allocative efficiency of technically inefficient production units we discuss how to measure allocative efficiency without presuming technical efficiency this is relevant when it is easier to introduce reallocations than improvements of technical efficiency we compare the approach to the traditional one of assuming technical efficiency before measuring allocative efficiency in particular we develop necessary and sufficient conditions in the technology to ensure consistent measures we suggest alternative interpretations of the approaches and we relate them to motivational and organizational change perspectives

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a decomposition of profit loss under output price uncertainty in this paper firm profit loss is decomposed as the sum of two terms related to the output price uncertainty price expectation error and risk preference plus one extra term expressing technical inefficiency we then describe the implementation of our theoretical model in a robust data envelopment analysis dea framework which allows an effective and separate estimation of each term of the decomposition in addition we offer an operational tool to reveal producers risk preferences a 2009 database of french fattening pig farms is used as an illustration our results indicate that risk preference and technical inefficiency are the main sources of profit loss

money politics and the post war business cycle abstract the political economy literature has enshrined as stylized fact the view that lower inflation and temporarily lower growth follow the election of republican presidents and has emphasized political manipulation of monetary policy as an explanation support for the monetary explanation comes in econometric work that largely ignores identification issues that dominate the literature on measuring the effects of monetary policy we generalize a standard vector autoregression framework to accommodate discrete political party variables we find almost no support for the view that political effects on the macroeconomy operate through monetary policy and only weak evidence that political effects are significant at all

measuring ecological efficiency with data envelopment analysis dea abstract the measurement of ecological efficiency provides some important information for the companies environmental management ecological efficiency is usually measured by comparing environmental performance indicators data envelopment analysis dea shows a high potential to support such comparisons as no explicit weights are needed to aggregate the indicators in general dea assumes that inputs and outputs are goods but from an ecological perspective also bads have to be considered in the literature bads are treated in different and sometimes arbitrarily chosen ways this article aims at the systematic derivation of ecologically extended dea models starting from the assumptions of dea in production theory and activity analysis a generalisation of basic dea models is derived by incorporating a multi dimensional value function f extended preference structures can be considered by different specifications of f e g specifications for ecologically motivated applications of dea

on the technical in efficiency of a profit maximum abstract in general production theoretical analysis aims at identifying an enterprise s technically efficient production alternatives according to the principles of economy achieving technical efficiency is considered as a prerequisite for a producer s further optimization behaviour and therefore as a matter of rationality we will show in our article however that it might be economically unfounded to focus only on technically efficient production alternatives using a nonlinear inequality constrained optimization framework we demonstrate that a profit maximizing production may imply technical inefficiency i e in graphical terms depending on the topology of the profit function the optimal input output combination may be located in the interior of the producer s production possibilities set in order to show this we establish mathematical and economic conditions for the profit maximization approach to yield a technically efficient or inefficient solution respectively in fact inefficient solutions emerge when input or output prices are not strictly positive over the entire domain and or the objective function is non monotonic we highlight some non pathological economic situations that are likely to set the stage for technically inefficient profit maxima and provide an example that illustrates how an enterprise can make use of this approach in order to improve profits by choosing technically inefficient production points in spite of those optimal inefficiencies economic environments with positive prices and technical efficiency of the optimum shall remain the normal case

the political viability of rule based monetary policy we have estimated two models explaining political support for the president as a function of economic performance one model reflects the assumption characterizing most of the literature that voters indiscriminately punish inflation and unemployment without regard to the tradeoffs between them the other represents a more demanding conception of voter sophistication about macroeconomic possibilities and about control of the money supply while the data do not unambiguously designate a best model of behavior the sophisticated voter hypothesis performs as well as the naive voter hypothesis in the context of our study clearly this result is subject to the usual econometric caveats including possible misspecification of the model multicollinearity among independent variables etc however there is no particular reason to believe that these problems should favor one model as opposed to the other thus while we cannot conclude that voters really think in terms of rates of growth of velocity and natural output we can question the conventional wisdom that consistent rule based monetary policies may not be politically viable

electoral cycles and budgetary growth in veterans benefit programs while many studies have generated negative findings regarding the general existence of electoral cycles in economic phenomena we have found an apparently robust electoral cycle in veterans benefits this pattern was found between 1961 and 1978 but has disappeared since then we use this case to investigate the possibility that electoral cycles might contribute to the growth of government spending using two different methods of inference we find no strong basis to conclude that such cycles cause increasing public sector growth

does there exist a political business cycle a box tiao analysis theories of the political business cycle are by now common they range from the elegant theoretical work of nordhaus 1975 to the essentially empirical work of tufte 1978 they all assume that politicians manipulate the economy to aid their reelection efforts in particular politicians manipulate macroeconomic policy to create a boom just before election day golden and poterba 1980 provide an excellent review of this literature both tufte and nordhaus provide casual evidence for the existence of a political business cycle using inflation and unemployment rates as indicators of macroeconomic outcomes tufte and nordhaus predict at a minimum that unemployment should be decreasing before election day if presidents are really manipulating the economy very well then unemployment should be at a minimum in the october before the election and hence should be rising after the election in the nordhaus version the economy pays for the pre election boom with a post election surge in the inflation rate nordhaus also suggests that the president should engineer a recession early in his term to reduce inflationary expectations tufte 1978 20 presents graphs of the unemployment series and claims that visual examination shows them to be generally consistent with the hypothesis however he provides no statistical tests of the hypothesis nor does he estimate the quantitative impact of elections on unemployment tufte does not examine the inflation series nordhaus restricts himself to comparing unemployment rates in the two years preceeding and following an election with a simple nonparametric test supporting the hypothesis the literature provides several good empirical tests of the political business cycle hypothesis both paldam 1979 and mccallum 1978 test for the existence of four year cycles and find none however they do not test for discontinuous changes in the series around election day golden and poterba examine whether the use of policy instruments changes near election day and

liquidity commonality in commodities abstract we examine liquidity commonality in commodity futures markets using data from 16 agricultural energy industrial metal precious metal and livestock commodities we show there is a strong systematic liquidity factor in commodities liquidity commonality was present in 1997 2003 when commodity prices were relatively stable and during the recent boom there is some support for both supply side and demand side explanations for this commonality we find no evidence of a consistent link between stock and commodity liquidity in general energy commodities appear to provide a better hedge against equity market liquidity risk than the other commodity families

markets technology and environmental regulation price ambivalence of waste paper in germany abstract we examine the price ambivalence of low quality waste paper grades 1 02 and 1 04 on the german market since 1990 the price of these grades is at times positive and at times negative the underlying reason is the combination of three institutional and technical characteristics of the market i as a result of waste management legislation the supply of waste paper is mostly independent of its price and its demand supply is bounded from below by collection and utilization quotas fixed by the regulation on packaging waste enacted in 1991 ii the only alternative to costly disposal of waste paper by dumping or incineration is its use as a secondary resource in the production of new paper as only the paper industry is capable of using waste paper in a productive manner in significant amount iii yet its use as a substitute for primary inputs is technically limited in this article we describe the technical and institutional conditions leading to price ambivalence and discuss the consequences for supply demand and trade of waste paper

testing the satisficing version of the political business cycle 1905 1984 this paper develops a test of the satisficing version of the political business cycle previous tests have focused on maximizing models of political behavior and are not sufficiently general to test for satisficing behavior using annual u s data for the period 1905 to 1984 we find evidence supporting the satisficing version of the political business cycle model but we reject the maximizing version in accordance with the satisficing hypothesis we find that increasing inflation or unemployment and decreasing monetary base growth in the third year of a presidential term are followed typically by reversals during the election year

asset market linkages evidence from financial commodity and real estate assets abstract we use a general markov switching model to examine the relationships between returns over three different asset classes financial assets us stocks and treasury bonds commodities oil and gold and real estate assets us case shiller index we confirm the existence of two distinct regimes a tranquil regime with periods of economic expansion and a crisis regime with periods of economic decline the tranquil regime is characterized by lower volatility and significantly positive stock returns during these periods there is also evidence of a flight from quality from gold to stocks by contrast the crisis regime is characterized by higher volatility and sharply negative stock returns along with evidence of contagion between stocks oil and real estate furthermore during these periods there is strong evidence of a flight to quality from stocks to treasury bonds

modeling undesirable factors in efficiency evaluation abstract data envelopment analysis dea measures the relative efficiency of decision making units dmus with multiple performance factors which are grouped into outputs and inputs once the efficient frontier is determined inefficient dmus can improve their performance to reach the efficient frontier by either increasing their current output levels or decreasing their current input levels however both desirable good and undesirable bad factors may be present for example if inefficiency exists in production processes where final products are manufactured with a production of wastes and pollutants the outputs of wastes and pollutants are undesirable and should be reduced to improve the performance using the classification invariance property we show that the standard dea model can be used to improve the performance via increasing the desirable outputs and decreasing the undesirable outputs the method can also be applied to situations when some inputs need to be increased to improve the performance the linearity and convexity of dea are preserved through our proposal

presidential popularity and macroeconomic performance are voters really so naive f ollowing the pioneering work of kramer 1971 numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between the macroeconomic performance of political administrations and their popularity or vote getting ability kramer s work showed that the aggregate congressional vote for an incumbent party can be explained rather well by variables indicating recent economic performance subsequent works have extended kramer s research by explaining presidential vote or gallup poll popularity data with similar models on one point almost all of these studies agree 2 votes and popularity can be explained well by models which suppose that voters judge policymakers on the basis of retrospective evaluation of past macroeconomic outcomes most authors interpret their results as being supportive of the hypothesis of rational voters since the evidence indicates that voting decisions are not based purely upon personalities party affiliation or chance kramer argued that if voters regard past macroeconomic performance of an administration to be indicative of future performance then a concern with past performance indicates a concern for future performance voters who simply extrapolate from the past to predict the future are rather naive however a sophisticated voter who has an understanding of the important intertemporal constraints embodied in the structure of the economy would be able to forecast future consequences of current policy choices more accurately than one who simply extrapolates if votes and popularity are simply functions of past outcomes then voters must either be ignorant of the basic structure of the economy or unconcerned with the future the supposition that voters are so naive might run counter to the intuition of most economists who generally assume individual rationality as a central behavioral postulate nevertheless the empirical results noted above have been accepted by many as evidence that voters do misperceive their own long run interest the implications of the naive voter hypothesis for macroeconomic policymaking are disturbing nordhaus 1975 has developed a model which shows that voter naivete can encourage vote maximizing politicians to induce political business cycles and an inflationary bias there is some but not unanimous empirical support for the existence of politically motivated business cycles and casual empiricism also suggests that politicians themselves believe in the naive voter 3 while studies show that empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that voters are concerned with the recent past the results do not reject a sophisticated voter hypothesis none of the aforementioned studies has tested a model consistent with a sophisticated voter hypothesis i e a model in which voters understand what outcomes are feasible in the long and short runs and are concerned with future as well as current and past economic performance in this paper we develop such a model and estimate it using gallup poll data on presidential popularity results of this model are compared to results from a naive voter model similar to those employed in previous research received for publication february 4 1982 revision accepted for publication july 30 1982 university of south carolina i am grateful for helpful comments provided by ray fair douglas hibbs william keech daniel richards abel l da costa fernandes and an anonymous referee i also wish to thank william keech for providing me with the gallup poll data on presidential approval rates aurel schubert provided excellent research assistance fair 1978a bloom and price 1975 arcelus and meltzer 1975 and pollard 1981 a 1981 b have all estimated models to explain voting while frey and schneider 1978 and hibbs i 982a 1982b have developed models to explain presidential popularity 2 an exception is provided by arcelus and meltzer 1975 3nordhaus 1975 and tufte 1978 have provided evidence of political business cycles for a number of western democracies and frey and schneider 1978 and maloney and smirlock 1981 have estimated policy reaction functions suggesting that the timing of elections affects policymaking see tufte for a discussion of casual empirical evidence indicating that politicians believe that current economic conditions affect electoral outcomes

multilateral productivity comparisons when some outputs are undesirable a nonparametric approach multilateral productivity comparisons of firms producing multiple outputs some of which are undesirable are obtained by making two modifications to the standard farrell approach to efficiency measurement the restriction that production technology satisfy strong disposability of outputs is relaxed to allow for the fact that undesirable outputs may be freely disposable and the efficiency measures are modified to allow for an asymmetric treatment of desirable and undesirable outputs performance measures that satisfy these requirements are calculated as solutions to programming problems the methodology is applied to a sample of mills producing paper and pollutants

presidential politics budget deficits and monetary policy in the united states 1960 1976 this paper has focused on the extent to which the traditional tools of macroeconomic management in the united states monetary and fiscal policy have contributed to a political business cycle regardless of whether politicians can successfully influence real economic variables to their own ends the evidence presented here suggests that they tried and that they enjoyed some at least indirect aid from their independent monetary authorities in doing so several major conclusions emerge

evolutionary voter sophistication and political business cycles the concept of the sophisticated electorate is central to many contemporary political economic models however no existing studies have yet clarified how voters could develop a sophisticated way of evaluating economic performance this study suggests a transitional hypothesis that removes the constraint that voters have prior knowledge about the macroeconomic environment and the true economic intent of the incumbent government the hypothesis permits behavioral innovation from learning and predicts that the evolutionary process toward sophistication may be triggered by socially suboptimal political business cycles that reveal the self serving characteristic of the government the empirical analyses using recent japanese experiences show that japanese political support behavior shifted from naivete to sophistication in the early 1970s after political manipulation occurred in the 1969 and 1972 parliamentary elections

the influence of elections on federal reserve behavior a political business cycle is tested in a monetary reaction function positive evidence is a result of the 1930s and 1940s and not post war elections in addition there is no evidence of such a cycle in a rational expectations model

unanticipated money and the political business cycle six different series of one period forecasts for money growth are generated for each year 1960 through 1984 the prediction errors are analyzed to see whet herthe authorities attempted to expand the economy in election years by unexpectedly raising money growth while there is no evidence of attempts to fool the public throughout the entire 1960 84 period such fooling may have been tried through 1974 it is speculated that the public discussion of expectations formation and of politicians motivations since then may have signaled officials that further attempts to mislead the public would be prohibitively costly copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

gold and the dollar and the euro pound and yen abstract usually gold and the dollar are negatively related when the dollar price of gold increases the dollar depreciates against other currencies this is intuitively puzzling because it seems to suggest that gold prices are associated with appreciation in other currencies why should the dollar be different we show here that there is actually no puzzle the price of gold can be associated with currency depreciation in every country the dollar price of gold can be related to dollar depreciation and the euro pound yen price of gold can be related to euro pound yen depreciation indeed this is usually the case empirically

how sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail energy prices abstract there is growing evidence that the primary effect of energy price shocks on the u s economy involves a reduction in consumer spending we quantify the direct effect on real consumption of unanticipated changes in discretionary income shifts in precautionary savings and changes in the operating cost of energy using durables the possibility of asymmetries in the response of real consumption to energy price shocks is also considered we demonstrate that linear models are consistent with the symmetric behavior of real consumption in 1979 when energy prices increased sharply and in 1986 when they fell sharply it is shown that historically energy price shocks have been an important factor in explaining u s real consumption growth but by no means the dominant factor

monetary policy and presidential elections a nonpartisan political cycle this paper develops a federal reserve reaction function which relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives pre and postpresidential election estimates of this reaction function for the post accord period of 1953 1984 suggest two conclusions

rational inefficiency adjustment costs and sequential technologies abstract in this paper we propose a novel approach to estimate the rational inefficiency of decision making units in the presence of adjustment costs using sequential definitions of the production technology we show how cost inefficiency can be decomposed into rational and residual inefficiency as well as inefficiency caused by technical change furthermore we estimate lower bounds for the unobserved adjustment costs based on unexploited cost reductions due to rational inefficiency these adjustment costs are used to evaluate the feasibility of exploiting cost reductions caused by residual inefficiency we demonstrate the empirical applicability of our model by estimating and decomposing the cost inefficiency of u s coal fired power plants using panel data which cover the period between 1994 and 2009

the bias towards zero in aggregate perceptions an explanation based on rationally calculating individuals i introduction a central theme in the study of economic behavior is individual rationality or utility maximizing behavior contrary to the accusations of many outside critics the economics assumption of rationality neither denies that information is costly nor implies that decisions are error free rational expectations allows for ignorance but insists on the absence of systematic errors in the aggregate even if some individuals make large underestimates their errors are offset by large overestimates made by others alternatively even if people on average underestimate the effect of some variable during one period they may overestimate its effect at a later date these assumptions form the basis for the standard conclusion that the government cannot systematically outsmart the public the theory and application of rational expectations has generated a vast literature over the last couple of decades it is now well known that the application of rational expectations theory to actual cases may for instance be unsuitable when there are systematic errors in the observed variables when loss functions are not quadratic or when variables are constrained to take only positive values while such limitations may well be problematic these objections have in our view not been very damaging in the sense that rational expectations still provides a natural starting point for much economic analysis like rational expectations this paper takes individual rationality as its central theme yet we reach a radically different conclusion from rational expectations regarding aggregate behavior we demonstrate that individual errors in identifying the relationships among variables cause a downward bias in the aggregate that would be equivalent to the public underestimating the strengths of the true relationships rational expectations has considered the misestimation type of error which can cancel out in the aggregate but with errors in identifying relationships there exists no similar cancelling out effect and thus the public appears to irrationally underestimate the strengths of relationships the paper is organized as follows first we set up a simple formal model to examine the misestimation problem and then contrast it to the identification problem section iii explains why the identification problem can be so important even when a relatively small number of variables are involved section iv reviews empirical evidence of bias in the expectations formation literature as shown in section v our hypothesis can be used to explain political business cycles in a standard aggregate supply and demand framework ii theory in our model individuals acquire knowledge in two steps they first identify the causal relationship between two or more variables and then estimate the strength of that relationship as with herbert a simon s satisficing approach 1959 1979 and the analysis in ronald a heiner 1988 we assume finite intellectual capabilities however our model neither assumes nor implies anything about simon s satisficing approach and the often related concept of bounded rationality instead our inquiry is strictly limited to the consequences of omitting variables and will not address the more ambitious question of what strategies individuals might adopt to improve learning like heiner we distinguish between the reliability of making decisions and the issue of obtaining information heiner shows that while decision making itself might be flawless when individuals face only a very limited amount of information it is optimal for them to choose a larger information set and enter into the imperfect decision zone he provides several different reasons finite channel capacity information complexity and nonlocal information for why the advantage of having much information also translates into more decision error while heiner s model deals with individuals making correct or incorrect decisions his underlying reasoning could equally well be used to motivate our analysis of why a portion of the population fails to appreciate certain economic relationships

opinion polls and political business cycles theory and evidence for the united states the paper shows that the frey schneider schultz hypothesis that there is a negative relation between the government s popularity and the government s incentives to engineer political business cycles is consistent with rational forward looking voting provided one makes appropriate assumptions about the incumbent s preferences the empirical part of the paper presents evidence favourable to the hypothesis using quarterly data on us money growth

hedgers funds and small speculators in the energy futures markets an analysis of the cftc s commitments of traders reports the commodity futures trading commission cftc s commitments of traders cot data are examined for crude oil unleaded gasoline heating oil and natural gas futures contracts the collection procedures for the cot data are first examined followed by granger causality tests to determine if relationships between trader positions and market prices exist a positive correlation between returns and positions held by noncommercial traders and a negative correlation between commercial positions and market returns are found furthermore positive returns result in an increase in noncommercial net positions in the following week whereas the net long positions held by commercial hedgers decline following price increases however traders net positions do not lead market returns in general

the federal reserve s response to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks evidence of a partisan political cycle the orthodox approach to modeling the fed s response to economic conditions is to employ a monetary policy reaction function most reaction functions are estimated by regressing a policy indicator possibly the federal funds rate or a monetary aggregate on variables that describe the state of the economy such as unemployment inflation and growth in output under certain conditions which we discuss below estimated coefficients from a reaction function provide information about the fed s monetary policy priorities moreover extending the model to include election and partisan dummy variables may provide information about the fed s response to political pressures there are two problems with interpreting the coefficients in a standard reaction function as the weights that the fed attaches to its policy objectives first the monetary policy decision may not be represented accurately by an aggregate reaction function one that models the fed as a whole because there are twelve voting members on the fomc chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 10 have recently addressed this issue by employing a disaggregated set of reaction functions the second problem with interpreting reaction function coefficients as the weights the fed places on its policy objectives is that this interpretation implicitly assumes structural stability of the underlying macroeconomy abrams froyen and waud 1 31 acknowledge this shortcoming when they state coefficients from estimated reaction functions do not provide direct information on policymaker utility functions rather than being the solution to an unconstrained optimization dependent only on policymaker preferences reaction functions are the output of a constrained maximization where the constraints are the reduced form equations that characterize