strikes as a result of imperfect information this paper proposes a model of the bargaining process that recognizes that negotiators have only imperfect information at their command the author argues that the probability of a strike occurring will increase if one party bases its perception of the opponent s position on the same variables employed to form its own position when the opponent s position is in fact based on different variables strike probability is therefore assumed to be related to movements in variables of interest to only one side the model is tested on a sample of fourteen bargaining relationships drawn from the series wage chronology published by the bureau of labor statistics which details settlements between particular firms and unions over a period of about thirty years estimates of strike probability are derived from the maximum likelihood logit procedure the findings suggest that although both relative and absolute wage increases in a firm have a negative effect on strike frequency relative changes are more important

bubbles and experience an experiment we investigate the occurrence of bubble crash pricing patterns in laboratory financial markets with a mixture of experienced and inexperienced traders we find that even with a minority of experienced traders bubbles are substantially abated

collective bargaining in the public sector the effect of legal structure on dispute costs and wages this paper examines the impact of collective bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of canadian public sector contracts the authors results suggest that policymakers designing collective bargaining legislation face a trade off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective bargaining legislation exists hence a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs however the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures copyright 1991 by american economic association

women as policy makers evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india this paper uses political reservations for women in india to study the impact of women s leadership on policy decisions since the mid 1990 s one third of village council head positions in india have been randomly reserved for a woman in these councils only women could be elected to the position of head village councils are responsible for the provision of many local public goods in rural areas using a dataset we collected on 265 village councils in west bengal and rajasthan we compare the type of public goods provided in reserved and unreserved village councils we show that the reservation of a council seat affects the types of public goods provided specifically leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own genders

strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

collective bargaining firm size and pensions in canada abstract the following paper analyzes the provision of job related pensions in canada the empirical results indicate that both unions and firm size have significant effects on the distribution of pensions the significance of unions on the provision of pensions does decline as firm size increases

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

cyclical fluctuations in strike activity using a set of data on contracts and strikes for the period 1970 81 the author distinguishes among the roles of aggregate business conditions labor market conditions and product market conditions in the determination of strike incidence and duration strike incidence is found to be highest in industries that are depressed relative to the rest of the economy but in regions with low unemployment this finding is consistent with the theory that the cost of a strike to a firm increases with the demand for its product and the cost of a strike to the union increases with unemployment another finding however is that strikes are longest in industries that are booming relative to the rest of the economy

probability judgment error and speculation in laboratory asset market bubbles in 12 sessions conducted in a typical bubble generating experimental environment we design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior the specific form of irrationality we investigate is the probability judgment error associated with lowprobability high payoff outcomes independently we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in multiperiod versus single period markets we establish that aggregate irrationality measured in one dimension probability judgment error is associated with aggregate irrationality measured in another bubble formation

collective bargaining in the public sector comment in a recent paper janet currie and sheena mcconnell 1991 hereafter cm provide evidence from the canadian public sector suggesting that requiring binding wage arbitration as opposed to granting the right to strike reduces dispute costs but increases wage costs disputes are defined as either an arbitration or a strike this leads them to conclude that compulsory arbitration pareto dominates other forms of legal structure both parties could potentially be made better off from the reduction in dispute costs associated with compulsory arbitration and those responsible for designing collective bargaining legislation face a trade off between reducing dispute costs and changing the division of the rent p 714 they base these important policy conclusions on their empirical evidence on the following relationships

contracts and strikes in canada 1952 1988 between 1952 and 1979 labour canada collected data on something in excess of 5300 contracts an earlier subset of these data covering 19531973 was used in work by inter alia riddell 1979 1980 but in recent years they have not been widely studied the reason is perhaps that in the early 1960s while labour canada was still assembling what is usually referred to as the wage chronologies file work also began on the collection of contract data for what is known as the wage file this data collection which continues to the present day has generated what many view as an unparalleled source of detail about wage agreements and most analyses of canadian contracts focus on the wage file alone this short paper briefly describes some aspects of the preparation of both data sets for analysis including the incorporation of information on strikes when they occurred a longer version of this paper that is available from the author dwells in considerably more detail on these issues the other main focus of this paper is on some preliminary evidence from a combination of the two samples covering contracts from 1952 to 1988 specifically the combined sample reveals several insights into changes over time in strike behaviour and contract length in future papers it is planned to use an extended version of the data beyond 1988 to explore these and other issues for a period of over 40 years the paper is organized as follows section ii describes the two sets of contract data paying particular attention to the use of labour canada s work stoppage file to supplement the information on those contracts that were settled only after a strike section iii outlines one way of combining the contract data sets and reports on the changes over time in strike behaviour and contract duration thus revealed

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

who uses interest arbitration the case of british columbia s teachers 1947 1981 several researchers have attempted to identify the circumstances under which parties subject to compulsory interest arbitration will actually push a contract dispute to arbitration in this paper a simple model that incorporates elements of the leading hypotheses is tested using a unique data set spanning 35 years of compulsory conventional arbitration experience among teachers in british columbia the strongest empirical finding is that bargaining units that used arbitration in the previous round of negotiations were at least ten percent more likely than other units to use it in the current round on the other hand variables intended to capture attitudes toward risk changes in the degree of uncertainty associated with arbitral outcomes differing beliefs about likely arbitral outcomes and principal agent problems were found to have little impact on the estimated probability of using arbitration

strikes arbitration and teacher salaries a behavioral analysis this study uses bacharach and lawler s behavioral theory of bargaining to derive hypotheses about the impact of strikes and compulsory interest arbitration on teacher salaries those hypotheses are tested with data sets on illinois and iowa school districts and on a national sample of teachers drawn from the current population survey the results suggest that strike use affects teacher salaries but that arbitration use does not additional tests indicate that the availability of both arbitration and of the legal or de facto right to strike has similar effects on salary levels increasing salaries by about 10 percent the findings also suggest that arbitration and the strike are used as defensive rather than offensive strategies

the use of replacement workers in union contract negotiations the u s experience 1980 1989 it is argued in many circles that a structural change occurred in u s collective bargaining in the 1980s strike incidence declined dispute incidence increased and the composition of disputes shifted away from strikes and toward holdouts we investigate the extent to which the hiring of replacement workers can account for these changes for a sample of over 300 major strikes since 1980 we estimate the likelihood of replacements being hired we find that the risk of replacement is lower for bargaining units with more experienced workers and declines during tight labor markets the composition of disputes shifts away from strikes as the predicted risk of replacement increases in addition the overall level of disputes increases as a result of the shift in the composition of disputes based on our estimates reducing the predicted replacement risk faced by bargaining units to the pre 1982 levels would have lead to a reduction in the dispute incidence by around 5 percentage points an increase in the fraction of disputes involving a strike by around 4 percentage points and an increase in the strike incidence by around 0 8 percentage points

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

taxation and political mobilization evidence from andhra pradesh abstractthis article empirically investigates whether there are differences in a region s taxation burden on the basis of support for the centralized state government in the indian state of andhra pradesh using randomness introduced by close election outcomes this article finds that the government collected less tax revenues where opposition parties were more successful the decline in tax revenue was most likely targeted at agricultural producers and a similar pattern is found in other available agricultural policies these results are consistent with a model in which it is optimal for a centralized government to catch up in elections it trails as opposed to bolstering existing leads furthermore these results suggest that taxation responds to electoral pressures and that agricultural producers in particular are targeted during times of political competition

an empirical study of the adverse selection model of strikes problems with existing empirical studies of the asymmetric information theory of strikes are 1 industry level data are used as proxies for firm level variables 2 studies using firm level data potentially suffer from simultaneity bias and 3 one of the key predictions of the theory is not tested the present paper addresses these issues while estimating a probit model of strike incidence using data comprising 2 459 contracts from canadian industry for 1964 85 that are merged with firm specific data under a number of alternative specifications results support the main predictions of the asymmetric information theory of strikes

is strike behavior cyclical we examine cyclicality of strike frequency and incidence using canadian data on strikes and contracts total strike frequency exhibits significant procyclicality to which within contract strikes contribute appreciably evidence is weaker for procyclical behavior of contract expiry strikes both in total and disaggregated by issue strike incidence is also procyclical particularly in manufacturing though the procyclicality here is confined to strikes over nonwage issues these results mirror those obtained by analyzing the frequency of strikes in the contract data industry specific cyclical variables positively affect strike incidence in manufacturing but region specific variables have no effect

wage bargaining with time varying threats we study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm s willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired as strikers find temporary jobs and as inventories or strike funds run out we find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary if dispute costs increase in the long run then dispute durations are longer settlement rates are lower and wages decline more slowly during the short run and may even increase the settlement wage is largely determined from the long run threat rather than the short run threat

price bubbles and crashes in experimental call markets abstract price bubbles relative to intrinsic dividend value are observed using a call market trading institution market prices tend to track intrinsic value only when the same group of highly experienced traders participate in three consecutive 15 round markets

bargaining unit composition and the returns to education and tenure using data on collectively bargained outcomes in pennsylvania schools in 1983 89 the authors find a strong relationship between the returns to education and tenure and the distribution of those attributes in the bargaining unit for instance the higher the median level of teacher tenure in a district the greater was the pay gap between teachers with low and high tenure this relationship was very strong in districts with vigorous community support for union activities and weak or nonexistent in districts with low union support the authors argue that consistent with the median voter model the unions in this study pushed hardest to advance the interests of their typical members and that they were most effective in doing so where the community was generally supportive of unions

final offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties abstract final offer arbitration foa is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers proposed by two disputing parties we build an equilibrium model of foa with players averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues the role of foa in incentivizing negotiated settlements the convergence of final offers and the normative effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion we show that increase in arbitral uncertainty increases the likelihood of negotiated agreements and make the final offers converge to each other risk aversion is not necessary for convergence of offers precision and mean of arbitral uncertainty matter differently and can be controlled separately moreover as also argued by the industry practitioners carefully selected level of diversity of opinion in the arbitrator roster increases the welfare of negotiating parties

final offer arbitration in final offer arbitration the two parties to a dispute submit final offers to an arbitrator the arbitrator then chooses as the binding solution that offer which is closest to his own view of the appropriate outcome because the disputants are imperfectly informed about the arbitrator s preferences final offer arbitration can be modeled as a game of imperfect information interesting questions arise concerning the nature of the optimal strategies and how they are affected by different characteristics of the arbitrator and the disputants we provide conditions for an equilibrium to exist in a final offer arbitration game when there are k issues the probability function is not specified and the disputants are either risk averse or risk neutral furthermore the players may have differing beliefs about the arbitrator s probability function we demonstrate that increased risk aversion by one of the parties will result in both players choosing positions farther away from the more risk averse party we also discover the affect of bias as well as the effect of increased sensitivity by the arbitrator on the positions taken by the players

state dependence in the incidence of strikes evidence from canadian contract data using heckman s dynamic probit model abstract this paper considers whether there is state dependence in strike incidence using longitudinal contract data from canada i obtain my estimates using heckman s estimator for dynamic probit models and find that there is no state dependence in strike incidence

arbitrator behavior and the variances of arbitrated and negotiated wage settlements the variance of arbitrated wage settlements is significantly lower than the variance of negotiated wage settlements in a sample of teachers contracts even when possible selection of contracts into arbitration is accounted for this result is consistent with the hypothesis that arbitrated settlements do not incorporate all of the information that is reflected in negotiated settlements

estimating strike effects in a general model of prices and quantities estimates of the effect of strikes on the production price and purchases of north american automobiles are provided over the period 1966 79 the estimates are based on a model that reflects the decisions of both consumers and producers and that captures important intertemporal adjustments before during and after the strike to allow for inventory buildup in anticipation of the strike as well as inventory depletion during the strike and replacement afterward the results generally indicated that both consumers and producers rationally responded to the expected and the actual event of the strike through a variety of related intertemporal adjustments and while the initial effects are in some instances quite pronounced the long run effects are usually minimal

logit estimates of strike incidence from canadian contract data logit estimates of strike incidence are made based on a unique and comprehensive data set of 2 437 collective agreements the appropriate level of aggregation since that is where bargaining occurs the results are interpreted through a theoretical framework emphasizing that strikes are more likely when the joint costs of using the strike mechanism are low relative to the cost of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same purposes such functions of strikes are to generate information elicit truth telling establish reputations provide catharsis and solve intraorganizational conflict

lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the united states the authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the united states in the manner suggested by the political economy model of grossman and helpman 1994 this is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data the authors test the model using a detailed cross sectional data set of agricultural protection subsidies and political action committee pac contributions in the late 1990s the model is qualitatively affirmed by the data they make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model s quantitative implications also found in recent studies this solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government the results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge

collective bargaining interest arbitration and police salaries previous research and conventional wisdom suggest that the practice of collective bargaining the availability of interest arbitration and the use of arbitration when available all have a positive

does mediation arbitration reduce arbitration rates evidence from a natural experiment to study the effect of the introduction of mediation arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure on interest arbitration the authors exploit a natural experiment in the arbitration institutions

bargaining and the role of expert agents an empirical study of final offer arbitration abstract expert agents such as lawyers play a prominent role in conflict resolution yet little is known about how they affect outcomes we construct a model that permits us to estimate the influence of agents and test whether the parties in a dispute face prisoner s dilemma incentives using eighteen years of final offer arbitration data from new jersey we find the parties do significantly better when they retain agents and that the parties learn about this benefit over time however we also find that the gain to using an agent is fully offset when the opposing party also hires an agent since agents are costly this noncooperative equilibrium is pareto inferior

the impact of collective bargaining legislation on disputes in the u s public sector no legislation may be the worst legislation this article estimates the impact of collective bargaining legislation on disputes during labor negotiations in the u s public sector we use a large national sample of u s state and local government contracts to compare the incidence and intensity of disputes by similar workers under different forms of collective bargaining legislation the breadth of our data allows us to examine the impact of five different forms of legislation our principal finding is that dispute costs are highest in jurisdictions that provide no explicit framework for bargaining or dispute resolution strikes are as frequent and as long when they are illegal and employers are not required to bargain with employees as when they are legal but employers are required to bargain arbitration is most frequently used when formal institutions for arbitration have been provided

the causes of bargaining failure evidence from major league baseball abstract final offer arbitration in major league baseball provides an ideal setting for examining the empirical regularities that are associated with bargaining failure since final offers salaries and player statistics which provide the fundamental facts for the case are all readily available using data for players eligible for arbitration for 1990 93 we conduct a wide variety of empirical tests regarding the relationship between aggressive offers and arbitration outcomes we find that aggressive offers by players trigger arbitration and that more aggressive offers are associated with inferior financial outcomes in arbitration overall clubs appear to outperform players in arbitration unexpectedly high or low offers are less common for players who have previously been through arbitration which suggests that learning occurs our results are inconsistent with simple one sided asymmetric information models of arbitration the results are more consistent with an optimism model or a model in which so

cyclical fluctuations in strike durations canadian data on strikes between 1946 and 1983 are used to estimate linear regression models for the logarithm of completed duration a thorough investigation of the influence of the business cycle reveals strong support for the hypothesis that strike durations are countercyclical the cyclical effect is shown to be robust to both the choice of cyclical variable and the econometric specification and the magnitude of the effect is quite substantial experimentation with different representations of the cycle reveals that it is difficult to improve on a simple formulation involving a single continuous variable

the effect of settlement stage on negotiated wage settlements in canada this paper analyzes the effect of the particular stage of wage settlement on the negotiated wage increase using micro data on canadian labor contracts between 1966 and 1975 the sample data base was divided into direct first stage bargaining mediation conciliation and work stoppage arbitration and structural wage equations were estimated for each set of data the results indicate that as negotiations move from direct bargaining to work stoppage labor market conditions measured by a vacancy rate become less important as an explanatory variable and price catch up becomes more important

equilibrium strategies for final offer arbitration there is no median convergence final offer arbitration is a procedure for settling disputes between two parties in which an arbitrator chooses the final offer of the party closest to what he considers a fair settlement this procedure is modeled as a two person zero sum game of imperfect information in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator s fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found such equilibria when they exist in pure strategies represent bids which are symmetric about the median and for most common distributions are separated from one another by two or more standard deviations this finding suggests that final offer arbitration may not accomplish its avowed purpose of inducing the two parties to converge on what they perceive to be t

irrationality and beliefs in a laboratory asset market is it me or is it you abstract this paper reports on an experiment designed to examine individual and market outcomes with a mixture of rational and non rational traders using values elicited via auctions we measure a specific form of irrationality the tendency to overweight high payoff low probability events or probability judgment error subjects are classified by their tendency to exhibit errors as well as their beliefs regarding whether others will make errors subjects then participate in a series of double auction markets the results indicate that both probability judgment error and beliefs about other subjects susceptibility to probability judgment error have significant impact on individual and market outcomes

lobbying incentives and the pattern of protection in rich and poor countries in seeking to explain why poor countries tend to choose policies that tax agriculture relative to manufacturing while rich countries do the opposite archetypical parameters for a poor agrarian economy and a rich industrial one are inserted in a computable general equilibrium model to simulate the medium term effects on income distribution of policies that distort the relative prices of tradables the model includes a non tradables sector and intermediate inputs realistic features that ensure even greater skewness in the distributional effects of protection than simpler models suggest the magnitude of the results helps explain the tendency for countries to change gradually from taxing to subsidizing agriculture relative to manufacturing as their economies develop the paper draws out the implications of the analysis for agricultural and trade policy reform in the 1990s this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

work stoppages and the theory of the offset factor evidence from the british columbian lumber industry one method of estimating losses resulting from work stoppages is to multiply the total number of man days lost during disputes by the average product of workers this statistic can be easily calculated using information typically available from government agencies but has obvious flaws for example the behavior of other firms not involved in disputes is ignored moreover when output is durable the impact on consumption is unknown since inventories can be used as buffers to assess the importance of these and other considerations i develop an alternative empirical framework and implement it using data from the british columbian lumber industry

a comparison of conventional final offer and combined arbitration for dispute resolution two widely used forms of arbitration are conventional arbitration in which the arbitrator makes an unconstrained settlement choice and final offer arbitration in which the arbitrator must choose between disputants final offers under an innovative as yet unused approach called combined arbitration if the arbitrator s notion of a fair settlement lies between the disputants final offers final offer arbitration rules are used otherwise conventional arbitration rules are used theoretically by combining the risks that the two standard forms of arbitration pose for disputants who do not voluntarily settle combined arbitration should generate convergent final offers the results of this controlled laboratory study show however that dispute rates are highest in combined arbitration and lowest in conventional arbitration these results challenge the theoretical predictions for combined arbitration as well as claims that final offer arbitration should reduce disputes compared to conventional arbitration the results are however consistent with a simple theory of disputant optimism

the effect of short selling on bubbles and crashes in experimental spot asset markets a series of experiments illustrate that relaxing short selling constraints lowers prices in experimental asset markets but does not induce prices to track fundamentals we argue that prices in experimental asset markets are influenced by restrictions on short selling capacity and limits on the cash available for purchases restrictions on short sales in the form of cash reserve requirements and quantity limits on short positions behave in a similar manner a simulation model based on delong et al 1990 generates average price patterns that are similar to the observed data asset market bubbles are persistent deviations of prices from fundamentals to the extent that bubbles exist they can influence investment levels and the allocation of capital and thereby have considerable economic effects in recognition of their potential importance the question of the existence and pervasiveness of bubbles has been a focus of extensive empirical investigation see e g shiller 1981 blanchard and watson 1982 diba and grossman 1988 and west 1988 these studies yield mixed results regarding the empirical relevance of bubble phenomena one source of the differences in conclusions may be that because the fundamental value of the assets cannot be observed tests of the presence of bubbles are joint tests with the particular specification of the process guiding the evolution of fundamentals also being tested the availability of short selling is widely believed to make bubble formation less likely one rationale for such a belief is the notion that the cause of asset market bubbles is a constraint on the ability of traders to speculate on future downward price movements see e g miller 1977 jarrow 1980 diamond and verrecchia 1987 or figlewski and webb 1993 in the absence of short sales traders may sell only the shares in their portfolios the availability of short sales relaxes this constraint in this paper we study empirically the effect of allowing short sales on both the incidence and magnitude of market bubbles we choose a setting in which the fundamental value of the asset is clearly and unambiguously defined and known at all times and bubbles typically occur namely we use the experimental environment that smith suchanek and williams 1988 introduce while

public sector earnings and the extent of unionization many studies have examined the influence of union density union members as a percentage of all workers on earnings in the private sector but few such studies have looked at the public sector using data from the 1991 current population survey this study estimates the determinants of earnings for state and local government employees in both the union and nonunion sectors the extent of public sector unionization appears to be positively correlated with earnings for both state and local government workers and for those covered and not covered by collective agreements although the effect for non covered employees is smaller than that for covered employees both effects are larger than those typically found in similar estimates for the private sector the authors also find that bargaining structure has some influence on earnings with the most consistent effect being a positive influence of arbitration on the earnings of local government workers

cost of living escalators in major union contracts this paper analyzes the price indexation provisions of a sample of major canadian collective bargaining agreements concluded between 1968 and 1975 under these contracts escalated wage increases comprised about one third of total wage increases and represented a major source of erosion in the relative wages of skilled workers the author argues that indexation provisions are usefully characterized by the marginal elasticity of the contractual wage rate to increases in prices measures of this responsiveness indicate that on average contractual wage rates are only slightly less than unit elastic with respect to price increases there is considerable variation across industries however in the extent to which wages respond to price changes

nonspeculative bubbles in experimental asset markets lack of common knowledge of rationality vs actual irrationality we report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets in a setting in which speculation is not possible bubbles and crashes are observed the results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation in markets where speculation is possible is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment

margin short selling and lotteries in experimental asset markets the robustness of bubbles and crashes in markets for assets with finite lives is perplexing this paper reports the results of experimental asset markets in which participants trade two assets in some markets price bubbles form in these markets traders pay higher prices for the asset with lottery characteristics i e a claim on a large unlikely payoff however institutional design has a significant impact on deviations in prices from fundamental values particularly for an asset with lottery characteristics price run ups and crashes are moderated when traders finance purchases of the assets themselves and are allowed to short sell

learning from interest arbitration the next round in final offer arbitration the decision of the arbitrator provides the parties with information about the preferences of the arbitrator that is not available prior to the award using data from wisconsin teacher negotiations from 1977 to 1986 the authors find that the information contained in an award altered the parties expectations about the arbitrator s preferences and influenced the subsequent negotiated settlement the negotiated settlement following an award was higher when the union s final offer was selected than when the employer s offer was selected in the round following an award the variance in negotiated settlements declined and the wage structure toward which the settlements converged was one that conformed with the arbitrator s views of fairness

an experimental comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration systems this paper reports the results of a systematic experimental comparison of the effect of alternative arbitration systems on dispute rates the key to our experimental design is the use of a common underlying distribution of arbitrator fair awards in the different arbitration systems this allows us to compare dispute rates across different arbitration procedures where we hold fixed the amount of objective underlying uncertainty about the arbitration awards there are three main findings first dispute rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes dispute rates were much lower in cases where arbitration was not available so that the entire pie was lost in the event of a dispute this confirms the empirical importance of the so called chilling effect on bargaining that has been conjectured is produced by the adoption of arbitration systems second the dispute rate in a final offer arbitration system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional arbitration system contrary to the usual argument we find no evidence that final offer arbitration eliminates the chilling effect third dispute rates are inversely related to the uncertainty costs of disputes dispute rates were lower in conventional arbitration treatments where the variance of the arbitration award was higher and imposed greater costs on risk averse negotiators our results can also be interpreted as providing tentative evidence that the negotiators were risk averse on average finally we find general agreement between the dispute rates in our experiment and dispute rates found in the field in comparable settings

reinterpreting arbitration s narcotic effect an experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining field evidence suggests that arbitration increases negotiation dispute rates we study repeated bargaining in a laboratory to understand the reasons why our results represent a reinterpretation of an explanation known as the narcotic effect the standard interpretation assumes that the probability of dispute without arbitration is constant across negotiations but field evidence suggests that experienced bargainers have fewer disputes to properly assess arbitration s impact we compare bargainer learning with and without arbitration under otherwise comparable laboratory conditions and develop a model to measure learning we find strong evidence that learning occurs in both cases but is slower with arbitration journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c92 d77 j52 q 1998 academic press

the relationship between unemployment spells and reservation wages as a test of search theory the theory of stationary job search predicts that controlling for other factors that affect the probability of leaving unemployment duration and reservation wages are likely to be positively associated the paper tests this prediction for british cross sectional data from 1982 using an estimating equation implied by search theory simultaneity is crucial in the evaluation of this prediction with single equation and instrumental variable estimates differing markedly perhaps surprisingly given the extreme paucity of both job interviews and offers in the sample the main finding is that reservation wages play a significant role in the determination of duration

futures contracting and dividend uncertainty in experimental asset markets prices in experimental asset markets tend to bubble and then crash to dividend value at the end of the asset s useful life explanations for this phenomenon are 1 that participants cannot form reliable future price expectations or 2 dividend risk aversion we report the results of experiments to test these hypotheses in one experimental series a futures market is introduced so that participants can obtain information on future share prices in another series of experiments the per period dividend is known with certainty the futures market treatment reduced the bubble the certain dividend treatment had little effect on the character of bubbles with inexperienced traders copyright 1995 by university of chicago press

signaling character in electoral competition we study a one dimensional hotelling downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform this is unobservable to voters character is desirable and a voter s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate s character this structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters since a policy platform affects voters utilities not only directly but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate s character the model generates a number of predictions starting with a failure of the median voter theorem jel d72 d82

momentum and overreaction in experimental asset markets abstract price volatility and investor overreactions are commonplace in experimental asset markets understanding the price dynamics in these markets is crucial for designing successful new trading institutions we report on a series of experiments to test the predictions of a new momentum model using a dynamical systems approach this model is then pitted against several standard models to predict prices as well as against expert human forecasters the comparative results suggest that each model has its advantages and regions of best performance overall the best predictive methods are the momentum model and expert human forecasters

arbitration and conflict resolution in labor management bargaining compulsory arbitration is frequently employed to resolve labor management bargaining disputes when the union is legally prohibited as are for example many public employees unions from striking in this form of arbitration an arbitrator is empowered to impose a settlement on the bargaining parties if their negotiations break down various compulsory arbitration schemes are now in use in many states including alaska connecticut iowa maine massachusetts michigan minnesota nebraska nevada new jersey new york oregon pennsylvania rhode island south dakota washington wisconsin and wyoming but there has been little formal analysis of the various schemes that are employed in these states and as a result the basis available for choice among them remains incomplete this paper classifies the theoretical problems that must be resolved before a more careful comparison of these compulsory arbitration schemes is possible provides a brief overview of the work that has been done on each of these problems and indicates what appear to be the most promising directions for future research along these lines four kinds of compulsory arbitration are considered here conventional ccmpulsory arbitration cca in which the arbitrator imposes a settlement of his unrestricted choice if negotiations break down finaloffer arbitration foa in which the arbitrator must choose without compromise between bargainers final offers if negotiations break down multiple foa a variant of foa originally suggested by donn and on occasion issue by issue foa which is like simple foa except that the arbitrator is permitted to fashion his settlement from the components of bargainers final offers cca simple foa and issue by issue foa are already in widespread use while multiple foa which is similar but not identical to a scheme used in eugene oregon has been suggested by donn and my 1979a article as an improvement on simple foa in the literature of industrial labor relations compulsory arbitration schemes have been judged primarily by three criteria the quality of the arbitral settlements they generate when negotiations break down their freedom from bias which is usually defined as the distortion of negotiated settlements away from what they would have been in ordinary bargaining with both strikes and lockouts permitted and the extent to which they create environments conducive to negotiated settlements an integrated analysis in which bargainers choosing their stategies consider the effects of their actions on negotiated and arbitral settlements as well as on the probabilities of these possibilities would be ideal but in beginning the study of the effects of arbitration schemes it is convenient and probably not misleading to simplify the problem by dividing it thus i shall propose separate analyses of the quality of arbitral settlements under noncooperative behavioral assumptions the bias of negotiated settlements under cooperative assumptions and the probability of a negotiated settlement under a blend of both noncooperative and cooperative assumptions each section of this paper in turn discusses existing work that is relevant to judging arbitration schemes by one of the above three criteria university of california san diego this research was supported by the national science foundation many of the observations made here evolved in discussions and correspondence with clifford donn who by no means agrees with all or even most of them i am grateful to him and to joel sobel and participants in a workshop presentation at the university of chicago who also made helpful comments

strikes as collective voice a behavioral analysis of strike activity this paper outlines a collective voice approach for examining the behavioral determinants of variation in strike activity at the organizational level the author argues that strikes should be vie

children and their parents labor supply evidence from exogenous variation in family size although theoretical models of labor supply and the family are well developed there are few credible estimates of key empirical relationships in the work family nexus this study uses a new instrumental variable the sex composition of the first two births in families with at least two children to estimate the effect of additional children on parents labor supply in the united states instrumental variables estimates using the sex mix are substantial but smaller than the corresponding ordinary least squares ols estimates moreover unlike the ols estimates the female labor supply effects estimated using sex mix instruments appear to be absent among more educated women and women with high wage husbands we also find that married women who have a third child reduce their labor supply by as much as women in the full sample while there is no relationship between wives child bearing and husbands labor supply excerpt

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

price bubbles gender and expectations in experimental asset markets abstract this paper reports results of laboratory markets for a risky asset with a flat fundamental value that equates expected dividends to the return on a safe asset subjects were sorted by gender in an unobtrusive manner and bubbles in this setting are pervasive and of comparable magnitude for both genders in contrast a robustness check done with a declining fundamental value did generate larger bubbles for groups of males elicited price forecasts tend to trail share prices as they rise and exceed prices as they fall a pattern that is tracked by a double adaptive forecasting model

is financial instability male driven gender and cognitive skills in experimental asset markets abstract the hypothesis that price stability would reliably increase with the fraction of women operating in financial markets has been frequently suggested in policy discussions to test this hypothesis we conducted 10 male only 10 female only and 10 mixed gender experimental asset markets and compared the effects of gender composition confidence risk attitude and cognitive skills male and female markets have comparable volatility and deviations from fundamentals whereas mixed gender markets are substantially more stable on the other hand higher average cognitive skills of the group are associated with reduced market volatility individual level analysis shows that subjects with higher cognitive skills trade at prices closer to fundamental values and earn significantly higher profits similarly mixed markets exhibit lower mispricing particularly for traders with lower cognitive skills our results are demonstrated to hold in other experimental asset market studies suggesting that a mixed gender composition reduces mispricing across different types of asset markets

experiments on electronic double auctions and abnormal trades the flash crash experienced by u s markets in may 2010 provided stark evidence that a large trade can have a powerful influence we explore the impact of an unusual trade on behavior in experimental bubbles markets we chose the experimental design proposed by smith suchanek and williams 1988 because replication shows it produces markets prone to mispricing after several rounds of trading our markets receive a large quantity order at an extreme price in a standard double auction bubble market pricing is unaffected by an abnormal order however with increased uncertainty about the underlying economic value of the asset over pricing weakens on arrival of a negative price shock

strikes and wages a test of an asymmetric information model this paper describes a simple model of labor disputes based on the hypothesis that unions use strikes to infer the profitability of the firm the model posits the existence of a negatively sloped resistance curve between wages and strike duration in addition it offer a series of predictions relating wage and strike outcomes to changes in the expected profitability of the firm and changes in the alternative opportunities of striking workers these implications are tested using data on wage outcomes strike probabilities and strike durations for a large sample of collective bargaining agreements

longitudinal analysis of strike activity this article presents an empirical study of strike activity in a panel of contract negotiations for some 250 firm and union pairs evidence is presented on two sources of variation in dispute rates changes in the characteristics of the collective bargaining agreement that affect subsequent strike outcomes and the effects of lagged strikes on the incidence and duration of subsequent disputes strike probabilities are significantly affected by the duration and expiration month of the previous agreement dispute rates are also increased by the occurrence of a short strike during the previous negotiations and reduced by the occurrence of a long strike

the effect of labour relations legislation on strike incidence the impact on strike incidence of nine labour relations policy variables representing legislation in eleven canadian jurisdictions is estimated using logit analysis of 3 347 individual collective agreements mandatory strike votes compulsory dues check off and compulsory conciliation boards are associated with significantly lower strike probabilities prohibition of replacement workers and employer initiated strike votes are associated with significantly higher strike probabilities no significant association was found between strike incidence and the length of cooling off period following conciliation and negotiated or automatic reopeners policy impacts are interpreted in a framework emphasizing the influence of asymmetric inforrnation and joint costs on strikes

a review of bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets this paper discusses the literature on bubbles and crashes in the most commonly used experimental asset market design introduced by smith et al it documents the main findings based on the results from 41 published papers 3 book chapters and 20 working papers

a test of the modigliani miller invariance theorem and arbitrage in experimental asset markets modigliani and miller show that the total market value of a firm is unaffected by a repackaging of asset return streams to equity and debt if pricing is arbitrage free we investigate this invariance theorem in experimental asset markets finding value invariance for assets of identical risks when returns are perfectly correlated however exploiting price discrepancies has risk when returns have the same expected value but are uncorrelated in which case the law of one price is violated discrepancies shrink in consecutive markets but persist even with experienced traders in markets where overall trader acuity is high assets trade closer to parity

the determinants of strikes in the united states 1900 1977 this study aims to assess the recent debate that has emerged in the literature over the economic and organizational political models of strikes and to propose and test a synthesis of those models as an explanation for the pattern of strike activity in the united states since 1900 the paper begins with a review of strike activity in the post 1900 period and then develops a conceptual framework incorporating six factors the size of union membership economic conditions political events institutional arrangements psychological variables and the extent of rival unionism to explain this historical pattern the second part of the paper contains a regression analysis of strike activity over the 1900 1977 period the regression results show that both the economic factors of unemployment and inflation and various noneconomic factors such as changes in union membership the outbreak of world war ii and enactment of new deal legislation are significant in explaining variations in strike activity during t

first contract arbitration effects on bargaining and work stoppages newly certified unions often experience difficulty negotiating a first agreement to remedy this the employee free choice act proposes that the national labor relations act provide for first contr

learning in sequential wage negotiations theory and evidence when union firm pairs bargain sequentially and when unobserved components of firms abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry we derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among followers than leaders in wage negotiations considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of canadian contract negotiations

the effects of public policy on strike duration hazard function estimates are utilized to analyze the effect of numerous public policy variables on strike duration based on 7 546 strikes in canada between 1967 and 1985 we find that only the mandatory strike vote substantially reduced conditional duration however the policy variables generally had a more favorable effect on reducing strike incidence so that on net they tended to reduce unconditional duration incidence times conditional duration specifically reduced unconditional duration was associated with the existence of conciliation and the requirement of a mandatory strike vote but the prohibition on replacement workers had a perverse effect

the timing of arbitration and sequential bargaining this paper links two literatures the paper adds to results on disagreement in per fect information bargaining games it is found that under certain conditions the possibility of third party intervention induces delay the paper is also the first attempt to model the arbitration process in a sequential bargaining framework it therefore adds to the theoretical arm of the industrial relations literature by permitting an explicit temporal setting for the chilling effect and alternative mechanisms for the timing of arbitration