bank competition and ecb s monetary policy in a model of oligopolistic competition in the banking sector we analyse how the monetary policy rule chosen by the central bank can influence the incentive of banks to set high interest rates on loans over the business cycle we exploit the basic model to investigate the potential impact of emu implementation on collusion among banks in particular we consider the possible eaects of the european central bank s policy criteria with regard to the cost of credit in national markets 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

more shock than therapy market transition employment and income in russia 1991 1995 sixteen predictions from market transition theory are assessed using survey data on employment earnings and income in russia during the first five years of market reform although the private sector has grown self employment is still rare incomes are down and unemployment is up a distended income distribution reflects unprecedented income inequality distinctive features of late soviet era stratification persist low returns to education a gender gap in earnings and low earnings among professionals the russian market transition offers more opportunity in trade consumer services and speculation and less in manufacturing than do other emerging makets this corresponds to merchat capitalism and contradicts the predictions of market transition theory everything the communists told us about communism was a lie everything they told us about capitalism turns out to be true popular russian joke circa 1996

regional variation in earnings inequality in reform era urban china this article studies the regional variation in earnings inequality in contemporary urban china focusing on the relationship between the pace of economic reforms and earning determination through

the market transition debate toward a synthesis in his seminal 1989 article a theory of market transition victor nee offered a new theory of social inequality and applied it to the study of the problem of transition from state socialist redistributive economy to market capitalism nee claimed that the emergence of markets in state socialist redistributive economies had unexpected consequences the most privileged stratum or class of state socialism the redistributors lost some of their privilege while those at the bottom of the state socialist hierarchy the direct producers benefited for earlier formulations see szelenyi and konrad 1969 szelenyi 1978 and whyte 1984 as a result inequality as measured by income or access to scarce goods was reduced nee s theory identified the mechanisms by which markets generated equality under redistributive systems if wages are not administratively set but established by transactive relations then producers are likely to have more power market power if markets operate then human capital is likely to be rewarded more while political loyalty is likely to matter less market incentive if there are markets in a redistributive economy then entrepreneurship becomes an alternative avenue of socioeconomic mobility market opportunity nee 1989 data collected in 1985 in rural china offered support to the theory of market transition between 1977 and 1985 overall income inequalities in china declined the income gap between urban residents and farmers shrank the income gap in the countryside between peasants and cadres also narrowed the decline of inequality arguably was the result of deregulation of state policies in agriculture after 1977 chinese peasants received land their production targets were less strictly regulated by planners and they were allowed to bring their produce to urban markets as

collusion and cyclic pricing by managers in markets with fluctuating demand abstract we analyze the cyclicity of pricing by managers with stock based or with profit based compensation in a market with stochastic autocorrelated demand development since managers with stock based compensation have a higher incentive to collude the cyclicity of prices is lower in this case

disagreement in bargaining an empirical analysis of opec abstract we consider a stylised model in which two cartel members bargain over the aggregate production quota in a world of asymmetric information we show that when the two cartel members are sufficiently different the probability of agreement depends on both the current state of demand and initial production specifically the probability of agreement is much lower when demand is low and initial production is relatively high than when demand is high and initial production is relatively low we also find that regardless of the current demand state the more extreme is initial production the higher is the probability of agreement using an event study where we take as events opec production quota announcements we demonstrate empirically that the predictions of the model are borne out

politics and markets dual transformations the articles published in this issue of the journal help advance the debate on market reform in former socialist states in our comment besides dealing with data analysis issues we suggest several ways to improve the level of debate about substantive issues these suggestions include more attention to politics including path dependence and more attention to middle level generalizations from other developing market societies

economic transformation and income inequality in urban china evidence from panel data using panel data of 4 730 urban residents drawn from 20 cities in china this article examines changes in income determinants between the prereform and reform eras to guide this empirical study a conceptual model is developed that emphasizes the coevolution of politics and markets to synthesize theoretical ideas in the recent debate on the transformation of state socialist societies the findings show significant changes in returns to education and in the rise of private hybrid firms in the reform era there is also strong evidence of institutional persistence in returns to positional power and in the organizational hierarchy these findings reveal multifaceted processes of transformation that call for more sophisticated theoretical models and in depth institutional analyses

between markets and politics organizational responses to reform in china in china s economic transition firms diversify assets through investments in the rapidly expanding service sector in response to organizational uncertainty using data from a random sample of firms in shanghai the author shows that there are two situations that cause this uncertainty economic instability where weak firms struggle to survive in the rapidly changing market system and administrative instability where large firms that were the most protected are now being forced to handle the responsibilities that were previously handled by the state the result is that both types of firm seek stability by spreading out risk through investment in low risk fast return markets revealing much about the economic reforms the overall strategy of a firm reflects at any given point in time important organizational facts any decision to fundamentally alter the deployment of internal resources represents a major structural change these kinds of changes do not occur often when they do they provide us wit

collusion fluctuating demand and price rigidity we study an infinitely repeated bertrand game in which an i i d demand shock occurs in each period each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period at the end of each period all information but the private signals becomes public we consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium sppe mainly for patient firms we show that price rigidity arises in the optimal sppe if the accuracy of the private signals is low we also study the implications of more firms and firms impatience on collusive pricing empirical evidence shows that prices in oligopolistic markets tend to be more rigid than prices in competitive markets dixon 1983 carlton 1986 this suggests that collusion may result in firms inflexible pricing behavior it is not obvious however that collusion causes price rigidity why do colluding firms not adjust prices according to changing environments by which they can potentially earn higher profits what limits colluding firms ability to coordinate thereby leading to price rigidity in this article we study how information asymmetry among firms limits colluding firms ability to respond to demand shocks and characterize the conditions under which prices are rigid specifically we consider private information about demand in an infinitely repeated bertrand game with two identical firms in which an i i d binary demand shock occurs in each period each firm receives a conditionally independent private signal about the underlying demand state at the beginning of each period and then charges a price the accuracy of private signals is measured by the probability of receiving a high respectively low signal conditional on a high respectively low underlying demand state therefore the lower the accuracy the higher the degree of informational asymmetry at the end of each period firms observe the underlying demand and the prices but they never observe their rivals signals we adopt symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe as our solution concept which requires that at each period firms pricing schemes

repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations abstract we study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments in every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization after observing the actual demand each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period while in a single shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals we show that it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times we also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers order quantities and discount factors when n is large finally we provide conditions under which a system optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers and develop a contract for achieving a system optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied

time varying competition normative models typically suggest that prices rise in periods of high demand and cost however in many markets prices fall when demand or costs rise this inconsistency occurs because the normative models assume that competitive intensity does not change with demand and cost conditions over time we therefore introduce the notion of time varying competition by suggesting that it is important not only to account for the direct effect of demand and cost on prices e g higher demand means higher prices but also the indirect effect of demand and cost changes on competition e g higher demand could cause more competition and hence lower prices we develop a general unified framework to empirically model the direct and indirect effects of demand and cost shifts on pricing in differentiated product markets our approach allows us to measure the indirect effect of multiple demand and cost drivers on competitive intensity and test predictions from alternative theories of repeated games the empirical application is to the u s photographic film industry where there are two main players kodak and fuji we find that the indirect effects are highly significant and comparable in magnitude to the direct effects competitive intensity is greater in periods of high demand and lower cost and is moderated by whether demand or costs are expected to grow or decline interestingly we find asymmetries in the competitive responses of kodak and fuji while kodak is sensitive to demand factors fuji is sensitive to costs our results suggest that market characteristics such as observability of competitor prices can be an important determinant of how competitive intensity is affected by demand and cost conditions

collusion and price rigidity we consider an in nitely repeated bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each rm receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period we focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe wherein any punishments are borne equally by all rms we identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each rm is strictly increasing in its cost level such fully sorting schemes offer efficiency bene ts as they ensure that the lowest cost rm makes the current sale but they also imply an informational cost distorted pricing and or equilibrium path price wars since a higher cost rm must be deterred from mimicking a lower cost rm by charging a lower price a rigid pricing scheme where a rm s collusive price is independent of its current cost position sacri ces efficiency bene ts but also diminishes the informational cost for a wide range of settings the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires i the absence of equilibrium path price wars and ii a rigid price if rms are sufficiently impatient however the rigid pricing scheme cannot be enforced and the collusive price of lower cost rms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat when the model is modi ed to include i i d public demand shocks the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a rm s lower cost realization may occur only when current demand is high

market transition and the persistence of power the changing stratification system in urban china research on transitional socialist societies has explored trends in income inequality and issues concerning who gains and who loses during market reforms we find that income inequality in a major chinese city declined only slightly during the first decade of reform policies it then increased dramatically in the subsequent five years strategic position in the state bureaucracy continues to be an important determinant of income although connections to the market system are becoming alternate sources of advantage we interpret these findings in light of the historical and institutional context of urban china

markets and inequality in transitional economies toward testable theories nee s 1989 and in this issue market transition theory contested by xie and hannum in this issue claims that market mechanisms have predictable implications for inequality compared to nonmarket allocation market exchange enhances the bargaining power of producers nee p 910 the core argument is that cadre advantages shall decline to the extent that markets replace redistribution as the dominant mode of economic allocation while in successive publications nee has altered his judgment about how far the market transition has proceeded in rural china and whether his theory does predict a decline of cadre privilege he has not altered the core claim about market allocation market economies vary widely in their patterns of power and privilege in ways unrelated to the extent to which a market economy has been established the variability of market economies warns against attempts to predict changes in inequality without first specifying the kinds of enterprises and other institutions that characterize the emerging market economy or even the characteristics of markets themselves we have been tempted into these predictions by the memorable polanyian contrast between two ideal typical economies redistributive and market that has proven a rich source of hypotheses about stratification szelenyi 1978 1983 and the theory of the firm kornai 1992 under state socialism this contrast has crystallized a research agenda by posing an important historical question about the social impact of the rise of market allocation in planned economies especially as it concerns the fate of communist officials but many now find that these ideal types and the continuum that bridges them are a poor guide to the analysis of emerging market economies see bian and logan 1996 lin 1995 rona tas 1994 1995 walder 1992 1995 and stark and xie and hannum in this issue general claims about the impact of markets should be viewed skeptically for the impact of markets works through the allocation of assets the characteristics of emerging markets and the political processes by which market economies are established markets per se are not the issue

a dynamic theory of countervailing power in this article i develop a model of an infinitely repeated procurement auction with one buyer and several sellers the buyer can accumulate a backlog of unfilled orders which similar to a boom in demand forces the sellers to collude on a low price to prevent undercutting if the buyer s cost of shifiing its consumption over time is low enough then the extent of collusion is bounded away from the joint profit maximizing level even for discount factors approaching one the model is extended to allow for multiple buyers large buyers are shown to obtain lower prices from the sellers buyer mergers increase pro t for all buyers not just the merging pair at the expense of the sellers in contrast buyer growth through addition harms buyers that do not grow and benefits sellers

recombinant property in east european capitalism recombinant property is a form of organizational hedging in which actors respond to uncertainty by deversifying assets redefining and recombining resources it is an attempt to hold resources that can be justified by more than one legitimating principle property tansformation in postsocialist hungary involves the decentralized reorganization of assets and the centralized management of liabilities together they blur the boundaries of public and private the boundaries of enterprises and the boundedness of justificatory principles enterprise level field research data on the ownership structure of hungary s 220 largest enterprises and banks and an examination of the government s recent debt consolidation programs suggest the emergence of a distinctively east european capitalism that will differ as much from west european capitalism as do contemporary east asian variants

a theory of market transition from redistribution to markets in state socialism state socialist redistributive economies are characterized by the allocation and distribution of goods through central planning this paper develops a theory of market transition which argues that in reforming socialist economies the transition from redistributive to market coordination shifts sources of power and privilege to favor direct producers relative to redistributors the shit improves incentives for direct producers stimulates the growth of private markets and provides to entrepreneurs an alternative path for socioeconomic mobility a set of hypotheses test the market transition theory with householdand village level data

ratings quality over the business cycle credit rating agencies cras have long held that reputational concerns discipline their behavior the value of reputation however depends on economic fundamentals that vary over the business cycle in a model of ratings incorporating endogenous reputation and a market environment that varies we find that ratings quality is countercyclical specifically a cra is more likely to issue less accurate ratings when fee income is high competition in the labor market for analysts is tough and securities default probabilities are low persistence in economic conditions can diminish our results while mean reversion exacerbates them the presence of naive investors reduces overall quality but quality remains countercyclical finally we demonstrate that competition among cras yields similar results

getting ahead in urban china this article argues that structural segmentation is a universal phenomenon in all complex societies and across political economies each political economy uses specific criteria in delineating segments of its economic and work organizations furthermore it is argued that segmentation identification constitutes a critical destination status for individuals engaged in the status attainment process a representative sample of the working population in tianjin china is analyzed to show that entrance into the core sectors state agencies and enterprises rather that the job per se constitutes the primary goal of status attainment entering into a more desirable work unit sector in china takes on differential significance and process for males and females formales the direct effect of intergenerational factors i e the effect of father s work unit sector is evident for females such an effect is only indirect instead to a great extent their status attainment also upward occupational mobility acr

the emergence of a market society changing mechanisms of stratification in china this article examines the effect of institutional change the shift from redistribution to markets in altering the mechanisms of stratification new institutionalists maintain that interests are emb

price dispersion and learning in a dynamic differentiated goods duopoly we study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes sometimes as highly differentiated as the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price differential there is scope for active learning by firms when information has low value to the firms they charge the same price as would be set by myopic players and there is no price dispersion when firms value information more highly on the other hand they actively learn by creating price dispersion such price dispersion arises in a cyclical fashion and is most likely to be observed when the firms environment changes sufficiently often but not too frequently firms payoffs are higher when they use correlated pricing strategies contrary to what one might expect such coordination need not hurt consumers provided they are sufficiently impatient

social inequalities in reforming state socialism between redistribution and markets in china this article extends market transition theory to an analysis of inequality under the conditions of partial reform in china logit regression analysis indicates cadres officials have no greater odds than other households of being among the privileged or avoiding poverty entrepreneurs andformer team cadres however are advantaged despite the rise of a hybrid elite of entrepreneurs who are currently cadres that capitalizes on redistributive power to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace increases in income inequality are modest when market reform stimulates improved economic performance the poor appear to benefit and experience comparable improvements in household income as a result there is only a slight increase in inequality at least in the early stages of market reform the empirical analysis is based on survey data collected in rural china in 1985

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle this paper investigates the efiect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand uctuations in the absence of capacity constraints i e a limiting case of our model haltiwanger and harrington 1991 show that flrms flnd it more di cult to collude during periods of decreasing demand we flnd that this prediction can be overturned if flrms capacities are su ciently small capacity constraints imply that punishment proflts move procyclically so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive proflts are rising haltiwanger and harrington s main prediction remains valid for su ciently large capacities

sunk costs and cartel formation theory and application to the dyestuff industry we first develop a simple model of entry showing that cartels are more likely to emerge during periods of downturns and in industries with significant sunk costs cartel formation is also accompanied by a decline in profits we then use the framework to investigate the emergence of the swiss dyestuff export cartel during the inter war period and find empirical evidence that supports the main predictions of the model the analysis indicates that sunk costs and entry may be important determinants of cartel formation and are complementary to the traditional cartel stability conditions

liquidation risks in the rotemberg saloner implicit collusion model abstract we extend the rotemberg saloner s 1986 rotemberg j saloner g 1986 a supergame theoretic model of price wars during booms american economic review 76 390 407 implicit collusion framework to the consideration of capital market imperfections captured by a non zero probability of liquidation of firms in recessionary periods we show that the rotemberg saloner result of countercyclical markups is quite robust to the extension and moreover liquidation risks may even strengthen the degree of markup countercyclicality

a model of collusion timing abstract i develop a dynamic model of collusion affording a substantial role to entry heterogeneous firms make collusion entry exit and investment decisions within an evolving environment the collusive agreement adopted is a rule of thumb motivated by the details of collusion in the lysine market it is found that an entrant will wait until it has a market share comparable to its competitors before agreeing to collude allowing for collusive possibilities tends to yield a less concentrated industry with reduced consumer welfare the model characterises events in the lysine market and could provide insights into markets with the potential for collusion and entry and uncertainty about the characteristics of potential entrants

tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion i study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects i find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also and more surprisingly on its volatility collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level but decrease with its volatility these results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles and the study of cooperation in repeated games

countercyclical pricing in customer markets i present a dynamic model of price determination in customer markets that are subject to exogenous business cycle fluctuations the business cycle is described in terms of a markov process in which market demand alternates stochastically between fast growth boom and slow growth recession phases in the consumers preferred equilibrium outcome 1 prices are below the monopoly level and 2 prices are countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively correlated through time a firm faces a dynamic trade off when making its current price selection while a higher price may raise a firm s profit in the short term it also may diminish the firm s reputation for low prices leading to lower profits in the future

collusion and heterogeneity of firms we examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic bertrand competition we show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting first we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold with or without capacity constraints next we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long run prediction despite the presence of multiple equilibria in the long run the most patient firm and the most impatient firm tend to dominate the market

property rights and stratification in socialist redistributive economies in socialist economies work organizations differ widely in the compensation they provide employees despite the absence of key product and labor market processes thought to ex plain such inequalities in market economies existing theories of stratification in socialist economies focus on the power and privilege of elites but inequalities among organizations are not created by political particularism or elite power in this paper i sketch elements of an institutional theory of stratification anchored in a conception of property rights the right to derive income from productive assets two aspects of property rights guide the analysis 1 the dispersion of property rights across a hierarchy of governmentjurisdictions and 2 the exercise of these rights by government jurisdictions as they extract revenues primarily through taxation extraction of revenues from a work organization varies with the budgetary resources of a government jurisdiction and the dependence of that jurisdiction on the out puts of the organization variation in revenue extraction in turn creates inequalities among work organizations in their abilities to provide benefits to employees an analysis of survey data on the provision of housing and benefits by work organizations in the large industrial city of tianjin china provides provisional support for these ideas s tudents of communist states have had little reason to dispute lenski s 1966 claim that the distribution of rewards in a society is a func tion of the distribution of power p 63 as ex emplified in szelenyi s wedding of elite theory to institutional economics this idea has been de veloped primarily in terms of the power of class es or occupational groups szelenyi 1978 be gan with the observation that planned economies operate according to redistributive rather than market principles however the process of re

the first shall be last entrepreneurship and communist cadres in the transition from socialism this article reviews the sociological literature on the transition from socialism to capitalism it distinguishes between the erosion and transition phases and between traditional and corporate segments in the emerging private sector panel survey data from hungary show that during the transition ex communist cadres maintain their advantageous position and do especially well in the more dynamic corporate segment they are successful because human capital is important in both capitalism and socialism and because the cadres are able to convert past political power to economic advantage contrary to the findings of studies based only on agriculture the transition increases income inequalities

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

robust collusion with private information the game theoretic literature on collusion has been hard pressed to explain why a cartel should engage in price wars without resorting to either impatience symmetry restrictions inability to communicate or failure to optimize this paper introduces a new explanation that relies on none of these assumptions if the cartel s member firms have private information about their costs price wars can be optimal in the face of complexity specifically equilibria that are robust to pay off irrelevant disruptions of the information environment generically cannot attain or approximate efficiency an optimal robust equilibrium must allocate market shares inefficiently and may call for price wars under certain conditions for a two firm cartel cost interdependence is a sufficient condition for price wars to arise in an optimal robust equilibrium that optimal equilibria are inefficient generically applies not only to collusion games but also to the entire separable pay off environment a class that includes most typical economic models copyright 2012 oxford university press

market power and price movements over the business cycle this paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly pricing model the model predicts that during a demand expansion the short run competitive price is a pure strategy nash equilibrium but in a recession firms set prices above the competitive price thus price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions the empirical analysis utilizes hamilton s time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly pricing model

disclosure policy and industry fluctuations this paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations the analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms we show that in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins otherwise firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in the product market under partial disclosure firms withhold information during sharp industry expansions or declines consequently the disclosure policy dampens the dissemination of shocks to the industry this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

price response asymmetric information and competition we compare predictions from a theoretical model based on the structure of the main outdoor retail market in jerusalem with the results of an empirical analysis of price response to changes in cost we find that firms without adjacent competition exhibit both upward and downward price rigidity an outcome we ascribe to asymmetric information between the consumer and the firm given that previous studies have focused on downward price rigidities of firms with market power our findings highlight the importance of accounting for transitory information asymmetries between the consumer and the firm when studying price rigidity

trade costs 1870 2000 what has driven trade booms and trade busts in the past century and a half was it changes in global output or in the costs of international trade to address this question we derive a micro founded measure of aggregate bilateral trade costs based on a standard model of trade in differentiated goods these trade costs gauge the difference between observed bilateral trade and frictionless trade in terms of an implied markup on retail prices of foreign goods thus we are able to estimate the combined magnitude of tariffs transportation costs and all other macroeconomic frictions that impede interna tional trade but that are inherently difficult to observe we use this measure to examine the growth of global trade between 1870 and 1913 its retreat from 1921 to 1939 and its subsequent rise from 1950 to 2000 we find that trade cost declines explain roughly 55 percent of the pre world war i trade boom and 33 percent of the post world war ii trade boom while a precipi tous rise in trade costs explains the entire inter

exchange rate pass through for strategic pricing and advertising abstract this paper builds a model in the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan t 1989 industries and market power in schmalensee r willig r eds handbook of industrial organization north holland amsterdam to estimate exchange rate pass through in price and advertising price cost margins market structure and firm conduct are estimated endogenously allowing for precise estimation of the degree of and reasons for incomplete pass through i demonstrate that price and advertising pass through are functions of demand cost and market conduct in the short run in the long run the market conduct and cost technologies are in turn determined by the exchange rate movements 1997 elsevier science b v

collusive price rigidity under price matching punishments by analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price matching punishment strategy we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close this provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve in contrast to the kinked demand curve it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits the relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high cost phase the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms in the market are also investigated

competition in the economic crisis analysis of procurement auctions we study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions using data from austrian construction procurements we estimate bidders construction costs within a private value auction model we find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1 5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis markups of winning bids decrease by 3 3 percentage points we also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger these two pieces of evidence point to pro cyclical markups

collusion over the business cycle we present a theory of collusive pricing for markets in which demand alternates stochastically between fast growth boom and slow growth recession phases we show that 1 the most collusive prices are weakly procyclical countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively negatively correlated through time and 2 the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle is larger when the expected duration of boom phases decreases and when the expected duration of recession phases increases we also offer a generalization of rotemberg and saloner s 1986 model interpreting their findings in terms of transitory demand shocks that occur within broader business cycle phases

a dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars we provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among jirms investment entry and exit it is a symmetric information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an activejim that is likely to exit in the near future numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment only the collusive industry generates price wars also the collusive industry offers both more and higherquality products to consumers albeit often at a higher price the positive effect of collusion on variety and quality more than compensates consumers for the negative effect of collusive prices so that consumer surplus is larger with collusion

examining models of collusion the market for lysine abstract we compare the experience with collusion in the market for lysine with the predictions of theory the lysine market provides an ideal setting following the confessions of cartel participants in antitrust investigations data availability allows demand and cost functions to be estimated and observed mark ups compared with predictions we find that several integral aspects of collusion in the lysine market are not adequately addressed in the literature the dynamics associated with entry and investment persistent asymmetries between firms the cartel s bargaining problem and the existence of cheating in equilibrium these issues are likely to have much wider applicability beyond the lysine market

local governments as industrial firms an organizational analysis of china s transitional economy despite widespread skepticism about government ownership in transitional economies china s rapid industrial growth has been led by public enterprises kornai s theory of soft budbet constraints born of the failure of earlier hungarian reforms fosters such skepticism but it assumes as fixed organizational characteristics that in fact vary widely across government jurisdictions local governments with smaller industrial bases have clearer financial incentives and constraints fewer nonfinancial interests in enterprises and a greater capacity to monitor them in china s vast public sector the fastest growth in output and productivity has occurred where government ownership rights are clearest and most easily enforced which enables officials to manage public industry as a diversified market oriented firm

why do larger buyers pay lower prices intense supplier competition abstract the paper provides a theoretical explanation of the common claim that larger buyers pay lower prices in the model suppliers compete more aggressively for the business of larger buyers much as they do in boom periods of rotemberg and saloner

market culture and authority a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east three frameworks purport to explain industrial arrangements and practices a market approach that emphasizes economic characteristics a cultural approach that sees organization as the expression of patterned values and an authority approach that explains organization as a historically developed structure of domination the efficacy of each approach is tested in explaining the organizational structures of three rapidly growing east asian economies japan south korea and taiwan the paper argues through comparative analysis that organizational growth is best explained by market and cultural factors but that authority patterns and legitimation strategies best explain organizational structure

tacit collusion in the presence of cyclical demand and endogenous capacity levels abstract we analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long run scale decisions firms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing in prices our focus is on the nature of prices we find that two types of price wars may exist in one collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars in the other consistent with the rotemberg and saloner 1986 definition of price wars we show that collusive prices can also become counter cyclical we also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative prices in booms and recessions if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough holding current demand constant prices in the boom are generally lower than the prices in the recession this reverses the results of haltiwanger and harrington 1991 in contrast if the marginal cost of capacity is low enough then prices in the boom are generally higher than the prices in the recession for costs in an intermediate range numerical examples are calculated to show specific pricing patterns

collusion under risk aversion and fixed costs we analyze collusion under demand uncertainty by risk averse cartels that care about the utility derived from profits with sufficient risk aversion and non trivial fixed operating costs it becomes difficult for cartels to collusively restrict output both when demand is low and marginal dollars are highly valued and when demand is high and potential defection profits are high output relative to monopoly levels becomes a u shaped function of demand greater risk aversion or higher fixed operating costs make collusion more difficult to support in recessions but easier to support in booms