the allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain push pull and advance purchase discount contracts while every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk the cost of insufficient supply some firms may even with wholesale price contracts completely avoid inventory risk the cost of unsold inventory with a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer by ordering his entire supply before the selling season bears all of the supply chain s inventory risk a pull contract also has a single wholesale price but the supplier bears the supply chain s inventory risk because only the supplier holds inventory while the retailer replenishes as needed during the season examples include vendor managed inventory with consignment and drop shipping an advance purchase discount has two wholesale prices a discounted price for inventory purchased before the season and a regular price for replenishments during the selling season advance purchase discounts allow for intermediate allocations of inventory risk the retailer bears the risk on inventory ordered before the season while the supplier bears the risk on any production in excess of that amount this research studies how the allocation of inventory risk via these three types of wholesale price contracts impacts supply chain efficiency the ratio of the supply chain s profit to its maximum profit it is found that the efficiency of a single wholesale price contract is considerably higher than previously thought as long as firms consider both push and pull contracts in other words the literature has exaggerated the value of implementing coordinating contracts i e contracts that achieve 100 efficiency such as buy backs or revenue sharing because coordinating contracts are compared against an inappropriate benchmark often just a push contract furthermore if firms also consider advance purchase discounts which are also simple to administer then the coordination of the supply chain and the arbitrary allocation of its profit is possible several limitations of advance purchase discounts are discussed

information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace this paper examines the interaction of information provision product quality and pricing decisions by competitive firms to explore the following question in a competitive market where consumers face uncertainty about product quality and or their preference for quality which firms those that sell higher or lower quality products have the higher incentive to provide what type of information we find that while the higher quality firm should always provide information resolving consumer uncertainty on product quality the lower quality firm under certain conditions will have the higher incentive to and will be the one to provide information resolving consumer uncertainty about their quality preferences in the analysis we trace the latter result to competition and to free riding on the information provision specifically in a monopoly market or when consumer free riding is restricted by the costliness of store visits the lower quality firm would have a lower incentive to provide information resolving consumer preference uncertainty than otherwise the model is also adapted to examine product returns as a possible strategy of information provision

retail pricing and clearance sales sellers of new products are faced with having to guess demand conditions to set price appropriately but sellers are able to adjustprice over time and to learn from past mistakes additionally it is not necessary that all goods be sold with certainty it is sometimes better to set a high price and to risk no sale this process is modeledto explain retail pricing behavior and the time distribution of transactions prices start high and fall as a function of time on theshelf the initial price and rate of decline can be predicted and depends on thinness of the market the proportion of customers who are window shoppers and other observable characteristics copyright 1986 by american economic association

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

service escape profiting from customer cancellations this paper explores the benefits of letting customers escape from prepurchased service contracts by offering refunds for cancellations we show that such a policy creates opportunities for multiple selling in a capacity constrained service i e collecting cancellation fees from advance buyers who cancel and then reselling the freed slots the better the alternative that motivates a cancellation the more profitable is a refund for cancellations policy compared with a no refund policy that locks in customers in contrast to previous research on money back guarantees for durable goods we show that offering refunds for service cancellations can be profitable 1 without charging a higher price compared with a no refund policy and 2 even when advance buyers would be willing to abandon the service for no refund also service providers should decrease rather than increase the customer hassle cost of cancellations our research also suggests a new profit advantage of advance selling i e capturing some of the consumer added surplus created when customers find new alternatives and are therefore willing to pay a fee to terminate the prepurchased contract finally yield management research typically assumes exogenous no shows by advance buyers we suggest that offering refunds for cancellation reduces the need to reserve capacity for high paying customers and improves capacity utilization

facilitating fit revelation in the competitive market this study examines firms strategic decisions in the competitive market regarding whether to engage in marketing activities to assist consumers in finding the fit between their personal tastes and products horizontal attributes we find that competitive firms strategies to facilitate fit revelation critically depend on the product qualities they offer in particular a firm offering a high quality product is more likely to facilitate fit revelation in the competitive market than it would as a market monopolist whereas a firm offering a low quality product is less likely to do so in addition the firm offering the high quality product implements fit revealing activities in a greater intensity than its rival that offers the low quality product if the quality difference between the two products is small and both products qualities are sufficiently high

price and order postponement in a decentralized newsvendor model with multiplicative and price dependent demand we analyze the effect of price and order postponement in a decentralized newsvendor model with multiplicative and price dependent demand wherein the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and possibly offers a buyback rate and the retailer determines the order quantity and retail price such postponement strategies can be used by the retailer by delaying his operational decisions order quantity and retail price until after demand uncertainty is observed we show how the equilibrium values of the contract parameters and profits are affected by i vertical competition ii type of contract wholesale price only or buyback iii demand distribution iv form of the expected demand function and v the timing of the retailer s operational decisions although in most cases postponement is quite beneficial for the channel members we show that for some model parameters due to vertical competition the expected value of perfect information about demand for price postponement and order postponement may be negative for the channel and even surprisingly for both members we also show that when a buyback option is offered neither order postponement nor price postponement has an effect on the equilibrium wholesale price profit allocation ratio between the manufacturer and the retailer and channel efficiency and that the equilibrium wholesale price expected retail price profit allocation ratio between the manufacturer and the retailer and channel efficiency in the model with buyback options under either order or price postponement further coincide with their counterparts in the corresponding deterministic model

price competition and compatibility in the presence of positive demand externalities in many cases the benefit to a consumer of a product increases with the number of other users of the same product these demand interdependencies are referred to in the literature as positive demand externalities or network externalities this paper examines the dynamic pricing behaviors of an incumbent and a later entrant with special attention to the impacts of demand externalities compatibility and competition on prices and profits defining market power as the ability to price above a competitor without losing market share we show how demand externalities and installed base combine to confer market power we model optimal pricing as a differential game with the optimal price trajectory established as nash open loop controls for a duopoly durable goods market with strong demand externalities the results show an increasing price trajectory can be optimal as expected a new entrant is better off if its products are compatible with those of the incumbent especially when demand externalities are strong and the installed base of the incumbent is large less intuitively the incumbent as well may be better off agreeing on common standards the comparison of monopoly and duopoly shows that under strong demand externalities and a small installed base the incumbent profits from compatible entry

optimal decisions for sellers considering valuation bias and strategic consumer reactions abstract in the online market for new and innovative products valuation bias commonly occurs between the initial valuation before purchase and the true valuation after purchase as a result of the consumer s lack of knowledge regarding the product valuation bias works in a complex manner on the one hand positive valuation bias increases the seller s demand while on the other hand it can also cause consumers to return their purchases which results in losses for the seller this paper first investigates the effect of the bias on the seller s optimal pricing the optimal price is determined always to increase strictly in the valuation bias if and only if the valuation bias does not exceed the consumer s return cost this result remains true regardless of whether the seller decides on the stocking quantity in addition to the valuation bias we consider strategic consumer reactions to the bias in two selling periods namely the advance period and the spot period our analysis finds that the seller s selling strategies e g pre announcing pricing trends are significantly affected by the relationship between valuation bias and the strategic consumer s estimation of the bias in addition though the optimal selling period is either the advance selling term or the spot selling term the seller does not need to provide for both periods sequentially we also determine that the unannounced pricing trend strategy and the announced non increasing pricing trend strategy are equivalent when the seller faces strategic consumers

probabilistic selling in quality differentiated markets probabilistic selling the sale of synthetic products consisting of a lottery between two distinct goods has been extensively analyzed in horizontal markets in this research we investigate probabilistic selling in quality differentiated markets this is an important new dimension of inquiry because of the widespread prevalence of quality differentiated markets as well as significant differences in the preference structure across these markets in fact this latter consideration casts doubt as to whether probabilistic selling will even emerge in quality differentiated markets we find that probabilistic selling emerges in quality differentiated markets as a way to profitably dispose excess capacity moreover probabilistic selling remains viable even under endogenous quality choice in addition in markets where sellers employ strong quality differentiation the introduction of an intermediate probabilistic good actually causes closer quality levels in a product line and enhances consumer welfare in contrast in markets where sellers employ weak quality differentiation the introduction of an intermediate probabilistic good increases quality separation and degrades consumer welfare overall we view our contribution as one of characterizing the optimality implementation and policy implications of probabilistic selling in quality differentiated markets this paper was accepted by pradeep chintagunta marketing

using yield management to shift demand when the peak time is unknown traditional peak load and stochastic peak load models assume firms have prior information about when peak demand occurs however price dispersion such as is typically used by firms practicing yield management can achieve some of the same efficient demand shifting even when the peak time is unknown equilibrium price dispersion arises because of stochastic demand and price rigidities but a previously unexplored benefit of price dispersion is its ability to reduce equilibrium capacity costs through demand shifting the model also suggests how yield management now more commonly called revenue management might actually benefit business travellers contrary to the popular prejudice

rational and adaptive performance expectations in a customer satisfaction framework this article develops and tests alternative models of market level expectations perceived product performance and customer satisfaction market performance expectations are argued to be largely rational in nature yet adaptive to changing market conditions customer satisfaction is conceptualized as a cumulative construct that is affected by market expectations and performance perceptions in any given period and is affected by past satisfaction from period to period an empirical study that supports adaptive market expectations and stable market satisfaction using data from the swedish customer satisfaction barometer is reported

constructive consumer choice processes consumer decision making has been a focal interest in consumer research and consideration of current marketplace trends e g technological change an information explosion indicates that this topic will continue to be critically important we argue that consumer choice is inherently constructive due to limited processing capacity consumers often do not have well defined existing preferences but construct them using a variety of strategies contingent on task demands after describing constructive choice consumer decision tasks and decision strategies we provide an integrative framework for understanding constructive choice review evidence for constructive consumer choice in light of that framework and identify knowledge gaps that suggest opportunities for additional research

why do hot dogs come in packs of 10 and buns in 8s or 12s a demand side investigation this paper presents a theory that yields insight into the determination of package prices and sizes consumer heterogeneity in consumption rates storage costs and transactions costs costs of making trips to the store explains differences in package sizes and unit prices in the model fully informed consumers and a monopolist seller pursue optimizing behavior the seller chooses package sizes and prices to maximize profits and the consumers select package sizes that maximize their utilities the authors show that consumer heterogeneity may induce the seller to offer more than one size and that larger sizes would be sold either at unit price discounts or unit price premiums welfare implications and empirical tests of the theory are presented copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

joint inventory and markdown management for perishable goods with strategic consumer behavior in this paper we formulate and analyze a novel model on a firm s dynamic inventory and markdown decisions for perishable goods we consider a dynamic stochastic setting where every period consists of two phases clearance phase and regular sales phase in the clearance phase the firm decides how much to order for regular sales as well as whether to markdown some or all of the leftover inventory from the previous period that will be disposed otherwise since strategic consumers may buy the product during clearance sales for future consumption markdown may cannibalize future sales at regular price hence the firm needs to make a trade off between product spoilage and intertemporal demand substitution we show that the firm should either put all of the leftover inventory on discount or dispose all of it and the choice depends on the amount of leftover inventory from the previous period in particular the firm should introduce markdown when the amount of leftover inventory is higher than a certain th

contracts biases and consumption of access services we study theoretically and empirically the consumption of access services we demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure pay per use versus three part tariffs even if the optimal consumption plans are identical we find that although there is extensive individual heterogeneity on average consumers choices follow a structure that is similar to a nearly optimal heuristic and correctly react to imbalances between the number of free calls and call opportunities remaining however consumers use the free units too quickly leading to overconsumption and lost surplus these errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution we also measure subjects willingness to pay for a contract with free access units and we find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per unit price with a substantial fraction willing to overpay in response the optimal firm strategy offers a three part tariff at a very small discount which increases revenue by 8 14 compared to only offering a pay per use contract data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1889 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

revenue management with partially refundable fares we introduce and analyze an intertemporal choice model where customer valuations are uncertain and evolve over time the model leads directly to the study of call options on capacity that are similar to partially refundable fares we show that the capacity provider earns significantly higher revenues by selling real options on capacity than on low to high pricing we also investigate the social implications and show that the use of options is both socially optimal and socially efficient

service cancellation and competitive refund policy although previous research demonstrates the profitability of partial refund policies in a monopoly setting there is a certain lack of ubiquity in practice about these refunds in competitive service markets this raises the question of how a partial refund policy may work and whether it is even sustainable in a competitive environment this study investigates how competition may influence the profitability and the equilibrium choice of refund policies it is shown that partial refunds may endogenously change the nature of strategic interaction between service providers from local monopolies into a competition regime which moderates the gains from exploiting the efficiency enhancing effect of partial refunds a whole range of pure strategy equilibria can be obtained as a result of the interplay between the efficiency improving and the competition intensifying effects when the capacity is small large such that the efficiency improving the competition intensifying effect is dominant both firms in equilibrium follow identical partial zero refund policies moreover interestingly the symmetric firms may end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm follows a partial refund policy and the other adopts a zero refund policy

consumer uncertainty and purchase decision reversals theory and evidence this research examines how prepurchase information that reduces consumer uncertainty about a product or service can affect consumer decisions to reverse an initial product purchase or service enrollment decision one belief commonly held by retailers is that provision of greater amounts of information before the purchase reduces decision reversals we provide theory and evidence showing conditions under which uncertainty reducing information provided before the purchase decision can actually increase the number of decision reversals predictions generated from an analytical model of consumer behavior incorporating behavioral theory of reference dependence are complemented by empirical evidence from both a controlled behavioral experiment and econometric analysis of archival data combined the theory and evidence suggest that managers should be aware that their information provision decisions taken to reduce decision reversals may actually increase them data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mksc 2015 0906

the effects of international differences in the tax treatment of goodwill a comment this paper suggests that a hypothesis in a previous paper in this journal is false the hypothesis relates to the tax deductibility of goodwill but the paper does not distinguish between goodwill on consolidation which is not tax deductible and other purchased goodwill which is deductible in some jurisdictions

selling to strategic consumers when product value is uncertain the value of matching supply and demand we address the value of quick response production practices when selling to a forward looking consumer population with uncertain heterogeneous valuations for a product consumers have the option of purchasing the product early before its value has been learned or delaying the purchase decision until a time at which valuation uncertainty has been resolved whereas individual consumer valuations are uncertain ex ante the market size is uncertain to the firm the firm may either commit to a single production run at a low unit cost prior to learning demand or commit to a quick response strategy that allows additional production after learning additional demand information we find that the value of quick response is generally lower with strategic forward looking customers than with nonstrategic myopic customers in this setting indeed it is possible for a quick response strategy to decrease the profit of the firm though whether this occurs depends on various characteristics of the market specifically we identify conditions under which quick response increases profit when prices are increasing when dissatisfied consumers can return the product at a cost to the firm and conditions under which quick response may decrease profit when prices are constant or when consumer returns are not allowed this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations and supply chain management

competitive response and equilibria this paper investigates the relationship between market share and promotional expenditures the long run using data that span a decade and 91 product categories we find that market shares are stationary for a majority of the products in the data base we find that relative promotional expenditures for the products are offsetting in the long run finally for products whose market shares show a trend it is difficult to discern the impact of relative promotional expenditure on the evolution of market share this result generalizes the empirical finding of bass et al bass f m m m givon m u kalwani d reibstein g p wright 1984 an investigation into the order of the brand choice process marketing sci 3 4 267 287 that offsetting competitive activity plays a role in the maintenance of what appears to be stationary and zero order behavior

tiers in one sided matching markets theory and experimental investigation the design of a matching market may affect behavior in prematch stages in some settings forward looking agents might purchase low priced properties with the intention of trading up from a design standpoint such behavior is undesirable we investigate a tiered structure as a potential solution using a model that endogenizes prematch acquisition decisions we show that tiers promote exchange while protecting the primary market in the laboratory we find that both firm revenue and total social surplus are improved by tiered matching and the amount of improvement depends on the exchange mechanism the firm uses we focus on two popular mechanisms deposit first and request first we find that subjects are less likely to take advantage of the match under tier free deposit first mechanism possibly because of risk aversion thus a tiered approach is more critical under the request first mechanism we confirm that risk aversion partly explains deviations from theory this paper was accepted by uri gneezy

fare prediction websites and transaction prices empirical evidence from the airline industry the marketing and operations disciplines have increasingly accounted for the presence of strategic consumer behavior theory suggests that such behavior exists when consumers are able to consider future distribution of prices and that this behavior exposes firms to intertemporal competition that results with a downward pressure on prices however deriving future distribution of prices is not a trivial task online decision support tools that provide consumers with information about future distributions of prices can facilitate strategic consumer behavior this paper studies whether the availability of such information affects transacted prices by conducting an empirical analysis in the context of the airline industry studying the effect at the route level we find significant price reduction effects as such information becomes available for a route both in fixed effects and difference in differences estimation models this effect is consistent across the different fare percentiles and amounts to a red

optimal pricing with speculators and strategic consumers this paper studies a monopolist firm selling a fixed capacity the firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high consumers may strategically choose when to purchase and they may also choose to purchase from the firm or from the speculators we characterize equilibrium prices and profits and analyze the long run capacity decisions of the firm there are three major findings first the presence of speculators increases the firm s expected profits even though the resale market competes with the firm second by facilitating resale the firm can mimic dynamic pricing outcomes and enjoy the associated benefits while charging a fixed price third speculative behavior may generate incentives for the seller to artificially restrict supply and thus may lead to lower capacity investments we also explore several model extensions that highlight the robustness of our results

the effects of an undisclosed regular price and a positive leadtime in a presale mechanism abstract a presale program is popular with manufacturers who wish to reduce the risk posed by uncertain demands we introduce a new price mechanism in which the manufacturer during the presale period does not disclose the exact regular price in the sale period although it is guaranteed to customers to be higher than the presale price as positive leadtime is much overlooked in presale models we analyze the rationality of including one the numerical results in this paper show that both the specific price mechanism and the positive leadtime have significant effects on the manufacturer s policy production quantity presale price regular price the expected profit and customer behaviors the optimal discount rate should be greater than 50 percent this conclusion is consistent with existing results of surveys on saturation points the manufacturer can take advantage of the latest information on demand gathered in the presale period to update their policy and increase their expected profit

managing product variety with advance selling and capacity restrictions abstract in this research we analyze the impact of advance selling with price discount on a firms ability to maximize the expected profit the production environment of the firm is characterized by short selling cycle multiple products demand variability and capacity restrictions the advance orders are randomly distributed with the parameters dependent on the discount levels under advance selling the advance orders are used to update the demand forecast of selling season and are delivered at the start of the selling season the problem is modeled as a three stage stochastic non linear programming problem we derive the concavity of the problem under customers willingness to buy in advance our solution methodology comprises the variance reduction technique of antithetic variates that gives credible value of price discount levels for different sets of demand values we also provide sensitivity analysis of the problem parameters to derive insights into the behavior of the expected profit and the benefits due to advance selling under capacity restrictions

cargo capacity management with allotments and spot market demand we consider a problem faced by an airline that operates a number of parallel flights to transport cargo between a particular origin to destination pair the airline can sell its cargo capacity either through allotment contracts or on the spot market where customers exhibit choice behavior between different flights the goal is to simultaneously select allotment contracts among available bids and find a booking control policy for the spot market to maximize the sum of the profit from the allotments and the total expected profit from the spot market we formulate the booking control problem on the spot market as a dynamic program and construct approximations to its value functions which can be used to estimate the total expected profit from the spot market we show that our value function approximations provide upper bounds on the optimal total expected profit from the spot market and they allow us to solve the allotment selection problem through a sequence of linear mixed integer programs with a special structure furthermore the value function approximations are useful for constructing a booking control policy for the spot market with desirable monotonic properties computational experiments show that the proposed approach can be scaled to realistic problems and provides well performing allotment allocation and booking control decisions

competition and two part tariffs monopoly power of some sort is thought to have viewed two part tariffs as price discrimibe a necessary condition for a firm to have the nation devices empower to price discriminate for example a firm ployed exclusively by prefers to use a two part tariff see oi 1971 firms with market rather than charge a single price for output power this paper ofhowever a competing firm could always charge fers an explanation for the use of such price a single price that consumers would prefer and schedules by firms in earn nonnegative profits thus it seems that the highly competitive marexistence of competition in a market would result kets such as health in the elimination of any two part tariff howclubs it is argued that ever the existence of two part tariffs in many in a world with buyer markets that are or appear to be competitive uncertainty about future demands they can belies this standard assumption this paper exprovide insurance for plains why monopoly power is not required for risk averse buyers the the existence of a two part tariff i show circumfixed entry fee finances stances in which price discrimination using a a marginal price below marginal cost it is two part tariff is preferred by consumers to a sinshown that the benefits gle price and therefore why this pricing method from this lower price will be found in competitive markets such pricwill under certain ing occurs in environments with uncertainty bespecified conditions cause two part tariffs act as a form of insurance outweigh the costs of ex ante consumers plan consumption however the entry fee there is a random component to their consump

a rational reconstruction of the compromise effect using market data to infer utilities this article explores the possibility that consumers use market data to make inferences about product utilities the argument is made by means of an example based on the compromise effect found in extant experimental data this phenomenon is generally looked at as a manifestation of deviations from rationality in choice however assuming full rationality i describe a decision rule that is based on consumers inferences about their personal valuation of alternatives from the portfolio of market offerings and some information about their own relative tastes through a number of examples i will argue that consumers often use this or similar decision rules to make inferences about utility i then show that the decision rule may generate compromise effects in experiments and that it may be sustainable the compromise effect could therefore be seen as preliminary evidence that consumers make such inferences

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

selection in migration and return migration evidence from micro data linked micro data from sweden and finland confirm predictions of migrant selection theory migrants are found to be negatively and return migrants positively selected on observable skills whereas there is only minor selection on unobservable skills

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

electronic tickets smart cards and online prepayments when and how to advance sell advance selling occurs when sellers allow buyers to purchase at a time preceding consumption shugan and xie 2000 electronic tickets smart cards online prepayments and other technological advances make advance selling possible for many if not all service providers these technologies lower the cost of making complex transactions at a greater distance from the seller s site they also give sellers more control over advance selling by decreasing arbitrage as technology enhances the capability to advance sell more academic attention is vital this paper strives to exploit these technologies by developing advance selling strategies until recently advance selling research focused on the airline industry and specific characteristics of that industry these characteristics included the price insensitivity of late arrivals e g business travelers compared with early arrivals e g leisure travelers demand uncertainty across flights on the same day and capacity constraints recent findings by shugan and xie 2000 show that advance selling is a far more general marketing tool than previously thought it does not require these industry specific characteristics it only requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuations moreover sellers without the ability to price discriminate can use advance selling to improve profits to the level of first degree price discrimination this finding is important because buyers are nearly always uncertain about their future valuations for most services e g the utility of next year s vacation or a future college education in this paper we take the next step from shugan and xie 2000 we show that advance selling profits do not come from buyer surplus but from more buyers being able to purchase we determine when and how to advance sell in a variety of situations including situations with limited capacity second period arrivals refunds buyer risk aversion exogenous credibility continuous preference distributions and premium pricing we determine when advance selling improves profits and when it does how to set advance prices we ask and answer seven questions first when should sellers advance sell second how much can advance selling improve profits compared with only spot selling third what factors impact the profitability of advance selling and how fourth should advance prices be higher or lower or the same as spot prices fifth how do capacity constraints impact advance selling strategies sixth should sellers limit the number of advance sales finally what is the possible impact of buyer risk aversion first we provide precise conditions when sellers should advance sell for example without capacity constraints we show that sellers should advance sell when marginal costs are sufficiently low to make it profitable to sell to buyers with low valuations and sufficiently high to convince buyers that the spot price will be higher than the advance price second we find that advance selling can almost double the profits from optimal spot selling to early arrivals we also show that advance selling has no impact on consumer surplus in markets with homogenous consumers and no capacity constraints therefore advance selling can increase social welfare because seller profits increase third we find that two very important factors impacting the profitability of advance selling are seller credibility and marginal costs buyers only advance buy when they expect an advantage from advance buying over spot buying without capacity constraints sellers must credibly convince buyers that the advance price is at a discount to the spot price we show that this condition is met under different circumstances for example large marginal costs can create credibility because buyers believe that these costs will lead to high spot prices fourth we find although optimal advance prices can be at a discount to the spot price that sometimes a premium is optimal premiums are optimal when capacity is large but limited and marginal costs are not too large buyers advance purchase at a premium to spot prices when capacity is limited and spot prices are low note that this is not a risk premium and risk aversion is not required no prior research has suggested this strategy because that research relies on the assumption that early arrivals are more price sensitive than later ones without that assumption premium advance pricing is sometimes optimal fifth we find that binding capacity constraints can impact the profitability of advance selling in opposite ways on one hand capacity constraints create seller credibility buyers believe that spot prices will be high when they know spot capacity is limited and perhaps more limited by advance sales on the other hand when capacity is limited the need to increase sales from discounted advance prices diminishes sixth consistent with desiraju and shugan 1999 we find that limiting advance sales can be profitable but only under restrictive conditions these conditions are 1 selling to all early arrivals would leave insufficient capacity in the spot period to sell to all second period arrivals with high valuations 2 the optimal spot price is high and 3 marginal costs are sufficiently small to make advance selling profitable finally we find that buyer risk aversion can sometimes increase the profitability of advance selling our findings provide precise guidelines for a large number of service providers that will have the technical capability to advance sell for those service providers advance selling provides a creative pricing strategy that can potentially provide substantial improvements in profits

option value a general approach this article examines a potential bias if expected consumer surplus is used to measure the benefits of a price change under uncertainty this bias which is called option value may be positive or negative a general framework is developed for analyzing the determinants of the sign of option value and this framework is applied to three types of uncertainty income uncertainty quality uncertainty and uncertainty over consumer tastes in the first two cases option value has a determinate sign however in the last case option value may be positive negative or zero in an unpredictable fashion

information acquisition for capacity planning via pricing and advance selling when to stop and act this paper investigates a capacity planning strategy that collects commitments to purchase before the capacity decision and uses the acquired advance sales information to decide on the capacity in particular we study a profit maximization model in which a manufacturer collects advance sales information periodically prior to the regular sales season for a capacity decision customer demand is stochastic and price sensitive once the capacity is set the manufacturer produces and satisfies customer demand to the extent possible from the installed capacity during the regular sales period we study scenarios in which the advance sales and regular sales season prices are set exogenously and optimally for both scenarios we establish the optimality of a control band or a threshold policy that determines when to stop acquiring advance sales information and how much capacity to build we show that advance selling can improve the manufacturer s profit significantly we generate insights into how operating conditions such as the capacity building cost and market characteristics such as demand variability affect the value of information acquired through advance selling from this analysis we identify the conditions under which advance selling for capacity planning is most valuable finally we study the joint benefits of acquiring information for capacity planning through advance selling and revenue management of installed capacity through dynamic pricing

advance selling when consumers regret we characterize the effect of anticipated regret on consumer decisions and on firm profits and policies in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations advance purchases trigger action regret if valuations turn out to be lower than the price paid whereas delaying purchase may cause inaction regret from missing a discount or facing a stockout consumers whom we describe as emotionally rational act strategically in response to the firm s policies and in anticipation of regret in this context regret explains two types of behavioral patterns inertia delayed purchase and frenzies buying early at negative surplus we show how firms should optimally respond to consumer regret and also characterize a normative regret threshold above which they should not advance sell action regret reduces profits as well as the value of advance selling and booking limit policies for price setting firms inaction regret has the opposite effects these effects are diminished by capacity constraints and are reversed for firms facing price pressure in the advance period owing e g to competition or market heterogeneity regret heterogeneity explains premium advance selling for the capacity constrained firm which may benefit from larger shares of regretful buyers finally we show how the negative effects of regret on profits can be mitigated by regret priming marketing campaigns and by offering refunds or options or allowing resales our results highlight the importance of assessing the relative strength of regret within and across market segments and of accounting for these factors in pricing and marketing policies this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

dynamic pricing and inventory management under inventory dependent demand we analyze a finite horizon periodic review joint pricing and inventory management model for a firm that replenishes and sells a product under the scarcity effect of inventory the demand distribution in each period depends negatively on the sales price and customer accessible inventory level at the beginning of the period the firm can withhold or dispose of its on hand inventory to deal with the scarcity effect we show that a customer accessible inventory dependent order up to dispose down to display up to list price policy is optimal moreover the optimal order up to display up to and list price levels are decreasing in the customer accessible inventory level when the scarcity effect of inventory is sufficiently strong the firm should display no positive inventory and deliberately make every customer wait the analysis of two important special cases wherein the firm cannot withhold or dispose of inventory delivers sharper insights showing that the inventory dependent demand drives both optimal prices and order up to levels down in addition we demonstrate that an increase in the operational flexibility e g a higher salvage value or the inventory withholding opportunity mitigates the demand loss caused by high excess inventory and increases the optimal order up to levels and sales prices we also generalize our model by incorporating responsive inventory reallocation after demand realizes finally we perform extensive numerical studies to demonstrate that both the profit loss of ignoring the scarcity effect and the value of dynamic pricing under the scarcity effect are significant

research note overselling with opportunistic cancellations in many business sectors such as airlines hotels trucking and media advertising customers arrivals and willingness to pay are uncertain managers must decide whether to quote a price low enough to guarantee early sales or to quote a higher price and risk that some units remain unsold in allocating capacity they face a trade off between two types of potential losses 1 yield loss selling at a low price and losing a better price later and 2 spoilage loss waiting in vain to sell at a high price and losing the opportunity of an earlier low price offer yield loss means that consumers who value the product most do not get to use it and spoilage loss means that valuable products are wasted because no consumers get to use them sellers typically hedge against the risk of spoilage loss by selling some units early at low prices and against the risk of yield loss by blocking some units in hope of selling them later at a high price in this paper we show that the use of overselling with opportunistic cancellations can increase expected profits and improve allocation efficiency under this strategy the seller deliberately oversells capacity if high paying consumers show up even when capacity is already fully booked the seller then cancels the sale to some low paying customers while providing them with appropriate compensation we derive a new rule to optimally allocate capacity to consumers when overselling is used and show that overselling helps limit the potential yield and spoilage losses yield loss is reduced because the seller can capture more high paying customers by compensating low paying customers who give up their right to the product spoilage loss is reduced because the compensation decreases the price spread perceived by the seller and as a result the seller is less anxious to speculate and block units overselling with opportunistic cancellations assures that the product will be sold to consumers who value it most this means that everybody wins and resources are allocated more efficiently than in conventional selling

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

dealing temporary price cuts by seller as a buyer discrimination mechanism this paper is concerned with temporary price cuts deals sales and specials as a mechanism for the seller to price discriminate between buyers with different intensities of demand we analyze why a seller offers such price cuts which buyers take advantage of them and what the parameters are that determine the amount and frequency of the discount offered in the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature on price deals 1 in section ii simple models of buyer and seller behavior are developed and we show why and how a seller adopts a dealing strategy section iii summarizes the key implications of the model and indicates how the price discrimination hypothesis could be tested in practice section iv suggests possible extensions of the model finally section v gives our conclusions in the marketing literature the issue of who is deal prone has been extensively researched an explanation for temporary price cuts usually called deals sales or specials is provided we hypothesize that they are a mechanism that discriminates between more intense and less intense demanders we further hypothesize a positive relationship between demand elasticity and holding costs buyers with more intense demand with high holding costs are those who will be buying the product at its regular price the low holdingcost buyers take advantage of deals by forward buying the model is applicable to three relationships 1 manufacturer reseller where the reseller may be a wholesaler or a retailer 2 resellerreseller for example wholesaler retailer and 3 retailer consumer we are grateful to michael mussa and albert madansky for their comments we also benefited from comments made by the marketing faculty of the wharton school at a seminar where an earlier version of this paper was presented neil beckwith in particular is acknowledged 1 for a more detailed review of deals and similar pricecutting mechanisms e g mail in rebates cents off labels coupons etc see narsimhan 1982 chan 2 journal of business 1985 vol 58 no 3 1985 by the university of chicago all rights reserved 0021 9398185 5803 0004 01 50

when choosing makes a good thing better temporal variations in the valuation of hedonic consumption abstract this research investigates how the valuation of delayed consumption of hedonic products such as concerts and chocolate varies with the passage of time between choice and consumption the authors find that when consumers make their own choices they exhibit increases in evaluations of delayed consumption but only if the interval between choice and consumption is relatively short the effect attenuates over longer periods resulting in an inverted u shaped relationship between evaluations and time in contrast when somebody else chooses the same option for the consumer evaluations decrease with the passage of time these effects depend on the extent of intrinsic motivation toward the object of consumption and occur only for consummatory consumption that is of inherent interest moreover anticipatory increases in evaluations before consumption have ironic negative effects on postconsumption evaluations the authors discuss implications and directions for further research

on optimal service capacity allocation policy in an advance selling environment in continuous time abstract based on some general reasonable assumptions this paper employs the techniques of calculus of variations and optimal control theory to derive 10 main propositions associated with a service provider who aims at maximizing the present value of revenues profits over a planning horizon in continuous time employing an aggregate pricing response function that is dependent on excess capacity and a convex service cost formulation the results show that i for a zero discount rate and unanticipated competitive entry units of service capacity are allocated evenly over time ii for a zero discount rate and anticipated competitive entry units of allocated service capacity are increasing over time iii for a positive discount rate and unanticipated competitive entry units of allocated service capacity are decreasing over time and iv for a positive discount rate and anticipated competitive entry units of allocated service capacity are increasing over time or are decreasing at first then increasing later in addition the questions of how deep a service firm should advance sell whether advance selling is optimal in continuous time and whether excess capacity could be an optimal strategy have been addressed furthermore related sensitivity analyses are performed and endpoint constraints together with alternative shapes of the service cost function are discussed the managerial implications of the study s results have been demonstrated

advance selling effects of interdependent consumer valuations and seller s capacity we examine the impact of consumer valuation interdependence and capacity on a firm s optimal selling strategies we consider a seller who can offer a single product to consumers twice in advance and in spot consumers choose whether and when to buy but if they buy in advance they are uncertain about their own valuations whether they buy in advance or in spot consumers valuations are realized in the spot period and they may range from fully independent to perfectly correlated creating markets with different characteristics of aggregate demand for the seller facing these consumers the seller chooses a portion of the total capacity to offer in advance and prices in both periods we describe how the optimal strategy and benefits of advance selling depend on the interdependence of consumer valuation as well as capacity level and other market parameters we find that a change in valuation interdependence can lead to dramatically different policies for the seller for example when individual valuations are highly diverse and the consumer population is large the seller must offer a discount during advance selling but may limit the advance sales on the other hand when valuations are highly correlated the seller can charge a premium price during advance selling for the same valuation interdependence the qualitative nature of the optimal strategy changes with available capacity this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management