inter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents abstractinter regional transfers and the induced under taxation of economic rents regional studies this paper shows that if taxes on economic rent are assigned to anticipatory first moving regions and inter regional transfers are mandated centrally rents are under taxed relative to optimal levels this provides a possible explanation for low rent capture observed in australia and canada two resource rich federal economies that also have fiscal equalization transfers between regions

endogenous transfer pricing and the effects of uncertain regulation abstract a scenario is constructed under which a multinational firm mnf faces a threat of a penalty the probability of which is based on the mnf s transfer price given this scenario the mnf s optimum transfer price could be in the interior and simultaneous interaction of the transfer price and real variables exists increased surveillance of the transfer price makes the mnf move its transfer price towards the arm s length price and checks fiscal abuses but it worsens the international allocation of resources even though the cost advantage of the exporting country increases still the impact on global welfare is ambiguous

state and provincial corporate tax planning income shifting and sales apportionment factor management abstract we empirically document a strategy through which corporations avoid state income taxes examining aggregated american state and canadian provincial data from 1983 1991 we find corporate income tax revenues are concave in corporate tax rates consistent with firms shifting their tax bases to more favourably taxed jurisdictions additional tests exploit unique features of state formula apportionment systems and find manufacturing shipments from states that tax outside their borders throwback states are decreasing in corporate income tax rates on sales

tax policy and present biased preferences paternalism under international capital mobility this paper deals with tax policy responses to quasi hyperbolic discounting earlier research on optimal paternalism typically abstracts from capital mobility if capital is mobile between countries it may no longer be possible for national governments to control domestic savings via capital taxation as in a closed economy in this paper we take a broad perspective on public policy responses to self control problems by showing how these responses vary i between closed and open economies ii between small open and large open economies and iii depending on whether or not both source based and residence based capital taxes can be used

strategic capital tax competition a pecuniary externality and a corrective device abstract d e wildasin journal of urban economics25 193 212 1989 identifies a source of inefficiency in capital tax competition models with price taking jurisdictions and provides a pigovian correction this paper identifies a second source of inefficiency in a non price taking environment when a jurisdiction increases its capital tax it affects the price of capital and thus other jurisdictions returns from trade in capital the pigovian correction to internalize this pecuniary externality is derived since a focus of recent research is on non price taking environments the existence of the pecuniary externality is important in qualifying existing results in the literature

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

the taxing task of taxing transnationals financial and real investment flexibility tax competition and superior economic information by transnationals both create a rationale for corporate income taxation and limit the effectiveness of such taxation while these factors have led to a variety of transnational tax policies such as deferral double taxation apportionment and trade rules very few of these institutional features have been integrated into tax competition and agency models in this paper i show how the integration of investment flexibility tax competition and agency issues is crucial to our understanding of corporate tax policies

are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting abstract this paper reexamines the main findings of cardarelli et al cardarelli r taugourdeau e vidal j p 2002 a repeated interactions model of tax competition journal of public economic theory 4 19 38 and catenaro and vidal catenaro m vidal j p 2006 implicit tax co ordination under repeated policy interactions recherches economiques de louvain 72 1 17 who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition in particular this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination it is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination

asset returns with transactions costs and uninsured individual risk abstract we explore whether incorporating an explicit motive for holding liquid assets within an equilibrium asset pricing model helps explain the following features of asset returns and turnover in the post war u s economy i the low risk free real interest rate ii the large spread between returns on liquid assets and stocks and iii the greater transaction velocity of liquid assets relative to stocks we introduce a demand for liquid assets by adding uninsured individual risk together with differential costs of trading securities numerical simulations attempting to match the return data generate a ratio of liquid assets to income considerably below observed levels

tax revenue losses through cross border loss offset an insurmountable hurdle for formula apportionment abstract this paper analyzes the relevance of firm losses for tax revenues and welfare when switching from separate accounting to a system of tax base consolidation with formula apportionment we find that a system change unambiguously decreases tax revenues in the short run in which neither firms nor governments can adjust their behavior due to the cross border loss offset inherent in formula apportionment in the medium run in which only firms can adjust their strategies tax revenues are still lower under formula apportionment if the probability of incurring losses or the costs of profit shifting are sufficiently small however in the long run where firms and governments can adjust their behavior a switch from separate accounting to formula apportionment is beneficial under the aforementioned conditions furthermore we show that a higher weight on input shares in the apportionment formula may mitigate tax competition and thus increase tax revenues because contrary to output factors input factors provide a backstop against a shortfall of tax revenues due to loss making subsidiaries

on models with an uncongestible public good and a continuum of consumers abstract this short note shows that models with an uncongestible or mildly congestible public good and a non atomic continuum of consumers have an interesting but unfortunate property only an infinite level of public good provision in the continuum economy can be approximated by feasible public good levels in a sequence of economies with finite populations we discuss the theoretical and practical problems this creates for familiar models that employ a continuum of consumers and a finite level of an uncongestible public good

money with idiosyncratic uninsurable returns to capital abstract this paper extends the income fluctuations problem to an economy with endogenous growth individuals instead of owning a stream of endowments accumulate capital with an investment irreversibility constraint and face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks to the return to capital money provides both a risk diversification and a liquidity role balanced growth paths exist despite the increasing dispersion of the wealth distribution the return to money cannot be equated to the social return to capital unless the government owns the entire capital stock with idiosyncratic risk and it is capable of operating this stock as efficiently as private agents can journal of economic literature classification numbers e31 e42 e58

fiscal capacity tax effort and optimal equalization grants in this paper we address the question how should the tax burden in a feder ation be distributed across the different jurisdictions so that the social cost of providing government services is minimized using optimal tax theory we derive formulas for the optimal equalization grants that equalize the social marginal cost of raising revenue across all provinces we show how the optimal equalization grants are related to a measure of tax effort based on the marginal cost of public funds and a measure of fiscal capacity that takes into account the elasticity of the tax base and its substitutability with other tax bases

corporate profit tax capital mobility and formula apportionment abstract the paper develops an analytical framework in which regional governments strategically determine the structure of the corporate profit tax system when an apportionment formula determines the proportion of the firms income subject to regional taxation the conclusions can be summarized as follows i regional governments subsidize capital through the corporate tax system ii tax rates become higher and the portion of capital costs that can be deducted from taxable income becomes smaller as the formula weighs more production shares iii the regionally provided good may be below or above the efficient level iv the extent of the distortion depends on the particular formula put into practice v regional governments strictly prefer a formula that exclusively weighs the production proportion to any other alternative

migration between home country and diaspora an economic analysis this paper investigates the distribution of a population group between a home country and diaspora given sequential decision making regarding migration at the individual level the home country is attractive to the members of the group yet their presence there requires a fixed amount of public spending e g on defense the per capita tax burden depends then on the size of the domestic population reflecting a case of fiscal externality this results in an inefficient distribution of the group between the home country and the diaspora encouraging immigration to the home country is an interest not only of those individuals who are currently in the home country but also of those residing in the diaspora however only when the burden of public spending in the home country is large enough do the latter volunteer to bear part of it even then in general this part is smaller than socially optimal

gross versus net equalization scheme in a federation with decentralized leadership this paper compares the impact of two equalization transfer schemes on regional budgetary choices a gross equalization scheme where ex post transfers to regions are financed from federal tax revenues and a net equalization scheme where region to region ex post transfers allocated by the federal government are self financed the net equalization scheme reduces ex post federal intervention and should therefore be favored over the gross equalization scheme in order to reduce opportunistic regional behaviour in addition the two equalization schemes differently affect the composition of public expenditures the gross equalization scheme generates an upward distortion of the amount of capital public expenditures whereas the net equalization scheme generates a downward distortion of the amount of current public expenditures compared to the optimum a welfare analysis reveals that incentives to use a net equalization scheme are strengthened for a sufficiently high number of regions

uncertainty currency excess returns and risk reversals abstract in this paper we provide strong evidence that heightened uncertainty in the u s real economy or financial markets significantly raises excess returns to the currency carry trade we posit that this works through the influence of uncertainty on global investors risk preferences macro and financial uncertainty also lower foreign exchange risk reversals an effect that is particularly strong for high interest rate portfolios our results are consistent with the idea that an increase in uncertainty regarding the u s economy or financial markets increases investors risk aversion which in turn drives up the expected returns and the cost of protection against crash risk in the fx market

transboundary pollution and household mobility are they equivalent abstract recent research has shown that perfect household mobility can serve as a disciplinary mechanism inducing national policy makers to internalize interregional externalities caused by transboundary pollution this paper develops a differential game to illustrate that the result is not necessarily robust when migration costs and explicit dynamics are introduced the paper shows that if governments constantly reoptimize imperfect household mobility leads to a tragedy of the commons and individual countries overemit even when pollution is purely local moreover these dynamic externalities get worse as the degree of household mobility increases and there is a qualitative difference between almost perfect and perfect mobilty that is a discontinuity at zero migration costs

the effects of inflation on real interest rates one of the most obvious facts of recent monetary history is that high inflation is associated with high nominal interest rates this association has been interpreted by many as supporting a superneutrality hypothesis that an increase in inflation will not affect real interest rates in the long run however the bulk of the evidence contradicts superneutrality beginning with irving fisher 1896 1930 most empirical investigations have found that fully anticipated inflation has less than a unit effect on nominal interest rates and thus reduces real interest rates even in the longest of runs this has been shown under the assumption that expectations are formed rationally douglas pearce 1979 that they take the form of an arbitrary distributed lag on past inflation rates fisher 1930 william gibson 1970 or that they are accurately represented by the livingstone expectations data pearce kajal lahiri 1976 lawrence summers 1983 attempted to measure the long run effect without an explicit theory of expectations regressing long swings in various nominal interest rates against long swings in inflation over various subintervals from 1860 to 1979 he found coefficients consistently less than unity for the post world war ii era as a whole the coefficients were in the range of 0 5 to 0 75 with standard deviations of 0 08 to 0 33 a few studies have found coefficients close to unity william yohe and denis karnosky 1969 martin feldstein and otto eckstein 1970 gibson 1972 lucas but as several authors have observed thomas sargent 1976 robert shiller 1980 john wood 1981 summers these findings are limited to a particular period of u s history approximately 1953 71 furthermore even a unitcoefficient would contradict superneutrality of the after tax real interest rate which would require a coefficient substantially greater than unity even taking into account the other inflation distortions in the tax system summers calculated that the coefficient ought to lie in the range of 1 3 to 1 5 far higher than observed these empirical findings pose a challenge to traditional monetary theory much of which implies that superneutrality should hold at least approximately for example the model of miguel sidrauski 1967 implies that the real interest rate should equal the marginal product of capital which in the long run should equal the representative household s marginal rate of time preference if this rate of time preference is a constant then in particular it will be independent of the rate of inflation if it is positively related to the household s wealth or utility then inflation can reduce the marginal product of capital somewhat through what are commonly called mundell tobin effects that is higher inflation can reduce the demand for real balances which reduces real wealth which lowers the rate of time preference and leads to further capital accumulation 2 but this real balance effect on saving is commonly recognized to be too small to make department of economics social science centre university of western ontario london canada n6a 5c2 we are grateful to charles adams norman cameron john chilton jacob frenkel david laidler ben mccallum baldev raj brad reid jack weldon john whalley ron winrck and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts all errors are attributable to transaction costs robert lucas 1980 finds empirical support for the hypothesis which he calls one of the central implications of the quantity theory of money it has also been adopted by a wide range of more eclectic economists as evidenced by its endorsement in two of the most popular macroeconomics textbooks rudiger dornbusch and stanley fischer 1981 pp 454 58 robert j gordon 1978 pp 289 91 2these implications of variable time preference can be drawn almost immediately from the work of hirofumi uzawa 1968 a graphical analysis is presented by david laidler 1969b who focuses on the logically equivalent question of the effects of paying interest on money

where should the elderly live and who should pay for their care we consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons elderly care is publicly provided there is one big city where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work and a number of small villages we show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees and we characterize the second best solution decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages

optimality free mobility and the regional authority in a federation abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of a federation characterized by strategically competing regions and freely mobile homogeneous individuals analyses of this economy have concluded that achieving a pareto optimal will require intervention by a national authority this paper makes one basic point the nash equilibrium of regional authority behavior is pareto optimal the implication is that there is no role for a national authority in either providing interregional transfers or correcting for decentralized provision of public goods the nash equilibrium involves samuelson public goods provision and regions purchasing preferred population distributions with optimal interregional transfers

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

cross border tax effects on affiliate investment evidence from european multinationals recent studies suggest that multinational firm activities at home and abroad are positively correlated which may be due to the use of common inputs like marketing patents etc then a cost shock at one location may lead to reduced activity in all other locations within the firm in this paper we theoretically and empirically analyze national corporate tax policy in such a setting our main hypothesis is that corporate taxation at the parent location not only reduces the parent s capital stock but also lowers capital stocks at affiliates abroad using micro data on european multinational firms we confirm the hypothesis showing that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5 6 decrease in the affiliate s capital stock from a welfare point of view this cross border tax effect on the capital stock gives rise to a negative fiscal externality of corporate taxation which is empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well known positive externality due to profit shifting

a monetary explanation of the equity premium term premium and risk free rate puzzles this paper develops and estimates a monetary model that offers an explanation of some puzzling features of observed returns on equities and default free bonds the key feature of the model is that some assets other than money play a special role in facilitating transactions which affects the rate of return that they offer the model is capable of producing a low risk free rate a high equity premium and an average positive relationship between maturity and term premium for default free bonds the model s implications for the joint distribution of asset returns velocity inflation money growth and consumption growth are also compared to the behavior of these variables in the u s economy

federalism equalization and risk aversion abstract what causes a group of countries to agree to form a federation other alternative arrangements which often are chosen instead are to form a unitary state or to remain autonomous federations usually allow for considerable freedom of movement among constituent regions they also provide a fairly limited redistribution of any rents earned in these regions these two features together imply that residents of poor regions can share in the rents in rich regions by migration this fiscal migration may waste resources why not simply share the rents equally among residents of all regions such a unitary arrangement although efficient would not appeal to residents of a country which is likely to be the best off region in a federation complete autonomy may expose residents of the separate countries to considerable idiosyncratic risk here i demonstrate that federation may be chosen by a group of countries even though it is a more wasteful arrangement than either other alternative if asymmetries among countries and the degree of risk aversion are large federal states also often implement transfers among the regions these transfers can be viewed as substitutes for fiscal migration i also show that the possibility of transfers even without any commitment to specifics makes federalism a more attractive option a federal constitution which requires transfers in excess of what would be made voluntarily may make federalism more attractive still

risk sharing in a federation with population mobility and long horizons in this paper risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with population mobility and infinite horizons is considered it is shown that the regional authorities will not fully exploit gains from interregional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect in the nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region however which corresponds to the policies of the central authority regional authorities who care about their reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation it is possible that improvements in the degree of mobility will make such commitments less likely jel classification h77 e61 and f36 le partage du risque dans une federation ou la population est mobile et l horizon temporel long ce memoire examine le partage du risque entre personnes a l interieur des regions et entre regions dans une federation ou il y a mobilite de la population et horizon temporel infini on montre que les autorites regionales n exploiteront pas pleinement les gains en provenance d un partage inter regional du risque quand la mobilite de la population est imparfaite cependant dans un equilibre a la nash il y a partage complet du risque entre les individus de chaque region ce qui correspond aux politiques des autorites centrales les autorites regionales qui tiennent a leur reputation peuvent etre capables de s engager a une allocation efficace il est possible que les ameliorations dans le degre de mobilite rendent ces engagements moins probables

factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game abstract this paper addresses capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of countries countries are asymmetric not only in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per inhabitant national governments tax capital and labor in order to finance a fixed public budget asymmetric capital taxation arises at equilibrium leading to a distortion on the international capital market we fully characterize how equilibrium taxes and welfare levels depend upon countries population and capital endowments we compare it to the autarky situation and show that fiscal competition erodes some but not all of the gains from capital markets liberalization

a model of competing jurisdictions with locally polluting environments and mobile populations in this model we consider a federation consisting oftwo geographically separated regional states withlocal taxing authority the residents of thefederation are identical in preferences and haveexplicit tolerance to pollution pollution is local innature and is a by product of production implying amore highly populated region would generate morepollution local authorities in the regions can andwill in the interest of local residents engage ingame theoretical taxation strategies the model isused to illustrate that nash equilibrium can resultwherein the two regions have different levels ofenvironmental quality the resulting nash conditionsimply for instance that residents of the cleanregion will subsidize those in the other region tostay in the more polluted environment in order foreach to accomplish their preferred consumption andenvironmental quality pair

allowing firms to choose between separate accounting and formula apportionment taxation this paper analyzes the effect on firm behavior and national tax revenues of allowing multinational firms to choose to be taxed under separate accounting rules or an apportionment formula separate accounting always generates more profitable output and conditional labor demand distortions from tax differentials while either method can generate a more profitable income shifting distortion both low cost and high cost firms can prefer separate accounting while medium cost firms prefer formula apportionment with symmetric countries a firm s preferred method generates greater tax revenues in the country with the lower tax rate with asymmetric countries a firm s preferred method need no longer generate greater tax revenues in the lower tax rate country due to the fact that countries and firms now value tax base distortions differently with this misalignment of preferences some firms can choose the preferred method of both countries at fixed tax rates

characterization of the optimal tax on money when it functions as a medium of exchange abstract this paper compares the relative efficiency of the implicit taxation of money and the explicit taxation of real commodities to finance a given amount of government expenditures in the model used money has the property of reducing transactions costs a sufficient condition for a tax on money to be welfare dominated by a linear tax on consumption expenditures is characterized in terms of a few parameters very familiar in macroeconomics this characterization is especially useful in the cases of heterogeneous consumers and increasing returns to scale in transactions since then the optimal tax on money may in principle be positive

how large are the welfare costs of tax competition abstract competition among regional governments may lead to suboptimal levels of capital taxation as governments ignore the external benefits of capital flight to other regions however there have been few attempts to quantify the magnitude of the resulting efficiency losses this paper presents extensive calculations of the efficiency costs over a wide range of parameter scenarios and assumptions about government behavior using various generalizations of wildasin journal of urban economics 25 1989 193 213 the efficiency costs tend to be fairly moderate under most though not all scenarios and particularly when allowance is made for the possibility of leviathan and non competitive government behavior

income shifting investment and tax competition theory and evidence from provincial taxation in canada abstract we study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in canada firms may use financial techniques such as lending among affiliates to reduce subnational corporate taxes a simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment government revenues and tax base elasticities depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not we then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behavior of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province the evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases according to our preferred estimate the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for income shifting firms is 4 9 compared with 2 3 for other comparable firms

evaluating the efficiency and equity of federal fiscal equalization abstract theoretically federal transfers that make household location decisions efficient should ignore local cost differences subsidize positive externalities and offset differences in federal tax payments and local taxes levied on non residents but not local tax revenues from residents transfers that redistribute resources equitably across regions will likely target areas with individuals of low earnings potential or low real incomes applying these criteria empirically canadian equalization policy appears neither efficient nor equitable but exacerbates pre existing inefficiencies and underfunds minorities locational inefficiencies cost canada 0 41 of income annually and cause over funded provinces to have populations of 30 beyond their efficient long run levels

tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership this paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers the paper s main result is that ex post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities insulating tax policy from capital mobility federal policy however introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition specifically ex post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare deteriorating relative to tax competition

a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation abstract this paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment in this model the central government is benevolent but cannot commit to ex post intergovernmental transfer policies while local governments act strategically after accounting for the ex post motives of the central government we then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze the effect of central control on local borrowing and show that central control is of no benefit because ex ante local taxation works to offset it we find the model yields different policy implications that central control is effective when extended to the case of residential mobility

how to make the metropolitan area work neither big government nor laissez faire we study how political boundaries and tax competition among jurisdictions interact with the labor and land markets to determine the economic structure and performance of metropolitan areas contrary to general belief institutional fragmentation and cross border commuting need not be welfare decreasing but the size of the central city matters for welfare under tax competition the central business district is too small tax competition also prevents public policy enhancing global productivity to produce their full impact although our results support the idea of decentralizing the supply of local public services by independent jurisdictions they also highlight the need of coordinating tax policies

company taxation and tax spillovers separate accounting versus formula apportionment it is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing the us and canada use so called formula apportionment fa to tax corporate income and the eu is debating a switch from separate accounting sa to fa this paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of fa to sa the focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation input choice and transfer pricing as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries the analysis shows that a move from sa to fa will not eliminate such spillovers and will in cases identified in the paper actually aggravate them

subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting this paper analyzes subsidies for intracity and intercity commuting in an urban economics framework with two cities and agglomeration externalities where workers may commute within and between cities first commuting subsidies serve to internalize agglomeration externalities intracity commuting subsidies give incentives to move to the larger city and intercity commuting subsidies make residents of the periphery commute to the core second if agglomeration rents are locally captured commuting subsidies act as a welfare enhancing transfer from the core to the periphery

a tiebout tax competition model abstract this paper analyzes a tiebout tax competition model where heterogeneity of consumer preferences is introduced into a standard tax competition framework following the modern tiebout tradition consumer sorting in the model is achieved through the activities of profit maximizing community developers once sorting is achieved the equilibrium is equivalent to that in a standard tax competition model with immobile but heterogeneous consumers a principal lesson of the analysis is that under capital taxation consumers with high public good demands are worse off than under a head tax regime in pursuit of high levels of public spending high demand communities impose high tax rates which drive away capital the analysis also establishes a number of other results

interregional redistribution and mobility in federations a positive approach the paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice we find that paradoxical consequences of inter jurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile while self sufficient regions are nec essarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes thus interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality at the same time however transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region the voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence empirical evidence from panel data from oecd countries and candian provinces is consistent with the theory

who gains from capital market integration tax competition between unionized and non unionized countries the welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries the asymmetry is expressed through the labour market one country has a perfect labour market whereas the other country s labour market is unionized our results indicate that the welfare effects of capital market integration differ depending on whether governments are active or passive in attracting capital in the absence of active governments capital market integration benefits the country with a competitive labour market whereas it harms the unionized country capital market integration benefits both countries if governments are active and compete for mobile capital using taxes subsidies

efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extensions of recent results this paper investigates the rationale for a system of equalization transfers in a federal system of government the existing sources of inefficiency of resource allocation in economies with more than one level of government are synthesized in the framework of a simple decentralized multiprovince model with mobile factors of production the sources of inefficiency arise first because migrants respond at the margin to incorrect signals owing to the phenomena of rent sharing and fiscal exterality and second because of global rather than local inefficiencies the model is then extended to consider the role of the federal government in providing intergovernmental transfers in the face of such inefficiencies in addition to synthesizing the sources of inefficiency in federal models the equity arguments for equalization are briefly recounted efficacite et paiements de perequation dans un systeme federal de gouvernement synthese et extensions de certains resultats recents ce memoire examine la logique qui soustend un systeme de paiements de perequation dans un systeme fdderal de gouverement les auteurs utilisent un modele simple d un systeme multi provincial decentralise avec des facteurs de production mobiles pour definir les sources d inefficacite dans l allocation des ressources dans les dconomies qui possedent plus d un niveau de gouvernement ces inefficacites proviennent de ce que d abord ceux qui se deplacent le font en reponse a la marge a des signaux incorrects engendres par le partage de la rente sur la base de la residence et par les phenomenes d exteralites fiscales elles sont aussi le resultat d inefficacites globales plutot que locales dans le cadre de ce modele les auteurs analysent le role du gouvernement federal effectuant des transferts inter gouverementaux pour corriger ces inefficacites en plus de presenter une synthese des sources d inefficacite dans les regimes federaux les auteurs font un bref rappel en passant a l ensemble des arguments fondes sur l equite qu on utilise pour rationaliser les paiements de perequation this paper is a linear combination of two papers presented at the may 1982 meetings of the canadian economics association in halifax entitled the case for equalization payments by the authors and recent developments in the theory of regional economic policy in canada by boadway the authors are grateful for comments by the discussants jim johnson and baxter macdonald and by jack mintz brian scarfe gerard belanger david sewell tom courchene and the referees we are especially heavily indebted to dan usher for many stimulating comments and suggestions while the work was in progress some of the above persons will undoubtedly disagree with the emphasis we have chosen to put on various aspects of the analysis for policy purposes support for some of this work has been provided by the economic council of canada and is gratefully acknowledged canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xv no 4 november novembre 1982 printed in canada imprimd au canada 0008 4085 82 0000 0613 01 50 1982 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 127 on wed 12 oct 2016 04 27 47 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms 614 robin boadway and frank flatters

the optimal structure of liquidity provided by a self financed central bank self financed central banks without capital and taxes cannot pay the return on capital to both money and national debt the gaps between the returns on capital and public securities are implicit taxes which are shifted forward to commodities that people finance with these securities because taxes on investment are less efficient than taxes on consumption the national debt should earn interest if people use it to finance expenditures that are investment intensive also because money provides short term liquidity raising the return on national debt delays expenditure to the future hence paying interest on national debt brings a resource windfall during transitions

nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition abstract this paper analyzes nash equilibria in a simple model of an economy with jurisdictions engaging in fiscal competition small number nash equilibria in which tax rates are the strategic variables are shown not to coincide with nash equilibria in which public expenditure levels are the strategic variables

decentralization and international tax competition abstract this paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions in the first stage of the game the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision in the second stage the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital a country s decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition in contrast to standard tax competition models decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare

strategic tax competition with a mobile population espanoleste articulo analiza un modelo estrategico de competicion de impuestos donde el capital y los identicos consumidores pueden migrar entre jurisdicciones los resultados obtenidos son comparados con los resultados del modelo tradicional de competencia tributaria donde la poblacion es inmovil ademas de los efectos fiscales y pecuniarios que aparecen en el modelo tradicional el modelo con poblacion movil presenta un nuevo efecto que distorsiona la provision de bienes publicos como en el caso del efecto pecuniario este nuevo efecto depende de si la jurisdiccion es exportadora neta o importadora neta de capital de esta manera en el caso de jurisdicciones simetricas ambos efectos desaparecen resultando en subprovision de bienes publicos en el caso donde las jurisdicciones son asimetricas ambos modelos tienen los mismos resultados cualitativos reforzando el modelo con poblacion movil los resultados de la externalidad pecuniaria englishthis paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical consumers the results of the model are compared to the traditional strategic tax competition model with immobile population in addition to the fiscal and pecuniary externalities present in the standard model a new effect shows up in the mo bility model to affect provision of the public good as with the pecuniary externality this new effect depends on whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers of capital thus in a symmetric set up the mobility effect along with the pecuniary externality disappears yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good while in the asymmetric case both models have the same qualitative results the mobility model strengthens the effects of the pecuniary externality the above results are obtained by comparing the form of the first order conditions between the mobility and immobility cases the remaining question is whether or not the equilibrium levels of the public goods conform to the predicted tendencies this question is answered with an example the results of this exercise show that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital the level of the public good is lower in the mobility case than in the immobility case however if the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital the public good level is sometimes higher and sometimes lower in the mobility case contrary to predictions

uncertainty and deviations from uncovered interest rate parity abstract it is well known that uncovered interest rate parity does not hold empirically especially at short horizons but is it really so we conjecture that uncovered interest rate parity is more likely to hold in low uncertainty environments relative to high uncertainty ones since arbitrage opportunity gains become more uncertain in a highly unpredictable environment thus blurring the relationship between exchange rates and interest rate differentials in this paper we first provide a new exchange rate uncertainty index that measures how unpredictable exchange rates are relative to their historical past then we use the new measure of uncertainty to provide empirical evidence that uncovered interest rate parity does hold in five industrialized countries vis a vis the us dollar at times when uncertainty is not exceptionally high and breaks down during periods of high uncertainty

time varying risk interest rates and exchange rates in general equilibrium under mild assumptions the data indicate that time varying risk is the primary force driving nominal interest rate differentials on currency denominated bonds this finding is an immediate implication of the fact that exchange rates are roughly random walks a general equilibrium monetary model with an endogenous source of risk variation a variable degree of asset market segmentation can produce key features of actual interest rates and exchange rates in this model the endogenous segmentation arises from a fixed cost for agents to exchange money for assets as inflation varies so does the benefit of asset market participation and that changes the fraction of agents participating these effects lead the risk premium to vary systematically with the level of inflation this model produces variation in the risk premium even though the fundamental shocks have constant conditional variances

coveting thy neighbor s manufacturing the dilemma of state income apportionment abstract this paper investigates the economic impact of the apportionment formulae used to divide corporate income taxes among the states most apportionment formulae by including payroll turn the state corporate income tax at least partially into a payroll tax using panel data from 1978 1994 the results show that this distortion has an important effect on state level employment for the average state reducing the payroll weight from one third to one quarter increases manufacturing employment around 1 1 concentrated in durable goods manufacturing and with larger effects in the long run the results also suggest that apportionment changes have important negative externalities on other states on average the aggregate effects of apportionment formula changes are close to zero

will social welfare expenditures survive tax competition increasing economic openness creates demands for social welfare programmes designed to cushion the impact of economic changes but may also encourage governments to reduce tax rates to attract mobile economic resources competitive tax reductions could then prevent governments from being able to finance significant welfare spending alternatively economic globalization might improve the ability of governments to afford social welfare programmes and several considerations point in this direction first taxes on internationally mobile activity represent only small fractions of total revenue collections personal income taxes value added taxes and social insurance contributions finance most social welfare spending second international competition need not reduce taxes and indeed over the past 25 years corporate tax collections have remained high as fractions of gdp and total taxes third the vitality of a country s economy largely determines its level of social spending to the extent that incomes rise as a result greater economic openness should strengthen provision of social welfare copyright 2006 oxford university press

implementing partial tax harmonization in an asymmetric tax competition game with repeated interaction this paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments we show that regardless of the structure of the coalition i e full or partial tax coordination whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the extent to which the capital endowment of the medium sized country is similar to that of the large or small country the most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country is to the average one the less likely the tax harmonization including the median country is to prevail and the more likely the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country is to prevail we also show that partial tax harmonization makes the member countries of the tax union better off and non member countries worse off which stands in sharpe contrast with previous studies such as konrad and schjelderup 1999 and bucovetsky 2009

multinationals multi plant economies and the gains from trade a general equilibrium model of a multinational enterprise based on economies of multi plant operation is developed these economies are modelled as arising from the existence of a joint input whose productivity in each production facility is independent of the number of facilities maintained by a firm the multinational thus offers the world increased technical efficiency by eliminating the duplication of the joint input that would occur with independent national firms since this technical efficiency may come at the expense of increased market power the full determinants of home country host country and world welfare are considered

fiscal externality rent sharing and equalisation transfers in japan this article describes a quantitative analysis of japanese equalisation transfers based on the fiscal externality models of hartwick boadway and flatters in particular it examines whether the actual level of equalisation transfers matches the theoretically optimal level from the efficiency point of view although the purpose of interregional fiscal transfer is not necessarily in the pursuit of an efficient allocation of resources equalisation transfer surely affects it it is often said in japan that the equalisation transfer may distort efficiency too much and that it is one of the causes of serious fiscal conflict between the metropolitan area and local rural prefectures the quantitative results show that the actual amount of transfers from resource rich to resource poor prefectures was below the optimal level in the 1980s however the resource poor prefectures have received an excessive transfer after 1990 specifically the direction of the optimal transfer might change in the second half of t

rare disasters and exchange rates we propose a new model of exchange rates which yields a theory of the forward premium puzzle our explanation combines two ingredients the possibility of rare economic disasters and an asset view of the exchange rate our model is frictionless has complete markets and works for an arbitrary number of countries in the model rare worldwide disasters can occur and affect each country s productivity each country s exposure to disaster risk varies over time according to a mean reverting process ri sky countries command high risk premia they feature a depreciated exchange rate and a high interest rate as their risk premium mean reverts their exchange rate appreciates therefore currencies of high interest rate countries appreciate on average to make the notion of disaster risk more implementable we show how options prices might in principle uncover latent disaster risk and help forecast exchange rate movements we then extend the framework to incorporate two factors a disaster risk factor and a business cycle factor we calibrate the model and obtain quantitatively realistic values for the volatility of the exchange rate the forward premium puzzle regression coefficients and near random walk exchange rate dynamics finally we solve a model of stock markets across countries which yields a series of predictions about the joint behavior of exchange rates bonds options and stocks across countries the evidence from the options market appears to be supportive of the model jel e43 e44 f31 g12 g15

incentive equivalence with fixed migration costs abstract if migration between communities is costless and if policy makers in each community anticipate the migration response to policy changes then the interests of the two communities are perfectly aligned decentralization is efficient this incentive equivalence is well known however the first order approach used in virtually all the literature may obscure the fact that no convexity assumptions need be made about technology or tastes this fact underscores the relevance of incentive equivalence even when there are scale economies in the public sector here the consequences of positive migration costs for this incentive equivalence are considered in contrast with much of the literature migration costs are assumed the same for everyone this formulation differs from the more common attachment to home assumption of heterogeneous migration costs conditional on the direction of migration interests of different communities are still perfectly aligned but natives of different communities may prefer different directions of migration weakening incentive equivalence if local policy makers have the power to induce large changes in migration flows however incentive equivalence fails only if economies of scale in population are important so that communities may be under populated

the optimum quantity of money rule in the theory of public finance this paper examines optimal tax policy in a monetary economy in which money serves as an intermediate good that helps facilitate the conversion of scarce resources into tinal consumption goods by enabling consumers to economize on the costs of transacting it is shown that in such an environment even though distorting taxes must be levied for revenue purposes the optimal tax structure calls for abstaining from inflationary finance and adopting the optimum quantity of money rule

redistribution within and across the regions of a federation the authors reconsider the literature on redistribution within a federation with mobile agents they conclude that redistribution is a function best assigned to the national government local governments with diverse preferences for redistribution distort individual migration decisions the authors also examine the fiscal externality literature which has made an efficiency argument for interregional transfers they show that if local governments have the same preferences for redistribution the nash equilibrium is efficient if preferences are diverse the authors show that nationally imposed interregional transfers do not address the source of the inefficiency nevertheless interregional transfers are shown to be a part of decentralized behavior

a nash tax game extending the generality of the henry george theorem abstract this paper analyzes a model of nash tax competition where jurisdictions can finance public goods with taxes on two types of mobile capital and a tax on land efficiency in public good provision results when the land tax becomes the single tax required to fund local government spending this conclusion affirms and extends the generality of the henry george theorem

the consequences of overlapping tax bases for redistribution and public spending in a federation tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with imperfectly mobile households states implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good a vertical fiscal externality reflecting the effect of state policies on federal revenues provides an incentive for state taxes to be too progressive a horizontal fiscal externality causes nonoptimal state taxes and expenditures because of the migration effect the federal government implements its own linear progressive tax and makes transfers to the states the federal government can nullify both externalities by appropriate fiscal policies and redistributive taxation can be decentralized to the states c 1998 elsevier science s a

shifting mne taxation from national to global profits a radical reform long overdue the current separate accounting taxation of corporations gives governments the right to tax the national incomes of firms operating within their borders however multinational and increasingly digital business models beg the question what is national taxable income we argue that a radical rethink of the corporate taxation moving away from a separate taxation of national corporate income to a taxation of global corporate income allocated via formula apportionment is long overdue global corporate income as a basis for taxation is supported both by recent theoretical developments and corroborating empirical evidence with the eu and emerging economies including china already considering its adoption nor is it new as we relate formula apportionment of global corporate income was used a century ago before commercial and political interests promoted separate accounting thereby providing both precedent and experience to inform its re adoption

the choice of apportionment factors under formula apportionment thispaperinvestigatesthechoiceofapportionmentfactorsunderacorporatetaxsystemofformulaapportionment in contrast to perceived wisdom we show that the apportionment formula contains both mobile capital and immobile labor factors regardless of whether the formula is determined decentrally by jurisdictions or centrally by a central planner the central planner uses the formula as a corrective instrument to internalize fiscal externalities we calibrate the model to the european union and show that replacing the current system of separate accounting by formula apportionment would substantially increase tax revenue and welfare under both centralized and decentralized formula choices

a spatial model of tax competition with multiple tax instruments abstract this paper presents a model of tax competition with two local jurisdictions in each metropolitan area located along a line segment and many metropolitan areas in the world economy the residents in each local jurisdiction are allowed to commute at a constant cost per mile to work in the other jurisdiction if a lump sum tax can be used then other taxes are not used if source based wage and business capital taxes can both be used then only the former is used in this case or if only a business capital tax can be used the local public good is underprovided

the european commission s proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base the european commission is currently preparing a proposal for a directive on the introduction of a common consolidated corporate tax base ccctb this paper reviews the current state of the european commission s preparation of the ccctb proposal and discusses the implications for efficiency and fairness of the tax system the analysis concludes that more evidence of significant economic benefits from introducing a ccctb would be required to generate widespread support for the project

company tax reform with a water s edge this paper analyzes the effects of switching from a corporate tax system based on separate accounting sa towards a system in which two countries form a formula apportionment fa union while a third country sticks to sa water s edge our analysis draws a positive picture on the water s edge regulation in the short run for given tax rates the transition from sa to fa is likely to reduce profit shifting from the fa union to non fa tax havens in a long run tax competition analysis we find a negative water s edge externality under fa that tends to be less detrimental than the profit shifting externality under sa and may offset other externalities under fa

residence and source based capital taxation in open economies with infinitely lived consumers abstract in this paper we investigate tax competition in a neoclassical growth model where each country may use both residence and source based capital taxes we show that both types of capital taxes are zero at any interior steady state just as in a closed economy for symmetric countries and even for countries that differ only with respect to size and productivity we prove analytically and verify numerically that the open economy policies coincide exactly with the closed economy policies in all time periods for countries that are asymmetric in other dimensions we find that source based taxes are used to manipulate the intertemporal terms of trade in the short run either way the fiscal externalities of source based taxes vanish once residence based taxes are allowed

money banking and capital formation we consider a monetary growth model in which banks arise to provide liquidity in addition there is a government that issues not only money but interest bearing bonds these bonds compete with capital in private portfolios when the government fixes a constant growth rate for the money stock we show that there can exist multiple nontrivial monetary steady states one of these steady states is a saddle while the other can be a sink moreover paths approaching a steady state can display damped endogenous fluctuations and development trap phenomena are common across different steady states low capital stocks are associated with high nominal interest rates the latter signal the comparative inefficiency of the financial system also increases in the steady state inflation rate can easily reduce the steady state capital stock journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e13 e44 e50 g20 o16

tax incidence majority voting and capital market integration we re examine from a political economy perspective the standard view that higher capital mobility results in lower capital taxes a view in fact that is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence we show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility the change of incidence of a tax on capital from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor may interact in such a way with political decision making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax this can happen whether or not the immobile factor labour can be taxed and whether or not savings can be subsided under capital mobility d 2005 published by elsevier b v

formula apportionment vs separate accounting a private information perspective abstract in 2002 the european commission recommended that member countries use formula apportionment procedures to tax multinational companies this departure from the standard separate accounting transfer pricing approach is an attempt to reduce the costs and distortions associated with auditing transfer prices unfortunately apportionment formulas create their own economic distortions and contrary to popular belief they do not eliminate distortions due to asymmetric information between the multinational and the national tax authorities in this paper i explicitly model the role of private information in two tax competition games one in which tax liabilities are calculated under formula apportionment and one in which tax liabilities are calculated under separate accounting and transfer prices are audited switching to a formula apportionment system affects the after tax profit of multinationals and the tax revenues paid by both domestic and foreign firms the direction and magnitude of the changes depend on the accuracy of the auditing technology and non monotonically on multinational costs the switch will have different effects on the tax receipts from domestic and foreign firms

vertical versus horizontal tax externalities an empirical test abstract we study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base one can observe two types of externalities a horizontal externality working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum and a vertical externality working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates building on the model of keen and kotsogiannis keen michael j kotsogiannis christos 2002 does federalism lead to excessively high taxes american economic review 92 1 363 370 we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables this test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of swiss municipalities that feature direct democratic fiscal decision making so as to maximize the correspondence with the benevolent governments of the theory we find that vertical externalities dominate they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition

ex ante free mobility ex post immobility and time consistency in a federal system abstract this paper examines regional population distribution when there is an interregional transfer policy without commitment we introduce explicitly the following time structure of actions individuals assumed to be identical make decisions on locational choices freely ex ante but are immobile ex post the fiscal policies of the local governments and the central government are implemented after individuals migration decisions the basic result is that locally stable no commitment equilibria are single community equilibria when there is a pure local public good we then illustrate the possibility for the interregional transfer policy to reduce the efficiency of population distribution

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

controlling migration in an open labor market a direct immigration policy is no longer feasiblefor a single region in a common labor market within apolitical economy approach this paper focuses on the question ofwhether migration can be controlled through the composition ofgovernment expenditures taking into account both capital and laborincome it turns out that the median voter s income is u shaped in thenumber of immigrants therefore the government can eitherprovide less of the goods preferred by foreigners in order to minimizeimmigration or carry out an active immigration policy byshifting its expenditures towards those publicly provided goods thepaper identifies the factors that determine the government schoice between the two strategies

corporate income taxation of multinationals in a general equilibrium model abstract this paper contributes to the discussion on separate accounting versus formula apportionment in the corporate income taxation of multinational enterprises the innovation is that we consider a general equilibrium tax competition model with an endogenous interest rate in contrast to previous studies we show that tax rates are inefficiently low not only under separate accounting but also under formula apportionment moreover we identify a wide range of empirically relevant cases where formula apportionment is superior to separate accounting independent of the magnitude of the concealment cost of profit shifting the reason for the change in results is that one country s tax rate affects other countries additionally via changes in the interest rate

a dynamic equalisation model for economic and social capital grants with a south african example abstract a capital grant model has been developed which can be used in developing economies to allocate grants to sub national governments for economic or social capital the model allows these allocations to happen in a way that increases the value of the capital stock whilst at the same time addresses any inter regional inequities or economic inefficiencies the model is also applied to south africa as an illustrative example and the results of three model simulations for that country are presented there is a discussion of the data requirements for the model and how it might be replicated by researchers for other economies

how tame will leviathan become in institutional competition competition among governments in the provision of public goods this article critically examines thehypothesis of brennan and buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments since leviathan type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors indeed such arule leads to a nash equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor however net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may depending on the same variables evendecrease net income moreover somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium finally applying the rule in a real worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies forthese reasons such a rule will hardly everbe introduced hence competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints whoever is afraid of leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments alone

is it tax competition or tax exporting abstract this paper extends the basic tax competition model to a framework in which jurisdictions have market power over the price of the output produced within their borders if firms within the jurisdiction are competitive the jurisdiction can play the role of monopoly rent collector by using taxes to restrict the level of output it is shown that the basic tax competition model can be thought of as a special case of this more general framework in this framework the opportunity to export the tax burden can partially or fully offset the well known effects identified by the tax competition model

why the european union should adopt formula apportionment with a sales factor using a two country tax competition model with a multinational enterprise mne this paper addresses the question of whether the european union should replace separate accounting sa in corporate income taxation by formula apportionment fa and if so which apportionment factors should be used our main result is that fa with a sales factor may mitigate or even eliminate fiscal externalities caused by the countries tax policy hence our analysis provides a microfoundation for the sales apportionment factor in an empirical calibration to the eu 15 we show that the transition from sa to fa with a sales only formula raises average tax rates by 2 and average tax revenues by 1 billion euros or 0 1 of gdp these effects result in an increase of welfare