alternative approaches to money and growth this paper reexamines the issue of money and growth in an economy with both endogenous labor supply and endogenous capital stock using three recently developed approaches the money in the utility function approach the cash in advance approach and the transactions costs approach by establishing a qualitative equivalence between alternative setups the authors find economically justifiable conditions such that all comparative statics results derived from the aforementioned approaches are identical copyright 1992 by ohio state university press

finite horizons and the non neutrality of money abstract this note re examines the issue of monetary super neutrality in an optimizing model with finite horizons mortality makes agents less patient and thus affects negatively the process of capital accumulation this distortion can be reduced by increases in monetary growth

the decline of dominant firms 1905 1929 the theory of dynamic limit pricing implies that a firm maximizes its wealth by gradually sacrificing its dominant market share we extend the theory by simulation methods to show that higher structural entry barriers generally result in both higher profits and a slower sacrifice of market share the model is applied to 42 once dominant firms in u s manufacturing to explain jointly the declines of their market shares and the profit rates earned during 1905 1929 the statistical results agree substantially with the hypothesis that these firms behaved consistently with maximizing their wealth through dynamic limit pricing

the relative importance of actual and potential competition empirical evidence from the pharmaceuticals market the relative importance of actual and potential competition empirical evidence from the pharmaceuticals market

are judges leading economic theory sunk costs the threat of entry and the competitive process in this paper we attempt to bring theoretical form to a particular entry argument that has found favor in the courts we suggest that sunk costs may not be a major impediment to entry when a group of customers can commit to an entry enhancing strategy buyers have strong incentives to adopt such strategies because they benefit directly from the resulting lower prices the simplest example involves a large buyer that is able to guarantee an entrant a market for its product long term contracts or even informal purchase commitments backed by customer reputation may also allow the entrant to obtain a guarantee of sufficient business to make the entry profitable once entry is thought likely to occur the existing competitors may be unwilling to attempt a price increase of any magnitude thus the threat of entry can maintain competitive prices even in the presence of sunk costs in section ii we motivate the analysis by discussing the current controversy over the role entry conditions play in an antitrust merger review then we discuss the necessary assumptions for a model of how the threat of entry can deter any price increase in the presence of sunk costs we note that these conditions are different from those commonly used in the economic literature

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

advertising sunk costs and barriers to entry this paper tests hypotheses about the entry deterring effects of advertising the model isolates three separate effects of advertising on entry the effect on the irrecoverable costs of entry the effect on the uncertainty underlying the entry environment and the effect on the measured rates of profit we find that advertising impedes entry since necessary advertising expenditures give rise to a sunk cost which raises the risk of entry however we also find a countervailing force due to advertising in that the entrant perceives a greater likelihood of success in markets where advertising is important our analysis shows that the overall impact of advertising on entry is positive

is money net wealth this paper develops a simple monetary model a hybrid of the sidrauski and overlapping generation frameworks in which new dynasties of infinitely lived agents continuously enter the economy it is shown that the long run nonsuperneutrality of money in life cycle models is a modality of the violation of the ricardian debt neutrality proposition the very same intergenerational redistribution effects which on the fiscal side are the source of debt nonneutrality are at work on the monetary side to create monetary wealth effects and make money nonsuperneutral in the long run copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

monetary and fiscal policy in an optimising model with capital accumulation and finite lives this paper considers the effects of monetary and fiscal policies in an optimizing model with capital accumulation and a pos itive birth rate an increase in monetary growth leads to a reduction in the real interest rate and a boost of capital and total consumpti on however the superneutrality result still prevails when open mark et operations are used to increase monetary growth and preferences ar e separable a tax financed fiscal expansion reduces capital and crow ds out consumption by more than 100 percent a bond financed fiscal e xpansion increases capital by less and crowds out consumption by more than a money financed fiscal expansion copyright 1988 by royal economic society

monetary policy and regional availability of debt financing the relative availability of bond and bank financing should affect the firm s external financing and investment decisions we define a measure that proxies for the regional borrowing inflexibility to substitute between bank and bond financing debt inflexibility debt inflexibility tilts the firm s financial structure towards equity and reduces investment the impact is stronger during the period of tight monetary policy particularly for smaller firms and firms without banking relationships debt inflexibility increases the sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows reduces the likelihood of dividend payment and makes the firm more likely to pay equity in mergers and acquisitions

location choice product proliferation and entry deterrence within a slightly modified version of hotelling s model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise we show that entry deterrence although optimal need not be achieved through product proliferation in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation we also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry

contestability queues and governmental entry deterrence this paper demonstrates that a perverse kind of entry deterrence can result when government subsidized production is combined with non price rationing in the form of queuing even though queuing leads to a total cost to the consumer not including the tax cost that is higher than the cost of an unsubsidized private supplier and even though the government s money price is rigid the market is not contestable the key to the result is that the waiting cost portion of the consumer s acquisition cost declines immediately upon entry and losses would be forced upon the entrant privatization would negate the entry deterrence thus leading to entry increased output at lower full prices lower average production costs decreased waiting costs increased profits and increased consumer surplus

noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry deterring signal recent work has investigated the effect of a potential entrant s uncertainty about postentry profits on the likelihood of his entering the market it has always been assumed that the potential entrant knows the type of postentry solution but lacks information on cost or as to whether the postentry solution will be cooperative or noncooperative we find that entry is more likely the greater is the preentry profit rate in equilibrium the threat of entry then forces the incumbent firms to act more competitively to deter entry

product bundling and incentives for mergers and strategic alliances this paper analyzes firms choice between a merger and a strategic alliance in bundling their product with other complementary product we consider a framework in which firms can improve profits only from product bundling while mixed bundling is not profitable pure bundling is because pure bundling reduces consumers choices and thus softens competition among firms firms benefit the most from this reduced competit ion if they form an alliance firms do not gain as much from a merger because internalizing the complementarity between the two products a merged firm is inclined to pursue aggressive pricing to gain market share yet firms may be motivated to choose a merger over an alliance because of foreclosure possibility as foreclosure is not possible under strategic alliance however in response unmerged rivals can use a strategic alliance to avert foreclosure hence the possibility of counter bundling via strategic alliance by rivals reduces the incentives for merger in equilibrium

research note additional learning and implications on the role of informative advertising observers argue that evidence for the persuasive role of advertising comes from competitive categories where increases in advertising lead to higher average prices conversely others claim that advertising serves a purely informational role here higher levels of advertising lead to better informed consumers and this should increase competition and stimulate lower prices the objective of this study is to neither confirm nor refute either of these perspectives it is rather to show that increases in informative advertisingalone can lead to both higher or lower prices i further show that the direction of this relationship depends on the level of differentiation between competing firms similar to grossman and shapiro 1984 i examine conditions where the differences between competing products are small but i also examine conditions where the differences are significant the role of advertising is to inform consumers about individual products and higher advertising for a product means that more of the potential market knows about it higher levels of advertising increase the relative importance of fully informed consumers compared to partially informed consumers this dynamic is the basis for explaining why informative advertising can push prices either up or down in a uniformly distributed spatial market

entry deterrence with uncertain entry and uncertain observability of commitment the standard approach to the issue of strategic entry deterrence is based on the assumption that if the incumbent does not precommit entry will take place with certainty while if he does precommit entry will be deterred with certainty in this note we allow for the possibility that the opportunity cost of entry is random so that entry is not a priori certain we also allow for the possibility that the incumbent s commitment is not observed by the potential entrant we show in numerical examples that even very little uncertainty may be sufficient to induce the incumbent not to attempt to deter entry

sovereign stress and smes access to finance evidence from the ecb s safe survey abstract we study the effect of sovereign stress on smes capital structure using restricted access data from the european central bank we find that during the sovereign debt crisis and controlling for borrowers quality firms in stressed countries became more likely to be denied credit to be credit rationed and to face higher loan rates less creditworthy firms were not more likely to become credit constrained suggesting no flight to quality in lending we also find that in order to make up for the decline in bank credit firms in stressed countries began relying considerably more on retained earnings and government subsidies

informative advertising and product match abstract this paper studies informative advertising in a variety of market structures for which some consumers are informed about two differentiated products while other consumers are uninformed we characterize a unique symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in advertising and pricing and analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium remarkably total surplus is non monotonic in advertising in a duopoly market the equilibrium level of advertising may be more or less than socially optimal we also study the effect of a trade association and compare these results with the first best solution and a multiproduct monopolist

informative advertising with differentiated products in this paper we study the role of promotional expenditures by sellers in a model of product differentiation advertising conveys full and accurate information about the characteristics of products heterogeneous consumers who have no source of information other than advertisements seek to purchase the products that best fit their needs despite the roles played by advertising in improving the matching of products and consumers and in increasing the elasticity of demand faced by each firm we find that the market determined levels of advertising are excessive given the extent of diversity in the market we derive a promotional equilibrium based on a specific information transmission technology paying explicit attention to the structure of consumer information and its impact on firms demand curves this allows us to study the effects of changes in the advertising technology including an increased ability to target messages to specific groups of consumers on the equilibrium in the product market we find that decreased advertising costs may reduce profits by increasing the severity of price competition

capacity outpl t and sequential entry comment two behavioral assumptions that are often made in the industrial organization literature are that an established firm or group may deter entry either through limit pricing the sylos postulate or by holding excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis in an interesting recent article in this review 1981 daniel spulber examines these behavioral assumptions to see whether they are consistent with rational behavior by an established firm spulber s analysis is based on a two firm two period game model in which the established firm is given a first in advantage by introducing this dynamic element into the model spulber is able to explicitly address the issue of the optimality of entry deterring behavior spulber finds that the use of limit pricing and or excess capacity to deter entry is rational only under a very limited set of circumstances in particular when the second period outcome is determined by a cournot nash equilibrium he derives the following results 1 the first period output of the established firm is always less than or equal to the first period output produced by a firm not anticipating entry the established firm essentially accommodates entry and limit pricing does not occur 2 the established firm never holds more capital than the amount that would minimize its production costs given its output choices in periods one and two this comment takes issue with spulber s conclusions about the cournot nash case it will be shown that the two results cited above may be reversed when the production technology is characterized by variable proportions this reversal hinges on the particular type of nash equilibrium employed in the analysis of the two period model spulber implicitly uses a nash equilibrium that is not subgame perfect 2 it is shown below that when one requires the nash equilibrium to be subgame perfect both limit pricing and excess capital investment outcomes are possible for the variable proportions technology case the subgame perfection property thus seems to capture an important strategic element in decision making for the established firm in some cases this type of strategic behavior leads to entry barriers that would not exist under innocent profit maximization by the established firm strategic entry barriers are discussed by steven salop 1979 spulber s notation and assumptions about demand and costs are adopted below

excess capacity and entry some empirical evidence recent articles by spence i977 dixit i979 and schmalensee i98i have elaborated on wenders i97i1 proposition that excess capacity can act as a barrier to entry the intent of all of these treatments is to suggest that firms may rationally invest in excess capacity with the expectation that excess capacity will be seen by potential entrants either as a signal of aggressive intent or as a credible threat 2 when excess capacity does not lead to creation of a credible threat it may still act as a barrier to entry by shifting the risk return perceptions of potential entrants enough to divert the potential entrants investments into other industries 3 alternatively investment in excess capacity by incumbent firms may reduce the prospects of an active market for the used equipment of a defunct entrant and thereby help to convert fixed costs into sunk costs consequently raising entry barriers 4 this paper represents an exploratory effort to investigate empirically the prevalence and efficiency of excess capacity in deterring entry first a simple and traditional model of entry is presented this is followed by the description of the data used to explore the excess capacity investment concept a combined results and comments section follows the description of the data

cost raising strategies advantage rivals by raising their costs in this paper we show that strategies designed to raise rivals costs have a number of advantages over predatory pricing they are credible do not necessarily require the victim to exit and do not necessarily require the existence of classical market power the paper sets up a general model proves a number of general results and then applies the model to specific strategies involving overbuying inputs and vertical integration

inflation and capital accumulation under a finite horizon abstract the effect of inflation on demand for capital and the aggregate capital labor ratio is investigated in a finite horizon utility maximization model it is shown that deriving saving and asset choice decisions from utility maximization does not in itself lead to superneutrality independence of steady state capital labor ratio from the rate of monetary growth as in the work of sidrauski and that a finite horizon is crucial in explaining this difference it is further shown that it is possible under very general conditions to show that increases in the rate of inflation will increase the aggregate capital labor ratio allowing us to extend the mundell tobin effect to a wider class of models

limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking abstract this paper extends an earlier paper by the author in which there were two economic agents an established firm and a potential entrant operating under complete information each agent being assumed to know the profit functions of both firms the present paper extends some of the results of the earlier work to a model in which it is not known with certainty to either agent what the profit functions would be after the entrant would come into the market

mix and match compatibility with vertical product dimensions this article considers a duopoly in which each firm produces two components of a system if the components are compatible consumers may mix and match the firms components the system components and consumer tastes are assumed to differ with regard to vertical characteristics in the model one firm may be the quality leader in one or both characteristics moreover a consumer s taste for the quality of one component may be perfectly correlated with or independent of his taste for the quality of the other component it is shown that in all cases the sum of each producer s component prices is weakly higher if the components are compatible the same is true of producer profits

devaluation levels versus rates abstract in a context of infinitely lived families a la sidrauski where consumers are lump sum compensated for the inflation tax and there is no capital mobility it is shown that a devaluation improves while an increase in the rate of devaluation deteriorates the balance of payments

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

technology debt and the exploitation of growth options abstract this paper analyzes the effect of the firm s technology on the agency costs of debt it is shown that for an important class of technologies agency costs are not a uniformly rising function of leverage for these technologies relatively high leverage can be consistent with a small tax subsidy the effect of technology on the exploitation of real options by a levered firm is examined the analysis provides a framework for a direct test of the agency cost of debt hypothesis using cost data

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

informative advertising in differentiated oligopoly markets abstract this paper examines the welfare implications of informative advertising in differentiated product oligopoly markets the analysis reconciles the conflicting results in previous studies that find advertising to be undersupplied in homogeneous product markets but oversupplied in differentiated product markets when the degree of differentiation is small in equilibrium purely informative advertising is undersupplied when brands are sufficiently close substitutes and oversupplied when brands are more differentiated product differentiation also has welfare implications for the effect of technological change in the advertising sector in response to an advertising cost innovation equilibrium prices fall and the market converges to the socially optimal resource allocation for brands that are sufficiently close substitutes whereas equilibrium prices rise and divergence occurs when brands are more differentiated

temporary stabilization policy abstract the effects of a temporary slowdown in the rate of expansion of money supply are studied under ramsey lucas and money superneutrality assumptions it is shown that such a policy expands consumption and leads to capital decumulation and current account deficits in the short run the model is a benchmark case in which temporary policy is always detrimental to welfare connection with the policy credibility issue is briefly discussed

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

would hotelling kill the electric car in this paper we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource owning firms when technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning by doing resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology we show that in such a context it is not necessarily the case that scarcity driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted rather we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions we show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy

sequential entry and deterrence with competitive spatial price discrimination abstract this paper analyzes sequential entry with perfect foresight in a competitive spatial price discrimination model with both an exogenous and an endogenous number of firms the spne locations do not coincide with the social cost minimizing locations

cyclicality of credit supply firm level evidence abstract we quantify fluctuations in bank loan supply in the time series by studying firms substitution between loans and bonds using firm level data any firm that raises new debt must have a positive demand for external funds conditional on the issuance of new debt we interpret firms switching from loans to bonds as a contraction in bank credit supply we find strong evidence of this substitution at times that are characterized by tight lending standards depressed aggregate lending poor bank performance and tight monetary policy we show that this substitution behavior has strong predictive power for bank borrowing and investments by small firms

distance and private information in lending we study the effects of physical distance on the acquisition and use of private information in informationally opaque credit markets using a unique data set of all loan applications by small firms to a large bank we show that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information leading to a trade off in the availability and pricing of credit which is more readily accessible to nearby firms albeit at higher interest rates ceteris paribus analyzing loan rates and firms decision to switch lenders provides further evidence for banks strategic use of private information however distance erodes our lender s ability to collect proprietary intelligence and to carve out local captive markets suggesting that the requisite soft information is primarily local the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

tying investment and the dynamic leverage theory the idea that an incumbent supplier may tie two complementary products to fend off potential entrants is popular among practitioners yet is not fully understood in formal economic theory this article makes sense of the argument by formally deriving a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine we show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain discouraging rivals from investing and innovating tie in sales may reduce consumer and total economic welfare copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

devaluation levels vs rates and balance of payments in a cash in advance economy abstract this paper investigates the consequences of the currency devaluation both in levels and rates on the balance of payments in a cash in advance economy with finite horizons endogenous capital accumulation and international capital immobility in this context a once and for all currency devaluation induces a balance of payments surplus whereas a sustained increase in the rate of devaluation produces in principle an ambiguous effect on the balance of payments if however non restrictive assumptions on some structural parameters are made an increase in the devaluation rate leads to a balance of payments surplus the exact opposite of calvo s result j int econ 11 2 1981 165

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

relationship lending and the transmission of monetary policy abstract repeated interactions allow lenders to uncover private information about their clients decreasing the informational asymmetry between a borrower and his lender but introducing one between the lender and competing financiers this paper constructs a credit based model of production to analyze how learning through lending relationships affects monetary transmission i examine how monetary policy changes the incentives of borrowers and lenders to engage in relationship lending and how these changes then shape the response of aggregate output the results demonstrate that relationship lending prevails in equilibrium smoothes the steady state output profile and induces less volatile responses to certain monetary shocks

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

achieving demand side synergy from strategic diversification how combining mundane assets can leverage consumer utilities we explore the overlooked issue of how certain strategic level interindustry diversification options might increase consumer utility discussions of inter industry diversification typically focus on producer synergies obtainable from economies of scope or from skill transfer across business units discussions of intra industry product diversification generally the province of marketing typically focus on synergies obtainable from product bundling which lowers producer costs or provides convenience for consumers we take a different tack by linking interindustry diversification and consumer utility we first separately examine two possible consumer benefits of interindustry diversification 1 facilitating consumers accomplishment of two tasks simultaneously or 2 attracting diverse consumer groups to a common platform when intergroup externalities exist we then assess a simple empirical context that shows potential for simultaneous consumer utilities and two sided market utility together we analyze this context and concurrently develop a mathematical model showing how these demand side synergies can create unique business value we next introduce asymmetric preferences among consumer subgroups and we refine our arguments by comparing their conclusions with the empirical data we learn that combinations of otherwise mundane i e commonplace assets can create consumer value superior assets are not necessary moreover common ownership is necessary for the pricing flexibility required to deliver and capture maximum value through interindustry diversification especially when consumer groups preferences may change the negotiations and settling up required for cooperation through alliances will without common ownership increase costs and reduce responsiveness we discuss the sustainability of demand side advantages and the implications of these ideas for future research and practice

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

money and growth revisited abstract conventional wisdom is that if public policy can affect the growth rate of the economy the welfare implications of alternative policies will be large in this paper a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous growth and money is examined in this setting inflation lowers growth through its effect on the return to work however the welfare costs of higher inflation are modest the endogenous labor supply is important in producing this result

informative advertising and entry deterrence a bertrand model abstract this paper shows that strategic entry deterrence via informative advertising is impossible in a game of sequential advertising followed by simultaneous price setting in a homogenous product market it contrasts schmalensee s journal of political economy 91 1983 636 653 result that when the strategic variables at the post advertising stage are quantities not prices optimal entry deterrence is possible and involves underinvestment in advertising

anticipated devaluations currency flight and direct trade controls in a monetary economy mendation for a country facing a balance of payments deficit this advice is often resisted by country governments instead direct trade controls such as tariffs quotas and subsidies are frequently used in this paper i propose an economic explanation for the reluctance to devalue and the use of trade controls namely the currency flight that can be expected to occur if the devaluation is anticipated in an effort to avoid or offset the effects of this currency flight countries may use direct controls i shall analyze the properties of using import tariffs and export subsidies with or without an anticipated devaluation to affect the balance of payments and obtain the social optimum

seniority and monopsony in the academic labor market workers with high seniority usually have higher wages than workers with low seniority and the same total labor marke t experience in contrast the results of this paper indicate that higher seniority is associated with lower salaries for university professors the author documents this finding for national surveys a nd individual institutions and explains it as due to monopsonistic discrimination by employers copyright 1993 by american economic association

on informative advertising and product differentiation abstract we study informative advertising within a random utility non localized competition model of product differentiation quasi concavity of profits may fail as each firm may prefer to deviate to a high price targeting consumers who only become informed about its own product when a symmetric equilibrium exists it is unique increasing the number of firms may increase or decrease the equilibrium price advertising tends to be suboptimal when product differentiation is low and excessive otherwise we also revisit grossman and shapiro grossman g shapiro s 1984 informative advertising with differentiated products review of economic studies 51 63 81 focusing on similarities in constructing a symmetric equilibrium in the two models but also illustrating differences in their welfare properties

caveat innovator strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions abstract the assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction the assumption underlying earlier strategic models that the entrant does not know the incumbent s payoffs after strategic have been tested does not appear to apply instead strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns in this environment strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry

loan syndication and credit cycles cyclicality in the supply of business credit has been the focus of a considerable amount of research this cyclicality can stem from shocks to borrowers collateral which affect firms ability to raise capital if agency and information problems are significant ben s bernanke and mark gertler 1989 or it can stem from shocks to bank capital which affect the supply of bank loans if agency and information problems limit the ability of banks to raise additional capital bernanke 1983 both of these channels may have been at work during the financial crisis that started in 2007 ran duchin oguzhan ozbas and berk a sensoy 2010 show that firms with more collateral were better able to withstand the contraction in credit and victoria ivashina and david scharfstein 2010 show that reductions in bank capital had an adverse effect on lending in this paper we examine cyclicality in the supply of credit in the context of modern forms of banking often referred to as the originateto distribute model in particular we are interested in the role of syndicated lending in traditional bank lending the focus of most models of banking banks originate and hold loans on their balance sheets this exposes banks to risk but provides them with strong incentives to screen and monitor borrowers douglas w diamond 1984 over the last 20 years however the development and growth of the syndicated loan market has enabled a bank to originate a loan but retain only a fraction of it on average the originating bank or lead bank retains about a third of each syndicated loan and sells the remaining share to a syndicate of investors which includes banks and institutional investors such as pension funds mutual funds hedge funds and sponsors of structured loan syndication and credit cycles

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

fixed costs sunk costs entry barriers and sustainability of monopoly this paper shows that i fixed costs of sufficient magnitude assure the existence of a vector of sustainable prices for the products of a natural monopolist prices making him invulnerable against entry ii nevertheless fixed costs do not constitute barriers to entry that is they need not have undesirable welfare consequences iii indeed in market forms that we call perfectly contestable large fixed costs are completely compatible with many desirable attributes of competitive equilibrium iv sunk costs do however constitute barriers to entry and v finally the profit and welfare consequences of entry barriers are described formally in this paper it is shown that i fixed costs of sufficient magnitude assure the existence of a vector of sustainable prices a set of product prices that make a natural monopolist invulnerable against successful entry ii nevertheless costs that are truly fixed do not constitute barriers to entry that is they do not have the welfare consequences normally attributed to barriers to entry iii indeed there are markets of a form which we call perfectly contestable markets and whose properties may be approximated in practice in which large fixed costs are completely compatible with many if not most of the desirable attributes of competitive equilibrium iv sunk costs do however constitute barriers to entry and v finally the resource allocation problems that stem from fixed costs are formally identical with those that accompany public goods both their sources and their character are the same thus the rationale for public supply of public goods may be no different from that pertaining to nationalization of natural monopolies

advertising and limit pricing we enrich milgrom and roberts 1982 limit pricing model to allow an incumbent to signal his costs with both price and advertisements our fundamental result is that a cost reducing distortion occurs in that the incumbent behaves as if there were complete information but his costs were lower than they are preentry price is therefore distorted downward and demand enhancing advertising is distorted upward as a consequence of signalling if advertising is a purely dissipative signal it is not used nor therefore distorted recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are featured

the persistence of monopoly an investigation of the effectiveness of the united kingdom monopolies commission a sample of twenty eight markets investigated by the uk monopolies and mergers commission is taken and market share changes are analysed for subsequent erosion of dominance the evidence points to a modest erosion for leading firms but only rarely to a loss of leadership although there is no significant difference between the rates of decline for leading firms in the mmc sample and a control group the achievement of some erosion of dominance in markets where entry barriers were reduced may represent some limited success for competition policy