earnings rents and competition in the airline labor market transformation of the airline labor market continues long after deregulation airline wages changed little immediately following deregulation implying either the absence of regulatory rents or maintenance of product market power and union strength analysis for 1973 1997 however indicates that prior to recent gains the relative earnings of air transport workers decreased markedly during the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s some of the earnings advantage of airline workers represents returns to occupational skills and worker specific quality labor rents are attributable largely to union bargaining power which in turn is constrained by the financial health of carriers

airport presence as product differentiation there is now widespread recognition that an airline s operation at a given airport greatly affects its competitive position on routes flown out of that airport see m levine 1987 s borenstein 1989 s morrison and c winston 1989 and myself 1989 among many others airlines typically defend any competitive advantage as stemming from the lower costs and better service that are said to be generated by hub and spoke route systems airline critics typically respond that airlines gain market power by dominating individual airports both views are at least plausible huband spoke transportation networks reduce the number of round trips necessary to carry a given number of passengers on a given set of itineraries while increasing the number of passenger miles flown if there are sufficient economies of scale in plane size then the advantages of hubbing can overcome the disadvantage in passenger miles resulting in lower total costs by pooling passengers with different ultimate destinations a hubbed system can also offer more frequent flights than would be economically feasible under a nonstop system it also appears however that airlines gain other advantages from a large presence at an airport incumbent airlines are the major source of financing for many airports and therefore gain a large degree of bureaucratic control over airport operations this control may enable them to block the entry or expansion of rivals airlines with a large presence in a given city also gain advantages from frequent flyer plans and nonlinear travel agent commission schedules see again levine and others if the bureaucratic and marketing advantages of airport presence are sufficient to prevent most attempts at entry then incumbents may gain the ability to exercise traditional market power by restricting output and driving up prices this paper argues that both simple costreducing and naive market power stories are inappropriate for the airline industry i present a model in which consumers are willing to pay a premium for the services of the dominant airline this premium may be related to a number of factors including flight frequency frequent flier miles and travel agent commission overrides this model has the advantage of treating oligopoly product differentiation in an explicit way of treating price as an endogenous variable and of allowing for airport presence to affect both costs and demand

competition privatisation and productive efficiency evidence from the airline industry we use data from the airline industry to examine the extent to which the costs of airline operations are affected by rents accruing to workers and the extent to which these rents depend inter alia upon the degree of competition in the industry our empirical results based on a panel of twelve european and seven major united states airlines confirm that state ownership substantially increases rents to labour while the effects of competition are more subtle and ambiguous airline profits tend to be associated with higher rents to employees the gains from further privatisation and liberalisation may be quite large does competition have significant effects on productive as well as allocative efficiency convincing empirical answers to this question have been hard to find for two reasons first data of the quality required for robust estimation of productive efficiency are only rarely available secondly there is frequently no convincing standard against which the efficiency of an industry or a firm may be compared since when the degree of competition varies many other things such as technology network structures and firm sizes typically vary as well these problems do not automatically make comparison impossible but they compound the need for high quality data one industry which is likely to be well suited to investigating questions of this kind is the international airline industry the industry contains a large number of firms thus ensuring at least enough potential competition to make questions about the effects of competition interesting but the scope for these firms to compete with one another has been influenced to varying degrees over the years by different national and international regulatory regimes in particular deregulation of the united states industry in 1978 provided a kind of natural experiment that has led not only to comparisons of the before and after variety but also to comparisons between the united states industry and that of other global regions notably europe such comparisons are far from straightforward but they are facilitated by the fact that the technology of civil aviation is more or less internationally standardised and by the relatively high quality of available data in the industry

deregulating european airlines deregulating european airlines francis mcgowan and paul seabright one of the industries with the greatest potential to benefit from the single european market is civil aviation which has been highly regulated by european governments the deregulation of civil aviation in the us since the late 1970s has provided valuable evidence about the nature of the airline industry and its response to the liberalization of conditions of entry by new carriers we examine the us experience and look at the changing regulatory framework for the european industry we also consider the main sources of market failure in air transport the lessons of the us experience are threefold first deregulation can in principle produce major gains to consumers without damaging the long run profitability of carriers by reducing the high costs of operation of european airlines second congestion problems especially the availability of landing slots at airports need to be managed effectively to prevent incumbent carriers squeezing out new entrants we recommend a system of slot auctions to achieve this third in spite of relatively low sunk costs of entry to the industry there remain significant opportunities for the exercise of market power by incumbent carriers deregulation of entry needs therefore to be supplemented by a vigorous competition policy especially with regard to the approval of mergers

rent sharing in the european airline industry abstract to the extent that product market competition affects managerial incentives to control costs price cost margins offer a poor guide to the evaluation of market power we propose a method to evaluate simultaneously both market power and its pass through on cost we focus on rent sharing between unions and management as a mechanism through which costs are endogenised we develop and estimate a structural model of competition where wages are endogenously determined in the first stage with a price setting market game following in the second stage this structural model is then estimated using data for 8 european airlines from 1976 1990 we find a strong support for the hypothesis that lax competition induces extensive rent sharing through excessive wages

transition losses of partially mobile industry specific capital in estimating the economic effects of public policy comparative static models typically assume homogenous factors that are either mobile or immobile for changes designed to improve factor allocations the former assumption would overstate welfare gains while the latter would understate them the model in this paper restricts each industry s capital reduction to its rate of depreciation the stock of depreciated capital represents an industry specific type of capital that may earn a lower equilibrium return this model suggests that previous estimates of efficiency gains from integration of u s personal and corporate income taxes are overstated by 5 billion

testing static oligopoly models conduct and cost in the sugar industry 1890 1914 we explore the widespread methodology of using demand information to infer market conduct and unobserved cost components under the hypothesis of static oligopoly behavior direct measures of marginal cost and conduct indicating small market power serve as benchmarks the more competitive models yield better cost estimates the best cost estimates occur when conduct is estimated as a free parameter which in turn only slightly underestimates our direct measure it also tracks the decline in market power accompanying the industry s structural changes the methodology is largely validated although partial cost information can improve its predictive power conclusions are robust to demand function

liberalizing european airlines cost and factor productivity evidence abstract european countries do not all share the same view concerning the benefits of increased competition among airlines in europe to explain this difference in attitudes the paper presents evidence on differences in costs and global factor productivity between the main european national flag carriers the data reveal a clear distinction between the main european and north atlantic routes unit costs per passenger kilometer are lower in north atlantic routes and unit profits are higher in european routes the first result reflects the economies of scale due to higher distances and traffic density on north atlantic routes the second result is an indication of the lower level of competition between airlines in europe finally tornqvist factor productivity growth indexes 1981 1986 show that the initial gap which existed between these productivity measures at the beginning of the period is shrinking this suggests that the european airline industry is currently in a more favorable situation to support more competition

concentration potential entry and performance in the airline industry airline markets do not satisfy the theoretical conditions for perfect contestability and theory does not indicate which deviations from perfect contestibilty significantly affect performance thus the effect of potential entry on performance in airline markets is explored empirically the best model for explaining fares is found to be one in which the measure of market concentration takes into account not only the number and size distribution of incumbents but also the number of potential entrants not significantly disadvantaged due to economies of scale and scope the hypothesis that all city pair markets are perfectly contestable is rejected coauthors are richard l johnson andrew s joskow gregory j werden and michael a williams copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

entry and competitive structure in deregulated airline markets an event study analysis of people express this paper proposes an alternative approach to the study of competitive structure in deregulated airline markets that avoids some of the weaknesses of previous studies this approach uses reactions of incumbent airlines stock prices to announcements of entry by people express to shed light on competitive structure these stock reactions reveal significant route specific profits or sunk costs and also provide evidence on the degree of competitive localization present in the industry the conclusions emerging from this analysis are corroborated by an examination of price sales quantity and schedule changes that followed people express entry

kenya s cereal sector reform programme managing the politics of reform abstract the political aspects of reform have been underplayed in structural adjustment programmes the problematic and inconsistent implementation of kenya s cereal sector reform programme csrp it is argued here is substantially the result of failing to manage the politics of reform good political management of the reform process would have included ensuring a clear understanding by interest groups of the likely consequences of liberalisation and full involvement of the president and cabinet from the outset in order to create an ongoing reform culture

dynamic oligopoly behaviour in the airline industry abstract this paper examines the dynamic interaction between united airlines and american airlines on a set of duopoly routes we estimate quarterly conduct parameters or conjectural variations and test constant behaviour bertrand cournot and collusive models we also test two regimeswitching models derived from the green porter price war model one based on reversion to bertrand behaviour during price wars the other on reversion to cournot behaviour the three constant behaviour models are all rejected the regime switching models can both describe the data but the cournot based version is preferred

estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry this paper considers the effect of an airline s scale of operation at an airport on the profitability of routes flown out of that airport the empirical methodology uses the entry decisions of airlines as indicators of underlying profitability the results extend the empirical literature on airport presence by providing a new set of estimates of the determinants of city pair profitability these estimates imply that city pair profits increase in airport presence and decrease rapidly in the number of entering firms the literature on empirical models of oligopoly entry is also extended via a focus on the role of differences between firms

wages and product market power this paper analyses time series on some 800 british manufacturing companies to address various questions concerning the role of insiders and market power in wage determination the following are the most important results first product market power has a positive impact on wages this impact is enhanced in large firms but is not influenced by union status second while firm specific factors influence wages the size of these effects is not influenced by union status firm size or product market power however product market power reduces the generally strong negative effect of unemployment on wages finally there is no robust evidence of insider power at work in wage setting irrespective of product market position

managerial incentives and product market competition are imperfectly competitive leibenstein 1966 claims that there may be a substantial amount of x inefficiency where x inefficiency measures the degree to which actual profits depart from the maximum of profits that could be obtained if all operations in the firm were carried out at minimal costs he offers empirical evidence from case studies showing that the welfare loss due to organizational slack is of an order of magnitude bigger than the welfare loss due to monopolistic price distortions on imperfectly competitive markets these results support the common presumption that increasing competition reduces organizational and in particular managerial slack however this early literature does not offer a theoretical explanation for the link between competition and managerial incentives in particular it ignores the fact that managerial incentives can be affected by the design of an incentive scheme in this paper i derive the optimal incentive scheme for a manager as a function of the competitiveness of the environment in which his firm operates the basic impact of increased competition is that it reduces the profits of a firm this has two effects in the model first if a firm has high costs then the reduction of profits may be sufficient to render the firm unprofitable so the probability that it has to be liquidated goes up this unambiguously induces the manager of the firm to work harder for a cost reduction in order to avoid liquidation and to keep his job second the reduction in profits may affect

airline mergers airport dominance and market power effects of northwestrepublic and twaozark mergers on fares at minneapolisst paul and st louis

capacity and product market competition measuring market power in a puppy dog industry abstract in this paper we specify and estimate a structural model which accounts for competition in two variables capacity and prices the model has a two stage setup in the first stage firms make capacity decisions followed by a product differentiated price setting game in the second stage since costs are endogenized through the first stage this has important implications for the measurement of market power in the product market in particular simpler one stage specifications would result in a bias in the measurement of market power which can be linked to the taxonomy for two stage games given in fudenberg and tirole 1984 fudenberg d tirole j 1984 the fat cat effect the puppy dog ploy and the lean and hungry look american economic review paper and proceedings 74 361 366 we then estimate this model demand cost short and long run and conduct for the european airline industry using data for the period of 1976 1990 we perform a number of specification tests and reject a simple one stage specification in favor of our two stage set up in particular we find that some degree of market power in the product market exists however market conduct in the two stage set up is significantly less collusive than in the more widely employed one stage specification which is consistent with the direction of bias in puppy dog games this illustrates that collusiveness of firms market conduct in the product market is significantly overestimated whenever capacity competition is not accounted for

endogenous costs and price cost margins an application to the european airline industry this paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins in particular we estimate price cost margins when firms bargain over wages we extent the standard two equation set up demand and first order condition in the product market to include a third equation which is derived from bargaining over wages in this way price cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa we implement the model using data for eight european airlines from 1976 1994 and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price cost margins and the assessment of market power our main result is that observed prices in europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices even though observed margins are consistent with nash behavior apparently costs had been inflated to the point that the european consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices

living by the golden rule multimarket contact in the u s airline industry this paper examines empirically the effects of multimarket contact on pricing in the u s airline industry the analysis of the time series and cross sectional variability of airline fares in the 1000 largest domestic city pair routes reveals the presence of statistically significant and quantitatively important multimarket effects fares are higher in city pair markets served by carriers with extensive interroute contacts these findings are consistent with the claims of industry experts that airlines live by the golden rule i e that they refrain from initiating aggressive pricing actions in a given route for fear of what their competitors might do in other jointly contested routes during his testimony mr steven b elkins senior director of marketing systems development for northwest airlines cited an example in which northwest lowered fares on night flights that were flying with empty seats in a number of routes from minneapolis and upper midwest cities to various west coast cities he said that continental airlines swiftly responded by cutting prices in important northwest markets mr elkins s memo advises northwest pricing analysts we will live by the golden rule in his testimony he explained that the golden rule in that context was that i did not want my pricing analyst initiating actions in another carrier s market like chicago for fear of what that other carrier might do to retaliate wall street journal october 9 1990 p b1

competition in european aviation pricing policy and market structure the purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of liberal bilateral agreements on some european air routes in terms of price competition and market structure the author proposes a model that explains firms behavior and shows that after the liberalization firms exploit their cost advantages and differentiate their products more but market structure still depends on access to airport facilities and other ancillary services controlled by the flag carriers these results differ from american evidence in that the author finds that the effect of airport presence on prices through lower costs more than offsets the effect through higher perceived quality copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd