computational analysis of the accession of chile to the nafta and western hemisphere integration we present the results based on the michigan computational general equilibrium model of western hemisphere economic integration it is shown that tariff elimination will have beneficial effects for most countries involved although the benefits as well as the costs of liberalizatio n are small however if a hemispheric treaty were to stimulate an increase in the capital stocks of the major south american economies the welfare gains would be substantial sensitivity tests reveal that the model exaggerates the likely gains from economies of scale due to liberalization but the error is small in this context because the impact of trade liberalization is small when econometric estimates of scale economies are incorporated into the model the welfare gains due to capital flows nevertheless remain robust a comparison of results for chile using different databases indicates that the impact of regional liberalization using a 1980 database may overstate the impact on the nonferrous metals sector in particular and manufacturing more generally nonetheless when using a 1990 database the change in output of the nonferrous metals sector remain larger than for any other sectors in the chilean economy

information spillovers gains from trade and interventions in frozen markets we study government interventions in markets suffering from adverse selection importantly asymmetric information prevents both the realization of gains from trade and the production of information that is valuable to other market participants we find a fundamental tension in maximizing welfare while some intervention is required to restore trading too much intervention depletes trade of its informational content we characterize the optimal policy that balances these two considerations and explore how it depends on features of the environment our model can be used to study a program introduced in 2009 to restore information production in the market for legacy assets

a bayesian model of voting in juries abstract we model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule we offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent regardless of the size of the jury and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed we prove a jury theorem for our general model as the size of the jury increases the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule for unanimity rule the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency a property that could emerge only in a continuous model journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

information aggregation in common value auctions a key question in information economics and finance is whether prices aggregate information in a competitive environment that is when agents are endowed with private information does competition lead in the limit to prices which would occur if all information were public this paper examines the asymptotic properties of prices in common value auctions when the number of bidders becomes large the main idea in this paper is to separate the issue of information aggregation from the issue of revenue efficiency we also distinguish between the amount of information prices contain and the degree to which prices approximate the asset s value using this approach we get a simple characterization of the limiting distribution of prices we are not only able to answer whether prices converge to the asset s value but also get an explicit form for the limiting distribution prices converge to the expected value of the asset conditional on the information possessed by what we call the pivotal bidder this provides insights on how the auction format and the information structure influence the limiting behavior of prices it shows that the limiting distribution of prices can be derived from the statistical properties of certain order statistics this lets us abstract from the specific equilibrium bidding strategies for example we show that while the first and second price auction have different equilibrium strategies they share a similar limiting distribution of prices these auctions yield different limiting distributions from auctions such as the english auction or kn auction our

efficiency in decentralised markets with aggregate uncertainty we study efficiency in decentralized markets with aggregate uncertainty and one sided private information there is a continuum of mass one of uninformed buyers and a continuum of mass one of informed sellers buyers and sellers are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs over time and buyers make the offers we show that all equilibria become efficient as trading frictions vanish

an analysis of a us southern african customs union sacu free trade agreement summary this paper analyzes the potential economic effects of bilateral negotiations for an fta between the united states and the southern african customs union sacu the us sacu fta bilateral negotiations were initiated in june 2003 but have become deadlocked over a series of issues of concern to the sacu to determine whether a bilateral fta might be in the sacu members interests we use the michigan model of world production and trade to assess the welfare and other economic effects of a bilateral fta we conclude that the benefits of an fta are rather small and that the interests of the global trading community including the united states and sacu could be better served by unilateral and especially multilateral liberalization

efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform price auctions abstract we prove that the equilibria of a large interdependent value uniform price auction model where bidders have arbitrary preferences for multiple units can be approximated by a nonatomic exchange economy we show that the uniform price auction is approximately efficient with a large number of participants and asymptotically aggregates idiosyncratic bidder information into the market price more generally our analysis framework provides conditions justifying the use of nonatomic limit model approximations to analyze the large market behavior of game theoretic models we demonstrate continuity requirements on the economic primitives sufficient for the equilibrium strategies of the two models to converge as the number of participants in the finite game approaches infinity

bilateral trade flows the gravity equation and functional form the gravity equation has been frequently and successfully used for nearly thirty years to further understanding of the determinants of bilateral trade flows across countries and subsequently to analyze commercial policy measures a maintained hypothesis by the applied literature on international trade as gravity equation loglinearity is questioned in this paper since the possibility of a general functional form is open through box cox transformations using data corresponding to the sixteen oecd most developed countries from 1964 to 1987 the authors reach the conclusion that the optimal functional form is slightly yet statistically different from the loglinear form in every year of the sample and they are able to propose one unique functional form suitable for all the sample period copyright 1993 by mit press

smooth trading with overconfidence and market power we describe a symmetric continuous time model of trading among relatively overconfident oligopolistic informed traders with exponential utility traders agree to disagree about the precisions of their continuous flows of gaussian private information with enough disagreement an equilibrium exists in which prices reveal the average of all traders signals immediately but traders continue to trade gradually towards target inventories the price is a linear function of a trader s inventory the derivative of a trader s inventory and the average other traders valuations prices reflect a keynesian beauty contest faster than equilibrium trading generates flash crashes jel d8 d43 d47 g02 g14

signalling in a dynamic labour market this paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the spence job market signalling model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time the dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria including ones that sustain implicit collusion even though the length of the game is finite emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the independence of never weak best response criterion of kohlberg and mertens 1986 it is shown that in the limit as the time between offers tends to zero any such equilibrium results in expectation in the unique stable outcome of the static spence model

dynamic signaling and market breakdown we consider the effects a public revelation of information e g rating grade has on trading in a dynamic signaling model competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration the external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium more interestingly we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices if signals are noisy no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information if signals are fully revealing then trade occurs even close to revelation however transaction prices are discontinuous

auctions actions and the failure of information aggregation we study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform price auction where n k bidders each demand one object before the auction each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world the good that is auctioned is a common value object for the bidders and a bidder s valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state we show that there are equilibria where the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of the world and aggregates no information even in an arbitrarily large auction in the equilibrium that we construct because prices do not aggregate information agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information before they participate in the market also market statistics other than price such as the amount of rationing and bid distributions contain extra information about the state our findings sharply contrast with past work which shows that large auctions aggregate information when there is no ex post action

matching markets with adverse selection abstract this paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of rothschild and stiglitz quart j econ 90 1976 629 the major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open ended and constantly refilled by new participants e g by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market the major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts as frictions become small we show that the least cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome regardless of the distribution of types among entrants moreover we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique

price inference in small markets this paper investigates the effects of market size on the ability of price to aggregate traders private information to account for heterogeneity in correlation of trader values a gaussian model of double auction is introduced that departs from the standard information structure based on a common fundamental shock the paper shows that markets are informationally efficient only if correlations of values coincide across all bidder pairs as a result with heterogeneously interdependent values price informativeness may not increase monotonically with market size as a necessary and sufficient condition for the monotonicity price informativeness increases with the number of traders if the implied reduction in the absolute value of an average correlation statistic of an information structure is sufficiently small

computational analysis of the menu of us japan trade policies we have used the michigan computable general equilibrium cge model of world production and trade to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of us japan trade policies the menu of policies encompasses the various preferential us and japan bilateral and regional free trade agreements ftas negotiated and in process unilateral removal of existing trade barriers and global multilateral free trade the welfare impacts of the ftas on the united states and japan are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms the sectoral employment effects are also generally small but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalisation the welfare effects on the fta partner countries are mostly positive though generally small but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries there are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on non member countries for some of the ftas analysed in comparison to the welfare gains from the us and japan bilateral ftas the gains from both unilateral trade liberalisation by the united states japan and the fta partners and from global multilateral free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system the us and japan ftas are based on hub and spoke arrangements we show that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions suggesting that the complex of bilateral ftas may create distortions of the global trading system

information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders this paper studies information aggregation in dynamic markets with a finite number of partially informed strategic traders it shows that for a broad class of securities information in such markets always gets aggregated trading takes place in a bounded time interval and in every equilibrium as time approaches the end of the interval the market price of a separable security converges in probability to its expected value conditional on the traders pooled information if the security is non separable then there exists a common prior over the states of the world and an equilibrium such that information does not get aggregated the class of separable securities includes among others arrow debreu securities whose value is 1 in one state of the world and 0 in all others and additive securities whose value can be interpreted as the sum of traders signals

information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values we study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values a trade of one asset or lack thereof can provide information about the value of other assets the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium we show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is suciently high the

education signalling with preemptive offers offers before workers complete their education workers cannot commit to turning down such offers offers are private so that workers are unable to use one firm s offer in an attempt to elicit better offers from other firms in the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of the model with unproductive education there is no wasteful education when education is productive the standard model predicts that more able individuals become overeducated to separate themselves from less able workers in our model less able workers become overeducated to partially pool with more able workers the pooling mutes the incentives of high ability workers who in consequence actually choose to become undereducated we examine the robustness of our result to modifications to the basic model

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

public vs private offers in the market for lemons we study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values short run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller when previous offers are observable bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse in contrast when offers are hidden agreement is always reached although with delay

acquisition targets and motives the case of the banking industry findings do not indicate poorly managed firms are more likely to be acquired than well managed firms the analysis uses a sample of 1 046texas banks that existed in 1970 out of which 201 were acqui red during the period 1970 82 a multinomial logit procedure is used to estimate the relationship between the likelihood of acquisition and the characteristics of the target firm and its market additional results suggest that firms with la rge market shares low capital asset ratios and operations in urban areas are r elatively likely to be acquired but not firms with low profits or low growth copyright 1987 by mit press

information aggregation and allocative efficiency in smooth markets recent years have seen extensive investigation of the information aggregation properties of markets however relatively little is known about conditions under which a market will aggregate the private information of rational risk averse traders who optimize their portfolios over time in particular what features of a market encourage traders to ultimately reveal their private information through trades we consider a market model involving finitely many informed risk averse traders interacting with a market maker our main result identifies a basic asymptotic smoothness condition on prices in the market that ensures information is aggregated as long as portfolios converge furthermore under this assumption the allocation achieved is ex post pareto efficient asymptotic smoothness is fairly mild it requires that eventually infinitesimal purchases or sales should see the same per unit price notably we demonstrate that under some mild conditions algorithmic markets based on cost functions or equ

markets transparency and the corporate bond market for decades corporate bonds primarily traded in an opaque environment quotations which indicate prices at which dealers are willing to transact were available only to market professionals most often by telephone prices at which bond transactions were completed were not made public the u s corporate bond market became much more transparent with the introduction of the transaction reporting and compliance engine trace in july 2002 beginning that date bond dealers were required to report all trades in publicly issued corporate bonds to the national association of security dealers which in turn made transaction data available to the public in this paper we describe trading protocols in the corporate bond market and assess the impact of the increase in transparency on the market we review how trace has affected the costs that corporate bond investors paid to bond dealers for their transactions we canvass the opinions of a variety of finance professionals and consider articles in the trade press to obtain a broader view of the impact of transparency on the corporate bond market

corporate bond market transaction costs and transparency using a complete record of u s over the counter otc secondary trades in corporate bonds we estimate average transaction costs as a function of trade size for each bond that traded more than nine times between january 2003 and january 2005 we find that transaction costs decrease significantly with trade size highly rated bonds recently issued bonds and bonds close to maturity have lower transaction costs than do other bonds costs are lower for bonds with transparent trade prices and they drop when the trace system starts to publicly disseminate their prices the results suggest that public traders benefit significantly from price transparency

bilateral trade flows and economic integration in latin america and the caribbean abstract a gravity equation is used to analyze intra latin american and caribbean trade which is shown to depend mainly on the exporters gnp and distance importers gnp and exporter government policies are also relevant variables richer countries import more natural resource based products than manufactures from poorer ones thus larger richer countries enjoy large trade surpluses particularly in manufactures integration systems have had mixed results the central american common market and caricom have contributed substantially to manufacturing trade lafta has achieved moderate results while the andean group s impact has been poor

economic integration among developed developing and centrally planned economies a comparative analysis we examine six integration schemes and decompose their ability to increase inter member trade into environmental policy and system effects environmental factors caused the greatest variation in trade creation with inter member distance the most important environmental variable the cacm and efta have followed more effective integration policies than the eec lafta and the andean pact although integration can thus benefit developed and developing countries alike for some such as those in latin america inter member distances severely limit its effectiveness while the combination of policy and system has kept the cmea fromrr achieving its full potential for increasing inter member trade its effectiveness does not differ from that of unions among market economies

learning and price discovery in a search market we introduce learning into an otherwise standard two sided search and bargaining market there is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand in the high state buyers are on the long side otherwise they are on the short side in equilibrium prices are on average higher in the high state individual agents learn about the distribution while searching agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining position buyers may initially insist on a low price and sellers on a high price after successive failures to trade agents become increasingly pessimistic about the market conditions and soften their bargaining stance when frictions are small equilibrium transaction prices are approximately market clearing despite aggregate demand being unknown thus the search and bargaining procedure enables price discovery in a decentralized market

history regionalism and caricom trade a gravity model analysis abstract a gravity model is fitted to 17 annual cross sections 1980 1996 of bilateral trade data imports and exports between caricom member states and selected trading partners specifically the paper investigates the effects of regional integration colonial legacies and linguistic ties on caricom bilateral trade flows between member states and between member states and north american and european union countries the empirical results indicate that history and regionalism have had significant and strong effects on caricom trade additionally two traditional explanatory variables in gravity models income per capita and population have significant and positive effects on caricom trade while the distance between trading partners exerts the expected negative effect

trade benefits under the eec generalized system of preferences the purpose of the paper is to test for the existence of a statistically significant effect of the eec generalized system of preferences on actual trade flows between developing countries and the eec using a gravity type model we estimate the gross trade creation effect of the eec generalized system of preferences on the eec imports from 10 major developing countries estimation on a yearly basis for the period 1967 1978 indicates the presence of a statistically significant effect it would appear that gross trade creation amounted to about s2 billion for these 10 countries in 1978 in addition to these calculations the paper reviews the eec generalized system of preferences in detail and offers comments on its future impact on exports from developing countries

how much information is incorporated in financial asset prices experimental evidence we propose a new estimation method and use experimental data from multiple double auction experiments in the literature to directly estimate how much information is incorporated in financial market prices we find that public information is almost completely reflected in prices but that surprisingly little private information less than 50 is incorporated in prices our estimates therefore suggest that while semi strong informational efficiency is consistent with the data financial market prices may be very far from strong form efficiency we compare our estimates with beliefs of economists surveyed at the econometric society meetings and find that economists and finance researchers alike expect market prices to reflect considerably more private information than what we estimated

search with adverse selection this paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection we study information aggregation by the price how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices when search frictions are small we identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small we trace this to a strong form of the winner s curse that is present in the sequential search model the failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

information percolation in large markets we introduce a simple model of the percolation of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter each other over time and reveal information to each other some of which they may have received earlier from other agents we are particularly interested in the evolution over time of the cross sectional distribution in the population of the posterior probability assignments of the various agents we provide a market example based on privately held auctions and obtain a relatively explicit solution for the cross sectional distribution of posterior beliefs at each time our results contribute to the literature on information transmission in markets hayek 1945 argues that markets allow information that is dispersed in a population to be revealed through prices grossman s 1981 notion of a rational expectations equilibrium formalizes this idea in a setting with price taking agents milgrom 1981 pesendorfer and swinkels 1997 and reny and perry 2006 provide strategic foundations for the rational expectations equilibrium concept in centralized markets a number of important markets however are decentralized these include over the counter markets and private auction markets wolinsky 1990 and blouin and serrano 2002 study information transmission in decentralized markets in contrast to these two papers equilibrium behavior in our market example leads to full revelation of information we happily acknowledge conversations with manuel amador frank kelly jeremy stein and pierre olivier weill and research assistance from sergey lobanov rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 and gale 1986a 1986b study decentralized markets without asymmetric information satterthwaite and shneyerov 2003 study decentralized market with private value asymmetric information amador and weill 2006 study a more abstract setting regarding transmission of common and private i nformation

multilateral regional and bilateral trade policy options for the united states and japan we have used the michigan model of world production and trade to simulate the economic effects on the united states japan and other major trading countries regions of the doha round of wto multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional bilateral free trade agreements ftas involving the united states and japan we estimate that an assumed reduction of post uruguay round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the doha round would increase world welfare by 686 4 billion with gains of 164 0 billion for the united states 132 6 billion for japan and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries regions if there were global free trade with all post uruguay round trade barriers completely removed world welfare would increase by 2 1 trillion with gains of 497 0 billion 5 5 per cent of gnp for the united states and 401 9 billion 6 2 per cent of gnp for japan regional agreements such as an apec fta an asean plus 3 fta and a western hemisphere fta would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the doha multilateral trade round would separate bilateral ftas involving japan with singapore mexico chile and korea and the united states with chile singapore and korea would have positive though generally small welfare effects on the partner countries but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries there would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non member countries for both the regional and bilateral ftas analysed the welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries