does exchange rate variability depress trade flows evidence from error correction models this paper examines the impact of exchange rate volatility on the trade flows of the g 7 countries in the context of a multivariate error correction model the error correction models do not show any sign of parameter instability the results indicate that the exchange rate volatility has a significant negative impact on the volume of exports in each of the g 7 countries assuming market participants are risk averse these results imply that exchange rate uncertainty causes them to reduce their activities change prices or shift sources of demand and supply in order to minimize their exposure to the effects of exchange rate volatility this in turn can change the distribution of output across many sectors in these countries it is quite possible that the surprisingly weak relationship between trade flows and exchange rate volatility reported in several previous studies are due to insufficient attention to the stochastic properties of the relevant time series copyright 1993 by mit press

50th anniversary article option pricing valuation models and applications this paper surveys the literature on option pricing from its origins to the present an extensive review of valuation methods for european and american style claims is provided applications to complex securities and numerical methods are surveyed emphasis is placed on recent trends and developments in methodology and modeling

temporal aggregation in political budget cycles electoral cycles have been widely debated since the pioneering studies of the 1970s on monetary and fiscal policy 1 drazen sums up the evidence in terms of active fiscal policy and passive monetary policy while expansionary fiscal policy is the main impulse behind electoral cycles monetary policy has an accommodating role 2 recently there has been a flurry of empirical work on political budget cycles pbcs using cross country panels the most influential works concentrate on the budget surplus because it can capture both increases in expenditures and tax cuts before elections and is thus the most sensitive indicator of aggregate pbcs 3a drawback of these extant studies is their reliance on annual observations since elections take place between january and december annual data do not allow one to identify the election year precisely to get around this problem other schemes have been proposed for example by the rule of the semester the previous year is counted as the election year if elections take place before july 4 what are the consequences of temporal aggregation for the measurement of pbcs instead of being concentrated in the election year pre electoral effects may be spread out over the two years leading up to elections more important if the sign of policies is reversed after elections lower frequency data may mask pbcs because the effects in the election year cancel out as akhmedov and zhuravskaya point out in their country study of russia 5to illustrate the differences between using annual and quarterly data to identify the election year imagine that elections take place in june furthermore assume there is a pre electoral deterioration in the budget surplus surplus 1 during the four quarters running up to elections followed by an improvement surplus 1 the next four quarters in the calendar year in which elections take place the net effect on the budget surplus is zero elections are not always in june of course what happens if elections are evenly spread out over the year table 1 presents a simulation where y 0 is the calendar year of elections y 1 is the year before and y 1 is the year after for elections in the first quarter of the election year namely y 0 q 1 our textbook example of a pre electoral expansion in the deficit during the four quarters prior to elections followed by a contraction the next four quarters implies that the surplus equals 1 from y 1 q 2 to y 0 q 1 it equals 1 from y 0 q 2 to y 1 q 1 and it equals 0 otherwise when the budget surplus is at its average value normalized here at zero the same procedure is followed for elections in the other three quarters if we aggregate the effects by calendar year there is a serious underestimation of pbcs in the election year since pre electoral expansions are almost cancelled out by post electoral contractions leaving a net expansive effect that is only 25 percent of the total stimulus before elections the least affected by temporal aggregation are post electoral fiscal adjustments since 62 5 percent of the total effect is reflected the year after elections on the other hand if there were no post electoral fiscal adjustments the problem of temporal aggregation would be much less severe since 62 5 percent of the total expansive effect would be reflected the calendar year of elections and 37 5 percent the year before this paper tackles the issue of temporal aggregation in pbcs head on we build a cross country panel with annual and quarterly data from nineteen latin american countries and twenty member states of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd over the 1980 2005 period 6 quarterly data allow us to identify the election year more precisely with annual data the election year is the calendar year in which elections take place with quarterly data the election year comprises the election quarter plus the three prior quarters we introduce two nonstandard features in our analysis

fiscal policy outcomes and electoral accountability in american states clear fiscal policy effects appear in american state gubernatorial and legislative elections between 1968 and 1992 independent of the effects of incumbency coattails term limits and macroeconomic conditions the results show that accountability is generally stronger following a period of unified party control than under divided government voter reactions to taxes and spending relative to the state economy are conditional on expectations which differ for each party net of these expectations republican gubernatorial candidates lose votes if their party is responsible for unanticipated increases in the size of the state budget democrats do not and indeed may be rewarded for small increases independent of this the incumbent governor s party is punished in legislative elections for failing to maintain fiscal balance taken together these results show how electoral accountability for fiscal policy outcomes is strong but highly contingent on a complex configuration of party labels partisan control expectations and institutions

exchange rate volatility and japan u s commodity trade an asymmetry analysis exchange rate volatility is said to affect trade flows in either direction when increased volatility is separated from decreased volatility asymmetric analysis reveals even more support for the fact that both increased volatility and decreased volatility affect trade flows in either direction we add to this new literature by considering 57 industries that trade between japan and the us in addition to providing evidence of asymmetric response of their trade flows to a measure of exchange rate volatility our approach identifies industries that could benefit from increased exchange rate volatility and those that could be hurt similarly we identify industries that could benefit from decreased volatility and those that could be hurt the overall conclusion is the adverse effects of dollar yen volatility on the trade between the two countries

do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle this paper develops and tests the theory that fiscal rules limit politicians ability to manipulate the budget for electoral gain using panel data from the american states i find evidence suggesting that stringent balanced budget rules dampen the political business cycle that is while spending rises before and falls after elections in states that can carry deficits into the next fiscal year this pattern does not exist in states with strict no carry rules neither binding gubernatorial term limits nor the partisan composition of government appear to significantly affect the magnitude of the political business cycle

prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this paper puts forward a valuation framework for mortgage backed securities rather than imposing an optimal value minimizing call condition we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depends upon the prevailing state of the economy to implement our valuation procedure we use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a prepayment function in light of recent aggregate gnma prepayment experience by integrating this empirical prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgagebacked securities given an optimal value minimizing call policy a mortgage should never be called when its market value is less than its call price similarly a mortgage should be called if it is worth more than its call price however mortgagors often call their loans when the prevailing refinancing rate exceeds the contract rate on the loan dunn and mcconnell 1981 in addition some mortgagors do not call their loans when the loan s contract rate exceeds the prevailing refinancing rate the purpose of this paper is to put forward a valuation framework for mortgagebacked securities consistent with these stylized facts associated with mortgage prepayments the mortgagor s prepayment decision is integral to our valuation framework however we do not impose an optimal value minimizing call condition to price these securities rather we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depending upon the prevailing state of the economy by integrating this prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgage backed securities to implement our valuation procedures we estimate a prepayment function given recent gnma prepayment experience we follow green and shoven 1986 by using a proportional hazards model to estimate the influence of various explanatory variables or covariates on the mortgagor s prepayment decision distinct from green and shoven we explicitly model the effects of seasoning as well as investigating the influence of interest cost savings from refinancing in addition we also consider the effects of lagged refinancing rates heterogeneity

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

the impact of late budgets on state government borrowing costs abstract we analyze how a key component of fiscal governance the ability of governments to pass a budget on time affects government bond yield spreads based on a sample of 36 us states from 1988 to 1997 and using an original data set on budget enactment dates we estimate that a 30 day budget delay has a cumulative impact that is equivalent to a one time increase in the yield spread of around 10 basis points states with sufficient liquidity incur no costs from late budgets while unified governments face large penalties from not finishing a budget on time

a note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints abstract an important agrument in the current debate over european monetary integration is that a monetary union requires formal fiscal restraints limiting individual member states budgetary powers to reduce the common monetary authority s risk of having to bail out insolvent member governments this note presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the united states nonparametric tests reveal that fiscal restraints significantly affect the probability of fiscal choices and performance without however preventing extreme outcomes fiscal restraints induce substitution of nonrestricted for restricted debt instruments

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

electoral cycles and budgetary growth in veterans benefit programs while many studies have generated negative findings regarding the general existence of electoral cycles in economic phenomena we have found an apparently robust electoral cycle in veterans benefits this pattern was found between 1961 and 1978 but has disappeared since then we use this case to investigate the possibility that electoral cycles might contribute to the growth of government spending using two different methods of inference we find no strong basis to conclude that such cycles cause increasing public sector growth

persistent trade effects of large exchange rate shocks this paper presents a theoretical basis for the argument that large exchange rate shocks such as the 1980s dollar cycle may have persistent effects on trade flows and the equilibrium exchange rate itself we begin with a partial equilibrium model in which large exchange rate fluctuations lead to entry or exit decisions that are not reversed when the currency returns to its previous level then we develop a simple model of the feedback from hysteresis in trade to the exchange rate itself here we see that a large capital inflow which leads to an initial appreciation can result in a persistent reduction in the exchange rate consistent with trade balance

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

the effects of macroeconomic stability on foreign trade an analysis for spain 1986 2000 two main factors underlie the rebirth of interest in the study of the influence of the real exchange rate on trade the reduction of its volatility and the current trend towards price stability the objective of this study is to analyse the effects of the process of nominal convergence required of the european member states for the fulfilment of monetary integration on foreign trade flows the case of spain which is especially interesting in this context is studied for the period 1986 to 2000 the results of estimating the aggregate functions of the export and import of goods shows how macroeconomic stability has altered the behaviour of trade with respect to the two basic determinants income and prices how it has caused a significant structural change in the real exchange rate and finally how it has laid the explanatory bases for transactions in the twenty first century with the single currency the euro

the effect of the asian financial crisis on the relationships among open macroeconomic factors for asian countries this study investigates the effect of asian financial crisis on the relationships among exchange rate volatility export import and productivity for taiwan korea malaysia and indonesia cointegration tests show no change for the long run equilibrium relationship among these variables throughout the crisis granger causality finds that some exogeneity orderings alter from pre to post crisis periods for the countries considered impulse response functions irs for the pre crisis period demonstrate the primary importance of productivity then second importance of export for the post crisis period oscillatory paths around zero of the irs imply an ambiguous finding for the direction of effect and relative exogeneity among variables studied the variance decompositions in export for taiwan korea and malaysia and in productivity for malaysia and indonesia did not change from the pre crisis to the post crisis era however most of the rest of the forecast error variances in variables were decomposed in

do state balanced budget requirements matter testing two explanatory frameworks balanced budget requirements bbrs affect all aspects of financial operations previous studies relied on characterizations that highlight a constitutional statutory distinction hou and smith public budgeting finance 26 3 22 45 2006 instead propose a political technical construct this article uses probit estimation six measures of balance and long panels to test which framework offers more explanatory power the findings suggest that bbrs matter to varying degrees technical requirements exert bigger effects than political ones the effects are more obvious on narrower than broader measures of balance and in the later phases of the budget cycle and the political technical construct offers more explanatory power than the constitutional statutory distinction

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

does exchange rate volatility affect import flows in g 7 countries evidence from cointegration models this paper provides new evidence on the long run relationship between imports and exchange rate volatility in g 7 countries the period examined is 1973 2 through 1995 1 cointegration analyses are based on johansen s 1991 1994 approach and robust single equation methods of stock and watson 1993 and phillips and loretan 1991 in conformity with theoretical considerations the results indicate that exchange rate volatility has a significant negative effect on the volume of imports of most g 7 countries whereas for canada it is positive and significant these findings are reasonably robust in terms of measures of exchange rate volatility and different estimation methods

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

political business cycles democratization and economic reform the case of africa abstract this paper presents cross country evidence that political business cycles are alive and well in the nascent democracies of the developing world africa provides fertile ground for the study of political business cycles this paper uncovers systematic electorally timed interventions in five monetary and four fiscal policy variables in a panel of african countries these findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory if africa s increasingly frequent elections are associated with reversals of fiscal and monetary policy reform there is a potential conflict between political and economic reform

measuring and analysing the effects of short term volatility in real exchange rates this paper examines short term volatility in the real effective exchange rates of industrial countries and its impact on their imports it yields three conclusions first volatility has not diminished as markets have gained experience with floating exchange rates the trend appears to be in the opposite direction for some countries second exposure to short term volatility has differed among countries japan and sweden have experienced much more than most other industrial countries third volatility appears to depress the volume of international trade this third finding is consistent with results reported by cushman and by akhtar and hilton and challenges earlier findings by hooper and kohlhagen

real exchange rate volatility and the us bilateral trade a var approach this paper uses var models to investigate the impact of real exchange rate volatility on u s bilateral imports from the united kingdom france germany japan and canada the var systems include u s and foreign macro variables and are estimated separately for each country the major results suggest that the effect of volatility on imports is weak although permanent shocks to volatility do have a negative impact on this measure of trade and those effects are relatively more important over the flexible rate period copyright 1989 by mit press

transparency political polarization and political budget cycles in oecd countries we investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance while some recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies in contrast we show conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature of many advanced industrialized economies using a sample of 19 oecd countries in the 1990s we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low er transparency countries while no such cycles can be observed in high er transparency countries furthermore we find in accordance with recent theory that electoral cycles are larger in politically more polarized countries

when to refinance a mortgage a dynamic programming approach abstract when should one refinance a mortgage loan it is one of the most common finance questions in today s world there have been surprisingly few attempts to answer this question in a structured manner however moreover the existing guidelines for refinancing consist of a short list of very simple rules that have a limited application this article addresses the question through a dynamic programming model coupled with an analysis of historical interest rates the analysis reveals a more complex set of rules for an optional refinance decision oftentimes conflicting with the conventionally accepted idea that rate differences must be greater than two percent

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

political budget cycles and divided government abstractpolitical budget cycles and divided government regional studies this study empirically examines the effect of divided governments on the existence of political budget cycles it uses a setting at the german municipality level where divided governments occur frequently and can be clearly disentangled from the underlying political system in this setting the executive does not have full discretion over expenditures and tax rates and needs support from the legislative to manipulate policy before executive elections the study shows that political budget cycles in expenditures and tax rates are more likely when the same party controls executive and legislative under divided government policy manipulation is significantly smaller

mortgages and markov chains a simplified evaluation model this paper has two purposes the first is purely expository to introduce stochastic interest rate models and security evaluation methods in a simple mathematical setting specifically we assume the uncertainties in the model are represented by a discrete time finite state markov chain second using this framework we present a relatively simple model for the evaluation of mortgage backed securities

disentangling patterns of state debt financing we examine the determinants of change in state government indebtedness from 1961 through 1989 using a pooled time series cross sectional analysis the analysis reveals that debt is primarily a function of economic conditions reflecting both the need to borrow and the capacity of states to repay debt however political factors such as culture partisan competition and electoral cycles also affect state debt we also find very weak evidence that tax and expenditure limitations ironically may increase state indebtedness while constitutional debt limitations have no effect upon slowing the growth of state debt

seeing the forest through the trees a meta analysis of political budget cycles despite a vast number of articles the political budget cycle literature contains many conflicting theories and empirical results i conduct the first ever meta analysis of this literature in order to establish whether a link between elections and government budgets exists using data on 1198 estimates across 88 studies published between 2000 and 2015 i find evidence of a statistically significant yet substantively small increase in government expenditures and public debt around elections and reductions in revenues and fiscal balance using meta regression analysis combined with bayesian model averaging i find support for some of the context conditional theories in the literature although the findings of political budget cycles are robust to publication bias as well as some of the methodological and study specific choices authors are forced to make they also shed light on how certain decisions may affect a study s findings this has implications for current and future research on political budget cycles

political budget cycles and the civil service evidence from highway spending in us states abstract we study political budget cycles in infrastructure spending that are conditional on bureaucratic organization bureaucrats can facilitate or hinder politicians ability to engage in voter friendly spending around elections to test this idea we use civil service reforms undertaken by us states in the second half of the 20th century to study political budget cycles in highway spending under civil service and patronage we find that under patronage highway spending is 12 higher in election years and 9 higher in the year before an election by contrast under civil service highway spending is essentially smooth over the electoral cycle these findings provide a novel way through which civil service rules can stabilize government activity

the costs and benefits of balanced budget rules lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy this paper analyzes the impact of a balanced budget rule that requires that legislators do not run deficits in the political economy model of battaglini and coate 2008 the main finding is that the rule leads to a gradual reduction in the level of public debt legislators reduce debt in periods when the demand for public goods is relatively low they do so because the rule by restricting future fiscal policies raises the expected costs of carrying debt whether the rule increases citizen welfare depends on a comparison of the benefits of a lower debt burden with the costs of greater volatility in taxes and less responsive public good provision a quantitative version of the model is developed in which costs and benefits can be evaluated a welfare loss results if the debt level when the rule is imposed lies in the support of the long run distribution associated with the unconstrained equilibrium

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

american option pricing under garch by a markov chain approximation abstract we propose a numerical method for valuing american options in general and for the garch option pricing model in particular the method is based on approximating the underlying asset price process by a finite state time homogeneous markov chain since the markov transition probability matrix can be derived analytically the price of an american option can be computed by simple matrix operations the markov transition probability matrix is typically sparse the use of a sparse matrix representation can substantially increase the dimension of the markov chain to obtain better numerical results the markov chain method works well for the garch option pricing framework and it serves as an alternative to the existing numerical methods for the valuation of american options in other pricing settings we provide a convergence proof for the markov chain method and analyze its numerical performance for the black scholes 1973 and garch option pricing models

estimating long run economic equilibria with stochastic trends an asymptotic theory is provided to analyze a menu of currently existing estimators of cointegrated systems we study in detail the single equation ecm seecm approach of hendry our theoretical results lead to prescriptions for empirical work such as specifying seecm s nonlinearly and including lagged equilibrium relationships rather than lagged differences of the dependent variable as covariates simulations support these prescriptions and point to problems of overfitting not encountered in the semiparametric approach of phillips and hansen 1990

exchange risk exposure and the option to trade rather than impeding trade increased exchange rate uncertainty may on average create trade as it implies a higher probability that ex post deviations from commodity price parity will exceed tariffs and transportation costs we demonstrate such an effect in a small country short term model under the alternative assumptions of perfect competition and of a monopolist trader producer the proofs rely on the fact that such firms exposures can be replicated and hedged by standard options under partial monopoly scenarios the effect of volatility is ex ante unclear though jel f31

the effects of exchange rate variability on international trade a meta regression analysis the trade effects of exchange rate variability have been an issue in international economics for the past 30 years the contribution of this article is to apply meta regression analysis mra to the empirical literature on average exchange rate variability exerts a negative effect on international trade yet mra confirms the view that this result is highly conditional by identifying factors that help to explain why estimated trade effects vary from significantly negative to significantly positive mra evidence on the pronounced heterogeneity of the empirical findings may be instructive for policy first by establishing that average trade effects are not sufficiently robust to generalize across countries and second by suggesting the importance of hedging opportunities hence of financial development for trade promotion for the practice of mra we make a case for checking the robustness of results with respect to estimation technique model specification and sample

making rules credible divided government and political budget cycles political budget cycles pbcs can result from the credibility problems office motivated incumbents face under asymmetric information due to the temptation to manipulate fiscal policy to increase their electoral chances we analyze the role of rules that limit public debt because borrowing is a necessary condition for aggregate pbcs since the legislature must typically authorize new debt divided government can make these fiscal rules credible commitment is undermined by either unified government or imperfect compliance with the budget law which can help explain why pbcs are stronger in developing countries and in new democracies when divided government affects efficiency voters must trade off electoral distortions and government competence