immobility rationing and price competition a model is studied where firms advertise prices and buyers play a noncooperative search game in an attempt to secure output from firms at the advertised prices firms face rising marginal costs and may not be willing to supply everything demanded at their price if they wind up with many buyers it is shown that rationing will occur in equilibrium no matter how averse buyers are to this possibility the result is specialised to a case where rationing occurs with probability one the equilibrium price and outputs are characterised for this case the theory of search has taken the literature in imperfect competition in an important direction by analysing the behaviour of buyers and sellers in an environment where there is no centralised technique for coordinating the choice decisions of buyers in this paradigm buyers are uninformed about the price that is charged by each different store essentially buyers cannot observe the strategies of individual firms an apparently more common but little analysed problem occurs when buyers can observe the pricing strategies of firms because of advertising but cannot observe the choice strategies of other buyers the ex post utility enjoyed by the buyer is uncertain because he does not know whether capacity constraints or rising costs might force the firm to ration or delay delivery if too many buyers choose the same firm

buyer s equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility a recursive approach we study a decentralized trading model as in peters 1984a where heterogeneous market participants face a trade off between price and trade probability we present a novel proof of existence of a unique demand vector in nash equilibrium based on a recursive approach that exploits the monotonicity of matching functions

behavioral demand effects when buyers anticipate inventory shortages abstract firms often worry about how buyers will react when there is an inventory shortage but the anticipation of facing a shortage may also impact buyer behavior in this paper we use a combination of theoretical modeling computational methods and laboratory experiments to understand buyers search behavior in markets where there is potential for either a costly or costless inventory shortage when inventory shortages are costly to buyers we find their equilibrium purchasing strategy generates a newsvendor problem among the firms in turn experimental data suggests buyer behavior can be explained by prospect theory better than by standard assumptions of fully rational expected utility maximizing agents indicating that potential inventory shortages generate loss aversion among buyers and there is systematic mis identification of the probability with which they will be able to procure an item using computational methods we find firms are able to extract more surplus from behavioral buyers via higher prices than would be predicted by the standard model on the other hand when inventory shortages are not costly to buyers the effect of behavioral biases on the part of buyers is not relevant but in this case there can be a benefit to reducing inventory via a reduction in price competition

debt maturity and the international financial architecture this paper presents a theory of the maturity of international sovereign debt and derives its implications for the reform of the international financial architecture the analysis is based on a model in which the need to roll over external debt disciplines the policies of debtor countries but makes them vulnerable to unwarranted debt crises due to bad shocks the paper presents a welfare analysis of several measures that have been discussed in recent debates such as international lending in last resort or the establishment of a mechanism for suspending payments on the external debt of crisis countries jel f34 o19

wage and technology dispersion this paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs stigler 1961 in equilibrium some firms adopt high fixed cost high productivity technologies offer high wages and fill job openings quickly other firms adopt less capital intensive technologies and offer low wages hiring mostly uninformed workers in equilibrium the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice we show that worker search which would appear to be a rent seeking activity in partial equilibrium may be efficiency enhancing in general equilibrium

pricing and signaling with frictions abstract we study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites observing sellers choices of prices and sites but not quality buyers choose which site to visit a seller s choices of prices can direct buyers search and signal quality a unique equilibrium exists and is separating when the quality differential is large the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information otherwise the quality of goods and or the number of sites created is inefficient due to a conflict between the search directing and signaling roles of prices

new microfoundations for the aggregate matching function empirical studies of the aggregate labor market matching function have favored a cobb douglas functional form for which there are no microfoundations in the existing literature i present a new model for the matching process based on a telephone line poisson queuing process which unlike other microeconomic approaches can be integrated directly into standard theoretical search models this implies a ces matching function approximately cobb douglas when search costs are approximately linear the model allows empirical estimates of matching function parameters to be interpreted in terms of the costs and benefits of search

debt maturity without commitment i analyze how lack of commitment afiects the maturity structure of sovereign debt governments balance beneflts of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default their choice of short versus longterm debt afiects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers the equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that re ect the price impact of these decisions the model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high output low or a cross default more likely these predictions are consistent with empirical evidence

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

biased signaling and yardstick comparisons in a sovereign debt market abstract this paper develops a sovereign debt model in which governments are privately informed about their likelihood of default but can themselves have a biased perception of this likelihood i show that in this setup government borrowing acts as a signal that is only partially informative about fundamental default probabilities and bond prices do not necessarily reflect true credit risk i also show that in a two country version of the model correlations between the two countries induces yardstick comparisons and the borrowing decision of one government affects the bond price received by the other whether the information spillover increases or decreases the distortion created by the bias depends on the extent to which borrowing signals reinforce each other

default settlement and signalling lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt this paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments this implication of the model is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement but after varying periods of exclusion copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

green taxes in a post paris world are millions of nays inevitable turning the paris agreement s greenhouse gas emissions pledges into domestic policies is the next challenge for governments we address the question of the acceptability of cost effective climate policy in a real voting setting first we analyze voting behavior in a large ballot on energy taxes rejected in switzerland in 2015 by more than 2 million people energy taxes were aimed at completely replacing the current value added tax we examine the determinants of voting and find that distributional and competitiveness concerns reduced the acceptability of energy taxes along with the perception of ineffectiveness most people would have preferred tax revenues to be allocated for environmental purposes second at the same time of the ballot we tested the acceptability of alternative designs of a carbon tax with a choice experiment survey on a representative sample of the swiss population survey respondents are informed about environmental distributional and competitiveness effects of each carbon tax design these impacts are estimated with a computable general equilibrium model this original setting generates a series of novel results providing information on the expected environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes reduces the demand for environmental earmarking making distributional effects salient generates an important demand for progressive designs e g social cushioning or recycling via lump sum transfers the case of lump sum recycling is particularly striking it is sufficient to show its desirable distributional properties to make it one of the most preferred designs which corresponds to a completely novel result in the literature we show that providing detailed information on the functioning of environmental taxes may contribute to close both the gap between acceptability ex ante and ex post and the gap between economists prescriptions and the preferences of the general public

an analysis of cost reduction innovation under capacity constrained inputs abstractthis article focuses on duopoly cost reduction innovation with the upstream input subjected to capacity constraints by two stage duopoly model some interesting conclusions are achieved f

search theory the 2010 nobel memorial prize in economic sciences this paper surveys search theory with an emphasis on the contributions of the 2010 laureates for the nobel memorial prize in economic sciences peter diamond dale mortensen and christopher pissarides

competing for order flow in otc markets we develop a model of a two sided asset market in which trades are intermediated by dealers and are bilateral dealers compete to attract order flow by posting the terms at which they execute trades which can include prices quantities and execution times and investors direct their orders toward dealers that offer the most attractive terms of trade equilibrium outcomes have the following properties first investors face a trade off between trading costs and speeds of execution second the asset market is endogenously segmented in the sense that investors with different asset valuations and different asset holdings will trade at different speeds and different costs for example under a leontief technology to match investors and dealers per unit trading costs decrease with the size of the trade in accordance with the evidence from the market for corporate bonds third dealers implicit bargaining powers are endogenous and typically vary across sub markets finally we obtain a rich set of comparative statics both analytically by studying a limiting economy where trading frictions are small and numerically for instance we find that the relationship between trading costs and dealers bargaining power can be hump shaped

debt dilution and sovereign default risk we measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and study debt covenants that could mitigate these effects we calibrate a baseline model with endogenous debt duration and default risk in which debt can be diluted using data from spain we find that debt dilution accounts for 78 percent of the default risk in the baseline economy and that eliminating dilution increases the optimal duration of sovereign debt by almost 2 years eliminating dilution also increases consumption volatility but still produces welfare gains the debt covenants we study could help enforcing fiscal rules

directed search and the bertrand paradox i study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition extended to incorporate general capacity constraints congestion effects and pricing based on ex post demand in the presence of any one of these ingredients the bertrand paradox fails to hold hence despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails specifically bertrand s paradox will not arise whenever the buyers expected utility from visiting a seller is decreasing in that seller s realized demand

inflation tax in the lab a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation in this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting to do so we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations the model which provides a game theoretic foundation to rocheteau and wright 2005 s competitive search monetary equilibrium is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework we find that the inflation tax is harmful with cash holdings production and welfare all falling as inflation rises and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates for instance for inflation rates between 0 and 5 welfare in the two markets we consider 2 seller 2 buyer and 3 2 falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage point rise in inflation compared with 0 4 percent over the range from 5 to 30 our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated even under low inflation

pricing access services many established industries such as the online service industry the telecommunication industry or the fitness club industry are access service industries when using services in these industries consumers pay for the privilege of accessing the firm s facilities but do not acquire any right to the facility itself a firm s pricing decisions in access industries frequently come down to a simple choice among flat fee pricing usage pricing or two part tariff pricing however it is not so simple for firms in those industries to make this choice access service firms typically face a mix of consumers who have intrinsically different usage rates a key characteristic of access service firms however is that the cost of providing an additional minute of usage is typically negligible as long as the firm has the necessary capacity to serve its customers service capacity which corresponds to the total available time on a firm s system is often limited in this paper we show that service capacity and consumer usage heterogeneity are two important factors that determine a firm s optimal choice we develop a model that incorporates these two salient characteristics shared by access industries and study what determines a firm s choice among the three alternative pricing structures flat fee pricing usage pricing or two part tariff pricing our analysis shows that in the presence of consumer usage heterogeneity service capacity mediates a firm s optimal choice in a complex yet predictable way a firm s choice also hinges on whether heavy or light users are more valuable in terms of their willingness to pay on a per unit capacity basis the presence of both consumer usage heterogeneity and capacity constraints prompts a firm to choose its pricing structure to attract a desired customer mix and to price discriminate as a result two part tariff pricing is not always optimal in access industries and a firm s pricing structure can vary in a complex way with the interaction of those two factors specifically we show that when light users are more valuable a firm may use a two part tariff or a flat fee depending on whether the firm is constrained by its service capacity but never charge a usage price alone or offer any signing bonus a negative flat fee or a flat payment to customers when heavy users are more valuable a firm may choose to set a usage price a signing bonus plus a usage price or flat fee interestingly regardless of whether heavy or light users are more valuable in an access service industry only flat rate pricing is a sustainable pricing structure once the industry has developed sufficient excess capacity we also show that the optimal pricing strategy in access industries can have some intriguing nonintuitive implications that have not been explored elsewhere for instance when the industry capacity is unevenly distributed between competing firms the large capacity firm may well be advised to increase rather than to decrease its price to accommodate the small firm it would be too costly and too tactless for the large firm to do otherwise in fact the strategy of accommodation calls on the larger firm to retreat in both light and heavy user markets and leave more of its capacity idle and more of the market demand unmet when the small firm s capacity hence the industry capacity increases this implies that incremental policy measures that encourage the growth of smaller companies in the presence of a large company can be welfare decreasing because the growth of smaller firm can force the retreat of a large company at the expense of market coverage today services account for two thirds to three quarters of the gnp not only in the united states but also in many industrial countries access industries are growing rapidly to exert profound impact on today s economy however service pricing in general and pricing access services in particular have not received adequate attention in the literature in this paper we take the first step in understanding how capacity constraints and consumer usage heterogeneity mediate the choice of pricing structures in both monopolistic and competitive contexts

directed search for equilibrium wage tenure contracts i analyze the equilibrium in a labor market where firms offer wage tenure contracts to direct the search of employed and unemployed workers each applicant observes all offers and there is no coordination among individuals workers applications as well as firms recruiting decisions are optimal this optimality requires the equilibrium to be formulated differently from the that in the literature of undirected search i provide such a formulation and show that the equilibrium exists in the equilibrium individuals explicitly tradeoff between an offer and the matching rate at that offer this tradeoff yields a unique offer which is optimal for each worker to apply and applicants are separated endogenously according to their current values despite such uniqueness and separation there is a non degenerate and continuous wage distribution of employed workers in the stationary equilibrium the density of this distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages in all equilibrium contracts wages increase with tenure which results in quit rates to decrease with tenure moreover the model makes novel predictions about individuals job to job transition and comparative statics

note the newsvendor model with endogenous demand this paper considers a firm s price and inventory policy when it faces uncertain demand that depends on both price and inventory level the authors extend the classic newsvendor model by assuming that expected utility maximizing consumers choose between visiting the firm and consuming an exogenous outside option the outside option represents the utility the consumer forgoes when she chooses to visit the firm before knowing whether or not the product will be available the authors investigate both the case in which the firm s price is exogenous and the case in which price is chosen optimally the paper makes two contributions first the authors show that the firm holds more inventories provides a higher fill rate attracts more customers and earns higher profits when it internalizes the effect of its inventory on demand second the authors show that in the endogenous price case the firm s two dimensional decision problem can be reduced to two sequential single variable optimizations as a result the endogenous price case is as easy to solve as the exogenous price case

information and prices with capacity constraints since george j stigler s 1961 seminal work the literature on consumer search has attempted to understand the relationship between the prices that are set by sell ers and the extent to which consumers can observe and compare these prices before purchasing a good in the theoretical branch of this literature one conclusion is almost universal as buyers become better informed about prices ex ante sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium 1 in fact this relationship is so engrained in the theory of consumer search that it is often accepted as manifest and applied to various markets and situations with little or no hesitation 2 in this paper i examine a completely standard consumer search model with one small yet often relevant additional restriction i assume that sellers possess a limited number of goods or can only serve a limited number of customers at once so that a given seller may be unable to meet realized demand in such an environment i show that the conven tional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold having more informed consumers can lead to either an increase or decrease in equilibrium prices or have no effect at all i characterize the regions of the parameter space where each is likely to occur the assumption that a seller s capacity may be fixed and that this constraint may be binding is a fairly important feature of many markets in some markets time is the constraint doctors and barbers and contractors can only serve a limited number of clients at once in other markets space is an issue private schools have a lim ited number of spots in each classroom while restaurants have a limited number of tables perhaps most common is markets in which sellers inventory is occasionally a limiting factor landlords have a limited number of apartments for rent and ticket agents have a limited number of concert tickets available in markets such as these consumers regularly trade off price and availability they are willing to pay more for

price dispersion with directed search we model a market where identical buyers direct their search to identical capacity constrained sellers sellers cannot fully commit to the list price so strategic bargaining may determine the sale price we study search and pricing behavior in symmetric equilibrium sale prices exhibit equilibrium dispersion as they respond naturally to local demand conditions uncoordinated search decisions lead to equilibrium demand heterogeneity so sellers realizing large demand bargain prices up we characterize the sale price distribution parametrically studying how different commitment limitations and market features affect pricing and surplus shares we also determine endogenously

government assisted oligopoly coordination a concrete case in 1993 the danish antitrust authority decided to gather and publish firm specific transactions prices for two grades of ready mixed concrete in three regions of denmark following initial publication average prices of reported grades increased by 15 20 percent within one year we investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and or capacity constraints but argue that these seem to have little explanatory power we conclude that a better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and hence led to increased prices contrary to the aim of the authority

optimal maturity of government debt without state contingent bonds abstract this paper shows that state contingent debt can be synthetically constructed using non contingent debt of different maturities a main policy implication of this principle is that the ramsey allocation with complete markets can be sustained with non contingent debt only by properly managing its maturity structure the numerical experiments however suggest that this policy implication ought to be taken with care we find that the debt positions that sustain the ramsey allocation are very high on the order of a few hundred times total gdp for a very simple four state economy and increasing in the number of states in addition they are very sensitive to small variations in the parameters of the model

sovereign defaults information investment and credit abstract why would a sovereign government immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default ever repay foreign creditors and correspondingly why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns this paper finds general conditions under which even in the absence of sanctions lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game furthermore it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria in this way it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations the two classical explanations are necessary to enforce repayment information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results the repayment default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy governments repay to affect agents expectations about them a default through its effect on expectations about fundamentals can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets governments repay to avoid these costs but may default in equilibrium when hit by a negative shock

targeted search with horizontal differentiation in the marriage market abstract we develop a search matching model in the marriage market with heterogeneous men a continuum of types and heterogeneous women a finite number of types the model has two distinguishing features first men and women are also horizontally differentiated second the search is targeted each type of woman constitutes a distinctive submarket and men are able to choose beforehand in which submarkets to participate but the search is random within each submarket we show that there is always a unique equilibrium in which men are endogenously segmented into different submarkets and that the equilibrium matching pattern is weakly positive assortative we then explore how the equilibrium marriage pattern changes horizontally and vertically as some exogenous shocks occur in particular we show that an internet induced increase in search efficiency would make the marriage pattern overall more assortative while an increase in the dispersion of the horizontal match fitness could make the marriage pattern overall less assortative

bertrand equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility this paper considers price competition among firms when there are capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms a natural method of allocating buyers among firms arises in the equilibrium of the buyers search game sufficient conditions are given under which the buyers equilibrium varies continuously with the prices charged by firms capacity constraints are used to guarantee that this ensures existence of mixed strategy equilibria for the pricing game played by sellers we show that natural pure strategy equilibria arise when the game is made large in appropriate ways since bertrand s criticism of cournot it has been known that models where sellers compete with prices may have undesirable properties when the commodities traded are homogenous in the simplest models with constant marginal costs price may be driven down to the competitive level even when there are only two firms more problematic if sellers are subject to capacity constraints nash in prices equilibrium may not exist at all these problems all arise because of a discontinuity in firms profit functions that arises when the prices of two or more firms are equal there have been many attempts to resolve this problem the simplest is to constrain sellers prices to be equal and to force them to compete in quantities this is the basis of most of the literature on monopolistic competi

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search n identical stores compete by choosing prices for a homogeneous good with constant marginal costs consumers search sequentially with perfect recall for the lowest price one class of consumers called shoppers have zero search costs while all other consumers have a positive search cost c there is a unique symmetric nash equilibrium price distribution with the property that it changes smoothly from marginal cost pricing when all consumers are shoppers and or c 0 and monopoly pricing when no consumers are shoppers remarkably as the number of stores increases the nash equilibrium becomes more monopolistic copyright 1989 by american economic association

the median voter setters and non repeated construction bond issues the median voter model pervades the literature concerning the estimation of demands for collective expenditures but with some unanswered criticism the general issue addressed in this paper is whether observed collective expenditure levels and the characteristics of observed majorities are more adequately described by the median voter model or the romer and rosenthal setter model on a sample of non repeated hospital construction referenda bond issues the median voter model and the romer and rosenthal setter model are compared in both full information and uncertainty contexts little empirical support of the setter model is found indeed the evidence supports the absence of expenditure maximizing behavior the specific conclusions are 1 the standard median voter model explains quite well for this sample of non repeated bond issues 2 the explanatory power of the median voter model appears to vary across both voting arrangements and types of reversion threats 3 the explanation of hospital expenditures which have been judged too large may be due to how benefits and costs are distributed among voters and 4 the preponderance of large majorities for hospital construction in the face of evidence that such facilities typically become a burden on the general tax fund is consistent with setters offering the median ideal in the presence of a reversion below the ideal

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

uniqueness of equilibrium in directed search models we study a decentralized trading model as in 7 where a finite number of heterogeneous capacity constrained sellers compete for a finite number of homogeneous buyers by posting prices this directed search model is known to admit symmetric equilibria yet uniqueness has proved elusive this study makes two contributions a substantive contribution is to establish uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium a methodological contribution is to develop a tool based on directional derivatives to characterize equilibrium

price dispersion in a directed search model this paper investigates a directed search model in which some buyers are uninformed about prices we find that sellers strategies are given by discrete distributions in any symmetric pricing equilibrium when the proportion of uninformed buyers is sufficiently high the unique symmetric pricing equilibrium involves a countably infinite number of atoms

frictional goods markets theory and applications we analyse dynamic general equilibrium models with more or less directed search by informed buyers and random search by uninformed buyers this nests existing specifications and generates new insights a quantitative application concerns the welfare cost of inflation which is known to be quite high with pure random search and low with pure directed search our calibration implies the impact of inflation is fairly low in part because in addition to the usual costs it provides benefits by more heavily taxing high price sellers that inefficiently profit from exploiting the uninformed other applications analyse analytically and numerically changes in credit conditions and information

gaining more by stocking less a competitive analysis of product availability the price competition between two firms can affect their decisions about product availability with occasional stockouts a firm loses from foregone sales yet it may indirectly benefit from the higher price a competitor is able to charge the more prone customers are to search elsewhere for the product upon encountering a stockout the greater is the gain from the reduced price competition between firms this paper establishes conditions whereby the strategic interaction of reduced price competition between firms outweighs the loss from foregone sales in such cases a firm can increase its expected profits by choosing to stock less these results provide a competitive rationale for the high stockout levels observed in some retail situations and have implications for the analysis of product availability in public policy settings

coordination matching and wages we analyse the coordination problem in the labour market by endogenizing the matching function and the wage share each firm posts a wage to maximize the expected profit anticipating how the wage affects the expected number of applicants in equilibrium workers apply to firms with mixed strategies which generate coordination failure and persistent unemployment we show how the wage share unemployment and the welfare loss from the coordination failure depend on the market tightness and the market size the welfare loss from the coordination failure is as high as 7 5 per cent of potential output jel classification c78 j64 les auteurs analysent le probleme de la coordination dans le marche du travail en endogeneisant la fonction arrimage et la part des revenus qui va aux salaires chaque entreprise definit le niveau de salaire qui maximise ses profits anticipes en tenant compte de l effet de ce niveau de salaire sur le nombre des applications qu elle peut anticiper de meme les travailleurs font application aupres d une entreprise a un salaire donne en tenant compte d une certaine relation d equivalence entre niveau de salaire et probabilite d obtenir l emploi voila qui engendre incoordination et chomage persistant on montre que la part des revenus qui revient aux salaires le niveau de chomage et les pertes de bien etre attribuables au manque de coordination dependent de la taille du marche et du degre de rarete de la main d oeuvre les pertes de bien etre attribuables au manque de coordination correspondent a quelques 7 5 pour cent de la production potentielle

growth in the shadow of expropriation we propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes political economy and contracting frictions the political economy frictions involve a preference for immediate spending while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt and expropriation we show that the political economy frictions slow an economy s convergence to the steady state due to the endogenous evolution of capital taxation the model rationalizes why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment why institutions such as the treatment of capital income evolve over time why governments in countries that grow rapidly accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities and why foreign aid may not affect growth

contingent prices and money price posting with directed search is a widely used trading mechanism coles and eeckhout showed that if sellers are allowed to post prices contingent on realized demand instead of one price then there is real market indeterminacy in this article we fit this contingent price posting protocol into a monetary economy we show that as long as holding money is costly there exists a unique equilibrium rather than a continuum in this equilibrium sellers post a low price for when the buyer is alone a high price for when several buyers show up and buyers randomize between sellers and money holdings

equilibrium price dispersion in retail markets for prescription drugs this study seeks to establish the empirical importance of price dispersion due to costly consumer search by examining retail prices for prescription drugs posted prices in two geographically distinct markets are shown to vary considerably across pharmacies within the same market even after one controls for variation due to pharmacy differences pharmacy heterogeneity accounts for at most one third of the observed price dispersion the empirical analysis hinges on the observation that consumers incentives to price shop depend on characteristics of the drug therapy cross sectional patterns in price distributions across drugs are consistent with the predictions of a search model prices for repeatedly purchased prescriptions for which the expected benefits of search are highest exhibit significant reductions in both dispersion and price cost margins

self fulfilling debt crises a quantitative analysis this paper investigates the role of self fulfilling expectations in sovereign bond markets we consider a model of sovereign borrowing featuring endogenous debt maturity risk averse lenders and self fulfilling crises a la cole and kehoe 2000 in this environment interest rate spreads are driven by both fundamental and nonfundamental risk these two sources of risk have contrasting implications for the maturity structure of debt chosen by the government therefore they can be indirectly inferred by tracking the evolution of debt maturity we fit the model to italian data and find that nonfundamental risk played a limited role during the 2008 2012 crisis

asymmetric capacity constraints and equilibrium price dispersion abstract price dispersion arises despite perfect information about prices in equilibrium the higher capacity firm adopts a high price high availability strategy the lower capacity firm adopts a low price low availability strategy and consumers are more likely to shop at the high price firm

competitive screening under heterogeneous information we study the interplay between informational frictions and second degree price discrimination our theory recognizes that consumers differ in their tastes for quality as well as in the information they possess about available offers which leads to dispersion over price quality menus in equilibrium while firms are ex ante identical we show that their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus to consumers of all valuations we explore the cross section of equilibrium menus and variations in market conditions to generate empirical predictions on prices qualities and markups across firms and within a firm s product line for instance more competition may raise prices for low quality goods yet consumers are better off as the qualities they receive also increase the predictions of our model illuminate empirical findings in many markets such as those for cell phone plans yellow pages advertising cable tv and air travel

the assignment of workers to jobs in an economy with coordination frictions this paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs owing to the anonymity of a large labor market workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs this randomness generates coordination frictions two workers may apply for a particular job whereas an identical job gets no applications the model generates assortative matching with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers and firms types it predicts that a worker s wage is increasing in her job s productivity and a firm s profit is increasing in its employees productivity the model also yields a version of the welfare theorems

equilibrium price dispersion under demand uncertainty the roles of costly capacity and market structure when capacity is costly and prices are set in advance firms facing uncertain demand will sell output at multiple prices and limit the quantity available at each price i show that the optimal price strategy of a monopolist and the unique pure strategy nash equilibria of oligopolists both exhibit intrafirm price dispersion moreover as the market becomes more competitive prices become more dispersed a pattern documented in the airline industry while generating similar predictions the model differs from the revenue management literature because it disregards market segmentation and fare restrictions that screen customers

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

directed search with multi vacancy firms abstract i construct a directed search model in which firms decide whether to enter a market and how many positions to create within this framework the number of firms and the size of each firm are determined endogenously wages play an allocative role in the matching process and the frictions inherent in this process derive from the equilibrium behavior of workers and firms i characterize the unique equilibrium comparative statics generate testable implications for cross sectional variation in matching efficiency as well as the dynamic behavior of vacancies and unemployment moreover allowing for ex ante heterogeneity across firms the model can easily and naturally generate the observed relationship between firm size wages profitability and hiring

product market and the size wage differential using directed search to model the product market and the labor market i show that large plants can pay higher wages to homogeneous workers and earn higher expected profit per worker than small plants although plants are identical except size a large plant charges a higher price for its product and compensates buyers with a higher service probability to capture this sizerelated benefit large plants try to become larger by recruiting at high wages this size wage differential survives labor market competition because a high wage is harder to get than a low wage moreover the size wage differential increases with the product demand when demand is initially low and falls when demand is already high

the threat of counterfeiting in competitive search equilibrium recent studies in monetary theory show that if buyers can use lotteries to signal the quality of bank notes counterfeiting does not occur in a pooling equilibrium in this paper i investigate the robustness of this non existence result by considering an alternative trading mechanism

a new suggestion for simplifying the theory of money we propose a new search theoretic model of monetary exchange with indivisible assets based on price posting instead of bargaining and incorporating noisy search this yields some familiar results plus a lot more the model admits multiple steady states due to the self referential nature of liquidity it admits cyclic chaotic and stochastic equilibria and compared to bargaining versions the dynamics are more general and have better microfoundations it generates price dispersion with interesting efficiency implications plus sticky prices and rational inattention parametric examples yield closed form solutions based on these results we suggest this should become a benchmark model in monetary economics

why do emerging economies borrow short term the authors argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long term debt they first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders by issuing long term debt the government lowers the probability of a liquidity crisis transferring risk to bondholders in equilibrium this risk is reflected in a higher risk premium and borrowing cost therefore the government faces a tradeoff between safer long term borrowing and cheaper short term debt second the authors construct a new database of sovereign bond prices and issuance they show that emerging economies pay a positive term premium a higher risk premium on long term bonds than on short term bonds during crises the term premium increases with issuance shifting toward shorter maturities this suggests that changes in bondholders risk aversion are important to understand emerging market crises

competition in transactions mechanisms the emergence of price competition abstract this paper models competition between firm market makers there are two goods a divisible numeraire and an indivisible good produced by firms the set of active consumers is random all consumers are identical conditional on arriving at the market first firms produce output equivalently install capacity and commit to a transactions mechanism next nature chooses the set of consumers at the market and each active consumer commits to visit a single firm all equilibria involve all firms choosing a fixed price thus price competition is derived not assumed journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l13

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

whether one votes and how one votes the aim of this paper is to determine if whether one votes effects the vote that is cast using an economic model of voting and observed voting results on nuclear power referenda the answer is a resounding yes overcoming registration turnout and roll off hurdles dramatically increases the odds of voting against nuclear power indeed participation swamps both economic and preference variables in the explanation of nuclear power voting outcomes the lesson is that there is a structure to participation at the polls that should not be ignored by those interested in analyzing voting outcomes

when votes are words not deeds some evidence from the nuclear freeze referendum according to our empirical results voting patterns in the nfr were consistent with the central thesis of an expressive model that moral expression dominates consequentialist behavior when choice is costless while consequentialist theory would predict that owners of capital would favor nuclear weapons capital owners could afford to vote contrary to their interests and in line with common morality because the costs of moral expression in the nfr were so low just as the capital ownership variables do not work in the direction predicted by our consequentialist model neither does income does this mean that wealthy voters cast votes diametrically opposed to their self interest not at all the expressive model contends that when voting is costless people do not have interests but rather moral judgments which now cost very little to express indeed when votes involve words not even individuals interests in government expenditure can be detected

competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints abstract ever since the seminal work by rothschild and stiglitz q j econom 90 1976 629 on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non existence of equilibrium in pure strategies has received much attention in the literature we extend the original analysis by considering firms which face capacity constraints which might be due to limited capital we show that under mild assumptions an equilibrium exists where every consumer obtains his appropriate rothschild stiglitz contract

self confirming price dispersion in monetary economies abstract in a monetary economy we show that price dispersion arises as an equilibrium outcome without the need for costly simultaneous search or any heterogeneity in preferences production costs or search technologies a distribution of money holdings among buyers makes sellers indifferent across a set of posted prices leading to a non degenerate price distribution this price distribution in turn makes buyers indifferent across a range of money balances rationalizing the non degenerate distribution of money holdings we completely characterize the distribution of posted prices and money holdings in any equilibrium equilibria with price dispersion admit higher maximum prices than observed in any single price equilibrium and feature an increasing density of prices in contrast to existing theories price dispersion reduces welfare by creating mismatch between posted prices and money balances inflation exacerbates this welfare loss by shifting the distribution towards higher prices

fiscal hedging with nominal assets abstract we analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy with distortionary labor income taxes nominal rigidities nominal debt of various maturities and short selling constraints optimal policy prescribes the almost exclusive use of long term debt such debt mitigates the distortions associated with hedging fiscal shocks by allowing the government to allocate them efficiently across states and periods

ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment we study the implementation of constrained efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction we argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding this holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching process has decreasing returns to scale where the hosios rule does not apply both with and without heterogeneity

non binding linked issues referenda analysis and an application non binding referenda petitions are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle this paper provides a simple theoretical and empirical analysis of a particular form of non binding referenda so called linked issues petitions it analyzes the ability of issue linkage to increase participation levels above those of single issue petitions and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and eastern enlargement of the european union

haircuts estimating investor losses in sovereign debt restructurings 1998 2005 abstract we calculate investor losses haircuts and recovery values in recent debt restructurings in russia ukraine pakistan ecuador argentina and uruguay haircuts are computed as the percentage difference between the present values of old and new instruments discounted at the yield prevailing immediately after the exchange recovery value means value received in terms of outstanding principal we find average npv haircuts ranging from 13 uruguay external exchange to 73 2005 argentina exchange recovery values range from 30 to about 75 we also find within exchange variations in haircuts and recovery values depending on the bond tendered with a few exceptions domestic residents do not appear to have been treated systematically better or worse than foreign residents

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

the mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment we study the implementation of constrained efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function we argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding this holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching function has decreasing returns to scale where the hosios rule does not apply both with and without heterogeneity this wage determination mechanism is similar to the one proposed by mortensen 1982 in a different setting

an equilibrium theory of learning search and wages we propose an equilibrium theory of learning from search in the labor market which addresses the search behavior of workers the creation of jobs and the determination of wages as functions of labor market histories in the model each worker has incomplete information about his job finding ability and learns about it from his search outcomes the theory formalizes a notion akin to discouragement over each uninterrupted unemployment spell unemployed workers update their beliefs about their job finding abilities downward and reduce their desired wages one contribution of the paper is to integrate learning from search into an equilibrium framework by inducing endogenous heterogeneity in workers beliefs learning from search provides a novel explanation for a set of related empirical observations about the labor market including unemployment duration dependence and wage dispersion another contribution is to apply lattice theoretic techniques to analyze learning from experience which is useful because learning generates convex value functions and in principle multiple solutions to a worker s optimization problem

sovereign debt maturity structure under asymmetric information abstract this paper studies the optimal choice of sovereign debt maturity when investors are unaware of the government s willingness to repay under a pooling equilibrium there is a wedge between the borrower s true default risk and the default risk priced in debt and its size differs with the maturity of debt safe borrowers tilt their debt maturity towards short term relative to the optimal choice under perfect information since long term debt pools more default risk that is not inherent to them risky borrowers mimic their behavior of safe borrowers to preclude the market from identifying their type in times of financial distress spreads increase and the default risk wedge of long term debt relative to short term debt increases which makes borrowers shorten their debt maturity data on bond issuances for a panel of countries show that consistent with the model maturities co vary negatively with spreads and that this co movement is stronger in those situations in which informational asymmetries are larger