on measures of excess burden and their application abstract new measures of the additional excess burden of a tax reform are proposed and are shown to be useful in three key policy applications these new measures induce a unique measure of marginal excess burden meb among its interesting properties meb is uniformly zero for a proportional tax on inelastically supplied labor problems in applying the standard measures of total excess burden are demonstrated it is concluded that the induced measure of the marginal cost of funds mcf should be regarded as the most useful concept in applied tax analysis

spatial evolution of social norms in a common pool resource game we study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common pool resource cpr game we consider three types of agents cooperators defectors and enforcers the role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average using theoretical and numerical analysis we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game in particular we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist we also derive the stability of these equilibria finally we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

why do you hate me on the survival of spite abstract spite involves harming others without good reasons it may survive in small populations or on markets with strategic substitutes we consider situations where selfishness helps efficiency here spite endangers efficiency but is wiped out by evolutionary forces

types and patterns an experimental east west german comparison of cooperation and solidarity abstract in a study of public good and solidarity experiments conducted in eastern and western germany we found in both games that eastern subjects behave in a significantly more selfish manner than do western subjects besides that we found that many qualitative results of both data sets are similar since our experiments were conducted in two parts of one nation we present an unusually well controlled cross cultural study by avoiding difficulties that usually arise in multinational settings we conclude that cooperation and solidarity behavior seem to depend strongly on different culture specific norms resulting from opposing economic and social histories in the two parts of germany

functional unpleasantness the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment economics experiments and everyday experience cast doubt on the assumption that people are self interested in divide the dollar ultimatum games participants turn down offers that would make them objectively better off similarly drivers stuck in a traffic jam fume at cars cruising by on the shoulder many stuck drivers would punish the moving ones if they could even at some cost to themselves such strategies appear irrational because they make the punisher worse off than accepting the situation or offer we examine explanations for costly punishment and relax the presumption that punishers themselves prefer cooperation using evolutionary game theory to show how uncooperative punishers can support cooperation

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

an evolutionary approach to norms iorms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups even when there are more than two people and no central authority this paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality the dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strategies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies the results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable one interesting possibility is the employment of metanorms the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms including metanorms dominance internalization deterrence social proof membership in groups law and reputation

local common property exploitation with rewards this paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property while standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation in contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage a stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the tragedy of the commons outcome

a note on defensive expenditures harmonised law diverse results in the context of many environmental hazards there is scope for self defence by victims multiple equilibria arise in a model of bilateral precaution under a regime of strict but incompletely enforced environmental liability this means that the same system of environmental law instigated in two economies may lead to very different outcomes it impacts upon policy analysis in a variety of ways and provides a channel for cultural factors to matter we explore the positive and normative effects of subsidising self defence

bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply how can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention i derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand the size of the price change and the degree of frictions the degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum the bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities i apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1 of earnings as a result small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities extensive and intensive margin elasticities and other disparate findings pooling estimates from existing studies i estimate a hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0 33 on the intensive margin and 0 25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions

evaluation of four tax reforms in the united states labor supply and welfare effects for single mothers an emerging consensus is that labor force participation is more responsive to taxes and transfers than hours worked to understand the implications of participation responses for the welfare analysis of tax reform this paper embeds this margin of labor supply in an explicit welfare theoretic framework we apply the framework to examine the welfare effects on single mothers in the united states following four tax acts passed in 1986 1990 1993 and 2001 we propose a simulation method combining features of fully structural microsimulation studies and simple deadweight loss calculations our approach accounts for the observed heterogeneity in the microdata but is simple to implement because we do not need to specify utility functions and estimate utility parameters we find that each of the four tax acts created substantial welfare gains and that the gains were concentrated almost exclusively on the participation margin our results imply that standard approaches not modeling the participation decision can make large errors

measuring economic efficiency using inverse optimum weights abstract this paper provides a method to measure the traditional kaldor hicks notion of economic efficiency when taxes affect behavior in contrast to traditional unweighted surplus measuring efficiency requires weighting individual benefits or surplus by the marginal cost to the government of providing a 1 transfer at each income level these weights correspond to the solution to the inverse optimum program in the optimal tax literature they are the social planning weights that would rationalize the status quo tax schedule as optimal i estimate the weights using the universe of us income tax returns from 2012 the results suggest that measuring economic efficiency requires weighting surplus accruing to the poor roughly 1 5 2 times more than surplus accruing to the rich this is because 1 of surplus to the poor can be turned into roughly 1 5 2 of surplus to the rich by reducing the progressivity of the tax schedule following kaldor and hicks original applications i compare income distributions over time in the us and across countries the results suggest us economic growth is 15 20 lower due to increased inequality than is suggested by changes in gdp because of its higher inequality the u s is unable to replicate the income distribution of countries like austria and the netherlands despite having higher national income per capita

welfare analysis meets causal inference we describe a framework for empirical welfare analysis that uses the causal estimates of a policy s impact on net government spending this framework provides guidance for which causal effects are and are not needed for empirical welfare analysis of public policies the key ingredient is the construction of each policy s marginal value of public funds mvpf the mvpf is the ratio of beneficiaries willingness to pay for the policy to the net cost to the government we discuss how the mvpf relates to traditional welfare analysis tools such as the marginal excess burden and marginal cost of public funds we show how the mvpf can be used in practice by applying it to several canonical empirical applications from public finance labor development trade and industrial organization

excusing selfishness in charitable giving the role of risk decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk a common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact while this behaviour could be fully rationalized by standard economic models this article shows that an additional mechanism is relevant the use of risk as an excuse not to give in a laboratory study participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity when their decisions do not involve tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity they respond very similarly to self risk and charity risk by contrast when their decisions force tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity participants act more averse to charity risk and less averse to self risk these altered responses to risk bias participants towards choosing payoffs for themselves more often consistent with excuse driven responses to risk additional results support the existence of excuse driven types

on the enforcement of territorial use rights regulations a game theoretic approach territorial use rights commonly known as turfs in the literature consists in the allocation of fishing rights to individuals and or groups to fish in certain geographical locations a requisite for these communities to be granted fishing rights is the formulation of a management and exploitation plan mep while thus far the literature on turfs has been centred on the biological and technical aspects of it to our knowledge there is no work squarely dealing with the issue of enforcement of the mep that the community once granted the fishing use rights have to comply with we formally explore this issue from an economic perspective by formulating a static game of norm compliance in a regime of common property resource exploitation the key characteristic of this game is a monitoring and sanctioning mechanism where fishermen monitor and sanction one another we found that in the absence of any endogenous regulation from the part of the fishing community turfs can not avoid the economic overexploitation of the fishery we discuss the importance of economic incentives and disincentives in the formulation of endogenous regulations aimed at ensuring compliance of the mep our results on the

a note on imitation based competition in common pool resources the tragedy of the commons refers to the dissipation of common ressources when several appropriators have access to it the nash equilibrium in common pool resource games describes such an overexploitation phenomena however some empirical facts and experimental results suggest that the degradation may exceed the nash equilibrium prediction rapid exhaustion of resources can then be explained by learning processes based on imitation behavior indeed when the number of players is limited the evolutionary outcome implies a higher level of dissipation than the nash equilibrium

income inequality in the united states 1913 1998 this paper presents new homogeneous series on top shares of income and wages from 1913 to 1998 in the united states using individual tax returns data top income and wages shares display a u shaped pattern over the century our series suggest that the large shocks that capital owners experienced during the great depression and world war ii have had a permanent effect on top capital incomes we argue that steep progressive income and estate taxation may have prevented large fortunes from fully recovering from these shocks top wage shares were flat before world war ii dropped precipitously during the war and did not start to recover before the late 1960s but are now higher than before world war ii as a result the working rich have replaced the rentiers at the top of the income distribution

dissecting the tragedy a spatial model of behavior in the commons abstract much of the discussion of the tragedy of the commons focuses on aggregate impacts often in data poor developing country settings few non experimental empirical studies shed light on contextual circumstances driving the extent of rent dissipation and overexploitation we utilize a high resolution data set to estimate a behavioral model of fishermen s spatial choices a unique policy setting allows us to measure the degree to which individual fishermen s choices appear aimed at mitigating the tragedy of the commons in a small numbers setting we find evidence of partial mitigation in excess of what we would expect under pure self interest but short of what would occur under group maximizing behavior we also examine how contextual factors in the fishery shape the degree of cooperation within the fishing season and find evidence that competition for the common pool resource distorts fishermen s implicit cost of distance creating a form of common property inertia

the effects of housing assistance on labor supply evidence from a voucher lottery this study estimates the effects of means tested housing programs on labor supply using data from a randomized housing voucher wait list lottery in chicago economic theory is ambiguous about the expected sign of any labor supply response we find that among working age able bodied adults housing voucher use reduces labor force participation by around 4 percentage points 6 percent and quarterly earnings by 329 10 percent and increases temporary assistance for needy families program participation by around 2 percentage points 15 percent we find no evidence that the housing specific mechanisms hypothesized to promote work such as neighborhood quality or residential stability are important empirically jel i38 j22 r23 r38

using differences in knowledge across neighborhoods to uncover the impacts of the eitc on earnings we develop a new method of estimating the impacts of tax policies that uses areas with little knowledge about the policy s marginal incentives as counterfactuals for behavior in the absence of the policy we apply this method to characterize the impacts of the earned income tax credit eitc on earnings using administrative tax records covering all eitc eligible lers from 19962009 we begin by developing a proxy for local knowledge about the eitc schedule the degree of sharp bunching at the exact income level that maximizes eitc refunds by individuals who report self employment income the degree of self employed sharp bunching varies signi cantly

the marginal cost of public funds hours of work versus labor force participation this paper extends the theory and measurement of the marginal cost of public funds mcf to account for labor force participation responses our work is motivated by the emerging consensus in the empirical literature that extensive participation responses are more important than intensive hours of work responses in the modelling of extensive responses we argue that it is crucial to account for the presence of non convexities created by fixed work costs in a non convex framework tax and transfer reforms give rise to discrete participation responses generating first order effects on government revenue these revenue effects make the marginal cost of funds higher and we show numerically that the implications for mcf tend to be substantial

linking common property resource management to human capital outcomes in regions where common pool resources provide significant support to their surrounding communities any climate change related shock could produce multiple livelihood repercussions in this paper a model explores how the health of common pool resources could impact upon human capital outcomes for communities that struggle to find alternate livelihood options when traditional means such as agriculture become unsustainable the management of common pool resources is modeled as a strategic interaction process between two heterogeneous communities that are directly or indirectly dependent upon it an unconstrained harvesting of common resources such as forestry not only depletes its stocks but it also indirectly affects crop output through soil degradation a number of situations are constructed where communities are able to successfully finance human capital accumulation through proper management of their common pool resources however results also warn that communities that are faced with limited opportunities towards accumulating human capital must plan ahead to prevent the depletion of their common resources below critical levels when non linear feedbacks to soil degradation emanate from low levels of common pool stocks human capital outcomes as well as future livelihoods of such communities are threatened

knowledge sharing and the dynamics of social capital abstract mutual aid often entails the sharing of knowledge we investigate how in turn knowledge sharing affects the long run dynamics of mutual aid in our economy agents with specific knowledge are held up by their principals inside communities agents aid each other by sharing their specific knowledge this process generates a new type of knowledge which exacerbates the specificity of the existing types and induces more agents to engage in mutual aid however since the knowledge generated is shared it progressively renders agents inside communities more flexible and thus less dependent on mutual aid we characterize conditions under which in the long run mutual aid spreads or is abandoned

the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates a critical review this paper critically surveys the large and growing literature estimating the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates using tax return data first we provide a theoretical framework showing under what assumptions this elasticity can be used as a sufficient statistic for efficiency and optimal tax analysis we discuss what other parameters should be estimated when the elasticity is not a sufficient statistic second we discuss conceptually the key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of the elasticity of taxable income using the example of the 1993 top individual income tax rate increase in the united states to illustrate those issues third we provide a critical discussion of selected empirical analyses of the elasticity of taxable income in light of the theoretical and empirical framework we laid out finally we discuss avenues for future research jel h24 h31 j22

welfare reform in european countries a microsimulation analysis this article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in work benefits in the 15 pre enlargement countries of the european union we use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins and the euromod microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates we quantify the equity efficiency trade off for a range of elasticity parameters in most countries because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase out rates increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme in contrast the in work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases

evolutionary stability of pure strategy equilibria in finite games abstract sufficient conditions for pure strategy nash equilibria of finite games to be lyapunov stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics the regular monotonic selection dynamics are discussed in particular it is shown that in almost all finite extensive form games all the pure strategy equilibria are stable in such games all mixed strategy equilibria close to pure strategy equilibria are also stable journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72

a dynamic approach to forest regimes in developing economies abstract in the developing economies optimal forest regimes should incorporate the socio economic characteristics of the user groups and since socio economic factors will change with time optimal forest regimes will also follow a dynamic path the two most important socio economic factors are the heterogeneity of the user group with respect to forest management and the direct dependence of the user group on forest normally the heterogeneity will increase and dependence will decrease with economic growth of user group an optimal control model is used to integrate the dynamics of natural system such as joint product of forests and its growth function and the dynamics of the two socio economic factors heterogeneity and dependence the model demonstrates that the dynamics of optimal forest regimes will depend upon the change in natural factors socio economic factors and on the interactions between natural and socio economic factors hence optimal forest management strategies would require a continuous refinement in forest management regimes instead of static state regimes as local communities in developing economies pass through different phases of economic growth

on the social dimension of time and risk preferences an experimental study when explaining risk taking intertemporal allocation and distributing behavior economists rely on risk time and other regarding preferences but offer no guidance on how these three crucial aspects are interrelated we report on an experiment exploring such interrelation for this sake we compare evaluations of several prospects each of which allocates certain or risky and immediate or delayed payoffs to the actor and to another participant we find that individuals are selforiented as to social allocation of risk and delay and other regarding with respect to expected payoffs jel c91 d63 d81 there is ample empirical evidence that people do not behave rationally when rationality implies maximization of one s own material rewards to gain flexibility economists have taken into account nonlinear evaluation of material rewards e g in the familiar form of utility of money functions as well as social utilities including other regarding concerns like altruism as in andreoni and miller 2002 inequality aversion as in fehr and schmidt 1999 and bolton and ockenfels 2000 or quasi maximin preferences as in charness and rabin 2002 undeniably this provides a rich toolbox for neoclassical repair which allows aligning rational choice predictions with empirical data on decision behavior nonetheless this toolbox may be

community enforcement of fisheries effort restrictions abstract this paper models the use of community sanctions to restrict effort in a simple gordon schaefer style model of the fishery with heterogeneous fishing costs the withdrawal of cooperation in other areas of life is used to both restrict effort and to sanction those who continue to cooperate with those who have not restricted effort coalition proof nash equilibria are generated by a combination of sanctions discouraging the defection of small groups and stock reductions discouraging noncooperation by large groups both entry restrictions and individual quotas can be supported by community sanctions under some parameter combinations however there are cases where each can generate lower total rents than would be available under open access relatively low cost fishers are more likely to support entry restrictions and ignore community attempts to restrict individual effort while high cost fishers are more likely to support quotas

in search of homo economicus behavioral experiments in 15 small scale societies we can summarize our results as follows first the canonical model is not supported in any society studied second there is considerably more behavioral variability across groups than had been found in previous cross cultural research and the canonical model fails in a wider variety of ways than in previous experiments third group level differences in economic organization and the degree of market integration explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games fourth individual level economic and demographic variables do not explain behavior either within or across groups fifth behavior in the experiments is generally consistent with economic patterns of everyday life in these societies

a note on coupled lotteries we study the impact of coupling a decision maker s lottery payoffs to those of a peer on the preferred level of risk by means of a lab experiment compared to the benchmark where the lotteries are paid off individually symmetrically coupled payoffs increase the willingness to take risks whereas asymmetrically coupled payoffs have the opposite effect moreover subjects with persistent choices in the different conditions behave more risk averse than subjects with non persistent behavior

evolutionary stability and media of exchange abstract the kiyotaki and wright model 1989 of money as a medium of exchange is analyzed within an evolutionary framework it is shown that fundamental speculative and polymorphic states can all be stable and that there may exist a multiplicity of stable states stringent assumptions regarding information and rationality are therefore unnecessary in order to explain the use of money as a medium of exchange even when the existence of a stable medium requires some individuals to trade their production good for one with a higher storage cost or when otherwise identical individuals must adopt different exchange strategies

risk taking for oneself and others a structural model approach economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk we examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality and compare them to individual decisions by estimating a structural model we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses we also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter these results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature they also have implications for financial agency which we discuss

collective action for local commons management in rural yunnan china empirical evidence and hypotheses using evolutionary game theory this paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management with the help of evolutionary game theory data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural yunnan china an econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided the degree of income disparity is quite small and resource restrictions are moderately problematic the finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders

contagious cooperation temptation and ecosystem collapse real world observations suggest that social norms o f cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a c ommon pool resource but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse we show that these patterns of erosion and 15 collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the tempta tion to overexploit the resource while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations we analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters including the size of the community and the rate of technological progress trigger catastrophic transitions from 20 relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation causing the social ecological system to collapse

effects on poverty and equity of the decline in collective tank irrigation management in tamil nadu india this paper investigates the factors influencing the decline in collective management of local commons and the impact of this decline on agricultural production and household consumption the analysis is based on a village and household data set collected in 1999 in tamil nadu india where tank irrigation systems are managed collectively for rice cultivation by informal water users organizations our statistical analyses find that one major reason for the decline in collective tank irrigation management is the dissemination of private well irrigation systems once the decline has occurred our analyses predict that the gap in rice yields between farmers who have access to private wells and those who must rely solely on tanks will widen with only the latter group suffering lower yields our analyses also find that the same pattern holds for levels of income and consumption because the affected farmers cannot sufficiently compensate for the loss of their rice income by diversifying their income sources to agricultural labor or non agricultural work in this way the decline in collective management results in greater inequality and poverty

on the sustainability of common property resources abstract we provide a model where a common property resource is managed by two types of agents cooperators and non cooperators who adjust their extraction strategies in response to persistent differential payoffs in our model the social approval of cooperators works as a reward mechanism which as we show favors both the pervasiveness of cooperative behavior and the sustainable management of natural resources specifically we show that in the presence of such a reward mechanism a stable equilibrium can be reached with both strategies being practiced simultaneously and a decentralized and sustainable management of common property resources is possible

on the uniqueness of equilibrium in cournot oligopoly and other games abstract in an average surplus sharing game such as a cournot oligopoly a group of agents share a production process each contributes an amount of input to the process and output is divided in proportion to the amount of input contributed uniqueness of the equilibrium is needed for any type of comparative static analysis however general uniqueness results for concave games have restrictive assumptions on preferences and technology specifically the conditions needed for uniqueness become more difficult to meet as the number of players increases a new theorem for uniqueness with easily interpretable conditions is given which is independent of the number of players journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d43

optimal income taxation of lone mothers an empirical comparison of the uk and germany optimal tax rules are used to evaluate the optimality of taxation for lone mothers in germany and britain the theoretical model is combined with elasticities derived from the structural estimation of lone mothers labour supply for both countries we do not find that in work credits with marginal tax rates are optimal however we show that when the government has a low taste for redistribution out of work transfers and transfer for the working poor are very similar implying very low marginal tax rates further the current tax and transfer systems in both countries are shown to be optimal only if governments have a much higher welfare value for income received by the non workers than the working poor government run transfer and redistribution programmes are of major importance in most developed countries such countries spend large amounts of public funds to provide income support to the poor although the precise structure of these pro grammes differs substantially as expenditures on public income support programmes count for a sizeable share of the government s budget in welfare states and because of their alleged negative work incentive effects there is an ongoing public debate about policy reforms in this area this controversy can be best described by the trade off between equity and efficiency income transfers increase the disposable income of the disadvantaged and thus their well being but the programmes introduce distortions that might lead to substantial disincentives in the labour market the aim of this article is to apply recent results from the optimal tax literature to analyse the design of personal income tax and welfare benefits empirically and to discuss its optimality we focus on the tax and transfer systems for lone mothers in germany and the uk

harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas we propose a dynamic model for studying the time evolution of fish stocks in an environment divided into two adjacent zones with different fishing policies we analyze two particular harvesting methods constant fishing effort and profit maximization in this case some agents engage in competition based on maximization of individual profit whereas others cooperate the asymptotic behavior of the system pinpoints that even if the presence of a reserve area leads to higher levels of sustainability in exploiting fish stocks attention should be paid in properly regulating the harvesting activity in order to avoid severe depletion of the resource

on the ir relevance of distribution and labor supply distortion to government policy should the assessment of government policies such as the provision of public goods and the control of externalities deviate from first best principles to account for distributive effects and the distortionary cost of labor income taxation for example is the optimal extent of public goods provision smaller than indicated by the samuelson rule because finance is distortionary or should environmental regulations fail to internalize externalities fully if the incidence of the regulations is regressive it is suggested that these questions are best addressed by considering distribution neutral implementation in which budget balance is achieved by choosing an adjustment to the income tax that offsets the distributive impact of the policy in question in basic cases both distribution and labor supply distortion are moot because the target policy and the tax adjustment produce offsetting effects on each thus traditional first best principles provide good benchmarks for policy analysis after all moreover even when actual implementation will not be distribution neutral in aggregate distribution neutral policy analysis has many conceptual and practical virtues that render it quite useful to investigators

social responsibility promotes conservative risk behavior abstract previous studies show that group risk taking can be more conservative than individual risk taking two common but untested reasons for this greater caution are the influence of social responsibility and a tendency to conform to the preferences of others we study changes in risk taking in simple settings where another s risk taking can sometimes be observed and where decisions affect not only one s own payoffs but sometimes also affect those of a passive second party we find that social responsibility leads to more conservative risk behavior in group decision making conformism has a more symmetric effect observing the choice of another tends to lead both individual and social decisions toward whatever the other s expressed risk preference is direct tests fail to link the social behavior we observe to the social preference for distributional fairness common in decision making under certainty

the case for a progressive tax from basic research to policy recommendations the fair distribution of the tax burden has long been a central issue in policyhe fair distribution of the tax burden has long been a central issue in policymaking a large academic literature has developed models of optimal tax making a large academic literature has developed models of optimal tax theory to cast light on the problem of optimal tax progressivity in this theory to cast light on the problem of optimal tax progressivity in this paper we explore the path from basic research results in optimal tax theory to paper we explore the path from basic research results in optimal tax theory to formulating policy recommendations formulating policy recommendations models in optimal tax theory typically posit that the tax system should maximize a models in optimal tax theory typically posit that the tax system should maximize a social welfare function subject to a government budget constraint taking into account social welfare function subject to a government budget constraint taking into account that individuals respond to taxes and transfers social welfare is larger when resources that individuals respond to taxes and transfers social welfare is larger when resources are more equally distributed but redistributive taxes and transfers can negatively are more equally distributed but redistributive taxes and transfers can negatively affect incentives to work save and earn income in the fi rst place this creates the clasaffect incentives to work save and earn income in the fi rst place this creates the classical trade off between equity and effi ciency which is at the core of the optimal income sical trade off between equity and effi ciency which is at the core of the optimal income tax problem in general optimal tax analyses maximize social welfare as a function of tax problem in general optimal tax analyses maximize social welfare as a function of individual utilities the sum of utilities in the utilitarian case the marginal weight for individual utilities the sum of utilities in the utilitarian case the marginal weight for a given person in the social welfare function measures the value of an additional dollar a given person in the social welfare function measures the value of an additional dollar of consumption expressed in terms of public funds such welfare weights depend on of consumption expressed in terms of public funds such welfare weights depend on the level of redistribution and are decreasing with income whenever society values the level of redistribution and are decreasing with income whenever society values more equality of income therefore optimal income tax theory is fi rst a normative more equality of income therefore optimal income tax theory is fi rst a normative theory that shows how a social welfare objective combines with constraints arising from theory that shows how a social welfare objective combines with constraints arising from limits on resources and behavioral responses to taxation in order to derive specifi c limits on resources and behavioral responses to taxation in order to derive specifi c

the dynamic efficiency costs of common pool resource exploitation we conduct the first empirical investigation of common pool resource users dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real world data fishermen s strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players actions revealing the profit structure of the fishery we compare the fishermen s actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies jel d24 q21 q22

optimal tax and transfer programs for couples with extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes the optimal design of general nonlinear tax transfer schedules for couples under unitary and collective approaches to family decision making we consider a double extensive model of labor supply where each spouse makes a labor force participation choice for given hours of work we present simple and intuitive optimal tax rules that generalize existing findings on the optimal taxation of single person households with extensive responses saez 2002 to the case of two person households with double extensive responses without income effects on labor supply optimal tax rules as a function of sufficient statistics are the same under the unitary and collective approaches with income effects on labor supply optimal tax rules under the two approaches continue to depend on the same sufficient statistics but the collective model features an additional pigouvian term arising from a within family participation externality finally we present microsimulations of tax reform for 15 european countries suggesting that a reduction of tax rates on secondary earners relative to primary earners is associated with strong welfare gains in all countries

risking other people s money experimental evidence on the role of incentives and personality traits decision makers often face incentives to increase risk taking on behalf of others through bonus contracts and relative performance contracts we conduct an experimental study of risk taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample and find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits the findings suggest that lack of concern for others risk exposure hardly requires financial psychopaths in order to flourish but is diminished by social concerns

work incentives and the food stamp program abstract labor supply theory makes strong predictions about how the introduction or expansion of a social welfare program impacts work effort although there is a large literature on the work incentive effects of afdc and the eitc relatively little is known about the work incentive effects of the food stamp program and none of the existing literature is based on quasi experimental methods we use the cross county introduction of the program in the 1960s and 1970s to estimate the impact of the program on the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply earnings and family cash income consistent with theory we find reductions in employment and hours worked when food stamps are introduced the reductions are concentrated among families headed by single woman

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers

the evolution of social norms in common property resource use the problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary game theoretic framework it is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well defined sense against invasion by narrowly self interested behavior the resource stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary game dynamics effects of changes in prices technology and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long run stock are analyzed when threshold values of the parameters are crossed social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long run stock and possibly to its extinction copyright 1996 by american economic association

generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax theory this paper proposes to evaluate tax reforms by aggregating money metric losses and gains of different individuals using generalized social marginal welfare weights optimum tax formulas take the same form as standard welfarist tax formulas by simply substitut ing standard marginal social welfare weights with those generalized weights weights directly capture society s concerns for fairness without being necessarily tied to individual utilities suitable weights can help reconcile discrepancies between the welfarist approach and actual tax practice as well as unify in an operational way the most prominent alternatives to utilitarianism such as libertarianism equality of opportunity or poverty alleviation jel d60 d63 h21 h23 i38