cooperation against theft a test of incentives for water management in tunisia water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi arid regions cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring using a theoretical model we show that theft is more likely when prices are high punishments are weak and cooperatives are large we also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring we test the model on data from tunisia for the years 2001 2003 relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs the results confirm that well designed incentives can reduce theft and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design

the regulation of non point source pollution and risk preferences an experimental approach many environmental problems notably arising from agriculture can be classified as non point source pollution problems in this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms designed to deal with such problems collective fining random fining and a tax subsidy scheme we find that the fining schemes induce under abatement a feature being enforced with experience we further elicit the participants risk attitude and show that the performance of collective fining is not affected by the subjects risk preferences under a system based on random fining the performance of the mechanism worsens in the presence of risk seeking subjects however coordination on over abatement under the tax subsidy can be alleviated if subjects are risk averse c 2011 elsevier b v all rights reserved

identifying the warm glow effect in contingent valuation abstract this paper reports the results from a contingent valuation study designed to investigate the influence of warm glow in willingness to pay wtp responses interindividual differences in warm glow motivation are measured through a factor analysis performed on a list of attitudinal items the reported wtp measures fail to pass the scope test both socioeconomic variables and motivational factor scores are significant in the explanation of the individual wtp measures we compute cold wtp measures by taking out the effect of the warm glow motivation these cold measures satisfy both the scope test and hausman s adding up property

dynamic nonpoint source pollution control policy ambient transfers and uncertainty when a regulator cannot observe or infer individual emissions corrective policy must rely on ambient pollution data assuming this kind of environment we study a class of dierential games of pollution control with prot functions that are polynomial in the global pollution stock given an open loop emissions strategy satisfying mild regularity conditions an ambient transfer scheme is exhibited that induces it in markov perfect equilibrium mpe proposed transfers are a polynomial function of the dierence between actual and desired pollution levels moreover they are designed so that in mpe no tax or subsidy is ever levied their applicability under stochastic pollution dynamics is studied for a symmetric game of polluting oligopolists with linear demand we discuss a quadratic scheme that induces agents to adopt markovian emissions strategies that are stationary and linearly decreasing in total pollution total expected ambient transfers are non positive and their magnitude is linearly increasing in physical volatility the size of the economy and the absolute value of the slope of the inverse demand function however if the regulator is interested in inducing a constant emissions strategy then in expectation transfers vanish the total expected ambient transfer is compared to its point source equivalent

will you purchase environmentally friendly products using prediction requests to increase choice of sustainable products research shows that commitment based interventions are among the most effective strategies to encourage pro environmental behaviors but methods to elicit commitments from a large number of individuals i e door to door or phone campaigns are often costly and unrealistic predictions requests a commitment type strategy are an effective mass communication strategy and have the potential to influence pro environmental behavior among large audiences this research is the first to demonstrate that prediction requests in a consumer behavior context influence preference for environmentally friendly products in addition this research examines the role of individual and contextual factors in influencing the efficacy of prediction requests study 1 shows that exposure to an advertisement with a prediction request leads to increased preferences for environmentally sustainable vs traditional household cleaning products compared to a control advertisement and that this effect is greater when the prediction request is paired with an audience cue vs prediction request only study 2 indicates that the effect of prediction requests on preference for sustainable products is greater for individuals with interdependent vs independent self construal substantive implications and directions for future research are discussed

an experimental investigation of the patterns of international trade this study is the first attempt to create and study a laboratory economy with some of the prominent features of an international economic system the concept of multiple countries in which each country has its own technology preferences and resource endowments is introduced and operationalized the questions posed in the study are related to the law of comparative advantage factor price equalization terms of trade efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions the study builds on previous work in the experimental study of general equilibrium phenomena

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

addressing social dilemmas with mascots information and graphics acknolwedgements this research was supported by funding from the national science foundation for the north east water resources network newrnet grant iia 1330406 and from the center for behavioral and experimental agri environmental research cbear which is supported by the u s department of agriculture economic research service we are grateful for comments received during the 2015 northeastern agricultural and resource economics association annual meeting and the 2015 behavioral and experimental economists of the mid atlantic conference authors listed in alphabetical order

experimental evidence on dynamic pollution tax policies abstract this paper uses laboratory experiments to provide primary empirical evidence on dynamic pollution tax policies in particular we investigate a setting where a regulator with incomplete information uses a pollution tax mechanism with a simple endogenous tax rate adjustment rule to cost effectively meet a pollution standard this mechanism provides the opportunity for firms to strategically abate in order to reduce future tax rates the experiments vary important policy design features such as the type of tax ambient or emissions the initial tax rate and the tax rate adjustment speed we find that in equilibrium the pollution standard is met on average for each of these settings the observed long run tax rates vary considerably across policy designs which can be explained with a theory that allows for a mix of strategic and myopic firms along with the recognition that the incentives generated by the policy design can influence whether an agent plays myopically or strategically

voluntary threat approaches to reduce ambient water pollution this article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary threat approach which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance in particular we develop an endogenous voluntary threat approach that can be parameterized to induce compliance as a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium and eliminate zero abatement equilibria experimental evidence on the proposed approach as well as the exogenous approach of segerson and wu 2006 suggests that the severity of the threatened tax and the opportunity for communication are critical in determining policy outcomes

performance of the ambient tax does the nature of the damage matter the ambient tax is often considered as an efficient instrument to achieve a first best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator cannot observe individual emissions or when monitoring costs are prohibitive while this view is supported to a large extent by experimental findings there remains several hurdles that hinder the implementation of the ambient tax in the field one of these hurdles is the nature of the damage experimental findings suggest that the efficiency of the ambient tax is higher under external damage i e if ambient pollution affects non polluters spraggon in j public econ 84 427 456 2002 than under internal damage i e if ambient pollution affects polluters themselves cochard et al in environ resour econ 30 393 422 2005 but this result rests on very different experimental settings therefore we designed a new experiment that allows to compare external and internal damage within a common setting our main finding is that the ambient tax is equally efficient under internal and external damage

embedded premium promotion why it works and how to make it more effective in this paper we define an embedded premium ep as an enhancement that involves a social cause added on to a product or service we characterize ep as a sales promotion strategy and juxtapose it with traditional approaches such as discounts and rebates across three experiments using a nationwide internet panel and employing stated measures and model based inference we find that at low denominations ep is more effective than an equivalent price discount we describe how an ep s social association may influence consumer choice quite differently than price promotions and contrary to the asymmetric price promotion effect documented in the promotions literature we find that ep benefits an unknown brand more than a known brand our hierarchical bayes approach uncovers heterogeneity in ep effectiveness that can be explained by affinity toward the focal charity personal motivations and demographic markers an identifiable segment of individuals prefer the other over self suggesting possible ep optimization and segmentation strategies two such strategies customization and coverage are empirically tested and the former is shown to be very effective our findings have broad implications for brand managers with regard to resource allocation and ep program return on investment roi as well as important social welfare implications

efficiency of nonpoint source pollution instruments an experimental study in nonpoint source pollution problems the regulator does not observe each polluter s individual emission which prevents him from using the conventional policy instruments therefore new instruments have been designed to regulate this type of pollution in an experiment we compare the efficiency of some of these instruments an input based tax an ambient tax subsidy an ambient tax and a group fine we assume that polluters themselves are affected by environmental damages a control session without any regulation is also carried out in order to study the status quo situation our experimental data show that the input tax and the ambient tax are very efficient and reliable and the group fine is fairly efficient and reliable these instruments improve social welfare with respect to the status quo on the contrary the ambient tax subsidy decreases social welfare with respect to the status quo and its effect is very unreliable

agricultural runoff as a nonpoint externality a theoretical development the purpose of this paper is to develop and explore a theory dealing with an important facet of agricultural runoff problems agricultural runoff is a nonpoint externality with notable implications for both research and policy a nonpoint externality exists whenever the externality contributions of individual economic agents cannot be practically measured by direct monitoring without monitoring regulations on emissions cannot be enforced and charges or subsidies cannot be assessed thus policies which are usually suggested for pollution abatement are not available there is great need for a theoretical base that can adequately capture these facts such a theory yields some important implications even before specific empirical applications the economic problem of agricultural runoff can be separated into three distinct categories first the sediment nutrients and chemicals removed by runoff represent a loss of resources to the individual farmer these costs are borne privately by farmers second if the discount rate of the individual farmer is greater than the social discount rate or if the farmer has a planning horizon which is shorter than society s the farmer will mine the soil resource at a rate which is more depletive than is socially optimal this is a temporal externality a third category involves the conservation of mass physical resources lost by the individual farm must appear elsewhere in the environment in sufficient quantities these resources are pollutants since water is the primary transport media for these resources it is water that is polluted by soil nutrients and agricultural chemicals this spatial externality has been the focus of much research here we intend to develop a theory for these issues to employ it to suggest a revised research methodology and to provide some important conclusions about alternative runoff policies only two of the three categories of agricultural runoff problems involve externalities and only the spatial externality is considered here

investment dynamics with fixed capital adjustment cost and capital market imperfections this paper examines the implications of financing frictions on capital stocks and on capital accumulation in the presence of non convex costs of adjusting the capital stock in this setup finance has an influence on both the level of capital and the timing of investment finance and productivity are complements and finance influences investment the strongest when firms wish to significantly adjust capital for fundamental reasons these theoretical considerations are confronted with uk data while finance is mostly irrelevant for long term capital decision the short run investment function shows a significant impact of finance which is also strongest for strong fundamental investment incentives

a damage based tax mechanism for regulation of non point emissions in a recent paper segerson 1988 proposed a novel incentive mechanism for stochastic non point emissions based on ambient pollution concentrations in nature for specification of the mechanism when the damage function is nonlinear the regulator must know polluters cost and emission functions the mechanism also gives incentives to form coalitions among polluters which if they are formed render the mechanism inefficient in this paper we propose a revised mechanism which eliminates the need for knowledge of polluters cost and emission functions and reduces the probability of coalition forming a standards and pricing version of the revised mechanism with both properties mentioned is also developed

the regulation of non point source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information abstract this paper develops a bayesian framework for discussing the role of information in the design of non point source pollution control mechanisms an ambient concentration tax is examined allowing for spatial transport among multiple zones imposition of the tax requires costly measurement of concentrations in selected zones and the selection of zones for measurement must be undertaken without perfect information regarding several parameters of the problem potentially crucial information issues discussed include a the impact of asymmetric priors regarding fate and transport b the cost of measuring ambient concentration and c the optimal acquisition of information regarding fate and transport

environmental policy under imperfect information incentives and moral hazard abstract when net emissions of individual polluters cannot be efficiently monitored then emissions charges controls on emissions levels or subsidies for emissions reduction are not effective as environmental policy instruments this paper proposes instruments that can be applied in such limited information situations these instruments take the form of contracts between a pollution control agency and individual polluters the contracts include a combination of fines and subsidies that induces dischargers to follow optimal environmental policies in the absence of individual monitoring

group decision making theory and behavior under performance based water quality payments abstract two theoretical models explaining group allocation decisions under watershed level performance based payments are explored i reward and penalize individual contributors and ii reduce the problem with cost sharing and cooperative abatement under model i an optimal amount of pollution from individual contributors can be achieved with proper payment incentive and group allocation formula model ii represents a cost effective solution to pollution reduction where the group optimizes its return from group payments but does not necessarily achieve an optimal level of pollution field experiment observations support farmer behavior closer to model ii

the voluntary provision of a pure public good with diminishing marginal returns in experiments investigating the voluntary provision of a pure public good participants consistently allocate resources to this good when the nash prediction is to allocate nothing this paper explores the robustness of this result when the nash prediction calls for a division of resources between the private and public goods we consider how a change in individual resource endowments and supplemental earnings information affect allocations to the public good results indicate that under both the high and low endowment conditions groups continue to allocate more resources than the nash prediction however providing participants with detailed instructions that describe the declining marginal benefit to the public good leads to a significant decrease in allocations to the public good

payments or persuasion common pool resource management with price and non price measures we use lab experiments to study policies that address common pool resource overuse we look at a price mechanism specifically a pigouvian subsidy and four non price interventions the non price policies are information alone information with a normative message communication alone and normative messages with communication allowed in all experiment sessions no intervention occurs in the first seven and last seven rounds allowing us to examine the effects of introducing and taking away a policy the subsidy leads to near efficient extraction but surprisingly leads groups that were not over extracting to also reduce extraction this over compliance decreases efficiency although on net the subsidy is the most efficiency enhancing intervention information provision communication normative appeals and normative appeals combined with communication all reduce over extraction though by less than the subsidy without exacerbating over compliance however the effects of information alone and communication alone are small and not robust the non price policies cause a decline in over extraction of from 0 549 information to 11 441 normative appeals with communication these effects are of the same order of magnitude as the effects seen in major field studies of conservation messaging the subsidy has the worst persistence properties after the intervention ceases while normative messages with communication have the best

ambient based pollution mechanisms a comparison of homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of emitters abstract over the last two decades ambient based tax mechanisms have been offered as a potential solution to the problem of nonpoint source water pollution previous theoretical analyses suggest that the performance of ambient based tax mechanisms does not depend on firm characteristics such as size whilst policy discussions advocate that such mechanisms are best suited for regulating relatively homogeneous firms using controlled laboratory experiments we provide empirical evidence that the distribution of firm sizes does have a significant impact on observed group decision making and further that heterogeneity has the potential to generate both some relatively desirable outcomes as well as some outcomes that are not attractive these results suggest that richer theoretical models that capture important strategic interactions and social preferences are needed to better describe laboratory behavior and by extension behavior in potential policy settings

ambient taxes when polluters have multiple choices economic research on environmental policy design has largely been concerned with the merits of emissions based economic incentives e g emissions charges emissions reduction subsidies transferable discharge permits ambient based tax subsidy schemes have drawn considerable interest in nonpoint pollution literature as alternatives to emissions based instruments expanding especially on segerson s seminal article this article examines the optimal design and budget balancing properties of ambient tax subsidy schemes under more realistic assumptions about the dimensions of firms choice sets than prior research

research issues in nonpoint pollution control research on nonpoint pollution control instruments has focused primarily on incentives applied either to production inputs that affect nonpoint pollution or to ambient pollution concentrations both approaches may in theory yield an efficient solution however input based incentives will generally have to be second best to make implementation practical design issues include which inputs to monitor and the rates to apply to them the limited research indicates that second best input based incentives can be effective in adjusting input use in environmentally desirable ways alternatively ambient based incentives have theoretical appeal because efficient policy design appears to be less complex than for input based incentives these incentives have no track record nor close analogues that demonstrate potential effectiveness however research on how households and firms might react in response to ambient based incentives is needed before these instruments can be seriously considered

collective versus random fining an experimental study on controlling ambient pollution this paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games collective vis a vis random fining as ameans to regulate non pointpollution using samples from both costa ricancoffee mill managers and costa rican students we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut although they lead to efficient outcomesthrough nash play in the majority of cases theobserved frequency of nash play is lower thantheoretically predicted moreover we rejectthe hypothesis that managers and studentsbehave equally off the equilibrium managerstend to over abate whereas students tend tounder abate this result suggests theimportance of considering subject pooldifferences in the evaluation of environmentalpolicies by means of experiments particularlyif those policies involve certain forms ofmanagement decisions

comparing regulations to protect the commons an experimental investigation in a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common pool resource game with heterogeneous users an access fee and subsidy scheme transferable quotas and non transferable quotas we calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users profits compared to free access extraction we compare the regulations according to five criteria resource preservation individual profits profit difference pareto improvement from free access and sorting of the most efficient users one of the main findings is that even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas

idiosyncratic shocks and the role of nonconvexities in plant and aggregate investment dynamics we examine a model of lumpy investment wherein establishments face persistent shocks to common and plant specific productivity and nonconvex adjustment costs lead them to pursue generalized s s investment rules we allow persistent heterogeneity in both capital and total factor productivity alongside low level investments exempt from adjustment costs to develop the first model consistent with available evidence on establishment level investment rates reassessing the implications of lumpy investment for aggregate dynamics in this setting we find that they remain substantial when factor supply considerations are ignored but are quantitatively irrelevant in general equilibrium the substantial implications of general equilibrium extend beyond the dynamics of aggregate series while the presence of idiosyncratic shocks makes the time averaged distribution of plant level investment rates largely invariant to market clearing movements in real wages and interest rates we show that the dynamics of plants investments differ sharply in their presence thus model based estimations of capital adjustment costs involving panel data may be quite sensitive to the assumption about equilibrium our analysis also offers new insights about how nonconvex adjustment costs influence investment at the plant when establishments face large and weakly persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks consistent with existing estimates we find that nonconvex costs do not cause lumpy investments but act to eliminate them

observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities abstract in controlling environmental externalities pigouvian taxes are an appropriate instrument when individual emissions can be monitored while ambient taxes are deemed appropriate to control non point source pollution when the ambient pollution but not individual emissions can be monitored this paper shows that under uncertainty the efficient regulatory scheme for non point source pollution is a mix of pigouvian and ambient taxes the pigouvian fees are imposed on emissions revealed by the polluting firms in exchange for a lower ambient tax thus a non point source case can be gradually transformed into a point source case

externalities and corrective policies in experimental markets this paper reports on the behaviour of simple laboratory markets which have an externality experiences with these markets provide some help in answering two broad questions 1 do markets with externalities behave in accordance with the law of supply and demand 2 how do the pollution tax pollution standard and pollution licenses compare as methods for correcting the externality