household risk management and optimal mortgage choice the portfolio of the typical american household is quite unlike the diversie ed portfolio of liquid assets discussed in e nance textbooks the major asset in the portfolio is a house a relatively illiquid asset with an uncertain capital value the value of the house generally exceeds the net worth of the household which e nances its homeownership through a mortgage contract to create a leveraged position in residential real estate other e nancial assets and liabilities are typically far less important than the house and its associated mortgage contract the importance of housing in household wealth is illustrated in figure i this e gure plots the fraction of household assets in housing and in equities against the wealth percentile of the household poor households appear at the left of the e gure and wealthy households at the right data come from the 1989 and 1998 survey of consumer finances the e gure shows that middle class american families from roughly the fortieth to the eightieth percentile of the wealth distribution have more than half their assets in the form of housing even after the expansion of equity ownership during the 1990s equities are of negligible importance for these households 1

prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this paper puts forward a valuation framework for mortgage backed securities rather than imposing an optimal value minimizing call condition we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depends upon the prevailing state of the economy to implement our valuation procedure we use maximum likelihood techniques to estimate a prepayment function in light of recent aggregate gnma prepayment experience by integrating this empirical prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgagebacked securities given an optimal value minimizing call policy a mortgage should never be called when its market value is less than its call price similarly a mortgage should be called if it is worth more than its call price however mortgagors often call their loans when the prevailing refinancing rate exceeds the contract rate on the loan dunn and mcconnell 1981 in addition some mortgagors do not call their loans when the loan s contract rate exceeds the prevailing refinancing rate the purpose of this paper is to put forward a valuation framework for mortgagebacked securities consistent with these stylized facts associated with mortgage prepayments the mortgagor s prepayment decision is integral to our valuation framework however we do not impose an optimal value minimizing call condition to price these securities rather we assume that at each point in time there exists a probability of prepaying this conditional probability depending upon the prevailing state of the economy by integrating this prepayment function into our valuation framework we provide a complete model to value mortgage backed securities to implement our valuation procedures we estimate a prepayment function given recent gnma prepayment experience we follow green and shoven 1986 by using a proportional hazards model to estimate the influence of various explanatory variables or covariates on the mortgagor s prepayment decision distinct from green and shoven we explicitly model the effects of seasoning as well as investigating the influence of interest cost savings from refinancing in addition we also consider the effects of lagged refinancing rates heterogeneity

why do monetary policies matter an experimental study of saving and inflation in an overlapping generations model we study experiments of an overlapping generations model where inflation is determined by the monetary policy and by the amount of average saving within each period we use a new experimental setup that allows us to observe more details of the process of expectation forming and separate this process from the actual saving process in contrast to experimental findings by lim prescott sunder marimon spear sunder and marimon sunder we find that 1 agents do not form first order adaptive expectations 2 subjects over save for precautionary reasons as a result 3 the so called friedman conjecture holds i e monetary policies which are equivalent in static equilibrium exhibit different levels and different volatility of inflation in the experiment this may generate important policy trade offs between monetary regimes we discuss our findings and relate them to current research on adaptive learning and the role it may have in ranking alternative monetary policies

house prices home equity based borrowing and the u s household leverage crisis us household leverage sharply increased in the years preceding the 2007 eco nomic recession the top panel of figure 1 shows the steady rise in household debt since 1975 which accelerated beginning in 2002 in just five years the household sector doubled its debt balance in comparison the contemporaneous increase in corporate debt was modest the middle panel shows that the increase in household debt from 2002 to 2007 translated into a striking rise in household leverage as mea sured by the debt to income ratio during the same time period corporate leverage declined the dramatic absolute and relative rise in us household leverage from 2002 to 2007 is unprecedented compared to the last 25 years one reason for the rapid expansion in household leverage during this period is that mortgage credit became more easily available to new home buyers mian and sufi 2009 strong house price appreciation from 2002 to 2006 however which may have been fueled by the availability of mortgage credit to a riskier set of new home buyers could also have had an important feedback effect on household lever age through existing homeowners given that 65 percent of us households already owned their primary residence before the acceleration in house prices the feedback from house prices to borrowing may be an important source of the rapid rise in household leverage that preceded the economic downturn our central goals in this study are to estimate how homeowner borrowing responded to the increase in house prices and to identify which homeowners responded most aggressively we examine this home equity based borrowing channel using a dataset consisting of anonymous individual credit files of a national consumer credit bureau agency we follow a random sample of over 74 000 us homeowners who owned their homes as of 1997 at an annual frequency from the end of 1997 until the end of 2008 the bottom panel of figure 1 plots the growth in debt of 1997 homeowners over time and shows that existing homeowners borrow significantly more debt as their house prices appreciate from 2002 to 2006 while the aggregate trend is suggestive

lender screening and the role of securitization evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets this article examines the link between mortgage securitization and lender screening during the boom and bust of the u s housing market using comprehensive data on both prime and subprime securitized and bank held loans we provide evidence that securitization affected lenders screening decisions in the subprime market for low documentation loans through two channels the securitization rate and the time it takes to securitize a loan the change in decision making by subprime lenders occurs on dimensions that are unreported to investors examining the time series evolution of the securitization market further reinforces these findings we exploit heterogeneity across subprime and prime markets to illustrate that the potential for moral hazard may be reduced with greater collection of hard information and increased monitoring of lenders our results suggest that the policy debate regarding securitization and lenders underwriting standards should separately evaluate the agency and non agency markets with special attention toward the extent of soft information in assets being securitized the author 2012 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

a strategy experiment in dynamic asset pricing this study presents a strategy experiment in a simple dynamic asset pricing model where the current market equilibrium asset price is determined by aggregated individual expectations of next period s price after participating in an introductory laboratory experiment on expectation formation participants formulate a complete forecasting strategy these strategies are programmed and markets are simulated participants receive feedback from the results of these simulations and can adapt their strategy four rounds are played and the entire experiment lasts eight weeks a final laboratory experiment compares predictions of participants with the predictions of the submitted strategy we find that most of the participants submit complicated strategies and that strategies become more complicated over the rounds most markets converge to a steady state price only after many periods if at all the number of converging price sequences increases over the rounds these results suggest in general slow convergence and learning of the subjects over the rounds even in a stationary environment learning the correct fundamental price level turns out to be difficult an important part of the non convergence seems to be caused not by individual strategies but by the interaction of several strategies from the final experiment we conclude that the strategies are a good representation of what participants do in a laboratory experiment

experimental evidence on the persistence of output and inflation this article presents experimental evidence from a monetary sticky price economy in which output and inflation depend on expected future inflation rational inflation expectations do not allow for persistent deviations of output and inflation following a monetary shock in the experimental sessions however output and inflation display considerable persistence and regular cyclical patterns

rational prepayment and the valuation of mortgage backed securities this article presents a new model of mortgage prepayments based on rational decisions by mortgage holders these mortgage bolders face beterogeneous transaction costs which are explicitly modeled the model is estimated using a version of hansen s 1982 generalized method of moments and is sbown to capture many of the empirical features of mortgage prepayment estimation results indicate that mortgage holders act as tbougb tbey face transaction costs tbat far exceed tbe explicit costs usually incurred on refinancing they also wait an average of more than a year before refinancing even when it is optimal to do so the model fits observed prepayment behavior as well as thee recent empirical model of schwartz and torous 1989 implications for pricing mortgage backed securities are discussed

nonexpert beliefs about the macroeconomic consequences of economic and noneconomic events economists assume that individuals think about the economy like economists which is especially important in all rational expectations and economic voting models despite contrasting evidence there has been little research on actual nonexpert macroeconomic beliefs in this paper i present the results of a survey among students designed to find out whether they distinguish macroeconomically relevant from irrelevant events i find that even people with some economic background tend to overestimate the effects of noneconomic events this bias is a function of gender economic training and the preferred means of mass communication

recreational versus professional bettors performance differences and efficiency implications using a novel dataset which allows comparisons across heterogeneous sub groups of pari mutuel bettors we demonstrate significant behaviour and performance distinctions between recreational and professional investors professionals ability to earn abnormal returns on short odds horses in high volume markets challenges the existing empirical consensus which offers very limited evidence of betting market inefficiency the results offer important lessons for betting operators and regulators and highlight the potential for similar avenues of investigation in other speculative markets

mortgage valuation under optimal prepayment mortgage originators offer borrowers various combinations of points loan fees and coupon high points and low coupon or low points and high coupon in this article points are interpreted as a device serving to separate borrowers with high prepayment probabilities from those with low prepayment probabilities borrowers and lenders are treated symmetrically both are risk neutral and both have complete and frictionless access to credit markets implying that borrowers can finance points if they wish except that borrowers prepayment speeds are private knowledge equilibria are derived both when borrowers cannot prepay voluntarily and when they can article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

mortgage default during the u s mortgage crisis this paper asks which theories of mortgage default are quantitatively consistent with observations in the united states during 2002 2010 theoretical models are simulated for the observed time series of aggregate house prices their predictions are then compared to actual default rates on prime fixed rate mortgages an out of sample test discriminates between estimated reduced forms of the two most prominent theories the test reveals that the doubletrigger hypothesis attributing mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event like unemployment outperforms a frictionless option theoretic default model based on this finding a structural partialequilibrium model with liquidity constraints and idiosyncratic unemployment shocks is presented to provide micro foundations for the double trigger hypothesis in this model borrowers with negative equity are more likely to default when they are unemployed and have low liquid wealth the model explains most of the observed strong rise in mortgage default rates a policy implication of the model is that subsidizing homeowners can mitigate a mortgage crisis at a lower cost than bailing out lenders

a generalized valuation model for fixed rate residential mortgages this paper uses option pricing techniques to rationally price mortgage instruments subject to both default and prepayment risk attention is given to terminations due to purely financial consideration of the mortgage contract itself as well as to personally induced terminations explicit inclusion of default in the mortgage valuation procedure also permits the valuation of insurance against such default qualitatively it is found that default differs significantly in the behavior from either prepayment or nonfinancial termination quantitatively however there is significant substitution between prepayment and default so that the addition of a default feature to the contract has only a modest impact on mortgage values unless there is substantial price volatility in the housing market or a high loan to value ratio copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

animal spirits heterogeneous expectations and the amplification and duration of crises we introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans households lend to firms and form expectations about their loan default probability under heterogeneous expectations with switching between forecasting strategies driven by reinforcement learning even a small fraction of pessimistic traders has a large aggregate effect causing a heterogeneous expectations risk premium i e significantly higher contract rates for loans and significantly lower output our stylized model illustrates how animal spirits and heterogeneous expectations may lead to aconfidence loss and to financial instability amplifying the magnitude of economic crises and slowing down recovery

mortgage terminations heterogeneity and the exercise of mortgage options as applied to the behavior of homeowners with mortgages option theoiy predicts that mortgage prepayment or default will be exercised if the call or put option is in the money by some specific amount our analysis tests the extent to which the option approach can explain default and prepayment behavior evaluates the practical importance of modeling both options simultaneouisly and models the unobserved heterogeneity of borrowers in the home mortgage market the paper presents a uinified model of the competing risks of mortgage termination by prepayment and default considering the two hazards as dependent competing risks that are estimated jointly it also accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity among borrowers and estimates the unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously with the parameters and baseline hazards associated with prepayment and default functions our results show that the option model in its most straightfolward version does a good job of explaininig default and prepayment but it is not enouigh by itself the simultaneity of the options is very important empirically in explaining behavior the results also show that there exists significant heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers ignoring this heterogeneity results in serious errors in estimating the prepayment behavior of homeowners

an intertemporal general equilibrium model of asset prices this paper develops a continuous time general equilibrium model of a simple but complete economy and uses it to examine the behavior of asset prices in this model asset prices and their stochastic properties are determined endogenously one principal result is a partial differential equation which asset prices must satisfy the solution of this equation gives the equilibrium price of any asset in terms of the underlying real variables in the economy in this paper we develop a general equilibrium asset pricing model for use in applied research an important feature of the model is its integration of real and financial markets among other things the model endogenously determines the stochastic process followed by the equilibrium price of any financial asset and shows how this process depends on the underlying real variables the model is fully consistent with rational expectations and maximizing behavior on the part of all agents our framework is general enough to include many of the fundamental forces affecting asset markets yet it is tractable enough to be specialized easily to produce specific testable results furthermore the model can be extended in a number of straightforward ways consequently it is well suited to a wide variety of applications for example in a companion paper cox ingersoll and ross 7 we use the model to develop a theory of the term structure of interest rates many studies have been concerned with various aspects of asset pricing under uncertainty the most relevant to our work are the important papers on intertemporal asset pricing by merton 19 and lucas 16 working in a continuous time framework merton derives a relationship among the equilibrium expected rates of return on assets he shows that when investment opportunities are changing randomly over time this relationship will include effects which have no analogue in a static one period model lucas considers an economy with homogeneous individuals and a single consumption good which is produced by a number of processes the random output of these processes is exogenously determined and perishable assets are defined as claims to all or a part of the output of a process and the equilibrium determines the asset prices our theory draws on some elements of both of these papers like merton we formulate our model in continuous time and make full use of the analytical tractability that this affords the economic structure of our model is somewhat similar to that of lucas however we include both endogenous production and

the inefficiency of refinancing why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers abstract this paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default when considering improvements in the borrower s creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates reduced defaults and increased availability of credit thus a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market we also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the key predictions of our model

securitization and distressed loan renegotiation evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis abstract we examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank held loans when compared to similar securitized loans across various specifications and origination vintages the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank held loans is 3 to 7 lower in absolute terms 13 to 32 in relative terms there is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers a quasi experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results

stochastic house appreciation and optimal mortgage lending w e characterize the optimal mortgage contract in a continuous time setting with stochastic growth in house price and income costly foreclosure and a risky borrower who requires incentives to repay his debt we show that many features of subprime loans can be consistent with properties of the optimal contract and that when house prices decline mortgage modification can create value for borrowers and lenders our model provides a number of empirical predictions that relate the features of mortgage contracts originated in a housing boom and the extent of their modification in a slump to location and borrowers characteristics jel g20 g21 g33

optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous time agency model we derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous time principal agent setting and implement it with a capital structure credit line long term debt and equity over which the agent controls the payout policy while the project s volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm s total debt capacity they increase the use of credit versus debt leverage is nonstationary and declines with past profitability the firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing at a higher rate through the credit line surprisingly the usual conflicts between debt and equity asset substitution strategic default need not arise in this paper we consider a dynamic contracting environment in which a riskneutral agent or entrepreneur with limited resources manages an investment activity while the investment is profitable it is also risky and in the short run it can generate arbitrarily large operating losses the agent will need outside financial support to cover such losses and continue the project the difficulty is that while the probability distribution of the cash flows is publicly known the agent may distort these cash flows by taking a hidden action that leads to a private benefit specifically the agent may i conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption and or ii stop providing costly effort which would reduce the mean of the cash flows therefore from the perspective of the principal or investors that fund the project there is the concern that a low cash flow realization may be a result of the agent s actions rather than the project s fundamentals to provide the agent with appropriate incentives investors control the agent s wage and may also withdraw their financial support for the project and force its early termination we seek to characterize an optimal contract in this framework and relate it to the firm s choice of capital structure we develop a method to solve for the optimal contract given the incentive constraints in a continuous time setting and study the properties of the credit line debt and equity that implement the contract as in the discrete time model of demarzo and fishman 2003 the continuous time setting offers several peter m demarzo is from stanford university and yuliy sannikov is from u c berkeley we

an analysis of mortgage contracting prepayment penalties and the due on sale clause the due on sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan we analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low in that case the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments we also demonstrate by a risk sharing argument that the due on sale clause is optimal in some settings even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales almost all conventional fixed rate home mortgage contracts written in the last decade contain a due on sale clause which gives the lender the contractual right to declare the total indebtedness due immediately if the mortgaged property is transferred as mortgage rates rise lending institutions suffer capital losses on fixed rate mortgage loans while borrowers earn capital gains equal to the difference between the face value and market value of their loans the due onsale clause gives the lending institution the right to demand the borrower s capital gain as a prepayment penalty in order to increase the probability of prepayment it can be optimal for the bank to accept a partial settlement in this paper we analyze the bank s strategy for setting the prepayment penalty it demands under the due on sale clause and examine the optimality of the clause the model we develop also applies to other types of prepayment penalties i e loan covenants which require payment of a premium over market value in order to extinguish

liar s loan effects of origination channel and information falsification on mortgage delinquency 1 this paper presents an analysis of mortgage delinquency between 2004 and 2008 using a loan level data set from a major national mortgage bank our analysis highlights two problems underlying the mortgage crisis a reliance on mortgage brokers who tend to originate lower quality loans and a prevalence of low documentation loans known in the industry as liar s loans that result in borrower information falsification while over three quarters of the difference in delinquency rates between bank and broker channels can be attributed to observable loan and borrower characteristics the delinquency difference between full and low documentation mortgages is due to unobservable heterogeneity about half of it potentially due to income falsification

repeated insurance contracts and learning this article considers a repeated insurance model with incomplete information in which the insurer and the consumer both learn over time about the unknown risk category of the consumer care choices by young consumers affect the informational value of the accident history under an optimal scheme of long term insurance contracts young consumers will always be subsidized by old consumers and consumers who are reassessed as low risk types are always subsidizers i e reverse experience ratings we compare this optimal scheme with the set of contracts that would emerge in a competitive market if only short term contracting were possible these sequentially competitive contracts can lead to over investment in care by both young and old consumers relative to the optimum in contrast to the underinvestment problem associated with moral hazard in insurance

housing market dynamics this paper presents a dynamic theory of housing market fluctuations it develops a life cycle model where households are heterogeneous with respect to income and preferences and mortgage lending is restricted by a down payment requirement the market interaction of young credit constrained households with older or richer unconstrained households generates the following results 1 current income of young credit constrained households affects housing prices independently of aggregate income 2 housing prices and the number of housing transactions are positively correlated 3 housing prices over react to income shocks 4 a relaxation of the down payment constraint triggers a boom bust cycle these results are consistent with patterns observed in the us and the uk

valuing commercial mortgages an empirical investigation of the contingent claims approach to pricing risky debt this paper empirically investigates a contingent claims model of commercial mortgage pricing we find that the magnitude of the observed default premia for a sample of nonprepayable fixed rate bullet mortgages can be explained by the contingent claims model in addition the model explains a significant proportion of the period to period changes in the default premia however given an assumed negative correlation between building value changes and interest rate changes the model s risk structure tends to increase less steeply with increasing maturity than the observed risk structure since the seminal work of black and scholes 1973 corporate liabilities have been modeled as options on the total value of the firm this contingent claims approach to bond pricing was refined by merton 1974 to allow for cash dispersals prior to the bonds maturities and by brennan and schwartz 1980 and ingersoll 1987 to allow for interest rate uncertainty although variants of these bond pricing models are currently being used extensively on wall street they have not been tested extensively moreover empirical studies have not successfully accounted for the observed spread between the rates on risky and default free debt jones mason and rosenfeld 1984 empirically investigate a model that assumes a nonstochastic term structure of interest rates while ramaswamy and sundaresan 1986 examine a model with stochastic interest rates to price floating rate notes in both cases the models could not explain the observed default premia the relative lack of empirical analysis is due partly to the complicated nature of corporate bonds major corporations generally have a large number of different bond issues outstanding that have different priorities in the event that the firm goes bankrupt moreover the bonds can have a variety of covenants specifying sinking fund provisions conditions under which technical default will occur and other restrictions that can have an impact on their value although these complications do not preclude pricing various bond issues on a case by case basis they make it difficult to test systematically the accuracy of the pricing model

do fiscal variables affect fiscal expectations experiments with real world and lab data we generate observable expectations about fiscal variables through laboratory experiments using real world data from several european countries as stimuli we compare a var model of expectations for data which is presented in a fiscal frame with one for neutrally presented data we measure the degree to which participants use fiscal data for their forecasts agents expectations are found neither to be consistent with rational nor with purely adaptive expectations but instead follow an augmented adaptive scheme methodological implications of the present approach for experiments in macroeconomics are also discussed

expectations and bubbles in asset pricing experiments abstract we present results on expectation formation in a controlled experimental environment in each period subjects are asked to predict the next price of a risky asset the realized market price is derived from an unknown market equilibrium equation with feedback from individual forecasts in most experiments prices deviate from the benchmark fundamental and bubbles emerge endogenously these bubbles are inconsistent with rational expectations and seem to be driven by trend chasing behavior or positive feedback expectations of the participants we also analyze individual predictions of participants and find that participants within a group tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy

optimal mortgage design this article studies optimal mortgage design in a continuous time setting with volatile and privately observable income costly foreclosure and a stochastic market interest rate we show that the features of the optimal mortgage are consistent with an option adjustable rate mortgage option arm under the optimal contract the borrower is given discretion of how much to repay until his balance reaches a certain limit the default rates and interest rate payment on the mortgage correlate positively with the market interest rate gains from using the optimal contract relative to simpler mortgages are the biggest for those who face more income variability buy pricey houses given their income level or make little or no down payment our model thus may help to explain a high concentration of option arms among riskier borrowers jel g20 g21 g33

adverse selection in a model of real estate lending we provide a rationale for the presence of points in mortgage loan contracts our analysis builds on two key features first insurance markets are unavailable for labor income second the due on sale clause allows banks to offer loan contracts which partially insure against fluctuations in labor income if explicit prepayment penalties are prohibited by law points serve effectively as prepayment penalties we also examine environments where such penalties are not prohibited and show that points will be used if interest rates cannot depend on the size of the loan conventional home mortgage contracts contain a vast array of contingent clauses the most controversial of these is the due on sale clause that gives the lender the contractual right to declare the loan fully payable if all or part of the mortgaged property is sold dunn and spatt 1985 argue that the due on sale clause can provide insurance to the borrower they consider an environment where individuals face uninsurable risk in their income if incomes are high when borrowers move they will prefer a contract which imposes a prepayment penalty when they sell their property in return for a subsidy perhaps in the form of lower interest rates when they stay dunn and spatt characterize the optimal contract when the income of borrowers is unobservable to the lender however all borrowers are ex ante identical in this paper we examine a market where individuals differ in the riskiness of their potential gains from selling their property if this information is private to the borrower the kind of insurance arrangement described above must be modified to deal with the obvious selection problems that arise any lender must therefore ensure that any insurance contract offered to individuals with riskier income streams does not offer so much insurance at such a favorable price that individuals with less risky income also accept the same contract the classic analysis of this type of problem is by rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and our analysis follows theirs in order to focus attention on the nature of the adverse selection problem we assume two types of individuals both types have the same expected income stream for simplicity we assume that type i individuals do not

time consistent health insurance currently available health insurance contracts often fail to insure long term illnesses sick people can suffer large increases in premiums or denial of coverage i describe insurance contracts that solve this problem their key feature is a severance payment a person who is diagnosed with a long term illness and whose premiums are increased receives a lump sum equal to the increased present value of premiums this lump sum allows him or her to pay the higher premiums required by any insurer people are not tied to a particular insurer or a group and the improvement is free insurance companies can operate at zero economic profits and consumers can pay exactly the same premium they do with standard contracts

the effects of regulating hidden add on costs we examine the welfare effects of price and disclosure regulation in a model where firms can shroud add on costs such as penalty fees for consumer financial products such regulation can increase or decrease welfare even when there are no direct costs there are however strong complementarities between price controls and disclosure mandates conditional on disclosure being mandated price controls always weakly increase welfare and conditional on prices being sufficiently constrained disclosure mandates always weakly increase welfare

consumer default credit reporting and borrowing constraints why do negative credit events lead to long term borrowing constraints exploiting banking regulations in peru and utilizing currency movements we show that consumers who face a credit rating downgrade due to bad luck experience a three year reduction in financing consumers respond to the shock by paying down their most troubled loans but nonetheless end up more likely to exit the credit market for a set of borrowers who experience severe delinquency we find that the associated credit reporting downgrade itself accounts for 25 to 65 of their observed decline in borrowing at various horizons over the following several years

the role of commitment in dynamic contracts evidence from life insurance we use data on life insurance contracts to study the properties of long term contracts in a world where buyers cannot commit to a contract the data are especially suited to test a theory of dynamic contracting since they include information on the entire proele of future premiums all the patterns in the data et the theoretical predictions of a model with symmetric learning and one sided com

individual expectations limited rationality and aggregate outcomes recent studies suggest that the type of strategic environment or expectation feedback can have a large impact on whether the market can learn the rational fundamental price we present an experiment where the fundamental price experiences large unexpected shocks markets with negative expectation feedback strategic substitutes quickly converge to the new fundamental while markets with positive expectation feedback strategic complements do not converge but show underreaction in the short run and overreaction in the long run a simple evolutionary selection model of individual learning explains these differences in aggregate outcomes

tests of the rational expectations hypothesis this paper reviews evidence on the structure of anticipation from a number of empirical studies jack muth s rational expectations hypothesis is compared with a variety of alternative models including ferber s law the implicit expectations model of edwin mills and muth s new errors in the variables model the cumulative evidence is of such strength as to compel the suspension of belief in the concept of rational expectations this implies that it is a mistake to proceed under the maintained hypothesis that expectations are rational instead it is necessary to test the sensitivity of empirical and theoretical results to alternative assumptions about the structure by which anticipations are generated copyright 1986 by american economic association

racetrack betting and informed behavior abstract horse racing data permit interesting tests of attitudes toward risk the present paper studies a new sample of racetrack results from atlantic city new jersey the questions examined are 1 are the market odds the best data for predicting the order of finish 2 do horses go off at odds that reflect their true probability of winning 3 is there any evidence that late bettors have better information than early bettors it is found that market odds predict the order of finish well but that favorites are good bets and long shots are poor ones the data suggest that there does exist an informed class of bettors and that bettors are on the whole neither risk neutral nor risk averse

risk based pricing and the enhancement of mortgage credit availability among underserved and higher credit risk populations this paper estimates an option based hazard model of the competing risks of fha mortgage termination results indicate that the elevated default risks of loans originated among lower credit quality and minority borrowers are more than offset by the damped prepayment speeds of those loans so as to result in markedly lower loan termination probabilities among underserved borrower groups those damped termination risks translate into sizable reductions in risk premia to investors in simulated lower creditquality mortgage pools empirical findings suggest that such pooling and risk based pricing of fha insured mortgages could serve to substantially reduce housing finance costs among underserved borrowers so as to advance both their homeownership opportunities and related federal housing policy objectives

an examination of the determinants of biased behaviour in a market for state contingent claims we develop a model to explain the differential incidence of the favourite longshot bias in parallel sectors of the pari mutuel horserace betting market hypotheses are derived from the model and these are tested using uk data to explore the origins of the bias significant variations in the bias are discovered between market sectors on and off racetrack these results shed light on competing demand side explanations for the favourite longshot bias and suggest that it is affected by a combination of behavioural and operational features of the markets and the types of bettors informed and leisure which they attract

subprime mortgage default abstract this paper constructs a reduced form credit risk model of mortgage default the data used is of privately securitized subprime arms adjustable rate mortgages originated between 1997 and 2008 and observed between 2000 and 2009 the period studied thus encompasses the beginning of the subprime crisis given the estimated model contractual properties of the loans are then used to infer the market price of default risk for the various quarters of origination it is empirically determined that a change in the inherent nature of borrowers led to a deterioration in their default performance a change which can be first detected in late 2004 on the other hand the evidence also indicates that the secondary mortgage market became aware of this change at about this same time the large rise in defaults in 2007 cannot therefore be attributed to any surprise other than the unexpectedly large fall in housing prices

commercial loan borrower s optimal borrowing and prepayment decisions under uncertainty we model a firm which faces continuing stochastic money needs and fluctuating interest rates the borrower minimizes the expected present value of the sum of interest payments and prepayment penalty costs subject to a liquidity constraint since contingent opportunities are absent from the model we find i the firm should not inventory cash ii the firm should prepay the maximum amount possible if it prepays at all

information learning and expectations in an experimental model economy the experimental learning to forecast literature finds that subjects use simple linear backward looking models when forecasting in environments with little to no inout the economic framework we study the formation of expectations in a laboratory economy of monopolistic firms and labour unions with almost complete knowledge of the model we observe simple backward looking rules but also a considerable share of model based expectations using information on the economic structure at least for some subjects expectations are informed by theory as in the previous literature we find individual prediction rules to be heterogeneous

reducing the impact of real estate foreclosures with amortizing participation mortgages we employ amortizing participation mortgage apm to offer a novel ex post renegotiation method of a foreclosure apm belongs to the family of home loan credit facilities advocated in the dodd frank wall street reform and consumer protection act 2010 in our framework apms reduce the endemic agency costs of debt by improving affordability these benefits increase the demand for real estate in bust times and reduce fragility of the financial system thereby preventing foreclosures we evaluate apms in a stochastic control framework and provide solutions for an optimal amortization schedule we generalize our approach to partially amortizing and commercial mortgages which encompass balloon payments finally we provide concrete numerical examples of home loan modifications we also offer detailed sensitivity analysis to market parameters such as house price volatility and interest rates

equilibrium subprime lending this paper develops an equilibrium model of a subprime mortgage market our goal is to offer a benchmark with which the recent subprime boom and bust can be compared the model is tractable and delivers plausible orders of magnitude for borrowing capacities as well as default and trading intensities we offer simple explanations for several phenomena in the subprime market such as the prevalence of teaser rates and the clustering of defaults in our model both nondiversifiable and diversifiable income risks reduce debt capacities thus debt capacities need not be higher when a larger fraction of income risk is diversifiable

till mortgage do us part mortgage switching costs and household s bank switching abstract we investigate the role of mortgage switching costs in shaping the households decision to change their main bank to this end we use a unique panel dataset that enables us to infer household s bank switching in conjunction with a legal reform that exogenously slashed down the mortgage switching costs the empirical evidence which survives to a variety of robustness checks supports the hypothesis that the explicit switching costs in the retail banking market are a weighty factor in shaping households bank switching despite any potential informational lock in dissecting the results we show that the effects of the reform were not uniform across households the more educated households those with a longer or broader relationship with their previous bank and those residing in ex ante less competitive banking markets were at the forefront of the wave of bank switching