asset specificity and the fear of exploitation if asset specificity renders the investing party dependent ex post why would the ex ante willingness to make relationship specific investments vary we show how specific investments generate both positive and counter negative cooperative incentives we also observe the influences of trust and time horizon on these incentives which are aggregated to derive the specific investments effect sie our result suggests that while the fear of exploitation increases proportionally to the magnitude of specific investments and the attendant quasi rents it grows exponentially with the deterioration of inter personal trust and or inter temporal time horizon contexts

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

price and authority in inter profit center transactions price and authority have traditionally been regarded as alternative social mechanisms for allocating resources however actual transactions whether inter or intrafirm can be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they combine both of these mechanisms an especially revealing example of this is the exchange of goods between two profit centers in the multi profit center firm three of the most common arrangements or transfer pricing polices for effecting these transactions are examined here exchange autonomy transfers depend primarily on price with no or minimal use of authority mandated full cost transfers involve a substantial exercise of authority relative to the use of price mandated market based transfers use both authority and price in important ways for all three policies the transaction costs of these internal transactions may exceed these costs on external transactions

allocating decision rights on the shop floor a perspective from transaction cost economics and organization theory this paper explores the links that the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor maintains with labor transaction attributes and several structural traits of the firm the approach is based on the transaction cost apparatus and harnesses the theoretical and empirical background provided by organization theory data are presented from a wide field survey in the spanish food and electronics industries standard industry classification sic 20 and 36 evidence not only verifies the influence of firm size property age and unionism but also shows that the allocation of decision rights is related to a particular mix of labor transaction traits specifically one of the most important results is that employer opportunism offers greater explanatory power than employee opportunism

disentangling the theories of firm boundaries a path model and empirical test theories on the motivation underlying firm boundaries have recently sparked renewed debate what best explains whether a firm relies on market control or hierarchical control to secure required resources how do the characteristics of the resources come into play in this study we consider a comprehensive path model of the governance mode decision for sourcing technological know how by integrating different perspectives on firm boundaries including transaction cost economics a resource based view and an options perspective we link characteristics of the technology i e uniqueness barriers to imitation commercial uncertainty technological dynamism to the perceived threat of opportunism the potential for sustainable advantage and the pursuit of a licensing agreement vis a vis the outright acquisition of the firm that possesses the desired know how we use structural equation modeling to analyze 127 sourcing arrangements our results show that technological dynamism and barriers to imitation indirectly influence the governance mode decision by increasing the perceived threat of opportunism commercial uncertainty directly influences the governance mode and decreases the likelihood of an acquisition vis a vis a licensing agreement although uniqueness and barriers to imitation are also positively associated with the perceived potential for sustainable advantage the potential for sustainable advantage had no direct effect on governance mode implications and suggestions for further research are offered

preference heterogeneity and insurance markets explaining a puzzle of insurance the textbook approach to insurance markets emphasizes the role of private information about risk in determining who purchases insurance in the classic adverse selection model of michael rothschild and joseph stiglitz 1976 individu als with higher expected claims buy more insur ance than those with lower expected claims who may be out of the market entirely this basic prediction of asymmetric information models of a positive correlation between insurance cov erage and accident occurrence has been shown to be robust to a variety of extensions to the stan

menu costs and the long run output inflation trade off abstract in standard new keynesian models there exists an unlimited long run trade off between output and inflation but when we allow for an endogenous frequency of price adjustment this is replaced by an inverted u shaped relationship

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

health insurance without single crossing why healthy people have high coverage standard insurance models predict that people with high risks have high insurance coverage it is empirically documented that people with high income have lower health risks and are better insured we show that income differences between risk types lead to a violation of single crossing in an insurance model where people choose treatment intensity we analyse different market structures and show the following if insurers have market power the violation of single crossing caused by income differences and endogenous treatment choice can explain the empirically observed outcome our results do not rely on differences in risk aversion between types

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

monetary policy trend inflation and the great moderation an alternative interpretation with positive trend inflation the taylor principle does not guarantee a determinate equilibrium we provide new theoretical results on determinacy in new keynesian models with positive trend inflation and new empirical findings on the federal reserve s reaction function before and after the volcker disinflation to find that i while the fed likely satisfied the taylor principle before volcker the us economy was still subject to self fulfilling fluctuations in the 1970s ii the us economy switched to determinacy during the volcker disinflation and iii the switch reflected changes in the fed s response to macroeconomic variables and the decline in trend inflation jel e12 e23 e31 e32 e52

lack of divine coincidence in new keynesian models abstract the literature has long agreed that the divine coincidence holds in standard new keynesian models the monetary authority is able to simultaneously stabilize inflation and output gap in response to preference and technology shocks i show that the divine coincidence holds only when inflation is stabilized at exactly zero even small deviations from zero generate policy trade offs i demonstrate this result using the model s non linear equilibrium conditions to avoid biases from log linearization when the model is log linearized a non zero steady state level of inflation gives rise to what i call the endogenous trend inflation cost push shock in the new keynesian phillips curve

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

pricing and welfare in health plan choice premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs either because consumers have private information or because prices are not risk rated this creates inefficiencies when consumers self select into plans we develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers we find a welfare loss of 2 11 percent of coverage costs compared to what is feasible with risk rating only about one quarter of this is due to inefficiently chosen uniform contribution levels we also investigate the reclassification risk created by risk rating individual incremental premiums finding only a modest welfare cost

a dynamic analysis of the demand for health insurance and health care we find that asymmetric information is important for the uptake of supplementary private health insurance and health care utilization we use dynamic panel data models to investigate the sources of asymmetric information and distinguish short run selection effects into insurance from long run selection effects short run selection effects i e responses to shocks are adverse but small in size also long run effects driven by differences in for example preferences and risk aversion are small but we find some evidence for multidimensional asymmetric information for example mental health causes advantageous selection estimates of health care utilization models suggest that moral hazard is not important

the threat from within account managers concern about opportunism by their own team members it is well known that transaction specific investments tsis made in customers by account managers makes them vulnerable to opportunism by customers i e the targets of the investments the present research shows that tsis made in customers by account managers can also lead them to be concerned about internal opportunism by nontargets of the investments e g information technology or finance specialists in their own teams furthermore it shows that concern about internal opportunism leads account managers to engage in internal blocking of their own team members i e restricting their access to customers and to customer information which results in lower performance with customers this phenomenon is a conundrum in that account managers interested in stronger performance with customers appear to block the very functional specialists who can help them attain better performance this research also identifies two types of continuities account manager customer continuity and specialist customer continuity that moderate the relationship between tsis and concern about internal opportunism building on the literature in economics and organization theory our research suggests that cross functional teams that are designed to bring different functional areas together are more complex to manage than previously believed this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta and preyas desai special issue editors

reconsidering the natural rate hypothesis in a new keynesian framework abstract this paper formulates a stylized new keynesian model in which each individual firm can select the frequency of its price adjustments the endogeneity of contract duration has a dramatic impact on the magnitude of the aggregate effects of steady state inflation with a plausible calibration of the magnitude of menu costs and other structural parameters this model predicts a relationship between steady state inflation and the frequency of price adjustment that is reasonably close to the empirical findings of cross country studies furthermore at moderate inflation rates steady state inflation generates relative price distortions that have a non trivial impact on aggregate output but this impact wanes and eventually disappears at much higher annual inflation rates because the frequency of price adjustment approaches that of the flexible price economy

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

make buy or ally a transaction cost theory meta analysis since the publication of williamson s markets and hierarchies many empirical articles have investigated the tenets of transaction cost theory using meta analytic techniques we quantitatively syn

advantageous selection in insurance markets this article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision risk tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk averse types taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients allowing a strict pareto gain this result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies as does the novel finding of a pure strategy partial pooling subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the insurance market copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

trend inflation taylor principle and indeterminacy positive trend inflation shrinks the determinacy region of a basic new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model when monetary policy is conducted by a contemporaneous interest rate rule neither the taylor principle which requires the inflation coefficient to be greater than one nor the generalized taylor principle which requires that the nominal interest rate to be raised by more than the increase in inflation in the long run is a sufficient condition for local determinacy of equilibrium this finding holds for different types of taylor rules inertial policy rules and price indexation schemes therefore regardless of the theoretical setup the monetary literature on interest rate rules cannot disregard average inflation in both theoretical and empirical analyses

learning about monetary policy rules abstract we study macroeconomic systems with forward looking private sector agents and a monetary authority that is trying to control the economy through the use of a linear policy feedback rule we use stability under recursive learning a la evans and honkapohja learning and expectations in macroeconomics princeton university press princeton new jersey 2001 as a criterion for evaluating monetary policy rules in this context we find that considering learning can alter the evaluation of alternative policy rules

asymmetric information in insurance general testable implications several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk as predicted by standard models of pure adverse selection or pure moral hazard we show here that the positive correlationproperty can be extended to general setups competitive insurance markets and cases where risk aversion is public we test our results on a french dataset our tests confirm that the estimated correlation is positive they also suggest the presence of market power

calvo vs rotemberg in a trend inflation world an empirical investigation this paper estimates and compares new keynesian dsge monetary models of the business cycle derived under two dierent pricing schemes calvo 1983 and rotemberg 1982 under a positive trend in ation rate our empirical ndings i support trend in ation as an empirically relevant feature of the u s great moderation ii provide evidence in favor of the statistical superiority of the calvo setting iii support the absence of price indexation under the calvo mechanism only the superiority of the calvo model against rotemberg is due to the restrictions imposed by such a pricing scheme on the aggregate demand equation the determinacy regions implied by the two estimated models indicate relevant dierences in the implementable simple policy rules

endogenous price stickiness trend inflation and macroeconomic stability previous studies show that higher trend inflation is more likely to induce indeterminacy of equilibrium in sticky price models based on micro evidence that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged this paper demonstrates that when the degree of price stickiness is endogenously determined in a calvo model indeterminacy caused by higher trend inflation is less likely a key factor for determinacy is the long run inflation elasticity of output implied by the new keynesian phillips curve this elasticity declines substantially with higher trend inflation in the case of exogenously given price stickiness whereas in the case of endogenous price stickiness the decline in the elasticity is mitigated because higher trend inflation leads to a higher probability of price adjustment

preference heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance the case of australia a basic prediction of theoretical models of insurance is that if consumers have private information about their risk of suffering a loss there will be a positive correlation between risk and the level of insurance coverage we test this prediction in the context of the market for private health insurance in australia despite a universal public system that provides comprehensive coverage for inpatient and outpatient care roughly half of the adult population also carries private health insurance the main benefit of which is more timely access to elective hospital treatment like several studies on different types of insurance in other countries we find no support for the positive correlation hypothesis because strict underwriting regulations create strong information asymmetries this result suggests the importance of multi dimensional private information additional analyses suggest that the advantageous selection observed in this market is driven by the effect of risk aversion the ability to make complex financial decisions and income

private information and insurance rejections across a wide set of nongroup insurance markets applicants are rejected based on observable often high risk characteristics this paper argues that private information held by the potential applicant pool explains rejections i formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk i first derive a new no trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections i then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no trade condition can explain rejections the methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs i apply this approach to three nongroup markets long term care disability and life insurance consistent with the predictions of the theory in all three settings i find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected i find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance and i show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected the results suggest that private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets publication abstract

from security to mobility generalized investments in human capital and agent commitment this paper considers the impacts of different investments in human capital firm specific versus generalized investments on employee commitment to the firm the resource based literature has stressed that only firm specific human capital is likely to generate organizational rents since those assets are more likely to be inimitable rare and therefore a better basis for sustained competitive advantage generalized investments in human capital i e investments in capabilities that people can transfer and deploy to other firms or settings are to be avoided however observing lessons from the literature on psychological contracts and organizational commitment we argue that generalized investments may have value for the firm through their effects on worker commitment to the firm the gain in worker commitment is valuable to firms given the fragile state of the contemporary employment relation in which the lack of job security is likely to breed diminished employee commitment this is particularly a concern for employment relations consisting of externalized labor i e contract work or selfemployed professionals operating as agents of the firm in which agent commitment is vital but likely to be more scarce in this paper we focus on the externalized workers independent agents of two insurance firms in addressing these issues a sample of 237 agents shows support for the benefits of generalized investments on agent commitment questioning conventional wisdom that such investments should be avoided we also examine the impact of relation specific investments and other key antecedents on agent commitment concluding that a mixture of strategic investments in human capital should be considered taking into account their impacts on the firm worker psychological contract we also examine the impact of agent commitment on agent performance in this context finding committed agents do provide greater value to the insurer

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

trend inflation sticky prices and expectational stability abstract micro evidence indicates that each period a fraction of prices is kept unchanged under a positive trend inflation rate in a sticky price model based on this evidence recent research shows that high trend inflation is a serious cause for indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium under the taylor rule this paper examines implications of trend inflation for expectational stability of the equilibrium an empirically plausible calibration of the model demonstrates that a fundamental rational expectations equilibrium is likely to be expectationally stable even in cases of indeterminacy induced by high trend inflation

strategic fit in industrial alliances an empirical test of governance value analysis abstract the exclusion of firm specific considerations in the standard economizing calculus approach to buyer supplier ties makes the large variations in the types of contracts used within the same industry unexplainable this article tests ghosh and john s 1999 strategizing calculus model that purports to close this gap the core organizing principle of this model is a three way fit among firm resources investments and governance that yields the highest net receipts from this principle the authors derive predictions and test them using data from 193 original equipment manufacturers that engage independent component suppliers the data show that investments must be aligned with more complete contract terms e g fixed prices hard designs to yield cost reduction outcomes for all firms however investments must be aligned with more incomplete contracts e g cost plus prices soft designs to yield end product enhancement outcomes but only for firms with relatively small downstream market

prices are sticky after all abstract economists have interpreted the evidence that prices change every four months as implying that sticky prices cannot be important for monetary transmission theory implies that this interpretation is correct if most price changes are regular but not if a large fraction are temporary as in the data since regular prices are much stickier than temporary ones our models predict that the stickiness of the aggregate price level matches that in a standard calvo model or a standard menu cost model in which micro level prices change about once a year in this sense prices are sticky after all

endogenous nominal rigidities and monetary policy monetary policy analysis with exogenously given nominal rigidities is subject to lucas critique if the degree of them varies over policy regimes as recent empirical studies point out in a calvo style sticky price model we endogenize nominal rigidities and examine its implications for monetary policy while previous studies stress that the frequency of price adjustment changes with steady state inflation we focus on how this frequency varies in response to changes in the taylor rule in the same steady state we find that a more aggressive policy response to inflation makes firms less likely to reset their prices resulting in a flat slope of the new keynesian phillips curve as observed in the post 1982 u s economy and a small variance of shocks to the curve as in the great moderation we also find that an aggressive policy response to inflation can stabilize both inflation and the output gap by exploiting the feedback effect of the policy stance on firms price setting taking into account this effect is thus crucial to the policy conduct further we show that an endogenous inflation weight of the social welfare loss function is critical to policy evaluation since this weight changes significantly with the frequency of price adjustment jel classification e31 e32 e52

the salesperson as outside agent or employee a transaction cost analysis this descriptive study explores the reasons for integration of the personal selling function i e the use of employee direct salespeople rather than manufacturers representatives reps a hypothesized model is developed based on both transaction cost analysis and the sales force management literature data from 13 electronic component manufacturers covering 159 u s sales districts are used to estimate a logistic model of the probability of going direct in a given district results are shown to be stable across specification and estimation methods and to fit the data well the transaction cost model is generally supported the principal finding is that the greater the difficulty of evaluating a salesperson s performance the more likely the firm to substitute surveillance for commission as a control mechanism i e to use a direct sales force among other findings direct sales forces are also associated with complex hard to learn product lines and with districts that demand considerable nonselling activities several factors prove unrelated including company size the amount of travel a district requires and the importance of key accounts this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 3 pages 234 254 in 1985

adverse selection in insurance markets policyholder evidence from the u k annuity market in this paper we investigate the importance of adverse selection in insurance markets we use a unique data set consisting of all annuity policies sold by a large u k insurance company since the early 1980s to analyze mortality differences among individuals who purchased different types of policies we find systematic relationships between ex post mortality and annuity policy characteristics such as whether the annuity will make payments to the estate in the event of an untimely death and whether the payments from the annuity rise over time these mortality patterns are consistent with the presence of asymmetric information in the annuity market we find no evidence of substantive mortality differences however across annuities of different size even though models of insurance market equilibrium with asymmetric information would predict such differences we also find that the pricing of various features of annuity contracts is consistent with the self selection patterns we find in mortality rates our results therefore suggest that selection may occur across many specific features of insurance contracts and that the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on others this highlights the importance of considering the detailed features of insurance contracts when testing theoretical models of asymmetric information

estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices we provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection we then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance such variation together with quantity data allows us to estimate the demand for insurance the same variation together with cost data allows us to estimate how insurers costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price the slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and the nature of selection and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare we illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employerprovided health insurance from one specific company we detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small in both absolute and relative terms

state dependent or time dependent pricing does it matter for recent u s inflation in the 1988 2004 micro data collected by the u s bureau of labor statistics for the cpi price changes are frequent every 4 7 months depending on the treatment of sale prices and large in absolute value on the order of 10 the size and timing of price changes varies considerably for a given item but the size and probability of a price change are unrelated to the time since the last price change movements in aggregate inflation reflect movements in the size of price changes rather than the fraction of items changing price due to offsetting movements in the fraction of price increases and decreases neither leading time dependent models taylor or calvo nor 1 st generation state dependent models match all of these facts some 2 nd generation state dependent models however appear broadly consistent with the empirical patterns

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

buyer supplier relations in industrial markets when do buyers risk making idiosyncratic investments it is well established that the existence of investments specific to a relationship influences the choice of governance structure including the use of contractual safeguards what is less well understood are the circumstances leading to the creation of those specific assets to begin with this paper explores the industrial buyer s motives to put itself at risk by making investments tangible and intangible which cannot be readily redeployed from one supplier to another using original data from a sample of 388 supply relationships involving all automakers in the u s and japan we examine features of the supply task the supplier and the supply environment which serve as motives to make supplier specific investments we also examine potential factors which facilitate the posting of specific assets as credible commitments to attenuate supplier opportunism we find that specific investments by buyers serve as a mechanism to 1 increase coordination when the manufacturing task is complex 2 buffer the buyer against technological uncertainty and 3 build close relationships when the requisite production skills are scarce the supply market is thin we find more specific investments in supply arrangements that are embedded in a broader business relationship we find fewer supplier specific investments in the japanese context finally we find that buyers focus their investments on lesser known low share component makers perhaps to capitalize on a unique focused supplier capability

the macroeconomic effects of nonzero trend inflation we study the macroeconomic effects of nonzero trend inflation in a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model under three common time dependent pricing schemes calvo truncated calvo and taylor we show that regardless of the pricing mechanism trend inflation leads to a reduction in the stochastic means of output consumption and employment and an increase in the stochastic mean of inflation beyond its deterministic steady state level the variability of most aggregates also increases these effects are quantitatively much stronger with calvo pricing

an empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance this paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world life insurance we report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information we conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market as in those for most other products

staggered price setting with endogenous frequency of adjustment abstract a model of staggered price setting in which the frequency of price changes is endogenous is presented

trend inflation wage and price rigidities and productivity growth abstract what are the steady state implications of inflation in a general equilibrium model with real per capita output growth and staggered nominal price and wage contracts surprisingly a benchmark calibration implies an optimal inflation rate of 1 9 percent the analysis also shows that trend inflation has important effects on the economy when combined with nominal contracts and real output growth steady state output and welfare losses are quantitatively important even for low values of trend inflation further nominal wage contracting is found to be quantitatively more important than nominal price contracting in generating the results this conclusion does not arise from price dispersion per se but from an effect of nominal output growth on the optimal markup of monopolistically competitive labour suppliers finally accounting for productivity growth is found to be important for calculating the welfare costs of inflation indeed the presence of 2 percent productivity growth increases the welfare costs of inflation in the benchmark specification by a factor of four relative to the no growth case

optimal mandates and the welfare cost of asymmetric information evidence from the u k annuity market much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected once detected however there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs to do so we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the u k annuity market the model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options we focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities the results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first best symmetric information benchmark by about 127 million per year or about 2 percent of annuitized wealth we also find that by requiring that individuals choose the longest guarantee period allowed mandates could achieve the first best allocation however we estimate that other mandated guarantee lengths would have detrimental effects on welfare since determining the optimal mandate is empirically difficult our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest

trend inflation indexation and inflation persistence in the new keynesian phillips curve purely forward looking versions of the new keynesian phillips curve nkpc generate too little inflation persistence some authors add ad hoc backward looking terms to address this shortcoming we hypothesize that inflation per sistence results mainly from variation in the long run trend component of inflation which we attribute to shifts in monetary policy we derive a version of the nkpc that incorporates a time varying inflation trend and examine whether it explains the dynamics of inflation when drift in trend inflation is taken into account a purely forward looking version of the model fits the data well and there is no need for backward looking components jel e12 e31 e52 in this paper we consider the extent to which guillermo calvo s 1983 model of nominal price rigidities can explain inflation dynamics without relying on arbitrary backward looking terms in its baseline formulation the calvo model leads to a purely forward looking new keynesian

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

the macroeconomics of trend inflation most macroeconomic models for monetary policy analysis are approximated around a zero inflation steady state but most central banks target an inflation rate of about 2 percent many economists have recently proposed even higher inflation targets to reduce the incidence of the zero lower bound constraint on monetary policy in this survey we show that the conduct of monetary policy should be analyzed by appropriately accounting for the positive trend inflation targeted by policymakers we first review empirical research on the evolution and dynamics of u s trend inflation and some proposed new measures to assess the volatility and persistence of trend based inflation gaps we then construct a generalized new keynesian model that accounts for a positive trend inflation in this model an increase in trend inflation is associated with a more volatile and unstable economy and tends to destabilize inflation expectations this analysis offers a note of caution regarding recent proposals to address the existing zero lower bound problem by raising the long run inflation target jel e12 e31 e32 e52 e58

optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation abstract in the monetary policy literature it is common to assume that trend inflation is zero despite overwhelming evidence that zero inflation is neither empirically relevant nor a practical objective for central bank policy we therefore extend the standard new keynesian model to allow for positive trend inflation showing that even low trend inflation has strong effects on optimal monetary policy and the dynamics of inflation output and interest rates under discretion the efficient policy deteriorates and there is no guarantee of determinacy even with commitment targeting non zero trend inflation leads to substantial welfare losses our results serve as a warning against indiscriminate use of models assuming zero trend inflation

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

tariffs and the risk of invasive pest introductions in commodity imports theory and empirical evidence abstract we investigate using tariffs as corrective taxes to reduce risks from biological invasions due to expanded world trade a theoretical analysis indicates that higher tariffs have ambiguous effects on invasive pest introductions an econometric analysis using data from us department of agriculture surveillance screening indicates that tariff rates exert a negligible influence on expected invasive pest introductions from commodities currently facing positive tariffs removal of duty free status would decrease expected pest intercepts but undermine other goals of us trade policy and lower consumer welfare consumer welfare loss is on the order of 38 million per expected intercept avoided