international institutional lending arrangements to sovereign borrowers abstract recent financial crises in east asia and elsewhere have illustrated the problems that plague emergency liquidity arrangements and the lender of last resort role of the international monetary fund and other international institutions in particular these act under conditions of extreme uncertainty where potential sovereign borrowers as well as private financial institutions are kept in the dark regarding the intentions of the emergency lenders and the amounts and terms of emergency liquidity that can be tapped from april 1999 longer term credit lines are being offered by the imf designed to be awarded to healthy countries before they experience contagion or distress the paper evaluates the advantages of this form of imf lending and this new trend in imf operations it is argued that provision of imf financing through such long term lending facilities is better in some senses than shorter term lending long term contracts reduce the uncertainty with respect to imf intentions moral hazard problems are reduced for the borrowing country and financial markets know the future level and terms of imf support another advantage is that long term loan contracts improve the allocation of resources within the borrowing country much as private sector facility lending is the dominant mode of finance in many markets so facility lending has efficiency advantages when it is provided by the imf this efficiency advantage is derived formally it is shown that sovereign borrowers are actually better off when utilizing these as backup lines of credit instead of emergency borrowing that is conducted after distress occurs facility lending by international institutions can lead to a welfare improvement and superior resource allocation for sovereign borrowers the intuition for this is that when financial distress drives these borrowers to increase their debt risk premia in borrowing rates would not rise at least up to the limits established by the size of the facility

trade interdependence the international financial institutions and the recent evolution of sovereign debt renegotiations abstract this paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country s pattern of trade with commercial creditors home countries on the outcome of debt rescheduling negotiations the analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three way debt rescheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country its creditors and the international financial institutions ifis the paper also considers the effects of the ifi sovereign debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt rescheduling negotiations two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the ifi sovereign debt policy evolution

the imf and concerted lending in latin american debt restructurings a formal analysis abstract this paper models the imf s policy of making its participation in an adjustment program contingent on a commitment by banks to finance the associated debt restructuring the analysis shows that this tactic pressures smaller banks tempted not to participate in sovereign debt restructurings to participate however it is also shown that the bank participation rate falls as required new lending rises furthermore the incentive for banks to choose not to participate rises as the probability of a future default rises and as bank capital increases

incentives and moral hazard plot level productivity of factory operated and outgrower operated sugarcane production in ethiopia we investigate the unique contractual arrangement between a large ethiopian sugar factory and its adjacent outgrower associations the only significant difference between the sugarcane production on the factory operated sugarcane plantation and on the outgrower operated plots is the remuneration system and thus the incentives to the workers we compare the productivity of the factory operated plantation with the outgrower operated plots based on a new cross sectional plot level data set that includes all plots that are operated by the sugar factory and its adjacent outgrower associations as sugar cane production depends on various exogenous factors that are measured as categorical variables e g soil type cane variety etc we estimate the production function by a nonparametric kernel regression method that takes into account both continuous and categorical explanatory variables without assuming a functional form and without imposing restrictions on interactions between the explanatory variables in order to obtain meaningful productivity measures we impose monotonicity in input quantities using the constrained weighted bootstrapping cwb method our results show that outgrower operated plots have ceteris paribus a statistically and economically significantly higher productivity than factory operated plots which can be explained by outgrowers having stronger incentives to put more effort into their work than the employees of the sugar factory

evaluating debt repurchases what are the alternatives to investment abstract a general model of debt repurchases is built which reconciles most points raised in the literature on buybacks the inclusion of assets alternative to domestic investment is shown to be of crucial importance in the analysis and leads to the reversal of some previous results it is shown that investment necessarily rises following a buyback independently of the source of the funds used the condition that determines whether or not buybacks are an attractive solution to the debtor is derived it is shown to depend on the price at which debt can be bought and on an interest differential effect

sovereign debt structural adjustment and conditionality abstract the lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure as a result a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure formalizing this argument we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt in certain circumstances it can eliminate debt overhang especially when it is coupled with concessionary lending of sufficient magnitude it is however unable to restore first best when it is anticipated by lenders conditionality may get international financial institutions and sovereign debtors into a trap where the debt overhang persist debt rescheduling takes place periodically and conditionality continues indefinitely

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

north south lending and endogenous domestic capital market inefficiencies abstract we develop an open economy model of intertemporal trade under asymmetric information capital market imperfections are endogenous and depend on a country s stage of economic development relative to the perfect information benchmark north south capital flows are dampened and possibly reversed and world interest rates are lower whereas riskless rates are equalized across borders the domestic loan rate is higher in poorer countries the model can be applied to a number of policy issues including the debt overhang problem the indexation of foreign public debts and the effect of income distribution on growth

syndicated lending under asymmetric creditor information abstract this paper explores how asymmetric information about borrower quality among syndicated lenders alters the incentive to refinance illiquid borrowers we use a model in which lenders enter the market sequentially in two rounds of lending between the two rounds a shock separates borrowers into good ones and bad ones and early entrants acquire information about individual borrower type while late entrants know only the distribution of borrower types the asymmetric information structure gives rise to both signalling and screening issues we show that self selecting contracts do not exist and that there is always a pooling perfect bayesian equilibrium in which late entrants lend to both good and bad types without borrower type being exposed before final clearing at the terminal time based on this framework we argue that prior to the 1982 international debt crisis it was possible for banks with heavy exposure to troubled debtors to attract rational newcomers in syndicated loans which were with positive probability bailout loans

financial markets shutdown and reaccess we employ a discrete time parametric duration model on a group of 121 countries over the period 1970 2011 and find that the probability of the end of financial markets shutdown and reaccess falls as these events become longer we also show that 1 shutdown episodes are longer when economic prospects are poor and the degree of financial openness falls the chief executive has been in office for long periods and the country has a default history and 2 spells of reaccess tend to be longer when economic growth improves and financial openness increases there are neither government crises nor government instability and the country did not default in the past jel c41 g15

estimating the productivity impacts of technology adoption in the presence of misclassification this article examines the impact that misreporting adoption status has on the identification and estimation of causal effects on productivity in particular by comparing measurement error ridden self reported adoption data with measurement error free dna fingerprinted adoption data we investigate the extent to which such errors bias the causal effects of adoption on productivity taking dna fingerprinted adoption data as a benchmark we find 25 false negatives and 10 false positives in farmers responses our results show that misreporting of adoption status is not exogenous to household characteristics and produces a bias of about 22 percentage points in the productivity impact of adoption ignoring inherent behavioral adjustments of farmers based on perceived adoption status has a bias of 13 percentage points the results of this article underscore the crucial role that correct measurement of adoption plays in designing policy interventions that address constraints to technology adoption in agriculture

can micro credit bring development abstract we examine the long run effects of micro credit on development in an occupational choice model similar to banerjee and newman jpe 1993 micro credit is modeled as a pure improvement in the credit market that opens up self employment options to some agents who otherwise could only work for wages or subsist micro credit can either raise or lower long run gdp since it can lower use of both subsistence and full scale industrial technologies it typically lowers long run inequality and poverty by making subsistence payoffs less widespread thus an equity efficiency tradeoff may be involved in the promotion of micro credit however in a worst case scenario micro credit has purely negative long run effects the key to micro credit s long run effects is found to be the graduation rate defined as the rate at which the self employed build up enough wealth to start full scale firms we distinguish between two avenues for graduation winner graduation of those who earn above average returns in self employment and saver graduation due to gradual accumulation of average returns in self employment long run development is not attainable via micro credit if winner graduation is the sole avenue for graduation in contrast if the saving rate and self employment returns of the average micro borrower are jointly high enough then micro credit can bring an economy from stagnation to full development through saver graduation thus the lasting effects of micro credit may partially depend on simultaneous facilitation of micro saving eventual graduation of the average borrower rather than indefinite retention should be the goal of micro banks if micro credit is to be a stepping stone to broad based development rather than at best an anti poverty tool

efficiency in wine grape production comparing long established and newly developed regions of south africa efficiency partly based on technology is central to international competitiveness this article applies a stochastic frontier inefficiency model to a panel of 77 wine grape farms in south africa between 2005 and 2015 and allows the comparison of efficiency levels for the old established wine regions with those of newer entrants thus we investigate whether experience plus first choice of location matters more than the follower s advantage of newer technology in all regions a greater share of permanent labor and increased supervision raised efficiency while more inorganic fertilizer and less irrigation has the opposite effect innovations in trellising had insignificant effects except in the old regions but not replacing old vines reduced efficiency however a higher proportion of red varietals also lowered efficiency in the old regions due to a fall in the price of red wine as these farmers continued to concentrate on quality reds the new regions compensated for falling prices by increasing crop size with irrigation and fertilizer and extending the area planted but with less concern for quality this appears to be more successful in efficiency terms but as international demand for quality wine increases it may be a poor long term strategy

bank heterogeneity reputation and debt renegotiation this paper examines a process of debt renegotiation in which banks possess divergent interests and there is asymmetric information the authors assume that large banks must exert pressure on small banks in order to obtain participation of these in the provision of new money and in debt forgiveness making use of a reputational model they argue that the effect of asymmetric information as to the amount of pressure that large banks can exert on small banks makes the debtor countries worse off than absent these asymmetries in information this also provides a rationale for the growing popularity of exit bonds copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

women s empowerment in agriculture implications for technical efficiency in rural bangladesh although a great deal of research exists on gender and agriculture few studies investigate the implications of reduced gender disparities in households for technical efficiency in this article i compare the levels of technical efficiency achieved on plots operated by households with different levels of gender disparities using plot level data from the 2011 2012 bangladesh integrated household survey and drawing on indicators derived from the women s empowerment in agriculture index i estimate a stochastic frontier production function model which includes women s empowerment in agriculture as an exogenous determinant of technical inefficiency i find that reduced gender disparities within households measured in terms of the empowerment gap between spouses are associated with higher levels of technical efficiency this result extends to plots that women jointly manage with their spouses as well as those that women do not actively manage

on the incentives associated with sovereign debt abstract this paper revisits the question of whether a sovereign s desire for future access to international credit markets which it retains by paying its international debts constitutes by itself enough of an incentive to make it a reliable customer for commercial lenders the answer is no as it is in the earlier analysis of bulow and rogoff but the result here is in certaincases stronger a defaulter here is excluded from participating in credit markets as both a debtor and a creditor whereas in the previous analysis a key assumption was that defaulters could return as creditors

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

technological innovations downside risk and the modernization of agriculture we use a randomized experiment in india to show that improved technology enhances agricultural productivity by crowding in modern inputs and cultivation practices specifically we show that a new rice variety that reduces downside risk by providing flood tolerance has positive effects on adoption of a more labor intensive planting method area cultivated fertilizer usage and credit utilization we find that a large share of the expected gains from the technology comes from crowding in of other investments therefore improved technologies that reduce risk by protecting production in bad years have the potential to increase agricultural productivity in normal years

strategic models of sovereign debt renegotiations the sovereign debt literature has often implicitly assumed that all the power in the bargaining game between debtor and creditor lies with the latter this paper explores that assumption by analyzing three game theoretic models of debt renegotiations in two of the models both of which are built on the traditional one sector growth model all the subgame perfect equilibria have an extreme form in which the game s surplus is captured by the creditor the third game has many subgame perfect equilibria that do not have this feature however the roles of various assumptions in all three games are examined

sovereign risk and secondary markets conventional wisdom says that in the absence of default penalties sovereign risk destroys all foreign asset trade we show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption that assets cannot be retraded in secondary markets without this assumption foreign asset trade is possible even in the absence of default penalties this result suggests a broader perspective regarding the origins of sovereign risk and its remedies sovereign risk affects foreign asset trade only if default penalties are insufficient and secondary markets work imperfectly to reduce its effects one can either increase default penalties or improve the working of secondary markets jel f34 g12 g15

comment on estimating the productivity impacts of technology adoption in the presence of misclassification wossen et al 2018 puts the spotlight on an important and until recently underestimated phenomenon farmers in developing countries may often misreport whether the crop varieties they grow are improved or not given the key role of improved varieties in the green revolution and ongoing debates on whether productivity gains can still be achieved and reach areas of the developing world where diffusion of improved varieties has been limited establishing reliable empirical evidence regarding the levels of adoption of improved varieties is a first order priority this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

accounting for slacks to measure and decompose revenue efficiency in the spanish designation of origin wines with dea abstract in this paper we show how data envelopment analysis dea may be used to measure and decompose revenue inefficiency taking into account all sources of technical waste in the context of an application to assess the spanish quality wine sector in particular designation of origin do wines we try to go beyond the standard approaches which use shephard distance functions or directional distance functions to provide decomposition that incorporates slacks as a source of technical inefficiency to accomplish this we will base our analysis on a recent approach introduced in cooper et al 2011a in particular we show how an output oriented version of the weighted additive model can be used to properly identify revenue technical and allocative inefficiencies in spanish dos in the application we conclude that the main source of revenue inefficiency in this sector is technical waste and that cava can be highlighted as the do that performs as a benchmark for more numbers of units