trust trustworthiness and information sharing in supply chains bridging china and the united states whether and how trust and trustworthiness differ between a collectivist society e g china and an individualistic one e g the united states generates much ongoing scientific debate and bears significant practical values for managing cross country transactions we experimentally investigate how supply chain members countries of origin china versus the united states affect trust trustworthiness and strategic information sharing behavior in a cross country supply chain we consider a two tier supply chain in which the upstream supplier solicits demand forecast information from the retailer to plan production but the retailer has an incentive to manipulate her forecast to ensure abundant supply the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the supply chain and supplier s capability to determine the optimal production quantity affect the efficacy of forecast sharing and the resulting profits we develop an experimental design to disentangle these three aspects and to allow for real time interactions b

productivity in swedish electricity retail distribution this paper examines productivity growth in electricity retail distribution in sweden in a multiple output multiple input framework the approach used is nonparametric data envelopment analysis dea productivity is measured by means of the malmquist index productivity comparisons are made between different types of ownership and between different service areas the study indicates a high rate of productivity growth due to economies of density when measured over a period of 17 years the results show no significant differences in productivity growth between different types of ownership or economic organization

supply chain relationships and contracts the impact of repeated interaction on capacity investment and procurement consider a firm developing an innovative product due to market pressures production must begin soon after the product development effort is complete which requires that an upstream supplier invests in capacity while the design of the product and production process are in flux because the product is ill defined at this point in time the firms are unable to write court enforceable contracts that specify the terms of trade or the supplier s capacity investment however the firms can adopt an informal agreement relational contract regarding the terms of trade and capacity investment the potential for future business provides incentive for the firms to adhere to the relational contract we show that the optimal relational contract may be complex requiring the buyer to order more than her demand to indirectly monitor the supplier s capacity investment we propose a simpler relational contract and show that it performs very well for a broad range of parameters finally we identify characteristics of the business environment that make relational contracting particularly valuable

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

measuring and decomposing the gender pay gap a new frontier approach abstract the gender pay gap measures the differences in the wages earned by female workers when compared to male workers accurately measuring the gender pay gap is an important exercise in order to assess how far we are from the ideal of equal pay for work of equal value determining the different sources of the gender pay gap is also very important in order to design appropriate policies for eliminating this gap we develop an enhanced method to measure and decompose the gender pay gap this method is based on the data envelopment analysis dea technique and on the malmquist index mi we use dea and the mi to construct an index reflecting an adjusted measure of the gender pay gap taking into account multiple productive characteristics and multiple types of pay furthermore we propose a decomposition of the gender pay gap into four components same gender pay gap cross gender frontier gap magnitude productive characteristics bias and pay package bias the method is applied to data relative to 15 712 men and 17 175 women working as business and administration associate professionals in the finance and insurance industry in 20 countries the results reveal the existence of a gender pay gap in all countries and that the value of the gap and of its components vary considerably between countries requiring different policies to tackle it

light duty vehicles and external impacts product and policy performance assessment abstract in order to demonstrate that welfare theory can be put into practice mathematical programming methods are used here which can handle the aggregation problems facing us when information concerning the relative valuation of external factors emissions safety risks non renewable energy use noise etc is highly uncertain product and policy performance measures are presented and then applied to one time period real data on the single perhaps most welfare affecting man made consumer product of the 20th century light duty vehicles ldvs the focus when examining costs imposed on society due to individuals or other economic units purchase and use of ldvs is here the total external cost from the choice of ldv technology the relative weights of the external factors are then determined endogenously by first using for each ldv model the unconstrained set of weights most favorable to itself the flexibility of the relative weights is then constrained according to assumed knowledge about true external relative costs by this procedure it is possible to aggregate the multiple societal impact factors of ldvs and thus to measure the total external impact of individual ldv models relative to current best practice technology

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

the relational advantages of intermediation this paper provides a novel explanation for the use of supply chain intermediaries we find that even in the absence of the well known transactional and informational advantages of mediation inter

inventories and the concentration of suppliers and customers evidence from the chinese manufacturing sector this study investigates the links between supplier and customer base concentrations and inventory holdings in the chinese manufacturing sector using financial data from a cohort of 516 companies we find that firms that face higher supplier density benefiting from better co ordination with suppliers hold fewer inventories whereas firms with higher customer density retain larger inventories as a result of the bargaining power exercised by customers we then extend the analysis by investigating the impact of account payables receivables and bad debt reserves finding that inventory holdings are positively associated with the two forms of financing and negatively associated with bad debts this last relationship however becomes less severe when firms have access to large volumes of payables finally we show that the above results hold with varying degrees of similarity also when we partition the dataset into six homogenous industrial segments overall this study contributes to the growing literature on inventories and the structure of the supply chain by shedding new light on the importance of both supplier and customer densities as well as the volume of payables and receivables for inventory management

statistical inference for aggregates of farrell type efficiencies in this study we merge results of two recent directions in efficiency analysis research aggregation and bootstrap applied as an example to one of the most popular point estimators of individual efficiency the data envelopment analysis dea estimator a natural context of the methodology developed here is a study of efficiency of a particular economic system e g an industry as a whole or a comparison of efficiencies of distinct groups within such a system e g regulated vs non regulated firms or private vs public firms our methodology is justified by the neoclassical economic theory and is supported by carefully adapted statistical methods copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

managing and reallocating inventory across two markets with local information abstract consider a firm that controls inventory centrally for two separate markets that are managed by regional managers having local demand information the central planner provides a dedicated inventory level to each market to ensure a minimum service level but can reallocate inventory once associated demands are filled how should such a firm solicit regional managers to share their local information so inventory levels can be set efficiently in this paper we study a forecast sharing game in such a firm where demand information lies within regions and inventory is managed by a central decision maker we show that incentives are misaligned and truthful information sharing is not an equilibrium we study two potential ways to improve the system a regional managers directly place orders rather than simply passing demand forecasts or b a pricing scheme for inventory reallocations is imposed we show that under direct ordering a unique pure strategy bayesian nash equilibrium exists and makes retailers place orders based on their true forecasts although the requested order quantities are not system optimal e g some inventory pooling benefits are lost under an endogenous transfer pricing mechanism set by the central planner we find that a first best truth telling equilibrium is possible under certain conditions we conduct a numerical study to examine the different cases and find that when the critical fractile is high direct ordering results in lower inventories while the reverse is true when the critical fractile is low expected profit comparisons show the value of local information

efficiency productivity and determinants of inefficiency at public day care centers in sweden efficiency differences among day care centers and productivity change over time are examined on the basis of nonparametric frontiers calculated using the dea methodology the data consist of approximately 200 public day care centers in gothenburg sweden for the years 1988 and 1989 the findings indicate a potential output increase of about 10 to 15 per cent each year and a productivity decrease of 3 per cent between the years an attempt is also made to explain the differences in inefficiency by applying a tobit model

industry performance and structural efficiency measures solutions to problems in firm models abstract it is shown that average unit structural efficiency measures do not measure the level of technical efficiency in a firm model of an industry alternative structural efficiency measures generalized to multiple input and multiple output technologies are presented as a solution to the problem of how to estimate the relative performance of an industry as a whole where reallocation of inputs across firms is not feasible compared to existing measures the proposed measures require additional information therefore the linear programming dea models needed to obtain this information are presented this non parametric approach to relative efficiency measurement is also used to obtain economic efficiency estimates for an industry as a whole without imposing a priori restrictions on the relative input and output weights

coordinating investment production and subcontracting we value the option of subcontracting to improve financial performance and system coordination by analyzing a competitive stochastic investment game with recourse the manufacturer and subcontractor decide separately on their capacity investment levels then demand uncertainty is resolved and both parties have the option to subcontract when deciding on their production and sales we analyze and present outsourcing conditions for three contract types 1 price only contracts where an ex ante transfer price is set for each unit supplied by the subcontractor 2 incomplete contracts where both parties negotiate over the subcontracting transfer and 3 state dependent price only and incomplete contracts for which we show an equivalence result while subcontracting with these three contract types can coordinate production decisions in the supply system only state dependent contracts can eliminate all decentralization costs and coordinate capacity investment decisions the minimally sufficient price only contract that coordinates our supply chain specifies transfer prices for a small number 6 in our model of contingent scenarios our game theoretic model allows the analysis of the role of transfer prices and of the bargaining power of buyer and supplier we find that sometimes firms may be better off leaving some contract parameters unspecified ex ante and agreeing to negotiate ex post also a price focused strategy for managing subcontractors can backfire because a lower transfer price may decrease the manufacturer s profit finally as with financial options the option value of subcontracting increases as markets are more volatile or more negatively correlated

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

a bargaining theory of distribution channels abstract a critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties in this article the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer one retailer channel to establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract they show that the institution of bargaining has force and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present the authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination thus there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members the authors rec

linear programming models for firm and industry performance programming models of technology are enjoying a revival in several strands of literature one such strand is the growing literature devoted to the assessment of firm performance based on the work of farrell 1957 and the later popularized by charnes cooper and rhodes 1978 under the name of data envelopment analysis dea for an early programming model see boles 1966 a second strand of literature seeks to model the industry production function and is associated with johansen 1972 fbrsund and hjalmarsson 1987 and aigner and chu 1968 a third strand of literature uses programming techniques such as nonparametric tests of regularity conditions in production see afriat 1972 hanoch and rothschild 1972 diewert and parkan 1983 and varian 1984 one of the purposes of this paper is to examine the relationship between the first two areas i e analysis of firm and industry programming models of technology and performance in order to compare the industry and firm models we restate them in a general programming form and ignore issues of functional form examination of these models in primal and dual form reveals that the industry approach constructs technology from firm data but allows hypothetical reallocation of aggregate resources across firms to yield an industry function the firm models also construct technology from the data on all firms in the sample industry but do not allow for reallocation of inputs across firms this suggests a natural hybrid an industry model which allows for both firm specific inputs and inputs which can be reallocated across firms the paper unfolds as follows we begin by presenting a stylized version of the aigner and chu and johansen models of industry production we

malmquist indices of productivity growth during the deregulation of norwegian banking 1980 89 productivity growth during the deregulation of the norwegian banking industry is studied within the framework of data envelopment analysis which explicitly allows for multiple outputs introducing malmquist indices for productivity growth total growth can be decomposed into frontier growth and change in each bank s distance to the frontier both the total growth index and its components can be consistently chained over time we find productivity regress at the average bank prior to the deregulation but rapid growth when deregulation took place deregulation also led to less dispersion of productivity levels within the industry

technical note optimal long term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information we consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon under a backlogging model we show that the manufacturer s optimal dynamic long term contract takes a simple form in the first period based on her private demand forecast the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee and from then on the two parties stick to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer s chosen price under a lost sales model we show that the structure of the optimal long term contract combines a menu of wholesale pricing contracts with an option that if exercised by the retailer reduces future wholesale prices in exchange for an immediate payment to the manufacturer the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 opre 2017 1626

designing incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing within a firm we consider a firm where the sales division sales is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division operations is responsible for ordering sales has better information about the demand than operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to operations to incentivize truthful information sharing we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of sales besides monetary payoffs we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of sales we model the setting as a signaling game and derive the pareto dominant separating equilibria of the game in laboratory experiments we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected payoff maximizing behavior we use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out of sample treatments and out of sample subjects we conduct additional experiments to provide further robus

a postscript on aggregate farrell efficiencies abstract in this note we derive alternative weighting schemes that complement those of fare and zelenyuk 2003 for consistent aggregation of farrell efficiencies when the technology exhibits global constant returns to scale

the law of one price in data envelopment analysis restricting weight flexibility across firms abstract the law of one price loop states that all firms face the same prices for their inputs and outputs under market equilibrium taken here as a normative condition for efficiency prices this law has powerful implications for productive efficiency analysis which have remained unexploited thus far this paper shows how loop based weight restrictions can be incorporated in data envelopment analysis dea utilizing the relation between industry level and firm level cost efficiency measures we propose to apply a set of input prices that is common for all firms and that maximizes the cost efficiency of the industry our framework allows for firm specific output weights and for variable returns to scale and preserves the linear programming structure of the standard dea we apply the proposed methodology to the evaluation of the research efficiency of economics departments of dutch universities this application shows that the methodology is computationally tractable for practical efficiency analysis and that it helps in deepening the dea analysis

information sharing in a long term supply chain relationship the role of customer review strategy in this paper we study the practice of forecast sharing and supply chain coordination with a game theoretical model we find that in a one shot version of the game forecasts are not shared truthf

wage setting and unemployment persistence in europe japan and the usa the persistence of high unemployment in the main european economies is one of the most puzzling economic developments of the past fifteen years average japanese unemployment has risen slightly since the mid seventies whereas unemployment in the united states still exhibits cyclical fluctuations around a gently rising level in marked contrast average unemployment in france germany and the united kingdom rose to a higher plateau during the latter part of the seventies shot up again in the early eighties and has remained persistently high identification of the causes of such unemployment persistence is crucial before one makes policy recommendations three possible causes spring to mind first persistence in the determinants of equilibrium and disequilibrium unemployment second excessive power of insiders in wage setting combined with high correlation between employment status and insider status and finally a high degree of state dependence sluggishness in labour demand although in general one expects all three causes to have played a role in the persistence of high european unemployment there is still a need to identify their relative importance the first set of factors has been assessed empirically in recent papers by among others sachs 1983 bruno and sachs 19x5 bruno 1986 layard and nickel1 1985 bean layard and nickel1 1986 newell and symons 1985 and others many of these papers have also allowed for sluggishness in labour demand although they did not particularly focus on it the second set of factors has been investigated by blanchard and summers 1986 who concluded that there is evidence of much higher correlation between employment status and insider status in the three largest european economies than in the united states

on manufacturing marketing incentives stereotypically marketing is mainly concerned about satisfying customers and manufacturing is mainly interested in factory efficiency using the principal agent agency paradigm which assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of the firm will act in their self interest we seek incentive plans that will induce those managers to act so that the owner of the firm can attain as much as possible of the residual returns one optimal incentive plan can be interpreted as follows the owner subcontracts to pay the manufacturing manager a fixed rate for all capacity he delivers each marketing manager receives all of the returns from his product in turn all managers pay a fixed fee to the owner under this plan the marketing managers will often complain about the stock level decisions even though these levels are announced in advance under a revised plan the owner can eliminate such complaints by delegating the stocking decisions to the respective marketing managers without any loss this plan is interpreted as requiring the owner to make a futures market for manufacturing capacity paying the manufacturing manager the expected marginal value for each unit of capacity delivered receiving the realized marginal value from the marketing managers and losing money on average in the process

banking efficiency in the nordic countries abstract evidence of the relative competitiveness of the banking industries in three nordic countries is provided by applying data envelopment analysis of productivity on the national and the pooled data sets the analysis produces a detailed account of how well banks from different countries and different sizes may be prepared to meet the more intense competition of a common european banking market

demand signalling under unobservable effort in franchising linear and nonlinear price contracts we study the signalling strategy of a principal who is privately informed about its high demand potential to an uninformed risk neutral agent we analyze the model in the context of a contract between a franchisor and a franchisee we examine the distortions of a two part pricing scheme necessary to credibly inform the franchisee agent we also study whether the inability of the franchisor principal to observe the agent s effort moderates or exaggerates the distortions from the first best two part pricing scheme a surprising outcome is that even though the principal incurs greater signalling cost the magnitude of distortion in the two part scheme is smaller when service is unobservable than when it is not thus a signalling strategy employing the fixed and variable fees is harder to detect under moral hazard empirical studies failing to control for moral hazard may incorrectly conclude that signalling strategy does not occur we later consider a three part scheme to verify whether or not the schem

salesforce incentives market information and production inventory planning salespeople are the eyes and ears of the firms they serve they possess market knowledge that is critical for a wide range of decisions a key question is how a firm can provide incentives to its salesforce so that it is in their interest to truthfully disclose their information about the market and to work hard many people have considered this question and provided solutions perhaps the most well known solution is due to gonik 1978 who proposed and implemented a clever scheme designed to elicit market information and encourage hard work the purpose of this paper is to study gonik s scheme and compare it with a menu of linear contracts a solution often used in the agency literature in a model where the market information possessed by the salesforce is important for the firm s production and inventory planning decisions

measuring imputed cost in the semiconductor equipment supply chain we consider the order fulfillment process of a supplier producing a customized capital good such as production equipment commercial aircraft medical devices or defense systems as is common in these industries prior to receiving a firm purchase order from the customer the supplier receives a series of shared forecasts which are called soft orders facing a stochastic internal manufacturing lead time the supplier must decide at what time to begin the fulfillment of the order this decision requires a trade off between starting too early leading to potential holding or cancellation costs and starting too late leading to potential delay costs we collect detailed data of shared forecasts actual purchase orders production lead times and delivery dates for a supplier buyer dyad in the semiconductor equipment supply chain under the assumption that the supplier acts rationally optimally balancing the cancellation holding and delay costs we are able to estimate the corresponding imputed cost parameters based on the observed data our estimation results reveal that the supplier perceives the cost of cancellation to be about two times higher and the holding costs to be about three times higher than the delay cost in other words the supplier is very conservative when commencing the order fulfillment which undermines the effectiveness of the overall forecast sharing mechanism

optimal soft order revisions under demand and supply uncertainty and upstream information abstract demand patterns for products with short life cycles or seasonal demand do not follow a discernible pattern for individual sales events and seasons due to uncertainty associated with effectiveness of product promotions willingness of major retailers to carry product and their support competition and other unforeseen marketplace events factors these atypical demand patterns can be volatile and unsuitable for traditional demand forecasting in such cases buyers utilize market signals to regularly update demand forecasts under these settings sharing early soft order i e order forecast with the supplier reduces buyer s risk of supply shortages in this study we propose an optimal order revision policy for a buyer facing atypical demand and supply uncertainty for a single selling season based on a stochastic dynamic program we demonstrate the value of soft orders as well as supplier s inventory position information for the buyer we make several key contributions i we introduce a decision model for buyer to optimally revise soft orders under supply uncertainty with or without supplier s inventory position information under a deposit scheme ii we characterize the relationship between the optimal soft order and final firm order under demand forecasts and revisions demonstrating that optimal orders may be aggressive conservative or match the demand forecast iii we identify settings under which inventory position information of the supplier is beneficial to the buyer iv we offer a mechanism for identifying the minimum unit deposit cost that will lead to truthful soft orders from the buyer a detailed analysis explores the structure of the optimal ordering policies as well as the effect of cost parameters and sources of uncertainty on buyer performance

setting the right incentives for global planning and operations we study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing and local demand management the stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units and the firm relies on the business units forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations we propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer an appealing refinement of nash equilibrium moreover these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions after analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

dynamic business share allocation in a supply chain with competing suppliers this paper studies a repeated game between a manufacturer and two competing suppliers with imperfect monitoring we present a principal agent model for managing long term supplier relationships using a unique form of measurement and incentive scheme we measure a supplier s overall performance with a rating equivalent to its continuation utility the expected total discounted utility of its future payoffs and incentivize supplier effort with larger allocations of future business we obtain the vector of the two suppliers ratings as the state of a markov decision process and we solve an infinite horizon contracting problem in which the manufacturer allocates business volume between the two suppliers and updates their ratings dynamically based on their current ratings and the current performance outcome our contributions are both theoretical and managerial we propose a repeated principal agent model with a novel incentive scheme to tackle a common but challenging incentive problem in a multiperiod s

does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better forecasting retailer this paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand forecast information we show that the manufacturer s expected profit is convex in the retailer s forecasting accuracy the manufacturer benefits from selling to a better forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster if the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer s forecasting capability improves more generally the manufacturer tends to be hurt benefit by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative poor finally the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract

a dea estimation of a lower bound for firms allocative efficiency without information on price data abstract in this paper we estimate a lower bound for the sum of firms allocative efficiencies in the absence of information on prices for this purpose we only estimate technical efficiency at both the firm and the industry level using a directional distance function and choosing a relevant direction our result relies on the decomposition of overall inefficiency into technical and allocative inefficiency at both the firm and the industry level the convexity of a technology induces a transfer from both total technical inefficiency and part of allocative inefficiency at the firm level to technical inefficiency solely at the industry level the remaining firms allocative inefficiency could be counted at the industry level hence the difference between technical inefficiencies at both levels can be interpreted as a lower bound for the sum of allocative inefficiency in the industry we show how to implement this bound in a dea framework