from physical to human capital accumulation inequality and the process of development this paper develops a growth theory that captures the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of growth along the process of development it argues that the positive impact of inequality on the growth process was reversed in this process in early stages of the industrial revolution when physical capital accumulation was the prime source of growth inequality stimulated development by channelling resources towards individuals with a higher propensity to save as human capital emerged as a growth engine equality alleviated adverse effects of credit constraints on human capital accumulation stimulating the growth process this research develops a growth theory that captures the endogenous replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of economic growth in the transition from the industrial revolution to modern growth the proposed theory offers a unified account for the effect of income inequality on the growth process during this transition it argues that the replacement of physical capital accumulation by human capital accumulation as a prime engine of economic growth changed the qualitative impact of inequality on the process of development in the early stages of the industrial revolution when physical capital accumulation was the prime source of economic growth inequality enhanced the process of development by channelling resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher in the later stages of the transition to modern growth as human capital emerged as a prime engine of economic growth equality alleviated the adverse effect of credit constraints on human capital accumulation and stimulated the growth process the proposed theory unifies two fundamental approaches regarding the effect of income distribution on the process of development the classical approach and the credit market imperfection approach 1 the classical approach was originated by smith 1776 and was further interpreted and developed by keynes 1920 lewis 1954 kaldor 1957 and bourguignon 1981 according to this approach saving rates are an increasing function of wealth and inequality therefore channels resources towards individuals whose marginal propensity to save 1 the socio political economy approach provides an alternative mechanism equality diminishes the tendency for socio political instability or distortionary redistribution and hence it stimulates investment and economic growth see the comprehensive survey of benabou 1996b

partisan competition growth and the franchise we present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth we identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth when 1 there exists an economic conflict among the elite 2 landed classes are not politically strong and 3 there exists a critical mass of industrial workers we observe both growth and democratization the lack of conditions 1 or 2 resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition 3 drives growth deterring democratic expansions we provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries

buyer supplier interaction asset specificity and product choice abstract firms often differentiate their products through the use of inputs that are differentiated or specialized the goal of this paper is to explore how the demand for specific investments may affect product variety in a bilateral duopolistic industry i develop a model where the degree of specificity of investments is endogenously determined through the product choices of both downstream buyers and upstream suppliers of inputs the existence of non contractible investments results in the emergence of a single supplier of a non specialized input however as the importance of having specific inputs increases fully specialized suppliers may emerge the buyers choose to increase their own competition by producing more similar products only in cases when the inputs are non specialized they do so to increase the investment incentives of the suppliers

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly this paper presents a simple model of compatibility and bundling in industries where consumers assemble several necessary components into a system that is close to their ideal the authors show that for a wide range of parameters firms will choose to produce compatible components but will offer discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same firm however firms would be better off if they could commit not to provide such discounts furthermore the equilibrium tends to involve socially excessive bundling finally mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the range of parameters over which socially excessive standardization occurs copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

the logic of political violence this paper offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war we formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one sided or two sided violence repression or civil war the model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war and suggests a natural empirical approach exploiting only within country variation in the data we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid as in the theory these effects are only present where political institutions are non cohesive

us europe differences in technology driven growth quantifying the role of education abstract european economic growth has been weak compared to the us since the 1980s in previous work krueger and kumar 2003 nber working paper no 9410 we argued that the european focus on specialized vocational education might have been effective during the 1960s and 1970s but resulted in a growth gap relative to the us during the subsequent information age when new technologies emerged more rapidly in this paper we extend our framework to assess the quantitative importance of education policy when compared to labor market rigidity and product market regulation other policy differences more commonly suggested to be responsible for us europe differences a decomposition exercise using a calibrated version of our model assigns a major role to education policy in explaining us europe growth differences

inequality democracy and the protection of property rights motivated by the observed relevance of institutional quality such as strong property rights for economic performance this research considers the emergence of property rights protection as a political outcome it argues that the support for such protection is greater the more equal income distribution and the smaller political bias when these conditions initially hold the politically influential rich elite may prefer to relinquish its power through democratisation in order to commit future policy makers to the enforcement of property rights thus ensuring larger investment and faster growth along the transition path in a very unequal economy however such democratisation will not take place

desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities i compare the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of systems composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers i show that even in the absence of positive consumption externalities network externalities prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus maximizing solution in today s environment many products are complex specified by a long array of characteristics part of the decision of the firm is to choose if it should break this long array of features into two or more smaller parts and produce the products corresponding to the smaller arrays instead of the product that embodies the full array we will call the products that correspond to these smaller arrays components and the product that corresponds to the full array a system note that components are by their definition complements components produced by different manufacturers are compatible if it is feasible for the consumers to combine them costlessly into a working system in this paper we will assume that there are two components which make up a system we will discuss competition under full compatibility when components produced by all firms are compatible with each other and under incompatibility when no components produced by different firms are compatible and no hybrid systems can exist 2 assuming availability of the same

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

complementarity coordination and compatibility the role of fixed costs in the economics of systems abstract we analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system we assume the presence of two systems each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products the combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect we focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and by this means the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed monopolistic or duopolistic symmetric or asymmetric we also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible

product differentiation in successive vertical oligopolies this is a successive oligopoly model with two varieties of a final product downstream firms choose one variety to sell on a final market upstream firms specialize in the production of one input specifically designed for one variety but they also produce the input for the other variety at an extra cost we show that as more downstream firms choose one particular variety more upstream firms specialize in the input specific to that variety and vice versa multiple equilibria may result and the softening effect of product differentiation on competition might not be strong enough to induce maximal differentiation jel classification l11 l13 l23

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

from rent seeking to human capital a model where resource shocks cause transitions from stagnation to growth we present a growth model where agents divide time between rent seeking in the form of resource competition and working in a human capital sector the latter is interpreted as trade or manufacturing rent seeking exerts negative externalities on the productivity of human capital adding shocks in the form of fluctuations in the size of the contested resource the model can replicate a long phase with stagnant incomes and high levels of rent seeking interrupted by small failed growth spurts eventually followed by a permanent transition to a sustained growth path where rent seeking vanishes in the limit the model also generates a rise and fall of the so called natural resource curse before the takeoff an increase in the size of the contested resource has a positive effect on incomes shortly after the takeoff the effect is negative and on the balanced growth path the growth rate of per capita income is independent of resource shocks les auteurs presentent un modele de croissance ou les agents divisent leur temps entre la chasse aux rentes sous la forme de concurrence pour la ressource existante et le travail productif dans le secteur du capital humain cette derniere activite peut se faire dans le commerce ou le secteur manufacturier la chasse aux rentes a des effets externes negatifs sur la productivite du capital humain si l on injecte des chocs prenant la forme de fluctuations dans la taille de la ressource contestee le modele peut generer une longue periode durant laquelle les revenus stagnent et le niveau de chasse aux rentes est eleve periode interrompue par des petits sursauts de croissance qui tournent court et suivie eventuellement par une transition permanente a un sentier de croissance soutenue ou a la limite les activites de chasse aux rentes disparaissent le modele genere aussi l apparition et la disparition de la malediction des ressources naturelles avant que la croissance prenne son envol un accroissement de la taille de la ressource contestee a un effet positif sur les revenus peu apres le decollage l effet est negatif et sur le sentier de croissance equilibree le taux de croissance des revenus per capita est independant des chocs sur la ressource

vertical governance change and product differentiation under decreasing component costs in deciding on whether and when to outsource component production firms should consider the trade off between total production costs and the ability to horizontally differentiate products we study the outsourcing decision in a duopoly under decreasing but uncertain market rates for components given that outsourcing increases the substitutability of the final products we find that there is at least one firm that eventually outsources component production because it cannot differentiate its product enough by in house production to justify the eventually higher costs the follower outsources at a lower market rate or may even remain vertically integrated the follower thus incurs the eventually much higher in house component costs longer while the low substitutability is enjoyed by both firms under endogenous roles firms thus engage in a preemption game to be the first to outsource we also find that firms generally outsource at lower market rates if uncertainty is higher but seek to preempt at remarkably higher market rates if substitutability remains low

the evolution of modern educational systems technical vs general education distributional conflict and growth abstract we study the evolution of an educational system founded on a hierarchical differentiation between vocational and general education with vocational playing an inferior role in the society the dynamics are best summarized by the ratio of the fraction of the population in vocational to that in general education which we interpret as a measure of the degree of stratification of the society we show that this ratio first rises and then declines with the level of development displaying an inverted u shape which reflects the complex interaction between economic and political forces including aggregate income growth wealth inequality and political participation

the coevolution of economic and political development from monarchy to democracy this article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development as the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital the relative economic and hence coercive power of land owners capitalists and workers shifts accordingly inducing the transition of the political system where political power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally to workers a smooth transition through political compromise facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital

firm specific human capital a skill weights approach the theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm specific skills the theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm a broader approach lets all skills be general but firms use them with different weights attached for example computer programming economics and accounting are general skills but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three one implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications we develop an equilibrium model of vertical foreclosure with the choice of input specifications vertical foreclosure occurs as the upstream division of the integrated firm makes a specialized input for its sister downstream division while it would as an independent firm provide a generalized input the changes in incentives with vertical integration can be explained by the externalities the choice of a specialized input entails vertical integration allows the upstream firm to internalize the benefit of raising the rival firm s costs at the downstream level we derive conditions for equilibrium vertical foreclosure to occur and discuss its welfare consequences

why did universities precede primary schools a political economy model of educational change universities were rst established in europe around the twelfth century while primary schools did not appear until the nineteenth this paper accounts for this phenomenon using a political economy model of educational change on who are educated the elite or the masses and what is taught general or speci c vocational education a key assumption is that

why did the elites extend the suffrage democracy and the scope of government with an application to britain s age of reform a new rationale is presented for why an elite may want to expand the franchise even in the absence of threats to the established order expanding the franchise can turn politicians away from particularistic politics based on ad personam redistribution within the elite and foster competition based on programs with diffuse benefits if these programs are valuable a majority of the elite votes in favor of an extension of the franchise despite the absence of a threat from the disenfranchised we argue that the evolution of public spending and of political competition in nineteenth century britain is consistent with our model i introduction at the beginning of the nineteenth century in most countries narrow elites had a disproportionate influence on public affairs even in england where parliament was an influential institution suffrage was mostly the privilege of the wealthy and some members of parliament were elected in boroughs with as few as 100 voters while cities such as manchester did not have any representative a century later most western countries had universal male suffrage with female suffrage to arrive shortly thereafter what brought about this democratic revolution in many cases the elites were forced out of power after violent revolutions however there are important examples such as england where democratization took the form of gradual extensions of the suffrage and these were accompanied by little overt violence it is the peculiar pride of england that the record of social and political reform is to be found on the statute book not in the annals of revolution cheyney 1931 p vii such peaceful democratizations are difficult to rationalize within the benchmark political economic models in those models extending the franchise dilutes the elite s power to influence policy and results

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

occupational choice and the spirit of capitalism the british industrial revolution triggered a socioeconomic transformation whereby the landowning aristocracy was replaced by industrial capitalists rising from the middle classes as the economically dominant group we propose a theory of preference formation under financial market imperfections that can account for this pattern parents shape their children s preferences in response to economic incentives middle class families in occupations requiring effort skill and experience develop patience and a work ethic whereas upper class families relying on rental income cultivate a refined taste for leisure these class specific attitudes which are rooted in the nature of preindustrial professions become key determinants of success once industrialization transforms the economic landscape i introduction the industrial revolution was more than capital accumulation and growth it also set off a social and political transformation that redefined hierarchies in society and reshaped the distribution of income and wealth before the onset of industrialization in eighteenth century britain wealth and political power were associated with the possession of land over the course of the nineteenth century a new class of entrepreneurs and businessmen emerged as the economic elite for the most part the members of this class rose from humble beginnings and had their social origins in the urban middle classes the landed elite was left behind and eventually lost its political and economic predominance many observers of the time linked this reversal in economic fortunes to differences in values attitudes and ultimately preferences across social classes there are countless examples both in scholarly and in fictional writing of portrayals of members of the landowning class as averse to work unwilling to save ill disposed tocommercialactivity andunabletoconsidermoneyassomething

princes and merchants european city growth before the industrial revolution as measured by the pace of city growth in western europe from 1000 to 1800 absolutist monarchs stunted the growth of commerce and industry a region ruled by an absolutist prince saw its total urban population shrink by one hundred thousand people per century relative to a region without absolutist government this might be explained by higher rates of taxation under revenue maximizing absolutist governments than under nonabsolutist governments which care more about general economic prosperity and less about state revenue

pecuniary emulation inequality and growth abstract we study a two class growth model in which agents care about both consumption and the social perception of their wealth rank the latter determines the social status enjoyed by agents social perceptions are based upon noisy signals of wealth and in equilibrium there is incomplete separation of classes the steady growth rate of the economy increases with the full information status differential between classes and contrary to the growth model without status it is affected by the initial level of wealth inequality both too much equality and too much inequality are detrimental to economic growth

das human kapital a theory of the demise of the class structure this paper suggests that the demise of the capitalists workers class structure was a socio economic transformation orchestrated by the capitalists in reaction to the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their profit rates physical capital accumulation in the process of industrialization enhanced the importance of human capital in production and generated incentives for capitalists to support the provision of public education for the masses triggering the demise of the existing class structure the implications of the theory are consistent with the voting patterns on england s education reform of 1902

the welfare cost of free public schools the welfare cost of free public schools is the difference between the cost of those schools and the maximum parents would be willing to pay to send their children to those schools estimates based on data from california school districts in 1970 indicate that this welfare cost is substantial mostly because private schools are cheaper per unit of quality than public schools

predation by public enterprises abstract this paper demonstrates that in addition to the usual niskanen type losses generated by excess production by public firms there is an unrecognized second type of loss in order to sell their excess production public firms have to price their output below the competitive price and thereby cause more efficient firms at the margin to be eliminated the discussion is then extended to include the case where public enterprises finance additional expansions of output by price discriminating against inframarginal customers but then face the threat of competition for these inframarginal customers from new potential entry public enterprises are further shown to provide more credible threats to potential entrants since unlike private firms they value the increased output associated with predation and not merely the higher future benefits produced by it

on nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators the empirical and theoretical results in this paper cast doubt upon the explanation of socialism advanced by gifford and kenney the empirical finding that socialism is inversely related to the degree of political instability is directly contrary to the prediction of their model

vertical mergers and product differentiation this paper presents an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers that incorporates strategic behaviors in the hotelling type location model this enables one to consider the relationship between downstream firms strategies for product differentiation and vertical integration i show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation of the integrated firm under some conditions partial integration arises in equilibrium which may increase the profit of the nonintegrated downstream firm the paper also discusses the welfare implications of vertical integration

social status education and growth this paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth we consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers nonwage income and innate ability a greater emphasis on status may induce the wrong individuals that is those with low ability and high wealth to acquire schooling causing workers with high ability and low wealth to leave the growth enhancing industries this crowding out effect taken alone discourages growth growth may be enhanced by a more egalitarian distribution of wealth which reduces the demand for status

mix and match compatibility with vertical product dimensions this article considers a duopoly in which each firm produces two components of a system if the components are compatible consumers may mix and match the firms components the system components and consumer tastes are assumed to differ with regard to vertical characteristics in the model one firm may be the quality leader in one or both characteristics moreover a consumer s taste for the quality of one component may be perfectly correlated with or independent of his taste for the quality of the other component it is shown that in all cases the sum of each producer s component prices is weakly higher if the components are compatible the same is true of producer profits

unequal english wealth since 1670 new data on probated wealth landownership debts and occupations extend our view of the distribution of english wealth back from 1911 to 1670 there were widening gaps in mean wealth between the top landed plus merchant classes and the middle classes across the industrial revolution century size distributions for individual assets also widened so did those for income or total wealth including human but nonhuman net worth did not become more unequal because of important shifts in the land share all inequality measures before 1914 exceeded all those since 1950 the estimates illuminate classical theories of distribution

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

the limitations of structural theories of commercial policy if a structural theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not structural most microeconomic theory is structural so are most balance of power theories in the realm of theories of commercial policy hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description in the latter category judith goldstein s work which attempts to account for american commercial policy in terms of the ideology of american central decision makers and charles kindleberger s ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies

education democracy and growth abstract this note presents a model of endogenous growth where redistribution determined by a political equilibrium is in the form of public education it is shown that there need not be a negative relationship between growth and redistribution as public education increases the level of human capital in the conomy and at the same time tends to produce a more even income distribution

general education vocational education and labor market outcomes over the life cycle policy proposals promoting vocational education focus on the school to work transition but with technological change gains in youth employment may be offset by less adaptability and diminished employment later in life to test for this tradeoff we employ a difference in differences approach that compares employment rates across different ages for people with general and vocational education using microdata for 11 countries from ials we find strong and robust support for such a tradeoff especially in countries emphasizing apprenticeship programs german microcensus data and austrian administrative data confirm the results for within occupational group analysis and for exogenous variation from plant closures respectively

attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment i introduction political shirking the degree to which a politican s actions deviate from the wishes of his constituents can take many different dimensions economists e g amacher and boyes 1978 davis and porter 1989 dougan and munger 1989 kalt and zupan 1984 lott 1987d nelson and siberberg 1987 and peltzman 1984 have debated whether shirking exists in how a politician votes when he does vote this divergence is measured through some particular special interest voting ratings e g american conservative union americans for democratic action etc however shirking can obviously take as many forms as there are outputs that a politician produces besides how he votes he also produces services for his constituents involving everything from being personally available to listen to the constituents grievances to ensuring effective handling of case work by his staff see for example fiorina 1977 fenno 1978 and cain et al 1987 1 one dimension that has not been sufficiently examined is the extent to which politicians shirk by failing to vote on pending legislation 2 no attention has been given to which mechanisms will make this particular type of shirking relatively more costly most economists agree that opportunitic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection e g amacher and boyes 1978 barro 1973 kalt and zupan 1984 nelson 1976 and telser 1976 3 by implication the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office however this opportunistic behavior might be reduced to the extent that political parties or constituencies impose costs for shirking through affecting politicisns post elective office career or the careers of their children thus a politicians last term in elective office may not represent his last period in any meaningful sense the next section outlines the differing views on how politicians act when they no longer face the threat of reelection section iii describes some empirical evidence on what mechanisms may prevent this last period problem the final section discusses the impliactions of these results ii the last period whether economists view politicians as ideologues e g kau and rubin 1979 and kalt and zupan 1984 or as simply attempting to maximize political support e g barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 nelson 1976 and peltzman 1984 the threat of reelection is seen as preventing shirking as kalt and zupan 1984 298 phrase it it appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits ideological shirking even those who do not view the last period as affecting how a politician votes argue that it will affect how often he votes lott 1987a 1987b has argued that if voters can determine and elect politicians that have ideological preferences corresponding exactly to the wishes of constituents politicians voting patterns should continue to reflect those values even when the cost of shirking in terms of forgone future votes is low the penalty to ideologues of not votingfor their constituency in the last period when they no longer face reelection is the forgone utility from not doing what they personally value assuming that politicians also desire leisure politicians should continue to vote for what they believe in but they should vote less frequently since they no longer receive the additional return of larger future support mechanisms to overcome this last period problem have been suggested by becker and stigler 1974 9 10 they argue that opportunistic behavior can be controlled if officeholders face the loss of a pension or equivalently a posted bond in the event of opportunistic behavior in their last term however the actual pension system does not effectively eliminate the last period for politicians since retirement payments are not based on cheating in the last period

comparative democracy the economic development thesis in comparative politics an established finding that economic development fosters democratic performance has recently come under challenge we counter this challenge with a dynamic pooled time series analysis of a major but neglected data set from 131 nations the final generalized least squares autoregressive moving averages estimates n 2 096 appear robust and indicate strong economic development effects dependent in part on the nation s position in the world system for the first time rather hard evidence is offered on the causal relationship between economics and democracy according to granger tests economic development causes democracy but democracy does not cause economic development overall the various tests would seem to advance sharply the modeling of democratic performance

education social security and growth abstract we study the role of government s allocation of tax revenues between two outlays public investment in education a transfer to the young generation and social security benefits to the older generation in an overlapping generations economy with pay as you go social security and altruistically motivated transfers from parents to children we analyze how the allocation of the tax revenues between the two outlays affects growth and welfare in competitive equilibria a we obtain comparative dynamics results for nonstationary equilibria subject to a change in the allocation profile b for stationary equilibria we show that for a given allocation profile of the tax revenues educational subsidies can either increase the growth rate or decrease it depending on the parameters of the model preferences production function and the tax rate c if government seeks to allocate funds in a way that maximizes the growth rate we demonstrate that under some plausible conditions it is not optimal to maintain pay as you go social security however if parents preferences combine strong concern for their retirement with significant degree of altruism towards their children then pay as you go social security system does enhance growth and welfare

the political economy of educational content and development lessons from history beyond years of schooling educational content can play an important role in the process of economic development individuals choices of educational content are often shaped by the political economy of government policies that determine the incentives to acquire various skills we first present a model in which differences in human capital investments emerge as an equilibrium outcome of private decisions and government policy choices we then illustrate these dynamics in two historical circumstances in medieval europe states and the church found individuals trained in roman law valuable and eventually supported productive investments in this new form of human capital in late 19th century china elites were threatened by the introduction of western science and engineering and continued to select civil servants who enjoyed substantial rents based on their knowledge of the confucian classics as a result investments in productive modern human capital were not made

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

does high income promote democracy the authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors such as the historical context various features of the institutional setting and simultaneity with the process of leadership change even after correcting for these many other influences the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions the authors go on to find that leaders risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries the authors confirm the finding by burkhart and lewis beck that the democracy promoting effect of income is stronger among the european countries they suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the southern european countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize this suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade

is democracy more expropriative than dictatorship tocquevillian wisdom revisited abstract we reexamine the incentive effect of political democracy on the tax rate by defining a political regime over two dimensions the extent of the franchise and the extent that the redistribution of tax revenues is biased towards the rich standard tocquevillian models assume that even if there is limited franchise there is no redistribution bias from this it follows that democracy is more expropriative than oligarchy because a poorer median voter opts for higher taxes introducing the realistic assumption of a redistribution bias we find a countervailing effect democratization decreases exploitation by the rich on the disenfranchised poor since tax revenues are redistributed over a larger base the median voter may gain less from redistributive taxation we call this the olson effect

education social cohesion and economic growth analysis of the contribution of education to growth through its role in promoting a common culture indicates that when different cultural groups separately determine the social content of their school curricula excessive polarization can result with less than optimal growth the optimal trajectory involves a gradual reciprocal convergence of school curricula towards the middle ground this may be difficult to implement in a political context in which all agents are identified with one group or another when curricula are determined by legislative bargaining centralization of schooling may result in overly rapid homogenization in some cases and perhaps surprisingly excessive polarization in others this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

the impact of economic development on democracy any account of the social and economic conditions of democracy must come to terms with the central finding of the cross national statistical research a sturdy though not perfect association between economic development and democracy to tackle these questions of causation we adopted a strategy of analytic induction based on comparative historical research our program of comparative historical research confirmed the conclusion of the cross national statistical analyses of the correlates of political democracy the level of economic development is causally related to the development of political democracy however the underlying reason for the connection in our view is that capitalist development transforms the class structure enlarging the working and middle classes and facilitating their self organization thus making it more difficult for elites to exclude them politically simultaneously development weakens the landed upper class democracy s most consistent opponent

an explanation for public provision of schooling the importance of indoctrination this article was completed while i was a national fellow at the hoover institution and represents the unpublished theory and cross country empirical sections from my 1984 university of california los angeles dissertation armen alchian harold demsetz gertrud fremling david friedman robert hansen ben klein ed lazear russell roberts finis welch e g west an unusually helpful anonymous referee from this journal and the participants in seminars at auburn university the university of california at los angeles and at davis california state university at hayward and northridge the hoover institution george mason university the university of houston southern methodist university the u s department of education texas a m university and the 1987 public choice meetings in tucson arizona provided valuable discussions i would like to thank maury pearl for very helpful research assistance any remaining errors are of course my responsibility

from education to democracy the conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy this paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on crosssectional correlations which disappear once we look at within country variation in other words there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more likely to become democratic

endogenous determination of public budget allocation across education stages abstract this paper studies the endogenous determination of public budget allocation across hierarchical education stages in less developed economies the top class has dominant political power to implement its most preferred policy which is characterized by exclusive participation and large schooling expenditure at higher education at the expense of basic education in developed economies the budget allocation is more balanced under certain parameters it leads to expanded participation of the middle class in higher education the model offers an explanation to the observed cross country policy difference and is broadly consistent with historical evidence

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

firms market behavior under imperfect information and economic natural selection abstract the economic natural selection argument claims superior survival performance for profit maximizing firms this assertion is investigated in a factorial simulation study assuming imperfect information three alternative models of firms behavior are tested with respect to their ability to adapt to the observed realizations of non stationary demand processes findings show that in such a scenario it is the difference in implicit learning and adaption capabilities rather than that in motivation or goals which affects survivability consequently differential bankruptcy and disengagement rates vary with the peculiarities of the market environment the tested assertion cannot generally be confirmed

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

malthus to solow a unified growth theory is developed that accounts for the roughly constant living standards displayed by world economies prior to 1800 as well as the growing living standards exhibited by modern industrial economies our theory also explains the industrial revolution which is the transition from an era when per capita incomes are stagnant to one with sustained growth the authors use a standard growth model with several technologies the first denoted the malthus technology requires land labor and reproducible capital as inputs the second denoted the solow technology does not require land the authors show that in the early stages of development only the malthus technology is used and due to population growth living standards are stagnant despite technological progress eventually technological progress causes the solow technology to become profitable and both technologies are employed at this point living standards improve since population growth has less influence on per capita income growth in the limit the economy behaves like a standard solow growth model excerpt

technological progress mobility and economic growth this paper analyzes the relationship between technological progress wage inequality intergenerational earnings mobility and economic growth in periods of major technological inventions a decline in the relative importance of initial conditions raises inequality enhances mobility and generates a larger concentration of high ability individuals in technologically advanced sectors stimulating future technological progress and growth however once technologies become more accessible mobility is diminished and inequality decreases but becomes more persistent the reduction in the concentration of ability in technologically advanced sectors diminishes the likelihood of technological breakthroughs and slows future growth user friendliness therefore becomes unfriendly to future economic growth copyright 1997 by american economic association

population technology and growth from malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond this paper develops a unied growth model that captures the historical evolution of population technology and output it encompasses theendogenous transitionbetween three regimes that have characterized economic development the economy evolves from amalthusianregime wheretechnologicalprogressis slow andpopulationgrowthprevents anysustainedriseinincomepercapita intoapost malthusianregime wheretechnological progress rises and population growth absorbs only part of output growth ultimately a demographic transition reverses the positive relationship between income and population growth andtheeconomyentersamoderngrowthregimewithreducedpopulationgrowth

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

from local to global competition abstract we introduce a framework that has known models of oligopolistic competition with differentiated products the circle the logit and the ces as limit cases this integrative approach incorporates both localized and global competition as well as price sensitive individual demands it is used to explain the impact of major changes over the last two centuries reductions in transport costs increased taste for variety population growth and use of technologies with greater returns to scale we work out the properties of an extended chamberlinian model with applications both in industrial organization and economic geography

academic admissions standards implications for output distribution and mobility we examine the trade offs implicit in academic admissions standards when students are charged cost based tuition and offered loans that remove liquidity constraints lowering entry requirements while holding graduation requirements fixed increases aggregate output and promotes a more equal distribution of wages but reduces relative income mobility and diminishes the scope for affirmative action lowering admissions standards while raising graduation requirements so that the number of graduates remains constant has little direct effect on output distribution or mobility but again reduces the scope for affirmative action income based affirmative action offers a better trade off between output and relative mobility than income neutral admissions jel d31 h42 i23 i28 j24

swords or plowshares a theory of the security of claims to property this paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities the model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons which are the instruments of predation and fortifications which provide defense against predation the analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined the analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure we also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property we find for example that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property

beyond ses a resource model of political participation this paper develops a resource model of political participation the resources considered are time money and civic skills those communications and organizational capacities that are essential to political activity these skills are not only acquired early in life but developed in the nonpolitical institutional settings of adult life the workplace organizations and churches and synagogues these resources are distributed differentially among groups defined by socioeconomic status a two stage least squares analysis shows these resources have powerful effects on overall political activity thus explaining why socioeconomic status has traditionally been so powerful in predicting participation we disaggregate overall activity into three kinds of acts those that involve giving time those that entail donating money and voting each requires a different configuration of resources resulting in different patterns of stratification across various political acts

heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school finance this paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of education finance affect inequality and growth agents interact through local public goods or externalities school funding neighborhood effects and economywide linkages complementary skills knowledge spillovers sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster integration therefore tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run a move to state funding of education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade off local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and educational structures copyright 1996 by american economic association

product homogeneity as a prisoner s dilemma in a duopoly with r d abstract we prove that firms may decide to compete in undifferentiated products due to a prisoner s dilemma generated by externalities affecting r d in product innovation moreover the incentive to invest is higher under price competition than under quantity competition

returns to investment in education a global update the author updates compilations of rate of return estimates to investment in education published since 1985 and discusses methodological issues surrounding those estimates some key patterns among the three main levels of education primary education continues to exhibit the highest social profitability in all world regions private returns are considerably higher than social returns because of the public subsidization of education the degree of public subsidy increases with the level of education which is regressive social and private returns at all levels generally decline by the level of a country s per capita income overall the returns to female education are higher than those to male education but at individual levels of education the pattern is more mixed the returns to the academic secondary school track are higher than the vocational track since unit cost of vocational education is much higher and the returns for those who work in the private competitive sector of the economy are higher than in the public noncompetitive sector and the returns in the self employment unregulated sector of the economy are higher than in the dependent employment sector controversies in the literature are discussed in the light of the new evidence the undisputable and universal positive correlation between education and earnings can be interpreted in many ways the causation issue on whether education really affects earnings can be answered only with experimental data generated by randomly exposing different people to various amounts of education given the fact that moral and pragmatic considerations prevent the generation of such pure data researchers have to make do with indirect inferences or natural experiments some have been attempted the author looks at the research on overeducation or surplus schooling the conclusions reinforce earlier patterns they confirm that primary education continues to be the number one investment priority in developing countries they also show that educating females is marginally more profitable than educating males that the academic secondary school curriculum is a better investment than the technical vocational tract and that the returns to education obey the same rules as investment in conventional capital that is they decline as investment is expanded