asymmetric information and middleman margins an experiment with indian potato farmers west bengal potato farmers cannot directly access wholesale markets and do not knowwholesale prices local middlemen earn large margins pass through from wholesale to farmgate prices is negligible when we informed farmers in randomly chosen villages about wholesale prices average farmgate sales and prices were unaffected but pass through to farmgate prices increased these results can be explained by a model where farmers bargain ex post with village middlemen with the outside option of selling to middlemen outside the village they are inconsistent with standard oligopolistic models of pass through search frictions or risk sharing contracts

procedural unfair wage differentials and their effects on unethical behavior in this paper we investigate how payment procedures that are deemed unfair can spur unethical behavior towards innocent coworkers in a real effort experiment in our discrimination treatment a highly unfair payment procedure with wage differentials half the workforce is randomly selected and paid by relative performance whereas the remaining receives no payment a joy of destruction game measures unethical behavior subsequently non earners in discrimination destroy significantly more than in the non discriminatory control treatments in discrimination unethical behavior is generally high for all non earners independent of individual inequality aversion and relative performance beliefs in the control treatments inequality aversion is the main driver of destructive behavior

a glimpse through the veil of ignorance equality of opportunity and support for redistribution abstract this study is an experimental investigation into preference for redistribution of income it had been hypothesized that belief in equality of opportunity in a society diminishes support for the welfare state this could potentially explain the low taxes and social benefits in the united states vis a vis europe to verify this hypothesis participants in an experiment were assigned different probabilities of winning and matched in groups of four next before finding out who would actually win they selected preferred transfers to be paid by the winners to the group as a whole it was found that the average transfers were about 20 lower in the sessions in which winning was determined by performance in a task rather than by sheer luck this difference cannot be explained by overconfidence in predicting own score it corroborates the conjecture that perceived determinants of success i e whether poverty results from laziness or bad luck affect the support for redistribution on the other hand greater inequality of opportunity measured simply by dispersion of probabilities of winning within a group did not lead to higher transfers

marketed surplus under risk do peasants agree with sandmo using a newly defined notion of aversion to income risk the behavior of the marketed surplus producer under price risk is characterized unlike the familiar case first examined by sandmo output depends on both ordinal preferences for goods and on risk attitudes conditions are found that yield an output level under risk that is smaller than under certainty if these conditions do not hold both risk and risk aversion may have a positive effect on output implications for econometric studies of risk attitudes are considered and illustrated with an example finally we examine the effect of uncertainty on the peasant s long run equilibrium

dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains evidence from ecuador we study the dynamics of smallholder participation in export value chains focusing on the example of small scale broccoli producers in the highlands of ecuador combining cross sectional data from a household survey with 11 year longitudinal data on export market transactions we explain the hazards of dropping out of a high value export chain we apply a multispell cox duration model that allows us to consider multiple entries and exits from the supply chain we also provide evidence on the welfare impacts associated with participation the results suggest that small scale farmers exit from the export sector is accelerated by high transaction risks experienced in the past while we find no particular evidence for the exclusion of small scale farmers from the export sector we do find that poorer households and female headed households tend to drop out faster especially as long as the sector is still prospering finally when considering welfare effects we do not find evidence that participation translates into tangible benefits for broccoli farmers we discuss some measures that could help improve the long term sustainability of smallholder integration in high value chains

inequality fairness and social capital we study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness and its separate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful in a controlled economic experiment we find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on social interactions probing the boundaries of this effect we document that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context if a well off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse off person then we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate moreover our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro social attitudes the successful are always more generous groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least generous in the trust game

suspicious success cheating inequality acceptance and political preferences abstract supporters of left wing parties typically place more emphasis on redistributive policies than right wing voters i investigate whether this difference in tolerating inequality is affected by suspicious success achievements that may arise from cheating using a laboratory experiment i exogenously vary cheating opportunities for stakeholders who work on a real effort task and earn money according to their self reported performances an impartial spectator is able to redistribute the earnings between the stakeholders although it is not possible to detect cheating i find that the opportunity to cheat leads to different views on whether to accept inequality left wing spectators substantially reduce inequality when cheating is possible while the treatment has no significant effect on choices of right wing spectators since neither differences in beliefs nor differences in norms about cheating can explain this finding it seems to be driven by a difference in redistributive preferences these results suggest that views on redistribution will diverge even more once public awareness increases that inequality may be to a certain extent created by cheating

contract farming and smallholder incentives to produce high quality experimental evidence from the vietnamese dairy sector in emerging markets for high value food products in developing countries processing companies search for efficient ways to source raw material of high quality one widely embraced approach is contract farming but relatively little is known about the appropriate design of financial incentives in a small farm context we use the example of the vietnamese dairy sector to analyze the effectiveness of existing contracts between a processor and smallholder farmers in terms of incentivizing the production of high quality milk a framed field experiment is conducted to evaluate the impact of two incentive instruments a price penalty for low quality and a bonus for consistent high quality milk on farmers investment in quality improving inputs statistical analysis suggests that the penalty drives farmers into higher input use resulting in better output quality the bonus payment generates even higher quality milk we also find that input choice levels depend on farmers socio economic characteristics such as wealth while individual risk preferences seem to be less important implications for the design of contracts with smallholders are discussed

how private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions fail the case of juhocukor a s the enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities contracts can be enforced through a variety of mechanisms both public and private however in many developing and transitional countries these public institutions are either absent or ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement under such conditions private enforcement mechanisms may provide a suitable replacement for public enforcement institutions this may be done externally through a third party or internally through self enforcing agreements this paper analyzes the use of self enforcing arrangements or internal private enforcement mechanisms using a case study of an agri business in a transition economy juhocukor a s a slovakian sugar processor we show that the use of internal private contract enforcement mechanisms can have a significant positive effect on output and efficiency for both partners to the exchange transaction in an environment characterized by the absence or ineffectiveness of public enforcement institutions 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the flipside of comparative payment schemes comparative payment schemes and tournament style promotion mechanisms are pervasive in the workplace we test experimentally whether they have a negative impact on people s willingness to cooperate participants first perform in a simple task and then participate in a public goods game the payment scheme for the task varies across treatment groups compared with a piece rate scheme individuals in a winner takes all competition are significantly less cooperative in the public goods game a lottery treatment where the winner is decided by luck has the same effect in a competition treatment with feedback winners cooperate as little as participants in the other treatments whereas losers cooperate even less all three treatments lead to substantial losses in the realised social surplus from the public good while having no significant impact on performance in a complementary experiment we aim to shed light on the psychological mechanisms behind our results data as supplemental material are available

just luck an experimental study of risk taking and fairness choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society this paper reports the results of the first experiment to our knowledge to study fairness views about risk taking specifically whether such views are based chiefly on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes we find that even though many participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities most favor some redistribution ex post many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices these findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators

money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators abstract this paper presents the results of an experiment in oxford where relative standing can be improved by randomly chosen dictators only by reducing burning the money of the coplayers at a cost to themselves almost 50 of the subjects engage in money burning and 75 of burners appear rank egalitarian

farmer participation in supermarket channels production technology and efficiency the case of vegetables in kenya supermarkets are gaining ground in agrifood systems of many developing countries while recent research has analyzed income effects in the small farm sector impacts on productivity and efficiency have hardly been studied we use a meta frontier approach and combine this with propensity score matching to estimate treatment effects among vegetable farmers in kenya participation in supermarket channels increases farm productivity in terms of meta technology ratios by 45 we also find positive and significant impacts on technical efficiency and scale efficiency supermarket expansion therefore presents opportunities for agricultural growth in the small farm sector which is crucial for poverty reduction in africa copyright 2012 oxford university press

resource scarcity and antisocial behavior abstract this paper examines whether exposure to persistent resource scarcity on the commons affects pastoralists readiness to engage in antisocial behavior towards their fellow commons users the region under study is divided into two areas according to exogenous variations in biomass production stemming from geological peculiarities we conducted a joy of destruction game with pastoralists from both areas and provide evidence for a positive relationship between antisocial behavior and long term exposure to scarcity antisocial behavior among villagers occurs twice as often in an area where resources are scarcer and competitive pressure is higher our results remain robust to the inclusion of various controls including beliefs socio demographics absolute and relative income and within group inequality if one interprets decreasing another participant s payoff below one s own as a tendency towards conflict behavior our results suggest a higher risk of conflict among resource users in areas of greater scarcity

contract enforcement social efficiency and distribution some experimental evidence we use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration we find that if a third party e g government perfectly enforces contracts social efficiency is enhanced we also find that when third party enforcement is imperfect social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts however opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers growers with ex post profits below reservation levels finally partial or one sided third party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects ability to use informal enforcement instruments

does africa need a rotten kin theorem experimental evidence from village economies this paper measures the economic impact of social pressure to share income with kin and neighbors in rural kenyan villages the authors conduct a lab experiment in which they randomly vary the observability of investment returns the goal is to test whether subjects reduce their income in order to keep it hidden the analysis finds that women adopt an investment strategy that conceals the size of their initial endowment in the experiment although that strategy reduces their expected earnings this effect is largest among women with relatives attending the experiment parameter estimates suggest that women behave as though they expect to be pressured to share four percent of their observable income with others and substantially more when close kin can observe income directly although this paper provides experimental evidence from a single african country observational studies suggest that similar pressure from kin may be prevalent in many rural areas throughout sub saharan africa

integrity for hire an analysis of a widespread customs reform abstract can governments improve bureaucratic performance by hiring integrity from the private sector in the past 2 decades a number of developing countries have hired private firms to conduct preshipment inspections of imports generating independent data on the value and tariff classification of incoming shipments i find that countries implementing such inspection programs subsequently experience large increases in import duty collections by contrast the growth rate of other tax revenues does not change appreciably additional evidence suggests that declines in falsification of import documentation are behind the import duty improvements the programs also lead to declines in undervaluation and misreporting of goods classifications historically this hired integrity appears to have been cost effective with improvements in import duty collections in the first 5 years of a typical inspection program amounting to 2 6 times the program s costs

contract farming smallholders and rural development in latin america the organization of agroprocessing firms and the scale of outgrower production abstract this paper demonstrates how contract farming functions as an economic institution and explores the causes of the observed variation in the scale of outgrower production in latin america we outline how market imperfections and transaction costs influence the decision of agroprocessing firms to contract out vertically integrate or use spot markets to obtain raw product the paper demonstrates how market conditions are likely to be associated with particular outgrower characteristics under contract farming an analysis of the mexican frozen vegetable industry illustrates determinants of successful and unsuccessful small scale contracting and suggests alternative policies to promote contract farming with smallholders

do non strategic sanctions obey the law of demand the demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism abstract the prospect of receiving a monetary sanction for free riding has been shown to increase contributions to public goods we ask whether the impulse to punish is unresponsive to the cost to the punisher or whether like other preferences it interacts with prices to generate a conventional demand curve in a series of experiments we randomly vary the cost of reducing the earnings of other group members following voluntary contribution decisions in our design new groups are formed after each interaction and no subject faces any other more than once so there is no strategic reason to punish we nonetheless find significant levels of punishment and we learn that both price and the extent to which the recipient s contribution is below the group mean are significant determinants of the quantity of punishment demanded moreover punishment is mainly directed at free riders even when it costs nothing to the punisher

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

is increasing inequality harmful experimental evidence abstract increasing inequality is commonly associated with social unrest and conflict between social classes this paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment to study the implications of greater inequality on the tendency to burn others income the experiment considers an environment where higher earnings in a real effort task are typically associated with higher effort and varies how fair and transparent this relationship is the findings indicate that greater inequality does not lead to more money burning itself rather it depends on whether the increase in inequality can be unequivocally attributed to exerted effort i e the fairness of the income generating process only if greater inequality can be the result of morally questionable activities subjects engage in substantially more money burning while most income burning aims at reducing inequality the fairness of inequality only plays a role in the extent of money burning but not so much for the qualitative burning patterns

oligopsony power asset specificity and hold up evidence from the broiler industry in this article we look for empirical evidence of hold up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross sectional national survey of broiler growers first we focus on the problem of under investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent s grower s under investment systematically depends on the principal s integrator s market power and the level of asset specificity second we provide an indirect test of hold up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal s market power the results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold up

luck choice and responsibility an experimental study of fairness views this is a pre copyedited author produced pdf of an article accepted for publication in journal of public economics following peer review

how does risk management influence production decisions evidence from a field experiment weather is a key source of income risk especially in emerging market economies this paper uses a randomized controlled trial involving indian farmers to study how an innovative rainfall insurance product affects production decisions the authors find that insurance provision induces farmers to invest more in higher return but rainfall sensitive cash crops particularly among educated farmers this shift in behavior occurs ex ante when realized monsoon rainfall is still uncertain the results suggest that financial innovation can mitigate the real effects of uninsured production risk

techno economic and environmental analysis of power generation expansion plan of ghana this paper examines the current electrical generation expansion plan of ghana and compares it with proposed expansion pathways with higher penetration of renewable energy technologies an adaptation of schwartz s scenario methodology was used to develop the scenarios which were then analysed using the long range alternatives planning leap model each of the scenarios represents policy options for generation expansion in ghana up to 2040 energy economic and environmental analysis of the three alternative scenarios compared to the base scenarios was undertaken sensitivity results show that if the country were to follow the generation expansion path described in the renewable energy scenarios it could reap economic benefits of 0 5 13 23 depending on the developments in fuel prices and renewable technology capital cost the analysis further quantifies benefits to be derived from a reduction in greenhouse gases of the scenarios policy implications for the generation system of ghana based on the results are also discussed

on price risk and the inverse farm size productivity relationship abstract the oft observed inverse relationship between farm size and productivity has elicited several explanations having important policy and theoretical implications using advances in the analysis of price risk effects on producer behavior and a simple two period model of an agricultural household that both produces and consumes under price uncertainty at the time labor allocation decisions are made this paper demonstrates analytically that a non degenerate land distribution and price risk can together produce an inverse relationship even absent any of the more common explanations empirical evidence from madagascar confirms the plausibility of this intuitive explanation for the phenomenon

the moral costs of nastiness we introduce two variants of the one shot joy of destruction minigame mini jod two players are endowed with the same amount of money they simultaneously decide whether or not to reduce the payoff of the other player at an own cost in one treatment there was a probability that nature would destroy the opponent s money anyway we test whether this feature reduces the moral costs of being nasty and find that destruction rates rise significantly despite the absence of strategic reasons

why do small scale producers choose to produce under contract lessons from nontraditional vegetable exports from zimbabwe summary this article explores the motivations behind the decision of small scale producers to grow nontraditional vegetables under contract for export based on a survey of small scale producers in zimbabwe four factors are identified as motivating contracting namely market uncertainty indirect benefits e g knowledge acquisition income benefits and intangible benefits respondents are clustered according to the relative importance of these factors in their contracting decision four clusters are identified and related to the characteristics of these farmers including size of the farm amount of land devoted to export crops access to alternative markets and the proportion of family income derived from export crops the results suggest that there are systematic differences between farmers in their decisions to contract which needs to be recognized in contract design and management 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

how high are rates of return to fertilizer evidence from field experiments in kenya the idea that peasant farmers are rational profit maximizers has been a staple of development economics since theodore schultz 1964 it has also been influential in shaping policy for example agricultural experts have stressed the importance of fertilizer use in raising agricultural yields pointing to impressive results on experimental farms and to huge differences in agricultural productivity across countries with different levels of fertilizer use robert evenson and douglas gollin 2003 historically many countries subsidized fertilizer in response but economists have been skeptical of claims that farmers are leaving money on the table noting that fertilizer may not have the same returns on real world farms as on experimental farms that returns to fertilizer may be low for many farmers even if they are high on average tavneet suri 2007 that fertilizer may require complementary inputs or may be risky many countries have withdrawn or scaled back fertilizer psychology and development theory and experimental evidence

measuring unfair in equality abstract this paper shows one way of generalizing the standard framework of inequality measurement to allow for a distinction between fair and unfair inequalities we introduce the unfairness lorenz curve and the unfairness gini which are generalizations of the standard versions of the lorenz curve and the gini with this more general framework in place we study the implications of responsibility sensitive theories of justice for the evaluation of the income distribution in norway from 1986 to 2005 we find that both the pre tax and the post tax income distributions have become less fair in norway even though the standard gini for the pre tax income distribution has decreased in the same period two trends explain this development the increase in income share of the top percentile and the change in the situation of females in the labor market the concentration of income at the top of the distribution contributes both to increased unfairness and increased inequality whereas the increase in females working hours and level of education primarily contributes to a reduction in inequality thus the latter effect dominates for the standard gini and the former effect for the unfairness gini furthermore we find that the increase in post tax unfairness is even larger than the increase in pre tax unfairness which shows that the tax system in norway contributes less to eliminating unfairness in 2005 than in 1986

nudging farmers to use fertilizer theory and experimental evidence from kenya we model farmers as facing small fixed costs of purchasing fertil izer and assume some are stochastically present biased and not fully sophisticated about this bias such farmers may procrastinate post poning fertilizer purchases until later periods when they may be too impatient to purchase fertilizer consistent with the model many farmers in western kenya fail to take advantage of apparently profit able fertilizer investments but they do invest in response to small time limited discounts on the cost of acquiring fertilizer free deliv ery just after harvest calibration suggests that this policy can yield higher welfare than either laissez faire policies or heavy subsidies

reforms globalization and endogenous agricultural structures in this paper i draw lessons from two quasi natural experiments the transition process in former communist countries and the rapid globalization of food chains on the optimality of farms and agricultural structures more generally i argue that a the farm structures that have emerged from the transition process are much more diverse than expected ex ante b this diversity is to an important extent determined by economic mechanisms which are influenced by initial conditions eg technology and reform policies c non traditional farm structures have played an important role during transition since they were optimal to address the specific institutional and structural constraints imposed by the transition process d there is more diversity than often argued in the farms that are integrated in global food chains e endogenous institutional contracting innovations in food chains may lock existing farm structures in a long run institutional framework and f indicators based on farm structures are not a good measure of welfare effects of the globalization of food chains

how private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions the enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities contracts can be enforced through a variety of mechanisms both public and private however in many developing and transitional countries these public institutions are either absent or ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement under such conditions private enforcement mechanisms may provide a suitable replacement for public enforcement institutions this may be done externally through a third party or internally through self enforcing agreements this paper analyzes the use of self enforcing arrangements or internal private enforcement mechanisms using a case study of an agri business in a transition economy juhocukor a s a slovakian sugar processor we show that the use of internal private contract enforcement mechanisms can have a significant positive effect on output and efficiency for both partners to the exchange transaction in an environment characterized by the absence or ineffectiveness of public enforcement institutions

the food system transformation in developing countries a disaggregate demand analysis for fruits and vegetables in vietnam abstract food systems in developing countries are currently undergoing a rapid transformation towards high value products and modern supply chains while supply side aspects of this transformation have been analyzed previously issues of consumer demand have received much less attention this article analyses demand patterns for fresh fruits and vegetables in vietnam using household survey data and a demand systems approach demand for products from modern supply chains particularly supermarkets and non traditional imports is highly income elastic and the income effect is stronger than the impact of prices and supermarket penetration this highlights the importance of considering demand side aspects when projecting future trends our results imply a continued restructuring of the food sector in the further process of economic development

finding missing markets and a disturbing epilogue evidence from an export crop adoption and marketing intervention in kenya in much of the developing world many farmers grow crops for local or personal consumption despite export options that appear to be more profitable thus many conjecture that one or several markets are missing this paper reports on a randomized controlled trial conducted by drumnet in kenya that attempts to help farmers adopt and market export crops drumnet provides smallholder farmers with information about how to switch to export crops makes in kind loans for the purchase of the agricultural inputs and provides marketing services by facilitating the transaction with exporters the experimental evaluation design randomly assigns pre existing farmer self help groups to one of three groups 1 a treatment group that receives all drumnet services 2 a treatment group that receives all drumnet services except credit or 3 a control group after one year drumnet services led to an increase in production of export oriented crops and lower marketing costs this translated into household income gains for new adopters however one year after the study ended the exporter refused to continue buying the cash crops from the farmers because the conditions of the farms did not satisfy european export requirements drumnet collapsed in this region as farmers were forced to sell to middlemen and defaulted on their loans the risk of such events may explain at least partly why many seemingly more profitable export crops are not adopted

the impact of interfirm relationships on investment evidence from the polish dairy sector abstract financial constraints and credit market imperfections are a major constraint on investment growth and poverty reduction in transition and developing countries this paper analyses the impact on investments of financial assistance programs as part of interfirm relationships our empirical evidence is based on a two stage survey methodology qualitative evidence on dairy companies assistance programs was gathered in the first stage through in depth interviews at the level of the dairy companies quantitative data on 290 milk producing rural households in poland was collected through a random survey in the second stage the empirical analysis shows that dairy companies have played an important role in financial assistance in particular for dairy specific investments in addition they had an important indirect impact on farm activities and investments through feed supply and loan guarantee programs

signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice we consider extensions of games where some players have the option of signaling future actions by incurring costs the main result is that in a class of games if one player can incur costs then forwards induction selects her most preferred outcome surprisingly the player does not have to incur any costs to achieve this the option alone suffices however when all players can incur costs one player s attempt to signal a future action is vulnerable to a counter signal by the opponent this vulnerability to counter signaling distinguishes signaling future actions from signaling types

agrifood industry transformation and small farmers in developing countries summary this article introduces this special issue on the rapid transformation of the agrifood industry in developing countries and its effects on small farmers we review the literature from the late 1980s to the present and find evidence first of food processing then retail transformation and mixed evidence of impacts on small farmers both inclusion particularly with resource providing contracts and exclusion sometimes from scale constraint sometimes from inadequate non land assets the special issue papers contribute to the debate by confirming the mix of cases of inclusion and exclusion the cases are main in horticulture and dairy key hopes for smallholder development

the long term forecast of taiwan s energy supply and demand leap model application abstract the long term forecasting of energy supply and demand is an extremely important topic of fundamental research in taiwan due to taiwan s lack of natural resources dependence on energy imports and the nation s pursuit of sustainable development in this article we provide an overview of energy supply and demand in taiwan and a summary of the historical evolution and current status of its energy policies as background to a description of the preparation and application of a long range energy alternatives planning system leap model of taiwan s energy sector the taiwan leap model is used to compare future energy demand and supply patterns as well as greenhouse gas emissions for several alternative scenarios of energy policy and energy sector evolution results of scenarios featuring business as usual policies aggressive energy efficiency improvement policies and on schedule retirement of taiwan s three existing nuclear plants are provided and compared along with sensitivity cases exploring the impacts of lower economic growth assumptions a concluding section provides an interpretation of the implications of model results for future energy and climate policies in taiwan

impact of third party contract enforcement in agricultural markets a field experiment in vietnam we study the effect of alleviating the information asymmetry regarding product quality that is widespread in contracts between agricultural producers and buyers in developing countries opportunistic buyers may underreport quality levels to farmers to reduce the price that they have to pay in response farmers may curb investment thereby negatively affecting farm productivity in an experiment we entitle randomly selected smallholder dairy farmers in vietnam who are contracted by a large company to independently verify milk testing results results indicate that treatment farmers use 12 more inputs and they also increase their output significantly some wider research and policy implications are discussed

last place aversion evidence and redistributive implications we present evidence from laboratory experiments showing that individuals are last place averse participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution in modified dictator games participants randomly placed in second to last place are the most likely to give money to the person one rank above them instead of the person one rank below last place aversion suggests that low income individuals might oppose redistribution because it could differentially help the group just beneath them using survey data we show that individuals making just above the minimum wage are the most likely to oppose its increase similarly in the general social survey those above poverty but below median income support redistribution significantly less than their background characteristics would predict jel codes h23 d31 c91