bidding behavior in descending and ascending auctions this research examines how individual differences and institutional practices influence consumer bidding in auctions bidders may be motivated by different goals e g thrill of winning the item with minimal attention to what they pay for it versus prudence winning the item at a price at or below its perceived value also innate or auctioneer induced differences may exist in the precision and salience of bidder cognitions about the item s value we report two studies on how these motivational and cognitive factors influence bids in descending and ascending auctions respectively each study also manipulated a situational variable wait time at each price step the two auctions realized different average prices for the same item set average bids were higher in the descending versus ascending auction in several study conditions in both auction formats bidders primed with thrill versus prudence bid higher but more precise and or salient values attenuated this goal effect among other results in the descending auction longer wait times elicited higher bids from bidders primed with thrill but not prudence in the ascending auction longer wait times produced lower bids for bidders primed with prudence but not thrill these findings on consumer bidding behavior have practical implications for auction design

two models of bid taker cheating in vickrey auctions vickrey second price sealed bid auctions have attractive theoretical properties but standard first price sealed bidding is far more common explanations of the rarity of vickrey auctions rely on concern about revelation of private information and on fear of cheating the authors present two models of bid taker cheating a static game theoretic model and a reputation based model of repeated auctions in the first an honest bid taker will not choose a vickrey auction in the second a trusted bid taker who cheats when it pays eventually destroys his or her reputation and the trust on which the use of vickrey auctions depends copyright 1995 by university of chicago press

asymmetric bidding in second price common value auctions abstract two comparative static characterizations for common value auctions under second price rules are extended to heterogeneous bidders the willingness to pay of the two highest bidders is enhanced on average by the release of public information and best responses are less aggressive when facing more rival bidders

consumer trust social marketing and ethics of welfare exchange the global corporate scandals such as enron worldcom and global crossing have raised fundamental issues of business ethics as well as economic social and anthropological questions concerning the nature of business competition and global capitalism the purpose of this conceptual paper is to introduce the concept of welfare exchange to the existing notions of economic social and anthropological notions of business and exchange in markets and society in the 21st century global competition and business success in the 21st century continue to raise the nature of economic value and the interaction among diverse actors in international markets institutions and society we believe that the nature of such exchange between consumers and organizations which can also be termed social marketing need to increasingly take into account a welfare and ethical component in this paper we introduce our concept of welfare exchange to emphasize the importance of such welfare and ethical issues in the global business environment of the 21st century

moral dimensions of the wta wtp disparity an experimental examination abstract contrary to welfare economic theory empirical evidence suggests that the amount of money people are willing to accept wta to forego a commodity will generally exceed the amount of money they are willing to pay wtp to gain the commodity this paper undertakes an experimental examination of the wta wtp disparity using conventional and ecologically produced eggs the results of this experiment reveal that the difference between the mean wtp and wta for conventional eggs is negligible while the mean wta is more than 1 5 times higher than the mean wtp in the case of ecological eggs an explanation for this result is offered following the boyce et al boyce r b brown t c mcclelland g h peterson g l schulze w d 1992 an experimental examination of intrinsic values as a source of the wta wtp disparity am econ rev 82 1366 1373 notion that an asymmetrical assignment of moral responsibility may cause wta to exceed wtp by comparing the two studies a tentative conclusion is that the valuation disparity is likely to increase with a corresponding increase in the degree of assigned moral responsibility

effect of distance of transportation on willingness to pay for food abstract consumers interest in locally produced foods is increasing hence there is a need to decipher and quantify consumers desire for local foods and understand the underlying causes of this demand more specifically we examine in this paper the issue of distance of transportation and its impact on consumer preferences we investigate how consumers willingness to pay wtp for food varies with the distance the food traveled results from non hypothetical second price auctions indicate that average wtp is falling in distance traveled indicating a preference for local production results also indicate that the marginal value of a mile traveled depends on the type of food studied apples vs wine socio demographic characteristics perceptions of freshness taste and food safety as well as support of local economy impact wtp for local foods

consumer research for consumers this article outlines a consumer focused approach for the study of consumer behavior i argue that much of the existing literature by developing knowledge that focuses on the determinants of consumer purchasing is implicitly biased toward a marketing perspective of consumer behavior in contrast i propose the need for a consumer focused approach that would advance knowledge aimed at helping consumers make wiser purchases this approach should address the most important and challenging consumer decisions describe consumer behavior in a manner that leads to prescriptions consider the actions of other parties in the marketplace and identify biases unique to or exacerbated by the consumer context this article then illustrates what such a consumer focused approach would imply for consumer research in three areas negotiations financial services and auctions

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders abstract the number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an auction in a symmetric model with risk neutral bidders holding independent information we obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first price and second price auctions with uncertainty about the number of rivals five auctions are revenue equivalent first price and second price auctions each with the number of bidders known or uncertain and english auctions

reservation price as a range an incentive compatible measurement approach abstract drawing from the literature on buyers uncertainty in preference and product knowledge the authors suggest and empirically test the proposition that a consumer s reservation price for a product is more meaningfully and accurately represented as a range than as a single point given this conceptualization they propose an approach for incentive compatible elicitation of a consumer s reservation price range icerange that builds on becker degroot and marschak s 1964 point of purchase method two empirical applications of the approach provide an assessment of its practicality and its predictive performance relative to current methodologies for reservation price elicitation the results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms the benchmark approaches in terms of predictive validity and yields valuable incremental information about uncertainty in product valuation

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

environment versus growth a criticism of degrowth and a plea for a growth in recent debates on environmental problems and policies the strategy of degrowth has appeared as an alternative to the paradigm of economic growth this new notion is critically evaluated by considering five common interpretations of it one conclusion is that these multiple interpretations make it an ambiguous and rather confusing concept another is that degrowth may not be an effective let alone an efficient strategy to reduce environmental pressure it is subsequently argued that a growth i e being indifferent about growth is a more logical social aim to substitute for the current goal of economic growth given that gdp per capita is a very imperfect indicator of social welfare in addition focusing ex ante on public policy is considered to be a strategy which ultimately is more likely to obtain the necessary democratic political support than an ex ante explicit degrowth strategy in line with this a policy package is proposed which consists of six elements some of which relate to concerns raised by degrowth supporters

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

the loser s curse and information aggregation in common value auctions we consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders the k highest bidders get an object and pay the k 1st bid bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this auction we then consider a sequence of auctions a r with n r bidders and k r objects we show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both k r and n r k r i e both the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object go to infinity

revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders an important managerial question is the choice of the pricing rule we study whether this choice depends on the uncertainty about the number of participating bidders by comparing expected revenues under discriminatory and uniform pricing within an auction model with affiliated values stochastic number of bidders and linear bidding strategies we show that if uncertainty about the number of bidders is substantial then the discriminatory pricing generates higher expected revenues than the uniform pricing in particular the first price auction might generate higher revenues than the second price auction therefore uncertainty about the number of bidders is an important factor to consider when choosing the pricing rule we also study whether eliminating this uncertainty i e revealing the number of bidders is in the seller s interests and discuss the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium

learning to bid the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation we examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good despite the absence of private valuations asymmetric information or risk aversion bidder strategies do not converge to the bertrand nash equilibrium strategies even in the long run deviations from equilibrium strategies depend on uncertainty regarding the value of the good auction structure the agents learning model and the number of bidders although individual agents learn nash bidding strategies in isolation the learning of each agent by flattening the best reply correspondence of other agents blocks common learning these negative externalities are more severe in second price auctions auctions with many bidders and auctions where the good has an uncertain value ex post

the effect of shill bidding upon prices experimental evidence this paper explores through a series of experiments the effect of shill bidding upon revenues and prices in auctions we study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework our findings are consistent with the prediction that if bidders are aware of the possibility of seller participation in an auction profits will be reduced on average we also study factors that affect bidder and seller participation decisions shill bidding can alleviate the problem of the winner s curse by lowering the price and it can thus provide benefits to bidders

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

vertically differentiated simultaneous vickrey auctions theory and experimental evidence we study settings where a number of sellers simultaneously offer vertically differentiated vickrey auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit demand buyers vertical differentiation can arise from differences in item quality item value certainty seller reliability or a combination of these factors we characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller revenue when bidders are restricted to submit at most one bid our theory predicts the existence of a unique bayes nash equilibrium that resembles a form of probabilistic mating of likes allowing unit demand bidders to place an arbitrary number of bids induces complex strategy profiles where bidders place positive bids in all available auctions higher bidder types tend to follow more targeted strategies focusing their serious bids on fewer and generally higher quality auctions the nature of the bidding equilibria introduces allocative inefficiencies that arise from the lack of coordination in auction selection among bidders we test our theoretical propositions in a controlled laboratory experiment while also utilizing a domain specific risk score to help assess how the bidders risk type affects their bidding behavior in support of our theory we find evidence of a probabilistic assortative matching between bidder and auction types we also find that low risk type bidders tend to crowd on the highest auction and will pay a premium for the certainty it offers whereas high risk type bidders fail to appropriately adjust for risk associated with the lowest auction leading to overbidding these lead to an interesting focal anomaly whereby bids are concentrated on the highest and lowest auctions bypassing intermediate auctions

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

experimental auction procedure impact on valuation of quality differentiated goods despite increased use of experimental auctions a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results this study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than english becker degroot marschak bdm and random nth price auctions especially in latter bidding rounds and that random nth price auction yields lower valuations than english and bdm auctions we find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations but the effect varies across auction mechanism

sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions this paper considers a housing market with price restrictions on such markets the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles this vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy proof allocation mechanism the main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps these sequences are demonstrated to play key roles in an english auction and a dutch auction respectively for the considered housing market with price restrictions less

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

hyper individualism and ultrasociality in a veblenian framework abstract in a series of articles gowdy and krall 2013 2016a 2016b framed the process of cumulative social change as a codevelopment of hyper individualism and ultrasociality they argue that at the macro level the global economic system behaves as a superorganism which has co opted human beings cooperative propensity in order to continuously expand its surplus value appropriating an ever larger share of natural resources at the micro level the neoliberal era has legitimized increased competition among individuals and has led to a hyper focus on the maximization of individual consumption in their social context individuals appear to be largely oblivious or dismissive of the growing superorganism as is evidenced by public unwillingness to address situations of global environmental stress in the context of veblen s evolutionary thinking this paper comments on gowdy and krall s articles by discussing two potential venues to tame the superorganism de growth and post nationalism it is argued that the former may be a solution only as a result of a severe ecological collapse scenario thus if the social desire to modify the superorganism exists it will have a greater chance to succeed as a post national project that would provide a structural scaffolding to place the superorganism within human control

a laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non point source pollution auctions allow regulators to identify land management changes with substantial environmental benefit and low opportunity cost this paper reports an experiment in which seller subjects compete in sealed offer auctions to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the experimenter regulator to subsidize pollution abatement one treatment employs uniform price auction rules whereas another treatment employs discriminative price auction rules we find that most offers in the uniform price auction are within 2 of cost whereas most offers in the discriminative price auction are at least 8 greater than cost nevertheless the discriminativeprice auction has superior overall market performance

an alternating recognition model of english auctions we present an alternative abstraction of an english oral ascending auction to the standard in milgrom and weber 1982 that accords more closely with practices in some auction markets in particular the assumptions that exits are irrevocable and necessarily public are dropped making endogenous the decision to compete silently and privately or openly in the model the price rises in a stylization of an auctioneer alternately recognizing two bidders who affirm willingness to pay the current price the auctioneer pays attention to other bidders only when a recognized bidder exits such exits may be temporary although we construct an equilibrium in which there is no benefit to exit and reentry the number of public exits is stochastic frequently a losing bidder will remain silent giving no indication of his willingness to pay and hence yielding no useful inference about his private information thus the source of the expected revenue advantage of english auctions over second price auctions is only stochastically available moreover when public exits are incomplete the ordinal rank of the bidder whose private information can be inferred is unknown making that information less valuable consequently the simpler formula for expected revenue in second price auctions may be the preferred approximation for english auctions

successful uninformed bidding this paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others we show that in a generalized second price auction with single unit demand bidders with less information do surprisingly well they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with more information do and may even have a higher expected utility we also find a positive relationship between the success of less informed bidders and a ratio of units for sale to bidders

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

influences on exchange processes buyers preconceptions of a seller s trustworthiness and bargaining toughness exchange theories posit that trust has an important and favorable influence on dyadic interactions this paper examines the notion that trust plays a key role in making a seller s tough bargaining strategy successful in a bargaining experiment we manipulated subjects preconceptions about a seller s trustworthiness and bargaining toughness as hypothesized a seller s expected trustworthiness plus toughness in bargaining led to higher levels of buyer seller cooperation and agreement and a higher level of buyer concessions

large common value auctions with risk averse bidders abstract we analyze large symmetric auctions with conditionally i i d common values and risk averse bidders our main result characterizes the asymptotic equilibrium price distribution for the first and second price auctions as an implication we show that with constant absolute risk aversion cara the second price auction raises significantly more revenue than the first price auction while this ranking seems robust in numerical analysis also outside the cara specification we show by counterexamples that the result does not generalize to all risk averse utility functions

on the theory of repeated games with private information part ii revelation through communication abstract we consider repeated games with private information discounting and communication similarly to abreu et al 1986 1987 we characterize supergame equilibrium allocations with truthful revelation in the two player case efficiency cannot be attained with supergame equilibria with truthful revelation

equilibria in open common value auctions abstract a sufficient condition for uniqueness of nash equilibrium in second price common value auctions is identified we establish that there exists a continuum of equilibria in irrevocable exit common value auctions for the case of two bidders we provide plausible sufficient conditions under which the expected seller revenue is maximized at the symmetric equilibrium an example in which the auctioneer s revenue at the symmetric equilibrium in a second price auction is strictly greater than the revenue at many asymmetric equilibria in the corresponding irrevocable exit auction is provided

irrationality in english auctions abstract this paper explores the effects of a particular form of irrational behaviour by participating bidders in a common value english auction we allow bidders to update their expected valuation of the good as the current price increases assuming that their opponents always play the symmetric nash equilibrium when only one bidder adopts this type of behaviour it is ambiguous whether the final auction price is higher or lower than at the symmetric equilibrium however when both bidders behave irrationally the final auction price is never lower than the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders match their strategies

the importance of others welfare in evaluating bargaining outcomes this research proposes that negotiators consider each other s payoffs in their evaluation of potential settlements beyond the level necessary to maintain the bargaining relationship we further hypothesize that the way in which negotiators weight their opponents payoffs relative to their own is a function of characteristics of the relationship and of the bargainers personalities specifically we consider liking of the other party payoff expectations satisfaction with past settlements the likelihood of future negotiations egocentricity and power orientation we demonstrate the impact of these factors on the satisfaction negotiators derive from profiting more and less than their opponents using data from an experiment in which subjects negotiate with computer simulated opponents

taking stock of stockbrokers exploring momentum versus contrarian investor strategies and profiles two studies were conducted among professional security analysts to explore their patterns of decision making while managing investment portfolios in study 1 a computer based simulation the analysts styles differed markedly with most exhibiting either a momentum or contrarian approach as indicated by responses to portfolio stock price changes study 2 used a verbal protocol procedure and semistructured depth interviews to probe the analysts thought processes momentum and contrarian investors were found to differ on a number of dimensions including price expectations age experience raw performance risk propensity cognitive style knowledge calibration and strategy adaptivity implications and limitations are discussed

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

an experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations abstract we study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single indivisible item valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder s own and other bidders signals theoretically the english auction yields efficient allocations while other standard auction formats fail to do so consistent with equilibrium predictions we find that an english auction yields significantly more efficiency than a second price sealed bid auction we also study the seller s expected revenue and the bidders expected profits and find that the experimental results are close to the theoretical predictions

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

awarding monopoly franchises repeatedly are second best block rate tariffs attainable without regulation under economies of scale demsetz s 1968 proposal of franchise bidding results at best in uniform prices approaching average cost this article questions the accepted belief that the auctioneer always needs to know the market demand function if the concept is modified so as to allow for bids consisting of block rate tariffs in order to increase welfare given a setting of repeated auctions the auctioneer can apply a sequential mechanism to evaluate bids instead of evaluating them in each auction independently we characterize the conditions under which a second best block rate tariff for given thresholds is approached in equilibrium

verifiable offers and the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations we use the experimental method to compare second price auctions with verifiable multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds despite the two institutions seeming equivalence we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second price auctions the difference occurs because low cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second lowest cost we also compare the two institutions to previously studied first price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non verifiable offers second price auctions yield the highest prices followed in order by verifiable negotiations non verifiable negotiations and first price auctions one of the more interesting facets of voluntary exchange is how changes in the strategic environment lead to differences in transaction outcomes for example the pioneering experimental work in chamberlin 1948 and smith 1962 illustrates that changing the nature of the information available to participants can dramatically influence the price and efficiency of an exchange process with this insight in mind in this article we use the experimental method to examine and compare four exchange mechanisms in a procurement setting in which a buyer faces several sellers that have privately known production costs the first two institutions are the first price auction and the second price auction these well known auction formats and their outcome equivalent variants the dutch auction and the english auction are used extensively to allocate products as varied as flowers art produce fish government securities and mineral rights 1 several governments have recently used auctions to allocate such valuable resources as radio spectra electric power and pollution rights 2 the second two institutions are variants of the multilateral negotiations introduced in thomas and wilson 2002 in this common exchange mechanism a buyer solicits price offers from multiple sellers and then he elicits more favourable offers by playing the sellers off one another until he accepts one of the offers or breaks off the negotiations among other settings multilateral negotiations are

are two better than one bargaining behavior and outcomes in an asymmetrical power relationship many consumer transactions are characterized by bargaining between parties holding unequal power positions the group polarization hypothesis suggests that the effects of group size will differ for high and low power bargainers accordingly power position and size of bargaining unit one two were manipulated in a threat vulnerable 2 2 game factor effects on economic performance communication style and post bargaining attitudes were examined at the unit and system levels supporting the group polarization hypothesis two person groups tend to magnify the power manipulation i e group size interacts with power position on post bargaining attitudes and system performance

the ultrasocial origin of the anthropocene abstract the current geological epoch has been dubbed the anthropocene the age of humans we argue that the roots of the anthropocene lie in the agricultural revolution that began some 8000 years ago unique human psychological and cultural characteristics were present in our distant hunter gatherer past but in terms of the biophysical impact of our species agricultural represented an unequivocal and decisive evolutionary break with the transition to agriculture human society began to function as a superorganism functioning as a single unit designed by social natural selection to produce economic surplus where environmental conditions were permitted early human agricultural societies followed the same pattern as a few social insects and exhibited explosive population growth complex and detailed division of labor intensive resource exploitation territorial expansion and a social organization favoring the survival and growth of the supergroup over the well being of individuals within the group similar economic forces lie behind ultrasociality in social insects and humans increased productivity from the division of labor increasing returns to scale and the exploitation of stocks of productive resources exploring the evolutionary mechanisms behind ultrasociality offers insights into the growth imperative that threatens the stability of the earth s life support systems

implementing efficient multi object auction institutions an experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents abstract we study three alternative implementations of the vickrey multi unit demand auction vickrey s original static sealed bid auction and two dynamic ausubel auctions with and without public dropout information reported during the auction although implemented by a weaker solution concept behavior in the dynamic vickrey auction with the public dropout information comes significantly closer to the theoretical prediction of sincere bidding bidding one s valuations than either the static vickrey auction or the dynamic auction without dropout information this suggests a possible tradeoff between the simplicity and transparency of a mechanism and the strength of its solution concept when agents are still learning and or when players are not fully rational drawing on results from related single unit and multi unit demand auctions and the results of a new single unit demand auction experiment we provide important insights into the behavioral mechanism underlying the superior performance of the ausubel auction with feedback information

silent auctions in the field and in the laboratory we analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions we focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding we then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions as a controlled environment this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field the laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction jel d44 h41

resolving uncertainty about the number of bidders in independent private value auctions an experimental analysis results from first price sealed bid auctions in which there is uncertainty regarding the number of bidders are reported consistent with recent theoretical findings concealing information regarding the number of bidders raises more revenue for the seller than revealing information individual bids show that 1 narrowly interpreted the nash equilibrium bidding theory underlying these theoretical predictions is rejected as less than 50 of all bids satisfy the strict inequality requirements of the theory but 2 a majority of the deviations from these inequality requirements favor the revenue raising predictions of the nash model and in a large number of cases involve marginal violations of the theory

endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions the paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent payos the reference point is endogenised as the expected price of the good in the auction the model predicts that in equilibrium bidders both overbid and underbid in comparison to the standard bidding function without reference dependent utility the model predicts that more bidders overbid than underbid and that bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders or the reserve price increases finally it is shown perhaps surprisingly that revenue equivalence continues to hold between rst and second price

auction fever rising revenue in second price auction formats the prevalent term auction fever visualizes that ascending auctions inconsistent with theory are likely to provoke higher bids than one shot auctions to explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally we design four different strategy proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo endowment effect arguments psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value a control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one shot auction with real endowments we conclude that when bidders are uncertain about their valuations auctions that foster pseudo endowment may raise bids and revenues

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

naturally occurring markets and exogenous laboratory experiments a case study of the winner s curse we examine the relevance of experimental findings from laboratory settings that abstract from the field context of the task that theory purports to explain using common value auction theory as our guide we identify naturally occurring settings in which one can test the theory experienced agents bidding in familiar roles do not fall prey to the winner s curse yet experienced agents fall prey to the winner s curse when bidding in an unfamiliar role we conclude that the theory predicts field behaviour well when one is able to identify naturally occurring field counterparts to the key theoretical conditions

the competitiveness of joint bidding in multiple units uniform price auctions recent literature on joint bidding in a single unit common value cv auction argues that the inference and precision that emerges from pooling information by joint bidders enhances competition such information pooling mitigates adverse selection and results in more aggressive bidding and may even increase revenue despite the reduction in the number of bidders we analyze here for the first time joint bidding in a simple cv uniform price auction with multi unit demand this introduces an opposite force due to increased monopsony power of the joint bidders called demand reduction dr we show that the pro competitive benefit from joint bidding in single unit auctions does not generalize to a multi unit environment even when dr is disallowed with dr the scope for improved competition is further eroded

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

better faster cheaper an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback the majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single attribute price format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time alternatively a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes while such an auction may provide higher theoretical utility to the buyer it is not clear that this theoretical improvement will be realized given the increased complexity of the auction in this research we present an ascending auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and dependent on three attributes motivated by a supply chain procurement problem setting we consider quality and lead time for the two attributes in addition to price the auction mechanism provides the bidders with restricted feedback regarding the buyer s utility function we explore experimentally the performance of this multiattribute auction mechanism as compared to a price only auction mechanism compared with the price only auction we find that our mechanism design is effective in increasing both buyer utility and bidder supplier profits

from the editors experimental designs in international business research the question that motivated this editorial was where are the ib experiments the short answer is that experiments are largely absent from the ib literature and we argue that they shouldn t be experimental methods offer the opportunity to significantly improve the evidence for the causal relationships in international business research in a variety of ways in this article we highlight the value and limitations of experiments in ib research and explain the basic tenets of experimental design and thinking with the goal of encouraging the submission of more papers with an experimental design to jibs