competitive coupon targeting with the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior and the development of statistical procedures to utilize this data firms can now target coupons to selected households with considerable accuracy and cost effectiveness in this article we develop an analytical framework to examine the effect of such targeting on firm profits prices and coupon face values we also derive comparative statics on firms optimal mix of offensive and defensive couponing the number of coupons distributed redemption rates face values and incremental sales per redemption among our findings when rival firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers the outcome will be a prisoner s dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers

speculative investor behavior and learning as traders learn about the true distribution of some asset s dividends a speculative premium occurs as each trader anticipates the possibility of reselling the asset to another trader before complete learning has occurred small differences in prior beliefs lead to large speculative premiums during the learning process this phenomenon helps explain a paradox concerning the pricing of initial public offerings the result casts light on the significance of the common prior assumption in economic models

an earnings prediction approach to examining intercompany information transfers abstract we assess potential information transfers by examining the association between the earnings announcements of early and late announcers in an industry our earnings prediction models are statistically significant much more frequently than would be expected by chance the models suggest potential positive information transfers on average but there is substantial cross industry variation in the strength of this relation we find that the greatest price reactions by nonannouncers to same industry earnings announcements occur in industries with the greatest earnings comovement

the case against intellectual property according to a common argument the presence of strong intellectualproperty rights spurs innovation which leads to higher economic growthand increasing benefits for all the argument seems coherent theestablishment of secure property rights is a fundamental pillar of a wellfunctioning market economy no economic agent exercises productiveeffort without the certainty of controlling its fruits what is true forphysical effort must be true for the intellectual one if strong propertyrights provide good incentives for the production of potatoes they mustalso provide good incentives for the production of ideas why then do we argue a case against intellectual property are wearguing that while stealing potatoes is bad stealing ideas is good weare not economic efficiency and common sense argue that ideasshould be protected and available for sale just like any other commodity but intellectual property has come to mean not only the right to ownand sell ideas but also the right to regulate their use this creates asocially inefficient monopoly and what is commonly called intellectualproperty might be better called intellectual monopoly when you buy apotato you can eat it throw it away plant it or make it into a sculpture current law allows producers of a cds and books to take this freedomaway from you when you buy a potato you can use the idea of a potatoembodied in it to make better potatoes or to invent french fries currentlaw allows producers of computer software or medical drugs to take thisfreedom away from you it is against this distorted extension ofintellectual property rights that we argue it is a long jump from the assertion that inventors deserve the fruits oftheir efforts to the conclusion that current patent and copyrightprotection are the best way of providing such reward statements such

did dubious mortgage origination practices distort house prices zip codes with high concentrations of originators who misreported mortgage information experienced a 75 larger relative increase in house prices from 2003 to 2006 and a 90 larger relative decrease from 2007 to 2012 compared with other zip codes several causality tests show that high fractions of dubious originators in a zip code lead to large price distortions originators with high misreporting gave credit to borrowers with high ex ante risk yet further understated the borrowers true risk overall excess credit facilitated through dubious origination practices explain much of the regional variation in house prices over a decade

a theory of disclosure in speculative markets this paper presents a theory of disclosure in a market where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and face short sale constraints assets trade above fundamentals reflecting the value of the option to sell to more optimistic investors in the future the initial seller has an incentive to commit to an imprecise disclosure policy despite the negative effect this has on the fundamental value of the asset in order to increase the potential for disagreement and hence the magnitude of the speculative premium i show that there is a strategic complementarity between sellers in their disclosure decisions this explains why financial misreporting and episodes of speculation occur together in waves and demonstrates that the endogenous choice of imprecise disclosure amplifies the extent to which assets are overpriced this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

conversation information and herd behavior experimental evidence shows that an important reason why people tend to imitate others to exhibit herd behavior is that they assume that the others have information that justifies their actions the information cascade models of banerjee 1992 and bikhchandani et al 1992 are significant developments in showing some general equilibrium and welfare effects of such rational imitative behavior but these models as specified may be of limited applicability since they assert that differences across groups in herd behavior can be attributed to the random decisions of first movers differences across groups in herd behavior might be explained more often in terms of different modes of interpersonal information transmission patterns of human conversation imply great selectivity to the kinds of information transmitted within groups this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the nature of competition with differentiated products there is an old debate going back to bertrand 1883 and edgeworth 1925 about the fragility of market equilibrium when competition arises among a few sellers it was hotelling s belief that price instability vanishes when products are differentiated hotelling 1929 recently attention was drawn to the fact that even if product differentiation can weaken the forces leading to price instability it cannot eliminate completely the possibility of price cycles d aspremont et al 1979 the purpose of this paper is to show that vertical and horizontal product differentiation do not operate in the same manner a stable market outcome including an endogenous product specification arises more frequently with the former than with the latter horizontal product differentiation is rooted in taste differences more precisely the potential customers have heterogeneous preferences about the proportion in which the attributes of the product should be combined a wide range of substitute products can then survive in the same market simply because each of them combines the various attributes of the product in a proportion suitable to a particular segment of customers between two products in the range the level of some attributes is augmented while that of others is lowered each variety has its own circle of customers exactly as the inhabitants located around a particular shop form its potential market none the less competitors can raid these privileged market shares by adequate price cuts by contrast vertical product differentiation refers to a class of products which cohabit simultaneously on a given market even though customers agree on a unanimous ranking between them between two products in the range the level of all attributes is augmented or lowered the survival of a low quality product then rests on the seller s ability to sell it at a reduced price compensating thereby for the higher a priori attractiveness of a more desirable quality the seller of a low quality product will specialise in the segment of customers whose propensity to spend on the corresponding range of products is low either because they have relatively lower income or relatively less intensive preferences than other customers at the same time the seller of a high quality product will enjoy an absolute advantage over his competitor 2 interestingly it turns out that price and product competition does not lead to the same results in these two situations regarding the stability of the market equilibrium to stress the differences we have chosen to concentrate on two

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

information marketing and pricing in the u s antiulcer drug market introduced into the united states in 1977 tagamet was the pioneer product in the class of antiulcer drugs known as h2antagonists by promoting ulcer healing through inhibiting acid secretion tagamet was able to heal ulcers and treat pre ulcer conditions pharmacologically on an outpatient basis thereby substituting for more costly hospital admissions and surgeries in 1983 another h2 antagonist called zantac entered and by early 1987 u s zantac sales surpassed those of the pioneering tagamet today there are four h2 antagonists sold in the united states tagamet zantac pepcid and axid zantac is now the world s largest selling prescription drug having estimated worldwide sales in 1994 of about 4 billion each of the four h2 antagonists is among the top 100 in world drug sales although tagamet lost u s patent protection on may 17 1994 in this paper we examine empirically the role of information in facilitating and explaining growth of the overall antiulcer drug market as well as in shaping the changing market shares of the four patented products the dissemination of information is due largely to the use of marketing channels such as visits by manufacturers representatives to physicians called detailing advertising in medical journals and most recently by direct to consumer advertising we examine these and also explore pricing policies product differentiation and orderof entry effects

a welfare criterion for models with distorted beliefs this paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief neutral ine cient if it is ine cient under any convex combination of agents beliefs while this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations it can identify negative sum speculation in a broad range of prominent models with distorted beliefs

consumption externalities and diffusion in pharmaceutical markets antiulcer drugs we examine the role of consumption externalities in the demand for pharmaceuticals at both the brand level and over a therapeutic class of drugs externalities emerge when use of a drug by others affects its value and or conveys information about efficacy and safety to patients and physicians this can affect the rate of market diffusion for a new entrant and can lead to dominance of one drug despite the availability of close substitutes we use data for h2 antagonist antiulcer drugs to estimate a dynamic demand model and quantify these effects the model has three components an hedonic price equation that measures how the aggregate usage of a drug as well as conventional attributes affect brand valuation equations relating equilibrium market shares to quality adjusted prices and marketing levels and diffusion equations describing the dynamic adjustment process we find that consumption externalities influence both valuations and rates of diffusion and that they operate at the brand and not the therapeutic class level

optimal second degree price discrimination and arbitrage on the role of asymetric information among buyers the traditional theory of second degree price discrimination tackles individual self selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to conduct arbitrage we study the optimal sale mechanism that takes into account both individual and coalition incentive compatibility we show that the monopolist can achieve the same profit regardless of whether or not buyers can form a coalition although marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers of different types in the optimal sale mechanism they fail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information

is perfect price discrimination really efficient an analysis of free entry we analyze models of product differentiation with perfect price discrimination and free entry with a fixed number of firms and in the absence of coordination failures perfect price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way however with free entry the number of firms is always excessive our results apply to a large class of models of product differentiation they also apply to models of common agency or lobbying with free entry and imply that one has excessive entry into the ranks of the principals

market and political regulatory perspectives on the recent accounting scandals not surprisingly the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting we do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political regulatory processes operate independently and the events are recent and not well researched so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural this paper offers conjectures on issues such as what caused the scandalous behavior why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time who killed arthur andersen the securities and exchange commission or the market did fraudulent accounting kill enron or just keep it alive for too long what is the social cost of financial reporting fraud does the united states in fact operate a principles based or a rules based accounting system was there market failure or was there regulatory failure or both was the sarbanes oxley act a political and regulatory overreaction does the united states follow an ineffective regulatory model

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

did credit rating agencies make unbiased assumptions on cdos article appears in papers and proceedings of the 123rd annual meeting of the amerian economic association denver co usa 6 9 january 2011

liar s loan effects of origination channel and information falsification on mortgage delinquency 1 this paper presents an analysis of mortgage delinquency between 2004 and 2008 using a loan level data set from a major national mortgage bank our analysis highlights two problems underlying the mortgage crisis a reliance on mortgage brokers who tend to originate lower quality loans and a prevalence of low documentation loans known in the industry as liar s loans that result in borrower information falsification while over three quarters of the difference in delinquency rates between bank and broker channels can be attributed to observable loan and borrower characteristics the delinquency difference between full and low documentation mortgages is due to unobservable heterogeneity about half of it potentially due to income falsification

financial system architecture this article builds a theory of financial system architecture we ask what is a financial market what is a bank and what determines the economic role of each starting with basic assumptions about primitives the types of agents and the nature of the informational asymmetries we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesce to form banks and which trade in the capital market it is shown that borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financial market moreover a financial system in its infancy will be bank dominated and increased financial market sophistication diminishes bank lending article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the evolution of buyout pricing and financial structure in the 1980s we examine changes in the pricing and financial structure of large management buyouts in the 1980s over time 1 buyout price to cash flow ratios rose in absolute terms particularly in deals financed using public junk bonds 2 required bank principal repayments accelerated leading to sharply lower ratios of cash flow to total debt obligations 3 private subordinated and bank debt were replaced by public junk debt and 4 management teams and dealmakers took more money out of transactions up front these patterns are consistent with an overheating phenomenon in the buyout market preliminary post buyout evidence lends some support to this interpretation

financial regulation and securitization evidence from subprime loans we examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate to distribute otd market the information asymmetries in the otd market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders we find using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality we interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators capital structure can mitigate moral hazard in addition we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have skin in the game and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting finally having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent overall our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the otd market the findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders incentives with the investors of mortgage backed securities

the economics of fraudulent accounting we argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences in a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous we show that in equilibrium low productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms this behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy we test the predictions of the model using firmlevel data we show that during periods of suspicious accounting firms hire and invest excessively while managers exercise options when the misreporting is detected firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves our firm level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000 in the aggregate our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment less growth

managers earnings forecasts and intra industry information transfers abstract the effect that voluntarily disclosed managers earnings forecasts have on the security prices of the announcing firms and other firms in the same industry is examined the results are consistent with information content in managers forecasts and with information transfer between forecast firms and other firms in the industry these inferences are drawn from firms abnormal returns computed from single and two index pricing models where the latter includes market and industry indexes interestingly while a positive information transfer is evident with market model residuals once industry cross sectional covariation in firms returns is removed no directional relation is apparent

market segmentation by price quality schedules some evidence from automobiles discrimination among heterogeneous buyers of a product is possible through the use of multiple quality variants this article quantifies various implications of the standard mussa rosen model of price quality discrimination as applied to the u s automobile industry it demonstrates that the price quality variants of a major manufacturer indeed segment the market as predicted by the model distortions in the range and nature of products offered in their prices and in the resulting consumer surplus in the automobile market are measured and shown to be significant copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

consumer strategies limiting the monopolist s power multiple and joint purchases i characterize the menu of bundles price quantity combinations offered by a monopolist when consumers can buy several bundles share bundles with others or do both in a two type setting i find that although perfect arbitrage prevents any price discrimination partial arbitrage in the form of multiple or joint purchases may actually lead to more pronounced price discrimination than when consumers can only pick one single bundle further clear predictions emerge for the price pattern contrasting with the existing literature with multiple purchases only the firm offers strict quantity discounts with joint purchases only discounts are infeasible

perfect price discrimination with costless arbitrage abstract the ability of a monopoly seller to prevent resale is often presented as a necessary condition for first degree price discrimination in this paper we explore this claim and show that even with costless arbitrage markets price discrimination may continue to be both feasible and profit maximizing despite potential resale with finite numbers of consumers arbitrage markets may be thin in the sense that there can be too few low valuation consumers to supply high valuation consumers we examine both ex ante and ex post arbitrage markets and show how a monopoly can exploit potential thinness to profitably price discriminate in each case we present sufficient conditions for equilibrium price discrimination we note that the form of such discrimination depends on the nature of the arbitrage market and consider business strategies that a monopoly might adopt to exacerbate market thinness our results show how market depth and the effectiveness of arbitrage can be the key elements for price discrimination rather than the per se prevention of reselling

the going public decision and the development of financial markets this paper explores the linkages between stock price efficiency the choice between private and public financing and the development of capital markets in emerging economies generally the advantage of public financing is high if costly information is diverse and cheap to acquire and if investors receive valuable information without cost the value of public firms generally depends on public market size which implies that there can be a positive externality associated with going public so that an inferior equilibrium can exist where too few firms go public the model is consistent with empirical observations on financial market development

individual marketing with imperfect targetability our research investigates the competitive ramifications of individual marketing and information management in today s information intensive marketing environments the specific managerial issues we address are as follows first what kinds of incentive environments do competing firms face when they can only target individual customers imperfectly second does the improvement in an industry s targetability intensify price competition in the industry such that all competing firms become worse off third should a firm share its customer knowledge so as to improve its rival s targetability fourth how should an information vendor sell its information that can improve a firm s targetability finally do competing firms have the same incentives to invest in their own targetability to answer those questions we develop a simple model a la narasimhan 1988 in which each of the two competing firms have their own loyal customers and compete for common switchers we assume that each firm can classify its own loyal customers and switchers correctly only with a less than perfect probability this means that each firm s perceived customer segmentation differs from the actual customer segmentation based on their perceived reality these two competing firms engage in price competition as an extension we also allow the competing firms to make their investment decisions to acquire targetability we show that when individual marketing is feasible but imperfect improvements in targetability by either or both competing firms can lead to win win competition for both even if both players behave noncooperatively and the market does not expand win win competition results from the fact that as a firm becomes better at distinguishing its price insensitive loyal customers from the switchers it is motivated to charge a higher price to the former however due to imperfect targetability each firm mistakenly perceives some price sensitive switchers as price insensitive loyal customers and charges them all a higher price these misperceptions thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and hence reduce the rival firm s incentive to cut prices this effect softens price competition in the market and qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing firms engaged in individual marketing a prisoner s dilemma occurs only when targetability in a market reaches a sufficiently high level this win win perspective on individual marketing has many managerial implications first we show that superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage however this does not mean that a firm should always protect its customer information from its competitors to the contrary we find that competing firms can all benefit from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of individual marketing when firms targetability is low indeed under certain circumstances a firm may even find it profitable to give away this information unilaterally however as individual marketing matures as firms targetability becomes sufficiently high further improvements in targetability will intensify price competition and lead to prisoner s dilemma therefore it is not only prudent politics but also a business imperative for an industry to seize the initiative on the issue of protecting customer privacy so as to ensure win win competition in the industry second we show that the firm with a larger number of loyal customers tends to invest more in targetability when the cost of acquiring targetability is high however the firm with a smaller loyal base can through information investment acquire a higher level of targetability than the firm with a larger loyal base as long as the cost of acquiring targetability is not too high as the cost further decreases competing firms will all have more incentives to increase their investments in targetability until they achieve the highest feasible level third an information vendor should make its information available nonexclusively exclusively when its information is associated with a low high level of targetability when the vendor does sell its information exclusively it should target a firm with a small loyal following if it can impart a high level of targetability to that firm finally our analysis shows that an information intensive environment does not doom small firms in fact individual marketing may provide a good opportunity for a small firm to leapfrog a large firm the key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge

credit default swaps and the credit crisis many observers have argued that credit default swaps contributed significantly to the credit crisis of particular concern to these observers are that credit default swaps trade in the largely unregulated over the counter market as bilateral contracts involving counterparty risk and that they facilitate speculation involving negative views of a firm s financial strength some observers have suggested that credit default swaps would not have made the crisis worse had they traded on exchanges i conclude that credit default swaps did not cause the dramatic events of the credit crisis that the over the counter credit default swaps market worked well during much of the crisis and that exchange trading has both advantages and costs compared to over the counter trading though i argue that eliminating over the counter trading of credit default swaps could reduce social welfare i also recognize that much research is needed to understand better and to quantify the social gains and costs of derivatives in general and credit default swaps in particular

customer coalitions monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence abstract this paper analyzes the interplay between a profit maximizing monopolist and a set of consumers who are able to form coalitions that bargain with the monopolist and or integrate into production we show that the monopolist will deter the formation of these countervailing coalitions through strategic selection of generic limit price offers to each consumer these limit prices are derived as subgame perfect equilibria in two alternative models of customer monopoly interplay in both models price discrimination emerges in environments wherein it has previously been considered unprofitable welfare analysis of the equilibria demonstrates the procompetitive effects of potential customer coalitions and generally provides an efficiency based motivation for a government ban on price discrimination

two part pricing with costly arbitrage this paper considers the optimal two part pricing strategy of a monopolist whose customers collude when they purchase the firm s product in contrast to the sentiment in the existing price discrimination literature i find that a monopolist s profit can actually increase when consumers share its good when transaction costs for collusion are zero the firm can extract the full consumer surplus through two part prices when transaction costs are positive or there are a substantial number of consumers without access to resale the firm may be hurt by arbitrage

forcing firms to talk financial disclosure regulation and externalities we analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation in our model disclosure is costly it has private and social value and its precision is endogenous we show that i a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy ii the nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient iii regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare iii the same is true for subsidies that change the perceived cost of disclosures and iv neither regulation method dominates the other article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

disclosure decisions by firms and the competition for price efficiency this paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied it is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal this is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure this paper develops a model of the relationship between firms investment decisions and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities it is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions this provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm disclosure decisions are studied the costs of disclosure are twofold first there are costs of producing and disseminating the information included here are opportunity costs of firms employees auditing and legal expenses costs of printing and distribution and costs associated with the release of any proprietary information second there are traders costs of assimilating the information for instance while it is not very costly to obtain a firm s 8 k and 10 k once produced it is quite costly to understand the implications of their contents while the former costs have been recognized in the literature on disclosure the latter costs have not that is while traders are sometimes viewed as having access to some costly information the information contained in firms disclosures is typically taken to be costlessly observed by all see for instance diamond 1985 and dye 1987 1 taking traders costs of learning the information content of firms disclosures into account leads to new conclusions regarding incentives to expend resources on disclosure in particular it is shown that firms may spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal this overdisclosure results from firms competing for the attention of traders this is an interesting result given the public policy concern that firms on their own will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal

intra industry information releases a recursive systems approach abstract this paper investigates the extent of intra industry information transfers associated with the half yearly earnings announcements of a sample of australian firms the omitted factor interpretation of foster s 1981 results is examined using a recursive systems specification of the return generating process to model extra market return covariation in cross section although some aspects of the results do appear sensitive to the alternative methodologies the overall conclusion is consistent with foster 1981 and supports the existence of intra industry information transfers associated with firms earnings releases

information and diffusion of new prescription drugs this article examines the role of different product information flows on the diffusion of new pharmaceuticals given the innovative nature of pharmaceutical drugs and their impact on health care expenditure there is a surprisingly small literature devoted to this topic some information flow mechanisms have been examined individually in the literature but very few have captured the simultaneous impact of these mechanisms on up take and diffusion this article uses the up take of statins as an example diffusion of this therapeutical group is expressed as a function of four specific informational channels self experience consumption externalities scientific evidence and marketing in addition to this the influence of economic factors is tested to examine whether they have any role in drug diffusion prescription data from over 130 general practitioners gp practices in the uk during 1991 2004 are used to test the econometric specification applying dynamic panel data methods results suggest individual self experience and clinical evidence are major factors promoting diffusion while there is an inverse relationship with gp practice size and diffusion having controlled for these factors financial incentives and marketing appear to play little role

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

personalized pricing and quality differentiation we develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing pp whereby firms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay we embed pp in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects firms choices over quality we show that firms optimal pricing strategies with pp may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations when the pp firm has high quality both firms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case conversely when the pp firm has low quality both firms lower their qualities although many firms are trying to implement such pricing policies we find that a higher quality firm can actually be worse off with pp while it is optimal for the firm adopting pp to increase product differentiation the non pp firm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving in closer in the quality space while pp results in a wider market coverage it also leads to aggravated price competition between firms because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities the nature of the cost function determines whether firms gain or lose by implementing such pp policies despite the threat of first degree price discrimination we find that pp with competing firms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare

intra industry information transfers associated with earnings releases abstract the impact that a firm s earnings releases have on the stock prices of other firms in its industry is examined for an identifiable sub set of firms the results are consistent with a significant information transfer occurring between the earnings release firm and the other firms in its industry this subset is identified by examining the impact of the release on the stock price of the announcing firm the magnitude of this impact is more significant for a sample of firms which have a larger percentage of their revenues in the same line of business as the earnings release firm vis a vis a sample with a lower percentage of their revenues from the same line of business alternative interpretations of the empirical results are also discussed the research findings have implications for information content and market efficiency research and for research on policy issues associated with disclosure regulation

modelling the effects of promotion expenditures on sales of pharmaceuticals the successful innovation of pharmaceuticals requires a substantial amount of marketing support despite concerns about the effects of these marketing efforts this study considers prior findings that indicate that higher marketing expenditures for a brand reduce its price elasticity of demand which may lead to higher prices in the context of the dutch pharmaceutical market the authors find that parameters are heterogeneous across brands and that marketing effects differ across product life cycle stages they propose a separate analysis of established and new brands for established brands marketing efforts neither have a positive effect on sales nor do they affect the price elasticity for new brands several proposed models might capture their diffusion pattern the diffusion of innovation models provide the best results marketing accelerates the rate of diffusion and leads to a higher baseline level of sales

persuasion or information the economics of prescription drug advertising the economic and welfare effects of advertising have been extensively studied over the last half century however these efforts have not led to a consensus either as to the effects or the value of advertising economists continue to reach polar conclusions that appear to be derived mainly from preconceptions of the social desirability of advertising on the one hand is research that emphasizes promotion s ability to create artificial product differentiation and thereby produce informational confusion 1 this line of research stresses the empirical association of extensive advertising with high concentration and high accounting profits evidence judged to support increased market power and entry barrier effects 2 a contrary body of research emphasizes the value of advertising in providing information and hence in promoting competition 3 the empirical findings most consistent with this view are that prices paid by consumers in selected markets are lower with advertising than without it 4

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association