supply chain relationships and contracts the impact of repeated interaction on capacity investment and procurement consider a firm developing an innovative product due to market pressures production must begin soon after the product development effort is complete which requires that an upstream supplier invests in capacity while the design of the product and production process are in flux because the product is ill defined at this point in time the firms are unable to write court enforceable contracts that specify the terms of trade or the supplier s capacity investment however the firms can adopt an informal agreement relational contract regarding the terms of trade and capacity investment the potential for future business provides incentive for the firms to adhere to the relational contract we show that the optimal relational contract may be complex requiring the buyer to order more than her demand to indirectly monitor the supplier s capacity investment we propose a simpler relational contract and show that it performs very well for a broad range of parameters finally we identify characteristics of the business environment that make relational contracting particularly valuable

public procurement with unverifiable quality the case for discriminatory competitive procedures unverifiable quality may affect the enforcement of procurement contracts even when the award procedure is able to select the most efficient firm in the market in this paper we show that a discriminatory competitive mechanism which awards the contract on the basis of price and firms past performance yields an efficient allocation of the contract and allows the buyer to implement her desired quality quality enforcement arises out of relational contracting whereby the buyer handicaps a contractor in future competitive tendering processes if it fails to provide the required quality we study an infinitely repeated procurement model with two firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms cost in which in each period the buyer runs a discriminatory auction we restrict our analysis to the case of a buyer committed to her handicapping strategy a case which captures some of the features of a public buyer when players use either grim trigger or stick and carrot strategies we find that the buyer can induce the delivery of optimal unverifiable quality with a variety of handicap levels and when applicable durations of the punishment period for some values of the handicap and the length of the punishment period both firms remain active in the market even when punished

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties obligations vague or unspecified traditional answers to this question invoke transaction costs or bounded rationality in contrast the authors argue that such incompleteness is often an essential feature of a well designed contract specifically once some aspects of performance are unverifiable it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified the authors explore the conditions under which this occurs and investigate the structure of optimal contracts when these conditions are satisfied copyright 1998 by american economic association

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

financial systems financing constraints and investment empirical analysis of oecd countries this paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 oecd countries we find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm s length bank firm relationships at the same time we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment and that close bank firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

costs and benefits of inducing intrabrand competition the role of limited liability when is inducing intrabrand competition via nonexclusive distribution an optimal strategy to address this issue a static model is developed to examine two settings the manufacturer uses exclusive distributors in the first setting and nonexclusive distributors in the second the analysis indicates that the choice of distribution rests critically on whether the manufacturer can effectively extract surplus from the distributors due to a variety of institutional reasons the distributors liability is often limited in performing on behalf of the manufacturer such limited liability restricts how much of the distributors surplus can be extracted when the distributors surplus cannot be fully extracted the manufacturer may prefer nonexclusive distribution even when distributors can free ride on each other s efforts

the determinants of wage changes in indexed and nonindexed contracts a switching model wage changes in a sample 1979 86 of canadian wage contracts are analyzed the sample is split into cost of living allowance cola and non cola contracts econometric estimation corrects for sample selectivity bias in non cola contracts the unemployment rate and a proxy for expected inflation are significant expected industry price changes and productivity changes exert smaller but significant effects in cola contracts ex ante inflation coverage ranges between 60 and 100 of expected inflation catch up for previous uncompensated inflation the unemployment rate and expected inflation are also significant a common wage structure across cola and non cola contracts is rejected by the data

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

optimal procurement contracts under a binding budget constraint the traditional literature on agency models predicts that for zero liability contracts it is optimal for the principal to pay for the information he cannot observe however this principle is not valid for a set of contracts mostly used by government agencies whose distinguishing feature is represented by a stringent budget constraint for the principal this paper shows that in this environment the principal will either choose a structure exibiting pooling or a bargaining solution the bargaining solution represents the analytical proof to the intuition of the difficulty in implementing procurement contracts stated by laffont and tirole 1993

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

are german banks different in recent years there has been a vigorous revival of the long standing debate about the uniqueness of german banks to date little consensus has been reached while some see few differences between the role of banks in germany and in other countries others claim that universal banks equity shareholdings in and nomination of representatives to the boards of nonfinancial firms are the key institutional features driving the rest of the german model of long term investment in high quality internationally competitive manufacturing this article argues that the uniqueness of the german banking system lies 1 in its unusually high capacity to provide industrial finance in the form of long term debt capital and 2 in its avoidance of the speculative boom credit crunch cycle experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in the 1980s and early 1990s these two key characteristics are attributable to a regulatory framework which involves strict prudential regulation access to long term refinancing sources and a federalist form of corporatism furthermore the behavior of german banks must be analyzed within a broader institutional system of economic governance which includes corporatist labor market institutions and a relatively large and modern sme sector

moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy both aristocratic privileges and constitutional constraints in traditional monarchies can be derived from a ruler s incentive to minimize expected costs of moral hazard rents for high officials we consider a dynamic moral hazard model of governors serving a sovereign prince who must deter them from rebellion and hidden corruption which could cause costly crises to minimize costs a governor s rewards for good performance should be deferred up to the maximal credit that the prince can be trusted to pay in the long run we find that high officials can become an entrenched aristocracy with low turnover and large claims on the ruler dismissals for bad performance should be randomized to avoid inciting rebellions but the prince can profit from reselling vacant offices and so his decisions to dismiss high officials require institutionalized monitoring a soft budget constraint that forgives losses for low credit governors can become efficient when costs of corruption are low

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

formal measures in informal management can a balanced scorecard change a culture abstract we extend traditional agency theory by exploring the roles for formal measures when managerial behavior is not governed by rules formulas or contracts part i describes relational incentive contracts with informal weights on formal performance measures more importantly it also explores how formal measures could be used in models of informal management such as adaptation and coordination politics and influence leadership and informal authority part ii considers the benefits from allowing key stakeholders to develop their own potentially inferior performance measures the collaboration to create a balanced scorecard of performance measures can help change an organization s culture

individual learning and cooperation in noisy repeated games we investigate whether two players in a long run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown specifically we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and or the monitoring structure each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned we show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a belief free equilibrium we also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples copyright 2014 oxford university press

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

productive low morale abstract this paper models employment relationship as a repeated principal agent problem with private evaluation the efficient contracts exhibit correlated movements between lagged wage and current effort that are consistent with the positive feedback between pay and morale in practice low morale therefore is an integral part of a well functioning relationship

inflation and wage indexation in the postwar united states this paper examines the relationship between inflation and wage indexation in the postwar united states using data on the prevalence of cost of living adjustments in major collective bargaining agreements the author finds that increases in inflation precede increases in wage indexation but reductions in inflation do not precede reductions in wage indexation there is virtually no evidence that wage indexation affects inflation copyright 1995 by mit press

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

an empirical model of wage indexation provisions in union contracts this paper describes the responses of index linked wage rates to concurrent price increases for a sample of canadian union contracts and then analyzes theseresponses in terms of a simple model of indexation to the aggregate price level the model highlights the importance of aggregate price movements in conveying information about industry specific prices the empirical analysis confirms that industry specific correlations between input and output prices and the consumer price index are important determinants of the flexibility of wages to prices across indexed contracts

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

fixed versus variable rate loans this paper discusses the nature of fixed and variable loan contracts and derives the conditions which determine the optimal quantity of each the results indicate that the payoff functions are quite different and dependent upon the project financed the appropriate conditions for the allocation of loan terms to a set of borrowers are then developed finally the analysis derives the optimal portfolio frontier and risk return trade off for the banking firm here it is demonstrated that the solution is unlikely to be at a point of zero interest rate risk

editorial does good marketing cause bad unemployment questionable methods for increasing nominal wages reduce real wages i e buying power by creating inflation shortages lower quality and long term unemployment to increase real wages i e the ability to buy more economic principles prescribe increasing productivity i e greater output from less input in contrast marketing principles prescribes increasing the value of output i e greater customer benefits through innovation beyond increasing real wages innovation spawns new occupations better matching individuals with skills and providing greater nonmonetary benefits i e job satisfaction unfortunately threatened entrenched incumbents often solicit protectionist legislation claiming negative externalities e g short term unemployment lower wages and burdens on society innovation does require labor to move from inferior to superior organizations i e unemployment however protectionism only delays and dramatically aggravates the inevitable trauma associated with progress as worker skills firm practices and buyer welfare fall further behind recent attacks demonizing wal mart e g the dubious vlasic pickle claim epitomize this situation they are archaic vanilla protectionism menacing both imperiled consumers and every consumer driven business

how high is the private gain from wage indexation the effects of firm specific shocks on the gain from writing state contingent wage contracts are examine in an extension of the model in gottfries 1992 it is shown that the introduction of firm specific uncertainty increases the gain from indexation to prices only moderately moreover nominal wage contracts should be more prevalent when unemployment benefits are high or unemployment spells are short

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

investing to cooperate theory and experiment we study theoretically and in a lab experiment investment decisions in environments where property rights are absent in our setting a player chooses an investment level before interacting repeatedly with a given set of agents the investment stochastically affects the payoffs of the game in every subsequent period we show that more volatile returns make investment more difficult in the absence of legal protection and might force the investor to invest more to guarantee cooperation experimental results are broadly consistent with the theoretical findings

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

money burning in subjective evaluation and limited liability a case for pay for performance abstract research on subjective evaluation in principal agent models have shown that the optimal contract should give uniform reward with zero money burning at all but the worst performance in a static game involving two independent tasks with only high or low output possible it is shown that when the agent is subjected to limited liability the optimal contract is more likely to exhibit pay for performance full money burning if both tasks yield low outputs partial money burning for mixed performance of low and high outputs and zero money burning following high output in both tasks

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

endogenous institutional selection building trust and economic growth abstract private order market institutions founded on trust based relational contracts suffer adverse selection and moral hazard problems while public order market institutions have a limited capacity to enforce contracts i model agent selection between contract enforcement institutions and demonstrate that the state s contract enforcement capacity is complementary to private order contract enforcement institutions for low to moderate levels of public order enforcement capacity this suggests that initial improvements to public order institutions cause the accumulation of trust and result in economic growth in both institutions however i show that the private order institution must collapse once the public order contract enforcement capacity is too great

cost of living adjustment clauses in union contracts a summary of results our paper provides an explanation why cost of living adjustment cola provisions and their characteristics vary widely across u s industries we develop models of optimal risk sharing between a firm and union to investigate the determinants of a number of contract characteristics these include the presence and degree of wage indexing the magnitude of deferred noncontingent wage increases contract duration and the trade off between temporary layoffs and wage indexing preliminary empirical tests of some of the implications of the model are described one key finding is that the level of unemployment insurance benefits appears to influence the level of layoffs and the extent of cola coverage simultaneously

banks and the false dichotomy in the comparative political economy of finance the wide ranging varieties of capitalism literature rests on a particular conception of banks and banking that the authors argue no longer reflects the reality of modern financial systems they take advantage of the greater information regarding bank activities revealed by the financial crisis to consider the reality across eight of the world s largest developed economies of the financial power of banks to act as bulwarks against market forces this article offers a marketbased banking framework that transcends the bank based capital market based dichotomy that dominates comparative political economy s consideration of financial systems and argues that future cpe research should focus on the activities of banks by demonstrating how market based banking increases market influences on the supply of credit the authors highlight an underappreciated source of financial market pressure on nonfinancial companies nfc s that can have a potential impact across the range of issues that the varieties of capitalism voc literature has seen as differentiating national systems this approach has implications in areas such as labor welfare innovation and flexibility

capital markets and corporate control a study of france germany and the uk this paper examines the relation between capital markets and corporate control in france germany and the uk it compares levels of takeover activity in the three countries and describes the degree to which takeovers are associated with changes in corporate control the paper examines the influence of regulation on forms of corporate ownership and control it compares regulation pertaining to the rights of employees managers and shareholders in the three countries and finds that regulatory rules are related to patterns of ownership and control changes the paper suggests that a fundamental objective of control changes is to correct managerial failure and that takeovers are suited to the correction of particular classes of managerial failure that cannot be readily rectified by contracts thus markets with low levels of takeovers may suffer from a low level of correction of managerial failure however by changing ownership takeovers may give rise to an inability of owners to commit themselves to the long term interests of managers and employees as a consequence financial systems with active takeover markets may be associated with inadequate investment in firm specific assets and an unduly short term investment horizon there is therefore a tradeoff between alternative methods of correcting managerial failure this is particularly important for european countries facing an extension of uk takeover activity to the continent the process is being encouraged by the european commission which aims to harmonize regulation on a uk style takeover code harmonization of regulation may have far reaching consequences for the structure of different countries capital markets and in view of the tradeoff is of uncertain merit

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

creativity and incentives creativity is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon with tremendous economic importance a crucial question for economists and for firms is the interplay of incentives and creativity we present experiments where subjects face creativity tasks where in one case ex ante goals and constraints are imposed on their answers closed tasks and in the other case no restrictions apply open tasks the effect of tournament incentives on creativity is then tested our experimental findings provide striking evidence that financial incentives in the form of tournament competition affect creativity in closed constrained tasks but do not facilitate creativity in open unconstrained tasks whereas being ranked relative to one s peers is an effective nonmonetary incentive with both types of tasks we develop a structural model that allows for subjects heterogeneity in being affected by the openness of the task and then use the structural model to not only estimate creative output in tournaments but also to predict creative output in two counterfactual incentive schemes piece rate and target bonus

intellectual property rights hinder sequential innovation experimental evidence abstract in this paper we contribute to the discussion on whether intellectual property rights foster or hinder innovation by means of a laboratory experiment we introduce a novel scrabble like word creation task that captures most essentialities of a sequential innovation process we use this task to investigate the effects of intellectual property allowing subjects to impose license fees on their innovations we find intellectual property to have an adverse effect on welfare as innovations become less frequent and less sophisticated introducing communication among innovators does not reduce this detrimental effect introducing intellectual property results in more basic innovations with subjects failing to exploit the most valuable sequential innovation paths subjects act more self reliant and non optimally in order to avoid paying license fees our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovation especially for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation processes

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

markets for ideas prize structure entry limits and the design of ideation contests contests are a popular mechanism for the procurement of innovation in marketing design and other creative industries firms use freelance marketplaces to organize contests and obtain high quality ideas for ads new products and even business strategies from participants a central question faced by contest sponsors is how to appropriately structure prizes and entry regulations i develop an empirical model of idea generation ideation contests and investigate the impact of the number of prizes prize amount and submission limit on participation and quality outcomes using data from a popular marketing ideation platform the model explains participant submission decisions jury ratings and sponsor rankings of winning submissions counterfactuals reveal the impact of design parameters on outcomes and provide guidance for the optimal design of ideation contests and platforms

insider bargaining power starting wages and involuntary unemployment recent analyses of wage bargaining has emphasized the distinction between insiders and outsiders yet one typically assumes that insiders and recently hired outsiders are paid the same wage we con

causes and effects of financing constraints at the firm level this paper focuses on the empirical assessment of determinants and effects of financing constraints at the firm level using a standard model of credit rationing based on asymmetric information firm age and size are found to be factors which should influence the probability of financing constraints improving business conditions strengthen the degree of informational asymmetry a unique panel of firm data for germany including direct information on financing constraints is used for the econometric analysis firms size and improving business conditions are found to have a significant effect furthermore a significant impact on investment and r d expenditures cannot be rejected

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

trade unions and seniority employment rules abstract some but not all trade union and insider outsider models assume that a seniority employment rule is used we investigate when firm and union members gain from such a rule and the consequences of their adopting one generally providing a seniority wage scale is also used they gain if union membership is not too large relative to demand and union bargaining power not too great moreover when outsiders are hired under a seniority employment rule employment is at the competitive level these results might explain why bargaining over employment is relatively uncommon and typically occurs only in industries with declining employment

implications of reduced search cost and free riding in e commerce this paper examines a market where the provision of information service is costly but information service has the characteristics of a public good consumers on the other hand can use the information service to make an informed purchase decision and derive higher utility from consuming their ideal product however after receiving the information service from an information service provider consumers can easily free ride by purchasing at low price sellers who do not provide any information service the paper examines the competition where sellers compete by providing information service for horizontally differentiated products and where technology reduces consumers search cost it is found that in this market a seller needs to establish itself as an information service provider in order to make positive profits even when there is free riding a seller however cannot make positive profits by free riding all the time also with an increase in competition in the information service market sellers have reduced incentives to provide information service it is also found that in this market a decrease in search cost may increase or decrease social welfare

efficient union labour contracts under seniority employment rules abstract a firm and worker sign a price contigent wage employment contract under lifo ly off rules a worker may prefer a contract which lays him off at low prices to one under which he is guaranteed employment at all prices

reply to managing channel profits comment we welcome moorthy s comment moorthy k s 1987 managing channel profits comment marketing sci 6 fall 375 379 it provides an opportunity to clarify several issues raised in our 1983 paper that paper was motivated by one concern channel coordination we believed that channel members benefit from coordination and that many institutional arrangements such as quantity discounts are actually coordinating mechanisms we developed a simple model to demonstrate our belief for historical accuracy mcguire and staelin cited by moorthy had already independently developed a useful model of duopolistic channel competition being unaware of their working paper our model not surprisingly differed from theirs both papers provide important but different insights into channel management

insiders outsiders and nominal wage contracts while the consequences of nominal wage contracts have been rather thoroughly analyzed there is no generally accepted theory of why such contracts prevail in this paper i argue that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is important for understanding nominal wage contracts since most employment fluctuations take the form of fluctuations in hiring insiders are normally not affected by them since prices are primarily determined by costs demand shocks have small effects on real wages thus insiders have little incentive to change to more complicated contracts with rigid nominal wages nominal demand shocks have large effects on the employment opportunities of outsiders but outsiders have little influence on labor contracts

the multiperiod principal agent problem in repeated principal agent models long term contracts can improve on short term contracts only if they commit either principal or agent to a payoff in some future circumstance lower than could be obtained from a short term contract negotiated if that circumstance occurs we show that efficient contracting under moral hazard alone does not require long term commitment from the principal provided a short term contract can punish the agent sufficiently in a sense made precise it requires no commitment from the agent either then linking payoffs in one period to outcomes in previous periods does not improve the tradeoff between incentives and risk sharing

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

idea generation creativity and incentives idea generation ideation is critical to the design and marketing of new products to marketing strategy and to the creation of effective advertising copy however there has been relatively little formal research on the underlying incentives with which to encourage participants to focus their energies on relevant and novel ideas several problems have been identified with traditional ideation methods for example participants often free ride on other participants efforts because rewards are typically based on the group level output of ideation sessions this paper examines whether carefully tailored ideation incentives can improve creative output i begin by studying the influence of incentives on idea generation using a formal model of the ideation process this model illustrates the effect of rewarding participants for their impact on the group and identifies a parameter that mediates this effect i then develop a practical web based asynchronous ideation game which allows the implementation and test of various incentive schemes using this system i run two experiments that demonstrate that incentives do have the capability to improve idea generation confirm the predictions from the theoretical analysis and provide additional insight on the mechanisms of ideation

dynamic business share allocation in a supply chain with competing suppliers this paper studies a repeated game between a manufacturer and two competing suppliers with imperfect monitoring we present a principal agent model for managing long term supplier relationships using a unique form of measurement and incentive scheme we measure a supplier s overall performance with a rating equivalent to its continuation utility the expected total discounted utility of its future payoffs and incentivize supplier effort with larger allocations of future business we obtain the vector of the two suppliers ratings as the state of a markov decision process and we solve an infinite horizon contracting problem in which the manufacturer allocates business volume between the two suppliers and updates their ratings dynamically based on their current ratings and the current performance outcome our contributions are both theoretical and managerial we propose a repeated principal agent model with a novel incentive scheme to tackle a common but challenging incentive problem in a multiperiod s

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval