tax competition in federations and the welfare consequences of decentralization abstract this paper explores the impact of intensified tax competition within federal systems characterized by the presence of both horizontal tax externalities between the states and vertical tax externalities between states and federal government it shows that although these push tax rates in opposite directions horizontal towards state taxes that are too low vertical towards state taxes that are too high leaving the net outcome unclear intensified tax competition always worsens their combined effect that is intensified lower level tax competition in the form of an increase in the number of lower level jurisdictions is sure to reduce welfare but this is not because as usually supposed it makes excessively low state taxes even lower rather it is welfare reducing either for that reason or because it makes excessively high state taxes even higher

factor mobility and income redistribution in a federation abstract jurisdictions in a federation redistribute income by taxing capital and providing transfers to labor capital and labor move to earn higher returns net of taxes or gross of transfer benefits between jurisdictions in determining its redistributive policy the government for each jurisdiction thus takes into account the effects of its policy on the movement of factors from and to the jurisdiction hence the extent of redistribution depends on the mobility of factors the mobility of capital or labor leads to less redistribution than under autarky however mobility of both capital and labor may lead to more redistribution than if only capital moves as a consequence increased mobility of factors is not necessarily harmful to redistribution

semiparametric estimation and consumer demand this paper considers the implementation of semiparametric methods in the empirical analysis of consumer demand the application is to the estimation of the engel curve relationship and uses the british family expenditure survey household composition is modelled using an extended partially linear framework this is shown to provide a useful method for pooling non parametric engel curves across households of different demographic composition c 1998 john wiley sons ltd

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

corporate taxation in the oecd in a wider context against the background of increased globalisation statutory corporate tax rates have shown a clear downward trend over the last two decades the sharp decline in these rates was accompanied by substantial tax base broadening and a comparable reduction in personal income tax rates only until the early 1990s this suggests that corporate tax competition is of increasing importance so far corporate tax revenues remain fairly stable but an analysis of corporate taxation in the context of the overall tax systems shows that a substantial shift towards value added taxes has taken place while the trends so far have been driven by smaller european countries recent tax reforms indicate that increasing tax competition is inducing a shift towards consumption even for larger economies

does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas charlot s paty s and piguet v does fiscal cooperation increase local tax rates in urban areas regional studies the main purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of fiscal cooperation on local taxation in a decentralized country using experience in french urban municipalities a tax setting model for local business tax is estimated using spatial and panel econometric techniques for the period 1993 2003 controlling for population size it is found that fiscal cooperation is likely to reduce tax competition and as a consequence to increase local business tax rates

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

what do we learn about consumer demand patterns from micro data the aim of this paper is to assess the importance of using micro level data in the econometric analysis of consumer demand to do this we utilize a time series of repeated cross sections covering some 4 000 households in each of 15 years employing a number of different aggregation procedures we conclude that aggregate data alone are unlikely to produce reliable estimates of structural price and income coefficients however once certain aggregation factors as well as trend and seasonal components are included an aggregate model is not necessarily outperformed across all demand equations in terms of forecasting ability jel d12 c52 c31 the purpose of this paper is to develop a complete consumer demand system based on a time series of individual household data and to use it to measure the biases introduced into the study of consumer de mand behavior when aggregate data are used in place of the appropriate microeco nomic data we assess the suitability of ag gregate data through the impact on income and price elasticities and by evaluating the ability of both micro and aggregate based models to forecast aggregate consumer de mand the biases introduced by the use of aggregate data depend upon the way that household characteristics interact with in come and price effects and on departures of demand systems from linearity we explore the structure of microeconomic demand sys tems and the role of household characteris tics in the behavior of consumer demand both for the light this may shed on the pattern of future demands and for the im plications this behavior has for issues of aggregation consumer demand patterns typically found in micro data sets vary considerably across households with different household characteristics and with different levels of income we model this variability by making intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations of our demand sys tem depend on household characteristics and by allowing for nonlinear total log expenditure terms in fact in theory consistent demand systems it is total ex penditure rather than disposable income that is allocated across goods we find that this general framework leads to a well specified data coherent demand system which is a quadratic extension of the popu lar almost ideal model of angus s deaton and john muellbauer 1980 the micro level estimates are shown to be sensitive to the treatment of endogeneity of total expen diture and to the specification of interaction terms with household characteristics in ad dition this specification is also shown to possess many attractive features for the evaluation of aggregate models

on environmental federalism and direct emission control abstract a theoretical exception to the race to the bottom contends that if decentralized environmental policy is comprised of direct controls on each firm emissions standards are set too high when compared to a centralized optimum herein we examine potential distortions in decentralized decision making by reconciling two recent views of direct environmental controls we show that differences in direct control policy can arise from differences in the number of symmetric jurisdictions in an economy our results suggest the race is on once the number of jurisdictions competing for a fixed number of firms increase we see the race is off when few jurisdictions can exploit their form of environmental market power

strategic tax competition with a mobile population espanoleste articulo analiza un modelo estrategico de competicion de impuestos donde el capital y los identicos consumidores pueden migrar entre jurisdicciones los resultados obtenidos son comparados con los resultados del modelo tradicional de competencia tributaria donde la poblacion es inmovil ademas de los efectos fiscales y pecuniarios que aparecen en el modelo tradicional el modelo con poblacion movil presenta un nuevo efecto que distorsiona la provision de bienes publicos como en el caso del efecto pecuniario este nuevo efecto depende de si la jurisdiccion es exportadora neta o importadora neta de capital de esta manera en el caso de jurisdicciones simetricas ambos efectos desaparecen resultando en subprovision de bienes publicos en el caso donde las jurisdicciones son asimetricas ambos modelos tienen los mismos resultados cualitativos reforzando el modelo con poblacion movil los resultados de la externalidad pecuniaria englishthis paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical consumers the results of the model are compared to the traditional strategic tax competition model with immobile population in addition to the fiscal and pecuniary externalities present in the standard model a new effect shows up in the mo bility model to affect provision of the public good as with the pecuniary externality this new effect depends on whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers of capital thus in a symmetric set up the mobility effect along with the pecuniary externality disappears yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good while in the asymmetric case both models have the same qualitative results the mobility model strengthens the effects of the pecuniary externality the above results are obtained by comparing the form of the first order conditions between the mobility and immobility cases the remaining question is whether or not the equilibrium levels of the public goods conform to the predicted tendencies this question is answered with an example the results of this exercise show that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital the level of the public good is lower in the mobility case than in the immobility case however if the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital the public good level is sometimes higher and sometimes lower in the mobility case contrary to predictions

a spatial analysis of provincial corporate income tax responses evidence from canada using a model of interdependent tax choices and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers this paper estimates making use of a spatial econometric framework corporate income tax setting functions for all canadian provincial governments the results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements general federal transfers and the federal corporate income tax a robustness check on the fiscal relationship between ontario and quebec verifies the existence of significant bi directional fiscal interdependencies the paper also introduces u s state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with canadian provinces a l aide d un modele de choix fiscaux interdependants et en tenant compte des paiements de perequation et des transferts generaux ce texte calibre a l aide d un cadre econometrique spatial les fonctions de definition de fiscalite des revenus de societes de tous les gouvernements provinciaux canadiens les resultats montrent qu il y a un effet d interaction positif significatif entre un sous ensemble de provinces et entre les provinces dans leur ensemble et le gouvernement federal les impots sur le revenu des societes des provinces sont co relies negativement avec les paiements de perequation les transferts generaux et l impot federal sur le revenu des societes des tests de robustesse montrent qu il y a relation d interdependance fiscale bidirectionnelle significative entre le quebec et l ontario le memoire introduit les impots sur le revenu des societes aux etats unis comme co variables et examine leur interaction avec ce qui se passe dans les provinces canadiennes

optimal fiscal federalism in the presence of tax competition abstract this paper models the optimal division of public goods provision between central and regional governments in an economy with interregional tax competition regional provision is inefficient because governments compete for scarce capital by lowering their capital taxes and public good levels to inefficiently low levels on the other hand central provision is inefficient because it is determined by the minimum winning coalition within a legislature the optimal degree to which public good provision should be decentralized depends on a tradeoff between these inefficiencies in our main model complete centralization is never optimal regional governments should supply some public goods

best nonparametric bounds on demand responses this paper uses revealed preference inequalities to provide the tightest possible best nonparametric bounds on predicted consumer responses to price changes using consumer level data over a finite set of relative price changes these responses are allowed to vary nonparametrically across the income distribution this is achieved by combining the theory of revealed preference with the semiparametric estimation of consumer expansion paths engel curves we label these expansion path based bounds on demand responses as e bounds deviations from revealed preference restrictions are measured by preference perturbations which are shown to usefully characterize taste change and to provide a stochastic environment within which violations of revealed preference inequalities can be assessed

mergers in fiscal federalism this paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition the merger of regions induces three eects on regional and local tax policies which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically i an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level ii a rise in the regional tax base and iii a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities it is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates this nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions

taxation of mobile factors as insurance under uncertainty this paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors i e capital under uncertainty the wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages in particular the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages thereby providing insurance for this reason jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump sum taxation is available in addition this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition

non parametric tests of consumer behaviour the neoclassical model of consumer behaviour postulates that a consumer s choice behaviour can be described as deriving from utility maximization subject to a budget constraint one is then naturally led to ask what this model implies about observed behaviour this question has been addressed from two quite distinct approaches the first approach originating in the work of slutsky 1915 and antonelli 1886 derives necessary and sufficient conditions involving the derivatives of the demand functions the second approach originating in the work of samuelson 1938 1947 1948 derives algebraic conditions on the demand functions implied by maximizing behaviour

consumer behaviour theory and empirical evidence a survey this survey is designed to emphasize the relationship between empirical a nd theoretical considerations in the analysis of consumer behavior a lthough it focuses primarily on analysis at the individual or micro l evel it tries where possible to draw implications for the estimati on of aggregate relationships the importance of micro level analysis stems from the rapid expansion in available panel and survey data se ts this development has generated its own theoretical and empirical issues many of which are raised in this survey copyright 1988 by royal economic society

tax competition uniform assessment and the benefit principle abstract in previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents however this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods one for residents and one for business for plausible parameter values numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm

the determinants of municipal tax rates in british columbia in this paper we study the regional pattern of municipal business property tax rates in the province of british columbia reduced form tax setting equations produce some evidence that municipal governments respond to tax changes in neighbouring jurisdictions a joint investigation of the determinants of tax base and municipal taxation decisions however reveals that it is difficult to interpret this response as arising primarily out of competition over tax base there is also some evidence that municipal tax rates are sensitive to taxes set on the same base by super municipal bodies jel classification c33 h71 les determinants des taux d imposition municipale en colombie britannique dans ce memoire les auteurs etudient le pattern regional des taux d imposition municipale sur la propriete fonciere commerciale dans la province de la colombie britannique on montre a l aide d un modele en forme reduite d equations de definition des taux d imposition que les gouvernements municipaux reagissent aux changements dans les taux d imposition dans leur voisinage cependant un examen conjoint des determinants de la base d imposition et des decisions municipales montre qu il est difficile d interpreter cette reaction comme emanant d une concurrence fiscale on montre aussi que les taux d imposition municipale sont sensibles aux niveaux de fiscalite imposes sur la meme base par les autorites supra municipales

demand systems with and without errors revealed preference theory assumes that each consumer has demands that are rational meaning that they arise from the maximization of his or her own utility function in contrast econometric or statistical demand models assume that each consumer s demands equal a rational systematic component derived from a common utility function plus an individual specific additive error term this paper reconciles these differences by providing necessary and sufficient conditions for rationality of statistical demand models given individual consumer rationality

a tax competition analysis of congestible public inputs abstract this paper investigates the provision of congestible local public inputs within a tax competition framework public input provision is financed by a business capital tax and by a profits tax on firms as a congestion tax with this tax system local tax and expenditure policies are inefficient because of potential capital outflows the tax mix is inefficient in that the profits tax rate is too high relative to the capital tax rate the level of public input provision is inefficiently low focusing on expenditure inefficiency this analysis of public inputs is compared with wilson s analysis journal of urban economics 1995 38 333 356 of congestible public goods

quadratic engel curves and consumer demand this paper presents a model of consumer demand that is consistent with the observed expenditure patterns of individual consumers in a long time series of expenditure surveys and is also able to provide a detailed welfare analysis of shifts in relative prices a nonparametric analysis of consumer expenditure patterns suggests that engel curves require quadratic terms in the logarithm of expenditure while popular models of demand such as the translog or the almost ideal demand systems do allow flexible price responses within a theoretically coherent structure they have expenditure share engel curves that are linear in the logarithm of total expenditure we derive the complete class of integrable quadratic logarithmic expenditure share systems a specification from this class is estimated on a large pooled data set of u k households models that fail to account for engel curvature are found ro generate important distortions in the patterns of welfare losses associated with a tax increase

how revealing is revealed preference this lecture address the following two key criticisms of the empirical application of revealed preference theory when the rp conditions do not reject they do not provide precise predictions and when they do reject they do not help characterize the nature of irrationality or the degree direction of changing tastes recent developments in the application of rp theory are shown to have rendered these criticisms unfounded a powerful test of rationality is available that also provides a natural characterization of changing tastes tight bounds on demand responses and on the welfare costs of relative price and tax changes are also available and are shown to work well in practice

nonlinear income taxation and matching grants in a federation with decentralized in kind transfers we extend to a fiscal federalism setting the literature on redistributive in kind transfers in the presence of nonlinear income taxation local governments have a cost advantage motivating decentralization of the in kind transfer the cost structure varies across regions and the central government cannot observe which region is which we show that decentralized in kind transfers can in this setting be an even more important instrument for relaxing self selection constraints thus helping redistribution than in single government models we characterize the optimal marginal tax rates and matching grants the grants have a very different structure than the one derived in earlier studies

tax competition relative performance and policy imitation rather than about their absolute payoffs governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments moreover they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere i study such behavior in a standard tax competition game both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies evolutionary stability for games with finitely many players is the appropriate solution concept independently of the number of jurisdictions involved an evolutionarily stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game with infinitely many players it thus involves drastic efficiency losses

nonparametric engel curves and revealed preference this paper applies revealed preference theory to the nonparametric statistical analysis of consumer demand knowledge of expansion paths is shown to improve the power of nonparametric tests of revealed preference the tightest bounds on indifference surfaces and welfare measures are derived using an algorithm for which revealed preference conditions are shown to guarantee convergence nonparametric engel curves are used to estimate expansion paths and provide a stochastic structure within which to examine the consistency of household level data and revealed preference theory an application is made to a long time series of repeated cross sections from the family expenditure survey for britain the consistency of these data with revealed preference theory is examined for periods of consistency with revealed preference tight bounds are placed on true cost of living indices

the effect of price on preference consistency over time construal level theory indicates that consumers tend to prefer products high in desirability greater functionality for distant future decisions but switch their preferences toward products high in feasibility greater usage convenience for near future decisions the current research demonstrates that price information traditionally considered as a feasibility cue can increase consumers near future preference toward products with greater functionality despite their low convenience leading to preference consistency over time as the underlying mechanism price information increases the functionality importance for near future decisions due to consumers enhanced value seeking tendency when seeing price and their lay belief that greater functionality represents higher value further when consumers are led to believe that greater convenience represents higher value price and the value seeking tendency result in a greater preference toward easy to use products for the distant future and lead to preference consistency across time as well theoretical implications are discussed

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

improving revealed preference bounds on demand responses there are three key dimensions by which revealed preference bounds on consumer demand responses can be improved the first relates to the improvements that arise from using expansion paths for given relative prices e bounds the second concerns the addition of new price information thirdly there are improvements due to assuming separability our previous research has examined the first two cases in this article we show how to impose separability assumptions within a fully nonparametric analysis and distinguish between weak and homothetic separability we also apply these ideas to the analysis of demand responses using united kingdom household level data

optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility abstract a single region s optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility in this model property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods e g residential property the key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods the role of labor mobility is also investigated

capitalization and community size abstract studies often show taxes and public services capitalized into house prices but no one has tested whether the rate of capitalization depends on community size the theoretical model of w h hoyt 1999 regional science and urban economics 29 155 171 predicts that capitalization occurs but that the rate of capitalization is weaker in large communities hoyt s model is tested empirically using a house price hedonic framework the tax capitalization results are less clear but the school quality and crime results firmly support the model s predictions using both school districts and municipalities to measure communities larger communities weaken the rate of capitalization

how large are the welfare costs of tax competition abstract competition among regional governments may lead to suboptimal levels of capital taxation as governments ignore the external benefits of capital flight to other regions however there have been few attempts to quantify the magnitude of the resulting efficiency losses this paper presents extensive calculations of the efficiency costs over a wide range of parameter scenarios and assumptions about government behavior using various generalizations of wildasin journal of urban economics 25 1989 193 213 the efficiency costs tend to be fairly moderate under most though not all scenarios and particularly when allowance is made for the possibility of leviathan and non competitive government behavior

nonparametric welfare and demand analysis with unobserved individual heterogeneity abstract this paper combines revealed preference and nonparametric estimation techniques to obtain nonparametric bounds on the distribution of the money metric utility and demand functions over a population of heterogeneous households our approach is independent of any functional specification on the household utility functions our method applies the weak axiom of revealed preference to a population of heterogeneous households although this does not produce the sharpest bounds we show that it is computationally attractive and provides narrow bounds we demonstrate the usefulness of our results by applying it to the consumer expenditure survey a us cross sectional consumption data set jel codes d12 c14

local government structure and urban residential location the large research literature on the tiebout model has developed with little attention paid to the urban economic structure in which local government functions this paper attempts to examine the theoretical consequences of local jurisdictions functioning within a conventional monocentric urban model it also discusses a mathematical formulation of a two jurisdiction linear city in which the local service level and local property tax rate might be used as strategic variables in a game theory sense it is concluded that for this to happen the local service level has to have more than one element which is intuitively appealing some references are developed to current british local government and possible changes

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

are pilots property taxes for nonprofits abstract nonprofit charitable organizations are exempt from most taxes including local property taxes but u s cities and towns increasingly request that nonprofits make payments in lieu of taxes known as pilots strictly speaking pilots are voluntary though nonprofits may feel pressure to make them particularly in high tax communities evidence from massachusetts indicates that pilot rates measured as ratios of payments to the value of local tax exempt property are higher in towns with higher property tax rates a one percentage point higher property tax rate is associated with a 0 2 percentage point higher pilot rate pilots appear to discourage nonprofit activity a one percentage point higher pilot rate is associated with 0 8 lower real property ownership by local nonprofits 0 2 lower total assets and 0 2 lower revenues of local nonprofits these patterns are consistent with voluntary pilots acting in a manner similar to low rate compulsory real estate taxes

property taxation nash equilibrium and market power abstract differences in tax policy arise from differences in the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area following wildasin 4 and bucovetsky 2 the tax rates in the jurisdictions are determined in a nash game in the tax rate the tax rate and public service level as well as the welfare of residents increase as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolis decreases

nonparametric estimation of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss we apply nonparametric regression models to estimation of demand curves of the type most often used in applied research from the demand curve estimators we derive estimates of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss which are the most widely used welfare and economic efficiency measures in areas of economics such as public finance we also develop tests of the symmetry and downward sloping properties of compensated demand we work out asymptotic normal sampling theory for kernel and series nonparametric estimators as well as for the parametric case the paper includes an application to gasoline demand empirical questions of interest here are the shape of the demand curve and the average magnitude of welfare loss from a tax on gasoline in this application we compare parametric and nonparametric estimates of the demand curve calculate exact and approximate measures of consumers surplus and deadweight loss and give standard error estimates we also analyze the sensitivity of the welfare measures to components of nonparametric regression estimators such as the number of terms in a series approximation

the random utility hypothesis and inference in demand systems in this paper the authors examine the consequences of adopting the random utility hypothesis as an approach for randomizing a system of demand equations random utility models are appealing since they allow the usual assumption of deterministic utility maximizing behavior by each consumer to coexist with the apparent randomness across individuals that is exhibited by data their results show that the use of random utility models implies that the disturbances of the demand equations may not be homoskedastic but must be functions of prices and or income copyright 1989 by the econometric society

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

is it tax competition or tax exporting abstract this paper extends the basic tax competition model to a framework in which jurisdictions have market power over the price of the output produced within their borders if firms within the jurisdiction are competitive the jurisdiction can play the role of monopoly rent collector by using taxes to restrict the level of output it is shown that the basic tax competition model can be thought of as a special case of this more general framework in this framework the opportunity to export the tax burden can partially or fully offset the well known effects identified by the tax competition model

income redistribution and public goods provision under tax competition abstract a standard result in existing literature is that public goods are under provided under tax competition see zodrow and mieszkowski 1986 this paper shows that introducing redistribution concerns changes the result capital mobility reduces income redistribution by increasing the efficiency costs of capital taxation if public goods have positive distributional effects providing more public goods counteracts the negative effects of capital mobility moreover under the condition that labor income and capital income are positively correlated less income redistribution through capital taxation can be compensated by stronger taxation of labor income as a result a higher level of public goods is desirable if capital mobility increases

tax competition rent seeking and fiscal decentralization abstract the present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self defeating we find that rent seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost

strategic pollution control and capital tax competition abstract in an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes or emissions caps and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically when they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax efficient for transboundary local pollution when they have the option to tax capital and emissions capital is subsidized untaxed and emissions taxes are inefficiently low efficient for transboundary local pollution in case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are pareto superior to emissions taxes that holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand alone policy or combined with capital tax competition