competition between exchanges a research agenda this paper describes open research questions related to the competition and market structure of financial exchanges and argues that only a combination of industrial organization and finance can satisfactorily attack these questions two examples are discussed to illustrate how the combination of these two approaches can significantly enrich the analysis the network externality puzzle which refers to the question of why trading for the same security is often split across trading venues and the impact of the multi sided character of financial exchanges on pricing and profitability

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

coalition building in a spatial economy abstract we analyze the possibility and consequences of coalition formation among suppliers of retail services we first provide a framework in which producers of substitutes have an incentive to cluster in marketplaces to attract consumers dispersed in space owing to spatial externalities the resulting spatial equilibrium can be welfare suboptimal we characterize regimes in which we find too little and those in which there is too much agglomeration of firms we analyze the role of coalitions of firms e g initiated by a land developer in this framework and show that such coalitions can overcome the suboptimality of the decentralized spatial allocation

haggling over substitutes abstract using a model of substitutable goods i determine generic conditions on tastes which guarantee that fixed prices are not optimal the fully optimal tariff includes lotteries that is a profit maximising seller would employ a haggling strategy we show that the fully optimal selling strategy in a class of cases requires a seller to not allow themselves to focus on one good but to remain haggling over more than one good this throws new light on the selling strategies used in diverse industries these insights are used to provide a counter example to the no lotteries result of mcafee and mcmillan j econ theory 46 1988 335

large investors regulatory taking and investor state dispute settlement abstract this paper offers an economic analysis of an international investor state dispute settlement regime isds in markets with large investors it identifies a reason for strategic overinvestment by the domestic industry leading to permissive regulation in the absence of isds an ideal investor state dispute settlement arrangement efficiency oriented transaction cost free with untouchable fully reliable and unbiased judges has positive and negative effects in this framework it generates an equal level playing field for domestic and foreign investors but it magnifies an existing overinvestment problem and may reduce world welfare the results explain anecdotal evidence according to which isds that protects foreign investors is liked by the domestic industry and disliked by other interest groups in the host country

desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities i compare the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of systems composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers i show that even in the absence of positive consumption externalities network externalities prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus maximizing solution in today s environment many products are complex specified by a long array of characteristics part of the decision of the firm is to choose if it should break this long array of features into two or more smaller parts and produce the products corresponding to the smaller arrays instead of the product that embodies the full array we will call the products that correspond to these smaller arrays components and the product that corresponds to the full array a system note that components are by their definition complements components produced by different manufacturers are compatible if it is feasible for the consumers to combine them costlessly into a working system in this paper we will assume that there are two components which make up a system we will discuss competition under full compatibility when components produced by all firms are compatible with each other and under incompatibility when no components produced by different firms are compatible and no hybrid systems can exist 2 assuming availability of the same

monetary integration and the cost of borrowing with european monetary union emu there was an increase in the adjusted spreads of euro area sovereign securities over germany corrected from the foreign exchange risk causing a lower than expected fall in borrowing costs the objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this increase and in particular whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors credit risk and or market liquidity or to international risk factors the empirical evidence suggests that it may have been a change in the market assessment of domestic both liquidity and default risk rather than international factors that caused the observed increase in adjusted spreads with monetary integration even though since market size scale economies have increased since emu their effect differs according to the size of the market

from drafts to checks the evolution of correspondent banking networks and the formation of the modern u s payments system 1850 1914 checks remained local payments instruments throughout virtually the entire nineteenth century their significant use in interregional transactions dates only to the 1890s we explain their lagged spatial diffusion by the evolution of centralized payments institutions to coordinate transactions among myriad banks not real technological changes to annihilate distance the pivotal institutions were large correspondent banks especially in new york after the civil war new york funds constituted a national settlement medium and the concentration of bankers balances in new york yielded liquidity and other externalities smoothing the flow of check payments

on market integration and the development of institutions the case of international commercial arbitration abstract this paper suggests that the institutional basis necessary to support efficient international trade is provided not only by treaties among national governments but also by international coalitions of private agents international commercial arbitration is an important example of these private coalitions the paper reviews the provisions and the practice of international arbitration and presents a general equilibrium model of the relationship between the expansion of international trade and the adoption of arbitration the model shows that arbitration alters the size and composition of markets while at the same time responding to exogenous changes in trade

a search based theory of the on the run phenomenon we propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices infinitely lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market we show that short sellers can endogenously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must deliver the asset they borrowed that asset enjoys greater liquidity a higher lending fee specialness and trades at a premium consistent with no arbitrage we derive closed form solutions for small frictions and provide a calibration generating realistic on the run premia

why there are organized futures markets i shall present an explanation of the existence of organized futures markets with more predictive power than the two prevailing rival views my explanation briefly is this an organized futures market facilitates trade among strangers one of the rival prevailing views is a defense of futures trading it asserts that an organized futures market furnishes legitimate businessmen with a means of hedging so that they can obtain insurance against price risk the other prevailing view is an attack on organized futures markets it asserts that such markets enable speculators to manipulate prices to the detriment of outsiders who are less well informed and to the detriment of legitimate businessmen such as farmers the attack on organized futures markets likens them to gambling casinos the defense sees them as a form of insurance neither the attack nor the defense is valid the correct explanation is closely related to why we conduct trade using money instead of by barter

price transmission and trader entry in domestic commodity markets abstract using detailed data from three simultaneous surveys of producers traders and exporters this paper examines the transmission of international coffee prices through the domestic value chain in uganda we find that producer price fluctuations are inconsistent with constant transaction costs we investigate three possible explanations for this finding storage and contango marketing costs that increase with price and trader entry that raises search time we test and reject the storage and marketing costs explanation but we find some evidence of trader entry in response to a rise in export price our findings suggest that small itinerant traders enter in response to an export price increase probably taking advantage of farmers ignorance of the rise in wholesale price

approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values abstract this paper studies the revenue maximization problem in environments wherein buyers have interdependent values and correlated types we show that 1 when the system of feasible sets is a matroid and buyer valuations satisfy a single crossing condition the generalized vickrey clarke groves mechanisms with lazy reserves vcg l are ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational 2 if in addition the valuation distribution satisfies a generalized monotone hazard rate condition the vcg l mechanism with conditional monopoly reserves is approximately optimal then we construct an ascending auction that implements the truth telling equilibrium of a vcg l mechanism in ex post equilibrium finally we discuss the connection between the vcg l mechanisms and greedy algorithms studied in lehmann et al 2002 and deferred acceptance auctions studied in milgrom and segal 2014 and the impact of competition by proving a bulow and klemperer 1996 type result

conflict inflation estimating the contributions to wage inflation in australia during the 1990s one of the major emerging macroeconomic problems during the past century has been the tendency for inflation to accelerate under prolonged periods of full employment according to isaac and kaldor this arises because the three major objectives of wage earners often conflict the first objective is the desire to maintain relativities the second is the desire to have a fair share of companies profits and the third is a reluctance to allow any encroachment on achieved standards of living owing to unfavourable exogenous events this paper tests how well these three objectives explain wage inflation in australia using a pseudo panel data based on the period 1989 2000 the authors find that wages are sensitive to the three major objectives but not to occupational unemployment rates

size matters for liquidity evidence from emu sovereign yield spreads abstract the objective is to study the relative importance of domestic components of emu sovereign yield spreads since the start of monetary integration the results indicate a change in the market value of liquidity as measured by market size after emu

auctions with online supply abstract online advertising auctions present settings in which there is uncertainty about the number of items for sale we study mechanisms for selling identical items when the total supply is unknown but is drawn from a known distribution items arrive dynamically and the seller must make immediate allocation and payment decisions with the goal of maximizing social welfare we devise a simple incentive compatible mechanism that guarantees some constant fraction of the first best solution a surprising feature of our mechanism is that it artificially limits supply and we show that limiting the supply is essential for obtaining high social welfare although common when maximizing revenue commitment to limit the supply is less intuitive when maximizing social welfare the performance guarantee of our mechanism is in expectation over the supply distribution we show that obtaining similar performance guarantee for every realization of supply is impossible

the division of markets is limited by the extent of liquidity spatial competition with externalities liquidity considerations will limit the number of markets in a competitive economy welfare implications are ambigious since liquidity is a positive externality there may be too little liquidity per market at a noncooperative equilibrium and too many markets compared to the surplus maximizing market structure but liquidity is also self reinforcing given an existing equilibrium new markets may not open because nobody wants to use a new market with low liquidity there may be too few markets to achieve efficiency a nondiscriminating monopolist will operate smaller and more numerous markets compared to optimality as well as to the equilibrium of independent auctioneers copyright 1988 by american economic association

economic theories of political dis integration abstract this paper surveys the recent political economy literature on countries incentives to form international unions and or to disintegrate in smaller jurisdictions the main factors that affect these incentives are i economic integration ii the international order iii international spillovers and iv the institutional setting some implications are drawn for the current debate in europe on the political effects of economic integration on the enlargement process and on the distribution of prerogatives between the european union and national governments

optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand the standard profit maximizing multi unit auction intersects the submitted demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve which is determined using the distribution from which the buyers valuations are drawn however when this distribution is unknown a preset supply curve cannot maximize monopoly profits the optimal pricing mechanism in this situation sets a price to each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically from other buyers bids the resulting profit converges to the optimal monopoly profit with known demand as the number of buyers goes to infinity and convergence can be substantially faster than with sequential price experimentation

time to ditch the nairu the concept of a natural rate of unemployment or nonacceleratinginflation rate of unemployment nairu has ruled macroeconomics for about 25 years yet it is still controversial a wide range of views exists over how the nairu should be estimated a fact that in itself raises questions about the practical usefulness of the concept this essay presents a brief for no confidence in four parts first the theoretical case for the natural rate is not compelling second the empirical evidence for a vertical phillips curve and the associated hypothesis that lowering unemployment past the nairu leads to unacceptable acceleration of inflation is weak and has become much weaker in the past decade third viewed collectively attempts to estimate the location of the nairu have become a professional embarrassment disagreements remain on too many basic issues fourth adherence to the concept as a guide to policy has major costs and negligible benefits conversely the risks of dropping the natural rate hypothesis are minor while the benefits from a sustained pursuit of full employment could be substantial

anonymous market and group ties in international trade abstract history provides many examples of cohesive groups dispersed over several countries who exploit the ties between their members to gain entry into foreign markets the phenomenon is well established empirically and noteworthy because it suggests the importance of informational barriers in international transactions we present a simple model where output is produced through a joint venture and agents have complete information domestically but are unable to judge the quality of their match abroad a minority of individuals otherwise identical to all others can exploit complete information in international matches between group members if they so choose group ties increase aggregate trade and income but hurt the anonymous market because they deprive it disproportionately of the group s more productive members

the phillips curve in australia abstract in this paper we discuss the development of phillips curves in australia over the forty years since phillips first estimated one using australian data we examine the central issues faced by researchers estimating australian phillips curves these include the distinction between the short and long run trade offs between inflation and unemployment and the changing level of the non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment nairu particularly in the 1970s we estimate phillips curves for prices and unit labour costs in australia over the past three decades these phillips curves allow the nairu to change through time and include a role for import prices and speed limit effects the paper concludes by discussing the changing role of the phillips curve in the intellectual framework used to analyse inflation within the reserve bank of australia over the past three decades

an experimental comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration systems this paper reports the results of a systematic experimental comparison of the effect of alternative arbitration systems on dispute rates the key to our experimental design is the use of a common underlying distribution of arbitrator fair awards in the different arbitration systems this allows us to compare dispute rates across different arbitration procedures where we hold fixed the amount of objective underlying uncertainty about the arbitration awards there are three main findings first dispute rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes dispute rates were much lower in cases where arbitration was not available so that the entire pie was lost in the event of a dispute this confirms the empirical importance of the so called chilling effect on bargaining that has been conjectured is produced by the adoption of arbitration systems second the dispute rate in a final offer arbitration system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional arbitration system contrary to the usual argument we find no evidence that final offer arbitration eliminates the chilling effect third dispute rates are inversely related to the uncertainty costs of disputes dispute rates were lower in conventional arbitration treatments where the variance of the arbitration award was higher and imposed greater costs on risk averse negotiators our results can also be interpreted as providing tentative evidence that the negotiators were risk averse on average finally we find general agreement between the dispute rates in our experiment and dispute rates found in the field in comparable settings

the immediate effect of monetary union on eu 15 sovereign debt yield spreads yield spreads corrected for exchange rate risk over 10 year german securities of european union eu countries that did not join economic and monetary union emu experienced an average decrease of 14 20 basis points during the first 3 years after the beginning of currency union conversely euro area countries adjusted spreads registered an average rise of 11 98 basis points in the same period this article examines the elements a possible change in the relative importance of domestic or international risk factors behind these results using both panel estimations in the two groups of countries and a country by country specification in each of them

the city network paradigm measuring urban network externalities in recent years network behaviour has been analysed extensively as the emerging model for economic growth by network behaviour a metaphor for co operative behaviour among individuals corporate

approximation in mechanism design this paper considers three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them challenge 1 optimal mechanisms are finely tuned to precise details of the distribution on agent preferences challenge 2 in environments with multi dimensional agent preferences economic analysis has failed to provide general characterizations optimal mechanisms challenge 3 optimal mechanisms are parameterized by unrealistic knowledge of the distribution of agents private preferences this paper surveys positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques and their relevance to theory and practice

contracting institutions and ownership structure in international joint ventures abstract this paper examines the role of contracting institutions on a multinational firm s optimal ownership strategy we develop a model in which both a multinational firm and its local joint venture partner can ex post engage in costly rent seeking actions to increase their ex ante agreed upon revenue share we show that the host country s level of contract enforcement and level of judicial favoritism affect the parties incentives to contribute to the international joint venture the model allows us to identify testable hypotheses relating these institutional features with the performance and optimal ownership structure of international joint ventures

envy freedom and prior free mechanism design abstract we consider the provision of an abstract service to single dimensional agents our model includes position auctions single minded combinatorial auctions and constrained matching markets when the agents values are drawn independently from a distribution the bayesian optimal mechanism is given by myerson 1 as a virtual surplus optimizer we develop a framework for prior free mechanism design and analysis a good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution moreover when there is no distribution this mechanism still provably performs well we define and characterize optimal envy free outcomes in symmetric single dimensional environments our characterization mirrors myerson s theory furthermore unlike in mechanism design where there is no point wise optimal mechanism there is always a point wise optimal envy free outcome envy free outcomes and incentive compatible mechanisms are similar in structure and performance we therefore use the optimal envy free revenue as a benchmark for measuring the performance of a prior free mechanism a good mechanism is one that approximates the envy free benchmark on any profile of agent values we show that good mechanisms exist and in particular a natural generalization of the random sampling auction of goldberg et al 2 is a constant approximation

a nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller abstract this paper describes a nearly optimal auction mechanism that does not require previous knowledge of the distribution of values of potential buyers the mechanism we propose builds on the new literature on the elicitation of information from experts we extend the latter to the case where the secret information shared by the experts potential buyers in our model can be used against them if it becomes public knowledge

networks and compatibility implications for antitrust in this paper we draw crucial parallels between the concepts of compatibility and networks and the more traditional concepts of complementarity and vertical relationships we also develop the important distinctions between two way networks and one way networks we then apply our framework to a number of current antitrust issues

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

granger causality in peripheral emu public debt markets a dynamic approach our research aims to analyze the possible existence of granger causal relationships in the behavior of public debt issued by peripheral member countries of the european economic and monetary union emu with special emphasis on the recent episodes of crisis triggered in the eurozone sovereign debt markets since 2009 with this goal in mind we make use of a database of daily frequency of yields on 10 year government bonds issued by five emu countries greece ireland italy portugal and spain covering the entire history of the emu from its inception on 1 january 1999 until 31 december 2010 in the first step we explore the pair wise granger causal relationship between yields both for the whole sample and for changing subsamples of the data in order to capture the possible time varying causal relationship this approach allows us to detect episodes of significant increase in granger causality between yields on bonds issued by different countries in the second step we study the determinants of these episodes analyzing the role played by different factors paying special attention to instruments that capture the total national debt domestic and foreign in each country

an operational measure of liquidity embedding the process of selling an asset in a search environment enables one to provide an exact definition of liquidity an asset s liquidity is the expected time until it is sold while pursuing an optimal in the sense of maximization of expected discounted net proceeds policy this analysis reveals that this definition is compatible with most other notions of liquidity and in particular with those of john maynard keynes impatience the discount associatedwith a quick sale predictability and flexibility copyright 1986 by american economic association