access to markets and rural poverty evidence from household consumption in china abstract this paper presents evidence on the effects of access to domestic and international markets on per capita consumption of households using data from rural china the econometric analysis uses alternative identification schemes to address the potential endogeneity of access to markets we use straight line distances to coastline and navigable river along with the topography of the intervening counties as sources of exogeneous variations we also use identification through heteroskedasticity which does not rely on standard exclusion restrictions the results from alternative identification schemes show that better access to both domestic and international markets has positive effects on per capita consumption the domestic market effect is significantly larger in magnitude and there is complementarity between the access to domestic and international markets

the part time premium enigma an assessment of the chilean case proquest denotes formulae omitted working part time has been seen by some researchers public policy advisers and politicians as a way for women to find a balance between home and paid work gregory and connolly 2008 bardasi and gornick 2008 however there is no agreement on the optimal balance indeed there are contrasting views on the subject those in favor suggest that in the absence of part time jobs female labor force participation would be substantially lower sundstrom 1991 dekker 2008 according to this belief women confronted with the choice between working full time and not working at all would opt for the latter on the other hand detractors in european countries assert that part time jobs imply a waste of resources and of investments in human capital since the many part time working women who are highly educated generally make a downward occupational move when they switch from full time to part time work gregory and connolly 2008 manning and petrongolo 2008 furthermore part time jobs have adverse repercussions for the economic well being of part time working women given that public social welfare benefits wage increases and professional development might be scarce for these women leiva 2000 warren 2008 fernandez kranz and others 2011 fernandez kranz and rodriguez planas 2011 in addition in mem ber countries of the organization for economic cooperation and develop ment oecd hourly earnings are lower manning and petrongolo 2008 and employer provided training less common gregory and connolly 2008 connolly and gregory 2009 in part time jobs than in full time jobs further more in those countries though the hourly earnings gap between women and men in full time work has been narrowing the same is not the case for female part time workers and males in full time jobs manning and petrongolo 2008 part time work among women after the birth of their first child is currently responsible for some of the pay gap between men and women kanji 2011 chile s rate of female labor force participation is one of the lowest in latin american countries cepal un eclac 2011 despite female educational attainment that is similar to or higher than that of other latin american countries carrillo gandelman and robano 2013 to increase female labor force partici pation the chilean government is promoting part time and home based work for women although part time work is not as extensive as in other countries the proportion of chilean women working part time has tripled in the past ten years and part time workers now represent more than 20 percent of the female work force national socio economic characterization survey casen 2009 contreras puentes and bravo 2005 show that in chile the female labor force participation rate is positively correlated with education it is not appar ent why female labor force participation is so low discrimination in the labor market or more generally the existent gender wage gap favorable to males nopo 2012 carrillo gandelman and robano 2013 might partially explain the low female participation rate as might cultural factors contreras and plaza 2010 find that women who have internalized machista values are less likely to participate in the labor market despite concerns of endogeneity owing to data limitations contreras and plaza 2010 find a negative rela tionship between female labor force participation and conservative values puentes and ruiz tagle 2011 using the voz de mujer survey analyze the same phenomenon while controlling for possible endogenous relationships 1 they find that cultural factors are not endogenously determined by a woman s labor participation decision on the contrary it seems that whether women work has little effect on cultural factors in the short term according to their study values develop in early childhood rather than during a woman s work ing life interestingly the same 2002 survey that contreras and plaza 2010 used was reapplied by the centro de estudios publicos and released in april 2012

central bank independence a critical view from a developing country perspective abstract merely establishing an independent central bank may not bring about its professed benefits in developing countries with shallow financial markets where there is limited scope for a truly independent monetary policy the benefits of an independent central bank may be eroded by conflicts between fiscal and monetary policy and by inherent problems of central bank institutional design so that problems of dynamic inconsistency associated with monetary policy are not solved but merely transformed less developed countries wishing to establish a low inflation path should concentrate on instituting financial policy reforms that bolster opposition to inflation and institutional arrangements that force discipline on fiscal policy directly rather than indirectly through monetary policy

a critical assessment of measures of central bank independence the methodology of measuring central bank independence suggested by bade and parkin three decades ago and inverse correlations between the measures and inflation have been widely accepted the measurement literature has made important contributions identifying elements of institutional design that establish the relationship between the central bank and the government and the measurements from an ordinal perspective provide some useful insights about the major institutional redesigns of central banks during the past several decades at the same time the measurement literature is problematic first a dummy variable bifurcating central banks into groups of independent and less independent central banks can duplicate the standard correlations suggesting the information content of the specific measures is limited second the correlations between inflation and measures of independence are not as stable as claimed and most important the measurements are subject to classification problems that have not been fully appreciated review of the institutional design and history of the bank of korea bank of japan and the federal reserve provide evidence the classification problems are important the measures of independence are more appropriately regarded as ordinal rankings of central bank independence rather than considered cardinal measures suitable for econometric modeling jel e50 e58 e65

openness central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio traditional explanations of the negative correlation between openness and inflation presume that an inverse relationship between the degree of openness and the sacrifice ratio reduces the inflation bias of descretionary monetary policy temple 2002 concludes however that such a relationship fails to emerge in cross country data our analysis of the same cross country data considered by temple indicates that once the degree of central bank independence and its interaction with greater openness and the sacrifice ratio in addition increased openness lessens the positive effect of central bank independence on the sacrifice ratio

postwar developments in business cycle theory a moderately classical perspective for issues regarding business cycles the phillips curve or aggregate supply portion of a macroeconomic model s specification is crucial unfortunately the relevant dynamic behavior is poorly understood flexible price models appear inconsistent with the data while existing sticky price models are unlikely to be policy invariant nevertheless current knowledge is adequate to design a rule for monetary policy that would if maintained result in near zero inflation and output fluctuations that are small by historical standards an operational rule of this type is described and some indication of its effectiveness is reported copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

the output inflation tradeoff and central bank reform evidence from new zealand the 1989 reserve bank of new zealand act provides a natural experiment in which the effects of institutional change on economic relationships can be studied the act set price stability as the single objective of monetary policy and gave the bank great independence reforms of this nature may lead to a greater short run output inflation tradeoff by altering optimal stabilisation policy and wage indexation allowing for environments where learning about the new regime is assumed to be rapid as well as slow we find that a large rise in the new zealand tradeoff has occurre d since implementation of the act

a comparison of three institutions for monetary policy when central bankers have private objectives how do different institutional arrangements for the central bank perform when central bankers have private objectives and society objectives vary with time this paper evaluates three benchmark monetary institutions from a constitutional perspective i a contract with an inflation or monetary target announcement ii an inflation rule and iii the laissez faire policy i e the absence of any contractual arrangement at the stage of institutional choice there is uncertainty about both society s mean inflation target and the central banker s future inflation target a target announcement reveals the type of the central banker and solves the credibility vs flexibility trade off but it can not prevent that the central banker follows private objectives the announcement based contract is the optimal institution if i the initial uncertainty about the central banker s objectives is small and ii if unemployment is sufficiently high

the lucas critique and the volcker deflation this paper examines in light of the lucas critique the behavior of the phillips curve and of the term structure of interest rates after october 1979 it starts with an informal account of the policy change and then discusses how we might expect these two relations to shift after such a change it finds little evidence of a direct effect of the policy change on the phillips curve at least until 1982 it finds substantial evidence of a direct effect on term structure this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

financial derivative instruments and social ethics recent finance literature attributes the development of derivative instruments interest rate futures stock index futures to 1 technological advances and 2 improved mathematical models for predicting option prices this paper explores the role of social ethics in the acceptance of financial derivatives the relationship between utilitarian ethical principles and the demise of turn of the century bucket shops is contrasted with modern tolerance of financial derivatives based upon libertarian ethical precepts our conclusion is that a change in social ethics also facilitated the growth in trading in modern financial derivatives

partisan governments the international economy and macroeconomic policies in advanced nations 1960 93 this article examines the impact of parties domestic institutions and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time series cross section data from nineteen oecd countries for the years between 1960 and the mid 1990s the results are as follows partisan governments have affected alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets the pattern of macroeconomic management still their impact has varied over time partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange rate system in place after following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s oecd governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline by contrast taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings as financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s partisan and institution led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries

monetary uncertainty strategic wage setting and equilibrium employment abstract an important recent strand of literature has shown that if wages are set strategically by inflation averse non atomistic unions then equilibrium employment is sensitive to the monetary regime this note demonstrates that such sensitivity need not reflect a direct aversion to inflation by unions but instead may result from union concerns for employment objectives in circumstances in which the variance and mean value of inflation are positively related

applying ethics to insider trading insider trading has received a bad name in recent decades the popular press makes it sound like an evil practice where those who engage in it are totally devoid of ethical principles yet not all insider trading is unethical and some studies have concluded that certain kinds of insider trading are actually beneficial to the greater investment community some scholars in philosophy law and economics have disputed whether insider trading should be punished at all while others assert that it should be illegal in all cases this paper explores the nature of insider trading and analyzes the issues to determine the positive and negative aspects of insider trading and how policy should be changed the best hope would be for studies to be made that isolate the individuals or groups who are fraudulently harmed by insider trading if any such groups exist then clearly worded legislation could be passed to prevent any fraud from being committed against these individuals and groups while allowing non fraudulent transactions to be completed without fear of prosecution until it can be clearly determined that someone is fraudulently harmed by insider trading there should be no law or regulation restricting the practice since such restrictions violate individual rights and will likely have a negative market reaction

part time work gender and job satisfaction evidence from a developing country this paper investigates the relationship between part time work and job satisfaction using a recent household survey from honduras in contrast to previous work for developed countries this paper does not find a preference for part time work among women instead both women and men tend to prefer full time work although the preference for working longer hours is stronger for men consistent with an interpretation of working part time as luxury consumption the paper finds that partnered women with children poor women or women working in the informal sector are more likely to prefer full time work than single women partnered women without children non poor women or women working in the formal sector these results have important implications for the design of family and child care policies in low income countries

new evidence on the output inflation trade off from developing economies the case of the cfa franc zone this aim of this paper is to give a contribution to the debate on whether output inflation trade offs are negatively influenced by the mean of inflation as postulated by new keynesians or by the variability of inflation as postulated by neo classical economists to remove any concerns about the arbitrariness of the choice of the sample the analysis will focus on a group of countries belonging to the same currency union the franc zone the results do not provide conclusive evidence on either theory as it was found that there existed a negative relation between the output inflation trade offs and the mean of inflation on the one hand and the variability of inflation on the other

the institutional foundations of monetary commitment a comparative analysis abstract this paper adopts an institutional perspective on the problem of designing governance structures for restraining monetary policy this perspective broadens the standard literature on central bank independence in several dimensions first although it recognizes that an independent central bank is one important institutional arrangement it also considers a much broader variety of institutional arrangements that have been used historically and today to restrain monetary policy second it considers not only the formal or legal institutional arrangements governing monetary policy but also the broader environment or institutional endowment in which those formal arrangements are embedded third this paper is concerned with the problem of enforcement given the institutional endowment in which formal monetary rules are implemented how likely are they to stick broadening the perspective in these ways frames the issue as a matching problem when it is recognized both that countries differ in the nature of their institutional endowments and that there is an array of possible formal arrangements that can be adopted to govern monetary policy the question then becomes how best to align the formal arrangements with the endowment in which they will be embedded case studies of diverse monetary policy making institutions in cote d ivoire argentina thailand and new zealand are used to motivate and illustrate the analysis

inflation rules with consistent escape clauses abstract simple inflation targets may be supplemented with an escape clause to be invoked in case the economy is hit by a major supply shock in this paper consistent solutions to the flood and isard 1989 imf staff papers 36 612 632 escape clause model are derived in the spirit of lohmann 1990 american economic review 82 273 286 she shows that flood and isard s assumption of symmetric boundary values of shocks outside of which the zero inflation rule should be broken is inconsistent as long as the employment target differs from the natural rate however she does not actually solve the model obstfeld 1991 nber working paper no 3603 applies this framework to an exchange rate escape clause but is unable to solve his model given a triangular distribution of the supply shocks this paper shows how the model can be solved and the optimal escape clause derived assuming a uniform distribution numerical examples suggest that the optimal boundary values in the consistent model are highly asymmetric

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

margin regulation and stock market volatility using daily and monthly stock returns we find no convincing evidence that federal reserve margin requirements have served to dampen stock market volatility the contrary conclusion expressed in recent papers by hardouvelis 1988a b is traced to flaws in his test design we do detect the expected negative relation between margin requirements and the amount of margin credit outstanding we also confirm the recent finding by schwert 1988 that changes in margin requirements by the fed have tended to follow rather than lead changes in market volatility after 55 years stock market margin requirements are again a source of controversy the securities and exchange act of 1934 transferred to the federal reserve system the authority exercised previously by the new york stock exchange and other private sector exchanges to set the minimum margins i e down payments that securities brokers and dealers subsequently expanded to all lenders must require of customers purchasing common stocks on credit the transfer of authority reflected the view widely held at the time that the low initial margins set by the exchanges had fueled the stock market boom of the 1920 s and that the frenzied liquidation of shares in response to margin calls had accelerated the crash in october 1929 supposedly dragging the economy down with it congress hoped that timely raising of margin requirements by the monetary authorities might dampen speculative excesses before they raged out of control or in today s terms that margin controls might reduce market volatility what the federal reserve has done since then with its margin setting authority can be seen from figure 1 which shows the time paths both of margins and one measure of market volatility from october 1934 to december 1987 margin requirements were set initially at 45 percent raised to 55 percent during the boomlet of 1936 and then cut back to a low of 40 percent after the sharp stockmarket break in the autumn of 1937 the requirement stayed at that level for the remainder of the 30 s and most of the war years but was stepped up sharply as the war drew to a close reaching 100 percent i e all cash no borrowing for most of 1946 changes were frequent over the next two and a half decades

nominal wage flexibility wage indexation and monetary union membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non membership this counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence but more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy it is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability the interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full indexation equilibrium

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

destabilizing effects of exchange rate escape clauses abstract this paper studies policy rules with escape clauses analyzing as an example fixed exchange rate systems that allow member countries the freedom to realign in periods of stress while well designed escape clause rules can raise society s welfare in principle limited credibility makes it difficult to implement such rules in practice an ems type institution that imposes political costs on policymakers who realign may raise welfare but can also produce equilibria far inferior to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate switches between multiple equilibria may have the character of sudden speculative attacks

optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain central bank preferences accountability through independence this paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank s preferences are unknown two key conclusions emerge from the paper first even with optimal targets or contracts central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society second if the delegation solution is preferable and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets i e by making it goal independent

political business cycles and macroeconomic credibility a survey there is clear evidence that government popularity and election performance is affected in part by economic performance suggesting that governments may manipulate the economy to political advantage simple models incorporating adaptive expectations which allowed the government to exploit this relationship were developed in the 1970s but fell out of fashion with the advent of new classical economics however modern theories of the political business cycle which are closely related to the macroeconomic policy game literature assume rational expectations and lead to forms of political business cycle driven by the existence of uncertainty of one type or another the international evidence suggests that some aspects of the theories apply although definitive conclusions are as we might expect hard to come by

a model of the federal reserve act under the international gold standard system abstract freeman am econom rev 86 1996a 1126 shows that an elastic money supply enhances the efficiency of monetary equilibrium by clearing default free debts at par value in the domestic credit market this research adds a foreign exchange market to freeman s model and extends his analysis into a two country model in which the arrival rates of agents are not equal between the two countries in this model an elastic money supply in the foreign exchange market to clear the exchange of fiat monies at gold standard parity accompanied by an elastic money supply in the domestic credit market could improve the efficiency of monetary equilibrium

inflation targeting does not matter another look at oecd sacrifice ratios recently in this journal goncalves and carvalho 2009 concluded that inflation targeters were able to bring inflation down at less cost than nontargeters p 242 this comment shows that their conclusion is not robust but instead is the result of comparing a particular subset of inflation targeting it disinflations with nonsimultaneous disinflations that occurred under very different macroeconomic conditions in their sample simple extensions such as justifiably varying the treatment group of it disinflations to control for common time varying effects or to control for the maastricht treaty effects suggest that it does not matter

microfinance and moneylender interest rate evidence from bangladesh summary the linkage between the formal and informal credit markets in developing countries has largely been unexplored this paper addresses one important aspect of the linkage by empirically investigating the impact of the intervention of microfinance programs on the moneylender interest rates in northern bangladesh and finds that moneylender interest rates increase with microfinance program coverage higher microfinance program coverage increases moneylender interest rates in the villages in which more loans are invested in productive economic activities than consumption borrowers resort to moneylenders for additional funds probably because of inadequate supply unavailability of seasonal working capital from mfis and tight repayment schedules which in turn increase demand for moneylender loans

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

quantitative method in finance from detachment to ethical engagement quantitative analysts or quants are a source of competitive advantage for financial institutions they occupy the relatively powerful but often misunderstood role of modeling structuring and pricing complex financial instruments in the capital markets but quants often function in a discipline free from ethical burdens models used to price complex instruments are usually beyond the mathematical understanding of financial sector participants who rely heavily on the integrity of the quant who built them although there has been some attempt to cover the ethics of mathematics applied to the capital markets designing a set of rules to guide the ethical behavior of quants cannot be made explicit and remains inexpressible because quants generally experience a sense of detachment from moral obligation there is a growing need to convert moral detachment into engagement our framework is indebted to key elements of wittgenstein s practical ethics philosophy and rawls justice principle the burden of balancing justice as fairness as defined by rawls with the inability to explicitly articulate ethical rules as defined by wittgenstein must fall to the quant we propose that the threshold delineating the barrier between ethical detachment and engagement can only be defined by the quants themselves it is their moral duty to disclose their level of ethical engagement when their models are put into practice

transparency democratic accountability and the economic consequences of monetary institutions debates about the appropriate mix between autonomy and accountability of bureaucrats are relevant to numerous areas of government action i examine whether there is evidence of a tradeoff between transparency democratic accountability and the gains from monetary delegation i begin by presenting a simple theoretical model which suggests that central banks that are transparent in the sense of publishing their macroeconomic forecasts will find it easier to acquire a reputation despite making central banks more subject to outside scrutiny then monetary transparency can lead to improved economic outcomes i also consider arguments about the effect of accountability provisions involving parliamentary oversight and control over central bankers the paper then uses a new data set to examine these issues empirically focusing on a natural experiment involving disinflation costs under different central banking institutions during the 1990s results suggest that countries with more transparent central banks face lower costs of disinflation while accountability provisions have no clear effect on disinflation costs my results also concord with earlier findings that the effect of monetary institutions is conditional on other features of the political environment

assessing the frontiers of ultrapoverty reduction evidence from challenging the frontiers of poverty reduction targeting the ultra poor an innovative program in bangladesh abstractthis article uses household panel data to provide robust evidence on the effects of brac s building resources across countries targeting the ultra poor tup program in bangladesh we use alternative treatment comparison pairs in addition to brac s own classification we exploit type 1 errors in assignment in brac s selection process to create a second treatment comparison pair this allows us to estimate the program effects on the target group not contaminated by mistargeting to address selection on unobservables we implement heteroskedasticity based identification and two recent estimators based on matching and propensity score reweighting the results show that participation had significant positive effects on food security clothing shoes livestock and cash savings but there is weak or no evidence of an impact on the number of household durables and assets and indicators of health and women s empowerment the effects on the poorest of the poor the target group may be different from

understanding the disinflations in australia canada and new zealand using evidence from smooth transition analysis abstract this paper investigates the disinflation experiences of three countries australia canada and new zealand unlike previous approaches which have sought to use institutional data to pre determine the causes speed and duration of the transitions to low inflation regimes this paper allows price data itself to determine the speed and timing of the reforms using smooth transition analysis the results show that the process of transition is related to two factors central bank independence and the general slowdown in economic activity which occurred during the early 1990s in all oecd countries other reforms to the labor market and fiscal policy were less influential

sectoral variability and the foundations of optimal inflation rate abstractthe recent monetary search models argue that the real effects of inflation on economic activity can be gauged through relative price variability rpv our study uses a large panel data of

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

ethics fairness and efficiency in financial markets 1993 ethics fairness and efficiency in financial markets financial analysts journal vol 49 no 6 pp 21 29

the political economy of monetary institutions in recent decades countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions including alternative exchange rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions emphasizing their role in resolving both the time inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy this first generation work however suffers from a central limitation it studies exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other by contrast the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and central bank independence together and in so doing present a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions the articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions investigating how political institutions democratic processes political party competition and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

political business cycles and central bank independence this paper develops a dynamic model of rational partisan business cycles in which wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the election result empirical analysis of 20 oecd countries supports the theoretical implication that left wing incumbents increase output but increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it the model is extended to incorporate the effects of alternative measures of central bank independence cbi the measure of objective independence outperforms the other measures and it is found that cbi reduces politically induced business cycles

political and economic determinants of interest rate behavior are central banks different i introduction do politicians manipulate the instruments of macroeconomic policy to improve their electoral prospects or in response to the preferences of their own party these questions are addressed but not yet resolved by the literature on political business cycles 1 to generate a political business cycle politicians must control the instruments of macroeconomic policy monetary policy plays an important role in the determination of inflation output and employment the objects of concern to politicians and voters yet politicians do not directly control the instruments of monetary policy in industrialized countries instead these instruments are controlled by the central banks which vary widely across countries in their degree of statutory independence we wish to examine empirically whether monetary policy is influenced by the timing of elections or a change in the party in power after controlling for unexpected changes in economic fundamentals our paper assesses therefore one aspect of independence namely whether a central bank makes monetary policy decisions without measurable political influence 2 in this study we attempt to look at what central banks actually do as opposed to what they are legislated to do to distinguish between the form and substance in discussions of central bank independence as in mayer 1976 3 our paper enlarges and improves on cowart 1978 and woolley 1983 both of whom studied the role of political factors in monetary policy for a sample of industrialized countries our methodology is to compare the responsiveness of interest rate changes to economic and political factors in seventeen countries as we discuss below there are differences in opinion about whether an interest rate variable or a monetary aggregate is a better representation of monetary policy actions we compare the results of qualitative measures of differences in central bank design e g rankings of banks in order of independence as determined by legislative criteria with the results of a quantitative comparison of differences in central bank behavior this exercise should help identify the important qualitative features in the reform of existing central banks or in the design of new central banks 4 in our empirical work the relevant relationships are estimated with a recursive vector autoregression technique to control for temporal instability in the economy between 1960 and 1990 and the endogeneity of the variables in question this methodological innovation has important consequences for the understanding of reaction functions and more generally for measuring the impact of macroeconomic shocks on monetary policy we also stress results for separate subsamples of fixed and flexible exchange rates as well as for the full sample our methodology measures the influence of politics on monetary policy relative to the choices and information actually available to the central bank when the monetary policy decision was made our study does not measure the influence of politics on the instruments of fiscal policy as in alesina et al 1991 our study also does not measure the direct influence of fiscal variables on the instruments of monetary policy although there is some evidence on this issue in for example parkin 1986 and burdekin and wohar 1990 burdekin and wohar estimate the relationships between deficits money base growth and inflation for a sample of countries and time period comparable to ours all these studies find some evidence that central banks do accommodate fiscal policy by financing deficits via money growth especially since the end of bretton woods we return to the issue of fiscal policy in considering the interpretation of our results but stress that the effects of fiscal policy are partly captured in our specifications because we measure monetary policy relative to the state of the economy 5 a brief review of the literature which measures statutory central bank independence is given in section ii

central bank independence and macroeconomic performance some comparative evidence this note uses information on a sample of sixteen oecd countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance as previous work suggests politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation however the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth unemployment or the ex ante real interest rate copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

inflation and central bank independence a meta regression analysis using 59 studies we perform a meta regression analysis of studies examining the relationship between inflation and central bank independence cbi the studies considered are very different with respect to the cbi indicator used the sample of countries and time periods covered model specification estimators used and publication outlet we conclude that there is a significant publication bias however we also find a significant genuine effect of cbi on inflation differences between studies are not caused by differences in cbi indicators used

centralised wage setting inflation contracts and the optimal choice of central banker the paper examines the appropriate design of central banking institutions in an economy in which the nominal wage is set by an inflation averse monopoly union as a positive mark up over its market clearing value the analysis considers both the optimal choice of central banker and the potential role for a linear inflation contract the optimal set of arrangements is a central banker who attaches less significance to inflation than does society combined with an inflation contract where the value of the contract parameter is related to the union s degree of inflationaversion following the important contribution of rogoff 1985 the appointment of a conservative central banker has been widely accepted as a potential albeit partial solution to the time inconsistency problem associated with discretionary policy making in placing a greater weight on inflation than does the government and society as a whole in the setting of monetary policy the central bank s temptation to create inflation surprises is reduced this then leads to a lower inflation rate in equilibrium than would otherwise prevail whilst in rogoff s stochastic framework this reduction in the inflationary bias has to be weighed against an increase in output variability the appropriate choice of central banker ensures a net improvement in welfare an important feature of rogoff s model is the assumption of an atomistic labour market in which nominal wages embodied in single period contracts reflect interaction between agents who hold no market power such a representation of the labour market also characterises most subsequent extensions of rogoff s analysis e g lohmann 1992 and waller 1992 however a number of recent papers in considering the time inconsistency issue have employed the assumption of unionised wage setting assuming either an allencompassing monopoly union or alternatively a number of individual unions each of which has a non negligible impact on macroeconomic variables examples include agell and ysander 1993 bleaney 1996 cubitt 1992 1995 horn and persson 1988 hutchison and walsh 1998 and skott 1997 these contributions have examined the implications of the assumed labour market imperfection from a variety of perspectives but only those of bleaney and skott directly consider its consequences for the appropriate specification of central bank objectives in what follows we explore the significance of unionised wage setting for

seigniorage and tax smoothing in the united states 1914 1986 abstract when monetary and fiscal authorities cooperate to minimize the distortionary costs of financing an exogenous stream of government expenditures barro s tax smoothing model implies a long run relationship between tax revenues and inflation previous empirical tests of this relationship are reinterpreted in light of recent work on cointegration and are shown to hold only when stochastic temporal variation in the excess burden of taxes and seigniorage is transitory in nature a new test that holds in the presence of nonstationary disturbances is developed and applied annual u s data from the period 1914 to 1986 reject the revenue smoothing hypothesis

inflation targeting and output inflation tradeoffs abstract this article assesses whether the adoption of inflation targeting it helps reduce the output inflation tradeoff we address the self selection problem of it policy adoption by the endogenous switching regressions and show that the output inflation tradeoffs are significantly lower in it countries not only over the whole sample but also across the developed and developing country subsamples in addition we also find strong evidence supporting the positive selection hypothesis i e countries have higher probability of adopting it are exactly those who benefit more larger reduction of output inflation tradeoff from the implementation of it additional results reveal that economies with higher trade openness lower financial openness and less flexible exchange rate regime are associated with larger tradeoff between output and inflation but the effects are only statistically significant in the it regime

partially independent central banks politically responsive governments and inflation theories of central bank independence have more exact implications regarding inflation in different political economic environments than generally understood or empirically examined they imply that inflation in any given country time will be a weighted average of what it would be if the central bank completely controlled monetary policy and what it would be if the government completely controlled it with the degree of central bank independence weighting the former an equation embodying this theoretical expectation is estimated by constrained least squares from a time series cross section of inflation rates in developed democracies since the bretton woods era the results confirm that the antiinflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader politicaleconomic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently conversely the inflationary impacts of all such political economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence

inflation targeting in emerging economies panel evidence abstract this paper shows there is no evidence that the inflation targeting regime it improves economic performance as measured by the behavior of inflation and output growth in developing countries the control of common time effects results in less negative and less significant it impacts on inflation inflation volatility and output growth volatility than previously found in the literature additionally our analysis shows robust evidence of lower output growth during it adoption on balance although lower long run mean inflation signals that the central banks of emerging economies with inflation targeting are more inflation averse the costs of disinflation have not been lower than under other monetary regimes

the disadvantage of tying their hands on the political economy of policy commitments incumbents are more likely to be re elected if they have a comparative advantage in the eyes of voters on some central issue this paper argues that incumbents have an incentive to avoid reforms that reduce the government s role in deciding these issues in order to increase their chances of re election this point is illustrated in the context of the choice of an exchange rate regime in an economy characterized by an inflation bias a flexible exchange rate allows the government to use monetary policy as a stabilization tool while fixed exchange rates remove the inflation bias of the economy on the one hand it is shown that a more inflation averse government may refrain from choosing fixed exchange rates in order to capitalize on the inflationary reputation of its opponent this incentive is contrasted with the opposite incentive to tie the hands of the future government should be incumbent be defeated on the other hand it is shown that electoral considerations may reinforce the incentive of the more inflationary government to tie its own hands with fixed exchange rates

the extent of the market and stages of agricultural specialization this paper provides empirical evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between crop specialization in a village economy and the extent of the market size of the urban market relevant for the village the results suggest that the portfolio of crops in a village economy becomes more diversified initially as the extent of the market increases however after the market size reaches a threshold the production structure becomes specialized again this evidence on the stages of agricultural diversification is consistent with the stages of diversification identified in the recent literature for the economy as a whole and also for the manufacturing sector the evidence highlights the importance of improving farmers access to markets through investment in transport infrastructure and removal of barriers to trading

monetary politics and unemployment persistence abstract this paper develops a positive model of monetary policy that allows for persistent unemployment and electoral uncertainty the common credibility problem associated with low inflation monetary policy results in both a more severe inflation bias and a stabilization bias however a simple state contingent performance contract eliminates both biases monetary policy is also subject to two different strategic political considerations it is used to influence future policy decisions as well as to increase the incumbent party s probability of re election this results in a political business cycle which however is fundamentally different for left wing and right wing governments

political parties and monetary commitments we argue that political parties will choose monetary institutions in order to help them win elections and retain office increased levels of economic openness in the industrial democracies have complicated the pursuit of office by altering the policy preferences of constituents and decreasing the ability of cabinet ministers to deliver promised economic outcomes we contend that monetary commitments can help political parties manage diverse constituent interests restore policy effectiveness and ultimately maintain their position in office therefore we expect that fixed exchange rates and central bank independence can improve cabinet durability especially under conditions of economic openness in the first section we discuss how fixed exchange rates and central bank independence can insulate cabinets from the political shocks of increased economic openness to determine the political value of these commitments we then test the effect of exchange rate commitments and central bank independence on cabinet durability in the second section in the third section we use the results of our statistical models to generate expected cabinet durability for the countries in our sample under alternative institutional configurations by comparing the expected durabilities we show that most monetary reforms have helped or at least not hurt expected cabinet durability

the dynamics of changes in the female wage distribution in the usa a quantile regression approach this paper examines the female wage structure focusing on changes at different points in the wage distribution newly developed quantile regression methods are used in analysing data from the march current population survey the results show that while the most significant changes for the less skilled women took place at the bottom of the wage distribution for the more skilled groups changes occurred at both ends of the distribution consequently wage inequality decreased for the high school graduates and increased for the younger college graduates furthermore the more highly skilled women experienced the steepest gain in wages regardless of their position in the distribution 1998 john wiley sons ltd

money debt and deficits in a dynamic game this paper analyzes a dynamic linear quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities the equilibrium outcome of the game determines the time path of money creation fiscal deficits and public debt the game is solved for different equilibrium concepts the equilibria are then compared and interpreted with reference to alternative institutional arrangements the main results are i coordination increases the speed of adjustment towards the steady state and takes the steady state value of public debt closer to the desired target ii precommitments take the non cooperative equilibrium closer to the coordinated outcome iii increasing the weight that each policymaker assigns to his own private objectives slows down the adjustment process places more burden on the opponent but has ambiguous effects on the steady state value of public debt

to peg or not to peg a simple model of exchange rate regime choice in small economies abstract the choice of an exchange rate peg often points to a trade off between gaining credibility and losing flexibility we show that the flexibility loss may be reduced if domestic and foreign shocks are correlated and more volatile allowing for a plausible structural change after a peg a flexibility gain may result

a bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank abstract in this paper a bargaining model is developed to analyze the appointment of central bankers in a two party political system the major results of the paper are 1 the party in power will appoint partisans early on but later appointments will be increasingly moderate in their views concerning monetary policy 2 changing the timing of the appointment of the board chairman from the end of a president s term in office to the first period of the president s term will lead to more partisan monetary policy 3 in equilibrium nominations to the board are not rejected thus confirmation hearings appear to be nothing more than a rubber stamp process 4 lengthening the terms on the board relative to the electoral cycle will lead to more moderate appointments to the central bank and a reduction in partisan policymaking

governance structures and the durability of economic reforms evidence from inflation stabilizations abstract this paper investigates the relationship between a country s political economic and institutional environment and its ability to implement sustainable economic reform programs the policy issue on which the study focuses is inflation stabilization it consists principally of econometric estimations of the relationship between the success of stabilizations in a large sample of countries and several political and economic explanatory variables the hypotheses tested are drawn both from the recent macroeconomic literature on policy credibility and from political science the major findings include the following 1 a despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary political repression does not appear to be an effective means for implementing sustainable stabilization policies durable economic reforms and political freedoms appear to be complementary 2 b as has been previously argued theoretically and demonstrated empirically political instability is detrimental to policy reform 3 c the political will and popular consensus for stabilization policies are enhanced during a severe economic crisis 4 d there is weak evidence that intervention by the international monetary fund rather than supporting reform programs can undermine their credibility

the ethics of insider trading revisited following manne 1966 insider trading and the stock market new york free press we introduce a distinction between insider trading and market manipulation on the one hand and corporate insiders versus misappropriators on the other hand this gives rise to four types of alleged inside transactions we argue that the literature on insider trading has often targeted inside transactions type ii iii and iv but that these arguments do not necessarily hold for type i transactions we look for consequentionalist as well as non consequentionalist arguments against type i transactions and demonstrate that these are hard to find throughout the article we refer extensively to the economic literature on insider trading in order to overcome a relative divide between the economic legal and philosophical discussion on insider trading

feature the price of reconciliation part time work families and women s satisfaction while the gender pay gap has been narrowing for women in full time jobs the pay penalty for the 40 of women who work part time has risen reflecting the growing polarisation of part time jobs in low wage occupations a further dimension is that women often experience downgrading from higher skill full time into lower skill part time occupations as women reorganise their working lives around the presence of children their reported hours and job satisfaction are highest in part time work but life satisfaction is scarcely affected by hours of work this feature explores these issues and their challenge for economic efficiency as well as gender equity

is new zealand s reserve bank act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract this paper evaluates the reserve bank of new zealand act of 1989 from a principal agent perspective arguing that the act represents a dismissal rule the optimal dismissal rule requires that the central banker be dismissed whenever inflation exceeds a critical level that depends on aggregate supply disturbances and measurement error in the inflation index this is essentially the structure established by the act the scope for renegotiating the target rate however creates an incentive for the government to set the critical rate too high consequently the inflation bias of discretion is reduced but not completely eliminated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

checks and balances and the supply of central bank independence abstract the paper analyzes the institutional conditions under which policymakers can credibly commit to an independent central bank and thereby mitigate the well known time consistency problem in monetary policy it is shown theoretically that granting independence via a statute is only credible for legislative systems with at least two heterogeneous decision making bodies which both have veto rights for example bicameral systems this thesis is supported by empirical evidence the legal independence of central banks is significantly higher in those oecd countries whose legislative processes are characterized by extensive checks and balances furthermore the negative relation between legal independence and inflation is larger in countries with checks and balances than in countries without checks and balances

strategic discipline in monetary policy with private information optimal targeting periods this paper analyzes a multiperiod monetary targeting procedure as a possible resolution to the credibility problem in pol icy when the monetary authority has some private information by limitin g the degree of flexibility permitted in policy this procedure mitiga tes the credibility problem as the length of the targeting horizon decreases the severity of the credibility problem falls but at the expense of weakening the monetary authority s ability to pursue its stabilization goals based on model simulations the analysis studi es the determinants of the optimal targeting horizon that balances the benefits of flexibility and discipline in policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

regulating financial markets protecting us from ourselves and others the current global financial and economic crisis highlights the ongoing tug of war between those who pull toward free markets and those who pull toward strict regulation of markets between those who pull toward libertarianism and those who pull toward paternalism rising stock markets and economic prosperity empower those who favor free markets and libertarianism stock market crashes and economic recessions empower those who favor strict regulation and paternalism this article discusses the current crisis against the backdrop of earlier crises and focuses on margin regulations which limit leverage suitability regulations which require providers of financial products to act in the interests of their clients blue sky laws which prohibit securities deemed unfair or unduly risky and mandatory disclosure regulations which require providers of financial products to disclose pertinent information even if potential buyers do not ask for it

making monetary policy objectives and rules what is it that monetary policy makers do and how do they do it the simple answer is that a central banker moves interest rates in order to maintain steady real growth and stable prices in this essay i examine the issues that arise in framing the problem faced by monetary policy makers i begin with a discussion of how over the past decade or so central banks have been made more independent and more accountable the result has been the virtual elimination of the inflation bias problem that is caused by political interference in the monetary policy process and better overall macroeconomic performance the essay proceeds with an example of a formal version of the policymakers problem describing their objectives and the information they need to formulate a policy rule i conclude with a discussion of a simple versus complex policy rules the impact of uncertainty on policy making and how central bankers use formal modelling in making their day to day decisions copyright 2000 by oxford university press

on the impossibility of central bank independence four decades of time and intellectual inconsistency the intellectual justification for modern central banking time inconsistency celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017 alongside the cambridge journal of economics however the key progeny of the time inconsistency literature central bank independence has fundamental flaws that have been thus far neglected in mainstream research in the first instance the argument for independence relies on a utilitarian rather than institutional analysis one that neglects the genesis of central banks and their relation to other institutions within a country second central bank independence neglects the complex interdependencies of the global monetary and financial system applying an institutional lens to the concept of central bank independence i conclude that independence fails under the reality of globalization as much as it does in a domestic context with central banks reliant on all manner of political institutions they are never really independent operationally or in terms of policy

disinflation credibility and price inertia a danish exposition this paper analyses the disinflationary policy pursued in denmark since october 1982 focusing on the phillips curve trade off and the credibility of this disinflationary policy the overall conclusion confirms no significant indication of the disinflationary policy being credible

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

is it possible that an independent central bank is impossible the case of the australian notes issue board 1920 1924 the history of the australian notes issue board over the period 1920 1924 is presented it is shown that the board was created as a genuinely independent monetary authority but was soon abolished as its policies antagonised interests upon which the government depended the episode illustrates the thesis that the possibility of a genuinely independent monetary authority is problematic

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

inflation band targeting and optimal inflation contracts in this paper we provide a theoretical treatment of how inflation target ranges cope with the time inconsistency problem arising from incentives for the monetary policymaker to exploit the short run trade off between employment and inflation to pursue short run employment objectives as in a barro gordon 1983 model inflation band targets are able to achieve many of the benefits that arise under practically less attractive solutions such as the conservative central banker and optimal inflation contracts our theoretical model also shows how an inflation targeting range should be set and how it should respond to changes in the nature of shocks to the economy

fairness outside the cocoon investment bankers security analysts traders and other finance professionals often behave as if they lived in a cocoon they need to recognize that they live under the community s rules of fairness as well as the market s rules through anecdotes quotations and survey reports this article discusses how internal and external obstacles keep finance professionals from perceiving the community s rules of fairness rules that often make their way into the law ultimately those who fail to understand and follow the community rules of fairness are taking risks they would be wise to avoid

open mouth operations abstract this paper explains how central bank statements rather than open market operations can be used to implement monetary policy in the extreme policy instruments can be held constant and yet interest rates will evolve along the path desired by the central bank we show how the recent implementation of monetary policy in new zealand works in this way using announcement data from new zealand we find that open mouth operations lead to large changes in interest rates across all maturities and these changes cannot be explained by open market operations implications are drawn for monetary policy in other jurisdictions

the impact of microcredit borrowing on household consumption in bangladesh the rapid expansion of microcredit in recent years renders knowledge of its impact on poverty critical unfortunately empirical investigations have been limited by endogeneity issues and randomiz

accountability transparency and inflation targeting inflation targeting regimes define a performance measure for the central bank a regime that places a large small weight on achieving the target is analogous to a high low powered incentive scheme high powered incentive structures promote accountability but may distort stabilization policy the optimal power under inflation targeting is derived under perfect and imperfect information the fundamental trade off between accountability and stabilization depends on the degree of transparency defined as the ability to monitor the central bank s performance multiplicative uncertainty increases the optimal weight to place on achieving an inflation target