learning to believe in sunspots a number of authors have shown that competitive economies may possess sunspot equilibria that is rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations 2 such results demonstrate that it does not require a lack of faith in the rationality of market participants to believe that competitive markets may be subject to purely speculative fluctuations driven solely by expectations 3 the mere existence of sunspot equilibria as solutions to a system of marketclearing conditions however might not be judged sufficient to indicate that competitive markets with rational participants could ever be subject to speculative instability the sunspot equilibria represent states of affairs in which agents act differently in the case of different realizations of the sunspot variable and it is rational for each agent to do so but it might be thought unlikely that the beliefs of all the participants in the market could ever come to be coordinated so as to bring about an equilibrium of that kind it is rational to believe that sunspots convey information about future states of affairs once the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium but why would rational agents ever begin to believe in such a thing so as to create the conditions under which the belief is rational in order to address such a question one must go beyond the mere statement of the conditions for equilibrium and discussion of what states of affairs satisfy them one must specify an explicit dynamic process according to which the beliefs of agents adjust when out of equilibrium any exercise of this kind is necessarily unsatisfactory as there is no univocal meaning for the postulate of rational behavior outside of an equilibrium it may well be the case that

median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

does right or left matter cabinets credibility and fiscal adjustments abstract this paper tests the widely held assumption that left wing cabinets favor higher public spending and examines whether cabinet ideology affects the persistence of major fiscal adjustments in a panel of large fiscal adjustments in oecd countries during the last 40 years we find evidence that left wing and right wing cabinets are partisan the left tends to reduce the deficit by raising tax revenues while the right relies mostly on spending cuts our testable hypothesis is that cabinets can signal commitment by undertaking fiscal adjustments in ways that are not favored by their constituencies in other words the left gains credibility when it cuts spending while the right becomes more credible when it increases tax revenues probit estimates of the determinants of persistence in fiscal adjustments confirm that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments the effect is significant for cuts in public spending public consumption wage or nonwage increases in total revenues direct taxes on businesses and other taxes we test for the role of several other determinants of persistence confirming that coalition and majority cabinets are associated with less persistence while periods of high or rising levels of indebtedness favor persistence the estimates of the impact of ideology and other variables on gdp and its components show that it is the size of the spending cut rather than cabinet ideology that is most important

policy change and learning in the rbc model what is the impact of surprise and anticipated policy changes when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations we examine this issue using the standard stochastic real business cycle model with lump sum taxes agents combine knowledge about future policy with econometric forecasts of future wages and interest rates dynamics under learning can have large impact effects and a gradual hump shaped response and tend to be prominently characterized by oscillations not present under rational expectations these fluctuations reflect periods of excessive optimism or pessimism followed by subsequent corrections

school district consolidation market concentration and the scale efficiency tradeoff consolidation is often proposed as a strategy for increasing school district quality without increasing educational funding however if consolidation reduces competition in the local school market and reduces efficiency any savings from exploiting economies of scale may be lost to increased inefficiency we use a stochastic cost function to investigate these effects for districts in texas we find important economies of scale but we also find that increased market concentration leads to increased cost inefficiency finally we illustrate the practical importance of these two potentially offsetting factors in a simulation that considers consolidating texas school districts to county level districts we find that failure to consider the effect on competition can lead to large overestimates of the benefits of consolidation

optimal degree of public information dissemination financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive external ities in these environments transparency may reduce expected welfare public announcements serve as focal points for higher order beliefs and affect agentsbehaviour more than justified by their informational contents some scholars conclude that reducing public signalsprecision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare this article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but under certain conditions not to all agents restricting the degree of publicity is a better suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are there is a general presumption that higher central bank transparency in terms of information disclosure to a wider audience improves the effectiveness of monetary policy and is beneficial to markets as it reduces information asymmetries helps to assess risk better and arrive at more informed decisions thus enhancing market efficiency while practitioners in central banks and international institutions agree on the desirability of informative announcements and promote higher transparency on the ground that any information is valuable to markets recent academic literature distin guishes private and public information and argues that public announcements may destabilise markets and reduce efficiency by their effects on higher order beliefs if markets are characterised by positive externalities morris and shin 2002 henceforth m s have shown that noisy public announcements may be detrimental to welfare from an ex ante point of view they conclude that a commitment to withholding relevant information or deliberately reducing its precision may be welfare enhancing in this article we challenge this conclusion by distinguishing two components of transparency precision ofinformationanddegreeofpublicity the degreeof publicity is the proportion of agents who receive a signal using a stylised coordination game introduced by m s we show that information should always be provided to the market

expectations learning and business cycle fluctuations this paper explores an alternative theory based on learning dynamics in the con text of an otherwise standard stochastic growth model we consider an environment in which households and firms have an incomplete model of the macroeconomy knowing only their own objectives constraints and beliefs agents are optimizing have a completely specified belief system but do not know the equilibrium map ping between primitive disturbances the aggregate state of the economy and mar ket clearing prices by extrapolating from historical patterns in observed data they approximate this mapping to forecast variables that are exogenous to their decision problems such as the rental rate of capital and the real wage this belief structure has the property that beliefs affect the true data generating process of the economy which in turn affects belief formation the economy is therefore self referential shifts in beliefs about future returns to labor and capital affect current market clear ing prices which in turn can reinforce beliefs in this environment current prices can become less informative about future economic conditions generating fluctuations in real activity this kind of mechanism driving business cycle fluctuations is found in early writ ings on macroeconomic dynamics for example alfred c pigou 1927 on page 122 writes

the relevance of commuting zones for regional spending efficiency abstractwe use data envelopment analysis dea efficiency scores to show that clustering municipalities into encompassing regional clusters improves spending efficiency of single stand alone municipalities we propose a new geographic aggregation based on municipalities to municipalities commuting flows defined using hierarchical cluster analysis our example for portugal shows that from an output oriented perspective between 83 and 98 of municipalities would increase their efficiency scores while from an input oriented perspective between 86 and 98 of municipalities would also be better off in terms of efficiency then using a linear regression model we find that population increases positively affects the efficient scores via scale economies also increases in the share of high educated and poorer residents leads to higher efficiency scores

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

envy fairness and political influence in local government wage determination evidence from norway the main question in this paper is do wages of low skilled workers in norwegian local governments adjust to clear the labor market for such workers or are the wages affected by trade unions comparing their wages with other wages inside the local governments the main empirical findings are as follows first wages of low skilled local government employees respond not to wages in the external labor market but to wages of higher skilled and higher paid workers inside the local government second wages are positively associated with the share of socialist politicians in the local council these results are interpreted as support for a union model with internal pay comparisons in norwegian local governments copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

an exploration of the eductive justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis this paper examines justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis that rely on the analysis of the agents mental forecasting educing activity which involves forecasting the forecasts of others etc the corresponding concept of eductive learning stability based on the game theoretical concept of rationalizability is primarily used within the classical muth model conditions for coordination of beliefs are interpreted and discussed they are robust to the introduction of noise more generally eductive stability fits economic intuition on coordination stability increases when the industry product differentiation increases and when decisions are sequential and observable copyright 1992 by american economic association

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

observing and shaping the market the dilemma of central banks while the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions the more the central bank influences the market the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates how should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market this paper analyses the optimal central bank s action and disclosure under endogenous central bank s information for three operational frameworks pure communication action and communication and signaling action when the central bank takes an action it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes however in the realistic case where central bank s action is observable it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action

optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge we study optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy with monopolistic competition where firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy information imperfections emerge endogenously because firms are assumed to have finite shannon capacity to process information we then ask how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on firms processing capacity when price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements we find that policy should nominally accommodate white noise mark up shocks for a large range of capacity values this fi nding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms processing capacity when mark up shocks are persistent accommodation may even have to increase in the medium term but has to decrease in the long run thereby generating a hump shaped price response and a slow reduction in output instead when prices are strategic substitutes policy tends to react with nominal demand contractions to mark up shocks in addition there might exist discontinuities between common knowledge equilibria and equilibria with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge

on fiscal disparities across cities abstract some cities have fewer taxable resources and higher costs for providing public services than do other cities the result which is widely regarded as unfair is a wide variation in the ability of cities to supply public services but our understanding of these fiscal disparities particularly on the cost side is limited this paper provides a general treatment of fiscal disparities by incorporating input and environmental costs into a model of local expenditure determination investigating the consequences of fiscal disparities in a system of local governments including housing price adjustments and migration and designing intergovernmental grants to offset fiscal disparities

central bank communication design in a lucas phelps economy abstract in a lucas phelps island economy an island has access to many informative signals about demand conditions each signal incorporates both public and private information the correlation of a signal s realizations across the economy determines its publicity if information sources differ in their publicity then price formation and expectations formation processes separate causing output gaps to open an output stabilizing central bank prefers averagely public information and sometimes limits the clarity of its policy announcements to achieve this the bank s incentive to engage privately in costly information acquisition and transmission is strongest not for the most influential signals but instead for those which drive the largest wedge between prices and expectations signals that are far from averagely public

do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions new empirical evidence we test eight hypotheses on political factors influencing the likelihood that a fiscal policy adjustment occurs we employ a panel discrete choice model for 20 oecd countries for the period 1970 2003 two different definitions of fiscal adjustments are used to capture the differences between rapid and gradual adjustments we find that these types of fiscal adjustment are primarily driven by economic factors and are hardly affected by political variables the likelihood that a rapid adjustment takes place is only influenced by upcoming elections while the likelihood that a gradual adjustment takes place increases in case of broad policy reform

on the relative unimportance of a balanced budget this paper explores the reasoning underlying milton friedman s preference for a small unbalanced budget over a large balanced one because the marginal return from government spending is less than the marginal cost measured in terms of the amount of income private individuals remain free to spend government expenditures have more of an adverse impact on the economy in his view than does the method of financing that spending using a panel data set comprising the 50 states plus the district of columbia we report evidence from the years 1967 through 1992 that growth rates in income per capita tend to be higher in states with smaller public sectors moreover we find that while both deficits and taxes reduce the rate of income growth in a state the negative impact of government spending is considerably larger at the margin

the perils of taylor rules abstract since john taylor s 1993 carnegie rochester conf ser publ policy39 195 214 seminal paper a large literature has argued that active interest rate feedback rules that is rules that respond to increases in inflation with a more than one for one increase in the nominal interest rate are stabilizing in this paper we argue that once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account active interest rate feedback rules can easily lead to unexpected consequences specifically we show that even if the steady state at which monetary policy is active is locally the unique equilibrium typically there exist an infinite number of equilibrium trajectories originating arbitrarily close to that steady state that converge to a liquidity trap that is a steady state in which the nominal interest rate is near zero and inflation is possibly negative journal of economic literature classification numbers e52 e31 e63

interest rate control and nonconvergence to rational expectations this paper investigates the feasibility of a monetary policy aimed at pegging the nominal rate of interest it shows that under general conditions such a policy would produce the well known cumulative process despite the fact that there exists a well behaved rational expectations equilibrium with no tendency for inflation to accelerate or decelerate the cumulative process shows up as the failure of learning to converge to rational expectations specifically the paper shows first in a conventional is lm model with an expectations augmented phillips curve and then in a micro based finance constraint model that if people follow any learning rule based on experience that satisfies a weak condition then the sequence of temporary equilibria under a policy of interest pegging cannot converge the nonconvergent path that will be observed accords with the familiar cumulative process in that inflation accelerates if the market rate of interest has been pegged below the natural rate

disentangling the demand function from the production function for local public services the case of public safety abstract in this paper we develop a theoretical framework and an econometric model which allow us to separate the effect of income and other socioeconomic variables on the demand for publicly provided goods from their effect on the price of those goods we apply our approach in a study of expenditures for police protection in a cross section of 73 u s cities and counties our results suggest that studies of public expenditures which fail to incorporate community characteristics in production and cost functions can yield very misleading results

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

the signaling role of policy actions abstract in an economy affected by shocks that are imperfectly known the monetary instrument takes on a dual stabilizing role as a policy response that directly influences the economy and as a vehicle for information that reveals the central bank s assessment to firms because mark up shocks cannot be neutralized by monetary policy providing firms with more information about these shocks exacerbates their reaction and creates a larger distortion recognizing the signaling role of its instrument the central bank distorts its policy response in order to optimally shape firms beliefs while providing firms with more information is always detrimental to the output gap it has a more subtle effect on price dispersion depending on whether information is provided through the transparency channel or through the signaling channel although more transparency is always detrimental to welfare the information that is conveyed by the monetary instrument improves welfare when firms coordination is highly valuable

efficient use of information and social value of information this paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies games that have externalities strategic complementarity or substitutability and heterogeneous information first we characterize the equilibrium use of information complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information raising aggregate volatility whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information raising cross sectional dispersion next we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents finally we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency if any in the equilibrium use of information we conclude with a few applications including production externalities beauty contests business cycles and large cournot and bertrand games

decentralization and the productive efficiency of government evidence from swiss cantons advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that among other benefits it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services this paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of government using a data set of swiss cantons we first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy further panel regressions of swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment we also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing for the swiss case the gender education gap

public sector efficiency the roles of political and budgetary institutions fiscal capacity and democratic participation the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether efficiency in public service provision is affected by political and budgetary institutions fiscal capacity and democratic participation in order to address this issue we take advantage of a new global efficiency measure for norwegian local governments we find that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation contribute to low efficiency in addition there is some evidence that democratic participation increases efficiency while a centralized top down budgetary procedure is associated with low efficiency

a technically level playing field profit efficiency analysis of enforced competition between publicly funded institutions abstract the study demonstrates how recent advances in the data envelopment analysis dea of profit efficiency and in combining dea and stochastic frontier analysis sfa to measure producer performance can be used to obtain a technically level playing field profit efficiency performance measure a three stage analysis is used to provide an empirical investigation of public sector universities facing regulatory pressures to attain both profit efficiency and output quality stage one employs directional distance function analysis to decompose dea profit efficiency measures into technical and allocative components as these performance measures incorporate the impacts of managerial inefficiency the operating environment and luck statistical noise stage two applies sfa to total radial and non radial slacks to obtain a degree of disentanglement from the latter two impacts the stage two results are used to define a common environment and common luck scenario thus permitting university producers inputs to be adjusted so as to reflect operation within this more level playing field scenario stage three recomputes the first stage dea for this scenario to yield an input focused technically level playing field measure of profit efficiency that unifies the regulatory financial audit and output quality indicators in a single best practice benchmarked performance measure

endogenous information acquisition in coordination games in the context of a beauty contest coordination game in which payoffs 1 depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and 2 from the average action players choose how much costly attention to pay to vari 3 ous informative signals each signal has an underlying accuracy how precisely it 4 identifies the state and a clarity how easy it is to understand the unique linear 5 equilibrium has interesting properties the signals which receive attention are the 6 clearest available even if they have poor underlying accuracy the number of sig 7 nals observed falls as the complementarity of players actions rises and if actions 8 are more complementary the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium 9 is more public in nature the consequences of rational inattention constraints on 10

bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods theory and evidence local governments allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents socio economic characteristics to gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack comparative statics and an empirical study of illinois municipalities are conducted the indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables representing socio economic characteristics costs and competition measures we find that slack or inefficient behavior is associated with richer communities lower education levels and a lack of competition for residents among municipalities

rationalizable foresight dynamics abstract this paper proposes and studies the rationalizable foresight dynamics a normal form game is repeatedly played in a random matching fashion by a continuum of agents who make decisions at stochastic points in time a rationalizable foresight path is a feasible path of action distribution along which each agent takes an action that maximizes his expected discounted payoff against another path which is in turn a rationalizable foresight path we consider a set valued stability concept under this dynamics and compare it with the corresponding concept under the perfect foresight dynamics

empirical evaluation of bureaucratic models of inefficiency two separate but related strands of literature exist regarding the efficiency of public sector service provision the theoretical base developed in the bureaucratic models of supply and the methodological base developed in the operations research and economic literatures most analyses focus exclusively on either the measurement or causes of inefficiency this paper seeks to empirically test bureaucratic models of supply by drawing on the measurement literature in anticipation of the results it is found that there does exist empirical evidence supporting some of the implications of these models

bureaucratic behavior in the local public sector a revealed preference approach public sector bureaucratic utility is typically assumed to be a function ofbudget size or government employment although intuitively appealing thereare no definitive direct tests of the assumption to fill this gap thispaper exploits data that isolate resource allocation decisions made by localpublic sector bureaucrats we use revealed preference theory to find thatthe bureaucracy behaves as if bureaucratic utility is an increasingfunction of employment across government functions and public spending providing direct evidence justifying the popular assumption in theoreticalmodels of government behavior

deadweight loss in environmental policy the case of the european union member states abstract with increased competition for scarce public financial resources and increased pressure on environmental policy it is necessary to determine the effectiveness of current environmental policy therefore the aim of this article was to determine the deadweight loss in public spending on the preservation of environment quality including national expenditures and the common agricultural policy in individual eu countries between the years of 2005 2016 to determine the relative differences in efficiency on environmental policy between eu countries bootstrapped data envelopment analysis and malmquist total factor productivity index decomposition was used it was found that generally the environmental prospects for european countries has improved over the last decade and have been reversely correlated to the deadweight loss however the inefficiency level of eu countries policy is on average relatively higher than what was reported in different regions of the world the highest efficiency of environmental spending has been therefore achieved in central eastern european and scandinavian countries and spain

incorporating contextual information in public sector efficiency analyses a comparative study of nsw local government using the planning and regulatory function of 173 nsw local governments several approaches for incorporating contextual or non discretionary inputs in data envelopment analysis dea are compared non discretionary inputs or factors beyond managerial control in this context include the population growth rate and distribution the level of development and non residential building activity and the proportion of the population from a non english speaking background the approaches selected to incorporate these variables include discretionary inputs only non discretionary and discretionary inputs treated alike and differently categorical inputs adjusted dea and endogenous dea the results indicate that the efficiency scores of the five approaches that incorporated non discretionary factors were significantly positively correlated however it was also established that the distributions of the efficiency scores and the number of councils assessed as perfectly technically efficient in the six approa

public sector efficiency leveling the playing field between oecd countries in this paper we seek a robust methodology for the measurement of the relative public sector efficiency of 19 oecd countries over the period 1980 2000 we estimate relative efficiency scores for five disaggregated accounts of public spending as well as for aggregate public spending then we use a semi parametric econometric method to isolate the impact of government inefficiency from the inefficiency arising from the socioeconomic environment and luck to verify the validity of our index we use it to examine a number of well established relationships in the public choice literature which have only been tested using local government data

budgeting for efficiency a case study of the public k 12 education systems of canada in spite of the declining and uneven performance of canadian students on the oecd s programme for international student assessment pisa tests little attention has been paid to whether provinces

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

the effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in israel 1989 1998 abstract we discuss the circumstances under which voters in local elections will reward fiscal responsibility and suggest that such circumstances evolved in israel in the mid 1990s we present empirical evidence that indeed fiscal performance of mayors substantially affected their reelection probability in the 1998 campaign but not in the 1989 and 1993 campaigns changes in the political environment enforcement of audit and financial reporting requirements tougher imposition of hard budget constraints and the development of local media are proposed as explanations the hypotheses that the fiscal variables reflect the income level at the locality or the mayor s success in extracting resources from the central government are tested and rejected

learning from prices public communication and welfare we study the effect of releasing public information about productivity or monetary shocks using a micro founded macroeconomic model in which agents learn from the distribution of nominal prices while a public release has the direct beneficial effect of providing new information it also has the indirect adverse effect of reducing the informational efficiency of the price system we show that the negative indirect effect can dominate thus the public information release may increase uncertainty about the monetary shock and reduce welfare we find that the optimal communication policy is always to release either all or none of the information

learning from private and public observations of othersʼ actions we study how a continuum of agents learn about disseminated information by observing others actions every period each agent observes a public and private noisy signal centered around the aggregate action taken by the population the public signal represents an endogenous aggregate variable such as a price or a quantity the private signal represents the information gathered through private communication and local interactions we identify conditions such that the average learning curve is s shaped learning is slow initially intensifies rapidly and finally converges slowly to the truth we show that increasing public information always slows down learning in the long run and under some conditions reduces welfare lastly optimal diffusion of information requires that agents strive to be different agents need to be rewarded for choosing actions away from the population average

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

on the determinants of local government performance a two stage nonparametric approach abstract this article analyzes the efficiency of local governments in the comunitat valenciana spain and their main explanatory variables the analysis is performed in two stages firstly efficiency is measured via nonparametric activity analysis techniques specifically we consider both data envelopment analysis dea and free disposable hull fdh techniques the second stage identifies some critical determinants of efficiency focusing on both political and fiscal policy variables in contrast to previous two stage research studies our approach performs the latter attempt via nonparametric smoothing techniques rather than econometric methods such as ols or tobit related techniques results show that efficiency scores especially under the nonconvexity assumption fdh are higher for large municipalities thus there is empirical evidence to suggest that resources may be better allocated by large municipalities however the inefficiency found is not entirely attributable to poor management as second stage analysis reveals both fiscal and political variables to be explicably related to municipality performance moreover the explanatory variables impact on efficiency is robust to the chosen technique either convex dea or nonconvex fdh

on the determinants of school district efficiency competition and monitoring abstract a number of researchers have asserted that inefficiency in the u s school system arises from a lack of incentives for public schools to behave efficiently this paper uses a shephard input distance function to model educational production and a switching regressions estimation to explore the relationship between school district efficiency and two existing incentive mechanisms competition and voter monitoring we find evidence that ease of monitoring enhances both technical and allocative efficiency of urban school districts and that increased competition reduces allocative inefficiency in communities above a competitive threshold we find no evidence that competition is related to technical inefficiency

adaptive versus eductive learning theory and evidence adaptive and eductive learning are two widely used ways of modeling the process by which agents learn a rational expectation equilibrium ree in this paper we report an experiment where we exploit differences in the conditions under which adaptive and eductive learning converge to ree so as to investigate which approach provides the better description of the learning behavior of human subjects our results suggest that the path by which the system converges appears to be a mixture of both adaptive and eductive learning model predictions

optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information svensson 2006 argues that morris and shin s 2002 analysis is contrary to what is claimed actually pro transparency this paper re examines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework recognizing that central banks impact on the economy not only indirectly via their public announcements but also directly through their policy actions we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention our results strengthen morris and shin s conclusions considerably in particular we find that public disclosure of the central bank s information is always undesirable

success and failure of fiscal consolidation in the oecd a multivariate analysis this paper tests five hypotheses explaining the success and failure of fiscal consol idation in a multivariate regression framework these hypotheses concern i the composition of the consolidation programme ii its size and persistence iii the gravity of the debt situation iv the influence of the international macroeconomic environment and v the con tribution of a preceding devaluation to test for composition effects we use cyclically adjusted data although many conclusions of the existing empirical literature are confirmed some do not survive a popular hypothesis that to succeed consolidation should rely on cutting the government wage bill is rejected a new empirical result is that the contribution of a devalu ation to the success of fiscal consolidation depends on the composition of the consolidation programme

measuring local government spending efficiency evidence for the lisbon region afonso a and fernandes s 2006 measuring local government spending efficiency evidence for the lisbon region regional studies 40 39 53 the expenditure efficiency of portuguese local governments in 2001 was assessed using data envelopment analysis for production frontier estimation a composite municipal output indicator was constructed and input and output efficiency scores were computed for 51 portuguese municipalities in the region of lisbon and vale do tejo this allows a determination of the extent of municipal spending that seems to be wasted relative to the theoretical best practice frontier the results suggest that vale do tejo municipalities could achieve on average the same level of output allegedly using around one third fewer resources improving performance without necessarily increasing municipal spending municipal expenditure technical efficiency data envelopment analysis dea lisbon afonso a and fernandes s 2006 l efficacite de la depense de l administration locale d

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector abstract this paper develops a test for pareto efficiency in the local public sectorusing the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the samuelson condition for efficiency by using cross section data it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property value maximizing and hence efficient fashion the empirical results show no systematic tendency to either under or over provide public goods in a sample of massachusetts communities

adaptive learning forecast based instrument rules and monetary policy abstract this paper argues that recently popular forecast based instrument rules for monetary policy may fail to stabilize economic fluctuations in a new keynesian model of output gap and inflation determination in which private agents face multi period decision problems but have non rational expectations and learn over time if the monetary authority adopts a forecast based instrument rule and responds to observed private forecasts then this class of policies frequently induce divergent learning dynamics a central bank that correctly understands private behavior can mitigate such instability by responding to the determinants of private forecasts this suggests gathering information on the determinants of expectations to be useful

are governmental expenditures also sticky evidence from the operating expenditures of public schools abstractexisting research on cost stickiness focuses primarily on for profit companies this study investigates cost behaviour in the public sector a new setting that deserves more research attent

anticipated fiscal policy and adaptive learning abstract the impact of anticipated policy changes when agents form expectations using adaptive learning rather than rational expectations is considered agents are assumed to combine limited structural knowledge with a standard adaptive learning rule these issues are analyzed using two well known set ups an endowment economy and the ramsey model in our scenario there are important deviations from both rational expectations and purely adaptive learning the approach could be applied to other frameworks

does eductive stability imply evolutionary stability this note presents a simple example of a model in which the unique rational expectations re steady state equilibrium is eductively stable in the sense of guesnerie 2002 but where evolutionary learning as introduced in brock and hommes 1997 does not necessarily converge to the re steady state price the example is a muthian cobweb model where producers have heterogeneous expectations and select forecasting strategies based upon recent realized profits by means of a simple three types example we show that a locally stable re fundamental steady state may co exists with a locally stable two cycle we also study the muthian model with a large number of different producer types and investigate conditions under which an evolutionary adaptive learning process based upon recent realized profits enforces global convergence to the stable re steady state and when persistent periodic price fluctuations can arise

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

real rigidity nominal rigidity and the social value of information does welfare improve when firms are better informed about the state of the economy and can thus better coordinate their production and pricing decisions we address this question in an elementary business cycle model that highlights how the dispersion of information can impede both kinds of decisions and in this sense be the source of both real and nominal rigidity within this context we develop a taxonomy for how the social value of information depends on the two rigidities on the sources of the business cycle and on the conduct of monetary policy jel d21 d82 d83 e32 e52

eductive stability in real business cycle models we reexamine issues of coordination in the standard rbc model is the unique rational expectations equilibrium attainable by rational agents who contemplate the possibility of small deviations from equilibrium surprisingly we nd that coordination cannot be expected even with strong common knowledge assumptions rational agents anticipating small but persistent deviations are led to take actions that eventually contradict the common knowledge assumption this impossibility theorem for eductive learning is not fully overcome when adaptive learning is incorporated into the framework

does public sector efficiency matter revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in a world sample this paper revisits the relationship between fiscal size and economic growth our work differs from the empirical growth literature because this relationship depends explicitly on the efficiency of the public sector we use a sample of 64 countries both developed and developing in four five year time periods between 1980 and 2000 building on the work of afonso et al public choice 123 321 347 2005 we construct a measure of public sector efficiency in each country and each time period by calculating an output to input ratio in addition we get an estimate of technical efficiency of public spending for 52 countries from 1995 to 2000 by employing a stochastic frontier analysis using these two measures we find evidence of a non monotonic relation between fiscal size and economic growth that depends critically on the size efficiency mix

indeterminacy and increasing returns abstract we investigate properties of the one sector growth model with increasing returns under two organizational structures capable of reconciling the existence of aggregate increasing returns with competitive behavior by firms the first involves input externalities the second involves monopolistic competition we show for parameters in close accord with recent literature on real business cycles that the model displays an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate a model of business fluctuations driven by self fulfilling beliefs in our first class of models growth is generated by exogenous increases in factor productivity in the second class the marginal product of capital is large enough for endogenous growth journal of economic literature classification numbers e00 e3 o40

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

bureaucracy inefficiency and time this paper examines the bureaucrat s choice between devoting resources to economic rents organizational slack and maximizing the budget of the agency a new model of bureaucracy is developed using utility rather than a demand function as its foundation it is shown that increases in income alter the slack budget constraint to favor organizational slack over budget maximization modern federal bureaucracies in the u s are predicted to be slack maximizing and x inefficient

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

public sector performance move or monitor governmental performance is a concern of citizens and politicians alike a specific interest is public sector waste which is thought to be pervasive and efforts to improve public sector performance are believed to be minimal economists have studied the topic extensively this paper discusses options on measuring public sector performance in urban areas and it also suggests certain public policy options that i believe deserve additional attention from a citizen s point of view when public service performance declines one can leave the jurisdiction this exit option has a substantial historical precedent in the united states going back to at least the landing of the mayflower in the urban public finance literature this is a consequence of the tiebout 1956 model in which there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions among which individuals may choose to live and people vote with their feet the model suggests that exit or the threat of exit leads to competitive forces that improve efficiency in the public sector an alternative to exit comes about through monitoring and voting monitoring and voting are attractive ways to effect change for individuals who do not want to exit as suggested by davis and hayes 1993 a fairly simple model can demonstrate the demand for good government there is a literature that examines the motives for exit dowding and john 1996 which points out and concludes that people may not move in response to the fiscal decisions of local governments perhaps voting and monitoring are more attractive options at least to a proportion of the population 2 this paper explores the move monitor trade off in influencing urban public sector performance although heuristic arguments can be made concerning the relative importance of moving or monitoring few researchers have investigated when if ever move and or monitor are effective means of improving public sector efficiency in this paper i would like to suggest that there are gaps in the literature proposing topics or future research

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

budget constrained frontier measures of fiscal equality and efficiency in schooling equality and efficiency are key issues in educational reform here the authors analyze the efficiency and equality consequences of various school finance reforms using a cost indirect output distance function this function readily models multiple output production under conditions of budgetary constraint and provides a natural measure of performance that is closely related to farrell type measures of efficiency the analysis suggests that despite school district inefficiency finance reforms can affect student achievement however any potential gains in output from redistribution are dwarfed by the potential gains from increased efficiency more strikingly the analysis demonstrates that budgetary reforms designed to equalize expenditures could actually increase the inequality of student achievement

types of bureaucratic interaction abstract a taxonomy of relationships between a public bureau and its sponsoring institution is modelled within a simple follower leader framework various assumptions are made with respect to who makes the decision about the bureaucratic activity level and with respect to cost information the role played by budgetary slack is emphasized deviations from the socially optimal bureau are identified but no general support is found for the view that bureaus tend to become too big

expectations and the stability problem for optimal monetary policies eine auf den fundamentaldaten beruhende regelbindung der geldpolitik ohne selbstverpflichtung die bei vollkommen rationalen erwartungen der privaten akteure optimal ware ist instabil wenn diese akteure de facto den ublichen regeln des adaptiven lernens folgen dieses problem lasst sich dadurch beheben dass die erwartungen privater akteure berucksichtigt und in geeigneter weise in die optimale geldpolitik einbezogen werden diese eindeutige schlusfolgerung gilt auch dann wenn sich der geldpolitische entscheidungstrager und die privaten akteure in einem simultanen lernprozess befinden unsere ergebnisse zeigen wie wichtig es ist die geldpolitik angemessen zu gestalten und dabei nicht nur die fundamentaldaten sondern auch direkt die beobachteten erwartungen privater haushalte und unternehmen zu berucksichtigen

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

exogenous information endogenous information and optimal monetary policy most of the analysis of optimal monetary policy is conducted with the calvo model this paper studies optimal monetary policy when the slow adjustment of the price level is due to imperfect information by decision makers in firms we consider two models a model with exogenous dispersed information and a rational inattention model in the model with exogenous dispersed information complete stabilization of the price level is optimal after aggregate productivity shocks but not after markup shocks by contrast in the rational inattention model complete stabilization of the price level is optimal both after aggregate productivity shocks and after markup shocks moreover in the model with exogenous dispersed information there is no value from commitment to a future monetary policy by contrast in the rational inattention model there is value from commitment to a future monetary policy because then the private sector can trust the central bank that not paying attention to certain variables is optimal

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

the flypaper effect and other anomalies abstract i develop a model in which income both in its own right and as a proxy for other socioeconomic characteristics is an input in the production function for local public services the most obvious example is education though there are other applications as well the comparative statics results from this model yield the following results 1 the observed flypaper effect the tendency for local government to spend a higher fraction of unrestricted grants than income of residents may be due at least in part to the fact that own income but not grants is a substitute for purchased inputs in the technology hence the propensity to spend on purchased inputs out of own income is lower than out of grants 2 the income elasticity of demand for public sector output may be higher than the observed income elasticity of demand for purchased inputs 3 equalization of educational opportunity via wealth neutrality as suggested by feldstein requires major changes in education finance once we recognice the distinction between purchased inputs and output

measuring equity of educational outcomes in the presence of inefficiency abstract disparities in school expenditures have been a major concern in school finance equalization of spending presumably fulfills the ideal of equal educational opportunity differences in spending however result not only from differences in service provision but also from variations in resource prices exogenous cost environments and efficiency as a result equity measures that use expenditures per pupil as the object will capture these other variations and therefore may not be indicative of unequal educational outcomes the purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic non parametric framework for measuring outcome equity of school districts data envelopment analysis is used to adjust expenditures for differences in cost environments and to control for inefficiency in new york state school districts the results suggest that nearly one half of the measured inequity can be attributed to sources other than disparities in outcomes

market based corrective actions many economic agents take corrective actions based on information inferred from market prices of firms securities examples include directors and activists intervening in the management of firms and bank supervisors taking actions to improve the health of financial institutions we provide an equilibrium analysis of such situations in light of a key problem if agents use market prices when deciding on corrective actions prices adjust to reflect this use and potentially become less revealing we show that market information and agents information are complementary and discuss measures that can increase agents ability to learn from market prices the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please email journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

explaining differences in productive efficiency an application to belgian municipalities the purpose of this paper is to measure and explain variations in productive efficiency of municipal governments in belgium technical efficiency is evaluated using a non parametric method based on the free disposal hull fdh reference technology we first calculate input output and graph farrell efficiency measures for a cross section of all 589 belgian municipalities in a second stage of the analysis we explain the calculated differences in efficiency in terms of variables related to the structural characteristics of municipalities and to the institutional environment

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances

an indirect approach to the evaluation of producer performance in this paper we suggest a somewhat new analytical approach to producer performance evaluation the suggested approach is somewhat new in that it synthesizes existing analytical techniques from three areas and uses them to look at performance evaluation in a new way the approach is particularly relevant to public sector or service sector contexts in which the performance of alternative providers of a public service is to be evaluated in these contexts any of the following conditions may hold 1 the standard profit maximizing cost minimizing or revenue maximizing paradigms are inappropriate 2 prices of some services being provided or of some resources being consumed are either nonexistent or unobserved 3 observed prices are not exogenous due to monopoly or monopsony power examples abound it is frequently argued that the provision of medical legal educational transportation employment and many other services by public or private agencies is driven by goals other than the maximization of profit moreover these and many other services such as police and fire protection do not always have market prices with which to value them in addition the lack of competition in the provision of many such services and thus in the employment of specialized resources used in their provision makes it dangerous to use existing but distorted market prices to compare the performance of providers on the basis of revenue or cost much less profit