delegating climate policy to a supranational authority a theoretical assessment abstract this paper studies the delegation of climate policy to a supranational environmental authority we develop a simple model of a world consisting of a large number of countries which derive utility from energy consumption countries suffer from global warming and local air pollution both caused by the combustion of fossil fuels and decide individually on investments in clean technologies for energy production a supranational environmental authority decides for each country on the maximally permitted amount of greenhouse gas emissions we demonstrate that the authority faces a dynamic inconsistency problem that leads to welfare losses but these losses can be kept small if the authority is endowed with an optimally designed mandate the optimal mandate penalizes the cost of local air pollution very heavily relative to the cost of global warming however delegation of climate policy faces a further difficulty as countries have a recurrent incentive to change the authority s mandate over time

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

jumping the curse early contracting with private information in university admissions this article introduces a new model of early contracting employers who have private information about the applicant s ability worry that applicants who accept their offer are precisely those who were not offered other jobs to avoid this winner s curse employers anticipate the time of contracting the model is developed in the context of university admissions and is shown to be consistent with several stylized facts in that market we show that in contrast to received wisdom allocative efficiency may be improved by the presence of early contracting

exchange rates inflation and the sterilization problem germany 1975 1981 when the goals of internal and external macroeconomic equilibrium are in conflict sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market may provide an independent policy instrument through which the central bank can resolve its dilemma in the short run this paper is concerned with the west german bundesbank s use of sterilization during the recent years of exchange rate flexibility the paper asks whether the bundesbank pursued sterilization during the years 1995 1981 and whether sterilized foreign exchange intervention exerts a significant influence on the exchange rate in the german case estimation of a stylized bundesbank reaction function suggests an affirmative answer to the first of these questions to assess the efficacy of sterilized intervention a structural portfolio balance model of german asset markets and prices is estimated dynamic perfect foresight simulations of the empirical model are used to ascertain whether imperfect substitutability between foreign and domestic bonds is sufficient to allow the bundesbank to attain independent internal and external goals over the short run of about a month the model s verdict is that the bundesbank has little if any power to influence the exchange rate over that time span without altering current or expected future money market conditions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

intervention and sterilisation under floating exchange rates the uk 1973 1983 in this paper a small portfolio balance model in the spirit of obstfeld 1983 is estimated for the sterling pound us dollar exchange rate over the period 1973 quarter 2 to 1983 quarter 4 it is demonstrated inter alia that pure or sterilised foreign exchange market intervention can be effective even when agents form expectations rationally

unravelling of dynamic sorting we consider a two sided finite horizon search and matching model with heterogeneous types and complementarity between types the quality of the pool of potential partners deteriorates as agents who have found mutually agreeable matches exit the market when search is costless and all agents participate in each matching round the market performs a sorting function in that high types of agents have multiple chances to match with their peers however this sorting function is lost if agents incur an arbitrarily small cost in order to participate in each round with a sufficiently rich type space the market unravels as almost all agents rush to participate in the first round and match and exit with anyone they meet copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

relationships among exchange rates intervention and interest rates an empirical investigation abstract this study uses herefore unavailable daily data on official intervention to test the joint hypotheses of perfect asset substitutability and exchange market efficiency this joint hypothesis is generally soundly rejected for six exchange rates over various sample periods in contrast to evidence elsewhere from weekly or monthly data lagged intervention is a significant determinant of realized profits in about half the cases this evidence is consistent with existence of a portfolio balance channel at least in the short run other evidence indicates that coordinated intervention sometimes may have an impact significantly different from intervention by one central bank alone

identification of interest rates and international capital flows the conventional paradigm that capital movements respond to differences in interest rates between countries and simultaneously reduce interest rate differentials has been difficult to demonstrate empirically this paper argues that such a demonstrati on may be feasible if a simultaneous model is specified that describe s the dynamics of adjustment and if a data interval is chosen that re veals the dynamics examination of u s and canadian data from the 19 60s supports the argument with monthly observations that paradigm is strongly supported with quarterly observations capital flows and i nterest rates are not significantly related copyright 1988 by mit press

how the market solves an assignment problem the matching of lawyers with legal claims in the market for lawyers observable data on promotion and turnover can be explained by reference to the idea that there is positive assortative mating of lawyers and legal claims there is a scale of resources effect under which it is optimal to assign larger claims to lawyers of higher quality in a law firm the institution of tenure performs a sorting function lawyers found to be of high quality are given tenured positions and the rest leave the value of legal claims handled by a firm determines its sorting problem which in turn determines its promotion ladder and turnover

fiscal policy and the exchange rate in the big seven abstract we isolate the aggregate demand effects of u s government spending from its asset supply effects working through increased deficits and examine the former with the help of a two country rational expectations model of the united states versus the rest of the world the simulation results suggest that even in the absence of asset supply effects the consequences of a government spending cut in the united states can be substantial a depreciation of the effective dollar rate of 4 percent and a fall in long term bond rates at home and abroad of 180 basis points in response to a sustained 50 billion cut 1982 dollars provided that the cuts are permanent and are perceived to be so by the public some multi country simulations suggest that u s fiscal shocks are not likely to cause strains within the ems if there is consistency in member countries monetary policies

a note on exchange rate expectations and nominal interest differentials a test of the fisher hypothesis this note tests the hypothesis that nominal interest differentials between similar assets denominated in different currencies can be explained entirely by the expected change in the exchange rate over the holding period this proposition often called the fisher open hypothesis or the hypothesis of perfect asset substitutability has been a major component of recent theories of exchange rate determination and has important implications for monetary policy 1 the fisher hypothesis differs from the covered interest parity theorem enunciated by keynes 11 while covered interest parity equates the nominal interest differential between financial centers to a known premium or discount on forward foreign exchange and is thus in principle riskless fisher parity involves risk in an essential way the two conditions are equivalent only when forward exchange rates equal expected future spot rates recent theoretical work for example that of grauer litzenberger and stehle 8 kouri 12 and frankel 6 shows that this need not be the case when market participants are risk averse thus while covered interest parity must always hold exactly in an informationally efficient asset market with no transactions costs fisher parity need not nominal interest differentials may reflect risk premia in addition to expected exchange rate movements 2 it should be emphasized at the outset that the tests conducted in this paper are really joint tests of the fisher hypothesis and a weak form of foreign exchange market informational efficiency levich 14 has argued that tests of market efficiency are always joint tests involving some hypothesized structure of normal equilibrium returns below we assume informational efficiency and instead test fisher s hypothesized arbitrage condition that nominal interest differentials equal expected percentage changes in exchange rates

a portfolio balance rational expectations model of the dollar mark exchange rate abstract a model is developed in which current account imbalances can be financed through transfers of bonds denominated in either currency the reduced form links the current spot rate to the expected future spot rate via a risk premium which depends on the global currency mix of outside assets that governments impose on private portfolios through budget deficits and interventions and on the global distribution of private wealth among regions with different portfolio preferences an iterative procedure generates rational expectations forecasts of the dollar mark rate which perform somewhat better than forward rates in predicting monthly changes in the spot rate

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

marketplaces markets and market design marketplaces are often small parts of large markets and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets marketplaces can have varying degrees of success and there can be marketplace failures i ll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins markets work best if they enjoy social support but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned even though others want to participate in them laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets and this raises new issues for market designers i ll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics marijuana sex and surrogacy and the design of markets for kidney transplants in the face of widespread laws against and broader repugnance for compensating organ donors i conclude with open questions and engineering challenges

bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon a standard demand deposit contract in which individuals are entitled to their full deposit at any time provided the bank is solvent is analyzed in a context in which there are no exogenous events on which agents condition their behavior and a unique equilibrium involving a bank run with positive probability is shown to exist

covered interest arbitrage in the 1970 s abstract this paper provides an empirical overview on covered interest arbitrage during the flexible exchange rate regime of the 1970 s it estimates the cost of transactions in foreign exchange and security markets and shows that these costs account for most of the deviations from parity

delegation time inconsistency and sustainable equilibrium this paper analyzes the effectiveness of delegation in solving the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy using a microfounded general equilibrium model where delegation and reappointment are explicitly included into the government s strategy the method of chari and kehoe 1990 sustainable plans journal of political economy 98 4 783 802 is applied to characterize the entire set of sustainable outcomes countering mccallum s 1995 two fallacies concerning central bank independence american economic review 85 2 207 211 second fallacy delegation is able to eliminate the time inconsistency problem with the commitment policy being sustained under discretion for any intertemporal discount rate

crucial issues concerning central bank independence abstract this paper argues first that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any tangible precommitment technology inevitably behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias furthermore there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it several implications are discussed

unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market gastroenterology with and without a centralized match the entry level market for american gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse from 1986 to 1996 before and since it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment we find that both before and after the years in which the centralized clearinghouse was used gastroenterologists are less mobile and more likely to be employed at the same hospital in which they were internal medicine residents than when the clearinghouse was in use this suggests that the clearinghouse not only coordinates the timing of appointments but also increases the scope of the market compared to a decentralized market with early appointments

tradable and nontradable directed technical change abstractwe wish to reconcile the major trends in wages and the terms of trade using a directed technical change approach in which i tradable and nontradable goods can be substitutes or complemen

to grab for the market or to bide one s time a dynamic model of entry we consider a simultaneous move dynamic entry game the fixed cost of entry is private information entering earlier increases the likelihood of being the monopolist but also increases the likelihood of coordination failure and simultaneous entry we consider general continuous distributions for the fixed cost and we characterize the unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in pure strategies comparative statics results are derived as the time between rounds approaches zero all of the action occurs during an arbitrarily small amount of time for the bertrand model we extend the analysis to allow for n firms

an examination of the objectives of monetary policy in four developing economies abstract this paper presents a model of monetary policy in developing economies which is estimated for mexico korea india and zambia the model is designed to identify both the goals and patterns of policy in these economies the results demonstrate that the authorities in these economies respond to foreign reserve flows partially sterilizing their impact in three countries they also respond to domestic variables accomodating seasonal variation and growth or price changes

self fulfilling early contracting rush in markets for entry level professionals the insurance motive drives some participants to sign early contracts the rush to early contracting can be self fulfilling as both its effect on expectations about demand supply balance in the subsequent spot market and the effect on it from changes in the demand supply balance can be nonmonotone matching markets with more risk averse participants a greater uncertainty regarding relative supply of positions or a more polarized distribution of applicant qualities are more vulnerable to self fulfilling early contracting rushes employers can have a collective interest in preventing early offers to a few promising applicants from starting the rushes

credibility of optimal monetary delegation while optimal monetary policy is subject to a credibility problem it is often argued that the government should appoint a central banker whose incentives differ from the government s the author argues however that such delegation does not overcome credibility problems given that delegation is discretionary and without costs reappointment costs of delegation are shown to improve suboptimal outcomes but credibility of optimal monetary policy turns out be worsened at best delegation therefore has no effects on credibility but only if reappointment has no costs copyright 1997 by american economic association

international asset pricing with time varying risk premia abstract recent empirical evidence that forward exchange rates are biased predictors of future spot rates can also be interpreted as evidence against the hypothesis of a constant risk premium consequently reconciliation of this evidence with efficient international capital markets requires the existence of time varying risk premia this paper modifies kouri s 1977 asset pricing model to allow time varying exected returns on assets eliminates the assumption of a risk free real asset and derives the characteristics of the risk premia in the forward market as well as the equilibrium yield relationships among the equities and riskless nominal bonds of all countries

the capitalization of income streams and the effects of open market policy under fixed exchange rates abstract this paper investigates the long and short run neutrality of open market monetary policy in a world of fixed exchange rates and imperfect substitutability between bonds denominated in different currencies using an illustrative portfolio balance model it shows that when the public discounts the future tax liabilities associated with the national debt and the central bank supports the exchange rate by trading non interest bearing foreign assets open market policy has a short run effect but no long run effect on the domestic price level and interest rate when the foreign exchange intervention assets earn interest that is rebated to and capitalized by the public open market policy loses even its short run efficacy the capital account offset to monetary policy is complete

deposit competition and financial fragility evidence from the us banking sector preliminary and incomplete please do not cite without permission we develop and estimate an empirical model of the u s banking sector using a new data set covering the largest u s banks over the period 2002 2013 our model incorporates insured depositors and run prone uninsured depositors who have rich preferences over dierentiated banks banks compete for deposits in the spirit of matutes and vives 1996 and can endogenously default we estimate demand for uninsured

sterilization policies in the ems countries an empirical analysis abstract the paper analyses the extent to which fixed exchange rates within the ems have hindered national monetary policies the results show that the german authorities have relatively more freedom in pursuing domestic monetary objectives the others may notwithstanding foreign exchange controls occasionally encounter severe exchange constraints

credibility of optimal monetary delegation comment in his recent paper in the american economic review jensen 1997 argues that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank which acts as an agent for the government does not mitigate the problem of time inconsistency but merely relocates it

testing the portfolio balance model a multi lateral approach abstract this paper estimates outside bond demand equations from the portfolio balance model of exchange rate determination for five currencies the approach used in this paper differs from other structural studies of the portfolio balance model in two fundamental ways first while previous studies limit the portfolio choice to domestic assets relative to a composite foreign asset the model analyzed in this paper decomposes the foreign asset by currency second exploiting the cross equation correlation that arises from this decomposition provides more efficient estimates of the asset market parameters

two fallacies concerning central bank independence this paper takes issue with two basic conclusions prevalent in the literature on central bank behavior first the paper argues that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any precommitment technology necessarily behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias since there is no functional connection between average rates of money creation or inflation and policy responsiveness to cyclical disturbances it is entirely feasible for the bias to be avoided in other words there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any absolute precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a competitive theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium unravelling in two sided matching i offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets the explanation does not rely on market power strategic motives or instability of the assignment mechanism uncertainty about workers ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed early however the insurance gain from early contracting may outweigh the loss from inefficient matching if firms are risk neutral it is the mediocre firms that will have the greatest incentive to offer early contracts opening up a market for early contracting will generally benefit the firms and hurt the workers if firms are sufficiently risk averse even the lowest quality firms may want to offer early contracts and a competitive equilibrium may not exist

estimation of portfolio balance functions that are mean variance optimizing the mark and the dollar abstract this paper offers a way of efficiently estimating the parameters in demand functions for mark and dollar assets the technique imposes the constraint that the parameters rather than being determined arbitrarily are based on investors optimizing behavior regarding expected returns and variances it dominates some previous empirical applications of finance theory in the respect that the expected returns are allowed to vary from period to period which is a necessary feature of any macro model the constraint that the parameters are based on mean variance optimization is also tested and not rejected

unraveling over time abstract unraveling the excessively early matching of future workers to employers leads to hiring decisions based on severely incomplete information we provide a model of unraveling in a one to one matching market without transfers its distinguishing feature is the gradual arrival of information about students that occurs over an extended period of time during which matches can be made in equilibrium the market spreads thinly over that period and employers attractiveness to students is uncorrelated with their worker s productivity our model connects previous seemingly unrelated models of unraveling and it highlights the implications of the two period assumption on which they rely our setting permits the analysis of information timing policies these are effective only if they provide a sudden and sufficiently large surge in information our main application is in the market for clerks to u s federal appellate courts a significant input into the efficiency of the justice system

the cost of a central bank leaning against a random walk abstract using a stochastic model we show that a central bank is expected to suffer a loss when it temporarily affects the exchange rate by sterilized intervention against a random walk we also demonstrate that the methodology used in several studies of the profitability of official central bank intervention biases their results towards finding positive profits this bias created by only observing periods where cumulative intervention sums to zero accounts for the seemingly contradictory empirical results of several intervention profitability studies

intervention in the mark dollar market the authorities reaction function abstract this paper investigates the intervention behavior of the deutsche bundesbank in the dollar dm market over the period 1974 to 1981 an intervention reaction model is developed which stresses the conditioning role of perceived exchange rate uncertainty the most important findings from non linear estimates are i an increase in perceived exchange rate risk shifts the bundesbank s trade off between money and exchange rate control in favor of the former aim probably due to risk aversion of the managers of the foreign department ii the bank tries to counter exchange speculation by compressing the expected risk premium and iii the bank does not completely sterilize

the collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse and why such failures are rare the collapse of the clearinghouse for the entry level gastroenterology labor market offers a unique opportunity to study the failures that sometimes afflict such markets to explore the reasons for the failure of the clearinghouse we conduct an experimental investigation of demand shocks of the kind that occurred in the gastroenterology market we find that a reduction in demand for positions leads to the collapse of the match only when it is detectable by firms before being detected by workers as in the unexpected shock that took place in 1996 which could be seen by firms in their reduced applicant pools simple demand and supply imbalances do not seem to interfere with the operation of the centralized match our results suggest that the market failed when applicants lost their ability to discern when they should reject an early exploding offer this suggests that the failure of the gastroenterology clearinghouse is related to the unraveling also seen in a number of decentralized markets

on the denomination of government debt a critique of the portfolio balance approach abstract we show that some classes of sterilized interventions have no effect on equilibrium prices and quantities the proof does not require complete markets ricardian equivalence monetary neutrality or the law of one price moreover regressions of exchange rates or interest differentials on variables measuring debt s currency composition contain no information about the affectiveness of such interventions other interventions require changes in monetary and fiscal policy their effects depend generally on the influence of these changes on the economy and not on the intervention alone in short sterilized intervention is not as the portfolio balance approach indicates an extra policy instrument

the forward exchange rate and macroeconomics abstract this paper discusses the conditions under which a risk premium is incorporated in the forward exchange rate a new condition for the existence of a risk premium is proposed we show that earlier models of the risk premium which emphasize either the role of net foreign investment or of the relative supplies of outside assets are not suited for assessing the effects of changes in macroeconomic policy

unraveling in matching markets the authors use a two period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling unraveling provides insurance in the absence of complete markets but causes inefficient assignments unraveling is more likely the smaller the applicant pool the smaller the proportion of more promising applicants and the greater the heterogeneity in the pool banning early contracts hurts firms and benefits less promising applicants the effects on more promising applicants depend on how the gains from early contracts are shared ex post buyouts eliminate inefficient assignments and more promising applicants always unravel copyright 1998 by american economic association

on the effects of sterilized intervention an analysis of weekly data abstract as the recent empirical studies surveyed here illustrate it is very difficult to demonstrate that the exchange rate risk premium depends through a portfolio balance channel on the currency composition of outside assets the existence of a portfolio balance effect is a necessary condition for sterilized intervention to be a genuinely independent tool of monetary policy this paper studies u s canadian data and attempts to improve on earlier studies by using higher frequency weekly data and by implementing an appropriate instrumental variables technique 2s2sls however we still fail to detect evidence of a portfolio balance effect

the currency composition of international reserves demand for international reserves and global safe assets abstract this paper examines determinants of the international reserves ir currency composition before and after the global financial crisis gfc applying the annual data of 58 countries we confirm that countries that trade more with the us euro zone uk and japan and issue more debt denominated in the big four currencies us dollar euro pound and yen hoard more ir in these currencies we find scale effects in which countries tend to diversify from the big four currencies as they increase their ir gdp and that a growing shortage of global safe assets gsas induces countries to hold more big four currencies countries hold less big four currencies as ir after the 2008 gfc while they hold more of such currencies since the tapering of the fed s quantitative easing qe the 2008 gfc and qe tapering weakened and sometimes reversed the effect of several economic factors we also find that target2 balances matter for the currency composition of ir in the euro zone commodity exporting countries tend to diversify their ir from the big four currencies when their terms of trade improve and that the valuation effects induced by euro usd exchange rate changes diminish the significance of the gfc in explaining the currency composition of ir

the influence of income on international capital movements abstract changes in income via their influence on asset demands affect portfolio allocation and potentially international capital movements this hypothesis derives empirical support albeit limited and correspondingly tenuous from the identification of a consistently significant influence of income on non official australian portfolio investment abroad

timing disturbances in labor market contracting roth s findings and the effects of labor market monopsony this paper addresses alvin roth s findings of market contracting at times earlier than optimal for market participants which roth describes as market unraveling a market failure he proposes to solve by designing centralized buyer seller matching programs this paper shows that while roth s engineering solutions are ingenious the early contracting phenomena derive from labor market monopsony under monopsony price is unavailable to clear the market time of contract becomes the currency for working out market forces roth s matching serves to shore up the monopsony and would be unnecessary if the monopsony were removed a superior solution is to end the monopsony

on the international harmonization of bank regulation this paper offers a three way typology of bank regulation and examines the question of international harmonization for each category for economic regulation the danger is that harmonization could support and preserve domestic protectionist regulatory regimes but it could instead be a beneficial guise for lowering protectionist barriers the latter efforts should be encouraged for prudential regulation national regulation should be adequate to handle the extra stresses of international banking harmonization efforts e g the basle accord may offer only modest help but the accord may offer indirect help by limiting national governments competitive efforts implicitly to subsidize their banks risk taking activities finally for information regulation national regulation appears to be adequate and international harmonization does not appear to be necessary copyright 1994 by oxford university press

inflation and monetary policy in selected west and central african countries abstract this paper studies the conduct and performance of monetary policy in five west and central african countries cameroon cote d ivoire gabon ghana and nigeria the first three are members of the cfa zone and maintain a fixed peg vis a vis the french franc the other two have recently opted for a more flexible exchange rate regime no general conclusion can be drawn on the monetary policy exchange rate policy nexus estimates of the offset coefficient are significantly different from negative one but var estimation results on the ability of the monetary authority to pursue an independent inflation target are mixed the monetary authorities of ghana and nigeria sterilize the accumulation of net foreign assets to a limited degree no such evidence exists for cfa zone members

disclosure of information in matching markets with non transferable utility we present a model of two sided matching where utility is non transferable and information about individuals skills is private utilities are strictly increasing in the partner s skill and satisfy increasing differences skills can be either revealed or kept hidden but while agents on one side have verifiable skills agents on the other side have skills that are unverifiable unless certified and certification is costly agents who have revealed their skill enter a standard matching market while others are matched randomly we find that in equilibrium only agents with skills above a cutoff reveal and then they match assortatively we show that an equilibrium always exists and we discuss multiplicity increasing differences play an important role to shape equilibria and we remark that this is unusual in matching models with non transferable utility we close the paper with some comparative statics exercises where we show the existence of non trivial externalities and welfare implications