efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

price wars in price setting supergames this paper presents a method of generating price wars in price setting supergames the market is one where symmetric oligopolists produce a differentiated product and use price as a strategic variable prices are posted and can be observed by all there is thus little uncertainty or scope for secret price cutting nevertheless price wars occur they are precipitated by periodic but infrequent demand shocks firms use the wars to learn about changed conditions in the market so that they can calculate the new stationary nash equilibrium learning is modeled in a bayesian fashion via the kalman filter copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

experimental gasoline markets abstract zone pricing in wholesale gasoline markets is a contentious topic in the public policy debate with a controlled laboratory experiment we investigate the competitive effects of zone pricing on consumers retail stations and refiners vis a vis the proposed policy prescription of uniform wholesale pricing to retailers we also examine the issue of divorcement and the rockets and feathers phenomenon the former is the legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated and the latter is the perception that retail gasoline prices rise faster than they fall in response to random walk movements in the world price for oil

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

uncovering financial market expectations of inflation this paper seeks to uncover market expectations of inflation from the joint dynamics of nominal interest rates and observed inflation i postulate 1 the existence of a stable vector autoregression in unobserved variables and 2 efficient financial markets the estimation procedure requires no further structural assumptions the econometrician need not observe all the information used by agents in forming forecasts or all the variables that influence real interest rates i find no empirical evidence that economic recessions are correlated with inflation forecast errors however postwar recessions are associated with ex ante real interest rates that are twice the postwar average

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

two stage residual inclusion estimation addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling the paper focuses on two estimation methods that have been widely used to address endogeneity in empirical research in health economics and health services research two stage predictor substitution 2sps and two stage residual inclusion 2sri 2sps is the rote extension to nonlinear models of the popular linear two stage least squares estimator the 2sri estimator is similar except that in the second stage regression the endogenous variables are not replaced by first stage predictors instead first stage residuals are included as additional regressors in a generic parametric framework we show that 2sri is consistent and 2sps is not results from a simulation study and an illustrative example also recommend against 2sps and favor 2sri our findings are important given that there are many prominent examples of the application of inconsistent 2sps in the recent literature this study can be used as a guide by future researchers in health economics who are confronted with endogeneity in their empirical work

taking a financial position in your opponent in litigation before filing suit a plaintiff can take a financial position in a defendant firm a short position benefits the plaintiff by transforming a negative expected value claim into a positive expected value one and by enhancing the claim s settlement value if the capital market is less than strong form efficient the plaintiff also benefits directly from the decline in the defendant s stock price when the defendant is privately informed about the case s merits bargaining failures can arise while aggressive short selling benefits the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant moderate levels of short selling can benefit the defendant and raise the settlement rate

modelling price competition across many markets an application to the spanish loans market abstract the purpose of this work is the structural modelling of price competition in a product differentiated industry in which many firms of varying size compete across many independent small markets with the target of identifying price behaviour we apply it to model competition among the more than 79 banks that were active in the spanish loans market during the period 1983 1991 using micropanel data a model in which national banks as opposed to regional and local banks fully internalize their cross rate effects in pricing is selected as the model that best fits the data our framework allows us to estimate the dead weight loss due to market power and to decompose it assessing the part attributable to price coordination

vertical relationships and competition in retail gasoline markets empirical evidence from contract changes in southern california comment this study examines how much if any of the differences in retail gasoline prices between markets is attributable to differences in the composition of vertical contract types at gasoline stations in each market the purchase of the independent retail gasoline chain thrifty by arco provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of changes in different vertical contract types on local retail prices this event caused sharp changes in the market share of i fully vertically integrated stations and ii independent stations differentially affecting local markets in the los angeles and san diego metropolitan areas using unique and detailed station level data this study examines how these sharp changes affected local retail prices the detailed data and the research design based on the thrifty station conversions allow for credible estimation of the effects of the market share of independent retailers and vertically integrated retailers on local market prices controlling for any omitted factors at the station level and the city level over time results for the los angeles and san diego metropolitan areas indicate that a decrease in the market share of independent stations has a significant positive impact on local retail price however a change in the market share of refiner owned and operated branded stations does not have a significant impact on local market price these results have important implications as policy makers consider the regulation of vertical contracts as a means to increase competition in gasoline markets the research design and detailed data also allow for inference on the underlying nature of retail gasoline competition

the timing of out of court settlements parties to a lawsuit will frequently delay litigation even in circumstances where a voluntary agreement is eventually reached this article is concerned with what causes legal disputes to be prolonged over time we discuss dynamic models of litigation to illustrate how changes in the bargaining environment might generate empirical hazard functions comparative statics results are then corroborated with empirical estimates of a hazard function adjusted to account for both the heterogeneity of lawsuits and the nonproportional time dependence suggested by theory

consumer and competitor reactions evidence from a field experiment abstract in response to a price change by a single seller it is common for the density of sellers in the market to influence both the quantity response of consumers and the price response of other sellers using field experiment data collected around a series of exogenously imposed price changes we find that an individual retailer with a larger number of competitors faces a more responsive demand this finding is fundamental to a predicted inverse relationship between market prices and the number of competitors we also examine the reaction of rival stations to exogenous price changes and find that the magnitude of a competitor s response is inversely related to the density of stations in the market

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

supermarket choice and supermarket competition in market equilibrium multi store firms are common in the retailing industry theory suggests that cross elasticities between stores of the same firm enhance market power to evaluate the importance of this effect in the u k supermarket industry we estimate a model of consumer choice and expenditure using three data sources profit margins for each chain a survey of consumer choices and a data set of store characteristics to permit plausible substitution patterns the utility model interacts consumer and store characteristics we measure market power by calculating the effect of merger and demerger on nash equilibrium prices demerger reduces the prices of the largest firms by between 2 and 3 8 depending on local concentration mergers between the largest firms lead to price increases up to 7 4

inflation real returns and capital investment we find evidence for the hypothesis of mundell 1963 and tobin 1965 that the expected real return component of interest rates is negatively related to the expected inflation component in the mundell tobin model the variation in expected real returns is caused by the variation in expected inflation our evidence suggests however that the variation in expected real returns is more fundamentally an outcome of the capital expenditures process equilibrium expected real returns vary directly with capital expenditures in order to induce equilibrium allocations of resources between consumption and investment this positive relation between expected real returns and real activity which comes out of the real sector combines with a negative relation between expected inflation and real activity which is traced to the monetary sector thus inducing the negative relation between expected inflation and expected real returns predicted by mundell and tobin but explained in terms of a model much different from theirs

the existence of nash equilibria in reaction functions for dynamic models of oligopoly consider cournot s stability analysis of his mineral spring duopoly cournot 1838 each of the two firms believes that its rival s output in the next period will simply equal that observed currently profit maximization yields reaction functions which are explicitly dynamic and are assumed to govern the actual evolution of the system cournot proved that the system is asymptotically stable in this simplest case cournot s result was shown by theocharis 1960 not to generalize to three or more firms fisher 1961 discusses more general cost and demand functions than those used by cournot even in the case considered by cournot however there is an obvious conceptual objection each firm s output will generally vary from one period to the next flagrantly violating its rival s conjecture some of james friedman s work especially 1968 1973 1976 and 1977 might best be viewed as an attempt to eliminate this delusional quality from dynamic models of oligopoly consider a typical duopoly scenario with two firms making repeated simultaneous quantity determinations friedman more commonly discusses price setting models but these are straightforwardly analogous each firm believes that the other firm s behavior is determined only by the quantity pair selected in the previous period in friedman s work as distinct from cournot s these beliefs are ultimately required to be consistent with the other firm s actual behavior for example firm 2 believes that firm l s output in the current period is given as

conjectures firm characteristics and market structure abstract this paper makes use of a unique data set to investigate how firms in the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market view their rivals and how consumers in turn view these firms own and rival price elasticities of demand conjectural variations and lerner indices are estimated for thirteen service stations in a submarket of vancouver these variables are then related to firm characteristics such as type of ownership degree of horizontal and vertical integration and type of service in this way systematic patterns in seller behavior and in buyer attitudes are revealed

winners and losers in a major price war abstract although retail price wars have received much business press and some research attention it is unclear how they affect consumer purchase behavior this article studies an unprecedented price war in dutch grocery retailing that started in fall 2003 initiated by the market leader to halt its sliding market share the authors investigate the short and long term effects of the price war on store visits on spending and on the sensitivity of these decisions to weekly prices and price image they use a unique data set with consumer hand scan and perceptual data for a national panel of 1821 households covering two years before and two years after the price war started although the price war initially entailed more shopping around and increased spending spending per visit ultimately dropped because consumers redistributed their purchases across stores the price war made consumers more sensitive to weekly prices and price image which helped both the chain that showed an improvement in price image

tacit collusion with price matching punishments abstract tacit collusion is explored under a strategy in which loosely speaking firms match the lowest price set by any firm in the previous period conditions are provided under which this strategy supports collusive outcomes in a subgame perfect equilibrium in contrast to traditional results the highest collusive price is always lower than the monopoly price it corresponds to the unique nash equilibrium price when upward and downward price deviations are matched our paper provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart from standard timing assumptions to do so

vertical control and price cycles in gasoline retailing we examine norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station specific observations from 2003 to 2006 the four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry wide labeled price support this moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern where we observe de facto simultaneous decision making by the headquarters without knowledge of their rivals prices when every monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level the price level on mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies

chapter 11 pricing models in marketing publisher summary this chapter brings together a set of diverse efforts in the recent literature on the modeling of price decisions and related questions in marketing there has been an impressive growth in the array of topics investigated in the literature various trends in the development of pricing models are evident from the foregoing review first one trend has been to develop theoretical models to describe observed pricing strategies in the marketplace and to derive conditions under which certain strategies are optimal this trend is clearly evident when one considers the area of dynamic pricing models another trend is an attempt to develop pricing models in which certain aspects of consumer behavior e g asymmetric response to price increases versus price decreases are incorporated this development is quite recent and does offer a large potential a third dominant direction is the use of game theoretic models for developing equilibrium pricing strategies

market power vertical integration and the wholesale price of gasoline this paper examines empirically the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices we use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in west coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals costs the research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices controlling for horizontal market structure cost shocks and trends we find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors input costs this suggests that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices

estimating a bargaining model with asymmetric information evidence from medical malpractice disputes this article uses a unique data set on medical malpractice disputes in florida to estimate the parameters of a bargaining game with asymmetric information the main findings of the article suggest that the bargaining game can replicate most of the qualitative and quantitative features of the data the article also simulates alternative policy regimes to quantify the effects of possible tort reforms such as imposing limits on contingency fees and caps on jury awards

regional finance and competition policy the canary islands petrol market market competition levels affect all agents of an economy businesses consumers and the state traditional analysis has evaluated the state s effects on the other agents but no analysis has been conducted regarding the inverse relationship thus the aim of this study is to estimate the tributary income losses that low levels of competition in the retail petrol market could cause in it using the data from canary islands autonomous community first we will use parker and roller s methodology 1997 to measure the level of competition and confirm a deficiency then using estimated rates we will determine the differences that would appear in tributary income if the market were to behave as a cournot s model our results show that the lack of competition causes a substantial loss of tributary income for this region somewhere between 5and 10 of the real income from the tax on unleaded petrol for the year 2004

credible pretrial negotiation pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information when a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court imposed judgment a central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff s threat to litigate is credible it is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient as a result the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected when this credibility constraint is binding traditional comparative static results are reversed in addition even though the defendant is being sued he wants the plaintiff s threat to be credible

edgeworth price cycles cost based pricing and sticky pricing in retail gasoline markets abstract this paper examines dynamic pricing behavior in canadian retail gasoline markets i find three distinct pricing patterns cost based pricing sticky pricing and sharp asymmetric retail price cycles that resemble the edgeworth cycles of maskin and tirole 1988 i use a markov switching regression to estimate the prevalence of the regimes and the structural characteristics of the cycles themselves i find cycles are more prevalent when there are more small firms and are accelerated and amplified with very many small firms in markets with few small firms sticky pricing dominates the findings are consistent with the theory of edgeworth cycles

empirical studies of gasoline retailing a guide to the literature abstract this paper surveys the empirical literature on gasoline retailing which has been growing rapidly over the last three decades possibly in response to antitrust and regulatory concerns and increased availability of pricing data studies of both pricing and non price decision variables are considered in general it is found that crude oil prices are the primary driver of national price movements over time however market structure has been identified as playing a role in price dynamics equilibrium selection and price differentials across markets and stations the economic literature emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity across stations and coordination problems faced by retailers several directions for future work are suggested including the development of theory and demand estimation using high frequency station level data

the effect of explicit communication on pricing evidence from the collapse of a gasoline cartel we study the collapse of collusion in quebec s retail gasoline market following a competition bureau investigation and show that it involved two empirical regularities high margins and asymmetric price adjustments using weekly station level prices we test whether collusion was successful and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel s strategy we do so in the markets targeted by the investigation and in markets throughout the province with similar pre collapse pricing cyclical markets our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement margins fell by 30 15 in target cyclical markets and adjustments became more symmetric

a theory of conscious parallelism abstract in this paper the rationality of conscious parallelism is studied within the context of a dynamic oligopoly model the doctrine of conscious parallelism is modelled as the outcome of a signalling game in which the rules of response are specified axiomatically this will result in a unique solution to the oligopoly problem that is based on firms need to have consistent expectations that subsequently generate collusive behaviour this model can then be used to more precisely define the conditions that facilitate or limit oligopolistic coordination as found in the traditional industrial organization literature

retail gasoline price dynamics and local market power using monthly data from the 48 contiguous states except nevada for the 1988 2002 period it is shown that retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than to equivalent wholesale price decreases moreover markets with high average retail wholesale margins experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response since gasoline is the only variable input average margins in a state likely reflect the degree of retail market power this suggests that sticky prices and response asymmetries in the gasoline market are at least partially a consequence of retail market power

the value of risk measuring the service output of u s commercial banks rather than charging direct fees banks often charge implicitly for their services via interest spreads as a result much of bank output has to be estimated indirectly in contrast to current statistical practice dynamic optimizing models of banks argue that compensation for bearing systematic risk is not part of bank output we apply these models and find that between 1997 and 2007 in the u s national accounts on average bank output is overestimated by 21 percent and gdp is overestimated by 0 3 percent moreover compared with current methods our new estimates imply more plausible estimates of the share of capital in income and the return on fixed capital

price dispersion and learning in a dynamic differentiated goods duopoly we study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes sometimes as highly differentiated as the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price differential there is scope for active learning by firms when information has low value to the firms they charge the same price as would be set by myopic players and there is no price dispersion when firms value information more highly on the other hand they actively learn by creating price dispersion such price dispersion arises in a cyclical fashion and is most likely to be observed when the firms environment changes sufficiently often but not too frequently firms payoffs are higher when they use correlated pricing strategies contrary to what one might expect such coordination need not hurt consumers provided they are sufficiently impatient

price matching and the domino effect in a retail gasoline market i introduction for many years there have been competition concerns regarding how retail gasoline prices are set in the united states and canada in several u s states including delaware maryland nevada and virginia such concerns gave rise to divorcement legislation under which refiners are not permitted to own or operate gas stations 1 concerns have also been raised in the united states regarding zone pricing a company that owns and operates gasoline stations might define price zones where prices for all its stations in the zone are the same it has been suggested that zone pricing is a form of price discrimination and thus is an indicator of market power it has also been argued that zone pricing can be used in an anticompetitive fashion to coordinate pricing and to deter entry through localized price cutting 2 in canada consumers have complained about the perceived uniformity of retail gas prices in some markets and the perception that retailers raise their prices at the same time consumers have also been troubled by the observation that retail gasoline prices in some markets rise faster than they fall 3 concerns have also been voiced regarding interjurisdictional differences in retail prices that do not appear to be cost based indicating to consumers that retail gasoline markets are not competitive 4 possibly in response to public concerns canada s gasoline industry has advanced a competitive theory of gasoline pricing to explain certain perceived features of gas pricing that lead to allegations of collusion or anticompetitive behavior under this theory it is assumed that gas is a homogeneous good consumers are willing to drive long distances to save small amounts of money on gas and prices are perfectly observable by consumers and nearby competitors based on these assumptions it is argued that intramarket prices tend to uniformity individual stations quickly match price changes by certain competitors and price changes pass through an entire market almost immediately in a domino fashion 5 while many complaints have been made regarding how retail gas prices are set and the gasoline industry has offered explanations there are almost no publicly available studies of how prices actually change in urban retail gasoline markets using complete station specific data on intraday price changes over a long period of time such data are simply not available for most urban markets and can only be collected through personal observation of prices or possibly via subpoena of retailers pricing records in the course of a formal investigation even here price data may not be complete yet without such data there exists no formal evidence that the stylized facts that the competitive theory attempts to explain are indeed facts and that pricing behavior is consistent with a theory of anti or procompetitive conduct the purpose of this article was to use gasoline station price data collected eight times per day for 103 d for 27 gas stations in guelph ontario to evaluate the accuracy of the received wisdom regarding gas prices and the implications advanced by the informal theory of competitive gas pricing while the informal competitive theory seems to have been accepted by governments in many instances some jurisdictions remain unconvinced for example the sense that consumers concerns regarding gasoline pricing were not being addressed led the house of legislative assembly of nova scotia to establish an all party committee to investigate gasoline pricing in that province in its report the committee made a number of strong recommendations such as retail divorcement or price regulation if divorcement is rejected a prohibition of petroleum product sales below acquisition cost and that refiners must charge the same rack price to all customers 6 these recommendations are clearly motivated by anxieties regarding possible anti competitive conduct which may or may not be supported by a detailed analysis of retail gasoline pricing data

the dynamics of pretrial negotiation it is shown that many cases proceed to court despite ample opportunity for interaction and much of the settlement takes place on the courthouse steps the deadline effect when fixed costs of bargaining are introduced a u shaped pattern of settlement appears with a greater chance of settlement at the beginning and at the end of negotiations than in the middle these characteristics persist even as the time between offers approaches zero the theoretical predictions are consistent with the stylized facts a large proportion of the lawsuits that are settled out of court are settled very close to the trial date or in the first several days of the trial 3 although the deadline effect appears in many other settings as well it has little theoretical support 4

asymmetric price adjustments in us gasoline markets impacts of spatial dependence on the rockets and feathers hypothesis gasoline retail prices show sometimes wild asymmetric fluctuations over time we explore the impact of spatial dependence on gasoline retail price formation by using for the first time an asymmetr

price ceilings as focal points to reach price uniformity evidence from a chinese gasoline market abstract this paper studies the price uniformity in the chinese gasoline market using station level data of hohhot city inner mongolia we first document that the mode prices of the gasoline stations are consistent with the price ceilings set by the government implying that the price ceiling regulation in the chinese gasoline market may serve as a focal point for the gasoline stations to reach price uniformity we corroborate the focal point hypothesis by providing evidence showing that some stations would jump to the ceilings as their prices approach the ceilings also we find that local market structure distance between stations station capacity market characteristics and past pricing behavior could affect the probability of gas stations to price at the ceilings moreover a higher price ceiling would reduce the probability that stations reach price uniformity our results provide another piece of evidence to the literature regarding the unintended effect of price ceiling regulation

the pricing behavior of italian gas stations some evidence from the cuneo retail fuel market abstract this paper studies how gas stations adjust their gasoline and diesel prices in response to their neighboring competitors the empirical analysis relies on data collected from january to august 2011 on the daily prices of 20 gas stations located in cuneo italy these data show significant price uniformity especially within the same geographical area of the town approximately one third of gas stations responded within a day to targeted competitors price changes indicating some evidence of price matching behavior in the industry additionally there is some but discontinuous geographical price propagation testifying to the presence of a weak domino effect finally spatial econometric analysis suggests that there is spatial dependence between gas stations up to about 1 1 km

waiting to persuade i analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power measured as the probability of making offers but learn as they play the game i show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date but never reach one before it given any discount rate if the learning is sufficiently slow the players agree immediately i show that for any speed of learning the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long provided that the players are sufficiently patient therefore although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn

the pricing of default free interest rate cap floor and collar agreements the paper focuses on the valuation of caps floors and collars in a contingent claim framework under continuous time these instruments are interpreted as options on traded zero coupon bonds the bond prices themselves are used as the underlying stochastic variables this has the advantage that we end up with closed form solutions which are easy to compute special attention is devoted to the choice of the stochastic process appropriate for the price dynamics of the underlying zero coupon bonds the increased volatility of interest rates and the introduction of numerous variable rate instruments have led to a more intensive use of highly sophisticated risk hedging tools among them interest rate caps floors and collars have recently gained a growing popularity an interest rate cap is an agreement between the provider of the cap and a borrower to limit the borrower s floating interest rate to a specific level for a given period of time to be more precise the borrower selects a reference rate to hedge e g libor a period of time to hedge e g 5 years and the level of protection desired e g a ceiling of 200 basis points above the current level of the libor if the market rate exceeds the ceiling rate the cap provider will make payments to the buyer sufficient to bring his rate back to the ceiling when the market rate is below the ceiling no payment is made

trial and settlement a study of high low agreements this paper presents the first systematic theoretical and empirical study of high low agreements in civil litigation a high low agreement is a private contract that if signed by litigants before the conclusion of a trial constrains the future damages payment to lie between a minimum and a maximum amount whereas the existing literature describes litigation as a choice between trial and settlement our examination of high low agreements a relatively new phenomenon in civil litigation introduces partial or incomplete settlements in our theoretical model trial is both costly and risky when litigants have divergent subjective beliefs and are mutually optimistic about their trial prospects cases may fail to settle in these cases high low agreements can be in the litigants mutual interest because they limit the risk of outlier damages awards while still allowing for an optimal degree of speculation using unique insurance claims data from a national insurance company we describe the features of these agreements and empirically investigate the factors that may influence whether litigants discuss or enter into high low agreements our empirical findings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model we also explore extensions and alternative explanations for high low agreements including their use to mitigate excessive offsetting trial expenditures

all pay contests this paper studies a class of games all pay contests which capture general asymmetries and sunk investments inherent in scenarios such as lobbying competition for market power labor market tournaments and r d races players compete for one of several identical prizes by choosing a score conditional on winning or losing it is weakly better to do so with a lower score this formulation allows for differing production technologies costs of capital prior investments attitudes toward risk and conditional and unconditional investments among others i provide a closed form formula for players equilibrium payoffs and analyze player participation a special case of contests is multiprize complete information all pay auctions

robust collusion with private information the game theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel should engage in price wars without resorting to either impatience symmetry restrictions inability to communicate or failure to optimize this paper introduces a new explanation that relies on none of these assumptions if the cartel s member firms have private information about their costs price wars can be optimal in the face of complexity specifically equilibria that are robust to pay off irrelevant disruptions of the information environment generically cannot attain or approximate efficiency an optimal robust equilibrium must allocate market shares inefficiently and may call for price wars under certain conditions for a two firm cartel cost interdependence is a sufficient condition for price wars to arise in an optimal robust equilibrium that optimal equilibria are inefficient generically applies not only to collusion games but also to the entire separable pay off environment a class that includes most typical economic models copyright 2012 oxford university press

the taxation effect on gasoline price asymmetry nexus evidence from both sides of the atlantic this paper explores the degree of competition in various gasoline markets and infers possible causes of price asymmetry across the globe for this purpose we use the dynamic ordinary least square method in order to estimate price asymmetry in twelve european countries and the united states for a sample of weekly observations which spans the period from june 1996 to august 2011 the results indicate the common perception that less competitive gasoline markets exhibit price asymmetry while highly competitive gasoline markets follow a symmetric price adjustment path finally the inclusion of taxes vat and excise tax into retail gasoline prices supports the existence of price asymmetry in many european countries

do gasoline mergers affect consumer prices the marathon ashland petroleum and ultramar diamond shamrock transaction abstract in 1999 marathon ashland petroleum map acquired the michigan assets of ultramar diamond shamrock uds which increased map s share of terminal storage in michigan from about 16 percent to about 25 percent and increased the share of gasoline stations bearing a map brand from about 16 percent to about 24 percent in this paper we examine whether this acquisition affected the retail price of gasoline we use a difference in differences model to compare price movements in six michigan cities affected by the acquisition with price movements in two nearby cities unaffected by the acquisition using this model we find no evidence that this acquisition led to higher prices for consumers

edgeworth price cycles evidence from the toronto retail gasoline market i exploit a new station level twelve hourly price dataset to examine the strong retail price cycles in the toronto gasoline market the cycles appear similar to theoretical edgeworth cycles strongly asymmetric tall rapid and highly synchronous across stations i test a series of predictions made by the theory about how firm behaviors would differentially evolve over the path of a cycle the evidence is consistent with the existence of edgeworth cycles and inconsistent with competing hypotheses while the cycles are an interesting phenomenon for study in their own right the evidence has important policy and welfare implications

punishment strategies in repeated games evidence from experimental markets abstract an experiment is designed to provide a snapshot of the strategies used by players in a repeated price competition game with a random continuation rule one hundred pairs of subjects played the game over the internet with subjects having a few days to make their decisions in each round occasionally subjects are asked to enter one period ahead pricing strategies instead of prices according to the elicited strategies between 90 and 95 of subjects punish less harshly in their initial response to a deviation than implied by the grim trigger strategy and do so in a way that depends on the size of the other subject s deviation future earnings are highest for subjects adopting the tit for tat strategy even after controlling for a subject s past earnings punishment strategies are generally softer and more graduated than implied by a grim trigger strategy and do better as a result

interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion rivalry in the vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game service station demand cost and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices costs and sales these functions are then used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constitutent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game the actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution nevertheless all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

multitask agency and contract choice an empirical exploration the multitask agency problem is examined empirically using contracts between private integrated oil companies and their service stations in the city of vancouver the empirical tests assess how variations in the characteristics of one task affect the choice of agent compensation scheme for another comparative statics from the model predict that higher powered incentives will be offered for gasoline sales when the secondary activity is not highly complementary with gasoline retailing where complementarity is measured by the cross price demand effect the covariation in uncertainty and the degree of effort substitutability copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

delay and settlement in litigation delay in litigation is a policy concern in many jurisdictions little evidence is available on the causes of such delay however we present a version of spier s 1992 bargaining model of litigation and derive directly a functional form for the conditional probability of case settlement we then estimate this and test predictions about the effects of legal costs and uncertainty over damages and liability on the conditional probability of settlement using data from negligence claims against several nhs trusts our results provide a direct test of the model and shed light on the causes of settlement delay in england

rules communication and collusion narrative evidence from the sugar institute case detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion the sugar institute did not fix prices or output prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to make price cutting more transparent meetings were used to interpret and adapt the agreement coordinate on jointly profitable actions ensure unilateral actions were not misconstrued as cheating and determine whether cheating had occurred in contrast to established theories cheating did occur but sparked only limited retaliation partly due to the contractual relations with selling agents jel l13 l41 this paper reexamines the cartel problem by studying the private discussions within one cartel while we find much that is in accord with george j stigler s 1964 basic insight that firms would structure an agreement conscious of their later incentive to cheat on it we also uncover puzzles for established theory and identify elements that a richer theory should encompass especially regarding the role of communication in collusion our window into the inner workings of a cartel is a remarkable series of notes on the weekly meetings of the sugar institute this trade association was formed in december 1927 in the wake of several years of falling margins and excess capacity by 14 firms comprising nearly all the cane sugar refining capacity in the united states it operated until 1936 when the supreme court ruled its practices illegal among the top executives in regular attendance at the meetings was louis v place vice president of mccahan a midsize refinery in philadelphia place who was in charge of all activities of the company except production and raw sugar purchases wrote over 500 pages of single spaced detailed

unobserved rational expectations and the german hyperinflation with endogenous money supply a kalman filtering technique is employed to test the convergent expectation hypothesis in the great german hyperinflation when the money supply is endogenously determined after converting the model structure to a state space form the parameters are estimated via minimization of a gaussian likelihood function the result is then used in a filter smoother combination to yield smoothed estimates of the state variable associated with the arbitrary constant of the rational expectations solution bo th para metric and nonparametric tests lead us to reject the null hypothesis of convergent expectations copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

an equilibrium selection theory of monopolization we develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market e g investing in process innovation or product development as well as in the market e g setting quantities or prices competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms investment levels relative size and profitability we show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market in particular it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm while not generating new equilibria this result complicates the task of determining whether a firm s dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization we discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation and illustrate these by means of two well known antitrust cases

collars and renegotiation in mergers and acquisitions i examine the motivation for and effect of including a collar in a merger agreement the most important cross sectional determinants of the bid structure cash vs stock and whether to include a collar are the market related stock return standard deviations for the bidder and target this evidence supports the hypothesis that the method of payment is dependent on the sensitivities of the bidder and target to market related risk because either has the incentive to demand renegotiation of the merger terms if the value of the bidder s offer changes materially relative to the value of the target during the bid period an important decision made during merger or takeover negotiations is the method of payment to be offered to target shareholders takeover bids can be made in cash and or some combination of securities issued by the bidding firm a considerable number of papers in the finance literature provide empirical evidence on the determinants of the choice between stock and cash as the method of payment including carleton et al 1983 niden 1986 crawford 1987 auerbach and reishus 1988 amihud lev and travlos 1990 chaney lovata and philipich 1991 and martin 1996 however this literature typically ignores the increasing fraction 20 in recent years of stock merger bids that contain a collar while an ordinary stock merger bid specifies the number of bidder shares offered as consideration for each target share the exchange ratio a collar bid provides for certain changes in the exchange ratio conditional on the level of the bidder s stock price around the effective date of the merger often insulating target stockholders from volatility in the bidder s stock price and promising a cash like payoff at the end of the bid period collar bids come in two basic forms the first which i call fixed exchange fex specifies a constant exchange ratio over a range of bidder stock prices with adjustment to the ratio outside those bounds an example of this type of transaction is the merger agreement announced on january 17 1994 between

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

non trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions abstract this paper demonstrates that non trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions when previous period actions of both firms are arguments of reaction functions continuity imposes essentially no restrictions on the set of equilibria

pretrial bargaining and the design of fee shifting rules legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation or fee shifting rules provide powerful incentives for settlement within the context of a direct revelation mechanism the fee shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court s award to the pretrial announcements this mechanism resembles rule 68 of the federal rules of civil procedure and other offer based rules in a simple extensive form game if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages probability of prevailing then rule 68 increases decreases the settlement rate

the selection hypothesis and the relationship between trial and plaintiff victory this paper develops implications of the selection hypothesis of priest and klein for the relationship between trial rates and plaintiff win rates i find strong evidence for the selection hypothesis in estimated relationships between trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial across case types and judges i then structurally estimate the model on judge data yielding estimates of the model s major parameters the decision standard the degree of stake asymmetry and the uncertainty parameter for each of three major case types contracts property rights and torts

evolved perception and behaviour in oligopolies abstract this paper builds on earlier studies which examined oligopolists in a repeated interaction as responding simply to past prices of their strategic rivals and which used data from a mature market with stable rules of thumb mappings from past actions or states of the market to present prices for the oligopolists behaviour whether purposefully learnt or emerging from the natural selection of the rivalry the earlier studies imposed exogenous partitions on the action space as perceived by the players this study explores how such perceptions might be endogenised a firm answer to the question of how oligopolists partition their perceptions of others actions both through time and across the price space will also provide information on how much or how little information they choose to use in short how boundedly rational the oligopolists have chosen to be we use data from a retail coffee market to examine the evolved optimal partitioning and mapping of price space manifest as the oligopolists rules of thumb the data suggest that brand managers are using very little information whether prices changed or not

endogenous price commitment sticky and leadership pricing evidence from the italian petrol market this article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky pricing policy using daily italian firm level prices and weekly average eu prices we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold first it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes after the policy change the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost based to sticky leadership pricing second using a dif in dif estimation and a synthetic control group we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky leadership pricing our paper highlights the importance of price commitment by a large firm in order to sustain tacit collusion

effectiveness and effects of attempts to regulate the uk petrol industry this paper evaluates the impact that investigation and regulation of the uk petrol industry has had on the profitability of the companies using a gross margin for petrol we estimate a series of variable parameter autoregressive processes the results demonstrate that the 1979 monopolies and mergers commission investigation into the industry caused a long term decline in profit margins in the industry despite the fact that no recommendations or undertakings were made this cannot however be said for subsequent investigations

price dynamics in european petroleum markets this paper analyses horizontal and vertical price dynamics in the eu petroleum markets the results indicate that the cross country price differentials have significant impact on the local price adjustments we investigate the cross national price spill overs and find that the extent of the welfare transfer due to asymmetric price transmission when analysed in a cross country setting is less pronounced than claimed in previous contributions in this area we also find empirical evidence although indirect for the politically charged concept of fuel tourism using a pan european cross product time series dataset

the effects of entry regulation on oligopolistic interaction the uruguayan banking sector this article develops a methodology to test alternative oligopoly models and to analyze the effects of entry restrictions on conduct this methodology is applied to the uruguayan banking sector whose legal entry barriers were significantly relaxed during the late 1970s the results are consistent with a von stackelberg type of industry where the degree of oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms is reduced as a consequence of the relaxation of the legal entry barriers

retail bank deposits as quasi fixed factors of production neoclassical models of the banking firm for example michael klein 1971 treat all deposit liabilities as fully variable factors of production banks then maximize profits minimize liability costs by equating the marginal costs of all liability types during each period the empirical relevance of these models is difficult to establish because binding deposit rate ceilings regulation q force bank competition for many retail deposits into implicit interest channels that are not readily measured it is therefore noteworthy that during two recent periods when deposit rate ceilings were not binding banks paid retail deposit rates considerably in excess of the rate at which they could borrow via large unregulated certificates of deposit such behavior seems inconsistent with the cost minimization prescribed by neoclassical bank models however if retail deposit accounts are interpreted as quasi fixed gary becker 1962 walter oi 1962 donald parsons 1972 sherwin rosen 1968 inputs to the banking firm these important historical observations can be reconciled with bank profit maximization this paper first describes two historical episodes during which the bank retail deposit rate exceeded the negotiable certificate of deposit rate for substantial periods of time while no profit maximizing cost minimizing bank would pay such a rate differential if retail deposit quantities are costlessly variable interpreting retail deposit accounts as quasi fixed inputs to the bank explains the peculiar rate structures a simple two period model of bank liability selection formalizes the analysis i two puzzling historical episodes

investigating the effects of store brand introduction on retailer demand and pricing behavior researchers have recently been interested in studying the drivers of store brand success as well as factors that motivate retailers to introduce store brands in this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a store brand into a particular product category specifically we are interested in the effect of store brand introduction on the demand as well as on the supply side on the demand side we investigate the changes in preferences for the national brands and price elasticities in the category on the supply side we study the effects of the new entrant on the interactions between the national brand manufacturers and the retailer introducing the store brand including how these interactions influence the retailer s pricing behavior in doing so we are also able to test whether the observed data are consistent with some of the commonly used assumptions regarding retailer pricing behavior for the demand specification we use a random coefficients logit model that allows for consumer heterogeneity the model parameters are estimated using aggregate data while explicitly accounting for endogeneity in retail prices our empirical results obtained from the oats product category based on store level data from a multistore retail chain indicate that the store brand introduction generates notable changes within the category the store brand introduction coincides with an increase in the retailer s margins for the national brand we find that the preferences for the national brand are relatively unaffected by the introduction of the store brand while consumers are in general more price sensitive in terms of elasticities than they were prior to store brand introduction a statistical test of the differences inmean price elasticities across stores and between the two regimes fails to reject the hypothesis of no change in these elasticities elasticities in specific stores however do increase after the store brand is introduced we also find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the preferences for the store brand on the supply side we test several forms of manufacturer retailer interactions to identify retailer pricing behavior most consistent with the data our results indicate that the data reject several commonly imposed forms of interactions in examining the nature of manufacturer interactions with the retailer we find that the manufacturer of the national brand appears to take a softer stance in its interactions with the retailer subsequent to store brand entry this finding is consistent with academic research and with articles in the popular press which suggest that the store brand enhances the retailer s bargaining ability vis a vis the manufacturers of the national brands we also provide results from a second product category frozen pasta that are largely consistent with those found in the oats category

do rockets rise faster and feathers fall slower in an atmosphere of local market power evidence from the retail gasoline market this study explores the possibility that local market power influences the observed asymmetric relationship between changes in wholesale gasoline costs and changes in retail gasoline prices i exploit an original data set of weekly gas station prices in southern california from september 2002 to may 2003 and take advantage of detailed station and local market level characteristics to determine the extent to which geographic and product differentiation influence price response asymmetry i find that brand identity proximity to rival stations and local market features and demographics each influence a station s predicted price response asymmetry

effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability theory and evidence abstract this paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability in one group fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents while members in the second group behave non cooperatively applying a model of alternating duopoly we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices when the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more which prevents the non cooperating group from unprofitable demand preemption

subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial abstract this paper is concerned with infinitely repeated duopoly games with discounting a question which has been open since friedman s rev econ stud 35 1968 257 272 reaction function article is settled for a general class of games the question is wheter nontrivial reaction function equilibria can be subgame perfect this question is answered in the negative such equilibria must be trivial in the sense of prescribing the stage game noncooperative equilibrium actions in every period independent of prior history

bargaining without a common prior an immediate agreement theorem in sequential bargaining models without outside options each player s bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when this paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement the main result states that despite this if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future then in equilibrium they will agree immediately this result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism

retail gasoline pricing what do we know abstract we use a data set consisting of a three year panel of prices from a sample of gasoline stations located in suburban washington dc and a corresponding census of the region s stations to develop three new empirical findings about retail gasoline pricing first while average retail margins vary substantially over time by more than 50 over the three years we analyze the shape of the margin distribution remains relatively constant second there is substantial heterogeneity in pricing behavior stations charging very low or very high prices are more likely to maintain their pricing position than stations charging prices near the mean third retail gasoline pricing is dynamic despite the heterogeneity in station pricing behavior stations frequently change their relative pricing position in this distribution sometimes dramatically we then relate these three findings to relevant theories of retail pricing while many models of retail pricing are consistent with some of our findings we find that all have serious shortcomings

an alternating move price setting duopoly model with stochastic costs abstract this paper examines an alternating move price setting duopoly model in which marginal costs are stochastic without persistence it is shown that provided marginal costs do not fluctuate excessively equilibria in which firms match the current monopoly price do not exist by contrast equilibria in which firms always match their rival along the equilibrium path do exist in these equilibria deviations off of the equilibrium path result in extended price wars in which firms repeatedly undercut each other finally examples in which such price wars are observed in equilibrium are constructed

litigation and settlement under the english and american rules theory and evidence in contrast to the american rule whereby each party bears its own costs the english rule requires losers at trial to pay the winner s legal fees up to a reasonable limit we develop six hypotheses regarding how these two cost allocation rules might affect settlements and litigated outcomes through changes in i the selection of cases reaching the settle versus litigate stage and ii behavior thereafter using data from florida which applied the english rule to medical malpractice claims during the period 1980 85 we examine the rules effects on the probability of plaintiffs winning at trial jury awards and out of court settlements the english rule increased plaintiff success rates at trial average jury awards and out of court settlements our interpretation of these findings emphasizes that the overall quality of the claims reaching the settle versus litigate stage must improve to generate the combination of effects observed

price adjustments by a gasoline retail chain we use daily data to examine price responses in the swedish gasoline market to changes in the rotterdam spot price exchange rates and taxes the distribution of price adjustments by a leading retail chain for the period january 1980 to december 1996 is symmetric with no small adjustments an error correction model shows that in the short run prices gradually move towards the long run equilibrium in response to cost shocks there is some evidence that also in the short run prices are stickier downwards than upwards prices respond more rapidly to exchange rate movements than to the spot market price our analysis emphasizes that to fully understand price adjustments it is necessary to examine data sets where the sample frequency at least matches that of price adjustments

vancouver s gasoline price wars an empirical exercise in uncovering supergame strategies this paper uses a unique data set to determine which dynamic model of tacit collusion best describes behaviour in a particular industry the area investigated is a region of the vancouver british columbia retail gasoline market players are service station managers who compete daily firms choose price in each period using strategies that depend on prices chosen in the previous period periodically unanticipated demand shocks precipitate price wars when shocks occur the firms in the market must determine the new demand conditions and adjust their strategies from an econometric point of view slopes of intertemporal reaction functions are latent variables the resulting system of equations with time varying parameters is estimated via the kalman filter different repeated game oligopoly models correspond to different transition matrices for the latent variables the models can thus be assessed in terms of their power to explain firm behaviour in this market

retail gasoline price cycles across spatially dispersed gasoline stations abstract studies of volatility in retail gasoline prices have used either weekly averages of the prices at a small subset of stations in a city or daily observations on prices at a small number of stations this paper uses daily observations on station specific prices within a large canadian metropolitan area to address whether weekly average prices or prices for a small number of stations provide an accurate description of pricing in a market with volatility this paper considers whether researchers using restricted data can draw meaningful conclusions about the appropriate theoretical model and the policy response to allegations of anticompetitive behavior

conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games abstract a family of constant conjectural variations strategies is defined and examined in the natural context of infinitely repeated cournot duopoly games with discounting it is shown that any pair of linear reaction functions in the family gives rise to a unique pair of quantities in stationary equilibrium as the conjectures and discount parameter vary the sum of the stationary quantities will vary anywhere between the competitive and the monopoly outcomes equilibrium is strongly stable and credible in the sense of exhibiting a variation of selten s subgame perfection provided that firms can react quickly enough to one another s actions

collusive price rigidity under price matching punishments by analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price matching punishment strategy we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close this provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve in contrast to the kinked demand curve it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits the relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high cost phase the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms in the market are also investigated

an econometric model of location and pricing in the gasoline market abstract the authors propose an econometric model of both the geographic locations of gasoline retailers in singapore and price competition among retailers conditional on their geographic locations although market demand for gasoline is not observed the authors are able to infer the effects of such demand from stations locations and pricing decisions using available data on local market level demographics using the proposed location model which is based on the assumption of social welfare maximization by a policy planner the authors find that local potential gasoline demand depends positively on the local demographic characteristics of the neighborhood using the proposed pricing model which is based on the assumption of bertrand competition between retail chains the authors find that retail margins for gasoline are approximately 21 the authors also find that consumers are willing to travel up to a mile for a savings of 03 per liter using the estimates of the proposed econometric model the a