time consistent public policy in this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure we characterize and solve for markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments the characterization consists of an inter temporal first order condition a generalized euler equation for the government and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations for a calibrated economy we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any point in time the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates we also find that when the only tax base is labour income the markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the ramsey equilibrium

commodity taxes under uncertainty abstract this paper considers the relative distorting effect on output of commodity taxes specific and ad valorem in a situation where a firm faces revenue uncertainty it is shown generally that this effect depends both on the precise nature of the firm s revenue uncertainty and on the degree of its risk aversion more specifically the distorting effect of each tax is characterised for a selection of objective functions and uncertain environments these characterisations are compared in order to show the influence of alternative specifications on the relative distorting effect

are consumption taxes really better than income taxes abstract we use political equilibrium theory and the neoclassical growth model to compare consumption and income tax systems if government outlays are used for redistribution through transfers then steady state equilibria in societies that use income taxes are not necessarily worse in welfare terms and may even be better income taxes are attractive precisely because they are more distortionary since this implies low equilibrium transfer levels we also find that switching tax systems typically does not benefit the median voter moreover a change from income to consumption taxes may make everybody worse off

a solution concept for majority rule in dynamic settings we define and explore the notion of a dynamic condorcet winner dcw which extends the notion of a condorcet winner to dynamic settings we show that for every dcw every member of a large class of dynamic majoritarian games has an equivalent equilibrium and that other equilibria are not similarly portable across this class of games existence of dcws is guaranteed when members of the community are sufficiently patient we characterize sustainable and unsustainable outcomes study the effects of changes in the discount factor investigate efficiency properties and explore the potential for achieving renegotiation proof outcomes we apply this solution concept to a standard one dimensional choice problem wherein agents have single peaked preferences as well as to one involving the division of a fixed aggregate payoff

how should control theory be used to calculate a time consistent government policy we study different solutions to a simple one dimensional linear quadratic game with a large number of private agents and a government a time consistent solution is defined as a solution to the hamilton jacobi bellman equation i e as a policy for which the government has noprecommitment capability this solution is compared to a policy where the government has an instantaneous pre commitment i e an equilibrium in which the government has a period by period leadership in both cases we show how control theory should be applied to calculate the equilibrium and how to relate these equilibria to the differential game literature

a distributional theory of government growth this article presents a closed form solution for time consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter extending meltzer and richard s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government at low stages of economic development the median voter identified as a relatively poor worker prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage at higher stages of development however when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises yet in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times hence government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state

emigration and wages in source countries evidence from mexico abstract this paper examines empirically the effect of mexican emigration to the united states on wages in mexico using data from the mexican and us censuses from 1970 to 2000 the main result in the paper is that emigration has a strong and positive effect on mexican wages there is also evidence for increasing wage inequality in mexico due to emigration simple welfare calculations based on a labor demand supply framework suggest that the aggregate welfare loss to mexico due to emigration is small however there is a significant distributional impact between labor and other factors

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

recognition redistribution and liberty abstract this paper examines the relationship between redistribution recognition and liberty in particular it critiques the existing approaches in the critical literature that either reduces redistribution to a simple subset of recognition or insists that recognition is both necessary and sufficient for redistribution to occur it argues instead that the introduction of the relatively weak assumption of minimal individual liberty is required for recognition and that while recognition is necessary it is insufficient for redistribution it also considers the sustainability of voluntary redistribution in a liberal society and voluntary recognition in an authoritarian society finally the approach is applied to the problems of discrimination genocide and ethnic conflict

green taxes can we protect the environment and improve the tax system at the same time on a cursory inspection public economics appears to provide a straightforward and compelling answer of yes to the question posed in the title to this paper as economists have long argued appropriately designed taxes can in principle at least efficiently restrain levels of polluting activities and in addition such taxes will generate revenues so that we can reduce rates on other forms of taxation that distort the functioning of the economy green taxes in short promise a double dividend they can both reduce excessive levels of pollution and increase the efficiency of the overall tax system at least so several economists have argued recently 17 20 but is this really so with the growing recognition of the enormous revenue potential of certain environmental taxes especially carbon taxes to address the problem of global warming public economists have returned to this question with a new round of research efforts directed both to understanding the properties of pollution taxes as revenue sources and to estimating their revenue potential and the magnitude of their effects on the economy and the newly emerging literature is producing some quite astonishing and very troubling findings in this paper i want to review this work and explore its implications when viewed in relation to some other research it appears to suggest that most forms of regulatory activity at least those that increase the costs of the regulated activities may have hitherto unappreciated costs of a stunning magnitude what many of us would have taken to be second order side effects of environmental and other regulatory policies can be of a magnitude that compromises to a significant extent their welfare enhancing properties having reviewed this body of work i wish also to explore some issues in the political economy of green taxes it is helpful to begin by briefly putting the issue in historical perspective

immigration and prices this paper examines the behavior of prices following the unexpected arrival of a large number of immigrants from the former soviet union fsu to israel during 1990 i use store level price data on 915 consumer price index products to show that the increase in aggregate demand prompted by the arrival of the fsu immigration significantly reduced prices during 1990 when one controls for native population size and city and month effects a one percentage point increase in the ratio of immigrants to natives in a city decreases prices by 0 5 percentage point on average it is argued that this negative immigration effect is consistent with fsu immigrants the new consumers having higher price elasticities and lower search costs than the native population thus immigration can have a moderating effect on inflation through its direct effect on product markets and not only by increasing the supply of labor

dynamic tax externalities and the u s fiscal transformation abstract we propose a theory of tax centralization in politico economic equilibrium taxation has dynamic general equilibrium implications which are internalized at the federal but not at the regional level the political support for taxation therefore differs across levels of government complementarities on the spending side decouple the equilibrium composition of spending and taxation and create a role for inter governmental grants the model provides an explanation for the centralization of revenue introduction of grants and expansion of federal income taxation in the u s around the time of the new deal quantitatively it accounts for approximately 30 of the federal revenue share s doubling in the 1930s and for the long term increase in federal grants

intergenerational redistribution with short lived governments we study the politics of intergenerational redistribution in an overlapping generations model with short lived governments the successive governments who care about the welfare of the currently living generations and possibly about campaign contributions are unable to pre commit the future course of redistributive taxation in a stationary politico economic equilibrium the intergenerational transfer in each period depends on the current value of the state variable and all expectations about future political outcomes are fulfilled we find that there exist multiple stationary equilibria in many political settings steady state welfare is often lower than it would be in the absence of redistributive politics

the political intergenerational welfare state abstract using a three period overlapping generations economy framework we characterize an intergenerational welfare state with endogenous education and pension under voting we show that although politically establishing pay as you go payg social security in isolation in a dynamically efficient economy will always reduce the capital investment and therefore the social welfare as expected in contrast politically implementing education pension policy package instead can improve both human and physical capital accumulation and social welfare over laissez faire however for this the political influence of the old has to be small thus limiting the size of the payg social security program

taxes redistribution and growth abstract this paper develops a simple model to study the effects of growth on economic policy and in particular on redistributive taxation i do not explain economic growth i assume it is exogenous and ask how changes in the growth rate and in several other variables affect the outcome of a political process that determines taxes and transfers it is shown that faster growing economies will choose more or less redistribution depending on risk aversion in the empirically relevant case the model predicts lower taxes in faster growing economies

a quantitative theory of social security without commitment abstract this paper investigates the determination of social security within a general equilibrium overlapping generations model where agents live for many periods and replacement rates are determined through voting in each period by forward looking agents the distinctive feature is the study of markov equilibrium policy outcomes which do not rest on a commitment mechanism versions of the model are calibrated to the us economic policy and demographic conditions even in the absence of commitment the policy preferences of tax paying working age voters sustain a positive level of retirement benefits this follows because the current choices about social security will have at the time when the current voters will retire a positive impact on the political support for social security and on the returns to savings on the other hand the projected decline in the u s population growth rate causes the replacement rate and the tax rate to decline this quantitative response without commitment differs from that in the case when policies are committed at time zero

sustainable plans and debt abstract this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal fiscal policy similar to that of lucas and stokey j monet econ 12 1983 55 93 except that we let the government default on its debt we consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we concentrate on trigger mechanisms which specify reversion to the markov equilibrium after deviations by the government and show that such mechanisms cannot support equilibria with positive debt we go on to show by way of examples that there can be more complicated trigger mechanisms which support positive debt journal of economic literature classification numbers e61 e62

immigration quotas and skill upgrading a reason why immigration policy is such a contended issue is that often immigrants end up obtaining the right to vote and hence may affect future policies this paper offers a dynamic general equilibrium model of immigration policy in each period a heterogeneously skilled population chooses an immigration policy by majority vote voters anticipate that immigration affects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate the main insight is the existence of a trade off between skill complementary immigration and the resulting shift in political power i argue that a reasonably parameterized version of the model is consistent with the main features of us immigration

on the faustian dynamics of policy and political power this paper examines the faustian dynamics of policy and power we posit a general class of dy namic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power resulting in the following faustian trade off if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy he then sacrifices future political power yet if he wants to preserve his future power he must sacrifice his present policy objec tives the trade off comes from the fact that the current political ruler pivotal voter cannot uncouple the direct effect of his policy from its indirect effect on future power a policy endogenous pe equilibrium describes this endogenous transfer of power and the resulting evolution of policy and political power over time we show that the faustian trade off in a pe equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales the political preservation effect induces more tempered policy choices than if one s policy choice did not affect one s political fortunes however the reformation effect induces more aggressive policies in order to exploit the productivity gains from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors we distinguish between political systems that give rise to monotone faustian dynamics political power that progressively evolves towards more fiscally liberal types of leaders and cyclical faustian dynamics political power that oscillates between liberal and conservative types of leaders in each case we show that the faustian trade off moderates the choices of each type of leader

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

persistent ideology and the determination of public policy over time this article investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico economic equilibria to this end i develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy individuals intertemporal choice and the evolution of political constituency my main finding is that a right wing ideology may increase the size of government data from a panel of 18 oecd countries confirm that after controlling for the partisan effect there is a positive relationship between the right wing political constituency and government size this is consistent with my theoretical prediction but hard to explain by existing theories

time consistent public expenditures in this paper we study the optimal choice of public expenditures when there is no way of committing to future policy and reputational mechanisms are not operative this amounts to conflning our attention to markov equilibria the environment is a neoclassical growth model where consumers derive utility from a public good this environment gives rise to a dynamic game between successive governments and the private sector and this game is made interesting by the presence of a state variable the capital stock we characterize equilibria in terms of an intertemporal flrst order condition a generalized euler equation gee for the government and we use this condition both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computation the gee reveals how the government optimally trades ofi tax wedges over time it also allows us to discuss in what sense a current government may be strategically in uencing future governments in their taxation decisions for a calibrated economy we flnd that when the tax base available to the government is capital income an inelastic source of funds at any moment in time the government still refrains from taxing at high rates in order to smooth distortions over time as a result the economy is far from the mix of public and private goods that would be optimal in a static context in return the savings distortion is not very severe and the capital stock is quite high

politico economic equilibrium and economic growth abstract we propose a notion of dynamic politico economic equilibrium which builds on two key assumptions policies are determined sequentially and agents are fully rational in their roles as both consumers and voters we examine a simple model of endogenous growth and infinitely lived agents where taxes on income are endogenous and where growth critically depends on the initial distribution of asset holdings we relate our equilibrium definition and results to existing literature on time consistency and on political economy and growth we show that our equilibria are time consistent and we argue that the choice of equilibrium concept might have important quantitative implications

time consistent optimal fiscal policy this article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period s capital income tax rate we find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment first capital income tax rates are very high 65 on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment second labor income taxes are rather low on average about 12 versus a value of around 31 under full commitment finally labor income taxes are quite volatile whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero

growth or stagnation the role of public education abstract this paper presents a political economic theory of growth and human capital accumulation where individuals of different ages disagree over the resource commitment to public education in the context of an overlapping generations model with two period lived agents population growth implies that the equilibrium quantity of public education reflects the preferences of youth and is therefore forward looking despite forward looking behavior it is shown that sufficiently rapid population growth can trigger economic stagnation in the political economic equilibrium the model therefore offers a novel explanation for observed negative correlations between population growth measures and economic growth

sustainable plans and mutual default this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of optimal taxation in which both private agents and the government can default on their debt as a benchmark we consider ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit to its policies at the beginning of time but in which private agents can default we then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational we adapt abreu s 1988 optimal trigger strategies to completely characterize the entire set of sustainable equilibria in particular we show that when there is sufficiently little discounting and government consumption fluctuates enough the ramsey allocations and policies in which the government never defaults can be supported by a sustainable equilibrium by way of an example we show that the larger the variance of government consumption the easier it is to support good outcomes we also show for moderate discount factors that in the best sustainable equilibrium tax rates are more volatile and debt is smaller than in the ramsey equilibrium

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

the effect of immigration on productivity evidence from us states abstract in this paper we analyze the long run impact of immigration on employment productivity and its skill bias we use the existence of immigrant communities across u s states before 1960 and the distance from the mexican border as instruments for immigration flows we find no evidence that immigrants crowded out employment at the same time we find that immigration had a strong positive association with total factor productivity and a negative association with the high skill bias of production technologies the results are consistent with the idea that immigrants promoted efficient task specialization thus increasing tfp and also promoted the adoption of unskilled efficient technologies

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

the political economy of intergenerational income mobility the intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members while much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced form parameter less is known about its underlying structural determinants using a model with exogenous talent endowments endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income the model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions we offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model we conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico economic institutions jel e24 j62 j68 p16

on the dynamics of growth and fiscal policy with redistributive transfers abstract this paper continues the study of optimal fiscal policy in a growing economy by studying the case in which the government simultaneously provides three main categories of expenditures public production services public consumption services and state contingent redistributive transfers we make two contributions to the literature firstly we set up a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which rational voters choose the capital tax rate and the allocation of total tax revenues between productive government expenditures public production services and non productive ones public consumption services and redistributive transfers we study the properties of these policies and their impact on growth secondly we deliver analytic results for the long run and transitional dynamics of optimal fiscal policies and endogenous growth in particular we establish existence and investigate the possibility of uniqueness and dynamic determinacy and how this possibility is affected by the chosen allocative and redistributive policies

public education reform community or national funding of education abstract i use a political economy model of public funding of education to evaluate the welfare implications of a move from a community to a nation wide funding policy broadening the scope of education finance has intragenerational redistribution effects as well as intergenerational effects previous studies have emphasized the intragenerational redistribution effects of moving from local to state financed systems while holding factor prices fixed the model in this paper includes a social security system and allows factor prices to vary endogenously i examine the welfare effects of broadening the scope of financing from a community to a nation wide system and find that there are very large welfare gains as voters internalize the effect of the education policy on both factor prices and social security benefits i also focus on the intergenerational distributional effects finding that significant welfare gains occur despite the displacement of the median voter to an older agent that cares less about children s well being

ageing government budgets retirement and growth we analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing increased longevity and reduced fertility on per capita growth the olg model captures direct effects working through adjustments in the savings rate labor supply and capital deepening and indirect effects working through changes of taxes government spending components and the retirement age in politico economic equilibrium growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment the closed form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in oecd economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per capita growth to accelerate if the retirement age were held constant the growth rate in politico economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment

self interest and public funding of education abstract the objective of this paper is to study whether publicly funded education can emerge as a political and economic equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy in which selfish agents vote for public funding of education the presence of complementarities between capital and labor in the production function implies that by improving the skills of next period s workers public funding of education increases the return on capital as a result savers will support a publicly financed education system in order to enhance their future income a version of the model calibrated using u s data generates large shares of gnp allocated to education hence the non altruistic incentive to support public education is quantitatively important

do immigrant inflows lead to native outflows we use 1980 and 1990 census data for 119 larger metropolitan statistical areas to examine the effect of skill group specific immigrant inflows on the location decisions of natives in the same skill group and on the overall distribution of human capital to control for unobserved skill group specific demand factors our models include lagged mobility flows of natives over the 1970 80 period we also estimate instrumental variables models that use the fraction of mexican immigrants in 1970 to predict skill group specific relative immigrant inflows over the 1980s despite wide variation across cities in the size and relative skill composition of immigrant population changes we find no evidence of selective out migration by natives we conclude that immigrant inflows exert a direct effect on the relative skill composition of cities cities that have received relatively unskilled immigrant flows have experienced proportional rises in the size of their unskilled populations this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

dynamic stability and reform of political institutions abstract this paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games the political aggregation rules used at date t 1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t effectively rules are players who can strategically delegate future policy making authority to different rules a political rule is stable if it selects itself a reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected the stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent for instance simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth weighted voting rules are not the result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra legal protests threats or private investment the approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature a parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration

the ramsey rule revisited in pursuit of an optimum tax scheme in terms of minimizing welfare loss economists have been searching for a better solution since the seminal contribution of ramsey 17 the literature is voluminous they include the works by hotelling 9 hicks 8 harberger 7 dimond and mirrlees 2 dixit 3 4 and sandmo 19 the ramsey optimum tax rule that is the percentage reduction in quantity demanded of each commodity be the same was interpreted by kahn 11 as the inverse elasticity rule the inverse elasticity rule states that the optimum tax rates and price elasticities of demand should be inversely related the merit of the inverse elasticity rule is that the optimum tax rate does not require the explicit knowledge on prices and quantities of the taxed commodities to evaluate policy implications one needs only to examine the published price elasticities of demand to arrive at optimum tax rates however the inverse elasticity rule normally applies only to a constant cost case in which average cost hence marginal cost is horizontal 10 18 in a competitive market while the constant cost case is plausible it assumes away the producer s surplus in this paper we prove that the inverse elasticity rule with the ad valorem tax on the gross demand price is equivalent to that with the supply ad valorem tax developed by ramsey however the inverse elasticity formula with the unit tax as shown in this paper is different furthermore we propose a sufficient condition for optimum tax ratio with a positively sloped supply schedule in addition we explore a sufficient condition for an optimum equiproportional tax across all commodities last we employ some empirical estimates of price elasticities of both demand and supply to calculate the optimum tax ratios

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

education democracy and growth abstract this note presents a model of endogenous growth where redistribution determined by a political equilibrium is in the form of public education it is shown that there need not be a negative relationship between growth and redistribution as public education increases the level of human capital in the conomy and at the same time tends to produce a more even income distribution

native internal migration and the labor market impact of immigration this paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of how immigration influences the joint determination of the wage structure and internal migration behavior for native born workers in local labor markets using data from the 1960 2000 decennial censuses the study shows that immigration is associated with lower in migration rates higher out migration rates and a decline in the growth rate of the native workforce the native migration response attenuates the measured impact of immigration on wages in a local labor market by 40 to 60 per cent depending on whether the labor market is defined at the state or metropolitan area level

on the third law of demand i introduction the alchian and allen 1967 63 64 theorem sometimes elevated to the status of a third law of demand as in bertonazzi et al 1993 is a clever application of the fundamental principle of economizing behavior as usually stated the theorem suggests that by reducing the price of higher quality relative to lower quality versions of the same good a fixed transportation charge will trigger a predictable shift in the mix of quality grades purchased by consumers in distant markets as compared to the mix purchased locally producers will respond rationally to this difference in behavior relatively more high quality goods will be included in outbound shipments leaving more low quality goods to be sold nearer the point of origin hence other things being the same the theorem predicts that it will be harder to find good apples in the state of washington a prime apple growing region than in say new york city where bad apples are comparatively more expensive the first law of demand still holds of co urse in that fewer apples of both types will be consumed in new york than in seattle ceteris paribus similarly given that the cost of a babysitter will be the same no matter where the parents of young children decide to spend the evening out they are more likely than an otherwise identical childless couple to choose an upscale restaurant over an inexpensive eatery and to go to the theater rather than to the movies moreover if both couples plan to see a play or a concert the couple with children will opt for better seats the foregoing examples indicate that the alchian and allen theorem is rich in empirical implications in what follows however we show that placed in the context of a market model its range of applications is narrower than has been acknowledged in the literature heretofore more specifically our analysis demonstrates that a fixed charge unambiguously reduces the price of a higher quality good relative to a lower quality version of the same good only when that good is sold by a perfectly competitive constant cost industry under increasing cost conditions or imperfectly competitive industry structures by contrast it is possible for relative prices either to be unaffected by the addition of a fixed charge or indeed for the lower quality good to become relatively cheaper in distant markets depending on the elasticity characteristics of relevant market demand and supply functions our analysis is in no way intended as an attack on alchian and allen or their fine textbook which has taught more than one generation of economists to be better price theorists we do not quarrel in the least with the pedagogical value of their theorem which has been immense our purpose is to identify some plausible scenarios under which the third law of demand may fail to hold the present article is thus in the spirit of yang and stitt 1995 who show that the ramsey 1927 rule for optimal commodity taxation is changed in important ways when the assumption of constant production costs is relaxed it is organized as follows in the next section the fundamentals of the alchian and allen theorem are described in more detail and its predictions are situated within the existing literature section iii explores the theorem s operations under alternative cost conditions and industry structures factors complicating the analysis of the effects of a fixed charge on the relative prices of high and low quality goods are also addressed in this section finally section iv contains some concluding remarks ii shipping the good apples out to borrow an example from a classic statement of the alchian and allen theorem 1 suppose that good washington apples sell for 10 cents each in seattle and bad apples each cost a nickel there because the price of a good apple is twice that of a bad apple seattle s consumers must sacrifice the opportunity of buying two bad apples to obtain a good one

demographics and the politics of capital taxation in a life cycle economy this article studies the effects of demographics on the mix of tax rates on labor and capital it uses a quantitative general equilibrium overlapping generations model where tax rates are voted without past commitments in every period and characterized as a markov equilibrium in the united states the younger voting age population in 1990 compared to 1965 accounts for the observed decline in the relative capital tax rate between those two years a younger population raises the net return to capital leads voters to increase their savings and results in a preference for lower taxes on capital conversely aging might increase capital taxation

political complements in the welfare state health care and social security abstract all oecd countries target a large majority of their welfare spending to the elderly through public pensions and health care programs spending in both programs has largely increased in the past decades often more than the share of elderly in the population we suggest that these phenomena may be due to political complementarities between these two transfer programs we show that these two programs may coexist because public health care may increase the political constituency in favor of social security and vice versa specifically public health decreases the absolute longevity differential between low and high income individuals therefore rising the retirement period and the total pension benefits of the former relatively to the latter this effect increases the political support for social security among the low income young we show that in a political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election a voting majority of low income young and retirees supports a large welfare state the composition between public health and social security is determined by intermediate median income types who favor the contemporaneous existence of these two programs since public health increases their longevity enough to make social security more attractive technological improvements in health care strengthens this complementarity and lead to more welfare spending

immigration and domestic wage an empirical study on competition among immigrants abstractwhile studies on the wage effects of immigration focus on native workers there is significantly less information on the wage effects of immigration on domestic foreign born workers in addition to analysing the impact of immigration on wages of native workers in this article we estimate the internal competition among foreign born workers in the united states firstly using data from the current population survey we find no empirical evidence supporting the substitutability of native workers for immigrants secondly there is no statistical difference between skilled and unskilled immigrants on the influence of the domestic labour market outcomes finally there is no internal competition among immigrants the income of non citizen workers mainly depends on state and national levels of economic situations not the number of non citizen workers available in the labour market

positive arithmetic of the welfare state abstract this paper argues that social security enjoys wider political support than other welfare programs because i retirees constitute the most homogeneous voting group and ii the intragenerational redistribution component of social security induces low income young to support this system in a dynamically efficient overlapping generation economy with earnings heterogeneity we show that for sufficient income inequality and enough elderly in the population a welfare system composed of a within cohort redistribution scheme and an unfunded social security system represents the political equilibrium of a two dimensional majoritarian election social security is sustained by retirees and low income young while intragenerational redistribution by low income young unlike unidimensional voting model our model suggests that to assess how changes in inequality affect the welfare state the income distribution should be decomposed by age groups

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

credible communication in dynastic government abstract this paper studies information disclosure in a model of dynastic government when information about past policy choices comes exclusively from the reports of previous administrations each administration has an incentive to choose its suboptimal one shot expenditure policy and then misrepresent its choice to its successor consequently it has been suggested that horizontal accountability i e a system of governance where auditing functions lie outside the executive branch can ensure credible disclosure of a government s activities this paper suggests a cautious approach to that view the baseline model examines the reporting incentives of an external auditor who can independently verify the information each period even with auditing credible disclosure is shown to be problematic various extensions to this baseline model are examined in one extension liberal i e those prefering larger government expenditures and conservative those prefering smaller expenditures regimes and auditors evolve over time it is shown that conservative liberal auditors are not credible when the current regime is also conservative liberal moreover because information transmission stops when the auditor s and the regime s biases coincide effective deterrents even in the good periods when the auditor s and the administration s biases differ are difficult to construct in all periods the equilibrium requirement of auditor neutrality constrains the dynamic incentives for efficient policy choices these constraints are shown to bind away from optimal policies in standard constructions of equilibrium various ways in which auditing protocols can overcome these problems are discussed

why don t voters put the gini back in the bottle inequality and economic preferences for redistribution abstract the classic democratic theory of redistribution claims that an increase in market income inequality causes an increase in the size of government through majority voter support for an offsetting expansion of redistribution i argue that the predicted inequality redistribution relationship can break down when voters face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk with respect to future labor income and a timing differential between tax collections and government outlays this is formalized using an incomplete market heterogeneous agent dsge model with majority voting and time to build policy which suggests the collective demand for redistribution will not necessarily increase with growing income or wealth inequality this result implies that even with equal political power among voters democracies do not have a systematic mechanism to offset rising inequality as contrary to popular belief

the future of social security we analyze the effect of the projected demographic transition on the political support for social security and equilibrium outcomes embedding a probabilistic voting setup of electoral competition in the standard olg model with capital accumulation we find that intergenerational transfers arise in the absence of altruism commitment or trigger strategies closed form solutions predict population ageing to lead to higher social security tax rates a rising share of pensions in gdp but eventually lower social security benefits per retiree the response of equilibrium tax rates to demographic shocks reduces old age consumption risk calibrated to match features of the u s economy the model suggests that in response to the projected demographic transition social security tax rates will gradually increase to 16 other policies that distort labor supply will become less important labor supply therefore will rise in contrast with frequently voiced fears

on the size of u s government political economy in the neoclassical growth model we study a dynamic version of meltzer and richard s median voter model of the size of government taxes are proportional to total income and they are redistributed as equal lump sum transfers voting takes place periodically over time and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility we calibrate the model to u s data key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices the total size of transfers predicted by our political economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data

the political economy of dynamic elections accountability commitment and responsiveness we survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians we define stationary electoral equilibrium which encompasses notions used by barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 banks and sundaram 1998 and others we show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions term limits however attenuate the responsiveness finding we also touch on related applied work and we point to areas for fruitful future research including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics

uncertainty and pollution the role of indirect taxation abstract this paper explores the potential usefulness of indirect taxation as a supplement to effluent charges it is argued that effluent charges should typically be accompanied by taxes on privately traded commodities linked to the pollutant in consumption or production the performance of such combinations of taxes and charges is then compared to that of an effluent standard

two sided intergenerational transfer policy and economic development a politico economic approach we consider an overlapping generations model with public education and social security where the overall size of these policies is determined in a repeated voting game we investigate the interaction between the politically determined policies and economic development in a markov perfect equilibrium the following results are obtained first the level of human capital determines whether these policies are sustained in the markov perfect equilibrium second if the level of initial human capital is sufficiently high human capital grows forever in contrast if the level of initial human capital is low the economy might be caught in a poverty trap

a second chance at success a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes a stationary markov perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment agents become rich or poor through educational investment and the poor have a second chance at success the results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance first when the cost is low the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility second when the cost is high there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility inequality and redistribution numerical examples show that the shift from a high cost economy to a low cost economy may reduce social welfare

employment turnover and the public allocation of unemployment insurance unemployment benefits are higher and turnover between unemployment and employment is lower in europe than in the u s we model the political determination of the unemployment insurance to explain these differences we show that saving and borrowing is a good substitute for unemployment insurance when turnover is high with high turnover the median voter thus prefers low unemployment insurance with low turnover generous unemployment insurance becomes more valuable if the median voter cannot bind future voters the voting cycle must however be long in order to support a high level of insurance endogenizing turnover produces the possibility of multiple political equilibria

taxing to control social costs the case of alcohol whether taxation of alcoholic beverages is an appropriate means of reducing social costs of alcohol consumption is a continuing public policy issue some argue that the public health costs and other external costs associated with the consumption of alcoholic beverages are so significant as to justify substantial excise taxes on those beverages others counter that a tax on alcohol would reduce consumption indiscriminately and therefore reduce the satisfaction experienced by millions of sensible drinkers without necessarily reducing the harm caused by a few excessive drinkers 2 this paper presents and applies a framework for evaluating these two views of the efficiency welfare effects of alcohol taxes determining the efficiency implications of alcohol taxes is complicated by the question of whether and how much abusers especially alcoholics benefit from alcohol consumption standard welfare theory assumes that all consumers of alcohol enjoy positive net benefits consumer surplus however it is possible that alcoholics over consume in the sense that consumer surplus from their

immigration and wages evidence from the 1980s this paper presents new evidence on the effects of immigration based on changes in the distributions of wages in 24 major u s cities during the 1980s we concentrate on measuring the effects of immigration at the lower tail of the wage distribution in particular we ask whether recent declines in the real earnings of the least skilled workers in the u s economy are related to immigration our empirical analysis reveals large differences across cities in the relative growth rates of wages for low and high paid workers nevertheless these differences bear little or no relation to the size of immigrant inflows excerpt

politico economic consequences of rising wage inequality abstract this paper uses a dynamic political economy model to evaluate whether the observed rise in wage inequality and decrease in median to mean wages can explain some portion of the relative increase in transfers to low earnings quintiles and relative increase in effective tax rates for high earnings quintiles in the u s over the past several decades specifically we assume that households have uninsurable idiosyncratic labor efficiency shocks and consider policy choices by a median voter which are required to be consistent with a sequential equilibrium we choose the transition matrix to match observed mobility in wages between 1978 and 1979 in the panel study of income dynamics psid data set and then evaluate the response of social insurance policies to a new transition matrix that matches the observed mobility in wages between 1995 and 1996 and is consistent with the rise in wage inequality and the decrease in median to mean wages between 1979 and 1996 we deal with the problem that policy outcomes affect the evolution of the wealth distribution and hence prices by approximating the distribution by a small set of moments we contrast these numbers with those from a sequential utilitarian mechanism as well as mechanisms with commitment

capital taxation under political constraints this paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform a policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform thus sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or u shaped so that savings are subsidized for the poor and or the middle class but are taxed for the rich u shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals political behavior is purely determined by economic motives

is the new immigration really so bad this article reviews the recent evidence on us immigration focusing on two key questions 1 does immigration reduce the labour market opportunities of less skilled natives 2 have immigrants who arrived after the 1965 immigration reform act been successfully assimilated overall evidence that immigrants have harmed the opportunities of less educated natives is scant on the question of assimilation the success of the us born children of immigrants is a key yardstick by this metric post 1965 immigrants are doing reasonably well even children of the least educated immigrant origin groups have closed most of the education gap with the children of natives

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

endogenous fiscal policies environmental quality and status seeking behavior abstract this paper analyzes endogenous fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model where agents care about social status and environmental quality the quest for a higher status is assimilated to a preference for capital wealth the government uses income tax to finance infrastructure and environmental protection we find that accounting for preferences for social status and environmental quality may lead to an allocation of tax revenue in favor of a cleanup effort to the detriment of infrastructure economic growth is not necessarily and negatively affected by this allocation as it is partly explained by an excessive accumulation of capital wealth due to the quest of status status seeking can however harm economic growth and environmental quality when its motive is important enough finally we show that economic growth may be consistent with environmental preservation but is not necessarily welfare improving as in the case of absence of status seeking behavior

lack of commitment and the level of debt the tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment we analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se while commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels one of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all in a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero and we analyze numerically more complex models we also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full commitment is enough to obtain these results

comparing specific and ad valorem pigouvian taxes and output quotas when the production or use of a good creates an external cost an unregulated market produces a socially inefficient quantity of output one remedy for this inefficiency is to impose a pigouvian tax equal to the marginal external damage associated with the good in many circumstances privately optimizing agents facing a pigouvian tax make decisions that are consistent with the maximization of social welfare

solving for optimal simple rules in rational expectations models this paper presents algorithms that solve for optimal simple monetary policy rules in rational expectations models with precommitment and discretion the algorithms are applied to the models in fuhrer j money credit banking 29 1997 214 clarida et al j econ lit 37 1999 1661 and rudebusch econ j 112 2002 402 to examine the efficiency properties of operational policy rules we show that optimized taylor type rules preform well in these models but that aside from the fuhrer moore model this result is sensitive to whether the central bank can respond to current period shocks taylor type rules that are operational in the sense that they do not respond to current period information are found to be highly inefficient in the rudebusch model and in the clarida et al 1999 model

dynamics of income distribution in this paper we have obtained closed form solutions in cass koopmans growth models with heterogeneous agents the relationship between the form of the production function and the dynamics of income distribution is made explicit we then use this relationship to determine what production structure is simultaneously consistent with facts on growth and income inequality our empirical findings give support to models with decreasing returns in the reproducible factor jel classification d3 o1 o4 dans ce memoire les auteurs obtiennent des solutions pour des modeles de croissance a la cass koopmans dans le cas ou les agents sont heterogenes on explicite la relation entre la forme de la fonction de production et la dynamique de la repartition des revenus on utilise alors cette relation pour determiner quelle structure de production est arrimee aux faits connus a la fois quant a la croissance economique et a la repartition des revenus les resultats empiriques supportent les modeles ou les rendements sur les acteurs de production reproductibles sont decroissants

growth learning and redistributive policies abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with redistributive taxation in which the growth rate of the economy affects the agents preferences over redistributive policies and therefore the equilibrium level of taxation the main mechanism through which the growth rate affects policy preferences is by changing the ability of the agents to learn their positions in the future distribution of incomes the main result of the paper is that during periods of growth the society opts for less taxation and less redistribution the model also predicts that growing economies are characterized by higher inequality in the distribution of income and by greater mobility of agents within income classes over time

the marginal efficiency effects of taxes and subsidies in the presence of externalities a computational general equilibrium approach abstract using 1983 data we develop a 19 sector computational general equilibrium model incorporating producer producer externalities and producer consumer externalities simulation results indicate that when additional government expenditure is financed by pigouvian taxes the marginal cost of public funds is substantially below one labor sales and output taxes also affect the output of the polluting industries and thus have indirect pigouvian effects which tend to reduce the associated marginal costs of public funds pigouvian taxes are usually more efficient than pigouvian subsidies since the tax revenue can be used to reduce other taxes

public education and pensions in democracy a political economy theory a dynamic political economy theory of scal policy is presented to explain the simultaneous existence of public education and pensions in modern democracies the driving force of the model is the intergenerational conict over the allocation of the public budget successive generations of voters choose scal policies through repeated elections the political power of elderly voters creates the motive for adults to support public investment in the human capital of future generations since it expands future pension possibilities we characterize the markov perfect equilibrium of the voting game in a small open economy the equilibrium reproduces salient features of intergenerational