estimating the impact of the hajj religion and tolerance in islam s global gathering we estimate the impact on pilgrims of performing the hajj pilgrimage to mecca our method compares successful and unsuccessful applicants in a lottery used by pakistan to allocate hajj visas pilgrim accounts stress that the hajj leads to a feeling of unity with fellow muslims but outsiders have sometimes feared that this could be accompanied by antipathy toward non muslims we find that participation in the hajj increases observance of global islamic practices such as prayer and fasting while decreasing participation in localized practices and beliefs such as the use of amulets and dowry it increases belief in equality and harmony among ethnic groups and islamic sects and leads to more favorable attitudes toward women including greater acceptance of female education and employment increased unity within the islamic world is not accompanied by antipathy toward non muslims instead hajjis show increased belief in peace and in equality and harmony among adherents of different religions the evidence suggests that these changes are likely due to exposure to and interaction with hajjis from around the world rather than to a changed social role of pilgrims upon return

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

rainfall and conflict a cautionary tale abstract there is evidence that in some contexts income shocks cause conflict the literature demonstrating this relationship uses rainfall shocks to instrument for income shocks arguing that in agriculturally dependent regions negative rain shocks lower income which incites violence this identification strategy relies on the assumption that rainfall shocks affect conflict only through their impacts on income this paper evaluates this exclusion restriction in the context of religious conflict in india using data on dam construction i identify districts that are downstream from irrigation dams and show that income in these areas is much less sensitive to rainfall fluctuations however rain shocks remain equally strong predictors of riot incidence in these districts i explore other channels through which rainfall might affect conflict

information aggregation through costly political action information about various policy alternatives is dispersed among the individual members of a society prior to a vote over the alternatives some people take costly political action to signal their private information to voters by informing voting decisions political action has potential to decrease the likelihood that voters cast mistaken votes perhaps surprisingly preelection communication may be counterproductive the dispersed information is partially aggregated by the vote and political action may contribute noise to the voting process in some cases the voting mechanism is more likely to implement the full information voting outcome in the absence of preelection political action copyright 1994 by american economic association

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

momentum and social learning in presidential primaries this paper investigates social learning in sequential voting systems in the econometric model candidates experience momentum effects when their performance in early states exceeds expectations the empirical application uses daily polling data from the 2004 presidential primary we find that kerry benefited from surprising wins in early states and took votes away from dean owing to these momentum effects early voters had up to five times the influence of late voters in the selection of candidates and this helps to explain the distribution of advertising expenditures finally we use the estimated model to conduct two counterfactual experiments

do political protests matter evidence from the tea party movement can protests cause political change or are they merely symptoms of underlying shifts in policy preferences this paper studies the effect of the tea party movement in the united states which rose to prominence through a series of rallies across the country on april 15 tax day 2009 to identify the causal effect of protests we use an instrumental variables approach that exploits variation in rainfall on the day of the coordinated rallies weather on tax day robustly predicts rally attendance and the subsequent local strength of the movement as measured by donations media coverage social networking activity and later events we show that larger rallies cause an increase in turnout in favor of the republicans in the 2010 congressional elections and increase the likelihood that incumbent democratic representatives retire incumbent policymaking is affected as well representatives respond to large protests in their district by voting more conservatively in congress finally the estimates imply significant multiplier effects for every protester republican votes increase by seven to fourteen votes together our results show that protests can build political movements that ultimately affect policy and they suggest that it is unlikely that these effects arise solely through the standard channel of private information revelation

disclosure venture capital and entrepreneurial spawning venture capital vc funds have been facing increasing regulatory scrutiny since the 2007 financial crisis particularly with respect to calls for increased disclosure requirements in this paper we examine the effect of more stringent securities regulation on the supply and performance of vc as well as on new business creation i e entrepreneurial spawning using country level and investment level data from 34 countries over the years 2000 2008 we find that more stringent securities regulation is positively associated with the supply and performance of vc around the world more stringent securities regulation is also positively associated with entrepreneurial spawning induced by vc among different forms of securities regulation disclosure stands out as having the most economically meaningful impact which casts doubt on the oft repeated objections to disclosure in vc that it would stifle the vc industry because secrets would have to be revealed to competitors and the public these findings are robust to numerous robustness checks for endogeneity the policy implications are clear however regardless of endogeneity concerns vc and entrepreneurship markets are enabled not curtailed in countries with better disclosure standards when one compares the existing differences in disclosure around the world and changes thereto over the 2000 2008 period

refuting two claims about virtual water trade abstract using the heckscher ohlin trade model i refute two prominent but incorrect claims on virtual water trade these claims are that virtual water trade i levels uneven water distribution and ii reduces the potential for water conflict both claims are based on an incorrect understanding of comparative advantage in the production of water intensive goods the results show that both claims only hold under certain conditions but do not necessarily follow from the heckscher ohlin trade model

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

rational turnout the neglected role of groups rational choice theories have difficulty accounting for individual participation in collective action voting is among the acts hardest to explain consumption benefits have been proposed to account for nonzero turnout the model presented here establishes a political investment basis for these benefits i argue that voters often act not in isolation but as part of groups with shared interests while individuals still vote because of consumption benefits arising from the act of voting some of these consumption benefits are provided by group leaders out of collective benefits received by the group in return for its votes the collective benefit comes from a candidate adopting policy positions closer to those of the group in passing i show that the widespread availability of public opinion polling increases the candidate s incentive to shift position finally some data from recent off year elections are shown to be consistent with the model

the globalization of virtual water flows explaining trade patterns of a scarce resource abstract water availability is paramount for security and development yet many countries suffer from water scarcity virtual water trade or trade in water embedded agricultural commodities has been considered a means for countries to overcome water deficits provided they can import food rather than produce locally despite a rich literature research on the subject has not reached a consensus on whether virtual water trade is actually driven by relative water endowment differentials e g countries seeking to alleviate pressure on their own resources or by comparative advantage in water utilization e g countries using their most abundant and cheap factors of production understanding what drives virtual water trade would support water management policies in targeting the roots of water depletion excessive use due to lack of other available inputs and bad water management due to absence of water use regulation using panel data of bilateral virtual water trade flows from 1994 to 2007 applied to a gravity model we first demonstrate that arid countries do resort to trade as a means to alleviate water scarcity second we demonstrate that there is much inefficiency in water use in some countries where other agricultural inputs land labor are available and cheap given the increased urgency related to global water scarcity our results suggest how agricultural production and trade could help countries preserve and better use precious water resources

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

rain emotions and voting for the status quo abstract do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo we exploit exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870 000 municipal vote outcomes in switzerland to address this question the empirical tests are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data we find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change our robustness checks suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate and changes in information acquisition in addition we provide evidence that rain might have altered the outcome of several high stake votes we discuss the psychological mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks a pattern that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change

news droughts news floods and u s disaster relief this paper studies the influence of mass media on u s government response to approximately 5 000 natural disasters occurring between 1968 and 2002 these disasters took nearly 63 000 lives and affected 125 million people per year we show that u s relief depends on whether the disaster occurs at the same time as other newsworthy events such as the olympic games which are obviously unrelated to need we argue that the only plausible explanation of this is that relief decisions are driven by news coverage of disasters and that the other newsworthy material crowds out this news coverage

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

the social multiplier aggregate data is often used to make inferences about individual level behavior if there are social interactions in which one person s actions influence his neighbor s incentives or information then these inferences are inappropriate the presence of positive social interactions or strategic complementarities implies the existence of a social multiplier where aggregate relationships will overstate individual elasticities we present a brief model and then estimate the size of the social multiplier in three areas the impact of education on wages the impact of demographics on crime and group membership among dartmouth roommates in these contexts there is a significant social multiplier jel ho jo co

on the economics of virtual water trade abstract virtual water trade is increasingly recognized as a useful metaphor for thinking about freshwater resources in an international context its legitimacy in terms of economic theory has been questioned by a number of authors however in this article i develop new theoretical results that place the virtual water concept on a firm economic foundation and which correct several misconceptions within the existing literature on virtual water economics

rational choice and the dynamics of collective political action evaluating alternative models with panel data been hampered by the inability to use perceptions of the costs and benefits of participation at a given time to predict behavior that necessarily occurred in the past and by ambiguities associated with analyzing behavioral intentions instead of actual participation using panel data collected on a national sample in west germany between 1987 and 1989 we show that variables from a collective interest model measured in 1987 individuals dissatisfaction with the provision of collective goods beliefs that group actions can be successful and beliefs in the importance of their own participation predict subsequent participation in collective protest activities variables corresponding to the private selective incentives associated with protest are found to be less relevant furthermore we find that engaging in protest changes many of the perceptions that influence future participation we discuss the implications for theories of political mobilization p erhaps no area in mass political behavior research is beset with such serious methodological difficulties as the study of participation in political protest and other unconventional activities some of the problems such as finding and eliciting truthful responses from the limited number of individuals who engage in these types of behaviors can and have been remedied through better sampling and more sensitive interviewing methods in national and local probability surveys a more fundamental problem however is that unlike voting or campaign participation unconventional behavior does not occur during fixed periods and hence researchers typically cannot plan a study in advance of the specific activities they may wish to analyze this means that almost all previous surveybased research on protest and unconventional political action is prone to what green and shapiro 1994 85 term the pedestrian methodological defect of predicting past behavior from information gathered at the survey s current time this error would be less consequential for causal

the effects of social networks on employment and inequality we develop a model where agents obtain information about job opportunities through an explicitly modeled network of social contacts we show that employment is positively correlated across time and agents moreover unemployment exhibits duration dependence the probability of obtaining a job decreases in the length of time that an agent has been unemployed finally we examine inequality between two groups if staying in the labor market is costly and one group starts with a worse employment status then that group s drop out rate will be higher and their employment prospects will be persistently below that of the other group

persuasion in politics we present a model of the creation of social networks such as political parties trade unions religious coalitions or political action committees through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members the key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network but not by those outside once created networks can be rented out to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas which may have little to do with network members core beliefs in this framework political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter rather parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the role of alliances in the early development of high growth firms rapid growth is sought after but may overstretch a firm s resources can alliances supply compensating support for rapidly growing firms longitudinal data on firms in a technology cluster are used to investigate rapid growth in relation to alliances and other factors known to be associated with firm growth rapid firm growth appears beneficial in terms of higher survival rates and earlier attainment of mid size but is rarely sustained alliances are predictors of rapid growth as are international operations venture capital is not directly associated with firm growth in the findings but there is a high incidence of alliances among venture capital backed firms copyright 2014 the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

a gravity model of virtual water trade this work investigates the determinants of virtual water trade vwt ows by means of an estimated gravity model of trade applied to the virtual water embodied in the agricultural goods exchanged across countries in line with the recent literature on the gravity model the paper presents a battery of estimation methods cross section and panel ols and pseudo maximum likelihood with and without two way xed eects the analysis shows that bilateral vwt ows are aected by the classical determinants of trade but also by national water endowments as well as by the level of pressure on water resources these general ndings are robust even though some variation can be observed across the estimation methods and in particular when smaller sub samples of countries such as continents and regional groups are considered this contributes to account for the mixed evidence in the literature on the importance of water endowments for the vwt ows

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero