taxing the unobservable the impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation summary because the shadow economy cannot be taxed it erodes the tax base and reduces tax revenues forcing governments to resort to other ways to finance their expenditures accordingly a larger shadow economy should give governments an incentive to shift revenue sources from taxes to inflation in line with the public finance motive of inflation in this paper we recall that point in a simple canonical model then empirically test it in a sample of up to 153 developed and developing countries over the 1999 2007 period in line with the model s prediction we indeed observe a positive relation between inflation and the size of the shadow economy and a negative relation between the tax burden and the size of the shadow economy we find that both relations are conditional on central bank independence and on the exchange rate regime implying that it is the strongest in institutional set ups that constrain monetary policy the least both relations are present in the sub sample of developed countries as well as the sub sample of developing countries both relations survive several robustness checks using various sets of control variables including the stock of debt controlling for endogeneity using alternative estimates of the shadow economy and estimating the two relations as a system of equations

the rule of law and economic growth where are we summary it is widely assumed that the rule of law is essential for economic growth however the rule of law is clearly a multidimensional concept encompassing a variety of discrete components from security of person and property rights to checks on government and control of corruption we review the theory underlying these different causal mechanisms linking the rule of law to economic growth and provide an introduction to some outstanding measurement issues we find that the correlation among different components of the rule of law concept are not tight among developing countries and that some inferences about the effects of property rights protection may not be warranted

on the dynamics of demand for leisure and the production of health our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the assumption that an individual maximizes lifetime utility subject to budget and time constraints and a health production function by choosing hours of leisure and levels of consumption of health related and health neutral goods and services moreover we use a very comprehensive health index that combines four scales measuring a variety of dimensions in the quality of life the euler equations derived from our model are estimated using data from six biennial panels of the retirement history survey

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

three lenses on the multinational enterprise politics corruption and corporate social responsibility scholars who analyze multinational enterprises mnes recognize the complex relationship between international business ib and society however compared with other ib topics research on politics corruption and corporate social responsibility three lenses on the mne remains somewhat embryonic with unresolved issues regarding frameworks measurement methods and theory this presents unique opportunities for integration and extension of disciplinary perspectives which we explore in this article we provide an introduction to potential linkages across these three lenses an agenda for additional theoretical and empirical research and a review of the papers in the jibs focused issue

corruption investments and contributions to public goods experimental evidence from rural liberia we analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods we obtain a proxy for corruption among liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to the chief we then use the gap between these measurements missing inputs to explain variation in investment behavior of villagers investment behavior is gauged with two simple artefactual field experiments our main results are that corruption i undermines incentives for voluntary contributions to local public goods and ii may reduce private investments of individuals subject to rent seeking by the chief in real life we also provide weaker evidence that the impact of corruption on investments and contributions to public goods is heterogeneous this impact may be gender specific and appears to vary with accessibility of communities

the peter pan syndrome in emerging markets the productivity transparency trade off in it adoption firms invest in technology to increase productivity yet in emerging markets where a culture of informality is widespread information technology it investments leading to greater transparency can impose a cost through higher taxes and the need for regulatory compliance the tendency of firms to avoid productivity enhancing technologies and remain small to avoid transparency has been dubbed the peter pan syndrome we examine whether firms make the trade off between productivity and transparency by examining it adoption in the indian retail sector we find that computer technology adoption is lower when firms are motivated to avoid transparency specifically technology adoption is lower when there is greater corruption but higher when there is better enforcement and auditing so firms have a higher productivity gain threshold to adopt computers in corrupt business environments that suffer from patchy and variable enforcement of the tax laws not accounting for this motivation to hide from the formal sector underestimates productivity gains from computer adoption thus in addition to their direct effects on the economy enforcement auditing and corruption can have indirect effects through their negative impact on adoption of productivity enhancing technologies that also increase operational transparency

beyond bankruptcy does the us bankruptcy code provide a fresh start to entrepreneurs abstract this paper assesses the extent to which the us bankruptcy system is effective in providing small businesses a fresh start after a bankruptcy filing i use data from the 1993 1998 and 2003 national survey of small business finances to explore how firms fare after a bankruptcy filing on the positive side previously bankrupt firms are not any more burdened than the average small firm by problems relating to profitability cash flow health insurance costs or taxes further the fact that these firms are surviving several years after the filing is itself a testament to the efficient functioning of the us bankruptcy system it suggests that the bankruptcy system goes a long way toward helping businesses recover after a bankruptcy filing however the one area of concern that persists after a filing is financing or credit access in general these firms have a nearly 24 percentage point higher likelihood of being denied a loan and are charged interest rates that are more than 1 percentage point higher than those charged to other businesses a bankruptcy affects all types of financing even trade credit which is a significant form of lending between businesses in fact it appears that firms with a bankruptcy record are rationed out of the market with all types of loans being denied at significantly higher rates than other firms further my results show that bankruptcy leads to a class of discouraged borrowers who are significantly less likely to even apply for a loan

bribery in international business transactions globalization leads to cross border business transactions between societies with very different norms and regulations regarding bribery bribery in international business transactions can be seen as a function of not only the demand for such bribes in different countries but the supply or willingness to provide bribes by multinational firms and their representatives this study addresses the propensity of firms from 30 different countries to engage in international bribery the study incorporates both domestic economic development culture and domestic corruption in the supplying country and international factors those countries patterns of trade and involvement in international accords in explaining the willingness to bribe abroad the propensity to provide bribes was the lowest when corruption was not tolerated in the multinational firms home countries when the firms countries were signatories of the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd anti bribery convention and when those countries traded heavily with wealthier nations further these findings are maintained when controlling for levels of economic development and cultural values in the supplying country in terms of culture firms from high power distance countries showed a somewhat greater propensity for providing bribes in transactions with less developed nations

tax morale and prosocial behaviour evidence from a palestinian survey the first empirical investigation is conducted into the relationship between prosocial behaviour and tax morale in the context of state capacity building as in the palestinian territories we consider public spirit a positive attitude adopted by citizens for the benefit of the community and associational activity individuals engagement in voluntary activities two major expressions of prosocial behaviour and estimate their impact on palestinians tax morale intrinsic motivation to pay taxes the empirical analysis employs a unique palestinian public opinion survey conducted in 2007 in the west bank and the gaza strip by using a bivariate probit model we find that tax morale increases with public spirit but it is lower among palestinians involved in associational activities predicted conditional probabilities indicate that public spirit has more impact when the respondent has low confidence in the institutions and in the rule of law finally more public spirit is required for a self employed person in order to deal with tax compliance than for a worker in the public sector unless the worker in the public sector has lower confidence in the institutions and in the rule of law than the self employed person

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

who receives medical care income implicit prices and the distribution of medical services among pregnant women in the united states the distribution of medical services among pregnant married women in the united states in 1980 is very unequal this distribution is examined to assess the predominant effect of tax transfer and insurance schemes on the implicit prices of medical services facing women differing by socioeconomic status healthiness and race estimates of the determinants of the probability of receiving four major prenatal medical services are obtained controlling both for socioeconomic status and for initial health status as inferred from estimates of health technology determining birthweight results reject the hypotheses that medical services are provided only on the basis of medical need or are allocated in a market in which the implicit price of care is invariant to husband s income the combined effect of taxes and transfers is found to reduce the implicit price paid for these four medical services by rich compared to poor married women in the united states and thus to encourage their use by higher income and education groups

the informal sector in developed and less developed countries a literature survey the main goal of this study is two fold 1 to provide ageneral overview of the contributions to the literature on theinformal sector with a special focus on the public choiceapproach and 2 to compare these contributions across twoinstitutionally different types of countries developed andless developed developing and transition countries thepaper focuses on the criteria used to define the informalsector the relationship between the formal and informaleconomy tax evasion and public choice analysis it isstressed throughout this paper that the distinction betweenthe two types of countries is of key importance

corruption centralization and the shadow economy in their pioneering work on corruption shleifer and vishny 1993 find that a centralized bureaucracy results in lower bribes our paper extends the analysis to economies with formal and informal sectors when corrupt officials operate in both sectors bureaucratic centralization is beneficial when confined to the formal sector however we show that crosssector centralization can result in higher bribes and lower welfare furthermore contrary to choi and thum 2005 we demonstrate that depending on the organization of the bureaucracy and the productivity of the informal sector the presence of the shadow economy may have adverse effects on corruption and welfare

why do firms hide bribes and unofficial activity after communism abstract our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden unofficial activity to be much larger in russia and ukraine than in poland slovakia and romania a comparison of cross country averages shows that managers in russia and ukraine face higher effective tax rates worse bureaucratic corruption greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith in the court system our firm level regressions for the three eastern european countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output

protection and social order abstract consider a simple world populated with two types of individuals those who work and create wealth peasants and those who steal the property of others bandits with bandits about peasants need to protect their output and can do so individually or collectively either way protection is costly it consumes resources and interferes with an individual s ability to create wealth this study investigates how individuals might make decisions in such circumstances how those decisions evolve over time and how broader societal characteristics can emerge from such decisions

job search and mobility in developing countries theory and policy implications abstract a labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive we show that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium in this dual economy we then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms profits we find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages we also find that an employment wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications in particular the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it

understanding the demand side issues of international corruption in global business business organizations and their representatives frequently encounter corruption and may be the perpetrators victims or simply participants in such acts while international corruption has existed in multiple forms for several years many individuals companies nations and international organizations are currently attempting to reduce or eliminate corrupt acts because of their harmful effects on local economies and the quality of life of citizens several of these corruption curtailment efforts have been directed toward the supply side of corruption i e those who make corrupt payments in developing an understanding of corruption however and formulating strategies for its reduction consideration must also be given to the demand side of corruption i e those who demand and accept corrupt payments accordingly this study examined the demand side of corruption and several related factors in the categories of government economy and poverty education geography and culture analysis of these factors employed the corruption perceptions index cpi formulated annually by transparency international ti and other sources several factors in each of the five categories were found to correlate significantly with perceived corruption and strategies for addressing these issues were developed and discussed

an empirical investigation of u s firms in reorganization the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization we find the recontracting framework of chapter 11 to be complex lengthy and costly violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered these deviations may result from the bargaining process of chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder oriented management to preserve firm value an example of such recontracting addresses myers underinvestment problem an investigation of the effects of chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter

the productivity of trust this paper tests whether social trust affects total factor productivity tfp using both development and growth accounting we find strong evidence of a causal positive effect of social trust on the level and growth of tfp we moreover observe that the effect of social trust on tfp runs through economic judicial institutions but not through political institutions those findings resist a series of robustness checks

does social trust determine the size of the welfare state evidence using historical identification most modern welfare states offer an extensive array of services and benefits that are wholly or partly financed by tax revenue one missing link in explaining the long run sustainability of such comprehensive welfare states could be the already existing stock of trust indeed our cross country results suggest that trust determines the size of welfare states as well as three features that are arguably necessary for their preservation high levels of political confidence strong legal institutions protecting private property rights and low levels of bureaucratic corruption

initial shareholdings and overbidding in takeover contests within the context of takeovers this paper shows that in private value auctions the optimal individually rational strategy for a bidder with partial ownership of the item is to overbid i e to bid more than his valuation this strategy however can lead to i an inefficient outcome and ii the winning bidder making a net loss further the overbidding result implies that the presence of a large shareholder increases the bid premium in single bidder takeovers at the expense of reducing the probability of the takeover actually occurring

the impact of corruption on investment predictability matters abstract this paper argues that it is not only level of corruption that affects investment but also the nature of corruption corruption regimes that are more predictable in the sense that those seeking favors from government do obtain those favors have less negative impact on investment than those that are less predictable using the data collected by world bank in preparing the world development report of 1997 we provide empirical support for the conjecture

a conceptual framework for constructing a corruption diffusion index in this paper we propose a conceptual framework for constructing a diffusion index of changes in overall perceptions with respect to corruption the corruption diffusion index we construct lies between 0 the greatest overall deterioration in corruption perceptions and 100 the greatest overall improvement in corruption perceptions with 50 no change in corruption perceptions as the critical reference the proposed methodology is applied to the 2010 2011 global corruption barometer survey data possible refinements of the proposed methodology to capture the potentially multi dimensional nature of corruption and the practical challenges associated with the empirical implementation are discussed

who trusts others community and individual determinants of social capital in a low income country this study presents new evidence on individual and community specific determinants of social trust using data from 96 villages in bangladesh we find perceived institutional trust to be positively correlated with stated inter personal trust at the same time there is significant social distance among various faith groups in our data both hindus and muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions moreover hindus trust christians buddhists and ngo workers more than muslims and are not distrustful of the wider society trust towards non muslims is negatively correlated with islamic school attendance among muslim respondents while religiosity tends not to play any role compared to religion the effects of institutional trust and local economic development are modest these findings are robust to control for a range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects

insecurity and the pattern of trade an empirical investigation corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade this paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade we find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do we also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods finally we argue that cross country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and the consequent variation in the prices of traded goods offer a simple explanation for the stylized fact that high income capital abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other

tax evasion in transition outcome of an institutional clash testing feige s conjecture in albania a field survey of households was conducted in tirana albania in 2000 a response rate of 89 3 yielded 1 340 valid questionnaires allowing me to test feige s in nelson j m tilley c walker l eds transforming post communist political economics national academy press washington dc p 21 conjecture that more tax evasion will be observed when formal and informal institutions clash respondents attitudes towards formal and informal institutions were obtained by applying factor analysis to their responses to a series of attitudinal questions the theoretical importance of the interaction between formal and informal institutions in determining tax evasion finds empirical support in the data

the impact of corruption on entry strategy evidence from telecommunication projects in emerging economies with globalization and the growth in emerging economies multinational enterprises mnes now frequently confront challenges associated with corrupt governments already a growing body of research has demonstrated that corruption significantly reduces a countrys aggregate inflows of foreign direct investment through its effects on firm performance we move the analysis of corruption from aggregate financial flows toward managerial theory and practice by examining how firms adjust their strategy for entering foreign markets in corrupt environments and how different types of corruption affect firms choices building on institutional theory we predict that mnes will respond to pervasive and arbitrary corruption in a host country by selecting particular types of equity and nonequity modes of entry using data on 220 telecommunications development projects in 64 emerging economies we find that firms adapt to the pressures of corruption via short term contracting and entry into joint ventures we also find that the arbitrariness surrounding corrupt transactions has a significant impact on firms decisions in addition to the overall level of corruption in contrast to extant research we show that mnes use nonequity entry modes or partnering as an adaptive strategy to participate in markets despite the presence of corruption

formal measures of the informal sector wage gap in mexico el salvador and peru using comparable micro level data from three countries we ask what type of person works in the informal sector and whether informal workers earn lower wages than observationally equivalent workers in the formal sector the characteristics of informal workers are similar across countries surprisingly when we control for these personal characteristics we find a significant wage premium associated with formal employment in el salvador and peru but a premium associated with work in the informal sector in mexico a model of endogenous selection offers little help in explaining the differences in wage patterns the research casts doubt on the received wisdom that the informal sector always and everywhere is a poorly paid but easily entered refuge for those who have no other employment opportunities this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

corruption and the shadow economy an empirical analysis this paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa we hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries the hypotheses are tested for a cross section of 98 countries our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions based indices of corruption are used employing an index of corruption based on a structural model however corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income but not in high income countries

conflicts in bankruptcy and the sequence of debt issues this paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule apr when we introduce explicit costs of class conflict the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt the implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues we test several other implications of our model as well

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

sovereign risk premia the link between fiscal rules and stability culture abstract there is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy such as fiscal rules reduce sovereign risk premia nevertheless it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters in our analysis of european bond spreads before the financial crisis we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies these proxies refer to a country s past stability performance government characteristics and survey results related to general trust we find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules yet the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture

the resolution of bankruptcy by auction allocating the residual right of design abstract in this paper we examine the value of the right to choose the method of sale of corporate assets we show that this right is valuable and that its value comes from recognizing conflicting incentives of claimants at the time of sale as with risky projects senior and junior claimants are shown to have distinct preferences on a set of common auction procedures they also differ on the issue of allocation of resources towards attracting bidders for the auction as a consequence the optimal allocation of the design right must depend on circumstances prevailing at the time of the sale while in general selling the firm by auction does not guarantee the use of optimal selling arrangements a suitable allocation of design rights may help mitigate inefficiency problems significantly

informality and credit constraints evidence from sub saharan african mses abstractthe attributes of micro and small enterprises mses influencing access to credit in particular the level and role of firm informality are analysed in the article the puzzle is the push for mses to join the formal sector and the tug to avoid the extra burden it places on the firm it is important to know more clearly what forces are at work and the sources of the causal effects this study uses data from the world bank enterprise surveys for five low income countries lics in sub saharan africa the method is empirical and as we find informality to be endogenous to credit constraints an instrumental variable approach is estimated further to address the possibility of reverse causality an instrument for the informality variable is required not registered with inland revenue tax office is the chosen instrument variable the findings reveal that as the probability of a firm operating in the formal sector increases there is greater access to external credit the causality relationships are

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

fiscal policy and the structure of production in a two sector developing economy abstract this paper develops a two sector model of a developing economy and examines the role of the informal sector in limiting the government s ability to increase tax revenues a key feature is the introduction of auditing of the informal sector and degree of tax enforcement in that sector we emphasize the interdependence between tax policy and enforcement in achieving a developing economy s fiscal objectives and show that by judicious policy choices the presence of the informal sector need not hinder its ability to raise tax revenues we supplement the formal analysis with numerical simulations highlighting the contrasting intertemporal tradeoffs implied by higher tax rates and tax enforcement levels

a panel data analysis of the effect of corruption on tourism this study empirically tests the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on tourism having to pay bribes while on holiday or a business trip increases the costs of travelling to a country where corruption is prevalent tourists are thus more likely to travel to countries where these additional costs do not need to be incurred this hypothesis is tested using a panel data set of over 100 countries and 16 years the results indicate that a 1 point increase in the corruption perception index implying a decrease in corruption results in a 2 to 7 increase in tourist inflows in addition tourist inflows rise with gdp per capita openness and growth and are higher in countries with a temperate climate

does governance cause growth evidence from china this study tests the causal relationships between quality of governance and economic growth at the provincial level in china during the post mao reform era exploiting the wide cross provincial variation and rapid change over time in governance institutions and economic performance in china during this period covering 1985 2005 the study provides a new perspective on the relationship between governance and growth whereas a large body of prior literature has demonstrated a strong positive association between high quality governance institutions and good economic performance at the cross country level few quantitative studies have explicitly tested the direction of causality between changes in governance quality and changes in economic outcomes this study aims to address this gap in the literature by testing two causal hypotheses on the interplay between provincial level governance and economic performance in china i improvements in provincial quality of governance predict subsequent economic growth rates and ii increases in provincial economic growth rates predict subsequent changes in quality of governance using new heterogeneous granger causality tests that allow for potential differences in the causal relations across provinces i show a significant and positive effect of economic growth on subsequent quality of governance largely driven by growth in the secondary sector but no significant effect of quality of governance on economic growth these findings suggest that improvements in formal governance have not been a key factor driving china s rapid growth instead the observed positive association between governance and growth reflects the ability of provincial governments to harness the potential created by economic growth to implement subsequent governance improvements for researchers studying the effect of governance on growth the results suggest that greater attention should be paid to possible reverse causality from economic outcomes to governance changes

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

informal sector the credit market channel abstract we build a model of firms choice between formality and informality complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods enforcement of property rights and contracts that make the participation in the formal credit market possible in a moral hazard framework with credit rationing their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements the model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

government policies and graft in an economy with endogenous labor supply abstract this paper is an extension of marcouiller and young s am econ rev 85 1995 630 paper which shows that in a two good economy with constant labor supply the government can always increase graft by squeezing the formal sector out of existence in this paper we find that if individuals choose the amount of labor they supply the government can increase graft by eliminating formal production in relatively rare cases

the design of bankruptcy law a case for management bias in bankruptcy reorganizations in an incomplete contracting environment bankruptcy is considered to be a renegotiation of the firm s financial contracts an optimal bankruptcy law is derived as optimal restric tions on the environment within which the claimants to a distressed firm bargain the law is used as a commitment device to ensure actions that are ex ante optimal but not subgame perfect we show that the bankruptcy court can use two types of mechanisms to implement the optimal bankruptcy outcome direct restrictions on the bargaining game between the claimants and the use of a restricted auction in both cases the restrictions prevent the strategic use of bankruptcy by firms not in financial distress provide for truthful revelation of information so that distress results in an ex post efficient allocation of resources and es tablish a bias toward the manager in reorganizations that provides correct ex ante decision making incentives

can africa compete with china in manufacturing the role of relative unit labor costs in this paper examine sub saharan africa s ssa bilateral trade and cost competitiveness with china we review patterns of bilateral trade between ssa and china showing an extraordinary imbalance in the structure of trade in that china overwhelmingly exports manufactured products to ssa and almost exclusively imports primary products in return our principal means of assessing the competitiveness of ssa s manufacturing sector vis a vis china are measures of relative unit labor costs rulc we find that african rulc levels have generally been very high relative to china but declined over the 2000s as china s wages have risen faster than chinese productivity while the reverse is true for the ssa countries in our sample nevertheless rulc vis a vis china remained elevated for many ssa countries as of 2010 generally high rulc along with weaknesses in the business climate suggest that most ssa countries are unlikely to be competitive in labor intensive manufacturing any time soon

the system of administrative and political corruption canal irrigation in south india the paper describes how some irrigation engineers raise vast amounts of illicit revenue from the distribution of water and contracts and redistribute part to superior officers and politicians it argues that the corruption system which is centred on control of personnel transfers is an important supply side reason for poor performance of canal irrigated agriculture insofar as the same system operates in other government departments it may be more important for understanding indian politics and the political influences on economic development than has previously been realised

fluidity of regulation csr nexus the multinational corporate corruption example corporate social responsibility csr is a relatively undeveloped concept despite its increasing importance to corporations one difficulty is the possible inexactness of csr another is the apparent reluctance by regulatory authorities and policy makers to intervene in the area this is largely a result of inhibitions created by traditional approaches to company law with emphasis on shareholder protection and financial disclosure the consequence is the stultification of independent development of csr by tying social issues to financial performance this attitude might not be unconnected to the theoretical and practical challenges in justifying csr and defining its scope the underlying impediment is a factual and theoretical failure to distinguish instrumental and pure ethical csr this article demonstrates that ethical csr highlights the role of regulation and a principal stance is that regulation is neither incompatible nor irreconcilable with ethical csr the article argues that cognizance of the intrinsic moral justification of pure csr is required for delineating the scope of csr as well as for clarifying the desirability and extent of its regulation it argues that the dynamic history and visage of multinational corporate corruption illuminates the fluidity of the regulation csr relationship the current and widening backlash against transnational corporate corruption is arguably a demonstration of the position that regulation and csr are not mutually exclusive and absolute concepts this article submits that recognition and application of this ethical and instrumental csr distinction is fundamental to the development of csr and resolution of connected questions of regulation

how does corruption affect public debt an empirical analysis summary this paper investigates the relationship between corruption the shadow economy and public debt it additionally examines whether the shadow economy increases the adverse effects of corruption on public debt the model is empirically tested for 126 countries over 1996 2012 using ordinary least squares ols fixed effects system generalized method of moments gmm and instrumental variable estimation and two measures of corruption the transparency international corruption perceptions index and the kaufmann et al corruption index results confirm that increased corruption and a larger shadow economy lead to an increase in public debt results additionally indicate that the shadow economy magnifies the effect of corruption on public debt suggesting that they act as complements results also suggest that a larger shadow economy reduces tax revenues and thus increases public debt similarly higher government expenditure enhances the effects of corruption on government debt hence reducing corruption should be a primary policy goal of governments given the complementarity detected between corruption and the shadow economy reducing corruption would also lead to a fall in the size of the shadow economy and public debt reducing corruption will also minimize the adverse effects of corruption on government debt through government expenditure

the impact of corruption on firm tax compliance in transition economies whom do you trust tax compliance is an important issue for gov ernments and the public alike to meet public needs and fund public mandates firms around the world are expected to comply with tax laws factors that are related to orga nizational firm tax compliance have not been sufficiently examined in the literature owing to the increasing global influence of transition economies factors associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particu larly of interest based on a sample of over 5 000 firms from 22 former soviet bloc transition economies we find that higher levels of corruption and higher levels of par ticularized trust reliance on friends and family are asso ciated with lower levels of tax compliance interestingly we also find that the negative relationship between cor ruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust trust in strangers overall our study s results suggest that institutional factors play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies

corruption and international trade an empirical investigation of african countries this paper attempts to estimate the effect of corruption on the flows of exports and imports of african countries using the gravity model approach and annual data for the period 1998 2007 we obtain negative and statistically significant correlations between the values of exports and imports and the levels of corruption in africa and trading partners thus the results support the view that corruption adversely affects international trade our estimates suggest that if a country with africa s average corruption perception index of 2 8 were to improve its corruption level to botswana s 5 9 its exports would improve by about 15 per cent and imports by about 27 per cent

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

endogenous authoritarian property rights abstract taxation and state enforcement of property rights share many common resources both are involved in determining the revenue of the state due to these interactions taxation and property rights enforcement of a proprietary state are complementary any change in the administrative capacity of the state that increases the taxation rate also increases the level of property rights enforcement and vice versa the capacity and incentive of the proprietary state to tax are also essentially the capacity and incentive to enforce property rights extra enforcement powers of the proprietary state might therefore increase rather than decrease production

economic regulations red tape and bureaucratic corruption in post communist economies summary should state regulatory involvement in the economy necessarily generate corruption while excessive regulatory burden is often treated as a cause of corruption this paper argues otherwise it distinguishes regulatory policy or de jure regulatory regimes from regulatory implementation and offers a more nuanced argument about the relationship between state regulations and bureaucratic corruption the analysis of business survey data covering 25 post communist economies demonstrates that mechanisms of regulatory implementation rather than heavy handed regulatory policy are responsible for bribery this analysis draws attention to the theoretical distinction between different types of regulatory hurdles and their differential effects on the quality of governance

ex ante efficiency of bankruptcy procedures abstract this paper suggests a framework to analyze the efficiency properties of bankruptcy procedures distinguishing between ex ante and ex post efficiency ex post efficiency consists in maximizing the ex post value of the insolvent firm whereas ex ante efficiency consists in maximizing the proceeds to creditors from the reorganization of the firm and providing incentives for the creditors to monitor the firm we show that the definition of creditors ownership rights over the company and the protection of the creditors seniority are crucial to asses the ex ante efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure

enforcement and political power in anticorruption evidence from china summary few empirical studies focused on the role of officials in the anticorruption enforcement especially in the authoritarian regime this paper uses linear panel data models with various control variables to investigate how the power of the government official in an anticorruption agency may impact the effectiveness of anticorruption campaign in china two types of political power are considered formal power is obtained when the discipline inspection secretary is also named as a vice party secretary of the province whereas informal power arises when the secretary used to work with the party secretary of the province it is found that both the formal and informal power of the secretary of the chinese communist party s discipline inspection commission i e the head of the anticorruption agency help enhance the number of corruption cases under investigation this result offers evidence to further explore how and why the anticorruption enforcement officials play their roles in a developing transitional country

the political economy of domestic tax reform in bangladesh political settlements informal institutions and the negotiation of reform abstractthis paper explains the persistence of a tax system characterised by low revenue collection and extensive informality in bangladesh it combines analysis of long term formal and informal institutions and of micro level incentives shaping negotiation of short term reform the system is unusually informal discretionary and corrupt but remains resistant to change because it delivers low and predictable tax rates to business extensive opportunities for corruption to the tax administration and an important vehicle for fundraising by political leaders and rent distribution to their elite supporters we then explore the dynamics of micro level reform and external pressure within the constraints of this overarching political bargain

tax morale in latin america in the tax compliance literature there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of tax morale in developing countries as a novelty this paper focuses thus on latin america analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically affect tax morale working with the two data sets latinobarometro and world values survey our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy furthermore people who said they knew have heard about practised tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others looking at individuals perception of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden lacking honesty and corruption are seen as the main factors we observed a significantly lower tax morale in south america mexico than in the central american caribbean area furthermore trust in the president and the officials the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax morale

the not so dark side of trust does trust increase the size of the shadow economy this paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust in a sample of countries both developed and developing that relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic policy and institutional variables to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period and to controlling for endogeneity it is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system

how to organize crime in criminal organizations diffusing information widely throughout the organization might lead to greater internal efficiency in particular since these organizations are self sustaining through enhancing trust however this may come at the cost of leaving the organization more vulnerable to external threats such as law enforcement we consider the implications of this trade off and characterize the optimal information structure rationalizing both hierarchical structures and organization in cells then we focus on the role of the external authority characterize optimal detection strategies and discuss the implications of different forms of enforcement on the internal structure of the organization and policy finally we discuss a number of applications and extensions in this paper we study the interplay between trust within an illegal organization and its vulnerability to the authorities illegal organizations function more effectively when the people who constitute them trust each other we argue that information sharing is an important factor in building internal trust and cohesion but that can leave the organization vulnerable understanding how this trade off affects an organization s information structure and productivity can allow us to assess detection policies designed to destabilize such organizations since 9 11 the u s congress has passed a 400 billion annual budget for the war on terror new domestic institutions have been created or enhanced among many others the counterterrorism section at the u s department of justice s criminal division international intelligence cooperation has been strengthened and new protocols and controversial legal tools such as the patriot act have been developed however these new agencies and institutions face the same basic questions that have challenged the prosecutors fighting organized crime in italy south america and eastern asia as well as authorities fighting terrorism all over the world now and in the past how can we learn about the internal structure of criminal organizations how should we go about investigating a criminal organization in order to break its internal cohesion how does a criminal organization react to investigation policies we highlight the fact that simply understanding the information links within an organization gives us insight into addressing these questions the anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a wide heterogeneity across the information structures of different criminal organizations the most credited theory about the mafia developed in the early 1990 s has identified the so called cupola as the highest level of the organization supposedly consisting of agents who hold large amounts of information about the organization itself and carry out the enforcement needed for the organization to function 2 these crucial agents are shielded from the authorities since they are typically not directly involved in criminal activities this theory suggests a centralized information and enforcement structure 1 previous drafts have circulated under the titles power and organizational structure under an external threat

the stability of household production technology a replication our article develops and estimates a structural model of household health production that jointly determines the demand for leisure and the demand for consumption for elderly males we use a stochastic dynamic programming framework based on the

presidential address institutions and culture how and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions this paper argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the missing link evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings first individual values consistent with generalized as opposed to limited morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non despotic political institutions in the distant past second well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are consistent with generalized morality and under different identifying assumptions this suggests a causal effect from values to institutional outcomes the paper ends with a discussion of the implications for future research jel a10 d7 e00

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

evaluating the effects of optimally distributed public programs child health and family planning interventions this paper develops and tests an optimizing model determining the distribution of family planning and health subsidies across heterogeneous households and assesses the biases in cross area estimates of the health effects of such subsidies due to public resource optimization the model incorporates both health externalities and the endogenous response of the size of the recipient population to program subsidies longitudinal data describing child health and publicly provided family planning and health programs in 20 barrios in laguna province in the philippines are used to estimate the effects of such programs on child health and the relationships between the distribution of the programs and preprogram health levels the impact of a program on a particular childs health status is viewed as dependent upon the childs length of exposure to the program a basic feature of the model is the presence of health externalities which is shown to be sufficient along with plausible features of household behavior to make selective subsidization of fertility control either alone or in combination with health investment subsidies pareto efficient the model suggests that subsidization of fertility control is likely to be pareto efficient in the presence of health or human capital externalities when human capital and family size are gross substitutes and or when any per child human capital subsidies may substitute for direct subsidies to health investment and an equalizing distribution of the subsidies the highest family planning subsidies to the lowest health recipient households is efficient when both health and family planning subsidies are used fertility control subsidies minimize the subsidy burden for donors and are highest when total subsidy expenditures per child are greatest