efficient non contractible investments in large economies abstract do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions we present a two sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching once matched buyer and seller bargain over the price taking into account outside options efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium we characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient we also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d51

international trade as an integrated equilibrium new perspectives the integrated equilibrium is a paradigm that has played a central role in the field of international trade the concept originated with paul a samuelson 1949 was further developed by avinash k dixit and victor f norman 1980 and placed at the heart of international analysis by elhanan helpman and paul r krugman 1985 the central idea is that a world with imperfect mobility of productive factors across regions or countries may replicate the essential equilibrium of a fully integrated economy provided that goods are perfectly mobile the concept of the integrated equilibrium has proved to be exceptionally tractable and useful for analytic developments as for example in the work of gene m grossman and helpman 1992 we have found using elements of integrated equilibrium analysis useful in our own work e g davis et al 1997 the central figures in developing the theory of trade and growth within the integrated equilibrium framework have been quite aware of its limitations helpman and krugman 1985 include a section on the cases in which factor price equalization fpe breaks down grossman and helpman 1992 make the distinction between national and international spillovers a key element of their theory of trade and growth moreover the starting point of krugman s work in the past decade on economic geography has been precisely to deny that the world operates as if it were an integrated economy this notwithstanding we believe that the grip of integrated equilibrium analysis on the way that the economics profession conceives of world trade patterns remains very powerful and in important ways distorts one s view of trade relations particularly among the relatively rich countries of the oecd we do not propose to banish integrated equilibrium analysis we believe that it is useful in the proper context however we do propose that it is important to have a fuller appreciation of the limits of such analysis from an empirical standpoint and thus to have a richer view of the determinants of world trade patterns

entrepreneurship and organization design we model entrepreneurship and the emergence of firms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents what distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for those who are relatively unmanageable while possibly excellent managers themselves become entrepreneurs entrepreneurs compete and create value by building efficient organizations and offering potentially well paid jobs to others while the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs this result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship

collective decisions and competitive markets in a general equilibrium model we allow for households with several typically heterogeneous members households that make efficient collective consumption decisions where different households may use different collective decision mechanisms yet households that operate within a competitive market environment the interaction of two allocation mechanisms collective decisions and competitive markets is investigated with a focus on the efficiency properties and decentralization possibilities of the dual allocation mechanism

on price taking equilibria in club economies with nonanonymous crowding abstract competitive equilibrium in a coalition production economy or a club economy typically does not exist when there is free entry for two reasons first there may be an integer problem as is familiar from club theory with anonymous crowding second optimal groups may have different compositions from the population and then even if there is no integer problem it may be impossible to partition the population into optimal groups i define a notion of approximate equilibrium and show that such an equilibrium always exists in a sufficiently large economy i focus on the optimal size of the economy rather than of clubs

nonatomic economies and the boundaries of perfect competition this paper explores the distinction between nonatomicity and thick markets as the source of perfect competition the focus of the paper is the construction of a model of an imperfectly competitive economy with a nonatomic continuum of traders and a continuum of differentiated commodities for which walrasian equilibria exist the failure of perfect competition in this instance can be identified in two ways individuals can affect prices and the core is strictly larger than the set of walrasian allocations by contrast it is shown that when markets are physically or economically thick or both then individuals cannot typically affect prices and the core always coincides with the set of walrasian allocations

valuation equilibrium with clubs abstract this paper considers model worlds in which there is a continuum of individuals who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities we show how through a suitable choice of commodity space restrictions on the composition of feasible groups can be incorporated into the specification of the consumption and production sets of the economy we also show that if there are a finite number of types then the classical results from the competitive analysis of convex finite agent economies can be reinterpreted to apply journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 h41

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

core equivalence theorem with production abstract in production economies the extent to which non equilibria are blocked depends on the allocation of control rights among shareholders because a blocking coalition s resources are affected by the firms it jointly owns with outsiders we formulate a notion of blocking that takes such interdependency problem into account and we prove an analog of the debreu scarf theorem for replica production economies our theorem differs from theirs in using an additional assumption which we argue is indispensable and is driven by the interdependency problem

efficient club formation in a frictional environment we study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents decisions regarding which club to visit the competing auctions equilibrium is constrained efficient and the reserve price in general will not be zero

the determinants of bank loan recovery rates in good times and bad new evidence abstract we find that factors explaining bank loan recovery rates differ depending on the state of an underlying credit cycle our modelling approach incorporates a two state markov switching mechanism to capture underlying economic conditions this latent credit cycle variable helps to explain differences in observed recovery rates over time using us bank default loan data from moody s ultimate recovery database and covering the pre and post global financial crisis gfc period the paper develops and implements a dynamic model for bank loan recovery rates we accommodate the distinctive empirical features of the recovery rate data while incorporating a large number of possible determinants we find that certain loan specific and other variables hold different explanatory power with respect to recovery rates in good versus bad times in the credit cycle i e depending on underlying credit market conditions our findings demonstrate the importance of accounting for counter cyclical expected recovery rates when determining capital retention levels

hatred and profits under the hood of the ku klux klan in this article we analyze the 1920s ku klux klan those who joined it and its social and political impact by combining a wide range of archival data sources with data from the 1920 and 1930 u s censuses we find that individuals who joined the klan in some cities were more educated and more likely to hold professional jobs than the typical american surprisingly we find little evidence that the klan had an effect on black or foreign born residential mobility or vote totals rather than a terrorist organization the 1920s klan is best described as social organization with a very successful multilevel marketing structure fueled by an army of highly incentivized sales agents selling hatred religious intolerance and fraternity in a time and place where there was tremendous demand jel codes d71 d72 r23 n32 copyright 2012 oxford university press

entrepreneurial land developers joint production local externalities and mixed housing developments abstract housing developments condos and suburban developments are not necessarily homogeneous developers provide different types of units of various sizes and other characteristics catering to different types of customers in this paper we allow joint production and local consumption externalities within each development and show that land developers who seek a profit maximizing set of units in developments may provide mixed developments we show that there exists an equilibrium and that every equilibrium is pareto efficient we provide examples in which mixed developments arise in a long run equilibrium we relate this work to a widely used hedonic pricing model by rosen 1974 and to an equilibrium concept under asymmetric information by rothschild and stiglitz 1976

a mechanism design approach to the tiebout hypothesis we revisit the tiebout hypothesis in a world in which agents may learn extra information as to how they value the various local public goods once located and jurisdictions are free to commit to whatever mechanism to attract citizens it is shown in quasi linear environments that efficiency can be achieved as a competitive equilibrium when jurisdictions seek to maximize local revenues but not necessarily when they seek to maximize local welfare interpretations and limitations of the result are discussed

meritocracy egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations we gratefully acknowledge support from the severo ochoa programme for centres of excellence in r d sev 2011 0075 barbera and bevia acknowledge support from grants consolidated group c eco2008 04756 and feder and sgr2014 515 ponsati acknowledges support from grants eco2012 37065 and sgr2009 1142

choosing peers homophily and polarization in groups this paper studies the formation of peer groups entailing the joint production of public goods in our model agents choose their peers and have to pay a connection cost for each member added to the group after groups are formed each agent selects a public project to make a costly contribution to and all members of the group experience the benefits of these contributions since agents differ in how much they value one project relative to the other the group s preferences affect the generated profile of public goods we characterize mutually optimal groups groups that are optimal for all their members when contribution costs are low relative to connection costs mutually optimal groups must be sufficiently homogeneous as contribution costs increase relative to connection costs agents desire more connections which in turn raises the risk of free riding extreme peers are then more appealing since they are more willing to contribute and polarization arises

decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods abstract we show that exhaustion of blocking opportunities is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium and that a related condition efficient scale is necessary and under an assumption on endowments sufficient such that competitive equilibrium exists and the core is nonempty these results do not require the euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in lindahl equilibrium do not require convexity of preferences or costs and do not require the strong assumption that private goods are essential journal of economic literature classification numbers d46 d50 d61 h40

clubs and the market large finite economies abstract this paper builds a general equilibrium model of finite economies with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of other club members because club memberships are indivisible and choices of club memberships must be coordinated across the population the core of such an economy may be empty and equilibrium may not exist however for large finite club economies an approximate core is not empty and states in this approximate core can be approximately decentralized by prices for private goods and for club memberships the arguments use convexification tools familiar from the literature on private goods economies and a new tool of some independent interest that addresses the special problems created by the nature of club memberships journal of economic literature classification numbers d2 d5 h4

clubs and the market this paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of the other members of their clubs the space of agents is a continuum but clubs are finite it is shown that i competitive equilibria exist and ii the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states the central subtlety is in modeling club memberships and expressing the notion that membership choices are consistent across the population

groups collective decisions and markets abstract we consider a general equilibrium model where multi member households make efficient collective consumption decisions and operate in a competitive market environment individuals have the option to leave the household and make it on their own or join another household we study the effect of these outside options on household formation household stability and equilibrium existence

dynamics and stability of constitutions coalitions and clubs a central feature of dynamic collective decision making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions for example current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations we develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness we show how this framework can be applied in political economy coalition formation and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs the explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision making 1 a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society 2 efficiency enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender

equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a tiebout economy with crowding types abstract we propose a new model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding the new feature is that taste and crowding characteristics of agents are distinguished from one another we prove that if the economy satisfies strict small group effectiveness then the core is equivalent to the set of tiebout equilibrium outcomes equilibrium prices are defined to depend solely on crowding characteristics this implies that only publicly observable information and not private information such as preferences is needed to induce agents to sort themselves into efficient jurisdictions thus our model allows us to satisfy bewley s 6 anonymity requirement on taxes in his well known criticism of the tiebout hypothesis

occupational choice incentives and wealth distribution abstract we consider a model of occupational choice in large economies where individuals differ in their wealth endowment individuals can remain self employed or engage in productive matches with another individual i e form firms matches are subject to a moral hazard problem with limited liability the division of the gains from such matches is determined by competitive forces when the incentive problem is asymmetric matches are typically wealth heterogeneous with richer individuals choosing the occupation for which incentives are more important the utilities attained within a match depend on the wealth distribution and changes in the latter give rise to trickle down effects