entry its deterrence and its accommodation a study of the u s photographic film industry this work set in the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1987 examines firm level demand based and cost based explanations for entry and accommodation strategies in the u s photographic film industry i first estimate preentry and postentry market structures then using the estimated demand cost and market conduct parameters i show how entry by fuji photo or lack thereof by others is a function of two market structures i also show how market structure and conduct and changes in them over the pre and postentry periods are in turn functions of entry its deterrence and it accommodation

competitive pricing by a price leader we examine the problem of pricing in a market where one brand acts as a price leader we develop a procedure to estimate a leader s price rule which is optimal given a sales target objective and allows for the inclusion of demand forecasts we illustrate our estimation procedure by calibrating this optimal price rule for both the leader and the follower using data on past sales and prices from the mid size sedan segment of the u s automobile market our results suggest that a leader follower system stackelberg seems more consistent with the pricing behavior in this market than a mutually independent pricing rule nash we also find that our optimal price rule explains this market data better than other pricing schemes that do not account for optimizing behavior on the part of the leader and the follower

investigating the effects of store brand introduction on retailer demand and pricing behavior researchers have recently been interested in studying the drivers of store brand success as well as factors that motivate retailers to introduce store brands in this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a store brand into a particular product category specifically we are interested in the effect of store brand introduction on the demand as well as on the supply side on the demand side we investigate the changes in preferences for the national brands and price elasticities in the category on the supply side we study the effects of the new entrant on the interactions between the national brand manufacturers and the retailer introducing the store brand including how these interactions influence the retailer s pricing behavior in doing so we are also able to test whether the observed data are consistent with some of the commonly used assumptions regarding retailer pricing behavior for the demand specification we use a random coefficients logit model that allows for consumer heterogeneity the model parameters are estimated using aggregate data while explicitly accounting for endogeneity in retail prices our empirical results obtained from the oats product category based on store level data from a multistore retail chain indicate that the store brand introduction generates notable changes within the category the store brand introduction coincides with an increase in the retailer s margins for the national brand we find that the preferences for the national brand are relatively unaffected by the introduction of the store brand while consumers are in general more price sensitive in terms of elasticities than they were prior to store brand introduction a statistical test of the differences inmean price elasticities across stores and between the two regimes fails to reject the hypothesis of no change in these elasticities elasticities in specific stores however do increase after the store brand is introduced we also find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the preferences for the store brand on the supply side we test several forms of manufacturer retailer interactions to identify retailer pricing behavior most consistent with the data our results indicate that the data reject several commonly imposed forms of interactions in examining the nature of manufacturer interactions with the retailer we find that the manufacturer of the national brand appears to take a softer stance in its interactions with the retailer subsequent to store brand entry this finding is consistent with academic research and with articles in the popular press which suggest that the store brand enhances the retailer s bargaining ability vis a vis the manufacturers of the national brands we also provide results from a second product category frozen pasta that are largely consistent with those found in the oats category

endogeneity in brand choice models applications of random utility models to scanner data have been widely presented in marketing for the last 20 years one particular problem with these applications is that they have ignored possible correlations between the independent variables in the deterministic component of utility price promotion etc and the stochastic component or error term in fact marketing mix variables such as price not only affect brand purchasing probabilities but are themselves endogenously set by marketing managers this work tests whether these endogeneity problems are important enough to warrant consideration when estimating random utility models with scanner panel data our results show that not accounting for endogeneity may result in a substantial bias in the parameter estimates

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

organic label bargaining power and profit sharing in the french fluid milk market the paper determines how the value added created by an organic label is shared in a vertical chain among manufacturers and retailers using purchase data on the french fluid milk sector we develop a structural econometric model of demand and supply that takes into account the bargaining power between manufacturers and retailers our results suggest that the organic label segment is more profitable as it permits the existence of higher margins moreover an organic label allows manufacturers to achieve more bargaining power relative to retailers and hence to obtain a higher share of total margins the econometric model is then used to assess the impact of an environmental policy in favor of the organic segment based on a mechanism of price support our results suggest that while a subsidy policy towards organic products benefits both manufacturers and retailers a tax policy toward conventional products benefits manufacturers of national brands at the expense of retailers and manufacturers that provide the private labels the benefits of such policies on the environment is relatively small all such policies tend to increase the impact on global warming and land use but reduce the impact on eutrophication acidification and energy use

a bayesian semiparametric approach for endogeneity and heterogeneity in choice models marketing variables that are included in consumer discrete choice models are often endogenous extant treatments using likelihood based estimators impose parametric distributional assumptions such as normality on the source of endogeneity these assumptions are restrictive because misspecified distributions have an impact on parameter estimates and associated elasticities the normality assumption for endogeneity can be inconsistent with some marginal cost specifications given a price setting process although they are consistent with other specifications in this paper we propose a heterogeneous bayesian semiparametric approach for modeling choice endogeneity that offers a flexible and robust alternative to parametric methods specifically we construct centered dirichlet process mixtures cdpm to allow uncertainty over the distribution of endogeneity errors in a similar vein we also model consumer preference heterogeneity nonparametrically via a cdpm results on simulated data show that incorrect distributional assumptions can lead to poor recovery of model parameters and price elasticities whereas the proposed semiparametric model is able to robustly recover the true parameters in an efficient fashion in addition the cdpm offers the benefits of automatically inferring the number of mixture components that are appropriate for a given data set and is able to reconstruct the shape of the underlying distributions for endogeneity and heterogeneity errors we apply our approach to two scanner panel data sets model comparison statistics indicate the superiority of the semiparametric specification and the results show that parameter and elasticity estimates are sensitive to the choice of distributional forms moreover the cdpm specification yields evidence of multimodality skewness and outlying observations in these real data sets data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1811 this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

structural modeling and policy simulation a primary goal of research in marketing is to evaluate and recommend optimal policies for marketing actions or instruments in the terminology of franses 2005 in this respect marketing is a very policy oriented field and it is ironic that so much published research skirts the issue of policy evaluation franses s article draws much needed attention to the question of what sort of model is usable for policy simulation and evaluation our perspective on what constitutes a valid model for policy evaluation differs from franses s view but we believe our view complements his in many important respects we also strongly believe that marketing has much to contribute to the literature on structural modeling we outline some of what we believe are the advantages for marketing scholars of using structural modeling for policy evaluations and some of the challenges presented by marketing problems franses focuses on a reduced form sales response model in which the outcome variable yt is modeled conditional on marketing variables xt if customers anticipate future marketing actions and take these into account in responding to the environment at time t an additional equation is appended to the system to describe the evolution of the xt variables in franses s view this system can be used for policy simulation if both the y and x equations have timeinvariant parameters that is the lucas critique which implies that parameters of reduced form models change if the policy regime changes does not apply according to franses a model must pass standard diagnostics possess good predictive properties and exhibit parameter stability to be useful for policy simulation we applaud the attention franses is bringing to model diagnostics we believe that structural work in both marketing and economics should pay close attention to the central features of the data increased use of model diagnostics will help ensure that structural models are capable of capturing these features however we do not believe that all the criteria proposed by franses such as out of sample validity and parameter stability are either necessary or sufficient to render a model useful for policy simulation reduced form models can pass all diagnostics including out of sample validation and still provide misleading predictions about the effects of policy changes reduced form

who participates in household scanning panels we compare two widely used household scanning panels maintained by the nielsen company and information resources inc to a random sample of the u s population results indicate that the demographic characteristics of the random sample more closely match the census bureau data than the household scanning panels we also show that after controlling for demographic differences participants in the household scanning panels are slightly more price sensitive than participants in the random sample the two household scanning panels yield similar results in relation to one another which suggests that the household scanning panels may suffer from sample selection and participation biases

quantity discount dependent consumer preferences and competitive nonlinear pricing abstract producers of consumer packaged goods often offer several package sizes of the same product and charge a lower unit price for a larger size in this article the authors investigate the quantity discount effect or the phenomenon that consumers derive transaction utility from the unit price difference between a small and a large package size of the same product the authors propose a modeling framework composed of a demand side model and a supply side model the empirical results suggest that quantity discount induced gains or losses have a significant impact on consumer buying behavior the authors also find a substantial amount of structural heterogeneity that is some consumers perceive quantity discounts as gains whereas others perceive quantity discounts as losses conversely the supply side analysis suggests that manufacturers in the empirical application do not consider quantity discount effects when setting prices through a series of policy experiments the authors show that by accou

marketing models and the lucas critique the lucas critique has been largely ignored in the marketing literature we present a number of conditions under which the critique is most likely to also apply in marketing settings next we provide some perspectives on how to diagnose and accommodate the lucas critique and identify various avenues for future research

competitive pricing behavior in the auto market a structural analysis in a competitive marketplace the effectiveness of any element of the marketing mix is determined not only by its absolute value but also by its relative value with respect to the competition for example the effectiveness of a price cut in increasing demand is critically related to competitors reaction to the price change managers therefore need to know the nature of competitive interactions among firms in this paper we take a theory driven empirical approach to gain a deeper understanding of the competitive pricing behavior in the u s auto market the ability motivation paradigm posits that a firm needs both the ability and the motivation to succeed in implementing a strategy boulding and staelin 1995 we use arguments from the game theoretic literature to understand firm motivation and abilities in different segments of the auto market we then combine these insights from the game theoretic literature and the ability motivation paradigm to develop hypotheses about competition in different segments of the u s auto market to test our hypotheses of competitive behavior we estimate a structural model that disentangles the competition effect from the demand and cost effects on prices the theory of repeated games predicts that firms with a long run profitability objective will try to sustain cooperative pricing behavior as a stable equilibrium when conditions permit for example markets with high concentration and stable market environments are favorable for sustaining cooperative behavior and therefore provide firms with the ability to cooperate the theory of switching costs suggests that in markets in which a firm s current customers tend to be loyal firms have a motivation to compete very aggressively for new customers recognizing the positive benefits of loyalty from the customer base in the long run as consumer loyalty in the market increases the gains from increasing market share by means of aggressive competitive behavior are more than offset by losses in profit margins firms therefore have the motivation to price cooperatively empirically we find aggressive behavior in the minicom pact and subcompact segments cooperative behavior in the compact and midsize segments and bertrand behavior in the full size segment these findings are consistent with our theory based hypotheses about competition in different segments in estimating a structural model of the auto market we address several methodological issues a particular difficulty is the large number of car models in the u s auto market existing studies have inferred competitive behavior only in markets with two to four products they also use relatively simple functional forms of demand to facilitate easy estimation functional forms of demand however impose structure on cross elasticities between products such structure when inappropriate can bias the estimates of competitive interaction we therefore use the random coefficients logit demand model to allow flexibility in cross elasticities we also use recent advances in new empirical industrial organization neio to extend structural estimation of competitive behavior to markets with a large number of products we use the simulation based estimation approach developed by berry et al 1995 to estimate our model a frequent criticism of the neio approach is that its focus on industry specific studies limits the generalizability of its findings in this study we retain the advantages of neio methods but partially address the issue of generalizability by analyzing competitive behavior in multiple segments within the auto industry to see whether there is a consistent pattern that can be explained by theory theoretical modelers can use our results to judge the appropriateness of their models in predicting competitive outcomes for the markets that they analyze a by product of our analysis is that we also get estimates of demand and cost apart from competitive interactions for the market managers can use these estimates to perform what if analysis they can answer questions about what prices to charge when a new product is introduced or when an existing product s characteristics are changed

empirical analysis of competitive product line pricing decisions lead follow or move together researchers have recently developed models for determining which market conduct best describes observed data we apply these techniques from the new empirical industrial organization literature to the competitive product line pricing decision where a firm strategically prices its brands when determining the profit maximizing conduct in the market demand cost and market structure are estimated endogenously empirical results from analyzing price competition in the laundry detergent market between procter and gamble selling tide and eraplus and lever brothers offering wisk and surf indicate that each firm positions its strong brand as a stackelberg leader with the rival s minor brand being the follower

riding the waves revealing the impact of intrayear category demand cycles on advertising and pricing effectiveness abstractgoing beyond traditional seasonality this research introduces the concept of the intrayear category demand cycle this phenomenon reflects demand cycles most consumer packaged goods categories experience throughout the year with periods of higher demand following periods of lower demand the author argues that acknowledging the existence of these cycles and understanding their impact on both advertising and pricing effectiveness and practice is critical for marketers specifically the author demonstrates how both advertising and price elasticities and observed advertising and prices evolve along these cycles for a unique set of 252 brands ranging from high advertising high priced premium mass brands to low advertising low priced value niche brands in 61 consumer packaged goods categories overall both advertising efectiveness and observed advertising are found to be stronger at demand peaks surprisingly consumer reactions to price decreases are weaker at demand peaks whereas reactions

estimating disaggregate models using aggregate data through augmentation of individual choice abstract in this article the authors propose a bayesian method for estimating disaggregate choice models using aggregate data compared with existing methods the advantage of the proposed method is that it allows for the analysis of microlevel consumer dynamic behavior such as the impact of purchase history on current brand choice when only aggregate level data are available the essence of this approach is to simulate latent choice data that are consistent with the observed aggregate data when the augmented choice data are made available in each iteration of the markov chain monte carlo algorithm the dynamics of consumer buying behavior can be explicitly modeled the authors first demonstrate the validity of the method with a series of simulations and then apply the method to an actual store level data set of consumer purchases of refrigerated orange juice the authors find a significant amount of dynamics in consumer buying behavior the proposed method is useful for managers to understand better

research note structural demand estimation with varying product availability this paper develops a model that extends the traditional aggregate discrete choice based demand model e g berry et al 1995 to account for varying levels of product availability in cases where not all products are available at every consumer shopping trip the observed market share is a convolution of two factors consumer preferences and the availability of the product in stores failing to account for the varying degree of availability would produce incorrect estimates of the demand parameters the proposed model uses information on aggregate availability to simulate the potential assortments that consumers may face in a given shopping trip the model parameters are estimated by simulating potential product assortment vectors by drawing multivariate bernoulli vectors consistent with the observed aggregate level of availability the model is applied to the uk chocolate confectionery market focusing on the convenience store channel we compare the parameter estimates to those obtained from not accounting for varying availability and analyze some of the substantive implications

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

a unified approach to identifying estimating and testing demand structures with aggregate scanner data a one to one map between a specific demand structure and a restricted cross elasticity matrix is developed and tested using a random utility model the resulting demand structure can be used to evaluate a firm s ability to differentiate its products and can help determine if demand is characterized by factors that are easy to change similar brands are assumed to share common attributes that are stochastically evaluated by the consumer resulting in a random utility model with correlated errors the map results in more precise cross elasticity estimates and can be used to both identify and test possible structures

an empirical investigation of private label supply by national label producers private labels pls are ubiquitous in several categories including groceries apparel and appliances however existing empirical work has not examined the differential impact of various upstream supply arrangements for pl products or the strategic motives for pl supply to do so requires one to model the interaction between private and national label nl products both upstream and downstream while accounting for strategic behavior on the part of manufacturers and retailers and retaining essential differences between nl and pl products we build a model that satisfies these requirements and lets us answer our two research questions first can an nl firm profit from being an outsourced pl supplier second what are the upstream and downstream impacts of different pl supply arrangements we answer these questions by modeling private labels as homogenous products at wholesale but as differentiated products at retail in contrast national label products are differentiated at both wholesale and retail levels using structural model estimates for fluid milk in a major metropolitan area we conduct three counterfactual experiments we find that both nl producers and retailers profit from adding private labels we also find that a vertically integrated supply of pl leads to lower prices for end consumers

an inventory system with demand dependent on both time and price assuming backlogged shortages abstract in this work we analyze an inventory model for items whose demand is a bivariate function of price and time it is supposed that the demand rate multiplicatively combines the effects of a time power function and a price logit function the aim is to maximize the profit per time unit assuming that the inventory cost per time unit is the sum of the holding shortage ordering and purchasing costs an algorithm is developed to find the optimal price the optimal lot size and the optimal replenishment cycle several numerical examples are introduced to illustrate the solution procedure

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

comments on competitive responsiveness marketing science features many and diverse articles that analyze competitive responsiveness although recent marketing science editorials e g shugan 2002 suggest that competitive responsiveness is only a part of a comprehensive competitive marketing strategy it remains a vital part for that reason and many others marketing science is particularly proud of this special issue edited by david j reibstein and dick r wittink before introducing and vigorously applauding both the editors and authors of this excellent special issue we emphasize that competitive responsiveness raises numerous issues including whether one can forecast outcomes of new policies based on past observations made under old policies i e the lucas critique and decisions regarding which variables should be considered endogenous shugan 2004 i e determined within the model perhaps normative models are inherently perishable evolution in market structure requires modifications over time also although complete consistency within the world of the model is aesthetically pleasing imposing industry specific exogenous constraints that might appear unrelated to the modeling assumptions is sometimes necessary

a larger slice or a larger pie an empirical investigation of bargaining power in the distribution channel this research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model we use the nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics the parties bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side the more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option the weaker the bargaining position we use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years firm size increases store brand introductions and service level differentiation in our empirical analysis of the german market for coffee we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer retailer pairs this result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner we are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits

valuation of new products in attribute space we contribute to the literature on new product valuation by presenting a model of new product introduction based on the distance metric dm approach of pinkse slade and brett 2002 models based on the dm approach are capable of dealing with highly differentiated food categories that are often responsible for the lion s share of new product activity furthermore since new products are typically characterized by differences in observable attributes the dm approach is appropriate in that it directly accounts for such differences our findings reveal that consumers benefit from new products even when the number of alternatives is already high copyright 2007 oxford university press

multi category competition and market power a model of supermarket pricing in many competitive settings consumers buy multiple product categories and some prefer to use a single firm generating complementary cross category price effects to study pricing in supermarkets an organizational form where these effects are internalized we develop a multi category multi seller demand model and estimate it using uk consumer data this class of model is used widely in theoretical analysis of retail pricing we quantify crosscategory pricing effects and find that internalizing them substantially reduces market power we find that consumers inclined to one stop rather than multi stop shopping have a greater pro competitive impact because they generate relatively large cross category effects

pricing and market concentration in oligopoly markets this paper investigates the relationship between prices and market concentration in the auto rental industry we assemble an original database that includes the number of auto rental operators and other exogenous demand and cost conditions at every commercial airport in the country the data are interesting because we observe a large variation in market structure ranging from more than 100 monopoly and duopoly markets to several competitive airports with more than eight firms in addition we collect daily rental prices in each market that are regressed against the number of operating firms and other control factors due to potential biases in treating market participants as exogenously assigned we employ a two stage estimation procedure in which an equilibrium model of endogenous market structure provides correction terms for the second stage price regression results show that ignoring the endogeneity of market structure severely underestimates the impact of additional competitors on prices with the

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

a decision support system for planning manufacturers sales promotion calendars a common event in the consumer packaged goods industry is the negotiation between a manufacturer and a retailer ofthe sales promotion calendar determining the promotion calendar involves a large number of decisions regarding levels of temporary price reductions feature ads and in store displays each executed at the level of individual retail accounts and brand skus over several months or a year though manufacturers spend much of their marketing budget on trade promotions they lack decision support systems to address the complexity and dynamics of promotion planning previous research has produced insights into how to evaluate the effectiveness of promotional events but has not addressed the planning problem in a dynamic environment this paper develops a disaggregate level econometric model to capture the dynamics and heterogeneity of consumer response by modeling the purchase incidence timing choice and quantity decisions of consumers we decompose total sales into incremental and nonincremental baseline plus borrowed the response model forms the basis of a market simulator that permits us to search for the manufacturer s optimal promotion calendar subject to a set of constraints some of them imposed by the retailer via the simulated annealing algorithm calendar profits are the net result of the contribution from incremental sales minus the opportunity cost from giving away discounts to nonincremental sales and the fixed costs associated with implementing promotional events e g retagging features displays incremental sales result from promotion induced switching the acceleration and quantity promotion effects on those switchers increased consumption and the carryover effect from purchase event feedback we applied our approach to the promotion planning problem of a large consumer packaged goods company in a nonperishable staple product category suggested by company executives canned tomato sauce subject to a retailer pass through constant rate of 80 provided to us by the collaborating firm the optimal promotion calendar produced by the modeling system followed a pattern of frequent and shallow temporary price reductions with no feature or display activity we also analyze how that result would change under different retailer pass through scenarios our findings indicated that the manufacturer could substantially improve the profitability of its sales promotion activity and that there would be a concurrent positive effect on retailer profit and volume levels management reported to us that the insights from the use of the system were implemented in their promotion planning process and produced positive results a validation analysis on follow up data for one market showed that promotion activity could be significantly reduced as recommended with no adverse effect on the brand s market share as predicted to generalize the model beyond the specific category where it was implemented we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the profile of the calendar i e frequency depth and duration of deals with respect to changes in market response competitive activity and retailer pass through first we found that the optimal depth frequency and timing of discounts is stable for price elasticities ranging from near zero to around four in absolute magnitude we also found no systematic impact of competitive promotions on the profile of the optimal calendar for example variation in competitive activity did not affect the optimal depth or frequency of discounts lastly we found changes in retailer pass through to have a significant effect on the optimal depth and number of weeks of trade promotion that a manufacturer should offer this emphasizes the importance to manufacturers of having accurate estimates of pass through for purposes of promotion budgeting and planning

breeding competitive strategies we show how genetic algorithms can be used to evolve strategies in oligopolistic markets characterized by asymmetric competition the approach is illustrated using scanner tracking data of brand actions in a real market an asymmetric market share model and a category volume model are combined to represent market response to the actions of brand managers the actions available to each artificial brand manager are constrained to four typical marketing actions of each from the historical data each brand s strategies evolve through simulations of repeated interactions in a virtual market using the estimated weekly profits of each brand as measures of its fitness for the genetic algorithm the artificial agents bred in this environment outperform the historical actions of brand managers in the real market the implications of these findings for the study of marketing strategy are discussed

investigating dynamic multifirm market interactions in price and advertising diagnosing the nature and magnitu de of competitive interactions among firms is important for developing effective marketing strategies in this paper we formulate a game theoretic model of firm interaction to analyze the dynamic price and advertising competition among firms in a given p roduct market firm or brand level demand functions account for the contemporaneous and carry over effects of these marketing activities and also allow for the effects of competitor actions firms take into consideration the actions of their rivals as well as their own demand and cost functions both production and advertising when determining the profit maximizing price and advertising levels our formulation enables us to quantify not only the direction and magnitude of competitive reactions but also to identify the underlying form of market conduct that generates the particular pattern of interaction we specify and estimate a fully structural econometric model for three firms constituting a distinct sub market within a personal care product category we estimate the demand and competitive interaction parameters as well as the production and advertising cost functions for each firm we then derive implications for competitive interactions and market structure interestingly we find that while firms seem to compete on advertising they price cooperatively thereby enhancing their price cost margins

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

how dynamic consumer response competitor response company support and company inertia shape long term marketing effectiveness long term marketing effectiveness is a high priority research topic for managers and emerges from the complex interplay among dynamic reactions of several market players this paper introduces restricted policy simulations to distinguish four dynamic forces consumer response competitor response company inertia and company support a rich marketing dataset allows the analysis of price display feature advertising and product line extensions the first finding is that consumer response differs significantly from the net effectiveness of product line extensions price feature and advertising in particular net sales effects are up to five times stronger and longer lasting than consumer response second this difference is not due to competitor response but to company action for tactical actions price and feature it takes the form of inertia as promotions last for several weeks for strategic actions advertising and product line extensions support by other marketing instruments greatly enhances dynamic consumer response this company action negates the postpromotion dip in consumer response and enhances the long term sales benefits of product line extensions feature and advertising therefore managers are urged to evaluate company decision rules for inertia and support when assessing long term marketing effectiveness

bounded rationality in pricing under state dependent demand do firms look ahead and if so how far the authors propose an empirical procedure to investigate the pricing behavior of manufacturers and retailers in the presence of state dependent demand rather than assuming that firms are perfectl

logit demand estimation under competitive pricing behavior an equilibrium framework discrete choice models of demand have typically been estimated assuming that prices are exogenous since unobservable to the researcher product attributes such as coupon availability may impact consumer utility as well as price setting by firms we treat prices as endogenous specifically prices are assumed to be the equilibrium outcomes of nash competition among manufacturers and retailers to empirically validate the assumptions we estimate logit demand systems jointly with equilibrium pricing equations for two product categories using retail scanner data and cost data on factor prices in each category we find statistical evidence of price endogeneity we also find that the estimates of the price response parameter and the brand specific constants are generally biased downward when the endogeneity of prices is ignored our framework provides explicit estimates of the value created by a brand i e the difference between consumers willingness to pay for a brand and its cost of production we develop theoretical propositions about the relationship between value creation and competitive advantage for logit demand systems and use our empirical results to illustrate how firms use alternative value creation strategies to accomplish competitive advantage

fishing industry borrows from natural capital at high shadow interest rates fish stocks can be considered as natural capital stocks providing harvestable fish fishing at low stock sizes means borrowing from the natural asset while fishing a particular quantity generates immediate profits and income an interest rate has to be paid in terms of foregone future fishing income as the fish stock s reproductive capacity remains low and fishing costs stay high in this paper we propose to apply the concept of shadowinterest rate to quantify the degree of overfishing it incorporates the relevant biological and economic information and compares across fish stocks we calculate the shadow interest rates for 13major european fish stocks and find these rates to range from10 tomore than 200 the concept of the shadow interest rate can be used to make the economic consequences of overfishing transparent and to evaluate the profitability of shortterm catch reductions as investments in natural capital stocks

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

predicting competitive response to a major policy change combining game theoretic and empirical analyses this research uses procter gamble s value pricing initiative as a context for testing whether actual competitor and retailer response to a major policy change can be predicted using a game theoretic model we first estimate demand functions for p g and competitor brands from the period before value pricing was initiated we then formulate a dynamic manufacturer retailer stackelberg model that includes p g a national brand competitor and a retailer the model takes p g s move as given and prescribes the price and promotion response of the competitors and the retailer we substitute the estimated demand parameters into the model to obtain prescriptions for each competitor and the retailer and see whether these prescriptions are related to the actual response we find that the dynamic game theoretic model calibrated with empirical estimates of demand parameters has significant predictive power we also test the predictive power of two benchmark models the first is based on the reaction function approach of leeflang and wittink leeflang peter s h wittink dick r 1992 diagnosing competitive reactions using aggregated scanner data internat j res marketing9 39 57 and the second is a simplification of our dynamic model where the retailer is not strategic the dynamic game theoretic model performs better than either benchmark

pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information abstract a product costs the manufacturer c unit to produce the retailer sells it at p unit to the consumers the retail market demand volume v varies with p according to a given demand curve d p how would or should the players i e the manufacturer and the retailer set their prices in contrast to many studies that assume a dominant manufacturer implementing the manufacturer stackelberg ms game this paper examines how a dominant retailer should operate when his knowledge of c is imperfect we first derive optimal decisions some of them counter intuitive for the dominant retailer when he is restricted to choosing between rs retailer stackelberg and ms second we propose a reverse quantity discount scheme that the dominant retailer i e the downstream player can offer to the manufacturer note that the standard discount scheme is offered by the upstream player we show that this discounting scheme is quite effective compared to the considerably more complicated though nevertheless theoretically optimal menu of contracts we also reveal a largely overlooked function of discounting i e discounting enables an ignorant but dominant player to usurp the earnings attributable to the knowledge of the dominated player finally we also show that discounting works well when the demand curve is linear but becomes ineffective when the demand curve is iso elastic a result echoing the conclusions of some earlier related works

demand estimation and merger simulations for drugs logits v aids abstract we use adhd drugs sales data from 2000 2003 and compare estimates of elasticities and merger simulations from three different demand models models include logit random coefficients logit and conditional aids demand model with multistage budgeting the magnitude of cross price elasticities is larger in the third model in comparison to the first two and some of the cross price elasticities are estimated to be negative hypothetical merger simulations show larger price effects for the multistage aids model in comparison to the discrete choice models

commercial use of upc scanner data industry and academic perspectives the authors report the findings from an exploratory investigation of the use of upc scanner data in the consumer packaged goods industry in the u s the study examines the practitioner community s view of the use of scanner data and compares these views with academic research forty one executives from ten data suppliers packaged goods manufacturers and consulting firms participated in wide ranging in person interviews conducted by the authors the interviews sought to uncover key questions practitioners would like to answer with scanner data how scanner data is applied to these questions and the industry s perspective regarding the success that the use of scanner data has had in each area the authors then compare and contrast practitioners views regarding the resolution of each issue with academic research this produces a 2 2 classification of each question as resolved or unresolved from the perspectives of industry and academia along the diagonal of the 2 2 issues viewed as unresolved by both groups are important topics for future research issues deemed resolved by both groups are correspondingly of lower priority in the off diagonal cells industry and academics disagree these topics should be given priority for discussion information exchange and possible further research practitioners reported that scanner data analysis has had the most success and been most widely adopted for decision making in consumer promotions i e coupons trade promotions and pricing for example logit and regression models applied to scanner data have revealed very low average consumer response to coupons which has directly led to reduced couponing activity managers also reported high levels of comfort with and impact from analyses of trade promotions and price elasticities while industry views most of the issues in these areas to be resolved academic research raises concerns about a number of practices in common commercial use these include price threshold analysis and trade promotion evaluation using baseline and incremental sales in product strategy advertising and distribution management practitioners reported that the use of scanner data has had more limited development success and impact in the case of new product decisions scanner data use has been slow to develop due to the inherent limitations of historicaldata for these decisions and a heavy reliance on traditional primary research methods in advertising scanner data is widely analyzed with models but confusion among practitioners is very high due to controversies about methods e g what level of data aggregation is best and conflicting results in distribution and retail management scanner data use has tremendous potential but a mixed track record to date thus practitioners view the use of scanner data as unresolved for most issues in product strategy advertising and distribution this view is largely though not entirely consistent with academic research which has only begun to address many of the key questions raised by practitioners in light of the large number of unresolved issues and mixed record of scanner data use to date the authors offer aseries of specific recommendations for immediate and long term research priorities that are likely to have the greatest impact on commercial utilization of upc scanner data topics of immediate priority include price thresholds and gaps baseline and incremental sales base price elasticity competitive reactions measurement of advertising effects management of brand equity rationalization of product assortments and category management long term priorities include a greater emphasis on profitability versus sales or market share developing prescriptive models versus descriptive models and the need for industry standards

liberalizing a distribution system the european car market we quantify the competitive effects of liberalizing the selective and exclusive distribution system in the european car market based on a model of oligopoly pricing with differentiated products we consider two possible competitive effects from liberalization i the creation of international intrabrand competition cross border trade which will result in a reduction of international price discrimination and ii a possible cumulative effect arising from a strengthening of national intrabrand competition which would result in reduced double marginalization we find that the reduction in international price discrimination mainly redistributes consumer gains across countries it has a positive but modest effect on total welfare if liberalization also has the cumulative effect of reducing double marginalization the welfare effects are much higher finally we find that the effects of liberalization on the manufacturers profits are either small or positive this finding implies that international price discrimination and softening competition through a double marginalization mechanism should not be interpreted as main profit motives for the previous distribution system but only as unintended side effects hence the industry rationale for maintaining the previous distribution system should be sought in other areas jel f15 l42

there is no aggregation bias why macro logit models work in this article we examine the aggregation properties of nested logit models to understand their exceptional macro level performance the problem of aggregating micro logit models involves integrating nonlinear functions of model parameters over a distribution of consumer heterogeneity the aggregation problem is analyzed using a mixture of analytic and simulation techniques with the simulation experiments using actual panel data to calibrate the distribution of heterogeneity we conclude that the practice of fitting aggregate logit models is theoretically justified under the following three conditions 1 all consumers are exposed to the same marketing mix variables 2 the brands are close substitutes and 3 the distribution of prices is not concentrated at an extreme value these conditions are frequently met in store level scanner data

identifying generalizable effects of strategic actions on firm performance the case of demand side returns to r d spending this paper provides an approach for assessing generalizable effects of strategic actions on firm performance we identify five key issues that need to be addressed before one can have confidence in the obtained strategic generalization in addition we suggest a methodology for attacking each of these five issues we then illustrate this framework using the example of demand side returns to r d spending we document two empirical generalizations in this research first and foremost we show that demand returns to r d spending depend on whether the firm has ability and motivation to take advantage of the r d investment thus only firms with high ability and motivation leverage the r d investment into monopoly rents in the form of subsequent price increases second we show that the concept of a firm needing both ability and motivation to sustain returns from a strategic action generalizes across strategic actions we make two other conclusions about empirical approaches to strategy research first to pro

assessing the competitive interaction between private labels and national brands in this article we employ the linear approximate almost ideal demand system la aids and specify price reaction equations derived under the la aids specification we perform intracategory analyses using data on six individual categories as well as a pooled analysis on a sample of 125 categories and 59 geographic markets we find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions demand and firm pricing behavior supply jointly determine observed market prices and market shares further estimates of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete picture of the ability of brands to raise price copyright 2000 by university of chicago press

tax incidence with strategic firms in the soft drink market abstract because soft drink sd consumption is considered to be a contributor to the epidemic of obesity there is a growing interest in evaluating the impact on sd consumption of alternative tax policies in this paper we propose a methodology to evaluate the impact of taxation of a food market taking into account the strategic price response of both manufacturers and retailers we apply this methodology to the french sd market and simulate the impacts of ad valorem and excise taxes we find that firms behave differently when facing an ad valorem tax or an excise tax an excise tax is overshifted to consumer prices while an ad valorem tax is undershifted to consumer prices we find that an excise tax based on the sugar content of sd is the most effective at reducing sd consumption our results also indicate that ignoring strategic pricing by firms leads to misestimations of the impact of taxation by between 15 and 40 depending on the products and the tax implemented in the short term that is ignoring positive long term health effects a 9 cents l excise tax has a small negative welfare effect about 1 person year

are supermarkets squeezing small suppliers evidence from negotiated wholesale prices we thank gregory s crawford for his encouragement and insightful comments we also thank victor aguirregabiria ozlem bedre meghan busse jean pierre dub e david genesove margaret kyle rafael moner colonques ariel pakes michelle sovinsky michael waterson ali yurukoglu and the seminar participants at the nber io winter meetings 2012 cepr jie conference on applied io 2012 hebrew university toulouse school of economics universidad diego portales universidad de chile the university of warwick and university of zurich noton acknowledges financial support from the institute for research in market imperfections and public policy icm is130002 ministerio de economia an earlier version of this article circulated under the title revealing bargaining power through actual wholesale prices

an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination rand 054 rand2007 cls 1994 07 13 v1 2u standard latex document class rand rand 054 dispatch 12 7 2008 ce n a journal msp no no of pages 26 pe sharon rand journal of economics vol 40 no 1 spring 2009 pp 20 45 an empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination sofia berto villas boas economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination if downstream cost differences exist then discrimination shifts production inefficiently toward high cost retailers so a ban increases welfare if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases so a ban reduces welfare using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by german retailers i estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market and less if downstream cost differences shrink or with less competition introduction wholesale price discrimination means that an upstream firm sets different prices for the same product for various downstream retailers wholesale price discrimination is commonly practiced in many markets examples include markets such as petroleum distribution steel heavy trucking tobacco and pharmaceuticals in several countries milk and other dairy products are sold using government administered or sanctioned discriminatory pricing schemes wholesale price discrimination practices are also used for services such as loans insurance and advertising 1 competition authorities have been concerned with wholesale price discrimination the european union treaty s article 82 c prohibits practices where a dominant firm would place trading partners at a competitive disadvantage the u s robinson patman act forbids discriminat ing in price between different purchasers where the effect may be to lessen competition unless the university of california berkeley sberto are berkeley edu i thank the editor igal hendel and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments and max auffhammer cyndi berck peter berck gal hochman silke januszewski forbes george judge kai uwe k uhn diana lazo mark muendler aviv nevo ariel pakes jeff perloff andrew sweeting miguel villas boas and participants at uc san diego university of michigan the inra idei conference in toulouse and the university of british columbia summer conference in industrial organization for their suggestions i thank daniel klapper for letting me have access to the data support from the giannini foundation and from an aes grant are gratefully appreciated see for gasoline markets texaco v hasbrouck 496 us 543 no 87 2048 1990 and the new york state motor fuel marketing practices act for steel chan hall and rust 2003 for heavy trucking volvo trucks north america inc v reeder simco gmc inc docket no 04 905 for tobacco brooke group ltd v brown and williamson tobacco corp 509 us 209 no 92 466 1993 for wholesale pharmaceuticals see http www datcp state wi us trade business unfair comp drug price jsp for dairy markets see for example gardner 1984 and for services see givens 1983 c 2009 rand copyright

product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets the case of the u s automobile industry this paper develops and estimates a model of the u s automobile industry on the demand side a discrete choice model is adopted that is estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey the estimation results are used in conjunction with population weights to derive aggregate demand on the supply side the automobile industry is modelled as an oligopoly with product differentiation equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the profit maximizing firms the estimation results are used in counterfactual simulations to investigate two trade policy issues the effects of the ver and exchange rate pass through

the incentive effects of tournaments with positive externalities among workers much recent research concerning work incentives has analyzed tournaments or contests between workers for rewards based on a comparison of their relative performance 3 5 8 9 12 bull schotter and weigelt 2 2 argue that tournaments are empirically pervasive characterizing incentives for many salespeople competing for bonuses managers vying for high level positions academics striving for limited tenured positions and politicians whose election hinges on relative votes received contrarily nalebuff and stiglitz 12 40 suggest that tournaments are rare for example many employees face incentives produced by upward sloping age earnings profiles 6 individual piece rates profit sharing or group bonus schemes 14 or potential firing 11 responding to this lack of agreement over the pervasiveness of tournaments recent theoretical research has begun to identify circumstances where tournaments fail or succeed the corpus of such work generalizes the conditions under which tournaments are optimal for example tournaments can respond effectively to common environmental shocks to productivity 5 12 heterogeneous workers 13 employee and employer moral hazard problems 3 monitoring difficulties 9 and inefficiencies associated with firing as an incentive 11 less work has addressed circumstances where tournaments may fail the question which concerns us here to date three circumstances where tournaments fail have been identified first as lazear and rosen noted in their seminal article on tournaments such incentives fail if individual effort can be measured perfectly or precisely inferred from output as they put it a difference of opinion is necessary for a horse race 8 845 if the winner is known before the race only the winner will run and slowly at that second lazear 7 analyzes circumstances where agents can engage in sabotage or increase the probability of winning by reducing their opponent s measured output tournaments then fail because the saboteur can reduce his or her own output while

modelling household purchasing behaviour to analyse beneficial marketing strategies price promotion and generic advertising are two common strategies to increase consumer demand for food products which one is preferred over the other depends largely on the relative importance of

new brand positioning and pricing in an oligopolistic market the positioning and pricing of a new brand requires knowledge about the relationship of both demand and cost with potential attribute locations and prices this paper addresses this problem and illustrates it in the context of the automobile market multi attribute expected utility theory which allows for consumer uncertainty about the brands is used to model individuals behavior attribute weights are estimated from market survey data on brands attributes and preferences using linmap as an estimation procedure expected utility is then updated using the multinomial logit model and choice data to account for the observation that stated preferences do not perfectly reflect the eventual choice it is hypothesized that when faced with an actual choice price may become more important to the consumer while other attributes may become more or less important than is reflected in stated preferences the resulting estimated choice probabilities are aggregated to form demand functions facing each brand which depend on all brands prices and attribute space locations assuming there is a price equilibrium in the existing market and that firms have the same variable cost function variable costs as a function of a brand s attribute levels are estimated given the demand and cost functions facing each firm including the potential new entrant the profit maximizing positioning and pricing of a new brand is analyzed using a game theoretic approach a solution is sought under the assumption that incumbents react to entry by changing their prices possible approaches to the translation of the perceptual attribute positioning of the new brand to physical and engineering attributes are reviewed improvements and future extensions of the study are discussed

a structural equations analysis of the impact of price promotions on store performance guided by past research conventional wisdom in the retailing area and microeconomic theory the authors develop a series of hypotheses about the effects of loss leaders in store price specials