bank runs liquidity costs and investment distortions abstract in this paper we extend the diamond and dybvig 1983 model of intermediation to study further the conditions under which bank runs can occur and to consider how private parties might adjust to the existence of bank run equilibria we provide weaker necessary conditions for runs we then characterize how banks respond to the possibility of runs in their design of deposit contracts and investment decisions banks might choose to offer contracts that prevent runs but under some conditions the second best contracts will involve accepting some risk of runs in order to achieve higher expected returns from their investments

the assessment money and banking theory and evidence this issue of the oxford review is concerned with money and banking the articles in the issue provide a comprehensive overview of recent developments in the literature they systematically evaluate both the theoretical and empirical literature on banks the monetary transmission mechanism the operation of financial systems and bank regulation both in a domestic and an international context does money matter has been a favourite question posed by academic economists for several decades while the question has not changed the answer has during the 1950s and 60s the conventional view was that it does matter during the 1970s and 80s the influence of monetary policy on real as opposed to inflationary developments came to be increasingly questioned the consensus in the 1990s has swung back a few decades to the view that money does matter a new twist to the story which did not feature prominently in the 1950s and 60s debate is that banks as well as money matter of course there were several authors such as gurley and shaw 1960 who pointed to the importance of banks in the monetary transmission mechanism however it is really only in the last decade that economic theorists have turned their attention to the rationale for and the special role of banks the irony of this is that the theoretical justification for banks is appearing just at the moment when many commentators point to the demise of banks in the face of such close substitutes as corporate bond markets money market funds and contingent securities

external discipline and financial stability abstract the paper examines the costs and benefits of external discipline dollarization foreign short term debt from the point of view of the stability of the financial system of an emergent ldc economy external discipline solves the time inconsistency problem of central bank policy to help banks in trouble but at the cost of excessive liquidation of projects the latter may be quite important when the danger of coordination failure of investors is large

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

understanding bank runs the importance of depositor bank relationships and networks we use a unique new database to examine micro depositor level data for a bank that faced a run we use minute by minute depositor withdrawal data to understand the effectiveness of deposit insurance the role of social networks and the importance of bank depositor relationships in influencing depositor propensity to run we employ methods from the epidemiology literature which examine how diseases spread to estimate transmission probabilities of depositors running and the significant underlying factors we find that deposit insurance is only partially effective in preventing bank runs further our results suggest that social network effects are important but are mitigated by other factors in particular the length and depth of the bank depositor relationship depositors with longer relationships and those who have availed of loans from a bank are less likely to run during a crisis suggesting that cross selling acts not just as a revenue generator but also as a complementary insurance mechanism for the bank finally we find there are long term effects of a solvent bank run in that depositors who run do not return back to the bank our results help understand the underlying dynamics of bank runs and hold important policy implications

on avoiding bank runs abstract can bank runs be avoided and should they be avoided i analyze a banking environment where bank runs can occur as a result of negative signals about the bank s investments in this environment banks can make sure that runs do not occur by designing the deposit contract appropriately i show that there are conditions under which it is profit maximizing for the bank to avoid runs and others under which occasional runs are part of optimal bank behavior i also compare the banking arrangement to an arrangement based on trading in equity

why do bank runs look like panic a new explanation this paper demonstrates that even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria a bank run may still occur when depositors expectations on the bank s fundamentals do not change more specifically a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank specific information will be revealed or when they learn that precise bank specific information will not be revealed the results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs it also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs

pre play research in a model of bank runs se estudia un modelo de corrida bancaria en el que los depositantes no llegaron a un consenso sobre la accion a elegir pero pueden informarse acerca de las intenciones de los otros jugadores la propiedad de equilibrio indeterminado reaparece en el juego con adquisicion de informacion en el escenario bajo analisis el equilibrio con niveles positivos de adquisicion de informacion resulta en mayores probabilidades de quiebra del banco la correlacion en las senales aumenta el espacio de parametros para el cual existen equilibrios con niveles positivos de adquisicion de informacion y mayor probabilidad de quiebra del banco

regulating banks through market discipline a survey of the issues abstract the interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed new capital accord this paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation we start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms next a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced we evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have finally we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism in this respect the basle committee has taken the right approach

models of banking instability a partial review of the literature abstract this paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed diamond and dybvig 1983 it explores the extent to which it a explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets and b justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry it suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real world banks in addition the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry it suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models

measuring banks liquidity risk an option pricing approach abstract this paper proposes a new approach to evaluating banks liquidity needs which is not only well grounded theoretically but is also easy to apply practically within the framework of a global game with imperfect information we first establish a boundary condition for bank runs and show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium for bank runs using the option pricing approach we then obtain a closed form formula for the value of bank equity with both run risk and insolvency risk finally a bank s optimal liquidity ratio is derived by maximizing the value of bank equity using data on chinese listed banks we show that the deviation of the actual liquidity ratio from the optimal liquidity ratio in a bank represents a robust proxy for its liquidity risk an increased liquidity shortfall leads to worsening liquidity problems and this is particularly pronounced when the liquidity shortfall is high

bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model in an infinitely repeated version of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieve interest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidity insurance without diamond and dybvig s assumption of no side trades the bank is subject to runs that may result from either excessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits the latter cause which cannot occur in diamond and dybvig s one generation model implies that suspension of convertibility may not prevent bank runs government intervention may be necessary to maintain bank stability article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

budget windows sunsets and fiscal control abstract in recent years the united states has evaluated policy changes using a multi year budget window a budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window s endpoint while a window that is too long includes years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless and allows the shifting of fiscal burdens to those whom budget rules are supposed to protect this paper characterizes the optimal budget window an appropriately designed budget window eliminates the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions the analysis also has implications for how to account for long term term budget commitments

a model of financial crises in emerging markets recent events in mexico asia russia and brazil have underscored that a satisfactory explanation of financial crises in emerging markets remains elusive not too long ago the prevailing view was that crises were the inevitable outcome of ongoing fiscal imbalances coupled with fixed exchange rates but this first generation view pioneered by krugman 1979 has fallen out of fashion because in many crises the crucial fiscal disequilibria were absent and as obstfeld 1994 has argued currency crises have sometimes occurred even though central banks had more than enough resources to prevent them witness much of europe in the early 1990s obstfeld put forward a second generation view in which central banks may decide to abandon an exchange rate peg when the unemployment costs of defending it become too large this new perspective implied that crises could be driven by self fulfilling expectations since the costs of defending the peg may themselves depend on anticipations that the peg will be maintained but obstfeld s emphasis on mounting unemployment and domestic recession while appropriate for the erm 1992 crisis was at odds with the facts in mexico in 1994 and east asia in 1997 asian

a model of the interactions between banking crises and currency crises abstract a second generation model of currency crises is combined with a standard banking model in a pegged exchange rate regime after funds have been committed to the banks news arrives about the quality of the banks assets and about the exchange rate fundamentals a run on the banks may cause a currency crisis or vice versa there are multiple equilibria with either twin crises or no crisis depending on depositors expectations of other depositors actions suspension of deposit convertibility can prevent a speculative attack on the currency but last resort lending to solvent banks can induce one

can short term capital controls promote capital inflows abstract in an economy a la diamond and dybvig j polit econ 91 3 1983 401 we present an example in which foreign lenders find it profitable to invest in an emerging market if and only if the emerging market government imposes taxes on short term capital inflows this implies that capital controls that are effective in reducing the vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises may increase the volume of capital inflows

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

banking panics and policy responses we study how banking panics unfold in av ersion of the diamond and dybvig 1983 model with limited commitment as is well known the banking authority could eliminate the possibility of a run on the banking system by committing to suspend payments to depositors if a run were to start once a run is under way however the banking authority will choose to reschedule rather than suspend payments we construct equilibria in which depositors run on the banking system with positive probability and we show that an equilibrium bank run in this setting is necessarily partial with only some depositors participating we also show that a run naturally occurs in waves with each wave of withdrawals prompting a further policy response from the banking authority the number of waves that occur in equilibrium is stochastic and can be arbitrarily large

need and generosity how markets for free goods equilibrate abstract when more people use emergency food pantries or homeless shelters how can an observer tell whether the change is being driven by greater need among users or greater generosity among donors why are serious and long standing gluts and shortages relatively rare in both the emergency food system and the emergency shelter system i answer both questions together by developing a model of the supply and demand for nonpriced goods quality plays the role in this model that price plays in standard model quality adjusts to clear the market and observers can tell whether need or generosity is responsible for changes in quantity by looking at the accompanying changes in quality

the role of non transparency in a currency crisis model abstract this paper extends the work by morris and shin am econom rev 88 1998 587 597 where multiple equilibria in the self fulfilling currency attack models can be reduced to a unique equilibrium when agents observe fundamentals privately with small errors we find that under a more general specification with realistic parameters noisy private observations are generally insufficient to prevent the multiplicity of equilibria the pivotal role played by the transparency of fundamentals policies in currency crisis is also examined surprisingly transparency may trigger rather than eliminate currency crises when fundamentals are relatively healthy our results may be relevant to research in other coordination problems

evaluating theories of bank runs with heterogeneity restrictions this paper empirically tests theories of bank runs we use a structural panel var to extract runs from deposit market data identification exploits cross sectional heterogeneity in deposit insurance we identify bank runs as adverse deposit market supply shocks hitting uninsured banks harder compared to insured conditional on a run we study the behavior of uninsured banks with bad and good fundamentals we find that both experience runs but deposit outflows at the former are more severe panic effects which affect all uninsured deposits alike irrespective of fundamentals dominate in the aggregate insured banks partially absorb the outflow of uninsured deposits

should bank runs be prevented abstract this paper extends diamond and dybvig s model j political economy 91 1983 401 to a framework in which bank assets are risky there is aggregate uncertainty about the demand for liquidity in the population and some individuals receive a signal about bank asset quality others must then try to deduce from observed withdrawals whether an unfavorable signal was received by this group or whether liquidity needs happen to be high in this environment both information induced and pure panic runs will occur however banks can prevent them by designing the deposit contract appropriately it is shown that in some cases it is optimal for the bank to prevent runs but there are situations where the bank run allocation may be welfare superior

rational herding in financial economics abstract this paper briefly describes recent papers on the economics of rational herding in financial markets some models can predict perfect herding in which rational agents all act alike without any countervailing force such herding typically arises either from direct payoff externalities negative externalities in bank runs positive externalities in the generation of trading liquidity or in information acquisition principal agent problems based on managerial desire to protect or signal reputation or informational learning cascades the paper also provides a few pointers to related literature and suggests issues to be addressed in future research

homeless in america homeless in california it is generally believed that the increased incidence of homelessness in the united states has arisen from broad societal factors such as changes in the institutionalization of the mentally ill increases in drug addiction and alcohol usage and so forth this paper presents a comprehensive test of the alternate hypothesis that variations in homelessness arise from changed circumstances in the housing market and in the income distribution we assemble essentially all the systematic information available on homelessness in u s urban areas census counts shelter bed counts records of transfer payments and administrative agency estimates we estimate similar statistical models using four different samples of data on the incidence of homelessness defined according to very different criteria our results suggest that simple economic principles governing the availability and pricing of housing and the growth in demand for the lowest quality housing explain a large portion of the variation in homelessness

banks debt maturity and financial crises abstract we develop a model in which the maturity of external debt of banks their level of international reserves and the term structure of interest rates are jointly determine self fulfilling runs may occur and banks take this possibility into account when choosing the structure of their assets and liabilities if the probability of a run is sufficiently small banks will deliberately choose an illiquid asset liability position and expose themselves to a run in that case short term debt will be cheaper than long term debt and the maturity structure of foreign debt will depend on attitudes towards risk

bank runs in emerging market economies evidence from turkey s special finance houses recent banking crises in emerging market countries have renewed debates about deposit insurance because insurance erodes banks incentives to manage risks prudently some argue that its elimination would improve bank stability yet eliminating insurance could be de stabilizing if it recreates risks of self fulfilling runs this paper examines dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of runs on turkey s special finance houses an uninsured sub sector of islamic banks detailed data on withdrawals are analyzed in a vector autoregressive framework that enables us to distinguish between informational and self fulfilling elements of runs we found that both types of dynamics were at work during the runs suggesting a role for deposit insurance judiciously used in ruling out expectational problems that fuel tendencies to run

sources of panics evidence from the weekly data abstract we use weekly data 1867 1933 to investigate the sources of banking and financial panics we find that while a panic s exact starting date is unpredictable one can identify environments conducive to panics a lack of liquidity in financial markets seems to be a key source results also reveal the effectiveness of the aldrich vreeland act inelastizing the money supply and shortening the panic of 1914 and suggest that the panic of 1933 may have been caused by a speculative attack on the gold backed us dollar via the banks as opposed to a run on the banks directly

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

financing banking crises abstract a model of strategic asset pricing is used to investigate the increase in interest rates and the formation of cash syndicates that can occur during privately financed banking crises results produced help to explain the federal reserve system s creation following the panic of 1907 and to clarify the fed s role in financing contemporary banking crises

additional evidence on the information based contagion effects of bank failures abstract recent theoretical models addressed the question of the nature of bank runs and what triggers them two competing hypotheses emerged pure panic and information based contagion this study provides additional evidence consistent with the latter hypothesis three observable bank characteristics are examined as proxy measures for the interim private information used by rational depositors in assessing the riskiness of a bank s long lived assets that may trigger bank runs the three factors are 1 the distance of the solvent banks headquarters from the headquarters of each failed bank 2 the size of the solvent banks and 3 the capital ratio as a proxy for their solvency the analysis is conducted in the context of the five large bank failures that occurred in the southwest region of the us during the mid 1980s weekly abnormal returns of 33 southwestern bhcs in ten critical failure related event dates are regressed on the three observable bank characteristics our findings suggest that distance and capital adequacy are negatively related to the magnitude of the contagion effect whereas size is positively related

information contagion and bank herding we show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks when bank loan returns have a common systematic factor the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor the increase in a bank s cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality in addition to the systematic risk factor hence banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives

an experiment on the causes of bank run contagions abstract to understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions we conduct bank run experiments in a modified diamond dybvig setup with two banks left and right the banks liquidity levels are either linked or independent left bank depositors see their bank s liquidity level before deciding right bank depositors only see left bank withdrawals before deciding we find that left bank depositors actions significantly affect right bank depositors behavior even when liquidities are independent furthermore a panic may be a one way street an increase in left bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the right bank but a decrease does not calm depositors

variable rate deposit insurance a re examination abstract this paper investigates the impact of variable rate deposit insurance on the financial and real sectors of the economy and its role as an absorber of bankruptcy risk within these sectors a variable rate system raises the cost of funds to the real sector and increases probability of bankruptcy of the borrowing firms when such bankruptcies occur society experiences a dead weight loss we argue that appropriate deposit insurance pricing must weigh the social costs connected with both financial firm failure and real sector bankruptcy

when does learning in games generate convergence to nash equilibria the role of supermodularity in an experimental setting this study clarifies the conditions under which learning in games produces convergence to nash equilibria in practice previous work has identified theoretical conditions under which various stylized learning processes achieve convergence one technical condition is supermodularity which is closely related to the more familiar concept of strategic complementarities we experimentally investigate the role of supermodularity in achieving convergence through learning using a game from the literature on solutions to externalities we systematically vary a free parameter below close to at and beyond the threshold of supermodularity to assess its effects on convergence we find that supermodular and near supermodular games converge significantly better than those far below the threshold from a little below the threshold to the threshold the improvement is statistically insignificant within the class of supermodular games increasing the parameter far beyond the threshold does not significantly improve convergence simulation shows that while most experimental results persist in the long run some become more pronounced

optimal financial crises empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of sunspots panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low we develop a simple model of this in this setting bank runs can be first best efficient they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios however if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a pareto improvement in welfare from the earliest times banks have been plagued by the problem of bank runs in which many or all of the bank s depositors attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously because banks issue liquid liabilities in the form of deposit contracts but invest in illiquid assets in the form of loans they are vulnerable to runs that can lead to closure and liquidation a financial crisis or banking panic occurs when depositors at many or all of the banks in a region or a country attempt to withdraw their funds simultaneously prior to the twentieth century banking panics occurred frequently in europe and the united states panics were generally regarded as a bad thing and the development of central banks to eliminate panics and ensure financial stability has been an important feature of the history of financial systems it has been a long and involved process the first cerntral bank the bank of sweden was established more than 300 years ago the bank of england played an especially important role in the development of effective stabilization policies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the end of the nineteenth century banking panics had been eliminated in europe the last true panic in england was the overend gurney company crisis of 1866

bank run psychology abstract banks are inherently susceptible to panics and bank runs due to the problem of maturity mismatch resulting in both a stable equilibrium in which the bank survives and an unstable equilibrium in which a bank run occurs understanding equilibrium selection in this setting is extremely important for safeguarding financial stability in this paper one new potential factor that determines whether a bank runs gets triggered or not is experimentally studied namely the psychological state of the depositor prior to participating in an experimental bank run game subjects are either induced with fear sadness or happiness using an autobiographical emotion induction task the findings suggest that the presence of background fear significantly increases the likelihood of withdrawal and a subsequent bank run in addition women are shown to be significantly more likely to withdraw then men but only in the fear induction treatment

payoff complementarities and financial fragility evidence from mutual fund outflows the paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets analyzing mutual fund data we find that consistent with a theoretical model funds with illiquid assets where complementarities are stronger exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets we also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors we present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects we analyze the implications for funds performance and policies

bank runs the deposit currency ratio and the interest rate abstract this paper provides a model of an economy with a banking system which is subject to bank runs the model is then used to explain the rise in short term interest rates during bank runs and the fall in the deposit currency ratio in anticipation of possible runs

financial intermediaries and liquidity creation trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets these securities which can arise endogenously have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents bank debt deposits is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content high grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits

the information sensitivity of debt in good and bad times abstract we empirically show the dynamics of information production and information sensitivity of bank debt around the great recession as more precise information is produced at the onset of the crisis bank debt becomes informationally sensitive along two separate dimensions first precise information amplifies the effect of market expectations on default risk second for banks that are already expected to perform poorly more precise information further increases default risk both effects are muted in good times overall our findings are consistent with information based models of financial crises

self fulfilling early contracting rush in markets for entry level professionals the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts the rush to early contracting can be self fulfilling as both its effect on expectations about demand supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand supply balance can be nonmonotone matching markets with more risk averse participants a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities are more vulnerable to self fulfilling early contracting rushes employers can have a collective interest in preventing early offers to a few promising applicants from starting the rushes

regulatory reform in european banking abstract a stylized model of the role of banks in a context of imperfect financial markets where the potential for market failure exists is proposed the specificity of banking is analyzed and the need of regulation explained the study of regulatory responses highlights the importance of their associated side effects particular attention is devoted to the interaction of regulation and competition in a strategic context the effects of deregulation and european integration of financial markets on banking competition are dealt with in the proposed framework

the role of liquidity and implicit guarantees in the german twin crisis of 1931 abstract using monthly balance sheet data of all major german credit banks we analyze deposit withdrawals and bank failures in the german banking and currency crisis of 1931 we find that deposit withdrawals were driven by the run on the currency but were also related to banks liquidity positions that branch banks were no more stable than unit banks and that large banks were privileged being bailed out and receiving preferential access to the discount window these findings underline the importance of liquidity and implicit guarantees in twin crises

deposit competition and financial fragility evidence from the us banking sector preliminary and incomplete please do not cite without permission we develop and estimate an empirical model of the u s banking sector using a new data set covering the largest u s banks over the period 2002 2013 our model incorporates insured depositors and run prone uninsured depositors who have rich preferences over dierentiated banks banks compete for deposits in the spirit of matutes and vives 1996 and can endogenously default we estimate demand for uninsured

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

the seesaw principle in international tax policy abstract the standard analysis of the optimal international tax policy of a small country typically assumes that the country either imports or exports capital but does not do both this paper considers the situation in which a small country both exports and imports capital and can alter its tax on one or the other but not both in each case a seesaw relationship is identified in which the optimal tax on the income from capital exports imports is inversely related to the given tax rate on income from capital imports exports the standard results for optimal taxation of capital exports and imports are shown to be special cases of the more general seesaw principle

contagious bank failures in a free banking system this paper develops a model of an unregulated banking system based around a private clearing house arrangement whilst such a system may dominate one with a public safety net in reducing moral hazard in lending and therefore the scope for individual bank insolvency it also increases the likelihood of contagious bank failures following a systemic shock or an aggregate liquidity shortage

bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net argentina and the tequila shock abstract this paper tests the random withdrawals vs informed based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in argentina as a consequence of the mexican devaluation of december 20 1994 this evidence is unique in several ways it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme and a case in which the bank runs were triggered by a currency run the findings of the paper provide support to the informed based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency

financial fragility liquidity and asset prices we define a financial system to be fragile if small shocks have disproportionately large effects in a model of financial intermediation we show that small shocks to the demand for liquidity cause either high asset price volatility or bank defaults or both furthermore as the liquidity shocks become vanishingly small the asset price volatility is bounded away from zero in the limit economy with no shocks there are many equilibria however the only equilibria that are robust to the introduction of small liquidity shocks are those with non trivial sunspot activity

basel iii leverage ratio requirement and the probability of bank runs abstract a new argument for the basel iii leverage ratio requirement is proposed the need to limit the risk of a bank run when there is imperfect information on the value of a bank s assets in addition to screening and monitoring borrowers banks provide liquidity insurance with the supply of short term deposits withdrawable on demand the maturity mismatch creates the risk of a disorderly bank run which can be exacerbated by imperfect information about the value of bank assets it is shown in a stylized basel iii framework that capital regulation should incorporate a liquidity risk component credit risk diversification and or a reduced probability of loan default which lead to a reduction of basel iii regulatory capital will increase the probability of a bank run the leverage ratio rule puts a floor on the basel iii risk weighted capital ratio allowing the limitation of such a risk

policy watch the expanding reach of the individual alternative minimum tax abstract the individual alternative minimum tax amt was designed in 1970 to apply reduce aggressive tax sheltering but under current law will grow to cover tens of millions of households in the next decade the growth occurs because the amt is not indexed for inflation and the 2001 tax cut reduced regular income taxes but not the amt amt growth is troubling because the tax has questionable effects on equity and efficiency and is inordinately complex this paper describes the amt discusses economic issues related to the alternative minimum tax and examines options for reform

illiquidity component of credit risk we describe and contrast three dierent measures of an institu tion s credit risk insolvency risk is the conditional probability of default due to deterioration of asset quality if there is no run by short term creditors total credit risk is the unconditional probability of default either because of a short term creditor run or long run asset insolvency illiquidity risk is the dierence between the two i e the probability of a default due to a run when the institution would otherwise have been solvent we discuss how the three kinds of risk vary with balance sheet composition we provide a formula for illiquidity risk and show that it is i decreasing in the liquidity ratio the ratio of realizable cash on the balance sheet to short term liabilities ii increasing in the outside option ratio a measure of the opportunity cost of the funds used to roll over short term liabil ities and iii increasing in the fundamental risk ratio a measure of ex post variance of the asset portfolio

on the welfare equivalence of asset markets and banking in diamond dybvig economies why do people choose bank deposit contracts over a direct participation in asset markets in their seminal paper diamond and dybvig s 1983 answer this question by claiming that bank deposit contracts can implement allocations that are welfare superior to asset markets equilibria the present paper demonstrates that this claim is false whenever the asset market participants are highly rational

depositor behavior under macroeconomic risk evidence from bank runs in emerging economies depositor behavior has been associated with bank specific characteristics random runs or contagion episodes using evidence on the 2000 02 bank runs in argentina and uruguay this paper shows that macroeconomic risk is also important few macroeconomic shocks can quickly cause large runs macroeconomic risk affects deposits regardless of traditional bank specific characteristics furthermore bank exposure to macroeconomic factors can explain differences in deposit withdrawals during crises the evolution of bank specific characteristics is mainly driven by macroeconomic factors while the informational content of bank specific variables declines overall depositors seem responsive to risk in a broader sense than that often considered by the literature

dynamic debt runs we develop a dynamic model of debt runs on a rm which invests in an illiquid asset by rolling over staggered short term debt contracts i e dierent contracts mature at dierent times we derive a unique threshold equilibrium in which creditors coordinate their asynchronous rollover decisions based on the rm s publicly observable and time varying fundamental the coordination problem ampli es the creditors concerns about the rm s future rollover risk created by its time varying fundamental and causes each maturing creditor to run ahead of others even when the current fundamental is substantially higher than its liability our model provides a set of implications on the roles played by volatility illiquidity and debt maturity in driving debt runs as well as on rms capital adequacy standards and credit risk

simulating fundamental tax reform in the united states this paper uses a new large scale dynamic life cycle simulation model to compare the welfare and macroeconomic effects of transitions to five fundamental alternatives to the u s federal income tax including a proportional consumption tax and a flat tax the model incorporates intragenerational heterogeneity and a detailed specification of alternative tax systems simulation results project significant long run increases in output for some reforms for other reforms namely those that seek to insulate the poor and initial older generations from adverse welfare changes long run output gains are modest

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

the brazilian default announcement and the contagion effect hypothesis abstract in this paper we use stocl market data to test several hypotheses regarding possible investor reaction to the february 20 1987 brazilian default both the traditional event study approach and a generalized least squares regression using brazilian exposure as an explanatory variable for abnormal returns are used a sample of 46 bank holding companies all listed on the new york or american srock exchanges is divided into groups of no low and high brazilian exposure we find that the initial stock market reaction to the default represents a rational investor response to new bank specific information however the stock market reaction also reveals that not all relevant information was contained in the disclosure announcement further we find some evidence of a contagion effect related to size

experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures abstract we investigate how coordination requirement measured by the coordination parameter affects the occurrence of miscoordination based bank runs in controlled laboratory environments we identify an indeterminacy region of the coordination parameter such that games with the parameter within the region have varying coordination outcomes and exhibit persistent path dependence experimental economies with the parameter above below the region stay close or converge to the run non run equilibrium switches between the two equilibria occur even with fixed economic fundamentals the experimental results are well accounted for by a version of the evolutionary algorithm that uses experimentation rates estimated from the experimental data

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

bank failure contagion in historical perspective abstract bank failures are contagious due to the lack of bank specific information depositors who lack financial information on individual banks make withdrawal decisions based on the condition of the banking system as a whole a high ratio of bank failures then signals an adverse condition within the banking sector and triggers systemwide bank runs this paper looks at bank panics in u s history and shows the importance of solvency information specific to individual banks the major empirical finding is that the government or banks stopped bank panics mainly by providing financial information on banks

banking and insurance abstract this paper studies the economic role of financial institutions in economies where agents incomes are subject to privately observable idiosyncratic random events the information structure precludes conventional insurance arrangements however a financial institution perhaps best viewed as a savings bank can provide partial insurance by generating a time pattern of deposit returns that redistributes wealth from agents with high incomes to those with low incomes resulting in a level of expected utility higher than that achievable in simple security markets insurance is incomplete because the bank faces a tradeoff between provision of insurance and maintenance of private incentives

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

the political economy of branching restrictions and deposit insurance a model of monopolistic competition among small and large banks this article suggests that the introduction of bank branching restrictions and federal deposit insurance in the united states likely was motivated by political considerations specifically we argue that these restrictions were instituted for the benefit of the small unit banks that were unable to compete effectively with large multiunit banks we analyze this political hypothesis in two steps first we use a model of monopolistic competition between small and large banks to examine gains to the former group from the introduction of branching restrictions and governmentsponsored deposit insurance we then find strong evidence for the political hypothesis by examining the voting record of congress

contagion and bank failures during the great depression the june 1932 chicago banking panic the authors examine the social costs of asymmetric information induced bank panics in an environment without government deposit insurance their case study is the chicago bank panic of june 1932 the authors compare the ex ante characteristics of panic failures and panic survivors despite temporary confusion about bank asset quality on the part of depositors during the panic which was associated with widespread depositor runs and bank stock price declines the panic did not produce significant social costs in terms of failures among solvent banks copyright 1997 by american economic association

reviews of the 2006 economic report of the president the u s tax system in international perspective a review of the 2006 economic report of the president s tax chapter 1 alan j auerbach university of california berkeley and nber april 12 2006 what can you say about a tax reform proposal that died this was the challenge facing the writers of the chapter on taxation for the 2006 economic report of the president hereafter erp one year ago the erp included a chapter entitled options for tax reform that began with the section heading why do we need tax reform and proceeded to lay out the available options that it suggested could make the u s tax system simpler more equitable and efficient in making the case for tax reform that chapter set the stage for the impending work of the president s advisory panel on tax reform while being careful to leave the president s options open until the panel reported the 2005 chapter twice included the phrase the president has not endorsed any specific proposal and this chapter does not advocate the adoption of any particular prototype for reform in case the reader didn t get the message the first two times the chapter concluded with a reminder that the president has not endorsed any specific proposal 2 that was then in november 2005 the tax reform panel issued its report so one might have anticipated a follow up chapter in this year s erp evaluating the panel s i am grateful to rosanne altshuler bill gale kevin hassett and joel slemrod for comments on an earlier draft slemrod 2005 provides a critical evaluation of the 2005 chapter

on the international harmonization of bank regulation this paper offers a three way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category for economic regulation the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers the latter efforts should be encouraged for prudential regulation national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking harmonization efforts e g the basle accord may offer only modest help but the accord may offer indirect help by limiting national governments competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks risk taking activities finally for information regulation national regulation appears to be adequate and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary copyright 1994 by oxford university press

bailouts and financial fragility how does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system i study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment when a crisis occurs the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses the anticipation of such a bailout distorts ex ante incentives leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable however it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may in addition leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis a policy of taxing short term liabilities in contrast can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability

could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs abstract restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity based runs even when a run does not occur welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset

run proof banking without suspension or deposit insurance abstract in a model of banking with asymmetric information among depositors and multiple sources of aggregate risk i show that a demand deposit arrangement with state contingent deposit payments and a priority of claims provision on final date resources is almost best under this arrangement intermediaries infer the realization of aggregate risk and of a privately observed signal on the outcome of the risky technology from depositors withdrawal choices and panics as well as information based runs are averted neither suspension provisions nor deposit insurance are necessary for an efficient run proof banking system furthermore intermediation provides information production services that a credit market does not necessarily provide

the fragility of short term secured funding markets abstract this paper develops an infinite horizon model of financial institutions that borrow short term and invest in long term assets that can be traded in frictionless markets because these financial intermediaries perform maturity transformation they are subject to potential runs we derive distinct liquidity collateral and asset liquidation constraints which determine whether a run can occur as a result of changing market expectations we show that the extent to which borrowers can ward off an individual run depends on whether it has sufficient liquidity collateral and asset liquidation capacity these determinants depend on the borrower s endogenous balance sheet and on exogenous fundamentals systemic runs are possible if shocks to the valuation of collateral held by outside investors are sufficiently strong and uniform and if the system as a whole is exposed to high short term funding risk the theory has policy implications for prudential regulation and lender of last resort interventions

interbank contagion at work evidence from a natural experiment this article tests financial contagion due to interbank linkages for identification we exploit an idiosyncratic sudden shock caused by a large bank failure in conjunction with detailed data on interbank exposures first we find robust evidence that higher interbank exposure to the failed bank leads to large deposit withdrawals second the magnitude of contagion is higher for banks with weaker fundamentals third interbank linkages among surviving banks further propagate the shock finally we find results suggesting that there are real economic effects these results suggest that interbank linkages act as an important channel of contagion and hold important policy implications jel g01 g21 g28 e58 since the onset of the financial turmoil increased uncertainty reflected particularly in counterparty risk has led banks to hoard liquidity this has resulted in a significant decline of trading in the interbank money markets jean claude trichet president of the european central bank december 2008

market rate versus fixed rate demand deposits abstract in an economy with uninsured banks market rate deposits are shown to provide services identical to fixed rate deposits without risking banking panics as long as there is not both aggregate uncertainty about liquidity demands and asymmetric information about bank asset quality however if both factors are present then the preferred deposit form depends on the riskiness of bank assets and information revealed through market prices the analysis may explain the evolution of fixed rate deposits before the introduction of deposit insurance moreover it provides currently relevant insights regarding deposit contract forms and deposit insurance

separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure abstract we use a split population survival time model to separate the determinants of bank failure from the factors influencing the survival time of failing banks basic indicators of a bank s condition such as capital troubled assets and net income are important in explaining the timing of bank failure however many of the other variables typically included in bank failure models such as measures of bank liquidity are not associated with the time to failure the results also suggest that the closure of large banks is not delayed relative to the closure of small banks

avoiding bank runs in transition economies the role of risk neutral capital abstract in a general equilibrium model with risk neutral and risk averse agents we show that if banks issue both demand deposits and equity then free banking is run proof and efficient in particular we obtain the first best insurance solution if there is adequate risk neutral capital if sufficient risk neutral capital is unavailable then a partial suspension of convertibility is optimal in general therefore policies like capital adequacy norms and deposit insurance are neither necessary nor desirable