strategic offering for a wind power producer as a result of subsidies and technological maturity renewable electricity producers have grown in some jurisdictions to clearly dominant positions in the market under this context we propose an offering strategy for a wind power producer with market power that participates in the day ahead market as a price maker and in the balancing market as a deviator uncertainty pertaining to wind power production and balancing market price is represented through a set of correlated scenarios the proposed model is a stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints mpec that can be recast as a tractable mixed integer linear programming milp problem which is solvable using available optimization software results from an illustrative example and two case studies show the effectiveness of the proposed model

the demand for food safety market imperfections and the role of government abstract this article reviews and comments upon a number of models of consumer choice of foods and diets with different real or perceived risks and benefits associated with them the article proceeds to discuss the imperfections and externalities in the market which result in a market solution which may provide too much or more typically too little food safety for individual consumers and for society the likely societal magnitudes of some of the costs of food borne ill health are also discussed the case for government intervention is quite clear but care must be taken not to impose too high a level of food safety

which factors influence the expansion of bioenergy an empirical study of the investment behaviours of german farmers the german government is planning to increase the share of renewable energy sources in this context it is important to understand the decision making behaviour of farmers regarding investments in renewable energy systems that generate energy from biomass and farmers reactions to investment support measures to study this behaviour we conduct a survey and confront farmers with a hypothetical opportunity to invest in a biogas plant our findings reveal that farmers have heterogeneous investment thresholds their investment decisions are mainly driven by capital costs and the subjective perception of the risk resulting from the investment other decision parameters like sustainability and non monetary objectives that are also examined in this paper play only minor roles however bounded rationality is an important factor moreover the influence of an investment subsidy was analysed only about half of the amount of the subsidy as expected according to normative forecast models is reflected in an increased willingness to invest furthermore farmers who have previously invested in bioenergy plants show lower investment thresholds and have stronger reactions to the subsidy regarding the expansion of renewable energies these findings are meaningful for policy impact analysis

energy market design for renewable resources imbalance settlements and efficiency robustness tradeoffs this paper examines optimal energy market bidding behavior for stochastic resources when energy imbalance payments are determined endogenously from market clearing conditions some electricity markets require wind producers to settle day ahead offers based on their real time energy production this is usually justified by economic and cost causation principles without considering the effects of these policies on curtailment and system balancing costs under these real time settlement requirements demand and wind forecast errors impact the effective penalty price so strategic behavior affects the penalty price paid by producers this paper formulates a two stage game where producers place energy bids in the day ahead market and then choose a curtailment level in real time and it derives the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for producers it details how supply curve convexity and resource correlation can lead wind producers to bid conservatively even when they are not risk averse the results show that market based pricing mechanisms improve tradeoffs between system efficiency and mean squared bid error as compared to the case where penalty levels are determined by alternative policies suggesting additional benefits of market based penalty prices beyond those previously studied

framing the allais paradox as a daily farm decision problem tests and explanations the well known allais paradox is reformulated as a daily farm decision problem only 26 of the farmers exhibit violations of the expected utility hypothesis moreover the tendency for violation decreases with the farm operator s education experience and family size no effects of the farm main crop or its scale were detected finally when taking into account the possibility of choice errors we find that the violation rate is statistically insignificant

bringing wind energy to market wind energy is a rapidly growing source of renewable energy generation however the current extra market approach to its assimilation into the electric grid will not scale at deep penetration levels in this paper we investigate how an independent wind power producer might optimally offer its variable power into a competitive electricity market for energy starting with a stochastic model for wind power production and a model for a perfectly competitive two settlement market we derive explicit formulae for optimal contract offerings and the corresponding optimal expected profit as wind is an inherently variable source of energy we explore the sensitivity of optimal expected profit to uncertainty in the underlying wind process we also examine the role of forecast information and recourse markets in this setting we quantify the role of reserves in increasing reliability of offered contracts and obtain analytical expressions for marginal profits resulting from investments in improved forecasting and local auxiliary generation the formulae make explicit the relationship between price signals and the value of such firming strategies

comparative economic voting britain france germany italy likelihood of a vote for the incumbent coalition in contrast personal economic circumstances no matter how measured demonstrate nonexistent to weak effects on vote choice overall economic conditions emerge as a relatively important vote determinant when a more properly specified general multi equation model of the vote is estimated economics shows itself to be as powerful as traditional factors used to explain the western european vote in particular economic variables exceed the impact of partisan identification in britain and roughly equal it in germany moreover the economic variables exercise more influence than the social cleavages of class and religion everywhere except italy

the vp function revisited a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years nannestad and paldam public choice 79 213 245 1994 published herein an extremely influential review of the literature linking economics and elections what they called the vp functions in that work they offered a number of conclusions in proposition form about the state of the evidence in this field we present the key ones 16 in all and assess the extent to which they continue to hold in light of the new evidence about what has come to be known as economic voting as shall be shown nannestad and paldam were prescient in their early establishment of many of the principal results explaining how the economy moves the vote choice

on the market impact of wind energy forecasts this paper presents an analysis of how day ahead electricity spot prices are affected by day ahead wind power forecasts demonstration of this relationship is given as a test case for the western danish price area of the nord pool s elspot market impact on the average price behaviour is investigated as well as that on the distributional properties of the price by using a non parametric regression model to assess the effects of wind power forecasts on the average behaviour the non linearities and time variations in the relationship are captured well and the effects are shown to be quite substantial furthermore by evaluating the distributional properties of the spot prices under different scenarios the impact of the wind power forecasts on the price distribution is proved to be considerable the conditional price distribution is moreover shown to be non gaussian this implies that forecasting models for electricity spot prices for which parameters are estimated by a least squares techniques will not have gaussian residuals hence the widespread assumption of gaussian residuals from electricity spot price models is shown to be inadequate for these model types the revealed effects are likely to be observable and qualitatively similar in other day ahead electricity markets significantly penetrated by wind power

g e moore and j m keynes a missing chapter in the history of the expected utility model in his posthumous essay my early beliefs john maynard keynes outlined his mental history in the dozen years before the war and asserted their importance to his later life yet despite keynes s assertion of the importance of this part of his mental history to who he was and what he did in 1938 the year the essay was written and two years after he published the general theory there is virtually no treatment in the history of economic thought of this period of his life or of its impact on his economic theory the purpose of this essay is to treat an episode of that period of his life which has particular analytical importance and to suggest some ways in which it might contribute to a clearer understanding of his later work in economics the episode in keynes s early life which the essay examines is his role in g e moore s changing opinion about the importance of rules in ethics in his classic principia ethica 1903 moore had originally asserted that obeying certain rules is a necessary part of ethically correct behavior but in his ethics 1912 he makes exactly the opposite argument saying that individuals are always justified in judging a case for themselves and are under no obligation to follow general rules of conduct in the parlance of modern philosophy moore switched from a rule utilitarian argument to an act utilitarian argument the first four sections of the essay detail the role which keynes played in moore s change of heart the final section discusses how the episode affects our understanding of keynes s work in economics

strategic reference point theory how can executives achieve a match between expected external environmental conditions and internal organizational capabilities that facilitates improved performance this paper argues that a firm s choice of reference points can help achieve strategic alignment capable of yielding improved performance and potentially even a sustainable competitive advantage building upon prospect theory and other relevant theoretical perspectives the strategic reference point srp matrix is developed a firm s srp consists of three dimensions internal capability external conditions and time a theory is developed which posits an optimal srp structure and propositions are offered which articulate the expected relationships between the srp strategic choice behavior and firm performance the paper closes with some suggestions for using strategic reference points in both research and practice

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

some econometric problems in the measurement of utility econometric problems in the measurement of utility are noted and solutions provided when lotteries which are used to elicit risk preferences are chained or linked they compound error terms if a utility index is constructed to estimate the utility function the estimates will be inefficient and possibly biased an econometric model that attaches an additive error term to the response of the decision maker and does not require indexing is shown to be a better alternative the measurement of utility functions in the context of risk and uncertainty is usually performed when testing the expected utility hypothesis lin dean and moore or for prescriptive analysis keeney and raiffa elicitation procedures typically have involved pre

voting for redistribution under desert sensitive altruism we endow individuals that differ in skill levels and tastes for working with altruistic preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy when altruistic preferences are desert sensitive i e when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard working to the lazy we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium we provide empirical evidence based on the issp 1992 dataset that preferences for redistribution are not purely selfish and that desert sensitive motivations play a significant role we estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert sensitive in the us than in europe we believe that differences in desert sensitive preferences for redistribution help explain the different social contracts that prevail in both continents

economic expectations and voting behavior in united states house and senate elections past individual level studies of economic voting 1 have incorrectly operationalized the model they employ by using past oriented rather than future oriented questions and 2 have failed to examine the level of economic voting in united states senate elections using the 1978 national election study we show that economic voting exists in senate but not house elections presumably due to the differences in electoral context even when economic voting occurs however there is no guarantee that the public will influence the direction of macroeconomic policy

the determinants of minimum wage rates this paper attempts to test the degree of responsiveness of canadian provincial governments to different political groups in establishing their relative minimum wage policies over the 1975 1982 period it discusses alternative explanations of minimum wage policies and focuses on the political market approach where women youth small business and unions play a role an econometric model is specified and estimated on pooled annual time series and cross section data for nine provinces in canada the results tend to support most of the hypotheses

influences on executive and congressional budgetary priorities 1955 1981 a reduced form equation system is used to analyze the influence of economic political and institutional influences on the budgetary priorities of the executive branch and congress during fiscal 1955 81 three related issues are considered the extent to which political and macroeconomic factors affect priorities the degree of interdependence among the components of the federal budget and between spending and revenues and differences between the executive branch and congress with respect to these issues both types of interdependence are present within both executive branch and congressional budgeting although this interdependence is stronger within the executive branch the influence of economic conditions on budgetary outcomes is strong but varies considerably across spending categories there is no evidence of apolitical business cycle political variables exert a modest influence on the budgetary outcomes examined differences between democratic and republican budgetary policies as well as differences in the budgetary priorities of different presidential administrations are small by comparison with the differences between executive and congressional policies

how lasting is voter gratitude an analysis of the short and long term electoral returns to beneficial policy dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightednessmayobstructthewelfare improvingeffectofdemocraticaccountability however weknowlittleabouthow long governments receive electoral credit for beneficial policies we exploit the massive policy response to a major natural disaster the 2002 elbe flooding in germany to provide an upper bound for the short and long term electoral returns to targeted policy benefits we estimate that the flood response increased vote shares for the incumbent party by 7 percentage points in affected areas in the 2002 election twenty five percent of this short term reward carried over to the 2005 election before the gains vanished in the 2009 election we conclude that given favorable circumstances policy makers can generate voter gratitude that persists longer than scholarship has acknowledged so far and elaborate on the implications for theories of electoral behavior democratic accountability and public policy

a theory of anticipated utility abstract a new theory of cardinal utility with an associated set of axioms is presented it is a generalization of the von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory which permits the analysis of phenomena associated with the distortion of subjective probability

shared quality uncertainty and the introduction of indeterminate goods the purpose of this paper is to introduce a new category of goods indeterminate goods which will be compared with the classical framework of experience search and credence goods nelson 1970 darby and karni 1973 this concept sheds new light on the nature and status of quality uncertainty through the following hypothesis uncertainty about the product s quality can be shared by all agents of the market and this uncertainty can be non neutral and disrupt the market we identify three types of shared uncertainty about the product s characteristics and the corresponding problems that can arise shared uncertainty due to the emergence of a product hirschman 1974 shared uncertainty concerning the past of a product basing ourselves on the art market and finally shared uncertainty regarding the future impacts of a product through empirical data on product safety

opportunity cost bidding by wind generators in forward markets analytical results wind generation must trade in forward electricity markets based on imperfect forecasts of its output and real time prices when the real time price differs for generators that are short and long the optimal forward strategy must be based on the opportunity costs of charges and payments in real time rather than a central estimate of wind output we present analytical results for wind s optimal forward strategy in the risk neutral case the optimal strategy is determined by the distribution of real time available wind capacity and the expected real time prices conditioned on the forward price and wind out turn our approach is simpler and more computationally efficient than formulations requiring specification of full joint distributions or a large set of scenarios informative closed form examples are derived for particular specifications of the wind price dependence structure in the usual case of uncertain forward prices the optimal bidding strategy generally consists of a bid curve for wind power rather than a fixed quantity bid a discussion of the risk averse problem is also provided an analytical result is available for aversion to production volume risk however we doubt whether wind owners should be risk averse with respect to the income from a single settlement period given the large number of such periods in a year

strength of preference and risky choice this paper provides conditions under which a utility function under risk can be legitimately interpreted to measure strength of preference between consequences these conditions require that if a decision maker regards the preference difference between acts a and b to be the same as the preference difference between acts a and b for every state of the world then the preference difference between a and b should be regarded as equivalent to the preference difference between a and b a key assumption is that a decision maker s preference differences between acts given one state of the world should be independent of common consequences given other states of the world usefulness of this result is discussed

dissatisfied democrats or retrospective voters economic hardship political institutions and voting behavior in latin america this article examines recent trends in latin american voting behavior and casts them in terms of sincere economic and strategic electoral concerns it argues that thanks to years of economic adversity latin americans have developed long sophisticated economic memories although this has resulted in rising frustration with democratic government according to recent opinion polls it has not always led voters to punish all parties responsible for hardship at election time a panel study of the region s presidential systems demonstrates that citizens punish incumbents by voting for established nonincumbents when electoral laws reduce opportunities available to small parties in the systems even if nonincumbents have also been blamed for hard economic times more permissive electoral systems in contrast encourage citizens to reject all parties responsible for economic decline the analysis demonstrates how economic and electoral concerns interact to affect voting behavior political accountability an

household portfolio diversification a case for rank dependent preferences the proliferation of novel preference theories in financial economics is hampered by a lack of non experimental evidence and by the theories additional complexity which has not been shown to be critical in applications in this article i present arguments in support of preferences with rank dependency using the survey of consumer finances data i document two widespread patterns inconsistent with expected utility i many households simultaneously invest in well deversified funds and in poorly diversified portfolios of stocks and ii some households with substantial savings do not invest anything in equities i show that portfolio choice models with rank dependent preferences plausibly parameterized and under fully rational assumptions are quantitatively consistent with the observed diversification these results call for further efforts to integrate the models of rank dependent preferences in portfolio theory and asset pricing the decision theoretic literature has long acknowledged the shortcomings of the expected utility theory of von neumann and morgenstern 1944 several generalizations of the theory are inspired by the experimental evidence and aimed at improving its descriptive accuracy however there are few applications of new models of preferences in finance and expected utility continues to dominate the field 1 two principal hurdles slow the proliferation of novel preferences in financial economics first the lack of empirical non experimental or field data confirming that the behavior motivating non expected utilities is widespread outside the laboratory settings second the additional and often significant complexity of the alternative preferences which has not been shown to be critical in applications where the models based on expected utility fall short of reasonable predictions this article presents empirical and theoretical this paper was previously circulated under the title household portfolio diversification the paper has benefited from the comments of shlomo benartzi luca benzoni markus brunnermeier john dickhaut maria perozek raj singh hersh shefrin and workshop participants at minnesota finance bag lunch 2003 wharton conference household financial decision making and portfolio choice and 2003 summer meetings of econometric society i would like to thank cam harvey the editor and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions a special thanks to jack kareken for comments and editorial help on an earlier draft i am grateful to donna zerwitz for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system all errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author address correspondence to valery polkovnichenko finance 3 122 csom 319 19 th

auctions experiments and contingent valuation laboratory experiments are a welcome development that promise to make a significant contribution to the study of economic behavior heiner 1985 plott 1982 smith 1982 1985 while relatively new to economics controlled laboratory studies of human behavior have long constituted the core of experimental psychology where there is a wealth of methodological experience from which experimental economists might profitably draw in particular current attempts to apply laboratory auction methods to valuing nonmarket environmental goods would be improved by more rigorous experimental design and data analysis procedures

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

systemic failure in the provision of safe food abstract many deficiencies in the capacity of a food system to deliver safe products are systemic in nature we suggest a taxonomy of four general ways in which a systemic failure might occur one relates to the connectedness or topology of the system another arises from mistrust on the part of downstream parties concerning signals on product attributes production processes and the performance of regulatory mechanisms a third arises when asymmetric information leads to low incentives for preserving food quality finally inflexibilities in adapting to different states of nature may leave the system vulnerable to failures innovations in information technology and institutional design may ameliorate many problems while appropriate trade industrial organization science and public infrastructure policies may also fortify the system

attractive compounds of unattractive investments and gambles a compound of many independent replicas of an investment or gamble may be attractive to some risk averters who do not accept the individual investment or gamble this can happen if there is a chance that the compound leads to a wealth level where the degree of risk aversion is lower than at the initial wealth level it can also happen if the investor has some sort of limited liability the von neumann morgenstern utility functions with the property that sufficiently long sequences of repetitions of any fair gamble are preferred to all finite wealth levels are characterized in this paper

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

modeling the impact of a wind power producer as a price maker wind energy is present in many countries throughout the world the main types of wind sales in electricity markets are via regulated tariffs or pool based markets production companies choose cost effective options for selling wind energy and some markets like the irish electricity market use regulated tariffs to remunerate wind production this paper aims to provide some answers to explain what effect wind offers may have in an electricity market if wind power producers participated in the day ahead market without receiving any premium or aid a price maker optimization model is used to detect its effect on prices the model encompasses energy offers by other technologies using residual demand curves and detailed modeling of wind imbalances it is observed that wind acting as price maker reduces electricity prices and the imbalance penalties help the system operator to reduce imbalances a realistic case study using data from the irish electricity market illustrates the methodology used comparing the effect of imbalance penalties in the models in terms of profit and total imbalance of the system

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

note further tests of aspiration level effects in risky choice behavior this note extends the work reported in payne laughhunn and crum payne j w d j laughhunn r crum 1980 translation of gambles and aspiration level effects in risky choice behavior management sci 26 1039 1060 on the need to incorporate a target return reference point or aspiration level concept in the analysis of risky choice behavior two experiments are reported the first experiment provides a more complete test of the model of reference point effects developed by payne laughhunn and crum a translation of outcomes procedure which adds a constant to all outcomes was used to vary the relationship of pairs of gambles to an assumed target or reference point the results fully support the model the second experiment provides evidence of the conceptual validity of the model by using explicit instructions to vary the target levels of managers while holding gamble values constant

the normative economics of health care finance and provision whereas in many countries the crisis in medical care has been seen in terms of excess spending on health services in the uk it has been seen at least by most of those who manage and work in the nhs as a crisis of underfunding this has come about as the result of the government s successful attempts to restrain the rate of growth of real spending on the nhs which in turn reflects the government s belief that its principal effective weapon against what it perceives to be inefficiency in the nhs is to challenge management itself reformed and to some extent liberated by systematic financial squeezes the same concern has given rise to a host of proposals for reform of the nhs most of which involve a much greater role for private insurance private finance of other kinds such as out of pocket payments and private provision of health care itself

electricity market clearing with improved scheduling of stochastic production abstract in this paper we consider an electricity market that consists of a day ahead and a balancing settlement and includes a number of stochastic producers we first introduce two reference procedures for scheduling and pricing energy in the day ahead market on the one hand a conventional network constrained auction purely based on the least cost merit order where stochastic generation enters with its expected production and a low marginal cost on the other a counterfactual auction that also accounts for the projected balancing costs using stochastic programming although the stochastic clearing procedure attains higher market efficiency in expectation than the conventional day ahead auction it suffers from fundamental drawbacks with a view to its practical implementation in particular it requires flexible producers those that make up for the lack or surplus of stochastic generation to accept losses in some scenarios using a bilevel programming framework we then show that the conventional auction if combined with a suitable day ahead dispatch of stochastic producers generally different from their expected production can substantially increase market efficiency and emulate the advantageous features of the stochastic optimization ideal while avoiding its major pitfalls a two node power system serves as both an illustrative example and a proof of concept finally a more realistic case study highlights the main advantages of a smart day ahead dispatch of stochastic producers

the ecological fallacy revisited aggregate versus individual level findings on economics and elections and sociotropic voting several aggregate level studies have found a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and election outcomes operating in intuitively plausible directions more recent survey based studies however have been unable to detect any comparable relationship operating at the individual voter level this persistent discrepancy is puzzling one recently proposed explanation for it is that voters actually behave in an altruistic or sociotropic fashion responding to economic events only as they affect the general welfare rather than in terms of self interested pocketbook considerations it is argued here that the discrepancies between the macro and micro level studies are a statistical artifact arising from the fact that observable changes in individual welfare actually consist of two unobservable components a government induced and politically relevant component and an exogenous component caused by life cycle and other politically irrelevant factors it is shown that because of this individual level cross sectional estimates of the effects of welfare changes on voting are badly biased and are essentially unrelated to the true values of the behavioral parameters of interest they will generally be considerable underestimates and may even be of the wrong sign an aggregate level time series analysis on the other hand will often yield reasonably good if somewhat attenuated estimates of the underlying individual level effects of interest thus in this case individual behavior is best investigated with aggregate rather than individual level data it is also shown that the evidence for sociotropic voting is artifactual in the sense that the various findings and evidence which ostensibly show sociotropic behavior are all perfectly compatible with the null hypothesis of self interested pocketbook voting

party identification retrospective voting and moderating elections in a federal system west germany 1961 1989 the hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in u s presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis here these hypotheses are applied to the german federal system that is characterized by staggered national and land provincial elections they are tested using data on real gnp growth at the national and land levels party vote shares in national and land elections party seat shares in national and land parliaments and the party composition of national and land governments over the time period 1961 1989 perhaps surprisingly all three hypotheses party identification retrospective voting and moderating elections find empirical support when applied to the german federal system although these hypotheses were formulated with reference to u s political institutions they travel well bar some modifications that take into account special features of the german political system

a risk return model with risk and return measured as deviations from a target return two attribute risk and return models are very popular in the economics and finance literature for analyzing decisions under uncertainty their popularity stems primarily from the intuitive appeal of the dichotomy into risk and return and from the ease with which the concepts can be diagrammed in two dimensions the most commonly used risk return model is the mean variance model in which risk is measured as the variance and return by the mean of the probability distribution over outcomes the mean variance model has a number of shortcomings which are widely known but of particular concern here are the facts that 1 mean variance dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for second degree stochastic dominance 2 unless the form of the probability distribution is restricted mean variance is consistent with von neumann morgenstern utility theory only if the utility function is quadratic and 3 as peter fishburn has noted

clarity of responsibility beyond the pocketbook how political institutions condition eu issue voting one of the most influential findings of the voting behavior literature of the past two decades was the realization that the clarity of the domestic institutional context influences the relationship between economic perceptions and incumbent vote this article extends this clarity of responsibility argument beyond economics to another policy field european integration to what extent do national political institutions mediate the extent to which voters reward or punish government for their policies relating to the european union eu or european integration that is eu issue voting using data from the 2004 european election study the authors provide evidence that clarity of responsibility affects the strength of eu issue voting specifically eu issue voting is accentuated when the domestic institutional environment provides clear lines of responsibility this finding suggests that the europeanization of national electoral politics depends in part on the domestic institutional context within each me

food safety regulation an overview of contemporary issues abstract this article discusses a number of issues that are influencing the evolution of food safety regulation in developed and to a lesser extent developing countries whilst not definitive it aims to highlight those factors which are considered crucial to an understanding of contemporary food safety controls in both the public and private spheres these issues include criteria applied to assess the need justification for food safety regulation relationships between public and private food safety control systems alternative forms that public food safety regulation can take strategic responses to food safety regulation and the trade implications of national food safety controls the article serves as an introduction to these issues which are discussed at greater length in the other papers that make up this special issue of food policy

redefining the merit order of stochastic generation in forward markets this letter proposes a new merit order for the dispatch of stochastic production in forward markets e g day ahead markets the proposed merit order considers not only the marginal cost of the stochastic generating unit which is often very low or zero but also the projected cost of balancing its energy deviations during the real time operation of the power system we show through an illustrative example that the proposed merit order leads to increased market efficiency as the penetration of stochastic generation in the electricity market grows

wind power trading under uncertainty in lmp markets this paper presents a new model for optimal trading of wind power in day ahead da electricity markets under uncertainty in wind power and prices the model considers settlement mechanisms in markets with locational marginal prices lmps where wind power is not necessarily penalized from deviations between da schedule and real time rt dispatch we use kernel density estimation to produce a probabilistic wind power forecast whereas uncertainties in da and rt prices are assumed to be gaussian utility theory and conditional value at risk cvar are used to represent the risk preferences of the wind power producers the model is tested on real world data from a large scale wind farm in the united states optimal da bids are derived under different assumptions for risk preferences and deviation penalty schemes the results show that in the absence of a deviation penalty the optimal bidding strategy is largely driven by price expectations a deviation penalty brings the bid closer to the expected wind power forecast furthermore the results illustrate that the proposed model can effectively control the trade off between risk and return for wind power producers operating in volatile electricity markets

the marginal utility of income does not increase borrowing lending and friedman savage gambles there has been a great deal of discussion about whether the marginal utility of income rises with income most notably milton friedman and leonard j savage argued in their classic paper that the willingness to gamble implies that the marginal utility of income is rising over a range the discussions of rising marginal utility and of friedman savage gambles have proceeded independently of the literature on time preference although the issues are in fact related logically drawing on this logical relationship we shall show 1 that at least when intertemporal utility is separable the stable levels of consumption that are usually observed imply that the marginal utility of income decreases as income rises 2 even if the marginal utility of income does increase friedman savage gambles normally will not maximize utility saving and dissaving can attain the levels of consumption which generate the most utility per dollar of income at a lower cost than gambles unless imperfections in the capital market are severe 3 even when the utility function is not temporally separable repeated gambling cannot be a rational way of dealing with a rising marginal utility of income we therefore conclude that observed gambling is seldom if ever explained by the logic set out in friedman and savage s seminal paper in view particularly of the stability of consumption levels and the lack of friedmansavage gambles we conclude that marginal utility of income does not rise with income i a conceptual framework

thinking economically about climate change abstract uncertainty over both the regional impacts and timing of climatic changes the way they tend to magnify the likelihood of so called natural disasters and their irreversibility require careful analysis of policy options from an economic standpoint the best approach is to apply cost benefit thinking the essential trade off is between doing nothing now and investing in either important preventive or adaptive measures the choices involve analysis of incurring costs now against the benefits of reducing vulnerability and future damage costs for any given level of warming the aim is to minimize the sum of policy costs and costs of adaptation by individuals any resulting policy decision will have to address issues of international cooperation and compensation these considerations may in turn influence the resulting policy choices between carbon taxes marketable permits and regulatory restrictions

estimating time preferences from convex budgets experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what seems reasonable for economic decision making such high rates are often attributed to present biased discounting a well known bias of standard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption utility attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversion to identify concavity researchers find reasonable discounting but at the cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature we present a new methodology for identifying time preferences both discounting and curvature from simple allocation decisions we find reasonable levels of both discounting and curvature and surprisingly dynamically consistent time preferences jel c91 d12 d81 understanding and estimating time preferences is obviously of great importance to economists marketers and policy makers consumers decide how much to invest in savings education real estate and life insurance how much to diet exercise and smoke whether to marry when to have children and what to leave in their wills while there has been substantial research estimating time preferences using aggregate consumption data 1 the bulk of the effort has occurred in laboratory environments 2 among the many laboratory techniques employed recent studies have favored multiple price lists mpl with monetary payments 3 with mpls individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller payment amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future the interest rate increases monotonically in a price list such that the point where an individual switches from preferring sooner payments to later payments carries interval

the costs of coalition coalition theories and italian governments governments in italy both change and remain the same from 1946 to 1992 the christian democratic party always held governing power but almost no cabinet stayed in office more than a few years and many governments collapsed after only a few months how can instability coexist with stability in this way how can governments break up at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation these questions are rooted in but not resolved by the available game theoretic literature on coalitional behavior my answer is that politicians purposive actions can reduce the costs of coalition i argue that the costs of making breaking and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions and on the array of parties and voters in policy space institutional and spatial conditions structure politicians opportunities and attempts to lower costs under some conditions as i show coalitions are cheap and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper the inference is that this framework comprehends both italy s extremes and the degrees of stability found in other parliamentary democracies

commodity choice behavior with pigeons as subjects starting from an initial baseline budget line income compensated price changes always resulted in substitution effects consistent with the slutsky hicks theory this behavior cannot be explained by a simple random behavior model similar changes in relative prices that did not originate from the initial baseline budget line resulted in undersubstitution effects the composition of consumption changed in the expected direction but the magnitude of change was not large enough to be consistent with the initial commodity bundle chosen these undersubstitution effects are not explainable by shifting preference patterns or anchoring effects found in inconsistent choice sequences with human subjects