the political economy of public income volatility with an application to the resource curse abstract in recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in greece or to unstable oil prices in venezuela we study the political consequences of such public income volatility as is standard in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re election probabilities but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power making policy more efficient yet at the same time it also reduces the re election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future this makes inefficient policy such as patronage public employment less costly our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth in the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices a characteristic of many developing countries we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction jointly interacting with increased patronage employment

politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets we analyze a golden rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and most u s states do today we study an overlapping generations economy where majorities choose durable and nondurable public goods in each period when demographics imply even moderate departures from ricardian equivalence the golden rule substantially improves efficiency examples calibrated to u s demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics

credible commitment and success with public enterprise reform abstract this paper studies why some efforts at public enterprise reform fail and why others succeed economic reforms are intended to increase efficiency and thus help sustain long term growth yet many governments have had difficulty sustaining the reforms they initiated and have reintroduced rigid controls over markets and enterprises this is because either in the process of implementation the government discovers that the costs of carrying the reform further are greater than the expected efficiency gains or the public is skeptical that the new policies can be sustained and does not take the actions necessary for the gains to be realized this paper develops a new institutionalist framework and employs various measures of policy commitment and net gain from continued reform to analyze these issues the paper suggests ways in which the potential success or failure of a reform can be assessed with implications for the steps that reformers might take to increase the chances of success

optimal taxation and strategic budget deficit under political regime switching i develop a dynamic political economy theory of optimal taxation and budget distortions in a model with partisan politics under asymmetric information politics affects the distribution of utilities in the economy political regime switching introduces fluctuations of this distribution these fluctuations justify strategic budget distortions by governments currently holding office and willing to favour their redistributive concerns against future majority under quite general assumptions on preferences these distortions take the form of budget deficits resp surpluses with leftist rightist governments endogenizing the probabilities of getting elected may reverse this result this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of taxation policy showing how partisan governments create strategic budget distortions under quite general assumptions on preferences for redistribution these distortions take the form of budget surpluses resp deficits when rightist resp leftist governments hold office being uncertain on whether it will remain in office in the future the current government chooses a level of deficit which will favour its redistributive concerns against those of future majorities it does so by constraining the redistributive policy of its successor through the budget constraint that the latter inherits a leftist resp rightist government is more resp less enclined to redistribute income by running some deficit today the leftist government ensures that society gets poorer tomorrow a future rightist government will redistribute more as society gets poorer the implemented tax policy will thus be close to what a leftist government would have chosen itself on the contrary by running a surplus today a rightest government relaxes the burden of taxation imposed by tomorrow s leftist government on high income agents this leftist government will be less eager to redistribute and will adopt the rightist party s behaviour under political regime switching strategic distortions of the state budget constraint become important tools for current governments willing to favour their own redistributive concerns against those of future majorities as a result of this dynamic game between partisan governments playing at different points in time with the state budget constraint future policies blend together the preferences for redistribution of current and past governments the commitment value of budget deficits has already been stressed by persson and

inflation financial markets and long run real activity abstract empirical evidence suggests that real activity the volume of bank lending activity and the volume of trading in equity markets are strongly positively correlated at the same time inflation and financial market activity are strongly negatively correlated in the long run as are inflation and the real rate of return on equity inflation and real activity are also negatively correlated in the long run particularly for economies with relatively high rates of inflation we present a monetary growth model in which banks and secondary capital markets play a crucial allocative function we show that at least under certain configurations of parameters the predictions of the model are consistent with these and several other observations about inflation finance and long run real activity

tax smoothing with stochastic interest rates a reassessment of clinton s fiscal legacy the return to sound fiscal policy after the high budget deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s has been hailed by many as the clinton administration s most important achievement we evaluate post war u s fiscal policy using a generalized tax smoothing model that allows for stochastic interest rates and growth rates we show that contrary to conventional wisdom the evolution of the u s debt gdp ratio during the 1980s was remarkably consistent with the tax smoothing paradigm in fact a more substantial departure occurred during the late 1990s when the debt gdp ratio fell more rapidly than predicted by optimal tax smoothing

political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy in the european community in recent theoretical and empirical research the variation in political and institutional arrangements which may affect the process of national policy formation is examined in order to explain cross country differences with respect to fiscal policies pursued in this paper we build upon this literature and examine whether and how cross country differences in debt accumulation and public sector size of member countries of the european community during the 1980s can be explained we conclude that the growth of government debt is positively related to the frequency of government changes and negatively to sound budgetary procedures in countries with left wing governments the growth of the share of government spending in total output generally tends to be higher

central bank independence and public debt policy the various proposals for the institutional design of the european monetary union have drawn fresh attention to the link between monetary and public debt policies this paper explores the strategic interaction between fiscal authorities setting public debt and the central bank controlling monetary policy in the absence of political distortions an optimally designed conservative independent central bank is sufficient to establish the second best in the presence of political distortions or with coordination of monetary and fiscal policy however also a debt target is needed

the limits of political compromise debt ceilings and political turnover we study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent seeking motives parties alternate in office and cannot commit to future policies but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if it expects future governments to do the same in contrast to the received literature we find that strict limits on government borrowing can exacerbate political economy distortions by making a political compromise unsustainable this tends to happen when political turnover is limited conversely a tight limit on the public debt fosters a compromise that yields the efficient outcome if political turnover is vigorous our analysis thus suggests that to sustain good economic policies a society needs to restrict either the extent of political turnover or the ability of governments to issue debt but not both

economic and political determinants of budget deficits in developing countries abstract the evidence from a large sample of developing countries tends to reject the empirical implications of optimizing models of the process of determination of fiscal deficits tax rates seigniorage and inflation the paper also presents some preliminary evidence that an important reason for the failure of the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy is that fiscal deficits are partly determined by political factors and that cross country differentials in budget deficits may depend on measures of political instability in particular as suggested by a number of recent theoretical approaches an increase in the degree of political instability appears to lead to greater budget deficits

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed established democracies this paper investigates the impact of elections on the level and composition of fiscal instruments using a sample of 19 high income oecd democracies during the period 1972 1999 we find that elections shift public spending towards current expenditures at the cost of public investment although we find no evidence for an electoral cycle for government deficit and overall expenditures we find a negative effect of elections on revenue attributed to a fall in direct taxation our results apply for predetermined electoral periods while endogenous elections seem to increase deficit and leave the composition of fiscal policy unaffected

the determinants of bank interest margins theory and empirical evidence this paper has developed a model of bank margins or spreads in which the bank is viewed as a risk averse dealer it was demonstrated that an interest spread or margin would always exist and that this was the result of transactions uncertainty faced by the bank moreover it was shown that this pure spread depended on four factors the degree of managerial risk aversion the size of transactions undertaken by the bank bank market structure and the variance of interest rates the model implied that liability and asset structures had to be analyzed together since they were directly interrelated through transactions uncertainty it was shown that because of this transactions uncertainty hedging behavior was perfectly rational within an expected utility maximizing framework extending the model from a structure with one kind of loan and deposit to loans and deposits with many maturities should lead to further interesting insights into margin determination especially as portfolio effects may become apparent

electoral uncertainty fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations abstract in this paper we study the link between elections fiscal policy and aggregate fluctuations the setup is a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both technology and political re election shocks the latter are incorporated via a two party model with elections the main theoretical prediction is that forward looking incumbents with uncertain prospects of re election find it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies and that this hurts capital accumulation our econometric estimation using u s data finds a statistically significant link between electoral uncertainty and policy instruments and in turn macroeconomic outcomes

understanding the behavior of bank spreads in latin america abstract over the last decade many countries in latin america have eliminated interest rate ceilings reduced reserve requirements and stopped direct credit controls these market oriented reforms have encouraged financial deepening thereby producing considerable economic benefits to the countries nevertheless the persistence of high interest rate spreads has been a disquieting outcome of the reforms this paper explores the determinants of bank spreads in a systematic way for argentina bolivia chile colombia mexico peru and uruguay during the mid 1990s the analysis shows that high operating costs raise spreads as do high levels of non performing loans although the size of these effects differs across the countries in addition reserve requirements in a number of countries still act as a tax on banks that gets translated into a higher spread beyond bank specific variables uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment facing banks appears to increase interest spreads the combination of these microeconomic and macroeconomic factors is a cause for concern in latin america as spreads widen the cost of using the financial system becomes prohibitive to some potential borrowers in addition the results suggest that bank capital requirements may not prevent excessive risk taking by banks when bank spreads are high

banking deregulation allocational consequences of relaxing entry barriers abstract we present an equilibrium analysis to predict the long run allocational consequences and risk implications of banking deregulation loan demand and deposit supply functions are derived from primitive assumptions about the preferences of individuals and banks are viewed as differentiated competitors in a spatial context we find that a relaxation of entry barriers into banking improves the welfare of borrowers and savers at the expense of bank stockholders equilibrium loan interest rates fall and equilibrium deposit interest rates rise as banking becomes more competitive despite this the equilibrium debt equity ratios of banks increase as entry barriers are relaxed we also examine the implications of capital standards and find that an increase in the minimum capital requirement benefits borrowers but hurts depositors

on the faustian dynamics of policy and political power this paper examines the faustian dynamics of policy and power we posit a general class of dy namic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power resulting in the following faustian trade off if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy he then sacrifices future political power yet if he wants to preserve his future power he must sacrifice his present policy objec tives the trade off comes from the fact that the current political ruler pivotal voter cannot uncouple the direct effect of his policy from its indirect effect on future power a policy endogenous pe equilibrium describes this endogenous transfer of power and the resulting evolution of policy and political power over time we show that the faustian trade off in a pe equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales the political preservation effect induces more tempered policy choices than if one s policy choice did not affect one s political fortunes however the reformation effect induces more aggressive policies in order to exploit the productivity gains from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors we distinguish between political systems that give rise to monotone faustian dynamics political power that progressively evolves towards more fiscally liberal types of leaders and cyclical faustian dynamics political power that oscillates between liberal and conservative types of leaders in each case we show that the faustian trade off moderates the choices of each type of leader

on the determinants of school district efficiency competition and monitoring abstract a number of researchers have asserted that inefficiency in the u s school system arises from a lack of incentives for public schools to behave efficiently this paper uses a shephard input distance function to model educational production and a switching regressions estimation to explore the relationship between school district efficiency and two existing incentive mechanisms competition and voter monitoring we find evidence that ease of monitoring enhances both technical and allocative efficiency of urban school districts and that increased competition reduces allocative inefficiency in communities above a competitive threshold we find no evidence that competition is related to technical inefficiency

banking spreads in latin america i introduction financial intermediation in latin america is low by international standards financial systems in latin america are still largely bank based but after a short period of strong credit growth sparked by financial liberalization in the early 1990s bank lending has not yet recovered from the collapse following the banking crises of the mid 1990s as shown by singh et al 2005 as a result from figure 1 it is clear that bank lending as a percentage of gross domestic product gdp is low compared to industrialized countries and other emerging markets this lack of financial intermediation is seen as an important obstacle to growth there is a considerable body of evidence indicating that financial intermediation is not only correlated with growth but also a causal factor in explaining economic performance see e g levine 2004 the low levels of lending in latin america appear related to the prevalence of high intermediation costs in the region intermediation spreads in latin america are high compared to those in other banking markets this is true when measuring spreads as either ex ante bank spreads the difference between weighted averages of lending rates and bank funding costs figure 2 or ex post net interest margins defined as the bank s total interest income minus total interest expense divided by the sum of interest bearing assets figure 3 the high levels of spreads are not a recent phenomenon and unlikely to be a result of the ongoing process of bank consolidation as in other regions in the 1990s latin america saw a trend toward bank consolidation and concentration to a large extent as depicted in inter american development bank 2004 consolidation was driven by financial crises and subsequent regulatory tightening while this resulted in a marked reduction in the number of banks in most countries it does not seem to have yielded a decline in competition intensity partly because it was accompanied by a lowering of barriers of entry to foreign banks which is shown in gelos and roldos 2004 and inter american development bank 2004 in fact banking spreads have fallen somewhat over the past decade although the pace of the reduction has been slow figure 4 1 this paper takes a closer look at the determinants of bank interest margins in latin america using bank and country level data from 85 countries including 14 latin american economies we assess the role of bankand country specific factors in determining banking spreads using microdata from more than 2 200 banks taking an international perspective allows us to delineate the key dimensions in which latin america differs from other regions the paper differs from existing studies in further dimensions apart from the latin american specific focus in a cross country approach among other aspects we make use of new or expanded data sets including comprehensive information on reserve requirements and foreign ownership and investigate the relationship between competition and bank spreads using behavioral measures of bank competition suggested by the new industrial organization literature figure 1 omitted figure 2 omitted the results suggest that latin america has higher interest rate levels less efficient banks and larger reserve requirements than other regions and that these factors have a significant impact on spreads however latin american countries do not differ markedly from their peers in other aspects that are found important in determining the cost of financial intermediation such as inflation bank profit taxation average bank size or average equity as a percentage of total bank assets ii the determinants of spreads literature review the extensive literature on bank behavior suggests that at the country level the following factors are likely to influence the cost of credit creditor rights and the quality of the legal framework higher recovery rates and shorter times to repossess collateral in countries with better legal environments are expected to reduce bank spreads

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

property rights and the political organization of agriculture we propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined in particular because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency the model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others we test some implications of the theory using a five decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 indian states

collateral type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk abstract this paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default pd of bank loans we focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables collateral type of lender and bank borrower relationship while controlling for the other explanatory variables the study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle 1988 2000 collected by the bank of spain s credit register central de informacion de riesgos we find that collateralised loans have a higher pd loans granted by savings banks are riskier and finally that a close bank borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk

the politics of related lending we analyze the protability of government owned banks lending to their owners we nd evidence that such lending has been used to transfer bank prots to the governments but only in localities where the incumbent politicians face signicant competition for reelection in localities where the incumbent party has a high probability of reelection there is no such evidence this result establishes a causal link behind extant evidence that banks lending to controlling parties owners and directors can result in looting of the banks we nd evidence that such looting occurs when controlling parties are at risk of losing control

fiscal policy public debt stabilisation and politics theory and uk evidence this paper presents a two party model of fiscal and debt policy in which the parties do not care about policy outcomes when out of office unlike other models of this type our model has predictions that are largely consistent with existing empirical findings about partisan and electoral effects on government expenditure tax revenue and debt it also yields new predictions about how the feedback of fiscal policy on lagged debt may depend on partisan and electoral effects these new predictions are not rejected by a test of the model on uk data in multi party democracies the motives of the party in power undoubtedly affect fiscal and monetary policy many economists and political scientists believe that economic policy makers are driven by two not mutually exclusive motives first they wish to remain in office as long as possible the survival or opportunistic motive second they wish to benefit their constituencies partisan motive the effects of these motives may show up in two ways in the data first there may be effects of ideological differences of the parties in power on fiscal and monetary policy so called partisan effects for example we might expect left wing governments to tax and spend more and possibly accumulate more debt second there may be attempts by the incumbent party to use fiscal and monetary policy to bribe the electorate prior to elections e g by cutting taxes and interest rates so called electoral effects recent econometric work has established some interesting stylised facts which are broadly consistent with these predictions several studies report evidence of electoral effects on various fiscal policy instruments for the united states tufte i978 for transfers bizer and durlauf i990 for taxes and macdonald i99i for state level public expenditure more recently alesina et al i 992 i 993 have found evidence of electoral effects on government debt in a panel study of oecd countries evidence of partisan effects on fiscal policy is scarcer alesina et al i 993 report partisan effects on debt and roubini and sachs i989 report in a study of oecd democracies that countries with a higher percentage of left wing governments have significantly higher longrun government spending to gnp ratios concurrently with the accumulation of this evidence a theoretical literature notably alesina and tabellini 1990 rogoff 1990 and rogoff and sibert i 988 has provided new explanations of observed electoral effects on

social polarization fiscal instability and growth abstract we present a dynamic model of fiscal policy in a simple growth framework where social polarization of preferences plays a central role in the evolution of fiscal instability and growth collapse in a highly polarized society a deficit occurs endogenously fiscal spending path becomes more volatile output collapses and economic growth rate is reduced along the transition path to a new lower level of output one novel feature is that the size of fiscal deficit the magnitude of fiscal volatility and the size of reduction in output and growth rate are explicitly shown to be increasing functions of the degree of social polarization this is because of the positive relationship between the polarization of preferences and the incentive for policymakers or socio economic groups to overexploit the government resources in a common pool setting polarization effect thereby we offer a fiscal instability channel that negatively links social polarization and growth which is an alternative yet distinct explanation for the empirical finding that social polarization is harmful to growth moreover we fully distinguish the incentive to engage in such short term policies under political uncertainty from that under polarization polarization and political uncertainty are shown to be distinct yet critical to the dynamic coordination failure in the common pool setting

distributional incentives in an equilibrium model of domestic sovereign default the european debt crisis shares features of historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research has been done this paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default in which a government chooses debt and default optimally responding to distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk averse agents who are split into debt holders and non holders equilibria with debt do not exist if the government is utilitarian and default is costless adding exogenous default costs the model supports equilibria with debt exposed to default risk in which debt falls as the fraction of agents who own the debt falls debt can also be sustained if the government s welfare weights are biased in favor of bond holders resulting in equilibria in which debt rises as debt ownership is more concentrated these results are robust to adding a second asset opening the economy to foreign investors or introducing taxes as an alternative redistributive policy instrument

rent destruction and the political viability of free trade agreements this paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements ftas the key element of the analysis is the rent destruction that these arrangements induce by eliminating intrabloc trade barriers an fta lowers the incentives of import competing industries to lobby for higher external tariffs thereby inducing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process using a conventional competitive model i show that the prospect of rent destruction can critically undermine and in some cases rule out entirely the political viability of welfarereducing ftas this result contrasts sharply with findings from the earlier regionalism literature

structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition abstract economies in transition are faced with a high degree of structural uncertainty i e uncertainty about which it is possible to learn through experience we study structural uncertainty s effects on a subsidy removal program subsidy removal causes unemployment but yields fiscal benefits and facilitates private sector growth when the policymaker does not know the speed with which the private sector absorbs the unemployed he will be driven toward a more decisive and therefore more informative policy the model also rationalizes policy reversals and implies that irreversibility constraints and political instability dampen the learning effect making policy more gradualist

budget deficits and redistributive politics this paper proposes a new view of the forces in the political process that cause governments to accumulate debt the analysis builds on a model of redistributive politics that contrary to median voter models does not restrict the set of policies that politicians can propose i show that deficits occur even in an environment where voters and periods are homogeneous this is an environment where previous political theories of debt would predict budget balance in the model deficits are a way for candidates to better target promises to voters and are therefore used as tools of redistributive politics the main contribution of the analysis is to show that the same forces that push candidates to redistribute resources across voters to pursue political advantage are forces that generate budget deficits most countries have sizeable national debts indeed thinking of governments as debtors seems so customary that it feels awkward to talk about a national credit this suggests that there are systematic forces pushing governments to regularly borrow to cover the excess of spending over receipts at the same time a significant amount of government spending consists of transfers to special interest groups that are hard to justify on efficiency or equity grounds this paper presents a political economic model that suggests that these two phenomena are connected debt is at least in part caused by the fact that in order to get elected candidates need to appeal to groups of voters with promises of transfers debt allows candidates a finer control over the promises they make to these groups

why is fiscal policy often procyclical many countries especially developing ones follow procyclical fiscal policies namely spending goes up taxes go down in booms and spending goes down taxes go up in recessions we provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less than benevolent government to appropriate rents voters have incentives similar to the starving the leviathan classic argument and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well we test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints with a reasonable amount of success

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

a political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo ricardian framework in the presence of different abilities and therefore different bequests some individuals are bequest constrained even in a neo ricardian world such individuals vote for taxes on future generations through the issuance of bonds thereby increasing their current consumption this produces some crowding out of capital reduces wage rates and increases the interest rate as a consequence even unconstrained individuals are no longer indifferent to the size of government debt the paper derives conditions that are conducive to larger debt and deficits when each of the living generations determines current taxes social security benefits and the national debt by majority rule copyright 1989 by american economic association

a time series cross section analysis of the determinants of australian trading bank loan deposit interest margins 1962 1981 abstract a theoretical model of the determination of trading bank interest margins based on the hedging theory of interest margin determination is tested on time series cross section data of australian trading banks generally the results are consistent with that theory that is there exists a stable non linear relationship between australian trading bank net loan deposit interest margins and measures of market power degree of absolute risk aversion and to interest rate uncertainty furthermore the shift from business sector to personal sector loan and deposit business is associated with increased bank interest margins

how foreign participation and market concentration impact bank spreads evidence from latin america increasing foreign participation and high concentration levels characterize the recent evolution of banking sectors market structures in developing countries the authors analyze the impact of these factors on latin american bank spreads during the late 1990s their results suggest that foreign banks were able to charge lower spreads relative to domestic banks this was more so for de novo foreign banks than for those that entered through acquisitions the overall level of foreign bank participation seemed to influence spreads indirectly primarily through its effect on administrative costs bank concentration was positively and directly related to both higher spreads and costs

inflation targeting fiscal rules and the policy mix cross effects and interactions we examine how inflation targeting it and fiscal rules fr affect inflation and fiscal performance in a large panel of countries during 1990 2009 in line with theory both fr and it appear to shape monetary and fiscal outcomes significant cross effects seem to exist as it strengthens fiscal performance whereas the combination of fr and it tends to be associated with more disciplined macroeconomic policies than if only one of these institutions operates our findings suggest that it and fr affect the coordination of the policy mix and point to potential benefits of reforming macroeconomic frameworks in a holistic fashion

liquidity provision banking and the allocation of interest rate risk abstract the paper studies the efficient allocation of technology induced interest rate risk and the implications of such risk for efficient liquidity provision complete immunization against interest rate risk is shown to be undesirable as it precludes the exploitation of favourable reinvestment opportunities under the assumptions of diamond dybvig 1983 interest induced valuation risks of long term assets should be born by early withdrawers reinvestment opportunity risks of short term assets by late withdrawers efficient liquidity provision thus entails no shifting of interest rate risk in the absence of additional moral hazard second best allocations can be implemented through unregulated competition among banks

endogenous political turnover and fluctuations in sovereign default risk abstract a sovereign default model in which the sovereign derives private benefits from public office and contests elections to stay in power is developed the economy s growth process is modeled as a markov switching regime which is shown to be a better description of the data for our set of emerging economies in the model consistent with evidence the sovereign is less likely to be reelected if economic growth is weak in the low growth regime there is higher probability of loss of private benefits due to turnover which makes the sovereign behave more myopically this growth linked variation in effective discount factor is shown to be important in generating volatility in sovereign spreads

mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits abstract this paper shows that a simple two stage voting mechanism may implement a constrained optimal state dependent decision about the size of the fiscal deficit i consider a setup with strategic fiscal deficits similar to alesina and tabellini 1990 three groups of voters are informed about the relative desirability of current public spending voters differ in their preferences for public goods and swing voters preferences may change over time the current government decides on the current spending mix and it has an incentive to strategically overspend a simple two stage mechanism under which a deficit requires the approval by a supermajority in parliament approximates a constrained optimal decision and under certain conditions increases social welfare relative to both a strict rule and a laissez faire constitution when the current majority is small political bargaining may further increase social welfare however when the current majority is large a supermajority mechanism with bargaining leads to a biased spending mix and it may reduce welfare whereas the laissez faire mechanism may yield the first best an appropriately adjusted majority threshold can avoid inefficient bargaining whenever necessary

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

harnessing windfall revenues optimal policies for resource rich developing economies a windfall of natural resource revenue or foreign aid faces government with choices of how to manage public debt investment and the distribution of funds for consumption particularly if the windfall is both anticipated and temporary we show that the permanent income hypothesis prescription of an ever lasting increase in consumption financed by borrowing ahead of the windfall and then accumulating a sovereign wealth fund swf is not optimal for capital scarce developing economies such countries should accumulate public and private capital to accelerate their development and only if the windfall is large relative to initial foreign debt is it optimal to build a swf the optimal time profile of consumption is biased towards the near future as compared to the permanent income hypothesis outcomes depend on instruments available to government we study cases where the government can make lump sum transfers to consumers where such transfers are impossible so optimal policy involves cutting distortionary taxation in order to raise investment and wages and where ricardian consumers can borrow against future revenues in which case the policy response to possible over consumption is a high level of investment in infrastructure

why are interest spreads so high in uganda using international comparisons and a unique bank level dataset on the ugandan banking system over the period 1999 to 2005 we explore the factors behind consistently high interest rate spreads and margins international comparisons show that the small size of ugandan banks persistently high t bill rates and institutional deficiencies explain large proportions of the high ugandan interest rate margins the ugandan bank panel confirms the importance of macroeconomic factors such as high inflation high t bill rates and exchange rate appreciation there is also evidence for the small market place and high costs of doing business explaining persistently high spreads and margins smaller banks and banks targeting the low end of the market incur higher costs and therefore higher margins spreads and margins also vary significantly with the sectoral loan portfolio composition of banks while there is little evidence for foreign bank entry privatization or changes in market structure explaining variation in spreads or margins over time

what should fiscal councils do fiscal watchdogs so called fiscal councils have been proposed as a method to counter deficit bias of fiscal policy the paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surve

interest margins and bank regulation in central america and the caribbean abstract this paper examines empirically the determinants of bank interest margins in central america and the caribbean over the period 1998 2014 a particular focus is set on the impact of differences in the regulatory environment and market structure across countries in explaining the interest margins of individual banks our results suggest that bank market power operating costs credit risk and liquid asset holdings increase the margin between loan and deposit rates while increased income diversification and gdp growth are associated with lower loan deposit spreads when considering information on banking regulation we find strong evidence to support our main hypothesis that improvements in market quality and liberalization have a significant effect on interest margins more specifically reductions in entry requirements to banking higher involvement of foreign banks and increased financial statement transparency are associated with significant reductions in interest margins

procedural choice in majoritarian organizations a puzzling feature of self governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive seemingly nonmajoritarian procedures e g chairs and committees this article provides a theory of self enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures we ask 1 why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place 2 why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter and 3 with what policy consequences in the model a risk averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency i e reduce the procedural uncertainty of free for all bargaining an equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive generating nonmajoritarian policy bias still a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty

majority rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods abstract despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon we build on baron and ferejohn s american political science review 83 4 1989 1181 1206 bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics specifically we show that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within a majoritarian institution the inability of current majorities to contract with future ones drives a wedge between spending on consumption today and investing for future consumption extensions to the model demonstrate that earmarking future returns to specific players and or detaching consumption from investment decisions yields more efficient levels of public investment

contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact abstract we show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification moreover with sanctions contingent on the observed state of the economy the pact avoids aggravating the situation of a country in recession moral hazard problems arise if the state also depends on unobservable politically costly fiscal effort this could explain why sanctions under the actual stability and growth pact are only automatically waived in extreme recessions and why the procedure linking observed deficits and sanctions involves a long and detailed assessment of a country s situation

intergenerational altruism with future bias abstract we show that standard preferences of altruistic overlapping generations exhibit future bias which involves preference reversals associated with increasing impatience this underlies a conflict of interest between successive generations we explore the implications of this conflict for intergenerational redistribution when there is a sequence of utilitarian governments representing living generations and choosing policies independently over time we argue that future bias creates incentives to legislate and sustain a pay as you go pension system which every government views as a self enforcing commitment mechanism to increase future old age transfers

governance structures and the durability of economic reforms evidence from inflation stabilizations abstract this paper investigates the relationship between a country s political economic and institutional environment and its ability to implement sustainable economic reform programs the policy issue on which the study focuses is inflation stabilization it consists principally of econometric estimations of the relationship between the success of stabilizations in a large sample of countries and several political and economic explanatory variables the hypotheses tested are drawn both from the recent macroeconomic literature on policy credibility and from political science the major findings include the following 1 a despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary political repression does not appear to be an effective means for implementing sustainable stabilization policies durable economic reforms and political freedoms appear to be complementary 2 b as has been previously argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically political instability is detrimental to policy reform 3 c the political will and popular consensus for stabilization policies are enhanced during a severe economic crisis 4 d there is weak evidence that intervention by the international monetary fund rather than supporting reform programs can undermine their credibility

fiscal restraint and the political economy of emu while the principle of delegation has become well established on the national level for monetary policy fiscal policies remain in the hands of policy makers depending on rent seeking interest groups we argue that the maastricht treaty provides a unique international commitment that enables governments to follow restrictive fiscal policies by attributing their negative side effects to europe and to implement austerity measures despite rising unemployment or a decline in growth hence the popularity of the european idea is instrumented to enforce fiscal discipline the paper outlines the political economy framework and presents new econometric evidence

barriers to investment in polarized societies i present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short sighted policies the relative price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over taxation investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition in the long run this results in output consumption and welfare being inefficiently low the larger is the degree of polarization the greater is the inefficiency political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth retarding policies

the new stability and growth pact a first assessment abstract the paper proposes a theoretical model of fiscal policy offering new insights on some of the key policy trade offs involved in the recent reform of the stability and growth pact as suggested by the proponents of the reform greater room for case specific economic judgment in the implementation of the pact may improve welfare in our model these gains occur because the consolidation path implied by the implementation of the pact does not discourage high quality measures in practice however the difficulty to extract true policy intent from budget figures may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy hence reforming a rules based fiscal framework with a view to enhance its economic rationale would also require closer monitoring a better grasp of the policies underlying the budget and ultimately stricter enforcement in that sense recent reforms are at best unhelpful

is there a politically optimal level of judicial independence independent courts render current policy more durable by raising the cost of future policy changes but may also engage in policy making of their own this paper asks is there an optimal level of judicial independence from the perspective of incumbent officials in the other branches to answer that question the paper develops a model of strategic institutional choice and tests it on the judicial institutions of the american states consistent with the model s predictions the most independenceenhancing institutions are found where political competition between rival parties is tightest and differences between party platforms are largest

random interactions in the chamber legislators behavior and political distance abstract i investigate the role of social interaction among members of parliament mps and the impact of such interaction on the political distance between parties using the random allocation of seats in the icelandic parliament i find that mp s voting and speech behaviors are affected by the behavior of legislators seated nearby i also show that greater random exposure to mps from different parties ultimately reduces the political distance between parties similar evidence is found using historical data for the u s house of representatives by exploiting the introduction of a lottery mechanism to determine desk assignments in 1845 i argue that random seating arrangements could constitute a low cost way of reducing differences within the political arena

political shocks and public debt the case for a conservative central bank revisited abstract we explore the dynamics of public debt and optimal institutions in the presence of political shocks arising from electoral uncertainty under commitment optimal stabilization is established by combining an inflation target with a debt target the inflation target should be contingent on the political shocks while the debt target forces the government to fully absorb the political shocks in the period in which it occurs in the absence of such inflation and debt targets but with monetary commitment a conservative central bank enhances stabilization an even more conservative central bank is optimal if monetary policy cannot commit

impact of bank competition on the interest rate pass through in the euro area this article analyses the impact of loan market competition on the interest rates applied by euro area banks to loans during the period 1994 2004 using a novel measure of competition called the boone indicator we find evidence that stronger competition implies significantly lower spreads between bank and market interest rates for most loan market products in line with expectations this result implies that stronger competition causes both lower bank interest rates and a stronger pass through of market rate changes into bank rates evidence of the latter is also presented by our error correction model ecm for bank rates further banks compensate income losses from increased loan market competition by offering lower deposit rates our findings with respect to the loan market rates have important monetary policy implications as they suggest that measures to promote competition in the european banking sector are likely to render the monetary policy transmission mechanism more effective

is the political business cycle for real abstract this paper constructs and examines a macroeconomic model which combines features from both real and political business cycle models we augment a standard real business cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence in order to replicate two important empirical regularities first that on average the economy expands early under democratic presidents and contracts early under republican presidents second that presidents whose parties successfully retain the presidency have stronger than average growth in the second half of their terms the model generates both of these features that conform to u s post world war ii data

take the money and run political turnover rent seeking and economic growth abstract we find a negative and significant relationship between gubernatorial turnover and u s state economic growth although our finding of an inverse relationship between growth and political instability may seem to contradict olson s 1982a famous hypothesis regarding the growth retarding nature of political stability such constitutional political changes were not primarily what olson had in mind we argue that enhanced political turnover is associated with more rent seeking since payoffs to focusing on special interest redistributive policies vs general growth enhancing ones are greater for less durable regimes therefore we interpret our evidence as supportive of olson s broader argument concerning the negative affect of rent seeking behavior on growth

political alternation and the fiscal deficits abstract this paper proposes the index of political alternation as a long run measure of political competition it expands the empirical literature on political determinants of fiscal performance and presents evidence for argentina that amplifications of governments planning horizon enhance fiscal performance

regulations market structure institutions and the cost of financial intermediation this paper examines the impact of bank regulations market structure and national institutions on bank net interest margins and overhead costs using data on over 1400 banks across 72 countries while controlling for bankspecific characteristics the data indicate that tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities boost the cost of financial intermediation inflation also exerts a robust positive impact on bank margins and overhead costs while concentration is positively associated with net interest margins this relationship breaksdownwhencontrolling for regulatory impediments to competition and inflation furthermore bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of economic freedom or property rights protection while these institutional indicators robustly explain cross bank net interest margins and overhead expenditures thus bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation they reflect broad national approaches to private property and competition

lending by example direct and indirect effects of foreign banks in emerging markets using a novel dataset that allows us to trace the bank relationships of a sample of mostly unlisted firms we explore which borrowers are able to benefit from foreign bank presence in emerging markets our results suggest that the limits to financial integration are less tight than the static picture of firm bank relationships implies even though foreign banks are more likely to engage large and foreign owned firms after an acquisition a bank is 20 less likely to terminate a relationship with a firm if the acquirer is foreign rather than domestic most importantly within a credit market firms appear to have the same access to financial loans and ability to invest whether they borrow from a foreign bank or not while foreign banks benefit all firms by indirectly enhancing credit access

fiscal rules and government borrowing costs international evidence we find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985 2010 we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets the results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the risk premium on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility jel e43 g12 h60

persistence of politicians and firms innovation we empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political institutions affects the innovation activity of firms we use 12 000 firm level observations from three waves of the italian observatory over small and medium enterprises and introduce a measure of political persistence defined as the average length of individual political careers in political institutions of italian municipalities standard ols shows no raw correlation between political persistence and firms innovation activity however once the causal effect is isolated by means of instrumental variables using death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence we find a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process innovation this finding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder firms incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness as long as they can extract rents from long term connections with politicians

are bank capital ratios pro cyclical new evidence and perspectives this paper analyses how the new basel iii leverage ratio and risk weighted regulatory capital ratio behave over the cycle the analysis proposes a set up to test for the cyclical properties of bank capital ratios taking into account structural shifts in banks behaviour during the global financial crisis and its aftermath using a large data set covering international banks headquartered in 14 advanced economies for the period 1994 2012 we find that the basel iii leverage ratio is significantly more countercyclical than the risk weighted regulatory capital ratio it is a tighter constraint for banks in booms and a looser constraint in recessions

the determinants of bank interest rate margins an international study abstract this paper studies the determinants of bank net interest margins nims in six selected european countries and the us during the period 1988 1995 for a sample of 614 banks we apply the ho and saunders model ho t saunders a 1981 the determinants of bank interest margins theory and empirical evidence journal of financial and quantitative analyses 16 581 600 to a multicountry setting and decompose bank margins into a regulatory component a market structure component and a risk premium component the regulatory components in the form of interest rate restrictions on deposits reserve requirements and capital to asset ratios have a significant impact on banks nims the empirical results suggest an important policy trade off between assuring bank solvency high capital to asset ratios and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers low nims the more segmented or restricted the banking system both geographically and by activity the larger appears to be the monopoly power of existing banks and the higher their spreads macro interest rate volatility was found to have a significant impact on bank nims this suggests that macro policies consistent with reduced interest rate volatility could have a positive effect in reducing bank margins

polarizing information and support for reform abstract we examine whether political polarization is an obstacle to common value reforms we conduct experiments in two ideologically polarized countries the united states and egypt subjects vote between enacting a reform which yields higher expected financial payoffs than the costs of implementation for all but has indirect differential benefits for supporters of only one group of voters versus not enacting the reform and everyone receiving lower payoffs we find that when the groups are polarized ideologically subjects are less likely to vote for reform when informed that another political group would differentially benefit and more likely to support reform should their own group benefit more when subjects are told that one group will differentially benefit from reform they are significantly more likely to explain their vote as being influenced by their own group membership in contrast we find that when subjects are organized into nonpolarized groups group membership predicts reform support less and when there are no differential benefits for a particular group the effect of membership on support is significantly reduced hence we find that the effect of polarization on support for common value reform is contingent on the existence of indirect differential benefits and the degree of ideological polarization of the groups who receive those benefits