an analysis of revisions to the industrial production index revisions to percentage changes in the total index of industrial production ip contain systematic components and are correlated with other information available at the time the provisional estimates are prepared indicating that the preliminary estimates are inefficient in particular revisions to percentage changes in ip i tend to be upward ii contain substantial seasonality iii generally increasse during periods in which ip is accelerating and iv revisions to the same month tend to be in the same direction filters for the provisional estimates that exploit these inefficiencies are estimated and the estimates generated from these filters pass the efficiencies are estimated and the estimates generated from these filters pass the efficiency test

cooperative management of groundwater resources in the presence of environmental externalities this paper investigates how cooperation among users can achieve a better management of groundwater in the presence of environmental externalities cooperation allows users to internalize the damages caused by their activities and reduce extractions the paper develops a game theoretical framework to assess the value of cooperation in an aquifer that is divided into three sub aquifers that are being overly exploited two types of externalities are modeled first water extractions in each sub aquifer impact water levels in neighboring sub aquifers extraction externality second the three sub aquifers are also connected to an ecosystem and thus decisions in each sub aquifer affect the health of the ecosystem environmental externality a cooperative game theory model is applied the model empirically shows how the uncontrolled extractions in each sub aquifer affects neighboring groundwater users but also cause severe impacts to the linked ecosystem the model is tested empirically in one of the most important aquifers in spain the eastern la mancha aquifer the results illustrate how both extraction and environmental externalities interact in affecting the likelihood of cooperation among the users the paper estimates the value of cooperation and its stability with and without the environmental externality

long term competition in a dynamic game the cold fish war this article presents a model of credible voluntary collective agreements in a dynamic game these agreements are implicit in collections of history dependent threat strategies i consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium voluntarism requires at least that all behavior be supported by the threat of collapse of the agreement which would return the players to the memoryless equilibrium collective rationality requires that the agreement be robust to the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation i analyze the set of agreements meeting each of these restrictions

the tragedy of the commons in a violent world earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by folk theorems for dynamic games in this article we graft on a standard natural resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent means because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted the threat supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect and thus credible the unique equilibrium is such that players exploit noncooperatively the resource when it is abundant and they revert to conflict when it becomes scarce the players utility is shown to be lower even if conflict wastes no resources

asymmetric information multiperiod labor contracts and inefficient job separations economists have for some time been telling the world and each other that in a dynamic economy some labor turnover is to be expected and is in fact efficient however there is a pervasive feeling that not all of the observed turnover is efficient the dilemma of course is to provide satisfactory reasons why inefficient turnover should occur with optimizing rational economic agents in light of this problem recent developments in implicit contract theory 1 4 5 have begun to focus on the idea that in a world of uncertainty asymmetric information and moral hazard problems may prevent efficient fully enforceable contingent claims contracts from developing in particular the asymmetric information i e firms privately observe their profits and workers privately observe their alternatives and moral hazard problems make efficient turnover unlikely because parties making separation decisions have neither all available relevant information nor have an incentive to use this information to make an efficient decision while this investigation into the ramifications of asymmetric information has yielded new insights analysis in previous studies has been limited to models in which separations occur only in the final period of the model in this paper a simple multiperiod model is developed in which separations may occur in each of several successive periods the multiperiod specification enables us to distinguish between temporary and permanent separations and to focus attention on the potential for inefficient separations induced by asymmetric information problems in an intertemporal setting in an intertemporal model in which separations may occur in any one of several successive periods intertemporal allocation problems arise because compensation in a given period plays an allocative role not only in that particular period but also in all periods prior to that period that the terms of compensation may play a multiple intertemporal role in allocating labor has been recognized previously in other contexts for instance this argument has been used to explain the observed occurrence of rising wage profiles with tenure in the presence of such factors as worker shirking or firm specific skill acquisition 2 9 in this asymmetric information setting intertemporal allocation problems

job matching and on the job training conventional analysis predicts that workers pay part of their on the job training costs by accepting a lower starting wage and subsequently realize a return to this investment in the form of greater wage growth missing from the conventional treatment of on the job training is a discussion of the process by which heterogeneous workers are matched to jobs requiring varying amounts of training this matching process constitutes a key feature of the on the job training model presented in this article and tested with a unique data set containing extensive information concerning on the job training employer search wages and wage and productivity growth

the excess sensitivity of layoffs and quits to demand excessive layoffs in bad times and excessive quits in good times both stem from the same weakness in practical employment arrangements the specific nature of worker firm relations creates a situat

cooperative and non cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery abstract we examine cooperative harvesting in a sequential fishery with stochastic shocks in recruitment two fleets harvest in a stochastic interception fishery we analyze cooperative management as a non cooperative game where deviations from cooperative harvesting are deterred by the threat of harvesting at non cooperative levels for a fixed number of periods whenever the initial stock falls below a trigger level we illustrate the sequential harvesting game with an application to the northern baltic salmon fishery cooperative harvesting yields participants substantial gains in terms of expected payoffs the greatest gains accrue to the fleet harvesting the spawning stock the actions of which are not observed by the competitor an explanation for the prevalence of fish wars is provided even if a cooperative agreement is reached shocks in recruitment trigger phases of non cooperative harvesting further the cooperative solution can only be maintained when stock uncertainty is not too prevalent

a dynamic approach to voluntary environmental contributions in tourism abstract in an evolutionary game theoretical model of tourism firms that use an endogenous natural common pool resource cpr we show that stable equilibria with voluntary environmental initiatives may coexist with other equilibria where voluntary abatement is absent the basins of attraction of the equilibria are identified and a bifurcation analysis is carried out producing two results with policy implications first there is a highly non linear relationship between the cost of abatement required to be green and the share of green firms second increases in the number of the cpr s users will ultimately dissipate the incentives to make abatement beyond regulation

firm specific training layoffs and unreliable workers firm specific training layoffs and unreliable workers 1 introduction early work in implicit contract theory argues that a long term relationship between a worker and a firm evolves due to the risk sharing nature of the implicit contract between a risk averse worker and a risk neutral firm some authors have criticized this initial argument see for example haltiwanger 1983 feeling that a long term relationship between a worker and a firm and the terms of an implicit contract between the two in large parts is explained via hiring costs training costs and the like this is the approach taken in the early work of becker 1975 oi 1962 and the most recent work of jovanovic 1979a these latter explanations are also appealing because long term relations between a worker and a firm are typically characterized by quits that decline with tenure and wages that increase with tenure as discussed in mortensen 1988 explanations of these phenomena fall into two categories job search theories or job training theories job search theories stress that there is a match specific component to the productivity of any worker firm match that a good match will result in a long term relationship explains why wages are positively correlated with tenure to explain a rising wage profile within a given match requires that the firm and the worker learn about the quality of their match over time a good match will be a long term one and the wage will rise over time as the match is discovered to be a good one jovanovic 1979b and barron and loewenstein 1985 model such a learning process job training theories maintain that long term relationships with rising wages exist because of firm specific training that increases with tenure again see jovanovic 1979a as an example this paper integrates these two theories in this paper firm specific training evolves as an increasing function of a worker s tenure with a firm this is so because there is a positive probability that a worker is unreliable in that he will be searching for another employer the firm being unable to identify in advance which workers are unreliable will update its prior belief as to a worker s reliability as a function of the worker s tenure the total level of training at any point in time will be an increasing function of this updated belief thus learning about the quality of a match an aspect of the job search theories plays an important role in explaining the level of firm specific training this learning process can also play a role in determining optimal layoffs if an unreliable worker is more likely to receive an acceptable outside offer when the worker is laid off than when he is employed the firm can use layoffs to elicit information about the worker s reliabiliy based upon this fact layoffs may occur even when the worker s marginal product exceeds his value of leisure before discussing the model in detail one crucial assumption deserves comment unlike previous work such a salop and salop 1976 enforceable self revealing contracts are ruled out by assumption thus the firm here cannot commit itself to a wage contract promising low wages initially in exchange for high wages as job tenure increases which contract would attract only reliable workers this assumption is of course a polar extreme but as such is consistent with more recent work in contract theory which investigates the terms of self enforcing contracts see for example holmstrom 1983 the idea is to provide a comparison with contracts in an idealized economy with no enforcement problems this assumption is justified if the cost of writing a legally enforceable contract is prohibitive or if as suggested in charmichael 1984 reputational forces are insufficient to deter a firm from cheating although workers here are risk neutral the model could be amended to include risk averse agents

are preliminary announcements of the money stock rational forecasts abstract we develop a theoretical framework of analyzing preliminary announcements of economic data and then apply this framework to the money stock we find that preliminary announcements of the money stock are best characterized as measured with classical errors in variables that is the revision is not correlated with the true value of the series the revision is however forecastable using information available at the time of the preliminary announcement our ability to forecast the revision implies that preliminary announcements are not rational estimates of the true money stock

job match tenure and wages paid by firms using a new data set consisting of a matched sample of workers and firms and including explicit measures of match quality the authors estimate a structural model and find new evidence of a strong positive relation between wages and tenure inclusion of firm fixed effects does not significantly reduce the estimated returns to tenure the results also shed light on the relative importance of human capital and job matching theories

collusion discounting and dynamic games abstract this paper investigates the following claims in a dynamic game i pareto optimal outcomes are sustainable only by patient players and ii the set of equilibrium outcomes expands in the discount factor the intuition for these results although immediate for purely repeated games is shown to be incomplete for dynamic games consequently there is no direct link between patience and the sustainability of pareto optimal outcomes in fact there are dynamic games arbitrarily close to a repeated game in which such collusion is facilitated by impatience however for a class of dynamic games any equilibrium outcome that is sustainable by less patient players is also an equilibrium outcome when players are more patient journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d90

internal labor markets and worker rents abstract we show that establishing an internal labor market by offering combined contracts across hierarchy levels strictly dominates external recruitment when workers are homogeneous the reason is that only an internal labor market can exploit higher tier rents for incentive provision on lower tiers given unobservable heterogeneity of workers relying on an internal labor market has the further advantage of improving the selection of high ability workers for higher ranks which is complemented by rent based incentive schemes however observable worker heterogeneity gives rise to a trade off between incentive and selection issues and may lead to ports of entry on higher tiers of the hierarchy

is there job lock evidence from the pre hipaa era we estimate discrete time hazard models of employment duration and standard logarithmic wage equations using the 1987 and 1990 panels of the survey of income and program participation sipp to examine the phenomenon of job lock we test for job lock using differences in differences approaches among those with and without employer provided health insurance and family members with and without health problems we find no statistically significant evidence of job lock on employment duration or wages using this approach we do find some evidence of shorter employment spells for those with employer provided health insurance and spouse provided health insurance and longer employment spells for those with employer provided health insurance and large families others have interpreted these findings as evidence of job lock however the wage equation results using these measures are not consistent with job lock although anecdotal evidence makes it clear that some workers have been locked into less than optimal jobs because of the combination of health problems and employer provided health insurance our results do not suggest that this phenomenon is pervasive in the u s economy

the distinguishing characteristics of temporary and permanent layoffs this paper develops a theory of layoffs in an intertemporal setting in which job separations may occur in each of several successive periods theoretical analysis of temporary layoffs in previous studies has been limited to models in which the layoffs occur only in the final period of the model this multiperiod implicit contract framework enables us to identify distinguishing characteristics of temporary and permanent layoffs that were heretofore blurred or distorted in previous contract analyses

fishery management under multiple uncertainty abstract among others who point to environmental variability and managerial uncertainty as causes of fishery collapse roughgarden and smith proc natl acad sci 93 1996 5078 argue that three sources of uncertainty are important for fisheries management variability in fish dynamics inaccurate stock size estimates and inaccurate implementation of harvest quotas we develop a bioeconomic model with these three sources of uncertainty and solve for optimal escapement based on measurements of fish stock in a discrete time model among other results we find 1 when uncertainties are high we generally reject the constant escapement rule advocated in much of the existing literature 2 inaccurate stock estimation affects policy in a fundamentally different way than the other sources of uncertainty and 3 the optimal policy leads to significantly higher commercial profits and lower extinction risk than the optimal constant escapement policy by 42 and 56 respectively

on imperfect evaluation and earning differentials this paper investigates the relationship between the technology for evaluating performance and optimal contract choice specifically the paper examines the different compensation packages that arise when occupations differ in evaluation technology workers are risk averse work effort is endogenous and there exists asymmetric information in occupations in which it is less difficult to measure output it is shown that compensation is more closely tied to output the implications for work effort the sorting of workers by ability and average compensation are developed analysis of a new data set confirms our predictions concerning earning differentials and wage growth the powerful 1 6 million member national education association and other teacher organizations have traditionally fought the notion of rewarding better teachers with more money arguing that there is no objective way to measure a teacher s competence and that it would lead to favoritism and bad morale time june 20 1983

fishing as a supergame abstract this paper considers how cooperative solutions to games of sharing fish resources can be supported by threat strategies with highly mobile fish stocks the number of agents compatible with a cooperative self enforcing solution is not very high for reasonable values of the discount rate but sensitive to changes in the discount rate and costs and to cost heterogeneity with migrating stocks where growth and reproduction depend on how much all agents leave behind after harvesting the likelihood of a cooperative self enforcing equilibrium is increased with a dominant player and a competitive fringe the rents and optimum stock level of the dominant player fall quickly as the share of the competitive fringe increases

addressing global environmental externalities transaction costs considerations is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively whereas others are not the transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis this approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so the demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments and determining who will pay and who will receive them four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights i scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs ii varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations iii asymmetric information and iv the extent of compliance and new entry these factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks implement the convention on the international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora execute the montreal protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer set limits on harvest of highly migratory ocean fish stocks and control greenhouse gas emissions jel d23 p14 q22 q51 q54 q58

cooperation on climate change mitigation abstract we analyze conditions under which it is possible to achieve efficient mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions with a self enforcing international agreement in which all countries find it in their self interest to abide by the agreement we model the choice of emissions by countries as a dynamic game we use a two part punishment scheme for deviations from an agreement that is renegotiation proof and show when this scheme supports the efficient outcome as a subgame perfect equilibrium using numerical examples we show that an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium exists for a range of reasonable parameter values the existence of such equilibrium may be non monotonic in the discount rate and the ratio of slope of marginal abatement cost and marginal damages

an integrated view of tests of rationality market efficiency and the short run neutrality of monetary policy abstract this paper analyzes an important class of models in which expectations play an important role topics included in the analysis are tests of 1 rationality of forecasts in either market or survey data 2 capital market efficiency 3 the short run neutrality of monetary policy and 4 granger causality in macroeconometric models the common elements of these tests are highlighted in particular cross equation tests for rationality or the short run neutrality of money are shown to be equivalent to more common regression tests in the literature these results demonstrate that the exact specification of the relevant information set used in rational forecasts is not necessary for the cross equation tests to have desirable asymptotic properties also discussed are the conditions for identification of coefficients and testability of hypotheses

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

are statistical reporting agencies getting it right data rationality and business cycle asymmetry this article provides new evidence on the rationality of early releases of industrial production ip and producer price index ppi data rather than following the usual practice of examining only first available and fully revised data we examine the entire revision history for each variable thus we are able to assess for example whether earlier releases of data are in any sense less rational than later releases and when data become rational our findings suggest that seasonally unadjusted ip and ppi become rational after approximately 3 4 months whereas seasonally adjusted versions of these series remain irrational for at least 6 12 months after initial release for all variables examined we find evidence that the remaining revision is predictable from its own past or from publicly available information in other economic and financial variables in addition we find a clear increase in the volatility of revisions during recessions suggesting that early data releases are less reliable in toughe

regulation of fisheries bycatch with common pool output quotas abstract many fisheries around the world are plagued with the problem of bycatch the inadvertent harvesting and discard of non targeted species bycatch occurs when targeted and non targeted species coincide in the same habitat and gear is imperfectly selective one of the prevailing methods of controlling bycatch is the common pool quota system under this system biologists set total allowable catches tacs for both the targeted and non targeted species and the fishing season is closed when one of these tacs binds we develop a predictive model of a renewable resource that is regulated with this kind of common pool quota system the model demonstrates that the equilibrium will generally be characterized by excessive discards shortened seasons and foregone target species harvest these results occur even with very efficient low bycatch fishing gear we examine the sensitivity of our predictions to changes in technological parameters and degrees of spatial correlation of target and non target species finally we derive the optimal bycatch penalty function and describe its significance in light of various policy options available to regulators

a free lunch in the commons we derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common pool resource the basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort we also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous agents are heterogeneous entry is costless or agents are playing a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game we also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a cournot oligopoly

the implications of job matching for retirement health insurance and leave benefits this paper focuses on potential reasons for variations in benefit packages in particular variations in the availability of retirement health insurance and leave an important feature of our analysis is that we do not start with heterogeneity in workforces to explain fringe benefit differences across employers it would be straightforward to say that differences across employers in fringe benefit packages simply represent differences in the preferences of their workforces rather we focus on heterogeneity across employers as an important source of differences in fringe benefit packages preliminary evidence is found supportive of the predicted differences in the likelihood of such fringe benefits as retirement health insurance and leave based upon two variables the extent of on the job training offered by the employer and the size of the employers we also examine the implied links between these fringe benefits and such variables as average tenture and the proportion of the workforce that is female

decentralized management of common property resources experiments with a centuries old institution for centuries villages in the alps employed a special system for managing their common properties individual users could inspect other users at their own cost and impose a predetermined sanction a fine when a free rider was discovered the fine was paid to the user who found a violator experiments with the institutions demonstrate that this mechanism considerably improves efficiency of resource use the classical model of identical selfish agents does not capture the data as well as a model with heterogeneous and linear other regarding preferences altruism and especially potentially dysfunctional behavior such as spite and mistake play important positive roles

cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions we model a dynamic common property resource game with unobservable actions and non linear stock dependent costs we propose a strategy profile that generates a worst perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase thereby supporting cooperation under the widest set of conditions we show under what set of parameter values for the discount rate resource growth rate harvest price and the number of resource users this strategy supports cooperation in the commons as a subgame perfect equilibrium the strategy profile that we propose which involves harsh punishment after a defection followed by forgiveness is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies

on employer specific information and internal labor markets the human capital literature of which becker s 2 paper is the seminal work stresses the productivity enhancing effects of schooling and on the job training later work by spence 21 and others emphasizes the fact that it is difficult for employers to ascertain the productivity of potential employees and suggests that activities such as schooling may provide employers with signals as to workers productivities in the signalling literature it is assumed that information generated concerning an individual s abilities is general in that it is known to all potential employers yet the information that an employer gathers concerning his workers abilities is not likely to be completely transferable to other employers as a consequence as rosen 18 249 points out there are limitations on the ability of the price system to achieve efficient assignments if the price system is incomplete there is a role for entrepreneurial activity of assembling an optimal work force this paper analyzes the employment relations that arise when employers information concerning new workers abilities is incomplete until after a period of employment the acquisition of such employer specific information is shown to lead to what has been referred to in the literature as internal labor markets internal labor markets as identified by dunlop 5 32 are the complex of rules which determine the movement of workers among job classifications within administrative units these movements may be transfers promotions demotions or layoffs to the exterior labor markets doeringer and piore 3 emphasize skill specificity and on the job training as the key factors in the emergence of the internal labor market along similar lines williamson wachter and harris 22 point out that job idiosyncracy can result in employment relations with attributes like those of internal labor markets by way of contrast this paper emphasizes the role of employer specific information in generating internal labor markets the theory provides an explanation as to why employers dismiss current employees at the same time that new employees are hired evidence that dismissal rates are not insignificant is presented in section iv the theory also provides a new rationale for long term em

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation an experimental evaluation abstract in a commons each firm s costs rise with industry output this externality can be mitigated if firms jointly restrict harvests but higher prices result repeated interaction usually facilitates cooperation that lowers harvest rates increased cooperation suggests there should be more firms in the socially optimal market structure using experimental markets with two to five firms we observe the influence of industry size on harvest rates cooperation increases the socially optimal number of firms in markets when there are static externalities but not for dynamic externalities finally even when the initial stock is low there is little tendency toward resource extinction

the optimal number of firms in the commons a dynamic approach we consider a common property resource sold in imperfectly competitive markets there is a dynamic externality current harvests lower future stocks raising future harvest costs and a static crowding externality increasing industry size raises costs but lowers prices thus it has ambiguous welfare effects the optimal industry size typically changes over time so that a first best outcome cannot be obtained with a fixed number of firms single firm exploitation is optimal only under special circumstances the socially optimal open loop steady state industry size corresponds to the static optimum both generally differ from the closed loop steady state optimum

oligopoly extraction of a common property natural resource the importance of the period of commitment in dynamic games the theory of noncooperative dynamic games has provided an extremely powerful framework for studying many of the classic questions in industrial organization for example questions about resource extraction advertising research and development investment in new capacity and barriers to entry where interactions over time among few firms are involved however an important methodological issue arises when economic competition over time is modeled as a dynamic game the issue is the appropriate formulation of the players strategy spaces

stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations according to international law straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations rfmos this paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical gordon schaefer bioeconomic model results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation but the lower is the likelihood of large rfmos being stable it is also shown that new entrants increase the incentives of rfmo members to leave and decrease the incentives of non members to join it moreover the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency

on recalls layoffs variable hours and labor adjustment costs abstract the paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment the analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires layoffs and quits but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off thus we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input it is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers further it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers