the competitive effects of vertical agreements for many years there were few distinctions drawn between horizontal and vertical agreements both were considered anticompetitive and subject to per se condemnation under the antitrust laws recently however this approach has come under attack and what was once the conventional wisdom is no longer so indeed there is growing acceptance of the view that vertical agreements can rarely have anticompetitive consequences per se legality would then be the appropriate standard in this paper we investigate the competitive implications of a particular vertical agreement the imposition of exclusive dealing requirements by a manufacturer on his distributors however to maintain the focus of the analysis we do not consider ultimate welfare gains or losses in an early application of economic analysis to this practice aaron director and edward levi 1956 suggest that exclusive dealing would be anticompetitive if it raised entry costs for rivals our object following this conjecture see their p 293 is to examine the market conditions under which exclusive dealing impedes entry howard marvel 1982 dealt with the practice of exclusive dealing he provides an efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing ignores the prospect that anticompetitive effects may follow and concludes that exclusive dealing ought therefore to be treated as legal per se p 25 this paper examines the possible anticompetitive effects neglected by marvel i market conditions for exclusive dealing

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

precommitment in competing vertical chains the design of distribution channels is an important marketing decision since a revision implies costly reorganization hence it makes sense to study strategic motives of alternative distribution devices a precommitment is a strategic move that affects the other players expectations on how oneself will behave and thus induces them to choose in one s own favor schelling 1960 how these tactics can be used by firms to favorably influence competition between vertical chains is the topic of the literature reviewed in this survey jel classification l22 l42 l81

in the shadow of the vote decision making in the european community scholarship on the european community ec focuses particular attention on how formal voting rules and institutional reform condition decision making outcomes the predominant view of ec history holds that decision making remained paralyzed until institutional reforms in 1987 and 1992 restored and expanded adherence to majority voting rules which in turn unblocked and expedited ec legislative efforts in this study i challenge these fundamental assumptions using comprehensive data for 1974 95 and a series of quantitative assessments including event history analysis i show that decision making in the 1970s was anything but paralyzed that the impact of the luxembourg compromise has been greatly overstated that institutional reforms actually encumbered rather than eased the ec legislative process and that institutional effects are mediated by the underlying distribution of member state preferences the findings have important implications for our understanding of the history and future trajectory of european integration and highlight the applicability of standard political science theories and methods to the study of the ec

tax competition and tax co ordination under destination and origin principles a synthesis this paper proposes a general framework for analysing commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles based on three possible tax spillovers the consumer price spillover the producer price terms of trade spillover and rent spillovers a model is presented which can be extended to accommodate all three spillovers using this model many of the results in the existing literature can be derived compared and extended

the comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition abstract especially but not only in the european union closer economic integration is putting increasing pressure on the destination principle under which goods entering international trade are normally taxed this has raised the possibility of switching to the origin principle which dispenses with problematic border tax adjustments this paper compares destination and origin principles under conditions of imperfect competition previous analyses which have considered only the competitive case have led to a qualified presumption in favour of the destination principle a series of results are established here for both cooperative and non cooperative tax setting which challenge that presumption under imperfect competition

optimal tariff equilibria with customs unions the authors construct a model of customs unions in which countries charge optimal tariffs customs unions internalize the externality that exists whenever two countries import the same good also customs unions make several countries into one large unit with more market power big customs unions can improve their members welfare relative to the free trade the authors model of customs unions separates the effects of tariff reduction from the effects of policy coordination the movement from nash equilibrium to a free trade association improves global resource allocations moving from a free trade association to a full customs union has ambiguous resource allocation effects

harmonisation of commodity taxes the restricted origin principle comment abstract this note shows that within a model where tariffs have distorted the pre tax situation as in the one used by berglas 1981 application of the restricted origin principle causes resource misallocation even when trade deflection takes place this conclusion is different from the one derived from models where the pre tax situation is pareto optimal e g shibata 1967 where trade deflection guarantees optimal allocation

common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion in a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents in this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperatively select agents name output prices and choose compensation schemes we exhibit an equilibrium in which all strategic variables not merely the marketing choices delegated to agents but prices as well are selected perfectly cooperatively this cooperative equilibrium is very simple and attractive each firm sets the collusive output price and employs a commission scheme to compensate the agent although each

the european union and international outcomes analysts of the european union eu and international bargaining have generally failed to appreciate how the shift within the eu from unanimity to qualified majority voting has affected european bargaining positions and international outcomes i analyze the international effects of changes in eu decision making rules with a simple spatial model and assess the utility of the model in two cases of environmental bargaining that span the entry into force of the maastricht treaty the eu can decisively shape international outcomes by concentrating the weight of its fifteen member states on a single substantive position and rendering that position critical to any internationally negotiated agreement the findings generalize to numerous areas of eu external relations and suggest that analysts should attend specifically to the eu and more generally to domestic and regional institutional factors in explaining international bargaining outcomes

rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions abstract this paper is about the determination of common external tariffs cets in customs unions cus we first examine how the relationship between preferences over cet levels technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a cu is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues we then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium cet among other things we find that when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members imports tariff preferences may be polarized the trade patterns of some cu members may be endogenous and as a result their payoff functions may not be single peaked this leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules e g the population and consumption rules and raises the possibility of a condorcet paradox

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment in a recent paper comanor and frech 1985 cf claim that a manufacturer enjoying a product differentiation advantage could impose exclusive dealing on distributors while also raising its wholesale price the two consumer groups in the model would then pay higher prices than under nonexclusive dealing cf also suggest that exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively strong cf s analysis does not carefully incorporate the constraints imposed by dealer rationality doing so within cf s model i reach opposite conclusions exclusive dealing will be accepted only if the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price to dealers relative to nonexclusive dealing price rises to one group of consumers but falls to the other moreover exclusive dealing is more likely to emerge when product differentiation is relatively weak

on the dampening of competition effect of exclusive dealing the authors compare and contrast the profit and welfare effects of exclusive dealing sales through a common retailer and vertical integration as did y j lin 1990 the authors find that imperfectly competitive manufacturers prefer to impose exclusive dealing on their retailers unlike lin the authors find that welfare is higher under exclusive dealing than when products are sold through a common retailer this finding suggests a new interpretation of the standard stations v united states 1949 antitrust case copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain on contractual form and coordination it is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers how then should the firms manage their contract negotiations the supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many possibly competing retailers we find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our setting where multiple manufacturers sell through a single retailer we allow the manufacturers to compete for the retailer s business using one of three types of contracts a wholesale price contract a quantity discount contract or a two part tariff it is well known that the latter two more sophisticated contracts enable the manufacturer to coordinate the supply chain thereby maximizing the profits available to the firms more importantly they allow the manufacturer to extract rents from the retailer in theory allowing the manufacturer to leave the retailer with only her reservation profit however we show that in our market structure these two sophisticated contracts force the manufacturers to compete more aggressively relative to when they only offer wholesale price contracts and this may leave them worse off and the retailer substantially better off in other words although in a serial supply chain a retailer may have just cause to fear quantity discounts and two part tariffs a retailer may actually prefer those contracts when offered by competing manufacturers we conclude that the properties a contractual form exhibits in a one manufacturer supply chain may not carry over to the realistic setting in which multiple manufacturers must compete to sell their goods through the same retailer

delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions abstract a difference in the objectives of members of a customs union may be a unifying rather than a divisive force if countries outside the union behave strategically one union member may want to delegate to its partner the ability to set the common external tariff we demonstrate these results in the context of a pure exchange general equilibrium trade model we show that if tariffs are strategic substitutes the union country which is relatively less well endowed in the exported good may be willing to delegate to its partner which behaves more aggressively in setting the union s policy the delegation decision is reversed if tariffs are strategic complements the model extends the standard results on the appropriate level of the union policy by adding another dimension that of the optimal decision making agent

the competitive effects of exclusive dealing evidence from the u s beer industry abstract several recent theoretical articles have modeled the effects of exclusive dealing contracts that restrict dealers to selling a single brand yet detailed empirical analysis of the impact of exclusivity on actual market outcomes has been lacking i analyze a unique set of firm level data on nearly 400 beer distributors in the united states the impacts of economies of scale and restrictions on distributor promotional activities on the use of exclusive dealing are measured as well as the effects of exclusivity on costs prices and output the results support the view that exclusive dealing serves to minimize manufacturer dealer incentive conflicts and enhances social welfare

harmonization of commodity taxes destination origin and restricted origin principles abstract the three tax principles are compared using a multiproduct custom union model it is shown that if member countries use the destination or origin principles no distortion or redistribution of income occurs even if their tax rates differ however under the restricted origin principle different tax rates result in distortion and income redistribution equal tax rates still result in a redistribution of real income an exact measurement of this redistribution is derived given these results it seems possible to conclude that the origin principle is superior to the other tax principles

exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure a firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size exclude it from the market and enjoy increased market power this strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers in addition allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms incentives to exclude rivals because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the transfer of another firm s profits

retailer power recent developments and policy implications retailing is big business ranking firms by revenue retailing includes belgium s largest company delhaize le lion tesco and j sainsbury from the uk top ten the giant metro group in germany and wal mart stores number four in the usa and the eighth largest company in the world with 119 billion turnover and 825 000 employees fortune 3 8 98 retailing is getting more concentrated over time the top ten grocers in europe were 28 of the market in 1992 but 36 by 1997 1 the behaviour of retailers matters for consumers cross country studies of pricing for near identical products e g cars televisions compact discs branded sportswear groceries find big differences between prices across european countries and between europe and the usa 2 the european commission is to start examining why europeans pay substantially more on average than us consumers

3 3 theory of customs unions abstract four recent models those of berglas corden meade and riezman which have extended the theory of customs union to 3 3 dimensions are reviewed the reasons for both apparent and real differences among the welfare propositions from these models are explained some new extensions are derived the main conclusions are that the family of 3 3 models introduce several effects which cannot be present in 3 2 models and that the distinctions among the models are due mostly to diverse assumptions concerning the trilateral pattern of trade which are not readily apparent

the size of trading blocs market power and world welfare effects abstract we construct an n country n commodity trade model to analyze the implications of bloc size for nash equilibrium tariffs and welfare the relationship between the absolute size of symmetric trading blocs and their market power is ambiguous and we illustrate how this relationship varies with model parameters in contrast sufficiently large increases in the relative size of a bloc enhance its relative market power and cause the welfare of its country members to rise above the free trade level we establish the existence of an optimal bloc size and study the dependence of optimal size on the parameters of the model

exclusive dealing before bork and beyond abstractantitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that bork articulated in the antitrust paradox indeed they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain when exclusive dealing might possibly cause harm and have modeled a variety of special cases where it does some albeit not all of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges

vertical separation and horizontal mergers the author considers a duopoly setting consisting of two manufacturer retailer pairs in which the observable contract between each manufacturer retailer pair specifies a two part tariff without intraband competition the author shows that an upstream merger is anticompetitive under very general demand and cost conditions downstream merger is analyzed using linear demand and constant marginal cost and is shown not to be anticompetitive both with and without intraband competition and for both price and output competition between retailers in the premerger regime copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

the economic theory of vertical restraints the types of contracts arising in a typical vertical manufacturer retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform price in addition to setting per unit prices manufacturers and retailers also revert to non linear pricing and non price instruments these instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of franchise fees resale price maintenance exclusive dealing exclusive territories and slotting allowances the use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on specific market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers this paper surveys the industrial organization literature on retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and consumer prices market structure efficiency and welfare

the dampening of competition effect of exclusive dealing using the dampening of competition approach to understanding vertical relationships this paper shows that in the absence of intrabrand retailer competition firms earn greater profits using exclusive dealing the paper explains the frequent simultaneous appearance of exclusive dealing and exclusive territoriality the results are used to analyze the famous 1949 standard stations case the author concludes that the 1949 court did the right thing for a wrong reason copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

capturing strategic rent full line forcing brand discounts aggregate rebates and maximum resale price maintenance this paper examines the implications of a retailer s shelf space stocking decisions on the optimal marketing strategy of an upstream multiproduct monopolist when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is known full line forcing brand discounts and maximum resale price maintenance are sufficient to achieve the monopolist manufacturer s first best profit when these strategies are adopted the retailer s profit is reduced to the scarcity rents obtainable on her shelf space when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is unknown the use of aggregate rebates can act as a screening device to maximize channel profit copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

on the superiority of the destination over the origin principle of taxation for intra union trade this paper shows that the widely accepted view that the destination principle is preferred to the restricted origin principle on allocative efficiency grounds is not correct in a more realistic model of a customs union with common external tariffs the restricted origin principle can be superior to the destination principle for both general and nongeneral taxes the two principles can also be equivalent in the case of both general and nongeneral taxes but under different sets of conditions copyright 1992 by royal economic society