imperfect competition expectations and the multiple effects of monetary growth in a monetary overlapping generations model with an imperfectly competitive labor market in which output is below its full employment level it is shown that different backward looking rules for forecasting inflation lead to different steady states despite yielding no forecast errors in the steady state and in many cases none in the short or medium run either higher monetary growth raises output in some steady states in others has no effect and in others lowers it this contrasts with ad hoc or competitive macromodels where the absence of forecast errors in the steady state usually defines it and its properties uniquely copyright 1992 by royal economic society

dividend policy creditor rights and the agency costs of debt we show that country level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm s agency costs of debt using a sample of 120 507 firm years from 52 countries we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights a reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41 reduction in the probability of paying a dividend and a 60 reduction in dividend payout ratios these results are robust to numerous control variables sample variations model specifications and alternative hypotheses we also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity overall our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision making outside of bankruptcy

unions oligopoly and the natural range of employment a simple two sector general equilibrium macromodel is presented wi th oligopolistic price determination in the product market and a unionized labor market in the first stage unions set the nominal wage and in the second stage firms choose outputs given wages by altering the balance of fiscal policy between the two sectors the government can achieve a continuum of aggregate employment levels the natural range of employment a unique natural rate will occur only i f one requires fiscal policy to be the same in both sectors this indicates that the natural rate property of some single or representative sect or macromodels is a special case

bank ownership and performance does politics matter this paper uses a new dataset to reassess the relationship between bank ownership and bank performance providing separate estimations for developing and industrial countries it finds that state owned banks located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs than their private counterparts and that the opposite is true for foreign owned banks the paper finds no strong correlation between ownership and performance for banks located in industrial countries next in order to test whether the differential in performance between public and private banks is driven by political considerations the paper checks whether this differential widens during election years it finds strong support for this hypothesis

industry growth and capital allocation does having a market or bank based system matter are market based or bank based financial systems better at financing the expansion of industries that depend heavily on external finance facilitating the formation of new establishments and improving the efficiency of capital allocation across industries we find evidence for neither the market based nor the bank based hypothesis while legal system efficiency and overall financial development boost industry growth new establishment formation and efficient capital allocation having a bank based or market based system per se does not seem to matter much

domestic and international determinants of bank profits foreign banks in australia abstract this paper develops and tests a model that integrates the existing multinational bank literature with the domestic bank profits literature using data for australia this paper demonstrates that an integrated model results in a small increase in explanatory power when compared to models drawn solely from the multinational banking literature the paper finds that profits are a negative function of competitor market share and bank licence status and a positive function of australian size and home gdp growth it is argued that there is incomplete integration between the market segments of domestic and multinational banks due to the first mover advantages of incumbent banks

institutional failure or market failure we investigate the effect of the power of creditors property rights protection and institutional quality on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures by extension stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors national indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights seemingly credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting

public capital and imperfect competition abstract in this paper we consider a macroeconomic model in which public capital is a productive input and there is monopolistic competition in the product market we analyze the effects of a permanent variation in public capital investment both in the short and in the long run finally we show that the optimal provision of public capital under imperfect competition is higher than that associated with the first best policy

does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit the authors investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks lending spreads for a large cross section of countries they measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at an aggregate level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks the authors find that after controlling for a number of other country characteristics judicial efficiency in addition to inflation is the main driver of interest rate spreads across countries this suggests that in addition to improving the overall macroeconomic climate in a country judicial reforms through a better enforcement of legal contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms

determinants of patent rights a cross national study abstract this paper presents an index of patent rights for 110 countries for the period 1960 1990 the index is used to examine what factors or characteristics of economies determine how strongly patent rights will be protected the evidence does indicate that more developed economies tend to provide stronger protection but the underlying factors which influence patent protection levels are the country s level of research and development r d activity market environment and international integration which are correlated with its level of development the results qualify however that r d activity influences patent protection levels after a nation s research sector reaches a critical size an implication of this is that to raise patent protection levels in weakly protecting countries it is important to foster a significant research base in those countries and thereby create incentives for protecting patent rights

the impact of mean reversion of bank profitability on post merger performance in the banking industry abstract this research study examines the tendency for serial correlation in bank holding company profitability finding significant evidence of reversion to the industry mean in profitability the paper then considers the impact of mean reversion on the evaluation of post merger performance of bank holding companies the research concludes that when an adjustment is made for the mean reversion post merger results significantly exceed those of the industry in the first 5 years after the merger

bank ownership privatization and performance evidence from a transition country abstract this paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in china over 1995 2010 reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks relative to state owned commercial banks however publicly traded banks subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets perform better regardless of ownership status the privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short or long run initial public offerings the positive long run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership moreover this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non interest income efficiency at the same time the results suggest that chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non interest revenue although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period

undominated prices in the three good model abstract any movement away from walrasian prices will make somebody worse off we ask which other prices share this property the paper characterizes the set of such prices called undominated prices for the three good economy output labor and a nonproduced good that is now well known from the work of barro grossman benassy and malinvaud we consider two groups of consumers workers and shareholders we show that under some conditions there exist prices and wages that generate unemployment and are undominated this requires that a workers be poorly endowed with the nonproduced good b there be little substitution in consumption between the produced and the nonproduced good and c the market for the produced good be balanced i e prices equal marginal costs

how does uncertainty about future fiscal policy affect current macroeconomic variables a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macromodel is constructed based on infinitely lived dynamically optimising households with labour market monopoly power randomness in future government spending causes randomness in the future output and price levels both when the money wage is flexible and when it is set one period in advance we show that through three different mechanisms rational anticipation of this depresses current aggregate demand if the wage is preset it thereby also depresses current output such fiscal uncertainty is suggested as one possible explanation for the faltering of the economic recovery in europe in 1995 and 1996

law finance and firm growth we investigate how differences in legal and financial systems affect firms use of external financing to fund growth we show that in countries whose legal systems score high on an efficiency index a greater proportion of firms use long term external financing an active though not necessarily large stock market and a large banking sector are also associated with externally financed firm growth the increased reliance on external financing occurs in part because established firms in countries with well functioning institutions have lower profit rates government subsidies to industry do not increase the proportion of firms relying on external financing the corporate finance literature suggests that market imperfections caused by conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries between corporate insiders and investors constrain firms in their ability to fund investment projects the magnitude of these imperfections depends in part on the effectiveness of the legal and financial systems because these systems differ across countries the literature implies that there should exist systematic cross country differences in firms ability to obtain external capital to finance investment in this paper we examine whether the underdevelopment of legal and financial systems does prevent firms in some countries from investing in potentially profitable growth opportunities in particular we focus on the use of long term debt or external equity to fund growth see our earlier work demirgut kunt and maksimovic 1996a which compares firms financial structures in developed and developing countries and finds the greatest difference to be in the provision of long term credit we estimate a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate that each firm in our thirty country sample could attain without access to long term financing we then compare these predicted growth rates to growth rates realized by firms in countries with differing degrees of development in their legal and financial systems our approach enables us to identify specific characteristics of the legal and financial systems that are associated with long term financing of firm growth thus we provide a micro level test of the hypoth

undominated wage rates in a unionized overlapping generations economy abstract an overlapping generations macro model where consumers are divided into workers and capitalists is analysed in each period the wage rate is negotiated between an employers union and a trade union other prices adjust competitively the solution concept used is cooperative the wage rate chosen by unions should be undominated i e there must not exist another wage rate leading to higher utilities for both workers and capitalists the resulting one period equilibria relative pareto optima rpo and also stationary equilibria stationary relative pareto optima srpo are analysed results are that full employment s rpo always exist and in some economies unemployment s rpo also exist sufficient conditions for the latter to be the case are stated and the existence of economies fulfilling these conditions is demonstrated

why are interest spreads so high in uganda using international comparisons and a unique bank level dataset on the ugandan banking system over the period 1999 to 2005 we explore the factors behind consistently high interest rate spreads and margins international comparisons show that the small size of ugandan banks persistently high t bill rates and institutional deficiencies explain large proportions of the high ugandan interest rate margins the ugandan bank panel confirms the importance of macroeconomic factors such as high inflation high t bill rates and exchange rate appreciation there is also evidence for the small market place and high costs of doing business explaining persistently high spreads and margins smaller banks and banks targeting the low end of the market incur higher costs and therefore higher margins spreads and margins also vary significantly with the sectoral loan portfolio composition of banks while there is little evidence for foreign bank entry privatization or changes in market structure explaining variation in spreads or margins over time

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

imperfectly competitive cycles with keynesian and walrasian features abstract we consider a multi sector overlapping generations model with oligopolistic firms in the output markets and wage setting trade unions in the labour markets a coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either walrasian or of the keynesian unemployment type there exist many deterministic and stochastic equilibrium cycles fluctuating between keynesian recession and walrasian boom periods with arbitrarily long phases in each regime the cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities money is neutral and superneutral but appropriate countercyclical fiscal policies stabilize the cycles in a textbook keynesian way

institutions for financial development what are they and where do they come from abstract among the fundamental causes of long run economic performance differences in institutions have received considerable attention in recent years at the same time a large body of theoretical and empirical work shows that financial development can have a big effect on economic performance this raises the more fundamental question as to why some countries have developed financial markets while others do not this paper reviews the theoretical and empirical research on this issue and shows that one of the channels whereby better institutions may have an effect on economic development is through the consolidation of larger and better financial markets an issue that is left aside in this paper relates to what regulations and policies lead to better functioning capital markets at some level one can think of regulations and policies as particular types of institutions nonetheless institutional problems are deeper causes leading to poor economic performance bad policies might simply be part of the channels through which they influence performance thus addressing the question of what determines the emergence of good institutions i e institutions that promote financial development seems particularly important recent research providing some answers to this question is also reviewed

endogenous imperfectly competitive business cycles abstract we investigate how imperfect competition affects the occurrence and the properties of endogenous rational expectations business cycles in an overlapping generations model with constant returns to scale in production the model has explicit product and labor markets all characterized by monopolistic competition an implicit assumption of barriers to entry justifies that the number of firms is fixed even when positive profits occur it turns out that both market power of firms on the product markets and market power of unions on the labor markets make the occurrence of cycles more likely in particular imperfect competition on the product markets and the positive profits associated with it may have the effect that there is a cycle even if the labor supply curve is increasing in the real wage rate for competitive cycles is required not only a decreasing labor supply curve but a wage elasticity below 1 2 at stationary equilibrium market power on the labor markets may have the effect that imperfectly competitive cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities some well known some reported in the paper concerning fluctuations in output and involuntary unemployment since involuntary unemployment does not occur under perfect competition such regularities are incompatible with competitive cycles

on the implications of market power in banking evidence from developing countries abstract this paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies it sheds light on the competition stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators the degree of market power bank cost and profit efficiency and overall firm stability the results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency despite significant cost efficiency losses the findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies

profits persistence and ownership evidence from the italian banking sector the hypothesis that ownership structure affects persistence of profits in the italian banking industry is tested the time invariant components of roa and roe are regressed against ownership concentration and the fraction of shares held by the major shareholders the results show that abnormal profits increase if ownership is concentrated in foundations and banks and decrease if market forces are allowed to operate

does market structure matter on banks profitability and stability emerging vs advanced economies abstract we empirically investigate the effects of market structure on profitability and stability for 1929 banks in 40 emerging and advanced economies over 1999 2008 by incorporating the traditional structure conduct performance scp and relative market power rmp hypotheses we observe that a greater market share leads to higher bank profitability being biased toward the rmp hypothesis in advanced economies yet neither of the hypotheses is supported for profitability in emerging economies the scp appears to exert a destabilising effect on advanced banks suggesting that a more concentrated banking system may be vulnerable to financial instability however the rmp seems to perform a stabilising effect in both economies evidence also highlights that profitability and stability increase with an increased interest margin revenues in a less competitive environment for emerging markets overall these results suggest that although policy measures to promote competition may dampen economic rent excessive implementation may have an undesired destabilising impact on banks

a model of imperfect competition with keynesian features the recent literature on the reappraisal of keynes has viewed keynesian equilibria as arising when prices are fixed and effective demands and supplies are equilibrated through the adjustment of quantities one problem with this approach is that it lacks a theory of price determination in particular of why prices are fixed in the present paper we show that a number of keynesian features arise in a model in which prices are fully flexible but where agents have some monopoly power one advantage of this approach is that it provides a theory of the determination of both prices and quantities

funding growth in bank based and market based financial systems evidence from firm level data the authors investigate whether firms access to external financing to fund growth differs between market based and bank based financial systems using firm level data for forty countries they compute the proportion of firms in each country that relies on external finance and examine how that proportion differs across financial systems they find that the development of a country s legal system predicts access to external finance and that stock markets and the banking system have different effects on access to external markets the development of securities markets is related more to the availability of long term financing whereas the development of the banking sector is related more to the availability of short term financing they find no evidence however that firms access to external financing is predicted by an index of the development of stock markets relative to the development of the banking system

privatization and bank performance in developing countries abstract we examine the postprivatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries our results suggest that i on average banks chosen for privatization have a lower economic efficiency and a lower solvency than banks kept under government ownership ii in the postprivatization period profitability increases but depending on the type of owner efficiency risk exposure and capitalization may worsen or improve however iii over time privatization yields significant improvements in economic efficiency and credit risk exposure iv we also find that newly privatized banks that are controlled by local industrial groups become more exposed to credit risk and interest rate risk after privatization

the economic value of a forested catchment with timber water and carbon sequestration benefits abstract this paper examines the optimal management strategy for a forested catchment that yields timber water and carbon sequestration benefits the faustmann multiple rotation model is extended to allow for the maximisation of the net present value of these timber and non timber benefits the model is applied to the thomson catchment in central gippsland victoria carbon sequestration benefits are modelled via total stand biomass accumulation the cost of carbon release back into the atmosphere upon logging is estimated as a function of rotation age using an adjusted pulpwood sawlog ratio the allowance for both non timber benefits is found to lengthen the optimal rotation in a large range of cases to infinity

on the effectiveness of economic policy when competition is imperfect and expectations are rational abstract we study the consequences of imperfect competition in a macro model with only one imperfection that of labor market competition otherwise the model is clean agents are optimizers prices are endogenous and expectations are rational we show that although imperfect competition in itself can explain unemployment as is well known it does not in itself give strong support to the use of traditional fiscal policy in fighting unemployment fiscal policy will almost inevitably have real effects but only through a special effect that may be difficult to control in many cases fiscal policy cannot create full employment and it may very well have perverse effects

privatization financial development property rights and growth abstract this study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i e property rights contracting rights political institutions and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms performance capital markets development and economic growth most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance efficiency and profitability which percolates to economic growth privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions namely the french civil law countries the stronger the economic and the governing institutions the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth overall privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector

corruption in bank lending to firms cross country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing abstract building on the important study by beck demirguc kunt and levine 2006 bank supervision and corruption in lending journal of monetary economics 53 2131 2163 we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus registries on corruption in bank lending using the unique world bank data set wbes covering more than 4 000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus registries assembled by djankov mcliesh and shleifer 2007 private credit in 129 countries journal of financial economics 84 299 329 and bank regulation data collected by barth caprio and levine 2006 rethinking bank regulation till angels govern cambridge university press new york to measure bank competition and information sharing we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption we also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks legal environment and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption