revenue management with strategic customers last minute selling and opaque selling companies in a variety of industries e g airlines hotels theaters often use last minute sales to dispose of unsold capacity although this may generate incremental revenues in the short term

sealed bids sunk costs and the process of competition how do firms recover precontract costs for example suppose 10 firms compete in a sealed bid auction for the right to explore and develop an offshore oil field each spends 500 000 to estimate the value of the field and to prepare its bid suppose this investigation reveals that the tract is worth approximately 20 million if sunk costs do not matter competition dictates that the winner must bid 20 million but if the winner is to recover its prebid costs the maximum offer can be only 19 5 million furthermore long run industry equilibrium considerations suggest that the highest bid will be only 15 million 20 million minus the total bid preparation costs of 5 million if competition forces firms to charge marginal cost why do firms ever invest in resources which become sunk in some industries inframarginal rents can be used to recover these costs however the example above as well as many others involves an all or none deci

conspicuous consumption and sophisticated thinking consumers purchase conspicuous goods to satisfy not only material needs but also social needs such as prestige in an attempt to meet these social needs producers of conspicuous goods like cars perfumes and watches highlight the exclusivity of their products in this paper we propose a monopoly model of conspicuous consumption using the rational expectations framework and then examine how purchase decisions are affected by the desire for exclusivity and conformity we show that snobs can have an upward sloping demand curve but only in the presence of consumers who are weakly followers laboratory tests lend support for this model prediction and for the rational expectations framework the experimental results suggest that subjects used some degree of sophisticated thinking to arrive at their first period decisions their behavior in the subsequent trials however can be adequately captured by a purely adaptive learning mechanism we discuss the implications of consumer learning for optimal dynamic pricing policy by a monopolist

is the growth of regionalism as significant as the headlines suggest lessons from agricultural trade the proliferation of regional trade agreements rtas has motivated a significant number of ex post econometric studies investigating their agricultural trade impacts the general conclusion is that rtas increase members trade by as much as 150 on average in this article we demonstrate that previous empirical work likely misrepresents the impact of rtas because of considerable heterogeneity in the depth of economic integration pursued by these agreements contrary to previous studies the results reveal that rtas are not universally trade creating and some agreements appear to provide very little benefit deep integration agreements on the other hand are largely responsible for the impressive agricultural trade flow increases reported in the literature testing the hierarchy of rtas largely confirms the theory the benefits of regionalism are an increasing function of the depth of economic integration

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

research note trading up a strategic analysis of reference group effects reference groups influence product and brand evaluations especially when the product is a publicly consumed luxury good marketers of such luxury goods need to carefully balance two important social forces 1 the desire of leaders to distinguish themselves from followers and 2 the countervailing desire of followers to assimilate with leaders in this paper we examine the theoretical implications of these social forces for firm prices product design and target consumer selection we show that the presence of reference group effects can motivate firms to add costly features which provide limited or no functional benefit to consumers furthermore reference group effects can induce product proliferation on one hand and motivate firms to offer limited editions on the other hand we find that offering a limited edition can increase sales and profits in some cases reference group effects can even lead to a buying frenzy

competitive strategies for late entry into a market with a dominant brand this paper considers optimal positioning advertising and pricing strategies for a firm contemplating entry in a market dominated by an entrenched competitor drawing on behavioral research on consumer preference formation we develop an individual level model that reflects differing consumer responses to similar products offered by the dominant brand and later entrants an effect we term asymmetric preferences from the resulting aggregate market response model we derive several competitive implications notably 1 that preference asymmetry can make a differentiated late entry strategy optimal even if preferences would appear to dictate otherwise and 2 that me too strategies are not equilibrium late entry strategies more generally our analysis suggests that preference asymmetry can contribute to the persistent competitive advantage of dominant brands

context dependent preferences and innovation strategy disruptive innovations introduce a new performance dimension into a product category but often suffer from inferior performance on key performance dimensions of their existing substitutes hence the followers of these innovations face an important decision to make they must choose to improve the new technology either on the key performance dimension shared with the old technology or on the new performance dimension this paper investigates which path firms should choose when they face such a dilemma in the absence of any cost or capability issues in doing so we integrate customer response into the theory of technological evolution and allow preferences on the product choices to be context dependent we show that context dependent preferences may encourage the follower to improve the new technology on the new performance dimension later we extend our game to a dynamic one and show that the context dependent preferences may cause the pioneer to innovate less this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

pre sale information in markets as diverse as that for specialized industrial equipment or that for retail financial services sellers or intermediaries may earn profits both from the sale of products and from the provision of pre sale consultation services we study how a seller optimally chooses the costly quality of pre sale information next to the price of information and the product price and obtain clear cut predictions on when information is over and when it is underprovided even though we find that information quality does not satisfy a standard single crossing property buyers who are a priori more optimistic about their valuation end up paying a higher margin for information but a lower margin for the product when they subsequently exercise their option to purchase at a pre specified price

the making of a hot product a signaling explanation of marketers scarcity strategy every marketer s dream is to create a hot product that customers would absolutely want to have thus generating considerable profit to the marketer according to one school of thought marketers should make products hard to get in order to create really hot products in this paper using a game theoretic model we investigate if such scarcity strategies can indeed be optimal while a scarcity strategy may appear to be a viable approach for making a firm s product successful further analysis raises some puzzling issues in particular it is not clear why a firm would not increase its price to get demand and supply in sync and increase its profit in the process we therefore offer a signaling explanation for the optimality of such strategies and show that a high quality seller may optimally choose to make the product scarce in order to credibly signal the quality of its product to uninformed customers our analysis indicates that a high quality seller optimally employs scarcity as a signaling device in product markets that are characterized ceteris paribus by a small difference in marginal cost between high and low quality products a low reservation price for a low quality product a greater heterogeneity in reservation prices for a high quality product and a moderate number of informed consumers our results provide a rationale for the fact that scarcity strategies are usually observed for discretionary or specialty products but not for commodity products staple products or new to the world products

the price of advice we develop a model of consulting advising where the role of the consultant is to reveal signals to her client that refine the client s original private estimate of the profitability of a project although the client can perfectly observe and evaluate these signals the consultant may only be able to do the same imperfectly or not at all this captures the idea that the expert may not fully understand the impact of her advice on the client we characterize the optimal contract between the consultant and her client it is a menu consisting of pairs of transfers specifying payments between the two parties in case the project is undertaken by the client and in case it is not the main result of the article is that in the optimal mechanism the consultant obtains the same profit as though she could perfectly observe and evaluate the impact of the signals whose release she controls on the client s profit estimate

on transparency in organizations when is it best for the principal to commit to not disclosing all that he she knows in moral hazard interactions i show that whenever the agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states then full transparency can generically be improved upon this implies that full transparency is generically suboptimal whenever the dimension of the information held by the principal exceeds the dimension of the agent s action in a simple class of problems i make further progress on the best disclosure policy assuming the principal can either disclose fully the state or remain silent

auctions and information acquisition sealed bid or dynamic formats the value of an asset is generally not known a priori and it requires costly investments to be discovered in such contexts with endogenous information acquisition which selling procedure generates more revenues we show that dynamic formats such as ascending price or multistage auctions perform better than their static counterpart this is because dynamic formats allow bidders to observe the number of competitors left throughout the selling procedure thus even if competition appears strong ex ante it may turn out to be weak along the dynamic format thereby making the option to acquire information valuable this very possibility also induces the bidders to stay longer in the auction just to learn about the state of competition both effects boost revenues and our analysis provides a rationale for using dynamic formats rather than sealed bid ones

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

one money one market the effect of common currencies on trade currency unions their dramatic effect on international trade a gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade the panel data bilateral observations for five years during 1970 90 covering 186 countries includes 300 observations in which both countries use the same currency i find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility even after controlling for a host of features including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime these effects statistically significant imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies currency unions like the european emu may thus lead to a large increase in international trade with all that that entails andrew rose

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal pricing of a conspicuous product during a recession that freezes capital markets abstract this paper considers the problem of how to price a conspicuous product when the economy is in a recession that disrupts capital markets a conspicuous product in this context is a luxury good for which demand is increasing in brand image brand image here means the ability of a consumer to impress observers by conspicuously displaying consumption of the good brand image is built up when the good is priced high enough to make it exclusive and eroded if the good is discounted recession is modeled as having two effects it reduces demand and it freezes capital markets so borrowing is not possible in pricing the conspicuous product the firm faces the following trade off reducing price helps maintain sales volume and cash flow in the face of reduced demand but it also damages brand image and thus long term demand the paper analyzes the firm s pricing policy facing scenarios of mild intermediate and severe recessions while taking the threat of bankruptcy into account for an intermediate recession the optimal solution is history dependent the results have implications for policy interventions in capital markets and for timing of mergers and acquisitions

price level co movements within currency unions an alternative integration metric this paper analyses currency union integration by testing whether price levels in member countries possess a common stochastic trend the trace statistic test for cointegration proposed by johansen 1995 demonstrates the presence of such a trend for most unions a disaggregated analysis identifies a common stochastic trend for several though fewer than half of country pairs within a union some unions such as the eurozone have small shares of cointegrated country pairs yet the share of cointegrated country pairs is large relative to countries outside currency unions comparison to a control group country pairs where one country belongs to a given union and the other country does not indicates that the cointegration found within a currency union is a union specific trait and not a feature of the individual countries within the union these results provide an alternative metric to intraunion trade for gauging the extent of currency union integration

an exploration of the eductive justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis this paper examines justifications of the rational expectations hypothesis that rely on the analysis of the agents mental forecasting educing activity which involves forecasting the forecasts of others etc the corresponding concept of eductive learning stability based on the game theoretical concept of rationalizability is primarily used within the classical muth model conditions for coordination of beliefs are interpreted and discussed they are robust to the introduction of noise more generally eductive stability fits economic intuition on coordination stability increases when the industry product differentiation increases and when decisions are sequential and observable copyright 1992 by american economic association

pricing of conspicuous goods a competitive analysis of social effects abstract social needs play an important role in the purchase of conspicuous goods in this article the authors extend traditional economic models to accommodate social needs such as desire for uniqueness and conformism and examine their implications for pricing conspicuous goods first in the context of a duopoly the authors identify the conditions under which the desire for uniqueness can increase demand among some consumers as the price of a product increases second the authors show that though the desire for uniqueness leads to higher prices and firm profits a desire for conformity leads to lower prices and profits third the authors find that consumers purchase high quality products not because of their desire for uniqueness but despite it finally marketers of conspicuous goods may find it beneficial not to emphasize the functional differences among their products when the need for uniqueness is high in a laboratory test the authors find support for the claim that demand for a product amo

the erosion of colonial trade linkages after independence high trade between countries with colonial ties may be explained by government policies that establish preferential access or as a consequence of networks formed through social interactions using bilateral trade data from 1948 to 2003 we examine the eect of independence on post colonial trade the severing of formal colonial relations can lead to an immediate reduction in trade as preferential access is eliminated as well as a gradual reduction corresponding to the deterioration of trading networks our results reveal that independence reduces colonial trade with its colonizer metropole the reduction cumulates over a 30 year period and the disruption is particularly severe for hostile separations we also find that overall colonial trade falls subsequent to independence but to a lesser extent than trade with the metropole

conspicuous consumption and dynamic pricing how do firms develop marketing strategy when consumers seek to satisfy both quality and status related considerations we develop an analytical model to study this issue examining both pricing and product management decisions in markets for conspicuous durable goods our analysis yields many interesting and nontrivial insights first we demonstrate that high intrinsic quality indirectly generates exclusivity via pricing effects in turn this exclusivity generates considerable social payoffs where consumers value status this insight reverses the direction of causality in the existing literature wherein only status considerations matter and mere price increases may enhance consumer utility second our dynamic model indicates that where consumers prioritize status benefits producers incur substantial price depreciation in equilibrium third we examine the product management strategies used by firms to preserve early adopter exclusivity finally we discuss the boundary conditions of our results as well as our results implications for managerial and policy issues

design innovation and fashion cycles a model of fashion cycles is developed in which designs are used as a signaling device in a dating game a monopolist periodically creates a new design over time the price of the design falls as it spreads across the population once sufficiently many consumers own the design it is profitable to create a new design and thereby render the old design obsolete this paper gives conditions under which all consumers would be better off by banning the use of fashion competition among designers may lead to less frequent changes in fashion and to higher prices than monopoly copyright 1995 by american economic association

capital stock management during a recession that freezes credit markets abstract this paper considers the problem of how to price a conspicuous product while maintaining liquidity during a recession which both reduces demand and freezes credit markets reducing price would help maintain cash flow but low prices can erode brand image and hence long term sales the paper extends earlier work of the same authors by explicitly deriving a firm s optimal cash management behavior taking into account that a too low cash level results in bankruptcy there are different sets of initial conditions for which qualitatively different solution trajectories are optimal we distinguish mild and severe recessions with mild recessions bankruptcy can be avoided for sure when the brand image is large enough in case the recession is of intermediate strength it can be optimal to throttle forward then back how aggressively one spends down cash reserves with the associated state constraint alternately being non binding binding non binding then binding in such a way that the firm ceases operation

the changing incidence of geography the incidence of bilateral trade costs is calculated here using neglected properties of the structural gravity model disaggregated by commodity and region and re aggregated into forms useful for economic geography for canada s provinces 1992 2003 sellers incidence is on average some five times higher than buyers incidence sellers incidence falls over time due to specialization despite constant gravity coefficients this previously unrecognized globalizing force drives big reductions in constructed home bias the disproportionate predicted share of local trade and large but varying gains in real gdp 7 lf11 f14 r12 the large gravity literature has revealed much information about bilateral trade costs anderson and eric van wincoop 2004 but the literature has not addressed incidence the proportions of trade costs paid by sellers and buyers the omission is important because incidence is what matters for most issues of regional specialization welfare and policy for example even with uniform trade costs sectors with larger sellers incidence will tend to have smaller supply all else equal as for welfare and policy uniform trade cost reductions confer benefits with buyers and sellers incidence varying across trade partners recently discovered properties of structural gravity are used here to calculate sectoral incidence measures of trade costs for canada s provinces 1992 2003 we uncover a secular fall in sellers incidence that induces a fall in home bias and a rise in real gdp this reflects a previously unrecognized force of globalization specialization acting to reduce the trade cost bill we add to the gravity literature new methods and new empirical lessons about canada s trade costs 1 inward and outward multilateral resistance anderson and van wincoop 2003 2004

economic effects of currency unions we develop a new instrumental variable iv approach to estimate the effects of different exchange rate regimes on bilateral outcomes the basic idea is that the characteristics of the exchange rate between two countries are partially related to the independent decisions of these countries to peg explicitly or de facto to a third currency notably that of a main anchor this component of the exchange rate regime can be used as an iv in regressions of bilateral outcomes we apply the methodology to study the economic effects of currency unions the likelihood that two countries independently adopt the currency of the same anchor country is used as an instrument for whether they share a common currency we find that sharing a common currency enhances trade increases price comovements and decreases the comovement of real gross domestic product shocks

competing for low end markets recent business research points to the fortune awaiting to be tapped in low end markets in this paper we investigate how the size of the low end market influences a firm s profits and the pioneering firm s quality choice as low valuation consumers increase in a market on average consumers willingness to pay decreases this may lead us to expect firms profits to decrease as the size of the low end market increases our analysis shows that if the size of the low end market is below a threshold an increase in the size of the low end market may actually dampen price competition and improve profits as firms can then strategically choose their quality levels such that their products are more differentiated conventional wisdom also suggests that the pioneering firm will offer a higher quality product and earn more profits compared with the later entrant in contrast to this notion of quality advantage our analysis identifies circumstances in which a pioneer can offer a lower quality product and yet earn more profits an experimental test lends support for some of our model s predictions we further extend the model to consider markets with multiple firms firms with multiple products and consumers with limited purchasing power

currency unions and trade how large is the treatment effect currency unions and trade what can the data say the impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex i argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent economic policy paper by andrew rose issue 30 2000 pp 7 45 using techniques designed to be robust in this situation i find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated torsten persson i have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large but i am not convinced by torsten persson s diagnosis and proposed solution i apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time series as well as cross sectional evidence the results are similar to my earlier ones the effect of a single currency on trade is large andrew rose

incorporating consumer price expectations in diffusion models in this paper the sensitivity of the optimal price path of a new durable product to the price expectations of consumers is examined consumers enter the market every period in a diffusion type framework during the initial periods more consumers enter the market due to word of mouth influence but in the latter periods saturation effects set in the entering set of cohorts form expectations about future prices and in a stable equilibrium these expectations are fulfilled it is shown that the price path is cyclical with the following properties at the beginning of the cycle the price is at its highest level it falls monotonically over time reaching a low price at the end of the cycle equal to the reservation price of the consumers willing to pay less the cycle lengths are not equal the sensitivity of the optimal price path to model parameters is explored through a numerical procedure

the effects of china s growth on the food prices and the food exports of other developing countries this article explores the impacts of china s growth in the international markets of agricultural products along two dimensions food price inflation and export growth in other developing countries china s food imports of vegetable oils have grown dramatically over the last decade linking china s economic growth to the recent increases in global food prices if china is a source of global food price inflation exporting countries will benefit whether they sell directly to china or not these direct and indirect linkages are explored using a short run partial equilibrium model of international trade in agricultural products in which consumer prices and trade costs are derived from bilateral trade flows china s effects on food prices and exports are estimated by reducing chinese food expenditures in 2007 by half roughly china s level of expenditures in 1995 results indicate that food prices as measured by ces price indexes in developing asia africa and latin america would have been reduced by 1 27 0 32 and 0 22 respectively china has been an important source of growth for exporters selling directly to china there is no evidence of export growth due to an overall increase in food prices caused by china s growth

do regional trade agreements increase members agricultural trade the gravity model is used extensively to investigate the trade flow effects of regional trade agreements rtas a notable feature common to previous research is the use of aggregate trade data these studies typically report conflicting and even negative results of the effect of rtas on members trade using recent developments in the gravity equation suggested by baier and bergstrand 2007 and anderson and van wincoop 2003 this article demonstrates that rta effects on members trade depend fundamentally on whether the analysis focuses on agricultural or nonagricultural sectors on the particular agreement analyzed and on the length of the phase in period that characterizes almost all rtas copyright 2008 oxford university press

ignorance promotes competition an auction model with endogenous private valuations we study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of n risk neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction we show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition as measured by the number of bidders furthermore in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information

selling to conspicuous consumers pricing production and sourcing decisions consumers often purchase goods that are hard to find to conspicuously display their exclusivity and social status firms that produce such conspicuously consumed goods such as designer apparel fashion goods jewelry etc often face challenges in making optimal pricing and production decisions such firms are confronted with precipitous trade off between high sales volume and high margins because of the highly uncertain market demand strategic consumer behavior and the display of conspicuous consumption in this paper we propose a model that addresses pricing and production decisions for a firm using the rational expectations framework we show that in equilibrium firms may offer high availability of goods despite the presence of conspicuous consumption we show that scarcity strategies are harder to adopt as demand variability increases and we provide conditions under which scarcity strategies could be successfully adopted to improve profits finally to credibly commit to scarcity strategy we show that firms can adopt sourcing strategies such as sourcing from an expensive production location supplier or using expensive raw materials this paper was accepted by preyas desai and pradeep chintagunta marketing

informal barriers and agricultural trade does monetary integration matter eu enlargement and the recent sovereign debt crisis of euro zone countries have revived the debate around the european monetary union emu in this article we ask how informal barriers to agricultural and food trade have changed since the introduction of the common european currency and whether this evolution can be attributed to monetary integration we focus on the foreign trade of the 11 emu founder countries over a nine year period covering the creation of the emu and find a diminishing marginal trade impact of both information and institutional barriers we find a lower level of trade barriers but cannot attribute this outcome to the introduction to the euro

systems competition and network effects this paper discusses firm behavior market performance and the public and private institutions that arise in systems markets i e markets where consumers use compatible components together to generate benefits in such markets which include communications networks and hardware software networks popular products are inherently more valuable these network effects can drive corporate strategies and are critical in understanding innovation in many high technology markets the discussion here emphasizes the dynamics of consumer adoption decisions in the presence of network effects competition between incompatible systems and how suppliers choose which components are compatible and which are not

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

currency unions and international integration this paper characterizes the integration patterns of international currency unions such as the cfa franc zone we empirically explore different features of currency unions and compare them to countries with sovereign monies by examining the criteria for mundellos concept of an optimum currency area we find that members of currency unions are more integrated than countries with their own currencies for instance we find that currency union members have more trade and less volatile real exchange rates than countries with their own monies business cycles are more highly synchronized across currency union countries than across countries with sovereign monies

that s what i thought i wanted miswanting and regret for a standard good in a mass customized world how can a standardized product survive in a mass customized world this requires understanding that consumers often experience problems predicting their future hedonic reactions to new experiences such as custom products leading to feelings of regret this form of regret occurs not because the custom product differs from specifications but because consumers miswanted the design they ordered our analytic model shows that regret aversion induces consumers to design custom products to reflect the attributes of the available standard products consequently regret averse consumers may choose the standard product rather than place a custom order the number of available standard products however moderates both these effects two experiments empirically substantiate the key predictions of the analytical model a the custom product s resemblance to the standard product grows with regret aversion associated with miswanting b there exists a segment of regretfully loyal consumers for the standard product in a mass customized world and it expands with regret aversion c both the above effects are weakened by the presence of a second standard product and d the custom product can increase its market share when the number of standard products increases

disaggregated trade and disaggregated currency unions a ranking of common currency effects andrew rose has long argued that a common currency has a large effect on increasing trade recently rose has called into question the reliability of this conclusion as new techniques have emerged for estimating gravity equations this article uses the sector specific gravity model developed by anderson and yotov 2010a to investigate if disaggregated trade can provide a reliable estimate of a common currency s effect disaggregating trade alone is insufficient to obtain a reliable estimate of a currency union regardless of econometric technique when the effect of a common currency on trade is uniform across all unions disaggregating the universe of currency unions with individual effects provides a reliable ranking of currency unions independent of estimation method by the effect that each union s currency has on increasing trade these rankings differ across sectors

social loss aversion and optimal contest design when managers are designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople service employees franchisees or product development teams a key question is what should the optimal proportion of winne

optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction we analyze a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations the seller can release without observing certain additional signals that affect the buyers valuations our main result is that in the expected revenue maximizing mechanism the seller makes available all the information that she can and her expected revenue is the same as it would be if she could observe the part of the information that is new to the buyers we also show that this mechanism can be implemented by what we call a handicap auction in interesting applications in the first round of this auction each buyer picks a price premium from a menu offered by the seller a smaller premium costs more then the seller releases the additional signals in the second round the buyers bid in a second price auction where the winner pays the sum of his premium and the second highest non negative bid in the case of a single buyer this mechanism simplifies to a menu of european call options

anticipated regret and product innovation when a firm introduces a product with new features some consumers may find it difficult to assess their valuations for these new attributes their purchase decisions made under such uncertainty may lead to postpurchase regret it has been experimentally shown that consumers may anticipate their potential postpurchase regret and make their current choices to mitigate or minimize it that is a consumer s anticipated regret can significantly impact his purchase decision given the trend that firms in various markets invoke regret to stimulate sales this paper analytically explores whether and how anticipated regret affects competing firms profits and product innovation our analyses reveal that the presence of anticipated regret can increase or decrease firms profits and foster or hinder product innovation depending on whether it makes the consumer segments more or less polarized in other words anticipated regret has a nonmonotonic effect on firms profits and the entrant s optimal quality therefore