campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

political donations and the allocation of public procurement contracts abstract we study whether and when firms donations to political parties induce favouritism in public procurement allocations our analysis builds on a unique comprehensive dataset covering all public procurement contracts and all corporate donations to major political parties in the czech republic over the period from 2007 to 2014 and exploits changes in political control over regional governments within this period for identification purposes we find that firms donating 10 more to a political party gaining losing power witness an increase decrease in the value of their public procurement contracts by 0 5 0 6 importantly and in line with theoretical expectations these effects only arise for contracts allocated under less restrictive procurement allocation processes assessing the underlying mechanisms we show that donating firms receive more small contracts allocated under less regulated procurement procedures face less competition in more regulated and open procurement procedures and tend to win with bids further above the estimated cost of the procurement contract

union experience and worker policy legislative behavior in california 1999 2012 unions influence the u s political process in numerous ways although scholarship has examined labor s effects on political office holding less research is available on the relationship between unions and legislator policy choice in this article i use theories of social identification civic engagement and intergenerational transfer of political values to explore the relationship between various definitions of a legislator s prior union experience and his or her roll call voting once in office i employ multilevel mixed effects regressions to analyze 2 427 federal and statewide worker related votes cast by california s legislators from 1999 to 2012 results indicate that higher probabilities of having worked in a unionized occupation or having a family member who belonged to a union are positively associated with voting for union supported issues the relationship is not cumulative however and is moderated by factors both endogenous and exogenous to the legislator

political economic markets perts and pests in food and agriculture j i lyniversity of california berkeley jjept of agricultural and resource economic l working paper al cljdare i lorking paper 0 231 politic eco lic l rxets a d pests i j food l ti achiculture by per ts cordon c rausser ja nlnl tt junot tlon a riii ent st ticn giannini fou 1cl itiol1of ar ricultllrnj econo ll i cs july 11 w

political parties campaign contributions and discrimination political parties can enhance their clout in congress by adding to the seats under their control or by increasing party loyalty interestingly the latter option seems to play a very small role in the two elections studied the democratic party altered their funding decisions based on loyalty during the 1980 election cycle but not in 1982 republicans did not base party contributions on party loyalty in either election although there is less reason to expect them to do so because of their minority status on the other hand both parties reacted to the possibility of additional seats by funneling funds into close races aggregate party contributions table 1 and the party specific models table 2 consistently suggest that money flows into these volatile races

political economy of the u s temporary duty suspension program an empirical note we examine every tds bill introduced by the house of representatives and approved by the u s international trade commission in the last six years the significant relationship between these bills and campaign contributions coupled with the personal characteristics of proponents and sponsors influence the policy outcomes of the u s tds program

green goals and full employment are they compatible abstract two empirical correlations are studied one between economic growth and environmental impacts and the other between the lack of economic growth and unemployment it is demonstrated that at a global level economic growth is strongly correlated with environmental impacts and barriers to fast decoupling are large and numerous on the other hand low or negative growth is highly correlated with increasing unemployment in most market economies and strategies to change this lead to difficult questions and tradeoffs the coexistence of these two correlations which have rarely been studied together in the literature on green growth degrowth and a growth justifies ambivalence about growth to make key environmental goals compatible with full employment the decoupling of environmental impacts from economic output has to be accompanied by a reduction of dependence on growth in particular strategies to tackle unemployment without the need for growth several of which are studied in this article need much more attention in research and policy

a test of the structure of pac contracts an analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s enactment of the bill was a major victory for the national rifle association which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark gun control act of 1968 congressional quarterly almanac 1986 p 82 i introduction every election the same political action committees pacs contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office well informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes 1 a mischaracterization of the exchange between pacs and politicians may produce these contradictory results empirical studies of roll call voting typically use pac contributions from only one election cycle earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior congress while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange recent empirical work however suggests another possibility interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles stratmann 1995 shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports snyder 1990 1992 presents evidence that interest groups make long term investments in politicians previous studies by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of pac money on legislative votes we examine roll call votes on gun control in the u s house of representatives during the 1980s to determine whether pacs make spot market purchases prepay for votes in the prior election cycle or make long term investments we investigate whether pac contributions have a durable long term investment effect as snyder 1992 suggests we consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract first we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control the national rifle association nra and hand gun control hgc their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of congress in which no floor vote occurred nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange further 1986 nra expenditures are significantly higher for first term representatives which is consistent with long term investments but contradicts a spot exchange since freshmen have the least influence to sell second we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting to date no empirical paper tests whether pac money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting and only stratmann 1995 and grenzke 1989 use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes our probit estimates indicate that nra expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and hgc expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes the independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one session prepayment nor a spot exchange the influence of nra expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long term investment the literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that pac contributions alter representatives votes interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of congress stratmann 1991 bronars and lott 1997 if a difficult to quantify variable and thus omitted from regressions signals a representative s true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable pac contributions might appear to influence votes the pattern of contributions and votes on gun control however indicates attempts by the nra and hgc to influence votes not merely the composition of congress

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

okun s law theoretical foundations and revised estimates okun s law has been accepted as an empirical regularity that predicts a 3 percentage point increase in output for every 1 point reduction in the unemployment rate but only because other facts such as weekly hours induced labor supply and productivity tend to rise as well when output gaps are estimated for the u s economy with a production function approach using two different data sets for potential output and nairu it is found that the marginal contribution of a 1 point reduction in unemployment is only about two thirds percent increase in output changes in weekly hours and capacity utilization have independent effects on the output gap copyright 1993 by mit press

do political action committees give money to candidates for electoral or influence motives this paper examines the motivation ofpolitical action committees in theircampaign contributions the paper estimatesthe effect of contributions on the 1996house of representatives elections and onthe candidates policy stances contributions to challengers have a largeimpact on election outcomes but incumbentreceipts do not on four of the five issuesexamined interest groups responded tocandidate positions rather than givingfunds to influence them these results areconsistent with an electoral motive forcontributions some evidence is presentedthat contributions to incumbents may begiven to secure unobservable services forthe pac

explanations of protectionism in international trade votes in this study we analyze the voting records of u s senators on three recent international trade bills our objective is to assess the importance of ideology and constituent interest as forces that influence protectionist vs free trade voting behavior the methodology uses discriminant analysis supplemented with expert judgement the first conclusion is that ideology is the more important force in generic protectionism issues and local constituent interests are more important for commodity specific issues second we find that protectionism is especially associated with liberal ideology high import impact and low export dependence although the discriminant analysis outperforms expert judgement in classifying protectionist vs free trade votes in two of the three bills studied the best explanation is obtained by using both methods together

conflict of interest and congressional voting a note results of this study are consistent with those of previous voting studies which have shown that party ideology and constituency characteristics are often significant explanatory variables in equations to explain voting no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that congressmen s voting decisions depend upon their private financial interests this suggests the conclusion that much of the concern about apparent conflicts of interest is unfounded but it must be recognized that this study has examined voting on just a few issues and has used data on financial holdings which were lacking in precision as more data becomes available in the next several years we should be able to resolve this question with greater confidence

the dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances we interpret fluctuations in gnp and unemployment as due to two types of disturbances disturbances that have a permanent effect on output and disturbances that do not we interpret the first as supply disturbances the second as demand disturbances demand disturbances have a hump shaped mirror image effect on output and unemployment the effect of supply disturbances on output increases steadily over time peaking after two years and reaching a plateau after five years

market constraints as a rationale for the friedman savage utility function since the classic paper by friedman and savage 1948 it has generally been accepted that the observed fact that individuals or firms participate in unfair lotteries and other forms of unfair risk taking may be explained by a section in the individual s utility function in which the individual shows risk preference rather than risk aversion in their model friedman and savage specify a utility function which is in turn concave convex and concave thus allowing for simultaneous purchase of insurance risk aversion and participation in lotteries risk preference however while their specified utility function is indeed capable of explaining observed behavior it does seem to be rather unsatisfactory in that it is an ad hoc specification it is the purpose of this paper to suggest a set of circumstances which give rise to a friedmansavage type utility function in particular it is shown that when certain capital market imperfections exist the utility function defined over intermediate wealth should be distinguished from and may have different properties than the one defined on final wealth then even if we accept the common assumption made in the literature that individuals are risk averse that is that their utility function is concave over final wealth it is still possible that they participate in unfair gambling and of course may also purchase insurance

indivisible labor lotteries and equilibrium abstract this paper considers an economy where labor is indivisible and agents are identical although the discontinuity in labor supply at the individual level disappears as a result of aggregation it is shown that indivisible labor has strong consequences for the aggregate bahavior of the economy it is also shown that optimal allocations involve lotteries over employment and consumption

unemployment and output dynamics in cis countries okun s law revisited abstractokun s law is a well known relationship between the change in the unemployment rate and output growth the main objective of this article is to provide a rigorous econometric analysis of okun s law for several cis countries using different models and theoretically justified econometric methods the traditional approach to okun s law estimation using ols regressions does not account for possible endogeneity of regressors and the implied inconsistency of the estimates obtained these problems point out to incorrectness of applications of the standard ols estimation techniques our study addresses these issues by using econometrically justified instrumental variable regression methods the article provides the results and discussions on practical use of okun s relationships for evaluation of average effects of economic growth on the unemployment rate and vice versa importance of accounting for confidence intervals in applications of okun s models to economic development analysis and cross country c

unemployment and other measures of labor market inefficiency a comparison of u k and u s labor markets 1931 96 unemployment is probably the most widely feared phenomenon of our times it represents an enormous waste of human resources reflects an important degree of inefficiency in economic systems and causes a disturbing degree of social distress organisation for economic co operation and development oecd 1994 pp 4 6 i introduction unemployment is undoubtedly one of the most researched areas of economics determinants of the number of unemployed and duration of unemployment the role of unemployment on the depreciation of human capital and on general life satisfaction the interrelationship of unemployment and inflation and unemployment and output okun s law and policies to reduce or even eliminate unemployment are just a few of the areas of research on unemployment the underlying assumption in many studies on unemployment is that there is a very close correspondence between unemployment and labor market inefficiency as witnessed in the quote by the oecd just given although rarely if ever stated there is also the assumption that a given unemployment rate indicates similar levels of inefficiency either across time and or regions or countries unfortunately and somewhat surprisingly this assumption has not been tested thus far 1 given the importance of comparisons of unemployment on the direction of macroeconomic policy of governments it is very important to determine whether unemployment is indeed a good proxy for labor market inefficiency the goal of the article therefore is to examine this issue thus we pose the following key questions 1 to what degree do unemployment rates reflect labor market efficiencies 2 if the goal is to measure relative labor market inefficiency is it meaningful to compare unemployment rates over time and 3 to what degree do differences in unemployment rates across countries reflect differences in labor market inefficiencies basic economic theory shows that inefficiency in any market depends not only on the wedge between supply and demand but also on the elasticities of demand and supply the calculation of so called harberger triangles harberger 1954 of deadweight loss dwl which has a long history in the industrial organization and public finance literatures indicates that for a given wedge between supply and demand the dwl can be very different depending on the elasticities of supply and demand interestingly however studies examining the costs of unemployment do not focus on this basic view of welfare loss studies such as gordon 1973 ahsenfelter 1980 hurd 1980 clark and oswald 1994 murphy and topel 1997 and leslie and blackaby 1999 among others examine the costs of unemployment from an individual perspective but do not measure inefficiency from a market perspective which is the focus of the harberger triangles except for a publication by fortin and bernier 1988 2 we know of no other application of calculating harberger triangles to determine the level of inefficiency in the labor market therefore this article uses labor market data from 1931 to 1996 in the united states and united kingdom to calculate the dwl of unemployment and then compares the estimates of dwl to the unemployment rate to determine how closely related inefficiency and unemployment are 3 the following section investigates the theoretical relationships between unemployment labor supply and demand elasticities and dwl from this discussion we propose two alternative measures of inefficiency the first is the unemployment loss index dwl divided by gross domestic product gdp which indicates how large labor market inefficiency is relative to total output in the economy the second measure is dwl per unemployed person a measure of the potential average gains to employing an unemployed individual section iii outlines the data and methodology used to estimate the elasticities of labor supply and labor demand over time in the united states and united kingdom allowing for changes in the elasticities over time

determinants of automobile pac contributions to house incumbents own versus rival effects this paper examines pac contributions by the big threeu s automakers and japanese auto dealers to houseincumbents a regression model is estimated where paccontributions are a function of a firm s own ties toan incumbent s district as measured by firmemployment and those of rivals for the big three own and u s rival effects are positive further theresults do not indicate the presence of a free ridereffect employment by a foreign subsidiary has no neteffect on u s contributions for the japanesedealers japanese plant employment has a positiveimpact on contributions and that of the big three anegative

output and unemployment dynamics in the united states 1950 1985 for us data over 1950 1985 the stochastic components of gnp growth and the unemployment rate appear to be stationary and there is substantial feedback between these variables the unconditional mean rate of unemployment in a joint model thus provides a natural benchmark in discussions of the business cycle a bivariate var model is used to describe output unemployment dynamics to estimate the degree of persistence of output innovations and to decompose output into trend and cycle the bivariate results are interpreted using a restricted var and it is shown that a closely related cyclical measure can be obtained directly from the okun s law equation

a measure of the u s output gap abstract an autoregressive distributed lag regression of the unemployment rate on output growth is structurally stable over the 1890 1986 period inverting this equation yields a measure of the output gap which is not subject to the spurious detrending problem

an analysis on the structural stability of okun s law a cross country study okun s law postulates an inverse relationship between movements of the unemployment rate and the real gross domestic product gdp this article investigates okun s law for 15 oecd countries and checks for its the structural stability by using data on employment and the labour force whether structural instability is caused either from the demand side or supply side is inferred

what do campaign contributions buy deciphering causal effects of money and votes in the 1987 1988 election cycle political action committees pacs spent 176 6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the house of representatives what do pacs buy when contributing this money if campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor s income campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor s preferred candidate is elected and the likelihood that if elected the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor most studies do not find that incumbents expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive 11 14 15 17 29 the evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis for example kau rubin and keenan 17 find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen 5 9 12 31 the lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for better models to explain campaign contributions 5 however the theoretical developments of for example ben zion and eyton 4 bental and ben zion 3 and baron 2 have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions in this study i plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes of all the reported empirical studies on this issue only chappell 5 uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used the best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

the determinants of minimum wage rates this paper attempts to test the degree of responsiveness of canadian provincial governments to different political groups in establishing their relative minimum wage policies over the 1975 1982 period it discusses alternative explanations of minimum wage policies and focuses on the political market approach where women youth small business and unions play a role an econometric model is specified and estimated on pooled annual time series and cross section data for nine provinces in canada the results tend to support most of the hypotheses

contributions to federal election campaigns by government contractors the author develops a theoretical model that determines whether or not a firm sponsors a political action committee and if it does the quantity of funds that the political action committee will disburse the firm is assumed to face supply and demand schedules for political action committee receipts whose positions depend on attributes of the firm such as firm size government sales intensity and market structure two related equations derived from the theoretical model a probit equation for political action committee sponsorship and a disbursements equation are estimated using pooled data on 226 government primarily defense contracting firms during the 1979 80 and 1981 82 election cycles copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

the politics of public aid to private industry the role of policy networks firms lobby for subsidies along geographic sector or factor lines and as a result receive subsidies with a local sectoral or factorwide scope this article investigates what determines the line of cleavage and thereby the scope of the subsidy the factor mobility hypothesis according to which an economic prior the degree of factor mobility determines the geometry of lobbying coalitions misses the fact that factor mobility is as much the product of policy and policymaking as it is its determinant this article argues instead that politicians maximize their chances of staying in power through the deliberate use of subsidies to structure the political debate and embed factor owners into stable policy networks individual factor owners in turn join these policy networks to lobby for monopoly rents capable of insuring them against adverse economic competition the model yields two testable hypotheses first right governments favor subsidies to capital whereas left governments favor subsidies to lab

campaign contributions and access an important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given in this story access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy relevant information under complete information regarding donors policy preferences i argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups and the recipient legislators preferences are similar however one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive relaxing the informational assumption on donors preferences i reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the informational value of access to any agent is endogenous

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

okun s law in panels of countries and states this article contributes to the empirical literature of okun s law in three respects first in contrast to the limited data used in the existing studies we employ two extensive across countries and across states i e within a country panel data sets to investigate the validity of okun s law second the use of the pooled mean group pmg estimator permits us not to pre filter the data as often done in the current literature and can take into account the possibility of cointegration between unemployment and output third in addition to the short run relationship or cyclical components between unemployment and output we also estimate the long run linkage between these two important variables empirical results show that unemployment and output are long run cointegrated irrespective of using country or state level data moreover the unemployment output linkages are found to be negative and highly significant both in the short and long run our results not only confirm the validity of okun s law

gambles and the shadow price of death recent papers on the value of life involve preferences of the sort introduced by milton friedman and leonard savage 1948 1 given the choice between undergoing a particular gamble in wealth and possessing the mathematical expectation of the payoffs of the gamble the consumers in these studies may prefer the gamble the presence of such risk loving preferences is inferred from two well established facts life is an indivisible commodity in the models and indivisibility leads to preference for gambles the former fact is made clear by philip cook and daniel graham the latter was first noted by yew kwang ng 1965 and is widely known in spite of the obvious connection the implications of risk loving tastes in this area have not been explored this paper examines some implications of such risk loving the idea that indivisibility produces friedman savage preferences and that such preferences create a demand for gambles is extended in section i to a theory of demand for indivisible goods and derived demand for associated optimum gambles this theory suggests that the price of an indivisible good will not compensate for possessing or not possessing the good section ii applies the demand theory to an equilibrium model of labor supply that is relevant to the determination of the value of life in this model the wage diflerential is useful in guiding policy toward public risks in spite of the fact that the differential is not compensating i demand for gambles and demand for goods

the cotton influence index an examination of u s cotton subsidies given the lack of a bill or amendment specific to cotton we introduce a cotton influence index to capture legislators influence in championing the cause of the cotton growers during the hearings of the farm security and rural investment act of 2002 regression analyses reveal a relationship between cotton influence index and campaign contributions cotton farmland party affiliation and ideology tobit analysis indicates a significant relationship between different actions and participations by representatives to advance the interest of cotton that is components of this index and their future cotton political action committees pacs contributions to them copyright 2006 oxford university press

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations under the traditional interpretation of macroeconomic fluctuations aggregate demand shocks move output and prices in the same direction while aggregate supply shocks move output and prices in opposite directions this paper examines the joint behavior of u s output unemployment prices wages and nominal money and asks whether it is consistent with this interpretation the answer is a qualified yes

rent seeking and pesticide legislation this paper provides a test of the appelbaum and katz 1987 rent seeking model in which rents are endogenous the appelbaum katz model is theoretically modified to correspond to our empirical application in which rent seeking and rent avoiding coalitions are attempting to influence legislators votes on pesticide regulations probit estimations are used to analyze the legislators votes on two bills to amend pesticide legislation a proxy for rent empirical results generally support the rent seeking determinants identified in the model tobit estimation is used to investigate campaign contributions by the coalitions to the legislators these contributions are a proxy for rent seeking activities again the model is supported

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

fixed cost of work and the demand for lotteries abstract a fixed cost of work is sufficient to induce risk averse individuals who obey the expected utility hypothesis to demand lotteries the critical assumption needed to generate this demand is that leisure is a normal good

congressional voting on labor issues the role of pacs this study measures the impact of labor and corporate political action committee pac contributions on the voting of members of the house of representatives on labor issues during 1979 80 it also analyzes the allocation of labor pac contributions among house candidates pac contributions were found to have a significant direct effect on roll call voting even controlling for the representative s political party and characteristics of the constituency since pac money also affects roll call voting indirectly by influencing which party wins elections the overall impact of pac money on congressional voting is probably substantial the author also finds that labor pacs have focused more on influencing the outcome of elections than on currying favor with powerful members of the house who are likely to be re elected anyway

effects of pro growth policies on employment evidence of regional disparities the main objective of our research is to study the direct impact of pro growth economic policies on employment creation globally and regionally as evidence has countered policy makers expectation

a cross country analysis of the okun s law coefficient convergence in europe the paper examines whether or not evidence is consistent with convergence of the okun s law coefficient olc among several alternative groupings of european economies a two step empirical strategy is employed the first step obtains rolling regression estimates of the olc for individual european countries the second step examines how the cross country variance of the olc evolves over the decade until 2002 in the selected country groupings evidence is found consistent with convergence of the olc among northern european countries and among countries with centralized wage bargaining but an absence of convergence in other country groups

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

asymmetry in okun s law in this paper we support the proposition that the output unemployment relationship as represented by okun s law is asymmetric okun s coefficients are defined based on a dynamic model that allows for asymmetry in the relationship between cyclical output and unemployment using data from the united states for the post war period our results show that the short run effects of positive cyclical output on cyclical unemployment are quantitatively different from those of negative ones and the data are consistent with the proposition that cyclical unemployment is more sensitive to negative than to positive cyclical output several theoretical

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

cyclical output cyclical unemployment and okun s coefficient a new approach estimates of okun s coefficient are obtained using new estimates of cyclical gnp and cyclical unemployment rates for the post war usa empirical estimates of the coefficient are near 0 25 somewhat smaller in magnitude than other recent estimates obtained applying similar econometric techniques to different estimates of cyclical output and unemployment tests fail to reject the hypothesis of parameter stability across an hypothesized break between the third and fourth quarters of 1973 suggesting similar relationships between cyclical output and unemployment both before and after the supply shocks of the 1970s

pacs lobbies and political conflict the case of gun control previous research has shown that pac contributions from the national rifle association as well as letters and lobbying by handgun control inc significantly affected congressional voting on the firearms owners protection act of 1986 holding constant ideology party constituency characteristics and a proxy for prior position on the issue using data from that study this paper shows that contributions have a somewhat different effect than lobbying contributions from nra were primarily targeted at nra supporters and had the net effect of making the progunners even more so contributions from handgun control while they did not significantly reinforce the proclivities of the gun controllers were directed only at that group at least in this case money appears to exacerbate conflict by contrast the police lobby directed its attention at both gun controllers and pro gunners the lobby effectively induced pro gunners to moderate their position

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

looking for leverage in pac markets corporate and labor contributions considered in this paper we explore the popular perception that political action committees pacs have substantial influence over elected legislators we question whether the leverage in the pac market is on the side of the contribution maker or the contribution taker analysis of the structure of pac markets suggests most markets are sellers markets not buyers markets pac contributions then may be more like protection money than attempts to buy votes or access

testing okun s law theoretical and empirical considerations using fractional integration abstractfull employment remains at the center of any economic policy following okun s conclusion regarding the trade off relation between unemployment and real gross national product growth new s

a note on the importance of cost structures for the behavior of political action committees in sum the cost environment in which pacs operate will directly influence both their behavior and their ability to buy political benefits recognition of these effects implies that the conclusions of earlier studies that different pacs follow inherently different strategies or that pacs are not rational in their contributory allocations are premature and indeed insupportable in the absence of cost analysis attention to costs also suggests that some important econometric problems may attend the investigation of pac behavior

explaining legislators positions on outside income limits voting on honoraria ceilings in the u s senate 1981 1983 this article examines roll call voting by members of the u s senate on three proposals to limit members outside income in the 1980s i find that several factors influenced legislators votes on outside income limits legislation oill first financial self interest was an important constraint on members willingness to support oill members who earned more honoraria were less likely to vote yes but this opposition was neutralized when limits were attached to the compensating mechanism of a pay raise senators from poorer states were generally more likely to support honoraria limits alone but less likely to support limits linked to a pay raise suggesting a responsiveness to constituent interests in both cases finally when oill was linked to a pay raise electoral considerations became prominent in legislators vote decisions with electorally vulnerable members less likely to vote yes

policy watch congressional campaign finance reform while campaign finance reform attracts a lot of attention it seems unlikely that such reform at least in it current guise will have a large impact on the functioning of the american political system recent studies have called into question the conventional wisdom that challenger campaign spending is especially effective suggesting that attempts to close the gap between incumbent and challenger spending will have a smaller than expected impact on election outcomes while it is safe to conclude that pacs wield some influence it is not clear that limiting cash contributions will have a substantial effect

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

bailout for sale the vote to save wall street this paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the united states the paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics district heterogeneity implies district specific electoral constraints on legislators ability to collect rents from and cast dissonant votes in support of special interests an empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables the empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias using valid instruments and considers several intuitive sub sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue the paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout