follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games this paper compares the leader and follower payoff in a duopoly game as they arise in sequential play with the nash payoff in simultaneous play if the game is symmetric has a unique symmetric nash equilibrium and players payoffs are monotonic in the opponent s choice along their own best reply function then the follower payoff is either higher than the leader payoff or even lower than in the simultaneous game this gap for the possible follower payoff had not been observed in earlier duopoly models of endogenous timing

distinguishing between equilibrium and integration in spatial price analysis this article introduces a new spatial price analysis methodology based on maximum likelihood estimation of a mixture distribution model incorporating price transfer cost and trade flow data this method permits differentiation between market integration and competitive market equilibrium and derivation of intuitive measures of intermarket tradability competitive market equilibrium perfect integration segmented equilibrium and segmented disequilibrium one can also use these estimates to derive semiparametric measures of time varying regime probabilities to track changing market conditions an application to trade in soybean meal among pacific rim economies demonstrates the usefulness of the method copyright 2002 oxford university press

cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials abstract saloner 1987 analyzes a cournot model with two production periods before the market clears if costs do not vary across periods any point on the outer envelope of the reaction functions between the firms stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne saloner s analysis is generalized by allowing for cost differences across periods the continuum of equilibria vanishes for any cost differential if costs fall slightly over time there are multiple leader follower equilibria otherwise the model generates a unique spne where both firms produce their single period cournot outputs in the period when production is cheaper

renewable electricity policies heterogeneity and cost effectiveness abstract renewable electricity policies promote investment in renewable electricity generators and have become increasingly common around the world because of intermittency and the composition of other generators in the power system the value of certain renewable particularly wind and solar varies across locations and technologies this paper investigates the implications of this heterogeneity for the cost effectiveness of renewable electricity policies a simple model of the power system shows that renewable electricity policies cause different investment mixes policies also differ according to their effect on electricity prices and both factors cause the cost effectiveness to vary across policies we use a detailed long run planning model that accounts for intermittency on an hourly basis to compare the cost effectiveness for a range of policies and alternative parameter assumptions the differences in cost effectiveness are economically significant where broader policies such as an emissions price outperform renewable electricity policies

estimating the degree of market integration existing tests of spatial market integration are commonly based on statistical criteria without an explicit link to an economic model of price determination this article proposes new measures of market integration defined directly in terms of a well known spatial price determination model and develops an econometric methodology for estimating these measures due to the intractability of the conditional density function of prices we use indirect inference to estimate the model parameters and market integration measures the methodology is illustrated with simulated data and is applied to soybean price data for the united states brazil and the eu copyright 2008 oxford university press

on equivalence between cournot competition and the kreps scheinkman game abstract the existing literature dealing with the equivalence between the kreps scheinkman ks game and cournot competition has focused on the case of a concave demand function this paper analyzes the equivalence possibilities under the much extended circumstances of strictly decreasing marginal industrial revenue a twice differentiable demand function and convex costs it proves that in the extended context the outcomes in the subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne of the ks game are those of cournot equilibrium ce and that a ce is on the path of the spne of the ks game if the marginal cost of each firm in some special borderline cases is not too high it further proves that for decreasing continuous demand and strictly increasing costs the outcome in the spne of the ks game if the spne exists is that of ce based on these results we argue that the ks game can serve as the basic form for studying quantity competition and for developing a t stage game theoretical framework to make competition form and timing endogenous

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

on flexibility in oligopoly abstract this paper demonstrates that even when firms initial moves are simultaneous the mere opportunity to wait out the opponent s move may be as harmful as a second mover disadvantage

being a leader or a follower this paper deals with the analysis of conflicts in duopoly situations in particular with the distribution of roles in the von stackelberg framework which firm will be the leader which firm the follower under what circumstances will firms find a mutually advantageous distribution of roles will they fight for leadership or followship in von stackelberg s analysis of duopoly either firms do not choose their respective roles or they fight for leadership this situation is due to the particular strategy space namely the quantity to produce of an homogeneous good we extend here the strategy space to price quantity pairs we show that if costs are identical or similar then both firms will prefer the role of follower if there is a significant cost differential between the firms then the non cooperative equilibrium can only be of two types either the less efficient firm will act as the leader selling a limited quantity at a low price and the more efficient firm as the follower selling to the residual demand at a higher price or the more efficient firm acting as leader will drive the less efficient firm out of the market by adopting a limit pricing strategy but in so doing that firm makes less profits than if it acts as follower we suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that firms in a duopoly framework will tend to coordinate on their mutually advantageous role distribution even if they compete in a non cooperative strategic way in terms of both prices and quantities

cointegration and market integration an application to the indonesian rice market this article suggests improvements in the use of regression analysis to measure spatial market integration the procedure pioneered by ravallion is still widespread but is valid only under certain conditions of exogeneity the alternative offered here is an error correction mechanism which makes it possible to test for exogeneity as well as indicating the direction and strength of causality in price formation between markets the method is illustrated with data on rice prices in different parts of the indonesian market the results confirm among other things that supply sources are more important than demand sources in driving prices

the digital provide information technology market performance and welfare in the south indian fisheries sector when information is limited or costly agents are unable to engage in optimal arbitrage excess price dispersion across markets can arise and goods may not be allocated efficiently in this setting information technologies may improve market performance and increase welfare between 1997 and 2001 mobile phone service was introduced throughout kerala a state in india with a large fishing industry using microlevel survey data we show that the adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers was associated with a dramatic reduction in price dispersion the complete elimination of waste and near perfect adherence to the law of one price both consumer and producer welfare increased

the extent pattern and degree of market integration a multivariate approach for the brazilian rice market the extent pattern and degree of integration are analyzed in a multivariate system with cointegrating restrictions the extent of the market is found by identifying locations that are linked by trade and where prices share identicall ong run information permanent component the pattern of integration characterizes interdependence and is analyzed by estimating a vector error correction model the degree of integration is calculated with persistence profiles of the long run relations we demonstrate that bivariate models are inadequate for capturing the spatial dynamics of price adjustment the methodology is applied to the brazilian rice market and policy implications are

endogenous stackelberg leadership abstract we consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyze which of the players will commit when both players have the possibility to do so to that end we study a two stage game in which each player can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2 we show that committing is more risky for the high cost firm and that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten 1988 allow the conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous stackelberg leader journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

the economics of renewable energy support abstract this paper uses theoretical and numerical economic equilibrium models to examine optimal renewable energy re support policies for wind and solar resources in the presence of a carbon externality associated with the use of fossil fuels we emphasize three main issues for policy design the heterogeneity of intermittent natural resources budget neutral financing rules and incentives for carbon mitigation we find that differentiated subsidies for wind and solar while being optimal only yield negligible efficiency gains policies with smart financing of re subsidies which either relax budget neutrality or use polluter pays financing in the context of budget neutral schemes can however approximate socially optimal outcomes our analysis suggests that optimally designed re support policies do not necessarily have to be viewed as a costly second best option when carbon pricing is unavailable

barometric price leadership abstract barometric price leadership refers to situations in which a price leader acts as a barometer of prevailing market conditions for other firms in the industry in this paper a model of price setting with costly information acquisition is analyzed it is shown that the unique equilibrium outcome is for one firm to acquire information and become a price leader while the other firm does not purchase information and becomes a follower in contrast to most previous work leadership in this model is due to the informational setting not the price setting mechanism as with symmetric information the unique outcome is the symmetric bertrand equilibrium

quantity leadership and social inefficiency a game of simultaneous free entry and sequential output choices is analyzed firms enter simultaneously in stage 1 by paying a fixed cost and they choose output levels sequentially in subsequent stages at the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game the production level of a firm is decreasing with the order of the firm in the decision making the firm that is the last to choose output produces the same amount as a typical firm in the standard symmetric simultaneous moves cournot game moreover industry output and market price are identical in the sequential and the symmetric cournot games it follows that in the sequential game there are fewer active firms and higher total surplus than in the standard symmetric cournot game strategic asymmetry results in higher concentration and higher total surplus without an increase in price

a variance components approach to food grain market integration in northern nigeria a variance components methodology is developed for joint tests on a sample of time series of prices for seasonal differences in the price integration of markets the approach requires a statistically adequate number of observations for each market within seasons characterized by constancy of transactions costs among markets the model is applied to eighteen months of weekly grain prices for twenty two villages in northern nigeria results suggest that markets are not well integrated in the six months covering the harvest period implications are drawn for research on market performance in the region

testing market integration new approaches with case material from the west bengal food economy given the inferential dangers of received methods a new methodology is introduced to provide a sequence of tests using weekly spot prices to examine the dynamic relationship of market commodity prices in three locations in west bengal tests suggest that the markets are integrated but a lower degree of integration of paddy and rice prices is identified the hypothesis of full market integration is rejected structural and institutional factors which affect the specifics of performance are identified physical isolation the institutional complexity of marketing systems and contractual forms the polarisation of assets assets specificity the institutional control of information and price formation the underdevelopment of linked markets and the idiosyncratic implementation of state regulatory policy and auto regulatory responses enter the explanation

second mover advantage and price leadership in bertrand duopoly we consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated product bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs we generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and or complements dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions we show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage for the linear version of the model we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance the analysis yields as the unique equilibrium outcome sequential play with the low cost firm as leader

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

agriculture reform and food crisis in syria impacts on poverty and inequality abstract the paper pursues a twofold objective from a methodological viewpoint it shows how to carry out an impacts evaluation of exogenous shocks on poverty and inequality in a context characterised by out of equilibrium poorly adjusting markets as it is the case in many developing countries using a social accounting matrix framework from an empirical viewpoint it provides an assessment of how the cereal price spikes of 2007 2008 and the global recession of 2008 2009 have impacted the welfare of syrian households and how did they compound with the on going agricultural sector liberalisation implemented by the government of syria since mid 1990s this will contribute to shed some lights on the economic background behind the spreading of unrest across the country over the last couple of years or so the results show that liberalisation impacts are very different and largely affected by the adopted budget closure rules while reforms aiming at reducing agricultural market distortions such as production subsidies and price support for strategic crops could generally have a positive effect on growth poverty and inequality the elimination of food security interventions such as food stamp schemes determines an adverse distributional impact against rural household and an increase of poverty the recent macroeconomic shocks food price crisis and the global recession determined a generalised poverty increase and showed an income distribution bias against rural households three fundamental policy implications can be drawn by this study first the liberalisation of agricultural sector shows a significant growth potential and is likely to determine positive effects on poverty through a generalised increase of incomes as well as public budget savings that could be used for pursuing other policy goals second in the short run there is a structural trade off between equity improvements and poverty alleviation the policy options that will more likely reduce absolute poverty show undesirable distributive biases both on overall inequality and on rural households vis a vis urban households third the reform should include a careful design of the use of budget savings mainly to address equity goals that are likely to be generated in the short run by liberalisation

the private and public economics of renewable electricity generation generating electricity from renewable sources is more expensive than conventional approaches but reduces pollution externalities analyzing the tradeoff is much more challenging than often presumed because the value of electricity is extremely dependent on the time and location at which it is produced which is not very controllable with some renewables such as wind and solar likewise the pollution benefits from renewable generation depend on what type of generation it displaces which also depends on time and location without incorporating these factors cost benefit analyses of alternatives are likely to be misleading other common arguments for subsidizing renewable power green jobs energy security and driving down fossil energy prices are unlikely to substantially alter the analysis the role of intellectual property spillovers is a strong argument for subsidizing energy science research but less persuasive as an enhancement to the value of installing current renewable energy technologies

empirical investigation into spatial integration without direct trade comparative analysis before and after the establishment of the ethiopian commodity exchange this paper presents a comparative analysis of the spatial price cointegration of coffee markets in ethiopia in the pre and post ethiopian commodity exchange ecx era using the autoregressive distributed lag ardl cointegration framework the study takes into consideration a market condition in which government policy restricts arbitrage coffee trade between coffee producing areas using coffee price data from 1998 2013 and applying a bounds test approach and toda yamamoto granger causality test the study finds that the establishment of ecx has strengthened regional integration rather than a national harmony between producer markets we also find evidence that since the establishment of ecx an opportunity was created for high quality coffee to dominate price formation while also allowing lower quality coffee producing areas to establish themselves the study underlines the importance of market transparency and exchange of price information between producer markets

the extent of the market examines the classical theory of the market in this paper authors consider the role of price market determination price movement in competitive and monopolistic markets extension of commodity markets

endogenous role in mixed markets a two production period model in this paper i investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly where private and state owned public firms compete by allowing two production periods i find that many equilibria exist including the cournot type equilibrium and one stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower however another stackelberg type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist if small inventory costs are introduced the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower

endogenous price leadership we consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow while the follower role is most attractive for each firm we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that consequently risk dominance considerations as in harsanyi and selten a general theory of equilibrium selection in games mit press cambridge ma 1988 allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait hence the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader

asymmetric information acquisition and behavior in role choice models an endogenously generated signaling game the authors employ a static homogeneous good duopoly model wherein firms can choose to produce in one of two periods the model allows agents to acquire information and then traces the impact of the information pattern on subsequent production behavior asymmetric information acquisition leads to a unique production role choice pattern the informed uninformed firm chooses to assume the leader s follower s role moreover if information is costly the typical equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information thus identical firms with identical opportunities choose to become asymmetrically informed and produce sequentially this is the unique refined equilibrium outcome copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

emission regulation of markets with sluggish supply structures i examine regulation in the presence of convex investment costs and technology specific capacity stocks announcement of future emission taxes reduces current emissions unless fossil fuels are scarce in which case the effect is ambiguous substantial future emission reductions require action today because it takes time to build up clean production capacity and phase out dirty capacity the pigou tax must be coupled with sector specific investment taxes or subsidies to induce the socially optimal trajectory if the private discount rate differs from the social discount rate if such investment taxes or subsidies are unavailable a time inconsistent second best alternative may be to tax emissions above the pigouvian level during the transition phase the theory is complemented with a stylized numerical model of the us electricity market

how integrated is the indian wheat market abstract applying the momentum threshold autoregressive m tar model due to enders and granger enders w and granger c w j 1998 unit root tests and asymmetric adjustment with an example using the term structure of interest rates journal of business and economic statistics 16 3 pp 304 311 this article examines the relationship between the various prices of wheat quoted at different market centres in four indian states we find evidence of m tar asymmetric adjustments of wheat prices indicating that price signals within states are transmitted over time in an asymmetric manner this type of price adjusting behaviour is consistent as to how price differentials may respond to poor dissemination of knowledge regarding market conditions and high transactions costs the results offer important policy implications

evaluating policy interventions with general equilibrium externalities abstract we report on the results of analytical and numerical models that describe the effects of non separable externalities or public goods on public policies with important general equilibrium consequences in the numerical exercise we calibrate a general equilibrium model with non separable air quality benefits in order to measure the excess burden and total net benefits of transportation and energy taxes in the 1995 u s economy the change in the physical level and the economic value in air quality associated with a given policy is a function of the substitution patterns between air quality and market goods that we assume the size of the deadweight loss due to pre existing distortions such as a tax on labor income is substantially affected by these substitution patterns

quantity setting oligopoly with endogenous sequencing abstract this paper investigates endogenous sequencing in a quantity setting oligopoly i formulate an n firm m period model where each firm chooses both how much to produce and when to produce it i find that at least n 1 firms simultaneously produce in the first period in every pure strategy equilibrium this result shows that the generalized stackelberg type outcome never appears in equilibrium except in a duopoly

modeling spatial price transmission in the grain markets of ethiopia with an application of ardl approach to white teff following the agricultural market liberalization policy there is an emerging grain market structure in ethiopia in which the central wholesale market exhibits concentration of power and spatial integration with the local markets due to this it is hypothesized that the central wholesale market influences the long run price movements in the local markets the relationship can be modeled as spatial price equilibrium with the aim to guide subsequent policy decisions with regard to public intervention in the post liberalization period in this study we modeled the spatial equilibrium relationship between the producer and the wholesale prices of white teff a major staple in ethiopia using the autoregressive distributed lag modeling approach to cointegration analysis first the existence of a nonspurious long run relationship in levels between the producer prices in the local market and the wholesale prices in the central market is confirmed second the long run relationship and the error correction model for the producer price are estimated the results reveal that the wholesale price of white teff in the central consumer market is a major short and long run determinant of the producer price in the local supply markets therefore the institutional role of the government with the aim of improving producers marketing margin and the overall performance of the grain markets in the post liberalization period can be influenced through targeted interventions at the central wholesale market

cost of delay and endogenous price leadership abstract we study the effects of discounting in a standard endogenous price leadership model we show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the leader with any cost of delay or discounting however small by analyzing the incentives that induce a firm to take up the leader position we derive positive predictions about which firm will lead most price changes firms with shorter reaction times will be more likely to become the price leader as will firms with lower cost of delay if the firms reaction times are similar

making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets abstract the prediction of asymmetric equilibria with stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically but failed to find support for it in contrast these experiments find that simultaneous move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous this paper generalizes hamilton and slutsky s hamilton j slutsky s 1990 endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria games and economic behavior 2 29 46 endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs i explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence i find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games however inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in hamilton and slutsky s endogenous timing games

economic liberalization and price response of aggregate private investment time series evidence from india this paper presents evidence on the effects of economic liberalization of 1991 on the price responsiveness of aggregate private investment in india the wide ranging reforms are expected to increase the price response of private investment due to i the le chatelier effect ii a higher price elasticity of demand for final goods and iii possible relaxation of the credit constraint the empirical results based on alternative specifications estimation methods and sample periods show a dramatic increase in the price response the elasticity of investment with respect to the relative cost of capital has increased five times after the dismantling of the licence raj ce texte examine les effets de la liberalisation de 1991 sur la reponse des prix de l investissement prive agrege en inde on aurait pu s attendre a ce que ces reformes importantes accroissent la reponse des prix de l investissement privea cause i de l effet le chatelier ii de la plus forte elasticite de la demande de biens finaux et iii de la relaxation possible de la contrainte financiere les resultats empiriques fondes sur des specifications des methodes d estimation et des periodes d echantillonnage differentes suggerent un accroissement dramatique dans la reponse des prix l elasticite de l investissement par rapport au cout relatif du capital s est accru par un facteur de 5 apres le demantelement du regime raj

alternative time patterns of decisions and dynamic strategic interactions this paper offers a simple approach to study steady state markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players are obliged to commit their actions for several periods it highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games the obtained results are then applied to various either micro or macroeconomic issues where time patterns of decisions matter

transfer costs spatial arbitrage and testing for food market integration conventional tests for food market integration ask often misleadingly whether prices in different locations move together in this paper an alternative methodology the parity bounds model pbm is developed which uses information on transfer costs in addition to food prices to assess the efficiency of spatial arbitrage monte carlo experiments using data generated by a point space spatial price equilibrium model show the pbm to be statistically reliable an application to philippine rice markets demonstrates that the pbm detects efficient arbitrage when other tests do not

endogenous leadership in a new market in this article i analyze strategic investment under uncertainty in a new market where firms face a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility the model predicts asymmetric equilibria under fairly general conditions even though firms are ex ante identical and have symmetric opportunities to enter the market in equilibrium one firm commits to early investment and the other firm follows a wait and see strategy in the ex post outcome firms end up with asymmetric sizes if the market profitability turns out close to or lower than expected firms end up in symmetric position if the market turns out highly profitable if uncertainty is small the model yields approximately stackelberg outcomes

a tale of two market failures technology and environmental policy abstract market failures associated with environmental pollution interact with market failures associated with the innovation and diffusion of new technologies these combined market failures provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of public policies that foster emissions reduction as well as the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the rate and direction of technological advance is influenced by market and regulatory incentives and can be cost effectively harnessed through the use of economic incentive based policy in the presence of weak or nonexistent environmental policies investments in the development and diffusion of new environmentally beneficial technologies are very likely to be less than would be socially desirable positive knowledge and adoption spillovers and information problems can further weaken innovation incentives while environmental technology policy is fraught with difficulties a long term view suggests a strategy of experimenting with policy approaches and systematically evaluating their success

firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry a choice between commitment and flexibility abstract this paper presents a model of stochastic oligopoly with demand uncertainty where firms endogenously choose entry timing we examine two extreme types of market structure and show that the equilibrium correspondence that connects them is continous with two identically sized firms there are symmetric cournot type equilibria where the probability of early entry declines with greater uncertainty and for low uncertainty two asymmetric equilibria with one large firm with a continuum of nonatomic firms there is a unique stackelberg equilibrium we conclude that the behavior of a dominant firm with a finite fringe can be approximated by stackelberg equilibrium journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d21 l11

co2 emissions energy consumption and output in france abstract this paper examines the dynamic causal relationships between pollutant emissions energy consumption and output for france using cointegration and vector error correction modelling techniques we argue that these variables are strongly inter related and therefore their relationship must be examined using an integrated framework the results provide evidence for the existence of a fairly robust long run relationship between these variables for the period 1960 2000 the causality results support the argument that economic growth exerts a causal influence on growth of energy use and growth of pollution in the long run the results also point to a uni directional causality running from growth of energy use to output growth in the short run

obtaining strategic advantage from being imitated when can encouraging clones pay an important business strategy research theme concerns finding ways to minimize competition faced by the firm this paper however focuses on a different set of situations the model developed suggests that an innovator s best strategy may be to encourage clones of its product when a network externality is present key factors to consider in assessing whether encouraging cloning is the innovator s best strategy are 1 the benefit to be derived in terms of added user base contributed by the clone sales traded off against 2 the unit sales that will be lost to the clones these factors in turn depend upon the strength of the network effect and the degree to which the innovator s product quality is perceived by consumers to be superior to the clone s the model further suggests that both the innovator and clone earn their highest payoffs when the clone takes the lead in price setting i e when the clone establishes its own price by considering for each price it might set how the innovator will react to that price and the innovator as price follower responds to the price the clone chooses the paper demonstrates that the clone leader innovator follower situation represents the unique nash equilibrium in price setting strategies a central implication is that when operating in a network externality environment instead of a problem to be avoided clones may be valuable assets to an innovating firm building up the user base for the innovator s technology by bringing lower valuing consumers into the market which in turn makes the innovator s product more attractive to high and medium valuing purchasers thus when the above described conditions hold being cloned can be more profitable for an innovating firm than dominating the market alone

testing market integration a model of spatial price differentials for a tradable good is proposed which avoids the inferential dangers of received methods using static price correlations the proposed method also extracts more information on the causes of price differentials from the same data the method is illustrated using monthly rice price data for postindependence bangladesh including the very substantial regional price shocks during the 1974 famine impediments to market integration are indicated

testing for food market integration revisited this article considers the statistical performance of four commonly used econometric tests for market integration the law of one price the ravallion model cointegration and granger causality a spatial price equilibrium spe model that is subject to both production shocks and general price inflation and mimics many of the key characteristics of integrated food markets is constructed the model is used to generate food price time series of lengths that are typical of the short sample sizes available in most developing countries for both instantaneously integrated and independent markets a series of monte carlo experiments on these artificial food price time series are performed which show that all four of the conventional tests for market integration are statistically flawed

spatial market integration in the presence of threshold effects a large body of research has evaluated price linkages in spatially separate markets much recent research has applied models appropriate for nonstationary data such analyses have been criticized for their ignorance of transactions costs which may inhibit price adjustments and thus affect tests of integration this analysis utilizes threshold autoregression and cointegration models to account for a neutral band representing transactions costs we evaluate daily price linkages among four corn and four soybean markets in north carolina nonlinear impulse response functions are used to investigate dynamic patterns of adjustments to shocks our results confirm the presence of thresholds and indicate strong support for market integration though adjustments following shocks may take many days to be complete in every case the threshold models suggest much faster adjustments in response to deviations from equilibrium than is the case when threshold behavior is ignored a large amount of empirical research has evaluated the extent to which spatially separate markets are integrated though the term is used loosely in the literature tests of market integration usually consider the extent to which shocks are transmitted among spatially separate markets the integration of markets can have important implications for price discovery and the operation of the market since persistent deviations from integration may imply riskless profit opportunities for spatial traders

collusive price leadership with capacity constraints abstract in this paper collusive price leadership in homogeneous good capacity constrained repeated price competition is examined in the stage game firms choose their timing of price setting although setting a price early is disadvantageous per se a large firm has an incentive to move early in order to demonstrate its commitment not to deviate if the discount factor is not too large this behavior raises the collusive price compared to that arising in collusion with simultaneous moves as a result all firms obtain strictly higher profits

the saving and investment nexus for china evidence from cointegration tests the saving and investment nexus as postulated by feldstein and horioka fh 1980 is revisited the saving investment correlation for china is estimated over the periods 1952 1998 and 1952 1994 the latter culminating in a period of fixed exchange rate regime amongst the key results it is found that saving and investment are correlated for china for both the period of the fixed exchange rate and the entire sample period with high saving investment correlation the results suggest that the chinese economy is in conformity with the fh hypothesis this is a valid outcome for in china capital mobility was fairly restricted over the 1952 1994 period as indicated by the relatively low foreign direct investment

on market integration and liberalisation method and application to ethiopia the article suggests further improvements in the methodology to analyse market integration it provides corrections to and methodological extensions of recent work in this journal it also presents a way of applying market integration techniques to the analysis of shocks such as market liberalisation and war the method is applied to the effects of liberalisation and the end of the civil war on food markets in ethiopia the conclusion is that liberalisation had important effects on the long run and short run integration of food markets