implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation abstract in a finite trader version of the diamond and dybvig j polit econ 91 1983 401 model the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism i e each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader when the model is modified by formalizing the sequential service constraint cf wallace fed reserve bank minneapolis quart rev 12 1988 3 the truth telling equilibrium implements the symmetric ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies

nodal market power assessment in electricity markets market power assessment is an important aspect of electric market analysis and operation market power problems are more complicated in an electric market than those in other markets due to the specific properties of electricity this paper investigates market power problems and the related solution techniques in an electric power market the impact of load variation the size of a power supplier and random failures on market power has been investigated the geographic difference of market power caused by network constraints has been considered must run share mrs and nodal must run share nmrs have been proposed to represent system and local market powers respectively an optimization technique and the topological analysis of power flow have been used to determine the mrs and nmrs expected nodal must run share enmrs has been proposed to represent the impact of random failures on market power and the associated risk of customers paying a high price due to the exercise of market power the contingency enumeration and probabilistic technique have been used to determine the enmrs the ieee reliability test system is analyzed to illustrate the proposed indices and techniques

a hedonic travel cost analysis for valuation of multiple components of site quality the recreation value of forest management abstract one benefit of managing forests is that one can alter the qualities of sites the value of changing site qualities however is generally not known this paper develops a formal hedonic travel cost model which can be used to estimate the value of both marginal and non marginal changes to sites the approach accommodates multiple simultaneous changes in site characteristics estimating this model using a set of permits from wilderness areas leads to revealed preference estimates of the recreational value of clear cuts old growth and nine other wilderness attributes

seigniorage banking and the optimal quantity of money abstract this paper discusses seigniorage in an economy with imperfect competition in the banking sector the amount of total seigniorage and its division between the central bank and the banking sector are derived by using the opportunity cost concept of seigniorage the paper analyzes the impact of changes in inflation reserve requirements competition and technology on the division of seigniorage and on the welfare loss and relates the analysis to the concept of the optimal quantity of money

the joint production of confidence endogenous regulation and nineteenth century commercial bank clearinghouses during the nineteenth century deposits increased relative to bank notes c ausing increased information asymmetry problems in banking this pape r describes how bank clearinghouses lowered these costs by monitoring bank activities and establishing mechanisms of managerial control i n effect regulating bank behavior such actions enforced the loca l one to one exchange rate between deposits and specie clearinghouse s increased regulation during financial panics creating and enforcin g a risk sharing device loan certificates for addressing panic rela ted information problems this paper concludes that the market s capacity to control bank managers depends on the banking product mix and more generally on information costs copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

trading horizons and the value of money abstract this paper shows that fiat money can be feasible and essential even if the trading horizon is finite and deterministic the result hinges on two features of our model first individual actions can affect the future availability of productive resources so agents may be willing to sell for money even if on that date they have no reason to accept it this makes monetary trade feasible in all preceding dates second agents are anonymous and direct their search for partners so gift giving arrangements may be prevented because agents can misrepresent their consumption needs this makes money essential in exploiting any gains from specialization and trade

reconciling bagehot and the fed s response to september 11 bagehot 1873 states that to prevent bank panics a central bank should provide liquidity at a very high rate of interest in contrast most of the theoretical literature on liquidity provision suggests that central banks should lend at an interest rate of zero this is broadly consistent with the federal reserve s behavior in the days following september 11 2001 this paper shows that both policies can be reconciled with commodity money as in bagehot s time liquidity is scarce and a high price allows banks to self select in contrast the fed has a virtually unlimited ability to temporarily expand the money supply so self selection is unnecessary

banking a new monetarist approach we develop a model where i banks take deposits and make investments ii their liabilities facilitate third party transactions other models have i or ii not both although we argue they are intimately connected we show that they both emerge from limited commitment we describe an environment characterize desirable allocations and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements banks are essential without them the set of feasible allocations is inferior as a technical contribution we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions show they involve backloading and analyse how this interacts with banking we also confront the theory with economic history copyright 2013 oxford university press

stationary sunspot equilibria in a finance constrained economy abstract stationary sunspot equilibria are shown to exist in a production economy with infinite lived agents when it is not possible to borrow against future wage income equilibrium fluctuations exhibit persistence over time scales of the same order of magnitude as observed business cycles an active fiscal policy that stabilizes aggregate money expenditures can prevent such fluctuations

financial fragility and the exchange rate regime abstract we study financial fragility exchange rate crises and monetary policy in a model of an open economy with diamond dybvig banks the banking system the exchange rate regime and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare if the mechanism fails banking crises and speculative attacks on the currency become possible we compare currency boards fixed rates and flexible rates with and without a lender of last resort a currency board cannot implement a social optimum in addition it allows bank runs to occur a fixed exchange rate system may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board a flexible rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs provided that the exchange rate and credit policies of the central bank are appropriately designed journal of economic literature classification numbers f3 e5 g2

imperfect interbank markets and the lender of last resort abstract this paper presents a monetary model in which interbank markets have limited commitment to contracts limited commitment reduces the proportion of assets that can be used as collateral and thus banks with high liquidity demands face borrowing constraints in interbank markets these constraints can be relieved by the central bank a lender of last resort through the provision of liquidity loans i show that the constrained efficient allocation can be decentralized by controlling only the money growth rate if commitment to interbank contracts is not limited otherwise a proper combination of central bank loans and monetary policy is needed to bring the market equilibrium into a state of constrained efficiency

money credit and banking in monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained this problem creates a role for financial intermediaries such as banks who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans in general financial intermediation improves the allocation the gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers liquidity constraints we also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving

evil is the root of all money plenary talk delivered at the annual meeting of the society for economic dynamics this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

allocation of unit start up costs using cooperative game theory this paper discusses a three part generation offer strategy that enables generators to put in unbundled variable operating costs and fixed start up no load costs we then propose methods based on cost sharing axioms to allocate fixed start up no load costs among electricity consumers load retailers that take into account equity and rationality considerations we focus on the single period cost allocation first we apply three well known game theoretic axioms the core the nucleolus and the shapley value we discuss the relative merits and demerits of each criterion and also explore certain theoretical conditions for the existence of the core and the shapley value lying inside the core finally the multiperiod start up cost allocation problem is studied allocations based on individual periods vis a spl grave vis composite allocation for all periods are compared and contrasted numerical examples are used to illustrate all theoretical concepts

competitive monies and the suffolk bank system a contractual perspective in recent years a number of monetary economists have begun to focus research on an old topic the economics of private money or free banking much of this literature is motivated by a sense that competitive markets may well prove superior to government regulation in coping with the problems inherent in a laissez faire monetary system noting this robert king in his recent survey paper suggests that the central focus of future research in this area must be the types of monetary institutions that the private market will deliver 10 123 by monetary institutions king presumably means the contractual mechanisms utilized in production and exchange relationships involving private money this paper examines one mechanism the so called suffolk bank system which the market did deliver in new england from around 1820 to just before the civil war while most historians have looked favorably on the suffolk mechanism almost all have mischaracterized the underlying rationale for the system in particular most analysts have interpreted the establishment of the suffolk bank s note redemption program as a response to gresham s law bad money drives out good money however the conditions of 19th century banking in new england and elsewhere as well prior to the establishment of the suffolk system rule out any application of gresham s law prior studies have also neglected the importance of evolutionary changes in the suffolk bank system over the first five years of its existence what we will label suffolk i was largely unsuccessful both in terms of its profitability and its capacity to control the behavior of the banks participating in the system several contract adaptations introduced in 1824 accounted for a sharp reversal in the fortunes of the suffolk bank system it is suffolk ii which has gained the accolades of bank historians ironically suffolk ii increased the prospects for a gresham s law kind of outcome of the sort emphasized by akerlof 1 however the contract structure of suffolk ii involved properties sufficient to allow that suffolk

costly monitoring financial intermediation and equilibrium credit rationing abstract this paper establishes a link between equilibrium credit rationing and financial intermediation in a model with asymmetrically informed lenders and borrowers costly monitoring and investment project indivisibilities intermediation is shown to dominate borrowing and lending between individuals and these financial intermediaries exhibit several of the important features of intermediaries as we know them equilibrium interest rates and the aggregate quantity of loans respond quite differently to changes in taste and technology parameters depending on whether or not there is rationing in equilibrium

the demand for site specific recreational activities a characteristics approach abstract a model of constrained utility maximizing behavior is developed to explain how a representative individual allocates his ski days among alternative sites the physical characteristics of the ski areas and the individual s skiing ability are explicit arguments in the utility function the budget allocation is given along with the parametric costs to ski including travel costs entrance fees equipment costs and the opportunity cost of his time shares a site s share being the proportion of ski days that the individual spends at that site are derived and assumed multinomially distributed a stochastic specification which maintains the inherent properties of the shares maximum likelihood estimation confirms the basic hypothesis that costs ability and characteristics all are important determinants of the sites shares the model explains a large proportion of the skier s allocation of ski days a multinomial logit model of skier behavior is also developed and maximum likelihood estimates of its parameters are obtained examination of the summary statistics from my model and the logit model indicates that my model predicts the skier s choice of sites better than the logit model

energy and reserve market designs with explicit consideration to lost opportunity costs the primary goal of this work is to investigate the basic energy and reserve dispatch optimization cooptimization in the setting of a pool based market of particular interest is the modeling of lost opportunity cost introduced by reserve allocation the authors derive the marginal costs of energy and reserves under a variety of market designs they also analyze existence algorithm and multiplicity of optimal solutions the results of this study are used to support the reserve market design and implementation in iso new england control area

inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange we study a random matching model of money in which a subset of people called bankers have known histories and the rest called nonbankers have unknown histories earlier we showed that if there are no outside assets then an optimal arrangement has bankers issuing objects banknotes that are used in trades involving nonbankers here the same model is used to compare such exclusive use of inside money to the exclusive use of outside money we show that the set of implementable outcomes using outside money is a strict subset of the set using inside money

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

the administrative foundations of self enforcing constitutions current theories of the rule of law argue that public officials respect rights if the citizens are coordinated on an equilibrium in which they collectively resist abuse constitutional rules are means to coordinate on this equilibrium in past and present states however constitutional rules often have no effect on the rule of law this paper suggests an alternative view of the origin and development of the rule of law instead of considering constitutional rules as coordination devices for citizens at large history suggests considering them as manifestations of equilibria with rulers constrained by administrators required to implement policy analysis of the administrative foundations of self enforcing constitutions may be the key to a theory and policy that would foster the rule of law in developing countries and those in transition in particular constitutional reforms might benefit from focusing on altering the equilibrium distribution of administrative capacity and power providing incentives to the administratively powerful to check predation by each other and the central authorities and to align administrators interests with social welfare

a note on estimating nested constant elasticity of substitution preferences for outdoor recreation a generalized version of a well known statistical result is used to suggest an alternative strategy for estimating nested constant elasticity of substitution preferences for recreation demand parameter and welfare estimates from nested constant elasticity of substitution count data demand system models are presented and compared to estimates from the multinomial approaches developed previously a significant advantage of the count data estimation strategy over the multinomial based approaches is that the analyst avoids the difficulties associated with choice occasion specification and interpretation copyright 2003 oxford university press

screening and mitigation of exacerbated market power due to financial transmission rights a methodology is proposed for taking into account potential exacerbation of market power due to financial transmission rights ftr allocations hedging position ratios hprs are computed for ftr bids these ratios quantify the relationship between the positions of an ftr bidder in the energy market and in the transmission rights allocation based on the transmission rights bids these ratios are used to identify the potential gambling positions from the transmission rights bidders and therefore used to prioritize critical positions in the auction the transmission right auction is modeled as a quadratic programming problem with a direct current dc approximation the methodology is illustrated by a three node network and then extended to larger networks

the efficiency of self regulated payments systems learning from the suffolk system this paper analyzes the operation of the suffolk system an interbank note clearing network operating throughout new england from the 1820s through the 1850s banks made markets in each other s notes at par which allowed new england to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade privately enforced regu lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking observers of the suffolk system have been divided some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent seeking on the part of boston banks and were primarily coervice and exploitative in the neighboring mid atlantic states regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in new york city on the model of the suffolk system this difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the suffolk system evidence supports the sanguine view new england s banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks an examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of boston and new york city banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in boston than in new york the benefits of the system extended outside of boston peripheral new england banks displayed high propensities to issue notes and wer able to maintain low specie reserves boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market to book values of equity thus there is no evidence that boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the demand for money total transactions as the scale variable abstract we examine the impact of a direct measure of total transactions in the uk economy on the demand for money by estimating three models two with proxies for transactions using the dynamic ols cointegration technique the total transactions measure outperforms both proxies

a unifying market power measure for deregulated transmission constrained electricity markets market power assessment is a prime concern when designing a deregulated electricity market in this paper we propose a new functional market power measure termed transmission constrained network flow tcnf that unifies three large classes of transmission constrained structural market power indices in the literature residual supply based network flow based and minimal generation based furthermore it is suitable for demand response and renewable integration and hence more amenable to identifying market power in the future smart grid the measure is defined abstractly and allows incorporation of power flow equations in multiple ways we investigate the current market operations using a dc approximation and further explore the possibility of including detailed ac power flow models through semidefinite relaxation and interior point algorithms from matpower finally we provide extensive simulations on ieee benchmark systems and highlight the complex interaction of engineering constraints with market power assessment

competitive banking bankers clubs and bank regulation this paper reexamines the view that banking regulation and central banking arose to counter market failures it investigates the factors that led bankers to form clubs and examines the regulations imposed by clubs on their members it suggests that such regulation is different from real world regulation and central banking and would be unlikely to arise spontaneously from free banking anyway it also suggests that this view is consistent with available evidence and compares it with the alternative views of gary gorton and donald j mullineaux 1987 and of charles a e goodhart copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

locational market power screening and congestion management experience and suggestions the existing new england electricity market follows a uniform pricing system inframarginal generators are paid a uniform clearing price while constrained on generators are paid bid prices subject to a locational market power screen in this paper we first report the operation experience of this approach during the market s first two years we then briefly review the new england power system nepool locational pricing proposal being implemented two new approaches for locational market power screening are presented the first one is based on a zonal network model and the second is based on a nodal transmission model both approaches are being evaluated by an independent consultant and are be to recommended to nepool test results of both approaches are included

stabilizing competitive business cycles abstract we study how stylized monetary proportional money transfers fiscal lump sum money transfers and public expenditure policies may eliminate endogenous deterministic cycles and stationary markov sunspot equilibria in a simple version of the overlapping generations model we also present new constructive methods for analyzing stationary markov sunspot equilibria in such a framework

importance of early snowfall for swedish ski resorts evidence based on monthly data abstract since the early 1970s sweden has experienced an almost uninterrupted surge in demand for downhill skiing however from the 2009 2010 season lift ticket sales have stagnated with the use of monthly data this study investigates the role of snow depth and economic factors in the demand for downhill skiing in sweden the empirical approach is based on a seemingly unrelated regression model allowing snow conditions but not economic factors to differ during the season the estimates show that an early season increase in natural snow depth by 10 cm raises the growth rate of lift ticket sales by 9 percentage points in the same period further the results indicate that downhill skiing is characterised by low income and price elasticities implying weak impacts on demand for such changes the price increase of lift tickets exceeds that of the inflation rate the recent decline in demand might indicate changed leisure preferences

the real bills doctrine versus the quantity theory a reconsideration two competing monetary policy prescriptions are analyzed within the context of overlapping generations models the real bills prescription is for unfettered private intermediation or central bank operations designed to produce the effects of such intermediation the quantity theory prescription in contrast is for restrictions on private intermediation designed to separate money from credit although our models are consistent with quantity theory predictions about money supply and price level behavior under these two policy prescriptions the models imply that the quantity theory prescription is not pareto optimal and the real bills prescription is

do banks have a future abstract are banks special intermediaries do they play any unique role in the economy and if so will they retain their specialness in the ever faster changing world of finance the rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking e age revolution have persuaded many that eventually banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can at least as efficiently be carried out by nonbanks this study re explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject and presents an approach which identifies the banks specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money the study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks lending to production has become relatively less important and the use of e money may soon be dominating financial transactions

currency elasticity and banking panics theory and evidence existing models of banking panics contain no role for monetary factors and fail to explain why some banking systems experienced panics while others did not a monetary model is constructed where seasonal variations in the demand for liquidity and credit play a critical role in generating banking panics these panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of currency in private banks but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted empirical evidence from canada and the united states for the period 1880 1910 is largely consistent with the predictions of the model

economic organization with limited communication this paper presents formal stylized representations of communication accounting systems oral assignment portable object written message and telecommunication systems are considered the environments that allow this formalization are characterized by spatial separation private information and a need to keep track of past actions transfers and shocks in environments that have spatial separation and private information beneficial multilateral arrangements can depend critically on agents ability to communicate to one another values of contemporary shocks and to keep track of histories of past transfers or past announced shocks this paper formalizes this idea and focuses on com

money financial stability and efficiency most analyses of banking crises assume that banks use real contracts however in practice contracts are nominal and this is what is assumed here we consider a standard banking model with aggregate return risk aggregate liquidity risk and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks we show that with non contingent nominal deposit contracts the first best efficient allocation can be achieved in a decentralized banking system what is required is that the central bank accommodates the demands of the private sector for fiat money variations in the price level allow full sharing of aggregate risks an interbank market allows the sharing of idiosyncratic liquidity risk in contrast idiosyncratic bank specific return risks cannot be shared using monetary policy alone real transfers are needed

the tc psi indicator for forecasting the potential for market power in wholesale electricity markets abstract wholesale electricity market regulators have long sought a simple reliable transparent indicator of the likely impact of wholesale market developments on the exercise of market power conventional indicators such as the pivotal supplier indicator psi and the residual supply index rsi cannot be extended to apply to meshed transmission networks especially when generating companies hold a portfolio of generating units at different locations on the network this paper proposes a generalisation of these standard measures termed the transmission constrained pivotal supplier indicator tc psi the tc psi of a generating company is defined as the maximum must run generation for any subset of generating plant while allowing for strategic operation of other plant in the portfolio we illustrate the use of the tc psi using a five node model of the australian nem

money intermediation and banking the business of money creation is conceptually distinct from that of intermediation yet these two activities are frequently but not always combined together in the form of a banking system we develop a simple model to examine the question when is banking essential there is a role for money due to a lack of record keeping and a role for intermediation due to the existence of private information both money and intermediation are essential when monitoring costs associated with intermediation are sufficiently low the two activities can be separated from one another however when monitoring costs are sufficiently high a banking system that combines these two activities is essential

note and comment the supply of credit money and the demand for deposits a reply in his paper in this journal marc lavoie 1999 sets out to establish that our mechanism for reconciling the demand for deposits with the credit led supply is not in conflict with the reflux principle and also to establish the reflux mechanism as the primary mechanism we accept the former without hesitation but the latter argument seems to us to hinge critically on the meaning of terms like primary and automatic and fallacy as well as drawing strength from an institutional framework which diverges in some respects from that of the uk in recent years we explain both of these responses in the two sections that follow before drawing a brief conclusion

federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives the authors advance a new perspective in the study of federalism their approach views federalism as a governance solution of the state to credibly preserving market incentives market incentives are preserved if the state is credibly prevented from compromising on future economic success and from bailing out future failures the salient features of federalism decentralization of information and authority and interjurisdictional competition help provide credible commitment or these purposes in addition the authors suggest that some federalism are self sustaining

panel thoughts on the future of payments and central banking the role of central banks in money and payments systems i would like to thank bruce smith for the honor of participating on this panel with such distinguished experts on central banking and payments moreover bruce should be commended for putting together an outstanding conference on what is probably the most important issue that the federal reserve system at least the federal reserve banks will need to grapple with early in the twentyfirst century to understand the role a central bank should play in the economy one needs to think carefully about what forms of market failure require this form of government intervention in the market the existence of financial intermediaries tells us that the perfect capital market assumptions that underpin the m m irrelevance results do not hold for policymakers the question is not whether financial markets money capital and payments markets are frictionless rather the question is do the private sector institutions that arise to mitigate or arbitrage away market frictions serve to complete the markets if not then public intervention in markets may be required in this case we are interested in the role a central bank may play in completing markets the papers presented in this volume provide some answers as to the central bank s role in money and payments i doubt there is much controversy in asserting that central banks have a role in establishing the unit of account although in small open economies a currency board may serve this function and in serving as the liquidity backstop for financial markets in turn these two roles for the central bank may require that payments be ultimately settled in central bank liabilities base money and hence be settled on the books of the central bank what is not clear is the need for the central bank to provide the medium of exchange in the form of fiat money a common theme across these papers is that properly structured private provision of money or banknotes is not only feasible it may be desirable the papers by williamson 1999 and cavalcanti and wallace 1999 show that inside money banknotes results in superior outcomes with respect to economic ef

reactive market power analysis using must run indices this paper investigates the issues of reactive power must run capacity in power system operations hence in electricity markets a must run index based method is proposed in the paper to measure the market power held by reactive power suppliers the nordic 32 bus system and the ieee 118 bus system are used to test the proposed method the market power holders of reactive power found using the proposed method are in accord with that found in the realistic nordic system operation and in the existing analysis of ieee 118 bus system the paper identifies through must run indices possible conditions that could lead to market power in the case of applying a bid structure within a market framework furthermore market structure drawbacks can cause the appearance of market power even in a topologically ideal system

monetary growth in a turnpike environment abstract a general equilibrium model of monetary growth in a turnpike economy is constructed it is shown that money lifts the economy up to a pareto superior growth path by eliminating the investment in projects with low returns the growth rate of the monetary economy is larger than that of the nonmonetary economy and mckinnon s complementarity hypothesis holds provided that the agents degree of relative risk aversion is not too large the main theorem states a sufficient condition for the existence of a monetary equilibrium with a constant rate of return on money

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

characteristics consumer surplus and new activities a proposed ski area abstract physical characteristics of activities and personal characteristics of the individual are incorporated into an expenditure function this function is used to define the compensating and equivalent variation for changes in the costs or physical characteristics of the existing activities or for a proposed activity as a function of its proposed characteristics and cost the model is used to estimate the demand for and the cvs and evs associated with the development of a colorado ski area these vary across skiers as a function of skiing ability value of time location of residence and skiing budget

recreation demand choices and revealed values of leisure time i introduction at least since the work of becker 1965 it has been recognized widely that time may play an important role in consumer demand one of the areas where this may be most significant empirically is in the valuation of natural resource amenities through their associated recreation demands a principal reason is that recreation is a time intensive commodity so that the value of the time spent in recreation would be expected to play a large role in its overall value the potential bias to consumer s surplus estimates of the net economic value of recreation from excluding time prices from the demand model has been recognized from the outset for example by knetsch 1963 and clawson 1959 to incorporate time into recreation demand models researchers have generally adopted the practice suggested by mcconnell 1975 of defining the full price of recreation as the money cost of a trip plus its monetized time cost though the use of full budgets also called for by the becker approach is less widespread bockstael et al 1987 pointed out quite clearly that both full budgets and full prices are required in the demand function if the recreationist is jointly choosing labor supply with recreation at an exogenous marginal wage but that the structure of demand was unclear if the individual was not making such marginal labor supply choices i e if he or she was working fixed hours subsequently larson and shaikh 2001 showed that the full prices full budgets specification is sufficient to satisfy the constraints on demand parameters that arise because choice is made subject to two binding constraints regardless of the individual s position in the labor market they also pointed out that models that use full prices but only money income in effect ignoring the role of time as a resource constraint cannot be consistent with the requirements of choice subject to two constraints although the outlines of how time should enter the structure of demand are becoming clear a major unresolved issue is how to determine its value in practice several studies have followed the basic logic of becker s early work assuming that the opportunity cost of recreation time i e the value of other time forgone in favor of recreation is an exogenous parameter such as the average wage rate or more commonly some fraction thereof this fraction is either chosen arbitrarily or estimated as part of the recreation demand model as in cesario 1976 mcconnell and strand 1981 and smith et al 1983 such assumptions may be erroneous for a variety of reasons assuming the average wage is the appropriate opportunity cost of time presumes that the individual faces no constraints on hours worked derives no utility or disutility from work and has a linear wage function as has been noted by chiswick 1967 bockstael et al 1987 and smith et al 1983 this is unlikely to be true for many people assuming some constant fraction of the wage is the opportunity cost of time especially an arbitrarily chosen fraction also seems likely to be incorrect for most people for all of these reasons an individual s average wage does not necessarily reveal anything about the shadow value of discretionary leisure time either as an upper or lower bound in a recent advance feather and shaw 2000 adapted the heckman 1974 labor supply model to include information supplied by recreationists about their labor supply status in particular whether they felt under or over employed relative to their desired number of hours this information is used to identify subgroups in the data for which the shadow value of leisure time is less than the wage or more than the wage which helps in the estimation of both a wage function and a shadow value of leisure time function this approach produces individual specific estimates of the opportunity cost of leisure time based on their demographics and labor market decisions which are used in a subsequent recreation demand analysis

the role of policy in the great recession and the weak recovery it s been nearly five years since the recession of 2007 2009 ended by all accounts this very severe recession was followed by an extremely disappointing recovery economic growth dur ing the recovery has been far too slow to raise the employment to population ratio from the low levels to which it fell during the recession or to close materially the gap between real gdp and potential gdp in marked contrast to the rapid recovery from the previous severe recession in the early 1980s or from earlier severe recessions in us history when you include both the periods of the recession and the slow recovery economic instability has more than tripled according to a common measure of performance used by macroeconomists the standard deviation of the percentage gap between real gdp and potential gdp rose from 1 percent during 1984 2006 to 5 percent during 2007 2012 taylor 2013 in this paper i consider the role of economic policy in this poor economic performance i the shift in policy in evaluating the role of policy it is important to consider actions taken before during and after the financial panic in the fall of 2008 a careful look at the full decade from five years before to five years after the panic reveals that there was a significant shift in policy away from what worked reasonably well in the decades before broadly speaking monetary policy regulatory policy and fiscal policy each became more discretionary more interventionist and less predictable in the years leading up to the

central bank liquidity management and unconventional monetary policies central banks that work under an inflation targeting regime generally use an interest rate as the main instrument to implement monetary policy the latter can be denominated conventional monetary policy central banks often deviate from this practice however and engage in other policies to deal with particular situations as these alternatives depart from the usual practice they are generally labeled unconventional policies during the recent global financial crisis and recession of 2008 09 central banks around the world and in latin america in particular responded to exter nal shocks in a variety of ways canales kriljenko and others provide a precise description of how different latin american central banks reacted to the u s financial crisis shock in 2008 with an emphasis on the heterogeneity in the use of unconventional monetary policy instruments 1 for example while colombia and peru lowered reserve requirements in their banking systems the central bank of chile relaxed the collateral requirements for repurchase repo transac tions 2 also chile and peru extended the repayment period in repo transactions these examples illustrate not only the heterogeneity in responses but also the prevalent use of unconventional instruments ishi stone and yehoue note that the central bank interest rate increased rather than decreased in many emerging countries in the months immediately following the fall of lehman brothers 3deviations from conventional policies were observed in latin america even before the recent global financial crisis and before the central banks implemented inflation targeting frameworks most notably central banks have often engaged in sterilized exchange rate interventions to smooth the effects of capital inflows due in part to commodity price booms and the resulting nominal exchange rate appreciation some countries like peru have used these inter ventions quite frequently whereas others have implemented these policies only after extreme movements in the nominal exchange rate for instance in chile even after the inflation targeting policies were already in place in this regard one important policy discussion is the relationship between inflation targeting regimes and liquidity management responses 4 in particular it is not obvious whether the application of such liquidity management policies implied some type of threat to the good implementation of the inflation targeting framework ishi stone and yehoue highlight the difficulties of using econometric time series techniques to evaluate the impact of liquidity man agement policies implemented in an inflation targeting framework because it requires disentangling the impact of each type of policy as well as the impact of the external shocks that presumably triggered the implementation of such policies 5 the fact that such policies were usually in place for just a few quarters further complicates the application of the time series based impact evaluation this paper contributes to the evaluation of such policies by constructing solving and simulating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model that explicitly includes the central bank s balance sheet as a key modeling input the model can explicitly predict the impact of selected unconventional monetary policies on the major macroeconomic variables including gross domestic product gdp consumer price index cpi inflation and the real exchange rate and it pays special attention to the role played by the specific facilities used by the central bank to manage market liquidity this paper uses chile as the main case for the application of the model providing a detailed account of its experience with these alternative tools since the introduction of the flexible inflation targeting framework in 1999 and calibrating the model to then analyze the effects of some of the policies implemented the theoretical framework is an extension of a new keynesian model of a small open economy with banks that take deposits from households which is the only way for the latter to finance consumption extending the more traditional cash in advance assumption borrow abroad lend to productive firms and hold bonds issued by the central bank

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

turning bagehot on his head lending at penalty rates when banks can become insolvent ever since bagehot s 1873 pioneering work it is a widely accepted wisdom that in order to alleviate ex ante bank moral hazard a lender of last resort should lend at penalty rates only in a model in which banks are subject to shocks but can exert effort to affect the likelihood of these shocks we show that the validity of this argument crucially relies on banks always remaining solvent the reason is that when banks become insolvent bagehot s prescription dictates to let them fail penalty rates charged when banks are illiquid but solvent then reduce banks incentives to avoid insolvency ex ante and thus increase bank moral hazard we derive a condition which shows precisely when this effect on ex ante incentives outweighs the traditional one and show that it is fulfilled under plausible scenarios

estimation and welfare calculations in a generalized corner solution model with an application to recreation demand the kuhn tucker model of wales and woodland 1983 provides a utility theoretic framework for estimating preferences over commodities for which individuals choose not to consume one or more of the goods due to the complexity of the model however there have been few applications in the literature and little attention has been paid to the problems of welfare analysis within the kuhn tucker framework this paper provides an application of the model to the problem of recreation demand in addition we develop and apply a methodology for estimating compensating variation relying on monte carlo integration to derive expected welfare changes

rediscounting under aggregate risk abstract this paper compares three institutions that offer an elastic currency open market operations a discount window and a private banknote issuing clearinghouse in an economy with financial markets otherwise hampered by a lack of liquidity when this economy is subject to aggregate financial shocks these alternative forms of central banking are shown to differ in their implications for risk sharing interesting implications include i central bank losses and monetary innovations that are part of an efficient equilibrium and ii desirable quantity restrictions at the discount window

bank capitalization and cost evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling we amend the standard cost model to account for the role of financial capital in banking the cost function is conditioned on the level of capital but we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of capitalization that minimizes cost we find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk

market segmentation and the diffusion of quality enhancing innovations the case of downhill skiing we report econometric results concerning the diffusion of detachable chairlifts in the united states that provide the first empirical evidence that the adoption of a technological innovation by a firm decreases the likelihood that a local competitor will also adopt it we model the effect that an innovation in service speed has on a f s incentive to differentiate the quality of its service from that of its competitors in our model the incentive to adopt is negatively related to the number of competitors who have already adopted our empirical results support this hypothesis

do we need a distinct monetary constitution abstract elements of the chicago and virginia traditions of political economy have rejected both competitive money production and money s politicization via post constitutional bargaining opting instead for constitutionalization this paper argues that competitive money production is not subject to the pro cyclicality that concerns constitutional political economy it also meets the standard of predictability that motivates constitutional perspectives although at the level of individual prices rather than the price level an effective monetary constitution is implicit in any constitution that protects rights to property contract and exchange and sets limits on the democratic process

payment system settlement and bank incentives in this article we consider the relative merits of net versus gross settlement of interbank payments net settlement economizes on the costs of holding non interest bearing reserves but increases moral hazard problems the put option value of default under net settlement can also distort banks investment incentives absent these distortions net settlement dominates gross although the optimal net settlement scheme may involve a positive probability of default article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

optimal monetary rules under persistent shocks abstract the tug o war for supremacy between inflation targeting and monetary targeting is a classic yet timely topic in monetary economics in this paper we revisit this issue within the context of a pure exchange overlapping generations model in which spatial separation and random relocation create an endogenous demand for money we study ar 1 shocks to both real output and the real interest rate irrespective of the nature of the shocks the optimal inflation target is always positive under monetary targeting shocks to output necessitate negative money growth rates for shocks to real interest rates money growth rates may be either positive or negative depending on the elasticity of consumption substitution also for output shocks monetary targeting welfare dominates inflation targeting but the gap between the two vanishes as the shock process approaches a random walk in sharp contrast for shocks to the real interest rate we prove that monetary targeting and inflation targeting are welfare equivalent only in the limit as the shocks become i i d the upshot is that persistence of the underlying fundamental uncertainty matters depending on the nature of the shock policy responses need to be either more or less aggressive as persistence increases

energy and reserve dispatch in a multi zone electricity market competitive bidding for ancillary services a s in addition to bidding for energy is increasingly recognized as an important part of electricity markets in this paper an lp based approach is presented for solving the multi product i e energy and a s products multi zone area physical market dispatch problem the approach can explicitly represent various constraints such as reserve requirement constraints network security limits and sharing of constrained resource capacity e g maximum unit generation between energy and reserve the joint dispatch method which dispatches energy and reserve market concurrently is extended to allow inter zonal reserve trading in a multi zone competitive pool numerical examples are included to demonstrate the salient characteristics of the joint dispatch solution

a theory of self enforcing monetary constitutions with reference to the suffolk system 1825 1858 abstract we develop a theory of self enforcing monetary constitutions a monetary constitution is the framework of rules within which money providing and money using agents interact a self enforcing monetary constitutions is upheld by the agents acting within the system it thus does not require external enforcement we describe how the institutional technology of polycentric sovereignty applies to monetary constitutions and show how the 19th century suffolk banking system was characterized by polycentric sovereignty rendering its de facto monetary constitution self enforcing we conclude by briefly discussing the implications of our analysis for the role of the state in maintaining healthy money and banking systems

circuit theory of banking and finance abstract drawing on monetary circuit theory this study develops an approach to analyze the integrated functions of banking and finance in a monetary production economy the study proposes a micro founded circuit sequenced model of a decentralized decisions economy where production exchange and investment from households and firms are integrated through money creation and funds allocation operated respectively by banks and non bank financial intermediaries the model is used to draw implications on the special nature of banks and the role of non bank financial intermediaries the relationship between saving and investment and the channels through which finance may cause the circuit process to break down the study also discusses how the circuit approach can be used for an integrated analysis of economic and financial structural change

free banking and monetary control despite growing interest in competitive payments systems and the continuing progress of bank deregulation relatively little is known about the macroeconomic implications of completely unregulated or free banking its advocates view free banking where competing banks freely issue monetary liabilities redeemable in base money 1 as a means for depoliticising the money stock by replacing public holdings of government money with private bank money while limiting changes in the monetary base such a programme begs many crucial questions how would the unregulated stock of bank money be determined would free banking enhance or reduce macroeconomic stability compared to regulated banking what implications would free banking have for the proper conduct of monetary policy lawrence h white i 984 ch i employs a model of a free banking system to answer some of these questions however because it concerns free banklng as practised in scotland in the nineteenth century white s model assumes an open economy operating in an international gold standard where the price level is given and there is no such thing as monetary policy in its modern sense were free banking to reemerge today it would probably be based not on a gold standard but on irredeemable paper fiat base money issued by a former or extant central bank under this form of free banking the price level is no longer given and conventional monetary policy questions remain relevant in particular would free banking on a fiat standard simplify or complicate the control of nominal variables including the price level and nominal income would it be easier or more difficult to adhere to a simple monetary rule what would happen if the stock of base money were frozen as a means for ruling out discretion altogether answers to such questions require an analysis of determinants of the money stock in a closed free banking system with a centrally determined stock of base money here i offer some preliminary answers based upon carl christ s i 989 formal interpretation of selgin i988 the features of free banking stressed here because they bear most on questions of monetary control include i the freedom of banks to issue notes as well as deposits where banknotes are a more

monetary stability and liquidity crises the role of the lender of last resort we study an economy where agents are subject to liquidity demand shocks and banks arise endogenously to insure consumers against these shocks in this environment we evaluate the desirability of a lender of last resort who can provide liquidity loans to banks in distress in the absence of a lender of last resort the economy has a unique stationary equilibrium the introduction of unlimited and costless lender of last resort services allows the economy to achieve a steady state allocation that is pareto optimal however this economy also displays a continuum of hyperin ationary equilibria we then explore restrictions on the provision of lender of last resort services that rule out such monetary instability while preserving some of the e ciency obtained by unrestricted lender of last resort services when the lender of last resort charges an interest rate on liquidity loans the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium and when the interest rate charged is high enough no hyperin ationary equilibria arise finally when the lender of last resort faces an upper bound on loanable funds there is again a unique long run equilibrium and when the upper bound on loanable funds is small enough hyperin ationary equilibria are ruled out

a micro econometric analysis of vacation behaviour we present a micro econometric limited dependent variable model which simultaneously explains the decision whether to go on vacation or not the choice of destination and the decision on the level of the vacation expenditures the model has been estimated on the basis of a cross section of dutch households we find a striking difference in income elasticity between domestic vacations and vacations abroad and a large impact of owning certain durables such as a boat on the choice of destination to illustrate the potential of the model some simulations are performed

modeling recreation demand within a random utility framework abstract this paper develops a single site single trip random utility model for describing recreation behavior the model is applied to a 1981 survey of households in the pennsylvania monongahela river basin hicksian benefit estimates derived from it are compared with those from a more conventional travel cost model estimated from the same survey

the choice of ski areas estimation of a generalized ces preference ordering with characteristics abstrac t a generalized ces gences preference ordering is developed and estimated it incorporates characteristics of both the individual and the activities the gences is used to explain the share of ski time an individual allocates to each ski area as a function of site characteristics skiing ability and costs the stochastic specification limited the shares to the 0 1 simplex this specification was found to be more appropriate than the conventional normality assumption the null hypothesis that preferences are homothetic and additive is rejected charactenrstics ability and costs are important determinants of demand the estimated elasticities provide numerous insights into skier behavior

financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with transaction costs abstract we analyze an overlapping generations economy where agents interact to share liquidity risk we show that a pure exchange economy has excessive trade in equilibrium because agents interact to rebalance their portfolios intergenerational financial intermediaries reduce the number of interactions because agents only transact when they face liquidity needs in the absence of asset risk intermediaries match redemptions with deposits and dividends and never sell assets if the economy is subject to transaction costs the intermediated economy can sustain higher stationary investment and welfare we also find that dead weight transaction costs can increase welfare because it protects banks from interbank arbitrage and dampens the inherent cyclicality of market economies

optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in an economy with real and liquidity shocks faced with real and nominal shocks what should a benevolent central bank do x the money growth rate or target the in ation rate in this paper we make a rst attempt at studying the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a micro founded model of money speci cally we produce an overlapping generations economy in which limited communication and stochastic relocation creates an endogenous transactions role for at money we nd that when the shocks are real welfare is higher under money growth targeting when the shocks are nominal and not large welfare is higher under in ation rate targeting while under in ation rate targeting it is always optimal to pursue an expansionary policy it is never optimal to do so under money growth targeting

private money creation and the suffolk banking system while much has been written on the history of the suffolk banking system somewhat surprisingly to our knowledge no attempt has been made to formally model its monetary consequences in this paper we attempt to fill this gap

on the welfare properties of fractional reserve banking monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking such as the ability to undertake more profitable long term investment opportunities and the difficulties associated with it such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders i show that a specific banking arrangement a joint liability scheme provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders

equilibrium bank runs we analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts or mechanisms is broad the mechanisms must satisfy a sequential service constraint but partial or full suspension of convertibility is allowed consumers must be willing to deposit ex ante we show by examples that under the so called optimal contract the postdeposit game can have a run equilibrium given a propensity to run triggered by sunspots the optimal contract for the full predeposit game can be consistent with runs that occur with positive probability thus the diamond dybvig framework can explain bank runs as emerging in equilibrium under the optimal deposit contract

money is memory abstract this paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible following myerson 8 the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment the environments feature either memory or money memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions and is available in fixed supply the main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory depending on the environment the converse may or may not be true hence from a technological point of view money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory journal of economic literature classification numbers e40 c73 d82

banks and markets in a monetary economy abstract modern financial sectors consist of banks asset markets and a central bank this paper builds a model where these institutions provide different financial services and their interaction supports efficient allocations when one institution is missing equilibria are by construction inefficient the paper analyzes how interest rates and asset prices depend on the structure of the financial sector and characterizes the central bank policy that supports efficient allocations the analysis relies on the difference between liquidity and real shocks and relates the notion of liquidity used in this paper to the one adopted in other studies

the value of inside and outside money abstract we study dynamic economies in which agents may have incentives to hold both privately issued a k a inside and publicly issued a k a outside circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium our analysis emphasizes spatial separation and limited communication as frictions that motivate monetary exchange we isolate conditions under which a combination of inside and outside money does and does not allow the economy to achieve a first best allocation of resources we also study the extent to which the use of private circulating liabilities alone or the use of public circulating liabilities alone can address the frictions that lead to monetary exchange

private money and banking regulation we show that the regulation of lending practices is desirable for the optimal provision of private money in an environment in which bankers cannot commit to repay their creditors neither an unregulated banking system nor a form of narrow banking in which banks hold 100 in reserves can provide the socially efficient amount of money if bankers provided such an amount then they would prefer to default on their liabilities we show that a regulation that increases the value of the banking sector s assets e g by limiting competition in credit markets will mitigate the commitment problem if the return on the banking sector s assets is made sufficiently large then it is possible to implement an efficient allocation

private and public circulating liabilities abstract legal and technological changes have made private banknote issue or its electronic equivalent possible we construct a model where private liabilities circulate either by themselves or alongside outside money we provide results on existence and multiplicity of equilibria and characterize dynamics near steady states our results support friedman in that circulating private liabilities are associated with endogenous volatility but implementing friedman s advice the government should ban private currency substitutes causes significant inefficiency the proposal of hayek that the government should leave currency creation to the market also is often constrained suboptimal both public and private circulating liabilities are required for optimality journal of economic literature classification numbers e3 e4 e5

economic inefficiencies and cross subsidies in an auction based electricity pool this paper compares two contrasting yet often used electricity market clearing procedures i an auction based algorithm including congestion management and transmission loss cost allocation and ii an optimal power flow the auction procedure produces a single period unit commitment and hence can be compared directly to an optimal power flow solution these algorithms are compared in terms of the economic efficiency of the solution attained and in terms of cross subsidies among generators and demands the purpose of this comparison is to quantify the actual cost to market participants of using a simple seemingly transparent procedure such as an auction based algorithm versus an integrated but computationally intensive one such as an optimal power flow