unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

coase versus pacman who eats whom in the durable goods monopoly in standard durable goods monopoly models both the set of buyers and the set of prices are assumed to be continua if the set of buyers is finite the perfectly discriminating monopoly outcome is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium when the seller is sufficiently patient introducing instead a smallest unit of account yields the coasian outcome as a generically unique subgame perfect equilibrium for patient enough buyers a folk theorem is obtained if both sets are finite these results reflect a strategic disadvantage of having to make moves with a large impact on other players payoffs the analysis is extended to durable goods oligopoly

managing technological development lessons from the newly industrializing countries this survey looks at the technological development of the newly industrializing countries to draw some important lessons for firms and governments in other developing countries first inventing products and processes is not at the center of the technological development needed for successful industrialization it is at the fringe what is at the center is acquiring the capabilities needed for efficient production and investment second some countries have overemphasized the drive for technological self sufficiency and paid a high price in poor productivity what makes the best economic sense is to combine foreign and local technological elements and to do this in a way that progressively develops local capabilities in areas where they can be more efficient third the acquisition of technological capability does not come merely from experience though experience is important fourth the economic environment through its influence on the technological efforts of firms is very important in determining the productivity of a country s resources

toward a political theory of the emergence of environmental incentive regulation this article makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy economists quasi unanimous preference for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism design literature within an incomplete contract approach to political economy we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable even though they appear inefficient from a standard economic viewpoint their justification lies in the limitations they impose on the politicians ability to distribute rents insights are provided on the emergence of incentive mechanisms in environmental regulation

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

government policy and performance of the indian engineering industry abstract a major liberalization of the indian industrial policy framework has been undertaken in the 1980s the proponents of liberalization expected not only a general increase in the efficiency of indian industry but also an improvement in its innovative performance detailed industry studies as well as macro level data suggest that the simultaneous liberalization of industrial licence and foreign technological collaboration policies resulted in a large scale entry of new firms into a range of industries industry structures best characterized as miniature replications of the global industry were created chiefly in response to an inherently large demand for foreign disembodied technology in the indian industrialization model foreign technological collaborations became the overwhelming source of product technology in the process the indian capital goods industry has been given the opportunity to better fulfil its role as diffuser of globally generated new technology to indian customers in doing so the liberalization measures have been successful in improving the performance of indian industry within the limits of an import substituting industrialization model the extremely fierce competitive situation coupled with nearly free access to foreign technology has however not been associated with an improvement in the indian engineering industry s innovative performance indeed the greater domestic competition has been associated with greater technology imports rather than greater in house innovative efforts

pollution permits and environmental innovation abstract this paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation stand alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing technology pollution permits that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation they have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used when the innovation occurs options to pollute at a given striking price fare better than allowances because they create private incentives to phase out pollution in the case of innovation we characterize the social optimum and show that it can be implemented by issuing options to pollute inter alia finally the paper compares ex ante and ex post government procurement surprisingly ex post licensing by the innovator to the government may yield a higher licensing fee than an ex ante contract

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

inward technology transfer and competitiveness the role of national innovation systems this paper examines the role of national innovation systems in the inward transfer of technology that has underpinned the transformation of japan and other east asian economies since 1945 the economies that have benefited most from inward technology transfer have national innovation systems that have strengthened their national absorptive capacity this capacity relies primarily on investments in scientific and technical training and on economic policies that enforce competition among domestic firms the particular channels for inward technology transfer the identity of any strategic industries targeted for public intervention and the overall level of a nation s trade restrictions are ail of secondary importance a central theme of global economic change during the postwar period has been the application in less developed countries of technologies developed within economically advanced regions this phenomenon underpinned the post 1945 transformation of japan and other east asian economies and influenced the reconstruction of western european economies after world war ii the application of externally developed technologies within latecomer economies is hardly unique to the postwar period however samuel slater s introduction of british textile manufacturing is but one example of inward technology transfer in the nineteenth century us economy and david 1992 traces the origins of patent monopolies to efforts by medieval european city states and nations to attract experts in industrial arts to practice their craft within these jurisdictions both international technology flows and government efforts to influence them for national competitive advantage thus have ample historical precedent several characteristics nevertheless distinguish the post 1945 era from earlier historical periods the influence of international technology transfer on national economic development has increased as the postwar development of such economies as taiwan and south korea has relied much less on natural resource endowments than nineteenth

technical change growth and trade new departures in institutional economics this article analyses the main theoretical and policy issues emerging from the literature on the evolutionary institutional economics of technical change the four distinguishing characteristics of which are that technology is often proprietary in nature only a part of knowledge is codifiable in handbooks blueprints patents and so on there are fundamental variations in the above two points across different technological fields and the evolution of knowledge is highly path dependent

strategic outsourcing revisited this paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcing the production of a non specific input good to an imperfectly competitive input market we apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by fudenberg and tirole 1984 to characterize the different equilibria and find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market if firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals costs we illustrate our analysis using a linear cournot model

leviathan governments and carbon taxes costs and potential benefits abstract this paper addresses positive aspects of the global warming debate that so far has been concerned by and large with normative issues the paper considers a consumers government that appreciates tax revenues as such leviathan in addition to conventional measures of welfare i e carbon taxes serve the dual purpose of correcting for externalities here global warming or more generally a stock externality from energy use and of raising revenues this government faces either a competitive or a perfectly cartelized supply the major findings are 1 i consumers may benefit from a leviathan government that appropriates some of the monopoly rent by deterring preemption to some extent 2 ii the leviathan motive raises initial taxes and thereby lowers initial emissions but increases the long run stock externality in a play with linear strategies 3 iii there exists a continuum of equilibria in nonlinear markov strategies which are however pareto inefficient compared with the linear strategies 4 iv but in case of a binding resource constraint nonlinear strategies are the only feasible ones

the transformation of competitive advantage in east asia an analysis of technological and trade specialisation summary in recent years there has been considerable interest in the relationship between a country s export competitiveness and the role played by technology in strengthening and maintaining competitive advantage a central feature of recent empirical work mainly focused on the oecd countries has rested on examining patterns of export and technological specialization between economies and sectors this paper moves attention away from the advanced industrialized economies to examine the trends for trade and technological specialization among the east asian developing economies in particular two aspects of specialization are examined first to what extent have patterns of competitive advantage changed over time and second to measure the relationship between patterns of trade and technological specialization important differences are found in the patterns of specialization and in the relationship between them among the advanced east asian economies and those catching up

intergenerational talent transmission inequality and social mobility abstract the paper investigates the effects of intra family talent transmission when human capital exhibits indivisibilities and parental financing of education involves borrowing constraints positive talent correlation reduces social mobility but steady state inequality and macroeconomic history dependence are not affected

government incentives when pollution permits are durable goods this paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxes versus pollution permits for a budget oriented government pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods and a pollution tax is seen as being equivalent to leasing out pollution permits first a general model is developed and then four stylized types of government are discussed a benevolent dictator a pure leviathan a green and a business friendly government we show that all types of government prefer a pollution tax system but this regime is not necessarily the best in social welfare terms the intuition is that a tax or leasing system makes it easier for the government to credibly commit to the budget maximizing level of pollution permits which is good for government revenues but not necessarily for social welfare

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

on the structure of take over models and insider outsider conflicts in negotiated take overs abstract we model a takeover game where the players can bid or bargain without the traditional exogenous constraints on the order length and number of alternating stages in our european setting dominant shareholders can appoint and dismiss management implying that we have an insider outsider conflict rather than a management shareholder agency problem and that the distribution of sizeable private benefits is a crucial issue the bargaining solution determines the price even if no explicit negotiations are observed while bargaining strength and scope for exclusion determine the type of takeover pre negotiated or not discriminatory or not

technology production and technology purchase in indian industry an econometric analysis an econometric analysis of the decisions of indian firms to invest in their own r d and to purchase technology through licensing agreements is undertaken these decisions are treated as being jointly determined by characteristics of indian industries indian prices and the supply of purchasable foreign technology the study finds that industrial structure firm size and public and private ownership influence the mix of own r d and technology purchase the pool of purchasable foreign technology indices both increased adaptive r d and technology purchase by indian firms copyright 1989 by mit press

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

markets and regulatory hold up problems abstract many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance a firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation we show that such incentives which resemble a hold up problem may not be overcome when government s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax the hold up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits a time consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations even if no permits are traded and their market price is low indeed an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great

the political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy abstract this paper develops a positive theory explaining pollution tax policy outcomes in a small open economy the equilibrium tax rate depends on lobby group membership the relative importance of lobbying activities and the tax elasticity of pollution the equilibrium properties are investigated the model is extended to incorporate pollution abatement and a pollution abatement subsidy we show that total pollution may be increasing in the pollution abatement subsidy rate this effect arises because the equilibrium pollution tax rate may be decreasing in the subsidy rate due to altered political influence of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium

learning and technical progress in the commuter aircraft industry an analysis of embraer s experience abstract companies in industrializing nations face major hurdles when moving into complex and highly competitive manufacturing industries this paper examines the example of such an entrant the brazilian aircraft company enbraer the paper is concerned with the technological strategy pursued by embraer and its learning experience with the brasilia commuter turboprop which achieved a 25 world market share in its seat category due in no small measure to its cost competitiveness and technological proficiency the paper presents econometric evidence of substantial learning effects as captured by the learning curve elasticities of the brasilia which conforms to frontier parameters although embraer was successful in its early product offerings aimed at a narrow niche its subsequent difficulties in moving to a broader product line and sustaining its technological development illustrate some of the problems that industrializing nations enterprises may encounter in building on a successful entry in technology intensive industries at a time of growing competition without crafting alliances to share the large associated technological and commercial risks

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

technology policy for industrialization an integrative framework and korea s experience abstract first this article reviews three policy perspectives 1 the market mechanism perspective includes the demand for and supply of technology and the linkage between the two 2 the technology flow perspective consists of technology transfer diffusion and r d 3 the dynamic perspective refers to technological trajectory it then integrates these three perspectives to develop a new three dimensional framework that may be useful to analyze technology policy for industrialization second this article applies the framework to analyze korea s technology policy as a case in point conclusions are 1 technology policies on foreign technology transfer technology diffusion and r d should change over time in response to changing external environment 2 technology policies become effective only when three major components policies to promote the demand side of technology policies to promote the supply side of technology and policies to provide effective links between demand and supply sides are well balanced finally it discusses implications for other developing countries

large firms in the production of the world s technology an important case of non globalisation us patenting by 686 of the world s largest manufacturing firms shows that their share of the world s production of technology is less than their share of r d activities and varies greatly amongst sectors in most cases the technological activities of these large firms are concentrated in their home country the characteristics of which influence the volume and trends in their technological activities much more strongly then the international component of these activities at the same time these large firms are major elements in the volume and the pattern of sectoral specializations in their home countries technological activities

u s technological leadership where did it come from and where did it go abstract during the quarter century following the second world war the united states was the world s most productive economy by virtually all measures and the technological leader across a very broad front this paper is concerned with the sources of u s technological leadership during that era and the reasons for the erosion of that leadership it is proposed that there were two distinguishable components of post war u s technological dominance one was a lead in mass production industries and this was of long standing the other was leadership in high technology industries due to massive american investments in science and technology eduction and research and development and this was new the u s advantage in mass production industries eroded when after bretton woods the world became a common market the u s preeminence in high technology industries diminished as other countries matched u s investments in science and technology it is argued that since the late 1960s the major industrial nations are bound together technologically as never before