entrepreneurship versus joblessness explaining the rise in self employment a large share of the workforce throughout the developing world is self employed and this proportion has increased in recent decades assessments of this development vary with pull factors such as high returns to capital contrasted with push factors such as barriers to more desirable salaried jobs using a long panel dataset from ghana we empirically investigate the changing structure of earnings in self employment relative to salaried work our analysis allows workers to sort into self employment for different reasons including expected earnings differentials and endogenous capital accumulation whilst highlighting constraints that workers may face we estimate a correlated random coefficient model using iv gmm taking into account the endogeneity of sector choice and capital accumulation we find that returns to productive characteristics in self employment have increased significantly between 2004 and 2011 whilst self employment has attracted increasingly skilled workers this points against the negative view of self employment as an occupation of last resort

the empirical content of the roy model this paper clarifies and extends the classical roy model of self selection and earnings inequality the original roy model based on the assumption that log skills are normally distributed is shown to imply that pursuit of comparative advantage in a free market reduces earnings inequality compared to the earnings distribution that would result if workers were randomly assigned to sectors aggregate log earnings are right skewed even if one sectoral distribution is left skewed most major implications of the log normal roy model survive if differences in skills are log concave however few implications of the model survive if skills are generated from more general distributions we consider the identifiability of the roy model from data on earnings distributions the normal theory version is identifiable without regressors or exclusion restrictions sectoral distributions can be identified knowing only the aggregate earnings distribution for general skill distributions the model is not identified and has no empirical content with sufficient price variation the model can be identified from multimarket data cross sectional variation in regressors can substitute for price variation in restoring empirical content to the roy model

ten little treasures of game theory and ten intuitive contradictions this paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once these games span the standard categories static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information for each game the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the nash equilibrium or relevant refinement in each case however a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior these contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others decisions

occupational mobility occupation distance and specific human capital abstract distance and direction measures are constructed and used to contrast occupational mobility following involuntary job displacement and total occupational mobility displacement involves specific capital loss some voluntary occupational mobility for example promotions reflects augmented skills rather than specific human capital loss wage losses following displacement are strongly related to distance and direction this is reflected in a downward shift in the skill portfolio by contrast the skill portfolio change in total occupational mobility shows a neutral or modest upward pattern suggesting limited or no specific human capital loss from voluntary occupational mobility the mean distance in occupational mobility following displacement declined significantly in the 1980s and 1990s suggesting the labor market was more efficiently reemploying workers following displacement lowering displacement costs in that period

cournot oligopoly reconsidering cournot the cournot equilibrium is consistent this article uses an infinite regress model of firm level decisions to find a rational expectations equilibrium for a duopoly and to relate concepts of conjectural variations and consistency to the cournot equilibrium the model derives a conjectural variation instead of assuming it in particular the cournot equilibrium is shown to be consistent in the usual sense of the literature the conflict between notions of consistent conjectures and the cournot equilibrium results from a compounding problem inherent in the earlier models we extend these results to the n firm problem alternatively the article can be viewed as providing a purely static model that generates the cournot equilibrium without reference to conjectures or quasi dynamics

identification issues in the public private wage gap with an application to italy this paper reviews some of the standard assumptions that are imposed in order to estimate the average public private wage gap and that are mainly related to the possible selection of the sector there are two contributions to the existing public private wage gap literature one is a better understanding of the identified parameters standard estimators identify a local effect late which in general cannot be generalized to the entire population as instead is almost always done the other is the partial identification of the population average treatment effect with an instrumental variable to the best of my knowledge this is the first paper in this literature that employs bounds the technique is applied to male workers in italy for compliers late estimates a wage advantage from working in the public sector greater than 30 this return is within the narrowest bounds on the population average treatment effect that are consistent even with a much smaller gap about 15 or more

labor market performance as a determinant of migration in a comparison of migrants with nonmigrants both observed and unobservable productivity factors are relevant this paper focuses more on the unobservable factors and their correlation between places of origin and destination a human capital model of migration demonstrates that more productive workers at the origin would choose to migrate only if the correlation between origin and destination factors is strongly positive longitudinal data drawn from the cote d ivoire living standards survey 1985 86 are used to examine the pattern of migration in the light of labor market performance both of wage employees and non farm self employed workers it is found that indeed the more productive workers migrate furthermore the general direction of migration is toward cities the conclusion is therefore that rural areas lose their productive workers and that urban areas may gain in productivity from the geographical shifts in population

the tragedy of the commons and socialization theory and policy we revisit the tragedy of the commons in an dynamic overlapping generations economy peopled of shepherds who decide how many sheep they let graze on a common parcel of land while relying on di fferent forms of rationality nash players pure or impure kantian players we examine the dynamics of heterogeneity and land congestion when the prevalance of those di fferent forms of rationality evolves over time follow ing a vertical oblique socialization process a la bisin and verdier 2001 we study the impacts of a quota and of a tax on the congestion of land and we show that introducing a quota may in some cases reduce the proportion of kantians pure and impure and worsen the tragedy of commons with respect to the laissez faire finally we examine whether a government should promote either a pure or an impure kantian morality by comparing the relative fi tness of pure impure kantians and their interactions with the congestion of land

discrimination in an equilibrium search model i construct an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and show that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination whenever any employers in the market have a distaste for minority workers one implication of the model is that gender or racial wage differentials understate the utility loss from discrimination in addition the wages of minority workers increase when their proportion increases in the labor market

the theory of public goods non nash behaviour abstract most treatments of equilibrium public goods provision assume zero conjectural variations in the sense that each individual regards the behaviour of the rest of the community as independent of his own this paper introduces nonzero conjectural variations into the model a diagram is introduced which can depict both the individual s and the community s equilibrium in the presence of nonzero conjectural variations equilibrium and optimal outcomes are compared and a specific functional form is used to investigate the effect of community size on the nature of equilibrium finally we discuss the requirement that conjectures should be consistent

are unemployment and out of the labor force behaviorally distinct labor force states this paper tests the hypothesis that the classifications unemployed and out of the labor force are behaviorally meaningless distinctions this hypothesis is rejected distinct behavioral equations govern transitions from out of the labor force to employment and from unemployment to employment the evidence reported in this paper is broadly consistent with versions of search theory in which unemployment is a state that facilitates the job search process in an appendix we demonstrate that log concavity of the wage offer distribution implies that the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the rate of arrival of job offers

roy model sorting and nonrandom selection in the valuation of a statistical life roy model sorting and the vsl wage hedonics is used to recover the value of a statistical life vsl by exploiting the fact that workers choosing riskier occupations are compensated with a higher wage roy oxford economic papers 3 1951 135 46 suggests that observed wage distributions will be distorted if individuals choose jobs according to idiosyncratic returns we describe how this type of sorting biases wage hedonic vsl estimates and implement two new estimation strategies that correct that bias using data from the current population surveys we recover vsl estimates that are three to four times larger than those based on the traditional techniques statistically significant and robust to a wide array of specifications

comparative advantage learning and sectoral wage determination we develop a model in which a worker s skills determine the worker s current wage and sector the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker s skills endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills we show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques we apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individual level panel data from the national longitudinal survey of youth we find that high wage sectors employ high skill workers and offer high returns to workers skills

estimation of a roy search compensating differential model of the labor market in this paper we develop a model that captures key components of the roy model a search model compensating differentials and human capital accumulation on the job we establish which components of the model can be non parametrically identified and which ones cannot we estimate the model and use it to assess the relative contribution of the different factors for overall wage inequality we find that variation in premarket skills the key feature of the roy model is the most important component to account for the majority of wage variation we also demonstrate that there is substantial interaction between the other components most notably that the importance of the job match obtained by search frictions varies from around 4 to around 29 depending on how we account for other components inequality due to preferences for non pecuniary aspects of the job which leads to compensating differentials and search are both very important for explaining other features of the data search is important for turnover but so are preferences for non pecuniary aspects of jobs as one third of all choices between two jobs would have resulted in a different outcome if the worker only cared about wages

migration costs and observational returns to migration in the developing world recent studies find that observational returns to rural urban migration are near zero in three developing countries we revisit this result using panel tracking surveys from six countries finding higher returns on average we then interpret these returns in a multi region roy model with heterogeneity in migration costs in the model the observational return to migration confounds the urban premium and the individual benefits of migrants and is not directly informative about the welfare gain from lowering migration costs patterns of regional heterogeneity in returns and a comparison of experimental to observational returns are consistent with the model s predictions

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

sorting it out international trade with heterogeneous workers each worker brings a bundle of skills to the workplace for example quantitative and communication skills since employers must take this bundle as a package deal they choose workers with just the right mix of skills we show that international differences in the distribution of worker skill bundles for example japan s abundance of workers with a modest mix of both quantitative and teamwork skills have important implications for international trade industrial structure and domestic income distribution formally we model two dimensional worker heterogeneity and show that the second moments of the distribution of skills are critical as in the roy model

does it pay for women to volunteer this article estimates the economic and noneconomic returns to volunteering for prime aged women estimates of a dcdp model indicate that an extra year of volunteer experience increases wage offers by 8 5 in future part time work and by 2 6 in future full time work on average working for free increases lifetime earnings by 16 7 the economic returns to volunteering are more important than the noneconomic returns in increasing lifetime utility the model also reveals an adverse selection mechanism into volunteering that helps explain why reduced form regressions of the returns to working for free will likely be downward biased

ricardo s theory of comparative advantage old idea new evidence when asked to name one proposition in the social sciences that is both true and non trivial paul samuelson famously replied ricardo s theory of comparative advantage truth however in samuelson s reply refers to the fact that ricardo s theory of comparative advantage is mathematically correct not that it is empirically valid in this paper we develop and implement an empirical test of ricardo s ideas we use novel agricultural data that describe the productivity in 17 crops of 1 6 million parcels of land in 55 countries around the world we find that a regression of log observed output on log predicted output has a precisely estimated slope of 0 84 and an r squared of 0 93 in our view these findings offer considerable support for ricardo s ideas

selective trials a principal agent approach to randomized controlled experiments we study the design of randomized controlled experiments when outcomes are significantly affected by experimental subjects unobserved effort expenditure while standard randomized controlled trials rcts are internally consistent the unobservability of effort compromises external validity we approach trial design as a principal agent problem and show that natural extensions of rcts which we call selective trials can help improve external validity in particular selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment effort and the interaction of treatment and effort moreover they can help identify when treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort expenditure

aggregation and social choice a mean voter theorem a celebrated result of black 1948a demonstrates the existence of a simple majority winner when preferences are single peaked the social choice follows the preferences of the median voter the median voter s most preferred outcome beats any alternative however this conclusion does not extend to elections in which candidates differ in more than one dimension this paper provides a multi dimensional analog of the median voter result we provide conditions under which the mean voter s most preferred outcome is unbeatable according to a 64 majority rule the conditions supporting this result represent a significant generalization of caplin and nalebuff 1988 the proof of our mean voter result uses a mathematical aggregation theorem due to prekopa 1971 1973 and borell 1975 this theorem has broad applications in economics an application to the distribution of income is described at the end of this paper results on imperfect competition are presented in the companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

discrimination and the effects of drug testing on black employment abstract a common assumption is that the rise of drug testing among u s employers must have had negative consequences for black employment i use variation in the timing and nature of drug testing regulation to identify the impacts of testing on black hiring i find that adoption of protesting legislation increases black employment in the testing sector by 7 to 30 and relative wages by 1 4 to 13 0 with the largest shifts among low skilled black men the results are consistent with ex ante discrimination and suggest that drug testing may benefit african americans by enabling nonusing blacks to prove their status to employers

education s role in china s structural transformation abstract we explore education s role in improving the allocation of labor between china s agricultural and nonagricultural sectors and measure the portion of china s recent growth attributable to this channel using detailed micro level data and an empirical model that allows for the endogenous selection of education and sector of employment we estimate the relationship between an individual s educational attainment sector and income we find that about 11 of aggregate growth in output per worker from 1978 to 2004 is accounted for by increased education with 9 coming through the labor reallocation channel and 2 attributable to increased within sector human capital

on the distribution of job characteristics an analysis of the dot data we analyse the information in the dictionary of occupational titles to characterize the structure of labour demand two dimensions an intellectual factor and a dexterity factor capture two thirds of the variance in job requirements the remaining co variance cannot be easily structured simple linear relationships go a long way in describing the matching between job activities and required worker qualities intellect for complex relations to data and to people dexterity for complex relations to things there is no dichotomy between mathematical and verbal required skills poor working conditions are not restricted to workers in low level jobs we find strong support for compensating wage differentials at more intellectual jobs men receive less wage compensation for working conditions while in jobs requiring greater dexterity they receive more such a relationship is absent for women

underinvestment in a profitable technology the case of seasonal migration in bangladesh hunger during pre harvest lean seasons is widespread in the agrarian areas of asia and sub saharan africa we randomly assign an 8 50 incentive to households in rural bangladesh to temporarily out migrate during the lean season the incentive induces 22 of households to send a seasonal migrant their consumption at the origin increases significantly and treated households are 8 10 percentage points more likely to re migrate 1 and 3 years after the incentive is removed these facts can be explained qualitatively by a model in which migration is risky mitigating risk requires individual specific learning and some migrants are sufficiently close to subsistence that failed migration is very costly we document evidence consistent with this model using heterogeneity analysis and additional experimental variation but calibrations with forward looking households that can save up to migrate suggest that it is difficult for the model to quantitatively match the data we conclude with extensions to the model that could provide a better quantitative accounting of the behavior

interaction and imitation with heterogeneous agents a misleading evolutionary equilibrium abstract in a two population evolutionary game we analyze the interaction between individuals belonging to two populations with the same strategy set but different payoffs a game is played among individuals in the two populations they imitate agents belonging to the same and also the alternative population when a revising agent is matched with someone in the alternative population who plays differently his expected payoff and the observed payoff of his partner diverge hence he conjectures the payoff from switching to the other strategy by weighing what he expected and what he observes the evolutionary dynamics has a unique locally asymptotically stable fixed point which typically differs from the evolutionary stable equilibrium without inter population imitation for a collective action game we analyze to what extent the compliance rate and the social welfare differ from the nash equilibrium and how these gaps depend on the confidence that agents assign to what they see

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

a brave new world kantian nashian interaction and the dynamics of global climate change mitigation abstract we model game theoretic situations in which agents motivated by kantian ethics interact with conventional nashian agents we define the concept of generalized kant nash equilibrium which encompasses the nash equilibrium the kantian equilibrium and the kant nash equilibrium as special cases we show the existence and uniqueness of a kant nash equilibrium in a static game of climate change mitigation and derive its properties in a dynamic setting we analyze a differential game of climate change mitigation in the presence of both types of agents and compare their markov emission strategies for both the static model and the dynamic model as the population share of kantians increases the quality of the environment improves and both types of agents are better off

breakfast lunch and dinner expenditures away from home in the united states abstract this study investigates the differentiated effects of economic and socio demographic variables on food away from home fafh expenditures by type of meal among different types of households in the united states using data from the 2008 and 2009 consumer expenditure surveys the systems of expenditures on breakfast lunch and dinner are estimated with a multivariate sample selection procedure statistical significance of error correlations among equations justifies estimation of the sample selection systems income work hours race education geographic region and household composition are important determinants of fafh expenditures income contributes to fafh expenditures of all meal types implying that the future of fafh industry is tied to macroeconomic conditions more education is associated with increased expenditures for fafh lunch and dinner effects of the supplemental nutrition assistance program snap are negligible

industry or academia basic or applied career choices and earnings trajectories of scientists we extend life cycle models of human capital investments by incorporating matching theory to examine the sorting pattern of heterogeneous scientists into different career trajectories we link differences in physical capital investments and complementarities between basic and applied scientists across industry and academic settings to individual differences in scientist ability and preferences to predict an equilibrium matching of scientists to careers and to their earnings evolution our empirical analysis using the national science foundation s scientists and engineers statistical data system database is consistent with theoretical predictions of i sorting by ability into basic versus applied science among academic scientists but not among industry scientists and ii sorting by higher taste for nonmonetary returns into academia over industry the evolution of an earnings profile is consistent with these sorting patterns the earnings trajectories of basic and applied scientists are distinct from each other in academia but are similar in industry this paper was accepted by lee fleming entrepreneurship and innovation

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

job matching and occupational choice this paper presents a model of job matching the generalizes the existing literature by allowing for different jobs types or occupations such differences affect the value of job specific experience inducing a career profile where certain types are sampled before others more specifically the analysis shows that it is optimal for the young and inexperienced to gravitate toward jobs exhibiting a certain kind of risk then after deriving the equilibrium job turnover rate for an economy in which people do not switch occupations panel data are used to estimate its underlying parameters the hypothesis that people do not switch occupations is rejected against the alternative that they do thus providing empirical support for the theoretical extension undertaken here

compensating variation and hicksian choice probabilities in random utility models that are nonlinear in income in this paper we discuss hicksian demand and compensating variation in the context of discrete choice we first derive hicksian choice probabilities and the distribution of the random expenditure function in the general case when the utilities are nonlinear in income we subsequently derive exact and simple formulae for the expenditure and choice probabilities under price policy changes conditional on the initial utility level this is of particular interest for welfare measurement because it enables the researcher to compute the distribution of compensating variation in a simple way we also derive formulae for the joint distribution of expenditure the choice before and after a policy change has been introduced

learning your comparative advantages we introduce an equilibrium labor market model where workers gradually learn about their unobserved production abilities while engaged in a productive activity occupation workers observe their output and extract information that allows them to make inferences about their unobserved aptitudes because workers are learning about themselves their output informs them not only about their productivity in their current occupation but about their likely productivity in other occupations as well as workers acquire more information they self select into the occupations in which they expect to perform best and their wages increase returns to experience here capture improved job selection by workers as they sort through occupations and learn

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

on economics a review of why nations fail by d acemoglu and j robinson and pillars of prosperity by t besley and t persson the purpose of this essay is to review the books why nations fail by daron acemoglu and james robinson and pillars of prosperity by timothy besley and torsten persson the essay briefly discusses the main contributions of the books and the role of politics for economic performance the review then discusses these contributions in the light of recent research on organizational economics particularly the modern theory of the firm jel d23 d72 o10 o47 o57

socioeconomic inequality of access to healthcare does choice explain the gradient equity of access is a key policy objective in publicly funded healthcare systems however observed inequalities of access by socioeconomic status may result from differences in patients choices using data on non emergency coronary revascularisation procedures in the english national health service we found substantive differences in waiting times within public hospitals between patients with different socioeconomic status up to 35 difference or 43 days between the most and least deprived population quintile groups using selection models with differential distances as identification variables we estimated that only up to 12 of these waiting time inequalities can be attributed to patients choices of hospital and type of treatment heart bypass versus stent residual inequality after allowing for choice was economically significant patients in the least deprived quintile group benefited from shorter waiting times and the associated health benefits were worth up to 850 per person

tests of labor market rigidities and the roy model abstract previous studies examining labor market rigidities using the roy model have not incorporated the demand side in this paper i show that when the demand side is included selection models of labor market rigidities based on the roy model in general lead to the prediction of mean wage differentials across sectors this result is not surprising since the allocation of workers between sectors is determined by the marginal worker not the mean or median worker and an inducement differential may be necessary for demand to equal supply in each sector of the labor market previous tests of labor market rigidities are tests of the joint null hypothesis that under competition wages would be equalized across sectors and that wages are in fact equalized across sectors they may therefore attribute differences in wage structure to rigidities that are in fact the result of equalization of supply and demand within the inducement model developed an example is presented from the paper of dickens w lang k 1985 a test of the dual labor market theory american economic review 75 4 792 805 using the panel study of income dynamics

inter industry mobility and the cyclical upgrading of labor we investigate whether a market clearing model is consistent with industry employment and wage patterns related to the cyclical upgrading of labor we demonstrate that roy s 1951 market clearing

mobility and the return to education testing a roy model with multiple markets self selected migration presents one potential explanation for why observed returns to a college education in local labor markets vary widely even though u s workers are highly mobile to assess the impact of self selection on estimated returns this paper first develops a roy model of mobility and earnings where workers choose in which of the 50 states plus the district of columbia to live and work available estimation methods are either infeasible for a selection model with so many alternatives or place potentially severe restrictions on earnings and the selection process this paper develops an alternative econometric methodology that combines lee s 1983 parametric maximum order statistic approach to reduce the dimensionality of the error terms with more recent work on semiparametric estimation of selection models e g ahn and powell 1993 the resulting semiparametric correction is easy to implement and can be adapted to a variety of other polychotomous choice problems the empirical work which uses 1990 u s census data confirms the role of comparative advantage in mobility decisions the results suggest that self selection of higher educated individuals to states with higher returns to education generally leads to upward biases in ols estimates of the returns to education in state specific labor markets while the estimated returns to a college education are significantly biased correcting for the bias does not narrow the range of returns across states consistent with the finding that the corrected return to a college education differs across the u s the relative state to state migration flows of college versus high school educated individuals respond strongly to differences in the return to education and amenities across states

life cycle schooling and dynamic selection bias models and evidence for five cohorts of american males this paper examines an empirical regularity found in many societies that family influences on the probability of transiting from one grade level to the next diminish at higher levels of education we examine the statistical model used to establish the empirical regularity and the intuitive behavioral interpretation often used to rationalize it we show that the implicit economic model assumes myopia the intuitive interpretive model is identified only by imposing arbitrary distributional assumptions onto the data we produce an alternative choice theoretic model with fewer parameters that rationalizes the same data and is not based on arbitrary distributional assumptions

kinship ties social networks and segmented labor markets evidence from the construction sector in egypt abstract this paper tests for rationing of entry into craft occupations in the construction labor market in egypt and investigates whether entry is rationed according to regional origin and access to kinship and other social networks i use a modified version of roy s model of occupational choice which allows for the existence of costs of entry into craft occupations data from a 1988 survey of construction workers are used to estimate the model and test for rationing the results confirm the existence of rationing according to a worker s regional background but are inconclusive with respect to kinship ties and social networks

putting tasks to the test human capital job tasks and wages using original representative survey data we document that analytical routine and manual job tasks can be measured with high validity vary substantially within and between occupations are significantly related to workers characteristics and are robustly predictive of wage differences between occupations and among workers in the same occupation we offer a conceptual framework that makes explicit the causal links between human capital endowments occupational assignment job tasks and wages which motivate a roy model of the allocation of workers to occupations we offer two simple tests of the model s gross predictions for the relationship between tasks and wages both of which receive qualified empirical support

differential taxation and occupational choice we develop a framework to study optimal sector specific taxation where each agent chooses an occupation by comparing her skill differential with the tax burden differential across sectors because skills are not perfectly transferable the diamond mirrlees theorem according to which the second best entails production efficiency fails social welfare can be increased by inducing some agents to join the sector in which their productivity is not the highest at the optimum income taxes balance the marginal losses from inter sector migration with the marginal gains from tailoring tax schedules to the distribution of productivities in each sector tagging a calibrated model indicates that sector specific taxation generates substantive welfare gains when skill transferability decreases with income as it enables the government to increase average taxes on high earners with large wage premia

gender differences physical activity and body weight we investigate the effect of physical activity on bodyweight and the gender differences in such effects following the copula approach to endogenous switching regression using data from the 2006 behavioral risk factor surveillance system brfss we find differentiated effects of socio demographic variables on exercise and on body mass indexes bmis and differentiated effects of exercise on bmi between genders regular exercise on average decreases bmi by 1 78 for women and 1 01 for men food price away from home has negative effects on bmi of both men and women

the u shapes of occupational mobility using administrative panel data on the entire danish population we document a new set of facts characterizing occupational mobility for most occupations mobility is u shaped and directional not only low but also high wage earners within an occupation have a particularly large probability of leaving their occupation and the low high earners tend to switch to new occupations with lower higher average wages exceptions to this pattern of two sided selection are occupations with steeply rising declining productivity where mainly the lower higher paid workers within this occupation tend to leave the facts conflict with several existing theories that are used to account for endogeneity in occupational choice but it is shown analytically that the patterns are explained consistently within a theory of vertical sorting under absolute advantage that includes learning about workers abilities

redistributive taxation in the roy model we consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector we show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens the constrained pareto frontier can be implemented with a single non linear income tax we derive formulas for this optimal tax schedule if sectoral inputs are complements a many sector model with self selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single sector model under natural conditions however they are more progressive than in a multi sector model without occupational choice or without overlapping wage distributions as in stiglitz 1982

evolution and kantian morality what kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor we propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative individuals preferences are their private information the set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions we show that a certain class of such preferences that combine self interest with morality of a kantian flavor are evolutionarily stable and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable we also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of maynard smith s and price s 1973 notion of evolutionary stability of strategies

the evolution of social norms in common property resource use the problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary game theoretic framework it is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well defined sense against invasion by narrowly self interested behavior the resource stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary game dynamics effects of changes in prices technology and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long run stock are analyzed when threshold values of the parameters are crossed social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long run stock and possibly to its extinction copyright 1996 by american economic association

kantian optimization a microfoundation for cooperation abstract although evidence accrues in biology anthropology and experimental economics that homo sapiens is a cooperative species the reigning assumption in economic theory is that individuals optimize in an autarkic manner as in nash and walrasian equilibrium i here postulate a cooperative kind of optimizing behavior called kantian it is shown that in simple economic models when there are negative externalities such as congestion effects from use of a commonly owned resource or positive externalities such as a social ethos reflected in individuals preferences kantian equilibria dominate the nash walras equilibria in terms of efficiency while economists schooled in nash equilibrium may view the kantian behavior as utopian there is some perhaps much evidence that it exists if cultures evolve through group selection the hypothesis that kantian behavior is more prevalent than we may think is supported by the efficiency results here demonstrated

the dynamics of changes in the female wage distribution in the usa a quantile regression approach this paper examines the female wage structure focusing on changes at different points in the wage distribution newly developed quantile regression methods are used in analysing data from the march current population survey the results show that while the most significant changes for the less skilled women took place at the bottom of the wage distribution for the more skilled groups changes occurred at both ends of the distribution consequently wage inequality decreased for the high school graduates and increased for the younger college graduates furthermore the more highly skilled women experienced the steepest gain in wages regardless of their position in the distribution 1998 john wiley sons ltd

gender wage gap and the role of skills and tasks evidence from the austrian piaac data set we analyze the gender differences in skills tasks and skill matching of workers and the impact of these factors on the gender wage gap using the survey of adult skills a product of the oecd pro

social and economic determinants of english voter choice in the 1997 general election using a theoretical framework in which voters choices are the result of utility maximisation decisions and in which the variation of utility functions across individuals is partly deterministic depending on their socio economic characteristics and partly stochastic we estimate constituency level regression equations to explain how the electoral shares of each of the main parties depend on conditions in the constituency whilst social characteristics ap pear to have an impact similar to that predicted in the existing literature economic conditions appear to have played a very different role in 1997 from in previous elections

firm wage differentials and labor market sorting reconciling theory and evidence why do firms pay different wages empirical evidence suggests the presence of substantial differences in firm pay controlling for worker skill moreover these differences are uncorrelated with ski

should workers care about firm size the authors analyze how firms of different sizes reward measured skills and unmeasured ability the empirical methodology based on nonlinear instrumental variable estimation permits direct estimation of the returns to unmeasured ability by firm size an analysis of panel data from the canadian survey of labour and income dynamics for two periods 1993 1998 and 1996 2001 reveals statistically significant differences between firms of different sizes in particular returns to unmeasured ability are higher in medium sized firms than in either small firms or large firms the authors find that the firm size wage gap and the differential in returns to unmeasured ability between small and medium sized firms is mainly explained by ability sorting the fact that larger firms reward ability less than medium sized firms is consistent with an explanation based on monitoring costs when firms become too large monitoring costs may prevent them from rewarding ability directly through wages

accounting for heterogeneity diversity and general equilibrium in evaluating social programmes this paper considers the merits and limitations of alternative criteria proposed to evaluate social programmes in the modern welfare state and the information required to implement them when individual responses to programmes are heterogeneous participation in programmes is based in part on this heterogeneity and the programmes have general equilibrium impacts on the economy particular attention is devoted to the voting criterion used in modern positive political economy and the ranking of alternative social states based on anonymity postulates evidence on heterogeneity is presented conflicts among the criteria are revealed in two empirical studies partial equilibrium approaches are shown to be misleading

introduction to the distribution of earnings and of individual output by a d roy this article summarises the lasting contribution of roy s 1950 fundamental paper roy a d 1950 the distribution of earnings and of individual output economic journal vol 60 239 pp 489 505

military service and political behavior evidence from france abstract we investigate the impact of compulsory military service on turnout and political preferences exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for french men we observe a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout we estimate that the service increases turnout by approximately 7 percentage points we also investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences when we control for selection into the military service we observe no support for a change in preferences of former conscripts

if people vote because they like to then why do so many of them lie of those eligible about 40 do not vote in presidential elections when asked about a quarter of those nonvoters will lie to the survey takers and claim that they did increases in education are associated with higher voting rates and lower rates of lying overall but with increased rates of lying conditional on not voting this paper proposes a model of voter turnout in which people who claim to vote get praise from other citizens those who lie must bear the cost of lying the model has a stable equilibrium with positive rates of voting honest non voting and lying reasonable parameter changes produce changes in these proportions in the same direction as the changes actually observed across education levels i argue that a model where people vote because they want to be known as voters provides a better explanation for observed voting behavior than does a model where people vote because they want to vote

the mixing problem in programme evaluation a common concern of evaluation studies is to learn the distribution of outcomes when a specified treatment policy or assignment rule determines the treatment received by each member of a specified population recent studies have emphasized evaluation of policies providing the same treatment to all members of the population in particular experiments with randomized treatments have this objective policies mandating homogenous treatment of the population are of interest but so are ones that permit treatment to vary across the population this paper examines the use of empirical evidence on programs with homogenous treatments to infer the outcomes that would occur if treatment were to vary across the population experimental evidence from the perry preschool project is used to illustrate the inferential problem and the main findings of the analysis

the generalized roy model and the cost benefit analysis of social programs the literature on treatment effects focuses on gross benefits from program participation we extend this literature by developing conditions under which it is possible to identify parameters measuring the cost and net surplus from program participation using the generalized roy model we nonparametrically identify the cost benefit and net surplus of selection into treatment without requiring the analyst to have direct information on costs we apply our methodology to estimate the gross benefit and net surplus of attending college

identification of standard auction models this paper presents new identification results for models of first price second price ascending english and descending dutch auctions we consider a general specification of the latent demand and information structure nesting both private values and common values models and allowing correlated types as well as ex ante asymmetry we address identification of a series of nested models and derive testable restrictions enabling discrimination between models on the basis of observed data the simplest model symmetric independent private values is nonparametrically identified even if only the transaction price from each auction is observed for richer models identification and testable restrictions may be obtained when additional information of one or more of the following types is available i the identity of the winning bidder or other bidders ii one or more bids in addition to the transaction price iii exogenous variation in the number of bidders iv bidder specific covariates while many private values pv models are nonparametrically identified and testable with commonly available data identification of common values cv models requires stringent assumptions nonetheless the pv model can be tested against the cv alternative even when neither model is identified

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

self enforcing environmental agreements and international trade abstract in the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements ieas barrett 1994 rubio and ulph 2006 the number of signatories of self enforcing ieas does not exceed three if non positive emissions are ruled out we extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced and consumed in each country and traded on world markets when signatory countries act as a stackelberg leader and emissions are positive the size of stable ieas may be significantly larger in our model with international trade this would be good news if larger self enforcing ieas would lead to stronger reductions of total emissions unfortunately in the presence of self enforcing ieas total emissions turn out to be only slightly less than in the business as usual scenario independent of the number of signatories we also investigate the role of international trade by comparing our free trade results with the outcome in the regime of autarky our autarky model turns out to be coincident with the basic model of the literature alluded to above we contribute to that literature by showing that in autarky the outcome of self enforcing ieas is also almost the same as in the business as usual scenario

empirical analysis of occupational hierarchies using data on u s engineers and the position of engineering jobs within firms this paper estimates a model of hierarchies within firms the model extends rosen s 1982 model of recursive production to two skills and multiple hierarchy levels the model generates an empirical model that is nested within a general roy 1951 model of self selection maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the production technology and the skill experience profiles are estimated the results suggest that approximately two thirds of changes in employment shares across hierarchy levels across time are explained by demographic shifts in the stock of engineering skills most of the returns to experience and to assignment to higher hierarchy levels within firms are caused by skill accumulation and self selection rather than technological dierences across hierarchy levels

estimating the variance of wages in the presence of selection and unobserved heterogeneity abstract identification of potential wage distributions by education is important to the study of the causal links between education inequality and uncertainty potential wage inequality within an educational group that is the variance in wages if all workers had the same education exceeds the observed statistics because self selected education truncates wage distributions decomposing potential wage inequality into heterogeneity known to the agent making the educational choice and uncertainty unknown to the agent suggests that wage uncertainty does not necessarily rise with education it is unobserved heterogeneity not uncertainty that explains the observed relationship between college graduation and higher wage inequality

downward nominal and real wage rigidity survey evidence from european firms it has been well established that the wages of individual workers react little especially downwards to shocks that hit their employer this paper presents new evidence from a unique survey of firms across europe on the prevalence of downward wage rigidity in both real and nominal terms the authors analyse which firm level and institutional factors are associated with wage rigidity the results indicate that it is related to workforce composition at the establishment level in a manner that is consistent with related theoretical models e g efficiency wage theory insider outsider theory the analysis also finds that wage rigidity depends on the labour market institutional environment collective bargaining coverage is positively related with downward real wage rigidity measured on the basis of wage indexation downward nominal wage rigidity is positively associated with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter employment protection regulations

skill transferability migration and development evidence from population resettlement in indonesia we use a natural experiment in indonesia to provide causal evidence on the role of location specific human capital and skill transferability in shaping the spatial distribution of productivity from 1979 1988 the transmigration program relocated two million migrants from rural java and bali to new rural settlements in the outer islands villages assigned migrants from regions with more similar agroclimatic endowments exhibit higher rice productivity and nighttime light intensity one to two decades later we find some evidence of migrants adaptation to agroclimatic change overall our results suggest that regional productivity differences may overstate the potential gains from migration

international migration self selection and the distribution of wages evidence from mexico and the united states we use the 1990 and 2000 mexican and u s population censuses to test borjas s negative selection hypothesis that the less skilled are those most likely to migrate from countries with high skill premia earnings inequality to countries with low skill premia earnings inequality we find that mexican immigrants in the united states are more educated than nonmigrants in mexico and were mexican immigrants to be paid according to current skill prices in mexico they would be concentrated in the middle of mexico s wage distribution these results are inconsistent with the negative selection hypothesis and instead suggest that there is intermediate selection of immigrants from mexico

alternative estimates of the effect of schooling on earnings this is the publisher s version it can also be found here http www mitpressjournals org doi pdf 10 1162 003465300558542

who will vote quadratically voter turnout and votes cast under quadratic voting who will vote quadratically in large n elections under quadratic voting qv first who will vote although the core qv literature assumes that everyone votes turnout is endogenous drawing on other work we consider the representativeness of endogenously determined turnout under qv second who will vote quadratically conditional on turning out we examine reasons that in large n elections the number of votes that an individual casts may deviate substantially from that under pure rational qv equilibrium play because turnout itself is driven by other factors the same determinants may influence how voters who do turn out choose the quantity of votes to cast independently the number of votes actually cast may deviate dramatically from pure qv predictions because of the complex and refined nature of equilibrium play most plausibly voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces would exhibit few of the features emphasized in the analysis of hyper rational equilibrium play and would have consequential properties that require a different research agenda to bring into focus some of our analysis also has implications for voting behavior under other procedures including one person one vote