are judges leading economic theory sunk costs the threat of entry and the competitive process in this paper we attempt to bring theoretical form to a particular entry argument that has found favor in the courts we suggest that sunk costs may not be a major impediment to entry when a group of customers can commit to an entry enhancing strategy buyers have strong incentives to adopt such strategies because they benefit directly from the resulting lower prices the simplest example involves a large buyer that is able to guarantee an entrant a market for its product long term contracts or even informal purchase commitments backed by customer reputation may also allow the entrant to obtain a guarantee of sufficient business to make the entry profitable once entry is thought likely to occur the existing competitors may be unwilling to attempt a price increase of any magnitude thus the threat of entry can maintain competitive prices even in the presence of sunk costs in section ii we motivate the analysis by discussing the current controversy over the role entry conditions play in an antitrust merger review then we discuss the necessary assumptions for a model of how the threat of entry can deter any price increase in the presence of sunk costs we note that these conditions are different from those commonly used in the economic literature

credible spatial preemption it is often argued that incumbent firms may deter entry by preemptive investment in new goods we show that these conclusions are reversed when multiproduct incumbentfirms may exit in response to entry once entrants are in an industry an incumbent will often want to withdraw some goods to prevent competition with the entrant from reducing profits on other goods such a reaction makes entry more attractive to a potential entrant the equilibrium industry structure is less likely to be monopolistic as the goods are better substitutes as exit costs are low and as the competition between producers of the same good is more intense

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

spatial monopoly non zero profits and entry deterrence the case of cement at least since kaldor 1935 a number of economists have argued that indivisibilities and accompanying economies of scale in spatially extended economies can negate the zero profit result generally associated with free entry the essential argument is that if there are industries in which transportation costs are non negligible and size economies call for firms that are large relative to local demand even the most intense competition need not result in a zero profit equilibrium recently eaton and lipsey 1978 have provided the analytical underpinnings for kaldor s largely intuitive argument and demonstrate that pure profits can remain even with free entry of new firms and price competition eaton and lipsey 1978 p 467 suggest that their result depends critically on the existence of the following conditions 1 the average total cost curve is declining over some initial range 2 customers are geographically spread out and intermingled with firms 3 transport is costly and 4 once the firm enters the market it has location specific sunk costs 2 this paper offers an empirical investigation of the non zero profit argument as applied to the u s cement industry on a priori grounds the cement industry appears to meet the necessary conditions for existence of positive site associated profits the existence or at least the belief that the a priori conditions are satisfied has provided a basis for using the industry as a representative case scherer 1980 pp 252 258 for instance offers a textbook example of entry deterrence through plant location strategy that combines elements of space and the standard deterrence argument 3 scherer then notes that in an interview study of plant size and location decisions in 12 industries across six nations the author observed by far the strongest emphasis on geographic space packing as an entry deterring strategy in the cement industry p 257 scherer s example of entry deterrence via strategic plant proliferation is an extension of the kaldor non zero profit argument however the non zero profit argument has at least one major drawback profits in the cement industry have not been significantly above normal for any sustained period the first section of this paper considers the evidence of the cement industry s approximation to the eaton and lipsey conditions and its historical profitability given the contradictory results between apparent satisfaction of the a priori conditions and the lack of supernormal profits a reformulation of the basic model is presented an explanation offered here for the absence of supernormal profits is derivable from the property rights paradigm the usual procedure in analyzing the reaction to new entrants in a spatially extended model has been to assign either initial locations to a set of firms or provide for a prearranged pattern of sequential entry both procedures implicitly assign property rights to locational rents and ignore the vital element that there will be competition to be the first plant in a given location 4 with demand for the product growing competition to be first at a given location will insure that the timing of construction of the

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

economies of scale and barriers to entry dixit has recently presented a model in which established firms select capacity to discourage entry but cannot employ threats they would not rationally execute after entry entry deterrence in a slight modification of this model involves the classical limit price output under linear or concave demand however the capital cost of a firm of minimum efficient scale is an upper bound on the present value of the monopoly profit stream that can be shielded from entry it is argued that this suggests the general unimportance of entry barriers erected by scale economies

returns to schooling for urban and migrant workers in china a detailed investigation abstractwe use a new data set the 2009 rural urban migration in china rumic to estimate returns to schooling in china using instrumental variable iv estimation after identifying a set of instruments we conduct comprehensive validity and relevance testing of different combinations of instruments as well as robustness analysis of our estimates for rural to urban migrants and urban residents in china we find that our point estimates are in the 6 9 range for urban workers compared to 7 8 for migrant workers returns for men at 8 9 are slightly higher than for women at 6 7 thus private returns to education in urban china in 2009 were not as high as other transition and developing countries but substantial and have increased over time comparing ols and iv estimates we also find that the attenuation bias due to measurement error is generally large and more important in the migrant sample compared to the urban sample

advertising sunk costs and barriers to entry this paper tests hypotheses about the entry deterring effects of advertising the model isolates three separate effects of advertising on entry the effect on the irrecoverable costs of entry the effect on the uncertainty underlying the entry environment and the effect on the measured rates of profit we find that advertising impedes entry since necessary advertising expenditures give rise to a sunk cost which raises the risk of entry however we also find a countervailing force due to advertising in that the entrant perceives a greater likelihood of success in markets where advertising is important our analysis shows that the overall impact of advertising on entry is positive

in search of predatory pricing can predatory pricing be reproduced in a laboratory environment we report research motivated by this objective we began with conditions that based on the literature appeared to combine the features this literature has suggested are favorable to the emergence of predation next we operationalized what was meant by predatory pricing in our design in order to compare prices with predictions from alternative theories of 10 experiments none evidenced predatory behavior most supported the dominant firm theory the second series of experiments addresses remedies for predation and finds that the effect is to increase prices and reduce efficiency

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

location choice product proliferation and entry deterrence within a slightly modified version of hotelling s model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise we show that entry deterrence although optimal need not be achieved through product proliferation in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation we also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry

noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry deterring signal recent work has investigated the effect of a potential entrant s uncertainty about postentry profits on the likelihood of his entering the market it has always been assumed that the potential entrant knows the type of postentry solution but lacks information on cost or as to whether the postentry solution will be cooperative or noncooperative we find that entry is more likely the greater is the preentry profit rate in equilibrium the threat of entry then forces the incumbent firms to act more competitively to deter entry

computers and the demand for skilled labour industry and establishment level panel evidence for the uk we use two united kingdom panel data sets to investigate skill upgrading in the united kingdom and how it has been affected by computerisation census data reveals that most aggregate skill upgrading is explained by within establishment rises in skill composition such upgrading is significantly related to computerisation a relation that is robust to different worker and computer types endogeneity human capital upgrading and other technology measures

entry deterrence and the free rider problem the public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant although incumbent firms act noncooperatively underinvestment in entry deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a pareto dominated arrangement in terms of profits by preventing entry

excess capacity and entry some empirical evidence recent articles by spence i977 dixit i979 and schmalensee i98i have elaborated on wenders i97i1 proposition that excess capacity can act as a barrier to entry the intent of all of these treatments is to suggest that firms may rationally invest in excess capacity with the expectation that excess capacity will be seen by potential entrants either as a signal of aggressive intent or as a credible threat 2 when excess capacity does not lead to creation of a credible threat it may still act as a barrier to entry by shifting the risk return perceptions of potential entrants enough to divert the potential entrants investments into other industries 3 alternatively investment in excess capacity by incumbent firms may reduce the prospects of an active market for the used equipment of a defunct entrant and thereby help to convert fixed costs into sunk costs consequently raising entry barriers 4 this paper represents an exploratory effort to investigate empirically the prevalence and efficiency of excess capacity in deterring entry first a simple and traditional model of entry is presented this is followed by the description of the data used to explore the excess capacity investment concept a combined results and comments section follows the description of the data

limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking abstract this paper extends an earlier paper by the author in which there were two economic agents an established firm and a potential entrant operating under complete information each agent being assumed to know the profit functions of both firms the present paper extends some of the results of the earlier work to a model in which it is not known with certainty to either agent what the profit functions would be after the entrant would come into the market

innovation threats and strategic responses in oligopoly markets this paper deals with the strategic reaction of firms to competitive threats stemming from newly developed products of actual competitors product innovation projects go through multiple time consuming stages with several continuation termination decisions hence competitors can react to the threat before the new product is introduced and thereby may prevent or facilitate the product s introduction we consider a duopoly model where firm 1 can start a two stage product innovation project for obtaining a horizontally and vertically differentiated product in between the two stages firm 2 can react by making an investment that improves the competitive position of the current product we find that under weak vertical differentiation firm 2 wants firm 1 to innovate horizontal differentiation softens competition and firm 2 over invests to induce firm 1 to launch the new product second under strong vertical differentiation firm 1 starts the product innovation project triggering under investment by firm 2 but never finishes it the under investment makes firm 2 a weaker competitor which induces firm 1 not to innovate third under very strong vertical differentiation firm 2 prevents a launch of the new product by over investing this results in a strong competitive position of firm 2 it therefore captures such a big market share that firm 1 will not introduce the new product the situation of firm 1 in the old market has worsened the option to complete the innovation created by initiating the first stage of the innovation project has a negative value for firm 1

a theory of market structure with sequential entry this article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry we characterize the perfect nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions first equilibria never involve excess capacity second a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are positive when computed myopically i e with no further entry third the equilibrium number of firms is the smallest number that can deter entry fourth aggregate output in equilibrium is no smaller than the limit output we calculate some explicit solutions to the model and examine comparative static properties

moral hazard as an entry barrier in an experience goods industry an entrant who could make positive profits by providing a better deal to buyers than do incumbents may cheat buyers by providing goods of low quality to make even greater profits if buyers foresee this possibility they will be unwilling to buy from an entrant as a result moral hazard in a seller s choice of the quality of an experience good can lead to a barrier to entry in particular since hit and run entry is likely to lead to low quality choice the threat of such entry may not discipline the pricing of incumbents we also show that the temptation to dishonest entry the moral hazard problem is stronger if buyers are already receiving some consumer surplus as a result there is a first entrant advantage because the first entrant faces less temptation to provide inefficiently low quality than do subsequent entrants and with rational buyers this works to his advantage the scale of entry may affect quality incentives and therefore introductory offers may assure buyers of an entrant s quality but this cannot happen under a suitable definition of constant returns

oligopolistic entry deterrence under incomplete information recent work has investigated the effects of asymmetric information between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant this study extends the analysis to allow the initial market structure to be a noncooperative oligopoly we show that there is a bayesian nash equilibrium in which the incumbent firms although unable to collude strategically deter entry that would have occurred under complete information in contrast to the past limit pricing literature it is a high price that deters entry as it signals to the potential entrant that this is a high cost industry extending the model to allow for multiple potential entrants we find that increasing the degree of potential competition raises the preentry price and reduces the likelihood of entry

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

would hotelling kill the electric car in this paper we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource owning firms when technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning by doing resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology we show that in such a context it is not necessarily the case that scarcity driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted rather we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions we show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

how to quickly get a job the transition from higher education to french labour market by a survival model this article analyses how long former university students stay unemployed when searching for a new job after the leaving of the french higher education cox duration models are used to account for the proportional hypothesis the main result of this article is that the worker s recruitment is based more on the choice of the faculty of initial training than the educational level attainment some policy implications are derived from our results to give some recommendations for individual job search and policy makers in education

computers and the changing skill intensity of jobs this paper investigates the impact of computer usage at work and other job features on the changing skills required of workers it compare skills utilization in britain at three data points 1986 1992 and 1997 using proxies for the level of skills actually used in jobs this study questions the validity of investigating the facts about and the sources of rising skills by using just educational attainment or occupational grouping data this paper finds that job skills have increased more quickly for women than for men these increases are more extensive than those captured by changes in the occupational class structure the spread of computer usage is very strongly associated with the process of upskilling and accounts in part for narrowing of the gender skills gap expanded use of quality circles is also linked to upskilling evidence for any direct role of trade in inducing skills increases is weak using the qualification held or occupation as a skills measure can lead to erroneous conclusions as to the origin of skills changes

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

entry barriers and economic welfare the relationship between economic welfare and the number of firms in a quasi cournot market is examined in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that can enforce the marginal cost principle to the firms along with regulating the number of firms it is shown that there exist excessive number of firms at the free entry quasicournot equilibrium vis a vis the first best welfare maximizing number of firms the thrust of this result essentially survives even if we replace a utopian first best government by a secondbest government that leaves the firms to pursue their respective profit maximization freely and engages solely in regulating the number of firms it can be shown that the excess entry prevails again in this second best world recent studies in the theoretical industrial organization literature have uncovered several instances which cast serious doubt on the reasonableness of a widespread belief that increasing competition will increase welfare stiglitz 1981 p 184 it has been shown that there are cases which are not altogether unreasonable where social welfare will be increased by strengthening rather than weakening the protection of incumbent firms from the threat of potential entry this is in sharp contrast with the traditional belief 2 what is not known however is how robust these pathologies in fact are we intend to settle this problem by proving two excess entry theorems in the quasi cournot parametric conjectural variations homogeneous oligopoly model seade 1980a b in the first place we presuppose the existence of a strong first best government that could costlessly enforce the marginal cost pricing principle by firms in an oligopolistic market and regulate entry in pursuit of first best social welfare optimization it is shown that the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium exceeds the first best welfare optimizing number of firms the result has already been noted by von weizsacker 1980a b and others in terms of numerical examples our theorem 1 asserts that this phenomenon always holds true for the family of quasi cournot models at hand an implication of this result is that the existence of entry barriers which protect incumbent firms from potential competitors is not necessarily welfare decreasing in sharp contrast with the traditional belief a problem remains with theorem 1 however in that an omnipotent first best government does not exist in reality and the first best ideal is unrealizable in the actual economy therefore even if the intervention by a first best government with a view to restricting the number of firms within an industry may be welfare improving it does

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

strategic entry deterrence recent developments in the economics of industry this paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence starting from bain s 1956 classical analysis a simple two stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry deterrence problem commitments credible threat and sub game perfection are illustrated in this context the various strategic variables that an incumbent firm can use to bar entry are discussed the issue of whether a group of incumbents can noncooperatively deter entry is taken up and some empirical evidence is reviewed copyright 1989 by blackwell publishers ltd

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

strategic competition among the few some recent developments in the economics of industry the title of this article is intended as a signal of two things first we are concerned with industries where several but not many firms are actually or potentially in competition with each other thus our topic is competition among the few 1 or oligopoly rather than the polar extremes of textbook perfect competition and pure monopoly secondly we are interested in the strategic nature of competition between firms where the meaning of strategic can be explained as follows if the essence of a game of strategy is the dependence of each person s proper choice of action on what he expects the other to do it may be useful to define a strategic move as follows a strategic move is one that influences the other person s choice in a manner favourable to one s self by affecting the other person s expectations of how one s self will behave schelling 1960 p 150

how entry threats induce slack abstract profits of incumbent firms are often observable to potential entrants and signal profit opportunities in a market incumbents therefore have an incentive to strategically manipulate profit reports since owners of firms typically derive utility only from profits incumbent firms have to balance the benefit of large profits against the possibility of entry it is shown that owners will generally accept below maximum profit performance i e tolerate slack in order to deter entry and furthermore that such entry deterring behaviour is successful even if it is anticipated by rational entrants

the persistence of early childhood maturity international evidence of long run age effects a continuum of ages exists within each starting class due to the use of a single school cut off date making the oldest children approximately twenty percent older than the youngest children at school entry we provide substantial evidence that these initial maturity differences have long lasting effects on student performance across oecd countries in particular the youngest members of each cohort score 4 12 percentiles lower than the oldest members in grade four and 2 9 percentiles lower in grade eight depending upon the country in fact data from canada and the united states shows that the youngest members of a cohort are even less likely to enroll in pre university academic track courses and high end academic universities taken together these findings point to important early relative maturity effects that propagate themselves into adulthood through the structure of education systems

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

excess capacity and limit pricing an empirical test entry may be inhibited by expectations that incumbents have lower marginal costs incumbents may be able to use limit pricing or excess capacity to further this expectation we construct an empirical model of oligopoly capacity and pricing decisions and of entrant responses the results support the hypothesis that both lower prices and greater excess capacity inhibit entry they further support limit pricing but provide no evidence that oligopolies deliberately install excess capacity to deter entry the results suggest however that limit pricing firms may exploit the entry inhibiting effects of unintended excess capacity by raising their limit prices

capacity output and sequential entry two crucial assumptions frequently made in industrial organization are that an established firm deters entry either by a constant high output the sylos postulate or by high excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis these assumptions may be an accurate description of the observed conduct of firms in some industries however when the rules of the post entry game are clearly specified the optimal output and investment strategies of an established firm may depart considerably from these behavioral assumptions because of this possible inconsistency with rational behavior any conclusions about the formation of industry based upon either assumption are highly suspect what is more these assumptions avoid the main issue of whether entry deterrence is worthwhile at all this paper presents a dynamic model of entry in which established firms pursue a cournot nash alternatively stackelberg strategy toward a potential entrant the entrant behaves in cournot nash fashion and chooses output on the basis of expected postentry profits at the equilibrium of the post entry game within this framework a constant output entry deterring strategy would involve maintenance of an entry deterring output level before and after entry is threatened an excess capacity entry deterring strategy would involve holding excess capacity at an entry deterring level and increasing output to that level after entry is threatened special conditions are presented under which the sylos postulate or the excess capacity hypothesis will accurately describe optimal entry deterring strategies in addition special conditions are examined under which the established firm maintains a constant output or holds pre entry excess capacity when large scale entry does in fact take place the analysis shows that in general established firm reactions to entry are quite different from these special cases the sylos postulate see joseph bain paolo sylos labini franco modigliani 1958 asserts not only that potential entrants expect established firms to maintain their output constant as entry occurs but that established firms keep output constant at a level that deters entry whether or not it is profitable to do so hailed as a welcome major breakthrough on the oligopoly front modigliani 1958 the sylos postulate underlies many papers in the large theoretical and empirical literature on limit pricing yet the sylos postulate ignores both the strategic interaction between firms and the dynamic aspects of entry 2 unless the established firm s monopoly output exceeds the entrydeterring level the established firm with a general cost function able to choose an entry deterring output level will instead always desire a lower output level before entry for the special case where capacity is an upper bound on output and the established firm is a stackelberg leader in the post entry game

dominant firms and their alleged decline abstract by way of a survey of recent literature on the theory of strategic competition this paper focuses on the question of whether dominant firms decline the traditional argument suggesting decline is found to be based on a rather unsatisfactory modelling of dominance and more acceptable conceptualizations suggest that such privileged positions will persist

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

labour market consequences of a high school diploma this article compares the labour market outcomes of high school dropouts to high school graduates who did not enrol into higher education but immediately entered the labour market using parental

returns to women s education using optimal iv selection this paper investigates returns to women s education by applying an optimal iv selection approach post lasso iv estimation which improves the first stage predictive relationship between an endoge

caveat innovator strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions abstract the assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction the assumption underlying earlier strategic models that the entrant does not know the incumbent s payoffs after strategic have been tested does not appear to apply instead strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns in this environment strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry

divisionalization and entry deterrence this paper assumes that incumbent firms can create new independent divisions more cheaply than potential entrants who must incur the additional overhead costs of new entry the main theoretical result is that such divisionalization ability leads perfectly informed incumbents to preempt all rational entry into their industries in contrast existing models of entry deterrence imply that informed incumbents even those with steadily decreasing average costs will often allow rational entry our result may explain why successful large scale entry by firms with no informational advantage is extremely rare the use of divisions to preempt entry may also explain why large firms in high profit oligopolies often divisionalize allowing their divisions to compete freely despite the negative pecuniary externality that each division imposes on others

the persistence of monopoly an investigation of the effectiveness of the united kingdom monopolies commission a sample of twenty eight markets investigated by the uk monopolies and mergers commission is taken and market share changes are analysed for subsequent erosion of dominance the evidence points to a modest erosion for leading firms but only rarely to a loss of leadership although there is no significant difference between the rates of decline for leading firms in the mmc sample and a control group the achievement of some erosion of dominance in markets where entry barriers were reduced may represent some limited success for competition policy