varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment we experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition at one extreme a subject s probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total expenditures at lower levels of competition a subject s probability of winning is affected more by her own expenditures than by the expenditures of others predicted expenditure levels are positively associated with higher levels of competition consistent with previous rent seeking experiments we find that subjects spend significantly more than the nash equilibrium prediction at all levels of competition however expenditure patterns generally follow the nash prediction expenditures decrease as the level of competition decreases our experimental design also includes a lottery choice experiment to control for subjects risk preference we find that subjects who are more risk averse spend significantly less in the contest and this effect is particularly strong for female subjects

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

rent seeking and the provision of public goods in this short paper i adopt the public choice school paradigm of modeling a government in order to compare its performance with that of the market in the standard model of the provision of public goods private provision is represented by the cournot nash equilibrium in individual contributions public provision incorporates rent seeking whereby some of the aspects of the allocation are determined indirectly by influence activities of the interested parties thus both allocation procedures yield inefficiency and the question is which procedure results in a greater amount of inefficiency private provision with its free riding incentives or public provision with its rent seeking incentives the results indicate that public provision may well be preferred to private provision of public goods thus superiority of private provision is not guaranteed even in the case of a non benevolent government copyright 1993 by royal economic society

the resurrection of the italian wage curve we show that the italian wage curve inexistent in the eighties and early nineties has reemerged after the 1993 income policy agreements owing to the greater role granted to exible and locally bargained top up wage components

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

strategic entry deterrence and terrorism theory and experimental evidence using a two stage rent seeking framework we present a simple model of strategic entry terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers the theory illustrates that relative to a cooperative outcome negative externalities lead to over spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under spending on deterrence our experimental results are broadly consistent subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures in contrast to theoretical predictions participation decisions while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest were influenced by a subject s ability to participate in multiple contests

appropriability and market structure in a stochastic invention model this research examines in the laboratory a class of game theoretic equilibrium models of private research and development r d we formulate a stochastic model of r d investment whose predictions can be examined by using laboratory experiments the noncooperative nash equilibrium of our operational model yields testable predictions about the effects of appropriability and market structure on r d the experimental results support the hypothesis that the degree of appropriability is inversely related to r d spending the results strongly support the hypothesis that an increase in group size yields greater aggregate r d the noncooperative nash equilibrium is shown to be a good predictor of central tendencies in the experiments

two stage team rent seeking experimental analysis this paper presents a two stage team rent seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among winning team members when early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort early actors can free ride on their late moving teammates however when early and late efforts are complements all team members exert positive effort levels asymmetries in early effort reduce effort choices for all late movers the theory is tested with laboratory experimental methods although subjects overinvest relative to the nash equilibrium in all treatments chosen effort levels provide limited support for the model early movers exerted higher effort in the complement treatment and second stage effort choices were broadly consistent with best response functions surprisingly in both single shot and repeated play environments early movers in the substitute treatment did not free ride choosing effort levels similar to those of late movers

capital regulation and deposit insurance abstract a model of deposit insurance in which the bank closure rule can systematically deviate from the economic insolvency condition used in earlier models is developed simulation of that model for plausible parameter values suggests that the failure to close banks on a timely basis has a profound effect in increasing the insurer s liability the implications of these results for capital regulation are discussed

the economics of workout lending lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans a model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially useful from socially wasteful workout loans the analysis is extended to examine two collective action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower the paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

market based risk adjusted examination schedules for depository institutions abstract among deposit insurance reforms considered by economists and policymakers have been prompt resolution of problem institutions risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums and risk adjusted capital requirements some economists have further suggested that risk adjusted deposit insurance premiums or capital ratios be calculated by applying option pricing models to stock market data alternatively the option methodology could be used to establish a risk based examination schedule whereby riskier banks would be examined on a more frequent basis such an examination schedule would be consistent with prompt resolution strategies since it would relate the frequency of examination and closeness of supervision to banks riskness this paper demonstrates how a risk adjusted examination schedule could be derived the paper also considers alternatives to the assumptions regarding examination policies made in standard applications of the option model which may not be valid for the sample periods previously used it discusses potential resulting biases and ways to mitigate their effects

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

an experimental investigation of efficient rent seeking the debate about the measurement of the amount of rent dissipated in rent seeking activities is unable to be answered by observations from the naturally occurring environment current theoretical investigations have indicated that a number of factors will affect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking the theory of efficient rent seeking predicts that the number of rent seekers their risk posture their ability to enter and exit the rent seeking process and the manner in which the probability of receiving a rent is determined will affect the amount of rent that is dissipated

financial institution structures in a developing two tier banking system an empirical perspective from eastern europe abstract an empirical analysis of the structure of hungarian financial institutions reveals them to be very profitable across all groupings although capital and liquidity ratios are on average low in comparison to west german standards the capital adequacy problems appear to be concentrated in the former affiliates of the central bank the thinness and underdevelopment of the hungarian securities market may hinder the capacity of the institutions to raise liquidity and capital ratios as well as inhibit the emergence of competitors seeking high levels of profitability

deposit insurance and risk taking behavior in the credit union industry abstract this paper examines the relationship between deposit insurance and risk taking behavior within the credit union industry time series tests employing industry average financial ratios for federal and state credit unions did not support the increased risk taking hypothesis although federal credit union capital declined immediately following the adoption of deposit insurance this was most likely the result of reduced capital requirements not deposit insurance liquidity and loan delinquency ratios had a negative time trend coefficient implying a decline in risk taking behavior during the post insurance period cross sectional test results employing iowa state chartered credit union data indicated that insured credit unions were better capitalized and more liquid than their uninsured counterparts overall there was no evidence that the adoption of deposit insurance increased the risk taking behavior of credit unions

risk aversion and rent seeking an extension and some experimental evidence theoretical investigations indicate that the risk attitudes of individuals will effect the amount of rent that can be assumed to be dissipated by rent seeking activities following this line of investigation we extend hillman and katz s work to a small numbers case and demonstrate that the degree to which a monopoly rent is dissipated is dependent upon the structure of the risk attitudes of two risk averse individuals

capital regulation and insured banks choice of individual loan default risks abstract how bankers choose the riskiness of their individual assets is an important question it is well known that fixed premium deposit insurance leads a bank to prefer a high variance asset portfolio but its effect on individual asset choice has not been carefully evaluated this paper demonstrates how bank examination procedures and capital adequacy standards can make the value of a bank s deposit insurance contract concave in individual asset risks insured bankers may therefore have a rational preference ceteris paribus for relatively safe individual loans even while they prefer risky portfolio returns the model s implications for loan securitization and the federal regulators new risk based capital standards are discussed