a utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods the paper studies utilitarian welfare maximization in a model with an excludable public good where individual preferences are private information if inequality aversion is large optimal allocations involve the use of admission fees and exclusion to redistribute resources from people who benefit a lot from the public good to people who benefit little if inequality aversion is close to zero optimal admission fees are zero these results are robust if earning abilities provide an additional source of heterogeneity and income taxation an additional policy instrument

innovation and communication signalling with partial disclosure this paper introduces a model of feedback effect equilibrium i e equilibria in which an asymmetrically informed agent is motivated to communicate its privately known attribute but can do so only through channels or signals which convey directly useful information to competing agents this revelation to the competition serves to reduce the value of the private information held by the first agent models of this kind are of obvious relevance to realistic theories of product or financial market disclosure policies of firms patenting and a host of related behavioural and regulatory issues this model is developed in the context of a set of firms engaged in research and development rivalry in which the value of privately held and disclosed information arises from its implications for the likelihood and timing of productive innovation

fossil resource trade balances emerging trends for the uk abstract the aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which the uk can be classified as a net importer of fossil resources and a creator of pollution havens abroad between 1968 and 2000 using input output techniques and a derived resource flow classification system both the physical trade balance ptb and pollution trade balance utb associated with fossil resource use are computed the ptb shows that between 1968 and the early 1980 s the uk is presented as a net importer of direct fossil resource flows between 1984 and 2000 the uk is identified as a net exporter of direct fossil resources these trends are primarily explained by the uk s discovery and commercial production of north sea oil and gas fields in the late 1970s on the other hand the utb shows that over the whole period the indirect used flows attributable to the uk s exports are higher than those attributable to its imports these findings suggest that the uk did not create pollution havens abroad from the use of fossil resources between 1968 and 2000 however it is noticeable in both cases that from 1995 the uk s position as a net exporter has been decreasing considerably maturing north sea oil and gas fields set against increasing demands for fossil fuels and imported goods is signalling a return to the uk s pre 1984 dependence on direct imported fossil resources and the possible creation of pollution havens abroad knowledge of these trends contributes to the evidence base for the uk s changing import and export structure and the potential environmental repercussions at home and abroad

long term changes in social metabolism and land use in czechoslovakia 1830 2000 an energy transition under changing political regimes abstract industrialisation goes along with sweeping changes in society s interrelations with its environment the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society leads to fundamentally new patterns in social metabolism a process which has been described as socio metabolic transition this paper investigates this transition for the case of the current czech and slovak republics and presents a dataset on the development of key variables related to social metabolism during the last 170 years the dataset includes time series data on the extraction of biomass and fossil fuels energy consumption and land use combining data on bohemia and moravia 1830 1915 with data on czechoslovakia 1918 1992 and the czech and slovak republics 1993 2002 the study covers a period of consecutive political and institutional changes it includes the feudal regime of the late period of the habsburg empire and its disintegration with wwi the short period of the czechoslovak republic in the interwar period the era of a planned economy under a communist regime the collapse of this regime and the subsequent turn towards a market economy and european integration in the 1990s the period was characterized by economic and physical growth it saw a doubling of population and a growth in gdp by a factor 20 domestic energy consumption dec increased by a factor 10 and the share of biomass in dec declined from more than 98 to less than 20 all in all the observed changes closely resemble the characteristic path of the socio metabolic transition as observed in other western european economies major political and economic changes did not result in fundamental alterations of the socio metabolic transition until the mid 20th century the communist era 1945 1989 was characterized by rapid physical growth and changes in the energy and land use system very similar to those of other western european economies in the same period however leading to dec values substantially higher than those of other european countries at around 300 gj cap in the mid 1980s the disturbances caused by the velvet revolution resulted in short term turbulences in social metabolism and structural adaptations and around the year 2000 the czech and slovak republics show biophysical features very similar to those of other western european countries

the structure of socio economic metabolism and its drivers on household level in hungary abstract the joint examination of input flows and the stocks of households provides novel perspectives for socio economic metabolism sem research our study aims to compare household level material flows and stocks and economy wide material inputs and to explore influential factors affecting the level of metabolism at household level household diaries and inventories n 73 were used to assemble household level data regarding material flows and stocks the mean value of the extrapolated annual material inputs 2 16 tons per household member while household stocks represented 1 17 tons per household member excluding building stocks and 46 tons if buildings were considered in the estimation according to our results material inputs and stocks are depending on household size and income exclusively amount of the direct input flows of the economy exceed the direct input flows of households significantly household inputs represent 10 3 of the hungarian direct material consumption dmc for better understanding the material balance of hungary was compiled and extended using an additional layer of the flows functions with regard to input flows every increment in direct inputs evokes multiple increment on macroeconomic scale since several input flows are assumed to be driven by the amount of stocks an increment in material stocks will add further material consumption surplus to this effect improvements in production processes can narrow multiplicative effects especially in food supply chains and construction activity similar characteristics in material flow and stock relations of three countries japan germany and hungary highlight that the decoupling is not possible without accumulation of lower amount of material in the societies

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

on countervailing incentives abstract this paper extends and unifies previous work on optimal contracts under countervailing incentives shedding light in particular on the relation between countervailing incentives and pooling inflexible rules our main result is that the nature of the optimal contract depends crucially on whether the agent s utility is quasiconcave or quasiconvex in the private parameter the optimal contract is separated in the former case and it may entail pooling in the latter case journal of economic literature classification number d82

the relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation abstract changes in patent law global competition and the rise of several new technologies suggest that patents could be of greater value than secrecy for many innovative firms particularly small firms that are unable to use market power or other factors to appropriate their investments in innovation data from the 1993 european community innovation survey cis for up to 2849 r d performing firms is analysed to determine the relative importance of secrecy vs patents this particular combination of appropriation methods is interesting because secrecy can act as a mutually exclusive alternative to patents the results show that a higher percentage of firms in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents however ordered logit regressions show that the probability that a firm rates secrecy as more valuable than patents declines with an increase in firm size for product innovations while there is no relationship for process innovations the firm s r d intensity has no effect on the relative value of secrecy vs patents there is weak evidence to show that participation in cooperative r d increases the value of patents over secrecy for product innovations the results are relevant to ongoing debates over changes to the patent system and the need for policies to encourage small firms to patent more

international comparison of resource use and its relation to economic growth the development of total material requirement direct material inputs and hidden flows and the structure of tmr abstract resource flows constitute the materials basis of the economy at the same time they carry and induce an environmental burden associated with resource extraction and the subsequent material flows and stocks which finally end up as waste and emissions a reduction of this material throughput and the related impacts would require a reduction of resource inputs and breaking the link between resource consumption and economic growth would require an increase in resource productivity material flow analysis mfa can be used to quantify resource flows and indicate resource productivity in this article we study the available empirical evidence on the actual de linkage of material resource use and economic growth we compare resource use with respect to total material requirement tmr and direct material input dmi for 11 and 26 countries respectively and the european union eu 15 the dynamics of tmr as well as of the main components are analysed in relation to economic growth in order to show whether there is a decoupling relative or absolute from gdp and a change of the metabolic structure in the course of economic development dmi cap so far only decoupled from gdp cap in relative terms that is in most countries it reached a rather constant level but with the exception of czech republic showed no absolute decline yet tmr cap was reduced in two high income countries and one low income country due to political influence changes in tmr were more influenced by hidden flows hf than by dmi we analyse the dynamics of the structure and composition of tmr in the course of economic development in general the economic development of industrial countries was accompanied by a shift from domestic to foreign resource extraction different relations can be discovered for the share of biomass fossil fuel resources construction resources and metals and industrial minerals

spatial and temporal flows of china s forest resources development of a framework for evaluating resource efficiency abstract population growth and resource scarcity have remained major constraints on china s development for several decades under conditions of resource limitations utilization efficiency is a key concern for chinese scientists and decision makers based on forest production and trade data for china we present a conceptual framework for resource flow analysis calculate the quantities and analyze the characteristics of flows of forest resources primarily wood and wood byproducts during the critical early economic development of china from 1953 to 2000 by converting the forest resource flows into log equivalents i e the quantity of logs required to generate a unit of each type of product the consumption of forest resources has accelerated throughout the study period and the structure and efficiency of forest resource utilization have both improved the proportion of forest resource flows obtained from outside china has increased and most of this wood was consumed by wood processing industries over time consumption has shifted from logs and lumber to the pulp and paper and artificial board industries to improve the economics and sustainability of its use of forest resources china should increase consumption of forest resources by its pulp and paper industry more fully utilize forest resources obtained from outside china and weaken the dependence on these foreign forest resources by promoting increased utilization efficiency and structural readjustment of the forest industry therefore improved forest management is an effective mean of weakening the dependence on foreign forest resources

economics of public good provision auditing outsourcing and bribery this study investigates a government s contracting decision to audit or outsource the provision of a public good given a potential hidden bribe and information asymmetries the key findings are the following first the bribe and price of the public good are increasing in the corruptibility of the department second the bribe is decreasing in the firm s bargaining power third a bribery equilibrium exists when the department s corruptibility is sufficiently high given the firm s bargaining power a bribe involves extortion or a compensatory payment depending on the department s corruptibility only a compensatory bribe affects the department s contracting decision ce memoire examine une decision contractuelle d un gouvernement de produire un bien public lui meme et de faire une verification ou d aller en sous traitance pour la fourniture d un bien public compte tenu de la possibilite de pot de vin cache et d asymetries informationnelles les principaux resultats s enoncent comme suit d abord le pot de vin et le prix du bien public s accroissent avec le degre de corruptibilite du ministere ensuite la taille du pot de vin decline a proportion que le pouvoir de marchandage de la firme s accroit enfin un equilibre de corruption existe quand la corruptibilite du ministere est suffisamment elevee compte tenu du pouvoir de marchandage de la firme un pot de vin implique une extorsion ou un paiement compensatoire selon la corruptibilite du ministere seul un paiement compensatoire affecte la decision contractuelle du ministere

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

public goods with costly access abstract we examine the optimal allocation of excludable public goods with a private access cost that some consumers may not be able to afford the full information benchmark is presented first then individuals access costs and income levels are private information when high income consumers have low access cost asymmetric information increases the cost of subsidizing the poor for accessing the public good and inequality increases when the low access cost consumers have the lower income subsidizing the poor may involve countervailing incentives but inequality decreases finally monopoly provision exacerbates underprovision of the poor particularly of those with low access cost

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

optimal diversity increasing returns versus recombinant innovation abstract choices regarding diversity play an important role in economics and innovation management but often remain implicit once made explicit the objectives of efficiency and diversity are usually posed as in conflict as efficiency relates positively and diversity negatively to various increasing returns to scale in markets such a perspective however neglects the benefits of diversity in terms of realizing system improvements through recombinant innovation or spillovers the latter implies a contribution of diversity to long term efficiency dominant economic approaches that address diversity such as option value and real options theories regard benefits of diversity as exogenous this paper proposes a simple model of variable endogenous diversity to analyse the optimal balance between increasing returns to scale and recombinant innovation it is discussed under which conditions one of four solutions is optimal complete specialization regardless of which option complete specialization in one specific option symmetric diversity perfect balance and asymmetric diversity the results give rise to a number of policy insights

the case against patents evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity unless productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as productivity is identifi ed with the number of patents awarded which as evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is evidence shows has no correlation with measured productivity this disconnect is at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in at the root of what is called the patent puzzle in spite of the enormous increase in the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy the number of patents and in the strength of their legal protection the us economy has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a has seen neither a dramatic acceleration in the rate of technological progress nor a major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure major increase in the levels of research and development expenditure both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equiboth theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on librium effect of improving incentives to invent the general equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that innovation can be negative the historical and international evidence suggests that while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects while weak patent systems may mildly increase innovation with limited side effects strong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generstrong patent systems retard innovation with many negative side effects more generally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from ally the initial eruption of innovations leading to the creation of a new industry from chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment chemicals to cars from radio and television to personal computers and investment banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a banking is seldom if ever born out of patent protection and is instead the fruit of a competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that competitive environment it is only after the initial stage of rampant growth ends that mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their mature industries turn toward the legal protection of patents usually because their internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these internal growth potential diminishes and they become more concentrated these observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with observations supported by a steadily increasing body of evidence are consistent with

the physical economy of the european union cross country comparison and determinants of material consumption abstract in this paper we investigate what determines observed differences in economy wide material use among the eu 15 member states the empirical basis for our analysis is an extended and revised material flow data set for each of the eu 15 countries in time series from 1970 to 2001 this data set comprises consistent data for domestic extraction imports and exports as well as for derived material flow indicators broken down by 12 types of materials we compare the level and composition of domestic material consumption dmc in the eu 15 member states and identify determinants of the observed differences across the european union member states overall dmc per capita varies by a factor of three ranging between 12 tonnes per capita in italy and the united kingdom and 37 tonnes per capita in finland this variability of dmc in the eu 15 is in a similar order of magnitude as the variability of gdp per capita or total primary energy supply per capita linear correlation analysis reveals that national income and final energy consumption relate to material use but cannot fully account for the observed differences in material consumption by breaking down overall material flow indicators into 12 categories of materials and analysing their use patterns in detail we identified a number of factors socio economic and natural that influence the level and composition of economy wide material use many of these factors are specific for certain types of materials others are more general and quite some driving factors counteract each other regarding the direction of their influence concluding we summarize the most important driving factors for domestic material consumption stressing population density as largely neglected but important explanatory variable for material use patterns discuss issues of environmental significance aggregation and the use of different denominators in material flow accounting and suggest a re interpretation of dmc

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

recombinant innovation and the boundaries of the firm abstract recombinant innovation the combination of existing ideas is important for technological progress we want to understand how important market frictions are in stifling the transmission of ideas from one firm to another although the theoretical literature emphasizes the importance of these frictions direct empirical evidence on them is limited we use comprehensive data on patent applications from the european patent office and a multiple spells duration model to provide estimates that suggest that they are substantial it is around 30 more costly to successfully discover and utilize new ideas created in another firm than in your own this compares to the increased costs of accessing new ideas across national borders of around 7 and across technologies of around 20 these result point towards substantial imperfections in the market for technology

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

material flow accounts balances and derived indicators for the czech republic during the 1990s results and recommendations for methodological improvements abstract the economy and the environment are connected through material and energy flows these flows are the key cause of environmental problems together with land use and other biological and social factors and can serve as an indirect indicator of pressure on the environment the leading method for assessing material flows and dematerialisation at a macroeconomic level was developed during the 1990s by a number of research institutes and organisations the result of this effort was the guide eurostat 2001 92 this is a guide for the analysis of the total mass of annual material inputs and outputs for the whole economic system using accounts balances and derived indicators of material flows the manual touches only briefly on the flows between various sectors of the economy this article describes the application of material flow analysis mfa to the economy of the czech republic relevant indicators were derived on the basis of accounts and balances of material flows compiled for the czech republic for 1990 2000 the indicators and analysis of material flows presented here are the first results covering a long time period and a comprehensive set of material flow accounts in a transition economy the results show that indicators of material flows decreased during the 10 year period analysed by approximately 30 40 material intensity also dropped by 30 i e material efficiency increased by 30 while the material intensity of other countries such as germany dropped by 30 in the 15 year period finally it has been possible to demonstrate that economic growth as expressed by gdp has been decoupled from environmental pressure as expressed by material flow indicators the article proposes further work that should be undertaken in mfa at macroeconomic level in the czech republic in conclusion recommendations are made on how to improve the methodology used

excludable public goods pricing and social welfare maximization abstract we compare two pricing strategies buffet pricing and usage pricing of excludable public goods for social welfare maximization buffet pricing is better than usage pricing for low consumer heterogeneity while the opposite holds for high consumer heterogeneity

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

on the importance of linking inputs and outputs in material flow accounts the weight of nations report revisited abstract the influential word resources institute report the weight of nations of 2000 called for additional research effort to understand linkages between primary material inputs and output of waste and emissions in material flow accounts the report proved highly influential in driving efforts toward methodological harmonization of national material flow accounts but had little impact in triggering additional study into comprehensive material flow accounts and material balances for national economies in this research we test the feasibility of linking inputs to outputs by establishing material flow balances for five countries including germany japan the united states china and australia using available statistical data and agreed calculation methods while statistics for emissions to air are well documented statistics for solid waste are usually incomplete and for many countries are of poor quality we employ stock and flow modeling to determine the waste potential of a national economy which can be used to validate statistically reported waste flows we ask whether the accounts could be up scaled to a global dataset and discuss challenges and limitations of such an approach we also revisit the findings of the wri report and find that methodological improvements to material flow accounting yield more reliable results than could be achieved two decades ago unifying input and output accounts in one coherent framework i e a material balance allows alignment of the policy domains of resource efficiency greenhouse gas and pollution abatement and waste minimization

the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector this article analyzes the efficient mechanism for downsizing the public sector focusing on adverse selection in productive efficiency each worker is assumed to have two type dependent reservation utilities the status quo utility in the public sector before downsizing and the utility that the worker expects to obtain by entering the private sector the efficient mechanism consists of a menu of probability of remaining in the public sector and transfer pairs that induces self selection a worker s full cost is defined by the sum of production cost in the public sector and reservation utility in the private sector it is optimal to start by laying off the agents with higher full cost when the public sector before downsizing is discriminating as the differential of private information about productive efficiency suggests there are countervailing incentives this makes the size of downsizing smaller under asymmetric information than under complete information

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic