optimal regulation of land development through price and fiscal controls abstract this paper examines the effectiveness of instruments existing residents of a community might use to regulate developers of vacant land in a community instruments examined include zoning laws price regulation and the shifting of fiscal burdens between existing residents and the developer traditional instruments such as zoning are not efficient in a world of perfect certainty price controls and creative fiscal arrangements produce efficient outcomes with uncertainty over future prices only by restructuring fiscal arrangements can the community efficiently control the developer

welfare properties of strategic r d investments in hotelling models abstract in linear city models if firms are allowed not allowed to locate outside the linear city they engage in excessive insufficient r d investments from the normative viewpoint this implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

zoning under spatial price discrimination i introduction the location of competing firms in a linear city has been profusely analyzed since the seminal work by hotelling 1929 who stated the minimum differentiation principle when each firm sets mill prices and consumers have linear transportation costs later d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 discussed the results obtained by hotelling and found that under quadratic transportation costs firms locate at the endpoints of the city a different scenario emerges when the sellers bear the transportation costs and are free to price discriminate among consumers throughout the market this problem was first envisaged by hoover 1937 and was formally analyzed by hurter and lederer 1985 and lederer and hurter 1986 they show that when the two firms simultaneously choose their locations in a linear city the equilibrium is that one firm locates in the first quartile and the other in the third quartile modern cities impose restrictions on the location of firms in the market in spain for example chemists and tobacconists shops cannot freely locate wherever they like they must maintain a certain distance from competitors that depends on the density of consumers in the market 1 the literature on zoning and firms locations has analyzed the effects of these legal restrictions on firms competition and market performances in this regard lai and tsai 2004 study the economic consequences of forbidding firms to locate within an area that emerges from the left hand border of the city they show that when firms compete with uniform prices the maximum differentiation principle as per d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 is still valid and that zoning improves welfare in a different setting chen and lai 2008 study optimal zoning when firms compete with discriminatory quantities under central symmetric zoning and show that zoning may improve social welfare these two papers consider linear cities 2 an alternative approach is to study a circular city as suggested by hamoudi and risueno 2012 they consider that consumers and firms locate in different areas they also introduce a regulator with different political profiles their analysis focuses on firms locations and the optimal size of commercial and residential areas under different political biases 3 unlike the abovementioned papers here we analyze zoning in a spatial duopoly with discriminatory pricing as developed by hurter and lederer 1985 and lederer and hurter 1986 to our knowledge this is the first attempt to analyze zoning within this framework we consider a linear city and linear transportation costs and we impose no restrictions on zoning design 4 in this context when firms choose their locations simultaneously they locate in the first and third quartiles these locations maximize social welfare if it is considered that the regulator gives the same weight to firms profits and the consumer surplus however when the regulator has a bias toward firms or consumers as in hamoudi and risueno 2012 we find that there is a need to impose certain restrictions on the locations of firms to get the first best our model differs from that of hamoudi and risueno 2012 in several aspects first we focus on discriminatory pricing rather than mill pricing second we study a linear city as opposed to a circular one third we allow areas where firms and consumers can coexist while they consider that firms and consumers are located on different sides finally we consider that zoning is unconstrained while they assume that zoning restricts the size of the region of the city where only firms can locate our results show that the bias of the regulator toward firms or consumers can be inferred from the regulation policy a bias toward firms is inferred when locations around the central area are forbidden and thus the zoning is close to the center of the city a bias in the direction of consumers exists when only locations around the central area are allowed which means that the zoning comprises the areas of the city close to the city boundaries

spurious rejections by cointegration tests induced by structural breaks the effects on three cointegration tests are examined when the series analysed are independent integrated processes each with a structural break although there are differences in detail among the tests the results indicate in all cases that when structural breaks are neglected in the analysis spurious rejections indicating the presence of cointegration can occur

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model revisited abstract this article reexamines sequential entry of firms in a hotelling model of spatial product differentiation as analyzed by neven neven d j 1987 endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model international journal of industrial organization 5 419 434 i show that the pattern of locations is generally asymmetric in the case of a duopoly profits are non monotonic in market size even in the range where the number of firms does not change the firm that bears the burden of entry deterrence gains from lower barriers to entry as long as entry deterrence is possible equilibrium profits of all firms may be larger in situations in which more firms are active

strategic multi store opening under financial constraint abstract this paper analyzes strategic store openings in a situation in which firms can open multiple stores depending on the financial constraints of the firm specifically given any upper limit of the number of store openings that two potentially symmetric firms can open they sequentially determine the number of store openings including their locations to maximize their profits as a result of our analysis in a microeconomic framework we show that the equilibrium strategy can be wholly classified into only two following opposite strategies according to the level of their financial constraints involved when firms can afford to invest significant amounts of money in the market the leader chooses segmentation strategy in which a part of the market can be monopolized by opening a chain of multiple stores and deterring the follower s entry in contrast when the leader has a severe financial constraint so that it can only monopolize less than half of the market the leader chooses minimum differentiation strategy where firms open each of their stores at exactly the same point as the rival s under this strategy the leader necessarily captures just half of the market furthermore we show that regardless of potential symmetry between firms both first and second mover advantages in terms of profit can occur in the equilibrium

symmetry breaking in two player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity a synthesis abstract this paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure strategy nash equilibria these classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game and relies on the theory of supermodular games the underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition to illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach we present some existing models dealing with r d capacity expansion and information provision which motivated this study

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

bidimensional vertical differentiation in markets where product quality is important more than one characteristic is usually necessary for producers to define product quality standard theory maintains that i in a duopoly there will be a quality leader no matter whether the product can incorporate one or two vertical attributes ii differentiation pertains only to one attribute by contrast in our set up there are also equilibria where the quality leader is better in two attributes and others where there is cross leadership namely a situation where each firm designs a product to dominate the other in one characteristic applications to minimum quality standards and tax subsidy on quality products are sketched showing spill over effects from one to the other quality dimension

spatial competition with a land market hotelling and von thunen unified we introduce into the standard spatial competition model the consumption of land by households and study the spatial competition under the influence of a land market in contrast to the standard assumption of a fixed given distribution of households we introduce the possibility of households relocation in reaction to firms location decisions thus the spatial distribution of households is treated as endogenous and a land market is introduced on which households compete for land use households consume simultaneously land and firms output accordingly the demand of each household becomes in turn endogenous as it depends on the income left after the land rent is paid not surprisingly the results obtained within this more general framework prove to be very different from the standard results for example in the 2 and 3 firm cases the optimal configuration of firms is a nash equilibrium when transport costs are high enough or the amount of vacant land is large enough the existence property is restored in the 3 firm case when the transport costs are high enough the introduction of vacant land causes a discontinuous change in the set of equilibrium configurations

optimal tax policy under environmental quality competition this paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality the first best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax or a subsidy for buying green products the first best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality regardless of environmentally conscious consumers if only one instrument is available the second best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality a uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough

sequential product positioning under differential costs this paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures it shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost it positions away from the most attractive location in the market further the larger the second mover s cost advantage the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location the paper also models uncertainty in the first mover s mind about the later entrant s cost structure and shows that an increase in this uncertainty in the sense of mean preserving spread also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market overall this paper suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product

survival at the center the stability of minimum differentiation abstract we model a hotelling market with multidimensional product differentiation in an evolutionary framework both evolutionary stability in the sense of schaffer 1989 and stochastic stability following kandori et al 1993 young 1993 are analyzed it is shown that firms move towards the center in product space i e a principle of minimum differentiation on all dimensions of the product space applies

quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming in many markets governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them such quality leadership strategies often win public acclaim especially when they involve environmental attributes using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation we show that if the high quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated it induces the regulator to weaken standards and welfare falls our results raise doubts about the social benefits of corporate self regulation and highlight the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for new regulations and their implementation

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition abstract the main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of consumer concentration around the market center on the equilibrium locations of location price games in the case of symmetric triangular density it is shown that no symmetric equilibrium exists however we demonstrate the existence of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies these equilibria are also characterized our secondary purpose is to study the sequential entry of two firms when the location space is not restricted to the market space this leads us to uncover a substantial first mover advantage which has been neglected in the literature

is zoning a negative sum game zoning is well known as a key instrument of planning regulation which is environmental regulation in its broadest sense zoning in terms of economic theorisation is normally justified by the pigovian welfare economics theses of market failure notably

spatial competition and price leadership in the stackelberg price leader price follower model each firm is typically better off as a follower than as a leader in this paper we show that introducing the spatial dimension provides a means of endogenising the role of price leadership furthermore the leader follower framework yields existence of a price and location equilibrium in the hotelling spatial model of competition where none exists under the original specification we first analyse the original hotelling model by determining reaction functions for firms this approach allows the model to be fully characterised and affords an intuitive explanation of the non existence of a price equilibrium for certain locations the reaction functions are then used to determine the solution when one firm adopts the stackelberg leadership role contrary to the existing predictions of the simple spatial duopoly model it is found that the outcome is asymmetric in terms of stackelberg equilibrium locations prices and profits with the first firm in the market enjoying higher profits than the subsequent entrant the equilibrium involves one firm locating at the mid point of the market this outcome is also appealing as it corresponds to the entry deterring and monopoly solutions

the competitive effects of price floors using hotelling s model of locational competition we show that a moderate price floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium resulting in minimum differentiation equilibrium prices are lower than prices in the absence of a floor a low price floor can lead to multiple equilibria with both minimum and maximum differentiation as possible outcomes

product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty we investigate hotelling s duopoly game of location then price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand we characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations contrary to the individual level random utility models location uncertainty is a differentiation force in equilibrium increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation higher expected equilibrium prices and profits and a greater welfare loss

duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small open city abstract this paper analyzes a duopoly location model with an asymmetric zoning that prohibits firms from locating to a specific interval in a small open linear city it is shown that the maximum differentiation principle presented in d aspremont et al econometrica 47 1979 1145 is still valid under area zoning regulation moreover a zoning regulation can be seen as a policy instrument to limit firms excess profits and a proper regulation may even reduce the distortion in total transportation costs therefore enhancing social welfare specifically the optimal zoning is about 29 5 percent of the city with no amenity effect finally all the land rents raised by zoning are eventually confiscated by the absentee landowner

signaling corporate social responsibility third party certification versus brands corporate social responsibility csr is a credence attribute of products which can be signaled either through a label certified by a third party or via unsubstantiated claims used as part of a brand building strategy we use an experimental posted offer market with sellers and buyers to compare the impact of these signaling strategies on market efficiency only third party certification gives rise to a separating equilibrium and an increase in csr investments unsubstantiated claims can generate a halo effect on consumers whereby the latter are nudged into paying more for the same level of csr investments by firms

assessing the relative merits of development charges and transferable development rights in an uncertain world traditionally regulatory instruments have been used to achieve planning objectives however emerging market based policy instruments such as transferable development rights a quantity based app

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

minimum quality standards and collusion we model the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly we extend the literature in determining the standard endogenously showing that the maximisation of social welfare entails an increase in the surplus accruing to consumers served by the low quality firm and a decrease in the surplus of the remaining consumers then we consider the effects of the standard on the stability of price collusion proving that the standard makes it more difficult for firms to collude if consumers are sufficiently rich

contract design and costly verification games abstract in this paper the signalling subgame in costly verification models is studied in the context of the investor entrepreneur contract without assuming the possibility of commitment to verification it is shown that the game has a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies implying that truth telling and deterministic verification are not an equilibrium behavior when the entire game starting from the stage of contract design is considered it is shown that the contract designed by the informed entrepreneur results in less verification cost than the one designed by the uninformed investor this could be taken as a normative criterion based upon which institutional arrangements as regards the distribution of bargaining initiative are to be designed

market structure and pricing strategy of china s automobile industry in this study using market level data on quantities prices and automobile characteristics from 1995 to 2001 we conduct a market analysis of the chinese automobile industry under imperfect competition on the demand side we apply a nested multinomial logit model to the national market share data in order to ascertain the demand features of china s automobile market on the supply side we assume bertrand behavior to uncover the markups set by automobile manufacturers our empirical results suggest that some large automobile manufacturers set high markups indicating their strong market power in china s automobile market however their declining markups in the late 1990 s imply a reduction in market control by the major producers

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

innocuous minimum quality standards abstract the present note shows that innocuous minimum quality standards namely below the lowest quality level in a market may have effects on equilibrium outcomes such a mqs reduces the incentive to invest in r d by the quality leading firm

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

information and the provision of quality differentiated products governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities we show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can but will not always encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality even if product qualities increase social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation we show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments jel l15 q58 i introduction in the past 20 years consumers have become increasinglyconscious ofthe undesirable health and safety attributes of the products they consume and surveys suggest that a growing percentage of consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality products such as organic foods and household cleaners and detergents that contain less toxic ingredients guber 2003 other high quality products facing higher demand include energy efficient products like extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation often these highquality products provide private benefits that are excludable to buyers as well as public benefits that are nonrival and nonexcludable for example reduced pesticide and chemical residue on food may lower the risk of cancer while also reducing contaminated run off that degrades ground and surface water quality extended life lightbulbs and improved home insulation may reduce an individual s utility bill while also reducing greenhouse gas emissions from lower energy consumption although interest in these types of high quality productsisgrowing demand isoften relatively small market shares of organic produce for

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

product differentiation with multiple qualities abstract we study subgame perfect equilibria of the classical quality price multistage game of vertical product differentiation each of two firms can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities consumers valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions the unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities we characterize equilibrium prices and the effects of qualities on the rival s equilibrium price in the general model equilibrium qualities depend on what we call the spence and price reaction effects for any equilibrium we characterize conditions for quality differentiation

when are private standards more stringent than public standards retailers private standards are increasingly important for addressing consumer concerns about safety quality and social and environmental issues empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts this article develops a political economy model that helps explain this stylized fact we show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one depending on several factors

minimal and maximal product differentiation in hotelling s duopoly abstract hotelling s 1929 model of duopolistic competition is re examined a family of utility functions is used which has as a special case hotelling s original utility function in a two stage location price game it is shown that an equilibrium exists when the curvature of the utility functions in the space of characteristics is sufficiently high the subgame perfect equilibrium never exhibits minimum product differentiation on the other hand not all equilibria are at maximal product differentiation

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

mixed duopoly location choice and shadow cost of public funds we examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly where a welfare maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit maximizing private firm we introduce shadow costs of public funding i e the excess burden of taxation the profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs we find that in a mixed duopoly the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare this result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly where the level of product differentiation is too high finally we show that when the shadow cost is high privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

newspaper differentiation and investments in journalism the role of tax policy many countries levy reduced rate indirect taxes on newspapers with proclaimed policy goals of stimulating investment in journalism and ensuring low newspaper prices however by taking into account the fact that the media industry operates in two sided markets we find the paradoxical result that the consequences of a low tax regime might be quite the opposite we also show that the low tax regime tends to increase newspaper differentiation if the advertising market is relatively small the newspapers might invest too little in journalism and be too differentiated from a social point of view in this case a tax increase will be welfare enhancing

a comment on zoning returns to scale and the value of undeveloped land this paper revisits the relationship between land value and parcel size the authors demonstrate that using a simple arbitrage equilibrium argument the value size relationship is convex concave whenever land assembly subdivision is possible they also explore further the impact of zoning on market outcomes copyright 1993 by mit press

certification and minimum quality standards when some consumers are uninformed we compare certification to a minimum quality standard mqs policy in a duopolistic industry where firms incur quality dependent fixed costs and only a fraction of consumers observe the quality of the offered goods compared to the unregulated outcome both profits and social welfare would increase if firms could commit to producing a higher quality an mqs restricts the firms quality choice and leads to less differentiated goods this fuels competition and may therefore deter entry a certification policy which awards firms with a certificate if the quality of their products exceeds some threshold does not restrict the firms quality choice in contrast to an mqs certification may lead to more differentiated goods and higher profits we find that firms are willing to comply with an ambitious certification standard if the share of informed consumers is small in that case certification is more effective from a welfare perspective than a minimum quality standard because it is less detrimental to entry

strategic quality competition and the porter hypothesis abstract this paper offers new support for the porter hypothesis within the context of a quality competition framework we use a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation in which two firms simultaneously choose to produce either a high environmentally friendly quality or low standard quality variant of a good before engaging in price competition in this simple setting we show that a nash equilibrium of the game featuring the low quality good can be pareto dominated by a different strategy profile in which both firms opt in favour of the green product our analysis demonstrates that in such a case both firms stand to profit from the introduction of a rule penalizing any firm refusing to produce the environmentally friendly product we also find that consumers themselves may benefit from such regulations this is always the case when shifting from low quality to high quality production brings about a cost efficiency improvement

forecasting the car penetration rate cpr in china a nonparametric approach with strong economic growth the auto industry has made great breakthroughs in recent years and has become a backbone industry in china while cars play an increasingly important role and are now the principal part of the auto industry both china s government and academic circles take strong interest in the prediction of cpr i e car penetration rate or cars per thousand people which will be the main guidance for the future industry policy we summarize the existing problems in recent research and propose to use nonparametric methods to estimate the cpr and its elasticity with respect to gdp per capita gdppc the results indicate that the nonparametric methods provide a much better fit than the conventional ols method and more importantly it captures the nonlinearity of the elasticity of cpr with respect to gdppc finally we predict future cpr in china

information constrained insurance the revelation principle extended abstract private information induced incentive constraints can cause allocations to diverge from full information optimal allocations often in the direction of limited insurance but can bring unanticipated anomalies related plausible contract exclusion restrictions can be damaging in welfare terms more generally private information optimal allocations can be sensitive to the information structure suggesting that the latter be specified with an eye toward realism as well as tractability in an effort to make tractability less of a constraint the paper shows how two apparently difficult information structures a costly state verification environment and a multiperiod multilateral private information environment can be handled theoretically by revelation principle methods the paper also shows how solutions can be generated numerically

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

pricing patterns as outcomes of product positions prior empirical work shows that different markets are characterized by different pricing patterns such as bertrand nash pricing or stackelberg leader follower pricing the author considers a duopolistic market where ex ante identical firms sequentially position their products prior to competing on prices in a single or multiperiod setting and show that the unique equilibrium outcome involves 1 firms choosing stackelberg pricing over bertrand nash pricing and 2 the positioning first mover acting as the price leader an attractive property of this model is that the ex post larger firm acts as the price leader which is consistent with prior empirical evidence copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

private voluntary standards in the food system the perspective of major food retailers in oecd countries abstract the paper examines the main economic and institutional incentives which have driven major oecd food retailers in their use of private voluntary standards and discusses their growing role in shaping the agri food system it is based on interviews with quality and safety directors of major oecd retailers and a brief survey of retailers actual buyer practices though not all retailers are included these firms account for over 70 of retail food sales in oecd countries we find that the growing voice of civil society changing legal and institutional frameworks increased market concentration and buying power as well as their integration with financial markets has provided the setting for development of private standards while food safety and quality standards are seen as key to maintaining and improving reputation as well as against legal liabilities additional standards such as labour environmental and animal welfare are also gaining ground as strategies for customer loyalty and market shares the grass roots retailer move in the harmonization of food safety standards is seen as an initial step towards a global approach to managing the food system with harmonization of other standards likely in the future given their buyer power these developments can be viewed as a way of governing the food system and will be important for both oecd and non oecd food and agricultural sector evolution in the coming years

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

on hotelling s competition with non uniform customer distributions abstract hotelling s competition in a two stage location price game is examined with increasing densities of consumers towards the centre it is shown that there is a range of rather even distributions for which firms locate at opposite ends of the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated duopolists will tend to move inside the market

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

duopoly and quality standards abstract in the absence of sunk costs a low quality producer benefits from a mildly restrictive quality standard whereas a high quality producer suffers from it consumers welfare increases if the firm producing the higher quality does not increase its quality significantly in response to the increase in quality by its rival a sufficiently severe standard causes exit from the industry when there are no sunk cost the high quality producer exits first

quality standards versus nutritional taxes health and welfare impacts with strategic firms the goal of this paper is to better understand firms strategic reactions to nutritional policies targeting food quality improvements and to derive optimal policies we propose a model of product differentiation taking into account the taste and health characteristics of products we study how two firms react to alternative policies an mqs policy linear taxation of the two goods on the market and taxation of the low quality good the mqs and the taxation of the low quality product are the preferred options by a social planner if taste is moderately important the mqs policy is chosen by a populist and a paternalist social planner if taste is a major component of choice the populist planner chooses to tax the low quality product whereas the paternalist planner prefers the mqs policy finally for a paternalist social planner an mqs based policy always allows for higher levels of welfare than an information policy alone