supply chain relationships and contracts the impact of repeated interaction on capacity investment and procurement consider a firm developing an innovative product due to market pressures production must begin soon after the product development effort is complete which requires that an upstream supplier invests in capacity while the design of the product and production process are in flux because the product is ill defined at this point in time the firms are unable to write court enforceable contracts that specify the terms of trade or the supplier s capacity investment however the firms can adopt an informal agreement relational contract regarding the terms of trade and capacity investment the potential for future business provides incentive for the firms to adhere to the relational contract we show that the optimal relational contract may be complex requiring the buyer to order more than her demand to indirectly monitor the supplier s capacity investment we propose a simpler relational contract and show that it performs very well for a broad range of parameters finally we identify characteristics of the business environment that make relational contracting particularly valuable

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

a test of steady state government debt neutrality a test of steady state government debt neutrality this paper investigates whether in the steady state the real interest rate is an increasing function of both the government debt and government spending using data from the period between january 1981 and march 1986 the paper finds no evidence of such a relationship these data afford an especially powerful test because the ratio of federal debt to trend output which had fallen from 93 to 33 percent between january 1948 and december 1980 reversed course after the enactment of the economic recovery tax act reaching 47 percent in march 1986 i introduction in conventional macroeconomic analysis government debt is not neutral because households view it as contributing to their net wealth as a result the larger the government debt is the wealthier households feel and the more they consume more consumption in turn spells less investment over time and thus a lower steady state capital stock as a result output is ultimately lower and the real interest rate higher in principle however households need not view government debt as net wealth 1 if households accurately foresee the future taxes that will service the government debt if they face perfect capital markets if taxes do not distort their decisions and if they internalize future generations then they treat the future taxes servicing the government debt as an exact offset consequently government debt is neutral since it does not make households feel wealthier and hence affects nothing 2 nevertheless because most macroeconomists doubt that households accurately foresee future servicing taxes have access to perfect capital markets and internalize future generations they do not model government debt as neutral like perfect competition however government debt neutrality may be a good approximation in many applications even if the assumptions underlying it are unrealistic therefore empirical analysis rather than introspection should determine how one models government debt this paper provides such an empirical analysis the empirical analysis focuses on the steady state relationship between government debt and the real interest rate 3 in the steady state a larger government debt leads to a smaller capital stock and hence a higher marginal product of capital if households view government debt as net wealth consequently the real interest rate is also higher if instead government debt is neutral nothing should happen to the real interest rate u s data from the period between january 1981 and march 1986 have been used here to investigate whether a larger government debt leads to a higher real interest rate in the steady state and hence whether government debt is neutral these data afford an especially powerful test because the ratio of federal debt to trend output which had fallen from 94 to 33 percent between january 1948 and december 1980 reversed course after the enactment of the economic recovery tax act reaching 47 percent by march 1986 moreover this upward trend is likely to continue well beyond 1986 such an enormous increase in federal debt should have raised by steady state real interest rate appreciably if households view government debt as net wealth to any important extent in the absence of evidence that the steady state real interest rate did rise government debt is judged to be neutral in the steady state section ii formulates the model which is estimated in sections iii and iv section v summarizes the paper and then briefly reviews an extensive literature consistent with government debt neutrality ii formulation of the econometric model the appendix demonstrates that if households view government debt as net wealth the real interest rate should be an increasing function of both the government debt and government spending in the steady state see also evans 1988 for this analysis

the price of anarchy in supply chains quantifying the efficiency of price only contracts in this paper we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price only contracts with a price only contract a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price without specifying the amount that will be transferred it is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory capacity decisions we measure efficiency with the price of anarchy poa defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain that is fully coordinated and the decentralized supply chain we characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations push or pull inventory positioning two or more stages serial or assembly systems single or multiple competing suppliers and single or multiple competing retailers

is ricardian equivalence a good approximation ricardian equivalence may be a good approximation even if all households have finite horizons many households have short horizons and an appreciable fraction of wage income is received by liquidity constrained households the approximation is likely to be better the more imperfect annuity markets are

dynamic bargaining in a supply chain with asymmetric demand information we analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product both firms are impatient and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached the buyer is privately informed about his type which can be high or low the high type s demand is stochastically larger than the low type s in the dynamic negotiation process the seller can screen whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers and the buyer has an endogenous and type dependent reservation profit with rational assumptions on the seller s belief structure we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game interestingly we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms relative patience and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first or with both simultaneously furthermore we explore our model to characterize the effect of demand forecasting accuracy on firm profitability we find that improved demand forecast benefits the buyer but hurts the seller when the buyer s forecasting accuracy is low however once the buyer s forecasting accuracy exceeds a threshold both firms will benefit from further improvement of the forecast this observation makes an interesting contrast to previous findings based on the one shot principal agent model in which improvement of forecasting accuracy mostly leads to a win lose outcome for the two firms and the buyer has an incentive to improve his forecasting accuracy only when it is extremely low this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

information distortion in a supply chain the bullwhip effect this article originally appeared in management science april 1997 volume 43 number 4 pp 546 558 published by the institute of management sciences consider a series of companies in a supply chain each of whom orders from its immediate upstream member in this setting inbound orders from a downstream member serve as a valuable informational input to upstream production and inventory decisions this paper claims that the information transferred in the form of orders tends to be distorted and can misguide upstream members in their inventory and production decisions in particular the variance of orders may be larger than that of sales and distortion tends to increase as one moves upstream a phenomenon termed bullwhip effect this paper analyzes four sources of the bullwhip effect demand signal processing rationing game order batching and price variations actions that can be taken to mitigate the detrimental impact of this distortion are also discussed

transaction taxes and the behavior of the swedish stock market abstract this paper studies the effects of transaction taxes on the behavior of swedish equity returns during the 1980 1987 period sweden provides an excellent laboratory style setting for such a study as taxes were imposed for political purposes rather than to alter the behavior of the stock market volatility did not decline in response to the introduction of taxes although stock price levels and turnover did large proportions of trading activity migrated overseas to london when the tax rate was increased to 2 in 1986

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

technical note optimal long term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information we consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon under a backlogging model we show that the manufacturer s optimal dynamic long term contract takes a simple form in the first period based on her private demand forecast the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee and from then on the two parties stick to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer s chosen price under a lost sales model we show that the structure of the optimal long term contract combines a menu of wholesale pricing contracts with an option that if exercised by the retailer reduces future wholesale prices in exchange for an immediate payment to the manufacturer the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 opre 2017 1626

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

sustaining long term supply chain partnerships using price only contracts abstract in this paper we study how an informal long term relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer performs in turbulent market environments characterized by uncertain demand we show that the long term partnership based on repeated interaction is sustainable under price only contracts when the supply chain partners are sufficiently patient that is the channel can be coordinated over a long time horizon when the factor whereby the members discount the future value of this trusting relationship is sufficiently high second above the minimum discount factor a range of wholesale prices exists that can sustain the long term partnership and there are different possible profit divisions between the two players third when the market is turbulent i e either the expected demand or the demand variance changes from period to period according to a probabilistic law it is typically less possible to sustain the long term partnership in a booming market or in a market with low demand variability finally obtaining more information about future market fluctuation may not help the supply chain to sustain the long term partnership due to partners strategic considerations with the availability of the market signal total supply chain profits increase but the retailer may even be worse off

a supplier s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information in the supply chain literature an increasing body of work studies how suppliers can use incentive schemes such as quantity discounts to influence buyers ordering behaviour thus reducing the supplier s and the total supply chain s costs various functional forms for such incentive schemes have been proposed but a critical assumption always made is that the supplier has full information about the buyer s cost structure we derive the optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information and compare it to the situation where the supplier has full information

supply chain performance under market valuation an operational approach to restore efficiency based on a supply chain framework we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation we first characterize a market equilibrium under a general single buyback contract we show that the buyer s stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm s own performance and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the supply chain we further reveal scenarios where full supply chain efficiency cannot be reached under any single buyback contract then focusing on contract design we characterize conditions under which a menu of buyback contracts can prevent downstream stocking distortion and restore full efficiency in the supply chain our study demonstrates that in a supply chain context a firm s incentive to undertake real economic activities to influence capital market valuation can potentially be resolved through operational means this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

optimal dynamic procurement policies for a storable commodity with levy prices and convex holding costs abstract in this paper we study a continuous time stochastic inventory model for a commodity traded in the spot market and whose supply purchase is affected by price and demand uncertainty a firm aims at meeting a random demand of the commodity at a random time by maximizing total expected profits we model the firm s optimal procurement problem as a singular stochastic control problem in which controls are nondecreasing processes and represent the cumulative investment made by the firm in the spot market a so called stochastic monotone follower problem we assume a general exponential levy process for the commodity s spot price rather than the commonly used geometric brownian motion and general convex holding costs we obtain necessary and sufficient first order conditions for optimality and we provide the optimal procurement policy in terms of a base inventory process that is a minimal time dependent desirable inventory level that the firm s manager must reach at any time in particular in the case of linear holding costs and exponentially distributed demand we are also able to obtain the explicit analytic form of the optimal policy and a probabilistic representation of the optimal revenue the paper is completed by some computer drawings of the optimal inventory when spot prices are given by a geometric brownian motion and by an exponential jump diffusion process in the first case we also make a numerical comparison between the value function and the revenue associated to the classical static newsvendor strategy

vertical contracts in a supply chain and the bullwhip effect this paper shows that decentralized supply chains in which upstream firms use linear wholesale prices may experience lower upstream production and downstream sales volatility than vertically inte

strategic inventories in vertical contracts classical reasons for carrying inventory include fixed nonlinear production or procurement costs lead times nonstationary or uncertain supply demand and capacity constraints the last decade has seen active research in supply chain coordination focusing on the role of incentive contracts to achieve first best levels of inventory an extensive literature in industrial organization that studies incentives for vertical controls largely ignores the effect of inventories does the ability to carry inventory influence the problem of vertical control conversely can inventories arise purely due to incentive effects this paper explicitly considers both incentives and inventories and their interplay in a dynamic model of an upstream firm supplier and a downstream firm buyer who can carry inventories in our model none of the classical reasons for carrying inventory exists however as we prove the buyer s optimal strategy in equilibrium is to carry inventories and the supplier is unable to prevent

seasonality and the monetization of federal budget deficits prior findings that federal government budget deficits promptly lead to increases in the monetary base are unreliable these findings are due largely to inadequate treatment of seasonality in post war quarterly data once seasonality is properly modeled no further short run relation is apparent theory suggests that there may be a long run relation between deficits and money growth if such a relation exists the sample of postwar u s data is too small to identify it

are government bonds net wealth evidence for the united states this paper investigates whether government bonds are viewed as net wealth if they are the nominal interest rate in steady state equilibrium should be an increasing function of the government debt and of government spending using forward interest rates realized during world war ii this paper finds no evidence of such a relationship these data afford an especially powerful test because the federal debt rose from 29 to 106 percent of trend output during the war this enormous increase in government debt actually appears to have reduced forward interest rates by a statistically significant but small amount

procuring fast delivery sole sourcing with information asymmetry this paper studies a queuing model in which a buyer sources a good or service from a single supplier chosen from a pool of suppliers the buyer seeks to minimize the sum of her procurement and operating costs the latter of which depends on the suppliers lead time the selected supplier can regulate his lead time but faster lead times are costly although the buyer selects the supplier to source from possibly via an auction and dictates the contractual terms the buyers bargaining power is limited by asymmetric information the buyer only has an estimate of the suppliers costs while the suppliers know their costs precisely we identify a procurement mechanism that minimizes the buyers total cost procurement plus operating this mechanism is not simple it is a numerically derived nonlinear menu of contracts therefore we study several simpler mechanisms e g one that charges a late fee and one that specifies a fixed lead time requirement no menus no nonlinear functions we find that simple mechanisms are nearly optimal generally within 1 of optimal because asymmetric information conveys significant protection to the supplier i e the supplier is able to retain most of the benefit of having a lower cost renegotiation is another concern with the optimal mechanism because it does not minimize the supply chains cost the firms can be both better off if they throw away the contract and start over interestingly we find that the potential gain from renegotiation is relatively small with either the optimal or our simple mechanisms we conclude that our simple mechanisms are quite attractive along all relevant dimensions buyers performance supply chain performance simplicity and robustness to renegotiation

stalking information bayesian inventory management with unobserved lost sales retailers are frequently uncertain about the underlying demand distribution of a new product when taking the empirical bayesian approach of scarf 1959 they simultaneously stock the product over time and learn about the distribution assuming that unmet demand is lost and unobserved this learning must be based on observing sales rather than demand which differs from sales in the event of a stockout using the framework and results of braden and freimer 1991 the cumulative learning about the underlying demand distribution is captured by two parameters a scale parameter that reflects the predicted size of the underlying market and a shape parameter that indicates both the size of the market and the precision with which the underlying distribution is known an important simplification result of scarf 1960 and azoury 1985 which allows the scale parameter to be removed from the optimization is shown to extend to this setting we present examples that reveal two interesting phenomena 1 a retailer may hope that compared to stocking out realized demand will be strictly less than the stock level even though stocking out would signal a stochastically larger demand distribution and 2 it can be optimal to drop a product after a period of successful sales we also present specific conditions under which the following results hold 1 investment in excess stocks to enhance learning will occur in every dynamic problem and 2 a product is never dropped after a period of poor sales the model is extended to multiple independent markets whose distributions depend proportionately on a single unknown parameter we argue that smaller markets should be given better service as an effective means of acquiring information

finite horizons infinite horizons and the real interest rate finite horizons infinite horizons and the real interest rate using an overlapping generations model in which households may have either finite or infinite horizons i derive the implications of each horizon for the steady state real interest rate i then formulate an econometric model of the steady state real interest rate and devise tests that can distinguish between finite and infinite horizons these tests are applied to annual and quarterly u s data which span the period 1875 1988 the results are inconsistent with finite horizons and broadly consistent with infinite horizons i introduction in conventional macroeconomic analysis government budget deficits raise perceived wealth and stimulate aggregate demand because households are modeled as having finite horizons if households are instead modeled as having infinite horizons budget deficits need not stimulate aggregate demand and hence need not affect output employment interest rates and the price level the reason is that households with infinite horizons do not view the government debt as net wealth thus they may treat budget deficits i e future taxes and current taxes as equivalent ricardian equivalence is said to hold if households treat budget deficits as equivalent to current taxes 1 three reasons are typically advanced for assuming households have finite horizons first the individuals who comprise current households have finite lifetimes second some households face binding liquidity constraints either now or in the future 2 third boundedly rational households may choose to behave myopically acting as if their current decisions do not affect allocations occurring beyond some horizon 3 these three reasons however do not necessitate modeling households as having finite horizons first barro 1974 has shown that finite lifetimes need not imply finite horizons second hayashi 1987 and yotsuzuka 1987 have shown that lenders may impose liquidity constraints that vary one for one with the government debt in such an environment the government debt relaxes no liquidity constraints third because bounded rationality assumes fixed costs of decision making it may be able to explain why aggregate demand would respond to small short term budget deficits but cannot explain why aggregate demand would respond to large or long term budget deficits because logically consistent reasons can be adduced for modeling households as having either finite or infinite horizons the issue of which is the better modeling strategy should ultimately be decided by empirical analysis this paper offers such an analysis it investigates the implications of finite and infinite horizons for the steady state behavior of the real interest rate the evidence reported here is inconsistent with finite horizons and broadly consistent with infinite horizons the rest of the paper is organized as follows using barro s 1974 overlapping generations model i derive its implications for the steady state real interest rate in section ii these implications differ according to whether households have inoperative bequest motives and finite horizons or operative bequest motives and infinite horizons in section iii i formulate an econometric model that encompasses the implications of the theoretical model of section ii for both of these cases in sections iv v vi and vii i test these implications using u s data in section viii i investigate whether the real interest rate evidences any short term departures from ricardian equivalence finally in section ix i draw some tentative conclusions ii an overlapping generations model of the steady state in this section i lay out barro s overlapping generations model which is the simplest model in which one can derive the implications of finite and infinite horizons for the steady state real interest rate

dynamic supplier contracts under asymmetric inventory information in this paper we examine a supply chain in which a single supplier sells to a downstream retailer we consider a multiperiod model with the following sequence of events in period t the supplier offers a contract to the retailer and the retailer makes her purchasing decision in anticipation of the random demand the demand then unravels and the retailer carries over any excess inventory to the next period unmet demand is lost in period t 1 the supplier designs a new contract based on his belief of the retailer s inventory and the game is played dynamically we assume that short term contracts are used i e the contracting is dynamically conducted at the beginning of each period we also assume that the retailer s inventory before ordering is not observed by the supplier this setting describes scenarios in which the downstream retailer does not share inventory sales information with the supplier for instance it captures the phenomenon of retailers distorting past sales information to secure better contracting terms from their suppliers we cast our problem as a dynamic adverse selection problem and show that given relatively high production and holding costs the optimal contract can take the form of a batch order contract which minimizes the retailer s information advantage we then analyze the performance of this type of contract with respect to some useful benchmarks and quantify the value of prudent contract design and the value of inventory information to the supply chain markovian adverse selection models in which the state and action in a period affect the state in the subsequent period are recognized as theoretically challenging and are relatively less understood we take a nontrivial step towards a better understanding of such models under short term contracting

budget deficit persistence and the twin deficits hypothesis abstract this paper gauges the twin deficits hypothesis i e a positive causal relationship between the external and budget deficits this relationship is measured by the responses of the external deficit to changes in the budget deficit induced by blanchard s model these responses are positively affected by the birth rate and by the degree of persistence of the budget deficit empirical results for the canadian and us economies reveal that although the relevant birth rates are small the great persistence of the budget deficits yields responses that are numerically large and statistically positive this contrasts with previous tests of the twin deficits hypothesis which have never formally taken into account the stochastic properties of the budget deficit

interest rates expected future deficits and tax proposals interest rates expected future deficits and tax proposals i introduction in several recent publications paul evans 1985 1987 1988a 1988b presents evidence suggesting a negative wealth effect in response to federal deficits evans 1987 investigates the impact future deficits have on current interest rates while he argues that expectations of future deficits are based in part on past history he also recognizes that economic agents could observe the legislative process and assess how likely congress is to enact new tax legislation appreciably affecting future budget deficits 1987 45 evans assumes that legislative information is both relevant and available but does not include it as a regressor instead he looks to the error term and tries to unpack the effect of tax legislation a more straightforward method for testing this hypothesis is to simply include a tax legislation variable in the estimated equation ii methodology the reduced form equation to be tested is delta i sub nt f delta i sub t j delta g sub t i delta m sub t i delta t sub t i where i is the nominal interest rate on an n period bond g is government purchases of goods and services d is the federal deficit variable and is simply the difference between federal outlays and federal receipts m is the money stock m1 t is a variable that reflects tax legislation currently being considered by congress j 1 2 3 and i 0 1 2 3 by incorporating the tax variable into the relevant information set the impact of tax legislation if there is one may be detected 1 the tax variable is constructed in the following manner major federal tax proposals enacted during the estimation period are taken from pechman 1987 the proposed revenue impact figures that were used by congress while these bills were being considered are included in congressional quarterly almanac along with a description of each tax proposal this information is treated as the best guess as to the economic impact of these tax proposals and is the information available to the market it is these estimated revenue impact figures that are included in the tax variable t many of the tax proposals during the sample period were multi year and their estimated revenue impacts extended over that time period in addition some tax proposals overlapped so that their individual impacts must be aggregated as an example the excise tax reduction act of 1965 provided a series of cuts over three and one half years the estimated impact for 1966 the second stage of the act was that revenue would fall by 1 6 billion or 4 billion per quarter at the same time the tax adjustment act of 1966 sought to increase taxes to dampen an inflationary trend brought on by the financing of the vietnam war revenues were expected to increase by 1 13 billion during the second quarter of 1966 and by 1 2 billion per quar ter over the 1967 fiscal year the combined effect of these two proposals during 1966 is illustrated in table i the ta x variable is the expected change in the deficit for the succeeding quarter in 1966 i the deficit was 0 6 billion and ceteris paribus could be expected to fall 73b the next quarter due to imminent tax changes the tax variable gives an indication of the future path that the deficit will take 2 iii results table ii shows the results obtained from the above equation using quarterly data from 1959 i 1984 iv 3 both a short and long term interest rate are used in this study 4 the short term rate s is the yield on newly issued taxable three month u s government securities and the long term rate l is the yield on u s treasury bonds due or callable in ten years or more the lag lengths used two and four lags coincide with those used by evans 1987 as does the differenced data and finally evans argues that the sums of the coefficients of individual variables provide the most meaningful information consequently those are presented

dynamic business share allocation in a supply chain with competing suppliers this paper studies a repeated game between a manufacturer and two competing suppliers with imperfect monitoring we present a principal agent model for managing long term supplier relationships using a unique form of measurement and incentive scheme we measure a supplier s overall performance with a rating equivalent to its continuation utility the expected total discounted utility of its future payoffs and incentivize supplier effort with larger allocations of future business we obtain the vector of the two suppliers ratings as the state of a markov decision process and we solve an infinite horizon contracting problem in which the manufacturer allocates business volume between the two suppliers and updates their ratings dynamically based on their current ratings and the current performance outcome our contributions are both theoretical and managerial we propose a repeated principal agent model with a novel incentive scheme to tackle a common but challenging incentive problem in a multiperiod s

optimal dynamic information provision abstract we study a dynamic model of information provision a state of nature evolves according to a markov chain an advisor with commitment power decides how much information to provide to an uninformed decision maker so as to influence his short term decisions we deal with a stylized class of situations in which the decision maker has a risky action and a safe action and the payoff to the advisor only depends on the action chosen by the decision maker the greedy disclosure policy is the policy which at each stage minimizes the amount of information being disclosed in that stage under the constraint that it maximizes the current payoff of the advisor we prove that the greedy policy is optimal in many cases but not always

resource allocation under demand uncertainty and private information we study the effect of multilateral private information on the efficiency of markets where capacity constrained upstream agents supply a resource to downstream entities facing uncertain end demands we analyze two models a pooling system in which a single downstream principal pools a resource from multiple upstream agents and a distribution system in which one upstream principal allocates a resource across multiple downstream agents we show that the presence of multilateral private information does not hinder efficiency in the pooling system in contrast in the distribution system the quantities allocated to downstream agents can exceed as well as fall short of their first best levels these results shed light on the recently improved performance of u s agricultural produce market and the observed episodes of shortages oversupplies in flu vaccine and other seasonal markets this paper was accepted by manel baucells decision analysis