a theory of the cross sectional fertility differential job heterogeneity approach this article presents a theory of the cross sectional fertility differential which produces the negative wage fertility relationship based on job heterogeneity although evidence suggests the importance of job heterogeneity in the labor market it has largely been ignored in theories of fertility choice i show that a theory incorporating job heterogeneity requires only standard conditions on preferences to generate the negative wage fertility relationship and the negative relationship derived from the model is robust to changes in economic environments e g public policy and technology furthermore the theory reconciles the negative cross sectional wage fertility relationship with various time series variations in aggregate fertility

the political economy of development an assessment research in the field of economic development is increasingly engaged with questions of political economy of how political choices institutional structures and forms of governance influence the economic choices made by governments and citizens we summarize recent developments in the field and introduce a set of papers that illustrate key themes and methodological innovations associated with the new political

implications of ethnic diversity ethnically differentiated societies are often regarded as dysfunctional with poor economic performance and a high risk of violent civil conflict the author distinguishes between dominance in which one group constitutes a majority and fractionalization in which there are many small groups in terms of overall economic performance the research shows that both theoretically and empirically fractionalization is normally unproblematic in democracies although it can be damaging in dictatorships in terms of the risk of civil war the author shows that both theoretically and empirically fractionalization actually makes societies safer while dominance increases the risk of conflict a policy implication is that fractionalized societies are viable and secession should be discouraged

endogenous lifetime and economic growth abstract endogenous mortality is introduced in a two period overlapping generations model probability of surviving from the first period to the next depends upon health capital that is augmented through public investment high mortality societies do not grow fast since shorter lifespans discourage savings development traps are possible productivity differences across nations result in persistent differences in capital output ratios and relatively larger gaps in income and mortality high mortality also reduces returns on education where risks are undiversifiable when human capital drives economic growth countries differing in health capital do not converge to similar living standards threshold effects may also result

precautionary saving of chinese and u s households we employ a model of precautionary saving to study why household saving rates are high in china and low in the united states the use of recursive preferences gives a convenient decomposition of saving into precautionary and nonprecautionary components over 80 of china s saving rate and nearly all u s saving arises from the precautionary motive the difference between u s and chinese household income growth rates is vastly more important than income risk for explaining the saving rates the key mechanism is that precautionary savers have target wealth to income ratios and rapid income growth necessitates high saving rates to maintain the ratio

the political economy of state failure rapid decolonization created many arbitrary countries in contrast to those states which had emerged through a quasi darwinian process of selection some of these new countries had structural characteristics which gravely impeded the provision of public goods their lack of a unifying sense of shared identity made cooperation difficult and their tiny economic size left them unable to reap scale economies two public goods security and accountability are particularly important for development and so where they could not be provided states failed the cause of a problem is not necessarily a guide to its solution darwinian struggle among failing states is not something to be encouraged solutions lie partly in a phase of international provision of the key public goods partly in enhanced regional pooling of sovereignty and partly in institutional innovation to make the domestic provision of public goods less demanding of the state copyright 2009 oxford university press

wars and state capacity the article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity the state s ability to raise revenue from taxes it starts from the simple observation

optimal aging and death understanding the preston curve does prosperity lead to greater longevity if so what is the strength of the income channel to address these questions we develop a life cycle model in which households are subject to physiological aging in modeling aging we draw on recent research in the elds of biology and medicine the speed of the aging process and thus the time of death are endogenously determined by optimal health investments a calibrated version of the model accounts well for the observed non linear cross country link between longevity and income also known as the preston curve

aid policy and growth in post conflict societies countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice this paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post conflict growth process it is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars and covers 27 countries that were in their first decade of post conflict economic recovery during the 1990s the authors first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post conflict countries they find that during the first three post conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level so ideally aid should phase in during the decade historically aid has not on average been higher in post conflict societies and it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade the authors then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post conflict countries and in particular whether particular components of policy are differentially important for this they use the world bank policy rating database the authors find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post conflict societies comparing the efficacy of different policies they find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies however historically this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post conflict societies

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

resource curse or not a question of appropriability this thesis presents three self contained essays focusing on empirical questions in growth and development economics each article addresses specific questions on why countries perform differently in particular i analyse the effect of democracy on economic development the relationship between natural resources and growth and the efficiency of foreign development assistance in the first essay democracy consolidation and growth i analyse the effect of democracy on economic growth in this context i argue that an important aspect to consider is how consolidated political systems are put simply i find that it is not only a question of how democratic countries are but also how long they have been democratic in other words economic performance tends to improve with the duration of uninterrupted democracy the performance of autocracies on the other hand tends to deteriorate over time however for newly established political systems there seems to be a cost of being democratic this implies that democracies only bear their fruit after some time the analysis has important policy implications to overcome initial straits international assistance focused on democratic consolidation may be important and a very good investment in fostering long run development the second essay resource curse or not a question of appropriability together with anne boschini and jesper roine is concerned with the relation between natural resources and economic development for most laymen as well as for most economists it would seem reasonable that countries richly endowed in natural resources also benefit from this wealth however a large literature has found a systematic negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth we suggest that this so called resource curse is not determined by resource endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources a country possesses and the quality of institutions in the country this combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource the concept of appropriability captures the likelihood of natural resources leading to rentseeking corruption or conflicts which in turn will harm economic development our results suggest that if institutions are good enough the curse may be turned into a blessing this may explain why some countries such as norway and botswana tend to benefit from their resources while others such as angola and sierra leone do not the third and final essay of this thesis foreign sectoral aid fungibility growth and poverty reduction is a contribution to the aid efficiency literature which is concerned with the question of whether aid helps or hinders economic development foreign development assistance is often targeted on specific public expenditure sectors if this aid is not used in the sector for which it was granted e g health education it is said to be fungible and donors may end up financing something completely different from what they intended e g military expenditures the major concern about sectoral fungibility is that the alternative use of aid may be less productive or less socially useful however measuring fungibility is not sufficient to determine whether foreign sectoral aid fungibility is actually harmful what is important is how the funds treated as fungible are used the essay starts by obtaining estimates of fungibility for 57 countries the results suggest that sectoral aid is indeed largely treated as fungible by recipient countries next to assess the economic and health effects of fungibility these estimates are incorporated into an empirical model of aid and growth as well as into a model of aid and infant mortality altogether i find no evidence of more fungible sectoral aid leading to worse performance

mortality reductions educational attainment and fertility choice this paper develops a model where reductions in mortality are the main force behind economic development the model generates a pattern of changes similar to the demographic transition where gains in life expectancy at birth are followed by reductions in fertility and increases in the rate of human capital accumulation the onset of the transition is characterized by a critical level of life expectancy at birth which marks the movement of the economy from a malthusian equilibrium to an equilibrium with investments in human capital and the possibility of long run growth

the origins of state capacity property rights taxation and politics economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes this paper develops a framework where policy choices in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity it studies the economic and political determinants of such investments demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements the results show that among other things common interest public goods such as fighting external wars as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions are conducive to building state capacity some correlations in cross country data are consistent with the theory

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

disease and development the effect of life expectancy on economic growth we exploit the major international health improvements from the 1940s to estimate the effect of life expectancy on economic performance we construct predicted mortality using preintervention mortality rates from various diseases and dates of global interventions predicted mortality has a large impact on changes in life expectancy starting in 1940 but no effect before 1940 using predicted mortality as an instrument we find that a 1 percent increase in life expectancy leads to a 1 7 2 percent increase in population life expectancy has a much smaller effect on total gdp however consequently there is no evidence that the large increase in life expectancy raised income per capita

the dutch disease a disease after all many third world oil producers are encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base while west european oil and gas producers netherlands united kingdom are suffering a decline in their traded goods manufacturing sector induced by real wage pressures it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil revenues may be somewhat ora mixed blessing the quip of the economist notwithstanding the mechanism behind this unbalance is clear enough part of the oil revenues is spent on non traded goods which leads to a real appreciation i e a rise in the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods this in turn draws resources out of the non oil traded sector into the non traded goods producing sector corden and neary 1982 van wijnbergen 1980 one may say that this is an efficient response to the increase in income from oil production the united kingdom mexico egypt simply should move into oil derived industries and non traded goods and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are exhausted however many developing countries are hesitant to take this advice after all the post world war ii success stories in economic development involve without exception countries that promoted their traded goods sector aggressively moreover it is a well established stylised fact that technological progress is faster in the traded non sheltered sectors of an economy than in the non traded sector balassa 1964 is an early reference considering the hypothesis that technological progress rather than taking place exogenously with the passage of time is a function of accumulated experience the concern of countries like egypt mexico or indonesia is much easier to understand since solow 1957 and denison 1962 it is known that capital accumulation explain only a small part of economic growth if most of economic growth is caused by learning by doing induced technologica

votes and violence evidence from a field experiment in nigeria following the wave of democratization during the 1990s elections are now common in low income societies however these elections are frequently flawed we investigate the nigerian general election of 2007 which is to date the largest election held in africa and one seriously marred by violence we designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti violence grassroots campaigning we find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject surveying and independent data sources crucially we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents we suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies vote buying and ballot fraud voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism

carbon capture and storage and transboundary pollution a differential game approach abstract we study the strategic behavior of two countries facing transboundary co2 pollution under a differential game setting in our model the reduction of co2 concentration occurs through the carbon capture and storage process rather than through the adoption of cleaner technologies furthermore we first provide the explicit short run dynamics for this dynamic game with symmetric open loop and a special markovian nash strategy then we compare these strategies at the games steady states and along some balanced growth paths our results show that if the initial level of co2 is relatively high state dependent emissions reductions can lead to higher overall environmental quality hence feedback strategy leads to less social waste

dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements abstract in terms of the number of signatories one observes both large and small international environmental agreements the theoretical literature based on game theory discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions the conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances under farsightedness both large and small stable coalitions can occur this theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments this paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared with the costs of abatement

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

postconflict monetary reconstruction during civil wars governments typically resort to inflation to raise revenue a model of this phenomenon is presented estimated and applied to the choices and constraints faced during the post conflict period the results show that far from there being a fiscal peace dividend post conflict governments tend to face even more pressing needs after than during war as a result in the absence of post conflict aid inflation increases sharply frustrating a more general monetary recovery aid decisively transforms the path of monetary variables in the post conflict period enabling the economy to regain peacetime characteristics post conflict aid thus achieves a monetary reconstruction analogous to its more evident role in infrastructure

explaining international fertility differences why do fertility rates vary so much across countries why are european fertility rates so much lower than american fertility rates to answer these questions we extend the barro becker framework to incorporate the decision to accumulate human capital which determines earnings and health capital which determines life span we find that cross country differences in productivity and taxes go a long way toward explaining the observed differences in fertility and mortality

the quantitative role of child care for female labor force participation and fertility consistent with facts for a cross section of oecd countries i document that the labor force participation rate of west german mothers with children aged zero to two exceeds the corresponding child care enrollment rate whereas the opposite is true for mothers with children aged three to mandatory school age i develop a life cycle model that explicitly accounts for this age dependent relationship through various types of non paid and paid child care the calibrated version of the model is used to evaluate two policy reforms concerning the supply of subsidized child care for children aged zero to two these counterfactual policy experiments suggest that the lack of subsidized child care constitutes indeed for some females a barrier to participate in the labor market and depresses fertility

pollution accumulation and abatement policy in a supply chain abstract this paper seeks to determine how the double marginalization phenomenon affects the tradeoff between polluting emissions and abatement activities related to pollution accumulation in a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer the environmental consequence of this inefficiency which emerges in a non cooperative vertical setting governed by a single parameter contract is overlooked in the literature on pollution control in the setup of a two stage game we investigate the impact of double marginalization for non cooperative equilibrium to check whether there are differences between dynamic and strategic effects of double marginalization on pollution accumulation both the open loop and feedback nash equilibria are derived over a finite time horizon with the cooperative solution as a benchmark

winners and losers from regional integration agreements how are the benefits and costs of a customs union divided between member countries outcomes depend on the comparative advantage of members relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world countries with a comparative advantage between that of their partners and the rest of the world do better than countries with an extreme comparative advantage consequently integration between low income countries tends to lead to divergence of member country incomes while agreements between high income countries cause convergence results suggest that developing countries are likely to be better served by north south than by south south agreements

demographic structures savings and international capital flows abstract this paper investigates how the different demographic characteristics of two countries will drive the flow of capital between them as inhabitants of the longer lived nation have a higher savings rate than do those with the shorter lifespan it is motivated by the recent us experience during which its net foreign asset position declined dramatically while simultaneously its longevity has fallen increasingly below that of other developed g7 economies our contribution is to address the issue by introducing empirically based survival mortality functions into a traditional two country macrodynamic framework in doing so we eliminate some of the unsatisfactory aspects associated with the traditional two country representative agent model the sensitivity of the capital flows and the resulting net foreign assets of the two economies to key structural characteristics and their consequences for savings are emphasized

average marginal tax rates from social security and the individual income tax we extend previous estimates of the average marginal tax rate from the federal individual income tax to include social security our computations consider the tax rates on employers employees and the self employed the income that accrues to persons with earnings below the ceiling and the effective deductibility of employers social security contributions from workers taxable income the next effect of social security on the average marginal tax rate is below 02 until 1966 but then rises to 03 in 1968 04 in 1973 05 in 1974 06 in 1979 and 07 in 1982 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

tribe or nation nation building and public goods in kenya versus tanzania this article examines how government policies affect ethnic relations by comparing outcomes across two nearby districts one in kenya and one in tanzania using colonial era boundary placement as a natural experiment despite similar geography and historical legacies governments in kenya and tanzania have followed radically different language education and local institutional policies with tanzania consistently pursuing more serious nation building the evidence suggests that nation building has allowed diverse communities in rural tanzania to achieve considerably better local public goods outcomes than diverse communities in kenya to illustrate while kenyan communities at mean levels of diversity have 25 percent less local school funding than homogeneous communities on average the comparable figure in the tanzanian district is near zero the kenya tanzania comparison provides empirical evidence that serious reforms can ameliorate social divisions and suggests that nation building should take a place on policy agendas especially in africa

the narrow moving band the dutch disease and the competitive consequences of mrs thatcher notes on trade in the presence of dynamic scale economies abstract this paper presents a model of trade in which comparative advantage instead of being determined by underlying attributes of countries evolves over time through learning by doing in this model arbitrary patterns of specialization once established tend to become entrenched over time the model sheds light on three widely held views that do not make sense in more conventional models first is the view that temporary protection of selected sectors can permanently alter the pattern of comparative advantage in the protecting country s favor second is the view that seemingly favorable developments such as the discovery of exportable natural resources may lead to a permanent loss of other sectors and reduce welfare in the long run third is the possibility that a temporary overvaluation of a currency due to tight money can lead to a permanent loss of competitiveness in some sectors

history lessons institutions factor endowments and paths of development in the new world the explanations offered for the contrasting records of long run growth and development among the societies of north and south america most often focus on institutions the traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion we in contrast argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the new world by the europeans suggests that although there were many influences factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

increasing returns and the genesis of american resource abundance the usa became the world s leading mineral producing nation between 1870 and 1910 a development paralleled by the rising resource intensity of american manufacturing this paper challenges the premise that resource abundance simply reflected the country s geological endowment of mineral deposits instead in the century following 1850 the usa exploited its natural resource potentials to a far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial minerals the paper argues that natural resource abundance was an endogenous socially constructed condition that was not geologically preordained it examines the complex legal institutional technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the us supply responses to the expanding domestic and international industrial demands for minerals and mineral products it suggests that strong positive feedbacks even in the exploitation of depletable resources were responsible for the explosive growth of the american minerals economy

rare disasters asset prices and welfare costs a representative consumer model with epstein zin weil preferences and i i d shocks including rare disasters accords with observed equity premia and risk free rates if the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 3 4 if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exceeds one an increase in uncertainty lowers the price dividend ratio for equity and a rise in the expected growth rate raises this ratio calibrations indicate that society would willingly reduce gdp by around 20 percent each year to eliminate rare disasters the welfare cost from usual economic fluctuations is much smaller though still important corresponding to lowering gdp by about 1 5 percent each year

human capital and the wealth of nations we reevaluate the role of human capital in determining the wealth of nations we use standard human capital theory to estimate stocks of human capital and allow the quality of human capital to vary across countries our model can explain differences in schooling and earnings profiles and consequently estimates of mincerian rates of return across countries we find that effective human capital per worker varies substantially across countries cross country differences in total factor productivity tfp are significantly smaller than found in previous studies our model implies that output per worker is highly responsive to changes in tfp and demographic variables jel e23 i25 j24 j31 o47 no question has perhaps attracted as much attention in the economics literature as why are some countries richer than others much of the current work traces back to the classic work of solow 1956 solow s seminal paper suggested that differ ences in the rates at which capital is accumulated could account for differences in output per capita more recently following the work of lucas 1988 human capital disparities were given a central role in the analysis of growth and development however the best recent work on the topic reaches the opposite conclusion klenow and rodriguez clare 1997 hall and jones 1999 parente and prescott 2000 and bils and klenow 2000 argue that most of the cross country differences in output per worker are not driven by differences in human capital or physical capital rather they are due to differences in a residual total factor productivity tfp in this paper we revisit the development problem in line with the earlier view we find that factor accumulation is more important than tfp in accounting for relative incomes across countries the key difference between our work and previous analyses is in the measurement of human capital the standard approach largely inspired by the work of mincer 1974 takes estimates of the rate of return to schooling as building blocks to directly measure a country s stock of human capital implicitly this method assumes that the marginal contribution to output of one additional year

training and lifetime income this paper challenges the notion that on the job training investments are quantitatively important for workers welfare and argues that on the job training may not increase lifetime income by more than 1 percent i argue that it is very difficult to reconcile the slowdown in wage growth late in a worker s career with optimizing behavior unless the technology for learning on the job is such that it generates very low gains from training the analysis is based on a nonparametric methodology for estimating the learning technology from wage profiles the results are arrived at by comparing the lifetime income when the worker optimally invests in his human capital to the one where he does not make any investments jel e24 j24 j31

the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game abstract we study the impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game i e the ability of a country to control its emissions taking into account the relationship between current emissions and future levels of pollution and thus on future damages we show that when all countries are myopic i e choose the laisser faire policy their payoffs are smaller than when all countries are farsighted i e non myopic however in the case where one myopic country becomes farsighted we show that the welfare impact of foresight on that country is ambiguous foresight may be welfare reducing for the country that acquires it this is due to the reaction of the other farsighted countries to that country s acquisition of foresight the country that acquires foresight reduces its emissions while the other farsighted countries extend their emissions the overall impact on total emissions is ambiguous moreover our results suggest that incentive mechanisms that involve a very small possibly zero present value of transfers can play an important role in inducing a country to adopt a farsighted behavior and diminishing the number of myopic countries these incentives would compensate the myopic country for the short run losses incurred from the acquisition of foresight and can be reimbursed by that country from the gains from foresight that it enjoys in the long run

dual role of price and myopia in a marketing channel abstract in this paper we study a dynamic two player channel where the manufacturer controls the wholesale price and the investment in quality and the retailer chooses the retail price we consider that the retail price affects both the demand and the perceived quality of the brand and that its variations contribute to the building of an internal reference price one of the model s distinctive features is that it accounts for the two meanings of price i e its classical objective measure of the cost of acquiring a particular quantity of the product and its subjective roles as an assessment of the quality of the product and an evaluation of gains or losses deal vs sacrifice resulting from buying a cheap or an expensive product this dual computation is done with respect to the internal reference price our objective is to investigate the impact of retailer s myopia on the pricing strategies and payoffs of channel members in this context a myopic retailer is an agent that disregards the effects of its pricing strategy on the evolution of the perceived brand quality and the reference price

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

the elasticity of intergenerational substitution parental altruism and fertility choice dynastic models common in macroeconomics use a single parameter to control the willingness of individuals to substitute consumption both intertemporally or across periods and intergenerationally or across parents and their children this article defines the concept of elasticity of intergenerational substitution egs and extends a standard dynastic model in order to disentangle the egs from the eis or elasticity of intertemporal substitution a calibrated version of the model lends strong support to the notion that the egs is significantly larger than one in contrast estimates of the eis suggests that it is at most one what disciplines the identification is the need to match empirically plausible fertility rates for the u s we illustrate the potential role of the egs in macroeconomics

population control policies and fertility convergence the rapid population growth in developing countries in the middle of the 20th century led to fears of a population explosion and motivated the inception of what effectively became a global population control program the initiative propelled in its beginnings by intellectual elites in the united states sweden and some developing countries mobilized resources to enact policies aimed at reducing fertility by widening contraception provision and changing family size norms in the following five decades fertility rates fell dramatically with a majority of countries converging to a fertility rate just above two children per woman despite large cross country differences in economic variables such as gdp per capita education levels urbanization and female labour force participation the fast decline in fertility rates in developing economies stands in sharp contrast with the gradual decline experienced earlier by more mature economies in this paper we argue that population control policies are likely to have played a central role in the global decline in fertility rates in recent decades and can explain some patterns of that fertility decline that are not well accounted for by other socioeconomic factors

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

prisoner s dilemma on behavioral choices in the presence of sticky prices farsightedness vs myopia abstract when making decisions in a dynamic environment myopic supply chain members tend to ignore the future effects of their decisions on the evolution of state dynamics by contrast far sighted decision makers consider about the impacts of current decisions on both current profits and future profits in order to study how behavioral choices affect the operation decisions and profits of supply chain members we develop a differential game with sticky prices where one manufacturer purchases components from one supplier and makes final products for end customers the supplier decides on its wholesale price while the manufacturer sets its production quantity either of supply chain members has two behavioral choices myopia and farsightedness we derive and compare equilibrium solutions under four different behavioral combinations our analysis shows that there always exists a prisoner s dilemma caused by behavioral choices farsightedness is a dominant strategy for either the supplier or the manufacturer but both to act myopically makes both of them better off furthermore comparing with other scenarios the whole supply chain obtains the highest profit when both players are myopic in addition we introduce a revenue sharing contract with static wholesale price to mitigate the adverse impacts of the prisoner s dilemma

studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons here we argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into an empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods the approach is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the government of canada over 130 years political competition emerges as the primary political factor affecting government size

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

economic backwardness in political perspective government policies and institutions shape economic incentives and via this channel have a first order impact on economic development why then do many societies adopt policies that discourage investment and maintain institutions that cause economic backwardness perhaps politically powerful groups elites are not in favor of economic growth but why it would appear that economic growth would provide more resources for these groups to take over or tax increasing their economic returns so why don t powerful groups always support economic development in this paper we develop a theory of inefficient government policies and institutions all else equal politically powerful groups would welcome superior institutions and technologies but in practice all else is not equal because superior institutions and technologies may reduce their political power and make it more likely that they will be replaced at the center of our theory is therefore the idea that changes in institutions or the introduction of new technologies often create turbulence eroding the political advantages and future economic rents of incumbent elites alternatively new technologies may enrich competing groups increasing their threat to incumbents these considerations make politically powerful groups fear losing power and oppose economic and political change even when such change will benefit society as a whole to understand the mechanism at work and its potential applications consider a concrete example industrialization in the nineteenth century bairoch 1982 estimates that between 1830 and 1913 world manufacturing output increased by a factor of 5 see table 1 panel a nevertheless this process was highly uneven across regions and countries bairoch also calculates that over the same period manufacturing output in developed countries europe and north america increasedbyafactorofover10 whereasitdeclinedinthe third world among developed countries there were

dynamic cournot competitive harvesting of a common pool resource a variant of the classical harvesting game where a number of competing agents simultaneously harvest a common pool natural resource is analysed the harvesting at each time is a cournot competition the critical assumption made in the present analysis is that most or all individual participants maintain a perspective which is wholly myopic three cases are analysed 1 the case of aggressive myopic cournot competition 2 co operation and 3 competition when there is an incumbent player the development in the number of active participants is outlined and stability criteria for a dynamic cournot competitive game are given the exact deadweight loss due to lack of co operation is calculated 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of wealth h t ouseholds acquire wealth from two sources they save out of income they have earned and they receive transfers from other people the first method of wealth accumulation goes under the name of life cycle saving in which people save during their working lives and dissave after retirement the second involves either an inter vivos transfer that is a transfer between living people or a bequest a transfer that occurs at the death of the donor while inter vivos transfers and bequests will arise in dynastic models where preferences include a taste for the well being of one s descendents few empirical life cycle models reflect these concerns indeed a sharp debate has arisen over the ability of the simple life cycle model to explain observed wealth accumulation understanding the relative sizes of these sources of wealth accumulation affects a variety of issues for example the effects of government debt social insurance public transfer programs estate taxes and incentives for charitable giving depend to some extent on the magnitude and nature of private saving and transfers of wealth analyses of the inequality of wealth may depend on whether most of wealth is earned or received as transfers appropriate policies for encouraging private saving may look rather different depending on whether most saving is to be consumed later in life or passed along to the next generation finally evidence on transfer patterns relates to more fundamental

could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels a game theoretic analysis abstract we identify the conditions under which a myopic pricing behavior could be a profit enhancing tool in the distribution channel a channel member is myopic when he ignores the evolution of the retail prices when actual and past retail prices affect consumers purchasing decisions a differential game is formulated where channel members control transfer and retail prices we start by examining a bilateral monopoly and then introduce competition at the manufacturing level the competing manufacturers play a la nash and can be both myopic both farsighted or one myopic while the other is farsighted we show that for a bilateral monopoly myopia enhances total channel profit when the effect of the reference price is small enough this remains true under competition at the manufacturing level when products are differentiated enough

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations

complements versus substitutes and trends in fertility choice in dynastic models demographers emphasize decreased mortality and economic development as the main contributors generating the demographic transition contrary to previous findings we show that simple dynastic models a la barro becker can reproduce observed changes in fertility in response to decreased mortality and increased productivity growth if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low enough we show that this is largely due to number and welfare of children being substitutes in the utility of parents in this case we find that with an ies of one third model predictions of changes in fertility amount to two thirds of those observed in u s data since 1800 between 1800 and 2000 fertility choice in the united states underwent a dramatic transition depending on estimates it fell from about six children per woman to around two children per woman this demographic transition from a state of high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality has been documented by demographers and historians in the united states and in every other developed country in the world over this same period natural rates of population growth net of immigration also fell but less substantially demographers have not reached a consensus on the root causes of this transformation but list several changes as likely main contributors these include reductions in infant and child mortality rates imrs and cmrs and the process of industrialization and economic development the work in demography and history on this topic has largely been limited to empirical studies with almost no choice based modeling of the type seen in economics even there issues of the timing of changes

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way