experience tenure and wage growth of young black and white men this paper studies the source of differences in wage growth between young black and white workers focusing on terminal high school graduates from the national longitudinal survey of youth we estimate the returns to on the job tenure and general labor market experience using ordinary least squares altonji and shakotko and topel estimators results from all three estimators indicate that returns to general experience for black workers trail those for white workers but that black workers earn equal if not higher returns to tenure than do white workers

market forces meet behavioral biases cost misallocation and irrational pricing psychological and experimental evidence as well as a wealth of anecdotal examples suggests that firms may confound fixed sunk and variable costs leading to distorted pricing decisions this article investigates the extent to which market forces and learning eventually eliminate these distortions we envision firms that experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with real world accounting practices including ones that confuse the relevance of variable fixed and sunk costs to pricing decisions firms follow naive adaptive learning to adjust prices and reinforcement learning to modify their costing methodologies costing and pricing practices that increase profits are reinforced in some market structures but not in others this process of reinforcement causes pricing practices of all firms to systematically depart from standard equilibrium predictions

habit persistence and teen sex could increased access to contraception have unintended consequences for teen pregnancies we develop a dynamic discrete choice model of teen sex and pregnancy that incorporates habit persistence habit persistence has two sources here the first is a fixed cost of having sex which relates to a moral or psychological barrier that has been crossed the first time one has sex the second is a transition cost whereby once a particular relationship has progressed to sex it is difficult to move back we estimate significant habit persistence in teen sex implying that the long run effects of contraception policy may be different from their short run counterparts especially if the failure rate of contraception is sufficiently large programs that increase access to contraception are found to decrease teen pregnancies in the short run but increase them in the long run

nonparametric tests of market structure an application to the cigarette industry the revealed preference approach is used to construct a nonparametric test of the monopoly model and some simple generalizations of it and the test is applied to data for the cigarette industry it exploits the maintained hypothesis that variations in the excise tax charged on a package of cigarettes allow us to assess seller reactions to common exogenous variations in marginal cost results indicate that the monopoly hypothesis and other simple models that do not embody at least a moderate amount of competition serve as poor predictors of the effects of excise tax changes on cigarette prices sales and revenues copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

is addiction rational theory and evidence this paper makes two contributions to the modeling of addiction first we provide new and convincing evidence that smokers are forward looking in their smoking decisions using state excise tax increases that have been legislatively enacted but are not yet effective and monthly data on consumption second we recognize the strong evidence that preferences with respect to smoking are time inconsistent with individuals both not recognizing the true dife culty of quitting and searching for self control devices to help them quit we develop a new model of addictive behavior that takes as its starting point the standard rational addiction model but incorporates time inconsistent preferences this model also exhibits forward looking behavior but it has strikingly different normative implications in this case optimal government policy should depend not only on the externalities that smokers impose on others but also on the internalities imposed by smokers on themselves we estimate that the optimal tax per pack of cigarettes should be at least one dollar higher under our formulation than in the rational addiction case

testing hypotheses about firm behavior in the cigarette industry data on the effects of excise taxes are used to investigate the level of competition in the cigarette industry a lower bound on the numbers equivalent of firms in the context of the conjectural variations model is derived and estimated results point to at least a moderately high level of competition and in particular allow for the rejection of the perfect cartel model this paper relies on comparative statics results and hence circumvents recent criticisms of a study of monopoly behavior in the cigarette industry

dynamic pricing behavior in perishable goods markets evidence from secondary markets for major league baseball tickets sellers of perishable goods increasingly use dynamic pricing strategies as technology makes it easier to change prices and track inventory this paper tests how accurately theoretical models of dynamic pricing describe sellers behavior in secondary markets for event tickets a classic example of a perishable good it shows that the simplest dynamic pricing models describe very accurately both the pricing problem faced by sellers and how they behave explaining why sellers cut prices dramatically by 40 percent or more as an event approaches the estimates also imply that dynamic pricing is valuable raising the average seller s expected payoff by around 16 percent

information power and war ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed the probability of conflict goes to zero however conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender s reservation value i employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power centric theories of world politics balance of power and power transition theory the formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity information asymmetries are greatest thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power centric explanations of world politics

measurement of monopoly behavior an application to the cigarette industry a simple scheme is proposed to measure monopoly pricing behavior the coefficient of the tax rate term in a price equation identifies the ratio of price to marginal cost no direct measurement of costs is required so a major problem for other empirical studies of monopoly is avoided empirical results for cross section time series data support rejection of atomistic competition but also provide evidence against the operation of an effective cartel in the cigarette industry the model represents an alternative interpretation of related results in a recent paper by barzel application of the methodology to other markets is feasible

war is in the error term at least since thucydides students of international relations have sought rational explanations for the advent of war rationalist explanations assume purposive action states are said to make reasoned decisions about the use of force although rationalist explanations have proven persuasive durable and offer the basis for cumulative theorizing they also imply substantial limits on what we can know about war i show that the most general rationalist explanation for war also dictates that the onset of war is theoretically indeterminate we cannot predict in individual cases whether states will go to war because war is typically the consequence of variables that are unobservable ex ante both to us as researchers and to the participants thinking probabilistically continues to offer the opportunity to assess international conflict empirically however the realization that uncertainty is necessary theoretically to motivate war is much different from recognizing that the empirical world contains a stochastic element accepting uncertainty as a necessary condition of war implies that all other variables however detailed the explanation serve to eliminate gradations of irrelevant alternatives we can progressively refine our ability to distinguish states that may use force from those that are likely to remain at peace but anticipating wars from a pool of states that appear willing to fight will remain problematic for example we may achieve considerable success in anticipating crises but our ability to predict which crises will become wars will probably prove little better than the naive predictions of random chance the need for uncertainty to account for war means that the same conditions thought to account for war must also exist among states not destined to fight otherwise states themselves will differentiate between opponents in a way that either removes the motives for war or restores uncertainty it has long been accepted that social processes possess an element of uncertainty but the centrality of uncertainty to rationalist explanations for war means that the advent of war is itself stochastic war is literally in the error term

the might of the pen a reputational theory of communication in international disputes i present a theory of effective diplomacy based on honesty and reputations i model diplomacy as a form of cheap talk and international interactions as an infinitely repeated game in which similar states find themselves in disparate situations over time the theory explains the success and failure of diplomacy reputations for honesty make honest communication possible a state caught bluffing is less able to communicate and less likely to attain its goals in the near future these findings imply that domestic audience costs are unnecessary for international signaling and that military strength is not the only way to build credibility

farm level nonparametric analysis of cost minimization and profit maximization behavior abstract this study investigates non parametrically the optimizing behavior of a sample of 289 kansas farms under profit maximization and cost minimization hypotheses the study uses both deterministic and stochastic non parametric tests the deterministic results do not support strict adherence to either optimization hypothesis the stochastic tests suggest that all 289 farms fail the profit maximization hypothesis whereas 171 farms failed the cost minimization hypothesis allowing for non regressive technical change does not alter the basic results 276 farms violate the profit maximization hypothesis and 138 violate the cost minimization hypothesis the evidence against cost minimization behavior seems to be far less substantial than that against profit maximization behavior

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

what makes deterrence work cases from 1900 to 1980 the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics force or the threat of force may be used either to change the status quo or to maintain it threatening the use of force to maintain the status quo often takes the form of deterrence defined by patrick morgan as the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else 1 deterrence sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails failures are attested to by numerous international wars of history in the nuclear age a failure could cost us our lives the conditions of successful deterrence thus require thorough logical and empirical analysis

peace war and the balance of power every possible relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war has been defended somewhere in the literature on international politics war is least likely if power is distributed equally war is least likely if power is distributed unequally and the distribution of power has no effect on the likelihood of war i try to settle this dispute by examining the effect of expectations about the outcome of war on the choice between war and negotiation i argue that each of these mutually contradictory propositions can be derived from some plausible set of premises and thus that which one is correct depends on which set of premises best describes a situation the most important factors affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war are 1 whether the terms of a compromise agreement that might be accepted in lieu of war affect the distribution of power between the antagonists and therefore the probability that the agreement will be enforced and 2 how many states interests will be affected by the outcome

affirmative action in education evidence from engineering college admissions in india abstract this paper examines an affirmative action program for lower caste groups in engineering colleges in india we study both the targeting properties of the program and its implications for labor market outcomes we find that affirmative action successfully targets the financially disadvantaged the upper caste applicants that are displaced by affirmative action come from a richer economic background than the lower caste applicants that are displacing them targeting by caste however may lead to the exclusion of other disadvantaged groups for example caste based targeting reduces the overall number of females entering engineering colleges we find that despite poor entrance exam scores lower caste entrants obtain a positive return to admission our estimates however also suggest that these gains may come at an absolute cost because the income losses experienced by displaced upper caste applicants are larger than the income gains experienced by displacing lower caste students limited sample sizes in our preferred econometric specifications however prevent us from drawing strong conclusions from these labor market findings

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

a dynamic analysis of the market for wide bodied commercial aircraft this paper uses an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial aircraft industry to analyse industry pricing industry performance and optimal industry policy a novel feature of the model with respect to the previous literature is that entry exit prices and quantities are endogenously determined in markov perfect equilibrium mpe we find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data such as high concentration and persistent pricing below static marginal cost are explained by this model we also find that the unconstrained mpe is quite efficient from a social perspective providing only 10 less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain finally we provide simulation evidence that an anti trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing

success in maximizing profits and reasons for profit deviation on dairy farms the weak axiom of profit maximization wapm was used to test how successful each of 70 individual new york state dairy farms was in maximizing profits using nine years of data the netput vectors were corrected for technological change using nonparametric indices that do not require the assumption of profit maximization nor any functional form for the underlying technology these technology indices are consistent with the nonparametric assumptions used in the wapm tests the average negative wapm deviation over the 70 farms was 0 20 indicating that on average these farms could have selected available netput vectors that would have increased profits by 20 of total receipts a tobit regression showed that the available characteristics on these farms explained very little of the variability in their abilities to select the best netput vectors yet increased age and additional education increased the ability to select the best netput vector

a social capital paradox entrepreneurial dynamism in a small world clean technology cluster abstract clean tech entrepreneurs have struggled to gain investor confidence because of some particular characteristics and circumstances of the industry this research combines network and sustainable development literature in the clean tech context to support the logic of a new investment approach that may stimulate sustainable investing in clean tech theory is proposed to suggest that there may be an advantageous social capital paradox where strong ties in a cluster lead to dynamism rather than decay the clean tech industry provides a context where strong ties offer network stability in a small world cluster such that it is a value creating organizational form offering greater dynamism two related propositions are developed to support the social capital paradox they lead to a theoretical conclusion that long term integrated partner solutions where partners are also resource constrained lead to successful alliances supporting a dynamic cluster that will grow over time a practical conclusion is that investing in a connected cluster of firms might be less risky compared to investing in a new firm or even a portfolio of well diversified assets de risking clean production investments may be achievable through a small world network cluster backed security

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

firm behavior in a market with addiction the case of cigarettes abstract this paper investigates firm behavior when demand is linked over time among other things the theoretical section shows that if firms are forward looking anticipated future events can affect current consumption of an addictive good even when consumers are completely myopic the empirical part of the paper reports a simulation of the 1983 federal cigarette excise tax increase both myopic and rational models of consumer demand give roughly the same predictions for per capita consumption but neither model does very well predicting actual consumption the problem appears to lie in the prediction of price suggesting that supply considerations are important

the revenues associated with relaxing admission standards at division i a colleges the pecuniary rewards associated with acquiring premium college athletes induce schools to lower academic standards for incoming players this study empirically examines the incentive for division i a schools those competing at the highest level of athletics in the usa to relax admission standards for college football players granting admissions to players with lower academic profiles enlarges a team s recruiting pool so that it acquires a greater number of premium players which in turn increases revenues for the school

academic admissions standards implications for output distribution and mobility we examine the trade offs implicit in academic admissions standards when students are charged cost based tuition and offered loans that remove liquidity constraints lowering entry requirements while holding graduation requirements fixed increases aggregate output and promotes a more equal distribution of wages but reduces relative income mobility and diminishes the scope for affirmative action lowering admissions standards while raising graduation requirements so that the number of graduates remains constant has little direct effect on output distribution or mobility but again reduces the scope for affirmative action income based affirmative action offers a better trade off between output and relative mobility than income neutral admissions jel d31 h42 i23 i28 j24

reputation and hegemonic stability a game theoretic analysis we develop and explicate a game theoretic model in which repeated play incomplete information and reputation are major elements a significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes the model is used to formalize certain aspects of the theory of hegemonic stability it shows that the dilemma or limits of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved unifying both benevolent and coercive strands of hegemony theory an example drawn from recent developments in the organization of petroleum exporting countries shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction we conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information

profit maximization returns to scale and measurement error a nonparametric analysis of agricultural production behavior was conducted for each of the contiguous forty eight states for the period 1956 82 under the joint hypothesis of profit maximization convex technology and nonregressive technical change tests were conducted in each state for profit maximization and for constant returns to scale although considerable variability was observed among states measurement errors of magnitudes common in secondary data yielded test results fully consistent with the profit maximization hypothesis in all states with complete output and input data copyright 1992 by mit press

did the swedish tobacco monopoly set monopoly prices empirical evidence is scarce on whether firms set profit maximizing prices as these typically depend delicately on details of difficult to observe strategic interactions to avoid this problem this paper provides a detailed case study of the swedish tobacco monopoly s pricing with data from 1916 to 1959 prices are found to be below those that maximize the expected net present value of profits however the difference between actual and optimal price diminishes over time and towards the end of the period the two are almost indistinguishable the net present value of actual profits is approximately 60 of what could have been obtained overall the pricing patterns appear more consistent with the firm learning about demand conditions than being the result of maximization of something other than profits

goliath s curse coercive threats and asymmetric power states typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries yet their threats often fail why expanding on a standard model of inter national crisis bargaining i argue that a theory of reputation building can help shed light on this puzzle the model casts reputation as a strategic problem showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors if challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands then even reputation conscious targets will acquiesce i argue however that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underesti mate their targets reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them in this way military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats the logic is illustrated by the 1939 russo finnish crisis and the argument s implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored

the incentive effects of affirmative action in a real effort tournament abstract affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament winners that is less efficient in this paper we study the empirical validity of such concerns in a case where the disadvantage affects capacities to compete we conducted real effort tournaments between pairs of children from two similar schools who systematically differed in how much training they received ex ante on the task at hand contrary to the expressed concerns our results show that the implementation of affirmative action did not result in a significant performance loss for either advantaged or disadvantaged subjects instead it rather enhanced the performance for a large group of participants moreover affirmative action resulted in a more equitable tournament winner pool where half of the selected tournament winners came from the originally disadvantaged group hence the negative selection effects due to the biased tournament rules were at least partially offset by performance enhancing incentive effects