monetary integration and economic reform recent research in contract theory views ownership as a substitute for complete contracts here this approach is applied to monetary integration countries face a coordination problem conducting monetary policy negative spillovers ensure uncoordinated policy generates too high inflation ex ante policy makers can undertake politically costly economic reform this has a positive spillover because it improves the outcome of the monetary policy game ex post contracting over policy may be possible but it supposed that ex ante contracting over reform and monetary policy is not this paper analyses when monetary union is a good substitute for this inability to commit

moral hazard and private monitoring we clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization sunspots in sustaining near efficient outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring we study a finitely repeated game where the stage game has multiple equilibria and show that mixed strategies can support partial cooperation but cannot approximate full cooperation even if monitoring is almost perfect efficiency requires extensive form correlation where strategies can condition upon a sunspot at the end of each period for any finite number of repetitions we approximate the best equilibrium payoff under perfect monitoring assuming that monitoring is sufficiently accurate and sunspots are available journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d82

rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions thus the issue of how to improve upon the time consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy we present a model with three players the central bark the fiscal authority and wage setters in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled we show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated we also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank

monetary union and labor market reform abstract policy makers incentives to undertake costly labor market reform depend on the international monetary system a regime of noncooperative monetary policy is compared with monetary union we find that noncooperative policy leads to more reform of factors that affect the inflation bias which regime leads to more reform of factors affecting labor market flexibility depends on the size of monetary policy spillovers and the degree of correlation of supply shocks we show that monetary union produces higher expected inflation but a lower variance of inflation welfare can be higher or lower with monetary union

caught in the trap welfare s disincentive and the labor supply of single men abstract youth unemployment is particularly large in many industrialized countries and has dramatic consequences in both the short and long term while there is abundant evidence about the labor supply of married women and single mothers little is known about how young childless singles react to financial incentives the french minimum income revenu minimum d insertion rmi often accused of generating strong disincentives to work offers a natural setting to study this question since childless single individuals primarily males constitute the core group of recipients exploiting the fact that childless adults under age 25 are not eligible for this program we conduct a regression discontinuity analysis using french census data we find that the rmi reduces the participation of uneducated single men by 7 10 at age 25 we conduct an extensive robustness check and discuss the implications of our results for youth unemployment and current policy developments

efficiency in repeated prisoner s dilemma with private monitoring abstract this paper analyzes repeated games with private monitoring where in each period each player receives a signal of the other player s action in the previous period and that signal is private information previous literature on discounted repeated games with private monitoring has not shown whether or not nearly efficient equilibria exist for a repeated prisoner s dilemma satisfying a certain assumption regarding stage game payoffs we show that there exists a nearly efficient sequential equilibrium provided that imperfectness of signals is small and players are patient journal of economic literature classification number c73

communication in repeated games with private monitoring abstract the paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed we address the following question what is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes the main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs when the discount factor tends to one contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at leasttwoother players journal of economic literatureclassification number c73

structural convergence under reversible and irreversible monetary unification abstract we explore endogenous monetary unification in the context of a model in which a country with serious structural distortions and hence high inflation is admitted into a monetary union once its economic structure has converged sufficiently towards that of the existing participants if unification is reversible so that the new entrant can always be forced to leave the union again later convergence stops for a while after the high inflation country has joined with irreversible unification in contrast temporary divergence occurs and unification will be delayed

unemployment labor market reform and monetary union monetary union such as the economic and monetary union in europe emu may affect incentives for labor market reform and thus equilibrium unemployment through several mechanisms if an inflation bias exists there is usually a stronger incentive to reduce equilibrium unemployment through national reform outside rather than inside the emu absent such a bias emu membership could lead to more reform one reason is that reform may increase wage flexibility which can substitute for monetary policy in the emu another reason could be a precautionary motive for low equilibrium unemployment to reduce the utility cost of increased macroeconomic variability in the emu

changes in male labor supply and wages in the 1980s both wages and labor supply of poorly educated men fell substantially relative to those of educated men some observers have interpreted this positive association between changes in w

a cohort analysis of the association between work hours and wages among men the results of some recent ingenious labor supply research may appear incompatible with the notion that uncompensated wage elasticities for men are small perhaps negative this paper argues there is no incompatibility the methodology in this recent research results in computing wage responses that come closer to measuring intertemporal wage elasticities than to uncompensated wage elasticities to demonstrate this i use pseudopanel data constructed from the march current population surveys from 1967 to 1998 to measure both intertemporal wage elasticities and uncompensated wage elasticities the latter appear sensitive to the particular specification of the hours equation

an empirical model of labor supply in a life cycle setting this paper formulates and estimates a structural intertemporal model of labor supply using theoretical characterizations derived from an economic model of lifetime behavior a two step empirical analysis yields estimates of intertemporal and uncompensated substitution effects which provide the information needed to predict the response of hours of work to life cycle wage growth and shifts in the lifetime wage path

estimating labour supply responses using tax reforms the 1980 s tax reforms and the changing dispersion of wages offer one of the best opportunities yet to estimate labor supply effects nevertheless changing sample composition aggregate shocks the changing composition of the tax paying population and discontinuities in the tax system create serious identification and estimation problems we develop grouping estimators that address these issues our results reveal positive and moderately sized wage elasticities we also find negative income effects for women with children

one money one market the effect of common currencies on trade currency unions their dramatic effect on international trade a gravity model is used to assess the separate effects of exchange rate volatility and currency unions on international trade the panel data bilateral observations for five years during 1970 90 covering 186 countries includes 300 observations in which both countries use the same currency i find a large positive effect of a currency union on international trade and a small negative effect of exchange rate volatility even after controlling for a host of features including the endogenous nature of the exchange rate regime these effects statistically significant imply that two countries sharing the same currency trade three times as much as they would with different currencies currency unions like the european emu may thus lead to a large increase in international trade with all that that entails andrew rose

strategic buyers and privately observed prices a model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed the set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring with private monitoring i e when prices are not observable to the competing sellers all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs this is in sharp contrast to the game with perfect monitoring where the folk theorem obtains journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

stabilization and growth in transition economies the early experience this paper analyzes the growth and stabilization experience in 26 transition economies in eastern europe the former soviet union and mongolia for the period 1989 1994 inflation rates have declined significantly in most countries following an inflation stabilization program growth resumes after stabilization occurs typically with a lag of about two years reducing inflation thus appears to be a precondition for growth an econometric analysis of the short run determinants of inflation and growth illustrates the key roles of fixed exchange rates improved fiscal balances and structural reforms in spurring growth and lowering inflation and confirms that inflation stabilization programs have been beneficial for growth even after controlling for structural reforms

can long run restrictions identify technology shocks gali s innovative approach of imposing long run restrictions on a vector autoregression var to identify the effects of a technology shock has become widely utilized in this paper we investigate its reliability through monte carlo simulations using calibrated business cycle models overall gali s methodology appears to be fruitful the impulse responses derived from the artificial data generally have the same sign and qualitative pattern as the true responses and the approach can be informative in discriminating between alternative models however our results reveal some important quantitative shortcomings including considerable estimation uncertainty about the impact of technology shocks on macroeconomic variables more generally the conditions under which the methodology performs well appear considerably more restrictive than implied by the key identifying assumption this underscores the importance of using economic models to guide in the implementation of the approach in interpreting the results and in assessing its limitations jel c32 e32 o33

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

the market work behavior and wages of women 1975 94 changes in the labor market participation and wages of women in the united states are analyzed over the period 1975 1994 using data from the current population survey women are organized into nine birth cohorts five schooling groups and each year of age from 25 to 60 years and their weekly and annual work hours their annual work weeks their employment population ratio and their real average hourly earnings tabulated schooling differences in work behavior have become wider in recent cohorts as have their wages the relationship between work and wages is estimated for women of different ages cohorts and marital status the gap between the work of unmarried and married women has narrowed and the role of wages both the wages of women and those of husbands is examined to determine the extent to which changes in wages account for these movements excerpt

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

collusion under monitoring of sales collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms prices are private information and their quantities are public information such an information structure is consistent with several recent price fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins for a class of symmetric oligopoly games it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion an asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firms with sales below their quotas in practice cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members

time consistency of monetary policy in the open economy abstract this paper shows that in an open economy time consistency problems are created not only by nominal government debt but also by nominal private debt to foreigners given any external nominal debt inflation redistributes wealth between domestic residents and foreigners a government that cares about the welfare of its residents will be tempted to inflate whenever it or its residents have issued nominal debt to foreigners an analysis of the u s net investment position shows that these international considerations have become increasingly relevant for the united states because the recent external deficits have largely been financed in nominal terms

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

fiscal policy when monetary policy is tied to the mast the paper analyses the time inconsistency problem of both exchange rate and fiscal policy in a small open economy the equilibrium under discretion is characterised by inflation and a deficit comm

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

excessive deficits sense and nonsense in the treaty of maastricht maastricht s fiscal rules willem buiter giancarlo corsetti and nouriel roubini the maastricht treaty on economic and monetary union in the ec has specified limits on both government debt and fiscal deficits satisfying these criteria is necessary for getting into emu once inside violating these limits will also incur penalties the fiscal requirements especially the debt criterion are much tougher than is required to ensure public sector solvency trying to attain these targets will force the ec initially into substantial deflation and recession failure to correct for real growth inflation and the business cycle makes the nominal deficit a poor basis for any policy or target ambiguity about how fiscal targets will in fact be interpreted might provide a way out but cannot today be relied upon to do so supranational fiscal rules are sometimes claimed to be justified by externalities in national fiscal policies we find this justification wanting both in theory and empirically a better case might be built on the imposition of external commitments to offset domestic political distortions that systematically induce excessive deficits even so we conclude that the fiscal convergence criteria on balance are harmful and should be disregarded or applied very loosely to avoid the risk of serious fiscal overkill

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

an analysis of the stability and growth pact we use a stylised model to analyse the stability and growth pact for countries that have formed the european monetary union emu in our model shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully therefore while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality with uncertainty a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy with differences in initial conditions conflicts of interest arise we study the nash bargaining solution

risk preferences and expected utility evidence from labor supply data i introduction why do some people enjoy bungee jumping while others do not why do some individuals hold extensive insurance portfolios it is intuitive to attribute these differences between people to their individual preferences for risk a concept that is appealing but hard to quantify arrow 1965 and pratt s 1964 coefficient of relative risk aversion rra has been the standard risk measure since the mid 1960s it relies on expected utility theory eut and the fact that the utility function is concave over wealth although eut is still widely used in economics theorists are increasingly unsatisfied with its performance this is true when applied specifically to risk aversion as well for example rabin 2000 provides a calibration argument that shows that if an expected utility maximizer is not essentially risk neutral over a modest stakes gamble he will be unrealistically risk averse over a large risk gamble he concludes that aversion to modest stakes risk has nothing to do with the diminishing marginal utility of wealth 1282 a frequent argument for continuing to use eut despite failures of its axioms is that it adequately explains behavior an empirical measure of risk aversion that explains behavior is very desirable as risk preference plays an important role in many decisions of interest to economists using a labor supply regression and information on each individual s income and hours of work i compute a measure of risk aversion gamma sub ls that is the curvature of utility over wealth and compare this measure of risk aversion to one based on the individual s willingness to accept gambles over lifetime income go both should measure an individual s preferences for large scale risk while it has been well established that an individual s risk preferences with respect to both large and small scale risk cannot be adequately explained by eut comparing gamma sub g and gamma sub ls affords an opportunity to see how eut performs over gambles of the same scale if eut is a good predictive model for behavior under uncertainty individuals who have a very concave utility function as measured by gamma sub ls should be less willing to gamble with lifetime income than those with smaller values of gamma sub ls i find no correlation between the two measures implying that eut does not explain the variation in risk preferences as measured by a hypothetical gambling frame many economists have questioned whether hypothetical choices are a good proxy for actual decisions in the context of risk and perhaps the discrepancy in the two measures stems from this from a preliminary look at how these measures vary with actual risky choices it appears that the measure of the curvature of utility over wealth does a better job of explaining actual risky choices such as smoking and binge drinking and the hypothetical gambling frame does a better job explaining people s responses to other hypothetical risky situations this is of interest for theorists who are trying to find the new direction for choices under uncertainty but also for empiricists who wish to use risk preferences to explain decision making and behavior ii measuring risk aversion with labor supply data aside from concerns as to the validity of eut risk aversion can be difficult to measure as it requires specific information on an individual s utility function chetty 2006 uses the fact that rra is directly related to the ratio of the income and compensated wage elasticities of labor supply and presents a formula that allows for the estimation of the coefficient of rra using labor supply data recall that rra is proportional to u sub cc u sub c where u sub c is the first partial derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption and u sub cc is the second derivative an agent s compensated wage elasticity is directly related to u sub c the larger the marginal utility of consumption the more benefit the agent gets from an additional dollar of income so the more willing he is to work when his wage increases

the sensitivity of an empirical model of married women s hours of work to economic and statistical assumptions this study undertakes a systematic analysis of several theoretic and statistical assumption s used in many empirical models of female labor supply using a singl e data set psid 1975 labor supply data the author is able to replic ate most of the range of estimated income and substitution effects fo und in previous studies in this field he undertakes extensive specif ication tests and finds that most of this range should be rejected du e to statistical and model misspecifications the two most important assumptions appear to be the tobit assumption used to control for sel f selection into the labor force and exogeneity assumptions on the wi fe s wage rate and her labor market experience copyright 1987 by the econometric society

why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit policy with time inconsistent preferences a conservative government in favor of a low level of public consumption knows that it will be replaced by a government in favor of a larger level of public consumption we show that the resulting level of public consumption is in between the levels the two governments would choose if each were in power both in the present and in the future in particular we show that if the conservative government is more stubborn in a particular sense than the succeeding government the conservative government will borrow more than it would had it remained in power in the future

wages and participation during the last 25 years annual hours worked by prime aged men fell by the equivalent of six 40 hour workweeks the reduction was more pronounced among those younger than among mid age workers among black men than among white men and among those with less schooling thus hours worked not only fell but showed increased dispersion increases that paralleled the growth in wage dispersion that has become so familiar to students of trends in wages the argument advanced here is that the correspondence is not coincidental the changes in hours worked are simply the labor supply responses that follow the changes in the structure of wages

the advantage of tying one s hands ems discipline and central bank credibility abstract it is often argued that the ems is an effective disciplinary device for inflation prone countries in europe since it forces the respective policy makers to pursue more restrictive monetary policies than they would otherwise it is not clear however why these countries should submit themselves to such discipline this paper argues that to answer this question appropriately one must consider that ems membership brings potentially large credibility gains policy makers in inflation prone countries the reason is that not only it attaches an extra penalty to inflation in terms of real appreciation but makes the public aware that the policy maker is faced with such penalty and thus helps to overcome the inefficiency stemming from the public s mistrust of the authorities

the optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union the paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit with international risk sharing fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard an inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline in a monetary union however this adverse effect on fiscal discipline is weaker this advantage of monetary unification may outweigh the disadvantage of not being able to employ monetary policy to stabilise country specific shocks while monetary unification may thus be optimal international risk sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline

time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy the problem of time inconsistency arises from two different sources first as shown by guillermo a calvo 1978 the re is an incentive for each government to engage in an initial unanti cipated inflation second as discussed by robert e lucas and nancy l stokey 1983 there is an incentive for each government to deviat e from the path of taxes announced by the preceding government in th is paper it is shown that these two sources of time inconsistency ca n be removed by a particular method of debt management involving bot h nominal and indexed government bonds of various maturities copyright 1987 by the econometric society

dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer we analyze a simple dynamic durable good model two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game we solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the necessarily mixed pricing strategies in equilibrium the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller a buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller

money debt and deficits in a dynamic game this paper analyzes a dynamic linear quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities the equilibrium outcome of the game determines the time path of money creation fiscal deficits and public debt the game is solved for different equilibrium concepts the equilibria are then compared and interpreted with reference to alternative institutional arrangements the main results are i coordination increases the speed of adjustment towards the steady state and takes the steady state value of public debt closer to the desired target ii precommitments take the non cooperative equilibrium closer to the coordinated outcome iii increasing the weight that each policymaker assigns to his own private objectives slows down the adjustment process places more burden on the opponent but has ambiguous effects on the steady state value of public debt

estimating life cycle labor supply tax effects we present an econometrically tractable life cycle labor supply model for panel data including intertemporally progressive taxes on uncertai wage and nonwge incomes our two stage fixedeffects generalized method of moments approach first extimates intretemporal and then intertemporal preferences specification testing domonstrates the value of incorporating joint progressive taxation of labor and nonlabor incomes results for prime age men emphasize the roles played by hourly wage endogeneity worker specific effects the measure of the rate of pay and intemporal budget constaint nonseparability simulations indicate that recent tax reform while not self financing stimulated made labor supplied by about 3 percent and reduced deadweight loss about 16 percent

political economy of monetary and budgetary policy even though all debt and wage contracts are indexed there is an incentive to levy a surprise inflation tax as this erodes the real value of debt service permits a cut in the tax rate and boosts private consumption with rules it is optimal to smooth tax and seigniorage revenues however with discretion associated with the markov perfect equilibrium the government finances an increase in spending through additional interest income paid on assets that are generated through a temporary bout of inflation and taxation the electorate prefers to appoint a central banker more concerned with inflation than the median voter copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

wage risk and employment risk over the life cycle we specify a structural life cycle model of consumption labour supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions that allows us to distinguish between different sources of risk and to estimate their effects the sources of risk are shocks to productivity job destruction the process of job arrival when employed and unemployed and match level heterogeneity our model allows for four main social insurance programmes in contrast to simpler models that attribute all income fluctuations to shocks our framework allows us to disentangle the effects of the shocks from the responses to these shocks estimates of productivity risk once we control for employment risk and for individual labour supply choices are substantially lower than estimates that attribute all wage variation to productivity risk increases in productivity risk impose a considerable welfare loss on individuals and induce substantial precautionary saving increases in employment risk have large effects on output and primarily through this channel affect welfare the welfare value of government programs such as food stamps which partially insure productivity risk is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides partial insurance against employment risk and no insurance against persistent shocks

the wage elasticity of informal care supply evidence from the health and retirement study author affiliation olena nizalova nizalova kse org ua acknowledgment i gratefully acknowledge steven haider jeff biddle john strauss and john goddeeris for their helpful comments throughout the process of working on the project and important comments from the anonymous referees i am also greatly indebted to michael nolte and his colleagues from the isr data enclave for making possible the revision of this article 1 introductionfor the past two decades the policy debate on issues related to the aging population has been growing at unprecedented rates throughout the world on one hand policy measures suggested in the debate include removal of the disincentives for labor force participation for the near elderly u s dhhs 1997 apfel 2004 cbo 2004 this would have effectively raised the wage rate faced by the targeted group as in the case of the elimination of the social security earnings test for those older than 65 in the united states friedberg 2000 on the other hand the role of informal caregiving is emphasized as a means to keep many individuals at home who would otherwise require expensive institutional care u s dhhs 1997 p 6 policies targeting these two objectives may turn out to conflict with each other higher wages may decrease hours devoted to informal care for elderly parents while policies encouraging informal care may lead to fewer working hours research on the effects of the social security earnings test mostly focuses on labor supply and claiming behavior of the affected group burtless and moffitt 1984 baker and benjamin 1999 gruber and orszag 1999 friedberg 2000 haider and loughran 2008 with little attention being paid to the potential interaction between incentives for paid employment and caregiving choices this interaction may have adverse implications for the well being of the oldest old given that the prevalence of caregiving is highest among individuals in their late midlife central to the analysis of this interaction is the concept of the wage elasticity the labor supply literature suggests a positive wage elasticity of labor supply smaller for males larger for females therefore if the wage elasticity of informal care supply is close to zero as has been found in earlier studies higher wages would lead to more labor supplied with negligible effects on the provision of informal care in this case one might hope that benefits from increased labor supply will not be offset along other dimensions if on the contrary the wage elasticity of informal care supply is relatively large and negative one should be more cautious when evaluating the effects of fiscal policies on labor supply among individuals in their late midlife a substantial negative wage elasticity of informal care supply would mean that along with increasing labor supply the near elderly would cut back on the hours of informal care they provide to their elderly parents this may potentially lead to more people turning to the government in their quest for help with covering formal long term care costs the goal of this article is to study the wage elasticity of informal care supply and contribute to the literature by directly addressing the issue of omitted variables in the time allocation and monetary transfer equations informal care supply is defined as annual time spent helping elderly parents with basic personal needs as well as household chores errands and transportation this article uses a unique opportunity of access to the restricted geographic identifiers for the health and retirement study hrs respondents to instrument hourly wages with the industry structure in the state of residence allowing for differential impact by education 1the primary finding of the article suggests that the wage elasticity of informal care supply is negative and substantially larger in magnitude than previously estimated due to the weakness of the instruments there is still a significant remaining bias in the estimates of the wage elasticity

monetary policy and policy credibility theories and evidence within the past decade there has been a significant shift in attitude by many western industrialized countries toward the objectives and conduct of national economic policy the events of the 1970s accelerating inflation and stagnant economic growth motivated the view that inflation had created its own stubborn self sustaining momentum that either was not amendable to the influences of conventional macroeconomic policy or else would yield to such influences only at unacceptable costs this led to the development of a program aimed at reestablishing control over prices while minimizing any adverse consequences of anti inflationary policies on output and employment seen as a new monetary experiment the essential ingredients included prudent financial management abstinence from discretionary intervention commitment to intermediate targets and above all prior announcement of these policies evidence of this program and its effects can be found oni the continents of europe north america and latin america and provide further important lessons in anti inflationary management this paper is a survey of recent theoretical developments in monetary policy which among other issues attempt to explain one rationale for this program and the likely consequences thereof to the extent that the new program of monetary and fiscal reform was deliberately made public and impressed upon citizens as an overriding commitment of governments in advance of its execution reflects a prevailing opinion that economic policies are more effective if they are credible to private economic agents this view emphasized forcefully by william fellner 1976 1979 may be seen as being mainly due to the assimilation of the rational expectations hypothesis

political shocks and public debt the case for a conservative central bank revisited abstract we explore the dynamics of public debt and optimal institutions in the presence of political shocks arising from electoral uncertainty under commitment optimal stabilization is established by combining an inflation target with a debt target the inflation target should be contingent on the political shocks while the debt target forces the government to fully absorb the political shocks in the period in which it occurs in the absence of such inflation and debt targets but with monetary commitment a conservative central bank enhances stabilization an even more conservative central bank is optimal if monetary policy cannot commit

wage inequality and family labor supply using the march current population surveys and the 1960 census this article describes earnings and employment changes for married couples in different types of households stratified by the husband s hourly wage while declines in male employment and earnings have been greatest for low wage men employment and earnings gains have been largest for wives of middle and high wage men these findings cast doubt on the notion that married women have increased their labor supply in the recent decades to compensate for the disappointing earnings growth of their husbands

on the identification of frisch labor supplies abstract this paper determines which structural components of the intertemporal decision process can be recovered from labor supply estimates obtained using heckman and macurdy s approach

the superiority of contingent rules over fixed rules in models with rational expectations the paper investigates the robustness of the proposition that in stochastic models contingent or feddback rules dominate fiped or openloop rules four arguments in favour of fixed rules are considere 1 the presence of an incompetent op malevolent policy maker 2 a trade off between flexibility and simplicity or credibility 3 the new classical proposition that only unanticipated stabilization policy has real effects 4 the time inconsistency of optimal plans in non causal models that is models in which the current state of the economy depends on expectations of future states the main conclusion is that the rational expectations revolution represented by arguments 3 and 4 does not affect the potential superiority of time inconsistent closed loop policies over time inconsistent open loop policies the case against conditionality in the design of policy must therefore rest on argument 1 or 2 which predate the new classical macroeconomics

monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers abstract with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership monetary unification reduces inflation taxes and public spending these disciplining effects of a monetary union which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases are likely to raise welfare two types of arrangements are considered for the union s common central bank ccb making the ccb more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the ccb in contrast to the results of svensson 1997 svensson l e o 1997 optimal inflation targets conservative central banks and linear inflation contracts american economic review 87 98 114 an optimally designed conservative ccb may outperform inflation targeting finally we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification hence subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

free riding convergence and two speed monetary unification in europe this paper shows that two speed monetary unification carries a danger low inflation countries in europe have an interest in delaying entry of the high inflation country because it would raise the average inflation rate however this country might refuse to join when the first group find it qualified to that is when convergence has taken place this is because the high inflation country can employ its monetary policy to stabilize against shocks given that the currency union members have optimally chosen a lower inflation rate hence a tradeoff exists between the necessity for convergence and the free rider problem

establishing a central bank issues in europe and lessons from the us list of figures list of tables preface list of conference participants 1 introduction part i the design of a central bank 2 designing a central bank for europe a cautionary tale from the early years of the federal reserve system 3 the european central bank reshaping monetary politics in europe 4 the ecb a bank or a monetary policy rule part ii transition from national central banks to a european central bank 5 hard erm hard ecu and european monetary union 6 voting

the effect of social benefits on youth employment combining regression discontinuity and a behavioral model natural experiments provide robust identifying assumptions for the estimation of policy effects yet their use for policy design is often limited by the difficulty of extrapolating on the basis of reduced form estimates in this study we exploit an age condition in the eligibility for social assistance in france which lends itself to a regression discontinuity rd design we suggest making the underlying labor supply model explicit that is translating the reduced form discontinuity in terms of discontinuous changes in disposable incomes this exercise shows the potential of combining natural experiments and behavioral models in particular we can test the external validity of the combined approach we find that it predicts the effect of a subsequent reform which extends transfers to the working poor remarkably well the model is then used to simulate the extension of social assistance to young people and finds that a transfer program with an in work component would not create further disincentives to work in this population