transfers in a polarized country bridging the gap between efficiency and stability we consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession the country is efficient if its break up into smaller countries leads to aggregate utility loss we show that in an efficient country whose citizens preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without interregional transfers we also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country then a high degree of polarization yields the full compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium

implications of ethnic diversity ethnically differentiated societies are often regarded as dysfunctional with poor economic performance and a high risk of violent civil conflict the author distinguishes between dominance in which one group constitutes a majority and fractionalization in which there are many small groups in terms of overall economic performance the research shows that both theoretically and empirically fractionalization is normally unproblematic in democracies although it can be damaging in dictatorships in terms of the risk of civil war the author shows that both theoretically and empirically fractionalization actually makes societies safer while dominance increases the risk of conflict a policy implication is that fractionalized societies are viable and secession should be discouraged

proprietary public finance and economic welfare abstract we develop a positive theory of public finance in which the objective of tax and spending policy is to extract rents for the incumbent ruler the analysis shows how dependence of the incumbent ruler s survival probability on his tax and spending policy can lower the equilibrium tax rate and increase the equilibrium amount of spending on productive public services but only until the minimum credible tax rate which depends on the ruler s endogenous survival probability becomes a binding constraint the central result of the analysis is that if a relatively benevolent tax and spending policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability then the ruler s equilibrium policy is relatively benevolent

behavioural development economics lessons from field labs in the developing world abstract explanations of poverty growth and development depend on the assumptions made about individual preferences and the willingness to engage in strategic behaviour economic experiments especially those conducted in the field have begun to paint a picture of economic agents in developing communities that is at variance with the traditional portrait we review this growing literature with an eye towards preference related experiments conducted in the field we also offer lessons on what development economists might learn from experiments we conclude by sharing our thoughts on how to conduct experiments in the field and then offer a few ideas for future research

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

explaining regional autonomy differences in decentralized countries why do groups want to secede and where is demand for self determination most likely to arise we argue self determination demand is moderated by the projected economic costs of policy autonomy the trade off between income and sovereignty implies that other things being equal richer regions are more likely to demand more autonomy this trade off suggests that relative regional income is a key predictor of autonomy demands we show evidence of this using new data collected at the level of second tier administrative sub divisions in 48 decentralized countries consistent with a demand and supply model of self determination we find that levels of policy autonomy are positively correlated with relative regional income regional population share natural resource endowment and regional inter personal inequality ethnically distinct regions have lower sovereignty which could explain higher levels of conflict in these regions but this association is conditional on controlling for the interactive effects be

if the worst comes to the worst dictator giving when recipient s endowments are risky abstract donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really needs their help does this uncertainty deter generosity we experimentally investigate a situation in which donors do not know the financial endowment of the recipient for certain but still have some information on the distribution the endowments are drawn from in the experiment we find that uncertainty does not deter generosity in fact if we filter out selfish dictators under most specifications of uncertainty dictators give more compared with the donation dictators make to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty they are particularly concerned about the possibility of a recipient leaving the lab with no payoff from the game

optimal taxation and fiscal constitution abstract assuming a world with excessive taxes the focuses of this paper are political mechanisms that ensure efficiency enhancing restraints on taxes in particular it is shown that supermajority requirements to approve tax increases as currently used in some us states is the means of attaining this objective their relationship to another such mechanism prevalent in earlier centuries that of franchise restrictions is discussed

diversification in banking is noninterest income the answer this paper assesses potential diversification benefits in the u s banking industry from the steady shift toward activities that generate fee income trading revenue and other types of noninterest income in the aggregate declining volatility of net operating revenue reflects reduced volatility of net interest income not diversification benefits from noninterest income which is quite volatile and increasingly correlated with net interest income at the bank level greater reliance on noninterest income particularly trading revenue is associated with lower risk adjusted profits and higher risk this suggests few obvious diversification benefits from the ongoing shift toward noninterest income

the perception of man and the conception of society two approaches to understanding society the social sciences offer two distinct approaches to understanding society one originated with the scottish moral philosophers and shaped the discipline of economics the other emerged from the french enlightenment and influenced the study of sociology the two approaches are based on radically different perceptions of man and man s relation to society this paper explores these alternative hypotheses and examines some major implications it concludes that the hypothesis reaching back to the scottish philosophers provides the basis for a unified approach in the social sciences

on enhanced cooperation abstract we analyze the issues relative to the formation of sub unions in a federation called enhanced cooperation agreements in the european union when centralization is not politically feasible an agreement among a subset of countries may allow such countries to exploit benefits from coordination that would otherwise be lost other countries in the federation may object to the sub union because it changes the status quo if cooperation at the federal level becomes convenient in the future the change in the status quo may adversely affect the countries which remained initially outside the sub union we show that as long as the countries can commit to coordinate on a policy which takes into account the utility of the excluded countries sub union formation may be optimal the relative advantage of a sub union towards immediate centralization increases when transfers are costly on the other hand if commitment is not possible then the excluded countries may be penalized we use the results to discuss the newly introduced rules for enhanced cooperation agreements in the european union

why countries are fiscally decentralizing this paper models and empirically investigates underlying forces that promote governmental decentralization or effective federalism in the world over the last 25 years a move to a federal system is based on the demand by hinterland regions for local autonomy which increases with national income growth greater relative hinterland population and increasing national population it is influenced as well by the degree of democratization nationally and locally decentralization is measured by both institutional indices indicating greater devolution of power to local governments and the share of local governments in national government consumption empirically the paper finds that decentralization changes in ways predicted in particular it increases with economic growth country size and population institutional structures based on colonial experience and initial constitutional provisions also matter

altruism or diminishing marginal utility abstract we challenge a commonly used assumption in the literature on social preferences and show that this assumption leads to significantly biased estimates of the social preference parameter using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate that the literature s common restrictions on the curvature of the decision makers utility function can dramatically bias the altruism parameter we show that this is particularly problematic when comparing altruism between groups with well documented differences in risk aversion or diminishing marginal utility i e men versus women giving motivated by pure versus warm glow motives and wealthy versus poor we conclude by proposing two approaches to address this bias

endogenous growth decline in social capital and expansion of market activities abstract we model in an endogenous growth set up the hypotheses that the expansion of market activities weakens social capital formation and that firms can invest in formal mechanisms of control and enforcement to substitute for social capital trust work ethics honesty the model shows that the economy tends to grow faster when it is relatively poorer in social capital and that perpetual growth can be consistent with the progressive erosion of social capital these results may help to reconcile putnam s claim that social capital has declined in the u s with the satisfactory growth performance of the u s over the same period

violence and risk preference experimental evidence from afghanistan we investigate the relationship between violence and economic risk preferences in afghanistan combining i a two part experimental procedure identifying risk preferences violations of expected utility and specific preferences for certainty ii controlled recollection of fear based on established methods from psychology and iii administrative violence data from precisely geocoded military records we document a specific preference for certainty in violation of expected utility the preference for certainty which we term a certainty premium is exacerbated by the combination of violent exposure and controlled fearful recollections the results have implications for risk taking and are potentially actionable for policymakers and marketers

size and performance of banking firms testing the predictions of theory abstract in recent years two important literatures on the theory of banking firms have developed one examines the economic functions of banks in environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed another considers the incentive effects moral hazard resulting from deposit insurance both theories make predictions about the relation between banking firm size and performance an empirical analysis of large bank holding companies investigates measures of market valuation and risk of failure limited support is provided for either set of theoretical predictions

transition costs in secessions with a brief application to scotland this article demonstrates that the costs incurred in the process of a region becoming a sovereign state can be large enough to outweigh the long term material benefits of independence transition costs consist of transaction costs fiscal costs and the cost of uncertainty their size depends crucially on whether the politics of the transition are cooperative game theory however shows that there are incentives for threats of non cooperation and for the exercise of such threats these considerations are applied briefly to the debate about scottish independence this includes a short analysis of how transition costs can be reduced a final section inquires about possible transition benefits which can consist of solidarity

natural resources decentralization and risk sharing can resource booms unify nations previous studies imply that a positive regional fiscal shock such as a resource boom strengthens the desire for separation in this paper we present a new and opposite perspective we construct a model of endogenous fiscal decentralization that builds on two key notions a trade off between risk sharing and heterogeneity and a positive association between resource booms and risk the model shows that a resource windfall causes the nation to centralize as a mechanism to either share risk and or prevent local capture depending on the relative bargaining power of the central and regional governments we provide cross country empirical evidence for the main hypotheses finding that resource booms i decrease the level of fiscal decentralization with no u shaped patterns ii cause the former due to risk sharing incentives primarily when regional governments are relatively strong and iii have no effect on political decentralization

regional income redistribution and risk sharing how does italy compare in europe abstract this paper investigates income redistribution and risk sharing and the underlying public policy in italy a country marked by stark regional economic contrasts unlike previous works this study also assesses the roles of public consumption investment and welfare assistance in kind the findings suggest that italy s fiscal system provides redistribution at 25 35 and risk sharing at 10 15 of gdp with public consumption playing a large role compared with results in the literature for other countries there appears to be less redistribution and risk sharing through italy s welfare and tax systems because of their different structures

cross border externalities and cooperation among representative democracies abstract this paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross border externalities by representative democracies the level of provision of each country is decided by a policy maker elected by majority rule at the country level we compare the case in which policy makers set their policies noncooperatively with the case in which they set their policies through coasian cooperation cooperation induces policy makers to internalize cross border externalities but it also induces strategic voters to elect a policy maker who cares less about the public good to reduce their public good contribution the former effect increases public good provision while the latter reduces it we show that once voters incentives are taken into account whether cooperation is beneficial depends neither on voters preferences nor on the magnitude of spillovers nor on the size bargaining power or efficiency of each country instead it depends only on the curvature of the demand for the public good cooperation increases decreases public good provision when the demand function is more less convex than the unit elastic demand function hence the desirability of international cooperation depends mostly on the type of public good considered

optimal secession rules abstract should the constitution of a federation allow for peaceful secession constitutionally defined secession rules are optimal ex post if the federation breaks down however they may be suboptimal ex ante if the member countries receive a benefit from the perceived long term stability of the federation and constitutionally defined secession rules increase the probability of a break up the optimal social contract trades off ex ante benefits and ex post losses and it may avoid explicit secession rules if transfers are costly the trade off is present even if ex post renegotiation is allowed finally we show that under asymmetric information it is more difficult to keep the federation together and that a secession war may occur

market networks and corporate behavior data on market relations between a large population of corporations and investment banks are used to study the organization market interforce the pattern of direct market ties between a firm and its banks forms of interfaces range from a long term exclusive tie the relationship interface to many short lived episodic ties the transaction interface with hybrid forms between the two poles contrary to widespread belief the article finds that strong relationships still exist transactions interfaces are rare most firms use hybrid interfaces a firm s interface is conceptualized as the intentional result of its efforts to reduce dependence and exploit power advantages observed interfaces are shown to be related systematically to various power dependence concepts including resource intensity number of transactions and dollar amounts raised criticality the availability of resource alternatives power asymmetry between a firm and its main bank organization size standardization of exchange and

the impact of violence on individual risk preferences evidence from a natural experiment this study estimates the impact of kenya s post election violence on individual risk preferences because the crisis interrupted a longitudinal survey of more than five thousand kenyan youth this timing creates plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to civil conflict by the time of the survey the study measures individual risk preferences using hypothetical lottery choice questions which are validated by showing that they predict migration and entrepreneurship in the cross section the results indicate that the post election violence sharply increased individual risk aversion immediately after the crisis the fraction of subjects who are classified as either risk neutral or risk loving dropped by roughly 26 percent the findings remain robust to an iv estimation strategy that exploits random assignment of respondents to waves of surveying

are scale economies in banking elusive or illusive evidence obtained by incorporating capital structure and risk taking into models of bank production abstract this paper explores how to incorporate banks capital structure and risk taking into models of production in doing so the paper bridges the gulf between 1 the banking literature that studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of production and 2 the literature that uses dual profit and cost functions to study the microeconomics of bank production without explicitly considering how banks production decisions influence their riskiness various production models that differ in how they account for capital structure and in the objectives they impute to bank managers cost minimization versus value maximization are estimated using u s data on highest level bank holding companies modeling the bank s objective as value maximization conveniently incorporates both market priced risk and expected cash flow into managers ranking and choice of production plans estimated scale economies are found to depend critically on how banks capital structure and risk taking are modeled in particular when equity capital in addition to debt is included in the production model and cost is computed from the value maximizing expansion path rather than the cost minimizing path banks are found to have large scale economies that increase with size moreover better diversification is associated with larger scale economies while increased risk taking and inefficient risk taking are associated with smaller scale economies

secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world abstract with the changing political and economic circumstances confronting their countries regionally concentrated minorities have been facing a strategic problem important aspects of which can be stylized as a situation in which a minority leader is uncertain about the costs of secession for her community this paper shows that this uncertainty is a central cause of secession using a model which incorporates both policies to appease secessionist aspirations and informational asymmetries in a situation of asymmetric information in which the policy maker is better informed about the consequences of separation than the minority leader signaling incentives make secession the unique equilibrium outcome whether mutually advantageous compromises exist or not we also show that the ruling majority may seek to maintain political unity by pre committing to minority protection rules which prevent bluffing by the informed policy maker additionally the model generates comparative statics results on the question of which states are most likely to adopt constitutional rules protecting the minorities living within their borders

how did distributional preferences change during the great recession abstract to better understand how support for redistributive policies is shaped by macroeconomic shocks we explore how distributional preferences changed during the recent great recession we conducted identical modified dictator games during both the recession and the preceding economic boom the experiments capture subjects selfishness the weight on one s own payoff and equality efficiency tradeoffs concerns for reducing differences in payoffs versus increasing total payoffs which we then compare across economic conditions subjects exposed to recession exhibit greater selfishness and higher emphasis on efficiency relative to equality reproducing recessionary conditions inside the laboratory by confronting subjects with possible negative payoffs weakly intensifies selfishness and increases efficiency orientation bolstering the interpretation that differing economic circumstances drive our results

social interaction and stock market participation we propose that stock market participation is influenced by social interaction in our model any given social investor finds the market more attractive when more of his peers participate we test this theory using data from the health and retirement study and find that social households those who interact with their neighbors or attend church are substantially more likely to invest in the market than non social households controlling for wealth race education and risk tolerance moreover consistent with a peer effects story the impact of sociability is stronger in states where stock market participation rates are higher

globalization as a challenge for public choice theory public choice theory in many ways provides a fruitful economicinstrumentarium to be applied to the phenomena of internalizationand globalization international political economics offers muchpotential for the analysis of real and relevant aspects ininternational relationships this paper sketches out a few selectedaspects of the globalization question for which public choicetheory could offer a useful explanatory contribution however itis made clear as well that the concept of globalization presentsa substantial challenge for public choice in that only a limitedpart of the institutional change that has accompanied globalizationhas been explained endogenously

risk in banking and capital regulation this paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control it is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk utilizing the mean variance model the following results are shown a the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks b as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation the theoretically correct risk weights under the risk based capital plan are explicitly derived and c the theoretically correct risk weights are restrictions on asset composition which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms the recent increase in bank failures especially after the 1980 and 1982 deregulatory acts has again ignited a controversy over the risk portfolio of the banking industry given the importance of this sector there has been increased scrutiny of the industry s motives for risk taking and possible regulatory changes to improve its stability these investigations have centered around two rather complementary areas the first of these is the role of deposit insurance and how its current pricing procedure encourages risk taking and justifies current bank regulations the works of buser chen and kane 4 kane 9 and benston et al 2 have made substantive contributions the authors demonstrates the way in which our current fixed rate insurance system rewards risk taking by the firm and insulates it through deposit insurance from the market discipline that needs to exist to ensure proper risk evaluation this realization has led these authors to propose a series of regulatory changes to encourage proper portfolio choice within the industry these include a shift to market value accounting risk based deposit insurance premiums and additional capital regulation the last of these serves as a method of coinsurance whereby higher capital levels require the bank to absorb greater losses in the event of failure and encourage additional prudence in management in essense it is one method of risk reduction that may offset the risk preference imposed on the industry due to the inappropriate insurance pricing because the amount of capital influences the probability of bank insolvency and thus the soundness of the entire banking system the regulators ceteris paribus prefer more capital to

the breakup of nations a political economy analysis this paper develops a model of the breakup or unification of nations in each nation the decision to separate is taken by majority voting a basic trade off between the efficiency gains of unification and the costs in terms of loss of control on political decisions is highlighted the model emphasizes political conflicts over redistribution policies the main results of the paper are i when income distributions vary across regions and the efficiency gains from unification are small separation occurs in equilibrium and ii when all factors of production are perfectly mobile all incentives for separation disappear i introduction following the demise of communism the entire map of europe from the atlantic coast to the urals is being redrawn and issues of separation unification and the redrawing of borders are yet again at the forefront of european concerns many of the issues raised by this process are primarily of a political cultural or linguistic nature however there are also economic considerations that bear on this problem the objective of this paper is to analyze some important economic and political determinants of the process of unification and separation of democratic nations the starting point of our analysis is to suppose that from an economic efficiency point of view separation of nations is never desirable a unified nation is always more efficient since free trade among regions is guaranteed duplication costs in defense and law enforcement are avoided and local public goods provision such as transportation and communication networks or common standards can be coordinated furthermore any benefits of decentralization that might be obtained in a world with several nations may also be achieved within a unified nation by replicating the administrative structure of the world with several

risks at work the demand and supply sides of government redistribution to comprehend how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to get a handle on both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives for governments to respond to these preferences this paper attempts to do both using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the individual and national levels in a first step we focus on how risk exposure and income are related to preferences for redistribution to test our hypotheses we extract detailed risk exposure measures from labour force surveys and marry them to cross national opinion survey data results from analysis of these data attest to the great importance of risks within the labour market in shaping popular preferences for redistributive efforts by governments in a second step we turn our attention to the supply side of government redistribution institutions we argue mediate governments reactions to redistributional demands following economic shocks using time series cross country data we demonstrate how national training systems and electoral institutions as well as partisanship shape government responses copyright 2006 oxford university press

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

the anatomy of distributional preferences with group identity abstract the increasing diversity of societies raises questions about the consequences for redistributive preferences this paper assesses the impact of social identity on distributional preferences in a modified dictator game i estimate individual level utility functions with two parameters that govern the trade offs between equity and efficiency and giving to self and to other subjects on average put less weight on income of the out group the out group treatment also changes the distribution of equity efficiency concerns however the experiment also uncovers a large individual heterogeneity of preferences an analysis of garp violations reveals that choices in both treatments overwhelmingly stem from well behaved yet systematically different underlying utility functions hence the evidence presented here suggests that the rational choice approach is a useful tool for understanding the effect of social identity on preferences

enjoying the quiet life under deregulation evidence from adjusted lerner indices for u s banks abstract the quiet life hypothesis posits that firms with market power incur inefficiencies rather than reap monopolistic rents we propose a simple adjustment to lerner indices to account for the possibility of forgone rents to test this hypothesis for a large sample of u s commercial banks we find that adjusted lerner indices are significantly larger than conventional lerner indices and trending upward over time instrumental variable regressions reject the quiet life hypothesis for cost inefficiencies however lerner indices adjusted for profit inefficiencies reveal a quiet life among u s banks

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

banks responses to deregulation profits technology and efficiency the deregulation of interest rates in the early 1980s raised bank funding costs and lowered profits in response banks raised fees for deposit services reduced branch operating costs and shifted to higher earning assets rates of return did not regain their prederegulation levels until the early 1990s our goal is to decompose the change in bank profits following deregulation into i intemal bank initiated adjustments to the new regulatory structure and ii external contemporaneous changes in banks business environment this decomposition will depend in part on the assumed competitive structure of the banking industry with perfect competition output and input prices are part of the external environment and banks responses are limited to changes in output and input quantities an alternative approach assumes imperfect competition where banks have some control over output prices deposit fees minimum balance requirements and interest rates on certain loans and output quantities and input prices comprise the external environment the altemative model is supported by the data using this model large banks but not smaller banks are found to have relied primarily on changing output prices and input use to mitigate and reverse the negative effects of deregulation on profits the adjustment to deregulation was essentially complete after four years following this additional changes in bank profitability during the late 1980s were primarily due to changes in banks business environment

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

secession and value abstract a model with random proposals where secession of coalitions is the only threat yields exploitative allocations if proposals for coalition s involve randomization the responders pay off vector consists of shapley values for coalition sizes ranging from 1 to s 1

a note on public goods in a decentralized fiscal union implications of a participation constraint this paper re examines the question of whether federal ex post redistribution in terms of public funds leads to under provision of public goods when member states may leave the economic federation

growing up in a recession does the historical macroeconomic environment affect preferences for redistribution we find that individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort support more government redistribution and tend to vote for left wing parties the effect of recessions on beliefs is long lasting we support our findings with evidence from three different datasets first we identify the effect of recessions on beliefs exploiting time and regional variation in macroeconomic conditions using data from the 1972 2010 general social survey our specifications control for nonlinear time period life cycle and cohort effects as well as a host of background variables second we rely on data from the national longitudinal survey of the high school class of 1972 to corroborate the age period cohort specification and look at heterogeneous effects of experiencing a recession during early adulthood third using data from the world value survey we confirm our findings with a sample of 37 countries whose citizens experienced macroeconomic disasters at different points in history

homeward bound interest identity and investor behavior in a third world export platform1 are indigenous investors in third world export platforms more stable than their allegedly footloose foreign rivals while mainstream economists hold that investor behavior is independent of investor identity and therefore call for the parallel treatment of domestic and foreign firms their critics hold that indigenous investors are more dedicated than their foreign counterparts and therefore call for industrial policies designed to cultivate and defend native entrepreneurs who is correct the author uses a unique combination of qualitative and quantitative data to document and account for the relative stability and dynamism of indigenous investors in the dominican republic s largest export processing zone and thereby brings economic sociology back from the margins of development theory and development theory back into the heartland of sociology

distributional conflict and jurisdictional organization abstract this paper explores the endogenous formation of jurisdictions assuming the political process is a costly fight to acquire shares of the gnp pie in such a setting the stability of a unified jurisdiction is not necessarily determined by the preferences of the richest member region we also show that a system of federalism is especially significant in ameliorating distributional competition and conflict less resources are spent in aggregate on appropriative activities under a hierarchical system of federalism than in a unified jurisdiction with a single central government

decentralization fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism political decentralization is widely believed to reduce ethnic conflict and secessionism in the world today yet decentralization is more successful in reducing conflict and secessionism in some countries than in others in this article i explore why this difference occurs i demonstrate using a statistical analysis of thirty democracies from 1985 to 2000 that decentralization may decrease ethnic conflict and secessionism directly by bringing the government closer to the people and increasing opportunities to participate in government but that decentralization increases ethnic conflict and secessionism indirectly by encouraging the growth of regional parties regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities producing legislation that favors certain groups over others and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism earlier versions of this article were presented at harvard university and the center for the study of democratic politics at princeton university the author would like to thank sandra alfonso leon james alt micah altman barry friedman shigeo hirano simon hug gary king rose rozaghian tulia falleti and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

bank capitalization and cost evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling we amend the standard cost model to account for the role of financial capital in banking the cost function is conditioned on the level of capital but we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of capitalization that minimizes cost we find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk

do consumers pay for one stop banking evidence from an alternative revenue function abstract in providing financial services jointly banks may reduce costs due to complementarities in production cost economies of scope or raise revenues from complementarities in consumption revenue economies of scope cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans have been found to be small revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be insignificant over 1978 1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue efficient frontier the lack of complementarities between deposits and loans where benefits are most likely to occur suggests that claims of important synergies from an expansion of banking powers be taken with caution

secession and the limits of taxation toward a theory of internal exit comment the purpose of this note is to correct an error in the seminal article on secession by buchanan and faith 1987 in their paper buchanan and faith neglected an important effect political separation affects markets and consequently individual private incomes

explaining social policy preferences evidence from the great recession to what extent do personal circumstances as compared to ideological dispositions drive voters preferences on welfare policy addressing this question is difficult because a person s ideological position can be an outcome of material interest rather than an independent source of preferences the article deals with this empirical challenge using an original panel study carried out over four years tracking the labor market experiences and the political attitudes of a national sample of americans before and after the eruption of the financial crisis the analysis shows that the personal experience of economic hardship particularly the loss of a job had a major effect on increasing support for welfare spending this effect was appreciably larger among republicans than among democrats a result that was not simply due to a ceiling effect however the large attitudinal shift was short lived dissipating as individuals employment situations improved the results indicate that the personal experience of an economic shock has a sizable yet overall transient effect on voters social policy preferences

networks markets and inequality julien gagnon thanks the gates cambridge trust for financial support sanjeev goyal is grateful to the keynes fellowship and the cambridge inet institute for financial support

reciprocity as a foundation of financial economics this paper argues that the subsistence of the fundamental theorem of contemporary financial mathematics is the ethical concept reciprocity the argument is based on identifying an equivalence between the contemporary and ostensibly value neutral fundamental theory of asset pricing with theories of mathematical probability that emerged in the seventeenth century in the context of the ethical assessment of commercial contracts in a framework of aristotelian ethics this observation the main claim of the paper is justified on the basis of results from the ultimatum game and is analysed within a framework of pragmatic philosophy the analysis leads to the explanatory hypothesis that markets are centres of communicative action with reciprocity as a rule of discourse the purpose of the paper is to reorientate financial economics to emphasise the objectives of cooperation and social cohesion and to this end we offer specific policy advice

risks and redistribution an individual level analysis much of the disagreement in the debate about globalization and its present or absent effects on the welfare state stems from competing assumptions about the individual level determinants of redistributional preferences this article calls for and provides testing of these causal mechanisms at the individual level traditional accounts suggest that risks at the industry level are important determinants of redistributional preferences this article argues that risks at the occupational level should also be considered a comprehensive new data set is used to test whether and what types of risks in the labor market play an important role in shaping preferences statistical analyses of public opinion surveys european social survey show strong evidence for the assumed causal mechanism contrary to much of the literature but in line with this article s claims it is the occupational rather than the industry level that is most important the article lays out implications of these findings

behind the market stage where real societies exist part i the role of public and private order institutions this two part article is an attempt to clarify the social conditions upon which the viability and efficiency of the market system rest it strives to show that the embeddedness thesis that is an explanation based upon the existence of long run personal ties involving the use of reputation mechanisms among transactors cannot fully elucidate the question as to how the problem of trust is solved in market societies as explained in part i there are difficulties of both theoretical and empirical historical kinds and these explain why the market order needs to be sustained by private and public order institutions in part ii the role of generalised morality in backing or supplementing such institutions is discussed in the light of game theory and particular emphasis is put on the ability of moral norms to sustain honest behaviour by generating the right kind of preferences and establishing trust the vexed problem of the dynamics of norm emergence and erosion is then addressed with a view to showing

financial asset holdings and political attitudes evidence from revolutionary england the english parliament s struggle for supremacy against monarchical dictatorship during the civil war 1642 1648 was crucial for the establishment of representative government yet its lessons continue to be debated i exploit novel data on individual mps drawn from 1 842 biographies to show that the conflict was over overseas interests and other factors over which the executive enjoyed broad constitutional discretion rather than over domestic property rights i further exploit the coincidence of individual mps ability to sign legally binding share contracts with novel share offerings by overseas companies to measure the effect of overseas share investment on their political attitudes i show that overseas shareholding pushed moderates lacking prior mercantile interests to support reform i interpret the effect of financial assetholding as allowing new investors to exploit emerging economic opportunities overseas aligning their interests with traders by consolidating a broad parliamentary majority that favored reform the introduction of financial assets also broadened support for the institutionalization of parliamentary supremacy over dictatorial rule jel codes o10 g11 f10 k00 n23 p10

the risk of financial intermediaries this paper reconsiders the formal estimation of bank risk using the variability of the profit function in our model point estimates of the variability of profits are derived from a model where this variability is endogenous to other bank characteristics such as capital and liquidity we estimate the new model on the entire panel of us banks spanning the period 1985q1 2012q4 the findings show that bank risk was fairly stable up to 2001 and accelerated quickly thereafter up to 2007 we also establish that the risk of the relatively large banks and banks that failed in the subprime crisis is higher than the industry s average thus we provide a new leading indicator which is able to forecast future solvency problems of banks

on the role of social norms in a market economy given that the discussion in section 2 focuses on but two potential sources of norms and on only a pair of variables affecting the activities of these sources it may appear premature to attempt to generalize about the supply of netn norms in a market economy however based on the above discussion it is nevertheless quite reasonable to hypothesize that the norms market will not operate in such a way as to ensure the proper supply of netn norms the failures found by economic theory in the economic marketplace and by petp in the political market have their analogue in the norms market that this can be said with some assurance even though the investigation has been so limited is due to the importance of the variables and group activities investigated the specific structural characteristics the high degree of specialization in society and the specific cluster of values those related to individualism examined above and found to be inhibitory to the supply of netn norms are of considerable importance and their negative impact on the norms market cannot readily be altered in the first place these variables are significantly and synergistically related to one another but secondly and more importantly these variables are so closely associated with the market economy itself that short of replacing the market little can be done to diminish the negative effect that these variables have on the supply of netn norms

externalities vs internalities a model of political integration abstract decentralized government leads to inter regional externalities whereas an integrated jurisdiction solves the externality problem centralized government entails other costs in particular a neglect for minority interests the paper models formally the trade off between these two forces in determining the optimum as well as the equilibrium design of jurisdictions both the relative size of regions and the distribution of tastes are shown to be important parameters of the problem

embeddedness in the making of financial capital how social relations and networks benefit firms seeking financing i investigate how social embeddedness affects an organization s acquisition and cost of financial capital in middle market banking a lucrative but understudied financial sector using existing theory and original fieldwork i develop a framework to explain how embeddedness can influence which firms get capital and at what cost i then statistically examine my claims using national data on small business lending at the level of dyadic ties i find that firms that embed their commercial transactions with their lender in social attachments receive lower interest rates on loans at the network level firms are more likely to get loans and to receive lower interest rates on loans if their network of bank ties has a mix of embedded ties and arm s length ties these network effects arise because embedded ties motivate network partners to share private resources while arm s length ties facilitate access to public information on market prices and loan opportunities so that the benefits of different types of ties are optimized within one network i conclude with a discussion of how the value produced by a network is at a premium when it creates a bridge that links the public information of markets with the private resources of relationships

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

trust networks and norms the creation of social capital in agricultural economies in ghana this paper contributes to the continuing debate over the multifaceted concept of trust and its ability to provide a richer explanation of processes of economic activity using case studies of agricultural production marketing and financing systems in brong ahafo region of ghana the analysis documents the means by which trust is created among farmers traders and agricultural input suppliers the mechanisms include formal and informal networks of working relations customer friendships pre existing networks and intermediaries the study shows that trust is necessary for the development of a vibrant private sector based on microenterprises in conditions where actors cannot rely on formal legal institutions at present

additive general error models for production cost and derived demand or share systems many empirical studies of production specify a deterministic model of the firm derive the implied behavioral equations input demand or share system and then embed this system in a stochastic framework by tacking on linear error terms in contrast this paper proposes general error models gems in which the error specification is an integral part of the optimization model these models are the statistical embodiment of stigler s view that apparent observed inefficiencies reflect the investigator s ignorance of the true optimization problem additive gems are proposed and interpreted specification tests indicate that a translog additive gem is superior to the standard translog specification

political bargaining in a federation buchanan meets coase abstract in recent decades the issues of federalism and political integration have gained prominence in public debate as well as in the academic realm a frequently made point is that allowing free secession may protect the minority s interests thus providing it with an incentive to enter the federation this paper explicitly considers the political process in the federation arguing that the option to secede may distort the political choices made by the individual regions to improve their bargaining positions as a result the allocation of resources in the federation could well end up being inefficient and unattractive for the minority region in contrast limiting the secession possibilities by requiring the consent of a majority of voters through a regional referendum rather than leaving it to the discretion of the legislature restores efficiency

what makes rational peasants revolutionary dilemma paradox and irony in peasant collective action peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to olson s collective action problem this article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles everyday forms of peasant resistance unorganized rural movements and organized peasant rebellions that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined first what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals the level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations peasants demand selective incentives the suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations the authorities and the allies of both a political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market second what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry s collective cause selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective selective incentives alone are counterproductive these questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self interest it is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action the dilemma peasants face or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self interest of none the paradox peasants face or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma for example with selective incentives and participate in collective action and the irony peasants face or that self interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox

bank income structure and risk an empirical analysis of european banks the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between bank risk and product diversification in the changing structure of the european banking industry based on a broad set of european banks for the period 1996 2002 our study first shows that banks expanding into non interest income activities present higher risk and higher insolvency risk than banks which mainly supply loans however considering size effects and splitting non interest activities into both trading activities and commission and fee activities we show that the positive link with risk is mostly accurate for small banks and essentially driven by commission and fee activities a higher share of trading activities is never associated with higher risk and for small banks it implies in some cases lower asset and default risks

coordinated action in local public goods models the case of secession without exclusion abstract this paper investigates threats of coordinated exit secession when coalitions cannot choose their members by exclusion this is modeled by a three stage noncooperative game in which voters choose a proportional tax rate and the level of public services and may choose to exit jointly a modified perfectly coalition proof nash concept is applied to rule out dynamically inconsistent threats and behavior by coalitions that is not self enforcing the major result is that cooption of potential seceding coalitions will not occur this result relies on the assumption that seceding coalitions cannot exclude potential members

secessions and political extremism why regional referenda do not solve the problem this paper shows that an uninformed player can increase his bargaining power by committing to receive information from an expert more skeptical to cooperation this general idea is applied to a model in which a regional political leader the expert influences voting in a referendum on independence by strategically disseminating information about the consequences of separation i show that this motivates a moderate electorate to appoint a more extreme leader to receive biased information that increases their bargaining power over the gains of staying unified however a trade off between bargaining power and precision of information causes inefficient outcomes in equilibrium jel c73 d72 d82 h77

on the number and size of nations this paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes and in different economic environments with more or less economic integration we focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations our model implies that i democratization leads to secessions ii in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries iii the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration

is competition good for trust cross country evidence using micro data abstract this paper empirically analyzes implications of market competition for generalized trust of about 80 000 individuals in about 60 countries we find that competition amplifies the trust generating effect of market integration for highly integrated individuals

the structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution against the current consensus among comparative political economists we argue that inequality matters for redistributive politics in advanced capitalist societies but it is the structure of inequality not the level of inequality that matters our theory posits that middle income voters will be inclined to ally with low income voters and support redistributive policies when the distance between the middle and the poor is small relative to the distance between the middle and the rich we test this proposition with data from 15 to 18 advanced democracies and find that both redistribution and nonelderly social spending increase as the dispersion of earnings in the upper half of the distribution increases relative to the dispersion of earnings in the lower half of the distribution in addition we present survey evidence on preferences for redistribution among middle income voters that is consistent with our theory and regression results indicating that the left parties are more likely to participate in government when the structure of inequality is characterized by skew

incentives for secession in the presence of mobile ethnic groups abstract this paper presents a model on secessions and nationalism with special emphasis on the role of imperfectly mobile ethnic minorities individuals trade off political benefits of homogeneity against economic costs from increasing returns to scale in production the main findings are i mobility decreases the political motivation for independence because increased competition for labour forces the ethnic majorities in the separating countries to accommodate their policy ii the impact of mobility depends on whether separation is politically or economically motivated iii increased mobility leads to a less accommodated policy in case of no separation

information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle abstract we study firms incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to investigate the role of endogenous information in accounting for business cycles our model predicts that for a wide range of parameter values firms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when the economy has been in a recession and a pessimistic belief about the state of the economy prevails than after a boom when firms share an optimistic belief the equilibrium price system which features endogenous information transmission dampens aggregate fluctuations by discouraging information acquisition our welfare analysis reveals that information acquisition in the decentralized economy is not efficient this is due to inefficient employment dispersion arising from information heterogeneity in equilibrium time series data for the u s economy support the model s prediction of wages being more informative about total factor productivity after recessions than following booms

understanding conditions for co management a framed field experiment amongst the tsimane bolivia we experimentally assess the willingness to self enforce restricted resource use by playing a common pool resource extraction game in four tsimane indigenous communities in the bolivian amazon we analyse the role of trust in participant s willingness to self restrict resource use and collaborate with the authorities contrary to game behaviour in the industrialized world we find that amongst the tsimane extractions decrease across rounds we also find that participants who trust a non tsimane and b the authorities extract less than other participants but findings are not robust across rounds using the economic and anthropological literature we interpret the findings arguing that trust in non tsimane which is strongly correlated with market access may capture generalized trust levels and that people with higher levels of generalized trust interact more easily in non personal transactions like the situation presented in the game as co management also entails non personal interactions with and trust in the authorities our findings seem relevant for community based conservation and co management

market institutions trust and norms exploring moral economies in nigerian food systems informal market institutions and small scale traders are responsible for feeding nigerian cities this study analyses a range of economic relationships and institutions that have evolved in the context of inadequate formal institutions such as banks and legal contracts through examining both personal relationships and institutional based trust the paper explores the role of moral norms trust is shown to be related to sanctions information on other parties and a range of norms that are drawn on both calculatively and habitually the perceived moralities of different forms of institution such as credit systems trader associations and commission agents are also examined

technology in a world of national frontiers abstract the accumulation of scientific knowledge and its application to production are accelerating the institutionalization of research in universities and corporate bodies was the first accelerator early in the century nationalism and the intensification of international competition are the current accelerators at the century s end nationalism increasingly drives r d through three mechanisms military rivalry trade rivalry and prestige rivalry the resultant steady rise in oecd countries r d spending as a percentage of gnp is by no means to be automatically applauded in particular it intensifies the problem of the developing countries for technology transfer remains for all the siren talk of alternatives a matter of hard slog learning and the task gets harder and harder

generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax theory this paper proposes to evaluate tax reforms by aggregating money metric losses and gains of different individuals using generalized social marginal welfare weights optimum tax formulas take the same form as standard welfarist tax formulas by simply substitut ing standard marginal social welfare weights with those generalized weights weights directly capture society s concerns for fairness without being necessarily tied to individual utilities suitable weights can help reconcile discrepancies between the welfarist approach and actual tax practice as well as unify in an operational way the most prominent alternatives to utilitarianism such as libertarianism equality of opportunity or poverty alleviation jel d60 d63 h21 h23 i38