do faculty salaries rise with job seniority abstract previous research suggests that academic salaries fall with greater job seniority using a 1988 national survey we find that the return to seniority is positive over a lengthy employment period tenure status and academic rank also affect the return to seniority

sticky prices and monetary policy evidence from disaggregated us data this paper disentangles fluctuations in disaggregated prices due to macroeconomic and sectoral conditions using a factor augmented vector autoregression estimated on a large data set on the basis of this estimation we establish eight facts 1 macroeconomic shocks explain only about 15 of sectoral inflation fluctuations 2 the persistence of sectoral inflation is driven by macroeconomic factors 3 while disaggregated prices respond quickly to sector specific shocks their responses to aggregate shocks are small on impact and larger thereafter 4 most prices respond with a significant delay to identified monetary policy shocks and show little evidence of a price puzzle contrary to existing studies based on traditional vars 5 categories in which consumer prices fall the most following a monetary policy shock tend to be those in which quantities consumed fall the least 6 the observed dispersion in the reaction of producer prices is relatively well explained by the degree of market power 7 prices in sectors with volatile idiosyncratic shocks react rapidly to aggregate monetary policy shocks 8 the sector specific components of prices and quantities move in opposite directions

elasticities of substitution in real business cycle models with home production this paper constructs a simple model of home production that demonstrates the connection between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in market consumption ies and the static elasticity of substitution between home and market consumption ses understanding this connection is important because there is a large body of empirical evidence suggesting that the ies is small but little evidence on the size of the ses we use our framework to shed light on the properties of a home production model with a low ies we find that such a model must have three fundamental properties in order to match key aspects of aggregate u s data first the steady state growth rate of technology must be the same across sectors second shocks to technology must be sufficiently positively correlated across sectors third capital must be used more intensively in the market sector than in the home sector a home production model with these three properties can be surprisingly successful at reconciling the rbc paradigm with evidence for a low ies

the ir relevance of real wage rigidity in the new keynesian model with search frictions we explore the role of real wage dynamics in a new keynesian business cycle model with search and matching frictions in the labor market both job creation and destruction are endogenous we show that the model generates counterfactual inflation and labor market dynamics in particular it fails to generate a beveridge curve vacancies and unemployment are positively correlated introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values however inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity this is because of the presence of labor market frictions which generate long run employment relationships the measure of real marginal cost that is relevant for inflation dynamics via the phillips curve contains a dynamic component that does not necessarily move with real wages

new keynesian perspectives on labor market dynamics abstract we find that demand shocks play an important role for business cycle fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies the reason is that those shocks give a strong incentive to demand constrained firms to adjust production and thereby labor input furthermore we argue that whether real wage rigidity a la hall 2005 employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness american economic review 95 50 65 helps explain the remaining part of the unemployment volatility puzzle depends critically on assumptions regarding the form of the wage bargain between firms and workers real wage rigidity tends to generate volatility in employment only in the case in which hours are chosen efficiently if on the other hand the real wage is allowed to affect firms s choices of hours directly the feature of real wage rigidity loses its ability to increase employment volatility

competition wages and teacher sorting lessons learned from a voucher reform this paper studies how local school competition affects teacher wages at markets where wages are set via individual wage bargaining using regional variation in private school entry generated by a swedish reform which allowed private schools to enter freely and a comprehensive matched employer employee data covering all high school teachers in sweden over 16 years i analyze the effects of competition on wages as well as labor flows the results suggest that competition translates into higher wages also for teachers in public schools while the average increases are modest new teachers gain 2 percent and high ability teachers in math and science receive 4 percent higher wages in the most competitive areas compared to areas without any competition from private schools several robustness checks support a causal interpretation of the results which together highlight the potential gains from school competition through a more differentiated wage setting of teachers

cut to the bone hospital takeovers and nurse employment contracts the authors examine changes in the wages employment and effort of nurses in california hospitals following takeovers by large chains in the 1990s the market for nurses has been described as a classic monopsony so that one might expect increases in firm market power to be associated with declines in wages however a basic contracting model predicts effects on effort rather than on wages which is what this analysis finds nurses experienced few declines in wages following takeovers but did see increases in the number of patients per nurse the measure of effort used here the authors show that their results are also consistent with an extended version of the monopsony model that considers effort and allows for revenue shifts following a takeover finally they find that these changes were similar in the largest for profit and non profit chains suggesting that market forces are more important than institutional form

nash solution and timing of bargaining abstract we analyze bargaining problems with unknown feasible sets and known disagreement points two characterizations of the nash solution are presented by formulating axioms specifying how bargaining solutions should respond under such circumstances

the consequences of minimum wage laws some new theoretical ideas economists generally agree that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers however this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of firms labor is not dependent on the wage in this paper we show that in a conventional efficiency wage model a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs the formal logic of our model is similar to the case of labor demand under monopsony but arises in a model with a large number of employers

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

effects of the minimum wage on the employment status of youths an update the large decline in the relative value of the minimum wage during the 1980s makes that period a valuable one for identifying the impact of variation in the minimum wage on youth employment this study produces the robust finding that when the experience of the 1980s is included a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is estimated to reduce teen employment by less than 1 percent the lower end of the range of previous estimates because this small employment effect is offset by a labor force withdrawal effect the study finds no discernible effect on measured unemployment the study also finds no apparent effect of the minimum wage on the employment of young adults aged 20 24

a time series analysis of representative agent models of consumption andleisure choice under uncertainty this paper investigates empirically a model of aggregate consumption and leisure decisions in which utility from goods and leisure is nontime separable the nonseparability of preferences accommodates intertemporal substitution or complementarity of leisure and thereby affects the comovements in aggregate compensation and hours worked these cross relations are examined empirically using postwar monthly u s data on quantities real wages and the real return on the one month treasury bill the estimated values of the parameters governing preferences differ significantly from the values assumed in several studies of real business models several possible explanations of these discrepancies are discussed

estimating a market equilibrium search model from panel data on individuals from albrecht and axell 1984 and is based on workers who are homogeneous in terms of market productivity and heterogeneous in terms of nonmarket productivity and on firms which are heterogeneous in terms of productive efficiency the equilibrium model is contrasted in terms of its fit to the data with an unrestricted version of the model which is based on a mixture of negative binomial distributions the equilibrium model fails to conform to the data in exactly the dimension of its major focus namely it implies that measurement error accounts for almost all of the dispersion in observed wages the equilibrium model also does not do well in fitting the unemployment duration distribution compared to the unrestricted model the problem is that the duration distribution itself does not support the existence of significant heterogeneity as evidenced by the estimates of the unrestricted model the paper also illustrates the use of such models for policy analysis by simulating the welfare effects of a minimum wage

bargaining foundations of shapley value1 a transferable utility economy in which each agent holds a resource which can be used in combination with the resources of other agents to generate value according to the characteristic function v is studied using a dynamic model of bargaining the main theorem establishes that the payoffs associated with efficient equilibria converge to the agents shapley values as the time between periods of the dynamic game goes to zero in addition it is demonstrated that an efficient equilibrium exists and is unique when an additivity condition is satisfied to demonstrate the sensitivity of the solution to the institutional detail we modify the model to allow for partnerships and show that the shapley value is no longer achieved

on the importance of the participation margin for labor market fluctuations abstract conventional analyses of labor market fluctuations ascribe a minor role to labor force participation we show by contrast that flows based analyses imply that the participation margin accounts for around one third of unemployment fluctuations a novel stock flow apparatus establishes these facts delivering three further contributions first the role of the participation margin appears robust to adjustments for spurious transitions induced by reporting error second conventional stocks based analyses are subject to a stock flow fallacy neglecting offsetting forces of worker flows on the participation rate third increases in labor force attachment among the unemployed during recessions are a leading explanation for the role of the participation margin

the effect of minimum salaries on employment of teachers a test of the monopsony model author affiliation william m boal college of business and public administration drake university des moines iowa 50311 usa e mail william boal drake edu acknowledgment this paper has benefited from helpful comments on earlier drafts by david harrington and ronald oaxaca by seminar participants at drake university and iowa state university and by anonymous referees 1 introductionthe market for schoolteachers has long been cited as an example of labor monopsony where employers that is school districts enjoy market power ehrenberg and smith 2000 hyclak johnes and thornton 2005 the reasons offered are plausible by definition school districts enjoy exclusive territories teachers have specialized training that might not be interesting to nearby nonschool employers many teachers are second earners in their families and might be unwilling to relocate in response to distant job offers there is some evidence that teachers have strong personal geographic preferences boyd et al 2005 it would appear that the set of potential employers available to a certified teacher is limited to the set of school districts within commuting distance of current residence for these reasons it is often argued that the greatest monopsony power is probably held by rural school districts because of their large geographic size an empirical literature dating back to landon and baird 1971 has tried to document monopsony in this market by regressing teacher salaries on measures of geographic concentration of school districts these studies often appear to find a negative effect of geographic concentration on teacher salaries see luizer and thornton 1986 for a survey a major difficulty with the salary concentration research strategy is that concentration is inversely related to urbanization because urban areas tend to have many school districts in close proximity and salaries for all workers tend to be higher in urban areas the apparent negative estimated effect of concentration may disappear when sufficient measures of urbanization are included ransom boal and beck 1998 moreover the urban rural difference in teacher salaries appears similar to the urban rural difference for other professionals hirsch and nottage 1998 1a second difficulty with the salary concentration research strategy is the increasing presence of teachers unions 2 a monopsonist faces or at least perceives an upward sloping supply of labor this upward slope raises marginal labor cost above the current wage causing the monopsonist to reduce employment equilibrium occurs on the labor supply curve but below the monopsonist s labor demand curve by contrast a union tries to raise the wage by moving the equilibrium above the supply curve estimates based on 1970s data show that unionized teachers enjoyed an average wage differential of roughly 10 3 in some cases a union might even move the equilibrium above the demand curve this is the prediction of the so called contract curve model for which eberts and stone 1984 1986 found some evidence among new york state school districts any test for monopsony ought to exclude unionized districts from the sample or control for unionism in some way this has not generally been done 4a recent seemingly unrelated literature has investigated the effects of legal minimum wages on employment in fast food restaurants katz and krueger 1992 card and krueger 1994 this literature has apparently documented slight increases in employment following increases in minimum wages the authors note that this result is incompatible with competitive labor markets and may be evidence for employer monopsony a modest increase in a minimum wage may increase employment in a monopsonized market because it flattens the employer s perceived labor supply curve and thereby lowers the employer s marginal labor cost curve

underpaid or overpaid wage analysis for nurses using job and worker attributes the nursing labor market presents an apparent puzzle hospitals report chronic shortages yet standard wage analysis shows that nursing wages have increased over time and greatly exceed those received by other college educated women this paper addresses this puzzle data from the current population survey cps are matched with detailed job content descriptors from the occupational information network o net nursing jobs require higher levels of skills and more difficult working conditions than do jobs for other college educated workers a standard cps only wage regression shows a registered nurse rn wage advantage of 22 log points compared to a pooled male female group of college educated workers control for o net job attributes reduces the rn gap to 08 while an arguably preferable nonparametric estimator produces a wage gap estimate close to zero we conclude that nurses receive compensation close to long run opportunity costs narrowing if not resolving the rn wage shortage puzzle

the nash bargaining solution is optimal abstract we consider the problem faced by players in a two person bargaining game who have different opinions about what is the appropriate solution concept to use a procedure is proposed to resolve such a conflict and it is shown that the nash bargaining solution constitutes the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the procedure as a by product we obtain that in the axiomatic characterization of the nash solution the controversial independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom can be replaced by a much weaker recursivity axiom which amounts to requiring independence of alternatives that cannot be obtained as an outcome of a risk sensitive solution

the cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment the flow opportunity cost of moving from unemployment to employment consists of forgone public benefits and the forgone consumption value of nonworking time we construct a time series of the opportunity cost of employment using detailed microdata and administrative or national accounts data to estimate benefits levels eligibility take up consumption by labor force status hours taxes and preference parameters the opportunity cost is procyclical and volatile over the business cycle the estimated cyclicality implies far less unemployment volatility in leading models of the labor market than that observed in the data irrespective of the level of the opportunity cost

sex discrimination and competition in product and labour markets theoritical explanations for wage discrimination collapse in the long run because competition should drive discriminations firms out of the market in product markets with imperfect competition em

equilibrium unemployment job flows and inflation dynamics this paper develops a general equilibrium model to explain a set of facts regarding job flows unemployment and inflation dynamics it integrates a theory of equilibrium unemployment into a monetary model with nominal price rigidities the labor market displays matching frictions and endogenous job destruction the model can explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment job creation job destruction and the joint fluctuations of the labor input along both the extensive and the intensive margin conditional on a shock to monetary policy allowing for variation of the labor input at the extensive margin leads to a significantly lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output this helps to explain the sluggishness of inflation and the persistence of output after a monetary policy shock

bargaining with an agenda gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda a family of increasing sets of joint utilities parameterized by time a solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time we axiomatize an ordinal solution i e one that is covariant with order preserving transformations of utility it can be viewed as the limit of step by step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next the stepwise agreements may follow the nash solution the kalai smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit

the importance of the agenda in bargaining abstract this paper discusses a multi issue bargaining game in which the players set up an agenda and negotiate on the issues sequentially according to this agenda we demonstrate that the agenda might play an important role in the bargaining and discuss the relationship between the agenda and the final outcome of the bargaining game assuming that players have conflicting evaluations regarding the importance of the issues under negotiation we identify the type of agenda each player prefers we also show that in such cases the outcome of the bargaining game need not to be efficient by demonstrating the strategic use of the agenda the paper explains the phenomenon of bargaining on the agenda

contagious speculation and a cure for cancer a nonevent that made stock prices soar a sunday new york times article on a potential development of new cancer curing drugs caused entremed s stock price to rise from 12 063 at the friday close to open at 85 and close near 52 on monday it closed above 30 in the three following weeks the enthusiasm spilled over to other biotechnology stocks the potential breakthrough in cancer research already had been reported however in the journal nature and in various popular newspapers including the times more than five months earlier thus enthusiastic public attention induced a permanent rise in share prices even though no genuinely new information had been presented a central tenet of f inancial economics is that an asset should trade at the risk adjusted present value of its expected future cash f lows these expected future cash f lows exist in people s minds and do not normally lend themselves to direct observation an equilibrium price in a frictionless market does not tolerate disagreements among market participants if some people deem the price too low they will buy the asset if others think it is too high they will sell it short if necessary although the efficient markets hypothesis predicts that price changes are unpredictable it associates them with changes in traders beliefs about future cash f lows or the appropriate discount rate beliefs change with the arrival of new information thus in hindsight at least we should be able to ascribe price changes to the arrival of specific new information we examine this view in the context of a series of news reports in the media pertaining to entremed enmd a biotechnology company and other members of its sector the sunday may 3 1998 edition of the new york times reports on a recent breakthrough in cancer research and mentions enmd a company with licensing rights to the breakthrough kolata 1998 the story s impact on the stock prices was immediate huge and to a large extent permanent the new news content of the times story was nil though the substance of the story had been published as a scientific piece in nature boehm et al 1997 and in the popular press including the times itself wade 1997 more than five months earlier in november 1997

noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution given a finite set of alternatives players alternate making offers player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto if 2 accepts it is enforced and the game ends otherwise 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives and so on if all alternatives are vetoed a disagreement alternative is enforced first we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game then we show that this outcome converges to the area monotonic solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity

limited information and advertising in the u s personal computer industry traditional discrete choice models assume buyers are aware of all products for sale in markets where products change rapidly the full information assumption is untenable i present a discrete choice model of limited consumer information where advertising influences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase i apply the model to the u s personal computer market where top firms spend over 2 billion annually on advertising i find estimated markups of 19 over production costs where top firms advertise more than average and earn higher than average markups high markups are explained to a large extent by informational asymmetries across consumers where full information models predict markups of one fourth the magnitude i find that estimated product demand curves are biased toward being too elastic under traditional models i show how to use data on media exposure to improve estimated price elasticities in the absence of micro ad data

monopsony power in the market for nurses estimates are presented of the inverse elasticity of supply of nursing services to the individual hospital a quantity which is a natural measure of employer market power the estimates corresponding to employment changes taking place over one year are quite high in the neighborhood of 0 79 and even for changes taking place over three years are substantial in the neighborhood of 0 26 the estimates do not significantly differ for hospitals in major metropolitan areas and do not depend very sensitively on the assumed form of the oligopsony equilibrium this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the talmud abstract for three different bankruptcy problems the 2000 year old babylonian talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games a rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in terms of the talmudic principle of equal division of the contested amount this rationale leads to a unique solution for all bankruptcy problems which always coincides with the nucleolus two other rationales for the same rule are suggested in terms of other talmudic principles needless to say the rule in question is not proportional division

ordinal cost sharing abstract we ask how the best known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions the value proportional and serial mechanisms should be extended to arbitrary problems we propose the ordinality axiom which requires that cost shares should be invariant under essentially all increasing transformations of the measuring scales following thevalueapproach first we present an axiomatization of the shapley shubik rule based on ordinality next we define and axiomatize two extensions of theserialmechanism which contrary to the friedman moulin rule are ordinal finally we note that the aumann shapley extension of theproportionalmechanism is not ordinal we propose and defend an alternative proportional extension which does satisfy ordinality journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d63 c71

monopsony in the low wage labor market evidence from minimum nurse staffing regulations this paper provides direct evidence on the extent of monopsony power in the low wage labor market by estimating the firm level elasticity of labor supply for nurse aides in the long term care nursing home industry using exogenous variation in hiring induced by the passage of a state minimum nurse staffing law i find that facilities initially out of compliance with the new law did not have to raise their wage offers relative to their competitors in order to hire more nurses while this is consistent with perfect competition in simple monopsony models of the labor market i discuss how the results may be more ambiguous in more complicated models

the changing effects of competition on non profit and for profit hospital pricing behavior abstract has the nature of hospital competition changed from a medical arms race in which hospitals compete for patients by offering their doctors high quality services to a price war for the patients of payors this paper uses time series cross sectional methods on california hospital discharge data from 1986 1994 to show the association of hospital prices with measures of market concentration changed steadily over this period with prices now higher in less competitive areas even for non profit hospitals regression results are used to simulate the price impact of hypothetical hospital mergers

multiple equilibria and minimum wages in labor markets with informational frictions and heterogeneous production technologies it is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it in this article we analyze a model with search frictions and heterogeneous production technologies in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though after imposition the lowest wage in the market exceeds the minimum wage the model has multiple equilibria as a result of the fact that the reservation wage of the unemployed and the lowest production technology in use affect each other imposition of a minimum wage may improve social welfare

no profitable decompositions in quasi linear allocation problems abstract we study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers the key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems combined with additional standard properties it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment

sex discrimination and product market competition the case of the banking industry this paper examines the relationship between product market competition and employment discrimination using an especially constructed data set that links microeconomic data on female employment with measures of market concentration in the banking industry the use of firm specific data drawn from this one industry allows estimation of this relationship in a manner that avoids the problems of interindustry differences that have troubled previous studies the results provide strong support for a negative relationship between market concentration and the relative employment of women further we find that individual market shares are unrelated to female employment suggesting that the relationship is due primarily to differences across markets rather than individual firms

labor market dynamics with endogenous labor force participation and on the job search abstract studies that incorporate endogenous labor force participation and search and matching frictions in a real business cycle model report that the model generates counterfactual dynamics 1 labor force participation is very volatile and strongly procyclical 2 unemployment is weakly procyclical or acyclical 3 unemployment and vacancies are positively correlated to improve the model s performance i enrich the model with on the job search as a mechanism to dampen the movements of participation and keep vacancy creation high for longer periods the proposed model successfully generates weakly procyclical participation strongly countercyclical unemployment and the beveridge curve the model also succeeds in matching the statistics for labor force participation and job to job flows

time use during the great recession using data from the american time use survey between 2003 and 2010 we document that home production absorbs roughly 30 percent of foregone market work hours at business cycle frequencies leisure absorbs roughly 50 percent of foregone market work hours with sleeping and television watching accounting for most of this increase we document significant increases in time spent on shopping child care education and health job search absorbs between 2 and 6 percent of foregone market work hours we discuss the implications of our results for business cycle models with home production and non separable preferences jel codes d13 e32 j22

comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict how norms against threats can have real effects abstract in many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments in guns that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set in such settings with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency we compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions under symmetry we find that the solution in which the threat point is least influential the equal sacrifice solution pareto dominates the other solutions since the equal sacrifice solution puts the least weight on the threat point norms against threats that can be seen in many seemingly rhetorical pronouncements in adversarial relations can mitigate some of the costs of conflict and therefore have efficiency enhancing effects journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d30 d70 d72 k42

compensating differentials and unmeasured ability in the labor market for nurses why do hospitals pay more nurses employed in hospitals realize a large wage advantage relative to nurses employed elsewhere this paper examines alternative sources of the hospital premium a topic of some interest given the current shifting of medical care out of hospitals whereas cross sectional estimates indicate a hospital rn wage advantage of roughly 20 percent longitudinal analysis suggests that a third to a half of the advantage is due to unmeasured worker ability the remainder is likely to reflect compensating differentials for hospital disamenities we further probe possible sources of the rn hospital premium by examining the receipt of fringe benefits differences in cognitive ability as measured by afqt test scores differences in the quality of experience the role of labor unions and rents earnings on second jobs and the magnitude of wage differentials associated with work shift

classic or new monopsony searching for evidence in nursing labor markets the market for registered nurses rns is often offered as an example of classic monopsony while a new monopsony literature emphasizes that firm labor supply is upward sloping independent of market structure using data from multiple sources we explore the relationship between nursing wages in hospitals and measures of classic and new monopsony wage level analysis fails to provide support for classic monopsony the relative wages of rns in 240 u s labor markets being largely uncorrelated with hospital system concentration longitudinal analysis shows nursing wages declining with increases in hospital concentration we interpret these results as providing support for classic monopsony effects in the short run but question whether wage effects are sustained in the long run no relationship is found between nursing wages and a new monopsony measure of mobility but support for new monopsony is found for women elsewhere in the labor market rns display greater interemployer mobility than do women or men in general two conclusions follow first upward sloping labor supply need not imply monopsonistic outcomes second absent more compelling evidence nursing should not be held up as a prototypical example of monopsony classic or new

nash demand game and the kalai smorodinsky solution we introduce two new variations on the nash demand game in one as in all past variants of nash demand games the nash bargaining solution is the equilibrium outcome the other demand game allows for probabilistic continuation in cases of infeasible joint demands specifically with probability 1 p the game terminates and the players receive their disagreement payoffs but with probability p the game continues to a second stage in which one of the two incompatible demands is randomly selected and implemented surprisingly the kalai smorodinsky solution is always the outcome of the most robust equilibrium of this game moreover ranking other solution concepts is impossible

resuscitating the wage channel in models with unemployment fluctuations higher wages all else equal translate into higher inflation more rigid wages imply a weaker response of inflation to shocks this view of the wage channel is deeply entrenched in central banks views and models of their economy in this paper we present a model with equilibrium unemployment which features three distinctive properties first using a search and matching model with right to manage wage bargaining a proper wage channel obtains second accounting for fixed costs associated with maintaining an existing job greatly magnifies profit fluctuations for any given degree of wage fluctuations which allows the model to reproduce the fluctuations of unemployment over the business cycle and third the model implies a reasonably low elasticity of steady state unemployment with respect to changes in benefits the calibration of the model implies low profits but does not require a small gap between the value of working and the value of unemployment for the worker

building a composite help wanted index abstract this paper builds a measure of vacancy posting over 1951 2009 that captures the behavior of total print and online help wanted advertising and can be used for time series analysis of the us labor market

attaching workers through in kind payments theory and evidence from russia external shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions in addition firms may devise attachment strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market when workers are compensated in kind they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration this endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature the article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self employed an analysis of matched household firm data from the russian federation corroborates the theory

reference functions and balanced concessions in bargaining in bargaining agents expect their concessions to be reciprocated using the reference function concept of thomson 1981 this paper constructs a class of solutions the outcomes of which lead to balanced concessions by agents as prescribed by the reference function adopted the kalai smorodinsky solution arises as a special case another solution in this class which depends on the entire feasible set is generated by using the centre of gravity as the reference function

monopsony power and relative wages in the labor market for nurses this paper examines the thesis that monopsony power is an important determinant of wages in nursing labor markets using data from the 1985 93 current population surveys measures of relative nurse non nurse wage rates for 252 labor markets are constructed contrary to predictions from the monopsony model no positive relationship exists between relative nursing wages and hospital density or market size nor is support found for the presence of monopsony power based on evidence on union wage premiums slopes of experience profiles or the mix of rn to total hospital employment

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions abstract most real life bargaining is resolved gradually during this process parties reach intermediate agreements these intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds we identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions the nash proportional and as a special case to the egalitarian solution and discrete raiffa solutions we show that the robustness of intermediate agreements plus additional well known and plausible axioms provide novel axiomatizations of the above mentioned solutions hence we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutions bargaining theories

unemployment fiscal multipliers we estimate the effects of fiscal policy on the labor market in us data an increase in government spending of 1 percent of gdp generates output and unemployment multipliers respectively of about 1 2 percent at one year and 0 6 percentage points at the peak each percentage point increase in gdp produces an increase in employment of about 1 3 million jobs total hours employment and the job finding probability all rise whereas the separation rate falls a standard neoclassical model augmented with search and matching frictions in the labor market largely fails in reproducing the size of the output multiplier whereas it can produce a realistic unemployment multiplier but only under a special parameterization extending the model to strengthen the complementarity in preferences to include unemployment benefits real wage rigidity and or debt financing with distortionary taxation only worsens the picture new keynesian features only marginally magnify the size of the multipliers when complementarity is coupled with price stickiness however the magnification effect can be large

is hospital competition socially wasteful we study the consequences of hospital competition for medicare beneficiaries heart attack care from 1985 to 1994 we examine how relatively exogenous determinants of hospital choice such as travel distances influence the competitiveness of hospital markets and how hospital competition interacts with the influence of managed care organizations to affect the key determinants of social welfare expenditures on treatment and patient health outcomes in the 1980s the welfare effects of competition were ambiguous but in the 1990s competition unambiguously improves social welfare increasing hmo enrollment over the sample period partially explains the dramatic change in the impact of hospital competition

medicaid managed care effects on children s medicaid coverage and utilization abstract we use data from the national health interview surveys nhis to measure the effects of the growth of medicaid managed care on children we examine both the probability that individual children were medicaid covered and their utilization of care we find that managed care penetration has significant effects on the composition of the medicaid caseload young children are less likely to be covered while poor school age children are more likely to be covered when we examine coverage by race we find that black children are less likely to be covered where medicaid managed care organizations mmcos are more prevalent these lower medicaid enrollment rates are linked to increases in the numbers of young children who go without any doctor visits in a year these results suggest that it is important to examine the potential effects of changes in medicaid on selection into the medicaid program rather than focusing exclusively on the effects of managed care on those who are enrolled in addition among those enrolled in medicaid higher managed care penetration is associated with an increase in the number of black children with chronic conditions who go without doctor visits but with decreases in the number of hispanic children and poor teens who go without care

bargaining with uncertain disagreement points much of the uncertainty concerning the likely outcome of a typical management labor conflict pertains to the cost of possible conflict to the two sides in this paper we consider situations of this kind where the cost of conflict is not known with certainty however we will assume the benefits from cooperation to be known we place our analysis in the abstract framework formulated by nash 1950 nash described a bargaining problem as a pair consisting of a feasible set the amount to be divided among management and labor and a disagreement point giving the payoffs to both sides when they fail to reach agreement on a division that is the strike nash investigated the existence of solutions to such problems that would satisfy a certain list of appealing properties in his analysis both feasible set and disagreement point were assumed to be known here we assume only the feasible set to be known several studies have appeared of bargaining situations where the feasible set is unknown but the disagreement point is known while we are of course not denying the relevance of such studies we believe that an analysis of situations where it is the consequences of conflict that are unknown might be equally and perhaps even more relevant to industrial experience indeed consider a management labor conflict over wages and benefits in many industries the future profitability of the enterprise can be predicted with reasonable accuracy on the basis of its performance in the previous years whereas the impact of a strike might depend on a number of factors that are significantly harder to evaluate this is because strikes are infrequent and conjectures about these factors are often not put to the test a strike is a threat that is often not carried out and because they involve a number of parameters that are difficult to quantify such as the psychological readiness of the strikers the support they might receive from the population and the media and the likely response of competing and related industries we impose on solutions a new condition of disagreement point concavity guaranteeing that agents will agree on a compromise before the uncertainty concerning the disagreement point is resolved to illustrate this requirement somewhat more concretely suppose that bargaining takes place today without the precise location of the disagreement point being known this uncertainty being resolved tomorrow the bargainers have two options the first option is simply to wait until tomorrow and solve then whatever problem has come up unfortunately the resulting pair of contingent compromises evaluated today is in general strictly pareto dominated the other possibility is to solve today the problem obtained by replacing the uncertain disagreement point by its expected value this represents the cost of conflict evaluated today and to solve the resulting problem today this second option has the advantage of yielding paretoundominated compromises provided of course that agents would in the case of no uncertainty select such compromises but unfortunately it may make one of the agents worse off than under the first option in order to ensure that all agents agree to reaching a compromise today we require that the second option always pareto dominate the first one we show that disagreement point concavity when used in conjunction with three standard properties that are satisfied by virtually all of the solutions commonly discussed

the unemployment volatility puzzle is wage stickiness the answer i discuss the failure of the canonical search and matching model to match the cyclical volatility in the job finding rate i show that job creation in the model is influenced by wages in new matches i summarize microeconometric evidence and find that wages in new matches are volatile and consistent with the model s key predictions therefore explanations of the unemployment volatility puzzle have to preserve the cyclical volatility of wages i discuss a modification of the model based on fixed matching costs that can increase cyclical unemployment volatility and is consistent with wage flexibility in new matches

labor market participation unemployment and monetary policy models of unemployment and monetary policy usually assume constant participation incorporating a participation decision into a standard new keynesian model with matching frictions we show that market tightness becomes endogenously more volatile because both the opportunity cost of home production and the reservation wage vary with participation the model can simultaneously explain the low volatility of participation the high volatility of unemployment and a procyclical workers outside option of working a policy of strict inflation targeting is close to optimal and increasing the response of the interest rate to inflation does not have a large impact on the volatility of unemployment because of the endogenous response of participation

bargaining under liquidity constraints unified strategic foundations of the nash and kalai solutions abstract we provide unified strategic foundations for the nash 1950 and kalai 1977 solutions in the context of negotiations under liquidity constraints we propose an n round game where in each round a seller and a buyer with limited payment capacity negotiate a bundle of divisible goods where bundle sizes can vary across rounds according to rubinstein s 1982 alternating offer game the game implements the nash solution if n 1 and the kalai solution if n and bundle sizes are infinitesimal if n is set by one player ex ante the buyer chooses n 1 while the seller chooses n we endogenize liquidity constraints and show they bind for all n even when there is no cost in holding liquidity

monopsony and the lifetime relation between wages and productivity we consider the relation between wages and productivity by means of a model based on the following assumptions workers live for 2 periods firms live forever senior workers differ nontrivially from junior seniority enhances workers expected second period earnings both firms and workers recognize the prospect of promotion and the senior junior wage differential at the time of hiring and firms have monopsony power in hiring junior workers we show that senior wages are equal to the senior marginal product but junior wages are set below the junior marginal product by an amount that depends on the elasticity of the firm s labor supply

generalized raiffa solutions abstract we define a family of solutions for n person bargaining problems which generalizes the discrete raiffa solution and approaches the continuous raiffa solution each member of this family is a stepwise solution which is a pair of functions a step function that determines a new disagreement point for a given bargaining problem and a solution function that assigns the solution to the problem we axiomatically characterize stepwise solutions of the family of generalized raiffa solutions using standard axioms of bargaining theory

search and matching frictions and optimal monetary policy abstract a recent literature has merged the new keynesian and the search and matching frameworks which has allowed the former to analyze the joint dynamics of unemployment and inflation this paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in this kind of hybrid framework i show that zero inflation is optimal when all wages are nash bargained in every period and the economy s steady state is efficient in the more realistic case in which nominal wage bargaining is staggered a case against price stability arises in response to real shocks the central bank should use price inflation so as to avoid excessive unemployment volatility and excessive dispersion in hiring rates for a plausible calibration the welfare loss under the zero inflation policy is about three times as large as under the optimal policy

the union impact on hospital wages and fringe benefits this paper uses 1977 data from a national probability sample of 1 200 hospitals to estimate the effect of unions on wages and fringe benefits in four occupations registered nurses practical nurses secretaries and housekeepers the results show that unionization has a significant impact on wages that increases with the length of time collective bargaining has been in effect at the individual hospital the overall wage effect of unions is about 8 percent for both types of nurses and 11 to 12 percent for secretaries and housekeepers employed in hospitals the authors also estimate an equation for hospital wide fringe benefits which shows that such benefits are positively related to the percent of full time employees in the four occupations covered by union contracts

implementing the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution the bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that are used by all non winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner s proposal that procedure non cooperatively implements the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

the equal loss principle for bargaining problems abstract we introduce a new bargaining solution which we call the equal loss solution this solution equalizes across agents the losses from the ideal point two characterizations of the solution are presented by formulating axioms specifying how bargaining solutions should respond to changes in the feasible set and the ideal point

labor supply factors and economic fluctuations we propose a new v ar identication scheme that enables us to disentangle labor supply shocks from wage bargaining shocks identication is achieved by imposing robust sign restrictions that are derived from a new keynesian model with endogenous labor force par ticipation according to our analysis on us data over the period 1985 2014 labor supply shocks and wage bargaining shocks are important drivers of output and unemployment both in the short run and in the long run these results suggest that identication strategies used in estimated new keynesian models to disentangle labor market shocks may be misguided we also analyze the behavior of the labor force participation rate through the lenses of our model wend that labor supply shocks are the main drivers of the participation rate and account for about half of its decline in the aftermath of the great recession

seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor marke t experience in contrast the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors the author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers copyright 1993 by american economic association

monopsony in the labor market this paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical research on monopsony in labor markets broadly defined as upward sloping labor supply to an employer we compare older monopsony models based on small numbers of employers with newer models based on labor market frictions such as moving costs and search we also compare older econometric approaches that focus on static wage concentration relationships with newer approaches that focus on dynamics our review of empirical estimates suggests that monopsony power based on small numbers of employers is probably rare but occasionally large while monopsony power based on frictions is probably widespread but small on average

negotiations in multi issue committees abstract we propose a non cooperative bargaining approach to the problem of collective decision making in committees by modelling this process as a sequential bargaining game the main objective of the paper is to discuss the formation of the agenda in multi issue committees and its relation to the importance of the issues we start by asserting that in the case of a single issue the set of all equilibrium outcomes of our game coincides with the set of coalitional stable outcomes we then consider multi issue committees to discuss the problem of forming agendas we argue that from the point of view of efficiency and stability the most important issues should be put first on the agenda we conclude with a sufficient condition on players preferences which guarantees the efficiency and stability of the bargaining outcomes for every possible agenda

an estimate of the rent generated by a premium college football player the national collegiate athletic association limits the payments athletes can receive for their services colleges are effectively monosony employers so players will not be paid their marginal revenue product therefore colleges capture an economic rent from players this paper measures these rents by estimating the marginal revenue product of a top college football player the empirical results suggest that a premium college player generates over 500 000 in annual revenues for his team

a theory of gradual coalition formation we study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games based on underlying tu games in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements we distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements reversible actions and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game irreversible actions we show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions on the other hand we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty irrespective of the reversibility of actions agreements between players form the basis of much that game theory seeks to explain there are obviously many useful ways to categorize such agreements in multilateral negotiations that is with more than two participants it seems natural to distinguish between cases in which the coalition forms in one step and those in which the coalition grows to its eventual size by attracting new members thus recipients of marshall aid collectively agreed to american terms at the ceec in 1947 whereas a strict subset of these countries agreed to the schuman plan in 1950 with the other current members joining the eu over time similarly negotiations on climate change culminated in universal agreement at rio in 1992 whereas india and china only agreed to reduce cfc emissions in london in 1990 after other countries had signed up to the montreal protocol finally un security council resolution 242 urged that a multilateral conference be set up to establish a comprehensive settlement in the middle east whereas the process initiated by the oslo agreements and arguably camp david has consisted of a sequence of agreements between israel and its neighbours we will refer to cases in which the grand coalition forms in one step as involving immediate coalition formation or icf for short and cases in which a coalition grows as involving gradual coalition formation

a meta allocation mechanism in cooperative bargaining abstract we analyze an iterative meta allocation mechanism the minimal agreement procedure which can be used to resolve bargaining conflicts generated by players proposal of differing solution concepts in two person cooperative bargaining at each stage of the iteration our procedure improves the disagreement point so that its limit is on the pareto frontier

pairwise trade asset prices and monetary policy abstract we construct a search theoretic model where fiat money coexists with real assets and all assets can be used as a media of exchange the terms of trade in bilateral matches are determined by a pairwise pareto efficient pricing mechanism we do not have to appeal to exogenous liquidity constraints to generate asset prices that are consistent with the following facts i fiat money can be valued despite being dominated in its rate of return ii real assets with identical dividend flows can have different rates of return and iii an increase in inflation raises asset prices lowers their returns and widens the rate of return differences between assets on the normative side we show that there is a range of inflation rates that implement the first best allocation

the impact of the minimum wage on other wages in this paper i explore how changes in the minimum wage affect various occupational wages i postulate that other wages increase for two reasons first firms try to mitigate the deterioration in a worker s relative wage which would cause him to reduce his work effort and second there is an increase in the demand for nonminimum wage workers wage adjustment patterns are examined to ascertain whether wage comparisons play a role in the adjustment process the empirical work shows a short run wage compression among white collar occupations which is consistent with the wage comparison model however large standard errors make inferences weak

economies of scale in non revenue producing cost centers implications for hospital mergers this paper uses semiparametric methods to estimate the magnitude of economies of scale in 14 non revenue producing cost centers in hospitals there are substantial economies of scale in small hospitals but economies are exhausted in hospitals with over 10 000 discharges annually in recent hospital mergers challenged by federal antitrust agencies one or both hospitals had over 10 000 discharges suggesting that efficiency gains in non revenue producing cost centers will be small and could easily be offset by nominal price increases

optimizing multi stage negotiations abstract we consider procedures where issues of varying importance and risk are negotiated in stages negotiation at any stage requires an agreement at each previous stage if negotiation terminates players realize the benefits from all earlier agreements we formalize this process by a strategic n stage negotiation game the expected subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is characterized by an intuitive compact formula which aggregates all the structural elements of the multi stage process we describe the optimal negotiation agenda for a given decomposition of the bargaining problem and we derive intuitive prescriptions for an optimal decomposition