endogenous market structures and the gains from foreign direct investment abstract this paper discusses the gains from liberalizing foreign direct investment fdi in a two country setting with endogenous market structure we investigate two different scenarios in the first scenario headquarters costs are large in the foreign country so that the industry is located in the domestic country only in this case multinational and national firms may coexist and market concentration may make fdi welfare improving for the foreign country and welfare reducing for the domestic country in the second scenario headquarters costs are symmetric and firms will be located in both countries here profitable fdi activities lead to mutual welfare gains irrespective of market structure effects

fdi and taxation a meta study despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses it still remains open whether or when tax competition is harmful moreover the influence of tax differentials on multinationals decisions is still insufficiently analyzed thus economists have increasingly resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of fdi with respect to company taxation as a result the empirical literature on taxation and international capital flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical literature its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical evidence in this paper we extend former meta analyses on fdi and taxation in three ways first we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta analyses up to date second we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta regression estimators and explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta data third we address some important issues in research on fdi and taxation to the clarification of which meta analysis can make valuable contributions these issues are mainly the influence of variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials e g public spending the implications of using aggregate fdi data as opposed to firm level information on measured tax effects the implications of bilateral effective tax rates and the possible presence of publication bias in primary research

general linear formulations of stochastic dominance criteria abstract we develop and implement linear formulations of general n th order stochastic dominance criteria for discrete probability distributions our approach is based on a piece wise polynomial representation of utility and its derivatives and can be implemented by solving a relatively small system of linear inequalities this approach allows for comparing a given prospect with a discrete set of alternative prospects as well as for comparison with a polyhedral set of linear combinations of prospects we also derive a linear dual formulation in terms of lower partial moments and co lower partial moments an empirical application to historical stock market data suggests that the passive stock market portfolio is highly inefficient relative to actively managed portfolios for all investment horizons and for nearly all investors the results also illustrate that the mean variance rule and second order stochastic dominance rule may not detect market portfolio inefficiency because of non trivial violations of non satiation and prudence

entry and strategic information display in credit markets in many countries lenders voluntarily provide information about their borrowers to private credit registries a recent world bank survey reveals that the display of a lender s own borrower information is often not reciprocated that is access to these registries does not require the prior provision of proprietary data we argue that incumbent lenders release information about a portion of their profitable borrowers for strategic reasons the reasoning is that the pool of unreleased borrowers becomes characterised by a severe adverse selection problem this prevents the entrants from bidding for all the incumbent s profitable borrowers and reduces their scale of entry

an asset allocation puzzle comment should the proportion of risky assets in the risky part of an investor s portfolio depend on the investor s risk aversion according to basic financial theory in particular the mutual fund separation theorem with a riskless asset the answer is no the theorem states that rational investors should divide their assets between a riskless asset and a risky mutual fund the composition of which is the same for all investors risk aversion affects only the allocation between the riskless asset and the fund however niko canner et al 1997 cmw hereafter observed that popular investment advice does not conform to this theory they reported the stocks bonds and cash allocations recommended by four advisors for conservative moderate and aggressive investors as shown in table 1 which is reproduced from cmw the advisors recommend a bond stock ratio that varies directly with risk aversion for example fidelity recommends a bond stock ratio of 1 50 for a conservative more riskaverse investor a ratio of 1 00 for a moderate less risk averse investor and a ratio of 0 46 for an aggressive still less risk averse investor the inconsistency between such advice and the separation theorem is called an asset allocation puzzle by cmw they attempted to solve the puzzle by relaxing key assumptions in the theory but finally reached a negative conclusion although we cannot rule out the possibility that popular advice is consistent with some model of rational behavior we have so far been unable to find such a model p 181 however they suggested that consideration of intertemporal trading might help resolve the puzzle in the present paper we provide theoretical support for the popular advice the two key insights are that the investor s horizon may exceed the maturity of the cash asset and that the investor rebalances the portfolio as time passes if the investor s horizon exceeds the maturity of cash which might be a money market security with maturity of one to six months then cash is not the riskless asset as is commonly assumed in the basic theory in a theory allowing portfolio rebalancing as opposed to a buy and hold framework it is not unreasonable to assume that the investor can synthesize a riskless asset a zero coupon bond maturing at the horizon using a bond fund and cash then bonds will be both in the synthetic riskless asset and in the risky mutual fund and we show that in this case the theoretical bond stock ratio varies directly with risk aversion for any hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara investor as an example of the type of results that a specific model can produce we provide a continuous time model with closed form solutions which produces theoretical bond stock ratios similar to the popular advice the present paper is organized as follows in the next section we analyze the popular advice in terms of the theory of mutual fund separation of david cass and joseph e stiglitz 1970 we show that this theory is relevant both in static and dynamic frameworks and use it to analyze the popular advice in complete and incomplete markets in section ii we analyze the popular advice in the context of robert c merton s 1971 continuous time statement of mutualfund separation and present an illustrative model in which a crra investor makes continuous time portfolio decisions under interest rate and stock price uncertainty in section iii numerical results are compared with the popular advice section iv is a conclusion bajeux besnainou department of finance school of business and public management george washington university 2023 g street nw washington dc 20052 jordan national economic research associates 1255 23rd street nw washington dc 20037 portait cnam and essec finance chair cnam 2 rue conte paris france this research was supported by a grant from the institute for quantitative investment research we thank two anonymous referees for their comments 1 hara functions include quadratic utility which is one way of justifying mean variance preferences and constant relative risk aversion crra utility both quadratic and crra utility were considered in the cmw analysis

endogenous market structures in international trade natura facit saltum abstract almost all of the large literature on international trade with imperfect competition assumes exogenous market structures the purpose of this paper is to develop a simple model that generates alternative market structures as nash equilibria for different parameterizations of the basic model equilibrium market structure is a function of the underlying technology familiar configurations such as a duopoly competing in exports or a single multinational producing in both markets arise as special cases small tax policy changes can produce large welfare effects as the equilibrium market structure shifts implying discontinuous jumps in prices quantities and profits

an asset allocation puzzle comment the purpose of this note is to look at the rationale behind popular advice on portfolio allocation among cash bonds and stocks we argue that the typical investment advice is not inconsistent with the behavior of risk averse expected utility maximizers we propose an additional solution to the asset allocation puzzle posed by niko canner et al 1997 who argue that popular advice contradicts financial theory because it is inconsistent with the capital asset pricing model capm mutual fund separation theorem the capm asserts that investors should hold the same selection of risky assets while popular advice is that investors should hold a proportion of bonds to stocks that increases with risk aversion using mean variance mv analysis and the capm canner et al show that recommended portfolios are far from optimal and that losses from the apparent failure of optimization are not substantial however they failed to explain the popular advice within an economic model we offer a rational model based on stochastic dominance to demonstrate that all popular financial advice portfolios belong to the efficient set for all risk averse investors using the historical annual real returns on bonds and stocks in canner et al we cannot ascertain that investment advisors indeed offer bad advice rather we maintain that acting as agents for numerous clients advisors recommend portfolios that are not inefficient for all risk averse investors i overview

aging population retirement and risk taking the increase in life expectancy spells disaster at retirement one can solve this problem by investing in the maximum geometric mean mgm portfolio which is empirically composed from equity for a t 30 year horizon or more the mgm portfolio dominates other investment strategies by almost first degree stochastic dominance the mgm portfolio also maximizes the expected value of the commonly employed preferences and prospect theory value function for various loss aversion parameters and various reference points for t 10 life cycle funds would increase virtually all investors welfare by shifting to the mgm portfolio so long as the investment horizon is at least 10 years this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

sharing default information as a borrower discipline device abstract creditors often share information about their customers credit records besides helping them to spot bad risks this acts as a disciplinary device if creditors are known to inform one another of defaults borrowers must consider that default on one lender would disrupt their credit rating with all the other lenders this increases their incentive to perform however sharing more detailed information can reduce this disciplinary effect borrowers incentives to perform may be greater when lenders only disclose past defaults than when they share all their information in some instances by fine tuning the type and accuracy of the information shared lenders can raise borrowers incentives to their first best level

public information and coordination evidence from a credit registry expansion this paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing to isolate the coordination channel from lenders joint reaction to new information we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers we show that lenders while learning nothing new about the firm reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders reaction to the negative news about the firm the results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress

trade policy with increasing returns and imperfect competition contradictory results from competing assumptions abstract a number of recent papers derive different results about the effects of trade and industrial policy on imperfectly competitive industries this paper sets out a single model within which policy under different market structures can be examined we consider the four types of market structure generated by oligopoly versus free entry and segmented markets versus integrated markets we conclude that the effects of policy are greater when markets are segmented than when they are integrated and that if transport costs are small policy is more potent when the number of firms is fixed than when there is free entry

privatization policy in an international oligopoly this paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly the argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than in greenfield fdi models since these profi ts hifts are partly paid for by the foreign firms in the bidding competition effects of local equity requirements trade and investment policies are also studied it is for instance shown that small local equity requirements are likely to be beneficial but large ones are counterproductive by preventing welfare enhancing foreign acquisitions

trade and trade policy with imperfect competition the case of identical products and free entry abstract this paper analyses intra industry trade between economies containing an imperfectly competitive industry in which firms produce a homogeneous output production is subject to increasing returns to scale and there is free entry and exit of firms trade is shown to unambiguously increase welfare by reducing the degree of monopoly in each market and increasing firm size the effects of differences in technology and endowments on the pattern of trade and welfare are examined import tariffs are shown to raise welfare in the country employing the tariff and the welfare implications of various types of industry subsidy are examined

the effects of formal and informal contracting in credit availability this paper investigates how the use of collateral formal contracting along with the market power of banks which facilitates relational contracts affects the availability of credit for business firms using loan data from the spanish credit register we show that the average credit quality of borrowers in a provincial market decreases with market concentration and the availability of collateral additionally the marginal effect of each variable decreases with the higher values of the other variable we also find that credit line interest rates increase with the availability of collateral although the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets therefore market power relations and collateral formal contracting act as substitutes to increase the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information

optimal portfolio choice for long horizon investors with nontradable labor income this paper examines how risky labor income and retirement affect optimal portfolio choice with idiosyncratic labor income risk the optimal allocation to stocks is unambiguously larger for employed investors than for retired investors consistent with the typical recommendations of investment advisors increasing idiosyncratic labor income risk raises investors willingness to save and reduces their stock portfolio allocation towards the level of retired investors positive correlation between labor income and stock returns has a further negative effect and can actually reduce stockholdings below the level of retired investors financial advisors typically recommend that their customers invest more in stocks than in safe assets when they are working and to shift their investments towards safe assets when they retire jagannathan and kocherlakota 1996 malkiel 1996 by contrast the standard academic models of portfolio choice merton 1969 1971 samuelson 1969 show that retirement is irrelevant for portfolio decisions if investment opportunities are constant and human capital is tradable in this case the fraction of wealth optimally invested in risky assets should be constant over the lifetime of an individual recent research building on the pioneering work by merton 1971 shows that time varying investment opportunities result in portfolio rules with an intertemporal hedging component whose magnitude depends on the investment horizon of the investor kim and omberg 1996 balduzzi and lynch 1997 brennan schwartz and lagnado 1997 brandt 1999 campbell and viceira 1999 2001 barberis 2000 with time variation in investment opportunities retirement and death play an instrumental role as events that exogenously fix the individual s investment horizon more importantly retirement also marks the time at which individuals stop working and thereafter must live off their lifetime savings and possibly transfers from this perspective retirement matters for portfolio choice

the foreign trade and sectoral impact of truck road pricing for cross border trade truck road pricing is on the brink of beingintroduced in a number of european countries the experience gained from switzerland thefirst country worldwide to implement such adistant dependent pricing scheme has provedinvaluable nevertheless significant questionsstill remain the present paper attempts toprovide some clarity by analysing the welfareand sectoral impact resulting from theintroduction of truck road pricing with respectto foreign trade it is shown that this impactcan be separated into four effects the pureterms of trade effect the tax revenue effect the transit tax revenue effect and the resourcegain effect resources set free by a reductionin transport activity a cge simulation ofeach of these effects identifies theirquantitative implications out of the foureffects the pure terms of trade effect turnsout to dominate at both the sectoral andaggregate level it triggers a trade inducedwelfare loss the tax revenue effect and lessso the transit revenue effect mitigate thisloss for a full road transport costinternalization a trade induced welfare loss isquantified for austria at 1 3 sensitivity ofthis and other aggregate variables is high withrespect to household reaction to transport taxrevenue refunding the trade induced welfareloss of variable size as explored in thisarticle counterbalances a fraction of thewelfare gain due to internalization

loan collateral decisions and corporate borrowing costs we examine the relation between borrowing costs and the presence of loan collateral we find the presence of collateral increases with default risk consistent with low quality borrowers reducing their risks and borrowing costs through the use of collateral by explicitly controlling for the interdependence between the decision to pledge collateral and borrowing costs we find that secured loans have predicted spreads substantially lower than if they had been made on an unsecured basis alternatively loans made on an unsecured basis have spreads not substantially different from if they had been secured the evidence suggests that collateral pledging decisions are generally consistent with borrowing cost minimization

endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives if banks have an informational monopoly about their clients borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploited via high interest rates in the future banks can correct this incentive problem by committing to share private information with other lenders the fiercer competition triggered by information sharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks but provided banks retain an initial informational advantage their current profits are raised by the borrowers higher effort this trade off determines the banks willingness to share information their decision affects credit market competition interest rates volume of lending and social welfare article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

almost marginal conditional stochastic dominance marginal conditional stochastic dominance mcsd developed by shalit and yitzhaki 1994 gives the conditions under which all risk averse individuals prefer to increase the share of one risky asset over another in a given portfolio in this paper we extend this concept to provide conditions under which most and not all risk averse investors behave in this way instead of stochastic dominance rules almost stochastic dominance is used to assess the superiority of one asset over another in a given portfolio switching from mcsd to almost mcsd amcsd helps to reconcile common practices in asset allocation and the decision rules supporting stochastic dominance relations a financial application is further provided to demonstrate that using amcsd can indeed improve investment efficiency

asymmetric demand information and foreign direct investment we examine the fdi versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic quantitysetting market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information compared to a firm that chooses to export a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand in addition to the well known tension between the fixed set up costs of investment the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect fdi may be observed even if trade costs are zero the analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both fdi and exports

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

strategic trade policy when firms can invest abroad when are tariffs and quotas equivalent abstract this paper investigates the equivalence of tariffs and quotas when the market in question is imperfectly competitive and open to direct foreign investment the absence of a foreign supply response under a quota so critical to the analysis of the differential impact of tariffs and quotas under imperfect competition is called into question by the potential occurence of direct foreign investment the paper proves the equivalence of optimal tariffs and quotas when the markets are oligopolistic and open to direct foreign investment

the role of personal wealth in small business finance abstract this paper provides new empirical evidence on the relationship between personal commitments and the allocation of small business credit the data suggest that personal commitments are important for firms seeking certain types of loans guarantees are more prevalent than collateral and organization type corporate versus noncorporate status appears to be particularly important in determining commitment use no systematic relationship is observed between commitment use and owner wealth personal commitments appear to be substitutes for business collateral at least for lines of credit while personal collateral and personal guarantees do not seem to substitute for each other personal commitments have generally become more important to small business lending since the late 1980s

the design of bank loan contracts the unique characteristics of bank loans emerge endogenously to enhance efficiency in a model of renegotiation between a borrower and a lender in which there is the potential for moral hazard on each side of the relationship firm risk is endogenous and renegotiated interest rates on the debt need not be monotone in firm risk the initial terms of the debt are not set to price default risk but rather are set to efficiently balance bargaining power in later renegotiation loan pricing may be nonlinear involving initial transfers either from the borrower to the bank or front the bank to the borrower article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

does information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device this is the authors accepted refereed and final manuscript to the article publisher s version available at http dx doi org 10 1016 j jbankfin 2014 02 010

trade structure transboundary pollution and multilateral trade liberalization the effects on environmental taxes and welfare this paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well being of all the countries involved in each of those countries the policy maker levies pollution taxes on the polluting firms and a tariff on imports in order to correct that distortion the purpose of the paper is to investigate the effect of a reduction in the tariff on equilibrium pollution taxes and welfare the existing literature has investigated this problem for trade between two identical countries this paper analyzes the problem in the more realistic context where countries are not necessarily identical and trade can be multilateral it becomes possible to show what bias is introduced when those two realities are neglected i find that a tariff reduction can actually lower output it can also lower welfare even if pollution is purely local

multinational firms technology and location this thesis consists of four essays its main theme is the location of production in multinational firms subsidizing away exports a note on strategic trade policy investigates how strategic

information and bank credit allocation abstract private information obtained by lenders leads to borrower capture to the extent that such information cannot be communicated credibly to outsiders we analyze how this capture affects the loan portfolio allocation of informed lenders first we show that banks charge higher interest rates and finance relatively less creditworthy borrowers in market segments with greater information asymmetries second when faced with greater competition from outside lenders banks reallocate credit toward more captured borrowers flight to captivity third if borrower quality and captivity are sufficiently correlated an increase in the competitiveness of uninformed lenders can worsen the informed lender s overall loan portfolio the model explains observed consequences of financial liberalizations

information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching abstract we analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition in the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition since the poaching activities can be targeted towards more creditworthy borrowers we find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits and therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets

short term loans and long term relationships relationship lending in early america recent banking theory holds that durable firm bank relationships are valuable to both parties this paper uses the contract specific loan records of a 19th century u s bank and shows that firms with extended relationships received three principal benefits first firmswith extended relationships had lower credit costs second long term customers provided fewer personal guarantees which were an alternative to collateral third long term customers were more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during a credit crunch these findings support theories that banks realize cost advantages through the use of proprietary information

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

economies of scale and market structure in international grain trade a large body of literature has examined international grain trade in imperfectly competitive models the article develops a two stage duopoly model that considers a private trader and a state trading enterprise ste competing on a foreign market the key difference between the private trader and the ste is their international organization while the ste makes use of external agents to export the private firm may choose to internalize international transactions the game is solved for different modes of competition and under both assumptions of homogeneous and differentiated products in order to assess how these assumptions affect the outcome of the game the results of the game are examined by using numerical examples the analysis shows that external shocks on export markets may result in a change of market structure and consequently of market shares these effects depend on the initial market structure furthermore the degree of product differentiation and the assumed mode of competition significantly affect the relative values of transaction and fixed costs at which the market structure changes

competing destinations gravity model an application to the geographic distribution of fdi the competing destinations formulation of the gravity model ensues from the fact that unlike the classical version this approach explicitly acknowledges the interdependence of the flows between a set of alternative locations i e country recipients are competing for foreign direct investment fdi this article examines empirically a range of theoretical hypotheses about the determinants of fdi location in a panel data regression framework the results of the estimation of a gravity model lend support to the proximity concentration and internalization hypotheses also the fact that fdi has been found to be decreasing in the competition posed by alternative locations is suggestive of the superiority of the competing destinations version of the gravity equation over its classical formulation

the suspension of borrowing an implicit penalty for loan default under imperfect information abstracta credit seeker may be suspended from borrowing for a period of time due to a previous default such suspension is widely used in bank lending through credit check our work analyses the effects of suspension on the investment choice of borrowers under uncertainty and on the lending policy of banks facing asymmetric information we show that suspension should be tightened at low loan rates but loosened otherwise to improve the repayment performance of borrowers we also show that although credit rationing may not be completely removed due to imperfect information the excess demand for credit or transitive waiting in the market can actually be attenuated by such efficient use of suspension our theoretical predictions are consistent with observed cyclical patterns of changes in lendingrates and suspension severity

market entry and foreign direct investment abstract the welfare economics of foreign direct investment fdi are addressed in a model of two countries and two periods in the first period firms enter markets as national firms in the second period fdi is possible the paper demonstrates that fdi reduces market entry in the first period and equilibrium profits in the second period compared to a trade regime without any fdi prices are higher in the first period but lower in the second period fdi unambiguously improves the sum of discounted consumer surplus if demand functions are linear or log linear and entry is free in the first period

up the average cost curve inefficient entry and the new protectionism abstract a two country model is developed in which each country produces one good with increasing returns the goods being perfect or imperfect substitutes with cournot nash behavior and free entry certain restrictive trade policies have effects opposite to their favorable effect under noentry assumptions import tariffs and export subsidies lead to inefficient entry that raises rather than decreases the average production cost of and price charge by the domestic industry with negative welfare consequences we argue that these predictions of our model are closely consistent with extensive canadian data on entry exit and firms responses to trade liberalization

saving taxes through foreign plant ownership this paper analyzes to which extent foreign plant ownership involves lower tax payments than domestic plant ownership we employ a model of endogenous foreign subsidiary ownership to derive a set of empirically testable hypotheses about the differential taxation of foreign and domestically owned subsidiaries we assess these hypotheses in a data set of 33 577 european foreign and domestically owned manufacturing plants we identify a significant tax saving of endogenous foreign owner ship on average foreign owners pay 594 euros per employee or about 56 percent less than domestic owners of similar subsidiaries this effect is larger in thinner markets with fewer plants in markets with a greater relative presence of foreign owners and for foreign owners of larger plants

new protectionism and multinational companies abstract this paper examines the welfare effects of eliminating non tariff barriers ntbs when firms expand abroad via export or direct investment di two broad categories of ntbs are considered according to whether they discriminate only against the foreign exporter type i or also against the local subsidiary of the foreign owned firm type ii it is shown that the welfare impact of market integration depends upon its influence on firms international strategies and that such influence is a function of the type of measure removed the elimination of ntbs type i may lead to a fall in consumer surplus and a rise in producer surplus due to a shift from di to export instead when ntbs type ii are removed consumers are likely to gain more than suggested by traditional analysis as firms may shift from export to di these results are then applied to explain the welfare implications of the rise in intra eu di recorded during the late 1980s and early 1990s

time diversification liquidity constraints and decreasing aversion to risk on wealth abstract the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation to the notions of time diversification and decreasing absolute aversion to risk on wealth we examine the attitude towards risk on initial wealth when the agent allocate this wealth to consumption over his lifetime time diversification occurs in that case because the agent will optimally split the risk on wealth into small seemingly independent risks on consumption the introduction of liquidity constraints reduces the implicit time horizon of the consumer and thereby increases his risk aversion the negative relationship between initial wealth and the implicit time horizon where the consumer will be liquidity constrained provides an argument for decreasing aversion to risk on wealth

an asset allocation puzzle this paper examines popular advice on portfolio allocation among cash bonds and stocks it documents that this advice is inconsistent with the mutual fund separation theorem which states that all investors should hold the same composition of risky assets in contrast to the theorem popular advisors recommend that aggressive investors hold a lower ratio of bonds to stocks than conservative investors the paper explores various possible explanations of this puzzle and finds them unsatisfactory copyright 1997 by american economic association

an extreme value approach to estimating volatility and value at risk this article determines the type of asymptotic distribution for the extreme changes in u s treasury yields the thin tailed gumbel and exponential distributions are strongly rejected against the fat tailed frechet and pareto distributions the empirical results indicate that the volatility of maximal and minimal changes in interest rates declines as time to maturity rises yielding a downward sloping volatility curve for the extremes the article proposes an extreme value approach to estimating value at risk and shows that the statistical theory of extremes provides a more accurate approach for risk management and value at risk var calculations than the standard models

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a non monotonic relationship between fdi and trade this paper presents a non monotonic relationship between foreign direct investment and trade based on the idea that although fdi eliminates trade costs on the final good the investing firm has to bear increased trade costs on an intermediate good

personal investing advice theory and evidence data from a unique survey containing information on the composition of the respondents total asset holdings both inside and outside their retirement accounts shed light on individual asset allocation behavior individual asset allocations are consistent with the recommendations of expert practitioners and with the prescriptions of economic theory the survey respondents maintain in cash and near cash investments a proportion of their wealth that declines as wealth increases they hold these safe assets outside their retirement accounts the proportion of total assets that they hold in equities declines with age and rises with wealth they do not appear to manage their assets across retirement and nonretirement accounts to maximize tax efficiency

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

bonds versus stocks investors age and risk taking abstract it has become increasingly popular to advise investors to relocate their funds from a primarily stock portfolio to a primarily bond portfolio as they get older however the well known decision rules such as mean variance or stochastic dominance rules are unable to explain this common practice almost stochastic dominance asd and almost mean variance amv approaches are used to examine the dominance of stock and bond portfolios asd and amv rules unambiguously support the popular practice of advising higher stock to bond ratio for long investment horizons hence we provide an explanation to the practitioners recommendation within the expected utility paradigm

stocks for the log run and constant relative risk aversion preferences abstract almost stochastic dominance implies that stocks are preferred over bonds in the long run by all preferences with bounded marginal utility unfortunately this analysis excludes the very central constant relative risk aversion crra preferences which have unbounded marginal utility we derive a simple closed form solution for the portfolio choice problem of crra investors which with the empirical parameters implies that stocks are preferred over bonds for all crra investors with relative risk aversion smaller than 3 9 as a by product the analysis offers an alternative derivation of the continuous time capm that does not rely on dynamic programming and allows for ambiguous investment horizons

preferred by all and preferred by most decision makers almost stochastic dominance while most decision makers may prefer one uncertain prospect over another stochastic dominance rules as well as other investment criteria will not reveal this preference due to some extreme utility functions in the case of even a very small violation of these rules such strict rules relate to all utility functions in a given class including extreme ones which presumably rarely represents investors preference in this paper we establish almost stochastic dominance asd rules which formally reveal a preference for most decision makers but not for all of them the asd rules reveal that choices which probably conform with most decision makers also solve some debates e g showing as practitioners claim an asd preference for a higher proportion of stocks in the portfolio as the investment horizon increases a conclusion which is not implied by the well known stochastic dominance rules

the effectiveness of laws against bribery abroad this paper analyzes the effectiveness of laws against bribery abroad in inducing foreign investors to reduce their investments in corrupt countries the laws are designed to reduce the supply of bribes by foreign investors by increasing the costs of bribing abroad such increase in costs will make foreign investors more sensitive to corruption and induce them to reduce their investments in corrupt countries however the paper argues that these laws need to be implemented and coordinated in multiple countries to become effective otherwise investors in a country will have incentives to bypass them when competitors from other countries are not bound by similar legal constrains the empirical analysis shows that investors from countries that implemented the oecd convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions of 1997 reduced their investments in corrupt countries investors from the us which were bound by the foreign corrupt practices act of 1977 also reduced investments in corrupt countries but only after the oecd anti bribery convention was in place

credit bureau policy and sustainable reputation effects in credit markets welfare increasing reputation effects arise in credit markets when adverse selection gives rise to borrower reputation formation incentives that mitigate moral hazard problems this paper shows that welfare stemming from reputation effects will diminish over time as the private information of borrowers is revealed to lenders in the form of lengthening credit histories aggregate borrower welfare may therefore decrease over time unless reputation effects can be sustained restricting a lender s access to a borrower s credit history via credit bureau policy is shown to be one method of sustaining reputation effects and preventing a decline in welfare copyright 1995 by the london school of economics and political science

a quick and easy method for estimating switching costs abstract i develop and test a method for a quick and easy calculation of consumer switching costs among brands in a given industry the theory developed and tested here maps observed brands prices and market shares onto the switching costs which deter a consumer of a specific brand from switching to any other competing brand then i demonstrate how users switching costs can be directly calculated in two different industries a the israeli cellular phone market and b the finnish market for bank deposits this calculation method can be used to calculate switching costs in a wide variety of other industries such as airlines health services computers software telecommunications and more

precautionary portfolio behavior from a life cycle perspective abstract the literature on household asset accumulation draws a sharp distinction between short run precautionary motives to buffer consumption from annual income shocks and long run life cycle considerations under income certainty however estimates of shock persistence imply considerable career uncertainty we study long run precautionary motives for life cycle wealth accumulation and portfolios allowing for uncertain returns incomes and lifespan we separate the effects of various factors on mean and median asset holdings including education risk aversion household heterogeneity bequests impatience variance and serial correlation of income shocks numerical solutions are compared with data from the 1992 survey of consumer finances

a note on almost stochastic dominance abstract both the expected utility maximization and the hierarchy property are very important properties in stochastic dominance for almost stochastic dominance leshno and levy 2002 propose a definition and tzeng et al 2013 modified it to give another definition this note provides more information on the two definitions the former has the hierarchy property but not the expected utility maximization whereas the latter has the expected utility maximization but not the hierarchy property

switching costs and adverse selection in the market for credit cards new evidence abstract to explain persistence of credit card interest rates at relatively high levels calem and mester aer 1995 argued that informational barriers create switching costs for high balance customers as evidence using data from the 1989 survey of consumer finances they showed that these households were more likely to be rejected when applying for new credit in this paper we revisit the question using the 1998 and 2001 scf further we use new information on card interest rates to test for pricing effects consistent with information based switching costs we find that informational barriers to competition persist although their role may have declined

strategic investments and the development of multinationals a model of multinational behavior is presented in which either the existence or absence of multinationals can be a nash equilibrium outcome the key determinant is the relationship between plant scale economies a force for geographic centralization and multiplant economies plus transport costs leading to multinationality the model predicts that multinational enterprise production arises when firm specific and transportation costs are large relative to plant scale economies the latter are both a technological and a strategic variable in the entry decision copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

tariff jumping and joint ventures it is well known that high tariffs tend to induce foreign direct investment fdi by encouraging the investors to jump the tariff wall this paper examines the economic interaction among tariffs fdi and international joint ventures ijv we show that in the presence of a strong local competitor even if opening a fully owned subsidiary is not profitable to a foreign firm the foreign firm may still enter the host country market through ijv however ijv is not profitable for sufficiently high tariff rates hence we argue that liberal trade policies may attract foreign investments through the formation of joint ventures

tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets abstract the literature on strategic trade policy has shown that in imperfectly competitive markets governments have an incentive to subsidize exports of their own firms yet the consequence of the departure from laissez faire is a wasteful subsidy race in contrast this paper shows that even in imperfectly competitive markets there is a strong tendency for laissez faire to prevail the driving force is the firms willingness to exploit tax or subsidy differentials by relocating production a small tax differential induces firms to change their place of production the change in market structure has a negligible effect on the oligopoly equilibrium but a non negligible impact on government revenues when tax policy is non discriminatory governments gain lose by attracting all firms when production is taxed subsidized hence laissez faire is the only equilibrium since from the point of view of the two producing countries laissez faire nondiscrimination pareto dominates the intervention equilibrium discrimination nondiscrimination is a simple device to result in a mutual beneficial outcome

making inefficient market indices efficient this paper uses the concept of marginal conditional stochastic dominance and a generalization of the 50 portfolio rule to develop a tractable and parsimonious methodology for constructing a second degree stochastic dominance ssd efficient portfolio from a given inefficient index because the ssd approach considers the entire probability distributions of asset returns the resulting portfolios are efficient with respect to all risk averse utility maximizing investors regardless of the form of their utility functions or the distributions of asset returns