pre emptive corruption hold up and repeated interactions this paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance the firm may offer a bribe to pre empt the inspection corruption is unfeasible in the one shot game because of inspector hold up in an infinitely repeated game we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy in this model the most likely bribe givers are not the firms that benefit the most from the illegal behaviour furthermore strengthening anti corruption policies has ambiguous welfare effects because it improves compliance only among a subset of firms and increases monitoring effort

e government internet adoption and corruption an empirical investigation abstract this study empirically investigates the impact of e government and internet adoption on curbing corruption by utilizing a large panel dataset the results reveal that e government is a powerful tool in reducing corruption via telecommunication infrastructure and the scope and quality of online services which is strengthened by greater internet adoption the interaction effects between e government and internet adoption suggest both as complements in anti corruption programs a dynamic panel data model that addresses the endogeneity problem and considers corruption persistency is employed results of panel granger causality tests indicate a unidirectional causality from e government to corruption while a bilateral causality between internet adoption and corruption

corruption a review as is increasingly recognised in academic literature and by international organisations corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development the aim of this survey is to organise and summarise existing theoretical and empirical work on corruption with a view to identifying opportunities for further research the paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models this is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption the paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research

the replacement of payroll tax by a tax on revenues a study of sectorial impacts on the brazilian economy abstract a topic of current research in discussion about the brazilian economy is the exemption from payroll taxes which aims to stimulate competitiveness of the firms boosting economic growth this topic was introduced in brazil by new laws that proposed replacing the payroll tax with a new tax on revenues the payroll tax rate of 20 was replaced by a tax rate of 1 or 2 on revenue this change has been applied primarily in labor intensive economic sectors in this paper a neoclassical model was used to evaluate some sectoral impacts of these tax changes the results show positive effects of this reform among them the increase in aggregate consumption and capital stock employment also grows in the labor intensive sector however under a government revenue neutral scenario these effects are almost completely lost which shows some evidence about the low efficiency of these reforms

causes and effects of corruption what has past decade s empirical research taught us a survey corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to a vast range of institutional jurisdictional societal and economic conditions it is this paper s aim to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state of the art survey of existing literature on corruption and its causes and effects a particularly strong focus is put on presenting and discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings

governance and timber harvests resource economics theory implies that risks associated with weak governance have an ambiguous impact on extraction with the net impact depending on the relative strengths of depletion and investment effects previous empirical studies have found that improved governance tends to reduce deforestation but to raise oil production here we present evidence that the marginal impact of improved governance on timber harvests in developing countries during 1984 2006 was nonmonotonic it tended to raise harvests in countries with weaker governance but to reduce harvests in countries with stronger governance this nonmonotonic impact occurred for both an index of governmental integrity corruption bureaucracy quality law and order and an index of governmental stability a simulation of hypothetical increases in these governance indices to the maximum 2006 values observed in the sample predicted that improved governance would reduce harvests in most countries but could raise harvests in some with large increases occurring in countries with the weakest governance

on the possibility of an inverse relationship between tax rates and government revenues abstract when arthur laffer and other supply side advocates plot total tax revenue as a function of a particular tax rate they draw an upward sloping segment called the normal range followed by a downward sloping segment called the prohibitive range a brief literature review indicates that tax rates on the prohibitive range in theoretical and empirical models have been the result of particularly high tax rates high elasticity parameters or both the labor tax rate which maximizes total revenue for example will depend on the assumed labor supply elasticity this paper introduces a new curve which summarizes the tax rate and elasticity combinations that result in maximum revenues separating the normal area from the prohibitive area a general purpose empirical u s general equilibrium model is used to plot the laffer curve for several elasticities and to plot the newly introduced curve using the labor tax example results indicate that the u s could conceivably be operating in the prohibitive area but that the tax wedge or labor supply elasticity would have to be much higher than most estimates would suggest

corruption and corruptibility summary the expressed norms and values of both citizens and street level officials explicitly condemn the giving or taking of bribes however citizens respond to extortion by officials and officials respond to temptation by clients this paper is based on over 6 000 interviews with the public and over 1 300 with street level officials in four postcommunist countries the czech republic slovakia bulgaria and ukraine who were questioned about i their values ii their hypothetical conditional behavior if exposed to extortion or temptation iii their personal experience of extortion or temptation and iv their actual behavior with respect to bribes

the effect of democracy on corruption income is key summary this paper provides an explanation for the ambiguous relationship between democracy and corruption using rich panel data with annual observations from 1998 to 2012 allows us to control not only for country and time invariant factors but also for potential reverse causality between corruption and income levels in a 3sls framework democracy reduces corruption but only in economies that have already crossed a gdp capita level of approximately us 2 000 in 2005 us for poorer nations democratization is suggested to increase corruption other institutional characteristics are unlikely to drive this result and findings are robust to a variety of robustness checks and quantile regressions

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

threshold effects of corruption theory and evidence summary we examine the impact of corruption on the quality of public infrastructure we propose a model in which private vendors supply governments with inputs necessary for the production of public goods asymmetric information between the two parties creates opportunities for vendors to earn profits these profits can be re distributed to government bureaucrats without impacting on the contractual form as long as firms do not operate at a loss thus corruption adversely affects the provision of public goods only when it crosses a threshold these results are examined in a sample of up to 125 countries consistent with our theory we find strong evidence of a corruption threshold

mission improbable does petroleum related aid address the resource curse petroleum related aid programmes and projects are a key part of donor activities in oil rich developing countries this paper critically assesses petroleum related aid activities using the norwegian oil for development programme as a main case recent research suggests that institutions or governance are essential in averting a resource curse while governance issues are beginning to receive more attention in these types of programmes they still form a minor part of programme activities the narrow sector focus that characterizes petroleum related aid makes it unlikely that it will produce the higher order institutional changes needed to lift the resource curse petroleum related aid activities address the issue of corruption only to a limited extent given the commercial and political interests of donor countries questions about the integrity and credibility of these types of programmes can be raised

a conceptual framework for constructing a corruption diffusion index in this paper we propose a conceptual framework for constructing a diffusion index of changes in overall perceptions with respect to corruption the corruption diffusion index we construct lies between 0 the greatest overall deterioration in corruption perceptions and 100 the greatest overall improvement in corruption perceptions with 50 no change in corruption perceptions as the critical reference the proposed methodology is applied to the 2010 2011 global corruption barometer survey data possible refinements of the proposed methodology to capture the potentially multi dimensional nature of corruption and the practical challenges associated with the empirical implementation are discussed

insecurity and the pattern of trade an empirical investigation corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically reduce international trade this paper estimates the reduction using a structural model of import demand in which insecurity acts as a hidden tax on trade we find that inadequate institutions constrain trade as much as tariffs do we also find that omission of indices of institutional quality biases the estimates of typical gravity models obscuring a negative relationship between per capita income and the share of total expenditure devoted to traded goods finally we argue that cross country variation in the effectiveness of institutions and the consequent variation in the prices of traded goods offer a simple explanation for the stylized fact that high income capital abundant countries trade disproportionately with each other

kyoto protocol cooperation does government corruption facilitate environmental lobbying does environmental lobbying affect the probability of environmental treaty ratification does the level of government corruption play a role for the success of such lobbying in this paper we propose that a more corruptible government may be more responsive to the demands of the environmental lobby we use several stratified hazard models and panel data from 170 countries on the timing of kyoto protocol ratification to test this hypothesis we find that increased environmental lobby group activity raises the probability of ratification and the effect rises with the degree of corruption

learning by working in big cities individual earnings are higher in bigger cities we consider three reasons spatial sorting of initially more productive workers static advantages from workers current location and learning by working in bigger cities using rich administrative data for spain we find that workers in bigger cities do not have higher initial ability as reflected in fixed effects instead they obtain an immediate static premium and accumulate more valuable experience the additional value of experi ence in bigger cities persists after leaving and is stronger for those with higher initial ability this explains both the higher mean and greater dispersion of earnings in bigger cities

the back scratching game we develop a new experiment to study the emergence of welfare reducing bilateral alliances within larger groups and the effectiveness of institutional interventions to curtail back scratching in each of the 25 rounds of our experiments a player the allocator nominates one of three others in a group as a co worker the receiver which determines the group production that period to be the productivity of the receiver which varies by round but also gives the receiver a bonus and makes them the allocator in the next round alliances then form if two individuals keep choosing each other even when their productivities are lower than that of others causing efficiency losses we study whether particular interventions reduce the rate of alliance formation random allocator rotation policies were found to be ineffective whether implemented prior to or following a baseline treatment low bonuses did significantly reduce the advent of alliances there hence seems to be some hope in preventing back scratching via reducing the gain that can be made by alliances

unexpected guests the impact of internal displacement inflows on rental prices in colombian host cities abstract we study the causal impact of internally displaced people idp inflows on rental prices in colombian host cities following an instrumental variables approach we find that as idp inflows increase low income rental prices increase and high income rental prices decrease we provide empirical evidence on two potential mechanisms for these findings excess demand for low income housing puts upwards pressure on rental prices increasing supply of high income housing coupled with rising homicide rates put downwards pressure on rental prices

does corruption boost or harm firms performance in developing and emerging economies a firm level study in the last decade a growing number of studies have addressed the ongoing debate about whether corruption sands or greases the wheels of business at the firm level this study revisits this debate and proposes a comprehensive theoretical framework to test whether corruption harms or boosts firm performance as well as the extent to which this relationship is mediated by the countries institutional settings the size and strategic behaviour of the firms and market competition based on a sample of 21 250 firms located in 117 emerging and developing countries and resorting to instrumental variable iv estimations three main results were found a regardless of the proxy used for corruption and firm performance the former clearly harms the latter b corruption greases the wheels of business for african firms but it sands the wheels for firms in latin america the caribbean eastern europe central asia and southern asia and c the negative impact of corruption on performance is mitigated for larger and exporting firms

re election incentives and deforestation cycles in the brazilian amazon abstract despite expansive research on amazonian deforestation and its drivers the role of local politics is not well understood using a panel data set that combines municipal level deforestation and election data from 2002 to 2012 i estimate the effect of an incumbent mayor running for re election on deforestation rates in election periods i find that deforestation rates increase 8 10 in election years when an incumbent mayor runs for re election an amount equivalent to four percent of the total forest lost since the 2004 elections electoral deforestation cycles do not appear to be driven by changes in agricultural policy implementation and activity but are linked to corruption and campaign finance suggesting that weak institutional constraints facilitate electoral manipulation of forest resources this phenomenon is not likely limited to amazonian forests re election incentives could very well lead to misallocation of other natural resources in alternate geographies

economic uncertainty and corruption evidence from a large cross country data set a vast amount of research has considered numerous causes and correlates of corruption also there have been many studies of the consequences of various forms of uncertainty however exploration of the nexus between economic uncertainty and corruption appears scarce after providing an intuitive and heuristic linkage between general economic uncertainty and corruption this article uses a large cross country data set to augment a fairly standard model with simple proxies for uncertainty and to investigate how economic uncertainty might affect the prevalence of corruption in addition a quantile regression framework is used to judge how the strength of various covariates may differ with the level of corruption seven main points emerge from the estimates first economic uncertainty is associated positively with corruption and the relation seems to be robust across measures of uncertainty and corruption second quantile regression estimates indicate considerable parametric heterogeneity across the dist

packing a punch political action committees and corruption political action committees pacs are unique and prominent players in american politics yet formal research on some aspects of pacs is lacking using us data over the period 1970 to 2009 this research demonstrates that the growth in pacs is positively associated with greater corruption a 10 increase in the number of pacs per capita would increase corruption by about 8 upon disaggregation corporate pacs rather than labour pacs are positively associated with corruption the effects of economic prosperity government size and population on us corruption are generally in line with the literature

corruption clubs empirical evidence from kernel density estimates a common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption countries characterized by the same economic social and cultural background do not necessarily experience the same levels of corruption in this article we use kernel density estimation techniques to analyse the cross country distribution of corruption particular emphasis will be given to the question whether the distribution of corruption shows more than one peak we find that most of the estimated densities exhibit twin peaks we also provide some evidence on the intra distribution dynamics and the persistence of corruption we find the group of countries classified within the two clubs to be very stable corruption is a highly persistent phenomenon substantial changes in the economic political and cultural environment of countries within the corruption club are required before a significant decline of corruption is to be expected

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

the multifaceted impact of corruption on international trade the purpose of this paper is to perform a detailed examination of corruption effects on trade based on corruption characteristics known to affect economic exchange within the corruption research field these characteristics are the level prevalence customs location function and predictability of corruption the multifaceted corruption impact on trade is empirically examined using a corruption augmented gravity equation the equation is estimated using a heckman version of a gmm instrumental variable method our results provide strong evidence of that import flows vary systematically with the investigated corruption characteristics and enable the identification of channels through which corruption affects international trade the empirical investigation clearly indicates the need to examine the multifaceted role of corruption to properly assess the trade effects of corruption

institutional quality and international trade institutions quality of contract enforcement property rights shareholder protection and the like have received a great deal of attention in recent years yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes the purpose of this paper is twofold first we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modeled within the framework of incomplete contracts we show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply among other things that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade second we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade using data on us imports disaggregated by country and industry the empirical results provide evidence of institutional content of trade institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows

corruption and market competition evidence from post communist countries summary this paper empirically examines whether market competition is associated with greater bribe payments we use firm level data from the business environment and enterprise performance surveys since market competition could be endogenous and some firms report zero bribes we employ a tobit estimation methodology instrumenting for market competition we find that greater market competition increases the amount of bribes paid results are robust across several measures of market competition however market competition is less strongly associated with bribes in the presence of other obstacles of doing business that could also lead to more bribes

the empirical measurement of rent seeking costs this survey focuses on the efforts carried out mainly by public choice scholars to measure the social cost of rent seeking the concept introduced by gordon tullock in 1967 and coined by anne krueger in 1974 is well known and accepted by the profession but its empirical measurement has fallen behind with respect to its theoretical formulation an often criticized lack in the literature although there are good general surveys none has specifically focused on reviewing the empirical efforts made to measure the phenomenon the purpose of this paper is to provide such a survey it could be said that the rent seeking concept has been fully integrated into economic jargon it is commonly used when some agent seeks to obtain an artificial transfer usually from government and covers all the actions efforts or expenses that the agent has to carry out to obtain the prize the key issue however is the possible social waste that arises in these situations the empirical efforts to measure such waste constitute the main purpose of this survey the concept of rent seeking was introduced by tullock 1967 although the term was first coined by krueger 1974 in a paper not related to the former in a recent paper tullock himself wrote of the history of the concept and the intellectual context within which it arose tullock 2003 starting with the pioneering work by harberger 1954 several studies were conducted during the 1950s in which the calculation of the social cost of monopolies and tariffs always gave the result of very modest figures the first response to these results was made by leibenstein 1966 and his x efficiency which refers to a hypothetical loss in efficiency due to the absence of competition shortly after leibenstein s paper appeared tullock argued that the deadweight costs of monopoly and tariffs understate the true social cost because the expenditures made to capture related rents have to be included so rectangles as well as harberger s triangles have to be included in the calculations let us see this argument once more figure 1 depicts the iconic tullock graphic analysis of rent seeking it represents the demand schedule d for a monopolized good where pm is the monopoly

a controlled field experiment on corruption abstract this paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues the experimenter s scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption in the experiment a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade we find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous it lowers the bribe s acceptance but it fosters reciprocation monitoring and punishment can deter corruption but we cannot reject that it may also crowd out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified finally our results suggest several micro determinants of corruption including age ability religiosity but not gender

does central bank independence lower inflation this paper provides a potential explanation for the recent findings of no significant relationship between central bank independence cbi and lower inflation we argue that although cbi delivers lower inflation in the short term it may reduce the scope for productivity enhancing public investment and so harm future growth potential we also argue that the effects on growth make cbi less likely to achieve lower inflation in the long term

the impact of corruption on firm tax compliance in transition economies whom do you trust tax compliance is an important issue for gov ernments and the public alike to meet public needs and fund public mandates firms around the world are expected to comply with tax laws factors that are related to orga nizational firm tax compliance have not been sufficiently examined in the literature owing to the increasing global influence of transition economies factors associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particu larly of interest based on a sample of over 5 000 firms from 22 former soviet bloc transition economies we find that higher levels of corruption and higher levels of par ticularized trust reliance on friends and family are asso ciated with lower levels of tax compliance interestingly we also find that the negative relationship between cor ruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust trust in strangers overall our study s results suggest that institutional factors play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies

the duality of crony corruption in economic transition toward an integrated framework in order to shed light on the issue of crony corruption in the context of economic transition i focus on the puzzle of china s unique experience of economic transition characterized by the duality forms and effects of crony corruption underlying local corporatism in a dual track i e market and political tracks transition i argue that the duality of local corporatism derives from the duality of crony corruption first the early form of local corporatism as state business public alliance is embedded in informal crony corruption as positive for the purpose of wealth growth in the initial phase of economic transition with public and private interests aligned as compatible second the later form of local corporatism as official manager private collusion is embedded in quasi formal crony corruption as negative for the purpose of wealth transfer in the later phase with public and private interests in conflict as incompatible the duality of crony corruption in the two phases of economic transition is caused by the interplay between formal and informal factors and between economic and political factors my contribution is twofold first i explain china s transition in terms of crony corruption underlying local corporatism second i develop an integrated framework of crony corruption concerning its content process antecedent and consequence

corruption cooperation and endogenous time discount rates virtually all uses of repeated games tostudy of cooperation assume that people stime discount rates are exogenous andfixed here we offer an evolutionary gameembedded in a multi period model ofinvestment and consumption in whichindividual time discounts are determined bytheir convergence to values determined byevolutionary stable strategies oursubstantive motivation though iscorruption and its relationship to economicgrowth to understand the observedrelationship between levels of corruptionand economic indicators of social welfare we argue that corruption is a form ofcooperation that requires closeinterpersonal monitoring if we assume moreover that when people discount thefuture greatly the only sustainable formsof cooperation are those that allow forclose monitoring then our analysis can beinterpreted as a dynamic model of therelationship between corruption andinvestment

corruption and international trade an empirical investigation of african countries this paper attempts to estimate the effect of corruption on the flows of exports and imports of african countries using the gravity model approach and annual data for the period 1998 2007 we obtain negative and statistically significant correlations between the values of exports and imports and the levels of corruption in africa and trading partners thus the results support the view that corruption adversely affects international trade our estimates suggest that if a country with africa s average corruption perception index of 2 8 were to improve its corruption level to botswana s 5 9 its exports would improve by about 15 per cent and imports by about 27 per cent

distribution and development in a model of misgovernance abstract this paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption income inequality and economic development the analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government in accordance with empirical evidence the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality and a negative relationship between corruption and development

corruption types of corruption and firm financial performance new evidence from a transitional economy using a nationwide survey of provincial institutional quality and a sample of private manufacturing small and medium scale enterprises the smes this paper contributes to the literature by considering for the first time the effects of corruption on the financial performance of vietnamese private smes interestingly contrary to previous findings we find that corruption when measured by a dummy variable does not affect firms financial performance after controlling for heterogeneity simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity however the intensity of bribery and the majority of the forms of corruption were found to have negative impacts on firms financial performance hence a typical approach using only a dummy variable for bribery might not adequately evaluate the impact of bribe intensity or even ignores the negative impacts of some types of bribes on firms financial performance the findings suggest that anti corruption measures are vital for the development of the vietnamese private smes

prosperity and depression prosperity and depression are relative concepts today both france and japan are depressed relative to the united states equivalently the united states is prosperous relative to these countries i say these countries are depressed relative to the united states because their output per working age person is 30 percent less than the u s level an interesting and important policy question is why are these countries depressed the answers for these two countries turn out to be very different the united states is prosperous relative to france because the u s intratemporal tax wedge that distorts the trade off between consumption and leisure is much smaller than the french wedge i will show that if france modified its intratemporal tax wedge so that its value was the same as the u s value french welfare in consumption equivalents would increase by 19 percent consumption would have to increase by 19 percent now and in all future periods to achieve as large a welfare gain as that resulting from this tax reform the united states is prosperous relative to japan because production efficiency is higher in the united states in the united states total factor productivity is approximately 20 percent higher than in japan if japan suddenly became as efficient in production as the united states its welfare gain in consumption equivalents would be 39 percent equally interesting and important are big changes over time in relative output per working age person across countries why are new zealand s and switzerland s economies depressed by over 30 percent relative to their 1970 trend corrected levels both of these countries have small populations but depressions are not restricted to small countries japan with its 125 million people is now depressed by 20 percent relative to its 1991 trend corrected level on the prosperity side why are ireland and south korea so prosperous now relative to their 1970 trend corrected levels this lecture is concerned primarily with big international differences among relatively rich industrial countries and changes in these differences over time the countries that receive primary attention all have market economies and healthy well educated populations in the countries considered the variations in aggregate output per working age person are large and reasonably good measures of the factor inputs are available this permits in many cases the identification of the change in policy or the difference in policy that gave rise to prosperity or depression this is in contrast to business cycle theory which provides little guidance to policy except for the important policy implication that a stabilization effort will have either no effect or a perverse effect the output variations studied and analyzed in this lecture are big an order of magnitude larger than the much studied business cycle fluctuations the variations studied however are an order of magnitude smaller than the muchstudied differences between the richest and poorest countries surprisingly only recently have depressions been systematically studied from the perspective of growth theory which is the theory used university of minnesota and federal reserve bank of minneapolis i thank my colleagues at the university of minnesota and the federal reserve bank of minneapolis for helpful discussions and comments in particular i thank tim kehoe ellen mcgrattan and nancy stokey for their help i also thank martin weale and franck portier for providing some british and french tax information used in this lecture thanks also go to sami alpanda and james macgee for research assistance and helpful discussions this lecture draws heavily on collaborative research with fumio hayashi i thank the economic and social research institute cabinet office government of japan and the u s national science foundation for financial support the views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

corruption governance investment and growth in emerging markets the article investigates the potential impact of corruption on economic growth by examining the effect that corruption may have on several significant determinants of economic growth namely investment in human private and public capital and on governance our theoretical approach allows for corruption to influence economic growth directly and indirectly through different investment and governance channels all previous empirical work on this issue has been based on national income and product accounts nipa data which do not normally break down gross domestic investment into its private and public sector and if they do they misclassify investment by public enterprises as private investment potentially biasing empirical findings in this article we use a data set from the international finance corporation that bypasses these problems we find that the impact of corruption on the level of public investment appears to be more ambiguous than it has been found in the previous literature we however

tax morale in latin america in the tax compliance literature there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of tax morale in developing countries as a novelty this paper focuses thus on latin america analysing tax morale as a dependent variable and searching for factors that systematically affect tax morale working with the two data sets latinobarometro and world values survey our findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the size of shadow economy furthermore people who said they knew have heard about practised tax avoidance have a significantly lower tax morale than others looking at individuals perception of reasons for tax evasion we found that the tax burden lacking honesty and corruption are seen as the main factors we observed a significantly lower tax morale in south america mexico than in the central american caribbean area furthermore trust in the president and the officials the belief that other individuals obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax morale

the economic effect of corruption in italy a regional panel analysis abstractthe economic effect of corruption in italy a regional panel analysis regional studies this paper provides a within country analysis of the impact of corruption on economic growth using a panel of italian regions from 1968 to 2011 through a robust measure of corruption this measure is averaged over five year periods to reduce short run fluctuations and probable delayed effects the results show a significant negative impact of corruption on long term growth in all specifications both on average and for each italian region as a consequence a zero level of corruption is growth maximizing this effect is non linear such that the negative impact of corruption on growth becomes less intense as corruption increases

bureaucratic corruption and income evidence from the land sector in bangladesh we examine for the first time the effects of corruption on income using household survey data from a developing country estimating the effects of corruption on income is challenging because of the simultaneous relationship between the two variables we use a two step instrumental variable approach to identify the effects of corruption on income we find that after adjusting for simultaneity bias the act of bribery reduces income and that higher bribes have a negative effect on income taken together our results provide a possible explanation why a vicious cycle between corruption and income inequality does not exist in the land sector in bangladesh

mutual raiding of production and the emergence of exchange joint exchange and raiding can emerge in a world of mutual raiding when the appropriated production is less valuable to the appropriator than to the defender and the defense is not too inferior to attack the amounts of resources allocated to production and raiding and the amounts of goods exchanged reciprocally are determined endogenously the model reduces to pure exchange and pure raiding as special cases pure exchange emerges when the usability of appropriation is sufficiently low pure raiding emerges if the defense is sufficiently inferior to attack the results of the model are intermediate between the results of the two extreme cases jel c6 c72 d51 d72 d74 f10 i introduction in the american civil war each side to some extent looted the other still some true reciprocal exchange between the two sides was conducted by blockade runners whereby the south exported cotton and imported manufactured goods varying across time space pure market exchange may be supplemented by or grow out of such activities as war piracy 1 corruption 2 extortion 3 crime 4 plundering or theft referred to as raiding or mutual raiding generally agents individuals groups companies nations can meet their consumption needs by exchange of goods in accordance with comparative advantage or else by attempts at confiscating the other s production resources goods or trade flows each route has been the subject of separate study this article develops a model in which the equilibrium balance between the two ways of acquiring desired goods is determined by the values of various parameters governing the productive and conflictual processes involved how can exchange conducted voluntarily and with mutual advantage emerge in a world where appropriation and defense through mutual raiding appear to be more natural means of survival 5 classical economics describes how agents exchange goods reciprocally voluntarily and nonviolently 6 political economy describes how agents appropriate and defend one productive resource without reciprocal exchange 7 a few authors attempt to integrate production exchange and appropriation 8 this article lets two agents exchange goods reciprocally and raid each other s production mutually hausken 2003 33 36 classifies the 78 possible models in the exhaustive spirit of rapoport and guyer 1966 for how one or several of the five objects production resources consumption goods exports and imports can be set under attack as is also the case for rider 1999 anderton et al 1999 and anderton 1999 this article utilizes ratio forms of the contest success function 9 reduction to a pure exchange model presented in section ii or a pure raiding model occurs by adjusting parameters also assuming raiding of production rider 1999 claims that pure exchange is impossible 10 which is correct when the production is equally valuable to the appropriator and defender rider shows that in the absence of pure exchange it could turn out and in fact it inevitably turns out that the advantages of diversified consumption achieved by mutual raiding exceeds the wastage of fighting effort if his result were universal one would not observe pure exchange in the real world which in fact we do accordingly this article shows that rider s 1999 result is not inevitable even when accepting his assumption that each agent produces only one of the two desired goods we believe that the two characteristics value of appropriation and superiority of defense over attack 11 are realistic and help explain the empirics as well as reciprocal exchange in the real world 12 regarding the first characteristic grossman and kim 1995 1279 present the following argument which is contrary to most contest models which let appropriated objects be equally valuable to the appropriator and the defender we also allow for the possibility that predation is destructive by which we mean that in any appropriative interaction the predator gains less than the prey loses

corruption across countries and regions some consequences of local osmosis abstract large and persistent differences in corruption across comparable countries is a challenging research issue even more intriguing are such differences across regions within the same country because the typically considered socioeconomic and governance characteristics are generally more similar across such regions than across different countries this paper s principal theme is that individuals perceptions of their environments are influenced by the realities that they have faced in the past these perceptions affect their current and future actions which in turn influence the current and future realities an articulation and analysis of these dynamics yields significant observations concerning individuals behavior and societal outcomes

do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption cross country quantile regression estimates abstract we examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross sectional data for nearly one hundred countries while the causes of corruption have drawn economists interest in recent years our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries for instance we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature but also provide new conclusions in many cases quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from ols regressions among the most corrupt nations larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption but greater democracy seems to alleviate it our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations

infrastructure incentives and institutions abstract expensive infrastructure is ineffective if it doesn t travel the last mile in nineteenth century new york and modern africa disease has spread when urbanites chose not to use newly built sanitation infrastructure to save money either subsidies or pigouvian fines can internalize the externalities that occur when people don t use sanitation infrastructure but with weak institutions subsidies generate waste and fines lead to extortion our model illustrates the complementarity between infrastructure and institutions and shows how institutional weaknesses determine whether fines subsidies both or neither are optimal contrary to becker 1968 the optimal fine is often mild to reduce extortion

urban economics for the developing world an introduction this is an introduction to the special issue of the journal of urban economics on urbanization in developing countries past and present we argue that the rapid urbanization and the rise of cities in the developing world demand new avenues of research and much more research to deal with the urban issues facing billions of people across the world that current work barely covers this issue contains papers which move in that direction and signals a commitment by the journal to pursue this agenda