pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

prices and qualities a search model recently there has been substantial interest in the study of price and or quality dispersion in markets with costly information many of these studies focus on the problem of price dispersion assuming that the quality is fixed i e homogeneous good the most distinct feature of these models is the way information is gathered information can either be obtained through the purchase of a newspaper at some cost information purchase models or through costly sequential or nonsequential search search models each of these models identifies the conditions under which a rational expectation price dispersion equilibrium will exist in particular using an information purchase model with two classes of consumers with differential information costs salop stiglitz 15 show that equilibrium may be characterized by a high and a low price for a homogeneous good on the other hand wildeschwartz 18 show that there can be price dispersion if consumers have different propensities to search they assume that one class of consumers will shop only once and the other class will shop an exogenously determined number of times before purchasing in their model only certain price distributions are sustainable in equilibrium the salop stiglitz and wilde schwartz results are due to the ex ante heterogeneity of consumer types in an interesting paper burdett judd 3 have established that price dispersion can exist even when consumers are identical due to ex post heterogeneity in information while the price dispersion models are illuminating in explaining the differential prices in the markets they are limited by their abstraction from the quality uncertainty goods of heterogeneous qualities can be and are offered in a recent paper 6 using an information purchase model with two classes of consumers we have analyzed the price and quality equilibria by examining three different environments involving costly information i quality information costly price information costless ii price information costly

does the european financial stability facility bail out sovereigns or banks an event study on may 9 2010 euro zone countries announced the creation of the european financial stability facility this paper investigates the impact of this announcement on bank share prices bank credit default swap cds spreads and sovereign cds spreads the main private beneficiaries were bank creditors furthermore countries with banking systems heavily exposed to southern europe and ireland benefited as evidenced by lower sovereign cds spreads the combined gains of bank debt holders and shareholders exceed the increase in the value of their banks sovereign debt exposures suggesting that banks saw their contingent claim on the financial safety net increase in value

agricultural revolution and elite reproduction in qing china the transition to capitalism debate revisited recent actor centric theory about the historical rise of capitalism emphasizes the role of the autonomous agrarian elite in fostering a sustained agricultural revolution this revolution generated ample agrarian surplus in the form of rural elite s elevated income to fuel a capitalist industrial takeoff in late eighteenth century england the nontransition to capitalism in eighteenth and nineteenth century china despite the vast surplus generated in its advanced agrarian sector shows that high agricultural productivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a capitalist takeoff by comparing qing china with eighteenth century england where capitalist industrialization erupted spontaneously and nineteenth century japan where capitalist industrialization succeeded under intensive state sponsorship this article argues that a strong urban entrepreneurial elite capable of centralizing the agrarian surplus and investing it in productive industrial innovation were as important as the existence of the surplus itself in fomenting capitalist transition the reproduction of the elite in eighteenth century china was constrained not by the anticommercial oriental despotic state as presumed in earlier literature but by the state s paternalist disposition in managing urban class conflict capitalist industrial development in china was further impeded in the nineteenth century when a nexus of local predatory military elite emerged in response to millenarian uprisings and wasted most of the agrarian surplus in their accumulation of means of violence the negative case of china helps us advance the actor centric model of capitalist transition by bringing urban entrepreneurs and class politics back in

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

prices and qualities in markets with costly information this paper extends the seminal work of akerlof and salop and stiglitz in two directions i the sellers can select both the selling prices and quality levels of their good and ii the buyers can acquire price quality information about individual sellers at a cost we observe multiple price quality combinations in equilibrium which depend upon the distribution of information costs of consumers and upon whether quality or price or both are costly observable welfare comparisons of equilibrium are considered we show that welfare will be greater when price advertising is permitted

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

oligopolistic competition in price and quality abstract we consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered some know only the prices and some know neither we show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality this equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and pareto inefficiency of the price quality offers where better price quality combinations are associated with lower prices

quality uncertainty and informative advertising we present a price signalling model with informative advertising a costly advertisement informs of the good s quality directly and therefore the seller determines the fraction of informed buyers endogenously we show that informative advertising only occurs in pooling equilibria for an advertising pooling equilibrium to exist consumer valuation for high quality advertising cost prior probability that quality is high and inaccuracy of the buyers pre purchase information must be sufficiently high for some parameters there is a unique undefeated advertising pooling equilibrium if advertising is used in equilibrium the adverse selection problem is mitigated

ripoffs lemons and reputation formation in agency relationships a laboratory market study this paper examines the effect of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship where the principal cannot observe the level of service provided by the agent using data from laboratory markets we demonstrate that the presence of moral hazard leads to shirking by agents however this lemons phenomenon occurs only about one half of the time while there is evidence of reputation effects in these markets seemingly reputable agents are often able to use opportunities for false advertising to their advantage and ripoff principals there has been considerable discussion about the price and quality of services provided within certain principal agent relationships for example the securities and exchange commission and congress have focused a great deal of attention on the price and quality of outside audit services to investors the securities and exchange commission and the department of justice have considered the regulation of investment banking contracts because of their concern over the price and level of services provided finally a large and growing literature has focused attention on the conflict between owners and managers and the problem of shirking by managers the above examples share a feature common to most agency relationships in that the services provided by the agent have a hidden characteristic specifically the principal cannot costlessly observe the level of service provided by the agent and thus cannot determine whether an unfavorable outcome is due to the agent s shirking or due to an unfortunate occurrence of a state of nature a large theoretical literature has developed e g shavell 9 which proposes remedies for dealing with the moral hazard problem that arises in these situations yet to our knowledge there has been no direct empirical test demonstrating that the moral hazard problem does in fact lead to shirking by agents furthermore the theoretical literature provides a number of competing models about the market s ability to provide pareto optimal levels of service in the presence of moral hazard

optimal taxation without state contingent debt in an economy studied by lucas and stokey tax rates inherit the serial correlation structure of government expenditures belying barro s earlier result that taxes should be a random walk for any stochastic process of government expenditures to recover a version of barro s random walk tax smoothing outcome we modify lucas and stokey s economy to permit only risk free debt having only risk free debt confronts the ramsey planner with additional constraints on equilibrium allocations beyond one imposed by lucas and stokey s assumption of complete markets the ramsey outcome blends features of barro s model with lucas and stokey s in our model the contemporaneous effects of exogenous government expenditures on the government deficit and taxes resemble those in lucas and stokey s model but incomplete markets put a near unit root component into government debt and taxes an outcome like barro s however we show that without ad hoc limits on the government s asset holdings outcomes can diverge in importa

dueling policies why systemic risk taxation can fail abstract two policy instruments for the banking sector are investigated namely systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity about bailout policy bailout expectations can induce moral hazard in the form of excessive risk taking by banks systemic risk taxation induces banks to prefer uncorrelated investments leading to lower systemic risk formation constructive ambiguity generates uncertainty about bailout prospects however systemic risk taxation also may inform banks about the regulator s concern for financial stability and thereby its bailout policy this result leads to a trade off between systemic risk taxation and constructive ambiguity and highlights the need to consider interdependence across policies when evaluating their effectiveness

quality indicators in theory and in fact abstract in recent literature it has been suggested that consumers need have no knowledge of product quality as a number of quality indicators or signals may be used as substitutes very little attention has been paid to the empirical verification of these studies the present paper is devoted to the issue of how well these indicators perform using market data provided by consumer magazines from 3 countries the results strongly indicate that price is a poor quality indicator the paper also presents some evidence which suggests that seller reputation and easily observable characteristics are also poor indicators

an asian route to capitalism religious economy and the origins of self transforming growth in japan modern capitalism is a self transforming dynamic that proliferates market niches new products and techniques the industrial revolution could take place only in the context of preexisting agricultural capitalism that in turn required a breakout from the obstacles constituted by agrarian coercive societies organizational conditions necessary for self sustaining capitalist growth included markets not only for commodities but for all factors of production land labor and capital combined under control of entrepreneurs motivated by an economic ethic of future oriented calculation and investment weber was mistaken in holding that the capitalist breakthrough occurred only in christian europe the author proposes a neo weberian model in which the initial breakout from agrarian coercive obstacles took place within the enclave of religious organizations with monasteries acting as the first entrepreneurs the model is illustrated by the case of buddhism in late medieval japan the leading sector of monastic capitalism spread into the surrounding economy through religious movements of mass proselytization which narrowed the gap between clergy and laity confiscation of buddhist property at the transition to the tokugawa period transferred the capitalist dynamic to the secular economy of an agricultural mass market opening the way for a distinctive japanese path through the industrial revolution

pleasures of cockaigne quality gaps market structure and the amount of grading the article explores under what circumstances high quality producers would not voluntarily submit to grading when low quality firms would readily do so and under what conditions high quality firms would have a lesser proportion of their output graded than would their low quality counterparts it also investigates how market structure affects the decison to grade establishing that a competitive industry carries out the optimal amount of grading when some firms have finite market shares the industry engages in excessive grading

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

when cheaper is better fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds abstract in this paper we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market first there is competition among funds second fund managers ability is not observed by investors before making their investment decisions third some investors do not make optimal use of all available information the main results of the paper are that 1 price competition is compatible with positive mark ups in equilibrium and 2 worse performing funds set fees that are greater or equal to those set by better performing funds these predictions are supported by available empirical evidence

experience dependent information diffusion and product quality in a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable to capture this asymmetry our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias consumers may attempt to adjust for bias but are not required to do so correctly as a result quality under perfect information need not be and usually will not be higher than quality under imperfect information in addition the externality exerted by informed consumers on uninformed consumers may not be the traditional beneficial externality jel l15

an options based approach to evaluating the risk of fannie mae and freddie mac abstract fannie mae and freddie mac assume a significant amount of interest and prepayment risk and all of the credit risk for about half of the 8 trillion u s residential mortgage market their hybrid government private status and the perception that they are too big to fail make them a potentially large but largely unaccounted for risk to the federal government measuring the size and risk of this liability is technically difficult but important for the debate over the appropriate regulation of these institutions here we take an options pricing approach to evaluating these costs and risks under the base case assumptions the estimated value of the guarantees is 7 9 billion over 10 years with a combined 5 percent value at risk of 122 billion we evaluate the sensitivity of these estimates to various modeling assumptions and also to the regulatory regime including forbearance policies and capital requirements the analysis highlights the benefits but also the challenges of taking an options based approach to evaluating the value of federal credit guarantees

bailouts the incentive to manage risk and financial crises a firm s termination leads to bankruptcy costs this may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm s debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms because of this implicit guarantee firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection however if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee extending parties to walk away i derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high volatility choices while net worth is high however risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm s net worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold hence the model reproduces the qualitative features of existing risk management rules and can account for phenomena such as flight to quality

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

pricing strategy quality signaling and entry deterrence abstract i investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two period model of a durable goods monopolist there exists an incumbent that is of two types that is high and low quality types they differ in terms of their r d capabilities and the incumbent s type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant if the entrant decided to enter the market nash bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant i show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent s quality type which serves to discourage entry in the prestige pricing the high quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price i also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing

advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments i introduction for years the federal trade commission ftc has attacked unfair and deceptive advertising recently it has turned its attention to errors of omission rather than commission by challenging agreements among sellers to limit advertising even when it is truthful one reason for eliminating advertising restrictions is to stimulate competition in the advertised dimension of the good or service for example price advertising may result in more price competition on the other hand professional associations argue that price competition causes product quality to deteriorate because sellers of high quality services are forced to match the lower prices of sellers of low quality products and through their codes professional associations have implicitly or explicitly discouraged some forms of advertising including price advertising restrictions of this nature still exist in some local markets although they have become the subject of ftc litigation 1 the quality deterioration argument of professional associations is plausible only when buyers are unable to observe quality prior to purchase 2 when buyers cannot distinguish quality moral hazard invites sellers to lower cost by providing lower quality adverse selection can result from price advertising causing lower cost products to drive out higher cost products as argued by akerlof 1970 the opposite point of view is that even when quality cannot be determined prior to purchase price advertising may enable sellers to signal quality and develop reputations 3 moreover transactions repeatedly involving the same buyers and sellers may enable buyers to form expectations about seller quality based on their experience that can make it worthwhile for a seller to provide higher quality the series of laboratory experiments described here permits the evaluation of market performance when buyers have very limited information the claim to be investigated is that price advertising prevents quality deterioration and improves market efficiency reputation formation through advertising is emphasized instead of other mechanisms such as warranties that may prevent quality deterioration 4 so that quality can be kept relatively neutral and easily understood by subjects we represent it as the grade of a commodity the structure underlying the experiments is based on holt s model of the determination of industry quality which is summarized in schmalensee 1979 demand is induced through the values for which buyers can redeem their purchases value is linearly related to grade so that no difference between average and marginal valuation of quality can arise to cause nonoptimal quality as it did in spence 1976 the production cost for each seller is quadratic in the grade selected by the seller therefore the efficient grade level is unique the most closely related experimental work on product quality decisions is reported in lynch miller plott and porter 1986 in their experiments sellers chose one of two quality levels prices were determined in an oral double auction efficient price and quality outcomes resulted when prospective buyers were given full information about quality removing the identities of sellers and allowing only post purchase quality information sometimes resulted in a lemons outcome in which sellers offer a low quality product even though the market would be more efficient with the production and sale of a high quality product private information tended to yield less efficient outcomes than full public information the posted offer experiments reported in this paper differ from the oral double auction experiments in lynch miller plott and porter because one of our objectives was to examine the effect of advertising restrictions on market efficiency in our experiments price advertising is implemented in a standard posted offer auction

fly by night firms and the market for product reviews this paper presents a model that permits third party information provision in a market characterized by information asymmetries and reputation formation the model is used to examine how the market for information provision affects prices and supply in the primary market they find that decreasing the cost of providing and using information 1 increases rather than decreases the margins received by reputable service firms 2 decreases the price of new untested service firms so reputation is more costly to build and 3 leads to more high quality firms and less fly by night firms copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

historical sociology s puzzle of the missing transitions a case study of early modern japan prominent accounts of the transition to capitalism have a far too limited understanding of pre capitalist agrarian economies potential for dynamism recent research shows that conditions earlier accounts identify as triggers for a transition to capitalism could be present without a transition occurring i expand on implications of these cases of missing transitions for theorizing the dynamics of pre capitalist agrarian economies i present a theoretical framework that shows how phenomena previously associated with the transition to capitalism such as flexible property rights in land and labor extensive markets and accumulation of industrial and mercantile wealth emerged in pre capitalist societies without leading to capitalist development i illustrate the analytic upshot of this framework by considering the case study of japan in the tokugawa era 1603 to 1868 for historical sociologists early modern japan has long been seen as an anomalous case puzzlingly mixing developments thought to represen

prices product qualities and asymmetric information the competitive case recent developments in the economics of information emphasize the informational content of prices we examine the degree to which prices convey information on product quality to uninformed agents under perfect competition we show that a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist when an equilibrium does exist the information on quality conveyed by prices depends on the shape of the average cost curves and the relative numbers of informed and uniformed agents

optimal taxation in the presence of bailouts the termination of a representative financial firm due to excessive leverage may lead to substantial bankruptcy costs a government in the tradition of ramsey 1927 may be inclined to provide transfers to the firm so as to prevent its liquidation and the associated deadweight costs it is shown that the optimal taxation policy to finance such transfers exhibits procyclicality and history dependence even in a complete market these results are in contrast with pre existing literature on optimal fiscal policy and are driven by the endogeneity of the transfer payments that are required to salvage the financial firm

ex ante investment ex post remedy and product liability low quality products may cause consumer harm a firm can reduce the probability of low quality through ex ante investment before sales and can take remedy actions such as product recalls if it learns after sales that product quality is low an increase in the firm s product liability increases its incentive for ex post remedy more ex post remedy however may reduce the firm s ex ante quality investment on the other hand higher product liability increases consumer demand for the product resulting in high output and hence greater return to ex ante investment the trade off between these two effects the substitution effect and the output effect can lead to an inverted u shaped relationship between ex ante investment and product liability we find that the firm always prefers full liability whereas consumers might be better off with less than full liability full product liability tends to be socially optimal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is sufficiently high otherwise partial liability can be socially optimal

from poverty to perversity ideas markets and institutions over 200 years of welfare debate to understand the rise of market fundamentalism from the margins of influence to mainstream hegemony we compare the u s 1996 personal responsibility and work opportunities reconciliation act and the english 1834 new poor law two episodes in which existing welfare regimes were overturned by market driven ones despite dramatic differences across the cases both outcomes were mobilized by the perversity thesis a public discourse that reassigned blame for the poor s condition from poverty to perversity we use the term ideational embeddedness to characterize the power of such ideas to shape structure and change market regimes the success of the perversity thesis is based on the foundations of social naturalism theoretical realism and the conversion narrative in the poverty to perversity conversion narrative structural blame for poverty is discredited as empiricist appearance while the real problem is attributed to the corrosive effects of welfare s perverse incentives on poor people themselves

the spread of sharecropping in tuscany the political economy of transaction costs land tenure is central to many agricultural transformations the author examines one of these transformations the spread of sharecropping in late medieval and early modern tuscany previous research suggested that sharecropping spread as agricultural relations were refeudalized in contrast the author s analyses of fixed term and share term leasing sharecropping show that landlords used sharecropping when it lowered their overall costs of labor supervision and land management however to explain the spread of sharecropping the florentine political economy which created particular patterns of land management costs and labor supervision costs must also be considered florence was a well developed center for urban manufacturing landlords were frequently urban merchants and they resided in florence these factors were crucial in shaping agricultural relations landlords use of sharecropping to reduce the overall costs of land management and labor supervision increased as the distance from florence the site of landlords principal activities increased as the size of farms increased and when crops had high costs of labor supervision and land management thus the use of sharecropping to lower costs associated with agricultural production must be considered in the context of the tuscan political economy

the value of pension benefit guaranty corporation insurance this paper considers the cost of pension benefit guaranty corporation pbgc insurance for single employer defined benefit pension plans it derives a formula for the pbgc s liability that explicitly recognizes the two necessary conditions that must arise for the pbgc to sustain a loss first the corporation sponsoring the pension iund must undergo bankruptcy and second this pension plan must be underfunded the pbgc s liability is valued as a contingent put option and expressed as infinite series of modified bessel functions the comparative statics of the model are examined and are quite consistent with economic intuition copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

economic interests and sectoral relations the undevelopment of capitalism in fifteenth century tuscany1 many preconditions for a rapid transition to industrial capitalism existed in tuscany in the late medieval early modern period including relatively efficient agricultural production a well developed commercial manufacturing sector the absence of a powerful feudal nobility and feudal obligations a large precocious urban economy and the development of a territorial state no such transition occurred however previous explanations for this are inadequate because they discount the strength of the tuscany economy or downplay the presence of these preconditions to explain the tuscan outcome this article draws on sectoral theories agriculture vs manufacturing from the neoclassical and marxist literature since these theories often give the wrong prediction because they are based on formal attributes of actors the author combines them with a weberian conceptualization of substantively specific economic interests