explaining international differences in male skill wage differentials by differences in demand and supply of skill this paper explores the hypothesis that wage differentials between skill groups across countries are consistent with a demand and supply framework using micro data from 15 countries we find that about one third of the variation in relative wages between skill groups across countries is explained by differences in net supply of skill groups the demand and supply framework does an even better job at explaining relative wages of low skilled workers

time out of work and skill depreciation this paper investigates the role of skill depreciation in the relationship between work interruptions and subsequent wages using swedish data from two waves 1994 and 1998 of the international adult literacy survey which included results of tests gauging respondents ability to read and make practical use of printed information the authors are able to analyze changes in individuals skills as a function of time out of work they find statistically strong evidence of a negative relationship between work interruptions and skills the analysis suggests that depreciation of general skills was economically important a full year of non employment for example was associated with a 5 percentile move down the skill distribution

inflation announcements and social dynamics this paper investigates the eectiveness of central bank communication when rms have heterogeneous ination expectations that are updated through social dynamics the bank s credibility evolves with these dynamics and determines how well its announcements anchor expectations we show that trying to eliminate high ination by abruptly introducing a low ination target can lead to short term overshooting

information acquisition dissemination and transparency of monetary policy this paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary author ity s policies each firm s payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions the policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference high quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announce ments however this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority jel classification e52 e58

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

foreign exchange intervention how to signal policy objectives and stabilise the economy abstract within a simple model of monetary policy for an open economy we study how foreign exchange intervention may be used as a costly signal of the policy makers objectives our analysis indicates that i foreign exchange intervention typically stabilises the national economy reducing the fluctuations of employment and output ii this result is sensitive to the institutional structure of decision making in that a larger stability gain is obtained when foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy are kept under the jurisdiction of different governmental agencies

impact of first birth career interruption on earnings evidence from administrative data abstractthis article makes use of unique administrative data to expand the understanding of the role women s intermittency decisions play in the determination of her wages we demonstrate that treating intermittency as exogenous significantly overstates its impact the intermittency penalty also increases in the education level of the woman the penalty for women with a high school degree with an average amount of intermittency during 6 years after giving birth to her first child is roughly half the penalty for college graduates we also demonstrate the value of making use of an index to capture multiple dimension of the intermittency experience and illustrate the importance of firm dynamics in the determination of a woman s wage

skilled immigration and innovation evidence from enrolment fluctuations in us doctoral programmes we study the contribution of foreign science and engineering talent to the creation of new knowledge in the u s economy using panel data on 2300 science and engineering s e departments at 100 large american universities from 1973 to 1998 we use macroeconomic shocks and policy changes in source countries that differentially affect enrollments across fields and universities to isolate exogenous variation in the supply of students at specific departments both foreign and domestic graduate students are central inputs into knowledge creation and the marginal foreign student contributes more to the production of scientific publications and citations a 10 decrease in the foreign share of doctoral students lowers s e research output at u s universities by 5 6 a theoretical model of university admissions and scholarships helps us infer the productivity effects of student quality and econometric results indicate that any visa restrictions limiting entry of highquality foreign students is most costly for u s innovation increased diversity appears to be the primary mechanism by which foreign students improve research outcomes the impact of more restrictive immigration policies depends on how they affect the quality margin and diversity of incoming foreigners

the case for open market purchases in a liquidity trap prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short term nominal interest rate renders open market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals we show that even were this the case there remains a powerful argument for large scale open market operations as a fiscal policy tool as we also demonstrate however this same reasoning implies that open market operations will be beneficial for stabilization as well even when the economy is expected to remain mired in a liquidity trap for some time thus the microeconomic fiscal benefits of open market operations in a liquidity trap go hand in hand with standard macroeconomic objectives motivated by japan s recent economic experience we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of open market operations for an economy in japan s predicament we argue japan can achieve a substantial welfare improvement through large open market purchases of domestic government debt

monetary mystique secrecy and central banking abstract the paper contains a discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy it documents the federal reserve s defense of secrecy as argued in a recent freedom of information act suit the federal reserve s arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed the discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial

the equilibrium degree of transparency and control in monetary policy we examine a central bank s endogenous choice of degree of control and degree of transparency under both commitment and discretion we argue that discretion is the more realistic assumption for the choice of control and that commitment is more realistic for the choice of transparency for the choice of control under discretion maximum degree of control is the only equilibrium for the choice of transparency under commitment a su ciently patient bank with su ciently low average in ation bias will always choose minimum transparency thus a maximum feasible degree of control with a minimum degree of transparency is a likely outcome the bundesbank and the federal reserve system are arguably examples of this jel classi cation e52 e58

comment on forward guidance communication commitment or both by marco bassetto forward guidance can be cheap talk in an infinitely repeated game with the public asymmetric information is necessary for cheap talk to be useful the central bank can build credibility over time to make cheap talk credible when to use forward guidance instead of general transparency remains unclear adding a lower bound on interest rates does not change the main conclusions

the welfare analytics of transaction costs externalities and institutional choice a natural result of the economist s participation in externality literature has been a strong emphasis upon market and price guided policies available theoretical foundations are insufficient for supporting this ideology absent is a conceptual framework which integrates institutional options and their attendant resource costs with what we know of resource and technology constraints this paper addresses this omission by incorporating an explicit role for transaction costs into traditional welfare diagrammatics

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

when and how much to talk credibility and flexibility in monetary policy with private information abstract this paper analyzes the role of noisy or imprecise announcements in mitigating the basic credibility problem in monetary policy based on a model where the monetary authority s private information gives rise to an unavoidable trade off between flexibility and credibility the analysis finds that noisy announcements can serve as a meaningful form of communication to make that trade off more favorable however such talk is not cheap the analysis predicts that those central banks who can speak more precisely are those who are less likely to speak at all

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

the college to work transition during the 1990s evidence from sweden this article analyses the time it takes for swedish college graduates to start a full time job that lasts for 6 months or more the focus is on the transition over time during the period 1991 to 1999 this period covers both upturns and downturns of the business cycle providing a unique opportunity to consider the importance of the timing of graduation the results show that the risk of unemployment and the unemployment duration have varied considerably with the business cycle both within and between cohorts for example the field of education is of more importance for the outcomes during recessions further the relative risk of unemployment has decreased over time for individuals with the highest degree of education whereas the unemployment duration has increased indicating that the selection into unemployment for this group may have changed over time this is interesting not least in the light of the sharp expansion of the higher educational system during the study period

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

do countries falsify economic data strategically some evidence that they might we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their economic data in a strategic manner among those suspected are countries with fixed exchange rate regimes high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model we also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and those in africa middle east eastern europe and latin america release economic data of questionable veracity our evidence calls for models with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for establishing independent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of high quality economic data

three decades of italian comparative advantages he structure of italian exports its characteristics its changes over time its causes and implications in terms of income and growth employment and fragility with respect to domestic and international shocks has been the issue around which at least three generations of italian economists have discussed and disagreed over the last 30 years if one has to attribute to one single cause the origin of this multi faceted debate that very cause would be the perplexity associated with the evidence of italy being on the one hand a large industrialised country with per capita income comparable to the top high income oecd members world bank 2004 and on the other hand being characterised by an export composition where traditional low skilled labour intensive sectors oecd 2001 and peneder 2003 such as textiles wearing apparel leather products furniture and footwear still play a relevant role this anomaly in the italian trade structure with respect to one of its fellow members of the g7 and its high level of persistence is what makes of italy a case in the international trading system this paper describes the primary feature giving rise to this debate the italian export composition and its evolution over time the analysis makes use of the revealed comparative advantage rca index associated with the name of bela balassa and through non parametric statistical techniques estimates the empirical the author is very grateful to miur prin pie 2003 and jetro for the financial support and to giancarlo spagnolo for his encouragement discussions with matteo bugamelli giuliano conti davide castellani sergio de nardis paolo guerrieri fabrizio onida and lucia tajoli are gratefully acknowledged the author thanks riccardo faini for sharing his work on the topic and lucia piscitello for making her districts taxonomy available he also benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees that largely influenced the restructuring of the paper many of the arguments of this paper come from the inspiring discussions the author had over the years with massimo tamberi all remaining errors and omissions are the author s own responsibility the data sets and the rscript used in the paper can be downloaded from the webpage http www economiamc org debenedictis

central bank secrecy in the foreign exchange market abstract this paper argues that with sticky goods prices and a forward looking exchange rate the central bank will only want a partial dissemination of its information about shocks to the economy it is shown that in such a model the central bank may prefer to intervene secretly in the foreign exchange markets when responding in anticipation of future shocks but openly when reacting to current shocks the model thus provides a rationale for secrecy in central bank foreign exchange operations the model also elucidates the relationship between the signaling and portfolio balance channels of sterilized intervention

optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information svensson 2006 argues that morris and shin s 2002 analysis is contrary to what is claimed actually pro transparency this paper re examines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework recognizing that central banks impact on the economy not only indirectly via their public announcements but also directly through their policy actions we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention our results strengthen morris and shin s conclusions considerably in particular we find that public disclosure of the central bank s information is always undesirable

returns to skills around the world evidence from piaac abstract existing estimates of the labor market returns to human capital give a distorted picture of the role of skills across different economies international comparisons of earnings analyses rely almost exclusively on school attainment measures of human capital and evidence incorporating direct measures of cognitive skills is mostly restricted to early career workers in the united states analysis of the new piaac survey of adult skills over the full lifecycle in 23 countries shows that the focus on early career earnings leads to underestimating the lifetime returns to skills by about one quarter on average a one standard deviation increase in numeracy skills is associated with an 18 percent wage increase among prime age workers but this masks considerable heterogeneity across countries eight countries including all nordic countries have returns between 12 and 15 percent while six are above 21 percent with the largest return being 28 percent in the united states estimates are remarkably robust to different earnings and skill measures additional controls and various subgroups instrumental variable models that use skill variation stemming from school attainment parental education or compulsory schooling laws provide even higher estimates intriguingly returns to skills are systematically lower in countries with higher union density stricter employment protection and larger public sector shares

forward guidance communication commitment or both abstract forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment odyssean by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information delphic i analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages without private information the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements pure odyssean forward guidance is redundant with private information communication can have social value forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank s private information about its own preferences or beliefs

the effect of immigration on productivity evidence from us states abstract in this paper we analyze the long run impact of immigration on employment productivity and its skill bias we use the existence of immigrant communities across u s states before 1960 and the distance from the mexican border as instruments for immigration flows we find no evidence that immigrants crowded out employment at the same time we find that immigration had a strong positive association with total factor productivity and a negative association with the high skill bias of production technologies the results are consistent with the idea that immigrants promoted efficient task specialization thus increasing tfp and also promoted the adoption of unskilled efficient technologies

learning the ramsey outcome in a kydland prescott economy abstract we study if adaptive learning by a central bank cb in the kydland and prescott environment can steer the economy to the pareto optimal outcome our cb evaluates its potential strategies regarding the announced and the actual inflation rate through expectations of the performance of these strategies formed thanks to its mental model of the economy this model is forward looking and adaptive at the same time as a starting point we follow arifovic et al 2010 and initially assume that there are two types of agents believers who set their inflation forecast equal to the announced inflation and non believers who form static optimal forecast coupled with a forecast error correction mechanism our results show that the economy can reach near ramsey outcomes most of the time in the absence of believers the economies almost always converge to the ramsey outcome in their experiments with human subjects arifovic and sargent 2003 showed that experimental economies reach and stay close to the ramsey outcome most of the time giving support to the just do it policy recommendation in light of the experimental findings our model is of particular interest as it is the only agent based or adaptive learning model that consistently selects the ramsey outcome in this context

the effect of unemployment benefits and nonemployment durations on wages abstract we estimate that unemployment insurance ui extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in ui eligibility in germany we show this effect combines two key policy parameters the effect of ui on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers our framework implies if ui extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration then reservation wages do not bind we derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects the effect of ui on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects jel j31 j64 j65

the ideology of efficiency searching for a theory of policy analysis the potential pareto improvement criterion and other measures of economic efficiency do not pass the test of consistency and coherence within economic theory nor do such measures accord with what public decision makers seek in policy advice from economists such efficiency measures are nonetheless durable components of the ideology of economics in general and benefit cost analysis in particular the objectivity of the policy scientist has been confused with the objectivity of the science while economic efficiency has no claim to objectivity the policy scientist can be an objective analyst of policy choices

on the long term effectiveness of exchange rate communication and interventions abstract exchange rate communication has come to play an increasingly important role as a policy tool for monetary authorities over the past decade the paper assesses the strategies and the long term effectiveness of communication as well as actual interventions the empirical results for the g3 economies indicate that communication has not only exhibited a significant contemporaneous effect on exchange rates but also has moved forward exchange rates up to a horizon of 6 months in the desired direction moreover communication is found to reduce exchange rate volatility and uncertainty whereas actual interventions tend to raise it overall this underlines a key difference between these two policy tools and suggests that communication tends to be a fairly effective policy tool over the medium term

coherence and the credibility of convertibility announcements abstract the recent devaluation crisis in mexico and its tequila effect elsewhere illustrate that two credibility problems associated with convertibility policies currency boards are announcements that violate truth telling and a non zero probability of policy failure we derive the trade off between these problems when announcements resemble cheap talk the strategic uncertainty created by this trade off implies that both the government and investors should recognize the presence of fed watchers who exploit any policy inconsistency for their own gain in this context credibility can be restored if the policy is coherent if it eliminates the marginal benefits for fed watching jel e63 e58 f40 1997 published by elsevier science ltd

monetary economics a review essay in this essay i define money to be whatever objects serve as generally acceptable media of exchange and i define monetary economics to be the study of the causes and economic consequences of the monetization of exchange that is of the use of media of exchange these definitions lead me to specify the distinctive objectives of monetary economics to be to understand 1 the monetization of exchange and its relation to the technologies of production and of exchange 2 the form that money takes and especially the viability of fiat money 3 the determination and significance of the real value of units of money and 4 the relation between the nominal quantity of money and aggregate economic activity the essay tries to acquaint the reader with the contents of the recently published handbook of monetary economic as they relate to these objectives of monetary economics and offer some critical thoughts on selected unsettled issues in monetary economics that my reading of the handbook suggested this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the meaning of economic efficiency in policy analysis there are crucial differences in the normative foundations of alternative economic cri teria used to assess the efficiency of policy pro posals differences between pareto and potential pareto measures are emphasized in this comparison of efficiency standards technical distinctions be tween these two criteria are examined and illus trated it is argued that potential pareto criteria have greater disciplinary acceptance than their nor mative foundations merit and further that the pareto measure has suffered undue criticism from association with its potential pareto namesake jel all

government intervention and strategic trading in the u s treasury market we study the impact of permanent open market operations pomos by the federal reserve on u s treasury market liquidity using a parsimonious model of speculative trading we conjecture that i this form of government intervention improves market liquidity contrary to conclusions drawn by existing literature and ii the extent of this improvement depends on the market s information environment evidence from a novel sample of federal reserve pomos during the 2000s indicates that bid ask spreads of on the run treasury securities decline when pomos are executed by an amount increasing in proxies for information heterogeneity among speculators fundamental volatility and pomo policy uncertainty consistent with our model

differences in skill loss during unemployment across industries and occupations starting with ljungqvist and sargent 1998 and pissarides 1992 the search and matching literature has found that skill loss occurring during unemployment has important effects on macroeconomic models of unemployment this paper presents some evidence that the rate of skill loss varies across occupations and industries occupations and industries that require more skills experience higher rates of human capital decay these findings have important implications for models of equilibrium unemployment in particular for mismatch unemployment and the optimal reallocation of workers across sectors

innovation and immigration insights from a placement policy abstract we examine the impact of immigration on innovation by exploiting a placement policy for immigrants in germany this allows us to overcome the potential bias of endogenous location decisions although the majority of inflows was unskilled we do not find any evidence of a negative impact on innovations instead our panel estimates suggest that immigration had no or even a positive impact on innovations

warning labels as cheap talk why regulators ban drugs abstract one explanation for drug bans is that regulators know more than consumers about product quality but why not just communicate the information in their ban perhaps via a would have banned label because product labeling is cheap talk any small market failure tempts regulators to lie about quality inducing consumers who suspect such lies to not believe everything they are told in fact when regulators expect market failures to result in under consumption of a drug and so would not ban it for informed consumers regulators ex ante prefer to commit to not banning this drug for uninformed consumers

cheap talk with two audiences these problems have in common a simple structure an informed sender says something to two interested but uninformed receivers who then take actions based on their beliefs these actions affect the sender as well as the receivers in this paper we study how costless nonverifiable claims cheap talk can affect these beliefs and hence the actions and how the incentives for truthful revelation to one receiver are affected by the presence of the other we then ask how welfare is affected by whether claims are made in public or in private as some of the above examples suggest public messages may be more credible than private messages addressed to either audience one possibility is that the presence of one audience can discipline the sender s relationship with the other we call this one sided

preliminary evidence on the determinants of federal reserve open market operations in the absence of a fixed policy rule the federal reserve bank fed has significant discretion in setting monetary policy the existence of professional fedwatchers attests to the fact that fed policy actions are difficult to interpret recent literature has focused on the motivations behind fed policy making and the need for secrecy and ambiguity we investigate one aspect of fed behavior the propensity of the fed to buy and sell government securities beyond that required to implement stated policies milton friedman 1982 26 called attention to this issue when he wrote

human capital graduate migration and innovation in british regions with the aid of a geographical information system our paper constructs a three stage least squares simultaneous equation model to investigate the interrelationships between the interregional flows of human capital and the innovation dynamism of a region in order to do this we model the interregional migration behaviour of high quality british university graduates from university into first employment and we relate these human capital flows to both the labour market characteristics and the knowledge characteristics of the employment regions this is done for all industries and separately for just high technology industries our results indicate that for england and wales there is a two way causality between the interregional human capital employment migration flows of recent university graduates and the innovation performance of regions however the results for great britain as a whole depend on whether london is included and scotland is excluded we find little or no support for the argument that the presence of local universities or small firms promotes regional innovation

competence implies credibility the credibility of monetary policy under discretion has been traditionally linked to the central bank s conservatism we show that another trait of the central bank cb her competence at doing her job or reputation thereof can be just as important to make her policy credible and transparent we analyze a static barro and gordon 1983 s game where the effects of monetary policy depend on an unknown state of the economy the cb forms her own private and imprecise view of this state that she may announce to p in a cheap talk game to explain and motivate her policy intentions the precision of the noise in the cb s view measures her competence the more accurate her assessment the clearer an idea she has about what to do the fineness of the equilibrium message space measures monetary policy s transparency in any equilibrium of the cheap talk game the cb credibly announces one of finite inflation targets that differ by at least a multiple of the inflation bias competence ratio if this ratio is too large the cb can credibly communicate only the direction of monetary policy as the cb s competence rises and this ratio falls p knows that the cb puts increasing weight on pursuing her objective targets relative to surprising expectations to stimulate output therefore the equilibrium message space becomes finer a more competent cb is also less likely to erroneously observe extreme realizations of the shocks so she is more able tofine tune expectations at times of business as usual

wage assimilation of immigrants and internal migrants the role of linguistic distance this paper investigates the wage assimilation of foreign immigrants and internal migrants in italy comparing them with stayers control for the selection in out migration is performed using a new

experimental evidence on the evolution of the meaning of messages in sender receiver games an experiment this paper experimentally investigates the evolution of message meanings when talk is cheap we consider communication between a privately informed sender and a receiver when the sender s message does not affect payoffs directly sender receiver games introduced by jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 and vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 provide the simplest stylized environment in which communication is essential communication is the only way to link the receiver s action to the sender s private information in addition sender receiver games have been widely used to study communication in accounting economics finance and political science intuition strongly suggests that effective communication will evolve when the players interests are closely aligned however there is always a nash equilibrium in which the sender randomizes uniformly across all messages such babbling equilibria are proper roger b myerson 1978 blume 1994 and even strategic stability elon kohlberg and jeanfrancois mertens 1986 does not rule out uninformative equilibria in general in response a literature developed that formulates equilibrium selection criteria by appealing to the existence of a commonly understood language matthew rabin 1990 steven a matthews et al 1991 joseph farrell 1993 that can be used to formulate credible deviations from equilibrium unfortunately the selection criteria from this literature are frequently strong enough to remove all equilibria from consideration in addition these arguments are vulnerable to stiglitz s observation in koo cho and david m kreps 1987 that successful deviations from equilibrium may induce further deviations which in turn may undermine the credibility of the original deviations both problems can be avoided by a dynamic approach as in rabin and sobel 1996 we also adopt a dynamic perspective but do not require messages to have a priori meanings instead distinct meanings may emerge endogenously this is important for communication across cultures and for language change 2 we are guided by recent results of blume department of economics university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 dejong department of accounting university of iowa iowa city ia 52242 kim department of economics sung kyun kwan university seoul 110 745 korea sprinkle department of accounting university of wisconsin madison wi 53706 we thank joyce berg vince crawford robert forsythe joel horowitz deirdre mccloskey forrest nelson larry samuelson gene savin joel sobel and especially two anonymous referees for their advice and suggestions we benefitted from comments and discussions resulting from presentations at the 1994 summer meetings of the econometric society the 1996 social learning workshop at suny stony brook the io me gt workshop at the university of iowa the university of bonn the university of bielefeld the center for economic research at tilburg university ohio state university seoul national university and texas a m university we are grateful for financial support from the college of business administration at the university of iowa the ira b mcgladrey institute and the national science foundation

the advantage to hiding one s hand speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market abstract we analyze an asymmetric information model of sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market we characterize an equilibrium in which a central bank with inside information about its exchange rate target trades with risk averse speculators who have private information about future spot rates the model identifies circumstances in which perverse responses to intervention will be observed i e the domestic currency depreciates when the central bank purchases it and it provides conditions under which the exchange rate will be highly sensitive to intervention the model also provides an explanation for two forms of policy secrecy i secrecy about the scale of an intervention operation is always desirable ii secrecy about the target is sometimes desirable

information sharing and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market abstract this paper develops a model of information sharing among heterogeneously informed agents and it uses the model to examine a rationale for intervention in the foreign exchange market the model shows that in a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium some agents can gain by sharing among themselves private information about transitory exchange rate disturbances in this setting a central bank can affect the exchange rate by aggregating and disseminating agents information the paper also illustrates the usefulness of intervention as a way to transmit that information

on the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities abstract the set of technological opportunities in a given industry is one of the fundamental determinants of technical advance in that line of business we examine the concept of technological opportunity and discuss three categories of sources of those opportunities advances in scientific understanding and technique technological advances originating in other industries and in other private and governmental institutions and feedbacks from an industry s own technological advances data from the yale survey on industrial research and development are used to measure the strength of various sources of technological opportunity and to discern interindustry differences in the importance of these sources we find that interindustry differences in the strength and sources of technological opportunities contribute importantly to explanations of cross industry variation in r d intensity and technological advance

the effect of immigration on innovation in italy abstractthis paper investigates the effect of immigration on innovation in italy a country characterized by prevalently unskilled immigration after addressing the potential endogeneity of the share of immigrants in the population using immigrant enclaves no evidence is found of either positive or negative effects of migrants on innovation this result is robust to allowing for different effects of low and medium high skilled migrants to using linear and non linear models and to considering both province level data on patent applications and firm level self reported measures also capturing innovation adoption

discretion wage indexation and inflation it is now well understood that discretionary policy making frequently leads to socially sub optimal outcomes this point was first made by kydland and prescott 12 using an example of a monetary policy game they argued that in the presence of output distortions in the economy the monetary authority has an incentive to renege on earlier promises to maintain price stability by expanding the money supply in order to create unexpected inflation thereby increasing output and employment since private wage setters form expectations rationally this policy action is anticipated and in equilibrium leads to excessive inflation without any resulting change in output or employment consequently in the absence of enforceable policy rules the time consistent discretionary monetary path produces a socially sub optimal inflation rate this form of policy behavior has important implications for the decisions of private agents such as their choice of the degree of wage indexation however most work in the literature on endogenous wage indexation stemming from the seminal paper by gray 10 has analyzed the equilibrium indexation choice assuming either a constant money growth rule 1 or a monetary rule involving lagged or contemporaneous feedback 8 17 only the recent papers by devereux 5 6 have attempted to examine the implications of time consistent discretionary monetary policy for endogenous wage indexation the informational structure he considers has the monetary authority setting the money stock prior to the realization of shocks so that the authority has no information regarding current period disturbances when determining its course of action this assumption precludes any contemporaneous attempt by the monetary authority to stabilize output or the price level devereux reaches the conclusion that wage setters who are aware of the authority s policy decision will find it optimal to index positively to unanticipated price level surprises since none of the aggregate shocks are offset directly by the monetary authority thus the informational environment confronting the authority influences the degree of indexation and subsequently the manner in which aggregate demand and supply variability impinge upon social welfare

equity considerations in economic and policy analysis there is little doubt that equity considerations play some role in human decision making this can be seen through statements that we are all created equal or that we have equal rights this can also be seen through some of the transfer mechanisms that societies are willing to put in place for the benefits of the poor or the malnourished in spite of this evidence the role of equity in resource allocation remains poorly understood most economic analyses tend to focus on efficiency issues and avoid addressing distribution issues as argued by sen 1987 1992 as long as human behavior is affected by equity considerations it seems that economics could be made more productive by paying greater attention to welfare distribution at the center of equity is whether and how to distinguish between people in terms of their needs their abilities their contributions and their individual rights people being different at least some of their differences seem to be relevant to the economic evaluation of equity issues at this point it remains somewhat unclear how to approach such issues the current debate about equity has been profoundly influenced by rawls s theory of justice rawls s theory is based on the concept of justice as fairness 1 it relies on a so called original position where individuals do not yet know their exact position in society rawls suggests that a society is just if its current members would find the original position fair rawls s views have been influential yet controversial part of the debate comes in part from some antagonism between equity and rights e g nozick and private property rights are often seen as contributing to inequalities of wealth in modern society the objective of this paper is to explore equity issues with a special focus on interactions between efficiency equity and the role of information in resource allocation in the next

cheap talk and the fed a theory of imprecise policy announcments this paper examines the problem faced by the federal reserve in announcing its private information about its future policies because it would like to manipulate expectations and pursue a time inconsistent policy the fed cannot reveal its policy objectives precisely and credibly it can however communicate some information about its goals through the cheap talk mechanism of vincent crawford and joel sobel making announcements that are imprecise and only giving ranges within which these goals may lie copyright 1989 by american economic association

when does coordination require centralization this paper compares centralized and decentralized coordination when manag ers are privately informed and communicate strategically we consider a multi divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other information about local conditions is dispersed and held by self interested division managers who communicate via cheap talk the only available formal mechanism is the allocation of decision rights we show that a higher need for coordination improves horizontal com

market distortions and government transparency in this paper we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions we first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information our key result is that distortions limit communication even if transparency is ex ante pareto superior to opaqueness it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high we next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions jel d82 e61

optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information abstract this paper examines the optimal behavior of a policymaker who is able to precommit labelled strong when the public entertains the possibility that he is either strong or weak unable to precommit the main result is that in the presence of doubts about their type it is optimal even for strong policymakers to partially accommodate inflationary expectations this contrasts with vickers 1986 who finds that when strength is conceived in terms of the relative concern for employment the strong policymaker inflates less under incomplete than under full information the paper also provides a theory of endogenous announcements

reputation and credibility in the european monetary system ems credibility axel weber this article provides a quantitative assessment of the credibility of the european monetary system during the disinflation period of the 1980s the results contradict the widely held view that the ems has operated as a dm zone it is shown that after a brief early phase the ems has functioned as a bipolar system with a hard currency option supplied by the german bundesbank and a soft currency option offered by the banque de france whilst from the onset the netherlands have chosen the hard currency option at least in a first stage the remaining smaller economies belgium denmark and ireland adopted the soft currency alternative at a later stage of the ems however the soft currency block has disintegrated and some countries most noticeably ireland and to a lesser extent france have shifted towards the hard currency standard it is argued that this increased tightening of the ems provides a favourable starting condition for the transition to economic and monetary union

do cognitive test scores explain higher u s wage inequality using microdata from the 1994 1998 international adult literacy survey for nine countries we examine the role of cognitive skills in explaining higher wage inequality in the united states we find that while the greater dispersion of cognitive test scores in the united states plays a part in explaining higher u s wage inequality higher labor market prices i e higher returns to measured human capital and cognitive performance and greater residual inequality still play important roles and are on average quantitatively considerably more important than differences in the distribution of test scores in explaining higher u s wage inequality

learning and communication in sender receiver games an econometric investigation this paper compares the performance of stimulus response sr and belief based learning bbl using data from game theory experiments the environment extensive form games played in a population setting is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games both the sr and bbl models fit the data reasonably well in common interest games with history while the test results accept sr and reject bbl in games with no history and in all but one of the divergent interest games estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the results may be subject to convergence bias

local human capital and productivity an analysis for the spanish regions sanroma e and ramos r 2007 local human capital and productivity an analysis for the spanish regions regional studies 41 349 359 this paper examines the relationship between the stock of human capital and productivity in the spanish regions nuts iii and assesses whether the transmission channel involves external economies the empirical evidence points to a positive relationship between the two variables although it cannot be explained in terms of the impact of exogenous local human capital external economies but rather in terms of other demand factors sanroma e et ramos r 2007 le capital humain et la productivite locales une analyse des regions d espagne regional studies 41 349 359 cet article cherche a examiner le rapport entre le stock de capital humain et la productivite dans les regions d espagne nuts iii et a evaluer si oui ou non la chaine de transmission implique des economies externes les preuves empiriques indiquent un rapport etroit entre les deux variables bien que l

self selection and the earnings of immigrants this paper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native population because of the endogeneity of the decision to migrate the empirical study shows that differences in the u s earnings of immigrants with the same measured skills but from different home countries are attributable to variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin at the time of migration excerpt

german jewish emigres and us invention historical accounts suggest that jewish emigres from nazi germany revolutionized us science to analyze the emigres effects on chemical innovation in the united states we compare changes in patenting by us inventors in research fields of emigres with fields of other german chemists patenting by us inventors increased by 31 percent in emigre fields regressions which instrument for emigre fields with pre 1933 fields of dismissed german chemists confirm a substantial increase in us invention inventor level data indicate that emigres encouraged innovation by attracting new researchers to their fields rather than by increasing the productivity of incumbent inventors

learning benevolent leadership in a heterogenous agents economy abstract this paper studies the potential commitment value of cheap talk announcements in an agent based dynamic extension of the kydland prescott model in every period the policy maker makes a non binding inflation announcement before setting the actual inflation rate it updates its decisions using individual evolutionary learning the private agents can choose between two different forecasting strategies they can either set their forecast equal to the announcement or use an adaptive learning scheme to potentially forecast the true inflation they switch between these two strategies as a function of information about the associated payoffs they obtain through word of mouth choosing always the currently most favorable one while all agents using the first strategy make the same forecast those using the second strategy may generate different individual forecasts in spite of the complexity of the environment the boundedly rational policy maker learns to sustain a situation with a positive but fluctuating fraction of believers this outcome is pareto superior to the outcome predicted by standard theory interestingly enough the actions taken by the policy maker undergo marked qualitative changes as a function of the prevailing heterogeneity among and learning characteristics of the private agents

bargaining rules for a thin spot water market markets for water rights have long been advocated to resolve user conflicts and to improve efficiency trelease 1961 hartman and seastone 1970 the potential for efficiency gains from market allocation of water has been well established burness and quirk 1979 eheart lyon and wong 1983 moore 1986 almost all studies of water markets address the transferability of long term water rights i e base or property rights eheart et al 1983 lyon 1986 saliba bush and martin 1987 crouter 1987 however rental or spot markets for water can improve efficiency by allowing allocational adjustments in line with changing conditions without disturbing the base rights system exchanges of either base rights or spot rights that entail a change in the point of diversion may result in third party effects even in the absence of return flow problems johnson gisser and werner 1981 eheart et al 1983 2 such third party effects place practical limits on the geographic scope of water exchanges and result in a thin market i e a market with few eligible participants thin markets are likely to be manipulated by participants leading to inefficiency unless suitable bargaining rules are designed to counter market manipulation the efficiency gains from water exchanges cannot be fully realized this paper uses multilateral bargaining models based on a game theoretic approach to address bargaining rules that will facilitate the efficient operation of a thin water market across a variety of bargaining environments institutional features such as the size of the water market the water rights system the distribution of farm sizes and the level of participants information define the bargaining environment the models are translated into computer simulations based on data representing irrigation water demand in the crane creek watershed of kankakee county illinois thin water markets are likely to be the rule rather than the exception especially in the u s west where many streams with insufficient flows are fully or overappropriated given this fact it is crucial to investigate how the efficiency of a thin water market is affected by the relative bargaining strengths of the participants and to suggest suitable bargaining rules that could improve the social gains achieved in thin water markets

talk is cheap although friedrich a von hayek leonid hurwicz and others stressed how the price system communicates private information on preferences technology and endowments our main means of communication is surely words but it is unclear whether mere words can be trusted absent outside sanctions for lying such as perjury law or a valuable reputation for honesty talk is cheap the perspective of the standard theory of signaling seems to suggest that cheap talk should be uninformative but this is misleading cheap talk can sometimes convey information and affect real payoffrelevant actions yet cheap talk s power is limited for example even given an unlimited chance to talk rational people may not reach an equilibrium or may not escape a bad one a growing literature in game theory political science and economics which i cannot survey here studies what cheap talk can and cannot do here i merely sketch some themes

bargaining over agricultural property rights discretion are malleable shifting as collective values and policies evolve over time the costs of resolving conflicts over property rights in water quality air quality wildlife habitat scenic vistas and other commons resources have the potential to be enormous innes policies to address these disputes determine which costs will be borne by whom and have broad ramifications for agriculture and environmental quality in this article i explore the process of bargaining over disputed rights to natural resources emphasizing the role of costs and delays in signaling information so that expectations may converge and voluntary settlements may be achieved economists traditionally focus on the economics of alternative outcomes resource allocations not on the processes for achieving those outcomes property rights disputes present a challenge for economists whose efficiency oriented tools do not indicate which interests ought to be favored or which starting point to use in evaluating the impacts of a change in entitlements nevertheless economic expertise is needed to devise effective institutional incentives for resolving disputes and to identify the distributional consequences of alternative dispute resolution processes the article concludes with observations on a constructive role for economists in this arena perceived fairness and property rights conflicts

differences and changes in wage structures preface introduction and summary richard b freeman lawrence f katz 1 a comparison of changes in the structure of wages in four oecd countries lawrence f katz gary w loveman david g blanchflower 2 international differences in executive and managerial compensation john m abowd michael l bognanno 3 the gender earnings gap some international evidence francine d blau lawrence m kahn 4 international wage curves david g blanchflower andrew j oswald 5 the changing structure of male earnings in britain 1974 1988 john schmitt 6 real wages employment and wage dispersion in u s and australian labor markets robert g gregory francis vella 7 labor markets and economic growth lessons from korea s industrialization 1970 1990 dae il kim robert h topel 8 wage differentials in italy market forces institutions and inflation christopher l erickson andrea c ichino 9 the swedish wage structure the rise and fall of solidarity wage policy per anders edin bertil holmlund 10 getting together and breaking apart the decline of centralized collective bargaining richard b freeman robert s gibbons 11 earnings inequality in germany katharine g abraham susan n houseman 12 a comparative analysis of east and west german labor markets before and after unification alan b krueger jorn steffen pischke contributors author index subject index

strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information optimal targeting periods this paper analyzes a multiperiod monetary targeting procedure as a possible resolution to the credibility problem in pol icy when the monetary authority has some private information by limitin g the degree of flexibility permitted in policy this procedure mitiga tes the credibility problem as the length of the targeting horizon decreases the severity of the credibility problem falls but at the expense of weakening the monetary authority s ability to pursue its stabilization goals based on model simulations the analysis studi es the determinants of the optimal targeting horizon that balances the benefits of flexibility and discipline in policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

the advantage of hiding both hands foreign exchange intervention ambiguity and private information this paper analyzes a dynamic exchange rate policy game in which the central bank has private information about its short term exchange rate target on the one hand and in which the market is faced with a certain degree of ambiguity concerning the actual intervention volume on the other sterilized interventions are shown to derive their effectiveness from the fact that they transmit information about the short term exchange rate target to the market in this respect we provide an explanation for the presumed inconsistency between intervention secrecy and the effectiveness of the signalling channel since our model predicts that interventions will be more effective on average if the central bank retains some degree of ambiguity moreover it is also shown that sterilized interventions will not exert a lasting effect on the exchange rate finally we have also investigated the extent to which some political and economic parameters determine the size of the intervention bias

asset bubbles labour market frictions and r d based growth employing an overlapping generations model of research and development r d based growth with labor market frictions this paper examines how employment changes induced by labor market frictions influence asset bubbles and long run economic growth asset bubbles can cannot exist when the employment rate is high low which leads to higher lower economic growth through labor market efficiency we also explore the steady state and transitional dynamics of bubbles economic growth and employment furthermore we show that policy or parameter changes that have a negative influence on the labor market can lead to a bubble burst

strategic central bank communication discourse analysis of the bank of japan s monthly report abstract we conduct a discourse analysis of the bank of japan s monthly report and examine its characteristics in relation to business cycles we find that ambiguous expressions tend to appear more frequently with negative expressions and this tendency is more pronounced in recessions this suggests that the central bank communicates strategically by obfuscating the reports when their private information is unfavorable

international macroeconomic policy coordination when policymakers do not agree on the true model the authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model t wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the nash noncooperative solution however the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction these points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models out of 1 000 possible combina tions of models that could represent u s beliefs non u s beliefs and the true model monetary coordination improves u s welfare in on ly 546 cases copyright 1988 by american economic association

the employment effects of terminating disability benefits abstract few social security disability insurance di beneficiaries return to the labor force making it hard to assess their likely employment in the absence of benefits using administrative data i examine the employment of individuals who lost di eligibility after the 1996 removal of drug and alcohol addictions as qualifying conditions approximately 22 started working at levels that would have disqualified them for di an employment response that is large relative to their work histories those who received di for 2 3 years had the largest response suggesting that a period of public assistance may maximize the employment of some disabled individuals

how do financial resources affect the timing of retirement after a job separation this study examines working people between the ages of 50 and 70 years old and the conditions that lead them to decide to retire or not after they experience a job separation based on data from the survey of income and program participation the author finds that among individuals whose jobless spells end in retirement most decide to retire within a year after separation the availability of resources such as social security retirement benefits high net worth and income from defined benefit pensions appear to encourage more rapid labor force exit and retirement rather than supporting job seekers during a long search perhaps surprisingly no correlation between retirement and the unemployment rate occurs but unemployment insurance benefits do delay retirement these results suggest little tolerance for long job searches regardless of labor market prospects and indicate that those who can afford to retire will do so rather quickly

can the government talk cheap communication announcements and cheap talk a great deal of attention has recently been focused on communication in economic contexts while some models of credible announcements have been based on reputational forces or penalties imposed by third parties as in sobel 21 and cothren 4 several recent papers have addressed the possibility of communication through cheap talk that is talk in situations with no explicit penalties for deception perhaps the most prominent application of cheap talk in the literature is the recent model of federal reserve announcements by stein 22 this paper will show that cheap talk equilibria of the sort modeled by stein and others often depend in a fundamental way on implausible discontinuities in public responses to government announcements that is cheap talk equilibria are frequently only possible if certain infinitesimally small changes in government announcements are capable of causing large discontinuous changes in public expectations and behavior intuitively if public expectations are a continuous function of government announcements then the government can fine tune these expectations the government will therefore often be tempted to deviate from the cheap talk equilibrium announcements in order to manipulate expectations this causes the equilibrium to unravel discontinuous public reactions sometimes prevent these equilibria from unraveling because they convert continuous choice problems which allow manipulative fine tuning into discrete choice problems where such fine tuning is impossible these discontinuities are implausible however and this may often rule out cheap talk as a realistic model of governmental policy announcements 2

career interruptions and subsequent earnings a reexamination using swedish data this paper reexamines the link between career interruptions and subsequent wages using a rich new swedish dataset we are able to disaggregate time out of work into several components regressing

what matters when the impact of ecb communication on financial market expectations this article analyses financial markets reaction to european central bank s ecb communication we apply a novel indicator that quantifies the contents of the ecb s introductory statements and allows disentangling ecb statements on prices the real and the monetary sector we provide evidence that it matters what issue the ecb is speaking about especially the ecb s statements on price developments represent important news to financial markets it also matters when the ecb affects markets communication drives maturities above 4 months