on the fixed nature of sharecropping contracts newbery and stiglitz i979 suggest four stylised facts of sharecropping which theories should attempt to explain the first is the persistence of sharecropping and its coexistence with fixed rental and wage markets under a variety of conditions over centuries of time the second is that in modern developed economies there appears to be a decline in share tenancy thirdly share tenancy is often but not alwavs associated with lower productivity than fixed rental land finally in many economies contracts involve shares of around one half for landlord and tenant this does not vary from contract to contract and does not seem to be the object of negotiation smith i776 and many subsequent authors have likened sharecropping to a tax they argue that under this type of contract tenants choose their labour supply to equate their marginal disutility of labour with their proportionate share of the marginal product instead of the full marginal product they therefore regard sharecropping as an inefficient form of land tenure however this view is difficult to reconcile with the first observation given the coexistence of fixed rent and share contracts it is reasonable to expect that if share contracts were relatively inefficient they would quickly die out this does not appear to have happened more recently it has been argued most notably by cheung i969 that if there is certainty and transactions costs are the same for all contracts then provided a share contract specifies the labour supply of the tenant it leads to the same efficient allocation of resources as a fixed rent or wage contract cheung has used this result as the basis of an explanation for coexistence he suggests that the transaction costs for share contracts are higher than for wage and fixed rent contracts however share contracts have the advantage that they allow the risk to be shared between the landlord and tenant whereas with fixed rent contracts the tenant bears all the risk and with wage contracts the landlord does given varying degrees of risk aversion among landlords and tenants it is possible that for some parties the risk sharing advantages outweigh the transaction cost disadvantages so that they will prefer share contracts whereas with others the reverse is true one problem with this argument raised by stiglitz i974 and newbery i977 is that given constant returns to scale the risk sharing properties of share contracts can be attained with mixtures of fixed rent and wage contracts if these do indeed have lower transaction costs share contracts would not then be observed

labor supply price market wage and the social opportunity cost of labor there is a substantial body of literature on the social opportunity cost of labor a major shortcoming of some of this literature is that it identifies the concept of social opportunity cost of labor socl only with forgone output or the wage paid at the previous job ignoring nonmonetary compensations this limitation is particularly important in the case of public projects that result in workers moving from one region to another generally different locations have different degrees of attractiveness and the monetary compensation required to attract a worker to a new job may be larger or smaller than the monetary compensation of the worker s previous job moreover if the forgone output concept is used to measure the socl in the case where a previously unemployed worker takes a job it may be tempting to value the socl at zero since there is no output loss it is obvious that workers attribute some value to their time even if they were previously unemployed otherwise they would be willing to work for free in this article the labor market will be looked at as a group of interrelated markets in which workers find differences in nonmonetary compensations private costs can be different from social costs if there are market distortions or externalities in line with harberger s three basic postulates of applied welfare economics the socl has two main components 2 first the cost of attracting a worker to the job in question labor supply price second the welfare effect that results from disturbing related markets subject to externalities or distortions

when does the prime rate change abstract we study the frequency of prime rate changes we model the prime rate as a time series variable that can be changed only at some cost this yields a logit model in which the probability of a prime rate change is a function of market variables we test this model using data from a micro data set that gives the dating of prime rate changes the results indicate that adjustment costs are important to the prime rate adjustment process and that changes in exogenous variables have a significantly larger effect on the probability of a prime rate increase than decrease

interest rate pass through and monetary transmission evidence from individual financial institutions retail rates official interest rate changes should influence short rates on money market instruments and retail products such as deposit accounts and mortgages but complete pass through is often taken for granted this paper provides a theoretical and econometric framework for assessing the evidence for this assumption using seventeen years of monthly data for rates on thirteen deposit and mortgage products offered by individual uk financial institutions the methodology allows for asymmetries and non linearities in adjustment and the results show that the speed of adjustment in retail rates depends on whether the perceived gap between retail and base rates is widening or narrowing

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

asymmetric pass through and risk of interest rate an empirical exploration of taiwan and hong kong this study employs the asymmetric threshold cointegration test suggested by enders and siklos 2001 and creates asymmetric ec egarch 1 1 m model to investigate the pass through of money market rate to banking retail rates in taiwan and hong kong it further explores the impact of interest volatility on interest rates over the period of february 1988 to december 2004 we find that the interest pass through mechanism of these two markets is noncomplete in addition based on the asymmetric threshold cointegration test we discover the existence of asymmetric cointegration relationship between retail rates and market rate in both markets in particular while employing asymmetric ec egarch 1 1 m model to test for the influence of money market rate adjustment and volatility on retail rates in short run we find robust evidence that there exist the upward rigidity in deposit rate and the downward rigidity in lending rate in both taiwan and hong kong this finding supports the hypothesis of the collusiv

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

asymmetric quantile analysis of the swedish mortgage price discovery process based on swedish banking data we discover robust and significantly positive asymmetric price transmission apt effects over all analysed regression quantiles of our mortgage interest rates with even larger positive apt for the higher percentiles the analysis was enabled through unique access to a swedish bank s seb own records of their true borrowing costs our central contribution is that there is a higher propensity for the bank to rapidly increase its mortgage interest rates for customers following an increase in its borrowing costs compared with the propensity for the bank to decrease its customers mortgage rates subsequent to a corresponding borrowing cost decrease

what does she see in him the effect of sharing on the choice of spouse all husbands and wives share in the spoils of marriage sharing makes each partner a residual claimant and encourages spouses to provide marital inputs however because each spouse is only a partial residual claimant each may be inclined to provide a suboptimal level of marital inputs the choice of spouse influences the level of distortion and under some circumstances the eficient mating is between individuals of equal value people tend to end up choosing partners of approximately their own social worth romantic choices appear to be a delicate compromise between one s desire to capture an ideal partner and one s realization that he must eventually settle for what he deserves

land reforms poverty reduction and economic growth evidence from india recognition of the importance of institutions that provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross section of society has renewed interest in the potential of asset redistribution including land reforms empirical analysis of the impact of such policies is however scant and often contradictory this paper uses panel household data from india together with state level variation in the implementation of land reform to address some of the deficiencies of earlier studies the results suggest that land reform had a significant and positive impact on income growth and accumulation of human and physical capital the paper draws policy implications especially from the fact that the observed impact of land reform seems to have declined over time

a theory of sharecropping the role of price behavior and imperfect competition this paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets we consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage we consider two different classes of contracts i tenancy contracts and ii crop buying contracts it is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping

market structure and the nature of price rigidity evidence from the market for consumer deposits panel data on consumer bank deposit interest rates reveal asymmetric impacts of market concentration on the dynamic adjustment of prices to shocks banks in concentrated markets are slower to raise interest rates on deposits in response to rising market interest rates but are faster to reduce them in response to declining market interest rates thus banks with market power skim off surplus on movements in both directions since deposit interest rates are inversely related to the price charged by banks for deposits the results suggest that downward price rigidity and upward price flexibility are a consequence of market concentration

limited liability and the existence of share tenancy abstract the paper considers the problem confronting an absentee landlord who can lease out his land on a fixed rent contract share rent contract or a mixture of the two it is argued that in poor areas it is natural to have each contract underwritten by an implicit limited liability clause which allows a person to forego paying rent under extreme crop failures in the presence of such an implicit clause a certain tension appears between a tenant and a landlord with the former preferring risky projects and the latter preferring safe ones it is shown that in such a case share tenancy turns out to be the dominant system from among the class mentioned above because it minimises the tension between the landlord and the tenant the result is then used to discuss conditions under which share tenancy will tend to wither away

an asymmetry generator for error coorection mechanisms with application to bank mortgage rate dynamics empirical evidence supports asymmetries in the adjustment of prices interest rates and other economic variables the asymmetry hypothesis however is often procedurally difficult to set up and test this article shows that a wide variety of such mechanisms can be nested within an asymmetry generator which represents the interactions between the disequilibrium term of an error correction mechanism and an ancillary driver process the asymmetry hypothesis can then be tested in a straightforward extension of linear statistical methods the methods are applied to 10 years of monthly new zealand mortgage rate data

share tenancy as strategic delegation abstract the paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium it considers a set up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements ranging from owner operation through the fixed rental system to sharecropping these landlords are the only sources of employment in the village and compete in the wages they pay to their workers in such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives

on the existence of share contracts under limited liability abstract in a principal agent relationship under limited liability the agent in general receives the full share of revenue we show that when the agent exerts effort in multiple tasks the effort substitution effect helps explain the existence of share contracts even under limited liability

the macroeconomic effects of public debt an empirical analysis of mozambique abstractwe assess empirically the macroeconomic effects of public debt for the case of mozambique over the period of 2000q1 2016q4 we use a vector autoregression model to assess these effects thro

loan commitments and optimal monetary policy abstract with loan commitments negotiated in advance the use of tight money to restrain nominal spending has asymmetric effects upon different categories of borrowers this can reduce efficiency even though aggregate demand is stabilized an equilibrium model of financial intermediation with loan commitments is developed and used to analyze the welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies if demand uncertainty relates primarily to the number of borrowers rather than to each one s demand for credit an interest rate smoothing policy is optimal

the effect of inflation targeting and financial openness on currency composition of sovereign international debt abstract this paper analyzes the joint effect of inflation targeting and capital account openness in promoting changes to the currency composition of sovereign international debt in developing countries first using difference in differences in combination with entropy balancing we offer empirical evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting together with high capital account openness can significantly reduce the reliance on foreign currency denominated sovereign international debt we find that financially integrated inflation targeting countries have 11 percentage points lower foreign currency shares in their sovereign debt compared to non targeting countries second we determine the threshold level of financial openness that countries need to attain before they see the full benefits of inflation targeting third the joint effect of inflation targeting and capital account openness significantly increases three years after the policy implementation our results are robust to alternative specifications which include instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity of the policy

investigation of production sales and inventory relationships using multicointegration and non symmetric error correction models the accumulated sum of a stationary series is called integrated if a linear combination of some of the integrated series is stationary it is said to be cointegrated this paper presents empirical results on inventories to consider the possibility of a deeper form of cointegration called multicointegration which is introduced in granger and lee 1989 a vector integrated series is multicointegrated if the accumulated sum of its stationary cointegrated linear combination is again cointegrated with itself inventory which is the accumulated sum of production minus sales is probably cointegrated with production and sales the empirical results generally support the presence of multicointegration of production and sales in many u s industries and industrial aggregates the results also favour the non symmetric error correction model providing evidence that the strength of attraction is different on both sides of the attractor a modified s s rule for inventory control is investigated in the context of a non symmetric error correction model and the results generally do not support the s s rule sufficient evidence is found to conclude that multicointegration is a useful concept in the area of inventory determination

asymmetric adjustment of commercial bank interest rates evidence from malaysia and singapore abstract this paper examines the rigidity of commercial bank interest rates using evidence from singapore and malaysia an asymmetric error correction technique is used to test whether mean adjustment lags are different when retail rates are above or below their equilibrium levels it is concluded in both countries that the mean adjustment lag is shorter when the deposit rate is above its equilibrium than when it is below its equilibrium using the framework of hannan and berger 1991 this finding implies that the hypothesis of collusion cannot be rejected

land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers this paper addresses the question of how farmers displaced by acquisition of agricultural land for the purpose of industrialization ought to be compensated prior to acquisition the farmers are leasing in land from a private owner or local government with a legally mandated sharecropping contract compensation rules affect the decision of the landlord to sell the land ex post to an industrial developer and ex ante incentives of tenants and landlord to make specific investments in agricultural productivity efficiency considerations are shown to require farmers be over compensated in the event of conversion

default risk and optimal debt management the role of movements in real rates in explaining the relationship between long and short term interest rates is explored within a model of optimal government debt management the government s incentives to resort in the future to inflation and ex post debt taxation in order to reduce the real value of its nominal liabilities have an impact on term premia and hence on the short long spread in particular default risk and consequently long term interest rates increase with the size of outstanding debt and the level of real rates in the presence of short maturities indexed debt and anti inflationary governments optimal maturity either lengthens or shortens with inflation risk depending on the time profile of government expenditure while it always lengthens with default risk however when the stock of debt is extremely large the compensation for default risk required by the agents on long term bonds may be so high that only shortterm debt can be issued the implications of this model are consistent with the observed behavior of risk premia in some highly indebted countries 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification h63 h43

a hierarchy model of associative farming abstract acceptance of the need for complementary services when agrarian reform is introduced such as credit and technical assistance has led many countries in latin america to organize land reform projects into collectives or production cooperatives but the disincentives to effort inherent in group farming have been a continual source of underproduction and disappointment with cooperative farming experiments the paper suggests an intermediate farming structure currently successful in the dominican republic in the framework of an agency contract incorporating the hierarchical relations between beneficiary administrator and governing agency the advantages of the associative over either individual or collective farming are illustrated

intertemporal discounting and tenurial contracts a simple two period model without uncertainty and strategic complementarity in the labor market or asymmetric information of any kind is employed to study the nature of contracts signed between a landlord and a tenant in a rural economy the paper provides conditions under which different types of contracts may prevail q 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

inefficient foreign borrowing a dual and common agency perspective studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate it then revisits the original sin debate analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment international portfolio diversification domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries access to international lending the paper thereby relates a country s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings their location the extent of control rights held by political authorities and the interests of dominant domestic political forces

the nature of the agricultural firm abstract models explaining the choice between rent wage and share contracts in agriculture abstract from the large variations within the classes of rent share and owner managed forms of organization regarding the extent to which a specific form accommodates specialization between labor and management as a result modern explanations of agricultural organizations are misleadingly dependent on risk aversion or the assumption that landowners have an absolute advantage in production decisions viewing the agricultural firm as a constitution instead of as a nexus of contracts facilitates an agency explanation of alternative organizational forms and their amenability to specialization

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank abstract this paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions the analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation indexed debt if delegation of monetary policy is viable the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt this increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks evidence on central bank independence debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content

tenancy and family resources a model and some empirical analysis abstract in this paper we discuss with the help of a simple model the role of family resource endowments in determining the extent of land leased in or leased out by a household this becomes important when the market for some of these resources is either not functioning at all or is functioning imperfectly we focus on three such resources which have some relevance in indian agriculture these are 1 the family s managerial skill 2 its endowment of human labour and 3 its endowment of draft animal labour household level data from six villages of maharashtra and andhra pradesh are also utilized to test some of the hypotheses

competition transmission and bank pricing policies evidence from belgian loan and deposit markets abstract this paper addresses the pass through from market interest rates to retail bank interest rates the paper advocates a heterogeneous approach and applies it to the belgian banking market a substantial proportion of the heterogeneity in bank pricing policies can be explained by the bank lending channel and the relative market power hypothesis the results also suggest that the long term pass through is typically less than one for one rejecting the completeness hypothesis while there is no convincing evidence for asymmetry in retail rates large deviations from equilibrium mark ups are faster reduced than small deviations overall conditions for corporate loans are more competitive compared to consumer loans demand and savings deposits have by far the most rigid prices

prime rate changes is there an advantage in being first this article analyzes the impact of prime rate changes on stock prices of prime rate change initiating banks relative to noninitiating banks the prime rate as a sticky price is analyzed and the potential directions and sizes of information effects are discussed and empirically examined it is found that prime rate increases generally convey bad news about the initiating banks prime rate decreases in contrast have weakly positive effects on the initiating banks prime rate change announcements are also found to have some effect on banks other than the initiating bank implying that contagion effects exist copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

tenure systems in traditional china i a general equilibrium model of tenure preference classical marginalists at least after john clark provide an unequivocal solution for the conventional factor market where people sell the productive services of their resources to producers the productexhaustion theorem says that if factors are priced according to their marginal products incomes of all resource owners will exactly exhaust the value of total products in the long run competitive equilibrium this holds true regardless of which factor is variable and which is fixed and regardless of which group of resource owners perform as producers who buy productive services of other resources in the market and claim residuals for themselves in an agrarian economy with land and labor as the inputs a land owner may cultivate his land and purchase the labor input from outside paying a wage rate in accordance with labor s marginal product the land owner is then the residual claimant alternatively he may lease out his land and receive a fixed rental rate per unit of area equal to the marginal product of land in this case the tenant is the producer and claims the residual income distribution between the two parties remains the same under each land arrangement wage and rent are therefore identical conceptually the classical marginal analysis has not presented a satisfactory theory of share tenancy which instead of being a seller buyer transaction in a conventional factor market is essentially a partnership arrangement between two persons who own complementary factors hence the term land renting will hereafter denote the fixed rent system exclusively in fact the direct application of marginal analysis to share tenancy has created considerable confusion in early economic literature only recently some general equilibrium models of land tenure systems have been developed for better understanding of the

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk we analyze optimal contract choice in agriculture when there is joint moral hazard on the part of the farmer in the supply of effort and the riskiness of the technique of cultivation in the presence of limited liability high powered incentive contracts such as fixed rental contracts will induce the farmer to adopt techniques of cultivation that are too risky from the point of view of the landlord on the other hand low powered incentive contracts such as fixed wage contracts will induce the farmer to supply too little effort we show that sharecropping contracts emerge as a natural solution to balance these two conflicting considerations

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

the long reach of cotton in the us south tenant farming mechanization and low skill manufacturing abstract this paper examines the long run impact of cotton agriculture on local development in the us south focusing on a novel aspect of structural change exploiting climate based variation in cotton production i show that cotton specialization in the late 19th century had a negative impact on local development that lasts through 2010 this negative relationship however only became evident in the second half of the 20th century i argue that the change was caused by the mechanization of cotton production which began in the 1950s after the mechanization local manufacturing absorbed displaced cotton tenants with low human capital in response to the inflow of cotton tenants labor productivity in manufacturing began to decline and the effects persisted in the long run the persistent decline in manufacturing productivity is explained by directed technical change that reduced demand for skills in manufacturing these results indicate that depending on the agricultural background structural change can negatively affect the evolution of technology and productivity in the industrial sector

equilibrium contingent compensation in contests with delegation we consider two player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player s behalf endogenizing delegation contracts we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates we first show that each player s equilibrium contract is a no win no pay contract then we examine the delegates equilibrium compensation spreads effort levels probabilities of winning expected payoffs and the players equilibrium expected payoffs we show that economic rents for the delegates may exist

risky public domestic debt composition in emerging economies abstract this paper explains why public domestic debt composition in emerging economies can be risky namely in foreign currency with a short maturity or indexed it analyses empirically the determinants of these risk sources separately developing a new large dataset compiled from national sources for 33 emerging economies over 1994 2006 the paper finds that economic size the breadth of the domestic investor base inflation and fiscal soundness are all associated with risky public domestic debt compositions yet to an extent that varies considerably in terms of magnitude and significance across sources of risk only inflation impacts all types of risky debt underscoring the overarching importance of monetary credibility to make domestic debt compositions in emerging economies safer given local bond markets rapid development monitoring risky public domestic debt compositions in emerging economies becomes increasingly relevant to global financial stability

the efficiency of the scandinavian banking sector a wavelet quantile regression analysis in this article the scandinavian housing financing market is analysed in order to determine whether the interest rate price discovery processes of denmark norway and sweden are efficient based o

revenue sharing in movie exhibition and the arrival of sound i introduction at least since adam smith economists have been intrigued by share contracts there has been a proliferation of models most of which tend to explain the share contract as resulting from some mix of optimal risk bearing and optimal effort motivation 1 a large number of researchers have attempted to test these models empirically sharecropping contracts not surprisingly are the most intensively examined the bibliography in knoeber 2000 but similar studies have been conducted in many other areas for example martin 1988 and lafontaine 1992 examine franchise arrangements hallagan 1978 investigates contracts used to lease gold claims leffler and rucker 1991 analyze a sample of private timber sale contracts goldberg and erickson 1987 study long term contracts for the sale of petroleum coke aggarwal and samwick 1999 investigate incentive contracts between firms and their executives and chisholm 1997 goldberg 1997 and weinstein 1998 all examine profit sharing contracts between fi lm companies and the talent this article differs in an important respect from most previous studies which analyze a cross section of contracts in an attempt to determine how or whether they vary according to the attributes of the contracting parties or the products being contracted for instead it investigates an area where a sudden technology shock led to the rapid and widespread replacement of one form of contracting by another the industry is the motion picture business and the shock was the arrival of sound during the silent film era the vast majority of first run feature films were rented to cinemas for flat daily or weekly payments within two years of the release of the first sound picture revenue sharing contracts were the norm and they remain the norm to this day 2 my goal is to investigate the degree to which the standard economic concerns moral hazard risk sharing and measurement problems can explain this change because the contracting parties remained the same the question becomes what was altered in the nature of the product or in its provision so as to have altered correspondingly the incentives faced i conclude the following first the advent of sound fundamentally changed the inputs live music and other acts supplied by the exhibitor and central to the show were replaced by a soundtrack and short sound films supplied by the film company the benefit of deterring exhibitor shirking through the use of flat rental fees which made the exhibitor full residual claimant declined accordingly the party whose effort makes the largest contribution to marginal product generally receives the largest proportion of the residual claims and in the decades following the arrival of sound the proportion of residual claims collected by film companies rose steadily in addition average revenue per film increased with sound whereas the cost of ensuring that exhibitors reported attendance revenue honestly done by locating a film company s representative in the theater remained the same the ex post division of revenue necessary for revenue sharing thus became cheaper on a per film basis finally uncertainty ab out the value in terms of expected attendance revenue of the early sound films appears to have raised the cost of negotiating lump sum rental fees and thus promoted experiments with revenue sharing however although this may have contributed initially it cannot explain the practice s persistence uncertainty about film values declined as talking films became better known ii the nature of the problem a film company contracts with an exhibitor so that they may jointly produce the final good a movie presentation 3 to that end each supplies essential inputs the film company provides the movie itself assembled from a variety of inputs and some sort of national advertising support the exhibitor provides the theater which consists of seating projection equipment a refreshment stand and other support activities and some form of local advertising

stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly an explanation based on managerial incentives abstract this paper shows that in a model of managerial delegation in a duopoly if an owner s decision to hire a manager is modeled explicitly then the subgame perfect equilibrium may coincide with the stackelberg solution interestingly this can happen even when the cost of hiring a manager is the same for the owner of each firm

agricultural workers credit rationing and family networks in rural mexico abstractwe use mixed methods and first hand household data in mexico to investigate credit practices by households engaged in agricultural wage employment quantitative analysis shows evidence of rationing in the formal sector but also suggests the existence of mitigating mechanisms qualitative analysis provides additional insights first income patterns associated with agricultural wage generate income smoothing needs that are sometimes better met by the informal sector second family networks can perform key functions as gateways to the formal sector through specific informal arrangements that inject flexibility into formal rules and procedures

efficient share tenancy contracts under risk the case of two rice growing villages in thailand abstract two categories of thai sharecroppers are observed to be efficient those under high poverty and high risk and those in a long term relation of gift exchange with their landlord econometric estimates show that use of variable factors by these sharecroppers is insignificantly different from that by owner operators and significantly higher than that by generic sharecroppers interpretations for this behavior are provided by models of sharecropping under safety first and of repeated contracts with gift exchange

limited liability wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies abstract an explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare differences in tenants wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments in this context the inability of landlords to specify their tenants effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered the selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts these results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots

the debt burden and debt maturity at low and moderate levels of government debt there appears to be little relation between the level of debt and its maturity but at high levels of debt a strong inverse relation emerges we start the paper by documenting this inverse relation for those oecd countries which have reached very high levels of debt we then provide a theory of the joint movements of debt and maturity which can explain both sets of facts it is based on the idea that at high levels of debt the government may need to decrease the maturity of the debt as debt increases in order to maintain the credibility of its anti inflation stance this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the economics of polygyny in sub saharan africa female productivity and the demand for wives in cote d ivoire polygyny is still practiced throughout much of sub saharan africa with important social consequences this paper makes the first attempt to link african polygyny directly to the productivity of women in agriculture using micro data i develop a structural model of the demand for wives that disentangles wealth and substitution effects using a large household survey from cote d ivoire i find that marked geographic diversity in cropping patterns leads to regional variation in female labor productivity i also find that conditional on wealth men do have more wives when women are more productive that is cheaper this substitution effect may explain why polygyny declined in rural areas of cote d ivoire during agricultural development

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

interest rate pass through and asymmetric adjustment evidence from the federal funds rate operating target period this study examines the long run interest rate pass through of the federal funds rate to the prime rate and whether there is asymmetric adjustment in the prime rate using the enders siklos 2001 momentum threshold autoregressive model over the period february 1987 to october 2005 once allowance is made for the endogenously determined structural break in the cointegrating relationship in april 1996 the adjustment of the prime rate to changes in the federal funds rate appears asymmetric with upward rigidity a result contrary to previous studies which found that the prime rate exhibits downward rigidity the finding of upward rigidity in the prime rate lends support for the customer reaction and adverse selection hypotheses moreover the empirical evidence seems to support the observation of increased pass through as a result of heightened competition in the banking industry as well as the federal reserve s enhanced transparency in monetary policy during the 1990s

collective agricultural production a solution for transition economies abstract the paper examines theoretical reasons and provides examples for productivity differences between agricultural service cooperatives and collectives service cooperatives can utilize economies of scale enhance competitiveness and provide technical information advantages that often outweighed problems of free riding low investment and excessive political intervention agricultural collectives while not adding substantial advantages are in addition associated with problems of supervision and effort supply tendencies to substitute casual workers or mechanization for regular members and low investment incentives while collective forms of organization in transition economies respond to high risk and market imperfections they do so inefficiently policies that create conditions for service cooperatives to compete may lead to large productivity gains

public debt and financial development abstract we examine the role of public debt in financial development the literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark we contrast this safe asset view to a lazy banks view developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly because it could make banks profitable but inefficient results from country level and bank level regressions are more supportive of the lazy banks view but the safe asset view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks there is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression

off farm work technical efficiency and rice production risk in taiwan this article investigates the differences in yield production production efficiency and yield risk for farmers both with and without off farm work using a nationwide survey of rice farmers in taiwan we estimate two stochastic production frontier models that accommodate technical inefficiency and production risk simultaneously for farmers both with and without off farm work the stochastic dominance criterion is then applied to compare the differences in the distributions of the estimated technical efficiency and yield risk between groups the empirical results indicate that these two groups of farmers use resources in different ways and off farm work is not necessarily associated with lower technical efficiency for farmers in the lower percentiles of the efficiency distribution those with off farm work are more efficient than their counterparts without off farm work in addition farmers with off farm work face higher production risk and this result is robust for the entire distribution