commodity price shocks and civil conflict evidence from colombia how do income shocks aect armed con ict theory suggests two op posite eects if labor is used to appropriate resources violently higher wages may lower con ict by reducing labor supplied to appropriation this is the opportunity cost eect alternatively a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation this is the rapacity eect our paper exploits exogenous price shocks in inter national commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in colombia to assess how dierent income shocks aect con ict we examine changes in the price of agricultural goods which are labor intensive and natural resources which are capital intensive we focus on coee and oil the two largest exports we nd that a sharp fall in coee prices in the 1990s increased violence dierentially in regions growing more coee by lower ing wages and the opportunity cost of joining armed groups in contrast a rise in oil prices increased violence dierentially in the oil region by in creasing municipal revenue siphoned through rapacity this pattern holds in several other agricultural and natural resource sectors providing robust evidence that price shocks aect con ict in opposite directions depending on the factor intensity of the commodity

credible spatial preemption it is often argued that incumbent firms may deter entry by preemptive investment in new goods we show that these conclusions are reversed when multiproduct incumbentfirms may exit in response to entry once entrants are in an industry an incumbent will often want to withdraw some goods to prevent competition with the entrant from reducing profits on other goods such a reaction makes entry more attractive to a potential entrant the equilibrium industry structure is less likely to be monopolistic as the goods are better substitutes as exit costs are low and as the competition between producers of the same good is more intense

on the salience of ethnic conflict ray acknowledges support from the national science foundation under grants 0421852 and 0617827 esteban is a member of barcelona economics xrea and is grateful for support from the generalitat de catalunya and the cicyt sej 2006 00369 this research is part of the polarization and conflict research project cit2 ct 2004 506084 funded by the european commission dg research sixth framework program

from maize to haze agricultural shocks and the growth of the mexican drug sector understanding how economic incentives affect illegal drug production is essential for crafting policies in response to the international drug trade policymakers typically face a choice between two strategies targetingcriminalgroupsvialawenforcement andofferingproducersincentivestoengage in alternate activities yet little is known about how the returns to alternate legal activities affect drug supply we contribute to this literature by examining how shocks to legal commodity prices affect the drug trade in mexico our analysis exploits exogenous movements in the mexican maize price stemming from weather conditions in u s maize growing regions as well as exports of other major maize producers using data on over 2200 municipios spanning 1990 2010 we show that lower prices differentially increased the cultivation of both marijuana and opium poppies in municipios

rainfall and conflict a cautionary tale abstract there is evidence that in some contexts income shocks cause conflict the literature demonstrating this relationship uses rainfall shocks to instrument for income shocks arguing that in agriculturally dependent regions negative rain shocks lower income which incites violence this identification strategy relies on the assumption that rainfall shocks affect conflict only through their impacts on income this paper evaluates this exclusion restriction in the context of religious conflict in india using data on dam construction i identify districts that are downstream from irrigation dams and show that income in these areas is much less sensitive to rainfall fluctuations however rain shocks remain equally strong predictors of riot incidence in these districts i explore other channels through which rainfall might affect conflict

a model of ethnic conflict we present a model of conflict in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism including violence it is this perceived responsiveness captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proposed change in ethnic policy that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause yet mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause our main results are i a one sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict ii a one sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income iii an increase in within group inequality increases conflict and iv an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict

imperfect price discrimination and welfare we develop a model in which a monopolist uses differences across consumers in their valuation of time to imperfectly price discriminate though it is customary to analyse price discrimination problems by the calculus of variations after postulating a continuum of types we assume a finite number of types and exploit the geometry and duality of the contract set and the structure of the programming specification we analyse in detail the qualitative properties of the model s solution and show by construction that our results exhaust the implications of the model for equilibrium contract pairs we show that imperfect discrimination is not bounded in welfare terms between perfect discrimination and single price monopoly and that the deadweight loss consumer surplus and output comparisons between single price monopoly and imperfect discrimination are ambiguous

tariffs versus quotas with strategic investment the relative efficiency of tariffs versus quotas is analyzed in a cournot oligopoly with strategic investment introducing quota licence fees to neutralize the international distributional effect when such licence fees remove quota rents from foreign firms then for the case of constrained entry with a sufficiently large number of firms quotas frequently hold a welfare advantage since tariffs relatively aggravate the inefficiency from overinvestment in the case of free entry and exit however tariffs hold a welfare advantage since there is greater benefit of increasing returns to scale to the economy by avoidance of excessive entry of firms

a note on credible spatial entry deterrence abstract this note revisits the question of spatial entry deterrence to investigate the credibility of pre emption by crowding in a differentiated market judd rand j econ 16 1985 153 argues that pre emption by crowding is not a credible entry barrier because an incumbent monopolist has an ex post incentive to withdraw products in response to entry we demonstrate that pre emption by crowding may be a credible entry barrier if multiple potential entrants choose the timing of entry endogenously

middleman minorities and ethnic violence anti jewish pogroms in the russian empire using detailed panel data from the pale of settlement area between 1800 and 1927 we document that anti jewish pogroms mob violence against the jewish minority broke out when economic shocks coincided with political turmoil when this happened pogroms primarily occurred in places where jews dominated middleman occupations i e moneylending and grain trading this evidence is inconsistent with the scapegoating hypothesis according to which jews were blamed for all misfortunes of the majority instead the evidence is consistent with the politico economic mechanism in which jewish middlemen served as providers of insurance against economic shocks to peasants and urban grain buyers in a relationship based on repeated interactions when economic shocks occurred in times of political stability rolling over or forgiving debts was an equilibrium outcome because both sides valued their future relationship in contrast during political turmoil debtors could not commit to paying in the future and consequently moneylenders and grain traders had to demand immediate re payment this led to ethnic violence in which the break in the relationship between the majority and jewish middlemen was the igniting factor

spatial pricing in the united states west germany and japan this paper investigates the spatial pricing policies of a sample of firms in the united states west germany and japan we begin in section i by providing general results for the three countries these suggest that f o b pricing is the exception rather than the rule furthermore there appear to be significant differences between the countries in the degree of spatial price discrimination the remainder of the paper examines whether the inter country differences in spatial discrimination can be explained by a theory of spatial pricing section ii uses the theory of spatial pricing proposed in greenhut and greenhut 1975 to derive an operational model in section iii the parameters of this model are estimated from the individual country data and the results are discussed section iv presents the conclusions the data used in this study were obtained from a survey of firms in the three countries in each country target regions were selected with a similar urban rural proportions as restricted by b existing acquaintanceships with professors in or near these urban rural centres survey constraint b was imposed after a mailed questionnaire pilot study in the united states had indicated a likely need for follow up mailings phone calls and even interviews before a sufficient number of responses from a particular place e g a particular state in the united states could be expected after selecting our comparable survey areas firms were picked at random from industrial lists of business establishments in each country and questionnaires were mailed to them the questionnaire is reproduced in the appendix the firms that returned questionnaires were compared to non responding firms no distinction in size of firm industry type or location was apparent for any country or sub region studied among the respondents we dropped from the sample all firms that were not subject to a significant freight cost defined to be a 5 per cent minimum freight cost to delivered cost ratio on sales to at least one distant market point our findings on pricing strategies are summarized in table 1 firms in the united states tend to price discriminatorily of 174 sampled firms less than one third priced non discriminatorily f o b the spokesmen for the remaining firms 67 per cent admitted that they did not add full freight cost to their mill price on all of their distant sales these firms therefore priced discriminatorily the tendency to price discriminatorily is even greater in west germany and japan with the percentage of discriminating firms approximately

who trusts others community and individual determinants of social capital in a low income country this study presents new evidence on individual and community specific determinants of social trust using data from 96 villages in bangladesh we find perceived institutional trust to be positively correlated with stated inter personal trust at the same time there is significant social distance among various faith groups in our data both hindus and muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions moreover hindus trust christians buddhists and ngo workers more than muslims and are not distrustful of the wider society trust towards non muslims is negatively correlated with islamic school attendance among muslim respondents while religiosity tends not to play any role compared to religion the effects of institutional trust and local economic development are modest these findings are robust to control for a range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects

why do hot dogs come in packs of 10 and buns in 8s or 12s a demand side investigation this paper presents a theory that yields insight into the determination of package prices and sizes consumer heterogeneity in consumption rates storage costs and transactions costs costs of making trips to the store explains differences in package sizes and unit prices in the model fully informed consumers and a monopolist seller pursue optimizing behavior the seller chooses package sizes and prices to maximize profits and the consumers select package sizes that maximize their utilities the authors show that consumer heterogeneity may induce the seller to offer more than one size and that larger sizes would be sold either at unit price discounts or unit price premiums welfare implications and empirical tests of the theory are presented copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

the political economy of the maoist conflict in india an empirical analysis we study the maoist naxalite conflict in india by constructing a comprehensive district level database combining conflict data from four different terrorism databases to socioeconomic and geography data from myriad sources using data on 360 districts for three time periods we find that land inequality and lower incomes are important factors behind the conflict exploiting the micro structure of the data we show that growth of incomes of scheduled tribes significantly decreases the intensity of the conflict finally we show that historical property rights institutions from colonial times that go back centuries affect present day conflict outcomes

an evaluation of does economic inequality breed political conflict studies contradictory findings that economic inequality may have a positive negative or no impact on political conflict are a puzzle for conflict studies three approaches have been used t o explain the inconsistent findings of the ei pc economic inequality political conflict nexus statistical modeling formal modeling and theory building because analysts have tended to possess different research skills these three approaches have been employed in isolation from one another singly however all three approaches have proved deficient and are unlikely to solve the ei pc puzzle the most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers such an approach to the ei pc puzzle produces a crucial test of the deprived actor and rational actor theories of conflict the approach is also our best hope for solving the other long standing puzzles in conflict studies

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

equilibrium number of firms and economic welfare in a spatial price discrimination model abstract we examine welfare implications of the equilibrium number of entering firms in a spatial price discrimination model in contrast to salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 the equilibrium number of firms can be either excessive or insufficient from the normative viewpoint

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

ethnic diversity and human capital development in india a disaggregated analysis at the state and district levels abstractthis study contributes to the development literature by providing a new perspective on understanding factors that influence human capital development in india we examine the effects of eth

conflict and distribution abstract we develop a behavioral model that links the level and pattern of social conflict to the societywide distribution of individual characteristics the model can be applied to groups that differ in characteristics such as wealth ethnicity religion and political ideology we settle questions of existence and uniqueness of conflict equilibrium conflict is seen to be closely connected with the bimodality of the underlying distribution of characteristics however in general the conflict distribution relationship is nonlinear and surprisingly complex our results on conflict patterns also throw light on the phenomena of extremism and moderation journal of economic literature classification numbers d63 d72 d74

oligopolistic competition and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis of entry regulation and tax subsidy schemes abstract two contributions to the general equilibrium analysis of an oligopolistic economy with free entry are intended first we generalize the excess entry theorem to the effect that a marginal decrease in the number of oligopolistic firms from the free entry equilibrium level improves economic welfare second we explore the pareto improving tax subsidy schemes in an oligopolistic economy several self financing and pareto improving tax subsidy schemes will be identified in contrast with the preceding analysis by atkinson and stiglitz which focused on the long run incidence of corporate taxation we analyse the short run as well as long run welfare implications of various policies under generalized conditions

ethnicity and conflict an empirical study this paper examines the impact of ethnic divisions on conict the empirical specication is informed by a theoretical model of conict esteban and ray 2011 in which equilibrium conict is related to just three distributional indices of diversity ethnic polarization ethnic fractionalization and a greenberg gini index constructed across ethnic groups our empirical ndings verify that these distributional measures are signicant correlates of conict the underlying theory permits us to use these results to make inferences about the relative importance of public goods in conict as well as the extent of within group cohesion in conictual activity these eects are further strengthened as we introduce country specic measures of group cohesion and the relative importance of public goods and combine them with the distributional measures exactly as specied by the theory

on monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity workers rents also matter in the dixit stiglitz model of monopolistic competition entry of firms is socially too small other authors have shown that excess entry is also a possibility with other preferences for diversity we sow that workers rents also contribute to explain excess entry through a general equilibrium mechanism larger wages indeed raises the aggregate earnings and firms sales and profits which entices too many firms to enter we discuss the possibility of over provision of varieties by comparing the equilibrium to unconstrained and constrained social optima and to other regulatory frameworks where wages are not controlled

profitable pricing when market segments overlap in this paper we analyze profitable pricing strategies when market segments overlap overlapping markets are segments that are not perfectly sealed and leakage between them can occur different consumers are assumed to incur possibly different transaction costs if they choose to purchase in the low price market a monopolist seller knows the distribution of transaction costs across consumers and must choose an optimal pricing strategy in particular the monopolist must decide whether to charge a single price or to price differentiate conditions are derived under which price differentiation will be the most profitable strategy when price differentiation is optimal the equilibrium amount of leakage is determined endogenously unlike the standard economics textbook model of price discrimination in which zero leakage is determined exogenously and is usually given as a necessary condition for price discrimination we show that zero leakage is not necessary for differential pricing to be optimal and that

weak entrants are welcome abstract this paper investigates the decision problem of an incumbent firm confronted by both a weak and strong entrant in a differentiated market suppose that the incumbent can deter entry of the weak firm but cannot deter entry of the strong firm by itself then the incumbent may allow entry of the weak firm and use it to alter the strong firm s entry decision the present paper formalizes this idea and it sheds new light on the fact that domestic firms are sometimes able to block strong foreign firms after trade liberalization the idea also explains why a dominant firm lets fringe firms be in the market

discrimination in a deprived neighbourhood an artefactual field experiment abstract we present a field experiment designed to examine the discriminatory motives of an understudied demographic the poorest people in england subjects are first asked to divide 10 between two strangers and then play a 10 dictator game with another stranger we subtly vary the ethnicity of the receivers by providing subjects with surnames randomly drawn from the electoral register including treatments that allow us to parse behaviour into either in group favouritism or out group negativity an important behavioural distinction that is typically overlooked in the discrimination literature our results suggest that the observed discriminatory attitudes are the result of out group negativity rather than in group favouritism we advance the literature on discrimination through the estimation of a structural model of group contingent social preferences which we exploit to perform counterfactual simulations our results provide insights into the behaviour of this unique demographic and provide a rationale for why they may support discriminatory policies in their voting behaviour

the economics of eco labeling standards costs and prices abstract the existing eco label landscape is fragmented because of the presence of numerous labels with different standards and is a pre competitive environment for firms to play in with many unanswered questions different standards eco labels are built around have different effects on credibility and legitimacy costs and benefits and ability to achieve sustainability goals of eco labeling focusing on eco label standards and using a hotelling type horizontal differentiation model we identify standards specific issues for and characterize primary barriers to eco labeling some of the major findings are as follows 1 more rigorous environmental standards enforced by higher integrity labels do not necessarily translate into higher selling prices 2 higher prices commanded by labeled products do not guarantee that a firm will derive higher profits from eco labeling 3 auditing fees paid per product unit being inspected for ensuring compliance with an eco label standard rather than participation fees paid up front is the primary de facto barrier to business involvement in eco labeling and 4 customers willingness to pay price premiums for eco labeled products is not a sufficient condition to generate a premium in the market

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial markets abstract vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york shows that the number of firms entering is excessive in his circle model of product differentiation we broaden his result to a large class of transport and production cost functions in particular convex transport and production costs always entail excessive entry as long as a price equilibrium exists we also provide an example of insufficient entry in equilibrium

war and conflict in economics theories applications and recent trends we review the main economic models of war and conflict these models vary in details but their implications are qualitatively consistent highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings recent empirical literature employing both laboratory and field data in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory however this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict we finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges

product variety and welfare under tough and soft pricing regimes we re examine the economic justification for the regulation of firms price policies existing analysis of the relative benefits of alternative pricing policies by treating market structure as exogenous loses an important trade off price deregulation leading to for example discriminatory pricing on the one hand enhances competition between incumbents but on the other acts as a strong deterrent against entry we illustrate this trade off by analysing the familiar address model of product differentiation and show that product variety is determined by the degree of spatial contestability of the market the ability of entrants to make binding location commitments and by whether firms are free to price discriminate copyright 1996 by royal economic society

final and intermediate goods taxation in an oligopolistic economy with free entry abstract optimal tax rules are analyzed in an oligopolistic economy with free entry the initial market allocation has two types of distortion price is set above marginal cost by the oligopolistic behavior and the advantage of increasing returns to scale is left to be unexploited by excessive entry of oligopolists with production subsidy accompanied by a self financing lump sum franchise tax on oligopolistic firms pareto efficient allocation could be restored without a lump sum tax on oligopolists however the second best optimum requires taxing intermediate inputs used in the oligopolistic industry the optimal intermediate goods taxation follows the production side ramsey rule to encourage the use of intermediate inputs elastic to output level and vice versa

segregation rent control and riots the economics of religious conflict in an indian city religious conflict is an important problem in many ethnically diverse countries horowitz 1985 a growing literature in economics suggests that conflict over resources is frequently at the root of such violence see for instance esteban and ray 2007 a number of recent empirical papers provide evidence that negative economic shocks to a community and the consequent struggle for control over resources can help explain the eruption of historic tensions into acts of violence miguel et al 2004 oster 2004 and miguel 2005 we explore this link further by studying the relationship between hindu muslim violence and living arrangements in particular residential segregation within cities in india that is conditional on city level demographics and the overall degree of ethnic tension what are the characteristics of specific locations within a city where communal violence tends to emerge and what can this tell us about why some neighborhoods erupt in this manner at certain points in time communal violence at the neighborhood level

implications of an economic theory of conflict hindu muslim violence in india we model intergroup conflict driven by economic changes within groups we show that if group incomes are low increasing group incomes raises violence against that group and lowers violence generated by it we then apply the model to data on hindu muslim violence in india our main result is that an increase in per capita muslim expenditures generates a large and significant increase in future religious conflict an increase in hindu expenditures has a negative or no effect these findings speak to the origins of hindu muslim violence in post independence india

uneven growth a framework for research in development economics the textbook paradigm of economy wide development rests on the premise of balanced growth that is on the presumption that all sectors will grow in unison over time as a country gets richer this view has served us reasonably well in some circumstances but is not particularly useful for accounts of modern under development in many developing countries economic growth has been fundamentally uneven software development the outsourcing of services sectoral technological change quick compositional shifts between agriculture and other sectors the rise of particular exports special economic zones and so on this paper will discuss both the sources of uneven growth and its implications with greater emphasis on the latter the paper will argue that much of the distributional issues or the reactions to globalization that we see in modern developing societies can be viewed as reactions to a growth process that is fundamentally uneven and is indeed perceived as such

non uniform pricing output and welfare under monopoly which the price varies with the quantity purchased than by charging a uniform price in general the profit maximizing non uniform price schedule and the welfare maximizing schedule do not coincide thus there may be scope for improving market performance through regulation the paper considers a regulator who has limited information and authority the issues addressed centre around the question of whether the level of total market output can be taken as a measure of market performance conditions under which welfare is a monotonic function of the level of total output are derived

helping minor firms reduces welfare the effect on national welfare of uneven technical progress and eli mination of a firm is analyzed under the existence of a cournot oligopolistic sector an increase in the share of an inefficient firm owing to its innovations results in a shift of production from more efficient firms to the inefficient firm causing a less efficie nt allocation of production it may decrease welfare even though the innovation itself is beneficial conversely policies keeping ineffic ient firms from innovations or eliminating them may increase welfare though they make the market structure more oligopolistic copyright 1988 by royal economic society

commodity bundling by single product monopolies consider two products that have independent demands in the sense that all individual buyers consider them neither substitutes nor complements then if the two products are priced separately the demand for either is independent of the price of the other in his classic analysis of block booking of feature films george stigler shows that it may be profitable for a monopoly seller of two such products to bundle them by requiring a buyer to take both in order to get either his work provides a rationale for tying arrangements that does not depend on technological or other dependencies among the products involved 2 adams and yellen extend the analysis of multiproduct monopoly with independent demands 3 they discuss two different bundling strategies pure bundling in which the seller only offers the products in fixed proportions and mixed bundling in which buyers may either buy the products separately or purchase a bundle with fixed proportions of each in this note i consider a single product monopoly and investigate the profit and welfare implications of bundling its product for some other

on the strategic choice of spatial price policy the strategic incentives with respect to the choice of price policy in spatial competition are analyzed in a duopoly model price discrimination emerges as the unique equilibriu m outcome in games with either simultaneous choice of policy and pric e or sequential choice where firms may commit first to uniform mill p ricing before the actual market stage nevertheless profits may be h igher with uniform pricing the authors models are applied to analyz e some common business practices that arise in geographical pricing like the basing point system and in the pricing of varieties or opti ons from a base product in a product differentiation context copyright 1988 by american economic association

competition of firms discriminatory pricing and location1 two costlessly mobile firms are to be located in a market region a subset of the plane the firms compete by setting locations and delivered price schedules to study this competitive stiuation an appropriate extensive form game is defined along with an appropri ate noncooperative solution concept existence and general properties of the equilibrium are demonstrated among the results are each firm increases its profit by locating so as to decrease total cost to both firms of serving the market firms will never locate coinciden tally if they have identical production costs and transport cost rates or if these are different and the firms are located in a circular market region having a uniform demand distribution this paper studies competition between two profit maximizing firms in space who are costlessly mobile and may discriminate in price we will allow the firms to set locations and delivered price schedules and we will be concerned with the existence and properties of equilibria in location and price starting with hotelling 9 the spatial competition literature has focused on location on bounded linear markets by two or more firms hotelling assumed identical firms that produced a single good with constant cost of production and considered consumers to be uniformly distributed and to have inelastic demand he also assumed that the consumers pay transport cost and purchase the good from the cheapest source hotelling claimed that a nash equilibrium in locations for the two firm market existed and yielded back to back locations at the center of the market many authors most recently d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 2 have noted that an equilbrium in prices and location does not exist for hotelling s model however if the firms employ identical exogeneously specified prices hotelling s conclusions hold subsequent work by smithies 14 hartwick and hartwick 7 and eaton 3 claimed to show that a nash equi librium in f o b prices and locations can exist in markets with a uniform distribu tion of consumers each of whom have identical elastic demand functions for the two and three firm problems the work of d aspremont et al casts doubt on these conclusions without the adoption of restrictive conditions our work contrasts with these works and related research which has dealt with linear markets with uniform distributions of customers and with identical firms our work will involve markets that are subsets of the plane having nonuniform distributions of customers our firms will be allowed to be different that is have differences in production and transport costs however the fundamental difference in our approach is that our firms will set discriminatory prices and not price f o b in many ways our work will represent the discriminatory pricing

a note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand abstract this paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to vickrey vickrey w s 1964 microstatics harcourt brace and world new york and salop salop s 1979 monopolistic competition with outside goods bell journal of economics 10 141 156 while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity we find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small otherwise there is insufficient entry in the limiting case of unit elastic demand the market is monopolized we broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function