corporate philanthropic disaster response and ownership type evidence from chinese firms response to the sichuan earthquake this article examines whether the charitable giving amount and likelihood of firm response to catastrophic events relate to firms ownership type using a unique dataset of listed firms in china where state ownership is still prevalent based on the data of chinese firms response to the 2008 sichuan earthquake we find that the extent of corporate contributions for state owned firms following this disaster is less than that for private firms state owned firms are also less likely to respond in this disaster compared to private firms the results also reveal that firm size profitability geography cash resource available and leverage affect firms philanthropic disaster response behavior in china

knowledge accumulation within an organization in this article we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization we show that knowledge accumulation is delayed the fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage falls gradually then rises again before falling finally toward zero we determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem or the specificity of knowledge we also discuss the form of the optimal life cycle wage profiles the role of the initial knowledge level and the role of discounting

liberalisation and r d in network industries the case of the electricity industry abstract electricity sector liberalisation has coincided with a significant decline in r d spending this paper reviews the industrial organisation literature on r d and innovation to explore the likely causes of the decline in r d spending in the electricity sector meanwhile r d productivity and innovative outputs in utilities and equipment suppliers appear to have improved however a lasting decline in r d expenditure can have a negative long term effect on technological progress and innovation in the sector we conclude that the decline in r d could have been predicted from the literature we also discuss the need to reorient the post liberalisation technology policy

privatization in developing countries a review of the issues abstract the theory and early experience of privatization in developing countries are reviewed privatization has been spurred by widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of public enterprises and the need to cut government expenditures unless it is accompanied by liberalization measures privatization of public enterprises is unlikely to result in significant gains in economic efficiency the sequencing of privatization and liberalization reforms will often determine their impact on efficiency but the correct order of implementation is not clear political opposition to privatization is likely to be limited to the state bureaucracy which will often be able to mobilize in order to limit the impact of reforms early implementation experiences suggest technical difficulties are as constraining as political factors

competition and corporate governance in transition this paper examines the elements of institutional development critical to the enhancement of company performance in transition economies this includes initial conditions forms of privatization institutional frameworks and the competitiveness of markets comparing empirical evidence the paper concludes that there is a clear distinction in effectiveness of policies followed and their impact between central europe and cis countries this divergence is attributed to fundamentally different political attitudes toward reform the need of cis governments to gain political support for reform and as a consequence of the desire of central european countries to join european union

privatization public offerings and political objectives this paper empirically analyses the political and economic objectives underlying privatization on the stock market particularly the factors of sips underpricing are explained and the study analyses whether the change of political parties in government play a role on the issue the paper has two main findings first larger initial returns occurred in the early stages of privatization second the change of government from left wing to right wing did not lead to significantly higher levels of underpricing the results show that governments are quite pragmatic with respect to underpricing maximizing proceeds from sips shows to be more important than ideological differences between parties in government

policy objectives and performance in a mixed market with bargaining abstract we analyse a mixed duopoly in which wages and salaries are determined by nash bargaining and where the public firm s unit costs depend on its objectives because of constant returns to scale welfare maximisation without restriction would eliminate or significantly weaken the private firm therefore we focus on constrained welfare maximisation in which case unit costs are normally higher in the public firm on the other hand the private firm may even earn more than in a monopoly if the public firm maximises profits or if the constraint offers too much protection

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

time based competition and the privatization of services the authors develop a vertical differentiation model which exhibits congestion externalities and in which firms choose service time this model is formulated for a variety of industry and ownership structures the authors find an ownership effect in which service speeds decrease when public services are privatized this effect however could be offset and even reversed by increased efficiency of private services the authors also investigate how prices and commitment ability with respect to service times will affect the service speeds in equilibrium copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

management ownership and market valuation an empirical analysis we investigate the relationship between management ownership and market valuation of the firm as measured by tobin s q in a 1980 cross section of 371 fortune 500 firms we find evidence of a significant nonmonotonic relationship tobin s q first increases then declines and finally rises slightly as ownership by the board of directors rises for older firms there is evidence that q is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family than when it is run by an officer unrelated to the founder

incumbent employees resistance to implementing privatization policy abstract the recent anti privatization trend in latin america france and south africa is a reminder that employees resist privatization because pre privatization firms tend to be over manned and to pay excessive wages we study the effect of employees resistance on the successful implementation of privatization in a stylized model in which the government interacts with employees of an unknown type the analysis clarifies some of the difficulties associated with the implementation process furthermore although common sense dictates that the government negotiates with the employees before finding an outside buyer we show that sometimes it is better off contacting an investor first

nationalization vs regulation of monopolies abstract this paper compares the effects of government ownership and regulation under private ownership on the production decisions of a monopoly firm it analyzes an optimal mechanism design problem in which the owners of the firm either the government or shareholders contract with a manager who has private information about the firm s cost function and takes an unobservable action that affects the firm s costs the model predicts that the privately owned regulated firm will use relatively more capital and the publicly owned firm will use relatively more labor than the second best efficient solution to the private information problem

sources of lifetime inequality is lifetime inequality mainly due to differences across people established early in life or to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime we answer this question within a model that features idiosyncratic shocks to human capital estimated directly from data as well as heterogeneity in ability to learn initial human capital and initial wealth we find that as of age 23 differences in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime earnings lifetime wealth and lifetime utility than do differences in shocks received over the working lifetime jel d31 d91 j24 j31 to what degree is lifetime inequality due to differences across people established early in life as opposed to differences in luck experienced over the working lifetime among the individual differences established early in life which ones are the most important a convincing answer to these questions is of fundamental importance first and most simply an answer serves to contrast the potential importance of the myriad policies directed at modifying or at providing insurance for initial conditions e g public education against those directed at shocks over the working lifetime e g unemployment insurance second a discussion of lifetime inequality cannot go too far before discussing which specific type of initial condition is the most critical for determining how one fares in life third a useful framework for answering these questions should also be central in the analysis of a wide range of policies considered in macroeconomics public finance and labor economics we view lifetime inequality through the lens of a risky human capital model agents differ in terms of three initial conditions initial human capital learning ability and financial wealth initial human capital can be viewed as controlling the intercept of an agent s mean earnings profile whereas learning ability acts to rotate

patent races and the persistence of monopoly patent races are important determinants of market structure for a new firm a patent can be an entry ticket into the market for an incumbent firm already in the market patents for related technologies can ensure that no new firm enters in this spirit recent work has explored the implications of patenting for the persistence of monopoly see for example dasgupta i982 gilbert i98i gilbert and newbery i982 much attention has been given to pre emptive patenting the strategic acquisition of patents by an incumbent firm solely to prevent potential rivals from entering the market in this context it is important to distinguish between two kinds of patent race a standard race is a competition in which a prize is awarded to the first player to reach the finishing line an asymmetrical race is a competition in which one player loses something of value if one of his rivals reaches the finishing line he is content if nobody wins but a prize is won by the first of the other players to reach the finishing line if any of them does so a patent race in which an incumbent firm s sole concern is to prevent potential rivals from entering his market is an asymmetrical race and not a standard race the distinction between the two kinds of race can be captured only in models with a sufficiently rich dynamic structure this and other advantages of a properly dynamic model are explained in section ii a model of an asymmetrical race with two firms is presented in section iii in this model the challenger wins a prize and the incumbent loses a prize if the challenger is first to reach the finishing line it is shown that the challenger is often automatically deterred from making any effort to win the race because the strategic interactions between the players are such that the incumbent would outdo any reasonable effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being first to reach the finishing line then the incumbent has no need to make any effort in the race in order to maintain his existing monopoly the reason is that the incumbent unlike the challenger does not need to go all the way to the finishing line to achieve his objective on the other hand it may be truedepending on the parameters describing the firmsthat the challenger wins the patent proceeding to the finishing line just as if he were the only contender for the patent of particular interest is the case in which the firms are identical

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

the return to schooling in structural dynamic models a survey this papers contains a survey of the recent literature devoted to the returns to schooling within a dynamic structural framework i present a historical perspective on the evolution of the literature from early static models set in a selectivity framework willis and rosen 1979 to the recent literature stimulated by keane and wolpin 1997 and which uses stochastic dynamic programming techniques after reviewing the literature thoroughly i compare the structural approach with the iv experimental approach i present their commonalities and i also discuss their fundamental di8erences to get an order of magnitude most structural estimates reported for the us range between 4 and 7 per year on the other hand iv estimates between 10 and 15 per year are often reported the discrepancy prevails even when comparable if not identical data sets are used the discussion is focussed on understanding this divergence the distinction between static and dynamic model specifications is a recurrent theme in the analysis i argue that the distinction between the iv approach and the structural approach may be coined in terms of a trade o8 between behavioral and statistical assumptions for this reason and unless one has very specific knowledge of the true data generating process it is neither possible nor sensible to claim which approach to estimation is more flexible more precisely i show that structural and iv approaches differ mainly at the level of i the compatibility of the underlying models with truly dynamic behavior ii the role of heterogeneity in ability and tastes iii the consideration of post schooling opportunities and iv the specification and interpretation of the mincer wage equation

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

multiperiod wage contracts and productivity profiles when creditors do not honor human capital as collateral firms can mediate financially by offering workers long term wage contracts the optimal contract specifies a wage consisting of a spot general skill component plus a component equal to the expected time averaged value of the worker s specific skills with a competitor variations in the smoothed specific component are due only to changes in expectations about the likelihood of quitting a competing firm the theory also explains interindustry disparities in wage paths and statistical discrimination by firms

privatization in latin america what does the evidence say privatization is under attack criticisms run from corrupt deals to abuse of market power and social welfare losses we evaluate the empirical record on privatization relying on recent comprehensive studies from latin america the paper presents four main results first the increased profitability of privatized firms is not explained by sample selection biases second in the quest to identify the sources of increased profitability after privatization we find little evidence that validates concerns of generalized market power abuses exploitation of workers and lack of fiscal benefits third the manner in which privatization is carried out matters transparency and homogeneity in procedures speed and limited restructuring prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion finally privatization s success is enhanced by two complementary policies deregulation or reregulation of industries previously shielded from competitive forces and an effective corporate governance framework that facilitates privatized firms access to capital at lower cost overall the empirical record shows that privatization leads to increased profitability and productivity firm restructuring fiscal benefits output growth and even quality improvements most cases of privatization failure can be linked to poor contract design opaque processes with heavy state involvement lack of reregulation and a poor corporate governance framework

generating efficiency economic and environmental regulation of public and private electricity generators in spain abstract economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on incentive based regulation such as price caps we focus on the effect of regulation as distinct from ownership and identify the effect of two different regulatory schemes on both publicly and privately owned spanish electricity generators publicly owned generators were more efficient under cost of service regulation private but not public firms responded to incentive regulation by increasing efficiency bringing their productivity to similar levels we introduce some novelty in modelling efficiency including three pollutants and declared plant availability as outputs and we test for the effect of environmental regulation in reducing pollutants

shareholder protection compulsory acquisition and the efficiency of the takeover process this paper examines public good problems connected with takeovers two broad categories of exclusion device oppression of minority interests and compulsory acquisition of shares are evaluated it is argued that inability to control the level of oppression with any precision renders the first method unsatisfactory from the policy viewpoint but that strong protection of minorities coupled with compulsory acquisition rights for the acquiror can straightforwardly generate an efficient solution to the public good problems it is shown that in the u k company law and the city code on takeovers and mergers combine to produce an approximation to this efficient solution against managements which are performing poorly in the eyes of the capital market and since the work of marris 1964 this incentive mechanism has come to play a prominent role in the economic analysis of company behaviour the usual argument is that as the market value of a particular company falls relative to the level that it is generally believed could be obtained by other managers following different policies the firm becomes increasingly vulnerable to a takeover by a raider attracted by the prospect of the capital gains that would ensue following managerial changes in turn the threat to the incumbent managers acts as a deterrent to behaviour which runs counter to shareholders interests the effectiveness of the workings of the takeover mechanism is therefore of some importance for the efficient utilisation and allocation of resources potential obstacles to the smooth functioning of the takeover process have however been recognised for quite some time as long ago as 1926 the greene committee on company law reform identified cases where a takeover had been inhibited by the actions of small minorities of shareholders much more recently grossman and hart 1980 have formalised some of the earlier points in a way that clearly highlights one of the major difficulties that freeriding strategies on the part of shareholders in firms with dispersed share ownership can prevent successful bids the argument is that shareholders of the target company believing their own actions have a trivially small effect on

corporate control in germany the article presents the german system of corporate control compared with the uk the number of listed joint stock companies in germany is relatively low the most important shareholders are companies whereas institutional investors play a minor role an essential feature of german corporate culture is the concept of the interest of the company as a whole and the long term approach in pursuing company goals joint stock companies operate under a two tier structure with a managing board controlled by the supervisory board the body which plays the central role in corporate governance in germany in contrast to what is widely believed german banks do not dominate companies even though they exert considerable influence through industrial holdings supervisory board mandates and proxy voting rights in addition to their regular banking business control via the market is less pronounced here than in the uk but is growing in importance copyright 1992 by oxford university press

corporate social responsibility ownership structure and political interference evidence from china prior research suggests that ownership structure is associated to corporate social responsibility csr in developed countries this article examines whether and how ownership structure affects csr in emerging markets using chinese firms social responsibility ranking our empirical evidences show that for non state owned firms corporate ownership dispersion is positively associated to csr however for state owned firms whose controlling shareholder is the state this relation is reversed we attribute the reversed relationship to political interferences and further test this hypothesis by demonstrating that regional economic development is negatively related to csr for state owned firms due to decreased political interference in more developed areas this study is the first to directly examine the relationship between the dispersion of corporate ownership and csr in emerging markets and our results depict that it is important to consider ownership type in assessing csr in emerging market where state ownership is still prevalent such as china the results also reveal that firm size profitability employee power leverage and growth opportunity affect csr in china

externalities and corporate objectives in a world with diversified shareholder consumers if shareholders own diversified portfolios and if companies impose externalities on one another shareholders do not want value maximization to be corporate policy instead shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values this occurs when firms internalize between firm externalities any kind of externality pecuniary or nonpecuniary vertical or horizontal suffices what matters is simply that one company s actions affect another s value thus besides the traditional benefit of risk reduction portfolio diversifi cation offers additional benefits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities this paper documents the extent of diversification and cross ownership of stocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the extent of cross ownership

timing of investments holdup and total welfare abstract we explore holdup with simultaneous and sequential investment with simultaneous investment both investors are held up with sequential investment contracting becomes possible after the project has commenced so the second investor avoids being held up if the investments are independent sequential investment increases cost of delay reduces the incentive for the first player to invest and increases the second player s incentive to invest the paper shows the timing of investment can act as an additional form of holdup if they have the option when to invest a party may choose the regime that does not maximize total welfare

does ownership always matter abstract the objective of this paper is to explain and illustrate the complex relationship between ownership arrangements and enterprise performance it is commonly argued that efficiency will be lower in the public sector than the private because enterprise objectives deviate from maximisation of profits and because monitoring arrangements are inadequate due to the absence of capital market discipline we argue that public ownership does make the owner manager relationship more complicated because the chain of principals and agents is expanded objectives are politically determined and these are conveyed by a policy making administrative structure to management but the relative efficiency of public as against private ownership actually depends on the efficacy of capital market monitoring on the political and constitutional system on the information and sanctions available to policy makers and on the nature of the management market variation in these factors can help to explain the different natures and roles of the public sector between countries

the financial and operating performance of newly privatized firms an international empirical analysis this study compares the pre and postprivatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 industries that experience full or partial privatization through public share offerings during the period 1961 to 1990 our results document strong performance improvements achieved surprisingly without sacrificing employment security specifically after being privatized firms increase real sales become more profitable increase their capital investment spending improve their operating efficiency and increase their work forces furthermore these companies significantly lower their debt levels and increase dividend payout finally we document significant changes in the size and composition of corporate boards of directors after privatization the last fifteen years have witnessed a significant global shift away from state socialism towards entrepreneurial capitalism one of the most important and visible aspects of this trend has been the enthusiasm with which governments of all political persuasions have sold their state owned enterprises soes to private investors in hopes that the generally unsatisfactory economic performance of these firms can be improved by the discipline of private ownership this denationalization process given its current title of privatization by the conservative government of margaret thatcher in

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

productive efficiency in public and private firms abstract this paper compares the degree of x inefficiency which emerges as a consequence of the imposition of the optimal incentive contracts in public and private firms using a straightforward principal agent model with two possible states of the world it establishes the rather surprising result that in the good state of the world public ownership always results in a higher degree of productive efficiency

interactions between investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information costs and benefits of privatized firms abstract in this paper we examine the interactions between investment timing and management effort in the presence of asymmetric information between the owner and the manager where the manager has an informational advantage we find that investment timing is later under asymmetric information than under full information implying a decrease in the value of equity option however in order to minimize any distortion under underinvestment management effort is greater under asymmetric information than under full information we show that there are trade offs in the efficiencies of investment timing and management effort under asymmetric information these results fit well with the findings of past empirical studies concerning the costs and benefits of privatized firms

working in public and private firms abstract we develop a theoretical framework for comparing incentives labor productivity and the allocation of effort in public versus private enterprises we incorporate socializing an activity which yields utility for workers and affects a firm s output into a multitask model of work organization we establish the two following results first the optimal workers compensation policy displays a larger incentive intensity in the private firm than in the public firm second labor productivity in the private firm may be higher or lower than in the public firm both results fit well with the findings of empirical work

lessons from privatization in britain abstract the process of privatizing most of britain s major public enterprises yields interesting conclusions on the three related issues 1 a problem of policy assignment arose in the use of privatization and liberalization to achieve both allocative and productive efficiency 2 evidence on the behavior of the public enterprises is consistent with an organizational model of the relevant principal agent relationships predicting certain types of slack absorption 3 the privatization process entailed policy choices that bear on their future productive efficiency effectiveness of monitoring by the market for corporate control and allocative efficiency provision for regulation

new data base on state owned enterprises privatization of state owned assets was a central economic reform of the 1980s and 1990s lack of data has made it impossible to judge the extent to which privatization has diminished the importance of state ownership in the economy or changed the performance of state owned enterprises this article introduces a new data base on state owned enterprises the first since the mid 1980s which partly fills this information gap the bureaucrats in business data base provides time series data for up to eighty eight countries on the share of state enterprises in the overall economy investment employment and internal and external credit as well as their overall surplus or deficit and the size of transfers to and from national treasuries the article presents the rationale for the data base describes its seven measures of state enterprise size and performance and explores possible uses of the information

ceo duality as a double edged sword how boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command when a firm s chief executive officer is also the chairperson of its board directors have opposing objectives according to organization theory such ceo duality establishes strong unambiguous le

the efficiency implications of earnings retentions an extension this paper reports on another attempt to statistically uncover evidence of embodied technological change as an explanation of changes in labor productivity in the united states in this version of the test an interregional cross section time series sample of data was used while the hypothesis has a lot of appeal it has proven difficult to find manifestations of embodiment in econometric tests this study has proven to be no exception despite the unique data set results were again not supportive of the hypothesis a possible limitation of this test is that the time period studied may have been too short references

designing a private industry government auctions with endogenous market structure abstract this paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure doupoly dual sourcing monopoly sole sourcing or government owned production are a function of the bids in designing the optimal mechanism the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus producer surplus and revenue under incomplete information doupoly is implemented less frequently and government production more frequently than under complete information when bidders are symmetric the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second price auction applications to privatization deregulation and defense procurement are discussed

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

do unlisted targets sell at discounts academic literature practitioners courts and regulators routinely assert that both private and subsidiary targets sell at discounts relative to public targets however the empirical evidence to support this conclusion is thin our work alters the methodology from prior research to avoid biases due to both one sided sample truncation and jensen s inequality following these changes we find no evidence that unlisted targets sell at discounts our results hold under a number of different approaches and after controlling for known determinants of acquisition pricing

industries with private and public enterprises in this paper attention will be focussed on an industry consisting of public enterprises and institutions rather than on a public enterprise itself public enterprises can be used by the government as an instrument to implement an industrial policy since there exist a variety of instruments and objectives we firstly categorize industries as well as market structures section 2 next we mention some recent results section 3 in the last section a general equilibrium model is introduced that offers a framework to policy makers when designing an efficient organization of an industry with external effects

public versus regulated private enterprise a comparison of public enterprise with regulated private enterprise shows that the efficiencies of privatization stem from the insulation it brings from arbitrary political and self serving influences the critical insulation springs from the costliness of interventions when there is a regulatory compact in place that protects private property from expropriation while it also corrects for market failures that same insulation means that public enteprise is a better form of organization for activities that call for a response to public interest exigencies which cannot be specified in advance or reliably adjudicated after the fact the analysis emphasizes that an appropriate regulatory compact requires institutional support international organizations that seek to implement privatization should consider promoting credible regulatory commitment by requiring countries to execute explicit regulatory compacts and by bringing to bear the weight of their continuing relationship as a means of motivating the countries to conform to such strictures

privatization and economic growth an empirical investigation from a sample of developing market economies this paper explores the economic determinants of privatization programmes and the macroeconomic impact of this institutional reform on the growth rate of the gdp a sample of thirty five developing market economies is considered over the 1988 92 period probit and tobit models are used to identify the determinants of successful privatization programmes then regressions are run where probabilities probit and expected values tobit are successively included as additional regressors beside the potential influence of other economic policy variables a significant positive effect is highlighted giving evidence of the importance of divestiture the economic effect is found to be stronger when this institutional reform took place in industry or infrastructure

political authority expertise and government bureaucracies by applying the revelation principle we focus on how a sponsor who possesses political authority could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts that is when they control information about the true costs of public services production our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement in a two types setting and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms we find that the agency is productively efficient under certain conditions the agency is also allocatively efficient while under others the low cost bureau oversupplies and the high cost agency undersupplies its output

privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry we consider a market in which a public firm competes against private ones and ask what happens when the public firm is privatized in the short run privatization is harmful because prices rise the disciplinary role of the public firm is lost in the long run privatization leads to further entry the net effect is beneficial if consumer preference for variety is not too weak a sufficient statistic for the social surplus to be higher in the long run is that the public firm makes a loss this suggests that profitable firms should not necessarily be privatized

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

management and ownership effects evidence from five countries despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross national sample this study empirically examines the ownership concentration performance relationship across the nations of canada france germany the united kingdom and the united states essentially we argue that the correlation if any between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied 1998 john wiley sons ltd

optimal design of research contests procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations and if the buyer cannot extract up front payments from suppliers we study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment an auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests if contestants are asymmetric it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one

empirical age earnings profiles the human capital earnings function in which earnings are expressed as a quadratic in potential experience is probably the most widely accepted empirical specification in economics in spite of its widespread acceptance the human capital earnings function provides a very poor approximation of the true empirical relationship between earnings and experience the standard formulation understates early career earnings growth by about 30 50 and overstates midcareer growth by 20 50 however simple alternative specifications that fit the data are available

privatization internal control and internal regulation abstract this paper develops a theory of the privatization of public enterprises the relevant decisions are modelled as a three stage process internal control internal regulation and privatization privatization is a move from an overcontrolled public firm to an overcontrolled private firm the firm never achieves the optimal extent of control because the necessary replacement of public by private managers leads not only to the desired reduction of bureaucracy but also to an undesired increase in profits moreover the reduction of overbureacratization is matched by a reduction in the quality of the supplied goods

privatization in theory and practice privatization george yarrow this paper examines the theoretical and empirical case for private versus public ownership privatization usually leads managers to place greater emphasis on the pursuit of profits however whether this is beneficial to society depends on the trade off between possible market failures due to a lack of competition and deficiencies in government control of public firms the competitive and regulatory environment is more important than the question of ownership per se in competitive markets there is a presumption in favour of private ownership where there is a natural monopoly vigorous regulatory action is required the evidence suggests that privatization has led to improved performance by firms such as the national freight corporation and cable and wireless which operate in a relatively competitive environment the benefits are less clear in the case of firms like bp britoil and british aerospace however the most worrying case is that of british telecom and the projected privatization of british gas where little thought has been given to limiting the abuse of monopoly power rather the regulatory environment has been tailored to the needs of the existing management and to ensuring a successful share flotation privatization is also advanced as a weapon for reducing trade union power encouraging wider share ownership redistributing wealth and improving the public finances however there are other policy instruments better suited to achieving these objectives the existing privatization programme has not led to a marked widening of share ownership and has resulted in windfall gains to a small group of investors at the expense of taxpayers in general

nationalization privatization and the allocation of financial property rights in this paper i have shown that a purely economic theory of nationalization and privatization is conceivable on the basis of an analysis of government as a rationally discriminating operator acting as the agent of pressure groups competing for redistribution variations in cost of capital differentials between private investors and the state essentially due to the existence of taxation explain alternate policies of taking over privately owned corporations and divesting from state enterprises soes some initial empirical results are encouraging consequently i cannot reject the hypothesis that through nationalization and privatization episodes politicians after all do behave according to economic rationality

welfare maximisation with endogenous average costs abstract in contrast to the earlier literature about industries mixing public and private ownership costs are not exogenous because firms choose capacity if capacity is increased the fixed costs increase but more can be produced at constant marginal costs it turns out that mixing private and public firms improves welfare if the deadweight loss of imperfect competition is significant all firms break even but welfare maximisation implies higher unit costs and lower profitability

the fiscal impact of privatization with some examples from arab countries abstract this paper reviews current thinking on the fiscal impact of privatization against the background of developments and prospects for privatization in arab countries it argues that the fiscal impact is likely to be slight in the absence of fundamental structural reforms by arab countries to secure gains in allocative efficiency by the privatized enterprises by itself privatization may simply lead to a change in the government s asset portfolio in the case of loss making enterprises the government may need to pay the private entrepreneur to take on the enterprise particularly when the sources of inefficiency reflect government policy decisions that are not likely to be modified alternatively liquidation of the assets of unprofitable enterprises may be the appropriate policy

contracting on time the paper shows how the time considerations especially those concerning contract duration affect incomplete contract theory time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts we consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting investment trade and renegotiation take place in continuous time we show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed term contracts or through a renegotiation proof evergreen contract a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice we provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts

holdups and efficiency with search frictions a natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees and larger investments translate into higher wages in particular when wages are determined by ex post bargaining the equilibrium is always inefficient recognizing that capital intensive production relations have to pay higher wages firms reduce their investments this can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers but this in turn depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms in contrast to this benchmark we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers this efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers we show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital intensive jobs

privatisation and x inefficiency a bargaining approach the usual analysis of privatization and x inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort the authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers workers dislike effort because it lowers utility firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity public sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximizers and therefore compared to private sector firms they bargain lower effort levels since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart the authors model predicts that under certain conditions privatization should raise effort and so lower x inefficiency and that wages may increase or decrease copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

human capital and self enforcing contracts this essay analyzes labor contracts as a device for rearranging factor incomes over time under conditions of extreme adverse selection in particular the lack of verifiable public information about future compensation prevents finitely lived workers from borrowing against their earnings specific human capital is used as an incentive to implement intertemporal self enforcing contracts between workers and firms after proposing a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such contracts the resulting equilibrium earnings profiles are explored along with the effects of imperfections in the credit market on the way workers choose jobs and allocate time between current production and training copyright 1988 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

malaysia genesis of a privatization transaction abstract this essay traces the evolution of the malaysian government s decision to undertake a major privatization initiative a specific transaction the port kelang container terminal is described and assessed as in several other developing countries that are undergoing a similar transformation privatization was part of a broader public policy response to poor public enterprise performance mounting domestic and external debt levels unsustainable public sector deficits and political change the container terminal privatization illustrates the difficulties inherent in implementation such as a shortfall of skilled government personnel legal obstacles protracted negotiations with employees and differences about the acceptable terms and conditions of sale

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration a comment this paper extends matsushima and matsumura 2003 by incorporating a large production cost difference between public and private firms in a quantity setting spatial mixed oligopoly the public and private firms first choose their locations in a linear market and then compete in quantities it is shown that for a significant inefficiency of the public firm all firms including both public and private firms agglomerate at the market centre ce texte developpe les resultats de matsushima et matsumura 2003 en incorporant la possibilite d une grande difference de couts de production entre l entreprise publique et les entreprises privees dans un oligopole spatial mixte de concurrence par les quantites les entreprises publiques et privees choisissent leur localisation dans un marche lineaire et se concurrencent par les quantites on montre que s il existe une inefficacite significative de l entreprise publique toutes les entreprises publiques et privees tendent a s agglomerer au centre du marche

institutional interest ownership type and environmental capital expenditures evidence from the most polluting chinese listed firms this study empirically examines whether firms environmental capital expenditures impact institutional investors investment decisions in the chinese market we particularly examine the impact of ownership type on the relationship of environmental capital expenditures and the behavior of different types of institutional investors by classifying institutional investors into two categories short term and long term investors in addition this study further investigates whether environmental capital expenditures related to ownership type increase firm value we find that long term institutional investors tend to invest in state owned firms soes making environmental capital expenditures results also indicate that with governmental backing and encouragement the market value of soes making more environmental capital expenditures is likely to increase however no similar results are found for non soes

bureaucrats in business the roles of privatization versus corporatization in state owned enterprise reform abstract this article provides evidence from a sample of 12 developing countries that countries which improved state owned enterprise performance the most followed a comprehensive strategy of reforms including a combination of privatization and corporatization further evidence that corporatization works better in combination with ownership and other reforms is provided through an analysis of government contracts with public managers private managers and private owners contracts with private managers and owners did better than contracts with public managers in part because the property rights of the former gave them a larger stake in the outcomes the article analyzes the political economy of state enterprise reform and finds that privatization and corporation have similar political costs and tend to succeed or fail together where reform was politically desirable politically feasible and credible countries privatized and corporatized successfully when countries were not politically ready to reform alternative ownership strategies were not successful in improving performance

auditing and competitive bidding in the public sector abstract this paper investigates the impact of a ministry s budget size on the choice between auditing a niskanen bureau and employing competitive bidding in the provision of a publicly funded good the ministry s marginal expected payoff increases fastest with budget size for auctioning as opposed to auditing however the ministry is shown to switch from a purely public provision to a competitive provision as the budget size increases even if expected fixed costs favor the audit the study contributes to the literature by extending the niskanen framework and by endogenizing the institutional arrangements for the provision of public sector goods

do markets differ much this essay reports the results of a crosssection study of differences in accounting profitability that sheds light on some basic controversies in industrial economics most previous cross section studies in this field have been concerned with testing hypotheses about structural coefficients in models meant to apply to essentially all markets as we have learned more about the difficulties of constructing such general models and of performing tests on their structural parameters properly structural cross section analysis has fallen out of fashion in contrast to most of the cross section literature the analysis reported here is fundamentally descriptive it does not attempt directly to estimate or to test hypotheses about structural parameters i hope to show by example that one can perform illuminating analysis of cross section data without a host of controversial maintained hypotheses cross section data can yield interesting stylized facts to guide both general theorizing and empirical analysis of specific industries even if they cannot easily support full blown structural estimation one can view the sort of search for stylized facts conducted here as either a replacement for or an input to interindustry structural estimation depending on one s feeling about the long run potential of that research approach this study also departs from much of the cross section literature by being fundamentally concerned with the importance of various effects not just with coefficient signs and t statistics in particular this essay provides estimates of the relative importance of firm market and market share differences in the determination of business unit divisional profitability in u s manufacturing using 1975 data from the line of business program of the u s federal trade commission ftc i find support neither for the existence of firm effects nor for the importance of market share effects moreover while industry effects apparently exist and are important they appear to be negatively correlated with seller concentration in these data section i relates firm market and share effects to current issues and controversies in industrial economics and thus supplies the motivation for our empirical analysis the remainder of the essay treats the data and

the underpricing of private targets abstract we examine acquisitions of private firms with valuation histories and find a positive relation between acquirer announcement returns and target valuation revisions similar to other studies acquirer announcement returns are positive on average however positive acquirer announcement returns are mainly driven by targets that are acquired for more than their prior valuation this relation is consistent with pricing effects associated with target valuation uncertainty and behavioral biases in negotiation outcomes

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

privatization and efficiency differentiating ownership effects from political organizational and dynamic effects this paper argues that the private public ownership factor should be differentiated from other factors that also influence the effect of privatization on efficiency this is empirically confirmed in a longitudinal study of 24 spanish firms for which several political and organizational factors are found to influence the estimated effects of privatization on efficiency the analysis of the timing of the effects reveals a strong significance for post privatization years 5 6 negative and 7 8 positive this suggests that the negative effect of these factors is transitional being eventually offset by the positive effects of the change to private ownership 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification l33

does competition solve the hold up problem in an environment in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers undertake ex ante investments the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies namely hold up and coordination problems this paper shows using an explicitly non cooperative model that when matching is assortative and investments precede market competition buyers investments are constrained efficient while sellers marginally underinvest with respect to what would be constrained efficient however the overall extent of this inefficiency may be large multiple equilibria may arise one equilibrium is characterized by efficient matches but there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures

corporate philanthropy and stock price crash risk evidence from china how to mitigate stock price crash risk has become a focus in the theoretical and practical fields building on the work of kim et al j bank finance 43 1 13 2014b this paper investigates the relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk under the unique chinese institutional background the results show that both state ownership and the 2005 split share reform attenuate the mitigating effect of corporate philanthropy on crash risk specifically the negative relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk is less pronounced for state owned enterprises than for non state owned enterprises and it is also less pronounced after firms accomplish the split share reform further this effect is more pronounced for firms with greater financial risks and poorer performance our paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and the economic consequences of corporate philanthropy it also offers useful guidance to firms that are seeking to reduce stock price crash risk in emerging markets

diversification ricardian rents and tobin s q according to prevailing theory firms diversify in response to excess capacity of factors that are subject to market failure by probing into the heterogeneity of these factors we develop the corollary that firms that elect to diversify most widely should expect the lowest average rents an empirical test with tobin s q as the measure of rents is consistent with this theory

moral hazard and capital structure dynamics we base a contracting theory for a start up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort and renegotiable contracts two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed the entrepreneur must be given limited liability and the investor s earnings must not decrease in the realized profi to f thefirm all message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria and no third parties are considered within this class of contracts equilibria and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur s incentives to exert effort these contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation if the investor has the bargaining power the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort in the latter case a non debt simple contract achieves efficiency the non contractibility of effort does not lower welfare thus when the non contractibility of effort matters our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics an early use of debt claims followed by a switch to equity like claims

multinationality and performance among british manufacturing companies over the period 1972 84 profitability among 304 large british manufacturing companies was positively related to their degree of multinationality moreover increases in overseas production were strongly associated with increases in sales and profitability the profitability of multinational growth over the whole period was independent of its destination supporting the view that the primary source of the superior performance of multinationals was competitive advantage rather than the higher rate of profit in the industries of other countries

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

bringing the market inside the firm academics consultants and practitioners have long advocated bringing the market inside the firm for example in the 1950 s and 1960 s economists proposed that the transferpricing problem should be solved by charging market prices for internal transactions similarly in the 1980 s financial economists suggested that the capital allocation problem should be solved by charging the external cost of capital for internal investments and wave after wave of organizational restructuring has advocated radical decentralization empowerment intrapreneurship and the like in short making employees feel like owners proponents of making transactions within firms more market like often seem to ignore the factors that brought these transactions inside firms in the first place but bengt holmstrom and paul milgrom 1991 1994 holmstrom and jean tirole 1991 and holmstrom 1999 hereafter referred to collectively as hmt remind us that in some cases integration is efficient precisely because it eliminates market incentives in such cases bringing the market inside the firm would clearly be undesirable in this paper we show that bringing the market inside the firm is often not feasible even if it would be desirable more precisely if some aspects of the market transaction are noncontractible as we define below then it is impossible to replicate spot market payoffs inside a firm this result would be trivial if the firm s only instruments were court enforceable contracts it is impossible by definition for such contracts to replicate payoffs that were noncontractible in a spot market our contribution is to show that this result also applies to relational contracts i e self enforcing agreements in repeated games to establish this result we follow sanford grossman and oliver hart 1986 hart and john moore 1990 and hart 1995 hereafter referred to collectively as ghm in using asset ownership to determine whether a particular transaction is inside a firm and hmt in adding court enforceable contracts to asset ownership models we also draw on our own work baker et al 2001 to model relational contracts the resulting model is the first we know of that simultaneously analyzes asset ownership courtenforceable contracts and relational contracts

privatization financial development property rights and growth abstract this study analyzes how prevailing institutional arrangements i e property rights contracting rights political institutions and corporate governance practices affect privatized firms performance capital markets development and economic growth most of the studies surveyed show that privatization enhances privatized firms performance efficiency and profitability which percolates to economic growth privatized firms performed better in countries with better regulatory and legal frameworks partial privatization may be beneficial in countries with weak institutions namely the french civil law countries the stronger the economic and the governing institutions the easier it is for privatized firms to thrive and contribute to economic growth overall privatization allows firms to achieve improved efficiency while driving the development of the financial sector

mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration abstract we investigate a mixed market where a state owned welfare maximizing public firm competes against profit maximizing private firms we use a circular city model with quantity setting competition in contrast to a pure market case discussed by pal 1998a spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium all private firms locate at the same point and the public firm locates at the opposite side we also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner jel classification h42 l13 oligopole mixte et agglomeration spatiale les auteurs examinent un marche mixte ou une entreprise publique possedee par l etat et cherchant a maximiser le niveau de bien etre est en concurrence avec des entreprises privees qui cherchent a maximiser leurs profits on utilise un modele de cite circulaire ou la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantite produite en contraste avec le cas du marche parfait discute par pal 1998a l agglomeration spatiale des entreprises privees parait etre en equilibre toutes les entreprises privees se localisent au meme point et l entreprise publique se localise du cote oppose il appert que ce pattern d equilibre de localisation est un equilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privee ne peut etre controlee par le planificateur social