the arithmetic of investment expenses recent regulatory changes have brought a renewed focus on the impact of investment expenses on investors financial well being the author offers methods for calculating relative terminal wealth levels for those investing in funds with different expense ratios under plausible conditions a person saving for retirement who chooses low cost investments could have a standard of living throughout retirement more than 20 higher than that of a comparable investor in high cost investments

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

does it pay to pay performance fees empirical evidence from dutch pension funds abstract we analyze the relation between investment returns and performance fees for 218 dutch occupational pension funds with an average total of 1090 billion euro in assets under management from 2012 to 2017 our dataset is free from self reporting biases and includes total return excess return and performance fees for six major asset classes we find no statistical evidence that the returns of pension funds that pay performance fees to asset managers for active investing are significantly higher or lower than the returns of pension funds that do not pay performance fees this is true for most asset classes and robust if we correct for risk we also document that large and more specialized pension funds pay less performance fees for a given level of excess return in alternative asset classes such as hedge funds and private equity this is possibly the result of better negotiation power due to their larger scale or higher level of expertise

demand uncertainty in a durable goods monopoly abstract as is well known in the durability literature the monopolistic renter of durable goods is better off in terms of profits than a seller of durable goods this paper provides an explanation for the persistent and widespread use of sales contracts despite what would appear to be reduced profits it is shown that in the presence of demand uncertainty and risk averse firms the monopolist has an incentive to offer sales contracts in order to transfer the risk of future demand shocks to consumers however if the monopolist is risk neutral rental contracts remain superior to sales contracts despite the presence of demand uncertainty

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist in the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination a new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay within each cohort consumers vary in their tastes for the good under broad conditions the seller will vary the price over time in most periods he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay periodically however he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

durable good monopoly with inventories abstract this paper points out that familiar strategic considerations may induce a durable good monopolist to hold inventories the motive for inventory holding by the monopoly is the standard one of production smoothing but it arises here due to strategic considerations which induce the durable good monopoly to sell uneven quantities over time

asset allocation risk models for alternative investments often the lack of mark to market data lures investors into the misconception that alternative asset classes and strategies represent somewhat of a free lunch this article proposes solutions to measuring mark tomarket risk in alternative and illiquid investments the authors describe how to estimate risk factor exposures when the available asset return series may be smoothed owing to the difficulty of obtaining market based valuations they show that alternative investments are exposed to many of the same risk factors that drive stock and bond returns i nvestors have long recognized that asset class returns are driven by a common set of risk factors asset allocators often use the risk factor approach to improve portfolio diversification and to translate macroeconomic views into expected asset returns in practice implementing a risk factor approach to asset allocation requires mapping asset classes to their underlying factor exposures which can be challenging especially for asset classes for which the available historical data are limited or biased in this article we propose solutions to measuring mark to market risk in alternative and illiquid investments we describe how to estimate risk factor exposures when the available asset return series may be smoothed owing to the difficulty of obtaining market based valuations we show that alternative investments are exposed to many of the same risk factors that drive stock and bond returns our approach has profound implications for risk estimation in an asset allocation context for example figure 1 shows the difference between adjusted and reported from index returns volatilities for several alternative investments as well as for public markets equities and bonds it also shows a measure of autocorrelation which highlights how return smoothing contributes to the misestimation of volatility the bottom line is that alternative investments are much more volatile on a mark to market basis than their reported index returns would suggest this bias tends to be more pronounced for indices that are smoothed in this article we describe the methodology used to arrive at these adjustments and include other key risk measures relevant to asset allocation we recognize that there already is a significant body of literature that attempts to estimate risk factor exposures for various individual alternative investments and strategies however little research has been done to estimate the risk factor exposures across all alternatives within an internally consistent unified risk factor framework given increased allocations to alternative investments in institutional investors portfolios we see an urgent need to develop a consistent approach that directly integrates the risks of alternative assets with the rest of investors portfolios

fees eat diversification s lunch although diversification is often spoken of as the only free lunch in investing the authors show that it is not free and that it must be considered in light of its costs they also show that fees on diversifying asset classes are high relative to their risk adjusted diversification benefit with the more exotic asset classes carrying higher price tags because there is meaningful cross sectional variation fees need to be considered when making strategic asset allocation decisions

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

the design of durable goods the use of a durable good is limited by both its physical life and usable life for example an electric car battery can last for five years physical life or 100 000 miles usable life whichever comes first we propose a framework for examining how a profit maximizing firm might choose the usable life physical life and selling price of a durable good the proposed framework considers differences in usage rates and product valuations by consumers and allows for the effects of technological constraints and product obsolescence on a product s usable and physical lives our main result characterizes a relationship between optimal price cost elasticities and opportunity costs associated with relaxing upper bounds on usable and physical lives we describe conditions under which either usable life or physical life or both obtains its maximum possible values examine why a firm might devote effort to relaxing nonbinding constraints on usable life or physical life consider when price cuts might be accompanied with product improvements and examine how a firm might be able to cross subsidize product improvements

durability choice under demand uncertainty this paper examines the impact of demand uncertainty on a monopolist s durability choice within a simple two period framework the analysis shows that the firm will produce the socially optimal durability if its output is rented and demand uncertainty is small but that it may produce units with inefficiently short life spans if output is sold however the model reveals that this planned obsolescence may be reduced from certainty levels depending upon the impact of uncertainty on future demand thus uncertainty may actually increase the firm s product durability relative to certainty levels

broader product line a necessity to achieve success strategic product line breadth decisions evoke differential responses from the manufacturing and the marketing areas manufacturing prefers keeping process disruptions to a minimum and as a result discourages product proliferation however marketing in its attempt to match products to heterogeneous consumer needs and gain market share emphasizes a broader product line we systematically investigate the market benefits and cost disadvantages of broader product lines on a large sample of over 1 400 business units our results indicate significant market share benefits and increases in firms profitability with broader product lines moreover widely held beliefs of increases in production costs are not empirically supported american manufacturing firms may indeed be flexible enough to accommodate product variety without significant detrimental effects on costs

relicensing as a secondary market strategy secondary markets in the information technology industry where used or refurbished equipment is traded have been growing steadily for original equipment manufacturers oems in this industry the importance of secondary markets has grown in parallel not only as a source of revenue but also because of their impact on these firms competitive advantage and market strategy recent articles in the press have severely criticized some oems who are perceived to be actively trying to eliminate the secondary market for their products other oems have policies that enhance their secondary markets the goal of this paper is to understand how an oem s incentives and optimal strategies vis a vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative competitive advantage product characteristics and consumer preferences the critical trade off that we examine is whether the indirect benefit from maintaining an active secondary market the resale value effect can outweigh the potentially negative effect of the sales of used products at the expense of new product sales the cannibalization effect to that end we develop a durable good model where the oem can directly affect the resale value of her product through a relicensing fee charged to the buyer of the refurbished equipment we analyze the oem s strategy in both the monopoly and the duopoly cases characterize the optimal relicensing fee set by the oem and draw conclusions on the conditions that favor stimulating or deterring the secondary market this paper was accepted by candace a yano operations and supply chain management

entry timing in a secondary market when to trade abstract in volatile long lead time and short selling season markets a secondary market enables buyers to update their inventory during the selling season the decision of when to update involves complicated trade offs between forecast accuracy expected lost sales and average purchasing cost we use a two stage inventory replenishment model to identify the optimal trading time across different scenarios across most scenarios the optimal trading time is around the midpoint of the season and is sensitive to the expected profit margin and demand forecast errors we discuss the impacts of the timing decision on upstream suppliers sales and channel performance in terms of sales revenue and supply demand mismatch costs specifically secondary market trading always reduces upstream suppliers sales no matter when trading occurs but trading at an optimal time can maximize a secondary market s profit gain over the no trade scenario through reducing supply demand mismatch

managing new and differentiated remanufactured products we study a firm that makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores to make remanufactured products along with new products in future periods the remanufactured product is differentiated from the new product so the firm needs to choose differentiated prices we analyze the monopoly environment in two period multi period three four and five and infinite planning horizons and characterize the optimal remanufacturing and pricing strategy for the firm in the process we identify remanufacturing savings thresholds that determine the production and pricing strategy for the firm among other results we find counter to intuition that in a finite horizon multi period setting the optimal policy is not necessarily monotone in remanufacturing savings

alpha hunters and beta grazers the search for incremental returns alphas in current parlance has become the holy grail of active investment this article begins by drawing a distinction between two broad classes of alphas 1 allocation alphas that are broadly available on a non zero sum basis by moving the strategic portfolio toward a more balanced return risk structure and 2 truly active skill based return enhancements derived from opportunistic inefficiencies inefficiencies can be hard to discern and even harder to exploit which may help explain both why some investors are able to consistently produce positive alpha and also why they are so few in number

research note the role of production lead time and demand uncertainty in marketing durable goods firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty this is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season once the firm has produced the goods the available production volume affects the firm s subsequent marketing decisions in this paper we study the relationship between the firm s production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer we develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies after taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions we find that the firm s optimal inventory level is u shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products furthermore unlike the case for nondurables for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved

pricing information goods a strategic analysis of the selling and pay per use mechanisms we analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods these mechanisms are selling where up front payment allows unrestricted use and pay per use where payments are tailored to use we analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay per use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known ticking meter effect we demonstrate that pay per use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low in a duopoly one firm uses selling and the other uses pay per use here in contrast to the monopoly selling yields higher profits than pay per use we demonstrate that surprisingly the profits of both duopolists can increase as the psychological cost associated with pay per use increases next we show that uncertainty in consumer use frequency does not affect pay per use in a monopoly but lowers profits from selling in a duopoly both the seller and the pay per use provider obtain lower profits when use frequency is uncertain we also analyze how pricing mechanism performance is affected if the firms cannot commit to prices if the pay per use provider offers a two part tariff and if consumers are risk averse

vertical contracts in a supply chain and the bullwhip effect this paper shows that decentralized supply chains in which upstream firms use linear wholesale prices may experience lower upstream production and downstream sales volatility than vertically inte

the abcs of hedge funds alphas betas and costs the authors decomposed their estimated pre fee 1995 2009 hedge fund return of 11 13 percent into fees 3 43 percent an alpha 3 00 percent and a beta 4 70 percent the year by year results show that alphas were positive during every year of the past decade even during the recent financial crisis

why do amusement parks only charge a fixed admission fee abstract we come up with some explanations on why amusement parks adopt pass pricing even when no additional transaction costs exist for implementing non linear pricing schemes the related factors include much fun generated by any ride and a higher transportation cost

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

price versus production postponement capacity and competition this article presents a comparative analysis of possible postponement strategies in a two stage decision model where firms make three decisions capacity investment production inventory quantity and price typically investments are made while the demand curve is uncertain the strategies differ in the timing of the operational decisions relative to the realization of uncertainty we show how competition uncertainty and the timing of operational decisions influence the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value in contrast to production postponement price postponement makes the investment and production inventory decisions relatively insensitive to uncertainty this suggests that managers can make optimal capacity decisions by deterministic reasoning if they have some price flexibility under price postponement additional postponement of production has relatively small incremental value therefore it may be worthwhile to consider flexible ex post pricing before production postponement reengineering while more postponement increases firm value it is counterintuitive that this also makes the optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty we highlight the different impact of more timely information which leads to higher investment and inventories and of reduced demand uncertainty which decreases investment and inventories our analysis suggests appropriateness conditions for simple make to stock and make to order strategies we also present technical sufficiency and uniqueness conditions under price postponement these results extend to oligopolistic and perfect competition for which pure equilibria are derived interestingly the relative value of operational postponement techniques seems to increase as the industry becomes more competitive

monopoly production and pricing of finitely durable goods with strategic consumers fluctuating willingness to pay abstract demand volatility and production lead time oblige manufacturers of made to stock goods to use economic forecasts in deciding on production quantities manufacturers of finitely durable goods face an additional complication in making production decisions they must consider not only the uncertainty in demand for new goods but also how the future sales will be affected by the older goods that will become available via a secondhand market using a model of an infinite horizon sequential game between a monopolistic producer of durable goods and strategic consumers we investigate how demand volatility affects producers production and pricing decisions we formulate the problem of a monopolist durable goods producer as a discrete time markov decision process and prove certain structural properties of the sales and production policy these structural properties facilitate an efficient computational algorithm which we use in running numerical experiments to explicate the producer s strategy and to conduct equilibrium comparative statics analysis we show that a simple myopic policy is optimal when each period s demand is independent and identically distributed i i d when demand is correlated across periods the producer s optimal production and sales policy is not myopic and in some states when the economy is poor the producer withholds some of the new goods inventory our numerical results suggest that in equilibrium the producer who is dealing with myopic rather than with forward looking consumers is more likely to sell some of these held back goods later as vintage goods

asset management fees and the growth of finance from 1980 to 2006 the financial services sector of the united states economy grew from 4 9 percent to 8 3 percent of gdp a substantial share of that increase was comprised of increases in the fees paid for asset management this paper examines the significant increase in asset management fees charged to both individual and institutional investors despite the economies of scale that should be realizable in the asset management business the asset weighted expense ratios charged to both individual and institutional investors have actually risen over time if we exclude index funds an innovation that has made market returns available even to small investors at close to zero expense fees have risen substantially as a percentage of assets managed one could argue that the increase in fees charged by actively managed funds could prove to be socially useful if it reflected increasing returns for investors from active management or if it was necessary to improve the efficiency of the market for investors who availed themselves of low cost passive index funds but neither of these arguments can be supported by the data actively managed funds of publicly traded securities have consistently underperformed index funds and the amount of the underperformance is well approximated by the difference in the fees charged by the two types of funds moreover it appears that there was no change in the efficiency of the market from 1980 to 2011 arbitrage opportunities to obtain excess risk adjusted returns do not appear to have been available at any time during the early part of the period passive portfolios that bought and held all the stocks in a broad based market index substantially outperformed the average active manager

the value of flexibility in make to order systems the effect of demand correlation we consider a manufacturer of mass customized modular products who orders components under demand uncertainty and sets prices produces to order and trades excess components in a secondary market after this uncertainty is resolved the sequence of events reflects in a parsimonious fashion the considerable reduction in demand uncertainty between the procurement stage and the selling season typical of industries with long supply lead times and short product life cycles we prove that in contrast to conventional wisdom the value of production flexibility and expected profit increase with demand correlation if and only if commonality between the corresponding products does not exceed a threshold we also prove that the value of flexibility and expected profit may each increase or decrease with demand variability depending on demand correlations and component commonalities across the entire product line finally we prove that when demand shocks are independent the optimal product prices are positively correlated if and only if the degree of commonality between the corresponding products exceeds a threshold

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

pricing and operational recourse in coproduction systems coproduction systems in which multiple products are produced simultaneously in a single production run are prevalent in many industries such systems typically produce a random quantity of vertically differentiated products this product hierarchy enables the firm to fill demand for a lower quality product by converting a higher quality product in addition to the challenges presented by random yields and multiple products coproduction systems often serve multiple customer classes that differ in their product valuations furthermore the sizes of these classes are uncertain employing a utility maximizing customer model we investigate the production pricing downconversion and allocation decisions in a two class stochastic demand stochastic yield coproduction system for the single class case we establish that downconversion will not occur if prices are set optimally in contrast we show that downconversion can be optimal in the two class case even if prices are set optimally we consider the benefit of postponing certain operational decisions e g the pricing or allocation rule decisions until after uncertainties are resolved we use the term recourse to denote actions taken after uncertainties have been resolved we find that recourse pricing benefits the firm much more than either downconversion or recourse allocation do implying that recourse demand management is more valuable than recourse supply management special cases of our model include the single class and two class random yield newsvendor models

optimal quality and quantity provisions for centralized vs decentralized distribution market size uncertainty effects abstract we provide insights on how market size uncertainty affects the optimal quality quantity provision in distribution channels when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for product quality in this context we denote the difference between the manufacturer s optimal quality quantity provision for a centralized channel and its optimal analog for a decentralized channel as the quality quantity differential we find that market size uncertainty creates or increases the quantity differential but it does not affect the differential s polarity in contrast market size uncertainty decreases the quality differential and it does so to the extent that depending on the level of consumer heterogeneity it reverses the differential s polarity moreover we find that the higher the inherent uncertainty level the more pronounced are the effects we likewise find that the effects of market size uncertainty are amplified if the notion of consumer heterogeneity is replaced with retail level competition

robust new product pricing we study the pricing decision for a monopolist launching a new innovation at the time of launch we assume that the monopolist has incomplete information about the true demand curve despite the lack of objective information the firm must set a retail price to maximize total profits to model this environment we develop a novel two period non bayesian framework where the monopolist sets the price in each period based only on a nonparametric set of all feasible demand curves optimal prices are dynamic as prices in any period allow the firm to learn about demand and improve future pricing decisions our main results show that the direction of dynamic introductory prices versus static prices depends on the type of heterogeneity in the market we find that 1 when consumers have homogeneous preferences introductory dynamic price is higher than the static price 2 when consumers have heterogeneous preferences and the monopolist has no ex ante information the introductory dynamic price is the same as

purchasing pricing and quick response in the presence of strategic consumers we consider a retailer that sells a product with uncertain demand over a finite selling season the retailer sets an initial stocking quantity and at some predetermined point in the season optimally marks down remaining inventory we modify this classic setting by introducing three types of consumers myopic consumers who always purchase at the initial full price bargain hunting consumers who purchase only if the discounted price is sufficiently low and strategic consumers who strategically choose when to make their purchase a strategic consumer chooses between a purchase at the initial full price and a later purchase at an uncertain markdown price in equilibrium strategic consumers and the retailer make optimal decisions given their rational expectations regarding future prices availability of inventory and the behavior of other consumers we find that the retailer stocks less takes smaller price discounts and earns lower profit if strategic consumers are present than if there are no strategic consumers we find that a retailer should generally avoid committing to a price path over the season assuming such commitment is feasible committing to a markdown price or to not mark down at all is often too costly inventory may remain unsold even in the presence of strategic consumers the better approach is to be cautious with the initial quantity and then mark down optimally furthermore we discuss the value of quick response the ability to procure additional inventory after obtaining updated demand information albeit at a higher unit cost than the initial order we find that the value of quick response to a retailer is generally much greater in the presence of strategic consumers than without them on average 67 more valuable and as much as 558 more valuable in our sample in other words although it is well established in the literature that quick response provides value by allowing better matching of supply with demand it provides more value often substantially more value by allowing a retailer to control the negative consequences of strategic consumer behavior