the importance of managerial ability on crude oil price uncertainty firm performance relationship abstract this paper investigates the effect of crude oil price uncertainty on firm performance and how the managerial ability impacts on this relationship using a large sample of 13 610 u s firms from 1983 to 2016 we reveal two main findings consistent with our hypothesis we find strong evidence for a negative effect of crude oil price uncertainty on firm performance at both aggregate market and sectoral levels however managerial ability helps firms dampen a significant proportion approximately 20 50 of the negative effect these findings are consistent in several robustness tests

executive compensation strategic competition and relative performance evaluation theory and evidence we examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets we show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance the need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance we find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

optimal design of pro conservation incentives abstract payments for environmental services pes schemes have become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for governmental and non governmental agencies to use in addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem services in pes schemes payments can either be tied to indicators of actions for service provision or to indicators of the generated service itself performance payments are synonymous for this second group i e payments are completely contingent on the procurement of an environmental good or service such a focus raises several practical issues during implementation we review and translate key aspects of the economic theory of incentives into the context of performance payment schemes with special attention paid to two practical issues risks outside the individual s control and distortion in the measurement of environmental services four different incentive payment approaches are presented and the effects of risk and distortion on optimal incentives are discussed the investigation of each payment approach is accompanied by a discussion of examples from the field

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

pitfalls in the use of systemic risk measures we examine pitfalls in the use of return based measures of systemic risk contributions srcs for both linear and nonlinear return frameworks assuming normal and heavy tailed distributions we identify nonexotic cases in which a change in a bank s systematic risk idiosyncratic risk size or contagiousness increases the risk of the system but lowers the measured src of the bank assessments based on estimated srcs could thus produce false interpretations and incentives we also identify potentially adverse side effects a change in a bank s risk structure can make the measured src of its competitors increase more strongly than its own

an analysis of the relation between the stewardship and valuation roles of earnings in this paper we seek a deeper understanding of how accounting information is used for valuation and incentive contracting purposes we explore linkages between weights on earnings in compensation contracts and in stock price formation a distinction between the valuation and incentive contracting roles of earnings in paul 1992 produces the null hypothesis that valuation earnings coefficients vecs and compensation earnings coefficients cecs are unrelated our empirical analyses of the relations between earnings and both stock prices and executive compensation data at the firm and industry levels over the period 1971 2000 rejects paul s 1992 hypothesis of no relation we also document an increasing weight over time on other public performance information captured by stock returns in the determination of cash compensation specifically we find that the incentive coefficient on returns is significantly higher in the second of two equal sample subperiods relative to the incentive coefficient on earnings

intertemporal cost allocation and managerial investment incentives a theory explaining the use of economic value added as a performance measure this paper provides a formal analysis of how managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative allocation rules when managerial compensation is based on accounting measures of income that include allocations for investment expenditures the main result is that there exists a unique allocation rule that always induces the manager to choose the efficient investment level the income measure created by this allocation rule is usually referred to as residual income or economic value added

magnitude and persistence of extreme risk spillovers in the global energy market a high dimensional left tail interdependence perspective abstract this paper studies the magnitude and persistence of extreme risk spillovers among stock returns of 124 energy companies worldwide between january 2006 and june 2019 as well as the corresponding firm specific determinants of firms extreme risk spillovers the high dimensional nonparametric method the coefficient of tail interdependence cti enables us to make better use of available information and to evaluate risk spillovers more precisely moreover we use spatial panel models that consider spatial heterogeneity among firms to explore the determinants of the risk spillovers the empirical findings from a study of energy firms risk spillover effects verify the necessity of persistence measurement also the most systemically risky energy companies are not necessarily the largest and some small firms can also generate large risk spillovers when they are in distress which indicates that determinants other than firm size could also affect the spillover effect such as business complexity and geographic location our regression results suggest that the extreme risk spillover of the energy companies exhibits significant heterogeneity in terms of business and region which deserves more attention for energy risk management the estimates can be used for making portfolio decisions and designing regulatory policies

contracting theory and accounting abstract this paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues i discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems i review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts and i compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes i also review the literature on communication including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place the paper also discusses capital allocation within firms including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems

indexed executive stock options abstract we design and derive a pricing model for an executive stock option with a strike price indexed to a benchmark and investigate its valuation and incentive implications in both up and down markets the indexed option filters out common risks beyond the executive s control thereby increasing the efficiency of incentive contracts the indexed option has a different payoff structure and much lower initial value than a traditional option incentive effects of the indexed option also differ from those of traditional options we design an optional penalty function to reduce the payoff if executives manipulate specified model parameters such as volatility

uncertainty and incentives empirical work testing for a trade off between risk and incentives has had at best mixed success this article provides two simple reasons associated with subjectivity of performance appraisals why we might not expect to see any negative relationship both reasons relate to empirically observed problems associated with monitoring i supervisors sometimes bias their evaluations based on their personal feelings toward their subordinates and ii supervisors will sometimes offer evaluations that reduce their costs these aspects of monitoring are ignored in the standard model and can reverse the usual negative trade off between risk and incentives

strategic inattention delegation and endogenous market structure abstract we model an industry in which a discrete number of firms choose the output of their differentiated products deciding whether or not to consider the impact of their decisions on aggregate output the firm s choice of ignoring the impact of its production on aggregate output which is typical of monopolistic competition is derived as an equilibrium choice rather than assumed upfront such a choice is labelled as strategic inattention we show that our model of strategic inattention is isomorphic to a model of strategic delegation with managerial compensation based on relative profit performance thus monopolistic competition and cournot oligopoly are reconciled within a general model which can lead to either market form

x inefficiency competition and market information whether competition forces firms toward efficient behaviour is an open question we consider a duopoly with firms run by managers and affected by adverse selection on costs in contrast to recent literature we point out that to have a genuine effect on firm x inefficiency competition must change managerial incentives by introducing the availability of some signal on the rivals behaviour we show that if costs are correlated the contractual use of that signal can render private managerial information uninfluential this result stresses the informational role of the market and suggests scope for future work

price discrimination and quality improvement this paper models quality improvements when multiple quality levels can sell owing to differences in consumers valuations of quality improvements firms can collude to price discriminate so that consumers with high valuations pay a price premium while others receive a quality level below the highest available imposing minimum quality standards or price ceilings can ensure that only the highest quality level of each product is sold such intervention reduces the quality adjusted price paid by consumers but also reduces the incentives for firms to innovate when enough consumers have high valuations such intervention must be welfare reducing owing to reduced innovation jel classification o31 l16 discrimination par les prix et amelioration de la qualite ce memoire presente un modele d amelioration de la qualite quand on peut vendre des produits a divers niveaux de qualitea cause des differences dans les evaluations d amelioration de qualite par les consommateurs les entreprises peuvent entrer en collusion pour faire de la discrimination par les prix de maniere a ce que les consommateurs qui apprecient davantage la qualite paient une prime pendant que les autres consommateurs recoivent une qualite au dessous de ce qui est la meilleure qualite disponible si on impose des normes de qualite minimale ou des plafonds aux prix on peut s assurer que seuls les produits de la plus haute qualite seront vendus de telles interventions reduisent le niveau de prix ajuste pour la qualite paye par les consommateurs mais reduisent aussi les incitations des entreprises a innover quand un nombre suffisant de consommateurs apprecient beaucoup la qualite de telles interventions peuvent reduire le niveau de bien etre a cause des innovations moins importantes

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

srisk a conditional capital shortfall measure of systemic risk we introduce srisk to measure the systemic risk contribution of a financial firm srisk measures the capital shortfall of a firm conditional on a severe market decline and is a function of its size leverage and risk we use the measure to study top financial institutions in the recent financial crisis srisk delivers useful rankings of systemic institutions at various stages of the crisis and identifies fannie mae freddie mac morgan stanley bear stearns and lehman brothers as top contributors as early as 2005 q1 moreover aggregate srisk provides early warning signals of distress in indicators of real activity received june 7 2011 accepted april 18 2016 by editor geert bekaert

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

the value of precontract information about an agent s ability in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection we analyze the expected value of information about an agent s type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection information about the agent s type enables the principal to sort screen agents of different types the value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the agent s risk aversion two factors that are typically associated with the severity of the moral hazard problem however the value of the information about agent type first increases but ultimately decreases in the severity of adverse selection the decrease comes about because the means available to the principal to induce effort namely the pay performance sensitivity must also be used to sort screen agents and these two goals conflict this decline in value occurs despite the monotonically increasing importance of the information in determining the principal s expected profits further we show that the peak value of information occurs at a predictable level of adverse selection these results imply that over some range the importance of the information will be increasing and the value of the information will be simultaneously decreasing in the severity of adverse selection

the intertemporal consequences of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property in an intertemporal framework the harm to firms from unauthorized reproduction of their products may be significantly greater than that predicted by most static models copying by some consumers reduces the appropriable surplus from all consumers including those consumers lacking any propensity to copy somewhat paradoxically however the commitment value of copies may also imply that profits are higher with copying than without copying it is therefore suggested that firms may prefer differential copyright enforcement and that the commitment value of copies may offer a strategic explanation for free giveaways of abridged versions of intellectual property and vertical product differentiation more generally

durable goods with quality differentiation abstract we study the optimal strategy of a durable goods monopolist who can offer goods in different qualities the key finding is that the presence of the additional sorting variable further undermines the firm s commitment problem leading to results that contrast sharply with those of standard durable goods models or those of models where the firm can commit

the use of accounting and security price measures of performance in managerial compensation contracts a discussion abstract it is commonly observed that the compensation paid to senior level executives depends on both accounting and security price measures of performance the articles by kim and suh bushman and indjejikian and sloan which i have been invited to discuss examine the issue of how much weight to place on these two measures in the contract the first two papers analyze the role that earnings can play in removing the noise in stock price in a rational expectations pricing model the sloan paper analytically and empirically examines the role that earnings can play in removing macroeconomic factors from stock price

durable good monopoly and best price provisions best price provisions guarantee buyers that the prices they pay are the lowest available if the seller subsequently cuts price then each previous buyer is entitled to a refund a durable good monopolist who offers certain forms of these provisions can construct a consistent plan yielding the same profits as rental agreements and contracts with explicit quantity commitments the provisions require special circumstances to be practical but they are simple and effective and appear in a variety of economic settings three applications are discussed international commodity agreements markets for electric turbogenerators and markets for financial claims copyright 1990 by american economic association

an empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis the principal agent framework has become a widely used paradigm in accounting and economics for analyzing issues in performance evaluation management control and the design of incentive systems while recent work in experimental economics has begun to examine empirically some of the underlying assumptions and implications of agency theory see baiman and lewis 1989 and kirby forthcoming few precise hypotheses have been tested using real world or naturally occurring data one exception has been the empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation rpe hypothesis agency theory suggests that there are benefits associated with evaluating agents on the basis of their relative performances when the agents performances are affected by a common shock term e g see diamond and verrecchia 1982 and holmstrom 1979 1982 specifically a relative performance based contract can remove the common shock term from an agent s performance which enables a better evaluation of the agent s actions

accounting income stock price and managerial compensation abstract this paper employs an agency model where a manager has a two dimensional action choice to study how the information content of earnings affects the design of compensation contracts based on earnings and price price is modeled as an endogenous variable that reflects all available information including earnings two settings are contrasted in the first earnings and price reflect the same underlying information about firm value while in the second earnings reflect a subset of the information reflected in price it is shown that differences in information content substantially alter the characteristics of compensation contracts based on earnings and price

are incentive contracts rigged by powerful ceos we argue that some powerful ceos induce boards to shift the weight on performance measures toward the better performing measures thereby rigging incentive pay a simple model formalizes this intuition and gives an explicit structural form on the rigged incentive portion of ceo wage function using u s data we find support for the model s predictions rigging accounts for at least 10 of the compensation to performance sensitivity and it increases with ceo human capital and firm volatility moreover a firm with rigged incentive pay that is one standard deviation above the mean faces a subsequent decrease of 4 8 in firm value and 7 5 in operating return on assets

an economic theory of planned obsolescence planned obsolescence is the production of goods with uneconomically short useful lives so that customers will have to make repeat purchases however rational customers will pay for only the present value of the future services of a product therefore profit maximization seemingly implies producing any given flow of services as cheaply as possible with production involving efficient useful lives this paper shows why this analysis is incomplete and therefore incorrect monopolists are shown to desire uneconomically short useful lives for their goods oligopolists have the monopolist s incentive for short lives as well as a second incentive that may either increase or decrease their chosen durability however oligopolists can generally gain by colluding to reduce durability and increase rentals relative to sales some evidence is presented that appears to be generally consistent with the predictions of the theory

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices recent developments in economic theory have focused attention on efficient methods for providing incentives within a corporation especially to top management jensen meckling 12 have examined some implications of incentive or agency problems for corporate finance in this paper we combine a simple model of security market equilibrium with that of an optimal managerial incentive contract using results of harris raviv 8 and holmstrom 9 we provide a rationale for including security prices in the managerial incentive contracts of publicly held firms in this model we also show that non systematic diversifiable risks will be considered in the capital budgeting decisions of a managerial firm operated in the interests of its stockholders this is in contrast to the implication of the arbitrage pricing theory a similar result follows from the capital asset pricing model which abstracts from incentive problems and suggests that only systematic risks ought to be considered the optimal contract model of the corporation takes the following view of the firm since decision makers within a firm are not sole owners of the business but employed agents the decisions which they make depend on the incentives which the organization provides these incentives are embodied explicitly in employment contracts and implicitly through the threat of dismissal or effect on reputation the contract whether explicit or not describes the decision maker s anticipation of the consequences to him conditional on various observable outcomes these outcomes are used to provide information useful in determining whether he did his job properly in the simplest optimal contract scenario there is a single principal and a single agent whose decision concerns the level of effort he expends the level of effort affects the level of output of the firm but not unambiguously because the output is also governed by other stochastic elements as a result some information about the agent s level of effort can be inferred

geographic income shifting by multinational corporations in response to tax rate changes we investigate geographic income shifting by 191 u s multinational corporations in response to worldwide changes in tax rates during 1984 90 between 1984 and 1986 the united kingdom reduced corporate tax rates from a maximum of 45 to 35 and in 1985 france reduced rates from 50 to 45 following these reductions in european rates the united states reduced top corporate tax rates from 46 to 34 between 1986 and 1988 canadian rates increased between 1984 and 1986 and then decreased through 1989 beginning in 1988 numerous countries enacted tax cuts apparently in response to those that occurred earlier in other countries as discussed in section 3 differential changes in tax rates provide incentives for geographic income shifting by multinational firms we identify two subperiods during 1984 90 in which relative tax rate changes

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

a portfolio view of banking with interest and noninterest activities this paper uses a portfolio framework to evaluate the impact of increased noninterest income on equity market measures of return and risk of u s bank holding companies from 1997 to 2004 the results indicate that the banks most reliant on activities that generate noninterest income do not earn higher average equity returns but are much more risky as measured by return volatility both total and idiosyncratic and market betas this suggests that the pervasive shift toward noninterest income has not improved the risk return outcomes of u s banks in recent years

incentives and compensation schemes an experimental study when the performances of agents are correlated because of a common random component contracts that use information on both the relative and absolute performances of agents theoretically outperform rank order tournaments and piece rate schemes although the theoretical advantage of such contracts has long been noticed in the literature the empirical papers that study this question have produced mixed results using a controlled laboratory experiment we shed light on the performance of these contracts we focus on the simplest version of such a contract the relative piece rate rpr and compare its performance with that of the tournament and piece rate schemes we find that when the rprs are imposed on the agents they exert higher effort levels and give the principal weakly higher profits than the tournament and piece rate contracts second we find that agents have little aversion to self select into the rpr scheme when other alternatives are available in our paper we fix the environment agents face and vary only their wage scheme our results support the theoretical predictions and suggest that principals can benefit from using rpr schemes in places where the piece rate and tournament contracts would otherwise be used

planned obsolescence and the r d decision by investing in rd i e the r d choice that maximizes current profitability does not maximize overall profitability the result is that if output is sold rather than rented then in its r d decision the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned obsolescence that lowers its own profitability

a diffusion model incorporating product benefits price income and information we start by assuming that a major benefit of many new durable products such as dishwashers and microwave ovens is time savings others such as vcrs also enhance the value of our leisure time using a household production framework we demonstrate that a utility maximizing individual will have a reservation price for the product which is a function of the product benefits and his wage rate by assuming that the wage rate has an extreme value distribution across the population we are able to derive for the aggregate process an income price dependent logistic adoption equation we then allow for the possibility that certain eligible consumers may delay their purchase of the product because they are unaware that it exists are suspicious of its quality or expect its price to fall unawareness uncertainty and hope for further price declines are assumed to decrease with the increase in the number of previous adopters the resulting diffusion model has the property that the product life cycle phenomenon can be explained jointly or separately by the income price process and the awareness uncertainty expectations process using data on household income on durable penetration within different income classes and on first purchase sales the aggregate diffusion model and its premises are tested and supported it is found that both the income price and awareness uncertainty expectations processes are at work however the dependence of the awareness uncertainty expectations delay process on the number of previous adopters e g word of mouth type effect exists only in certain product categories and is usually relatively weak it is demonstrated that if the word of mouth type effects are weak a price skimming strategy is optimal for a monopolist and also is likely to be implemented by oligopolists the sales forecasting implications of the model also are pursued

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

earnings and price based compensation contracts in the presence of discretionary trading and incomplete contracting abstract the paper analyzes the use of reported accounting earnings and price as a basis for compensating a manager when he trades on private information and share price is set rationally based on privately held information publicly available and contractible information and publicly available but noncontractible information in addition we analyze the comparative statics of the compensation on reported earnings and price with respect to changes in the economy

stock price reaction and value relevance of recognition versus disclosure the case of stock based compensation this study examines the equity price reaction to the pronouncements related to accounting for stock based compensation and assesses the value relevance of recognition versus disclosure in financial reporting we document that firms exhibit significant abnormal returns around the issuance of the exposure drafts proposing to require recognition of stock based compensation costs and also around the event reversing that decision to require disclosure only while encouraging recognition we also document that the abnormal returns are most pronounced for high tech high growth and start up firms our results are consistent with the contracting theory and show that disclosure is not a substitute for recognition r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

extreme us stock market fluctuations in the wake of 9 11 we apply extreme value analysis to us sectoral stock indices in order to assess whether tail risk measures like value at risk and extremal linkages were significantly altered by 9 11 we test whether semi parametric quantile estimates of downside risk and upward potential have increased after 9 11 the same methodology allows one to estimate probabilities of joint booms and busts for pairs of sectoral indices or for a sectoral index and a market portfolio the latter probabilities measure the sectoral response to macro shocks during periods of financial stress so called tail s taking 9 11 as the sample midpoint we find that tail s often increase in a statistically and economically significant way this might be due to perceived risk of new terrorist attacks copyright 2008 john wiley sons ltd

capital shortfall a new approach to ranking and regulating systemic risks the financial crisis of 2007 2009 has given way to the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 2012 yet many of the banking issues remain the same we discuss a method to estimate the capital that a financial firm would need to raise if we have another financial crisis this measure of capital shortfall is based on publicly available information but is conceptually similar to the stress tests conducted by us and european regulators we argue that this measure summarizes the major characteristics of systemic risk and provides a reliable interpretation of the past and current financial crises

optimal ceo compensation some equivalence results i study optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments when the investment return is contractible an optimal contract combines a base salary golden parachute and bonus when the return is not contractible two types of optimal contracts are studied a contract with restricted stock and a contract with stock options these three types of contracts are equivalent they implement the same outcome and lead to the same expected payoff for the manager implying that the choice of contractual form is irrelevant in the environment i study i suggest directions of research for the relevance of different contractual forms

replacement cycles income distribution and dynamic price discrimination this article analyses how income distribution intellectual property rights and other regulatory policies such as minimum quality standards determine pricing strategies in a dynamic context where a monopolist periodically introduces new generations or upgrades of a durable good discrimination through quality and screening in this article takes place in a context where consumers buy several versions of the durable good during their lifetime instead of a single version as in inderst s 2008 or koh s 2006 it also differs from glass 2001 in that an equilibrium may emerge in which different consumer types replace their durable generations with different frequencies our modelling is motivated by stylized facts from the last brazilian pof household budget survey

the strategic choice of managerial incentives do firms with separate owners and managers maximize profits we address this question for an oligopoly where managers compete in quantities or prices as in the cournot or bertrand models and owners choose their managers incentives we find that there is a strategic aspect in the problem of selecting incentives and that profit maximizing behavior does not result in particular in the oligopoly we study the behavior of firms competing in quantity price more closely resembles perfectly competitive collusive behavior than cournot bertrand behavior

does uniqueness in banking matter abstract we investigate whether and how the uniqueness of banking activities affects the performance and systemic risk of u s banks we find that banks performing more unique activities exhibit higher profitability and lower risk controlling for size diversification and other key characteristics we further find that banks sensitivity to systemic risk displays an inversely u shaped relation with activity uniqueness we interpret the impact of uniqueness in analogy to recent theories showing that systemic diversity promotes financial stability our study highlights the role of uniqueness in banking and has important implications for policy makers and banking regulators

a primer on financial contagion abstract this paper presents a theoretical framework to highlight possible channels for the international transmission of financial shocks we first review the different definitions and measures of contagion adopted by the literature we then use a simple multi country asset pricing model to classify the main elements of the current debate on contagion and provide a stylized account of how a crisis in one country can spread to the world economy in particular the model shows how crises can be transmitted across countries without assuming ad hoc portfolio management rules or market imperfections finally tracking our classification we survey the results of the empirical literature on contagion

a contracting perspective on earnings quality abstract this paper analyzes the impact of signal to noise ratios and the autocorrelation of a performance measure on the principal s welfare in dynamic agencies with renegotiation we consider the impact of changes in the persistent transitory and reversible components of accounting earnings on its usefulness in valuation versus contracting increasing the persistent components and reducing the reversible components are generally desirable for valuation but not for contracting eliminating transitory components of earnings is generally desirable for valuation but not necessarily for contracting we discuss the contracting implications of differences in the autocorrelations of accounting earnings versus stock returns

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

strategic disclosure of meaningful information to rival i study a model of strategic disclosure of a private signal to a rival in the presence of a payoff externality in the model two agents forecast the unknown true state of a future period specifically the quality of the signal is also private information hence which quality of signal is revealed for which incentive is the main question of interest i show that even when disclosure is costly the revealing equilibrium where an agent voluntarily reveals his signal can exist and it should be a monotone equilibrium asymmetry between the penalty for an incorrect forecast and the reward for a correct forecast is a necessary condition for the existence of this revealing equilibrium if the penalty is larger than the reward the unique revealing equilibrium is a separating equilibrium where only the low quality signal is disclosed in order to induce the rival s imitation on the other hand if the reward is much larger than the penalty the unique revealing equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where the signal is always revealed in order to induce the rival s deviation if the reward is not much larger than the penalty no revealing equilibrium is robust to a costly disclosure jel d81 d82

how do households choose quality and time to replacement for a rapidly improving durable good abstract many durable goods particularly in the high technology sector of the economy experience rapid quality improvement as a result replacement is typically due to obsolescence rather than breakdown and replacement cycles are relatively short when these goods are vertically differentiated consumers must make two important inter related choices upon making a purchase what quality level to buy and how long to wait between purchases in this paper we analyze how these two decisions relate to underlying preferences and to each other both theoretically and empirically we demonstrate how a single tenuous assumption in a commonly used theoretical model can drive the relationships we would predict when we take this model to the data this highlights the necessity of a more direct empirical analysis in our empirics we show that quality choice and replacement cycle length rcl are generally positively correlated we also find evidence of non monotonic relationships between quality choice and marginal utility of quality and rcl choice and marginal utility of money that is households who value quality more don t always buy higher quality pcs and households who value money less don t always buy more frequently ceteris paribus our results provide new insights into the nature of durable goods demand the proper characterization of markets and market segments and welfare measures

incentive contracting and value relevance of earnings and cash flows accounting performance measures such as earnings and cash flows are useful for both valuation and performance evaluation purposes however little evidence exists on whether there is any association between these two roles in this study we provide large sample empirical evidence that the value relevance of earnings explains a significant amount of the cross sectional variation in the pay sensitivity of earnings and the incremental value relevance of cash flows explains variation in the marginal pay sensitivity of cash flows we document that while both value relevance and compensation weight on earnings decline from the subperiod of 1993 to 1997 to the subperiod of 1998 to 2003 both value relevance and compensation weight on cash flows increase from the earlier subperiod to the later subperiod overall our results provide additional evidence that value relevance of a performance measure plays a significant role in its use for performance evaluation

incentive efficiency of compensation based on accounting and market performance abstract this paper analyzes how earnings and price are used in executive compensation contracts risk averse shareholders collectively design a contract and individually trade in the stock market in the optimal linear contract the use of earnings and price depends critically on incentive efficiency i e how precisely the measures convey the true outcome the relative weight of price to earnings exaggerates the true relative importance of price because price impounds traders overall information while its informational value lies in the incremental information it provides the use of price allows shareholders to share trading risks with managers

durable goods monopoly with discrete demand we analyze a dynamic game between consumers and the sole seller of a durable good unlike previous analyses we assume that there exists a finite collection of buyers rather than a continuum none of the main conclusions of the literature on durable goods monopoly survives this change in assumption coase s conjecture that a durable goods monopolist cannot earn supracompetitive profits in the continuous time limit bulow s proposition that renting a durable is always more profitable than selling it and stokey s proposition that precommitting to a time path of prices is always optimal are all false when the set of buyers is finite thus the assumption of a continuum of consumers so innocuous and useful a simplification in other contexts has proved misleading in the context of durable goods monopoly

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

managerial expertise private information and pay performance sensitivity this paper characterizes optimal pay performance sensitivities of compensation contracts for managers who have private information about their skills and those skills affect their outside employment opportunities the model presumes that the rate at which a manager s opportunity wage increases in his expertise depends on the nature of that expertise i e whether it is general or firm specific the analysis demonstrates that when managerial expertise is largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity is lower higher than its optimal value in a benchmark setting of symmetric information furthermore when managerial skills are largely firm specific general the optimal pay performance sensitivity decreases increases as managerial skills become a more important determinant of firm performance unlike the standard agency theoretic prediction of a negative trade off between risk and pay performance sensitivity this paper identifies plausible circumstances under which risk and incentives are positively associated in addition to providing an explanation for why empirical tests of risk incentive relationships have produced mixed results the analysis generates insights that can be useful in guiding future empirical research

ceos outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market wide effects i e rpe there is little evidence to support this theory oyer 2004 journal of finance 59 1619 1649 posits that an absence of rpe is optimal if the ceo s reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy s fortunes we directly test and find support for oyer s 2004 theory we argue that the ceo s outside opportunities depend on his talent as proxied by the ceo s financial press visibility and his firm s industry adjusted roa our results are robust to alternate explanations such as managerial skimming oligopoly and asymmetric benchmarking

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

the dependence of pay performance sensitivity on the size of the firm i analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm s shareholders i use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship estimating this model on chief executive officer ceo compensation data using nonlinear least squares i determine that pay performance sensitivity as defined by jensen and murphy 1990b appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size however measured i also analyze the properties of pay performance sensitivity for teams of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as ceo pay performance sensitivity

gauging potential sovereign risk contagion in europe abstract this study adopts the covar methodology to analyse the tail risk relationships among european sovereigns which provide arguably important information for policymakers to identify countries that should come under close scrutiny during the current debt crisis

relative performance evaluation and project selection relative performance evaluation rpe occurs when one person s compensation depends on the relation of his output to that of others agency theory e g lazear and rosen 1981 and holmstrom 1979 1982 predicts that managerial compensation will use relative performance when other firms outputs reveal information about the manager s actions which is not knowable from the manager s output alone tests of the theory measure other firms outputs using the performance of other firms in the same industry or some macroeconomic measures of performance these two approaches are designed to separate industry and economy effects from the effects of the manager s actions empirical tests by antle and smith 1986 and janakiraman lambert and larcker 1992 found limited evidence that managerial compensation is adjusted for industry effects gibbons and murphy 1990 found some adjustment in ceo compensation for industry performance and much more adjustment for changes in market wide rates of return this paper provides an explanation for these empirical results by illustrating how the benefits of rpe based schemes depend on the absence of project choice decisions in the canonical agency model 1

why banks are not too big to fail evidence from the cds market this paper argues that bank size is not a satisfactory measure of systemic risk because it neglects aspects such as interconnectedness correlation and the economic context in order to differentiate the effect of bank size from that of systemic importance we control for systemic risk using the covar measure introduced by adrian and brunnermeier 2011 we show that a bank s contribution to systemic risk has a significant negative effect on banks credit default swap cds spreads supporting the too systemic to fail hypothesis once we control for systemic risk bank size relative to gross domestic product gdp has either no or a positive effect on banks cds spreads the effect of bank size increases in the home country s debt ratio and turns positive already at moderate debt ratios this result is consistent with the too big to save hypothesis we show further that the effect of systemic risk rises sharply at the onset of the financial crisis in august 2007 but weakens after the failure of lehman brothers reflecting changing bailout expectations taken together our results suggest that banks are not too big to fail but they may be too systemic to fail and too big to save andreas barth and isabel schnabel