property rights externalities and resource degradation locating the tragedy abstract resource degradation in the third world is largely driven by the demands of farm households for fuelwood and land for agriculture since resources are often controlled through indigenous systems of property the tragedy of the commons has been used to explain resource degradation as a result private property is suggested as a solution to resource degradation a dynamic model capable of examining household incentives for resource use under private and common property is developed results of the model reject the conventional wisdom that gives rise to the presumed optimality of private individual property in natural resources and the correlated indictment of group management regimes

the role of property rights in determining the environmental quality income relationship article i nfo this paper examines the role of property rights in shaping the relationship between environmental quality and income it develops an analytical framework that integrates the effects of property rights evolution natural resource attributes agent characteristics and production technology on the environment income relationship the substantive strength of this framework lies in its ability to rationalize a wide range of environment income relationships the model shows that the u shaped environment income relationship which is consistent with the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis can arise only under specific model conditions thus the framework provides an additional explanation for non universality of ekc we provide evidence in support of our framework from case studies of various natural resources

the uk demand for cigarettes 1954 1986 a double hurdle approach the double hurdle perspective suggests that it is crucial to distinguish between per capita and per smoker consumption when estimating the demand for cigarettes this paper presents a two equation model which identifies consumption and participation as two separate decisions the model is estimated with annual data on u k cigarette expenditure and participation rates highlighting the differing influence of prices income and health scares on the participation rate and on smokers demand for cigarettes

estimating dynamic demand for cigarettes using panel data the effects of bootlegging taxation and advertising reconsidered abstracct a dynamic demand for cigarette consumption is estimated using pooled data of 46 states over the period 1963 to 1980 a price elasticity of 0 2 and an insignificant income elasticity is found using pooled estimation techniques the bootlegging effect is modeled explicitly using neighboring price the effect is found to be significant two major policy issues are analyzed in light of these new estimates 1 cigarette taxation is found to be an effective tool for generating revenues even though there may be spillover effects to neighboring states where bootlegging is significant 2 the effects of the fairness doctrine act and the advertising ban on cigarette consumption are re examined we find mild support for the effectiveness of subsidized anti smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption and no support for the thesis that the ban on advertising helps to increase per capita consumption

the effects of price and smoking risk information on the demand for tobacco in taiwan an empirical study this study evaluates the effects of a cigarette price increase and smoking risk information on tobacco consumption in taiwan tobacco price expenditure and an index of smoking risk information for taiwan were introduced into a central bureau of statistics cbs demand model to estimate several cigarette demand elasticity coefficients according to this model increasing the cigarette price is a more effective means of reducing cigarette consumption than disseminating more risk information in addition we found that a price rise of nt 5 per cigarette pack would cause a reduction in the consumption of domestic and imported cigarettes of 3 23 and 4 86 packs per capita respectively total per capita consumption of cigarettes would be reduced annually by 8 09 packs 7 56 despite this reduction in cigarette consumption the increase in cigarette price would at the same time lead to a significant net increase in tax revenue to the taiwan government

competition wage commitments and application fees in this article i intend to justify the rare use of application fees in labor markets i analyze a model in which there is a training or testing period preceding a worker s effective production period with various commitment abilities of firms i find that application fees are used if and only if all future wages can be committed before a worker applies otherwise no application fees will be charged the model is then modified to explain the positive fees in journal submissions and college admissions

health behavior health knowledge and schooling the positive correlation between schooling and good health is well documented one explanation is that schooling helps people choose healthier life styles by improving their knowledge of the relationship between health behaviors and health outcomes that is schooling improves the household s allocative efficiency in producing health this empirical study uses direct measures of health knowledge to test this explanation part of the relationship between schooling and the consumption of cigarettes alcohol and exercise is explained by differences in health knowledge however most of schooling s effects on health behavior remain after differences in knowledge are controlled for

property rights to multi attribute fishery resources abstract the united nations code of conduct for responsible fisheries urges governments to manage multiple yield bycatch and habitat attributes of fishery resources the information and enforcement costs of multi attribute management are high however as a result relatively few attributes generally stock biomass age structure and growth are specified in yield targets exposing others e g localized abundance sex to excessive use in the public domain spillovers caused by fishing gear e g gear conflicts bycatch habitat damage generally are regulated with catch limits and area closures that artificially divide or exclude activities which interact due to attribute jointness total fishery income is compromised because tradeoffs are not evaluated at the margin alternative arrangements that bundle fishery resource attributes are suggested bundled property rights could evolve from a comprehensive assignment of usufruct rights which reduce the transaction costs of gathering information on unspecified attributes and of contracting for spillovers markets for harvest rights could resolve the simpler gear conflict and bycatch problems other interactions e g predation habitat requirements would require corporate or collective property rights and governance arrangements that make harvesters and other interested parties the residual claimants of their harvest decisions subject to government restrictions that protect public goods

tournaments as a worker discipline device c c yang i introduction in the absence of unemployment a worker caught shirking and subsequently fired could obtain a new job at the market wage without difficulty as a result of this and the imperfect monitoring of workers on the job effort shapiro and stiglitz 1984 argued that there must be involuntary unemployment in equilibrium to serve as a worker discipline device making job loss costly so as to discourage shirking 1 in response to shapiro and stiglitz s argument carmichael 1985 suggested that workers could pay employment fees to purchase their jobs and that the competition among workers for jobs would raise such fees until all involuntary unemployment disappeared alternatively there is the so called bonding scheme bonds are posted by workers when initially hired and forfeited if the workers are caught shirking the fear of losing the bonds then substitutes for the threat of becoming unemployed in creating work incentives the competition among workers for jobs would allow firms to charge an amount for bonds until there were no difference between employment and unemployment and so again there would be no involuntary unemployment in a nutshell the introduction of an employment fee or a bonding scheme can eliminate involuntary unemployment making obsolete unemployment as a worker discipline device in the real world however rarely are employment fees or bonding observed why do employment fees bonding or the like not then emerge to arbitrage the difference between employment and unemployment so as to eliminate involuntary unemployment this is a puzzle for shirking models romer 1996 461 2 it has been claimed that contracts with upward sloping age earning profiles the so called implicit bonding can act as perfect substitutes for contracts with explicit employment fees or bonds akerlof and katz 1989 negate this claim and show that the implicit bonding in general does not eliminate the need for involuntary unemployment as a worker discipline device to resolve the bonding issue katz 1986 suggests that future theoretical work is required to analyze the problem in an explicitly contractual setting this article offers an attempt in this direction we study a type of contract which is prevalent in the real world and most importantly can act as a perfect substitute for the employment fee or bonding scheme as far as the elimination of involuntary unemployment is concerned the contract in question is the so called tournament 3 a tournament contract compensates workers on the basis of their relative performance prizes arising from tournaments are fixed in advance and a worker receives the winner s prize not by being good in the absolute sense but by being better than the other workers contracts with the characteristics of tournaments are prevalent in labor markets the salesman who sells the most is given a large bonus the best worker gets promoted to become the company manager etc the incentive effects of tournaments have been analyzed in detail by lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 malcomson 1984 and others 4 in contrast to the extensive analysis of the microeconomic incentives of tournaments this article focuses on the macroeconomic implications of tournaments in the vein of shirking models it is shown that all involuntary unemployment will disappear if it is feasible for firms to exploit tournaments to full flexibility this finding pinpoints the power of tournament contracts in resolving involuntary unemployment as a consequence of this result the generation of equilibrium unemployment will require that there be certain impediments to the full exploitation of tournaments we suggest institutional constraints legal rules or social norms as possible candidates for the impediments the rest of this article is organized as follows

differential consumer demand systems it is shown in this paper that several well known systems like the rotterdam model and the almost ideal demand system can be seen as different parametrizations of the budget share differential equation using a third parametrization a new system called the cbs system is developed and discussed special attention is given to the relative price version of the system and in particular to the special case of preference independence some estimates for the netherlands based on time series for 1953 1981 using various approaches are presented

common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources abstract the literature on common property based resource management comprises many important studies that seek to specify the conditions under which groups of users will self organize and sustainably govern resources upon which they depend using three of the more comprehensive such studies and with an extensive review of writings on the commons this paper demonstrates that the enterprise of generating lists of conditions under which commons are governed sustainably is a flawed and impossibly costly research task for a way out the paper examines the relative merits of statistical comparative and case study approaches to studying the commons it ends with a plea for careful research design and sample selection construction of causal mechanisms and a shift toward comparative and statistical rather than single case analyses such steps are necessary for a coherent empirically relevant theory of the commons

efficiency wage models of unemployment a second view kevin lang and shulamit kahn efficiency wage models in which firms find it profitable to pay wages above workers reservation wages provide a promising explanation for unemployment and interindustry wage differentials one criticism of such models is they imply firms should sell jobs by requiring up front bonds from new workers however only some efficiency wage models imply this moreover firms might not require bonds for many reasons we show that moral hazard and adverse selection models together explain many labor market phenomena the efficiency wage model conforms well to empirical finding but certain anomalies suggest the need to consider rent sharing models carmichael s paper in this volume is an important contribution to the debate over the importance of efficiency wages he clearly outlines some of the deficiencies in the theory and thus points out areas needing further research nevertheless his conclusions are far too negative he greatly exaggerates the theoretical weakness of the efficiency wage model and gives insufficient recognition to the empirical implications generated by this model and to tests of these implications i shirking models there is direct empirical evidence that shirking is a serious problem for firms firms spend significant sums monitoring workers levine 1987 reviews the evidence that worker shirking is widespread and costly the evidence in burroway 1979 and mars 1982 also demonstrates the importance of shirking and stealing carmichael s primary argument against shirking models is that if the payment of efficiency wages to deter shirking led to an excess supply of workers workers would buy their jobs by posting bonds since we do not observe workers posting bonds he concludes that firms do not pay efficiency wages either given the importance of shirking the absence of market clearing bonds needs explaining one explanation is that the market has found some reasonable substitute for bonds such as deferred wage payments it is theoretically feasible to substitute deferred wage payments for up front bonds as noted by akerlof and katz 1989 however the empirical evidence of industries with deferred payments i e where low beginning wages are balanced by high subsequent wages is mixed dickens and katz 1987b krueger and summers 1988 and abraham and farber 1987 indicate that industries which pay high wages to high tenure workers tend to pay high wages to low tenure workers on the other hand high wage industries also tend to have steeper earnings profiles which may be evidence of deferred earnings in these industries as shapiro and stiglitz 1984 note a second possible explanation for the absence of market clearing bonding is that bonding gives firms an incentive to fire workers immediately upon collecting their bonds however this explanation assumes that a firm will immediately fire every worker who posts a bond if there are any reputation costs at all some firms sometimes will not fire bond posting workers and we should observe some bonding yet with finite length contracts there must be some reputation costs because otherwise firms would never pay workers in the last period thus firm incentives to cheat and fire workers cannot explain the complete absence of bonding clearly the absence of market clearing bonding is not fully understood and further theoretical work is needed dickens katz lang and summers 1989 review a wide variety of possible reasons that bond posting is limited the important point is that there are many potential reasons for limited bonding other than the absence of efficiency wages on the other hand the lack of bonding despite the importance of shirking does not demonstrate that firms pay efficiency wages there may be reputation or other costs to the worker caught shirking even in the absence of bonding as dickens katz lang and summers 1989 demonstrate in the absence of bonding whether paying efficiency wages dominates relying solely on increased monitoring depends on the parameters of the model and is therefore an empirical issue

competition and regulation in the taxi industry abstract a simple model of the taxi industry suggests that deregulation of fares and entry may not be optimal the conditions of competition do not hold in the industry even approximately a model of search where drivers and riders search for each other is presented for the cruising taxi market this indicates that equilibrium of a deregulated industry does not exist price regulation is essential and entry regulation may be useful in addition viewing the medallion as a bond for appropriate performance provides another possible rationale for regulation

taxation or regulation looking for a good anti smoking policy abstract this paper investigates the relative ability of two anti smoking policies taxes and regulation in inducing reductions in cigarette consumption and in providing incentives to stop smoking or not to start to our results based on canadian data show that cigarette demand responds to taxes elasticity of 0 28 but not to regulation while the converse is true for the proportion of smokers in the population

industry wage differentials and efficiency wages a dissenting view with south african evidence abstract does industry wage dispersion constitute evidence of either efficiency wages or rent sharing comparison of the industry wage premia of whites and africans in south africa casts doubt upon the rent extraction and the gift exchange explanations of the industry wage structure unions combined with union threats fail to explain the data other explanations unobserved ability compensating differentials and the shirking monitoring and turnover models are rejected here as they have been before remaining possibilities are expense preference theory and internal equity rules implications for future research are pointed out

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

are cigarette bans really good economic policy this study investigates the quarterly relationship between the quantity of cigarettes sold real disposable income per capita and the relative price level of cigarettes in canada careful attention is paid to the nonstationarity of the data and the dynamic specification of the model it is concluded that cigarette demand is extremely insensitive to price and income changes this is evidence of the large consumer surplus smokers enjoy and the large revenue increasing potential of a cigarette tax increase policy as opposed to cigarette bans

persistent wage dispersion and involuntary unemployment it is costly for firms offers to workers to be turned down both because firms must make additional offers and making offers is costly and because capital is underused or unused provided that workers apply to at least two firms for jobs there will be wage dispersion in equilibrium and some workers will randomly fail to receive any wage offers firms in the same industry with access to the same technology may nevertheless choose different levels of capital intensity firms using capital intensive technologies will pay higher wages

limited entrepreneurial attention and economic development economic development depends on the allocation of entrepreneurial resources to efforts to discover new profit opportunities limited entrepreneurial attention is allocated between maintaining current activities and starting new activities this paper addresses the problem of allocating limited entrepreneurial attention in a variety of contexts the issues that are addressed are product improvement and new product development the choice of career as an innovative entrepreneur a managerial entrepreneur or a salaried employee the venture capitalist s attention to current and new ventures and funds the writing of internal contracts and market contracts and the supervising of current employees and hiring additional employees

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

did henry ford pay efficiency wages we examine henry ford s introduction of the five dollar day in 1914 in an effort to evaluate the relevance of efficiency wage theories of wage and employment determination we conclude that the ford experience strongly supports the relevance of these theories ford s decision to increase wages dramatically is most plausibly the consequence of labor problems of the kind efficiency wage theorists stress the structure of the five dollar day program is consistent with the predictions of efficiency wage theories there is vivid evidence that the introduction of the five dollar day resulted in substantial queues for ford jobs significant increases in ford productivity and profits accompanied the new regime

moral hazard asset specificity implicit bonding and compensation the case of franchising i introduction there is a large and growing interest in the structuring of compensation to deal with the moral hazard problem much of this literature treats various forms of income sharing such as piece rates and sharecropping as a means for a principal to provide incentives to an agent this literature has been extended to the case of two sided moral hazard where both parties to an exchange may shirk another mechanism to induce effort discussed in the literature is bonding where workers post a bond that is forgone if effort is inadequate klein 1980 and klein and leffler 1981 treat the possibility of specific assets as constituting an implicit bond where poor performance by a firm is penalized by bankruptcy and sale of assets at a loss this paper studies a situation where these issues coalesce the case of compensation arrangements in franchising the typical franchise contract calls for the sharing of franchise income between franchisee and franchisor additionally franchisees may be terminated for poor performance if franchise assets have a degree of specificity the ensuing sale of assets at a loss provides a penalty for poor performance we examine the determinants of franchise royalty rates and fees in this setting while there is a literature on two sided moral hazard and some empirical work on franchising based on this idea none incorporates the potential influence of asset specificity we explicitly consider the role of implicit bonding and asset specificity in conjunction with moral hazard on the part of both trading parties we go beyond previous work in franchising by estimating the effects of asset specificity and other influences on the royalty rate further part of our empirical work utilizes improved micro data on actual franchise contracts our approach and its implications are discussed in section ii consistent with previous work we expect the royalty rate to decrease increase as the importance of the franchisee s franchisor s input increases however more specific capital with the threat of termination acts as an implicit bond and substitutes for a reduced royalty rate in inducing franchisee effort thus we expect royalty rates to increase with asset specificity also unlike other approaches we do not necessarily expect an inverse relationship between the royalty rate and the franchise fee for example the greater the importance of franchisor effort the higher the royalty rate but the franchise fee may also increase if franchise revenue rises by enough our hypotheses are tested using two different data sets an original firm level data set is taken from federal trade commission ftc required uniform franchise offering circulars ufoc 1 in addition data are obtained from bond s 1989 the source book of franchise opportunities the data are discussed and the results presented in section iii we find substantial support for our approach for example factors that increase the importance of the franchisee s effort such as the number of employees supervised lower the royalty rate and increase the franchise fee also a reduction in the specificity of the franchisee s investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee 2 section iv summarizes our findings and concludes the paper ii the approach and the hypotheses the typical franchising contract consists of a two part payment by the franchisee to the franchisor the franchisee pays an up front nonrefundable franchisee fee and a continuing royalty payment usually a percentage of sales in return the franchisee receives the right to use the franchisor s brand name capital and a method of operation in addition the franchisor provides on going support to the franchisee however the franchisor maintains the right to unilaterally terminate the contract if the franchisor determines that the franchisee is not delivering a product consistent with the quality guaranteed by the brand name

firm specific human capital as an employer discipline device the inability of employers to monitor perfectly the level of effort of their employees is a potentially serious impediment to labor market efficacy indeed a number of recent studies have concluded that this may lead to involuntary unemployment shapiro and stiglitz 1984 sparks 1986 an inefficient sectoral allocation of workers oi 1990 strand 1986 and discrimination against productively identical workers bulow and summers 1986 this paper shows that the lock in effect of firm specific human capital can help alleviate problems of worker moral hazard and thereby promote labor market performance i introduction as the surveys of akerlof yellen 1986 ch 1 carmichael 1990 lang and kahn 1990 and weiss 1990 amply illustrate the last decade witnessed the emergence of a large body of literature which falls under the general rubric of efficiency wage models of the labor market the hallmark of this approach is that some essential aspect of worker performance depends upon the wage paid by the firm much recent work bulow summers 1986 oi 1990 shapiro and stiglitz 1984 sparks 1986 and strand 1986 has considered the case in which due to monitoring difficulties worker effort depends positively upon the wage the popularity of the approach undoubtedly stems from its ability to apparently explain many stylized features of labor market behavior in an attractively simple and straightforward manner in the papers cited above shapiro and stiglitz 1984 and sparks 1987 show that labor market equilibrium can be characterized by involuntary unemployment bulow and summers 1986 demonstrate that inter alia efficiency wage models are consistent with equilibrium discrimination against productively identical agents and finally oi 1990 and strand 1986 show that efficiency wage payments can generate an inefficient sectoral allocation of workers yet recent research now suggests that the results obtained from this class of model are highly sensitive to the specific assumptions made at the outset about the completeness of contractual arrangements indeed as carmichael 1985 astutely observed if contracts can include bond payments even if financed by borrowing from imperfect capital markets the standard imperfect monitoring variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis fails to predict the emergence of equilibrium involuntary unemployment i e all workers receive their reservation utility however proponents of efficiency wage models have responded to this criticism by arguing that workers would be unwilling to post large bonds with firms due to a problem of employer moral hazard specifically workers recognize that firms may hire them in order to steal their bond payment ex post once this limitation on admissible bond payments is recognized it might then be tempting to conclude that the main results of the efficiency wage literature will re emerge in this paper i consider this issue in an environment which also allows for investment in firm specific human capital the basic structure is similar to hashimoto 1981 following macleod and malcomson 1987 1989 i assume that 1 worker performance measures are sufficiently nebulous to preclude verification by third parties and 2 as in carmichael 1983 the courts are unable to ascertain whether in the event of separation a worker quit or was fired this informational structure generates a potentially serious joint worker employer moral hazard problem workers may shirk and employers may simply hire labor in order to collect any bond payments or exit fees stipulated in the contract as emphasized by both carmichael 1989 1990 and macleod and malcomson 1987 1989 the solution to this contracting problem requires that both parties receive a non negative return from the continuation of the match relative to what can be obtained from its dissolution

locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal abstract illegal water diversions and lax rule enforcement are common on irrigation canals we present a mathematical programming model of a watercourse calibrated to a canal in maharashtra on which farmers voted to cooperate to control water theft the model solution computes the crop choices and profits of individually optimizing farmers who differ in their location it reveals the spatial distribution of gains and losses from cooperation it illuminates why voluntary bargaining will rarely achieve an efficient water allocation it also shows that landless laborers might well be against local cooperation if the expropriated water nurtures labor intensive crops

health risk and the decision to quit smoking this study contributes to the understanding of the decision to quit smoking by taking into account the learning of new risk information the specific hypothesis tested is that smokers learn new risk information and hence create an incentive to quit from their own experience probit models are estimated for the decision to quit smoking based on longitudinal data obtained from taiwan it is shown that health risk measured by the observed change in health status over the period between two surveys has a relatively substantial positive effect on the probability of quitting smoking in addition the results indicate that schooling has a significantly positive effect on the probability of quitting these findings are consistent with the predictions of a bayesian learning framework and suggest that the risk information obtained from individual experience which is the sole source of information available to smokers in most developing countries plays the same role that public information does

cigarette demand health scares and education in turkey the purpose of this paper is to examine the demand characteristics of cigarettes in turkey aggregate time series date for the 1960 88 period are used in estimation income and price elasticities of cigarette demand are obtained the effect of health warning is estimated to reduce cigarette consumption by about 8 since the inception of warnings in 1982 imports of cigarettes have been allowed since 1984 in addition to advertising of cigarettes in the non electronic media the effect of health warnings are found to be stronger than the opposing effect of advertising the results also suggest that public education about adverse health effects of smoking may be more effective in reducing consumption and less regressive on consumer incomes than raising the price of cigarettes

commons regulation and rent seeking behavior the dilemma of pakistan s guzara forests curred over the past 120 years these forests known locally as guzara forests can be characterized as regulated commons the regulation by placing quantitative restrictions on felling aimed at an orderly exploitation of these forests on the surface the failure of regulation seems to be a simple case of enforcement failure however a closer look reveals a fairly complex picture in which factors such as the delineation of property rights and the rent seeking behavior of those subject to regulation as well as of the regulators themselves have contributed to the problems of these forests the evidence presented in this article shows that the way the regulation was devised gave rise to a discordant structure of property rights involving the government and the local inhabitants despite early signals that it could not be effectively enforced no rectifying change was introduced in the structure of rights which has persisted into the postcolonial era indeed there was a reversal of some potentially beneficial institutional changes that had been introduced toward the end of the colonial period while the process of degradation was set in motion by discordances that arose in the process of delineating property rights it is the theory of rentseeking behavior that provides an adequate explanation of its persistence as well as of the subsequent reversals an effective response to the problem of the guzara forests must take account of two additional features in the regulation of these forests first in addition to the common property externality that leads to the tragedy of the commons these forests also display interjurisdictional externality by virtue of their location second a common

production efficiency and exit in rights based fisheries economic theory predicts that the least efficient vessels are more likely to exit a fishery following the transition to an individual transferable quota itq management regime tools are needed to help analysts predict the likely degree and distribution of consolidation prior to implementing itq programs this research utilizes a one stage estimation procedure to determine the degree to which one s technical inefficiency preceding an itq regime influences the likelihood of exiting our results indicate that a vessel s measure of technical inefficiency is a significant and positive factor in explaining whether it exits the fishery following the implementation of itqs jel q22

why was there mandatory retirement abstract lazear argues that hours constraints and mandatory retirement form part of an efficient contract which inhibits worker shirking he argues that initially workers earn less than their vmp and must work more than they want while later they earn more than their vmp and must work less however if bonding is costly incentive compatibility requires that workers can never exceed the contracted hours in addition hours will be set so that vmp exceeds the disutility of employment consequently being paid more than their vmp is only sufficient not necessary for workers to be constrained to work less than they wish

the effects of an anti smoking campaign on cigarette consumption empirical evidence from greece 1987 the effects of an anti smoking campaign on cigarette consumption empirical evidence from greece applied economics vol 19 no 3 pp 323 329

high value forests hidden economies and elite capture evidence from forest user groups in nepal s terai abstract this paper argues that the policy on decentralised forest management in nepal informed by experiences from the middle hills overlooks the complexity and conflictual potential of establishing effective and equitable user groups in the terai our case study evidence from west central terai suggests that the combination of high forest value and weak institutional control mechanisms create opportunities for local elites to siphon off substantial shares of the benefits generated by valuable local forests the rents created by autonomous fug policies give rise to stark distributional biases a scramble for control and institutional instability we estimate the extent of elite capture and argue that institutional reform needs are intimately linked to controlling what we call the hidden economy of forest user groups

appropriation violent enforcement and transaction costs a critical survey this paper focuses on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach it has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario i e voluntary as well as coercive exchange however voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power this means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid and that the political coase theorem lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

cigarette consumption in spain empirical evidence and implications for public health policy the partial adjustment habit persistence model is used to analyse the behaviour of the demand for cigarettes in spain over the period from 1964 to 1988 on that basis the short and long run elasticities of demand with respect to price income and advertising intensity are estimated the model also provides and estimation of the effects that the anti smoking policies implemented during the period might have had on consumption the results are used to anticipate the probable impact on sales of a total ban on advertising and to design a suitable method to finance a health education campaign about the risks of smoking

the structure of a contract and the theory of a non exclusive resource the process of arriving at a useful concept of analysis is not only slow and painful but also may go astray and attain nothing useful someone begins with one example or observation followed by a theory which is intuitively plausible a theoretical term associated with a vague concept is coined examples of a seemingly different type emerge which call for another theory the process goes on as examples and theories continue to accumulate the different categories under the same heading of analysis serve only to confuse and each associated theory becomes ad hoc such has been the fate of the concept of externality a more useful approach i think is via contractual conditions the example chosen for illustration is marine fisheries where the fishing right is taken

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

taxation smuggling and demand for cigarettes in canada evidence from time series data abstract this study analyzes canadian cigarette consumption and taxation between 1980 and 1994 a period in which there have been large price rises and declines and a dramatic increase in the consumption of contraband tobacco products we examine elasticities of legal cigarette sales and total sales including contraband with respect to the price of legal cigarettes and various other factors the growth of the contraband market since 1987 appears to have created two classes of cigarette taxed and untaxed with responses to changes in the legal price that are respectively higher and lower than was previously the case the sensitivity of total cigarette sales to the taxation instrument is much lower than it would appear from sales of taxed cigarettes alone

the stability of cigarette demand the relative effects of various governmental interventions upon cigarette consumption is important to policy makers historically the demand for cigarettes has been quite unstable previous studie

a free lunch in the commons we derive conditions under which raising costs through a regulatory constraint or a fully expropriated tax can increase the profits arising from a common pool resource the basic model assumes a fixed number of identical agents with linear costs selling in a single period at an exogenous price a necessary and sufficient condition for a cost increase to be profitable is that aggregate output from the resource be locally convex in aggregate effort we also show that cost increases can be profitable even if price is endogenous agents are heterogeneous entry is costless or agents are playing a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game we also discuss more general welfare implications of the result along with its relation to existing results for a cournot oligopoly

updated notes on the interindustry wage structure 1890 1990 the author documents and analyzes changes in wage structure across manufacturing industries over the years 1890 1990 interindustry differentials in wages were highly stable over that period for production workers but much less stable for nonproduction workers interindustry wage patterns were very similar for production and nonproduction workers in 1990 though this similarity dates back only to 1958 although dispersion of wages across industries followed varying trends over the period it was higher in 1990 than at any previous time in this century the variables that have been most strongly correlated with wage growth are productivity growth rising union density rising capital intensity and profit growth

ownership agency and wages an examination of franchising in the fast food industry this paper estimates the difference in compensation between company owned and franchisee owned fast food restaurants the contrast is of interest because contractual arrangements give managers of company owned outlets less of an incentive to monitor and supervise employees estimates based on two data sets suggest that employee compensation is slightly greater at company owned outlets than at franchisee owned outlets the earnings gap is 9 percent for assistant and shift managers and 2 percent for full time crew workers furthermore the tenure earnings profile is steeper at company owned restaurants these findings suggest that monitoring difficulties influence the timing and generosity of compensation

the trade off between supervision and wages evidence of efficiency wages from the nlsy standard efficiency wage models suggest that workers employed in places with lower probabilities of identifying shirking will earn more as will workers who have better alternative opportunities this paper provides new empirical evidence in support of efficiency wage theory using the national longitudinal surveys of youth data the empirical results support the prediction of the model that workers employed in larger work groups are paid more a finding consistent with a supervision wage trade off additional evidence supports the prediction that workers with better alternative opportunities earn more the classical competitive theories of wage determination predict that workers will be paid the value of their marginal product these theories suggest that after accounting for differences in working conditions there should be no variation in wages among homogeneous workers recent findings that industry affiliation and firm size affect wages suggest that part of the explanation of wage structure is missing these results call into question the view that industry wage differentials can plausibly be rationalized with textbook competitive models krueger and summers 1988 p 280 this paper follows the efficiency wage literature by assuming that one important determinant of wage differences is variation in employers ability to monitor workers efforts 2 this paper provides new empirical evidence in support of efficiency wage theory using data from the national longitudinal surveys of youth nlsy a data set that is noticeably absent from the efficiency wage literature efficiency wage models attempt to complete the explanation of wage structure by focusing

health scare excise taxes and advertising ban in the cigarette demand and supply the cigarette industry is a fascinating laboratory for industrial economists because of its concentrated market structure and history of conflicts over health and tax issues the industry has been the focal point of many economic studies most of the recent studies have concentrated on the demand side of the market for example bass schmalensee hamilton and fujii deal with the impact of advertising and the health scare on cigarette demand 4 15 10 8 barzel johnson and sumner ward assessed the importance of the excise tax or ad valorem tax on consumers cigarette demand 3 12 16 on the supply side vernon rives naylor developed an econometric model of the tobacco industry 20 which however is more concerned with the agricultural aspects of the product than the industry s market organization a careful review of the above studies suggests serious shortcomings which appear to limit their application to policy formulation or market analysis first the variables are introduced in an ad hoc fashion without reference to existing demand or supply theories second none of the above studies recognizes explicitly the interactions among the variables in the demand and the supply equations in the context of the determination of market equilibrium this paper has three objectives 1 to apply the standard neoclassical market theory to the cigarette industry 2 to identify the interactions between cigarette demand and supply using a simultaneous equations approach the first such attempt in a cigarette industry study and 3 to evaluate the effects of cigarette taxes advertising and health scare issues on the industry s output based on the empirical results obtained from the simultaneous equations analysis the judicious selection of explanatory variables careful data

a theory of wage dispersion and job market segmentation job market segmentation refers to the idea that there tends to be a correlation among high wages high productivity high capital intensity high value added few quits relative to layoffs and low labor turnover this paper develops a model of wage dispersion and job market segmentation based on the very sparse assumption that the only departure from a strictly orthodox neoclassical world consists of wages being sticky in the short run implications of the model are explored and discussed

individual heterogeneity and interindustry wage differentials estimates of interindustry wage differentials are obtained using a fixed effects estimator on a long panel the national longitudinal survey of young men nls after controlling for observable worker characteristics 84 percent of the residual variance of log wages across industries is explained by individual fixedeffects only 16 percent of the residual variance is explained by industry dummies since no controls for specific job characteristics are used job characteristics that vary across industries could potentially explain this rather small residual across industry log wage variance that is not attributable to individual effects clearly then these data do not force us to resort to noncompetitive explanations of interindustry wage differentials such as efficiency wage theory furthermore efficiency wage theories predict that wages in efficiency wage paying or primary industries should be relatively rigid therefore industry wage differentials should widen in recessions however no such tendency is found in the data

government manipulation of constitutional level transaction costs a general theory of transaction cost augmentation and the growth of government transaction costs are pivotal to the ongoing political choice of where to draw the line between the private sector and the public sector contrary to the dominant paradigm politically important transaction costs are actively manipulated in the public sector by those who perceive potential personal gain from such action over time transaction cost changes so created by government decision makers may fundamentally redefine the role and scope of government to analyze the role of transaction costs in the growth or decline of government it is essential to distinguish transaction costs that are unavoidable realworld constraints from those that are contrived in the sense that they are created by government officials use or extension of their existing authority once discretionary power is vested in the government its officials have both the capacity and the incentive to restructure the transaction costs constraining the revision ofgovernrnental authority this restructuring of transaction costs may take two forms 1 altering people s perceptions of the costs and benefits of governmental authority in a given sphere an information cost problem 1 2 altering the cost of acting upon one s perceptions of the costs and benefits of collectivization in order to procure revision of the scope of governmental authority 2

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

anti smoking publicity taxation and the demand for cigarettes this study demonstrates that anti smoking publicity in the mass media in switzerland has had a substantial permanent impact on cigarette consumption extended publicity following the 1964 u s surgeon general s report accompanying various tax increases and preceding a public vote on an advertising ban for tobacco products decreased consumption permanently by 11 in addition publicity had important indirect effects which are reflected in smokers strong reactions to nominal cigarette price increases estimated nominal cigarette price elasticity is 1 0 by contrast real cigarette prices failed to be significant thus publicity in the mass media provides a powerful tool for deterring cigarette consumption