the impact of the eu emissions trading system on low carbon technological change the empirical evidence abstract this paper reviews the empirical literature analysing the effects of the eu emissions trading system eu ets on low carbon technological change the emerging evidence is assessed with references to both relevant economic concepts and the evolving regulation of the eu ets through the years the two most robust indications of the literature are a free allocation grandfathering tended to hamper low carbon investments in phases i 2005 2007 and ii 2008 2012 and b the eu ets appears to have been relatively more effective in stimulating innovation of low carbon technologies than their adoption importantly however a complete general picture of the impact of the eu ets on low carbon technological change is missing the main gap regards the lack of empirical evidence for phase iii 2013 2020 especially econometric studies are only few due to the lack of suitable databases accessible to researchers a problem that the relevant public authorities are urged to address thanks to the recent reforms of the eu ets the incentives for innovation and adoption of low carbon technologies are probably stronger today than ever before

unintended consequences of price controls an application to allowance markets abstract price controls established in a cap and trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor however they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions in particular when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price regardless of the prevailing market price in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for u s firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper although in practice many other conditions will determine its use

environmental regulation technological diversity and the dynamics of technological change inducing technological progress is an important objective of environmental regulation we investigate under which conditions regulation induced technological progress pursues the best technological option we analyze a setting with vertical and horizontal technological progress cost uncertainty time limited patent protection and a case that is typical for some emissi4on intensive industries like electricity generation or the chemical industry under taxes and standards only the current least cost technology is used and developed implying a lock in into a possibly inferior technology tradable permits yield slower progress but can facilitate the simultaneous development of technologies rendering lock ins less likely

lessons from the polder energy tax design in the netherlands from a climate change perspective this paper evaluates energy tax reform in the netherlands between 1988 and 2002 from a climate change perspective in particular the introduction of two indirect taxes on energy products is now responsible for a considerable amount of tax revenue from a green tax base the paper discusses the energy tax base and rate structure from a modern pigovian tax perspective and illustrates the practical difficulties involved in the indirect and non uniform taxation of emissions also further improvements of the energy tax structure are discussed such as a better targeting of the energy tax base and tax rate to fuel characteristics

climate policy with technology transfers and permit trading in this paper we analyze technology transfers tt and tradable emission rights which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations subsidizing tt leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the south thereby reducing the international permit price this is beneficial for the north as long as it is a permit buyer hence it chooses to subsidize tt by contrast the permit selling south suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates despite receiving subsidies we also consider how tt affects countries non cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions finally a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics

elasticities of substitution in caribbean tourism abstract this paper constructs a three level ces model and estimates the effect of real exchange rates on competition for tourism earnings elasticities of substitution are estimated first intra caribbean then among regional aggregates a worldwide and a u s market are both estimated u s tourists substitute relatively more interregionally but less intra caribbean significant effects of political violence are also captured development policy options are examined including the role of parallel tourism exchange rates and caribbean collusion

prices vs quantities the effects on technology choice abstract it is well known that price and quantity based regulation approaches provide different investment incentives but usually only the effect on the level of investment is studied in this paper we show that under uncertainty they also lead to the adoption of different technologies due to the disparate risks that a regulated firm is exposed to different regulatory instruments induce different technologies and this effect cannot be compensated by varying the design of the instruments furthermore price based instruments lead to the adoption of a socially suboptimal technology so that the inclusion of technology choice provides a bias in favor of a quantity based regulation compared with weitzman s weitzman m l 1974 prices vs quantities review of economic studies 41 477 491 criterion

should renewable energy policy be renewable political flexibility brings about trade offs for policy makers aiming to support the deployment of renewable energy sources res on the one hand it allows incorporating new information on ex ante uncertain benefits and costs of res policy on the other hand it may deter res investments this paper scrutinizes how these trade offs play out economically and politically when res policy makers choose the degree of flexibility as well as the instruments to implement flexibility the analysis builds on a theoretical framework distinguishing between flexibility by design and by adjustment it is complemented by a discussion of three case studies res support schemes in germany and the united kingdom and the eu emissions trading scheme theoretical as well as empirical results suggest that the politically chosen degree of flexibility by policy design may be sub optimally low in contrast flexibility by policy adjustment is often excessively high

ex post efficient permit markets a detailed analysis this paper provides a detailed analysis of ex post efficient permit markets after a short review of institutional designs that can achieve ex post efficiency under uncertainty and asymmetric information we analyze the effects of an ex post efficient regulation on the expected costs of the regulated firms on their investment behavior and on the incentives for strategic behavior on imperfectly competitive permit markets also we inquire about the budget effects of the regulation our results show that ex post efficient permit markets have considerable benefits beside the direct increase in expected social welfare

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control reply abstract the process of technological change in pollution control is broken into three basic steps innovation diffusion and optimal agency response firm incentives to promote these steps are then examined under five regulatory regimes direct controls emission subsidies emission taxes free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits on a relative basis emission taxes and auctioned permits provide the highest firm incentives to promote technological change at times free permits generate lower incentives direct controls which are common regulatory tools usually provide the lowest relative firm incentives to promote technological change

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

the optimal initial allocation of pollution permits a relative performance approach the initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes we generalize the analysis of bohringer and lange 2005 eur econ rev 49 8 2041 2055 to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter firm relative performance comparisons including grandfathering and auctions as well as novel mechanisms we show that using firms historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting while using firms historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms instead it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions we then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism

pollution permits and environmental innovation abstract this paper starts with a warning about the negative impact of plain pollution allowance markets on environmental pollution innovation stand alone spot markets enable the government to expropriate an innovation by offering a competing technology pollution permits that puts an arbitrary downward pressure on the licensing price advance allowances reduce expropriation but still create suboptimal incentives for innovation they have the further drawback that permits are inefficiently used when the innovation occurs options to pollute at a given striking price fare better than allowances because they create private incentives to phase out pollution in the case of innovation we characterize the social optimum and show that it can be implemented by issuing options to pollute inter alia finally the paper compares ex ante and ex post government procurement surprisingly ex post licensing by the innovator to the government may yield a higher licensing fee than an ex ante contract

innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector this paper discusses policy instruments for redirecting technical change within the electricity sector to mitigate climate change first we unravel the mechanism behind directed technical change explaining why markets may underprovide innovations in expensive renewable technologies in comparison to innovations in energy efficient fossil fuel generators subsequently we characterize technical change in electricity generation technologies stressing the heterogeneity of knowledge spillovers both within and between clean electricity generation technologies we argue that there exists a rationale for a portfolio approach to innovation in the electricity sector i e optimal innovation policies are neither fully generic nor fully specific and they need to be adapted in response to new information learned by the government the existing innovation literature does not however provide a clear cut answer for designing such a policy we compare policy instruments and argue that public r d support to clean technologies either in the form of subsidies or prizes seems to be the prime candidate for implementing non generic innovation policy

optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information abstract a market model of environmental regulation with interdependent production and pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous firms is developed firms have private information about costs which have a quadratic form firms pursue bayes nash strategies in communication with the regulator the full information optimum cannot be attained unless gains from trade in the product market net of external damages exceed the information rents earned by firms aggregate output and externality levels are lower at the regulated equilibrium than at the full information social optimum

price effects inefficient environmental policy and windfall profits we examine conditions under which a new or tighter restriction on emissions from a competitive polluting industry creates price effects in adjacent markets price effects may arise when a quantity restriction on emissions causes output to fall and therefore output price to rise they may also arise when the required reduction in output causes the price of a polluting input to fall we model emissions as a fixed proportion of output limiting the possibilities for input substitutions the possibility of price effects exists whenever the set of regulated firms is large relative to its input or output markets a possibility that is expressly ruled out in montgomery s j econ theory 5 395 418 1972 paper two potential implications of price effects are explored one is an efficiency concern a welfare maximizing regulator who neglects price effects will require more than the optimal level of abatement the other is a distributional concern an emissions restriction might create windfall profits for the polluting industry

environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology abstract we investigate incentives through environmental policy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology first we study the case where the regulator makes long term commitments to policy levels and does not anticipate arrival of new technology we show that taxes provide stronger incentives than permits auctioned and free permits offer identical incentives and standards may give stronger incentives than permits second we investigate scenarios where the regulator anticipates new technologies we show that with taxes and permits the regulator can induce first best outcomes if he moves after firms have invested whereas this does not always hold if he moves first

instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous this paper compares qualitatively and quantitatively the welfare effects of emissions taxes auctioned emissions permits and free grandfathered permits when technological innovation is endogenous we find that there is no unambiguous case for preferring any of these policy instruments the relative welfare ranking of instruments depends on the costs of innovation the extent to which innovations can be imitated the slope and level of the marginal environmental benefit function and the number of polluting firms we illustrate the types of situations when there can be significant welfare discrepancies between the policies and when there are not

investment incentives under emission trading an experimental study this paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits we consider three allocation auction policies auctioning off costly permits through an ascending clock auction grandfathering permits with re allocation through a single unit double auction and grandfathering with re allocation through an ascending clock auction our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering we nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment it affects the static efficiency from permit trading

tightening environmental standards the benefit cost or the no cost paradigm ms ff ichael porter and claas van der linde have written a paper that is interesting and to us at least somewhat astonishing it is a defense of environmental regulation indeed an invitation to more stringent regulation that makes essentially no reference to the social benefits of such regulation this approach contrasts starkly with the methods that economists and other policy analysts have traditionally used when assessing environmental or other regulatory programs the traditional approach consists of comparing the beneficial effects of regulation with the costs that must be borne to secure these benefits for environmental regulation the social benefits include the reductions in morbidity or premature mortality that can accompany cleaner air the enhanced recreational opportunities that can result from water quality improvements the increased land values that might attend the cleanup of a hazardous waste site the enhanced vitality of aquatic ecosystems that might follow reductions in agricultural pesticide use or any of the other potentially significant benefits associated with tighter standards from this benefit cost approach emerges the standard tradeoff discussed in virtually every economics textbook porter and van der linde deny the validity of this approach to the analysis of environmental regulation claiming it to be an artifact of what they see as a static mindset in their view economists have failed to appreciate the capacity of

incomplete credit markets and monetary policy abstract we study monetary policy when private credit markets are incomplete the macroeconomy we study has a large private credit market in which participant households use non state contingent nominal contracts nscnc a second small group of households only uses cash supplied by the monetary authority and cannot participate in the credit market there is an aggregate shock we find that despite the substantial heterogeneity the monetary authority can provide for optimal risk sharing in the private credit market and thus overcome the nscnc friction via a counter cyclical price level rule the counter cyclical price level rule is not unique to pin down a unique monetary policy rule we consider two secondary goals for the monetary authority i expected inflation targeting and ii nominal gdp targeting we examine the impact of each of these approaches on the price level rule and other nominal variables in the economy

toward a new conception of the environment competitiveness relationship accepting a fixed trade off between environmental regulation and competitiveness unnecessarily raises costs and slows down environmental progress studies finding high environmental compliance costs have traditionally focused on static cost impacts ignoring any offsetting productivity benefits from innovation they typically overestimated compliance costs neglected innovation offsets and disregarded the affected industry s initial competitiveness rather than simply adding to cost properly crafted environmental standards can trigger innovation offsets allowing companies to improve their resource productivity shifting the debate from pollution control to pollution prevention was a step forward it is now necessary to make the next step and focus on resource productivity

technical change and the marginal cost of abatement abstract we address one aspect of the treatment of technical change in the environmental economics literature how technical change impacts the marginal cost of abatement we review a selection of papers that employ a variety of representations of technical change and show that these representations have quite different and sometimes surprising effects on the marginal costs of pollution reductions we argue that these varied representations in fact correspond to a variety of different technology options we then present results indicating that this representation matters the impacts of technical change on the marginal cost of abatement can crucially impact policy analysis

incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms the direction and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs we establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement negligence may however induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases increases marginal abatement costs for low high levels of abatement

does more stringent environmental regulation induce or reduce technology adoption when the rate of technology adoption is inverted u shaped abstract we show that for a broad class of technologies the relationship between policy stringency and the rate of technology adoption is inverted u shaped this happens when the marginal abatement cost mac curves of conventional and new technologies intersect which invariably occurs when emissions are proportional to output and technological progress reduces emissions per output this outcome does not result from policy failure on the contrary in social optimum the relationship between the slope of the marginal damage curve and the rate of technology adoption is also inverted u shaped under more general conditions these curves can look even more complicated e g such as inverted w shaped

dynamic incentives of environmental regulations the effects of alternative policy instruments on technology diffusion abstract we develop a framework for comparing empirically the effects of alternative environmental policy instruments on the diffusion of new technology market based and command and control approaches can he quantitatively compared by estimating the economic penalty that firms through their actions reveal to be associated with violation of standards in the context of concerns about global climate change we empirically examine the likely effects of pigouvian taxes technology adoption subsidies and technology standards we employ state level data on the diffusion of thermal insulation in new home construction comparing the effects of energy prices insulation cost and building codes

do exogenous shocks better leverage the benefits of technological change in the staged elimination of differential environmental regulations evidence from china s cement industry before and after the 2008 great sichuan earthquake abstract technological modernization is crucial for productivity and environmental management and has profound implications for china where both overproduction and industrial pollution are serious issues this study reports empirical results for existing cement plants in sichuan province in china capturing changes in productivity and environmental performance between 2007 and 2010 during this time period as the moratorium period of differential environmental regulations came to an end certain existing plants modernized their production processes after the great sichuan earthquake in 2008 using primary data and the directional distant function approach this study investigates the financial and environmental benefits of technological modernization by examining improvements in productivity and environmental performance we find that the decision to modernize by changing the production process from conventional vertical shaft kilns vsks to modern dry rotary kilns as part of a cleaner production strategy yields significant savings in pollution abatement costs without compromising production efficiency we compare this modernization strategy to a reference strategy whereby firms continued to use vsk technology and invested in end of pipe technology to satisfy stricter environmental regulations we find that the environmental benefits of technological modernization are approximately three times greater than the non environmental financial benefits when environmental benefits are considered the payback period is significantly reduced going from 8 97 years to 2 26 years

commitment versus discretion in climate and energy policy to decarbonize the power sector policy makers need to commit to long term credible rules for climate and energy policy otherwise risk of opportunistic policy making will impair investments into low carbon technologies however the future benefits and costs of decarbonization are subject to substantial uncertainties thus there may also be societal gains from allowing policy makers the discretion to adjust the policies as new information becomes available we examine how this trade off between policy commitment either unconditional or state contingent and discretion affects the optimal intertemporal design of market based instruments in the power sector using a dynamic partial equilibrium model we show that commitment to a state contingent level of ambition for the market based instrument leads to higher welfare than both unconditional commitment and discretion with benefit uncertainty the choice between the practically more feasible approaches of unconditional commitment and discretion is analytically ambiguous a basic numerical illustration suggests that policy discretion may outperform unconditional commitment in terms of welfare however this result is reversed when only a limited fraction of benefit uncertainty resolves in reasonable time when future policy makers have own agendas or when investors are risk averse with cost uncertainty policy discretion is welfare superior if the government can commit to a technology deployment target

competition in tourism among the mediterranean countries this paper examines tourism competition among the mediterranean countries with particular emphasis on greece the estimated model includes as explanatory variables an income index a price index of the host country a price index of the competitors spain portugal and italy and exchange rate the results show that the main determinants of greece s tourism demand are both price indexes and exchange rate they also show that spain seems to be greece s main competitor

r d and abatement under environmental liability law comparing incentives under strict liability and negligence if compensation differs from harm abstract this paper analyzes equilibrium r d in pollution control and equilibrium pollution abatement by polluters who are subject to environmental liability law when the level of compensation differs from the level of environmental harm we contrast the performance of strict liability with that of the negligence rule privately optimal levels necessarily deviate from socially optimal ones under strict liability whereas private decisions are first best under negligence unless compensation is much smaller than harm it is established that the way in which privately optimal r d deviates from the first best level depends on the kind of technical change in pollution abatement counterintuitively polluters might overinvest into r d in pollution control if compensation falls short of harm and may underinvest if compensation exceeds harm

an econometric study of tourist arrivals in aruba and its implications abstract the principal purpose of this study is to analyze econometric estimates in order to explain tourist arrivals to aruba from the united states the netherlands and venezuela the study specified a dynamic econometric model for modeling short term as well as the long term responses it estimated both linear and log linear functions and it applied the box cox statistical method to determine the appropriate functional form the inclusion of venezuela as a developing country permitted the comparison of the behavior of tourism demand in relatively rich and poor countries the results indicated the extent to which cross country behavior of demand differs with respect to changes in effective prices and exchange rates this study can assist in the formulation of future macroeconomic policies as well as market and pricing strategies in a small or microstate economy

scale and transfers in international emissions offset programs abstract voluntary emissions offset programs between developing and industrialized countries suffer from adverse selection because participants will self select into the program in contrast pure subsidies for mitigation lead to full participation and hence efficiency but require large financial transfers which make them unattractive to industrialized countries we present a simple model to demonstrate the impact of three policy options on the performance of offset programs 1 baseline scale increases 2 offset discounting and 3 setting stringent baselines with baseline scale increases entire political jurisdictions such as regions or nations are assigned a single aggregate baseline and must choose whether to participate as one entity we find that increasing scale both improves efficiency and reduces transfers from offset buyers to sellers offset discounting means paying less than the value of abatement and can be paired with trading ratios between offsets and allowances in a cap and trade system we show that discounting is inefficient but can make offsets more attractive to industrialized countries setting stringent baselines also involves a tradeoff between efficiency and transfers we finally show that pareto efficient policies that are individually rational for buyers and sellers entail some combination of discounting and or stringent baselines offset policies are never first best but can be efficiency improving especially with increased scale

abatement and allocation in the pilot phase of the eu ets we use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over allocation that took place across european countries during the pilot phase 2005 2007 of the european union emission trading scheme using a dynamic panel data model we estimate the counter factual business as usual emissions scenario for eu member states comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions we find that both over allocation and abatement occurred along with under allocation and emissions inflation over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over allocation of approximately 280 million euas and total abatement of 247 mt co2 however we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 mt co2 also occurred possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features

on the efficient market diffusion of intermittent renewable energies abstract capacity costs of renewable energies have been decreasing dramatically and are expected to fall further making them more competitive with fossils building on an analytically tractable peak load pricing model we analyze how intermittency of renewable energies affects the market diffusion that results from these lower costs in particular once renewables have become competitive by attaining the same levelized cost of electricity lcoe as fossils the marginal increase in efficient capacities due to a further cost reduction varies substantially initially it is small then it rises but it falls again once renewable capacities are large enough to satisfy the whole electricity demand at times of high availability if external costs of fossils are internalized by a pigouvian tax then perfect competition leads to efficient investments in renewable and fossil capacities even though we assume that only a subgroup of consumers can adapt their demand to price fluctuations that are caused by the intermittency of renewables moreover fossils receive a capacity payment through the market for their reliability in serving demand of non reactive consumers maximum electricity prices rise with the share of renewables if regulators impose a price cap this initially raises investments in renewables but the effect may reverse if the share of renewables is large

foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism evidence from the caribbean there exist legal channels for informational lobbying of u s policymakers by foreign principals foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues this paper empirically studies whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of caribbean tourism and suggests the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development panel data are used to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by caribbean principals and u s tourist arrivals to caribbean destinations a variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association the policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries

labor force participation and monetary policy in the wake of the great recession in this paper we provide compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post 2007 decline in the u s labor force participation rate we then proceed to formulate a stylized new keynesian model in which labor force participation is essentially acyclical during normal times that is in response to small or transitory shocks but drops markedly in the wake of a large and persistent aggregate demand shock finally we show that these considerations can have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy especially under circumstances in which adjustments to the short term interest rate are constrained by the zero lower bound

a paler shade of green environmental policy under induced technical change conventional wisdom argues that environmental policy is less costly if it induces the development of cleaner technologies in contrast to this argument we show that once the second best nature of actual economies is taken into account the cost of environmental policy may well be larger with induced technical change itc than without thus itc may lower both the emissions reductions and the welfare gains associated with environmental policy in an endogenous policy framework itc may reduce the desired stringency of the policy

efficiency productivity and environmental policy a case study of power generation in the eu this study uses the eu public power generating sector as a case study to investigate the environmental efficiency and productivity enhancing performance of the european union s co2 emissions trading scheme eu ets in its first phase using data envelopment analysis methods we measure the environmental efficiency and the productivity growth registered in public power generation across the eu over the 1996 2007 period in the second stage of our analysis we attempt to explain changes in productivity and efficiency over time using econometric techniques our analysis suggests two conclusions carbon pricing led to an increase in environmental efficiency and to a shift outwards of the technological frontier and the overly generous allocation of emission permits had a negative impact on both measures these results are shown to be robust to changes in controls and specifications

end of pipe or cleaner production how to go green in presence of income inequality and pro environmental behavior in this paper we consider a vertically differentiated duopoly model in which a green producer competes with a brown rival in a market in which consumers are environmentally concerned in particular consumers are assumed to value not only the intrinsic quality of a certain product but also its environmental impact this environmental valuation has a positional content consumers attach a positive attribute to the green product while penalizing the brown one in this context we consider the choice of the green firm between cleaner and end of pipe abatement efforts we find that the interplay between the intensity of market competition consumers income disparity and environmental concern can play a crucial role in directing the green producer towards one or the other technological choice more precisely the adoption of cleaner production technologies can be discouraged by low average income and by tough competition while it can be spurred by the moral social incentive towards pro environmental behavior

firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control comment following on from an analysis by milliman and prince this article considers further the relative incentives for technical change provided by different pollution control instruments the comments involve the recognition that emission targets are typically chosen fairly arbitrarily because of regulators lack of knowledge of abatement cost schedules there is also a more detailed discussion of the practicability of auctioning emissions permits as these have been less thoroughly covered in the literature than the other instruments

intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies and the choice of policy instruments environmental benefits only unfold if green environmentally friendly technologies are widely diffused and intensively deployed within a firm we investigate how different types of policies directly and in combination affect the number of different green energy technologies adopted by a single firm intra firm diffusion using data from a dedicated survey on the diffusion of green energy technologies of 1200 swiss firms and applying well identified econometric models we found that energy taxes are a very effective policy instrument for the intra firm diffusion of green energy technologies even more important however are non political measures that show the largest effect among all tested instruments additional analyses show that a time consistency in policy making is more important for energy tax regimes than for regulations and b no evidence for complementarities between the policy types could be identified

pollution permits and compliance strategies abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spot and futures markets for tradeable pollution permits on the potential polluters compliance decisions polluters can buy permits invest in pollution abatement or else stop production or source out we show that stand alone spot markets induce excessive investment the introduction of a futures market reduces this incentive to invest but is not the optimal way to control pollution a menu of options on pollution rights possibly coupled with intertemporally bundled sales yields higher welfare because of its focus on long run demand elasticities and rent extraction this paper can be applied to a variety of situations such as demand side management public transportation bypass in telecommunications or forward sales by a private monopolist

on reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs investment subsidies are widely used to induce adoption of new technologies that can lower the marginal cost of reducing emissions to economize on these subsidies governments would like to distinguish between firms that need to receive a subsidy to adopt a new technology and firms that would adopt that technology even without subsidies we show that policies consisting of a menu of emission taxes and investment subsidies can potentially induce firms to self select

nominal gdp targeting with heterogeneous labor supply we study nominal gdp targeting as optimal monetary policy in a model with a credit market friction following azariadis bullard singh and suda 2016 henceforth abss as in abss the macroeconomy we study has considerable income inequality which gives rise to a large private sector credit market households participating in this market use non state contingent nominal contracts nscnc we extend the abss framework to allow for endogenous and heterogeneous household labor supply among credit market participant households we show that nominal gdp targeting continues to characterize optimal monetary policy in this setting optimal monetary policy repairs the distortion caused by the credit market friction and so leaves heterogeneous households supplying their desired amount of labor a type of divine coincidence result we also analyze the case when there is an aging population we interpret these findings in light of the recent debate in monetary policy concerning labor force participation

case study evidence that direct regulation remains the main driver of industrial pollution avoidance and may benefit operational efficiency abstract environmental regulation is required to reduce industrial pollution to levels that are socially acceptable and economically efficient but there is debate over the most efficient form of such regulation typically a limited range of environmental and economic parameters are accounted for in the econometric studies that inform that debate this paper integrates evidence from two separate studies to assess a broad range of parameters related to the efficiency of industrial environmental regulation questionnaire responses from 25 italian manufacturers of building chemicals and 28 irish pharmaceutical manufacturers provided evidence on the environmental effectiveness and operational impacts of different regulatory instruments combined with extensive emissions data from irish pharmaceutical manufacturers survey results enabled a quantitative estimation of pollution avoidance specifically attributable to direct regulation the monetised social benefit of avoided pollution was found to be equal to direct compliance costs chemical manufacturers in italy and ireland stated that direct regulation is a more important driver of industrial environmental performance than economic or voluntary regulation and their responses indicated that direct compliance costs may be countered somewhat by stimulated operational improvements it was concluded that direct regulation is an effective approach for multi pollutant control in an industrial context and that the efficiency of such regulation may be underestimated in studies that do not consider the full range of pollutants and operational effects

incentives for advanced pollution abatement technology at the industry level an evaluation of policy alternatives abstract in this research we evaluate the incentive effects of five environmental policy instruments to promote the development and adoption of advanced pollution abatement technology in a heterogenous industry from most to least incentive the policy instruments can be rank ordered as follows i auctioned permits ii emissions taxes and subsidies iii issued marketable permits iv performance standards including performance standards in this list necessitates the assumption that they are differentiated between heterogeneous firms before the technology adoption in a way which replicates the initial emissions control distribution of the efficient incentive based instruments with the starting point normalized in this fashion the instrument rankings are invariant with respect to the size of firms the size of the industry or the industry s abatement cost structure

does a recession call for less stringent environmental policy a partial equilibrium second best analysis this paper analyses second best optimal environmental policy responses to real and financial shocks in a two period partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms an environmental externality and credit constraints we show that to alleviate credit constraints and encourage investment the second best optimal emission tax falls short of marginal emission damages the optimal response to shocks depends on how the shock affects the size of the environmental and credit market failures and the effectiveness of the tax in alleviating these market failures under mildly restrictive assumptions on functional forms the optimal response to a persistent negative productivity shock or a tightening of credit is to reduce the emission tax our results are informative for how climate change policy should optimally change with the business cycle

optimal pollution standards and non compliance in a dynamic framework in this paper we present a stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime at each time the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non compliance with the pollution limit and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions we derive two main results first we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases while both emissions and the level of non compliance decrease second we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm s capital investment is socially desirable we numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount which crucially depends on the severity of the fine in the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment

rushing the impatient allowance reserves and the time profile of low carbon investments postponing the issue date of allowances in a cap and trade scheme by e g a reserve mechanism impacts the time profile of low carbon investments if the postponement constrains intertemporal arbitrage short term investments increase but long term investments are deterred this effect aggravates the shortage of long term investments at least partially attributed to firms impatience the cancellation of allowances agreed for phase iv of the eu ets is suitable to counteract the negative effects of cap neutral postponement on long term investments by making the reserve redundant all effects crucially depend on how firms form expectations about future allowance prices

markets and regulatory hold up problems abstract many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance a firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation we show that such incentives which resemble a hold up problem may not be overcome when government s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax the hold up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits a time consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations even if no permits are traded and their market price is low indeed an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great

innovation in pollution control comparisons of the various institutional arrangements for controlling pollutant emissions from individual sources effluent fees effluent control subsidies marketable permits and direct command and control regulation have usually focused on their static efficiency properties and institutional feasibility e g dales 1968 zerbe 1970 baumol and oates 1975 kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 spence and weitzman 1978 russell 1979 a relatively neglected area has been the study of how each arrangement influences innovation in pollution control a few studies e g kneese and schultze 1975 marin 1978 mills and white 1978 russell 1979 have casually claimed that the control methods that rely on economic incentives provide superior incentives for innovation but there have been few systematic studies of the question this paper provides a simple model of pollution control innovation by a profitmaximizing polluter who is subject to the various control methods the consequences of the methods will be explored in three major contexts first we assume that the polluter and the innovation is a small enough part of the overall pollution problem so that none of the important marginal conditions are changed by the innovation second we assume that the polluter and the innovation are important enough so that marginal conditions are changed by the innovations but that the governmental authority determining pollution control incentives or levels fails to make the appropriate adjustments third we again assume that the innovation causes marginal conditions to change but in this case the governmental authority makes the appropriate adjustments we use the term ratcheting to describe this last phenomenon in all cases we assume that the innovating polluter correctly predicts the reactions of the governmental authority and bases his innovation decisions on that prediction a profit maximizing entrepreneur would normally be expected to adopt any innovation that promised gains present discounted value to him in excess of initial

linking induced technological change and environmental regulation evidence from patenting in the u s auto industry a b s t r a c t this article uses a carefully screened patent database in automobile emission control technologies and a detailed regulatory action analysis to examine firms innovation in response to u s technology forcing auto emissions standards enacted between 1970 and 1998 the study finds that under the performance based technology forcing pbtf auto emissions regulations both automakers and compo nent suppliers innovated and introduced more advanced emission control technologies for automobile applications the study also shows that stringent pbtf regulation temporarily induced domestic u s firms to become more innovative than foreign firms that operated in the local u s market during the early phase of the regulatory regime findings of this research strongly imply that government intervention in the form of technology forcing regulation can drive firms to invest in technological innovation

dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments a survey abstract in this paper i survey and discuss recent developments on the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced abatement technology a main conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that under competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and control moreover taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the regulator is myopic if the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it optimally regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices taxes and policies by setting quantities issuing tradable permits are almost equivalent the literature also shows that under competitive conditions there is no difference between auctioning permits and grandfathering moreover timing and commitment of environmental policy is not crucial for adoption under competitive conditions commitment has positive incentive effects however if an r d sector has market power in the presence of market imperfections the ranking of the different policy instruments is ambiguous

does host market regulation induce cross border environmental innovation this paper evaluates the effect of host country environmental policy stringency on the offshoring of environmental patents for 2000 top world r d performers it is shown that a more stringent environmental regulation triggers both the extensive and intensive margin of patent offshoring in the field of environmental technologies results are robust to various different specifications alternative definitions of innovation offshoring and of regulation restrictions and to the consideration of possible endogeneity of regulation it is suggested inter alia that r d subsidies and non market based regulatory measures are more important than market based instruments as drivers of cross border environmental innovation length 26 pages

optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information abstract politically motivated subsidies can have undesired environmental consequences asymmetric information regarding firm productivity constrains the government s ability both to redistribute income and control emissions taking political and information constraints as given this article characterizes a social welfare maximizing policy the optimal policy uses a single instrument to achieve both goals making income support subsidies contingent upon pollution reduction price variation allows the government to design contracts with countervailing incentives potentially eliminating some firms information advantage

technology diffusion with market power in the upstream industry this paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting downstream industry that can purchase an abatement technology from a monopolistic upstream industry second best policies are derived for the full range of the abatement technology s emission intensities and marginal abatement costs the second best permit quantity can be both above or below the socially optimal emission level explicit consideration of the output market provides further insights on how market power distorts the allocation in the downstream industry the ranking between permits and taxes is ambiguous in general but taxes weakly dominate permits if full diffusion is socially optimal in addition it is analysed how a cap on the permit price affects the diffusion of an abatement technology

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

environmental policy reconsidered the role of technological innovation abstract this paper discusses recent environmental policy wisdom in the light of technological and organizational innovation starting from empirical evidence it argues that the main econometric models which are used in environmental policy analysis do not consider properly the determinants and effects of innovation and offer unreliable estimates of policy effects some solutions to the latter problem show that the integration between environmental policy and industrial policy can be more efficient than traditional environmental policies in the protection of the environment technological cooperation moreover can be an important instrument to stabilize international environmental agreements

the effect of allocation above emissions and price uncertainty on abatement investments under the eu ets abstract the european union emission trading scheme eu ets by far the largest in its kind has inspired several other carbon markets in the world based on interviews with plant managers from almost all belgian ceramics lime and cement producers this study describes how manager s perceptions on emission trading affected investment decisions in line with behavioural economics reference dependence is found to explain why free allocation below emissions creates a greater incentive to abatement investment compared to allocation above emissions in the ceramics sector allocation above emissions refrained managers from including carbon gains in payback times this contradicts the famous coase theorem which predicts that free allocation has no effect on abatement incentives the results indicate that auctioning part of the emission rights will reduce barriers to abatement investment carbon price uncertainty is seen as a disincentive for abatement investment by some managers and as an incentive by others intermediate levels of uncertainty add option value to abatement investments because the associated gradual learning adds flexibility in an uncertain carbon constrained future however high levels of uncertainty creating a risk of offshoring even when companies innovate creates an option value to postpone abatement investments narrow framing misperceiving the risk hedging counter cyclicality of carbon costs reinforces the option value to wait therefore policy should aim to reduce price uncertainty for very low and very high carbon prices not for an intermediary price range

contract design for the purchase of environmental goods from agriculture an environmental stewardship program whereby farmers are paid directly for the environmental goods they provide is developed by combining the microparameter distribution model with mechanism design principles the program overcomes the information asymmetry between farmers and governments and accounts for the deadweight losses from distortionary taxes the characteristics of optimal input and payment schedules of the program are derived these optimal schedules are determined by the tradeoffs between farming profits environmental benefits and deadweight losses from taxes and are second best except under restrictive conditions on deadweight losses from taxes and on the marginal product of inputs and marginal pollution costs

the structure of the climate debate first best climate policy is a uniform carbon tax which gradually rises over time civil servants have complicated climate policy to expand bureaucracies politicians to create rents environmentalists have exaggerated climate change to gain influence other activists have joined the climate bandwagon opponents to climate policy have attacked the weaknesses in climate research the climate debate is convoluted and polarized as a result and climate policy complex climate policy should become easier and more rational as the paris agreement has shifted climate policy back towards national governments changing political priorities austerity and a maturing bureaucracy should lead to a more constructive climate debate

the merits of new pollutants and how to get them when patents are granted the performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa this interaction is studied for a type of innovation where a new technology reduces emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time causes a new type of damage if the new pollutant associated with this technology is sufficiently different from existing ones such that marginal damage is increasing in each of them but additive across pollutants a diversification of the pollution portfolio is socially desirable in a situation where the incentives to develop such a technology are created by patents the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent holding firm this result carries over to other types of innovation the performance of taxes is limited by either the inability to implement specific pollution mixes or monopoly pricing for constant returns to scale at the industry level the combined use of taxes and permits ensures the first best mix of technologies and provides positive research incentives

the role of investment in environmental lobbying contests this paper establishes that a lobbying stage following investment decisions regarding abatement technology may imply a positive strategic effect of investment pointing to relatively more investment in pollution abatement technologies than without lobbying the intuition is that polluting firms may choose to implement more advanced abatement technology as a credible commitment device in order to lower the investment of environmentalists in the lobbying contest that will ultimately determine whether or not an emissions tax is introduced

prices vs quantities technology choice uncertainty and welfare technological improvements have proven essential in mitigating environmental problems such as climate change depletion of the ozone layer and acid rain while it is well known that price and quantity based regulatory instruments provide different investment levels the effects on the choice between different technologies have received scant attention this paper expands on the prices versus quantities literature by investigating firms technology choice in the face of demand and supply side uncertainty i show that the regulator can not design tradable emissions permits and an emissions tax such that the two regimes are equivalent even in terms of expected values moreover a tax encourages the most flexible abatement technology if and only if stochastic costs and the equilibrium permit price have sufficiently strong positive covariance compared with the variance in consumer demand for the good produced finally the firms technology choices are socially optimal under tradable emissions permits but not under an emissions tax

non mandatory approaches to environmental protection the approach to environmental protection has been evolving from a regulation driven adversarial government push approach to a more proactive approach involving voluntary and often business led initiatives to self regulate their environmental performance this has been accompanied by increasing provision of environmental information about firms and products to enlist market forces and communities in creating a demand for corporate environmental self regulation by signaling their preferences for environmentally friendly firms this paper provides an overview of the non mandatory approaches being used for environmental protection and surveys the existing theoretical literature analyzing the economic efficiency of such approaches relative to mandatory approaches it also discusses empirical findings on the factors motivating self regulation by firms and its implications for their economic and environmental performance it examines the existing evidence on the extent to which information disclosure is effective in generating pressures from investors and communities on firms to improve their environmental performance