testing for evidence of adverse selection in the automobile insurance market a comment in 1994 puelz and snow presented empirical evidence of adverse selection in the market for automobile collision insurance using data from a private insurer they claimed to have found strong evidence of adverse selection in the insurer s portfolio their test was based on individuals choice of deductible in each risk class from the models of rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 it is well known that if residual adverse selection is present in some risk classes insurers will offer menus of contracts from which insureds will self select at equilibrium higher risk individuals will choose the smaller deductible and will be charged the higher price per unit of insurance dionne doherty and fombaron 2000 an empirical test of the theory is to verify in each risk class whether lower deductibles are chosen by insureds with higher accident proba

one switch utility functions and a measure of risk consider the relative attractiveness to a decision maker of two financial gambles as the wealth of that individual varies it may seem reasonable that either one alternative should be preferred for all wealth levels or that there exists a unique critical wealth level at which the decision maker switches from preferring one alternative to the other decreasing risk aversion is not sufficient for this property to hold we identify the small class of utility functions for which it does we show how the property leads naturally to a measure of risk the results of this paper apply equally well to discounting functions for cash flows one switch discount functions permit at most one change in preference between cash flows as all payoffs are deferred in time

a note on comparative downside risk aversion abstract we provide comparative global conditions for downside risk aversion which are similar to the ones studied by ross for risk aversion we define a coefficient of downside risk aversion and study its local properties

multi period insurance contracts this paper examines the form of insurance contracts in the presence of asymmetric information about consumers accident probabilities our goal is to understand the adjustment in contract terms as a function of accident histories in a finite horizon model we also compare these adjustments between alternative market structures our principal findings indicate that history dependent insurance contracts serve a useful sorting role individuals who declare themselves low risks to insurance companies face adverse contracturai terms if they subsequently have many accidents these adjustments are strongest in the case of a single insurance seller but are present in the competitive model as well

a dynamic auction for multi object procurement under a hard budget constraint this contribution revisits the problem of allocating r d subsidies by government agencies typically the applicants financial constraints are private information the literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information rents and thus improve the efficiency of how scarce public funds are allocated we propose a new open clock auction for this procurement problem this auction is strategically simple as it exhibits truthtelling in dominant strategies and satisfies ex post rationality while observing the budget constraint we test the auction in monte carlo simulation and discuss its applicability and limitations moreover we highlight connections to recent advances in computer science

modifying variability and correlations in winner take all contests we consider contests with a fixed proportion of winners based on relative performance special attention is paid to winner take all contests which we define as contests with relatively few winners receiving relatively large awards but we consider the full range of values of the proportion of winners if a contestant has the opportunity to modify the distribution of her performance what strategy is advantageous when the proportion of winners is less than one half a riskier performance distribution is preferred when this proportion is greater than one half it is better to choose a less risky distribution using a multinormal model we consider modifications in the variability of the distribution and in correlations with the performance of other contestants increasing variability and decreasing correlations lead to improved chances of winning when the proportion of winners is less than one half and the opposite directions should be taken for proportions greater than one half thus it is better to take chances and to attempt to distance oneself from the other contestants i e to break away from the herd when there are few winners a more conservative herding strategy makes sense when there are many winners our analytical and numerical results indicate that the probability of winning can change substantially as variability and or correlations are modified furthermore in a game theoretic setting in which all contestants can make modifications choosing a riskier less risky performance distribution when the proportion of winners is low high is the dominant best response strategy we briefly consider some practical issues related to the recommended strategies and some possible extensions

moral hazard and dynamic insurance data this paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of moral hazard we first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence under moral hazard individual claim intensities decrease with the number of past claims we then show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish this moral hazard effect from dynamic selection on unobservables we develop nonparametric tests and estimate a flexible parametric model we find no evidence of moral hazard in french car insurance our analysis contributes to a recent literature based on static data that has problems distinguishing between moral hazard and selection and dealing with dynamic features of actual insurance contracts methodologically this paper builds on and extends the literature on state dependence and heterogeneity in event history data jel d82 g22 c41 c14

empirical contract theory the case of insurance data abstract while contract theory has reached a high degree of sophistication econometric applications remain scarse one often invoked reason is that adequate data is hard to find we argue that insurance data fit especially well the requirements of econometric testing then we propose some insights on how insurance data can be used to test the predictions of contract theory as an illustration we present some preliminary empirical results relative to the existence of adverse selection of the rothschild and stiglitz type in automobile insurance

repeated insurance contracts with adverse selection and limited commitment in this paper we describe the sequential equilibria of a two period monopoly with asymmetric information and limited commitment in the market for accident insurance the role of learning is analyzed and the possible sequential pooling semiseparating and separating equilibria are described where the probability that a buyer will make a revealing first period contract choice is equal to zero is positive and is equal to one respectively in the absence of discounting we show that only pooling and semiseparating equilibria exist provide a limited characterization of when these equilibria occur and show that accident contingent insurance and accident underreporting occur with positive probability along the equilibrium path of the game

putting risk in its proper place this paper examines preferences toward particular classes of lottery pairs we show how such concepts as prudence and temperance can be fully characterized by a preference relation over these lotteries if preferences are defined in an expected utility framework with differentiable utility the direction of preference for a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the nth derivative of the utility function what makes our characterization appealing is its simplicity which seems particularly amenable to experimentation

automobile insurance ratemaking in the presence of asymmetrical information automobile insurance is an example of a market where multi period contracts are observed this form of contract can be justified by asymmetrical information between the insurer and the insured insurers use risk classification together with bonus malus systems in this paper we show that the actual methodology for the integration of these two approaches can lead to inconsistencies we develop a statistical model that adequately integrates risk classification and experience rating for this purpose we present poisson and negative binomial models with regression component in order to use all available information in the estimation of accident distribution a bonus malus system which integrates a priori and a posteriori information on an individual basis is proposed and insurance premium tables are derived as a function of time past accidents and the significant variables in the regression statistical results were obtained from a sample of 19 013 drivers

advantageous selection in insurance markets this article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision risk tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk averse types taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients allowing a strict pareto gain this result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies as does the novel finding of a pure strategy partial pooling subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the insurance market copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

uncertainty resolution and the timing of annuity purchases abstract this paper considers the question of why the annuity market is thin a model is presented in which consumers have the option of purchasing annuities before discovering their survival probability they can then recontract the initial choice after the resolution of this form of uncertainty it is shown that consumers purchase insurance against their own survival probability type at a very young age and do not undertake further transactions this characterization is then used to analze the effects of introducing future income uncertainty and to investigate the trade off between old age insurance motive and portfilio flexibility

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

salesforce compensation plans in environments with asymmetric information in this paper we present a theory of salesforce compensation plans to provide insights into why it may be advantageous for a profit maximizing firm to offer members of its salesforce the opportunity to choose from a menu of compensation plans although such contractual arrangements are not commonly used in the industry they have been introduced and implemented by firms such as ibm and st regis paper as in our previous work on salesforce compensation plans basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 we use an agency theory framework in this paper we relax the assumptions of information symmetry and salesforce homogeneity and show the conditions under which it is optimal to offer a menu of compensation plans we also show that even when these assumptions are relaxed there are situations where offering a single plan characterized by basu lal srinivasan and staelin basu a k r lal v srinivasan r staelin 1985 salesforce compensation plans an agency theoretic perspective marketing sci 4 fall 267 291 is still optimal insights gained from the analyses are discussed in the context of an existing compensation scheme

evidence on adverse selection equilibrium signaling and cross subsidization in the insurance market the configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system using contractual data from a representative insurer we estimate a reduced form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage the data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead us to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks

managerial motivation dynamics and incentives firms can increase profitability by appropriately motivating managers we investigate drivers of managerial motivation and propose how firms can use performance pay to alter motivational patterns we focus on the agent s optimal effort decision in trading off compensation utility with effort cost in a static and dynamic setting surprisingly we find that lower risk aversion or increased pay are not necessarily motivating factors and identify the relevant effort drivers underlying the agent s utility and compensation plan we characterize properties of agents preferences for output lotteries risk aversion aggressiveness prudence that trigger systematic motivational patterns with respect to a variety of factors such as the agent s productivity and past performance time to evaluation the firm s capabilities and market factors our insights are robust holding under very general modeling assumptions on preferences rewards and the stochastic effort output function

adverse selection and statistical discrimination an analysis of canadian automobile insurance abstract statistical discrimination occurs when a characteristic such as sex is used as an indicator of the risk group of an individual the theory of adverse selection is used to explain the occurrence of statistical discrimination a model of the market for collision insurance which is based on the theory of adverse selection is estimated on canadian data the results suggest that adverse selection occurs in this market simulations of the effect of prohibiting sexual discrimination in the 21 24 age group indicate that the premiums for single females would increase substantially and that a significant proportion would no longer purchase collision insurance

compensation incentives and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness the common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false in fact no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse this paper finds simple intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse the paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse and gambles that increase or decrease risk with the growing interest in executive compensation and agency problems

risk behavior in response to quotas and contests much of the salesforce compensation literature has focused on developing incentive schemes to maximize effort levels on the part of the salesforce the amount of effort to expend in the selling task is considered to be the sole decision variable for a sales representative in this paper we introduce another key decision variable for a sales representative which is how much risk to undertake in the selling task in other words we consider the fact that for a sales representative riskiness of performance e g the dispersion of the probability distribution for sales is often a choice and not a given fate for example a sales representative trying to increase sales may have the choice of allocating a given amount of effort on the low risk approach of pursuing a small set of existing customers or incur the same effort on the high risk option of getting new larger customers to switch from competitors this paper examines how decisions on risk behavior on the part of the sales representatives are influenced by compensation schemes we show that such decisions are sensitive to the payoff structure when a quota based or a rank order contest based compensation scheme is used more specifically we argue that a high quota level or a rank order contest where only the top few win induce sales representatives to opt for high risk prospects whereas a low quota level or a rank order contest where a high proportion win induce sales representatives to opt for low risk prospects this does not stem from any kind of violation of standard expected utility theory but arises from the specific structure of jumps in payoffs it is not that the inherent risk attitudes of the sales representatives are being altered rather under some quota and contest conditions a more risky prospect may yield higher expected utility for an inherently risk averse sales representative while under some other quota and contest conditions a less risky prospect may lead to a higher expected utility for an inherently risk seeking sales representative the theoretical propositions are tested in a series of five experiments the first two experiments test the theoretical results of quota based compensation the quota levels are manipulated subjects select between segment types where the mean expected sales are the same but the variance varies the next two experiments test the risk behavior of subjects in contest based incentive schemes when the proportion of winners in the contest is manipulated the results provide strong support for our models with only a few subjects departing from the theoretical predictions a fifth experiment shows some cognitive response data to explain the behavior that is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions this paper provides implications that are useful for managers who design compensation schemes a common assumption in most normative models on salesforce compensation is that all sales representatives are either risk averse or risk neutral this might often lead to the conclusion that sales representatives cannot be expected to engage in high risk activities in the absence of a risk premium over and above the compensation scheme while this may be true if sales representatives are facing only a piece rate compensation plan it need not be the case when quota based or contest based compensation schemes are used our results suggest that when the sales quotas are set high or if the proportion of winners in a sales contest is low sales representatives may engage in high risk behavior alternatively if the quotas are low or the proportion of winners in a sales contest is high sales representatives may engage in low risk prospects hence if a firm would like to dampen high risk behavior on the part of the salesforce lowering quota levels or increasing the proportion of winners in sales contests might do so similarly in order to reduce conservatism towards risk moving up the quota levels or reducing the proportion of winners in sales contests could be useful our results extend beyond just salesforce management to any situation where payoffs are based on reaching a certain threshold level in performance or are based on relative performance for example similar implications hold in tournaments for promotion to a limited number of top management positions in an organization influencing the portfolio of r d managers and so on

salesforce compensation theory and managerial implications this paper discusses recent advances in the study of salesforce motivation and compensation special emphasis is given to quantitative approaches from the economics finance and marketing literatures the paper summarizes the findings in this analytical work in the context of some examples of compensation practice in order to illustrate the usefulness of the paradigm for the evaluation and setting of compensation systems we consider some major issues in setting compensation such as the firm s own objective the salesperson s objective and the nature of the sales response function variations in these factors imply significant variation in optimal compensation policy where optimal takes into account the components in the plan the parameter levels of the components and whether or not a menu of such plans should be made available to the salesforce by highlighting the results in the literature in light of some relevant compensation examples we show the applicability of theory to the practical concerns of salesforce management we close with a summary of these insights and directions for future research in the area

asymmetric information and learning evidence from the automobile insurance market this paper tests the predictions of adverse selection models using data from the automobile insurance market i find that in contrast to what recent research suggests the evidence is consistent w

consumer lock in with asymmetric information abstract a two period version of the rothschild and stiglitz 1976 model of competitive screening in an insurance market is presented its features include repeat purchase of insurance among consumers no commitment among insurers or consumers asymmetric information among insurers about a consumer s accident history and state contingent contracts an equilibrium may exist in this model with full pooling in period one and consumer lock in in period two in such an equilibrium high risk consumers are experience rated and firms earn negative profits in period one and positive profits in period two

compensation plans for single and multi product salesforces an application of the holmstrom milgrom model the agency theory approach to understanding salesforce compensation plans is modified to incorporate the intratemporal nature of the salesperson s effort rate decision i e the decision about the effort rate at any given point in time potentially depends upon the sales performance up to that point in time in the accounting period under the assumptions considered in this paper holmstrom and milgrom 1987 have shown that the optimal compensation plan is linear in total sales over the accounting period the comparative statics results obtained here corroborate most of the corresponding results in the salesforce compensation literature moreover we derive many additional results not available in the literature it is demonstrated that the commission income as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of the sales effort or an increase in base sales on the other hand the salary component of the total compensation goes up with increases in uncertainty absolute risk