inventory inaccuracies in the wholesale supply chain abstract the inventory level shown in the information system contrary to popular belief and assumptions in most academic papers and in spite of the considerable amounts invested in information technology is often inaccurate the inventory inaccuracy occurs when the inventory shown in the information system is not in agreement with the actually available inventory in this paper we first describe the major factors generating inventory inaccuracy then we provide situations permitting to manage an inventory system subject to errors we provide a general framework permitting to model the inventory inaccuracy issue in particular we link the inaccuracy issue with the well known random yield problem the shown link permits us to derive the optimal ordering policy of an inventory framework where demand satisfaction is done based on the inventory records which are subject to inaccuracies we also propose an analysis permitting to show the added value of an advanced identification system such as the rfid technology

production lot sizing and carbon emissions under cap and trade and carbon tax regulations cap and trade and carbon tax are two emission regulations widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms based on economic order quantity eoq model this paper examines the production lot sizing issues of a firm under these two regulations respectively the optimal lot size and emissions under the two regulations are achieved we then investigate the impacts of production and regulation parameters on the optimal lot size and emissions furthermore we compare the firm s optimal carbon emissions under the two regulations it is found that under the cap and trade regulation the firm s decisions of the optimal emissions as well as permits trading depend on the differentiated permits trading prices if setup incurs the same cost as holding incurs per unit of generated emissions both regulations always lead to the same optimal emissions which is also equal to that without emission regulation otherwise neither regulation always leads to lower emissions than the other does

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

sustainability in electrical and electronic equipment closed loop supply chains a system dynamics approach abstract in this paper we examine the impact of ecological motivation and technological innovations on the long term behavior of a closed loop supply chain with recycling activities ecological motivation manifests through legislation and green image factor whereas technological innovations manifest through design for environment we adopt system dynamics methodology applied to many environmental systems seeking long term gains the developed model is implemented to a real world supply chain of electrical equipment in greece numerical analysis illustrates the factors concerned like the delay of the legislation enforcement to achieve a sustainable future through non renewable resources and landfill preservation

managing product returns to achieve supply chain sustainability an exploratory study and research propositions abstract the aim of this article is to develop research propositions for product returns management using the institutional theory int as the foundation for the study the paper culminates with a research model based on this theoretical perspective to examine the input and output of product returns management as part of a comprehensive sustainability effort the study is exploratory in nature based on five case studies of participating manufacturers in the automotive and electrical and electronics industry in malaysia the interview results reveal that the five participating companies established a product returns management program to handle three types of product returns found in their organizations this is not surprising because successful product returns management has a number of internal and external benefits to the firms our interviews also uncover that the abundant amount of product returns is pressing these companies to implement an effective product returns management program based on the primary and secondary data collected in this study three propositions are developed for future research which should be tested with a large empirical data set to strengthen the theoretical contributions and managerial implications of this study

the economic theory of agrarian institutions introduction alternative approaches to the theory of institutions in economic development pranab bardhan rational peasants efficient institutions and a theory of rural organization methodological remarks for development economics joseph e stiglitz part 1 land and labour theories of sharecropping nirvikar singh a comparison of principal agent and bargaining solutions the case of tenancy contracts clive bell contracts with eviction in infinitely repeated principal agent relationships bhaskar dutta et al production relations in semi arid african agriculture hans binswanger et al part 2 credit and interlinked transactions rural credit markets the structure of interest rates exploitation and efficiency kaushik basu credit and agrarian class structure mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal credit rationing tenancy productivity and the dynamics of inequality avishay braverman and joseph e stiglitz on choice among creditors and bonded labour contracts t n srinivasan some aspects of linked product and credit market contracts among risk neutral agents clive bell and t n srinivasan a note on interlinked rural economic arrangements pranab bardhan interlinkages and the pattern of competition debraj ray and kunal sengupta part 3 marketing and insurance agricultural institutions for insurance and stabilization david m newbery peasants risk aversion and the choice of marketing intermediaries and contracts a bargaining theory of equilibrium marketing contracts pinhas zusman part 4 co operatives technology and the state agricultural producer co operatives louis putterman institutional analysis of credit co operatives avishay braverman and j luis guasch agrarian structure technological innovations and the state alain de janvry et al

a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits in this paper the joint problem of ordering and offering price discount by a supplier to his sole major buyer is analyzed the objective is to induce the buyer to alter his order schedule and size so that the supplier can benefit from lower set up ordering and inventory holding costs we generalize the quantity discount pricing model of monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 6 720 726 to 1 explicitly incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and 2 relax the implicit assumption of a lot for lot or order for order policy adopted by the supplier an algorithm is developed to solve the supplier s joint ordering and price discount problem

channel coordination under price protection midlife returns and end of life returns in dynamic markets this paper examines three channel policies that are used in declining price environments price protection p is a mechanism under which the manufacturer pays the retailer a credit applying to the retailer s unsold inventory when thewholesale price drops during the life cycle midlife returns m allow the retailer to return units partway through the life cycle at some rebate and end of life returns e allow the retailer to return unsold units at the end of the life cycle under decliningretail prices if the wholesale prices and the return rebates are set properly then em i e midlife and end of life returns achieves channel coordination however such a policy may not be implementable because it may require the manufacturer to be worse off as a result of coordination if p is used in addition to em and the terms are set properly then pem guarantees both coordination and a win win outcome if theretail price is constant over time then em is sufficient to guarantee both coordination and a win win outcome

the structure of periodic review policies in the presence of random yield this work provides a comprehensive analysis of a general periodic review production inventory model with random variable yield existence of an order point whose value does not depend on yield being random is proved in the single period case without specifying the yield model and using a very general cost structure when yield is a random multiple of lot size the nonorder up to optimal policy is characterized for a finite horizon model the finite horizon value functions are shown to converge to the solution of an infinite horizon functional equation and the infinite horizon order point is shown to be no smaller than when yield is certain

the price of anarchy in supply chains quantifying the efficiency of price only contracts in this paper we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price only contracts with a price only contract a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price without specifying the amount that will be transferred it is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory capacity decisions we measure efficiency with the price of anarchy poa defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain that is fully coordinated and the decentralized supply chain we characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations push or pull inventory positioning two or more stages serial or assembly systems single or multiple competing suppliers and single or multiple competing retailers

risk aversion and credit constraints in farmers decision making a reinterpretation in 1976 the agricultural development council sponsored a conference on risk uncertainty and agricultural development which has been summarised in a volume edited by james roumasset jean marc boussard and inderjit singh 1979 the volume provides an excellent review of the state of the art at that time however as discussed in the summary chapters of that volume there were few theoretical empirical or policy issues on which clear conclusions could be reached on the basis of knowledge then available in the intervening years progress has been made on a number of issues as a result of both empirical investigations and theoretical advances this paper concentrates on advances which have relevance to the controversy about the relative roles of risk aversion and credit constraints in limiting farmers investment levels especially for purchased inputs such as seeds or fertilizers in particular we review recent experimental studies on the extent of risk aversion among farmer populations in developing

product quality and return policy in a supply chain under risk aversion of a supplier abstract this study aims to identify the relationship between return policy and product quality decisions in a decentralized system we consider a supply chain situation as in a retail or oem supply chain system where a buyer decides a return policy for consumers and delegates the product quality decision to a supplier we consider the supplier s different risk attitudes whether risk averse or risk neutral a penalty contract is introduced to control the supplier s hidden action conveying external failures due to returns to the supplier we show the conditions for supply chain coordination and demonstrate that product quality enhancement needs to precede a generous return policy setting in view of the prevalent business environment and current supply chain management practices moreover we indicate the optimal conditions for a generous return policy setting without quality enhancement

transboundary pollution in the black sea comparison of institutional arrangements this paper analyses the transboundary pollution between romania and ukraine coastal states along the black sea and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem to achieve this goal we use a dynamic and strategic framework we compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first best case with three different institutional arrangements the non cooperative game of countries the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the black sea commission our findings indicate that the non cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules

spatially distributed production data for supply chain models forecasting with hazardous waste abstract this paper introduces a novel approach to forecasting future commodity production in hundreds of nodes which represents a key input for many applications of supply chain models a mathematical model was proposed to handle the problem of forecasting with spatially distributed and uncertain data it is derived from the principle of regression analysis and extended by a data reconciliation technique additional areal constraints guarantee mass conservation in a tree like structure which reflects the organisational arrangement of an investigated region the proposed model was tested through a case study where future production of hazardous waste suitable for thermal treatment was forecasted in 206 base nodes 14 superior nodes and one apex based on an extensive investigation of historical data it was revealed that extrapolations carried out at different levels of the hierarchical organisational structure lead to inconsistent forecasts the differences between forecasts reached up to 50 in addition to this mass conservation was violated significant corrections were performed by computations utilizing the formulated model the corrections ranged from between 0 and 12 for 90 of nodes there were 17 nodes where massive adjustments of up to 30 were inevitable

agency theory and franchising some empirical results this article provides an empirical assessment of various agency theoretic explanations for franchising including risk sharing one sided moral hazard and two sided moral hazard the empirical models use proxies for factors such as risk moral hazard and franchisors need for capital to explain both franchisors decisions about the terms of their contracts royalty rates and up front franchise fees and the extent to which they use franchising in this article i exploit several new sources of data on franchising to construct a cross section of 548 franchisors involved in various business activities in the united states in 1986 the data are most consistent with a model based on two sided moral hazard the empirical models are also more successful at explaining the extent to which franchisors choose to franchise stores than at explaining the terms of franchise contracts finally contrary to the predictions of several theoretical models i find that royalty rates and franchise fees are not negatively related

commitment through specific investment in contractual relationships the effectiveness of stipulated damages in inefficiently excluding competitors can be undermined by the penalty doctrine and by the possibility of renegotiation recent works show that investment by the breached against party can restore the effectiveness of stipulated damages the authors investigate a model in which the breaching party makes a specific investment and show that 1 the breaching party s overinvestment can be an effective commitment device without need to use stipulated damages 2 the commitment through overinvestment does not suffer from the penalty doctrine nor from the possibility of renegotiation and 3 the availability of stipulated damages creates no additional effect

the effect of inventory record inaccuracy in information exchange supply chains abstract the goal of this paper is to quantify the impact of inventory record inaccuracy on the dynamics of collaborative supply chains both in terms of operational performance i e order and inventory stability and customer service level to do so we model an information exchange supply chain under shrinkage errors in the inventory item recording activity of their nodes present the mathematical formulation of such supply chain model and conduct a numerical simulation assuming different levels of errors results clearly show that inventory record inaccuracy strongly compromises supply chain stability particularly when moving upwards in the supply chain important managerial insights can be extracted from this analysis such as the role of benefit sharing strategies in order to guarantee the advantage of investments in connectivity technologies

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

the economics of energy service contracts energy service contracting can provide a cost effective route to overcoming barriers to energy efficiency energy service contracts allow the client to reduce operating costs transfer risk and concentrate attention on core activities however the energy services model may only be appropriate for a subset of energy services and energy using organisations a challenge for both business strategy and public policy is to identify those situations in which energy service contracting is most likely to be appropriate and the conditions under which it is most likely to succeed energy service contracting is a form of outsourcing it will only be chosen where the expected reduction in the production cost of supplying energy services can more than offset the transaction cost of negotiating and managing the relationship with the energy service provider production costs will be determined by a combination of the physical characteristics of the energy system and the technical efficiency of the relevant organisational arrangements including economies of scale and specialisation transaction costs in turn will be determined by the complexity of the energy service the specificity of the investments made by the contractor the competitiveness of the energy services market and the relevant legal financial and regulatory rules this paper develops these ideas into a general framework that may be used to assess the feasibility of energy service contracting in different circumstances the framework leads to a number of hypotheses that are suitable for empirical test

barriers to product return management in automotive manufacturing firms in malaysia the increasing of global warming and depletion of natural resources has become a concern for society government and industry there is a growing importance on recovery of used materials and products amongst industry players the malaysian government has conducted many green campaigns and provided incentives for some green practices however the adoption of product return and recovery management is still low amongst automotive manufacturers therefore it is important to understand the obstacles towards product return adoption so that the countermeasures can be thought of to overcome this situation the objective of this paper is to investigate the barriers of product return management amongst automotive manufacturing firms in malaysia a total of 228 automotive manufacturers and assemblers were identified as the sampling frame which was selected based on the census sampling method due to the limited sample size of the study the data was analysed using the partial least squares pls with the measurement model had shown sufficient model fit and the structural model revealed that the data supported the hypothesised model the large effect size and higher than zero values of the predictive capabilities imply that the model has sufficient variance explained for the predictive capability of the hypotheses testing of the study based on the results this study has found that the resource barrier has a significant effect on the level of adoption of product returns specifically the resource barrier and the extent of the manufacturing return adoption were positively related 0 361 p 0 01 resource barrier and the extent of the distribution returns 0 252 p 0 05 and resource barrier and the extent of the customer returns 0 333 p 0 01 the result reflects that automotive manufacturers have a lack of resources to afford the product return implementation as a matter of fact high initial investments in terms of finances human resources and time are required for the product return adoption other variables of the study such as the attitudinal and perception barrier information barrier and technical barrier were found to be insignificant with the adoption of product return management as a conclusion this study discovered that the resource barrier was the major obstacle that impeded the automotive manufacturers in malaysia from adopting the product return management the outcome is expected to help policy makers manufacturers as well as stakeholders in setting appropriate policies and strategies to improve the product return and recovery management adoption

a theory of prostitution prostitution is low skill labor intensive female and well paid this paper proposes a marriage market explanation to this puzzle if a prostitute compromises her marriage market prospects she will have to be compensated for forgone marriage market opportunities we discuss the link between poverty and prostitution and show that prostitution may decrease with male income if wives and prostitutes are drawn from the same pool of women we point to the role of male sex ratios and males in transit in sustaining high levels of prostitution and we discuss possible reasons for its low reputation and implications for marriage patterns

investigation of rfid investment in a single retailer two supplier supply chain with random demand to decrease inventory inaccuracy abstract inventory information inaccuracy is one of the main causes to the inventory waste in supply chain operations which motivates many companies to adopt modern tracing technologies e g radio frequency identification rfid to decrease inventory errors and strengthen the cooperation between the supply chain stakeholders considering different types of rfid possess unequal technique features in tracing items in more practical environment for the first time this paper explores the different effectiveness of rfid in decreasing the inventory inaccuracies in a supply chain containing one retailer and two suppliers firstly a novel scale factor function is introduced to illustrate the relationships between the variable cost of rfid and the non full abilities of rfid in decreasing inventory inaccuracies then under the stochastic demand and inaccurate inventory analytical models are formulated to investigate the cost effectiveness of different rfids to the optimal order quantities and the expected profits in different scenarios uncoordinated and coordinated supply chains hereby the best coordination strategies are addressed at last numerical results obtained from different scenarios on adopting rfid and a practical case level rfid system for recycling packaging cases indicate that rfid can not only decrease inventory inaccuracies but also strengthen the supply chain coordination

distress rentals and the land rental market as a safety net contract choice evidence from tigray ethiopia rural households in the semiarid northern ethiopian highlands are net buyers of food crop failure due to erratic and unpredictable rainfall occurs frequently and leads to food shortages and income shocks the renting out of land may be one of the coping responses of households exposed to shocks we developed a theoretical household model for poor landlord households capturing their contract choice response to downside production shocks we tested econometrically whether contract choice may depend on poverty capital constraints production risk and random shocks the multinomial logit model estimates show that poor households experiencing random shocks are more likely to choose fixed rent contracts as a distress response to shocks suggesting that fixed rent contracts may be used to meet immediate needs but at the expense of future incomes we also found that fixed rent contracts are preferred when ex ante production risk is low while sharecropping is more likely where production risk is high finally we found an indication that the choice of a fixed rent contract as a coping response to shocks comes as a last resort after all other means of coping are exhausted

efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes we examine the problem of developing supply contracts that encourage proper coordination of forecast information and production decisions between a manufacturer and distributor of high fashion seasonal products operating in a two mode production environment the first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead time while the second is expensive but offers quick turnaround we focus on contracts of the form w1 w2 b wherewi is the wholesale price offered for production modei andb is a return price offered for items left over at the end of the season we find that such a contract can coordinate the manufacturer and distributor to act in the best interest of the channel the pricing conditions needed to ensure an efficient solution vary depending on the degree of demand forecast improvement between periods and the manufacturer s access to forecast information we also examine whether these conditions ensure a pareto optimal solution with respect to two traditional production settings

coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems supply chain management scm has become an important management paradigm as supply chain members are often separate and independent economic entities a key issue in scm is to develop mechanisms that can align their objectives and coordinate their activities so as to optimize system performance in this paper we provide a review of coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems in a framework that is based on supply chain decision structure and nature of demand this framework highlights the behavioral aspects and information need in the coordination of a supply chain the identification of these issues points out several directions of future research in this area

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

social contracts markets and efficiency groundwater irrigation in north india this paper uses primary data to analyze the institutions and informal markets that govern groundwater allocation in the principal sugarcane belt of north india in contrast to earlier literature we find that the observed water trades result in efficient water allocation across farms we interpret this and other stylized facts in terms of a simple bargaining model with limited inter player transfers poor functioning of the power sector leads to reduced pumping and a water supply constraint simulations show that power supply reform can significantly increase farm yields be financed out of the increased farm profits and provide an instrument to use for attaining intertemporal efficiency in water allocation

the right to return this article studies the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract the two extreme cases are the consignment contract which allocates all the burden to the manufacturer and the no return contract in which retailers purchase the merchandise outright and assume responsibility for unsold inventory contract choices are shown to vary across countries industries products and types of transactions the article identifies six main factors affecting this choice optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment relative advantage in disposing of the unsold inventory optimal risk allocation incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand information asymmetry and costs associated with the consignment contract per se several testable implications are presented and the choice of contracts in the publishing industry is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model

price protection in the personal computer industry price protection is a commonly used practice between manufacturers and retailers in the personal computer pc industry motivated by drastic declines of product values during the product life cycle it is a form of rebate given by the manufacturer to the retailer for units unsold at the retailer when the price drops during the product life cycle it is a controversial policy in the pc industry because it is not clear how such a policy benefits the supply chain and its participants we show that price protection is an instrument for channel coordination for products with long manufacturing lead times so the retailer has a single buying opportunity a properly chosen price protection credit coordinates the channel for products with shorter manufacturing lead times so the retailer has two buying opportunities price protection alone cannot guarantee channel coordination when wholesale prices are exoge nous however when the price protection credit is set endogenously together with the wholesale prices channel coordination is restored in the two buying opportunity setting with fixed wholesale prices we show that price protection has two primary impacts 1 shifting sales forward in time and 2 increasing total sales finally we present a simple numerical example that suggests given the current economics of the pc industry that price protection under fixed wholesale prices may benefit the total chain and the retailer but hurt the manufacturer

emissions trading of global and local pollutants pollution havens and free riding abstract in the presence of local sulfur and global carbon pollutants we examine the pollution haven hypothesis and free riding behavior under domestic emissions trading poorer southern countries become pollution havens when free trade opens up whenever sulfur damage functions are linear or when sulfur levels in equilibrium are not higher in the south with global trading of carbon permits the pollution haven effect emerges in equilibrium whenever the convex sulfur damage functions are nonlinear countries that do not participate in a global protocol designed to reduce carbon emissions enjoy double benefits stemming from free riding and cleaner local environments

incentive and production decisions for remanufacturing operations we consider a manufacturer producing original products using virgin materials and remanufactured products using returns from the market where the amount of returns depend on the incentive offered by the manufacturer we determine the optimal value of this incentive and the optimal production quantities in a stochastic demand setting with partial substitution we analyze 3 different models in centralized and decentralized settings where the collection process of the returns is managed by a collection agency in the decentralized setting we also analyze contracts to coordinate the decentralized systems and determine the optimal contract parameters finally we present our computational study to observe the effect of different parameters on the system performance

two moment decision models and expected utility maximization two moment decision models are consistent with expected utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent s preferences are restricted this paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models the implications for economic analysis are then derived two different approaches to representing an agent s preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use under the mean standard deviation ms approach the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff while the expected utility eu criterion assumes that the expected value of some utility function defined over payoffs is used instead the fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results or at least approximately so space does not

a novel closed loop supply chain based on the quality of returned products abstract closing an existing real world supply chain and modelling the resultant network are challenging practices this paper investigates the possibility of closing the chain in a textile company and the effects of such a decision on the profits of the chain the paper addresses one of the common problems in modelling the return rates of backward chain since inaccuracy in estimation of such rates leads to incorrect results the present model forgoes the need for commonly used predetermined rates by proposing a conditional quality based segmentation policy addition of a secondary chain as a recovery option quality dependent incentive rates and flexibility of the model in defining quality are also among novel points of this paper first a bi objective model is proposed to formulate the chain which includes the manufacturers distributors and customers in the forward chain and remanufacturing repairing and recycling centers in the backward chain this model is applicable to industries with zero waste strategy and similar recovery facilities second an extensive sensitivity analysis is carried out on a case study from textile industry the results reveal that increase in rate of returns with low medium qualities leads to higher profits since they create more suitable environmental economical business opportunities moreover closing the supply chain of the company increases the impact of distributors collectors performance on the final profits hence managers of the company need to adopt a pricing policy in favor of the distributors collectors which equals to lower repairing remanufacturing and purchase costs from manufacturers and higher sales prices to customers manufacturers and recycling center

epa s voluntary 33 50 program impact on toxic releases and economic performance of firms abstract this paper examines the motivations for participation in the voluntary 33 50 program and the program s impact on the toxic releases and economic performance of firms in the u s chemical industry it demonstrates that the benefits due to public recognition and the potentially avoided costs of liabilities and compliance under mandatory environmental regulations provide strong incentives for participation after controlling for sample selection bias and the impact of other firm specific characteristics this paper shows that program participation led to a statistically significant decline in toxic releases over the period 1991 93 the program also had a statistically significant negative impact on the current return on investment of firms but its impact on the expected long run profitability of firms was positive and statistically significant

equity development and climate change control the paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions a game theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control then the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed jel c7 h0 h3 q38

analyzing structure of two echelon closed loop supply chain for pricing quality and recycling management abstract this paper analyzes the effects of recycling and product quality level on pricing decision in a two echelon closed loop supply chain clsc where demand is sensitive with price and quality level of the product under stackelberg game setting this paper considers three possible collection activities of used product for recycling viz retailer led collection manufacturer led collection and third party led collection it is found that third party s involvement in used product collection activity is always disadvantageous in this proposed model cost parameters of the reverse channel play an important role in determining best channel structure quality level and price of the product directly vary with recycling a threshold of collection effort determines which party between manufacturer and retailer can provide the best quality product at least price to resolve channel conflict and to distribute surplus profit the concepts of sub game perfect equilibrium and alternative offer bargaining strategy are used the analysis reveals that the subgame perfect equilibrium retail price cuts out channel conflict and depicts particular profit split irrespective of the offering party the proposed model is also justified by illustrating numerical examples

modelling product returns in inventory control exploring the validity of general assumptions the literature on stochastic models for inventory control with product returns commonly makes the following simplifying assumptions demand and returns are each a homogeneous compound poisson process and the processes are independent of each other in this paper we explore the validity of these assumptions by analysing real data on return flows in addition we discuss practical implications of our findings and we provide insights on information management for inventory systems with return flows

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

on the origins of gender roles women and the plough the study examines the historical origins of existing cross cultural differences in beliefs and values regarding the appropriate role of women in society we test the hypothesis that traditional agricultural practices influenced the historical gender division of labor and the evolution of gender norms we find that consistent with existing hypotheses the descendants of societies that traditionally practiced plough agriculture today have less equal gender norms measured using reported gender role attitudes and female participation in the workplace politics and entrepreneurial activities our results hold looking across countries across districts within countries and across ethnicities within districts to test for the importance of cultural persistence we examine the children of immigrants living in europe and the united states we find that even among these individuals all born and raised in the same country those with a heritage of traditional plough use exhibit less equal beliefs about gender roles today jel codes d03 j16 n30 copyright 2013 oxford university press

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

barriers to product returns and recovery management in a developing country investigation using multiple methods abstract there is growing recognition of the value that can be recaptured from unproductive assets resulting from returned merchandise using product returns and recovery management prrm this is important as organizations can no longer ignore or accumulate returns at the back of the warehouse this paper identifies the barriers that impede prrm among manufacturing firms in malaysia and provide useful summary data and analysis to entice firms to consider adopting pprm this study reviewed 38 journal articles which were subsequently validated through field interviews using multiple case study method the content analysis reveals that the two major obstacles are financial and resource constraints which fall within the category of internal barriers however the results of the interviews with six manufacturers in malaysia indicate that external barriers are the main obstacles that hinder the adoption of prrm thus suggesting that there may be a subtle difference between the results reported in academic research and managers perceptions of the barriers of product returns and recovery management the external barriers such as customers operational performance and perception are perceived by managers to be detrimental to the adoption of prrm which is contradictory to the academic findings in addition financial and resource constraints impede the adoption of prrm this suggests that further study should be conducted by expanding the sample size to continue to empirically explore the barriers of prrm this study helps policy makers in emerging countries in general and malaysia in particular in setting appropriate policies and strategies to improve product returns and recovery of manufacturing firms

mean variance analysis of supply chains under wholesale pricing and profit sharing schemes in this paper we explore the use of a wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme wpps for coordinating supply chains under the mean variance mv decision framework we first analytically establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for coordinating the centralized supply chain by wpss we then show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the stackelberg game with wpps in the decentralized case after that we discuss the information asymmetric case in which the retailer can be benefited by pretending to be more risk averse finally we propose a new measure for the manufacturer to prevent this cheating from happening insights are generated

implementing extended producer responsibility the case of sweden s car scrapping scheme this article examines the consequences of implementing extended producer responsibility epr the analysis identifies to what extent epr creates economic incentives and what the financial consequ

incomplete contracts and the governance of complex contractual relationships even the simplest of economic transactions can be so complex that it is practically impossible to list the entire range of outcomes and contingencies that might affect contractual performance scholars outside the formal economic field of contract theory have long recognized that this complexity implies that real world contracts will almost never provide an exhaustive description of the rights and obligations of the contracting parties in every possible contingency the central role of contractual incompleteness in transaction cost economics contract law and the law and economics movement should be contrasted with the minor role it played in the formal theory of contracts developed by economic theorists over the past two decades the starting point of most formal contracting models e g the principal agent model with moral hazard is the feasibility of a complete description of the set of possible contingencies and the ability to write contracts that are sensitive to even the most minute details of the events arising in the course of the transaction one reason that might help explain this neglect of the role of incomplete contracts is the lack of a well developed theory of contract enforcement governance by focusing on explicit written contracts as the only available method of governance many models abstract from the role of other instruments such as ownership rights contract law as interpreted by courts reputation in long term relationships and social conventions that define what constitutes acceptable

role of risk sharing and transaction costs in contract choice theory and evidence from groundwater contracts empirical modeling of contract choice has been problematic because routine large scale surveys do not contain sufficient information on matched partners and on contractual terms this paper is based on a primary level survey of groundwater contracts in india we discuss several different measures for riskiness and transaction costs and use them to test for alternative theories of contract choice although the risk sharing explanation has been most popular in the theoretical literature it is not found to be significant the data are more consistent with a double sided incentive model where the need for giving proper incentives to the buyer and the seller determines contract choice

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

a two level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between russia china and annex b countries this paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between russia and developing countries dcs mainly represented by china on the international market of emission permits created by the kyoto protocol the model uses a formulation of i a demand function for permits from annex b countries and ii marginal abatement costs mac in russia and china provided by two detailed models gemini e3 is a computable general equilibrium model that provides the data to estimate annex b demand for permits and macs in russia poles is a partial equilibrium model that is used to obtain mac curves for china the competitive scenario is compared with a monopoly situation where only russia is allowed to play strategically the impact of allowing dcs to intervene on the international emission trading market is thus assessed

time consistent shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction we study the problem of allocation over time of total cost incurred by countries in a cooperative game of pollution reduction we compute the characteristic function for all possible coalitions and apply the shapley value to determine a fair distribution of the total cooperative cost among players we design a mechanism for allocation over time of total individual cost so that the initial agreement remains valid for the whole duration of the game

extended producer responsibility instruments and innovation in eco design an exploration through a simulation model abstract this paper presents an agent based simulation model that models both economical and physical relations between firms recyclers and consumers this framework allows an investigation into the connection between physical environmental variables waste flows virgin material flows and economic decisions of agents in the product chain i e firms innovation strategies consumers choices and development of recycling activities the paper highlights the value of using agent based modeling as an operational tool to investigate the effect of waste prevention policy on economic and technological decisions of agents we focus on three types of extended producer responsibility epr instruments which are recycling fees tax subsidy and norms the simulation results show that the impact of each instrument depends on the policy design in particular on the level of stringency and on the reward system which is implemented we show that only tax subsidy systems and stringent norms can lead to radical innovations and to significant changes in product designs in the case of tax subsidy the impact relies more on an innovation effect while in the case of norm it mainly relies on a selection effect

design and analysis of government subsidized collection systems for incentive dependent returns we present and solve two bilevel programming bp models describing the subsidization agreement between the government and a company engaged in collection and recovery operations these enable the company to capture the remaining value in cores referring to used products of different quality types to pick up the cores the company needs to open collection centers and dispatch vehicles on direct routes to customer sites customers have an inherent willingness to return their core and decide to do so according to the quality dependent financial incentive offered by the company in order to promote collection and recovery the government pays a uniform subsidy to the company for each core collected we introduce a supportive and a legislative bp model to tackle this comprehensive collection system design problem in both models the outer problem of the bp formulation involves the government which is the leader and wants to minimize the unit subsidy the company is the follower in the inner problem and tries to maximize its net profit from the cores subject to the government s subsidy decision in the supportive model the company itself is not bound by the minimum collection rate targeted by the government thus the amount of collected cores may not be sufficient the government tries to resolve this situation with increased subsidization the legislative model assigns the minimum collection rate responsibility to the company but also entitles it to a certain profitability ratio guaranteed by the government the solution methodology proposed for both models consists of brent s method for the outer problem and a tabu search heuristic solving the inner problem its effectiveness is tested in computational experiments the results show that for the same collection rate and profitability ratio the government has to grant a higher subsidy in the supportive model than in the legislative model

incentive equilibrium in an overlapping generations environmental game we consider two overlapping generations that want to coordinate their strategies of working consuming and controlling pollution since the cooperative solution is not an equilibrium and hence is not a self enforcing contract a mechanism is required to sustain it we show how incentive strategies and the resulting incentive equilibrium could provide such a mechanism we also derive the conditions that ensure the credibility of these strategies

pre marital confinement of women a signaling and matching approach abstract parents in several cultures discipline their daughters to inculcate the supposedly feminine virtues and improve their prospects in the marriage market this process invariably involves imposing restrictions on their behavior movement and social relations we refer to such practices as pre marital confinement and provide a unified game theoretic framework which encompasses the different arguments that have been advanced by social scientists to explain pre marital confinement the proposed framework views confinement by parents as an intrinsically valueless or valuable signal of some unobservable characteristic of their daughters which is valued by men in the marriage market we focus on identifying the conditions that lead to a societal norm of confinement we also show that behind a veil of ignorance where gender is unknown agents will choose to prohibit rather than permit confinement if it is intrinsically valueless and the parameters characterizing the society are such that the ex post equilibrium would involve pooling

a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions abstract in recent years the transboundary pollution problems in the world are becoming more and more serious the diffusion of pollutants is common and each region which suffers from the pollution wishes that the polluter in neighboring regions would either reduce polluting or compensate for the damages this paper studies a cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric regions there are two novel features in this paper first there is a stackelberg game between the industrial firms and their local government while the governments can cooperate in pollution reduction second transboundary pollution damages the regions in two ways through a global accumulative pollutant and a regional non accumulative pollutant the paper characterizes the parameter spaces that governments in two neighboring regions can collaborate and gives the feedback nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms it is found that only when the governments get cooperation the regional impact caused by the neighboring region pollution diffusion could be taken into consideration when the governments develop strategies additionally a payment distribution mechanism is proposed and a subgame consistent cooperative solution is provided with such a payment distribution both governments will receive a higher payoff in a cooperative solution than in a non cooperative solution at any instant of time during the game

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

risk coping land tenure and land markets an overview of the literature over the last decades a significant amount of literature has been published on informal risk coping in developing countries in this paper we review how informal risk coping has been addressed in the land tenure literature from two main perspectives a first stream of research looks at how customary tenure and communal property perform key informal risk coping functions a second subset of this literature analyses how informal risk coping creates land market imperfections through sharecropping or distress sales the segmentation of the literature results from the demsetzian property rights framework further research on risk coping and land tenure would benefit from examining recent work on property regimes

bullwhip effect and supply chain costs with low and high quality information on inventory shrinkage abstract inventory inaccuracy is the mismatch between the recorded inventory and the physical inventory which is severe and widespread in industry a few studies have investigated the bullwhip effect with the existence of inventory inaccuracy the development of information technologies has provided companies with access to accurate inventory information in real time this will surely affect the bullwhip effect and supply chain costs the aim of this paper is to build an analytical model to systematically investigate these effects we consider a retailer manufacturer supply chain in which the retailer faces inventory shrinkage which is the main cause of inventory inaccuracy both the situations with accurate real time inventory information i e high quality information and the situation with statistical inventory information i e low quality information are studied we examine the relationships between the bullwhip effect information distortion and supply chain costs with different levels of information quality the results of our analysis enrich the existing literature on the bullwhip effect first we show that the bullwhip effect is magnified along the chain when higher quality information on inventory shrinkage specifically real time rather than statistical data is obtained second we show that the magnification of the bullwhip effect does not necessarily result in higher costs third we demonstrate that higher quality information increases the benefits of information sharing our paper provides new insights into the causes extent and economic dynamics of order variability in the presence of inventory inaccuracy and may thus suggest ways of more effectively managing the bullwhip effect and inventory

governance and contract choice theory and evidence from groundwater irrigation markets abstract this paper examines the role governance institutions play in the adoption of contracts we develop a simple model of the contracting relationship in a setting where unverifiable outcomes exist and use it to interpret data on groundwater irrigation contracts in bangladesh a distinguishing feature of this market is the variety of village level institutions which impose different degrees of punishment for contract violation consistent with the model we find households adopt contracts that rely on unverifiable outcomes which are not formally contractible when punishment for contract violation is weak conversely households adopt contracts that rely on formally contractible and verifiable outcomes when punishment is severe this evidence is consistent with contract terms being chosen optimally given what is or is not formally contractible

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

design and planning of a closed loop supply chain with three way recovery and buy back offer abstract due to strict environmental legislations and competitive economics worldwide closed loop supply chain clsc management has been receiving increasing attention in order to improve the return rate of used products in this paper a recovery framework is proposed by employing buy back offer at retailer level the proposed recovery framework is integrated with an optimization model for a multi period clsc under demand and capacity uncertainty to determine optimal buy back price that needs to be offered to consumers so that the minimum collection limit set by the legislators is fulfilled as well as overall cost of the integrated system is minimized the developed model addresses the possibility of three way recovery options namely product remanufacturing component remanufacturing and raw material recovery to determine the optimal manufacturing remanufacturing and recycling quantity sensitivity analysis suggests that there is a trade off between the extra benefit generated through remanufacturing and the cost of acquisition of used products due to the employment of buy back offer a condition for the buy back offer to be simultaneously advantageous for both manufacturer and retailer under revenue sharing contract is derived a comparative study is also undertaken to examine the performance of the clsc when collection is made through buy back offer vs third party collection the proposed clsc model is further extended by adding a separate demand for remanufactured products and the performance of the initial model with the extended model is compared

time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution abstract this note determines a rule to share a surplus gained when two countries or regions agree to coordinate their policies to reduce downstream pollution an intertemporal decomposition scheme for the total side payment is proposed this scheme has the following individual rationality property in each subgame that starts along the cooperative trajectory one country is guaranteed to receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution for this country another notion of individual rationality obtains this country will at any instant of time during the play of the game receive a higher payoff in the cooperative solution than in the disagreement solution

the choice of energy saving modes for an energy intensive manufacturer considering non energy benefits in practice energy intensive manufacturers have two main options when improving their energy efficiency design and implement energy efficiency projects on their own we call this self saving or enter into an energy performance contracting epc which mainly includes shared savings and guaranteed savings in this paper we will discuss an energy intensive manufacturer facing self saving and shared savings options and how this manufacturer chooses the optimal energy saving mode when non energy benefits are considered we only consider costs and profit as non energy benefits and formulate an optimization model of self saving and a stackelberg game model of shared savings from our model analysis when considering only energy savings we find that the optimal unit savings has a monotonic impact on the optimal profit of the manufacturer our results indicate that the manufacturer will prefer the second option to the first when the investment cost factor ratio of the energy service company esco to the manufacturer is small otherwise the manufacturer will prefer the first to the second furthermore when considering non energy benefits we find that the results change in some cases

persistent norms and tipping points the case of female genital cutting abstract more than 200 million women alive today have undergone female genital cutting fgc despite the associated negative health outcomes the practice has persisted for generations the prevailing theory of fgc persistence is that fgc is a social coordination norm which implies that if a sufficient number of community members agree to abandon fgc a tipping point is reached and the rate of fgc will fall to zero recent empirical evidence is inconsistent with this theory this paper formalizes an alternative theoretical explanation in which households have heterogeneous thresholds i e the rate of fgc in their community at which the household switches from practicing to not practicing fgc this threshold heterogeneity removes the certainty that a tipping point exists and introduces the possibility of a stable internal equilibrium in the rate of fgc in a community using a dataset of more than 27 000 women born across 4 5 decades in burkina faso i use a novel technique to construct community level distributions of household thresholds these distributions show that some communities in burkina faso have tipping points while some have a stable internal equilibrium i find suggestive but statistically insignificant evidence that communities with a larger share of educated women higher poverty rates and lower population density are more likely to have a tipping point additionally the empirical method developed in this paper has applications to the evolution of other social phenomena such as technology adoption voting behavior and racial segregation

analysis of supply chains with quantity based fixed incentives abstract this paper examines the use of quantity based fixed incentives to coordinate inventory decisions in a decentralized supply chain we consider a two stage supply chain of autonomous supplier and distributor and prove that the optimal ordering policy for the newsvendor distributor under fixed incentives is an s s type policy we further show that external and internal quantity based incentives can restore channel coordination in single period and channel members can benefit through arbitrary splitting of the resulting additional chain profit the single period results are extended to multiple periods and the impact of fixed incentives on the distributor s optimal stocking policy and channel efficiency are examined under three different multi period supplier strategies numerical examples are used to compare the multi period strategies and to provide additional managerial insights the results show that contrary to common belief incentive plans developed and maintained based only on current inventory data perform poorly in long term and that such incentive plans must be periodically updated to enhance their efficiency furthermore we show that high level of incentives designed to push too much inventory downstream of the supply chain can actually reduce the chain s efficiency

towards a sustainable society the status and future of energy performance contracting in china abstract associated with the rapid economic growth last decades have witnessed significant increases of both energy production and energy consumption in china it is also recognized that the air pollutants emissions brought by excessive fossil energy consumptions have caused serious environmental problems it is imperative to save energy and reduce emissions in china as an innovative market mechanism energy performance contracting epc can effectively reduce the energy consumption china has released a series of laws polices regulations and plans that include epc related contents due to the massive demand as well as the facilitation efforts from the governments epc has developed rapidly in china for instance the number of employees the aggregate investment and the total output value of energy service companies increased by 31 8 times 56 times and 73 2 times between 2005 and 2013 the evolution of policy system of epc in china is examined in this study the results show that legal protection policy guidance and fiscal incentives are main measures to promote the development of epc these policies showcase china s efforts on achieving energy conservation enhancing energy efficiency and improving environmental performance by encouraging the implementation of epc however the analysis also reveals some existing issues further development of epc depends on a number of factors such as a complete legal security system a mature market mechanism flexible economic incentives and the specific development plan for epc the experiences gained in china are helpful for promoting the development of epc industry especially in the developing countries

the role of exclusive contracts in facilitating market transactions vertical contracts between a buyer and a seller often contain exclusivity provisions that restrict their ability to transact with third parties in the future in this paper we develop a matching model in which matched agents first decide whether or not to adopt exclusivity provisions and then bargain over the price of a good in the presence of private information we show that by making disagreement more costly exclusivity provisions reduce the risk of inefficient bargaining breakdowns and that agents find it optimal to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets for intermediate levels of market thickness all agents matched and unmatched would be better off if courts did not enforce the exclusivity provisions

uncertainty entrepreneurship and sharecropping in india this study attempts to explain the coexistence of different farm lease arrangements in terms of the varying significance of entrepreneurial functions in india crop sharing arrangements are common in areas of relative economic certainty with very little scope for decision making for example for product and factor substitution and where the entrepreneurial profit is low fixed cash rents are common in situations of high uncertainty where the scope for decision making is significant or where the crops are highly profitable efficiency considerations predominate in areas of sharecropping favoring a smaller farm size whereas under high uncertainty large size is favored for reducing risk

risk preferences and the economics of contracts t he literature of risk aversion and risk preference is one of the richest sources of ad hoc assumptions concerning tastes n o significant behavior has been illuminated by assumptions of differences in tastes such theories have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down they give the appearance of considered judgement yet really have only been ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures george j stigler and gary s becker 1977 p 89

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function