stock option repricing and its alternatives an empirical examination in this paper i examine the likelihood of ceo stock option repricing and its alternatives namely option grant stock grant and do nothing multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility moreover repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important finally i find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing my results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention and not by agency cost considerations

program trading and expiration day effects the arbitrage between index futures and the underlying cash index and the cash settlement feature of index futures contracts which requires arbitrageurs to unwind positions in the stock market are thought to be at the heart of the abnormal stock price movements during the triple witching hour the last hour of trading on days on which index futures index options and options on index futures expire simultaneously during 1984 and 1985 volume was substantially higher than normal in the last hour of trading on those quarterly fridays open interest in the expiring futures contracts on the expiration day amounted to about 40 per cent of the average month end open interest the incremental stock market volume however was approximately one third the volume that would be inmplied if the entire expiration day open interest were traded in the stock market analysis of stock market price changes in the last hour of expiration days and the first halfhour of the following day indicates that the volatility of price changes was significantly higher on expiration days with the stock market tending to fall stocks not in the sp index option expirations themselves did not lead to abnormal market movements when the magnitude of price effects was measured by the degree of reversal in prices on the morning after the expiration day the average magnitude of the price effect in the 10 most recent quarterly futures contract expirations examined was about 0 4 per cent of the closing index value at expiration the average expiration day price effect of 0 4 per cent is not large considering that a price impact of approximately 0 25 per cent of the value of the transaction can be expected on the basis of the bid ask spread once this market impact cost is drawn out the average expiration day price impact falls to about 0 15 per cent of the value of the transaction an amount representing the additional cost of liquidity furthermore price impacts in excess of those found on expiration days are frequently encountered in large block transactions where the cost of providing liquidity also increases on expiration days however transactions in many stocks occur simultaneously so the market as a whole is affected

repudiation and renegotiation the case of sovereign debt a model of sovereign debt is analyzed in this model renegotiation arises in a natural way because information is incomplete the renegotiation game has many equilibria the standard contract theory approach suggests that the parties should agree to choose the efficient equilibrium strategies when the contract is written refinements of the equilibrium notion such as strategic stability suggest that a very inefficient equilibrium may be chosen the tension between these two approaches raises deep questions about the correct way to analyze a large class of contracting problems copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the term structure of volatility implied by foreign exchange options this paper illustrates regression and kalman filtering methods for estimating the time varying term structure of volatility expectations revealed by options prices short and long term expectations are estimated for four currencies using daily phlx options prices from 1985 to 1989 throughout this period there were important differences between shortand long term expectations the slope of the term structure changed frequently and there were significant variations in long term volatility expectations the expectation estimates can be used to value otc options to improve hedging strategies and to test the hypothesis that the options market overreacts

stock grants as a commitment device abstract a large and increasing fraction of the value of executives compensation is accounted for by security grants however in most models of executive compensation the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state contingent cash payments security awards are redundant in this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long term contracts we show that in this environment if stock grants are not used then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts when stock grants are used however nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk sharing and higher firm value

option prices as predictors of equilibrium stock prices the black scholes option pricing model modified for dividend payments is used to calculate jointly implied stock prices and implied standard deviations a comparison of the implied stock prices with observed stock prices reveals that the implied prices contain information regarding equilibrium stock prices that is not fully reflected in observed stock prices the implications of this finding are discussed this study investigates the role of call option prices as predictors of the equilibrium prices of their underlying stocks using the black scholes 3 bs model previous tests of the bs model have shown that the formula is highly successful in explaining the observed market prices of options see black and scholes 2 galai 8 chiras and manaster 6 and macbeth and merville 12 according to the model the option price is a function of the current value of the underlying stock the instantaneous variance of the stock s rate of return the time to maturity of the option the risk free rate of interest and the exercise price of the option 1 given an observed option price and known values of all input parameters to the bs model except the stock price one can determine the price of the underlying stock that equates the observed option price to its calculated value it follows from the underlying logic of the model that the implied price is the value of the underlying stock for which a continuously revised option bond portfolio would be a perfect substitute for the stock hence if options are actually priced according to the model implied stock prices will be the option market s assessment of equilibrium stock values previous empirical studies have assumed that observed stock prices are the relevant stock prices for option valuation however just as stock prices may differ in the short run from one exchange to another i e nyse midwest

stock option repricing heads i win tails you lose recent scandals at enron worldcom and global crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before however these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice as professor joseph badaracco of harvard business school points out the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right where both choices can be justified yet one must be chosen over the other whether or not to reprice stock options represents one such ethical dilemma repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance however it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline

the repricing of executive stock options abstract we examine a sample of firms that reset the exercise prices on their executive options these repricings follow a period of about one year of poor firm specific performance in which the average firm loses one fourth of its value no other offsetting changes to option terms or compensation are made and many firms reprice more than once without repricing a majority of the options would have been at the money within two years we find that when faced with circumstances in which repricing might be chosen firms with greater agency problems smaller size and insider dominated boards are more likely to reprice

a general framework for evaluating executive stock options abstract motivated by recent recommendations by both european and american accounting standards boards that executive stock options be expensed in firms statements we provide an analytical and flexible framework for their evaluation our approach takes into account the vesting period american style resetting and reloading provisions that are features of many option programs and also considers the trading restriction on executives we identify a recursive structure in the stream of options that are granted to the executive over the course of her employment by exploiting this we are able to obtain a near explicit formula for the option value this enables us to discuss the joint effects of the different features on the exercising strategies and firms granting cost especially we highlight some significant interactions among these features

multi unit pay your bid auctions with variable awards abstract multi unit auctions in which bidders can win a variable number of units differ significantly from multi unit auctions in which bidders can only win one unit in an independent private values pay your bid auction where bidders may win up to two units we show that first order conditions imply separating and pooling of bids must both occur with positive probability this behavior is not found in multi unit uniform price auctions it also contrasts with asymmetric first price auctions of a single good whose first order conditions are superficially similar a uniform distribution example is analyzed numerically journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 c72

the value of shorting abstract this paper assesses the effects of short sale constraints on asset prices the analysis focuses on a particular period in sweden during which shorting stocks was impossible but stock options were traded firstly the effect on both stock options and the underlying stock was investigated jointly by considering deviations from put call parity secondly the effects on only the derivatives were investigated by considering their implied volatilites the main findings are i the impact on pricing are consistent with a short sale constraint ii these effects are much more pronounced when shorting is not possible iii these effects are not solely attributable to the mispricing of the stock as previous research indicates and iv access to international shorting markets can alleviate local short sale constraints

underwater options and the dynamics of executive pay to performance sensitivities we empirically analyze the dynamics of executives pay to performance sensitivities option pay to performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay to performance sensitivity in other ways building a detailed data set on executives portfolios of stock and options we find that the responsiveness of pay to performance sensitivities created by all executive holdings of stock and options to changes in stock price is large the elasticity of pay to performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0 7 and is larger for high option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater the dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay to performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines on average these larger grants restore approximately 40 of the stock price induced pay to performance sensitivity declines option repricings are inconsequential in this regard despite the attention they have attracted in looking at positive returns we find the reverse higher returns both directly increase pay to performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants which raise pay to performance sensitivities further thus option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases

large option trades market makers and limit orders this article focuses on the difference between market makers and limit orders in their role as suppliers of liquidity for both sources of liquidity i analyze the price behavior of stocks and options around large option trades and i estimate the premium paid by the initiator of the large trade my findings suggest that limit orders for options are picked off after adverse changes in the underlying stock price furthermore i find that for these transactions there is a permanent change in quotations in the direction of the transaction after transactions where market makers supply liquidity quotes tend to return to their pretrade level article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

initial margin policy and stochastic volatility in the crude oil futures market this article examines the relationship between the volatility of the crude oil futures market and changes in initial margin requirements to closely match changes in futures market volatility with the corresponding changes in margin requirements we infer the volatility of the futures market from the prices of crude oil futures options contracts using a mean reverting diffusion process for volatility we show that changes in margin policy do not affect subsequent market volatility

comparing the spanish and the discriminatory auction formats a discrete model with private information abstract the spanish treasury is the only treasury in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell government debt winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than the weighted average price of winning bids wap and pay the wap otherwise following gordy gordy m 1996 multiple bids in a multiple unit common value auction board of governors of the federal reserve system we model the spanish auction as a common value auction of multiple units with private information allowing for multiple bids numerical analysis shows that bidders spread their bids more in the spanish than in the discriminatory auction and bid higher for the first unit and that the expected seller s revenue is higher in the spanish than in the discriminatory auction within a reasonable set of parameter values

on renegotiation design a central concern of contract theory is to investigate departures from the first best paradigm in which rational agents could in principle achieve unrestrained efficiency through complete long term contingent contracts in order to take into account some of the observed limitations in real life contracts attention has been paid to informational problems one focus has been on asymmetries of information between contractors adverse selection and moral hazard have been used for example to analyze insurance problems labor contracts managerial incentives regulation of monopolies vertical restraints or the financial structure of firms see for example hartholmstrom 1987 for a survey of these issues attention has also been devoted to private information shared by the parties but unavailable to outsiders like courts that is observable but unverifiable information asymmetries of information between contractors introduce constraints which indeed most often prevent to achieve first best efficiency unfortunately this paradigm involves technical difficulties which explains why most contributions focus on unidimensional asymmetries and may leave some undeterminacies as to the form of optimal contracts e g if there are more than one asymmetry or the size of the inetliciencies there may for instance exist several equilibria which are more or less inefficient the last paradigm observable but unverifiable information is technically more convenient what is not clear however is the extent to which the presence of unverifiable information may prevent achieving first best

are incentive contracts rigged by powerful ceos we argue that some powerful ceos induce boards to shift the weight on performance measures toward the better performing measures thereby rigging incentive pay a simple model formalizes this intuition and gives an explicit structural form on the rigged incentive portion of ceo wage function using u s data we find support for the model s predictions rigging accounts for at least 10 of the compensation to performance sensitivity and it increases with ceo human capital and firm volatility moreover a firm with rigged incentive pay that is one standard deviation above the mean faces a subsequent decrease of 4 8 in firm value and 7 5 in operating return on assets

the timing of option repricing we investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company s stock price for a sample of 236 repricing events we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20 day period following the repricing date in addition repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date these findings suggest that ceos opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date

s p 100 index option volatility using transaction data on the s p 100 index options we study the effect of valuation simplifications that are commonplace in previous research on the timeseries properties of implied market volatility using an american style algorithm that accounts for the discrete nature of the dividends on the s p 100 index we find that spurious negative serial correlation in implied volatility changes is induced by nonsimultaneously observing the option price and the index level negative serial correlation is also induced by a bid ask price effect if a single option is used to estimate implied volatility in addition we find that these same effects induce spurious and unreasonable negative cross correlations between the changes in call and put implied volatility an important area of current research is the estimation and behavior of market volatility implied by option pricing models for example stein 1989 concludes that the s p 100 index option market is inefficient because longer term options overreact to changes in the implied volatility of short maturity options day and lewis 1988 document an increase in volatility around the quarterly expiration cycle schwert 1990 draws conclusions about the behavior of volatility around the stock market crash of 1987 by using implied volatility all of these studies use a simplified option pricing framework to estimate implied market volatility previous research generally assumes that the s p 100 index option is european style this option is actually american style it is also common to assume that the dividend yield is constant the dividends are not constant and exhibit distinct seasonal patterns harvey and whaley 1991b show that large pricing errors can be induced in the option prices if the american feature and the discrete dividends are ignored option pricing errors translate into errors in the implied volatility estimates this paper uses s p 100 index call and put transactions and an american style option pricing model with the exact discrete dividend series to calculate a time series of implied volatilities this valuation method

the relation between implied and realized volatility abstract previous research finds the volatility implied by s p 100 index option prices to be a biased and inefficient forecast of future volatility and to contain little or no incremental information beyond that in past realized volatility in contrast we find that implied volatility outperforms past volatility in forecasting future volatility and even subsumes the information content of past volatility in some of our specifications our results differ from previous studies because we use longer time series and nonoverlapping data a regime shift around the october 1987 crash explains why implied volatility is more biased in previous work

returns policy new model introduction and consumer welfare abstract this paper investigates how economic outcomes differ for new model introduction between two extreme contracts outright sales contract and returns policy contract with full credit under the outright sales contract we show that the retailer s incentive to introduce a new model can lead to a reduction of consumer welfare when the retailer is moderately risk averse the primary conclusion from this study is that the returns policy contract resolves this conflict between firms and consumers and that the supply chain introduces the new model only when consumer surplus from the new model is higher than that from the old model

the behavior of the volatility implicit in the prices of stock index options abstract we examine stock market volatility around the quarterly expirations of stock index futures contracts and nonquarterly expirations of stock index options using estimates of the volatility implicit in the option prices the option prices reflect increases in the volatility of the underlying stock indexes around both quarterly and nonquarterly expiration dates analysis of the residual returns on index options provides evidence consistent with an unexpected increase in market volatility around expiration dates

the valuation of american call options and the expected ex dividend stock price decline abstract this study focuses on the ex dividend stock price decline implicit within the valuation of american call options on dividend paying stocks the roll 1977 american call option pricing formula and the observed structure of cboe call option transaction prices are used to infer the expected ex dividend stock price decline as a proportion of the amount of the dividend the relative decline is shown to be not meaningfully different from one confirming some recent evidence from studies which examined stock prices in the days surrounding ex dividend

hedging winner s curse with multiple bids evidence from the portuguese treasury bill auction auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price quantity bids despite the widespread adoption of this institutional feature and its use by bidders the motivations behind its use and its effects on auction outcomes are not well understood theoretically and have been little explored empirically this paper proposes that bidders use multiple bids to adjust for winner s curse by spreading her bids a bidder aligns her outcome more closely to the aggregate outcome of the auction this hypothesis is tested using bidding data from treasury bill auctions in portugal i find that ceteris paribus a bidder submits a greater number of bids and disperses prices on these bids more widely when there is a greater potential for winner s curse in particular both these measures of bid spreading increase with the volatility of market interest rates and the expected number of participating well informed bidders

the relative performance of five alternative warrant pricing models five warrant pricing models are examined in this study a pair based on the black scholes model a pair based on the constant elasticity of variance cev modification and an extendible warrant model a la longstaff based on more than 20 000 warrant price observations the flexible exponent cev model generates the lowest average absolute pricing error in most of the warrants examined the dilution adjusted black scholes model however remains a reasonable economical alternative in many cases

contract renegotiation and coasian dynamics consider a long term relationship between a seller and a buyer whose valuation for a per period service or a durable good is private as trade progresses the valuation will be partially revealed and it may be impossible for the parties to commit ex ante not to take advantage of this we analyse this situation first by supposing that the parties can sign a sequence of short term contracts and secondly by supposing that they can sign a long term contract but cannot commit not to renegotiate it later we find a close relationship in the second case between the optimal long term contract and the non commitment outcome in the standard coasian durable good model our results also have implications for hidden information principal agent models

time varying volatilities and calculation of the weighted implied standard deviation rogalski tinic have reported a monthly pattern in ex post stock return variances that differs between small and large market capitalization firms maloney rogalski find that option prices reflect these monthly patterns ex ante this study extends maloney rogalski s work by devising an expiration specific weighted implied standard deviation wisd it is found that i the monthly patterns in one month wisds are basically similar to the monthly patterns in ex post variances detected by rogalski tinic for both large and small size firms and ii use of expiration specific wisds as opposed to standard composite wisds results in improved performance of option pricing models

the rationality of early exercise decisions evidence from the s p 100 index options market this study provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the early exercise bistoty of sp but we show that a substantal number of these decisions are clearly irratonal since it would bave been possible to realize a larger riskless net cash jlow by seuling unlike p us studies of early exercise our tests of efflciency and the rationat decions tbatpresumably lead to eficient markets are model independet we also provide evidence concerning the relatve significance of dividends and the wild card to index optonpricing models and introduce and document the importance of the opton to exercise and avoid the indirect costs oftbe spread we alsofind evidence of a significant day of tbe week exercise effect and present some likely explanations for that effect

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

errors in implied volatility estimation estimating implied volatility by inverting the black scholes formula is subject to considerable error when option characteristics are observed with plausible errors especially for options away from the money large changes in volatility produce small changes in option prices conversely small errors in option prices and other option characteristics produce large errors in implied volatilities in the presence of small measurement errors unobserved truncation of option prices that violate lower bounds for absence of arbitrage can also lead to systematic volatility smiles the paper proposes feasible gls estimators that reduce the noise and bias in implied volatility estimates

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

on the optimality of resetting executive stock options the practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect initial incentives resetting can still be an important value enhancing aspect of compensation contracts even from an ex ante standpoint in fact we find that some resetting is almost always optimal the relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to influence the resetting process greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

risk aversion and block exercise of executive stock options abstract it is well documented that executives granted stock options tend to exercise early and in a few large transactions or blocks standard risk neutral valuation models cannot explain these patterns and attempts to capture the exercise behavior of risk averse executives have been limited to the special case of one option this paper solves for the optimal exercise behavior for a risk averse executive who is granted multiple stock options we show that utility based models do not predict block exercise behavior rather the risk averse executive exercises stock options individually at a sequence of increasing price thresholds when in addition the executive faces frictions such as costly exercise he faces a trade off between exercising little and often to maximize return and exercising larger quantities on fewer occasions to minimize effort this generates realistic block exercise behavior and yields new predictions in particular executives should begin by exercising large blocks of options but the block sizes should become smaller over time our framework also allows us to study the impact of multiple exercise dates on estimates of the cost of options to the company we find that assuming the executive can only exercise on a single occasion underestimates the cost of the options compared with allowing for optimal exercise behavior

on the valuation of american call options on stocks with known dividends both the roll and the geske equations for the valuation of the american call option on a stock with known dividends are incorrectly specified this note presents the corrected valuation formula explains the misspecifications and provides a numerical example

the creation and resolution of market uncertainty the impact of information releases on implied volatility we model and examine the impact of information releases on market uncertainty as mea sured by the implied standard deviation isd from option markets distinguishing between scheduled and unscheduled announcements we hypothesize that since the timing although not the content of scheduled announcements is known a priori the pre release isd will impound the anticipated impact of important releases on price volatility and that the isd will normally decline post release as this uncertainty is resolved conversely we hypothesize that the unexpected high volatility caused by major unscheduled releases will cause market participants to adjust upward their estimates of likely volatility over the remaining life of the option resulting in an increase in the isd our evidence supports both hypotheses the isds that we consider are from the t bond eurodollar and deutschemark options markets we examine scheduled macroeconomic news releases such as the employment report and the ppi we also find that the observed tendency for the isd to fall on fridays and rise on mondays is due to the weekday pattern of scheduled news releases

discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions evidence from when issued transactions abstract we use when issued transactions data to assess the treasury s current experiment with uniform auctions when issued volume is higher under uniform as compared to discriminatory auctions suggesting a higher information release which should reduce pre auction uncertainty and the winner s curse under uniform auctions when issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement the pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions this is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre auction information and lower the short squeeze a direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results

ceos outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market wide effects i e rpe there is little evidence to support this theory oyer 2004 journal of finance 59 1619 1649 posits that an absence of rpe is optimal if the ceo s reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy s fortunes we directly test and find support for oyer s 2004 theory we argue that the ceo s outside opportunities depend on his talent as proxied by the ceo s financial press visibility and his firm s industry adjusted roa our results are robust to alternate explanations such as managerial skimming oligopoly and asymmetric benchmarking

the stochastic behaviour of market variance implied in the prices of index options the purpose of this paper is to examine the time series properties of volatilities and to consider various financial and real variables that may be correlated with innovations in expected volatility the measure used in this study is the black scholes volatility implied in weekly call option prices written on the spot price of the ftse index a u k market equity index first the authors determine if capital structure can explain the relation between changes in the volatility of equity and structure can explain the relation between changes in the volatility of equity and changes in the level of the index second they analyze whether innovations in the volatilities of prices of real variables could also explain changes in equity volatility including the volume of transactions in equities oil prices exchange rates nominal and real interest rates and inflation copyright 1991 by royal economic society

optimal strike prices of stock options for effort averse executives abstract this paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at the money hall and murphy hall brian murphy kevin j 2000 optimal exercise prices for executive stock options american economic review 90 2 209 214 claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance however they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort averse into their model we revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages options and stock grants we simulate the manager s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders equity under alternative compensation schemes and identify schemes that are optimal our simulations indicate that when abstracting from tax considerations it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable i e substantially in the money on their expiration date prior to 2006 the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006

optimal sales force compensation we analyze a dynamic moral hazard model to derive optimal sales force compensation plans without imposing any ad hoc restrictions on the class of feasible incentive contracts we explain when the compensation plans that are most common in practice fixed salaries quota based bonuses commissions or a combination thereof are optimal fixed salaries are optimal for small revenue cost ratios quota based bonuses commissions should be used if the revenue cost ratio takes intermediate large values if firms face demand uncertainty markets are rather thin and the revenue cost ratio large firms should combine a commission with a quota based bonus if word of mouth advertising affects sales a dynamic commission that increases over time can be optimal when entering a new market or launching a new product firms should install long term bonus plans

a note on a simple accurate formula to compute implied standard deviations abstract we derive a simple accurate formula to compute implied standard deviations for options priced in the classic framework developed by black and scholes 1973 and merton 1973 when a stock price is equal to a discounted strike price this formula reduces to a formula provided by brenner and subrahmanyam 1988 however their formula s accuracy is sensitive to stock price deviations from a discounted strike price the formula derived here extends the range of accuracy to a wide band of option moneyness

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

a bayesian approach to modeling stock return volatility for option valuation new measures of stock return volatility are developed to increase the precision of stock option price estimates with bayesian statistical methods volatility estimates for a given stock are developed using prior information on the cross sectional patterns in return volatil ities for groups of stocks sorted on size financial leverage and trading volume call option values computed with the bayesian procedure generally improve prediction accuracy for market prices of call options relative to those computed using implied volatility standard historical volatility or even the actual ex post volatility that occurred during each option s life although the bayesian methods produce biased call price estimators they do reduce the systematic tendency of standard pricing approaches to overprice underprice options on high low volatility stocks little bias improvement is observed with respect to the time to maturity and moneyness of the call options

debt and seniority an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management we argue that long term debt has a role in controlling management s ability to finance future investments a company with high widely held debt will find it hard to raise capital since new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors conversely for a company with low debt we show there is an optimal debt equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments we derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior

valuation of american call options on dividend paying stocks empirical tests abstract this paper examines the pricing performance of the valuation equation for american call options on stocks with known dividends and compares it with two suggested approximation methods the approximation obtained by substituting the stock price net of the present value of the escrowed dividends into the black scholes model is shown to induce spurious correlation between prediction error and 1 the standard deviation of stock return 2 the degree to which the option is in the money or out of the money 3 the probability of early exercise 4 the time to expiration of the option and 5 the dividend yield of the stock a new method of examining option market efficiency is developed and tested

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research