managerial reputation and the competitiveness of an industry abstract the interaction between managerial incentives and strategic behavior in a duopolistic industry is explored managers are differentiated by their ability to reduce overhead costs a manager s current compensation is an increasing function of firm profit while his future income depends on the labor market s beliefs over his ability for the purpose of enhancing their reputation in the labor market we show that managers choose to produce in excess of that predicted by profit maximization this result applies only to imperfectly competitive industries though the intensity of competition is independent of industry volatility when firms are profit maximizers we find that the price cost margin is decreasing in the variance of industry wide shocks when firms are manager run

who s on first an empirical test of the coase theorem in baseball because of their highly developed skills major league baseball players generate significant economic rents according to the weak version of the coase theorem the allocation of these players is independent of who controls the rights to these rents which depends on the rules governing competition in the baseball labour market the rules of major league baseball establish a dual system for senior players the market is competitive and players have the right of free agency allowing them to attempt to contract with the team of their choice for players with fewer years of experience the market is monopsonistic and a player s right to play baseball is owned by his current team consequently we simultaneously observe two different allocations of property rights using individual player data for 1979 and 1980 we test whether baseball player movement is independent of the ownership of these rents we estimate the wage marginal revenue determination process for free agent and non free agent movers and

migration trends and earnings of free agents in major league baseball 1976 1979 this paper is an empirical investigation of the effect of team characteristics on the migration pattern of free agents in major league baseball during the period 1976 1979 the results indicate that high quality free agents tend to leave winning teams and move to teams in cities with large or rapidly growing populations the compensation paid to free agents is shown to depend on these team characteristics as well as the players personal characteristics and market conditions

externalities property rights and the allocation of resources in major league baseball most economists who have analyzed professional baseball have concluded that two distinctive features of its labor market the reserve clause and player draft influence the distribution of wealth between players and owners but do not affect the allocation of playing talent among teams such conclusions which are strongly at variance with laymen s views of such matters are derived from theoretical considerations rather than empirical examinations our paper examines data from the two decades of major league history and concludes that on the basis of that data the empirical generalizations of previous economists do not appear to be justified

ownership of property rights and the allocation of talents under the reserve clause system that assigns the property rights on the major league baseball players services to teams player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players in contrast under the current free agency system players with free agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors thus the system assigns the property rights to players using data extracted from the baseball archive http baseball1 com this article examines the effect of the change in the property rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams we find that the change increased large market teams shares of veteran all star players and the concentration of senior players

environmental valuation under sustainable development environmentalism has evolved since the 1960 s from a concern with the preservation of wilderness in the american experience to a concern over pollution of human habitat throughout the industrialized world northern anxiety spread to the loss of tropical rainforests and biodiversity in the south where environmentalism evolved further in an encounter with indigenous interpretations conditions and priorities by the late 1980 s climate change emerged as a central issue in a now global discourse on the relationship between environment and development the principle of sustainable development that current needs are to be met as fully as possible while ensuring that the life opportunities of future generations are undiminished relative to present is now widely accepted this paper illustrates that incorporating environmental values per se in decision making will not bring about sustainability unless each generation is committed to transferring to the next sufficient natural resources and capital assets to make development sustainable 11 refs 3 figs

free agency long term contracts and compensation in major league baseball estimates using longitudinal data for major league baseball players this paper estimates the effects of eligibility for free agency or arbitration on compensation and contract duration becaus e eligibility is based on experience and better players are kept longe r a fixed effects approach is used arbitration and free agency eligibility both raised annual compensation however only free agen cy raised contract duration the free agency findings are consistent wi th nash bargaining however additionally considering the arbitration results suggests the winner s curse duration rises only when a team might lose a player the auction market is thus avoided copyright 1993 by mit press

entry and managerial incentives abstract this paper presents a two period full information model of entry where owners of incumbent and entrant firms endogenously select the incentive schemes for their managers it is shown that when output decisions are delegated to managers the incumbent s owner chooses to base incentive schemes only partly on profit but if output decisions are reached via nash bargaining between managers the incumbent s owner will base the reward on profit alone the entrant never bases the incentive scheme solely on profit if there is a sufficiently high fixed cost of entry then the incumbent can deter entry by providing management with appropriate incentive schemes

a stated preference valuation of the non market benefits of pollination services in the uk using a choice experiment survey this study examines the uk public s willingness to pay to conserve insect pollinators in relation to the levels of two pollination service benefits maintaining local produce supplies and the aesthetic benefits of diverse wildflower assemblages willingness to pay was estimated using a bayesian mixed logit with two contrasting controls for attribute non attendance exclusion and shrinkage the results suggest that the uk public have an extremely strong preference to avoid a status quo scenario where pollinator populations and pollination services decline total willingness to pay was high and did not significantly vary between the two pollination service outputs producing a conservative total of 379m over a sample of the tax paying population of the uk equivalent to 13 4 per uk taxpayer using a basic production function approach the marginal value of pollination services to these attributes is also extrapolated the study discusses the implications of these findings and directions for related future research into the non market value of pollination and other ecosystem services

wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective abstract this paper develops a one population indirect evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer supplier and many a sufficiently large number of retailers to study how the retailer s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price its observability the error probability of the observed result on the rival s preference the market scale and the retailer s bargaining power this paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer we find that the profit revenue maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high low given an appropriate wholesale price the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers population the larger the market scale the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price the cross effects of the retailer s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process

the coase theorem free agency and major league baseball a panel study of pitcher mobility from 1961 to 1992 a great deal of conceptual and empirical work in the economic analysis of the law and property rights has been directed towards resolving a controversy surrounding the coase theorem many economists and legal scholars interpret the theorem as containing two propositions the first is that in the absence of transactions costs and wealth effects parties will bargain to an efficient outcome the second holds that the same outcome will be achieved regardless of the distribution of property rights the latter is known as the invariance thesis and it has been a source of dispute among scholars and between economic theorists and owners of economic enterprises e g owners of professional sports teams 5 11 16 23 24 25 26 28 29 this paper provides an econometric test of the invariance proposition major league baseball presents a natural experiment consisting of an industry in which there has been an explicit change in the assignment of property rights beginning in 1879 the reserve clause gave monopsony power to team owners a player could negotiate salary only with the team that owned his contract and the team could trade or sell the player as management saw fit in 1976 this system was replaced by the institution of free agency whereby a player with at least six years of major league experience acquired

political manipulation of a public firm s objective function abstract in the context of a government owned public firm that competes with a private firm this paper demonstrates how the government can maximize its true objective by assigning the public firm a different objective function interestingly this assigned objective function need bear no resemblance to the actual objective being sought enabling the government to disguise a politically unpopular agenda and or outside influence

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

using baseball card prices to measure star quality and monopsony i introduction measuring productivity presents problems in many areas of economics this is especially true in sports economics where appropriate indicators of individual productivity apart from team productivity have been the subject of much debate and where the issue of fairness in compensation has become especially contentious in recent years due to the extremely high salaries being paid to participants baseball has been studied more widely than any other sport largely because of the vast amount of data that has been assembled for it and its fairly well defined indicators hits home runs earned run averages eras and so on however even in this sport controversies over productivity and compensation continue problems were severe enough in 1994 to have resulted in a 232 day general strike and the first ever cancellation of the world series events that are estimated to have cost major league baseball mlb and the economy close to 1 billion 1 this research will utilize baseball card prices a relatively neglected source of market evaluation of players reflecting their value to the ultimate consumer to measure the important but intangible characteristic of star quality or charisma possessed by some players star quality which exists over and above productivity as indicated in official game statistics is generally acknowledged to bring fans to the stadiums and impact team revenues in a significant way this research will determine a numerical measure of star quality as the residual in a model of baseball card prices based on traditional performance variables we shall use this in the computation of a total productivity figure for a sample of baseball players for the period leading up to the strike of 1994 from this we will derive a measure of the players marginal revenue product mrp and examine the issue of monopsonistic exploitation by comparing this expanded mrp to the players salaries ii monopsonistic exploitation the institutional arrangements and operating policies of mlb have acted to restrict mobility in that labor market and have led to numerous charges of monopsonistic exploitation over the years historically players were drafted into a team and reserved to employment by that team alone unless they were traded to another team at the discretion of management however several lawsuits and labor grievances in the 1970s resulted in the introduction of free agency which limits a team s control over a player to six years the mlb players association argues that even this shortened restrictive period together with the collusive operating policies permitted under baseball s special exemption from antitrust laws gives rise to monopsonistic exploitation this implies that many players receive less than their mrp to their team this sentiment was an element in the players rejection of management s position in the 1994 contract negotiations which led to the strike that canceled part of two seasons previous research on measuring productivity roger noll 1974 was one of the first researchers to study baseball productivity and one of the few to address the issue of star quality noll attempted to capture the star quality effect by entering the number of star players on a team as an explanatory variable in his attendance regression other researchers have advanced the technique for determining productivity from performance statistics but have not addressed the star quality factor directly the productivity study of scully 1974 focused on a player s slugging percentage total number of bases divided by total at bats as the statistic with the greatest influence on a team s winning percentage and hence on team revenues using 1968 69 data scully found that a one point increase in a team s slugging percentage increased total team revenue by over 9 500 medoff 1976 focused on runs scored as the major indicator of player performance as it contributed to team revenues in 1972 74

price equilibrium and willingness to pay in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly in the framework of a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with uncovered market and zero costs we study the existence of a price equilibrium when a welfare maximizing public firm producing low quality goods competes against a profit maximizing private firm producing high quality goods we show that a price equilibrium exists if the quality spectrum is wide enough vis a vis a measure of the convexity of the distribution of the consumers willingness to pay and that such equilibrium is unique if this sufficient condition is tightened logconcavity of the income distribution is inconsistent with the existence of equilibrium

what exactly is corporate responsibility towards nature ecological responsibility or management of nature abstract the paper analyses the motives and consequences of including environmental protection in good managerial practices driven by a concern of responsible corporate behaviour corporate social responsibility is increasingly discussed in economics and management studies today this idea is fairly recent and stems from a philosophical school of thought attributed to hans jonas which says that nature must be preserved for anthropocentric as well as biocentric reasons in this respect the consequences that these two visions imply for men and companies will be developed corporate leaders often make use of this concept which finds its origins in philosophy in order to analyse the normative behaviour of their companies in this respect we shall favour a jonasian interpretation hans jonas will help us question the fundamental meaning of responsibility we will attempt to investigate this meaning using csr more specifically this article tries to answer the question what exactly is corporate responsibility is it a mere concept currently in fashion or is it a new structural approach which could indeed take responsibility into account in so far as long term environmental preservation is concerned in order to answer this question we shall first propose a reading of stakeholders this approach poses several problems when dealing with corporate responsibility regarding the preservation of nature secondly we shall present a more detailed analysis of such corporate social responsibility and the problems it poses the debate regarding action with the interest of its outcome and action in the interest of the action itself shall be the focal point of our discussion this article will adopt a narrative and critical methodology so as to achieve this goal we propose to critically analyse theoretical paradigms and test them through case studies

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

are free agents perspicacious peregrinators the perspicacious peregrinator model of solomon w polachek and francis w horvath hypothesizes that individuals decide to migrate based on the size of potential gains this model is tested using themigration decisions of major league baseball players between 1977 and1979 potential gains are measure d as the differ ence between earnings with and without migration a distinction is made between players eligible for free agency and those ineligible so as to a ccount for differences in the level of competition for players services in diff erent segments of this market migration is found tobe related to the expected gain from earnings for players eligible for free agency but not for those ineli gible copyright 1987 by mit press

an accurate measurement of the crowd out effect income effect and price effect for charitable contributions in the past empirical research on charitable contributions has focused on two issues estimating the income and price elasticities of contributions and estimating the extent to which government funding crowded out private contributions the two fundamental problems in all these studies are the differences in the underlying conceptual models and the use of imperfect data for empirical analysis this paper addresses both of these problems

wage disparity and team productivity evidence from major league baseball using data describing baseball teams from 1985 to 1998 it is found that levine s levine d i 1991 cohesiveness productivity and wage dispersion journal of economic behavior and organization 15 237 255 team cohesiveness hypothesis is supported over ramaswamy and rowthorn s ramaswamy r rowthorn e 1991 efficiency wages and dispersion economica 58 501 514 danger potential hypothesis the implication is that teams with greater wage disparity experience a reduction in team performance 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

the sports business as a labor market laboratory with superior data on compensation and productivity as well as the occurrence of abrupt dramatic market structure and player allocation rules changes sports labor markets offer an excellent setting in which to test economic hypotheses this paper reviews evidence from sports in four areas employer monopsony discrimination the coase theorem and incentive contracts supervision and performance there is considerable evidence of monopsony as well as for the existence of some forms of discrimination against minority athletes incentive contracts have strong effects on player performance and behavior and there is mixed evidence on the predictions of the coase theorem

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

pay and performance in major league baseball the case of the first family of free agents it is well established that a baseball player s salary is based on his performance experience star status bargaining power mobility and his team s ability to pay this paper focuses on veteran players who are on the brink of retirement and on the

environmental responsibility versus taxation taxation as a tool of environmental economic policy traditionally aims at generating a discouraging effect upon both the consumer and producer environmental degradation should finally stabilize itself the mechanism of taxation replies to a behavioural stimulus taxes versus subsidies recent economic analyses have not aimed at focusing their studies concerning the very responsibility of economic actors on anything else other than the mechanism of taxation taxes thus imply responsible behaviour we shall attempt to highlight that responsibility could be defined independently from taxation and that the affirmation of responsibility is inversed to taxation technically speaking we shall demonstrate that the taxation extolled by the legislator induces a certain crowding out effect as regards to responsibility in the first part of this article we shall therefore insist that economic policies in terms of taxation drive away the sentiment of individual responsibility we shall reason in terms of production and consumption to demonstrate this fact finally we shall insist that a high degree of responsibility could substitute taxation

game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly abstract in this paper we review various models that have been proposed for the study of mixed oligopoly that is markets in which private and public firm compete on equal basis using only market instruments

team roster turnover and attendance in major league baseball empirical support is shown for the propositionthat sports fans prefer the composition of their home team to remain the same from season to season controlling for price income population team quality league year the stadium effects the regression results indicate that for each percentage point increase in the turnover of the composition of the team attendance will fall by about 0 7 the implications of this heretofore ignored tendency are briefly discussed

internal organization and managerial compensation in oligopoly abstract we demonstrate that the benefit that an oligopolistic firm derives from departmentalization managerial specialization depends upon the internal organization of the rival firm as a result even if both firms are assumed a priori identical they need not select an identical form of internal organization since the benefit from departmentalization exhibits increasing returns to scale a duopolist derives more restricted benefits from departmentalizing compared with a monopolist the implications of increased competition or the form of internal organization upon the compensation of managers depends upon the degree of correlation between the uncertain demands that face competing firms

partners in giving the crowding in effects of uk government grants abstract this study examines the determinants of voluntary donations to uk charities using empirical specifications that combine error component and simultaneous equations methods in a series of tests we identify the one way fixed effects endogenous representation for government grants as the best empirical model when this endogeneity is taken into account government grants cause significant crowding in for the full sample and the two largest cohorts price coefficients are negative and fund raising coefficients are positive religion charities are net revenue maximizers whereas other charity cohorts fund raise short of net revenue maximization

property rights and resource use evidence from mlb starting pitchers we conduct a unique test of the efficiency of property rights in major league baseball the rights to the services of players are resources that can be possessed by the clubs or by the players them

testing coase theorem the case of free agency in nba this study seeks to test the applicability of the coase theorem to the allocation of players within according to the coase theorem a player s final allocation would be the same no matter who has ownership of his playing rights if there are no transaction costs what ownership affects is just the allocation of wealth using data from the national basketball association nba this article argues that player mobility is likely to be affected by player ownership due to transaction cost imposed by the institution it is also concluded that performance indicators used for value estimation vary by position and that this also affects player transfer

privatization strategic foreign direct investment and host country welfare recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment fdi we show that there is a two way causality between privatization and greenfield fdi privatization increases the incentive for fdi which in turn increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no fdi the optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms and on the foreign firm s mode of entry

incentive schemes as strategic variables an application to a mixed duopoly abstract in the context of asymmetry of information between firms owners and their managers we investigate the use of incentive contracts as strategic variables in a duopoly with a public and a private firm by giving the public manager an incentive scheme based on a linear combination of profit and sales revenue we show that welfare can be improved furthermore we show that the government should not privatize the public company

customer discrimination in professional basketball evidence from the trading card market this paper presents evidence on the existence of customer racial discrimination in professional basketball from recent prices for the trading cards of former players in the national basketball association data were collected on the 258 active roster players in the nba during the 1976 77 season 133 of whom had cards issued that year maximum likelihood estimation of a card price equation is carried out accounting both for the nonrandom selection of the players for whom cards exist and for left censoring of the dependent variable overall the empirical results suggest the absence of customer racial discrimination in the pricing of basketball trading cards however there is some evidence that the effect of career length on trading card prices is lower for whites than for blacks and that the card price premium for players who subsequently coached in the nba is lower for blacks than for whites

the existence and persistence of a winner s curse new evidence from the baseball field this study takes advantage of recent developments in the measurement and valuation of individual output in the baseball labor market to i reassess prior evidence that this market is afflicted by the winner s curse phenomenon and ii test whether bidders learn to avoid this curse over time though we find no evidence of negative average returns on player contracts for the earliest cohort of baseball free agents we conclude that teams in that era failed to efficiently discount their bids in accord with available information especially about risk what is more evidence from a larger sample of players signed in the late 1990s shows that teams have continued to overvalue inconsistent free agents and failed to limit their bids to conform to players lower values in small markets this is consistent with experimental evidence that finds bounded rational behavior when bidders are faced with complex valuation problems involving multiple elements

free agency competitive balance and diminishing returns to pennant contention e woodrow eckard this article argues that the 1976 introduction of free agency increased competitive balance in major league baseball the evidence is based on a new empirical measure that captures the key dynamic element of balance year to year fluctuations in team performance my hypothesis is that diminishing returns to each additional year s production of a pennant contending team reduces the incentive to bid continually for top players free agency allows talent to be reallocated more readily to potential new contenders given that player sales had been restricted prior to 1976 the hypothesis is supported by evidence of declining attendance during contending streaks jel l83 i introduction since the inception of free agency in major league baseball mlb over 20 years ago its effect on competitive balance has been controversial for almost a century the reserve system had assigned de facto property rights in players services to mlb teams this changed after 1976 when veteran players were allowed to unilaterally sell their services to the highest bidder team owners predicted a consequent decline in competitive balance arguing that large market clubs would outbid others for talent and come to dominate this claim is still made today as the basis for major restructuring proposals such as new restrictions on player salaries and mobility team payroll caps and various cross subsidization schemes 1 economists have examined the issue from both theoretical and empirical angles theorists such as el hodiri and quirk 1971 implicitly agree with the owners that the best players concentrate where their marginal revenue products mrps are the highest that is in high demand cities that also may be the most populous debate has revolved instead around rottenberg s 1956 invariance proposition which states that the distribution of playing talent will be the same under both systems if player sales are unrestricted teams where mrps are the highest purchase the services of the best players whether from other low mrp clubs or directly from the players themselves free agency therefore should not affect competitive balance critics such as daly 1992 argue that before 1976 first line players seldom were sold so the invariance proposition does not apply several studies examine empirically the effect of free agency on competitive balance taken together the results are consistent with the invariance proposition namely balance did not change this article argues that these studies use balance measures that ignore a critical aspect of competition namely year to year changes in a team s position in league standings using empirical measures that capture this dynamic i report new evidence that balance improved after free agency i then extend the existing theory of sports leagues to explain why free agency might cause such an outcome and provide an independent test of the theory specifically there are diminishing marginal returns to each additional year s production of a pennant contending team reducing the incentive to bid continually for top players this allows also rans to obtain the talent necessary to improve their performance and become contenders i also provide evidence that quality players were seldom sold under the old reserve system ren dering the invariance proposition moot the article is organized as follows the next section reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature section iii describes my measures of competitive balance and section iv presents empirical results comparing balance in mlb before and after free agency section v provides evidence that sales of first line players were sufficiently rare as to nullify the invariance proposition section vi presents the theoretical argument linking free agency to an improvement in balance followed by a supporting empirical test in section vii section viii summarizes and concludes the article