an economic theory of self control the concept of self control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization the individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer the resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create this paper stresses the implications of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving saving and the timing of income flows and individual discount rates

a search theoretic model of the retail market for illicit drugs a search theoretic model of the retail market for illegal drugs is developed trade occurs in bilateral potentially long lived matches between sellers and buyers buyers incur search costs when experimenting with a new seller moral hazard is present because buyers learn purity only after a trade is made this model is consistent with some new stylized facts about the drugs market and it is informative for policy design the effectiveness of different enforcement strategies is evaluated including some novel ones that leverage the moral hazard present in the market copyright oxford university press

the metamorphosis of development economics abstract the scientific paradigm of development economics is not dead nor is it declining in importance instead it has desynthesized into more than 30 analytical and specialized subparadigms which deal with the complex economic phenomena in ldcs the great number of sub disciplines of development economics is a verification of the dynamic evolution of the discipline and shows its trend towards increased specialization which seems to be the true index of the scientific progress of the subject for those who complain that the current output of new development theories is smaller w a lewis we remind them that development economics is a discipline which has more of a praxeological concrete orientation than a theoretical abstract one it seems that the world today needs more the exercise of development praxeology by the activist than the abstract theorizing of the purists however the study and empirical research of development phenomena in the context of the 30 or more specialized sub disciplines offers an opportunity for improving the quality of our knowledge on these phenomena by the recurrent validation and consolidation of development theories

frontiers of climate change economics the economics of climate change is an active field of research the contributions to a special issue are put in context of the literature and it is suggested that second best issues such as carbon leakage and the green paradox need to be complemented with a political economy analysis of why certain instruments are politically infeasible and with intra and intergenerational analyses of the impact of climate policy a case is also made for more empirical work on the gradual and catastrophic damages of global warming

strategic interdependence in models of property rights the concept of strategic interdependence has opened a wide spectrum of explanation beyond the robinson crusoe economy this essay explores the implications of strategic interdependence for the theory of property rights and the new institutional economics schotter it attempts to clarify some of the linkages from institutional economics to micro and macroeconomic theory by considering how property institutions result from strategic interdependence confer payoffs to individual agents and reflect collective choices based on individual preferences

guns and butter and government popularity in britain britain under the government of prime minister thatcher provides a unique opportunity to probe the effects of both war and macroeconomic performance on government popularity monthly ratings for thatcher and conservative party support june 1979 to july 1985 are examined by way of box tiao intervention models the model that best captures the impact of the falklands war of 1982 is of the gradual temporary variety popularity gains accrued through the three month war shrink in a geometric fashion nevertheless they prove to be worth over five percentage points for the conservative party a year later in the 1983 election macroeconomic performance meanwhile is found to have an asymmetric effect on government popularity with unemployment strongly significant but inflation not significant at all apparently the british public is punishing failure on employment while letting success on inflation go unrewarded qualifications of the positive effect of war and the negative effect of macroeconomic performance are suggested

behavioral economics for environmental policy abstract the predictions of widely prescribed global and country level environmental policies at present are based mainly on mainstream economic models which treat individual actors to be unboundedly rational in their decision making in recent years however behavioral and experimental economists have found that the individual actors in many circumstances act within a bounded rationality framework suggesting that predictions based on the unbounded rationality models would be less valid while some of mainstream economists have already started adopting the bounded rationality based models in their academic discourse many environmental economists seem to be reluctant to use these alternative models of rationality in their research and policy prescriptions this paper highlights the implications of using bounded rationality models in environmental research in general and policymaking in particular

intertemporal trades and problems of self control abstract this paper develops a model which explains how individuals manage self control strategies for situations in which an average level of activity per unit time is what needs controlling the focus of the model is intertemporal trades times when for example a dieter decides to eat dessert with lunch by promising himself he will forego dessert at dinner self control is managed successfully by those who learn to complete such trades the paper analyzes the process of learning about the reliability of ones strategies for intertemporal trades

testing for forward looking behaviour evidence from the enactment of smoking restrictions abstractthis paper develops a new test for forward looking behaviour based on the establishment of public smoking restrictions given that the announcement of these restrictions effectively increases the future cost of smoking we should expect forward looking smokers to curb their consumption before the restriction is effective due to complementarity between present and future consumption i perform the estimation using detailed high frequency household level purchase data the results provide evidence against the forward looking behaviour of smokers households do not reduce their cigarette purchases before announced public smoking restrictions are established they only do so once the restriction is in effect

anomalies in intertemporal choice evidence and an interpretation research on decision making under uncertainly has been strongly influenced by the documentation of numerous expected utility eu anomalies behaviors that violate the expected utility axioms the relative lack of progress on the closely related topic of intertemporal choice is partly due to the absence of an analogous set of discounted utility du anomalies we enumerate a set of du anomalies analogous to the eu anomalies and propose a model that accounts for the anomalies as well as other intertemporal choice phenomena incompatible with du we discuss implications for savings behavior estimation of discount rates and choice framing effects

climate change and intergenerational equity revisiting the uniform taxation principle on carbon energy inputs abstract this paper presents a neoclassical growth model with three energy sectors and a climate externality energy is used in the production of the final consumption good the energy sectors differ on the exhaustibility of the energy resource oil is an exhaustible resource coal is an abundant resource and a green energy sector uses labor oil and coal use increases the stock of carbon in the atmosphere which generates a climate externality standard pigouvian taxation prescribes that a uniform tax on all carbon energy inputs is optimal this uniform tax must be equal to the social cost of carbon because this is the externality that the usage of these inputs generates i consider a policymaker who cares about future generations and may discount the future less than the individuals in the economy this paper s main theoretical result is that the uniform taxation rule does not carry over to an economy with a low social discount rate in particular the optimal carbon tax on oil does not equal the optimal carbon tax on coal moreover while the optimal tax on coal equals the social cost of carbon the optimal carbon tax on oil follows a more general formula

circumventing formal structure through commitment presidential influence and agenda control although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the congress and president ought to provide congress with agenda power the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship we show that if the president can make clear cut commitments presidential commitment can counter the dominance hierarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes thus the details of political interactions in particular the possibilities for commitment may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure

optimal transition to renewable energy with threshold of irreversible pollution when cheap fossil energy is polluting and pollutant no longer absorbed beyond a certain concentration there is a moment when the introduction of a cleaner renewable energy although onerous is optimal with respect to inter temporal utility the cleaner technology is adopted either instantaneously or gradually at a controlled rate the problem of optimum under viability constraints is 6 dimensional under a continuous discrete dynamic controlled by energy consumption and investment into production of renewable energy viable optima are obtained either with gradual or with instantaneous adoption a longer time horizon increases the probability of adoption of renewable energy and the time for starting this adoption it also increases maximal utility and the probability to cross the threshold of irreversible pollution exploiting a renewable energy starts sooner when adoption is gradual rather than instantaneous the shorter the period remaining after adoption until the time horizon the higher the investment into renewable energy

unilateral emission cuts and carbon leakages in a dynamic north south trade model the effects of a unilateral cut in emissions are analyzed in a dynamic two country model two intermediate goods are produced one of which uses the fossil fuel these inputs are traded and combine to produce a final good the effect of a cut in fossil fuel use by a bloc e g annexure 1 countries in the kyoto protocol depends on whether the fuel is priced at marginal cost or above in the latter case a green paradox may appear the paper s contribution lies in analyzing the dynamics and trade implications of the unilateral action

consumption self control by rationing purchase quantities of virtue and vice consumers attempts to control their unwanted consumption impulses influence many everyday purchases with broad implications for marketers pricing policies addressing theoreticians and practitioners alike this paper uses multiple empirical methods to show that consumers voluntarily and strategically ration their purchase quantities of goods that are likely to be consumed on impulse and that therefore may pose self control problems for example many regular smokers buy their cigarettes by the pack although they could easily afford to buy 10 pack cartons these smokers knowingly forgo sizable per unit savings from quantity discounts which they could realize if they bought cartons by rationing their purchase quantities they also self impose additional transactions costs on marginal consumption which makes excessive smoking overly difficult and costly such strategic self imposition of constraints is intuitively appealing yet theoretically problematic the marketing literature lacks operationalizations and empirical tests of such consumption self control strategies and of their managerial implications this paper provides experimental evidence of the operation of consumer self control and empirically illustrates its direct implications for the pricing of consumer goods moreover the paper develops a conceptual framework for the design of empirical tests of such self imposed constraints on consumption in consumer goods markets within matched pairs of products we distinguish relative virtue and vice goods whose preference ordering changes with whet her consumers evaluate immediate or delayed consumption consequences for example ignoring long term health effects many smokers prefer regular relative vice to light relative virtue cigarettes because they prefer the taste of the former however ignoring these short term taste differences the same smokers prefer light to regular cigarettes when they consider the long term health effects of smoking these preference orders can lead to dynamically inconsistent consumption choices by consumers whose tradeoffs between the immediate and delayed consequences of consumption depend on the time lag between purchase and consumption this creates a potential self control problem because these consumers will be tempted to over consume the vices they have in stock at home purchase quantity rationing helps them solve the self control problem by limiting their stock and hence their consumption opportunities such rationing implies that per purchase occasion vice consumers will be less likely than virtue consumers to buy larger quantities in response to unit price reductions such as quantity discounts we first test this prediction in two laboratory experiments we then examine the external validity of the results at the retail level with a field survey of quantity discounts and with a scanner data analysis of chain wide store level demand across a variety of different pairs of matched vice regular and virtue reduced fat calorie or caffeine etc product categories the analyses of these experimental field and scanner data provide strong convergent evidence of a characteristic crossover in demand schedules for relative vices and virtues for categories as diverse as among others potato chips chocolate chip cookies cream cheese beer soft drinks ice cream and frozen yogurt chewing gum coffee and beef andturkey bologna vice consumers demand increases less in response to price reductions than virtue consumers demand although their preferences are not generally weaker for vices than for virtues constraints on vice purchases are self imposed and strategic rather than driven by simple preferences we suggest that rationing their vice inventories at the point of purchase allows consumers to limit subsequent consumption as a result of purchase quantity rationing however vice buyers forgo savings from price reductions through quantity discounts effectively paying price premiums for the opportunity to engage in self control thus purchase quantity rationing vice consumers are relatively price in sensitive from a managerial and public policy perspective our findings should offer marketing practitioners in many consumer goods industries new opportunities to increase profits through segmentation and price discrimination based on consumer self control they can charge premium prices for small sizes of vices relative to the corresponding quantity discounts for virtues virtue consumers on the other hand will buy larger amounts even when quantity discounts are relatively shallow a key conceptual contribution of this paper lies in showing how marketing researchers can investigate a whole class of strategic self constraining consumer behaviors empirically moreover this research is the first to extend previous theoretical work on impulse control by empirically demonstrating its broader implications for marketing decision making

quasi hyperbolic discounting and social security systems hyperbolic discounting has become a common assumption for modeling bounded rationality with respect to individual savings decisions we examine the effects of hyperbolic discounting on the comparison of alternative social security systems we show that this form of bounded rationality breaks the equivalence between funded and pay as you go systems established in sheshinski and weiss 1981 intergenerational transfers within a payg economy are usually secured by the social security system and independent of longevity whereas this is not the case for the funded economy the savings level under hyperbolic discounting is lower than under exponential discounting laibson et al 1996 but the ratio between the savings level under hyperbolic discounting within a funded economy and a payg economy depends on the effectiveness of the commitment devices it is shown that if individuals are hyperbolic discounters then in a payg economy any change in the mandated level of intergenerational transfers is neutralized by individuals voluntary bequests this does not apply to a funded system

the supply of non renewable resources there exists no formal treatment of non renewable resource nrr supply systematically deriving quantity as function of price we establish instantaneous restricted fixed reserves and unrestricted nrr supply functions the supply of a nrr at any date and location not only depends on the local contemporary price of the resource but also on prices at all other dates and locations besides the usual law of supply which characterizes the own price effect cross price effects have their own law they can be decomposed into a substitution effect and a stock compensation effect we show that the substitution effect always dominates a price increase at some point in space and time causes nrr supply to decrease at all other points this new but orthodox supply setting extends to nrrs the partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply policies thereby it provides a generalization of many results about policy induced changes on nrr markets the properties of restricted and unrestricted supply functions are characterized for hotelling homogeneous as well as ricardian non homogeneous reserves for a single deposit as well as for several deposits that endogenously come into production or cease to be active

what is considered development economics commonalities and differences in university courses around the developing world we use a combination of surveys of instructors and data from course syllabi to examine how the subject of development economics is taught at the undergraduate and master s level in over 200 courses

nash equilibrium strategies in directional models of two candidate spatial competition the standard approach to two party political competition in a multi dimensional issue space models voters as voting for the alternative that is located closest to their own most preferred location another approach to understanding voter choice is based on preferred direction of change with respect to some specified neutral point e g an origin or status quo point

hyperbolic discounting and the phillips curve using a standard dynamic general equilibrium model we show that the interaction of staggered nominal contracts with hyperbolic discounting leads to inflation having significant long run effects on real variables

rational addiction with learning and regret we present a theory of rational behavior in which individuals maximize a set of stable preferences over goods with unknown addictive power the theory is based on three fundamental postulates that consumption of the addictive good is not equally harmful to all that individuals possess subjective beliefs concerning this harm and that beliefs are optimally undated with information gained through consumption although individual actions are optimal and dynamically consistent addicts regret their past consumption decisions and regret their initial assessment of the potential harm of the good addict prone individuals who believe it could not happen to them are most likely to be drawn into a harmful addiction

the new institutional economics and its applicability to development abstract the several remarkable developments in the social sciences which have come to be known as the new institutional economics nie have not yet been fully exploited for analyzing the determinants and effects of institutional change in the context of development this paper identifies two important components of the nie and illustrates both a potential complementarities between them and b their applicability to various problems and policies in the long term development of developing countries

is there really a green paradox abstract in the absence of a co2 tax the anticipation of a cheaper renewable backstop increases current emissions of co2 since the date at which renewables are phased in is brought forward and more generally future emissions of co2 will decrease the effect on global warming is unclear green welfare falls if the backstop is relatively expensive and full exhaustion of fossil fuels is optimal but may increase if the backstop is sufficiently cheap relative to the cost of extracting the last drop of fossil fuels plus marginal global warming damages as then it is attractive to leave more fossil fuels unexploited and thus limit co2 emissions we establish these results by analyzing depletion of non renewable fossil fuels followed by a switch to a clean renewable backstop paying attention to timing of the switch and the amount of fossil fuels remaining unexploited we also discuss the potential for limit pricing when the non renewable resource is owned by a monopolist finally we show that if backstops are already used and more backstops become economically viable as the price of fossil fuels rises a lower cost of the backstop will either postpone fossil fuel exhaustion or leave more fossil fuel in situ thus boosting green welfare however if a market economy does not internalize global warming externalities and renewables have not kicked in yet full exhaustion of fossil fuel will occur in finite time and a backstop subsidy always curbs green welfare

saving more in groups field experimental evidence from chile abstract we test the impact of a peer group program on savings in a sample of microcredit clients we conduct two randomized trials among these 2687 microcredit clients the first finds that a savings group treatment which combines public goal setting monitoring in the group and non financial rewards increases savings in a new savings account significantly the number of deposits grows 3 7 fold and the average balance almost doubles in contrast a more classical measure a substantially increased interest rate has no effect for most participants and raises the savings balance only for the very top of the distribution a second experiment conducted a year later tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that effects of similar size can be achieved through feedback text messages without meetings rewards or peer pressure given that participants are borrowing at 90 apr we discuss how and when saving more could be harmful or beneficial

the dynamics of structural realignment g overnments render decisions on how resources and values are allocated in a society in the united states congress is the institution in which most of the key allocating decisions are made to the extent the u s political system is integrated the coalitions that form around the issues debated in congress should be reflected in the coalitions that support presidential candidates and those that support the major political parties we formulate a spatial theory of political change in which new ideological cleavages appear in congressional behavior and presidential elections and gradually reorganize the mass party base the theory leads us explicitly to consider the question of realignment and to specify conditions under which the parties will lose support from voters

the fewer the better number of goals and savings behavior abstract this article examines the effect of the number of goals on consumers savings behavior drawing from research on implementation intention the authors show that under certain conditions presenting a single savings goal leads to greater savings intention and actual savings than presenting multiple savings goals multiple goals typically evoke trade offs among competing goals and thus increase the likelihood that people will remain in a deliberative mind set and defer actions in contrast the authors propose and demonstrate that a single goal evokes a stronger implementation intention which in turn has a greater effect on behavior change they also show that the advantage of a single goal over multiple goals on saving is attenuated when saving is easier to implement or when the multiple savings goals are integrated rather than competing among themselves theoretical and practical implications are discussed

optimal transition from coal to gas and renewable power under capacity constraints and adjustment costs this paper studies the optimal transition from existing coal power plants to gas and renewable power under a carbon budget it solves a model of polluting exhaustible resources with capacity constraints and adjustment costs to build coal gas and renewable power plants it finds that optimal investment in renewable energy may start before coal power has been phased out and even before investment in gas has started because doing so allows for smoothing investment over time and reduces adjustment costs gas plants may be used to reduce short term investment in renewable power and associated costs but must eventually be phased out to allow room for carbon free power one risk for myopic agents comparing gas and renewable investment is thus to overestimate the lifetime of gas plants e g when computing the levelized cost of electricity and be biased against renewable power these analytical results are quantified with numerical simulations of the european commission s 2050 energy roadmap

temptation and taxation we study optimal taxation when consumers have temptation and self control problems embedding the class of preferences developed by gul and pesendorfer into a standard macroeconomic setting we first prove in a two period model that the optimal policy is to subsidize savings when consumers are tempted by excessive impatience the savings subsidy improves welfare because it makes succumbing to temptation less attractive we then study an economy with a long but finite horizon which nests as a special case the phelps pollak laibson multiple selves model thereby providing guidance on how to evaluate welfare in this model we prove that when period utility is logarithmic the optimal savings subsidies increase over time for any finite horizon moreover as the horizon grows large the optimal policy prescribes a constant subsidy in contrast to the well known chamley judd result

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

ordering the extraction of polluting nonrenewable resources energy markets are often characterized by the use of multiple nonrenewable resources such as coal and natural gas with different pollution characteristics the same resource may have different qualities as when high and low sulfur coal is used to generate electricity multiple resources are used in providing transportation services such as cars running on gasoline or plug in hybrids that may be fueled by electricity produced from coal when these nonrenewable resources contribute differentially to pollution what is the opti mal sequence of extraction over time harold hotelling 1931 developed the classical theory of extraction of a nonrenewable resource orris c herfindahl 1967 extended the hotelling model by considering many resources with different unit costs of extraction and proposed the least cost first principle extraction must be ordered by cost with the cheapest resource used first others have examined whether herfindahl s model remains valid in a variety of situations in a general equilibrium setting see murray kemp and ngo v long 1980 tracy r lewis 1982 in the presence of setup costs g rard gaudet moreaux and stephen w salant 2001 under het erogeneous demands chakravorty and darrell l krulce 1994 and when the extraction rate is constrained jean pierre amigues et al 1998 stephen p holland 2003 in these studies following hotelling and herfindahl resources were differentiated by cost alone in this paper we abstract from cost considerations and focus on how the sequence of extraction may be affected when resources are differentiated only by their pollution character istics we consider two resources one more polluting than the other without loss of generality consider coal to be the dirty resource and natural gas the clean one both may be used to generate electricity environmental regulation is imposed through a cap on the stock of pollution this may be a stylized approximation of an international agreement such as the kyoto protocol which aims to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 1 with heterogeneity in pollution the results are nonintuitive and do not depend on the emis sion rates of the resources when the economy is already at its allowable stock of pollution the clean natural gas is used first and use of the dirty coal is postponed to the future this is what one would expect armed with insights from the herfindahl model however when the economy starts from below the ceiling and accumulates pollution coal may be used first and use of the clean natural gas is postponed the optimal strategy is to benefit from natural dilution by build ing the stock of pollution as quickly as possible this is done by burning coal rather than natural

frames of mind in intertemporal choice recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed kahneman and tversky s prospect theory kahneman d a tversky 1979 prospect theory an analysis of decision under risk econometrica472 363 391 explains many of these framing effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated this paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference point concept to intertemporal choice three experiments demonstrate that when people choose between immediate and delayed consumption the reference point used to evaluate alternatives can significantly influence choice the first study elicited relative preference for immediate and delayed consumption using three methods each of which differently framed choices between alternatives offering identical end state consumption the conventional discounted utility model predicts that the three methods of elicitation should yield similar estimates of time preference but preferences were found to differ in accordance with a reference point model the second and third studies extend and replicate the results from the first the third using real rather than hypothetical choices

the grey paradox how fossil fuel owners can benefit from carbon taxation abstract this paper considers the distributional impact of optimal carbon taxation on fossil fuel owners a carbon emitting exhaustible resource competes with a dirtier abundant resource and a clean backstop a time dependent carbon tax is set to optimally use these resources under a cap constraint over co 2 atmospheric concentration as the cap is tightened the dirtier resource becomes less competitive compared to the exhaustible resource the competition effect but the timing and duration of extraction of the exhaustible resource is modified the timing effect we provide analytical expressions of these effects and determine conditions over size of reserves pollution contents extraction costs and demand elasticity such that the exhaustible resource owners profits increase as the ceiling is tightened calibrations for the transport and power sectors suggest that the profits of conventional oil and natural gas owners increase compared to a baseline without regulation for plausible carbon ceiling values

growth renewables and the optimal carbon tax optimal climate policy is investigated in a ramsey growth model of the global economy with exhaustible oil reserves an infinitely elastic supply of renewables stock dependent oil extraction costs and convex climate damages four regimes can occur depending on the initial social cost of oil being larger or smaller than that of renewables and depending on the initial oil stock being large or small we also offer some policy simulations for the first and second regime which illustrate that with a lower discount rate more oil is left in situ and renewables are phased in more quickly we identify the conditions under which the optimal carbon tax rises or decreases subsidizing renewables without a carbon tax induces more oil to be left in situ and a quicker phasing in of renewables but oil is depleted more rapidly initially the net effect on global warming is ambiguous abstract from author

management of a capital stock by strotz s naive planner abstract the capital management problem posed by r h strotz is analyzed for the case of the naive planner who fails to anticipate changes in his own preferences by imposing progressively stronger restrictions on the primitives of the problem namely the discounting function the utility index function and the investment technology the planner s behavior is characterized first as the solution to an ordinary differential equation and then via explicit formulae inasmuch as these characterizations leave the discounting function essentially unrestricted the theory can accommodate in particular decision makers who discount time according to the hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic curves used in applied work and said to be supported by psychological studies comparative statics of the model are discussed as are extensions of the analysis to allow for credit constraints limited foresight and partial commitment

commodity price volatility with endogenous natural resources abstract natural resource reserves are exogenous in models of small commodity exporters changes in the stock of reserves play no role in the macroeconomy including in business cycle volatility trade dynamics or exchange rate volatility we consider richer supply dynamics and model exploration and depletion we show that an endogenous supply of reserves is important for capturing the stylised facts associated with commodity price shocks including a commodity currency the crowding out of non commodity activity dutch disease and a volatile business cycle we also consider how exploration and depletion affect the ranking of optimal monetary and taxation policies when natural resource reserves are held fixed monetary policy is an efficient tool for stabilising the effects of commodity price shocks however when exploration and depletion are accounted for using interest rates to stabilise the effects of commodity price changes becomes inefficient using taxes on the resource sector specifically an ad valorem royalty remains efficient

tobacco taxes and starting and quitting smoking does the effect differ by education this article uses duration analysis to investigate the role of tobacco taxes in starting and quitting smoking applying a variety of parametric duration models to a sample of irish women it finds that in general tobacco taxes do influence starting and quitting smoking in the expected direction it also finds that the effect for starting differs by education but in a nonmonotonic way with the greatest effect for women with intermediate levels of education the results for quitting suggest the greatest effect for women with the lowest level of education these results are unchanged when account is taken of unobserved heterogeneity

the social discount rate what discount rate should be applied to social investments it is standard to use the market interest rate thereby respecting private preferences we show that application of this revealed preference criterion rests on faith not on logic it is justified only if preferences over all choices including past choices are time invariant the conditions for this to be true are stringent under more reasonable conditions policy makers should be more patient than private citizens whose choices define the most short sighted pareto optimum

too much coal too little oil abstract our main message is that it is optimal to use less coal and more oil once one takes account of coal being a backstop which emits much more co2 than oil the way of achieving this is to have a steeply rising carbon tax during the initial oil only phase a less steeply rising carbon tax during the intermediate phase where oil and coal are used alongside each other and the following coal only phase and a flat carbon tax during the final renewables only phase the laissez faire outcome uses coal forever or starts with oil until it is no longer cost effective to do so and then switches to coal we also analyze the effects on the optimal transition times and carbon tax of a carbon free albeit expensive backstop solar or wind energy subsidizing renewables to just below the cost of coal does not affect the oil only phase the gain in green welfare dominates the welfare cost of the subsidy if the subsidy gap is small and the global warming challenge is acute without a carbon tax a prohibitive coal tax leads to less oil left in situ and substantially delays introduction of renewables but curbs global warming substantially as coal is never used finally we characterize under general conditions what the optimal sequencing oil and coal looks like

stability and centrality of legislative choice in the spatial context majority rule spatial voting games lacking a core still always present a near core outcome more commonly known as the copeland winner this is the alternative that defeats or ties the greatest number of alternatives in the space previous research has not tested the copeland winner as a solution concept for spatial voting games without a core lacking a way to calculate where the copeland winner was with an infinite number of alternatives we provide a straightforward algorithm to find the copeland winner and show that it corresponds well to experimental outcomes in an important set of experimental legislative voting games we also provide an intuitive motivation for why legislative outcomes in the spatial context may be expected to lie close to the copeland winner finally we show a connection between the copeland winner and the shapley value and provide a simple but powerful algorithm to calculate the copeland scores of all points in the space in terms of the modified power values of each of the voters and their locations in the space

institutionalizing majority rule a social choice theory with policy implications recent results in the theory of pure majority rule demonstrate the genericity of majority rule cycles as established by richard mckelvey 1979 l cohen 1979 and n schofield 1978 majority rule nearly always breaks down and when it does the breakdown is complete the theorems given below may be summed up in the following three assertions 1 for any policy or alternative there exists a set of alternatives that command a majority of votes against it 2 this situation is not an abberation but rather is the general case and 3 it is almost always possible in multidimensional choice settings to find a sequence of votes that begins at any point and ends at any other point majority rule may wander anywhere yet when these theoretical assertions are applied to legislatures based upon majority rule they contain no obvious policy content or predictions the key insight which we elaborate in this paper is that majority rule is not self implementing there is no majority rule machine into which we feed preferences and out of which come outcomes rather there is a complex series of institutional arrangements underpinning the operation of majority rule legislatures arrangements from which theorists have mistakenly abstracted in fact majority rule theorists have not focused at all on institutional details instead they have restricted themselves to the majority rule dominance relation operating under the implicit assumption that what may be proved true about this relation is true of all legislative institutions based upon it in this paper we show that this assumption is misleading and that the the results based upon it must be reinterpreted in order to be useful for understanding real world committees and legislatures

the effect of credit on spending decisions the role of the credit limit and credibility the objective of the present research is to study consumer decisions to utilize a line of credit the life cycle hypothesis from economics argues that consumers should intertemporally reallocate their incomes over their life stream to maximize lifetime utility one form of intertemporal allocation is to use past income in the form of savings in the future a second form is the use of future income in the present this can only be done if consumers have access to a temporary pool of money that they can draw from and replenish in the future a function performed by consumer credit however our research reinforces prior findings that consumers are unable to correctly value their future incomes and that they lack the cognitive capability to solve the intertemporal optimization problem required by the life cycle hypothesis instead we argue that consumers use information such as the credit limit as a signal of their future earnings potential specifically if consumers have access to large amounts of credit they are likely to infer that their lifetime income will be high and hence their willingness to use credit and their spending will also be high conversely consumers who are granted lower amounts of credit are likely to infer that their lifetime income will be low and hence their spending will be lower however based on research in the area of consumer skepticism and inference making we also argue for a moderating role of the credibility associated with the credit limit specifically we argue that the above effect of credit availability would be particularly strong for consumers who believe that the credit limit credibly signals their future earnings potential i e a naive consumer who has limited experience with consumer credit however as consumers gain experience with credit they start discounting credit availability as a predictor of their future and start questioning the validity of the process used to set the credit limit hence with experience the effect of credit limit on the willingness to use credit should be attenuated we test these predictions in five separate studies in the first experimental study we manipulate credit limit and credibility and pose subjects with a hypothetical purchase opportunity consistent with our prediction credit limit impacted the propensity to spend but only when the credibility was high in the second experimental study we replicate these findings even when subjects were given information about their expected future salaries and also show that the credit limit influences their expectation of future earnings potential in the third study we show that the mere availability and increase of current liquidity cannot explain our findings in the fourth study we conduct a survey of consumers in which we measure a number of demographic characteristics and also ask them for their propensity to spend in a given purchase situation in the fifth study we use the survey of consumer finances scf dataset a triennial survey of u s families that is designed to provide detailed information on the use of financial services spending behaviors and selected demographic characteristics results from both studies 4 and 5 provide further support for our proposed framework credit limits influence spending to a greater extent for consumers with lower credibility younger consumers and less educated consumers across all studies we achieved triangulation by using a variety of approaches surveys and experiments subjects types young students and older consumers nature of predictor variables manipulated and measured dependent measures purchase likelihood credit card balance new charges and methods of analysis anova and regression and consistently found that increasing credit limits on a credit card increases spending especially when the credibility of the limit is high this paper joins a growing body of literature in marketing and behavioral decision theory that goes beyond the traditional domains of inquiry e g product choice effects of marketing mix variables and focuses on consumer decisions relating to the appropriate use of income to finance consumption our framework differs from prior research on the effect of payment mechanisms on spending in two significant ways first we are interested in the effects of the availability of credit on spending and not necessarily in the effect of the transaction format that is associated with each payment mechanism second while prior research has studied the point of purchase and historic i e prepurchase effects of credit the present research is concerned with the availability of credit in the future specifically our framework is invariant to the current and prior usage of credit by the consumer

brown backstops versus the green paradox abstract anticipated climate policies are ineffective when fossil fuel owners respond by shifting supply intertemporally the green paradox this mechanism relies crucially on the exhaustibility of fossil fuels we analyze the effect of anticipated climate policies on emissions in a simple model with two fossil fuels one scarce and dirty e g oil the other abundant and dirtier e g coal we derive conditions for a green orthodox anticipated climate policies may reduce current emissions the model can also be used to analyze spatial carbon leakage calibrations suggest that intertemporal carbon leakage from 0 to 8 is a relatively minor concern

self control for the righteous toward a theory of precommitment to indulgence prior research has examined consumers use of self control to avoid hedonic myopic temptations such as overspending and smoking in this research we investigate the opposite form of self control whereby consumers force themselves to indulge and avoid default forms of spending on utilitarian necessities and or savings in particular consumers who have difficulty choosing items that are perceived as indulgences or luxuries e g a cruise over necessities e g saving for college education and cash in everyday decisions may use precommitments to indulgence especially when the psychological cost of such commitments is less concrete these propositions were tested in a series of studies involving real and hypothetical choices as well as process measures the results indicate that a substantial segment of consumers choose hedonic luxury rewards over cash of equal or greater value consumers typically explain such choices based on the need to precommit to indulgence to make sure that the award does no

self signaling and the costs and benefits of temptation in consumer choice abstract the literature on self control emphasizes that temptation is costly the authors propose that temptation entails not only costs but also benefits for consumers these arise from self signaling effects of how consumers handle tempting choice options succumbing to temptation is a costly self signal of weak willpower whereas resisting temptation is a beneficial self signal of strong willpower five experiments demonstrate that these self signaling costs and benefits of temptation depend not only on the chosen item but also on the temptation from the nonchosen options the authors discuss theoretical implications of their findings for research on impulsive choice and self control and on self signaling and managerial implications for pricing and assortment strategies

self command in practice in policy and in a theory of rational choice an increasingly familiar occurrence for obstetricians is being asked by patients to withhold anesthesia during delivery the physician often proposes that a facemask be put beside the patient who may inhale nitrous oxide as she needs it but some determined patients ask that no such opportunity be provided if gas is available they will use it and they want not to be able to the request is interesting for decision theory and raises questions of ethics policy and physician responsibility even if the woman is merely making a mistake if she simply does not know how painful labor will be and how glad she will be even in retrospect if the pain is relieved but some women who make this request have had earlier deliveries during which they demanded anesthesia and received it they are acquainted with the pain they anticipate asking for relief and they want it withheld when they do they expect to regret afterwards any recourse to anesthesia this particular instance of attempted selfdenial has features that are special but many that are common the woman is so far as we know in good health physically and mentally she anticipates a transient period when her usual values and preferences will be suspended or inaccessible she has reasons for wanting to frustrate her own wishes at the critical time she needs cooperation she may ratify her choice afterward by expressing herself grateful that no anesthesia was offered even when requested there are ethical dilemmas and legal issues and there is conflict if say the husband disagrees with the physician in the delivery room about what his wife really wants

optimal taxes on fossil fuel in general equilibrium we analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with an externality through climate change from using fossil energy our central result is a simple formula for the marginal externality damage of emissions or equivalently for the optimal carbon tax this formula which holds under quite plausible assumptions reveals that the damage is proportional to current gdp with the proportion depending only on three factors i discounting ii the expected damage elasticity how many percent of the output flow is lost from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere and iii the structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere thus the stochastic values of future output consumption and the atmospheric co2 concentration as well as the paths of technology whether endogenous or exogenous and population and so on all disappear from the formula we find that the optimal tax should be a bit higher than the median or most well known estimates in the literature we also formulate a parsimonious yet comprehensive and easily solved model allowing us to compute the optimal and market paths for the use of different sources of energy and the corresponding climate change we find coal rather than oil to be the main threat to economic welfare largely due to its abundance we also find that the costs of inaction are particularly sensitive to the assumptions regarding the substitutability of different energy sources and technological progress

myopia and addictive behaviour we present a theory of addictive behaviour which can account for addicts apparent disregard for the future consequences of their current actions the discounting of future utility is increasing in past consumption indicating increasingly myopic behaviour as consumption increases the intertemporal complementarity generated by the endogenous discounting produces multiple steady states which can account for the simultaneous existence of myopic addicts and non myopic non addicts within a time consiste nt expected utility framework the theory also accounts for the probabilistic incidence of addiction and successful rehabilitation and the possibility of recurrence

income smoothing and self control the case of schoolteachers experimental economics is frequently criticized on the grounds that the incentives offered to subjects in the laboratory are too low to give the results any validity in particular when the results reject the standard economic maximizing model the presumption is frequently made that anomalies will go away if incentives are raised to levels faced in the real world indeed as camerer and hogarth 1999 have recently noted it is an open question what results from the laboratory tell us about incentives in naturally occurring environments 1 in this article we report the choices made by subjects in one such naturally occurring environment the choice of payment pattern by california public schoolteachers we calibrate the size of their incentives and show that depending on the discount rate chosen not insignificant amounts of income may be given up by large numbers of individuals all of whom are college graduates to implement what may be considered a sensible consumption plan but one that is not optimal according to the standard income smoothing utility maximizing model i the choice problem teachers usually work 10 months in a 12 month academic year so that if they are paid only during their working period they receive no salary in july and august in the standard economic model of intertemporal financial planning however the absence of summer salary payments would present no problem because teachers could simply save some fraction of their salary arranging whatever summer consumption pattern was desired within the overall budget constraint moreover because the income saved would accumulate interest this strategy would dominate a strategy of asking that the same annual salary be paid in 12 equal installments several authors e g thaler 1980 schelling 1984 thaler and shefrin 1981 loewenstein and prelec 1992 laibson 1997 rabin 1997 have questioned the validity of the standard model and proposed an alternative approach 2 in this new approach the teacher may well agree that the optimal plan is to smooth consumption by saving with interest during the earning months but executing this optimal plan is not without cost thaler and shefrin 1981 who explicitly note the schoolteachers planning problem argue that these implementation costs or costs of self control could change the behavior of teachers and make them willing to enter an implicit savings program at zero interest even though that would lower the present value of their income an obvious question for field investigation is how many do this and at what cost in addition for those teachers who enter such schemes it is of interest to know if they see themselves as being challenged by issues of self control ii the data our data come from two questionnaires the first questionnaire see appendix a was sent to 259 school districts in california 3 replies with usable data were received from 130 districts 50 a follow up telephone survey checked on the possibility that a school district might pay interest to teachers who choose to have their 10 months salary paid over 12 months and also that teachers might choose to be paid over an 11 month period 4 a second questionnaire shown in appendix b was sent to all teachers in one of the school districts identified in the first survey as offering a 12 month payment option 5 we obtained 121 responses with at least some useful information a response rate of 32 given the personal nature of some of the questions this response rate is reasonable though it does of course raise a question about the representativeness of our sample and its small size suggests that only tentative conclusions can be drawn from it iii choices offered and taken in the first survey 71 school districts 55 did not offer their employees any choice of salary arrangement of these 37 with 15 205 teachers paid salaries on a 10 month basis 15 with 11 284 teachers paid on a 12 month basis and i 0 districts paid teachers who work 10 months on a 10 month basis and those who work 12 months 12 times

emission regulation of markets with sluggish supply structures i examine regulation in the presence of convex investment costs and technology specific capacity stocks announcement of future emission taxes reduces current emissions unless fossil fuels are scarce in which case the effect is ambiguous substantial future emission reductions require action today because it takes time to build up clean production capacity and phase out dirty capacity the pigou tax must be coupled with sector specific investment taxes or subsidies to induce the socially optimal trajectory if the private discount rate differs from the social discount rate if such investment taxes or subsidies are unavailable a time inconsistent second best alternative may be to tax emissions above the pigouvian level during the transition phase the theory is complemented with a stylized numerical model of the us electricity market

intertemporal depletion of resource sites by spatially distributed users mineral deposits and other exhaustible resources are scattered around the globe as are their users yet the theory for analyzing depletion of such resources assumes that all resource sites and all users are located in the same place when applying the theory therefore one is forced to disregard what often seems to be an important real world consideration our purpose here is to generalize harold hotelling s 1931 theory of exhaustible resources to accommodate situations in which resource sites and their users are spatially distributed our analysis has many applications it can be applied to a conventional exhaustible resource like oil alternatively it can be applied to an unconventional exhaustible resource like scarce landfill space shipments of solid waste to landfills in other states or countries have become a prominent public policy issue eduardo ley et al 2000 finally our analysis can be applied in situations where the space reflects not geographical location but characteristics of the resource e g the sulfur content hardness and so forth of coal which users find distinctive 2 only two theoretical papers in resource economics have introduced spatial considerations 3 jean jacques laffont and michel moreaux 1986 studied the extraction of resources from sites located along a line segment with all users at one end charles kolstad 1994 was the first to consider spatially distributed users in his formulation consumers are distributed uniformly along a line segment with resource sites at each end kolstad s approach although innovative requires that the set of users be parti

carbon leakage the green paradox and perfect future markets policies of lowering carbon demand may aggravate instead of alleviate climate change green paradox in a two period three country general equilibrium model with finite endowment of fossil fuel one country enforces an emissions cap in the first or second periods when that cap is tightened the extent of carbon leakage depends on the interaction of various parameters and elasticities conditions for the green paradox are specified all determinants of carbon leakage resulting from tightening the first period cap work in the opposite direction when the second period cap is tightened tightening the second period cap does not necessarily lead to the green paradox

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

foreign exchange constraints and growth possibilities in the ldcs abstract we analyse the influence of foreign exchange constraints on output growth in the ldcs by studying the effect that these constraints have on the speed of adjustment of both investment and import activities we model the speed of adjustment of investment as a function of available foreign exchange resources and allow for imperfect substitutability between the domestic and the foreign capital stocks

fossil fuels stock externalities and backstop technology the hotelling exhaustible resource model is extended to include stock pollution and nonpolluting backstop technology it is shown that an optimal energy consumption strategy typically includes a regime in which the two energy sources are consumed simultaneously along this regime fossil fuel consumption decreases and backstop consumption increases together fossil fuel and backstop consumption may form eleven optimal regime combinations a decrease in the backstop price decreases the initial level of optimal emission tax

empirical measures of factors affecting social rates of discount economists have long considered possible divergences between private and social rates of time preferences in this paper we investigate factors hypothesized to affect this potential divergence results indicate that time preferences of individuals may be influenced by 1 whether the resource in question is publicly or privately managed respondents tend to have lower rates of time prefernce for publicly managed resources and 2 the type of good being managed respondents tend to have lower rates of time preference for income derived from a forest than for income derived from a portfolio of stocks and bonds additional factors which may influence the revealed rate of time preference include the pattern of benefits derived over time and various personal characteristics of the respondent although numerous methodological problems cloud the issues our results suggest that capital markets may fail to aggregate utility over individuals and between goods and that it may therefore be appropriate for governments to consider using lower rates of discount than the private sector and to vary the rate used according to the type of good being evaluated

the core and the stability of group choice in spatial voting games the core of a voting game is the set of undominated outcomes that is those that once in place cannot be overturned for spatial voting games a core is structurally stable if it remains in existence even if there are small perturbations in the location of voter ideal points while for simple majority rule a core will exist in games with more than one dimension only under extremely restrictive symmetry conditions we show that for certain supramajorities a core must exist we also provide conditions under which it is possible to construct a structurally stable core if there are only a few dimensions our results demonstrate the stability properties of such frequently used rules as two thirds and three fourths we further explore the implications of our results for the nature of political stability by looking at outcomes in experimental spatial voting games and at belgian cabinet formation in the late 1970s

threat escalation and crisis stability a game theoretic analysis we develop a model of crisis stability based on a deterrence game players are assumed to be able to choose any level of initial cooperation or noncooperation the more cooperative player if there is one may then choose to retaliate in a crisis players are assumed to have escalated their conflict and desire to stabilize it before it explodes players can by threatening their opponent stabilize the new status quo in addition points of threat escalation are identified at which neither player can prevent the opponent from escalating further without threatening the opponent more severely than before the crisis erupted thereby heating up an already tense situation crisis stabilization is aided by being close to the full cooperation position though paradoxically both players may benefit from having created a crisis that only escalating threats may resolve we discuss ways of avoiding threat escalation and the increased risk of war that it entails especially in conflicts between the superpowers

targets for global climate policy an overview a survey of the economic impact of climate change and the marginal damage costs shows that carbon dioxide emissions are a negative externality the estimated pigou tax and its growth rate are too low to justify the climate policy targets set by political leaders a lower discount rate or greater concern for the global distribution of income would justify more stringent climate policy but would imply an overhaul of other public policies catastrophic risk justifies more stringent climate policy but only to a limited extent

the duration of the smoking habit i introduction most smokers smoke out of habit once the habit is ended many of smoking s most harmful effects decline rather quickly preventing and ending cigarette addiction is therefore the straightest path toward preventing the health damage done by cigarette smoking consequently the related questions of why people start smoking and why they quit are central to formulating and evaluating effective antismoking policies duration or hazard models are designed to measure the probability of transition between states and are thus ideal for investigating the structural determinants of the transition between addiction and non addiction nevertheless most previous work in the economics literature uses the aggregate smoking participation rate defined as the percentage of people who currently smoke or an individual s probability of participation rather than a hazard rate to measure the attractiveness of habitual smoking this paper models the hazard rates of both starting and quitting the cigarette smoking habit the starting hazard rate is the probability that an individual will start smoking in a given time period conditional on being a nonsmoker until then the quitting hazard rate is the probability of quitting smoking in a given time period conditional on being a smoker since the starting date both of these rates should rise and fall in response to changes in the attractiveness of smoking the two rates will respond differently to different stimuli since the starting hazard reflects the point of view of nonsmokers and the quitting hazard reflects the point of view of smokers hazard or duration models possess several advantages over smoking participation models most obviously smoking participation rates cannot directly distinguish between increased starting rates and decreased quitting rates but the hazard models can also in a participation rate model it is difficult to control for the effect of the duration of the habit whereas duration models are designed specifically to allow for and measure the dependence of the hazard rate on duration another advantage is that the participation rate at any one time will oversample the number of long term smokers relative to those who had a short term habit whereas a duration model is designed to avoid this source of bias one drawback however is that because of their inherent panel nature the data requirements of duration models are somewhat more difficult to satisfy as shall be seen the only previous work in the economics literature that estimates the hazard rate of starting smoking is douglas and hariharan 1994 my paper improves upon douglas and hariharan in at least three important ways first it estimates the hazard rate of quitting smoking as well as that of starting second it takes into account variation in state level regulation third its time varying covariate model allows hazard rates to respond dynamically to changes in cigarette price regulation and information variables the use of time varying covariates is important because it brings the empirical model into much closer accord with theory the decision whether or not to start or quit smoking is an ongoing decision made one day at a time on the basis of current information the hazard of starting is greatest when the cost of the habit appears lowest and its benefit appears highest this comparison of cost and benefit changes through time as price information income and life cycle variables change while douglas and hariharan 1994 used price information from the potential smoker s most vulnerable age on the theory that its marginal effect is greatest at that time the model used in this paper allows each individual s hazard rate to respond to changes in price and public information as they occur the leading theoretical model of the decision to smoke is the rational addiction model of becker and murphy 1988 which assumes that consumers of addictive goods begin smoking only after fully weighing the costs and benefits of the habit

reason and war a new specification of the expected utility model of international conflict places expected utilities within a polar coordinate system treats thirdparty choices in a manner more consistent with classical forms estimates the expected utilities derived from not challenging existing policies more fully represents the expected costs of conflict and normalizes expected utilities regardless of system size by assuming that the probability of escalation of a dispute increases monotonically with leaders expectations of gain we derive continuous functions for the probabilities of war intervention violence and peace the revised theory significantly improves our ability to discriminate between violent and nonviolent disputes and between violent disputes that escalated to warfare and those that did not in europe between 1816 and 1970 in this essay

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

evolution of time preferences and attitudes toward risk this paper explores a general model of the evolution and adaption of hedonic utility it is shown that optimal utility will be increasing strongly in regions where choices have to be made often and decision mistakes have a severe impact on fitness several applications are suggested in the context of intertemporal preferences the model offers an evolutionary explanation for the existence of conflicting short and long run interests that lead to dynamic inconsistency concerning attitudes toward risk an evolutionary explanation is given for s shaped value functions that adjust to the decision maker s environment jel d81 d83 this paper is based on the hypothesis that individual decisions are guided by hedonic util ity an individual who faces several alternatives will choose the one that promises the greatest pleasure or happiness then given that the properties of a hedonic utility function determine individual behavior and individual behavior determines biological fitness evolutionary forces will have shaped our utility during the long time in which the modern human being evolved in this sense hedonic utility can be considered as a reward system that induces individuals to make optimal choices a view that is supported both by theory and evidence from neuroscience 1 as irving kupfermann eric r kandel and susan iversen 2000 express it pleasure is unques tionably a key factor in controlling the motivated behaviors of humans 1007 for the econo mist the interesting question is then about the properties of the evolutionary optimal reward system and how these properties adapt to the environment in which individuals make choices the present paper reconsiders and solves a general model of the evolution of utility suggested by arthur j robson 2001a which predicts how cardinal properties of utility functions should adapt to the decision environment it turns out that the optimal utility function will be steep in regions where decisions have to be made frequently and where wrong decisions would lead to large losses in fitness in those regions even small changes in consumption will cause large changes in happiness the evolution of context specific utility functions is then shown to be optimal whenever the decisions our ancestors had to make arrived in distinct choice situations the model can also be extended to incorporate learning about evolutionary relevant attributes of available options

crisis bargaining escalation and mad although incomplete information is recognized to be an essential feature of crises game theoretic formulations have not generally modeled this explicitly this paper models a mutually assured destruction mad crisis as a game of sequential bargaining with incomplete information sufficiently simple that its equibria may be found these provide better game theoretic foundations for the notions of resolve and critical risk and their role in crises and also make it possible to compare the bargaining dynamics of this model with those of descriptively richer but incompletely specified models revealing several inconsistencies several analyses of mad conclude that the state with the greatest resolve in this contest of resolve will prevail many models based on critical risks suggest that a state is less likely to escalate the greater its adversary s resolve in our model however the state with the weakest resolve sometimes prevails and some states prove more likely to escalate if their adversaries resolve is greater

on intertemporal selfishness how the perceived instability of identity underlies impatient consumption how does the anticipated connectedness between one s current and future identity help explain impatience in intertemporal preferences the less consumers are closely connected psychologically to their future selves the less willing they will be to forgo immediate benefits in order to ensure larger deferred benefits to be received by that future self when consumers measured or manipulated sense of continuity with their future selves is lower they accept smaller sooner rewards wait less in order to save money on a purchase require a larger premium to delay receiving a gift card and have lower long term discount rates

international capital markets oil producers and the green paradox a rapidly rising carbon tax leads to faster extraction of fossil fuels and accelerates global warming we analyze how general equilibrium effects operating through the international capital market affect this green paradox in a two region two period world with identical homothetic preferences and without investment the global interest rate falls and the green paradox weakens with investment or a relatively more impatient oil importing region the green paradox may be strengthened because the future oil demand function shifts downward or because the interest rate rises if the oil importing region is very much more patient than the oil exporting region the green paradox may be reversed but in our calibrated model the effects are tiny with exploration and endogenous initial oil reserves a future carbon tax lowers cumulative oil extraction in partial equilibrium if the boost to current oil extraction is weakened strengthened or reversed in general equilibrium so is the fall in cumulative extraction a partial and general equilibrium welfare analysis of a future carbon tax both for full and partial exhaustion is given the effects of stock dependent extraction costs are separately discussed in an appendix

simultaneous supplies of dirty energy and capacity constrained clean energy is there a green paradox the effects of two popular second best clean energy policies are analysed using an extended hotelling type resource extraction framework this model features first heterogenous energy sources and second a capacity constrained backstop technology this setup allows for capturing the following two empirical observations first different types of energy sources are used simultaneously despite different production cost second experiences from various european countries show that a further expansion of the use of climate friendly technologies faces substantial technological as well as political constraints we use this framework to analyse if under two policy scenarios a so called green paradox occurs a subsidy for the clean energy as well as an expansion of the capacity of the clean energy are considered the analysis shows that under plausible parameter values both policy measures lead to a weak green paradox however a strong green paradox is only found for the capacity expansion scenario in addition the subsidy is found to be welfare enhancing while the capacity increase is welfare enhancing only if the cost of adding the capacity is sufficiently small we also show the effects of the policies crucially depend on the initial capacity and that under certain scenarios even an extreme green paradox is found

goal setting and self control abstract this paper addresses the role of non binding goals to attenuate time inconsistency present biased agents have linear reference dependent preferences and endogenously set a goal that is the reference point they face an infinite horizon optimal stopping problem in continuous time when there is sufficient commitment to expectation based goals goal setting attenuates the present biased agent s tendency to stop too early and may even lead an agent to wait longer than the first best in particular reference dependence is strictly worse for a time consistent agent notably none of the effects of goal setting require loss aversion