political cycles and economic performance in oecd countries empirical evidence from 1951 2006 this paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short term economic performance i employ data on annual gdp growth in 21 oecd countries over the 1951 2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests in countries with two party systems gdp growth is boosted before elections and under leftwing governments in the first two years of a legislative period these findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance my findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short term economic performance

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

school finance reform assessing general equilibrium effects abstract in 1994 the state of michigan implemented one of the most comprehensive school finance reforms undertaken to date in any of the states understanding the effects of the reform is thus of value in informing other potential reform initiatives in addition the reform and associated changes in the economic environment provide an opportunity to assess whether a simple general equilibrium model can be of value in framing the study of such reform initiatives in this paper we present and use such a model to derive predictions about the effects of the reform on housing prices and neighborhood demographic compositions broadly our analysis implies that the effects of the reform and changes in the economic environment are likely to have been reflected primarily in housing prices and only modestly on neighborhood demographics we find that evidence for the detroit metropolitan area from the decade encompassing the reform is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

why do households without children support local public schools linking house price capitalization to school spending while residents receive similar benefits from many local government programs only about one third of all households have children in public schools we argue that capitalization of school spending into house prices can encourage even childless residents to support spending on schools we identify a proxy for the extent of capitalization the supply of land available for new development and show that towns in massachusetts with little undeveloped land have larger changes in house prices in response to a plausibly exogenous spending shock towns with little available land also spend more on schools we extend these results using data from school districts in 46 states showing that per pupil spending is positively related to the percentage of developed land this positive correlation persists only in districts where the median resident is a homeowner and is stronger in districts with more elderly residents who do not use school services and have a shorter expected duration in their home our findings support models in which capitalization encourages the provision of durable local public goods and provides an additional reason why some elderly support local school spending

capitalization and the theory of local public finance the tiebout literature is incomplete this paper argues because it has not fully accounted for the capitalization of local fiscal variables into house values the paper explains why capitalization arises why it persists in long run equilibrium how it affects both residential location and the outcome of local voting and why it interferes with the efficiency of a system of local governments the analysis which is based on the main tiebout assumptions plus a property tax combines a model of household bids in a housing market with a median voter model of local public service determination

on entry exit and coordination with mixed strategies abstract a dynamic entry and exit game is studied where following dixit and shapiro 1986 the economics of strategic planning lexington books pp 63 79 firms play symmetric mixed strategies coordination among entrants improves and creates a tendency for the value of incumbency to increase as the number of incumbent firms increases up to the point of excess capacity this feature implies that when considering mixed strategies the relevant payoffs are not monotonic as the probability of entry increases expected profit for a given firm conditional on entry increases over some initial range it is shown that the payoffs have an interesting dynamic structure which allows the complete characterization of the equilibrium

tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly abstract we analyze the incidence of ad valorem and unit excise taxes in an oligopolistic industry with differentiated products and price setting bertrand firms both taxes may be passed on to consumers by more than 100 percent and an increase in the tax rate can increase short run firm profits and hence the long run number of firms we provide summary conditions for these effects to arise the conditions depend on demand curvatures and are written in elasticity form surprisingly the analysis largely corroborates cournot results with homogeneous demand

a new approach for identifying the parameters of a tax capitalization model abstract this study re estimates property tax capitalization rates with two empirical innovations first the underidentification problem inherent in all capitalization studies is resolved using estimates of rental values instead of estimates of the net user cost second the methodology along with the utilization of a unique data set mitigates biases resulting from potential correlations between property tax rates and unobservable amenities or public services the extent of tax capitalization estimated here is greater than estimates reported in many recent studies and is statistically indistinguishable from full capitalization the study also provides insights regarding the variability of the net user cost of housing

the effect of welfare and wage levels on the location decisions of female headed households abstract this paper develops and estimates a model designed to calculate the impact of welfare benefit levels wages and tax rates on the location choices of female headed households the empirical model assumes that women simultaneously choose both where they will live and whether or not they will participate in the welfare system based on their expected income and expected hours of work for each location participation possibility these income and hours expectations depend in turn on the welfare benefits wage and tax rates facing each household in each location it is found that both regional welfare levels and wage rates have a significant effect on the location decisions of this population the probability of a typical female headed household with little outside income leaving an area with low welfare payments and low wages can be as much as 12 points higher over a 4 year period than the probability of leaving a high welfare high wage area

migration and income redistribution responsibilities this study examines whether afdc benefits determine or discourage state to state migration flows in the united states a pooled cross section time series model is developed to estimate afdc benefits in a state and recipients and whether benefits in one state affect benefits in other states a second model using data from the 1980 census and the panel study of income dynamics estimates migration of afdc recipients and the level of benefits in in migration and out migration states both models indicate that small but statistically significant amounts of migration occur which may be quite important but only in the long run movers although small in number are much more likely to move to a state with higher benefits states perceive this migration as important indicating that states should have less control and the federal government more control over income redistribution

measuring the social value of local public goods an empirical analysis within paris metropolitan area a non linear hedonic model is used to estimate the implicit marginal prices of 17 local public goods in a paris suburban area on an original data set of some 8200 housing units the results reveal a robust effect of local public school quality measured both by the fraction of junior high school students that are at least two years behind grade level and the student teacher ratio on house prices it is observed that housing owners marginal willingness to pay for reducing commuting time is roughly similar for public transportation than for car transportation another noticeable result is the complete capitalization of local taxes at a discount rate of 3 5 an illustration of the potential usefulness of the results for cost benefit analysis is also provided

an overlapping generations model of electoral competition this paper presents a dynamic model of political competition between two parties with different policy preferences a party is explicitly modeled as a sequence of overlapping generations of candidates all of whom face finite decision horizons in general there is a conflict between the interests of the individual policymakers and those of the party which includes subsequent generations of candidates we characterize this conflict and suggest a scheme of intergenerational transfers within the party which can resolve or mitigate this conflict the paper shows how the overlapping generations model can be usefully applied to the political arena this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

systematic assessment error and intrajurisdiction property tax capitalization over the past twelve years considerable evidence has accumulated on the extent to which intercommunity differences in property tax burdens are capitalized into property values 17 21 8 7 25 recently linneman 14 has analyzed the validity of this evidence after taking into consideration alternative models of local government finance in the model that he believes best represents the spirit of the tax capitalization literature local government expenditures are financed wholly by property tax receipts he demonstrates that in this case a perfect correlation between taxes and public goods makes it econometrically impossible to estimate property value equations unless measurement errors and omitted variables are present he therefore asserts that existing results on the tax capitalization issue are of nebulous value

differential capitalization of local public service characteristics analysis of the capitalization of property tax and public service differentials has come a long way since oates s pathbreaking work oates 1969 it is now well established that interjurisdictional differentials in local property tax rates and public service levels are reflected to some degree in house prices heinberg and oates 1970 meadows 1976 mcdougall 1976 king 1977 in addition intrajurisdictional tax capitalization may occur due to local assessment practices church 1974 black 1977 edelstein 1974 bloom ladd and yinger 1980 however there has been little research undertaken exploring the possibility of intrajurisdictional public service capitalization intrajurisdictional tax and publicservice capitalization represents an important extension of the tiebout analysis of the local public sector tiebout 1956 while individuals may respond to differentials in public service levels and tax rates in their mobility and house purchase decisions it is not at all clear that these attributes are valued uniformly for all units within a jurisdiction it may be that the proximity of a unit to a school rather than school quality determines value or capitalization may depend more on structural characteristics such as the size of a house the neglect of this point has been in large part due to data limitations most studies assume either explicitly or implicitly that benefits from public services are uniform within jurisdictions studies using aggregate data on a jurisdiction or census tract unit of observation focus on the impact of interjurisdictional service differentials on the median valued house such data do not permit an exploration of the interrelationship between housing and public service characteristics studies utilizing micro data relate housing prices to jurisdiction wide expenditures or quality measures such as reading scores to test the capitalization hypothesis however these public sector characteristics are seldom related to individual housing characteristics and there has been little systematic study of the possibility of significant interaction between public sector and other housing and location characteristics

a capitalization approach to fiscal incidence at the local level this paper argues that an analysis of the capitalized burdens and benefits of the local public sector offers a simple straightforward and objective computational methodology to fiscal incidence at the local level this capitalization approach represents a major departure from the highly discretionary and imprecise computational environment of the reasonable assumptions and aaron and mcguire approaches it is initially discussed both from conceptual and operational points of view and then implemented using alternate procedures major limitations of the approach are then noted a comparative perspective on fiscal incidence results based on the capitalization approach and of earlier studies on this subject is provided in the concluding section of the paper during the past two decades several important studies have been published which investigate the redistributive implications of federal provincial and local government finances in canada all the canadian studies on the subject in general follow the methodology used for similar studies in the united states these studies differ as to the shifting of tax burden assumptions and the concept of income employed and understandably their results also vary accordingly a common criticism of these approaches is that their distribution conclusions depend crucially on what incidence hypothesis is chosen musgrave and musgrave 1976 394 all these studies merely illustrate what the distribution of fiscal incidence would be if the incidence assumptions were true the numerical es

the impact of proposition 13 on house prices in northern california a test of the interjurisdictional capitalization hypothesis it wen institute of business and university of california economic research berkeley center for real estate and urban economics wobkingipaper series these papers are preliminary ature their purpose 39 limul discussion comme h re they are not to be 39 or quoted ny publication without express permission of the author working paper no 80 11 the impact of proposition 13 on house prices in northern california a test of the interjurisdictional capitalization hypothesis by kenneth t rosen

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

entry fixed costs and the aggregation of private information we investigate the ability of the price system to aggregate private information in a market of uncertain size and where set up costs are incurred by entrants it is shown that the equilibrium is random even when the totality of private information is so large that aggregate uncertainty is virtually non existent in particular the limiting equilibrium does not approach the full information walrasian outcome hence the model identifies a technological factor increasing returns which gives rise to informational losses

partisan conflicts and parliamentary dominance the norwegian political business cycle this is the author s final accepted and refereed manuscript to the article the final publication is available at www springerlink com

the value of school facility investments evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design author s cellini stephanie riegg ferreira fernando rothstein jesse abstract despite extensive public infrastructure spending surprisingly little is known about its economic return in this paper we estimate the value of school facility investments using housing markets standard models of local public goods imply that school districts should spend up to the point where marginal increases would have zero effect on local housing prices our research design isolates exogenous variation in investments by comparing school districts where referenda on bond issues targeted to fund capital expenditures passed and failed by narrow margins we extend this traditional regression discontinuity approach to identify the dynamic treatment effects of bond authorization on local housing prices student achievement and district composition our results indicate that california school districts underinvest in school facilities passing a referendum causes immediate sizable increases in home prices implying a willingness to pay on the part of marginal homebuyers of 1 50 or more for each 1 of capital spending these effects do not appear to be driven by changes in the income or racial composition of homeowners and the impact on test scores appears to explain only a small portion of the total housing price effect c 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

searching for leviathan comment and extension in a recent article wallace oates 1985 investigated whether fiscal decentralization tended to act as a constraining influence on the overall size of the public sector this hypothesis has been advanced by several alternative theories of government behavior including richard musgrave s 1959 model of how the distribution function of government would be carried out by subnational governments geoffrey brennan and james buchanan s 1980 leviathan model and the more traditional public choice model for example walter hettich and stanley winer 1984 all contend that the decentralization of tax and spending decisions introduces competition among governmental units seeking to attract citizens and other mobile resources and thereby constrains taxing power oates analyzed two data sets one pertaining to the state and local sector in the united states and the other consisting of a sample of 43 countries and found little empirical support for the decentralization hypothesis the purpose of this paper is to reconsider his analysis in the case of state and local governments specifically it will be argued that oates s measures of decentralization may be inappropriate to test the hypothesis furthermore by taking into account the structure or composition of local governmental jurisdictions within a state empirical support of the decentralization hypothesis can be marshaled for general purpose local governments such as counties and municipalities i measuring fiscal decentralization among the states

the politics of ambiguity politicians face a trade off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent this paper analyzes this trade off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent first we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party s ideal policy and his own ideal policy second we show that often the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision thus politicians may prefer to be ambiguous

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

house price responses to a national property tax reform abstract we show that house prices in general did not respond to a substantial cut in the national property tax in sweden the estimates are based on rich register data covering more than 100 000 sales over a time period of two and a half years because the swedish property tax is national and thus unrelated to local public goods our setting is ideal for causal identification of the property tax on house prices we observe price increases only in a small segment of the market containing properties with very high tax values we discuss but can admittedly not empirically discriminate between several potential explanations for why we find no evidence of capitalization except for the top segment of the market

uncertainty resolution private information aggregation and the cournot competitive limit a cournot model of oligopoly in which otherwise identical firms have private differential information about the common cost of production and a shared but unknown demand curve is examined a bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding game of incomplete information is solved for explicitly and analysed in the symmetric equilibrium different firms produce at different output levels because they have different information because the information individual firms have is random total output and hence market price is also random for any finite number of firms the main result of the paper relates to the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium when the number of firms becomes large under fairly general conditions on the joint distribution of demand and individual firms information about demand the random equilibrium price converges almost surely to a constant in the limit more importantly this price equals the perfectly competitive price in other words in large markets even if no firm knows the true market demand curve and firms are not price takers and do not use price as a signal to improve their information the competitive price will prevail with certainty in the limit aggregate outcomes are as if all firms shared their private information with each other

the unemployment rate consequences of partisan monetary policies economists and political scientists have identified several ways in which political motivations and institutional arrangements can affect macroeconomic policymaking one way is described by the political business cycle model 42 37 in which vote seeking politicians manipulate the path of the economy to secure unsustainably favorable conditions at election times variants of this model have been widely tested with limited success a second channel for political impacts comes through partisan policy changes brought about by electoral turnover the pathbreaking work in this literature includes the contributions of hibbs 30 31 32 33 and beck 11 these works have focused on the empirical issue of how unemployment rates vary under democratic and republican presidents in the u s and have found strong support for the proposition that unemployment rates decline under democratic administrations a third phenomenon has been studied primarily by economists and concerns the credibility problem faced by a central bank selecting money growth rates models of the credibility problem 8 21 describe a setting in which the central bank and the public interact by respectively choosing actual and expected money growth rates in a variant of the prisoners dilemma this interaction can result in excessive inflation

estimating the residual demand curve facing a single firm this paper presents an econometric technique for estimating the single firm residual demand curve that does not require the estimation of demand cross elasticities the technique is particularly suited for the estimation of firm market power in product differentiated industries where cross elasticities are notoriously difficult to measure one estimated parameter is directly related to a firm s markup of price over marginal cost when product differentiation is extensive when an industry consists of a dominant firm and a price taking fringe when a consistent conjectures equilibrium is the correct oligopoly solution concept when firms are stackelberg leaders relative to their environment or when firms are perfect competitors the estimates can indicate power over price in other circumstances an instrumental variables technique is employed using firm individuated factor prices to identify firm specific residual demand yet even when instruments are unavailable the technique produces elasticity estimates biased in the conservative direction of disproving market power this methodology is applied to estimate the market power of three firms in an industry characterized by product differentiation brewing over our 1962 82 sample period pabst and coors had similar national market shares and each had high shares in several states yet pabst was virtually a price taker while coors possessed substantial market power anheuser busch had market power in the early part of the sample but little after 1975 when miller brewing changed the competitive nature of the industry

capitalization of interjurisdictional fiscal differentials an alternative approach abstract in virtually every study concerning capitalization of fiscal differentials into property values the unit of observation has been a local jurisdiction or an individual house sale within a jurisdiction urban economic theory suggests that capitalization of fiscal differentials should be most obvious at the border of two jurisdictions housing price differentials between adjacent blocks at the border of two jurisdictions will be used to study capitalization such an approach reduces problems associated with measurement of dis amenities and public services and with the use of a distance variable in urban areas with multiple employment or recreation centers

capitalization of property tax differentials within and among municipalities usa most studies evaluating the effect on housing prices of regulatory programs for controlling urban growth use econometric methods hedonic price models without considering the research design aspects of the task this article examines the strengths and

centralization and government competition this paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal centralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmentation on the size of public sector in the united states the empirical findings at the national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller government the findings at the state and local levels however show no empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization

why are there nimbys an owner occupied home is an un usual asset because it cannot be diversi ed among locations and because it is the onlysizable asset that most owners possess among the unin sured risks of homeownership is devaluation by nearby changes in land use opponents of land use change are called nimbys not in my back yard this article submits that nimbyism is a rational response to the uninsured risks of home ownership it explores the possibilities and draw backs of providing an insurance market to cover such risks it concludes that some progress is being made towards developing such markets jel r52 residents who strenuously oppose devel opment of land in their immediate area are often called nimbys the acronymic per soni cation of the expression not in my backyard the oppositionof neighbors is an importantproblemin americanland use reg ulation itcanfrustrate the implementationof carefully planned residential development locally desired industrial development and placement of the necessary nuisances of ur ban life such as power plants and land lls downs 1994 fischel 1991 nelson 1999 portney 1991 rephann forthcoming nimbys sometimes appear to be irratio nal in theiroppositionto projects in the sense that they express far fetched anxieties or doggedly ght projects whose expected neighborhood effects seem small or even be nign i submit in this note that such anxieties might not be irrational if we consider that most nimbys are homeowners and that homeowners cannot insure their major and often only asset against devaluation by neighborhood effects nimbyism mightbet ter be viewed as a risk averse strategy i con clude with a few notes about how an insur ance market might be developed to head off

a three sector model for real property tax incedence abstract this article presents a new three sector general equilibrium model for tax incidence analysis the model differs from the usual two sector model not only in the addition of an extra sector but also in abandoning the classical tradition of specifying with capital and labor arguments the property tax in the model is specified as a partial tax applying to real but not to personal property used in the production of housing services and other goods the model is quantified by selecting numerical values for its parameters in order to estimate percentage changes in the endogenous variables caused by the introduction of an exogenous property tax the major effect of the tax is to make real property relatively more expensive and to cause less real property to be produced

international and domestic constraints on political business cycles in oecd economies the effect of increased capital mobility on the national control of macroeconomic policy continues to be a topic of debate empirical contributions to this debate share the assumption that domestic macroeconomic policy is driven by either partisan or countercyclical motivations and that the effects of international financial flows have roughly similar effects in all countries this article reevaluates the integration hypothesis in a framework in which manipulations of the macroeconomy derive from opportunistic motivations the article emphasizes the ways in which prior institutional choices effect the way these motivations are translated into actions evidence from individual country and pooled time series tests suggests that opportunistic cycles are less likely to occur when 1 a government maintains a fixed exchange rate in the presence of highly mobile capital or 2 when the central bank enjoys above average independence

environmental amenities as a source of market power site specific environmental amenities can provide a source of product differentiating market power using estimates from hedonic price equations and residual demand models our analysis recovers firm specific estimates of price markups as measures of market power and uses these markups to estimate the implied marginal value for access to coastal beaches the application involves rental price and occupancy data for several thousand beach properties along a portion of the north carolina coastline during the 1987 to 1992 rental seasons

assessing the efficiency of local open space provision abstract this paper tests the efficiency of local provision of land conservation i examine how housing prices which capitalize open space amenities and future tax obligations change after municipalities vote on referendums for conservation spending using a dynamic regression discontinuity based on voting outcomes results suggest that average housing prices increase about 0 68 1 12 for every 1000 per household of open space spending authorized which indicates inefficiency and underprovision of conservation i also examine tax capitalization and supply side explanations for estimated capitalization

property taxes and elderly mobility abstract the 2000 2005 housing market boom in the u s has caused sharp increases in residential property taxes housing rich but income poor elderly homeowners often complain about rising tax burdens and anecdotal evidence suggests that some move to reduce their tax burden there has been little systematic analysis however of the link between property tax levels and the mobility rate of elderly homeowners this paper investigates this link using household level panel data from the health and retirement study hrs and a newly collected data set on state provided property tax relief programs these relief programs generate variation in effective property tax burdens that is not due solely to arguably endogenous local community choices about taxes and expenditure programs the findings provide evidence suggesting that higher property taxes raise mobility among elderly homeowners the point estimates from instrumental variable estimation using relief programs to generate instruments suggest that a 100 increase in annual property taxes is associated with a 0 73 percentage point increase in the 2 year mobility rate for homeowners over the age of 50 this is an 8 percent increase from the baseline 2 year mobility rate of 9 percent these results are robust to alternative specifications

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

capitalisation of fiscal variables and land scarcity fiscal packages usually capitalise into house prices yet if enough land for construction is available housing developers could supply new houses and capitalisation may disappear this paper provides a theoretical model in which income taxes and public services capitalise at lower rates when housing supply elasticity increases using an empirical linear interaction model we estimate the impact of available land for construction on capitalisation rates with a panel of swiss communities results indicate that fiscal variables do not capitalise differently in communities where housing supply is constrained by land availability thus land availability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for capitalisation to disappear

estimating property tax capitalization a further comment in recent years an increasingly popular area of empirical investigation has concerned attempts to test tiebout s 1956 hypothesis that allocative efficiency in the provision of public services may be attained through a system of local governments 1 in his seminal contribution to the analysis of the tiebout hypothesis and the capitalization of property taxes oates 1969 reasoned that if consumers are sensitive to the public service benefits and property tax costs associated with home ownership these factors should be reflected in housing prices until recently most studies of the capitalization phenomenon have followed oates s specification in which housing values are regressed on a vector of housing characteristics public service measures and a tax price term 2 as several analysts have noted 3 however attempts to test the tiebout hypothesis by using an oates type equation must certainly lead to failure this is so because in a perfect tiebout equilibrium a marginal increase in housing value brought about by increased provision of public services must necessarily be offset by a marginal decrease in housing value caused by the added tax cost assuming that

housing price functions and ownership capitalization rates abstract in this paper we examine the problem of consistently estimating capitalization rates and hedonic housing prices we specify a hedonic pricing model for housing that combines owner occupied and rental unit samples in a manner yielding hedonic prices not subject to selection bias and capitalization rates which vary with the age and family income of the residents we use the 1982 annual housing survey ahs for metropolitan philadelphia to obtain parameter estimates for this model our findings indicate that selectivity bias is present in price functions utilizing only owner occupied or rental unit samples our results further indicate that the mean annual capitalization rate for owner occupied units is approximately 10 however the capitalization rate is non monotonically related to both age of the head and family income

property tax shifting under imperfect competition the hedonic price models are commonly used to empirically assess the degree to which property taxes are shifted from property owners to property renters the findings of these studies vary sporadically in terms of the degree of tax shifting the competitiveness of housing markets may significantly influence the degree of tax shifting in this article we allow a nonzero price cost markup in the hedonic price equation and examine the impact of market power on property tax shifting in our case study we examine the property specific characteristics occupancy record and local property tax associated with hundreds of managed rental properties in central new hampshire the results show that depending on the degree of market power exercised by a property management firm the anti competitive structure of the market may significantly contribute to property tax shifting from property owners to property renters