how to value employee stock options one of the arguments often used against expensing employee stock options is that calculating their fair value at the time they are granted is very difficult this article presents an approach to calculating the value of employee stock options that is practical easy to implement and theoretically sound it explicitly considers the vesting period the possibility that employees will leave the company during the life of the option the inability of employees to trade their options and the relevant dilution issues this approach is an enhancement of the approach suggested by the financial accounting standards board s statement of financial accounting standards no 123 because it does not require an arbitrary reduction in the life of the option to allow for early exercise caused by the inability of employees to trade their options

antebellum tariff politics regional coalitions and shifting economic interests abstract throughout u s history import tariffs have been put on a sustained downward path in only two instances from the early 1830s until the civil war and from the mid 1930s to the present this paper analyzes the political economy of tariff reductions in the antebellum period tariff politics was highly sectional the north supported high tariffs the south favored low tariffs and the west was a swing region in the 1820s a coalition between the north and west raised tariffs by exchanging votes on import duties for spending on internal improvements president andrew jackson delinked these issues by vetoing several internal improvements bills the nullification crisis led to the compromise tariff of 1833 which phased out tariffs above 20 percent over a 9 year period by this time transportation improvements gave the west access to foreign markets giving the region a stake with the south in maintaining a low tariff equilibrium thus the west s changing position on trade policy helps explain the

valuing employee stock options does the model matter in this numerical analysis of models for valuing employee stock options the focus is on the impact of a model on the resulting option prices and the sensitivity of pricing differences between models with respect to changes in the parameters for most models the price reduction relative to standard options is uniquely determined by the expected life of the option in fact with the exception of the financial accounting standards board 123 model pricing differences are negligible if the models are calibrated to the same expected life of the option consequently the application of models with several hard to estimate parameters such as the utility maximizing model can be greatly simplified by calibration because expected life is easier to estimate than utility parameters

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform comprehensive reforms often fail despite being beneficial to society politicians may block comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions in which they benefit from a piecemeal reform at the expense of others because formal commitment devices for vote trading are frequently missing trust and reciprocity among legislators can play an important role for vote trading we investigate in a laboratory experiment whether legislators will impede comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions even if formal commitment devices for vote trading after reform failure are missing we find that open ballots allow for vote trading without commitment based on trust and reciprocity in turn legislators frequently reject efficient comprehensive reforms in such institutions

the effects of logrolling on congressional voting the theoretical public choice literature suggests that vote trading is an important determinant of congressional voting behavior yet empirical voting models do not allow for vote trading these models recognize that observed ideology may influence legislative behavior but do not correct for unobserved ideology this study devises new tests for logrolling and ideology the empirical model controls for logroll agreements and unobserved ideological interest via the correlation of unobserved variables the results reflect the presence of vote trading coalitions on some votes but not on others the results cast doubt on the importance of personal ideological interests of legislators copyright 1992 by american economic association

instability of collective decisions testing for cyclical majorities the issues of cyclical majorities and instability of collective choices have been in the fore front in the discussion of social choice mechanisms cycling lack of equilibria and so called chaos theorems have been prevalent in the public choice literature whether cycling actually occurs in processes that are decided by majority rule has been a long standing question however cycling has not been made quantifiable nor has it been clear how one would determine empirically whether majorities are cyclical in this paper cycling has been given an empirical meaning this paper provides a method to test for cyclical majorities and applies it to decisions made in the us congress the test results indicate stability and the presence of persistent winners and losers in congress

lobbying and agricultural trade policy in the united states the authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the united states in the manner suggested by the political economy model of grossman and helpman 1994 this is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data the authors test the model using a detailed cross sectional data set of agricultural protection subsidies and political action committee pac contributions in the late 1990s the model is qualitatively affirmed by the data they make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model s quantitative implications also found in recent studies this solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government the results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge

valuing executive stock options with endogenous departure abstract executive stock options differ from exchange traded options because of vesting and portability restrictions executive departure from the firm forces early exercise reducing the value of executive options current methodology calculates the option value by multiplying the black scholes option price by the departure probability this ignores the possibility that executive departure is less likely when stock price is high and thus is correlated with the stock price we show that this correlation implies a substantial increase in option values a similar situation occurs in performance based option packages where the actual number of options granted depends on stock performance

congressional voting on term limits between 1990 and 1995 twenty three states unilaterally imposedterm limits on their own delegations tocongress in 1995 the house ofrepresentatives defeated a constitutionalamendment that would have limited the termsfor all of congress only weeks later thesupreme court struck down the individualstate laws in 1997 the house againbrought the issue to a vote which alsofailed this paper models congressionalvoting on term limits with a simple gamewithin an interest group theory withlegislators as imperfect agents ofconstituents the game foremost predictsthat members from term limited states wouldbe more likely to support term limits inthe first vote but no more likely on thesecond vote the empirical section employsprobit multinomial logit and orderedprobit maximum likelihood estimations toconfirm the stated hypotheses among otherresults in particular both the joint andconditional probability of a yea on thefirst vote and a subsequent nay on thesecond vote is higher for members fromstates that had unilaterally self imposedterm limits the results are robust tomodel specification estimator andalternative sampling implications areproposed in the concluding comments

term limits causes and consequences this paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation particularly on congress i first consider theories that aroseto explain among related issues why individual states mightunilaterally self impose term limits on their own delegationsto congress next i consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure first supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government highspending second higher tenure creates inefficient anti competitive conditions in the legislative election market term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure these claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature based on theliterature reviewed this paper finds that while term limitswill reduce average tenure there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies further research on a more general reform which would strike deeper at these underlying causes isimplied

taxes torts and the toxics release inventory congressional voting on instruments to control pollution i introduction governments can choose from a wide variety of policy instruments to control pollution including tax and subsidy schemes marketable permits information provision programs liability systems with well defined property rights and command and control selection of emission standards or technologies economists throughout the 1980s devoted significant effort to modeling the relative merits of these instruments the question of why politicians would prefer one manner of controlling pollution over another also attracted attention starting with buchanan and tullock s 1975 positive theory of externality control in which polluters find direct regulatory controls on emissions more profitable than pollution taxes theories of instrument selection have been developed in which politicians choose policies based on the relative costs and benefits to shareholders workers and environmentalists are affected by the constraints imposed by political institutions and are driven to select the most efficient policy instrument to achieve a given level of redistribution 1 to date however there have been few empirical tests of what drives instrument selection in environmental policy there is a large empirical literature devoted to explaining the level of support for environmental programs in congress most articles focus on the degree to which a legislator s stand on a given environmental bill can be explained by narrow district interests generally the material interests of constituents or by ideology either constituents or the member s own policy preferences studies of voting on environmental legislation by ackerman and hassler 1981 crandall 1983 pashigian 1985 and yandle 1989 offer evidence that legislators actions are in part explained by the district or state level impacts of proposed legislation on their constituents kalt and zupan 1984 find that after controlling for constituents material self interest in proposed strip mining legislation the ideology of constituents and the personal ideologies of their representatives influence voting on this aspect of environmental preservation as grier 1993 demonstrates debate over the general role of the legislator s specific ideology in voting continues in studying votes in the house and senate on the proposed size of the superfund during debate over the program s renewal hird 1993 concludes that congressional voting on superfund is found to represent legislator s environmental and liberal ideologies as much as if not more than narrowly defined self interest he links the importance of ideology to voting on superfund in part to the bill s symbolic environmental appeal in environmental legislation the final impact of a bill on industry and the environment often depends on issues resolved through technical amendments downs s theory of rational ignorance and arnold s theory of the degree to which constituents will link congressional actions with real world outcomes predict that members of congress may be less constrained by general constituent interests on amendment votes since these votes are less likely to be covered in the media than are final legislative votes as denzau and munger 1986 and grier and munger 1991 note groups with specific interests such as affected industries may find it less costly to persuade a member of congress to vote their way on a measure if the representative s constituents are supportive of or indifferent to the measure in the case of technical amendments affected parties may be more influential than on highly visible votes because the lack of media coverage translates into a lower probability that the vote will become a major campaign issue in future elections this implies that voting on the instruments to control pollution will be driven in part by the specific district level costs and benefits of these measures while voting on the final passage of a bill will be more driven by general constituent interests

non marketability and the value of employee stock options abstract we adapt the benninga et al 2005 framework to value employee stock options esos the model quantifies non diversification effects is computationally simple and provides an endogenous explanation of eso early exercise using a proprietary dataset of eso exercise events we measure the non marketability eso discount we find that the eso value on the grant date is approximately 45 of a similar plain vanilla black scholes value the model is aligned with empirical findings of esos gives an exercise boundary of esos and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share based employee and executive compensation using the model we give a numerical measure of non diversification in an imperfect market

nontraded asset valuation with portfolio constraints a binomial approach we provide a simple binomial framework to value american style derivatives subject to trading restrictions the optimal investment of liquid wealth is solved simultaneously with the early exercise decision of the nontraded derivative noshort sales constraints on the underlying asset manifest themselves in the form of an implicit dividend yield in the risk neutralized process for the underlying asset one consequence is that american call options may be optimally exercised prior to maturity even when the underlying asset pays no dividends applications to executive stock options eso are presented it is shown that the value of an eso could be substantially lower than that computed using the black scholes model we also analyze nontraded payoffs based on a price that is imperfectly correlated with the price of a traded asset the economics of asset pricing when one or more of the assets in the opportunity set are either subject to trading restrictions or entirely nontraded is a matter of great interest viewed from a practical perspective we have several important examples of such assets that are subject to trading restrictions pensions which represent perhaps the most significant of assets held by individual households are subject to trading restrictions it is typically the case that assets in pensions are not available for immediate consumption borrowing against pension assets is subject to significant direct and indirect costs by way of taxes and early withdrawal penalties human capital is another example housing investment is also illiquid and subject to significant transaction costs together pensions human capital and housing constitute a substantial part of a typical household s assets the significance of such nontraded assets for risk premia has already been noted by bewley 1982 there are other circumstances where lack of unrestricted trading plays an important role executive compensation plans usually take the this article was presented at boston university we would like to thank the editor bernard dumas and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments we also thank nalin kulatilaka and seminar participants for useful suggestions ganlin chang fei guan and carlton osakwe provided valuable research assistance j detemple acknowledges support from the social sciences and humanities research

what do campaign contributions buy deciphering causal effects of money and votes in the 1987 1988 election cycle political action committees pacs spent 176 6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the house of representatives what do pacs buy when contributing this money if campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor s income campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor s preferred candidate is elected and the likelihood that if elected the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor most studies do not find that incumbents expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive 11 14 15 17 29 the evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis for example kau rubin and keenan 17 find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen 5 9 12 31 the lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for better models to explain campaign contributions 5 however the theoretical developments of for example ben zion and eyton 4 bental and ben zion 3 and baron 2 have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions in this study i plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes of all the reported empirical studies on this issue only chappell 5 uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used the best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

retrospectives cost benefit analysis and the classical creed cost bene t analysis provides the dominant economic approach with whicheconomists talk to each other to government bureaucrats and to the general laityabout the desirability of public programs and investment projects cost bene tstudies have pushed economic thinking into public debates and reciprocally havebrought an uncommon level of public scrutiny to the technical deliberations ofeconomists precisely because cost bene t analysis addresses serious real world decisions this widely used and frequently abused tool of applied economics has had a bumpyhistory last year newspaper headlines across the country announced that apentagon investigation had found systematic manipulation of net bene t estimatesat the army corps of engineers for example grunwald 2000 the corps hasbeen the political godfather of cost bene t analysis in the united states but ithas also long been suspected of an institutional bias in favor of projects that canadd signi cantly to its own budget allocations re ecting on the early record of

autocorrelation structure of forecast errors from time series models alternative assessments of the causes of post earnings announcement drift abstract this paper demonstrates that the evidence supporting the hypothesis that post earnings announcement drift pead is caused by investors failure to incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings is also consistent with researchers over differencing an already stationary time series specifically we show the evidence is driven by a subset of firms where over differencing of quarterly earnings in estimating earnings surprises is most likely to have occurred given the persistence of the pead over time our alternative explanation suggests that the prior research investigating the causes for the pead overestimates investors naivete

the exercise and valuation of executive stock options abstract in theory hedging restrictions faced by managers make executive stock options more difficult to value than ordinary options because they imply that exercise policies of managers depend on their preferences and endowments using data on option exercises from 40 firms this paper shows that a simple extension of the ordinary american option model which introduces random exogenous exercise and forfeiture predicts actual exercise times and payoffs just as well as an elaborate utility maximizing model that explicitly accounts for the nontransferability of options the simpler model could therefore be more useful than the preference based model for valuing executive options in practice

the cotton influence index an examination of u s cotton subsidies given the lack of a bill or amendment specific to cotton we introduce a cotton influence index to capture legislators influence in championing the cause of the cotton growers during the hearings of the farm security and rural investment act of 2002 regression analyses reveal a relationship between cotton influence index and campaign contributions cotton farmland party affiliation and ideology tobit analysis indicates a significant relationship between different actions and participations by representatives to advance the interest of cotton that is components of this index and their future cotton political action committees pacs contributions to them copyright 2006 oxford university press

does stock return predictability affect eso fair value abstract executive stock options esos are modified american options that cannot be valued using standard methods with a few exceptions the literature has discussed the eso fair value by assuming unpredictable stock returns which are not supported by the available empirical evidence in this paper we obtain the fair value of american esos when stock returns are predictable and specifically driven by the trending ornstein uhlenbeck process of lo and wang 1995 we solve the executive s portfolio allocation problem for a simple buy and hold strategy when his wealth can be distributed between a risk free asset and a market portfolio this problem is jointly solved with the executive s optimal exercise policy we find that executives tend to wait longer the higher the predictability independently of the composition of executive s asset menu we have also analyzed the implications under the fas123r proposals for the eso fair value and found that even for low autocorrelations there is a meaningful mispricing when unpredictable returns are erroneously assumed

the relationship between congressional spending and tenure with an application to term limits whether term limits would increase or decrease federal spending depends on the reason for the causal relationship between tenure and spending we investigate this subject by empirically studying congressional spending and tenure for all united states house and senate members who entered congress between the 94th and 102nd congresses 1975 1992 as our measure of congressional spending we use the national taxpayers union s congressional spending scores our study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists between congressional spending and tenure for some groups of congressmen we then test three hypotheses relating tenure and spending no single hypothesis is consistent with all of our empirical results nevertheless the small sizes of the empirical effects estimated in this study suggest that term limits would have an inconsequential impact on the level of federal spending at least via the moral hazard mechanisms described in this paper

optimal exercise prices for executive stock options although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant date market price in practice virtually all options are granted at the money we offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle by showing that pay to performance incentives for risk averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at or near the grant date market price we provide an operationally useful alternative to black scholes 1973 for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options our framework has implications not only for exercise price policies but also for indexed options option repricings exchanges of cash for stock based compensation and the design of bonus plans

pricing executive stock options under employment shocks abstract we obtain explicit expressions for the subjective objective and market value of perpetual executive stock options esos under exogenous employment shocks driven by an independent poisson process previously we obtain the executive s optimal exercise policy from the subjective valuation that is necessary for the objective one or fair value the perpetual eso is compared with the true finite maturity eso finding that the approximation is reasonably good to illustrate the usefulness of the objective valuation for accounting purposes we analyze the statistical distribution of the fair value when there is uncertainty about the employment shock intensity finally the role of esos in the design of executives incentives is also discussed

logrolling in the u s congress i introduction a long standing question in political science is whether exchange occurs in legislatures as it is expected in any economy where the intensity of demand varies the issue was originally raised by buchanan and tullock 1962 and expanded by coleman 1966 and mueller 1967 the subsequent literature has produced numerous models of vote trading haefele 1971 riker and brams 1973 koford 1982a much of the work suggests that vote trading leads to chaotic results see for example riker and brams 1973 kramer 1977 and mckelvey 1976 currently vote trading s quantitative importance and optimality are unknown references to logrolling go back to the early literature in political science bentley 1907 refers to it and since then scholars such as mayhew 1966 and ferejohn 1974 have provided primarily anecdotal evidence for logrolling the economic analysis of logrolling has mostly been theoretical and little work has been done to assess the qualitative and quantitative importance of vote trading in legislatures however much might be learned from such analysis given the apparent puzzle that for most roll calls votes on parts of bills only a minority of districts stand to gain yet such proposals get passed until recently vote trading has not been identified empirically stratmann 1992 is the only paper that identifies vote trades statistically and it looks only at vote trades among agricultural interests however it would be interesting to know whether logrolling is prevalent in circumstances other than farm commodity programs we need to identify logrolling coalitions to assess how widespread logrolling agreements are we expect them to be common if the intensity of demand for legislation varies related to the issue of vote trading is the question of what factors determine congressional voting behavior major elements in a legislator s voting decision are constituency interests ideology party and perhaps vote trading one segment of the literature on congressional voting has focused on the role of political parties as an important force determining a legislator s voting decision some authors have argued that parties provide an organizational framework within which logrolling will happen see for example fiorina 1974 koford 1987 weingast and marshall 1988 johnson and stratmann 1992 alternatively lindsay and maloney 1988 suggest that party discipline forces a legislator to vote for or against a piece of legislation the latter view implies that on some issues party affiliation forces the legislator to vote against constituency interests 1 whether party affiliation is a signal to constituencies of one s overall propensity to vote on bills or a means to build coalitions or whether both elements are important is an unresolved question voting along party lines can be due to party loyalty or party pressure promoting the interests of one s constituency or logrolling within the party to answer questions about voting along party lines and about vote trading and coalitions within a quantitative framework one has to distinguish empirically between party loyalty and logrolling coalitions that are organized within a party empirical studies have typically included a party dummy variable in regression equations however if logrolling coalitions are organized within a party such a dummy variable will measure both potential party loyalty or potential party discipline and membership in a logrolling coalition this paper uses a different approach to separate the logrolling variable from the party loyalty variable and so distinguishes between voting for a proposal because of membership in a log rolling coalition organized by a party and because of potential party discipline this paper analyzes a broad range of votes where logrolling has been reported the analysis spans two congresses 1959 to 1962 and examines trades between interests favoring subsidies for city interests labor interests and farm interests

the political economy of the fair labor standards act of 1938 this paper examines the congressional passage of the american minimum wage law the fair labor standards act of 1938 voting on the act is modeled as a function of the concentration of the constituencies for minimum wage legislation north south differentials and legislator ideology it is shown that the house radically altered the final content of the bill abandoning a proposed wages and hours board with discretionary powers to determine minimum wages in favor of a flat rate following the objections of several interest groups north south divisions over the bill had little influence over congressional voting and the influence of constituent groups increased relative to legislators ideology as the bill became an important election issue

logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism theory and evidence from china this paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of logrolling between interest groups on social welfare in a non democratic political system in particular we focus on china where bureaucratic interest groups are separate vertical organizations reaching down from beijing to the provinces and cities the key question in this paper is what are the effects of the logrolling of parochial interest groups on state policies and social welfare in autocracies we address this question both theoretically and empirically the theory predicts a specific distortion in resource allocation because of logrolling while the empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction we find policy outcomes under logrolling are characterized by excessive spending on all the interest groups preferred goods and insufficient spending on public goods we test the existence of logrolling between the ministry of civil affairs and ministry of health in china our result shows logrolling between the two ministries lead to inefficiencies in social security and health care policies

imperfect information and the meltzer richard hypothesis standard majority voting models predict that redistribution is positively linked to the mean to median income ratio but empirical evidence is mixed this paper shows that the different empirical reactions to rising mean to median income ratios can be rationalized in a simple romer roberts meltzer richard framework with imperfect information in such a model it is important to consider the source of rising mean to median ratios income growth of the poor can lead to less redistribution as more agents perceive themselves to be rich which tends to reduce the support for redistribution an empirical application reveals that the model can explain a substantial part of the first reagan tax cut

american garch employee stock option valuation abstract we implement a flexible simulation based approach for the fair value of employee stock option eso that accounts for the vesting period departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise we introduce garch effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case we also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several eso characteristics we compare this valuation with fas 123 method revealing a fas overvaluation finally we value a real eso plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated eso prices

legislative voting and the economic theory of politics empirical studies of legislative voting have multiplied since the mid 1970s early work 13 distinguished two modes of representation delegates who vote as voters want and trustees who use their own judgment more recently researchers have considered only delegates claiming that legislators who use their own ideology are shirking following principal agent theory representatives are conceived as conduits through which citizens transmit and express interests empirical work on this question however has found that the legislator s ideology explains more variation in vote choices than is explained by measures of constituent interest the seeming contradiction has led some 9 10 17 to reject the economic theory of legislator behavior as erroneous the truth is that no such theory has ever been fairly stated much less tested estimating equations have been ad hoc and the usual approach to measuring ideology has imposed correlation between the equation error and an explanatory variable 8 in both cases the result is

employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis this paper describes the exercise behavior of over 50 000 employees who hold longterm options on employer stock at eight corporations employees typically exercise options years before expiration commonly sacrificing half of the black scholes value exercise is strongly associated with recent stock price movements the market to strike ratio proximity to vesting dates time to maturity volatility and the employee s level within the company these findings have implications for compensation planners the fasb as it develops a new accounting standard for options and financial statement users and preparers who apply and interpret the new fasb standard

agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions we study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals we show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs jel c92 d71 d72

what should government do problems of social cost externalities and all that public choice as a field introduced the framework for a methodical economic analysis of political markets the output of these markets of course is reflected by the role that government plays that is specifically true with respect to the organization of economic activity gordon tullock has studied a myriad of aspects of this topic for more than half a century we examine his answers to the question of what should government do and how they have influenced and are still impacting the discussion on the proper role of government in the economy

free trade fair trade strategic trade and protectionism in the u s congress 1987 88 what conditions led the one hundredth congress of the united states to enact fair trade and strategic trade policies into law during 1987 88 political partisanship is an important force with democrats supporting and republicans opposing all types of trade intervention otherwise the coalitions of support for and opposition to the various trade policies differ particularly in the senate in that body international business is associated with support for fair trade policies and with opposition to classical protectionism while domestic u s business is associated with support for classical protectionism liberalism is strongly associated with support for fair and strategic trade policies but is not associated with classical protectionism in the house of representatives the long standing protectionist coalition remains an influence few forces in support of free trade remain in u s politics changing international market conditions rapidly affect the making of u s trade policy

centralized vote trading this paper presents a model of centralized vote trading in a legislature in this model legislators trade only with party leaders who set prices at which they will buy needed vote changes and sell promises to pass or defeat particular bills each legislator trades away votes on bills of little concern to him and of high concern to leaders and purchases promises from the leaders to pass or defeat particular bills of high concern to the legislator relative to the price the leguslator must pay