money and loans agents expect to trade with each other infinitely often but face a temporal absence of a coincidence of wants when they meet only loans and or money can facilitate exchange in small close knit economies enduring trade relationships are valued and loans are optimal in larger economies with limited communication information concerning repayment of loans diffuses too slowly to deter agents from reneging unless loans are severely restricted in magnitude money has no such redeemability problems but if clower constraints bind loans help supplement money purchases so that both become essential roles of various institutions and the historical evolution of media of exchange are explained

a search model of money and circulating private debt with applications to monetary policy a search theoretic model is used to examine the coexistence of money and circulating private debt money is still valued even though there coexists credit which circulates among agents and dominates in the rate of return when there coexist multiple equilibria the equilibrium with credit pareto dominates the one without credit if money supply is not extremely plentiful this article also provides some predictions about the effects of monetary policies a policy of open market operations whereby government discounts less for second hand debt decreases the value of money credit and interest rate prevailing in the market this policy can also improve welfare by making credit trade feasible when the only equilibrium entails no credit without intervention

money credit and banking in monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained this problem creates a role for financial intermediaries such as banks who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans in general financial intermediation improves the allocation the gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers liquidity constraints we also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving

housing finance and monetary policy we document three facts concerning how the structure of housing finance affects the monetary transmission mechanism first the characteristics of residential mortgage markets differ markedly across industrialized countries second the impact of monetary policy shocks to residential investment and house prices is significantly stronger in those countries with larger flexibility development of mortgage markets third the transmission to consumption is stronger only in those countries where mortgage equity release is common and mortgage contracts are predominantly of the variable rate type we then build a two sector dsge model with financial constraints to rationalize those facts

optimal monetary policy in a model of money and credit we investigate the extent to which monetary policy can enhance the functioning of the private credit system specifically we characterize the optimal return on money in the presence of credit arrangements there is a dual role for credit it allows buyers to trade without fiat money and also permits them to borrow against future income however not all traders have access to credit as a result there is a social role for fiat money because it allows agents to self insure against the risk of not being able to use credit in some transactions we consider a nonlinear monetary mechanism that is designed to enhance the credit system an active monetary policy is sufficient for relaxing credit constraints finally we characterize the optimal monetary policy and show that it necessarily entails a positive inflation rate

intergroup conflict and intra group punishment in an experimental contest game we study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio political conflict the relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not we find first that our results contradict the independence of groupsize prediction conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals and both are substantially above equilibrium towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257 of the predicted level there is however substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members second allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures now material losses are 869 of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members investments these results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs

2002 lawrence r klein lecture liquidity and asset prices we broadly define liquid assets or monetary assets as any asset that can be readily sold in the market and can be held by a number of people in succession before maturity we ask in what environment is the circulation of liquid assets essential for the smooth running of the economy by developing a canonical model of a monetary economy i e where the circulation of liquid assets is essential we are able to examine the interaction between liquidity asset prices and aggregate economic activity

money and asset prices with uninsurable risks abstract we present a theory of differences of liquidity across assets based on an endogenous ranking of assets as media of exchange arising from their relative quality as hedging devices when assets have two distinct roles as intertemporal media of exchange and hedging devices buyers have generically a strict preference for paying sellers with the asset which is the relative better hedging device for sellers the consequence of this preference is that there are three monetary policy regimes and these regimes differ in which assets serve as media of exchange whether assets carry a liquidity premium and in the impact that monetary policy has on asset prices

asset prices and liquidity in an exchange economy i develop an asset pricing model in which financial assets are valued for their liquidity the extent to which they are useful in facilitating exchange as well as for being claims to streams of consumption goods the implications for average asset returns the equity premium puzzle and the risk free rate puzzle are explored in a version of the model that nests the work of mehra and prescott 1985

payments and liquidity under adverse selection informational asymmetries regarding the future value of assets affect their role in exchange i construct a random matching economy composed of two assets a risk free bond and a lucas tree whose terminal value is privately known to its holder no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements the main finding supports a pecking order theory of payments agents use their risk free bonds first in order to finance their spending shocks and they use their information sensitive assets only if their holdings of bonds are depleted the theory has implications for the optimal provision of risk free bonds the structure of asset returns and liquidity

money and capital as competing media of exchange we construct a model where capital competes with fiat money as a medium of exchange and we establish conditions on fundamentals under which fiat money can be both valued and socially beneficial when the socially efficient stock of capital is too low to provide the liquidity agents need they overaccumulate productive assets to use as media of exchange when this is the case there exists a monetary equilibrium that dominates the nonmonetary one in terms of welfare under the friedman rule fiat money provides just enough liquidity so that agents choose to accumulate the same capital stock a social planner would

rehypothecation and liquidity abstract we develop a dynamic general equilibrium monetary model where a shortage of collateral and incomplete markets motivate the formation of credit relationships and the rehypothecation of assets rehypothecation improves resource allocation because it permits liquidity to flow where it is most needed the liquidity benefits associated with rehypothecation are shown to be more important in high inflation high interest rate regimes regulations restricting the practice are shown to have very different consequences depending on how they are designed assigning collateral to segregated accounts as prescribed in the dodd frank act is generally welfare reducing in contrast an sec15c3 3 type regulation can improve welfare through the regulatory premium it confers on cash holdings which are inefficiently low when interest rates and inflation are high

collateral secured loans in a monetary economy abstract this paper presents a microfounded model of money where durable assets serve as a guarantee to repay consumption loans we study a steady state equilibrium where money and credit coexist in such an equilibrium a larger investment in durable capital relaxes the borrowing constraint faced by consumers we show that the occurrence of over investment and the behavior of capital accumulation depend on the rate of inflation the relative risk aversion of agents and the marginal productivity of the capital goods

house prices borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle i develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices credit constraints nominal loans and asset prices changes in asset prices modify agents borrowing capacity through collateral value changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction and are amplified and propagated over time the financial accelerator is not constant across shocks nominal debt stabilises supply shocks making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate i discuss the role of equity debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism finally i find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility

liquidity and asset prices a new monetarist approach abstract when lenders cannot force borrowers to repay debts assets are often pledged to secure loans in this paper borrowers lose collateral once they renege on debts and exclusion of defaulters occurs probabilistically with a higher probability implying better enforcement increased efficiency in enforcement reduces asset prices while raising loan to value ratios if the rise in loan to value ratios is the dominant effect aggregate liquidity and output increase with the advance in enforcement inflation raises the repayment cost by increasing the loan rate while raising the default cost through exclusion consequently inflation raises loan to value ratios and output only when enforcement is sufficiently efficient

a more complete conceptual framework for sme finance abstract we propose a more complete conceptual framework for analysis of sme credit availability issues in this framework lending technologies are the key conduit through which government policies and national financial structures affect credit availability we emphasize a causal chain from policy to financial structures which affect the feasibility and profitability of different lending technologies these technologies in turn have important effects on sme credit availability financial structures include the presence of different financial institution types and the conditions under which they operate lending technologies include several transactions technologies plus relationship lending we argue that the framework implicit in most of the literature is oversimplified neglects key elements of the chain and often yields misleading conclusions a common oversimplification is the treatment of transactions technologies as a homogeneous group unsuitable for serving informationally opaque smes and a frequent misleading conclusion is that large institutions are disadvantaged in lending to opaque smes

asset prices liquidity and monetary policy in an exchange economy i formulate a model in which money coexists with equity shares on a risky aggregate endowment agents can use equity as a means of payment so shocks to equity prices translate into aggregate liquidity shocks that disrupt the mechanism of exchange i characterize a family of optimal monetary policies and find that the resulting equity prices are independent of monetary considerations i also study a perturbation of the family of optimal policies that targets a positive constant nominal interest rate and find that in this case the real equity return includes a liquidity return that depends on monetary considerations

bank net worth asset prices and economic activity abstract a dynamic general equilibrium model is proposed to study the interactions between the banking sector asset prices and aggregate economic activity a durable asset serves as a productive input and as a collateral for loans the propagation mechanism of a negative productivity shock is enhanced and prolonged through the interaction of credit constraints and asset prices where the bank loan and the investment are squeezed by a higher bank capital asset ratio for lending and at the same time a stricter collateral requirement for borrowing the model explains why banking crises often coincide with depression in the asset markets the results also bear policy implications for the debates over regulatory bank capital adequacy and credit control policies

money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information abstract we construct a model with private information in which consumers write dynamic contracts with financial intermediaries a role for money arises due to random limited participation of consumers in the financial market without defection constraints a friedman rule is optimal the mean and variability of wealth tend to fall with inflation in the steady state and the welfare effects of inflation are very small with defection constraints the effects of inflation on the distribution of welfare and consumption are large but the effect on average welfare is still small the relaxation of defection constraints resulting from higher inflation can cause a substantial increase in the real interest rate journal of economic literature classification numbers d8 e4 g2

monetary policy in a channel system abstract channel systems for conducting monetary policy are becoming increasingly popular despite its popularity the consequences of implementing policy with a channel system are not well understood we develop a general equilibrium framework of a channel system and study the optimal policy a novel aspect of the channel system is that a central bank can tighten or loosen its policy without changing its policy rate this policy instrument has so far been overlooked by a large body of the literature on the optimal design of interest rate rules

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

incomplete record keeping and optimal payment arrangements abstract we study a random matching absence of double coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag we study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

credit and money in a search model with divisible commodities this paper examines the competition between money and credit in a search model with divisible commodities it is shown that fiat money can be valuable even though it yields a lower rate of return than the coexisting credit the competition between money and credit increases efficiency the monetary equilibrium with credit pareto dominates the monetary equilibrium without credit whenever the two coexist when a credit is repaid with money the competition also bounds the purchasing power of money from below by that of credit and so eliminates the weak inefficient monetary equilibrium found in previous search models with numerical examples three different monetary equilibria are ranked and the properties of the interest rate are examined

sticky prices and costly credit we develop a theory of money and credit as competing payment instruments then put it to work in applications agents use cash and credit because the former latter is subject to the inflation tax transaction costs frictions that make the choice of payment method interesting also imply equilibrium price dispersion we derive closed form solutions for money demand and show how to simultaneously account for the price change facts cash credit shares in micro data and money interest correlations in macro data the effects of inflation on welfare price dispersion and markups are discussed as are nonstationary equilibria with dynamics in the price distribution

outside versus inside bonds a modigliani miller type result for liquidity constrained economies when agents are liquidity constrained two options exist sell assets or borrow we compare the allocations arising in two economies in one agents can sell government outside bonds and in the other they can borrow by issuing inside bonds all transactions are voluntary implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt we show that any allocation in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that the converse is not true however the optimal policy in each economy makes the allocations equivalent

asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy abstract previous authors have argued that the otimal monetary policy is contractionary if buyers value consumption substantially more than sellers there is some randomness and informational constraints make asset trading useful we show that there is an incentive compatible expansionary policy that dominates all incentive compatible contractionary policies