incentives productivity and labor contracts the relationship between age earnings profiles and worker incentives is examined by contrasting wage and salary workers with the self employed it is argued that the steepness of wage and salary workers age earnings profiles reflects the desire to provide work incentives to those workers since self employed workers do not face this agency problem they are used as a benchmark to gauge productivity empirical support of the proposition is provided and the effects of human capital accumulation are separated empirically from incentive effects the most important conclusion is that under some strong assumptions most of the slope in age earnings profiles is accounted for by the desire to provide incentives rather than by on the job training

gender differences in training capital and wages this paper constructs an equilibrium job matching model where workers differ in their attachment to the labor force the model predicts that workers with weaker attachment to the labor market will receive lower starting wages and lower post training wages and will be placed in jobs that offer less training and use less capital the implications of the model for gender differences in pay and job assignment are tested with the eopp data set ourfindings suggest that while training intensity during the first three months of employment is similar in positions filled by males and females females are employed in positions that have a shorter duration of on the job training and that use less capital these differences in on the job training and capital in positions filled by men and women as well as a lower market value for women s prior labor market experience account for a substantial part of the gap in wages between males and females

a search interpretation of male female wage differentials a general equilibrium search framework is used to examine the role of gender differences in labor market behavior patterns e g quit rates for personal reasons in determining gender wage differentials for samples of high school and college graduates from the national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy these behavioral patterns are found to be significantly different across the sexes and account for 20 30 of the wage differentials in particular they play a key role in explaining the male female wage differential that remains after controlling for the gender composition across occupations

labor market frictions human capital accumulation and long run growth positive analysis and policy evaluation we construct a search model with endogenous human capital and labor participation to study the growth effects of short run frictions and the effectiveness of human capital policies employment learning effort and output growth increase with more effective learning better labor market matching lower job separation or less costly vacancy creation although output growth employment vacancy creation and learning and search effort are most responsive to changes in a human capital policy that directly affects learning effort such a policy need not be more beneficial for welfare the effects of human capital policies become larger as the severity of labor market frictions rises

wage determination for career and non career workers in the uk is there labour market segmentation this study proposes that the earnings of career employees are influenced by a different set of parameters from the earnings of non career employees the above proposition is tested by using a matched employer employee sample within the econometric framework of a bivariate sample selection model where the career status is modelled as endogenous and is subject to choice decisions

job matching and on the job training conventional analysis predicts that workers pay part of their on the job training costs by accepting a lower starting wage and subsequently realize a return to this investment in the form of greater wage growth missing from the conventional treatment of on the job training is a discussion of the process by which heterogeneous workers are matched to jobs requiring varying amounts of training this matching process constitutes a key feature of the on the job training model presented in this article and tested with a unique data set containing extensive information concerning on the job training employer search wages and wage and productivity growth

an examination of firms employment costs the existence of quasi fixed costs of work may affect firms desired employee hours and number of workers which has important implications for the estimation of labour supply parameters firm level data from the 1982 employment opportunity pilot project is used to estimate the importance to firms of employee quasi fixed costs related to searching hiring training and firing specifically this paper examines how these costs affect number of workers and hours per worker turnover and vacancies to the extent that the costs are determined by the firm s presumably exogenous industrial classification an attempt is made to control for biases due to employee heterogeneity as well results show that higher costs are associated with lower turnover fewer vacancies and longer hours as predicted by a model of labour demand

the impact of stronger intellectual property rights on science and technology in developing countries abstract this paper identifies some effects of the global trend towards stronger protection of intellectual property rights on developing countries and traces related debates pharmaceutics biodiversity and ethnic knowledge are critical areas of impact trade relating intellectual property might allow developing countries to be compensated but incentive implementation of optimal compensation in the legislatures seems infeasible scientific communities in developing countries are particularly vulnerable to limitations of cooperation and access to information resulting from stronger intellectual property rights protection as their efforts to obtain normal science results must be considerable consequences of the bayh dole act and of the patenting of research tools on international scientific cooperation are analysed in this context

how well do linear approximation methods work abstract in this paper we investigate the accuracy of approximating policy functions for three different approximation methods in the context of a neoclassical model with a production tax we find that a variant of the king plosser and rebelo procedure yields the best approximations overall but that in certain instances researchers may be better off using a discrete state space solution to the euler equations of the model

on some computational aspects of equilibrium business cycle theory abstract this paper evaluates the accuracy of quadratic approximate methods in the context of a simple real business cycle model the level of accuracy is found to be very high on the face of the results reported here we are confident that the different computation methods proposed to date in this literature can be employed interchangeably

a toolbox for the numerical study of linear dynamic rational expectations models espanolse presenta una guia para resolver y estudiar modelos de expectativas racionales dinamicas lineales ldre luego de codificar el modelo se aplica una function simple para log linealizarlo simular los efectos de series exogenas de shocks calcular condiciones de momentos muestrales y poblacionales y obtener funciones de impulso respuesta se resuelven y estudian detalladamente tres modelos clasicos en la literatura de real business cycles brock and mirman ldre toolbox of matlab functionsoptimal growth and uncertainty the discounted case journal of economic theory 4 3 479 513 1972 king plosser and rebelo production growth and business cycles i the basic neoclassical model journal of monetary economics 21 195 232 1988 y mendoza real business cycles in a small open economy american economic review 81 4 797 818 1991 englishby simplifying the computational tasks and by providing step by step explanations of the procedures required to study a linear dynamic rational expectations ldre model this paper and the accompanying ldre toolbox of matlab functions guide a researcher with almost no experience in computational work to resolve and study his own model after coding the model following specific guidelines a single function call is all that is needed to log linearize the model simulate it under exogenous sequences of shocks compute sample and population moment conditional models in the real business cycles literature are solved and studied throughout to give detailed examples of the steps involved in solving and studying ldre models using the ldre toolbox namely the economies in brock and mirman optimal growth and uncertainty the discounted case journal of economic theory 4 3 479 513 1972 king plosser and rebelo production growth and business cycles i the basic neoclassical model journal of monetary economics 21 195 232 1988 and mendoza real business cycles in a small open economy american economic review 81 4 797 818 1991

job matching and women s wage tenure profile recently researchers have challenged the validity of the dominant theories of wage growth claiming that the observed positive relation between wages and tenture is an artefact of omitted job match quality in sharp contrast to the human capital theory job match theory implies that women s wages are not directly affected by their discontinuous labour force participation using samples of women workers from three data sets the authors estimate structural models of the wage tenure relation which control directly for job match quality and find evidence of a strong positive relation between wages and tenture

mission control the development of personnel systems in u s industry this paper examines historical differences in personnel practices among u s industries to explore the roots of modern bureaucratic work control we report multivariate analyses of data describing organizational personnel practices collected by the national industrial conference board between 1935 and 1946 we find evidence of three early strands of bureaucratic labor control in different industrial sectors worker allocation and job evaluation techniques which evolved from scientific management in modern assembly line industries internal labor market mechanisms in white collar nonmanufacturing practices related to seniority and the formalization of rules in unionized and skilled industries our analyses suggest that the institutional environment and the historical period of an industry s founding were among the central contingencies shaping labor control in a particular sector as were several factors that past research has emphasized more such as technology and skills labor market conditions and unionization our analyses thus corroborate some previous accounts of industrial differences in bureaucratic control while also suggesting some revisions concerning where when and why employment relations first became bureaucratized

sectoral patterns of technical change towards a taxonomy and a theory abstract the purpose of the paper is to describe and explain sectoral patterns of technical change as revealed by data on about 2000 significant innovations in britain since 1945 most technological knowledge turns out not to be information that is generally applicable and easily reproducible but specific to firms and applications cumulative in development and varied amongst sectors in source and direction innovating firms principally in electronics and chemicals are relatively big and they develop innovations over a wide range of specific product groups within their principal sector but relatively few outside firms principally in mechanical and instrument engineering are relatively small and specialised and they exist in symbiosis with large firms in scale intensive sectors like metal manufacture and vehicles who make a significant contribution to their own process technology in textile firms on the other hand most process innovations come from suppliers these characteristics and variations can be classified in a three part taxonomy based on firms 1 supplier dominated 2 production intensive 3 science based they can be explained by sources of technology requirements of users and possibilities for appropriation this explanation has implications for our understanding of the sources and directions of technical change firms diversification behaviour the dynamic relationship between technology and industrial structure and the formation of technological skills and advantages at the level of the firm the region and the country

solution and estimation of re macromodels with optimal policy macro models of monetary policy typically involve forward looking behavior except in rare circumstances we have to apply some numerical method to find the optimal policy and the rational expectations equilibrium this paper summarizes a few useful methods and shows how they can be combined with a kalman filter to estimate the deep model parameters with maximum likelihood simulations of a macro model with staggered price setting interest rate elastic output and optimal monetary policy illustrate the properties of this estimation approach

employer search training and vacancy duration we develop a model of optimal employer search strategy when information about match quality is endogenous the model is tested using four data sets two of which have not previously been used as theory predicts we find that when filling positions requiring more training employers search more intensively and extensively employers also search more extensively when hiring workers with more education and with prior experience these findings provide strong evidence of systematic variation in search strategies based on the characteristics of the positions and job applicants factors that influence employer search also affect the duration of a vacancy

worker effort decisions and efficient gender specific wage tenure profiles i introduction during the past thirty years women have increased their labor force participation female labor market intermittency has decreased and women s total labor market experience and years of tenure with the current employer have increased what these trends imply about the evolution of the gender gap in wages depends in part on gender differences in returns to tenure it is therefore surprising that economists have all but ignored the empirical finding that women have higher returns to tenure than do men over a significant portion of their working lives one reason why this finding has been ignored or treated as an anomaly may be the lack of theoretical constructs which predict an inverse gender gap in returns to tenure several labor market models predict that women should have lower returns to tenure than men human capital theory offers the most frequently cited explanation of flatter earnings profiles for female workers according to human capital theory gains from specialization and exchange lead to one household member specializing in home production and the other in market work since only women bear children historically the outcome of the exchange has been that women have specialized in home production indeed all surveys of time use indicate that women spend on average two to three times as long on housework as men as a consequence of this allocation women anticipate intermittent labor force participation and fewer years overall in the labor force than men this pattern too is borne out in national surveys which invariably find shorter average tenure and fewer total years of labor market experience for women than for men women typically have shorter completed job spells as well hall 1982 table 5 presents evidence that the gender gap in completed job duration is quite large he estimates that 63 8 percent of men but only 49 6 percent of women hold jobs with eventual tenure of at least five years with 37 3 and 15 1 percent of men and women respectively holding jobs with eventual tenure of at least twenty years because of the greater intermittency and shorter anticipated work history for women than men women will find it optimal to acquire less human capital than men 1 lesser quantities of general human capital tends to flatten both the observed earnings experience profile and the observed earnings tenure profile two factors contribute to this pattern first skills deteriorate during periods out of the labor market as in mincer and polachek 1974 which flattens the earnings experience profile for women relative to men second women anticipating discontinuous work histories select into occupations with flatter earnings profiles to minimize the penalty to labor force withdrawals as in polachek 1981 the effects of firm specific human capital on gender differences in wage tenure profiles vary across models for example kuhn 1993 constructs an elegant game theoretic model of gender differences in training and wages if women have a higher exogenous exit rate than men in equilibrium they will be placed in jobs with lower levels of firm specific training with a positive relation between training and productivity and a common share rate of the costs and benefits of specific training for men and women the wage tenure profiles of men will be steeper than those for women in contrast becker and lindsay 1994 argue that firm specific human capital leads to higher returns to tenure for women than men becker and lindsay assume that men and women have the same level of firm specific training however women have greater variance in their opportunity cost of remaining with a firm and so are more likely than men to separate inefficiently by giving women a greater share of both the costs and benefits of firm specific human capital through a steeper wage tenure profile firms reduce undesirable turnover although human capital arguments dominate the literature on gender differences in the labor market other models of wage growth predict flatter wage tenure profiles for women

private sector training and graduate earnings this paper uses a survey of british graduates to estimate the impact of employer provided training on the earnings of men and women graduates the results indicate that although the training impact is reduced after controlling for endogeneity some forms of training have a considerable impact however there are substantial gender differences in the earnings impact of various typ es of training moreover men graduates are more likely to receive training than otherwise identical women

firm specific training layoffs and unreliable workers firm specific training layoffs and unreliable workers 1 introduction early work in implicit contract theory argues that a long term relationship between a worker and a firm evolves due to the risk sharing nature of the implicit contract between a risk averse worker and a risk neutral firm some authors have criticized this initial argument see for example haltiwanger 1983 feeling that a long term relationship between a worker and a firm and the terms of an implicit contract between the two in large parts is explained via hiring costs training costs and the like this is the approach taken in the early work of becker 1975 oi 1962 and the most recent work of jovanovic 1979a these latter explanations are also appealing because long term relations between a worker and a firm are typically characterized by quits that decline with tenure and wages that increase with tenure as discussed in mortensen 1988 explanations of these phenomena fall into two categories job search theories or job training theories job search theories stress that there is a match specific component to the productivity of any worker firm match that a good match will result in a long term relationship explains why wages are positively correlated with tenure to explain a rising wage profile within a given match requires that the firm and the worker learn about the quality of their match over time a good match will be a long term one and the wage will rise over time as the match is discovered to be a good one jovanovic 1979b and barron and loewenstein 1985 model such a learning process job training theories maintain that long term relationships with rising wages exist because of firm specific training that increases with tenure again see jovanovic 1979a as an example this paper integrates these two theories in this paper firm specific training evolves as an increasing function of a worker s tenure with a firm this is so because there is a positive probability that a worker is unreliable in that he will be searching for another employer the firm being unable to identify in advance which workers are unreliable will update its prior belief as to a worker s reliability as a function of the worker s tenure the total level of training at any point in time will be an increasing function of this updated belief thus learning about the quality of a match an aspect of the job search theories plays an important role in explaining the level of firm specific training this learning process can also play a role in determining optimal layoffs if an unreliable worker is more likely to receive an acceptable outside offer when the worker is laid off than when he is employed the firm can use layoffs to elicit information about the worker s reliabiliy based upon this fact layoffs may occur even when the worker s marginal product exceeds his value of leisure before discussing the model in detail one crucial assumption deserves comment unlike previous work such a salop and salop 1976 enforceable self revealing contracts are ruled out by assumption thus the firm here cannot commit itself to a wage contract promising low wages initially in exchange for high wages as job tenure increases which contract would attract only reliable workers this assumption is of course a polar extreme but as such is consistent with more recent work in contract theory which investigates the terms of self enforcing contracts see for example holmstrom 1983 the idea is to provide a comparison with contracts in an idealized economy with no enforcement problems this assumption is justified if the cost of writing a legally enforceable contract is prohibitive or if as suggested in charmichael 1984 reputational forces are insufficient to deter a firm from cheating although workers here are risk neutral the model could be amended to include risk averse agents

efficient labor contracts with employment risk this article analyzes efficient employment agreements where the demand for consumption insurance can be satisfied by noncontractual means we assume that workers can save and that consumption is determined by a strong form of the permanent income hypothesis under conditions of asymmetric information about exogenous shocks to labor demand we derive a unique compensation schedule that efficiently guides decisions by both workers and employers efficient employment outcomes are generated without a need for third party enforcement or monitoring and workers choose a consumption policy that leaves them indifferent among realizations of labor demand within this solution it is both costless and efficient for workers to delegate employment decisions to the firm within the context of the model we analyze implications for the equilibrium distribution of wages and for empirical studies of labor supply

job match tenure and wages paid by firms using a new data set consisting of a matched sample of workers and firms and including explicit measures of match quality the authors estimate a structural model and find new evidence of a strong positive relation between wages and tenure inclusion of firm fixed effects does not significantly reduce the estimated returns to tenure the results also shed light on the relative importance of human capital and job matching theories

job matching with finite horizon and risk aversion the consequences of introducing risk averse workers with a known finite retirement age into a simple job matching framework are explored the job matching model includes two jobs in the primary job workers and firms learn about the worker s productivity by observing his output over time in the secondary job productivity of any worker is known with certainty at the outset workers start off in the primary job but based on their observed performance may choose to switch to the secondary job the model is developed in two stages first the finite retirement age is introduced while the usual assumption of risk neutral workers is retained in this model it is shown that all workers who achieve at least a certain cumulative output record denoted r by a certain age denoted t will thereafter remain in the primary job until retirement those who do not achieve r by age t switch to the secondary job at or before age t and remain there second risk aversion is introduced along with finite retireme

dividing the costs and returns to general training data from the national longitudinal survey of youth indicate that the employer often pays the explicit costs of not only on site training but also off site general training although few of these costs appear to be passed on to workers in the form of a lower wage while in training completed spells of general training paid for by previous employers have a larger wage effect than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer a model where contract enforcement considerations cause employers to share the costs and returns to purely general training can explain these findings

an explanation of international differences in education and workplace training abstract we develop a simple search equilibrium model of workplace training and education based on two features first investment in education improves job related learning skills and reduces training costs by firms second firms with vacant skilled job slots can choose between recruitment from the market and training compared to germany and japan the us has both a higher inflow rate into unemployment and a higher efficiency of the matching process while the combined effect of these differences on the share of educated labor is ambiguous the effect on the percentage of firms undertaking workplace training is to unambiguously reduce it

job duration seniority and earnings an important stylized fact about labor markets is that workers with longer seniority with their current employer have higher earnings than other workers with the same total labor market experience this study shows that workers in longer jobs earn more throughout than workers in a series of shorter jobs and that the measured positive cross sectional return seniority is largely a statistical artifact due to the correlation of seniority with an omitted variable representing the quality of the worker the job or the worker employer match the implication is tha t earnings do not in fact rise very much with seniority copyright 1987 by american economic association

sources of training and their impact on wages using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth from 1986 to 1990 the author investigates the wage impact of various sources of training among them company training programs apprenticeships business schools vocational and technical institutes correspondence courses and seminars outside the workplace time spent in training of whatever kind apparently did not affect 1990 wage levels the incidence of two kinds of training however company training and seminars outside work was positively related to wage levels as well as to wage change between 1986 and 1990 that is workers who undertook such training enjoyed higher wages than those who did not time spent in vocational schools was also positively associated with wage change though not with 1990 wage levels the other forms of training had no apparent impact on either wage levels or wage change

wage determination of registered nurses in proprietary and nonprofit nursing homes this study explores why registered nurses employed in nonprofit nursing homes earn higher wages than those employed in proprietary facilities previous studies have explained this finding in a property rights context where higher wages were posited to result from the weaker incentives for cost minimization accompanying nonprofit status this paper tests an alternative explanation of sectoral wage differences which is predicated on the reason for the coexistence offor profit and nonprofit firms in a given industry informational constraints concerning the quality of care are posited to cause the long term health care market to fail to provide care at the upper levels of a quality of care continuum nonprofits are viewed as a response to this form of market failure acting to fulfill customers demand for higher quality and higher cost long term care with attendant demand for higher quality nurses than in for profit homes both the observed sectoral pattern in selectivity and wage decompositions based on selectivity corrected wage regressions call into question the property right explanation yet are consistent with an asymmetric information explanation

the unemployment volatility puzzle the role of matching costs revisited recently pissarides 2009 has argued that the standard search model with sunk xed matching costs increases unemployment volatility without introducing an unrealistic wage response in new matches we revise the role of matching costs and show that when these costs are not sunk and therefore can be partially passed on to new hired workers in the form of lower wages the amplication mechanism of xed matching

earnings unemployment and the allocation of time over time since an individual s labour market history can be described by a markov chain in state space it is possible to calculate the steady states it is natural to interpret the steady state proportion in unemployment for a group of identical workers as the natural rate of unemployment for this group i e it is the expected proportion that would be employed if the environment were to remain constant it is shown how the natural rate of unemployment is different for different groups the model is estimated using data from a large u s income maintenance experiment the predictions of the model with some exceptions bear up well to confrontation by data the empirical findings also accord well with existing evidence on cross section studies of labour supply we find that labour force participation rates implied by the estimated models are positively related to earnings for all age sex and race groups as expected we demonstrate that the elasticities of the unemployment rates for all groups with respect to expected wage rates are negative and large in absolute value in the case of adults while the role of the wage in allocation of time is not novel the existing neoclassical labour literature uses static labour supply models to interpret participation rate studies

job mobility and earnings over the life cycle previous studies have shown that in the short run quits generally lead to wage increases on the next job and layoffs to no increase or to a wage cut the author of this study argues however that the prospect of a job change for any reason creates a disincentive for a worker to invest in training that is specific to the current job and therefore those who change jobs frequently may earn less over their life cycle than those who other things equal seldom change jobs an analysis of data from the national longitudinal survey of mature men supports that expectation showing that for white males job separations usually lead to wage gains in the short run but nonmobile workers tend to achieve significantly higher wages over the long run

extensive search intensive search and hiring costs new evidence on employer hiring activity this paper presents recent evidence on employer search to fill a position a 1982 employer survey sponsored by the national institute of education and the national center for research in vocational education provides the basis for analyzing employer search and hiring costs the paper examines the effects of such factors as employer size dismissal costs unionization on the job training adjustment costs capital and labor market conditions on intensive employer search extensive employer search and hiring costs intensive employer search is measured by the average number of hours the employer spends recruiting screening and interviewing per applicant extensive search is measured by the number of applicants seen per applicant interviewed and the number interviewed per employment

domestic patents and developing countries arguments for their study and data from brazil 1980 1995 abstract this paper presents data from brazilian patent office instituto nacional de propriedade industrial inpi and compares them with data from the united states patent office uspto developing countries have technological activities that are important locally but not significant at international level imitation local learning adaptation of foreign innovations these activities might be patentable only at national level therefore the study of domestic patents of developing countries provides a broader picture than uspto patents this paper compares 8309 inpi patents with 475 uspto patents between 1980 and 1995 domestic patent data show peculiarities in the brazilian case possibly shared with other countries in similar technological level a high share of individual patents b foreign owned firms with important activities c low firm involvement in rd b according to firm size there is a u shaped distribution of patents c evidences of multi technology large firms d a relatively small share of firms have more than one patent in the whole period the contrast between uspto and national patenting statistics shows different rankings according to ownership structure leading firms industrial sectors and international patent classification these differences highlight sources of international competitiveness and point to weaknesses in brazilian innovative activities this paper concludes evaluating the contributions and weaknesses of this database for the evaluation of the brazilian national system of innovation

optimal mismatch and promotions i introduction a substantial proportion of workers are employed in jobs for which they appear to be either overqualified or underqualified for instance using data from the panel study of income dynamics sicherman 1991 finds that 40 percent of his sample are overeducated and another 16 percent are undereducated rumberger 1987 reports similar values using data from the quality of employment surveys other studies which find substantial education mismatch include duncan and hoffman 1981 verdugo and verdugo 1989 and hersch 1991 and evidence that a single firm hires both under and overqualified workers is presented here this paper provides an explanation for why firms hire both overqualified and underqualified workers firms hire overqualified workers because these workers require less training for their initial positions such workers also form a pool from which promotions are made which lowers hiring costs for higher level positions within the firm workers accept positions for which they are overqualified to enhance their probability of promotion and because of search and mobility costs but if they fail to be promoted to a position that better matches their qualifications they are more likely to quit firms hire underqualified workers despite their longer training requirement since such workers are less likely to quit and provide continuity of the labor force over time thus contrary to job matching arguments that would explain these hires as a result of imperfect information hiring of seemingly mismatched workers is optimal and these matches are made with perfect information the model developed in this paper yields three testable hypotheses 1 training time for entry level jobs is inversely related to overqualification at the time of hire 2 workers who are overqualified on their current job are those who have failed to be promoted to a job which better matches their qualifications and such workers are more likely to quit and 3 workers overqualified at time of hire are more likely to be promoted to test these hypotheses i use new data collected for this purpose previous empirical research such as that cited above was restricted by data availability to examining only the match between education and the worker s current job thus the quality of the match with the worker s initial job and the match between worker qualifications other than education has gone unexplored however various worker characteristics in addition to education are often substituted for each other in determining a worker s qualification for a job thus i examine additional qualifications including the match between the worker s experience level of previous job and use of skills information on the match between the worker s qualifications and those required for the initial job with the employer is particularly important since entry level qualifications determine training time for the initial job as well as the likelihood of promotion further individual specific training time for the initial job is necessary but typically not available since data sets providing information on training such as the panel study of income dynamics and quality of employment surveys request information on training time for the average worker and not for the individual worker the data set reveals several interesting statistics qualification mismatch at hire is fairly common for this firm 29 percent of the sample report themselves overqualified for their first job with the firm while 13 percent report themselves as underqualified lateral intra firm mobility is common and occurs far more frequently than promotions workers in the sample average 1 3 promotions but four different jobs with the employer this suggests that the job matching process occurs not only by turnover but through intrafirm mobility consistent with the assumptions and implications of the model the empirical results indicate that workers who are overqualified at hire receive less training and more promotions and that workers overqualified for their current job are more likely to quit

pensions and wage premia i introduction despite the widespread acceptance of the theory of compensating differences empirical efforts to estimate the magnitude of these differences have met with only mixed success 1 with the exception of fatal risks economists have not been able to consistently find a significant relationship between wages and other job characteristics the failure to find consistent evidence on compensating differentials has been attributed to either poor measures of non wage characteristics or inadequate controls for worker productivity 2 studies by gunderson hyatt and pesando 1992 montgomery shaw and benedict 1992 and moore 1987 which have been able to explicitly address these issues have had greater success in finding significant compensating differentials in this paper we focus on an alternative explanation for the variation in estimated compensating differentials that the magnitude of the compensating differential varies systematically across different sectors in the labor market the theory of compensating differentials predicts that the implicit price or cost of providing a job attribute such as pensions will be a function of firm or industry technological differences and that the value attached to that attribute will also vary across workers depending on their tastes if workers and firms are not randomly assigned to sectors this will lead to systematic variations in the size of the estimated compensating differential across sectors or markets the result of this variation is that studies using different subsamples of the labor force will yield very different estimates of the size of the compensating differential the few studies that have addressed sources of heterogeneity in compensating differentials have concentrated on testing for individual differences in tastes for risk 3 in contrast our emphasis is on firm side differences in technologies or market power we estimate the compensating differential between annual pension accruals and wage rates and let this tradeoff vary by firm size and union status with corrections for selectivity bias the implicit cost of pensions and hence the size of the compensating differential may vary by finn size or union status for a number of reasons greater ability to spread fixed administrative costs across a large work force more difficulty monitoring worker effort or the presence of market power thus the cost of fringe benefits to the firm may be lower in large or unionized firms than in small nonunion firms we find empirical evidence supporting this view the estimated wage pension compensating differentials are smaller in unionized and large firms than in small nonunion firms the results from this paper are significant for several reasons 1 they provide evidence that compensating differentials vary across markets this evidence could account for some of the differences in estimates of tradeoffs across studies that have used different nonrandom samples 4 more importantly these sectoral differences serve as a reminder that the labor market is in fact a multitude of markets and that technological differences that vary across markets should be considered when addressing issues ranging from estimating the returns to human capital investment to the impact of the minimum wage 5 2 these results also deepen our knowledge of the relationship between pensions and wages a relationship that has important implications for the shape of workers wage earnings profiles or for the mechanisms for motivating workers and for the returns to human capital and for the distribution of income regarding the latter pensions are a large component of compensation and work by even and macpherson 1990 mccarthy and turner 1983 and moore 1987 suggests that coverage rates and returns are smaller for women and blacks our analysis suggests that an element of the differences could be sectoral choices

the transfer of human capital abstract most of our productive knowledge was handed down to us by previous generations the transfer of knowledge from the old to the young is therefore a cornerstone of productivity growth we study this process in a model in which the old sell knowledge to the young old agents train the young and charge them for this service we take an information theoretic approach in which training occurs if a young agent watches an old agent perform a task equilibrium is not constrained pareto optimal the old have private information and this gives rise to an adverse selection problem some old agents manage to sell skills that the planner would prefer to extinguish so as to allow more young agents to start new technologies in this sense there is too much resistance to change

do wages rise with job seniority many previous studies have found a strong positive effect of job seniority tenure on wages this paper re examines the evidence using a simple instrumental variables scheme to deal with the fact that tenure is likely to be related to unobserved individual and job characteristics that affect the wage we use the variation of tenure over a given job match as the principal instrumental variable for tenure the variation in tenure over the job is uncorrelated by construction with the fixed individual and job match specific components of the error term of the wage equation our main finding is that the partial effect of tenure on wages is small and that general labour market experience and job shopping account for most wage growth over a career the strong cross section relationship between tenure and wages is due primarily to heterogeneity bias prior researchers see mincer and jovanovic 1981 bartel and borjas 1981 borjas 1981 cline 1979 and mellow 1981 and many others have established that job seniority has a strong positive relationship with wage rates in a cross section or a cross section time series of individuals in this paper we re evaluate the evidence concerning the partial effects on wages of job seniority tenure and total labour market experience the extent to which wages rise with tenure is important for several reasons first and foremost the wage tenure profile is a fundamental question about the structure of earnings over careers second the wage tenure profile is a key determinant of the extent to which the earnings power of individuals is tied to specific jobs and it is important for assessment of the losses suffered by displaced workers hamermesh 1984 third evidence that wages rise with job tenure has been used to explain the decline in quits with tenure since the wage growth on the current job lowers the probability that the worker will locate a superior alternative a growing theoretical literature surveyed in parsons 1984 has taken the evidence of a strong wage tenure profile at face value and sought to provide an explanation for the relationship the most prominent explanation is the theory of specific human capital oi 1962 becker 1962 mincer 1974 parsons 1972 kuratani 1973 and hashimoto 1980 in which the growth of wages with tenure holding experience constant is attributed to the worker s share of investments in firm specific skills more recently lazear 1981 has presented a supervision model of wage growth in which firms defer compensation as a means of inducing workers not to shirk freeman 1977 and harris and holmstrom 1982 provide an explanation for wage growth based on an insurance motive salop and salop 1976 nickell 1976 and guasch and weiss 1982 present adverse selection models of wage growth in which firms use a wage tenure profile as a

interindustry wage differentials and the gender wage gap using data from the march 1988 current population survey the authors find that the wages of female workers differ significantly by industry even when the analysis controls for workers productivity related characteristics although these interindustry wage differentials are at least as large as men s and are highly correlated with them as well there are statistically significant differences between the two of the overall gender wage gap the average female worker earns about 65 as much as the average male worker 12 22 can be explained by differences between the patterns of interindustry wage differentials of men and women and 15 19 by differences in the distribution of male and female workers across industries thus the combined industry effects explain about one third of the overall gender wage gap

efficiency and labor market dynamics in a model of labor selection this article characterizes efficient labor market allocations in a labor selection model the model s crucial aspect is cross sectional heterogeneity for new job contacts which leads to an endogenous selection threshold for new hires with cross sectional dispersion calibrated to microeconomic data 40 of empirically relevant fluctuations in the job finding rate arise which contrasts with results in an efficient search and matching economy the efficient selection model s results hold in partial and general equilibrium as well as with sequential search abstract from author

matching turnover and unemployment this paper develops the view that workers move into and out of the labor market because of changes in the perceived value of their market opportunities a search model is combined with a matching model to yield movement of workers from job to job and into and out of employment

pension portability and labor market efficiency a survey of the literature this paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature evaluating the labor market effects of policies to enhance pension portability one perspective is that reducing the cost of job change w

the effect of job tenure on wage offers a wage offer can be either acceptable or unacceptable to a worker but in cross sectional and panel data only acceptable wage offers are observed an ols wage equation will not reveal how job tenure affects wage offers but rather will reveal how tenure affects acceptable wage offers by jointly modeling the firm s determination of the wage offer and the worker s decision to accept or reject the offer we are able to estimate the effect of job tenure on wage offers consistently in contrast to the usual ols results we find that job tenure has no statistically significant effect on wage offers

order from chaos the effects of early labor market experiences on adult labor market outcomes this paper examines the consequences of initial periods of churning or mobility in the labor market to help assess whether faster transitions to stable employment relationships as envisioned by advocates of school to work programs would be likely to lead to better adult labor market outcomes an analysis of national longitudinal survey of youth data for the years 1979 92 yields modest evidence at best linking early job market stability to better labor market outcomes the authors find that for both genders adult labor market outcomes defined as of the late 20s or early to mid 30s are for the most part unrelated to early labor market experiences this evidence does not support efforts to explicitly target the school to work transition insofar as doing so implies changing the structure of youth labor markets so that workers form earlier and firmer attachments to employers industries or occupations

why do low educated workers invest less in further training several studies document that low educated workers participate less often in further training than high educated workers this article investigates two possible explanations low educated workers invest less in training because of 1 the lower economic returns to these investments or 2 their lower willingness to participate in training controlling for unobserved heterogeneity we find that the economic returns to training for low educated workers are positive and not significantly different from those for high educated workers however low educated workers are significantly less willing to participate in training we show that this lesser willingness to train is driven by economic preferences and personality traits

the implications of job matching for retirement health insurance and leave benefits this paper focuses on potential reasons for variations in benefit packages in particular variations in the availability of retirement health insurance and leave an important feature of our analysis is that we do not start with heterogeneity in workforces to explain fringe benefit differences across employers it would be straightforward to say that differences across employers in fringe benefit packages simply represent differences in the preferences of their workforces rather we focus on heterogeneity across employers as an important source of differences in fringe benefit packages preliminary evidence is found supportive of the predicted differences in the likelihood of such fringe benefits as retirement health insurance and leave based upon two variables the extent of on the job training offered by the employer and the size of the employers we also examine the implied links between these fringe benefits and such variables as average tenture and the proportion of the workforce that is female

employer size and labor turnover the role of pensions the well documented lower labor turnover in large firms than in smaller firms has been cited as evidence that large firms pay workers above their opportunity wage this study investigates whether t

on employer specific information and internal labor markets the human capital literature of which becker s 2 paper is the seminal work stresses the productivity enhancing effects of schooling and on the job training later work by spence 21 and others emphasizes the fact that it is difficult for employers to ascertain the productivity of potential employees and suggests that activities such as schooling may provide employers with signals as to workers productivities in the signalling literature it is assumed that information generated concerning an individual s abilities is general in that it is known to all potential employers yet the information that an employer gathers concerning his workers abilities is not likely to be completely transferable to other employers as a consequence as rosen 18 249 points out there are limitations on the ability of the price system to achieve efficient assignments if the price system is incomplete there is a role for entrepreneurial activity of assembling an optimal work force this paper analyzes the employment relations that arise when employers information concerning new workers abilities is incomplete until after a period of employment the acquisition of such employer specific information is shown to lead to what has been referred to in the literature as internal labor markets internal labor markets as identified by dunlop 5 32 are the complex of rules which determine the movement of workers among job classifications within administrative units these movements may be transfers promotions demotions or layoffs to the exterior labor markets doeringer and piore 3 emphasize skill specificity and on the job training as the key factors in the emergence of the internal labor market along similar lines williamson wachter and harris 22 point out that job idiosyncracy can result in employment relations with attributes like those of internal labor markets by way of contrast this paper emphasizes the role of employer specific information in generating internal labor markets the theory provides an explanation as to why employers dismiss current employees at the same time that new employees are hired evidence that dismissal rates are not insignificant is presented in section iv the theory also provides a new rationale for long term em

human capital vs signalling explanations of wages increases wages by directly increasing the worker s productivity this learning explanation is usually associated with human capital theory however it seems unlikely that learning explains all the wage differences associated with schooling and work history better educated workers are not a random sample of workers they have lower propensities to quit or to be absent are less likely to smoke drink or use illicit drugs and are generally healthier it is unlikely that employers make full use of differences in propensities to quit or to be absent or sick when hiring workers these characteristics are often not directly observed and the americans with disabilities act precludes firms from using either poor health or the likelihood of future sickness as a hiring criterion unless it is directly related to job performance however if low levels of education are associated with these unfavorable employee characteristics and employers are allowed to take education into account when hiring workers we would expect employers to favor better educated workers as a means of reducing their costs of sickness and job turnover in turn students will take these hiring criteria into account when deciding how long to stay in school students will choose a length of schooling to signal their ability to employers and employers will demand a minimum level of schooling

gender differences in displacement cost evidence and implications this paper uses a unique and newly available data set on displaced workers to estimate differences in the wage costs of displacement between women and men while predisplacement wages rise at about the same rate with tenure for women as men in this data set women lose more from displacement than men and the magnitude of this loss increases with tenure overall we interpret our results as not supportive of the specific capital hypothesis that women accumulate less firmspecific human capital than men and we suggest that future attempts to explain our result focus on gender differences in the process of search for a new job

turnover and promotion of lawyers an inquiry into gender differences this paper analyzes the turnover and promotion of male and female lawyers using data on two cohorts of lawyers one which entered law firms between 1969 and 1973 and the other entering between 1980 and 1983 this study considers whether law firm promotion decisions have differed for women and if so whether these differences have declined over time a competing risks duration model is employed to capture the link between the lawyer s decision to stay or leave and the firm s decision to grant or deny promotion we find that over the entire sample period women are considerably less likely to be promoted and slightly more likely to leave the firm without being promoted however we also find that the parametric differential between men and women in partnership hazards has been reduced substantially and in the most general of our specifications eliminated across the two cohorts in contrast the gap between male and female job turnover rates does not appear to change over time we find that the gap between males and females in the cumulative partnership rate at seven years of experience falls from 32 to 14 percent the turnover gap increases about 0 2 percent with females slightly more likely to exit from the firm in the later period

internal labour markets causes and consequences the paper analyzes the causes and consequences of internal labor market rules that yield long tenure promotion from within seniority pensions and due process in dismissals about half the workforce are estimated to be in such markets competitive reasons for internal labor markets as a response to specific training and arms length relationships between workers and firms are surveyed these reasons are found to be consistent with the pattern of internal labor markets among non union firms however some internal labor markets e g among small unionized firms are probably a response to union pressure and government regulations in these circumstances low labor mobility could pose problems for policy copyright 1991 by oxford university press

real business cycles in this paper we demonstrate how certain very ordinary economic principles lead maximizing individuals to choose consumption production plans that display many of the characteristics commonly associated with business cycles our explanation is entirely consistent with i rational expectations ii complete current information iii stable preferences iv no technological change v no long lived commodities vi no frictions or adjustment costs vii no government viii no money and ix no serial dependence in the stochastic elements of the environment we also provide a completely worked out example of the type of artificial economy we have in mind the time series properties of the example exhibit some major features of observed business cycles although this type of model may not be capable of explaining all of the regularities in actual business cycles we believe that it provides a useful well defined benchmark for assessing the relative importance of factors e g monetary disturbances

heterogeneous firms and the organization of production firms in the same industry exhibit systematic differences in the organization of production and the structure of employment entrepreneurial ability is the specific scarce input that limits the size of a firm this input must be allocated to two activities coordinating production and monitoring workers able entrepreneurs can convert calendar time into larger supplies of coordinating effort that enable them to assemble large firms greater ability implies a higher shadow price of time which increases the implicit costs of monitoring a dispersion of entrepreneurial abilities generates an equilibrium size distribution of firms differences in monitoring costs affect the choice of worker productivities the design of products and the organization of production the monitoring cost hypothesis advanced in this paper goes a long way in explaining the equilibrium of an industry containing heterogeneous firms that differ in size and behavior

job matching and occupational choice this paper presents a model of job matching the generalizes the existing literature by allowing for different jobs types or occupations such differences affect the value of job specific experience inducing a career profile where certain types are sampled before others more specifically the analysis shows that it is optimal for the young and inexperienced to gravitate toward jobs exhibiting a certain kind of risk then after deriving the equilibrium job turnover rate for an economy in which people do not switch occupations panel data are used to estimate its underlying parameters the hypothesis that people do not switch occupations is rejected against the alternative that they do thus providing empirical support for the theoretical extension undertaken here

worker heterogeneity job screening and firm size a model of job screening is developed in which firms make wage offers to workers based on an imperfect evaluation of their abilities if large firms have higher costs of acquiring information about workers they screen workers with less accuracy and choose a wage compensation scheme different from the one small firms choose this generates the often observed positive correlation between firm size and wages the model also predicts that wage structure and perhaps wage dispersion will differ by firm size and that individuals who acquire more schooling will also choose to work in a larger firm these hypotheses are tested and supported using data from the national longitudinal survey

labor turnover wage structures and moral hazard the inefficiency of competitive markets a multiperiod general equilibrium model of the labor market is developed in which risk averse workers are faced with job related uncertainty and labor turnover is costly if a worker is unlucky and suffers a bad job match he quits and joins another firm hoping that he will like its work environment more because the quality of a job match is unobservable workers cannot insure against the risk of a bad match the firm provides implicit insurance against job dissatisfaction typically by paying workers more than their net marginal products in their early years with the firm and less subsequently since the probabilities of the insured against events the quit rates over time are affected by the amount of such insurance provided this implicit insurance is characterized by moral hazard individuals quit when in the absence of insurance they would not the equilibrium contract balances out efficiency in risk bearing with efficiency in turnover incentives we show that the equilibrium contract is not con