in praise of frank ramsey s contribution to the theory of taxation frank ramsey s brilliant 1927 paper modestly entitled a contribution to the theory of taxation is a landmark in the economics of public finance nearly a half century later through the work of diamond and mirrlees 1971 and mirrlees 1971 his paper can be thought of as launching the field of optimal taxation and revolutionising public finance ramsey f p 1927 a contribution to the theory of taxation economic journal vol 37 145 pp 47 61

the pricing of protected areas in nature based tourism a local perspective abstract this paper extends the literature on optimal pricing of recreation in protected areas by introducing price discrimination between groups of visitors and given that the agency charges different prices to subsets of visitors by including a distributional dimension that is particularly relevant for a national park agency receiving visitors from different origins other issues related to optimal entrance fees including negative ecological impacts and positive spillover effects on local communities resulting from changes in visitation are also discussed based on this model the paper provides an estimation of optimal entrance fees and revenues for the costa rican system of protected areas

nonlinear pricing to produce information we investigate the firm s dynamic nonlinear pricing problem when facing consumers whose tastes vary according to a scalar index we relax the standard assumption that the firm knows the distribution of this index in general the firm should determine its marginal price schedule as if it were myopic and produce information by lowering the price schedule bunching consumers at positive purchase levels should be avoided as a special case we also consider a market characterized by homogeneous consumers with a static but unknown demand curve we show that when there are repeat purchases the forward looking firm should tend towards penetration pricing otherwise its strategy should tend towards skimming we extend our insights to more general settings and discuss implications for pricing product lines

distributional equity and the pricing of public final and intermediate goods abstract this paper studies the implications of distributional concerns for the pricing of public final and intermediate goods under a general equilibrium and general private production setting it is shown that in a many household world the pricing formula applying to the household is characterized by the distribution of goods while that applying to the private firm is characterized by the distribution of profits moreover both pricing formulae include a term incorporating the general equilibrium redistributive effects of public pricing we compare our results with those in baumol and bradford american economic review 1970 60 265 283 feldstein american economic review 1972 62 32 36 journal of public economics 1972 1 45 72 and yang journal of public economics 1991 45 135 141

the second best core an economy with a single output and input is considered for the case of economies of scale in production equilibria are studied for a cooperative game of joint production in which goods are allocated by a price system the paper proposes a second best core in which allocations that are feasible for a coalition must be attainable by a price system existence is examined and properties of second best core allocations are analyzed copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the ramsey problem for congestible facilities abstract in recent years a new set of models drawing on vickrey 1969 has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities these models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers time of use decisions and the congestion technology standard models in contrast simply assume the general form of the cost function we apply the new approach to analyze the ramsey problem for a congestible facility and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology

reforming residential electricity tariff in china block tariffs pricing approach the chinese households that make up approximately a quarter of world households are facing a residential power tariff reform in which a rising block tariff structure will be implemented and this tariff mechanism is widely used around the world the basic principle of the structure is to assign a higher price for higher income consumers with low price elasticity of power demand to capture the non linear effects of price and income on elasticities we set up a translog demand model the empirical findings indicate that the higher income consumers are less sensitive than those with lower income to price changes we further put forward three proposals of chinese residential electricity tariffs compared to a flat tariff the reasonable block tariff structure generates more efficient allocation of cross subsidies better incentives for raising the efficiency of electricity usage and reducing emissions from power generation which also supports the living standards of low income households

regulation through output related profits tax prospects are discussed for regulating a multiproduct monopolistic enterprise through a tax on profit at a rate variable with output selection of weights when defining output could induce outcomes ranging from ramsey pricing to any desired pattern of cross subsidy the telecommunications industry is used to illustrate if quality depends upon output as in public transport socially optimal pricing would be induced the scheme has the advantage of limiting detailed intervention and preserving the profit motive however unrealistic assumptions are necessary and implementation would require a great deal of information this limits its practical value disenchantment with economic regulation creates a dilemma effective regulation can be difficult both in principle and in practice and it can carry unintended consequences on the other hand governments are unwilling to accept the full implications that leaving large multiproduct utilities to their own devices would have for pricing and output typical worries are excessive profit through the exploitation of monopoly fundamental changes in patterns of cross subsidy and neglect of the public service dimension interference with the setting of prices of individual products may be considered undesirable or impractical differential rates of commodity taxation could in principle solve many of the problems but they are not possible for institutional reasons even if government was inclined to use them however some of the enterprises in question are sufficiently large that it is feasible to levy differential rates of tax on total profits and profits taxes are generally accepted as having legitimate place in free enterprise this paper is an exploration of the extent to which profits tax might be made to simulate differential commodity taxes and so achieve policy objectives for an unregulated industry the special features of the tax which enable it to tackle this problem are that the rate of taxation is related to the level of physical output and in the case of a multi product enterprise output is defined as a weighted aggregate of individual outputs the output related profits tax was proposed by alan walters as a device for indirect regulation of the british telecommunications industry on its sale into private ownership the principles apply equally to urban transport

on the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility in this paper we have analyzed the pricing and benefit structure of a private club or public utility by means of a simple two period model we have analyzed the relationship of the two period charges and their responses to a change in the rate of interest we have also analyzed the pricing schemes under various objectives which include the equal payment the social gain and the public choice cases the two period pricing schemes under the special cases where no intertemporal borrowing or lending is allowed and where memberships are growing at an exogenous rate have also been analyzed in addition we have presented a multiperiod model with exogenous growth in memberships and with the consideration of inflation a schedule of fair access charges for this model has been derived it should be useful in many practical applications

multiproduct two part tariffs abstract two part pricing by a multiproduct monopoly and a differentiated oligopoly are examined and compared two part pricing policies are seen to depend on whether products are complements or substitutes and on whether or not the market is segmented a principle result is that although competition tends to lower unit prices there is no corresponding tendency for competition to reduce entry fees the unit pricing rule is related to the ramsey pricing rule oligopoly equilibrium unit prices equal marginal cost when there is one consumer type

examining the differences in self and publicly supplied firms water demands this research examines the fac tors influencing the decision made by manufac turing firms regarding their source of water sup ply and tests whether self supplied firms exhibit demands for intake water different from firms supplied by a public utility the first stage of the estimation model involves a probit analysis of the supply source choice and the second stage employs a regression model with endogenous switching to estimate the demand equations for the two types offirms results indicate that eco nomic factors such as annual connection fees influence the supply source decision jel q25

the welfare effects of different pricing schemes for electricity distribution in finland the main components of electricity prices can be divided into the wholesale price the price of network operations and taxes even if the wholesale price is determined efficiently total welfare can be significantly disturbed if network operations are priced inefficiently in this study we calculate network prices based on four alternative methods these are marginal cost pricing ramsey pricing fdc pricing and optimal two part tariffs the welfare effects on the prevailing pricing system are compared we show that potentially significant improvements in welfare can be achieved by using marginal cost prices or optimal two part tariffs also ramsey pricing indicates that prevailing prices are inefficient

game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale abstract this paper surveys the analysis by means of cooperative game theory of economies in which there are increasing returns to scale in the first section necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a core of a general equilibrium economy are considered in the second section the partial equilibrium approach to increasing returns production which developed along with the natural monopoly literature is surveyed the close relationship between the general equilibrium and partial equilibrium approaches is emphasized

optimum tariffs for vertically differentiated products with an application to indian tea exports optimum export tariffs are typically related to the elasticity of demand for exports in homogeneous goods markets in this paper we set up a simple model for large exporters of quality differentiated products and estimate optimum tariffs based on the quality of the good restrictions on demand parameters implied by the theoretical model are used in estimating demands for different qualities of indian tea exports we use the estimated model to find optimum tariffs for two qualities of indian tea exports and find that optimum export tariffs for high quality teas should on average be 14 higher than the tariff on low quality tea exports

targeted and untargeted subsidy schemes evidence from postdivestiture efforts to promote universal telephone service abstract normative economic analysis traditionally has pointed toward the merits of policies wherein prices reflect the economic cost of providing a good or service subsidization policies are nevertheless common in a variety of industries where such subsidies occur economists have long advocated targeting those subsidy flows to maximize their effectiveness and minimizing the allocative inefficiency caused by financing of the subsidy despite the apparent consensus in economic thought on this subject empirical evidence of the relative effectiveness of targeted versus untargeted subsidies to date has been lacking in this article we address this lacuna by examining a set of large scale targeted and untargeted subsidy flows that have developed side by side each with the same nominal policy goal promoting universal telephone service specifically we test empirically the relative contributions of the alternative subsidy mechanisms in promoting the policy goal of maximizing subscription to the public s

some simple analytics of peak load pricing author s bergstrom ted mackie mason jeffrey k abstract consider a public utility that offers its service at two different times we study the effects of a change from uniform pricing throughout the day to peak load pricing we show that for a utility constrained to operate with a fixed rate of return on capital the introduction of peak load pricing can plausibly reduce the price of the service it both in peak and off peak times we also find that peak load pricing can lead to either greater or smaller capacity than uniform pricing we find a simple criterion for determining whether a particular individual gains or loses from peak load pricing

on the economics of subscriptions firms sell journals both by offering subscriptions which provide the purchaser with all issues of the journal and by selling individual copies at a comparatively high price we show that by selling subscriptions in addition to individual copies a monopolist can price discriminate thereby increasing his profits and that such price discrimination may increase the level of social welfare compared to a situation in which no subscriptions are sold

fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional externalities new results and an application to us air pollution abstract the economics of fiscal federalism has identified two book end departures from first best provision of a public good local governments may respond to local conditions but ignore inter jurisdictional spillovers alternatively central governments may internalize spillovers but impose uniform incentives ignoring local heterogeneity we provide a simple model that demonstrates that the choice of pricing policy also depends crucially on a third factor the shape of marginal costs of providing the public good if marginal costs are convex then marginal abatement cost elasticities will be higher around the local policies this increases the deadweight loss of those policies relative to the centralized policy ceteris paribus if they are concave then the opposite is true using a detailed simulation model of the us electricity sector we then empirically explore these tradeoffs for us air pollution we find that us states acting in their own interest lose about 31 5 of the potential first best benefits whereas the second best uniform policy loses only 0 2 of benefits the centralized policy outperforms the state policy for two reasons first inter state spillovers are simply more important that inter state heterogeneity in this application second because of the convexity of the marginal cost functions elasticities are much lower over the range relevant to the centralized policy dampening the distortions

social welfare loss due to second best pricing an application to the portuguese telecommunications the telecommunications industry is usually characterized by low marginal costs and significant fixed costs which are the conditions for the inefficiency of marginal cost pricing in such cases theory postulates that optimal pricing is obtained by maximizing welfare subject to a restriction of viability of the firm the second best pricing scheme the possible welfare losses due to second best pricing varies according to the values of marginal costs prices and demand elasticities this paper analyses to what extent the second best pricing has been achieved in the portuguese telecommunications firm ctt over the period 1950 150 1984 as well as the magnitude of the price cost margins and welfare losses created we obtained empirical evidence of the presence of economies of scale a welfare loss estimate of 1 of the telecommunications receipts and a result that price was 40 greater than marginal cost we concluded that price regulation and public ownership of the firm did not seriously affect social welfar

tariff structure of japanese electric power companies an empirical analysis using dea this research explores a marginal cost mc based pricing system using data envelopment analysis dea this dea technique is widely applied for performance analysis and efficiency measurement in public and private sectors this article does not follow such a previous research direction rather directing itself towards the new measurement of mc and ramsey prices of multiple electric power services as an important case study this research applies the proposed dea approach to examine how much the current tariffs of japanese electric power services deviate from these mc and ramsey prices this type of research has never been explored in japan even though such a research effort is needed by many policy makers and consumers it is hoped that our empirical findings can serve as a policy making basis for guiding the japanese electric power industry this study believes that this japanese experience is useful for other nations such as asia pacific countries where many public industries are regulated by their governments

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

a core selection for regulating a single output monopoly we consider a single output production economy in which all coalitions of agents have access to the technology under increasing returns to scale the corresponding cooperative game without side payments is convex and hence has a large core we propose a core selection that is obtained by considering the lowest price of output relative to input such that the corresponding vector of indirect utilities is feasible the constant returns equivalent allocation is feasible and achieves this utility vector it satisfied the property of technological monotonicity when the production possibility set expands no agent faces a utility loss technological monotonicity and the core property together characterize the constant returns equivalent solution

health and income inequality attempting to avoid the aggregation problem attempts to test the relative deprivation hypothesis that income inequality affects individual health are subject to the aggregation problem waldmann quarterly journal of economics 107 1992 ingeniously attempts to overcome the difficulty by using income data for the poor and the share of income accruing to the rich the study finds that his results do not hold for a more recent data set and it suggests that his method may not overcome the aggregation problem

an exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem abstract we propose a novel method to find nash equilibria in games with binary decision variables by including compensation payments and incentive compatibility constraints from non cooperative game theory directly into an optimization framework in lieu of using first order conditions of a linearization or relaxation of integrality conditions the reformulation offers a new approach to obtain and interpret dual variables to binary constraints using the benefit or loss from deviation rather than marginal relaxations the method endogenizes the trade off between overall societal efficiency and compensation payments necessary to align incentives of individual players we provide existence results and conditions under which this problem can be solved as a mixed binary linear program we apply the solution approach to a stylized nodal power market equilibrium problem with binary on off decisions this illustrative example shows that our approach yields an exact solution to the binary nash game with compensation we compare different implementations of actual market rules within our model in particular constraints ensuring non negative profits no loss rule and restrictions on the compensation payments to non dispatched generators we discuss the resulting equilibria in terms of overall welfare efficiency and allocational equity

price regulation of access to telecommunications networks abstract without access of networks to each other competition in the telecommunications sector would hardly have spread so quickly such mutual access is necessary for carriers to provide ubiquitous service and enable endusers to call and be called by anybody without subscribing to a system wide monopolist one way access concerns bottleneck inputs provided by an incumbent network to entrants while two way access concerns the interconnection between networks whereas one way access regulation is exclusively driven by containment of market power two way access is additionally affected by collusion possibilities among the numerous pricing rules discussed none clearly dominates this article provides a roadmap vis a vis the competing policy objectives for access price regulation

optimal fiscal policy for a state or local government abstract state and local government services are enjoyed by and taxes borne by two groups residents and non residents this paper addresses the question if state and local governments maximize their residents welfare and cannot distinguish between individual residents and non residents but know the aggregate characteristics of the two groups what set of taxes subsidies and public goods should they choose some of the results obtained are i even when all commodities are taxable and equity is ignored the existence of non resident consumption makes uniform taxation non optimal ii in some cases whether a commodity should be taxed or subsidized is independent of its own price elasticity iii central cities may be subsidized by suburban residents and iv the ability of state and local governments to redistribute is inversely proportional to the openness of the economy

optimal pricing of the portuguese telephone service a first attempt is made at finding the optimal two part tariff for portugese telephone service a theoretical model of consumer demand is presented and the two part tariff which maximizes social welfare is derived the model is then calibrated using portugese data and previous econometric studies the optimal long run two part tariff consists of an access charge that is close to twice the marginal cost of access and a usage charge 25 above the marginal cost of use the level of the optimal two part tariff depends mainly on the marginal cost of taxation and on an index of aversion to inequality the structure of the optimal two part tariff depends mainly on the ratio between the marginal consumer s usage level and the average usage level although the cost estimates are very tentative the results suggest that the 1986 usage charge was greater than optimum no similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the acces charge

does inequality in china affect health differently in high versus low income households china s so called reform and opening up policy gai ge kai fang implemented nearly 30 years ago has led to tremendous economic development china s nominal gross domestic product gdp was 3 25 trillion us dollars in 2007 making it the fourth largest economy in the world at the same time income inequality has become quite skewed in china inviting considerable criticism moreover the trend towards greater income inequality persists of particular public policy relevance is the effect of income inequality on health disparities in china particularly for low income households this study addresses this issue using a longitudinal dataset from the china health and nutrition survey chns over the period 1997 to 2006 our central finding is that income inequality affects health differently by socioeconomic status income inequality harms individual health among low income households by more than it does among high income households more specifically health is more adversely affected by greater incom

the pricing of public intermediate goods revisited abstract this paper revisits the pricing of publicly produced goods for competitive downstream industries we show that under a general equilibrium setting and with a general technology in the private production a uniform pricing formula should apply to the household and the private firm this uniform pricing formula extends the optimal formulae derived in baumol and bradford 1970 in a straightforward way

the externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution abstract this paper deals with implementing the efficient allocation of transboundary and persistent pollution in particular we adapt varian s compensation mechanism varian a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed amer econ rev 85 1994 1278 1293 to cover situations in which pollutants extend to neighboring regions and their effects persist over time the main contribution of this paper is the design of a mechanism that implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the efficient pollution levels in this context

a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed the author describes a class of simple two stage mechanisms that implement efficient allocations as subgame perfect equilibria for economic environments involving externalities these mechanisms known as compensation mechanisms solve a wide variety of externalities problems including implementation of lindahl allocations regulation of monopoly and efficient solutions to the prisoner s dilemma copyright 1994 by american economic association

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

infant mortality relative income and public policy do health outcomes depend on relative income as well as on an individual s absolute level of income we use infant mortality as a health status indicator and find a significant and positive link between infant mortality and income inequality using cross national data for 93 countries holding constant the income of each of the three poorest quintiles of a country s population we find that an increase in the income of the upper 20 of the income distribution is associated with higher not the lower infant mortality our results are robust and not just caused by the concave relationship between income and health the estimates imply a decrease in infant mortality by 1 5 for a one percentage point decrease in the income share of the richest quintile the overall results are sensitive to public policy public health care expenditure educational outcomes and access to basic sanitation and safe water can explain the inequality health relationship thus our findings support the hypothesis of public disinves

the simple economics of extortion evidence from trucking in aceh this paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory we designed a study in which surveyors accompanied indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips during which they observed over 6 000 illegal payments to police soldiers and weigh station attendants using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments we further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes including third degree price discrimination and a menu of two part tariffs our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy

the european debate on rate systems in the interwar period this article describes a particular branch that evolved in the diffusion of electrical rate systems in twentieth century europe and the debate that ensued between the competitive promotional and cost based approaches three major questions are addressed what factors and historical circumstances favoured the emergence of more or less efficient pricing schemes why did some enterprises opt for promotional rates while others defended the cost based alternative what is the historical origin of marginal cost pricing it is shown how the volatility of the costs that characterize hydro electric production made this particular technology very sensitive to a cost approach towards pricing and to a seasonal and time of day perspective on rate systems

shadow prices consistency and the value of life this paper examines the consequences of inconsistent shadow pricing the principal example of such inconsistency is the value of life safety second best shadow pricing policy is shown to depend upon how public sector budgets are allocated and the principle that public sector decision makers should agree to a consistent shadow price is shown to require information unlikely to be available a weaker consistency principle requiring minimal information is then developed

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

price elasticities for local telephone calls price elasticities are estimated for local telephone calls and minutes of conversation using data from a pricing experiment in central illinois conducted by general telephone and electronics the experiment charges separately for calls and for minutes using a model that is consistent with the theory of telephone demand the authors estimate the effects of both prices the nonlinear generalized least squares estimates of the elasticities are fairly small about 0 1 or less in absolute value at experimental price levels but they are estimated with high precision the report briefly considers the application of these results to predict the effects of introducing measured service telephone rates in other cities residential telephone subscribers in the united states typically pay a flat monthly rate for local service with no extra charge for calls within the local area the alternative of explicitly charging for local calls commonly referred to as usage sensitive pricing or local measured service is of increasing interest to u s telephone companies and regulatory commissions cosgrove and linhart 5 garfinkel and linhart 8 baude ed 2 3 charging for calls that are now free clearly holds promise of increasing economic efficiency alleman 1 mitch

wealthier is healthier we estimate the effect of income on health using cross country timeseries data on health infant and child mortality and life expectancy and income per capita we use instrumental variables estimates using exogenous determinants of income growth to identify the pure income effect on health isolated from reverse causation or incidental association the long run income elasticity of infant and child mortality in developing countries lies between 0 2 and 0 4 using these estimates we calculate that over a half a million child deaths in the developing world in 1990 alone can be attributed to the poor economic performance in the 1980s

health insurance and the demand for medical care evidence from a randomized experiment we estimate how cost sharing the portion of the bill the patient pays affects the demand for medical services the data come from a randomized experiment a catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out of pocket price the price elasticity is approximately 0 2 we reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure for example by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization

estimation of price elasticities for an international telephone demand model the demand for international telephone calls in australia is comprised of three s ervices with three distinct prices in order to estimate elasticities for both tariffs and surcharges an econometric model is developed t hat has two submodels each of which consists of an aggregate equatio n and an allocation system one model determines how the total number of telephone calls is allocated among the three services while the second allocates the total number of minutes called between directly dialed and operator connected services the model is estimated using aggregate data for telephone traffic emanating from australia copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

the demand for transport fuels in turkey abstract in this paper we estimate the demand for transport fuels in turkey specifically using four different models namely a partial adjustment model a distributed lag model an autoregressive distributed lag model and an error correction model we estimate gasoline and diesel demand functions with quarterly data covering the period 2003 q1 2014 q3 we find a stable long run relationship only for diesel demand income and price our results imply that gasoline demand does not respond to income and price in the long run reflecting a shift from gasoline towards diesel induced by differential tax policies furthermore we find that transport fuel demand is price inelastic making tax on fuel a perfect tool for raising budget revenues in addition our results suggest that fuel demand responds to negative and positive price changes symmetrically

implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects abstract the regulation of a persistent pollutant through a sequence of compensation mechanisms varian h 1994 a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed american economic review 85 1278 1293 involves the unexpected conclusion that it may be optimal to establish lower taxes in response to an increase in the magnitude of a possible catastrophe

effects of income inequality on population health new evidence from the european community household panel this study provides new evidence in order to explore the relationship between income inequality and health in the european union countries using new data from the european community household panel echp a variety of different specifications were tried using diverse dependent variables such as life expectancy at birth and child mortality the results show new support to the influence of income inequality on health indicators using aggregate data and panel techniques

optimal two part pricing in a carbon offset market a comparison of organizational types author affiliation murray fulton johnson shoyama graduate school of public policy diefenbaker building university of saskatchewan saskatoon sk s7n 5b8 canada e mail murray fulton usask ca corresponding author james vercammen food and resource economics and sauder school of business 2053 main mall university of british columbia vancouver bc v6t 1z2 canada e mail james vercammen ubc ca acknowledgment the authors would like to thank tom ross and ralph winter for valuable comments on an early version of this article as well as the southern economic journal editor and two anonymous reviewers the usual caveats apply 1 introductionone of the consequences of the kyoto protocol kp and the increased focus on the role of greenhouse gases ghgs in climate change is that market based approaches to reducing ghg emissions are being actively developed in europe the european union eu operates an emissions trading scheme ets 1 while in the united states the chicago climate exchange ccx trades carbon offsets among exchange members 2 in canada a number of provinces have announced plans for carbon trading schemes four of them have joined the western climate initiative wci a consortium of canadian provinces and states developing a regional cap and trade system wci 2008 the wci and the regional greenhouse gas initiative rggi a consortium of northeastern and mid atlantic states see rggi 2008 are part of the international carbon action partnership a group of countries and regions from around the world that has formed to actively pursue the development of mandatory cap and trade systems in carbon 3the agriculture and forestry sectors are likely to be important suppliers of carbon offsets to the carbon market both through carbon sequestration activities for example the storing of carbon in the soil or in trees and through activities that reduce ghg emissions for instance estimates made by the united states at the time the kp was being negotiated projected that forest cropland and grazing land management sinks could have accounted for about half of u s reduction commitments u s department of state 2002 in canada the federal government estimated that agricultural and forestry sinks could provide in the order of 15 20 million metric tons of carbon offsets relative to a total of 270 300 million metric tons of reductions required under the kp government of canada 2005 food and agricultural organization fao estimates indicate that dryland soils in the world could sequester somewhere in the range of 12 000 16 000 million metric tons of carbon fao 2004 in the case of agriculture since carbon offsets are sold in units that are much larger than most individual farmers can supply carbon sequestration from a number of producers must be aggregated to fulfill contracts 4 as a consequence market intermediaries or aggregators as they are known are emerging to perform this economic function some of these aggregators are organized as for profit firms while others are organized by farmers associations examples of for profit firms are as follows c green aggregators ltd a privately owned company that contracts with farmers in manitoba saskatchewan and alberta for carbon sequestration the carbon they acquire is sold on the ccx c green aggregators 2008 and agcert international an irish company founded to generate emission reductions from livestock farms agcert international 2008 much of agcert s sales of carbon credits has been direct to individual emitters on the producer association side the iowa farm bureau has created agragate climate credits corporation to aggregate carbon credits for sale on the ccx agragate climate credits corporation 2008 agragate administers the project transacts trades on the exchange and distributes earnings to project participants

coal rates and revenue adequacy in a quasi regulated rail industry this article considers whether equitable rates to captive coal shippers are compatible with competitive rates of return in the rail industry using the results of a translog cost function based on panel data of class i railroads for 1974 1986 i show that returns to scale are sufficiently large to cause coal rates to rise to socially unacceptable levels if coal shippers have to bear the entire revenue burden moreover even if noncoal traffic makes a contribution to overhead the revenue burden on coal traffic is still substantial and would require increases in coal rates that are probably neither politically nor economically feasible

an algorithm for ramsey pricing by multiproduct public firms under incomplete information abstract we consider the problems facing a regulatory authority charged with the responsibility of regulating a multiproduct public firm the regulatory constraint arises in the form of a break even profit constraint a price vector which maximizes social welfare subject to this break even constraint is commonly referred to as a ramsey price vector this paper describes in a general equilibrium framework a regulatory procedure which converges to a ramsey price vector this procedure could be applied to a natural monopoly in a contestable market situation in which the regulator and the firm cooperate to implement ramsey pricing as a limit pricing strategy to prevent incursions from potential entrants

income taxation public sector pricing and redistribution income taxation and public sector pricing are considered in an integrated control theory model of the mirrlees tradition it is shown that the often alleged separability between income taxation as a purely distributional instrument and public pricing as a purely allocational instrument usually does not hold rather in our model public prices have to resemble the distributionally modified public prices proposed by feldstein 1972 application of the fiscal policy instrument public pricing restricts the distributional task of income taxation our results differ considerably from the direct indirect taxation controversy because the assumption of constant returns to scale cannot be imposed in a model of public pricing

evaluating the welfare effects of reforming municipal water prices abstract despite the strong criticisms by economists of water utility pricing practices and the presence of well articulated theoretical models of efficient pricing alternatives few empirical studies have documented the magnitude of the efficiency gains from altering water prices the structures of water supply costs and water demands are estimated using data from vancouver canada a simulation program uses these estimated relationships to compute the impact upon a representative water utility s output and deficit and upon aggregate consumer surplus of a move from its current practice to efficient prices simulation results show that a move to seasonally differentiated pricing with an annual charge calculated to recoup the resulting deficit raises aggregate surplus by approximately 4 this result contrasts with recent water pricing studies that found welfare improvements of approximately 1

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

efficient excise taxation the evidence from cigarettes we develop a model in which optimizing policy makers in adjacent government jurisdictions levy excise taxes on a commodity that has a unique point of production from which all shipments emanate from this model we derive an unusually specific predicted geographical pattern of those excise taxes in which these taxes rise at a decreasing rate as one moves outward from the point of production we compare these predictions to the observed pattern of cigarette taxes imposed by state governments in the united states and find the data to be fully consistent with our model among these predictions is the existence of a ripple effect which reduces taxes in many other jurisdictions due to low taxes at the point of production we estimate that these induced tax reductions in other states save cigarette producers and consumers a minimum of 110 million per year

public pricing under imperfect competition abstract existing literature on second best pricing assumes that regulatory control encompasses all industries subject to distortion this paper extends the theory in a game theoretic framework to incorporate market power outside the regulated sector we find that in this situation price always exceeds marginal cost in the public firm and that the profit constraint for the public firm need not be binding in addition the existence of pricing distortions outside the regulated sector can actually increase welfare

the equity and efficiency of two part tariffs in u s natural gas markets abstractresidential natural gas customers in the united states face volumetric charges that average about 30 percent more than the marginal cost of gas this inefficient departure from marginal cost pricing allows gas utilities to cover their fixed infrastructure and operating costs proposals for recovering these costs instead through fixed monthly fees are often opposed because of a widespread belief that current rate schedules have desirable distributional consequences using nationally representative household level data we show that the correlation between household income and natural gas consumption is indeed positive but surprisingly weak so current rate schedules are only mildly progressive in part we argue that this is because poor households tend to have larger families and less energy efficient homes we calculate bill impacts under a variety of scenarios and show that even a modest energy assistance program would more than offset the distributional impact of tariff rebalancing for most low

the eu 20 20 2020 targets an overview of the emf22 assessment three computable general equilibrium models are used to estimate the economic implications of a stylized version of eu climate policy if implemented at the lowest possible cost the 20 emissions reduction would lead to a welfare loss of 0 5 2 0 by 2020 second best policies increase costs a policy with two carbon prices one for the ets one for the non ets could increase costs by up to 50 a policy with 28 carbon prices one for the ets one each for each member state could increase costs by another 40 the renewables standard could raise the costs of emissions reduction by 90 overall the inefficiencies in policy lead to a cost that is 100 125 too high the models differ greatly in the detail of their results the ets non ets split may have a negligible impact on welfare while the renewables standard may even improve welfare the models agree however that the distortions introduced by total eu package imply a substantial welfare loss over and above the costs needed to meet the climate target the marginal total and excess costs reported here are notably higher than those in the impact assessment of the european commission

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

implementing the efficient allocation of pollution we provide simple mechanisms to implement the efficient allocation of pollution first assuming complete information across firms and then allowing for incomplete information both mechanisms operate by inducing firms to monitor one another using firms reports to determine pollution allotments and transfers the complete information mechanism determines a firm s transfer according to a linear pollution price set by other firms both mechanisms can be modified to be budget balanced in and out of equilibrium the complete information mechanism implements the efficient allocation even when firms are allowed to use mixed strategies under a single crossing condition the same holds for the incomplete information mechanism this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

regulatory preferences and two part tariffs the case of electricity the purpose of this paper is to develop and demonstrate a method for deriving and testing regulatory preferences within and across customer classes and to assess the impact of these preferences on price structures and regulatory effectiveness in the electric utility industry the method extends a technique described in both nelson and ross for uncovering interclass preferences in a uniform price framework 24 33 34 by employing a two part tariff framework the extension enables the derivation of both interclass and intraclass preferences intraclass preferences can be derived in a two part tariff framework because regulators can discriminate not only between customer classes as with uniform prices but also within a customer class two part tariffs are also introduced because actual price structures in the electric utility industry are better approximated by two part tariffs than by uniform prices models of optimal two part tariffs particularly those of schmalensee and sherman and visscher are extended to allow regulatory preferences to vary across and within heterogeneous customer classes 36 37 13 27 11 25 19 18 22 2 these variable preferences are incorporated into a weighted social surplus function which regulators are assumed to maximize given this model of regulatory behavior preference weights can be derived for the electric utility industry with information on the markups of both per unit prices over marginal costs of kwh output and fixed charges over the marginal costs of customer connection and on output and connection demand elasticities

first and second best pricing with uncertain demand as has been well known since at least the work of hotelling 6 marginal cost pricing is the ideal regulatory policy in a simple certainty setting however when economies of scale exist in production such a policy will in general entail a revenue shortfall for the firm ideally the regulator should meet such a short fall by raising lump sum taxes but that solution is liable to prove infeasible ramsey pricing popularized by baumol and bradford 4 examines the second best pricing policy when firms receive no tax subsidy so prices must exceed marginal costs the celebrated inverse elasticity rule shows that with demands for the various goods independent goods whose elasticity of demand is proportionately less should have their price exceed marginal cost proportionately more further complications arise when one takes into account the uncertainty involved in economic decisions in recognition of this there has recently been considerable discussion of first best pricing with stochastic demand 5 the general conclusion of this discussion is that marginal cost pricing continues to be the first best policy in order to reach this conclusion however the literature has in effect assumed that regulators are risk neutral compared to this large literature on stochastic first best pricing the only two papers known to us that treat second best pricing with stochastic demand are by sherman visscher 11 and by wecker upton 15 both these treatments assume the marginal utility of income of the regulator is constant and so also require that there be risk neutrality in this work on the other hand we will consider both first and second best pricing policies when the regulator is explicitly allowed to be risk averse in the former case we will be interested in whether marginal cost pricing will continue to be the first best policy whereas in the latter case we will examine whether the simple inverse elasticity rule can hold despite considerations of risk and the risk behavior of regulators finally we will directly relate the results of our first best analysis to our study of the second best problem in much of the paper the source of demand uncertainty will be arbitrary we will

optimal commodity grouping in a partial equilibrium framework this note characterizes in a partial equilibrium economy with a single agent which commodities should be taxed whenever there is only one available tax rate we show that commodities with low price elasticities should be imposed luxuries are eventually exempted

nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems abstract for a very general class of pollution control models involving strictly quasi concave utility functions over consumption and environmental quality and strictly convex emission abatement cost functions a proportional cost sharing mechanism is presented inspired by the ratio equilibrium introduced by 7 it is shown that the proportional solution yields a cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts and that the resulting utility imputation always lies in the stand alone core of the cost sharing game in order to decentralize the proportional cost sharing equilibrium a financial compensation mechanism implementing the proportional solution in complete information nash equilibrium is presented

optimal pricing of local telephone service although payment for nearly all other goods and services including toll long distance telephone calls increases with greater consumption nearly 90 percent of the residential telephone subscribers and more than half the business subscribers in the united states now pay a flat monthly rate for local calls see larry garfinkel recently however the telephone companies and regulatory commissions have been moving cautiously toward imposing usage charges for local telephone calls there is renewed interest in what is currently termed usage sensitive pricing t usp it is due to the combined forces of inflation increased local usage and competition from independent firms that sell telephone terminal equipment and supply private toll lines to business customers under usp the pricing of such services as telephone installation directory assistance and minutes of calling is based on incremental rather than average costs since world war ii technological advances have benefited long distance far more than local telephone calling development in microwave communications coaxial cable satellites and waveguides have dramatically lowered the costs of long distance transmission in contrast the costs of local service have moved upward since the late 1960 s at a rate not far below the general price index see at t 1975 faced with a continuing stream of requests for local telephone rate increases state regulatory commissions are finding the concept of tying prices to usage increasingly attractive at t and some of the independent telephone carriers are beginning to test usp plans in several cities with flat rate tariffs increases in local calling add to carrier costs but not to their revenues the local calling rate per subscriber has increased by an average of 2 percent for the past seven years at t s chairman has stated we are moving more and more in the direction of usage sensitive pricing see washington star news p a12 and according to newspaper accounts of at t management documents the bell system plans to phase out flat rate telephone service and begin charging for each local call in major metropolitan areas in 1978 80 see seattle postintelligencer pp 1 10 still regulatory commissions consumer groups and the carriers themselves remain cautious about requiring usage sensitive tariffs for all subscribers the prospective gains from prices more closely related to costs are at least partially offset by the added costs of metering equipment and billing most telephone subscribers prefer flat rates according to bell system marketing surveys see garfinkel p 28 and it is by no means clear which groups of subscribers will be helped and which harmed by such revisions in local tariff structures will the poor end up paying more because they use their phones more should different prices be charged for calls at different times of day on what bases should the monthly and per call rates be determined the purpose of this paper is to sort out some of the questions of economic efficiency and equity that arise when changes are considered in the methods of pricing local telephone services in section i i construct a department of economics the rand corporation and the international institute of management berlin this study was supported under a grant from the john and mary r markle foundation i am indebted to walter s baer for numerous contributions to this paper to s c littlechild and patricia munch and to the managing editor and a referee of this review for critical and constructive review of a draft i have benefited as well from the comments and suggestions of james h alleman stanley m besen william s comanor john m drew leland l johnson john a kay edward d lowry carl pavarini john rolph ralph turvey and chris witze bryant mori assisted with the computer programming see my 1976 paper for a more extensive version of this paper which also discusses optimal flat rate and optimal peak load tariffs

dynamics of price regulation we study the dynamics of price regulation for an industry adjusting to exogenous technological progress first we characterize the optimal capacity path and replacement cycles in a neoclassical investment model second we show that naive rate ofreturn regulation which ignores components of economic depreciation eventually results in a deficient level of capacity due to excessively high retail prices burdened by the need to recover the underdepreciated costs of historical investments third we explain how price cap regulation leads to more efficient capital replacement decisions compared to naive rate of return regulation and we show how finite price cap horizons distort capital replacement finally we interpret recent regulatory reforms in telecommunications markets

income distribution and infant mortality comparing two countries in which the poor have equal real incomes the one in which the rich are wealthier is likely to have a higher infant mortality rate this anomalous result does not appear to spring from measurement error in estimating the income of the poor and the association between high infant mortality and income inequality is still present after controlling for other factors such as education medical personnel and fertility the positive association of infant mortality and the income of the rich suggests that measured real incomes may be a poor measure of social welfare this paper considers and tests several possible explanations such as the provision of medical services the degree of urbanization the extent of female literacy and differences in the composition of births among different income groups none of these factors adequately accounts for the positive association between the incomes of the rich and infant mortality the geographical scope is worldwide excerpt

government organization and power i introduction economists have systematically examined the economics of government finance and long ago established that the means of financing government creates inefficiencies in the market for instance see baumol and bradford 1970 and diamond and mirrlees 1971a 1971b what may be less well examined and understood is that apart from the distortions that arise from the means of government finance government officials can have an incentive to provide a combination of services and taxes that are nonoptimal as in niskanen 1997 the ability of government to exercise coercive and pricing power creates these incentives a growing number of articles explore the effect of government power on its size for example anderson and tollison 1988 and rogers and rogers 1995 examine the implications of pricing power for government size in his work on bureaucracy niskanen 1971 considered the implications of coercive power for government size olson 1991 mcguire and olson 1996 niskanen 1997 and mcguire 2001 examine the implications of the joint exercise of coercive and pricing powers by an autocratic government to our knowledge however no previous work explicitly distinguishes between the coercive and pricing powers of government and none systematically examines all the possible combinations of coercive and pricing powers in the present analysis we develop a simple theoretical framework that allows us to examine on an integrated basis the exercise of government power the framework abstracts from any distortions in the means of government finance and separates government power into two dimensions pure coercive power and pure pricing power pure coercive power is the ability of a government to compel consumers to accept more of the public good than they desire at each tax price through fiat coercive power typically arises when citizens are unable to exit a jurisdiction costlessly and the government is able to push citizens beyond what they would accept in a voluntary relationship pure pricing power is the government s ability to restrict output along a given demand curve and earn rents by doing so pricing power typically arises when the government has limited competition and faces a downward sloping demand curve for its services we consider four polar combinations of coercive and pricing power in comparison to the social optimum lindahl democracy monopoly niskanen bureaucracy and autocracy as shown in figure 1 the government in lindahl democracy exercises neither coercive nor pricing power a monopoly government is able to restrict its output and exercise pricing power to earn rents in a traditional monopolistic fashion but it cannot engage price discrimination or expropriation to obtain any remaining consumer surplus from its citizens a niskanen bureaucracy can exact all of the surplus that consumers obtain from the public goods it provides but it must use the surplus in the production of public goods it cannot exercise pricing power and restrict output to obtain rents as a monopoly would an autocracy exercises both coercive and pricing power in practice democratic governments are likely to have both coercive and pricing powers rather than to conform to the lindahl ideal our analytical framework allows us to clarify and reconcile the differences between some of the previous contributions to the literature on government power and size in democracy a government can simultaneously use its coercive power to grow too large and its pricing power to restrict its output and earn rents furthermore government size or rents alone may be poor indicators of the extent to which government fails to achieve optimality in its provision of services government power may be used to generate rents provide too much government service or a combination of both ii social optimum consider a jurisdiction or economy with n identical individuals and two goods a purely public good and a purely private good

two views of applied welfare analysis the case of local telephone service pricing there are two standards that an economist may use to determine optimal prices the first is arnold harberger s 3 utilitarian standard which says that prices should be chosen to maximize the algebraic sum of consumer s and producer s surpluses the second is the competitive standard which regards any voluntary exchange as welfare improving and therefore seeks prices that maximize such exchanges the purpose of this essay is to briefly discuss these alternative theories of economic welfare point out how they may conflict and illustrate such a conflict in the pricing of local telephone service

continuous cross subsidies and quantity restrictions this article provides a model of loss leader pricing and quantity restrictions for a competitive multiproduct industry when individual consumers have continuous and independent demands for the set of available goods utilizing a generalization of the model proposed by bliss 1988 we demonstrate the importance of consumer heterogeneity for the existence of cross subsidies when there is complete information and individual consumers have smooth downward sloping demands continuous cross subsidies arising from consumer heterogeneity are also shown to exist in hotelling models our use of continuous rather than unit demands allows us to analyze issues related to welfare which in turn exposes a strong incentive for the firm to place binding quantity restrictions on consumers we also show how the presence of quantity restrictions can be used to distinguish between continuous cross subsidies arising from heterogeneous consumers versus those arising from classic demand complementarity with homogeneous agents

the demand for local telephone service a fully discrete model of residential calling patterns and service choices we present an empirical model of households choices among local telephone service options for example between flat rate and measured service and the interrelation of these choices with the number and average duration of local calls households make at each time of day to each geographical zone using a nested logit model with estimation performed on a randomly selected subset of the households calling patterns we calculate elasticities of demand for each local service option number of calls average duration and revenues with respect to the fixed monthly charges and the usage charges for calling under each option we find moderate price elasticities of number of calls with respect to usage charges for households subscribing to measured service nevertheless raising usage charges has a negligible effect on revenues since a sufficient number of households either originally subscribe to flat rate service or convert to flat rate service in response to higher usage charges we find a high elasticity of demandfor each service option with respect to itsfixed monthlyfee this indicates high substitutability among service options the shift among service options induces new calling patterns which wefind to be a small but not negligible indirect effect e most telephone operating companies offer residential customers several options for local service there are two general categories of service flat rate service under which a household can for a fixed monthly charge make an unlimited number of calls within a specified geographical area and measured service for which the household pays a lower fixed monthly fee but can make only a specified number or dollar value of calls at no extra charge after which charges are incurred for additional calls various flat rate services differ in the size of the geographical area in which calling is at no extra charge with higher monthly fees for larger areas measured services differ with respect to the threshold number or dollar value of calls beyond which the customer is charged

intergenerational health mobility an empirical approach based on the echp despite the importance of the study of health mobility few attempts have been made to measure intergenerational mobility not only in the european union but also in other countries such as united states this article is focused on the study of intergenerational health mobility using data from the european community household panel echp in particular the relationships between self assessed health of parents and their sons are analysed the evidence obtained suggests that in spain sons reported health depends significantly on the self assessed health of their fathers

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco