new evidence on implicit contracts from linked employer employee data we improve the precision of the implicit contract model test proposed by beaudry and dinardo 1991 our dataset allows us to define the exact industry and plant of a particular employment relationship link local labor market characteristics to individual level wages and control for composition effects we find evidence in favor of the spot market model of wage setting in the whole sample but there is significant variation across industries and education levels in particular the spot market matters most for low skill workers while the implicit contract model with one sided limited commitment applies better to high skill workers

the case for stabilizing exchange rates this paper presents the case for a return to an system the main point of the analysis in this paper exchange rate system resembling that which preis in fact to show why modem critiques of traditional vailed in the bretton woods period or which logic here are in fact unjustified prevails within europe at the present time that is it argues the case for a system of mostly fixed rates the paper is in five parts i begin with some broad that can sometimes be adjusted even philosophical questions about the reasons for even considering a return to fixed rates the second the argument is not an enthusiastic one i do not part documents what i believe to be the key thing claim that an adjustable peg system will solve all that we have learned in the past fifteen years that of the problems of the current system or that it will foreign exchange markets behave much more like be without problems of its own however the the unstable and irrational asset markets described experience of floating rates has made the adjustable by keynes than the efficient markets described by peg look much better in comparison and greatly modem finance theory the third part then asks reinforced the case against letting exchange rates be what harm this instability does and argues that determined just like any other asset price conventional efforts to test for serious costs which generally fail to show much harm from exchange fashions in exchange rate regimes go in obvious rate instability are likely to miss the main action cycles in spite of the vast additions both to our the fourth part examines the advantages of exchange store of knowledge and to our theoretical sophistrate flexibility and asks whether occasional parity ication since the 1940s practical arguments against changes are a good enough substitute finally the flexible rates are not very different from those fifth part tries to tie the whole argument together advanced by the architects of the bretton woods offering a case for an adjustable peg system

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

german dominance in the ems evidence from interest rates abstract the paper presents an empirical analysis of german dominance and asymmetries in the ems based on a dynamic system of equations explaining national money market interest rates the hypothesis of strict german dominance of the ems is rejected however there are some noticeable asymmetries in the ems germany is a relatively strong player and has been the least dependent country in the early phase of the system since 1983 german independence has diminished in contrast france throughout and italy in the early phase of the ems have been relatively weak players in the system

exchange rate behaviour under the ems regime was there any systematic change abstract most empirical studies fail to detect any systematic effects of the ems regime on the economic performance of member countries this reveals the difficulty of constructing controlled experiments which can distinguish what is due to the ems from that due to common external pressures we argue that the crucial step is to examine the exchange rates distribution since no performance improvements will appear if exchange rate behaviour does not change within the ems we find that there are changes in the third and fourth moments which imply that ems currencies have become more fragile and susceptible to shocks particularly negative shocks relative to non ems currencies

target zones and exchange rate dynamics this paper develops a simple model of exchange rate behavior under a target zone regime it shows that the expectation that monetary policy will be adjusted to limit exchange rate variation affects exchange rate behavior even when the exchange rate lies inside the zone and is thus not being defended actively somewhat surprisingly the analysis of target zones turns out to have a strong formal similarity to problems in option pricing and investment under uncertainty

a new theory of corporatism and wage setting abstract the standard view on corporatist institutions for wage setting in many european economies is based of the insider outsider model corporatism is associated with lack of wage flexibility this paper discusses a new approach starting from the importance of nominal contracts the rationale for these contracts is to avoid future bargaining adjusting these contracts ex post to aggregate shocks would raise their efficiency however avoiding the bargaining required for this adjustment was the main reason for negotiating these contracts in the first place this is the fundamental contradiction under corporatism outside institutions can play this role these institutions provide therefore a type of flexibility not available in decentralized economies empirical evidence supports the basic ideas of this model

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

time consistent collection of optimal seigniorage a unifying framework this paper reviews the existing literature on the time consistency problem of seigniorage collection when monetary policy is determined by optimal taxation considerations it develops a unifying accounting framework and suggests a general measure for seigniorage which encompasses the standard measures employed in the literature in addition the ex ante optimal solution to the optimal taxation problem is derived and interpreted in relation to the ramsey principle we show that the different recommendations of the public finance literature i e the friedman rule of optimal deflation moderately positive inflation and seigniorage maximizing inflation are specific solutions to the optimal taxation problem the paper continues with a formal illustration of the time consistency problem of the ex ante optimal policy and the characterization of the time consistent solution under discretion as possible solutions to the time consistency problem we consider reputational forces institutional reforms that establish central bank independence and specific ways of asset and debt management in particular it is formally shown that a modified version of the asset and debt management scheme suggested by persson persson and svensson is not only necessary but also sufficient for optimality although this did not hold in their model

capital controls and balance of payments crises abstract the theory of balance of payments crises shows that under perfect foresight a system of fixed exchange rate is not sustainable in the presence of diverging economic policies in this paper it is shown how and why capital controls succeed in maintaining the principle of a fixed but adjustable parity both cases of a devaluation and a revaluation are considered and a condition for a parity change to be credible is presented

managing innovation optimal incentive contracts for delegated r d with double moral hazard abstract managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates r d to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions the analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated r d is an option delegated r d with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated r d with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome the analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated r d attains the first best the discussion also considers delegated r d with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions

long term risk sharing wage contracts in an economy subject to permanent and temporary shocks this article develops and tests an implication of risk shifting in labor market implicit contracts a 2 period implicit contract model is presented the optimal contract in the face of bankruptcy constraints calls for a real wage that responds asymmetrically to permanent and temporary shocks to the firm s revenue function in particular the real wage responds more to a permanent shock than to a temporary shock of the same size this implication is tested on 12 4 digit standard industrial classification sic code industries eleven of the 12 industries sampled show evidence that supports the asymmetric wage response implication

costs demand and producer price changes abstract using business survey data we estimate an ordered probit model to explain the occurrence of producer price increases and decreases in the french manufacturing industry our results show that changes in intermediate input prices are the main driver of producer price changes changes in firms labor costs their production level or the producer price index of their industry contribute less to the occurrence of price changes moreover when they face a change in their costs firms adjust their prices upward more often and more rapidly than they do it downward especially when the shock is perceived as permanent

contractual wages and the wage cushion under different bargaining settings how does a typically european bargaining system with collective bargaining and national minimum wage coexist with low unemployment and high wage flexibility a unique data set on workers firms and collective bargaining contracts in portugal is used to analyze the determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion difference between contractual and actual wages the results indicate that the wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and firm attributes whereas it shrinks the returns to union power therefore firm specific arrangements partly offset collective bargaining granting firms certain freedom when setting wages contractual wages reflect trade unions egalitarian policy

the quality of innovation and the extent of the market abstract i present a comprehensive model of international trade in technology that considers both the demand for inventions and the supply of inventions on the demand side domestic and foreign firms make strategic technology adoption decisions on the supply side inventors compete to sell licenses for their technology to domestic and foreign firms countries benefit from international trade in technology because they obtain the best invention from a larger pool of inventions international trade in technology increases the extent of the market for inventions and thereby improves the quality of innovation technology trade lowers prices increases outputs and increases the volume of trade in differentiated products when traded products are not close substitutes international markets for technology generate gains from trade the results of the analysis are robust to the possibility of technology transfer either through expropriation or imitation protection of intellectual property rights preserves incentives for entry of inventors and improves the quality of innovation

policy bargains and the problem of model selection abstract parameter uncertainty and disagreements about model specification pose a particular difficulty for economic policy design frankel and rockett argue that if model uncertainty is not explicitly taken into account policy coordination is as likely to decrease welfare as increase it this paper therefore looks at the scope for reducing errors by making strategic model choices part of the overall policy selection procedure it shows that alternative definitions of the policy bargain produces decisions which are robust against disagreements about the correct model while alternative choices of model produce policies which are robust against model uncertainty hence fixed i e model free policy rules are no substitute for making strategic model choices

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

technology trade and growth a unified framework abstract our recent work examines the links among innovation technology trade and growth one strand focuses on research activity technology diffusion and growth the other examines technology and trade in this paper we exploit the common treatment of technology in these two strands to provide a parsimonious model of innovation growth and trade we examine the effect of lower geographic barriers to trade on research and the effects of scale and research productivity on relative incomes

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

seigniorage and the case for national money in countries with high rates of inflation there is typically movement away from the use of the local currency the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of using a local currency with emphasis on the seigniorage foregone by using a foreign money even if it should be desirable for a country to fix its exchange rate it still loses seigniorage if it does not use its own money the case for using a foreign money then turns largely on the superior discipline imposed on domestic policymakers by removing their control over the money supply alternative methods of imposing discipline are discussed estimates of the amount of seigniorage raised by different governments are presented seigniorage amounts in some cases to about 10 percent of government revenue estimates are also presented of both the annual flow and one time stock costs of giving up use of domestic currencies and instead using the dollar the flow cost is typically about 1 percent of gnp and the stock cost is around 10 percent of gnp

wages profits and rent sharing the paper suggests a new test for rent sharing in the u s labor market using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector it shows that a rise in a sector s profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long run level of wages in that sector the paper controls for workers characteristics for industry fixed effects and for unionism lester s range of wages is estimated for rent sharing reasons alone at approximately 24 per cent of the mean wage

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

rent sharing and wages evidence from company and establishment panels a central question in labor economics and macroeconomics is whether the textbook competitive model provides an adequate representation of the labor market using longitudinal data on companies and establishments this article suggests that it may not as predicted by rent sharing models of the labor market changes in profitability are shown to feed through into long run changes in wages these are not temporary wage effects and are not driven by the unionized workplaces in the data the article s estimates imply that for rent sharing reasons alone lester s range of wages is approximately 16

the effect of implicit contracts on the movement of wages over the business cycle evidence from micro data in this paper we address the question of whether wages are affected by labor market conditions in a manner more consistent with a contract approach than with a standard spot market model from a simple implicit contract model we derive implications about the links between wages and past labor market conditions using individual data from the current population survey and the panel study of income dynamics we find that an implicit contract model with costless mobility describes these links better than either a simple spot market model or an implicit contract model with costly mobility

real wage determination and rent sharing in collective bargaining agreements the microeconomic forces that influence real wages are not fully understood this paper studies pay determination using data on approximately 600 labour contracts it finds that the real wage is an increasing function of past profitability in the employer s industry and a decreasing function of the level of unemployment in the employer s region these results are consistent with rent sharing theories

portfolio choices firm shocks and uninsurable wage risk assessing the importance of uninsurable wage risk for individual financial choices faces two challenges first the identification of the marginal effect requires a measure of at least one component of risk that cannot be diversified or avoided moreover measures of uninsurable wage risk must vary over time to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity secondly evaluating the economic significance of risk requires knowledge of the size of all the wage risk actually faced existing estimates are problematic because measures of wage risk fail to satisfy the non avoidability requirement this creates a downward bias which is at the root of the small estimated effect of wage risk on portfolio choices to tackle this problem we match panel data of workers and firms and use the variability in the profitability of the firm that is passed over to workers to obtain a measure of uninsurable risk using this measure to instrument total variability in individual earnings we find that the marginal effect of uninsurable wage risk is much larger than estimates that ignore endogeneity we bound the economic impact of risk and find that its overall effect is contained not because its marginal effect is small but because its size is small and the size of uninsurable wage risk is small because firms provide substantial wage insurance

welfare effects of global patent protection this paper uses a simple model of invention and patent protection to examine the welfare effects of extending patent protection from the country where invention takes place to another country that is only a consumer of invented products it is shown that while the welfare of the inventing country certainly rises with the extension of patent protection that of the other country probably falls and may well fall by more than the increase in welfare of the inventing country in particular as patent protection is extended to a larger and larger portion of the world the effect on the welfare of the world as a whole of extending it to the rest of the world becomes negative

trips trade and growth a two country model of endogenous growth is employed to assess the importance of intellectual property rights to trade growth and technology transfer the paper provides theoretical results linking the intellectual property rights regime to trade patterns aggregate r d worldwide growth and aggregate welfare measures failure to provide patent protection for foreign made innovations forces innovators to employ less than the best practice research technologies reduces aggregate r d activities worldwide effectively eliminates technology transfer across countries and reduces worldwide growth copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the limits of independence and the policy of the ecb it is argued that the european central bank s independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position it follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability one consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as often effective attempts to protect its position another is that making a central bank or any other institution completely independent may be much harder than it seems and failed attempts which come close are not necessarily to be preferred even by the advocates of independence to less ambitious designs

micro foundations for wage flexibility wage insurance at the firm level to what extent do firms insulate their workers wages from fluctuations in product markets which firm and worker attributes are associated with wage flexibility at the micro level we first rely on guiso pistaferri and schivardi 2005 to estimate dynamic models of sales and wages finding that in portugal workers wages respond to permanent shocks on firm performance as opposed to transitory shocks we then explore the factors associated with wage flexibility finding that collective bargaining and minimum wages are associated with higher wage insurance by the firm while the threat of firm bankruptcy reduces it managers receive less protection against permanent shocks than other workers

insurance within the firm we evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer employee panel data unlike previous contributions this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm which are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of diversifiable risk we allow for both temporary and permanent shocks to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only partially risk sharing considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings variability the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an important vehicle of insurance provision

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

target zones and international policy coordination the contrast between the necessary and sufficient conditions for success abstract this paper distinguishes between the necessary and sufficient conditions for adopting exchange rate target zones for improving macroeconomic performance the necessary conditions are easily satisfied but it is much more difficult to design a targetting system which satisfies the sufficient conditions when the exchange rate is an intermediate target on that criterion the gains may be smaller than previously estimated however target zones have important practical advantage they are effective in promoting stability and as a simple but uncontroversial way of securing the coordination necessary to prevent policy makers adopting inefficient or competitive policies

exchange rate regimes and inflation only hard pegs make a difference abstract using data from a large sample of developing countries from 1985 to 2001 we confirm that hard pegs currency boards or a shared currency reduce inflation and money growth there is no evidence that soft pegs confer any monetary discipline after other factors are controlled for inflation triggers regime switches under hard pegs monetary growth is unaffected by fiscal deficits or by inflation shocks under soft pegs as under floats increased fiscal deficits and positive inflation shocks are associated with higher monetary growth the apparently slower per capita output growth under hard pegs is explained by their geographical distribution jel classification f41

insider forces and wage determination this paper investigates the relative importance of firm specific factors i e insider forces in wage determination using firm level data on 219 u k companies over 1974 82 it finds that a 1 percent rise in a firm s prices or productivity relative to the aggregate economy leads to a rise in relative wages of 0 1 0 2 percent as a corollary to this outside factors like the aggregate wage and the unemployment rate also play an important role there is evidence for insider based hysteresis effects but these are inversely related to the extent to which firms take national agreements into account copyright 1990 by royal economic society

transparency reputation and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates this paper shows that if the cost of importing foreign inflation and real exchange rate shocks are not too high then the equilibrium nominal exchange rate regime for a country with a credibility problem is a peg under which credibility is higher and inflation is lower than under a float this holds true although devaluations of the pegged rate are assumed to be costless the reason is that as realized inflation is not perfectly controllable planned inflation under a float is private information in contrast since the exchange rate can be perfectly controlled pegging resolves the private information problem is more transparent and makes reputation more effective

on the imperfect substitutability of policy regimes exchange rate targetting vs policy coordination abstract exchange rate targetting is always an imperfect substitute for explicit policy coordination but succeeds when economies are either structurally dissimilar with symmetric shocks or structurally symmetric with dissimilar shocks a joint commitment then generates economies of scale in interventions

wage contracts when output grows stochastically the roles of mobility costs and capital market imperfections the paper considers an industry in which individual output follows a stochastic growth process with a cumulative effect it analyzes the roles of labor mobility and capital market conditions in the determination of wage contracts positive costs of mobility are shown to be necessary for the provision of wage and employment insurance when workers have no access to the capital market when insurance is provided wages grow less than average productivity if the capital market is perfect wage insurance will be provided even in the absence of costs of mobility in this case wages grow faster than average productivity

implicit contracts a survey 7mplicit contracts resolve the distribution of uncertainty and utilization of specific human capital between risk averse workers and less risk averse firms incomplete contracts are required to yield involuntary layoffs in contract markets otherwise contracts are efficient and pareto optimal by construction there is a close relation between contract theory and neoclassical labor market theory contracts smooth consumption but increase the volatility of labor supply and labor utilization to demand disturbances because contractural insurance eliminates the income effects of socially diversifiable risks this result is similar to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis however the price mechanism in a contract is substantially different contracts embody a nonlinear two part pricing scheme the lump sum part allocates the income consumption consequences of risks and the marginal pricing part allocates production and labor utilization this implicit pricing mechanism is in all respects flexible though the observed average hourly wage combines both parts and may give the outward appearanceof rigidity furthermore the observed average wage rate in a contract does not reflect marginal conditions necessary for structural econometric estimation indivisibilities appear necessary to account for the split between work sharing and layoffs contracts with private information are also considered in the nonlinear pricing context this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the drivers of foreign direct investment into research and development an empirical investigation this paper examines the determinants of foreign direct investment fdi in research and development laboratories by 32 multinational enterprises in the pharmaceutical and electronics industries the paper applies a dichotomous set of motives for fdi results from an econometric analysis of 136 laboratory investments show that relative market size and relative strength of a country s science base determine whether fdi in research and development is carried out in order to exploit existing firm specific advantages or in order to build up new firm specific advantages this holds true in similar form for japanese european and u s firms and across the two industries

long term wage fluctuations with industry specific human capital exploiting long term interindustry demand shifts this article provides evidence that 1 industry level wages do not respond to industry demand conditions 2 at the industry level the employment of young workers responds more to demand shifts than does the employment of experienced workers and 3 the postdisplacement wages of displaced workers are strongly affected by demand in their predisplacement industries these findings are consistent with a model in which worker s investments in industry specific skills pose a barrier to interindustry labor mobility and wages do not respond to spot labor market conditions

bertrand competition when rivals costs are unknown the conclusions of the bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of asymmetric information about rivals costs asymmetric information eliminates the discontinuity in the bertrand model and significantly alters the properties of the market equilibrium in the bertrand nash equilibrium when rivals costs are unknown firms price above marginal cost and have positive expected profit the analysis is extended to franchise competition the market equilibrium is sensitive to market structure and yields incentives for entry copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

on the mean reverting properties of target zone exchange rates one key prediction of the target zone model is that the exchange rate should be mean reverting within the band although this property is widely referred to in the target zone literature little work has been done to test it in this paper we seek to remedy this important lacuna in the literature by examining the time series properties of the seven currencies participating in the exchange rate mechanism erm of the european monetary system for the period 13 march 1979 to 9 april 1992 using standard univariate unit root tests we find little evidence of mean reversion however using variance ratio test statistics which control for heterogeneity in the distribution of exchange rate behaviour we find much more evidence of mean reversion another part of our work includes implementing a panel unit root test

intramarginal intervention in the ems and the target zone model of exchange rate behavior abstract exchange rate data produced by the european monetary system ems contradict important predictions made by the standard target zone model we show that the contradictions reflect a misinterpretation of policies pursued by the ems countries they intervened intramarginally to keep exchange rates will within their bands not at the edges of the bands to keep rates from crossing them in the basle nyborg agreement of 1987 however they agreed to make fuller use of the band and exchange rates behave differently thereafter the effect appears clearly in the behavior of the french franc and less decisively in the behavior of the italian lira we conclude by examining and rejecting other explanations for the observed difference in exchange rate behavior

fiscal rules and government borrowing costs international evidence we find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985 2010 we apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets the results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the risk premium on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility jel e43 g12 h60

the phillips curve the persistence of inflation and the lucas critique evidence from exchange rate regimes comment we present evidence from the united states and the united kingdom that the persistence of price inflation is significantly higher under managed exchange rate regimes than under gold based fixed exchange rate regimes these differences are also reflected in expectations augmented phillips curves we use a two country macro model with forward looking price setters to demonstrate that higher monetary accommodation of inflation and exchange rate accommodation of inflation differentials increase inflation persistence the evidence does not contradict this hypothesis it supports the hypothesis of forward looking price setters and highlights the empirical significance of the lucas critique jel e31 e42 f33

do employers provide insurance against low frequency shocks industry employment and industry wages i use panel data to examine whether long term changes in industry wages are positively related to long term changes in industry employment previous research using repeated cross sectional data found no systematic relationship between these variables using standard fixed effects models to deal with individual heterogeneity i find a robust positive relationship between changes in composition constant industry wages and industry employment this suggests that growing industries attract less skilled individuals in a manner that biases down the estimated relationship between industry employment and wages in repeated cross sectional data the results imply that supply curves facing industries are elastic but upward sloping

wages and the value of nonemployment nonemployment is often posited as a worker s outside option in wage setting models such as bargaining and wage posting the value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages we measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers our quasi experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance ui benefit levels in austria we document that wages are insensitive to ui benefit changes point estimates imply a wage response of less than 0 01 per 1 00 ui benefit increase and we can reject sensitivities larger than 0 03 the insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration and among job switchers and recently unemployed workers the insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used nash bargaining model which predicts a sensitivity of 0 24 0 48 our evidence supports wage setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment

fewer monies better monies in the aftermath of emerging market crises from russia to asia and latin america there is a quest for better monetary arrangements that are more crisis proof fixed rates are out flexible rates are in with a policy focus on inflation targeting but there is of course the alternative of abolishing exchange rates all together this paper revisits the issue of dollarization or currency boards to review what arguments in the debate stand up the case for flexible exchange rates emphasizes the need for a tool to accomplish relative price adjustment this paper argues that in an intertemporal perspective most shocks require financing in the capital market rather than adjustment moreover countries frequently do not use their flexible rate to play a cyclical role and as a result only a pay a premium for the option to depreciate but do not take advantage of the flexibility on the contrary they engineer systematic overvaluation in the context of inflation targeting

asymmetries and rigidities in wage adjustments by firms the authors use micro data from a survey of firms to test for labor market rigidities and asymmetries in response to demand shifts they analyze wage and employment adjustments to positive and negative shifts as measured by real sales growth the results show that wage adjustments are fairly small compared with employment adjustments they are also asymmetric with significant adjustments in response to positive shifts but not negative shifts these asymmetries are no more pronounced in large firms manufacturing heavily union or highly skilled industries than in other firms or industries in contrast employment adjustments show no consistent pattern of asymmetry copyright 1993 by mit press