bargaining enforcement and multilateral sanctions when is cooperation counterproductive scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use however previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation this puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation in this article i test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using james fearon s 1998 breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion the empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail their failure is due to enforcement not bargaining problems without the support of an international organization cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time without institutional support cooperation is worse than useless it is counterproductive this result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant

equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games this paper analyzes a general model of two player bargaining in the shadow of war where one player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war i derive conclusions about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints where these constraints hold regardless of the game form hence the qualitative results are game free i show that the higher the informed player s payoff from war the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling the dispute short of war and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war the latter result rationalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war i then provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the probability of war

a sheriff two bullets and three problems this paper analyzes deterrence in international conflicts assume a strong country has several opponents and faces a military capacity constraint which is not exhausted after just one war two main effects are at work if the strong country is constrained then reputation is more expensive and may occur less often the problem is that the opponents may but need not be more aggressive compared to a world without a constraint it may be that an axis of evil does not exist before a war occurs but is implicitly formed even by moderate countries after the first war was waged a point of interest is whether the constrained strong country should obtain additional capacity given that the objective is to minimize the number of wars the analysis sheds some new light on the u s foreign policy the united nations and the axis of evil

testing deterrence theory rigor makes a difference there is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically the disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data but they are magnified by methodological confusion especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure

supply side strategic unemployment in small business in this paper the model which will be analysed is characterized by a labour market with a profitable vacancies b unemployment c excess labour supply d limited mobility and divisibility of labour and e competition on the job the analysed setting is typical for a small business economy the analysis suggests that unemployment will be greater than equilibrium unemployment if present employees and potential entrants consider job assignments for this market under strategic perspectives

uncertainty and monetary policy in a wage bargaining model in a wage bargaining model increased uncertainty concerning monetary and real aggregates is shown to give rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate moreover the equilibrium unemployment rate is found to depend on the choice of monetary policy regime as this choice affects the uncertainty wage setters face when setting the nominal wage rate it is also shown that the equilibrium inflation rate may depend on uncertainty in such a way that increased uncertainty gives rise to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate as well as a higher equilibrium inflation rate or what has been called stagflation

capabilities perception and escalation the evolution of crises depends upon interpreting intentions under uncertainty we model crises as a game of two sided incomplete information players are uncertain about their own payoffs from war because of differences between observable and actual capabilities we derive four hypotheses testing them against crises in europe between 1815 and 1970 we show a nonmonotonic relationship between ex ante observable capabilities and the likelihood of violence in a crisis as well as the ex ante likelihood of a negotiated settlement we answer five questions 1 how do differences in observable capabilities between rivals influence the likelihood of a crisis and the escalation to violence 2 how do intangible capabilities alter the effects of observable capabilities on the likelihood of conflict and violence 3 what do national leaders learn from the responses of their adversaries in crises 4 under what conditions can deterrence succeed 5 under what conditions are the strong likely to give in to the weak or vice versa in a crisis

information power and war ultimatum bargaining models of international interactions suggest that when conflict is costly and the actors are fully informed the probability of conflict goes to zero however conflict occurs with some positive probability when the challenger is uncertain about the defender s reservation value i employ a simple ultimatum game of bargaining to evaluate two traditional power centric theories of world politics balance of power and power transition theory the formal and empirical analyses demonstrate that as states approach power parity information asymmetries are greatest thus enhancing the probability of militarized conflict uncertainty is a central cause of conflict emergence and is correlated with the distribution of observable capabilities recognizing the relationship between the distribution of power and the uncertainty offers a more sophisticated interpretation of power centric explanations of world politics

arms races and conflict experimental evidence we study escalation and aggression in an experimental first strike game in which two participants play multiple rounds of a money earning task in each round both players can spend money to accumulate weapons the player with more weapons can spend money to strike against the other player which almost totally eliminates the victim s earnings potential and removes their capacity to strike weapons can serve as a means of deterrence in four treatments we find that deterrence is strengthened if weapon stocking cannot be observed that a balance of power is effective in maintaining peace and that mutually beneficial trade decreases the risk of confrontation but not necessarily the likelihood of costly arms races

strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories i demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction i show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use monte carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values finally i reanalyze a well known game theoretic model of war bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 international interaction game my results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model

international interdependencies in fiscal stabilization policies abstract trade links imply that business cycle fluctuations are transmitted among trade partners to the extent that fiscal policy can mitigate business cycle fluctuations international interdependencies in stabilization policies arise we analyse in a two country general equilibrium model the role of fiscal policy in mitigating risk or providing implicit insurance in the presence of capital market imperfections and adjustment failures rigid wages it is shown that there is a welfare case for an active stabilization policy and that it is larger in the presence of adjustment failures rigid wages non cooperative policy decisions imply inefficiencies in fiscal stabilization policies which in the case of flexible wages may imply too much stabilization whereas stabilization is always insufficient in the case of rigid wages

what makes deterrence work cases from 1900 to 1980 the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives is an enduring feature of international politics force or the threat of force may be used either to change the status quo or to maintain it threatening the use of force to maintain the status quo often takes the form of deterrence defined by patrick morgan as the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else 1 deterrence sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails failures are attested to by numerous international wars of history in the nuclear age a failure could cost us our lives the conditions of successful deterrence thus require thorough logical and empirical analysis

credibility uncertainty and deterrence in this paper the connection between deterrence stability and threat credibility is examined conceptually and theoretically we formulate as a model of bilateral deterrence a game of incomplete information in which each player is uncertain about its opponent s preferences should it unilaterally alter the status quo uncertainty about the preferences of one s opponent leads to uncertainty about the opponent s willingness to retaliate by identifying the credibility of each player s retaliatory threat with the probability that a player prefers retaliation to capitulation we maintain consistency with both the traditional strategic literature where credibility usually means believability and with game theory where credibility is usually synonymous with sequential rationality i e subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze formally the strategic implications of this conception of credibility and thus explore the critical role played by uncertainty in deterrence by explicitly modeling uncertainty we are able to understand the role of threats in contributing to or detracting from the robustness of a deterrence relationship

unemployment benefits contract length and nominal wage flexibility we show in a union bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment but also nominal wage flexibility and thus reduces employment varia

rationalizable strategic behavior the notion of equilibrium proposed by nash 19 has come to play a dominant role in economic applications of noncooperative games while analyses of nash equilibria have unquestionably contributed to our understanding of economic behavior it would be unreasonably optimistic to maintain that nash solved the problem of noncooperative strategic choice there is a small literature beginning with ellsberg 6 and a much larger oral tradition which argues that nash behavior is neither a necessary consequence of rationality nor a reasonable empirical proposition in this paper i take the view that although there may be various reasons why an agent might select a nash strategy the notion of an equilibrium has little intrinsic appeal within a strategic context when an agent reaches a decision in ignorance of the strategies adopted by other players rationality consists of making a choice which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs rather than one which is optimal post hoc this point of view is not original indeed most serious justifications of the nash hypothesis embrace such an approach arguing that agents will expect the game to yield a nash outcome and consequently will choose their equilibrium strategies nevertheless when we think in terms of maximizing utility subject to expectations rather than realizations it becomes clear that the nash hypothesis far from being a consequence of rationality arises from certain restrictions on agents expectations which may or may not be plausible depending upon the game being played we are then quite naturally led to ask are there any restrictions of individuals expectations and hence choices which are required by rationality alone rather than by subjective plausibility this paper is concerned with defining justifying characterizing and refining a criterion for rational strategic choice which i label rationalizability

the unemployment effect of exchange rate volatility in industrial countries using data on 17 industrial countries from 1982 to 2003 and controlling for a wide array of factors this paper finds that higher exchange rate volatility increases the unemployment rate the magnitude of the effect is small the results are robust to variations in specification

stability and the distribution of power the relation between stability and the distribution of power is an important and long debated problem in international relations theory the balance of power school argues that an even distribution of power is more stable while the preponderance of power school argues that a preponderance of power is more stable empirical efforts to estimate this relation have yielded contradictory results this essay examines the relation between stability and the distribution of power in an infinite horizon game theoretic model in which two states are bargaining about revising the international status quo the states make offers and counteroffers until they reach a mutually acceptable settlement or until one of them becomes so pessimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement that it uses force to impose a new settlement the equilibrium of the game contradicts the expectations of both schools and offers an explanation for the conflicting empirical estimates in the model stability is greatest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the expected distribution of benefits that the use of force would impose

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

how does uncertainty about future fiscal policy affect current macroeconomic variables a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macromodel is constructed based on infinitely lived dynamically optimising households with labour market monopoly power randomness in future government spending causes randomness in the future output and price levels both when the money wage is flexible and when it is set one period in advance we show that through three different mechanisms rational anticipation of this depresses current aggregate demand if the wage is preset it thereby also depresses current output such fiscal uncertainty is suggested as one possible explanation for the faltering of the economic recovery in europe in 1995 and 1996

exchange rate variability and wage formation in open economies abstract exchange rate variability is shown to influence wage formation in open economies with strong unions increased exchange rate variability may thus increase real and product wages and lower employment hence a stable and predictable exchange rate policy may have some gain

domestic opposition and signaling in international crises this article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises it combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two party electoral choice one state has two strategic actors a government and an opposition party both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo the rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals the parties payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate the model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state s preferences this finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation

optimal wage indexation with exchange rate uncertainty in an oligopolistic and unionized economy abstract the role of wage indexation as a policy instrument in a model of an oligopolistic and unionized economy is examined there is uncertainty on the future exchange rate evolution when writing labour contracts optimal indexation is shown to depend on product market characteristics

deterrence the elusive dependent variable the testing of theory in international relations requires clearly articulated assumptions the specification of scope conditions rigorously formulated propositions appropriate tests and a valid and reliable data set against which to test the propositions this last requirement has generally been the most neglected dimension of research in this article we examine two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence by paul huth and bruce russett that do not deal adequately with the problems intrinsic to constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis t the problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties inherent in identifying deterrence successes which leave few if any behavioral traces and of inferring the intentions of would be challengers our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference 2 we would like to thank the canadian institute for international peace and security and

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

rationalist explanations for war realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war against this view i show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms the first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it the second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible

military capabilities and escalation a correction to bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick bueno de mesquita morrow and zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict i show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions and i offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games

capabilities uncertainty and resolve a limited information model of crisis bargaining this paper presents and solves a crisis bargaining game under limited information the sides alternate offers from three possible offers with war and its costs starting if the target s counteroffer is rejected the equilibrium of the model falls into four different cases these four cases are analyzed to determine how the sides communicate through their offers and how the costs of war initial beliefs misperceptions and distribution of capabilities drive the probabilities of a crisis and war the model demonstrates a joint selection bias misspecification problem in empirical studies of crises arising from the unobservable nature of beliefs several empirical studies of crisis bargaining are discussed in the light of this methodological problem new patterns of evidence are found that support the presence of the selection problem and their conclusions are reexamined

the unprofitability of mixed strategy equilibria in two person games abstract in this paper it is demonstrated that the payoffs of mixed strategy equilibria are equal to the maximin values for all 2x2 matrix games if maximim implies completely mixed strategies this characterizes a subclass of unprofitable games maximin instead of nash equilibrium has been suggested as an appropriate solution concept for these games

testing theories of strategic choice the example of crisis escalation strategic choice explanations of international crisis escalation imply that because actors anticipate the likely responses of others and choose actions that avoid undesirable responses our observations of nations decisions to use force are interdependent and censored for example suppose a weak nation b is threatened by a powerful neighbor a if b believes a s threat then it should back down unfortunately this censors our ability to observe whether a would actually use violence many traditional methods ignore this censoring and mis specify the extent to which variables influence crisis behavior to ameliorate the problems of interdependence and censoring i develop the strategically censored discrete choice model estimating this model using bayesian markov chain monte carlo simulation methods i analyze bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 dyadically coded version of the militarized interstate dispute data gochmann and maoz 1984 based on bayesian model comparison statistics i conclude that strategic explanations outperform nonstrategic ones in explaining crisis behavior

nominal rigidity and monetary uncertainty in a small open economy temporary nominal rigidity is introduced into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy the foreign country is also modelled and is the closed economy counterpart of the domestic country we examine whether a small open economy is more vulnerable than a closed economy to uncertainty over its monetary policy a signal of an increase in future variability which was not previously foreseen as a risk by agents is shown to weaken the current exchange rate and boost current output in the small open economy in the equivalent closed economy it has no effect on current variables

conflict resolution and peace this paper analyzes the escalation of conflict in crisis situations as the outcome of choices made by rational individuals in times of crisis national leaders must confront the conflicts of interest that might lie dormant under other circumstances a crisis is characterized as a constraint in the options available to decision makers they must choose either to negotiate or to fight the form that the resolution of the conflict takes is determined by the options chosen by assuming that the probability of a rational leader choosing a particular strategy is monotonic with the expected utility associated with that choice marginal contributions to the probability of an event are combined to provide functional forms that predict peace asymmetric escalation and war this approach yields a single theory of war and peace that also accounts for the occurrence of military interventions the more frequently observed form of conflict escalation it is also shown that peace is not simply the absence of war the theory is tested using a revised specification of the expected utility measures in 133 disputes involving european states

crisis bargaining escalation and mad although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises game theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly this paper models a mutually assured destruction mad crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found these provide better game theoretic foundations for the notions of resolve and critical risk and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer but incompletely specified models revealing several inconsistencies several analyses of mad conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate the greater its adversary s resolve in our model however the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails and some states prove more likely to escalate if their adversaries resolve is greater

the strategic sources of foreign policy substitution while a growing body of work provides empirical support for the notion that political leaders substitute foreign policies depending on a variety of domestic political and economic conditions little work examines the underlying strategic causes of substitution this article argues that foreign states behave strategically in order to a avoid becoming the targets of domestically troubled executives or b to take advantage of the domestic trouble another state endures such strategic interaction delimits the set of foreign policies reasonably available to leaders in trouble at home thus producing the impetus for policy substitution this article develops a theoretical model of strategic behavior and policy substitution and reports empirical results of a multivariate probit model

credible pretrial negotiation pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information when a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court imposed judgment a central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff s threat to litigate is credible it is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient as a result the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected when this credibility constraint is binding traditional comparative static results are reversed in addition even though the defendant is being sued he wants the plaintiff s threat to be credible

active stabilization policy and uninsurable risks abstract active demand management policies may have positive welfare effects through the implicit social insurance provided by stabilizing wrt to uninsurable risks the present paper presents an intertemporal general equilibrium model for an economy with a capital market imperfection and shows that monetary policy is effective and that there is a positive welfare effect of an active stabilization policy the welfare effect arises via a reduction of risk premia in wages