discount magnitudes payer size appears to affect bargaining power but the economic significance of the effect is small the data exhibit patterns consistent with a bargaining explanation in which discount magnitudes depend critically on payers abilities to channel patients to hospitals with which favorable discounts have been negotiated

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in the author examines third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input the author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices in other cases discrimination raises some prices and lowers others the author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration copyright 1987 by american economic association

non insurance markets loss size manipulation and competition experimental evidence the common view that buyer power of insurers may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in extracting price concessions however in markets where the buyer is an insurer the interests of insurers and consumers to reduce prices may be importantly misaligned the positive dependence between loss size and the insurer s expected profits limits the insurer s incentives to reign in loss sizes in markets with small initial loss sizes insurers may try to raise these in order to create demand for insurance after having defined insurance and non insurance markets based on the initial loss size we develop theory to show that insurers with buyer power have incentives to create insurance markets insurer competition will push their profits to zero but markets do not return to the initial non insurance state this constitutes a welfare loss we design experimental insurance markets to test our theory and find support monopolistic insurer subjects in non insurance markets increase loss sizes to establish insurance markets insurer competition eliminates profits but not the loss size to uninsured consumers this provides an additional reason to be careful in granting insurers buyer power jel classification c92 d81 g22 i11 l13

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

payoff uncertainty bargaining power and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations this article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs the possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference the buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers this sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus moreover the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by committing to a minimum purchase price or outsourcing the first and second mover advantages for the sellers are also identified

location choice by households and polluting firms an evolutionary approach this paper examines several policy regimes to deal with the problem of households suffering from environmental damage by firms in the same region we employ an evolutionary framework to analyze migration movements in the course of time since firms and households will not relocate immediately in response to payoff differentials we show that taxation gives firms and households an incentive to stay away from each other laissez faire compensation only gives households firms an incentive to stay away from firms households we find that taxation creates the right incentives to reach a local welfare maximum however when there are multiple local maxima circumstances may arise under which compensation leads to a better outcome than taxation c 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

productivity gains from geographic concentration of human capital evidence from the cities abstract based on recent theoretical developments the argument is made that the average level of human capital is a local public good cities with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents after conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings this prediction is supported by data for standard metropolitan statistical areas smsas in the united states where the smsa average levels of formal education and work experience are used as proxies for the average level of human capital the alternative explanations of omitted smsa variables and self selection are evaluated an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity is computed

spatial competition with a land market hotelling and von thunen unified we introduce into the standard spatial competition model the consumption of land by households and study the spatial competition under the influence of a land market in contrast to the standard assumption of a fixed given distribution of households we introduce the possibility of households relocation in reaction to firms location decisions thus the spatial distribution of households is treated as endogenous and a land market is introduced on which households compete for land use households consume simultaneously land and firms output accordingly the demand of each household becomes in turn endogenous as it depends on the income left after the land rent is paid not surprisingly the results obtained within this more general framework prove to be very different from the standard results for example in the 2 and 3 firm cases the optimal configuration of firms is a nash equilibrium when transport costs are high enough or the amount of vacant land is large enough the existence property is restored in the 3 firm case when the transport costs are high enough the introduction of vacant land causes a discontinuous change in the set of equilibrium configurations

a new product growth for model consumer durables this article originally appeared in management science january 1969 volume 15 number 5 pp 215 227 published by the institute of management sciences a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables the basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior the model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data a long range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets

collusion exclusion and inclusion in random order bargaining this paper examines the profitability of three types of integration in a cooperative game solved by a random order value e g the shapley value collusion between players i and j is a contract merging their resources in the hands of one of them say i this contract can be represented as a combination of exclusion which lets i exclude j s resource but not use it himself and inclusion which lets i use j s resource but not exclude j from it this representation yields a third difference condition on the characteristic function that determines the profitability of collusion generalizing existing results for specific games namely collusion is profitable unprofitable when the complementarity of the colluding players is reduced increased by other players

discriminatory nonlinear pricing fixed costs and welfare in intermediate goods markets abstract we investigate the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in input markets when nonlinear wholesale tariffs are feasible after accepting their respective wholesale contracts two downstream firms have to pay a fixed cost in order to become active in the downstream market if the downstream firm with lower marginal cost has significantly higher fixed cost uniform pricing leads to lower marginal wholesale prices for all downstream firms and thus higher quantities of the final product being produced this in turn implies that banning price discrimination improves welfare and consumer surplus if the downstream firm with lower marginal cost has only weakly higher or even lower fixed cost banning price discrimination deteriorates welfare and consumer surplus

localized competition and the aggregation of plant level increasing returns blast furnaces 1929 1935 a recent empirical literature has shaken economists confidence in the value of aggregate industry level data to illuminate production relationships but the statistical finding you cannot aggregate however well documented is not an economic explanation plant level relationships do aggregate in depression era blast furnace operations despite the presence of very substantial interplant heterogeneity the most common economic cause of nonaggregability the economic explanation of this lies in poor short run substitutability of one plant s output for another s substitutability determines the importance of composition effects in understanding aggregate time series constrains the potential cleansing effects of recessions and therefore influences industry evolution quite broadly

nash in nash tariff bargaining abstract we provide an equilibrium analysis of the efficiency properties of simultaneous bilateral tariff negotiations in a three country model of international trade we consider the setting in which discriminatory tariffs are allowed and we utilize the nash in nash solution concept of horn and wolinsky 1988 we allow for a general family of political economic country welfare functions and assess efficiency relative to these welfare functions we establish a sense in which the resulting tariffs are inefficient and too low so that excessive liberalization occurs from the perspective of the three countries

spatial arrangements of externality generating and receiving activities many cases of externalities in agricultural production such as pesticide drift cross pollination and offensive odors are attributable to the incompatibility of neighboring land uses this paper offers an examination of when an efficient activity arrangement is compatible with free market incentives also free market and socially efficient activity arrangements are characterized in terms of spatial concentration of the externality generating uses

cities under stress this paper studies the effect of terrorist attacks on the internal structure of cities we develop an urban framework with capital structures suitable for the study of this question and analyze the long and short term implications of this type of events in the long run the analysis shows that a terrorist attack will affect urban structure only modestly relative to the potentially large decrease in the level of economic activity in the city land rents will not decline at all locations in the short run agglomeration forces will amplify the effect of the original destruction and will reduce urban economic activity temporarily

a dynamic theory of countervailing power in this article i develop a model of an infinitely repeated procurement auction with one buyer and several sellers the buyer can accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders which similar to a boom in demand forces the sellers to collude on a low price to prevent undercutting if the buyer s cost of shifiing its consumption over time is low enough then the extent of collusion is bounded away from the joint profit maximizing level even for discount factors approaching one the model is extended to allow for multiple buyers large buyers are shown to obtain lower prices from the sellers buyer mergers increase pro t for all buyers not just the merging pair at the expense of the sellers in contrast buyer growth through addition harms buyers that do not grow and benefits sellers

the externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution abstract this paper deals with implementing the efficient allocation of transboundary and persistent pollution in particular we adapt varian s compensation mechanism varian a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed amer econ rev 85 1994 1278 1293 to cover situations in which pollutants extend to neighboring regions and their effects persist over time the main contribution of this paper is the design of a mechanism that implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the efficient pollution levels in this context

group purchasing nonlinear tariffs and oligopoly abstract loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting aggregate purchase or market share targets these discounts are widespread and are often the impetus for consumers to form buying groups or group purchase organizations gpos this paper models the competitive effects of the introduction of a gpo into a market within which the preferences of the gpo s members are horizontally differentiated while nonlinear tariffs are an effective way for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus when two suppliers compete using such schedules the results are far more competitive in comparison to simple bertrand nash competition with linear tariffs this result holds when the product of each of the suppliers is attractive to a substantial portion of consumers in our model the nonlinear schedule puts all customers in play to a degree that contrasts sharply with the competition at the margin characteristic of constant per unit prices moreover competing in nonlinear tariffs removes allocative inefficiency that can result from single price competition

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal policies in cities with congestion and agglomeration externalities congestion tolls labor subsidies and place based strategies abstract this paper develops a spatial general equilibrium model that accommodates both congestion and agglomeration externalities while firms and households land use decisions are endogenous across continuous space focusing on the interaction between externalities and land use patterns we examine the efficiencies of first best policies and second best pricing and place based strategies using numerical simulations a first best policy must combine both pigouvian congestion tolling pct and pigouvian labor subsidies pls instruments or design an optimal toll or subsidy internalizing agglomeration externalities or congestion externalities we also examine second best pricing policies if only one instrument is adopted congestion pricing policies alone e g a partial pct or a flat rate toll can improve social welfare only in heavy congestion cities and their welfare gains may be insignificant e g below 10 of the welfare improvement achieved by first best policies in contrast second best labor subsidy policies alone are a more effective alternative to first best policies as to place based policies the firm cluster zoning fcz regulation is more efficient than the urban growth boundary ugb policy ugbs only have small effects on the agglomeration economy but could worsen land market distortions via residential rent escalation effects these findings suggest that it is important to internalize business land use decisions and relax monocentricity assumptions in order to appreciate the interplay of both urban externalities since spatial adaptations to policy interventions can distort system efficiencies

predicting advertising pulsing policies in an oligopoly a model and empirical test given that firms pulse in advertising should firms pulse in or out of phase it is shown that out of phase maximizes the oligopoly profits and is also the markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game the basic intuition for this result comes from the following fact it is more profitable to increase consideration when the competitor s consideration is lower evidence from several product categories seems to support this theoretical result

information sharing in union firm relationships large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions when they do an ex ante agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade however if the firm refuses to share information the union may shade down its wage demand to increase the probability of acceptance this reduction in the wage can increase the joint surplus of the agents and increase social welfare as a result there are some circumstances in which bargaining with incomplete information can be better for the agents and society than bargaining with complete information many firms and their input suppliers form long term relationships in which they periodically negotiate their terms of trade as has long been recognized the presence of private information can cause negotiations to break down on occasion resulting in an inefficient disruption of production for example the united auto workers with superior knowledge of its strike fund and or its member s outside options may call for a strike against general motors if the firm is unwilling to meet its wage demands and the firm s unwillingness to concede may be due to its superior knowledge of demand productivity and or its stock of inventories theoretically such disruptions could be avoided if the agents would simply agree to reveal their private information before the negotiations begin 2 whether or not this will occur is unclear however since some agents may be unwilling to enter into such an agreement if it sufficiently weakened their bargaining position the literatures on noncooperative bargaining and mechanism design have already dealt with many of the issues that arise in this environment in the bargaining literature it is generally assumed that the agents already possess the private information and then the implications of different bargaining processes are examined see ausubel et al 2002 for a survey in the mechanism design literature one of the questions addressed is whether the agents can find a way to commit to ex

spreading versus concentrating damages environmental policy in the presence of nonconvexities abstract this paper examines the role of nonconvexities in externality control from a policy perspective nonconvexities can arise from a number of sources and can significantly alter the optimal solution to an externality problem for instance it may be socially desirable to concentrate externality damages in one area and prohibit them in another rather than spread the effects of the externality across a number of sites if this solution is optimal a pollution tax will not achieve the social optimum but a system of marketable permits will

mergers when prices are negotiated evidence from the hospital industry in recent years many hospitals have merged in part to gain bargaining leverage with managed care organizations mcos we investigate the price impact of hospital mergers by formulating and estimating an equilibrium bargaining model between hospital systems and managed care health insurers over prices for inpatient services we estimate the parameters of the model using claims and discharge data from northern virginia in 2006 inova health system proposed to acquire prince william hospital we nd that this merger would have raised prices signicantly and that the remedy of separate bargaining imposed by the ftc in a separate hospital case would have resulted in a larger price increase

buyers miscoordination entry and downstream competition this article shows that buyers coordination failures might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent firm and a more efficient potential entrant if there were a single buyer or if all buyers formed a central purchasing agency coordination failures would be avoided and efficient entry would always occur more generally exclusion is less likely the lower the number of buyers for any given number of buyers exclusion is less likely the more fiercely buyers compete in the downstream market first intense competition may prevent miscoordination equilibria from arising second in cases where miscoordination equilibria still exist it lowers the maximum price that the incumbent can sustain at such exclusionary equilibria buyers have experienced increased concentration in many sectors in particular grocery retailing 1 2 this trend has triggered a wide debate on the effects of buyer power 3 we contribute to this debate by studying how concentration and competition among buyers affect the possibility of entry by a new upstream supplier in an industry characterised by scale economies in our model buyers fragmentation may lead to a situation where a new upstream firm does not manage to enter a market although endowed with lower marginal costs than an incumbent firm when several buyers decide independently from which supplier to purchase miscoordination equilibria may arise where all buyers buy from the incumbent even if the entrant sets a lower price if all buyers address the incumbent none of them has an incentive to deviate that is to switch to the entrant anticipating that a single order would not allow the

prices profits and pass through of costs along a supermarket supply chain bargaining and competition in this paper we present an empirical study of a supermarket supply chain to understand the determinants of prices and profits enjoyed by farmers processors and supermarkets we study the liquid milk market which has seen much controversy about both the distribution of rents and the mechanisms firms have used to influence the distribution we discuss insights from a series of interviews we conducted with executives and farmer representatives our interviews suggest a model in which the farmer s price is determined mainly by the sterling value of international commodity prices the retail price is determined by marginal costs and the intensity of supermarket competition and the wholesale price is determined in private bilateral negotiations between retailers and processors which are characterized by well informed agents and a high level of efficiency we present a simple theoretical model that captures these features and bring it to data on supply chain prices for the period 1994 2014 we find that over this period there has been great variation in the intensity of retail price competition and in the sterling value of international commodity markets which together result in large changes both to the overall surplus in the supply chain and to its distribution between farmers and the other firms after farmers have been paid the sterling value of international commodity prices the profit that remains to be split between processors and retailers mostly goes to supermarkets because of competition between processors

managed care s price bargaining with hospitals research has shown that managed care mc slowed the rate of growth in health care spending in the 1990s primarily via lower unit prices paid however the mechanism of mc s price bargaining has not been well studied this article uses a unique panel dataset with actual hospital prices in massachusetts between 1994 and 2000 to examine the sources of mc s bargaining power i find two significant determinants of price discounts first plans with large memberships are able to extract volume discounts across hospitals second health plans that are more successful at channeling patients can extract greater discounts patient channeling can add to the volume discount that plans negotiate

bilateral oligopoly the efficiency of intermediate goods markets abstract we show that intermediate goods markets may be efficient despite the presence of commonly accepted signs of market failure such as high concentration both among sellers and buyers sparse trading networks price dispersion and externalities the results are derived in an extensive form model of bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers and multiple sellers and with externalities between the negotiations we also characterize the structure of the endogenous trading network i e how firms choose trading partners prices are dispersed and depend on both the concentration of capital and the concentration of sales consistent with some stylized facts on buyer power

the production of eco labels eco labeling is a market based technique for conveying information about consumers demands for environmental protection most criticisms of eco labeling have concentrated on demand side issues the potential for firms or countries to use eco labels to manipulate market power and the difficulty of creating credible labels in this paper we argue that fundamental problems also arise on the production side specifically we argue that both increasing returns to scale and complexities in production imply that it will be possible to market only a small percentage of environmental attributes through the use of eco labels we present evidence for our hypotheses from a detailed survey of 100 randomly selected consumer products

bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger the paper presents a model of duopoly in which firms acquire inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with suppliers it combines a bargaining model with a duopoly model to examine how input pri

the loss leader is a turkey targeted discounts from multi product competitors abstract i show that multi product firms can compete for their more profitable customers by setting lower margins on goods that are purchased primarily by them effectively offering them discounts without offering these discounts to less profitable customers this suggests a theory of multi product pricing in which a good s profit margin is inversely related to the profitability of the customers who purchase it this theory i provides one explanation for firms offering lower prices to larger customers and ii suggests that loss leader pricing may allow firms to compete more vigorously for more profitable customers this can explain why stores sell turkeys as loss leaders at thanksgiving but may not discount flowers on mother s day or candy on valentines day

alonso s discrete population model of land use efficient allocations and competitive equilibria in his 1964 book w alonso proposed several concepts of land use equilibrium in terms of discrete population however the so called new urban economics has been concerned exclusively with continuous population models it is the authors belief that in order to develop logical foundations for continuous population models it would be useful to go back to the original models of alonso in this paper they focus on the additive land price model of alonso and examine its solution characteristics in particular the authors demonstrate the existence and pareto efficiency of equilibria and the supportability of efficient allocations through additive land price systems copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

bargining bundling and clout the portfolio effects of horizontal mergers we examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate goods market served by a downstream monopolist if the merged firm can bundle transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger absent cost efficiencies consumer and total welfare do not change if the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger absent cost efficiencies welfare typically falls we evaluate the profit effects of mergers for the case of two part tariff contracts rival firms gain lose from mergers that raise lower downstream prices contrary to conventional wisdom a merger that harms the retailer may increase welfare

the welfare effects of bundling in multichannel television markets we measure how the bundling of television channels affects short run welfare we estimate an industry model of viewership demand pricing bundling and input market bargaining using data on ratings purchases prices bundles and input costs we conduct simulations of a la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers we estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103 0 percent under a la carte these higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated 5 4 to 0 2 percent and 1 7 to 6 0 percent respectively jel d12 l11 l51 l82 m31

the labour input response to permanent changes in output an errors in variables analysis based on panel data using panel data for norwegian manufacturing we revisit the increasing returns to scale puzzle for labour inputs we consider the response of the input of white collar workers blue collar workers and blue collar worker hours to permanent changes in output permanent and temporary changes in output are treated as latent variables we compare ols iv and gmm estimates of the response elasticities and conclude that the distinction between permanent and temporary changes is essential our gmm estimates suggest that the increasing returns to scale puzzle remains for all measures of the labour input also when we consider their response to permanent changes in output for materials the output response indicates approximately constant returns to scale this suggests non homotheticity of the production technology jel classification c23 j23

price discrimination and sequential contracting in monopolistic input markets abstract this paper examines the welfare implication of banning price discrimination in the intermediate goods market in which a monopolistic supplier contracts with asymmetric downstream retailers we demonstrate that the supplier has a strong incentive to manipulate the interdependent demand structure through sequential contracting whether price discrimination is banned or not and allowing price discrimination improves social welfare and consumer surplus when sequential contracting is implemented by the supplier

landscape preferences and patterns of residential development abstract i analyze a model of residential location choice where people derive utility from their proximity to open space when people have such landscape preferences then 1 equilibrium residential development is mixed with undeveloped land 2 equilibrium land price gradients depend sensitively on how land markets are organized are not generally monotonic and may or may not reflect the value of open space and 3 dynamic equilibria generally have the property that more remote areas are developed before more central areas finally when compared to optimal development equilibrium development houses too many residents too close together and remote areas are developed too soon these results imply that equilibrium development may not be sprawling enough and that policies to encourage infill development are not welfare improving

credit market frictions and the allocation of resources over the business cycle abstract in a seminal paper davis and haltiwanger 1990 demonstrated that recessions are associated with increased job reallocation the conventional view has interpreted this as evidence of cleansing less productive jobs are destroyed in recessions and resources are reallocated to more productive uses this paper argues instead that in the presence of credit market frictions reallocation might go the other way directing resources from more efficient to less efficient uses this will occur if more efficient production arrangements are also more vulnerable to credit constraints i show that this pattern arises endogenously in an equilibrium model and offer some evidence that firms with higher output per worker tend to borrow more suggesting they are more vulnerable to credit constrains

buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations we study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides in case of a bilateral disagreement flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment a larger buyer pays a higher per unit price when buyers bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low and a lower price otherwise an analogous result holds for sellers these predictions and the implications of different technologies are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power

customer coalitions monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence abstract this paper analyzes the interplay between a profit maximizing monopolist and a set of consumers who are able to form coalitions that bargain with the monopolist and or integrate into production we show that the monopolist will deter the formation of these countervailing coalitions through strategic selection of generic limit price offers to each consumer these limit prices are derived as subgame perfect equilibria in two alternative models of customer monopoly interplay in both models price discrimination emerges in environments wherein it has previously been considered unprofitable welfare analysis of the equilibria demonstrates the procompetitive effects of potential customer coalitions and generally provides an efficiency based motivation for a government ban on price discrimination

votes or money theory and evidence from the us congress abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group s campaign contributions to politicians we uncover a robust hump shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator this pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician thereby increasing contributions but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds thereby decreasing contributions the model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and pac donations and local employment by sector this procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

buyer power from joint listing decision we consider a model of vertically related markets in which an upstream firm faces a competitive fringe of less efficient suppliers and negotiates with customers that compete in a downstream market we allow downstream firms to form a buyer group which selects suppliers on behalf of its members we show that transforming individual listing decisions into a joint listing decision makes delisting less harmful for a group member which in turn enhances the group members bargaining position at the expense of the upstream firm we also discuss the implication for upstream investment incentives

environmental cleanliness as a public good welfare and policy implications of nonconvex preferences abstract this paper explores the implications of a form of nonconvexity in individual preferences over the public good cleanliness the implications of this nonconvexity on equilibrium outcomes welfare analysis the process of development and optimal government policy are examined the nonconvexity can imply a role for government in providing a commitment to a clean environment even if the government has a cost disadvantage in cleaning compared with individuals by providing a credible commitment to a clean environment the government can induce private individuals to undertake optimal levels of cleaning on their own

trade spatial separation and the environment we develop a simple two sector dynamic model to show how pollution can provide a motive for trade by spatially separating incompatible industries we assume that the production of smokestack manufactures generates pollution which lowers the prod uctivity of an environmentally sensitive sector farming two identical unregulated countries will gain from trade if the share of world income spent on smokestack goods is high in contrast when the share of world income spent on the dirty good is low trade can usher in a negatively reinforcing process of environmental degradation and real income loss for the exporter of smokestack goods 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the role of buying consortia among smes in the electricity market in italy we model the electricity market in italy focusing on the impact of buying consortia among smes on the behaviour of the large electricity producers and sellers we show that consortia may in certain circumstances produce a pro competitive result i e they may induce a reduction of prices not only for consortia members but also for firms not in the consortia

social welfare and income inequality in a system of cities abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of a system of core periphery cities to examine the main determinants of intra and inter regional income disparities the economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous unskilled and heterogeneous skilled workers unskilled workers whose wages are determined competitively specialize in food production in local cities skilled workers whose wages are determined according to a nash bargain manufacture a high tech commodity in the metropolis we establish conditions under which this core periphery equilibrium spatial configuration emerges we show that both intra and inter regional income disparities are present the determinants of each type of disparity and the social welfare implications are fully investigated our results suggest that public policy programs that improve income equality may not be necessarily welfare enhancing

countervailing power and dynamic efficiency this paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency we consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier s incentives to invest in lower marginal cost we challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers incentives instead we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier more on his toes and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering in terms of both price and quality relative to buyers alternative options

input price discrimination with downstream cournot competitors abstract this paper addresses third degree price discrimination in input markets i decompose the upstream monopolist s profit into two parts one that depends on average input prices and one that depends on their distribution this decomposition is useful in comparing the welfare properties of price discrimination against uniform pricing under reasonable assumptions input price discrimination negatively affects both consumer surplus and total welfare

raising rivals cost through buyer power we re examine the view that a ban on price discrimination in input markets is particularly desirable in the presence of buyer power this argument crucially depends on an inverse relationship between downstream firms profits and the uniform input price assuming different input efficiencies among downstream firms we derive a necessary and sufficient condition such that a higher input price benefits a subset of relatively efficient downstream firms in such instances consumers may be better off if discriminatory pricing is feasible

vertical bargaining and retail competition what drives countervailing power this article investigates the effects of changes in market concentration on the equilibrium prices in a supply chain results are derived from a theoretical model of bilateral bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition whether countervailing buyer power arises in the form of lower input prices following greater concentration downstream depends on the pass through rate of input prices to retail prices countervailing buyer power generally does not translate into lower retail prices because of heightened market power at the retail level

health insurance as a two part pricing contract monopolies appear throughout health care we show that health insurance operates like a conventional two part pricing contract that allows monopolists to extract profits without inefficiently constraining quantity when insurers are free to offer a range of insurance contracts to different consumer types health insurance markets perfectly eliminate deadweight losses from upstream health care monopolies frictions limiting the sorting of different consumer types into different insurance contracts restore some of these upstream monopoly losses which manifest as higher rates of uninsurance rather than as restrictions in quantity utilized by insured consumers empirical analysis of pharmaceutical patent expiration supports the prediction that heavily insured markets experience little or no efficiency loss under monopoly while less insured markets exhibit behavior more consistent with the standard theory of monopoly

higher prices for larger quantities nonmonotonic price quantity relations in b2b markets we study a microprocessor company selling short life cycle products to a set of buyers that includes large consumer electronic goods manufacturers the seller has a limited capacity for each product and negotiates with each buyer for the price our analysis of their sales data reveals that larger purchases do not always result in bigger discounts instead the discount curve is like an n while existing theories cannot explain this nonmonotonic pattern we develop an analytical model and show that the nonmonotonicity is rooted in how sellers value capacity when negotiating with a buyer large buyers accelerate the selling process and small buyers are helpful in consuming the residual capacity however satisfying midsized buyers may be costly because supplying these buyers can make it difficult to utilize the remaining capacity which is often too much for small buyers but not enough for large buyers we briefly discuss the implications for capacity rationing and posted pricing as well as potential appl

nash in nash bargaining a microfoundation for applied work a nash equilibrium in nash bargains has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly this paper proposes a non cooperative foundation for nash in nash bargaining that extends the rubinstein 1982 model to multiple upstream and downstream rms assuming there exists gains from trade for each rm pair we prove that there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement and negotiated prices that correspond to rubinstein prices if and only if the marginal contribution of a set of agreements is weakly greater than the sum of the agreements marginal contributions we provide stronger conditions under which equilibrium prices are unique

are supermarkets squeezing small suppliers evidence from negotiated wholesale prices we thank gregory s crawford for his encouragement and insightful comments we also thank victor aguirregabiria ozlem bedre meghan busse jean pierre dub e david genesove margaret kyle rafael moner colonques ariel pakes michelle sovinsky michael waterson ali yurukoglu and the seminar participants at the nber io winter meetings 2012 cepr jie conference on applied io 2012 hebrew university toulouse school of economics universidad diego portales universidad de chile the university of warwick and university of zurich noton acknowledges financial support from the institute for research in market imperfections and public policy icm is130002 ministerio de economia an earlier version of this article circulated under the title revealing bargaining power through actual wholesale prices

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

effects of wholesaler concentration on retailers by format evidence from japanese brand level price data using unique brand level wholesale price data this article examines how purchase prices of commodities for retailers are influenced by wholesale concentration compared with studies focusing on retail prices little empirical work has measured the impact of wholesale concentration on wholesale prices economic theory suggests that the sensitivity of purchase price in response to degree of wholesale concentration is smaller for large retail formats than for small retail formats in the presence of intra format retail competition to test the validity of the theoretical implication i measure the impact of the concentration on purchasing prices for retailers by format empirical findings support the hypothesis that the large retail format tends to draw advantageous purchase prices when wholesalers become increasingly oligopolistic