on the dynamics of recycling and natural resources we study the dynamic impact of recycling through its effect on the production set of the economy and its relationship with natural resources the contribution of renewable and recyclable resources for sustainability is studied although in the short run recycling may alleviate resource scarcity in the long run it is not enough to compensate for the exhaustibility of non renewable resources and the possibility of obtaining non decreasing output paths crucially depends on the extent to which production rests on renewable resources furthermore recycling interacts with natural resource growth surprisingly not always favoring sustainability the production and recycling function is a generalization of the traditional production function providing an integrated view of regular production and recycling and representing the production set of the economy when a recycling technology is available

the demographic cycle and optimal schooling choices a model is developed that enables the authors to estimate the effects of demographic cycles on both earnings and schooling the model is tested using data from the 1991 korean occupational wage survey the results indicate that cohorts following large birth cohorts in the cycle choose relatively less formal schooling compared to pre peak cohorts and that post peak cohorts also have lower incomes this result concerning south korea is consistent with findings from previous studies concerning the united states annotation

endogenous destruction in conflict theory and extensions this article develops a general equilibrium model of conflict to characterize the implications of endogenous destruction for bargaining and fighting specifically we consider the scenario where two contending parties engage in bargaining to avoid fighting when there are direct costs e g arms buildups and indirect costs e g destruction to consumable resources of conflict without imposing specific functional form restrictions on conflict production and destruction technologies we show their interactions in determining an optimal decision between fighting and bargaining we find that under the shadow of conflict bargaining is costly as the contending parties always allocate more resources to arming for guarding settlement through bargaining than in the event of fighting in contrast to conventional thinking that bargaining is pareto superior over fighting we show conditions under which fighting dominates bargaining as the nash equilibrium choice the positive analysis may help explain the general causes of fighting without resorting to the assumption of incomplete information or misperceptions jel d74 h56 c7

external threat and collective action i introduction individuals with common interests usually attempt to further their welfare by acting collectively examples of collective action include the provision of a public good or collective good the establishment of clubs and the formation of alliances or political parties in his seminal work the logic of collective action olson 1965 uses the provision of collective goods as an example to discuss collective action problem or coordination failure in particular he analyzes how group size and the distribution of individual benefits of a collective good may affect the provision level of the good two of the most celebrated propositions from his book are the suboptimality proposition the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good p 35 and the exploitation proposition there is a systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small p 29 these propositions have generated a broad research effort in collective action problems in economics and political science many scholars have examined the validity of these propositions 1 a limitation of olson s theory is that he analyzed collective action problems as phenomena within a single group while assuming that external threat to a group either does not exist or is treated as a constant in many cases however two or more groups compete against each other in these situations a group s provision of collective goods might be affected by the configurations of its own group and the competing groups and relative strength of the groups to illustrate assume that two alliances of states say a and b are competing for supremacy an increase in a s military spending poses a greater threat to b s security in response to the heightened threat members of b might feel the need to increase their military spending which in turn could affect the military spending decisions of members of a bruce 1990 develops a model that endogenizes external threat in a three country model with two allies and one adversary interest group lobbying is another example to understand a group s lobbying behavior scholars often focus on the number and size of firms within the group and their geographical distribution however the configuration of a competing interest group and the two groups relative strengths should also figure into an individual firm s decision concerning the appropriate contribution to its group s lobbying efforts other examples include party discipline voter turnout ledyard 1981 1984 palfrey and rosenthal 1983 electoral coalitional politics tsebelis 1990 hausken 1995a b negative campaigning in primary elections newman and niou 2000 factional rivalry in civil wars and joint ventures for research and development in industrial organizations all these examples point to the importance of external threat in explaining the logic of collective action in this article to study simultaneously the way intergroup competition and intragroup collective action interact we develop a collective good model that endogenizes external threat in the context of competition between two groups a group can be either defensive or offensive in nature we define a group as defensive if its fighting capacity can be used only to defend its own resources a group is offensive if its fighting capacity can be used to expropriate resources from its rivals as well as protect its own resources we realize that empirically it is difficult to determine whether a group is offensive or defensive but theoretically it is useful to know how the offensive or defensive nature of a group can affect the collective action problem we analyze collective action problems when 1 one of the groups is offensive whereas the other is defensive and 2 both groups are offensive respectively also in group competition if conquests are economically profitable the way spoils of victory are divided among group members can also affect collective action

guns butter and anarchy a state in the international system implicit in realism must allocate its limited resources between satisfying its intrinsically valued ends and the means of military power i formalize this guns versus butter problem in a simple infinite horizon model in which two states must continually decide how to allocate their resources and whether to attack the other state the analysis establishes sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of an equilibrium in which neither state attacks shows that there is a strictly pareto dominant pair of peaceful equilibrium payoffs characterizes the unique peaceful markov perfect equilibrium that yields them and describes the comparative statics of the equilibrium allocations more broadly the analysis also suggests that the notion of anarchy has little if any substantive significance distinctively related to international politics and that the problem of absolute and relative gains is superfluous

anarchy and its breakdown anarchy defined as a system in which participants can seize and defend resources without regulation from above is not chaos but rather a spontaneous order however anarchy is fragile and may dissolve either into formless amorphy or into a more organized system such as hierarchy under anarchy each contestant balances between productive exploitation of the current resource base and fighting to acquire or defend resources anarchy is sustainable only when there are strongly diminishing returns to fighting effort the decisiveness parameter is sufficiently low and incomes exceed the viability minimum these considerations explain many features of animal and human conflict

assessing the economic viability of alternative water resources in water scarce regions combining economic valuation cost benefit analysis and discounting abstract this paper demonstrates a comprehensive methodology for assessing the viability of an environmental management plan that has long run economic and ecological impacts the case study under consideration is the implementation of a water resource management plan in a water scarce region of the world namely cyprus specifically this plan proposes to replenish a depleting aquifer with treated wastewater the proposed methodology first identifies the key stakeholder groups farmers and the general public who are hypothesized to derive economic values benefits from implementation of this plan and then uses stated preference methods to capture the total economic value of these benefits benefits are aggregated over the relevant populations of these stakeholder groups and weighed against the total costs of implementing the plan in a long run cost benefit analysis cba an econometrically estimated time declining trajectory of discount rates is used for the cba in order to assess the long run sustainability of the plan the results reveal that the net benefit trajectory estimated with the time declining discount rate takes one and a half to three times as long to come to a plateau compared to the constant discount rates of 3 5 and 6 emphasizing the importance of using declining discount rates and capturing the entirety of the benefits generated by such plans this methodology is particularly recommended for providing much needed information to support the implementation of the eu water framework directive which advocates the use of cba with consideration of the notion of sustainability for achieving the good water status for all european waters

validity of sustainability framework for china s mining cities a structural equation modelling approach abstractmany studies developed their framework for sustainability through indicator systems but the interactions and relationships within these indicators have not been studied yet in this article based on indicator systems we use a sample of 78 mining cities in china and employ structural equation modelling sem method to explore the validity of sustainability framework our empirical results show that resources abundance positively affects urbanization level significantly but negatively affects cleaner production level and environmental protection level significantly economic strength positively affects urbanization level significantly cleaner production level has a significant effect on economic strength and non mineral resources conversion efficiency we also find that when economic strength is low resources abundance might weaken the positive effect of economy on urbanization

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

the theory of collective action and burden sharing in nato mancur olson s theory of collective action could account for much of the variance in the defense burdens of the allied nations of the north atlantic treaty organization nato in the early years of the cold war but the association between economic size gross domestic product or gdp and defense burden the ratio of military expenditures to gdp has declined to insignificant levels two influences are shown to be important in producing this change the increased pursuit of private goods by greece turkey and portugal and the growing cooperation among the other european allies since cooperation in the military realm has not provided the europeans with credible means of self defense it appears to be a consequence of the general growth of interdependence in europe during the postwar period nato is still essentially a uniquely privileged group producing a relatively pure public good accordingly the theory of collective action continues to provide valuable insights into the operation of the alliance

collective action and the group size paradox according to the olson paradox larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests we address the issue in a model with three distinctive features explicit intergroup interaction collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics and nonlinear lobbying costs the interplay of these features leads to new results when the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function or higher larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize with smaller elasticities a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the olson argument and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function we also demonstrate that these results are true irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria

on the formation of alliances in conflict and contests this paper examines the problem of the formation of alliances in conflict and more generally in contests with three players each player possesses an exogenous strategic endowment e g arms efforts rent seeking activity the outcome of contests including those between any alliances of players is governed by a contest success function csf in the three person one cake problem an alliance between two players against the third one will form if and only if the csf has an increasing returns characteristic when an alliance forms there is a tendency to be formed by the weaker players against the strongest player similar tendencies exist in other three person problems that i examine

what is sustainable development this paper introduces two axioms that capture the idea of sustainable development and characterizes the welfare criterion that they imply the axioms require that neither the present nor the future should play a dictatorial role in society s choices over time theorems 1 and 2 show there exist sustainable preferences which satisfy these axioms and provide a full characterization theorems 3 5 study a standard dynamical system representing the growth of a renewable resource economy give a turnpike theorem and exhibit the differences between sustainable optima and the ones according to discounted utilitarianism

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry we investigate simultaneous inter and intra group conflict in the shadow of within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members group conflict efforts a more symmetric group faces a higher degree of internal conflict and might expend more effort in external conflict when the group conflict effort technology is highly complementary depending on the degree of complementarity the stronger player s relative contribution to external conflict might be higher in a more asymmetric group and as a result it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff in the absence of any complementarity the rent dissipation is non monotonic with the within group power asymmetry

reversal of fortunes the rise and fall of lifetime earnings of iranian men abstractthe islamic revolution of 1979 the 8 year war with iraq 1980 88 and the collapse of oil prices in 1986 dealt huge blows to iran s economy in this article we use a pseudopanel constructed from annual multiple surveys during 1984 2004 to analyze changes in cohort earnings and consumption through these tumultuous times using well known techniques we decompose the changes in median cohort earnings of men into cohort age and year effects our results show that cohorts born before 1950 who were well into their careers at the time of the revolution enjoyed a steady increase in lifetime earnings however those born after the mid 1960s who started their careers during the revolution and the war with iraq experienced losses relative to previous cohorts in contrast to earnings per capita expenditures do not indicate a declining cohort trend for younger cohorts when we restrict the year effects to cyclical variation only the cohort effects show a rising trend we interpret the difference in

economic policy changes and wage differentials in latin america abstract this article presents estimates of the impact of changes in liberalization policies on wage differentials by schooling level using a new high quality data set for 18 latin american countries for 1977 98 the method controls for all fixed and time varying country characteristics some of which may affect the policies themselves the results indicate that liberalizing policy changes overall have had a short run disequalizing effect of expanding wage differentials although this effect tends to fade away over time this disequalizing effect is due to the strong impact of domestic financial market reform capital account liberalization and tax reform however privatization contributed to narrowing wage differentials and increasing trade openness had no significant effect on wage differentials technological progress rather than trade flows appears to be a channel through which policy changes are affecting inequality

a comparison of rent seeking models and economic models of conflict this paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize the purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases a key finding is that where such comparisons are possible the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth redistribution activities than does the rent seeking model

a component based approach to discounting for natural resource damage assessment abstract the paper proposes a component based approach to guide the choice of the social discount rate in natural resources damage assessment where time and discounting are key features it is a multi rate discounting scheme which draws on concepts from dual rate and time declining approaches each damage component is discounted at a component specific constant rate related to its time trajectory assuming a normatively defined declining schedule of rates as a starting reference components with longer time profiles generally represented by welfare losses are discounted at lower rates than short term damage components mainly remedial costs the rationale behind this choice is that the longer the duration of the damage component the higher the related nonincident specific uncertainty on the resource values and the more relevant the equity issues when estimating the total damage the resulting implicit average discount rate depends on the duration of each component and its relative relevance in the total damage in each moment from an operational point of view anchoring the rates to government prescriptions would support the robustness of the damage estimates in a court of law whereas the dual based environmental discount rate is based on ad hoc assumptions that are more difficult to justify

explaining cross country differences in policy response to child labour we develop a model of child labour where poverty and inequality combine to determine policy response to child labour if there are strategic complementarities between parents decisions to educate their children and firms technology choice multiple school enrolment equilibria arise only rich countries and those that are not too poor and have a low wealth inequality benefit from adopting child labour laws this is because such laws commit an economy with either of those initial conditions to the full school enrolment equilibrium which pareto dominates all other equilibria moreover wealth redistribution is not sufficient to eliminate child labour jel classification i20 o33 une explication des differences d un pays a l autre dans la reaction des politiques au phenomene du travail des enfants les auteurs developpent un modele de travail des enfants dans lequel les niveaux de pauvrete et d inegalite se combinent pour determiner les politiques si des complementarites strategiques existent entre les decisions des parents d eduquer leurs enfants et le choix de technologie des entreprises de nombreux equilibres impliquant divers niveaux d inscription a l ecole sont possibles seuls les pays riches et ceux qui ne sont pas trop pauvres ou qui ont un degre d inegalite de la richesse relativement bas tirent profit de lois reglementant le travail des enfants c est le cas parce que de telles lois engagent une economie qui a ces caracteristiques a se diriger vers un equilibre d inscription totale des enfants a l ecole dans ces cas il s agit d un equilibre qui domine au sens de pareto tous les autres equilibres on note de plus que la redistribution de la richesse ne suffit pas pour eliminer le travail des enfants

social discounting under uncertainty a cross country comparison recent research suggests that social cost benefit analysis should be conducted with a declining discount rate for instance newell and pizer discounting the distant future how much do uncertain rates increase valuations j environ econ manage 46 2003 52 71 show that the us certainty equivalent discount rate declines through time using a simple autoregressive model of us interest rates this paper extends that line of research estimating both autoregressive and regime switching models of real interest rates to determine certainty equivalent discount rates in australia canada germany and the uk it is found that the regime switching model is a better model of past interest rate behavior for all four countries this model tends to produce a more rapid decline in certainty equivalent discount rates the paper provides applications to the economics of climate change and nuclear power

equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two player model of society where only armed self enforcement of property rights is possible the main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players the parameter space is partitioned into regions in which the respective types of equilibrium occur the equilibrium types involve positive arms expenditure by respectively neither player the richer player and both players the latter case involves a sub type in which the poorer player s entire endowment is expended on arms jel d30 d72 d74

what you don t know can hurt you or at least mislead you family behaviors unobserved heterogeneities and the determinants and impacts of human resources over the life cycle what one does not know in the form of unobserved heterogeneity can mislead one in empirical estimates a simple model of intrahousehold allocations illustrates the possible importance of unobserved factors such as abilities in determining human resources and their impacts the author reviews over forty years of studies primarily from latin america and the caribbean but also from elsewhere to illustrate the substantial empirical importance of unobserved heterogeneity with regard to preferences and intrahousehold allocations schooling returns school quality early life nutrition and program evaluation

outstanding female economists in the analysis and practice of development economics abstract this article examines the contributions of five eminent economists all women to the analysis and practice of development economics irma adelman frances stewart and nancy birdsall are leading advocates of alternative development strategies that focus on poverty alleviation and investment in human capital anne krueger and alice amsden stand at the forefront of two opposing camps in a lively and long lasting debate on the appropriate role of government in trade and industrialization we use the storied careers of these economists as a vehicle to convey the big picture of how development economics has evolved and which topics have proved durable