electoral equilibria with entry some simulations the objective of this paper is to investigate by means of simulation the impact of third party entry on the spatial separation of candidates specifically we do real time simulations of palfrey s 1984 model of electoral equilibria with entry after relaxing some of its assumptions our finding that the threat of third party entry can induce virtually the same spatial separation of the major party candidates as entry with certainty is both a strong and interesting result

multi party competition with exit a comment on duverger s law contrary to duverger s law there exist multi party systems in conjunction with simple majority single ballot systems at least three exceptions exist to this law rae 1971 and riker 1976 1982 offer explanations for two of the most prominent exceptions i e canada and india i also discuss another exception great britain in this paper i use a simple one dimensional spatial model to show that a multi party system can be supported under a simple majority single ballot system this explanation depends on the way political parties exit the system if parties decide sequentially whether or not to exit a multi party system can not be maintained if political parties make this decision simultaneously a multi party system may be able to sustain itself

new parties and policy outcomes evidence from colombian local governments abstract in many democracies increasing political competition has changed the traditional party system and brought new parties into the political arena this study examines whether the presence of politicians from new parties affects the size of government measured by public spending and tax revenue the study focuses on colombian municipalities where new parties have been numerous and successful in recent years regression discontinuity estimates show that public spending and tax revenues are significantly higher in municipalities governed by a mayor from a new party using information about local politics and the features of the new parties i argue that this result is not associated with new party ideology but instead relates to new parties having lower probability of reelection which raises the incentives to increase short term rent seeking

the distributional effects of conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing evidence from an estimated dsge model abstract this paper compares the distributional effects of conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing qe within an estimated open economy dsge model of the euro area the model includes two groups of households i wealthier households who own financial assets and are able to smooth consumption over time and ii poorer households who only receive labor and transfer income and live hand to mouth we use the model to compare the impact of policy shocks on constructed measures of income and wealth inequality net disposable income net asset position and relative per capita income except for the short term expansionary conventional policy and qe shocks tend to mitigate income and wealth inequality between the two population groups in light of the coarse dichotomy of households that abstracts from richer income and wealth dynamics at the individual level the analysis emphasizes the functional distribution of income

political competition between differentiated candidates abstract we introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidates immutable characteristics such as gender race or previously committed policy positions as well as their policy positions which are flexible candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences and choose policy positions to maximize their winning probability we characterize a property of voter utility functions uniform candidate ranking ucr that captures a form of separability between fixed characteristics and policy when voters have ucr preferences candidates equilibrium policies converge in any strict equilibrium in contrast notions like competence or complementarity lead to non ucr preferences and policy divergence in particular we introduce a new class of models that contains the probabilistic voting model as a special case and in which there is a unique equilibrium that generically features policy divergence

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

micro targeting and polarization abstract this paper connects the rise in polarization to changes in media technology which allow for higher precision in the advertising strategy of candidates candidates place ads in media outlets whose audiences differ in ideology and size we develop the concept of media centrality which takes into account differences in the media network and in ideology media centrality leads to a simple characterization of both the optimal targeting strategy and policy we show that generally a more fragmented media landscape leads to an increase in polarization

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great or even greater in competitive seats as in non competitive ones basic downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two candidate elections common journalistic wisdom moreover leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close yet the available evidence from the us congress disconfirms this prediction to explain this counterintuitive result we develop a spatial model that allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competition partisan loyalties and incentives for voter turnout that can lead office seeking candidates especially candidates in close elections to emphasize policy appeals to their voter base rather than courting the median voter

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

retrospective voting and party polarization we provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization we contrast sophisticated nash versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy instead they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance as determined in equilibrium we show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective compared to nash voting moreover this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

incumbent positioning as a determinant of strategic response to entry existing research has identified different firm characteristics that determine an incumbent s reaction toward market entrants this study widens the perspective from a firm s absolute attributes to its relative positioning within its competitive environment the hypotheses for the empirical analysis are derived from game theoretic models with either vertical or horizontal product differentiation in each of the two theoretical models two incumbents initially choose very different quality and variety levels respectively and move closer to the center when faced by entry of a competitor from the vertical differentiation model we predict a stronger price reduction by high quality firms in our empirical analysis we are using a novel dataset of the high quality restaurant market in germany to test the theoretical findings while the hypotheses with respect to adjustments of prices and varieties are supported we do not find empirical evidence for the predicted quality adjustment

sequential entry industry structure and welfare in this paper we reexamine the relationship between potential competition industry structure and welfare in a market subject to a sequential entry threat where firms can make quantity commitments and have access to a constant returns technology it is shown that provided entry is not blockaded the incumbent s will either prevent entry or allow all the potential entrants in furthermore actual entry may decrease but social welfare never goes down with more potential entrants nevertheless with a finite number of potential entrants policies which lower the cost of entry need not be beneficial in welfare terms

party competition in a heterogeneous electorate the role of dominant issue voters this paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate the latter consists of numerous groups of dominant issue voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda parties follow a lexicographic objective function aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions the emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference its extreme ends occupied by dominant issue voters attract the policy platforms the difference in policy platforms is not reduced the conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the manifesto research group

electoral rules strategic entry and polarization abstract how does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system i e the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties by studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits a a first order negative effect on platform polarization b a second order negative effect on the number of parties as polarization decreases centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter and c an additional third order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties we then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model

cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems we study a dynamic model of elections where many parties may enter or exit political competition at each election a new political leadership arrives for each party the leadership cannot choose the party s platform ideological identities are fixed but must decide whether or not to contest the election contesting elections is costly and this cost is higher if the party has recently been inactive the distribution of voters ideal policies or public opinion changes over time via a markov process with a state independent persistence parameter we characterise stable party systems where the set of contestants is invariant to the recent most observed opinion we show that stable party systems exist only when public opinion is sufficiently volatile while highly persistent moods lead to instability and change in the party system whenever public opinion changes

limit qualities and entry deterrence in this article we investigate how the interplay of competition among incumbents and the magnitude of a potential entrant s setup cost determines the configuration of the array of products to be offered in a perfect nash equilibrium we show that incumbents can use limit qualities to deter entry we also demonstrate that rivalry among incumbents may lead to excessive entry deterrence our analysis generates predictions about the correlation between the degree of product differentiation and the size of the entrant s setup costs

sovereign wealth funds the norwegian experience sovereign wealth funds have rapidly become significant international institutions the performance of funds varies substantially across countries but comprehensive and systematic analyses of funds have been hampered by the lack of transparency of most funds the relative transparency of the norway fund allows us to do an econometric analysis of the fund s performance the record resembles that of a mutual fund that has taken on greater risk over time there is no evidence that the fund has disrupted foreign financial markets more than mutual funds do there remains a question as to whether the fund and its finance ministry have been effective agents for the norwegian citizens whose assets they are managing

principle vs pragmatism policy shifts and political competition this article investigates the electoral effect of party policy shifts i argue that whether party policy shifts are damaging or rewarding depends on whether the shift occurs in the pragmatic or principled issue domain on pragmatic issues voters value getting things done policy shifts in this domain signal responsiveness to the changing environment and are likely to be rewarded principled issues however concern core beliefs and values any policy shift in this domain is a sign of inconsistency and lack of credibility which is likely to lead to voter withdrawal these arguments are supported by evidence from 23 advanced democracies over a period of 40 years

policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies what accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation i introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence 1 a model which incorporates candidate specific variables so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy related electoral advantages or disadvantages 2 a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters candidate utilities thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds i report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model i then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results

explaining variation in the competitiveness of u s senate elections 1922 2004 we develop and test predictions about the factors determining the competitiveness of elections to the u s senate to do so we deliberately abstract away from candidate specific conditions that have often been used to study political competitiveness in order to focus on basic structural features of the electoral landscape in our framework party specific constraints on the ideological positioning of local candidates linked to the national party organization and its contributors interact with the heterogeneity of state electorates to determine the number of highly competitive senate contests three hypotheses emerge from this model 1 the greater the diversity of a party s national legislative delegation the more highly competitive senate elections we will observe 2 states in which the ideological heterogeneity of the electorate is relatively high will exhibit a greater number of highly competitive elections and 3 highly competitive senate contests will be more common in states with closed primaries than in states with open primaries we provide strong evidence in support of the first two hypotheses and some evidence in support of the third

voters private valuation of candidates quality abstract different voters might have different valuations of candidates qualitative features we argue that this intuitive fact acts as a strong stabilizing force in electoral competition dynamics when candidates are office motivated pure strategy equilibria may exist unlike when all voters favor the same candidate perhaps more importantly it affects candidates platform moderation incentives in a rather intriguing manner when voters are evenly split in terms of their candidates quality valuations then both candidates have incentives to locate sufficiently near but not necessarily exactly at the center of the policy space however as the number of voters who favor the same candidate rises maximum equilibrium differentiation follows a non trivial u shaped pattern it is first decreasing and then increasing in the fraction of voters who prefer the more popular candidate

comparing electoral systems a geometric analysis this paper constructs a game theoretic model of elections inalternative electoral systems with three or four candidates each electoral system specifies how the platforms of thecandidates and their scores give rise to an outcome whengeometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can competeagainst each other for victory a pivot probability isassociated to that pair each voter is rational and picks thecandidate that maximizes her expected utility which resultsfrom the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about thepivot probabilities candidate positioning is endogenous andthe result of a nash game the possible equilibria arecomputed for plurality and runoff majority systems

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

a tale of two unions divergent platforms and their constituencies the median voter theorem has regularly been used in economics to represent the behaviour of teachers unions little empirical work however tests whether this framework is a good fit for teachers

stability in electoral competition a case for multiple votes abstract it is well known that the hotelling downs model generically fails to admit an equilibrium when voting takes place under the plurality rule osborne 1993 this paper studies the hotelling downs model considering that each voter is allowed to vote for up to k candidates and demonstrates that an equilibrium exists for a non degenerate class of distributions of voters ideal policies which includes all log concave distributions if and only if k 2 that is the plurality rule k 1 is shown to be the unique k vote rule which generically precludes stability in electoral competition regarding the features of k vote rules equilibria first we show that there is no convergent equilibrium and then we fully characterize all divergent equilibria we study comprehensively the simplest kind of divergent equilibria two location ones and we argue that apart from existing for quite a general class of distributions when k 2 they have further attractive properties among others they are robust to free entry and to candidates being uncertain about voters preferences

rational voting and candidate entry under plurality rule we analyze a formal model of electoral competition under plurality rule that is characterized by two novel features first rather than assuming a fixed field of candidates we allow candidates to make decisions regarding entry as well as location second voters in our model are strategically rational that is they maximize utility over expected policy outcomes rather than simply voting for the ideologically closest candidate given these assumptions all equilibria in this model are such that the set of entrants locates at the median voter s ideal point this result stands in sharp contrast to earlier models of multicandidate competition in which entry is not allowed and voters vote sincerely

candidates credibility and re election incentives i study elections between citizen candidates who cannot make binding policy commitments before taking office but who are accountable to voters due to the possibility of re election in each period a representative voter chooses among heterogeneous candidates with known policy preferences the elected candidate chooses the policy to implement and how much rent seeking to engage in when in office as the voter decides both which candidate to elect and subsequently whether the candidate is retained this framework integrates elements of electoral competition and electoral accountability i show that in the best stationary equilibrium when utility functions are concave over policy non median candidates are elected over candidates with policy preferences more closely aligned with the voter in this equilibrium there are two candidates who are elected at some history and the policies these candidates implement in office do not converge this divergence incentivizes candidates to engage in less rent seeking increasing voter welfare copyright 2013 oxford university press

inferring strategic voting we estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes we adopt a set estimator using japanese general election data we nd a large fraction 75 3 80 3 of strategic voters only a small fraction 2 4 5 5 of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred misaligned voting existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting accordingly while our estimate of strategic voting is high our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies

policy divergence and voter polarization in a structural model of elections abstractone of the most widely discussed phenomena in american politics today is the perceived increasing partisan divide that splits the u s electorate a contested question is whether this diagnosis is actually true and if so what the underlying cause might be we propose a new method that simultaneously estimates voters preferences and parties positions on economic and cultural issues we apply the model to u s presidential elections between 1972 and 2008 the model recovers candidates positions from voters behavior and decomposes changes in the overall political polarization of the electorate into changes in the distribution of voters ideal positions voter radicalization and consequences of elite polarization sorting