truthful bundle multiunit double auctions we address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers each buyer demands some bundle s of various commodities and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity to design truthful double auction mechanisms we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget to the best of our knowledge this padding method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy proof individually rational budget balanced and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment furthermore these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle single unit mechanisms with higher efficiency lower buying prices and higher selling prices

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

revealed social preferences of dutch political parties we measure the redistributive preferences of dutch political parties using unique detailed information from their election proposals by employing the inverse optimal tax method we calculate the political weights across the income distribution for each political party we find that all dutch political parties give a higher political weight to middle incomes than to the poor moreover the political weights of the rich are close to zero furthermore we detect a strong political status quo bias as the political weights of all political parties hardly deviate from the weights implied by the pre existing tax system we argue that political economy considerations are key in understanding these results

tax planning of married couples and intra household income inequality abstract this paper examines tax planning of married couples under separate taxation it shows that concerns about the intra household income distribution prevent couples from minimizing tax payments the empirical analysis exploits a specific feature of the german tax system which allows married couples to save taxes by deviating from the default symmetric payroll tax treatment and assigning favorable tax treatment to the primary earner and unfavorable tax treatment to the secondary earner based on a representative random sample of individual tax files we find that a couple is less likely to choose the tax minimizing treatment if tax planning is associated with a larger decline of the net of tax income of the secondary earner this applies regardless of whether the husband or the wife is the main earner however couples where the wife is the main earner are generally more reluctant to assign the more favorable tax treatment to the wife

individual versus joint taxation in models with household production in a recent paper piggott and whalley 1996 challenge the conventional wisdom that says that the individual rather than the household should be the unit of taxation and argue instead for joint taxation their point of departure is a point well taken the literature on which this wisdom is based in particular boskin and sheshinski 1983 ignores the existence of household production the general argument is a nice one in the theory of the second best in the absence of taxation of market wage income the marginal rates of technical substitution between primary and secondary labor in market and in household production would be equal to each other and the marginal rate of substitution between the market and household good would be equal to the marginal rate of transformation between them thus achieving pareto efficiency introduction of income taxation leads to a distortion of the relation between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation which is the focus of concern in the literature 2 and given the differing econo

pigou meets ramsey gender based taxation with non cooperative couples abstract this paper explores the implications of gender based income taxation in a non cooperative model of household behavior in a first step we show how gender based taxes can act as pigou taxes and correct the externality induced by a non cooperative household equilibrium we find that the first best pigou tax rules are solely determined by spouses relative marginal rates of substitution between the public household good and private consumption breaking down this general rule into the primitives of the model the spouse with a comparative advantage in home production should be taxed at a higher rate in a second step we embed our non cooperative framework in a standard second best planning problem in which taxes serve a revenue raising purpose in this case the optimal structure of differential taxation by gender is partly determined by a ramsey type inverse elasticity rule and partly by a pigouvian tax element we show that these two forces work in opposite directions in determining whether men or women should be taxed at a higher rate and that either one could be dominant depending on the revenue raising position of the government this result is robust to the introduction of two groups of households that differ in their mode of decision making which can be either cooperative or non cooperative

income taxation of couples spouses labor supplies and the gender wage gap abstract we study the taxation of couples when female wages do not reflect their true productivity we show that the expression for the marginal tax rates of the male spouses is the same as in a mirrleesian world where wages reflect true productivities marginal taxes for the female spouses are reduced because of a pigouvian correction consequently the wage discrimination pleads for a lower marginal tax on the female spouse furthermore the distortion of a couples tradeoff between male and female labor supply is the same as in a mirrleesian world without a gender wage gap it only depends on true productivities and not on wages in other words the tax system completely neutralizes the extra distortion introduced by the wedge between the female spouse s wage and her true productivity

the tax unit and household production under a progressive income tax conventional wisdom is that taxing individuals rather than households is preferred from an efficiency point of view the reason is that secondary workers whose labor supply elasticity is high will be taxed at a lower marginal rate than primary workers whose labor supply elasticity is low here we argue that once household production is taken into account things are more complicated since tax design should also not distort the input of family members time in household production factor input distortions as well as ramsey considerations thus need to enter the choice of the tax unit we provide a numerical example of an economy for which a move from an individual to a household basis in the income tax can be efficiency improving we then use a general equilibrium model parameterized using australian tax rates and data whose results clearly show that welfare gains can occur under changes from an individual to a household basis for an existing income tax our results th

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

optimal taxation of business and individual incomes abstract this paper applies the optimal taxation approach to two versions of fisher s consumption and investment model it then shows that eliminating the business or corporation income tax through full integration of this tax with the individual income tax is non optimal by both efficiency and equity standards in the case where business investment is financed completely by borrowing the business income tax should be assigned to the goal of raising revenue efficiently and the individual tax is associated only with the equity objective

the tax unit and household production comment in a recent paper published in this journal piggott and whalley 1996 challenge the conventional wisdom that taxing individuals rather than households is preferred from an efficiency point of view p 398 they argue that once household production is taken into account things are more complicated since tax design should also not distort the input of family members time in household production they support their view by providing computational results these results seem to demonstrate that welfare can indeed be enhanced if households are taxed as a unit and not as individuals this comment sets out to show however that their analysis contains some quite critical points in our opinion if piggott and whalley s approach is followed through to its end it only enforces the conventional view piggott and whalley work with an extended family labor supply model the extension concerns household production expressed by some function n there are two model variants with different degrees of complexity in the first variant a representative household is considered and producer prices are held constant the model serves to demonstrate piggott and whalley s basic line of argumentation within a simple framework the second variant extends the first one in several respects its functional specification is more complex and it is a general equilibrium model with two household types the model is parameterized using australian tax rates and data it is shown that aggregate welfare gains can occur under well designed income tax reforms the reforms are such that the individual tax base is replaced with a household tax base additionally average and marginal tax rates are proportionally adjusted to preserve revenue

for love or money the impact of income taxes on marriage higher sometimes lower than their combined single income tax obligations in this paper we explore the impact of the federal individual income tax as well as other economic and demograplhic variables on the marriage decisionis of individuals using longitudinal data from the panel study on income dynamics for the period 1968 92 we estimate a discrete time hazard model of the time to first marriage we find that the probability of marriage is significantly affected by a range of economic and demographic variables importantly we find that an increase in total income taxes paid by married versus single women has a negative effect on the likelihood of marriage and that the change in the marginal tax rate is also a significant determinant of marriage in some cases in contrast the tax effects are rarely significant in determining marriage probabilities among men although there are some differential responses by race in general the impacts of the income tax variables even when statistically significant are small

household bargaining and the design of couples income taxation this paper studies the design of couples income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses utilities bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple information structure and labor supply decisions follow the mirrleesian tradition however while the household s total consumption is publicly observable the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable with a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses marginal income tax rate includes a pigouvian paternalistic and an incentive term the pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy tax for the high weight low weight spouse whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low high the sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples in some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low weight spouse who may be female and a negative one for the high weight spouse possibly the male this is at odds with the traditional boskin and sheshinski results our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions finally we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model the calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower and possibly even negative marginal tax rate

optimal tax treatment of the family married couples abstract this paper examines the appropriate tax treatment of the family in a series of analytical models and numerical examples for a population of taxpaying couples which differ in earning capacity we drive the optimal tax rates for each potential earner these rates depend crucially upon own and cross labor supply elasticities and the joint distribution of wage rates our results suggest that the current system of income splitting in the united states under which husbands and wives face equal marginal tax rates is nonoptimal using results from recent econometric studies and allowing for a sensitivity analysis the optimal tax rates on secondary workers in the family are much lower than those on primary earners indeed our best estimate is that the secondary earner would face tax rates only one half as high as primary earners

a life cycle consistent empirical model of family labour supply using cross section data this paper estimates a utility maximising model of the joint determination of male and female labour supplies using a sample of married couples from the u k family expenditure survey the emphasis is on the estimation of within period preferences that are consistent with intertemporal two stage budgeting under uncertainty however the approach we adopt provides an alternative method of estimating certain aspects of life cycle behaviour to the fixed effects constant approach of heckman and macurdy 1980 macurdy 1981 and browning deaton and irish 1985 moreover it relaxes some of the underlying restrictions that are implicit in these constant models under uncertainty

on the taxation of trade within and between households abstract tax reform proposals affect individual welfares in ways which strongly depend on the nature of specialisation in household production and the pattern of trade within households variation in the degree of specialisation in domestic production across households strongly influences the impacts on individual tax burdens of a given tax reform the standard models of the economics literature cannot be used to analyse these issues because they ignore the two person nature of households and the existence of household production and trade this paper proposes a simple and tractable model to remedy this and uses it to analyse the impacts of the types of tax reform that have been the subject of recent policy debate

until taxes do us part tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision the tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the us france and germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus we study how they affect the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage proposal game at the end of the game they may get married live together without formal marriage or split up in this signaling game proposing or getting married is costly but can indicate strong love the striking property we obtain is that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married if the bonus is sufficiently large the signaling mechanism breaks down and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains similarly a marriage penalty may increase the marriage probability specifically the penalty may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission which was otherwise not possible our results also imply that marriage decisions in the laissez faire are not necessarily privately optimal in some cases a bonus or a penalty may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient it may increase the number of efficient marriages that otherwise may not be concluded

trade reduction vs multi stage a comparison of double auction design approaches with the growth of electronic markets designing double auction mechanisms that are applicable to emerging market structures has become an important research topic in this paper we investigate two truthful double auction design approaches the trade reduction approach and the multi stage design approach and compare their resulting mechanisms in various exchange environments we find that comparing with the trade reduction approach the multi stage design approach offers mechanisms applicable to more complicated exchange environments furthermore for the known trade reduction mechanisms we prove that the corresponding mechanisms under the multi stage design approach are superior in terms of both social efficiency and individual payoffs in each exchange environment of interest our computational tests show that the mechanisms under the multi stage design approach achieve very high efficiency in various scenarios

income splitting among the self employed under individual taxation with progressive marginal tax rates households in which the distribution of income is unequal benefit from attributing income to the lower income household member self employment provides greater potential to split income in this way because of the absence of a third party reporting income using the canadian experience as a case study this paper develops a unique estimator of the incidence of illegal income splitting among self employed couples the results suggest that the incidence of income splitting among self employed men in canada is non trivial but no evidence is found that self employed women attribute income to their spouses jel classification h26 h21 h31 j22 le fractionnement du revenu chez les travailleurs autonomes dans un regime fiscal qui a des taux marginaux d imposition progressive des revenus les membres d un menage dans lequel la repartition des revenus n est pas g rien n indique que les femmes qui sont travailleurs autonomes attribuent une portion de leurs revenus a leur epoux

flat income taxation redistribution and labour market performance a flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in european countries this article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment we do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the netherlands the model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked labour force participation skill formation wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details the simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment this finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way

the importance of ordering in sequential auctions to date the largest part of literature on multi unit auctions has assumed that there arek homogeneous objects being auctioned where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all ofk units these modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential the aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction we study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd price auctions two heterogeneous jobs and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints

family specific investments and divorce with dynamically inconsistent households marital contracts and policy abstract this paper bridges two distinct areas of inquiry the economic theory of the family and behavioral research on time inconsistent preferences motivated by anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting that present bias plays a role in intra household decision making we propose a model in which hyperbolic discounting couples engage in home production activities thereby accumulating family specific capital over time at any given point in time the gains to continued marriage depend on the accumulated stock of this capital and a temporary random shock to match quality couples whose match quality deteriorates may choose to divorce and this is more likely to happen if past investments in family specific capital have been low we obtain three main sets of results first present biased preferences induce couples to underinvest in family specific capital and to overdivorce second sophisticated couples but not naive ones may choose to enter marriage on terms which make divorce more costly to obtain third the inefficiencies in the behavior of time inconsistent couples can be completely undone by means of earnings and divorce taxes that vary over the marital life cycle

a dominant strategy double auction a double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed this mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer s bid double auction in addition the mechanism always produces full information first best prices the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism the mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

regional policy and company investment behaviour mcgreevy t e and thomson a w j 1983 regional policy and company investment behaviour reg studies 17 347 358 the paper looks at the effectiveness of regional financial assistance from the perspective of the companies receiving such assistance it notes that very little attention has been given to company behaviour and perception as opposed to macro economic analysis of regional policy the article is based on a survey of forty nine scottish manufacturing firms which had been offered regional selective assistance and sets out to examine 1 methods of investment analysis and the role of regional incentives in this process 2 to investigate what would have happened in the absence of such assistance and 3 to establish which type of financial incentive was most influential the results in the opinion of the authors do indicate that regional policy has a positive impact in providing investment and jobs in scotland which would not have otherwise occurred

the employment impacts of an investment incentive differential efficiency of the industrial revenue bond krmenec a j 1990 the employment impacts of an investment incentive differential efficiency of the industrial revenue bond reg studies 24 95 107 capital subsidy programmes like the industrial revenue bond irb are presumed to be employment generators theoretically there is no reason to expect this demand for labour should increase only if the output effect of the subsidy outweighs the substitution effect evidence generated from a municipal user survey across northeastern illinois indicates that the irb is a weak employment generator rather the irb appears to act more as an employment stabilizer irb recipient firms exhibited less annual variation in employment change than nonrecipient firms estimated cross elasticities of the demand for labour do not exhibit significant variation sectorally or geographically programme targeting therefore may not substantially improve the effectiveness of this economic development instrument krmenec a j 1990 les effets d emploi d une incitation a

taxation and the earnings of husbands and wives evidence from sweden i examine the response of husbands and wives earnings to a tax reform in which husbands and wives tax rates changed independently allowing me to examine the effect of both spouses incentives on each spouse s behavior i analyze the large swedish tax reform of 1990 1991 and find that in response to a compensated fall in one spouse s tax rate each spouse s earnings rise i compare these results to those of simplified econometric models used in the typical setting in which independent variation in each spouse s tax rate is unavailable i find that standard econometric specifications may produce substantially biased estimates

the optimal income taxation of couples this paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples a multidimensional screening problem each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market but makes an hours of work choice and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work if second earner participation is a signal of the couple being better worse off we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax subsidy on secondary earnings and that the tax subsidy on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically we present calibrated microsimulations for the united kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs

the responses of youth to a cash transfer conditional on schooling a quasi experimental study summary we estimate the effect of cash transfers given to youth conditional on high school attendance on the labor supply decisions and academic performance of youth we exploit differences in the size of the total transfer received based on timing of birth to identify the causal effects of interest specifically individuals born late in a quarter receive a larger total transfer than comparable individuals born early in the following quarter we find that the transfer increases the labor market participation of youth and the number of months worked the estimated effect is larger for individuals from low income families the results suggest that some youths are borrowing constrained since we find no evidence of corresponding effects on academic performance alleviating the constraint appears only to affect consumption decisions and not human capital investment copyright 2011 john wiley sons ltd the provision of cash transfers to parents children and youth is an integral part of public policy in many organisation for economic co operation and development oecd countries however it is an open question whether cash transfers given to families is an effective way of increasing equality of opportunity as is the goal in this paper we investigate the relationship between adolescent outcomes and a publicly provided cash transfer to youth given conditional on high school attendance our contribution is twofold first we provide evidence on the effect of giving cash transfers to youth in a setting characterized by a high general transfer level and free access to education second using large administrative datasets covering the entire danish population combined with a quasi experimental setup we are able to identify the causal relation between cash transfers and adolescent behavior and outcomes

taxes and time allocation evidence from single women and men the classic model of becker 1965 suggests that labor supply decisions should be analyzed within the broader context of time allocation and market good consumption choices but most empirical work on policy has focused exclusively on measuring impacts on market work this paper examines how income taxes affect time allocation during the entire day and how these time allocation decisions interact with expenditure patterns using the panel study of income dynamics from 1975 to 2004 we analyze the response of single women s housework labor supply and other time to variation in tax and transfer schedules across income levels number of children states and time we find that when the economic reward to participating in the labor force increases market work increases and housework decreases with the decrease in housework accounting for approximately two thirds of the increase in market work analysis of repeated cross sections of time diary data from 1975 to 2004 shows that home production decreases substantially when market hours of work increase in response to policy changes data on expenditures from the consumer expenditure survey from 1980 to 2003 show some evidence that expenditures on market goods likely to substitute for housework increase in response to a greater incentive to join the labor force the baseline estimates imply that the elasticity of substitution between consumption of home and market goods is 2 61 the results are consistent with the becker model meanwhile single men show little response to changes in tax policy and we are able to rule out an elasticity of substitution between home and market goods for this group of more than 1 52

taxing women a macroeconomic analysis based on well known evidence on labor supply elasticities several authors have concluded that women should be taxed at lower rates than men we evaluate the quantitative implications and merits of this proposition relative to the current system of taxation setting a proportional tax rate on married females equal to 4 8 increases output and married female labor force participation by about 3 9 3 4 and 6 9 4 0 respectively gender based taxes improve welfare and are preferred by a majority of households nevertheless welfare gains are higher when the u s tax system is replaced by a proportional gender neutral income tax 2011 published by elsevier b v

assessing the employment effectiveness of small business financing schemes some evidence from israel this paper presents an empirical assessment of the employment effects of two assistance schemes aimed at improving the accessibility of small businesses to capital the first scheme is a revolving loan fund operating in two small towns the second is a capital grant scheme aimed at promoting industrial activity in rural areas empirical data relating to the period 1986 89 is analysed for both schemes

the impact of real rents and wages on household formation although the economic literature has analyzed some components of the headship decision study of household formation has been primarily in the realm of demography the authors expand the demographic model to include economic determinants of the decision to remain with parents or not and to live with a group or separately they focus on measuring the effect of spatial variations in rental costs on the probability of forming a household the authors results based on a sample of 2 573 youths in their twenties indicate that the cost of housing and potential labor earnings are important variables in explaining this probability copyright 1993 by mit press

modularity and greed in double auctions abstract designing double auctions is a complex problem especially when there are restrictions on the sets of buyers and sellers that may trade with one another the goal of this paper is to develop a modular approach to the design of double auctions by relating it to the exhaustively studied problem of designing one sided mechanisms with a single seller or alternatively a single buyer we consider several desirable properties of a double auction feasibility dominant strategy incentive compatibility the still stronger incentive constraints offered by a deferred acceptance implementation exact and approximate welfare maximization and budget balance for each of these properties we identify sufficient conditions on two one sided algorithms one for ranking the buyers one for ranking the sellers and on a method for their composition into trading pairs which guarantee the desired property of the double auction our framework also offers new insights into classic double auction designs such as the vcg and mcafee auctions with unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers

on the optimal rate structure of an individual income tax what is the optimal rate structure of a personal income tax in the literature on optimal taxation this important question has been approached by introducing a linear income tax formula into a revised ramseyian model which takes into account both efficiency and equity objectives of taxation the assumption of a linear tax enables us to examine the degree of tax progression through the behavior of the average rate but it does not throw light on how the marginal rate should vary with income 1 lecture 13 a classic paper by mirrlees 7 which was later expounded on by atkinson and stiglitz 1 412 22 solves this problem by explicitly considering a general income tax schedule however both linear and general tax formulae provide little guide for policy making since in practice the tax rates are graduated by a bracket system that is the income scale is divided into segments or brackets and rates are applied only to the income in each bracket rates increase or decrease by small percentage points from one bracket to the next in order to avoid large and abrupt changes in tax burden as income rises the present paper attempts to demonstrate how we can easily transform a segment graduated tax system into a multiple linear system and then incorporate it into the standard optimum taxation model we then proceed to derive the conditions governing the optimal value of an upper or lower limit of a tax bracket and the marginal tax rate applied to the bracket combining these conditions together will enable us to infer what the optimal rate structure should be

truthful double auction mechanisms following the multistage design approach we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms the bc lp mechanism and the mbc mechanism for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers in this market each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity furthermore various transaction related costs will be incurred when a buyer trades with a seller we prove that under both mechanisms truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all buyers and sellers when the buyers bundle information and the transaction cost information are common knowledge the bc lp mechanism can be implemented by just solving two linear programs whereas the mbc mechanism has a higher complexity the empirical study shows that the mbc mechanism achieves higher efficiency over the bc lp mechanism and that both outperform the ksm tr mechanism the only known truthful mechanism for a more restrictive exchange market

the effects of joint taxation of married couples on labor supply and non wage income abstract the united states changed its tax treatment of married couples in 1948 from a system in which each spouse paid taxes on his or her own income to a system in which a married couple is taxed as a unit the switch from separate to joint taxation changed incentives for labor supply and asset ownership this paper investigates the effects of the conversion to joint taxation taking advantage of a natural experiment created by cross state variation in property laws married individuals in states with community property laws had always been taxed as if each spouse had earned half of the couple s income and thus were unaffected by the 1948 legal change comparing the behavior of highly educated taxpayers in affected and unaffected states indicates that the tax change is associated with a decline of approximately 2 percentage points in the employment rate of married women consistent with the higher first dollar tax rates they faced after 1948 women married to self employed men were also less likely to have non wage income after 1948 reflecting pre 1948 allocation of family assets to wives for tax purposes the effects of joint taxation on married men s labor force participation and non wage income holding are generally not statistically significant

adjustment costs firm responses and micro vs macro labor supply elasticities evidence from danish tax records we show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms we develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs we present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using danish tax records first larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities second kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities third the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods

partial tax reform an optimal taxation perspective this paper presents a framework for evaluating partial tax reform proposals based on the theory of optimal taxation which is complementary to an analysis based on the theory of equitable taxation developed by walter hettich in this journal the analysis focuses on the fundamentally different perspectives on tax reform of the two schools of thought never theless the two approaches are complementary in that first they require decision makers to state explicitly their views on horizontal and vertical equity and second they then provide a systematic means of evaluating partial tax reforms based on those criteria

why governments should invest more to educate girls abstract women and men often receive the same percentage increase in their wage rates with advances in schooling because these returns decline with more schooling the marginal returns for women will tend to exceed those for men especially in countries where women are much less educated the health and schooling of children are more closely related to their mother s education than father s more educated women work more hours in the market labor force broadening the tax base and thereby potentially reducing tax distortions these three conditions it is argued justify the disproportionate allocation of public expenditures toward women s education

optimal tax and transfer programs for couples with extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes the optimal design of general nonlinear tax transfer schedules for couples under unitary and collective approaches to family decision making we consider a double extensive model of labor supply where each spouse makes a labor force participation choice for given hours of work we present simple and intuitive optimal tax rules that generalize existing findings on the optimal taxation of single person households with extensive responses saez 2002 to the case of two person households with double extensive responses without income effects on labor supply optimal tax rules as a function of sufficient statistics are the same under the unitary and collective approaches with income effects on labor supply optimal tax rules under the two approaches continue to depend on the same sufficient statistics but the collective model features an additional pigouvian term arising from a within family participation externality finally we present microsimulations of tax reform for 15 european countries suggesting that a reduction of tax rates on secondary earners relative to primary earners is associated with strong welfare gains in all countries

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

combinatorial auction design combinatorial auctions have two features that greatly affect their design computational complexity of winner determination and opportunities for cooperation among competitors dealing with these forces trade offs between desirable auction properties such as allocative efficiency revenue maximization low transaction costs fairness failure freeness and scalability computational complexity can be dealt with algorithmically by relegating the computational burden to bidders by maintaining fairness in the face of computational limitations by limiting biddable combinations and by limiting the use of combinatorial bids combinatorial auction designs include single round first price sealed bidding vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanisms uniform and market clearing price auctions and iterative combinatorial auctions combinatorial auction designs must deal with exposure problems threshold problems ways to keep the bidding moving at a reasonable pace avoiding and resolving ties and controlling complexity

a smart market for industrial procurement with capacity constraints we address the problem of designing multi item procurement auctions for a monopsonistic buyer in capacity constrained environments using insights from classical auction theory we construct an optimization based auction mechanism smart market relying on the dynamic resolution of a linear program minimizing the buyer s cost under the suppliers capacity constraints suppliers can modify their offers in response to the optimal allocation corresponding to each set of bids giving rise to a dynamic competitive bidding process to assist suppliers we also develop a bidding suggestion device based on a myopic best response mbr calculation that solves an associated optimization problem assuming linear costs for the suppliers we study within a game theoretic framework the sequence of bids arising in this smart market under a weak behavioral assumption and some symmetry requirements an explicit upper bound for the winning bids is established we then formulate a complete behavioral model and solution methodology based on the mbr rationale and show that the bounds derived earlier continue to hold we analytically derive some structural and convergence properties of the mbr dynamics in the simplest nontrivial market environment which suggests further possible design improvements and investigate bidding dynamics and incentive compatibility issues via numerical simulations

entrepreneurship and growth creative and equilibrating events this paper investigates the constraints on the growth of creative and equilibrating entrepreneurial events the empirical material is drawn from the greek economy it was observed that the two different levels of entrepreneurial events involve constraints of different kinds this paper analyses those constraints and their significance for entrepreneurial growth

agent competition double auction mechanism this paper proposes an agent competition double auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer to customer marketplaces under the proposed double auction mechanism bidding one s true valuation private information is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions the proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency furthermore these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities

reply to apps rees and gottried richter in our earlier paper in this journal 1996 we argued that in a model with both market and household production each of which has two factor inputs primary and secondary worker labor individualbased taxation will distort the factor input ratio whereas household or joint taxation which has similar tax rates for the two workers will not there is an added distortion of household production under individual taxation that does not appear in a model with only consumption of goods and leisure and in which ramsey labor supply elasticity considerations point toward individual taxation we used 1974 australian data to analyze a possible move from an existing individual based income tax to an alternative household based tax a move from a status quo separate tax regime to joint taxation we suggested that the added distortion of household production under individual taxation made such a move more likely to be welfareimproving we considered pairwise comparisons of model solutions under prevailing nonoptimal individual tax rates and common household member rates calculated in various ways our results showed that if the dispersion in individual tax rates is large enough the tax induced distortion of household production can be the dominant consideration in the comparison we neither computed nor characterized optimal tax rate configurations in this application the lessons from optimal tax design seemed uninteresting and rather trivial a de novo design of an optimal tax structure across household members would almost certainly