optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

the impact of subsidies on x efficiency in ldc industry theory and an empirical test the x inefficiency costs of protection and industrial concentration have been topics of considerable interest in the literature on economic development balassa 1975 and bergsman 1974 for example have argued that protection by increasing x inefficiency generates a major welfare cost which is not captured by traditional costs of protection calculations and white 1976 has examined the relationship between inappropriate factor intensities which he associates with xinefficiency and industrial concentration the common theme which emerges from each of these studies is that public policy can have a major impact on economic performance not only by influencing factor proportions but also by influencing the intensity with which a non measurable input x efficiency is employed despite the intuitive appeal of the x efficiency concept there have been very few empirical tests of this hypothesis this partly reflects the imprecise nature of the basic concept but also the lack of adequate micro economic data x efficiency clearly relates to efficiency within firms so that the most appropriate tests would rely on data on firm level efficiency in this paper we propose a direct test of the x efficiency hypothesis using firm level data we build on previous work by corden 1970 1974 and martin 1978 who showed how to model x efficiency effects using the concept of managerial leisure we extend these simple models of managerial behavior emphasizing the role of the external managerial labor market the model is then used to explore the relationship between changes in public policy managerial effort and x inefficiency certain predictions of the model are tested using cross section data from a survey of firms in two subsidized industries in ghana efficiency indices are computed on the basis of a translog frontier production function variations in relative efficiency are then correlated with several explanatory variables including the presence or absence of subsidy payments to the firm subsidized firms in both industries are found to exhibit higher relative levels of x inefficiency

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

are those paid more really more productive the case of experience this study uses computerized personnel microdata on the white male managerial and professional employees at a major u s corporation to address the following question can the additional earnings which are associated with more labor market experience at a point in time really be explained by higher productivity at the same point in time our answer to this question based on both cross sectional and longitudinal information is that performance plays a substantially smaller role in explaining cross sectional experience earnings differentials and earnings growth than is claimed by those who have adopted the human capital explanation of the experience earnings profile this response depends critically on our assumption that the performance ratings which supervisors give to their white male managerial and professional subordinates adequately reflect the subordinates relative productivity in the year of assessment we present a great deal of evidence which strongly supports this assumption

executive effort and selection of risky projects this article examines the incentives of executives to adopt risky projects the agency problem considered is that of motivating the executive to expend effort to generate information about the profitability of projects and to select the best project conditional upon the information that his effort generates we show that the executive and the principal will not always agree regarding which project is best we provide conditions under which this conflict of interest leads from the principal s perspective to either an underinvestment or an overinvestment in risky projects

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

imperfect information and dynamic conjectural variations this article analyzes oligopoly interaction in an environment where firms are imperfectly informed about the evolution of the market demand curve the analysis develops a two period cournot framework under the assumptions that demand shifts are positively serially correlated that firms never directly observe the demand curve and that firms never observe the previous quantity decisions of rivals firms do draw inferences about the position of the demand curve from past observations on prices consequently the current output of a firm will influence the current market price which will then influence rivals inferences about future demand the future output decisions of rivals will respond accordingly the theory predicts negative dynamic conjectural variations essentially a firm perceives that an increase in its output will lower the current market clearing price which will cause rival firms to think that the demand curve has shifted down and hence induce them to lower their outputs in the future

do tournaments have incentive effects much attention has been devoted to studying models of tournaments or situations in which an individual s payment depends only on his or her output or rank relative to that of other competitors academic interest derives from the fact that under certain sets of assumptions tournaments have desirable normative properties because of the incentive structures they provide our paper uses nonexperimental data to test whether tournaments actually elicit effort responses we focus on professional golf tournaments because information on the incentive structure prize distribution and measures of individual output players scores are both available we find strong support for the proposition that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance

economic contests comparative reward schemes contests are situations in which an individual s reward depends on his performance relative to others students are graded on a curve the candidate with the most votes gets the political office the underling who performs best is promoted to the executive position contests are useful in dealing with indivisible rewards reducing monitoring costs and minimizing risks from common uncertainties they are employed to sort potential participants and once they have entered to induce appropriate effort from them with monitoring precision and prize spreads as potential choice variables optimal contest structures are derived for fair and unfair contests among equal and unequal participants the converse problems of climbing low ability individuals enter the contest designed for high ability candidates and slumming are shown to be manageable

spatial differentiation and vertical mergers in retail markets for gasoline this paper studies an empirical model of spatial competition applied to gasoline markets the main feature is to specify commuting paths as the locations of consumers in a hotelling style model as a result spatial differentiation depends in an intuitive way on the structure of the road network and the direction of traffic flows the model is estimated using panel data on the quebec city gasoline market and used to evaluate the consequences of a recent vertical merger difference in difference and counterfactual simulation methods are compared and the results to a large extent validate the assumptions of the demand model jel g34 l13 l42 l81 q41 r41

farm price responsiveness and the choice of functional form abstract the estimated responsiveness of farmers to changes in the prices of output or inputs is in general very sensitive to the econometric model used using cross section survey data for farms in marginal rice growing districts in west malaysia price elasticities based on estimated input demand equations derived from a quadratic restricted profit function were found to be superior to those derived from translog or cobb douglas production functions or from a translog restricted profit function the cobb douglas production function is restrictive and should be used sparingly restricted profit functions are only believable if the available price data are of high quality

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

career concerns incentives an experimental test abstract holmstrom s holmstrom b 1982 1999 managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective review of economic studies 66 169 182 originally published in essays in economics and management in honour of lars wahlbeck helsinki career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields the underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a bayesian way which is difficult to directly test with field data typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence i the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side ii decision errors take time to decrease iii while subjects average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play a mild winner s curse arises on the labor demand side

an economic theory of central places is not really a theory of spatial economic behaviour instead it is a series of brilliant conjectures about the locational configurations that will result from such behaviour the brilliance of these conjectures is illustrated by the successful applications of the theory to such diverse phenomena as the locational patterns of retailing activity in cities and of service centres in rural areas the size distribution of cities and the diffusion of information and diseases in this paper we outline an economic model of central places 2 our theorising has two distinct purposes first we wish to begin the development of a theory of central places that is based on maximising behaviour of economic agents any theory of economic behaviour from which central places can be derived is necessarily both difficult and cumbersome non convexities in the activities of buying and selling drive the model and thus non differentiabilities and discontinuities abound as one seeks more generality in such circumstances difficulties multiply rapidly in order to begin the job we have used assumptions that are specific and sometimes even crude the second purpose of our theorising is to illustrate the limitations of current central place theory by providing counter examples to some propositions commonly accepted to follow from it for this purpose we need not worry about lack of generality in any of our counter examples of course we are not solely concerned to refute accepted generalisations by doing so we hope to make alternative possibilities apparent what we hope to attain therefore is a theoretical development inspired by the extremely fruitful conjectures of existing central place theory

the incentive effects of tournaments revisited evidence from the european pga tour this analysis of data from the 1987 european men s professional golf association pga tour strongly supports the hypothesis that the level and structure of prizes in pga tournaments influence players performance specifically players performance appears to vary positively with both the total money prizes awarded in a tournament and the marginal return to effort in the final round of play a value that varies among players largely depending on how the prize money is allocated among finishers of different ranks the authors suggest that these results together with the similar results of their earlier study of the 1984 u s men s pga tour may have implications for the design of compensation systems for certain groups of workers such as corporate executives college professors and salespeople

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

escalation errors and the sunk cost effect an explanation based on reputation and information asymmetries this paper is concerned with explaining a paradox of human behavior consider the following example a department manager makes a large investment in new production equipment and soon after learns of different equipment that could perform the same operations at lower cost incremental analysis favors switching but the manager refuses saying he does not want to waste the investment already made such real world examples have been extensively documented and studied by social scientists see thaler 1980 and staw 1981 in these examples the decision maker having commited to a course of action subsequently discovers new information that indicates that continuing the earlier commitment would likely result in worse consequences than switching in spite of this he clings to and even escalates his earlier

piece rate incentive schemes this paper uses recent results from incentive theory to study heretofore informal critiques of piece rate compensation schemes the informal critiques are based on the history of failed attempts to install piece rate compensation schemes at the turn of the century the formal analysis emphasizes the importance of information and commitment in contracting the main result is as follows in a work environment characterized by hidden information and a hidden action if neither the firm nor the worker can commit to future behavior then no compensation scheme piece rate or otherwise can induce the worker not to restrict output

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

worker reputation and productivity incentives this paper examines firms problem of how to motivate risk averse workers not to shirk when workers utility functions are unknown the problem is studied in a 2 period setting in which a worker s actions today can influence not only his compensation today but the firms beliefs about his preferences firms cannot credibly commit to ignore the revealed information so workers actions today affect their future compensation contracts it is shown that in the wilson miyazaki equilibrium firms may pool workers and learn about their types gradually over time rather than inducing them to separate and reveal their types immediately

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

spatial retail markets with commuting consumers in this paper we analyse a model of spatial competition with commuting consumers due to claycombe 1991 international journal of industrial organization 9 303313 we show that results different from claycombe s are obtained if a rigorous game theoretic analysis is applied to the model our results provide a theoretical basis for a later study carried out by claycombe and mahan 1993 international journal of industrial organization 11 283 291 and lead to predictions which are in line with the empirical results of that later study for small commuting distances relative to the distance between firms there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which the price is continuous and decreasing in both the commuting distance and the proportion of commuting consumers for intermediate distances however a symmetric price equilibrium in pure strategies in general does not exist only if all consumers commute and the commuting distance is large perfect competition prevails

property rights and x efficiency comment louis de alessi s paper 1983 begins in an ecumenical spirit and suggests that property rights theory and the x efficiency approach have not drawn on each other s contributions i share that spirit there is much to learn from a variety of approaches but as de alessi proceeds the ecumenical spirit withers the last three sections argue to the effect that general neoclassical theory i e property rights theory obtains the same results as x efficiency theory but has a superior methodology de alessi s paper puts me in the position of a reluctant dualist his approach resembles an intellectual takeover bid since it argues 1 that neoclassical theory is flawed 2 that the property rights approach has corrected the flaws and 3 by implication that it supercedes other micro approaches 2 the concepts of property rights transaction costs and adjustment costs and their motivational implications are certainly useful i see no reason to argue against them or against property rights theory but i believe that there is more to the explanation of inefficiency thus i will stress the special nature of the x efficiency approach examine our differences and attempt to correct some of de alessi s misinterpretations nevertheless i believe that de alessi s article renders an important service since it gives a succinct summary of property rights theory and explains its significance the main differences between us lie in the basic presupposition behind the two approaches in answering the motivation question property rights theory seems to say that property rights are the only motivating force and that people act to fully maximize wealth given the limits of their property rights when they do so their activities are efficient the x efficiency approach raises a different type of question namely it asks within the firm and outside of the exchange relationship what are the motivating forces that determine effort and productivity including the motivating forces leading to maximizing or less than maximizing behavior property rights are of course a motivating force however it is one of many not the only motivating force nor in many instances is it the most important one determining effort it is important to highlight these differences because different modes of analysis determine not only results but what the analyst looks for and possibly finds the value of a theory depends in part on the research it generates another difference lies in the interest in inefficiency it is not clear whether de alessi cares about inefficiency the postulate of maximization of utility by all individuals and the explicit assertion by de alessi that the equilibrium solution associated with a given set of constraints is efficient p 73 gives the impression that inefficiency is assumed away clearly the x efficiency approach sees inefficiency as a major problem only if one employs an approach that at least recognizes within it the possibility of inefficiency can one have empirical results which indicate an approximation to efficiency inefficiency must be a variable if we are to be able to find meaningful empirical instances which are efficient compared to the neoclassical approach the property rights approach seems to dissect the firm into component individuals and their implicit contracts after dissection the property rights approach assumes that the ordinary utility maximization rules still apply professor of economics and population department of economics harvard university 204 littauer center cambridge ma 02138 i am indebted to h barkai j dean r frantz e helpman j medoff and j rothenberg for valuable comments they are not responsible for errors or viewpoints the labels property rights theory and general neoclassical theory will be used interchangeably 2to stake his claim de alessi might have considered at least some other alternative approaches such as the work of oliver williamson 1970 and that of richard nelson and sidney winters 1982

herding and anti herding a model of reputational differentiation abstract we analyze a model related to the strategic herding literature where a second expert maximizes his expected second period value by conforming with a first expert herding in contrast to the herding literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent if the value of being the only smart agent is sufficiently large the second expert always opposes its predecessor s report otherwise herding may result

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

spatial aspects of retail market structure beef pricing revisited abstract spatial retail markets with multiplant firms and conjectural variations are analyzed in this paper in this context the interplay between commuting characteristics and concentration is discussed leading to an empirical test for the effect of those variables on retail beef prices commuting characteristics are found to have a significant effect on prices this suggests that a significant concentration price relationship might emerge if retail markets were defined in the narrow way that the spatial retail model suggests that they should be