an examination of the structure of governance in california school districts before and after proposition 13 this paper explores the structure of governance in california school districts two alter native models are considered the decisive voter benevolent dictator model and a model that al lows for rent seeking behavior on the part of district decision makers a formal test between these two models is proposed and implemented the decisive voter model is found wanting as an expla nation of school district decision making both before and after the passage of proposition 13 there is however some evidence that the constraints imposed on some districts by proposition 13 have forced decision makers to act in a manner more consistent with the preferences of their constituents

the demand for education with power equalizing aid abstract state grants in aid modify the full fiscal income and tax price for education services faced by voters in local school districts if aid is non linear in the local property tax rate as occurs with district power equalization coupled with an aid floor then individual budget constraints are non linear and least squares estimation is inappropriate we develop and estimate a model that incorporates these effects derive and extensively illustrate the comparative statics present global and local elasticities and simulate the impact of parameter changes on the variance of spending and the cost of the program

inflation and welfare in a monetary economy it is in everyone s private interest to try to get someone else to hold non interest bearing cash and reserves but someone has to hold it all so these efforts must simply cancel out all of us spend several hours per year in this effort and employ thousands of talented and highly trained people to help us these person hours are simply thrown away wasted on a task that should not have to be performed at all

public sector efficiency leveling the playing field between oecd countries in this paper we seek a robust methodology for the measurement of the relative public sector efficiency of 19 oecd countries over the period 1980 2000 we estimate relative efficiency scores for five disaggregated accounts of public spending as well as for aggregate public spending then we use a semi parametric econometric method to isolate the impact of government inefficiency from the inefficiency arising from the socioeconomic environment and luck to verify the validity of our index we use it to examine a number of well established relationships in the public choice literature which have only been tested using local government data

decentralized income redistribution reconsidered decentralized income redistribution reconsidered i introduction which is the appropriate level of government to undertake income redistribution this issue is receiving renewed attention from economists examining how migration and labor supply responses affect the costs of transfer payments at the state or federal level in a recent paper brown and oates 1987 use a formal public choice model to show that the possibility of migration of transfer recipients between states leads to suboptimal transfer levels even when taxpayers care only about transfer recipients within their own states with benefit spillovers across states their argument for federal responsibility for redistribution is presumably even stronger gramlich 1985 also argues that migration is large enough to lead to suboptimal levels of transfers at the state level because states with low benefit levels will be able to export their poor increasing the cost of redistribution to high benefit states gramlich s conclusion is based on the empirical work in gramlich and laren which finds that the migration effect is very strong though only in the very long run 1984 510 the implicit argument is that migration raises the cost of redistribution at the state level compared to the federal level 1 however neither brown and oates nor gramlich consider labor supply responses that is hours and participation in their analyses on the other hand several recent papers have attempted to estimate the cost of redistribution at the national level incorporating labor supply responses to taxes and transfers but not interjurisdictional migration 2 some empirical evidence is available which is consistent with either migration or labor supply effects for example helms 1985 uses time series cross section data on state expenditure and tax policies and finds that while spending on public services schools highways etc increases personal income increased state transfer payments financed by state taxes significantly reduce total state personal income this reduction could be caused by either migration or labor supply responses to taxes and transfers indeed helms s estimates indicate a very large response to transfer spending one more dollar of transfers reduces state personal income in the long run by 14 83 helms concludes states which seek to devote substantial tax revenues to transfer payments will experience significantly reduced growth prospects which limits the scope for redistribution at the state and local levels 1985 581 a concise summary of the standard argument concerning federalism and redistribution might be as follows 1 interstate migration of taxpayers and transfer recipients raises the taxpayer cost of income redistribution at the state level above the cost at the federal level 2 state wide redistribution confers spillover benefits to residents of other states 3 therefore as compared with a national system decentralized responsibility for income redistribution yields a less redistribution because its cost is higher and b less than the socially optimal amount of redistribution because of externalities my 1988 paper shows that step 1 of the above argument is not necessarily true because the migration effect which previous authors have stressed can be offset by a tax exporting effect by which residents of one state shift some of the fiscal cost of redistribution to residents of other states both the income effect and the substitution effect of increased redistribution will reduce the labor supply and hence earnings of transfer recipients the labor supply and earnings of taxpayers may also fall if substitution effects are strong enough the tax exporting effect arises if taxes and transfers on net reduce total earnings in a state since the state s federal tax obligations depend on its earnings

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply recent surveys on the labor supply responses of men document a divergence in the estimates of substitution and income effects obtained using various estimation approaches generally studies accounting for nonlinear tax schedules in a static setting via a piecewise linear approach produce estimates that typically imply higher substitution and lower income responses than are suggested by empirical work applying other approaches this paper demonstrates that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer choice problem with nonlinear budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into behaviorally meaningful restrictions these constraints arise not as a consequence of economic theory but instead as a requirement to create a properly defined statistical model in the analysis of piecewise linear budget sets the implicit constraints required by maximum likelihood in estimation amount to imposition of slutsky conditions at all wage income combinations associated with kink points in the analysis of differentiable budget sets the tacit constraints invoked by maximum likelihood also involve inequality restrictions on slutsky terms the empirical work presented in this study supports the contention that these implicit constraints play a major role in explaining the discrepancies in estimates found in the literature on men s labor supply

the flypaper effect what happens to a state s spending when it receives an unconditional grant from the federal government the standard theoretical analysis predicts that the increase in spending will be the same as that generated by an equivalent increase in local incomes or roughly 5 10 percent for most states in contrast numerous empirical analyses have found that spending increases by much more with some estimates near 100 percent this result is known as the flypaper effect since the money appears to stick where it hits the authors review this evidence as well as other studies that find similar behavior in firms

the effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government this paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government state government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950 88 elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout particularly among the poor and a poorer pivotal voter as predicted we find that these changes a fall in the income of voters relative to state income and the ouster of republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending

is the median voter decisive evidence from referenda voting patterns abstract this paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions previous tests have relied on cross sectional data while we make use of a pair of california referenda to estimate a first difference specification the referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 and 67 to 55 respectively we find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules however the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules especially in communities that have a large share of high income voters with attributes that suggest low demand for public services based on a model that explicitly recognizes that each community contains voters with both high and low demand for public school spending we also find that an increase in the share of low demand voters is associated with a lower decisive voter income percentile for the high demand group this two type model implies that our low demand types individuals over age 45 with no children have demands that are 45 lower than other voters collectively these findings are consistent with high income voters with weak preferences for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education

the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of married men in sweden abstract this paper presents labor supply functions estimated on a sample of prime age swedish males the model used takes account of the nonlinear character of individuals budget sets caused by the progressive income tax it also allows preferences to vary between individuals calculations with the estimated functions using a partial equilibrium framework indicate a sizeable effect of the income tax on hours of work the average expected deadweight loss of the income tax is found to be approximately 20 percent of tax revenue

inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange we study a random matching model of money in which a subset of people called bankers have known histories and the rest called nonbankers have unknown histories earlier we showed that if there are no outside assets then an optimal arrangement has bankers issuing objects banknotes that are used in trades involving nonbankers here the same model is used to compare such exclusive use of inside money to the exclusive use of outside money we show that the set of implementable outcomes using outside money is a strict subset of the set using inside money

cost sharing versus block funding in a federal system a demand systems approach this paper employs a maximizing framework consistent with the axioms of consumer preference to analyze local government s choice of spending on different social services within this framework it is possible to include both block funding and cost sharing intergovernment transfer schemes canada s movement to block funding from the cost sharing method of financing provincial expenditures on hospitals medical care and post secondary education is analyzed the results indicate that the provincial governments actions are generally consistent with a significant maximizing model of consumer behavior and that the change to block funding had a significant impact on real provincial funding of some previously cost shared social services

the demand for money financial innovation and the welfare cost of inflation an analysis with household data we use microeconomic data on households to estimate the parameters of the demand for currency derived from a generalized baumol tobin model our data set contains information on average currency deposits and other interest bearing assets the number of trips to the bank the size of withdrawals and ownership and use of atm cards we model the demand for currency accounting for adoption of new transaction technologies and the decision to hold interest bearing assets the interest rate and expenditure flow elasticities of the demand for currency are close to the theoretical values implied by standard inventory models however we find significant differences between individuals with an atm card and those without the estimates of the demand for currency allow us to calculate a measure of the welfare cost of inflation analogous to bailey s triangle but based on a rigorous microeconometric framework the welfare cost of inflation varies considerably within the population but never turns out to be very lar

toward a comprehensive model of welfare exits the case of afdc pressures to reform the welfare system in the united states give rise to a need for improved information about individual welfare recipients using data from the survey of income and program participation and event history analysis this paper profiles the probabilistic tendencies of conditions associated with welfare exits the joint influences of policy economic conditions and individual circumstances and characteristics are considered in an attempt to build a comprehensive model of program turnover

a politico economic theory of income redistribution this study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public good nature of redistribution and political scientists who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands we propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the american states the empirical analysis addresses determinants of the aid to families with dependent children guarantee adjusted for medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled we posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables such as per capita income and latent constructs such as liberal party control we specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the lisrel method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients the findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee

welfare generosity the importance of administrative efficiency community values and genuine benevolence using 1988 1991 state level data a public expenditure model is estimated for benefits paid through the aid to families with dependent children afdc programme the paper investigates whether differences in programme efficiency community attitudes perceptions of the effects of afdc on recipient behaviour and tastes for redistribution explain the variation in public support for welfare across states

estimating school district expenditure functions under conditions of closed end matching aid abstract several studies have used ordinary least squares ols to estimate school district expenditure functions for states with closed end matching aid the present paper demonstrates that the estimates of these studies may be inconsistent a two stage technique which guarantees consistent estimates is described and is used to estimate the price elasticity of expenditure for pennsylvania school districts the two stage estimates indicate expenditure to be substantially more price elastic than do the ols estimates the two stage technique is appropriate for estimating any input demand or expenditure function when closed end matching aid is involved

nonmonotonic demand for income redistribution benefits the case of afdc two different motives are often advanced to explain taxpayer nonrecipient support for income redistribution programs the first motive is the result of interdependent utilities between nonrecipients and the recipients of redistribution program benefits the source of this interdependence could be taxpayer altruism alternatively redistribution might be seen as one way to alleviate the potential for crime or social unrest recent theoretical analyses have suggested a second motiveincome redistribution programs act as protection against the possibility of unforseen loss in personal income 5 6 21 32 researchers using panel data find widespread random and temporary movements in individual income poverty and welfare program use that would seem to suggest a potentially significant insurance demand for redistribution programs 2 the results from one study for example indicate that while four to five percent of the total u s population could be classified as persistent recipients of welfare program benefits between 1969 and 1978 receiving program benefits in at least five of those years over one quarter of the u s population participated in welfare programs at least once over this same ten year period 9 74 in the past researchers estimating nonrecipient support for income transfer programs have considered only one of these two motives while ignoring the other 3 this paper extends the examination of the demand for income redistribution by integrating the public good and social insurance demand motives into one model the first part of the paper sets up the individual s decision model for income redistribution one consequence of interacting the public good and social insurance motives into one model is that support for higher benefit payments is expected to come from the tails of the income distribution low income individuals both recipients and nonrecipients benefit directly from the reduced risk of income randomness while high income

local public expenditure in sweden a model where the median voter is not necessarily decisive abstract this paper deals with local public expenditures and the analysis is based on cross section data for the swedish municipalities two models are estimated one is the basic median voter model where the decisive voter is assumed to be the voter with median income while the other is a more general statistical alternative the statistical alternative nests the basic median voter model as a special case which makes it easy to test the null hypothesis that the basic median voter model is the correct model given that the alternative is the true general structure although our results indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis the estimation results are nevertheless similar for the two models

special interest groups and the allocation of public funds i propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income in this model violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government the predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry although windfalls are legally unrestricted the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to 2 30 per capita upon receipt of funds the marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0 20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income states which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less these results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature

changing the price of pork the impact of local cost sharing on legislators demands for distributive public goods abstract the provision of public services through national legislatures gives legislators the chance to fund locally beneficial public projects using a shared national tax base nationally financed and provided local congestible public goods will be purchased at a subsidized price below marginal cost and may be inefficiently too large as a consequence an important assumption behind this inefficiency is that national legislators in fact demand more of the locally beneficial project as the local price for projects declines this paper provides the first direct test of this important assumption using legislators project choices following the passage of the water resources development act of 1986 wrda 86 we find legislators chosen water project sizes do fall as the local cost share rises with a price elasticity of demand ranging from 0 81 for flood control and shoreline protection projects to 2 55 for large navigation projects the requirement of wrda 86 that local taxpayers contribute a greater share to the funding of local water projects reduced overall proposed project spending in our sample by 35 and the federal outlay for proposed project spending by 48

income redistribution in a federal system the question of the appropriate level of government to undertake income redistribution is receiving renewed attention from economists the standard argument about the issue might be summarized as follows 1 interstate migration of taxpayers and transfer recipients raises the cost to voters of income redistribution at the state level above the cost at the federal level 2 statewide redistribution confers spillover benefits to residents of other states 3 therefore as compared with a national system decentralized responsibility for income redistribution yields both less redistribution and less than the socially optimal amount of income redistribution the purpose of this paper is only to question step 1 of the above argument of course readers who accept the assumptions of the standard argument may conclude that the possible weakening of step 1 of that argument reduces the likelihood that its conclusion holds the paper argues that the cost of redistribution faced by state residents may in fact be lower at the state level than at the national level because their federal tax obligations fall as the state redistributes more income thus part of the cost of redistribution at the state level can be exported to residents of other states the state s federal tax bill falls when taxable incomes in the state are reduced by increased redistribution deductibility of state taxes enhances this result but is not necessary for it to demonstrate the proposition without adding unnecessary complication a simple model of income redistribution is described in which governments at all levels use linear tax transfer schedules to redistribute income the single government case is considered first then two levels of government are introduced and finally migration is allowed it is shown that without migration state costs are never greater than national costs of redistribution as long as redistribution reduces total money income when migration is allowed the result depends on the elasticity of migration responses compared with the elasticity of labor supply responses

the demand for welfare generosity this paper estimates economic models of the determinants of state benefit levels in the aid to families with dependent children afdc program using 1969 1992 data these models have been extensively researched however the existing literature has produced an unacceptably wide range of estimates using alternative econometric procedures this paper systematically examines both the specification assumptions underlying previous analyses as well as several additional specification issues it is therefore able to replicate and reconcile estimates from previous studies and to provide updated consensus estimates of the demand for welfare generosity it finds that changes in the average level of income within states have small but statistically significant positive effects on benefits with the confidence bounds on the elasticity extending from 0 11 to 0 82 changes in the effective price of redistribution are found to have at most weak negative effects with elasticities in the range of 0 14 to 0 02 these results are used to evaluate the effects of block grant provisions in the recently enacted welfare reform legislation

the effects of lottery prizes on winners and their neighbors evidence from the dutch postcode lottery each week the dutch postcode lottery pcl randomly selects a postal code and distributes cash and a new bmw to lottery participants in that code we study the effects of these shocks on lottery winners and their neighbors consistent with the life cycle hypothesis the effects on winners consumption are largely confined to cars and other durables consistent with the theory of in kind transfers the vast majority of bmw winners liquidate their bmws we do however detect substantial social effects of lottery winnings pcl nonparticipants who live next door to winners have significantly higher levels of car consumption than other nonparticipants

the econometrics of piecewise linear budget constraints a survey and exposition of the maximum likelihood method in this article maximum likelihood techniques for estimating consumer demand functions when budget constraints are piecewise linear are exposited and surveyed consumer demand functions are formally derived under such constraints and it is shown that the functions are themselves nonlinear as a result the econometric problems in estimating such functions are exposited and the importance of the stochastic specification is stressed in particular the specification of both unobserved heterogeneity of preferences and measurement error econometric issues in estimation and testing are discussed and the results of the studies that have been conducted to date are surveyed

demandable debts as a means of payment banknotes versus checks we examine whether transactable forms of privately issued demandable debt are better used as banknotes or checks the distinction between the two is that a check must be redeemed by the issuing bank with each use whereas a banknote can circulate we find that the answer to the question depends on the cost of early redemption if this cost is small banknotes will not circulate so the question is moot if this cost is large incentive problems may prevent the circulation of banknotes for intermediate values of the early redemption cost banknotes will be preferred over checks

female labor supply with a discontinuous nonconvex budget constraint incorporation of a part time full time wage differential this paper incorporates the well documented part time full time wage differential into an empirical labor supply model with both a heterogeneity and a random error term and estimates that model fo

the chaning composition of income transfer programmes a public choice analysis this paper investigates the role of the interaction between the aid to families with dependent children afdc and food stamp programmes as an explanation for the decline in real income transfers experienced in the united states in the 1970s a public choice model is developed that focuses on the negative income tax features of the food stamp programme and its impact on the marginal cost of income redistribution the hypothesis developed from the theoretical model is investigated with a panel data set the econometric results suggests that the introduction of the food stamp programme did lead to a decline in real afdc transfers but that combined transfers afdc plus food stamps rose after the introduction of the food stamp programme it is further found that a flypaper effect is present which explains the strong stimulative effect from the food stamp grant on the level of income redistribution

on the relative unimportance of a balanced budget this paper explores the reasoning underlying milton friedman s preference for a small unbalanced budget over a large balanced one because the marginal return from government spending is less than the marginal cost measured in terms of the amount of income private individuals remain free to spend government expenditures have more of an adverse impact on the economy in his view than does the method of financing that spending using a panel data set comprising the 50 states plus the district of columbia we report evidence from the years 1967 through 1992 that growth rates in income per capita tend to be higher in states with smaller public sectors moreover we find that while both deficits and taxes reduce the rate of income growth in a state the negative impact of government spending is considerably larger at the margin

spatial spillover effects in the swedish local rescue services this paper studies what factors determine the expenditures on rescue services by municipalities in sweden the main purpose is to identify spatial spillover effects between municipalities in order to analyse strategic behaviour the analysis is based on a joint product model where collective security is assumed to contain local and regional public good elements in the empirical analysis we find that the reaction functions are negatively sloped meaning that we cannot reject the hypothesis of free riding behaviour it is also found that rescue services can be considered a normal good and that the municipalities respond positively to security policy threats cet article cherche a etudier les facteurs qui determinent les depenses des municipalites suedoises pour les services de secours le but principal est d identifier les effets de debordement geographiques sur les municipalites afin d analyser le comportement strategique l analyse est fondee sur un modele de produits lies dont la securite collective e

the flypaper effect identifying areas for further research the flypaper effect literature dates back three decades it is overwhelmingly neo classical in approach attempting to improve the median voter demand model and or temper it with public choice supply side perspectives whilst this approach provided valuable early substantial analytical insights more recent papers seem to have contributed only marginally to an understanding of the flypaper effect if indeed it exists at all hence as well as providing a long overdue comprehensive review of the literature on the flypaper effect this paper identifies more productive avenues for further research

voluntary donations and public expenditures in a federal system proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks the author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations the author characterizes the response of political economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions partial replacement is the most likely outcome though others are possible copyright 1987 by american economic association

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

tax credits labor supply and child care we explore the impact of the child care tax credit in the u s income tax system on the labor supply decisions of married women with young children by incorporating the cost of child care into a st

a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis search theoretic models of monetary exchange are based on explicit descriptions of the frictions that make money essential however tractable versions of these models typically make strong assumptions that render them ill suited for monetary policy analysis we propose a new framework based on explicit micro foundations within which macro policy can be studied the framework is analytically tractable and easily quantifiable we calibrate the model to standard observations and use it to measure the cost of inflation we find that going from 10 percent to 0 percent inflation is worth between 3 and 5 percent of consumption much higher than previous estimates

legal constraints and the choice of educational grant structures recent empirical work suggests that legalconstraints are significant in choosingstate educational grant structures unfortunately the literature has not takensuch constraints into account thus callinginto question particular grant structurerecommendations this paper studies theconditions under which a legislature underorder to reform its educational grantstructure prefers foundation grants overdistrict power equalization grants atheoretical model is presented in which thechoice is shown to depend on the legalbasis of the court s decision and theempirical validity of this conclusion isdemonstrated using connecticut data and aseparate model of school districtexpenditure choice

bureaucracy inefficiency and time this paper examines the bureaucrat s choice between devoting resources to economic rents organizational slack and maximizing the budget of the agency a new model of bureaucracy is developed using utility rather than a demand function as its foundation it is shown that increases in income alter the slack budget constraint to favor organizational slack over budget maximization modern federal bureaucracies in the u s are predicted to be slack maximizing and x inefficient

inefficiencies in public environmental services the paper discusses efficiency issues in the public provision of environmental services in particular waste water treatment it is shown that in the face of increasing respectively decreasing returns to scale the zero profit constraint of a cost minimizing public firm induces underinvestment respectively overinvestment in public capacity compared with efficient allocation between public purification and effluent control by private polluters x inefficiency of the public firm counter acts the inefficiency in allocation arising from overinvestment and it reinforces the inefficiency in allocation in case of underinvestment in public purification capacity as subsidy can bring down the user s charge imposed on sources but it will also increase x inefficiency the subsidy counteracts underinvestment but reinforces overinvestment in public capacity

residential demand for electricity under inverted block rates evidence from a controlled experiment block rate structures are used extensively in public utility pricing including residential electricity estimating price elasticities in this context is complicated by the resulting nonlinearity of the consumer s budget constraint this article estimates the demand for electricity under inverted block rates using data from a residential rate experiment the study provides an opportunity to obtain short run price elasticities in an experimental setting and to compare alternative estimators developed for nonlinear budget constraints elasticities of demand with respect to individual components of the block rate are developed using a modification of the structural maximum likelihood estimator

the decline of welfare benefits in the u s the role of wage inequality welfare benefits in the u s have experienced a much studied secular decline since the mid 1970s we explore a new hypothesis for this decline related to the increase in wage inequality in the labor market and the decline of real wages at the bottom of the distribution we posit that voters prefer benefits which are tied to low skilled wages we test the hypothesis using a 1969 1992 panel of state level data an additional contribution of our analysis is the use of general social survey data on voter preferences for welfare which we combine with current population survey data to determine the voter in each state who has the median preferred welfare benefit level our analysis reveals considerable evidence in support of a role for declining real wages in the decline of welfare benefits

explaining the decision to repeal an optional local tax county governments in pennsylvania have had the option to repeal the intangible property tax since 1978 as of 1992 27 of pennsylvania s 66 counties had repealed it an attempt is made to explain empirically the probability of repeal in this paper the empirical model accounts for a large part of the variation across counties the results show that the probability of levying the intangible property tax is positively related to the projected change in the real estate tax rate further it was found that revenue diversification and several taste and political variables significantly influence the repeal decision these findings are consistent with those of previous tax adoption studies the evidence however does not show the exportation of real estate taxes to have the expected effect on the probability of repeal

a bureaucratic theory of flypaper effects abstract one well documented pattern in local public finance is that in comparison with what is spent out of residents private income a disproportionate amount of lump sum intergovernmental aid is used to increase expenditures rather than to reduce local taxes this paper shows how a bureaucratic model of the type suggested by niskanen bureaucracy and representative government aldine atherton chicago 1971 can be used to explain this behavior an empirical test of the model using 115 small governments in michigan suggests that this bureaucratic model explains capital expenditures well while operating expenditures appear to be better explained by the standard median voter model

the effects of grants in aid on state and local expenditures abstract this paper develops econometric methods to estimate the effect of the piecewise linear budget constraints created by grant formulas in which the subsidy rate is not constant over expenditures e g closed end grants the methods are applied to the afdc program the results show that because of the kinked nature of the grant formula 1 the present federal formula actually increases cross state inequality in afdc benefits 2 several subsidy rates in the formula actually reduce benefits and 3 the so called flypaper effect disappears

panel thoughts on the future of payments and central banking maintaining a uniform electronic currency the role a central bank should play in operating or regulating a payments system is not a new issue back in 1913 for example congress decided that the federal reserve would play a major role providing the country with a national check clearing system and a single uniform currency and while that role has not changed much over the years in 1980 congress revised its view of the payments system with the passage of the depository institution deregulation and monetary control act among other things the act requires the federal reserve to price its check clearing services and earn a competitive return or exit the business today the role of the federal reserve in providing a national currency is being reexamined this reexamination is driven by recent technological advances banks now have the ability to offer a new kind of currency electronic cash also known as ecash that could readily compete with federal reserve notes so the question naturally arises should congress allow banks to issue their own private currency a privilege banks used to have before the civil war to answer that question we need to address several concerns including one that is often overlooked the loss of a uniform currency allowing banks to issue currency e cash usually raises concerns about the loss of seigniorage the effectiveness of monetary policy and the overall stability of our monetary system allowing banks to issue their own currency will no doubt reduce seigniorage because e cash will be a close substitute for federal reserve notes the success of e cash will be at the expense of the united states treasury related to the concern over the loss of seigniorage is the concern that as the demand for federal reserve notes declines so will the impact of monetary policy furthermore the introduction of e cash may not only weaken monetary policy but it may also make markets less stable based on the history of private money systems some economists worry that banks would be tempted to overissue their currency while these are legitimate concerns a concern that is often overlooked when the e

games the states don t play welfare benefits and the theory of fiscal federalism fiscal federalism theory predicts that states will behave strategically in welfare programs because voter demand for welfare is sensitive to tax price while the tax price itself changes because of welfare induced migration this paper tests these propositions on afdc in the united states for a panel from 1982 88 using new models for the determination of the recipiency ratio the tax price and composite neighbors the data do not support any substantial tax price elasticity of demand for welfare estimates of migration effects on tax price are found to be sensitive to specification copyright 1995 by mit press

the elusive flypaper effect abstract the flypaper effect is the common empirical result that lump sum intergovernmental grants stimulate more local government spending than increases in private income which are theoretically equivalent in this paper four of the best known explanations of the flypaper effect are tested using data from michigan school districts none of these explanations are confirmed by the data the cause of the flypaper effect is likely to be much more deeply rooted in the nature of local decision making than is currently recognized

an empirical investigation of interstate afdc benefit competition claims that states which offer generous welfare benefits attract the poor and that some states pay low benefits intending to drive the poor away are neither uncommon nor entirely un founded this paper employs a two player state generalized game to model states choice of a benefit level in the aid to families with dependent children afdc program migration by the poor in response to interstate differentials in earnings and welfare opportunities and the subse quent changes in afdc caseloads drive this game estimation of the model using 1979 data suggests that states within approximately 750 miles of each other do engage in a benefit setting game the rival s initial number of poor and preference for non afdc consumption appear to be the more influential rival characteristics these findings while derived from a different methodological approach are consistent with previous studies which indicate that welfare recipients tend to move toward higher benefit states such migration may impede the efficient spatial allocation of labor the results also indicate that states will tend to offer lower benefits given recipient migration than would be the case otherwise state jurisdiction over benefits consequently leads to underprovision of afdc federalization of the afdc program would improve efficiency in terms of the spatial allocation of labor and the provision of afdc

bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods theory and evidence local governments allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents socio economic characteristics to gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack comparative statics and an empirical study of illinois municipalities are conducted the indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables representing socio economic characteristics costs and competition measures we find that slack or inefficient behavior is associated with richer communities lower education levels and a lack of competition for residents among municipalities

estimation of the demand for local public education under a kinked budget constraint unlike previous studies on the demand for local public education this paper applies a minimum likelihood technique developed for a kinked budget constraint to the case of wisconsin school districts and carries out simulations the results indicate that 1 the bias in estimation under standard econometric techniques is substantial 2 the so called flypaper effect indeed exists and 3 the impacts of grants on expenditures and wealth neutrality are different from those obtained by previous studies copyright 1990 by mit press