durable goods and product obsolescence the issue of product obsolescence is addressed by examining the optimal sales strategy of a monopolist firm that may introduce an improved version of its current product consumers expectations of a forthcoming product lowers the price that they are willing to pay for the current product because of its loss in value due to obsolescence the new product is characterized by consumers increased willingness to pay and by its competitive interaction with the old product these characteristics affect the tradeoff that the firm makes between the cost of waiting for new product sales versus the cost of cannibalizing these sales we analyze the effect of these characteristics of the new product on the firm s optimal sales strategy we consider the various policy measures available to the firm including limiting initial sales in order to lower cannibalization of the new product buying back the earlier version of the product in order to generate greater demand for the new product and announcements of future product introductions we find that for modest levels of product improvement the firm s optimal policy is to phase out sales of the old product while for large improvements a buy back policy is more profitable lastly we find that the firm is better off if it informs consumers whether a new product is forthcoming

children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

building the family nest premarital investments marriage markets and spousal allocations we develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by premarital investments the marriage market is characterized by assortative matching and endogenously determined sharing rules form the basis of intra household allocations by incorporating pre marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model we are able to identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously determined and maritally sustainable intra marital sharing rules in particular we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre marital investments and intra household allocations are efficient the efficiency of both pre marital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that for each couple the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market

optimal taxation and cross price effects on labor supply estimates of the optimal gas tax abstract this study estimates parameters necessary to calculate the optimal second best gasoline tax most notably the cross price elasticity between gasoline and leisure prior theoretical work indicates the importance of this elasticity but despite this almost none of the prior studies of commodity taxation and none of the studies on second best environmental regulation actually estimate it using household data we find that gasoline is a relative complement to leisure and thus that the optimal gasoline tax is significantly higher than marginal damages the opposite of the result suggested by the bulk of the prior literature indeed even if there were no externalities at all associated with gasoline the optimal tax rate would still be almost equal to the average gas tax rate in the u s following this approach to estimate cross price elasticities with leisure could strongly influence estimates of optimal rates for other important commodity or pollution taxes

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

intra household allocation of parental leave we introduce childcare sharing in a collective model of household behavior to investigate which factors make spouses increase or decrease their share of parental leave the concern about future consumption motivates parents to invest in their human capital and to limit their leave duration using relative income and the age difference between spouses as distribution factors we cannot reject pareto efficiency in childcare sharing higher relative incomes and larger age differences shift the conditional leave allocation towards the relatively poorer and younger partner respectively households with higher total income purchase more professional childcare

fuel taxes an important instrument for climate policy abstract this article shows that fuel taxes serve a very important role for the environment and that we risk a backlash of increased emissions if they are abolished fuel taxes have restrained growth in fuel demand and associated carbon emissions although fuel demand is large and growing our analysis shows that it would have been much higher in the absence of domestic fuel taxes people often assert that fuel demand is inelastic but there is strong research evidence showing the opposite the price elasticity is in fact quite high but only in the long run in the short run it may be quite inelastic which has important implications for policy makers had europe not followed a policy of high fuel taxation but had low us taxes then fuel demand would have been twice as large hypothetical transport demand in the whole oecd area is calculated for various tax scenarios and the results show that fuel taxes are the single most powerful climate policy instrument implemented to date yet this fact is not usually given due attention in the debate

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

a new product growth for model consumer durables this article originally appeared in management science january 1969 volume 15 number 5 pp 215 227 published by the institute of management sciences a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables the basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior the model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data a long range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets

fuel efficiency improvements feedback mechanisms and distributional effects in the oil market we study the interactions between fuel efficiency improvements in the transport sector and the oil market where the efficiency improvements are policy induced in certain regions of the world we are especially interested in feedback mechanisms of fuel efficiency such as the rebound effect carbon leakage and the green paradox but also the distributional effects for oil producers an intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is introduced where opec core producers have market power we find that the rebound effect has a noticeable effect on the transport sector with the magnitude depending on the oil demand elasticity in the benchmark simulations we calculate that almost half of the energy savings may be lost to a direct rebound effect and an additional 10 to oil price adjustments in addition there is substantial intersectoral leakage to other sectors through lower oil prices in the regions that introduce the policy there is a small green paradox effect in the sense that oil consumption increases initially when the fuel efficiency measures are gradually implemented finally international carbon leakage will be significant if policies are not implemented in all regions we estimate leakage rates of 35 or higher when only major consuming regions implement fuel economy policies non opec producers will to a larger degree than opec producers cut back on its oil supply as a response to fuel efficiency policies due to high production costs

optimal dynamic durability abstract consider a firm that adjusts its production and the choice of durability for its products instantaneously we show that when the marginal cost with the respect to durability is nonincreasing a the optimal durability for both the competitive firm and the monopolist decreases over time and b the monopolist will produce a good with lower durability than the competitive firm we thus lend support for empirical findings and causal observations that found the phenomenon of declining durability over time

the effects of transport regulation on the oil market does market power matter instruments used to regulate the consumption of oil in the transport sector include fuel taxes biofuel requirements and fuel efficiency standards however the effects that these have on oil consumption and price vary if market power is present in the oil market the directions of change in consumption and price might contrast with those in a competitive market as a result the market structure affects not only the effectiveness of the policy instruments used to reduce oil consumption but also the terms of trade and carbon leakage in particular reduced oil consumption as a result of increased fuel efficiency standards will unambiguously increase the price of oil under a monopoly

oligopolies and product durability abstract we analyze a simple two period quantity setting model where firms rent all of their output we compare the durability chosen by an oligopolist to the competitive socially optimal durability the model shows in subgame perfect equilibria the durability chosen by oligopolists will be cost minimizing independent of their output levels thus swan s independence result can be extended to oligopoly markets if the firms rent their output we also demonstrate the independence result can be extended to certain corner solutions

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly this paper examines the use of taxation to control external damage due to pollution when product durability is endogenously determined a special form of the emissions function is also examined which is equivalent to an excise tax on output the dynamic oligopoly model indicates that many conventional results in the durability and taxation literature need not hold when durability is endogenously determined in particular the analysis shows durability may not be independent of industry structure nor will firms minimize their manufacturing costs of providing service in addition the second best tax on imperfectly competitive firms is not necessarily less than the tax on a competitive firm when firms choose their product s durability

marriage divorce and reciprocity based cooperation this paper considers partnership formation partnership dissolution and reciprocity based cooperation by couples in the form of voluntary transfers to smooth consumption while risk sharing is one benefit of having a partner it is also limited by the endogenous risk of separation the equilibrium formation and dissolution of partnerships are determined simultaneously with cooperative behavior publicly provided earnings insurance is shown to increase the turnover rate in the marriage market as well as to reduce the steady state marriage rate and the implicit financial cooperation between partners

learning by doing and product durability many durable goods industries are industries that have significant learning affects i examine a monopolist s and social planner s cost minimizing durability choice in both the short and the long run when learning effects are present the model indicates that the relationship between durability and learning depends crucially upon whether or not knowledge decays and on learning s impact on the marginal cost of durability in particular this model demonstrates that swan s 1970 1971 independence result will hold in the long run if knowledge does not decay but will not hold if knowledge does decay thus whether or not monopolists will manufacture products with the same durability or quality as a social planner depends to a large extent on the type of learning process in the industry and on whether or not quality and durability directly influence this learning process

gains from cartelisation in the oil market in this paper we ask whether opec still gains from cartelisation in the oil market despite low producer prices and a modest market share we apply two intertemporal equilibrium models of the global oil market one consisting of a cartel and a fringe and one describing a hypothetical competitive market comparing the outcome of these models we conclude that there are positive cartelisation gains of about 18 percent in the oil market in comparison with what pindyck 1978 found for the 1970s this may be considered as quite modest moreover we study whether the cartelisation gains to opec are altered by different moves by non opec producers or consumer countries generally we find that the relative cartelisation gains are unchanged one exception is exploration activities where we find that a major increase in non opec reserves could remove the cartelisation gains to opec completely in this case the opec countries could find themselves better off without the cartel

gender neutral inheritance laws family structure and women s status in india this paper examines whether economic empowerment of women improves their autonomy within their marital household and investigates the mechanism by exploiting variation from a legal reform aimed at improving women s inheritance rights in india results suggest that the reform increased women s participation in decision making but at the expense of the older generation of household members and not at the expense of their husbands two channels are proposed to explain this phenomenon first this can be driven by a shift in the family structure from traditional joint families to nuclear households such a change is consistent both with the increase in women s decision making authority which they can exert to move out of the joint household as well as with men s incentives since men have weaker financial links with their parents post reform second even within joint families the amendments empowered young couples at the expense of the older generation of household members

class systems and the enforcement of social norms abstract we analyze a model in which there is socially inefficient competition among people in this model self enforcing social norms can potentially control the inefficient competition however the inefficient behavior often cannot be suppressed in equilibrium among those with the lowest income due to the ineffectiveness of sanctions against those in the society with the least to lose we demonstrate that in such cases it may be possible for society to be divided into distinct classes with inefficient behavior suppressed in the upper classes but not in the lower

divorce remarriage and welfare a general equilibrium approach modern marriage markets display increasing turnover with less marriage but more divorce and remarriage as a consequence a large number of children live in single parent and step parent households we summarize here a general equilibrium approach that allows welfare evaluations in the absence of children we show that higher aggregate divorce may raise welfare because it facilitates remarriage even children may be better off in a high divorce remarriage environment because of stronger incentives for fathers to transfer money to the custodial mothers jel j1 j12 j13 k1 k10

does britain or the united states have the right gasoline tax this paper develops an analytical framework to assess the second best optimal level of gasoline taxation taking into account unpriced pollution congestion and accident externalities as well as interactions with the broader fiscal system we provide calculations of the optimal taxes for the us and the uk under a variety of parameter scenarios under our central parameter values the second best optimal gasoline tax is 1 01 gal for the us and 1 34 gal for the uk current tax rates are much lower than this in the us and higher in the uk the calculations are moderately sensitive to alternative parameter assumptions the congestion externality is the largest component in both nations revenue raising needs also play a significant role as do accident externalities and local air pollution potential welfare gains from reducing the current uk tax rate are estimated at nearly one fourth the production cost of all gasoline used in the uk even larger gains could be achieved by switching to a tax on vehicle miles with equal revenue yield for the us the welfare gains from optimizing the gasoline tax are smaller but those from switching to an optimal tax on vehicle miles are very large

improving channel coordination through franchising in this paper we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members in particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract namely the royalty structure and the monitoring technology we begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer in this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination we then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees finally we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel our general results are found to be consistent with those in brickley and dark 1987 and norton 1988 who conclude that franchising is affected by principal agent problems our theory finds special support in the work of lafontaine 1988 where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments

child support and partnership dissolution this article studies the determinants of partnership dissolution and focuses on the role of child support we exploit the variation in child support liabilities and entitlements driven in part by the introduction of a new set of complex rules that determined child support liability in the uk and by their interaction with welfare rules our panel has the virtue that the post 1993 variation in child support liability for all couples in partnerships formed prior to 1993 is unanticipated we find strong evidence that the resulting large child support liabilities significantly reduced dissolution risks

concurrent renting and selling in a durable goods monopoly under threat of entry this article analyzes the choice of contract sales or rental of a durable goods monopolist facing a threat of future entry although in the absence of such a threat a monopolist would prefer to rent his entire output we show that the threat of entry alters that preference there is an optimal preentry contract mix involving both rental and sales if both firms behave as cournot duopolists after entry the optimal choice of preentry contracts enables the erstwhile monopolist to gain the same profits as he would if he behaved as a von stackelberg leader

the design of durable goods the use of a durable good is limited by both its physical life and usable life for example an electric car battery can last for five years physical life or 100 000 miles usable life whichever comes first we propose a framework for examining how a profit maximizing firm might choose the usable life physical life and selling price of a durable good the proposed framework considers differences in usage rates and product valuations by consumers and allows for the effects of technological constraints and product obsolescence on a product s usable and physical lives our main result characterizes a relationship between optimal price cost elasticities and opportunity costs associated with relaxing upper bounds on usable and physical lives we describe conditions under which either usable life or physical life or both obtains its maximum possible values examine why a firm might devote effort to relaxing nonbinding constraints on usable life or physical life consider when price cuts might be accompanied with product improvements and examine how a firm might be able to cross subsidize product improvements

market structure and the durability of goods a basic proposition in microeconomics is that a monopolist tends to produce less output than would be produced by a competitive industry with this proposition in mind it is tempting to suggest that monopolistic producers of durable goods will produce goods with less durability than would be produced by a competitive industry this result was derived by martin 1962 kleiman and ophir 1966 levhari and srinivasan 1969 and schmalensee 1970 however swan 1970 showed that monopolists would choose the same degree of durability for their goods as would competitive producers the reason that earlier writers had reached a different result was that they had focused on long run equilibrium profits and ignored the role of initial conditions in optimizing decisions the swan independence result that durability is independent of market structurewas first derived under the assumption of constant returns to scale specifically the average cost of production was assumed to be an increasing function of durability but independent of the level of output the constant returns to scale assumption was first relaxed by sieper and swan 1973 by introducing a fixed capacity cost they showed that with finitely lived capacity which required replacement the independence result continued to hold in the very long run although market structure could affect durability before attainment of long run equilibrium no systematic results were derived kamien and schwartz 1974 introduced rising average cost curves and resurrected the result of earlier writers that a monopolist would choose a lower durability than competitive firms however swan 1977 pointed out that the kamien schwartz analysis is flawed by not allowing the monopolist access to the same technology as the competitive industry if the monopolist is allowed to choose the optimal number of plants then swan s independence result holds finally auernheimer and saving 1977 introduced costs of adjusting the rate of output and the durability of output they showed that if long run increasing costs arise from pecuniary external diseconomies then the independence result is preserved as remarked by schmalensee 1979 in his survey the general message of

durability choice under demand uncertainty this paper examines the impact of demand uncertainty on a monopolist s durability choice within a simple two period framework the analysis shows that the firm will produce the socially optimal durability if its output is rented and demand uncertainty is small but that it may produce units with inefficiently short life spans if output is sold however the model reveals that this planned obsolescence may be reduced from certainty levels depending upon the impact of uncertainty on future demand thus uncertainty may actually increase the firm s product durability relative to certainty levels

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

the cost of reducing gasoline consumption high nominal gas prices new awareness of threats to national security and growing concern about global warming have reignited discussion of ways to reduce gasoline consumption in the united states debate centers on changing two policies already in place the federal gas tax and corporate average fuel economy cafe standards two influential recent reports find that increasing the gas tax would attain a given reduction in gas consumption at lower cost than would tightening cafe standards national research council 2002 congressional budget office 2003 the gas tax has this advantage because it encourages not just increases in fuel efficiency but also reductions in miles driven in contrast cafe standards actually encourage more driving because increases in fuel efficiency reduce the cost of gas per mile driven we also compare the costs of the gas tax and cafe standard but take into account interactions with preexisting tax distortions many papers examine the effects of these tax interactions in other contexts but to our knowledge none of them considers the cafe standard see e g lars bovenberg and ruud de mooij 1994 ian parry 1995 lawrence goulder 1995 bovenberg and goulder 1996 parry et al 1999 don fullerton and gilbert metcalf 2001 these interactions reduce the cost of the gas tax but increase the cost of cafe thus expanding the cost advantage enjoyed by the gas tax this difference does not arise because the gas tax raises revenue while the cafe standard does not rather this result is similar to that in west and williams 2004a which showed that since gasoline and leisure are relative complements raising the gas tax will increase labor supply generating additional efficiency gains in this paper we estimate a consumer demand system using data from the consumer expenditure survey and the california air resources board and find that miles driven and leisure are relative complements thus the gas tax encourages labor supply by raising the cost per mile driven producing an additional efficiency gain conversely because cafe reduces the cost per mile it discourages labor supply and yields an additional efficiency loss while the induced changes in labor supply are tiny relative to the labor market they are still substantial relative to the gas market and thus have a dramatic effect on the relative costs of the two policies our point estimates imply that they reduce the social marginal cost of the gas tax starting from the status quo gas tax rate and ignoring the benefits of reduced gas consumption by almost 30 percent while increasing the marginal cost of cafe by nearly 60 percent this result implies that the case for raising the gas tax rather than tightening the cafe standard is far stronger than previous studies suggest indeed it strongly suggests that any tightening at all of the cafe standard would lower welfare unless the benefits of reduced gas consumption have been seriously underestimated

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

power couples changes in the locational choice of the college educated 1940 1990 college educated couples are increasingly located in large metropolitan areas these areas were home to 32 percent of all college educated couples in 1940 39 percent in 1970 and 50 percent in 1990 we investigate whether this trend can be explained by increasing urbanization of the college educated or the growth of dual career households and the resulting severity of the colocation problem we argue that the latter explanation is the primary one smaller cities may therefore experience reduced inflows of human capital relative to the past and thus become poorer

investment in schooling and the marriage market we present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns the labor market return resulting from higher wages and a marriagemarket return defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles this asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses when the labor market returns to schooling rises home production demands less time and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken more women may invest in schooling than men

the effects of the corporate average fuel efficiency standards in the us this paper examines the effects of the corporate average fuel economy standards cafe on automobile sales prices and fuel consumption first a discrete choice model of automobile demand and a continuous model of vehicle utilization are estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey for 1984 1990 next the demand side model is combined with a model of oligopoly and product differentiation on the supply side with these elements in place the effects of the cafe regulation are assessed through simulations and compared to the effects of alternative policy instruments such as an increase in gasoline tax

unilateral co2 reductions and carbon leakage the consequences of international trade in oil and basic materials a recursively dynamic general equilibrium model featuring six world regions with trade in energy and non energy goods is used to simulate the period from 1990 through 2100 in 10 year intervals the simulations explore the effect of unilateral action by the oecd to curb global co2 emissions unilateral cuts create incentives for free riding by non participating regions so that global emissions are reduced by less than the amount that the oecd cuts back its regional emissions carbon leakage occurs through two channels first basic materials production increases in unconstrained regions resulting in increased carbon intensity of gdp second reductions in oecd oil imports cause the world oil price to fall leading to an increased energy intensity in the non participant regions in this paper we use a general equilibrium model to assess the extent to which these two mechanisms reduce the effectiveness of oecd reductions in curbing global co2 concentrations

the dynamic adjustment of optimal durability and quality they don t make them like they used to is a well known adage which is investigated in this paper we show that when the marginal cost with respect to durability or quality per unit of production does not increase with production then a a competitive firm and a monopolist will choose an optimal durability or quality path that decreases over time b the more likely it is that quality and quantity are substitutes either in consumption or production the more likely it is that quality will deteriorate over time as the market approaches the steady state c substitutability of quality and durability will tend to drive quality down even faster when durability declines

commentaries and rejoinder to measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks by paulo albuquerque and bart j bronnenberg this series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on strategic and managerial issues arising from albuquerque and bronnenberg albuquerque p b j bronnenberg 2012 measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks marketing sci 31 1 4 23

birth control and female empowerment an equilibrium analysis we analyze from a theoretical perspective the impact of innovations in birth control technology on intrahousehold allocation of resources we consider a model of frictionless matching on the marriage market in which men as well as women differ in their preferences for children moreover men unlike women must marry to enjoy fatherhood we show that more efficient birth control technologies generally increase the power hence the welfare of all women including those who do not use them this empowerment effect requires that the new technology be available to single women an innovation reserved to married women may result in a disempowerment effect

optimal management of environmental externalities with time lags and uncertainty many environmental externalities occur with time lags that can range from a few days to several centuries in length and many of these externalities are also subject to uncertainty in this paper we examine the key features of an optimal policy to manage environmental externalities that are both lagged and stochastic we develop a two period two polluter model and obtain closed form solutions for optimal emissions levels under different combinations of damage functions and stochastic processes these solutions show that it is not obvious whether greater control should be exerted on polluters that generate externalities with longer lags or on polluters that generate externalities with shorter lags we find that the optimal ranking of polluters with respect to the length of the time lag associated with their externality will depend on a the discount rate b conditional expectations of future states of the polluted resource c persistence of the pollutant and d initial conditions

the market power of opec 1973 2001 we apply a multi equation dynamic econometric model on monthly data to test if the behaviour of opec as a whole or different sub groups of the cartel is consistent with the characteristics of dominant producers on the world crude oil market in the period 1973 2001 our results indicate that the producers outside opec can be described as competitive producers taking the oil price as given and maximizing profits the opec members do not fit the behaviour of price taking producers our findings of low residual demand price elasticities for opec underpin the potential market power of the producer group and are in line with the results in some recent energy studies on the other hand our findings indicate that neither opec nor different sub groups of the cartel can be characterized as a dominant producer in the period 1973 1994 however we find that the characteristics of a dominant producer to some extent fit opec core as from 1994 thus although opec clearly has affected the market price the producer g

long term partnership formation marriage and employment of course marriage and employment are different nevertheless a worker looking for a job a rm looking for worker or a single person looking for a marriage partner face similar problems as all are seeking a long term partner indeed forming long term partnerships is a common occurrence in life there are many other examples business people search for other business people to form a pro table relationship bridge players seek to nd a suitable partners students search for a good university we would all like to nd a good friend etc the problem becomes signi cant if there are substantial differences in the return obtained from forming a partnership with different partners for example employers differ in the wages they offer or in the work environment they provide in such a situation a worker may reject some job offers similarly as many have learned to their cost some make better marriage partners than others the problem is two sided while a worker is evaluating a potential employer the employer is also evaluating the worker it is this two sided aspect of the problem that generates a signi cant interest a worker s willingness to accept employment at a rm depends not only on the characteristics of the rm but also the other possible options open to the worker the better an individual s opportunities elsewhere the more selective he or she will be in evaluating a potential partnership an academic who believes harvard may make an offer in the near future will be more selective in evaluating offers from lesser universities in this way expectations play a role if a single man believes that few if any women will nd him an acceptable marriage partner then he may accept the rst opportunity that presents itself partnership formation typically does not comply with a classic market situation where all participants know everything and all trades take place at zero cost finding a job nding a husband or wife or nding a business partner is a time consuming activity where opportunities typically arrive over time at uncertain intervals of time of course we can act in ways that in uence the arrival rate of potential partner workers go to employment agencies or read help wanted advertisements in newspapers singles of a certain age go to discos or join tennis clubs the literature on search and matching sm see mortensen 1982 and pissarides 1990 for early examples 1 provides an excellent framework for the economic journal 109 june f307 f334 royal economic society 1999 published by blackwell publishers 108 cowley road oxford ox4 1jf uk and 350 main street malden ma 02148 usa

environmental regulation in an open economy abstract environmental regulation by a large trading country affects the world price of traded commodities a series of second best environmental taxes are derived which explicitly incorporate trade effects for cases which depend on the type of externality the regulating country s commodity trade balance and the presence or absence of trade taxes in the regulated market a coordinated policy solution using both tax and tariff instruments also is derived the practical implications for domestic environmental policy making which emerge from the theoretical results are evaluated

do high oil prices matter evidence on the mobility behavior of german households focusing on travel survey data from germany this paper investigates the determinants of automobile travel with the specific aim of quantifying the effects of fuel prices and fuel economy the analysis is predicated on the notion that car mileage is a two stage decision process comprising the discrete choice of whether to own a car and the continuous choice of distance traveled to capture this process we employ censored regression models consisting of probit and ols estimators which allows us to gauge the extent to which sample selectivity may bias the results our elasticity estimates indicate a significant positive association between increased fuel economy and increased driving and a significantly negative fuel price elasticity which ranges between 35 and 41 taken together these results suggest that fuel taxes are likely to be a more effective policy measure in reducing emissions than fuel efficiency standards

on comparing monopoly and competition in exhaustible resource exploitation abstract it is widely believed that exhaustible resource monopolies do not enjoy as much market power as standard non resource monopolies and may even produce in a socially optimal way we argue that this paradoxical result arises from an inappropriate comparison methodology when similar assumptions are applied to the resource and the conventional cases we show that the resource monopoly behaves as expected i e restricts supply

automobile externalities and policies this paper discusses the nature and magnitude of externalities associated with automobile use including local and global pollution oil dependence traffic congestion and traffic accidents it then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities including fuel taxes fuel economy and emissions standards and alternative fuel policies summarizing insofar as possible the welfare effects of those policies finally we discuss emerging pricing policies including congestion tolls and insurance reform and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities

policy watch the economics of fuel economy standards one of the most hotly contested of all energy policy issues involves corporate average fuel economy or cafe standards for new cars and light duty trucks tighter standards would reduce gasoline consumption and hence both greenhouse gas emissions as well as this country s vulnerability to oil price shocks but they would also increase the price of new vehicles worsen traffic congestion and depending on how they are phased in possibly even reduce occupant safety these effects are amenable to economic analysis and we review the evidence to date bearing on this interesting and important question

the role of social norms in a model of marriage and divorce in the us the rate of divorce has increased at an alarming rate since the 1960s this paper presents a mechanism which gives rise to the emergence of multiple equilibria and a discrete jump in the rate of divorce in a simple search environment we attempt to show that social norms influence the way each agent searches for a matching partner and hence the probability of divorce in a low divorce equilibrium agents are willing to spend more cost in the search process as a result the act of divorce becomes a more accurate signal of unobservable characteristics of a divorced agent this type of social norms is self consistent in equilibrium as social stigma attached to divorce is relatively high and this forces agents to be more discreet in the search process for exactly the opposite reason a high divorce equilibrium can also be supported where agents are willing to spend little cost in the search process in the light of this logic the rapid increase in the rate of divorce can be seen as a movement from a low divorce to a high divorce equilibrium possibly triggered by a temporary shock

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

on the state of the union an overlapping generations model of marriage and divorce is constructed to analyze family structure and intergenerational mobility agents differ by sex marital status and human capital single agents meet in a marriage market and decide whether to accept or reject proposals to wed married couples must decide whether to separate or not parents invest in their children depending on their wherewithal a simulated version of the theoretical prototype can generate an equilibrium with a significant number of female headed families and a high degree of persistence in income across generations to illustrate the model s mechanics the effects of two antipoverty policies namely child support and welfare are investigated

divorce remarriage and child support there is some evidence that children of divorced parents do not perform as well as comparable children in intact families but that this gap declines with the aggregate divorce rate we develop a model in which the higher expectations for remarriage associated with higher divorce rates can trigger an equilibrium in which divorced fathers make more generous transfers that benefit their children and the mother in the aftermath of divorce as a result the welfare loss of children from the separation of their parents can be lower when divorce and remarriage rates rise

matching finding a partner for life or otherwise how do job worker and husband wife relationships form and why do some matched pairs subsequently separate economists and game theorists are in the process of developing and applying an equilibrium explanation of match formation and separation based on the principle of voluntary pairing under competitive conditions the purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of these developments the general existence of patnership structures with the property that no one has an incentive to separate has been established these equilibrium structures maximize aggregate value over the set of all feasible match structures in the transferable utility case according to this pure theory of matching competition for partners can be expected to yield equilibrium match structures that are both stable and socially efficient at least under conditions of frictionless certainty search theoretic models that take account of meeting costs and initial uncertainty about match values have been developed to explain sepa

research note the role of production lead time and demand uncertainty in marketing durable goods firms often have to make their production decisions under conditions of demand uncertainty this is especially true for product categories such as automobiles and technology goods where the lead time needed for manufacturing forces firms to make production decisions well in advance of the selling season once the firm has produced the goods the available production volume affects the firm s subsequent marketing decisions in this paper we study the relationship between the firm s production and marketing decisions for a durable goods manufacturer we develop a dynamic model of a durable product market in which the demand functions are developed from a micromodeling of consumer utility functions and an equilibrium analysis of consumer strategies after taking into account the demand uncertainty as well as the potential for cannibalization of future sales the manufacturer makes its production and sales decisions we find that the firm s optimal inventory level is u shaped in the durability of the product and that the firm suffers a larger loss due to uncertainty when it is leases rather than sells its products furthermore unlike the case for nondurables for durable goods we find that the effect of uncertainty persists even after the uncertainty has been resolved