forest conservation too much or too little a political economy model this paper studies the formation offorest policy when the government isinfluenced by an environmental lobbyand an industrial lobby representing anon competitive wood processing industry government decides on forestconservation by way of restricting timberharvesting lobbying is modelledas a common agency game with differencesin the efficiency of lobbying acomparison of the political equilibriashows that an exporting forestindustry faces a stricter conservationrequirement than a forest industrywhose production is destined for domesticmarkets if the industrial lobbyis more efficient than the environmentallobby conservation is insufficientfrom the social point of view however conservation may be insufficienteven if the environmental lobby is moreefficient in lobbying than theindustrial lobby this is because thelobbying effort of the environmentallobby also benefits consumers thatremain politically passive

collusion collective action and protection theory and evidence this paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying we show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high the empirical evidence from the u s supports the theory greater collusionreduces the level of pac contributions

partial exposure in large games abstract in this work we introduce the notion of partial exposure in which the players of a simultaneous move bayesian game are exposed to the realized types and chosen actions of a subset of the other players we show that in any large simultaneous move game each player has very little regret even after being partially exposed to other players if players are given the opportunity to be exposed to others at the expense of a small decrease in utility players will decline this opportunity and the original nash equilibria of the game will survive

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

trade liberalization antidumping and safeguards evidence from india s tariff reform abstract this paper is the first to use product level data to examine empirically whether countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political economic pressure we focus on the case of india a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and antidumping import restrictions we first estimate structural determinants of india s import protection using the grossman and helpman 1994 model and provide evidence from its pre reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory we then re estimate the model on the indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that india s 1991 1992 imf arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to india s tariff policy however when we re estimate the model on data from 2000 2002 that more completely reflects india s cross product variation in import protection by including both its post reform tariffs and its additional non tariff barriers of antidumping and safeguard import protection the significance of the grossman and helpman model determinant estimates is restored we interpret these combined results as evidence that india unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of antidumping and safeguard protection in the face of political economic pressure the estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with india s use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform finally we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on india s micro level development

fiscal federalism and lobbying abstract which government functions should be decentralized resp centralized once lobbying behavior is taken into account we find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized resp centralized when regional lobbies have conflicting interests then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization on the contrary when regional lobbies have aligned interests then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization provided that policy spillovers on the non organized groups are not too strong

market access for sale abstract this paper focuses on the links between foreign lobbying and preferential market access granted by the united states government to exporters in the rest of the americas we first develop a simple framework based on grossman and helpman grossman g helpman e 1994 protection for sale american economic review 84 4 833 850 to explain how lobbying by foreign firms affects their preferential access to the united states market we then estimate the model using data on tariff preferences and lobby contributions for the 34 countries in the region empirical results suggest that foreign lobbying is an important force behind preferential market access to the united states the structural estimates indicate that the weight given to foreign lobby contributions in the united states government objective function is five times higher than the weight granted to tariff revenue forgone due to preferences thus our results indicate that market access is up for sale and foreign lobbies are buying it

a bargaining theory of inefficient redistribution policies when two policies are available to achieve the same goal why is the relatively inefficient one often observed we address this question in the context of policies used to redistribute income towards special interest groups sigs in a two stage model in the first stage the set of constraints on policy instruments is chosen in the second stage the government and sigs bargain over the level of the available transfer policies restrictions on the use of efficient policies and the use of inefficient ones reduce the surplus over which sigs and governments can bargain there is however an offsetting effect not generally recognized in models of inefficient redistribution an improvement in the government s bargaining position which allows it to capture a larger share of the surplus we show that this positive effect for the government dominates under plausible conditions inefficient policies are the equilibrium outcome under alternative first stage mechanisms for policy selection such as the election of policymakers or in some cases bargaining between sigs and the government jel classification d7 f13 c70 h23

revealed political power this paper adopts a revealed preference approach to the question of what can be inferred about bias in a political system we examine a dynamic environment in which individuals dier by income each period long run preference profiles are unobserved to an outside observer but are known to belong to a well behaved class in which individual preferences are ordered by income in each state policy data is summarized by a markov policy rule the observer makes inferences about the underlying distribution of political power as if political power were derived from a wealth weighted voting system with weights that can vary across states the weights determine the nature and magnitude of the wealth bias positive weights on relative income in any period indicate an elitist bias in the political system whereas negative weights indicate a populist one we ask what class of weighted systems can rationalize a given policy rule as a weightedmajority outcome each period our first result shows that without further knowledge all forms of bias are possible any markov policy rule can be shown to be rationalized by any system of wealth weighted voting an additional single crossing restriction on preferences can however rule out certain weighting systems we then augment policy data with polling data and show that the set of rationalizing wealth weights are bounded above and below in some cases polls can provide information about the change in political inequality across time

endogenous trade policy through majority voting an empirical investigation abstract the median voter approach to trade policy determination within a heckscher ohlin framework as in mayer am econ rev 74 5 1984 970 predicts that an increase in inequality holding constant the economy s overall relative endowments raises trade barriers in capital abundant economies and lowers them in capital scarce economies we find support for this prediction using cross country data on inequality capital abundance and diverse measures of protection we perform certain robustness checks that include controlling for the effects of political rights and schooling as well as using alternative datasets on factor endowments

political economy of the u s mexican tomato trade agreement we develop a political economy model to analyse the us mexican tomato trade agreement by treating the minimum import price as a negotiated settlement we incorporate the special characteristics of the us mexican tomato dispute namely trade among large countries the role of competing fresh and processed tomato lobbies quota revenues accruing to mexican producers bargaining for a minimum import price rather than a tariff and the role of the canadian tomato market we show the importance of the size of the lobby group s supply the weight elected officials place on national welfare and the elasticities of export supply and import demand in determining the optimal price wedge for the united states larger fresh tomato or cherry grape tomato supply intensifies the degree of protection awarded to us growers while us processors work to mitigate this effect from mexico s perspective larger mexican fresh or cherry grape output induces a push towards free trade due to the agreement s depressing effect on mexican prices while mexican processors and quota revenues exacerbate the price wedge

a quantile based test of protection for sale model this paper proposes a new test of the protection for sale pfs model by grossman and helpman 1994 unlike existing methods in the literature our approach does not require any data on political organization we use quantile and quantile iv regressions to do so using the data from gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 surprisingly the results do not provide any evidence favoring the pfs model we also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it

lobbying costs and trade policy abstract we study how endogenous lobbying costs influence trade policies although in practice lobbying expenditures far exceed campaign contributions the literature on the political economy of trade policy has focused on the latter in this paper we develop a model in which informational lobbying costs play a role in determining the structure of protection in the model special interest groups can choose to send a signal to the policymaker regarding some information they possess and the policymaker observes the signal before setting the trade policies we find that lobbying expenditures directly affect the equilibrium policies in order to test the predictions of the model we collected data on lobbying expenditures from the center for responsible politics as well as data on trade and industry characteristic variables for the united states from other sources we perform a structural estimation of the equilibrium trade policies and find support for our model the empirical evidence indicates that lobbying expenditures play an important role in explaining the variation of protection across sectors moreover the model leads to considerably lower and more reasonable estimates of the weight that the government places on social welfare relative to political contributions

foreign lobbies and us trade policy abstract in popular discussion much has been made of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners the general presumption being that this is harmful to the home economy however in a trade policy context this may not be the case if the policy outcome absent any foreign lobbying is characterized by welfare reducing trade barriers foreign lobbying may reduce such barriers and possibly raise welfare using a new data set on foreign political activity in the united states this paper investigates this question empirically tariffs and nontariff barriers are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

protection for sale the case of oligopolistic competition and interdependent sectors in grossman helpman s 1994 canonical protection for sale pfs model political competition among industry lobbies is driven purely by their interests as consumers this paper introduces demand linkages and oligopolistic competition into the pfs framework to address the rivalry among lobbies stemming from product substitutability it shows that increased substitutability weakens the interest groups incentives to lobby and reduces tariff distortions this may explain why empirical tests of pfs find surprisingly little impact of lobbies on the government s trade policy decision the paper also analyzes endogenous lobby formation suggesting that demand linkages may adversely affect the industry decision to organize resume proteger les ventes le cas de la concurrence oligopolistique et des secteurs interdependants dans le modele canonique de grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale pfs la concurrence politique entre lobbyistes est purement alimentee par leurs interets en tant que consommateurs ce texte presente dans ce cadre d analyse les enchainements de la demande et la concurrence oligopolistique pour prendre en compte la rivalite entre lobbyistes qui derive de la substituabilite des produits on montre qu une substituabilite accrue reduit l incitation des groupes d interets a faire du lobbying et reduit les distorsions tarifaires cela peut expliquer pourquoi les tests empiriques du modele pfs ont decouvert un impact etonnamment faible des lobbies sur les decisions des gouvernements dans le monde des politiques commerciales le texte analyse aussi la formation endogene des lobbies suggerant que les enchainements de la demande peuvent affecter negativement la decision de s organiser

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

lobbying competition over trade policy competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy this article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers the theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well known grossman helpman model of trade policy determination modified to account for the cross sectoral use of inputs itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions importantly accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the welfare mindedness of governments in setting trade policy

the wto impact on international trade disputes an event history analysis abstract many consider improved dispute settlement one of the leading achievements of the wto this paper tests the implication of a game theoretic approach that predicts that more efficient litigation devices increase the frequency and number of trade disputes we propose an empirical event history analysis of gatt wto and ustr section 301 cases identify the demographic patterns for births and lifespans of u s disputes and test the hypothesis of a wto structural break the evidence supports the view that the wto increased the incidence of u s trade disputes while shortening their lifespan

macroeconomic adjustment and the history of crises in open economies abstract this paper investigates the impact of the history of crises on macroeconomic performance we first study the impact of past banking crises on the probability of a future banking crisis we do not detect a learning process from past banking crises countries that have already experienced one banking crisis generally have a higher likelihood of experiencing another crisis and the depth of the crisis does not appear to be affected by the previous historical experience with crisis events evidence also suggests that in middle income countries higher de jure capital account openness is associated with lower likelihood of a banking crisis a lower ratio of non performing loans during the crisis and higher levels of forgone output in the crisis aftermath in contrast we find that past crisis experience has a significant impact on savings when facing considerable political risk the past does seem to matter countries with more people who were exposed over their lifetime to larger disasters will tend to save more this association however does not hold for countries with more stable political systems

protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry the political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import competing producers the regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving or instigating international collusion hence voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import competing producers and a de emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement similarly trigger price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti dumping measures to preserve fair competition likewise the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated but as demonstrated by kalt s econometric analysis contentious complaint of unfair foreign competition voluntary export restraints trigger price mechanisms and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors

political contribution caps and lobby formation theory and evidence abstract the perceived importance of special interest group money in election campaigns motivates widespread use of caps on allowable contributions we present a bargaining model in which the effect of a cap that is not too stringent on the amount a lobby can contribute improves its bargaining position relative to the politician it thus increases the payoff from lobbying which will therefore increase the equilibrium number of lobbies when lobby formation is endogenous caps may then also increase aggregate contributions from lobbies and increase politically motivated government spending we present empirical evidence from u s states that support various predictions of the model we find a positive effect on the number of pacs formed from enacting laws constraining pac contributions moreover the estimated effect is non linear as predicted by the theoretical model very stringent caps reduce the number of pacs but as the cap increases above a threshold level the effect becomes positive contribution caps in the majority of u s states are above this threshold

the optimal distribution of pollution rights in the presence of political distortions a critical issue in designing a system of tradable emission permits concerns the distribution of the initial pollution rights the purpose of this paper is to investigate how the initial rights should be optimally set when the determination of the number of tradable permits is subject to the influence of interest groups according to the coase theorem in the case where there are low transaction costs the assignment of the initial rights does not affect the efficiency of the final resource allocation in the presence of political pressure we show that the distribution of the initial rights has a significant effect on social welfare in contrast to the conventional results we find that grandfathered permits may be more efficient than auctioned permits even after taking into consideration the revenue recycling effect

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

investment options and the business cycle abstract this paper extends r mehra e c prescott recursive competitive equilibrium the case of homogeneous households econometrica 48 1980 1365 1380 to a production economy with two capital goods it is an rbc model in which each unit of investment requires a new idea an option when options are scarce new capital is harder to put in place and the value of old capital rises thus the stock market and tobin s q are negative indexes of intangibles during a boom q rises gradually as options are used up because investment represents an exercise of options it has an intertemporal substitution tradeoff that is absent from the adjustment cost model equilibrium may be efficient even without markets for knowledge the stock market may suffice

reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy abstract using the menu auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner s trade policies we find that such unilateral liberalization may induce reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country intuitively unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import competing lobby there for lower protection

policymakers horizon and trade reforms the protectionist effect of elections this paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization we focus on all major trade liberalization bills introduced since the early 1970s in the u s congress in which house and senate members serve respectively two and six year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years we show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than house representatives however this result does not hold for the last generation of senators who face elections at the same time as house members suggesting that inter cameral differences are driven by term length considering senators alone we find that the last generation is less likely to support trade liberalization than the previous two this result is pervasive and holds both when comparing the behavior of different senators voting on the same bill and that of individual senators voting on different bills the protectionist effect of election proximity disappears for senators who are retiring or hold safe seats

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous environmental protection with unilateral tariff reduction this paper studies how one country s decision to liberalize trade affects the political economic structure that determines environmental policy in another country by constructing a political economy model in which the formation of lobby groups and environmental policy are endogenously determined we show that unilateral tariff reductions by a large country importing a polluting good will generate a lobby group with a relatively lower cost of organization in a small country exporting that good a formulated lobby demands an inefficient environmental policy and hence the small country s environmental regulations become less efficient then we show that when a lobby already exists unilateral tariff reductions result in the formation of a rival lobby and consequently make the small country s environmental policy more efficient

initial asset inequality and tariff formation a cross country analysis abstract using cross country evidence it is found that a country s initial asset inequality is positively and significantly associated with the formation of the average tariff rate even after controlling for the democracy index and some endowment measures

a swing state theory of trade protection in the electoral college this paper analyzes trade policy determination in the electoral college in the presence of swing voters it determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re election probability strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of electoral college votes an empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive u s states lends support to the theoretical findings

lobbying multisector trade and sustainability of free trade agreements this paper is concerned with the sustainability of free trade agreements fta fta sustainability is influenced by governments valuations of political contributions discount factors the lobbying position of the specific interest groups in the intra industry trade sectors and the sectoral coverage of the fta i find that i under certain conditions the fta under protectionist lobbying could be more sustainable than the fta under no political pressure ii the lobby supported fta is more sustainable than the lobby opposed fta and the fta under no political pressure and iii multisector trade enhances fta sustainability jel classification f12 f13 f15 lobbying commerce multisectoriel et durabilite des accords de libre echange ce memoire examine la durabilite des arrangements de libre echange ale celle ci est influencee par les evaluations par les gouvernements des contributions politiques les facteurs d escompte la position de lobbying des groupes d interet specifiques dans les secteurs de commerce intra industriel et la couverture sectorielle de l accord de libre echange l auteur trouve que i sous certaines conditions l ale pourrait etre plus durable s il y a lobbying protectionniste que si pression politique il n y a pas ii l ale supporte par du lobbying est plus durable que l ale oppose au lobbying et sans pression de lobbying et iii le commerce multisectoriel ameliore la durabilite de l ale

lobbying and de centralization this paper presents a positive theory of de centralization of policy decisions in an international union defined as a supranational jurisdiction that may exercise a policy prerogative on behalf of member countries i build a benchmark model where national lobbies can coordinate i e form a trans national lobby at no cost and show that lobbying does not affect the fiscal regime on the other hand when interest groups cannot coordinate decentralization emerges as a political equilibrium with lobbying policy centralization hurts national lobbies by increasing competition for influence at a constitutional stage interest groups induce politically motivated governments to reject centralization three extensions show that this result depends on the level of cross border externalities the voting rule at the constitutional stage and the details of the institutional decision mechanism under centralization

lobbying competition over trade policy counterlobbying over trade policy competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy this paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy the theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well known grossman helpman model of trade policy determination modified suitably to account for the cross sectoral use of inputs in production itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition importantly accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the welfare mindedness of governments in setting trade policy

substitutability and protectionism latin america s trade policy and imports from china and india this article examines the trade policy response of latin american governments to the rapid growth of chinese and indian exports in world markets to explain more protection in sectors where a large share of imports originates in china and india the protection for sale model is extended to allow for region specific degrees of substitutability between domestic and imported varieties of a good the results suggest that more protection toward chinese and indian goods can be explained by the higher substitutability of chinese and indian goods with domestic varieties the data support the model which performs better than the original protection for sale framework in explaining latin america s structure of protection

can we obtain realistic parameter estimates for the protection for sale model in the grossman and helpman 1994 model of endogenous trade protection sectoral lobbies try to influence an incumbent government that maximizes a weighted sum of political contributions and aggregate welfare we empirically investigate this model using u s and turkish data our specification is more tightly tied to theory than those in existing studies additionally we assume all specific factor owners to be organized into different lobbies these changes validated by hypothesis tests yield more realistic parameter estimates of the government s concern for aggregate welfare and of the fraction of population organized into lobbies peut on obtenir des calibrations realistes des parametres du modele de protection en vue d augmenter les ventes dans le modele de protection commerciale endogene de grossman helpman 1994 des lobbys sectoriels tentent d influencer un gouvernement en place qui maximise une somme ponderee des contributions politiques et du bien etre collectif les auteurs utilisent ce modele pour analyser les donnees pour les etats unis et la turquie on specifie le modele d une maniere qui serre de plus pres la theorie que ce qui a ete le cas dans les etudes anterieures de plus on assume que tous les proprietaires de facteurs de production specifiques sont organises en lobbys differents ces changements valides par des tests d hypotheses engendrent des estimations plus realistes des parametres de la fonction d interet du gouvernement pour le bien etre collectif et pour la fraction de la population organisee en lobbys

on a political solution to the nimby conflict scale economy in the construction and operation of public facilities such as landfills calls for cooperation among communities to build a common facility arthur o sullivan 1993 such a facility is a mixture of a public good and a private bad and hence leads to strong opposition by communities to locate it in their vicinity bruno s frey et al 1996 this is one of the most serious environmental concerns of recent years and is known as nimby not in my backyard in this paper we study the hypothesis that a democratic political process creates an adequate mechanism for the resolution of the nimby conflict the intuitive explanation is simple a nimby conflict is likely to induce lobbying and symmetric pressures by all threatened communities in the relevant region as is well known gene m grossman and elhanan helpman 1994 when subject to symmetric pressures politicians stick firmly to principles and function most efficiently the existing literature on the siting of noxious facilities focuses mainly on normative issues such as welfare maximizing siting via decentralized community based mechanisms e g howard kunreuther and paul r kleindorfer 1986 robert c mitchell and richard t carson 1986 and deborah minehart and zvika neeman 2002 evidently however such mechanisms have seldom been practiced e g stephen k swallow et al 1992 the current study adopts a positive approach integrating a political economic framework with a model of a competitive real estate market in the theoretical section a government of a linear two city economy determines the location of a noxious facility which affects the equilibrium in the real estate market and induces the spatial distributions of price and population the government is subject to political pressures by city level lobbies of landowners both landlords and home owners in general the political equilibrium and the socially optimal siting differ however the more equitable the distribution of landownership in the region the smaller the difference at the limit when property distribution is perfectly equitable and all cities participate in the political arena the government locates the facility at the socially optimal site the analysis proceeds by identifying additional conditions under which the political equilibrium siting coincides with the socially optimal location and with an empirical analysis in the empirical section the theoretical framework is extended to account for a multiple city region and is calibrated to assess the prospects of the political system for resolving the nimby conflict in the context of landfill siting in israel it is shown that if all cities in the region form political lobbies and the politicians are not extremely corrupt the political siting is close geographically to the socially optimal location and the difference entails a less than 0 1 percent reduction in social welfare moreover even if the formation of lobbying in the region is incomplete as long as the weight the politicians assign to social welfare is larger than 0 7 the proximity of the politically and socially optimal locations is preserved we interpret the above results as supportive of the hypothesis of an effective political solution to the nimby conflict

lobbying under political uncertainty abstract this paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge we characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence we also offer some results for the general case including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient

endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection a long run model of trade policy determination this paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions under certain conditions free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare moreover greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and in most cases more protection for each of these lobbies furthermore industries with higher levels of capital stock fewer capitalists more inelastic demand and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

political economy sectoral shocks and border enforcement in this paper we examine the correlation between sectoral shocks and border enforcement in the united states enforcement of national borders is the main policy instrument the u s government uses to combat illegal immigration the motivation for the exercise is to see whether border enforcement falls following positive shocks to sectors that are intensive in the use of undocumented labor as would be consistent with political economy models of how enforcement policy against illegal immigration is determined the main finding is that border enforcement is negatively correlated with lagged relative price changes in the apparel fruits and vegetables and slaughtered livestock industries and with housing starts in the western united states this suggests that authorities relax border enforcement when the demand for undocumented workers is high

why special economic zones using trade policy to discriminate across importers tariffs are generally assumed to depend on the product not the identity of the importer however special economic zones are a common economically important policy used worldwide to lower tariffs on selected goods for selected manufacturers i show this is motivated by policymakers desire to discriminate across buyers when a tax is intended to raise prices for sellers through a mechanism distinct from existing theories of optimal taxation using a new dataset compiled from public records and exogenous changes in imports of intermediate goods i find the form composition and size of us zones are consistent with the theory

campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups abstract regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones are these regulations desirable this paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry in the absence of entry contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field with entry however a competition effect and a bargaining effect may arise resulting in inefficient entry and exit decisions in particular a cap may lead to worse policies than the status quo and even if better policies are chosen the resulting gain in welfare may be more than offset by the entry costs regulation can also lead to the simultaneous entry of competing groups creating costly rent seeking on issues previously unaffected by lobbying

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

the politics of infrastructure investment the role of product market competition abstract in spatial competition public infrastructure plays a crucial role in determining product market outcomes in our model consideration of infrastructure s impact on the product market drives the preferences of consumers in their dual role as voter taxpayers the spatial heterogeneity of consumers produces conflicting political interests and in many cases inefficient outcomes however across both exogenous and endogenous market environments product market competition consistently leads to higher levels of publicly funded infrastructure than monopoly collusion furthermore competition s boost to the popular support for infrastructure investment is often excessive while monopoly leads to underinvestment

the pluralistic view of politics asymmetric lobbyists ideological uncertainty and political entry abstract the decision maker chooses a policy on behalf of two principals and has private information about his ideology the decision maker s expected rent can be fully extracted by congruent principals but not when principals objectives are too conflicting

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

conflict and cooperation the structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency abstract this paper is a contribution to the theory of common agency initiated by b d bernheim and m d whinston 1986 quart j econ 101 1 31 by common agency we mean the following an agent decides upon an action which affects its well being as well as the well being of n other individuals the principals each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent on the action chosen under complete information bernheim and whinston prove the existence of an interesting subset of nash equilibria they call truthful provide arguments in defense of this refinement and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs this paper provides a set of theoretical results to identify the structure of equilibrium payoffs with special attention to the payoff of the agent by focusing on complete information we are in a position to evaluate the effects of competition per se on the magnitude of the rent obtained by the agent we illustrate this user guide on a wide and diverse family of applications including auctions competition for an input economic influence and private production of public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

endogenous trade policy and lobby formation an application to the free rider problem abstract this paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby individual firms only contribute to the lobbying effort if it is in their own self interest so that both trade policies and lobby formation are endogenous by introducing bargaining between the industry and the government the paper provides microfoundations for the tariff formation function approach taken by many authors in the political economy literature applied to the free rider problem the model identifies general conditions under which increasing the number of firms in an industry makes cooperation between them more difficult