the monetary approach to exchange rate determination under rational expectations the dollar deutschmark rate abstract this paper reformulates the monetary approach after ascertaining that a money demand function with a partial adjustment mechanism had more empirical support than a money demand function which assumed instantaneous stock adjustment the resulting exchange rate equation is estimated by two rational expectations techniques the parameter estimates are reasonable and are robust to the estimation technique used to different specifications of the driving processes and to changes in the estimation period the structural model outperforms the random walk model and its own unconstrained equivalent a pure time series equation in outof sample forecasts

buyer power with atomistic upstream entry can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare abstract this paper investigates the effects of buyer power on entry into an atomistic upstream market and economic welfare under reasonable market conditions we show that industries with a few buyers induce more upstream entry than industries with a larger number of firms in particular monopsony can be more conducive to entry and lead to higher social welfare than more fragmented industry structures this seeming paradox arises because a single buyer better internalizes the positive effects of entry on later periods supply conditions than a collection of firms this result is relevant in a number of market settings including markets for specialized labor and processing markets for agricultural products

minimum wages for domestic workers impact evaluation of the indian experience abstract what impact does minimum wage legislation have on wages and employment opportunities in an informal sector in a developing country the paper answers this question in the context of minimum wage legislation for domestic workers in india over the period of 2004 2012 combining matching procedure with difference in difference estimation approach supported by extensive robustness checks the paper estimates both the short run and the long run impact of the legislation on real wages and employment results show a positive impact of the legislation on real wages in the shortrun while there is limited evidence of this effect persisting in the long run further the legislation did not seem to have any impact at the extensive margin on the probability of being employed as a domestic worker over short or long run our analysis further reveals that the wages of majority of workers remain below the minimum wage available evidence from the ground in line with theoretical predictions point towards weak enforcement of the legislation as the potential driving factor of observed results as india recently extended national level minimum wage for all workers the paper provides a cautionary tale on the potential pitfalls of implementation of this legislation in informal sector and suggests some ways to overcome the same

labour im mobility and monopsonistic exploitation of workers in the urban informal sector lessons from a field study it is well recognised in labour economics that employers in monopsonistic competition have market power to set wages below the productivity of workers if workers are immobile which causes monopsonistic exploitation of workers monopsonistic exploitation is propelled by employers expectations about the degree of im mobility of workers and therefore by ex post mobility of workers it hence begs a question of what determines the relative im mobility of informal workers which has significant implications for monopsonistic exploitation and working poverty in the urban informal sector from our field study of urban and peri urban labour markets in bangladesh by modifying the method of stochastic frontier analysis we explain the behavioural foundation to the relative im mobility of informal workers we thereby unravel the effects of individual and household characteristics sociological institutional factors and household ties including worker s kinship on the relative immobility of a worker that can in turn explain monopsonistic exploitation and working poverty widely prevalent in the urban informal sector of south asia

local employer competition and training of workers abstractthe new training literature suggests that in a monopsonistic market employers will not only pay for firm specific training but also pay for general training if the risk of poaching is limited this implies that training should decrease with more competition for employees among firms using worker level data for germany on training participation and on training duration the authors find empirical support for this hypothesis specifically the authors find that employees are significantly less likely to participate in training if the local density of firms in a sector is high and they have shorter training durations when the local sector concentration is low

discrimination in an equilibrium search model i construct an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and show that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination whenever any employers in the market have a distaste for minority workers one implication of the model is that gender or racial wage differentials understate the utility loss from discrimination in addition the wages of minority workers increase when their proportion increases in the labor market

is part time farming really a step in the way out of agricultural one of the most important questions regarding the phenomenon of part time farming is whether it is a stable situation or just a step in the way out of agriculture this article provides support for the first possibility in the context of israeli family farms in the 1970s a multinomial logit model of work choices is estimated including estimated transition probabilities among the explanatory variables the results indicate that a high objective probability of exit from farming within the next decade decreased the tendency to engage in off farm work especially in a full time job in 1971

oligopsony and the distribution of wages we propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non wage characteristics while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics we completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that inside and outside forces interact in wage determination this interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence

underpaid or overpaid wage analysis for nurses using job and worker attributes the nursing labor market presents an apparent puzzle hospitals report chronic shortages yet standard wage analysis shows that nursing wages have increased over time and greatly exceed those received by other college educated women this paper addresses this puzzle data from the current population survey cps are matched with detailed job content descriptors from the occupational information network o net nursing jobs require higher levels of skills and more difficult working conditions than do jobs for other college educated workers a standard cps only wage regression shows a registered nurse rn wage advantage of 22 log points compared to a pooled male female group of college educated workers control for o net job attributes reduces the rn gap to 08 while an arguably preferable nonparametric estimator produces a wage gap estimate close to zero we conclude that nurses receive compensation close to long run opportunity costs narrowing if not resolving the rn wage shortage puzzle

monopsonistic competition low wage labour markets and minimum wages an empirical analysis abstractthis article investigates the degree of monopsony power of employers in different industries against the background of a statutory minimum wage introduction in germany in january 2015 a semi structural estimation approach is employed based on a dynamic model of monopsonistic competition the empirical analysis relies on a linked employer employee data set which allows to control for observed heterogeneity both on the worker and on the firm side the results show important differences in monopsonistic competition among low wage industries while retailing the hotel and restaurant industry as well as agriculture can be described as monopsonistic labour markets this is not true for other services and manufacturing of food products from a policy point of view the introduction of a uniform minimum wage may therefore lead to different employment reactions in industries with a similar minimum wage bite

who pays for the minimum wage this paper analyzes the eects of a large 60 and persistent increase in the minimum wage instituted in hungary in 2001 we propose a new approach to estimating the employment eects of a minimum wage increase that exploits information on the distribution of wages before and after the policy change we infer the number of jobs destroyed by comparing the number of pre reform jobs below the new minimum wage to the excess number of jobs paying at and above the new minimum wage our estimates imply that the higher minimum wage had at most a small negative eect on employment and so the main eect was pushing up wages we then use data on a large panel of firms to evaluate the economic incidence of the minimum wage increase contrary to theoretical models that attribute the small employment eects of minimum wage changes to monopsonistic wage setting we find no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage led to lower profitability among low wage employers instead we find that the costs of the minimum wage were largely passed through to consumers

testing for employer monopsony in turn of the century coal mining isolated company towns are often cited as likely examples of labor monopsony this article tests for monopsony power by estimating inverse labor supply elasticities using a county level panel dataset on nonunion west virginia coal mining from 1897 to 1932 the model specification incorporates dynamics in such a way that an estimate of the gap between marginal revenue product and the wage can easily be computed as a weighted average of short and long run inverse elasticities modest estimated short run inverse elasticities and very small long run inverse elasticities imply that coal operators enjoyed little if any monopsony power over their workers

unemployment and urban labour markets two quite distinct views on how metropolitan labour markets work have co existed for over three decades both claim empirical support and after a brief period of confrontation they continue to co exist today giving quite conflicting signals to policy makers according to the first model the urban labour market consists of a number of spatially defined sub markets so that local unemployment exists primarily because of deficiencies in highly localised demand for labour by this argument unemployment rates remain high in the absence of a renewed supply of appropriate jobs within short commuting distances of the jobless the solution according to this model is to attract private and public sector production into such areas in contrast a second model views the city as a single market in which transactions between labour and capital take place regardless of the location of residence and employment sites according to this perspective the spatial incidence of unemployment simply reflects the residential

a stochastic monopsony theory of the business cycle two distinct regimes contractions and expansions are generated in a model in which goods markets clear and all individuals are optimizing strict wage and price takers have fully rational expectations and are heterogeneous in both preferences and resource endowments involuntary unemployment asymmetric monetary policy effectiveness and a changing relationship between real wages and employment over the business cycle are the result of optimizing behavior by monopsonistic wage setting and price taking firms faced with price uncertainty an upward sloped supply of employees and efficiency wage behavior disequilibrium and involuntary unemployment can occur at the level of the individual firm s labor market jel e32 e52 j41 j42 i introduction for many economists three stylized facts are central to any plausible theory of the business cycle 1 friedman and schwartz 1963 and romer and romer 1994 concluded that monetary shocks have output employment and unemployment effects at least some of the time and such effects are asymmetric with respect to the state of the economy 2 unemployment is subject to fluctuations associated with recessions and expansions and in some recessions has been very high 1 3 the relationship between real wages and employment appears to be time period sensitive as reported by abraham and haltiwanger 1995 although first proposed by keynes modern economists such as benassy 2002 argue that at least some unemployment is best characterized as involuntary and indicates a state of disequilibrium in this article we consider a plausible alternative to disequilibrium explanations of these elements of the business cycle based on goods market imperfections such as those by benassy 2002 and dixon and rankin 1995 who considered monopoly power by firms in the goods market and benassy 1995 who assumed monopoly power by unions in the labor market we assume that the goods market is characterized by competitive market clearing but firms have some monopsony power as reflected in an upward sloped or bounded supply of labor to the firm and the ability to set the optimal wage before knowing the price they will receive for their output which is assumed to be stochastic and making their employment decision these modifications are embedded in an otherwise conventional general equilibrium model in which all agents firms and consumers workers capitalists are fully optimizing and form totally rational expectations and labor may exhibit efficiency wage behavior 2 this is not a representative agent model and cannot be reduced to such individuals are heterogeneous in both their endowments and preferences firms may be heterogeneous with respect to their production technology and the interests of firm owners are distinct from those of their employees the latter is essential to generate the changing regimes that produce predictions that correspond to the stylized facts monetary shocks affect output prices employment and unemployment in an asymmetrical manner consistent with the traditional business cycle the key to understanding these effects is the labor market if the expected quantity of money is generated then the competitive market clearing real wage will result lower than expected quantities of money generate a deficiency of aggregate demand lower than expected output prices and real wages above the competitive wage real wages above the competitive wage are associated with excess supply of labor and involuntary unemployment independent of that associated with efficiency wage behavior this contractionary regime will persist as long as the low quantities of money persist even though all agents have fully rational expectations are optimizing and the goods market clears in this regime increases in the quantity of money increase prices employment and output and employment varies negatively with the real wage efficiency wage behavior may decrease effort as the real wage rate is decreased

the public private sector gender wage differential in britain evidence from matched employee workplace data this article shows that little of the gender earnings gap in the public and private sectors in britain are explained by differences in employee characteristics the differences in workplace characteristics however make a significant sizeable contribution it is shown that performance related pay and company pension schemes are associated with higher relative earnings in the private sector whilst increased provision of family friendly employment practices in the public sector is associated with higher relative earnings for women

strategic gains from discrimination abstract according to a classical argument an employer handicaps herself if basing hiring decisions on factors unrelated to productivity therefore discrimination is undermined by competition this paper in contrast argues that being discriminatory can be a commitment device that helps an employer and its rivals to partially segment the labor market which leads to lower wages and higher profits discrimination can thus be an endogenous response to competition indeed the relationship between discrimination and competition can be non monotone moreover the logic suggests that a ban on wage discrimination may instead lead to discrimination in hiring

a microfoundation for increasing returns in human capital accumulation and the under participation trap this paper considers educational investment wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production it investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education a central insight is that the ex post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education optimal policy is not to subsidise education instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state provided childcare support

social comparisons in oligopsony abstract a large body of evidence suggests that social comparisons matter for workers valuation of the wage they receive the consequences of social comparisons in imperfectly competitive labor markets are less well understood we analyze an oligopsonistic model of the labor market where workers derive dis utility from comparing their own wage with wages paid at other firms as social comparisons become more prevalent all workers are paid higher wages the wage distribution becomes more equal and employment shifts to high productivity firms moreover the total wage bill and output increase while aggregate profits decline overall welfare rises our theoretical results have implications for estimating the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing a firm

optimal investment under operational flexibility risk aversion and uncertainty traditional real options analysis addresses the problem of investment under uncertainty assuming a risk neutral decision maker and complete markets in reality however decision makers are often risk averse and markets are incomplete we confirm that risk aversion lowers the probability of investment and demonstrate how this effect can be mitigated by incorporating operational flexibility in the form of embedded suspension and resumption options although such options facilitate investment we find that the likelihood of investing is still lower compared to the risk neutral case risk aversion also increases the likelihood that the project will be abandoned although this effect is less pronounced finally we illustrate the impact of risk aversion on the optimal suspension and resumption thresholds and the interaction among risk aversion volatility and optimal decision thresholds under complete operational flexibility

turning a blind eye costly enforcement credible commitment and minimum wage laws in many countries non compliance with minimum wage legislation is widespread and authorities may be seen as having turned a blind eye to a legislation that they have themselves passed but if enforcement is imperfect how effective can a minimum wage be and if non compliance is widespread why not revise the minimum wage this paper examines a minimum wage policy in a model with imperfect competition imperfect enforcement and imperfect commitment and argues that it is the combination of all three that produces results which are consistent with a wide range of stylized facts that would otherwise be difficult to explain within a single framework we demonstrate that turning a blind eye can indeed be an equilibrium phenomenon with rational expectations subject to an ex post credibility constraint since credible enforcement requires in effect a credible promise to execute ex post a costly transfer of income from employers to workers a government with an objective function giving full weight to efficiency but none to distribution is shown paradoxically to be unable to credibly elicit efficiency improvements via a minimum wage reform

panel data estimates of the production function and product and labor market imperfections summary consistent with two models of imperfect competition in the labor market the efficient bargaining model and the monopsony model we provide two extensions of a microeconomic version of hall s framework for estimating price cost margins we show that both product and labor market imperfections generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue which can be characterized by a joint market imperfections parameter using an unbalanced panel of 10 646 french firms in 38 manufacturing industries over the period 1978 2001 we can classify these industries into six different regimes depending on the type of competition in the product and the labor market by far the most predominant regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and efficient bargaining in the labor market ic eb followed by a regime of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right to manage bargaining in the labor market ic pr and by a regime of perfect competition in the product market and monopsony in the labor market pc mo for each of these three predominant regimes we assess within regime firm differences in the estimated average price cost mark up and rent sharing or labor supply elasticity parameters following the swamy methodology to determine the degree of true firm dispersion to assess the plausibility of our findings in the case of the dominant regime ic eb we also relate our industry and firm level estimates of price cost mark up and extent of rent sharing to industry characteristics and firm specific variables respectively copyright 2011 john wiley sons ltd

anti poaching agreements in labor markets we analyze competition for experienced workers among wage setting firms the firms can design poaching offers with higher wages to workers who switch from rivals relative to wages paid to their own existing employees we evaluate the profit and welfare effects of anti poaching agreements that eliminate poaching offers as a recruiting method anti poaching agreements increase industry profits whereas workers are made worse off we show that the effects of anti poaching agreements on total welfare are determined by the magnitude of workers switching costs and the productivity change associated with switching employers jel l41 l40 j42

monopsony power in the market for nurses estimates are presented of the inverse elasticity of supply of nursing services to the individual hospital a quantity which is a natural measure of employer market power the estimates corresponding to employment changes taking place over one year are quite high in the neighborhood of 0 79 and even for changes taking place over three years are substantial in the neighborhood of 0 26 the estimates do not significantly differ for hospitals in major metropolitan areas and do not depend very sensitively on the assumed form of the oligopsony equilibrium this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

search and nonwage job characteristics this paper quantifies the importance of nonwage job characteristics to workers by estimating a structural on the job search model the model generalizes the standard search framework by allowing workers to search for jobs based on both wages and job specific nonwage utility flows within the structure of the search model data on accepted wages and wage changes at job transitions identify the importance of nonwage utility through revealed preference the estimates reveal that utility from nonwage job characteristics plays an important role in determining job mobility the value of jobs to workers and the gains from job search

wages profits and rent sharing the paper suggests a new test for rent sharing in the u s labor market using an unbalanced panel from the manufacturing sector it shows that a rise in a sector s profitability leads after some years to an increase in the long run level of wages in that sector the paper controls for workers characteristics for industry fixed effects and for unionism lester s range of wages is estimated for rent sharing reasons alone at approximately 24 per cent of the mean wage

heterogeneous effects of imperfectly enforced minimum wages in low wage labor markets abstract we present minimum wage effects across different enforcement regimes exploiting state time variation and policy discontinuities at contiguous districts across state borders in india we show that the effect of minimum wages on wages and employment significantly increases with an increase in enforcement in weak enforcement regimes estimated wage effects are negligible and employment effects are negative or null in stricter regimes wage effects are positive and strong and employment effects are positive or null in most specifications these results are consistent with theories on imperfect enforcement in monopsonistic labor markets and are robust to alternative definitions of enforcement and employment and employing instrumental variables for enforcement

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

the depressing effect of agricultural institutions on the prewar japanese economy why didn t the japanese miracle take place before world war ii the culprit we identify is a barrier that kept prewar agricultural employment constant using a standard neoclassical two sector growth model we show that the barrier induced sectoral distortion and an ensuring lack of capital accumulation account well for the depressed output level without the barrier japan s prewar gnp per worker would have been at least about a half of that of the united states not about a third as in the data the labor barrier existed because we argue the prewar patriarchy forced the son designated as heir to stay in agriculture

classic or new monopsony searching for evidence in nursing labor markets the market for registered nurses rns is often offered as an example of classic monopsony while a new monopsony literature emphasizes that firm labor supply is upward sloping independent of market structure using data from multiple sources we explore the relationship between nursing wages in hospitals and measures of classic and new monopsony wage level analysis fails to provide support for classic monopsony the relative wages of rns in 240 u s labor markets being largely uncorrelated with hospital system concentration longitudinal analysis shows nursing wages declining with increases in hospital concentration we interpret these results as providing support for classic monopsony effects in the short run but question whether wage effects are sustained in the long run no relationship is found between nursing wages and a new monopsony measure of mobility but support for new monopsony is found for women elsewhere in the labor market rns display greater interemployer mobility than do women or men in general two conclusions follow first upward sloping labor supply need not imply monopsonistic outcomes second absent more compelling evidence nursing should not be held up as a prototypical example of monopsony classic or new

gender and trade aspects of labour markets we provide a comprehensive up to date review of the large body of theory and evidence on the linkages between trade liberalisation and gender inequality in income as well as two of the latter s key underlying determinants wages and employment on balance the evidence for developing countries points to an overall beneficial impact of trade expansion on female employment both relative to male employment and in absolute terms although largely concentrated in unskilled manufacturing by contrast the bulk of the evidence suggests a widening gender wage gap as a result of freer trade

a generalised model of monopsony this article presents a general but very simple model in which the supply of labour to an individual employer is not infinitely elastic but the employer can also raise employment by increasing expenditure on recruitment using this it is shown how that division between perfect competition and monopsony is whether there are diseconomies of scale in recruitment using a unique british data set containing information on both labour turnover costs and the number of recruits we present estimates that do suggest that there is an increasing marginal cost of recruitment debates about the desirability and consequences of labour market interventions like minimum wages trade unions welfare benefits hours restrictions and firing costs continue to be at the heart of debates about the way in which modern industrialised economies should be run is it best to have a relatively de regulated labour market the us being held up as a model by proponents of this view or can some regulation lead to better labour market outcomes with some northern european countries being held up as a model by this group debate about the merits of intervention is most commonly put in terms of a trade off between efficiency and equality with those economists favouring a more interventionist approach tending to be those who have a welfare function that puts greater weight on equality and or those who believe the efficiency cost of equality is relatively low

firm sponsored general education and mobility frictions evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty this study asks why hospitals provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty this support is striking because nursing education is clearly general clearly paid by the firm and information asymmetries appear minimal using aha and survey data i find hospitals employing a greater share of their msa s registered nurses are more likely to provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty net of size and other institutional controls given the institutional context i interpret this result as unusually specific evidence that technologically general skill training may be made de facto specific by imperfect and costly mobility

competition and teacher pay i introduction recent policy initiatives are increasing the degree of competition in primary and secondary education the number of charter schools is growing at an astounding rate vouchers are available to eligible children in florida utah and a number of cities including washington d c kafer 2005 school districts throughout the country are experimenting with subcontracting campuses to private firms the increasing popularity of policies that foster school competition dovetails with a burgeoning literature on the effects of educational competition researchers have examined the effects of educational competition on academic outcomes average public school spending and school district efficiency l this research has largely ignored the effects of increased competition on teacher pay yet reductions in the market power of school districts could have a significant impact on teacher earnings if school districts behave as typical monopsonists or oligopsonists when hiring then a lack of competition suppresses wages and policies that are designed to enhance competition among schools could lead to higher teacher salaries ceteris paribus 2 alternatively if a school district s position as a monopolistic provider of education services generates economic rents there are few parties to whom those rents might be dissipated besides school district personnel if teachers have been able to appropriate a share of the economic rents generated by the market power of school districts then increased competition could lower teacher salaries 3 this study uses individual data on more than 335 000 teachers from 670 texas school districts to explore the empirical relationship between competition and teacher pay the analysis suggests that a lack of competition in the public school system has led to significant market power for texas school districts resulting in lower wages for most texas teachers but higher wages for teachers in relatively concentrated markets ii theoretical models the elementary and secondary education industry in the united states is often highly concentrated more than 30 of u s educational markets are served by a single public school district and there are many more that are served by only a handful of educational providers 4 the concentrated nature of education markets suggests two alternative models of teacher wage determination the first is a classic oligopsony model and the second is a rent sharing model an oligopsony model of teacher wage determination boal and ransom 1997 lay out a classic cournot model of oligopsony that can be directly applied to the educational labor market 5 firms school districts choose an employment level l sub i to maximize the firm s revenue function r sub i given the employment level of all other firms in the market l sub i 1 r sub i l sub i w l sub i l sub i l sub i the market wage is determined by the total employment of all firms the first order condition for each firm implies that it chooses l sub i such that 2 mrp sub i w w l sub i l epsilon sup 1 in this model the gap between the marginal revenue product of firm i mrp sub i and the wage rate w depends on the firm s employment share l sub i l and the inverse wage elasticity of labor supply for the market epsilon sup 1 6 assuming that firms have different marginal revenue products the employment weighted average across all the firms in the market is 3 summation over i mrp sub i w l sub i wl epsilon sup 1 summation over i l sub i l sup 2 the last term on the right hand side is the familiar herfindahl index of market concentration thus wages are a function of market concentration h the employment weighted average marginal revenue profit per worker bar

dynamic labor market competition and wage seniority abstract we design an overlapping generations model of the labor market experienced workers bear costs of switching employers whereas the segment for junior workers is horizontally differentiated the literature typically explains wage seniority premia with reference to productivity gains generated by the accumulation of worker experience or mechanisms associated with incomplete information in contrast this paper characterizes how the wage seniority premium depends on the relative intensities of competition in the markets for junior and senior workers in particular we show that a wage seniority premium may prevail even under circumstances where senior workers are less productive than junior workers

rural reforms and agricultural growth in china this paper employs province level panel data to assess the contributions of decollectivization price adjustments and other reforms to china s agricultural growth in the reform period decollectivization is found to improve total factor productivity and to account for about half of the output growth during 1978 84 the adjustment in state procurement prices also contributed positively to output growth its impact came mainly from the responses in input use the effect of other market related reforms on productivity and output growth was very small reasons for slowdown in agricultural growth after 1984 are also analyzed copyright 1992 by american economic association

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

wage growth landholding and mechanization in chinese agriculture this paper uses farm panel data from china to examine the dynamics of land transactions machine investments and the demand for machine services recently china s agriculture has experienced a large expansion of machine rentals and machine services provided by specialized agents which has contributed to mechanization of agricultural production the empirical results show that an increase in nonagricultural wage rates leads to expansion of self cultivated land size a rise in the proportion of nonagricultural income or the migration rate also increases the size of self cultivated land interestingly however relatively educated farm households decrease the size of self cultivated land which suggests that relatively less educated farmers tend to specialize in farming the demand for machine services has also increased if agricultural wage and migration rate increased over time especially among relatively large farms the results on crop income support the complementarity between rented in land and machine services demanded which implies that scale economies are arising in chinese agriculture with mechanization and active land rental markets

is there monopsony in the labor market evidence from a natural experiment recent theoretical and empirical advances have renewed interest in monopsonistic models of the labor market however there is little direct empirical support for these models we use an exogenous change in wages at department of veterans affairs va hospitals as a natural experiment to investigate the extent of monopsony in the nurse labor market we estimate that labor supply to individual hospitals is quite inelastic with short run elasticity around 0 1 we also find that non va hospitals responded to the va wage change by changing their own wages

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

differences in labor supply to monopsonistic firms and the gender pay gap an empirical analysis using linked employer employee data from germany this article investigates women s and men s labor supply to the firm within a semistructural approach based on a dynamic model of new monopsony using methods of survival analysis and a large linked employer employee data set for germany we find that labor supply elasticities are small 1 9 3 7 and that women s labor supply to the firm is less elastic than men s which is the reverse of gender differences in labor supply usually found at the level of the market our results imply that at least one third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination by profit maximizing monopsonistic employers

a survey of the effects of the minimum wage on prices abstract it is well established in the literature that minimum wage increases compress the wage distribution firms respond to these higher labour costs by reducing employment reducing profits or raising prices while there are hundreds of studies on the employment effect of the minimum wage there are merely a handful of studies on its profit effects and only a couple of dozen studies on its price effects furthermore a comprehensive survey on minimum wage price effects is not available in the literature given the policy relevance of this neglected issue in this paper we summarize and critically compare the available evidence on the effects of minimum wages on prices

market freedom as antipower historically republicans were of different minds about markets some such as rousseau reviled them while others like adam smith praised them the recent republican resurgence has revived this issue classical liberals such as gerald gaus contend that neorepublicanism is inherently hostile to markets while neorepublicans like richard dagger and philip pettit reject this characterization though with less enthusiasm than one might expect i argue here that the right republican attitude toward competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent and that republicanism demands such markets for the same reason it requires the rule of law because both are essential institutions for protecting individuals from arbitrary interference i reveal how competition restrains and in the limit even eradicates market power and thereby helps us realize market freedom i e freedom as nondomination in the context of economic exchange finally i show that such freedom necessitates anglo nordic economic policies

market power and efficiency in a search model we build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and resulting policy implications of firms market power in a frictional labor market our environment has two main characteristics wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and there is a finite number of agents we find that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient and that the firms market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high to the low productivity firms a minimum wage forces the low productivity firms to increase their wage leading them to hire even more often thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they limit firms market power by improving the workers outside option

minimum wages for ronald mcdonald monopsonies a theory of monopsonistic competition recent empirical work on the effects of minimum wages has called into question the conventional wisdom that minimum wages invariably reduce employment we develop a model of monopsonistic competition with free entry to analyse the effects of minimum wages and our predictions fit the empirical results closely under monopsonistic competition we find that a rise in the minimum wage raises employment per firm causes firm exit and may increase or reduce industry employment minimum wages increase welfare if they raise industry employment but welfare effects are ambiguous if employment falls

oligopsony and monopsonistic competition in labor markets we argue that models of oligopsony or monopsonistic competition provide insights and explanation for many empirical phenomena in labor markets using a simple model with job differentiation and preference heterogeneity we illustrate how such models can be employed to explain the existence of wage dispersion the persistence of labor market discrimination market failures in the provision of training and the anomalous employment effects of minimum wages

wage dispersion over the business cycle abstract in this paper i provide robust evidence that fluctuations in wage dispersion are independent of the business cycle while residual wage dispersion i e dispersion of wages within narrowly defined demographic and skill groups of workers increases during booms and lessens during recessions moreover i show that the procyclical fluctuations in residual wage dispersion are mainly generated by cyclical changes in the upper half of the residual wage distribution

strengthening state capabilities the role of financial incentives in the call to public service we study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in mexico different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites and job offers were subsequently randomized screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants intellectual ability personality and motivation this allows the first experimental estimates of i the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants ii the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer and iii the role of job attributes distance attractiveness of the municipal environment in helping fill vacancies as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities a theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry we find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their iq personality and proclivity towards public sector work i e we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities

moving toward markets labor allocation in rural china abstract china s economic reforms have brought rapid growth in rural off farm employment raising questions about the assumption that rural china is labor surplus and has poorly functioning factor markets we investigate this by testing for separability between household labor demand and supply using panel data we find that separability is rejected overall indicating that factor markets remain underdeveloped nonseparability however is associated with labor surplus in some areas and labor shortage in others moreover separability holds where substantial employment opportunities exist in the wider township suggesting that such employment promotes competitive allocation within villages as well as the inter village movement of resources

attaching workers through in kind payments external shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate t

monopsony in the labor market this paper surveys recent theoretical and empirical research on monopsony in labor markets broadly defined as upward sloping labor supply to an employer we compare older monopsony models based on small numbers of employers with newer models based on labor market frictions such as moving costs and search we also compare older econometric approaches that focus on static wage concentration relationships with newer approaches that focus on dynamics our review of empirical estimates suggests that monopsony power based on small numbers of employers is probably rare but occasionally large while monopsony power based on frictions is probably widespread but small on average

does equal pay legislation reduce labour market inequality this paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality when the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely however with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before profits of discriminating firms might increase and discrimination can persist in the long run although it would have disappeared without the policy

individual heterogeneity and interindustry wage differentials estimates of interindustry wage differentials are obtained using a fixed effects estimator on a long panel the national longitudinal survey of young men nls after controlling for observable worker characteristics 84 percent of the residual variance of log wages across industries is explained by individual fixedeffects only 16 percent of the residual variance is explained by industry dummies since no controls for specific job characteristics are used job characteristics that vary across industries could potentially explain this rather small residual across industry log wage variance that is not attributable to individual effects clearly then these data do not force us to resort to noncompetitive explanations of interindustry wage differentials such as efficiency wage theory furthermore efficiency wage theories predict that wages in efficiency wage paying or primary industries should be relatively rigid therefore industry wage differentials should widen in recessions however no such tendency is found in the data

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

a pareto improving minimum wage this paper shows that a graduated minimum wage in contrast to a constant minimum wage can provide a strict pareto improvement over what can be achieved with an optimal income tax the reason is that a graduated minimum wage requires high productivity workers to work more to earn the same income as low productivity workers which makes it more difficult for the former to mimic the latter in effect a graduated minimum wage allows the low productivity workers to benefit from second degree price discrimination which increases their income

monopsony power pay structure and training although interest in monopsonistic influences on labor market outcomes has revived in recent years only a few empirical studies provide direct evidence on this topic in this article the authors analyze the effect of monopsony power on pay structure using a direct measure of labor market thinness the authors find evidence of monopsony power as firms facing fewer local competitors offer lower wages to skilled labor and trainees but not to unskilled labor the findings have important implications for the economic theory of training as most recent models assume monopsonistic pay setting for skilled labor but not for trainees

attaching workers through in kind payments theory and evidence from russia external shocks may cause a decline in the productivity of fixed capital in certain regions of an economy exogenous obstacles to migration make it hard for workers in those regions to reallocate to more prosperous regions in addition firms may devise attachment strategies to keep workers from moving out of a local labor market when workers are compensated in kind they find it difficult to raise the cash needed for migration this endogenous obstacle to migration has not yet been considered in the literature the article shows that the feasibility of attachment depends on the inherited structure of local labor markets attachment can exist in equilibrium only if the labor market is sufficiently concentrated attachment is beneficial for both employers and employees but hurts the unemployed and the self employed an analysis of matched household firm data from the russian federation corroborates the theory

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the gender effects of the minimum wage under weak compliance with labour regulations the case of bolivia this paper contributes to the minimum wage mw literature by providing new evidence on the gender effects of the mw in the context of weak compliance with labour regulations we study bolivia s ca

new market power models and sex differences in pay in the context of certain models it is possible to infer the elasticity of labor supply to the firm from the elasticity of the quit rate with respect to the wage we use this strategy to estimate the elasticity of labor supply for men and women workers at a chain of grocery stores identifying separation elasticities from differences in wages and separation rates across different job titles within the firm we estimate that women have lower elasticities so a robinson style monopsony model can explain reasonably well the lower relative pay of women in the retail grocery industry

the relation between farm size and farm productivity the role of family labor supervision and credit constraints abstract the paper shows that if the performance of hired farmhands is affected by supervision from family members and if the availability of credit is dependent on the amount of land owned then a systematic positive or negative relationship between per acre yields and farm size will prevail a model with no supervision effects on labor productivity would predict that yields are unaffected by farm size the paper also investigates the relation between land utilization and owned holding size when land rental possibilities are limited results are shown to be compatible with various observed patterns in ldcs