on the net impact of europeanization the eu s telecoms and electricity regimes between the global and the national this article examines the outcome of the eu policy process from various comparative perspectives in an effort to distinguish the net effects of eu membership and eu level regimes from more general perhaps global processes of change it argues that the major features of liberalization would have been diffused to most if not all member states even in the absence of the european commission other agents of supranationalism and eu level intergovernmental commitment to liberalize this is not to suggest that europeanization does not matter but that it matters in less obvious and perhaps in less critical ways than is frequently assumed the argument is supported by comparative empirical analysis of the spatial and temporal diffusion of liberalization since the 1980s and of nationalization since the late 19th century

political competition and policy adoption market reforms in latin american public utilities on y docencia econ omicas this article shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence previous work shows the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking controlling for these effects this article demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and ideological polarization even at a time when ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence this article studies policy adoption using duration analysis for the 18 countries of latin america during the 1985 2000 period when most of the market reforms in public utilities were adopted s tudies of market reforms in latin america have typically emphasized the common financial and technological pressures that limited the ability of incumbents to impose their ideological preferences on policy adoption during the 1980s and 1990s this article shows that although it is true that the ideology of incumbents cannot fully explain policy adoption political competition and the relative ideology of challengers did shape the incentives of policymakers and thus played a significant role in the adoption of market reforms the article shows these effects on the market reforms of latin american public utilities which have been widely regarded as an example of policy convergence market oriented reforms in telecoms and electricity including the privatization of assets the liberalization of markets and the separation of regulatory authority from operations spread rapidly around the globe and especially through latin america

limiting regional electricity sector integration and market reform the cases of france in the eu and canada in the nafta region recent decades have witnessed liberal reforms in electricity policy in western countries and an emerging literature with prominent perspectives on how to analyze such reforms some analysts viewwestern countries as replicating the policy models of britain and the united states the first nations to adopt liberal reforms others see european union and north american free trade agreement countries as subjected to regional electricity sector integration by supranational regional agreements the authors challenge those views arguing that national interests have limited domestic electricity market reforms in france and canada despite their participation in regional electricity market integration projects by examining surplus producing acceleration in building nuclear and hydroelectric plants initiatives to secure export access as part of regional market integration and the ability to limit the effects of market access reciprocity domestically this comparative analysis of france and canada demonstrates tha

on the dynamics of ethnic fractionalization does fractionalization change over short periods of time if so are there any substantial implications for economic performance to answer such questions we construct a new panel data set with measures of ethnic linguistic and religious fractionalization for 26 former communist countries covering the period from 1989 to 2002 our fractionalization measures show that transition economies became more ethnically homogeneous over such a short period of time although the same did not happen for linguistic and religious diversity in line with the most recent literature there seems to be no effect of exogenous diversity on macroeconomic performance that is on per capita gdp growth however we find that dynamic endogenous ethnic diversity is negatively related to growth although this is still not the case for linguistic and religious diversity these findings are robust to different specifications polarization measures and instrument sets as well as to a composite index of ethnic linguistic religious fractionalization

the role of party reputation in the formation of policy abstract this paper shows that a party can credibly establish a platform more moderate than the ideology of its members and thereby raise the probability that the party s nominee wins the election a lame duck incumbent optimally implements his party s platform in order to maintain his party s reputation for having a moderate platform this increases the likelihood that his party retains power when candidates credibly locate themselves in policy space via this mechanism we show that if candidates are sufficiently impatient then their policies are bounded away from one another the policy convergence result is not robust

measuring international capital mobility a review many barriers to the international movement of capital across national boundaries have been dismantled over the course of the last 20 years financial integration was greatly enhanced by the removal of capital controls on the part of the united states germany canada switzerland and the netherlands after 1973 the recycling of surpluses to developing countries through the euromarkets in the 1970 s the removal of capital controls in the united kingdom and japan beginning in 1979 financial integration among european community countries including france and italy in preparation for 1992 recent moves toward financial liberalization in smaller countries in the pacific and the steady process of technical and institutional innovation that has proceeded around the world some popular tests of international capital mobility however appear to show anomalous results martin feldstein and charles horioka upset conventional wisdom in 1980 when they concluded that changes in countries rates of national saving had very large effects on their rates of investment and interpreted this finding as evidence of low capital mobility the argument

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

revisiting the single european act and the common wisdom on globalization the european program of liberalization launched by the single european act sea of 1987 is commonly seen as a powerful instance of globalization trends of economic integration liberalization and international institution building this article revisits the origins of the sea to argue that the extent and success of its liberalizing program depended on a causally distinct push for european institutional reform a retracing of concrete political patterns behind the sea greatly strengthens broader statistical and theoretical challenges to the notion of strong universal trends of globalization

are legislators ideologues or the agents of constituents abstract legislatures often make important economic decisions a decade ago economists viewed each legislator as the agent if not of the median voter of some pivotal voter in a party constituency therefore the voting decision of a legislator could readily be predicted if one could measure the preferences of the relevant pivotal voter models where interests on specific issues can be simply linked to votes on the same issues are questionable however since votes will be traded across issues political parties are one important vehicle for organizing such trades a simple empirical test for the united states senate however clearly rejects the notion that the representative is the agent of the median voter or a local party constituency even if vote trades are allowed thus there is ample opportunity for politicians even under reelection constraints to either voice their own ideology or that of idiosyncratic support coalitions the relevant theory and empirical evidence is summarized and some validating tests for european parliaments are suggested

is polarization bad abstract the adverse effects of political and social polarization on government policies are empirically well documented yet some democracies seem to cope well or even benefit from diversity in this paper we develop a theoretical model to show how elections in polarized societies contribute to improve quality of government we consider both polarization among citizens and political actors political polarization where the second is endogenously determined by parties competing to win the support of the majority of voters we find that more heterogeneous societies are more likely to be politically polarized but that the divergence of positions in the political arena helps the electorate control government corruption by raising electoral stakes our results which are consistent with the findings of a substantial empirical literature suggest that when funneled into political competition polarization may help improving quality of government and policies

the control of politicians in divided societies the politics of fear autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power in addition they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending i present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare the fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters the model predicts extensive use of patronage ethnic bias in taxation and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader these predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance ethnic bias wasteful policies and kleptocracy in post colonial africa

international overborrowing a decomposition of credit and currency risks summary the severity of the financial crises enveloping the tiger economies of southeast asia in 1997 came as a surprise to many observers this paper uses a simple fisherian model of the overborrowing syndrome to compare the asian crises of 1997 with earlier overborrowing episodes in mexico and chile while important similarities exist the crises in southeast asia have been exacerbated by the unhedged foreign exchange positions of asian banks these open currency positions not only imposed significant additional losses on the banks following devaluation they also magnified the scale of overborrowing during the cycle s initial boom phase failure to limit the exposure of banks to foreign exchange risk therefore increased the magnitude of the boom bust overborrowing cycle both ex ante and ex post the paper highlights the importance of effective regulation and supervision of capital markets with a focus on limiting the speculative currency positions of banks especially those that form the core of the domestic payments system and therefore enjoy a possibly implicit public guarantee improving the institutional infrastructure of financial supervision is the only effective way of mitigating the macroeconomic costs of overborrowing

polarization and corruption in america abstract using panel data from the us states we document a robust negative relationship between state level government corruption and ideological polarization this finding is sustained when state polarization is instrumented using lagged state neighbor ideology we argue that polarization increases the expected costs of engaging in corruption especially deterring marginal low level corruption consistent with this thesis federal prosecutorial effort falls and case quality increases with polarization tangible anti corruption measures including the stringency of state ethics laws and independent commissions for redistricting are also associated with increased state polarization

linking conflict to inequality and polarization in this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict we show that a suitable monotone transform of the equilibrium level of conflict can be proxied by a linear function of the gini coefficient the herfindahl hirschman fractionalization index and a specific measure of polarization due to esteban and ray jel classification d74 d31

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

capital mobility and the relationship between saving and investment rates in oecd countries abstract this paper considers tests that use data on saving and investment rates to determine the degree of international capital mobility two types of evidence are presented to show that a high correlation between saving and investment rates across oecd countries can be consistent with a high degree of capital mobility this evidence qualifies the conclusions of previous studies and casts doubt on the usefulness of testing hypotheses about capital mobility with data on saving and investment rates

the strength of issues using multiple measures to gauge preference stability ideological constraint and issue voting a venerable supposition of american survey research is that the vast majority of voters have incoherent and unstable preferences about political issues which in turn have little impact on vote choice we demonstrate that these findings are manifestations of measurement error associated with individual survey items first we show that averaging a large number of survey items on the same broadly defined issue area for example government involvement in the economy or moral issues eliminates a large amount of measurement error and reveals issue preferences that are well structured and stable this stability increases steadily as the number of survey items increases and can approach that of party identification second we show that once measurement error has been reduced through the use of multiple measures issue preferences have much greater explanatory power in models of presidential vote choice again approaching that of party identification

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

beyond the median voter preferences district heterogeneity and political representation despite the centrality of the median voter prediction in political economy models overwhelming empirical evidence shows that legislators regularly take positions that diverge significantly from the preferences of the median voter in their districts however all these empirical studies to date lack the necessary data to directly measure the preferences of the median voter we utilize a unique data set consisting of individual level voting data that allows us to construct direct measures of voter preferences we find that legislators are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter in homogeneous districts

segregation and the quality of government in a cross section of countries we provide a new compilation of data on ethnic linguistic and religious composition at the subnational level for a large number of countries using these data we measure segregation of groups within the country to overcome the endogeneity problem that arises because of mobility and endogenous in ternal borders we construct an instrument for segregation we find that more ethnically and lin guistically segregated countries i e those where groups live more spatially separately have a lower quality of government there is no relationship between religious segregation and governance trust is an important channel of influence it is lower in more segregated countries jel hi 1 h77 j15 017 z12 z13 racial and religious conflicts are often associated with poor politicoeconomic performance especially in developing countries economists have recently turned their attention to ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an explanation of differences in the pace of development starting with an influential paper by william easterly and ross levine 1997 since then many others have shown that fractionalization is negatively correlated with a host of policy outcomes and the quality of government 1 however many ethnically diverse countries the united states for instance are quite successful what makes different countries more or less capable of handling

political bias in policy convergence privatization choices in latin america since the early 1980s privatization has spread in latin america under both right wing rulers and populist presidents this regional convergence toward privatization seemed to announce the end of partisan policy making however not all governments implement privatization in the same way even in the context of policy convergence technocrats propose similar policy options in countries where capital dearth creates pressures for convergence yet politicians build the electoral and government coalitions that make these policies possible and their preferences shape the institutions chosen at implementation the bias introduced by politicians depends on their prior beliefs and constituencies which shape their institutional preferences beliefs about economic nationalism and state intervention influence the selection of regulations at the time of privatization whereas coalition building with political constituencies shapes the definition of selling conditions in privatized companies this political bias which is contingent on the privatizing government explains that the regional policy convergence toward privatization did not extend to its implementation that is although politicians may be losing influence about whether to privatize they still have a say in the choice of how to privatize this article analyzes the impact of this political bias by focusing on the choice of regulatory institutions and selling conditions in five cases of privatization of electricity and telecommunications in latin america

bipolar multicandidate elections with corruption the goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority s preference on policy questions but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders we consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria among a wide class of single winner scoring rules only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

candidates credibility and re election incentives i study elections between citizen candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re election in each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences the elected candidate chooses the policy to implement and how much rent seeking to engage in when in office as the voter decides both which candidate to elect and subsequently whether the candidate is retained this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability i show that in the best stationary equilibrium when utility functions are concave over policy non median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter in this equilibrium there are two candidates who are elected at some history and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge this divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent seeking increasing voter welfare copyright 2013 oxford university press

do voters affect or elect policies evidence from the u s house there are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation in one view voters can affect candidates policy choices competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center in this view elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise in the alternative view voters merely elect policies politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two opposing policy views will be implemented we assess which of these contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant for the u s house focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi experimental estimates of the impact of a randomized change in electoral strength on subsequent representatives roll call voting records we find that voters merely elect policies the degree of electoral strength has no effect on a legislator s voting behavior for example a large exogenous increase in electoral strength for the democratic party in a district does not result in shifting both parties nominees to the left politicians inability to credibly commit to a compromise appears to dominate any competition induced convergence in policy

bargaining in legislatures over particularistic and collective goods we develop a bargaining model in which a legislature divides a budget among particularistic and collective goods by incorporating both private and public goods in a unified model we uncover nonmonotonic relationships between legislative preferences for collective spending and the amount of the budget actually allocated to collective goods put simply policy proposers can exploit coalition partners strong preferences for public goods to actually provide fewer public goods in equilibrium while directing more private goods to themselves these results explain why policy reforms to limit special interest spending often fail this unified model also sheds new light on when legislatures prefer open or closed amendment rules and when coalitions take different sizes and shapes