democracy and economic growth a meta analysis despite a sizeable theoretical and empirical literature no firm conclusions have been drawn regarding the impact of political democracy on economic growth this article challenges the consensus of an inconclusive relationship through a quantitative assessment of the democracy growth literature it applies meta regression analysis to the population of 483 estimates derived from 84 studies on democracy and growth using traditional meta analysis estimators the bootstrap and fixed and random effects meta regression models it derives several robust conclusions taking all the available published evidence together it concludes that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth however democracy has robust significant and positive indirect effects through higher human capital lower inflation lower political instability and higher levels of economic freedom democracies may also be associated with larger governments and less free international trade there also appear to be country and region specific democracy growth effects overall democracy s net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental

what u s data should be used to measure the price elasticity of demand for alcohol this paper examines how estimates of the price elasticity of demand for beer vary with the choice of alcohol price series examined our most important finding is that the commonly used accra price data are unlikely to reliably indicate alcohol demand elasticities estimates obtained from this source vary drastically and unpredictably as an alternative researchers often use beer taxes to proxy for alcohol prices while the estimated beer taxes elasticities are more stable there are several problems with using taxes including difficulties in accounting for cross price effects we believe that the most useful estimates reported in this paper are obtained using annual uniform product code upc barcode scanner data on grocery store alcohol prices these estimates suggest relatively low demand elasticity probably around 0 3 with evidence that the elasticities are considerably overstated in models that control for beer but not wine or spirits prices

state alcohol policies teen drinking and traffic fatalities this empirical study evaluates the policy responsiveness of teen drinking in models that can condition on the unobserved state specific attributes that may have biased conventional evaluations the results demonstrate that cross state heterogeneity can be important and that beer taxes have relatively small and statistically insignificant effects on teen drinking models of youth traffic fatalities also indicate that the conventional beer tax elasticities are not robust to additional controls for omitted variables the importance of these omitted variables is illustrated by a counterfactual which compares models of nighttime fatalities to those that occur in the daytime when the rate of alcohol involvement is substantially lower

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

does law and order attenuate the benefits of democracy on economic growth recent studies have reported positive associations between democracy and economic growth they have also explored how associations could differ across regions or income levels however might the effects of democracy on growth also depend on factors such as institutions promoting law and order using a panel specification we employ a democracy law and order interactive term to examine if the effects of democracy on economic growth depend on these other institutions we find that positive effects of democracy diminish and might even turn negative in countries where other institutions such as those supporting law and order are strong

on the dynamics of ethnic fractionalization does fractionalization change over short periods of time if so are there any substantial implications for economic performance to answer such questions we construct a new panel data set with measures of ethnic linguistic and religious fractionalization for 26 former communist countries covering the period from 1989 to 2002 our fractionalization measures show that transition economies became more ethnically homogeneous over such a short period of time although the same did not happen for linguistic and religious diversity in line with the most recent literature there seems to be no effect of exogenous diversity on macroeconomic performance that is on per capita gdp growth however we find that dynamic endogenous ethnic diversity is negatively related to growth although this is still not the case for linguistic and religious diversity these findings are robust to different specifications polarization measures and instrument sets as well as to a composite index of ethnic linguistic religious fractionalization

an empirical test of the effect of excess capacity in price setting capacity constrained supergames abstract in a multi period game industry excess capacity may act to deter firms from cheating on a non cooperative oligopoly price a model is developed that translates the deterrrent influence of excess capacity into predictions about the relationship between excess capacity and oligopoly price cost margins the model is tested with time series data from the u s aluminum industry results are consistent with those predicted by the model

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

oligopolistic pricing over the deterministic market demand cycle some evidence from the us portland cement industry abstract haltiwanger and harrington 1991 haltiwanger j harrington j e jr 1991 the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior rand journal of economics 22 89 104 formulated a theory of self enforcing collusion assuming a deterministic demand cycle they predicted that under a self enforcing non cooperative pricing scheme for any level of demand the price in the rising part of the cycle would always be greater than the price in the falling part of the cycle they also predicted that the path of collusive profits should reach its peak before market demand we test their predictions using data from the portland cement industry the hypotheses are tested using a multi equation system differentiating the boom and the bust periods from 1974 to 1989 the results support both of haltiwanger and harrington s hypotheses

ethnic discrimination and the migration of skilled labor we develop a model of interdependency between emigration education investment and discrimination in the context of an ethnically divided developing economy assuming a rent extraction basis for discrimination we first endogenize ethnic discrimination in the benchmark case of an economy closed to migration and then explore how migration prospects affect ethnic inequality under the free migration assumption we find the intuitive result that migration prospects have a protective effect on the minority immigration restrictions set by receiving countries on the other hand have the paradoxical effect of creating migration flows that would otherwise have remained latent

can police deter drunk driving economic studies using aggregate data generally find that higher taxes are the most effective policy to reduce drunk driving while criminologists report strong evidence supporting law enforcement measures in policy evaluations this paper evaluates these differing perspectives using the aggregate data that is typically used in the economic literature ols and fixed effects models show that police can affect the probability of arrest for drunk driving and in combination with evidence from dui deterrence experiments this suggests that the failure of economic models to detect deterrence reflects the lack of systematic and sustained police efforts against dui

the lagged impact of state and local taxes on economic activity and political behavior politicians are frequently characterized as making fiscal decisions based on a shorter time horizon than is required for full taxpayer adjustment thus generating near term benefits and relatively high tax rates this argument requires a negative impact of taxes on economic activity distributed over a relatively long time period considerable empirical evidence suggests that state and local taxes do not significantly impact the geographic distribution of economic activity this analysis however finds a significant negative distributed lag impact of such taxes on capital formation the approach emphasizes interstate tax competition in formulating the cross section time series estimating equation

pricing strategies in supergames with capacity constraints some evidence from the u s portland cement industry abstract theory demonstrates that demand variations can have nonmonotonic effects on pricing in supergames with capacity constraints furthermore this nonmonotonic relationship can be a function of capacity utilization rates time series data from 25 regional cement markets are used to examine this results empirically no statistically significant relationship is found between demand variations pricing and excess capacity

implicit taxes collected by state liquor monopolies state monopolization or taxation aresupposedly justified because of negativeexternalities from alcohol consumption butrecent research questions the efficacy ofsuch policies suggesting that their actualgoals may be revenue generation consideration of this hypothesis isfacilitated by estimates of the implicittaxes charged in monopoly states whichgenerally are substantially higher thantaxes in non monopoly states evidencethat monopolization and high taxes do notaffect the level of externalities is alsoexplained by adjustments that rationalindividuals make to avoid the consequencesof such policies thus providing furthersupport for the revenue maximizationhypothesis

ethnic diversity and economic development abstract this paper analyzes the role that different indices and dimensions of ethnicity play in the process of economic development firstly we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of alternative data sources for the construction of indices of religious and ethnic heterogeneity secondly we compare the index of fractionalization and the index of polarization we argue that an index of the family of discrete polarization measures is the adequate indicator to measure potential conflict we find that ethnic religious polarization has a large and negative effect on economic development through the reduction of investment and the increase of government consumption and the probability of a civil conflict

can democracy help growth and ethnic divisions this paper presents further empirical evidence suggestive of democracy s positive role in ameliorating the negative growth effects of ethnic diversity in nations however it is shown that endogeneity problems and a direct negative growth effect of democracy place inherent limitations on the strength of policy implications which may be drawn from the evidence

correlated demand shocks and price wars during booms the supergame theoretic model of price competition rotemberg and saloner 1986 is re examined in the case of serially correlated demand shocks the equilibrium price is shown to exhibit the same counter cyclical movement as in the i i d case if the discount factor and the number of firms satisfy certain relationship

collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle this paper investigates the efiect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand uctuations in the absence of capacity constraints i e a limiting case of our model haltiwanger and harrington 1991 show that flrms flnd it more di cult to collude during periods of decreasing demand we flnd that this prediction can be overturned if flrms capacities are su ciently small capacity constraints imply that punishment proflts move procyclically so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive proflts are rising haltiwanger and harrington s main prediction remains valid for su ciently large capacities

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

collusive pricing with capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we explore the response of collusive prices to changing demand conditions when firms operate under capacity constraints in the presence of demand uncertainty we find support for the conventional view that periods of low demand lead through the emergence of excess capacity to a breakdown of collusive pricing we also find that the nature of price wars depends on the degree of excess capacity in the industry while small amounts of excess capacity can lead firms to engage in mild price wars characterized by uniform price reductions and market share stability more severe price wars characterized by price undercutting and market share instability can emerge if excess capacity is sufficiently great finally our results lend support to the view that market share instability is a symptom of ineffective collusion

beer taxation and alcohol related traffic fatalities the majority of studies of alcohol related traffic fatalities find beer taxes to be an important policy variable this is surprising since beer taxes only have a small impact on consumption and heavy drinkers are the least responsive to prices this study shows that the tax relationship is not robust across data periods and that it reflects missing variable biases while lack of control for law enforcement efforts does not appear to bias tax coefficients failure to include determinants of alcohol consumption other than taxes and drinking age and or factors that simultaneously determine drinking behavior and political support for alcohol taxes apparently do

a theory of price control price or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place to delimit the scope of my analysis i shall use the term price control to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions first the control must fix the price or income terms of private contracts this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis 2 second the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government taxation and subsidization are thus excluded finally the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales purchases or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price 3 by this stipulation price support is also excluded even on such terms legal regulations to control price are still many and varied to evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts by this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications 4 an alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

optimal penal codes in price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper constructs optimal pure strategy penal codes for a broad class of symmetric bertrand supergames with capacity constraints the results should simplify the analysis of bertrand supergames because the punishments comprising the penal codes constructed below have a very simple form and the associated payoffs are often easy to calculate it is also shown that for a commonly employed subclass of the games considered the admission of mixed strategies does not allow severer punishments the analysis draws heavily on the pathbreaking work of abreu 1984 he demonstrated that in the search for optimal penal codes attention can be restricted to simple penal codes simple penal codes are characterized by a vector of outcome paths one for each player the ith outcome path is interpreted as the punishment to be imposed on the ith player if he deviates from the equilibrium path or from any punishment path section 2 explains the basic framework of analysis the class of bertrand games studied is very general no particular rationing rule is imposed some mild restrictions are placed on the firms sales functions instead the commonly used models of levitan and shubik 1972 and beckman 1965 are special cases of the games analysed below it is assumed throughout that there is a price firms can be induced to charge if the punishment for charging a different price gives the offending firm a payoff equal to its security level for the supergame thus either there must exist a static nash equilibrium in pure strategies or else the discount factor must not be too close to zero in section 3 optimal penal codes are constructed and it is established that the punishments comprising them always drive punished firms to their security levels the arguments employed make clear that optimal penal codes are not generally unique this issue is addressed in section 4 where it is also shown that the levitan shubik rationing rule exhibits more types of optimal penal codes than do other rules in particular if the levitan shubik rule is employed then punishments that are analogous to abreu s 1986 symmetric two phase punishments for cournot games can be used to construct optimal penal codes in bertrand games this property does not hold generally however