the importance of group coverage how tax policy shaped u s health insurance in 1954 the internal revenue service stipulated that employer contributions to the health insurance plans of their employees were to be excluded from employee taxable income today the tax subsidy is major feature of the u s health care market this paper examines the initial effects of the tax subsidy on the demand for health insurance using previously unexamined data from 1953 and 1958 results suggest that the tax subsidy increased the growth of group insurance particularly among union members and employed persons this is a critical effect because group insurance is not only less expensive than individual insurance but it is also easier to obtain and households with access to group health insurance are far more likely to purchase health insurance coverage than those without similar access by increasing access to group insurance the tax subsidy fostered an increase in the purchase of group health insurance by people who may not have purchased individual coverage and generated institutional change as it cemented an employment based system of group health insurance in the united states this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

entry exit and performance in airline markets abstract data from the airline industry indicate that 1 entry generally is not induced by price levels substantially above the norm 2 entry reduces fares and increases output and exit increases fares and reduces output and 3 incumbents cut price and maintain output in response to entry and survivors increase both price and output in response to exit these findings cast doubt on the ability of entry to prevent or reverse price increases from anticompetitive mergers

diversification multi market contact and profitability this paper analyses the relationships between diversification multi market contact and industry profitability it focuses on the link between diversification and multi market contact to show that when diversification establishes or increases the extent to which firms meet in more than one market the effect of such multi market contact is to increase the possibility that collusion emerges as an evolutionary stable strategy as a result multi market contact may increase the potential for tacit collusion and so lead to higher profitability the effects of diversification and multi market contact on the price cost margin and the rate of return to capital are estimated using a specially constructed new database for uk manufacturing industry in 1979 this database provides information on the diversification and multi market contact of 418 firms across 134 manufacturing industries thus linking firm and industry level data the results show a clear positive effect of multi market contact on industry profitability

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

from the fringe to the fore labor unions and employee compensation conventional wisdom suggests that labor unions raise worker wages while the newer empirical literature finds only negligible earnings effects i reconcile this apparent contradiction by arguing th

information disclosure in auctions an experiment we report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first price sealed bid auctions interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random matching protocol and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period when bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods prices are higher than the theoretical prediction however when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction we suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

why did male pension coverage decline in the 1980s this analysis of 1979 and 1988 may current population survey data suggests explanations for why male pension coverage declined during the 1980s and why the decline was particularly pronounced among young workers during the 1980s employment shifted toward jobs with lower pension coverage and this shift was more pronounced among young workers than among older workers more important than the reduction in the percentage of workers offered pensions however was reduced participation in pension plans one factor contributing importantly to declining participation rates was the growing share of pensions that were 401 k plans under such plans participation is more voluntary than it is under other plans and young workers are more likely than older workers to decline to participate

gender differences in labor market decisions evidence from rural mexico this study examines gender employment differences in mexicos rural sector using the 1994 survey of rural entrepreneurs and financial services it employed an approach that separate the effects of initial endowments from the gender differences that can be attributed to preferences available opportunities labor market discrimination and other market conditions all of which referred to as labor market structural issues findings show that higher levels of education are associated with a higher employment propensity although the variable for some secondary schooling is not significant for men as expected married men are more likely to be employed than single men while for females the opposite results ensues which indicate that women in rural areas tend to specialize in non market activities particularly after marriage also gender differences in labor market experience proxied by age seems to influence the self employment choice these results have implications for public policy aimed at reducing gender inequality in labor market outcomes in rural mexico the main lesson is that policies that focus solely on individual endowments could have a limited impact on reducing gender inequality if they are not accompanied by policies addressing structural supply and demand factors that are unique to the study population and that influence the choice of women to enter and remain in the workforce

protecting intellectual property rights are small firms handicapped this paper studies the determinants of patent suits and settlements during 1978 99 by linking information from the u s patent office the federal courts and industry sources we find that litigation risk is much higher for patents that are owned by individuals and firms with small patent portfolios patentees with a large portfolio of patents to trade or other characteristics that facilitate cooperative resolution of disputes are much less likely to prosecute infringement suits however postsuit outcomes do not depend on these characteristics these findings show that small patentees are at a significant disadvantage in protecting their patent rights because their greater litigation risk is not offset by more rapid resolution of their suits our empirical estimates of the heterogeneity in litigation risk can help in developing private patent litigation insurance to mitigate the adverse affects of high enforcement costs

resale and collusion in a dynamic market for semidurable goods the paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second hand markets it will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity the main contribution of the paper shows that an active second hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude as do policies that affect the functioning of the second hand market e g leasing policy and buy back it will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits

entrepreneurship social mobility and income redistribution in south india development economists have been preoccupied with the problem of increasing the size of the gnp pie to the relative neglect of its distribution despite the recent disenchantment with the viewpoint that all classes share in the benefits of industrial growth empirical data on the distribution of income business opportunity and economic power are in short supply many of the studies on entrepreneurship and economic development when they are not apologetics for ruthless capitalist exploitation as paul baran suggests extol the achievements of the capitalist entrepreneur without examining class origins and monopoly advantage joseph schumpeter sees entrepreneurs irrespective of class origin as heroic figures with the dream and will to found a private kingdom to conquer adversity to achieve success for its own sake and to experience the joy of creation for gustav papanek 1967 the private entrepreneur who is frugal diligent far sighted remarkably able and willing to take political risks is in large part responsible for the success of pakistan in achieving rapid industrialization

the impact of unionism on fringe benefit coverage abstract the estimated effect of unionism on fringe benefit coverage is shown to be relatively robust to econometric method the atypical characteristics of unionized workers especially their larger employer size higher wages and longer worker week explain between one and two thirds of their higher fringe benefit coverage

buyer confusion and market prices we employ a price setting duopoly experiment to examine whether buyer confusion increases market prices each seller offers a good to buyers who have homogeneous preferences sellers decide on the number of attributes of their good and set prices the number of attributes bears no cost to the sellers and does not affect the value of the good to the buyers but adds complexity to buyers evaluation of the goods the experimental results indicate that the buyers make more suboptimal choices and that prices are higher when the number of attributes of the goods is higher moreover prices and profits are higher than those in a benchmark treatment with perfectly rational robot buyers

economic integration and the sustainability of multimarket collusion abstract we examine the impact of and links between two types of economic integration on the stability of multimarket collusion when firms interact in quantities in segmented markets 1 multilateral trade liberalization captured by a reduction of trade costs across all markets and 2 preferential trade liberalization captured by an expansion in the size of individual markets while holding the level of external trade costs tariffs constant in general collusive stability is non monotonically related to economic integration in the case of multilateral liberalization the effect depends on the initial level of trade costs and the extent of liberalization however on the average the complete elimination of trade costs is pro competitive when these costs are sufficiently high initially in the case of regional integration the effect of liberalization is pro competitive when external trade barriers are sufficiently high but anti competitive when these barriers are sufficiently low

role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information we investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent we characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by jackson and sonnenschein 2007 that restricts the message spaces the principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss we show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes we also extend the results of the single agent model to the multi agent model

gender differences in pensions the causes of gender differences in pensions are examined for retirees and employees using the 1982 newly entitled beneficiary survey and the 1979 and 1988 may current population surveys for both retirees and the employed population much of the gender gap in coverage is accounted for by gender differences in labor market characteristics while children and marriage have a negative effect on female coverage among retirees even after controlling for labor market characteristics the negative effect is not observed among more recent groups of female employees finally recent convergence of male and female labor market characteristics contributed to a decline in the coverage gap during the 1980s

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

bertrand competition with asymmetric marginal costs this article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory the games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms marginal costs while the standard theory requires the low cost firm to set a price just equal to the high cost firm s marginal cost which is identical across all three games and win the entire market intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs we develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture jel l11 l12 c91 d43

increasing wage dispersion and the changes in relative employment and wages in mexico s urban informal sector 1987 1993 this study analyses the role of changes in informal formal relative employment wage levels and wage inequality in explaining increasing wage dispersion in mexico during the 1987 1993 period from 1987 to 1993 the variance of the log of hourly wages for mexican workers increased by more than 50 per cent using data from the encuesta nacional de empleo urbano we find that this increase in the overall wage dispersion was mainly driven by increasing wage dispersion in the formal sector coupled with a faster growth in formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment however compression in the distribution of wages within the informal sector contributed to substantially slowdown the increasing overall wage inequality about 60 per cent of the 1987 1993 4 65 percentage point reduction in the informal sector share of total employment is explained by changes in the structure that determines sectoral employment the rest is explained by changes in the composition of the labour force particularly in

the impact of management incentives in intergroup contests abstract in intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group s members her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members i test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager s efforts in the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment the results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only however group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures

explaining the decline in the offer rate of employer retirement plans between 2003 and 2012 workplace retirement plans deferred compensation plans dcs and deferred benefit plans dbs help workers save for retirement conveniently consistently and automatically but the percentage of

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

nonlinear budget constraints and consumer demand an application to public programs for residential housing abstract this study presents a methodology for exploiting the nonlinear hedonic nature of housing prices to estimate the compensated demands of households for particular housing attributes the methodology is employed to provide hicksian benefit measures of a particular housing subsidy program typical of those undertaken recently in developing countries

the co2 abatement game costs incentives and the enforceability of a sub global coalition abstract this paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short term climate change policy package guided by the united nations framework convention on climate change and the berlin mandate initiatives game theoretic tools and the global trade environment interface are explored within a 26 region 13 commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of oecd regions to comply with a non binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition the results showed that in the absence of side payments the achievement of such a coalition might require the design of suitable trade instruments

concentration in the european electricity industry the internal market as solution abstract this article offers an analysis of the present competitive and regulatory framework of the european electricity sector and the results achieved with the liberalisation process considering the reactions of incumbents to the liberalisation the focus in this work is mainly on the problem of market concentration in the sector the new trends toward the creation of national champions as well as recent mergers between gas suppliers and electricity producers raise serious concerns about abuses of market power and risk of future collusion in particular the strategic linkage of existing markets and the expansion into new ones are analyzed in the light of the multimarket contact theory considering investment in interconnection among member states the internal market issue is investigated as a solution to the risks coming from liberalisation

an analysis of the demand for housing attributes this paper uses a two step approach to estimate a system of structural demand equations for housing attributes estimation of a hedonic price regression in the first step yields implicit prices for housing attributes for the toronto metropolitan area in 1978 which are then used to estimate the expenditure share equations derived from the indirect translog utility function empirical results indicate that the composite housing attributes used in the second stage model are own price elastic while an examination of cross price relationships reveals that these attributes are reasonably substitutable

collusion at the extensive margin abstract we augment the multi market collusion model of bernheim and whinston 1990 by allowing for firm entry into and exit from individual markets we show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive agreement collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other s markets or territories we characterise parameter values that sustain this type of collusion and identify the assumptions where this collusion is more likely to hold than its intensive margin counterpart specifically it is demonstrated that where duopoly competition is fierce collusion at the extensive margin is always sustainable finally we provide a theoretic foundation for the use of a proportional response enforcement mechanism

multi market contact and competition evidence from the depression era portland cement industry abstract theoretical work has suggested that contact between firms in different markets can facilitate tacit collusion empirical work on this link has been limited we address the paucity of empirical evidence with a novel plant level dataset for the cement industry during the great depression we find that multi market contact fosters tacit collusion and higher prices based on a new measure of contact that accounts for capacity utilization a one standard deviation increase in our measure of contact increases prices by around 4 3 we then examine the effect of the national industrial recovery act s codes of fair conduct introduced in 1933 to stem deflation through cooperative behavior within industries we find that the effects of the codes were most strongly felt in markets with the highest level of multi market contact this suggests that multi market contact can be a useful tool for firms to support collusive outcomes tacit or otherwise

specification of hedonic regressions non nested tests on measures of neighborhood quality abstract the j test a non nested test is used to determine which set of neighborhood variables best explains the variation in housing prices the results indicate that characteristics of neighbors race and socio economic descriptors are more important than the quality of public services

credible entry threats into contestable markets a symmetric multi market model of contestability the theory of contestable markets emphasizes potential competition yet it is reticent on the identity of potential entrants recent literature discusses the im possibility of hit and run entry for several types of entrants r d cairns and d mahabir 1988 argue that existing firms in related markets are most likely to be capable of hit and run entry but unlikely to be motivated this paper expands their arguments by sketching a multimarket framework and by discussing a model that captures most of the current debate the model marks a first step into revising contestability theory along the lines of this debate copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

multi market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement this paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand related markets we show that cartel prosecution can have a knock on effect bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break up of the cartel in the adjacent market cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets we discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus explore antitrust spillovers the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms

when will the gender gap in retirement income narrow among recent retirees women receive substantially less retirement income from social security and private pensions than men increases in women s labor market attachment and earnings relative to men over the past 50 years provide some optimism for an improvement in female retirement income particularly for married women this study shows that women s income from social security and private pensions has improved only slightly relative to men over the past 25 years using data on people approaching retirement age over the next 20 years prospects for future improvement are investigated one of the main conclusions is that pension income among women particularly married women will rise sharply relative to men s over the next few decades but a substantial gap could remain even if women close the gap in experience and salaries

multimarket contact and pricing evidence from the u s cement industry abstract we empirically examine the effect of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s cement industry a model of price and quantity formation is estimated for a panel of 25 regional cement markets over 16 years the results indicate that the divergence of price from marginal cost in a particular market is directly related to the extent of multimarket contact among firms in that market

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

trade negotiations domestic policies and the most favored nation clause this paper illustrates how restricting trade instruments to non discrimination links trade agreements to non trade agreements and under certain conditions helps governments further lower tariffs and or domestic standards policies these conditions are i governments objective functions are sufficiently concave with respect to domestic standards policies ii domestic standards are sufficiently valued and iii policies are strategic complements these can then be used as a rationale for restricting safeguard measures to non discrimination ce texte montre comment le fait de restreindre les instruments de politique commerciale a la seule poursuite de liens commerciaux libres de discrimination relie accords commerciaux et non commerciaux et a certaines conditions aide les gouvernements a reduire encore davantage les tarifs douaniers et ou les normes politiques nationales ces conditions sont que i les fonctions objectives soient suffisamment concaves par rapport aux normes politiques nationales ii les normes nationales soient suffisamment valorisees et iii les politiques soient des complements strategiques ces arguments fournissent le rationale pour limiter les mesures de protection a la seule non discrimination

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

trends in aggregate concentration in the united states i assemble two rarely used data sets to measure aggregate concentration in the u s in the 1980s and 1990s despite the merger waves of those decades aggregate concentration declined in the 1980s and the early 1990s but rose modestly in the late 1990s the levels at the end of the decade were at or below the levels of the late 1980s or early 1990s the average size of firm and the relative importance of larger size classes of firms increased however gini coefficients for employment and payroll shares of companies showed moderate but steady increases from 1988 through 1999

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

the structure of competition how competition between one s rivals influences imitative market entry this paper investigates how the pattern of encounters between a firm s competitors affects the firm s inclination to follow its competitors into a new market we theorize that direct encounters between a firm s rivals lead to a herding effect making imitative market entry more likely past mutual forbearance between a firm s competitors resulting from asymmetric multimarket competition further strengthens this herding effect by enhancing the firm s expectations of market attractiveness in contrast aggressive past rivalry between the competitors resulting from symmetric multimarket contact dampens these expectations producing a competition effect that makes herding less probable we test our idea in two distinct contexts the chinese pharmaceutical industry and the taiwanese computer hardware industry and find consistent support in both settings we discuss how our analysis of what we call the structure of competition can be extended to research on other forms of firm behavior

on interdependent supergames multimarket contact concavity and collusion abstract following bernheim and whinston 1990 this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms ability to collude real world imperfections tend to make firms objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent firms payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others then multimarket contact always facilitates collusion it may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any the effects of conglomeration are discussed multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents objective function is submodular in material payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13 l21

taking the initiative what characterizes leaders abstract taking the initiative is a crucial element of leadership and an important asset for many jobs we assess this element of leadership in a game in which it emerges spontaneously since people have a non obvious possibility to take the initiative we can show that leadership in this game correlates with real life activities associated with taking the initiative combining this game with other experimental games and with questionnaires we investigate the personality characteristics that entail leadership we find efficiency concerns and generosity to be important determinants of leadership leaders have an internal locus of control and are more patient than non leaders but they are not different from the non leaders with respect to risk attitude response time patterns and the results from the cognitive reflection test show that cognitive resources are relevant in the decision to lead

disability and the labour market an analysis of british males this paper attempts using data from the british labour force survey 1996 to examine to what extent differences in labour market outcomes between able bodied and disabled men may be attributed to differences in endowments of human capital and associated productivity differences both labour force participation and selectivity corrected human capital equations are estimated and decomposition techniques applied to them using the methodology of baldwin and johnson baldwin m johnson w g 1994 labor market discrimination against men with disabilities journal of human resources xxix 1 winter 1 19 the employment effects of wage discrimination against the disabled are also estimated evidence of both substantial wage and participation rate differences between able bodied and disabled men are found which have implications for the operation of the 1995 disability discrimination act

adjustment costs and the sequencing of trade liberalisation a common feature of trade agreements between countries is that the integration of markets proceeds in stages this paper examin es conceptually the role played by adjustment costs in determining the best way to structure an agreement between two countries when there are multiple sectors to be liberalised adjustment costs to liberalisatio n of industries might influence the timing of liberalisatio n with the analysis bearing similarity to why tariff reductions tend to be phased in over time when two industries have no spillover eff ects trade agreements with sequential liberalisation will be less costly to sustain however if the liberalisation of one in dustry influences permanently the flow of benefits from liberalising the other industry simultaneous liberalisation may be easier to sustain

what to show on the wine labels a hedonic analysis of price drivers of sicilian wines unlike previous literature we construct a hedonic model of wine price that incorporates all the main categories of variables simultaneously to enable a better evaluation of their importance on wine price formation a comprehensive model has the advantage of providing more reliable estimates of the attributes implicit prices thereby facilitating firms pricing and improving effectiveness of wine production and marketing decisions we utilize two different datasets of sicilian wines collecting data from influential wine guides our results suggest that wine price strongly depends on objective features such as vintage alcoholic content geographical origin grape variety producer size and cellaring potential in addition use of containers like tonneaux and barrique positively affects prices whereas use of concrete containers has a negative influence no univocal indications emerge with regard to the effect of the type of company type of viticulture and firm age as for sensorial characteristics our a

new product introduction and incumbent response strategies their interrelationship and the role of multimarket contact in this article the author studies the determinants of both new product introduction and incumbent response strategies in a single integrated framework building on previous research in strategic

sticks and carrots two incentive mechanisms supporting intra group cooperation abstract in this note we introduce two distinct incentive mechanisms that support dynamic intra group cooperation in the context of prisoner s dilemma payoffs rewards for cooperating and punishments for defection where the rewarding or punishing party may be outside the relationship

umbrella branding with imperfect observability and moral hazard abstract in a framework of repeated purchase experience goods with seller s moral hazard and imperfect monitoring umbrella branding may improve the terms of the implicit contract between seller and buyers whereby the seller invests in quality and buyers pay a high price in some cases umbrella branding leads to a softer punishment of product failure which increases the seller s value in other cases umbrella branding leads to a harsher punishment of product failure which allows for a reputational equilibrium that would otherwise be impossible on the negative side under umbrella branding one bad signal may kill two revenue streams not one combining costs and benefits i determine the set of parameter values such that umbrella branding is an optimal strategy

collusion in multiproduct oligopoly games under a finite horizon applying recent results on finitely repeated games to oligopoly theory the author finds that there exists a class of finite horizon output games in which collusion can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium trigger strategies prevent defection from the cooperative outcome by credibly threatening that the defector will be forced to exit the industry for the case of a multiproduct oligopoly it is shown that collusion in one market can be enforced by the threat of punishment in a second market if someone defects even though the two markets are structurally independent the firms make them strategically interdependent through their strategies copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

group dynamics in experimental studies the bertrand paradox revisited abstract different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects behavior considering the repeated bertrand duopoly game of dufwenberg and gneezy dufwenberg m gneezy s u 2000 price competition and market concentration an experimental study international journal of industrial organization 18 7 22 we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to nash equilibrium limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject s own opponent in contrast leads to competitive behavior when we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment full we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices we can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example

trade costs and multimarket collusion contrary to conventional wisdom this article argues that trade liberalization may facilitate collusion and reduce welfare with the help of a duopoly model in which firms interact repeatedly in multiple markets we first show that if trade costs i e tariffs transport costs and discount factors are not too high efficient cartel agreements necessitate the cross hauling of goods as that entails lower deviation incentives in this setting we then demonstrate that reciprocal trade liberalization always raises total output when trade costs are within a range whose lower bound exceeds a threshold level but may reduce total output and thus be pro collusive when trade costs are below that threshold level

foreign direct investment location strategies in the tire industry we analyze the nature of international competition among multinational firms in the tire industry using the frameworks of the theories of oligopolistic reaction and foreign direct investment we find that the firms investment patterns are related to the number and identities of competitors host country characteristics and foreign experience global tire companies from several nations demonstrate oligopolistic reaction behavior

anomalous behavior in a traveler s dilemma the notion of a nash equilibrium has joined supply and demand as one of the two or three techniques that economists instinctively try to use first in the analysis of economic interactions moreover the nash equilibrium and closely related game theoretic concepts are being widely applied in other social sciences and even in biology where evolutionary stability often selects a subset of the nash equilibria many people are uneasy about the stark predictions of the nash equilibrium in some contexts where the extreme rationality assumptions seem implausible kaushik basu s 1994 traveler s dilemma is a particularly convincing example of a case where the unrelenting logic of game theory is at odds with intuitive notions about human behavior the story associated with the dilemma is that two travelers purchase identical antiques while on a tropical vacation their luggage is lost on the return trip and the airline asks them to make independent claims for compensation in anticipation of excessive claims the airline representative announces

poverty among minorities in the united states explaining the racial poverty gap for blacks and latinos the two largest minorities in the united states african americans and people of hispanic origin show official poverty rates at least twice as high as those of non hispanic whites these similarly high poverty rates between the two minorities are however the result of different combinations of factors related to the specific characteristics of these two groups in this article we analyse the role of demographic and labour related variables in the current differential of poverty rates among racial and ethnic groups in the united states and its recent evolution our results show first that these differentials are largely explained by differing family characteristics of the ethnic groups furthermore we show that while labour market activity of family members and a preponderance of single mothers play a more significant role in the higher poverty rates of blacks a larger number of dependent children is closely associated with higher poverty among latinos who also suffer from a larger educational att

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

hedonic prices demands for urban housing amenities and benefit estimates abstract this paper uses a rosen two step hedonic price trait demand approach to estimate demand functions for a vector of urban amenities to ascertain whether this theoretically preferred approach yields benefit estimates which differ from the oft used ridker henning one step hedonic approach we conduct a sensitivity analysis we find that the two step approach does yield different benefit estimates and that the differences are large for some amenities the estimates are sensitive to the functional form of the hedonic equation when the forms are significantly different according to modified box cox results but are not particularly sensitive to specification of the amenity demand equation

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

commitment in utility regulation a model of reputation and policy applications abstract this paper builds a dynamic model of utility regulation where a government cannot commit to a time inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment by allowing the government s type to change over time i explore how reputation concerns may generate partial commitment restricting attention to equilibria that are strongly renegotiation proof i show that there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium this contains episodes of investment and good behaviour followed by periods of expropriation and non investment i then apply the model to consider how the power of the incentive scheme and decentralization may influence the properties of this equilibrium in the case of the power of incentives the model suggests that price caps may worsen commitment in developing countries but not in developed ones similarly the model suggests that decentralisation is likely to have a significant effect on commitment but that this effect will depend on the general ability of the government to commit overall we conclude that the effect of such policies on commitment will be different across countries depending on the institutional environment

the decline of private sector unionism and the gender wage gap between 1973 and 1988 private sector unionism fell by 9 5 percentage points more for men than women and the gender wage gap one minus the ratio of female to male wages decreased by 09 these trends support two findings first unionism fell more slowly for women primarily because the probability of unionism fell most rapidly in jobs dominated by males second the greater decline in unionism among males is responsible for approximately one seventh of the 09 decline in the gender wage gap

price discrimination or uniform pricing which colludes more abstract conventional wisdom attributes different economic outcomes of uniform pricing and price discrimination to the heterogeneity in market conditions or market participants such as differences in demand elasticity or production costs we offer a new explanation for the observed differences that relates to behavioral aspects rather than demand or supply side effects in particular in a symmetric bertrand duopoly laboratory experiment for which theory predicts no differences between the two pricing regimes we find that tacit price collusion is systematically higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing

social learning in market games abstract our experiments test the effect of different information settings on firms behaviour in duopoly price and quantity games we find that when players have full information on their rivals choices the imitation rule prevails and such learning behaviour induces more competitive outcomes in the cournot market designs by the same token when information on the average industrial profit is provided there is evidence of an increase in cooperation and the majority of players experiment with new strategies when their payoff falls below the average profit palomino f vega redondo f 1999 dixon h d 2000

the effects of a new subway line on housing prices in metropolitan toronto an analysis by means of using the estimation results of a modal choice model and the hedonic price regressions model is conducted in order to identify the effects of a subway line in toronto on the values of housing units the modal choice model is used for the estimation of the direct benefits from the improvement in transportation and the hedonic price equations for the identification of subway effects on housing prices empirical results indicate that the direct savings in commuting costs have been capitalized into housing values

why is poverty so high among afro brazilians a decomposition analysis of the racial poverty gap this study aimed to identify the major factors underlying the large discrepancy in poverty levels between two brazilian racial groups whites and afro brazilians we performed an oaxaca blinder type decomposition for nonlinear regressions in order to quantify the extent to which differences in observed geographic sociodemographic and labor characteristics characteristics effect account for this difference the remaining unexplained part coefficients effect provides evidence on how these characteristics differentially impact on the risk of poverty in each group a detailed decomposition of both effects allows the individual contribution of each characteristic to be determined our results show that the characteristics effect explains a large part of the discrepancy in poverty levels with education and labor variables of household members explaining at least one half of the effect and geographic and demographic variables accounting for the remainder however the unexplained part that remains significant has increased in importance in recent last years and probably results from unequal access to high quality education and the persistence of discrimination against colored workers in the labor market

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

pension coverage and retirement savings of young and prime aged workers in canada 1986 1997 in this paper we assemble data from several household surveys to document how pension coverage of young and prime aged workers has evolved in canada between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s we show that between 1986 and 1997 pension coverage has fallen significantly for men has dropped slightly for young women and has increased for prime aged women the decline in union density and employment shifts towards low coverage industries explain most of the decline in pension coverage of men and young women in contrast most of the increase in coverage of prime aged women remains unexplained while pension coverage has fallen for men and young women their real average contributions to registered retirement savings plan rrsps have increased substantially as a result the sum of the amounts they contributed to registered pension plans rpps and rrsps has increased markedly jel classification j26 j32 couverture des regimes de rentes et epargnes pour la retraite des travailleurs jeunes et de ceux dans la force de l ge au canada 1986 1997 dans ce memoire les auteurs assemblent des donnees de plusieurs enquetes sur les menages pour documenter l evolution de la couverture des regimes de rentes des travailleurs jeunes et dans la force de l ge entre le milieu des annees 80 et le milieu des annees 90 on montre que cette couverture a chute de maniere significative pour les hommes a decline legerement pour les femmes et s est accrue pour les femmes dans la force de l ge la chute du taux de syndicalisation et les deplacements de l emploi vers des secteurs ou la couverture est plus faible expliquent le gros du declin de couverture pour les hommes et les jeunes femmes quant a l accroissement de la couverture pour les femmes dans la force de l ge il demeure inexplique alors que la couverture des deux premiers groupes a decline leurs contributions aux regimes enregistres d epargne retraite reer ont augmente substantiellement en consequence le total des sommes qu ils ont contribuees aux regimes de rentes enregistres et aux reer ont augmente de maniere importante

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

female participation and labor market attachment in rural canada this article explores the reasons for differences in female rural urban participation rates by estimating a dynamic model of participation allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and state dependence using canadian panel data the results suggest that overall observed differences in rural urban participation rates are primarily due to differences in observed socioeconomic characteristics however for women resident in low income households there is evidence that the operation of rural labor markets effectively lowers their participation rates copyright 2002 oxford university press

discrimination and detailed decomposition in a logit model abstract the paper suggests how to use the logit model to decompose the gender difference in the probability of an occurrence the technique is illustrated by an analysis of formal sector employment in urban zambia

on the stability of multimarket collusion in price setting supergames abstract in this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions the model we consider is a segmented markets duopoly with differentiated goods in which price setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome we find that when goods are very close substitutes and trade costs are sufficiently high a marginal reduction in trade costs facilitates collusion exactly the opposite is true if for any given degree of product substitutability trade costs are sufficiently low we also study the dependence of multimarket collusion on product differentiation

why do smaller firms pay less this paper uses data from the national longitudinal survey of young men and the current population survey for 1983 to examine the relationships among wages firm size and plant size we reach three key findings first plant size has little independent effect on wages once we have controlled for firm size for firms with fewer than 1 000 employees second we find evidence of sorting on observed and unobserved ability characteristics across firm sizes better educated and more stable workers are in larger firms third results from a first difference estimator indicate that about 60 percent of the wage size effect is due to unobserved heterogeneity when all firms are considered and about 100 percent when firms with 25 or more employees are considered

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

conspiracy at the pump abstract on the basis of evidence of price fixing in may 2006 the canadian competition bureau targeted retail gasoline outlets in some local markets in the province of quebec in june 2008 criminal charges were filed against many individuals and companies operating in those local markets we employ a differences in differences approach to determine whether the public announcement of the antitrust investigation triggered a reaction in one of the targeted markets we find that the price of gasoline in the targeted market fell by 1 75 cents per liter after the public announcement of the investigation we also briefly discuss how well the stiglerian theory of collusion performs in this real world conspiracy

symmetric research joint ventures cooperative substitutes and complements we introduce the concepts of cooperative substitutes and complements and use them to explain when all firms in a research joint venture will choose equal levels of r d we show that the second order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity and nesting conditions already derived in the literature finally we apply our results to the comparison between cooperative and non cooperative r d and show in an important special case that asymmetric outcomes are only optimal for a very limited range of parameter values

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data

multimarket contact economies of scope and firm performance we integrate the efficiency and competitive effects of product market scope choice into a comprehensive model of economic performance and empirically test the model in the context of the u s airli

multimarket contact competition and pricing in banking abstract in this paper we assess the impact of multimarket contact of banks on their market power by means of a simultaneous equation model in which the divergence of price from marginal cost is a function of multimarket linkages the model is estimated using aggregate data from the italian regions for the years 1997 2009 our results show that multimarket contact is positively and significantly correlated to the market power index and is also connected to both home and non home market concentration the evidence is robust to changes in model specification and multimarket contact measures and supports the idea that firms which have a greater amount of contact are more likely to collude

plant size and the decline of unionism abstract declining plant size is shown to explain a significant portion of the recent decline in unionism particularly in manufacturing the paper also shows how to use the probit model to decompose the change in unionism into explained and unexplained components

union membership determination and industry characteristics recent literature on the economics of unionism has expanded beyond its customary focus on the wage and nonwage effects of collective bargaining and given increased attention to the determinants of union membership previous union membership studies have been couched primarily within an individual choice framework whereby utility maximizing individuals choose either to join or not to join a union empirical work typically treats membership as a function of some vector of personal characteristics 1 2 10 11 21 it is our contention that such studies can best be interpreted as explaining the determination of the union status of jobs and that several industry and firm characteristics in addition to personal characteristics can be expected to affect significantly union membership in this paper theory and evidence relating to the effects of firm and industry characteristics on union membership are presented industry level data are bridged with a large microdata set containing individual characteristics in order to examine the determinants of unionism among workers in manufacturing utilizing a simultaneous model and controlling for sample selection bias we find that product market concentration capital intensity establishment size and job risk significantly affect the likelihood of union membership