bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions use of computerized nash competitors abstract results are reported from a series of first price sealed bid auctions where bidders face computerized nash equilibrium competitors the results provide strong support for employing this newly developed methodology as a testing procedure for nash equilibrium bidding models

dynamic learning in a two person experimental game abstract we analyze learning in a two person simultaneous choice repeated game agents form beliefs about their rival s strategies which they revise as the game progresses we test this model using data from a series of experiments we obtain data on subjects expectations by asking them to predict their rival s choice in each period of the game subjects are paid for each correct prediction we analyze the data using the kalman filtering technique and find that learning is broadly consistent with bayesian updating the predicted equilibrium based on this learning process is indistinguishable from observed behavior for most subjects in later periods

traders expectations in asset markets experimental evidence we elicit traders predictions of future price trajectories in repeated experimental markets for a 15 period lived asset we find that individuals beliefs about prices are adaptive and primarily based on past trends in the current and previous markets in which they have participated most traders do not anticipate market downturns the first time they participate in a market and when experienced they typically overestimate the time remaining before market peaks and downturns occur when prices deviate from fundamental values belief data are informative to an observer in predicting the direction of future price movements and the timing of market peaks

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

learning to bid an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games we examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent private values under two different price rules first and second price participants play all four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids this allows us to study how institutional changes are anticipated and whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games we find that learning does not drive bidding towards the benchmark solution bid functions are adjusted globally rather than locally directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid changes the data support a cognitive approach to learning

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

subjective probabilities in games an application to the overbidding puzzle this article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games we conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first price auctions the experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction and indeed overbid when provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions subjects learn to make better predictions and to curb significantly overbidding the structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

gary becker s contributions to economics from his first published work gary becker has consistently strived to extend the domain of economic analysis his interest is in social science broadly defined and he is convinced that economic theory in its established neoclassical form provides the best set of tools for analysing social science questions when he finds an interesting problem on the borderland of what is conventionally thought of as economics and that is where he is looking for his problems he is not worried that he is trespassing on the traditional grounds of sociologists political scientists lawyers anthropologists or biologists on the contrary he clearly delights in showing how economic theory can be brought to bear on such problems he is of course not alone in trying to extend the borders of economics many other scholars have contributed to the movement which some have characterized as economic imperialism becker is one of the most outstanding of the imperialists this review of his work is organized in accordance with the main topics on which becker has worked chronologically his work on the economics of discrimination which grew out of his doctoral dissertation comes first next in order come his fundamental contributions to human capital theory he was also one of the founders of the so called new theory of consumption which is no longer so new and he has made important contributions to the economic study of crime and punishment and to the economics of political decision making some of his most original work is in the economics of the family where he provides economic explanations of such questions as marriage divorce and procreation after the topic by topic review of becker s contributions i will try to provide a more general evaluation of his work and to characterize it more fully in terms of research traditions and methodological attitudes

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

extending environmental management beyond the firm boundaries an empirical study of dutch food and beverage firms consumer demand for environmental sustainability and for affordable prices calls for cooperation and information exchange in food chains to reduce joint environmental impact known as externally oriented environmental management e em e em is increasingly regarded as a management tool to simultaneously improve environmental operational and business performance understanding the factors that influence managers to develop e em helps to design environmentally and economically sustainable food chains the prior research regarding these factors is not exhaustive and demanded a multi period approach this study expands the understanding of the factors that influence managers to develop e em with a multi period empirical research we address the effects of external institutional pressures regulative normative and culturally cognitive and the level of in company environmental management i em on e em which involves information exchange in the chain cooperation with suppliers and customers the analysis relies on survey data of 255 and 96 dutch food and beverage f b processors from 2002 and 2010 respectively the findings indicate that respondents have considerably improved i em over time i em requires in company pzrocedures ranging from environmental strategy formulation to the managerial review of achieved results to assure continuous improvement of environmental performance f b processors that had already achieved a high level of i em are more likely to develop e em also growing normative and culturally cognitive pressures from supply chain partners and increasingly from long term public private environmental covenants significantly influenced e em implementation however regulative pressure from public authorities had no impact it appeared that e em is influenced mostly by institutional pressures when the firms are less experienced with i em

industrial long term agreements on energy efficiency in the netherlands a critical assessment of the monitoring methodologies and quantitative results abstract long term agreements ltas with industry were added to the mix of energy policy instruments in the netherlands at the beginning of the 1990s within a few years these agreements have become very important for the industrial energy conservation policy in this study we assessed the extent to which the targets set out by the government were achieved to this end we studied 1 whether the original policy targets for industry were adequately translated to the contracted ltas 2 whether the ltas achieved the contracted goals and 3 whether the monitoring methodologies that were developed ensure a complete comparable and objective monitoring of the energy intensity developments in manufacturing industry the policy target for manufacturing industry was to decrease energy intensity by 19 in the period 1989 2000 excluding feedstocks it turned out to be possible to contract ltas that cover 72 75 of the energy consumption in manufacturing industry the average of the contracted lta targets amounts to an 18 intensity decrease the average goal achievement of the ltas in the period 1989 1997 turned out to be in accordance with the contracted targets although more than half of the lta sectors are lagging behind the agreed rate of intensity decrease for each of the ltas a monitoring methodology was developed some aspects of these monitoring methodologies have resulted in the fact that the lta monitoring does not ensure a comparable and objective monitoring of the energy intensity results in the ltas overall we conclude that the monitoring of the energy intensity developments in the long term agreements sectors is insufficiently transparent we recommend a stricter enforcement of uniform monitoring requirements in a new generation of ltas and independent supervision and verification of the monitoring results

voluntary agreements in environmental policy an empirical evaluation for the chilean case abstract in this paper the author assesses and discusses the chilean approach on voluntary environmental agreements based on a survey questionnaire performed in 322 facilities belonging to four industrial sectors the author evaluated the effectiveness and static efficiency of five voluntary agreements vas using the propensity score method the study found out that vas had a significant effect in encouraging the implementation of environmental initiatives although most of them represent incremental rather than radical improvements moreover whilst it confirms that vas can suffer from regulatory capture it also reveals that capture can coexist with significant environmental improvements in other areas regarding the static efficiency impact it suggests that vas succeeded in encouraging cost minimization in terms of operational and transaction costs furthermore this research documented that participation in an industrial association is by far the most significant variable associated with voluntary agreements and that regulatory threats and governmental funding are incentives of secondary importance finally it concludes by highlighting that the lack of public participation together with several institutional and political factors that subdue the ambitiousness of targets are the most serious drawbacks which should be addressed in order to avoid credibility issues of vas in the near future

individual behavior of first price auctions the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets abstract this article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the nash equilibrium predictions of the first price sealed bid auction a subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer simulated bids the design used between subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral nash equilibrium our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments which after each auction reveals the winning bid only by means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior

dutch sectoral energy intensity developments in international perspective 1987 2005 this paper makes use of a new dataset to investigate energy intensity developments in the netherlands over the period 1987 2005 the dataset allows for a comparison with 18 other oecd countries a key feature of our analysis is that we combine a cross country perspective with a high level of sectoral detail covering 49 sectors particularly innovative is our evaluation of energy intensity developments in a wide range of service sectors we find that across sectors energy intensity levels in the netherlands on average decreased only marginally and increased in services this performance is in general worse than the oecd average especially between 1987 and 1995 changes in the sectoral composition of the economy play an important role in explaining aggregate trends in the manufacturing sector about half of the efficiency improvements were undone by a shift towards a more energy intensive industry structure in contrast in the service sector efficiency decreased which was undone for about one third by a shift towards a less energy intensive sector structure

policies influencing cleaner production the role of prices and regulation abstract low prices of inputs low costs associated with non product outputs and poor regulatory forcing have often not been conducive to diffusion of cleaner production however developments may be noted in the field of taxation subsidies liability and permits that tend to be more favourable to cleaner production extension thereof may favour cleaner production more in the future cleaner production stands to gain much by slashing subsidies and substantial ecotaxation of inputs and non product outputs similarly the regulatory enforcement of best available technologies liability for waste and tradable permits may help the diffusion of cleaner production

indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world experimental evidence the authors design and study an olg experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage the economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria the authors do not observe nonstationary rational expectations paths observed paths tend to converge close to or somewhat below the low inflation stationary state the adaptive learning hypothesis is consistent with the data in selecting the low inflation stationary state rational expectations equilibrium as a long run stationary equilibrium nevertheless simple adaptive learning models do not capture the market uncertainty or the biases observed in the data copyright 1993 by the econometric society

impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions abstract experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given the concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium which is based on a principle of ex post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison captures the data