equality employment and budgetary restraint the trilemma of the service economy this article presents an analysis of the postindustrial economy from a political economy perspective it identifies a set of specific distributional trade offs associated with the new role played by the services sector as the chief source of employment growth in advanced democracies over the last three decades it is argued that three core policy objectives budgetary restraint wage equality and expansion of employment constitute a political trilemma that allows only two of the goals to be successfully pursued at the same time using a combination of statistical and case oriented analysis the authors demonstrate the political and economic salience of the trilemma the distributional tensions inherent in each strategy to cope with it and the political institutional constraints under which these strategies are chosen

the structure of citizen attitudes and the european political space a common concern regarding the viability of institutional reform of the eu is whether european citizens constitute a political community that facilitates democratic governance one important aspect of this concern is whether public perceptions are structured so as to ease or impede political discourse across europe to investigate this question the authors examine whether the eu mass public organizes its attitudes toward eu policy issues in systematic and meaningful ways specifically they examine whether eu citizens attitudes across a broad range of policies decided at the eu level are structured consistently with several prominent models of the eu policy space using eurobarometer data the authors show that citizens policy positions on eu issues are systematically organized along a single dimension that is different from domestic left right

the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies in this article we evaluate two claims made in recent studies of the welfare states of advanced industrial societies first that welfare states have remained quite resilient in the face of demands for retrenchment and second that partisan politics have ceased to play a decisive role in their evolution addressing the first claim we present analysis from a new data set on unemployment insurance and sickness benefit replacement rates for 18 countries for the years 1975 99 we find considerably more evidence of welfare retrenchment during the last two decades than do recent cross national studies second we examine the end of partisanship claim by estimating the effects of government partisanship on changes in income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment programs our results suggest that contrary to claims that partisanship has little impact on welfare state commitments traditional partisanship continues to have a considerable effect on welfare state entitlements in the era of retrenchment

a revelation scheme for allocating organizational resources abstract efficient resource allocation in a hierarchical organization frequently requires top management to obtain information from division managers but division managers may place personal interests above those of the organization and communicate distorted information designing simple and robust optimal game theoretic revelation schemes is difficult instead of making another attempt at this we analyze a project valuation scheme actually used by several us government agencies under certain environments the scheme encourages managers to truthfully reveal the relative benefits of alternative projects while some aspects of these environments do not have nice mathematical properties we argue that they may well represent better characterizations of the way managers actually view their situation

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

first branch or root the congress the president and the federal reserve much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues from an empirical perspective that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy in this paper a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the congress the president and one agency we use the u s federal reserve as an extended example can dictate policy outcomes the results of the paper include the congressional dominance theorem if more than 2 3 of house members and more than 2 3 of senate members agree on something they get it the theorem is obvious the proof is in the u s constitution but often forgotten in the substantive literature more realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of congress are more diverse powers of the president to influence policy with and without appointments are also analyzed

low pay dynamics and transition probabilities this paper models low pay transitions in britain using a bivariate probit model with endogenous selection to address the initial conditions problem and parental variables as instruments the exogeneity of the initial state is strongly rejected and results in considerable overstatement of the effects of explanatory factors the probability of being low paid depends strongly on low pay in the previous year restricting attention to those who remain employees results in an overstatement of the probability of the low paid moving up the earnings distribution but is not found to have much effect on the estimated effects of explanatory variables

international evidence on tradables and nontradables inflation abstract using 1970 1985 sectoral data for the oecd we find that inflation in nontradable goods exceeds inflation in tradables we identify a demand shift towards nontradables and faster growth of total factor productivity in the tradable goods sector as the prime causes of the differential inflation in addition disinflation attempts and the exchange rate regime appear to have exerted significant influence on the relative inflation rate

mind the gap please the changing nature of entry jobs in britain we examine wages in jobs taken by those out of work entry jobs and the characteristics of the individuals who fill them there are large entry wage gaps relative to other jobs more importantly real entry wages have fallen by around 20 log points relative to all other jobs since 1979 one quarter of this decline is accounted for by differences in individual and job characteristics and around 40 from an unexplained fall in the position of entry jobs in the wage distribution that entry wages differ from the stock of all wages should be incorporated into labour supply modelling

caught in a trap wage mobility in great britain 1975 1994 in this paper i study wage mobility in great britain using the new earnings surveys of 1975 94 and the british household panel surveys of 1991 94 measuring mobility in terms of decile transition matrices i find a considerable degree of immobility within the wage distribution from one year to the next mobility is higher when measured over longer time periods those in lower deciles in the wage distribution are much more likely to exit into unemployment and non employment measuring mobility by studying changes in individuals actual percentile rankings in the wage distribution i find evidence that short run mobility rates have fallen since the late 1970s this has potentially important welfare implications given the rise in cross section earnings inequality observed over the last two decades copyright 2000 by the london school of economics and political science

specialization productivity and financing constraints we analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets but improves the asset s long term productivity while the former is known to make financing more difficult we show that the latter can ease financing constraints and increase financing capacity by improving an entrepreneur s incentive to repay the overall impact of specialization on the terms of financing depends on which effect is more important specialization decisions interact with the nature of investments their timing the need for outside financing and an entrepreneur s ability to commit to a level of specialization the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

what you want depends on what you know firm preferences in an information age information has become a core input for many companies this article examines how this affects firm policy preferences in contrast to national typologies of capitalism or microeconomic expectation

do affluent countries face an incomes jobs tradeoff according to an influential view in the united states pay for less skilledworkers is lowand government benefits are stingy but this facilitates the creation of newjobs and encourages such individuals to take those jobs inmuch of westerneurope relative pay levels are higher for those at the bottom and benefits are more generous but this is said to discourage job creation and job seeking this article offers a comparative assessment of this trade off viewbased on pooled timeseries cross section analyses of 14 countries in the 1980s and 1990s the findings suggest that greater pay equality and a higher replacement rate do reduce employment growth in lowproductivity private sector service industries and in the economy as a whole however these effects are relatively weak the results point to a variety of viable options for countries wishing to maintain or move toward a desirable combination of jobs and equality

how much income mobility is there in britain using the first four waves of the british household panel survey 1991 4 and a variety of methods we show that there is much mobility in household net income from one year to the next in britain however most income changes from one year to the next are not very large and when incomes are longitudinally averaged so that transitory variations are smoothed out substantial permanent income differences are revealed there is some evidence of greater mobility for those in the tails of the income distribution relative to the middle and for elderly persons compared to non elderly persons

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

credit wages and bankruptcy laws we analyze how bankruptcy laws affect the general equilibrium interactions between credit and wages soft laws reduce the frequency of liquidations and thus ex post inefficiencies but they worsen credit rationing ex ante this hinders firm creation and thus depresses labor demand rich agents who need few outside funds can invest even if creditor rights are weak hence they favor soft laws that exclude poorer agents from the credit market and reduce the competition for labor such laws can generate greater utilitarian welfare than under perfect contract enforcement by barring access to credit to some agents soft laws lower wages which increases the pledgeable income of richer agents and decreases the liquidation rates they must commit to when they induce strong credit rationing however soft laws are pareto dominated by tougher laws combined with subsidies to entrepreneurs

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

time matters postindustrialization new social risks and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies western welfare states were built during the postwar years with one key objective to protect family male breadwinners against the consequences of losing their ability to extract an income from

from institutions to financial development and growth what are the links this paper presents an integrated overview of the literature linking institutions financial development and economic growth from the large body of research on institutional development the paper first selects those contributions that make it possible to study the role of institutional arrangements in ameliorating worsening the information frictions and transaction costs that characterize the development of financial markets the paper then investigates the theoretical mechanisms by which these specific frictions affect economic growth and presents the stock of empirical evidence quantifying the impact of institutions on growth through financial development

workers rights in open economies global production and domestic institutions in the developing world previous large n research suggests that globalization could have either positive or negative consequences for labor rights in developing nations this article examines the ways in which domestic political institutions and interests conditions the effects of economic globalization it develops several hypotheses regarding the impact of domestic factors on labor rights outcomes and uses the case of costa rica to assess these hypotheses the result is that although segments of the costa rican economy and labor force have benefited from industrial upgrading in recent years the enclave nature of the export oriented economy and the historical repression of organized labor render difficult the achievement of some internationally recognized core labor rights the article concludes by discussing some of the issues for future research that are highlighted by the costa rican case

conflicts in bankruptcy and the sequence of debt issues this paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule apr when we introduce explicit costs of class conflict the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt the implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues we test several other implications of our model as well

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

small states in big trouble state reorganization in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s in australia denmark new zealand and sweden in the 1980s coalitions of politicians fiscal bureaucrats and capital and labor in sectors exposed to international competition allied to transform the largest single nontradables sector in their society the state particularly the welfare state they exposed state personnel and agencies to market pressures and competition to reduce the cost of welfare and other state services the impetus for change came from rising foreign public and private debt rising public debt levels and expensive welfare states interacted to create a tax wedge between employers wage costs and workers received wages this undercut international competitiveness worsening current account deficits and leading to more foreign debt accumulation two factors explain variation in the degree of reorganization in each country differences in their electoral and constitutional regimes and the willingness of left parties to risk splitting their core constituencies introduction of market pressures is an effort to go beyond the liberalization of the economy common in industrial countries during the 1980s and both to institutionalize limits to welfare spending and to change the nature of statesociety relations away from corporatist forms of interest intermediation in short not just less state but a different state

the new economics of organization over the last ten years or so an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics it is perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a theoretical focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this paper provides political scientists with an overview of the new economics of organization and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy so far positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy in part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration the other side of the coin however is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice voting and markets and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions this third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy indeed of all organizations in fact significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken but by economists not political scientists in small numbers of course economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of downs 1967 tullock 1965 and niskanen 1971 but this new wave of theoretical work is different it is already a large complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements a contractual perspective on organizational relationships a focus on hierarchical control and formal analysis via principal agent models this approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm which assumes away all organizational considerations to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms corporations and other enterprises behave as they do propo

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

reinventing welfare regimes employers and the implementation of active social policy denmark and britain have adopted quite similar active social reforms in which employers play a major role in the programmatic delivery of services however the implementation of the programs has differed dramatically in the two countries danish firms despite having had virtually no prior involvement in administering social programs have participated in far greater numbers than british employers who by contrast have long provided private employment based social benefits drawing from interviews with 107 randomly selected british and danish corporations this article seeks to explain why danish employers have participated at higher rates than their british counterparts subtle programmatic differences that reflect each country s welfare regime have had profound feedback effects on firms willingness to participate in the programs these findings have implications for regimes capacities both to correct for traps and to revise social protections to meet the needs of the new economy

institutions in comparative policy research the article explores the intersections between the different perspectives of institutional and policy research and discusses the characteristic purposes and conditions of theory oriented policy research where the usefulness of statistical analyses is generally constrained by the complexity and contingency of causal influences although comparative case studies are better able to deal with these conditions their capacity to empirically identify the causal effect of differing institutional conditions on policy outcomes depends on a restrictive case selection that would need to hold constant the influence of two other sets of contingent factors the policy challenges actually faced and the preferences and perceptions of the actors involved when this is not possible empirical policy research may usefully resort to a set of institutionalist working hypotheses that are derived from the narrowly specified theoretical assumptions of rational choice institutionalism although these hypotheses will often be wron

the limits of tax and expenditure limits tel implementation as a principal agent problem previous scholarship has shown that tax and expenditure limits tels often fail to constrain government growth this paper views the implementation of tels as a principal agent problem agency theory predicts that delegation is affected by the preferences of agents and the costs of monitoring those agents using panel data for the us states from 1970 through 2008 i conduct an empirical test of the validity of the principal agent model for tels i find that state spending limitations are only effective at cutting the growth of state and local spending under the direction of agents who have a preference for limited government additionally state property tax limitations are only effective when monitoring does not require costly coordinated action these findings contradict an alternative theory of tel implementation that looks towards the policy s origin my research suggests that the arrangements of delegation determine when and under what conditions tels effectively reduce government growth

the politics of structural change swedish social democracy and thatcherism in comparative perspective the 1930s and the 1980s were decades of significant political economic change in the capitalist democracies depression and the rise of the industrial working class created opportunities for the establishment of social democracy in the 1930s stagflation and the decline of the working class made possible waves of radical rightist reform however this article suggests that only governments that do not have to concentrate myopically on the exigencies of winning the next election have the political space to undertake structural changes the benefits of which may only be manifest in the medium term in turn successful reforms are likely to entail changes in underlying social structural conditions such as the strengthening or weakening of organized labor movements that both expand the electoral constituencies of the government s partisanpreferred policies and improve their macroeconomic efficacy these propositions are examined with respect to the construction social democracy in sweden in the 1930s and the

the institutional dynamics of policy administration bureaucratic influence over securities regulation theory a dynamic systems model of administrative politics that 1 relaxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president congress and an administrative agency 2 emphasizes aggregate institutional behavior and 3 analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy behavior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency political relationships hypotheses the main set of hypotheses focus on the aggregate institutional relationships among the president congress and administrative agency these four possible hypotheses include bureaucratic influence bureaucratic autonomy mutual influence and political influence the purpose here is to assess the relative merits of competing explanations for bureaucratic behavior securities regulation is a perfect area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspectives since the findings of existing research on this topic are disparate methods vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative politics by examining three empirical models of sec enforcement behavior in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals for the 1949 92 annual period results the sec sends potent signals of their own via their changes in regulatory outputs that will affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles however the sec s administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sensitive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would expect presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals with respect to the sec are interdependent to a sizeable extent thus raising doubts about the separate independent effect democratic institutions have over the bureaucracy the implications of this study suggest that conventional theories of agency political relations serve as an oversimplified way to study administrative behavior future research on this topic

tests of institutional versus non institutional models of local public expenditure determination are institutional or non institutional factors more important determinants of local public expenditure decisions employing data that allows us to directly identify the entire distribution of voter expenditure demands we estimate models of deviations of actual expenditures from the expenditure demand of defensible benchmarks namely the median voter s expenditure demand and the mean of voters expenditure demands three competing paradigms are employed to specify these models namely a non institutional model the reform government movement s explanation of how institutions affect local government decisions and a transactions cost model of this same phenomenon predictions from these three competing models differ in many respects comparisons of results from estimating models of expenditure deviations are found to be generally more consistent with the non institutional model than with either of the two institutional models these results suggest that a competitive local public service market helps limit the ability of governments to tax and spend in excess of the demands of the median or mean voter

optimal bankruptcy law and firm specific investments in this paper we characterize an optimal bankruptcy law that takes into consideration the incentives of managers to invest in firm specific human capital we show that the optimal bankruptcy law is biased towards the management team and may be implemented by the use of a restricted auction mechanism in which creditors have the right to refuse bankruptcy but are not allowed to bid for the firm the bankruptcy law is needed as a commitment device to implement the optimal outcome

the limit of equality projects public sector expansion sectoral conflicts and income inequality in postindustrial economies in this study we investigate how structural economic changes constrain an equality project the public sector expansion strategy first we describe a three stage process in which a growing produc

the design of bankruptcy law a case for management bias in bankruptcy reorganizations in an incomplete contracting environment bankruptcy is considered to be a renegotiation of the firm s financial contracts an optimal bankruptcy law is derived as optimal restric tions on the environment within which the claimants to a distressed firm bargain the law is used as a commitment device to ensure actions that are ex ante optimal but not subgame perfect we show that the bankruptcy court can use two types of mechanisms to implement the optimal bankruptcy outcome direct restrictions on the bargaining game between the claimants and the use of a restricted auction in both cases the restrictions prevent the strategic use of bankruptcy by firms not in financial distress provide for truthful revelation of information so that distress results in an ex post efficient allocation of resources and es tablish a bias toward the manager in reorganizations that provides correct ex ante decision making incentives

earnings mobility family income and low pay for policy purposes it is important to establish both the nature of the low paid workforce at any point in time and ability to obtain better paid jobs through mobility within the earnings distribution over time in particular two important issues are the extent to which low pay is a transient phenomenon for any particular worker and the extent to which low pay is associated with low family incomes and therefore poverty we attempt to examine both aspects making use of the first three waves of the british household panel survey bhps

introduction epistemic communities and international policy coordination the growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions what factors shape their behavior under conditions of uncertainty what are the origins of international institutions and how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge while a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights at its core the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system level factors unit level factors or some complex interplay between the two whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create defend or expand their own wealth and power to enhance collective material benefits or to promote nonmaterial values a related question of

the choices for scandinavian social democracy in comparative perspective scandinavian social democracy represents one of the most systematic attempts to shape economic institu tions and policies in pursuit of equality and full employment increasingly however these goals haveeluded governments and their institutional supports have eroded this paper seeks to understand this shiftthrough a comparative analysis that places particular emphasis on the interaction between macroeco nomic policies and wage bargaining institutions it is argued that the nature of this interaction and theassociated economic effects have been changed by new technology capital market integration andservice sector expansion as a result centralized wage bargaining institutions and accommodatingmacroeconomic policy regimes have been undermined and social democracy increasingly faces a choicebetween the promotion of equality and employment for all

economic globalization and the welfare state in affluent democracies 1975 1998 prior scholarship is sharply divided on how or if globalization influences welfare states globalization s effects may be positive causing expansion negative triggering crisis and reduction curvilinear contributing to convergence or insignificant we bring new evidence to bear on this crucial debate with a pooled time series analysis of two measures of the welfare state and 16 indicators of economic globalization for 17 affluent democracies from 1975 to 1998 the analysis suggests that 1 state of the art welfare state models warrant revision in the globalization era 2 most indicators of economic globalization do not have significant effects 3 the few significant globalization effects are in different directions and often inconsistent with extant theories 4 the globalization effects are far smaller than the effects of domestic political and economic factors and 5 these effects are not systematically different for liberal vs nonliberal welfare state regimes european vs non european countries or with four alternative dependent variables increased globalization and a modest convergence of the welfare state have occurred but globalization does not unambiguously cause welfare state expansion crisis and reduction or convergence bisherige befunde der sozialwissenschaftlichen forschung zum kausalen verhaltnis von globalisierung und wohlfahrtsstaat sind nicht eindeutig danach kann globalisierung positive effekte haben und zu einem ausbau an wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit fuhren eine krise des wohlfahrtsstaates oder leistungsreduktionen herbeifuhren kurvilineare wirkungen aufweisen und zu konvergenz beitragen als auch vollkommen insignifikant sein unsere gepoolte zeitreihenanalyse von wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und globalisierung in 17 reichen demokratien 1975 1998 hat folgende befunde zu tage gefordert 1 im zeitalter der globalisierung erscheinen bestehende wohlfahrtsstaatsmodelle revisionsbedurftig 2 die mehrzahl der okonomischen globalisierungsindikatoren weist keine signifikanten effekte auf 3 die wenigen signifikanten effekte zeigen in unterschiedliche richtungen und stimmen haufig nicht mit bestehenden theoretischen annahmen uberein 4 die globalisierungseffekte sind deutlich kleiner als die effekte binnenpolitischer variablen und okonomischer faktoren 5 diese effekte unterscheiden sich in liberalen und nicht liberalen wohlfahrtsregimen bzw europaischen und nicht europaischen landern nicht systematisch von einander im analysezeitraum konnen wir sowohl einen anstieg der verschiedenen globalisierungsindikatoren sowie eine moderate konvergenz der verschiedenen wohlfahrtsstaaten konstatieren jedoch kann der prozess der globalisierung nicht eindeutig als kausale ursache fur die unterschiedlichen entwicklungsrichtungen in den verschiedenen wohlfahrtsstaaten identifiziert werden

the dual transformation of social protection and human capital comparing britain and germany britain and germany have been experiencing significant changes in the nature of work and welfare since the 1990s although important differences have remained there have been compelling indication

political bias in policy convergence privatization choices in latin america since the early 1980s privatization has spread in latin america under both right wing rulers and populist presidents this regional convergence toward privatization seemed to announce the end of partisan policy making however not all governments implement privatization in the same way even in the context of policy convergence technocrats propose similar policy options in countries where capital dearth creates pressures for convergence yet politicians build the electoral and government coalitions that make these policies possible and their preferences shape the institutions chosen at implementation the bias introduced by politicians depends on their prior beliefs and constituencies which shape their institutional preferences beliefs about economic nationalism and state intervention influence the selection of regulations at the time of privatization whereas coalition building with political constituencies shapes the definition of selling conditions in privatized companies this political bias which is contingent on the privatizing government explains that the regional policy convergence toward privatization did not extend to its implementation that is although politicians may be losing influence about whether to privatize they still have a say in the choice of how to privatize this article analyzes the impact of this political bias by focusing on the choice of regulatory institutions and selling conditions in five cases of privatization of electricity and telecommunications in latin america

the power of parallel thinking a small computer model demonstrates that an appropriate organization of boundedly rational individuals can find optimal policies in an environment that is overwhelmingly complex for unorganized decision makers the model is also used to identify conditions under which optimal or even good policies are not found the demonstrated adaptive power of the model is interpreted in light of recent developments in the theory of computational complexity that place new stress on powerful methods of search and of new models from computer science which markedly advance search effectiveness by harnessing parallel structures of information processing

university challenges explaining institutional change in higher education higher education policy has been subject to considerable reform in oecd states over the past two decades some states have introduced tuition fees others have massively increased public funding for higher education and still others remain in stasis retaining the elitist model with which they began the postwar era this article develops the argument that higher education policy in the oecd is driven by a set of partisan choices within a trilemma between the level of enrollment the degree of subsidization and the overall public cost of higher education the author develops a formal model of the micromechanisms underlying movements within this trilemma noting the importance of partisan politics existing enrollment tax structure and access these propositions are tested statistically on a sample of twenty two oecd countries and through case histories of higher education reform in england sweden and germany

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

the impact of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and fdi a new institutional analysis the effects of iso 9000 diffusion on trade and foreign direct investment fdi have gone understudied we employ panel data reported by oecd nations over the 1995 2002 period to estimate the impact of iso adoptions on country pair economic relations we find iso diffusion to have no effect in developed nations but to positively pull fdi i e enhancing inward fdi and positively push trade i e enhancing exports in developing nations

do low paid workers benefit from the urban escalator evidence from british cities cities are characterised as places of increased human capital accumulation dynamic labour markets and faster wage growth in short places where workers can get ahead studies suggest that urban w

an affinity to commons model of public support for environmental energy policy abstract as atmospheric co 2 continues to rise above 450 ppm policymakers struggle with uncertainty concerning predictors of citizen support for environmental energy policies eeps and preferences for their design topics which have received limited attention in empirical literature we present an original model of policy support based on citizens affinity to commons pathways by which individuals enjoy natural public goods that in turn shape preferences between alternative policy mechanisms we evaluate this model using a survey of southern california electricity customers with results indicating the model s utility in predicting public support of eep stronger community ties are associated with preferences for pull type subsidies whereas stronger connections to natural commons are linked to support for both pull and push type sanctions findings have implications for coalition building as advocates may engender support for green energy policy by framing sanctions as protecting natural commons and framing subsidies either in this same way and or as producing benefits for communities

should courts enforce credit contracts strictly the intimate linkages between law and nance are currently the centre of wide rangingempirical investigations this article presents a simple banking model with informationasymmetries concerning borrowers entrepreneurial talent it is shown that improvements inthe enforcement of contract by courts reduce agency problems but can also reduce the bank sincentive to screen borrowers adequately thus worsening credit allocation a stricterenforcement of credit contracts therefore may be socially harmful even if costlessly achieved improvements in accounting standards however always make bank screening of borrowers lesscostly and improve credit allocation and social welfare

the covariance structure of earnings in great britain 1991 1999 i analyse the dynamic structure of earnings in great britain for the period 1991 99 by decomposing the earnings covariance structure into its permanent and transitory components according to the british household panel study data earnings inequality of male full time employees increases over the 1990s however earnings mobility may have also increased that is for this period earnings persistence falls this evidence is at odds with previous literature on earnings dynamics both for britain and other oecd countries moreover human capital and job related characteristics account for nearly all persistent earnings differences and the transitory component is highly persistent

bankruptcy law in latin america past and future this paper studies bankruptcy law in latin america focusing on the brazilian reform we start with a review of the international literature on this subject next we examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in general as well as the trade offs involved we follow this theoretical discussion with an empirical evaluation of the quality of current insolvency procedures in latin america we find that the region is governed by a set of laws that is inefficient even when compared with regions of lower per capita income this inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital next we focus on the recent brazilian bankruptcy reform analyzing its main components and possible effects the appendix describes difficulties of the reform process in brazil and lessons other latin american countries can learn from it

protecting the environment when costs and benefits are privately known in this survey i analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction the presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable permits and emission taxes for controlling pollution for instance it may no longer be optimal to equate the social marginal benefits to the marginal cost of cleanup in determining appropriate abatement levels i conclude this review with some suggestions for future research in this area

who delivers partisan clients in the argentine electoral market why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork ridden political systems this article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others we explain such differences by focusing on political parties access to resources supply side and voters dependence on fiscal largesse demand side we show how these differences affect the patron s choice of public sector wages and employment we use subnational level data to show different electoral returns from patronage for the two major political coalitions in argentina peronism and the ucr alianza and their effect on preferences over public sector wages and employment w hy do some political parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork ridden political systems this article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others we explain returns to patronage by highlighting differences in the political parties access to resources supply side and the voter s dependence on public sector jobs demand side we propose that just as political parties cater their policies to particular groups of voters they pursue different strategies when allocating pork in exchange for support on the supply side we highlight the importance of partisan biases in the fiscal and electoral institutions that regulate the access and distribution of public resources on the demand side we show that patronage is a distributive mechanism that provides different returns to voters with different skills and labor market expectations

new labour and the labour market the recent run of good macroeconomic news masks mounting evidence that worklessness is increasingly concentrated on selected individuals households and socio economic groups and in geographical areas these distributional aspects have been overlooked or ignored over the last 20 years but we believe they now form the most pressing labour market and social problems facing this administration we focus on what we view as the government s selected priorities the concentration of unemployment on certain individuals groups and areas increasing inactivity especially marked among less educated older men low pay persistence of low wages and its relationship with job loss and the distribution of work across households and child poverty many of these problems leave lasting scars on individuals so that successful intervention may beneficially change an individual s life chances we examine the evidence on each of these issues and the current state of policy aimed to reduce their scale or intensity copyright 2000 by oxford university press

can politicians police themselves natural experimental evidence from brazil s audit courts to enhance government accountability reformers have advocated strengthening institutions of horizontal accountability particularly auditing institutions that can punish lawbreaking elected offi

the dubious role of institutions in international business a road forward our commentary returns to the conundrum of how institutions matter in international business ib by revisiting the 2018 jibs decade award article by jackson and deeg 2008 on comparing capitalisms we first synthesize their main insights around institutional diversity and track its significant impact within ib and other management fields we then suggest three main takeaways that could move jackson and deeg s agenda further in terms of developing a more nuanced approach to institutions in ib we close with suggestions for future research and urge ib scholars to be more cautious when drawing on different strands of institutions theory

a cost benefit analysis of the random assignment uk employment retention and advancement demonstration this article presents a cost benefit analysis of britain s employment retention and advancement era demonstration which was evaluated through the first large scale randomized control trial in the uk era used a combination of job coaching and financial incentives in attempting to help long term unemployed men and low income lone parents sustain employment and progress in work once they were employed using both administrative and survey data era s effects on benefits and costs were estimated through impact analyses which exploited the experimental design the findings indicated that era was cost beneficial for long term unemployed adult men but not for lone parents the key findings appear robust to sensitivity tests uncertainty as implied by the ses of the estimated impacts was addressed through a monte carlo analysis an approach seldom previously used in cost benefit analyses of social programs

u s politics and greater regulation of inward foreign direct investment an analyst of u s foreign economic policy observes that each wave of antiforeign sentiment associated with the surge of foreign direct investment fdi coming into the united states washes ashore a flotsam of restrictive and exclusionary laws that recedes slightly or becomes buried and forgotten in the sand only to advance again with a new wave during the late 1980s the controversy generated by the sharp rise of japanese acquisitions in the united states washed ashore the latest flotsam of regulatory measures and further advanced the tangle of rules and regulations targeting inward foreign direct investment ifdi of the various types of fdi the present study is concerned mainly with the policy change toward foreign investment in an already established domestic business this type of investment often involves merger or acquisition and is distinct from a greenfield investment where the foreign investor establishes from scratch a new business in the host economy

the political economy of technological innovation and employment building on the varieties of capitalism thesis of comparative advantages in technological innovation the authors theorize the effect of sociopolitical coordination from a dynamic perspective and then apply the dynamic theories to the political economy of employment in comparison to the existing employment literature situated in a constant technology context based on cross sectional survey as well as pooled time series aggregate data the authors argue that new technologies not only increase productivity through process innovation but also generate rents through product innovation by preventing opportunistic behavior between firms sociopolitical coordination intensifies reciprocal sharing of innovation which increases productivity returns but dilutes rents leading to comparative advantage in process over product innovation because process innovation is labor saving but product innovation is employment friendly interfirm coordination further leads to comparative disadvantage in job creation from in

left government policy and corporatism explaining the influence of partisanship on inequality the author argues that to understand the relationship between partisan government and equality two fundamental things need to be done separate the effects of partisanship on policy and of policy on the economy and assess the influence of government partisanship once the mediating role of corporatism is accounted for the main goal of this article is to explore the relationship between government partisanship policy and inequality at the lower half of the wage distribution the analysis is motivated by a puzzling finding in previous work the absence of government partisanship effects on earnings inequality the author focuses on the role of three different policies government employment the generosity of the welfare state and minimum wages the results show that government employment is a most significant determinant of inequality although it is affected by left government only when corporatism is low they also demonstrate that welfare state generosity does not affect inequality and in turn is not associated with left government finally they reveal that the effect of government partisanship on minimum wages and of minimum wages on inequality is completely conditional on the levels of corporatism these effects are only present when corporatism is low the author explains why specific policies do or do not affect earnings inequality and also why corporatism mitigates or magnifies the influence of government partisanship by explicitly exploring the determinants of policy and earnings inequality the article represents an important contribution to our understanding of how governments can promote redistribution

policy implications of new data on income mobility the existence of income mobility may moderate concerns about growing inequalities especially if income mobility has increased however the evidence for rising mobility is equivocal and its extent is not enough to offset the growth of cross sectional inequality there is a case for greater concern for and different policies towards those persistently or recurrently poor than those only temporarily poor but the data analysed here suggest that the bulk of low income observations come from the first two categories analysis of income mobility may help understand why people s incomes follow different trajectories and how policy might affect this

the changing distribution of male wages in the uk this paper uses microeconomic data from the u k family expenditure surveys fes and the general household surveys ghs to describe and explain changes in the distribution of male wages since the late 1970s wage inequality has risen very fast in the u k and this rise is characterized both by increasing education and age differentials we show that a large part of the changes in the u k can be summarized quite simply as increases in eduction differentials and a decline of growth of entry level wages which persist subsequently this fact we interpret as cohort effects we also show that like in the u s an important aspect of rising wage inequality is increased within group wage dispersion finally we use the ghs to evaluate the role of alternative education measures

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy a basic question for the design of bankruptcy law concerns whether value should be divided in accordance with absolute priority research done in the past decade has suggested that deviations from absolute priority have beneficial ex ante effects in contrast this paper shows that ex post deviations from absolute priority also have negative effects on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders such deviations aggravate the moral hazard problem with respect to project choice increasing the equityholders incentive to favor risky projects as well as with respect to borrowing and dividend decisions

democracy the market and the logic of social choice this article compares the types of knowledge democracy and the market require to rationally allocate resources i argue that high levels of public ignorance and voters inability to compare the effects of different parties policies make it difficult for parties and elections to rationally allocate resources markets mitigate these problems because the simultaneous existence of multiple firms products facilitates comparisons that mimic the conditions of scientific experimentation the economy of knowledge involved in such comparisons indicates there are epistemic advantages to using firms and markets instead of political parties and elections to allocate scarce resources however in contrast to arguments that markets merely provide better information than political decisions i argue markets epistemic advantages are derived from the way they facilitate comparisons that minimize decision makers need for knowledge or understanding