prices or quantities can dominate banking and borrowing the possibility of intertemporal banking and borrowing of tradable permits is often viewed as tilting the various policy debates about optimal pollution control instruments towards favoring such time flexible quantities this paper shows that this view can be misleading at least for the simplest dynamic extension of the original prices versus quantities information structure the model of this paper allows firms to know and act upon the realization of uncertain future costs two full periods ahead of the regulators for any given circumstance the paper shows that either a fixed price or a fixed quantity is superior in expected welfare to time flexible banking and borrowing furthermore the standard original formula for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities contains sufficient information to completely characterize the regulatory role of intertemporal banking and borrowing the logic and implications of these results are analyzed and discussed

linking permit markets multilaterally we formally study the determinants magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains generated in multilateral linkages between permit markets we provide two novel decomposition results for these gains characterize individual preferences over linking groups and show that our results are largely unaltered with strategic domestic emissions cap selection or when banking and borrowing are allowed using the paris agreement pledges and power sector emissions data of five countries which all use or considered using both emissions trading and linking we quantify the efficiency gains we find that the computed gains can be sizable and are split roughly equally between effort and risk sharing

using a policy mix for pollution control a review of economic literature this article provides a review of economic studies analyzing the use of multiple policies a socalled policy mix to cope with single pollution problems to guide and structure the review an analytical framework is developed and applied the framework integrates transaction costs into the analysis of pollution problems and policies to overcome them moreover it understands a pollution externality not only as a market failure but more generally as the failure of private governance structures based on this insight two rationales for using a policy mix are identified first a policy mix may help to correct for multiple reinforcing failures of private governance structures such as pollution externalities and technological spillovers second a policy mix can be employed if the implementation of single first best policies brings about high transaction costs e g when marginal pollution damages are heterogeneous or polluters are unlikely to comply with the policy for each rationale the relevant literature is presented based on the review avenues for future research are identified

clean up your own mess an experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency although market based environmental policy instruments feature prominently in economic theory and are widely employed they often face public resistance we argue that such resistance may be driven by moral responsibility where citizens prefer to tackle the environmental problems that they have caused by themselves rather than delegating the task to others by means of a market mechanism using a laboratory experiment that isolates moral responsibility from alternative explanations we show that moral responsibility induces participants to take inefficient actions that reduce the earnings of the whole group of participants we discuss the implications of this finding for the design and implementation of environmental policies

losses from effluent taxes and quotas under uncertainty recent theoretical papers by adar and griffin j environ econ manag 3 178 188 1976 fishelson j environ econ manag 3 189 197 1976 and weitzman rev econ studies41 477 491 1974 show that different expected social losses arise from using effluent taxes and quotas as alternative control instruments when marginal control costs are uncertain key assumptions in these analyses are linear marginal cost and benefit functions and an additive error for the marginal cost function to reflect uncertainty in this paper empirically derived nonlinear functions and more realistic multiplicative error terms are used to estimate expected control and damage costs and to identify empirically the mix of control instruments that minimizes expected losses

regulating stock externalities under uncertainty abstract using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock costs of adjusting the stock and uncertainty in costs we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price based policies e g taxes relative to quantity based policies e g tradable permits for controlling stock externalities as in weitzman rev econom stud 41 4 1974 477 the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs favoring prices but some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary including correlation of cost shocks across time discounting stock decay and the rate of benefits growth applied to the problem of greenhouse gases and climate change we find that a price based instrument generates several times the expected net benefits of a quantity instrument

a symmetric safety valve abstract how to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap and trade program for carbon dioxide with a safety valve that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level we find two significant problems both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase one is that most important examples of price volatility in cap and trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked but instead when allowance prices collapsed second a single sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment we illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one sided approach

environmental regulation capital output and energy efficiency in china an empirical research based on integrated energy prices abstract how to improve environmental quality and achieve high quality development of economy have become important challenges for china in the new era based on the klems framework this paper analyzes the relationship between environmental regulation factor substitution and energy saving effect by using panel structure vector autoregression model and panel data of china industry from 2004 to 2014 the following conclusions are drawn 1 china s environmental regulation can promote the substitution of capital to energy however benefit of this substitution in the long run is greater than that in the short run 2 only in the long run can china s environmental regulations have significant energy saving effect technological innovation is the main reason for the improvement of energy saving effect of environmental regulation 3 china s environmental regulation will not significantly improve the structure of capital which makes the economic benefits low finally the paper discusses the possible ways to improve china s environmental regulation from the aspects of forming a scientific environmental supervision system improving energy pricing mechanism and capital structure

rent creation and rent seeking in environmental policy rents and political motives are present in many aspects of public policy this article considers the role of rents rent seeking and the political choice of environmental policy rents are introduced into the political choice of price and quantity regulation under conditions of uncertainty the model shows how political economy aspects affect the choice between price and quantity regulation the contesting of rents associated with different policies affects the regulatory structure and influences the political choice of an environmental policy target the primary conclusion is that the political choice of environmental policy depends on the interaction between the efficiency of rent transfer and the size of rent seeking groups within the economy

emissions trading with profit neutral permit allocations this paper examines the impact of an emissions trading scheme ets on equilibrium emissions output price market concentration and profits in a generalized cournot model we develop formulae for the number of emissions permits that have to be freely allocated to firms to neutralize the profit impact of the ets we show that its profit impact is usually limited in a cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs total industry profits are preserved so long as freely allocated permits cover a fraction of initial emissions that does not exceed the industry s herfindahl index

climate policy design with correlated uncertainties in offset supply and abatement cost emission offsets within cap and trade systems are widely believed to contain system costs and stabilize allowance prices however trends in offsets supply are uncertain may be persistent and may be correlated with other sources of uncertainty in a dynamic stochastic model we find total costs increase as does variability in allowance prices and emissions as uncertainty in offsets becomes more persistent and to a lesser extent becomes negatively correlated with uncertainty in abatement costs these results are amplified with risk sensitivity larger annual offset limits and competitive offset purchasing imposing an allowance price collar can mitigate cost increases and price variability jel q54 q58

reduction of fossil fuel emissions in the usa a holistic approach towards policy formulation abstract in the united states the response of the federal government to the global initiative of reduction of emissions of co2 has been limited with the kyoto protocol having entered into force in february 2005 there will be renewed international pressure on the united states for action concurrently the us economy growing modestly is characterized by large current account and budget deficits this situation calls for garnering additional revenue through repealing of the recent tax cuts an option available is to impose a modest carbon tax the rationale of such a tax is that it would address the twin objectives of additional revenue and reduction of emissions in this paper the impact of a hypothetical carbon tax imposed in a revenue neutral context on 2001 household incomes is analyzed primarily to ascertain its progressivity progressivity of any tax is strongly associated with its political acceptability the incidence of the hypothetical carbon tax is computed across the income quintiles it is observed that only the households in the highest income quintile and the lowest income quintile are impacted by the tax it is found that this tax is weakly regressive in the us context

coupled economic ecological systems with slow and fast dynamics modelling and analysis method the purpose of this article is to contribute to the exploration of non convex dynamics in coupled human nature systems we study welfare issues associated with the management of a human nature complex adaptive system with a threshold and a stochastic driver we exemplify with a specific system where we link changes in the number and diversity of birds to the abundance of a pest insects that causes damages to goods and services valuable to human beings we present a method that simplifies the analysis and helps us discuss different management models that combine direct and indirect controls of the pest this allows us to show that 1 the choice of control method depends in a highly non linear way on biodiversity characteristics and 2 the socially optimal outcome may not be reachable using price instruments hence the price vs quantity debate needs to be revisited using a complex adaptive system lens

the market for tradable ghg permits under the kyoto protocol a survey of model studies abstract this paper gathers results from 25 models of the market for tradable greenhouse gas ghg emission permits under the kyoto protocol due to diverging projections of emissions growth and different modeling approaches the model results differ substantially the average market volume is approximately 17 and 33 billion usd under global trading and annex b trading respectively including non carbon ghg lowers compliance costs and permit prices in the absence of the us permit demand roughly equals hot air from the former soviet union these countries can increase their revenues from selling permits by restricting supply which raises the permit price

correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice abstract for two decades environmental economists have generally maintained that benefit uncertainty is irrelevant for choosing between price and quantity instruments but that cost uncertainty matters with the identity of the efficient instrument depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions but in the presence of simultaneous correlated uncertainty such policy instrument recommendations may be inappropriate with plausible values of relevant parameters the conventional identification of a price instrument will be reversed to favor instead a quantity instrument the opposite reversal from the choice of a quantity instrument to a price instrument seems less likely to occur

higher price lower costs minimum prices in the eu emissions trading scheme this paper examines the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system ets when some emissions are regulated outside of the ets we theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare using a numerical simulation model of the european union we find that moderate minimum prices in the eu ets can reduce the costs of eu climate policy by up to thirty percent we also find that due to tax interaction effects the optimal minimum price in the eu ets should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non ets sectors this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

optimal carbon taxes for china and implications for power generation welfare and the environment abstract china is expected to constitute about half of the world s emissions between 2010 and 2040 as concerns about climate change intensify the chinese government is poised to commit to a low carbon economy these conditions make china a suitable case in which to study how emission policies impact on energy supply welfare and the environment to achieve this purpose we incorporate abatement technologies into the gtap computable general equilibrium model and show that optimal taxes range between 0 03 for services and 2 02 for manufacturing in most cases simulated tax rates are by far higher than pollution taxes stipulated in the new chinese environmental tax law furthermore despite a decline in output of many sectors including the electricity sector overall welfare gains exist from introducing carbon taxes moreover these taxes reduce environmental pollution by approximately 62 5 in general carbon taxes are insufficient for mitigation in china and due to a coal dominant energy structure implementing these taxes leads to a decline in power generation hence the chinese aggressive investment strategy for renewable electricity technologies as stipulated in its 13th five year plan is understandable

optimal intensity targets for greenhouse gas emissions trading under uncertainty uncertainty is an obstacle for commitments under cap and trade schemes for emission permits we assess how well intensity targets where each country s permit allocation is indexed to its future realized gdp can cope with uncertainties in international greenhouse emissions trading we present some empirical foundations for intensity targets and derive a simple rule for the optimal degree of indexation to gdp using an 18 region simulation model of a cooperative global cap and trade treaty in 2020 under multiple uncertainties and endogenous commitments we show that optimal intensity targets could reduce the cost of uncertainty and achieve significant increases in global abatement the optimal degree of indexation to gdp would vary greatly between countries including super indexation in some advanced countries and partial indexation for most developing countries standard intensity targets with one to one indexation would also improve the overall outcome but to a lesser degree and not in all individual cases although target indexation is no magic wand for a future global climate treaty gains from reduced cost uncertainty and the potential for more stringent environmental commitments could justify the increased complexity and other potential downsides of intensity targets

coordinating climate and trade policies pareto efficiency and the role of border tax adjustments abstract this paper explores the role of trade instruments in globally efficient climate policies focusing on whether or not some form of border tax adjustment bta is warranted when carbon prices differ internationally the analysis shows that while there is no case for bta when all instruments can be freely deployed pareto efficiency does require a form of bta when carbon taxes in some countries are constrained its purpose then is to partly counteract the impact on emissions of inappropriate carbon pricing there or equivalently to undo the trade distortions such pricing creates the required form of bta is generally complex but a special case is identified in which it optimally has the simple structure envisaged in practical policy discussions it is also shown that the efficiency case for bta depends critically on whether climate policies are pursued by carbon taxation or by cap and trade

the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs this paper addresses the following question to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost effectively should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target the total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs monitoring costs and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms under common assumptions i show that allowing noncompliance is cost effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty however one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs this last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty in fact the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty and can actually be lower finally tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms abatement costs

tracking global carbon revenues a survey of carbon taxes versus cap and trade in the real world abstract we investigate the current use of public revenues which are generated through both carbon taxes and cap and trade systems more than 28 3 billion in government carbon revenues are currently collected each year in 40 countries and another 16 states or provinces around the world of those revenues 27 7 8 billion are used to subsidize green spending in energy efficiency or renewable energy 26 7 4 billion go toward state general funds and 36 10 1 billion are returned to corporate or individual taxpayers through paired tax cuts or direct rebates cap and trade systems 6 57 billion in total public revenue earmark a larger share of revenues for green spending 70 while carbon tax systems 21 7 billion more commonly refund revenues or otherwise direct them towards government general funds 72 of revenues drawing from an empirical dataset we also identify various trends in systems use of carbon revenues in terms of the total revenues collected annually per capita in each jurisdiction and offer commensurate qualitative observations on carbon policy design choices

energy prices and carbon taxes under uncertainty about global warming this paper extends the strategic interactions between producers of fossil fuels concerned about their profits and a taxing government concerned about the consumers welfare for uncertainty global warming follows an ito process stochasticity requires to differentiate between reversible and irreversible emissions in contrast to the deterministic version the unconstrained reversible case allows for a closed form solution but not the more realistic and constrained case nevertheless interesting analytical properties e g about when to stop emissions implicit conservation due to monopolistic supply are derived and complemented by a numerical example

optimism bias portfolio delegation and economic welfare this study explores the effects of investor optimism bias in a portfolio delegation framework we show that the optimistic investor increases his portfolio delegation while the risk averse manager reduces investment in the risky asset the investor suffers welfare loss due to lower expected return but the manager enjoys increased compensation the investor s optimism bias aggravates the moral hazard problem

joint production and pricing decisions for multiple products with cap and trade and carbon tax regulations abstract cap and trade and carbon tax regulations are the two main low carbon policies to curb carbon emissions this paper studies the joint production and pricing problem of a manufacturing firm with multiple products under cap and trade and carbon tax regulations and compares the effects of the two regulations on the total carbon emissions the firm s profit and social welfare the firm faces price sensitive demands and the demands for these products are independent firstly we find that the optimal number of products to be produced under cap and trade regulation carbon tax regulation is determined by the emission trading prices and the cap tax rate secondly we detect that the optimal cap tax rate is decreasing increasing or constant in the environmental damage coefficient finally we discover that the social welfare under carbon tax regulation is not less than that under cap and trade regulation although there is neither one regulation always inducing more profit and having advantages in curbing carbon emissions than the other one

the development of renewable energy power in india which policies have been effective abstract the international energy agency has identified the development of renewable energy sources as a key element to mitigate climate change at the same time it has projected india to be the second largest contributor to the increase in global energy demand to 2035 india hence faces a significant challenge to ensure its energy security by diversifying its power generation mix in the wake of the creation of a green climate fund in cancun this paper studies empirically the effect of the introduction of the electricity act 2003 and the tariff policy 2006 as well as the implementation of feed in tariffs and minimum quotas on clean electricity sourcing on the development of grid connected renewable energy power in nine indian states over the period 2001 2009 results suggest that the passing of the tariff policy 2006 state level policies quantity based instruments and a greater participation of the private sector have played a key role in promoting the development of installed capacity from renewable energy power in the nine states of the sample

strategic investment in climate friendly technologies the impact of global emissions trading our point of departure is that a group of industrialized countries invest in research and development r d of greenhouse gas ghg abatement technologies r d investments influence the future ghg abatement choices of both industrialized and developing countries we distinguish between investments that reduce industrialized countries abatement costs and investments that reduce developing countries abatement costs unlike earlier contributions we include global trading in emission permits this changes the nature of the game with global permit trading industrialized countries should in many cases invest strategically in technologies that only reduce abatement costs at home this comes in addition to investments abroad second we show that r d investments always decrease total emissions finally we find that the developing region receiving investments always benefits

prices versus quantities versus hybrids in the presence of co pollutants we investigate the optimal regulation of a pollutant given its abatement interaction with another pollutant under asymmetric information about firms abatement costs we take a policy relevant second best approach by assuming that the co pollutant is regulated exogenously but perhaps not efficiently our focus is on optimal policy choice in this setting and we derive rules for determining whether a pollutant should be regulated with an emissions tax an emissions market or a market with price controls given the regulation of its co pollutant we find that the policy choice for a pollutant is unaffected by its interaction with a co pollutant that is controlled with a fixed number of tradable permits because changes in emissions of the primary pollutant do not affect aggregate emissions of the co pollutant however when a co pollutant is controlled with a tax the policy choice for the primary pollutant must account for its effect on expected co pollutant damage through changes in the variance of co pollutant emissions consequently standard conclusions about the environmental policy choice problem must be modified in this case our results have important implications for designing policies for greenhouse gases under uncertainty

the impact of global warming on agriculture a ricardian analysis reply we measure the economic impact of climate on land prices using cross sectional data on climate farmland prices and other economic and geophysical data for almost 3 000 counties in the united states we find that higher temperatures in all seasons except autumn reduce average farm values while more precipitation outside of autumn increases farm values applying the model to a global warming scenario shows a significantly lower estimated impact of global warming on u s agriculture than the traditional production function approach and in one case suggests that even without co sub 2 fertilization global warming may have economic benefits for agriculture 16 refs 5 figs 5 tabs

electricity and markets over the last fifteen years an increasing number of electricity industries have replaced vertical integration with markets as the main method of organising production electrical energy is traded in many european and us markets while the us also has markets for generating capacity us generators can reduce the cost of complying with environmental regulations by trading emissions of sulphur dioxide while europe has just started a carbon dioxide emissions trading scheme this article discusses the way in which these markets put economic principles into practice in particular it shows that several different market designs can provide theoretically equivalent incentives for generators to build capacity and that emissions trading may have unexpected impacts upon electricity prices

price controls and banking in emissions trading an experimental evaluation we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate the effects of price controls and permit banking on limiting permit price risk while both instruments reduce between period price volatility and within period price dispersion combining price controls and permit banking yields important benefits banking alone produces high permit prices in earlier periods that fall over time but the combined policy produces lower initial prices and lower volatility however banking price controls and the combination all produce higher between period emissions volatility hence for emissions markets that seek to control flow pollutants with strictly convex damages efforts to limit permit price risk can result in higher expected damage

regulation by prices quantities or both a review of instrument choice choosing appropriate policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation once objectives are agreed and suitable targets adopted policy makers can employ command and control regulation and or economic instruments and choose between fixing a price or a quantity this paper examines the relative advantages of price quantity and hybrid instruments according to their efficiency under uncertainty the trade off between credible commitment and flexibility implementation international considerations and political economy various illustrations of the theory are provided with two detailed applications to climate change and transport policy specifically congestion and safety pricing

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

combining price and quantity controls under partitioned environmental regulation abstract this paper analyzes hybrid emissions trading systems etss under partitioned environmental regulation when firms abatement costs and future emissions are uncertain we show that hybrid policies that introduce bounds on the price or the quantity of abatement provide a way to hedge against differences in marginal abatement costs across partitions price bounds are more efficient than abatement bounds as they also use information on firms abatement technologies while abatement bounds can only address emission uncertainty using a numerical stochastic optimization model with equilibrium constraints for the european carbon market we find that introducing hybrid policies in eu ets reduces expected excess abatement costs of achieving targeted emission reductions under eu climate policy by up to 89 we also find that under partitioned regulation there is a high likelihood for hybrid policies to yield sizeable ex post cost reductions

designing climate mitigation policy this us paper provides an exhaustive review of critical issues in the design of climate mitigation policy by pulling together key findings and controversies from diverse literatures on mitigation costs damage valuation policy instrument choice technological innovation and international climate policy the authors begin with the broadest issue of how high assessments suggest the near and medium term price on greenhouse gases would need to be both under cost effective stabilization of global climate and under net benefit maximization or pigouvian emissions pricing the remainder of the paper focuses on the appropriate scope of regulation issues in policy instrument choice complementary technology policy and international policy architectures

environmental policy and the economic downturn this paper considers how environmental policies should respond to macroeconomic downturns it first explores the implications of the global economic downturn of 2008 09 for environmental policies focusing in particular on the example of action against climate change the arguments for and against activist fiscal policies in general are then reviewed and the case made that a demand induced downturn provides a very good opportunity to undertake a necessary step change in the public spending component of environmental policies and to start working through a backlog of public investment to improve the environment fiscal policy should be used to improve the allocation of resources across time and space recent fiscal stimuli are considered in the light of this discussion it is also argued that there is little cause to delay the introduction of price signals to internalise environmental externalities but the levels at which such signals should be set requires careful analysis changes over the business cycle may be warranted depending on the nature of the environmental externality and the cause s of the business cycle in question

emissions trading systems with cap adjustments abstract emissions trading systems etss with fixed caps lack provisions to address systematic imbalances in the supply and demand of permits due to changes in the state of the regulated economy we propose a mechanism which adjusts the allocation of permits based on the current bank of permits the mechanism spans the spectrum between a pure quantity instrument and a pure price instrument we solve the firms emissions control problem and obtain an explicit dependency between the key policy stringency parameter the adjustment rate and the firms abatement and trading strategies we present an analytical tool for selecting the optimal adjustment rate under both risk neutrality and risk aversion which provides an analytical basis for the regulator s choice of a responsive ets policy

combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change abstract uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave differently and leads to divergent welfare consequences although most of the debate on global climate change policy has focused on quantity controls due to their political appeal this paper argues that price controls are more efficient simulations based on a stochastic computable general equilibrium model indicate that the expected welfare gain from the optimal price policy is five times higher than the expected gain from the optimal quantity policy an alternative hybrid policy combines both the political appeal of quantity controls with the efficiency of prices using an initial distribution of tradeable permits to set a quantitative target but allowing additional permits to be purchased at a fixed trigger price even sub optimal hybrid policies offer dramatic efficiency improvements over otherwise standard quantity controls for example a 50 trigger price per ton of carbon converts the 3 trillion expected loss associated with a simple 1990 emission target to a 150 billion gain these results suggest that a hybrid policy is an attractive alternative to either a pure price or quantity system

an international policy architecture for the post kyoto era in february 2005 the kyoto protocol to the united nations framework convention on climate change came into force but without participation by the united states its impacts on emissions of greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide co2 the primary anthropogenic driver of climate change will be trivial but scientific robert t watson 2001 and economic charles d kolstad and michael a toman 2001 analyses point to the need for a credible international approach because the kyoto protocol s ambitious targets apply only to the short term 2008 2012 and only to industrialized nations the agreement will impose relatively high costs and generate only modest short term benefits while failing to provide a real solution joseph e aldy et al 2003 for these reasons most economists see the agreement as deeply flawed richard n cooper 1998 david g victor 2001 warwick j mckibbin and peter j wilcoxen 2002 although some see it as an acceptable first step axel michaelowa 2003 virtually all agree however that the protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge we describe the basic features of a postkyoto international global climate agreement which addresses three crucial questions who when and how the respective elements are first a means to ensure that key nations industrialized and developing are involved second an emphasis on an extended time path of action employing a cost effective pattern over time and third inclusion of market based policy instruments i who expand participation to include all key countries

carbon markets and technological innovation this paper examines the effects of firm level innovation in carbon abatement technologies on optimal cap and trade schemes with and without price controls we characterize optimal cap and trade regulation with a price cap and a price floor and compare it to the special cases of pure taxation and a simple emissions cap innovation shifts the tradeoff between price and quantity based instruments towards quantitybased emissions trading schemes more specifically an increase in innovation effectiveness lowers the optimal emissions cap and leads to relaxed price controls unless the slope of the marginal environmental damage curve is small because of the decrease in the emissions cap innovation in abatement technologies can lead to a higher expected carbon price so as to provide sufficient incentives for private r d investments the expected carbon price decreases once innovative technologies are widely used

prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants abstract we examine the choice of policy instruments price quantity or a mix of the two when two pollutants are regulated and firms abatement costs are private information whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies when pollutants are complements a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement yet if they are substitutes the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas

consignment auctions of free emissions allowances abstract while the initial distribution of emissions allowances is usually thought to be independent of the emissions outcome free allocation can affect the efficiency and fairness of allowance trading inefficiency may result from thin allowance markets poor price discovery and regulatory or organizational complexities that hinder the recognition of opportunity costs concerns about fairness may result from intransparency in the process of transferring substantial allowance value we explore the role of consignment auctions in mitigating these concerns these revenue neutral auctions return the financial value of allowances to their original holders while revealing prices and directing allowances to their highest valued use they also can be used to support a minimum price when allowances are freely distributed which may facilitate program linkage consignment auctions have minimal administrative costs and do not necessarily involve government experience indicates that they can play an important role especially in new markets

the strategic dimension of financing global public goods abstract one challenge in addressing transboundary problems such as climate change is the incentive to free ride transfers from multilateral compensation funds are often used to counteract such incentives albeit with varying success we examine how such funds can change the incentive to free ride in a global public goods game in our game self interested countries choose their own preferred course deciding their voluntary public good provision whether to join a fund that offers compensation for providing the public good and the volume of compensatory payments we show that i total public good provision is higher when those contributing are given more compensation and ii non participation in the fund can be punished if the remaining members decrease their public good provision sufficiently we then examine three specific fund designs in the first the compensation paid to each country is equal to the percentage of above average total costs for public goods provision this design is best able to deter free riding and can establish the social optimum as the equilibrium in the second the compensation paid to each country is a function of the marginal cost of their public good provision here there are significant incentives to free ride in the third case the monetary resources provided by the fund are fixed a design frequently encountered in international funds this design is the one least able to deter free riding

tradeable carbon permit auctions how and why to auction not grandfather abstract an auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change to minimize administrative costs permits would be required at the level of oil refineries natural gas pipe lines natural gas liquid sellers and coal processing plants to maximize liquidity in secondary markets permits would be fully tradable and bankable the government would conduct quarterly auctions a standard ascending clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery an auction is preferred to grandfathering giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions because it allows reduced tax distortions provides more flexibility in distribution of costs provides greater incentives for innovation and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents

soft and hard price collars in a cap and trade system a comparative analysis we use a stochastic dynamic framework to compare price collars price ceilings and floors in a cap and trade system with uncertainty in the level of baseline emissions and costs we consider soft collars which provide limited volume of additional emission allowances a reserve at the price ceiling and hard collars which provide an unlimited supply of additional allowances thereby preventing allowance prices from exceeding the price ceiling conversely allowances are removed from the market if prices fall to the floor we find that increasing the size of the reserve strictly lowers expected net present values of compliance costs however there is a diminishing effect as the allowance reserve is expanded most of the expected cost savings are achieved with a modest reserve consequently a rather limited soft price collar could provide considerable assurance about cost while preventing the possibility that emissions could spiral out of control

enforcement and price controls in emissions trading this paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms abatement costs the analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits when this occurs accommodating the effect of abatement cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second best optimal values however it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices this enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs and the policy produces the second best optimal outcome

forms of scale curves and differential inverse demand systems this article provides a new interpretation of the scale effects in differential inverse demand systems a scale curve is defined as a curve that shows how the expenditure share of a good or service changes as the consumption level changes it is shown that brown lee and seale s synthetic model has the same scale effects as do the box cox scale curves in this light their model is not a mere composite but a model in its own right an empirical illustration given for japanese fresh food demand suggests that the underlying scale curves differ from both linear and loglinear forms

public acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax abstract climate change is one of the greatest challenges confronting the international community requiring action to achieve deep cuts in carbon emissions the implementation of potentially uncomfortable but necessary policy measures is though critically dependent upon public acceptability this paper reports a novel application of stated preference techniques to explore the influence of key design attributes on the acceptability of a personal carbon trading scheme in isolation and when compared to a carbon tax illustrative forecasts from the models developed indicate the importance of design attributes especially the basis of the initial permit allocation for personal carbon trading and the use to which revenues are put for carbon tax results indicate that the best scheme designs could be acceptable to a majority of respondents

which policy is more effective carbon reduction in all industries or in high energy consuming industries from dual perspectives of welfare effects and economic effects abstract carbon emission reduction policy is the main method to curb carbon emissions and tackle climate change however few studies have investigated the effectiveness of carbon emission reduction polices from the welfare and economic perspectives this study establishes a dynamic general equilibrium model with input output structure and compares the effects of emission reduction in all industries and in high energy consuming industries the main conclusions are that carbon emission reduction constraints for all industries have more significant negative impacts on consumption and social welfare compared to emission reduction constraints for high energy consuming industries to be more precisely carbon emission reduction in high energy consuming industries has comparative advantages in maintaining social welfare stability regarding economic effects compared with the carbon emission reduction in high energy consuming industries carbon emission reduction in all industries leads to a larger decline in total output and outputs of most industries however the role of carbon emission reduction in all industries is more significant in promoting employment the carbon emission reduction policies of all industries and high energy consuming industries have strengths in economic effects respectively the findings could provide references for the government to take appropriate measures to promote carbon emission reduction and economic growth

tax versus trading and efficient revenue recycling as issues for greenhouse gas abatement abstract we give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission abatement using the first multi party model to include both tax versus trading under uncertainties and revenue recycling including multiple independent parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions permit trading in handling abatement cost uncertainties from that shown by existing single party literature but a previously ignored and much bigger advantage of a tax from better handling uncertainties in business as usual emissions greatly boosts the overall tax versus trading advantage yet the degree to which each mechanism is used to raise and recycle revenue efficiently by lowering distortionary taxes rather than recycle revenue as lump sums or not raise revenue by giving tax thresholds or free permits may in turn dominate any tax versus trading advantage choosing the best greenhouse abatement mechanism should thus consider the issues of tax versus trading and efficient revenue recycling together

business cycles and emission trading with banking abstract we propose an emission cap adjustment policy for an emission trading system ets that allows banking of allowances for later use and faces business cycle uncertainty the forward looking banking decisions cause a commitment problem with respect to regulator s next period allowance supply decision we tackle the commitment problem by focusing on the markov equilibrium of the policy the equilibrium policy has a surprisingly simple structure combining features from both price and quantity instruments the regulator s ability to choose a new cap for each period does not render banking obsolete but on the contrary makes banking an integral part of the equilibrium policy using data from the eu ets to calibrate the model we solve the markov equilibrium policy for the case of carbon emissions regulation and compare markov policies with and without the possibility to bank allowances a counterfactual analysis of the eu ets during the period of 2009 2013 shows that the optimal markov policy would have led to a steadier allowance price level and a stricter emission regulation than what was actually observed in the eu ets

emission taxes and tradable permits a comparison of views on long run efficiency we compare three different views on the long runefficiencies of emission taxes which includethresholds inframarginalexemptions and of tradeable emission permitswhere some permits areinitially free the differences are caused bydifferent assumptions aboutwhether thresholds and free permits should besubsidies given only to firmsthat produce or full property rights treatingtax thresholds as well asfree permits as property rights would departfrom the conventional view but would allow greater flexibility in makingeconomic instruments bothefficient and acceptable such flexibilitycould be very important inachieving efficient control of greenhouse gasemissions

intra union flexibility of non ets emission reduction obligations in the european union the eu proposal on greenhouse gas emission reduction has 28 targets for 2020 an eu wide one for co2 emissions covered by the european trading system ets and one target for non ets emissions per member state implementation is more expensive than needed i consider three alternative proposals to reduce costs in the irish proposal member states can purchase ets permits to offset excess non ets emissions in the polish proposal member states can sell excess non ets emissions in the ets in the swedish proposal member states can trade their non ets allocations i compare these alternatives to the default policy no flexibility outside the ets and the cost effective solution full flexibility i calibrate a simple model to the results of the eu impact assessment which did not disclose all details and made odd assumptions the non ets allocation exceeds the projected emissions for three member states the alternative flexibility mechanisms would be used to only a limited extent but would cut the costs of meeting the target the swedish and polish proposals come closest to the cost effective solution because of the hot air the irish proposal performs best if there are negative surprises in either abatement costs or emissions the swedish proposal will become policy

optimal emission taxes for full internalization of environmental externalities abstract the present study proposes a set of optimal emissions fees that could be used to reduce the damages caused by industrial pollution the approach we use allows for the setting of pollution taxes at their economically appropriate level in particular tax rates are computed for china india and 19 sub saharan african countries all other world regions are grouped according to income level such as low income lower middle income upper middle income and high income economies our results show that constructed optimal pollution taxes range as high as 2 9 per 1 dollar of output for heavy manufacturing in the high income countries and as low as 0 01 in the service sectors of the low income countries these results show that a full internalization of the damages in each sector calls for raising the tax rates in some sectors and lowering them in others

cross border electricity market effects due to price caps in an emission trading system an agent based approach the recent low co2 prices in the european union emission trading scheme eu ets have triggered a discussion whether the eu ets needs to be adjusted we study the effects of co2 price floors and a price ceiling on the dynamic investment pathway of two interlinked electricity markets loosely based on great britain which already has introduced a price floor and on central western europe using an agent based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a co2 market including banking we analyse the cross border effects of national policies as well as system wide policy options a common moderate co2 auction reserve price results in a more continuous decarbonisation pathway this reduces co2 price volatility and the occurrence of carbon shortage price periods as well as the average cost to consumers a price ceiling can shield consumers from extreme price shocks these price restrictions do not cause a large risk of an overall emissions overshoot in the long run a national price floor lowers the cost to consumers in the other zone the larger the zone with the price floor the stronger the effect price floors that are too high lead to inefficiencies in investment choices and to higher consumer costs

a cap and trade commitment policy with allowance banking we examine the planner s dynamic regulation problem in an emission trading system ets with allowance banking the planner sets the emissions cap for the next period after the current period allowance market has cleared but before knowing the next period s abatement cost realization this creates a time consistency problem when banking is possible we examine two policies to overcome the consistency problem a commitment solution and the markov perfect solution we show that the endogenous price floor generated by the banking demand becomes an integral feature of the two policies hence they can be best described as hybrid policies that combine elements from emissions taxes and tradable allowances this reveals new welfare implications that have an influence on instrument choice in the traditional prices versus quantities setup we compare the expected welfare outcomes of four different policy instruments the commitment policy the markov policy a pigouvian tax and a no banking ets we show that allowing banking can yield welfare gains compared to tax and quantity regulation with or without commitment

lock in effect of emission standard and its impact on the choice of market based instruments abstract a country s existing emission standard policy will lead to a lock in effect when the country plans to adopt new market based instruments to control greenhouse gas emissions it must consider this effect as it chooses among instruments to avoid larger efficiency loss in this paper we find that the lock in effect will cause a kink point to occur on the marginal abatement cost mac curve this change of shape for the mac curve reminds us to be cautious in choosing market based instruments when applying weitzman s rule we also introduce this concept into a dynamic multi regional computable general equilibrium cge model for china and simulate mac curves for all regions after applying weitzman s rule we propose a timeline for introducing price instruments under different marginal benefit mb curve scenarios

carbon markets 15 years after kyoto lessons learned new challenges abstract carbon markets are substantial and they are expanding there are many lessons from market experiences over the past eight years there should be fewer free allowances better management of market sensitive information and a recognition that trading systems require adjustments that have consequences for market participants and market confidence moreover the emerging market architecture features separate emissions trading systems serving distinct jurisdictions and a variety of other types of policies exist alongside the carbon markets this situation is in sharp contrast to the top down integrated global trading architecture envisioned 15 years ago by the designers of the kyoto protocol and raises a suite of new questions in this new architecture jurisdictions with emissions trading have to decide how whether and when to link with one another stakeholders and policymakers must confront how to measure the comparability of efforts among markets as well as relative to a variety of other polic

global warming prices versus quantities from a strategic point of view abstract this paper investigates how the choices of the instruments affect the interactions in a stock externality game global warming between cartelized fossil fuel suppliers and consumers more precisely the paper studies the equilibria in markov strategies in a dynamic game with each player choosing either the quantity or the price strategy including short run first mover advantages indeed opec and its opponent iea have tried both instruments in the past and play currently in quantities given such a non competitive setting both players should prefer the price instrument therefore both players are expected to switch back to price and tax policies if global warming will be treated effectively

carbon pricing and general equilibrium under leontief production technology abstract comparing temperature and emissions data does not clearly show a relationship between the two variables going further this study combines leontief production technology with a computable general equilibrium model of global trade in order to quantitatively test the implications of mitigation policies for welfare and the environment we compute optimal emissions taxes and show that administering carbon fees reduces environmental damages by nearly 50 however there is a tradeoff effect on production which calls for caution when implementing environmental policies in general environmental benefits and resources shifting due to carbon taxes lead to welfare gains

designing carbon markets part ii carbon markets in space this paper analyses the design of carbon markets in time i e intertemporally it is part of a twin set of papers that ask starting from first principles what an optimal global carbon market would look like by around 2030 our focus is on firm level cap and trade systems although much of what we say would also apply to government level trading and carbon offset schemes we examine the first principles of temporal design that would help to maximise flexibility and to minimise costs including banking and borrowing and other mechanisms to provide greater carbon price predictability and credibility over time

technological change and the timing of mitigation measures we use a coupled carbon cycle and energy systems engineering model to analyze the future time path of carbon emissions under an illustrative co2 concentration stabilization limit of 550 ppm our findings confirm the emission pattern as found by wre global emissions rise initially pass through stabilization in order to decline in the second half of the 21st century we show that for a given co2 concentration target emission trajectories within an intertemporal optimization framework depend mainly on two factors the discount rate and the representation of technological change as either static or dynamic we obtain a similar near term emission time path as wre when using a model with static technology and a discount rate of 7 we obtain a trajectory with lower emissions in the near term when using a lower discount rate and or treating technology dynamics endogenously in the model we briefly outline a model that endogenizes technological change through learning curves we then compare differences in emission trajectories between alternative model formulations of technological change they are sufficiently small as to be of secondary importance when compared to treating co2 concentration stabilization as an inter temporal optimization problem or not whereas our results confirm the computational results of wre we arrive nonetheless at different policy conclusions if long term emission reduction is the goal we cannot follow business as usual even in the short term action needs to start now action does not necessarily mean aggressive short term emission reductions but rather enhanced r d and technology demonstration efforts that stimulate technological learning these are the necessary preconditions that long term reduction targets can be met with improved technology and at costs lower than today we close by pointing out two further critical issues uncertainty and the possible mismatch between the world of economic models and that of climate policy

strategic climate policy with offsets and incomplete abatement carbon taxes versus cap and trade abstract this paper provides a first analysis of a policy bloc of fossil fuel importers which implements an optimal climate policy faces a non policy fringe of other fuel importers and an exporter bloc and purchases offset from the fringe we compare a carbon tax and a cap and trade scheme for the policy bloc in either case accompanied by an efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe the policy bloc is shown to prefer a tax over a cap since only a tax reduces the fuel export price and by more when the policy bloc is larger offsets are also more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap the optimal offset price under a carbon tax is below the tax rate while under a cap and free quota trading the offset price must equal the quota price the domestic carbon and offset prices are both higher under a tax than under a cap when the policy bloc is small when the policy bloc is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower

a note on correlated uncertainty and hybrid environmental policies this note examines the effects of correlated uncertainty between abatement costs and pollution damage on hybrid emissions control policies in particular i show how correlated uncertainty affects the structure and performance of control policies that combine permit trading with price controls moreover i show how correlated uncertainty affects the choice between a simple emissions tax versus a hybrid policy under correlated uncertainty constant marginal damage is no longer necessary or sufficient for a tax to be an optimal policy

policy interactions risk and price formation in carbon markets carbon pricing is an important mechanism for providing companies with incentives to invest in carbon abatement price formation in carbon markets involves a complex interplay between policy targets dynamic technology costs and market rules carbon pricing may under deliver investment due to r d externalities requiring additional policies which themselves affect market prices also abatement costs depend on the extent of technology deployment due to learning by doing this paper introduces an analytical framework based on marginal abatement cost mac curves with the aim of providing an intuitive understanding of the key dynamics and risk factors in carbon markets the framework extends the usual static mac representation of the market to incorporate policy interactions and some technology cost dynamics the analysis indicates that supporting large scale deployment of mature abatement technologies suppresses the marginal cost of abatement sometimes to zero whilst increasing total abatement costs however support for early stage r d may reduce both total abatement cost and carbon price risk an important aspect of the analysis is in elevating risk management considerations into energy policy formation as the results of the stochastic modelling indicate wide distributions for the emergence of carbon prices and public costs around the policy expectations

bayesian learning growth and pollution abstract environmental problems such as climate change have great uncertainties current expectations are that uncertainties about climate change will be resolved quickly we examine this hypothesis theoretically and computationally we consider bayesian learning about the relationship between greenhouse gas levels and global mean temperature changes a key uncertainty learning is non trivial because of a stochastic shock to the realized temperature we find theoretically the expected learning time which is related to the variance of the shock and the emissions policy implying a tradeoff between the benefits of controlling emissions and information we imbed the learning model into an optimal growth model with a climate sector and solve the resulting dynamic program we find computationally that learning takes on average over 90 yr far longer than currently believed

the impact of global warming on agriculture reply in our paper with daigee shaw mendelsohn et al 1994 henceforth mns we developed a new approach to measuring the impact of global warming on agriculture we call this approach ricardian because it relies upon standard rent theory as a way of identifying the impact of changes on net economic welfare we compared the ricardian approach with the traditional production function approach which uses agricultural production functions but has great difficulty identifying all the other adjustments that farmers make in response to changing external conditions the ricardian approach is particularly well suited to a tremendously heterogeneous sector because it can rely upon reduced form estimation and does not require the impossible task of constructing structural models of hundreds of crops in thousands of locations estimating the model using cross sectional data on climate farm land prices and other economic and geophysical data for almost 3 000 counties in the united states the ricardian approach shows a significantly lower estimated impact of global warming than the traditional productionfunction approach indeed our preferred statistical approach showed modest benefits of climate change in his comment on mns in this issue of the review william r cline 1996 raises three concerns first he notes that the analysis assumes that output prices remain constant second he asserts that the analysis assumes that the supply of water for irrigation is perfectly elastic third he calls for testing the results of the model on alternative climate scenarios from general circulation models gcm s his first and third points are useful additions while the second is incorrect our ricardian approach assumes that the existing pattern of agricultural land rents and land prices reflects the long run equilibrium economic effect of climate and other geophysical and economic variables standard economic reasoning shows that by calculating the estimated effects of perturbing the climatic variables we can project the impact of climate change on economic welfare we do so in a partial equilibrium approach which assumes that output prices are invariant to the climate and cline is correct to point out that this might lead to biased estimates because the partialequilibrium estimates tend to underestimate damages and overestimate benefits in fact the bias is small given standard parameters for agricultural demand and supply functions we illustrate this point using linear supply and demand functions for agricultural crops let demand be given by qd ao a1p while supply is q po pi p where q and p are output and price and ai and i are parameters in equilibrium at the old climate market outcomes are qo and po now suppose that global warming contracts supply so that

alternative approaches to cost containment in a cap and trade system we compare several emissions reduction instruments including quantity policies with banking and borrowing price policies and hybrid policies safety valve and price collar using a dynamic model with stochastic baseline emissions the instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all options based on simulation analysis with the model parameterized to values relevant to proposed us climate mitigation policies we find that restrictions on banking and borrowing including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings can severely limit the value of the policy depending on the regulator chosen allowance issuance path although emissions taxes generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs a cap and trade system combined with either a safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax but with lower emissions variance than a tax consistently a price collar is more cost effective than a safety valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when abatement costs decline

technology diffusion with market power in the upstream industry this paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting downstream industry that can purchase an abatement technology from a monopolistic upstream industry second best policies are derived for the full range of the abatement technology s emission intensities and marginal abatement costs the second best permit quantity can be both above or below the socially optimal emission level explicit consideration of the output market provides further insights on how market power distorts the allocation in the downstream industry the ranking between permits and taxes is ambiguous in general but taxes weakly dominate permits if full diffusion is socially optimal in addition it is analysed how a cap on the permit price affects the diffusion of an abatement technology

ecological sufficiency individual liberties and distributive justice implications for policy making we investigate the prospects of voluntary ecological sufficiency for environmental and climate policy under the constraints implied by political liberalism we find that freedom of choice restricts sufficiency to rather wealthy societies and that a sufficiency threshold cannot be derived by referring to the poor sufficiency can be in conflict with the demands of social justice i e if the sufficiency threshold is below the social minimum implied by social justice benefits from sufficiency are highly related to individual perceptions such benefits cannot be expressed in a standard preference framework consequently alternative measures of welfare and inequality are required if sufficiency is a significant phenomenon in society standard environmental policies can have a pronounced interaction with voluntary sufficiency i e if quantity regulation is present overall the voluntary notion of sufficiency causes a dilemma as sufficiency is largely a matter of civil society however voluntary sufficiency is expected to make important contributions to the preservation of ecological resources if properly balanced with social and environmental policies and framed by public discursive control

permit market auctions with allowance reserves this article investigates pollution permit auctions that incorporate allowance reserves in these auctions the sale of a fixed quantity of permits is supplemented by an additional permit reserve this reserve automatically releases permits if a sufficiently high price is triggered the main justifications for implementing an allowance reserve are to reduce price volatility as well as assisting in cost containment we show paradoxically that incorporating an allowance reserve into a permit auction can decrease firms payoffs increase the clearing price and increase compliance costs this has implications for all major cap and trade markets including the us regional greenhouse gas initiative

policy shocks and market based regulations evidence from the renewable fuel standard the renewable fuel standard mandates large increases in u s biofuel consumption and is implemented using tradable compliance credits known as rins in early 2013 rin prices soared causing the regulator to propose reducing future mandates we estimate empirically the effect of three policy shocks that reduced the expected mandates in 2013 we find that the largest of these shocks decreased the value of the fuel industry s 2013 compliance obligation by 7 billion we then study the effects of the shocks on commodity markets and the market value of publicly traded biofuel firms results show that the burden of the mandate reductions fell primarily on advanced biofuel firms and commodity markets of the marginal compliance biofuel we argue that the policy shocks reduced the incentive to invest in the technologies required to meet the future objectives of the rfs and discuss alternative policy designs to address the problems that arose in 2013

revenue raising vs other approaches to environmental protection the critical significance of pre existing tax distortions using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a tax interaction effect that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates this effect is partially offset by a revenue recycling effect grandfathered pollution quotas such as those used under the 1990 clean air act amendments to regulate electric utilities so2 emissions do not benefit from this offset preexisting taxes raise this regulation s cost by over 70 more than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue recycling effect

harvest efficiency and fishery discards under harvest uncertainty and trading restrictions abstract we study harvesting efficiency and the problem of discards under harvest uncertainty in a fishery that is managed with quotas with only idiosyncratic harvest uncertainty we show that frictionless post harvest quota trade can achieve full efficiency and eliminate quota overage discards completely in the absence of such trade we deduce an ad valorem tax subsidy that eliminates discards while delivering a desired aggregate harvest target alternatively we show that a hybrid policy i e a combined quota and landings fee can implement a manager s aggregate target harvest level efficiently and without discards when harvest shocks in addition have a fishery wide common component post harvest quota trading per se cannot eliminate discards policy intervention in the form of either landing taxes or a hybrid scheme is needed given the prevalence of trading restrictions in many quota managed fisheries worldwide our paper offers important policy advice

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare

prices vs quantities technology choice uncertainty and welfare technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain while it is well known that price and quantity based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention this paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty i show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent even in terms of expected values moreover a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced finally the firms technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits but not under an emissions tax

carbon pricing in the eu evaluation of different eu ets reform options abstract this paper studies various options to support allowance prices in the eu emissions trading system ets such as adjusting the cap an auction reserve price and fixed and variable carbon taxes in addition to the eu ets we use a dynamic computable general equilibrium model that explicitly allows for allowance banking and for a detailed cost effectiveness analysis at the eu member state level we find that tightening the cap provides an ad hoc solution to the fundamental issue of the robustness of the effective carbon price while introducing a price component to the ets brings structural carbon price support in times of negative demand shocks for emission allowances these price based policies still benefit from the intertemporal flexibility through the banking provision in the eu ets by re allocating emissions over time with stronger emission reductions in early years and emission increases in later years a higher emission price has a larger negative impact on the new member states economies than on other member states furthermore introducing a carbon tax in addition to the eu ets decreases the price of allowances resulting in welfare gains for net buyers of allowances while net sellers are worse off