every little helps esg news and stock market reaction stories about corporate social responsibility have become very frequent over the past decade and managers can no longer ignore their impact on firm value in this paper we investigate the extent and the determinants of the stock market s reaction following ordinary news related to environmental social and governance issues the so called esg factors to that purpose we use an original database provided by covalence ethicalquote our empirical analysis is based on about 33 000 esg news positive or negative targeting one hundred listed companies over the period 2002 2010 on average firms facing negative events experience a drop in their market value of 0 1 whereas companies gain nothing on average from positive announcements we find also that market participants are responsive to the media but they do not react to firms press releases or to ngos disclosures moreover our results indicate that sector s reputation mitigates the loss the goodwill hypothesis and that cultural proximity and lexical contents of esg disclosures play a significant role in the magnitude of the impact

bonus culture competitive pay screening and multitasking to analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation we embed multitasking and screening within a hotelling framework competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay shifting effort away from long term investments risk management and cooperation efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal who dulls incentives to extract rents as competition intensifies monopsonistic underincentivization of low skill agents first decreases and then gives way to growing overincentivization of high skill ones aggregate welfare is thus hill shaped while inequality tends to rise monotonically bonus caps can help restore balance in incentives but may generate other distortions

managerial bargaining power in the determination of compensation contracts and corporate investment this paper considers the design of managerial compensation contracts and their impact on corporate investment decisions and the managerial effort decision the model relates the compensation scheme to outside share ownership and managerial bargaining position using the methods of mechanism design under asymmetric information a shift in favor of effort is documented in the case where managerial bargaining strength is weak while a shift toward more use of capital investment results from strong managerial bargaining power the model distinguishes managerial equity holdings from contingent compensation contracts our results are related to the empirical literature on pay performance sensitivities

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard a continuous time approach this article presents a continuous time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk averse agent and a risk neutral principal under the model setup we show that the optimal controls are constant over time and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome we also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation the model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions we argue that in the third best world the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm s production functions contrary to conventional wisdom sometimes the higher the volatility the higher the sensitivity of the contract the firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news we also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions copyright 2005 oxford university press

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

menus of price quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation abstract many authors have proposed mechanisms to induce regulated polluting firms to truthfully reveal their private information this paper proposes an alternative scheme in which the regulator offers each firm a menu of linear price quantity contracts faced with this menu each firm s dominant strategy is to truthfully report its private information and self select the contract that is ex post efficient the proposed menu schedule that is more elastic than the firm s residual marginal damage function engenders a positive quantity effect thereby counterbalancing the firm s incentive to misreport prompted by the linearity of price due to its built in price quantity structure the scheme performs as designed regardless of the elasticities of marginal damage and demand functions

dynamic yardstick mechanisms abstract this paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated this sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation the paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long term contracts we found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bound on transfers that an agent can be asked to pay in contrast short term contracting fails to implement the commitment solution with constraints on transfers second absent current yardstick the possibility of using correlated mechanisms in the future allows the principal to implement the first best with a renegotiation proof long term contract whereas this cannot be achieved with short term contracting

sovereignty and economic development the case of israel and palestine the future permanent economic agreement between israel and palestine will have to determine among other things the trade regime and whether there should be economic borders the decision will have to satisfy goals of economic development including a reduction in economic and social gaps between the two countries and questions of sovereignty we describe and analyse the evolution of the palestinian economy before and since the oslo agreements concerning the future agreement we discuss the tradeoffs between sovereignty and prosperity and argue for the establishment at first of economic borders and a regime of less than full integration

contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition we investigate contracting and information sharing in two competing supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer the two supply chains are identical except they may have di

simple menus of contracts in cost based procurement and regulation in an influential paper jean jacques laffont and jean tirole 1986 formulated a principal agent model of cost based procurement and regulation and showed that the principal can implement the optimal mechanism by offering the agent a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts two related problems with applying this theory in practice have been that the economic logic and the underlying mathematics involved in calculating the optimal menu are quite complex and the principal must be able to specify the agent s entire disutility of effort function in order to calculate the optimal menu as a result the model has not been widely used in practice to either calculate actual incentive contracts or even to develop useful qualitative guidance about the nature of the optimal solution and how it is affected by various economic factors the purpose of this paper is to show that dramatically simpler menus which are easy to understand and calculate and which have lower informational requirements can at least in some cases capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the fully optimal complex menu in particular this paper considers two item menus where one item is a cost reimbursement contract and the other item is a fixed price contract such menus are called fixed price cost reimbursement fpcr menus for the case where the agent s utility is quadratic and the agent s type is distributed uniformly it is shown that the optimal fpcr menu always captures at least three quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves where the gain is measured relative to the result of using a cost reimbursement contract this paper s research was originally motivated by a policy issue in defense procurement in the united states the department of defense dod purchases almost all major weapons systems from sole source contractors using contracting methods that essentially amount to using cost reimbursement contracts the best way to understand why dod uses costreimbursement contracting methods is that they perform precisely the function identified in laffont and tirole s principal agent model they guarantee in a situation that amounts to a bilateral monopoly that dod and the firm can reach an agreement i e they guarantee that the agent will always produce the good of course the use of cost reimbursement contracting methods

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

capital structure with countervailing incentives the regulatedjirm s choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives the jirm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases when the jim s investment is large countervailing incentives lead both high and low cost jims to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium thus decoupling capital structure from private information when investment is small or medium sized the model may admit separating equilibria in which high cost jirrns issue greater equity and low cost jims rely more on debt jinancing

monopoly regulation under asymmetric information prices versus quantities we compare two instruments to regulate a monopoly that has private information about its demand or costs fixing either the price or quantity for each instrument we consider sophisticated screening and simple bunching mechanisms we characterize the optimal mechanisms and compare their welfare performance with unknown demand and increasing marginal costs the sophisticated price mechanism dominates that of quantity whereas the sophisticated quantity mechanism may prevail when marginal costs decrease the simple price mechanism dominates that of quantity when marginal costs decrease but the opposite may arise if marginal costs increase with unknown costs both instruments are equivalent

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

intertemporal non linear pricing this paper examines the impact of variations in temporal parameters in a non linear pricing model the two period model being analysed allows a rather general characterization of the price functions and of the impact of changes in temporal parameters such as the social rate of time discount the marginal costs in the two periods the interest rate and the growth rates in demand comparative statics results are derived under the assumption that price functions satisfy a strong optimality condition examples are given tarification non lineaire dans un cadre intertemporel dans cet article l auteur analyse l impact des variations dans les parametres temporels d un modele de tarification non lineaire on considere un modele i deux penodes qui permet une caracterisation assez generale des fonctions de prix et des impacts de variations dans les parametres temporels tels que le taux social de preference temporelle les cofuts marginaux dans les deux periodes le taux d interet et les taux de croissance de la demande l auteur derive des resultats de statique comparative en posant comme hypothese que les fonctions de prix satisfont une condition d optimalite forte des exemples sont donnes the present paper deals with the problem of designing price functions that would maximize social welfare under the constraint that firms operating under increasing returns and or large fixed costs break even there is an abundant literature on this general problem it is not my intention here to survey this literature but only to mention a few seminal papers namely ramsey 1927 coase 1946 boiteux 1956 baumol and bradford 1970 guesnerie 1980 and laffont and tirole 1984 the specific purpose of the present i am grateful to maurice marchand to the participants in the economic theory workshop queen s university the ceremade seminar universite de paris ix and the mathematical economics seminar at core universit6 de louvain for their comments the current version was written in the spring of 1985 during my visit to the universite de toulouse and was subsequently revised to meet the very helpful comments of two anonymous referees financial support from sshrc is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xix no 3 august aofit 1986 printed in canada imprim6 au canada 0008 4085 86 539 555 1 50 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 57 on sat 10 sep 2016 05 43 49 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

supplier switching decisions abstract in order to maximize profit a buying firm should continuously search for and access sources which offer more favorable prices while the literature is replete with works on the formation and development of buyer supplier relationships there is surprisingly only scarce research on the termination of such relationships and supplier switching using the concept of switching costs in a principal agent framework we at first analyze whether a firm switches the entire or a partial quantity to an alternative supplier when there is either symmetric or asymmetric information about the alternative supplier s cost structure information asymmetry results in inert supplier switching decisions subsequently we extend our model and take competitive reactions of the incumbent supplier and economies of scale effects into consideration we find conditions under which no partial and complete switching occurs which depend on the buying firm s beliefs about the alternative supplier s unit costs switching costs the price offered by the incumbent supplier and refinements of the price offered by the incumbent supplier due to competitive reactions and economies of scale broader implications for supplier relationship management and sourcing strategy decisions are also provided

existence of optimal mechanisms in principal agent problems we provide general conditions under which principal agent problems with either one or multiple agents admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal our results cover as special cases pure moral hazard and pure adverse selection we allow multidimensional types actions and signals as well as both financial and non financial rewards our results extend to situations in which there are ex ante or interim restrictions on the mechanism and allow the principal to have decisions in addition to choosing the agent s contract beyond measurability we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms it is not unusual for randomization to be necessary for optimality and so it should be and is permitted randomization also plays an essential role in our proof we also provide conditions under which some forms of randomization are unnecessary

procurement and renegotiation parties bound by an incomplete contract have an incentive to renegotiate after acquiring new information the issue of the parties investment in the relationship before renegotiation is analyzed in a simple two period procurement model the firm invests in the first period it then learns its production cost and the sponsor learns its value for the project williamson s underinvestment presumption is shown to hold under very general assumptions about bargaining and about the ex post asymmetry of information as long as the firm s investment is not observable by the sponsor the introduction of a cancellation fee may well lead to even less investment contrary to what is sometimes argued the role of ex ante price fixing as an alternative way to reintroduce some form of commitment and the problem of cost overruns are discussed last it is shown that if investment is observable by the sponsor andthus may become a joint decision variable the two parties may choose to under or overinvest

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

selection of contract suppliers under price and demand uncertainty in a dynamic market in this paper we consider a supply contracting problem in which the buyer firm faces non stationary stochastic price and demand first we derive analytical results to compare two pure strategies i periodically purchasing from the spot market and ii signing a long term contract with a single supplier the results from the pure strategies show that the selection of suppliers can be complicated by many parameters and is particularly affected by price uncertainty we then develop a stochastic dynamic programming model to incorporate mixed strategies purchasing commitments and contract cancellations computational results show that increases in price demand uncertainty favor long term short term suppliers by examining the two way interactions of contract factors price demand purchasing bounds learning and technology effect salvage values and contract cancellation both intuitive and non intuitive managerial insights in outsourcing strategies are derived

controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information abstract applying a real option approach this paper examines how asymmetric information alters key variables of a firm s supplier switching process such as the timing of contracting hurried versus delayed contracting transfer payments set up switching and abandonment decisions in a symmetric information setting delayed contracting is unambiguously beneficial abandoning the once established relation with the entrant supplier is never an issue in contrast under asymmetric information hurried contracting with potentially abandoning the relation can be beneficial consistent with adverse selection models we find that under delayed contracting in equilibrium the firm switches less frequently to the entrant supplier switching inertia surprisingly we also find that under hurried contracting the firm switches more frequently to the entrant supplier switching acceleration and may abandon the relation finally we study how these key variables of the supplier switching process change when also the incumbent supplier has private information two sided asymmetric information case

inequality and trust in sweden some inequalities are more harmful than others we present new evidence on the influence of income inequality on generalized trust using individual panel data from swedish counties together with an instrumental variable strategy we find that differences in disposable income and especially differences among people in the bottom half of the income distribution are associated with lower trust the relationship between income inequality and trust is particularly strong for people with a strong aversion against income differentials we also find that the proportion of people born in a foreign country is negatively associated with trust

optimal contracts for teams in a team subject to both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed optimal contracts are under certain conditions linear in the team s output the outcome is the same whether the principal observes just the total output or each individual s contribution thus monitoring is not needed to prevent shirking by team members instead the role of monitoring is to discipline the monitor production is a collective enterprise by workers in a firm or firms in a joint venture the synergy that is the reason for the team s existence may mean that an individual s contribution to the team s output is not distinguishable so that it is impossible to pay him according to his own productivity how should the principal remunerate the team members so as to maximize his own profit in this paper we analyze incentives in teams with asymmetric information both adverse selection each member s ability is known only to himself and moral hazard effort cannot be observed directly holmstrom 1982 showed that in a team model with moral hazard the principal can ensure an outcome arbitrarily close to the full information ideal by using a contract that punishes each team member arbitrarily severely whenever team output falls below some target however this seems to be an unrealistically drastic way of solving the moral hazard problem in our model we in effect prevent the principal from using such a contract by introducing adverse selection in addition to moral hazard and by assuming that ability and effort interact in such a way that the principal is unable to disentangle an agent s effort from his ability under the assumption that the principal and the team members are risk neutral we shall show that the principal can implement his information constrained optimum simply by offering each agent a payment linear in the team s output although the essential feature of our analysis is the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard this result can be understood by first considering the special case in which the agents abilities are common knowledge in this case the moral hazard problem can be completely solved the principal can do as well as he

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

incentive regulatory policies the case of public transit systems in france we assess the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation using a principal agent framework to study the regulatory schemes used in the french urban transport industry taking the current regulatory schemes as given the model of supply and demand provides estimates for the firms inefficiency the effort of managers and the cost of public funds it allows us to derive the first best and second best regulatory policies for each network and compare them with the actual situation in terms of welfare loss or gain fixed price policies lie between fully informed and uninformed second best schemes cost plus contracts are dominated by any type of second best contract from these results we may conjecture that fixed price contracts call for better informed regulators

double sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts contractual arrangements involving revenue profit sharing are often based on fairly simple often linear rules in addition in many contexts these contracts are not finely adjusted to the particular circumstances of individual agents or markets nor do they vary over time to the extent current theories based on optimal contracting suggest they should we develop a simple model of such revenue or profit sharing arrangements based on double sided moral hazard and show that this model can account for many of these stylized facts more specifically the model shows that linear contracts can be optimal and that benefits from customizing terms can in some cases be quite limited if not zero

a risk averse buyer s contract design abstract this research focuses on the design of optimal procurement contracts for competitive bidding involving risk neutral contractors and a risk averse buyer individuals or small businesses need to contract services from larger more efficient firms examples of such services include moving expertise or the building of computing facilities a customized office or home in these situations fixed price contracts are typically used we find that the fixed price contract should not always be employed the buyer can more efficiently account for the bidding strategies of the contractors if he absorbs some risk of cost overruns

nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper studies the nonparametric identification of a contract model with adverse selection and moral hazard specifically we consider the false moral hazard model developed by laffont and tirole 1986 we first extend this model to allow for general random demand and cost functions we establish the nonparametric identification of the demand cost deterministic transfer and effort disutility functions as well as the joint distribution of the random elements of the model which are the firm s type and the demand cost and transfer shocks the cost of public funds is identified with the help of an instrument testable restrictions of the model are characterized

simple cost sharing contracts we extend rogerson s 2003 intriguing analysis of the performance of simple procurement contracts to consider settings where the supplier s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly although the simple contract that rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely we show that in all settings under consideration though a fairly simple pair of contracts one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement can always secure more than 73 of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

optimal contracting of separable production technologies abstract we analyze the class of agency problems with a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent in which hidden actions and hidden information on the agent s efficiency are jointly present technological assumptions such as monotonicity of likelihood are no longer sufficient for the optimal contract to be monotone in the sharing rule we show that these regularity properties obtain for the rather wide class of production technologies that are separable in the agent s inputs together with ordinal properties such as monotone differences and affiliation of inputs separability yields the monotonicity in efficiency of the agent s actions and indirect utility

incentives allocation and labour market reforms during transition the case of urban china 1986 1990 has the reform process in china resulted in the introduction of incentives directed at a more efficient allocation of resources using data on individual earnings in urban liaoning province for the period 1986 1990 and a wage equation approach we address this issue in the context of labour market reforms focusing specifically on returns to education our results indicate that failure to address the issue of endogenous selection of more able individuals into state owned enterprises soes can severely bias returns downwards unlike in soes returns in collective owned enterprises coes increased the latter having been allowed to grow out of the plan more quickly and subject to more competition in factor and product markets we conclude that decentralization without competition is unlikely to result in the introduction of an efficient incentive mechanism the more administratively determined regular wages are one avenue for increased returns we find evidence of differentiated bonuses in coes but

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

the impact of environmental management on firm performance environmental management has the potential to play a pivotal role in the financial performance of the firm many individuals suggest that profitability is hurt by the higher production costs of environmental management initiatives while others cite anecdotal evidence of increased profitability a theoretical model is proposed that links strong environmental management to improved perceived future financial performance as measured by stock market performance the linkage to firm performance is tested empirically using financial event methodology and archival data of firm level environmental and financial performance significant positive returns were measured for strong environmental management as indicated by environmental performance awards and significant negative returns were measured for weak environmental management as indicated by environmental crises the implicit financial market valuation of these events also was estimated cross sectional analysis of the environmental award events revealed differences for first time awards and between industries first time award announcements were associated with greater increases in market valuation although smaller increases were observed for firms in environmentally dirty industries possibly indicative of market skepticism this linkage between environmental management and financial performance can be used by both researchers and practitioners as one measure of the benefits experienced by industry leaders and as one criterion against which to measure investment alternatives

changes in the covalence ethical quote financial performance and financial reporting quality we examine the equity valuation effect of press releases of upgrades or downgrades reflected in the covalence ethical quote ceq an index ranking the ethical performance of multinational firms the index is updated quarterly and is comprehensive enough to include 45 criteria reflecting working conditions impact of product impact of production and company institutional impact thus it captures many dimensions of firms ethical performance that are not accounted for in previous research our research encompasses a joint test of the value relevance of the index itself and the impact of ethical reputation on a firm s value we find first a significant causal relationship between stock market reactions and changes in the ceq specifically disclosures of positive negative changes in firm ethical performance cause increases decreases in firm value second cross sectional analysis indicates a positive association between changes in firm ethical performance and both its financial performance and its financial reporting quality collectively these results suggest that the ceq conveys information that is useful to investors further corporate measures taken to increase ethical performance are associated with positive benefits to shareholders finally investors have concluded that good news about their firms efforts to be ethical is worth the cost

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

privatization of public enterprises in this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained the manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient in a privatized firm the manager s effort is chosen efficiently the reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient in the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient on the other hand the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently it is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government s multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive compatible reward for the manager

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

the target incentive system vs the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect abstract in a dynamic adverse selection type of principal agent relationship where the principal is committed over time to a particular incentive system with fixed structure but variable parameters but not to any intertemporal incentive scheme with both fixed structure and parameters the ratchet effect arises but varies with different incentive systems we show that compared with using prices as the sole planning mode the principal can attenuate the ratchet effect by stipulating targets as well as a result the target incentive system entails higher expected welfare than the price incentive system in a perfect bayesian equilibrium

incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal agent model several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the current financial crisis using a principal agent model this paper investigates the incentive effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent s and principal s behavior specifically we show how bonus taxes affect the agent s incentives to exert effort and the principal s decision regarding the composition of the compensation package fixed salary and bonus rate we find that surprisingly a bonus tax can increase the bonus rate and decrease the fixed salary if the agent is highly risk averse additionally a bonus tax can induce the principal to pay higher bonuses even though the agent s effort unambiguously decreases nevertheless a bonus tax reduces the overall salary of the agent further results are derived with respect to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a general effort cost function

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

x efficiency and technical efficiency efficiency measurement has become a very popular field in applied economics in recent years and with this interest there has been a large intellectual investment in refining the empirical methods available to researchers in the area in this paper we relate these developments to harvey leibenstein s original 1966 insight into the psychological ideas underlying the notion that economic agents may not achieve maximal efficiency in their productive decisions and behaviour of course it is always possible to argue that apparent inefficiency only arises from a failure of the observer to realise what it is that is being maximized however we evade this easy escape route into non falsifiable hypothesizing and instead take at face value the fact that too many empirical studies have come up with substantial measures of inefficiency for us to ignore its importance for normative economics

a dynamic model of supplier switching abstract while a broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer supplier relationships limited research exists under which circumstances a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier recently wagner and friedl 2007 have developed a framework to analyze a static one shot supplier switching decision when the buyer has asymmetric information about the supplier s production costs we extend their basic framework to a dynamic one assuming that the supplier learns the production costs over time when he sets up the production process since the supplier s cost information at the individual stages crucially determines the setup and the switching decision it becomes essential for supply chain management to provide proper incentives so that the supplier reveals his cost information truthfully over time we characterize the optimal setup and switching strategy as well as the optimal supply chain contract we also compare our findings with those of the static setting to provide further insights

provision of incentives for information acquisition forecast based contracts vs menus of linear contracts in the producer seller relationship the seller besides his role of selling is often in an ideal position to gather useful market information for the producer s operations planning incentive alignment is critical to motivate both information acquisition and sales efforts two popular contract forms are investigated one is the forecast based contract fc that requires the seller to submit a demand forecast the seller obtains commissions from the realized sales but is also obliged to pay a penalty for any deviation of the sales from the forecast the other is the classical menu of linear contracts mlc from which the seller can choose a contract that specifies a unique commission rate and a fixed payment the conventional understanding suggests that the mlc is superior but it is often assumed that information is exogenously endowed in contrast we find that with an endogenous information acquisition effort the mlc may suffer from a conflicted moral hazard effect that creates friction between mot

optimal regulation of multinationals under collusion this paper analyses the optimal collusion proof mechanism for the regulation of multinational firms mnfs in foreign direct investment fdi projects there is a host country with a profitable investment opportunity either a multinational firm mnf or a local firm lf can undertake this project nonetheless due to its firm specific advantage and the mnf has the potential to create a larger surplus the host government faces an informational constraint such that it cannot observe the extra surplus the mnf can generate using this set up karabay 2010 shows that employing foreign ownership restrictions to force a joint venture jv can help the host government to partially overcome its information disadvantage in this paper we extend karabay 2010 by studying the host government s optimal regulatory policy when the mnf and the lf can collude it turns out collusion imposes no cost on the host government and the expected welfare attained in the absence of collusion can still be secured under collusion

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

a model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for new issues this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker the optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized the model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues an investment banker performs three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities underwriting advising and distribution this paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker ultimately a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is

wages or fringes some evidence on trade offs and sorting the two key predictions of hedonic wage theory are that there is a trade off between wages and nonmonetary rewards and that the latter can be used as a sorting device by firms to attract and retain the kind of employees they desire we use the vignettes method to estimate individuals willingness to pay for fringe benefits and job amenities we find negative wage fringe trade offs considerable heterogeneity in willingness to pay for fringe benefits and signs of sorting

using return policies to elicit retailer information we show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions roughly stated the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions a retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms as a consequence a retailer is less inclined to misstate market conditions by serving as an additional control instrument a returns policy reduces the manufacturer s need to ration cut production

competition and regulation in vertically related markets in an industry where naturally monopolistic and competitive activities are vertically related should the natural monopolist be allowed also to operate in the deregulated competitive sector unlike much of the literature on vertical integration this paper assumes that monopoly pricing behaviour is regulated and therefore the effect of vertical integration on the task of regulation is central to the analysis in the model there is both imperfect information and imperfect competition when vertical integration by the monopolist is allowed the regulator s task is made harder insofar as the monopolist has anticompetitive incentives to raise rivals costs on the other hand integration may lead to there being fewer firms in the deregulated sector and hence less duplication of fixed costs the overall welfare comparison between separation and integration is ambiguous as two simple examples illustrate various extensions to the analysis are also considered one of the central questions in debates on regulatory reform is how to organize industries that contain both naturally monopolistic and potentially competitive activities electricity transmission and distribution are characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions but electricity generation is not in the gas industry pipeline services may be naturally monopolistic but supply to larger customers is not in telecommunications natural monopoly is more a feature of local network operations than of long distance operations and is not present in apparatus manufacture and supply or in the provision of value added services in railways while the infrastructure of track and stations is naturally monopolistic the supply of train services might not be policy developments notably those associated with privatization in britain and deregulation in the united states have sometimes led to radical structural reform in these industries at t for decades a vertically integrated monopolist was required under the 1982 settlement of its long running antitrust case against the u s government to divest itself of its local network operations the central electricity generating board cegb in england and wales was restructured both vertically transmission grid activities were separated from generation and horizontally before privatization in 1990 1991 by contrast british telecom was privatized as a vertically integrated dominant firm bt now faces competition from mercury and others especially in the long distance market but its dominance of local network operations might affect competition there and in other areas such as apparatus supply the local network monopoly would of course have to be regulated in any event but its link via ownership to vertically related and potentially competitive activities poses additional regulatory questions many of the efforts of the regulatory body oftel notably in relation to interconnection between bt s and rivals 1 for a general account of the theory and british experience of regulatory reform in the utility industries

a theory of socialistic internal capital markets abstract we develop a model of a two division firm in which the strong division has on average higher quality investment opportunities than the weak division we show that in the presence of agency and information problems optimal effort incentives are less powerful and thus managerial effort is lower in the strong division this leads the firm to bias its project selection policy against the strong division the selection bias is more severe when there is a larger spread in the average quality of investment opportunities between the two divisions

the structure of trust in china and the u s this article investigates the structure of trust in china and compares it with the u s using the 2000 and 2005 waves of the world value survey wvs we analyze two dimensions of trust trust in people and trust in major companies it is found that the level of trust has remained stable in china within the 5 year period on the other hand trust in major companies has declined dramatically in u s while trust in people has increased slightly the structure of trust in companies is different from trust in people for both countries individuals with higher education tend to have a higher level of trust individuals who are divorced tend to have lower trust in people individuals who think that other people are fair are more likely to trust in people preference for competition has a positive effect on trust in major companies on the other hand some differences between the two countries are observed perception of fairness does not affect trust in major companies in china while it has a positive effect in u s in year 2006 preference for equality has a negative effect on trust in major companies in u s but no significant effect in china the pattern of trust and its changes over time may reflect differences in market conditions in the two economies

does marketing activity contribute to a society s well being the role of economic efficiency does the level of marketing activity in a country contribute to societal well being or quality of life does economic efficiency also play a positive role in societal well being does economic efficiency also moderate or mediate the marketing activity effect on societal well being marketing activity refers to the pervasiveness of promotion expenditures and number of retail outlets per capita in a country economic efficiency refers to the extent to which the economy is unhampered by corruption burdensome government regulation and a large informal economy we used secondary data from the world bank and other statistical sources to answer these questions our study findings suggest that both marketing activity and economic efficiency contribute positively to societal well being and that economic efficiency plays more of a mediator than moderator role between marketing activity and societal well being the public policy implication of this study is that increases in marketing activity and economic efficiency in countries characterized as low on both dimensions should significantly increase the quality of life in those countries

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

residual income based compensation plans for controlling investment decisions under sequential private information earlier literature has pointed to the effectiveness of residual income type measures based on particular accrual accounting rules such as the relative benefit allocation rule these performance metrics have been shown to generate desirable managerial incentives when investment decisions are delegated this paper further attests to the robustness of these measures by extending the result to a sequential adverse selection model with an inherent real option an option to abandon in other words as long as the residual income measures are judiciously constructed neither private information nor the requirement to selectively exercise an option derails their use in this setting

incomplete contracting and price regulation abstract this paper deals with price regulation of a monopolistic distribution grid which sells a license to some retailer the regulator aims at attaining efficient sale of the license and efficient relationship specific investments of the agents the first best can be attained by a sequential regulatory mechanism which gives the seller an option to grant the license but allows the buyer to make counteroffers this sequential mechanism runs counter to the usual price cap idea since possible upward but never downward renegotiation of the regulated prices is the vehicle to attain the first best