micro incentives and municipal behavior political decentralization and fiscal federalism in argentina and mexico summary this article analyzes the mixed results of political and fiscal decentralization in latin america by comparing taxing and spending policies in six cities in argentina and mexico consistent with previous studies we find that decentralization has been frustrated by overconcentration of power at the provincial level and large vertical fiscal imbalances though we characterize these as functional elements in a system of redistributive policy making that benefits a wide array of provincial and municipal actors we seek to add a new dimension to the literature by arguing that micro level incentives conditions and circumstances particular to specific places are more important determinants of municipal behavior than macro level structures those policy and institutional changes intended to make officials more responsive to local conditions federalism local elections intergovernmental transfers and own source revenues we conclude that the theory of decentralization relies on a flawed conception of the causal mechanisms that are hypothesized to create responsiveness in local officials

when is delivering the goods not good enough how economic disparities in latin american neighborhoods shape citizen trust in local government this article develops and tests a theory to explain why perceptions of good government performance are a necessary but insufficient condition for the poor to trust their local government the authors theorize that independent of partisan sympathies the poor evaluate local government on the basis of government performance and the economic disparities that they observe in their neighborhood of residence accordingly even if the poor hold positive perceptions of government performance they are less likely to trust their local government when they live in a context of high economic inequality to test their theory the authors rely on census public opinion and systematic observation data collected within resident identified neighborhood borders in each of seventy one neighborhoods sampled from six municipalities in el salvador the findings are consistent with the hypotheses and indicate that economic inequality at the neighborhood level may produce a reservoir of distrust in local government among the poor the results further highlight the political relevance of neighborhoods for the formation of citizen attitudes toward local government in the latin american context

monetary union with voluntary participation a monetary union is modelled as a technology that makes a surprise policy deviation impossible and requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy within a fully dynamic context we show that such an arrangement may dominate a regime with independent national currencies two new results are delivered by the voluntary participation assumption first the optimal plan is shown to respond to a country s temptation to leave the union by tilting both current and future policy in its favour this yields a non linear rule according to which each country weight in policy decisions is time varying and depends on its incentive to abandon the union second we show that there might be conditions such that a break up of the union as has occurred in some historical episodes is efficient the paper thus provides a first formal analysis of the incentives behind the formation sustainability and disruption of a monetary union

on analyzing the world distribution of income consideration of world inequality should cause reexamination of the key concepts underlying the welfare approach to measuring income inequality and its relation to measuring poverty this reexamination leads to exploration of a new measure that allows poverty and inequality to be considered in the same framework incorporates different approaches to measuring inequality and allows varied expressions of the cost of inequality applied to the world distribution of income for 1820 1992 the new measure provides different perspectives on the evolution of global inequality

does commercialization undermine the benefits of decentralization for local services provision evidence from mexico s urban water and sanitation sector summary decentralization has been promoted as a means to better reflect citizen preferences and improve local services many developing countries decentralized and promoted neoliberal policies such as commercialization simultaneously leaving mayors with the responsibility of improving public services through self financing reforms this study evaluates experiences in three mexican cities to assess whether decentralization and commercialization practices have resulted in improved water and sanitation services it finds that commercialization has increased social conflict surrounding urban services provision and that local institutional constraints further undermine mayor s ability to adopt politically contentious policies the result has been stalled and uneven service improvements

currency areas and voluntary transfers this paper discusses the relationship between the formation of a currency area and the use of voluntary fiscal transfers between countries we show that there is a trade off between the benefits of flexible exchange rates and the additional risk sharing benefits of voluntary transfers that can be sustained in a currency area we show that whether a currency area is beneficial or not will depend on the magnitude of economic parameter values in particular we show that in a simple two country model and for a plausible set of economic parameter values a currency area is optimal

even up maintaining relationships abstract when are economic interactions mediated by prices and transfers and when are they mediated by variations in the continuation payoffs within a relationship to address this question we examine a relationship between two players who periodically face opportunities to undertake randomly generated projects that impose a cost on one player and a benefit on the other as well as opportunities to make voluntary transfers to one another we characterize the set of equilibria with particular emphasis on the efficient frontier in the absence of transfers incentives are often created by adjusting the continuation values of the relationship sometimes increasing player 1 s continuation payoff to induce player 1 to accept a particularly costly current project and sometimes increasing player 2 s continuation payoff in contrast once transfers enter the picture continuation payoffs maximize the sum of the two players payoffs no matter how asymmetric the point on the pareto frontier under consideration however transfers can also be relatively rare and in particular can occur less often than the adjustments in continuation values that occur without transfers players thus rely on transfers to create incentives but manage to do so while rarely making transfers

one for some or one for all taylor rules and interregional heterogeneity we document a novel empirical phenomenon the u s federal reserve appears to set interest rates partly in response to regional economic disparities this result is robust even after controlling for factors such as the central bank s forecasts and a battery of explanatory variables we argue that this likely does not reflect an explicit concern about regional differences by policymakers but instead can be explained by a model with nonlinear regional phillips curves consistent with the predictions of this model we find that the federal reserve responds disproportionately to fluctuations in low unemployment states alternative explanations cannot account for this finding

a volatility based theory of fiscal union desirability abstract heterogeneous countries may rationally choose to form a currency union first and a fiscal union later we find and illustrate empirically for the emu countries reasonable volatility conditions under which this sequencing in the deepening process is indeed rationalizable changes in the distribution of expected income shocks require a reassignment of political weights to restore unanimous support for an added fiscal dimension the bargaining space depends on countries relative income size and cross correlation of shocks

scalar politics in sectoral reforms negotiating the implementation of water policies in ecuador 1990 2008 in ecuador neo liberal reforms in the 1990s transformed the water and irrigation sector at different scales we analyze how these neoliberal reforms were implemented from the top down by the world bank and the national government as well as how from the grassroots water users negotiated these policies and their implementation at local and national level we show that these sectoral reforms were politically contested as it changed roles responsibilities and authority at different scales of governance this is evidenced by the fact that locally the relationships between water users differently scaled state agencies and broader networks greatly determined how water users associations negotiated the irrigation management transfer program as well as the development of new water policies our analysis highlights how the alliances that differently positioned actors create to navigate water policy implementation shape the scalar and the political dimensions of sectoral reforms it shows that actors need multi scalar networks of support to develop political leverage overcome opposition and materialize projects in the water governance domain

natural resources and decentralization in nicaragua are local governments up to the job abstract both decentralization and natural resource management literature suggest that natural resources could benefit from the redistribution of centralized management authority yet neither has sufficiently examined the processes already underway in numerous developing countries to decentralize resource management from central to municipal government authorities this study reviews the role of 21 local governments in forest management in nicaragua it finds that most interventions are economically motivated and that three key factors are needed for local governments to be good resource managers capacity incentive and long term commitment these three factors are part of a process in which civil society can play a critical role

rethinking optimal currency areas the traditional mundellian criterion which implicitly assumes commitment to monetary policy is that countries with similar shocks should form unions without such commitment a new criterion emerges countries with dissimilar temptation shocks namely those that exacerbate time inconsistency problems should form unions critical to this new criterion is the idea that monetary policy is benevolent in that it takes into account the interests of all the countries in the union when countries have dissimilar temptation shocks benevolent unions can help overcome the time inconsistency problems that individual countries face existing unions can strictly gain by admitting new members with more severe time inconsistency problems because policy in the expanded union is less sensitive to the temptation shocks of members of the existing union

do asymmetries matter for european monetary policy in this paper we analyze the impact of economic and institutional ecb decision rules asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in euroland we consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks in output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ecb concerning the conduct of common monetary interest rate policy welfare implications of the alternative decision procedures are discussed

rethinking the economics of water an assessment water is rising on the policy agenda as population growth and climate change intensify scarcity shocks and access inequalities the conventional economic policy recommendations privatization pricing and property rights have struggled due to a failure to account adequately for the politics of water and the associated distributional conflicts we identify distinctive social and physical characteristics of water supply and demand and explore their implications for three central areas of water policy financing infrastructure pricing and property rights reform growing dependence on groundwater and non networked water supplies exacerbates these challenges and reinforces the need to rethink the economics of water and tackle the political challenges head on meeting the water sustainable development goals would require institutional and technological innovations to supply allocate and manage water as well as a sustained political and financial commitment to address those who might be left behind

a real options perspective on the future of the euro abstract a break up of the eurozone is no longer regarded as implausible this will be a costly and irreversible decision in conditions of continuing uncertainty therefore it is amenable to analysis in the real options framework we do so by solving as an n dimensional optimal stopping problem with country specific shocks and convergence of member economies we compare a complete break up with individual country departures in calibrated solutions for a symmetric case we find a non negligible but small option value furthermore we find a new theoretical result on the non monotonicity of abandonment threshold with respect to volatility

temporal aggregation of univariate and multivariate time series models a survey abstract we present a unified and up to date overview of temporal aggregation techniques for univariate and multivariate time series models explaining in detail although intuitively the technical machinery behind the results some empirical applications illustrate the main issues

sustainable international monetary policy cooperation abstract we provide new insight on international monetary policy cooperation in a familiar two country setting a country facing a relatively more volatile markup shock has an incentive to deviate from an assumed cooperation regime to a non cooperation regime a similar result obtains if countries differ in size have non unitary elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods and have different degrees of trade openness home bias in consumption this motivates our study of an endogenous history dependent sustainable cooperation regime its history contingent welfare redistributions are supported by incentive compatible variations in resource transfers through the terms of trade or net exports such an endogenous cooperative solution may also provide a theoretical rationale for perceived occasional cooperation between national central banks in reality

a repeated game model of monetary union given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank s operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation this is modelled as a repeated game and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries incentive compatibility constraints is found the optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level so as to maintain the worse hit country s incentive to abide by the rule

paradoxes of decentralization water reform and social implications in mexico summary decentralized governance of water resources is a centerpiece of mexico s neoliberal reform strategy we analyze decentralization based on urban rural case studies in distinct geographical regions to ascertain whether it is linked to more efficient water management or sustainable use of water resources and to examine its development implications we assess whether or not private sector management is related to a more efficient sustainable and accountable management of water variety of municipal and private management arrangement in four urban areas we find that it has not resulted in efficiency or sustainability gains for agricultural water management irrigation districts in two case studies benefited from the more democratic participatory management by water users under mexico s transference strategy but did not result in greater equity efficiency or sustainability of water use we argue that decentralization in the mexican water sector is context specific and marked by limited benefits privatization is less an instrument aimed at improving efficiency than a channel for preferred treatment for capital accumulation by private entities as well as a legitimized way for the state to transfer the burden of water management to non state institutions the creation of new forms of water institutions requires not the retrenchment of the state but rather its involvement to ensure accountability transparency equity and sustainability

the labor market impact of immigration in western germany in the 1990 s in this article we estimate the wage and employment effects of recent immigration in western germany using administrative data for the period 1987 2001 and a labor market equilibrium model we find that the substantial immigration of the 1990s had very little adverse effects on native wages and on their employment levels instead it had a sizeable adverse employment effect on previous immigrants as well as a small adverse effect on their wages these asymmetric results are partly driven by a higher degree of substitution between old and new immigrants in the labor market and in part by the rigidity of wages in less than flexible labor markets in a simple counter factual experiment we show that in a world of perfect wage flexibility and no unemployment insurance the wage bill loss of old immigrants would be much smaller

monetary policy effects new evidence from the italian flow of funds new evidence on the transmission of monetary policy to the economy is provided through an analysis of the effects of a restrictive monetary policy shock on italian flow of funds over the period 1980 to 2002 firms reduce issuance of debt and decrease the acquisition of financial assets providing no support for the existence of strong financial frictions following the shock in the first quarter households increase short tem liabilities and diminish the acquisition of liquid assets and shares the public sector increases net borrowing during the first 2 years financial corporations decrease their borrowing for three quarters while in the same period the foreign sector increases borrowed funds we claim that our results shed new light on the role of the financial decisions of the economic sectors in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy

common currencies vs monetary independence we study the optimal monetary policy in a two country open economy model under two monetary arrangements a multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers b common currencies with a centralized policy maker our findings suggest that i monetary policy competition leads to higher long term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses ii the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies iii the welfare losses from higher long term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks

optimal monetary policy under low trend inflation abstract in the monetary policy literature it is common to assume that trend inflation is zero despite overwhelming evidence that zero inflation is neither empirically relevant nor a practical objective for central bank policy we therefore extend the standard new keynesian model to allow for positive trend inflation showing that even low trend inflation has strong effects on optimal monetary policy and the dynamics of inflation output and interest rates under discretion the efficient policy deteriorates and there is no guarantee of determinacy even with commitment targeting non zero trend inflation leads to substantial welfare losses our results serve as a warning against indiscriminate use of models assuming zero trend inflation

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries this paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size we show that at points on the frontier where only one country s incentive constraint binds the efficient agreement will be a non stationary one that starts with a positive trade distortion but eventually reaches free trade our analysis illustrates how i relative country size ii consumption smoothing incentives and iii sunk investments affect the form of efficient trade agreements in contrast to previous work on gradualism our results are obtained from a model in which the economic environment is stationary