information school choice and academic achievement evidence from two experiments we examine a natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school test scores to lower income families in a public school choice plan receiving information significantly increases the fraction of parents choosing higher performing schools parents with high scoring alternatives nearby were more likely to choose nonguaranteed schools with higher test scores using random variation from each experiment we find that attending a higher scoring school increases student test scores the results imply that school choice will most effectively increase academic achievement for disadvantaged students when parents have easy access to test score information and good options from which to choose

do better schools matter parental valuation of elementary education the evaluation of numerous school reforms requires an understanding of the value of better schools given the difficulty of calculating the relationship between school quality and student outcomes i turn to another method and use house prices to infer the value parents place on school quality i look within school districts at houses located on attendance district boundaries houses then differ only by the elementary school the child attends i thereby effectively remove the variation in neighborhoods taxes and school spending i find that parents are willing to pay 2 5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores this finding is robust to a number of sensitivity checks

the analytics of the pricing of higher education and other services in which the customers are inputs many services provide outputs that depend partially on the customers as inputs the presence of other customers often contributes to the output experienced by each purchaser higher education is the premier example others are legion we provide a simple model that addresses the questions of competitive pricing and allocative efficiency for these types of services prices that charge customers for what they get on net output minus input from the firm both are competitive and support efficient allocations these prices internalize the apparent external effects of customers on each other few examples of such prices exist in the real world

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

the effect of school choice on participants evidence from randomized lotteries school choice has become an increasingly prominent strategy for enhancing academic achievement to evaluate the impact on participants we exploit randomized lotteries that determine high school admission in the chicago public schools compared to those students who lose lotteries students who win attend high schools that are better in a number of dimensions including peer achievement and attainment levels nonetheless we find little evidence that winning a lottery provides any systematic benefit across a wide variety of traditional academic measures lottery winners do however experience improvements on a subset of nontraditional outcome measures such as self reported disciplinary incidents and arrest rates

good principals or good peers parental valuation of school characteristics tiebout equilibrium and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions good principals or good peers parental valuation of school characteristics tiebout equilibrium and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions by j esse m r othstein school choice policies may by aligning admin istrators incentives with parental demand yield improved efficiency in educational production milton friedman 1962 john e chubb and terry m moe 1990 but eric a hanushek 1981 cautions if the efficiency of our school systems is due to poor incentives for teachers and admin istrators coupled with poor decision making by consumers it would be unwise to expect much from programs that seek to strengthen market forces in the selection of schools p 35 empha sis added poor decision making is not required parents may rationally choose schools with pleasant surroundings athletic facilities cultural advantages ibid p 34 over those that most efficiently pursue academic performance they may prefer poorly run schools with good peer groups over those that are more effective but en roll worse students j douglas willms and frank h echols 1992 1993 or they may simply be unable to identify effective schools thomas j kane and douglas o staiger 2002 any factor that leads parents to choose any but the most effective available schools will tend to dilute the incentives for efficient management that choice might otherwise create this study examines the distribution of stu dent outcomes across schools within metropol itan housing markets for evidence on parental demand economists have long noted that par ents choices among residential locations are potentially informative about how more com plete choice systems may operate charles m tiebout 1956 melvin v borland and roy m howsen 1992 caroline m hoxby 2000 rothstein 2005 1 i ask whether school effec tiveness plays a sufficiently important role in these decisions to create meaningful incentives for more productive school management i adopt a specific understanding of effective ness appropriate to the question at hand a substantial portion of between school differ ences in student performance can be attributed to differences in student body composition this portion includes the effects of individual stu dent characteristics on their own test scores any direct peer group effects and any indirect ef fects of a school s composition on the quality of its instruction if wealthy schools attract better teachers joseph r antos and sherwin rosen 1975 or more parental involvement this is for my purposes a peer effect it depends on the quality of the school s administration only via school composition a school administrator cannot attract demand by offering a school with wealthy students as these can be offered only if wealthy families demand the school in the first place only the remaining portion of a school s contribution to test scores is effectiveness 2 department of economics and woodrow wilson school princeton university wallace hall 3 rd floor princeton nj 08544 e mail jrothst princeton edu i thank alan auerbach tom davidoff caroline hoxby jus tin mccrary rob mcmillan john quigley cecilia rouse emmanuel saez till von wachter four anonymous refer ees editor robert moffitt seminar participants at several institutions and especially david card for helpful sugges tions i am grateful to the college board for essential data and to a national science foundation graduate research fellowship and the fisher center for real estate and urban economics at uc berkeley for funding see cecilia elena rouse 1998 julie b cullen et al 2005 william g howell et al 2002 and alan b krueger and pei zhu 2004 for analyses of several existing nonresidential choice programs though none focuses on the particular issue studied here this definition avoids the need to find observable de terminants of effectiveness which have proved elusive hanushek 1986 my definition however ignores a school s contribution to nontest outcomes e g sports or music if such outcomes motivate parental choices i will conclude that parents do not demand effective schools of

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

incomplete credit markets and monetary policy abstract we study monetary policy when private credit markets are incomplete the macroeconomy we study has a large private credit market in which participant households use non state contingent nominal contracts nscnc a second small group of households only uses cash supplied by the monetary authority and cannot participate in the credit market there is an aggregate shock we find that despite the substantial heterogeneity the monetary authority can provide for optimal risk sharing in the private credit market and thus overcome the nscnc friction via a counter cyclical price level rule the counter cyclical price level rule is not unique to pin down a unique monetary policy rule we consider two secondary goals for the monetary authority i expected inflation targeting and ii nominal gdp targeting we examine the impact of each of these approaches on the price level rule and other nominal variables in the economy

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

lucas s signal extraction model abstract this is a version of lucas s 1972 expectations and the neutrality of money with finite supports for the exogenous random variables and with aggregate real shocks the finite supports simplify the proofs and permit solutions for examples to be computed the presence of aggregate shocks permits the model to display output aggregate demand and output inflation correlations that more closely duplicate those found in some data sets correlations that have been interpreted as evidence against the model

will affirmative action policies eliminate negative stereotypes a key question concerning affirmative action is whether the labor market gains it brings to minorities can continue without it becoming a permanent fixture in the labor market the authors argue that this depends on how the policy affects employers beliefs about the productivity of minority workers they study the joint determination of employer beliefs and worker productivity in a model of statistical discrimination in job assignments the authors prove that even when identifiable groups are equally endowed ex ante affirmative action can bring about a situation in which employers correctly perceive the groups to be unequally productive ex post copyright 1993 by american economic association

school vouchers a survey of the economics literature we review the theoretical computational and empirical research on school vouchers with a focus on the latter our assessment is that the evidence to date is not sufficient to warrant recommending that vouchers be adopted on a widespread basis however multiple positive findings support continued exploration specifically the empirical research on small scale programs does not suggest that awarding students a voucher is a systematically reliable way to improve educational outcomes and some detrimental effects have been found nevertheless in some settings or for some subgroups or outcomes vouchers can have a substantial positive effect on those who use them studies of large scale voucher programs find student sorting as a result of their implementation although of varying magnitude evidence on both small scale and large scale programs suggests that competition induced by vouchers leads public schools to improve moreover research is making progress on understanding how vouchers may be designed to limit adverse effects from sorting while preserving positive effects related to competition finally our sense is that work originating in a single case e g a given country or in a single research approach e g experimental designs will not provide a full understanding of voucher effects fairly wide ranging empirical and theoretical work will be necessary to make progress

reputation and school competition abstract stratification is a distinctive feature of competitive education markets that can be explained by a preference for good peers learning externalities can lead students to care about the ability of their peers resulting in across school sorting by ability this paper shows that a preference for good peers and therefore stratification can also emerge endogenously from reputational concerns that arise when graduates use their college of origin to signal their ability reputational concerns can also explain puzzling observed trends including the increase in student investment into admissions exam preparation and the decline in study time at college jel i21 i23 i26 j24

labor force participation and monetary policy in the wake of the great recession in this paper we provide compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post 2007 decline in the u s labor force participation rate we then proceed to formulate a stylized new keynesian model in which labor force participation is essentially acyclical during normal times that is in response to small or transitory shocks but drops markedly in the wake of a large and persistent aggregate demand shock finally we show that these considerations can have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy especially under circumstances in which adjustments to the short term interest rate are constrained by the zero lower bound

identification of treatment effects under imperfect matching with an application to chinese elite schools abstract this paper extends the treatment effect framework for causal inference to contexts in which the instrument appears in a data set that can only be linked imperfectly to the treatment and outcome variables contained in another data set to overcome this problem i form all pairwise links between information on the instrument and information on the treatment and outcome matched by the commonly recorded personal characteristics in both data sets i show how these imperfect conditional matches can be used to identify both the average and distributional treatment effects for compliers of the common units of the two data sets this multiple data source approach is then applied to analyze the effect of attending an elite middle school in a chinese city where schools admissions lottery records can only be linked imperfectly to the administrative student records

bureaucrats or politicians part i a single policy task this paper investigates the normative criteria that guide the allocation of a policy task to an elected politician versus an independent bureaucrat the bureaucrat is preferable for technical tasks for which ability is more important than effort or if there is great uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required abilities the optimal allocation of redistributive tasks is ambiguous and depends on how the bureaucrat can be instructed but irrespective of the normative conclusion the politician prefers not to delegate redistributive policies

does the market value value added evidence from housing prices after a public release of school and teacher value added value added data are an increasingly common evaluation tool for schools and teachers many school districts have adopted these methods and released the results publicly in this paper we study the release of value added data in los angeles by the los angeles times newspaper to identify how measured value added is capitalized into housing prices this analysis is the first in the us school valuation literature to examine property value responses to a value added information shock which is of interest as this measure is less correlated with demographics than typical school quality measures unique to this setting as well is the release of both school and teacher level value added data which allows us to examine how property values respond to both types of information using a difference indifferences methodology surrounding the release we find that neither school nor teacher value added scores are capitalized into home prices our results suggest that despite the contentiousness following these data releases homeowners do not consider value added models as currently constructed to be a relevant school quality measure on the margin

market power and price discrimination in the u s market for higher education the main purpose of this paper is to estimate an equilibrium model of private and public school competition that can generate realistic pricing patterns for private universities in the u s we show that the parameters of the model are identified and can be estimated using a semi parametric estimator given data from the npsas we find substantial price discrimination within colleges we estimate that a 10 000 increase in family income increases tuition at private schools by on average 210 to 510 a one standard deviation increase in ability decreases tuition by approximately 920 to 1 960 depending on the selectivity of the college discounts for minority students range between 110 and 5 750

nominal gdp targeting with heterogeneous labor supply we study nominal gdp targeting as optimal monetary policy in a model with a credit market friction following azariadis bullard singh and suda 2016 henceforth abss as in abss the macroeconomy we study has considerable income inequality which gives rise to a large private sector credit market households participating in this market use non state contingent nominal contracts nscnc we extend the abss framework to allow for endogenous and heterogeneous household labor supply among credit market participant households we show that nominal gdp targeting continues to characterize optimal monetary policy in this setting optimal monetary policy repairs the distortion caused by the credit market friction and so leaves heterogeneous households supplying their desired amount of labor a type of divine coincidence result we also analyze the case when there is an aging population we interpret these findings in light of the recent debate in monetary policy concerning labor force participation

accountability and flexibility in public schools evidence from boston s charters and pilots charter schools are publicly funded but operate outside the regulatory framework and collective bargaining agreements characteristic of traditional public schools in return for this freedom charter schools are subject to heightened accountability this paper estimates the impact of charter school attendance on student achievement using data from boston where charter schools enroll a growing share of students we also evaluate an alternative to the charter model boston s pilot schools these schools have some of the independence of charter schools but operate within the school district face little risk of closure and are covered by many of same collective bargaining provisions as traditional public schools estimates using student assignment lotteries show large and significant test score gains for charter lottery winners in middle and high school in contrast lottery based estimates for pilot schools are small and mostly insignificant the large positive lottery based estimates for charter schools are similar to estimates constructed using statistical controls in the same sample but larger than those using statistical controls in a wider sample of schools the latter are still substantial however the estimates for pilot schools are smaller and more variable than those for charters with some significant negative effects

output and price level effects of monetary uncertainty in a matching model abstract monetary uncertainty and information lags are put into a random matching model so that the resulting setting has some meetings in which producers are relatively informed and others in which consumers are relatively informed for that setting the ex ante socially optimal way to conduct trade is characterized the optimum can display a variety of relationships between money and total output and the price level while the price level is always sticky even the direction of its response and that of total output depend on the magnitude of the lag and on subtle features of the serial correlation properties of the money supply

school markets the impact of information approximating schools effectiveness abstract the impact of competition on school performance is likely to depend on whether parents are informed about schools effectiveness or value added which may or may not be correlated with absolute measures of their quality and on whether this information influences their school choices thereby affecting schools market outcomes this paper explores this by considering chile s sned program which seeks to identify effective schools selecting them from homogeneous groups of comparable institutions its results are widely disseminated and the information it generates is different from that conveyed by a simple test based ranking of schools which turns out to approximate a ranking based on socioeconomic status we use a sharp regression discontinuity to estimate the effect that being identified as a sned winner has on schools enrollment tuition levels and socioeconomic composition through five applications of the program we find no consistent evidence that winning a sned award affects these outcomes

inefficient competition in shadow education investment abstract we investigate how inequalities in wages productivity and education affordability determine individuals educational efforts as they compete for premier jobs extending tullock s 1980 contest theory framework with endogenous returns we first find that competition for better paying jobs can result in social inefficiency in the form of excessive educational efforts second a widening wage gap intensifies the effort competition which induces inefficiency with higher likelihood when the returns to education effort diminish too quickly third when one player s productivity improves relative to the other s the benefitting player is encouraged to exert more effort while his opponent tends to be discouraged to do so the larger share of social inefficiency is carried by the less productive player fourth when educational effort becomes more affordable to one player compared to the other competition increases efficiency only if the change favors the more productive player in the opposite case social inefficiency increases in both cases the less productive player again bears the larger share of social inefficiency

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

admission tuition and financial aid policies in the market for higher education we present an equilibrium model of the market for higher education our model simultaneously predicts student selection into institutions of higher education financial aid educational expenditures and educational outcomes we show that the model gives rise to a strict hierarchy of colleges that differ by the educational quality provided to the students we also develop a new estimation procedure that exploits the observed variation in prices within colleges identification is based on variation in endowments and technology it does not rely on observed variation in potentially endogenous characteristics of colleges such as peer quality measures and expenditures we estimate the structural parameters using data collected by the national center for education statistics and aggregate data from peterson s and the national science foundation

the effects of generalized school choice on achievement and stratification evidence from chile s voucher program in 1981 chile introduced nationwide school choice by providing vouchers to any student wishing to attend private school as a result more than 1000 private schools entered the market and the private enrollment rate increased by 20 percentage points with greater impacts in larger more urban and wealthier communities we use this differential impact to measure the effects of unrestricted choice on educational outcomes using panel data for about 150 municipalities we find no evidence that choice improved average educational outcomes as measured by test scores repetition rates and years of schooling however we find evidence that the voucher program led to increased sorting as the bbestq public school students left for the private sector d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

indivisibilities lotteries and monetary exchange we introduce lotteries randomized trading into search theoretic models of money in a model with indivisible goods and fiat money we show goods trade with probability 1 and money trades with probability where 1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power with divisible goods a nonrandom quantity q trades with probability 1 and again money trades with probability where 1 iff buyers have sufficient bargaining power moreover q never exceeds the efficient quantity not true without lotteries we consider several extensions designed to get commodities as well as money to trade with probability less than 1 and to illuminate the efficiency role of lotteries