a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

voting equilibria under proportional representation this article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome oriented voters in elections under proportional representation pr i develop a model of elections under pr in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage i use a new solution concept robust equilibrium which greatly mitigates the well known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition applying the equilibrium concept to the model i find that pr promotes representation of small parties in general even when voters are strategic however the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules thus pr may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters main concern is policy outcomes

three party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation this article studies the long run dynamics of policy choices government formations and voting behavior under a parliamentary constitution and proportional representation i develop an infinite period game where in each period voters participate in a proportional representation election and three farsighted parties bargain over one dimensional policy programs and government positions the model incorporates the interaction between elections and coalition bargaining which is the essence of politics in most parliamentary systems as well as a dynamic environment of policymaking a policy once implemented remains in effect until another replaces it i find a markov perfect equilibrium in which 1 there is no majority party in any election 2 election results converge over time to a stable vote distribution 3 policy outcomes change over time but eventually stay within a set of three points 4 minimal winning coalitions and minority governments are formed with positive probability and alternate over time

real exchange rates between the wars abstract bilateral real exchange rates are analyzed for fifteen countries over the period 1925 1937 using a benchmark invariant principal components technique for the period 1925 1931 half of real exchange rate variation originates from countries on floating exchange rates and half from price level differences between countries on the gold standard for the period 1931 1937 real exchange rate movements between the sterling bloc the european gold bloc and the us and canada appear dominant within bloc variation is secondary and mostly due to competitive devaluations our results support earlier evidence that the nominal exchange rate regime to a large extent determines real exchange rate variation

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

how effective are fiscal incentives for r d a review of the evidence this paper surveys the econometric evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal incentives for r d we describe the effects of tax systems in oecd countries on the user cost of r d the current position changes over time and across different firms in different countries we describe and criticize the methodologies used to evaluate the effect of the tax system on

dynamic legislative policy making abstract we prove existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in an infinite horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next we allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities and we assume preferences and the status quo are subject to arbitrarily small shocks we prove that equilibrium continuation values are differentiable and that proposal strategies are continuous almost everywhere we establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence and we provide weak conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines an aperiodic transition probability over policies we establish a convergence theorem giving conditions under which the invariant distributions generated by stationary equilibria must be close to the core in a canonical spatial model finally we extend the analysis to sequential move stochastic games and to a version of the model in which the proposer and voting rule are determined by play of a finite perfect information game

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

elections governments and parliaments in proportional representation systems this paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation electoral system a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament and parties that cannot commit to the policies they will implement once in government government formation involves efficient proto coalition bargaining and elections yield unique strong nash equilibrium outcomes depending on the status quo minimal majority surplus or consensus governments can form if parties and voters are myopic and the status quo is subject to shocks consensus governments and centrist policies occur only in a crisis otherwise governments are minimal winning and policies reflect only the preferences of the government parties

real exchange rates and macroeconomics a selective survey the paper discusses real exchange rate issues of industrial and of developing countries for real exchange rates among the key industrial countries we ask what is the best conceptual framework to shed light on this question we look at alternative theoretical approaches and at empirical evidence on the relation among interest rates expectations and depreciation the discussion of developing countries real exchange rates focuses on the link between real exchange rates real wages and the profitability of capital the model highlights the discrepancy between the mobility of capital including in the long run physical capital and

is public r d a complement or substitute for private r d a review of the econometric evidence is public r d spending complementary and thus additional to private r d spending or does it substitute for and tend to crowd out private r d conflicting answers are given to this question we survey the body of available econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years a framework for analysis of the problem is developed to help organize and summarize the findings of econometric studies based on time series and cross section data from various levels of aggregation laboratory firm industry country the findings overall are ambivalent and the existing literature as a whole is subject to the criticism that the nature of the experiment s that the investigators envisage is not adequately specified we conclude by offering suggestions for improving future empirical research on this issue

real exchange rate volatility and exchange rate regimes evidence from long term data abstract using over one hundred years of historical data for the uk canadian japanese and french us real exchange rates we find that real exchange rate volatility is greater for flexible exchange rate periods than for fixed rate periods

carbon trading in the policy mix the kyoto protocol is stimulating the development of emissions trading schemes at the national and international levels these are being introduced alongside existing policy instruments such as carbon taxes and negotiated agreements leading to complex problems of policy interaction but the topic of policy interaction remains under researched this paper aims to improve understanding of such interactions by examining the conditions under which a cap and trade scheme for carbon dioxide emissions may usefully coexist with carbon energy taxes support mechanisms for renewable electricity and policies to promote energy efficiency the paper argues that each of these instrument combinations may be acceptable provided they contribute to either improving the static or dynamic efficiency of the trading scheme or delivering other valued policy objectives but since the coexisting instruments may raise overall abatement costs while contributing nothing further to emission reductions the objectives and trade offs within the policy mix must be explicit

international interest rate linkages and the exchange rate regime abstract return differentials between instruments denominated in canadian dollars and instruments denominated in american dollars are investigated the study compares the properties of return differentials in the period of fixed exchange rates during the 1960s and in the period of flexible exchange rates during the 1970s and 1980s both real and nominal return differentials are investigated the results indicate that the change in exchange rate regime is not associated with a change in the average level of ex post return differentials between canada and the united states models which predict ex ante return differentials from available information in a rational expectations framework show a surprisingly large amount of structural stability across the regime change the major impact of the flexible exchange rate regime is on the variance of ex post return differentials and not on the average level of ex post or ex ante return differentials jel e42 e58 g15

the assessment technology policy current research and problems in science and technology policy are reviewed trends in innovative activity in the g 7 economies during the past two decades are summarized and the economic rationale for policy in this area given policy tools currently in use in many countries include tax credits and subsidies the intellectual property system and competition policy ongoing areas of current controversy are the interaction of intellectual property and competition policies environmental and innovation policy standard setting in industries characterized by network externalities and the privatization of scientific research and its consequences copyright 2002 oxford university press

innovation strategies as a source of persistent innovation an important topic in the recent literature on firms innovation is the question of whether and to what extent firms which innovate once have a higher probability of innovating again in subsequent periods this phenomenon is called the persistence of innovation although the literature has established that innovation persistence is indeed important from an empirical point of view relatively little attention has been paid to identifying the reasons why this is the case in this article we contribute to the literature by proposing that differences in innovation strategies across firms are an important driving force behind innovation persistence we analyses this issue using a panel database constructed from r d and community innovation surveys in norway empirical measures of five innovation strategies are identified by means of an inductive method ad hoc supplier based market driven r d intensive and science based a dynamic random effects probit model is used to estimate whether and to what extent these innovation strategies are a source of persistent innovation the results support the idea that the differences in innovation strategies across firms are an important determinant of the firms probability to repeatedly innovate more concretely we found that firms pursuing the strategies market driven r d intensive and science based were more likely to be persistent innovators we also distinguish the effects of strategy differences on the persistence of product and process innovation in all firms and within high tech versus low tech firms

how do patent laws influence innovation evidence from nineteenth century world fairs studies of innovation have focused on the effects of patent laws on the number of innovations but have ignored effects on the direction of technological change this paper introduces a new dataset of close to fifteen thousand innovations at the crystal palace world s fair in 1851 and at the centennial exhibition in 1876 to examine the effects of patent laws on the direction of innovation the paper tests the following argument if innovative activity is motivated by expected profits and if the effectiveness of patent protection varies across industries then innovation in countries without patent laws should focus on industries where alternative mechanisms to protect intellectual property are effective analyses of exhibition data for 12 countries in 1851 and 10 countries in 1876 indicate that inventors in countries without patent laws focused on a small set of industries where patents were less important while innovation in countries with patent laws appears to be much more diversified these findings suggest that patents help to determine the direction of technical change and that the adoption of patent laws in countries without such laws may alter existing patterns of comparative advantage across countries jel d2 k11 l51 no 014

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

a model of farsighted voting i present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation in such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace that policy in the future the model can be used to characterize both long term preferences and distributions over policy outcomes in situations where policy is ongoing and voters are farsighted

a dynamic theory of public spending taxation and debt this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending taxation and debt policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically defined districts the legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing these revenues can be used tofinance a national public good and district specific transfers interpreted as pork barrel spending the value of the public good is stochastic reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters in equilibrium policy making cycles between two distinct regimes business as usual in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork and responsible policy making in which policies maximize the collective good transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good in the long run equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile public good provision is too low and debt levels are too high in some environments a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

internationalization of the renminbi what it means for the stability and flexibility of the international monetary system the central question this paper addresses is whether internationalization of the rmb would be sufficient for the international monetary system ims to provide greater stability and flexibility than today s ims whether chinese efforts to internationalize the rmb culminate in the currency achieving reserve status will be for china to realize the path to reserve currency status however is not one that the chinese can pursue unilaterally internationalization entails an interaction between private and public decision making and is a function of private sector confidence as much as public policy the outcome will be the result of strategic interplay involving public policies across systemically important countries and confidence building among global savers and investors the paper argues that international cooperation especially among reserve currency countries on policy frameworks to achieve the common objectives of economic growth full employment price stability and sustainable fiscal positions will define a coherent and well functioning ims copyright 2013 oxford university press

global inspection games abstract in the tax evasion game a typical example of inspection game audits are costly and audit probabilities are determined by the tax agency based on the tax returns submitted by taxpayers we find that if taxpayers incomes are correlated e g when they are subject to a common shock the optimal audit probability for low declarations is an increasing function of the average declaration as the latter is an informative signal of the realized level of income since a taxpayer s optimal declaration is an increasing function of the probability of an audit the optimal auditing rule creates incentives for taxpayers to coordinate their declarations the resulting coordination game features multiplicity of equilibria and thus strategic uncertainty about the equilibrium that will be selected when we add a source of fundamental uncertainty about the type of agency taxpayers face the situation can be realistically modeled as a global game further and unlike the coordination game before it yields a unique and usually interior equilibrium which is consistent with empirical evidence and supported by the data collected in a computerized experiment the model can be applied to other inspection games of economic interest such as the regulation of industries and the allocation of welfare benefits among others

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

the effectiveness of r d subsidies a meta regression analysis of the evaluation literature widespread and increasing public subsidy for research and development r d has given rise to a large and growing number of evaluation studies while economic theory identifies market failures that justify public support theory also suggests reasons why returns might be disappointing similarly the empirical literature investigated 52 micro level studies published since 2000 on either input or output r d reports a wide range of findings the lack of conclusiveness both of theory and of the evaluation literature motivate this meta regression analysis mra this study contributes to policy debate by identifying a representative subsidy effect after controlling for publication selection bias and for a wide range of sample and study heterogeneities mra findings reject crowding out of private investment by public subsidy but reveal no evidence of substantial additionality in addition among the research practices explaining the heterogeneous effects reported in this literature those related to the treatment of unobservable firm heterogeneity are particularly important

robust non parametric measures of exchange rate variability changes in exchange rates are well known to possess non gaussian distributions yet in testing for differences in exchange rate volatility few researches have examined measures that do not assume gaussian data this paper develops a robust non parametric measure for comparing exchange rate variability across time the measures are applied to monthly exchange rate data to test for differences in exchange rate variability across different monetary policy regimes the comparison show inconsistencies between conclusions based on the classical f test and the robust non parametric equivalent using the robust test for changes in exchange rate variability we do not conclude that variability has increased over time increases in variability do occur but usually only in specific percentiles of the data