quantitative analysis of network externalities in competing technologies the vcr case we develop a dynamic structural model of consumers choices and producers pricing in an oligopolistic market for newly introduced durable products with network externalities the model is then applied to empirically analyze the de facto standardization of the vhs format in the u s home vcr market during 1981 1988 we find i the network advantage of vhs explains at least 70 3 to 86 8 of the logarithm of relative sales of vhs to betamax in each year ii an increase in the network advantage of vhs was an engine of tipping toward the vhs format and iii in the early 1980s the network advantage of vhs was mainly due to its expected growth advantage

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

intergenerational income group mobility and differential fertility one question development economists are especially interested in but so far left unanswered is how would the societal income distribution be affected by introducing a family planning program to reduce the reproduction rate of the poor which is usually high in developing countries the purpose of this paper is to search for analytical answers to this question we are able to make definite comparisons about some class of inequality measures of the steady state societal income distributions and these comparisons provide strong theoretical support in favor of the above mentioned family planning program excerpt

self enforcing exchange among generations implications for consumption and mobility abstract a three generation olg model with one directional altruism and two directional intra family transfers is presented adults invest in their children s education and make transfers to their elderly parents however due to lack of altruism adults with high earnings do not share consumption equally with their elderly parents but spend a larger share of their earnings on own consumption and on their children s education this allows the model to be consistent with three empirical observations that are difficult to reconcile with traditional altruistic frameworks of intergenerational social interactions and mobility i consumption is not perfectly shared between members of an extended family ii consumption is not equally persistent over the lifecycle as across generations and iii the intergenerational persistence of earnings is particularly high at the top end of the earnings distribution

decomposing intergenerational income elasticity the gender differentiated contribution of capital transmission in rural philippines summary using longitudinal data from rural philippines we decompose intergenerational income elasticity ige into five distinct pathways intergenerational transmissions of health education land and spouse education capital plus residual correlation in productivity intergenerational human capital transmissions from mothers are stronger than those from fathers maternal education is the parental capital most strongly associated with ige while naive ige estimates are indistinguishable for sons and daughters the pathways that generate these results differ strikingly for sons ige is entirely explained by parent to child capital transmission by contrast strong income correlation exists between daughters and parents even after controlling for parent and child capital endowments

distributional effects of public education in an economy with public pensions we study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays education and pay as you go social security affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents we consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs and allocates tax revenues to finance them in our model human capital is one of the factors of production it is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs parents decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism heterogeneous in its strength across the population which leads to heterogeneity of incomes we investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution we show that in this framework contrary to some earlier results increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

educational inequality and intergenerational mobility in latin america a new database abstract the causes and consequences of the intergenerational persistence of inequality are a topic of great interest among various fields in economics however until now issues of data availability have restricted a broader and cross national perspective on the topic based on rich sets of harmonized household survey data we contribute to filling this gap by computing time series for several indexes of relative and absolute intergenerational education mobility for 18 latin american countries over 50 years and making them publicly available we find that intergenerational mobility is on average rising in latin america this pattern seems to be driven by the high upward mobility of children from low educated families at the same time there is substantial immobility at the top of the distribution significant cross country differences are observed and are associated with income inequality poverty economic growth public educational expenditures and assortative mating

contagion and risk sharing on the inter bank market abstract increasing inter bank lending has an ambiguous impact on financial stability using a computational model with endogenous bank behavior and interest rates we identify the conditions under which inter bank lending promotes stability through risk sharing or provides a channel through which failures may spread in response to large economy wide shocks more inter bank lending relationships worsen systemic events for smaller shocks the opposite effect is observed as such no inter bank market structure maximizes stability under all conditions in contrast deposit insurance costs are always reduced under greater numbers of inter bank lending relationships a range of regulations are considered to increase system stability

like grand parent like child multigenerational mobility across the eu abstract this study shows that the multigenerational transmission of inequality in most of the 28 eu countries is higher than what a parent to child paradigm would suggest while a strand of the literature claims that this is due to a direct grandparental effect economic historian gregory clark argues that multigenerational mobility follows a markovian process in his view not only are previous estimates severely attenuated by an errors in variables problem but persistence is also constant across time and space using a unique retrospective survey containing information on three generations of european citizens we provide suggestive evidence against such a universal law of mobility while estimates based on measurement error models show that persistence is indeed as strong as clark suggests there are cross country differences furthermore for a few eu countries we cannot reject the hypothesis of a direct grandparental effect overall there is no single data generating process to describe multigenerational persistence that fits all eu countries 2

the political economy of wealth and interest we study the relationship between wealth redistribution and the allocation of firm ownership the economy s wealth distribution affects the equilibrium interest rate and the allocation of entrepreneurial rents when wealth determines agents ability to borrow this leads to an unconventional voting behaviour of the politically decisive middle class the political preferences of middle and upper class voters coincide when redistribution only has an adverse interest rate effect middle class voters vote with the lower class if redistribution gives access to entrepreneurial rents technology may strongly affect political outcomes greater inequality amplifies the interest rate effect and may lead to less redistribution

markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies with production uncertainty this paper concerns the existence of markov perfect equilibria in altruistic growth economies previous work on deterministic models has established existence only under extremely restrictive conditions we show that the introduction of production uncertainly yields an existence theorem for aggregative infinite horizon models with very general forms of altruism journal of economic literature classification numbers

pride and prejudice using ethnic sounding names and inter ethnic marriages to identify labour market discrimination labour markets discriminate against workers with particular ethnic sounding names we use non random sorting into interethnic marriage and salient differences between sephardic and ashkenazi surnames to evaluate the causal impact of sephardic affiliation on wages using the 1995 israeli census we estimate the effect of a sephardic sounding surname on wages we first compare the wages of israeli jewish males born to sephardic fathers and ashkenazi mothers sa who are more likely to carry a sephardic surname with the wages of israeli jewish males born to ashkenazi fathers and sephardic mothers as we find that israeli labor markets discriminate based on perceived ethnicity sa workers earn significantly less than their as counterparts we then exploit the custom of women to adopt their husbands surnames to disentangle actual ethnicity from the ethnicity perceived by the market consistent with ethnic discrimination based on surnames we find that it is father in law s ethnicity rather than father s ethnicity that shapes female wage rates finally we find that labor markets discriminate based on surname only when those names provide additional information about ethnicity when ethnicity can be discerned from skin tone surnames do not provide additional explanatory power with respect to wages

should bank runs be prevented abstract this paper extends diamond and dybvig s model j political economy 91 1983 401 to a framework in which bank assets are risky there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high in this environment both information induced and pure panic runs will occur however banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately it is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

rational herding in financial economics abstract this paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets some models can predict perfect herding in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities negative externalities in bank runs positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition principal agent problems based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation or informational learning cascades the paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research

bank runs in emerging market economies evidence from turkey s special finance houses recent banking crises in emerging market countries have renewed debates about deposit insurance because insurance erodes banks incentives to manage risks prudently some argue that its elimination would improve bank stability yet eliminating insurance could be de stabilizing if it recreates risks of self fulfilling runs this paper examines dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of runs on turkey s special finance houses an uninsured sub sector of islamic banks detailed data on withdrawals are analyzed in a vector autoregressive framework that enables us to distinguish between informational and self fulfilling elements of runs we found that both types of dynamics were at work during the runs suggesting a role for deposit insurance judiciously used in ruling out expectational problems that fuel tendencies to run

when equal opportunity is not enough training costs and intergenerational inequality this paper develops an individual optimization model with persistent intergenerational immobility its key feature is that training costs are negatively correlated with family background leading to differences in privately optimal training levels across population groups heterogeneity of innate abilities is shown to reduce but not eliminate the importance of family backgrounds conversely wage thresholds which result from indivisibilities in the production or training functions or noncompetitive elements in the economy such as segmented labor markets increase the scope for inequality in the steady state

wage structure as implicit insurance on human capital in developed versus underdeveloped countries abstract this paper explores the role of wage structure as implicit insurance on human capital it illustrates how smaller wage differentials in the developed world can be welfare enhancing by acting as implicit insurance while larger wage differentials in underdeveloped countries make investments in human capital riskier in other words with smaller wage differentials the students in a developed country are insured against poor educational outcomes through the existence of well paid alternative employments which are not present in the economy of a less developed country this result arises as multiple equilibria in a general equilibrium model when there are no insurance markets for human capital

the poor are twice cursed wealth inequality and inefficient credit market abstract this paper investigates the role of unobservable wealth differences on credit market equilibrium given there is also asymmetric information concerning effort preferences and choices in equilibrium poor but able entrepreneurs may subsidise the rich and incompetent or be excluded as a result investment may exceed or fall short of the optimal level low inequality may deliver conditions for perfect screening and an efficient level of investment the equilibrium with cross subsidisation is consistent with otherwise puzzling empirical observations

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

capital income taxation wealth distribution and borrowing constraints the theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter temporal allocation of resources the theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings structural assumptions are made such that with no taxation aggregate savings are socially excessive in the long run i e the rate of return is smaller than the discount rate sufficient conditions for a pareto efficient taxation or subsidization of capital in the long run depend on the correlation between individuals consumption and savings a subsidy may be efficient when individuals incomes follow a predictable pattern of life cycles with no negative bequest 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

equilibrium income inequality among identical agents the paper offers a theory of income differences in which income inequality exists and persists despite identical tastes and talents teams of unskilled labor supervised by schooled managers produce goods with increasing returns to scale agents are assumed unable to borrow to fund the human capital investment needed to become managers despite ex ante identical agents the model displays the following equilibrium phenomena i risk averse agents accept fair gambles implying an unequal ex post distribution of unearned income ii agents agree to publicly subsidize education although those receiving the subsidy have the highest material wealth and iii income and educational differences are perpetuated from generation to generation

job information networks neighborhood effects and inequality this paper explores the theoretical and empirical literature to examine the use by different social groups of informal sources of information provided by friends relatives and acquaintances during job search and its consequences for the job market it also addresses the role of network structure and size the resource endowments of contacts and nature of the links between contacts to explain differences in the effects of job information networks in doing so the paper also turns to the sociology literature on job information networks and provides an economic perspective on such sociological concepts as strong versus weak ties inbreeding distance from structural holes etc the paper distinguishes between models of exogenous job information networks that is where individuals obtain job related information through a given social structure and endogenous job information networks which are social networks that result from individuals uncoordinated actions the paper pays special attention to such issues as physical and social proximity and sharing of information and discusses them in the context of the recent social interactions and neighborhood effects literature finally the paper outlines a model that integrates job information networks where interactions occur in business cycle frequencies with the dynamics of human capital formation which include the joint effects of parental community and neighborhood human capital and are set in life cycle frequencies for the purpose of organizing suggestions for future research and examining earned income inequality

distribution and growth in models of imperfect capital markets abstract a full analysis of the distribution of income should include both the inequality in income between different generations of the same family what is usually called intergenerational ocial mobility and the inequality in income between different families in the same generation becker tomes 1979 p 1154

economic interpretations of intergenerational correlations science itself for example see galton s 1869 study of the eminence of relatives or his 1889 analysis of the heights of parents and children but extensive use of economic theory to interpret these correlations is much more recent using basic economic concepts such as supply demand investment incentives missing markets and so on theorists hope to explain how and why status is correlated across generations economic theory might provide a unified treatment of a variety of socioeconomic indicators such as earnings income occupation or wealth or it might predict how taxes subsidies and economic regulation affect intergenerational mobility and the operation of markets however while the subject matter earnings consumption wealth occupa tion is clearly interesting to economists it could nonetheless be the case that beyond basic questions of measurement economic theory has not improved our understanding of intergenerational mobility goldberger 1989 is quite explicit in this contention by emphasizing the distinction between genes and environment and by using statistical theory as its main analytical tool the paper by samuel bowles and herbert gintis in this issue implicitly concurs with goldberger we take this challenge very seriously what characterizes an economic approach to mobility while biologists and bowles and gintis distinguish endowments and investments by their source genetic versus environmental factors one focus of economic theorists is motiva

talent growth and income distribution a model with heterogeneous individuals and bequests between generations is constructed to analyze income distribution and educational choice the introduction of an imperfection in the credit market is shown to influence the allocation of talent both ability and bequest are of relevance in deciding whether or not to invest in education with learning by doing between generations the allocation of talent affects not only the level of production but also the growth rate copyright 1993 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

bank suspension of convertibility abstract a banking panic occurs when depositors at all banks seek a large reduction in their deposit holdings suspension of convertibility of demand deposits into currency was the banking system s response to a banking panic when depositors are incompletely informed about the state of bank investments a panic can occur when depositors expect capital losses conditional on having observed noisy indicators of the state of bank investments banks with superior information about the investments can signal to depositors by suspending convertibility that continuation of the long term investments is mutually beneficial

the effects of compulsory schooling on growth income distribution and welfare abstract in this paper we consider an olg model with productive capital and human capital affecting the quality of labor in each generation parents invest in their children s education but disregard its external effect on the aggregate production function government intervention in providing compulsory schooling increases economic growth along the equilibrium path while the intragenerational income distribution becomes more equal also in the long run the majority of individuals in each generation are better off due to compulsory schooling

a theory of the welfare state the welfare state can be seen as an insurance device that makes lifetime careers safer increases risk taking and suffers from moral hazard effects adopting this view the paper studies the trade off between average income and inequality evaluating redistributive equilibria from an allocative point of view it studies the problem of optimal redistributive taxation with tax induced risk taking and shows that constant returns to risk taking are likely to imply a paradox where more redistribution results in more post tax inequality in general optimal taxation will either imply that the redistribution paradox is present or that the economy operates at a point of its efficiency frontier where more inequality implies a lower average income redistribution welfare state

bank runs the deposit currency ratio and the interest rate abstract this paper provides a model of an economy with a banking system which is subject to bank runs the model is then used to explain the rise in short term interest rates during bank runs and the fall in the deposit currency ratio in anticipation of possible runs

intergenerational earnings mobility inequality and growth abstract we examine a model in which per capita income inequality intergenerational mobility and returns to education are all determined endogenously individuals earn wages depending on their ability which is a random variable they purchase an education with transfers received from their parents and are subject to liquidity constraints in the model multiple steady state equilibria are possible countries with identical tastes and technologies can reach differing rates of mobility inequality and per capita income equilibria with higher levels of output also have lower inequality higher mobility and more efficient distribution of education

a theory of intergenerational mobility we study the link between market forces cross sectional inequality and intergenerational mobility emphasizing complementarities in the production of human capital we show that wealthy parents i

the effect of content on global internet adoption and the global digital divide a country s human capital and economic productivity increasingly depend on the internet as a result of its expanding role in providing information and communications this has prompted a search for ways to increase internet adoption and narrow its disparity across countries the global digital divide previous work has focused on demographic economic and infrastructure determinants of internet access that are difficult to change in the short run internet content increases adoption and can be changed more quickly however the magnitude of its impact and therefore its effectiveness as a policy and strategy tool has until now been unknown quantifying the role of content is challenging because of feedback network effects between content and adoption more content stimulates adoption which in turn increases the incentive to create content we develop a methodology to overcome this endogeneity problem we find a statistically and economically significant effect implying that policies promoting content creation can substantially increase adoption because it is ubiquitous internet content is also useful to effect social change across countries content has a greater effect on adoption in countries with more disparate languages making it a useful tool to overcome linguistic isolation our results offer guidance for policymakers on country characteristics that influence adoption s responsiveness to content and for internet firms on where to expand internationally and how to quantify content investments this paper was accepted by lorin hitt information systems

the desegregating effect of school tracking this paper makes the following point detracking schools that is preventing them from allocating students to classes according to their ability may lead to an increase in income residential segregation it does so in a simple model where households care about the school peer group of their children if ability and income are positively correlated tracking implies that some high income households face the choice of either living in the areas where most of the other high income households live and having their child assigned to the low track or instead living in lower income neighbourhoods where their child would be in the high track under mild conditions tracking leads to an equilibrium with partial income desegregation where perfect income segregation would be the only stable outcome without tracking

non leaky buckets optimal redistributive taxation and agency costs abstract economists generally have argued that income redistribution comes at a cost in aggregate income we provide a counter example in a model where private information gives rise to incentive constraints in the model a wage tax creates the usual distortion in labor leisure choices but the redistributive grants that it finances reduce a distortion in investment in higher education we prove that simple redistributive policies can yield pareto improvements and increase aggregate income indeed redistributive policies are under most circumstances more effective in increasing efficiency than corrective taxes or subsidies where higher education is beyond the reach of the poor

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

gary becker s contributions to economics from his first published work gary becker has consistently strived to extend the domain of economic analysis his interest is in social science broadly defined and he is convinced that economic theory in its established neoclassical form provides the best set of tools for analysing social science questions when he finds an interesting problem on the borderland of what is conventionally thought of as economics and that is where he is looking for his problems he is not worried that he is trespassing on the traditional grounds of sociologists political scientists lawyers anthropologists or biologists on the contrary he clearly delights in showing how economic theory can be brought to bear on such problems he is of course not alone in trying to extend the borders of economics many other scholars have contributed to the movement which some have characterized as economic imperialism becker is one of the most outstanding of the imperialists this review of his work is organized in accordance with the main topics on which becker has worked chronologically his work on the economics of discrimination which grew out of his doctoral dissertation comes first next in order come his fundamental contributions to human capital theory he was also one of the founders of the so called new theory of consumption which is no longer so new and he has made important contributions to the economic study of crime and punishment and to the economics of political decision making some of his most original work is in the economics of the family where he provides economic explanations of such questions as marriage divorce and procreation after the topic by topic review of becker s contributions i will try to provide a more general evaluation of his work and to characterize it more fully in terms of research traditions and methodological attitudes

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

intergenerational persistence of earnings the role of early and college education recent empirical evidence from the united states indicates a high degree of persistence in earnings across generations designing effective public policies to increase social mobility requires identifying and measuring the major sources of persistence and inequality in earnings we provide a quantitative model of intergenerational human capital transmission that focuses on three sources innate ability early education and college education we find that approximately one half of the intergenerational correlation in earnings is accounted for by parental investment in education in particular early education we show that these results have important implications for education policy

projecting the economic impact of the internet in this paper we analyze the impact of the internet on the performance of the economy and the standard of living of average americans our analyses illustrate that even though the stock market s speculative bubble has burst the internet will continue to have a significant impact on old economy industries and as a result generate real benefits for the overall economy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

too much investment a problem of asymmetric information this paper shows that under plausible assumptions the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality this conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the stiglitz weiss model it is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance however under the stiglitz weiss assumptions used to derive an underinvestment result equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance

unfair credit allocations this article investigates the impact of credit allocation on heterogeneous wealth entrepreneurs we show that with decreasing risk aversion and unobservable wealth poorer borrowers exert more effort as a consequence of endogenous adverse selection they are either excluded from the market or necessarily subsidize richer borrowers in a pooling equilibrium resulting in a paradoxical and inequitable redistribution alternatively a less likely separating equilibrium may occur in which poor types bear the entire weight of separation in the form of excess risk taking

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

intergenerational transfers production and income distribution abstract we consider an overlapping generations economy where the aggregative production process uses physical capital and human capital intergenerational transfers from parents to their children are motivated by altruism we distinguish between two types of transfers investment of parents in the education of their offspring and capital transfer the gift bequest motive we show that the intensity of each type of altruism and hence the composition of the two types of transfers affect significantly the equilibrium output and the intragenerational income distributions comparing competitive equilibria from the same initial distributions of capital transfers and human capital we derive a the economy with the higher education inclined altruism attains lower output and more equal intragenerational income distributions if either the production function s elasticity of substitution is not large or the altruism is weak b for more bequest inclined altruism the effects are usually reversed c under public provision of education higher bequest inclined altruism results in lower output and less equal distribution of income in all dates

does the new economy measure up to the great inventions of the past abstract during the four years 1995 99 u s productivity growth experienced a strong revival and achieved growth rates exceeding that of the golden age of 1913 72 accordingly many observers have declared the new economy to be an industrial revolution even more important than the second industrial revolution of 1860 1900 which made the golden age of productivity growth possible this paper dissects the recent productivity revival subtracts out a cyclical component and concludes that there is no revival of the productivity growth trend in the 88 percent of the private economy lying outside of the durables manufacturing sector the paper explains this surprising finding by pointing to limitations in computers and the internet in comparison with the great inventions of the past

long run growth and human capital this paper analyzes long term growth in a closed economy with human as well as physical capital the human capital corresponds to general education private utility maximization determines each child s schooling costs of educating a given individual are convex although self sustaining growth is not possible steady states with per capita output growing faster than the underlying rate of technological progress do emerge and the magnitude of some comparative static results is increased section 3 attempts to pin down the degree of growth rate amplification implied in practice concluding with estimates of 30 50 percent

inequality incomplete contracts and the size distribution of business firms this article analyzes the effects of intrafirm bargaining on the formation of firms in an economy with imperfect capital markets and contracting constraints in equilibrium wealth inequality induces a heterogeneous distribution of firm sizes allowing for firms both too small and too large in terms of technical efficiency the findings connect well to empirical facts such as the missing middle of firm size distributions in developing countries the model can encompass a nonmonotonic relationship between aggregate output and inequality it turns out that an inflow of capital may indeed decrease output in absolute terms

introduction to development theory abstractthisarticle introduces the symposium on economic development theory 2007 elsevier inc all rights reserved jel classi cation o11 o12keywords development economics development economics a subject that studies institutions growth inequality and povertyin the developing world is a large lively and exciting area of research the objective of thissymposium is to put together some contributions in economic theory with a distinct focus ondevelopment questions much of early development economics as typi ed in the work of paul rosenstein rodan arthurlewis ragnarnurkse tiborscitovsky allynyoung gunnarmyrdal harveyleibenstein alberthirschman amartyasenandothers wastheoretical thoughnotnecessarilyinthesenseofformalmodel building theseauthorsallfelttheneedtobringnewconceptsintoeconomictheory ideas that would capture the essential features of underdevelopment and provide explanationsof the development process existing economic theory with its focus on competitive markets depersonalized exchange steady technical progress and balanced growth simply did not seemrightwhenmatchedwiththegroundrealitiesofunderdevelopment fragmented imperfect orjustplain missing markets highly personalized transactions in credit insurance or agrarian tenancy ambiguousornonexistentpropertyrights andwidespreadevidenceofpovertytrapsandhistoricallock ins a fair bit of modern economic theory was born in some of these early development writings young s article 40 on increasing returns was perhaps the rst systematic study of noncon vexities in economic growth rosenstein rodan s celebrated paper 32 on post war interven tion in europe provided a conceptual foundation for modern thinking on coordination failures

bank failure contagion in historical perspective abstract bank failures are contagious due to the lack of bank specific information depositors who lack financial information on individual banks make withdrawal decisions based on the condition of the banking system as a whole a high ratio of bank failures then signals an adverse condition within the banking sector and triggers systemwide bank runs this paper looks at bank panics in u s history and shows the importance of solvency information specific to individual banks the major empirical finding is that the government or banks stopped bank panics mainly by providing financial information on banks

risks and rewards gary becker s contributions to economics gary becker is one of the most original and influential economists of our age his originality lies in extending the frontiers of economics and broadening the range of important social science problems that are amenable to economic analysis he has gone against the grain of establishment thinking in the economics profession invariably choosing to work on problems that were considered beyond the boundaries of modem economics yet this work made close contact with many of the great economists of the past and many of the concepts he invented and developed are now widely if not routinely used in modem economics several of the approaches to problems he pioneered have evolved into fields and specialities in their own right that becker has had an immense intellectual impact and influence in the economics profession is supported empirically by the voluminous citations to his work over the years and in other ways obviously citation counts have well known difficulties and cannot prove anything by themselves but if used in conjunction with more fundamental evidence they do have the virtue of being quantifiable marshall medoff s 1989 1 recent citation study is one of the best available because citations are weighted by the importance of the journals in which articles appear among non nobel prize economists working in u s universities under 65 years of age becker ranks first in total citations over the 1971 85 period to which medoff s study refers and he is first by a very wide margin though the study is limited to economists in the united states it is clear that becker would rank at or very close to the top of any worldwide list furthermore becker s work is virtually all substantive economic analysis hardly any of it is devoted to the development of methodological tools or to surveys both of which gamer citations more easily and many concepts

stochastic wealth dynamics and risk management among a poor population we use herd history data collected among pastoralists in southern ethiopia to study stochastic wealth dynamics among a poor population although covariate rainfall shocks plainly matter household specific factors including own herd size account for most observed variability in wealth dynamics we find no support for the tragedy of the commons hypothesis past studies may have conflated costly self insurance with stocking rate externalities biophysical shocks move households between multiple dynamic wealth equilibria the lowest suggesting a poverty trap according to nonconvex path dynamics these findings have broad implications for development and relief strategies among a poor population vulnerable to climatic shocks a vast economic literature on risk management rests explicitly or implicitly on the classic friedmanite permanent income hypothesis studies of portfolio management consumption smoothing social insurance and the like all depend on the canonical assumption that stochastic income realisations are drawn from a stationary income distribution leading to consumption smoothing off a stable asset base the possibility of asset accumulation connects this literature to the immense literature on the theory and empirics of economic growth

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

regional agricultural endowments and shifts of poverty trap equilibria evidence from ethiopian panel data we examine changes in patterns of equilibria over time and across regions applied to the ethiopia rural household survey we revisit incidence of multiple equilibria using new nonparametric techniques and examine single equilibria that remain stagnant below the poverty line using quantile regressions we identify differences across the income distribution we introduce the empirical analysis of sequences of equilibria we identify a single equilibrium in 1994 1999 but find a second higher equilibrium emerging in 1999 2004 evidencing a shift from unimodal toward a bimodal asset distribution the most deprived region exhibits a low level stagnant equilibrium despite significant rural income growth nationwide

early and late human capital investments borrowing constraints and the family we develop a dynastic human capital investment framework to study the importance of family borrowing constraints and uninsured labor market risk as well as the process of intergenerational ability

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

sorting and long run inequality many social commentators have raised concerns over the possibility that increased sorting in society may lead to greater inequality to investigate this we construct a dynamic model of intergenerational education acquisition fertility and marital sorting and parameterize the steady state to match several basic empirical endings we end that increased sorting will signiecantly increase income inequality four factors are important to our endings a negative correlation between fertility and education a decreasing marginal effect of parental education on children s years of education wages that are sensitive to the relative supply of skilled workers and borrowing constraints that affect educational attainment for some low income households

redistribution as a selection device abstract this paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent it argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy s surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects moreover the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a pareto improvement although all agents are non satiable an agent s entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production i find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs ability the new equilibrium is characterized by i the selection of better entrepreneurs ii a higher riskless rate of return on capital iii lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and iv the fact that all agents are better off

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

wealth distribution and optimal inheritance taxation in life cycle economies with intergenerational transfers we introduce intergenerational transfers into a general equilihrium life cycle model in order to explain observed levels of wealth heterogeneity in our overlapping generations model heterogenous agents face uncertain lifetime and leave both accidental and voluntary bequests to their cinldren furthermore agents face stochastic employment opportunities the model is calibrated with regard to the characteristics of the us economy our resuits indicate that hequests onl account for a sniall proportion of ohserved wealth heterogeneitv the introduction of an inheritance tax increases both welfare are measured by the average value of the newborn and equality of the wealth distribution preliminary versions of this paper have been presented at conference on intergenerational transfers taxes and the distribution of wealth in uppsala 1999 and the econoinetric societv european meetirig in santiago dc compostela 1999 we would like to thank michael kaganovieli john laitner james smith frank stafford and carl cristian von weizsacker for comments on earlier versions of the paper all remaining errors are ours

the political economy of intergenerational income mobility the intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members while much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced form parameter less is known about its underlying structural determinants using a model with exogenous talent endowments endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income the model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions we offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model we conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico economic institutions jel e24 j62 j68 p16