distinguishing between equilibrium and integration in spatial price analysis this article introduces a new spatial price analysis methodology based on maximum likelihood estimation of a mixture distribution model incorporating price transfer cost and trade flow data this method permits differentiation between market integration and competitive market equilibrium and derivation of intuitive measures of intermarket tradability competitive market equilibrium perfect integration segmented equilibrium and segmented disequilibrium one can also use these estimates to derive semiparametric measures of time varying regime probabilities to track changing market conditions an application to trade in soybean meal among pacific rim economies demonstrates the usefulness of the method copyright 2002 oxford university press

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

estimating the degree of market integration existing tests of spatial market integration are commonly based on statistical criteria without an explicit link to an economic model of price determination this article proposes new measures of market integration defined directly in terms of a well known spatial price determination model and develops an econometric methodology for estimating these measures due to the intractability of the conditional density function of prices we use indirect inference to estimate the model parameters and market integration measures the methodology is illustrated with simulated data and is applied to soybean price data for the united states brazil and the eu copyright 2008 oxford university press

risk sharing in licensing abstract this paper studies the design of linear license contracts under demand or cost uncertainty the optimal contract consists in general of a mix of a fixed fee and royalties the source of uncertainty has a crucial impact on the type of royalties that must be used in particular under demand uncertainty at most two of the instruments are used the contract generally combines a fixed fee with an ad valorem royalty when cost is uncertain a wider variety of cases can arise the contract may involve a combination of either type of royalties coupled with a fixed fee alternatively it may be optimal to use all three available instruments

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

cash crop production food price volatility and rural market integration in the third world large farmers in the third world often devote to cash crops a larger share of their land than do small farmers this paper suggests a possible explanation even in the presence of food markets third world farmers food security is best assured by food self sufficiency a model of crop portfolio choice under multivariate risk is used to show that reasonable assumptions regarding risk and preferences reproduce the observed pattern simulations further indicate that food market integration reduces the need for food self sufficiency policy implications are drawn regarding domestic trade liberalization and agricultural technology

the digital provide information technology market performance and welfare in the south indian fisheries sector when information is limited or costly agents are unable to engage in optimal arbitrage excess price dispersion across markets can arise and goods may not be allocated efficiently in this setting information technologies may improve market performance and increase welfare between 1997 and 2001 mobile phone service was introduced throughout kerala a state in india with a large fishing industry using microlevel survey data we show that the adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers was associated with a dramatic reduction in price dispersion the complete elimination of waste and near perfect adherence to the law of one price both consumer and producer welfare increased

malawi reforming the state s role in agricultural marketing abstract the role of the state in agricultural marketing activities has been a contentious issue in many countries undergoing structural adjustment this paper examines three examples of smallholder market reform in malawi to illustrate the case for various forms of state involvement and the complexities involved in reducing the state s role when this is required

how is the liberalization of food markets progressing market integration and transaction costs in subsistence economies we propose a modification of baulch s parity bounds model to measure the market integration of food markets in developing countries instead of extrapolating a single observation of transaction costs we estimate transaction costs predicted transaction costs compare well with survey data of traders probabilities of market regimes computed on the basis of predicted transaction costs fluctuate significantly and do not support fixed regime probabilities over time the probability of market integration with trade decreases consistently during food shortages increasing either the probability of no trade or loss making trade or the probability of profitable but unexploited trade opportunities the data further support a negative trend in market integration with trade

efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes we examine the problem of developing supply contracts that encourage proper coordination of forecast information and production decisions between a manufacturer and distributor of high fashion seasonal products operating in a two mode production environment the first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead time while the second is expensive but offers quick turnaround we focus on contracts of the form w1 w2 b wherewi is the wholesale price offered for production modei andb is a return price offered for items left over at the end of the season we find that such a contract can coordinate the manufacturer and distributor to act in the best interest of the channel the pricing conditions needed to ensure an efficient solution vary depending on the degree of demand forecast improvement between periods and the manufacturer s access to forecast information we also examine whether these conditions ensure a pareto optimal solution with respect to two traditional production settings

estimating policy effects on spatial market efficiency an extension to the parity bounds model the standard parity bounds model pbm is extended to allow for dynamic shifts in regime probabilities in response to changes in marketing policy the approach allows estimation of the length of the adjustment period and a statistical test for no policy effects the extended pbm is applied to maize and wheat markets in ethiopia evidence of a dynamic adjustment path is found and grain marketing reforms are found to have improved spatial efficiency in a few markets worsened it in a few others but generally to have had little effect on the spatial efficiency of ethiopian grain markets

competitive and cooperative inventory policies in a two stage supply chain we investigate a two stage serial supply chain with stationary stochastic demand and fixed transportation times inventory holding costs are charged at each stage and each stage may incur a consumer backorder penalty cost e g the upper stage the supplier may dislike backorders at the lower stage the retailer we consider two games in both the stages independently choose base stock policies to minimize their costs the games differ in how the firms track their inventory levels in one the firms are committed to tracking echelon inventory in the other they track local inventory we compare the policies chosen under this competitive regime to those selected to minimize total supply chain costs i e the optimal solution we show that the games nearly always have a unique nash equilibrium and it differs from the optimal solution hence competition reduces efficiency furthermore the two games equilibria are different so the tracking method influences strategic behavior we show that the system optimal solution can be achieved as a nash equilibrium using simple linear transfer payments the value of cooperation is context specific in some settings competition increases total cost by only a fraction of a percent whereas in other settings the cost increase is enormous we also discuss stackelberg equilibria

the right to return this article studies the allocation of responsibility for unsold inventory provision for which is made in practically every distribution contract the two extreme cases are the consignment contract which allocates all the burden to the manufacturer and the no return contract in which retailers purchase the merchandise outright and assume responsibility for unsold inventory contract choices are shown to vary across countries industries products and types of transactions the article identifies six main factors affecting this choice optimal inventory policy in a stochastic retail demand environment relative advantage in disposing of the unsold inventory optimal risk allocation incentives to invest in promotions and provide services to increase consumer demand information asymmetry and costs associated with the consignment contract per se several testable implications are presented and the choice of contracts in the publishing industry is shown to be consistent with the predictions of the model

price protection in the personal computer industry price protection is a commonly used practice between manufacturers and retailers in the personal computer pc industry motivated by drastic declines of product values during the product life cycle it is a form of rebate given by the manufacturer to the retailer for units unsold at the retailer when the price drops during the product life cycle it is a controversial policy in the pc industry because it is not clear how such a policy benefits the supply chain and its participants we show that price protection is an instrument for channel coordination for products with long manufacturing lead times so the retailer has a single buying opportunity a properly chosen price protection credit coordinates the channel for products with shorter manufacturing lead times so the retailer has two buying opportunities price protection alone cannot guarantee channel coordination when wholesale prices are exoge nous however when the price protection credit is set endogenously together with the wholesale prices channel coordination is restored in the two buying opportunity setting with fixed wholesale prices we show that price protection has two primary impacts 1 shifting sales forward in time and 2 increasing total sales finally we present a simple numerical example that suggests given the current economics of the pc industry that price protection under fixed wholesale prices may benefit the total chain and the retailer but hurt the manufacturer

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

fee versus royalty licensing in a cournot duopoly model abstract this paper finds that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed fee licensing for the patent holding firm when the cost reducing innovation is non drastic the reason for this result is that the patent holding firm enjoys a cost advantage over the licensee under royalty licensing while the two firms compete on equal footing under fixed fee licensing

the privatization of agricultural trading in malawi abstract this paper examines the privatization of smallholder agricultural output marketing in malawi despite problems with implementing the privatization program including serious disruptions in the supply of maize the staple food the move toward greater private sector involvement in agricultural marketing has been successful nonetheless several medium term development issues e g food security and buyer and seller of last resort functions need to be addressed in the context of relations between the marketing parastatal admarc and the private sector before the policy change can be regarded as fully successful

contracting with externalities the paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and n agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents trades with the principal when the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non signers in contrast when the principal s offers are privately observed the distortion is due to the externalities given agents equilibrium trades comparison of the two externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes in both cases we show that when n is large each agent can be treated as non pivotal provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied we also study the case in which the principal can condition each agent s trade on other agents messages we characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent s participation is voluntary when the principal can commit to any such mechanism she implements the first best outcome while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment however in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than n goes to infinity in the limit we obtain a generally inefficient outcome in which each agent feels non pivotal

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

abuse of dominance and licensing of intellectual property patent thickets layers of licenses a firm needs to be able to offer products that embody technologies owned by multiple firms and licensing policies have drawn increasing scrutiny from policy makers patent thickets involve complementary products which gives rise to double marginalization the so called royalty stacking problem and has the potential to retard diffusion of new technologies and reduce consumer welfare this paper examines the impact of licensing policies of one or more upstream owners essential intellectual property ip on the downstream firms that require access to that ip the terms under which downstream firms can access this ip affects entry decisions product diversity prices and welfare we consider both the case in which a single party controls the essential ip and the case in which different parties control complementary pieces of essential ip we compare the outcome of several alternative standard licensing arrangements such as flat rate access fees royalty percentages per unit fees patent pools and cross licensing arrangements with or without vertical integration we first consider the case where there is a single upstream owner of essential ip increasing the number of licenses enhances product variety which creates added value but it also intensifies downstream competition which dissipates profits we derive conditions under which the upstream ip monopoly will then want to provide an excessive or insufficient number of licenses relative to the number that maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare when there are multiple owners of essential ip royalty stacking can reduce the number of the downstream licensees but also the downstream equilibrium prices the consumers face the paper derives conditions determining whether this reduction in downstream price and variety is beneficial to consumers or society finally the paper explores the impact of alternative licensing policies with fixed license fees or royalties expressed as a percentage of the price an upstream ip owner cannot control the intensity of downstream competition in contrast volume based license fees i e per unit access fees do permit an upstream owner to control downstream competition and to replicate the outcome of complete integration the paper also shows that vertical integration can have little impact on downstream competition and licensing terms when ip owners charge fixed or volume based access fees

supplier manufacturer coordination in capacitated two stage supply chains abstract manufacture to order is an increasingly popular strategy in commodity electronics and other similar markets where many different product configurations can be produced from common components to succeed in this environment manufacturers need to keep both cost and order fulfillment time low in this article we compare three different mechanisms that a manufacturer whose revenues depend on order delays may use to affect its component supplier s inventory decisions these mechanisms are specifying components inventory level offering a share of the earned revenues to the supplier called simple revenue sharing and offering a two part revenue sharing scheme we show that whereas the first two approaches do not lead to supply chain coordination the two part scheme does we demonstrate with numerical experiments that up to a point the component supplier benefits from having a high utilization of its production facility whereas the manufacturer benefits from having excess production capacity

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

on licensing policies in bertrand competition abstract three licensing policies the auction the fee and the royalty are studied in a bertrand type duopoly with differentiated goods the analysis is conducted in terms of a multistage noncooperative game involving an external patentee and two firms each producing a differentiated good in bertrand price competition a principal finding is that for a patentee the royalty may be superior to the other two policies journal of economic literature classification numbers 026 611 621

licensing a new product with non linear contracts this paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good the licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good we show that the licensor is able to obtain the profit a monopolist would achieve by producing the new good the equilibrium licensing contract specifies both a fixed fee and a royalty scheme based on the production of a licensee le memoire examine la situation ou un detenteur de brevet sur une technologie qui permet de produire un nouveau bien cherche a ceder une autorisation d exploiter cette innovation a un ensemble de producteurs qui ont differents couts marginaux de production d un bien existant on montre que le detenteur de brevet est capable d obtenir le profit qu un monopoleur obtiendrait en produisant le nouveau bien le contrat de licence d equilibre specifie a la fois un paiement forfaitaire et un arrangement de royautes sur la base du volume de production de l exploitant

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

note the role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively we focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer s and a manufacturer s profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a price at which to sell an item such a commitment is often necessary for retailers who sell primarily through catalogues

transfer costs spatial arbitrage and testing for food market integration conventional tests for food market integration ask often misleadingly whether prices in different locations move together in this paper an alternative methodology the parity bounds model pbm is developed which uses information on transfer costs in addition to food prices to assess the efficiency of spatial arbitrage monte carlo experiments using data generated by a point space spatial price equilibrium model show the pbm to be statistically reliable an application to philippine rice markets demonstrates that the pbm detects efficient arbitrage when other tests do not

testing for food market integration revisited this article considers the statistical performance of four commonly used econometric tests for market integration the law of one price the ravallion model cointegration and granger causality a spatial price equilibrium spe model that is subject to both production shocks and general price inflation and mimics many of the key characteristics of integrated food markets is constructed the model is used to generate food price time series of lengths that are typical of the short sample sizes available in most developing countries for both instantaneously integrated and independent markets a series of monte carlo experiments on these artificial food price time series are performed which show that all four of the conventional tests for market integration are statistically flawed

spatial price efficiency in mozambique s post reform maize markets maize zea mays shortages and maize price instability continue to occur in mozambique in spite of policy reforms and great capacity for increased production in northern mozambique this study measured the efficiency of spatial maize price arbitrage in mozambique s post reform period spatial price inefficiency does not seem to explain why food shortages continue to occur in mozambique suggesting nonprice market constraints such as poor infrastructure and poor market institutions as more likely explanations baulch s spatial efficiency test indicated that it is not profitable to ship maize from northern surplus maize regions to southern mozambique records of interregional maize shipments show that indeed grain is not being shipped from the north to the south market liberalization may have improved spatial price efficiency but high transfer costs still limit trade and potential benefits from freeing markets under these circumstances food shortages and price instability are likely to continue