co integration analysis of quarterly european tourism demand in tunisia abstract the purpose of this study is to identify the factors that affect the destination choice process in addition to prices and income factors the supply factor is introduced as an explanatory variable in the econometric model co integration analysis and error correction models ecms are used to estimate the long run tourism demand elasticities and to forecast the quarterly european tourism demand for a 1 year ahead horizon the main finding of this study is that the behaviour of european tourists varies from one country to another the co integrating relationships show that the large elasticity magnitude may be the reflection of the relatively expensive services often sought after by tourists from these countries the estimated values of the supply elasticity corroborate the supply induced demand hypothesis finally compared to the basic structural model and using the root mean squared error the ecm provides more precise forecasts

the effect of food stamps on labor supply a bivariate selection model abstract although there is a large literature on the effects of u s transfer programs on labor supply this is the first such study of the food stamp program we model the nonlinearity and nonconvexity of the budget constraint and use maximum likelihood methods to estimate hours of work functions for female heads of household the largest recipient group in the program we also model the joint response to afdc and food stamps and we account for the existence of a significant number of eligible households who do not participate in the programs a three equation bivariate selection model is estimated on a sample of eligible households with maximum likelihood

vote buying supermajorities and flooded coalitions in a recent paper banks 2000 adopting the framework of our model groseclose and snyder 1996 derives several new and noteworthy results in addition he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4 here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption in equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition that is she does not bribe every member of her coalition we conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of banks s proposition 1 we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote buying game

household labor supply and welfare participation in sweden using a sample of swedish households we estimate a household labor supply model assuming that preferences for consumption and leisure can be described by a direct translog utility function the labor supply and welfare participation decisions are treated as a discrete choice problem and we assume that these choices follow a simple conditional logit rule in addition we allow unobserved individual specific effects to be correlated across alternatives we assume that these unobserved effects are drawn from a discrete distribution and the correlation across alternatives is modeled using factor loading techniques classification error in hours is allowed for by using a multiplicative measurement error specification the estimates from the structural model yield inelastic labor supply among husbands and positive wage elasticity for wives further the cross elasticities are close to zero

a joint dynamic model of fertility and work of married women this article estimates a dynamic model of fertility and labor supply of married women drawn from the national longitudinal survey of young women 1968 91 it distinguishes part time and full time employment sectors which differ by pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns and transferability of human capital the model with unobserved heterogeneity in earning ability and preferences for children fits the data and produces reasonable forecasts of labor force participation in decisions the estimates unpack important features of the persistence in labor market decisions intertemporal substitution of leisure over the life cycle and the effect of work interruptions due to childbirth on lifetime utility

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

impacts of capital inflows on aggregate spending categories the case of turkey this paper discusses the impact of foreign savings on aggregate spending categories in turkey using the vector autoregressive var models the major finding is that foreign savings has an increasing effect on consumption the increase of investment arises from the accelerator effect of consumption which results in an upward trend in investment in non tradable sectors concluding that the policy of relying on foreign savings to obtain long term increases in tradable sector investment and competitiveness is ill judged

the analysis of committee power an application to senate voting on the minimum wage a widely noted empirical regularity of congressional behavior is that standing committees exert disproportionate influence on congressional choices the observed phenomenon has a number of labels committee influence committee power and from the parent chamber s perspective deference to committees and a large body of theoretical and empirical research has sought to determine when and why it exists this paper takes as given only the weakest form the observation namely that committee power exists sometimes it does not directly address the questions of when and why committee power exists although much of the relevant literature is reviewed rather it focuses on a prerequisite to the resolution of disputes about committee power how can committee power be assessed empirically section i reviews three classes of explanations and identifies obstacles to convincing empirical tests of the accounts section ii introduces an econometric approach for analyzing committee power section iii applies the technique to a sequence of votes on minimum wage legislation in the senate in 1977 section iv extends the technique to multi dimensional choice spaces section v is a discussion and summary

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

an examination of the market for favors and votes in congress this paper examines the strategies that horse traders and power brokers adopt in trading favors to pass legislation although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading with data from the senate vote on the byrd amendment to the 1990 clean air act i conduct such a test the test provides evidence that on this vote i favor trading occurred ii the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination and iii the coalition leaders did not collude with each another

the welfare cost of means testing pensioner participation in income support we estimate parametric and semi parametric binary choice models of benefit take up by british pensioners and use a revealed preference argument to infer the cash equivalent value of disutility arising from stigma or complexity of the claims process these implicit costs turn out to be relatively small averaging about 3 4 per week across income support recipients using the foster greer thorbecke measure of poverty among pensioners we find that allowing for implicit claim costs incurred by benefit recipients raises the measured degree of poverty by not more than 13 copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

the conventional treatment of seasonality in business cycle analysis does it create distortions abstract no so says one model that is broadly consistent with postwar u s seasonal and business cycle data

on seasonal cycles unit roots and mean shifts the interpretation of seasonality in terms of economic behavior depends on the form of the econometric time series model that allows for a description of seasonality popular models often assume ei

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

vote buying in a stylized setting as we noted in the introduction we do not propose to discuss possible implications for the real world of democratic politics that may be drawn from the highly stylized models of vote buying that we have analyzed in this paper to the extent that economic legal or moral thresholds prevent the emergence of the purchase and sale of votes among persons who initially possess property rights in the collective franchise our whole analysis is simply inapplicable if however such thresholds serve only to inhibit but not to prevent totally the emergence of such markets there should be some value in an analysis that embodies the zero transactions costs assumption

a structural model of multiple welfare program participation and labor supply work on estimating the labor supply effects of high marginal tax rates in welfare programs has been hindered by the difficulty of estimating the effects of participation in multiple welfare programs simultaneously the authors solve this problem by applying methods of simulation estimation to a model of labor supply and multiple program participation the results show asymmetric wage and tax rate effects with fairly large wage elasticities of labor supply but very inelastic responses to moderate changes in cumulative marginal tax rates implying that high welfare tax rates do not necessarily induce major reductions in work effort copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

the value of medicaid interpreting results from the oregon health insurance experiment we develop frameworks for welfare analysis of medicaid and apply them to the oregon health insurance experiment across different approaches we estimate low income uninsured adults willingness to

disability capacity for work and the business cycle an international perspective important policy issues arise from the high and growing number of people claiming disability benefits for reasons of incapacity for work in oecd countries economic conditions play an important part in explaining both the stock of disability benefit claimants and inflows to and outflows from that stock employing a variety of cross country and country specific household panel data sets as well as administrative data we find strong evidence that local variations in unemployment have an important explanatory role for disability benefit receipt with higher total enrolments lower outflows from rolls and often higher inflows into disability rolls in regions and periods of above average unemployment in understanding the nature of the cyclical fluctuations and trends in disability it is important to distinguish between work disability and health disability the former is likely to be influenced by economic conditions and welfare programmes while the latter evolves in a slower fashion with medical technology and demographic changes there is little evidence of health disability being related to the business cycle so cyclical variations are driven by work disability the rise in unemployment due to the current global economic crisis is expected to increase the number of disability insurance claimants

presidential pork executive veto power and distributive politics mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others the model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers including the effects of divided government electoral rules and term limitations for the executive

seasonality in variance is common in macro time series while it is widely appreciated that financial time series exhibit seasonality in variance it is less widely known that many macroeconomic time series exhibit significant seasonality in variance as well we look at nine common macro time series including measures of prices money and interest rates all have significant seasonality in variance this feature has implications for time series practice generally for seasonal adjustment and for policymakers copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

explaining and forecasting results of the self sufficiency project this paper studies the self sufficiency project ssp a controlled randomized experiment concerning welfare by estimating a model of endogenous skill accumulation multidimensional job opportunities and time varying opportunity costs of labour market time methods for estimating dynamic programming models with unobserved heterogeneity are extended to account for unexpected policy interventions and endogenous sample selection and initial conditions parameters are identified and consistently estimated by imposing optimal responses to the exact form of the ssp earnings supplement and the experimental program which induces exogenous variation between treatment groups and within groups as treatment progresses the estimated model tracks primary outcomes well in and out of sample except for underestimating trends in the sample of new welfare applicants predictions from counterfactual experiments run counter to non structural results reported elsewhere and they suggest that details of the ssp s design are critical for interpretation of results the separate ssp plus treatment may have longer lasting and more generalized impacts than the in sample impacts suggest copyright oxford university press

sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models we propose a method to identify bounds i e set identi cation on the shar ing rule for a general collective household consumption model unlike the eects of distribution factors it is well known that the level of the sharing rule cannot be uniquely identi ed without strong assumptions on preferences across households of dierent compositions our new results show that though not point identi ed without these assumptions narrow bounds on the sharing rule can be obtained we get these bounds by applying revealed preference restrictions implied by the collective model to the household s continuous aggregate demand functions we obtain informative bounds even if nothing is known about whether each good is public private or assignable within the household though having such infor mation tightens the bounds we apply our method to us 1999 2009 psid data this application obtains tight sharing rule bounds that yield useful conclusions regarding the eects of income and wages on intrahousehold resource sharing and on the prevalence of individual as opposed to household level poverty

recent advances in modelling seasonality abstract in this paper we review recent developments in econometric modelling of economic time series with seasonality the prime focus is on econometric models which incorporate explicit descriptions of seasonal variation instead of removing this variation using a seasonal adjustment method this review centres around developments in seasonal unit root models and in periodic parameter models both in the univariate and multivariate context several empirical examples are used for illustration we also discuss several areas for further research

bargaining with the president a simple game and new evidence i employ a simple game to suggest the effects of information and expectations on bargaining strategies and responses i make use of members predispositions in order to identify actors likely to be bargaining using administration headcounts i show that while very few members misrepresent their preferences during the coalition building process those who do represent a large proportion of the administration s core supporters make their misrepresentations unsystematic to avoid a costly reputation and convert more readily than those who are not strategic considerations drive conversion among bluffing members while identification with the administration determines conversion among other members compromise generates few conversions a conservative estimate of bluffing suggests that the conversion of bluffers decided more than half the administration s critical votes i speculate about a model to account for the observed bluffing

promocast a new forecasting method for promotion planning this article describes the implementation of a promotion event forecasting system promocasttm and its performance in several pilot applications and validity studies pilot studies involved retail grocery chains with 95 to 185 stores per trading area the goal was to provide short term tactical forecasts useful for planning promotions from a retailer s perspective thus the forecast system must be able to handle any of the over 150 000 upcs in each store s item master file and must be scalable to produce approximately 800 000 000 forecasts per year across all the retailers served by efficient marketing services inc ems inc this is a much different task than one that confronts a manufacturer even one with abroad product line manufacturers can benefit from custom modeling in a product line or category retailers need a production system that generates forecasts that help promotion planning marketing scientists have typically approache promotion analysis from the manufacturer s perspective one objective of this article is to encourage marketing scientists to rethink promotion analysis from a different perspective from the retailer s point of view the planning unit is the promotion event neither weekly store tracking data norshopping trip data from consumer panels are easily aggregated to reflect total sales during a promotion event we describe the promotion event databases and the statistical model developed using these databases the data are the strategic asset our goal is to help retailers use their data to increase the profitability of promotions we have data on the performance of each upc in each store under a variety of promotion conditions on each store s adeptness at executing various styles of promotions as well as on chain wide historical performance for each upc we use many historical averages from these databases to build a 67 variable regression style model the forecast incorporates a simple bias correction needed when using a log transformed dependent variable the natural log of total unit sales we argue that the historical averages matching the planned ad and display conditions provide a benchmark superior to the widely used base times lift method when aggregated into case units the natural unit for product ordering 69 of the forecasts in our first validation study were within one case compared to 39 within one case using the appropriate historical averages we report the results of two over time validity studies that reflect the value of our model for retailers the limitations and implications of this planning tool for managerial decision making concerning stocking levels are discussed whenever historical data are the strategic asset we face inherent limitations our model does not forecast new products the forecast error increases when an existing product is promoted in a new way over 99 5 of the time we have full data from which to create a forecast however with a database for a typical chain market containing over 20 million promotion events in the 30 month time frame we use 100 000 events have less than ideal data the breadth of the database typically 150 000 ups makes it impractical to incorporate data on competitive offerings we find that regression style modeling is not adept at incorporating information on the 1 200 subcommodities managed in our pilot stores or the 1 000 manufacturers who supply those stores despite these limitations we show the value of using promotion event data how tactical forecasts based on these data can directly impact the bottom line of grocery retailers and how store by store forecasts can help retailers with problems of running out of stock or overstocking

spurious deterministic seasonality it is sometimes assumed that the r2 of a regression of a first order differenced time series on seasonal dummy variables reflects the amount of seasonal fluctuations that can be explained by deterministic variation in the series in this paper we show that neglecting the presence of seasonal unit roots may yield spuriously high values of this coefficient

the seasonal cycle in u s manufacturing abstract this paper examines the seasonal cycle in the manufacturing sector of the u s economy the most significant feature is a sharp slowdown in july we argue that this event is not easily explained by technology or preference shifts but instead results from synergies across economic agents

women s college decisions how much does marriage matter this article investigates the sequential college attendance decision of young women and quantifies the effect of marriage expectations on their decision to attend and graduate from college a dynamic choice model of college attendance labor supply and marriage is formulated and structurally estimated using panel data from the nlsy79 the model is used to simulate the effects of no marriage benefits and finds that the predicted college enrollment rate will drop from 58 0 to 50 5 using the estimated model the college attendance behavior for a younger cohort from the nlsy97 is predicted and used to validate the behavioral model

why do countries and industries with large seasonal cycles also have large business cycles we show that there is a strong positive correlation across countries and industries between the standard deviation of the seasonal component and the standard deviation of the nonseasonal component of aggregate variables after documenting this stylized fact we discuss possible explanations and develop a model that generates our empirical finding the main feature of the model is that firms endogenously choose their degree of technological flexibility as a function of the amounts of seasonal and nonseasonal variation in demand although this model is intended to be illustrative we find evidence supporting one of its key empirical implications

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

centralized vote trading this paper presents a model of centralized vote trading in a legislature in this model legislators trade only with party leaders who set prices at which they will buy needed vote changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders and purchases promises from the leaders to pass or defeat particular bills of high concern to the legislator relative to the price the leguslator must pay

pivotal power brokers theory and evidence on political fundraising this study examines the campaign fundraising success of senate incumbents that have a unique pivotal status legislatively in the senate with regards to parliamentary procedures e g the filibuster regression estimates place the fundraising advantage in favor of certain pivotal moderates over all other senators at about 2 12 million in real terms in total contribution per 2 yr election cycle pivotal status is even more significant in explaining variations in pac contribution in the u s senate given that individuals who make contributions are not likely to be as interested as pacs in buying policy the results also suggest that krehbiel s pivotal politics krehbiel k 1988 pivotal politics a theory of u s lawmaking chicago il university of chicago press construct warrants modification given that it offers prediction about policy outcomes and gridlock intervals without fully incorporating interest group politics of the vote buying or policy buying variety

structural estimation of a model of school choices the boston mechanism vs its alternatives we model household choice of schools under the boston mechanism bm and develop a new method applicable to a broad class of mechanisms to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible

estimating labor supply responses and welfare participation using a natural experiment to validate a structural labor supply model in this paper we formulate and estimate an economic model of labor supply and welfare participation the model is estimated on data on single men from quebec drawn from the 1986 canadian census budget sets for each work welfare combination accounting for income taxes tax credits and welfare benefit rules are derived using a microsimulation model we validate our model by comparing reactions to a welfare reform that implied a dramatic increase in welfare benefits predicted by our model to those obtained by using a regression discontinuity approach the results show that our model is capable of recovering actual changes in labor supply and welfare participation we also show the advantage of having estimated a structural model by illustrating how labor supply and welfare participation change when benefit levels change

on the mis measurement of legislator ideology and shirking in this paper we show that current statistical measures of legislator s shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested we note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross sectional regressions where legislators voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis specified we also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct the uncovered set and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate we argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by senators is equally consistent with senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data

identifying the common component of international economic fluctuations a new approach in this paper we develop an aggregation procedure using time varying weights for constructing the common component of international economic fluctuations the methodology for deriving time varying weights is based on some stylised features of the data documented in the paper the model allows for a unified treatment of cyclical and seasonal fluctuations and also accommodates the dynamic propagation of shocks across countries we find evidence for a world business cycle as well as evidence for a distinct european common component we also find some evidence that macroeconomic fluctuations have become more closely linked across industrial economies in the period after 1973 the world economy has become more closely integrated in recent years due to increasing trade and financial flows across countries this has spurred interest in the question of how the ongoing phenomenon of globalisation has affected the transmission and propagation of business cycle fluctuations across national borders an important question in this context is whether a substantial fraction of economic fluctuations are country specific or if there exists a world business cycle which might be defined as fluctuations that are common across all countries more generally the comovement of macroeconomic aggregates across different countries has become a topic of increasing interest in both academic and policy circles these issues have implications in a number of dimensions an empirical analysis of the relative importance of country specific versus common international fluctuations is of relevance for determining the structure of certain classes of international business cycle models from a policy perspective strong comovement of output across countries at business cycle frequencies implies that external trade would be unlikely to play a significant role in dampening fluctuations domestic policies aimed at affecting the real exchange rate and thereby attempting to boost net exports in the short run would then tend to have limited impact the degree of synchronisation of business cycles across countries also has important implications for short run international policy coordination and for assessing the feasibility of monetary unions therefore identifying and analysing the common component of international economic fluctuations is relevant from a number of different perspectives

estimation with response error and nonresponse error in survey data originates from failure to contact the sample and from false answers to verifiable questions these errors may be systematic and associated with uncooperative or unreliable respondents zabel modeled attrition in the survey of income and program participation and found systematic demographic and design effects bollinger and david modeled response error and identified correlations to income per capita in this analysis we link missing interviews in a panel and response error through a trivariate probit analysis robustness of the correlation between attrition and response error is examined by comparing variants of the model the joint model of response error and attrition becomes the first stage of a pseudolikelihood estimate of a model of food stamp participation the model is significantly different from naive probit on the survey data