does working from home work evidence from a chinese experiment about 10 of us employees now regularly work from home wfh but there are concerns this can lead to shirking from home we report the results of a wfh experiment at ctrip a 16 000 employee nasdaq listed chinese travel agency call center employees who volunteered to wfh were randomly assigned to work from home or in the office for 9 months home working led to a 13 performance increase of which about 9 was from working more minutes per shift fewer breaks and sick days and 4 from more calls per minute attributed to a quieter working environment home workers also reported improved work satisfaction and experienced less turnover but their promotion rate conditional on performance fell due to the success of the experiment ctrip rolled out the option to wfh to the whole firm and allowed the experimental employees to re select between the home or office interestingly over half of them switched which led to the gains from wfh almost doubling to 22 this highlights the benefits of learning and selection effects when adopting modern management practices like wfh

conformism peer pressure and adverse selection to examine the effects of peer pressure in adverse selection problem we define a peer pressure function that represents the psychological costs and incorporate it into the agent s utility function based on these assumptions the efficient agent who has conformity preference produces less outputs than the first best level while the inefficient agent produces more than the second best level of standard adverse selection output when the agents feel peer pressure among themselves although the production gap between the utility functions under peer pressure narrows the gap of the ex post information rent goes wider as the information rent of efficient agents increases our theoretical results are consistent with some empirical experimental findings

procrastination at the patent office abstract pointing to a limited set of statistics suggesting that examiners turn in much of their work product at the end of quota periods the commerce department has recently raised concerns over examiner procrastination and its consequences for examination quality end loading of review completions alone however is not dispositive evidence of procrastination in this paper we confirm that examiners complete a substantial percentage of reviews at the end of both bi weekly and quarterly quotas and then proceed to test for additional markers that may separate a procrastination explanation for these findings from a range of alternative theories among other tests explored in this regard we predict and find evidence of an immediate spike in end loading upon the onset of examiner telecommuting a change in work environments that likely exacerbates self control problems our findings support a procrastination interpretation for at least some portion of the observed end loading of reviews with our outcomes analysis suggesting that the predominant consequence of this behavior for examination quality is an increase in examination durations

the impact of private and public feedback on worker performance evidence from the lab previous empirical studies have demonstrated the positive incentive effects of private performance feedback as well as public recognition on work performance in our laboratory experiments we directly compare these two feedback schemes moreover we compare their incentive effects across two real effort tasks that differ in regard to how interesting the subjects perceive working on them we find that both feedback schemes lead to performance increases compared to the tasks respective control treatments in particular subjects ability and a positive interim feedback enhance performance competitive preferences significantly affect performance only in the less enjoyable and challenging task jel c9 j3 m1

productivity spillovers in team production evidence from professional basketball we estimate a model where workers are heterogeneous both in their own productivity and in their ability to facilitate the productivity of others we use data from professional basketball to measure the importance of peers in productivity because we have clear measures of output and members of a worker s group change on a regular basis our empirical results highlight that productivity spillovers play an important role in team production despite this we find that worker compensation is largely determined by own productivity with little weight given to productivity spillovers

innovation outcomes in a distributed organization intrafirm mobility and access to resources prior research has established a relation between intrafirm mobility and innovation outcomes at distributed organizations the literature has also uniformly agreed on the mechanism underlying this relationship the sharing of tacit knowledge and recombination of ideas that occurs because of intrafirm mobility but a second mechanism may also be at work intrafirm mobility might help distant employees secure access to resources for their innovative projects using unique data on travel employment and patenting for 1 315 inventors at the indian research and development r d center of a fortune 50 multinational i find that intrafirm mobility in the form of short duration business trips from a distant r d location to headquarters is positively related to higher subsequent patenting at the individual level i also find mobility immediately prior to meetings at which r d funds are most likely to be disbursed to be related to higher subsequent patenting this study sheds new light on how intrafirm mobility a

shirking or productive schmoozing wages and the allocation of time at work this study uses detailed time diaries from household surveys for 1975 and 1981 to examine how changes in the use of time on the job affect earnings among nonunion workers the marginal minute of break time apparently increases earnings but not as much as does the marginal minute of work time among union workers additional time in unscheduled breaks appears to be associated with significantly higher earnings though other break time is not the author concludes that further growth in on the job leisure would reduce productivity that monitoring workers would yield returns to the firm but that entirely eliminating breaks would be counterproductive

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

on the economic architecture of the workplace repercussions of social comparisons among heterogeneous workers we analyze the impact on a firm s profits and optimal wage rates and on the distribution of workers earnings when workers compare their earnings with those of coworkers we consider a low productivity worker who receives lower wage earnings than a high productivity worker when the low productivity worker derives dis utility not only from his own effort but also from comparing his earnings with those of the high productivity worker his response to the sensing of relative deprivation is to increase the optimal level of effort consequently the firm s profits are higher its wage rates remain unchanged and the distribution of earnings is compressed

discrete choice with social interactions and endogenous memberships this paper develops a theory of sorting and behavior when the latter is subject to social influences i extend the choice model with social interactions developed by brock and durlauf 2001a 2003 to allow for equilibrium group formation individuals choose a group and a behavior subject to an endogenous social effect the latter turns out to be a segregating force and stable equilibria are stratified the sorting process may induce inefficiently multiple behavioral equilibria such a theory serves as a means to solve identification and selection problems that may undermine the empirical detection of social effects on individual behavior i exploit the theoretical structure to build a nonlinear in the social effect selection correction term such a term allows identification and solves the selection problem that arises when individuals can choose the group whose effect the researcher is trying to disentangle

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

breakthroughs deadlines and self reported progress contracting for multistage projects we study the optimal incentive schemes for multistage projects staged financing pervasive in both venture capital and research grants arises as a feature of the optimal contract the nature of progress plays an important role when progress is tangible incentives are provided through a series of deadlines and a reward scheme that decreases over time early progress in one stage gives the agent more time and funding to complete the next one when progress is intangible unverifiable progress reports are used despite the fact that the information in the report has no social value the optimal contract involves a soft deadline wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date if the agent reports progress at that date then the principal gives him a relatively short deadline to complete the project if not then a probationary phase begins in which the project is terminated at a constant rate until progress is reported we explore the implications for welfare and optimal project design

incentives for managers and inequality among workers evidence from a firm level experiment we present evidence from a firm level experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial compensation from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower tier workers theory suggests that managerial incentives affect both the mean and dispersion of workers productivity through two channels first managers respond to incentives by targeting their efforts towards more able workers implying that both the mean and the dispersion increase second managers select out the least able workers implying that the mean increases but the dispersion may decrease in our field experiment we find that the introduction of managerial performance pay raises both the mean and dispersion of worker productivity analysis of individual level productivity data shows that managers target their effort towards high ability workers and the least able workers are less likely to be selected into employment these results highlight the interplay between the provision of managerial incentives and earnings inequality among lower tier workers

school choice and segregation evidence from an admission reform we evaluate the effects of school choice on segregation using data from an admission reform in the stockholm upper secondary schools before 2000 the students were assigned to their nearest school but from the fall of 2000 the students can apply to any school within stockholm and admission decisions are solely based on grades as expected the new admission policy increased segregation by ability however segregation by family background and especially segregation between immigrants and natives also increased significantly the increase in segregation by family background can be explained by ability sorting but the increase in ethnic segregation can not

peer effects in the workplace existing evidence on peer effects in the productivity of coworkers stems from either laboratory experiments or real world studies referring to a specific firm or occupation in this paper we aim at providing more generalizable results by investigating a large local labor market with a focus on peer effects in wages rather than productivity our estimation strategy which links the average permanent productivity of workers peers to their wages circumvents the reflection problem and accounts for endogenous sorting of workers into peer groups and firms on average over all occupations and in the type of high skilled occupations investigated in studies on knowledge spillover we find only small peer effects in wages in the type of low skilled occupations analyzed in extant studies on social pressure in contrast we find larger peer effects about one half the size of those identified in similar studies on productivity

tournaments and office politics evidence from a real effort experiment in many environments tournaments can elicit more effort from workers except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other because it is hard to separate effort ability and output in many real workplace settings the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin there is even less evidence on the impact of sabotage because real world acts of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjective peer evaluation or office politics we discuss a real effort experiment in which effort quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments our results suggest that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics competitors are more likely to sabotage each other in tournaments and as a result workers actually provide less effort simply because they expect to be the victims of sabotage adjusting output for quality with the rating of an independent auditor shrinks the incentive effect of the tournament even further since output tends to become more slipshod

moving to opportunity in boston early results of a randomized mobility experiment this paper examines the short run impacts of a change in residential neighborhood on the well being of low income families using evidence from a program in which eligibility for a housing voucher was determined by random lottery we examine the experiences of households at the boston site of moving to opportunity mto a demonstration program in five cities families in high poverty public housing projects applied to mto and were assigned by lottery to one of three groups experimental offered mobility counseling and a section 8 subsidy valid only in a census tract with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent section 8 comparison offered a geographically unrestricted section 8 subsidy or control offered no new assistance but continued to be eligible for public housing our quantitative analyses of program impacts uses data on 540 families from a baseline survey at program enrollment a follow up survey administered l to 3 5 years after random assignment and state administrative data on earnings and welfare receipt 48 percent of the experimental group and 62 percent of the section 8 comparison group moved through the mto program one to three years after program entry families in both treatment groups were more likely to be residing in neighborhoods with low poverty rates and high education levels than were families in the control group however while members of the experimental group were much more likely to be residing in suburban communities than were those in the section 8 group the lower program take up rate among the experimental group resulted in more families remaining in the most distressed communities households in both treatment groups experienced improvements in multiple measures of well being relative to the control group including increased safety improved health among household heads and fewer behavior problems among boys experimental group children were also less likely to be a victim of a personal crime to be injured or to experience an asthma attack there are no significant impacts of either mto treatment on the employment earnings or welfare receipt of household heads in the first three years after random assignment

crime in the lab detecting social interaction abstract according to the standard economic perspective criminal activities vary with the price of crime which depends on the severity of punishment and the detection probability an alternative view claims that crime is also influenced by social interaction phenomena such as peer pressure or neighbourhood effects detecting social interaction in the field is fraught with difficulties however in this paper we argue that given its extensive control possibilities experiments are well suited to show the potential existence of social interaction effects we present an experimental study where people can engage in criminal activities we find support for the importance of social interaction on average subjects steal the more the more others steal this behaviour can be interpreted in terms of reciprocity

optimal contract to induce continued effort we consider a basic model of a risk neutral principal incentivizing a risk neutral agent to exert effort to raise the arrival rate of a poisson process the effort is costly to the agent is unobservable to the principal and affects the instantaneous arrival rate each arrival yields a constant revenue to the principal the principal therefore devises a mechanism involving payments and a potential stopping time to motivate the agent to always exert effort we formulate this problem as a stochastic optimal control model with an incentive constraint in continuous time over an infinite horizon although we allow payments to take general forms contingent on past arrival times the optimal contract has a simple and intuitive structure which depends on whether the agent is as patient as or less patient than the principal toward future income this paper was accepted by manel baucells decision analysis

optimal design of social comparison effects setting reference groups and reference points in this paper we study how social planners should exploit social comparisons to pursue their objectives we consider two modes of social comparison referred to as behind averse and ahead seeking behaviors depending on whether individuals experience a utility loss from underperforming or a utility gain from overperforming relative to their peers modeling social comparison as a game between players we find that ahead seeking behavior leads to output polarization whereas behind averse behavior leads to output clustering a social planner can mitigate these effects in two ways i by providing the full reference distribution of outputs instead of an aggregate reference point based on the average output and ii by assigning players into uniform rather than diverse reference groups social planners may thus need to tailor the reference structure to the predominant mode of social comparison and their objective a performance focused social planner may set the reference structure so as to maximize the output of either the top or the bottom player depending on whether she puts greater marginal weight to larger or smaller outputs when the social planner also cares about utility she faces a dilemma because performance optimization may not be aligned with utility maximization inevitably the social planner will have to confront equity issues because better performance may not reflect greater effort or greater ability this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

do professionals choke under pressure high rewards or the threat of severe punishment provide strong motivation but also create psychological pressure which might induce performance decrements by analyzing the performance of professional football players in penalty kick situations the paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of detrimental incentive effects two pressure variables are considered in particular 1 the importance of success and 2 the presence of spectators there are plenty of situations in which pressure arises in the workplace knowing how individuals perform under pressure conditions is crucial because it has implications for the design of the workplace and the design of incentive schemes

peers at work we study peer effects in the workplace specifically we investigate whether how and why the productivity of a worker depends on the productivity of coworkers in the same team using high frequency data on worker productivity from a large supermarket chain we find strong evidence of positive productiv ity spillovers from the introduction of highly productive personnel into a shift worker effort is positively related to the productivity of workers who see him but not workers who do not see him additionally workers respond more to the presence of coworkers with whom they frequently interact we conclude that social pressure can partially internalize free riding externalities that are built into many workplaces jel j24 l81 m54

valuing alternative work arrangements abstract we employ a discrete choice experiment in the employment process for a national call center to estimate the willingness to pay distribution for alternative work arrangements relative to tr

ethical spillovers in firms evidence from vehicle emissions testing in this paper we explore how organizations influence the unethical behavior of their employees using a unique data set of over three million vehicle emissions tests we find strong evidence of ethical spillovers from firms to individuals when inspectors work across different organizations they adjust the rate at which they pass vehicles to the norms of those with whom they work these spillovers are strongest at large facilities and corporate chains and weakest for the large volume inspectors these results are consistent with the economics literature on productivity spillovers from organizations and peers and suggest that managers can influence the ethics of employee behavior through both formal norms and incentives the results also suggest that employees have persistent ethics that limit the magnitude of this influence these results imply that if ethical conformity is important to the financial and legal health of the organization managers must be vigilant in their hiring training and monitoring to ensure that employee behavior is consistent with firm objectives

the polarization of the u s labor market this paper analyzes a marked change in the evolution of the u s wage structure over the past fifteen years divergent trends in upper tail 90 50 and lower tail 50 10 wage inequality we document that wage inequality in the top half of distribution has displayed an unchecked and rather smooth secular rise for the last 25 years since 1980 wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution also grew rapidly from 1979 to 1987 but it has ceased growing and for some measures actually narrowed since the late 1980s furthermore we find that occupational employment growth shifted from monotonically increasing in wages education in the 1980s to a pattern of more rapid growth in jobs at the top and bottom relative to the middles of the wage education distribution in the 1990s we characterize these patterns as the u201cpolarization u201d of the u s labor market with employment polarizing into high wage and low wage jobs at the expense of middle wage work we show how a model of computerization in which computers most strongly complement the non routine abstract cognitive tasks of high wage jobs directly substitute for the routine tasks found in many traditional middle wage jobs and may have little direct impact on non routine manual tasks in relatively low wage jobs can help explain the observed polarization of the u s labor market this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

telework urban form energy consumption and greenhouse gas implications a primary motivation of telework policy is to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions using a numerical simulation of the standard urban model we show telework causes sprawl calling into question the idea that telework decreases energy consumption overall effects depend on wage changes due to telework land use regulation such as height limits or greenbelts and the telework participation rate while energy consumption increases in some scenarios emissions may fall due to changes in the energy mix between gasoline and other sources jel r11 r28 c60

long range growth economic development in the global network of air links we study the impact of international long distance flights on the global spatial allocation of economic activity to identify causal effects we exploit variation due to regulatory and technological constraints which give rise to a discontinuity in connectedness between cities at a distance of 6000 miles we show that these air links have a positive effect on local economic activity as captured by satellite measured night lights to shed light on how air links shape economic outcomes we first present evidence of positive externalities in the global network of air links connections induce further connections we then find that air links increase business links showing that the movement of people fosters the movement of capital in particular this is driven mostly by capital flowing from high income to middle income but not low income countries taken together our results suggest that increasing interconnectedness generates economic activity at the local level by inducing links between businesses but also gives rise to increased spatial inequality locally and potentially globally

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

tournaments without prizes evidence from personnel records we use a quasi experimental research design to study the effect of giving workers feedback on their relative performance the setting is a firm in which workers are paid piece rates and where for exogenous reasons management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity we find that merely providing this information leads to a large and long lasting increase in productivity that is costless to the firm our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others this paper was accepted by olav sorenson organizations

dynamic security design convergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications an entrepreneur with limited liability needs to finance an infinite horizon investment project an agency problem arises because she can divert operating cash flows before reporting them to the financiers we first study the optimal contract in discrete time this contract can be implemented by cash reserves debt and equity the latter is split between the financiers and the entrepreneur and pays dividends when retained earnings reach a threshold to provide appropriate incentives to the entrepreneur the firm is downsized when it runs short of cash we then study the continuous time limit of the model we prove the convergence of the discrete time value functions and optimal contracts our analysis yields rich implications for the dynamics of security prices stock prices follow a diusion reflected at the dividend barrier and absorbed at zero their volatility as well as the leverage ratio of the firm increase after bad performance stock prices and book tomarket ratios are in a non monotonic relationship a more severe agency problem entails lower price earning ratios and firm liquidity and higher default risk

in search of workers real effort reciprocity a field and a laboratory experiment we present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage nor to a positive or negative peer comparison this result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort in an additional real effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables an exact calculation of an employer s surplus from the work contract is a crucial prerequisite for a positive wage effort relation this demonstrates that an employee s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake jel c91 c92 j41

experimental identification of asymmetric information evidence on crop insurance in the philippines abstract i study asymmetric information in crop insurance in the philippines using a two level randomized field experiment and incentivized preference elicitation in this first experimental study of moral hazard in non health insurance preventable damages double on randomly insured plots among farmers with high trust in the insurance provider farmers prefer insurance on plots that are at risk of floods and crop diseases a sign of classic adverse selection and plots that are far away from home a sign of selection on anticipated moral hazard behavior resulting in 72 higher payouts on preferred plots overcoming these challenges requires leveraging new technologies

how many jobs can be done at home evaluating the economic impact of social distancing measures taken to arrest the spread of covid 19 raises a fundamental question about the modern economy how many jobs can be performed at home we classify the feasibility of working at home for all occupations and merge this classification with occupational employment counts we find that 37 of jobs in the united states can be performed entirely at home with significant variation across cities and industries these jobs typically pay more than jobs that cannot be done at home and account for 46 of all us wages applying our occupational classification to 85 other countries reveals that lower income economies have a lower share of jobs that can be done at home

work environment and individual background explaining regional shirking differentials in a large italian firm the prevalence of shirking within a large italian bank appears to be characterized by significant regional differentials in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are substantially more prevalent in the south we consider a number of potential explanations for this fact different individual backgrounds group interaction effects sorting of workers across regions differences in local attributes different hiring policies and discrimination against southern workers our analysis suggests that individual backgrounds group interaction effects and sorting effects contribute to explaining the north south shirking differential none of the other explanations appears to be of first order importance i introduction whether individual behavior is determined by group interactions or by individual background is undoubtedly a fundamental question for the social sciences this question presented itself forcefully when we stumbled onto the following piece of evidence there appear to be significant regional differentials in the prevalence of shirking among the employees of a large italian bank in particular absenteeism and misconduct episodes are considerably more frequent in the southern branches of the bank in this paper we examine several potential explanations for this fact first individual preferences for shirking versus working may differ according to one s region of hirth we will refer to this hj othesis as one of different individual hackgrounds the second possibility is one of locational sorting low shirking types may tend to migrate to the north high shirking types may tend to migrate to the south or hoth third the northern and southern

the incidence and wage consequences of home based work in the united states 1980 2000 abstract this study documents the rapid growth in home based wage and salary employment and the sharp decline in the home based wage penalty in the united states between 1980 and 2000 these twin patterns observed for both men and women in most occupation groups suggest that employer costs of providing home based work arrangements have decreased consistent with information technology it advances being an important source of these falling costs i find that occupation gender cells that had larger increases in on the job it use also experienced larger increases in the home based employment share and larger declines in the home based wage penalty

experimenting with contests for experimentation we report an experimental test of alternative rules in innovation contests when success may not be feasible and contestants may learn from each other following halac kartik and liu in press the contest designer can vary the prize allocation rule from winner take all wta in which the first successful innovator receives the entire prize to shared in which all successful innovators during the contest duration share in the prize the designer can also vary the information disclosure policy from public in which at each period all information about contestants past successes and failures is publicly available to private in which contestants only know their own histories in our setting the optimal contest design in terms of maximizing the probability that at least one innovator is successful depends on the probability of successful innovation given that innovation is feasible under some parameters the designer will prefer a wta public contest while under others he will prefer shared private our experiments provide evidence that private disclosure contests behaviorally dominate public disclosure regardless of the prize allocation rule and moreover that shared private contests dominate wta private contests

disappointment aversion and social comparisons in a real effort competition we present an experiment to investigate the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential real effort competition specifically we study the contribution of social comparison effects to the disappointment aversion previously identified in a two person real effort competition gill d and v prowse a structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition american economic review 102 2012 469 503 to do this we compare social and asocial versions of the gill and prowse experiment where the latter treatment removes the scope for social comparisons if disappointment aversion simply reflects an asymmetric evaluation of losses and gains we would expect it to survive in our asocial treatment alternatively if losing to or winning against another person affects the evaluation of losses gains as we show would be theoretically the case under asymmetric inequality aversion we would expect treatment differences we find behavior in social and asocial treatments to be similar suggesting that social comparisons have little impact in this setting unlike in gill and prowse we do not find evidence of disappointment aversion jel c91 d12 d81 d84

consumption network effects in this paper we study the relevance and mechanics of consumption network effects we use long panel data on the entire danish population to construct a measure of consumption based on administrative tax records and define the peer groups in terms of workplace occupation education and age we then apply an iv strategy and fixed effect models to recover the effects our instruments arise naturally from the network structure and firms shocks the estimated effects are statistically significant and relevant for policies as they generate non negligible multiplier effects further the results are consistent with a keeping up model

are you happy while you work using a new data source permitting individuals to record their well being via a smartphone we explore within person variance in individuals well being measured momentarily at random points in time we find paid work is ranked lower than any of the other 39 activities individuals can report engaging in with the exception of being sick in bed precisely how unhappy one is while working varies significantly with where you work whether you are combining work with other activities whether you are alone or with others and the time of day or night you are working

venture capital financing moral hazard and learning we consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model the value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project the allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard the optimal contract is a time varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option the option itself is based on the control of the funds the dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project a positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities finally relationship financing including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting

monitoring motivation and management the determinants of opportunistic behavior in a field experiment economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation employees are rational cheaters who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs we investigate the rational cheater model by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism a significant fraction of employees behave as the rational cheater model predicts a substantial proportion of employees however do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate this heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer jel d2 j2 l2 l8 m12

clean evidence on peer effects we study subjects who were asked to fill letters into envelopes with a remuneration independent of output in the pair treatment two subjects worked at the same time in the same room and peer effects were possible in the single treatment subjects worked alone and peer effects were ruled out we find evidence of peer effects in the pair treatment because the standard deviations of output are smaller within pairs than between pairs moreover average output is higher in the pair treatment thus peer effects raise productivity finally low productivity workers are the most sensitive to the behavior of peers

outsourcing education experimental evidence from liberia in 2016 the liberian government delegated management of 93 randomly selected public schools to private providers providers received us 50 per pupil on top of us 50 per pupil annual expenditure in control schools after one academic year students in outsourced schools scored 0 18 higher in english and mathematics we do not find heterogeneity in learning gains or enrollment by student characteristics but there is significant heterogeneity across providers while outsourcing appears to be a cost effective way to use new resources to improve test scores some providers engaged in unforeseen and potentially harmful behavior complicating any assessment of welfare gains

large risks limited liability and dynamic moral hazard we study a continuous time principal agent model in which a risk neutral agent with limited liability must exert unobservable effort to reduce the likelihood of large but relatively infrequent losses firm size can be decreased at no cost or increased subject to adjustment costs in the optimal contract investment takes place only if a long enough period of time elapses with no losses occurring then if good performance continues the agent is paid as soon as a loss occurs payments to the agent are suspended and so is investment if further losses occur accumulated bad performance leads to downsizing we derive explicit formulae for the dynamics of firm size and its asymptotic growth rate and we provide conditions under which firm size eventually goes to zero or grows without bounds

network effects and welfare cultures we empirically examine the role of social networks in welfare participation using data on language spoken at home to better infer networks within an area our empirical strategy asks whether being surrounded by others who speak the same language increases welfare use more for those from high welfare using language groups this methodology allows us to include local area and language group fixed effects and to control for the direct effect of being surrounded by one s language group these controls eliminate many of the problems in previous studies the results strongly confirm the importance of networks in welfare participation

does job testing harm minority workers evidence from retail establishments because minorities typically fare poorly on standardized tests job testing is thought to pose an equality efficiency trade off testing improves selection but reduces minority hiring we develop a conceptual framework to assess when this trade off is likely to apply and evaluate the evidence for such a trade off using hiring and productivity data from a national retail firm whose 1 363 stores switched from informal to test based worker screening over the course of one year we document that testing yielded more productive hires at this firm raising mean and median tenure by 10 or more consistent with prior research minorities performed worse on the test yet testing had no measurable impact on minority hiring and productivity gains were uniformly large among minority and nonminority hires these results suggest that job testing raised the precision of screening without introducing additional negative information about minority applicants most plausibly because both the job test and the informal screen that preceded it were unbiased

what field experiments have and have not taught us about managing workers this paper reviews the field experimental evidence on firm employee relationships there is strong evidence that output rises in response to financial incentives but more mixed support for worker reciprocity in response to employer generosity non financial approaches such as worker recognition or adding meaning to mundane tasks can also increase output social relations are central to how firms function and have been shown to have an important impact on the design of incentive schemes what we do not know however far exceeds that which we have learned a broad swathe of important topics including recruiting worker promotion and training are virtually untouched thus far by field experiments

interactions between workers and the technology of production evidence from professional baseball this paper examines how the effort choices of workers within the same firm interact with each other in contrast to the existing literature we show that workers can affect the productivity of their co workers based on income maximization considerations rather than relying on behavioral considerations such as peer pressure social norms and shame theoretically we show that a worker s effort has a positive effect on the effort of co workers if they are complements in production and a negative effect if they are substitutes the theory is tested using panel data on the performance of baseball players from 1970 to 2003 the empirical analysis shows that a player s batting average significantly increases with the batting performance of his peers but decreases with the quality of the team s pitching furthermore a pitcher s performance increases with the pitching quality of his teammates but is unaffected by the batting output of the team these results are inconsistent with behavioral explanations which predict that shirking by any kind of worker will increase shirking by all fellow workers the results are consistent with the idea that the effort choices of workers interact in ways that are dependent on the technology of production these findings are robust to controlling for individual fixed effects and to using changes in the composition of one s co workers in order to produce exogenous variation in the performance of one s peers

social interactions in high school lessons from an earthquake after an earthquake hit southern italy in 1980 young men from certain towns were exempted from compulsory military service we show that the exemption raised high school graduation rates of boys by more than 2 percentage points we do this by comparing high school graduation rates of young exempt men and older nonexempt men from the least damaged areas and men of the same age groups from nearby towns that were not hit by the quake similar comparisons show that graduation rates of young women in the affected areas also increased since in italy women are not subject to the draft the findings suggest the presence of spillover effects jel i21 j13

transparency inequity aversion and the dynamics of peer pressure in teams theory and evidence we provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion analyzing a two period model with two agents we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure when contributions are unobservable agents act as though they were purely selfish however when contributions are made transparent at an interim stage agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the interim information in the second period this form of peer pressure reduces free riding and thus more efficient outcomes are attained the results are confirmed in a real effort experiment

the financing of innovation learning and stopping we consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success we distinguish between two financing modes namely relationship financing where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable and arm s length financing where it is unobservable we find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes the rate at which funding is released becomes tighter over time under relationship financing and looser under arm s length financing the tradeoff in the choice of financing modes is between lack of commitment with relationship financing and information rents with arm s length financing

the role of airports in city employment growth 1950 2010 abstract this study considers the effects of commercial airports on local economies over the post world war ii period specifically 1950 2010 to overcome endogeneity concerns a pooled synthetic control event study strategy is employed on newly digitized historical aviation data to estimate treatment effects on a variety of employment population and wage outcomes i find that airports have led to on average 3 9 percent growth in total employment and 3 4 growth in population per decade over the 30 year period for which wage and air traffic data are available earnings per worker increased by 2 and per capita personal income increased by 3 corresponding to growth rates of up to 1 2 percent per decade respectively

delegated information acquisition with moral hazard abstract we analyze a principal agent problem with moral hazard where a principal searches for an opportunity of uncertain return and hires an agent to evaluate available options the agent s effort affects the informativeness of a signal about an option s return based on the information provided by the agent the principal decides whether to exercise the option at hand we derive properties of the optimal contract in both static and dynamic versions of the problem we show that there are intermediate values of the prior probability that the option is of high quality at which positive effort cannot be sustained we also show that if the prior is below a threshold then the agent is rewarded for delivering bad news about the option s quality we derive distortions relative to the first best on the implemented effort level and optimal stopping decision for some parameter values it is optimal for the principal to commit to an ex post suboptimal stochastic decision to exercise an option

optimal unemployment insurance this paper considers the design of an optimal unemployment insurance system the problem is modeled as a repeated principalagent problem involving a risk averse agent the unemployed worker and a risk neutral principal which cannot monitor the agent s search effort the optimal long term contract subject to the associated incentive constraints is characterized this contract involves a replacement ratio that decreases throughout the unemployment spell and a wage tax after reemployment that under some mild regularity conditions increases with the lenght of the unemployment spell some numerical results are presented that suggest that the gains from switching to this optimal unemployment insurance scheme could be quite large the performance of this optimal contract is also compared to alternative liquidity provision mechanisms

random interactions in the chamber legislators behavior and political distance abstract i investigate the role of social interaction among members of parliament mps and the impact of such interaction on the political distance between parties using the random allocation of seats in the icelandic parliament i find that mp s voting and speech behaviors are affected by the behavior of legislators seated nearby i also show that greater random exposure to mps from different parties ultimately reduces the political distance between parties similar evidence is found using historical data for the u s house of representatives by exploiting the introduction of a lottery mechanism to determine desk assignments in 1845 i argue that random seating arrangements could constitute a low cost way of reducing differences within the political arena

identification of endogenous social effects the reflection problem this paper examines the reflection problem that arises when a researcher observing the distribution of behaviour in a population tries to infer whether the average behaviour in some group influences the behaviour of the individuals that comprise the group it is found that inference is not possible unless the researcher has prior information specifying the compisition of reference groups if this information is available the prospects for inference depend critically on the population relationship between the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes inference is difficult to implossible if these variables are functionally dependent or are statistically independent the prospects are better if the variables defining reference groups and those directly affecting outcomes are moderately related in the population

motivation and markets many workers receive pay based on subjectively assessed performance yet the shirking model of efficiency wages excludes it this paper incorporates such pay with the following results performance pay is more efficient than efficiency wages when the costs of having a job vacant are low and qualified workers in short supply more capital intensive industries pay more than less capital intensive industries as observed in studies of interindustry wages differentials sustaining an efficient outcome requires a social convention similar to the notion of a fair wage the model also makes predictions about the relationship between turnover wages growth and unemployment copyright 1998 by american economic association

are workers willing to pay to join a better team using data from the major league baseball free agent market this study is the first to show that the productivity expected of the team a worker will join produces a significant negative compensating wage differential the younger workers in the sample drive this result trading 25 of their wages to join teams with an expected productivity one standard deviation higher this investment can be recouped if a reasonable increase in human capital occurs these results are robust to contract length wage simultaneity and indicate that investment in human capital motivates the observed tradeoff suggesting a new pathway through which human capital accumulation can affect wages reliable measures of workers own past productivity and the productivity expected of a worker s future team provide key advantages to identifying these effects jel j31 j24 m54

airline traffic and urban economic development this paper provides new evidence on the link between airline traffic and employment in us metropolitan areas the evidence confirms the common view that good airline service is an important factor in urban economic development frequent service to a variety of destinations reflected in a high level of passenger enplanements facilitates easy face to face contact with businesses in other cities attracting new firms to the metro area and stimulating employment at established enterprises the empirical results show that a 10 per cent increase in passenger enplanements in a metro area leads approximately to a 1 per cent increase in employment in service related industries however airline traffic has no effect on manufacturing and other goods related employment suggesting that air travel is less important for such firms than for service related businesses these estimates are generated controlling for reverse causality between employment and traffic the results imply that expansion of chicago s o hare ai

no excuses for good behavior volunteering and the social environment abstract we study the effect of the social environment on the quantity and quality of voluntary labor contributions by extending benabou and tirole s 2006 image signaling framework we derive theoretical predictions on time volunteered given 1 the availability of excuses to stop volunteering and 2 the presence of an authority figure we test these predictions in an experiment where laboratory subjects are directly involved in a local nonprofit operation we find that in the absence of excuses to stop volunteering subjects volunteer longer without working less productively this increase is partially driven by subjects reluctance to be the first to stop volunteering the presence of an authority figure has little impact but the presence of peers has a positive and significant impact

who compares to whom the anatomy of income comparisons in europe this article provides unprecedented direct evidence from large scale survey data on both the intensity how much and direction to whom of income comparisons income comparisons are considered to be at least somewhat important by three quarters of europeans they are associated with both lower levels of subjective well being and a greater demand for income redistribution the rich compare less and are happier than average when they do which latter is consistent with relative income theory with respect to the direction of comparisons colleagues are the most frequently cited reference group those who compare to colleagues are happier than those who compare to other benchmarks

social norms and economic incentives in firms abstract this paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms we introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents desire for or peer pressure towards social efficiency in a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms we show that one and the same norm can be output increasing neutral or output decreasing depending on the contract multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise

a continuous time version of the principal agent problem this paper describes a new continuous time principal agent model in which the output is a diffusion process with drift determined by the agent s unobserved effort the risk averse agent receives consumption continuously the optimal contract based on the agent s continuation value as a state variable is computed by a new method using a differential equation during employment the output path stochastically drives the agent s continuation value until it reaches a point that triggers retirement quitting replacement or promotion the paper explores how the dynamics of the agent s wages and effort as well as the optimal mix of short term and long term incentives depend on the contractual environment the understanding of dynamic incentives is central in economics how do companies motivate their workers through piece rates bonuses and promotions how is income inequality connected with productivity investment and economic growth how do financial contracts and capital structure give incentives to the managers of a corporation the methods and results of this paper provide important insights to many such questions this paper introduces a continuous time principal agent model that focuses on the dynamic properties of optimal incentive provision we identify factors that make the agent s wages increase or decrease over time we examine the degree to which current and future outcomes motivate the agent we provide conditions under which the agent eventually reaches retirement in the optimal contract we also investigate how the costs of creating incentives and the dynamic properties of the optimal contract depend on the contractual environment the agent s outside options the difficulty of replacing the agent and the opportunities for promotion our new dynamic insights are possible due to the technical advantages of continuous time methods over the traditional discrete time ones continuous time leads to a much simpler computational procedure to find the optimal contract by solving an ordinary differential equation this equation highlights the factors that determine optimal consumption and effort the dynamics of the agent s career path are naturally described by the drift and volatility of the agent s pay offs the geometry of solutions to the differential equation allows for easy comparisons to see how the agent s wages effort and incentives depend on the contractual environment finally continuous time highlights many essential features of the optimal contract including the agent s eventual retirement in our benchmark model a risk averse agent is tied to a risk neutral principal forever after employment starts the agent influences output by his continuous unobservable effort input the principal sees only the output a brownian motion with a drift that depends on the agent s effort the agent dislikes effort and enjoys consumption we assume that the agent s utility function has the income effect that is as the agent s income increases it becomes costlier to compensate him for the effort also we assume that the agent s utility of consumption is bounded from below

sorting incentives and risk preferences evidence from a field experiment abstract we conducted experiments within a firm to measure the risk preferences of workers who face substantial daily income risk we find that these workers are significantly more risk tolerant than individuals from the broader population this is consistent with sorting risk tolerant workers are attracted to high risk occupations

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

incentive systems in a real effort experiment in the reported experiment different payment schemes are examined on their incentive effects payments based on individual team and relative performance are compared subjects conducted computerized tasks that required substantial effort the results show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels in team production free riding occurred but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than in case of individual pay effort was higher but more variable in tournaments while in case of varying abilities workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others finally attitudes towards work and other workers differed strongly between conditions

performance in competitive environments gender differences even though the provision of equal opportunities for men and women has been a priority in many countries large gender differences prevail in competitive high ranking positions suggested explanations include discrimination and differences in preferences and human capital in this paper we present experimental evidence in support of an additional factor women may be less effective than men in competitive environments even if they are able to perform similarly in non competitive environments in a laboratory experiment we observe as we increase the competitiveness of the environment a significant increase in performance for men but not for women this results in a significant gender gap in performance in tournaments while there is no gap when participants are paid according to piece rate this effect is stronger when women have to compete against men than in single sex competitive environments this suggests that women may be able to perform in competitive environments per se

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

can losing lead to winning individuals groups and teams who are behind their opponents in competition tend to be more likely to lose in contrast we show that through increasing motivation being slightly behind can actually increase success analysis of more than 18 000 professional basketball games illustrates that being slightly behind at halftime leads to a discontinuous increase in winning percentage teams behind by a point at halftime for example actually win more often than teams ahead by one or approximately six percentage points more often than expected this psychological effect is roughly half the size of the proverbial home team advantage analysis of more than 45 000 collegiate basketball games finds consistent though smaller results experiments corroborate the field data and generalize their findings providing direct causal evidence that being slightly behind increases effort and casting doubt on alternative explanations for the results taken together these findings illustrate that losing can sometimes lead to winning this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

getting it done dynamic incentives to complete a project a principal wants an agent to complete a project the agent undertakes unobservable effort which affects in each period the probability that the project is completed we characterize the contracts that the principal sets with and without commitment with full commitment the contract involves the agent s value and wage declining over time in order to give the agent incentives to exert effort the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal also involves the agent s wage declining over time while the worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal has a constant wage and is in fact the unique stationary equilibrium the best weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium for the principal is achieved by a constant wage that maximizes the principal s payoff conditional on wages being constant we compare these solutions to the efficient outcome

the tradeoff between performance and quitting in high power tournaments tournaments may be characterized by the performance they induce as well as by the rate of quitting and dropouts of participants although most of the attention in the literature is on the performance induced by high power incentives there are many daily situations in which dropouts and quitting are a major concern using a field experiment in schools and a model of dynamic tournament we examine the effect of different levels of rewards on the rate of quitting our experiment indicates that there is a possible tradeoff between performance and quitting strong incentives tournaments induced participants to exert more effort and exhibit a better performance but at the same time it induces a higher rate of quitting we present a multi stage tournament model that gives rise to a similar characterization jel c93 c73 d8 j30

training wages and sample selection estimating sharp bounds on treatment effects this paper empirically assesses the wage effects of the job corps program one of the largest federally funded job training programs in the u s even with the aid of a randomized experiment the impact of a training program on wages is difficult to study because of sample selection a pervasive problem in applied microeconometric research wage rates are only observed for those who are employed and employment status itself may be affected by the training program this paper develops an intuitive trimming procedure for bounding average treatment effects in the presence of sample selection in contrast to existing methods the procedure requires neither exclusion restrictions nor a bounded support for the outcome of interest identification results estimators and their asymptotic distribution are presented the bounds suggest that the program raised wages consistent with the notion that the job corps raises earnings by increasing human capital rather than solely through encouraging work the estimator is generally applicable to typical treatment evaluation problems in which there is nonrandom sample selection attrition copyright wiley blackwell