durable goods and product obsolescence the issue of product obsolescence is addressed by examining the optimal sales strategy of a monopolist firm that may introduce an improved version of its current product consumers expectations of a forthcoming product lowers the price that they are willing to pay for the current product because of its loss in value due to obsolescence the new product is characterized by consumers increased willingness to pay and by its competitive interaction with the old product these characteristics affect the tradeoff that the firm makes between the cost of waiting for new product sales versus the cost of cannibalizing these sales we analyze the effect of these characteristics of the new product on the firm s optimal sales strategy we consider the various policy measures available to the firm including limiting initial sales in order to lower cannibalization of the new product buying back the earlier version of the product in order to generate greater demand for the new product and announcements of future product introductions we find that for modest levels of product improvement the firm s optimal policy is to phase out sales of the old product while for large improvements a buy back policy is more profitable lastly we find that the firm is better off if it informs consumers whether a new product is forthcoming

determinants of energy productivity in 39 countries an empirical investigation abstract this paper uses three types of analysis to investigate the drivers of energy productivity changes occurring in 39 countries during 1995 2009 we find that increases in sectoral energy productivity were the primary driver behind economy wide energy productivity improvements structural economic shifts away from industry and towards service oriented sectors played a lesser role in aggregate energy productivity improvements nations with similar demographic and economic characteristics showed similar levels of energy productivity and rates of improvement most notably former communist countries and nations undergoing economic liberalization exhibited the highest rate of improvement although they are still less energy productive than developed nations moreover the econometric analysis reinforces the long standing hypothesis that higher levels of income per capita and higher energy prices are associated with greater energy productivity while a greater share of output from industry is associated with lower energy productivity levels in particular higher energy prices and income levels are associated with improvements in sectoral energy productivity

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

the efficiency of equity in organizational decision processes it is now widely accepted that rent seeking anne krueger 1974 or directly unproductive profit seeking jagdish bhagwati 1982 may cause inefficiencies in the context of public sector decisions the possibility that government decisions for example about taxes quotas franchises or standards may create or redistribute rents induces private parties to spend valuable resources to influence that distribution even when such expenditures carry no social benefit moreover the social cost of rent seeking can exceed the value of the resources spent trying to gain and protect rents for example because the fear of losing wealth through redistribution reduces the incentives for wealth creation treating rent seeking activities as characteristic of public sector decision processes ignores the fact that similar phenomena are to be found in firms unions and other private sector organizations our recent work milgrom 1988 our 1988 1990 papers attempts to identify the advantages of decision processes private or public that permit rent seeking and to incorporate these into a cost benefit analysis of optimal decision processes our work begins with an analysis of why rents and quasi rents arise in organizations and of the forms that the rent seeking they engender may take some measures to insulate the decision process from rent seeking such as limits on the provision of information by interested parties or restrictions on the range of options considered may degrade the quality of decisions especially by blocking the flow of valuable information optimal decision processes balance the costs of rent seeking against the value of information obtained several aspects of the rules affect the opportunities that members have to spend resources trying to alter the distribution of rents to ascertain the possibilities for rent seeking the analyst must ask questions like can the parties propose new initiatives at any time can they give volumes of testimony in a form of their own choosing can they appeal adverse decisions are decision makers obliged to respond to the parties initiatives is the range of actions that they can take in response relatively broad rather than being tightly constrained by property rights or other formal rules more affirmative answers to these questions lead to more opportunities or greater incentives for costly rent seeking as a kind of shorthand we call decision processes that have more of these elements more open processes the very elements that make a process open to rent seeking may also add flexibility and responsiveness helping to ensure that important ideas and proposals are fully considered from this perspective the benefits of openness can in principle be measured by a value of information calculation in the usual manner of statistical decision theory weighing the costs and benefits it follows that a more open process is more desirable when the rents available for redistribution are low and the value of the information that might be acquired is high conversely when the potential for redistribution is high and the value of information is low the optimal decision process is less open this kind of reasoning helps to illuminate the variations in the decision processes that are found in many organizations we have discussed a number of examples in our earlier work including the characteristics of personnel departments the contrasting patterns of decision making employment and compensation in u s and japanese firms professor of economics stanford university and jonathan b lovelace professor of economics graduate school of business stanford university stanford ca 94305 respectively this work was supported by the national science foundation

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

measuring the energy security implications of fossil fuel resource concentration abstract economic assessments of the welfare effects of energy insecurity are typically uncertain and fail to provide clear guidance to policy makers as a result governments have had little analytical support to complement expert judgment in the assessment of energy security this is likely to be inadequate when considering multiple policy goals and in particular the intersections between energy security and climate change mitigation policies this paper presents an alternative approach which focuses on gauging the causes of energy insecurity as a way to assist policy making the paper focuses on the energy security implications of fossil fuel resource concentration and distinguishes between the price and physical availability components of energy insecurity it defines two separate indexes the energy security price index espi based on the measure of market concentration in competitive fossil fuel markets and the energy security physical availability index espai based on the measure of supply flexibility in regulated markets the paper illustrates the application of espi and espai with two case studies france and the united kingdom looking at the evolution of both indexes to 2030

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

i take care of my own a field study on how leadership handles conflict between individual and collective incentives from the early literature on the role of firm managers alchian and demsetz 1972 to the industrial organisation on contracts and mechanism design laont and martimort 2009 economists have given a lot of attention to find solutions to the imperfect alignment between individuals incentives and an organisation s collective goals prendergast 1999 in that literature a key role of managers is to monitor individuals to reward behaviour aligned with the collective goals and reduce sub optimal behaviour such as shirking how ever another strand of literature since akerlof 1982 has put forward a vision of reciprocal behaviour between an organisation s leadership and its members gifts high wages recognition from the organisation are reciprocated by high effort from the members of the organisation by rewarding individual members rather than strictly monitoring them organisations may benefit from greater effort and cohesion experimental research in organizational economics has provided mixed results suggesting that agents do react to personal incentives but also that reciprocal behaviour can play a substantial role camerer and weber 2012

determinants of energy demand in the french service sector a decomposition analysis abstract this paper analyzes the changes in the energy consumption of the service sector in france over the period 1995 2006 using the logarithmic mean divisia index i lmdi i decomposition method the analysis is carried out at various disaggregation levels to highlight the specifics of each sub sector and end use according to their respective determinants the results show that in this period the economic growth of the service sector was the main factor that led to the increase in total energy consumption structure productivity substitution and intensity effects restricted this growth but with limited effect by analyzing each end use this paper enables a more precise understanding of the impact of these factors the activity effect was the main determinant of the increase in energy consumption for all end uses except for air conditioning for which the equipment rate effect was the main factor structural changes in the service sector primarily impacted energy consumption for space heating and cooking improvements in productivity limited the growth of energy consumption for all end uses except for cooking finally energy efficiency improvements mainly affected space heating energy use

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

fooled by performance randomness overrewarding luck we provide evidence of a violation of the informativeness principle whereby lucky successes are overly rewarded we isolate a quasi experimental situation where the success of an agent is as good a

an economic approach to influence activities in organizations members of organizations spend considerable time effort and ingenuity attempting to influence decision makers such influence activities may bring benefits to the organization but they also involve real costs this essay offers an economic rationale for such influence activity as representing rational self interested behavior in the presence of informational asymmetries and an analysis of how the design of the organization s structure and policies should respond to the incentives for attempting influence it is posited that information valuable for the organization s decision making is directly available only to members of the organization who have some personal stake in the decisions these individuals may then have an incentive to try to manipulate the information they develop and provide in order to influence the resulting decisions to their benefits this can be costly both in degrading the quality of decision making and in diverting the attention and effort of the organization s members from more productive activities the organization has three different methods it can employ to discourage excessive influence activities and to encourage more directly productive uses of time and effort it can limit access to decision makers and participation in decision making it can alter its decision making criteria to favor those performing well in productive activities and it can provide direct financial incentives to encourage the desired allocation of effort it is shown that an efficiently designed organization will use such financial incentives only as a last resort instead it will always first alter its decision participation policies and decisionmaking criteria

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

what drives the change in china s energy intensity combining decomposition analysis and econometric analysis at the provincial level abstract we employ decomposition analysis and econometric analysis to investigate the driving forces behind china s changing energy intensity using a provincial level panel data set for the period from 1995 to 2009 the decomposition analysis indicates that a all of the provinces except for a few experienced efficiency improvement while around three fourths of the provinces economics became more energy intensive or remained unchanged b consequently the efficiency improvement accounts for more than 90 of china s energy intensity change as opposed to the economic structural change the econometric analysis shows that the rising income plays a significant role in the reduction of energy intensity while the effect of energy price is relatively limited the result may reflect the urgency of deregulating the price and establishing a market oriented pricing system in china s energy sector the implementation of the energy intensity reduction policies in the eleventh five year plan fyp has helped reverse the increasing trend of energy intensity since 2002 although the chinese government intended to change the industry led economic growth pattern it seems that most of the policy effects flow through the efficiency improvement as opposed to the economic structure adjustment more fundamental changes to the economic structure are needed to achieve more sustainable progress in energy intensity reduction

mapping the evolution of energy growth nexus synergies and trade offs the study explores the intellectual structure development and evolution of energy crisis and economic growth research through bibliometric analysis of research articles on energy growth nexus from 2000 to 2017 by using citespace where gephi is used to analyse the authors collaboration the analysis incorporates 27 152 references cited by 344 authors in 1165 articles and from 330 journals the results of study quantitatively present the most cited articles authors countries institutions and intellectual structure with data visualization in the knowledge domain of energy growth nexus the study categorizes the major research areas in energy growth nexus research as carbon dioxide emission electricity consumption heterogeneous panel real income renewable energy and financial development the study discusses emerging trends which provide the future research fronts and intellectual development within the framework of energy growth nexus

non commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions abstract auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment the manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker s output taking into account all interim information he has obtained the worker will work just hard enough and show it to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult this usually raises the costs of setting work incentives so incentives are softened sometimes drastically moreover when a worker s on the job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information

durable good monopoly and best price provisions best price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available if the seller subsequently cuts price then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund a durable good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments the provisions require special circumstances to be practical but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings three applications are discussed international commodity agreements markets for electric turbogenerators and markets for financial claims copyright 1990 by american economic association

does financial agglomeration promote the increase of energy efficiency in china abstract whether financial agglomeration is conducive to the improvement of energy efficiency is of great significance for china to better follow the path of energy conservation and emission reduction and green sustainable development based on the balanced panel data of 285 cities in china from 2005 to 2017 this paper analyzes the impact of financial agglomeration on energy efficiency theoretical analysis shows that financial agglomeration can influence energy efficiency through scale economy effect innovation driving effect information spillover effect and structural adjustment effect dynamic spatial econometric results show that from a national perspective financial agglomeration has a positive impact on energy efficiency however from the perspective of different regions and different city sizes it is found that financial agglomeration can have different effects on energy efficiency financial agglomeration has a significant positive impact on energy efficiency in eastern and central regions megacities and big cities financial agglomeration has a significant negative impact on energy efficiency in western china and has no significant effect on energy efficiency in medium sized and small cities finally based on the conclusions of the study specific proposals for financial agglomeration to improve energy efficiency are proposed

cheap talk and bogus network externalities in the emerging technology market many emerging technologies exhibit path dependent demands driven by positive network feedback such network effects profoundly impact marketing strategists thinking in today s network economy however the significant network externalities expected by many people often fail to materialize in the emerging technology market we analyze this phenomenon in the context of a technology distribution channel by studying cheap talk strategies under information asymmetry we show that incentive compatible contracts are essential for achieving credible information transmission in our model the better informed technology vendor has an incentive to inflate the retailer s ex ante belief of network externalities when a wholesale price contract is adopted when properly termed revenue sharing contracts are implemented there are information efficient cheap talk equilibria where truthful information transmission is mutually beneficial when the vendor s information is imperfect even revenue sharing contracts cannot guarantee credible information transmission if there is significant prior belief disparity between the vendor and the retailer this study demonstrates how information inefficient equilibria e g information blockage arise because of the conflict of interest or the conflict of opinion among channel members it also explores the role of cheap talk in facilitating channel coordination

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

discretion and bias in performance evaluation most of the economics literature on compensation and organizations builds from the theory of agency for the most part the literature analyzes situations in which agents performance can be controlled by tying compensation to objective performance measures such as output or sales it ignores the fact that most compensation arrangements involve superiors subjectire and hence non contractible judgements about employee performance in our view much of what is interesting about actual employment relations follows from the observation that performance appraisal is a process by which humans judge other humans milkovich and wigdor 1991 this paper studies the implications of subjective performance evaluation for compensation policies and for the efficiency of employment relations our objectives are two fold first we propose the importance of subjectivity of evaluations to better understand organizatlonal practices such as politicking favoritism and compression of wage scales second we hope to orient the study of subjective performance evaluation in ways that are consistent with empirical evidence on what organizations actually do

the design of durable goods the use of a durable good is limited by both its physical life and usable life for example an electric car battery can last for five years physical life or 100 000 miles usable life whichever comes first we propose a framework for examining how a profit maximizing firm might choose the usable life physical life and selling price of a durable good the proposed framework considers differences in usage rates and product valuations by consumers and allows for the effects of technological constraints and product obsolescence on a product s usable and physical lives our main result characterizes a relationship between optimal price cost elasticities and opportunity costs associated with relaxing upper bounds on usable and physical lives we describe conditions under which either usable life or physical life or both obtains its maximum possible values examine why a firm might devote effort to relaxing nonbinding constraints on usable life or physical life consider when price cuts might be accompanied with product improvements and examine how a firm might be able to cross subsidize product improvements

a new perspective on planned obsolescence automobile manufacturers have long had a policy of introducing annual style changes into their new model cars textbook publishers have a policy of periodically bringing out revised editions of their popular books recently ibm changed the operating system used in its personal computers causing a reduction in the compatibility between its old and new machines if one were to ask the typical man in the street to explain what is happening in these markets he would not hesitate before giving the following answer in economists terminology he would say that for the above firms the incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete is too high i e the firms have an incentive to practice planned obsolescence of course just as is true for the man in the street economists have also long observed and commented on the speed with which new products are introduced for example galbraith 1958 suggests that the annual model changes of automobile manufacturers are socially wasteful while fisher griliches and kaysen 1962 provide empirical estimates of the costs of these changes there have also been numerous theoretical attempts to model the idea of planned obsolescence or the related idea of killing off the market for secondhand goods but most of these models have in fact considered the choice a monopolist faces concerning how much durability to build initially into his product rather than the monopolist s incentive to introduce new versions of his product over time 1 in this paper i consider planned obsolescence from the standpoint of a firm that can change the nature of what it sells and show that the man in the street is in fact correct in many settings the incentive for a durable goods monopolist to introduce new products that make old units obsolete will be above that which is socially optimal

energy intensity a decomposition and counterfactual exercise for latin american countries abstract this paper investigates trends in energy intensity over the last 40 years based on a sample of 75 countries it applies the fisher ideal index to decompose the energy intensity into the relative contributions of energy efficiency and economic structure then the determinants of these energy indexes are examined through panel data regression techniques special attention is lent to latin american countries lac by comparing its performance to that of a similar set of countries chosen through the synthetic control method when analyzed by income level energy intensity has decreased in a range between 40 and 54 in low and medium income countries respectively efficiency improvements drive these changes while the structural effect does not represent a clear source of change the regression analysis shows that per capita income petroleum prices fuel energy mix and gdp growth are main determinants of energy intensity and efficiency while there are no clear correlations with the activity component in the case of lac the energy intensity decreased around 20 which could be interpreted as an under performance however the counterfactual exercise suggests that lac has closed the gap with respect to its synthetic control

integrated product architecture and pricing for managing sequential innovation science and technology advances drive firms to continually enhance their product s performance and launch sequentially improving offerings firms face challenges in marketing such improving products to well informed forward looking consumers who anticipate product improvements and seek to delay their purchase timing product design specifically a modular upgradable architecture in which improving and stable subsystems of a product are separated and selectively upgraded can be a valuable approach for marketers to alleviate consumer concerns about product obsolescence however such an architecture based approach can present new challenges as well and dealing with them requires carefully coordinated cross functional decision making by the firm in this paper we identify and formalize the notion of design inconsistency which refers to the monopolist firm s inability to commit to future product design architectures we find that firms experience design inconsistency even when they are able to commit to future prices and design inconsistency lowers firm profits as well as consumer surplus we then derive a joint product architecture and pricing approach to solve this problem this enables an innovating firm to optimally and in a time consistent manner launch modular upgradable products the modeling and analysis in the paper lends insight into types of markets and products for which modular upgradability is most appropriate and offers guidelines on making pricing and product design decisions jointly for managing sequential innovation this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

how to boost energy productivity in china s industrial sector an integrated decomposition framework based on multi dimensional factors abstract the industrial sector is a pillar for china s economy improving the energy productivity is of great significance to mitigate the discrepancy between energy use and energy supply as well as the economic development and environmental friendliness this paper extended the previous decomposition method by introducing six new components energy output oriented regional efficiency energy output oriented scale economy energy output oriented pure technical efficiency these new factors can uncover the impacts of regional balance development scale economy optimization and resource allocation efficiency change on energy productivity the main research results indicate that during the 2000 2016 period 1 industrial energy productivity yield progressively increased and the discrepancies of energy productivity in different regions were obvious eastern region represented the best energy productivity performance followed by the central and western regions 2 technological progress in both energy saving and production were two principal contributors to energy productivity growth overall the pure technical efficiency also promoted energy productivity suggesting that resource allocation efficiencies were performed well in both the energy market and the output market 3 by contrast both the energy and output oriented scale economy effect failed to promote energy productivity growth besides the energy oriented and output oriented regional efficiency had opposite impacts on energy productivity the former one had the inhibiting effects while the last one had the promoting effects finally several relevant suggestions for policymakers were provided

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

durable goods monopolists rational consumers and improving products we consider the case of a monopolist supplying an improving durable product to a population that is heterogeneous in its valuation of product quality in a two period framework we show that if consumers expect the product to improve in present value terms then intertemporal discrimination might result in the first period marginal consumer being left with zero surplus and some higher end consumers postponing purchase the resulting trajectories for quality and price do not constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium one of our conclusions is that the logic of profit maximization in the context of rational consumer choice imposes a demand side constraint on the rate of product improvement we also emphasize the disequilibrium consequences of improving a product so rapidly that high end consumers are tempted to wait for a future new and improved version finally the formulation adopted in the paper may be useful to understand observed differences in product improvement rates in different markets

energy intensity developments in 40 major economies structural change or technology improvement this study analyzes energy intensity trends and drivers in 40 major economies using the wiod database a novel harmonized and consistent dataset of input output table time series accompanied by environmental satellite data we use logarithmic mean divisia index decomposition to 1 study trends in global energy intensity between 1995 and 2007 2 attribute efficiency changes to either changes in technology or changes in the structure of the economy and 3 highlight sectoral and regional differences we first show that heterogeneity within each sector across countries is high these general trends within the sectors are dominated by large economies first and foremost the united states in most cases heterogeneity is lower within each country across the different sectors regarding changes of energy intensity at the country level improvements between 1995 and 2007 are largely attributable to technological change while structural change is less important in most countries notable exceptions are japan the united states australia taiwan mexico and brazil where a change in the industry mix was the main driver behind the observed energy intensity reduction

planned obsolescence and the r d decision by investing in rd i e the r d choice that maximizes current profitability does not maximize overall profitability the result is that if output is sold rather than rented then in its r d decision the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned obsolescence that lowers its own profitability

the dynamic pricing of next generation consumer durables learning curve effects aspects of consumer demand models e g reservation price distributions intertemporal utility maximizing behavior and competitive activity are reasons which have been offered to explain why prices of new durables decline over time this paper presents an alternative rationale based on the buying behavior for products with overlapping replacement cycles i e next generation products a model for consumer sales of a new durable is developed by incorporating the replacement behavior of a previous generation product pricing strategies for two product generations are investigated analytically and with numerical methods results indicate that durable replacement behavior leads to a wider set of optimal pricing strategies than previously obtained several empirical illustrations of industry pricing practices for successive product generations are also shown to be consistent with the theoretical results finally various areas for future research are outlined

the role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition workers routinely carry out activities that increase their productivity with their current employer for which they are not directly compensated for example a worker may be asked to develop relationships with clients or shop floor staff or he may develop a better understanding of how his firm operates firmspecific human capital of this type is difficult to quantify so that it is likely to be difficult to directly compensate the worker for its acquisition this paper is concerned with designing compensation schemes for employees to induce them to collect nonverifiable firm specific human capital if firms develop reputations for fairly compensating workers for skill collection the vagueness of these skills may not provide a significant incentive problem i consider the case where firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations as a result the acquisition of human capital is subject to a dual moral hazard problem first noted in kahn and huberman 1988 first a worker only collects skills if there is a promise of a higher wage if he does so second the employer has an incentive to claim that the worker has not collected these skills even when he in fact has in order to save on wage costs so on the one hand it is difficult to repay the worker after skills are collected as the firm has an incentive to renege however the worker cannot be repaid before collecting skills as he has no subsequent incentive to collect them following the institutional literature i assume that the firm can commit to a labor contract which attaches wages to different tasks the principal purpose of the paper is to show that the firm can use this ability to commit to a wage scale for different tasks to induce a worker to collect firm specific human capital in the presence of this dual moral hazard problem where the worker is rewarded for skill acquisition by promotion to another job assume that a worker can be assigned to one of two jobs d and

network externality compatibility choice and planned obsolescence this paper attempts to provide a formal theory of planned obsolescence based on incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities the author explores how a monopolist s ability to make the new product incompatible with the old version of a product constrains the optimal dynamic behavior of the monopolist the social optimum and the market equilibrium are compared finally the possibility of quality distortion is considered as a commitment mechanism to the future compatibility choice copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

incentives performance and choking in darts this paper examines how within match variation in incentives affects the performance of darts players the game of darts offers an attractive naturally occurring research setting because performance can be observed at the individual level and without obscuring effects of risk considerations and behavior of others we analyze four data sets covering a total of 29 381 darts matches of professional amateur and youth players we find that amateur and youth players display a sizable performance decrease at decisive moments professional players appear less susceptible of such choking under pressure our results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance

pricing information goods a strategic analysis of the selling and pay per use mechanisms we analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods these mechanisms are selling where up front payment allows unrestricted use and pay per use where payments are tailored to use we analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay per use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known ticking meter effect we demonstrate that pay per use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low in a duopoly one firm uses selling and the other uses pay per use here in contrast to the monopoly selling yields higher profits than pay per use we demonstrate that surprisingly the profits of both duopolists can increase as the psychological cost associated with pay per use increases next we show that uncertainty in consumer use frequency does not affect pay per use in a monopoly but lowers profits from selling in a duopoly both the seller and the pay per use provider obtain lower profits when use frequency is uncertain we also analyze how pricing mechanism performance is affected if the firms cannot commit to prices if the pay per use provider offers a two part tariff and if consumers are risk averse

commentaries and rejoinder to measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks by paulo albuquerque and bart j bronnenberg this series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on strategic and managerial issues arising from albuquerque and bronnenberg albuquerque p b j bronnenberg 2012 measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks marketing sci 31 1 4 23

benefits of channel discord in the sale of durable goods minimizing strife through vertical integration is commonly seen as the holy grail for long term success in product distribution in this paper we take a different slant showing that sometimes a separated channel that embodies a degree of discord can be helpful particularly when a long term view is taken this result is shown in the context of durable goods manufacturing the quandary of durable goods production is that once demand for a certain time frame is met there is a subsequent temptation to flood the market with additional goods as such consumers are reluctant to buy immediately instead opting to wait for discounted prices this problem can be alleviated by a degree of channel discord high wholesale prices ensure future sales will slow to a trickle

electronic tickets smart cards and online prepayments when and how to advance sell advance selling occurs when sellers allow buyers to purchase at a time preceding consumption shugan and xie 2000 electronic tickets smart cards online prepayments and other technological advances make advance selling possible for many if not all service providers these technologies lower the cost of making complex transactions at a greater distance from the seller s site they also give sellers more control over advance selling by decreasing arbitrage as technology enhances the capability to advance sell more academic attention is vital this paper strives to exploit these technologies by developing advance selling strategies until recently advance selling research focused on the airline industry and specific characteristics of that industry these characteristics included the price insensitivity of late arrivals e g business travelers compared with early arrivals e g leisure travelers demand uncertainty across flights on the same day and capacity constraints recent findings by shugan and xie 2000 show that advance selling is a far more general marketing tool than previously thought it does not require these industry specific characteristics it only requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuations moreover sellers without the ability to price discriminate can use advance selling to improve profits to the level of first degree price discrimination this finding is important because buyers are nearly always uncertain about their future valuations for most services e g the utility of next year s vacation or a future college education in this paper we take the next step from shugan and xie 2000 we show that advance selling profits do not come from buyer surplus but from more buyers being able to purchase we determine when and how to advance sell in a variety of situations including situations with limited capacity second period arrivals refunds buyer risk aversion exogenous credibility continuous preference distributions and premium pricing we determine when advance selling improves profits and when it does how to set advance prices we ask and answer seven questions first when should sellers advance sell second how much can advance selling improve profits compared with only spot selling third what factors impact the profitability of advance selling and how fourth should advance prices be higher or lower or the same as spot prices fifth how do capacity constraints impact advance selling strategies sixth should sellers limit the number of advance sales finally what is the possible impact of buyer risk aversion first we provide precise conditions when sellers should advance sell for example without capacity constraints we show that sellers should advance sell when marginal costs are sufficiently low to make it profitable to sell to buyers with low valuations and sufficiently high to convince buyers that the spot price will be higher than the advance price second we find that advance selling can almost double the profits from optimal spot selling to early arrivals we also show that advance selling has no impact on consumer surplus in markets with homogenous consumers and no capacity constraints therefore advance selling can increase social welfare because seller profits increase third we find that two very important factors impacting the profitability of advance selling are seller credibility and marginal costs buyers only advance buy when they expect an advantage from advance buying over spot buying without capacity constraints sellers must credibly convince buyers that the advance price is at a discount to the spot price we show that this condition is met under different circumstances for example large marginal costs can create credibility because buyers believe that these costs will lead to high spot prices fourth we find although optimal advance prices can be at a discount to the spot price that sometimes a premium is optimal premiums are optimal when capacity is large but limited and marginal costs are not too large buyers advance purchase at a premium to spot prices when capacity is limited and spot prices are low note that this is not a risk premium and risk aversion is not required no prior research has suggested this strategy because that research relies on the assumption that early arrivals are more price sensitive than later ones without that assumption premium advance pricing is sometimes optimal fifth we find that binding capacity constraints can impact the profitability of advance selling in opposite ways on one hand capacity constraints create seller credibility buyers believe that spot prices will be high when they know spot capacity is limited and perhaps more limited by advance sales on the other hand when capacity is limited the need to increase sales from discounted advance prices diminishes sixth consistent with desiraju and shugan 1999 we find that limiting advance sales can be profitable but only under restrictive conditions these conditions are 1 selling to all early arrivals would leave insufficient capacity in the spot period to sell to all second period arrivals with high valuations 2 the optimal spot price is high and 3 marginal costs are sufficiently small to make advance selling profitable finally we find that buyer risk aversion can sometimes increase the profitability of advance selling our findings provide precise guidelines for a large number of service providers that will have the technical capability to advance sell for those service providers advance selling provides a creative pricing strategy that can potentially provide substantial improvements in profits

the effects of economic and policy incentives on carbon mitigation technologies the ability to estimate the likely effects of potential climate change policies on energy use and greenhouse gas ghg emissions requires an improved understanding of the relationship between different policy alternatives and energy saving and ghg reducing changes in technology a particularly important and understudied aspect of this set of issues is the conceptual and empirical modeling of how the various stages of technological change are interrelated how they unfold over time in response to market forces and the differential impact of various policies for example r d subsidies environmental taxes information programs we summarize several contributions to this literature and suggest promising areas for continued research on empirical analysis and modeling of induced technological change

market structure and innovation a survey economics we all recite deals with allocation of limited resources towards satisfaction of unlimited wants resources are typically identified as land labor and capital plus a technology that determines their transformation into consumer goods disparity between the available goods and services and the desired gives rise to scarcity and the question of what how and for whom to produce the focus then shifts to description and evaluation of alternative resource allocation mechanisms for making the choices the pareto criterion by which an allocation of resources is deemed efficient if any reallocation improving the position of some individual worsens the position of others is a commonly employed gauge of a mechanism s performance in the absence of externalities increasing returns to scale and uncertainty a perfectly competitive market system yields a pareto optimal allocation of resources this underlies the view that individual self interest is compatible with society s interest the further conclusion that pareto optimality may not be achieved via the market system in the presence of monopoly elements provides an economic rationale for antitrust laws the objective of a resource allocation mechanism appears to be according to the analysis described above to make the best of available resources the alternative objective of relaxing constraints through expanding the resource base or developing new technology seems to be beyond its scope thus until rather recently technical advance had been regarded in the mainstream of economic theory as unmotivated by the quest for profits and substantially unaffected by resource allocation instead as j schmookler observed technology had been viewed as a parameter like the weather affecting the outcome of resource allocations but itself unaffected by them 84 1965 evidence that technological progress has significantly contributed to growth in productivity together with a substantial increase in research and development activity largely financed by government and carried out by industry see f machlup 51 1962 may have spurred reconsideration of this view once technical advance is regarded as an economic variable it is natural to in

factor substitution and energy productivity fluctuation in china a parametric decomposition analysis abstract technical research on energy productivity can support government officials as they evaluate practical energy policies for the future this study proposed a parametric method to decompose china s energy productivity rate of change into six factors based on a theoretical stochastic frontier analysis the method was applied to conduct an empirical study using inter provincial panel data in china from 1995 to 2012 the results highlighted three key points first the general rate of change in energy productivity was mainly influenced by a steady positive rate of change in technical progress combined with a steady negative rate of change in technical efficiency the core factors causing fluctuations in energy productivity included a positive rate of change in the substitution of capital and energy and a negative rate of change in the substitution of labor and energy second from a geographic perspective provinces with a high rate of change in technical progress experienced a weaker deterioration in technical efficiency however the rate of change in technical efficiency tends to decline as the rate of change in technical progress increases third there is a similar changing trend between the substitution of capital and energy and the substitution of labor and energy

practical implications of game theoretic models of r and d the purpose of this paper is to survey recent game theoretic models of research and development and to ask whether they yield practical implications or testable hypotheses the papers i will be discussing have been written or published within the past five years they have a good deal in common relying upon similar assumptions and building upon each other because of this the literature surveyed here may seem narrow and some relevant work has probably been inadvertently omitted i apologize for these omissions for want of space i will not discuss the normative conclusions of this literature

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

exploring the relationship between the markets for new and used durable goods the case of automobiles given that durable products are long lived there exists the possibility of secondary markets for used products as well as the potential for product obsolescence this is an important issue in markets where technology changes rapidly because the introduction of new versions of a product can make earlier versions obsolete more generally prices of older versions in the secondary market adjust in response to changes incorporated in new versions of the product thus another method of evaluating consumers response to a new product is by looking at the variation in market prices of the old product this paper develops a general model to explore the relationship between primary markets for new cars and secondary markets for used cars the results suggest that the depreciation of used cars is influenced strongly by the types of changes in new model cars

market research and innovation strategy in a duopoly we model a duopoly in which ex ante identical firms must decide where to direct their innovation efforts the firms face market uncertainty about consumers preferences for innovation on two product attributes and technology uncertainty about the success of their research and development r d investments firms can conduct costly market research before setting r d strategy we find that the value of market information to a firm depends on whether its rival is expected to obtain this information in equilibrium consequently one firm may forgo market research even though its rival conducts such research and learns the true state of demand we examine both vertical and horizontal demand structures with vertical preferences firms are a priori uncertain about which attribute all consumers will value more in this case a firm that conducts market research always attempts innovation on the attribute it discovers that consumers prefer and expends more on r d than a rival that has not conducted market research with horizontal preferences distinct segments exist each caring about innovation on only one attribute and firms are a priori uncertain how many consumers each segment contains in this case a firm that conducts market research may follow a niche strategy and attempt innovation to serve the smaller segment to avoid intense price competition for the larger segment a firm that conducts market research may therefore invest less in r d and earn lower postlaunch profits than a rival that has forgone such research

the neo luddite s lament excessive upgrades in the software industry we examine two reasons why a monopoly supplier of software may introduce more upgrades than is socially optimal when the upgrade is backward but not forward compatible so users who upgrade reduce others network benefits one explanation involves a commitment problem profits and social welfare may suffer because ex post the monopolist will want to sell the upgraded product to new consumers the second involves consumer heterogeneity here oversupply arises from the difference between the externality that upgrades impose on the marginal and average consumer and from the effect of upgrades on sales of the base good