women s fertility market work and marital status a test of the new household economics with international data since its emergence from the pioneering efforts of becker 1960 and mincer 1962 the new household economics has inspired a wide range of theoretical and empirical models of demographic behaviour with particular emphasis on fertility female labour force participation and marriage a central principle of these models has been to assign critical roles to the values of men s and women s time in the decision making process in the present paper i adhere to that principle while seeking to contribute to the empirical literature in two important respects 1 the econometric model developed in this paper incorporates several improvements over prior models although women s fertility market work and marital status are closely interconnected their endogeneity has not been fully reflected in previous econometric work 2 in the present model all these demographic variables are endogenous and are subject to a common set of incomes and prices another distinctive feature represents an extension of the approach developed by butz and ward 1979 they used interaction termsmen s and women s earnings weighted by female labour force participation to explain variation in us birth rates here earnings are interacted with the endogenous demographic variables in all equations simulation experiments are used to gauge the total impacts of changes in men s and women s pay under alternative sets of initial conditions 2 for the first time so far as known cross national data are used in a direct test of the new household economics although the literature contains

renewable resource economists and policy what differences have we made abstract this paper surveys developments in fisheries economics and fisheries policy over the past half century early work clarified the nature of the economic issues associated with open access laying the groundwork for changes in policies after coastal nations expanded their jurisdictions in 1976 perhaps the most important point made by economists is that property rights matter and that open access conditions create economic as well as biological problems the policy process has begun to create property rights systems although many of the world s fisheries still operate under mixed systems of regulations and open access incentives

policy watch the marriage penalty many government programs have implicit penalties or subsidies for marriage for example many couples pay higher income taxes when married than their combined tax liabilities as single filers while many other couples receive a marriage subsidy because their joint taxes fall with marriage likewise most low income couples are eligible for higher welfare benefits if they are separated rather than married this article discusses the marriage penalty with a particular focus on tax and transfer programs why does it exist who faces it to what extent does it affect marriage and labor market behavior what tradeoffs are involved in reducing it

widows waiting to wed re marriage and economic incentives in social security widow benefits in this paper we focus on an age restriction for remarriage in the social security system to determine if individuals respond to economic incentives for marriage aged widow er benefits are paid by the federal government to persons whose deceased spouses worked in social security covered employment a widow er is eligible to receive benefits if she or he is at least age 60 if a widow er remarries before age 60 he or she forfeits the benefit and therefore faces a marriage penalty under current law there is no penalty if the remarriage occurs at 60 years of age or later we investigate whether this rule affects the marriage behavior of widows specifically we examine the rates of remarriage of women around age 60 under current as well as past social security eligibility rules using data from the vital statistics our results provide compelling evidence that this group of women respond to economic incentives when considering the decision to remarry first the 1979 law change that eliminated the marriage penalty for those at least age 60 resulted in a large increase in the marriage rate for widows at

changing the price of marriage evidence from blood test requirements abstract we use state repeals of blood test requirements btrs for a marriage license that occurred between 1980 and 2008 to examine the impact of changes in the price of marriage on the marriage decision using a within group estimator that holds constant state and year effects and exploits variation in the repeal dates of btrs across states we find that btrs are associated with a 6 1 percent decrease in marriage licenses issued by a state this main finding is supported with results from individual level marriage license and current population survey data the largest effects are found for lower socioeconomic groups

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

over the borderline how the characteristics of lines shape optimal tax policy using the example of geographic borders i demonstrate how the permeability of lines in the tax system and the ability of the tax authority to reduce tax evasion across lines are essential determinants of the optimal commodity tax policy

optimal tax treatment of the family married couples abstract this paper examines the appropriate tax treatment of the family in a series of analytical models and numerical examples for a population of taxpaying couples which differ in earning capacity we drive the optimal tax rates for each potential earner these rates depend crucially upon own and cross labor supply elasticities and the joint distribution of wage rates our results suggest that the current system of income splitting in the united states under which husbands and wives face equal marginal tax rates is nonoptimal using results from recent econometric studies and allowing for a sensitivity analysis the optimal tax rates on secondary workers in the family are much lower than those on primary earners indeed our best estimate is that the secondary earner would face tax rates only one half as high as primary earners

for love or money the impact of income taxes on marriage higher sometimes lower than their combined single income tax obligations in this paper we explore the impact of the federal individual income tax as well as other economic and demograplhic variables on the marriage decisionis of individuals using longitudinal data from the panel study on income dynamics for the period 1968 92 we estimate a discrete time hazard model of the time to first marriage we find that the probability of marriage is significantly affected by a range of economic and demographic variables importantly we find that an increase in total income taxes paid by married versus single women has a negative effect on the likelihood of marriage and that the change in the marginal tax rate is also a significant determinant of marriage in some cases in contrast the tax effects are rarely significant in determining marriage probabilities among men although there are some differential responses by race in general the impacts of the income tax variables even when statistically significant are small

governing a groundwater commons a strategic and laboratory analysis of western water law we examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the american west solving a dynamic common pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments three forms of legal rules common pool depletion with a rule of capture to establish ownership absolute ownership doctrine entry restrictions prior appropriation doctrine and stock quotas correlative rights doctrinekre examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments

bargaining and distribution in marriage the standard economic model of the family is a common preference model that assumes that a family maximizes a single utility function and implies that family behavior is independent of which individuals receive income or control resources in recent years this model has been challenged by game theoretic models of marriage that do not impose pooling and are therefore consistent with empirical evidence that income controlled by husbands and wives does have different effects on family behavior in this paper the authors review a number of simple bargaining models and relevant empirical evidence and discuss their implications for distribution within marriage

cohabitation marriage and divorce in a model of match quality the objective of this research is to further our understanding of how and why individuals enter and leave coresidential relationships we develop and estimate an economic model of nonmarital cohabitation marriage and divorce that is consistent with current data on the formation and dissolution of relationships jovanovic s journal of political economy 87 1979 972 90 theoretical matching model is extended to help explain household formation and dissolution behavior implications of the model reveal what factors influence the decision to start a relationship what form this relationship will take and the relative stability of the various types of unions the structural parameters of the model are estimated using longitudinal data from a sample of female high school seniors from the united states new numerical methods are developed to reduce computational costs associated with estimation the empirical results have interesting interpretations given the structural model they show that a significant cause of cohabitation is the need to learn about potential partners and to hedge against future bad shocks the estimated parameters are used to conduct several comparative dynamic experiments for example we show that policy experiments changing the cost of divorce have little effect on relationship choices

german income taxation and the timing of marriage i investigate how the german income tax code affects the timing of marriages the german income tax code allows married couples to benefit from full income splitting relative to unmarried couples

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

taxing an independent scotland if scotland were to become independent it would gain considerably more control over its tax system than it currently enjoys in this paper we consider the consequences of independence for the optimal design of a new scottish tax system an analysis which would also be of some relevance for considering the consequences for tax design of independence of other smaller nations scotland is different from the rest of the uk in some ways that are important for tax system design incomes are more equally distributed for example that is one reason why the progressive income tax currently raises less per head in scotland than in the rest of the uk it also suggests that there is less to be gained in terms of redistribution from sharply progressive taxation independence would create additional complexity for individuals and firms working or trading across borders it could also put downward pressure on tax rates and our analysis suggests that optimal tax rates in an independent scotland are likely to be lower than optimal rates in the uk as a whole at the same time the context of a substan tial budget deficit will continue to put upward pressure on tax rates

will you civil union me although the tax system is not marriage neutral in many countries it has been found to be only slightly significant in determining marriage decisions buffeteau and echevin 2003 alm and whittington 1995 this paper tests whether the tax system can alter the decision to contract a civil union which is less binding than a marital contract in 1999 france introduced civil union pacs as an alternative legal union to marriage i assess the impact of taxation on the decision to contract a pacs using a difference in differences evaluation of the 2005 income tax reform for newly pacsed couples as the control group is contaminated by the reform i propose an original estimation method based on a difference in differences in differences setting to estimate bounds to the impact of the reform my results find a positive and increasing impact of taxation on pacs rates but also a change in the timing of pacs unions suggesting that taxation alters the decision to contract a pacs in addition i find a slightly significant impact of taxation on the decision to terminate a pacs

welfare effects on female headship with area effects the existing literature on welfare effects on female headship in the united states shows significant positive correlations in cross section possibly increasing over time however when geographic or area effects are permitted in the estimation these correlations either disappear or reverse in sign the results have implications for the study of welfare effects in other countries including canada where benefits vary considerably across provinces and localities within them

an experimental examination of fisheries with concurrent common pool and individual quota management i introduction how user communities exploit and develop institutions to manage common pool resources attracts attention from across the social sciences e g national research council 2002 dynamic common pool resources such as aquifers forest soils and fisheries are a focus because of their potential to sustain income and provide food and water security particularly in traditional communities and in vulnerable communities in the developing world e g arnason kelleher and willman 2009 baland and platteau 1996 economic analyses have been directed primarily at identifying extraction levels that central planners can impose in order to maximize the highest sustainable flow of resource benefits conrad 2010 wilen 2000 while political scientists sociologists and anthropologists have studied the governance structures that establish use norms and policies and the conditions under which users can successfully manage the resource without central intervention e g agrawal 2002 ostrom 2009 recent trends in management have introduced economically significant examples of dynamic resources where a central planner constrains the full extent of the interseason externality ensuring sustainable resource levels and extractions but other externalities persist within seasons that have the potential to dissipate much of the rent the most prevalent examples are in fisheries where management agencies use biological fish stock assessments to establish a hard seasonal total allowable catch tac for each fishery to ensure stock health in many fisheries catch share programs allocate shares of the tac as quota to groups or to individuals who then can or must form cooperatives to manage intraseason externalities caused by concurrent production congestion in season growth patterns or market timing interest is added because these groups called sectors in many fisheries are often self identifying and multiple sectors participate in each fishery harvesters can affiliate around harvesting methods management preferences geography or any other factor on the one hand this strategy could be a method for carving users into groups that meet ostrom s 2009 conditions and thus supporting self management of intraseason externalities e g cunningham and bostock 2005 aoki and hayami 2001 townsend shotton and uchida 2008 wilson nielsen and dengbol 2003 on the other hand it could be a technique for breaking political gridlock preventing more efficient economic management of the inter or intraseason externalities e g acheson and gardner 2011 kuperan and sutinen 1998 while such sectorization programs are thought to have many benefits such as an increase in legitimacy incorporating local knowledge and getting managers out of the business of setting individual allocations prospective and retrospective economic analysis of these policies is difficult because if different sectors choose different regulations the fishery can be regulated by multiple management systems concurrently this presents two significant challenges to analysts assessing the effects of such catch share programs first they must figure out not only how harvesters in each sector will respond to the harvesting strategies of others in their sector but also how the sectors will strategize against one another where contemporaneous congestion or price externalities are present some sectors rules might permit members to strategically adjust their harvesting behavior to respond to harvesting strategies of other sectors thus a theoretical and empirical framework requires harvesters to make daily decisions that are subject to cumulative annual constraints within a dynamic game with different types of players reflecting each sector in addition the counterfactual policy environment against which the sector program will be assessed must take into account the shifts in targeting and market timing behavior that not only reflect changes in the rules that apply to sector members but also the different rules under which harvesters are operating

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

marital status and fertility in the united states welfare and labor market effects the incidence of marriage and the proportion of childbearing that occurs within marriage have decreased sharply in the united states in the last several decades this paper examines whether the probability that a woman is currently married and the number of children she has borne as reported in the 1980 u s census are related to two identifiable factors the variation in welfare programs across states specifically afdc and medicaid benefits and afdc up expenditures or the variation in the market wage opportunities available to women and to their potential husbands afdc and medicaid benefit levels are associated with fewer women being currently married medicaid benefits are related to lower fertility levels for both black and white women whereas afdc benefits in cash and food are associated with lower fertility among white women ages 15 24 those states that extend afdc benefits to families with unemployed parents in other words fathers in intact poor families do not have significantly more women married or higher fertility rates contrary to what might be expected from economic incentives men s market wages are associated with more frequent marriage and higher fertility whereas higher market wage opportunities for women have substantial effects in the opposite direction all of which are consistent with standard models of gender specialization and the demand for marriage and fertility

a model of regulated open access resource use abstract this paper develops a model of regulated open access resource exploitation the regulatory model assumes that regulators are goal oriented choosing target harvest levels according to a safe stock concept these harvest quotas are implemented by setting season lengths conditioned on the industry fishing capacity the industry enters until rents are dissipated conditioned on season length regulations harvest levels fishing capacity season length and biomass are determined jointly using parameter estimates from the long regulated north pacific halibut fishery predictions of these variables from the regulated open access model are compared to predictions that arise from the gordon model

the panel study of income dynamics after fourteen years an evaluation this article considers the representativeness of the panel study of income dynamics psid over its 14 year history from 1968 to 1981 given the dynamics of entry and exit from the panel by 1981 40 of the original members had left the sample and were replaced by new entrants who joined either existing households or new households being formed by members of the original sample we consider the distribution of demographic characteristics and earnings equations over time and we compare the psid with the current population survey cps by either approach we find little evidence that the psid has become unrepresentative

the effect of relationship status on health with dynamic health and persistent relationships the dynamic evolution of health and persistent relationship status pose econometric challenges to disentangling the causal effect of relationships on health from the selection effect of health on relationship choice using a new econometric strategy we find that marriage is not universally better for health rather cohabitation benefits the health of men and women over 45 being never married is no worse for health and only divorce marginally harms the health of younger men we find strong evidence that unobservable health related factors can confound estimates our method can be applied to other research questions with dynamic dependent and multivariate endogenous variables

til death or taxes do us part the effect of income taxation on divorce there is now much empirical evidence that economic incentives affect the divorce decision via their impact on the flow of benefits of divorced vs married individuals however the effect of the individual income tax on divorce has been neglected in this work the income tax in the us is structured so that tax liability often changes with marriage some couples incur a marriage penalty in the form of higher taxes when they marry while others receive a marriage subsidy because their tax burden falls with marriage in this paper the authors examine the impact of the individual income tax on the likelihood of divorce in the us using data from the panel study on income dynamics they estimate a discrete time hazard model of the probability of divorce from the first marriage to test the hypothesis that the probability of divorce rises with the marriage penalty they also examine the role of other economic factors in the divorce decision the authors find that individuals respond to tax incentives in their decision to divorce although these responses are typically small and differ for men and women authors

nash equilibrium tariffs for the united states and canada the roles of country size scale economies and capital mobility a theoretical analysis of optimal nash equilibrium tariff rates is presented a numerical general equilibrium model is then used to find nash equilibrium tariff rates for the united states and canada the nash equilibrium tariffs are small relative to partial equilibrium estimates 18 percent for the united states and 6 percent for canada the united states is essentially indifferent between the nash equilibrium and free trade while canada is better off at the latter by 4 billion empirical results support theoretical predictions that the optimal tariff is smaller when the country is smaller there are scale economies and free entry and capital is internationally mobile

marriage markets and assortative mating with household public goods theoretical results and empirical implications this paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage result from joint consumption of household public goods assuming transferable utility within marriage the paper proves that marriage markets will be characterized by positive assortative mating on wealth when spouses differ only in endowments and the gains to marriage result only from public goods when spouses differ in wages and household public goods are produced at home the results imply offsetting effects with public good economies creating an incentive for positive assortative mating on wages and gains from specialization creating an incentive for negative assortative mating on wages the results help explain the persistent lack of empirical support for becker s prediction of negative assortative mating on wages and have implications for empirical analysis of all joint living arrangement decisions

the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior in households whose allocation decisions can be represented as nash bargained household decisions extrahousehold environmental parameters eeps serve as pure shifters of the threat points the comparative statics of changes in demands due to changes in these eeps are given these are incorporated into a comprehensive statement of the empirical content of nash bargained household behavior including a nash generalization of barten s 1966 fundamental matrix equation of the theory of consumer demand estimation and data requirements are discussed along with nested testing of the following structure the neoclassical model is nested in the nash bargained model which in turn is nested in an unrestricted model of household demands emphasized throughout is the enriched menu of explanatory variables for demand analysis provided by the nash model as well as the model s ability to jointly analyze i household formation and ii intrahousehold allocation decisions

income taxes and the marriage decision economic incentives have been found to play an important role in the marriage decision in developed and developing countries however the way in which the income tax treatment of the family affects these incentives has been routinely ignored this paper uses time series data for the united states from 1947 to 1988 to estimate the impact of economic factors including for the first time the tax consequences of marriage on the aggregate marriage rate the estimation results indicate that economic factors like income female wages and education play an important and statistically significant role in the marriage decision in particular the tax consequences of marriage clearly affect the marriage decision when income taxes increase with marriage the aggregate marriage rate declines however the magnitude of this impact is quite small this result suggests that some individuals respond to tax incentives in their marriage choices but that for many individuals taxes do not affect these decisions

the spatial incidence of local retail taxation this paper examines the effects of local retail taxation in two simple models of spatial competition suppose that a suburb or central city imposes an excise tax or subsidy on a particular commodity such as gasoline liquor restaurant meals or groceries or imposes a general sales tax that affects many commodities simultaneously to what extent does this lead to higher prices within the jurisdiction and in neighboring jurisdictions section ii presents the basic model of spatial competition that forms a component of the fixed locations model of section iii and the entry model of section iv infinitely many stores are located along an infinite line and demand density is completely inelastic and uniform along the line the main endogenous variables of interest are the prices charged by the different stores throughout the paper a nash equilibrium in prices is assumed section iii presents the fixed locations model in which the tax is imposed after stores have already established themselves store locations are fixed due to location specific sunk costs if a suburb containing a single store imposes an excise tax on a commodity the store that is taxed and its first second and third nearest neighbors on each side increase their prices by 57 7 percent 15 5 percent 4 2 percent and 1 1 percent of the tax respectively this result is independent of the spacing of the stores and independent of whether or not they are evenly spaced if a suburb containing several stores imposes an excise tax the changes in price follow directly by adding the effects of taxes on several adjacent stores if a central city taxes all stores on the right half line the results are given by 12 the taxed and untaxed stores closest to the boundary

income taxes and the timing of marital decisions abstract in this paper we estimate the impact of the federal individual income tax on the timing of marital decisions anecdotal evidence suggests that the tax penalty often associated with marriage contributes to the decision of when to marry using household data from the panel study on income dynamics we estimate various models of the probability of delaying marriage as a function of the change in tax burden caused by marriage as well as several other variables we find that there is a significant positive relationship between the marriage penalty in a year and the probability of delaying marriage until the following year the magnitude of the effect however is small

how does the choice of the gender indicator affect the analysis of gender differences in agricultural productivity evidence from uganda summary we use ols and decomposition techniques to investigate gender differences in agricultural productivity in uganda using nationally representative surveys from years 2009 2012 the analysis applies different gender dummies female head of household female plot holder and female plot manager to investigate how the variable of choice affects the calculation of the gender gap our analysis obtains different results depending on the gender variable of choice the study finds that regardless of the variable of choice the gender gap in agricultural productivity decreases or disappears when factors of production and crop choice are controlled for the conditional gender gap is about 10 and significant when using female plot manager as the gender variable while we find no conditional gender gap when using the other gender variables the use of time fixed effects and decomposition contributes evidence that the typically available gender variables are insufficient for identifying how gender and decision making of different household members play a role in productivity this finding is problematic for targeting effective interventions to increase agricultural productivity and reduce gender inequalities in agriculture finally we find that the older status of female heads holders and manager of plots child dependency ratio and limited access to adult male labor are factors decreasing productivity in female plots in uganda

cross border shopping from small to large countries abstract contrary to predictions of theoretical models there are many examples in the real world of cross border shopping from small to large countries we demonstrate that a sufficient wedge between marginal costs of public funds in small and large countries can explain this phenomenon

saying i don t the effect of the affordable care act young adult provision on marriage this paper investigates the effect of the affordable care act young adult provision on the propensity to marry the young adult provision expanded options for obtaining insurance coverage outside of marriage young adults affected by the provision might have less incentive to marry since one avenue for obtaining health insurance coverage is through marriage this paper examines this question by applying difference in differences type methods using the 2008 2013 american community survey results suggest that the provision is associated with decreases in the likelihood of marrying cohabitation and spousal health insurance coverage and an increase in the probability of divorce

marriage divorce and social safety net policy i study the effects of the earned income tax credit eitc and welfare reforms of the 1990s on flows into and out of marriage i use test scores to predict who is most likely to be affected by the policy changes and employ a flexible functional form to estimate heterogeneous effects i find that lower earning married women are more likely to divorce as the eitc expands but i find no effect of eitc generosity on marriage i find little effect of welfare generosity on marriage or divorce flows for any group my results suggest that there are nonsymmetric responses to policy on flows into and out of marriages

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

eu regional policy and tax competition the european union eu provides coordination and financing of trans european transport infrastructures i e roads and railways which link the eu member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility this raises the question of whether eu involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies moreover an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition we analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms we show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition in contrast with regard to union periphery infrastructure the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures here the effects on tax competition are ambiguous our results provide a rationale for eu level regional policy that supports the development of intra union infrastructure

the married widow marriage penalties matter marriage penalties are a controversial feature of many government policies empirical evidence of their behavioral effects is quite mixed which is surprising because economic theory predicts that they should have an impact on the headship decision we investigate the removal of marriage penalties from the surviving spouse pensions of the canadian public pension system in the 1980s these reforms provide a simple and transparent source of identification our results indicate that marriage penalties can have large and persistent effects on marriage decisions we also present evidence suggesting that it is individuals with characteristics correlated with greater wealth who respond to the penalties jel j1 h2

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects