decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem in markets with adverse selection only low quality units trade in the competitive equilibrium when the average quality of the good held by sellers is low we show that under decentralized trade however both high and low quality units trade although with delay moreover when frictions are small the surplus realized is greater than the static competitive surplus thus decentralized trade mitigates the lemons problem remarkably payoffs are competitive as frictions vanish even though both high and low quality units continue to trade and there is trade at several prices markets differ in the degree to which trade is centralized call markets used to set opening prices on the nyse are highly centralized and all trade takes place at a single price the market clearing price in contrast in housing labor or used car markets trade is highly decentralized and prices are determined by bilateral bargaining between buyers and sellers and may differ between trades the competitive model abstracts away from these institutional aspects thus providing a model suitable in principle for the study of both centralized and decentralized markets our results suggest that decentralized markets with adverse selection may perform better than anticipated by the static competitive model and therefore that these institutional features cannot be ignored it is known that in markets for homogenous goods decentralized trade tends to yield competitive outcomes when trading frictions are small because competitive equilibrium is efficient in these markets this implies that decentralized trade generates nearly efficient outcomes in markets with adverse selection however competitive equilibria ce need not be efficient which raises the possibility that alternative market structures perform better in this article we study a version of akerlof s 1970 market for lemons in which trade is decentralized each period an equal measure of buyers and sellers enters the market every seller is endowed with a unit of either high or low quality at each period every agent in the market has a positive probability of meeting an agent of the opposite type once matched a buyer without observing the quality of the seller s unit makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller accepts then they trade at the offered price and both agents exit the market if the seller rejects the offer then both agents remain in the market at the next period discounting of future gains and the possible delay in matching with a trading partner constitute trading frictions when the average quality of the good held by entering sellers is low the market has a unique competitive equilibrium ce in which the price equals the buyers value of a low quality unit

on measuring the nearness of near moneys revisited abstract in this paper we re examine the theoretical foundations and empirical estimation of models which incorporate a ces utility function to study the nearness of money substitutes we show that previous studies using these models have been subject to a number of theoretical and empirical flaws the result of these flaws has been to overestimate the degree of substitutability between money and near money assets we show that when these errors are corrected estimates of substitution elasticities are several times smaller than even those of the most recent studies and therefore are more in line with estimates from more traditional demand for money studies

intermediation and resale in networks i study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure a partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power competition governs trade withi

sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers abstract a matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers differing only in their reservation price is analyzed no subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies we demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the good with large probability even as friction becomes negligible we investigate the relationship between the use of nash and sequential bargaining nash bargaining seems applicable only when the sequential approach yields a unique stationary strategy subgame perfect equilibrium

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

comparing systems approaches to innovation and technological change for sustainable and competitive economies an explorative study into conceptual commonalities differences and complementarities this paper makes a distinction between three theoretical frameworks that have been highly influential in the discourse on innovation competitiveness and sustainability sectoral systems of innovation ssi technological innovation systems tis and socio technical systems st systems these frameworks share a common systems approach to innovation but are often positioned as different bodies of literature that correspond to different epistemic communities this paper is explorative and conceptual in nature it presents a systematic comparative review of ssi tis and st systems based on the following analytical dimensions 1 system boundaries 2 actors and networks 3 institutions 4 knowledge 5 dynamics and 6 policy approach in the concluding section commonalities and differences of the three approaches are presented and suggestions for complimentarily are made c 2010 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

a finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search abstract i study a model in which a finite number of men and women look for future spouses via random pairwise meetings the central question is whether equilibrium marriage outcomes are stable matchings when search frictions are small the answer is they can but need not be for any stable matching there is an equilibrium leading to it almost surely however there may also be equilibria leading to an unstable matching almost surely a restriction to simpler strategies or to markets with aligned preferences rules out such equilibria however unstable even pareto dominated matchings may still arise with positive probability under those two restrictions combined in addition inefficiency due to delay may remain significant despite vanishing search frictions finally a condition is identified under which all equilibria are outcome equivalent stable and efficient

transforming the energy sector the evolution of technological systems in renewable energy technology this paper analyses the development and diffusion of technologies that utilize renewable energy sources in germany sweden and the netherlands the analysis enlarges the life cycle model of industry evolution to one where the focus is on the formation and evolution of new technological systems particular focus is on explaining success and failures in shifting from a formative phase into one characterized by positive feedbacks a set of challenges is identified for policy makers attempting to influence the process of transforming the energy sector

unpacking policy processes for addressing systemic problems in technological innovation systems the case of offshore wind in germany while empirical studies on technological innovation systems tis usually focus on policy instruments and their suitability for curing identified weaknesses of such emerging systems the underlying policy processes and their effects have been largely disregarded we address this gap by exploring the style of two crucial policy making processes and how it influences the functioning and performance of a tis taking the case of offshore wind in germany our findings indicate important positive and negative impacts of the policy style on the tis for example the muddling through character apparent in one of the policy processes negatively influenced entrepreneurial activities knowledge development and finally technology diffusion whereas the participatory nature of both processes had a positive impact both on tis functioning and performance based on our findings we derive implications on how to improve policy making so as to foster the development of an emerging tis

fairness price stickiness and history dependence in decentralized trade this chapter investigates the implications that social preferences have for the stationary strategic equilibrium of such a decentralized market agents are supposed to be averse to unfairly unfavorable as well as unfairly favorable deals in the spirit of fehr and schmidt 1999 but we stay rather close to standard individualistic preferences the negative weights on advantageous and disadvantageous deviations from what is considered as the fair benchmark are such that utility remains strictly increasing in own surplus share and in contrast to the original fehr schmidt model the fair split need not automatically be a 50 50 division any price between sellers cost and buyers willingness to pay may be the one which for whatever reasons is agents reference point in a given market this makes it possible to consider a more flexible notion of fairness than is usually done it is in line with cognitive dissonance theory from psychology and the noteworthy experiments of binmore et al 1991 1993 where subjects who were triggered to play different bargaining equilibria ended up considering very different surplus distributions as fair

auctions actions and the failure of information aggregation we study a market where k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform price auction where n k bidders each demand one object before the auction each bidder receives an informative but imperfect signal about the state of the world the good that is auctioned is a common value object for the bidders and a bidder s valuation for the object is determined jointly by the state of the world and an action that he chooses after winning the object but before he observes the state we show that there are equilibria where the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of the world and aggregates no information even in an arbitrarily large auction in the equilibrium that we construct because prices do not aggregate information agents have strict incentives to acquire costly information before they participate in the market also market statistics other than price such as the amount of rationing and bid distributions contain extra information about the state our findings sharply contrast with past work which shows that large auctions aggregate information when there is no ex post action

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

herding and the winner s curse in markets with sequential bids abstract we present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner s curse a seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers we characterize three classes of equilibria that differ widely in their information aggregation properties and in the size of the rent the seller captures from the buyers we compare the procedure of sequentially soliciting bids from the buyers to conducting an english auction for the object in terms of maximization of seller s revenue and demonstrate the superiority of the former journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d83

bargaining and markets complexity and the competitive outcome abstract rubinstein and wolinsky rev econ stud 57 1990 63 78 consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade they show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome here i consider rubinstein and wolinsky s model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences together with the standard payoff in the game then every equilibrium is stationary markov and induces the unique competitive price thus i demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome

dynamic matching and bargaining games a general approach this paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies this result is informed by the analysis of non cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions a central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions in particular does the trading outcome become walrasian when frictions become small existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers the characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games

the role of networks in antitrust investigations antitrust investigations typically focus on the competitive pressures coming from within the defined markets of interest however competitive pressures can also come from other markets even when individually these markets place only weak constraints on one another collectively they may matter a networks approach to modelling competition permits a systemic view of competition that can sometimes paint a more accurate picture we demonstrate this through some simple examples and show more generally how tools from the networks literature can be applied to capture competition across a system of interrelated markets as a leading example we consider antitrust investigations into supermarkets where local geographic markets have been used as the basis of investigation

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

simulating currency substitution bias the sign and size of estimates of the elasticity of currency substitution critically depend on the definition of the oppurtunity costs of holding money we investigate possible biases by means of monte carlo experiments as sufficient real data are not available

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

bilateral bargaining in networks abstract each connected pair of nodes in a network can jointly produce one unit of surplus a maximum number of linked nodes is selected in every period to bargain bilaterally over the division of the surplus according to the protocol proposed by rubinstein and wollinsky equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining econometrica 53 1985 1133 1150 all pairs which reach an agreement obtain the discounted payoffs and are removed from the network this bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the dulmage mendelsohn decomposition partition of the bipartite network of the set of nodes in this network

tie breaking in games of perfect information abstract the paper suggests that ties in an extensive form game have strategic implications if they represent credible threats or promises we consider a subset of subgame perfect nash equilibria obtained by breaking ties according to their strategic implications and show that the subset is nonempty for finite extensive form games of perfect information journal of economic literatureclassification number 026

the co evolution of policy mixes and socio technical systems towards a conceptual framework of policy mix feedback in sustainability transitions abstract understanding how policymaking processes can influence the rate and direction of socio technical change towards sustainability is an important yet underexplored research agenda in the field of sustainability transitions some studies have sought to explain how individual policy instruments can influence transitions and the politics surrounding this process we argue that such individual policy instruments can cause wider feedback mechanisms that influence not only their own future development but also other instruments in the same area consequently by extending the scope of analysis to that of a policy mix allows us to account for multiple policy effects on socio technical change and resultant feedback mechanisms influencing the policy processes that underpin further policy mix change this paper takes a first step in this regard by combining policy studies and innovation studies literatures to conceptualise the co evolutionary dynamics of policy mixes and socio technical systems we focus on policy processes to help explain how policy mixes influence socio technical change and how changes in the socio technical system also shape the evolution of the policy mix to do so we draw on insights from the policy feedback literature and propose a novel conceptual framework the framework highlights that policy mixes aiming to foster sustainability transitions need to be designed to create incentives for beneficiaries to mobilise further support while overcoming a number of prevailing challenges which may undermine political support over time in the paper we illustrate the framework using the example of the zero carbon homes policy mix in the uk we conclude with deriving research and policy implications for analysing and designing dynamic policy mixes for sustainability transitions

portfolio redistribution impacts within the narrow monetary aggregate a number of important monetary and financial changes occurred in the 1980s a rising question among monetary economists is whether the character of m1 has changed substantially as a result in particular a frequent contention is that interest bearing checkable deposits behave as a savings type asset thus subjecting m1 to portfolio redistribution effects in the modern era this research examines the elasticities of substitution for a variety of financial assets pre and post 1980 results indicate that m1 subcomponents do show significant substitution with savings type assets however the portfolio redistribution impacts are not confined to the interest bearing checkable deposits further results indicate that this behavior is not unique to the 1980s copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

what s wrong with the fundamental existence and welfare theorems abstract the definition of walrasian competitive equilibrium on which the fundamental existence and welfare theorems rest assumes that all trading in decentralized exchange economies takes place at the final equilibrium prices which further implies that at equilibrium prices the value of each agent s equilibrium commodity bundle is equal to the value of her endowment and equal treatment of agents with the same preferences technology and endowment the logic of the theorems supports the conclusion that in competitive economies prices the allocation of commodities and the distribution of income and material welfare are determined by the preferences technology and endowments of the agents in real world markets however agents can discover equilibrium prices only by making mutually advantageous transactions at disequilibrium prices any sequence of such transactions leads stably to an exchange equilibrium at which the offer prices of all agents are close to each other and which exhausts all private opportunities to realize economic surpluses the exchange equilibrium set however is in general a continuum and the exact equilibrium reached depends on the path of transactions in general exchange equilibria do not treat agents with the same preferences and endowments equally and the exchange equilibrium allocation of commodities does not conserve the values of individual agent endowments existence and stability of exchange equilibrium are transparent consequences of the logic of voluntary exchange but because of transaction path dependence equilibrium prices allocations of commodities and the distribution of wealth and economic welfare are not determined by agents preferences and endowments

bargaining dynamics in exchange networks abstract we consider a one sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and the dynamics of bargaining in such a market our dynamical model is local involving iterative updates of offers based on estimated best alternative matches in the spirit of pairwise nash bargaining agents are not strategic in our model we establish that when a balanced outcome a generalization of the pairwise nash bargaining solution to networks exists our dynamics converges rapidly to such an outcome

rubinstein auctions on competition for bargaining partners abstract this paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described in all the variants that we consider except for one case of public offers either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

research and extension expenditures and productivity in japanese agriculture 1960 1990 abstract this paper investigates the cause for the decline in the growth of productivity in japanese agriculture since the late 1960s for this objective it investigates the effects of research and extension r e activities on the extent and the direction of the bias of technological change in japanese agriculture for the period 1960 1990 based on the translog cost function framework empirical results show that the cost reducing effects of r e measured in terms of the absolute value of the cost r e elasticity increased slightly from 0 194 in 1960 to 0 205 in 1965 and then decreased consistently to 0 110 in 1990 this finding is broadly consistent with the finding of the decline or slowdown in agricultural productivity since the late 1960s the bias due to r e was found to be toward labor intermediate inputs and other inputs saving on the one hand and machinery and land using on the other labor saving and machinery using biases are consistent with the hicksian induced innovation hypothesis

analyzing the functional dynamics of technological innovation systems a scheme of analysis various researchers and policy analysts have made empirical studies of innovation systems in order to understand their current structure and trace their dynamics however policy makers often experience difficulties in extracting practical guidelines from studies of this kind in this paper we operationalize our previous work on a functional approach to analyzing innovation system dynamics into a practical scheme of analysis for policy makers the scheme is based on previous literature and our own experience in developing and applying functional thinking it can be used by policy makers not only to identify the key policy issues but also to set policy goals

dynamic monetary equilibrium in a random matching economy this article concerns an infinite horizon economy where trade must occur pairwise using a double auction mechanism and where fiat money overcomes lack of double coincidence of wants traders are anonymous and lack market power goods are divisible and perishable and are consumed at every date preferences are defined by utility stream overtaking money is divisible and not subject to inventory constraints the evolution of individual and economywide money holdings distributions is characterized there is a welfare ordered continuum of single price equilibria reflecting indeterminacy of the price level rather than of relative prices

bargaining and efficiency in networks abstract we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement the global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium for many networks all markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient even as players become patient we investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect but non markovian equilibria the analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain

the strategic analysis of intermediation the importance and the special character of intermediation were recognized as early as in the eighteenth century and have been stressed by many authors afterwards in spite of this long tradition comparatively little work has been done on the details of the economic theory of intermediation instead it was assumed that intermediation can simply be treated like any other economic activity in contrast i will argue that the theory of intermediation requires a specific game theoretic analysis and moreover that many preconceptions that one might have on the basis of standard microeconomic theory are wrong

complexity and competition extensive form market games typically have a large number of noncompetitive equilibria in this paper we argue that the complexity of noncompetitive behavior provides a justification for competitive equilibrium in the sense that if rational agents have an aversion to complexity at the margin then maximizing behavior will result in simple behavioral rules and hence in a competitive outcome for this purpose we use a class of extensive form dynamic matching and bargaining games with a finite number of agents in particular we consider markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers and deterministic exogenous sequential matching rules although the results can be extended to other matching processes if the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences lexicographically with the standard payoff then every equilibrium strategy profile induces a competitive outcome

land reform as commenced business the evidence against stopping abstract in the new paradigm institutions are long term endogenous thus the aims of land reform must be compatible with replace or substitute for initial incentives and power structures many reforms e g compulsory collectives are not redefinition of land reform is therefore needed yet the case for private land redistribution with ceilings remains the inverse relationship rests firmly on lower cost labor transactions in small farms though large but competitive transport or processing firms which enjoy lower cost capital transactions may be needed crucial is the impact of the postreform structure on livelihoods especially for the growing rural majority near landless workers new style market based reforms have potential probably best combined with old style ceilings substantial compensation with urban taxpayers sharing costs alternative off farm prospects and progressive taxes on large landholdings or bequests

bilateral oligopoly the efficiency of intermediate goods markets abstract we show that intermediate goods markets may be efficient despite the presence of commonly accepted signs of market failure such as high concentration both among sellers and buyers sparse trading networks price dispersion and externalities the results are derived in an extensive form model of bilateral bargaining with multiple buyers and multiple sellers and with externalities between the negotiations we also characterize the structure of the endogenous trading network i e how firms choose trading partners prices are dispersed and depend on both the concentration of capital and the concentration of sales consistent with some stylized facts on buyer power

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

measuring substitution in monetary asset demand systems the allen elasticity of substitution aes is widely used to study monetary asset substitution and structural demand stability blackorby and russell showed that the aes is uninformative and that the morishima elasticity of substitution mes is the appropriate measure a point overlooked in the monetary literature use of improper measures can lead to incorrect inferences this article considers five alternative measures of substitution the aes the mes the hicksian and marshallian elasticities of demand and mundlak s unencountered but appealing constant cost elasticity of substitution selection of the substitution measure appropriate to respective research questions is addressed

contracts search and organizational diversity abstract in this paper we develop a search model that allows for pareto ranked multiple equilibria and investigate its implications on organizational diversity the novel feature of the model is that multiple equilibria are obtained by the self contained feedback mechanism between optimal contracting choices and the reservation value which is in sharp contrast to existing literature that emphasizes the increasing returns to scale in the matching function our results provide some new insights on why there may exist significant differences in the internal organization of firms across countries and even in the same country and industry

the relation between farm size and farm productivity the role of family labor supervision and credit constraints abstract the paper shows that if the performance of hired farmhands is affected by supervision from family members and if the availability of credit is dependent on the amount of land owned then a systematic positive or negative relationship between per acre yields and farm size will prevail a model with no supervision effects on labor productivity would predict that yields are unaffected by farm size the paper also investigates the relation between land utilization and owned holding size when land rental possibilities are limited results are shown to be compatible with various observed patterns in ldcs

markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games abstract rubinstein and wolinsky rev econ stud 57 1990 63 show that a simple homogeneous market with exogenous matching has a continuum of non competitive perfect equilibria however the unique markov perfect equilibrium of this model is competitive by contrast in the more general case of heterogeneous markets even the markov property is not enough to guarantee the perfectly competitive outcome we define a market game that allows for heterogeneous values on both sides of the market and exhibit a number of examples of non competitive markov perfect equilibria with and without discounting unlike the homogeneous case these equilibria allow for inefficient trades and for trade at non uniform prices the non competitive equilibrium may be unique

structure behavior and market power in an evolutionary labor market with adaptive search abstract this study uses an agent based computational labor market framework to experimentally study the relationship between job capacity job concentration and market power job capacity is measured by the ratio of potential job openings to potential work offers and job concentration is measured by the ratio of work suppliers to employers for each experimental treatment work suppliers and employers repeatedly seek preferred worksite partners based on continually updated expected utility engage in efficiency wage worksite interactions modelled as prisoner s dilemma games and evolve their worksite behaviors over time the main finding is that job capacity consistently trumps job concentration when it comes to predicting the relative ability of work suppliers and employers to exercise market power

technological change and elasticities of substitution in korean agriculture abstract in this paper by using the translog cost function two issues are investigated concerning the korean agricultural sector during the prewar 1918 to 1938 and postwar 1949 to 1971 periods first characteristics of the technology used and the process of technical innovation are analyzed second an attempt is made to determine the partial elasticities of substitution for various pairwise combinations of land labor fixed capital and working capital we find that the technological innovations in korean agriculture were land and labor saving fixed capital neutral and working capital using further we find that working capital was a strong substitute for land and labor in the prewar period and a weak substitute in the postwar period fixed capital was a weak substitute for land and labor in the prewar period and a weak complement to land and labor in the postwar period finally working capital and fixed capital were weak substitutes in the prewar period and strong complements in the postwar period

the role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining can it be good for efficiency abstract we consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of mortensen and wright 2002 we find that private information typically deters entry but the welfare can actually be higher under private information

bargaining and reputation in search markets in a two sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus the matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus the frequency of behavioral types is determined in equilibrium even if the frequency of behavioral types is negligible they aect the terms of trade and eciency in an unbalanced market where the entering

walras retrouve decentralized trading mechanisms and the competitive price we extend the standard analysis of decentralized markets to allow for the possibility that traders interact simultaneously with more than one trader on the opposite side of the market in contrast with the literature we reconcile the walrasian equilibrium with the outcome of decentralized strategic trade we show that there exist generic matching technologies that determine local market conditions such that as market frictions vanish the equilibrium price is the one that would result in the static walrasian market our analysis highlights the importance of local market conditions for the determination of equilibrium prices

bargaining in stationary networks we study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players con nected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network we show that all equilibria are payoff equivalent the payoffs and the set of agreement links converge as players become patient several new concepts mutually estranged sets partners and shortage ratios provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network we develop a procedure to deter mine the limit equilibrium payoffs for all players characterizations of equitable and nondiscriminatory networks are also obtained jel c78 d85 competitive equilibrium theory assumes large and anonymous markets in which every buyer can trade with every seller underlying these assumptions are standard goods and services that may be traded at low transaction costs by agents who are not in specific relationships with one another however in many markets goods and services are heterogeneous e g cars apartments or need to be tailored to particular needs e g manufacturing inputs technical support furthermore trad ing opportunities may depend on transportation costs social relationships infor mation advertising trust technological compatibility joint business opportunities free trade agreements etc in such cases it is natural to model the market using a network where only pairs of connected agents may engage in exchange new theories are needed to explore the influence of the network structure on market outcomes many questions arise how does an agent s position in the net work determine his bargaining power and the local prices he faces who trades with whom and on what terms when are prices uniform in the network one possible conjecture is that an agent s bargaining power is determined by his relative number of connections in the network however this simple theory is implausible consider the network of four sellers located at the top nodes and nine buyers located at the bottom nodes depicted in figure 1 assume that each seller supplies one unit of a homogeneous indivisible good each buyer demands one unit of the good and all buyers have identical values for the good the buyer located in the middle has the largest number of links in the network as he is connected to each

economic reform and aggregate cropping patterns for egypt abstract beginning in the early 1980s the government of egypt embarked on an aggressive initiative to progressively change its centrally planned economy to a system more dependent on domestic and international markets the agriculture and food sectors have taken the lead in the economic reforms this paper investigates changes in egyptian cropping patterns as an indicator of the success of the transition toward a more market oriented economy first trends in cultivated area and gross margins during the economic reforms are described responses of cropping patterns to changes in gross margins are then evaluated a random effect distributed lag model with pooled cross sectional time series methods is used to examine the relationship for individual crops canonical correlation analysis provides a more general assessment of responsiveness of the overall cropping pattern

adaptive policies policy analysis and policy making abstract public policies must be devised in spite of profound uncertainties about the future when there are many plausible scenarios for the future it may well be impossible to construct any single static policy that will perform well in all of them it is likely however that the uncertainties that confront planners will be resolved over the course of time by new information thus policies should be adaptive devised not to be optimal for a best estimate future but robust across a range of plausible futures such policies should combine actions that are time urgent with those that make important commitments to shape the future and those that preserve needed flexibility for the future in this paper we propose an approach to policy formulation and implementation that explicitly confronts the pragmatic reality that policies will be adjusted as the world changes and as new information becomes available our suggested adaptive approach allows policymakers to cope with the uncertainties that confront them by creating policies that respond to changes over time and that make explicit provision for learning the approach makes adaptation explicit at the outset of policy formulation thus the inevitable policy changes become part of a larger recognized process and are not forced to be made repeatedly on an ad hoc basis this adaptive approach implies fundamental changes in the three major elements of policy making the analytical approach the types of policies considered and the decision making process

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

money and its substitutes abstract measurement of the elasticity of substitution between financial assets is an important element in evaluating the role that those assets play in the economy this paper generalizes the model developed by chetty by relaxing the separability conditions while restoring homotheticity to the utility function the general model is found to produce empirical estimates that are statistically superior to the original while substantially reducing the estimated elasticities of substitution consequently the various types of savings accounts no longer appear to be very close substitutes for money balances

does commodity money eliminate the indeterminacy of equilibrium abstract previous studies have shown that a random matching model with divisible fiat money and without constraint on agents money inventories possesses a continuum of stationary single price equilibria wallace j econom theory 81 1998 223 conjectures that the indeterminacy can be eliminated by the use of commodity money instead i find that in a similar random matching model with dividend yielding commodity money a continuum of stationary single price equilibria exists when the utility of dividend is not too high this result casts doubt on the conventional belief that the indeterminacy of monetary equilibrium is be caused only by the nominal nature of money

rice technology farmer rationality and agricultural policy in egypt estimates of a homothetic translog cost function show that egyptian rice farmers are economically rational and responsive to input price changes own price and cross price elasticities of input demand based on the cost function estimates provide insight into policies currently being pursued or considered by the egyptian government the analysis indicates a reduction in fertilizer trade restrictions could substantially reduce fertilizer prices and increase fertilizer use labor and mechanical power are not strong substitutes indicating that subsidization of machinery is not an appropriate policy to reduce agricultural labor shortages

do policy mix characteristics matter for low carbon innovation a survey based exploration of renewable power generation technologies in germany abstract policy mixes may play a crucial role in redirecting and accelerating innovation towards low carbon solutions thus addressing a key societal challenge towards this end some argue that the characteristics of such policy mixes matter greatly yet with little empirical evidence backing up such claims in this paper we explore this link between policy mix characteristics and low carbon innovation using the research case of the transition of the german electricity system towards renewable energy our empirical insights are based on an innovation survey administered to german manufacturers of renewable power generation technologies which builds on the community innovation survey for our purposes we adjusted the survey to better capture companies perceptions of policy mixes employing a bivariate tobit model we find evidence that companies perceptions regarding the consistency and credibility of the policy mix are positively associated with their innovation expenditures for renewable energies and this positive link intensifies when considering the mutual interdependence of these policy mix characteristics in contrast neither the comprehensiveness of the instrument mix nor the coherence of policy processes were found to be related to innovation expenditures overall these findings suggest that future research on low carbon and eco innovation should pay greater attention to the characteristics of policy mixes rather than focusing on policy instruments only finally our findings indicate a need to consider how policy may be measured in innovation surveys to generate better informed policy advice regarding the greening of innovation

reconceptualising the policy mix for innovation abstract recent years have seen the emergence take up and use of the term policy mix by innovation policy makers and by policy analysts and scholars alike imported from economic policy debates the term implies a focus on the interactions and interdependencies between different policies as they affect the extent to which intended policy outcomes are achieved however the meaning of the term remains ambiguous nonetheless we argue that the emergence of the policy mix concept into common use in the field of innovation policy studies provides us with a window of opportunity to reconsider some basic and often hidden assumptions in order to better deal with a messy and complex multi level multi actor reality we draw upon a range of literatures to re conceptualise the basic building blocks of innovation policy studies in order to arrive at a useful definition of policy mix tensions and interactions of different kinds across a series of dimensions we suggest that this reconceptualisation has important implications for the future scope and focus of prescriptive and analytical innovation policy studies

estimating the liquidity of m2 components in the post didmca era i introduction the depository institutions deregulation and monetary control act of 1980 didmca together with the garn st germain act and related federal reserve actions resulted in a thorough redefinition of the money stock measures as discussed in anderson and kavajecz 1994 and related writings the current components of m1 and m2 recognize the significant changes among existing assets that occurred throughout the 1970s examples include the rapid growth of money market mutual funds mmmfs and the breakdown of distinctions between deposits of commercial banks and thrift institutions the measures of money include assets introduced by legislation such as now accounts and money market deposit accounts mmdas the didmca also deregulated interest rates on bank deposits with january 1986 completing the phase out of regulation q this paper examines the liquidity of the assets within the restructured definitions of m1 and m2 we offer empirical evidence regarding the cost of decreasing these asset holdings as well as for other bank deposits such as individual retirement accounts iras the results can be used to assess how easily they can be converted into a medium of exchange section ii features the model formulation based upon a representative household s intertemporal optimization problem with liquidity costs our study provides estimates of both relative and absolute liquidity as lippman and mccall 1986 discuss liquidity represents a fundamental characteristic of assets yet remains elusive in its measurement to this extent research seeking to measure or estimate liquidity is sparse lippman and mccall s 1986 criterion consists of the optimal expected amount of time to transform an asset into money hooker and kohn 1994 define liquidity as the difference between the asset price at its optimal sale relative to its immediate sale adjustment cost serves as our measure for liquidity this criterion conforms to commonly used definitions found in economics textbooks particularly those that emphasize asset withdrawal for transactions mishkin 1995 55 for example defines liquidity as the relative ease and speed with which an asset can be converted into a medium of exchange the adjustment cost approach measures withdrawal costs in dollar units it regards liquidity as an inherent characteristic of the asset and captures the total cost involved with changing asset holdings the implicit inclusion of time costs within the formulation is consistent with lippman and mccall 1986 asymmetry in adjustment cost arises because liquidity explicitly involves the cost of reducing asset holdings while economic units incur costs due to increasing financial assets larger costs result from withdrawal we use a minor modification of pfann and verspagen s 1989 asymmetric adjustment cost function proposed by dutkowsky 1995 the function offers several attractive properties for estimating liquidity cost it allows for asymmetry in the direction of either increases or decreases within portfolio reallocation further the commonly used linear quadratic function is nested within this equation enabling straightforward testing for greater withdrawal cost the asymmetric adjustment cost specification has been utilized previously by pfann and palm 1993 within labor demand section iii reports empirical findings we estimate the structural parameters using generalized method of moments gmm and monthly data for the december 1983 march 1993 period the results reveal significant evidence of asymmetry in the direction of decreasing asset holdings for all components except demand deposits this finding supports the existence of greater cost for withdrawing as opposed to increasing holdings among interest bearing accounts further the evidence points to a definite ordering of liquidity among several assets within this group savings deposits rank as the most liquid followed by small time deposits mmmfs and individual retirement accounts

institutional power play in innovation systems the case of herceptin new technologies must be accompanied by institutional change innovative actors therefore need to do institutional work or take a role as an institutional entrepreneur in order to shape the institutions in the best interests of their technology however the literature on system building and on institutional entrepreneurship have little overlap the goal of this paper is to bridge these two bodies of literature to gain additional insights into how institutional change evolves in a technological innovation system we show how the pharmaceutical firm roche acted as a powerful institutional entrepreneur by influencing the health care system in england to create a market for the personalized cancer drug herceptin we demonstrate that institutional change can be preceded by a range of innovation system building activities that are not directly intended to bring about institutional change but are required in order for institutional change to take place through this case study we show how the system building and institutional change literature can complement each other

modelling competitive behavior a single seller of an indivisible object wishes to sell the good to one of many buyers the seller has zero value for the good the buyers have a commonly known identical value of one this article attempts to determine strategic environments that ensure the seller s ability to exploit the competitive behavior of the buyers to extract all the surplus in the game i show that in many simple dynamic games there are subgame perfect equilibria that involve the seller s giving up the good for free even if the seller has an informational advantage that allows him to keep bidders from learning the bidding behavior of their opponents there still exist perfect bayesian equilibria that involve a sale at the price of zero however in this case a simple refinement in the spirit of sequential equilibria can be used to rule out such collusive behavior and to show that the unique equilibrium outcome satisfying this refinement yields the seller a price of one

a dual approach to measuring the nearness of near monies increasing returns to scale rts is frequently po stulated as affecting productivity in surface coal mining however it is not cl ear whether increased capital intensity or increased output is the relevant phen omenon a ray homothetic production function that incorporates the capital labor mix and fixed site geology into the scale elasticity is presented and estimated with a micro mine level dataset the results indicate that higher capital int ensity contributes to higher rts for some types of capital equipment but not al l on the average increasing rts was found with few mines approaching optimal scale copyright 1987 by mit press

policy mixes for sustainability transitions an extended concept and framework for analysis reaching a better understanding of the policies and politics of transitions presents a main agenda item in the emerging field of sustainability transitions one important requirement for these transitions such as the move towards a decarbonized energy system is the redirection and acceleration of technological change for which policies play a key role in this regard several studies have argued for the need to combine different policy instruments in so called policy mixes however existing policy mix studies often fall short of reflecting the complexity and dynamics of actual policy mixes the underlying politics and the evaluation of their impacts in this paper we take a first step towards an extended interdisciplinary policy mix concept based on a review of the bodies of literature on innovation studies environmental economics and policy analysis the concept introduces a clear terminology and consists of the three building blocks elements policy processes and characteristics which can be delineated by several dimensions based on this we discuss its application as analytical framework for empirical studies analyzing the impact of the policy mix on technological change throughout the paper we illustrate the proposed concept by using the example of the policy mix for fostering the transition of the german energy system to renewable power generation technologies finally we derive policy implications and suggest avenues for future research

social welfare and income inequality in a system of cities abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model of a system of core periphery cities to examine the main determinants of intra and inter regional income disparities the economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous unskilled and heterogeneous skilled workers unskilled workers whose wages are determined competitively specialize in food production in local cities skilled workers whose wages are determined according to a nash bargain manufacture a high tech commodity in the metropolis we establish conditions under which this core periphery equilibrium spatial configuration emerges we show that both intra and inter regional income disparities are present the determinants of each type of disparity and the social welfare implications are fully investigated our results suggest that public policy programs that improve income equality may not be necessarily welfare enhancing

egypt s multiproduct agricultural technology and agricultural policy based on the hypothesis that egyptian farmers maximise economic profits the multiproduct translog profit function is used to estimate input demand and output supply functions for corn rice and cotton crops grown in egypt s nile delta elasticity estimates indicate a generally high degree of price responsiveness the estimates are used to evaluate egyptian agricultural policies concerning labour mechanisation and output prices the results show that egypt s agricultural policies of taxing output and subsidising certain inputs have hada substantial negative impact on agricultural productivity

agents come to bits towards a constructive comprehensive taxonomy of economic entities abstract mirowski mirowski p 2007 markets come to bits evolution computation and markomata in economic science journal of economic behavior and organization 63 209 242 argues for a constructive approach to economic modeling centered on markets as evolving computational entities this essay counters that a broader constructive approach to economic modeling can and should be taken the recent advent of powerful computer technologies supporting agent based modeling abm renders feasible the computational study of economies modeled as evolving systems of interacting agents in abm an agent refers broadly to bundled data and behavioral methods representing an entity constituting part of a computationally constructed world examples of possible agent referents include individuals social groupings institutions e g markets biological entities such as crops and physical entities such as transportation networks and weather consequently abm provides tremendous opportunities for economists and other social scientists to tailor the breadth and depth of the entities represented in their models to the application at hand a simple abm of a two sector decentralized market economy is used for concrete illustration

bilateral matching and bargaining with private information we study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game dmbg with two sided private information bilateral bargaining the model is a private information replica of mortensen and wright 2002 there are two kinds of frictions time

welfare costs of inflation when interest bearing deposits are disregarded a calculation of the bias abstract most estimates of the welfare costs of inflation are devised considering only noninterest bearing assets ignoring that since the 1980s technological innovations and new regulations have increased the liquidity of interest bearing deposits we investigate the resulting bias sufficient and necessary conditions on its sign are presented along with closed form expressions for its magnitude two examples dealing with bidimensional bilogarithmic money demands show that disregarding interest bearing monies may lead to a non negligible overestimation of the welfare costs of inflation an intuitive explanation is that such assets may partially make up for the decreased demand of noninterest bearing assets due to higher inflation

retrading in market games when agents are not price takers they typically cannot obtain an efficient real location of resources in one round of trade this paper presents a non cooperative model of imperfect competition where agents can retrade allocations consistent with edgeworth s idea of recontracting we show a there are pareto optimal allocations including competitive equilibrium allocations that can be approximated arbitrarily closely when trade is myopic i e when agents play a static nash equilibrium at every round of retrading b any converging sequence of allocations generated by myopic retrading can be supported along some retrade proof subgame perfect equilibrium path when traders anticipate future rounds of trading

the translog utility function and the demand for money in the united states in recent years considerable effort has been directed towards establishing the nature of the relationship between money and nearmonies but with mixed success the approaches vary from multi interest rate single equation studies to the careful simultaneous equations studies summarized and amended by feige and pearce 1977 and extended recently by donovan 1978 offenbacher 1979 and barnett 1980 the empirical results also vary with numerous studies favoring only one interest rate see the surveys in fisher 1978 1983 some claiming that a variety of entities are close substitutes for money e g chetty 1969 and others showing that weak substitution or even complementarity may be the result of the measurement of elasticities of substitution between money and a number of other assets e g feige and pearce 1977 offenbacher 1979 and barnett 1980 the debate seems to have overshadowed a second and equally intriguing issue which centers on the establishment of an acceptable definition of money the basic idea of this study is to take an approach that takes account of the different degrees of moneyness possessed by the various monetary assets this paper produces quantitative estimates of the degree of substitutability of other monetary assets for money in the context of a flexible functional form model with a

decentralized trading with private information the paper studies how asset prices are determined in a decentralized market with asymmetric information about asset values we consider an economy in which a large number of agents trade two assets in bilateral meetings a fraction of the agents has private information about the asset values we show that over time uninformed agents can elicit information from their trading partners by making small offers this form of experimentation allows the uninformed agents to acquire information as long as there are potential gains from trade in the economy as a consequence the economy converges to a pareto efficient allocation

a review of the european offshore wind innovation system offshore wind has the potential of becoming an important pillar of the future european energy system it can contribute to policy objectives on climate change energy security green growth and social progress however the large potential of offshore wind does not automatically lead to a large share in future energy systems neither does the emergent stage of development of the technology recent insights in innovation studies suggest that the success chances of technological innovations are to a large extent determined by how the surrounding system the innovation system is built up and how it functions in this paper we assess the offshore wind innovation systems of four countries denmark the uk the netherlands and germany with the objective to provide recommendations for strengthening the overall european offshore wind innovation system we use the technological innovation system tis approach to analyse the system in 2011 based on the analysis we identify a number of challenges that the european offshore wind sector faces some of them include a serious deficiency of engineers fragmented policies and poor alignment of national regulatory frameworks cost of the technology and limited grid infrastructure since the problems hinder the entire system development we call for a systemic policy instrument that would support the innovation system around this technology and contribute to its wider diffusion in europe

compulsive policy making the evolution of the german feed in tariff system for solar photovoltaic power abstract in recent years policy approaches that build upon the notion of innovation systems have enjoyed increasing attention in science technology and innovation policy but while the usefulness of systemic thinking in policy making has been demonstrated in a large number of empirical settings we still lack a detailed understanding of the dynamics at play when policy makers address systemic problems in this paper we show how complex interdependencies and the uncertain nature of technological change shape the process of targeted policy interventions in socio technical systems toward this end we analyzed the evolution of the german feed in tariff fit system for solar photovoltaic power a highly effective and widely copied policy instrument targeted at fostering the diffusion and development of renewable energy technologies we find that the policy has been subject to a considerable amount of changes many of which are the result of policy makers addressing specific system issues and bottlenecks interestingly however often these issues themselves were driven by unforeseen technological developments induced by previous policy interventions we argue that the pattern of policy serving as both a solution to and a driver of technological bottlenecks shows strong similarities with what rosenberg 1969 called compulsive sequences in the development of technical systems by shedding more light on how the characteristics of socio technical systems affect policy interventions our framework represents a first step toward more closely integrating the literature on innovation systems with the work on policy learning

is small beautiful farm size productivity and poverty in asian agriculture the debate on the relationship between farm size and productivity has gone through a complete circle in the 1960s it was perceived that small farms were efficient because they can fully use their resources particularly family labor and they can monitor their production activities closely but in the 1970s and 1980s as many asian countries rapidly moved towards industrialization and urbanization small farms were considered a major obstacle in this process

markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks abstract we study the markov perfect equilibria mpes of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement we establish the existence of mpes and show that mpe payoffs are not necessarily unique a method for constructing pure strategy mpes for high discount factors is developed for some networks we find that all mpes are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient

market clearing and price formation abstract considered here is decentralized exchange of privately owned commodity bundles voluntary transactions take the form of repeated bilateral barters under broad and reasonable hypotheses the resulting process converges to competitive equilibrium price taking behavior is not assumed prices emerge over time they need neither be anticipated nor known at any interim stage

rural market imperfections and the farm size productivity relationship evidence from pakistan the subject of this article is the relationships between farm size and productivity and between farm size and profitability in the developing countries the recent controversies over the inverse size output relationship are reviewed and a framework is provided that explains the inverse relationship based on plausible assumptions about imperfections in the markets for labor land credit and risk from this framework a set of testable hypotheses are derived the hypotheses are tested on recent farm level panel data from pakistan a strong inverse relationship between farm size and yield is present in the sample even when household fixed effects are used to account for unobserved heterogeneity moreover the suggested market imperfections framework is consistent with the data

asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets an inversion result abstract i consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations the seller makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller observes the buyer s valuation symmetric information bilateral trade is trivially efficient if the seller cannot observe the valuation asymmetric information bilateral trade is inefficient this bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market in the steady state equilibrium of the market game the relation between the informational regime and efficiency is inverted with small frictions efficiency obtains if information is asymmetric if information is symmetric however the trading outcome can be very inefficient even if frictions vanish