optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons in many industries managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline we investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm s objective is to maximize expected revenues examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry which markets space such as seats on airline flights cabins on vacation cruises and rooms in hotels that become worthless if not sold by a specific time we formulate this problem using intensity control and obtain structural monotonicity results for the optimal intensity resp price as a function of the stock level and the length of the horizon for a particular exponential family of demand functions we find the optimal pricing policy in closed form for general demand functions we find an upper bound on the expected revenue based on analyzing the deterministic version of the problem and use this bound to prove that simple fixed price policies are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity finally we extend our results to the case where demand is compound poisson only a finite number of prices is allowed the demand rate is time varying holding costs are incurred and cash flows are discounted the initial stock is a decision variable and reordering overbooking and random cancellations are allowed

mergers and business model assimilation evidence from low cost airline takeovers this paper examines mergers that lead to an almost immediate replacement of the target firm s business model in favour of that of the acquiring firm we examine the post merger behaviour of the two leading european dedicated low cost airlines easyjet and ryanair each acquiring another low cost airline respectively go fly and buzz we find that both takeovers had an immediate and sustained impact on both the pricing structures and the extent of inter temporal price discrimination used on the acquired routes with early booking fares noticeably reduced and only very late booking fares increased overall the analysis points to a pro competitive effect of both takeovers as a consequence of the introduction of the acquiring firms business models and associated yield management pricing systems

when choosing makes a good thing better temporal variations in the valuation of hedonic consumption abstract this research investigates how the valuation of delayed consumption of hedonic products such as concerts and chocolate varies with the passage of time between choice and consumption the authors find that when consumers make their own choices they exhibit increases in evaluations of delayed consumption but only if the interval between choice and consumption is relatively short the effect attenuates over longer periods resulting in an inverted u shaped relationship between evaluations and time in contrast when somebody else chooses the same option for the consumer evaluations decrease with the passage of time these effects depend on the extent of intrinsic motivation toward the object of consumption and occur only for consummatory consumption that is of inherent interest moreover anticipatory increases in evaluations before consumption have ironic negative effects on postconsumption evaluations the authors discuss implications and directions for further research

optimal dynamic pricing of perishable products with stochastic demand and a finite set of prices abstract consider a continuous time inventory problem in which a retailer sets the price on a fixed number of a perishable asset that must be sold prior to the time at which it perishes the retailer can dynamically adjust the price between any of a finite number of allowable prices demand for the product is poisson with an intensity that is inversely related to the price the optimal policy is piecewise constant the maximum expected revenue is nondecreasing and concave in both the remaining inventory and the time to go for a given inventory level the optimal price declines as the time at which the products perish approaches at any given time the optimal price is nonincreasing in the number of items remaining unsold these results are extended to i the case in which the prices and corresponding demand intensities depend on the time to go and ii the case in which the retailer can restock to meet demand at a unit cost after the initial inventory has been sold

airline market power and intertemporal price dispersion this paper analyzes the empirical relationship between market structure and price dispersion in the airline markets connecting the u k and the republic of ireland price dispersion is measured by the gini coefficient calculated using fares posted on the internet at specific days before takeoff we control for passengers heterogeneity in their purpose of travel as well as for such peak periods as christmas and easter our finding of a negative correlation between competition and price dispersion suggests that competition is likely to hinder the airlines ability to price discriminate although this effect appears to be lessened in peak periods

the name your own price channel in the travel industry an analytical exploration name your own price nyop retailers such as priceline offer an alternative distribution channel for service providers in the travel industry such as airlines hotels and car rental companies our research employs an analytical model to identify and understand key trade offs driving the decision by a service provider to employ an nyop channel assuming that such a channel is available this decision requires the existence of forces that counteract the adverse consequences of cannibalization of sales through traditional posted price channels our analysis provides some insight into these forces contracting with the nyop retailer facilitates market segmentation and price discrimination and allows for disposal of excess capacity after meeting business travel demand however the cost of this flexibility is that the service provider can no longer credibly precommit to maintaining high prices when there is unsold capacity also when contracting with an independent retailer the service provider is unable to extract the entire revenue generated from nyop consumers a key insight from our model is that the rationale for contracting with an nyop retailer is driven by the uncertainty in business travel demand not the expectation of excess capacity indeed all else equal the larger the capacity the less likely it is that contracting with an nyop retailer is the right decision on the part of the service provider

cooperation in ongoing organizations this paper argues that overlapping games can provide a natural theory of long lived organizations it shows that participation in organizations of infinite duration changes the incentives of agents with finite lives and will induce more cooperation than a static model would predict after developing the general theory we apply it to the description of career paths in organizations and show that it can be optimal to give the youngest workers the most arduous tasks

on the optimal pricing policy of a monopolist the paper presents a simple explanation of price dispersion by a monopolist assuming only that consumers arrive in a random order and are served on a first come first served basis a firm can sometimes increase its profits by charging two different prices for the same good and rationing sales at the lower price however it is never necessary to charge more than two prices and a single price is sufficient as long as either the marginal revenue curve is everywhere downward sloping or the marginal cost of production is constant

value of time speeding behavior and gasoline prices abstract value of time vot is a key parameter in economics and policy this paper presents an alternative method to estimate vot by analyzing an hourly dataset on drivers speeding behavior as a function of the gasoline price our identification strategy is novel as it is based on the intensive margin in comparison previous studies reveal vot on the extensive margin but choice alternatives have multiple attributes thereby potentially confounding estimates consistent with the range of the prior literature we find a vot of about 50 of the wage rate and analyze sources of bias from accidents and traffic tickets these bias functions suggest that previous stated preference vot estimates are likely downward whereas previous revealed preference estimates are likely upward biased

service escape profiting from customer cancellations this paper explores the benefits of letting customers escape from prepurchased service contracts by offering refunds for cancellations we show that such a policy creates opportunities for multiple selling in a capacity constrained service i e collecting cancellation fees from advance buyers who cancel and then reselling the freed slots the better the alternative that motivates a cancellation the more profitable is a refund for cancellations policy compared with a no refund policy that locks in customers in contrast to previous research on money back guarantees for durable goods we show that offering refunds for service cancellations can be profitable 1 without charging a higher price compared with a no refund policy and 2 even when advance buyers would be willing to abandon the service for no refund also service providers should decrease rather than increase the customer hassle cost of cancellations our research also suggests a new profit advantage of advance selling i e capturing some of the consumer added surplus created when customers find new alternatives and are therefore willing to pay a fee to terminate the prepurchased contract finally yield management research typically assumes exogenous no shows by advance buyers we suggest that offering refunds for cancellation reduces the need to reserve capacity for high paying customers and improves capacity utilization

inventory and price behaviour the point of this paper is that inventory adjustment attenuates downward pressure on price when realized demand is low because firms accumulate inventory hold overs speculating that demand will be stronger in the succeeding period when realized demand is high the firm draws down its inventories until a stock out occurs and price rises to clear the market

housing finance and monetary policy we document three facts concerning how the structure of housing finance affects the monetary transmission mechanism first the characteristics of residential mortgage markets differ markedly across industrialized countries second the impact of monetary policy shocks to residential investment and house prices is significantly stronger in those countries with larger flexibility development of mortgage markets third the transmission to consumption is stronger only in those countries where mortgage equity release is common and mortgage contracts are predominantly of the variable rate type we then build a two sector dsge model with financial constraints to rationalize those facts

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

the anatomy of standard dsge models with financial frictions abstract we compare two standard extensions to the new keynesian framework that feature financial frictions the first model originating from kiyotaki and moore 1997 is based on collateral constraints the second developed by carlstrom and fuerst 1997 and bernanke et al 1999 accentuates the role of external finance premia we tweak the models and calibrate them in a way that allows for both qualitative and quantitative comparisons next we thoroughly analyze the two variants using moment matching impulse response analysis and business cycle accounting overall we find that the business cycle properties of the external finance premium framework are more in line with empirical evidence in particular the collateral constraint model fails to produce hump shaped impulse responses and generates volatilities of the price of capital and rate of return on capital that are inconsistent with the data by a large margin

price discrimination in free entry markets using a spatial model of monopolistic competition we investigate price discrimination in free entry zero profit markets we show that when brands are heterogeneous competition does not prevent discrimination the power to earn economic profits is not necessary for a firm to maintain discriminatory prices our model treats formally the fact that consumers difer not only in the utility they derive from a good but also in how strongly they prefer one brand over all others in markets where firms are very competitive sorting consumers on the strength on brand preference produces larger price differentials between groups than sorting on the basis of consumers reservation prices for the good when firms sort customers on the basis of strength of brand preference however we find that the output and welfare effects are generally less favorable than when sorting is more closely related to consumers reservation prices

dynamic pricing behavior in perishable goods markets evidence from secondary markets for major league baseball tickets sellers of perishable goods increasingly use dynamic pricing strategies as technology makes it easier to change prices and track inventory this paper tests how accurately theoretical models of dynamic pricing describe sellers behavior in secondary markets for event tickets a classic example of a perishable good it shows that the simplest dynamic pricing models describe very accurately both the pricing problem faced by sellers and how they behave explaining why sellers cut prices dramatically by 40 percent or more as an event approaches the estimates also imply that dynamic pricing is valuable raising the average seller s expected payoff by around 16 percent

using yield management to shift demand when the peak time is unknown traditional peak load and stochastic peak load models assume firms have prior information about when peak demand occurs however price dispersion such as is typically used by firms practicing yield management can achieve some of the same efficient demand shifting even when the peak time is unknown equilibrium price dispersion arises because of stochastic demand and price rigidities but a previously unexplored benefit of price dispersion is its ability to reduce equilibrium capacity costs through demand shifting the model also suggests how yield management now more commonly called revenue management might actually benefit business travellers contrary to the popular prejudice

the evolution of u s airline competition studies by academic economists were a significant force in the movement towards deregulation of the domestic airline industry in the early 1970s levine 1965 jordan 1970 keeler 1972 douglas and miller 1974 during the critical 1977 78 period in which deregulation was imposed first de facto by the civil aeronautics board cab and then de jure by congress the chairman and vice chairman of the cab were economists for the 14 years since deregulation economists have continued intensive study of the industry in part because of the unusual availability of reliable firm and transaction level data and in part because of the rare opportunity to observe an industry as it evolves from strict economic regulation to fairly unimpeded competition and strategic behavior the simplest prediction of economists about airline deregulation and one of the few on which nearly all economists agreed was that deregulation would improve consumer welfare in comparison to continued price and entry regulation fourteen years later nearly all economists still agree on this though the degree of enthusiasm for the deregulation outcome varies considerably there was substantial disagreement among economists about the market structure that would result because studies of scale economies in the airline industry had concluded that none existed beyond the scale of the smaller major airlines of the 1970s caves 1962 eads et al 1969 many economists argued that deregulation would result in more than the 11 major airlines that existed at the time of deregulation others predicted that only a few or possibly only one airline would survive at a large scale two noted university of chicago economists sam peltzman and lester telser made a bet in 1979 on whether

bayesian evaluation of dsge models with financial frictions we evaluate two most popular approaches to implementing financial frictions into dsge models the bernanke gertler and gilchrist 1999 setup where frictions affect the price of loans and the kiyotaki and moore 1997 model where they concern the quantity of loans we take both models to the data and check how well they fit it on several margins overall comparing the models favors the bernanke gertler and gilchrist framework however even this model does not make a clear improvement over the new keynesian benchmark in terms of marginal likelihood and similarity of impulse responses to those obtained from a var

third degree price discrimination in the presence of congestion externality this paper analyzes third degree price discrimination of a monopoly airline in the presence of congestion externality when all markets are served the model features the business passenger and leisure passenger markets where business passengers exhibit a higher time valuation and a less price elastic demand than leisure passengers our main result is the identification of the time valuation effect of price discrimination which can work in the opposite direction as the well known output effect on welfare this time valuation effect clearly explains why discriminating prices can improve welfare even when this is associated with a reduction in aggregate output

customer return policies for experience goods this paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies by focusing on the experience goods aspect of many products return policies allow consumers to defer their purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods in so doing they insure consumers against ex post loss which allows a monopoly seller to charge more than otherwise it is shown that the seller adopts the return policy when consumers are highly risk averse or retail costs are high consumers are strictly better off under the return policy but there is too little adoption of the policy in equilibrium copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

price discrimination through refund contracts in airlines this paper shows how an airline monopoly uses refundable and non refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their travel our theoretical model predicts that the difference between these two fares diminishes as individual demand uncertainty is resolved using an original data set from u s airline markets we find strong evidence supporting our model price discrimination opportunities through refund contracts decline as the departure date nears and individuals learn about their demand

pricing non storable perishable goods by using a purchase restriction general optimality results the aim of this paper is to investigate the validity of the optimality results derived from eur j oper res 134 2001 631 by relaxing the following two assumptions a the firm offers restricted units first and then unrestricted units later at higher price levels and b only one type of product is available during the whole selling process in the absence of a we establish a general optimality theorem which shows that any optimal policy in eur j oper res 134 2001 631 remains to be optimal in the class of general policies that allow the restriction to be attached at any price level for the simultaneous availability issue associated with b we demonstrate that there always exists an optimal policy that is sustainable even when all active prices are made available at the same time these two results assure the relevance of the theoretical model in eur j oper res 134 2001 631 to current yield management practices and further improve our understanding on the role and the impact of a well designed purchase restriction on pricing decisions

dynamic pricing through discounts for optimizing multiple class demand fulfillment in a multiple customer class model of demand fulfillment for a single item we consider the use of dynamic price discounts to encourage backlogging of demand for customer classes denied immediate service customers are assumed to arrive over several stages in a period and customer classes are distinguished by their contractual price and sensitivity to discounts through dynamic programming we determine the optimal discounts to offer assuming a linear model for the sensitivity of customers to such inducements we show that customers are served in class order and allocation of inventory to demand is determined by considering the current number of customers backlogged as well as the current inventory position through comparison to a naive supplier allocating inventory first come first served with no discounting we show that profits are primarily influenced by the allocation of capacity and the use of price discounts primarily benefits the second class customers overall fill rate heuristics for implementation of the solution in real time settings are given

airline pricing behavior under limited inter modal competition this paper empirically analyzes airline pricing for short haul flights in contexts with no credible threat of inter modal competition to this end we explore the southern italian market since it is less accessible by other transport modes and thus fares are the direct outcome of air related competition we show in fact that market power matters depending on the level of intra modal competition and that airlines apply differentiated mark ups besides consistent with the implementation of inter temporal price discrimination ipd we find a non monotonic inter temporal profile of fares with a turning point included in the interval of the 43rd to 45th days before departure finally we provide evidence that in more competitive markets airlines are more likely to engage in ipd jel l11 l13 l93

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

a theory of clearance sales clearance sales are widely used by firms as an intertemporal selling policy in particular in markets where firms face demand uncertainty and need to choose capacity in advance clearance sales consist in charging a high price initially but then lowering the price in the sales period high valuation consumers purchase the good at the high initial price so as to avoid rationing at the low price while low valuation consumers wait for the price to drop we develop a simple model of intertemporal monopoly pricing under demand uncertainty and show that clearance sales may be the optimal intertemporal selling policy

chained credit contracts and financial accelerators sufficiently high net worth of financial intermediaries fis is considered a necessary condition for financial and macroeconomic stability in this paper we explore why the net worth of fis is important as compared to that of nonfinancial firms using a dynamic general equilibrium model in which both fis and nonfinancial firms rely on costly external debt we find that an exogenous disruption of the fis net worth has a greater aggregate impact than does the same sized disruption of the nonfinancial firms net worth the key reason is that the net worth of the fis in the united states is small jel e22 e44 g21

sustainable positive profit multiple price strategies in contestable markets abstract one of the most important features of contestable market is the incumbent s inability to react to entry while in the traditional literature this prevents the incumbent from earning positive profits in multiple price setting it allows him to make a binding commitment to maintain his strategy even if entry occurs it is shown that as a result of this pre commitment any natural monopolist can find a multiple price strategy that yields positive profit and prevents entry

dynamic pricing advance sales and aggregate demand learning in airlines this paper uses a unique u s airlines panel data set to empirically study the dynamic pricing of inventories with uncertain demand over a finite horizon i estimate a dynamic pricing equation and a dynamic demand equation that jointly characterize the adjustment process between prices and sales as the flight date nears i find that the price increases as the inventory decreases and decreases as there is less time to sell consistent with aggregate demand learning and price adjustment demand shocks have a positive and much larger effect on prices than the positive effect of anticipated sales

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

competition and price dispersion in the airline markets we use two ticket level data sets on one way domestic flights for the us airlines to examine the potentially nonlinear relationship between price dispersion and three forms of competition inter firm inter flight and frequency competitions the linear relationship is rejected at any conventional significance levels in particular there is an s shaped relationship between market concentration and price dispersion this can be a reason for the mixed results in the literature roughly speaking the inter flight and frequency competitions have opposite effects on price dispersion finally in general the size of aircraft has a positive effect on price however for very large aircraft the relationship becomes negative

house prices borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle i develop a general equilibrium model with sticky prices credit constraints nominal loans and asset prices changes in asset prices modify agents borrowing capacity through collateral value changes in nominal prices affect real repayments through debt deflation monetary policy shocks move asset and nominal prices in the same direction and are amplified and propagated over time the financial accelerator is not constant across shocks nominal debt stabilises supply shocks making the economy less volatile when the central bank controls the interest rate i discuss the role of equity debt indexation and household and firm leverage in the propagation mechanism finally i find that monetary policy should not target asset prices as a means of reducing output and inflation volatility

the role of bank capital in the propagation of shocks abstract the recent financial turmoil has underlined the importance of analyzing the link between banks balance sheets and economic activity we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which bank capital mitigates an agency problem between banks and their creditors as a result the capital position of banks affects their ability to attract loanable funds and therefore influences the business cycle through a bank capital channel of transmission we find that the bank capital channel greatly amplifies and propagates the effects of technology shocks on output investment and inflation moreover bank capital shocks create sizeable declines in output and investment

service cancellation and competitive refund policy although previous research demonstrates the profitability of partial refund policies in a monopoly setting there is a certain lack of ubiquity in practice about these refunds in competitive service markets this raises the question of how a partial refund policy may work and whether it is even sustainable in a competitive environment this study investigates how competition may influence the profitability and the equilibrium choice of refund policies it is shown that partial refunds may endogenously change the nature of strategic interaction between service providers from local monopolies into a competition regime which moderates the gains from exploiting the efficiency enhancing effect of partial refunds a whole range of pure strategy equilibria can be obtained as a result of the interplay between the efficiency improving and the competition intensifying effects when the capacity is small large such that the efficiency improving the competition intensifying effect is dominant both firms in equilibrium follow identical partial zero refund policies moreover interestingly the symmetric firms may end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm follows a partial refund policy and the other adopts a zero refund policy

airline pricing under different market conditions evidence from european low cost carriers abstract traditional theories of airline pricing maintain that fares monotonically increase as fewer seats remain available on a flight this implies a monotonically increasing temporal profile of fares in this paper we exploit the presence of drops in offered fares over time as an indicator of an active yield management intervention by two main european low cost carriers and measure its effectiveness we find that reduction of the offered airfare by one standard deviation raises a flight s load factor on average by 2 7 percent a measure unaffected by the intensity of competition in a route furthermore yield management interventions are less effective the higher the share of leisure holiday and visiting friends and relatives traffic on the route this result runs counter to the common perception of leisure passengers being more responsive to price changes

a guide to the pitfalls of identifying price discrimination this paper demonstrates that plausible cost based explanations exist for what are commonly perceived to be cases of price discrimination we explain such commonly discussed problems as the price spreads of retail gasoline products the high price of dinners at restaurants the high price of popcorn at movie theaters and the fact that airline ticket prices vary with how long the ticket is purchased before the flight s departure our explanations benefit from not relying on consumer ignorance or implicit collusion among numerous sellers

efficient and competitive rationing abstract the contracts that interest us here are called priority service contracts the salient feature of such contracts is that they specify each customer s priority in obtaining service that is they specify the tank order in which a customer is served out of the available supply until all customers are served or supply is exhausted such contracts essentially establish queues for customers in section 1 the author provides some background about priority service section 2 formulates a basic model and offer several illustrations also describes two main examples that motivate the theoretical development section 3 derives some key results that show how the prices of priority service contracts are designed to induce customers to self select efficient service orders in section 4 the author discusses various ways that state enterprises can organize markets that implement priority service efficiently in section 5 we study the operation of competitive markets for priority service section 6 concludes with some summary remarks two themes are emphasized one is that a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting priority service for absent spot markets the other is that oligopolistic firms may have insufficient incentives to offer efficient product diversity consequently allocative efficiency depends on entry of numerous firms even so dispersal of supplies among many firms can prevent productive efficiency when there are advantages from pooling supplies

the efficiency of advance purchase discounts in the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty abstract the pricing behavior of two airlines is examined one is operated by a welfare maximizing social planner the other by an unregulated monopolist total capacity is fixed and aggregate demand is uncertain it is shown that advance purchase discounts can assist in attaining an efficient allocation of capacity when it is not feasible to operate a spot market on the day of the flight it is further shown that the planner may offer larger or smaller discounts than the monopolist

optimal pricing with speculators and strategic consumers this paper studies a monopolist firm selling a fixed capacity the firm sets a price before demand uncertainty is resolved speculators may enter the market purely with the intention of resale which can be profitable if demand turns out to be high consumers may strategically choose when to purchase and they may also choose to purchase from the firm or from the speculators we characterize equilibrium prices and profits and analyze the long run capacity decisions of the firm there are three major findings first the presence of speculators increases the firm s expected profits even though the resale market competes with the firm second by facilitating resale the firm can mimic dynamic pricing outcomes and enjoy the associated benefits while charging a fixed price third speculative behavior may generate incentives for the seller to artificially restrict supply and thus may lead to lower capacity investments we also explore several model extensions that highlight the robustness of our results

systematic peak load pricing congestion premia and demand diverting empirical evidence abstract this paper finds empirical support to systematic peak load pricing in airlines higher fares in ex ante known congested periods it estimates a congestion premia and supports the main empirical prediction in gale and holmes gale i holmes t 1993 advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity american economic review 83 135 146 less discount seats on peak flights

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

when is price discrimination profitable we consider a general model of monopoly price discrimination and characterize the conditions under which price discrimination is and is not profitable we show that an important condition for profitable price discrimination is that the percentage change in surplus i e consumers total willingness to pay less the firm s costs associated with a product upgrade is increasing in consumers willingness to pay we refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition and relate it to many known results in the marketing economics and operations management literatures

advance purchase discounts and monopoly allocation of capacity optimal pricing by a monopoly airline that faces capacity constraints during the peak demand period is studied the existence of capacity constraints means that in order to expand output the airline must divert demand from the peak period to the off peak period a particular advance purchase discount policy is shown to be the profit maximizing method of selling tickets if the advance purchase requirement were infeasible output and total surplus would both be lower jel l12 substantial discounts for air travel are generally available to travelers who are willing to purchase tickets a week or more in advance of the departure date this paper demonstrates why the imposition of an advance purchase requirement may be a profit maximizing strategy for a monopoly airline facing capacity constraints during times of peak demand 1 the practice of imposing an advance purchase requirement on discount tickets is also placed in a favorable light in terms of its impact on social

shortages segmentation and self selection this paper considers the rationality and implications of using shortages as a self selection device shortages lead to uncertain access and enable sellers to offer ensured access either to the good or to a preferred variety of the good at a higher price or as part of a bundle it is shown that such activities allow firms to span nonconcavities in their revenue function firms respond to changes in demand and costs through changes in quantity and or the premium for ensured access but not through changes in the base price

transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements publisher summary this chapter discusses transaction costs risk aversion and the choice of contractual arrangements every transaction involves a contract and the transactions conducted in the marketplace entail outright or partial transfers of property rights among individual contracting parties the contractual arrangements through which these transfers are negotiated are several and varied the chapter presents a theory that states that economic efficiency is the same under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint of private property rights although transaction costs exist in the real world the theory enables the understanding of much of the farming behavior however the presence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same constraint of competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangements if a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing productive resources of more than one resource owner a contract to combine the resources will be obtained the formation of the contract involves partial transfers of property rights in one form or another such as leasing hiring or mortgaging

introducing financial frictions and unemployment into a small open economy model the current nancial crisis has made it abundantly clear that business cycle modeling no longer can abstract from nancial factors it is also becoming increasingly clear that the stylized modeling of labor markets without explicit unemployment that is the current standard approach has its limitations some questions which the dominating extant business cycle models are mute on but that we would like to answer are how important are nancial and labor market frictions for the business cycle dynamics of a

monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty when a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices this article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing when there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist s optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price

a taxonomy and research overview of perishable asset revenue management yield management overbooking and pricing this paper proposes the term perishable asset revenue management to denote the field that combines the areas of yield management overbooking and pricing for perishable assets after summarizing the characteristics common to problems in this field the paper discusses the objectives and constraints faced by decision makers then it offers a comprehensive taxonomy with 14 different elements and reviews the research that has been done related to each element finally it suggests some important areas of future research that can help bridge the gap between theory and application

nonlinear pricing strategies and competitive conditions in the airline industry i introduction many industries use nonlinear pricing based on product attributes one industry where this practice is long recognized is domestic airlines while price dispersion in the industry has been widely studied data limitations have prevented analysis investigating the impact of competitive conditions on price dispersion linked to nonlinear pricing as opposed to variation in costs this paper uses a novel data set that allows us to investigate how nonlinear pricing strategies vary with market structure we construct a ticket menu using standard categories of tickets including first class tickets business class tickets fully refundable tickets nonrefundable tickets and nonrefundable restricted tickets these categories exhibit substantially different prices and are available across all types of routes we investigate both how market concentration and the competitive pressures generated by southwest and other low cost carriers impact the relative fares within the ticket menu using traditional measures of concentration including both herfindahl hirschman index hhi and discrete measures used in other studies of airlines competitive duopoly and monopoly we observe only a modest impact of concentration on relative fares the discrete measures appear to be more informative indicating that concentration primarily reduces the relative fares for high end first class tickets on monopoly routes we identify a puzzle regarding the pricing of high end fares under monopoly the evidence does not support a more general relationship between concentration and other fares we find considerably stronger evidence regarding the impact of southwest on the fare structure while previous studies show that southwest s presence reduces mean fares our results provide a much richer picture the results show that southwest s presence reduces low end fares but actual and potential competition from southwest also generally leads to a substantial compression of the entire fare structure competition from other low cost carriers also affects the fare structure but does not lead to a compression of fares our analysis ties into several literatures our work is closely related to the theoretical work on nonlinear pricing and imperfect competition see e g rochet and stole 2002 stole 1995 1 generically however there is no natural empirical implementation of these models for testing more specifically in these models consumers differ in two dimensions brand loyalty and their marginal preference for quality the results of these papers show that the relationship between competition and high versus low prices turns on the correlation between consumers preferences for quality and their brand loyalty unfortunately these models generally predict monotonicity so that prices exhibit either a wider or narrower spread related to competition busse and rysman 2002 our results in contrast show that higher prices are reduced on highly concentrated routes but that intermediate prices are at most modestly affected the results for actual and potential competition from southwest generally support the predictions of rochet and stole 2002 that increased competition will lead to fare compression our study is also related to the empirical work on competition and price dispersion in airline markets there is an extensive body of work regarding the relationship between market concentration and airline price dispersion the empirical evidence on this matter is mixed in a seminal paper borenstein and rose 1994 examine concentration and price dispersion using cross sectional variation in market concentration and dispersion to identify the relationship between the two they show that airlines offer highly dispersed prices the expected absolute difference in fares between two randomly chosen passengers on the same airline and route is 36 of the average price the authors also find that price dispersion decreases with market concentration

mortal managers and long term goals an impossibility result this article examines decision myopia under effort and risk neutrality an infinite non overlapping sequence of mortal managers is selected and their performance evaluated contracts admit premature termination plant condition depends on maintenance which induces an interstage linkage in production when ability and action are imprecisely known by employers no contract achieves the first best outcome furthermore if the manager discounts less than the owners inefficiency is partially due to moral hazard which resembles myopia optimal contracts infer ability and motivate behavior via manipulation of wage schedules and tenure guidelines

evidence of directional price discrimination in the u s airline industry abstract this paper explores possible determinants that may affect an airline s decision to charge passengers different roundtrip fares depending on trip origin a case of directional price discrimination such fare differences cannot be the result of differences in cost as the cost of flying a roundtrip passenger does not significantly differ depending on direction it is argued that directional fare differences result from airlines recognizing that passenger price elasticities differ between route endpoints a price discriminating airline will then charge a higher roundtrip fare at the endpoint where the passenger price elasticity of demand is comparatively lower evidence is found suggesting that airlines do use differences in income to price discriminate when setting roundtrip fares fares are found to be 0 18 0 43 higher on average for each 1000 difference in average per capita income between origin and destination metro areas this finding is sensible assuming that higher incomes reduce the price elasticity of demand for air travel with richer passengers being less sensitive to the cost of travel

revenue management without commitment dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales a seller has a fixed number of goods to sell by a deadline at each time he posts a regular price and decides whether to hold a flash sale over time buyers privately enter the market and strategically time their purchases if a buyer does not purchase when she arrives she can pay an attention cost to recheck the regular price afterwards or she can wait for future flash sales where she may obtain a good at a discounted price in the unique markov perfect equilibrium the seller sporadically holds flash sales to lower the stock of goods a flash sale increases the willingness to pay of future buyers but decreases the willingness to pay of buyers who arrive early in the game when it is very likely that a buyer will obtain a good in a flash sale the seller holds a big initial flash sale for all but one unit of the good

dynamic oligopoly pricing evidence from the airline industry we explore how pricing dynamics in the european airline industry vary with the competitive environment our results highlight substantial variations in pricing dynamics that are consistent with a theory of intertemporal price discrimination first the rate at which prices increase towards the scheduled travel date is decreasing in competition supporting the idea that competition restrains the ability of airlines to price discriminate second the sensitivity to competition is substantially increasing in the heterogeneity of the customer base reecting further that restraints on price discrimination are only relevant if there is initial scope for price discrimination these patterns are quantitatively important explaining about 83 percent of the total within ight price dispersion and explaining 17 percent of the observed cross market variation of pricing dynamics

a multiproduct dynamic pricing problem and its applications to network yield management a firm has inventories of a set of components that are used to produce a set of products there is a finite horizon over which the firm can sell its products demand for each product is a stochastic point process with an intensity that is a function of the vector of prices for the products and the time at which these prices are offered the problem is to price the finished products so as to maximize total expected revenue over the finite sales horizon an upper bound on the optimal expected revenue is established by analyzing a deterministic version of the problem the solution to the deterministic problem suggests two heuristics for the stochastic problem that are shown to be asymptotically optimal as the expected sales volume tends to infinity several applications of the model to network yield management are given numerical examples illustrate both the range of problems that can be modeled under this framework and the effectiveness of the proposed heuristics the results provide several fundamental insights into the performance of yield management systems

airline seat allocation with multiple nested fare classes this paper addresses the problem of determining optimal booking policies for multiple fare classes that share the same seating pool on one leg of an airline flight when seats are booked in a nested fashion and when lower fare classes book before higher ones we show that a fixed limit booking policy that maximizes expected revenue can be characterized by a simple set of conditions on the subdifferential of the expected revenue function these conditions are appropriate for either the discrete or continuous demand cases these conditions are further simplified to a set of conditions that relate the probability distributions of demand for the various fare classes to their respective fares the latter conditions are guaranteed to have a solution when the joint probability distribution of demand is continuous characterization of the problem as a series of monotone optimal stopping problems proves optimality of the fixed limit policy over all admissible policies a comparison is made of the optimal solutions

optimal monetary policy in a model with agency costs this paper integrates a fully explicit model of agency costs into an otherwise standard dynamic new keynesian model in a particularly transparent way a principal result is the characterization of agency costs as endogenous markup shocks in an output gap version of the phillips curve the model s utility based welfare criterion is derived explicitly and includes a measure of credit market tightness that we interpret as a risk premium the paper also fully characterizes optimal monetary policy and provides conditions under which zero inflation is the optimal policy finally optimal policy can be expressed as an inflation targeting criterion that depending upon parameter values can be either forward or backward looking

monetary policy and large crises in a financial accelerator agent based model abstract an accommodating monetary policy followed by a sudden increase of the short term interest rate often leads to a bubble burst and to an economic slowdown through the implementation of an agent based model with a financial accelerator mechanism we are able to study the relationship between monetary policy and large scale crisis events a two step computational approach is proposed which performs i a pattern search of double dip episodes and ii counter factual simulations implementing unconventional monetary policy the main results can be summarized as follow a sudden and sharp increases of the policy rate can generate recessions b after a crisis returning too soon and too quickly to a normal monetary policy regime can generate a double dip recession while c keeping the short term interest rate anchored to the zero lower bound in the short run can successfully avoid a further slowdown

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

bertrand edgeworth oligopoly in large markets the relation between perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive equilibria is analysed for a bertrand edgeworth model of a single market in which capacity constrained firms choose prices as strategies the market always has a nash equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies as the number of firms increases the corresponding equilibria converge in distribution to a perfectly competitive price this result provides a justification for perfect competition that is based on an explicit account of price formation however monopoly prices persist with a positive but vanishing probability regularity or well defined inverse demand functions are not required

pricing non storable perishable goods by using a purchase restriction with an application to airline fare pricing abstract the aim of this paper is to address the pricing problem of non storable perishable goods or services such as airline seats and hotel rooms by incorporating the use of purchase restrictions such as the advance booking requirement that is commonly used by airlines and hotels we will show that there exists an optimal pricing policy of at most three prices which can be obtained by solving a series of linear programming problems we will demonstrate that when applied to airline fare pricing the monotonicity condition of the model is equivalent to the requirement that business travelers are less price elastic than leisure travelers we will further illustrate the applicability of the model through a numerical example in the context of airline fare pricing by incorporating the impact of various fences

advance selling effects of interdependent consumer valuations and seller s capacity we examine the impact of consumer valuation interdependence and capacity on a firm s optimal selling strategies we consider a seller who can offer a single product to consumers twice in advance and in spot consumers choose whether and when to buy but if they buy in advance they are uncertain about their own valuations whether they buy in advance or in spot consumers valuations are realized in the spot period and they may range from fully independent to perfectly correlated creating markets with different characteristics of aggregate demand for the seller facing these consumers the seller chooses a portion of the total capacity to offer in advance and prices in both periods we describe how the optimal strategy and benefits of advance selling depend on the interdependence of consumer valuation as well as capacity level and other market parameters we find that a change in valuation interdependence can lead to dramatically different policies for the seller for example when individual valuations are highly diverse and the consumer population is large the seller must offer a discount during advance selling but may limit the advance sales on the other hand when valuations are highly correlated the seller can charge a premium price during advance selling for the same valuation interdependence the qualitative nature of the optimal strategy changes with available capacity this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment