stagnation theory and stagnation policy following the traditions of kalecki and keynes we are led to believe that a high long term rate of growth is necessary to establish an adequate use of capacity and full employment because somehow our economy is rather inflexibly adjusted to such high long term rates of growth in this line is harrod s theory harrod 1939 1948 as well as my own maturity and stagnation steindl 1952 both explain the secular depression of the pre war decade in these terms the economy is unable to adjust to low growth rates because its savings propensity is adapted to a high one

product market imperfections and loan commitments i show in a model of competitive banks that the characteristics of loan contracts are affected by product market imperfections in the borrower s industry a bank loan commitment increases the value of a borrower firm operating in an imperfectly competitive industry and thus dominates a simple loan even in the absence of risk sharing considerations and informational asymmetries between the borrower and the bank while it is individually rational for a firm to obtain a loan commitment all the firms in that industry taken together are made worse off by the existence of loan commitments a loan commitment is a contract guaranteeing future availability of credit to a borrower at a prespecified fixed or stochastic interest rate although bank loan commitments are an important financial instrument and there exists an extensive literature analyzing them the rationale for their existence is still a matter of research this paper provides an explanation for the existence of bank loan commitments to borrowers from industries in which there is imperfect competition in the product market it is shown that in such industries the option to acquire financing at predetermined rates enhances the borrower s strategic power and thus creates value for the individual borrower consider an industry with imperfect competition where firms face the problem of noncooperatively exploiting a product market opportunity the optimal product market strategy of a firm depends on the output of its rivals a firm with access to resources at a lower marginal cost than its competitors has a strategic advantage that it can exploit to gain a larger market share and profits it is shown here that a firm that does not have such a strategic advantage can create it by purchasing for a fixed initial fee an option to acquire a factor of production such as financing at favorable terms specifically by initially negotiating a bank loan commitment the firm can finance an expansion of output to meet a strategic contingency at more favorable terms than would be possible if the expansion had to be financed in the spot market the ability to exercise the commitment enables the firm to threaten its rivals strategically and moves the industry to an equilibrium more favorable to that firm thus creating value for the borrower it is shown below that it is optimal for all firms to acquire bank loan commitments altering the industry equilibrium in the process

bank credit rationing and the customer relation abstract this paper investigates the theory that preference in situations of bank rationing is given to those customers with the strongest customer relation it has shown that within a certainty model where competitive pressure among banks requires full compensation for other bank relationships neither deposit levels nor intertemporal demand would produce the preferential treatment claimed it has also been shown that the prime borrowers would be unable to bargain effectively for credit line protection from such occasions of credit restriction

an economic rationale for the pricing structure of bank loan commitments abstract an economic rationale is provided for the competitive equilibrium deployment of commitment and usage fees in loan commitment pricing it is shown that under perfect information assessing both fees rather than just one permits optimal risk sharing when the borrower is privately informed about its probability of future commitment utilization commitment and usage fees can be used to induce borrowers to identify themselves by self selection through contract choice the equilibrium characterized here is dissipative and thus raises the usual existence questions which are addressed in the paper

the valuation of multiple claim insurance contracts this paper provides a closed form solution for the value of a multiple claim insurance contract that is subject to a deductible amount and or an upper limit on claims the solution is a time integral of european option prices the model provides three important insights first systematic risk in insurance policies is altered in the presence of deductibles and maximum indemnity levels second idiosyncratic risk affects policy valuation and the required rates of return on underwriting portfolios finally contrary to traditional actuarial intuition changes in the risk free interest rate may either increase or reduce policy values

bank credit commitments credit rationing and monetary policy when loan needs are uncertain and bankruptcy is costly contracts resembling bank credit commitments dominate ordinary debt contracts the fees charged on commitments reduce bankruptcy risk by smoothing out borrowers loan payments reduced bankruptcy risk entitles borrowers to larger loans thereby reducing the risk of quantity rationing even if commitments reduce rationing risk monetary policy is not necessarily weaker under commitment finance a rise in lenders cost of funds perhaps reflecting a monetary contraction can reduce the expected value of a project more under a commitment than under an ordinary debt contract copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

relaxing the cash in advance constraint at a fixed cost are simple trigger target portfolio rules optimal this paper studies the microeconomic foundations of trigger target rules of portfolio demand such as the demand for money it allows an agent to relax her cash in advance constraint by paying a fixed transactions cost to move between money and the interest bearing asset an example is generated where the potential of being liquidity constrained in order to avoid incurring the transactions cost can cause excessive nonconcavities of the value function in a dynamic program such that simple trigger target rules of money demand are suboptimal

credible commitments contract enforcement problems and banks intermediation as credibility assurance abstract we consider contract enforceability problems in credit transactions and justify a bank as an organizational solution to market breakdown due to unenforceable contracts specifically we explain i why loan commitments exist and ii why banks exist to sell such commitments a loan commitment resolves moral hazard more efficiently than any combination of inside equity and spot credit however the market breaks down if commitment sellers are individuals because their promises to honor contracts are not credible with a large bank a perfect sequential equilibrium is obtained in which credibility is restored

viewpoint understanding the great depression bernanke 2000 and james 2001 it is now commonplace to view the depression from an international perspective and to test causal hypotheses by comparing the experiences of countries that endured more and less severe cyclical downturns this is in contrast with the earlier generation of scholarship notably the influential work of friedman and schwartz 1963 and temin 1976 which viewed the depression as centred in the united states and focused on shocks and policies in that country specific hypotheses associated with the global perspective continue to be disputed but there seems little question that the international view serves as a point of departure for a growing portion of recent scholarship whether this new research has produced a scholarly consensus is another matter in this paper i ask whether it is possible to arrive at such a consensus by synthesizing the old and new literatures i describe a perspective that views the great depression as a global phenomenon emphasizing linkages among countries and the destabilizing influence of the international monetary and financial system but that at the same time acknowledges the uniquely important character of events and policies in the united states i thereby suggest that the opposition between the old and new or u s centric and global views of the great depression may ultimately prove artificial the task for macroeconomic and historical scholarship

transactions costs and portfolio choice in a discrete continuous time setting abstract this paper makes the following observation concerning a new formulation of the consumption and portfolio choice model of merton 1971 with transaction costs suppose an investor observes his or her current wealth only when making a transaction that transactions are costly and that decisions to transact can be made at any time based on all current information if at each transaction the agent is charged a fixed fraction of current portfolio value an optimal policy exists and the optimal interval of time between transactions is fixed independent of time and current wealth

loan commitment contracts terms of lending and credit allocation this paper analyzes the structure of loan commitment contracts and the interrelationships among their component parameters lenders offer borrowers a set of loan packages from which the latter may choose that package found to be most appealing borrowers may trade off changes in any loan parameter in exchange for other adjustments the borrower at this time may purchase a larger credit ration for a price supporting empirical evidence is presented recently researchers have begun to study the determinants of loan commitment or line of credit contracts such contracts play an extremely important role in bank credit allocation according to the federal reserve bulletin over 70 of u s commercial and industrial loans are made under loan commitment contracts given the central importance of the institution it is not surprising that it is the subject of a growing literature loan commitment contracts have importance both at the micro level in terms of the bank customer relationship and at the marco level in terms of the channels of operation of monetary policy in this paper we seek to present and test empirically an analytic model of loan commitment contracts our paper differs from most previous work in that we include empirical analysis of credit allocation moreover most previous theoretical work on the subject has concentrated on the specific issue of pricing of the contracts often using an approach based on option theory and not on the quantity allocation of credit and its determinants we are particularly interested in the determinants of the quantitative allocation of credit to bank customers and in the composition of and trade offs among the various parameters comprising such a loan commitment package our model helps explain how contract terms are established in the market and will illuminate the institutional framework of commercial lending a view of the credit contract as a package of loan terms has been implied recently in connection with the credit rationing problem studies by azzi and cox 21 arzac schwartz and whitcomb 11 and koskela 81 show that the

competition risk neutrality and loan commitments abstract we rationalize fixed rate loan commitments forward credit contracting with options in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality future interest rates are random but there are no transactions costs borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a non cooperative nash game between the bank and the borrower the initial formal analysis is basically in two steps first we show that the only spot credit market nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank s informational handicap second we show that loan commitments because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank s expected profit and the loan interest rate enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium perhaps our most surprising result is that if the borrower has some initial liquidity it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing

loan commitments investment decisions and the signalling equilibrium abstract this paper analyzes the use of loan commitments to finance future risky investment projects when the capital market is informed of a firm s project quality having a loan commitment would lead the firm to overinvest if banks are competitively rational the cost of this overinvestment would be borne by the firm making the loan commitment contract unattractive when the project quality is private information firms will signal their project qualities through purchasing loan commitments this signal is credible because purchasing a loan commitment poses overinvestment cost to the firm this paper establishes and characterizes this dissipative signalling equilibrium

inflationary price stability and the great crash an early analysis reconsidered the historical account of american economic conditions before the great crash in a d gayer s monetary policy and economic stabilisation 1935a reflects an inter war debate over the consequences of a stable price level when underlying productivity is rising strongly its account evokes in several ways recent concern over the emergence of financial sector instability under inflation targeting regimes a theoretical treatment of the main analysis permits both comparison between different perspectives in thinking at the time and a critical re examination of the relevance of this thinking to modern policy dilemmas nominal targets may have destabilising real sector consequences

why do migrants remit this paper examines primary incentives of remitting using estimated bilateral data on remittances this paper demonstrates that a rise in the home remittance receiving country s gross national income gni per capita leads to fewer remittances and that a rise in the host remittance sending country s gni per capita motivates migrants to remit more real exchange rates and real interest rates have no effect on remittances these results indicate that altruism is an important and critical component of motivations behind remittances however altruism alone does not appear to be a sufficient explanation of the motivations behind remittances other incentives such as loan repayment and investment play a non negligible role in this regard as well the degree of altruism is higher for migrants from developing countries in comparison with migrants from developed countries and it is higher when we define remittances as personal transfers rather than personal transfers and compensation of employees the results of the vector error correction model show if remittances deviate from the equilibrium relationship they will eventually revert

what really caused the great recession rhyme and repetition in a theme from the 1930s diagnoses of the 2008 financial crisis have invoked arguments involving real sector developments that though much debated in the 1930s had largely disappeared from the literature in recent decades prompted by these revivals the present study re examines an inter war conviction that the depression had its origins in uneven technological progress and monopolistic competition effectively reversing the induced roundaboutness view of the austrian thesis these writings noted a conflict between the resulting need for monetary accommodation and its potentially destabilising distributional consequences a common framework permits the extent of similarity in inter war and contemporary american experience to be assessed with the comparison drawing attention to the 1990s nasdaq boom and the subsequent financial behaviour of the us corporate sector consistently with the earlier literature but contrary to recent conclusions financial sector excess is seen as an aggravating factor rather than an initiating cause of the recession

investment opportunities and corporate demand for lines of credit abstract the behavior of a risk neutral corporation in selection of a line of credit is modeled in a new framework where demand for credit lines by a firm arises from the stochastic arrival in continuous time of short lived opportunities to capture investment projects the firm needs speed and secrecy to capture projects before competitors the firm chooses a credit line that balances its up front commitment cost against the expected extra cost of borrowing in the spot market upon exhaustion of its credit line the firm s demanded credit line depends upon both relative pricing within the contract and the nature of the firm s growth opportunities interestingly while credit line demand is positively related to business growth prospects it is potentially negatively related to uncertainty in those prospects

the economics of loan commitment contracts credit pricing and utilization abstract our purpose is to examine the circumstances under which enduring customer relationships such as revolving credit agreements will become predominant we compare loan commitment contracts under which borrowers may take down funds at fixed marginal mark up to spot lending under which funds are priced in consideration of customers leverage under the first arrangement insurance against default risk is priced as a fixed front end fee under the second arrangement it is priced under a rising leverage specific markup schedule we show that when default risk is independent of take down the loan commitment contract will always dominate spot loans when default risk increases with credit use spot loans may become dominant

the equilibrium valuation of risky discrete cash flows in continuous time this paper values a contingent claim to discrete stochastic cash flows generated by a poisson arrival process with a randomly varying intensity parameter in the most general case both the size and the arrival intensity of cash flows may correlate wih state variables in a continuous time economy assuming the conditions of an intertemporal capital aset pricing model solutions for the value of the contingent claim can be found using various techniques the paper suggests immediate applications to the valuation of insurance contracts the decision to build a firm with unknown future investment opportunities and the pricing of mortgage backed securities

unemployment and the real wage the economic basis for contesting political ideologies using the keynesian theory of effective demand this paper demonstrates how particular models such as that of cooperative capitalism enunciated by the left keynesian social democrats the marxian model of profit squeeze emphasizing distributive conflict and even the conservative model relying on supply side stimulus fit in as particular variants of a more general theoretical scheme through a reconstruction of the familiar is schedule the argument is weaved around the theme of the relations between unemployment and real wage in the context of both a closed and an open economy to explain the common macroeconomic basis of contesting ideologies copyright 1990 by oxford university press

did hayek and robbins deepen the great depression contrary to some accounts the hayek robbins austrian theory of the business cycle did not prescribe a monetary policy of liquidationism in the sense of passive indifference to sharp deflation during the early years of the great depression there is no evidence that hayek or robbins influenced any liquidationist in the hoover administration or the federal reserve system federal reserve policy during the great depression was instead influenced by the real bills doctrine which despite some apparent similarities was diametrically opposed in key respects to hayek s norms for central bank policy