efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

the scope of mandatory bargaining a critique and a proposal this paper argues that the mandatory permissive distinction in the scope of the duty to bargain collectively should be abandoned in favor of a policy of classifying all lawful subjects as mandatory the author shows that in recent applications of the distinction by the nlrb and the courts many subjects of interest to labor have been declared within the exclusive control of management she argues that the rationales used by the board and the courts in these decisions are not compelling and the mandatory permissive distinction is even less convincing when its current application is compared to the criteria of an ideal scope of bargaining

the impact on economic performance of a transformation in workplace relations this study examines how a transformation in patterns of conflict and cooperation affected economic performance in 25 work areas of a large unionized manufacturing facility in the period 1984 87 unlike most studies of industrial relations and economic performance this study clearly distinguishes conflict from cooperation but evaluates the two together rather than focusing on only one an analysis of data collected from union and employer records and interviews strongly suggests that work areas with traditional labor management relations rooted in adversarial assumptions had higher costs more scrap lower productivity and a lower return to direct labor hours worked than work areas with transformational relations characterized by increased cooperation and improved dispute resolution

debt and financial expectations an individual and household level analysis in this article we show that optimistic financial expectations impact positively on both the quantity of debt and the growth in debt at the individual and household levels our theoretical model shows that this association is predicted under a variety of plausible scenarios in the empirical analysis we explore the determinants of debt and of growth in debt using british data we find convincing support for our theoretical priors and show that it is optimistic financial expectations per se that are important in influencing debt rather than the accuracy of individuals predictions regarding their future financial situation jel d18 d84 d91

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

belief based refinements in signalling games abstract there are many economic problems which when modelled as games of incomplete information give rise to many sequential equilibria severely limiting the usefulness of the model there has recently been a large literature devoted to refining the set of equilibria in order to reduce this multiplicity by restricting the set of admissible disequilibrium beliefs this paper argues that the logical foundations of some refinements and the equilibria they focus on are problematic and further proposes an alternative refinement that avoids the difficulties we also provide an existence theorem covering a broad class of signalling games often studied in economics journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c70 d82

strikes scabs and tread separations labor strife and the production of defective bridgestone firestone tires this paper provides a case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality we consider whether a long contentious strike and the hiring of permanent replacement workers by bridgestone firestone in the mid 1990s contributed to the production of an excess number of defective tires using several independent data sources we find that labor strife in the decatur plant closely coincided with lower product quality count data regression models based on two data sets of tire failures by plant year and age show significantly higher failure rates for tires produced in decatur during the labor dispute than before or after the dispute or than at other plants also an analysis of internal firestone engineering tests indicates that p235 tires from decatur performed less well if they were manufactured during the labor dispute compared with those produced after the dispute or compared with those from other non striking plants monthly data suggest that the production of defective tires was particularly high around the time wage concessions were demanded by firestone in early 1994 and when large numbers of replacement workers and permanent workers worked side by side in late 1995 and early 1996

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

industrial relations performance economic performance and qwl programs an interplant analysis this study analyzes the relationship among plant level measures of industrial relations performance economic performance and quality of working life programs the analysis employs pooled time series and cross section data from 18 plants within a division of general motors for the years 1970 79 the empirical results show strong associations between industrial relations and economic performance measures and limited support for the hypothesis that quality of working life efforts improve both kinds of performance

delegation of monitoring in a principal agent relationship this paper studies a principal agent relationship with moral hazard in which the principal or the supervisor can monitor the agent s hidden action by using identical monitoring technologies the paper shows that delegation of monitoring to the supervisor is profitable because of two effects with delegation the principal can better regulate the incentives incentive effect and can commit to wage structures to which she could not commit without delegation commitment effect as a logical step collusion is introduced and it is shown that even with the possibility of collusion delegation is an optimal strategy

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

rewarding performance by promotion to a different job abstract use of promotions rather than performance related pay to provide incentives can be justified if performance is non verifiable information this does not explain why promotion is to a different job rather than simply a better paid job the effectiveness of tournaments is undermined however if unsuccessful workers are equally suited to higher paid jobs and can engage in bribery or other influence activity a promotion based reward structure with pay tied to jobs can be made immune to such activity if misallocations of employees to jobs are costly to the firm

labour unrest and the quality of production evidence from the construction equipment resale market this paper examines the construction equipment resale market to assess whether equipment produced by the world s largest manufacturer of construction machinery caterpillar experienced lower product quality in facilities that underwent contract disputes during the 1990 s analysis of auction data reveals that resale market participants significantly discounted machines produced in these dispute affected facilities additionally pieces of equipment produced in facilities undergoing unrest were resold more often received worse appraisal reports and had lower list prices taken together the evidence supports the hypothesis that workmanship at dispute affected facilities declined and that the resulting impact on the economic quality of the equipment produced was significant the dispute was associated with at least 400 million in lost service flows due to inferior quality equipment alone

job independence as an incentive device a firm can either subject its workers to strict rules and regulations or grant them independence if independent they can make entrenchment investments which will not only raise their productivity but also make the firm depend on their cooperation however in contrast to a standard holdup problem the firm can afterwards take over control thus stripping such workers of a part of their bargaining assets this leads to structural distortions and may aggravate the holdup problem however the threat of partial expropriation may also alleviate the holdup problem and even induce overinvestment

mechanism design by an informed principal private values with transferable utility we provide a solution to the informed principal problem in the independent private values setting with monetary transfers the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented allocation we show that there is no distortion all principal types implement an allocation that is optimal for the principal ex ante before he she learns his her type as an application we consider settings with linear utility for bilateral exchange in which the principal is one of the traders the solution is a combination of a participation fee a buy out option for the principal and a resale stage with posted prices

informed principal problem with moral hazard risk neutrality and no limited liability abstract we consider a principal agent moral hazard problem with risk neutral parties and no limited liability in which the principal has private information the principal s private information creates signaling considerations that may distort the implemented outcome these distortions can explain e g efficiency wages beaudry 1994 and muted incentives inderst 2001 we show that in a large class of environments these distortions vanish if the principal is allowed to offer sufficiently rich contracts

incentive schemes as a signaling device abstract this paper considers a model of moral hazard where the principal has private information for instance in an organizational setting the firm may be better informed about the profitability of a sales area for which it seeks to employ a new sales representative we show how this information asymmetry may lead to a game of signaling which can mute incentives

non commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions abstract auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment the manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker s output taking into account all interim information he has obtained the worker will work just hard enough and show it to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult this usually raises the costs of setting work incentives so incentives are softened sometimes drastically moreover when a worker s on the job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information

comparing allocations under asymmetric information coase theorem revisited abstract this paper investigates the robustness of coase theorem under asymmetric information we identify the conditions under which the same allocation is attained as an equilibrium in a bilateral trade model no matter which informed or uninformed party has the bargaining power to make a contract offer

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the role of commitment in a principal agent relationship with an informed principal abstract in many circumstances a principal who has private information when contracting with an agent may perform some further action simultaneously with or after the agent s choice of an action we analyze such a principal agent relationship with an informed principal as a noncooperative game and distinguish two extensive form games first the principal can commit to his subsequent action at the time of contracting second the principal s announcement for his action is not binding at the time of performance we show that commitment by the principal leads to separation and no commitment leads to pooling journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d82

how unions affect productivity in manufacturing plants this study investigates several hypotheses as to how unions may affect productivity analysis of data from 46 manufacturing plants for 1982 indicates a negative union impact on productivity the author finds evidence suggesting that unions reduce the effectiveness of some managerial practices undertaken to increase productivity and that a poor labor management relations climate also reduces productivity these two factors account for almost 50 percent of the negative union impact

discretion and bias in performance evaluation most of the economics literature on compensation and organizations builds from the theory of agency for the most part the literature analyzes situations in which agents performance can be controlled by tying compensation to objective performance measures such as output or sales it ignores the fact that most compensation arrangements involve superiors subjectire and hence non contractible judgements about employee performance in our view much of what is interesting about actual employment relations follows from the observation that performance appraisal is a process by which humans judge other humans milkovich and wigdor 1991 this paper studies the implications of subjective performance evaluation for compensation policies and for the efficiency of employment relations our objectives are two fold first we propose the importance of subjectivity of evaluations to better understand organizatlonal practices such as politicking favoritism and compression of wage scales second we hope to orient the study of subjective performance evaluation in ways that are consistent with empirical evidence on what organizations actually do

union bargaining decisions and contract ratifications the 1982 and 1984 auto agreements the authors of this study investigate the determinants of union contract ratification votes by analyzing plant level data relevant to the 1982 and 1984 auto industry agreements with the uaw the results strongly suggest that the more vulnerable workers are to layoff the more likely they are to vote for ratification of proposed agreements the results also show however that workers tend to vote against ratification in plants in which other things equal the labor relations climate is poor in addition comparisons across contracts indicate how voting patterns associated with various plant and worker characteristics change when contract proposals shift toward greater job security and away from wage increases

concession bargaining the impact on shareholders equity this analysis of bargaining settlements in 1982 83 shows that on average shareholders in those firms that negotiated concessionary settlements enjoyed an 8 to 10 percent increase in the value of their holdings the author interprets this result to mean not that the value of the firm increased but rather that concessions enlarged the shareholders portion of the firm s value at the expense of the workers portion on the other hand concession bargaining does not seem to have reallocated business risk between shareholders and labor finally the evidence suggests that firm specific sources of risk can explain in part not only the magnitude of the concession effects but also the probability that concession bargaining will occur

an investigation of the equal commission rate policy for a multi product salesforce for a multi product sales force the policy of paying commissions as an equal percentage of realized gross margins is shown to be in general nonoptimal from the firm s profit maximization point of view for a homogeneous salesforce the nonoptimality results from the fact that earlier research while taking into account the effect of commission rates on a salesperson s allocations of total time to the multiple products has not incorporated the effect of commission rates on salesperson s total selling time resulting from his her trading off income vs total time to maximize utility the equal commission rate policy is however optimal for the cases of i salesperson with a fixed total selling time and a minimum income requirement and ii fair income salesperson whose total selling time is merely a function of income and not based on rate of change of income as in the utility maximization case if the salesforce is heterogeneous e g different salespersons have differing sales responses to selling time this makes the equal commission rate policy to be in general nonoptimal even for the restrictive cases i and ii it is suggested that the commission rates be set higher for products with greater elasticities relating quantities sold to selling times the common practice of paying commissions as a percentage of total dollar sales rather than gross margins is shown to be optimal under certain assumptions

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

toward a structural account of union participation in management the case of western airlines in 1983 and 1984 four unions at western airlines agreed to wage cuts work rule changes two tier wage plans and other concessions in return for seats on the board of directors a health services program financial information sharing and an employee involvement program the author uses data from interviews conducted with all parties between 1983 and 1987 to argue that meaningful and lasting employee participation occurred only when the union had enough power to induce management to forgo some of its traditional prerogatives a structural factor the union and management shared a vision of how participation could serve both parties interests a cognitive factor and the union had substantial institutional security a second structural factor

signaling quality with increased incentives previous work on informed principal problems with moral hazard suggested that the principal should signal project quality by retaining a larger share of the project and hence lowering incentives for the agent we show that this view is incomplete if project quality and effort are complements and effort is more valuable for high quality projects a principal with a high quality project may separate from a principal with a low quality project by increasing incentives for the agent this holds with a risk neutral agent who is protected by limited liability as well as with a risk averse agent and unlimited liability a dynamic version of our model in which the agent learns project quality in later periods provides an explanation for the use of initially reduced royalty rates in business format franchising contracts

optimal monitoring policies in agencies this article considers a principal agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monitoring technology that can be used to acquire additional information about the agent s actions subsequent to observing the agent s output although randomized monitoring policies are feasible we show that in a variety of contexts optimal monitoring policies are deterministic and lower tailed that is there exists some critical level of output such that further investigation of the agent s actions occurs if and only if output falls below this critical level

optimal auditing with heterogeneous income sources the optimal enforcement policy when households are heterogeneous with respect to both income level and to income source leads to more intense income auditing for easy to monitor sources we obtain the common result that within each income source any taxpayer reporting less than a predetermined cut off level will be audited while taxpayers reporting at least this level will never be audited however this audit policy leads to very different reporting behavior depending on the income source the internal revenue service does not audit only honest taxpayers and an increase in the audit budget may lead to a larger segment of full evaders

the dynamics of marriage and divorce we formulate and estimate a dynamic model of marriage divorce and remarriage using panel data on two cohorts of danish men and women the marital surplus is identified from the probability of divorce and the surplus shares of husbands and wives from their willingness to enter marriage we find that the educations of husbands and wives are complements education raises the share of the marital surplus for men but not for women as men and women get older husbands receive a larger share of the marital surplus the estimated costs of divorce are high both early and late in marriage

the value of ignorance this article provides a new perspective on the information structure of an agent in a standard model of adverse selection before the contracting takes place the agent has the opportunity to gather private information on a relevant parameter that affects final payoffs i allow for the possibility that the agent remains uninformed with some probability the agent s optimal choice of information structure is derived and it is shown that in the case of two states of nature the possibility of remaining ignorant has a positive strategic value for the agent since a poor information structure generates strategic benefits there will be no equilibrium in which the agent is perfectly informed even if additional information is costless at the margin

costly state verification with varying risk preferences and liability abstract in the scenario of loan contracts with costly state verification we examine how the properties of the set of states different risk preferences of debtors and varying liability of lenders affect the structure of optimal repayments in particular we show that with risk averse debtors a general set of states a constant observation cost and both unlimited and limited lender liability the debtor is strictly better off revealing the true state of nature when his realized revenue is low which implies that optimal debtor consumption has a downward jump around the single switch from observed to unobserved states if the debtor can destroy revenue or if the debtor is risk neutral this non monotonicity of consumption disappears moreover given the loan size there is more monitoring under debtor risk aversion than risk neutrality we present simulations showing that a contract with unlimited lender liability and debtor risk aversion has a higher expected observation cost but a lower variance of consumption than a contract with limited lender liability finally we discuss the problems of commitment to verification and contract renegotiation in this framework

the role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition workers routinely carry out activities that increase their productivity with their current employer for which they are not directly compensated for example a worker may be asked to develop relationships with clients or shop floor staff or he may develop a better understanding of how his firm operates firmspecific human capital of this type is difficult to quantify so that it is likely to be difficult to directly compensate the worker for its acquisition this paper is concerned with designing compensation schemes for employees to induce them to collect nonverifiable firm specific human capital if firms develop reputations for fairly compensating workers for skill collection the vagueness of these skills may not provide a significant incentive problem i consider the case where firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations as a result the acquisition of human capital is subject to a dual moral hazard problem first noted in kahn and huberman 1988 first a worker only collects skills if there is a promise of a higher wage if he does so second the employer has an incentive to claim that the worker has not collected these skills even when he in fact has in order to save on wage costs so on the one hand it is difficult to repay the worker after skills are collected as the firm has an incentive to renege however the worker cannot be repaid before collecting skills as he has no subsequent incentive to collect them following the institutional literature i assume that the firm can commit to a labor contract which attaches wages to different tasks the principal purpose of the paper is to show that the firm can use this ability to commit to a wage scale for different tasks to induce a worker to collect firm specific human capital in the presence of this dual moral hazard problem where the worker is rewarded for skill acquisition by promotion to another job assume that a worker can be assigned to one of two jobs d and

loan size as a commitment device the authors model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy the borrower underreports with a positive probability in the successful state and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure under lack of commitment to audit probabilities an increase in loan size convinces the borrower that the lender has a high stake in an audit this reduces the probability of underreporting and leads to overinvestment relative to the commitment case however there is underinvestment relative to the level under full information copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

employee voice human resource practices and quit rates evidence from the telecommunications industry the authors draw on strategic human resource and industrial relations theories to identify the sets of employee voice mechanisms and human resource practices that are likely to predict firm level quit rates then empirically evaluate the predictive power of these variables using data from a 1998 establishmentlevel survey in the telecommunications industry with respect to alternative voice mechanisms they find that union representation predicts lower quit rates even after they control for compensation and a wide range of other human resource practices that may be affected by collective bargaining also predicting lower quit rates is employee participation in offline problem solving groups and in self directed teams no apparent association is found between quit rates and the availability of nonunion dispute resolution procedures regarding human resource practices higher relative wages and internal promotion policies predict lower quit rates and contingent staffing electronic monitoring and variable pay predict higher rates

the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts a signaling approach abstract we analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements selfish principals are not we investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract offer to the agent explicit and implicit contracts are shown to be substitutes since the agent learns the principal s type a selfish principal must rely on explicit incentives a fair principal by contrast can effectively induce implicit incentives and does not need to use explicit incentives we also find a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives

unions and cooperative behavior the effect of discounting using union contract and industry wage survey data this article examines the effect of discounting on cooperative bargaining behavior by unions and firms game theory predicts that higher discount rates raise the temptation to defect from cooperation measures of cooperative behavior included the presence of merit pay incentive pay wage employment guarantees or labor management study committees discount rates were proxied by the relevant industry s failure rate failure rates generally had negative effects on cooperation industry wage survey results showed larger effects for union than non union establishments providing support for the union bargaining framework

the value of information in a principal agent model with moral hazard the ex post contracting case abstract in a principal agent model with moral hazard a signal about the principal s technology the stochastic mapping from the agent s action to the outcome is observed before the contract is offered the signal is either uninformative null information informative and observed only by the principal private information or also observed by the agent public information we show that from an ex ante standpoint before the signal is observed i the agent prefers private to both null and public information ii the principal sometimes prefers null to both private and public information and iii when the principal prefers public to null information she prefers public to private information whereas the agent prefers private to public information in this last situation we also show that iv for any separating equilibrium with private information there exists a contract with public information that both strictly prefer

informed principal moral hazard and the value of a more informative technology we analyze a principal agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology we characterize perfect bayesian equilibria of the contracting game that possess the following properties i a principal with a more informative technology ends up earning less profits than a principal with a less informative one does ii compared to the complete information case the actions implemented by the privately informed principal can be distorted iii the agent can end up being better off when the principal has private information

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

optimal contracting with subjective evaluation this paper extends the standard principal agent model to allow for subjective evaluation the optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures moreover discrimination against an individual implies lower pay and performance suggesting that the extent of discrimination as measured after controlling for performance may underestimate the level of true discrimination finally the optimal contract entails the use of bonus pay rather than the threat of dismissal hence neither efficiency wages nor the right to dismiss an employee are necessary ingredients for an optimal incentive contract

on the equivalence of general and specific control in organizations most principal agent relationships in firms are multidimensional in the presence of multiple tasks and multiple performance signals the contract between principal and agent not only has to motivate the agent but also has to direct the agent to allocate effort among different tasks the value of efforts for a specific task accrues not only through the principal s expected returns but also through its contribution to overall risk and therefore to the risk diversification of the task portfolio hence if the agent is risk averse multitask relationships can be considered as a portfolio problem coupled with incentive constraints we examine the relationship between specific control sc and general control gc for multitask principal agent problems under sc the principal observes the outcome of each individual task and uses this set of information for compensation under gc contracts are based only on the aggregate signal such as cumulative profits of all tasks we describe two sets of multitask problems for which gc and sc are equivalent that is contracts based only on aggregate performance signals impose the same incentives for the agent as a contract that is based on the outcome of each task the first multitask problem is characterized by homogeneous tasks in the second multitask problem all activities are perfect substitutes in the cost function of the agent the equivalence of sc and gc arises since gc provides insurance to the agent and yields the same overall risk premium as specific control moreover gc allows the principal to set the same incentives as sc since the marginal returns from gc are equal to the sum of the marginal returns for each task under sc the results described in this paper can serve as benchmarks where gc and sc are equivalent we show how the equivalence can be relevant for a variety of business situations such as the compensation of sales persons or managers at all hierarchy levels we also discuss the reasons when gc and sc differ suppose for instance that tasks are technologically separable and the precision of the performance of one task is low then the principal is forced under gc to adopt an incentive scheme that implements only a low effort across all tasks since the average precision matters under sc however the principal can tailor the optimal efforts to each task

signaling new product reliability with after sales service contracts prior studies on performance based contracting pbc for after sales services have highlighted its advantages over traditional resource based contracting rbc when products are established and their reliability is known to all parties we develop a game theoretic model to investigate how these insights are affected when the vendor is privately informed about the reliability of a newly developed product a novel feature of our model is the interaction between reliability signaling private information and the vendor s discretionary investment in spares inventory private action which arises naturally in the setting we consider we find that this interaction leads to contrasting equilibrium outcomes under the two contracts rbc induces the vendor to focus on inventory savings leading to underinvestment in spares whereas pbc induces the vendor to focus on reliability signaling achieved through overinvestment in inventory as a result neither contract is efficient we investigate two means to mitigate this inefficiency but either approach has caveats a making inventory verifiable removes the trade off between reliability signaling and inventory investment but results in diverging contract preferences between the vendor and the buyer b pooling inventories across multiple buyers saves inventory costs but it also hinders reliability signaling potentially exacerbating inefficiency this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

signalling and renegotiation in contractual relationships this paper examines how the possibility of renegotiation affects contractual outcomes in signaling games when an infinite number of rounds of renegotiations are allowed before contracts are executed the main results of the paper are 1 contracts may still contain distortions 2 the popular efficient separating equilibrium outcome is never an equilibrium outcome with renegotiation 3 incentive compatibility constraints can be generalized to incorporate renegotiation 4 equilibrium outcomes can be separating and nevertheless depend on the uninformed player s prior and 5 renegotiation in signaling games may lead to outcomes similar to equilibrium outcomes of screening games in which multiple contract purchases are allowed copyright 1993 by the econometric society

taste heterogeneity and urban spatial structure the logit model and monocentric theory reconciled abstract a model of urban spatial structure for a linear and closed monocentric city is formulated by allowing the presence of randomly distributed idiosyncratic tastes for location in an otherwise uniform household population land use equilibrium conditions are shown to have a stochastic representation which depends on the distribution of the idiosyncratic tastes over the population of households a special case in which the multinomial logit model gives the representative household s locational choice probability is derived and examined for a logarithmic utility function it is shown that the stochastic equilibrium can also be obtained as the solution of a welfare optimum problem either by maximizing total social welfare primal or by minimizing total opportunity cost dual either formulation gives the equilibrium allocations and associated decentralizing land prices some comparative statics analysis is undertaken to show that while most results are like those of the alonso mills muth model increasing taste heterogeneity decentralizes the linear urban form flattening the rent and population density gradients the alonso mills muth solution is obtained as an asymptotically limiting case which provides an upper bound on the steepness of the rent and population density gradients and a lower bound on the length of the linear city and the welfare level of the representative consumer

the effects of grievance activity on productivity this study develops and tests a production function that includes a plant s grievance filing rate as a determinant of productivity application of that function to data on nine unionized paper mill

income tax evasion labour supply and the equity efficiency tradeoff abstract this paper is an attempt to incorporate tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income taxation a model of variable labour supply with tax evasion is used to derive supply functions for labour in regular and irregular markets given taxpayer behaviour the government chooses tax rates penalties and the probability of detection to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function the results consist in the derivation of a formula for the optimum marginal tax rate and a characterization of the factors determining the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection as instruments for the control of tax evasion

warranties as signals under consumer moral hazard this article examines the use of prices and warranties as signals of product quality to consumers who choose how to maintain their purchases the seller s incentives are strongly affected by the interaction of quality and maintenance in determining product reliability two different assumptions about this interaction are made a separating equilibrium in which high quality is signalled with a low warranty and low price is shown to be possible in both cases

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

incomplete contracts and signaling this article presents a principal agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness i show that in the presence of transactions costs incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal s type two types of transactions costs are considered those incurred ex ante drafting costs and those incurred ex post enforcement or verification costs i prove that in the presence of either of these costs asymmetric information leads to more contractual incompleteness than full information does

maverick buying eliminate participate leverage companies have consolidated purchasing volumes that were scattered across organizational units to lower purchasing prices to realize these benefits companies frequently opt for a hybrid organizational structure that is conducive to a specific form of non compliant behavior referred to as maverick buying local business units bypass official processes and source from suppliers other than the designated supplier this non compliant action counteracts companies efforts to benefit from volume consolidation we consider maverick buying as a form of hidden action in a principal agent framework and provide a formal analysis of strategies that companies employ to avoid maverick buying or remedy its negative consequences our results suggest that the conventional strategy of monitoring and penalizing agents in case of non compliance not only has clear limitations but may be ineffective rather than trying to eliminate maverick buying through monitoring companies should under some conditions participate in agents superior market knowledge we propose a self selection model the principal offers contract menus termed participation menus tailored to agents with attractive outside options and agents without incentives to buy maverick we demonstrate that participation menus perform particularly well when conventional monitoring fails and that in some situations they can be employed to leverage the agents purchasing capabilities

union effects on productivity profits and growth has the long run arrived this article interprets literature examining union effects on economic performance production function studies indicate small overall union impacts on productivity positive effects where they exist appear to result from management response to decreased profit expectations and from a natural selection process lower profitability among unionized firms is well established more interesting is the possibility that unions appropriate quasi rents deriving from long lived tangible and intangible capital the connection between unions investment behavior and productivity growth emerges as a particularly fruitful line of empirical inquiry although it does not encourage a sanguine view of unionism s long run impact

invariance of expected utilities in logit models abstract an unnoticed and restrictive property of the logit model is proved the expected utility or expected utility change conditional on having selected an alternative i is invariant over all alternatives in the choice set this limits the use of logit in situations where expected utilities should realisticly vary by choice made the probit model is not subject to this restriction

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

is poor worker morale costly to firms in 1985 and 1990 studies norsworthy and zabala reported evidence supporting the hypothesis that declining worker morale has reduced productivity and productivity growth this study partly replicat

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

a test of an efficiency model of grievance activity copyright by cornell university this is the publisher s version also available electronically from http ilr sagepub com content 45 1 3 refs

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

vacation behaviour under high travel cost conditions a stated preference of revealed preference approach abstract this paper investigates vacation behaviour under high travel cost conditions we estimate discrete portfolio vacation choice models on data obtained in a novel free format stated preference of revealed preference sp off rp choice experiment the substantive contribution of this paper is that we develop new insights into vacation behaviour under high travel cost conditions we find that vacationers exhibit considerable diminishing marginal disutility of vacation travel costs furthermore we have identified significant interactions effects across the following vacation choice dimensions destination length of stay accommodation type and mode of transport therefore a substantial increase in travel costs is likely to have marked consequences for the tourism industry reaching beyond the transportation side of tourism methodological contributions of this paper are twofold 1 it proposes a choice experiment in which sp alternatives are constructed by pivoting of late consideration set alternatives rather than only of a chosen alternative and 2 it proposes and illustrates the use of a generalization of a recently proposed sp off rp estimation procedure

compensation plans for single and multi product salesforces an application of the holmstrom milgrom model the agency theory approach to understanding salesforce compensation plans is modified to incorporate the intratemporal nature of the salesperson s effort rate decision i e the decision about the effort rate at any given point in time potentially depends upon the sales performance up to that point in time in the accounting period under the assumptions considered in this paper holmstrom and milgrom 1987 have shown that the optimal compensation plan is linear in total sales over the accounting period the comparative statics results obtained here corroborate most of the corresponding results in the salesforce compensation literature moreover we derive many additional results not available in the literature it is demonstrated that the commission income as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of the sales effort or an increase in base sales on the other hand the salary component of the total compensation goes up with increases in uncertainty absolute risk