the nature of diversified business groups a research design and two case studies diversified business groups dominate the private sectors of most of the world s economies several of these economies have undergone sudden policy changes that significantly increase domestic competitive intensity the authors demonstrate how the changes in corporate scope that accompany such competitive shocks can be used to weigh the importance of different explanations for the existence of diversified business groups the authors illustrate their reasoning by studying the restructuring of two of india s largest business groups following a comprehensive post 1991 package of policy reforms the case studies also elucidate aspects of the restructuring process that should inform larger sample empirical analyses copyright 1998 by blackwell publishing ltd

temptation and social security in a dynastic framework abstract we investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay as you go payg social security system in a dynastic framework in which individuals have self control problems the presence of self control problems induces individuals to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption individuals efforts to balance between the short term urge for temptation and the long term commitment for consumption smoothing result in self control costs in this environment payg social security works as a self control cost reducing device in contrast the presence of altruism induces individuals to save more this in turn mitigates the adverse effects of self control problems and payg social security on savings but magnifies the self control costs we find that in our environment the adverse welfare effects of a payg system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporate altruism and self control issues separately however the level of mitigation is quite modest

commutes neighborhood effects and earnings an analysis of racial discrimination and compensating differentials abstract recent tester studies indicate that minority workers face restricted residential and employment opportunities because of racial discrimination in housing and labor markets these restrictions may create a spatial mismatch between where urban minorities reside and where metropolitan area jobs are located resulting in reduced proximity of minority workers to jobs prior studies of racial discrimination and urban spatial mismatch however have paid little attention to the possibility that differences in employment commutes may be partially offset by compensating variations in neighborhood amenities quality adjusted house prices and earnings such effects could help to mitigate the impact of discrimination on minority workers using a unique subset of the 1985 and 1989 american housing surveys we estimate a fixed effects commute time model that controls for quality adjusted house prices neighborhood amenities and earnings results indicate that although blacks have longer commutes than comparably skilled white and asian workers roughly one third of the estimated difference is offset by neighborhood amenity and housing price differentials however even after controlling for neighborhood fixed effects and earnings educated black workers have significantly longer commutes than comparably skilled asian and white workers additional findings indicate that regardless of race household mobility is an important mechanism through which the market attains a spatial equilibrium providing further support for arguments that restricted proximity to residential opportunities and jobs reduces the economic welfare of minority households

intra metropolitan variation in earnings and labor market discrimination an econometric analysis of the atlanta labor market one of the most enduring debates concerning racial differences in earnings is whether housing segregation within metropolitan areas adversely affects the employment opportunities of urban blacks two possible negative effects can be listed first the decentralization of lower skilled jobs combined with the suburban residential exclusion of low income households may have caused wage rates within the suburban labor market to rise above those paid within the central city if this is the case and if housing market discrimination restricts the relative ability of blacks to offer their labor supply to suburban employers then at least part of the racial difference in earnings can be attributed to housing segregation second housing segregation may cause private sector labor market discrimination to be more severe within the central city in comparison to suburban areas as suggested by becker s taste for discriminating model 3 a relatively large black labor supply within the central city may require a lower black to white earnings ratio in order to induce prejudiced employers to hire large numbers of black workers with the workforce of most central cities becoming increasingly black this may be an important factor in explaining racial differences in earnings surprisingly while variation in discrimination among occupations regions industries and sectors have been examined in some detail spatial differences in discrimination between the central city and suburbs have largely escaped analysis in this paper the earnings of private sector workers broken down by occupation race and sex are compared between worksite areas encompassing the metropolitan area of atlanta georgia while an extensive literature can be found on interregional differences in earnings little evidence exists on the spatial variation in wage rates within metropolitan regions in fact virtually nothing has been done on this issue since the classic study of the chicago labor market by rees and shultz 19

constrained efficiency in the neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we investigate the welfare properties of the one sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks we focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first order condition of a constrained planner s problem this condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low the factor composition of income of the consumption poor using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature we illustrate that there can be either over or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long run distribution of wealth for the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking it has much too low a steady state capital stock

supply side interventions and redistribution we evaluate the eect on welfare of shifting the burden of capi tal income taxes to labor taxes in a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and constant tax rates we calibrate and simu late the economy we nd that lowering capital taxes has two eects i it increases e ciency in terms of aggregate production and ii it redistributes wealth in favor of those agents with a low wage wealth ratio when the parameters of the model are calibrated to match the distribution of income in terms of the wage wealth ratio the redis tributive eect dominates and agents with a high wage wealth ratio would experience a large loss in utility if capital income taxes were eliminated

on the optimal progressivity of the income tax code this paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor pro ductivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution a progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare these bene cial eects of a progressive tax system have to be traded oagainst the e ciency loss arising from distorting endoge nous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions a determination of the optimal progressivity of the income tax code therefore calls for a quantitative exploration using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we nd that the optimal us income tax is well approximated by a at tax rate of19 5 and a xed deduction of about 3 700 the steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 0 4 higher consumption in each state of the world an explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates however that a majority of the population currently alive would suer welfare losses calling into question the political feasibility of such

intertemporal labor supply and human capital accumulation we solve and estimate a dynamic model that allows agents to optimally choose their labor hours and consumption and that allows for both human capital accumulation and savings estimation results and simulation exercises indicate that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is much higher than the conventional estimates and the downward bias comes from the omission of the human capital accumulation effect the human capital accumulation effect renders the life cycle path of the shadow wage relatively flat even though wages increase with age hence a rather flat life cycle labor supply path can be reconciled with a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources this article examines the role of corporate headquarters in allocating scarce resources to competing projects in an internal capital market unlike a bank headquarters has control rights that enable it to engage in winner picking the practice of actively shifting funds from one project to another by doing a good job in the winner picking dimension headquarters can create value even when it cannot help at all to relax overall firm wide credit constraints the model implies that internal capital markets may sometimes function more efficiently when headquarters oversees a small and focused set of projects this article analyzes the process by which internal capital markets channel limited resources to different uses inside a company in so doing it seeks to address two related sets of questions first what is the fundamental economic rationale for creating an internal capital market that is under what circumstances can it make sense to combine several technologically distinct projects under one roof and have them seek funding from corporate headquarters as opposed to setting them up as stand alone companies that each raise external financing on their own second given this rationale what is the optimal size and scope of an internal capital market should headquarters be involved in funding a large number of projects or just a few and should these projects be unrelated to one another or in similar lines of business the answers to both sets of questions flow from the insight that in a credit constrained setting where not all positive npv projects can be financed headquarters can create value by actively reallocating scarce funds across projects for example the cash flow generated by one division s activities may be taken and spent on investment in another division where the returns are higher or alternatively one division s assets may be used as collateral to raise financing that is then diverted to the other division simply put individual projects must compete for the scarce funds and headquarters job is to pick the winners and losers in this competition

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

optimal taxation merging micro and macro approaches efficient provision of social insurance and efficient redistributionofresourcesamongindividualsaresomeofthemostimportantandchallenging questions in macroeconomics and public finance a seminal contribution of mirrlees 1971 is the starting point for the modern approach to answering these questions a trade off between efficiency and insurance or equity is inherent to this approach and is a key determinant of the optimal policy in this paper we argue that the large body of research that follows mirrlees approach has been developing in two quite separate directions referred to in this paper as the micro and macro approaches we argue that merging the two directions

choosing a place to live and a workplace espanolen este trabajo se estudia como la politica fiscal y los costos de transporte determinan la distribucion geografica de los trabajadores y las familias se utiliza un modelo simple de dos regiones con costos de transporte bienes publicos locales e infraestructura local se presenta una breve revision de literatura relacionada que estudia otros factores determinantes de la localizacion de los agentes se argumenta que las cuestiones estudiadas juegan un rol importante en la distribucion geografica de la actividad economica en el area urbana del gran buenos aires englishwe study how fiscal policies and commuting costs determine the geographical distribution of workers and households in an economy we characterize equilibrium outcomes in a simple two region model with commuting costs local public goods and local infrastructure we also provide a short survey of the related economic literature that discusses other important factors driving the localization decisions of agents finally we argue that the issues raise in this paper play a significant role in the geographic distribution of economic activity in the greater buenos aires urban area of argentina

taxation and household labor supply we evaluate reforms to the u s tax system in a life cycle setup with heterogeneous married and single households and with an operative extensive margin in labor supply we restrict our model with observations on gender and skill premia labor force participation of married females across skill groups children and the structure of marital sorting we concentrate on two revenue neutral tax reforms a proportional income tax and a reform in which married individuals flle taxes separately separate flling our flndings indicate that tax reforms are accompanied by large increases in labor supply that difier across demographic groups with the bulk of the increase coming from married females under a proportional income tax reform married females account for more than 50 of the changes in hours across steady states while under separate flling reform married females account for all the change in hours

imperfections in the economics of public policy imperfections in markets and climate change the economics of public policy has suffered from collective amnesia we have forgotten or ignored much of the tradition of public policy in imperfect economies whose foundations were laid by james meade and paul samuelson this has been associated with a period of around two decades from the early 1980s to the early 2000s where the economics of public policy has bent to political winds and has fed arguments for government to get out of the way and leave everything to the markets to self interest and to self regulation this has manifested itself via the choice of models those which imply often directly from assumptions passive government patterns of teaching the marginalisation of public economies in imperfect economics and compartmentalisation examples in climate change where this amnesia has misled include approaches to discounting and the failure to make non marginal change central to analysis on the other hand creative application of modern public economics gives interesting results such as the possibility of making both current and future generations better off and of informed discussion complementing economic instruments there are strong formal analogies between policy on climate change and on behavioural economics indeed there seems to be great potential in the combination of these two fields jel a10 a12 d61 d62 d63

the surprising power of age dependent taxes this paper provides a new empirically driven application of the dynamic mirrleesian framework by studying a feasible and potentially powerful tax reform age dependent labour income taxation i show analytically how age dependence improves policy on both the intratemporal and intertemporal margins i use detailed numerical simulations calibrated with data from the u s panel study of income dynamics to generate robust policy implications age dependence 1 lowers marginal taxes on average and especially on high income young workers and 2 lowers average taxes on all young workers relative to older workers when private saving and borrowing are restricted finally i calculate and characterize the welfare gains from age dependence despite its simplicity age dependence generates a welfare gain equal to between 0 6 and 1 5 of aggregate annual consumption and it captures more than 60 of the gain from reform to the dynamic optimal policy the gains are due to substantial increases in both efficiency and equity when age dependence is restricted to be pareto improving the welfare gain is nearly as large

optimal taxation in theory and practice the optimal design of a tax system is a topic that has long fascinated economic theorists and flummoxed economic policymakers this paper explores the interplay between tax theory and tax policy it identifies key lessons policymakers might take from the academic literature on how taxes ought to be designed and it discusses the extent to which these lessons are reflected in actual tax policy we begin with a brief overview of how economists think about optimal tax policy based largely on the foundational work of ramsey 1927 and mirrlees 1971 we then put forward eight general lessons suggested by optimal tax theory as it has developed in recent decades 1 optimal marginal tax rate schedules depend on the distribution of ability 2 the optimal marginal tax schedule could decline at high incomes 3 a flat tax with a universal lump sum transfer could be close to optimal 4 the optimal extent of redistribution rises with wage inequality 5 taxes should depend on personal characteristics as well as income 6 only final goods ought to be taxed and typically they ought to be taxed uniformly 7 capital income ought to be untaxed at least in expectation and 8 in stochastic dynamic economies optimal tax policy requires increased sophistication for each lesson we discuss its theoretical underpinnings and the extent to which it is consistent with actual tax policy to preview our conclusions we find that there has been considerable change in the theory and practice of taxation over the past several decades although the two paths have been far from parallel overall tax policy has moved in the y n gregory mankiw is professor of economics matthew weinzierl is assistant professor of business administration and danny yagan is a ph d candidate in economics all at harvard university cambridge massachusetts their e mail addresses are ngmankiw

optimal taxation in life cycle economies abstract we use a very standard life cycle growth model in which individuals have a labor leisure choice in each period of their lives to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income the intuition for our result is straightforward in a life cycle model the individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual s lifetime one way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age if tax rates cannot be conditioned on age a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal as it can imperfectly mimic age conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates journal of economic literature classification numbers e62 h21

u s tax policy and health insurance demand can a regressive policy improve welfare abstract the u s tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it subsidizes only those offered group insurance through their employers who also tend to have a relatively high income moreover the subsidy takes the form of deductions from the progressive income tax system giving high income earners a larger subsidy to understand the effect of the policy we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance a complete removal of the subsidy may lead to a partial collapse of the group insurance market reduce the insurance coverage and deteriorate welfare there is however room for improving the coverage and welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market

insurance and taxation over the life cycle we consider a dynamic mirrlees economy in a life cycle context and study the optimal insurance arrangement individual productivity evolves as a markov process and is private information we use a first order approach in discrete and continuous time and obtain novel theoretical and numerical results our main contribution is a formula describing the dynamics for the labour income tax rate when productivity is an ar 1 our formula resembles an ar 1 with a trend where i the auto regressive coefficient equals that of productivity ii the trend term equals the covariance productivity with consumption growth divided by the frisch elasticity of labour and iii the innovations in the tax rate are the negative of consumption growth the last property implies a form of short run regressivity our simulations illustrate these results and deliver some novel insights the average labour tax rises from 0 to 37 over 40 years whereas the average tax on savings falls from 12 to 0 at retirement we compare the second best solution to simple history independent tax systems calibrated to mimic these average tax rates we find that age dependent taxes capture a sizable fraction of the welfare gains in this way our theoretical results provide insights into simple tax systems copyright 2013 oxford university press

a quantitative analysis of capital income taxation this paper studies the quantitative impact of eliminating capital income taxation on capital accumulation and steady state welfare in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of sixty five period lived individuals who face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty under a wide range of parameter configurations the capital income tax rate that maximizes steady state welfare is positive even though eliminating it completely would raise the steady state capital stock toward the golden rule this is because the tax burden is shifted toward the younger and liquidity constrained years reducing the individuals ability to self insure copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the optimal taxation of asset income when government consumption is endogenous theory estimation and welfare this paper derives the ramsey optimal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it extending judd 1999 i demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the united states between 1948q1 to 2015q4 i demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule i simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous the shifting pattern of welfare measurements con rms the theoretical results i calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the us between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0 449 hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements though only by the equivalent of between 1 103 and 1 616 percent permanent increase in consumption well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored the maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1 491 and 1 858 and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0 148 and 0 186 allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare bene t to 1 865 all the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply

the cyclical and secular behaviour of the labour input comparing efficiency units and hours worked summary a monthly labour input series designed to correct for the fact that all hours worked are not of the same quality is constructed and its properties compared with unadjusted hours worked this efficiency units series is constructed from bls data on hours worked and earnings by age and sex the cyclical fluctuations displayed by the efficiency units series are smaller on average than those displayed by hours worked although the difference is not large however the secular behaviour of the series is quite different hours worked per capita displays a significant positive trend while efficiency units per capita does not

what has been learned about labor supply in the past twenty years the main advance in the study of labor supply in the past 20 years has come in recognizing and interpreting the variety of different labor supply functions that coexist in the empirical literature a crucial theoretical distinction with important empirical payoff is that between labor supply choices at the extensive margin i e labor force participation and employment choices and choices at the intensive margin i e choices about hours of work or weeks of work for workers another important distinction is the one between a descriptive labor supply function and a structural supply function that can be the basis for out of sample policy investigations concerning responses to tax and welfare programs and evaluations of welfare losses a full understanding of the participation hours dichotomy leads to an appreciation of the importance of the problem of selection bias what is the wage to impute to a nonworking person these distinctions are a legacy of the research conducted on labor supply over the past 20 years many important empirical questions have been addressed i how strong are the effects of taxes welfare and transfer programs on labor supply ii how important is intertemporal substitution can life cycle labor supply models explain business cycle labor supply behavior iii has the consensus view of the 1960 s of high labor supply elasticities for married women and low labor supply elasticities for married men held up all of the empirical evidence assembled on labor supply must be called into question in the light of important research on the basic quality of the data conducted by analysts at the university of michigan i discuss this evidence in a concluding section except for my discussion of measurement issues i focus only on the major discoveries about which a general consensus has emerged

on the distributional effects of reducing capital taxes this article asks whether household heterogeneity and market incompleteness have quantitatively important implications for the welfare effects of tax changes we compare a representative agent economy to an economy in which households face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk the income process is consistent with empirical estimates and implies a realistic wealth distribution we find that capital tax cuts imply large welfare gains in the representative agent economy however when households are heterogeneous substantial redistribution during transition means that only a minority will support capital tax cuts whereas most households can expect large welfare losses

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the budgetary and welfare effects of tax deferred retirement saving accounts abstract the present paper analyzes the budgetary macroeconomic and welfare effects of tax deferred retirement saving accounts similar to u s 401 k plans in a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous households because of the initial deferral of tax payments the short run budgetary cost of tax deferred accounts is significantly higher than the long run cost therefore the budget neutral introduction of tax deferred accounts would make current and near future households worse off although it would increase national wealth and total output in the long run if the government spread the short run cost to future households by increasing debt the policy change could make all age cohorts on average as well off as the economy without tax deferred accounts due to increased government debt and debt service costs however national wealth and total output would decrease in the long run thus introducing tax deferred accounts would not increase national wealth and improve social welfare at the same time this is partly because the policy change is regressive and reduces the risk sharing effect of the current income tax system

household search and the aggregate labor market we develop a theoretical model with labour market frictions incomplete financial markets and with households which have two members households face unemployment risks but their members adjust their labour supplies to insure against unemployment we use the model to explain the cyclical properties of aggregate employment and participation as in the u s data the model predicts that the participation rate the fraction of individuals that want jobs is not strongly correlated with aggregate economic activity this property is in sharp contrast to the strongly procyclical participation predicted by both neoclassical models and models with search frictions when we assume bachelor households or households with infinitely many members complete markets in the two member household model and in the data primary earners are always in the labour force secondary earners have a mildly countercyclical participation rate and a mildly procyclical employment rate their behaviour insures the household against unemployment risks

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

the choice of the personal income tax base abstract starting with vickrey 1945 and mirrlees 1971 the optimal tax literature has studied the design of a personal income tax the assumed ideal would be to tax earnings ability earnings ability is unobservable for tax purposes however past papers have focused instead on designing a tax on labor income existing tax bases though depend on a broader range of information about each individual than just labor income in principle this supplementary information can help in designing a tax that has more attractive distributional properties by more closely approximating an ability tax the objective of this paper is to lay out theoretically and estimate empirically how to make best use of available information about each individual in addition to earnings in a setting where the first best tax would be an ability tax the theory lays out an equity efficiency trade off when choosing the tax base in the empirical work we find the tax base that is best on equity grounds alone we find that the choice to tax couples based on their joint income and the inclusion of dividends interest income and dependents deduction in the tax base in roughly their current form can be rationalized simply based on their value in better approximating an ability tax without any need for supplementary motivations for these provisions however the inclusion of mortgage and property tax payments in the list of itemized deductions cannot be defended on these grounds

optimal pension systems with simple instruments we analyze optimal pension systems relying on simple policy instruments in a lifecycle environment which admits endogenous decisions of how much to work as well as when to retire the optimality in this context means the highest welfare that can be achieved within a restricted set of instruments while keeping the total cost of the pension system unchanged the policy instruments we consider are the optimized retirement benefit functions modeled after a stylized version of the current us social security

on the optimality of age dependent taxes and the progressive u s tax system abstract in life cycle economies where an individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant the optimal marginal tax rates on capital and labor income vary with age conversely the progressivity imbedded in the u s tax code implies that marginal tax rates vary with age because tax rates vary with earnings and earnings vary with age using numerical simulations this paper shows that if the tax authority is prevented from conditioning tax rates on age some degree of progressivity is desirable as progressive taxation better imitates optimal age dependent taxes than an optimal age independent tax system this role for progressive taxation emanates from efficiency reasons and does not rely on any insurance nor re distribution arguments

the long run effects of changes in tax progressivity abstract this paper compares the steady state outcomes of revenue neutral changes to the progressivity of the tax schedule our economy features heterogeneous households who differ in their preferences and permanent labor productivities but it does not have idiosyncratic risk we find that increases in the progressivity of the tax schedule are associated with long run distributions with greater aggregate income wealth and labor input average hours generally declines as the tax schedule becomes more progressive implying that the economy substitutes away from less productive workers toward more productive workers finally as progressivity increases income inequality is reduced and wealth inequality rises many of these results are qualitatively different than those found in models with idiosyncratic risk and therefore suggest closer attention should be paid to modeling the insurance opportunities of households

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets abstract diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts the literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles we show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post when managers derive utility from the funds under their purview moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives the ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds this effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount

flat tax reform a quantitative exploration abstract this paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the u s is replaced by a flat tax as proposed by hall and rabushka 1995 the flat tax 2nd ed hoover the central aspects of such reform the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply as well as its distributional consequences are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model main results are that i the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive effect on capital accumulation ii mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems but aggregate labor in efficiency units increases iii in all circumstances analyzed the distributions of earnings income and especially wealth become more concentrated

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

age dependent taxes with endogenous human capital formation we assess the gains attained by the introduction of age dependent labor income taxes in an overlapping generations economy where individuals live a meaningful life cycle and endogenously accumulate human capital the model is sufficiently rich to isolate the role of general equilibrium effects credit market imperfections and different forms of human capital accumulation the large welfare gains we obtain cannot be attained without age dependence nor can they be attained with age dependent taxes if progressivity of labor income taxes and capital income tax rates are not suitably adjusted to profit from the complementarity of these instruments

optimal taxation in a life cycle model we extend deaton s atemporal optimal commodity tax model to a life cycle envi ronment in which the individual may choose to work in many periods we are able to con firm the corlett hague intuition goods that are more complementary with leisure should be taxed at higher rates in addition we prove that in the microeconomic framework under lying some popular general equilibrium models if real wage and interest rates are constant over the life cycle the addition of some interest taxation to a consumption tax regime would be welfare improving and that optimal labour tax rates decline with age

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

managerial incentives and internal capital markets capital budgeting in multidivisional firms depends on the external assessment of the whole firm as well as on headquarters assessment of the divisions while corporate headquarters may create value by directly monitoring divisions the external assessment of the firm is a public good for division managers who consequently are tempted to free ride as the number of divisions increases the free rider problem is aggravated and internal capital markets substitute for external capital markets in the provision of managerial incentives the analysis relates the value of diversification to characteristics of the firm the industry and the capital market

intangible investment and ramsey capital taxation the standard analysis of optimal fiscal policy aggregates different types of assets into a unique capital good and all types of capital taxes into a unique capital tax this paper considers a disaggregated framework an economy with corporate and dividend taxes where firms invest in both tangible and intangible assets which can be expensed or sweat in our setup firms can always respond to changes in the timing of taxation we find that the optimal long run policy features zero corporate taxes and positive dividend taxes with labor and dividend taxes being identical moreover the initial capital levy is relatively small

an analysis of fiscal policy with endogenous investment specific technological change the effects of distortional fiscal policies are studied within a model in which there is endogenous investment specific technological change labor is used in the production of output and also for research purposes labor or capital taxes then distort the trade off between developing new technologies and investing in existing types of capital it is shown that if there is an externality in the research activity then it may be socially optimal to impose both a capital tax and an investment tax credit the growth rate is shown to be increasing in the rate of capital taxation and decreasing in the rate of labor taxation although the effect of taxation on the growth rate is modest this supports the observation that there is relatively little relationship between growth rates of economies and their rates of taxation

labor dependent capital income taxation abstract capital taxation which is negatively correlated with labor supply is proposed this paper uses a life cycle model of heterogeneous agents that face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and shows that the tax scheme provides a strong work incentive when households possess large assets and high productivity later in the life cycle when they otherwise would work less the system also adds to the saving motive of prime age households and raises aggregate capital the increased economic activities expand the tax base and the revenue neutral reform results in a lower average tax rate the negative cross dependence generates a sizable welfare gain in the long run relative to the tax system that treats labor and capital income separately as a tax base the reform however can hurt the elderly during the transition with a high marginal tax on their capital income

on income and wealth taxation in a life cycle model with extensive labour supply in a stationary life cycle model with extensive labour supply two forms of taxation are studied non linear income taxation and linear wealth taxation in the life cycle model the social weights of the dynasties depend on their permanent incomes not on the observed taxable current income a tax on wealth then can complement income tax as a redistributive tool the derivative of social welfare with respect to the wealth tax rate at the no tax point is computed it is positive whenever permanent income is positively correlated with aggregate life time savings this result is illustrated on a numerical example

taxation and saving a retrospective atkinson and sandmo 1980 evaluated the taxation of saving by embedding the static optimal tax framework within the two period overlapping generations model using this model they collected a series of important results for optimal taxes on labour and capital income under a variety of assumptions regarding the instruments and objectives of the government in particular the availability of national debt to spread burdens among different generations of individuals with clear intuition and presentation the study remains an important source for understanding the welfare implications of the taxation of saving

residential choice mobility and the labor market abstract there is substantial evidence suggesting that the process of suburbanization creates new job opportunities that are not equally exploited by all workers in order to explain this phenomenon a simple model is developed which incorporates borrowing constraints as an important restriction on moving decisions obstructing the necessary labor flows between jurisdictions required to equalize net wages in essence people who cannot borrow will be restricted in terms of their capability of changing residence location and therefore will have limited possibilities of working in distant labor markets or they will be subject to excessive commuting furthermore the labor allocation induced by households behavior facing these constraints affects consumer welfare production and producers profits the outcomes with perfect credit markets and with borrowing restrictions are calculated and the economic welfare levels are compared as wages are flexible they adjust to reflect the relative scarcity of workers present in each jurisdiction consequently some of the negative effects of the borrowing constraints are compensated so the outcomes cannot be easily compared some numerical examples are constructed to have an idea of the possible outcomes under different conditions finally it is found that allowing for moving cost deductions from taxable income may help to alleviate the problem

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

internal versus external capital markets this paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation we focus pritnarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending while both represent centralized forms of financing in the former case the financing is owner provided while in the latter ceise it is not we argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences 1 it leads to more monitoring than bank lending 2 it reduces managers entrepreneurial incentives and 3 it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

optimal life cycle unemployment insurance we argue that us welfare would rise if unemployment insurance were to be increased for young workers and decreased for old this is because young workers have little means to smooth consumption during unemployment and want jobs to accumulate high return human capital so unemployment insurance is highly valuable to them while the induced moral hazard problem is mild we consider a life cycle model with unemployment risk and endogenous search eort that we calibrate to match us labor market institutions we nd that allowing unemployment replacement rates and other government transfers to decline with age yields sizeable welfare gains which amount to around two thirds of the gains attained under the constrained optimal scheme for unemployment insurance over the life cycle

evidence on the insurance effect of redistributive taxation copyright 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

fiscal policy and asset prices with incomplete markets we study the simultaneous impact of fiscal policy decisions on macroeconomic activity wealth distribution and asset prices we consider a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents where government debt and capital are imperfect substitutes increases in public debt lead to significant increases in the riskless rate and to a reduction in the equity premium while higher capital income tax rates lead to a higher equity premium the crowding out effects on capital and output are much higher than in models where government debt and capital are perfect substitutes which thus ignore households portfolio reallocation decisions the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

age dependent employment protection this paper examines the age related design of firing taxes by extending the theory of job creation and job destruction to account for a finite working life time we first argue that the potential employment gains related to employment protection are high for older workers as they are magnified by the proximity to retirement but higher firing taxes for these workers increase job destruction rates for the younger generations furthermore from a normative standpoint when firms cannot ex ante age direct their search the impact of each generation of unemployed workers on the average return on vacancies makes the internalization of the search costs for the other generations imperfect through the ex post nash bargaining process we show that the first best age profile of firing taxes is typically hump shaped partially in contradiction with existing policies in some european countries taking into account the fact that the human capital of older workers is more specific than general tends to exacerbate these results

the capital budgeting process incentives and information we study the capital allocation process within firms observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems it is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low we also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer there is general agreement that investment decisions are the most important decisions made by corporations the choice of projects and the level of investment is critical not just for stakeholders of the firm but also for the economic well being of society as a whole it has been alleged that u s firms invest too little and tend to overemphasize short term results for example porter 1992 citing poterba and summers 1992 asserts that u s firms use hurdle rates to evaluate investment projects that are higher than their estimated costs of capital to understand the investment behavior of firms one must consider both the process by which external capital is made available to firms and the process by which internally and externally raised capital is allocated to investment projects within the firm considerable attention has been paid to how firms raise external capital the fundamental insight in this area is the celebrated result of modigliani and miller mm that capital structure is irrelevant in the absence of capital market frictions accordingly in the three decades since their contribution research on how external capital is raised has focused on market frictions including information and incentive problems relatively little research has focused on the internal allocation process and its relationship to the organization of the firm modern finance theory prescribes allocating capital according to the net present value npv rule just as the mm result itself provides no theory of the arrangements under which

dividend and capital gains taxation under incomplete markets motivated by the jobs and growth tax relief reconciliation act jgtrra of 2003 the effects of capital income tax cuts are investigated in an economy with heterogeneous households and a representative mature firm dividend tax cuts contrary to capital gains tax cuts lead to a decrease in investment and capital this is because they increase the market value of existing capital and households require a higher return to hold this additional wealth in line with empirical evidence the model predicts substantial increases in dividends and stock prices overall the tax cuts lead to a welfare reduction equivalent to a consumption drop of 0 5

optimal taxation in a limited commitment economy this paper studies optimal ramsey taxation when risk sharing in private insurance markets is imperfect due to limited enforcement in a limited commitment economy there are externalities associated with capital and labor because individuals do not take into account that their labor and saving decisions aect aggregate supply wages

arm s length relationships we show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive this phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored

consumption taxes and economic efficiency with idiosyncratic wage shocks fundamental tax reform is examined in an overlapping generations model in which heterogeneous agents face idiosyncratic wage shocks and longevity uncertainty a progressive income tax is replaced with a flat consumption tax if idiosyncratic wage shocks are insurable i e no risk this reform improves interim efficiency a result consistent with the previous literature but if more realistically wage shocks are uninsurable this reform reduces efficiency even though national wealth and output increase over the entire transition path this efficiency loss in large part stems from reduced intragenerational risk sharing that was previously provided by the progressive tax system

simulating fundamental tax reform in the united states this paper uses a new large scale dynamic life cycle simulation model to compare the welfare and macroeconomic effects of transitions to five fundamental alternatives to the u s federal income tax including a proportional consumption tax and a flat tax the model incorporates intragenerational heterogeneity and a detailed specification of alternative tax systems simulation results project significant long run increases in output for some reforms for other reforms namely those that seek to insulate the poor and initial older generations from adverse welfare changes long run output gains are modest

tiered housing markets and their relationship to labour market areas this paper develops a tiered geography of local housing market areas hmas that provides a national framework for spatial planning it is derived from a theoretical understanding of the economic basis of hmas the analysis explores the relationships between the tiers of the hma geography and local labour market areas drawing on this understanding the empirical research generates sets of different potential geographies of hmas for england based on an algorithm that applies criteria linked to the degree of closure of migration and or commuting patterns a range of theoretically appropriate criteria then enable the different geographies to be assessed the choice of geography is guided by chow tests of statistical differences in standardised house prices in neighbouring hmas derived from hedonic regressions finally conclusions are drawn on the validity of the approach developed the empirical work is on england and datasets drawn from the census and land registry

the timing of redistribution we investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted toward low income families but that may distort savings decisions can dominate early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted as a result of information constraints we use simple two period overlapping generations models with heterogeneous agents under six policy regimes a model calibrated to the u s economy benchmark two early redistribution lump sum regimes two targeted late redistribution regimes and finally a model without taxes and redistribution redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young generation and a capital tax on the old generation we argue that if the programs are small in size late redistribution can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output better targeting of low income households cannot completely offset savings distortions in addition we find that the optimal transfer and tax policy implies a capital tax of 100 and transfers exclusively to the young generation