lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies abstract this paper uses the common agency approach to analyze the joint determination of product and labor market distortions in a small open economy capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages while other factors of production are not organized the paper shows that product and labor market distortions always move in the same direction and that their level is not modified by social pacts between capital and labor it also shows that labor market distortions are second best hence conditionality by foreign organizations should target distortions in product markets but not in labor markets

regulation and efficiency in transition the case of telecommunications in italy abstract in regulating the telecommunications industry the separation between network and retail functions which is designed to countervail the market power of incumbent operators is a relevant issue despite its importance little empirical research has addressed the effects of such a separation accordingly this paper provides insights into the consequences of the italian communications regulatory authority s agcom decision to impose this type of separation on the incumbent telecommunications operator telecom italia in particular the studied separation is between the firm s network related functions and those used for provision of its communication services the present research finds that the type of separation implemented by agcom allows a provider to maintain the advantages of operational scale in its network structure without dampening competition in the existing market for communications services the study also offers further empirical evidence on the advantages of a composite vs translog function in analyzing the multiproduct cost structure of a telecommunications operator

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

some models for estimating technical and scale inefficiencies in data envelopment analysis in management contexts mathematical programming is usually used to evaluate a collection of possible alternative courses of action en route to selecting one which is best in this capacity mathematical programming serves as a planning aid to management data envelopment analysis reverses this role and employs mathematical programming to obtain ex post facto evaluations of the relative efficiency of management accomplishments however they may have been planned or executed mathematical programming is thereby extended for use as a tool for control and evaluation of past accomplishments as well as a tool to aid in planning future activities the ccr ratio form introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes as part of their data envelopment analysis approach comprehends both technical and scale inefficiencies via the optimal value of the ratio form as obtained directly from the data without requiring a priori specification of weights and or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms of relations between inputs and outputs a separation into technical and scale efficiencies is accomplished by the methods developed in this paper without altering the latter conditions for use of dea directly on observational data technical inefficiencies are identified with failures to achieve best possible output levels and or usage of excessive amounts of inputs methods for identifying and correcting the magnitudes of these inefficiencies as supplied in prior work are illustrated in the present paper a new separate variable is introduced which makes it possible to determine whether operations were conducted in regions of increasing constant or decreasing returns to scale in multiple input and multiple output situations the results are discussed and related not only to classical single output economics but also to more modern versions of economics which are identified with contestable market theories

x efficiency in emerging competitive markets the case of u s telecommunications abstract whether or not the progressive introduction of competition in the u s telecommunications industry has induced firm level efficiencies is studied in this paper two sets of performance measures are computed for local operating companies using data envelopment analysis for the years 1973 1978 1981 1984 and 1987 the first set measures whether firms are able to augment output values the second set measures whether firms conserve resources or inputs both sets of measures improve between 1973 and 1987 the output value augmentation measures initially rise steeply and then plateau while the input conservation measures rise more steadily these indicate that firms have benefited from incumbency positions in early exploitation of opening markets but increasing pressures have induced firms to continuously strive towards frugality in resource consumption

damned if you do and damned if you don t two masters abstract we study common agency problems in which two principals groups make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent s action our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments for our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium which typically involves randomization by both principals greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition the principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards sometimes strictly with rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups with punishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals we study whether introducing an attractive compromise reduces competition between principals our framework of imperfect monitoring offers a natural perturbation of the standard common agency model of menu auctions which results in sharper equilibrium predictions the limit equilibrium prediction provides support to both truthful equilibria and the competing notion of natural equilibria which unlike the former may be inefficient

price cap regulation incentives and quality the case of brazilian telecommunications abstract this paper reviews the incentive properties of yardstick schemes with special reference to quality performance and to the economic foundations and practical applications of data envelopment analysis dea the core of the paper is related to the construction of synthetic relative efficiency scores for quality which were obtained for brazilian local telephony over the period 1998 2002 the telecommunications industry in brazil has been characterized by the recent implementation of price cap regulation the evidence indicates substantial quality underperformance with some improvements towards the end of the period the efficiency scores obtained based on the flexible dea approach suggest that adjustment factors should be used in the productivity offset of the price cap rule so as to provide premiums for superior quality performance in terms of lower x factors the dea based yardstick procedure can provide a practical alternative to monitoring a series of specific quality indicators in terms of a set of penalties for underperformance the composite quality indicators do not rule out the identification of optimal adjustments recommended for individual indicators

the absent minded driver abstract the example of the absent minded driver was introduced by piccione and rubinstein in the context of games and decision problems with imperfect recall they claim that a paradox or inconsistency arises when the decision reached at the planning stage is compared with that at the action stage though the example is provocative and worth having their analysis is questionable a careful analysis reveals that while the considerations at the planning and action stages do differ there is no paradox or inconsistency journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d81 c72

estimating most productive scale size using data envelopment analysis abstract the relation between the most productive scale size mpss for paparticular input and output mixes and returns to scale for multiple inputs multiple outputs situations is explicitly developed this relation is then employed to extend the applications of data envelopment analysis dea introduced by charnes cooper and rhodes ccr to the estimation of most productive scale sizes for convex production possibility sets it is then shown that in addition to productive inefficiencies at the actual scale size the ccr efficiency measure also reflects any inefficiencies due to divergence from the most productive scale size two illustrations of the practical applications of these results to the estimation of most productive scale sizes and returns to scale for hospitals and stem electric generation plants are also provided emphasize the advantage of this method in examining specific segments of the efficient production surface

cooperation in games with forgetfulness companies and managers are apt to forget information yet classic game theory analysis assumes that all players have perfect recall this paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multiplayer game theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior we find that forgetfulness impacts the ability of firms to cooperate in countervailing directions on one hand forgetfulness can diminish the ability to punish deviators making cooperation more difficult on the other hand under some conditions forgetfulness can make meting out severe punishments even below stage minimax punishments credible and decrease the ability for players to effectively deviate facilitating cooperation even in circumstances where cooperation cannot be sustained under perfect recall we apply our model to a number of strategic games that commonly appear in the literature this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

the forgetful passenger when there is absent mindedness probabilities may change even when no new information becomes available a similar phenomenon occurs in general imperfect recall situations journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d81 c72

a theory of yardstick competition in the typical regulatory scheme a franchised monopoly has little incentive to reduce costs this article proposes a mechanism in which the price the regulatedfirm receives depends on the costs of identical firms in equilibrium each firm chooses a socially efficient level of cost reduction the mechanism generalizes to cover heterogeneous firms with observable differences medicare s prospective reimbursement of hospitals by using diagnostically related groups is a scheme very similar to the one outlined here

collusive conduct in duopolies multimarket contact and cross ownership in the mobile telephone industry the deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in hopes of increasing competition one example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the united states where the fcc created duopolies in which two firms were granted licenses to compete in strictly defined product and geographic markets taking advantage of the unique regulatory environment we test to what degree duopolistic competition leads to competitive market outcomes we find that cross ownership and multimarket contact are important factors in explaining non competitive prices

productivity change and its determinants among leading mobile operators in europe the european mobile telecommunications industry has seen increased competition and market saturation in recent years so improving productivity will become crucially important for mobile operators in the near future this study adopts a bootstrap malmquist index approach to estimate productivity change among a sample of 23 of europe s leading mobile operators over the 2008 to 2009 period using a second stage regression this article also analyses the determinants of productivity changes in terms of regulation competition and ownership structure the results show that mobile companies operating in countries that have recently joined the eu have a positive association with productivity change in contrast to their counterparts in south east europe concerning market competition the leading mobile operators that experience higher productivity changes operate in more concentrated markets the results also indicate that international mobile operators perform better in terms of productivity change than their

integrating the regulatory and utility firm perspectives when measuring the efficiency of electricity distribution abstract several dea applications for benchmarking in utility regulation use classical models which reveal inconsistencies due to pareto inefficient targets the natural course of action would be to incorporate weight restrictions reflecting value judgments and requiring interaction between analyst and decision maker we show that weight restricted dea models still present some inconsistencies since it is not possible to ensure that the target both dominates the observed dmu and lies on the empirical production frontier besides the decision maker and analyst interaction it is necessary to consider a further distinction between the two parties the regulatory agency and the utility company which adopt different criteria to determine the efficient target a model to obtain a preferred target dea index is formulated taking advantage of the dual based dea graphical analysis thus we propose a two phase dea analysis that can integrate both perspectives a case study about the brazilian electricity sector is included which illustrates the above mentioned issues

don t fool yourself to believe you won t fool yourself again abstract a possible solution to the absent minded driver problem is that the decision maker optimizes taking into account the utility he will actually have in the future and not the utility level he should have

consumer inattention and bill shock regulation for many goods and services such as electricity health care cellular phone service debit card transactions or those sold with loyalty discounts the price of the next unit of service depends on past usage as a result consumers who are inattentive to their past usage but are aware of contract terms may remain uncertain about the price of the next unit i develop a model of inattentive consumption derive equilibrium pricing when consumers are inattentive and evaluate bill shock regulation requiring firms to disclose information that substitutes for attention when inattentive consumers are sophisticated but heterogeneous in their expected demand bill shock regulation reduces social welfare in fairly competitive markets which may be the effect of the federal communication commission s recent bill shock agreement if some consumers are attentive while others naively fail to anticipate their own inattention however then bill shock regulation increases social welfare and can benefit consumers hence requiring zero balance alerts in addition to the federal reserve s new opt in rule for debit card overdraft protection may benefit consumers

service quality in brazilian mobile telephony an efficiency frontier analysis the mobile telephony sector is characterized by the dynamic interplay of rapid changes in technology and an apparently growing competition as indicated by the fierce nonprice competition and is yet associated with the entry of new operating companies in some cases in this context a relevant and neglected issue is the assessment of how service quality responded to an increasingly competitive environment this study utilizes data envelopment analysis to assess the quality efficiency of mobile telephony companies in brazil during the 2000 2003 period window analysis was conducted for the entire period taking as reference different quality indicators pertaining to different forms of complaints and calls completed and interrupted the efficiency measurement was made feasible by interpreting the indicators reflecting a positive dimension of quality as outputs and those reflecting negative aspects of quality as inputs given potential heterogeneities across firms that relate to the frequency band and to th

relative efficiency measurement and prospects for yardstick competition in brazilian electricity distribution abstract the paper considers the non parametric methodology of data envelopment analysis dea in the context of efficiency measurement for brazilian electricity distribution in 1997 98 indicating the existence of firms operating substantially below the efficiency frontier the potential and difficulties associated with the implementation of yardstick competition schemes are then discussed stressing in particular the role of relative efficiency scores obtained from the dea approach

corporate lobbying and commitment failure in capital taxation this paper investigates the effects of lobbying by corporations when investments are irreversible and government cannot commit to tax policies we show that industries which rely more heavily on sunk capital lobby more vigorously and are generally more successful in obtaining tax breaks thus lobbying can mitigate the capital levy problem nevertheless these industries invest less in long run equilibrium than more flexible ones we then consider the effects of relaxing legal restrictions on corporate lobbying when the deadweight costs of lobbying fall taxes on sunk capital tend to fall but political contributions may rise as lobbyists compete more intensively for political favors on balance a ban of lobbying may therefore cause investment to rise or fall this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a comparative application of data envelopment analysis and translog methods an illustrative study of hospital production this paper compares inferences about hospital cost and production correspondences from two different estimation models 1 the econometric modeling of the translog cost function and 2 the application of data envelopment analysis dea while there are numerous examples of the application of each approach to empirical data this paper provides insights into the relative strengths of the estimation methods by applying both models to the same data the translog results suggest that constant reruns are operant whereas the dea results suggest that both increasing and decreasing returns to scale may be observed in different segments of the production correspondence in turn suggesting that the translog model may be averaging diametrically opposite behavior on the other hand by examining the rate of output transformation both models agree that patient days devoted to care of children are more resource intensive than those devoted to adults or to the elderly in addition we compare estimates of technical efficiencies of individual hospitals obtained from the two methods the dea estimates are found to be highly related to the capacity utilization but no such relationship was found for the translog estimates this comparative application of different estimation models to the same data to obtain inferences about the nature of underlying cost and production correspondences sheds interesting light on the strengths of each approach and suggests the need for additional research comparing estimation models using real as well as simulated data

durability market structure and new used goods models focuses on the relationship between market structure and monopoly power durability models new used goods model durability and monopoly in the new used model interdependence between market structure and durability ebsco

regulatory measurement and evaluation of telephone service quality regulators of utilities that operate as local monopolies would like to set prices or allow rates of return based upon the quality of a utility s service however quality is highly multidimensional traditionally regulators have collected measures of quality on many separate dimensions and compared performance on these dimensions to explicit pass fail standards they have lacked a method of combining complex patterns of substandard and superstandard performance on these many dimensions to arrive at an overall evaluation of the quality of service to redress this problem we first describe the information processing problems regulators encounter when they attempt to integrate this complex array of information intuitively and the problems that arise when the link between service quality as reflected in patterns of passed and failed standards and regulatory incentives is not made explicit to utility management we develop a bootstrapped method for formalizing each expert regulator s evaluation policy us

quality frontier of electricity distribution supply security best practices and underground cabling in finland electricity distribution is a prime example of local monopoly in most countries the costs of electricity distribution operators are regulated by the government however the cost regulation may create adverse incentives to compromise the quality of service to avoid this cost regulation is often amended with quality incentives this study applies theory and methods of productivity analysis to model the frontier of service quality a semi nonparametric estimation method is developed which does not assume any particular functional form for the quality frontier but can accommodate stochastic noise and heteroscedasticity the empirical part of our paper examines how underground cabling and location affect the interruption costs as expected higher proportion of underground cabling decreases the level of interruption costs the effects of cabling and location on the variance of performance are also considered especially the location is found to be a significant source of heteroscedasticity in the interruption costs finally the proposed quality frontier benchmark is compared to the current practice of finnish regulation system the proposed quality frontier is found to provide more meaningful and stable basis for setting quality targets than the average practice benchmarks currently in use

productivity growth technical progress and efficiency change in industrialized countries this paper analyzes productivity growth in 17 oecd countries over the period 1979 1988 a nonparametric programming method activity analysis is used to compute malmquist productivity indexes these are decomposed into two component measures namely technical change and efficiency change we find that u s productivity growth is slightly higher than average all of which is due to technical change japan s productivity growth is the highest in the sample with almost half due to efficiency change jel c43 d24 in this paper we apply recently developed

regulator flexibility and the administrative allocation licensing of 3g spectrum globally most nations assign radio spectrum to provide 3g mobile services during the period 1999 2007 while there is consensus among most economists that auctions are the preferred assignment mechanism the assignment mode is split more or less equally in terms of the number of licences issued between administrative allocations and auctions with auction procedures tending to raise more revenue for governments cartelier 2003 the question that naturally arises is why are administrative allocations so popular a method to assign spectrum mcmillan 1995 conjectures that administrative allocations provide additional flexibility accordingly this study examines the performance of 3g assignments in terms of an econometric analysis of a unique sample of national 3g spectrum administrative allocations these outcomes are modelled as depending on spectrum package attributes and post award network deployment requirements

inefficient equilibria in lobbying lobbying is often represented as a common agency game common agency games typically have multiple equilibria one class of equilibria called truthful has been identified by bernheim and whinston quarterly journal of economics 1986 101 1 1 31 in this paper we identify another class of equilibria which we call natural in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative the alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65 of the matches while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5 of the matches 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the adoption of incentive regulation and its effect on technical efficiency in telecommunications in the united states abstract incentive regulation has become an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the united states the issue explored here is whether incentive regulation has resulted in an increase in efficiency after providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation a methodology for measuring technical efficiency and its change is introduced this is a multiple output multiple input distance function approach to measuring technical efficiency the results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988 1999 period indicate that in the production of local service intrastate toll access service and interstate access to local loops there was no change in technical efficiency between the 1988 1990 period and the 1991 1999 period something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to promote

conflict and cooperation the structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency abstract this paper is a contribution to the theory of common agency initiated by b d bernheim and m d whinston 1986 quart j econ 101 1 31 by common agency we mean the following an agent decides upon an action which affects its well being as well as the well being of n other individuals the principals each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent on the action chosen under complete information bernheim and whinston prove the existence of an interesting subset of nash equilibria they call truthful provide arguments in defense of this refinement and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs this paper provides a set of theoretical results to identify the structure of equilibrium payoffs with special attention to the payoff of the agent by focusing on complete information we are in a position to evaluate the effects of competition per se on the magnitude of the rent obtained by the agent we illustrate this user guide on a wide and diverse family of applications including auctions competition for an input economic influence and private production of public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72

economic policy and special interest politics a great deal of research has been done on the boundary between economics and political science in the last five to ten years this research in political economics spans many subfields such as macroeconomics trade public finance regulation rational choice politics and game theory a common denominator has been to study structural models of the political process agents behave rationally within well specified economic and political institutions where the policymaking process is formulated as an extensive form game methodologically much progress has been made relative to traditional approaches which were often based on inconsistent or irrational political and economic behaviour relying on non derived influence functions political support functions or vote functions yet the modem work has largely developed separately in each subfield without much contact with other subfields and each of the resulting literatures tends to focus on a distinct but partial aspect of the political process in this lecture i shall argue that even though the progress to date has been substantial we can gain a better understanding of policymaking in democracies by combining the insights from different strands of thinking on some economic policy issues the conflicting views both among citizens and politicians basically reduce to a single left to right dimension examples may include the politics of inflation vs unemployment capital taxation or the size of government we can think about policy issues within this domain of general interest politics as being resolved via traditional downsian electoral competition at least to a first approximation but the economic policy process also allows narrow interest groups ample opportunities to concentrate benefits to their own group at the expense of the population as a whole the resulting policy conflict is generically multi dimensional resolving it by voting alone would thus result in condorcet cycles we therefore need to go beyond the simplest electoral models to understand policy determination within this domain of special interest politics this lecture deals with special interest politics to make my point about fruitful analytical arbitrage i will stick to the same underlying policy example throughout this will be a simple model of a society where the government uses