value of information in competitive economies with incomplete markets we study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets we show that generically the welfare effect of a change in the information available prior to trading can be in any direction there exist changes in information that make all agents better off and changes for which all agents are worse off in contrast for any change in information a pareto improvement is feasible that is attainable by a planner facing the same informational and asset market constraints as agents in this sense the response of competitive markets to changes in information is typically not socially optimal

an examination of the efficiency of the london traded options market this paper examines the pricing of call options on the london traded options market using month end data on 16 companies from april 1978 to july 1983 the black and scholes model is successful in identifying mispriced options and therefore appears to be applicable however the significant profits which can be made from using the model in establishing riskless spreads do not exceed transactions costs the market cannot therefore be said to be inefficient in the narrowly financial sense it remains to investigate whether the very large bid ask spreads on this market which are the major component of transactions costs are actually justified by the risks borne by market makers

a note on discount rate policy and the variability of discount window borrowing abstract the purpose of this note is to evaluate the appropriate discount rate policy rules consistent with minimization of the variability of borrowing at the federal reserve discount window in the context of goodfriend s 1983 model of the bank borrowing decision it is demonstrated that either a penalty rate or a subsidy rate policy will produce minimized variability of borrowing so long as the subsidy rate adjusts point for point to changes in the value of the federal funds rate these policy rules are compatible with a policy procedure designed to target borrowed or non borrowed reserves if the fed does not adhere to one of these specific rules minimization of borrowing variability requires an open market procedure in which the fed pegs the federal funds rate

public pensions unemployment insurance and growth abstract we develop an overlapping generations model that highlights the interaction between an unfunded pension program and an unemployment insurance program in the presence of a labor market with union wage setting both programs are financed by earmarked proportional wage taxes levied on firms and their employees the equilibrium path entails endogenous growth and involuntary unemployment the presence of spillovers between pension programs and unemployment insurance programs has striking implications for growth policy efficiency issues and the transition to a fully funded pension system

a positive theory of social security based on reputation we construct a general equilibrium model in which a pay as you go social security system can be adopted and sustained as a political and economic equilibrium we alalyze the welfare implictions of this system and compare general equilibrium welfare measure to the commonly used notion of actuarial fairness

on competitive price adjustment for a storable good and abstention from trade the public good aspect of information is used to account for periods in which the aggregate level of trade is low it is shown that abstention from trade may occur when the uncertainty with respect to the market clearing price there is no auctioneer gets large relative to the cost of getting information about it and relative to the cost of postponing transactions in this case all agents are aware of bilateral pareto improving trading opportunities but these opportunities are not exploited

on optimal non linear taxation and public good provision in an overlapping generations economy abstract using the self selection approach to tax analysis within an olg framework the paper examines optimal non linear labour and capital income taxation and the provision of a durable public good under endogenous wages the marginal tax rules depend on the influence of the tax instruments on self selection and on the income earning abilities of the households in particular we found that production inefficiency occurs in the model justifying capital income taxation for the public good the paper derives a dynamic analogue of the second best samuelson rule encompassing both inter and intragenerational redistributive considerations furthermore the usual conditions guaranteeing the efficiency of the first best samuelson rule are not sufficient in the present model

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

growth forecasts belief manipulation and capital markets abstract we analyze how a benevolent privately informed government agency would optimally release information about the economy s growth rate when the agents hold heterogeneous beliefs we model two types of agent conforming and dissenting the former has a prior that is identical to that of the government agency whereas the latter has a prior that differs from that of the government agency we identify both informative and uninformative equilibria informative equilibria are equilibria in which the government agency s equilibrium signal leads to a revision of beliefs we demonstrate that the uninformative equilibria can in fact dominate the informative ones in terms of ex post social welfare

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

the value of public information in a cournot duopoly we derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale

does anticipated information impose a cost on risk averse investors a test of the hirshleifer effect this paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk averse investors trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets specifically i examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades consistent with my theoretically derived predictions i find that investors current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short term capital gains taxes on trading profits as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase this evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information which is commonly referred to as the hirshleifer effect

distributional effects of public education in an economy with public pensions we study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays education and pay as you go social security affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents we consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs and allocates tax revenues to finance them in our model human capital is one of the factors of production it is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs parents decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism heterogeneous in its strength across the population which leads to heterogeneity of incomes we investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution we show that in this framework contrary to some earlier results increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology

higher education funding the value of information abstract this note examines the key role of information about individual skills in economic welfare in the model agents invest in higher education when the returns to their investment are uncertain they choose how to finance their investment on the basis of a public signal about their individual skills this note provides an example of an economic framework in which in equilibrium more information about individual skills more accurate signals makes economic agents worse off

federal reserve operating procedures a survey and evaluation of the historical record since october 1979 comment william poole has produced another thoughtful and thought provoking paper two major conclusions emerge from his work first the instability of growth in m1b since october 1979 can be attributed largely to a reluctance by the federal reserve to permit wide enough swings in the federal funds rate second to correct this problem and to promote greater stability in financial markets and the economy the fed ought to replace lagged with contemporaneous reserve accounting and reform the discount window they should then begin to hit a nonborrowed base or reserves target that grows at a steady rate i will organize my comments around these two conclusions i will not comment directly on the other excellent paper in this session by ralph c bryant i will refer to some of bryant s empirical work though in my discussion of the poole paper poole attributes the continued extensive volatility of m1b growth since october 1979 to efforts by the federal reserve to smooth interest rates he concedes that the fed really has let go the federal funds rate to a very considerable extent but he believes that variability in m1b growth over tonger periods is due primarily to the important role accorded interest rates in federal reserve policy making italics mine he cites four reasons for believing that the post october 1979 targeting procedures qualitatively are not very different from the federal funds targeting procedure followed earlier of the four the most interesting and empirically verifiable is that in nearly one third of the weeks since october 1979 the federal funds rate has averaged within 100 basis points of either the bottom or the top of the widened target range during these weeks the constraint on the funds rate might have prevented the fed from hitting its nonborrowed reserves target poole in fact accepts this view uncritically

optimal taxation in life cycle economies abstract we use a very standard life cycle growth model in which individuals have a labor leisure choice in each period of their lives to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income the intuition for our result is straightforward in a life cycle model the individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual s lifetime one way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age if tax rates cannot be conditioned on age a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal as it can imperfectly mimic age conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates journal of economic literature classification numbers e62 h21

a quantitative analysis of capital income taxation this paper studies the quantitative impact of eliminating capital income taxation on capital accumulation and steady state welfare in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations of sixty five period lived individuals who face idiosyncratic earnings risk borrowing constraints and life span uncertainty under a wide range of parameter configurations the capital income tax rate that maximizes steady state welfare is positive even though eliminating it completely would raise the steady state capital stock toward the golden rule this is because the tax burden is shifted toward the younger and liquidity constrained years reducing the individuals ability to self insure copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the intergenerational state education and pensions allocation is inefficient when generations overlap this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements we show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones in our mechanism via the public education system the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital they pay back the debt via a social security tax the proceedings of which finance pension payments when the complete market allocation is achieved the rate of return implicit in this borrowinglending scheme should equal the market rate of return

put call parity theory and an empirical test of the efficiency of the london traded options market abstract put call parity theory in the presence of dividends is extended to take account of transaction costs and new testable models are derived these models are used to test the efficiency of the london traded options market using synchronous option and share prices when account is taken only of option spread significant numbers of deviations from put call parity are identified when commission costs on options and shares are considered however almost none of these deviations prove to be exploitable

the externalities associated with the common property exploitation of groundwater abstract in this paper the rate of groundwater extraction under the common property arrangement is the outcome of a dynamic game played with feedback strategies the analysis clarifies the externalities associated with the common property extraction of groundwater and identifies an risk externality that arises when firms are risk averse identifying the various externalities bears on the development of appropriate forms of groundwater management in particular the risk externality would be unknown to the watermaster of a central control agency suggesting the need for creative decentralized forms of groundwater management

the demand for irrigation water in the high plains of texas 1957 80 a new method of calculating groundwater pumpage is used to estimate water demand these results are used via the gisser sanchez model to show that pumpage regulation is unlikely to be beneficial in the texas high plains a sensitivity analysis is performed on present value profits under optimal control and competitive schemes using different water demand slope and intercept values the results indicate that the gisser sanchez rule is useful in determining the divergence in pumpage time paths and percentage difference in profits under the two schemes but it is not insightful in determining the nominal difference in profits

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

cadillac desert revisited property rights public policy and water resource depletion to alleviate arizona s dependence on groundwater the federal government subsidized construction of the central arizona project cap to import water from the colorado river in exchange for the subsidy arizona reformed its groundwater law to eliminate common property pumping and to ban groundwater mining after the year 2025 we build a model of water resource development in which imported water is a capacity constrained backstop the model is applied to quantify the welfare effects of alternative cap construction dates and arizona groundwater laws we reach two general conclusions first cap was completed 86 years too early in 1987 at a deadweight loss of 2 612 billion ironically construction in 1987 yielded lower surplus than never constructing cap second the political exchange of reform for subsidy introduced a greater loss 2 612 billion than it corrected 0 810 billion the exchange was worse than doing nothing at all

equity and efficiency effects of redistributive policies abstract how do various forms of redistribution affect the distributions of earnings and consumption and their intergenerational mobility do redistributive policies enhance efficiency by mitigating market imperfections or do they create a trade off between equity and efficiency to address these issues a dynamic general equilibrium model is constructed and solved numerically the effects of the degrees of targeting of money transfers and educational transfers and the relative performance of the two types of transfers are examined

the value of information in efficient risk sharing arrangements suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets we show that better information makes everyone worse off if the economy has a representative agent that is the economy s demand for state contingent consumption equals the demand of a hypothetical agent who owns all the economy s wealth the representative agent moreover is normatively unrepresentative although each agent dislikes information the representative agent is indifferent although we emphasize pure exchange our results imply that a representative agent model might seriously misstate the welfare effects of improved information in an economy with production and risk sharing even if it performs well otherwise

benefits from groundwater management magnitude sensitivity and distribution empirical estimates of benefits from groundwater management are reported for an area in california with heavy reliance on groundwater supplies benefits are quite sensitive to the water demand schedule and interest rate but less sensitive to other parameters however in all cases considered the increases in welfare from groundwater management are less than ten percent tax revenues received under a system of pump taxes are four to five times as large as the benefits from management thus groundwater users gain under a system of quotas but may suffer substantial welfare losses under pump taxes

self interest and public funding of education abstract the objective of this paper is to study whether publicly funded education can emerge as a political and economic equilibrium in an overlapping generations economy in which selfish agents vote for public funding of education the presence of complementarities between capital and labor in the production function implies that by improving the skills of next period s workers public funding of education increases the return on capital as a result savers will support a publicly financed education system in order to enhance their future income a version of the model calibrated using u s data generates large shares of gnp allocated to education hence the non altruistic incentive to support public education is quantitatively important

estimation of the depreciation rate of physical and r d capital in the u s total manufacturing sector i introduction numerous studies on production and cost the sources of productivity and endogenous growth have recognized the pivotal role of the physical capital stock studies at various levels of aggregation over assets and industries have emphasized the crucial role of investment in plant and equipment in the growth of demand and productive capacity it is clearly recognized by economists and policymakers that knowledge capital approximated by rd 1986 to measure the depreciation rates of the stock of rd 1980 in the literature on dynamic demand models such an approach was first adopted by epstein and denny 1980 and more recently by kollintzas and choi 1985 for a single capital good and on a theoretical level in bernstein and nadiri 1987a 1987b the paper is organized as follows the specification of the model is presented in section ii section iii is devoted to a discussion of the data and to the presentation of the parameter estimates of the model in section iv we present the empirical results for the depreciation rates for physical and r d capital and compare them with those reported in the literature we compare the physical capital stock estimates generated by our model with the official capital stock estimates produced by u s department of commerce bureau of economic analysis in this section we also present our estimates of the decomposition of gross investment into replacement and expansion investment for both physical and r d capital these decompositions are important from the vantage point of public policy analysis

informational efficiency and welfare in the stock market abstract in an overlapping generations model each generation invests a given budget into a portfolio consisting of risky shares and a riskless asset in each period all agents receive information about the future dividends of the shares there is a unique stationary equilibrium this equilibrium is not constrained efficient in the sense that there exists a non market clearing share price such that all agents would be better off if the shares were exchanged at this price further for certain stochastic environments the public information is socially harmful and we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for this to occur

experimentation and learning in a differentiated products duopoly abstract this paper explores price setting behavior in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation firms learn from the difference in their realized demands in light of the price differential the informativeness of this market experiment is shown to be increasing in size of the price differential in markets with highly substitutable products price dispersion is enhanced as firms adjust their prices so as to generate more information in markets with highly differentiated products firms compress their prices as they prefer to reveal less about the extent of product differentiation journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l13

finite lifetimes and growth abstract in this paper we study the long run growth property of overlapping generations models it is shown that in one sector models with convex technologies the asymptotic growth rate must be zero this results because the young do not have sufficient income to purchase a large capital stock thus a policy of income redistribution to the young can generate growth even if financed by income taxation additionaly it is shown that two sector models and one sector models with nonconvex technologies are consistent with growth

the efficiency gains from dynamic tax reform this paper presents a new simulation methodology for determining the pure efficiency gains from tax reform along the general equilibrium rational expectations growth path of life cycle economies the principal findings concern the effects of switching from a proportional income tax with rates similar to those in the u s to either a proportional tax on consumption or a proportional tax on labor income a switch to consumption taxation generates a sustainable welfare gain of almost 2 percent of lifetime resources in contrast a transition to wage taxation generates a loss of greater than percent of lifetime re sources a second general result is that even a mild degree of progressivity in the income tax system imposes a very large efficiency cost this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

money and redistribution revisionist notes on a problem of samuelson abstract this paper disputes the view that money remedies a friction of overlapping generations its arguments are based upon the numerical example of samuelson 1958 it shows that there is a one to one mapping from equilibria in a system of complete timeless markets to the sequential equilibria usually studied friction is absent in that sense further monetary injection is not unique in converting inefficiency to efficiency the same conversion is possible in markets for consumption loans the common factor of both conversions is redistribution of wealth prior to trade such redistributions correspond to redistributions of numeraire in complete timeless markets

groundwater use under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces a game theoretic model of groundwater extraction in a two cell aquifer under incomplete information a novel assumption is that individual users have incomplete knowledge of the speed of lateral flows in the aquifer although a user is aware that his neighbor s water use has some influence on his future water stock he is uncertain about the degree of this impact we find that the lack of information may either increase or decrease the rate of water use and welfare in a two period framework the relevant characteristic is the ratio of the periodic marginal benefits of water use depending on whether this ratio is convex or concave the average speed with which the aquifer is depleted decreases or increases when users learn more about the local hydrologic properties of groundwater in principle welfare may decrease even in cases when the groundwater allocation is closer to the efficient groundwater allocation

discount window borrowing monetary policy and the post october 6 1979 federal reserve operating procedure abstract a demand schedule for discount window borrowing based on profit maximizing bank behavior is derived a feature of non price rationing at the discount window making longer duration borrowing more costly is shown to make lagged borrowing and expected future spreads between the federal funds rate and the discount rate relevant to the current borrowing decision consequently both the size of the coefficients in the borrowing functions as well as the form of the function itself depend on expected fed policy toward the spread the demand function for discount window borrowing provides the critical link by which non borrowed reserve control affects short term interest rates and ultimately the money supply under post october 6 1979 reserve targeting the analysis suggests some reasons why the fed has experienced difficulty in specifying estimating and utilizing a discount window borrowing function in the non borrowed reserve operating procedure

labor contracts and the role of monetary policy in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper characterizes labor contracts in a dynamic economy subject to both real and nominal shocks in this environment we compare alternative means of trading labor services spot markets fixed nominal wage contracts and price contingent contracts the welfare ordering of these market structures is shown to depend on the relative variability of the real and nominal shocks and the costs of contingent contracts the paper also investigates the role of monetary policy and the neutrality of feedback rules finally we demonstrate that the optimal policy is nonstochastic

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

groundwater focusing on the real issue most studies of the welfare economics of groundwater have focused mainly on the dichotomy between optimal control of groundwater use and no control at all this article argues that under circumstances that generally prevail in semiarid zones assigning property rights to groundwater and permitting the market to determine the allocation of water use can lead to a second best solution an argument is made that if potential users would be allowed to coase bargain with incumbent users on the issuance of new groundwater rights the second best solution is elevated to a pareto optimal solution this article is also a tale of two states water law and performance in new mexico and arizona

is the conventional view of discount window borrowing consistent with the behavior of weekly reporting banks discount window borrowing by weekly reporting banks disaggregated by federal reserve district is used to estimate marvin goodfriend s 1983 model of borrowed reserves little evidence is found to support the argument that a bank s borrowing decision is determined by the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate and by prior bank borrowing a weekly reporting bank has only a 2 7 percent chance of visiting the discount window during any given maintenance period this result is consistent with the presence of considerable harassment costs imposed by the discount window officer copyright 1994 by mit press

current issues in the economics of groundwater resource management the issue of groundwater management remains a practical concern in many regions throughout the world while water managers continue to grapple with the question of how to manage this resource in this article we attempt to bring the most advanced and appropriate tools to bear on the issue of resource allocation involving groundwater our objective is to demonstrate the state of the art in the literature on ways to think about this complex resource and to deal with the important economic issues emanating from its complexity we present the conceptual framework within which economists examine the elements interacting in the management of groundwater resources indicate why the role of the market is limited with respect to the price of this very complex resource and point to the mechanisms that can pull competitive groundwater price and quality graded quantity of groundwater in line with their equilibrium levels in particular we critically review economic models of groundwater use examine the potential for groundwater management discuss the difficulties encountered in the estimation of the relevant control variables of such models and identify the advantages and limitations of the instruments devised for the efficient use allocation of this resource finally we argue that devised regulatory schemes usually ignore the information and knowledge needed for their implementation and we suggest a core of conditions necessary for successful groundwater management reforms

the effects of well management and the nature of the aquifer on groundwater resources we compare groundwater use under collective well management in china where village leaders allocate water among households and under private well management where farmers either pump from their own wells or buy water from wells owned by other farmers villages are divided into connected or isolated groups depending on whether there are lateral groundwater flows between aquifers underlying a village and neighboring ones in rural china households under collective well management use less water even under collective management households located in connected villages use more water indicating that the connectedness of the aquifers may undermine leaders incentives to conserve water

optimal taxation in a life cycle model we extend deaton s atemporal optimal commodity tax model to a life cycle envi ronment in which the individual may choose to work in many periods we are able to con firm the corlett hague intuition goods that are more complementary with leisure should be taxed at higher rates in addition we prove that in the microeconomic framework under lying some popular general equilibrium models if real wage and interest rates are constant over the life cycle the addition of some interest taxation to a consumption tax regime would be welfare improving and that optimal labour tax rates decline with age

when is the standard analysis of common property extraction under free access correct a game theoretic justification for non game theoretic analyses analyses of common property extraction under free access follow two distinct paths traditional and game theoretic giving rise to two standard methodologies one methodology avoids game theoretic analysis by assuming that aggregate extraction in each period induces fel rent dissipation the second methodology solves for the marko perfect equilibrium of an n player extraction game investigating aggregate behavior over time as n we show by example that these coexisting standard methodologies can yield conflicting predictions we then provide conditions relatively easy to satisfy sufficient for the two approaches to yield the same predictions

the neutrality and optimality of counter cyclical monetary policy in equilibrium models with a wealth effect a condition is offered which is both necessary and sufficient for the counter cyclical neutrality of all linear monetary feedback rules with respect to deviations in real market output in that class of stochastic macro economic models with rational expectations additive disturbances multiple markets and a wealth effect on excess commodity demand studied by barro 1976 barro and fischer 1976 king 1982 asako 1982 waldo 1982 and marini 1985 the condition has the form of a constraint on the values of the control parameters of a general monetary feedback rule that includes all other linear feedback rules in this class of models as special cases when the selection of parameters violates this constraint prospective monetary feedback can completely stabilize deviations in real market output around its natural rate without sustained inflation la neutralite et loptimalite de la politique monetaire dans des modcles d equilibre quand un effet de richesse existe on propose une condition necessaire et suffisante pour assurer la neutralite contre cyclique de toutes les regles de retroaction mon6taires lin6aires pour ce qui est des deviations dans le niveau de produit r6el dans cette classe de modeles macro economiques stochastiques avec anticipations rationnelles chocs additifs marches multiples et un effet de richesse sur la demande exc6dentaire de biens tels qu etudies par barro 1976 barro fischer 1976 king 1982 asako 1982 waldo 1982 et marini 1985 cette condition prend la forme d une contrainte sur les valeurs des parametres de controle d une regle mon6taire generale de retroaction dont toutes les autres regles mon6taires lineaires dans cette classe de modele ne sont que des cas particuliers quand la s6lection des parametres ne satisfait pas cette contrainte la retroaction mon6taire prospective peut stabiliser completement les deviations du produit reel autour de son taux naturel sans engendrer une inflation soutenue i would like to thank jim brander ed burmeister john b carlson marsha courchane mike devereux ian domowitz jim glassman craig hakkio stephen r g jones woo sik jung doug mctaggart keizo nagatani doug pearce steve poloz neil raymon stan reynolds john seater shinichi watanabe de mmn wu two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the 1986 canadian economic association meetings the 1986 north american summer meetings of the econometric society the system committee on financial canadian journal of economics revue canadienne d economique xx no 3 august aouit 1987 printed in canada imprime au canada 0008 4085 87 612 624 1 50 canadian economics association this content downloaded from 207 46 13 52 on fri 21 oct 2016 05 54 00 utc all use subject to http about jstor org terms neutrality and optimality 613

controlling monetary aggregates the discount window this paper argues that current discount window policy coupled with non borrowed reserve targeting of the federal reserve makes the quantity of high powered money endogenous examination of the advisability of this procedure in a stochastic environment is conducted using a general equilibrium financial model it is concluded that the current policy reduces the destabilizing effects of shifts between various depository financial assets but increases the effect of other asset portfolio shifts and aggregate supply disturbances these results are consistent with the work of poole inasmuch as the current debate over discount policy is a repackaging of the debate over interest rate or aggregates control for monetary policy

sufficient and necessary conditions for information to have social value in pure exchange this paper extends corrects and unifies earlier statements concerning the social value of public information as well as the no trading conditions in pure exchange sufficient and necessary conditions are provided for both the single period and two period cases in a postsignal trading model the social value of information is shown to be closely linked to the allocational efficiency of the market the degree of homogeneity of prior beliefs and of information structures the time additivity of preferences and the efficiency of endowments we conclude that the case in favor of public information is much stronger than previously suggested

the macroeconomics of early retirement early retirement was introduced after the appearance of redundant middle aged workers not entitled to pensions this distortionary policy reduces human capital accumulation and economic growth but shifts part of the tax burden on future generations why was it adopted alternative policies which do not introduce long term distortions but impose a larger cost on the current generation of workers were blocked by a coalition of high income workers who did not plan to retire early but sought to reduce the current tax burden and low income workers who expected to retire early and to benefit from the early retirement pension

how social security and medicare affect retirement behavior in a world of incomplete markets this paper provides an empirical analysis of how the u s social security and medicare insurance system affect the labor supply of older males in the presence of incomplete markets for loans annuities and health insurance we estimate a detailed dynamic programming dp model of the joint labor supply and social security acceptance decision focusing on a sample of males in the low to middle income brackets whose only pension is social security the dp model delivers a rich set of predictions about the dynamics of retirement behavior and comparisons of actual vs predicted behavior show that the dp model is able to account for wide variety of phenomena observed in the data including the pronounced peaks in the distribution of retirement ages at 62 and 65 the ages of early and normal eligibility for social security benefits respectively we identify a significant fraction of health insurance constrained individuals who have no form of retiree health insurance other than medicare and who can only obtain fairly priced private health insurance via their employer s group health plan the combination of significant individual risk aversion and a long tailed pareto distribution of health care expenditures implies that there is a significant security value for these individuals to remain employed until they are eligible for medicare coverage at age 65 overall our model suggests that a number of heretofore puzzling aspects of retirement behavior can be viewed as artifacts of particular details of the social security rules whose incentive effects are especially strong for lower income individuals and those who do not have access to fairly priced loans annuities and health insurance

blackwell s ordering and public information abstract we characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty results dating to hirshleifer amer econom rev 61 1971 561 have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect we show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of blackwell and welfare is fully general furthermore blackwell s ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering

optimal groundwater extraction under uncertainty and a spatial stock externality we introduce a model that incorporates two important elements to estimating welfare gains from groundwater management stochasticity and a spatial stock externality we estimate welfare gains resulting from optimal management under uncertainty as well as a gradual stock externality that produces the dynamics of a large aquifer being slowly exhausted this groundwater model imposes an important aspect of a depletable natural resource without the extreme assumption of complete exhaustion that is necessary in a traditional single cell bathtub model of groundwater extraction using dynamic programming we incorporate and compare stochasticity for both an independent and identically distributed as well as a markov chain process for annual rainfall we find that the spatial depletion of the aquifer is significant to welfare gains for a parameterization of a section of the ogallala aquifer in kansas ranging from 2 9 to 3 01 which is larger than those found previously over the region surprisingly the inclusion of stochasticity in rainfall increases welfare gains only slightly

the value of information in production economies abstract it is known that blackwell s 1953 ann math statist 24 265 272 theorem according to which more information always has positive value does not hold in many economic circumstances in particular in exchange economies with random endowments it may fail completely we show that in certain economies with risk averse consumers and risk neutral producers the blackwell theorem holds in competitive equilibrium given that risk sharing markets are absent however in the presence of a risk sharing market it is shown that for crra utility functions all agents may become weakly worse off with better information journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d80 g14

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

aging population and education finance abstract conventional wisdom suggests that aging of population will increase political pressure to tilt the composition of social spending in favor of the elderly while potentially sacrificing other publicly provided goods such as education this view seems to be supported by recent empirical findings that per child public education spending tends to be lower in us jurisdictions with higher fraction of elderly residents do these cross sectional findings also carry the dynamic implication that longevity will lead over time to waning political support for funding of public education this paper challenges such implication we present a model that is consistent with the aforementioned cross sectional regressions yet predicts an overall positive impact of increasing longevity on public education funding and economic growth

the value of information in a simple duopoly model abstract this paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty it explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers by comparing the ten possible types of information structures it is shown that information may be detrimental that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and or the consumer and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival s cost rather than its own all of these irregular results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient

public and private information about short and long lived assets using an overlapping generations model this paper considers the impact of an improvement in the technology that investors use to obtain signals about future payouts of a risk asset it is shown that the effects of such a change on the predictability of the gross return on the asset and on the welfare of the agents depend on whether the asset will make multiple future payouts is long lived or a single future payout is short lived and whether the signals about the payoffs are public or private copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

asset price variability in a rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that in a rational expectations equilibrium with different types of agents who are informed and uniformed about a piece of information price variability may increase as the proportion of agents who are informed increases this is a surprising result and the paper establishes the conditions under which price variability will increase as the percentage of informed agents increases

a note on the no premature exercise condition of dividend payout unprotected american call options a clarification abstract it is shown that merlon s sufficient condition for no rational premature exercise of a dividend payout unprotected american call option is frequently misunderstood and used incorrectly in the finance literature when applied to the multiple dividend case this is especially true in papers we receive to review for journals the purpose of this note is to clarify understanding of the no premature exercise condition

the timing of redistribution we investigate whether late redistribution programs that can be targeted toward low income families but that may distort savings decisions can dominate early redistribution programs that cannot be targeted as a result of information constraints we use simple two period overlapping generations models with heterogeneous agents under six policy regimes a model calibrated to the u s economy benchmark two early redistribution lump sum regimes two targeted late redistribution regimes and finally a model without taxes and redistribution redistribution programs are financed by a labor tax on the young generation and a capital tax on the old generation we argue that if the programs are small in size late redistribution can dominate early redistribution in terms of welfare but not in terms of real output better targeting of low income households cannot completely offset savings distortions in addition we find that the optimal transfer and tax policy implies a capital tax of 100 and transfers exclusively to the young generation