learning to believe in sunspots a number of authors have shown that competitive economies may possess sunspot equilibria that is rational expectations equilibria in which purely extrinsic uncertainty affects equilibrium prices and allocations 2 such results demonstrate that it does not require a lack of faith in the rationality of market participants to believe that competitive markets may be subject to purely speculative fluctuations driven solely by expectations 3 the mere existence of sunspot equilibria as solutions to a system of marketclearing conditions however might not be judged sufficient to indicate that competitive markets with rational participants could ever be subject to speculative instability the sunspot equilibria represent states of affairs in which agents act differently in the case of different realizations of the sunspot variable and it is rational for each agent to do so but it might be thought unlikely that the beliefs of all the participants in the market could ever come to be coordinated so as to bring about an equilibrium of that kind it is rational to believe that sunspots convey information about future states of affairs once the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium but why would rational agents ever begin to believe in such a thing so as to create the conditions under which the belief is rational in order to address such a question one must go beyond the mere statement of the conditions for equilibrium and discussion of what states of affairs satisfy them one must specify an explicit dynamic process according to which the beliefs of agents adjust when out of equilibrium any exercise of this kind is necessarily unsatisfactory as there is no univocal meaning for the postulate of rational behavior outside of an equilibrium it may well be the case that

does the great recession imply the end of the great moderation international evidence in this paper we examine whether or not the great recession had a temporary or permanent effect on output growth volatility after years of low macroeconomic volatility since the early eighties based on break detection methods applied to a set of advanced countries our empirical results do not give evidence to the end of the great moderation period but rather that the great recession is characterized by a dramatic short lived effect on the output growth but not on its volatility we show that neglecting the breaks both in mean and in variance can have large effects on output volatility modeling based on garch specifications

the american business cycle continuity and change in recent decades the american economy has experienced the worst peace time inflation in its history and the highest unemployment rate since the great depression these circumstances have prompted renewed interest in the concept of business cycles which joseph schumpeter suggested are like the beat of the heart of the essence of the organism that displays them in the american business cycle some of the most prominent macroeconomics in the united states focuses on the questions to what extent are business cycles propelled by external shocks how have post 1946 cycles differed from earlier cycles and what are the major factors that contribute to business cycles they extend their investigation in some areas as far back as 1875 to afford a deeper understanding of both economic history and the most recent economic fluctuations seven papers address specific aspects of economic activity consumption investment inventory change fiscal policy monetary behavior open economy and the labor market five papers focus on aggregate economic activity in a number of cases the papers present findings that challenge widely accepted models and assumptions in addition to its substantive findings the american business cycle includes an appendix containing both the first published history of the nber business cycle dating chronology and many previously unpublished historical data series

is there an inflation productivity trade off some evidence from the manufacturing sector in greece this paper examines the effect of inflation on total factor productivity growth tfp using time series data for every two digit greek manufacturing industries in order to do the above a translog flexible cost function is estimated and used to decompose tfp growth into scale economies inflation and technical change the advantage of estimating a very general and flexible cost function is that it allows us for the first time to examine empirically a large number of significant relationships between tfp growth and economies of scale inflation and technical change the main conclusion drawn from this analysis is that inflation reduces tfp growth in a way which is sizeable furthermore using standard causality test the direction of causality between inflation and tfp growth was tested at the manufacturing level

inflation output growth and nominal and real uncertainty empirical evidence for the g7 abstract we use univariate garch models of inflation and output growth and monthly data for the g7 covering the 1957 2000 period to test for the causal effect of real and nominal macroeconomic uncertainty on inflation and output growth and the effect of inflation on inflation uncertainty our evidence supports a number of important conclusions first inflation is a positive determinant of uncertainty about inflation second output growth uncertainty is a positive determinant of the output growth rate third there is mixed evidence regarding the effect of inflation uncertainty on inflation and output growth hence uncertainty about the inflation rate is not necessarily detrimental to economic growth finally there is not much evidence supporting the hypothesis that output uncertainty raises inflation

the long run relationship between openness and government size evidence from bounds test the bounds test is applied to determine the existence of a level relationship between government size openness terms of trade volatility and external risk using time series data from australia canada england norway sweden and the usa bounds test results show that the existence of a long run relationship in the usa and canada but not in any of the other countries long run parameters are estimated using both autoregressive distributed lag and fm ols procedures results vary from country to country with some evidence that government size is significantly affected by openness and terms of trade volatility however contrary to argument and evidence developed using cross section data empirical evidence presented in this paper show that the size of the government has not changed to mitigate the effect of increased income risks associated with greater openness

the implications of the historical decline in us energy intensity for long run co2 emission projections this paper analyzes the influence of the long run decline in us energy intensity on projections of energy use and carbon emissions to the year 2050 we build on our own recent work which decomposes changes in the aggregate us energy gdp ratio into shifts in sectoral composition structural change and adjustments in the energy demand of individual industries intensity change and identifies the impact on the latter of price induced substitution of variable inputs shifts in the composition of capital and embodied and disembodied technical progress we employ a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium cge model of the us economy to analyze the implications of these findings for future energy use and carbon emissions comparison of the simulation results against projections of historical trends in gdp energy use and emissions reveals that the range of values for the rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement aeei conventionally used in cge models is consistent with the effects of structural changes at the sub sector level rather than disembodied technological change even so our results suggest that us emissions may well grow faster in the future than in the recent past

the fischer black hypothesis some time series evidence we estimate an arch m model to analyze the relationship between the conditional standard deviation of real gross national product gnp and its growth rate for the period 1871 1993 we find that variability significantly increases output growth rates in addition impulse response functions show that the effect of variability on growth rates is dynamic these results provide evidence in favor of black s 1987 business cycle hypothesis

do turnover costs protect insiders the ability of insiders to extract rents associated with exogenous turnover costs is addressed in a dynamic model the higher these rents the higher is the incentives for outsiders to obtain future insider status and thus to underbid current insiders as a consequence there is a lower limit to the number of insiders that can avoid entrance of outsiders and the insiders cannot in each period obtain a rent equal to the turnover costs the insider model never explains a lower but may result in a higher employment level than in the case where all workers are wage takers copyright 1994 by royal economic society

macroeconomic uncertainty and performance in the european union abstract we use a very general bivariate garch m model and monthly data on eu countries covering the 1962 2003 period to test for the impact of real output growth and nominal inflation macroeconomic uncertainty on inflation and output growth our evidence supports a number of important conclusions first in the majority of countries uncertainty regarding the output growth rate is related to the average growth rate and the effect in several countries is negative second in half of the cases there is no significant relationship between inflation uncertainty and output growth performance third inflation and output uncertainty have a mixed effect on inflation nevertheless considerable evidence for the cukierman meltzer hypothesis is obtained our conclusions are based on adopting both a structural and a reduced form bivariate garch model finally we also find statistically significant evidence of regime switching for both inflation and output growth volatility throughout the sample

the great moderation and the relationship between output growth and its volatility this study examines the effect of the great moderation on the relationship between u s output growth and its volatility over the period 1947 to 2006 first we consider the possible effects of structural change in the volatility process in so doing we employ garch m and arch m specifications of the process describing output growth rate and its volatility with and without a one time structural break in volatility second our data analyses and empirical results suggest no significant relationship between the output growth rate and its volatility favoring the traditional wisdom of dichotomy in macroeconomics moreover the evidence shows that the time varying variance falls sharply or even disappears once we incorporate a one time structural break in the unconditional variance of output starting 1982 or 1984 that is the integrated garch effect proves spurious finally a joint test of a trend change and a one time shift in the volatility process finds that the one time shift dominates

on union preferences and labour market models insiders and outsiders this paper constructs a model of trade union behavior in which there is a distinction between insiders and outsiders this is used to examine one of the most troublesome issues in macroeconomic theory namely the extent to which a rise in aggregate demand might generate wage increases rather than growth in employment a generalization of the most widely used union utility function is presented the analysis reveals the conditions under which insiders will agree to let outsiders into employment derives two step wage preferences and proves a new result on wage rigidity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

economic growth and human capital accumulation simultaneity and expanded convergence tests abstract earlier economic growth studies are extended to account for simultaneity between economic growth and human capital accumulation the speed of income convergence and contribution of human capital to economic growth are underestimated if contemporaneous human capital growth effects are ignored

productivity and economic growth in japan and the united states during the period from 1960 to 1973 the economic growth rate in japan was at the rate of 10 or 11 percent per year japan was not the only country that grew rapidly during that period france and germany grew at 5 9 and 5 4 percent per year between 1960 and 1973 and italy grew at 4 8 percent per year even the united kingdom grew at a respectable 3 8 percent per year the united states grew at 4 3 percent per year during this period to fill out the roster of the seven major industrialized countries canada grew at 5 1 percent per year after the first oil crisis in 1973 and even more so after the second oil crisis in 197879 there was a dramatic decline of economic growth among industrialized countries growth in the oecd countries dipped to 2 6 percent per year between 1973 and 1979 japanese growth dropped from the doubledigit levels of the 1960 s and the early 1970 s to 3 8 percent per year from 1973 to 1979 in the united states the growth rate dropped to slightly above the oecd average at 2 8 percent per year the rate of economic growth in germany dropped to 2 4 percent and in france to 3 1 percent in every major industrialized country there was a precipitous fall in the rate of economic growth the sources of economic growth in japan and the united states over the whole period from 1960 to 1979 are given in table 1 if we compare japan and the united states during the period 1960 79 we see that the growth of output over the whole period was 8 3 percent in japan and only 3 5 percent in the united states we can allocate this growth in output in the two countries among its three sources namely the contribution of capital input the contribution of labor input and the rate of technical change by far the most important contributor to economic growth in both countries is the growth of capital input this growth source accounts for about 5 percentage points of the japanese economic growth rate and about 1 5 percentage points of the u s economic growth rate this amounts to 60 percent of japanese growth and 40 percent of u s growth labor input in the two countries is a major contributor to economic growth accounting for 1 5 percent of the japanese growth rate and 1 2 percent of the u s growth rate the rate of technical change is an important contributor as well at nearly 2 percent in japan and 0 7 percent in the united states i conclude that by far the most important contributor to economic growth in the two countries is the growth of capital input the relative importance of capital input is much greater in japan than in the united states focusing attention on the period from 1973 to 1979 after the energy crisis we can see that capital input retained its lead as a source of economic growth in both countries however the decline in the growth of tdiscussants john w kendrick george washington university j randolph norsworthy rensselaer polytechnic institute rolf r piekarz national science foundation

the asymmetric effects of uncertainty on inflation and output growth we study the effects of growth volatility and inflation volatility on average rates of output growth and inflation for post war us data our results suggest that increased growth uncertainty is associated with significantly lower average growth while higher inflation uncertainty is significantly negatively correlated with lower output growth and lower average inflation both inflation and growth display evidence of significant asymmetric response to positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude copyright 2004 john wiley sons ltd

effects of growth volatility on economic performance empirical evidence from turkey this paper examines the relationship between growth and growth volatility for a small open economy with high growth volatility turkey quarterly data for the period from 1987q1 to 2007q3 suggests that growth volatility reduces growth and that this result is robust under different specifications this paper contributes to the literature by focusing on how growth volatility affects a set of variables that are crucial for growth empirical evidence from turkey suggests that higher growth volatility reduces total factor productivity investment and the foreign currency value of local currency depreciation moreover it increases employment though the evidence for this is not statistically significant

insiders and outsiders in wage determination a firm starts with a group of insiders or seasoned workers there is also a large pool of outsiders who are initially less productive but are transformed into insiders after one period of employment the firm gains from having a large pool of insiders some of whom may be laid off in bad years insiders gain from keeping their numbers small if the insiders set their wage unilaterally they will choose a path that in this extreme case prevents employment of outsiders even if future employment prospects are good if the wage path is set by bilateral bargaining the extra advantage to the firm permits employment of some outsiders in some situations

the effect of money shocks on interest rates in the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity most current empirical work finds no evidence that money shocks lower interest rates we show that these nonresults are mainly due to a failure to model the conditional heteroskedasticity of interest rates autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity arch models find a significant liquidity effect where ordinary least squares ols models do not the existence of a liquidity effect is found using different models and sample periods when arch models are used in estimation but never when ols is employed

are empirical measures of macroeconomic uncertainty alike there is a plethora of time series measures of uncertainty for inflation and real output growth in empirical studies but little is known whether they are comparable to the uncertainty measure reported by individual forecasters in the survey of professional forecasters are these two measures of uncertainty inherently distinct this paper shows that compared with many uncertainty proxies produced by time series models the use of real time data with fixed sample recursive estimation of an asymmetric bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model yields inflation uncertainty estimates which resemble the survey measure there is however overwhelming evidence that many of the time series measures of growth uncertainty exceed the level of uncertainty obtained from survey measure our results highlight the relative merits of using different methods in modelling macroeconomic uncertainty which are useful for empirical researchers

the effects of expected and unexpected volatility on long run growth evidence from 18 developed economies 1 introductionalthough there is disagreement about the magnitude many economists agree that business cycles have negative consequences for welfare in the short run by causing output to deviate from potential as a result most policymakers regard reducing volatility as a desirable goal however there is disagreement about the long run consequences of business cycles some models suggest that business cycle volatility should reduce long run growth in these models increased volatility increases risk reduces investment and slows the growth rate of output in addition volatility may reduce the diffusion rate of new technology which might reduce the long run growth rate hence business cycles have negative short run consequences by causing output to deviate from the trend and negative long run consequences by slowing the long run growth rate if these models are accurate then the welfare consequences of business cycles are more severe than previously thought an alternative view of the growth volatility relationship suggests that there may be a long run benefit to business cycles in these models increased volatility stimulates inventive activity which increases the long run growth rate reduced volatility will be beneficial in the short run but if reduced volatility decreases the long run growth rate then there are costs to stabilization as a result policymakers would face a trade off between business cycle volatility and long run growth in addition it is possible that the long run costs of stabilization policy might exceed the short run benefits this article sheds new light on the growth volatility relationship first this article focuses on two types of volatility expected volatility and unexpected volatility this allows a more thorough test of the two general hypotheses linking growth to volatility second this article empirically examines the relationship between growth and volatility for 18 industrialized nations over a 110 year period therefore the analysis avoids the problem of short time span of data this article proceeds as follows section 2 clarifies the relationship between the competing hypotheses as well as between expected and unexpected volatility section 3 analyzes the growth volatility relationship without making the distinction between expected and unexpected volatility section 4 uses generalized method of moments gmm and ordinary least squares ols along with panel data to estimate the effects of expected and unexpected volatility on growth section 5 concludes with suggestions for further research 2 the growth volatility relationshipthe view that business cycle volatility reduces the long run growth rate focuses on risk bernanke 1983 ramey and ramey 1991 and pindyck 1991 argue that volatility creates risk about future demand and that firms are unlikely to invest in new plants and equipment if they are unsure about the demand for their product the greater the volatility in output the more uncertain future demand becomes the greater the risk and the less likely firms are to invest this negative relationship between volatility and investment might lead to a negative relationship between growth and volatility increased volatility decreases investment which then slows the growth rates of the capital stock and output the effect would be especially pronounced if new technology is embodied in new capital goods ramey and ramey 1995 and macri and sinha 2000 have found results consistent with this view of the growth volatility relationship using aggregate data this view emphasizes the risks associated with unexpected changes in output when firms cannot accurately forecast the demand for their goods they reduce capital expenditures which reduces growth the view that business cycles might increase long run growth focuses on the opportunity cost of productivity enhancing activities peas bean 1990 and saint paul 1993 view firms as solving an intertemporal profit maximizing problem in which producing goods provides profits today but engaging in peas produces profits only in the distant future

industrial production volatility and the supply chain abstract the issue of production volatility is important to firms interested in managing their supply chain this paper empirically estimates the volatility of industrial production using the garch and egarch time series models three questions are addressed can volatility be predicted is the effect of unexpected changes in production on volatility asymmetric and how persistent is volatility following a production disturbance the results indicate that production volatility is time varying and can be predicted in the majority of cases examined and that overestimates of production lead to greater increases in volatility than do underestimates

an empirical refinement of the relationship between growth and volatility the link between business cycle volatility and the long run growth rate has received increasing attention in the literature over the last ten years yet neither is there a theoretical consensus nor consistent empirical evidence that would lead us to believe the relationship is positive negative or nonexistent either within broadly defined regions or over time this study investigates a possible cause for this phenomenon what we find is that out of 14 popularly defined sub regions only 7 can be constrained over time within the respective sub region while only two broadly defined regional classifications are justified we did find that the grouping of oecd countries is statistically valid but only if the relationship is allowed to vary over time we suggest a refinement of the current empirical work that takes into account both more narrowly defined regional and time parametric heterogeneity

the stock market and the productivity slowdown international evidence extending baily s model of the productivity slowdown to the manufacturing sectors of five other countries we find that a decline in the growth of capital services reflected in declines in the stock market can explain much of the 1973 1978 decline in productivity abroad as well as in the united states we also show however that the stock market declines often preceded the declines in productivity growth and the model is less successful when the sample period is extended through 1981

the effects of real and nominal uncertainty on inflation and output growth some garch m evidence in this paper we use garch m methods to test four hypotheses about the effects of real and nominal uncertainty on average inflation and output growth in the united states from 1948 to 1996 we find no evidence that higher inflation uncertainty or higher output growth uncertainty raises the average inflation rate we also find no support for the idea that more risky output growth is associated with a higher average real growth rate our key result is that in a variety of models and sample periods inflation uncertainty significantly lowers real output growth copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

the effect of recessions on the relationship between output variability and growth this paper investigates the relationship between output volatility and growth using post war real gdp data for the united states we expand on recent research by beaudry and koop 1993 documenting the asymmetric effect of recessions on output growth the results presented in this paper suggest that output volatility is highest when the economy is contracting while we find that the economy expands most rapidly following a recession this expansion is offset by the negative impact of output uncertainty

understanding real business cycles he 1 960s were a time of great optimism for macroeconomists many economists viewed the business cycle as dead the keynesian model was the reigning paradigm and it provided all the necessary instructions for manipulating the levers of monetary and fiscal policy to control aggregate demand inflation occurred if aggregate demand was stimulated excessively and unemployment arose if demand was insufficient the only dilemma faced by policymakers was determining the most desirable location along this inflation unemployment tradeoff or phillips curve the remaining intellectual challenge was to establish coherent microeconomic foundations for the aggregate behavioral relations posited by the keynesian framework but this was broadly regarded as a detail that should not deter policymakers in their efforts to stabilize the economy the return of the business cycle in the 1970s after almost a decade of economic expansion and the accompanying high rates of inflation came as a rude awakening for many economists it became increasingly apparent that the basic keynesian framework was not the appropriate vehicle for understanding what happens during a business cycle nor did it seem capable of providing the empirically correct answers to questions involving changes in the economic environment or changes in monetary or fiscal policy the view that keynesian economics was an empirical success even if it lacked sound theoretical foundations could no longer be taken seriously the essential flaw in the keynesian interpretation of macroeconomic phenomenon was the absence of a consistent foundation based on the choice theoretic framework of microeconomics two important papers one by milton friedman 1968 and the other by robert lucas 1976 forcefully demonstrated examples of

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances