observable and unobservable determinants of replacement of home appliances despite the dominant role of replacement purchases in many consumer durable categories the research in this area has not been extensive only in the last few years has the economic theory made progress towards a more rigorous analysis of the dynamic nature involved in replacement decisions as a consequence of this applied researchers have switched from conventional discrete choice models to new econometric techniques e g duration analysis that allow for richer relationships between socioeconomic variables characteristics of the durable good and the likelihood of its replacement over time our study focuses on two home appliances taken from the residential energy consumption survey recs based on a duration model that allows for unobserved heterogeneity across households we conclude that household demographics and product features both observable and unobservable in general have statistical power to explain replacement decisions over time

decisions to replace consumer durables goods an econometric application of wiener and renewal processes current sales of most consumer durable goods are accounted for by replacements however only in recent years has the economic literature provided a more rigorous analysis of replacement purchases by incorporating elements of dynamic programming and of the theory of stochastic processes this paper is an empirical study of household replacement decisions modeled as an optimal stopping rule using data from the residential energy consumption survey recs of the u s department of energy we conclude that demographic variables operation and replacement costs and equipment characteristics may affect ownership spells of appliances such as electric heaters and central air conditioners

credible public policy abstract credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame perfect nash equilibrium behavior for the government it is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of abreu 1988 for repeated games the results are then extended to systems with state variables simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example

a note on the optimal tariff retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intraindustry trade abstract this paper uses krugman s 1980 model of trade with product differentiation and monopolistic competition to examine the effects of a uniform ad valorem tariff the main results are there exists an optimal tariff even for a small economy and the optimal tariff rate is an increasing function of the size of the economy and the degree of production differentiation under reasonable parameter assumptions a tariff war between two countries of equal size in which each country retaliates by imposing its own optimal tariff causes a welfare loss equivalent to a drop in income of about 4 percent

software piracy an analysis of protection strategies software piracy by users is generally believed to harm both software firms through lower profits and buying customers through higher prices thus it is thought that perfect and costless technological protection would benefit both firms and consumers the model developed here suggests that in some circumstances even with significant piracy not protecting can be the best policy both raising firm profits and lowering selling prices key to the analysis is joining the presence of a positive network externality with the fact that piracy increases the total number of program users the network externality exists because consumers have an incentive to economize on post purchase learning and customization costs

modelling the consumer s decision to replace durable goods a hazard function approach this article analysis the consumer s durable good replacement decision using hazard models in contrast to the typical limited dependent variable model often used in durable good demand studies hazard models allow for much richer replacement to illustrate the technique a recursive system consisting of a regression equation and a hazard model is used to examine home heating system replacement decisions by residencial customers of a major southeasten us electric utility the results indicate that overall system replacement rates decline over time and that the probability of replacement for specific households depends negatively on the age of the head of household abd the availability of natural gas and positively on system age and higher than expected household energy use

a probabilistic choice model for market segmentation and elasticity structure marketing scholars commonly characterize market structure by studying the patterns of substitution implied by brand switching though the approach is useful it typically ignores the destabilizing

global software piracy searching for further explanations this paper identifies that information and communication technology ict has a negative effect on software piracy rates in addition to consolidating prior research that economic development and the cultural dimension of individualism also negatively affect piracy rates using data for 59 countries from 2000 to 2005 the findings show that economic well being individualism and technology development as measured by ict expenditures explain between 70 and 82 of the variation in software piracy rates during this period the research results provide important implications for policy makers and business practitioners to help reduce software piracy

software piracy a strategic analysis and policy instruments abstract we examine the government s role in restricting commercial piracy in a software market welfare maximization may or may not result in monitoring as the socially optimal outcome correspondingly either monopoly situation or market sharing between an original firm and a pirate are subgame perfect equilibria if it is profitable for a monopolist to prevent piracy by installing a protective device then not monitoring is the equilibrium we also discuss the effects of network externalities in addition to deriving the effects of changes in the reliability of the pirated software and network benefits on the policy variables the extent of piracy and the monopolist s incentive to prevent piracy

optimal strategic pricing of reproducible consumer products this paper investigates the strategic pricing of consumer durable products which can be acquired through either purchase or reproduction e g computer software as copy piracy results in an opportunity loss its adverse effect on profits needs to be incorporated in strategic decisions such as pricing using a dual diffusion model which parsimoniously describes sales and copying and employing control theory methodology optimal price trajectories are derived for the period of monopoly the results indicate that a in absence of any protection skimming pricing strategies are generally optimal and b copy protection is warranted only when sales diffuse much faster than copying and the protection technology does not significantly raise the marginal production cost

pareto efficient income taxation with stochastic abilities abstract this paper studies pareto efficient income taxation in an economy with finitely lived individuals whose income generating abilities evolve according to a two state markov process the study yields three main results first when individuals are risk neutral in any period the only individuals whose earnings are distorted are those who currently are and have always been low ability in addition the degree to which these perpetual low ability types have their earnings distorted decreases over time converging to zero if the time horizon is long enough second the earnings distortions are continuous with respect to the degree of risk aversion at the risk neutral solution third pareto efficient income tax systems can be time consistent even when the degree of correlation in ability types is large the condition for time consistency suggests a novel theoretical reason why the classic equity efficiency trade off may be steeper in a dynamic environment than previously thought

the terms of trade and the international coordination of fiscal policy this paper develops an example of a noncooperative game between fiscal authorities in two countries the key strategic link between countries is the terms of trade an equilibrium without cooperation is characterized by excessive tax rates and public spending levels in each country the outcome is analogous to the nash equilibrium of the static optimal tarif game in trade theory but in this model there is also a dynamic distortion caused by noncooperative behaviour this dynamic distortion depresses capital accumulation and reduces the equilibrium capital stock in each country numerical examples suggest a significant welfare benefit of cooperation

commercial piracy and intellectual property policy abstract i discuss the competition between a copyright owner and several commercial pirates who sell copies of the same information good to consumers i view the increased risk of a punishment that offering a pirate copy to a consumer causes as an advertising cost whose value is chosen by the government the structure of the market for pirate copies is affected also by fixed costs that are caused by punishments or drm systems i present a systematic analysis of the effects of these policy variables and the quality of pirate copies on the market for the considered information good

reputation and time consistency recent work has shown that reputational arguments based on trigger strategies can sometimes be used to deal with the problem of time inconsistency in government policy this idea was exploited by robert barro and david gordon 1983 in a model of inflation and by v v chari and patrick kehoe 1988 in a model of capital taxation here it is shown that reputational arguments of this sort are widely applicable 2 a general policy model is developed based on an economy that is stationary over time contains identical households and has no endogenous state variables it is shown in general that the infinite horizon version of this model has equilibria in trigger strategies that yield outcomes strictly better than those attainable as equilibria in the one period model

monetary policy cooperation and multiple equilibria abstract we consider international monetary policy regimes in a world of two identical economies characterized by unemployment persistence in the non cooperative regime markov perfect nash equilibrium policies are generally not unique furthermore policies may be asymmetric in this otherwise symmetric model monetary policy cooperation also exhibits multiple equilibria but these are fewer and always symmetric cooperation may be counterproductive or beneficial for either country depending upon the initial non cooperative and resulting cooperative outcome

sustaining policy cooperation between economies of different size abstract i consider an example of a two country model featuring national heterogeneity and demonstrate that heterogeneity plays an important role for the countries gains from international policy cooperation and just as important for the incentives to break the cooperative agreement i find that national heterogeneity unambiguously reduces trigger strategies support for policy cooperation in other words the more countries differ the harder it is to sustain policy cooperation

demand for differentiated durable products the case of the u s computer printer market i introduction this paper aims to provide a theoretical and empirical description of consumer behavior in a dynamic market for differentiated durable goods the computer hardware industry serves as an example of the type of market we consider markets for computer systems and components as well as for many other high technology products exhibit some striking similarities that are of particular concern for an empirical economist as follows products are differentiated in multiple dimensions in addition to price products are durable yielding consumption services over multiple periods product quality rapidly improves over time empirical work on estimating differentiated product demand systems has been dominated by static discrete choice models with random utility see berry levinsohn and pakes 1995 goldberg 1995 and nevo 2001 among others however markets for durable goods exhibit several features at odds with their assumption of myopic consumer behavior first traditional static discrete choice models implicitly assume that consumers participate in the market every period choosing one of the available products or an outside option thus the fraction of consumers who do not buy any product in a given period could only be explained by the high value they assign to the outside alternative for durable goods however purchases are made infrequently and result in a consumer s exiting the market for a significant period of time hence the model needs to account for consumers outflow from the market arising from their purchase decisions second a static framework may give a misleading picture of the aggregate sales time pattern in a dynamic industry in many markets for durable products it is not uncommon to see rapidly improving product quality and falling prices given any reasonable set of consumer preferences over the product characteristics space static discrete choice models for such an industry will tend to predict an upward trend in aggregate sales this fails to account for a variety of patterns commonly seen in the data third the evolution of product quality leads to the possibility of intertemporal demand substitution by forgoing a current purchase the consumer retains the option to buy a potentially better product in the future hence the decision of when to buy may be just as important for consumers as the decision of what to buy this trade off cannot be accounted for in the static framework the purpose of this paper is to remedy these shortcomings of static discrete choice models in durable goods markets with particular attention paid to technological change and the dynamics of new products adoption the paper presents a dynamic model of consumer demand for differentiated durable products that explicitly accounts for consumers expectations of future product quality and consumers outflow from the market that arises endogenously from their purchase decisions in this model the consumer faces a sequence of static discrete choice problems over a non stationary choice set we show that for a subclass of random utility models which include the multinomial logit and the mcfadden 1978 generalized extreme value gev model there exists a scalar valued sufficient statistic that determines the value of the option to postpone the purchase this allows us to model industry evolution over a vastly reduced state space and to formalize the consumer s decision of when to buy as an optimal stopping problem a solution to that problem defines the hazard rate of product adoptions while the nested discrete choice model determines the alternative specific purchase probabilities integrating individual decisions over the population distribution generates rich dynamics of aggregate and product level sales the paper proceeds to present monte carlo evidence that ignoring the time dimension of consumer choice will induce a downward bias in the estimates of consumer preferences over quality sometimes reversing the sign of the coefficients

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

cheating for the common good in a macroeconomic policy game abstract this paper presents a simple repeated game model of interaction between an optimizing government and the private sector two polar cases are considered a the private sector is represented by a single agent and b there is a continuum of heterogenous atomistic private agents in both cases the government starts each repetition by making a non binding announcement about its future actions the players have complete and perfect information with one exception the private agents do not know whether or not the government will act as announced thus each private agent i either behaves with probability i as if it trusted the announcement or plays with probability 1 i as a stackelberg leader after observing the reaction of the private sector the government implements the actual policy measures finally the private agent s update i as a function of the payoffs received we show that although the government s announcements are never respected acting as if they were true leads to an outcome that simultaneously improves the situation of the government and of those players that trust it compared to the standard equilibrium solutions an overwhelming majority of private agents very rapidly learns to behave as if the announcements were true the other agents also experience higher payoffs due to an herding effect the fact that the announcements are always reneged is crucial for the solution to be pareto improving these results are in stark contrast to the conclusions usually presented in the related economic literature

international coordination of fiscal deficits abstract nearly all existing studies of international coordination of fiscal deficits focus on aggregate demand aspects of the problem in contrast this paper adopts a dynamic general equilibrium perspective and emphasizes the public finance side of fiscal deficits in a world with international capital mobility the fiscal deficit of any single government affects world interest rates and therefore influences intertemporal resource allocation in all countries the paper shows that these international externalities may result in inefficiently large fiscal deficits high interest rates and low levels of welfare if international policy coordination is absent

the welfare implications of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities this paper finds that unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in the presence of demand network externalities can not only induce greater firm profits relative to the case where there is no copying it can lead to a pareto improvement in social welfare ceteris paribus when network externalities are present firms have a greater incentive to expand output because marginal revenue is higher and or they may wish to create preemptive installed bases this paper suggests that unauthorized copying can be a relatively efficient means of achieving this by allowing the firm in effect to price discriminate among different classes of consumers copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

replacement cycles income distribution and dynamic price discrimination this article analyses how income distribution intellectual property rights and other regulatory policies such as minimum quality standards determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a monopolist periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good discrimination through quality and screening in this article takes place in a context where consumers buy several versions of the durable good during their lifetime instead of a single version as in inderst s 2008 or koh s 2006 it also differs from glass 2001 in that an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable generations with different frequencies our modelling is motivated by stylized facts from the last brazilian pof household budget survey

tinbergen and theil meet nash controllability in policy games abstract this paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static lq strategic context between n players we show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and nash equilibrium existence

growth human capital spillovers and international policy coordination the paper is concerned with public policy and economic development in a world of interdependent economies its objective is to show how the international coordination of economic policy is a means of promoting growth across countries the analysis is based on a two country endogenous growth model in which the production of human capital depends on country specific tax financed public expenditure and worldwide previously accumulated knowledge we consider optimal policy as the outcome of a dynamic game between benevolent governments we show that both growth which itself has no normative significance and welfare are indeed higher under cooperation than under non cooperation

unanticipated shocks and the maintenance and replacement of durable goods abstract this paper investigates how a durable goods owner responds to a once for all unanticipated shock in a stationary state market this problem is examined in the context of housing the circumstances are determined under which a landlord will respond in each of the following five ways i abandon his building immediately ii run down his building optimally and then abandon iii operate his building forever iv demolish his building immediately and reconstruct a new building on the site and v run down his building demolish it and reconstruct a new building on the site the analogous cases for other durable goods should be obvious

coordination of fiscal policies in a world economy abstract this paper provides a simple counterexample to the standard belief that in a world economy in which all countries are small strategic interactions between policymarkers are trivial and thus cooperative and non cooperative government policies coincide it is well known that this holds for tariff policies however this paper demonstrates the result does not apply to fiscal policy in addition the paper analyzes how optimally coordinated fiscal policies differ from non cooperative policies it finds that relative to optimally coordinated levels non cooperative government spending can be too high or too low depending on the sign of a transmission effect which captures the overall effect countries actions have on each other

participation in a currency union in any voluntary cooperative agreement the potential gain from deviation should determine the minimum influence required over common decision making this paper begins by observing that a highly asymmetric distribution of power between two partners is not sustainable if the choice variables are strategic substitutes it then studies a simple general equilibrium model of a monetary union and shows that a small economy will not take part in the agreement unless it can secure influence that is more than proportional to its size and a transfer of seigniorage revenues in its favor copyright 1992 by american economic association

how do households choose quality and time to replacement for a rapidly improving durable good abstract many durable goods particularly in the high technology sector of the economy experience rapid quality improvement as a result replacement is typically due to obsolescence rather than breakdown and replacement cycles are relatively short when these goods are vertically differentiated consumers must make two important inter related choices upon making a purchase what quality level to buy and how long to wait between purchases in this paper we analyze how these two decisions relate to underlying preferences and to each other both theoretically and empirically we demonstrate how a single tenuous assumption in a commonly used theoretical model can drive the relationships we would predict when we take this model to the data this highlights the necessity of a more direct empirical analysis in our empirics we show that quality choice and replacement cycle length rcl are generally positively correlated we also find evidence of non monotonic relationships between quality choice and marginal utility of quality and rcl choice and marginal utility of money that is households who value quality more don t always buy higher quality pcs and households who value money less don t always buy more frequently ceteris paribus our results provide new insights into the nature of durable goods demand the proper characterization of markets and market segments and welfare measures

information acquisition and reputation dynamics we study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions in our model a sequence of short lived customers interact over time with a single long lived firm that privately knows its type good or opportunistic customers must pay to observe the firm s past behaviour we characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation consumption and restoration of reputation the opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm copyright 2011 oxford university press

international policy design and the sustainability of policy bargains events of the past decade and the persistence of the worldwide recession have underlined the interdependence of the major economics competitive devaluations first illustrated the dangers of unilateral decisions and politicians have regularly called for concerted policies since the bonn economic summit in 1978 economic theory has shown that coordinated policies can bring gains but the question of whether those gains will be significant and how they will be distributed remains unanswered remarkably few empirical results on how interdependence should affect policy design or even on the signs of spillovers between economies have been produced this paper estimates the costs of uncoordinated policies to the us and eec economies and also the potential gains and risks in cooperation it focuses particularly on the process of determining rational policy bargains and whether in an international context such bargains are likely to be sustainable

the gains from fiscal cooperation in the two commodity real trade model abstract this paper analyzes the gains from fiscal cooperation within the context of the standard two commodity real trade model it shows how the adjustment in the terms of trade is the critical factor in determining the effects of moving from a noncooperative equilibrium in general a noncooperative equilibrium leads to an overexpansion of government expenditure on the import good relative to a cooperative equilibrium the specific example of a logarithmic economy is also considered the paper discusses further the welfare effects resulting from the formation of a coalition of two countries among three

socio economic development and software piracy an empirical assessment the high rate of software piracy is a growing concern for software developers as well as businesses and governments it is argued here that the piracy rate is influenced by expected benefits and costs to the pirates a model is developed using a set of variables that may affect such benefits and costs and hence piracy rate in a country and tested for a large sample of 53 countries the results of this paper suggest that the existing socio economic conditions and the lack of proper institutions in developing and emerging economies may be responsible for high software piracy rates one may therefore infer that the current trends of globalization and socio economic development may help software piracy in developing countries

international fiscal policy coordination and economic growth this paper examines the effects of policy coordination in a two country model of endogenous growth governments choose taxes to provide public inputs and public consumption goods tax rates affect the rewards to investment and rates of economic growth two regimes are examined one with independent policy making and one with policy coordination whatever the regime the choice of public inputs is always efficient without coordination however governments choose inefficient tax rates but taxes may be either higher or lower than under policy coordination as a consequence growth rates may be lower or higher than those under policy coordination copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

international real business cycles we ask whether a two country real business cycle model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business cycles with this question in mind we document a number of discrepancies between theory and data the most striking discrepancy concerns the correlations of consumption and output across countries in the data outputs are generally more highly correlated across countries than consumptions in the model we see the opposite