the poverty gap in school spending following the introduction of title i abstract title i of the 1965 elementary and secondary education act explicitly directed more federal aid for k 12 education to poorer areas for the first time in us history with a goal of promoting regional convergence in school spending using newly collected data we find some evidence that title i narrowed the gap in per pupil school spending between richer and poorer states in the short to medium run however the program was small relative to then existing poverty gaps in school spending even in the absence of crowd out by local or state governments the program could have reduced the gap by only 15 percent

human capital accumulation in a federation abstract more than half of the variation across u s school districts in real k 12 education expenditures per student is due to differences between rather than within states i study the welfare implications of redistribution of education expenditures by the federal government using an analytically tractable model of human capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents and endogenous state policies the net welfare effect of federal redistribution depends on a trade off between the positive effect of redistributing resources toward poorer states and the negative effect resulting from misallocation of population across states federal redistribution increases welfare in a calibrated version of the model

noncooperation by popular vote expectations foreign intervention and the vote in the 2015 greek bailout referendum when popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones it not only affects domestic voters but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements we explore how voters respond to this strategic environment we use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 greek bailout referendum a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a noncooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations our analysis of the greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior voters expecting that a noncooperative referendum outcome would force greece to leave the eurozone were substantially more likely to vote cooperatively than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the country s creditors leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a noncooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes

is a uniform social policy better fiscal federalism and factor mobility this paper develops a two country model to study two questions how do the degrees of centralization of redistribution and of factor mobility affect the productive efficiency of the economies what degrees of centralization of redistribution and of factor mobility are likely to be chosen by majority rule the model shows that a system of centralized redistribution can lead to less efficient outcomes if labor or capital are not mobile and an inefficient outcome with incomplete or no factor mobility receives a majority of votes in both countries whenever the structure of labor markets is very different in the two countries

does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

fiscal shenanigans targeted federal health care funds and patient mortality we explore the effectiveness of matching grants when lower levels of government can expropriate some of the funds for other uses using data on the medicaid disproportionate share program we identify states that were most able to expropriate funds payments to public hospitals in these states were systematically diverted and had no significant impact on patient mortality payments that were not expropriated were associated with significant declines in patient mortality overall subsidies were an effective mechanism for improving outcomes for the poor but the impact was limited by the ability of state and local governments to divert the targeted funds

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

active labour market policies and the efficiency of the european social fund in spanish regions abstractactive labour market policies and the efficiency of the european social fund in spanish regions regional studies this paper estimates the determinants of public expenditure on active labour market policies almps at the regional level using panel data from a sample of the 17 spanish regions 1989 2010 the estimations take into account endogeneity dynamics and spatial dependence among regions estimations outcome is interpreted with the help of a simple theoretical model of intergovernmental grants results reveal that the european social fund is not effective in its aim of promoting almp expenditure and show that rent seeking when regions compete to attract funds from a common pool provokes the opposite effect which is exacerbated in the presence of imitation

political credit cycles the case of the euro zone we study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the euro delayed rather than advanced economic reforms in the euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries we show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration in turn not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident we analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in greece spain ireland and portugal and by way of contrast in germany a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the euro

cops and crime abstract the violent crime control and law enforcement act of 1994 established the community oriented policing services cops program that provided grants to states and localities to pay up to 75 of the cost for new police hires for 3 years to date the cops program has awarded almost 5 billion in hiring grants paying for 64 000 new police officers we use annual data from 1990 through 2001 from 2074 cities with populations in excess of 10 000 to show that for each officer paid for by grant funds the size of the force expands by 0 70 officers the size of cops grants are correlated with population and crime rates but not the pre cops time trends in crime rates or the size of the police force this allows us to use the size of cops grants as an instrument for the size of the police force in regressions where crime is the outcome of interest these models indicate that police added to the force by cops generated statistically significant reductions in auto thefts burglaries robberies and aggravated assaults

relying on the private sector the income distribution and public investments in the poor abstract what drives governments with similar revenues to provide very different amounts of goods with private sector substitutes education is a prime example i use exogenous shocks to brazilian municipalities revenue during 1995 2008 generated by non linearities in federal transfer laws to demonstrate two things first municipalities with higher income inequality or higher median income allocate less of a revenue shock to education and are less likely to expand public school enrollment they are more likely to invest in public infrastructure that is broadly enjoyed like parks and roads or to save the shock second i find no evidence that the quality of public education suffers as a result if anything unequal and high income areas are more likely to improve public school inputs and test scores following a revenue shock given their heavy use of private education i further provide evidence that an increase in public sector revenue lowers private school enrollment

the empirics of the municipal fiscal adjustment we summarize the literature that uses the vector error correction model approach to analyze the dynamics of the municipal fiscal adjustment the international comparison between samples collected from entire countries and specific regions reveals interesting similarities but also remarkable differences the main similarities are the fulfillment of the intertemporal budget constraint the volatility of the budgetary components and the importance of the intergovernmental transfers as an adjustment instrument the most remarkable difference is the preponderant role of the own revenues in the usa probably reflecting the larger fiscal autonomy of us municipalities in most cases the large municipalities seem to be more dependent on grants than their small counterparts although this pattern is broken in japan finally partial evidence supporting the existence of moral hazard problems and the flypaper effect is provided

fear of floating and the external effects of currency unions the introduction of the euro has considerably affected the de facto monetary policy autonomy defined as independence from monetary policy in the key currency areas in countries outside the european currency union ecu using a standard open economy framework we argue that de facto monetary policy autonomy has significantly declined for countries that dominantly trade with the ecu and slightly increased for countries that dominantly trade with the dollar zone the predictions of our model find support in the data we estimate the influence of the bundesbank s ecb s and the fed s monetary policies on various country groups the de facto monetary policy autonomy of both non euro eu members and efta countries declined with the introduction of the euro this effect was slightly stronger for the eu member countries than for efta countries as our theory predicts at the same time the de facto monetary policy autonomy of australia and new zealand vis a vis the us dollar has moderately increased

unsticking the flypaper effect in an uncertain world abstract we provide a novel explanation for the flypaper effect based on insurance arguments in our model the flypaper effect arises due to the differential response of precautionary savings to private income or fiscal transfers shocks in an uncertain world with incomplete markets the model generates two testable implications i the flypaper effect is a decreasing function of the correlation between fiscal transfers and private income and ii such relationship is stronger the higher is the volatility of fiscal transfers and or private income an empirical analysis of argentinean provinces for the period 1963 2006 finds strong support for the model s implications

the rise of the states u s fiscal decentralization in the postwar period article i nfo article history one of the most dramatic changes in the fiscal federalism landscape during the postwar period has been the rapid growth in state budgets which almost tripled as a share of gdp and doubled as a share of government spending between 1952 and 2006 we argue that the greater role of states cannot be easily explained by changes in tiebout forces of fiscal competition such as mobility and voting patterns and are not accounted for by demographic or income trends rather we demonstrate that much of the growth in state budgets has been driven by changes in intergovernmental interactions restricted federal grants to states have increased and federal policy and legal constraints have also mandated or heavily incentivized state own source spending particularly in the areas of education health and public welfare these outside pressures moderate the forces of fiscal competition and must be taken into account when assessing the implications of observed revenue and spending patterns

the new institutional economics and the theory of the firm abstract concepts of importance in the literature of the new institutional economics such as transaction costs and bounded rationality have been used to extend the standard neoclassical model of the firm but the hybrid models created have failed to provide adequate explanations of enterprise behavior an alternative neoinstitutional model of the firm is developed in the paper that differs from the pure neoclassical model and hybrid models in respect to both the nature of the solution it yields and the process by which it reaches a solution the neoinstitutional firm cannot be expected to achieve either the hypothetical allocative efficiency promised by the frictionless neoclassical model or the relatively efficient constrained pareto optimal solutions predicted by the largely frictionless hybrid models the orthodox marginal rules of neoclassicism can only be used to solve lower level problems that appear within the firm

the flypaper effect what happens to a state s spending when it receives an unconditional grant from the federal government the standard theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in spending will be the same as that generated by an equivalent increase in local incomes or roughly 5 10 percent for most states in contrast numerous empirical analyses have found that spending increases by much more with some estimates near 100 percent this result is known as the flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where it hits the authors review this evidence as well as other studies that find similar behavior in firms

microenterprise growth and the flypaper effect evidence from a randomized experiment in ghana standard models of investment predict that credit constrained firms should grow rapidly when given additional capital and that how this capital is provided should not affect decisions to invest in the business or consume the capital we randomly gave cash and in kind grants to male and female owned microenterprises in urban ghana for women running subsistence enterprises we find no gain in profits from either treatment for women with larger businesses we strongly reject equality of the cash and in kind grants only in kind grants cause growth in profits suggesting a flypaper effect whereby capital coming directly into the business sticks there but cash does not the results for men also suggest a lower impact of cash but differences between cash and in kind grants are less robust there is suggestive evidence that the difference in the effects of cash and in kind grants is associated more with lack of self control than with external pressure

a predictive index for the flypaper effect abstract it is well established that lump sum public grants boost local government spending more than an equivalent increase in private income the flypaper effect one shortcoming of the related literature is that it presumes all communities have an identical propensity to consume from an intergovernmental grant this paper is one attempt to allow for a heterogeneous response the working conjecture is that government expenditure on administrative overhead is a gauge of voter control over fiscal decisions high overhead spending implies a lower provision of public services and a stronger role for revenue maximizing forces in the budget setting process as such the flypaper effect should be more marked in high overhead communities an overhead index is applied to a sample of pennsylvania communities in the philadelphia metropolitan area it is difficult to understand these governments spending propensities from various windfall revenues without the help of the overhead index supportive evidence for this approach because overhead data is widely available the technique here can be used to address important policy questions such as predicting variations in state government responses to the recently created lump sum welfare grants

finders keepers forfeiture laws policing and local budgets to encourage anti drug policing the federal government and many state governments have enacted laws that allow police agencies to keep a substantial fraction of the assets that they seize in drug arrests we use rich new data on police seizures and local spending to explore the reactions of both governments and police to the incentives created by these policies we find that local governments offset police seizures by reducing their other allocations to police partially undermining the incentives laid out in statute and diverting the earmarked funds to other purposes police in turn respond to the real net incentives for seizures once local offsets are taken into account by increasing the drug arrest rate heroin prices also increase suggesting that the increased emphasis on anti drug policing raises the supply costs of illicit drugs these findings highlight both the promise and pitfalls of using financial incentives to solve agency problems in a federal system both local agents and intervening governments have sophisticated responses to financial incentives and these responses must be taken into account in both designing effective policies and evaluating their consequences 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending when investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower level governments it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments in this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates the formula for the distribution of funds is used as an exclusion restriction in an iv estimation we find evidence of crowding in where federal grants are shifted to more local spending but not to reduced local tax rates

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

the political geography of the eurocrisis the european union provided a mixed response to the 2008 financial crisis on the one hand it refused to pursue fiscal integration through a common budget on the other it introduced significant transfers between countries that were designed to produce financial stabilization the authors analyze this response as the outcome of democratic constraints on eu leaders given the eu s current institutional structure citizens preferences pose a binding constraint on what leaders can do as these preferences limit the scope of risk pooling among members and the degree of political tolerance for different courses of action the authors show that citizens preferences reflect differences in the geography of income production regimes and institutional organization the heterogeneity of constituencies redistribution preferences combined with a diverse economic geography helps to explain why political constraints on national governments prevent them from engaging in further fiscal integration by contrast externalities among member states shift the preferences of citizens who may experience negative effects and make international redistribution politically feasible the authors analyze these two mechanisms and present novel empirical results on the determinants of preferences for fiscal integration and international redistribution in the aftermath of the eurocrisis

tax mix corners and other kinks abstractthis paper models the local tax mix determination process in the presence of statewide fiscal limitations the decentralized government finance archetype and shows how excess sensitivity of local public spending to grants the conventionally and somewhat misleadingly termed flypaper effect arises in the constrained tax mix irrespective of whether lower or upper limits bind and how it cannot in general be taken as a symptom of local government overspending an empirical application to italian province panel data provides consistent evidence of the role of corner solutions produced by two sided tax limits in explaining the sensitivity of local public expenditures to grants

preferences for international redistribution the divide over the eurozone bailouts why do voters agree to bear the costs of bailing out other countries despite the prominence of public opinion in the ongoing debate over the eurozone bailouts voters preferences on the topic are poorly understood we conduct the first systematic analysis of this issue using observational and experimental survey data from germany the country shouldering the largest share of the eu s financial rescue fund testing a range of theoretical explanations we find that individuals own economic standing has limited explanatory power in accounting for their position on the bailouts in contrast social dispositions such as altruism and cosmopolitanism robustly correlate with support for the bailouts the results indicate that the divide in public opinion over the bailouts does not reflect distributive lines separating domestic winners and losers instead the bailout debate is better understood as a foreign policy issue that pits economic nationalist sentiments versus greater cosmopolitan affinity and other regarding concerns

special interest groups and the allocation of public funds i propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income in this model violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government the predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry although windfalls are legally unrestricted the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to 2 30 per capita upon receipt of funds the marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0 20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income states which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less these results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature

does partisan affiliation impact the distribution of spending evidence from state governments expenditures on education abstract how and why does partisan affiliation impact policy using a regression discontinuity strategy and focusing on state education spending we find that democratic and republican governors allocate spending differently in particular school districts with higher shares of minority students receive larger state transfers than other districts under democratic governors a similar pattern occurs in state transfers to higher education institutions this is true regardless of whether the governor is eligible for reelection we find no evidence that democrat governors are simply sending money to areas with a larger share of democrats these results suggest that the observed policy divergence is driven by differences in preferences of elected candidates

government decision making and the incidence of federal mandates abstract this paper analyzes the effects of federally mandated program changes on state spending and revenues incorporating and evaluating the predictive value of several common theories of the state decision making process using several sources of exogenous increases in public medical spending i estimate that the entire state portion of the burden of mandated spending is borne by decreases in other public welfare spending while federal mandates may influence the composition of benefits at the state level it is much more difficult for them to change the total level of state transfers comparison of state reactions to different shocks suggests that these reductions are due in part to the substitutability of programs in the voter utility function but also in part to the stickiness of spending within budget categories states with greater racial differences between recipients and voters and states with less generous neighbors reduce other public welfare spending by even more alleviating the burden the medical expansions imposed on their taxpayers mandates may thus serve only to increase inequality across states

bayesian inference for comparative research rv egression analysis in comparative research suffers from two distinct problems of statistical inference first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of a repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second the small and collinear data sets of comparative research yield imprecise estimates of the effects of explanatory variables we describe a bayesian approach to statistical inference that provides a unified solution to these two problems this approach is illustrated in a comparative analysis of unionization a widely used tool in quantitative comparative politics is the linear regression model estimating relationships between institutional and economic variables observed for a set of countries constituting some population of interest a brief survey of recent comparative research finds no shortage of work of this type for instance remmer 1991 identifies economic crisis as a source of electoral volatility in latin american countries in the 1980s robertson 1990 presents evidence that institutions moderating the transaction costs of negotiations between capital and labor reduce industrial conflict and golden 1993 finds that union wage moderation in industrialized democracies results from coordinated collective bargaining although the methodological advantages are well documented jackman 1985 we identify two distinct problems of statistical inference endemic to this type of quantitative comparative research first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of some repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second because data sets tend to be small and collinear the effects of explanatory variables are estimated imprecisely in most applications the first problem is generally ignored and the second is solved by imposing restrictions on the regression model to obtain sensible results the bayesian model of statistical inference provides a unified solution to these two distinct problems of quantitative comparative research two features of bayesian inference are important in this context first probability is conceived subjectively as characterizing a researcher s uncertainty about the parameters of a statistical model this subjective probability concept seems particularly useful in comparative settings where the data are typically convenience samples not generated by a known probability mechanism such as random sampling second bayesian inference allows the inclusion of other information in addition to the quantitative sample information again this seems useful in the comparative context where rich historical material is commonly available sparking ideas for researchers but formally discarded in the final analysis in the bayesian approach this historical material can be formally incorporated into the analysis we begin by detailing why the nonstochastic and weak data typical of comparative research are problematic for conventional linear regression analysis we next introduce some ideas about bayesian inference and describe bayesian regression analysis these ideas are applied to a comparative analysis of unionization the subject of a recent exchange in the american political science review between michael wallerstein and john stephens stephens and wallerstein 1991 wallerstein 1989 the bayesian regressions we present are supplemented with a sensitivity analysis that investigates how our conclusions depend upon the sample data and our prior beliefs although we survey some ideas in bayesian statistics a full introduction to the bayesian approach to statistical inference is beyond our scope here good book length treatments are pollard 1986 lee 1989 and at a slightly higher level press 1989 our intention here is to spotlight problematic but ignored issues of statistical inference in a common area of application the bayesian alternative that we present represents just one way forward to address these inferential problems

does foreign aid promote the expansion of government building on the literature on public finance i seek to advance our understanding of variations in government size by exploring the impact of official development assistance on fiscal policy i hypothesize that foreign aid operates in accordance with the flypaper effect systematically generating incentives and opportunities for the expansion of government spending results from a time series cross sectional regression analysis of growth in government spending over the 1970 99 time period are consistent with the hypothesis for middle and lower income nations aid represents an important determinant of government expansion looking at the tax and revenue side of the equation however reveals a more perverse pattern of response aid promotes not only increased spending but also reduced revenue generation the results have important implications from both a theoretical and policy perspective inter alia they point to the potentially self defeating nature of efforts to promote market oriented programs of state retrenchment via development assistance as well as to the importance of incorporating international transfers into future research on government spending

hospital ownership and public medical spending the hospital market is served by firms that are private for profit private not for profit and government owned and operated i use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that was intended to improve medical care for the poor to test three theories of organizational behavior i find that the critical difference between the three types of hospitals is caused by the soft budget constraint of government owned institutions the decision makers in private not for profit hospitals are just as responsive to financial incentives and are no more altruistic than their counterparts in profit maximizing facilities my final set of results suggests that the significant increase in public medical spending examined in this paper has not improved health outcomes for the indigent i introduction the hospital market is served by firms that are private for profit private not for profit and publicly owned and operated in this paper i examine how a hospital s type of ownership influences its response to profitable opportunities that are created by changes in government policy the policy change that i exploit was designed to improve the quality of medical care for lowincome individuals by significantly increasing hospitals financial incentives to treat them this program also substantially increased the revenues of those hospitals that had been serving a disproportionate share of the indigent i use this plausibly exogenous change in government policy to test three different theories of organizational behavior and then to assess the impact of hospital behavioral responses on health outcomes the response of organizations to changes in government policy will have an important impact on the consequences of these policies this is likely to be especially true in the medical sector in which the federal state and local governments contract directly

general revenue sharing and public sector unions abstract in this paper i find that in the context of a large intergovernmental general revenue sharing program implemented from 1972 to 1986 cities increased expenditures one for one with federal grants which is suggestive of a large flypaper effect furthermore i find that cities in states with pro union collective bargaining laws spent more than half of the transfers on increased wages while cities in states without such laws spent a greater fraction on increased government services these latter findings suggest that public sector unions play an important role in determining the usage and impact of intergovernmental grants

the value of school facility investments evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design author s cellini stephanie riegg ferreira fernando rothstein jesse abstract despite extensive public infrastructure spending surprisingly little is known about its economic return in this paper we estimate the value of school facility investments using housing markets standard models of local public goods imply that school districts should spend up to the point where marginal increases would have zero effect on local housing prices our research design isolates exogenous variation in investments by comparing school districts where referenda on bond issues targeted to fund capital expenditures passed and failed by narrow margins we extend this traditional regression discontinuity approach to identify the dynamic treatment effects of bond authorization on local housing prices student achievement and district composition our results indicate that california school districts underinvest in school facilities passing a referendum causes immediate sizable increases in home prices implying a willingness to pay on the part of marginal homebuyers of 1 50 or more for each 1 of capital spending these effects do not appear to be driven by changes in the income or racial composition of homeowners and the impact on test scores appears to explain only a small portion of the total housing price effect c 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

mental accounting of public funds the flypaper effect in the lab abstract we report evidence from a series of laboratory experiments that focus on mental accounting of public funds groups of three players decide upon how much to redistribute within the group we measure the preference to redistribute when transfers are made either out of individual accounts the players own money or out of a common account the group s money since the common account is dissolved after each round and paid out to individuals its size should not affect the decision to redistribute the experiment is designed to control for anchoring as a potential confounding effect we find that the size of the common account significantly affects redistribution behavior specifically the transfer increases in the size of the common account this effect is significantly more pronounced when the transfer is paid out of the common account instead of the individual account we interpret these findings as evidence for a flypaper effect due to mental accounting

failing forward the euro crisis and the incomplete nature of european integration the european union eu project of combining a single market with a common currency was incomplete from its inception this article shows that the incompleteness of the governance architecture of e

exploring the political economy of labour market institutions labour markets how reforms took place many economists argue that the european unemployment problem relates to large labour market rigidities this paper argues that many of those inflexibilities and the underlying institutional regulations can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees this is because many policies that increase unemployment actually benefit these insiders an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour market institutions demonstrates that the observations are consistent with this view the findings imply 1 higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection 2 unemployment benefits are lower the more employment reacts to wages 3 a higher level of unemployment and the existence of a right wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage giles saint paul

asymmetric information and agenda control the bases of monopoly power in public spending abstract a pervasive empirical finding widely known as the flypaper effect is that lump sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction moreover such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process we posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid the empirical results are consistent with flypaper and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants

information chance and evolution alchian and the economics of self organization i introduction alchian 1950 invoked the idea that selection could replace or supplement rationality or conscious design in economic theory evolution in alchian s theory is a force that is complementary to and may even substitute for rationality he showed that selection could lead firms to act in a way consistent with maximizing as an evolutionary adaptation in an environment where positive profits are necessary for survival in such an instance no one individual within the organization would know all that the organization knows because its intelligence is distributed and its goal seeking behavior is an emergent behavior hence no individual could know or say if or how his or her actions lead to any goal or outcome the collective product of their interactions must earn positive profits so the organization can compete with others for scarce resources only to the observer economist will the macroscopic patterns in their behavior appear to be goal oriented by applying the evolutionary metaphor to the firm alchian emphasized self organization over deliberate design as a source of order in economic affairs in tackling this problem he reinvigorated the research program that adam smith 1776 and hayek 1944 extolled they called for the study of an invisible hand far more powerful than the modern version which is little more than a proposition about the computation of a price vector their strong invisible hand theorem is a statement about the inherent order in human affairs an order that is the result of human action but not human design 1 like alchian smith 1776 and hayek 1944 stressed decentralized and self directed action over centralized and planned deliberation and they stressed adaptation in far from equilibrium processes over optimizing in equilibrium their arguments have a strikingly modern tone to economists versed in evolution and chaos and they have a contemporary proponent in alchian alchian s teaching shaped my understanding of economics i distill his teaching to the phrase economics is information theoretic this is evident from the role chance plays in his work for what is chance but a series of coin flips giving yes or no answers to questions a property right is a list of binary decision rules assigning authority to agents it too is information theoretic institutions are information theoretic as well for they give yes or no answers to questions posed by agents seeking guidance from the social knowledge encoded in institutions evolution is information theoretic for it gives yes or no answers to questions about the survival of carriers of information in addition to alchian williamson 1988 jensen and meckling 1979 and friedman 1953 argue that evolutionary competition selects efficient forms of organization in their counterargument to the evolutionary model penrose 1952 and winter 1964 1975 point out that its proponents fail to exhibit a mechanism through which heritable determinants of fitness are transmitted 2 in trying to uncover a mechanism through which selection can operate nelson and winter 1974 1982 argue that internal culture and structure are transmitted as heritable characteristics winter 1982 argues that only human beings possess knowledge and its use and meaning derive from their interaction within an organization the idea that information is distributed among members of an organization and becomes useful to the organization only through structure is closely linked to the idea of emergent behavior i extend alchian s evolutionary argument to show that goal seeking is an emergent property of the dynamic by which an organization comes into being and evolves this dynamic is closely tied to winter s theory of structure and to the enhanced performance that lies behind the idea of emergent behavior for concreteness i consider a network coordination game with a structure of local interaction ii

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

economic risk and political risk in fiscal unions a fiscal programme that redistributes income from rich to poor individuals indirectly redistributes tax revenues from regions hit by a favou rable shock to regions hit by an unfavourable one centralised fiscal redistribution has therefore been advocated as a way to insure individuals against region specific shocks in this paper we argue that a centralised fiscal policy while reducing the uncertainty on the tax base may create additional uncertainty on the tax rate using a simple model we show that the higher uncertainty on the policy instrument might more than offset the lower uncertainty on the tax base several countries around the world are breaking up e g the former soviet union and in others regional movements are becoming more vocal in demanding more autonomy e g italy spain at the same time several western european countries are integrating in a supernational community fiscal policy issues and in particular the level of centralisation of fiscal decisions are important considerations in the formation or collapse of political jurisdictions or of federations of regions and countries 1 a long tradition in public finance argues that a centralised fiscal system can reach more efficient outcomes by better internalising the numerous externalities associated with both the expenditure and the revenue sides of fiscal policy particularly when factors are mobile this line of argument applies to both the provision of public goods gordon 1983 and to redistributive fiscal policy pauli 1973 ladd and doolittle 1982 brown and oates 1987 a counter argument to this conclusion is developed in perotti 1997 who shows that in the presence of differences in say labour markets or the administration of fiscal policy centralised redistribution can lead to a more inefficient allocation of resources a second argument in favour of centralised fiscal policy is based on the insurance properties of redistribution when different countries are hit by

risks and redistribution an individual level analysis much of the disagreement in the debate about globalization and its present or absent effects on the welfare state stems from competing assumptions about the individual level determinants of redistributional preferences this article calls for and provides testing of these causal mechanisms at the individual level traditional accounts suggest that risks at the industry level are important determinants of redistributional preferences this article argues that risks at the occupational level should also be considered a comprehensive new data set is used to test whether and what types of risks in the labor market play an important role in shaping preferences statistical analyses of public opinion surveys european social survey show strong evidence for the assumed causal mechanism contrary to much of the literature but in line with this article s claims it is the occupational rather than the industry level that is most important the article lays out implications of these findings

the flypaper effect and other anomalies abstract i develop a model in which income both in its own right and as a proxy for other socioeconomic characteristics is an input in the production function for local public services the most obvious example is education though there are other applications as well the comparative statics results from this model yield the following results 1 the observed flypaper effect the tendency for local government to spend a higher fraction of unrestricted grants than income of residents may be due at least in part to the fact that own income but not grants is a substitute for purchased inputs in the technology hence the propensity to spend on purchased inputs out of own income is lower than out of grants 2 the income elasticity of demand for public sector output may be higher than the observed income elasticity of demand for purchased inputs 3 equalization of educational opportunity via wealth neutrality as suggested by feldstein requires major changes in education finance once we recognice the distinction between purchased inputs and output

reviving leviathan fiscal federalism and the growth of government this article revisits the influential leviathan hypothesis which pos its that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries i use panel data to examine the effect of fiscal decentralization over time within countries attempting to distinguish between decentralization that is funded by intergovernmental transfers and local taxation first i explore the logic whereby decentralization should restrict government spending if state and local governments have wide ranging authority to set the tax base and rate especially on mobile assets in countries where this is most clearly the case decentralization is associated with smaller government second consistent with theoretical arguments drawn from wel fare economics and positive political economy i show that governments grow faster as they fund a greater portion of public expenditures through intergovernmental transfers

beyond incentives do schools use accountability rewards productively we use a regression discontinuity design to analyze an understudied aspect of school accountability systems how schools use financial rewards for two years california s accountability system financially rewarded schools based on a deterministic function of test scores qualifying schools received per pupil awards amounting to about 1 of statewide per pupil spending corroborating anecdotal evidence that awards were paid out as teacher bonuses we find no evidence that winning schools purchased more instructional material increased teacher hiring or changed the subject specific composition of their teaching staff most importantly we find no evidence that student achievement increased in winning schools supplemental materials for this article are available online

do federal grants boost school spending evidence from title i abstract one of the federal government s main elementary and secondary education programs is title i which allocates money for compensatory education to school districts based on child poverty i use sharp changes in per pupil grant amounts surrounding the release of decennial census data to identify effects of title i on state and local education revenue and how much the program ultimately increases spending by recipient school districts i find that state and local revenue efforts initially are unaffected by title i changes but that local governments substantially and significantly crowd out changes in title i within in a 3 year period

is there an intrahousehold flypaper effect evidence from a school feeding programme are public transfers targeted toward children neutralised by the household as the theory of altruism implies or is there an intrahousehold flypaper effect whereby such transfers stick to the child this paper studies the impact of a school feeding programme on child caloric intake in the philippines using a quasi experimental methodology the empirical results confirm an intrahousehold flypaper effect indeed they indicate virtually no intrahousehold reallocation of calories in response to the feeding programme in poorer households however children s gains from the programme appear to be taxed more heavily

crisis politics in europe why austerity is easier to implement in some countries than in others when countries face balance of payments crises their policy responses vary widely this article argues that the choice between the two main options of internal adjustment i e austerity and stru

an evaluation of eu regional policy do structural actions crowd out public spending motivated by the lack of success of previous studies trying to estimate the impact of the european cohesion policy this paper brings an unexplored issue to light transfers that are intended to finance public investment in key areas for growth might be crowded out by subsidized governments to alternative uses in fact using annual data from fifteen member countries 1993 2005 we conclude that public investment in the member countries makes up around 60 of the increase in eu funds the limited role of the european commission in the allocation of the funds could partially explain this result

finders keepers forfeiture laws policing incentives and local budgets to encourage anti drug policing the federal government and many state governments have enacted laws that allowpoliceagencies tokeepasubstantial fractionofthe assets thattheyseizeindrugarrests weuserich new data on police seizures and local spending to explore the reactions of both governments and police to the incentives created by these policies we find that local governments offset police seizures by reducing their other allocations to police partially undermining the incentives laid out in statute and diverting the earmarked funds to other purposes police in turn respond to the real net incentives for seizures once local offsets are takenintoaccount byincreasingthedrugarrestrate heroinpricesalsoincrease suggestingthattheincreased emphasis on anti drug policing raises the supply costs of illicit drugs these findings highlight both the promise and pitfalls of using financial incentives to solve agency problems in a federal system both local agents and intervening governments have sophisticated responses to financial incentives and these responses must be taken into account in both designing effective policies and evaluating their consequences 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the effects of grants in aid on state and local expenditures abstract this paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures e g closed end grants the methods are applied to the afdc program the results show that because of the kinked nature of the grant formula 1 the present federal formula actually increases cross state inequality in afdc benefits 2 several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits and 3 the so called flypaper effect disappears

the effect of state education finance reform on total local resources abstract both the federal government and the states use intergovernmental grants to try to change the composition of local spending across different programs as well as the distribution of resources across localities many states are now under court order to use state education grants to reduce local disparities in education spending while a substantial body of literature suggests that these court orders increase the level and progressivity of state education spending there is little evidence on their broader effects on the total resources available not just for schools in low income districts but for other programs across all localities we find that states finance the required increase in education spending in part by reducing their aid to localities for other programs particularly for wealthier areas thus while court ordered school finance equalizations do increase total state aid to localities for education they do so at the expense of drawing state intergovernmental aid away from programs like public welfare health hospitals and general services these findings provide insight into the effectiveness of using earmarked funds to achieve redistribution

school district operational spending and student outcomes evidence from tax elections in seven states abstract we use close tax elections to estimate the impact of school district funding increases on operational spending and student outcomes across seven states districts with passing levies directed new revenue toward support services and instructor salaries but did not increase teacher staffing levels these districts eventually realized gains in student achievement and attainment our preferred estimates imply that increasing operational spending by 1000 per pupil increased test scores by approximately 0 15 of a standard deviation and graduation rates by approximately 9 percentage points there is some evidence of diminishing returns as these effects are driven by districts below the median in spending per pupil based on research linking academic outcomes to earnings we conclude that these spending increases were likely cost effective

the elusive flypaper effect abstract the flypaper effect is the common empirical result that lump sum intergovernmental grants stimulate more local government spending than increases in private income which are theoretically equivalent in this paper four of the best known explanations of the flypaper effect are tested using data from michigan school districts none of these explanations are confirmed by the data the cause of the flypaper effect is likely to be much more deeply rooted in the nature of local decision making than is currently recognized

global crises and populism the role of eurozone institutions populist parties are likely to gain consensus when mainstream parties and status quo institutions fail to manage the shocks faced by their economies institutional constraints which limit the possible actions in the face of shocks result in poorer performance and frustration among voters who turn to populist movements we rely on this logic to explain the different support of populist parties among european countries in response to the globalization shock and to the 2008 2011 financial and sovereign debt crisis we predict a greater success of populist parties in response to these shocks in euro zone countries and our empirical analysis confirms this prediction this is consistent with voters frustration for the greater inability of the euro zone governments to react to difficult to manage globalization shocks and financial crises our evidence has implications for the speed of construction of political unions a slow staged process of political unification can expose the eu to a risk of political backlash if hard to manage shocks hit the economies during the integration process

more cops less crime abstract i exploit a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of police on crime the american recovery and reinvestment act increased funding for the community oriented policing services cops hiring grant program from less than 20 million over 2005 2008 to 1 billion in 2009 hiring grants distributed in 2009 were allocated according to an application score cutoff rule and i leverage quasi random variation in grant receipt by comparing the change over time in police and crimes for cities above and below the threshold in a difference in differences framework relative to low scoring cities those above the cutoff experience increases in police of about 3 2 and declines in victimization cost weighted crime of about 3 5 following the distribution of hiring grants the effects are driven by large and statistically significant effects of police on robbery larceny and auto theft with suggestive evidence that police reduce murders as well crime reductions associated with additional police were more pronounced in areas most affected by the great recession the results highlight that fiscal support to local governments for crime prevention may offer large returns especially during bad macroeconomic times

we voted for this abstract this paper examines two institutional factors that influenced school spending in missouri during the 1970s first the retirement of a bond issue is usually accompanied by an increase in the operating tax rate which requires voter approval the retirement of a bond issue does not reduce but apparently obscures the cost of a tax increase in addition a change in assessment practices in 1975 allowed some districts to increase their effective operating rates without voter approval each of these factors led to substantial tax increases in the affected districts