the birth of a new industry entry by start ups and the drivers of firm growth the case of encryption software the paper analyses the birth of the encryption software industry esi a new niche in the software industry using a chandlerian perspective this work reports the main facts about fir entry and growth with a particular focus on start up strategies and actions since scale economies do not play a major role in esi the paper investigates the different sources of fir competitive advantages this work shows that innovation and product differentiation along with investments in co specialised assets are variables strongly correlated to young fir probability to survive and grow in doing so we have collected highly detailed information on product introduction us patents granted worldwide alliances and biographical data of fir founders 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved jel classificatio m13 l86 o32

duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

communicating excellence in innovation the innovation performance relationship is well studied in the literature but the effect of innovation based public recognitions is underresearched this article finds a positive effect whose magnitude is contingent upon the firm s growth experience and its service manufacturer character

cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous abstract this paper addresses a neglected question in the literature of cartel stability and the use of trigger strategies to maintain such stability we employ a model in which market demand is linear and involving n firms each operating subject to one of possibly n different cost functions we show that the stability of the cartel may depend crucially upon the relative efficiencies of the firms and argue that in such models explicit attention must be given to this possibility

complementary approaches to discursive contestation on the effects of the ipr regime on technology transfer in the face of climate change the effects of intellectual property rights ipr on the transfer of environmentally sound technologies ests has resulted in discursive contestation on the one hand the ipr regime is regarded as a catalyst to ests transfer on the other hand the ipr regime itself is argued to work as a barrier to the transfer of ests to developing countries this contestation moved to another layer of discussion concerning what to do about the current ipr regime and the climate change regime that overlap on the subject matter of technology transfer the ipr as a catalyst approach prefers the ipr regime to remain as the status quo and that the climate change regime construct an enabling environment by lowering the transaction costs of technology transfer and enhancing the regulatory capacity of developing countries on the contrary skeptics of the role of the ipr regime in ests transfer prefer an active utilization of the flexible mechanisms of the ipr regime and more interventionist actions by the climate change regime for effective ipr sharing regarding this bi polar contestation this paper analyzes why and where this discursive contestation occurs based on the economic theories of market failure the benefits and difficulties of remedial institutional approaches to tackle market failures are explored then complementary institutional designs in compatibility with the ipr regime and in response to market failures are explored with exemplary cases under the climate change regime

collusion and leadership abstract the paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion it extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially it is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader in case of pure bertrand competition price leadership restores the scope for perfect collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise when firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion in case of asymmetric costs the less efficient firm must act as the leader finally such leadership is less effective in case of cournot competition since following an aggressive deviation by the leader the follower would rather limit its own output making it more difficult to punish the deviation still quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting

a theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining this paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play although the bargaining phase is cheap talk following a generalized alternating offer protocol sharp predictions arise from three axioms two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan the third embodies a theory of disagreement that play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in which bargaining broke down equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all discount factors and are simple to construct all equilibria generate the same welfare optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bargaining protocol the theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitoring and heterogeneous discount factors and yields new insights into classic relational contracting questions

industrial evolution through complementary convergence the case of it security the article addresses the dynamics through which product markets become derailed from early product life cycle plc tracks and engaged in complementary convergence with other product markets or industries we compare and contrast the theories that can explain respectively the plc and the derailing of this cycle into a process of complementary convergence the article challenges the standard industry conception and proposes a distinction between the emergent industrial sector the emergent product market or niche and the industry as a more well established entity based on empirical evidence from the it security sector two trajectories of complementary convergence are identified lower order integration the integration of different product markets in a sectoral context and higher end integration the integration of product markets into the offerings of established industries while young ventures dominate lower order integration incumbents in established industries dominate higher order integration for both trajectories mergers and acquisitions represent a central means for realizing convergence copyright 2011 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the industrial dynamics of open innovation evidence from the transformation of consumer electronics abstract this paper addresses how the open innovation concept as recently coined by henry chesbrough can be analyzed from an industrial dynamics perspective the main proposition of the paper is that the specific modes in which different companies manage open innovation in regard to an emerging technology reflect their differential position within the innovation system in question the nature and stage of maturity of the technological regime and the particular value proposition pursued by companies the proposition is analyzed through an in depth study of the current transformation of sound amplification from linear solid state technology to switched or digital technology within the consumer electronics system of innovation the analysis especially addresses the complex interplay between technology entrepreneurs and incumbents and demonstrates that open innovation sometimes has to be conducted under conditions of high transaction costs

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

open innovation for sustainability lessons from the greenxchange experience an ictsd policy brief the following policy brief discusses the natural experiment of greenxchange in the context of open innovation open innovation is a phrase popularized by berkeley professor henry chesbrough who argues that firms should externalize r d and other innovative activity for the sake of technological advancement and greenxchange was a web based program allowing for firms to share their intellectual property for the sake of sustainable innovation under the open innovation paradigm our research indicates that the mild success of greenxchange demonstrates a gap between academic ideas and their utilization in practice

collusive behavior with heterogeneous firms in a repeated duopoly with heterogeneous firms i ask which enforceable collusive arrangement is likely to prevail i propose the equilibrium at which both firms are just indifferent between colluding and defecting for discount factors not exceeding a critical level i show this equilibrium is pareto optimal possibly even the unique pareto optimum i then apply bargaining theory and show that the proposed equilibrium is the likely outcome of explicit negotiations finally i argue that the proposed equilibrium is an obvious focal point on which firms may tacitly coordinate the proposed equilibrium promises to be useful for comparative statics analysis of collusive oligopoly

cartels profits and excess capacity a model of a collusive duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity is studied the negotiated output quotas depend on the bargaining power of the firms which derives from the damage the firms can do by cutting prices for fixed capacities the unit profit of the small firm is at least as large as that of the large firm and the relative position of the small firm is better when demand is low when the capacities can be chosen once and for all there is excess capacity in equilibrium so long as the cost of capacity is not too high copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms in the context of an infinitely repeated capacity constrained price game we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities when firms are sufficiently patient there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms a firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel when a cartel is not all inclusive colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity contrary to previous work our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate sized firms rather than the largest or smallest firms

technological regimes and schumpeterian patterns of innovation this paper proposes that the specific pattern of innovative activities in an industry can be explained as the outcome of different technological learning regimes a technological regime is defined by the particular combination of technological opportunities appropriability of innovations cumulativeness of technical advances and properties of the knowledge base building upon the distinction between schumpeter mark i and schumpeter mark ii industries this paper provides empirical estimates of the relationships between indicators of the schumpeterian patterns of innovation concentration of innovative activities stability in the hierarchy of innovators and importance of new innovators and indicators of the variables defining technological regimes

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

technological regimes and sectoral patterns of innovative activities this paper focuses on the relationships between observed patterns of innovative activities within a sector and the related context and underlying microeconomic processes that might account for them it claims that there are some invariant features with respect to relative prices and incentives mechanisms of learning and knowledge accumulation that greatly affect the rate and structure of innovative activity these features are different across sectors the paper proposes that the specific pattern of innovative activity of a sector can be explained as the outcome of different technological regimes that are implied by the nature of technology and knowledge the notion of technological regime provides a synthetic representation of some of the most important economic properties of technologies and of the characteristics of the learning processes that are involved in innovative activities copyright 1997 by oxford university press

the nash bargaining solution is optimal abstract we consider the problem faced by players in a two person bargaining game who have different opinions about what is the appropriate solution concept to use a procedure is proposed to resolve such a conflict and it is shown that the nash bargaining solution constitutes the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the procedure as a by product we obtain that in the axiomatic characterization of the nash solution the controversial independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom can be replaced by a much weaker recursivity axiom which amounts to requiring independence of alternatives that cannot be obtained as an outcome of a risk sensitive solution

share green growth regional evaluation of green output performance in china abstract reducing carbon emissions is much more difficult than reducing other pollutants through current technology promoting the efficiency of energy use and developing clean energy are the only two economically feasible approaches for the future however without low carbon technology pursuing green growth could negatively affect production activities in this study we develop a directional distance function ddf model based on the slacks of the output oriented slack based measure along an endogenously determined directional vector we can calculate the efficiency scores by reducing the undesirable output and expanding desirable output simultaneously the global malmquist index is integrated with the ddf model to capture the dynamic change of output performance based on the output performance of green growth we use counterfactual thinking to evaluate gdp losses caused by limiting carbon emissions the empirical study using the provincial data of china shows that technological progress not efficiency change pushes green growth in china we also find that pursuing green growth in china would lead to a gdp loss of 7 8 furthermore a sub regional analysis shows that the eastern regions were almost immune to the strict carbon control policy while the midwestern regions were affected severely to alleviate the gdp loss we offer suggestion on setting up a green growth sharing mechanism among regions

endogenous mergers and collusion in asymmetric market structures recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion including an indivisible cost of cartelization we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion since they balance the small firms incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders indivisible cartelization cost using an endogenous merger model we also show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion current antisymmetry merger policy can thus be counterproductive

sectoral patterns of technical change towards a taxonomy and a theory abstract the purpose of the paper is to describe and explain sectoral patterns of technical change as revealed by data on about 2000 significant innovations in britain since 1945 most technological knowledge turns out not to be information that is generally applicable and easily reproducible but specific to firms and applications cumulative in development and varied amongst sectors in source and direction innovating firms principally in electronics and chemicals are relatively big and they develop innovations over a wide range of specific product groups within their principal sector but relatively few outside firms principally in mechanical and instrument engineering are relatively small and specialised and they exist in symbiosis with large firms in scale intensive sectors like metal manufacture and vehicles who make a significant contribution to their own process technology in textile firms on the other hand most process innovations come from suppliers these characteristics and variations can be classified in a three part taxonomy based on firms 1 supplier dominated 2 production intensive 3 science based they can be explained by sources of technology requirements of users and possibilities for appropriation this explanation has implications for our understanding of the sources and directions of technical change firms diversification behaviour the dynamic relationship between technology and industrial structure and the formation of technological skills and advantages at the level of the firm the region and the country

the climate policy hold up green technologies intellectual property rights and the abatement incentives of international agreements the success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of green technologies this requires that international environmental agreements ieas and trade related intellectual property rights trips interact productively using a simple and tractable model we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold up effect in anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non signatories turning the iea brown self enforcing ieas have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under trips countries hosting patent holders extract rents from trips but may be better off without them

cartel contract duration empirical evidence from inter war international cartels a formal cartel organization sets up a multilateral relationship between firms in a given industry while standard contracting literature has studied bilateral monopoly relationships in detail there are horizontal relationships like cartels that also have contractual aspects to shed light on how these contracts work this paper takes a sample of legal formal cartel contracts and examines their structure and durability borrowing from industrial organization theories and transaction cost theories the empirical model tests for the importance of demand uncertainty and cartel organizational characteristics in determining cartel contract duration the results show that the more uncertain the environment within which the cartel operates the shorter the expected cartel duration other industry structure characteristics and cartel organization variables included in the empirical model have a much weaker influence on duration copyright 2005 oxford university press

optimal cartel trigger price strategies abstract a dynamical model of industry equilibrium is described in which a cartel deters deviations from collusive output levels by threatening to produce at cournot quantities for a period of fixed duration whenever the market price falls below some trigger price in this model firms can observe only their own production level and a common market price the market demand curve is assumed to have a stochastic component so that an unexpectedly low price may signal either deviations from collusive output levels or a downward demand shock

barometric price leadership abstract barometric price leadership refers to situations in which a price leader acts as a barometer of prevailing market conditions for other firms in the industry in this paper a model of price setting with costly information acquisition is analyzed it is shown that the unique equilibrium outcome is for one firm to acquire information and become a price leader while the other firm does not purchase information and becomes a follower in contrast to most previous work leadership in this model is due to the informational setting not the price setting mechanism as with symmetric information the unique outcome is the symmetric bertrand equilibrium

ringleaders in larger number asymmetric cartels the concept of a cartel ringleader has specific legal meaning but has received relatively little attention in the economic literature of cartels this article draws on a sample of 89 european cartels to identify how often ringleaders exist who they are and what they do it argues that ringleaders are more likely where the traditional cartel problems are likely to be most acute i e with larger numbers of members exhibiting substantial size asymmetries this is confirmed for price fixing and bid rigging cartels and is especially pronounced where the ringleader displays aggressive as opposed to merely organisational behaviour

endogenous cartel formation experimental evidence in a bertrand oligopoly experiment firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel like communication and if so they may get fined by a cartel authority we find that the four firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption

appropriability mechanisms and the platform partnership decision evidence from enterprise software we examine whether ownership of intellectual property rights ipr or downstream capabilities is effective in encouraging entry into markets complementary to a proprietary platform by preventing the platform owner from expropriating rents from start ups we study this question in the context of the software industry an environment where evidence of the efficacy of ipr as a mechanism to appropriate the returns from innovation has been mixed entry in our context is measured by an independent software vendor s isv s decision to become certified by a platform owner and produce applications compatible with the platform we find that isvs with a greater stock of formal ipr such as patents and copyrights and those with stronger downstream capabilities as measured by trademarks and consulting services are more likely to join the platform suggesting that these mechanisms are effective in protecting isvs from the threat of expropriation we also find that the effects of ipr on the likelihood of partnership are greater when an isv has weak downstream capabilities or when the threat of imitation is greater such as when the markets served by the isv are growing quickly this paper was accepted by gerard p cachon information systems

fines and reputational sanctions the case of cartels abstract in this article we revive an old debate in the law and economics literature the relative role of public and reputational sanctions in deterring misconduct we propose an empirical framework which accounts for public sanctions in our case cartel fines and a more direct measure of reputational sanctions harnessing recent developments in opinion mining we use the intensity and the sentiment of media exposure of misconduct as a measure of reputational effect and thus approximation of the reputational sanction as a demonstration we combine an event study approach sentiment analysis and econometric techniques on a sample of 339 listed cartel member firms prosecuted by the european commission between 1992 and 2015 our results offer evidence that in the context of cartels public and reputational sanctions act as substitutes where there is a reputational penalty increasing this penalty reduces the effect of the public sanction one the other hand in the absence of a reputational punishment the effect of the cartel fine steps in

collusion under monitoring of sales collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms prices are private information and their quantities are public information such an information structure is consistent with several recent price fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins for a class of symmetric oligopoly games it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion an asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas in practice cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

denying leniency to cartel instigators costs and benefits abstract a large number of countries have introduced successful leniency programs into their competition law enforcement to encourage colluding firms to come forward with evidence that will help detect cartels and punish price fixers this paper studies a feature of some of these programs that has received relatively little attention in the literature the inclusion of no immunity for instigators clauses niics these provisions deny leniency benefits to parties that instigate cartel behavior or function as cartel ringleaders our results show that niics can lead to increased or decreased levels of cartel conduct by removing the instigator s benefit from cooperating with the authorities a niic undoes some of the destabilizing benefit the leniency program was intended to generate and thereby furthers cartel stability on the other hand the instigator faces an asymmetrically severe punishment under a niic and this can reduce the incentive to instigate in the first place

a non cooperative bargaining game with risk averse players and an uncertain finite horizon abstract for an alternating offer bargaining game with an uncertain horizon the equilibrium payoff to a player is greater the less risk averse is he relative to his opponent as the horizon becomes infinite in length the equilibrium partition converges to the nash bargaining solution

the impact of environmentally friendly innovations on value added while recent literature has focused on explaining the determinants of green innovations it is not well understood how such innovations affect performance to analyse the relationship between green innovation and performance new industry level panel data were exploited these include 12 oecd countries the whole manufacturing sector and a period of 30 years the results show that green inventions are u shape related to performance however the turning point is quite high and hence only relevant for a few industries this indicates that given the current level of green promotion market incentives alone are not sufficient to allow the green invention activities of industries to rise considerably to verify these results and to get a better understanding of the mechanisms in the green market we finally made several interviews with multinational firms that have a good understanding of what happens on the global market of green innovation

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

innovation and diffusion of clean green technology can patent commons help abstract this paper explores the characteristics of 238 patents on 90 inventions contributed by major multinational innovators to the eco patent commons which provides royalty free access to third parties to patented innovations on green technologies we compare the pledged patents to other patents in the same technologies or held by the same multinationals to investigate the motives of the contributing firms as well as the potential for such commons to encourage innovation and diffusion of climate change related technologies we find pledged patents to protect environmentally friendly technologies and to be of similar value as the average patent in a pledging firm s patent portfolio but of lower value than other patents in their class our analysis of the impact of the patent commons on diffusion of patented technologies suggests that making patents accessible royalty free did not result in any significant increase in diffusion as measured by citing patents this study therefore indirectly provides evidence on the role of patents in the development and diffusion of green technologies

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

profit sharing in a collusive industry abstract we study a model in which collusive duopolists divide up the monopoly profit according to their relative bargaining power we are particularly interested in how the negotiated profit shares depend on the sizes of the firms if each can produce at the same constant unit cost up to its capacity we show that the profit per unit of capacity of the small firm is higher than that of the large one we also study how the ratio of the negotiated profits depends on the size of demand relative to industry capacity and how this ratio changes with variations in demand

driving effect of technology innovation on energy utilization efficiency in strategic emerging industries abstract under the policy of energy saving and emission reduction technological innovation has become the key power driver to improve energy utilization efficiency by using the panel data of 21 industrial segments between 2000 and 2015 this paper investigates the driving effect of technological innovation on energy utilization efficiency in strategic emerging industries and analyzes the critical factors influencing the driving effect of technological innovation by the stochastic frontier analysis method the empirical result shows that technological innovation between 2000 and 2015 has had a significant positive driving effect on the energy utilization efficiency of strategic emerging industries and exhibits a development trend of year by year steady state growth on the whole the greater the value of the development expenditure of new green products and the investment in environmental pollution treatment the greater the technological efficiency the greater the value of the transformation expenditure of energy saving technology the greater the technological inefficiency finally the paper proposes the countermeasures and suggestions for the driving effect of technological innovation on energy utilization efficiency in strategic emerging industries an empirical study is made to analyze the driving effect of technological innovation on energy utilization efficiency the positive and negative factors of technological innovation are forgotten strategic emerging industries can select optimal innovation behavior to improve quality and efficiency of energy utilization based on the results

the elixir or burden of youth exploring differences in innovation between start ups and established firms despite the widely acknowledged role of start ups in economic development little is known about their innovative activities compared with those of established firms drawing on a sample of 12 209 uk firms we differentiate between services and manufacturing firms and using a matching estimator approach demonstrate that start ups differ significantly from established firms in their innovation activities we find that in services being a start up increases the likelihood of product innovations however in manufacturing we find no significant differences in the likelihood of product innovation between start ups and established firms when examining the returns to innovation we find that start ups have a significant advantage both in services and in manufacturing we explore the implications of these results for theory and policy

innovation performance and embeddedness in networks evidence from the ethiopian footwear cluster this study focuses on innovation in a cluster of informal shoemaking firms in ethiopia namely the mercato footwear cluster it examines how differently those firms are embedded in networks and how heterogeneous they are in absorptive capacity and how this heterogeneity affects their innovation performance business interactions with buyers suppliers and other producers are the major channels through which knowledge flows into the cluster these business networks are mainly built on trust and long term relationships and tend to be selective the study reveals that despite homogeneity in social background the firms in the cluster behave and perform differently based on econometric analysis we document a positive and strong effect of local network position and absorptive capacity on innovation performance

some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric bertrand supergames abstract optimal penal codes in asymmetric bertrand supergames exhibit security level punishments for the largest firm if no firm has sufficient capacity to service the market then collusion that is barely sustainable by optimal penal codes entails higher capacity utilization by the largest firm than by the other firms collusion supported by optimal penal codes in models with a large firm facing a competitive fringe can result in the large firm having low capacity utilization and thus providing a price umbrella for the fringe firms which have high capacity utilization journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 l11 l13

sectoral systems of innovation and production the concept sectoral system of innovation and production provides a multidimensional integrated and dynamic view of sectors it is proposed that a sectoral system is a set of products and the set of agents carrying out market and non market interactions for the creation production and sale of those products a sectoral systems has a specific knowledge base technologies inputs and demand agents are individuals and organizations at various levels of aggregation they interact through processes of communication exchange co operation competition and command and these interactions are shaped by institutions a sectoral system undergoes change and transformation through the co evolution of its various elements 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

collusion with persistent cost shocks we consider a dynamic bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed cost shock in each period although cost shocks are independent across firms within a firm costs follow a first order markov process we analyze the set of collusive equilibria available to firms emphasizing the best collusive scheme for the firms at the start of the game in general there is a trade off between productive efficiency whereby the low cost firm serves the market in a given period and high prices we show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm if the distribution of costs is log concave and firms are sufficiently patient then the optimal collusive scheme entails price rigidity firms set the same price and share the market equally regardless of their respective costs when serial correlation of costs is imperfect partial productive efficiency is optimal for the case of two cost types first best collusion is possible if the firms are patient relative to the persistence of cost shocks but not otherwise we present numerical examples of first best collusive schemes

collusion among asymmetric firms the case of different discount factors abstract this study investigates collusive behavior among asymmetric firms for this purpose we develop a selection criterion for deriving a unique collusive outcome and apply it to the case when firms have different discount factors our analysis reveals that for collusion to be self enforcing it is unnecessary that all firms have sufficiently high discount factors but rather only that firms on average have a sufficiently long run view the optimal collusive outcome entails a strict ordering of output quotas in which firms with relatively low discount factors receive a disproportionate share of market demand as found in the case of a common discount factor a fall in a firm s discount factor reduces the likelihood of successful collusion this effect reduces firm profits on the other hand in the event that firms can collude a lowering of a firm s discount factor increases its output quota so that its profits rise

event studies in management research theoretical and empirical issues we examined the use of event studies in management research and found that there was inadequate attention paid to theoretical and research design issues this lack of attention may lead to false in

a dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars we provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among jirms investment entry and exit it is a symmetric information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an activejim that is likely to exit in the near future numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment only the collusive industry generates price wars also the collusive industry offers both more and higherquality products to consumers albeit often at a higher price the positive effect of collusion on variety and quality more than compensates consumers for the negative effect of collusive prices so that consumer surplus is larger with collusion

examining models of collusion the market for lysine abstract we compare the experience with collusion in the market for lysine with the predictions of theory the lysine market provides an ideal setting following the confessions of cartel participants in antitrust investigations data availability allows demand and cost functions to be estimated and observed mark ups compared with predictions we find that several integral aspects of collusion in the lysine market are not adequately addressed in the literature the dynamics associated with entry and investment persistent asymmetries between firms the cartel s bargaining problem and the existence of cheating in equilibrium these issues are likely to have much wider applicability beyond the lysine market

in which industries is collusion more likely evidence from the uk i examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price fixing across uk manufacturing industries in the 1950s the econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising intensive than in low advertising industries there is also some evidence of a non monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion there is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion

firms age process innovation and productivity growth abstract this paper looks directly at the impact of firms age and process innovations on productivity growth a model that specifies productivity growth as an unknown function of these variables is devised and estimated using semiparametric methods results show that firms enter the market experiencing high productivity growth and that above average growth rates tend to last for many years but also that productivity growth of surviving firms converges process innovations at some point then lead to extra productivity growth which also tends to persist somewhat attenuated for a number of years

the determination of price and output quotas in a heterogeneous cartel applying a selection criterion that uses both subgame perfection and the nash bargaining solution this paper investigates the relationship between firms cost functions and collusive behavior it is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price that the low cost firm would set if it was a monopolist comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low cost firm s unit cost but is decreasing in the high cost firm s unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

asset profiles for technological innovation abstract this paper proposes a conceptual distinction between four generic categories of assets for technological innovation 1 scientific research assets 2 process innovative assets 3 product innovative application assets and 4 aesthetic design assets technological innovation may sometimes require the activation of only one asset type but more often a specific constellation of more asset types has to be mobilized the asset categories differ profoundly with respect not only to their respective competence bases but also with respect to their functional contribution to industrial innovation and mostly also to their organizational attachment this way of conceiving technological innovation is opposed to the one dimensional r d conception that tends to view r d as one functional asset along with others like manufacturing or marketing it is argued that the different innovative assets are often located in different organizational settings within the corporation the coupling between assets is discussed in terms of inter asset specificity we illustrate the great variation of innovative asset profiles across a wide spectrum of product categories the concept of technological trajectories is reinterpreted in terms of asset profile oscillations and regroupings finally the framework is related to recent efforts to formulate a resource based theory of the firm and the implications for innovation strategy is discussed

on the role of patience in collusive bertrand duopolies abstract this paper analyzes the role of patience in a repeated bertrand duopoly where firms bargain over which collusive price and market share to implement it is shown that the least patient firm s market share is not monotone in its own discount factor

general equilibrium tax incidence under imperfect competition a quantity setting supergame analysis the incidence of various taxes is analyzed in a model with competitive and oligopolistic sectors friedman s grim trigger strategies support collusion with firms producing output to maximize joint profits subject to the constraint that no firm desires to cheat the sustainable level of output depends on the capitalized value of future retaliation therefore tax induced changes in the net return to capital the discount rate affect the output mix through their impact on the sustainability of collusion this collusive pricing effect is isolated and analyzed one result is that a general factor tax on capital but not labor is shifted

technologies products and organization in the innovating firm what adam smith tells us and joseph schumpeter doesn t adam smith s insights into the increasingly specialized nature of knowledge production are crucially important in understanding the contemporary problems of managing innovating firms products and firms are based on an increasing range of fields of specialized technological understanding competition is not based on technological diversity but on diversity and experimentation in products etc firms rarely fail because of an inability to master a new field of technology but because they do not succeed in matching the firm s systems of coordination and control to the nature of the available technological opportunities copyright 1998 by oxford university press

quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement this paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti cartel policy it develops a conceptual framework which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification this is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred our best estimate is two thirds and even on conservative assumptions at least half of all harms or seven times the detected harm is deterred

collusive price leadership with capacity constraints abstract in this paper collusive price leadership in homogeneous good capacity constrained repeated price competition is examined in the stage game firms choose their timing of price setting although setting a price early is disadvantageous per se a large firm has an incentive to move early in order to demonstrate its commitment not to deviate if the discount factor is not too large this behavior raises the collusive price compared to that arising in collusion with simultaneous moves as a result all firms obtain strictly higher profits

a price setting supergame between two heterogeneous firms when firms attempt to tacitly collude they inevitably face a market sharing problem this problem is further complicated when firms have asymmetries this paper studies a price setting supergame between two firms with different costs the paper investigates sustainability of tacit collusion and solves the market sharing problem under tacit collusion the resulting equilibrium from the supergame is used to study limit pricing government policies toward entrants and welfare change due to technological progress and a change in the time discount rate the paper shows that even costlessly achieved technological progress can decrease social welfare