the electricity generation adequacy problem assessing dynamic effects of capacity remuneration mechanisms abstract following liberalization reforms the ability of power markets to provide satisfactory incentives for capacity investments has become a major concern in particular current energy markets can exhibit a phenomenon of investment cycles which generate phases of under and over capacity and hence additional costs and risks for generation adequacy to cope with these issues new mechanisms called capacity remuneration mechanisms crm have been or will be implemented this paper assesses the dynamic effects of two crms the capacity market and the strategic reserve mechanism and studies to what extent they can reduce the investment cycles generation costs and shortage costs of both mechanisms are also compared to conclude on their effectivity and economic efficiency a simulation model based on system dynamics is developed to study the functioning of both crms and the related investment decisions the results highlight the benefits of deploying crms to solve the adequacy issue shortages are strongly reduced compared to an energy only market besides the capacity market appears to be more beneficial since it experiences fewer shortages and generation costs are lower these comparisons can be used by policy makers in particular in europe where these two crms are mainly debated to determine which crm to adopt

promoting industrial symbiosis empirical observations of low carbon innovations in the humber region uk industrial symbiosis has been identified as a strategy to increase resource efficiency lower carbon emissions and increase business growth one type of industrial symbiosis is the innovative use of wastes from one company as a resource for another company however empirical understanding of implementing waste to resource innovations and hence how they can be promoted by public and private organisations is still limited therefore this study explored how companies implemented waste to resource innovations in the humber region uk five case studies were conducted with companies that used or supplied a secondary biomass resource for power generation or fuel manufacturing this article discusses how companies developed relations with biowaste resource suppliers or clients the results expanded operational understanding of waste to resource innovation processes as it revealed companies activities and their strategic considerations comparing the case studies the social processes through which relations between biowaste resource partners developed were largely similar however two different networking strategies were identified some companies had to engage new industries and therefore diversified their resource partners during the innovation process but strived to limit the number of resource partners once the innovation was realised conversely others expanded activities within their network and hence strengthened existing relations during the innovation but strived to increase the number of resource partners afterwards to manage risky over dependencies within their supply network finally resource security economic benefits and policy and regulation were of key importance to conclude operational and strategic insights to promote the uptake of waste to resource innovations are presented however further research is necessary before broad generalizations can be considered

the finnish power market are imports from russia low cost electricity market integration of high and low price areas is expected to bring benefits to the consumers in a high price area however these potential benefits are highly dependent on the market characteristics and the policy interventions we use simulation to study the effects of different alternatives for the expansion and operation of the interconnector finland russia on the finnish market a high price area our results show that the current trading arrangement where a single trader owns the transmission rights and limits the trade during peak hours to avoid capacity charges in russia is beneficial for finland at the current interconnection capacity however if the interconnector is expanded the behaviour of the trader would create significant distortions in the finnish market we also analyse the pros and cons of maintaining a strategic reserve in finland in combination with the different scenarios of interconnection expansion and trading arrangements we conclude that in the absence of trust in imports the need for a strategic reserve is undeniable this will slightly reduce the economic benefits of integration for finnish consumers but it will significantly improve reliability

willingness to pay for parallel private health insurance evidence from a laboratory experiment debate over the effects of public versus private health care finance persists in both academic and policy circles this paper presents the results of a revealed preference laboratory experiment that tests how characteristics of the public health system affect a subject s willingness to pay wtp for parallel private health insurance consistent with the theoretical predictions of cuff et al 2010 subjects average wtp is lower and the size of the private insurance sector smaller when the public system allocates health care hurley is also affiliated with the centre for health economics and policy analysis mcmaster university cameron is also affiliated with the centre for health economics and policy analysis mcmaster university we acknowledge helpful comments from two anonymous referees andrew muller michel grignon and other members of the new and emerging team project on experimental methods applied to health economics at mcmaster university in particular we would like to acknowledge dale marsden and aleksandra gajic for research support and stuart mestelman for valuable input on the paper especially section 5 we would also like to thank conference participants from the 2009 canadian economics association meetings and seminar participants from university of innsbruck social science research centre berlin university of regensburg and york university for helpful comments this research was funded by the canadian institutes of health research grant no 76670 the views expressed are those of the authors alone email nbuckley yorku ca

modeling long term dynamics of electricity markets in the last decade many countries have restructured their electricity industries by introducing competition in their power generation sectors although some restructuring has been regarded as successful the short experience accumulated with liberalized power markets does not allow making any founded assertion about their long term behavior long term prices and long term supply reliability are now center of interest this concerns firms considering investments in generation capacity and regulatory authorities interested in assuring the long term supply adequacy and the stability of power markets in order to gain significant insight into the long term behavior of liberalized power markets in this paper a simulation model based on system dynamics is proposed and the underlying mathematical formulations extensively discussed unlike classical market models based on the assumption that market outcomes replicate the results of a centrally made optimization the approach presented here focuses on replicating the system structure of power markets and the logic of relationships among system components in order to derive its dynamical response the simulations suggest that there might be serious problems to adjust early enough the generation capacity necessary to maintain stable reserve margins and consequently stable long term price levels because of feedback loops embedded in the structure of power markets and the existence of some time lags the long term market development might exhibit a quite volatile behavior by varying some exogenous inputs a sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the influence of these factors on the long run market dynamics

simulating price patterns for tradable green certificates to promote electricity generation from wind abstract this article uses computer simulation to anticipate the price dynamics in a market for tradable green certificates tgcs these markets have been used in europe to promote generation of electricity from renewable resources like wind similar markets have been proposed in the united states of america usa where the certificates are called renewable energy credits recs the certificates are issued to the generating companies for each megawatt hour of renewable electricity generation the companies may sell the certificates in a market and the revenues from certificate sales provide an extra incentive to invest in new generating capacity proponents argue that this market based incentive can be designed to support government mandates for a growing fraction of electricity generation from renewable sources in the usa these mandates are set by the states and are known as renewable portfolio standards rps we simulate the price dynamics of a market designed to support an aggressive mandate for wind generation in the northwestern usa the simulations show that the certificate price climbs rapidly to the cap in the early years after the market opens investors then react to these high prices with construction of new wind capacity after a few years wind generation meets and then exceeds the requirement we show that this pattern appears again and again when the simulations are repeated with wide variations in the estimates of behavioral parameters we use the model to study the impact of different trading strategies by the wind companies and by the distribution companies we also study the simulated market response if the usa adopts the carbon allowance market envisioned in the climate stewardship act the article concludes with recommendations for policy makers involved in tgc market design

generation capacity adequacy in interdependent electricity markets this paper deals with the practical problems related to long term security of supply in regional electricity markets with transmission constraints differences between regulatory policies and market designs in terms of generation adequacy policies may distort the normal functioning of the neighboring markets as well as the reliability of supply we test the effect of heterogeneous regulatory design between two interdependent markets energy only market price capped market without capacity mechanisms and price capped markets with forward capacity contracts obligation we rely on a long term market simulation model in system dynamics that characterizes expansion decision in a competitive regime the results show that differences in market designs affect both price and reliability of supply in the two markets we examine both the short and long terms effect and how free riding may occur where capacity adequacy policies are adopted in one market but not the other the main finding is that the lack of harmonization between local markets in policies to ensure capacity adequacy may lead to undesirable side effects

rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms crm in deregulated electricity markets ubiquitous in real world electricity markets crms are introduced country by country in an ad hoc manner lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling comparability and coordination they are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a theoretical benchmark model that argues that competitive energy only markets with voll pricing provide adequate levels of capacity while the benchmark model is a consistent starting point for discussions about electricity market design it ignores the two market failures that make crms the practically appropriate and theoretically justified policy response to capacity issues first energy only markets fail to internalize security of supply externalities as involuntary curbs on demand under scarcity pricing generate social costs beyond the private non consumption of electricity second when demand is inelastic and the potential capacity additions are discretely sized investors face asymmetric incentives and will underinvest at the margin rather than overinvest after presenting the key features of the theoretical benchmark model this paper conceptualizes security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives and concludes with some consideration regarding design of crms

tacking stock of the eu power target model and steering its future course abstract the european union took more than 20 years to start defining a common market design for its internal electricity market a european power target model and a further 10 years to fully implement it meanwhile the reference generation set of that model has shifted from ccgt burning gas to res plants transforming intermittent natural resources could the existing eu target model continue to work well for the short term operation and long term investment if not can the existing eu institutions easily produce an res resilient new power target model

a framework to evaluate security of supply in the electricity sector security of electricity supply soes has become a major concern for regulators and policymakers over the last decade however most work focusses either more generally on energy security or on a single fuel we develop a comprehensive but flexible framework to assess the soes for a single jurisdiction taking into the account the specificities of electricity this framework has two aims i provide a snapshot of the situation to understand current weaknesses and determine what actions are required ii capture the evolution over time to evaluate progress and identify potential problems before they materialise the framework based on an extensive literature review consists of twelve dimensions that are critical for soes we develop metrics that capture the state and evolution of each dimension this framework is intended to be a management information tool for all stakeholders aimed at organising data and structuring its analysis to enable monitoring the evolution of the soes while also functioning as an early warning system by flagging potential future problems

the impact of investors risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms abstract this paper analyses the impact of risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms with investors facing an uncertain peak load three market designs are studied for this purpose a competitive energy only market a capacity market and a strategic reserve mechanism a simulation model based on system dynamics is developed in order to represent investment decisions and analyse the behaviour of each market design risk aversion is modelled through the computation of conditional value at risk the results are discussed in terms of impact on the reliability ability to limit shortages and cost total generation costs of the studied market designs when comparing the three market designs the capacity market seems to be the least affected by the introduction of risk aversion both in terms of cost and reliability this result suggests that implementing a capacity market is preferable in order to deal with the adverse effects of risk aversion given the simulations and parameters that were used

electricity markets for energy flexibility and availability impact of capacity mechanisms on the remuneration of generation technologies abstract increased shares of renewable energy sources res to fulfill ambitious european policy targets mothballing or decommissioning of existing units and absent investments lead to concerns about the system and market adequacy to restore market adequacy capacity mechanisms cms are widely discussed and implemented in various types they are intended to provide sufficient and clearly perceivable long term price signals for available capacity as integral part of the market cms interact with the other markets markets like day ahead markets are used to trade energy imbalance markets or reserve requirements are examples for markets for flexibility among others green certificates are in place to value emission neutral injection from res resulting altered prices and shifting remuneration have effects on all generation technologies cms may affect participating technologies by imposing a capacity demand a resulting change in the generation mix may also have an impact on non participating technologies two gaps can be identified in the discussion and modeling of cms in the literature first proposed game theoretic equilibrium models fall short in representing the distinctive features of different types of cms second most models incorporating cms found in the literature only focus on the interaction with the energy based market valid assessments of cm need to consider the interaction of remuneration for available capacity and flexibility and the indirect interaction with the remuneration for emission neutral res two formulations of a game theoretic market equilibrium model are proposed which represent specific cms with its distinctive features in particular a market wide centralized capacity market ccm and targeted strategic reserves srs moreover the equilibrium models explicitly combine the cms with markets for flexibility and indirect with remuneration for res we contribute to the discussion of cms by quantifying the interactions and shifting shares of remuneration based on the interaction between cms and remuneration for emission neutral injection the effect of cms on non participating res is described we conclude based on the case study results that targeted mechanisms like srs implemented with the single purpose of ensuring availability introduce large inefficiencies in the system by missing on the interaction between availability and flexibility in contrast a market wide ccm provides a beneficial outcome for all technologies at the same time it yields a sufficient high reserve margin at lowest cost it provides clear signals for the different values of energy output flexibility availability and emission neutral injection

sensitivity of reserve margin to factors influencing investment behaviour in the electricity market of england and wales abstract the electricity generation and distribution industries of england and wales have recently undergone major re structuring as part of the privatization process of taking them out of the public sector on the generation side three major companies have been created which compete both with each other and with the new independent companies who are expected to enter the market trading between generators and distributors is controlled centrally by a pool system which attempts to ensure the optimal operation of the system in the short term and gives a pricing signal for longer term investment this pricing signal depends upon an a priori loss of load probability this paper is intended to provide insights into how the investment in capacity for generation could evolve according to various regulatory conditions economic assumptions degrees of competition and the strategic behaviour of the separate companies using a system dynamics approach a simulation model of investment is developed to generate insights into the volatility of the reserve margin variations in the loss of load probability and the various market share scenarios the degree of uncertainty in the demand the amount of information exchange between competitors and the degree of foresight in planning are considered as well as different financial or market share objectives for companies

economic consequences of a capacity market implementation the case of poland abstract this paper investigates the potential economic consequences of setting up a capacity market in poland a computable model of the polish power generation system is developed and employed to analyse the impact of this mechanism two scenarios are designed for this study i a reference scenario that reflects the energy only market and ii a capacity market scenario that assumes the implementation of such an instrument to assess the economic consequences the following parameters are estimated i annual electricity prices ii loss of load hours iii expected energy not served and only for the capacity market scenario iv market clearing price v total budget of the capacity market and vi increase in electricity price due to the introduction of the capacity market the findings of the study indicate that the long term maintenance of the energy only market results in higher electricity prices when compared to putting a capacity market into operation introducing a capacity market enables existing resources to be used effectively without excessive capital expenditure the methods and conclusions presented in this paper provide valuable findings and policy insights regarding the potential economic consequences of a capacity mechanism in a power system mostly dominated by coal and undergoing an energy transition

the role of regulatory learning in energy transition the case of solar pv in brazil abstract an important problem that has attracted significant amount of attention within the context of energy transitions is the carbon lock in a situation in which energy systems are locked in to high carbon technologies through a path dependent process several measures to avoid the carbon lock in involve technology specific measures which in turn implies that those measures may result in an energy system locked in to certain low carbon technologies we consider that the brazilian system needs policies to escape the carbon lock in which are based on providing incentives to low carbon technologies we develop an analytical framework to analyze the role of regulatory institutions in the possible lock in to utility scale photovoltaic in the sense that they create barriers to the adoption of distributed generation photovoltaic we show that the definition of a process to adapt the institutional framework in a context of stress in the innovation system is crucial for the adoption of new technologies applying our framework to the brazilian power sector we observe that only when regulators consider the possibility that the system is locked in to centralized production technologies and not when they just consider the carbon lock in they manage to eliminate barriers to distributed generation based on solar pv

capacity adequacy in power markets facing energy transition a comparison of scarcity pricing and capacity mechanism this article analyses how a capacity mechanism can address security of supply objectives in a power market undergoing an energy transition that combines energy efficiency efforts to stabilise demand and a rapid increase in the proportion of renewables to analyse this situation power markets are simulated over the long term with a system dynamics model integrating new investment and closure decisions this last trait is relevant to studying investment in power generation in mature markets undergoing policy shocks the energy only market design with a price cap with and without a capacity mechanism is compared to scarcity pricing in two investment behaviour scenarios with and without risk aversion the results show that the three market designs lead to different levels of risk for peaking unit investment and results thus differ according to which risk aversion hypothesis is adopted assuming a risk neutral investor the results indicate that compared to an energy only market with a price cap at 3 000 mwh an energy only market with scarcity pricing and the market design with a capacity mechanism are two efficient options to reach similar levels of load loss but under the hypothesis of risk aversion the results highlight the advantage of the capacity mechanism over scarcity pricing

strategic bidding and rebidding in electricity markets abstract successful deregulation in electricity markets depends crucially on the ability of market regulation to promote and maintain free competition there are however important physical characteristics in electricity markets such as the constraints imposed by the physical transmission infrastructure that have the potential to undermine competition and provide opportunities for market participants to exploit temporary positions of market power in this paper the regional market of queensland australia is analysed it is found that strategic behaviour by generators exists and is closely related to the occurrence of the kind of extreme price events that characterise many deregulated electricity markets in addition rebidding behaviour by base load generators immediately after extreme price events is shown to have negative impacts on the operation of the market the key message is that promotion of competition in electricity markets can have undesirable consequences unless the regulatory policy is carefully designed to counter strategic behaviour by market participants

counting on the neighbours challenges and practical approaches for cross border participation in capacity mechanisms capacity mechanisms have been implemented in an uncoordinated way by many countries in europe in recent years to ensure security of supply the european commission has defined via the state aid guidelines principles to minimize their impact on trade and competition in european electricity markets the paper identifies the different drivers of these national reforms maps the key issues associated with the coordination of capacity mechanisms across countries and explores alternative approaches to allow for explicit cross border participation in capacity mechanisms

an improved mechanism for capacity payment based on system dynamics modeling for investment planning in competitive electricity environment many countries have experienced restructuring in their electric utilities this restructuring has presented the power industries with new challenges the most important of which is long term investment planning under uncertain conditions this paper presents an improved mechanism for capacity payment the mechanism has been investigated based on system dynamic modeling in our proposed mechanism generators will recover a part of their investment through capacity payment while the payment for any plant remains constant during the operation period it depends on the investment needed to build it the main factors affecting long term planning have been considered in our model the approach can be used to investigate the effects of fixed as well as variable capacity payment in market investment we used the probability density function of load as a new concept to calculate average market price delays in unit constructions estimation of demand and market capacity growth during construction periods have been included in the proposed algorithm as parameters which affect the regulator s decision for changing capacity payment the model can be used by regulators to investigate strategies that may affect the fluctuations in the market

how to correct for long term externalities of large scale wind power development by a capacity mechanism this paper deals with the practical problems related to long term security of supply in electricity markets in the presence of large scale wind power development the success of recent renewable promotion schemes adds a new dimension to ensuring long term security of supply it necessitates designing second best policies to prevent large scale wind power development from distorting long run equilibrium prices and investments in conventional generation and in particular in peaking units we rely upon a long term simulation model which simulates electricity market players investment decisions in a market regime and incorporates large scale wind power development in the presence of either subsidized or market driven development scenarios we test the use of capacity mechanisms to compensate for long term effects of large scale wind power development on prices and reliability of supply the first finding is that capacity mechanisms can help to reduce the social cost of large scale wind power development in terms of decrease of loss of load probability the second finding is that in a market based wind power deployment without subsidy wind generators are penalised for insufficient contribution to the long term system s reliability

does size matter simulating electricity market coupling between colombia and ecuador since the beginning of the liberalization era the integration of electricity markets has been promoted in many regions arguing that this will bring benefits in terms of security of supply and efficiency however little progress has been made in the last decades in most regions with some successful exceptions such as the nordpool and more research is needed to determine under which circumstances those benefits are achievable we develop a system dynamics model to analyze the potential benefits and risks of market coupling and to improve the understanding of its implications on policy design this model allows us to simulate the long term behavior of two interconnected countries under different interconnection scenarios and different policies regarding capacity payments the analysis is focused on colombia and ecuador which have been trading electricity for more than 10 years and offer an interesting case study given their complementarity in terms of hydropower supply however the results of the simulations show that this complementarity is not necessarily exploited while the relative size of the countries determines the magnitude of the potential benefits of integration the interconnector capacity plays a key role in achieving those benefits additionally both factors significantly affect the outcome of policies such as the implementation of capacity payments we conclude that capacity policies and integration policies need to be coordinated

how to benefit from a common european electricity market design abstract the realization of an internal electricity market in europe is currently on the one hand progressing in particular thanks to the wide spread implementation of market coupling solutions for cross border congestion management on the other hand diverging national market designs pose a threat to the continuation of this process given the challenges to electricity market design in a multi regional context we analyze how different design aspects namely cross border congestion management and capacity mechanisms affect welfare and generation adequacy in europe in doing so we rely on an agent based simulation model for electricity wholesale markets which we apply within several numerical computational case studies for the region of central western europe 2012 2030 our results confirm the benefits of market coupling in terms of welfare as well as generation adequacy furthermore we find indications that coordinating market designs across regions supports these targets therefore we recommend that european energy policy forms a stable transparent regulatory framework with cross border market coupling as an integral component in this context energy policy targets should be clearly defined and operationalized which also needs to consider potential conflicts between them finally electricity market designs need to be coordinated among states to benefit most from a common european market