a positive effect of human capital on growth abstract recent studies have found that economic growth appears to be unrelated to increases in educational attainment in this note i show that there is a correlation in one dataset but it is typically hidden by unrepresentative observations

a non expected utility model and its application in practical auctions this article presents a non expected utility decision model which is nonlinear in the winning probabilities the model not only explicitly expresses bidders attitudes to risk but also addresses t

educational human capital and levels of income evidence from states in india 1965 92 abstract this paper examines the long run steady state relationship between levels of educational human capital and levels of income for the 15 major states of india between 1965 and 1992 the relationship is estimated using the pooled mean groups pmg technique which produces common long run coefficients but allows heterogeneity of the short run adjustment parameters the results suggest that levels of educational human capital proxied by high school enrollment rates have a robust positive impact on steady state levels of income this is true for male and female education and the regressions also suggest that states which have larger gender gaps in education have lower steady state incomes the estimated relationship is robust to the inclusion of alternative measures added controls and variation in the degree of state coverage

financial technology shocks and the case of the missing m2 m2 growth was unusually weak in the early 1990s when its velocity soared although m2 growth subsequently recovered its velocity plateaued at a high level giving rise to a case of missing money these swings in m2 growth have accompanied opposite swings in bond mutual fund inflows m2 growth is better tracked and the missing m2 problem is resolved when money models are modified to account for shifts in bond mutual fund costs this approach avoids the capital gains and portfolio substitution problems posed by adding bond or equity funds to m2 while capturing the substitution effects relevant to money demand

emotional bidders an analytical and experimental examination of consumers behavior in a priceline like reverse auction e commerce has proved to be fertile ground for new business models which may be patented for up to 20 years and have potentially far reaching impact on the e commerce landscape one such electronic market is the reverse auction model popularized by priceline com there is still uncertainty surrounding the survival of such new electronic markets currently available on the internet understanding user behavior is necessary for better assessment of these sites survival this paper adds to economic analysis a formal representation of the emotions evoked by the auction process specifically the excitement of winning if a bid is accepted and the frustration of losing if it is not we generate and empirically test a number of insights related to 1 the impact of expected excitement at winning and frustration at losing on bids across consumers and biddings scenarios and 2 the dynamic nature of the bidding behavior that is how winning and losing in previous bids influence their future bidding behavior

private versus social returns to human capital education and economic growth in india abstract this paper investigates whether differences between private and social returns to education of government sector employees can contribute to an explanation of the micro macro paradox in the literature on education and growth we hypothesize that in india educated people find privately rewarding jobs in a sector in which social returns are low namely the government sector this could help explain high returns to education at the micro level and small or negative coefficients on education growth in growth regressions at the macro level the empirical results which are consistent with this hypothesis are based on an analysis of state level data from india spanning 40 years

partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations in a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed bid double auction dissolves a partnership efficiently this well known result remains valid in a model with interdependent valuations however if common values components are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction therefore a simple extention of the rules of double auctions is suggested that ensures participation even though these modified double auctions are not incentive efficient they still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the specifications of the model

auction guarantees for works of art abstract this paper addresses the question of whether auction guarantees change the bidding environment and whether they cause a change in price once the value of an item is taken into account we analyze both the cases of third party guarantees and in house guarantees we use two datasets one of christie s and sotheby s contemporary and impressionist evening sales from january 2010 to february 2012 and another larger dataset consisting of all items auctioned at christie s from 2001 to may 2011 while more expensive items are more likely to have guarantees we find little empirical evidence to suggest an effect on price from the guarantee itself once the value of the item is taken into account

takeover contests toeholds and deterrence we consider a setting in which two potential buyers one with a prior toehold and one without compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs the toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares the non toeholder anticipates this extra aggressiveness of the toeholder thus he is deterred from participating unless he has a high valuation for the target company this leads to large inefficiency losses for many configurations expected target returns are first increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold

backward looking interest rate rules interest rate smoothing and macroeconomic instability the existing literature on the stabilizing properties of interest rate feedback rules has stressed the perils of linking interest rates to forecasts of future inflation such rules have been found to give rise to aggregate fluctuations due to self fulfilling expectations in response to this concern a growing literature has focused on the stabilizing properties of interest rate rules whereby the central bank responds to a measure of past inflation the consensus view that has emerged is that backward looking rules contribute to protecting the economy from embarking on expectations driven fluctuations a common characteristic of the existing studies that arrive at this conclusion is their focus on local analysis the contribution of this paper is to conduct a more global analysis we find that backward looking interest rate feedback rules do not guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium we present examples in which for plausible parameterizations attracting equilibrium cycles exist the paper also contributes to the quest for policy rules that guarantee macroeconomic stability globally our analysis indicates that policy rules whereby the interest rate is set as a function of the past interest rate and current inflation are likely to ensure global stability provided that the coecient on lagged interest rates is greater than unity

asymmetric price benefits auctions abstract this paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided we provide results on existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions comparative statics are developed especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d39 d44 d52 d74 d82

generalizations that aren t evidence on education and growth abstract several papers have suggested that the relationship between changes in average schooling and growth is weak in the cross country data this might call into question the relevance of micro estimates of returns to schooling at least for developing countries this paper examines the reliability of some of the aggregate evidence and presents an alternative framework for analysing these questions

another look at long run money demand abstract this paper investigates the long run demand for m1 in the postwar united states previous studies based on data ending in the late 1980s are inconclusive about the parameters of postwar money demand this paper obtains precise estimates of these parameters by extending the data through 1996 the income elasticity of money demand is approximately 0 5 and the interest semi elasticity is approximately 0 05 these parameters are significantly smaller in absolute value than the corresponding parameters for the prewar period a caveat is that the analysis assumes there is no trend in money demand resulting from technological change

a theory of impact philanthropy this article develops a new model of altruism called impact philanthropy an impact philanthropist is someone who wants to personally make a difference while that motive is straightforward its logical implications are significantly different from other models of philanthropy for example the contributions of other donors can reduce an impact philanthropist s charitable fulfillment as a result cooperation among impact philanthropists can reduce aggregate giving in addition impact philanthropy can lead to a codependent relationship between givers and receivers in which both benefit from the other finally the model suggests a conflict between charitable organizations and its donors concerning the allocation of charitable gifts in particular a charitable organization prefers to spread a donor s contribution across many goods whereas a donor prefers to target his or her contribution at a specific good d 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

human capital and the reduction of inequalities an intra national analysis in italy human capital is a fundamental economic resource in the knowledge economy era and improvements in education are usually associated with both economic development and the reduction of inequality i

the demand for m1 in the u s a 1960 1988 estimated u s m1 demand functions appear unstable regularly breaking down over 1960 1988 e g missing money great velocity decline m1 explosion we propose a money demand function whose arguments include inflation real income long term bond yield and risk t bill interest rates and learning curve weighted yields on newly introduced instruments in m1 and non transactions m2 the model is estimated in dynamic error correction form it is constant and with an equation standard error of 0 4 variance dominates most previous models estimating alternative specifications explains earlier breakdowns showing the model s distinctive features to be important in accounting for the data

the impact of discrete bidding and bidder aggressiveness on sellers strategies in open english auctions reserves and covert shilling in practice the rules in most open english auctions require participants to raise bids by a sizeable discrete amount furthermore some bidders are typically more aggressive in seeking to become the current bidder during competitive bidding most auction theory however has assumed bidders can place any tiny continuous bid increase and recommend as optimal the tiniest possible increase this article examines how incorporating discrete bidding and bidder aggressiveness affect optimal strategies for an important decision for auction sellers which is setting the lowest acceptable bid at which to sell the property we investigate two alternative methods sellers often use to enforce this decision these are setting an irrevocable reserve before the auction and covert shilling where the seller or confederates pose as bona fide bidders and raise bona fide bids unsuspected by bidders these optimal strategies interest auction participants especially sellers who must recognize the bidding rules and bidder aggressiveness they will encounter in actual auctions we also examine how these strategies change with the auction context such as the number of bidders and how they differ from corresponding strategies already identified for continuous bidding our model examines open english auctions where bidders have independent private valuations we find that discrete bidding does affect these strategies as does the aggressiveness of the bidder with the highest valuation relative to the average aggressiveness of all other remaining bidders we identify the seller s optimal discrete reserve and show that if the highest valuator is relatively more less aggressive this increases decreases from the optimal continuous reserve and also increases decreases as the number of bidders increases with continuous bidding by contrast this reserve is invariant to the number of bidders as this bidder becomes relatively more aggressive for a given number of bidders the optimal discrete reserve increases while as he or she becomes less aggressive the seller s expected auction utility increases which increases the set of auctions where discrete bidding generates higher seller welfare than continuous we propose a covert shilling model that requires shilling sellers and any confederates and auctioneers to outwardly act no differently than with reserves to avoid detection we identify cases where the seller optimally shills once the bona fide bidding has stopped and identify the corresponding optimal point to stop shilling and accept the next bona fide bid if offered this stopping point does not depend on where bona fide bidding stops or aggressiveness or the number of bidders or on whether shill bids alternate with bona fide bids or are consecutively entered we also find that the optimal lowest acceptable bid with shilling can be higher lower than that with reserves if the highest valuator is sufficiently unaggressive aggressive by comparison in continuous bidding shilling and reserves yield identical lowest acceptable bids sometimes the seller using a shilling strategy optimally should not shill at all and instead accept the bid where bona fide bidding stops this can occur when that bid or the number of bidders is sufficiently high or when the highest valuator is as or less aggressive than other bidders optimal shilling can be as practical to implement as reserves because it does not require sellers to have any information beyond that needed in a reserve auction if sellers shill optimally they can never be worse off compared to using a reserve and can be better off shilling can make bidders worse off but can also make them better off when the seller using a shilling strategy optimally accepts bids below the optimal reserve in these latter cases shilling pareto dominates reserves ex ante we provide numerical examples to illustrate these results we discuss how our results might be affected if shilling is not covert or bidders valuations have a common value component rather than being independent or by the rules used in many discrete bid internet auctions

the search for a stable money demand function a survey of the post 1973 literature phe question of whether the demnand function for money is stable is one of the most important recurring issues in the theory and application of macroeconomic policy what is being sought in a stable demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank s control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy as such the notion of a stable demand function appears to involve three key elements e g john t boorman 1976 p 317 and david e w laidler 1977 pp 34 35 first the demand for money relation should be highly predictable in a statistical sense as measured by the usual goodness of fit statistics precision of estimated coefficients and presumably its ability to forecast accurately out of sample second a stable demand function for money has relatively few arguments a relationship that requires knowledge about a large number of variables in order to pin it down is in effect not predictable finally the variables that appear as arguments in the function should represent significant links to spending and economic activity in the real sector in sum a stable demand function for money means that the quantity of money is predictably related to a small set of key variables linking money to the real sector of the economy the importance of a stable money demand function for monetary policy can be illustrated with the standard is lm model in which interest rates and gnp are the endogenous variables in this context a stable demand function for money translates into a well defined relationship between money interest rates and gnp

is infrastructure capital productive a dynamic heterogeneous approach this paper offers an empirical evaluation of the output contribution of infrastructure drawing from a large data set on infrastructure stocks covering 88 countries and spanning the years 1960 2000 and using a panel time series approach the paper estimates a long run aggregate production function relating gdp to human capital physical capital and a synthetic measure of infrastructure given by the first principal component of infrastructure endowments in transport power and telecommunications tests of the cointegration rank allowing it to vary across countries reveal a common rank with a single cointegrating vector which is taken to represent the long run production function estimation of its parameters is performed using the pooled mean group estimator which allows for unrestricted short run parameter heterogeneity across countries while imposing the testable restriction of long run parameter homogeneity the long run elasticity of output with respect to the synthetic infrastructure index ranges between 0 07 and 0 10 the estimates are highly significant both statistically and economically and robust to alternative dynamic specifications and infrastructure measures there is little evidence of long run parameter heterogeneity across countries whether heterogeneity is unconditional or conditional on their level of development population size or infrastructure endowments

endogenous participation in charity auctions abstract data from a recent field experiment suggests that differences in participation rates are responsible for much of the variations in charity auction revenues across formats we provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of this and other related results the model illustrates the limits of previous results that assume full participation and introduces some new considerations to the choice of auction mechanism it also implies however that the data cannot be explained in terms of participation costs alone there must exist mechanism specific obstacles to participation

on optimal reservation prices in auctions the theory of auction design examines how various factors affect the outcome of an auction most of the existing literature focuses on how varying the amount of information available to each bidder affects the bid taker s expected revenue when all other factors remain constant this paper studies how the bid taker s expected revenue varies with changes in the auction format when such changes affect the number of bidders and in turn the bidders maximum value for the object being sold specifically we examine how varying the reservation price or screening level affects the bid taker s expected revenue though its effect on the number of bidders for two simple examples the losses associated with a reduced number of bidders outweighs any benefits that nontrivial reservation prices might have had in models with an exogonously set number of bidders

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

education human capital and growth a personal perspective this article reviews the literature on the relationship of economic growth to the education levels of the labor force the emphasis is on yoram ben porath s contribution to some of the issues in this field the endogeneity of schooling the role of the public sector as an absorber of educated labor and the importance of personal human capital created by investments in reputation and personal relationships the f connection

long run income and interest elasticities of money demand in the united states econometric techniques designed to accommodate nonstationary data are used to reexamine the stability of interest and income elasticities of money demand in the united states estimates based on postwar monthly data reveal a stable relationship between m1 velocity and various measures of interest rates that proxy the opportunity cost of holding money balances tests for the existence of cointegration and methods used to estimate the income and interest elasticities are based on procedures prescribed by soren johansen 1988 corresponding error correction estimates offer insight as to the dynamics of the process that maintains the equilibrium relation between velocity and interest rates copyright 1991 by mit press

government bias in education schooling attainment and long run growth a surprising cross country stylized fact is that higher public spending on education tends to lower the long run growth rate of per capita gdp and the returns to schooling this is contrary to the conventional wisdom that education is a major driver of growth in this article we revisit this issue and try to understand these puzzling facts in terms of an endogenous growth model our cross country calibration of the growth model predicts that countries with a greater government involvement in education experience lower schooling efforts and lower growth

short run money demand abstract the conventional wisdom holds that the short run demand for money is unstable this paper challenges the conventional view by finding a stable demand for m1 in u s data from 1959 through 1993 the approach follows previous work in interpreting long run money demand as a cointegrating relation and it uses goldfeld s partial adjustment model to interpret short run dynamics the key innovation is the choice of the interest rate in the money demand function most previous work uses a short term market rate but this paper uses the average return on near monies the savings accounts and money market mutual funds that are close substitutes for m1 this choice helps rationalize the behavior of money demand in particular the increase in the volatility of velocity after 1980 is explained by increased volatility in the returns on near monies

auctions with price proportional benefits to bidders after some auctions including amish estate sales and buyer rings knockout auctions each bidder receives a share of the revenue generated by the auction we show that in the symmetric case equilibrium bids in both first price sealed bid auctions and oral auctions increase as each bidder s share increases in the case of independent signals oral auctions result in higher expected equilibrium prices than do first price sealed bid auctions journal of economic literature classification number d44

monetary policy lessons of recent inflation and disinflation by 1975 most economists agreed that the money demand function in the united states was reasonably stable and could serve as a reliable basis for the formulation of monetary policy those suspicious of monetarism were on the defensive in the light of the apparently inexorable increase of m1 velocity of about three percent per year with deviations of only a few tenths of a percent experience with rising money growth and rising inflation through 1980 only confirmed monetarist views as figure 1 shows all this had changed by 1986 with disinflation in the 1980s m1 velocity departed convincingly from its 1953 79 trend the money demand function seems to have fallen apart and is apparently not a reliable basis for monetary policy after all consequently the first major section following this introduction is devoted to the decline of velocity after 1981 and the demise of the standard money demand function some authors including i believe benjamin friedman conclude that this evidence leaves us so uncertain about the nature of money demand that policymakers cannot rely at all on any presumed money demand regularities in contrast my working hypothesis is that the money demand continues to be a stable function of relatively few variables but that the interest elasticity of money demand is substantially higher than previously thought others have sought money demand explanations in terms of regime shifts but that literature will not be discussed here events have not been kind to keynesian monetary policy positions either keynesians tend to concentrate on interest rates especially real interest rates as the best guide to the effects of monetary policy on the economy the real rate is discussed

labour market regulation industrial relations and technological regimes a tale of comparative advantage in this paper we present comparative evidence from oecd countries concerning the impact of labour market institutions and regulations on technological specialization the interplay between the degree of labour market flexibility the system of industrial relations and the knowledge base of different industries determines the viability of different human resource strategies thereby shaping the patterns of comparative advantage our empirical results show that countries with coordinated industrial relations systems and strict employment protection tend to specialize in industries with a cumulative knowledge base we argue that two mechanisms explain these patterns the larger the scope for resorting to internal labour markets the lower the adjustment costs imposed by labour market regulation furthermore employment protection and coordinated industrial relations regimes by aligning workers and firms bjectives encourage firm sponsored training as well as the accumulation of firm specific competencies allowing firms to fully exploit the potential of the internal labour market copyright 2002 oxford university press

private information and altruism in bidding roscas this article studies how altruism improves allocations in a private information environment where strategic behaviour reduces economic welfare a theoretical analysis establishes that in an environment characterised by uncertainty and private information outcomes of auctions in rotating savings and credit associations roscas are more efficient when bidders preferences are altruistic rather than selfish a semi parametric structural estimation technique for rosca auctions is presented a parametric structural estimation identifies interactions between group characteristics and bidder altruism it is found that effective leadership and intra group diversity are associated with a greater extent of bidder altruism and thus more efficient intra rosca allocations

sweep programs the fall of m1 and rebirth of the medium of exchange this paper investigates the effect of sweep programs on m1 using dynamic simulations of money demand over 1994 2000 the postsample period constitutes when sweep programs have been in effect all models generate predictions systematically above reported m1 using data on newly initiated programs test findings indicate that sweeps account for the overprediction within the conventional money demand model with a long term interest rate we construct a medium of exchange measure m1s equal to m1 plus estimated holdings of sweep balances m1s velocity compares favorably with that of broader aggregates evidence indicates cointegration within m1s money demand

optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities abstract this paper studies optimal auction design with asymmetric linear financial externalities among bidders when the matrix that relates bidders payoffs to their payments is nonsingular the payment related component in the design objective must equal a unique linear combination of its counterparts in bidder s payoffs if all multipliers of the linear combination are nonnegative a modified myerson procedure is discovered for deriving the optimal design if any multiplier is negative an arbitrarily high value can be achieved for design objective by setting proper fixed transfers to bidders when the matrix is singular the unbounded optimum result typically prevails we applied our method to auctions with cross shareholdings and charity auctions for revenue maximizing and efficient designs

silent auctions in the field and in the laboratory we analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions we focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding we then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions as a controlled environment this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field the laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction jel d44 h41

the stability of long run money demand in five industrial countries abstract this study provides strong evidence for the stability of long run demand functions for narrowly defined money m1 in five industrial countries u s japan canada u k and west germany using post war quarterly data evidence of stability is examined using two different estimation techniques and through a formal test of parameter constancy designed specifically for cointegrating vectors in the majority of these countries the key to stability is the imposition of a unitary long run income elasticity that is rarely rejected by the data

the role of education in the environmental kuznets curve evidence from australian data abstract this paper is based on the underlying idea that the use of energy resources in a society significantly depends on their level of education then it is hypothesized that education might directly affect environmental quality by worsening it at early stages and improving it once education expands from its certain level thus we pursue an extension of the standard environmental kuznets curve by including an indicator of the evolution of citizens education this empirical strategy might avoid bias on income coefficients and in turn assess the value of education as environmental policy an application for australia is given to illustrate this possibility by using higher education data for a large time span 1950 2014 empirical results suggest that in most of the studied period expansion in education rate has increasingly compensated the rise of per capita co 2 emissions stemming from the economic growth moreover only in recent years both per capita income and education expansion have been proved to reduce emissions however provided that income growth is difficult to manage it would be worth considering the possibility of promoting education in order to achieve environmental objectives

charitable motives and bidding in charity auctions research on bidding in auctions has generally relied on the assumption of self interested bidders this work relaxes that assumption in the context of charity auctions because understanding charitable motives has important implications for auction design and charities fundraising strategies this study investigates bidders specific types of charitable motives and the strength of these motives we carry out three controlled field experiments consisting of real life auctions conducted on a local internet auction site we use a novel design in which we simultaneously run charity and noncharity auctions for identical products and vary the percentage donated to charity results show that auctions with proceeds donated to charity lead to significantly higher selling prices a result due to a higher bidding by bidders with charitable motives rather than to increased bidder entry we also find that increased prices only occur when the charitable donation is a percentage of the auction revenue and that a fixed charitable donation associated with each auction has no effect on prices furthermore we find that prices are increasing in the percentage donated to charity we find considerable support for a model of voluntary shill like bidding where charitable bidders try to increase proceeds in charity auctions we also find that auctions with 25 of revenue donated to charity had higher net revenue than noncharity auctions hence companies may be able to use charity auctions as part of a corporate social responsibility strategy and at the same time increase profitability even though they donate part of the proceeds to charity

rotating savings and credit associations when participants are risk averse we model rotating savings and credit associations roscas among risk averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks a random rosca is not advantageous whereas a bidding rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion the payoff scheme of a bidding rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries the risk sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk sharing contract and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution

specifying human capital a review of the measures of the stock of human capital used in empiricalgrowth research including adult literacy rates school enrollmentratios and average years of schooling of the working age population reveals that human capital is mostly poorly proxied the simple use ofthe most common proxy average years of schooling misspecifies therelationship between education and the stock of human capital based onhuman capital theory the specification of human capital is extended toallow for decreasing returns to education and for differences in thequality of a year of education the different specifications give riseto hugely differing measures of the stock of human capital acrosscountries and development accounting results show that misspecifiedhuman capital measures can lead to severe underestimation of thedevelopment effect of human capital

charity auctions with multiple goods bidding behavior and revenue abstract in a charity auction with multiple goods we show that the highest losing bid uniform price auction revenue dominates its lowest winning bid counterpart only in the highest losing bid uniform price auction is bidding independent of the number of goods and players and revenue increasing in the number of goods

returns to education in india summary in india both men and women with more education live in households with greater consumption per capita yet aggregating across age cohorts and states an extra year of education brings male cohorts only 4 more consumption and provides no additional consumption for female cohorts this result is robust to 1 accounting for survey measurement error 2 different measures of household consumption and composition 3 allowing returns to differ by state and school quality and 4 age misreporting the only area with substantial returns is entering into regular wage work which still employs only a small fraction of the population

auctions versus negotiations which is the more profitable way to sell a company an auction with no reserve price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder we show under reasonable assumptions that the auction is always preferable when bidders signals are independent for affiliated signals the result holds under certain restrictions on the seller s choice of negotiating mechanism the result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition the paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can help derive new results in auction theory jel d44 g34 there are close analogies between standard price theory and the theory of auctions in an absolute english auction in which the price rises continuously until only one bidder remains and the seller is required to accept the final bid the sale price equals the lowest competitive price at which supply equals demand in the theory of optimal auctions the seller is treated as a monopolist who can choose any

an evaluation of friedman s monetary instability hypothesis in this article i examine what i call milton friedman s monetary instability hypothesis drawing on friedman s work i argue that there are two main components to this view the first component is the idea that deviations between the public s demand for money and the supply of money are an important source of economic fluctuations the second component of this view is that these deviations are primarily caused by fluctuations in the supply of money rather than the demand for money each of these components can be tested independently to do so i estimate an otherwise standard new keynesian model amended to include a money demand function consistent with friedman s work and a money growth rule for a period from 1875 to 1963 this structural model allows me to separately identify shocks to the money supply and shocks to money demand i then use variance decompositions to assess the relative importance of shocks to the supply and demand for money i find that shocks to the monetary base can account for up to 28 of the fluctuations in output whereas money demand shocks can account for less than 1 of such fluctuations this provides support for friedman s view

lessons on monetary policy from the 1980s t he half decade running from mid 1982 to mid 1987 was a pretty good era for u s monetary policy as these things go a sharp easing of policy beginning some time around midyear 1982 helped set in motion a recovery from the most severe business downturn the united states had experienced since the 1930s a downturn that tight monetary policy earlier on had deliberately brought about in order to slow the alarming acceleration of prices the recovery that ensued developed into a sustained expansion that continued without interruption through the end of 1987 thereby setting a new record for the longest recorded business expansion in u s peacetime experience a fiscal policy based on unprecedentedly large and continually growing structural budget deficits was a major factor underlying this record length expansion but at least monetary policy did not stand in the way just as importantly the severe 1981 82 recession served its intended purpose of substantially restoring price stability and even after five years of expansion inflation remained modest by recent historical standards at least as judged by these outcomes for the standard objectives of macroeconomic policy u s monetary policy was a distinct success during these years economists hoping to say something useful about monetary policy have had a tougher time the quantitative relationships connecting income and price movements to the growth of familiar monetary aggregates including especially the m1 measure of the money stock that had been the chief focus of monetary policy during 1979 82 utterly fell apart during this period moreover the collapse of these long standing

biases in approximating log production most empirical work in economic growth assumes either a cobb douglas production function expressed in logs or a log approximated constant elasticity of substitution specification estimates from each are likely biased due to logging the model and the latter can also suffer from approximation bias we illustrate this with a successful replication of masanjala and papagerogiou the solow model with ces technology nonlinearities and parameter heterogeneity journal of applied econometrics 2004 19 171 201 and then estimate both models in levels to avoid these biases our estimation in levels gives results in line with conventional wisdom

erratumauction guarantees for works of art this paper addresses the question of whether auction guarantees change the bidding environment and whether they cause a change in price once the value of an item is taken into account we analyze both the cases of third party guarantees and in house guarantees we use two datasets one of christie s and sotheby s contemporary and impressionist evening sales from january 2010 to february 2012 and another larger dataset consisting of all items auctioned at christie s from 2001 to may 2011 while more expensive items are more likely to have guarantees we find little empirical evidence to suggest an effect on price from the guarantee itself once the value of the item is taken into account