partisan bias in economic news evidence on the agenda setting behavior of u s newspapers abstract we study the agenda setting political behavior of a large sample of u s newspapers during the 1996 2005 period our purpose is to examine the intensity of coverage of economic issues as a function of the underlying economic conditions and the political affiliation of the incumbent president focusing on unemployment inflation the federal budget and the trade deficit we investigate whether there is any significant correlation between the endorsement policy of newspapers and the differential coverage of bad good economic news as a function of the president s political affiliation we find evidence that newspapers with pro democratic endorsement pattern systematically give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a republican than when the president is democratic compared to newspapers with pro republican endorsement pattern this result is robust to controlling for the partisanship of readers we find similar but less robust results for the trade deficit we also find some evidence that newspapers cater to the partisan tastes of readers in the coverage of the budget deficit we find no evidence of a partisan bias or at least of a bias that is correlated with the endorsement or reader partisanship for stories on inflation

does informative media commentary reduce politicians incentives to pander abstract elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander i e to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn prior to the election whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest this suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices we show that although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent s incentive to pander in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse furthermore in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a yes man suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice we explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies

how the baby boomers retirement wave distorts model based output gap estimates hours per capita measures based on the private sector as usually included in the set of observables for estimating macroeconomic models are affected by low frequent demographic trends and sectoral shifts that cannot be explained by standard models further model based output gap estimates are closely linked to the observable hours per capita series hence hours per capita that are not measured in concordance with the model assumptions can distort output gap estimates this paper shows that sectoral shifts in hours and the changing share of prime age individuals in the working age population lead indeed to erroneous output gap dynamics regarding the aftermath of the global financial crisis model based output gaps estimated using standard hours per capita series are persistently negative for the us economy this is not caused by a permanently depressed economy but by the retirement wave of baby boomers which lowers aggregate hours per capita after adjusting hours for changes in the age composition to bring them in line with the model assumptions the estimated output gap gradually closes in the years following the global financial crisis

when do long run identifying restrictions give reliable results many recent articles have identified behavioral disturbances in vector autoregressions by imposing restrictions on the long run effects of shocks this article demonstrates that this approach will be unreliable unless the underlying economy satisfies three types of strong restrictions although many aspects of these issues have been raised before this article draws out and illustrates the implications for inferences under the long run scheme furthermore it provides strategies for dealing with the problems

media competition and electoral politics we build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout while information pushes up independent turnout partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate and on average they vote less when informed

optimal simple monetary and fiscal rules under limited asset market participation the combination of limited asset market participation and consumption habits generates indeterminacy for empirically plausible calibrations of a business cycle model characterized by price and nominal wage rigidities equilibrium determinacy is restored by demand management policies based on simple fiscal rules in this regard fiscal control of nominal income growth is particularly effective in addition the complementarity between the taylor rule and the fiscal feedback on nominal income growth produces relatively large welfare gains limiting both aggregate and intragroup volatilities

media bias and influence evidence from newspaper endorsements this paper investigates the relationship between media bias and the inuence of the media on voting in the context of newspaper endorsements werst develop a simple econometric model in which voters choose candidates under uncertainty and rely on endorsements from better informed sources newspapers are potentially biased in favor of one of the candidates and voters thus rationally ac count for the credibility of any endorsements our primary empiricalnding is that endorsements are inuential in the sense that voters are more likely to support the recommended candidate after publication of the endorsement the degree of this inuence however depends upon the credibility of the endorsement in this way endorsements for the democratic candidate from left leaning news papers are less inuential than are endorsements from neutral or right leaning or newspapers and likewise for endorsements for the republican thesendings suggest that voters do rely on the media for information during campaigns but that the extent of this reliance depends upon the degree and direction of any bias

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

mass media instrumental information and electoral accountability journalism is widely believed to be crucial for holding elected officials accountable at the same time economic theory has a hard time providing an instrumental explanation for the existence of accountability journalism according to the common downsian reasoning rational voters should not be willing to pay for information out of purely instrumental motives because the individual probabilities of casting the decisive vote are typically very low we show that this rationale does not apply when a group of voters shares a common goal such as accountability and information is delivered via mass media in contrast to the pessimistic downsian view rational voters can have a considerable willingness to pay for the provision of instrumental information in these scenarios our model thus reconciles the rational voter approach with the common perception of journalism as a watchdog that holds elected officials accountable

rule of thumb consumers productivity and hours in this paper we study the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks in a model with rule of thumb consumers in the literature this nancial friction has been studied only with reference to scal shocks we show that the presence of rule of thumb consumers is also very helpful in accounting for recent empirical evidence on productivity shocks rule of thumb agents together with nominal and real rigidities play an important role in reproducing the negative response of hours and the delayed responses of output and

independent auditors bias and political agency abstract this paper analyzes political agency with endogenous information collection and revelation by third party auditors while increasing incentives for auditors to provide information straightforwardly improves political control a small amount of pro incumbent bias can also be useful for maintaining high levels of control when the equilibrium level of control is high most investigations uncover positive information about the incumbent since positive information increases reelection rates mildly pro incumbent auditors are willing to work harder than unbiased auditors in these equilibria for moderate levels of control pro incumbent auditors are again useful due to their extra effort even though they may suppress some negative information in equilibrium only when market incentives are low so equilibrium control is weak are unbiased or anti incumbent biased auditors better for voters than mildly pro incumbent auditors

expectation shocks and learning as drivers of the business cycle psychological factors market sentiments and less than fully rational shifts in beliefs are widely believed to play a role in the economy yet they are rarely considered in macroeconomic models this paper evaluates the empirical role of expectational shocks on business cycle fluctuations the paper relaxes the rational expectations assumption to exploit survey data on expectations in the estimation of a new keynesian model which allows for learning by economic agents expectation shocks affect the formation of expectations and capture waves of optimism and pessimism that lead agents to form forecasts that deviate from those implied by their learning model the empirical results uncover a crucial role for these novel expectations shocks as a major driving force of the u s business cycle expectation shocks regarding future real activity are the main source of economic fluctuations accounting for roughly half of business cycle fluctuations

the dynamics of hours worked and technology the response of hours worked to technology shocks in the postwar us economy has increased over time we offer a structural interpretation of this important time varying macroeconomic moment the time varying patterns captured by a structural var are consistent with those obtained from a parsimonious rbc model with a less than unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labour the observed changes in the response of hours are attributable to increases in the magnitude of the degree of capital labour substitution finally we conjecture that the observed time variation in is related to changes in the skill composition of the work force and biases in technological change

technology shocks and job flows we consider a version of the solow growth model where technological progress can be investment specific or investment neutral the labour market is subject to search frictions and the existing productive units may fail to adopt the most recent technological advances technological progress can lead to the destruction of technologically obsolete jobs and cause unemployment we calibrate the model to replicate the high persistence that characterizes the dynamics of firms neutral technology and the frequency of firms capital adjustment we find that neutral technological advances increase job destruction and job reallocation and reduce aggregate employment investment specific technological advances reduce job destruction have mild effects on job creation and are expansionary hence neutral technological progress prompts schumpeterian creative destruction while investment specific technological progress operates essentially as in the standard neoclassical growth model using structural var models we provide support to the key dynamic implications of the model copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

revealing information in electoral competition electoral competition between two expert candidates may lead to inefficient platform choices the present paper studies electoral competition between two experts and a third uninformed candidate the latter behaves populistically this seemingly useless candidate restores efficiency the paper then endogenizes information acquisition if the information acquisition costs are low then equilibria with i three expert candidates or ii two experts and one uninformed candidate may arise there are costs such that the latter equilibrium is the only pure strategy equilibrium in which information is transmitted

strategic disclosure of research results the cost of proving your honesty in situations where a biased sender provides verifiable information to a receiver i study how strategic reporting affects the incentives to search for information research provides series of signals that can be used selectively in reporting i show that the sender is strictly worse off when his research effort is not observed by the receiver he has to conduct more research than in the observable case and in equilibrium discloses all the information he obtained however this extra research can be socially beneficial and mandatory disclosure of results can thus be welfare reducing finally i identify cases where the sender withholds evidence and for which mandatory disclosure rules become more attractive in 2002 editors of eleven of the most prestigious medical journals announced that they would only publish the results of studies that were entered at their start in a publicly available database 1 pharmaceutical firms conduct clinical trials to test the efficacy and potential side effects of their drugs and to compare them to competitors products publishing results of studies is an efficient way to influence doctors prescriptions and patients tastes however firms can conduct multiple trials and select the most favourable results the system of mandatory disclosure adopted by medical journals is a response to the fear of such selective publishing 2 it makes the research effort of pharmaceutical firms more observable and will influence both the information they disclose and the amount of research they perform in the present article i study the interaction between the research and disclosure decisions which is an essential element in many settings the adoption of mandatory disclosure rules has subtle effects and i discover that leaving the research effort unobservable can sometimes be socially beneficial 3 i study the interaction between research and disclosure in a model where a biased sender searches for information and communicates it strategically to a receiver who will

shocking stuff technology hours and factor substitution the response of hours to technology shocks is a key controversy in macroeconomics we show that differences between rbc and nk models hinge on highly restrictive views of technology we introduce ces production technologies and demonstrate that the response of hours depends on the factor augmenting nature of shocks and the capital labor substitution elasticity in both models we develop analytical expressions to establish the thresholds determining its sign this opens new margins for shock identification combining theory and var evidence we discuss how our models provide new robust restrictions for empirical work especially using the labor income share

quantity restrictions on advertising commercial media bias and welfare abstract we study the welfare effect of a quantity restriction on advertising in free to air television and other advertising financed media in the presence of commercial media bias broadcasters face a trade off between increasing the number of viewers by sending content that is highly valued by viewers and increasing the price of advertising by choosing advertiser friendly content a cap on advertising drives the per viewer price of ads up thus content improves for viewers therefore the cap can be welfare enhancing even when viewers are not ad averse competition among broadcasters makes it more likely that a cap on advertising improves welfare thus there is a complementarity between regulation and competition on this market we also show that a tax on advertising revenues has quite different effects than a cap on advertising quantity

shadow economies at times of banking crises empirics and theory this paper investigates the response of the shadow economy to banking crises our empirical analysis based on a large sample of countries suggests that the informal sector is a powerful buffer which expands at times of banking crises and absorbs a large proportion of the fall in official output to rationalise our evidence we build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which accounts for financial and labour market frictions and for nominal rigidities in line with the empirical literature on the shadow economy we assume that in the informal sector access to external finance is limited and the production technology is relatively more labour intensive following a banking shock in the official sector the model predicts a large negative transmission to the unofficial economy that substantially dampens the overall effect of the shock

the balanced us press we measure the relative ideological positions of newspapers voters interest groups and political parties using data on ballot propositions we exploit the fact that newspapers parties and interest groups take positions on these propositions and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them we find that on average newspapers in the united states are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states that is they are balanced around the median voter still there is a significant amount of ideological heterogeneity across newspapers which is smaller than the one found for interest groups however when we group propositions by issue area we find a sizable amount of ideological imbalance broadly speaking newspapers are to the left of the state level median voter on many social issues and to the right on many economic issues to complete the picture we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions

citizen editors endogenous information acquisition and news accuracy abstract this paper provides a model of the market for news where profit maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens the analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias the bias in a media outlet s news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor in particular the results show that the expected accuracy of news reports is lower the more ideological an editor is nevertheless citizens find it optimal to acquire information from a media outlet whose editor has similar ideological preferences depending on the distribution of citizens ideological preferences a media outlet may choose an ideological editor even in a monopolistic market moreover ideological editors are more likely to be present in the market for news i the higher the number of media outlets competing in the market for news ii the lower the opportunity cost that citizens have to incur to acquire information

media markets special interests and voters abstract this paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence i use the concentration of campaign contributions from political action committees to proxy for special interests capture of us senate candidates from 1980 to 2002 and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets in state media markets and out of state media markets unlike in state media markets out of state markets focus on neighboring states politics and elections thus if citizens punish political capture increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in state counties relative to the out of state counties where the candidate receives less coverage i find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0 5 to 1 5 percentage points in in state counties relative to the out of state counties robustness checks suggest that these results are not driven by omitted senator characteristics or by differences between in state and out of state counties along dimensions other than the media environment

a spatial theory of news consumption and electoral competition we characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news when there are two media outlets each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones but voter welfare is not always higher copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

the effect of ideological positions on job market interaction a spatial analysis abstract reporters and editors may not have the same ideology when an editor wants to employ a new reporter with a different ideology they have to negotiate the price of moving from their own ideology to the other s ideology we focus on the job market for reporters where the agents negotiate over the ideological position to be reported and wage we adopt a spatial model in which each agent suffers a utility loss as the agreed upon position moves away from his her favored one equilibrium determines a threshold ideological gap for a match to be formed our analysis generates a natural separation between extreme mildly extreme and moderate ideologies furthermore we find that agents that hold extreme ideologies compromise less than moderates this formulation may be applied to other situations in which agents involve monetary and non monetary considerations especially a preference for social proximity jel codes j32 j44

extremist platforms political consequences of profit seeking media we analyze how information about candidate quality affects the choice of electoral platforms made by an office motivated political challenger the incumbent is of known quality and located at the ideal policy of the voter the voter cares for both policy and the candidates quality and can learn about the challenger s quality by buying information a high quality challenger then has an incentive to signal her quality by choosing a policy that induces the voter to buy information we first study the benchmark case in which the information is supplied exogenously and its quality is independent of the challenger s platform this yields multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibrium platforms by contrast when the information is supplied by a profit maximizing media outlet its quality depends on the challenger s platform and we obtain a unique equilibrium platform in particular when the incumbent s quality is relatively low the media coverage rises and the challenger s platform diverges further from the voter s ideal policy as the voter s preference for quality increases

can long run restrictions identify technology shocks gali s innovative approach of imposing long run restrictions on a vector autoregression var to identify the effects of a technology shock has become widely utilized in this paper we investigate its reliability through monte carlo simulations using calibrated business cycle models overall gali s methodology appears to be fruitful the impulse responses derived from the artificial data generally have the same sign and qualitative pattern as the true responses and the approach can be informative in discriminating between alternative models however our results reveal some important quantitative shortcomings including considerable estimation uncertainty about the impact of technology shocks on macroeconomic variables more generally the conditions under which the methodology performs well appear considerably more restrictive than implied by the key identifying assumption this underscores the importance of using economic models to guide in the implementation of the approach in interpreting the results and in assessing its limitations jel c32 e32 o33

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

broken trend stationarity of hours worked the estimated impact of a technology shock on hours worked using structural vector autoregressions svars depends to a great extent on whether or not hours worked is considered to be integrated of first order it is shown in this article that the widely analysed time series of hours worked per capita in the us business sector evolves around a broken linear trend when this fact is taken into account the unit root null is rejected by recently proposed tests therefore it can be stated that empirical specifications with hours in first differences are not recommended it seems more appropriate to control for the presence of this shift in the deterministic component we also draw this conclusion from a bivariate model for both productivity growth and hours worked our results suggest that technology improvements have a negative but nonsignificant effect on hours only in the very short run this impact later becomes positive and statistically significant after five periods

real rigidities productivity improvements and investment dynamics abstract the theoretical literature on business cycles predicts a positive investment response to productivity improvements a prediction we question from theoretical and empirical perspectives we show that a short term negative response of investment to a positive technology shock is consistent with a reasonably parameterized new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model in which firm specific capital introduces an additional real rigidity and monetary policy is not fully accommodative employing bayesian techniques we provide evidence that permanent productivity improvements have short term contractionary effects on investment although this result can be obtained from both firm specific and rental capital models only in the case of the former is the average price duration in line with the microeconometric evidence

technology shocks capital utilization and sticky prices abstract we quantitatively evaluate a business cycle environment featuring endogenous capital utilization and nominal price rigidity that illustrates a negative relationship between labor hours and technology tfp shocks and a positive relationship between hours and investment mei shocks sticky prices induce firms to suppress changes in output due to tfp shocks through changes in the utilization rate of the existing capital stock and labor demand mei shocks have an indirect impact on output via their link with capital utilization and are shown to be the dominant driver of post 1979 us business cycles

political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias abstract we develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings and maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information that the partisan audience does not like hearing while voters are rational understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately important information is lost through bias and can lead to electoral mistakes we characterize those conditions that give rise to electoral mistakes showing that heightened political polarization and asymmetric distributions of voter ideologies make electoral mistakes more likely even if the median ideology is a centrist and centrist voters gain access to unbiased news media bias can generate excessive cross over voting which in turn can lead to the election of the wrong candidate

manipulated news model electoral competition and mass media abstract this paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media and self mediatization the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates in elections in the model a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two office motivated candidates the voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place while the media outlet suppresses some of this information because the voter s decision making could be incorrect direct distortion the candidates have an incentive to win the election by influencing the media coverage through policy settings indirect distortion as a result policy convergence to the voter s ideal policy occurs if and only if the media bias is sufficiently small we then characterize the set of equilibria in terms of the degree of distortion the results suggest that if either strategic media manipulation or competition among the candidates is omitted then the distortion is nonnegligibly misspecified

mass media and special interest groups abstract media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior it is generally accepted that news coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups however existing models reach the opposite conclusions about the relationship between the profitability of advertising and media bias we present a theoretical model that reconciles these results the model shows that the sign of the effect of marginal costs of production or marginal advertising revenues on the level of distortion in news coverage depends on complementarity or substitutability between media bias and audience size for an interest group the existence of a budget constraint for an interest group and media outlets reliance on subscription in addition to advertising revenues

trend breaks long run restrictions and contractionary technology improvements abstract structural vector autoregressions with long run restrictions are extraordinarily sensitive to low frequency correlations recent literature finds that the estimated effects of technology shocks are sensitive to how one treats hours per capita however after allowing for statistically and economically significant trend breaks in productivity results are much less sensitive hours fall when technology improves the issue is that the common high low high pattern of productivity growth and hours i e the low frequency correlation inevitably leads to a positive estimated response the trend breaks control for this correlation this example suggests a practical need for care in using long run restrictions

what do technology shocks tell us about the new keynesian paradigm abstract researchers have used unanticipated changes to monetary policy to identify preference and technology parameters of macroeconomic models this paper uses changes in technology to identify the same set of parameters estimates based on technology shocks differ substantially from those based on monetary policy shocks in the post world war ii united states a positive technology shock reduces inflation and increases hours worked significantly and rapidly in both cases relative to policy shock identification technology shock identification implies i long duration durability in preferences instead of short duration habit ii built in inflation inertia disappears and price flexibility increases in response to technological improvement consumption durability increases hours worked because households temporarily increase labor supply to accumulate durables towards a new higher steady state level limited nominal rigidities allow inflation to fall because firms are able to immediately cut prices when households labor supply increases finally we consider alternative data constructions and econometric specifications we find that i and or ii hold in nearly every case

government control of the media abstract we present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation in media freedom across countries and over time media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the government has a particular interest in mobilizing citizens to take actions that further some political objective but are not necessarily in citizens individual best interest however the distinction between state and private media is smaller large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private media but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media media bias in state and private media markets diverge as governments become more democratic whereas media bias in democracies and autocracies converge as positive externalities from mobilization increase

what does a technology shock do a var analysis with model based sign restrictions abstract this paper estimates the effects of technology shocks in var models of the u s identified by imposing restrictions on the sign of impulse responses these restrictions are consistent with the implications of a popular class of dsge models with both real and nominal frictions and with sufficiently wide ranges for their parameters this identification strategy thus substitutes theoretically motivated restrictions for the atheoretical assumptions on the time series properties of the data that are key to long run restrictions stochastic technology improvements persistently increase real wages consumption investment and output in the data hours worked are very likely to increase displaying a hump shaped pattern contrary to most of the related var evidence results are not sensitive to a number of specification assumptions including those on the stationarity properties of variables

media as watchdogs the role of news media in electoral competition abstract we develop an equilibrium model to analyze the role of the media in electoral competition when policy payoffs are state dependent party policies do not converge to the median voter s ideal policy if the media report only party policies news analysis about the state though possibly biased can discipline off equilibrium deviations and make the parties adopt more centrist policies since voters are rational the party favored by the media need not win with a higher probability instead media bias may reduce the effectiveness of electoral competition and lead to more polarized policies

collective mass media bias social media and non partisans abstract this paper builds a simple political agency model to demonstrate that there is a possible collective bias in the reporting of political issues and suggests that this bias may lead society to a collective failure in which overall social welfare is harmed in our model media outlets aim to build a reputation of high adeptness at policy forecasting and audiences rely on policy information to make better decisions and update their beliefs regarding the quality of each outlet after the election outcome is revealed the role of social media is incorporated into our model s framework thus the chance of a non partisan individual being informed about each political candidate s proposed agenda depends on the collective mass media coverage of that candidate as well as the number of partisan individuals in favor of that candidate since it is assumed that partisan voters post politically relevant information on social networks

is the media liberal an indirect test using news magazine circulation many critics allege that the us national news media is biased in favour of liberal causes and democratic candidates the lack of an objective measure of news content ensures that such charges remain controversial i consider an indirect test for media bias if the national news media do exhibit a liberal bias consumption should be higher in liberal media markets ceteris paribus i examine determinants of circulation of the three major weekly news magazines across the us and find that newsweek and time have higher circulation in liberal markets while us news has higher circulation in conservative markets the evidence is consistent with a liberal bias for time and newsweek while us news may be relatively conservative but still left of centre or absolutely conservative

an alternative explanation of the price puzzle abstract this paper proposes an explanation for the frequent appearance of a price puzzle in vars designed for monetary policy analysis it assumes that the data are generated by a model in which output and output gap are not equivalent while an econometrician follows the common practice of including only output in the var the omission of the output gap is shown to spuriously produce a price puzzle and several other incorrect conclusions in a class of commonly used models this can happen even if the model admits a triangular identification and if the forecasts produced by the misspecified var are optimal when the model is tested on us data all predictions are supported a commodity price index is not needed to solve the puzzle

the effects of media slant on firm behavior abstract the media can impose reputational costs on firms because of its important role as an information intermediary and its ability to negatively slant coverage we exploit a quasi natural experiment that holds constant the information event across firms but varies the availability of a major news outlet in local markets we find that firms subject to the threat of slanted coverage suppress the release of negative information before the event and release it subsequently our results are consistent with theory on the active role firms can play in managing their reputational capital through anticipatory actions to avoid negative media coverage

the ins and outs of unemployment an analysis conditional on technology shocks we analyze how unemployment job finding and job separation rates react to neutral and investment specific technology shocks neutral shocks increase unemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility investmentspecific shocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hours worked volatility movements in the job separation rates are responsible for the impact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements along its adjustment path the evidence warns against using models with exogenous separation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technology shocks in search and sticky price models

media slant against foreign owners downsizing abstract using a unique data set from nationally distributed quality newspapers in germany we find evidence for both quantitative and qualitative media slant against foreign firms a downsizing foreign firm receives almost twice as much attention as a domestic firm and the tone of media reports is more negative media slant is a measure for economic xenophobia directed against foreign owners which constitutes an obstacle to foreign direct investment

when can a news organization lead public opinion ideology versus market forces in decisions to make news do news organizations purposefullylead the public to support a particularideological agenda when debating thisquestion many analysts draw conclusionsfrom weak empirical evidence we introducea model that clarifies how a newsorganization s internal structure combineswith market forces to affect when it canlead public opinion we identify conditionsunder which liberal reporters orpolitically driven media magnates canachieve ideological goals we alsoilluminate important barriers that preventmany would be public opinion leaders fromever satisfying these conditions we showthat internal structure and market forcesare critical determinants of any newsorganization s power over public opinion

productivity shocks and real business cycles abstract productivity shocks play a central role in real business cycles as an exogenous impulse to macroeconomic activity however measured solow prescott residuals do not behave as an exogenous impulse rather econometric evidence provided in this paper indicates that 1 money interest rates and government spending granger cause these impulses and 2 a substantial component of the variance of these impulses between one quarter and one half is attributable to variations in aggregate demand these results are robust to a number of econometric issues including measurement errors specification of the production function and certain forms of omitted real variables

demand for slant how abstention shapes voters choice of news media political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into information cocoons and segregate along ideological lines we show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates cross over in news consumption voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist this non monotonicity in the demand for slant makes voters ideologies non recoverable from their choice of news media and generates disproportionate demand for media outlets that are centrist or only moderately biased it also implies that polarisation of the electorate may lead to an ideological moderation in news consumption

selective reporting of factual content by commercial media the authors study the market for factual content and examine whether competition increases or decreases its provision factual content is supplied by commercial media firms which observe a set of facts depicting the state of the world and selectively decide how to report them consumers value content that matches their opinion which incentivizes media firms to slant their reports by omitting certain facts novel features in the authors model include consumers ability to anticipate the media s incentives for slant and the requirement that all media stances must be supported by facts furthermore consumers find reports with more facts to be more convincing despite consumers ability to detect slant and their demand for factual support the research shows that competition results in consumers reading fewer facts and being unable to update their prior beliefs about the state of the world the authors also find that a monopoly medium may be more polarizing than competitive media and that polarized report

do technology shocks lead to a fall in total hours worked this paper contributes to the debate initiated by gali in 1999 i provide a theory with capital income taxation labor hoarding as well as long run shifts in the social attitudes to the workplace modelled as leisure at the workplace to argue that there are other shocks that may influence labor productivity in the long run i introduce medium run identification and show it to be superior to long run identification or standard short run identification when applied to artificial data with u s data and medium run identification i find the robust result that technology shocks lead to a hump shaped response of total hours worked which is mildly positive following a near zero initial response jel e32 e24 c32 c15 copyright c 2004 the european economic association

the structural dynamics of output growth and inflation some international evidence we examine the dynamics of output growth and inflation in the us euro area and uk using a structural time varying coefficient var there are important similarities in structural inflation dynamics across countries output growth dynamics differ swings in the magnitude of inflation and output growth volatilities and persistences are accounted for by a combination of three structural shocks changes over time in the structure of the economy are limited and permanent variations largely absent changes in the volatilities of structural shocks matter

information manipulation and climate agreements it appears that news media and some pro environmental organizations have the tendency to accentuate or even exaggerate the damage caused by climate change this article provides a rationale for this tendency by using a modified international environmental agreement iea model with asymmetric information we find that the information manipulation has an instrumental value as it ex post induces more countries to participate in an iea which will eventually enhance global welfare from the ex ante perspective however the impact that manipulating information has on the level of participation in an iea and on welfare is ambiguous

downs meets d aspremont and company convergence versus differentiation in politics and the media abstract media firms have incentives to differentiate their news products to soften price competition when consumers value cognitive consistency between the news they read and the policies they support politicians are induced to propose more polarized policies to conform to a polarized media landscape a stronger commercial motive or a weaker preference for editorial neutrality in the media exacerbates this effect and causes party policies to become more extreme we find that prices for news products are higher when consumers have a demand for cognitive consistency despite the fact that maximal product differentiation does not hold for media firms

inequality and media capture abstract popular support of redistributive policies depends on information they have about the tax system and efficiency of public projects mass media provides a convenient means for manipulating public opinion even when voters understand that the media can be biased i develop a theory of media capture in which the rich can influence information published in a media outlet at a cost the model shows that higher inequality is associated with lower media freedom this effect is stronger in democratic regimes i find empirical support for the model in both panel data and cross country analysis

reporting for sale the market for news coverage this paper proposes a formal model of the market for political news under reasonable market conditions and when the audience has psychological biases it may be profitable for outlets to differentiate their coverage moreover the implications of the model speak to a deeper impact of political polarization of the electorate

commodity price shocks and the business cycle structural evidence for the u s this paper evaluates the relative importance of commodity price shocks in the u s business cycle therefore we extend the standard set of business cycle shocks to include unexpected changes in commodity prices the resulting svar shows that commodity price shocks are a very important driving force of macroeconomic fluctuations second only to investment specific technology shocks particularly with respect to inflation neutral technology shocks and monetary policy shocks on the other hand seem less relevant at business cycle frequencies neutral technology shocks rather play an important role at low frequencies

food law and the internal market taking stock abstract the history of community food law is briefly traced the changes in policy which followed the difficulties encountered in vertical harmonization and the cassis de dijon case are described 1989 is identified as a turning point since the legal framework for community food law has now been agreed the future legislative programme is described as is the need for cooperation between member states and the commission through all processes from scientific assessment to control

what can we learn about news shocks from the late 1990s and early 2000s boom bust period this is a substantially revised version of the paper previously circulated as a new var based approach to identifying news shocks

mass media competition political competition and public policy if better informed voters receive favourable policies then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting this paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups the increasing returns to scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests and groups that are valuable to advertisers this news bias alters the tradeoff in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy the paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics the model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters

the dynamic effects of neutral and investment specific technology shocks the neoclassical growth model is used to identify the short run effects of neutral technology shocks which affect the production of all goods homogeneously and investment specific shocks which affect only investment goods the real equipment price crucial for identifying the investment shocks experiences an abrupt increase in its average rate of decline in 1982 so the analysis is based on a split sample on the basis of the preferred specification the two technology shocks account for 73 percent of hours and 44 percent of output s business cycle variation before 1982 and 38 percent and 80 percent afterward the shocks also account for more than 40 percent of hours and 58 percent of output s forecast errors over a three to eight year horizon in both samples the majority of these effects are driven by the investment shocks

skill biased technological change and the business cycle over the past two decades technological progress in the united states has been biased towards skilled labor what does this imply for business cycles we construct a quarterly skill premium from the cps and use it to identify skill biased technology shocks in a var with long run restrictions hours fall in response to skill biased technology shocks indicating that at least part of the technology induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labor demand investment specific technology shocks reduce the skill premium indicating that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregate production

the effects of technology shocks on hours and output a robustness analysis we analyze the effects of neutral and investment specific technology shocks on hours and output long cycles in hours are removed in a variety of ways hours robustly fall in response to neutral shocks and robustly increase in response to investment specific shocks the percentage of the variance of hours output explained by neutral shocks is small large the opposite is true for investment specific shocks news shocks are uncorrelated with the estimated technology shocks copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

monetary policy and automatic stabilizers the role of progressive taxation we study the effects of progressive labor income taxation in an otherwise standard new keynesian nk model we show that progressive taxation i introduces a trade off between output and inflation stabilization and affects the slope of the phillips curve ii acts as automatic stabilizer changing the responses to technology shocks and demand shocks and iii alters the prescription for the optimal monetary policy the welfare gains from commitment decrease as labor income taxes become more progressive quantitatively the model reproduces the observed negative correlation between the volatility of output hours and inflation and the degree of progressivity of labor income taxation

methods versus substance measuring the effects of technology shocks abstract calibration and modern bayesian estimation methods for a neoclassical stochastic growth model are applied to make the case that the identification of key parameters rather than quantitative methodologies per se is responsible for empirical findings for concreteness the model is used to measure the contributions of technology shocks to the business cycle fluctuations of hours worked and output along the way new insights are provided in the parameter identification associated with likelihood based estimation the sensitivity of likelihood based estimation to the choice of structural shocks is assessed and bayesian model averaging is used to aggregate findings obtained from different dsge model specifications