the structure of multi period employment contracts with incomplete insurance markets this paper examines the structure of multi period employment contracts in an economy with identical workers when only incomplete insurance is provided against job related contingencies the incompleteness of insurance markets stems from an asymmetry of information between the worker and the insurer in this situation the employment contract will provide implicit insurance by paying workers less than their marginal product during some periods and more during others the paper explores how the characteristics of such contracts are altered by increases in uncertainty worker risk aversion hiring costs and the amount of specific and general training provided a sequel to this paper examines the efficiency properties of such contracts this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

wage profiles and imperfect capital markets a positive analysis this paper examines the structure of long term employment contracts when labor is mobile and risk averse employers are unable to monitor workers outside job offers workers cannot borrow against future income and workers productivity is increasing in the length of service with the long term employer workers are then liquidity constrained and the contract trades off consumption smoothing against efficiency in turnover in contrast to previous papers which have examined this problem this paper provides a continuous time formulation that permits a detailed characterization of the properties of the wage profile

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

the inflation discipline of currency substitution abstract we examine the argument that currency substitution should be encouraged since it provides an inflation discipline in highly stylized games of national welfare maximization we find that as currency substitution increases currency survival comes to dominate all other considerations and inflation rates do indeed come down however we find no reason to think that these competitive inflation rates will be optimal the discipline embodied in currency substitution may be too weak or too strong it may be a poor substitute for direct coordination of monetary and fiscal policies we try to relate our analysis to recent u k proposals

the significance of the probabilistic voting theorem for centuries it has been recognized that democratic government is endangered by two unfortunate properties of majority rule voting the absence of an electoral equilibrium comparable to the general equilibrium in the economy and the risk of expropriation of minorities by majorities much of democratic theory is devoted to the study of how these dangers can be averted the probabilistic voting theorem has been alleged to show that these dangers are illusory it is argued in this paper that though the theorem is valid on its assumptions these assumptions are considerably stronger and the theorem is less comforting about the stability of democratic government than one might at first suppose

probabilistic voting and equilibrium an impossibility result the introduction of voters uncertainty alone is in no way sufficient to guarantee an equilibrium outcome of a voting process what is needed in addition is the assumption that the voting probabilities depend strictly convex respectively concave of the utility losses caused by the proposed policies of the different parties this assumption is however not compatible with an unrestricted policy space and it has to be rejected for theoretical as well as empirical reasons thus using models of probabilistic voting we still have to accept that cycles can arise and electoral outcomes are prone to manipulation via agenda setting

international currency substitution and the income velocity of money abstract this paper presents new empirical evidence on the degree to which international currency substitution destabilizes domestic money demand it also provides an explanation of some apparent discrepancies among previous empirical studies of currency substitution this explanation hinges on the distinction between the elasticity of currency substitution and the cross elasticity of money demand a large small value of one elasticity does not imply a large small value of the other a large cross elasticity is required for currency substitution to destabilize domestic money demand the empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the view that these cross elasticities are typically small

currency substitution and the demand for money some evidence for canada recently the possibility that foreign and domestic currencies are substitutes has received considerable attention see 1 2 3 10 19 21 currency substitution has important implications for the working of flexible exchange rates if the degree of currency substitution is high small changes in the money supply would induce large changes in the exchange rate furthermore currency substitution would transmit the effect of monetary disturbances from one country to another indeed significant currency substitution would seriously undermine the ability of flexible exchange rates to provide monetary independence this paper examines the empirical importance of currency substitution in the framework of the demand function for money if currency substitution is important the expected change in the exchange rate should be a significant determinant of the demand for home currency in section 2 we undertake such a test for the canadian demand for money during the recent flexible exchange rate period there is considerable evidence that the forward exchange rate is a good measure of the expected exchange rate our own tests confirm these results for canadian data since 1970

currency substitution and the optimal inflation tax abstract there exist conflicting results on the optimal inflation tax in open economies subject to currency substitution this paper reconciles the different results and concludes that except in very special cases the optimal inflation tax is positive

on the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates in this paper we consider a particular international economic policy regime the laissez faire regime the distinguishing features of which are unrestricted portfolio choice and floating exchange rates and as we show this regime although favored by many economists is not economically feasible it does not have a determinate equilibrium that is an implication of an overlapping generations model more basically it is an implication of the notion that money is wanted only in order to accomplish trades

economic exchange during hyperinflation historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt individuals normal trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning of markets to explore these issues we construct a theoretical model of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of economic exchange in our model buyers must carry cash while shopping and some transactions take place in a decentralized setting in which buyer and seller negotiate over the terms of trade of an indivisible good since buyers face the constant threat of incoming younger hence richer customers their bargaining position is weakened by inflation allowing sellers to extract a higher real price however we show that higher inflation also reduces buyers search increasing sellers wait for customers as a result the volume of transactions concluded in the decentralized sector falls at high enough rates of inflation all agents suffer a welfare loss

international currency substitution and seigniorage in a simple model of money i introduction currency substitution describes the change in the holdings of domestic and foreign real balances in response to fluctuations in the relative prices of these currencies so far the empirical evidence on the strength of currency substitution has been mixed miles 1978 finds evidence in favor of strong currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar bordo and choudhri 1982 criticize miles on the ground that miles has a misspecified model and their estimates of a canadian money demand function indicate little currency substitution in a recent paper rogers 1992 finds that dollarization in a high inflation economy such as mexico s is quite strong and statistically significant imrohoroglu 1994 on the other hand estimates the extent of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar using a gmm approach and finds that the elasticity of currency substitution in canada is quite low between 0 29 and 0 43 depending on the instruments used furthermore the estimate of the share of u s dollar denominated deposits in producing canadian liquidity services is on the order of 1 percent to 3 percent the policy implications of currency substitution have been extensively analyzed most of these studies concentrate on the impact of currency substitution on the volatility of exchange rates and the autonomy of domestic monetary policy under a flexible exchange rate regime 1 recently researchers have started to explore whether currency substitution alters the results in the optimal inflation tax literature for example vegh 1989 shows that it may be optimal to resort to the inflation tax under currency substitution since it reduces the distortion introduced by an exogenously given positive foreign interest rate in his model a positive foreign interest rate creates a distortion because it acts as an indirect consumption tax kimbrough 1991 analyzes a small open economy under currency substitution where domestic agents are required to use domestic real balances to purchase the domestic nontraded good foreign real balances to purchase the imported good and either domestic or foreign real balances to purchase the exportable good he finds that it is optimal to follow the friedman rule of a zero nominal interest rate in this setup since money serves as an intermediate good guidotti and vegh 1993 however argue that kimbrough s 1991 result only applies under very restrictive assumptions on the transactions technology and that in general the optimal inflation rate is positive under currency substitution aizenman 1992 considers a multi country money in the utility function model in a common currency area where there are collection costs associated with income taxation he shows that in the absence of a cartel agreement on how to share the seigniorage revenue the optimal inflation rate for individual countries will exceed the optimal inflation rate under a cooperative solution canzoneri and diba 1992 study the role of currency substitution in a two country money in the utility function model under a flexible exchange rate regime where there are collection costs of lump sum taxes they show that the outcome of a noncooperative seigniorage maximization or welfare maximization game is characterized by the friedman rule the cooperative outcome on the other hand includes the inflation tax as part of an optimal tax package since lump sum taxes are costly to collect the theoretical literature summarized above suggests that currency substitution may have important economic implications most of the attention has been on the role of the elasticity of currency substitution the share of foreign real balances in the residents domestic portfolio has largely been ignored laney radcliffe and willett 1984 and joines 1985 emphasize the distinction between the elasticity of substitution and the cross elasticity of money demand and argue that a high cross elasticity is necessary for currency substitution to have a major destabilizing impact on domestic money demand

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

the economics and politics of the structure of public expenditure the paper derives a complete system ofdemand equations for public consumptionexpenditures as the outcome of rationalbehaviour in a model where governmentmaximizes expected electoral support theallocation of expenditures is found todepend not only on the prices of publicservices and total expenditure and tosatisfy the constraints of demand theory which have been the focus of attention ofprevious empirical studies of theallocation of public expenditures but inaddition on the prices of privateconsumption goods the distribution ofvoter incomes and the expected change invoter support from varying the levels ofpublic provision

debt and tariffs an empirical investigation of the evolution of revenue systems abstract this paper presents a theoretical framework where government chooses fiscal structure so as to maximize political support and where the evolution of fiscal systems is determined by changing economic political and administrative factors estimating equations are derived and the model is used to explain the development of revenue structure in canada from 1871 to 1913 a period when major revenue sources consisted of the tariff debt and excises the empirical analysis distinguishes between government plans and ex post observations of public revenues and places particular emphasis on the derivation of hypotheses linking economic political and administrative variables to revenue structure

the currency substitution hypothesis and relative money demand in mexico and canada the author estimates demand for dollars relative to domestic currency in mexico and canada using 1 a multivariate model with a relative money demand equation and 2 single equation models including an error correction representation he also analyzes the models encompassing properties the anomalous correlation between the mexican dollarization ratio and expected peso depreciation implies that convertibility risk was associated with holding mexidollars under this interpretation higher expected depreciation coincides with a drop in relative demand for dollars because there is the possibility that the government will forcibly convert mexdollars when these central bank liabilities rise and foreign reserves run low several testable alternative explanations are rejected copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

currency substitution and seigniorage maximizing inflation the case of cambodia this article contributes a new empirical study on currency substitution in cambodia in our analysis a model of money in the utility function is adopted the empirical results indicate that the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic real currency balances in cambodia is high moreover the high share of foreign real balances in providing domestic liquidity services in cambodia is also confirmed by empirical analysis given these findings the effects of the currency substitution on the government ability to gain from seigniorage revenue are also examined the analysis from simulated results shows that the cambodian government has little opportunity to gain from seigniorage revenue

endogenous tariff formation under representative democracy a probabilistic voting model wolfgang mayer 1984 applied duncan black s 1948 median voter theorem to investigate endogenous tariff formation under direct democracy this paper extends mayer s model from direct to representative democracy the extension from direct to representative democracy is straightforward if candidates possess perfect information one can still apply the median voter theorem for a candidate in a two party representative democracy also chooses the most preferred tariff of the median voter mayer 1984 himself fully recognized this direct extension 2 nevertheless if candidates possess imperfect information which is believed typical in the real world how the medianvoter outcome might alter or be modified remains unanswered the purpose of the current paper is to answer the question that candidates are something more than simply policy surrogates is the highlight of the article by james m enelow and melvin j hinich 1982 in contrast to direct democracy in which only policies matter in voter choices in a representative democracy candidates are thought to be judged by voters on the basis of both nonpolicy candidate characteristics and proposed policies in this paper i adopt the view of enelow and hinich 1982 and combine it with candidate uncertainty more specifically i consider a model incorporating candidates lack of information regarding voters nonpolicy preferences the model gives rise to probabilistic rather than deterministic voting 3 i show that in such a framework the equilibrium tariff is no longer dictated by the most preferred tariff of the median voter but is a weighted mean or even the mean of voters most preferred tariffs moreover the income distribution resulting from the equilibrium tariff tends to be more equalized than that from free trade the plan of the paper is as follows section i introduces the model of the paper it consists of an economic and a political structure section ii characterizes the equilibrium tariff and discusses its implications for income distribution concluding remarks are presented in section iii

foreign inflation transmission under flexible exchange rates and currency substitution the dynamic and steady state effects of a permanent unanticipated increase in foreign inflation on a small open economy are analyzed under flexible exchange rates and currency substitution the velocity of domestic money and consequently the domestic inflation rate may rise along the transition path to steady state but only if demand for foreign currency is sufficiently elastic such that the substitution from foreign to domestic money on impact is large higher foreign inflation is transmitted negatively when demand is inelastic all else constant a higher initial level of foreign real balances increases the magnitude of the transmission effects copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

gmm estimates of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar this paper investigates the empirical strength of currency substitution between the canadian dollar and the u s dollar euler equations implied by a small open economy money in the utility function model are estimated and tested by hansen s generalized method of moments procedure the major empirical finding is that both the elasticity of currency substitution and the share of u s currency in the production of canadian liquidity services are economically small even though the combined domestic and u s real balances appear to provide statistically significant economizing on transactions costs copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

optimal taxation and inflation in an open economy abstract this paper examines the role of the inflation tax in the optimal revenue raising tax package for a small open economy where money is held because it serves to reduce transacttions costs associated with purchasing goods consumers choose whether domestic money or foreign money will serve as the medium of exchange for various goods purchases so as to minimize such costs results are derived regarding the appropriate role of taxes on domestic and foreign money in the optimal tax structure it is demonstrated that with a sufficiently rich tax structure friedman s rule which calls for a monetary policy that drives the nominal interest rate to zero is a component of the optimal tax policy

political influence economic interests and endogenous tax structure in a computable equilibrium framework with application to the united states 1973 and 1983 we consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model ofa competitive political economy in which the economic interestsof groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibriumpolicy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed the model incorporates an amended version of the gemtap taxmodel calibrated to data for the united states for 1973 and1983 emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of gemtaphouseholds into homogeneous groups affects the numericalrepresentation of interests and influence for representativemembers of each group

the competitive externalities and the optimal seignorage this study analyzes the inflation tax in an economy with several competing decisionmakers who can effectively print more money via the central bank the author derives the sequential rational expectation equilibrium and shows that the presence of competing decisionmakers increases the inflation rate and may put the economy on the wrong side of the inflation tax laffer curve the analysis is interpreted for a country consisting of several states or provinces where the centralized government system is weak similar results apply to the case of competing ministers in an economy where the central bank is weak copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

the optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency substitution abstract an important result in the optimal inflation tax literature is that if money is modeled as reducing transactions costs the optimal nominal interest rate is zero this paper examines this issue in the context of a small open economy where both domestic and foreign currency circulate as media of exchange it is shown that the presence of foreign money enables the government to reduce the distortion introduced into the economy by a positive foreign nominal interest rate by setting a positive domestic nominal interest rate

labor turnover wage structures and moral hazard the inefficiency of competitive markets a multiperiod general equilibrium model of the labor market is developed in which risk averse workers are faced with job related uncertainty and labor turnover is costly if a worker is unlucky and suffers a bad job match he quits and joins another firm hoping that he will like its work environment more because the quality of a job match is unobservable workers cannot insure against the risk of a bad match the firm provides implicit insurance against job dissatisfaction typically by paying workers more than their net marginal products in their early years with the firm and less subsequently since the probabilities of the insured against events the quit rates over time are affected by the amount of such insurance provided this implicit insurance is characterized by moral hazard individuals quit when in the absence of insurance they would not the equilibrium contract balances out efficiency in risk bearing with efficiency in turnover incentives we show that the equilibrium contract is not con