hospital choices hospital prices and financial incentives to physicians we estimate an insurer speci c preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in california the function is additively separable in a hospital price paid by the insurer the distance traveled and plan and severity speci c hospital xed eects capturing hospital quality we use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital severity interactions and obtain markedly dierent results than those from a logit the estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality lower priced hospitals but the cost quality trade odoes not vary with capitation rates the patient protection and aordable care act of 2010 includes provisions to establish ac countable care organizations acos in the medicare program these are groups of health care providers that oer services to a large number of patients and are eligible to share in any cost savings they achieve for the medicare program 1 private sector acos are forming in parallel to this initiative often with very similar structures and payment arrangements the proportion of savings acos keep is linked to their performance on quality standards the goal of the initiative is to reduce health care costs in both medicare and private insurance and to improve coordination of care the tying of cost savings to quality standards is designed to mitigate the concern that an increase in incentives to control costs might lead to a decrease in the quality of care the health policy literature has noted that similar cost control incentives are currently utilized by some health maintenance organizations hmos in california and elsewhere 2 in this paper we investigate the impact of these incentives on the cost and quality of care provided to patients focusing in particular on the choice of hospital for privately insured patients giving birth we use

quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand we study incentives for quality provision in markets where providers are motivated semi altruistic prices are regulated and firms are funded by a combination of block grants and unit prices competition is based on quality and demand adjusts sluggishly health or education are sectors in which the mentioned features are the rule we show that the presence of motivated providers makes dynamic competition tougher resulting in higher steady state levels of quality in the closed loop solution than in the benchmark open loop solution if the price is sufficiently high however this result is reversed if the price is sufficiently low and below unit costs sufficiently low prices also imply that a reduction in demand sluggishness will lead to lower steady state quality prices below unit costs will nevertheless be welfare optimal if the providers are sufficiently motivated

reacting to rankings evidence from america s best hospitals rankings and report cards have become a popular way of providing information in a variety of domains i estimate the response to rankings in the hospital market and find that hospitals that improve their rank are able to attract significantly more patients the average hospital in my sample experiences a 5 change in non emergency medicare patient volume from year to year due to rank changes these findings have implications regarding the competitiveness of hospital markets and the effect that the dissemination of quality information in hospital markets can have on individual choice

robust assortment optimization in revenue management under the multinomial logit choice model we study robust formulations of assortment optimization problems under the multinomial logit choice model the novel aspect of our formulations is that the true parameters of the logit model are assumed to be unknown and we represent the set of likely parameter values by a compact uncertainty set the objective is to find an assortment that maximizes the worst case expected revenue over all parameter values in the uncertainty set we consider both static and dynamic settings the static setting ignores inventory consideration whereas in the dynamic setting there is a limited initial inventory that must be allocated over time we give a complete characterization of the optimal policy in both settings show that it can be computed efficiently and derive operational insights we also propose a family of uncertainty sets that enables the decision maker to control the trade off between increasing the average revenue and protecting against the worst case scenario numerical experiments show that our robust approach combined with our proposed family of uncertainty sets is especially beneficial when there is significant uncertainty in the parameter values when compared to other methods our robust approach yields over 10 improvement in the worst case performance but it can also maintain comparable average revenue if average revenue is the performance measure of interest

measuring welfare from ambulatory surgery centers a spatial analysis of demand for healthcare facilities this paper studies competition between healthcare facilities particularly between hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers asc s in the market for outpatient surgery the goal is to answer questions about the existence and magnitude of welfare gains earned from the use of asc s these questions are relevant to current policy debates about the usefulness of asc s i calculate welfare by specifying a multinomial logit model of consumer demand for healthcare facilities and estimating structural elements of demand functions total elimination of asc s results in between 10 2 and 28 1 minutes of welfare loss per patient surgery

job exit behavior of older men a dynamic programming model of job exit behavior and retirement is constructed and estimated using the method of simulated moments the model and estimation method allow for both unobserved individual effects and unobserved job specific match effects the model is estimated using two different assumptions about individual discount factors first a static model with the discount factor equal to zero is estimated then a dynamic model with the discount factor equal to 95 is estimated in both models it is found that bad health age and lack of education increase the probability of retirement the dynamic model performs better than the static model and has different implications for retirement behavior the job specific effects are an important source of unobserved heterogeneity copyright 1991 by the econometric society

quality competition with profit constraints abstract firms in markets such as health care and education are often profit constrained due to regulation or their non profit status and they are often viewed as being altruistic towards consumers we use a spatial competition framework to study incentives for cost containment and quality provision by altruistic firms facing profit constraints if prices are regulated profit constraints lead to lower cost containment efforts but higher quality if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic under price competition profit constraints reduce quality and cost containment efforts but lead to lower prices if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic profit constrained firms cost containment efforts are below the first best while their quality might be too high or too low if prices are regulated profit constraints can improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price depending on the degree of altruism

bridge jobs and partial retirement the job stopping process of older workers often includes some combination of postcareer bridge employment partial retirement and reverse retirement fewer than two fifths of household heads retire directly from career jobs over half partially retire at some point in their working lives and a quarter reenter the labor force after initially retiring in addition postcareer employment is frequently located outside the industry and occupation of the career job and there are important differences in postcareer labor force experiences by gender permanent income and career job pension status

the effect of entry regulation in the health care sector the case of home health the consequences of government regulation in the post acute care sector are not well understood we examine the effect of entry regulation on quality of care in home health care by analyzing the universe of hospital discharges during 2006 for publicly insured beneficiaries about 4 5 million and subsequent home health admissions to determine whether there is a significant difference in home health utilization hospital readmission rates and health care expenditures in states with and without certificate of need laws con regulating entry we identify these effects by looking across regulated and nonregulated states within hospital referral regions which characterize well defined health care markets and frequently cross state boundaries we find that con states use home health less frequently but system wide rehospitalization rates overall medicare expenditures and home health practice patterns are similar removing con for home health would have negligible system wide effects on health care costs and quality

patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income we study the effects of cross border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions we use a salop model with a high middle and low income region in each region a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation in equilibrium regions with higher income offer better quality which creates an incentive for patient mobility from lower to higher income regions assuming a prospective payment scheme based on drg pricing we find that lower non monetary administrative mobility costs have i no effect on quality or welfare in the high income region ii a negative effect on quality but a positive effect on welfare for the middle income region and iii ambiguous effects on quality and welfare for the low income region lower monetary mobility costs copayments might reduce welfare in both the middle and low income region thus health policies that stimulate cross border patient mobility can be counterproductive when regions differ in income

the auctioneerless economics of axel leijonhufvud the dark forces of time and ignorance and the coordination of economic activity leijonhufvud focuses his analysis on the coordination of economic activities in a world tossed and torn by ever new episodes of instability macroeconomic theory must finally admit and properly analyse the limits of collective and individual rationality starting from the system s coordination leijonhufvud underlines the crucial role of information learning and institutions coming to individual choice he unremittingly rejects unbounded rationality methodologically however his use of general equilibrium as a benchmark seems to have conditioned his analysis in bringing to light the dark forces of time and ignorance leijonhufvud himself seems to have fallen under the influence of the siren represented by general equilibrium theory copyright 2006 oxford university press

the industrial organization of health care markets the u s health care sector is large and growing health care spending in 2011 amounted to 2 7 trillion and 18 percent of gdp approximately half of health care output is allocated via markets in this paper we analyze the industrial organization literature on health care markets focusing on the impact of competition on price quality and treatment decisions for health care providers and health insurers we conclude with a discussion of research opportunities for industrial organization economists including opportunities created by the u s patient protection and affordable care act

the price ain t right hospital prices and health spending on the privately insured we use insurance claims data for 27 6 percent of individuals with private employer sponsored insurance in the us between 2007 and 2011 to examine the variation in health spending and in hospitals transaction prices we document the variation in hospital prices within and across geographic areas examine how hospital prices influence the variation in health spending on the privately insured and analyze the factors associated with hospital price variation four key findings emerge first health care spending per privately insured beneficiary varies by a factor of three across the 306 hospital referral regions hrrs in the us moreover the correlation between total spending per privately insured beneficiary and total spending per medicare beneficiary across hrrs is only 0 14 second variation in providers transaction prices across hrrs is the primary driver of spending variation for the privately insured whereas variation in the quantity of care provided across hrrs is the primary driver of medicare spending variation consequently extrapolating lessons on health spending from medicare to the privately insured must be done with caution third we document large dispersion in overall inpatient hospital prices and in prices for seven relatively homogenous procedures for example hospital prices for lower limb mris vary by a factor of twelve across the nation and on average two fold within hrrs finally hospital prices are positively associated with indicators of hospital market power even after conditioning on many demand and cost factors hospital prices in monopoly markets are 15 3 percent higher than those in markets with four or more hospitals

delivered pricing and the impact of spatial differentiation on cartel stability abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spatial differentiation on the sustainability of collusion on delivered prices it shows that the choice of the punishment mechanism that enforces collusion is crucial for determining whether differentiation facilitates cartel pricing or not if punishments are optimal then differentiation tends to facilitate collusion optimal punishments impose minmax profits on deviators independently of the degree of differentiation a high degree of differentiation then renders deviations less profitable since it makes business stealing more costly but does not affect the deviator s punishment profits depending on the transport cost technology excessive differentiation may have a countervailing effect however because it also implies high transport costs for the cartel if collusion is sustained by standard grim trigger punishments instead then collusion may be easiest for minimal differentiation the reason is that competitive and thus grim trigger punishment profits are higher the higher the degree of differentiation

health insurance and the demand for medical care evidence from a randomized experiment we estimate how cost sharing the portion of the bill the patient pays affects the demand for medical services the data come from a randomized experiment a catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out of pocket price the price elasticity is approximately 0 2 we reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure for example by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization

money interest and capital a study in the foundations of monetary theory list of illustrations list of tables series preface preface 1 real analysis and monetary analysis an introduction part i real analysis critique 2 wicksellian monetary theory 3 neo walrasian monetary theory 4 the neoclassical synthesis revisited 5 keynesian and monetarists 6 friedman s monetary framework the quantity theory restated part ii monetary analysis foundations 7 re laying the foundations of monetary theory 8 some further questions of method and methodology 9 marshallian microfoundations of monetary equilibrium 10 macroeconomic analysis and monetary equilibrium 11 real analysis and monetary analysis the central arguments references index

the welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the us medical care market summary managed care health insurers in the usa restrict their enrollees choice of hospitals to within specific networks this paper considers the implications of these restrictions a three step econometric model is used to predict consumer preferences over health plans conditional on the hospitals they offer the results indicate that consumers place a positive and significant weight on their expected utility from the hospital network when choosing plans a welfare analysis assuming fixed prices implies that restricting consumers choice of hospitals leads to a loss to society of approximately 1 billion per year across the 43 us markets considered this figure may be outweighed by the price reductions generated by the restriction copyright 2006 john wiley sons ltd

estimation and identification of merger effects an application to hospital mergers abstract existing empirical estimates of merger effects are compromised by the fact that merging and nonmerging entities differ in unobserved ways that independently affect outcomes of interest to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of consummated mergers i propose an approach that focuses on the response of rivals to mergers and accounts for the endogeneity of exposure to these mergers i apply this approach to evaluate the impact of independent hospital mergers in the united states between 1989 and 1996 using the physical colocation of rivals as an instrument for whether they merge i find a sizeable one time increase in price following a rival s merger with the greatest increase occurring among hospitals nearest the merging hospitals these results are more consistent with predictions from structural models of the hospital industry than with prior observational estimates of the effects of hospital mergers

beyond microfoundations towards a not too rational macroeconomics at ucla we are establishing a center for computable economics i have been very much involved in this effort this may surprise you that a non mathematical macro monetary economist should become an enthusiast for this project is one of those things that do not compute but then as i will explain we take a special interest in things that do not compute one may come to computable economics by many intellectual routes i will trace my own not because it makes a particularly edifying story but because it will tell you what kind of problems i hope we can make progress on by developing the field of computable economics but before we get to that i had better explain what i mean by computable economics

demand for and regulation of cardiac services centralization of cardiac services can increase hospital surgery volumes and decrease access for patients this study estimates the effects of changes in the regulation of cardiac services on treatments mortality and utility demand for surgery services by heart attack victims who form expectations of the need for and productivity of surgery in their choice of hospital and treatment is estimated the results indicate that mortality and ex ante utility are insensitive to moderate changes in policy changes in surgery volume and travel costs offset one another despite similar health outcomes the competing policies have different implications for taxpayers

a dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices abstract we develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyze the effects of competition on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level our model combines a differential game approach with a hotelling spatial competition framework and our analysis applies in particular to industries such as long term care health care child care and education if providers nursing homes hospitals schools nurseries use closed loop decision rules which imply strategic interaction over time we show that although increased competition leads to higher quality in the steady state quality provision is nevertheless lower than under open loop rules and also suboptimally low from a welfare perspective thus our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interaction between competing providers as a potential source of inefficiency in quality provision

optimal dynamic volume based price regulation abstract we consider a model of optimal price regulation in markets where demand is sluggish and asymmetric providers compete on quality using a spatial model which is suitable to investigate the health care and education sector we analyse within a dynamic set up the scope for price premiums or penalties on volume under the assumption of symmetric cost information we show that the socially optimal time path of quality provision off the steady state can be replicated by a simple dynamic pricing rule where the dynamic part of the rule is ex ante non discriminatory in the sense that the price premium or penalty on volume is common across providers despite their differing production costs whether the price schedule involves a penalty or a premium on volume relates to two concerns regarding production costs and consumer benefits which go in opposite directions price adjustments over time occur only through the price penalty or premium not time directly which highlights the simplicity and thus applicability of this regulation scheme

inequality neighbourhoods and welfare of the poor abstract this paper investigates how neighbourhood effects interacting with income inequality affect poor people s ability to access basic facilities like health care services schooling and so on we model this interaction by integrating consumers income distribution with the spatial distribution of their location and explore the consequences of an increase in income inequality or variations in the neighbourhood characteristics on the welfare of the rich and poor in general and their access to market in particular we find that in general the impact will be non monotonic owing to an interesting trade off between the provision effect and the price effect on the one hand there is the positive provision effect higher valuation of the rich attracts the supplier to enter into the neighbourhood allowing the poor who live sufficiently close by to access the service on the other hand there is the negative price effect the service provider charges a higher price higher is the income or larger is the proportion of the rich in the neighbourhood in the extreme there exists the possibility of complete exclusion of poor from the market the service provider caters only to the rich and the poor has absolutely no market access we have identified the higher income gap between rich and poor as the key factor that exposes the poor to this complete exclusion possibility

hospital competition and quality with regulated prices we analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices considering the effect of both introducing competition monopoly versus competition and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs increased substitutability or a higher number of hospitals with semi altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous in contrast to the received body of theoretical literature this is consistent with and potentially explains the mixed empirical evidence

assessing competition in hospital care markets the importance of accounting for quality differentiation quality differentiation is especially important in the hospital industry where the choices of medicare patients are unaffected by prices unlike previous studies that use geographic market concentration to estimate hospital competitiveness this article emphasizes the importance of quality differentiation in this spatially differentiated market i estimate a random coefficients discrete choice model that predicts patient flow to different hospitals and find that demand responses to both distance and quality are substantial the estimates suggest that patients do not substitute toward alternative hospitals in proportion to current market shares implying that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital competitiveness

labor force dynamics of older men this paper describes and analyzes movements of older men among labor force states in the united states using quarterly observations derived from the retirement history survey rhs the results indicate substantial undercounts in the biannual data indicating that the prevalence of labor force movements at older ages has been underestimated previously the results show that labor force dynamics at older ages are important including duration and spell occurrence dependence and work experience effects these effects are robust to nonparametric controls for unobserved heterogeneity the estimates indicate that social security benefits have strong effects on the timing of labor force transitions at older ages but that changes in social security benefit levels over time have not contributed much to the trend toward earlier labor force exit excerpt

competition and waiting times in hospital markets this paper studies the impact of hospital competition on waiting times we use a salop type model with hospitals that differ in geographical locationand potentially waitingtime andtwotypesofpatients high benefitpatientswhochoosebetweenneighbouring hospitals competitive segment and low benefit patients who decide whether or not to demand treatment from the closest hospital monopoly segment compared with a benchmark case of monopoly we find that hospital competition leads to longer waiting times in equilibrium if the competitive segment is sufficiently large given a policy regime of hospital competition the effect of increased competition depends on the parameter of measurement lower travelling costs increase waiting times higher hospital density reduces waiting times while the effect of a larger competitive segment is ambiguous we also show that if the competitive segment is large hospital competition is socially preferable to monopoly only if the regulated treatment price is sufficiently high 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

optimizing healthcare network design under reference pricing and parameter uncertainty abstract healthcare payers are exploring cost containing policies to steer patients through qualified information and financial incentives towards providers offering the best value with reference pricing rp a payer determines a maximum amount paid for a procedure and patients selecting a provider charging more pay the difference in a tiered network tn providers are stratified according to criteria such as quality and cost each tier having a different out of pocket price motivated by a program recently implemented in california we design an optimization model for payers combining both rp and tn filling the gap of quantitative research on these novel payment policies the main decision is to select which providers to exempt from rp whose patients will face no out of pocket costs patients choice of a provider is modeled with a multinomial logit model the objective is to minimize the payer s cost while constraints provide decision makers with levers for a trade off between cost reduction and providers quality we build a robust counterpart of our model to account for parameter uncertainty numerical experiments provide insights into how tiers are scattered on a price quality plane we argue that this system has strong potential in terms of costs reduction quality increase for patients and visibility for high value providers

is hospital competition socially wasteful we study the consequences of hospital competition for medicare beneficiaries heart attack care from 1985 to 1994 we examine how relatively exogenous determinants of hospital choice such as travel distances influence the competitiveness of hospital markets and how hospital competition interacts with the influence of managed care organizations to affect the key determinants of social welfare expenditures on treatment and patient health outcomes in the 1980s the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous but in the 1990s competition unambiguously improves social welfare increasing hmo enrollment over the sample period partially explains the dramatic change in the impact of hospital competition

exit from the hospital industry we study the exit of hospitals from the market for inpatient services more generous hospital reimbursement significantly reduces the probability of exit throughout the 1990s conditional on reimbursement levels hospital efficiency was not a significant determinant in the early 1990s but in the mid to late 1990s less efficient hospitals were significantly more likely to exit throughout the period high tech services increased the probability of survival and for profit hospitals were more likely to exit the role of medicare as a determinant of exit became less important in the latter half of the 1990s

profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals this paper proposes two tests of the hypothesis that not for profit hospitals nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals the profit variability test states that the profits of an nfp will be less variable over time than profits of a for profit hospital if the nfp maximizes utility subject to a profit constraint the second test examines whether nfp profits respond less to change in exogenous factors such as medicare reimbursement rates than profits of for profit hospitals both tests performed on panel data from 1983 to 1988 support the hypothesis that nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals

the effect of reimbursement on the intensity of hospital services we examine how hospital treatment intensity is affected by an exogenous change in average reimbursement for an admission theory predicts that treatment intensity would be most affected for highly profitable services but unaffected for unprofitable services we use medicare inpatient data from 11 states for 16 disease categories that vary in the generosity of reimbursement to test this prediction using the coefficients from quantile regressions we calculate a difference in difference estimate of the effect of the balanced budget act bba of 1998 comparing the pre and post bba change in treatment intensity at high medicare share hospitals to low medicare share hospitals we find that not for profit hospitals cut treatment intensity at the 50th 75th and 95th quantiles only for generously reimbursed services intensity at the 25th percentile was unaffected regardless of generosity we did not measure a statistically significant response at for profit or public hospitals to the bba

free to choose reform choice and consideration sets in the english national health service choice in public services is controversial we exploit a reform in the english national health service to assess the effect of removing constraints on patient choice we estimate a demand model that explicitly captures the removal of the choice constraints imposed on patients we find that post removal patients became more responsive to clinical quality this led to a modest reduction in mortality and a substantial increase in patient welfare the elasticity of demand faced by hospitals increased substantially post reform and we find evidence that hospitals responded to the enhanced incentives by improving quality this suggests greater choice can raise quality

competition and equity in health care markets we provide a model where hospitals compete on quality under fixed prices to investigate how hospital competition affects i quality differences between hospitals and as a result ii health inequalities across hospitals and patient severities the answer to the first question is ambiguous and depends on factors related to both demand and supply of health care whether competition increases or reduces health inequalities depends on the type and measure of inequality health inequalities due to the postcode lottery are more likely to decrease if the marginal health gains from quality decrease at a higher rate whereas health inequalities between high and low severity patients decrease if patient composition effects are sufficiently small we also investigate the effect of competition on health inequalities as measured by the gini and the generalised gini coefficients and highlight differences compared to the simpler dispersion measures

product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets the case of the u s automobile industry this paper develops and estimates a model of the u s automobile industry on the demand side a discrete choice model is adopted that is estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey the estimation results are used in conjunction with population weights to derive aggregate demand on the supply side the automobile industry is modelled as an oligopoly with product differentiation equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the profit maximizing firms the estimation results are used in counterfactual simulations to investigate two trade policy issues the effects of the ver and exchange rate pass through

how social security and medicare affect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets this paper provides an empirical analysis of how the u s social security and medicare insurance system affect the labor supply of older males in the presence of incomplete markets for loans annuities and health insurance we estimate a detailed dynamic programming dp model of the joint labor supply and social security acceptance decision focusing on a sample of males in the low to middle income brackets whose only pension is social security the dp model delivers a rich set of predictions about the dynamics of retirement behavior and comparisons of actual vs predicted behavior show that the dp model is able to account for wide variety of phenomena observed in the data including the pronounced peaks in the distribution of retirement ages at 62 and 65 the ages of early and normal eligibility for social security benefits respectively we identify a significant fraction of health insurance constrained individuals who have no form of retiree health insurance other than medicare and who can only obtain fairly priced private health insurance via their employer s group health plan the combination of significant individual risk aversion and a long tailed pareto distribution of health care expenditures implies that there is a significant security value for these individuals to remain employed until they are eligible for medicare coverage at age 65 overall our model suggests that a number of heretofore puzzling aspects of retirement behavior can be viewed as artifacts of particular details of the social security rules whose incentive effects are especially strong for lower income individuals and those who do not have access to fairly priced loans annuities and health insurance

competition and quality in health care markets a differential game approach we investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach in which quality is a stock variable using a hotelling framework we derive the open loop solution health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period and the feedback closed loop solution providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states under the closed loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information if the marginal provision cost is constant the open loop and closed loop solutions coincide and the results are similar to the ones obtained by static models if the marginal provision cost is increasing investment and quality are lower in the closed loop solution when competition is more intense in this case static models tend to exaggerate the positive effect of competition on quality

is hospital competition wasteful stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0741 6261 28199222 2923 3a2 3c247 3aihcw 3e2 0 co 3b2 zthe rand journal of economics is currently published by the rand corporation your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals rand html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgfri jan 4 14 10 49 2008