hiding information in open auctions with jump bids we analyse a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats we focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact dropout values of the opponents who exit the auction we show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency

counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information this article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker s productivity than potential employers previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker s qualifications as a result assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient i find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient i analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers and find these investment levels to be first best

parallel imports and the pricing of pharmaceutical products evidence from the european union we consider policy issues regarding parallel imports pis of brand name pharmaceuticals in the european union where such trade is permitted we develop a simple model in which an original manufacturer competes in its home market with pi firms the model suggests that for small trade costs the original manufacturer will accommodate the import decisions of parallel traders and that the price in the home market falls as the volume of parallel imports rises using data from sweden we find that the prices of drugs subject to competition from parallel imports fell relative to other drugs over the period 1994 1999 econometric analysis finds that parallel imports significantly reduced manufacturing prices by 12 19 there is evidence that this effect increases with multiple pi entrants

promotion turnover and preemptive wage offers this paper examines the strategic promotion and wage decisions of employers when employees may be more valuable to competing firms competing employers must incur a cost to learn the quality of their match with a manager promotion signals that workers are potentially valuable managers in other firms and so can lead to turnover to preempt competition for a manager an employer may offer a wage high enough to discourage competitors from acquiring information and bidding up the wage further or hiring the worker away this transfers wages from good workers to bad more costly information acquisition yields greater expected lifetime wages copyright 1993 by american economic association

star power colleague quality and turnover in this article we argue that the existence of greater organizational resources in the form of higher quality colleagues acts as a retention mechanism we test our hypotheses using a panel data set of securities analysts in 24 securities firms over a 9 year period results show that analysts working with higher quality colleagues are less likely to turnover analyst turnover is affected by the performance of two types of colleagues colleagues within one s group and colleagues in the client facing role this colleague effect applies to analyst turnover to competitor firms and not to analysts who exit the securities analysts industry copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

job allocation rules and sorting efficiency experimental outcomes in a peter principle environment an important issue in personnel economics is the design of efficient job allocation rules firms often use promotions both to sort workers across jobs and to provide them with incentives however the peter principle states that employees output tends to fall after a promotion lazear 2004 suggests that self selection may improve job allocation efficiency while preserving incentive effects we reproduce this peter principle in the laboratory and compare the efficiency of a promotion standard with subjects self selecting their task we find no evidence of effort distortion as predicted by theory furthermore we find that when the peter principle is not severe promotion rules often dominate self selection efficiency of task assignment results are consistent with imperfect appraisal of transitory ability and a lack of strategic behavior

contributions of universities to regional economic development a quasi experimental approach goldstein h a and renault c s 2004 contributions of universities to regional economic development a quasi experimental approach regional studies38 733 746 universities potentially contribute to regional economic development in a number of ways research creation of human capital through teaching technology development and transfer and co production of a favourable milieu we find that the research and technology creation functions generate significant knowledge spillovers that result in enhanced regional economic development that otherwise would not occur yet the magnitude of the contribution that universities research and technology development activities play is small compared with other factors we use a quasi experimental approach to explain variation in change in average earnings per job across 312 metropolitan statistical areas in the usa in 1969 86 and 1986 98 goldstein h a et renault c s 2004 la contribution des universites au developpement economique regional une facon qua

promotion turnover and discretionary human capital acquisition this article explores human capital acquisition decisions when job placement helps determine competition for a worker with asymmetric information workers may invest in firm specific capital without long term contracts specific investment increases promotion chances and hence wage competition shifting competition back to a time when firms are symmetrically uninformed if general human capital is the efficient output maximizing investment then an equivalent firm specific investment maximizes expected career wages this is a general result for sellers in second price auctions sellers of labor invest to maximize the expected second highest bidder valuation wage not the winner s expected valuation

price regulation and parallel imports of pharmaceuticals abstract this paper studies the effects of price regulation and parallel imports in the on patent pharmaceutical market in a theory model where the producer price is subject to bargaining between the brand name producer and a distributor we show that the effects of stricter price regulation crucially depend on whether the producer faces competition from parallel imports while parallel imports improve the bargaining position of the distributor price regulation counteracts this effect and may even be profitable for the producer we test the implications of our model on a unique dataset with information on sales and prices at both producer and retail level for 165 substances over 4 years 2004 2007 we show that stricter price regulation reduces competition from parallel imports and has no strictly negative effect on producer profits in the presence absence of parallel imports our results suggest that price regulation might improve static efficiency without being harmful for dynamic efficiency in the presence of parallel imports

why do sellers usually prefer auctions we compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly a simple simultaneous auction and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding the sequential process is always more efficient but preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers because the auction is more conducive to entry precisely because of its inefficiency it usually generates higher expected revenue we also discuss the effects of lock ups matching rights break up fees as in takeover battles entry subsidies etc

a framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment abstract we analyze the causes and the welfare consequences of international differences in labor turnover and human capital investment the framework incorporates different views as special cases conditions are identified under which multiple equilibria or differences in deep economic parameters explain the observed differences in labor practices we show that when there is an informational problem regarding job changing workers quality general human capital like firm specific human capital can also affect labor turnover and that better job matching is obtained at the expense of lower human capital investment given multiple equilibria a high turnover equilibrium is found superior in the pareto sense to a low turnover equilibrium if matching uncertainty is large the reverse is true when matching uncertainty is small

pharmaceutical price controls and entry strategies abstract this paper finds that the use of price controls has a statistically and quantitatively important effect on the extent and timing of the launch of new drugs firms headquartered in countries that regulate price reach fewer markets than those in countries without price controls companies avoid price controlled markets and are less likely to introduce products in additional markets after entering a price controlled country launches into low price european countries are further delayed following legalization of parallel imports the results suggest that price regulation in one country affects entry into other countries and may affect the strategies of domestic firms

a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms we show that a framework that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms including the following first real wage decreases are not rare but demotions are second wage increases are serially correlated third promotions are associated with large wage increases fourth wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder fifth workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next

testing for asymmetric employer learning recent evidence suggests that employers acquire more precise information about a worker s productivity the more time he or she spends in the labor market the following question arises is learning symmetric that is do all employers have the same information about workers productivity or is learning asymmetric that is does the current employer have superior information about workers productivity this article develops a learning model with endogenous mobility that nests both learning hypotheses it then proposes new tests for asymmetric employer learning overall learning appears to be mostly symmetric except possibly when the employees involved are college graduates

a sticky floors model of promotion pay and gender abstract according to raw data from the british household panel survey full time women are more likely than men to be promoted controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity we find that women are promoted at roughly the same rate as men but may receive smaller wage increases consequent upon promotion to help explain these phenomena we construct a new sticky floors model of pay and promotion in our model women are just as likely as men to be promoted but find themselves stuck at the bottom of the wage scale for the new grade

internal promotion and external recruitment a theoretical and empirical analysis we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment using a job assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two level job hierarchies with one managerial position the model predicts that controlling for the number of managers increasing the number of lower level workers is associated with 1 greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment 2 higher profit and 3 more general training empirical analysis of a large cross section of british employers is consistent with these predictions

excessive labour raiding final version received 24 july 2006 labour raiding refers to rms recruiting and hiring employed workers the literature on labour raidingsupports the idea that raiding sorts workers into their most productive positions i present a model wherean outside rm decides whether or not to pay to learn the match quality of an employed worker and theemployer decides whether or not to pay its worker a high wage that pre empts the raiding i show that theemployer may pay a low wage and gamble that it will not be raided rather than use a pre emptive wage this leads to an excessive amount of raiding

promotion turnover earnings and firm sponsored training i develop a model in which different technological conditions lead to distinct equilibria with different patterns in labor mobility promotion earning distribution and provision of firm sponsored training key is the asymmetric learning of workers characteristics because of the information that is conveyed to the market by promotion firms have incentives to adopt strategic promotion policies which result in different patterns in the use of internal labor market the theory explains well the differences between the japanese and the united states labor markets

should sellers prefer auctions a laboratory comparison of auctions and sequential mechanisms when bidders incur a cost to learn their valuations bidder entry can impact auction performance two common selling mechanisms in this environment are an english auction and a sequential bidding process theoretically sellers should prefer the auction because it generates higher expected revenues whereas bidders should prefer the sequential mechanism because it generates higher expected bidder profits we compare the two mechanisms in a controlled laboratory environment varying the entry cost and find that contrary to the theoretical predictions average seller revenues tend to be higher under the sequential mechanism whereas average bidder profits are approximately the same we identify three systematic behavioral deviations from the theoretical model 1 in the auction bidders do not enter 100 of the time 2 in the sequential mechanism bidders do not set preemptive bids according to the predicted threshold strategy and 3 subsequent bidders tend to overenter in response to preemptive bids by first bidders we develop a model of noisy bidder entry costs that is consistent with these behaviors and we show that our model organizes the experimental data well data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1800

competing for talents abstract two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking the peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership equilibrium is asymmetric with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per rank high quality agents are present in both organizations while low quality agents receive no resources from either organization and are segregated by quality into the two organizations a stronger peer effect increases the competition for high quality agents resulting in both organizations concentrating their resources on fewer ranks with steeper increases in resources per rank and yields a greater equilibrium difference in average quality between the two organizations

asymmetric employer information promotions and the wage policy of firms abstract this paper provides evidence that inefficient promotion strategies and large wage increases upon promotion may both arise as a consequence of asymmetric employer information building on the seminal work by waldman 1984a and milgrom and oster 1987 we first present a model that illustrates how both phenomena may jointly arise due to the information revealing character of promotions using experimental labor markets we find evidence consistent with asymmetric employer information being a causal factor for both inefficient promotions and large wage increases upon promotion furthermore we analyze the effect of asymmetric employer information on profits and turnover

wage signaling a dynamic model of intrafirm bargaining and asymmetric learning the article analyzes the effect of employer worker bargaining on wage dynamics in the presence of asymmetric information between current and potential employers a failure to reach an agreement leads to output loss because the disagreement points depend upon the worker s productivity productive workers separate themselves from less productive workers and signal their ability through wages in existing models of asymmetric learning wages are attached to publicly observable characteristics and wage growth occurs only when there is a change in observable characteristics this model in contrast generates an increase in earnings dispersion in cohorts of workers with similar observable characteristics

asymmetric learning and the wage productivity relationship abstract a worker s current employer will typically acquire information concerning that worker s productivity that is not directly available to other potential employers a number of papers have considered this idea and argued that in such a setting these other firms will utilize the actions of the current employer as signals of productivity in this paper i argue that this perspective can explain the existence of puzzling results concerning the relationship between wage and productivity growth found in the classic studies of medoff and abraham 1980 1981

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

corporate tournaments human capital acquisition and the firm size wage relation this paper provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed size wage effect and inter industry wage differences it develops a model in which incentives for workers to accumulate general human capital are provided by corporate tournaments where workers with the highest level of general human capital win promotions given that the prizes in such tournaments are determined by outside market conditions the investment and the equilibrium wages depend on firm and industry characteristics the model implies that workers in bigger firms and in more technology intensive and profitable firms and industries acquire more human capital and receive higher wages and benefits

retained earnings dynamic internal promotions and walrasian equilibrium in the early stages of the process of industry evolution firms are financially constrained and might pay different wages if workers have heterogeneous expectations about the prospects for advancement offered by each firm s job ladder this paper argues that nevertheless if the output market is competitive the positive predictions of the perfectly competitive model are still a good description of the long run outcome if firms maximize the discounted sum of constrained profits financing expenditure out of retained earnings profits are driven down to zero as the perfectly competitive model predicts ex ante identical firms may follow different growth paths in which workers work for a lower entry wage in firms expected to grow more in the steady state however workers performing the same job in ex ante identical firms receive the same wage i explain when the long run outcome is efficient when it is not and why firms that produce inefficiently might drive the efficient ones out of the market even when the steady state has the positive properties of a walrasian equilibrium to some extent it is not technological efficiency but workers self fulfilling expectations about their prospects for advancement within the firm what explains which firms have lower unit costs grow more and dominate the market

empirical analysis of occupational hierarchies using data on u s engineers and the position of engineering jobs within firms this paper estimates a model of hierarchies within firms the model extends rosen s 1982 model of recursive production to two skills and multiple hierarchy levels the model generates an empirical model that is nested within a general roy 1951 model of self selection maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the production technology and the skill experience profiles are estimated the results suggest that approximately two thirds of changes in employment shares across hierarchy levels across time are explained by demographic shifts in the stock of engineering skills most of the returns to experience and to assignment to higher hierarchy levels within firms are caused by skill accumulation and self selection rather than technological dierences across hierarchy levels

preservation of trade secrets and multinational wage premia this paper considers the strategic behavior of a multinational rm with superiortechnologyoperatinginadevelopingcountry domestic rmsdonothaveaccesstothesuperior technology other than by hiring away multinational corporation mnc workers the mnc can retain its workers by paying a wage premia and wedetermine how the industry structure and the nature of strategic competitionbetween rms affects the mnc s incentive to pay this premia and thus preserveits informational advantage we characterize conditions under which mncsinef ciently divide job tasks in order to raise the cost to domestic rms ofacquiring the mnc s trade secrets jel f23 j31 o33

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided