the causes of preference reversal observed preference reversal cannot be adequately explained by violations of independence the reduction axiom or transitivity the primary cause of preference reversal is the failure of procedure invariance especially the overpricing of low probability high payoff bets this result violates regret theory and generalized nonindependent utility models preference reversal and a new reversal involving time preferences are explained by scale compatibility which implies that payoffs are weighted more heavily in pricing than in choice copyright 1990 by american economic association

randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity averse preferences abstract in random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment agents are assumed to act as if they faced each problem on its own while this approach is valid when agents are expected utility maximizers ambiguity averse agents may use the randomization device to hedge and thereby contaminate the data

non transitive choice event splitting effects or framing effects recent studies have examined possible causes of the robust empirical failure of the transitivity axiom of expected utility theory by pitting regret aversion against alternative explanations such as event splitting effects these tests show that cycles replicate when the latter are controlled but are sensitive to changes in problem representation the control for event splitting effects however does not rule out their contribution to cyclical choices in some circumstances an experiment is reported which investigates this possibility cyclical choices are observed that cannot be due to event splitting effects but appear attributable to within event and between act evaluations of decision problems plus framing effects

fair wages when employers face the risk of losing money abstract when employers can incur losses from the labor relationship in a gift exchange game they offer lower wages on average than in a no loss relationship taking employers risk of losing money into account employees exert more effort per wage unit

should we use willingness to pay to elicit community preferences for health care new evidence from using a marginal approach abstract we describe a willingness to pay wtp survey in which values were elicited from the public for three disparate health care programmes previous applications of wtp in this context have revealed a high proportion of preference reversals between wtp values and ordinal ranking of the programmes in view of the doubts these findings raise over the use of wtp in this context our aim was to develop a method of eliciting wtp values which we considered would improve consistency between respondents explicit ranking of the programmes and their wtp values compared to the standard approach the structure of the new design the marginal approach reduced the number of possible preference reversals thus encouraging a degree of consistency among respondents despite this the marginal approach did not result in fewer preference reversal being observed in actuality thus casting doubt on the application of wtp in this context

does the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradict the independence axiom one of the most puzzling paradoxes in decision theory is the preference reversal phenomenon this phenomenon seems to contradict the transitivity axiom for a long time one of the cornerstones of utility theory this paradox is established whenever a decision maker prefers lottery x to lottery y but is willing to put a lower selling price on x than on y such experiments first reported by harold lindman 1971 and sarah lichtenstein and paul slovic 1971 were repeated by david grether and charles plott 1979 werner pommerehne et al 1982 and robert reilly 1982 although the later researchers improved the mechanism through which the selling price emerges they all found systematic reversals a new approach to this problem was developed by charles holt 1986 and edi karni and zvi safra 1987 from two different starting points these authors showed that the preference reversal phenomenon does not necessarily prove a violation of the transitivity axiom as it may contradict the independence axiom this implies that people do not maximize expected utility but in that case the preference reversal phenomenon becomes just another evidence against expected utility theory but not against the transitivity axiom these results have their own disadvantages although the independence axiom is not as fundamental as transitivity it is nevertheless very appealing on normative grounds of course the preference reversal phenomenon necessarily contradicts at least one of the assumptions of expected utility theory but empirical evidence shows that despite its normative appeal violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom may happen see for example joshua ronen 1971 and doug snowball and clif brown 1979 in this paper i therefore suggest a decision mechanism for the preference reversals lotteries which is transitive and satisfies the independence axiom but not the reduction axiom

lottery choice incentives complexity and decision time this paper reports the results of an experiment on lottery choice in which decision cost is measured as decision making time a simple decision cost model motivates this measurement and the experiment and predicts relationships between incentive mechanism manipulations and decision making time which are borne out in the experiment the decision cost model also suggests that decisions will change in the face of the incentive manipulations in the experiment this suggestion is borne out in a complex decision making environment but not in a simple one specification tests demonstrate that observed changes in subjects behavior are not merely due to changes in subject specific error variance one may conclude from this that the payoff dominance problem is a real issue in complex decision making experiments copyright 1993 by royal economic society

are preferences monotonic testing some predictions of regret theory in this paper the authors demonstrate that the assumption of regret aversion which has been invoked in regret theory to explain several well documented violations of expected utility theory also implies the existence of strict preferences between some stochastically equivalent actions and implies certain systematic violations of monotonicity the authors report an experimental test of these predictions they find that while choices between stochastically equivalent actions are entirely consistent with expected utility theory there is clear evidence of the monotonicity violations predicted by regret theory copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

preference reversals and the independence axiom of all of the paradoxical patterns of behavior reported in laboratory experiments one of the most perplexing for decision theorists is the preference reversal phenomenon a subject in a preference reversal experiment is typically given a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a modest amount of money a p bet and a lottery with a low probability of winning a large amount of money a bet the lowest amount of money for which the subject would willingly sell either of these lotteries is also elicited the most common reversal is for a subject to choose the p bet over the bet but to put a higher selling price on the bet preference reversals were first reported by harold lindman 1971 and sarah lichtenstein and paul slovic 1971 in discussing the psychologists discovery of such reversals david grether and charles plott remark the inconsistency is deeper than mere lack of transitivity or even stochastic transitivity it suggests that no optimization principles of any sort lie behind even the simplest of human choices 1979 p 623 this paper offers a simple alternative explanation of documented preference reversals an explanation that does not require the abandonment of the transitivity assumption

do subjects remember the past in many experiments experimenters use the random lottery incentive mechanism and ask many questions to each subject that is at the end of the experiment just one of the questions is picked at random and the subject paid on the basis of their answer to this one question the idea is that subjects should separate the various questions and reply to each as if it were a separate question this procedure is methodologically sound if the subjects preferences obey expected utility eu theory which implies a form of separation but if they do not this incentive mechanism is open to criticism indeed many referees use this argument against the research they argue that subjects do not consider questions separately if the questions are revealed to the subjects one by one then the appropriate alternative hypothesis is that their behaviour evolves with the questions here this hypothesis is tested that the questions already answered affect the answers to the subsequent questions the analysis shows that

values elicited from open ended real experiments abstract the idea that preferences are only revealed by real incentives is deeply embedded in economists worldview consequently evidence from hypothetical experiments has not readily permeated economic thinking one method for determining whether hypothetical experiments provide useful information about preferences is to compare them to similar real goods experiments this study looks at responses elicited by three real experiments we examine the proportion of responses that meet a series of criteria that range from a broad appeal of plausibility to a narrow restriction based on quasi concavity of preferences we argue that these proportions are unreasonably low

strike coordination and dismissal in uniform wage settings abstract we study a gift exchange game with 12 employees and one employer when the employer can offer individually differentiated wages in a setting without collective action we observe high levels of wages effort choices and total earnings when the employer is restricted to offering a uniform wage trust and reciprocity drop dramatically due to widespread shirking the stepwise introduction of two collective action mechanisms strike and coordination increases the employees share of the total earnings but does not mitigate the free riding problem adding employment risk to the collective action setup drives up wages reduces free riding and leads to higher total earnings however this increase in productivity is not sufficient to achieve the high levels of wages efforts and earnings that we observe with individually differentiated wages

trading volume and asset liquidity since the depth and liquidity of a market depend on the entry decisions of all potential participants each trader assesses them according to conjectures about entry by others if trade is equally costly across markets this externality leads to the concentration of trade on one market if not it can produce multiple conjectural equilibria some where trade concentrates on one market and others where large traders resort to a separate market or to search for a trading partner while fragmentation is welfare reducing in the two market case no such ranking is possible if it involves off exchange search

eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes the willingness to assign approach improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary health policy goal however still limited guidance is available on how best to elicit preferences for health care programmes this study examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programmes and named willingness to assign wtas wtas reveals relative monetary based values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment experimental evidence is reported from a deliberative empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the catalan health service evidence from this experimental study reveals that within the context of multiple programmes preferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by preference reversals as compared to values revealed from an adapted technique eliciting the willingness to pay wtp extra taxes another finding suggests that although programmes promoting health received the higher rel

reduction of compound lotteries with objective probabilities theory and evidence abstract the reduction of compound lotteries axiom rocl has assumed a central role in the evaluation of behavior toward risk and uncertainty we present experimental evidence on its validity in the domain of objective probabilities our battery of lottery pairs includes simple one stage lotteries two stages compound lotteries and their actuarially equivalent one stage lotteries we find violations of rocl and that behavior is better characterized by a source dependent version of the rank dependent utility model rather than expected utility theory since we use the popular 1 in k random lottery incentive mechanism payment procedure in our main test our experiment explicitly recognizes the impact that this payment procedure may have on preferences thus we also collect data using the 1 in 1 payment procedure we do not infer any violations of rocl when subjects are only given one decision to make these results are supported by both structural estimation of latent preferences as well as non parametric analysis of choice patterns the random lottery incentive mechanism used as payment protocol itself induces an additional layer of compounding by design that might create confounds in tests of rocl therefore we provide a word of caution for experimenters interested in studying rocl for other purposes such as the relationship between ambiguity attitudes and attitudes toward compound lotteries to carefully think about the design to study rocl payment protocols and their interaction with the preferences being elicited

economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon a reexamination in a recent issue of this review david grether and charles plott 1979 hereinafter referred to as g p presented a series of experiments that show that individual decisions are made in a manner inconsistent with standard preference theory this inconsistency can be illustrated by the following example individuals under suitable laboratory conditions first have a choice between a lottery with a high probability of winning a small sum of money the p bet probability bet and a lottery with a high stake but low probability of winning the m bet money bet after indicating a preference for one of the lotteries in the pair the same subjects are then asked to place a monetary value on each of the individual lotteries grether and plott found that a large number of participants stated a preference for the p bet in the first round but placed a higher value on the other lottery the m bet in the second round this behavior a preference reversal is inconsistent with the traditional statements of preference theory

consolidation fragmentation and market performance this paper studies the impact of market consolidation or fragmentation on its performance examining four alternative models of exchange a consolidated clearing house fragmented clearing houses a monopoly dealer market and an interdealer market the effects of the market mechanism on the expected quantity traded the price variance faced by individual traders the quality of market price signals the expected gains from trade and the exchange implementation costs are studied

implicit versus explicit ranking on inferring ordinal preferences for health care programmes based on differences in willingness to pay the paper explores the merit of the willingness to pay wtp method as a way to elicit public preferences regarding health care priorities the aim is to test the extent to which the implicit ranking inferred from the ordinal differences in wtp values corresponds with respondents explicit ranking of the same programmes this issue of convergent validity is explored by face to face interviewing of population samples in six european countries in total 1240 respondents the most consistent result is the inconsistency of wtp and explicit ranking in all six countries the convergent validity of wtp is low particularly among those who did not state different wtp values on the three programmes being considered

market experience eliminates some anomalies and creates new ones we report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals we investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions a tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes we find little support for the former but strong support for the latter also whilst just enough market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly therefore although market experience shapes behaviour in our experiments it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory

public vs private demand for covering long term care expenditures this article studies the determinants of the willingness to pay wtp for long term care ltc insurance coverage two alternatives are considered one compulsory financed through taxes the other purchased on a voluntary basis and paid through a premium wtp was elicited through open ended contingent valuation within a survey conducted in the italian region emilia romagna about ltc population needs we model information on individual wtp as a two stage process where respondents first establish their interest for ltc cover then state their wtp results show that interest and wtp are influenced by different variables and that differences arise also between the wtp for public and private coverage

union wage differentials product market influences and the division of rents this paper examines the extent to which product market conditions limit the ability of trade unions to establish wage differentials over nonunion pay the mean union pay differential is estimated to be of the order of 8 percent to 10 percent in establishments with some degree of product market power but zero in establishments facing competitive product market conditions when competitive conditions are faced a preentry closed shop and high union coverage of the industry are both required it is estimated that only 5 percent of the establishments in which there are significant differentials over nonunion pay face generally competitive product market conditions copyright 1990 by royal economic society

testing the rate of preference reversal in personal and social decision making classic preference reversal where choice and valuation procedures generate inconsistent preference orderings has rarely been tested in hypothetical health care treatment scenarios two studies the first non incentivised and the second incentivised are reported in this article in both studies respondents are asked to make decisions that affect themselves a personal decision making frame and those for whom they are responsible a social decision making frame the results show non negligible and systematic rates of preference reversal in both frames although these rates are slightly but non significantly lower in the incentivised condition moreover in both studies the rate of predicted preference reversal was somewhat higher in the social than in the personal decision making frame a finding that is explained by greater risk aversion when choosing treatment options for others than when choosing treatments for oneself

choices involving uncertain probabilities abstract this paper contains an analytic and empirical component the analytic one examines how people should value information on probabilities versus payoffs according to expected utility theory it also examines under what conditions various generalized utility models such as subjective expected utility theory prospect theory and rank dependent utility entail testable predictions for preference for information the empirical component examines people s actual information preferences and to what extent they fit the various models after describing two experiments and their findings it is concluded that generalized utility models are unlikely to offer much insight into risky decision making

testing different stochastic specificationsof risky choice the harless camerer hc hey orme ho and random preference rp models of stochastic variation in choice under uncertainty are compared implications of these models including some that are independent of the deterministic theory with which they are combined are tested in an experiment in which participants respond to decision problems twice the hc model generally performs poorly the ho model predicts more violations of dominance than are observed while the rp model fails to account for those few violations which do occur additional regularities are observed which are inconsistent with all three models when combined with expected utility theory

the common consequence effect testing a unified explanation of recent mixed evidence abstract the common consequence effect is perhaps the most investigated violation of expected utility theory and yet no single generalised expected utility model convincingly organises the experimental data this paper reports a test of a modified version of expected cardinality specific utility theory with boundary effects neilson w s 1992 economics letters 39 275 278 which can explain some recent mixed evidence without recourse to subjective probability weighting models the results do not convincingly support the boundary effect hypothesis and neither support the more usual probability weighting arguments but do indicate instability in preferences largely consistent with event splitting effects

in search of workers real effort reciprocity a field and a laboratory experiment we present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage nor to a positive or negative peer comparison this result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort in an additional real effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables an exact calculation of an employer s surplus from the work contract is a crucial prerequisite for a positive wage effort relation this demonstrates that an employee s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake jel c91 c92 j41

alcohol and self control a field experiment in india this paper studies alcohol consumption among low income workers in india in a 3 week field experiment the majority of 229 cycle rickshaw drivers were willing to forgo substantial monetary payments in order to set incentives for themselves to remain sober thus exhibiting demand for commitment to sobriety randomly receiving sobriety incentives significantly reduced daytime drinking while leaving overall drinking unchanged i find no evidence of higher daytime sobriety significantly changing labor supply productivity or earnings in contrast increasing sobriety raised savings by 50 percent an effect that does not appear to be solely explained by changes in income net of alcohol expenditures

preference reversals without the independence axiom the preference reversal phenomenon was believed to be inconsistent with the transitivity axiom of decision theory however recent theoretical papers have demonstrated that the preference reversals that were observed in earlier experiments could be explained by subject violations of the independence axiom or the compound lottery axiom therefore those preference reversals are not known to be inconsistent with generalization of expected utility theory that replace the independence axiom the present paper reports the results of experiments in which a substantial proportion of subject responses violate the asymmetry axiom these results are inconsistent with expected utility theory and its generalizations copyright 1989 by american economic association

mortgage choice as a natural field experiment on choice under risk data on approximately 280 000 borrowers from the uk survey of mortgage lenders are used to model choices between variable and fixed rate mortgages the choice is assumed to depend on three factors risk attitude interest rate expectations and individual discount rate the ordered probit model is used for estimation while taking account of a number of econometric issues including missing counterfactuals selectivity and endogeneity a large number of strong effects are found including higher income borrowers are less risk averse and have a lower discount rate and risk aversion rises with the amount borrowed providing evidence of increasing relative risk aversion

information technology and screen based securities trading pricing the stock and pricing the trade many major stock exchanges rely on their member firms to act as dealer intermediaries risking their own capital to trade as dealers with investor customers a confluence of forces will dramatically alter the role of these intermediaries and the strategies available to them information technology is increasing the diversity of trading strategies used by investors these impose different costs and risks upon intermediaries alternative electronic trading venues off exchange trading systems are increasing the competition faced by established exchanges and have been especially effective in targeting investors who impose low risks upon intermediaries finally many of the automated systems developed by existing exchanges have stripped of many of the cues that have in the past been used by intermediaries to assess the riskiness of an investor s trade and to price accordingly we believe that competitive pressure from alternative trading venues will drive exchanges to develop mechanisms to support risk based pricing we explore through a stylized model of trading how the use of risk based pricing can preserve the established central market this enables intermediaries to separate pricing the shares traded from pricing the services for dealing these shares and provides low cost execution while preserving the benefits of intermediation our model uses a detailed computer simulation in which dealers interact with order flow to produce a sequence of trades which determine market prices which in turn influence order flow the model enables us to calculate trading costs for different classes of investor various other standard measures of market quality and market maker profitability

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

validity of open ended and payment scale approaches to eliciting willingness to pay the open ended and payment scale approaches to eliciting willingness to pay wtp valuations are compared use of the payment scale led to a higher response rate a higher rate of completion of the wtp question higher mean and median wtp values a stronger association between wtp and ability to pay and a higher r2 in regression analysis of wtp on several independent variables taking these results in combination it can be inferred that the payment scale technique leads to more valid wtp values than use of the open ended approach

gift exchange in a multi worker firm one of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that in an incomplete contracts environment workers on average do not shirk and usually provide more than the minimum enforceable effort level in general 40 to 60 percent of the workers reward higher wages with higher effort these results are observed for simple one employer one worker relationships in this paper we investigate whether they generalize to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers we compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers we find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce and intention based reciprocity rather than social preferences seems to be the main driving force behind gift exchange

using contingent valuation to elicit public preferences for water fluoridation the methods and results of a contingent valuation survey to elicit public preferences for water fluoridation are reported the study demonstrates that not only is it important to acknowledge that there will be losers from the introduction of such a programme but that losers must be allowed to express a value for the magnitude of their perceived loss two methods of valuing this loss are explored conventional willingness to accept compensation questions are compared with questions in which losers are asked to state their willingness to pay to prevent their water being fluoridated the results provide tentative support for asking willingness to pay to prevent questions instead of willingness to accept questions when evaluating certain types of public good the issue of protest responses in contingent valuation surveys is also highlighted and discussed

observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods the preference reversal phenomenon is usually interpreted as evidence of nontransitivity of preference but has also been explained as the result of the difference between individuals responses to choice and valuation problems the devices used by experimenters to elicit valuations and the random lottery selection incentive system this paper reports an experiment designed so that none of these factors could generate systematic nontransitivities yet systematic violations of transitivity were still found the pattern of violation was analogous with that found in previous preference reversal experiments and is consistent with regret theory copyright 1991 by the econometric society

further evidence of the impact of regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty a preliminary experimental study of the relative impact of regret and disappointment on individual choice under uncert ainty is followed up and extended in various ways taken in conjuncti on with the earlier work the new results provide further evidence of the limitations of von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory a nd indicate the potential power of the alternative models discussed it is argued that there is sufficient weight of evidence to encourage further systematic investigation copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

rational choice with status quo bias abstract motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one s current situation on her choice behavior the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case we follow a revealed preference approach and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect and that are applicable in any choice situation to which the standard static choice model applies

understanding preference imprecision the term preference imprecision seems to have different meanings to different people in the literature one can find references to a number of expressions for example vagueness incompleteness randomness unsureness indecisiveness and thick indifference curves some of these are theoretical constructs some are empirical the purpose of this paper is to survey the various different approaches and to try to link them together to see if they are all addressed to the same issue and to come to some conclusions in the course of this survey we report on evidence concerning the existence of preference imprecision and its impact on theoretical and empirical work

measuring consumers willingness to pay at the point of purchase abstract economists psychologists and marketing researchers rely on measures of consumers willingness to pay wtp in estimating demand for private and public goods and in designing optimal price schedules existing market research techniques for measuring wtp differ in whether they provide an incentive to consumers to reveal their true wtp and in whether they simulate actual point of purchase contexts the authors present an empirical comparison of several procedures for eliciting wtp that are applicable directly at the point of purchase in particular the authors test the applicability of becker degroot and marschak s 1964 well known incentive compatible procedure for assessing the utility of lotteries to measuring consumers wtp in three studies the authors explore the reliability validity and feasibility of the procedure and show that it yields lower wtp estimates than do non incentive compatible methods such as open ended and double bounded contingent valuation they show experimentally t

how people respond to contingent valuation questions a verbal protocol analysis of willingness to pay for an environmental regulation abstract this paper investigates what a respondent is thinking when answering a willingness to pay question in a contingent valuation using a think aloud technique from psychology called verbal protocol analysis the willingness to pay responses we observed seem to be constructed from a variety of considerations including an obligation to pay a fair share of the cost of the solution and signaling concern for a larger set of environmental issues the finding that respondents seem to construct their values at the time they are asked rather than reporting a more well defined value is seen as consistent with over two decades of research on the psychology of decision making potential uses of verbal protocols in contingent valuation studies are also discussed

indifference or indecisiveness choice theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences abstract a commonly held belief in economics is that an individual s preferences that are revealed by her choices must be complete this paper takes issue with this position by showing that one may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon observing her choice behavior we relax the standard weak axiom of revealed preferences warp and show that a potent theory of individual choice with and without risk can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with some other standard postulates the most notable features here are that an agent is allowed to be indifferent between certain alternatives and indecisive about others moreover an outside observer can identify which of these actually occur upon examining the observable choice behavior of the decision maker as an application we also show how our theory may be able to cope with the classical preference reversal phenomenon

price discovery in the u s treasury market automation vs intermediation this paper examines the contribution to price discovery by electronic and voice based trading systems in the u s treasury market evidence shows that the electronic trading system has more price discovery and that trading automation increases the speed of incorporating information into prices however human trading generates significant price discovery though its volume is low the relative contribution of a trading system to price discovery depends on liquidity volatility volume trade size and order imbalance the voice based trading system contributes more to price discovery when trade size is large and liquidity is low these findings provide important implications for the design of electronic markets for securities with different characteristics and trading environments this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

developments in non expected utility theory the hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk this article reviews recent developments in the economic theory of individual decision making under risk since the 1950s it has been known that individual choices violate the standard model of expected utility in predictable ways considerable research effort has now been devoted to the project of developing a superior descriptive model following an overview of non expected utility theories which distinguishes between conventional and non conventional approaches the paper seeks to assess these alternative models in terms of empirical success using laboratory and field data and theoretical usefulness the closing sections reflect on some new directions emerging in this literature

preference reversal information processing effect or rational non transitive choice preference reversal is often explained as an information processing effect whereby individuals respond differently to valuation problems than to straight choices regret theory offers the alternative explanation that individuals act on consistent but nontransitive preferences regret theory in its most general form is shown to make specific predictions about nontransitive pairwise choices that correspond with the preferences reversal phenomenon some experiments designed to discriminate between these two explanations are reported the main finding is that as regret theory predicts the preference reversal phenomenon can be reproduced in situations in which subjects confront only choice problems copyright 1989 by royal economic society

further evidence of preference reversals choice valuation and ranking over distributions of life expectancy moving between choice and direct valuation procedures can cause substantial systematic preference reversals which is problematic because it leaves us unsure as to which procedure if any is best this article reports a study that tests whether using a ranking procedure to infer values rather than more conventional direct valuation can negate this phenomenon the results suggest that the ranking procedure can render strict preference reversals both less substantial and less systematic this could have important implications for the valuation of health outcomes and in attempting to ascertain whether choice valuation or ranking best uncovers people s preferences similar tests in the context of more realistic health outcome descriptions are recommended

intra experimental income effects and risk aversion abstract harrison s 1986 modification of the bekker degroot and marshak 1964 mechanism for eliciting risk preferences is employed to test the hypotheses of expected utility theory with respect to changes in income increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion subjects in the laboratory are shown to exhibit such behavior

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

social comparison and performance experimental evidence on the fair wage effort hypothesis we investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity we present three studies which all use three person gift exchange experiments consistent with akerlof and yellen s 1990 fair wage effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level we observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects we also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences

unionized construction workers are more productive this paper presents evidence on the effect of unionism on productivity in construction the linkages are distinct from those studied previously in industrial settings apprenticeship training and hiring halls probably raise union productivity while jurisdictional disputes and restrictive work rules lower it using brown and medoff s methodology union productivity measured by value added per employee is 44 to 52 percent higher than nonunion the estimate declines to 17 to 22 percent when estimates of interarea construction price differences are used to deflate value added occupational mix differences and possibly apprenticeship training account for 15 to 27 percent of this difference

preference reversals for ambiguity aversion this paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant the reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context dependent weightings of attributes we offer an explanation based on sugden s random reference theory with different elicitation methods generating different random reference points then measurements of ambiguity aversion that use willingness to pay are confounded by loss aversion and hence overestimate ambiguity aversion this paper was accepted by teck ho decision analysis

does realism matter in contingent valuation surveys the importance of stressing the realism or policy relevance of a contingent valuation cv survey is commonly recognized by cv researchers this paper focuses on the relationship between the probability that a subject s response will result in real consequences and the subject s accurate reporting of willingness to pay results from experiments support the argument that efforts to make contingent valuation surveys real are important however our results also suggest that the connection between the survey and the likelihood of a payment must be rather powerful before surveys generate accurate reporting of willingness to pay for a public good

fair wages survive multiple sources of income inequality when an employee in a gift exchange game earns significantly less than the employer the source of employer income does not affect effort choices however to induce one unit of effort the employer has to pay higher wages than in a game without payoff inequality

prospect theory and energy efficiency abstract investments in energy efficiency entail uncertainty and when faced with uncertainty consumers have been shown to behave according to prospect theory preferences are reference dependent and exhibit loss aversion and probabilities are subjectively weighted using data from a choice experiment eliciting prospect theory parameters i provide evidence that loss averse people are less likely to invest in energy efficiency then i consider policy design under prospect theory when there are also externalities from energy use a higher degree of loss aversion implies a higher subsidy to energy efficiency numerical simulations suggest that the impact of prospect theory on policy may be substantial

competition and relational contracts the role of unemployment as a disciplinary device when workers are faced with the threat of unemployment their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable as a result a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party but can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs we examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market we show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor long term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment however stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity

the use of information system technology to develop tests on insider trading and asymmetric information issues related to insider trading remain popular research topics empirical studies using historical data are limited by two key factors 1 the inability to identify exactly who possesses inside information and 2 the inability to identify the accuracy of information possessed advances in information system technology enable us to overcome these problems in the laboratory using this technology we create a research shell to conduct experiments where we can identify the exact type and quality of information accessible by each trader our system includes the capability to monitor individual activities in accessing inside information the system can automatically impose a monetary penalty if random monitoring identifies a trader accessing inside information our experiments involve traders who receive access to inside information without initial knowledge of the quality of that information the results indicate that traders were able to outperform the market if penalties for being caught accessing such information were not included once penalties were included however no significant performance differences were observed finally in a second set of experiments involving a simplified market with infrequent electronic monitoring and low penalty amounts inside information seemed to be rapidly and effectively disseminated to traders possessing no inside information

payoff dominance vs cognitive transparency in decision making i introduction there is a general question about how well laboratory markets work in eliciting true preferences given the low opportunity costs of making errors as in harrison 1989 vernon smith 1982 set out a series of conditions that must be adhered to if a laboratory market investigation is to provide insight into economic behavior in naturally occurring markets the opportunity cost question posed above is covered under smith s payoff dominance and reward saliency precepts for laboratory market experiments if the experimental setting is to elicit true preferences from the subjects the monetary payoffs in the experiment must be salient and dominate potential extraneous influences on subject behavior this paper reports on three series of experiments which employ the becker degroot marshak bdm mechanism to investigate the interaction between payoff dominance reward saliency and cognitive effort in the decision task the bdm mechanism is well suited to this task because it involves only individual choice is theoretically incentive compatible and offers a high degree of experimenter control over payoffs initial information and feedback on the results of decisions becker degroot and marschak 1964 introduced the following preference elicitation mechanism individuals state the most they would be willing to pay wtp 1 for a good then a random price is drawn from a distribution known to the individuals if the stated value is greater than or equal to the random price the individual buys the good at the randomly determined price otherwise the individual does not buy the good the bdm bidding mechanism can be shown to be incentive compatible the intuition is straightforward it is not in the individual s interest to understate true wtp if the random buying price falls between the stated wtp and the true wtp the individual has foregone a beneficial trade it is also not in an individual s interest to overstate true wtp if the random buying price is greater than the true value but less than the stated value the individual will be required to buy the good at a price greater than true wtp a more formal proof is easy to construct 2 let v the true value of one unit of the auction good b the bid submitted to purchase one unit of the good r the price randomly determined to be paid if the good is purchased p r probability that price r is randomly selected y sup o initial income u y utility a function of money income and the value of the good and e initial monetary balance provided in an experiment in the wtp version of the bdm auction the good is purchased if b greater than or equal to r with the subject paying only r and not purchased if b less than r in experiments using the bdm the subject cannot bid more than the experimental balance e so it must be that v less than e if the experiment is to be demand revealing assuming that subjects maximize expected utility they will submit bid b that maximizes eu integral of p r u y sup o e v r dr between limits b and 0 integral of p r u y sup o e dr between limits e and b the first integral describes the expected payoff for random prices r below the bid b and the second integral describes the expected payoff for random prices between the bid b and the maximum possible bid as limited by the balance e the maximum over b occurs when the derivative of eu with respect to b is zero in other words when deu db p b u y e v b u y e 0 so long as p b greater than 0 i e there is some probability the offered bid will be the price the above implies that the maximum occurs when b v in other words it is individually optimal to submit a bid b equal to one s true value v for the commodity although the bdm is incentive compatible in theory it is an empirical question whether it has this property in practice

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion