adaptation to electricity crisis businesses in the 2011 great east japan triple disaster abstract electricity crises can spur improvements in electricity conservation that would be unachievable under normal circumstances this paper investigates how businesses adapted to electricity shortages following the march 11 2011 great east japan earthquake tsunami and nuclear disaster in summer 2011 mandatory and voluntary electricity conservation measures affected nearly all of japan and peak hour electricity consumption was reduced by a remarkable 18 in the tokyo region using statistical data from 14 business surveys conducted in 2011 and 2012 this paper identifies patterns with regard to type of adaptation conservation requirements economic sector and timeframe results indicate that behavioral adaptations e g reduction of illumination or air conditioning were much more common than schedule adaptations e g shifting production times or hardware adaptations e g installing energy efficient devices or private generators adaptation patterns were very similar between mandatory and voluntary conservation areas manufacturing companies were more likely to implement schedule adaptations than other companies certain types of adaptations persisted into 2012 especially reduction of illumination and air conditioning and installation of energy efficient devices these insights may be useful for informing electricity conservation policies in non crisis contexts

all pay war we study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models but because countries lack information about their opponent in this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common knowledge but realized resource levels are private information each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare the country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production in equilibrium both comparative and absolute advantages matter a larger resource share is allocated to warfare by the country with a comparative advantage in warfare at relatively low realized resource levels and by the country with an absolute disadvantage in warfare at relatively high realized resource levels from an ex ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage in warfare is more likely to win the war unless its military potential is much lower

group reputations stereotypes and cooperation in a repeated labor market reputation effects and other regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria existing reputation building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions this paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium fre with stereotyping perceived type correlation in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions new experiments generate results in line with the fre prediction including final period reversions to stage game equilibrium and non cooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters

observability and the payback criterion among the enigmas of corporate finance theory that have received little attention is the puzzling use of the payback method as a capital budgeting tool although the payback method has many drawbacks it is widely used in industry see klammer 1972 fremgren 1973 schall sundem and geijsback 1978 1 gordon 1955 attempted to explain this anomaly by observing that the inverse of the payback period is an approximation for the internal rate of return but as sarnat and levy 1969 point out the accuracy of the approximation depends on the life of the project and its irr for low values of irr the inverse of payback is a very poor approximation moreover it is difficult to believe that corporations that use complex and sophisticated technologies need a rule of thumb to approximate something as simple to compute as the irr in fact empirical evidence shows that most firms compute both the irr and the payback period see schall the payback criterion continues to be widely used in industry although there is little support for it among the academicians this paper attempts to find an economic rationale for it by using an incentive model with asymmetric information it argues that when the managers possess private information regarding projects selected for implementation it is in their interest to choose ceteris paribus projects that pay back faster since manager s wages depend on output because their productivity is unknown by choosing projects that pay back fast they hope to improve their reputations i wish to thank milton harris and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions while i retain the responsibility for any remaining errors 1 it has been found that payback is rarely used as a primary capital budgeting method it is used as a secondary criterion to a discounted cash flow method such as npv net present value or irr internal rate of return

the energy efficiency paradox revisited through a partial observability approach the present paper examines the energy efficiency paradox demonstrated in greek manufacturing firms through a partial observability approach the data set used has resulted from a survey carried out among 161 energy saving technology firm adopters maximum likelihood estimates that arise from an incidental truncation model reveal that the adoption of the energy saving technologies is indeed strongly correlated to the returns of assets that are required in order to undertake the corresponding investments the source of the energy efficiency paradox lies within a wide range of factors policy schemes that aim to increase the adoption rate of energy saving technologies within the field of manufacturing are significantly affected by differences in the size of firms finally mixed policies seem to be more effective than policies that are only capital subsidy or regulation oriented

normal markets market imperfections and energy efficiency abstract the conventional distinction between economic and engineering approaches to energy analysis obscures key methodological issues concerning the measurement of the costs and benefits of policies to promote the adoption of energy efficient technologies the engineering approach is in fact based upon firm economic foundations the principle of lifecycle cost minimization that arises directly from the theory of rational investment thus evidence that so called market barriers impede the adoption of cost effective energy efficient technologies implies the existence of market failures as defined in the context of microeconomic theory problems of imperfect information and bounded rationality on the part of consumers for example may lead real world outcomes to deviate from the dictates of efficient resource allocation a widely held contrary view that the engineering view lacks economic justification is based on the fallacy that markets are normally efficient

energy efficiency barriers in commercial and industrial firms in ukraine an empirical analysis abstract improvement in energy efficiency is one of the main options to reduce energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions however large scale deployment of energy efficient technologies is constrained by several factors employing a survey of 509 industrial and commercial firms throughout ukraine and a generalized ordered logit model we quantified the economic behavioral and institutional barriers that may impede the deployment of energy efficient technologies our analysis shows that behavioral barriers resulted from lack of information knowledge and awareness are major impediments to the adoption of energy efficient technologies in ukraine and that financial barriers may further impede investments in these technologies especially for small firms this suggests that carefully targeted information provisions and energy audits will enhance ukrainian firms investments in energy efficient technologies to save energy consumption improve productivity and reduce carbon emissions from the productive sectors

gordon tullock and experimental economics gordon tullock s research has substantially influenced the development of economic science in general and experimental economics in particular we present the first comprehensive survey of this significant achievement we show how tullock s research in bioeconomics influenced later developments in neuroeconomics and how his pioneering work on rent seeking generated a literature of laboratory tests of his hypothesis we also describe tullock s own experiments and draw attention to his early insights on trust games

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

a policy approach to the environmental impacts of technological lock in abstract the broadening spectrum of environmental problems the uncertainty regarding their scale and duration and their possible irreversibility in the context of the growing social preference for environmental quality make it necessary to undertake an ex ante approach to the link between productive activity and environmental quality this link lies in technology and the right approach is to understand how the process of technological change can lead towards sustainability the added value of evolutionary economics in the context of environmental policy resides mainly in the fact that it warns that certain inferior environmental technologies may be locked in to the economic system the results of our model show that it would be advisable to undertake policies expressly aimed at the process of sustainable technological change applying an ex ante precautionary approach in a way that is complementary to the conventional equilibrium oriented environmental policies the nature of these policies and how they might be implemented are questions we will address from this novel approach to the concept of sustainable development in short the main objectives of this paper are to understand more fully the dynamics of the process of technological change its role in sustainable development and to assess the implications of this dynamic approach to techno environmental policy to achieve these goals we have developed an agent based model abm using distributed artificial intelligence dai concepts drawn from the general methodology of social simulation

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

strategies for cost effective carbon reductions a sensitivity analysis of alternative scenarios analyses of alternative futures often present results for a limited set of scenarios with little if any sensitivity analysis to identify the factors affecting the scenario results this approach creates an artificial impression of certainty associated with the scenarios considered and inhibits understanding of the underlying forces this paper summarizes the economic and carbon savings sensitivity analysis completed for the scenarios for a clean energy future study iwg 2000 its 19 sensitivity cases provide insight into the costs and carbon reduction impacts of a carbon permit trading system demand side efficiency programs and supply side policies impacts under different natural gas and oil price trajectories are also examined the results provide compelling evidence that policy opportunities exist to reduce carbon emissions and save society money

barriers to industrial energy efficiency investments in greece abstract this paper sets out to investigate the main determinants of industrial decision making process with respect to energy efficiency investments based on a survey among greek industries in the empirical analysis probit models are employed the results support that an energy saving campaign should regard industries as subgroups with different needs and different managerial aspects the importance of qualified employees is also established from this survey an energy conservation framework would be more effective if the diffusion of information with regard to industrial energy saving investments is based on investment in human capital

the efficiency paradox bureaucratic and organizational barriers to profitable energy saving investments abstract the paradox of why profitable energy saving investments are not undertaken continues to provoke debate the underlying phenomenon might be called the efficiency paradox because it represents a case in which business firms which are often presumed or taken axiomatically to be economically efficient make decisions that do not maximize profits new data from one of the us environmental protection agency s voluntary pollution prevention programs enables this paradox to be explored statistically the data show that both the level and variation in returns to lighting upgrade investments cannot be explained by standard economic models substantial gains in energy efficiency can be achieved without sacrificing profitability both economic and organizational factors account for some of the variation in observed returns to these investments but the results suggest a need for improved and more comprehensive theories of the investment behavior of firms and other organizations

the myths and facts of energy efficiency abstract the debate about how much energy efficiency is socially desirable and what is the best way to finance and implement energy conservation measures has reached a critical junction in many countries the arguments have passed the stage of whether more energy efficiency is possible or desirable and are centred around how much and how best to implement them this is a survey article which attempts to shed some light on several critical issues in this debate first it distinguishes between what is technically possible v what is economically desirable in energy efficiency improvements second it looks at some of the alleged causes of social under investment in energy efficiency and identifies ways to reduce or eliminate them third it addresses the question of who is best equipped to implement energy efficiency improvements and how one may go about promoting it finally the paper addresses critical financing and equity questions

rent seeking and market structure comment if the firms in an industry are to be successful in raising money to influence government two conditions must be met 1 there must be sufficient rents available from government decisions regarding that industry to make such expenditures worthwhile and 2 the industry must be sufficiently concentrated to avoid a free rider problem in fund raising this argument though seemingly intuitively appealing has been under recent empirical attack this paper seeks to restore the parapets

linking consumer energy efficiency with security of supply most modern energy policies seek to achieve systematic ongoing incremental increases in consumer energy efficiency since this contributes to improved security of supply favourable environmental outcomes and increased economic efficiency yet realised levels of efficiency are typically well below the most cost effective equilibrium due to variety of behavioural and organisational barriers which are often linked to information constraints in addition efficient users are normally unrewarded for collective benefits to system security and to the environment thus reducing the incentives for energy consumers to invest in efficiency improvements this paper examines the dichotomies and symmetries between supply and demand side solutions to energy security concerns and reviews opportunities to overcome barriers to improved consumer efficiency a security market is identified as a mechanism to promote both demand and supply side investments that support electricity system security such a market would assist in setting the optimal quantity of reserves while achieving an efficient balance between supply and demand side initiatives it would also help to smooth overall investment throughout the energy system by encouraging incremental approaches such as distributed generation and demand side alternatives where they provide competitive value although the discussion is applicable to energy systems in general it focuses primarily on electricity in new zealand

understanding carbon lock in abstract this paper narrative argues that industrial economies have been locked into fossil fuel based energy systems through a process of technological and institutional co evolution driven by path dependent increasing returns to scale it is asserted that this condition termed carbon lock in creates persistent market and policy failures that can inhibit the diffusion of carbon saving technologies despite their apparent environmental and economic advantages the notion of a techno institutional complex is introduced to capture the idea that lock in occurs through combined interactions among technological systems and governing institutions while carbon lock in provides a conceptual basis for understanding macro level barriers to the diffusion of carbon saving technologies it also generates questions for standard economic modeling approaches that abstract away technological and institutional evolution in their elaboration the question of escaping carbon lock in is left for a future paper

how much market do market based instruments create an analysis for the case of white certificates in the context of economic instruments for more energy efficiency and climate protection tradable certificates have been investigated for renewable energy and for a number of emissions in contrast tradable energy efficiency or white certificates have only lately been considered as a market based tool to foster energy efficiency as compared to standards and labelling for example theoretically there is little doubt about the advantages in practice however some fundamental problems arise critical issues are the design of an efficient artificial market for white certificates its compatibility with the european emissions trading system the identification of a suitable target group for an energy efficiency obligation and the measurement of energy savings as compared to a reference use of energy we use the theoretical framework of transaction cost economics to elaborate these issues we conclude that transaction costs and investment specificity will restrict markets for white certificates in practise long term contracts rather than spot trade will be the prevailing form of governance for energy efficiency investments

explaining the energy efficiency gap expected utility theory versus cumulative prospect theory abstract energy efficiency is one of the key factors in mitigating the impact of climate change and preserving non renewable resources although environmental and economic justifications for energy efficiency investments are compelling there is a gap between the observable and some notion of optimized energy consumption the so called energy efficiency gap behavioral biases in individual decision making have been resonated by environmental research to explain this gap to analyze the influence of behavioral biases on decisions upon energy efficiency investments quantitatively we compare expected utility theory with cumulative prospect theory on basis of a real world example we illustrate how the extent of the gap is influenced by behavioral biases such as loss aversion probability weighting and framing our findings indicate that cumulative prospect theory offers possible explanations for many barriers discussed in literature for example the size of the gap rises with increased risk and investment costs because behavioral biases are systematic and pervasive our insights constitute a valuable quantitative basis for environmental policy measures such as customer focused and quantitatively backed public awareness campaigns financial incentives or energy savings insurances in this vein this paper may contribute to an accelerated adaption of energy efficiency measures by the broader public

demand side management overcoming market barriers or obscuring real costs abstract this paper compares two approaches to estimating the net benefits of a demand side management program that subsidizes the purchase of efficient equipment the total resource cost trc test suggests net benefits of us 6 9 million estimates based on consumer s surplus yield an estimated net loss of us 6 3 million this gap is due to differences in estimates of participants net benefits market failures do not appear to be significant and thus cannot explain much of the gap the more plausible explanation is that the trc uses a lower discount rate than participants use for themselves and it omits some costs

implied discount rate and payback threshold of energy efficiency investment in the industrial sector the industrial sector is responsible for about a third of the energy usage in the united states and there is significant energy saving potential from the industrial sector however the phenomenon of energy efficiency gap the scenario in which cost effective energy efficient technologies enjoy only limited market success appears frequently in the industrial sector this article tries to explain this efficiency gap in the industrial sector by empirically estimating the implied discount rates and payback thresholds industrial firms use to evaluate their energy efficiency investments using the industrial assessment centers iac database from 2002 to 2011 with more than 30 000 energy efficiency recommendations this article builds structural models of firms evaluation of an energy efficiency project the model results show that the implied discount rates of medium to small industrial firms range from 40 to 45 and the average payback threshold is about 9 months

rent seeking in a market with morality solving a puzzle about corporate social responsibility rent seeking by lobbying for government favors is generally thought to be wasteful in view of this wastefulness it is puzzling that rent seeking by corporations has not been criticized as a failure to be socially responsible or even as an unethical business practice this article examines the compatibility of rent seeking with corporate social responsibility by utilizing thomas dunfee s idea of a marketplace with morality this idea is useful for solving this puzzle because in considering whether rent seeking is compatible with corporate social responsibility it is necessary first to define rent seeking which this article argues is a normative concept and second to find some principled way of identifying rent seeking behavior it also solves the puzzle about rent seeking by revealing that the concept of rent seeking itself is of little use in determining whether certain conduct is or is not socially responsible since rent seeking activity cannot be identified without first evaluating which activity is rent seeking

the industrial structure of the california assembly committee assignments economic interests and campaign contributions this paper examines the provision of campaign contributions made by economic interests to incumbents seeking reelection in the 1984 1986 and 1988 california assembly elections the study tests whether the distribution of campaign contributions by specific industrial sectors corresponds to legislator possession of the policy property rights associated with membership on relevant assembly standing committees a non parametric statistical model compares the distribution of campaign contributions from groups within a given industrial sector to members of relevant policy committees with the distribution of contributions from all other contributor classes the empirical analysis confirms that committee assignments significantly affect the allocation of special interest resources in assembly elections substantiating the importance of institutional considerations in influencing special interest activity

ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent seeking society abstract the paper develops a model of rent seeking in a democratic political context where voting as well as rent seeking matters in this context the paper demonstrates that voter ideology is a constraint on the rent seeking game as well as a possible avenue of rent seeking in a setting where there are both rent seeking and ideological interest groups rent seekers can free ride on the efforts of ideologues which tends to reduce rent seeking effort in a setting where complementary economic and ideological interest groups coordinate their efforts both rent seeking and ideological conflict tend to increase

on the social costs of rent seeking versus the social costs of production flexibility in this paper an analysis is provided of two alternative methods of defensive behaviour by a firm first rent seeking and second potential adjustment by way of investing in product flexibility from the analysis it emerges that at times rent seeking may be socially superior less socially wasteful to other more traditional means of responding to threats this paper therefore suggests that in circumstances where some type of defensive or aggressive activity by firms is available rent seeking while constituting gross social waste may be a net social gain given the alternative options available to the firm

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

participation in deterministic contests abstract this paper considers participation in deterministic contests for m 1 identical prizes which employ an auction like rule to determine the winners in most papers that investigate such models participation by precisely m 1 players is associated with players having complete information about their opponents characteristics and participation by more than m 1 players is associated with players having incomplete information about their opponents characteristics i show that incomplete information is in fact neither sufficient nor necessary for participation by more than m 1 players

capital rationing and organizational slack in capital budgeting this paper reconciles three stylized facts about capital budgeting in firms and shows that they are tied to the presence of asymmetric information among the several members of the firm each with his or her own objectives and decisions the facts of interest are 1 the existence of organizational slack 2 the rationing of resources within organizations 3 the stated cut off rate for accepting capital projects in firms is often greater than the market rate of interest organizational slack is defined as the excess of resources allocated over the minimum necessary to accomplish the tasks assigned resource rationing is defined as the under allocation of resources i e an increase in the amount allocated would generate revenues in excess of its costs rationing and slack are both manifestations of ex post inefficiencies an lp model is used to show that these inefficiencies can occur in ex ante efficient organizational designs when asymmetric information is present the optimal allocation policy involves a hurdle rate criterion in which the hurdle rate is strictly in excess of the cost of capital thus inducing rationing in some states of the world typically resources are optimally allocated such that slack exists in other states the optimal allocation policy trades off these two inefficiencies

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

investment in energy efficiency do the characteristics of firms matter the literature on energy efficiency provides numerous examples of apparently profitable technologies that are not universally adopted yet according to the standard neoclassical theory of investment profit maximizing firms should undertake all investments with a positive net present value the standard theory also holds that the discount rate for computing the present value of a project should be the return available on other projects in the same risk class and therefore should not depend on characteristics of the firm this model as applied to energy saving investments is tested by examining whether firms characteristics influence their decision to join the environmental protection agency s voluntary green lights program a discrete choice regression is estimated over a large sample of participating and nonparticipating firms missing values in the data matrix are replaced with multiple imputations from a distribution estimated using the expectation maximization algorithm the results show that 1 sub

barriers within firms to energy efficient investments abstract many investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability internal hurdle rates are often set at levels higher than the cost of capital to the firm reasons for these practices include bounded rationality principal agent problems and moral hazard the policy implication is that government can simultaneously improve overall energy efficiency and increase private sector productivity by providing informational and organizational services that go beyond the traditional regulatory framework

illegal markets and the social costs of rent seeking this paper argues that making goods or services illegal results in an increase in the social costs associated with rent seeking the increased social cost is in the form of negative externalities that result from market participants use of coercion and violence in attempts to control trade in the illegal good consequently the social costs of rent seeking will exceed the value of resources dissipated in rent seeking competition and where the external costs exceed the undissipated portion of the tullock cost the social cost of rent seeking is greater than the sum of tullock and harberger costs

the proof of the pudding making energy efficiency work abstract if western industrialized market economies are to realize a substantial proportion of the potential benefits of increased energy efficiency there is a need to move beyond engineering and economic estimates of efficiency potential and to consider seriously the implications of the behavioural and programme evaluation literature on energy efficiency that literature suggests that reliance upon market mechanisms alone will not permit realization of economically efficient levels of energy efficiency however if points the way toward designing energy efficiency programmes that show real promise of significantly achieving their potential in industrialized market economies

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

energy conservation policies in jordan abstract jordan imports almost all the energy required for its social and economic development during the period 1974 1984 energy consumption grew at an average rate of about 14 year due mainly to growth in the national economy but exacerbated by inefficient use of energy to alleviate the burden of the energy bill on the economy the ministry of energy has adopted a policy aimed at securing sufficient energy supplies at minimum cost to the economy this policy has focused on improving the efficiency of energy use and encouraging energy conservation in order to reduce the effect of oil imports on foreign reserves reduce the impact of emissions of toxic gases on the environment and the cost of additional investment in production facilities the energy conservation programme was put into application in early 1985 the energy income elasticity during the period 1985 1988 has dropped from 1 4 to 1 which indicates a substantial improvement in overall energy utilization

been top down so long it looks like bottom up to me abstract while technologists emphasize suboptimal choices by individuals and organizations many economists have ignored behavior exhibiting technical inefficiency this paper selectively discusses efforts by some economists to identify and measure technical inefficiency as applied to the energy efficiency gap bottom up economics would seek to measure significant departures from best practice technology distinguish between inefficiency that is more less wasteful of energy than other inputs and focus on developing testable hypotheses about technical inefficiency support for widespread intervention in energy use decisions may not necessarily follow from such an inquiry

balancing act government roles in an energy conservation network government led interorganizational alliance networks present a sensible opportunity to overcome many societal challenges through collaborative governance in particular few researchers have studied alliance networks in the field of energy conservation in commercial buildings a sector with unique barriers to greater diffusion of innovative cost saving strategies we applied an analytic inductive case based method and social network analysis to study one particular alliance network the united states commercial building energy alliances representing interests from retail commercial real estate and healthcare sectors this alliance network was initiated by the united states department of energy with assistance from several federally funded research laboratories in the united states to promote the diffusion of knowledge and ultimately encourage greater deployment of energy efficiency and clean energy strategies in commercial buildings we draw upon interview data from 28 cases of private non profit and governmental organizations and complete network data from the alliance participants we honed in on eight focal cases of governmental organizations to provide insight on how the four forms of energy and environmental data information and knowledge shared within an alliance network address the challenge of a vastly underutilized energy resource namely conservation further we identify and discuss the public s four roles commissioner interpreter marketer and user in providing balance to the diffusion of both private and public goods in a network

asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation this paper considers the question how should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager obviously if the divisions as represented by their managers are indifferent among various allocations of the resource the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie the resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete or at least symmetric information this aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic i e there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another thus although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed they are really unnecessary in the model we develop a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources and effort is costly to the manager we further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort given these assumptions we seek an optimal resource allocation process our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal in particular if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices if there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production a somewhat more complicated but similar scheme is required

incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi task problems abstract we consider a model with a politician facing a multi task problem while in office the reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others we show that a combination of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate this inefficiency the incentive contract does not require direct information about the performance of the politician and is self financing across terms

estimating bounds on the economy wide effects of the cef policy scenarios abstract the scenarios for a clean energy future study relied primarily on bottom up technology based methods to estimate costs associated with its scenarios these methods however do not allow for calculation of economy wide or general equilibrium effects of the policies considered we propose and apply a means of combining the bottom up estimates with estimates of the costs associated with a carbon charge obtained from computable general equilibrium models our approach is based on the concept of production inefficiency the economy lies within its production frontier with respect to the provision of energy services the cef technology policies are interpreted as moving the economy toward its frontier as well as moving the frontier outward while the carbon charge induces a substitution effect along the frontier this perspective allows a synthesis of the two sets of calculations

risk aversion heterogeneity and contests we introduce a novel method of modellingcontests that avoids the complexitiesencountered by the best response function approach we analyse contests in which i there are many risk averse players ii attitudes to risk may differ acrossindividuals and iii the technology thattransforms rent seeking effort intoprobability of winning may also differacross individuals we establish that ifevery player has a constant degree ofabsolute risk aversion a uniqueequilibrium exists we also establishcomparative static results and examine howthe level of rent dissipation is affectedby the heterogeneity of attitudes towardsrisk and the precise nature of the technology

efficiency gains within firms under voluntary environmental initiatives this paper focuses on efficiency gains that voluntary environmental initiatives may achieve within the firm current debate concerning the extent and significance of inefficiencies within firms is critically important to the progress of energy and environmental policies several recent lines of inquiry in microeconomics help explain the persistence of inefficiencies within firms in addition two of the most prominent new approaches in the field of business strategy resource based strategy and the capabilities perspective focus on the heterogeneity among firms and the resulting pockets of inefficiency within firms they suggest at least three generic strategies for voluntary environmental initiatives challenging outdated organizational routines creating opportunities for differentiation or complementing firms resource investment trajectories these generic approaches suggest that there is considerable scope for further experimentation with voluntary environmental initiatives

energy tax changes and competitiveness the role of adaptive capacity this paper estimates the effect of energy tax and price changes on total factor productivity tfp and net trade at the industry level using a panel of industries from european countries covering the period 1990 2003 we investigate the hypothesis that industries with high adaptive capacity measured by their relative level of labor compensation are able to mitigate the adverse effects of energy tax rises better than others we identify the pro adaptation effect by interacting wage levels a proxy for human capital with energy taxes we find that the negative marginal effect of higher energy taxes on tfp and net trade is significantly reduced for industries with stronger human capital and even turns to an overall positive effect in at least two cases up to three low wage sectors display an overall negative effect this suggests that human capital is key to adaptation to higher energy costs and climate policy in some cases making it a win win

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

triggers and barriers to energy efficiency measures in the ceramic cement and lime sectors evaluating and understanding the interplay of barriers to the diffusion of energy efficiency measures is highly relevant because if policies are effective in overcoming these barriers co2 emissions can be decreased at low cost the study aims to understand how managers make decisions to invest in energy efficiency how perceived barriers affect these decisions and how policy can overcome these barriers we apply neo classical economic theory as well as insights from transaction cost economics and behavioural economics to understand why hurdle rates even when omitted costs and risk are taken into account are higher than the weighted average cost of capital we find that internal capital budgeting rules and the effort of studying technical feasibility and profitability are relevant to understanding the efficiency gap the results indicate that the voluntary agreement and the emission trading scheme are complementary addressing different barriers in different contexts

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

making the link climate policy and the reform of the uk construction industry this paper explores the barriers to energy efficiency in the construction of non domestic buildings in the uk the source of the barriers is argued to lie in the organisation of the construction industry including the linear design process the reliance on cost based competitive tendering and the incentives placed upon different actors the consequences include oversizing of equipment reduced quality neglect of whole life costs and lack of integrated design each of these problems can usefully be interpreted using concepts from the new institutional economics while the barriers are well known to construction industry specialists they are relatively neglected in the academic literature on energy policy furthermore conventional policy measures such as building regulations leave these barriers largely untouched the uk construction industry is currently undergoing a series of reforms which aim to change the relationship between different actors and to achieve improvements in product quality and productivity while these reforms have the potential to address many of the barriers the reform agenda makes practically no reference to sustainability this paper argues that climate policy objectives must be integrated into the reform agenda if the uk is to begin the transition to a low carbon built environment

impacts of market based climate change policies on the us pulp and paper industry abstract much of the policy debates on climate issues have centered on the optimal level and timing of policy interventions that cost effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions we briefly review the range of policy issues in our paper and assess the impact that climate change policies may have on energy use and carbon emissions in the us pulp and paper industry we then present results from time series based analyses of changes in technologies and fuel mix and compare the results with engineering based technology analyses of us pulp and paper production for a copy of the model and software send e mail to mruth bu edu projections based on information for eight paper and paperboard categories are presented for the years 1995 2020 the findings indicate that under a wide range of specifications and policy assumptions carbon emissions from fossil fuel use per ton of product are likely to decline when combined with investment incentives an additional cost effective reduction in carbon emissions per ton of product will be realized however expected increases in output from the industry are likely to be higher than the reductions in energy and carbon intensities the policy implications of these findings are discussed

distributional coalitions and the politics of economic reform in latin america for much of the discipline of economics a closed economy is seen as the result of efforts of distributional coalitions and rent seekers to maintain sector specific protections accordingly economic liberalization is explained by the policy consistency of uncompromising reform elites students of the politics of economic adjustment in the developing world in turn have argued that reform programs concentrate costs in the present and disperse benefits in the future hence losers are prepared to engage in collective action whereas prospective winners facing uncertainty about payoffs remain disorganized they thus posit the cohesiveness and insularity of policymakers as the main variable for explaining successful reform both economists and political scientists therefore adopt a collective action approach that overlooks how groups organize in support of liberalization in the recent latin american experience however these reforms have preserved market reserves for firms that provided vital political support to and often colluded with policymaking elites this setting has thus reproduced incentives for rent seeking behavior even in the presence of comprehensive liberalization this evidence supports two interrelated theoretical claims first distributional coalitions may proliferate when the state withdraws from the economy not only when it intervenes second interest based variables retain explanatory power in political economy which state autonomy arguments disregard irrespective of whether the economy is closed or open which neoclassical perspectives overlook to highlight the centrality of interest groups favoring marketization therefore the article suggests modifications to the dominant theories of collective action and the literature on the politics of economic adjustment

information processing and organizational structure abstract standard economic theories of the firm and other organizations stress profit maximization as the foundation for derivation of predictable behavior yet statistical and case study evidence continues to accumulate that real firms do not act as required by the neoclassical framework instead of being represented by ever more elaborate maximization models the firm can be modeled simply as a network of information processing agents the actions of the firm are then a function only of the network structure and the information processing capabilities of the agents this approach can be used to explain a number of features of organizational behavior including the process of technological diffusion it also suggests that derivation of the optimal organizational structure may be computationally complex with a number of implications for economic theory and policy development

cultural institutions and value formation on the art market a rent seeking approach the formation of value in the artistic market can be specifically affected by the behavior of cultural institutions acting on it as monopolistic quality certifiers the rent maximizing strategy limits quantities to sub optimum levels and keeps prices and costs higher this can be worsened by institutional rent seeking the establishment s strategies cannot always be matched through public policies because this can result in an increase of monopoly social losses and of the establishment s lobbying efforts

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40