bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment in this paper i structurally estimate a stochastic bargaining model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy and i conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure i show that the model fits well data on the duration of negotiations and government durations in postwar italy also i show that changes in the proposer selection process would not affect either the duration of negotiations or government durations whereas the imposition of a strict deadline would in general reduce the incentives to delay agreement as well as government durations

competition in a deregulated air transportation market abstract under deregulation airlines developed hub and spoke hs networks enabling them to aggregate demand increase frequency reduce airfares and prevent entry into the marketplace this research evaluates airline profit based on micro economic theory of behaviour under deregulation through a two stage nash best response game equilibria in the air transportation industry is sought to evaluate the most profitable hs network for an airline to survive in a deregulated environment in the first stage of the game an integer linear program aids in generating potential networks in the second stage a nonlinear mathematical program maximizes profits for each airline based on the networks chosen by all participants the variables of the mathematical program include frequency plane size and airfares in an illustrative example both monopoly and duopoly solutions are attainable as a function of demand

centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods a political economy approach abstract this paper takes a fresh look at the trade off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods it argues that the sharing of the costs of local public spending in a centralized system will create a conflict of interest between citizens in different jurisdictions when spending decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives this conflict of interest will play out in the legislature depending on precisely how the legislature behaves the result may be excessive public spending or allocations of public goods characterized by uncertainty and misallocation across districts the extent of the conflict of interest between districts is affected by spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending thus the relative performance of centralized and decentralized systems depends upon spillovers and differences in tastes for public spending but for different reasons than suggested in the existing literature

endogenous federal grants and crowd out of state government spending theory and evidence from the federal highway aid program contrary to simple theoretical predictions existing evidence suggests that federal grants do not crowd out state government spending a legislative bargaining model with endogenous grants documents a positive correlation between grant receipts and preferences for public goods this correlation has likely biased existing work against measuring crowd out to correct for such endogeneity the model motivates instruments based on the political power of state congressional delegations exploiting this exogenous variation in grants the instrumental variables estimator reports crowd out that is statistically and economically significant this endogeneity may explain the flypaper effect a nonequivalence between grant receipts and private income jel d70 h40 h77

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

estimating the price of tradable permits for greenhouse gas emissions in 2008 12 abstract many attempts have been made recently to predict the prices of tradable permits for greenhouse gas ghg emissions in the first commitment period of the kyoto protocol 2008 12 in this paper we attempt to refine these price estimates based on i the results of economic models and identification of factors which influence prices but are not fully reflected in the models ii lessons from price forecasting experience in the us sulfur dioxide market and iii current price data from the nascent international market for ghg permits we expect ghg permit prices to be at the lower end of the broad spectrum of existing predictions this implies among other things that resource transfers to developing countries associated with emissions trading will be relatively low nevertheless even a modest price will have a significant influence on the decisions of consumers and investors in energy markets around the world

comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies the role of legislative committee structure abstract this paper analyzes the impact of legislative committee structure on policy outcomes comparing a tax committee enacting tax expenditures and a decentralized system of specialized committees undertaking direct spending an endogenous commodity taxation framework is combined with models of legislative bargaining and committee voting the main conclusion is that the tax committee structure gives rise to lower subsidy levels under a wide range of circumstances however it is only under a more restrictive set of assumptions that social welfare is higher in the tax committee regime this theoretical analysis is illustrated by two examples of institutional change in congress

burden sharing in a greenhouse egalitarianism and sovereignty reconciled the allocation of emission entitlements across countries is the single most controversial issue in international climate policy extreme positions within the policy debate range from entitlements based on current emission patterns sovereignty to entitlements based on equal per capita allocations egalitarianism this paper shows that gradual convergence from sovereignty towards egalitarianism could provide a pragmatic solution to the equity debate when combined with international emissions trading the convergence approach stands out for offering the developing countries substantial incentives for participation in the international greenhouse gas abatement effort without imposing excessive burdens on the industrialized countries

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

industry level emission trading between power producers in the eu in this paper we investigate how restrictions for emission trading to the energy intensive power sector will affect the magnitude and distribution of abatement costs across eu countries vis a vis a comprehensive eu emission trading regime we find that emission trading between european power sectors allows the harvest of a major part of the efficiency gains provided by full trade as compared to strictly domestic action however trade restrictions may create a more unequal distribution of abatement costs across member states than is the case for a comprehensive trade regime the reason for this is that restricted permit trade enhances the secondary terms of trade benefits to eu member countries with low marginal abatement costs at the expense of the other eu member states

market power and hot air in international emissions trading the impacts of us withdrawal from the kyoto protocol ten years after the initial climate change convention from rio in 1992 the industrialized world is finally likely to ratify the kyoto protocol which will impose legally binding greenhouse gas emission reductions on the developed world however the kyoto protocol will enter into force without the usa which withdrew under president bush in march 2001 accounting for hot air and market power of the former soviet union on emission permit markets it is shown that us withdrawal has important consequences on environmental effectiveness compliance costs and excess costs of market power under the kyoto protocol non compliance of the usa implies a dramatic decrease in environmental effectiveness as well as compliance costs of oecd countries whereas the former soviet union and transitional economies in eastern europe suffer from a huge decline in permit sales revenues excess costs of market power in permit trade increase in relative terms but decline substantially in absolute terms due to us withdrawal pol

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

a cost allocation problem arising in hub spoke network systems abstract this paper studies a cost allocation problem arising from hub spoke network systems when a large scale network is to be constructed jointly by several agents both the optimal network design and the fair allocation of its cost are essential issues we formulate this problem as a cooperative game and analyze the core allocation which is a widely used solution concept the core of this game is not necessarily non empty as shown by an example a reasonable scheme is to allocate the cost proportional to the flow that an agent generates we show that if the demand across the system has a block structure and the fixed cost is high this cost allocation scheme belongs to the core numerical experiments are given with real telecommunication traffic data in order to illustrate the usefulness of our analytical findings

industrial pricing theory and managerial practice we organize the existing theoretical pricing research into a new two level framework for industrial goods pricing the first level consists of four pricing situations new product competitive product line and cost based the second level consists of the pricing strategies appropriate for a given situation for example within the new product pricing situation there are three alternative pricing strategies skim penetration and experience curve pricing there are a total of ten pricing strategies included in the framework we then identified a set of cost product market and information conditions which determine what pricing situation s a firm is facing as well as which strategies are appropriate within a given situation some of these determinant conditions are common to many pricing strategies e g highly elastic demand while others are unique to a given strategy within a particular pricing situation for example within the product line situation the profitability of supplementary sales is a unique determinant of the complementary product pricing strategy razor and blade pricing using this framework as a basis for an empirical study we examined how well current industrial pricing practice matches the prescriptions from the existing research our sample consisted of 270 respondents 27 response rate of these more than 50 indicated that they used more than one pricing strategy in formulating their most recent pricing decision for a high value industrial product sold in the united states as in previous research cost plus pricing was the most often cited pricing strategy 56 of the respondents since the respondents were able to indicate their use of more than one pricing strategy the data are of the pick k from n variety in order to model the managers pricing strategy choices we constructed a stacked binary logit with a separate observation for each strategy within a given pricing situation the signs of the determinant variables were estimated as interaction terms the new product pricing strategies skim penetration experience curve were used for new models in the market skim pricing was used in markets with high levels of product differentiation by firms at a cost disadvantage due to scale penetration pricing was used by firms with a cost advantage due to scale in markets with high level of overall elasticity but low brand elasticity experience curve pricing was used for minor innovations by firms with low capacity utilization in markets with a high level of differentiation the competitive pricing strategies leader parity and low price supplier were used in mature markets parity pricing was used by firms in a poor competitive situation i e high costs low market share low product differentiation these firms were also unable to take advantage of high levels of elasticity since their capacity utilization was high in contrast the low price supplier strategy was used by firmswith low costs due to scale advantages since they have low utilization these firms can take advantage of elastic brand demand none of the determinants were significantly related to the choice of leader pricing product line pricing strategies bundling complementary product and customer value pricing were more likely to be used by firms which sell substitute or complementary products bundle pricing was used for per sale contract pricing in markets with high levels of brand elasticity complementary product pricing razor and blade was used by firms that enjoyed high profitability on its supplementary sales using customer value pricing a firm offers a stripped down version of its current products to appeal to more price sensitive segments or to leverage new distribution channels this strategy was used to target a narrow segment in high growth markets where price changes are difficult to detect cost based pricing was more likely to be used in marketswhere demand is very difficult to estimate in such a situation cost based pricing makes a great deal of sense in general the results show that the managers pricing strategy choices are consistent with normative pricing research however questions about how managers combine their strategies to arrive at a final price as well as the organizational influences on pricing strategies remain important areas for future research

supplier initiated outsourcing a methodology to exploit synergy in transportation over the last decades transportation has been evolving from a necessary though low priority function to an important part of business that can enable companies to attain a competitive edge over their competitors to cut down transportation costs shippers often outsource their transportation activities to a logistics service provider of their choice this paper proposes a new procedure that puts the initiative with the service provider instead supplier initiated outsourcing this procedure is based on both operations research and game theoretical insights to stress the contrast between the traditional push approach of outsourcing and the here proposed pull approach where the service provider is the initiator of the shift of logistics activities from the shipper to the logistics service provider we will refer to this phenomenon as insinking insinking has the advantage that the logistics service provider can proactively select a group of shippers with a strong synergy potential moreover these synergies can be allocated to the participating shippers in a fair and sustainable way by means of a so called shapley monotonic path of customized tariffs insinking is illustrated by means of a practical example based on data from the dutch grocery transportation sector

legislative representation bargaining power and the distribution of federal funds evidence from the us congress this article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds in a legislative bargaining model we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas and two channels underlie this result the proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation in our empirical analysis we find that small states relative to large states receive more funding in the us senate relative to the house we also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship throughout the history of federations and international organisations a key consti tutional design question involves how jurisdictions of different sizes are represented in legislative bodies and how their votes will ultimately be weighted large jurisdictions typically argue for delegation sizes or voting weights that are roughly proportional to population whereas small jurisdictions typically argue for an equal number of delegates or votes for each jurisdiction this conflict over representation is presumably driven at least in part by a belief that increased representation strengthens bargaining power in the battle over the geographic distribution of funds authorised by these legislative bodies in this article i analyse the relationship between legislative representation bar gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and empirical perspective in addition to investigating the existence of a relationship between representation and federal funds i also explore the underlying mechanisms that is i ask which political institutions such as agenda control provided to commit tees and the formation of coalitions under majority rule shape the bargaining power of jurisdictions in central legislatures and thus facilitate the relationship between repre sentation and the distribution of federal spending to provide a framework for analysing these issues i begin by developing a simple theoretical model of a central legislature that determines the crossjurisdiction distri bution of local public goods which are financed by a national tax base both delegation sizes and population are variable allowing me to consider a variety of institutional arrangements for jurisdictional representation legislators represent local interests and given the common pool problem associated with concentrated benefits and dis persed tax costs attempt to increase ownjurisdiction spending but to restrain spending elsewhere the model follows a recent literature on legislative bargaining in which a proposer must secure a majority of votes in order to pass legislation and due to the

majority rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods abstract despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon we build on baron and ferejohn s american political science review 83 4 1989 1181 1206 bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics specifically we show that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within a majoritarian institution the inability of current majorities to contract with future ones drives a wedge between spending on consumption today and investing for future consumption extensions to the model demonstrate that earmarking future returns to specific players and or detaching consumption from investment decisions yields more efficient levels of public investment

electoral and financial effects of changes in committee power the gramm rudman hollings budget reform the tax reform act of 1986 and the money committees in the house most rational choice theories of legislatures locate the source of committee power in the restrictive procedural rules that enforce committee jurisdictions however there is no empirical support for this claim further there is little evidence for the natural implication that membership on more powerful committees confers electoral benefits i address these puzzles by exploiting the occurrence of major budget and tax reforms in the mid eighties these reforms provide a natural experiment for measuring the electoral and financial consequences of changes in committee power i show that the procedural rule changes instituted by the gramm rudman hollings budget reform caused an increase in campaign contributions to members of the budget committee and led to a reduction in the vote share of members of the appropriations committee this heretofore unrecognized effect of the gramm rudman hollings budget reform on the welfare of members of the house rivals that of a more widely recognized policy shock th

performance measures and metrics in outsourcing decisions a review for research and applications outsourcing an operations strategy that influences the performance of a supply chain has become an important component of global operations management an effective global sourcing strategy helps companies to manage the flow of parts and finished products in meeting the needs of overseas and domestic markets outsourcing reduces the cost of assets facilitates core competencies to reduce production costs leads to strategic flexibility and reduces administrative and overhead costs some of the reasons why companies are against outsourcing include integration challenges sacrificing their competitive base opportunistic behaviour rising transaction and coordination costs limited innovation and higher procurement costs despite these shortcomings outsourcing will continue to play an important role in enhancing organizational competitiveness therefore an attempt has been made to review the literature on outsourcing with particular reference to performance measures and metrics pmms used in arriving at outsourcing decisions the main objective of this paper is to present a taxonomy classification of pmms in outsourcing decisions at the pre outsourcing during outsourcing and post outsourcing stages also based on the literature review and analysis an attempt is made to determine a list of specific tools and techniques for pmms in outsourcing finally the limitations of the paper and future research directions are presented

contractual difficulties in environmental management the case of wetland mitigation banking abstract this paper offers a principal agent model of private contracting in mitigation banking aimed at protection of wetland acreage and habitat bio diversity and physical functions of us wetlands while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract such a contract may be incapable of achieving the federally mandated objective of no net loss of wetland functions through wetland mitigation there may be failure of contract design or execution also considered are several institutional mechanisms that may promote the convergence of private contracting and attainment mandated wetland protection these include greater oversight by the government payment of subsidies greater accuracy in the identification of actual wetland quality by the principal and use of several other incentive alignment mechanisms

cooperative game theory approach to allocating benefits of horizontal cooperation abstract logistics costs in general and transportation costs in particular represent a large fraction of the operating costs of many companies one way to try to reduce these costs is through horizontal cooperation among shippers thus when the transportation needs of two or more companies are merged their collective transportation requirements can be met at lower cost the attainable cost savings are due to economies of scale which translate into cheaper rates due to increased negotiation power use of larger vehicles and bundling of shipments in this paper a linear model is presented and used to study the cost savings that different companies may achieve when they merge their transportation requirements on the one hand solving this optimization model for different collaboration scenarios allows testing and quantifying the synergies among different potential partners thus identifying the most profitable collaboration opportunities on the other the problem of allocating the joint cost savings of the cooperation is tackled using cooperative game theory the proposed approach is illustrated with an example in which different cooperative game solution concepts are compared extensive numerical experiments have also been carried out to gain insight into the properties of the corresponding cost savings game and the behavior of the different solution concepts

seniority in legislatures we construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system we model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues modeled as a divide the dollar game however each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide by majority rule whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the baron ferejohn rule an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal if the legislature rejects the proposal another agenda setter is randomly selected and the process is repeated if the legislature accepts the proposal the legislative session ends and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office the voters verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature we find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system and that legislators are always reelected

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

distributive politics and the costs of centralization this paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting with centralization regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region specific projects the outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within region benefits the number of projects funded may be non monotonic in the strength of project externalities the efficiency gains from decentralization and the performance of constitutional rules such as majority voting which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization

the impact of federal spending on house election outcomes while it is widely believed by academics politicians and the popular press that incumbent members of congress are rewarded by the electorate for bringing federal dollars to their district the empirical evidence supporting that claim is extremely weak one explanation for the failure to uncover the expected relationship between federal spending and election outcomes is that incumbents who expect to have difficulty being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal outlays since it is generally impossible to adequately measure this effort the estimated impact of spending is biased downward because of an omitted variable bias we address this estimation problem using instrumental variables for each house district we use spending outside the district but inside the state containing the district as an instrument for spending in the district federal spending is affected by a large number of actors e g governors senators mayors and other house members in the state delegation

economic policy and special interest politics a great deal of research has been done on the boundary between economics and political science in the last five to ten years this research in political economics spans many subfields such as macroeconomics trade public finance regulation rational choice politics and game theory a common denominator has been to study structural models of the political process agents behave rationally within well specified economic and political institutions where the policymaking process is formulated as an extensive form game methodologically much progress has been made relative to traditional approaches which were often based on inconsistent or irrational political and economic behaviour relying on non derived influence functions political support functions or vote functions yet the modem work has largely developed separately in each subfield without much contact with other subfields and each of the resulting literatures tends to focus on a distinct but partial aspect of the political process in this lecture i shall argue that even though the progress to date has been substantial we can gain a better understanding of policymaking in democracies by combining the insights from different strands of thinking on some economic policy issues the conflicting views both among citizens and politicians basically reduce to a single left to right dimension examples may include the politics of inflation vs unemployment capital taxation or the size of government we can think about policy issues within this domain of general interest politics as being resolved via traditional downsian electoral competition at least to a first approximation but the economic policy process also allows narrow interest groups ample opportunities to concentrate benefits to their own group at the expense of the population as a whole the resulting policy conflict is generically multi dimensional resolving it by voting alone would thus result in condorcet cycles we therefore need to go beyond the simplest electoral models to understand policy determination within this domain of special interest politics this lecture deals with special interest politics to make my point about fruitful analytical arbitrage i will stick to the same underlying policy example throughout this will be a simple model of a society where the government uses

collaboration among small shippers in a transportation market abstract intense competition in markets is pushing companies to increase their operational efficiency one possible way to achieve increased efficiency is through cooperation with other companies we study the coalition formation among small shippers in a transportation market characterized by uncertain demand we analyze the decisions taken by the coalition and study the effect of shipper characteristics on the benefit of collaboration analysis shows that the shippers always benefit from the coalition but when the benefits are to be allocated the coalition may not always guarantee the budget balance which is elementary for sustainability of any coalition using a game theoretical approach this study proposes saving allocation mechanisms and discusses the conditions that lead to a balanced budget