bargaining enforcement and multilateral sanctions when is cooperation counterproductive scholars and policymakers generally assume that multilateral cooperation is a necessary condition for economic sanctions to be of any use however previous statistical tests of this assumption have shown that sanctions are more successful with lower levels of cooperation this puzzle calls into question established theories of economic statecraft as well as theories of international cooperation in this article i test possible explanations for the ineffectiveness of multilateral cooperation on sanctions events using james fearon s 1998 breakdown of cooperation into bargaining and enforcement phases as a framework for discussion the empirical results show that when multilateral economic sanctions fail their failure is due to enforcement not bargaining problems without the support of an international organization cooperating states backslide from promises of cooperation backsliding occurs because of domestic political pressures and uncertainty about the intentions of the other sanctioning countries backsliding causes an initial burst of cooperative behavior to decay over time without institutional support cooperation is worse than useless it is counterproductive this result suggests that international cooperation is a more fragile equilibrium than previously thought but undercuts realist arguments that international organizations are unimportant

uncertainty bailouts and the kornai effect abstract we investigate the effects of bailouts on a firm with negative profits the production function is cobb douglas and the firm experiences both revenue and cost uncertainty the effect of bailouts on input demand depends on the technology the variances of the random variables and the correlation between them

the effects of bailouts and soft budget constraints on the environment this paper investigates the effects of financial relief programs commonly referred to as bailouts on pollution a partial equilibrium soft budget constraint model of the firm is developed to identify the effect of bailouts on the emission decisions of firms the results from the model indicate that the expectation of bailouts increases ex ante emissions a more stringent emissions tax is required to achieve the same level of emissions if bailouts are available than if bailouts are not available however a tradable permit system will maintain the same emissions level if bailouts are available as when bailouts are not available

vulnerability to terrorist attacks in european electricity decarbonisation scenarios comparing renewable electricity imports to gas imports the decarbonised future european electricity system must remain secure reliable electricity supply is a prerequisite for the functioning of modern society scenarios like desertec which partially rely on solar power imports from the middle east and north africa may be attractive for decarbonisation but raise concerns about terrorists interrupting supply by attacking the long unprotected transmission lines in the sahara in this paper i develop new methods and assess the european vulnerability to terrorist attacks in the desertec scenario i compare this to the vulnerability of today s system and a decarbonisation scenario in which europe relies on gas imports for electricity generation i show that the vulnerability of both gas and electricity imports is low but electricity imports are more vulnerable than gas imports due to their technical characteristics gas outages and potentially resulting blackouts are the very unlikely consequence even of very high number attacks against the gas import system whereas short blackouts are the potential consequence of a few attacks against the import electricity lines as the impacts of all except extreme attacks are limited terrorists cannot attack energy infrastructure and cause spectacular fear creating outages both gas and electricity import infrastructure are thus unattractive and unlikely terrorist targets

inspiration coalition and substitution external influences on postcommunist transformations there has been a recent explosion of interest in the external influences on the political and economic transformations of postcommunist states this article consolidates several analytical advances in this literature and distills three main functions of external actors namely to lengthen the time horizons of postcommunist politicians to expand the circle of interested reformers and to deter opponents of reform the article argues that a focus on external influences is a growth area for good conceptual work only if it addresses the union of foreign and domestic influences rather than treating them as stylized alternative explanations the central point is that outside actors should be considered as striving to influence the choices of existing domestic actors with whom they can be seen to form a kind of informal coalition at bottom outsiders do best through a combination of strategies strengthening domestic actors already committed to their approach winning over new domestic actors to their priorities and preventing the unconvinced from obstructing reforms

bilateralism and free trade we study a setting with many countries in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets countries can sign bilateral free trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade we allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free trade agreements a profile of free trade agreements defines the trading regime our principal finding is that in symmetric settings bilateralism is consistent with global free trade we also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements

intergenerational risk sharing via social security when financial markets are incomplete this paper develops an overlapping generations model with stochastic production and incomplete markets to assess whether the introduction of an unfunded social security system can lead to a pareto improvement even if the initial equilibrium is neither production ine cient in the spirit of diamond 1965 nor dynamically ine cient in the spirit of samuelson 1957 when returns to capital and wages are imperfectly correlated and subject to aggregate shocks then the consumption variance of all generations can be reduced if private markets or government policies enable them to pool their labor and capital incomes a social security system that endows retired households with a claim to labor income may serve as an e ective tool to share aggregate risk between gener

international sanctions as international punishment much of the contemporary literature on the utility of international sanctions approaches the apparent riddle of why sanctions are embraced so eagerly when they are supposedly such an ineffective tool of statecraft by focusing on the instrumental and rational purposes of sanctions as a result one purpose that does not always lend itself to a rational means end calculus the purpose of punishment tends to be overlooked or more commonly dismissed outright this article explores punishment as both a useful and an effective purpose of international sanctions it argues not only that sanctions should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft but also that they are a form of international punishment for wrongdoing despite the difficulties of applying the term punishment in the context of international relations the article then examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means end rationality is used suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions the argument is then applied to the case of u s sanctions imposed after the soviet union s invasion of afghanistan to demonstrate the different purposes of punishment at work in this case the article concludes that just as we cannot understand punishment as a purposive human activity solely by reference to a rational model of a means to a clearly delineated end so too we cannot entirely understand sanctions as a form of international punishment by an attachment to a rational model of policy behavior however some forms of punishment are exceedingly effective and this may explain why sanctions continue to be a popular instrument of statecraft

strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict although strategic interaction is at the heart of most international relations theory it has largely been missing from much empirical analysis in the field typical applications of logit and probit to theories of international conflict generally do not capture the structure of the strategic interdependence implied by those theories i demonstrate how to derive statistical discrete choice models of international conflict that directly incorporate the theorized strategic interaction i show this for a simple crisis interaction model and then use monte carlo analysis to show that logit provides estimates with incorrect substantive interpretations as well as fitted values that can be far from the true values finally i reanalyze a well known game theoretic model of war bueno de mesquita and lalman s 1992 international interaction game my results indicate that there is at best modest empirical support for their model

on the determinants of the success of economic sanctions an empirical analysis theory theories predicting the success of economic sanctions are tested on the universe of sanction episodes from 1914 to 1989 hypotheses the probability of success depends upon the cost to the target nation the extent of trade linkages between target and sender the stability of the target the amount of time sanctions are in force and whether financial sanctions are utilized method data are analyzed using logistic regression results the factors affecting success depend upon the goals of the sending nations when that goal is simply destabilization the principal determinant of success is the initial stability of the target for other goals the use of financial sanctions is most effective we also find evidence of a modest downward trend over time in the relative effectiveness of sanctions in the latter category

designing social security a portfolio choice approach public social security systems may provide diversification of risks to individuals life time income capturing that a pay as you go program paygo may be considered as a quasiasset we study the optimal size of the social security program as well as the optimal split between a funded part and a paygo part by means of a theoretical portfolio choice approach a low yielding paygo system can benefit individuals if it contributes to hedge other risks to their lifetime resources moreover a funded part of the social security system can be justified by potential imperfections to the individuals free access to the stock market numerical calculations for sweden norway the us and the uk demonstrate that the optimal size of paygo part of the pension program varies considerably in response to differences in projected growth rates and the correlation between stock returns and growth our calculations suggest that a paygo program has an important role in the three former countries but not in the u k

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

pensions and intergenerational risk sharing in general equilibrium we investigate intergenerational risk sharing in two pillar pension systems with a pay as you go pillar and a funded pillar the funded pension pillar can be either defined contribution or defined benefit only a defined benefit scheme with an appropriate investment policy establishes optimal intergenerational risk sharing we show how the pension system affects capital markets in general and the equity premium in particular

interests power and multilateralism multilateralism characterizes to varying degrees patterns of interaction among states and the formal organizations they construct the utility of multilateral norms or organizations varies with the type of cooperation problem states confront thus the functional logic of international cooperation leads to hypotheses about the conditions under which the institution of multilateralism may be a feasible and efficient solution as in coordination problems and those under which it will not as in collaboration problems within these constraints powerful states choose institutions that will serve their interests with multilateral arrangements becoming more attractive as the future is valued more highly multilateral institutions should be stable in circumstances of changing distributions of power relative to more hierarchical institutions the vulnerability of patterns of international cooperation to various exogenous changes depends on the type of strategic interaction underlying state behavior

voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing in a funded pension system we explore the feasibility of a funded pension system with intergenerational risk sharing when participation in the system is voluntary typically the willingness of the young to participate depends on their belief about the future young s willingness to do so we characterise equilibria with voluntary participation and show that the likelihood of their existence increases with risk aversion and financial market uncertainty we find that mandatory participation is often necessary to sustain a funded pension pillar and to let participants benefit from intergenerational risk sharing

understanding the soft budget constraint we propose a clarification of the notion of a soft budget constraint a concept widely used in the analysis of socialist transitional and market economies our interpretation is broad enough to embrace most existing approaches to soft budget constraint phenomena and provides a classification of their causes and consequences in light of this interpretation we then review the theoretical literature on the subject and compare it with those on other dynamic commitment problems in economics

risk sharing across generations without publicly owned equities abstract the u s social security trust fund currently invests in government bonds investing some of it instead in equities while continuing to pay social security benefits under existing rules would alter potentially improve the sharing of financial risks across non trading generations this paper shows that the same risk sharing can be achieved without direct government ownership of equities if instead the government places a linear and symmetric tax on risky private capital returns this equivalence is very robust and holds even if some agents are endogenously borrowing constrained

theocracy and resilience against economic sanctions abstract this paper provides a simply theory to explain the impact of sanctions on a regime s policies and behavior sanctions are generally put to strip the target country from its available rents and weaken the government s stance against growing discontent in the population we show however that sanctions may give legitimacy to an incumbent government by influencing the optimal level of religious ideology provided by the state and further stabilizing its grip to power and rents while in a good state of nature sanctions build resilience as long as religious ideology among the population is strong at bad times they compel the target country to move towards ideological moderation in a world of asymmetric information the target country always finds it optimal to send a signal that truly represents the prevailing state of nature in order to induce learning and reach a win win outcome

sanctions some simple analytics governments often seek influence beyond their borders one way is through what thomas schelling 1960 1966 calls brute force taking direct physical control less extreme methods are to promise rewards for taking desired actions or to threaten punishments for not carrying them out sanctions sanctions involve two parties the sender and the target to help identify pronouns antecedents we consider a feminine sender and masculine target the sender s objective is to influence the target by threatening to impose some measure against him for acting contrary to her interest sanctions have long been important in international relations athens imposed a trade embargo against megara ultimately setting off the peloponnesian war 431 404 bc sanctions are central to such international agreements as the united nations charter the world trade organization and the montreal protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons u s law prescribes the use of sanctions in circumstances related for example to national security human rights intellectual property and international trade do sanctions actually achieve senders objectives a common claim is that they usually fail and are costly to senders recent u s legislation proposes to limit unilateral u s sanctions except trade related ones on the grounds that they cost more than they are worth history provides examples of sanctions that were costly and ineffectual such as the league of nations sanctions against the italian occupation of abyssinia or u s sanctions against cuba united nations sanctions against iraq remain in place having achieved less than full success to say the least see gary hufbauer et al 1990 more systematic studies suggest that sanctions often do succeed particularly when objectives are modest hufbauer et al 1990 examine 116 episodes of sanctions with military or political objectives deeming about one third successful sanctions imposed under u s trade law have worked even better about three fourths of the time see e g sykes 1992 thomas bayard and kimberly a elliott 1994 elliott and j david richardson 1997 here we develop a simple framework to explain how sanctions can worl and what is required for them to succeed our framework exploits advances in the theory of repeated games and bargaining under incomplete information while a game theorist would recognize the flavor of our results the setting here is a fresh one 2 we find success more likely when the threatened measure costs the sender little relative to the gain from modifying the target s behavior while the damage to the target is large relative to his cost of complying with the sender s will results consistent with both intuition and empirical evidence as well as with adam smith 1776 book iv ch i moreover a more patient sender is more likely to succeed while the target s patience can work to the sender s disadvantage 3

social security and risk sharing abstract in this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay as you go social security system is ex ante pareto improving in a stochastic olg economy with capital accumulation and land we argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy in our model financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria interim pareto efficient therefore a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents welfare is evaluated ex ante and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing we also examine the optimal size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform

domestic opposition and signaling in international crises this article explores the effect of domestic political competition on the escalation of international crises it combines an incomplete information model of crisis bargaining with a simple model of two party electoral choice one state has two strategic actors a government and an opposition party both of which declare openly whether they support the use of force to alter the status quo the rival state updates its beliefs and selects its strategy in response to both signals the parties payoffs depend upon a retrospective evaluation by the domestic electorate the model shows that the inclusion of a strategic opposition party decreases the ex ante probability of war by helping to reveal information about the state s preferences this finding has important implications for research on democracy and international conflict since it suggests a mechanism through which democratic states can overcome informational asymmetries which have been identified as a central obstacle to negotiation

cooperation with network monitoring this paper studies the maximum level of cooperation that can be sustained in perfect bayesian equilibrium in repeated games with network monitoring where players observe each other s actions either perfectly or not at all the foundational result is that the maximum level of cooperation can be robustly sustained in grim trigger strategies if players are equally well monitored comparative statics on the maximum level of cooperation are highly tractable

are smart sanctions feasible this article reviews the literature on the smart sanctions approach developed in the late 1990s in response to the failure of conventional sanctions and questions the efficacy of this instrument smart sanctions modify the conventional sanctions tool by targeting the culpable political elites by means of arms embargoes financial sanctions and travel restrictions and by cushioning vulnerable groups children women the infirm and the elderly by exempting specified commodities such as food and medical supplies from embargoes this two pronged sanctions approach is designed to hit the real perpetrators directly and spare potential innocent victims thus leading to the speedier change of sanctionee behavior although the special design of smart sanctions may seem logically compelling and politically attractive this article argues that the numerous operational problems involved combined with the intricacies of the political processes of the un security council will make a smart sanctions regime difficult to establish and enforce effectively

does high income promote democracy the authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors such as the historical context various features of the institutional setting and simultaneity with the process of leadership change even after correcting for these many other influences the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions the authors go on to find that leaders risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries the authors confirm the finding by burkhart and lewis beck that the democracy promoting effect of income is stronger among the european countries they suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the southern european countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize this suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade

distinguishing characteristics of degrees of success and failure in economic sanctions episodes this paper uses 104 episodes from the hufbauer et al 1985 1990 dataset to examine the correlates of classes of outcomes of economic sanctions the parsimonious equations presented identify the characteristics of sanctions episodes conducive to success rather than marginal success and the characteristics productive of failure rather than marginal failure failure is most likely if there is significant third party assistance to the target and if the pre existing trade linkage between sender and target is small success is most easily achieved when the objective is not classified as modest and when pre sanction relations between sender and target are cordial or neutral the equations presented overcome data and methodological flaws of earlier studies exhibit reasonable predictive accuracy and satisfy a battery of tests of statistical significance hypothesized coefficient sign goodness of fit high likelihood and informational efficiency

when are sanctions effective a bargaining and enforcement framework although a considerable literature identifies the conditions under which sanctions are more likely to be successful few studies examine the question of when sanctioning states or senders are willing to enforce their sanctions laws against their firms using a game theoretic model we argue that imposing sanctions creates a strategic dilemma for senders we demonstrate that senders often have disincentives to enforce their sanctions policies given that the restriction on economic transactions with targeted states may undermine their firms competitiveness the model indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed when the sender s firm retains a moderate share of the target s market relative to its foreign competitors however the model also demonstrates that sanctions are likely to be imposed only when the conditions do not favor their success the empirical implications of the model are tested using the threat and imposition of economic sanctions ties data set

rare disasters asset prices and welfare costs a representative consumer model with epstein zin weil preferences and i i d shocks including rare disasters accords with observed equity premia and risk free rates if the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 3 4 if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds one an increase in uncertainty lowers the price dividend ratio for equity and a rise in the expected growth rate raises this ratio calibrations indicate that society would willingly reduce gdp by around 20 percent each year to eliminate rare disasters the welfare cost from usual economic fluctuations is much smaller though still important corresponding to lowering gdp by about 1 5 percent each year

the political effectiveness of terrorism revisited terrorists attack civilians to coerce their governments into making political concessions does this strategy work to empirically assess the effectiveness of terrorism the author exploits variation in the target selection of 125 violent substate campaigns the results show that terrorist campaigns against civilian targets are significantly less effective than guerrilla campaigns against military targets at inducing government concessions the negative political effect of terrorism is evident across logit model specifications after carefully controlling for tactical confounds drawing on political psychology the author concludes with a theory to account for why governments resist compliance when their civilians are targeted

the hidden hand of economic coercion why do policymakers consistently employ economic sanctions even though scholars consider them an ineffective tool of statecraft game theoretic models of economic coercion suggest the success rate may be understated because of selection effects when the targeted country prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions the bulk of successful coercion episodes should therefore end with sanctions threatened but not imposed this contradicts the recent literature on sanctions which assumes that sanctions rarely if ever work at generating significant concessions from the targeted country and are imposed for domestic or symbolic political reasons if the game theoretic argument is correct the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented a statistical analysis of data on sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals strongly supports the gametheoretic argument these results suggest that the significance of economic coercion has been undervalued in the study of statecraft and international relations more generally

economic interdependence bargaining power and political influence bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power it is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones the use of economic interdependence for political influence requires instead that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone whether this is true is independent of the degree of asymmetry in the economic relationship or its direction an explanation is given for the fact that other scholars have reached different conclusions and the implications of these results for our understanding of a variety of types of relations among governments are derived

precision guided or blunt the effects of us economic sanctions on human rights this study analyzes the consequences of economic sanctions for the target country s human rights situation we offer a political economy explanation for different types of human rights infringements or improvements in reaction to economic shocks caused by sanctions based on that explanation we derive hypotheses linking sanctions to four types of human rights economic rights political and civil rights basic human rights and emancipatory rights we use endogenous treatment regression models to test those hypotheses by estimating the causal average treatment effect of us economic sanctions on each type of human rights within a uniform empirical framework unlike previous studies we find no support for adverse effects of sanctions on economic rights or basic human rights once the endogenous selection of sanctioned countries is modelled with respect to women s rights our findings even indicate a positive effect of sanctions that is associated with improvements in women s economic rights only our results for political rights and civil liberties suggest significant deterioration under economic sanctions we conclude that it is important to account for the potential endogeneity of economic sanctions and to distinguish different dimensions of human rights as the effects of economic sanctions along those dimensions may vary considerably

a computable general equilibrium model of international sanctions in iran we detail recent international sanctions against the iranian economy and its government imposed by a subset of developed countries the effects of these sanctions on the iranian economy in general and upon upper and lower income rural and urban iranian households as well as the iranian government are modelled using a computable general equilibrium cge model we supplement the global trade analysis project 8 data set using income and expenditure shares from the urban and rural household income and expenditure survey from the statistical centre of iran sci the model is calibrated to simulate the effects of international sanctions as closely as possible we use endogenous trade taxes to simulate the effects of sanctions on iranian oil and petrochemical exports and iranian imports of petroleum products metal products and motor vehicles our study finds that international sanctions reduced aggregate iranian welfare by 14 15 rural households in iran suffered welfare losses which were almost double those experienced by urban households and the poorest urban and rural households experienced the largest welfare losses in the order of 5 10 but the government of iran sees a decrease in real revenue of 40 50 due to the large negative effect of sanctions on the iranian oil sector

intergenerational risk sharing and endogenous labour supply within funded pension schemes funded defined benefit pensions add to welfare on account of providing intergenerational risk sharing but lower it on account of inducing labour supply distortions we show that a properly designed funded defined benefit pension scheme involves a welfare improvement even if contributions are distortionary and even if individuals face potentially correlated wage and equity risks numerical calculations indicate that diversification gains from risk sharing are large compared to the losses related to labour supply distortions this result withstands a number of extensions like the introduction of a short sale constraint for individuals or the inclusion of a labour income tax

how international sanctions worked domestic and foreign political constraints on the brazilian informatics policy from 1985 to 1989 a trade conflict between the united states and brazil developed around brazil s protectionist information technology policy during that period and under the threat of trade sanctions some changes were made in the brazilian policy the effectiveness of sanctions in promoting policy changes in brazil resulted not only from economic losses but also from the shift provoked in the balance of political support for the policy within brazilian society moreover sanctions were effective not because they affected the interests of groups benefiting from the policy but because they pushed previously uncommitted groups to join the opposition to it

do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target a form of foreign pressure sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries there is much pessimism on whether they ever work this article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect it destabilizes the leaders it targets i present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion i find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross country time series data the destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think i conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy s real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle

intergenerational risk sharing pensions and endogenous labour supply in general equilibrium we show that a two tier pension system with a pay as you go first tier and a fully funded defined wage indexed second tier can provide for optimal intergenerational risk sharing without distorting the labour supply thereby achieving the first best other arrangements with a fully funded second tier fail to achieve the first best

when do imposed economic sanctions work previous research has documented only a modest success rate for imposed sanctions by contrast the success rate is higher in cases that are settled at the threat stage in this article the authors provide new insights about the circumstances under which sanctions cause behavioral change only after being imposed first the target must initially underestimate the impact of sanctions miscalculate the sender s determination to impose them or wrongly believe that sanctions will be imposed and maintained whether it yields or not second the target s misperceptions must be corrected after sanctions are imposed a game theoretical model with incomplete information is used to develop and clarify the argument

sanctions in networks abstract in this paper we contribute to the sender target models of sanctions by explicitly incorporating the linkages social political or economic that bind the sender and target to other agents given any network model and architecture we draw attention to two factors that play a key role in determining the efficacy of sanctions in reducing the frequency of violations these are respectively strategic complementaritiesbetween the sanctioning action deleting link with target and number of direct links of the sender and the externalities imposed on the sender by third parties we examine the role played by these factors both in the short run when links can only be deleted and the long run when links can also be added as well as when sanctions are unilateral the sender can only delete own links or multilateral the sender can impose on common allies to sever links to the target our analysis allows an active role to the target to build an opposing coalition to deflect sanctions and to third parties to engage in sanction busting it also extends to multiple senders and targets existence of interest groups within sender and target with dissimilar objectives and signed networks allowing both antagonistic and cordial bilateral relationships

the termination of international sanctions explaining target compliance and sender capitulation abstract with the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the cold war the termination of these punitive measures has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in international politics yet research has hitherto almost exclusively focused on sanctions implementation and effectiveness whereas their termination has received little attention in this paper we draw on studies analyzing the varying duration of sanctions to examine under which conditions they end in contrast to prior research that has mostly treated the end of sanctions as a single category our analysis disaggregates sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation we run a competing risks model using novel dyadic sanctions data and show that the determinants of both outcomes significantly diverge while poor economic health and high political volatility in the target country make it significantly more likely to comply political alignment between the sender and target and leadership changes in the sender country lead to a higher probability of sender capitulation