on the political economy of educational vouchers abstract two significant challenges hamper the analyses of the collective choice of educational vouchers one is the multi dimensional choice set arising from the interdependence of the voucher public education spending and taxation second even absent a voucher preferences over public spending are not single peaked a middling level of public school spending may be less attractive to a household than either high public school spending or private education coupled with low public spending we show that besley and coate s 1997 representative democracy model provides a viable approach to overcome these hurdles we provide a complete characterization of equilibria with an endogenous voucher a voucher is adopted in political equilibrium provided the coefficient of variation of income is sufficiently small we undertake a parallel quantitative analysis and we find that no voucher arises in equilibrium for the u s income distribution which exhibits too much heterogeneity for a tighter income distribution including those in douglas county colorado where a voucher was recently adopted our model predicts a positive voucher public support for a not too large voucher arises because the cross subsidy to public school expenditure from those switching to private schools outweighs the subsidy to those who attend private school in the absence of a voucher

spatial competition and vertical integration cement and concrete revisited reply in this review 1983 mark mcbride reconsiders the federal trade commission s ftc enforcement policy toward vertical mergers between cement and ready mix concrete firms in response to a significant increase in acquisitions of ready mix concrete firms by cement manufacturers during the 1960 s the ftc undertook a series of legal actions to block or dissolve the mergers the actions of the ftc constituted one of the most intensive efforts undertaken to date to challenge vertical mergers in a single industry mcbride p 1012 notes that the actions of the ftc provoked considerable debate concerning the motivation for the mergers both in the industry and in academe a significant number of articles were published advancing various reasons for the mergers in addition to the ftc s main contention that the mergers were motivated by a desire for captive markets it has been suggested that there were economies of integration or that the mergers were the outcome of an erroneous view of the potential benefits to foreclosure held by executives in the beleaguered cement industry 2 mcbride s 1983 paper offers another explanation for the mergers his argument is that vertical integration was undertaken to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing in the cement industry 3 the empirical results presented by mcbride suggest that vertical integration was a significant factor in the decline of cement prices in the 1960 s the purpose of this comment is to point out some of the problems with mcbride s analysis in particular we show that the experimental design of his testing equation is faulty and does not offer a test of his hypothesis as a result mcbride s analysis does not provide convincing evidence on whether cement firms vertically integrated to avoid rigid oligopolistic pricing or if cement firms were merely reacting to prices that had already begun to decline our intent however is not to challenge mcbride s contention that vertical integration can provide lower prices to consumers rather we would argue that the evidence presented at the ftc hearings involving cement and ready mix concrete firms as well as mcbride s and others analyses illustrate the problems in discerning the motives for mergers 4

multitask agency and contract choice an empirical exploration the multitask agency problem is examined empirically using contracts between private integrated oil companies and their service stations in the city of vancouver the empirical tests assess how variations in the characteristics of one task affect the choice of agent compensation scheme for another comparative statics from the model predict that higher powered incentives will be offered for gasoline sales when the secondary activity is not highly complementary with gasoline retailing where complementarity is measured by the cross price demand effect the covariation in uncertainty and the degree of effort substitutability copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

tests of a rational theory of the size of government in many countries the political party holding power changes more frequently than the trend growth rates in government spending and taxes shifts of political power are often preceded by rhetoric about meeting needs or cutting taxes which post election performances rarely match yet changes in the size of government up and down occur on average the size of government measured by the share of taxes or spending to output has increased in many countries during the past century but changes in size occur at diffrent rates and at times the relative size of government declines

dynamic limit pricing and internal finance abstract this paper examines a model of dynamic limit pricing with a profit maximizing fringe constrained to finance new investment from internal finance in a differential game the dominant firm controls price thereby determining the current earnings of the fringe while the fringe chooses its optimal retention ratio if market growth is less than the discount rate an important feature of the solution is that price must eventually drop to the fringe long run cost of production if market growth is initially rapid the dominant firm is much more aggressive in limiting fringe growth

group loyalty and the taste for redistribution interpersonal preferences preferences that depend on the characteristics of others are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior as an alternative approach this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences i show that self reported attitudes toward welfare spending are determined not only by financial self interest but also by interpersonal preferences these interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises and racial group loyalty individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises these findings help to explain why levels of welfare benefits are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

can consumers benefit from a policy limiting the market share of a dominant firm abstract this paper asks if consumers can possibly benefit from a policy limiting the market share of a dominant firm in the near term the policy is bad for consumers because an output constraint on the dominant firm raises the current price however the policy stimulates investment in the competitive fringe sector the policy might reduce the future price as the expanded fringe sector disciplines the future pricing behavior of the dominant firm in such a case however the policy has a welfare trade off for consumers a cost in the current period and a benefit in the future period this paper shows that the net effect on consumer welfare is negative in the leading case in which the dominant and fringe firms share the same technology the analysis has applications for both domestic antitrust and international trade policies

income inequality size of government and tax progressivity a positive theory abstract i investigate the relationship between income inequality and the composition of public spending in redistributive policies i extend the meltzer richard model of voting over redistribution allowing voters to choose not only the amount of a uniform lump sum transfer but also the level of provision of a public good the governmental budget is balanced thus these two choices determine the tax rate on labor income the multidimensionality of the policy space implies that there is no condorcet winner i adopt a citizen candidate model of electoral competition to tackle this problem i show that the progressivity of the tax system is increasing in the mean to median income ratio while the size of the government need not be this means that higher income inequality implies a more progressive tax system but in contrast with the traditional analysis it may also result in a smaller size of government such results are consistent with the most recent findings in the empirical literature

social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework many observers argue that political polarization particularly on social and cultural issues has increased in the united states how does this influence the political competition on economic issues we analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share in equilibrium candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically liberal voters as well as socially liberal and economically conservative voters we analyze how voters cultural preferences and candidates cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions jel d72 e62 h50 z13 many observers have argued that polarization between the two major parties in the united states particularly on noneconomic cultural matters has increased this is reflected both at the elite level in particular in congress poole and rosenthal 1984 1985 2000 and among democratic and republican activists and voters abramowitz and saunders 2008 harbridge and malhotra 2011 in the american national election survey respondents report their own ideological position on a scale from 1 very liberal to 7 very conservative the number of respondents who report one of the extreme positions 1 2 6 or 7 has grown from 20 and 21 percent in 1972 and 1976 to 31 and 30 percent in the 2004 and 2008 respectively moreover liberal and conservative voters have become considerably more reliable supporters of democrats and republicans respectively over the last generation 1 if we accept the widespread view that reagan s conservative revolution has created a cultural wedge between the parties that only widened in the 1990s and 2000s what consequences for the parties economic policies should we expect

vertical integration in the u s pulp and paper industry 1900 1940 a transaction cost model of vertical integration is tested based on detailed descriptions of every pulp and paper mill operating in the united states between 1900 and 1940 this study contributes to the literature on integration through the use of a large disaggregated database that allows identification of individual mills over time vertical integration of pulp and paper production is found to be positively associated with regional concentration paper mill capacity and production of standardized grades of paper over time new entrants behaved differently than established mills because few mills switched between integration and specialization once established copyright 1994 by mit press

the aging population and the size of the welfare state data for the united states and countries in western europe indicate a negative correlation between the dependency ratio and labor tax rates and the generosity of social transfers after other factors that influence the size of the welfare state are controlled for this occurs despite the increased political clout of the dependent population implied by the aging of the population this paper develops an overlapping generations model of intra and intergenerational transfers including old age social security and human capital formation that addresses this seeming puzzle we show that with democratic voting an increase in the dependency ratio can lead to lower taxes or less generous social transfers

vertical integration and firm boundaries the evidence since ronald h coase s 1937 seminal paper a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input output structures in the last twenty five years empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating we review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions first what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and second what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices quantities investment and profits throughout we highlight areas of potential cross fertilization and promising areas for future work

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

optimal taxation and heterogeneous oligopoly this paper examines the effects of firm specific taxes on an oligopoly composed of firms of unequal sizes holding different conjectures operating with nonidentical costs four types of effects are analyzed on profits on industry concentration on total tax revenue and on social welfare the author derives 1 the revenue maximizing taxes 2 the welfare maximizing taxes and 3 welfare maximizing taxes subject to a revenue constraint

efficiency and vertical integration the case of mine mouth electric generating plants this paper tests four propositions regarding the efficiency of vertical arrangements 1 vertically integrated and nonintegrated firms allocate inputs with efficiency and 2 achieve equal technical efficiency 3 upstream transaction specific investments provide monopsony power and 4 monopsony behavior does not differ by vertical arrangement a behavioral cost function for mine mouth generating plants is estimated the findings include significant differences in the allocative efficiency of integrated versus nonintegrated plants and increased technical efficiency for vertically integrated plants transaction specific investments in mines provide monopsony power nonintegrated plants exercise this power while integrated plants do not copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts this article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions i estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the california department of transportation i model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation the results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions subcontracting decisions and bidding distortions in conclusion i propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes

does the median voter model explain the size of government evidence from the states despite an attempt by its own authors it is difficult to argue that the influential model of the size of government developed by meltzer and richard 1981 has had convincing empirical backing in this paper we adapt that model to a model of state government size the main testable hypothesis is that as income inequality grows government size as measured by the percentage of income devoted to government redistribution grows we test the model using panel data from the us states from 1979 1991 in contrast to the results found by meltzer and richard 1983 we find little evidence to support the model the results are robust to several model specifications and estimation techniques

the franchise life cycle and the penrose effect abstract the paper suggests that the received economic analyses of franchising give insufficient consideration to its apparent role in facilitating the rapid development of networks of outlets a characteristic which receives much attention in the industry s own periodicals the paper argues that franchising based upon standardization and replication with contractual policing rather than the direct monitoring of branches assists a rapidly growing chain to circumvent the penrose constraint on organizational development this gives rise to a life cycle effect evidence from a large sample of us franchises appears to confirm our growth facilitation hypothesis

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

on the political economy of zoning abstract households choose a community in a metropolitan area and collectively set a minimum housing quality and a property tax to finance a local public good the collective imposition of a lower bound on housing consumption induces an income stratified equilibrium in a specification where meaningful community differentiation would not arise without zoning we show computationally that zoning restrictions are likely to be stringent with a majority facing a binding constraint in communities that permit it by inducing a stratified equilibrium zoning causes tiebout welfare gains in aggregate but with large welfare transfers relative to stratified equilibrium without zoning the zoning equilibrium is significantly more efficient as it reduces housing market distortions

franchising and risk management franchising is an important and controversial form of vertical integration allegations of opportunistic behavior by franchisors have led to calls for public regulation and in some states fairness in franchising laws the advisability of such regulation depends on the long run incentives to franchise if franchising is a temporary step on the path to complete ownership integration regulation may be called for alternatively if complete or partial franchising is a permanen t market solution regulation is at least contestable this paper offer s new evidence on the incentives to franchise copyright 1988 by american economic association

vertical integration in the u s auto industry a note on the influence of transaction specific assets abstract recent refinements in the theory of the firm suggest that organization form may be sensitive not only to the degree to which assets are specific to a transaction but also to the type of capital employed this paper reports evidence regarding the relative influence of transaction specific investments in physical and human capital on the pattern of vertical integration using new data obtained directly from u s auto manufacturers the results support the proposition that investments in specialized technical know how have a stronger influence than those in specialized physical capital on the decision to integrate production within the firm

income distribution and investment abstract after being the subject of a heated debate during the sixties and the seventies the relation between income distribution and growth has received renewed attention in recent years the new literature has focused on three channels whereby this relation can occur imperfections in capital markets voting on fiscal policy and political instability in all these approaches growth in or outside the steady state is the result of investment in physical or human capital therefore these theories can also be stated and tested in terms of the effects of income distribution on investment this has the double advantage of reducing the complexity of a necessarily brief survey and of bringing out more clearly the main elements of novelty in this literature so far empirical implementations of these theories have in general been restricted to reduced form regressions of growth or equivalently investment on income distribution and other variables in this survey i take a step further and test the three approaches by explicitly estimating the role of the imperfections in capital markets of government expenditure and of political instability in mediating the effects of income distribution on investment

why the poor do not expropriate the rich an old argument in new garb we consider a political economy with two partisan parties each party represents a given constituency of voters if one party labour represents poor voters and the other christian democrats rich voters if a redistributive tax policy is the only issue and if there are no incentive considerations then in equilibrium the party representing the poor will propose a tax rate of unity if however there are two issues tax policy and religion for instance then this is not generally the case the analysis shows that if a simple condition on the distribution of voter preferences holds then as the salience of the non economic issue increases the tax rate proposed by labour in equilibrium will fall possibly even to zero even though a majority of the population may have an ideal tax rate of unity 1998 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

viewpoint empirical research on firms boundaries empirical research on the determinants of firms boundaries has flourished over the past 25 years this article discusses the progress that has been made to date emphasizing the intellectual advances made by researchers in this literature during this period i stress empirical researchers important role in operationalizing theoretical concepts and relate how success on this dimension brings these concepts to bear on real life make or buy decisions i also discuss shortcomings in the current literature in particular the paucity of research on how variation in firms boundaries can affect economic outcomes and point to how and where such shortcomings might be overcome la recherche empirique sur les determinants des frontieres de l entreprise a fleuri au cours des derniers 25 ans cet article discute des progres accomplis en mettant l accent sur les avancees intellectuelles faites par les chercheurs dans la litterature specialisee durant cette periode on souligne le role important des chercheurs empiriques dans l operationnalisation des concepts theoriques et on explique comment les succes dans ce registre ont contribuea faire que ces concepts ont eu un impact sur les decisions de faire ou faire faire dans la vie reelle on discute aussi des deficiences de cette litterature en particulier la pauvrete des travaux de recherche sur l impact de la variation dans les frontieres des entreprises sur les rendements economiques et on suggere comment de telles deficiences pourraient etre corrigees

an empirical look at franchising as an organizational form franchise contracts are identified as a hybrid form of economic organization motives for the dominance of franchise arrangements are identified by examining the theoretical literature on franchising and related literatures on the theory of the firm firm growth managerial and employee selection a nd brand name capital empirical tests are performed on the incidence of franchise contracts across states for three industries in which f ranchising is prominent and data are readily available the results s uggest that both principal agent incentives and informational incenti ves favor the use of franchise arrangements copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

spatial price competition a semiparametric approach we investigate the nature of price competition among firms that produce differentiated products and compete in markets that are limited in extent we propose an instrumental variables series estimator for the matrix of cross price response coefficients demonstrate that our estimator is consistent and derive its asymptotic distribution our semiparametric approach allows us to discriminate among models of global competition in which all products compete with all others and local competition in which products compete only with their neighbors we apply our semiparametric estimator to data from u s wholesale gasoline markets and find that in this market competition is highly localized

majority rule and the public provision of a private good this paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good health care

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

liberalizing a distribution system the european car market we quantify the competitive effects of liberalizing the selective and exclusive distribution system in the european car market based on a model of oligopoly pricing with differentiated products we consider two possible competitive effects from liberalization i the creation of international intrabrand competition cross border trade which will result in a reduction of international price discrimination and ii a possible cumulative effect arising from a strengthening of national intrabrand competition which would result in reduced double marginalization we find that the reduction in international price discrimination mainly redistributes consumer gains across countries it has a positive but modest effect on total welfare if liberalization also has the cumulative effect of reducing double marginalization the welfare effects are much higher finally we find that the effects of liberalization on the manufacturers profits are either small or positive this finding implies that international price discrimination and softening competition through a double marginalization mechanism should not be interpreted as main profit motives for the previous distribution system but only as unintended side effects hence the industry rationale for maintaining the previous distribution system should be sought in other areas jel f15 l42

income distribution and tax structure empirical test of the meltzer richard hypothesis abstract the meltzer richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research but little empirical support the empirical literature has concentrated on cross country studies and the size of the public sector and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality this analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution here tax structure new data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in norway are exploited we show how the multi dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences in the econometric analysis instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution the estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution

market power vertical integration and the wholesale price of gasoline this paper examines empirically the relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices we use discrete and differential changes in the extent of vertical integration generated by mergers in west coast gasoline refining and retailing markets to test for incentives to raise rivals costs the research design allows us to test for a relationship between vertical integration and wholesale prices controlling for horizontal market structure cost shocks and trends we find evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors input costs this suggests that vertical integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices

empirical evidence on on vertical foreclosure i introduction prior to the 1980s the united states department of justice and the federal trade commission actively challenged vertical mergers on the theory that such mergers foreclosed unintegrated rivals in the downstream market from access to inputs supplied by the merged firm this policy changed when critics of the foreclosure theory claimed that vertically integrated firms have no incentive to transfer products between the upstream and downstream markets at a price other than the market price and therefore vertical mergers have no effect on the price charged to consumers 1 the arguments against attacking vertical mergers were also supported by research that demonstrated that vertical integration can enhance efficiency 2 as a result vertical mergers currently receive very little if any attention from the enforcement agencies recent contributions by ordover saloner and salop 1990 krattenmaker and salop 1986 and salinger 1988 1989 have reopened the debate about the competitive effects of vertical mergers they each use theoretical models to show that vertical foreclosures can raise costs to unintegrated rivals and lead to higher prices for consumers although these models demonstrate that foreclosure can be a profitable strategy that injures competition to date these theories have not been tested empirically if vertical foreclosure rarely occurs or if it occurs only in a narrow set of circumstances changes in current policy on vertical mergers may not be justified a necessary but not sufficient condition for anticompetitive foreclosure is that the vertical merger cause the unintegrated rivals to be less profitable this result from previous theoretical work is tested here on a sample selected from all vertical merger cases challenged by the justice department and the federal trade commission during the period 1963 to 1982 we find no evidence of anticompetitive market foreclosure for the sample of cases challenged by the antitrust agencies one possible explanation for our results is that the tests over the entire sample are significantly affected by a few weak cases brought by the government during a period of aggressive antitrust enforcement we test this by examining variables that have been identified by krattenmaker and salop 1986 and the department of justice merger guidelines as being conducive to foreclosure such as barriers to entry and industry concentration even the cases with high industry concentration and barriers to entry which potentially should exhibit substantial market power provide no evidence of foreclosure while this does not preclude anticompetitive foreclosure as a possibility it does call into question the cases brought by the antitrust agencies during the 1960s and the 1970s until the proponents of the more rigorous economic version of the foreclosure theory provide clearer guidelines about the conditions under which vertical mergers are likely to injure competition continuation of the current policy of not contesting these mergers seems justified ii theory of anticompetitive foreclosure the foreclosure arguments used to challenge vertical mergers during the 1950s and 1960s were easily discredited because no formal theory was used to support them more recent attempts to reconstruct the foreclosure theory have used economic models to demonstrate that vertical foreclosure can reduce competition the key to each of these models is that foreclosure raises the costs to the unintegrated rivals of the merged firm and this under certain conditions raises the price of the final product to the consumer the legal definition of foreclosure focuses on the ability of unintegrated firms to buy from or sell to integrated rivals while the economic definition of anticompetitive foreclosure focuses on whether prices to consumers increase salinger 1988 has provided a model that demonstrates the conditions under which anticompetitive foreclosure will occur

do firm boundaries matter in his famous article the nature of the firm ronald coase 1937 raised two fundamental questions that have spawned a large body of research do firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources and what determines where firm boundaries are drawn while the first of these questions has received some theoretical attention notably oliver williamson 1975 1985 benjamin klein et al 1978 and sanford grossman and oliver hart 1986 it has largely been ignored empirically instead the empirical work in this area discussed in the other articles in this session has addressed the second question by analyzing the determinants of vertical integration thus while we know something about the forces that determine firm boundaries we know relatively little about how these boundaries affect actual firm behavior this is a major limitation in our understanding of the nature of the firm to begin to assess how firm boundaries affect behavior we analyze whether there are differences between integrated and nonintegrated chemical manufacturers in their investments in production capacity we focus on producers of vinyl chloride monomer vcm the sole use of which is in the production of the widely used waterproof plastic polyvinyl chloride pvc vcm is a homogenous commodity and is traded in relatively liquid markets moreover there is no obvious production link between vcm and pvc other than that one is an input into the other for example pvc is not a byproduct of vcm production nevertheless twothirds of vcm producers in our sample are integrated downstream into pvc the existing literature would ask why we observe this degree of integration we ask instead whether integrated and nonintegrated vcm producers invest differently in production capacity

risk preferences and the economics of contracts t he literature of risk aversion and risk preference is one of the richest sources of ad hoc assumptions concerning tastes n o significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes such theories have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down they give the appearance of considered judgement yet really have only been ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures george j stigler and gary s becker 1977 p 89

profit taxes and the growth of fringe firms in this paper we examine the optimal taxation of corporate profits in a multi period limit pricing model where a dominant firm faces expansion by a competitive fringe the optimal policy requires tax rates to vary both intertemporally and across firm sizes and balances the benefit of fringe growth in eroding the market power of the dominant firm and the cost of displacing the dominant firm s output with the higher cost output of the fringe the results are relevant for assessing the policy of giving preferential tax treatment to small firms as practised by several oecd countries jel classification h32 lii

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

determinants of vertical integration an empirical test this paper tests models of vertical integration with emphasis on incentives that arise from transactions costs and demand variability the tests are based on a logit analysis of firms backward integration choices in a sample of thirty four chemical products the results are consistent with recent transactions cost theories and the demand variability model proposed by carlton 1979 copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

retail contracting and costly monitoring theory and evidence abstract we reconcile seemingly conflicting hypotheses and evidence that surface in the principal agent literature specifically we examine the literature that deals with the effect of costly monitoring on retail organizational form our principal agent model of the optimal relationship between up and downstream firms allows the principal to garner two types of imperfect signals of agent effort sales data and behavior data the model yields predictions that we confront with the econometric evidence which comes from both franchising and sales force compensation literatures we find that when variation in the informativeness and in the cost of increasing the informativeness of both signals is considered the evidence is consistent with the theory