reputation effects in the market of certifiers evidence from the audit industry i introduction asymmetric information between seller and buyer can impede mutually beneficial transactions one of the solutions to this problem is to recruit an independent third party a certifier who verifies unobserved product characteristics for the buyer the certifier s independence is at the heart of the tripartite arrangement this independence however can be compromised when sellers pay for the certification for instance in the market of auditors and credit rating agencies cra it is not the investor i e the buyer of the security who pays for the certifier s services but the company which is to be impartially rated or audited in this business model companies can naturally manipulate their ratings audits furthermore investors only have a limited power to weed out dishonest certifiers simply because companies instead of investors choose auditors and cra ultimately these problems can pervert the certifier s mission to serve the investing community dranove and jin 2010 not surprisingly this conflict of interest has often been cited as a cause for accounting scandals and more recently for inflated credit ratings e g bis cfgs 2008 the economist 2004 2006 auditors and cra alike refute the criticism of their business model arguing that the threat of losing their reputation is a sufficient disciplinary device e g the economist 2005 1 however this claim has not yet been empirically substantiated a successful mechanism of reputation has three components in the presence of conflicts of interest consider the audit market 2 first investors have to punish companies which chose low quality auditors there is evidence that capital markets severely penalize companies whose audit reports are of dubious quality e g chaney philipich and kirk 2002 gao 2003a krishnamurthy zhou and zhou 2006 pacini and hillison 2003 second this negative capital market reaction should feed into companies auditor choice i e companies should choose high quality auditors third auditors then should have the incentive to provide high quality audits the second stage of this mechanism has not been empirically validated yet in particular it has not been analyzed whether the adverse capital market reaction to low audit quality feeds into companies auditor choice and if it does how a positive effect of adverse quality signals on audit demand means that firms prefer to engage lenient auditors in order to receive favorable reports suggesting that conflicts of interest overwhelm reputation concerns and clearly fail the disciplinary mechanism a negative effect on the other hand indicates that while investors do not pay for audit services they can exert discipline on auditors indirectly by forcing public companies to choose high quality auditors a success of reputation in this paper i exploit the natural experiment of arthur andersen s collapse and test the effects of audit quality signals on companies auditor choice in discrete choice models the quality signals in this study are auditors industry specific financial restatement histories i e the proportion of clients in an industry which restated financial statements in the past i find that auditors restatement histories are a crucial driving force in the subsequent auditor choice of deserting andersen clients there are compelling reasons why auditors financial restatement histories should forcibly feed into a company s auditor choice restatements are material corrections of published financial statements which cannot be relied upon anymore and have to be reissued since the very role of the independent auditor is to ensure that financial statements are fairly presented in all material respects it appears natural to think that the auditor has not done his job properly if a financial statement has to be restated later indeed there is ample evidence that capital markets receive restatements badly

the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the health insurance market we test the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the hmo market federal employees were provided with report cards on a limited basis in 1995 and then on a widespread basis in 1996 exploiting this natural experiment we find that subjective measures of quality and coverage influence plan choices after controlling for plan premiums expected out of pocket expenses and service coverages the effect is stronger within a small sample of new hires compared to a larger sample of existing federal employees we also find evidence that report cards increase the price elasticity of demand for health insurance

right to work laws free riders and unionization in the local public sector empirical models of local government unionization reveal substantial reductions in union membership due to right to work laws free riders rather than underlying antiunion sentiments are probably responsible because the unionization models include better measures of sentiments than right to work laws furthermore these laws reduce the probability that bargaining unions form by more than they reduce the probability that nonbargaining associations form in three of five local government functions these results also confirm the importance of free riders because union security clauses that prohibit free riders in states without right to work laws exist only in collective bargaining contracts

the perils of transparency in bureaucracies many countries have recently enacted or proposed reforms aimed at increasing citizens information on the quality of some public sector services disclosure of schools and teachers quality is the case that has generated the biggest public debate in the us the no child left behind act nclb requires learning progress to be measured for every child and results from students tests be made available in annual report cards so that parents can evaluate schools performances similar reforms have also been proposed for many other public services in the uk legislation introduced in the year 2000 now requires that the performance of each local government is reviewed and made public with regards to provision of services such as re police housing social services and education but also like the condition of roads the

analyzing the analysts career concerns and biased earnings forecasts this paper examines the career concerns of security analysts we relate long histories of their earnings forecasts to job separations we find that relatively accurate past forecasts lead to favorable career outcomes such as remaining at or moving up to a high status large prestigious brokerage house controlling for accuracy optimistic forecasts relative to the consensus increase the chances of favorable job separations job separations depend much less on accuracy for analysts who cover stocks that are underwritten by their brokerage houses such analysts are also much more likely to be rewarded for optimistic forecasts than other analysts furthermore job separations were much less sensitive to accuracy and somewhat more sensitive to optimism during the stock market mania of the late 1990s these findings suggest that the well documented analyst forecast optimism bias is likely due to incentives to promote stocks

union membership in the united states 1973 1981 this paper reports estimates of union membership gathered from may current population surveys from 1973 to 1981 the authors present data by occupation industry selected states and smsas race gender and educational attainment the paper both extends and differs from that by freeman and medoff which presents unionism estimates for the private sector for 1968 75 to facilitate longitudinal analysis this paper reports three year moving averages of occupational and industry data and annual estimates of demographic classifications the data include public sector as well as private sector workers and they exclude workers not covered by the national labor relations act also the authors provide only union membership estimates not estimates on workers covered by union contracts this paper suggests that the percentage of all workers that are unionized in the united states remained fairly constant over the 1973 81 period

right to work laws and the extent of unionization it is a well known fact that the extent of unionization is less in states with right to work rtw laws a framework is developed for determining whether rtw laws actually cause a decrease in the extent of unionization or whether they simply mirror preexisting tastes of workers against unions a set of empirical tests is proposed that can distinguish between these explanations based on differences between rtw and non rtw states in the demand for union representation the supply of union jobs relative to that demand and the observed union nonunion wage differential these tests are implemented using disaggregated data from the quality of employment survey and the current population survey and a pattern is found that is consistent with the hypothesis that rtw laws simply mirror preexisting preferences against union representation

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

testing the term structure of interest rates using a stationary vector autoregression with regime switching abstract the expectations model of the term structure for us data on three and six month treasury bills for the period 1962 1 1987 3 is explored the analysis allows for the nonstationarity of the data and for unobserved stochastic switches of regime by estimating vars in the yield spread and the change in the three month rate which allow the time series processes to change between regimes in contrast to other results for the expectations model such as those of hamilton 1988 mankiw and miron 1986 and others we find that the data do not reject the model

truth telling by third party auditors and the response of polluting firms experimental evidence from india in many regulated markets private third party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit potentially creating a conflict of interest this article reports on a two year field experiment in the indian state of gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting there are three main results first the status quo system was largely corrupted with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard although true emissions were typically higher second the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards third treatment plants in turn reduced their pollution emissions the results suggest reformed incentives for third party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective jel codes q56 m42 d22 copyright 2013 oxford university press

price differentials and price discrimination reply and extensions precise definitions of price discrimination are analyzed in this paper as part of a reply to one of my earlier papers on a related topic the main conclusion is that the two definitions used most frequently are appropriate only in special circumstances not recognized previously no definition exists to cover all real world situations

network effects bargaining power and product review bias theory and evidence i construct a theoretical framework for expert product reviews and demonstrate how the existence of positive network effects can make review inflation profitable even when consumers are rational this finding moreover suggests that product reviews may serve as a coordination mechanism for early adopters in an empirical application to the video game journalism industry i find evidence that reviews are inflated for games produced by large firms and for those that are part of pre existing game franchises additionally i find variation in inflation across genres that would be inconsistent with common alternative theories of inflation such as consumer naivete

rationality and analysts forecast bias this paper proposes and tests a quadratic loos utility function for modeling corporate earnings forecasting where financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy optimal forecasts with minimum expected error are optimistically biased and exhibit predictable cross sectional variation related to analyst and company characteristics empirical evidence from individual analyst forecasts is consistent with the model s predictions these results suggest that positive and predictable bias may be a rational property of optimal earnings forecasts prior studies using classical notions of unbiasedness may have prematurely dismissed analysts forecasts as being irrational or inaccurate

persistence in variance structural change and the garch model this article examines the persistence of the variance as measured by the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity garch model in stock return data in particular we investigate the extent to which persistence in variance may be overstated because of the existence of and failure to take account of deterministic structural shifts in the model both an analysis of daily stock return data and a monte carlo simulation experiment confirm the hypothesis that garch measures of persistence in variance are sensitive to this type of model misspecification

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

how do consumers motivate experts reputational incentives in an auto repair market abstract moral hazard exists in expert service markets because sellers have an incentive to shade their reports of the buyer s condition to increase the short run demand for their services the california vehicle emission inspection market offers a rare opportunity to examine how reputational incentives work in such a market i show that consumers are 30 percent more likely to return to a firm at which they previously passed than to one at which they previously failed and that demand is sensitive to a firm s failure rate across all consumers these and other results suggest that demand incentives are strong in this market because consumers believe that firms differ greatly in their consumer friendliness and are skeptical even about those they choose weak demand incentives in other expert service markets are not a direct consequence of moral hazard but rather of its interaction with switching costs and consumers belief that firms are relatively homogeneous

the impact of mandatory disclosure laws on product choices an analysis of the salad dressing market abstract the nutrition labeling and education act nlea requires most food products to include a nutrition label prior to the nlea labeling was voluntary this study uses nutrition label information and supermarket scanner data pre and post nlea to examine the impact of moving from a voluntary to a mandatory labeling regime on consumer product choice the voluntary unraveling of information is shown to be an important market mechanism prior to the nlea all low fat salad dressings had a nutrition label while the majority of the higher fat dressings did not however there remained large variation in fat content among dressings that did not voluntarily label those with the highest fat levels experienced a significant decline in sales after they were required to disclose the results indicate that even in markets with credible low cost mechanisms to disclose mandatory labeling can have an impact on consumer behavior and health

delivering bad news market responses to negligence abstractone of the goals of the legal liability system is to ensure that sellers provide appropriate care reputation effects may also deter negligence the little available research evidence suggests that reputation effects are minimal however we develop a theory tailored to an environment such as medicine in which sellers are of heterogeneous quality and face two types of demand private consumers who exhibit downward sloping demand for example private health insurance and government consumers who exhibit perfectly elastic demand at a fixed price for example medicaid insurance the theory predicts that high quality sellers who suffer reputation losses will see their caseloads shift from private to government patients while low quality sellers will lose government patients and may gain private patients combining individual patient level data from florida for the years 1994 2003 with physician level litigation data we find evidence that physicians experience reputation effects that are consist

an empirical examination of quality certification in a lemons market i introduction researchers have long understood that a variety of mechanisms may be used to overcome problems of adverse selection stigler 1961 224 notes that s ome forms of economic organization may be explicable chiefly as devices for eliminating uncertainties in quality and akerlof 1970 cites independent groups such as the consumers union and united laboratories that test and certify the quality of goods there is however little empirical evidence that illustrates the effectiveness of such mechanisms in this article we examine the effect certification has on a market characterized by adverse selection using data from the market for young thoroughbreds we compare the performance of sales where auction houses provide certification services with sales where certification is absent the thoroughbred racehorse market consists of two distinct types of public auctions certified and noncertified sales in a certified sale auction houses physically inspect the horses nominated to their sales selling only the horses they conclude are from the upper end of the quality distribution in noncertified sales auction houses sell all horses nominated to a sale our empirical strategy is to perform tests that indicate whether adverse selection affects market outcomes in either certified or noncertified sales a finding that adverse selection is present in noncertified sales but absent in certified sales is consistent with the hypothesis that certification alleviates problems of adverse selection we adopt three approaches to test for the presence of adverse selection 1 the first approach is in the spirit of chiappori and salanie 2000 who examine the relationship between unobservable factors from participation and performance equations we model adverse selection as a case of sample selection bias and examine the correlation between errors in participation and price equations 2 to accomplish this we use a unique data set that allows us to estimate how breeder decisions to sell or retain horses affect market prices the data set consists of a 10 random sample of all thoroughbreds born in 1993 and includes both horses retained by their breeders who own a horse at the time of its birth and horses that breeders chose to sell our second test follows genesove 1993 and chezum and wimmer 1997 by examining the relationship between seller characteristics and price theoretically when observable seller characteristics are correlated with seller incentives to select goods adversely prices should reflect these differences chezum and wimmer observe that some breeders sell all of their horses whereas others retain a portion to race they find that market prices are inversely related to the extent of a breeder s involvement in racing concluding that adverse selection affects market outcomes we extend this work in two respects first we isolate the effect seller characteristics have on price through the decision to sell or retain a horse second we compare the effect seller characteristics have on observed prices in certified and noncertified sales our last test follows bond 1982 who attempts to identify adverse selection in the market for used trucks by comparing the repair records of trucks that were sold with the records of trucks retained by their original owners because the horses in our sample had not begun their racing careers at the time they were sold we use data on racetrack earnings as an ex post measure of quality and compare the quality of horses sold in noncertified sales with certified horses and horses retained by their breeders the results from each approach are consistent with certification alleviating problems of adverse selection we find that holding observable attributes constant horses that would receive unusually high market prices in noncertified sales are even more valuable in other options and are less likely to be sold in a noncertified sale

the effects of collective bargaining rights on public employee compensation evidence from teachers firefighters and police widespread public sector unionism emerged only in the 1960s as individual states opened the door to collective bargaining for state and municipal workers in this study the author exploits differences in timing of legislative reforms across states to construct estimates of the causal effects of public sector collective bargaining rights on pay benefits and employment for teachers firefighters and police perhaps surprisingly estimates that allow for state fixed effects and state specific trends show little effect on teachers pay benefits or employment despite significantly increasing union presence among teachers for firefighters the results show a substantial positive effect on wages for police the wage effect was more modest but the workweek was significantly shortened

labour unrest and the quality of production evidence from the construction equipment resale market this paper examines the construction equipment resale market to assess whether equipment produced by the world s largest manufacturer of construction machinery caterpillar experienced lower product quality in facilities that underwent contract disputes during the 1990 s analysis of auction data reveals that resale market participants significantly discounted machines produced in these dispute affected facilities additionally pieces of equipment produced in facilities undergoing unrest were resold more often received worse appraisal reports and had lower list prices taken together the evidence supports the hypothesis that workmanship at dispute affected facilities declined and that the resulting impact on the economic quality of the equipment produced was significant the dispute was associated with at least 400 million in lost service flows due to inferior quality equipment alone

accountability incentives and behavior the impact of high stakes testing in the chicago public schools the recent federal education bill no child left behind requires states to test students in grades 3 to 8 each year and to judge school performance on the basis of these test scores while intended to maximize student learning there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies this study examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in the chicago public schools in 1996 1997 using a panel of student level administrative data i find that math and reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of the accountability policy in comparison to both prior achievement trends in the district and to changes experienced by other large urban districts in the mid west however for younger students the policy did not increase performance on a state administered low stakes exam an item level analysis suggests that the observed achievement gains were driven by increases in test specific skills and student effort i also find that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions by increasing special education placements preemptively retaining students and substituting away from low stakes subjects like science and social studies

the value of delegated quality control this paper studies the case in which a firm delegates quality control to an independent monitor in a repeated game consumers trust provides incentives to acquire information about whether the good is defective and withhold defective goods from sale if third party reports are observable to consumers delegation lessens the first and dispenses with the second moral hazard concern but also creates agency costs internal quality control is optimal only if trades are sufficiently frequent and consumer information is sufficiently precise this result holds in the presence of the possibility of collusion fully non verifiable presale information and economies of scale in external quality control

certification and market transparency we provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency in a market with opaque product quality sellers use certification as a signaling device while buyers use it as an inspection device this difference alone implies that seller certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare under buyer certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency but because seller certification yields larger profits active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed these findings are robust and widely applicable to for instance patents automotive parts and financial products

information gathering externalities for a multi attribute good most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions customers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others their choices affect firms incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers choices we characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics and consumers are heterogeneous ex ante consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm s investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire cheaper information affects consumers information gathering and thereby firm investment this can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus profits and welfare

strategic certification and provision of quality we study the effect of the presence of a certification intermediary in an environment where information asymmetries are particularly severe the intermediary improves the information that buyers have about quality this in turn increases the incentives that the seller has to provide high quality goods efficiency is increased by the presence of the intermediary but quality is underprovided in equilibrium relative to full information the intermediary can implement the optimal policy in many ways the amount of information revealed ranges from full disclosure to partial noisy disclosure

voluntary quality disclosure and market interaction marketers disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels this study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information we show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm in addition sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure behavior the disclosure leader reveals unambiguously less information than in the simultaneous disclosure case whereas the follower ex ante reveals less more private information than that released by the leader or by the firms in the simultaneous case when the disclosure cost is sufficiently low high we also examine the equilibrium firm profits and social welfare we demonstrate that there may be a u shaped relationship between equilibrium monopoly profits or social welfare under both monopoly and duopoly and the disclosure cost moreover in comparison to the simultaneous disclosure case sequential disclosure can lead to increasingly softened competition improving both firm profitability and social welfare

energy performance certificates and investments in building energy efficiency a theoretical analysis abstract in the european union energy performance certificates epcs provide potential buyers or tenants with information on a property s energy performance by mitigating informational asymmetries on real estate markets the conventional wisdom is that they will reduce energy use increase energy efficiency investments and improve social welfare we develop a model that partly contradicts these predictions although epcs always improve social welfare in the absence of market failures other than asymmetric information their impact on energy use and investments is ambiguous and depends both on the time horizon considered and the distribution of energy needs in the population this implies that in a second best world where energy externalities are under priced epcs can damage social welfare

bargaining laws and unionization in the local public sector this paper analyzes the effects of bargaining law characteristics on rates of unionization in over 10 000 local government departments representing five different government services that were without bargaining units in 1977 duty to bargain laws significantly increased the probability of bargaining union formation between 1977 and 1982 the results of the analysis reject the hypotheses that this effect reflects only underlying union strength the release of pent up demand for unionization or the transformation of nonbargaining unions into bargaining unions the changes in unionization attributable to duty to bargain laws are so large that they account for nearly all of the differences in average unionization rates between states with and without these laws

the economic value to smokers of graphic warning labels on cigarettes evidence from combining market and experimental auction data abstract many countries now require prominent pictorial health warning labels hwls on the front and back of cigarette packages in the us pictorial hwls have been adopted but tobacco industry litigation has delayed their implementation this intervention could have value to smokers if it increases their information and changes their smoking behavior in this paper we estimate the value of two different health warning labels for cigarette packages relative to the current us labeling policy our methodology does not depend on the personal values of policy makers or other individuals as the value of information estimates we derive are based solely on smokers own consumption choices not any public health or other effects we introduce an approach to valuing information with a surplus measure that couples willingness to pay from non hypothetical experimental auctions with time series revealed preference demand estimates we find that a pictorial hwl has a large value to smokers and a higher value than a label that only contains text insofar as changing purchase behavior

are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences in campaigns candidates often avoid taking positions on issues concealing the policy preferences that would guide them if elected this paper describes a novel explanation for ambiguity in political campaigns it develops a model of candidate competition in which policy motivated candidates can choose whether or not to announce their policy preferences to voters it applies eyster and rabin s econometrica 73 5 1623 1672 2005 concept of cursed equilibrium which allows for varying degrees of understanding of the connection between type policy preference and strategy whether to announce if voters updated according to bayes rule they would understand that candidates who do not announce positions are strategically concealing an unpopular policy preference in equilibrium only the most extreme candidates those located furthest from the median voter s position would choose to take no position however if voters do not sufficiently appreciate the informational content of a non announcement unraveling will not occur and both extremists and more moderate candidates will not announce positions

quality disclosure and competition we analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare we show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost when the disclosure cost is low welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly but when the disclosure cost is high welfare is higher under duopoly in either market structure disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus

quality signaling through certification in developing countries this paper studies how signaling the credence attributes of consumer goods distorts their market equilibrium in developing countries costs of certification sunk in order to achieve credibility play a key role in producing an oligopolistic market leading to high prices that form a barrier for consumers in the south to lower the cost certification is better achieved by a single independent body which can be financed either by end consumers through a fee or by public subsidies the paper identifies the conditions under which each funding mechanism is most efficient taking into account the government s budget constraint the theoretical analysis is motivated with reference to agricultural seed certification

asymmetric information adverse selection and online disclosure the case of ebay motors since the pioneering work of akerlof 1970 economists have been aware of the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets the remarkable growth in online auctions of used goods where buyers generally purchase sight unseen therefore poses a puzzle i argue that given a means for credible information disclosure sellers will voluntarily disclose their private information to buyers through online media this limits information asymmetries and adverse selection to test this theory i examine the role of information in a large online used car market ebay motors i nd that sellers selectively disclose information that information asymmetries are reduced by these disclosures and that online media such as photos text and graphics provide a rich environment for information disclosure

threshold arch models and asymmetries in volatility this paper attempts to enlarge the class of threshold heteroscedastic models tarch introduced by zakoian 1991a we show that it is possible to relax the positivity constraints on the parameters of the conditional variance unconstrained models provide a greater generality of the paths allowing for nonlinearities in the volatility cyclical behaviour is permitted as well as different relative impacts of positive and negative shocks on volatility depending on their size we give empirical evidence using french stock returns

eliciting informative feedback the peer prediction method many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities products and vendors a scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback each rater merely reports a signal and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater s report honest reporting proves to be a nash equilibrium the scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals we also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems

reforming payments to healthcare providers the key to slowing healthcare cost growth while improving quality the seemingly intractable debate about how to slow the growth of healthhe seemingly intractable debate about how to slow the growth of healthcare costs in the united states and elsewhere has traditionally boiled care costs in the united states and elsewhere has traditionally boiled down to efforts to limit prices and quantities directly in public healthdown to efforts to limit prices and quantities directly in public healthcare programs the focus in the united states is often on tighter price regulation care programs the focus in the united states is often on tighter price regulation for example the balanced budget act of 1997 achieved most of its savings by for example the balanced budget act of 1997 achieved most of its savings by reducing the growth of regulated prices in medicare for physicians hospitals reducing the growth of regulated prices in medicare for physicians hospitals and most other healthcare providers the affordable care act of 2010 also and most other healthcare providers the affordable care act of 2010 also achieved most of its scored budgetary savings which were used as a partial achieved most of its scored budgetary savings which were used as a partial offset for the costs of coverage expansions through reducing medicare price offset for the costs of coverage expansions through reducing medicare price growth elmendorf 2010 a

a structural model of the retail market for illicit drugs we estimate a model of illicit drugs markets using data on purchases of crack cocaine buyers are searching for high quality drugs but they determine drugs quality i e their purity only after consuming them hence sellers can rip off first time buyers or can offer higher quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again in equilibrium a distribution of qualities persists the estimated model implies that if drugs were legalized in which case purity could be regulated and hence observable the average purity of drugs would increase by approximately 20 percent and the dispersion would decrease by approximately 80 percent moreover increasing penalties may raise the purity and affordability of the drugs traded by increasing sellers relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first time buyers

estimating and predicting multivariate volatility thresholds in global stock markets we propose a general double tree structured ar garch model for the analysis of global equity index returns the model extends previous approaches by incorporating i several multivariate thresholds in conditional means and volatilities of index returns and ii a richer specification for the impact of lagged foreign us index returns in each threshold we evaluate the out of sample forecasting power of our model for eight major equity indices in comparison to some existing volatility models in the literature we find strong evidence for more than one multivariate threshold more than two regimes in conditional means and variances of global equity index returns such multivariate thresholds are affected by foreign us lagged index returns and yield a higher out of sample predictive power for our tree structured model setting

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

quality disclosure under consumer loss aversion consumers experience a sense of loss when a product s quality does not match their expectations to alleviate consumer loss aversion cla firms can disclose information to reduce consumers uncer

information school choice and academic achievement evidence from two experiments we examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower income families in a public school choice plan receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher performing schools parents with high scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores using random variation from each experiment we find that attending a higher scoring school increases student test scores the results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose

strategic information disclosure the case of multi attribute products with heterogeneous consumers we examine the incentives for firms to voluntarily disclose otherwise private information about quality attributes of differentiated products in particular we focus on the case of differentiated products with multiple attributes and consumers that are heterogeneous in their preferences over these attributes we show that there exist certain configurations of consumer preferences under which a firm producing a high quality product even with zero costs of disclosure may choose not to reveal the quality of its product this failure of firms to voluntarily disclose the quality of their products will arise when providing consumers with more information results in more elastic demands for these products which in turn triggers more intensive price competition and leads to lower prices and profits for all firms as a result the equilibrium in which disclosure is voluntary may diverge from that in which disclosure is mandatory

was there a peso problem in the u s term structure of interest rates 1979 1982 during the period following october 1979 through 1982 the u s federal reserve allowed interest rates to fluctuate widely in contrast to its previous policy of targeting these rates in the 1970s the policy was abandoned in 1982 in favor of an operating procedure that reduced the variation in interest rates this paper implements an estimation method to identify from the term structure of eurodollar returns the market s beliefs that the federal reserve may revert to interest rate targeting the model is not rejected and gives plausible estimates of the probability of a switch in monetary regimes copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

getting to the top of mind how reminders increase saving we provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect these empirical results do not map neatly into existing models so we provide a simple model where limited attention to exceptional expenses can generate undersaving that is in turn mitigated by reminders data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2296 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities abstract with the development of modern information technologies relying on nanotechnologies and remote sensing a number of systems can be envisaged that allow for monitoring of the negative externalities generated by producers consumers or travelers road pricing schemes or individual emission meters for automobiles are two examples we analyze a dynamic model of stock pollution when the regulator has incomplete information on emissions generated by heterogeneous agents our contribution is to explicitly study a decentralized policy for adoption of monitoring equipment over time we determine the second best tax rates the pattern of monitoring technology adoption and identify conditions for the voluntary diffusion of monitoring technologies over time simulations show the welfare gains compared to alternative policies

demand inducement and the physician patient relationship the physician patient relationship is a paradigm for any expert client relationship the physician both diagnoses the patient s illness and recommends a treatment this dual role gives the physician incentive to recommend treatments whose costs outweigh their medical benefits these socially inefficient treatments correspond to the notion of physician induced demand the level of inducement chosen by the physician is shown to depend on the price and potential medical benefits of treatment and the relative diagnostic skills of physician and patient this model offers several testable hypotheses some of which are confirmed by related studies

the role of sales agents in information disclosure evidence from a field experiment with a large nationwide retailer we run a natural field experiment to measure the effects of energy use information disclosure customer rebates and sales agent incentives on demand for energy efficient durable goods although a combination of large rebates plus sales incentives substantially increases market share information and sales incentives alone each have zero statistical effect and explain at most a small fraction of the low baseline market share sales agents strategically comply only partially with the experiment targeting information to more interested consumers but not discussing energy efficiency with the disinterested majority these results suggest that seller provided information is not a major barrier to energy efficiency investments at current prices in this context data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2327 this paper was accepted by john list behavioral economics

rating the raters are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies abstract credit rating agencies cras are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products in response to this accusation cras argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them since their reputation is at stake the objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies we show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the cra income comes from other sources than rating complex products by contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the cra we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough we provide some empirical support for this prediction by showing that ceteris paribus the proportion of subprime residential mortgage backed securities rmbs that were rated aaa by the three main cras indeed increased over the last eight years we analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of cras that we call the platform pays model

the predictive power of the term structure of interest rates in europe and the united states implications for the european central bank abstract this paper examines the relationship of the term structure of interest rates to monetary policy instruments and to subsequent real activity and inflation in both europe and the united states the results show that monetary policy is an important determinant of the term structure spread but is unlikely to be the only determinant in addition there is significant predictive power for both real activity and inflation the yield curve is thus a simple and accurate measure that should be viewed as one piece of useful information which along with other information can be used to help guide european monetary policy

bargaining laws as a cause and consequence of the growth of teacher unionism this study analyzes state level data for 1959 78 to determine whether the rapid growth of teacher unionism during those years was primarily a result or a cause of the public sector bargaining laws adopted during the same period the author finds contrary to the view of some scholars that the enactment of laws requiring public sector employers to bargain with majority representatives of their employees was the single most important cause of the growth in the proportion of teachers covered by union contracts although the growth in teacher unionism in turn encouraged the adoption of some new or stronger bargaining laws this effect was relatively weak more important predictors of new bargaining laws included the extent of political patronage in a state and the bargaining laws adopted by neighboring states

the advertising mix for a search good we extend the persuasion game to bring it squarely into the economics of advertising we model advertising as exciting consumer interest into learning more about the product and determine a firm s equilibrium choice of advertising content over quality information price information and horizontal match information equilibrium is unique whenever advertising is necessary the outcome is a separating equilibrium with quality unravelling lower quality firms need to provide more information for a given quality level as a function of consumer visit costs first quality information is disclosed then price information and then horizontal product information are added to the advertising mix some suggestive evidence is provided from airline ads in newspapers this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

regulating innovation with uncertain quality information risk and access in medical devices we study the impact of regulating product entry and quality information requirements on an oligopoly equilibrium and consumer welfare product testing can reduce consumer uncertainty but also increase entry costs and delay entry using variation between eu and us medical device regulations we document patterns consistent with valuable learning from more stringent us requirements to derive welfare implications we pair the data with a model of supply demand and testing regulation us policy is indistinguishable from the policy that maximizes total surplus in our estimated model while the european union could benefit from more testing post market surveillance could further increase surplus

the effect of information on product quality evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards this study examines the effect of an increase in product quality information to consumers on e rms choices of product quality in 1998 los angeles county introduced hygiene quality grade cards to be displayed in restaurant windows we show that the grade cards cause i restaurant health inspection scores to increase ii consumer demand to become sensitive to changes in restaurants hygiene quality and iii the number of foodborne illness hospitalizations to decrease we also provide evidence that this improvement in health outcomes is not fully explained by consumers substituting from poor hygiene restaurants to good hygiene restaurants these results imply that the grade cards cause restaurants to make hygiene quality improvements

tree structured multiple regimes in interest rates this article develops a generalized tree structured gts model of the short term interest rate that accommodates regime dependent mean reversion and regime dependent volatility clustering and level effects in the conditional variance the model is constructed using the idea of multivariate tree structured thresholds and nests the popular generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and square root processes as simple special cases it allows us to estimate the optimal number of regimes endogenously from the data and to exploit possible additional information in the term structure and in other macroeconomic variables we provide empirical evidence of the strong potential of the gts model in forecasting conditional first and second moments also in comparison with alternative models of the short rate

adverse selection in electronic markets evidence from online stamp auctions we analyze adverse selection costs in online stamp auctions based on a comparison of prices on ebay with those of matched stamps at a specialty stamps auction site in the u s michael rogers inc mr which we know a priori has low quality uncertainty we find that buyer prices are 10 15 lower on ebay as compared to mr and the price difference increases with the value of the stamps consistent with this adverse selection discount we find that the seller reputation mechanism on ebay has an economically modest although statistically significant effect on auction price and probability of sale

report cards the impact of providing school and child test scores on educational markets this paper studies study the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores prices and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers a randomly selected half of the sample villages markets received report cards this increased test scores by 0 11 standard deviations decreased private school fees by 17 percent and increased primary enrollment by 4 5 percent heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores higher enrollment and lower fees

does conflict of interest lead to biased coverage evidence from movie reviews media outlets are increasingly owned by conglomerates inducing a conflict of interest a media outlet can bias its coverage to benefit companies in the same group we test for bias by examining movie reviews in media outlets owned by news corp such as the wall street journal and time warner such as time we find higher ratings for 20th century fox movies in news corp outlets compared to movies by other studios to disentangle bias from correlation of taste we introduce and validate a novel matching procedure using individual movie ratings from online platforms using this procedure we find no evidence of bias in news corp nor time warner outlets we reject even small effects such as bias of one extra star out of four every thirteen movies we test for differential bias when the return to bias is plausibly higher examine bias by media outlet and by journalist as well as editorial bias we also consider bias by omission whether media outlets are more likely to review highly rated movies by affiliated studios and conflict of interest within a movie aggregator in none of these dimensions do we find evidence of bias we relate to previous work and discuss three explanations for the lack of bias in our setting high values of media reputation organizational features in a conglomerate and low returns to bias

tie in sales and price discrimination this paper analyzes a class of contracts between buyers and sellers which specifies that the purchase of one good cannot be effectuated unless a second good is also purchased the economic forces resulting from a tie in are shown to be influenced by factors such as depreciation of the tying good the sales policy of the firm and the discount rate price discrimination the traditional hypothesis for this tie in is seen to make sense only when these factors align themselves in particular ways although an alternative hypothesis risk reduction is unaffected by these factors the price discrimination hypothesis therefore loses much of its appeal relative to the alternative

price discrimination with differentiated products definition and identification i introduction price discrimination is said to exist when the same product is sold to different consumers at different prices most economists also agree that price discrimination is at work when similar but not identical products are sold at prices that do not reflect differences in costs economics textbooks are rife with examples such as student or senior citizen discounts hardcover and paperback versions of books dinner versus lunch prices at restaurants airfares with various restrictions and price spreads of retail gasoline products on the other hand some economists have criticized the identification of such apparent price anomalies as price discrimination for example lott and roberts 1991 argue that there are usually cost based explanations for these phenomena and propose such explanations for the cases of airfare gasoline and restaurant prices nevertheless the authors do not challenge the conventional wisdom that price differences that cannot be explained by cost differences are discriminatory in recent years a number of papers have set out to empirically assess instances of alleged price discrimination the literature goes to great lengths to control for potential sources of cost variation among different products and thus to the extent that it is successful is not subject to the lott roberts critique almost all studies conclude that price discrimination is practiced in the particular market they analyze a skeptic of course could always argue that some sources of cost variation have not been accounted for and thus dismiss the results as erroneous despite the mild controversy over the methodology and its effectiveness the basic premise seems universally accepted the existence of price variation that cannot be explained by cost differences constitutes price discrimination this is not however a formal definition in fact there is no single widely accepted definition of price discrimination when products are not homogeneous some authors define price discrimination to exist when price cost margins absolute differences between differentiated products are unequal whereas others prefer to compare price cost markups percentage differences few authors have discussed the relative merits of one measure over the other 1 the relationship between the two has never been spelled out and the choice among them remains arbitrary in this article i aim to shed some light on this issue and provide some guidelines to empirical researchers interested in price discrimination i start by providing an overview of the current state of the literature in section ii i introduce the two competing definitions of price discrimination and briefly discuss the justification that has been provided for each i then review the empirical literature that uses one or the other definition as the basis of testing for price discrimination i present the basic methodology and discuss the definitional choices made by researchers investigating different market environments the picture that emerges from this overview is murky and provides little guidance to the empirical practitioner the absence of controversy on the choice of definition might simply reflect the fact that the two commonly used definitions are equivalent in section iii i show that this is not the case specifically it is possible for one definition to indicate the presence of price discrimination and for the other one to reject it it is also possible for the two measures to take opposite signs that is one product may have a higher markup and a lower margin than the other i also show that in general the margin criterion is more likely to indicate the presence of price discrimination i conclude that the choice of definition has important implications and should be given careful consideration the challenge is to come up with a consistent way of thinking about price discrimination that can easily be applied in a variety of settings

monetary policy regimes implications for the yield curve and bond pricing abstract we develop a multivariate dynamic term structure model which takes into account the nonlinear time varying relation between interest rates and the state of the economy in contrast to the classical term structure literature in which nonlinearities are captured by increasing the number of latent state variables or by latent regime shifts in our no arbitrage framework the regimes are governed by thresholds and are directly linked to economic fundamentals specifically starting from a simple monetary policy model for the short rate we introduce a parsimonious and tractable model for the yield curve which takes into account the possibility of regime shifts in the behavior of the federal reserve in our empirical analysis we show the merit of our approach three dimensions interpretable bond dynamics accurate short end yield curve pricing and yield curve implications

the motivation and bias of bureaucrats many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about their jobs rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is the focus of this paper and three primary results are shown first bureaucrats should be biased second sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests for a range of bureaucracies those who are biased against clients lead to more efficient outcomes third self selection need not produce the desired bias instead selection to bureaucracies is likely to be bifurcated in the sense that it becomes composed of those who are most preferred by the principal and those who are least preferred

reacting to rankings evidence from america s best hospitals rankings and report cards have become a popular way of providing information in a variety of domains i estimate the response to rankings in the hospital market and find that hospitals that improve their rank are able to attract significantly more patients the average hospital in my sample experiences a 5 change in non emergency medicare patient volume from year to year due to rank changes these findings have implications regarding the competitiveness of hospital markets and the effect that the dissemination of quality information in hospital markets can have on individual choice

how product standardization affects choice evidence from the massachusetts health insurance exchange this paper examines the effect of choice architecture on massachusetts health insurance exchange a policy change standardized cost sharing parameters of plans across insurers and altered information presentation post change consumers chose more generous plans and different brands but were not more price sensitive we use a discrete choice model that allows the policy to affect how attributes are valued to decompose the policy s effects into a valuation effect and a product availability effect the brand shifts are largely explained by the availability effect and the generosity shift by the valuation effect a hypothetical choice experiment replicates our results and explores alternative counterfactuals

that s news to me information revelation in professional certification markets i introduction market economies devote substantial resources to certify product quality educational testing services ets offers sat tests for college applicants u s news world report ranks universities underwriters laboratories certifies consumer and industrial products moody s reports bond ratings and accounting companies audit financial reports for public corporations in theory if one party of the trade possesses superior information about product quality a professional certificate can alleviate the information asymmetry and therefore attenuate the lemons problem and facilitate trade akerlof 1970 1 the informational role of professional certification has profound implications for markets yet little is known empirically how professional certifiers behave and compete indeed while theories have advanced to making welfare comparisons across market structures franzoni 1999 lizzeri 1999 and regulators express concerns about the market power of certifiers u s securities and exchange commission sec 2003 little is known about the primitive facts on market structure and certifier performance for example what information does a monopoly certifier provide who obtains useful information from such a certificate how do subsequent entrants compete with the incumbent and whether and to what extent entrants provide information to the market are all fundamental questions to which we have limited insights the lack of clean empirical evidence is not surprising since observational data alone might confound criteria differences and sorting effects rendering field data suggestive but not entirely compelling indeed even when field data circumvent these problems too many theoretically relevant factors change simultaneously to allow a clean comparative static test the goal of this paper is to use two controlled field experiments to provide empirical insights on these basic questions using sportscard grading as an example we employ an approach field experiments that might prove useful for future scholars studying related phenomena for decades a popular tool in the literature to answer such questions has been an event study event studies infer information content by comparing for example market prices before and after the release of bond ratings or analysts earnings report assuming market price is a sufficient statistic of the information available to the market the event study approach has two caveats it is difficult to control simultaneous information flow and it is difficult to pin down the exact timing of the arrival of the certificate rumors may spread before the official announcement we overcome these difficulties by collecting data from one natural field experiment and one framed field experiment see harrison and list 2004 for a detailed discussion of natural versus framed field experiments both experiments are undertaken in naturally occurring settings where the key theoretical factors are identifiable and arise endogenously our chosen market the sportscard grading industry is attractive in this regard for several reasons first there is a generally agreed upon set of traits for grading sportscards and quality is a major determinant of price second the industry is relatively young and thus far has been unregulated third there has been little change in the grading technology but the industry has evolved dramatically over the last 20 yr specifically the first grading service professional sports authenticators psa began operating in 1987 and now belongs to a publicly traded company due to institutional reasons detailed below psa has not changed its grading system since its inception in 1999 the market expanded and two competitors entered the market sportscard guaranty llc sgc entered in early 1999 and beckett grading services bgs entered later in 1999 all three services continue operating today and at least 14 other fringe grading companies have joined the market since 1999

does competition improve analysts forecast informativeness this paper studies the effect of competition on analysts forecast informativeness analysts compete to achieve a higher rank in forecast accuracy competition can impair improve or have no effec

the short run and long run effects of behavioral interventions experimental evidence from energy conservation we document three remarkable features of the opower program in which social comparison based home energy reports are repeatedly mailed to more than six million households nationwide first initial reports cause high frequency action and backsliding but these cycles attenuate over time second if reports are discontinued after two years effects are relatively persistent decaying at 10 20 percent per year third consumers are slow to habituate they continue to respond to repeated treatment even after two years we show that the previous conservative assumptions about post intervention persistence had dramatically understated cost effectiveness and illustrate how empirical estimates can optimize program design jel d12 d83 l94 q41

modeling and forecasting short term interest rates the benefits of smooth regimes macroeconomic variables and bagging in this paper we propose a smooth transition tree model for both the conditional mean and variance of the short term interest rate process the estimation of such models is addressed and the asymptotic properties of the quasi maximum likelihood estimator are derived model specification is also discussed when the model is applied to the us short term interest rate we find 1 leading indicators for inflation and real activity are the most relevant predictors in characterizing the multiple regimes structure 2 the optimal model has three limiting regimes moreover we provide empirical evidence of the power of the model in forecasting the first two conditional moments when it is used in connection with bootstrap aggregation bagging

right to work laws new evidence from the stock market 1 introduction business organizations the national right to work committee and organized labor periodically devote enormous resources to battles over passage or repeal of individual state rightto work rtw laws all rtw laws outlaw union shop agreements clauses in collective bargaining agreements that require employees to join the union that represents them and about half also outlaw agency shop agreements clauses in collective bargaining agreements that require nonmembers to pay a fee to the union to cover the cost of representation supporters of rtw argue that employees should not be required to pay dues to a labor organization that they do not support opponents argue that because union contracts and grievance arbitration systems cover all employees members and nonmembers rtw laws encourage free riding by individuals who want to gain the benefits of unionization without bearing the costs and that this weakens labor unions are rtw laws largely symbolic or do they reduce union membership the probability of union growth and union bargaining power informed opinion is still sharply divided one view is that rtw laws reduce the probability of union organizing at least in the years immediately following their passage and that this along with lower levels of membership in previously organized units reduces the level of unionization in a state e g hirsch 1980 carroll 1983 garofalo and malhotra 1992 davis and huston 1993 1995 ellwood and fine 1987 present evidence that the effect on new organizing is most severe with new organizing diminished between 32 and 38 in the 10 years after passage of a rtw law 1 zax and ichniowski 1991 see also ichniowski and zax 1991 demonstrate that the dampening of new organizing extends to the public sector when it operates under rtw laws even when those laws are favorable to unions in other respects others however argue that rtw legislation is largely symbolic it reflects the prevailing anti union opinion climate of a particular state but has little independent impact on union organizing or membership moore and newman 1985 1975 wessels 1981 lumsden and peterson 1975 sobel 1995 presents evidence on the true number of free riders consistent with the taste hypothesis rtw legislation is passed in this perspective in states in which public opinion is anti union and the labor movement is politically weak in these states workers are less attracted to unions and it is this public opinion climate rather than the law itself that hurts union growth 2 we present a new type of evidence on this issue from two states in which public opinion had turned sharply against unions or at least in favor of rtw in the period before the passage of a rtw law we reason that if passage of the rtw law itself actually lowers the probability of unionization or reduces the bargaining power of unions operating within a particular state beyond the effect of the prior shift in attitudes then anticipated future profits of firms operating in that state will rise in response to passage of that law because unions are associated with lower firm profits 3 hence equity values of those firms will increase we use event study methodology to discover whether or not this actually happened in louisiana when it passed a rtw law in 1976 and in idaho when it passed a rtw law in 1985 1986 4 louisiana and idaho are both well suited to research based on the event study technique legislative action in both states took place in the period in which daily stock price data are available from all three sources of stock price data new york american and nasdaq 5 daily as opposed to monthly stock price data are much more likely to reveal statistically significant changes in shareholder equity brown and warner 1985 because we use daily rather than monthly data a finding of no statistically significant change in shareholder equity would be valid evidence that rtw laws are symbolic rather than substantive

rational expectations econometric analysis of changes in regime an investigation of the term structure of interest rates abstract this paper is of interest both for its methodological contribution of new tools for analyzing rational expectations models and for its substantive conclusions concerning the term structure of interest rates during the monetary experiment of october 1979 the paper studies systems subject to changes in regime interpreted here as occasional discrete shifts in the parameters governing the time series behavior of exogenous economic variables the specification is shown to be quite tractable both theoretically and empirically the technique is used to analyze yields on three month treasury bills and ten year treasury bonds during 1962 to 1987 a constant parameter linear model for short term rates is shown to be inconsistent both with the univariate time series properties of short rates and with the observed bivariate relation between long and short rates under the expectations hypothesis of the term structure an alternative nonlinear model that admits the possibility of changes in regime affords a much better description of the univariate process for short rates moreover the cross equation restrictions implied by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure are consistent with the nonlinear specification indeed the residuals of the restricted relation have a standard error of only 0 8 basis points this is a third less than that of a completely unrestricted linear regression of long rates on short rates and compares with an unconditional standard deviation of long rates of 142 basis points i conclude that once the recognition by bond traders of changes in regime is taken into account the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates holds up fairly well for these data

quality disclosure and certification theory and practice this essay reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on quality disclosure and certification after comparing quality disclosure with other quality assurance mechanisms and describing a brief history of quality disclosure we address two sets of theoretical issues first why don t sellers voluntarily disclose through a process of unraveling and given the lack of unraveling is it desirable to mandate seller disclosure second when we rely on certifiers to act as the intermediary of quality disclosure do certifiers necessarily report unbiased and accurate information we further review empirical evidence on these issues with a particular focus on healthcare education and finance the empirical review covers quality measurement the effect of third party disclosure on consumer choice and seller behavior as well as the economics of certifiers jel d18 k32 l15 m31

school quality and information disclosure evidence from the housing market i introduction tiebout s 1956 theory tying residential sorting patterns to the provision of local public goods provided the foundation for a large and growing literature assessing the relationship between school quality and housing markets many of these studies have used housing prices to directly estimate the monetary value of improvements in student test scores to parents and homeowners few have focused on the role of information in mediating relationships between buyers sellers schools and housing values 1 fewer still have examined the behavior of home sellers and their role in the provision of information on school quality this article takes a step toward filling these gaps in the literature building on the unraveling theory of information disclosure in the industrial organization literature grossman 1981 milgrom 1981 we first investigate the behavior of home sellers in revealing information about local schools we ask whether and how school quality affects the likelihood that a seller will reveal the identity of a property s assigned school in an online real estate listing empirical tests of unraveling are rare as the true quality of a product is typically unobserved the housing market provides a novel context to test this theory if sellers selectively reveal information on schools then information on its own controlling for school quality may have an impact on sales prices if the cost to buyers of obtaining information on school quality is sufficiently high we explore these issues empirically both in a period where the costs of gathering information are relatively high years 2001 and 2002 and in a period where these costs are presumably much lower years 2006 and 2007 between these two periods the mandates of the 2001 no child left behind nclb act coupled with the growth of the internet undoubtedly reduced the cost of information gathering for potential buyers and perhaps also lowered the costs of disclosure for sellers drawing on multiple listing service mls data of residential sales in fairfax county virginia the largest suburb of washington dc our results confirm that sellers of units located in high quality school assignment zones are on average more likely to disclose the school s identity in an online listing an increase of just ten points in an elementary school s passage rate on statewide tests increases the likelihood of information disclosure by a sizeable 5 percentage points in the 2001 2002 period a finding that is robust to a variety of alternative specifications and controls including the addition of real estate agent fixed effects predictably selective disclosure appears to be present but weaker in the 2006 2007 period when the cost of gathering information on school quality was likely lower a ten point increase in test scores yields a 2 to 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of disclosure our findings of moderate selective disclosure in the latter period hold even when we apply a school boundary discontinuity design and are robust to alternate measures of school quality including measures of adequate yearly progress under nclb in both periods we observe more selective disclosure for single family homes and those with three or more bedrooms presumably families with children than for smaller units we also find more selective disclosure in neighborhoods with high concentrations of young children our results support the findings of several previous studies bayer ferreira and mcmillan 2007 figlio and lucas 2000 confirming that school quality is more important in housing transactions involving families with children than for those without we also investigate the extent to which information disclosure is capitalized in housing prices using school fixed effects to control for school quality we find that information disclosure does not have an independent effect on a home s price

the promise and pitfalls of using imprecise school accountability measures in recent years most states have constructed elaborate accountability systems using school level test scores however because the median elementary school contains only 69 children per grade level such measures are quite imprecise we evaluate the implications for school accountability systems for instance rewards or sanctions for schools with scores at either extreme primarily affect small schools and provide weak incentives to large ones nevertheless we conclude that accountability systems may be worthwhile even in states with aggressive financial incentives the marginal reward to schools for raising student performance is a small fraction of the potential labor market value for students

a general multivariate threshold garch model with dynamic conditional correlations we introduce a new multivariate garch model with multivariate thresholds in conditional correlations and develop a two step estimation procedure that is feasible in large dimensional applications optimal threshold functions are estimated endogenously from the data and the model conditional covariance matrix is ensured to be positive definite we study the empirical performance of our model in two applications using u s stock and bond market data in both applications our model has in terms of statistical and economic significance higher forecasting power than several other multivariate garch models for conditional correlations

conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public we show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than buy recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to at the time of and subsequent to the recommendation date we conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias we show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias the results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform

regulation by shaming deterrence effects of publicizing violations of workplace safety and health laws publicizing firms socially undesirable actions may enhance firms incentives to avoid such actions in 2009 the occupational safety and health administration osha began issuing press releases about facilities that violated safety and health regulations using quasi random variation arising from a cutoff rule osha followed i find that publicizing a facility s violations led other facilities to substantially improve their compliance and experience fewer occupational injuries osha would need to conduct 210 additional inspections to achieve the same improvement in compliance as achieved with a single press release evidence suggests that employers improve compliance to avoid costly responses from workers

disclosure of information in matching markets with non transferable utility we present a model of two sided matching where utility is non transferable and information about individuals skills is private utilities are strictly increasing in the partner s skill and satisfy increasing differences skills can be either revealed or kept hidden but while agents on one side have verifiable skills agents on the other side have skills that are unverifiable unless certified and certification is costly agents who have revealed their skill enter a standard matching market while others are matched randomly we find that in equilibrium only agents with skills above a cutoff reveal and then they match assortatively we show that an equilibrium always exists and we discuss multiplicity increasing differences play an important role to shape equilibria and we remark that this is unusual in matching models with non transferable utility we close the paper with some comparative statics exercises where we show the existence of non trivial externalities and welfare implications