the 1985 86 oil price collapse and afterwards what does game theory add this paper focuses on the strategies used by opec to generate cartel profits over the period 1983 90 the evidence supports the hypothesis that opec adopted a swing producer strategy from 1983 to 1985 but when saudi arabia s profits fell below the level of coumot profits in the summer of 1985 it abandoned the role of swing producer driving prices to the cournot level subsequently saudi arabia appears to have adopted a tit for tat strategy designed to punish excessive cheating by other opec members based on these findings the strengths and limitations of game theory are assessed

hedging production risk with options the expected utility maximization problem is solved for producers with both price and production uncertainty who have access to both futures and options markets introduction of production uncertainty alters the optimal futures and options position and almost always makes it optimal for the producer to purchase put options and to underhedge on the futures market simulation results lend support to the practice of hedging the minimum expected yield on the futures market and hedging remaining expected production against downside price risk using put options the results are strengthened if the producer expects local production to influence national prices and if risk aversion is higher at low income levels

peak oil and energy policy a critique energy policy has frequently been based upon assumptions about future oil prices at the end of the 1970s it was assumed oil prices would continue to rise now a similar assumption pervades policy design this article critiques the peak oil hypotheses which lie behind these forecasts and policy beliefs and considers that from a climate change perspective the challenge is too much not too little fossil fuel reserves the coming of shale gas its fungibility with oil via the electrification of transport along with technological advances in increasing the depletion rates of existing wells and new reserves together undermine that assumption that rising oil prices will rapidly make renewable and other low carbon technologies cost competitive without subsidies the paper suggests indexing carbon prices to the oil price infrastructure investment strategic storage and a focus on market failures provides a superior approach to energy policy rather than relying on forecasts of oil prices and picking winners

opec market failure or power failure abstract the actions of opec and saudi arabia are discussed in terms of their objectives and their technical and social constraints it is concluded 1 that opec does not act as a cartel and 2 that hotelling s rule is not an important feature of pricing or production opec s more specifically saudi arabia s ideal policy is to keep price moderate to try to assure a market for their high reserves over the long run such an action would require heavy investments in capacity including in excess capacity for times of interruption of supply from other countries as in the 1990s and for times of high demand as in the 2000s the action may be inconsistent with other objectives and in any case may be too difficult to achieve

causes for an asymmetric relation between the price of crude oil and refined petroleum products we revisit the issue of asymmetries in the relation between the price of crude oil and refined petroleum products in the united states an econometric analysis of monthly data indicates that the asymmetric relation between the price of crude oil and motor gasoline is generated by refinery utilization rates and inventory behavior the asymmetric relation between the price of crude oil and home heating oil probably is generated by contractual arrangements between retailers and consumers together these results imply that price asymmetries may be generated by efficient markets under these conditions there is little justification for policy interventions to reduce or eliminate price asymmetries in motor gasoline and home heating oil markets

the political economy of opec abstract we develop a conceptual model that captures opec pricing behavior and apply it to explain the large gap observed between domestic fuel prices in opec countries and prices in the rest of the world we model opec as a cartel of nations not firms and assume that politicians use two instruments production quotas and domestic fuel consumption subsidies the cartel of nations model suggests that introduction of alternatives to petroleum products may lead opec to reduce exports and increase domestic fuel consumption the empirical analysis suggests that when opec sets production quotas it places similar weights on consumer and producer surplus but when opec countries set domestic fuel subsidies on average 6 more weight is given to consumer surplus with some of the opec countries pursuing very aggressive domestic cheap fuel policies

do oil producers act as oil igopolists in this paper the author analyzes an oligopoly model of exhaustible resource extraction and develop predictions about relative extraction patterns of different producers using the open quote oil close quote igopoly model of loury one can show that producers with large stocks produce a larger amount but a smaller percentage of their stocks than producers with small stocks the authors extend loury s model to cases where extraction costs differ among producers and where costs are a function of cumulative extraction an increase in extraction costs for a producer causes it to produce less relative to its rivals when extraction costs rise with cumulative extraction producers with large reserves tend to have lower extraction costs and a smaller ratio of cumulative production to initial reserves than producers with small reserves the authors test the predictions of the model using oil industry data and find that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of open quotes oil close quotes igopoly theory producers with larger reserves extract a smaller share of their reserves and have lower production costs than producers with smaller reserves this pattern holds for 73 countries with oil reserves during the time period 1970 1989 and for approximately 400 us oil companies in 1983 and 1984 more the observed pattern of production for both opec and non opec producers is consistent with open quote oil close quote igopoly theory opec producers do not appear to restrain production given their level of reserves relative to non opec producers thus viewing the oil market as containing one dominant firm opec with a competitive fringe may be misleading further the pattern of extraction observed in oil markets is inconsistent with the pattern predicted by competitive theory 29 refs 5 figs 6 tabs less

decomposing the macroeconomic effects of natural disasters a national income accounting perspective abstract there is an unresolved debate as to whether natural disasters present true obstacles to a country s economic growth and development given that the empirical evidence is rather heterogeneous in this paper we explore whether aggregate analyses are likely to mask different responses of the components export and import government consumption investment and private consumption of gross domestic product gdp to this end we assembled a panel data set of hurricane strikes and national income accounting data for 21 caribbean countries for the period 1970 2011 we used a panel vector autoregressive varx model to take account of the direct impact of the storm shocks and any feedback mechanisms our results suggest that the responses on each gdp component differ widely where we find some effects on export import public consumption investment and private consumption however the differences in timing and directions of these impacts demonstrate why it may be difficult to find any clear and large net aggregate impact of hurricanes and natural disasters in general on gdp

a test of the opec cartel hypothesis 1974 1983 this paper tests whether the higher oil prices fo the last decade could have been the result of producer collusion we find little evidence that opec influenced oil prices during the years of skyrocketing prices 1974 1980 but there is evidence that it did so during the recent years of softening prices 1981 1983

iranian oil free zone and international oil prices abstract one of the main elements of economic sanctions against iran due to its nuclear and military programs is crude oil exportation restrictions in addition to investment in iranian energy related projects senders of such sanction are interested in understanding the impacts of such embargos on international oil prices we apply unrestricted vector autoregressive var model using impulse response functions irf and variance decomposition analysis vda tools with annual data from 1965 to 2012 to analyze the dynamic response of international oil prices to iranian oil export sanction controlling for the supply of non iranian oil the world gdp per capita and post islamic revolution exogenous dummy variables we show that international oil prices respond negatively and statistically significant to increasing shock in absolute negative changes of the iranian oil exports our proxy of iran oil sanctions following the first 2 years after shock the main reason is the positive response of the non iranian oil supply to negative shocks in iranian oil exports filling the missing supply of iranian oil in international markets

crude oil price fluctuations and saudi arabia s behaviour this study attempts to explain why crude oil prices fluctuate the main cause being the quota regime which characterises the opec agreements given that the saudi oil supply is inelastic in the short term a shock in the oil market is accommodated by an immediate price change by contrast a dominant firm behaviour in the long term causes an output change which is accompanied by a smaller price change this explains why oil prices overshoot the results of a general equilibrium model applied to saudi arabia support this analysis they also indicate that saudi arabia does not have any incentive for altering the crude oil market equilibrium with either positive or negative supply shocks as its welfare declines and that it has an incentive disincentive for intervening if a negative positive demand shock hits the crude oil market a second set of simulations is designed to understand what kind of oecd policy might help to bring down prices a tax cut would worsen the situation whereas policies that can increase the price elasticity of demand seem to be very effective

on the identification of cointegrated systems in small samples a modelling strategy with an application to uk wages and prices abstract this paper discusses the practical application of identification in cointegrated systems it will argue that in a common realistic modelling situation of a limited data set and the theory requirements of a fairly rich model the techniques proposed in the existing literature are almost impossible to implement successfully there are crucial decisions to be made over the order in which various restrictions are imposed in the move from a general unrestricted vector error correction model vecm to the fully over identified vecm we will argue that imposing exogeneity restrictions at the earliest possible stage of the model reduction process and then restricting the dynamic adjustment of the model hugely increases the power of tests of overidentifying restrictions on the long run cointegrating vectors in practice this means that a thorough use of economic theory at an early stage rather than treating a model as a pure statistical artefact can yield enormous benefits

fuel efficiency improvements feedback mechanisms and distributional effects in the oil market we study the interactions between fuel efficiency improvements in the transport sector and the oil market where the efficiency improvements are policy induced in certain regions of the world we are especially interested in feedback mechanisms of fuel efficiency such as the rebound effect carbon leakage and the green paradox but also the distributional effects for oil producers an intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is introduced where opec core producers have market power we find that the rebound effect has a noticeable effect on the transport sector with the magnitude depending on the oil demand elasticity in the benchmark simulations we calculate that almost half of the energy savings may be lost to a direct rebound effect and an additional 10 to oil price adjustments in addition there is substantial intersectoral leakage to other sectors through lower oil prices in the regions that introduce the policy there is a small green paradox effect in the sense that oil consumption increases initially when the fuel efficiency measures are gradually implemented finally international carbon leakage will be significant if policies are not implemented in all regions we estimate leakage rates of 35 or higher when only major consuming regions implement fuel economy policies non opec producers will to a larger degree than opec producers cut back on its oil supply as a response to fuel efficiency policies due to high production costs

on quota violations of opec members abstract over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for opec countries however the academic literature on opec focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns this paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain opec members incentives for abiding or violating quotas we first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice the model highlights the trade off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007 we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and opec s quota system disciplining its members in bad times

an analysis of oil production by opec countries persistence breaks and outliers this study examines the time series behaviour of oil production for opec member countries within a fractional integration modelling framework recognizing the potential for structural breaks and outliers the analysis is undertaken using monthly data from january 1973 to october 2008 for 13 opec member countries the results indicate there is mean reverting persistence in oil production with breaks identified in 10 out of the 13 countries examined thus shocks affecting the structure of opec oil production will have persistent effects in the long run for all countries and in some cases the effects are expected to be permanent

prices rise faster than they fall output prices tend to respond faster to input increases than to decreases this tendency is found in more than two of every three markets examined it is found as frequently in producer goods markets as in consumer goods markets in both kinds of markets the asymmetric response to cost shocks is substantial and durable on average the immediate response to a positive cost shock is at least twice the response to a negative shock and that difference is sustained for at least five to eight months unlike past studies which documented similar asymmetries in selected markets gasoline agricultural products etc this one uses large samples of diverse products 77 consumer and 165 producer goods accordingly the results suggest a gap in an essential part of economic theory as a start on filling this gap the study finds no asymmetry in the resonse of an individual decision maker a supermarket chain to its costs but it finds above average asymmetry where a cost shock is filtered through a fragmented w

oil exploitation and the environmental kuznets curve abstract this study refers to a panel estimation of an environmental kuznets curve ekc for oil to determine the factors most affecting oil exploitation in 38 oil producing countries during 1990 2000 control variables such as oil reserves oil price population political rights and the gini index were used to determine its contribution to the main ekc model the empirical results fully support the existence of an ekc for oil exploitation furthermore the result indicates that the proved oil reserves has a significant and positive role in oil production but oil price and population do not significantly affect crude oil production also increased freedoms and a better income distribution will reduce the rate of oil exploitation thus policies aiming at enhancing democratic society and better income distribution would be more compatible with sustainability

hedging with price and output uncertainty abstract this paper extends mckinnon s analysis of hedging with price and output uncertainty to the general case where preferences are not necessarily quadratic and probability distribution not necessarily normal

investigation of production sales and inventory relationships using multicointegration and non symmetric error correction models the accumulated sum of a stationary series is called integrated if a linear combination of some of the integrated series is stationary it is said to be cointegrated this paper presents empirical results on inventories to consider the possibility of a deeper form of cointegration called multicointegration which is introduced in granger and lee 1989 a vector integrated series is multicointegrated if the accumulated sum of its stationary cointegrated linear combination is again cointegrated with itself inventory which is the accumulated sum of production minus sales is probably cointegrated with production and sales the empirical results generally support the presence of multicointegration of production and sales in many u s industries and industrial aggregates the results also favour the non symmetric error correction model providing evidence that the strength of attraction is different on both sides of the attractor a modified s s rule for inventory control is investigated in the context of a non symmetric error correction model and the results generally do not support the s s rule sufficient evidence is found to conclude that multicointegration is a useful concept in the area of inventory determination

u s oil dependence 2014 is energy independence in sight abstract the importance of reducing u s oil dependence may have changed in light of developments in the world oil market over the past two decades since 2005 increased domestic production and decreased oil use have cut u s import dependence in half the direct costs of oil dependence to the u s economy are estimated under four u s energy information administration scenarios to 2040 the key premises of the analysis are that the primary oil market failure is the use of market power by opec and that u s economic vulnerability is a result of the quantity of oil consumed the lack of readily available economical substitutes and the quantity of oil imported monte carlo simulations of future oil market conditions indicate that the costs of u s oil dependence are likely to increase in constant dollars but decrease relative to u s gross domestic product unless oil resources are larger than estimated by the u s energy information administration reducing oil dependence therefore remains a valuable goal for u s energy policy and an important co benefit of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions

opec s market power an empirical dominant firm model for the oil market abstract we estimate a dominant firm competitive fringe model for the crude oil market using quarterly data on oil prices for the 1986 2016 period the estimated structural parameters have the expected signs and are significant we find that opec exercised market power during the sample period counterfactual experiments indicate that world gdp is the main driver of long run oil prices however supply depletion factors have become more important in recent years

optimal bidding and hedging in international markets this paper examines the optimal bidding and hedging decisions of a risk averse contractor for a construction project abroad we show that currency options play no role as a hedging instrument when the contractor has a quadratic utility function however if the contractor is prudent currency options are used for hedging purposes prudence thus generates a hedging demand for currency options when foreign exchange exposure is uncertain contrary to the conventional wisdom we show that currency hedging may have perverse effects on the contractor s bidding behavior in a canonical example with negative exponential utility functions we demonstrate that the possibilities for the contractor to bid more aggressively in the absence of currency hedging are not factitious

the emperor has no clothes the limits of opec in the global oil market most scholars and policymakers believe opec can and does influence the price of oil by acting as a cartel this paper argues that most of the conventional wisdom about opec is wrong opec rarely if ever influences the oil production rate in its member states further opec has almost no lasting impact on world prices except under rare conditions there was one occasion on which opec did have a significant impact on world oil prices namely the 1973 oil crisis but opec s role in the event has been greatly misunderstood the circumstances of the crisis were highly exceptional making it unlikely that the organization could ever have a similar impact on world oil prices again this paper seeks to correct the misunderstanding about opec s role and replace it with a better understanding of the organization i argue that opec is dysfunctional as a cartel as it has little or no causal impact on its members choices about production levels or investment in production capacity opec s role is obscured in part by the complexity of the world oil market and in part by misdirection by policymakers especially within opec many scholars especially economists have argued that opec should be understood as a cartel designed to solve a prisoner s dilemma pd coordination game yet opec s persistence is better understood as a widespread failure to update beliefs about the organization a failure that is driven by information asymmetry and politics the fact that such a widespread belief about the world s most important commodity market could be wrong can help us better understand international regimes

opec behavior a test of alternative hypotheses since interpretations of past and future oil price patterns depends on the model chosen the author tests and compares alternative theories of opec as a first step in validating the choice on any one model the results show that among opec countries the partial market sharing cartel model is the only model not rejected by at least some of the 11 members and gives the best explanation of production in comparison with 11 non opec countries the competitive model could not be rejected for 10 of the 11 non opec producers this raises the question of why if opec is a cartel friedman s predictions have not come true and introduces new questions for future research 19 references 3 tables

how do oil producers respond to oil demand shocks abstract this paper analyzes the response of international oil producers to demand induced changes in the price of crude oil during 1975 2011 focusing on potential differences between opec and non opec countries the goal is to derive consistent estimates of the short run price elasticity of crude oil supply at the country level i find that oil producers hardly respond to demand shocks within the same month and that the corresponding impact price elasticities of supply are statistically indistinguishable from zero while there is little evidence of differences in the dynamic responses to a typical flow demand shock on average over the sample period opec members seem to curtail production in response to a speculative demand shock whereas non opec production expands significantly flow and speculative demand shocks account for a nontrivial fraction of the total variability in country level crude oil supply

hedging with commodity options when price distributions are skewed lapan moschini and hanson have demonstrated that commodity options can be useful for hedgers who face a symmetric price distribution and who wish to maintain a net open market position this is because options skew the distribution of profits to the right and such skewness typically increases expected utility in this paper i use standard comparative statics to show that options are relatively more valuable for reducing the skewness of a nonsymmetric price distribution depending on the direction of the skewness and the underlying price expectations hedgers may write options as well as purchase them

on the economic determinants of oil production theoretical analysis and empirical evidence for small exporting countries abstract in this paper decisions regarding production in oil exporting countries are studied by means of theoretical analysis and empirical investigation in particular we aim at describing the relationship between oil production levels and changes in the world oil demand and prices intertemporal production decisions by a representative oil producer are modeled by means of a partial equilibrium model in this theoretical model oil producers are subject to exogenous shocks in world oil consumption and prices oil companies can change output levels only by incurring a fixed cost results from the simulation of this model show a strong relationship between oil production and changes in world oil consumption on the contrary the effects of changes in real oil prices on oil production decisions seem to be much lower results from the simulation of the theoretical model are then empirically investigated using time series econometric techniques the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that oil producing countries are characterized by different responses to changes in world oil demand and in real oil prices for many countries production rapidly adjusts to changes in consumption whereas responses of oil production to innovations in real oil prices are found to be not statistically significant in addition when non linearities in the relationship between world oil demand prices and output levels are allowed for evidence of asymmetric effects of shocks to exogenous variables on output levels is found for some countries

heterogeneous noncompliance with opec s oil production cuts abstract in this study we explore the heterogeneous noncompliance behavior among ten member nations of the organization of the petroleum countries opec overall we find that the three top oil producers saudi arabia iran and venezuela and the four relatively low oil producers libya indonesia algeria and qatar exhibit higher cheating frequencies and magnitudes while they tend to offset their peers conduct conversely the three mid oil producers uae nigeria and kuwait display much lower frequencies and magnitudes of noncompliance with opec s administered quotas while they largely demonstrate herding behavior among their peers the volatilities of the respective cheating magnitudes are rather similar across the three clusters though this study contributes to the economic literature by further illuminating the operational mode of opec and by exposing its three main subsets its interdependent structure and its members customary behavioral patterns

oil production responses to price changes an empirical application of the competitive model to opec and non opec countries abstract falling oil prices over the last decade accompanied by over production by some opec members and the growth of non opec supply warrant further empirical investigation of the competitive model to ascertain production behavior a supply function based on a modification of griffin s model is estimated using data from 1973 1997 the sample period unlike griffin s however includes phases of price increase 1970s and price decrease 1980s 1990s thus providing a better framework for examining production behavior using the competitive model the opec results do not support the competitive hypothesis instead a negative and significant price elasticity of supply is obtained this result offers partial support for the target revenue theory for most of the non opec members the estimates support the competitive model opec s loss of market share and the drop in the share of oil based energy should signal adjustments in price and quantity based on a competitive world market for crude oil

a dynamic network analysis of the world oil market analysis of opec and non opec members abstract we characterize the dynamic network structure of major oil producing countries we examine the oil production coordination of 13 organization of the petroleum exporting countries opec and 17 non opec members we construct the dynamic network structure using the network connectedness measure of diebold and yilmaz 2009 we investigate the structural changes in connectedness of opec and non opec members additionally we study how the influence of opec members non opec countries and major oil producers evolve we find that the network structure of major oil producing countries changes significantly over time specifically the impact of changes in oil production of all opec members on global oil production declines whereas the impact of non opec on global oil production increases opec s increase decisions have a significant and positive impact on opec and non opec coordination however cut decisions do not affect coordination we find that opec countries and developing countries have significantly higher levels of connectedness additionally countries with high oil production levels have significantly more influence the empirical results provide intuition about the recent developments in global oil production

oil prices speculation and fundamentals interpreting causal relations among spot and futures prices abstract a consensus that the world oil market is unified begs the question where do innovations in oil prices enter the market here we investigate where changes in the price of crude oil originate and how they spread by examining causal relationships among prices for crude oils from north america europe africa and the middle east on both spot and futures markets results indicate that innovations first appear in spot prices for dubai fateh and spread to other spot and futures prices while other innovations first appear in the far month contract for west texas intermediate and spread to other exchanges and contracts links between spot and futures markets are relatively weak and this may have allowed the long run relationship between spot and future prices to change after september 2004 together these results suggest that market fundamentals initiated a long term increase in oil prices that was exacerbated by speculators who recognized an increase in the probability that oil prices would rise over time

determinants of opec production implications for opec behavior we estimate models that identify the economic and organizational determinants of crude oil production by individual opec nations to clarify the interpretation of econometric results we model production with specifications that resolve the statistical ordering of variables and estimate models with techniques that can cope with stochastic trends in the time series we also analyze the short run dynamics for asymmetries that may carry important insights about opec behavior results indicate that quotas are an important determinant of production and their effects generally are symmetric which implies that opec is an organization that influences production and ultimately prices real prices generally have a positive effect on production and the size of this effect may depend on spare capacity which implies that opec behaviors also embody competitive elements finally all nations other than saudi arabia show some form of production sharing behavior which may imply that opec shares mismatches between the call for opec production and opec quotas

opec and other commodity cartels a comparison abstract the economic literature provides specific characteristics for cartels although the theory of international cartels is not well developed in the literature and every cartel is unique some of these characteristics exist in each cartel this study investigates the existence of these characteristics in six known commodity cartels including opec in addition it compares the oil companies cartel the seven sisters to opec and summarizes the findings of opec econometric models developed in the literature in the last 25 years and concludes that the results do not support cartel or competitive models for opec although other cartels are more successful than opec many books and articles in economics use opec as a cartel example neither statistical tests nor theory support the popular use of opec as a cartel example indeed this article concludes that opec is composed of saudi arabia the dominant world producer plus several distinct sub groups and that separate models are required to explain the behavior of each assigning the power of some opec members to opec has caused confusion about its behavior recent opec success is attributed to political natural and technical capacity limitations in the oil fields that prevented countries from cheating on their quota in other words opec adherence to the quota except for saudi arabia is anything but voluntary

oil consumption subsidy removal in opec and other non oecd countries oil market impacts and welfare effects abstract this paper studies the oil market effects of phasing out oil consumption subsidies in the transport sector welfare effects in different countries are also examined the paper further investigates potential feedback mechanisms of oil subsidy removal via lower oil prices in the global oil market which may stimulate oil consumption in other regions an intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is applied where opec core producers have market power the major subsidisers of oil are opec countries and the effects of subsidy removal here are quite pronounced consumption of oil in the transport sector of opec countries declines significantly as a result the global oil price falls slightly and other regions increase their oil consumption to some degree although opec consumers are worse off by the subsidy removal total welfare in opec increases due to higher profits from oil production

price cutting and business stealing in imperfect cartels although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns important puzzles remain standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment but they fail to explain two important factual observations first apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs second it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected we propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation

export flexibility and currency hedging this article studies the behavior of an export flexible firm under exchange rate uncertainty we show that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable spot exchange rate otherwise the firm s optimal output depends on its preferences and on the underlying uncertainty we further show that the full hedging theorem holds only when the firm always finds it optimal to sell its entire output in the foreign market otherwise export flexibility introduces a convexity into the firm s foreign exchange risk exposure which calls for the use of currency options for hedging purposes

will disruptions in opec oil supply have permanent impact on the global oil market abstract opec has long been a major stakeholder and strong player in the global energy market especially in the petroleum sub sector in recent time however there have been questions over the influence of opec in the sub sector due to changing petroleum production landscape specifically as a result of the discovery of unconventional energy resources in north america and emergence of non opec petroleum producing and exporting countries this development could have significant effect on the global energy market and the macro economy of opec member countries the stationarity or otherwise of opec oil production supply has important implications for determining whether fluctuations in opec market supply has temporary or permanent effect using the zivot andrews structural break stationarity test and production data of opec member countries from 1980 to 2011 this paper investigates whether fluctuations in opec market supply has temporary or permanent effect the empirical analysis shows that for only 5 opec members nigeria saudi arabia ecuador kuwait and uae is the hypothesis of unit root rejected this implies that for the five 5 opec members the effects of shocks to oil production are not permanent and future pattern of oil production can be predicted following past trend the practical implication of this finding is that opec production quota strategy may not have long term impact on the global oil market thus the cartel needs to improve oil production policy coordination among members and ensure strict adherence to production quota while also stressing the need for diversification in member countries

imperfect cartelization in opec a model of global oil production is applied to study cartelization by opec countries we define a measure for the degree of cooperation analogous to the market conduct parameter of cyert et al 1973 geroski et al 1987 lofaro 1999 and symeonidis 2000 this parameter is used to assess the incentives of different opec members to collude we find that heterogeneity in opec and the supplies of the non opec fringe create strong incentives against collusion more specifically opec s supply strategy although observed to be substantially more restrictive than that of a cournot nash oligopoly is found to still be more accommodative than that of a perfect cartel the strategy involves allocating larger than proportionate quotas to smaller and relatively costlier producers as if to bribe their participation in the cartel this is in contrast to predictions of the standard cartel model that such producers should be allocated relatively more stringent quotas furthermore we demonstrate that cartel collusion is more likely to be sustained for elastic than for inelastic demand since global oil demand is well known to be inelastic this observation provides another structural explanation for why opec behavior is inconsistent with that of a perfect cartel our study points to multiple headwinds that limit opec s ability to mark up the oil price 2016 elsevier b v