a dynamic tiebout theory of voluntary vs involuntary provision of public goods this paper considers a dynamic model of tiebout like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods at issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time we model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated sequential location decisions over one of two communities each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods the first is one in which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community the second is a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by a majority vote opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation of public capital the markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied our main result shows that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state individuals locational choices eventually select the involuntary provision mechanism this holds despite the fact that unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a nash equilibrium of the static game each period we also describe conditions under which voluntary provision survives these conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to decrease wealth dispersion over time the results are shown to be consistent with findings relating inequality to school choice

preserving religious identity through education economic analysis and evidence from the us abstract this paper models the decision of religious parents to send their children to private religious schools as reflecting their desire to shield their children from external influences and thus preserve their religious identity it follows that when the share of the minority in the local population grows and outside influences become less threatening the demand for separate religious schooling among the members of the religious group decreases this pattern implies concavity in the relationship between enrollment in private and religious schooling and the share of the religious group in the population we present empirical evidence from united states county data on catholic and private school enrollment that strongly supports our theory the paper contributes to a better understanding of the demand for religious education

bargaining enforcement and multilateral sanctions when is cooperation counterproductive scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use however previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation this puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation in this article i test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using james fearon s 1998 breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion the empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail their failure is due to enforcement not bargaining problems without the support of an international organization cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time without institutional support cooperation is worse than useless it is counterproductive this result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant

divestment investment sanctions and disinvestment an evaluation of anti apartheid policy instruments pressure for divestment and mandatory disinvestment sanctions directed against south africa are an instance of domestic interest groups in one country seeking policy change in another the link from shareholder divestment to disinvestment by firms is tenuous however since south africa active firms do not seem to suffer as a consequence of divestment pressure and legislated sanctions are likely to have unpredictable and sometimes perverse effects on the extent of apartheid practices

public provision of private child goods abstract this paper analyzes the public provision of private goods for children in a politico economic model with endogenous fertility the government provides every child with goods that can also be purchased by parents in private markets and the level of provision is determined by majority rule households with many children benefit from the public provision more than those with fewer children thus a political conflict arises between them the distribution of the number of children across households which is a crucial factor for determining which group is politically dominant is endogenously determined by households fertility decision the sequential interaction between fertility and political decisions might lead to multiple equilibria equilibrium with high fertility and low private public spending ratio and equilibrium with low fertility and high private public spending ratio our model could explain the large differences in fertility and structure of child related spending across countries

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

why do different countries choose a different public private mix of educational services we observe a wide range across countries in the percentage of total enrollments that attend private rather than public schools this paper seeks to explain 1 the systematically higher proportion of private enrollments pvt in developing as compared with developed countries at the secondary level and 2 the seemingly random variation across countries within a given level of education and stage of development i argue that the latter is due to differentiated demand and nonprofit supply both of which stem from cultural heterogeneity especially religious heterogeneity in contrast the large pvt at the secondary level in developing countries is hypothesized to stem from limited public spending which creates an excess demand from people who would prefer to use the public schools but are involuntarily excluded and pushed into the private sector the limited public spending on secondary education in turn is modelled as a collective decision which is strongly influenced by the

education and propaganda tradeoffs to public education provision in nondemocracies abstract nondemocratic regimes face a tradeoff when investing in public education education promotes human capital acquisition expanding the tax base yet it also enhances political sophistication and participation at a cost to nondemocratic regimes to relax this tradeoff a regime can disseminate propaganda through its education system i show that even bayesian citizens can be influenced by propaganda by deterring political opposition propaganda can induce nondemocracies to invest in education when they otherwise would not improving social welfare when propaganda is too strong however it can generate a backlash using cross country and survey data i find evidence consistent with the predictions

do pensions foster education an empirical perspective the paper examines the effect of population ageing on public education spending on the one hand ageing is expected to have a negative effect on education as an increasing number of retirees resu

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

cheap children and the persistence of poverty this paper develops a theory of fertility that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty within and across countries if educated individuals have a comparative advantage in raising educated children then parental fertility choice is shown to give rise to a poverty trap in which the poor choose high fertility rates with low investment in child quality moreover the impact of child quality choice on economic performance is amplified by the diluting effect of higher fertility on physical capital accumulation the theory proposes insights regarding the effects of inequality globalisation and life expectancy on economic growth and demographic transitions this paper develops a theory of fertility and child educational choice that offers an explanation for the persistence of poverty within and across countries the joint determination of the quality education and quantity of children in a household is studied under the key assumption that individuals productivity as teachers increases with their own human capital in contrast the minimum time cost associated with raising a child regardless of the child s quality the quantity cost is not affected by parental education as a result the price of child quantity relative to the price of child quality increases with individuals wages in particular for low wage individuals for whom the opportunity cost of time is low children of minimal quality are cheap this assumption therefore generates a comparative advantage for the poor in child quantity whereas high wage educated individuals have a comparative advantage in raising quality children consistent with the well known evidence poor households thus choose relatively high fertility rates with relatively low investment in their offspring s education and therefore their offspring are poor as well in contrast high income families choose low fertility rates with high investment in education and therefore high income persists in the dynasty evidence from the us provided by hanushek 1992 suggests that a trade off between quantity and quality of children does indeed exist hanushek argues that movements in family size could explain over half the variance in some test scores and that the elasticity of achievements with respect to the number of children in the family is 0 03 implying that the annual achievement growth of each child in a family will fall about 2 when a second child is added and about 0 5 when a sixth child is added 1

immigration public education spending and private schooling this article examines the impact of immigration on private school enrollment through the mechanism of public education spending it finds that the immigrant share of population raises private school enrollment across countries by leading to a decrease in the share of public education spending the decrease is driven by responses to immigrants from culturally similar and developed countries this suggests that the role of public schools in promoting social cohesion among diverse populations is weighted against other concerns in education funding decisions in places with immigrant populations the endogeneity of immigrant share is accounted for by using an instrument constructed from gravity model estimates

immigration redistribution and universal suffrage the effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated this paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations which are that i immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people s higher levels of xenophobia and that ii immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote since the demand for redistribution depends on the expected gap between median voter income and mean income immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because as non citizens they do not change the median voter s income but as economic stakeholders they do affect the mean income four empirical consequences of i and ii are tested at the individual level evidence from the european values survey in 45 countries confirms ii showing that immigrants expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high in contrast i is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used

international institutions and economic sanctions economic sanctions have long occupied the attention of both scholars and policy makers despite the widespread use of sanctions many observers have concluded that the inherent problems associated with imposing sanctions involving multiple senders substantially limit their effectiveness this article reviews two books that analyze the factors that influence cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions these books indicate that international institutions can do much to promote cooperation of this sort however this essay argues that the extent to which international institutions facilitate cooperation among senders of sanctions is likely to depend on the domestic politics of members the type of institution being used for this purpose the nature of the strategy being pursued and the distribution of power among members although these books make significant contributions to our understanding of the factors that promote cooperation among senders of multilateral sanctions they examine the factors that promote the effectiveness of sanctions in only a peripheral manner one potential influence on the effectiveness of sanctions that are organized by an international institution however is the likelihood that the institution will be captured by member states or by interest groups within them additional research that investigates the conditions under which international institutions are likely to be captured and the implications of institutional capture for their performance may therefore prove useful to scholars of international relations and economic statecraft

income inequality size of government and tax progressivity a positive theory abstract i investigate the relationship between income inequality and the composition of public spending in redistributive policies i extend the meltzer richard model of voting over redistribution allowing voters to choose not only the amount of a uniform lump sum transfer but also the level of provision of a public good the governmental budget is balanced thus these two choices determine the tax rate on labor income the multidimensionality of the policy space implies that there is no condorcet winner i adopt a citizen candidate model of electoral competition to tackle this problem i show that the progressivity of the tax system is increasing in the mean to median income ratio while the size of the government need not be this means that higher income inequality implies a more progressive tax system but in contrast with the traditional analysis it may also result in a smaller size of government such results are consistent with the most recent findings in the empirical literature

power politics and international trade r recent literature attributes the relative scarcity of open international markets to the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade we argue that the prisoner s dilemma representation does not reflect the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in an anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly doing so leads us to two conclusions 1 free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances and 2 alliances are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions if they are embedded in bipolar systems than in multipolar systems using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 we test these hypotheses the results of the analysis make it clear that alliances do have a direct statistically significant and large impact on bilateral trade flows and that this relationship is stronger in bipolar rather than in multipolar systems in the early 1970s students of international relations began what would become a long and heated debate about the political correlates of open international markets recently however an important element of consensus has begun to emerge most contributors to this debate now seem to agree that the prisoner s dilemma structure of state preferences with respect to trade explains the relative dearth of open international markets here we argue that what has become the standard prisoner s dilemma representation neglects the most critical aspect of free trade agreements in the anarchic international system namely their security externalities we consider these external effects explicitly in order to do so we construct and analyze a simple game theoretic model the results of this analysis demonstrate that tariff games between allies differ systematically from those played between actual or potential adversaries these differences imply that free trade is more likely within rather than across political military alliances however our analysis also suggests that the evolutionary prospects of alliances vary those that are the products of bipolar systems are more likely to evolve into free trade coalitions than are their multipolar counterparts less credible exit threats and clearer responsibilities for alliance stability explain the advantage of a bipolar system we test this argument using data drawn from an 80 year period beginning in 1905 the empirical analysis supports our argument it demonstrates that alliances have a direct statistically significant and large effect upon bilateral trade moreover it shows that on average alliances have a much stronger effect on trade in a bipolar than in a multipolar world 2

relying on the private sector the income distribution and public investments in the poor abstract what drives governments with similar revenues to provide very different amounts of goods with private sector substitutes education is a prime example i use exogenous shocks to brazilian municipalities revenue during 1995 2008 generated by non linearities in federal transfer laws to demonstrate two things first municipalities with higher income inequality or higher median income allocate less of a revenue shock to education and are less likely to expand public school enrollment they are more likely to invest in public infrastructure that is broadly enjoyed like parks and roads or to save the shock second i find no evidence that the quality of public education suffers as a result if anything unequal and high income areas are more likely to improve public school inputs and test scores following a revenue shock given their heavy use of private education i further provide evidence that an increase in public sector revenue lowers private school enrollment

simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices abstract i consider a model in which several identical objects are sold simultaneously via an auction and a posted price mechanism the model explains several empirical regularities regarding bidding behavior in ebay auctions such as the finding that some bidders bid multiple times over the course of the auction and that bidders tend to bid with greater frequency near the end of the auction than the beginning i also show that sellers prefer to simultaneously use auctions and posted prices than to use either mechanism individually

bargaining with arrival of new traders we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events which represent arrival of traders or information we char acterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers the possi bility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics there is delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations the seller pay off equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival in applications when buyer valuations fall average prices drop and delay increases surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate

diffusion of a new product under network effects the us dvd market we formulate a model that captures the inter dependence between hardware demand and software supply indirect network effect in the dvd industry the identification of the network effect comes from the difference in software availability across two different formats vhs and dvd we find that a 1 increase in the number of dvd titles raises the demand for dvd players by 0 87 simultaneously a 1 increase in video player ownership leads to a 0 14 increase in the variety of video titles our simulations show that hardware manufacturers might be able to internalize the network externality to increase total industry revenues

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

corruption fertility and human capital abstract we build an overlapping generations model in which reproductive households face a child quantity child quality trade off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital by integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth corruption and fertility choices we show that the negative relation between fertility and economic development may also be affected by differences in the magnitude of bureaucratic corruption

municipal government approaches to service delivery an analysis from a transactions cost perspective municipal governments are less likely to contract out for service delivery if citizen preferences for the service are heterogeneous this conclusion is based on an analysis that extends to the public sector the empirical industrial organization literature on transaction costs and the make or buy decision faced by private firms service delivery practices for sixty three municipal services are examined the findings are consistent with the proposition that the cost for writing and monitoring contracts may be an important consideration in municipal service delivery approach and that bureaucratic supply may not be as inefficient as some previous studies indicate

competition between private and public schools testing stratification and pricing predictions abstract when there are peer effects in education private schools have an incentive to vary tuition to attract relatively able students epple and romano american economic review 88 1 1998 33 develop a general equilibrium model characterizing equilibrium pricing and student selection into schools when peer effects are present the model predicts that competition will lead private schools to give tuition discounts to more able students and that this will give rise to an equilibrium exhibiting stratification by income and ability between the public and private sectors and to a hierarchy of schools within the private sector the model also yields a variety of comparative static predictions the predictions of the model are tested in this paper using a unique data set assembled by figlio and stone research in labor economics 1999 115 tests of equilibrium predictions of the model reveal that the propensity to attend private school increases with both income and ability and among private schools the propensity to attend the highest tuition schools rises with both income and ability within private schools tuition declines with student ability with a substantial number of even high income households paying little or no tuition the correlation between income and ability is greater in public than private schools tests of comparative static predictions of the model reveal that both income and ability become stronger predictors of private school attendance as public school expenditure falls income becomes increasingly important in determining placement in the private school hierarchy as public school expenditure falls discounts to ability in the lowest quality private school decline as public school expenditure rises while discounts to ability in the highest quality private school are little affected by changes in public school expenditure expenditure in private schools rises as expenditure in public schools increases these empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities abstract two features common to many auctions are the use of reserve prices and the existence of secondary markets for the goods being sold even in simple symmetric settings the combination of these features can preclude existence of an equilibrium in symmetric separating bidding strategies with a reserve price sufficiently far below the maximum endogenous valuation a symmetric equilibrium still exists but with some types pooling at the reserve the optimal reserve price depends not only on the joint distribution of bidders information before and after the auction but also on how surplus is divided in the secondary market journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c7 l1 d82

public versus private education when differential fertility matters we assess the merits of different education systems in a framework that accounts for the joint decision problem of parents regarding fertility and education specifically we compare the implications of a public and a private schooling regime for economic growth and inequality we find that private schooling leads to higher growth when there is little inequality in human capital endowments across families in contrast when inequality is high public education yields higher growth by reducing fertility differentials in addition public schooling leads to income convergence while private schooling can result in ever increasing inequality our analysis highlights theimp ortanceof accounting for endogenous fertility differentials when analyzing educational policies

sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers we analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private value auctions for differentiated goods new buyers and new objects may arrive at random times since objects are imperfect substitutes buyers values are not persistent instead each buyer s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from the same in this paper we consider a model of dynamic markets in which buyers and sellers arrive randomly to the market and examine the equilibrium behavior of market participants in response to these arrivals in particular we investigate the role of current and anticipated future market conditions in determining endogenous outside options in this setting we characterize the influence of these outside options on equilibrium price determination and study the manner in which equilibrium payoffs and behavior are affected by both current conditions and future dynamics in our model buyers face an infinite sequence of auctions for heterogeneous but stochastically equivalent objects each buyer s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from a fixed distribution that arrive at random times moreover new buyers probabilistically arrive on the market in each period thus in any given auction buyers are presented with the outside option of participating in a future auction for an imperfectly substituted equivalent object but with a potentially different number of competitors we describe the unique symmetric markov equilibrium of this model by deriving a precise characterization of this option value

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

marketplaces and matching this paper models equilibrium trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated when first visiting the market a buyer samples a stock of goods if fortunate the buyer matches with and purchases one of these goods and then exits the market if an initial match does not exist the buyer can now only match with the flow of new goods for sale the previous stock has been sampled and rejected in a steady state the current stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side it is shown that this market behaviour describes matching patterns between unemployed job seekers and vacancies in uk job centres

das human kapital a theory of the demise of the class structure this paper suggests that the demise of the capitalists workers class structure was a socio economic transformation orchestrated by the capitalists in reaction to the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their profit rates physical capital accumulation in the process of industrialization enhanced the importance of human capital in production and generated incentives for capitalists to support the provision of public education for the masses triggering the demise of the existing class structure the implications of the theory are consistent with the voting patterns on england s education reform of 1902

reconsidering carbon permits auction mechanism an efficient dynamic model one of major concerns for china and developing countries is the new international trade rule concerning carbon emissions which one needs to know its suitable mechanism and the possible implication on china s carbon trading market precisely in an emission and trade scheme an important question is whether the auction outcome is efficient since this is closely related with the economic costs of emissions reduction due to the unique features of carbon permits existing auction mechanisms do not seem to be suitable for their distribution inspired by the t tonnement process this paper proposes a new auction mechanism for them for both practical application and theoretical extension the discrete and continuous situations are examined respectively the result shows that the proposed auction converges to pareto optimal equilibria and that without ties the equilibrium is unique for bidders the straightforward bidding strategy is the most preferred one in the sense that the strategy makes them avoid the risk of loss intuitively the auctioneer s utility is increasing in the number of bidders while bidders pay off is increasing in permits to a certain extent the proposed auction mechanism resolves the confliction between efficiency and revenue in the multi item auction theory while it increases people s understanding for carbon emission auction mechanism design

self interest and public funding of education abstract the objective of this paper is to study whether publicly funded education can emerge as a political and economic equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy in which selfish agents vote for public funding of education the presence of complementarities between capital and labor in the production function implies that by improving the skills of next period s workers public funding of education increases the return on capital as a result savers will support a publicly financed education system in order to enhance their future income a version of the model calibrated using u s data generates large shares of gnp allocated to education hence the non altruistic incentive to support public education is quantitatively important

government spending corruption and economic growth there is considerable debate over the effects of both corruption and government spending on growth but few studies have considered how the interaction between them might affect economic growth this paper provides a contribution to the debate starting wigth an endogenous growth model and extending it to account for the effects of corruption on components of government spending namely military and investment spending it then illustrates the non negligible indirect effects of corruption on military spending and government investment expenditure using model simulations the resulting model is then estimated on a comprehensive panel of 106 countries and the results show that the interactions between corruption and investment and corruption and military spending have strong negative impacts on economic growth the results also indicate important complementarities between corruption and military spending suggesting that combating corruption will not only have direct positive effects but is also likely to have positive indirect effects through reducing the size of the negative impact of the military burden they are also found to be robust across different measures of corruption levels of economic development and groupings of countries this suggests that policies to reduce corruption combined with those to reduce military burdens such as regional security agreements would have a considerable impact on economic growth

the economics of schooling production and efficiency in public schools n recent years public and professional interest in schools has been heightened by a spate of reports many of them critical of current school policy these policy documents have added to persistent and long standing concerns about the cost effectiveness and fairness of the current school structure and have made schooling once again a serious public issue as in the past however any renewed interest in education is likely to be short lived doomed to dissipate as frustration over the inability of policy to improve school practice sets in this frustration about school policy relates directly to knowledge about the educational production process and in turn to underlying research on schools although the educational process has been extensively researched clear policy prescriptions flowing from this research have been difficult to derive 2 there exists however a consistency to the research findings that does have an immediate application to school policy schools differ dramatically in quality

the natalist bias of pollution control for a given technology two ways are available to achieve low polluting emissions reducing production per capita or reducing population size this paper insists on the tension between the former and the latter controlling pollution either through pigovian taxes or through tradable quotas schemes encourages agents to shift away from production to tax free activities such as procreation and leisure this natalist bias will deteriorate the environment further entailing the need to impose ever more stringent pollution rights per person however this will in turn gradually impoverish the successive generations population will tend to increase further and production per capita to decrease as the generations pass one possible solution consists in capping population too

two tier public provision comparing public systems abstract the paper considers a two tier institution in which government provides public services but individuals can opt out of public provision but not taxes funding for the public service is chosen endogenously by majority vote and we first provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority vote equilibrium in line with existing results the equilibrium tax rate usually falls below the one found in a one tier system opting out of public consumption is prohibited as the public system loses the political support of the rich who exit we prove that when the two tier system majority dominates a purely private system a majority in society always welcomes a transition from a one tier public system to a two tier system it is the only system that is stable in an evolutionary sense otherwise a majority consisting of the middle class may be in favor of staying in a one tier system prohibiting exit because of a slippery slope argument

public private mix of health expenditure a political economy and quantitative analysis this paper constructs a simple model to examine decisions on public and private health spending under majority voting in the model agents with heterogeneous incomes choose how much to consume and spend on health care and vote for public health expenditure the health status of an agent is determined by a ces composite of public and private health expenditure the existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium are established a quantitative exercise reveals the importance of the relative effectiveness of public and private health expenditure and their substitutability in determining the public private mix of health expenditure and in accounting for the observed differences across a sample of 22 advanced democratic countries

ends against the middle determining public service provision when there are private alternatives abstract public provision of a service coexists with private market provision the quality of public provision is determined by majority vote preferences are not single peaked owing to the presence of private alternatives we identify two cases in one majority voting equilibrium always exists and the median income voter is pivotal in the other a necessary condition for equilibrium indentifies the pivotal voter who must have income below the median when equilibrium exists a coalition of middle income households who consume the public alternative will be opposed by a coalition of rich and poor households with the rich choosing private consumption

coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information abstract a monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types the seller coordinates the buyers adoption decisions based on their reported types and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions we study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion proof and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions and the number of adoptions is maximized subject to the participation constraints

the state socialization and private schooling when will governments support alternative producers abstractunderstanding the institutional features that can improve learning outcomes and reduce inequality is a top priority for international and development organisations around the world economists appear to have a good case for support to non governmental alternatives as suppliers of schooling however unlike other policy domains freer international trade or privatisation economists have been remarkably unsuccessful in promoting the adoption of this idea we develop a general positive model of why governments typically produce schooling which introduces the key notion of the lack of verifiability of socialisation and instruction of beliefs which makes third party contracting for socialisation problematic we use the model to explain variations around the world in levels of private schooling we also predict the circumstances in which efforts to promote the different alternatives to government production like charter voucher and scholarship are likely to be successful

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

the long side of the market and the short end of the stick bargaining power and price formation in buyers sellers and balanced markets the determinants of bargaining power and price formation in a dynamic exchange market where new traders enter randomly over time are studied when agents on the long side of the market possess the option to wait for the arrival of future partners the terms of trade in the spot market must honor the value of this option the equilibrium terms of trade are expressed in intuitive closed form equations that highlight the distinct influences of short run spot market conditions and long run market demographics i introduction few concepts in economics are as intuitive as the idea that traders on the long side of a market wind up holding the short end of the stick that is they receive little or none of the gains from trade consider for instance the classic setting in which b identical buyers each with unit demands for an indivisible homogeneous good face s identical sellers each with one unit of the good for sale it is well known that in a broad class of one shot trading games all of the surplus in this setting goes to the short side of the market in equilibrium that is if b s buyers bid the price up to their reservation value often it is only when b s that market institutions the rules of the game have any bearing on the equilibrium division of surplus this classic result is somewhat brittle because of the discontinuity in the terms of trade when moving from positive to negative levels of excess demand its logic is familiar however from bertrand competition and it is very compelling the option value to an agent frozen out of a trade in a one shot market game is his reservation payoff of zero any outcome that confers nonzero surplus to a long side agent cannot be sustained in equilibrium because all of the long side agents who would otherwise be frozen out possess a strict incentive to undercut

the child is father of the man implications for the demographic transition we propose a new theory of the demographic transition based on the evidence from natural sciences that physical development during childhood affects adult life expectancy positively this theory is embodied in a continuous time olg framework where fertility longevity and education all result from individual decisions we conclude that a sustained improvement in physical development is at the basis of the observed demographic transition in today s developed countries and may be an important factor in explaining the slow transition from the malthusian towards the modern era the dynamics of the proposed model reproduce the key features of the demographic transition including sustained improvements in child physical development permanent increase in life expectancy a hump shaped evolution of both population growth and fertility and late increases in secondary educational attainments

walras retrouve decentralized trading mechanisms and the competitive price we extend the standard analysis of decentralized markets to allow for the possibility that traders interact simultaneously with more than one trader on the opposite side of the market in contrast with the literature we reconcile the walrasian equilibrium with the outcome of decentralized strategic trade we show that there exist generic matching technologies that determine local market conditions such that as market frictions vanish the equilibrium price is the one that would result in the static walrasian market our analysis highlights the importance of local market conditions for the determination of equilibrium prices

voting education and the great gatsby curve abstract high inequality goes hand in hand with low intergenerational earnings mobility across countries little is known about why the us is characterized by high inequality and low mobility while the opposite tends to hold for scandinavian countries in an overlapping generations model calibrated to the us education policies are endogenized via probabilistic voting by exploiting cross country variation in the bias in voter turnout towards the educated and elderly the model replicates the negative relation between inequality and public education expenditures and accounts for more than a quarter of the variation in inequality and mobility for the us i find that compulsory voting could foster mobility whereas inequality would be hardly affected

the effectiveness of private versus public schools the case of indonesia abstract in most developing countries education is largely publicly provided however the scarcity of public funds and recent evidence of public school inefficiency calls for an examination of the dominant role of the state in this paper we use data from indonesia to examine the effectiveness of public versus private schools we use labor market earnings as our measure of effectiveness controlling for observable personal characteristics and school selection we find that graduates of private secondary schools perform better in the labor market this is contrary to the widely held belief in indonesia that public secondary schools are superior our findings coupled with the existing literature on private school cognitive and cost advantages suggest the need for greater private participation in the education sector

the macroeconomics of child labor regulation we develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences and multiple steady states can arise the introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill biased technological change which induces parents to choose smaller families the theory can account for the observation that in britain regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality and coincided with rapid fertility decline

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

to segregate or to integrate education politics and democracy how is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system we develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures we find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad based democracy where politicians are responsive to low income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich the main predictions of the theory are consistent with state level data and micro data from the u s as well as cross country evidence from the programme for international student assessment study

an explanation for public provision of schooling the importance of indoctrination this article was completed while i was a national fellow at the hoover institution and represents the unpublished theory and cross country empirical sections from my 1984 university of california los angeles dissertation armen alchian harold demsetz gertrud fremling david friedman robert hansen ben klein ed lazear russell roberts finis welch e g west an unusually helpful anonymous referee from this journal and the participants in seminars at auburn university the university of california at los angeles and at davis california state university at hayward and northridge the hoover institution george mason university the university of houston southern methodist university the u s department of education texas a m university and the 1987 public choice meetings in tucson arizona provided valuable discussions i would like to thank maury pearl for very helpful research assistance any remaining errors are of course my responsibility

dynamic markets with competitive bidding the model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices are determined in first price auctions it combines competition over time familiar from the pairwise meeting models with instantaneous bidding competition it inquires how different properties of the model determine the relative importance of these two aspects of the competition and in particular how the non market clearing price result of the matching and bargaining models is affected by the

the political economy of school choice linking theory and evidence abstract we derive an improved methodology for linking theoretical parameters of a political economy model of school choice to empirical values estimated by regressing local private enrollment shares on mean income the median to mean ratio religious and ethnic composition and other variables this leads us to reject the commonly maintained assumption that a coalition of ends against the middle determines local school funding and to conclude instead that the median income voter is decisive it also allows us to estimate the perceived relative efficiency advantage of private schooling which we find to be about 30 at the margin

schooling political participation and the economy abstract we investigate how the link between individual schooling and political participation is affected by country characteristics using individual survey data we find that political participation is more responsive to schooling in land abundant countries and less responsive in human capital abundant countries even while controlling for country political institutions and cultural attitudes we find related evidence that political participation is less responsive to schooling in countries with a higher skill premium as well as within countries for individuals in skilled occupations the evidence motivates a theoretical explanation in which patterns of political participation are influenced by the opportunity cost of engaging in political rather than production activities

ethnic diversity public spending and individual support for the welfare state a review of the empirical literature we review the empirical literature that studies the effect of ethnic diversity on public spending and on individual support for the welfare state the survey puts a particular focus on the fast growing literature that uses experiments to study the effects of ethnic diversity many of these studies have appeared since the pioneering survey by alesina and la ferrara and have not been covered by a survey before

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

income distribution and macroeconomics fertility adjustment prior to education investment abstract this paper develops a theory in which households prepare for future education by adjusting the quantity of children they intend to raise income inequality lowers output per worker only if the inequality is attributed in some part to unexpected disturbances after childbirth

sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects abstract we show that in sequential auctions of a large enough number of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values prices will on average have a downwards trend

bidding behavior and experience in internet auctions abstract we study the role of experience in internet art auctions by analyzing repeated bidding by the same bidder in a unique longitudinal field dataset our results show that experience significantly lowers the level of bids suggesting that bidders change their bidding behavior throughout time participating in more than ten auctions brings down average bids by up to 26 we further test several possible explanations for the observed learning behavior and show that the change in bidding strategy is a result of a change in within auction behavior that is generated with experience our results are robust to concerns of endogenous participation as well as bidder fixed effects

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

inequality and growth why differential fertility matters we argue that inequality and growth are linked through differential fertility and the accumulation of human capital we build an overlapping generations model in which dynasties differ in their initial endowment with human capital growth the income distribution and fertility are endogenous due to a quantiy quality tradeoff families with less human capital decide to have more children and invest less in education when initial inequality is high large fertility differentials lower the growth rate of average human capital since poor families who invest little in education make up a large fraction of the population in the next generation a calibrated model shows that this fertility differential effect is quantitatively important we also provide empirical evidence to confirm the links between inequality differential fertility and growth suggested by the model

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

vouchers for private schooling in colombia evidence from a randomized natural experiment colombia used lotteries to distribute vouchers which partially covered the cost of private secondary school for students who maintained satisfactory academic progress three years after the lotteries winners were about 10 percentage points more likely to have finished 8th grade primarily because they were less likely to repeat grades and scored 0 2 standard deviations higher on achievement tests there is some evidence that winners worked less than losers and were less likely to marry or cohabit as teenagers benefits to participants likely exceeded the 24 per winner additional cost to the government of supplying vouchers instead of public school places

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

human capital social capital and public schooling abstract public education contributes to growth not only by building human capital but also by instilling common norms that increase social cohesion this is modeled in the context of a political economy framework in which social cohesion reduces wasteful rent seeking and thus strengthens incentives for investment in human captial the political decisions that determine whether different social groups retain separate schooling systems or adopt an integrated system weigh these material advantages against the psychic cost to parents of alienating their children from traditional values this aspect of public education helps explain why commonly education is publicly administered as well as publicly financed

using threshold models to explain international relations the outcome of political opposition or revolution is a public good which suggests that free riding will diminish the effectiveness of these forms of collective action the private gains from contributing to collective goals are increased however if individuals place some value on ideological conformity or group identity nevertheless some external stimulus is often needed to set in motion a tendency toward social motivation that is strong enough to outweigh the free rider incentive this paper investigates the extent to which international pressure and demonstration effects can serve to signal support for the objectives of domestic groups in a target country and thereby mobilize collective action in pursuit of their goals it is of interest to know not only the extent to which inherent barriers to effective collective action are overcome by outside support but also to show how foreign economic policy can have an impact on political processes in the target country even when that policy itself has minimal economic effects

private schools in a global world globalization is a popular term that to economists describes the effects of diminished costs to trade around the world the technological revolution of the past two decades lowered barriers to trade in the financial sector as well as in the goods and services sectors as a result we routinely consume products from china india or latin america and these and other countries likewise consume goods and services from us many argue that a by product of the technological revolution is the loss of country and regional cultural identity we find mcdonald s and starbucks in seattle washington beijing china and small towns around the globe others argue that this simply implies wider choice of goods and of cultural identities as economists think about globalization we attribute these changes to efficiency in the marketplace the technological advances have enabled countries to export those goods and services for which they have a comparative advantage and the gains from trade have resulted in increased economic growth worldwide while we see the benefits from the enhanced flow of goods and services across markets economists have paid less attention to the nonmarket aspects of globalization the increased flow of information and people across national boundaries implies increased competition across all sectors of the economy similar to the market for goods and services the political institutions that survive the competitive race in the long run presumably will be those that enhance efficiency this is not to intimate that political systems will replicate the efficiency of the marketplace but to suggest that competitive forces tend to lead to more efficient structures and ultimately toward more efficient outcomes as these public administrative institutions become more competitive politics should play a diminished role and economic efficiency should play an even greater role in future structures if globalization ultimately leads to more efficient institutions the value of examining current international differences in institutional structures is immense through understanding past and current differences we gain insight into our future today i want to examine one specific institution within this context private provision of elementary and secondary schooling i want to examine private schooling by exploring the institutions that govern the provision of private schooling the role of politics and economics in the evolution of these institutions and finally the efficiency implications of the various institutional arrangements at each step in this examination i shall be assessing the role that globalization has played and is expected to play in the delivery of schooling around the world 1 private provision around the worldeconomists have studied education since the days of adam smith we have estimated the demand for schooling provided normative assessments of the role of the state in education examined the effects of public expenditures for education on housing markets estimated the returns to schooling and estimated the relationship between public schooling and economic development but most of all economists have estimated education production functions that relate public sector inputs such as per pupil expenditures pupil teacher ratios or teacher salaries to educational achievement and as last year s southern economic association distinguished guest lecturer so eloquently demonstrated economists policymakers and the public have been sorely perplexed by the lack of positive association between these inputs and the achievement of public school students hoxby 2004 the private side of schooling has received increasing attention from economists as data have become more available james 1993 private schooling occupies a significantly smaller sector of the economy in the united states than does public schooling according to unesco 2000 data approximately 12 of students enrolled in primary schools in this country attend private schools

educational systems growth and income distribution a quantitative study this study sets out to develop a dynamic model within an economy characterized by the coexistence of public and private schools under imperfect credit market conditions in an attempt to provide a clearer understanding of the evolution of economic growth and income inequality we find that any government wishing to reduce income inequality should adopt policies aimed at increasing the enrollment rate in public schools however whilst high enrollment rates can be sustained in private schools and thus create enhanced economic growth this can only occur if accompanied by the liberalization of the credit markets

strategic bargaining and competitive bidding in a dynamic market equilibrium this paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as rubinstein 1985 and gale 1986 and 1987 by considering a new matching process we assume that a central information agency exists such as job centres and newspapers in the labour market or real estate agents in the housing market which puts potential traders into direct contact with each other with agent heterogeneity equilibrium trade is characterized by existing traders on the other side since existing traders have already sampled and rejected each other two procedures of trade coexist namely strategic bilateral bargaining and a competitive bidding process depending on the number of potential matches a new trader obtains we characterize the unique symmetric markov perfect equilibrium to this stochastic trading game

complements versus substitutes and trends in fertility choice in dynastic models demographers emphasize decreased mortality and economic development as the main contributors generating the demographic transition contrary to previous findings we show that simple dynastic models a la barro becker can reproduce observed changes in fertility in response to decreased mortality and increased productivity growth if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough we show that this is largely due to number and welfare of children being substitutes in the utility of parents in this case we find that with an ies of one third model predictions of changes in fertility amount to two thirds of those observed in u s data since 1800 between 1800 and 2000 fertility choice in the united states underwent a dramatic transition depending on estimates it fell from about six children per woman to around two children per woman this demographic transition from a state of high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality has been documented by demographers and historians in the united states and in every other developed country in the world over this same period natural rates of population growth net of immigration also fell but less substantially demographers have not reached a consensus on the root causes of this transformation but list several changes as likely main contributors these include reductions in infant and child mortality rates imrs and cmrs and the process of industrialization and economic development the work in demography and history on this topic has largely been limited to empirical studies with almost no choice based modeling of the type seen in economics even there issues of the timing of changes