a review of the recent empirical literature on displaced workers this article reviews the empirical literature on job displacement job displacement is widespread and strongly countercyclical tending to peak during economic downturns but concentrated in indus

stabilization policy a reconsideration i introduction in 1936 keynes s general theory explained how fiscal and monetary policy could be used to end depressions since that time no developed country has ever seen a downturn on the scale of the 1930s the general theory was not just a how to book on the avoidance of depressions it was an argument for stabilization policy itself the years since the general theory have seen a revolt against keynesian economics in a revisionist mode milton friedman argued that countercyclical policy cannot affect the average level of unemployment and output robert lucas and thomas sargent 1979 went further contending that it is not only impossible to increase average output it is also impossible to stabilize it more recently lucas 1987 2003 has argued that policies to stabilize output even if effective would yield negligible welfare gains thus stabilization policy should not be a macroeconomic priority lucas s conclusion notwithstanding stabilization policy has long been an explicit or implicit objective of monetary policy in most industrial countries even including those countries with inflation targets the volatility of output has in fact declined in most major industrial countries since the mid 1980s and monetary policy arguably deserves at least partial credit see bernanke 2004 mirroring practice monetary policy research commonly takes it as given that along with price stability stabilization policy the minimization of squared deviations of output around potential is an appropriate policy objective see for example clarida et al 1999 in this article we explore the economic rationale for stabilization as a policy goal concluding that it does in fact deserve high policy priority we survey a large body of literature that critiques the validity of key assumptions in lucas s argument we also offer suggestive evidence that stabilization policy can significantly reduce average levels of unemployment by providing stimulus to demand in circumstances where unemployment is high but underutilization of labor and capital does little to lower inflation a monetary policy that vigorously fights high unemployment should however also be complemented by a policy that equally vigorously fights inflation when it rises above a modest target level the federal reserve act thus wisely enunciated price stability and maximum employment as twin goals for monetary policy ii the case against stabilization policy macroeconomic analysis typically assumes that social welfare depends negatively on both inflation above a modest target level here assumed zero and unemployment above some minimum socially efficient level for example a standard social welfare function is the discounted sum of period losses l sub t of the form see among others barro and gordon 1983 pp 592 93 1 l sub t a u sub t 1 k u sup 2 b pi sup 2 sub t where u sub t and pi sub t are the unemployment and inflation rates in period t and u sup is the natural rate of unemployment the coefficient k is positive reflecting the desirability of unemployment below the natural rate because real economies deviate in many respects from perfect competition the natural rate of unemployment is likely to exceed the socially optimal unemployment rate for example with monopolistic competition goods are underproduced because they are priced above marginal cost so potential output is inefficiently low and equilibrium unemployment is too high standard macroeconomic analysis additionally assumes that inflation is determined by an expectations augmented accelerationist phillips curve of the form 2 pi sub t pi sup e sub t f u sub t u sup epsilon sub t where pi sup e sub t is the expected inflation rate at time t with expectations formed at t 1 and epsilon sub t captures supply shocks to the phillips curve at t

advance notice and job search the value of an early start recent studies of the effect of advance notice on jobless duration following displacement misspecify the relationship between these two variables by treating advance notice as a dummy regressor in conventional survival time models job search theory however suggests that the major impact of advance notice is not to alter the efficiency of search after job loss but rather to allow workers to begin search before job loss the authors develop a sequential regimes job search model which allows search prior to displacement for workers with advance knowledge of layoff with different search intensities before and after layoff maximum likelihood estimates of the model are then computed using a pooled data set from the 1984 and 1986 displaced worker surveys advance knowledge is found to significantly shorten jobless duration for most labor force groups using these estimates the authors simulate the effect of various levels of advance knowledge on jobless duration their results indicate that relatively modest advance notice substantially benefits many displaced workers

nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in propagation of the great depression this paper examines the effects of the financial crisis of the 1930s onthe path of aggregate output during that period our approach is complementary to that of friedman and schwartz who emphasized the monetary impact of the bank failures we focus on non monetary primarily credit related aspects of the financial sector output link and consider the problems of debtors as well as those of the banking system we argue that the financial disruptions of 1930 33 reduced the efficiency of the credit allocation process and that the resulting higher cost and reduced availability of credit acted to depress aggregate demand evidence suggests that effects of this type can help explain the unusual length and depth of the great depression this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a reconsideration of the twentieth century robert a mundell held his prize lecture december 8 1999 at aula magna stockholm university he was presented by lars e o svensson chairman of the prize committee this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

mandatory notice and the jobless durations of displaced workers using canadian displaced workers survey data for 1981 86 the author studies the effect of canadian advance notice laws on displaced workers jobless durations by considering statutory notice requirements rather than actual notice provision the author is able to avoid the problems associated with the endogeneity of notice that have characterized previous studies of this question so called group notice laws which apply to large scale layoffs reduced the jobless durations of plant closure victims but individual notice laws which apply to all layoffs in some jurisdictions but only small scale layoffs in others had little effect one possible explanation for this difference is that workers who lose their jobs while their plant remains open may have stronger expectations of being rehired than do other displaced workers and may therefore delay job search with or without notice

jobless spells and re employment wages many studies of job loss attribute the earnings losses associated with layoffs to the loss of job occupation and industry specific human capital this paper estimates the effect of jobless spells on post layoff wages using data from the 1984 panel of survey on income participation for a sample of adult white male workers who were permanently laid off between 1974 and 1984 the estimated impact of jobless spells on starting wages and survey date wages several years after re employment are controlled for separations layoffs and quits and for individual and job characteristics the estimates show that jobless spell durations reduce starting wages wage growth in the new job is lower for workers who experience long spell durations a result that suggests acceptance of jobs which are poor matches compared to other workers who spend less time out of work following a layoff the findings support labour force policies which minimize the amount of time a person is out of work

money still makes the world go round the zonal view many leading monetary economists have come to regard the monetary aggregates as obsolete measures of the monetary policy stance this critique has led some to view money as having lost its central role in the conduct of monetary policy we say to those advocating excising money from monetary policy not so fast to better understand the potential role for money we develop a zonal view of monetary policy which reflects the historical regularity for the relative informativeness of the quantitative measures of monetary policy such as the monetary aggregates and real interest rates to depend on the inflation zone in which a central bank finds itself the zones range from high inflation zone 1 to deep deflation zone 5 with intermediate zones of moderate inflation zone 2 low inflation zone 3 and low deflation zone 4 we find considerable support for this view in the historical data which stretches back to the 19 th century seen from this perspective the past experience of central banks casts doubt on the singular importance often attributed to the short term real interest rate as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy this applies especially in the current low inflation environment in which many central banks find themselves the zonal view has far reaching implications for monetary policy frameworks for the analytical efforts to understand the monetary policy transmission mechanism and for central bank communication strategies this paper was prepared for the 21 st congress of the european economic association held in vienna on august 27 2006 the views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors

advance notice and postdisplacement joblessness this article investigates whether prenotification decreases postdis placement joblessness reduced form estimates indicate that lengthy written notice is associated with small increases in the probability of avoiding nonemployment but with no decline in average durations significant reductions are found however for household heads women nonwhites and in local labor markets with high unemploy ment rates a new method is developed to control for the endogeneity of voluntarily provided advance notice this procedure suggests that previous research substantially overstates the degree to which preno tification reduces nonemployment and indicates that the actual de crease is between 2 and 5 working days

on the job search the case of nevada test site contractor employees the us nuclear testing moratorium has reduced employment levels at the nevada test site nts this study analyses the incidence duration and determinants of on the job search activity of nts employees who expect permanent job losses empirical results support theoretical predictions originating from search theory and suggest that high skilled white collar workers are the most likely to search while employed and therefore are the least likely to face severe dislocation problems

a puzzling aspect of the effect of advance notice on unemployment displaced workers with generous periods of advance notice are more likely than their non notified counterparts to avoid post displacement unemployment altogether but once unemployed they tend to escape from unemployment much more slowly the authors using data from the five year retrospective 1988 and 1990 displaced worker surveys examine three potential explanations for this puzzle delaying behavior induced by the receipt of unemployment insurance nonrandom distribution of notice to workers and previous studies failure to appropriately incorporate the pre displacement search time of notified workers this analysis supports the third explanation after allowing for less intense search prior to displacement than following displacement the authors find that the pattern of escape rates for otherwise observationally equivalent workers does not differ by notification status

identifying fiscal policy in effectiveness from the differential counter cyclicality of government spending in the interwar period differences across decades in the counter cyclical stance of fiscal policy can identify whether the growth in government spending affects output growth and so speeds recovery from a recession we study government spending reaction functions from the 1920s and 1930s for twenty countries there are two main findings first surprisingly government spending was less counter cyclical in the 1930s than in the 1920s second the growth of government spending did not have a significant effect on output growth so that there is little evidence that this feature of fiscal policy played a stabilizing role in the interwar period resume identifier le caractere effectif ou non de la politique fiscale a partir de la contra cyclicite differentielle des depenses gouvernementales pendant l entre deux guerres des differences dans le degre de contra cyclicite de la politique budgetaire peuvent servir a identifier si la croissance des depenses publiques a un effet sur la croissance de l output et accelere ainsi la reprise de l activite suivant une recession nous etudions des fonctions de reaction des depenses publiques pour les annees 1920 et 1930 ce pour vingt pays il en ressort deux resultats principaux premierement et fait surprenant les depenses publiques etaient moins contra cycliques durant les annees 1930 que 1920 deuxiemement la croissance des depenses publiques n a pas eu d effet significatif sur la croissance de l output ce qui permet de douter que cet aspect de la politique budgetaire ait joue un role stabilisateur durant l entre guerre

currencies and the allocation of risk the welfare effects of a monetary union in a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets nominal securities and mean variance preferences a monetary union is desirable when the gain from eliminating excess volatility of nominal variables exceeds the cost of reducing the number of currencies with which to hedge risks copyright 1998 by american economic association

financial factors in the great depression eginning with irving fisher 1933 and john maynard keynes 1931 b 1963 macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the great depression turning points during the depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets stock market collapse waves of bankruptcy and bank failure and contractions in the money stock but the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the depression has been a source of controversy as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the depression this essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the depression and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the depression and for macroeconomics i argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial real links in the depression followed a paradigm shift in economics a central neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity also the increasing emphasis on learning and path dependence in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy makers failed to prevent the depression

the political economy of the euro crisis this article introduces the special issue on the political economy of the euro crisis which aims to improve our understanding of the causes consequences and implications of the highly unusual nature of this crisis a financial crisis among developed countries within a supranational monetary union the article provides a brief chronology of the crisis discusses its underlying causes and reviews the ways in which comparative and international political economy can help us understand the crisis the article then discusses the individual and collective contributions of the articles in the special issue and discusses possible future research paths on the political economy of the euro crisis we conclude with a brief discussion of how a political economy perspective informs our understanding of the long term prospects for the eurozone and european integration

preunemployment job search and advance job loss notice preunemployment search is the fundamental labor market process generating beneficial effects of advance notice yet theory indicates that workers receiving notice may not search whereas others may search even without advance notice our weighted results indicate that over one third of all nonnotified workers still search and over 40 of workers receiving notice do not respond by searching further preunemployment search determinants differ for notified nonnotified workers and men women for notified men search is strongly increased by longer notice and strongly decreased by higher unemployment insurance benefits but neither factor affects the employed search decisions of notified women

how do unemployment insurance and recall expectations affect on the job search among workers who receive advance notice of layoff this paper explores how advance notice of layoffs recall rehiring expectations and unemployment insurance ui benefits affected on the job search among a random sample of arizona ui recipients in 1975 76 the analysis which includes extensive controls for the characteristics of workers and their jobs indicates that pre unemployment search increased with length of notice and decreased with expected recall also among workers not expecting recall pre unemployment search decreased with the level of ui benefits available after layoff the authors argue that improved experience rating would encourage firms to give employees advance notice when layoffs are imminent and re employment bonuses for workers with zero or short unemployment spells would encourage early search

the ups and downs of capitalism ben bernanke is a leading macroeconomist who has contributed extensively to the literature on business cycles monetary policy the role of financial markets in economic fluctuations inflation targeting and the economics of the great depression he is one of the six economists who form the nber business cycle dating committee a group that determines the dates of recessions in the us in this article interview professor bernanke discusses issues relating to the great depression of the 1930s and problems relating to inflation in the latter half of the twentieth century

could stable money have averted the great contraction i introduction although over fifty years have elapsed since the onset of the great contraction controversy still swirls about the factors responsible for its depth and long duration a basic issue is the hypothesis due to friedman and schwartz 1963 that the great contraction would have been attenuated had the federal reserve not allowed the money stock to decline although the validity of the hypothesis has been a subject of much debate there is little empirical evidence directly addressing it a direct test of the friedman and schwartz hypothesis requires simulating the behavior of output under a counterfactual policy of stable money that approach was adopted by warburton 1966 friedman 1960 and modigliani 1969 none of whom constructed a model of the economy on the basis of which to conduct his test recently mccallum 1990 has used simulations from a macro model to show that his base rule with feedback would have avoided the severe decline in nominal income that occurred between 1929 and 1933 1 the extent to which his rule would have improved the behavior of nominal income depends on the value of the feedback coefficient mccallum s simulations however do not address the issue considered here of how a stable money rule would have performed in this paper we present simulations that focus on the stable money counterfactual our model is based on mccallum s but we use a more general framework than his that a estimates separate relations for output and the price level and b places no prior restrictions on the feedback from output and the price level to money our stable money counterfactual does not change the long term rate of money growth from that actually experienced and thus involves only short run changes in the behavior of the money supply we assume that dynamics embedded in the output and price relation are not especially sensitive to this type of policy change we simulate two variants of milton friedman s 1960 constant money growth rule the first a strong form of the rule assumes that the fed could quickly offset changes in the money multiplier by changes in high powered money and thus keep the money stock on the constant growth rate path in each quarter the second a weaker form of the rule assumes that the money multiplier is observed with a one quarter lag and the fed can only set the expected rate of growth of money conditional on last period information equal to the constant rate our basic simulation is derived from a model estimated for the 1921 1 1941 4 interwar period the results of this simulation buttress the views of friedman and schwartz had a constant money growth rule with an annual rate equal to the average 1921 41 rate of 2 95 percent been followed throughout the interwar period the great contraction would have been avoided real output would have declined from 1929 3 to 1933 1 but the order of magnitude of the cumulative change 11 1 to 21 6 percent and the annual rate of change 3 3 to 6 6 percent when the actual cumulative change was 36 2 percent and the annual rate of change was 12 1 percent would have been comparable to other recessions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the basic simulation we assume that the output and price relations remained stable over the entire interwar period the extraordinary economic conditions of the great contraction could have arguably shifted the output and price relations thus we also present an alternative simulation that uses estimates of these relations based on the 1920s data this simulation shows that a constant money growth rule with an annual rate equal to the 1921 29 average of 3 29 percent would have prevented even a mild recession during the great contraction period section ii contains a brief survey of the continuing debate over the cause and propagation mechanism of the great contraction and its implications for the stable money hypothesis

meltzer s history of the federal reserve this review argues that allan meltzer s account of the fed between 1913 1951 complements friedman and schwartz s in their monetary history meltzer emphasises policy making within the system rather than the evolution of the money supply and its effects on the economy he stresses the uncertainty of the fed s independence before the 1951 accord and the effects of economic ideas notably the real bills and riefler burgess doctrines on policy many virtues in the book are noted and one weakness a failure to explain why inadequate ideas became dominant within the fed when sounder alternatives were available in contemporary monetary thought

the returns to mobility and job search by gender using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth the authors estimate the returns to job search mobility and the interaction of search and mobility for young men and women they find st

an empirical test of the theory of on the job search preunemployment search is the fundamental labor market process generating beneficial effects of advance notice yet theory indicates that workers receiving notice may not search whereas others may search even without advance notice our weighted results

sticky prices as coordination failure this paper links the coordination failure and menu cost approaches to the microeconomic foundations of keynesian macroeconomics if a firm s desired price is increasing in others prices then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity thus nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes jel e12 e30 keynesian macroeconomics waned in the 1970 s because economists grew disenchanted with its weak microeconomic foundations the central difficulty was that keynesian models were based on ad hoc rigidities in nominal wages and prices the 1980 s produced two approaches to reviving keynesian theory the menu cost literature n gregory mankiw 1985 george akerlof and janet yellen 1985 seeks to provide rigorous explanations for nominal rigidities these papers argue that small frictions in price setting are enough to produce large nominal rigidities in contrast the coordination failure literature russell cooper and andrew john 1988 abandons nominal rigidities and seeks alternative foundations for keynesian models the central idea is that many economic activities such as production e g john bryant 1983 trade e g peter diamond 1982 and investment e g nobuhiro kiyotaki 1988 exhibit synergism or strategic complementarity one agent s optimal level of activity depends positively on others activity strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria with high activity equilibria superior to low activity equilibria thus an economy may be stuck in an underemployment equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists models with nominal rigidities and models with coordination failures are often presented as competing paradigms 1 this paper shows that this view is incorrect we take a step toward unifying the foundations of keynesian economics by showing that the two sets of ideas are highly complementary nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes this failure has the essential features of coordination failures in previous models flexibility in one firm s price increases the incentives for other firms to make their prices flexible this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity equilibria with less rigidity more active price adjustment are often pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity these results contribute to our understanding both of coordination failure and of nominal rigidity the range of keynesian phenomena explained by coordination failures is greatly expanded previous coordination failure models contain only real variables and thus ascribe no role to monetary policy or other determinants of nominal spending our results suggest that coordination failure is at the root of inefficient nonneutralities of money theories of nominal rigidities gain new empirical and policy im

democratic institutions and exchange rate commitments since the collapse of the bretton woods system countries have been able to choose from a variety of exchange rate arrangements we argue that politicians incentives condition the choice of an exchange rate arrangement these incentives reflect the configuration of domestic political institutions particularly electoral and legislative institutions in systems where the cost of electoral defeat is high and electoral timing is exogenous politicians will be less willing to forgo their discretion over monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate in systems where the costs of electoral defeat are low and electoral timing is endogenous politicians are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime consequently differences in domestic political systems can help account for variations in the choice of exchange rate arrangements we test this argument using constrained multinomial logit and binomial logit on a sample of twenty democracies over the period 1974 95 domestic political institutions have a significant effect on exchange rate regime choice even after controlling for systemic macroeconomic and other political variables

the macroeconomics of the great depression a comparative approach recently research on the causes of the great depression has shifted from a heavy emphasis on events in the united states to a broader more comparative approach that examines the interwar experiences of many countries simultaneously in this lecture i survey the current state of our knowledge about the depression from a comparative perspective on the aggregate demand side of the economy comparative analysis has greatly strengthened the empirical case for monetary shocks as a major driving force of the depression an interesting possibility suggested by this analysis is that the worldwide monetary collapse that began in 1931 may be interpreted as a jump from one nash equilibrium to another on the aggregate supply side comparative empirical studies provide support for both induced financial crisis and sticky nominal wages as mechanisms by which nominal shocks had real effects still unresolved is why nominal wages did not adjust more quickly in the face of mass unemployment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the spectre of deflation a review of empirical evidence what explains the widespread fear of deflation this article reviews the history of thought economic history and empirical evidence on deflation with a view to answering this question it also outlines informally the main effects of deflation in applied monetary models the main finding is that for both historical and contemporary deflations there are many open empirical questions that could be answered using the tools economists use to study inflation and monetary policy more generally qu est ce qui explique la peur tres repandue de la deflation ce memoire fait un tour d horizon de l histoire de la pensee economique de l histoire economique et des resultats empiriques quant aux effets de la deflation en vue de repondre a cette question on fait aussi echo informellement aux effets principaux de la deflation dans les modeles monetaires appliques ce qui ressort principalement de ce travail est que tant pour les deflations dans l histoire que dans le monde contemporain il y a bien des questions empiriques encore irresolues auxquelles on pourrait donner une reponse en utilisant l outillage mental que les economistes utilisent pour etudier l inflation et la politique monetaire plus generalement sp c tre n thing that is thought to be seen but has no material existence haunting presentiment of ruin war madness etc

lessons from the 1930s great depression this paper provides a survey of the great depression comprising both a narrative account and a detailed review of the empirical evidence focusing especially on the experience of the united states we examine the reasons for and flawed resolution of the american banking crisis as well as the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy we also consider the pivotal role of the gold standard in the international transmission of the slump and leaving gold as a route to recovery policy lessons for today from the great depression are discussed as are some implications for macroeconomics

international aspects of the great depression and the crisis of 2007 similarities differences and lessons we focus on two international aspects of the great depression financial crises and international trade and try to discern lessons for the current economic crisis both downturns featured global banking crises which were generated by boom slump macroeconomic cycles during both crises world trade collapsed faster than world incomes and the trade decline was highly synchronized across countries during the depression income losses and rises in trade barriers explain trade s collapse owing to vertical specialization and more intense trade in durables today s trade collapse is due to uncertainty and small shocks to trade costs hitting international supply chains so far the global economy has avoided the global trade wars and banking collapses of the depression perhaps owing to improved policy even so the global economy remains susceptible to large shocks owing to financial innovation and technological

politics institutions and trade lessons of the interwar era recent studies cast doubt on the value added of international trade agreements and institutions using a new data set that consists of about 35 000 observations on the trade of fifty four nations between 1919 and 1938 we examine whether this skepticism also applies to the infamous interwar trade blocs traditional historical accounts attribute to them a large drop in international trade and a rise in the political tensions that would later erupt in world war ii in this study we show that no bloc raised trade among its members as a whole or decreased trade between members and nonmembers however our findings are not wholly consistent with the skepticism recent studies express we argue that conflicts of interest among the great powers encouraged the emergence of the bloc system and also gave rise to intrabloc trade shifts consistent with the political interests of their great power hubs the political military alliances these conflicts created also reduced trade between their signatories and we argue more generally that the causal chain runs from politics to trade as a result measuring only the effect of agreements and institutions on aggregate trade between their members can generate inaccurate estimates of their value added

international liquidity in a multipolar world today s global monetary and financial system to a remarkable extent continues to rely on the u s dollar for international liquidity this reflects the currency s historic role the liquidity of american financial markets and the absence of alternatives but with the emergence of emerging markets the capacity of the united states to provide safe assets will be outstripped by the growth of international transactions it is thus likely that other large economies presumably europe and china will eventually join the united states as sources of international liquidity and that other currencies will come to share the dollar s reserve currency status

investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes under inflation targeting estimates of the indexation parameter in hybrid new keynesian phillips curves are either equal to zero or very low in the united kingdom canada sweden and new zealand analogous results hold for the euro area under the european monetary union and for switzerland under the new monetary regime under stable regimes with clearly defined nominal anchors inflation appears to be purely forward looking these results question the notion that the intrinsic inflation persistence found in post wwii u s data is structural in the sense of lucas carnegie rochester conference series on public policy 1 1976 19 46 and suggest that hardwiring inflation persistence in macroeconomic models is potentially misleading

stability without a pact lessons from the european gold standard 1880 1914 stability pacts european lessons from the gold standard the gold standard was a system of fixed exchange rates that offered little opportunity for carrying out monetary policies short of suspending gold convertibility trade integration and capital mobility were very high it is worthwhile asking whether there are useful lessons to draw for emu from european experience during that period one clear lesson is that debts matter another basic finding is that the stability of the european gold standard depended on the underlying price trend deflation prior to 1895 resulted in rising public debt burdens which forced some countries to leave the system once gold was discovered and deflation gave way to inflation real interest service fell debts grew more slowly and a high degree of convergence allowed most countries to return to gold for emu this result implies that stability will hinge on the ecb s policy not being too restrictive other lessons concern the fragility of institutions in the face of deep public finance difficulties the risks for the single market of leaving out countries that have not fully converged and the existence of a virtuous cycle including low real interest rates fast growth and debt reduction marc flandreau jacques le cacheux and frederic zumer

trade blocs currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s we analyze the impact of commercial and financial policies on the reorientation of trade in the 1930s we report evidence that commercial policies attenuated prior connections between income growth and trade and that exchange rate instability marginally discouraged international trade in contrast the tendency toward regionalization commonly ascribed to the formation of trade and currency blocs was already evident to a considerable extent prior to the regional policy initiatives of the 1930s this reorientation is more properly attributed to ongoing historical forces such as commercial and financial links between countries forged over many years

viewpoint understanding the great depression bernanke 2000 and james 2001 it is now commonplace to view the depression from an international perspective and to test causal hypotheses by comparing the experiences of countries that endured more and less severe cyclical downturns this is in contrast with the earlier generation of scholarship notably the influential work of friedman and schwartz 1963 and temin 1976 which viewed the depression as centred in the united states and focused on shocks and policies in that country specific hypotheses associated with the global perspective continue to be disputed but there seems little question that the international view serves as a point of departure for a growing portion of recent scholarship whether this new research has produced a scholarly consensus is another matter in this paper i ask whether it is possible to arrive at such a consensus by synthesizing the old and new literatures i describe a perspective that views the great depression as a global phenomenon emphasizing linkages among countries and the destabilizing influence of the international monetary and financial system but that at the same time acknowledges the uniquely important character of events and policies in the united states i thereby suggest that the opposition between the old and new or u s centric and global views of the great depression may ultimately prove artificial the task for macroeconomic and historical scholarship

specialization and the big push abstract in this paper we consider industrialization as the situation in which economy achieves high productivities by an increase in the degree of specialization we study it by introducing intermediate goods sectors in the murphy shleifer vishny model of the big push and show the existence of multiple pareto ranked equilibria

business cycles in international historical perspective business cycle models seek to answer the question of why economies go through cycles of recession and recovery or boom and bust any theory of the business cycle makes two sorts of claims what shocks are most important in disturbing the economy and what economic structure is necessary for propagating these shocks for example one common explanation of business cycles begins with monetary shocks and then seeks to explain why monetary shocks are not purely neutral as neoclassical theory would have it and instead have real effects at least in the short term early models in this vein were often implicitly or explicitly based on the proposition that markets do not clear continuously early equilibrium real business cycle theories instead emphasized the importance of real shocks especially to technology which may cause socially efficient fluctuations even when markets are always in equilibrium more recent models have attempted to marry the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics with the substantive keynesian ideas that money is not neutral and that economic fluctuations are costly new keynesian theories of the business cycle admit the possibility of a number of economic shocks including monetary and technology shocks but then focus on explaining how nominal price rigidities within the economy can turn these shocks into recessions or booms other models show that business cycles driven by keynesian animal spirits are consistent with rigorous microfoundations and rational expectations seeking empirical evidence for and against these various approaches we turn business cycle theories loose on perhaps the greatest macroeconomic laboratory

golden fetters the gold standard and the great depression barry eichengreen oxford university press new york 1992 pp xix 448 39 95

the relative effects of employed and unemployed job search a lthough many early models of job search assumed that job seekers were unemployed economists have come to recognize the importance of on the job search mattila 1974 for example found that roughly 60 of quitters experienced no unemployment between jobs implying that the majority of voluntary job changers engaged in on the job search the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search has been modelled in the theoretical search literature barron and mccafferty 1977 burdett 1978 however there have been no attempts to estimate empirically the determinants of this choice 2 some researchers have however examined the resulting wages associated with these two types of search and found a greater wage return to employed than to unemployed search mattila 1969 black 1980 however because voluntarily unemployed search involves forgoing income burdett 1978 while employed search does not abstracting from voluntary reductions in hours incomemaximizing job seekers would never quit to search unless the expected net return to unemployed search exceeded that for employed search thus the previously mentioned empirical findings at first glance might appear to contradict the assumption of income maximization by job seekers because some workers do quit into unemployment 3 in this paper it is argued that previous attempts to compare the returns of employed and unemployed job search suffer from a selectivity problem specifically searchers who accept offers without experiencing any unemployment are likely to have unobservable variables such as informal job contacts and ability which will raise the relative return to employed search compared to that of voluntarily unemployed job seekers 4 providing an explanation for higher wages for on the job searchers than for unemployed searchers this paper estimates the relative wage effects of employed and unemployed search and the determinants of the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search unlike earlier work mattila 1969 black 1980 the previously mentioned selectivity problems are accounted for this is the first attempt to estimate the determinants of choice of search mode 5 without adjusting for selectivity bias as regards employed vs unemployed search it is found that employed search is associated with greater expected wage offers than unemployed search controlling for measurable personal characteristics however accounting for selectivity the expected wage offer given unemployed search is greater than that given employed search finally the greater is the difference between the expected offer given unemployed and that given employed search the more likely one is to choose unemployed search these findings suggest that quitting to search unemployed may be a wealth maximizing decision received for publication november 5 1980 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 university of illinois at urbana champaign and arizona state university respectively professor low is partially supported by a faculty grant from the graduate college at arizona state university the authors thank francine blau wallace hendricks and two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions i for a summary of this literature see lippman and mccall 1976 2 barron and mccafferty 1977 do estimate an aggregate time series model of the log of the proportion of quits entering unemployment as a function of the vacancy rate proxied by the help wanted advertising index however such a model ignores search that does not lead to quits and does not include variables beyond the vacancy rate that influence an individual s choice of search mode i it is also possible that the forgone earnings due to unemployed search could in principle be less than the possible savings in direct search costs due to unemployed search relative to employed search see burdett 1978 in this case a lower wage return to unemployed search could imply that quitting was based on income considerations further individuals may have quit for nonwage reasons 4 black 1980 found that other things equal those who planned to seek new employment but did not quit had significantly lower wage growth than those who did not plan to search and did not quit this finding strongly suggests the likelihood of a selectivity bias black 1980 p 227 black s 1976 1980 data the michigan panel study of income dynamics psid for his work on employed search did not allow him to distinguish employed and unemployed search

problems of sample construction in studies of the effects of unemployment insurance on unemployment duration conventional analyses of the effect of unemployment insurance ui on unemployment duration have neglected the issue of sample construction the authors show that such studies by failing to account for job finding among those eligible for ui within intervals corresponding to the waiting time and filing delays associated with drawing benefits overstate the expected unemployment duration of ui recipients while understating that of nonrecipients ignore a dominant line of causation running from duration to ui benefit status produce misspecified hazard functions and may overstate by as much as 50 the effect of the ui replacement rate on jobless duration

the new deal and modern memory summary economists and other social scientists may never be able to explain fully why the greatdepression happened when it did or why it initially was so severe numerous hypotheses havebeen advanced as we have seen and each of them contributes important insights into thecauses of the macroeconomic calamity in which most of the world was mired in 1929 1933 if however one is forced to adopt a monocausal theory it must center on the actions of america scentral bank which presided over an extraordinary expansion in bank credit in the mid to late1920s and then took the punch bowl off the table for the purposes of this article though the key question is why did the great depressionlast longer in the united states than it did in any other nation the answer as laid out in thenext section is presidential politics 23 there will come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of egypt but after them will arise seven years offamine and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of egypt the famine will consume the land genesis 41 29 30 nkjv

inflationary price stability and the great crash an early analysis reconsidered the historical account of american economic conditions before the great crash in a d gayer s monetary policy and economic stabilisation 1935a reflects an inter war debate over the consequences of a stable price level when underlying productivity is rising strongly its account evokes in several ways recent concern over the emergence of financial sector instability under inflation targeting regimes a theoretical treatment of the main analysis permits both comparison between different perspectives in thinking at the time and a critical re examination of the relevance of this thinking to modern policy dilemmas nominal targets may have destabilising real sector consequences

nominal wage stickiness and aggregate supply in the great depression building on earlier work by eichengreen and sachs we use data for 22 countries to study the role of wage stickiness in propagating the great depression recent research suggests that monetary shocks transmitted internationally by the gold standard were a major cause of the depression accordingly we use money supplies and other aggregate demand shifters as instruments to identify aggregate supply relationships we find that nominal wages adjusted quite slowly to falling prices and that the resulting increases in real wages depressed output these findings leave open the question of why wages were so inertial in the face of extreme labor market conditions

advance notice job search and postdisplacement earnings three to 5 years after job displacements workers receiving the advance notice mandated by current law earn approximately 10 more than their nonnotified counterparts this differential is not the result of firms systematically notifying persons with favorable reemployment prospects early warnings are disproportionately obtained by individuals expected to earn relatively low wages in subsequent employment it is not clear however whether prenotification has a causal effect the notification differential may occur because the advance notice is frequently provided by employers offering other kinds of adjustment assistance such as job counseling skill retraining supple mental unemployment benefits or outplacement assistance

lessons from the political economy of the new deal the new deal produced a fundamental change in the structure of american government the national government came to play a much larger role in the financing of social welfare programmes while administration of the programmes was largely located at the states both the purely national and the shared federal parts of the welfare system were characterized by impersonal rules the political economy of how the rules came about and how the new deal experience may have contributed to americans changing their views on the danger of dealing with the national government is the primary focus the paper closes with speculations about the possible effect of changing views on american participation in the second world war after 1939

british monetary and fiscal policy in the 1930s current economic turbulence has revived interest in interwar macroeconomic instability and policy this paper provides a guide to the current state of knowledge on british macroeconomic policy between 1929 and the eve of the second world war for today s economists and policy makers mindful that some will seek lessons from this earlier age it makes clear the very particular economic and policy context of the time including the marked difference between british and american economic performance and policies and the challenge posed by the massive rise in debt brought about by the first world war knowledge transfer is possible here for policy learning but what transpires is that lessons are typically stronger as negatives than as positives namely what should not be done in general as against what might be done this largely situation specific the focus is the role and effectiveness of the monetary and fiscal policies pursued together with an assessment of the principal policy not adopted namely the keynesian solution of significant loan financed public works to remedy mass unemployment the analysis is comparative with respect to us macroeconomic economic performance and policy it explores the different macroeconomic shocks of the contraction phase the term great depression is not really appropriate to the british experience in the two countries comparative policy regimes and then in turn analyses the policy mix and policy effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy including for britain the counterfactual keynesian solution a business cycle periodization is adopted with the key role for the abandonment of the gold standard in terms of regaining freedom of choice in macroeconomic policy itself experiencing significant developments after 1931 the traditional role of the cheap money induced housing boom in britain s post 1932 economic recovery is reaffirmed the impact of the fiscal policies actually pursued are then discussed as are assessments of the likely effectiveness of the keynesian solution had the 1929 liberal party s we can conquer unemployment spending package been implemented

macroprudential policy what can it achieve this paper examines both the objectives and the available instruments for new macroprudential policy making bodies it argues that the objective financial stability is best understood as avoiding widespread disruption of financial flows achieving this objective requires that policy makers carry out two different but related tasks first they must ensure the resilience of the financial system to external shocks second they must respond in a timely fashion to future unsustainable expansions of credit and growth of asset prices these are old policy challenges what has changed is the emergence of new vulnerabilities in our innovative and relatively lightly controlled financial system exposed by the recent global financial crisis macroprudential policy can be effective in addressing these vulnerabilities but will not remove the major political and institutional obstacles to the effective control of unsustainable credit expansions 136 words

restarting globalization after world war ii structure coalitions and the cold war the present period of economic globalization originated following world war ii given the strongly protectionist tendencies prevailing at the time how did this happen structural economic and military causes along with intervening coalitional and institutional factors are considered trade policy change is examined in the five largest trading economies britain france the federal republic of germany japan and the united states structural economic causes best explain why protectionist tendencies were so strong and why they were weakest in the united states and the federal republic the liberalizing trend inaugurated in the united states and the federal republic was also facilitated by coalitional side payments to agriculture cold war related military interests appear to have been the strongest impetus behind the unilateral form of the liberalization

a century of us central banking goals frameworks accountability several key episodes in the 100 year history of the federal reserve have everal key episodes in the 100 year history of the federal reserve have been referred to in various contexts with the adjective great attached to been referred to in various contexts with the adjective great attached to them the great experiment of the federal reserve s founding the great them the great experiment of the federal reserve s founding the great depression the great infl ation and subsequent disinfl ation the great moderation depression the great infl ation and subsequent disinfl ation the great moderation and the recent great recession here i ll use this sequence of great episodes and the recent great recession here i ll use this sequence of great episodes to discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of federal to discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of federal reserve policymaking the goals of policy the policy framework and accountability reserve policymaking the goals of policy the policy framework and accountability and communication the changes over time in these three areas provide a useful and communication the changes over time in these three areas provide a useful perspective i believe on how the role and functioning of the federal reserve have perspective i believe on how the role and functioning of the federal reserve have changed since its founding in 1913 as well as some lessons for the present and for changed since its founding in 1913 as well as some lessons for the present and for the future the future

kicking the habit moving from pegged rates to greater exchange rate flexibility why do governments find it so difficult to move from pegged exchange rates to greater exchange rate flexibility i first establish that there is a problem to be solved that there are powerful incentives for greater flexibility deriving from changes in the international economic and financial environment but that policymakers find it difficult to engineer a smooth transition i offer practical suggestions and a framework under which the probability of a smooth transition can be maximised drawing examples from recent economic history i then attempt to understand the experience of selected countries which have undertaken this transition

multiple expectational equilibria under monopolistic competition this paper shows that a monopolistically competitive economy with real investment can have multiple rational expectations equilibria one is associated with entrepreneurs optimistic expectations about future demand another with entrepreneurs pessimism it also shows that an optimistic expectational equilibrium pareto dominates a pessimistic equilibrium an investment subsidy can be beneficial both by reducing the original underinvestment distortion and by changing firms expectations from pessimistic to optimistic the most important assumption is increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition makes increasing returns consistent with each producer s optimization

reported vs actual job search by unemployment insurance claimants this study compares self reported job search contacts of unemployment insurance recipients with independently verified job search contacts for the total sample reported contacts averaged 2 61 per week compared with actual contacts of only 1 78 per week nearly one fifth of the sample made no job contacts for the single weeks analyzed the separate equations estimated for reported and actual job contacts suggest that systematic misreporting may distort the conclusions particularly for the impact of unemployment insurance benefits on search intensity that would result from analyzing reported rather than actual contacts some implications of the findings for reported unemployment rates also are explored