does working from home work evidence from a chinese experiment about 10 of us employees now regularly work from home wfh but there are concerns this can lead to shirking from home we report the results of a wfh experiment at ctrip a 16 000 employee nasdaq listed chinese travel agency call center employees who volunteered to wfh were randomly assigned to work from home or in the office for 9 months home working led to a 13 performance increase of which about 9 was from working more minutes per shift fewer breaks and sick days and 4 from more calls per minute attributed to a quieter working environment home workers also reported improved work satisfaction and experienced less turnover but their promotion rate conditional on performance fell due to the success of the experiment ctrip rolled out the option to wfh to the whole firm and allowed the experimental employees to re select between the home or office interestingly over half of them switched which led to the gains from wfh almost doubling to 22 this highlights the benefits of learning and selection effects when adopting modern management practices like wfh

making coasean property more coasean abstractin his pioneering work on transaction costs ronald coase presupposed a picture of property as a bundle of government prescribed use rights not only is this picture not essential to coase s purpose but its limitations emerge when we apply coase s central insights to analyze the structure of property itself this leads to the coase corollary in a world of zero transaction costs the nature of property does not matter to allocative efficiency however as with the coase theorem the real implication is for our world of positive transaction costs we need to subject the notion of property to a comparative institutional analysis because transaction costs are positive property is initially defined in terms of things uses are grouped under exclusion rights and in rem rights are widely employed a more thoroughly coasean approach points back to a picture of property more like the traditional one furnished by the law

radio spectrum and the disruptive clarity of ronald coase abstractin the federal communications commission ronald coase exposed deep theoretical foundations via normative argument the government controlled scarce frequencies spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic coase saw that regulators limited conflicts by restricting uses and that property owners routinely perform such functions via the price system the fundamental insight was that analytical symmetry was demanded accounting for the net benefits of both regulation and markets coase augured that the price system would outperform administrative allocation a conclusion mocked by communications policy experts yet one specific slice of the coasean program competitive bidding for licenses commenced at the federal communications commission in 1994 today over 70 u s auctions have been held 31 305 licenses sold and 52 6 billion paid to the treasury the reform is a textbook example of economic policy success even as it raises the question why have market mechanisms not been further implemen

the acquisition of fisher body by general motors abstract it is commonly said that in 1926 general motors was led to acquire its supplier of automobile bodies fisher body because fisher body held up general motors it is claimed that fisher body did this by locating its body plants far away from the general motors assembly plants and by adapting inefficient methods of production thus increasing both the cost of producing bidies and the profits of fisher body under its cost plus contract this tale is factually incorrect what general motors acquired in 1926 was the 40 percent of the shares of fisher body that it did not already own furthermore fisher body did not locate its plants far away from the general motors assembly plants it is also most implausible for many reasons that the fisher brothers would have used inefficient methods of production there is no evidence that a holdup occurred

war of attrition evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit i introduction young industries often undergo a process of shakeout gort and klepper 1982 and klepper 1996 attracting excess firms and gradually shedding them over time more mature industries are likewise often forced to contract in the face of recession or product specific negative demand shocks when an overcrowded industry is forced to shrink which firms exit and which ones survive the conventional answer in economics is that overcrowded industries tend to shed inefficient firms and retain efficient ones we might call this survival of the most efficient a process analogous to natural selection that can adaptively improve the efficiency of industries over time nelson and winter 1982 fudenberg and tirole 1986 model firms exit decisions in overcrowded duopoly markets as wars of attrition and show that the intuition of survival of the most efficient has merit even if firms have little information regarding their costs relative to their competitors however the equilibrium of their game is complex involving a solution to a system of differential equations since neither fortune 500 chief executive officers in the naturally occurring markets nor undergraduate participants in laboratory markets deliberately solve differential equations when deciding whether or not to exit a declining market it is an open question as to how well fudenberg and tirole s rational reconstruction of the exit decision corresponds to the facts of how people make such decisions we report the results of a laboratory experiment designed to answer this question nearly 200 subjects in 16 sessions participated in a total of 3 800 wars of attrition based on fudenberg and tirole s model at the beginning of each period subjects were randomly paired and given a private cost draw that usually induced negative net per second payoffs in a shared market and positive net payoffs per second in monopoly subjects then decided in real time whether and when to exit the market never to return monotonic equilibrium strategy functions predict higher cost inefficient participant exit at an earlier time than their lower cost competitor that is the relatively efficient competitor survives in the market we find that fudenberg and tirole s model organizes our data surprisingly well especially considering its complexity we observe exit by the higher cost firm in 76 of cases when differences between the costs faced by firms are substantial the rate of efficient exit rises to nearly 100 the data on exit times are likewise quite close to the point predictions particularly in the crucial higher portion of the cost distribution that generally governs exit times the median deviation from equilibrium exit times falls to zero by the end and on average subjects earn payouts identical to those predicted in equilibrium our design permits tests of two other conjectures in fudenberg and tirole first our data supports fudenberg and tirole s core comparative static prediction that a decrease in the ex ante likelihood of actually being in a war of attrition leads to an increase in the speed of exit 1 second half of our sessions use costs framed as fixed costs suffered while in the market and half use costs framed as opportunity costs earned by exiting the market there is no evidence that this treatment variable affects exit behavior this isomorphism between gains and losses predicted by standard theory stands in stark contrast to evidence from previous individual decision making experiments suggesting asymmetries in how people react to potential losses and potential gains although wars of attrition have an important place in the game theoretic literature there are surprisingly few experimental studies directly relating to them 2 3 bilodeau childs and mestelman 2004 study a three player full information war of attrition framed as a volunteer game and report widespread failure of equilibrium predictions the predicted volunteer in a subgame perfect nash equilibrium only volunteers 41 of the time

the transaction costs paradigm 1998 presidential address western economic association 1998 presidential address western economic association though the idea can be traced to david hume and adam smith the path breaking first economic analysis of transaction costs did not occur until 1937 when ronald coase published the nature of the firm 1 stigler and boulding perspicaciously reprinted coase s paper in the famous aea readings in price theory 1952 but for a quarter of a century it had no real impact on the profession in the 1940s two significant works were published which touched on transaction costs but these sparks did not ignite a fire 2 the transaction costs paradigm began to blossom in the early 1960s again it was coase who supplied the primum mobile his great paper on social cost was published in early 1961 though aaron director dated that issue of journal of law and economics as 1960 ronald had company this time george stigler s article on information cost came out later the same year and kenneth arrow s work on the appropriability of returns to inventions appeared in 1962 3 the combined wisdom of three brilliant men would perhaps not have been enough except that by the early 1960s science was on their side jargonistic articles on economic development flooded the journals throughout the 1950s but by 1960 economists were beginning to question the explanatory power of this kind of economics after the clarion call of friedman s work on the consumption function a few years earlier in 1957 the great methodological debate began 4 the demand for testable implications was becoming more vociferous by the day and the tendency for economists to be policy oriented was losing hold as the keynesian revolution waned 5 the tide of economic explanation was beginning to swell and the transaction costs paradigm was the beautiful goddess who emerged from the foam i began graduate work at ucla in 1961 and after my ma a year later i turned to audit the price theory lectures of jack hirshleifer and armen alchian the straight as student who knew by heart everything about market imperfections was told that this kind of knowledge did not count by 1963 graduate students at ucla s department of economics were all talking property rights and transaction costs now i knew coase and stigler by heart and could even handle the questions on pricing behavior and mergers at the end of friedman s price theory 1962 moreover i was the luckiest of the lot because in late 1963 armen gave me a copy of a manuscript by harold demsetz 6 one of the great expositors of our time harold wrote about property rights and transaction costs with such clarity and force that i decided then and there to work on these topics for my doctorate since that time my research has all been on the same track in this address i shall confine discussion of the transaction costs paradigm to my own involvement this limitation is imposed by necessity i like to sail the strange seas of thought alone and have seldom read other people s publications with the seriousness they deserve after i left chicago in 1969 from 1976 to 1982 i spent my time on contracts in the petroleum industry and from 1982 to now my research has concentrated on economic reforms in china although these works are all transaction costs oriented the former is not in print because it is proprietary while the latter has mostly been published in chinese after more than half a lifetime on the seashore however i feel it is time to share my small collection of pebbles with colleagues in the wea still you would not be wrong if you feel that i am addressing the subject as if i were a stranger returning from another planet i the nature of transaction costs transaction costs must be defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a robinson crusoe economy this broad definition is necessary because it is often impossible to separate one type of transaction cost from another the toll collector of a bridge serves not only transacting customers but also police against trespassers

information aggregation around macroeconomic announcements revisions matter abstract i show that an empirical relation exists between stock returns on macroeconomic news announcement days and the future revisions of the released data but that this link differs across the business cycle using three major macroeconomic series that undergo significant revisions nonfarm payroll gross domestic product and industrial production i present evidence that daily returns on the standard poor s 500 index and revisions are positively related in expansions and negatively related in recessions the results suggest that revisions do matter i e that investors care about the final revised value of a macroeconomic series that they infer accurate information from the release of the preliminary inaccurate report and that the more precise information is aggregated into prices on the day of the initial announcement the results are consistent with the predictions of rational expectations trading models around public announcements combined with well established empirical results on the asymmetric interpretation of information across the business cycle

a coasian perspective on informal rights assignment among waste pickers in the philippines this paper examines in light of the coase theorem how delineation of a degree of enforceable rights for a previously open access dumpsite in the philippines would affect market transactions of waste pickers it shows that a simplistic exclusion solution was not enough to constrain rent dissipation of recyclables in the primeval land fill some intervention of non government organisations backed by some initial government assistance were found helpful in reducing transaction costs to sustain operations and promote innovations and initiatives from the scavengers themselves despite obvious external economic difficulties

coase s choice of methodology this paper examines the nature of ronald h coase s realism by considering the relationship between theories and facts in his methodology i focus especially on coase s criticisms of friedman s 1953 essay as set out in a lecture published in 1982 it is shown that in developing his argument coase applies his institutional economics to address the question of how economists operating within a regulated market for ideas choose their theories he calls for realism in methodology and carries out an empirical study of economists choices he explores how the profession is regulated and highlights how discourse impacts on the functioning of science a key question addressed within this paper is how can coase maintain a sociological and rhetorical view of science without falling into relativism i identify the different motives for theory choice that coase considers and show that his answer is both institutional and epistemic this helps to clarify the status of the empirical basis in coase s methodology and sheds new light on the nature of his realism i conclude by carrying out a reflexive analysis of coase s text as a text that attempts to justify the methodology on which it is itself based

a theory of jump bidding in ascending auctions abstract jump bidding is a commonly observed phenomenon that involves bidders in ascending auctions submitting bids higher than required by the auctioneer such behavior is typically explained as due to irrationality or to bidders signaling their value we present field data that suggests such explanations are unsatisfactory and construct an alternative model in which jump bidding occurs due to strategic concerns and impatience we go on to examine the impact of jump bidding on the outcome of ascending auctions in an attempt to resolve some policy disputes in the design of ascending auctions

the new institutional economics and the theory of the firm abstract concepts of importance in the literature of the new institutional economics such as transaction costs and bounded rationality have been used to extend the standard neoclassical model of the firm but the hybrid models created have failed to provide adequate explanations of enterprise behavior an alternative neoinstitutional model of the firm is developed in the paper that differs from the pure neoclassical model and hybrid models in respect to both the nature of the solution it yields and the process by which it reaches a solution the neoinstitutional firm cannot be expected to achieve either the hypothetical allocative efficiency promised by the frictionless neoclassical model or the relatively efficient constrained pareto optimal solutions predicted by the largely frictionless hybrid models the orthodox marginal rules of neoclassicism can only be used to solve lower level problems that appear within the firm

pigou and coase in retrospect this paper documents through direct quotation and mathematical analysis the parallels between both the logic and the policy conclusions of a c pigou and r h coase it is shown that pigou s analysis encompasses the essential features of both the nature of the firm and the problem of social cost but more importantly pigou lays out the logical connection between the two an underlying theme is that particularly in the case of pigou much substance has been lost in mathematical translation had that substance not been forgotten the 1960 coase would not have had to attack pigou c 1993 academic press inc copyright 1993 by oxford university press

the effects of shifts in a return distribution on optimal portfolios when the distribution of the returns of a risky asset undergoes a stochastically dominating shift a risk averse investor may not necessarily increase the investment in that asset this paper provides restrictions on the investor s utility function that are necessary and sufficient for a dominating shift to bring about no decrease in the investment in the respective asset if there are two risky assets in the portfolio these conditions are also necessary if there are n 2 assets and are necessary and sufficient if the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

theory experiment and the federal communications commission spectrum auctions abstract the fcc uses the simultaneous multi round auction sma to assign spectrum licenses congress mandated that the sma be compared to an auction that allows combinatorial bids we review the theoretical and experimental evidence relevant to the sma procedures and their inherent defects results from experiments evaluating the sma in comparison to a combinatorial auction designed by charles river and associates show that several of the sma rules hinder efficiency and create a trade off between efficiency and auction length the combinatorial auction outperforms the sma when license values are superadditive but requires more time to complete and is not robust

estimating the value of information we derive a general expression for the value of information to a price taking investor in a dynamic environment and provide a framework for its estimation we study the value of both private and public information and break it into its instrumental and psychic parts to illustrate we estimate and rank the values of leading macroeconomic indicators gdp employment etc using variations in option prices we find that consumer investors with conventional preference parameters would pay 3 to 5 bps of their wealth for a one time private peek into these indicators such signals provide substantial instrumental value but a minor psychic value received august 29 2016 editorial decision june 6 2018 by editor itay goldstein authors have furnished an internet appendix which is available on the oxford university press web site next to the link to the final published paper online

risk preferences and the macroeconomic announcement premium this paper develops a revealed preference theory for the equity premium around macroeconomic announcements stock returns realized around pre scheduled macroeconomic announcements such as the employment report and the fomc statements account for 55 of the market equity premium we provide a characterization theorem for the set of intertemporal preferences that generates a nonnegative announcement premium our theory establishes that the announcement premium identifies a significant deviation from time separable expected utility and provides asset market based evidence for a large class of non expected utility models we also provide conditions under which asset prices may rise prior to some macroeconomic announcements and exhibit a pre announcement drift

telework urban form energy consumption and greenhouse gas implications a primary motivation of telework policy is to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions using a numerical simulation of the standard urban model we show telework causes sprawl calling into question the idea that telework decreases energy consumption overall effects depend on wage changes due to telework land use regulation such as height limits or greenbelts and the telework participation rate while energy consumption increases in some scenarios emissions may fall due to changes in the energy mix between gasoline and other sources jel r11 r28 c60

equilibrium interest rates and multiperiod bonds in a partially observable economy this paper analyzes the market for financial assets in a production and exchange economy with several realized outputs and a single unobservable source of nondiversifiable risk the paper demonstrates that for a large class of diffusion outputs and preferences optimizing consumers first estimate the realizations of the unobservable factor and then use these estimates to determine portfolio and consumption rules moreover the explicit consideration of this unobservable productivity factor affects equilibrium demands and prices the equilibrium spot rate of interest emerges as the best estimate of the unobservable factor and multiperiod default free bonds arise as the optimal hedge for the unobservable changes of the stochastic investment opportunity set this paper analyzes the market for financial assets in a production and exchange economy with several realized outputs and a single unobservable source of nondiversifiable risk the paper poses and answers three questions 1 how do consumers determine equilibrium demands and prices when their investment opportunities are unobservable 2 in equilibrium what financial assets provide an optimal hedge for the

the impact of public information on the stock market we study the relation between the number of news announcements reported daily by dow jones company and aggregate measures of securities market activity including trading volume and market returns we find that the number of dow jones announcements and market activity are directly related and that the results are robust to the addition of factors previously found to influence financial markets such as day of the week dummy variables news importance as proxied by large new york times headlines and major macroeconomic announcements and non information sources of market activity as measured by dividend capture and triple witching trading however the observed relation between news and market activity is not particularly strong and the patterns in news announcements do not explain the day of the week seasonalities in market activity our analysis of the dow jones database confirms the difficulty of linking volume and volatility to observed measures of information

the coasean analysis of lighthouse financing myths and realities in the lighthouse in economics coase r h journal of law and economics vol 17 no 2 357 76 1974 coase reached the conclusion that in england there existed a relatively efficient privately financed lighthouse system which would refute economists traditional statements concerning the production of public goods the purpose of this paper is to challenge his conclusion we first show that from a methodological and theoretical perspective the lighthouse is consistent with the problem of social cost coase r h journal of law and economics vol 3 1 44 1960 then applying coase s own method historical case studies we attempt to re examine the respective roles and efficiencies of private initiative and government

cross country heterogeneity in intertemporal substitution abstract we collect 2735 estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption from 169 published studies that cover 104 countries during different time periods the estimates vary substantially from country to country even after controlling for 30 aspects of study design our results suggest that income and asset market participation are the most effective factors in explaining the heterogeneity households in rich countries and countries with high stock market participation substitute a larger fraction of consumption intertemporally in response to changes in expected asset returns micro level studies that focus on sub samples of rich households or asset holders also find systematically larger values of the elasticity

the incidence and wage consequences of home based work in the united states 1980 2000 abstract this study documents the rapid growth in home based wage and salary employment and the sharp decline in the home based wage penalty in the united states between 1980 and 2000 these twin patterns observed for both men and women in most occupation groups suggest that employer costs of providing home based work arrangements have decreased consistent with information technology it advances being an important source of these falling costs i find that occupation gender cells that had larger increases in on the job it use also experienced larger increases in the home based employment share and larger declines in the home based wage penalty

information quality and long run risk asset pricing implications i study the asset pricing implications of the quality of public information about persistent productivity shocks in a general equilibrium model with kreps porteus preferences low information quality is associated with a high equity premium a low volatility of consumption growth and a low volatility of the risk free interest rate the relationship between information quality and the equity premium differs from that in endowment economies my calibration improves substantially upon the bansal yaron model in terms of the moments of the wealth consumption ratio and the return on aggregate wealth in this paper i introduce learning into a production based long run risk model learning improves the asset pricing implications of the model along three dimensions it increases the equilibrium equity premium reduces the volatility of consumption growth and reduces the volatility of the risk free interest rate i show that because of the production economy setting the relationship between information quality and the equity premium differs from that found in pure exchange economies see e g veronesi 2000 quantitatively my model improves substantially upon the bansal and yaron 2004 model in terms of its predictions about the volatility of the return on aggregate wealth and the wealth consumption ratio compared to bansal and yaron 2004 i use a lower relative risk aversion rra parameter two and a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution ies parameter two my model generates a lower risk premium on the market portfolio 5 06 per year but does roughly as well as the bansal and yaron 2004 model according to other measures commonly used to assess the performance of consumption based asset pricing models such as the key moments of the risk free interest rate and the consumption growth rate more specifically i consider a general equilibrium model with a linear production technology and kreps porteus preferences kreps and porteus 1978 hengjie ai is at the fuqua school of business duke university this paper is based on chap

strategic asset allocation in a continuous time var model abstract this paper derives an approximate solution to a continuous time intertemporal portfolio and consumption choice problem the problem is the continuous time equivalent of the discrete time problem studied by campbell and viceira q j econ 114 1999 433 in which the expected excess return on a risky asset follows an ar 1 process while the riskless interest rate is constant the paper also shows how to obtain continuous time parameters that are consistent with discrete time econometric estimates the continuous time solution is the limit of that of campbell and viceira and has the property that conservative long term investors have a large positive intertemporal hedging demand for stocks

telecommuting traffic congestion and agglomeration a general equilibrium model abstract we develop a fully closed general equilibrium model of a monocentric city in which land is allocated to production housing and roads cbd workers and telecommuters are imperfectly substitutable in production cbd workers contribute to the cbd s agglomeration economies but cause traffic congestion in commuting telecommuters do not cause congestion and do not contribute to agglomeration the effects of telecommuting on the urban economy and land use pattern are studied the first best optimal policy in the presence of agglomeration economies congestion and telecommuting is derived and its impacts are compared with the effects of different second best policies

measuring intertemporal substitution the importance of method choices and selective reporting i examine 2 735 estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption eis reported in 169 published studies the literature shows strong selective reporting researchers discard negative and insignicant estimates too often which pulls the mean estimate up by about 0 5 the reporting bias dwarfs the effects of methods with the exception of the choice between micro and macro data when i correct the mean for the bias for macro estimates i get zero even though the reported t statistics are on average two the corrected mean of micro estimates of the eis for asset holders is around 0 3 0 4 calibrations greater than 0 8 are inconsistent with the bulk of the empirical evidence jel e21 c83

information quality and stock returns revisited this paper investigates the relation between information on the state of the economy and equity risk premium we use a setup where investors have epstein zin preferences and the economy randomly switches between booms and recessions we are able to establish 2 key results first investors with high elasticity of intertemporal substitution eis will require lower excess returns for holding stocks if they are provided with better information on the state of the economy second we find that this also holds for investors with moderate eis if they are sufficiently risk averse

coase on broadcasting advertising and policy the initial argument developed in this paper is that a wants based conception of the objectives of policy clearly operative in his broadcasting studies together with the acceptance of certain assumed properties of the competitive process tightly constrain coase s work at times for example when considering the impact of advertising coase accepts that the assessment of policy must be carried out on a broader basis coase does not however go on to develop a criterion beyond wants elsewhere he highlights the importance of the distinction between wants and needs this paper further argues that by elaborating upon this distinction it becomes possible to give an indication of how a broader framework for the assessment of policy might be developed copyright 2001 by oxford university press

the fable of the bees an economic investigation ever since a c pigou wrote his books on welfare a divergence between private and social costs has provided the main argument for instituting government action to correct allegedly inefficient market activities the analysis in such cases has been designed less to aid our understanding of how the economic system operates than to find flaws in it to justify policy recommendations both to illustrate the argument and to demonstrate the nature of the actual situation the quest has been for real world examples of such defects

the provision of lighthouses services a political economy perspective ronald coase s 1974 article on lighthouses and the trinity house case in particular has triggered extensive debate on the notion of a public good but also on the possibility of private production of public goods the resultant literature has discussed the concept of private property and the characteristics of a public good and offered an economic analysis of the status of lighthouses

lighthouse provision in premodern japan we investigate how lighthouses were provided in premodern japan with a specific focus on the role of the private sector using national survey data on lighthouses collected by the government in 1883 we find that lighthouses constructed by the private sector in the edo period 1603 1868 accounted for nearly 70 of lighthouses existing at the time of the survey and that there was no significant difference in technical features between private and public lighthouses however we observe that almost all private lighthouses were located at ports and additional case studies indicate that the public authorities endorsed the operation of some lighthouses which might have contributed to their profits and improved their long term survival we also find that various factors including the formation of merchant coalitions and whether users were identifiable influenced whether a private organization could circumvent the free rider problem

learning and asset price jumps w e develop a general equilibrium model in which income and dividends are smooth but asset prices contain large moves jumps these large price jumps are triggered by optimal decisions of investors to learn the unobserved state we show that learning choice is determined by preference parameters and the conditional volatility of income process an important model prediction is that income volatility predicts future jump periods while income growth does not consistent with the model large moves in returns in the data are predicted by consumption volatility but not by consumption growth the model quantitatively captures these novel features of the data jel g00 g12 g14 d83 a prominent feature of financial markets is infrequent but large price movements jumps 1 in this article we develop a model in which income and dividends have smooth gaussian dynamics however asset prices are subject to large infrequent jumps in our model large moves in asset prices obtain from the actions of the representative agent to acquire more information about the unobserved state of the economy for a cost we show that the optimal decision to incur a cost and learn the true economic state is directly related to the level of uncertainty in the economy this implies that aggregate economic volatility as well as market volatility should predict jumps in returns we show that indeed in the data consistent with the model return jumps are predicted by consumption volatility market volatility further the implied asset price implications from our model are consistent with the key findings from parametric models about frequency and predictability of jumps as well as nonparametric jump detection analysis of barndorff nielsen and shephard 2006 based on

optimal portfolio choice under incomplete information models of asset pricing generally assume that the variables which characterize the state of the economy are observable however the distributional properties of asset prices that are relevant for portfolio decisions are in general not observable and therefore must be estimated the estimation of expected returns is a particularly difficult problem and estimation errors are likely to be substantial in this light it is reasonable to examine whether the assumption of observability of expected returns and other relevant state variables causes significant mis specification in equilibrium models of asset prices this paper has three main objectives first to derive optimal estimators for the unobservable expected instantaneous returns using observations of past realized returns second to establish that estimation and portfolio choice can be solved in two separate steps third to analyze the impact of estimation error on investment choices the estimators of expected returns are in general not consistent i e the estimation error does not tend to disappear asymptotically the effects of the estimation error therefore cannot be ignored even if realized returns are observed continuously over an infinite time period

against posner against coase against theory in two articles published in 1993 richard posner characterized and vigorously attached ronald coase s methodological orientation coase resisted posner s diagnosis but did not provide a response this paper offers a response which coase might have given one of posner s major claims was that coase is antitheoretical or hostile to theory here it is suggested that posner s allegations suffer from serious unreflected ambiguities once we distinguish between a few different meanings of theory and theoreticity and between attitudes and accomplishments in regard to theory or between being antitheoretical nontheoretical protheoretical and theoretical it becomes possible to argue that coase does not hold an antitheoretical attitude even if his accomplishments fall short of theory in many but not all senses of the word the larger relevance of this conflict is that its confusions tend to be characteristic of parts of the economics profession more widely copyright 1998 by oxford university press

waiting to invest investment and uncertainty the textbook analysis that accepts all projections with positive net present values as positive is quite generally wrong the ability to delay a project means that almost every project competes with itself postponed with uncertain interest rates even the simplest of projects has an option value the effect of interest rate uncertainty on the optimal delay of investment is sizable this implies that the rate of aggregate investment will depend on both the level of the real interest rate and the degree of interest rate uncertainty furthermore it is not necessarily true that investment rises with a fall in interest rates copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

the general equilibrium effects of the residential property tax incidence and excess burden abstract an urban general equilibrium model is used to explore the efficiency effects and distributional consequences of the residential property tax in a model of a small open city the replacement of a nondistortionary land tax with the residential property tax reduces the land area density and population of the city the aggregate net return on land falls by an amount equal to 164 93 of total tax revenue in a model of a closed region when city q replaces the land tax with the residential property tax production and employment shift to other cities in the region the net return on land decreases in city q and increases in other cities in the region in aggregate landowners are made better off by the change in tax policy while residents are made worse off the excess burden of the property tax is computed as 6 5197 of tax revenue

the energy implications of city size and density abstract this paper develops a new open city urban simulation model capable of showing the urban form and energy consumption effects of variation in city size the model is able to consider city size differences caused by wage and amenity differentials both with and without housing and land use regulation the surprising conclusion is that per capita energy use is relatively invariant to city size when growth is driven by wages but falls modestly with growth induced by rising amenity common land use policies specifically density limits and greenbelts can positively or negatively affect both city welfare and energy use

state capacity and economic development causal mechanism or correlative filter abstract in this paper we explore why there are no examples of societies with low state capacity and high economic development we argue that such an outcome is unlikely because of the nature of investments in state capacity societies that become rich in the absence of a strong state invite predation by societies that develop such states thus societies invest in state capacity in part to plunder other societies wealth those investments are a form of rent seeking potentially preyed upon societies are forced to invest in state capacity in turn so as to deter potential attackers this entails that as soon as a rent seeker enters the game the likelihood of a low capacity high development society surviving falls this explains the historical lack of such societies we thus interpret state capacity not as a causal condition for widespread economic prosperity but a survivability condition for enjoying this prosperity

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

the cost of rent seeking evidence from cellular telephone license lotteries the inventors of the theory of rent seeking used an analogy with competitive markets to conclude that all monopoly rents would be dissipated in the competition to obtain the property rights to them 23 29 subsequent theorists showed that this conclusion is quite sensitive to assumptions about foresight risk aversion conjectures and bias 15 21 30 since little quantitative information about actual rent seeking competitions is available the theory has developed in an empirical vacuum in this paper we attempt to fill that vacuum with an estimate of rent seeking expenditure by applicants in the federal communications commission s fcc cellular telephone license lotteries held between 1986 and 1989 we go on to compare expenditures with estimates of the value of the licenses at stake these lotteries constitute a unique natural experiment any u s citizen was eligible to enter each geographic lottery once and only once for an expense which we calculate as modest the lotteries were widely publicized and heavily entered there were over 320 000 applications one per market filed for 643 cellular licenses and third party application preparers entered the market rapidly because licenses were awarded sequentially prospective participants in later lotteries could find out that expected net returns from earlier lotteries were positive because of undersubscription the value of the prize was known because sales of previously awarded licenses had begun to take place before later lotteries were held and market analysts were using such sale prices to value licenses not yet awarded the later lotteries seem almost optimally contrived to maximize the dissipation of rents yet comparing the resources invested in entry the price of a fully prepared application with the rents available the market value of cellular telephone licenses shows that dissipation was far short of complete

assigning property rights to radio spectrum users why did fcc license auctions take 67 years abstract while leo herzel 1951 and ronald coase 1959 persuasively argued for auctioning licenses issued by the federal communications commission fcc not until 1993 did the u s congress grant the fcc authority to assign wireless operating permits via competitive bidding why were auctions with obvious efficiency and equity advantages so long in coming why were comparative hearings in the public interest first abandoned as assignment tools in 1981 not for auctions but for lotteries and why were radio and tv licenses pointedly excluded from auctions four factors the special interest of regulators in influencing broadcasting content the limits placed on explicit program regulation by the u s constitution the recent increase in the relative economic importance of nonbroadcast wireless services and the agency problem embedded in central planning are used to explain both the political stability of economically inefficient licensing methods and recent reforms

how prudent are consumers using data from the consumer expenditure survey this paper presents a simple test that provides an explicit estimate of the parameter in the utility function that reflects the strength of the precautionary saving motive the coefficient of relative prudence the test yields a fairly precise estimate of a small precautionary motive in fact the estimate is too small to be consistent with widely accepted beliefs about risk aversion the presence of liquidity constrained households does not appear to explain this finding and there is some evidence that self selection of households into risky environments also cannot explain the results

robust permanent income and pricing i suppose there exists an extremely powerful and if i may so speak malignant being whose whole endeavours are directed toward deceiving me rene descartes meditations ii 1

asset pricing in a production economy with incomplete information this paper analyzes an economy in which investors operate under partial information about technology relevant state variables it is shown that for gaussian information structures under incomplete observations the consumer s problem can be transformed into an equivalent program with a completely observed state the conditional expectation of the underlying unobservable state variables a consequence of this transformation is that classic results in finance remain valid under an appropriate reinterpretation of the state variables the static capital asset pricing model capm of sharpe 24 lintner 16 and mossin 20 states that the expected premium on any risky asset is proportional to the premium on the market as a whole this theoretical linear relationship however is subject to criticisms on two grounds first it does not seem to be supported by the empirical evidence second it is based on the premises of a constant opportunity set merton 19 subsequently relaxes this assumption and shows that when the opportunity set fluctuates over time due to changes in the state of the economy individual securities are also priced with respect to selected portfolios funds providing a hedge against unanticipated fluctuations 2 more recently breeden 3 has extended merton s results by emphasizing the role of aggregate consumption in pricing relationships in this paper we seek to further our understanding of asset pricing by relaxing the assumption that investors observe the state of the economy in the mertonbreeden framework observed state variables affect the means and variances of asset returns implying deformations of the opportunity set over time from a practical point of view it seems that this complete information assumption is violated investors in financial markets operate under partial knowledge of the microvariables which influence production and the returns on assets their decisions rely mostly on information through noisy channels such as newspapers technical reviews or weather reports in this paper we attempt to model such

ronald coase and methodology ronald coase wrote two great theoretical articles that earned him the nobel prize the nature of the firm in 1937 and the problem of social cost in 1960 he also wrote many articles dealing with the methodology of economics often in the setting of a discussion of a particular economist such as adam smith or alfred marshall the methodological articles will be my particular focus here

information and the equity premium we determine how better information aects the average equity premium in a standard representative agent exchange economy perfect information obviously eliminates the equity premium and we show that a particular kind of information about the level of future consumption always lowers the average equity premium surprisingly information must sometimes raise the average equity premium no matter what the preferences of the representative agent information purely about the volatility either of consumption or the marginal utility of consumption raises the equity premium for a wide class of preferences moreover information can raise the average equity premium by an arbitrarily large percentage while still matching important magnitudes such as average growth and the risk free rate we consider two dierent economies a two period economy with arbitrary preferences for the representative agent and an infinite horizon economy with standard additive separable ces utility with independent growth rates through time