irrational diversification in multiple decision problems the paper deals with multiple decision problems which are similar to the task of guessing the color outcomes of ve independent spinnings of a roulette wheel 60 of whose slots are red and 40 white each correct guess yields a prize of 1 the guess of 5 reds clearly rst order stochastic dominates any other strategy in contrast subjects diversify their choices when facing a multiple decision problem in which the choice is between lotteries with clear objective probabilities the diversi cation is stronger when the subjects face uncertainty without objective probabilities and weaker when the choice problem involves real life actions c 2002 elsevier science b v

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

the variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 canadian election formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties should locate at the electoral mean recent research has found no evidence of such convergence in order to explain non convergence the stochastic electoral model is extended by including a competence and sociodemographic valance in a country where regional and national parties compete in the election that is the model allows voters to face different sets of parties in different regions we introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient c for regional and national parties and show that when c is high there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties an electoral survey of the 2004 election in canada is used to construct a stochastic electoral model of the election with two regions quebec and the rest of canada the survey allows us to estimate voter positions in the policy space the variable choice set logit model is used to built a relationship between party position and vote share we find that in the local nash equilibrium for the election the two main parties with high competence valence the liberals and conservatives locate at the national electoral mean and the bloc quebecois with the highest competence valence locates at the quebec electoral mean the new democratic party has a low competence valence but remains at the national mean the greens with lowest competence valence locate away from the national mean to increase its vote share

political competition between differentiated candidates abstract we introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidates immutable characteristics such as gender race or previously committed policy positions as well as their policy positions which are flexible candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences and choose policy positions to maximize their winning probability we characterize a property of voter utility functions uniform candidate ranking ucr that captures a form of separability between fixed characteristics and policy when voters have ucr preferences candidates equilibrium policies converge in any strict equilibrium in contrast notions like competence or complementarity lead to non ucr preferences and policy divergence in particular we introduce a new class of models that contains the probabilistic voting model as a special case and in which there is a unique equilibrium that generically features policy divergence

continuity in auction design abstract j cremer and r p mclean econometrica56 1988 1247 1257 have shown that the auctioneer can extract all the surplus when the private valuations of bidders are not statistically independent the paper shows that this result does not necessarily arise under limited liability or risk aversion under limited liability and or risk aversion we prove that the functions corresponding to the auctionner s optimal expected gain and to the maximum total surplus are continuous in the space of possible information distributions thus by continuity the auctioneer wil not be able to extract all the rents when bidders private valuations are approximately independent

inventories stock outs and production smoothing if stock outs are ignored and if demand shocks are additive then optimal behaviour requires that the marginal cost of production mc be equated with the expected marginal revenue of increasing expected sales by one unit emr however with more general demand shocks and still ignoring stock outs the excess of mc over emr has the same sign as the covariance of the slope of the demand curve and the marginal valuation of inventory the equality of emr and mc is also broken by taking account of stock outs even if demand shocks are additive if there is a production lag then taking account of stock outs implies that optimal behaviour will be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost of production is linear two alternative definitions of production smoothing are presented and optimal behaviour in the presence of stock outs displays each type of smoothing it is a well known proposition that a firm producing a storable good under conditions of increasing marginal cost will tend to smooth the time profile of its production relative to the time profile of its sales the incentive to smooth production arises from the fact that the cost function is a convex function of the level of production for a given average level of production average costs can be reduced by reducing the variation in production of course if the cost function is linear in the level of production then this incentive to smooth production disappears however we will demonstrate in this paper that if the possibility of stock outs is explicitly incorporated into the firm s dynamic optimization problem i e if we impose a non negativity constraint on inventories and if there is a lag in production then optimal behaviour can be characterized by production smoothing even if the cost function is linear

markups aggregation and inventory adjustment in this paper i suggest a unified explanation for two puzzles in the inventory literature first estimates of inventory speeds of adjustment in aggregate data are very small relative to the apparent rapid reaction of stocks to unanticipated variations in sales second estimates of inventory speeds of adjustment in firm level data are significantly higher than in aggregate data the paper develops a multisector model where inventories are held to avoid stockouts and price markups vary along the business cycle the omission of countercyclical markup variations from inventory targets introduces a downward bias in estimates of adjustment speeds obtained from partial adjustment models when the cyclicality of markups differs across sectors this downward bias is shown to be more severe with aggregate rather than firm level data similar results apply not only to inventories but also to labor and prices montercarlo simulations of a calibrated version of the model suggest that these biases are quantitatively significant

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

money and the business cycle with one period nominal contracts a modified version of the nominal contract developed by j a gray 1976 and s fischer 1977 is introduced in a general equilibrium model with money which has been used in the real business cycle literature money is introduced in the model through cash in advance constraint two kinds of contracts are examined namely a nominal wage contract and a nominal price contract the nominal wage contract improves the fit of the model in many respects the nominal price contract increases the output volatility enormously but it has some unrealistic features

learning dynamics for mechanism design an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms in a repeated interaction public goods economy incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information oneshot game an experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations this provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations these predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice the simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested

uncertainty in sales and inventory behaviour in the u s trade sectors this paper investigates uncertainty in sales and inventory behavior for the u s wholesale and retail trade sectors first using a vector error correction model with garch m the authors find that the uncertainty measured by forecast error variance in sales does not affect inventory behavior in both trade sectors second using forecast error variance decomposition and estimated permanent components they observe that the uncertainty may be attributed more to demand shocks than to cost shocks

a note on the econometric use of constant dollar inventory series abstract one dollar of finished goods inventories does not represent the same amount of physical goods as one dollar of sales when department of commerce constant dollar series are used this can cause seriously biased regression estimates

production sales and the change in inventories an identity that doesn t add up we examine two measures of monthly manufacturing production the first is the index of industrial production the second is constructed from the accounting identity that output equals sales plus the change in inventories we show that the means variances and serial correlation coefficients of the log growth rates differ substantially between the two series and the cross correlations are in most cases less than 0 4 a model of classical measurement error indicates that in 15 of 20 two digit industries measurement error accounts for over 35 of the variation in the monthly growth rates of seasonally adjusted industrial production

accounting for output fluctuations in manufacturing there is a substantial body of evidence to the effect that output is more volatile than sales among manufacturing industries numerous explanations have been advanced to account for this excess output volatility some examples are pro cyclical inventory movements induced by a stockout avoidance motive cost and technology shocks and decreasing marginal costs this article assesses the contribution of these different motives to output volatility for six different manufacturing industries linear quadratic models are estimated for each of the industries and then dynamic simulations are employed to determine the volatility of output when one or more of the factors are removed from the model technology shocks provide the most significant contribution to output volatility the stockout avoidance motive is also important cost shocks provide a very small contribution and marginal production costs are increasing at the margin and thus stabilize output it is also shown that output volatility declines when curre

exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design a basic goal in mechanism design is to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy efficiency voluntary participation and dominant strategy incentive compatibility previous work has shown that this is impossible unless the agents and planner have sufficient information about each other and common knowledge these results have remained largely theoretical because the required information is generally not available in practical applications however recent work has shown that these limitations can be overcome in simple settings using neurometric technologies that provide noisy signals of subjects preferences that can be used in the mechanism design problem here we build on this work by carrying out two new experiments designed to test the extent to which these neurometrically informed mechanisms nims can be applied to more complicated and realistic environments we find robustness to large type and action space and to the degrees of loss and risk aversion observed in most of our sample

secure implementation experiments do strategy proof mechanisms really work strategy proofness requiring that truth telling is a dominant strategy is a standard concept used in social choice theory saijo et al 2003 argue that this concept has serious drawbacks in particular announcing one s true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy and almost all strategy proof mechanisms have a continuum of nash equilibria for only a subset of strategy proof mechanisms do the set of nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide for example this double coincidence occurs in the groves mechanism when preferences are single peaked we report experiments using two strategy proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of nash equilibria but the other has a unique nash equilibrium we found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two

neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice recent advances neuroeconomics combines methods and theories from neuroscience psychology economics and computer science in an effort to produce detailed computational and neurobiological accounts of the decision making process that can serve as a common foundation for understanding human behavior across the natural and social sciences because neuroeconomics is a young discipline a sufficiently sound structural model of how the brain makes choices is not yet available however the contours of such a computational model are beginning to arise and given the rapid progress there is reason to be hopeful that the field will eventually put together a satisfactory structural model this paper has two goals first we provide an overview of what has been learned about how the brain makes choices in two types of situations simple choices among small numbers of familiar stimuli like choosing between an apple or an orange and more complex choices involving tradeoffs between immediate and future consequences like eating a healthy apple or a less healthy chocolate cake second we show that even at this early stage insights with important implications for economics have already been gained

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

are preliminary announcements of the money stock rational forecasts abstract we develop a theoretical framework of analyzing preliminary announcements of economic data and then apply this framework to the money stock we find that preliminary announcements of the money stock are best characterized as measured with classical errors in variables that is the revision is not correlated with the true value of the series the revision is however forecastable using information available at the time of the preliminary announcement our ability to forecast the revision implies that preliminary announcements are not rational estimates of the true money stock

the production and inventory behavior of the american automobile industry understanding inventory movements is central to an understanding of business cycles this paper presents an empirical study of the behavior of inventories in the automobile industry it finds that inventory behavior is well explained by the assumption of intertemporal optimization with rational expectations the underlying cost structure appears to have substantial costs of changing production as well as substantial costs of being away from target inventory thelatter being a function of current sales given this cost structure whether inventory behavior is stabilizing or destabilizing depends on the characteristics of the demand process in the automobile industry inventory behavior is destabilizing the variance of production is larger than the variance of sales

a measure of bullwhip effect in supply chains with a mixed autoregressive moving average demand process abstract in this paper we quantify the impact of the bullwhip effect the phenomenon in which information on demand is distorted as moving up a supply chain for a simple two stage supply chain with one supplier and one retailer assuming that the retailer employs a base stock inventory policy and that the demand forecast is performed via a mixed autoregressive moving average model arma 1 1 we investigate the effects of the autoregressive coefficient the moving average parameter and the lead time on the bullwhip effect

on the generic nonoptimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms a general theorem that includes pure exchange economies it is shown that if an economy s participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no potentially conflicting interests i e if the economy is indecomposable then every continuous truth dominant allocation mechanism will attain nonoptimal allocations on an open dense set of preference profiles classical edgeworth box exchange economies economies with no externalities and no production but with arbitrary numbers of consumers and goods as well as economies with public goods and economies with other kinds of externalities are all shown via simple arguments to be indecomposable the results are extended to cover nonrevelation mechanisms copyright 1990 by the econometric society

joint production quasi fixed factors of production and investment in finished goods inventories inventory investment has long been an important area of inquiry for empirical work in macroeconomics this is due in large measure to the fact that inventory investment is a major source of fluctuations in aggregate output empirical work on inventories however has been dominated by the use of simple univariate flexible accelerators 1 the major objective of this paper is to propose and test a multivariate flexible accelerator model for inventory investment the model is tested with data on finished goods inventories from the manufacturing sector of the u s economy there are two reasons for undertaking such a task first at a theoretical level a univariate flexible accelerator model asserts that investment in say finished goods inventories is proportional to the gap between the desired and actual stocks of finished goods such a model presumes that decisions by firms on finished goods inventories are made independently of decisions on other stocks but theory suggests that when firms make simultaneous decisions on a variety of stocks which includes not only finished goods but also goods in process inventories the size of the work force etc decisions on finished goods will interact with decisions on

the resurgence of inventory research what have we learned abstract recent empirical and theoretical research on business inventories is surveyed and critically evaluated while most inventory research has had macroeconomic motivations we focus on its microtheoretic basis and on potential conflicts between theory and evidence the paper asks two principal questions first how can inventories which are allegedly used by firms to stabilize production nonetheless be a destabilizing factor at the macroeconomic level second why if firms are following the production smoothing model is production more variable than sales in many industries we suggest that the so called s s model may help answer both questions

the production impact of cash for clunkers implications for stabilization policy during july and august of 2009 americans purchased nearly 700 000 new automobiles or light trucks under the government s cash for clunkers program officially the car allowance rebate system or cars under the terms of the purchase qualified buyers traded in their old vehicles to receive a rebate on the price of a new vehicle the amount of the rebate either 3 500 or 4 500 depended on both the model that was traded in and the model that was acquired the direct cost to taxpayers of subsidizing these purchases was roughly 2 8 billion the program had two primary goals to reduce energy consumption and pollution by inducing consumers to replace their old gas guzzlers with newer fuel efficient models and to serve as a stimulus for the troubled automobile industry and the u s economy as a whole in this article we take a close look at the second objective exploring how the cars program affected sales and more important production in the automobile industry 1 drawing on our findings we then propose an answer to the more difficult question of the program s impact on u s gross domestic product gdp 2 in line with other recent studies our analysis shows that the cars program had only a transitory cumulative effect on sales we estimate an initial impact of about 450 000 additional automobile sales but these were essentially shifted from the periods before and especially after the program we calculate that by january 2010 the cumulative effect of the cars program on auto sales was essentially zero 3 more important for our purposes however is the program s effect on automobile production while most studies of cars have focused on sales we argue that the program s success as a stimulus to the economy hinges on its impact on production production increases are more likely to translate into higher gdp and employment gdp being fundamentally a measure of production sales clearly rose at the outset but given that the industry can simply let inventory stocks absorb the increase in sales higher sales alone do not imply higher gdp or employment 4 overall we find that the program had a very modest and short lived effect on production production was about 200 000 units higher during the program in comparison to the 450 000 increase in sales sales from september 2009 to january 2010 were correspondingly lower than they would have been in the absence of cars which allowed producers to have lower production while still replenishing their inventory stocks thus on a quarterly basis we estimate that the cars program shifted production by around 100 000 units from 2009q4 and 2010q1 to 2009q3 these calculations suggest that the program had a negligible direct effect on gdp shifting less than roughly 2 billion or less than one tenth of 1 of gdp into 2009q3 from the subsequent two quarters this contrasts starkly with a study released by the department of transportation dot in the immediate aftermath of the program which concluded that cars had given a substantial boost to both gdp and employment in the final section of the article we discuss why our conclusions differ from those of the dot study our findings raise broader questions beyond just this particular program about the efficacy of efforts to stimulate short term spending it is clearly a mistake to gauge their impact by just looking at the spending they induce without looking at the supply side it is reasonable to expect that producers will use other margins than production and employment to respond to temporary movements in sales so the only question is quantitative how large is the gap between the sales and production impact we find it to be large in the case of cash for clunkers in what follows we will lay out the economics behind our analysis by examining how rebates and other transitory price changes affect consumer purchases and manufacturers inventory decisions

rational expectations and the smoothing properties of inventories of finished goods abstract this paper formulates and estimates a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model of inventories of finished goods and employment of labor the view that the primary role of inventories of finished goods is to act as a buffer stock in the face of fluctuating demand is examined both the model and estimation results indicate that this is the case because of differences in the costs involved for firms in changing their inventory stocks and labor force in addition to providing some new evidence on the behavior of inventories of finished goods and employment the paper illustrates a technology for maximum likelihood estimation of structural parameters under the hypothesis of rational expectations

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

inventories and sticky prices note in a recent contribution to this review alan blinder provides an interesting analysis of the relationship between optimal inventory decisions and the process of price adjustment arguing that inventory permits separation of production and sale decisions and allows the firm greater flexibility in responding to anticipated demand disturbances blinder shows that the responsiveness of relative prices depends critically upon the cost of storage and the temporal structure of the demand shocks few economists would fault the intuitive substance of blinder s basic proposition and the proposition is justified with characteristic precision the analysis however is considerably less general than blinder maintains the formal argument of his paper relies upon a simple model of a monopolist capable of backlogging orders and storing unsold goods as the model is constructed order backlogs assume a role of fundamental importance in any stationary equilibrium this feature of the model vitiates blinder s extension of his result to situations in which order backlogs are prohibited the basic monopoly model developed in sections i and ii of blinder s paper places no restriction upon the sign of inventory negative inventory is interpreted as net unfilled orders while no distinction is drawn between reductions in gross inventory and additions to the order backlog as a result the cost of holding inventory is symmetric around an arbitrary minimum point the only role of inventory is to permit the time paths of production and sales to differ gross inventory allows production to antedate sales while order backlogs generate revenue before production costs are borne under these circumstances if future costs and revenues are discounted it is natural to expect any stationary equilibrium level of net inventory to be negative this can be shown to be true of blinder s model it is useful to distinguish in general between the nonstochastic stationary level of inventory n and the stochastic stationary level n the former is realized when the current expected demand disturbance eo is zero and production equals sales the latter which differs from customary usage represents the level of inventory expected to prevail when adjustment to the current nonzero expected demand disturbance is complete if the demand disturbance is not a random walk so that p 1 in blinder s 5 the two equilibria coincide relatively little attention is devoted to either stationary solution because blinder s main interest is in the optimal current solution level n1 the stochastic stationary level is crucially important however since it represents the goal toward which the current choice must provide an optimal first step to verify that both nand n are negative whenever production is strictly positive note that blinder s necessary condition 7 with the coefficient cl set equal to zero together with the definition of xa as the deviation of the shadow value of inventory q from its nonstochastic stationary value q implies

inventories inflation dynamics and the new keynesian phillips curve abstract we introduce inventories into an otherwise standard new keynesian model and study the implications for inflation dynamics inventory holdings are motivated as a means to generate sales for demand constrained firms we derive various representations of the new keynesian phillips curve with inventories and show that one of these specifications is observationally equivalent to the standard model with respect to the behavior of inflation when the model s cross equation restrictions are imposed however the driving variable in the new keynesian phillips curve real marginal cost is unobservable and has to be proxied by for instance real unit labor cost an alternative approach is to impute marginal cost by using the model s optimality conditions we show that the stock sales ratio is linked to marginal cost we also estimate these various specifications of the new keynesian phillips curve using gmm we find that the predictive power of the inventory specification at best approaches that of the standard model but does not improve upon it

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

inventories and the volatility of production a stylized fact associated with inventory behavior is that the variance of production exceeds the variance of sales this paper presents a model of production decisions with demand uncertainty that incorporates no nnegativity constraints on inventories even with no productivity shocks optimal behavior by the firm is consistent with this stylized fact either if demand exhibits positive serial correlation or if the firm can backlog excess demand the reason is that a demand shock affects both the actual inventory level given unchanged production and the desired level production must replenish the stock and adjust to the new desired level copyright 1987 by american economic association

the relevance of private information in mechanism design abstract recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information and are sufficiently risk neutral it is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents we show that these full rent extraction results hinge on the implicit assumption that the agents beliefs uniquely determine their preferences we present an example of the voluntary provision of a public good in which this assumption is relaxed and consequently even in highly correlated environments if agents beliefs do not uniquely determine their preferences then the extraction of the agents entire information rents is impossible

can the production smoothing model of inventory behavior be saved the production smoothing model of inventory behavior has a long and venerable history and theoretical foundations that seem very strong yet certain overwhelming facts seem not only to defy explanation within the production smoothing framework but actually to argue that the basic idea of production smoothing is all wrong most prominent among these is the fact that the variance of detrended production exceeds the variance of detrended sales this paper first documents the stylized facts then it derives the production smoothing model rigorously and explains how the model can be amended to make it consistent with the facts finally it reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence and tries to draw some tentative conclusions

coordinating lead times and safety stocks under autocorrelated demand we consider a supply chain in which orders and lead times are linked endogenously as opposed to assuming lead times are exogenous this assumption is relevant when a retailer s orders are produced by a supplier with finite capacity and replenished when the order is completed the retailer faces demands that are correlated over time either positively or negatively which may for example be induced by a pricing or promotion policy the auto correlation in demand affects the order stream placed by the retailer onto the supplier and this in turn influences the resulting lead times seen by the retailer since these lead times also determine the retailer s orders and its safety stocks which the retailer must set to cover lead time demand there is a mutual dependency between orders and lead times the inclusion of endogenous lead times and autocorrelated demand represents a better fit with real life situations however it poses some additional methodological issues compared to assuming exogenous lead times or stationary demand processes that are independent over time by means of a markov chain analysis and matrix analytic methods we develop a procedure to determine the distribution of lead times and inventories that takes into account the correlation between orders and lead times our analysis shows that negative autocorrelation in demand although more erratic improves both lead time and inventory performance relative to iid demand positive correlation makes matters worse than iid demand due to the endogeneity of lead times these effects are much more pronounced and substantial error may be incurred if this endogeneity is ignored

a response to glazer and rosenthal we are most grateful to glazer and rosenthal for the attention they have paid to our work abreu and matsushima 1992a b c in the process of criticizing our mechanism they have provided an elegant exposition of it which usefully supplements our own efforts the criticisms themselves we feel are misplaced and based on a close reading but narrow interpretation of our results glazer and rosenthal seek to show that in our mechanisms the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies is or indeed ought to be controversial in terms of conventional decision theory the iterative logic is impeccable when iterative deletion leads to a unique profile that profile is the unique rationalizable profile the unique nash equilibrium and so on of course the logic of iterative dominance entails common knowledge of rationality the theoretical coherence of this assumption has been questioned in the context of backward programming in extensive form games see luce and raiffa 1957 pp 80 81 rosenthal 1981 basu 1988 reny 1992a 1992b bonanno 1991 binmore 1987a 1987b and gul 1989 among others these paradoxes of common knowledge of rationality have been highlighted in stylized examples such as the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma and rosenthal s centipede game which in fact has been a seminal inspiration for this recent literature 2 but our mechanisms are simultaneous there is no opportunity to demonstrate irrationality strategic or otherwise and therefore no scope to rationalize iteratively dominated behavior from a decision theory perspective the glazer and rosenthal critique might therefore be viewed as an elaborate revival of the indefensible claim that players in a one short prisoners dilemma will choose not to confess because they are both better off doing so than by both playing their dominant strategies within the standard game theory paradigm there is really nothing more to be said before turning to issues of bounded rationality we note that the glazer and rosenthal critique is essentially premised on the existence of a countervailing focal point but what is a focal point the notion is notoriously vague and we are aware of no widely accepted definition 3 this is not to deny that in very simple and particular games certain behavior may be focal frequently focalness is identified with a pareto dominating equilibrium and this is the point of view glazer and rosenthal seem to adopt 4 this is implicit in their acknowledgement that when the social choice function does satisfy pareto optimality our objection loses much of its immediate

the equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models abstract in costly voting models voters abstain when a stochastic cost of voting exceeds the benefit from voting in probabilistic voting models they always vote for a candidate who generates the highest utility which is subject to random shocks we prove an equivalence result in two candidate elections given any costly voting model there exists a probabilistic voting model that generates winning probabilities identical to those in the former model for any policy announcements and vice versa thus many predictions of interest established in one of the models hold in the other as well providing robustness of the conclusions to model specifications

the mean voter theorem necessary and sufficient conditions for convergent equilibrium formal models of elections have emphasized the convergence of party leaders towards the centre of the electoral distribution this paper attempts to resolve the apparent disparity between the formal result and the perception of political divergence by considering a model incorporating valence valence can be interpreted as the non policy basis of political judgement made by the electorate concerning the quality of political contenders the theorem presented here shows that there is a necessary condition for convergence the condition involves the difference in party valences and the electoral variance when the condition fails the low valence parties will be forced to adopt policy positions far from the electoral centre the inference appears to be substantiated by an empirical model of the israel election in 1996 copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades the possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here the specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms the reason for this remains an open question

vote motivated candidates abstract we study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs we find that if a strict nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large but finite electorates if the votes are independent random events then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates our results have implications for existing models of redistributive politics and spatial competition as the properties of pure strategy equilibria in such games carry over to equilibria in games with arbitrary candidate preferences on the other hand candidate utility functions will matter if the individual voting decisions are correlated in the presence of aggregate uncertainty such as changing economic conditions or political scandals the preferences of parties and candidates with respect to shares of votes will have an effect on political competition

local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models abstract electoral equilibria depend upon candidates motivations maximization of expected vote share may not lead to the same behavior as maximization of the probability of winning the election accordingly it is desirable to understand when electoral equilibria are insensitive to the choice of candidate motivations this paper examines sufficient conditions for local equilibrium equivalence between expected vote share maximization and maximization of probability of victory in the spatial model of elections with probabilistic voters

the stylized facts about the behavior of manufacturers inventories and backorders over the business cycle 1959 1980 recent theoretical work has highlighted the role of inventories in propagating business cycles this paper attempts to provide an empirical foundation for current and future research on the role inventories play in business cycles the evidence presented here indicates that inventories and backorders are major variables in predicting output fluctuations further the evidence is that disaggregating inventories by stage of fabrication is important in predicting output in concert with previous findings our results suggest that disaggregated inventories ought to be a component of models of the business cycle

bullwhip effect measurement and its implications the bullwhip effect or demand information distortion has been a subject of both theoretical and empirical studies in the operations management literature in this paper we develop a simple set of formulas that describe the traditional bullwhip measure as a combined outcome of several important drivers such as finite capacity batch ordering and seasonality our modeling framework is descriptive in nature as it features certain plausible approximations that are commonly employed in practical inventory systems the results are nonetheless compelling and can be used to explain various conflicting observations in previous empirical studies building on the theoretical framework we discuss the managerial implications of the bullwhip measurement we show that the measurement can be completely noninformative about the underlying supply chain cost performance if it is not linked to the operational details such as decision intervals and leadtimes specifically we show that an aggregated measurement over relatively long time periods can mask the operational level bullwhip in addition we show that masking also exists under product or location aggregation in some illustrative cases

international evidence on the persistence of economic fluctuations abstract this paper presents new evidence on the persistence of fluctuations in real gnp we estimate two measures of persistence nonparametrically using post war quarterly data from canada france germany italy japan the united kingdom and the united states we compare these estimates with monte carlo results from various ar 2 processes for six out of seven countries the point estimates indicate that a 1 shock to output should change the long run unvariate forecast of output by well over 1 low order arma models yield similar conclusions finally we examine the persistence in relative outputs of different countries

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

an empirical investigation of dynamic ordering policies adaptive base stock policy is a well known tool for managing inventories in nonstationary demand environments this paper presents empirical tests of this policy using aggregate firm level data first we extend a single item adaptive base stock policy in previous literature to a multi item case second we transform the policy derived for the multi item case to a regression model that relates firm level inventory purchases to firm level sales and changes in sales forecasts we focus on two research questions can the adaptive base stock policy explain cross sectional ordering behaviors under sales growth to the extent that the adaptive base stock policy fails to explain ordering behaviors under sales growth are there frictions that explain such a finding our empirical results demonstrate disparities in ordering behaviors between firms experiencing high and moderate sales growth contrary to theoretical prediction this implies that inventory purchases are a function of not only current sales and changes in sales forecast but also past sales growth as potential explanations for this departure from theoretical prediction we show that both future demand dynamics and inventory holding risks depend on past sales growth in addition we find that firms inventory holding risks may also be affected by purchasing constraints imposed by supply chain contracts our results provide managerial implications for practitioners and inform future theoretical research this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

a theory of voting in large elections this paper provides a game theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections in our model voters strategies form a quantal response equilibrium qre which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior we first show that a qre in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates and then proceed to show that with enough voters and the addition of a regularity condition on voters utilities a nash equilibrium profile of platforms exists when candidates seek to maximize their expected margin of victory this equilibrium 1 consists of all candidates converging to the policy that maximizes the expected sum of voters utilities 2 exists even when voters can abstain and 3 is unique when there are only 2 candidates