power systems expansion planning with time varying co2 tax abstract this article analyzes the effects of implementing a two stage carbon tax on a ten year power expansion planning model the timing effect of the tax is analyzed by studying the costs capacity investments economic dispatch and co 2 emissions in fixed flat and two stage tax schemes results show that under the absence of political economy constraints the most cost effective solution is to have a low co 2 tax in the first stage and an optimal higher tax in the final stage however early actions can be justified depending on how relevant the policy maker considers the beneficial economic and not economic outcomes of a higher first stage tax consequently focusing on a final period goal may not be the best way of facing the global warming problem if emissions saved early have an important value when preventing the consequences of climate change

why does the combination of the european union emissions trading scheme and a renewable energy target makes economic sense abstract the european climate and energy mix of targets and policies has been criticised by many economists in particular it is often argued that the renewable energy targets do not make economic sense because they represent an expensive option to reduce co2 emissions within a cap and trade scheme such as the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets in addition it has also been claimed that support for renewable electricity deployment negatively interacts with the eu ets having a dampening effect on the co2 price which favours the dirtiest technologies and is detrimental for the greener ones in this article we argue that this mainstream economic view is short sighted and that a multidisciplinary economic analysis of the climate and energy policy mix is required mainstream economic analysis is based on a narrow approach for the assessment of instrument combinations and neglects relevant insights from several economic disciplines including innovation economics and political economy approaches in reality economic theory supports the combination of an ets and renewable energy targets the existence of different policy goals and market failures the demand pull influence of renewable energy policies on innovation a political economy approach and the different risk exposure of renewable energy technologies call for a policy mix although policy combinations are not a panacea and bring problems on their own the aforementioned negative interaction between renewable energy deployment and the carbon price in the eu ets can be mitigated through appropriate coordination and or instrument choice and design

a folk theorem for one shot bertrand games we show that bounded monopoly profits are essential for the uniqueness of the bertrand paradox zero profit outcome otherwise a folk theorem obtains for one shot homogeneous product bertrand games any positive but finite payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium

caps on political lobbying comment following the 1999 israeli elections the winning candidate s ehud barak s party was fined 3 2 million dollars for violating israel s campaign financing laws by exceeding the spending cap imposed and raising 1 2 million dollars illegally see time europe 2000 while adhering to the strict ncaa recruiting regulations the university of oregon spent 3 million dollars to make their football locker room the best anywhere including the nfl lexington herald leader 2003 when asked about the previous salary cap in the uk football league players said that it the cap was so artificial that clubs paid money in brown paper envelopes bbc2 newsnight 2002 in all these cases there officially existed a rigid spending cap however they show that even though a cap exists the cap might not be easily enforced when enforced the penalty may just be financial rather than a change in outcome the cap may be enforced and adhered to but there may also be alternate perhaps less effective hence more costly means of spending we also see that the flexible nature of the cap is often built into the rules by examining the salary caps of the four major us sports leagues where the caps are routinely exceeded in baseball and basketball surpassing the cap invokes a pure financial penalty called a luxury tax which is proportional to the excess in football while the cap is stated in terms of salaries many teams use signing bonuses as a way to circumvent it in ice hockey there is a dual cap system where the luxury tax is invoked on salaries falling between the two caps and signing bonuses are an allowed method to exceed the

asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information the two player case abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of bayesian equilibrium for a class of generally asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information due to its importance in applications some prominence is given to the first price all pay auction for which a detailed characterization of equilibrium and an approximation to equilibrium of its well studied complete information version are supplied furthermore we relate our uniqueness result to the well known multiplicity of equilibria in the war of attrition second price all pay auction which emerges as a limit point of the class of two player auction games considered journalof economic literature classification numbers d44 c62 c72

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

the dynamics of electricity demand in pakistan a panel cointegration analysis abstract this paper examines the dynamics of electricity demand in pakistan at the aggregate and sectoral levels over the period 1978 2012 panel cointegration test and fully modified ordinary least squares method is employed to determine the long run relationship between electricity consumption real income real price of electricity and domestic price of non energy products the results reveal that electricity demand is more responsive to changes in income than changes in prices at the aggregate and disaggregate levels short run and long run income elasticities are positive and statistically significant supporting the conservation hypothesis it appears from the results that long run price elasticities are negative and significant at the aggregate level and for the agriculture commercial residential sectors and public utilities the short run price elasticities are significant but low in magnitude which implies that changes in electricity price exert minimal effect on the electricity consumption in pakistan the domestic price of non energy products is positive and significant for aggregate sample in the short run the domestic price of non energy products exert significant negative positive impact on electricity demand in the agriculture industrial sectors the results thus provide important information to the agents operating in the electricity market regarding the income and pricing policies and helps in planning the future strategy of electricity demand management

the all pay auction with nonmonotonic payoff i model innovation contests as an all pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly r d investments and as a result there is no winner in such a case the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid i derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium in the mixed strategy equilibrium the support of the low value bidder is not continuous and both the high value and the low value bidders place an atom in the distinct lower bound of their respective support under symmetric valuation both bidders place an atom at zero these results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest

innovation and industry evolution the theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents by contrast we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent while the remaining firms are challengers moreover we consider a sequence of innovations so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after but only until the next better innovation is developed we begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the schumpeterian process of creative destruction that is a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger the essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods the new methods of production or transportation the new markets the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates schumpeter 1942 pp 82 83

first movers non movers and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature based recreational goods abstract the importance of ecosystem services for mankind stresses the issue of identifying different institutional solutions to effectively secure their adequate provision much focus has been on services of the public good type and instruments like payments for environmental services we extend this work to consider the possible social gains from supporting development of new markets for nature based recreational goods which may alleviate negative externalities caused by congestion problems our three main questions are i why is there a lack of market development ii can there be social gains from intervention and supporting the development of such markets and iii if so then how could such intervention be best performed we use a two stage non cooperative bayesian simultaneous move game model and show that in spite of apparent potential first mover advantages in a developing market demand uncertainty and sunk costs may equally well result in widespread presence of non movers on the supplier side we show that social gains can be made from offering a subsidy towards the sunk costs analysing three possible subsidy schemes we show a that fixed costs may make rationing optimal b that sequential rationing does not necessarily dominate strict rationing because c the more subsidies are offered the larger each subsidy must be to induce participation and that d the longer a single agent on the market may keep market information to himself the better a non rationing scheme will perform relative to rationing schemes finally e subsidies for second mover entry may be optimal in some cases

discrimination in a model of contests with incomplete information about ability we study contests with private information and identical contestants where contestants efforts and innate abilities generate output of varying qualities the designer s revenue depends on the quality of the output and she offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality we characterize the equilibrium behavior outcomes and payoffs for both nondiscriminatory and discriminatory where the reward is contestant dependent contests we derive conditions under which the designer obtains a larger payoff when using a discriminatory contest and describe settings where these conditions are satisfied

the max min group contest weakest link group all pay auction we investigate a group all pay auction in which each group s effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group specific public good we fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups there are four types of equilibria the pure strategy equilibria in which all active players exert the same effort the semi pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support we then analyze a general contest with n groups

efficiency effectiveness and implementation feasibility of energy efficiency rebates the renove plan in spain abstract state sponsored incentive policies frequently include subsidies or rebates for the purchase of more efficient appliances however more research is required into the effects of this tool in isolation a case in point is the so called renove plan in spain first the inefficiency losses dead weight losses associated with energy efficiency rebates must be taken into account such a policy may also encourage the large scale purchasing of energy efficient appliances which may finally result in an increase in electricity consumption rebound effect furthermore although a subsidy is more widely accepted than other tools from social and political viewpoints especially than taxes the fiscal consolidation challenge faced by many countries reduces the scope for environmental policy measures on the expenditure side of the budget and strengthens the need to use taxes to meet the agreed policy objectives this paper shows that the current application of the spanish renove plan with rebates on the dishwasher market for energy efficient appliances generates some welfare losses a rebound effect and a considerable deficit in public budgets the paper examines and assesses the effect of different combinations of taxes and rebates in the case of dishwashers in spain based on their performance in terms of economic efficiency environmental effectiveness and implementation feasibility

innovative activity and sunk cost abstract we analyze innovative activity in a general framework with time dependent rewards and sunk costs when firms are identical innovation is delayed by an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the size of the reward when one firm has higher profit potential it is more likely to innovate first our framework generalizes an all pay auction however we show that under certain conditions there is qualitatively different equilibrium behavior

the political economy of an energy tax the united kingdom s climate change levy energy taxes designed to control energy consumption and to assist the achievement of climate change control targets under the kyoto protocol are fairly common in european union countries yet many of these taxes bear little resemblance to the design guidance that is given in economics textbooks political economy analysis in which the interaction of economics and political reality is emphasised explains the gap between theoretical ideals and practical reality a closer look at the factors that influence real world policy design should help policy oriented economists in designing measures that have a greater chance of adoption the end result may well be nth best solutions which simply have to be lived with but there may also be room for design improvements that still honour the political constraints of policy design this paper illustrates these issues in the context of one tax the uk climate change levy

price competition in a capacity constrained duopoly abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in a model of price setting duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity and demand is continuous and decreasing in general there is a unique equilibrium so that comparative static exercises are meaningful the properties of the equilibrium conform with a number of stylized facts the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller is demand relative to capacity when demand is in an intermediate range the firms use mixed strategies they randomly hold sales if capacities are chosen simultaneously before prices the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of cournot quantities

the evolution of market structure when there is a sequence of innovations the paper explores the question of how market structure evolves when there is a sequence of opportunities to innovate does one firm extend its technological superiority to become increasingly dominant or does technological leadership constantly change hands in a process of actionreaction a simple duopoly model is proposed in which the answer to this question depends upon the nature of product market behaviour in that model highly competitive product market behaviour leads to increasing dominance whereas cournot behaviour may lead to action reaction

the importance of the design of market based instruments for co2 mitigation an age analysis for spain in the past few decades economists have defended the use of market based instruments mbi in environmental and climate policy there have been many papers which have compared the costs of attaining environmental objectives with mbis and with command and control instruments however very few have compared different mbis in examining these costs this paper seeks to analyse various mbis for co2 mitigation from the viewpoint of cost effectiveness using an age applied general equilibrium model for the case of spain a distinction is drawn between 1 quantity instruments which represent different extents of a market for emission permits and 2 price instruments which represent different types of tax each instrument can affect different segments of the emission sources and therefore can have very different effects on the economy as a whole we show how mbi can help to minimise mitigation costs but also how taxes and tradable emission permits that are limited or constrained by many exemptions and distortions can raise costs considerably

assessment of regional trade and virtual water flows in china the success of china s economic development has left deep marks on resource availability and quality some regions in china are relatively poor with regards to water resources this problem is exacerbated by economic growth flourishing trade activities on both domestic and international levels have resulted in significant amounts of water withdrawal and water pollution hence the goal of this paper is to evaluate the current inter regional trade structure and its effects on water consumption and pollution via virtual water flows virtual water is the water embedded in products and used in the whole production chain and that is traded between regions or exported to other countries for this assessment of trade flows and effects on water resources we have developed an extended regional input output model for eight hydro economic regions in china to account for virtual water flows between north and south china the findings show that the current trade structure in china is not very favorable with regards to water resource allocation and efficiency north china as a water scarce region virtually exports about 5 of its total available freshwater resources while accepting large amounts of wastewater for other regions consumption by contrast south china a region with abundant water resources is virtually importing water from other regions while their imports are creating waste water polluting other regions hydro ecosystems

energy taxation in a small open economy social efficiency gains versus industrial concerns welfare analyses of energy taxes typically show that systems with uniform rates perform better than differentiated systems especially if revenue can be recycled by cutting taxes that are more distortionary however in practical policy efficiency gains must be traded off against industrial concerns presumably energy dependent industries of small open economies will suffer relatively more if taxed this computable general equilibrium cge study examines the social costs of compensating the energy intensive export industries in norway for their profit losses from imposing the same electricity tax on all industries the costs are surprisingly modest this is explained by the role of the nordic electricity market which is still limited enough to respond to national energy tax reforms thus an electricity price reduction partly neutralizes the direct impact of the tax on profits in addition we examine the effects of different compensation schemes and find significantly lower compensation costs when the scheme is designed to release productivity gains

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

intergenerational effects of a green tax reform for a more sustainable social security system abstract green tax reforms are popular in some circles not only because of their direct effect on reducing pollution but also because their revenue capacity may allow to reduce other more distortionary taxes despite their potential benefits the political implementation of green tax reforms is not straightforward changes in environmental taxes have different intergenerational effects which need to be taken into account when considering their political support among a country s population in this paper we analyze the economic and intergenerational welfare effects of introducing a green tax reform to ameliorate the spanish social security system we consider two types of energy taxes an energy consumption tax and an energy input tax we find that both types of reforms are favored by young individuals but rejected by older generations the number of generations supporting the reform depends crucially on the disutility that individuals derive from pollution suggesting that an increase in environmental awareness may be needed for green tax reforms to be politically viable

markov perfect equilibrium in the us digital camera market abstract this paper examines the model launch and withdrawal decisions of the major digital camera makers for the period 1996 1999 these manufacturers produce differentiated products and some have the experience of participating in a similar market the film camera market this paper investigates to what extent the following four factors affect firms decisions to launch a new model of digital camera the effects of competition with within brand models the effects of competition with cross brand models the level of experience in the film camera market and market conditions the empirical findings suggest that good market conditions can accommodate more products which has a positive effect on product launches on the other hand existing cross brand models have a negative effect on product launches while within brand models and experience in similar markets have an ambiguous effect on product launches

the role of sunk costs in the decision to invest in r d we present a dynamic empirical model of a firm s r d decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk r d costs taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms and among different technological regimes we estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm level data of spanish manufacturing for 1990 2000 conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors we find that r d history matters this true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk r d costs associated with performing r d sunk r d costs are found to be higher for large high tech firms

soft money and campaign finance reform we analyze special interest influence on policy when political contributions are capped but the regulation contains soft money loopholes the politician chooses between two policy options we define special interest influence as the probability the politician chooses the policy he would not have chosen in the absence of contributions any binding cap reduces special interest influence but the effect may be nonmonotonic a ban on contributions can result in greater special interest influence than a binding but nonzero cap the results may also have implications for the policy response to the 2010 supreme court ruling on citizens united v fec