dealing with consumer default bankruptcy vs garnishment abstract what are the positive and normative implications of eliminating bankruptcy protection for indebted individuals without bankruptcy protection creditors can collect on defaulted debt to the extent permitted by wage garnishment laws the elimination lowers the default premium on unsecured debt and permits low net worth individuals suffering bad earnings shocks to smooth consumption by borrowing there is a large increase in consumer debt financed essentially by super wealthy individuals a modest drop in capital per worker and a higher frequency of consumer default average welfare rises by 1 of consumption in perpetuity with about 90 of households favoring the change

optimal bankruptcy code a fresh start for some abstract what is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law i answer this question using an incomplete markets life cycle model with a planner who can choose state contingent bankruptcy costs i develop two main theoretical characterizations first whenever debt discharge is allowed it should occur without cost second bankruptcy should always be allowed for highly indebted households quantitatively the optimal policy can generate a welfare gain as large as 11 6 however attractive informal default asymmetric information and moral hazard can reduce the welfare gain to as little as 0 7

consumption smoothing and debtor protections abstract protections for defaulting debtors are a widely used form of consumption insurance this paper evaluates the costs and benefits of this insurance both inside and outside of bankruptcy first i show that consumption declines by 6 upon default revealing a potential role for greater debtor protections to smooth consumption second i use changes in states laws to estimate the impact of one type of debtor protection asset exemptions on repayment in default and interest rates while higher exemptions smooth consumption by reducing collection in default the interest rate cost is large relative to the benefits adapting a sufficient statistics formula from the literature the estimates imply that the cost of additional exemption protection exceeds what debtors are willing to pay

the un importance of chapter 7 wealth exemption levels this paper examines the effects of the chapter 7 wealth exemption level on welfare bankruptcy filings debt and on asset holdings i build a heterogeneous agent life cycle model which features uninsurable income and expense shocks moreover households can borrow and save simultaneously when a borrower defaults on her debt by filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy she can keep her assets up to the wealth exemption level wealth exemption levels are important for two reasons first they explain the extensive and intensive margin of the credit card debt puzzle around thirty percent of borrowers both in the model and in the data who borrow at high interest rates simultaneously save at low interest rates however these borrowers borrow and save only relatively small amounts a few thousand u s dollars second ignoring the exemption level biases results because it overstates the costs of defaulting the welfare gains from chapter 7 compared to the european system where debt is not discharged are twice as high when exemption levels are positive compared to when they are ignored at the same time wealth exemption levels are unimportant in the sense that they have an impact only at low exemption levels the effects of increases in the exemption level fade out very quickly there is no strong positive relationship between exemption levels which vary across u s states and default rates in the model this is in contrast to the previous literature but consistent with the data the reason is that those borrowers who might default do not own much wealth therefore only very few households are affected by increases in the exemption level

unsecured credit markets are not insurance markets abstract we study the extent to which unsecured credit markets have altered the transmission of increased income risk to consumption variability over the past several decades we find that unsecured credit markets pass through increased income risk to consumption irrespective of bankruptcy policy and the information possessed by lenders if risk sharing has indeed improved over this period the reasons do not therefore lie in the unsecured credit market

risk based pricing of interest rates for consumer loans abstract by focusing on observable default risk s role in loan terms and the subsequent consequences for household behavior this paper shows that lenders increasingly used risk based pricing of interest rates in consumer loan markets during the mid 1990s it tests three resulting predictions first the premium paid per unit of risk should have increased over this period second debt levels should have reacted accordingly third fewer high risk households should have been denied credit further contributing to the interest rate spread between the highest and lowest risk borrowers for people obtaining loans the premium paid per unit of risk did indeed become significantly larger after the mid 1990s for example for a 0 01 increase in the probability of bankruptcy the corresponding interest rate increase tripled for first mortgages doubled for automobile loans and rose nearly six fold for second mortgages additionally changes in borrowing levels and debt access reflected these new pricing practices particularly for secured debt borrowing increased most for the low risk households who saw their relative borrowing costs fall furthermore while very high risk households gained expanded access to credit the increases in their risk premiums implied that their borrowing as a whole either rose less or sometimes fell

bankruptcy and delinquency in a model of unsecured debt this article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default we observe that for individuals 60 90 days late on payments i 85 make payments during the next quarter and ii 40 reduce their debt to understand these facts we develop a quantitative model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers typically offering partial debt forgiveness instead of a blanket imposition of the penalty rates most unsecured credit contracts specify

default and punishment in general equilibrium we extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools the equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates along with the usual prices of assets and commodities by reinterpreting the variables our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates it also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets we show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model and that default in conjunction with refinement opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets the market chooses the promises default penalties and quantity constraints of actively traded assets

credit limits and bankruptcy abstract credit cards offer a limit rather than a specific loan size at a pre approved interest rate this paper studies the determination of these credit limits jointly with default in the presence of one period debt i adapt the standard incomplete markets macroeconomic model of one period unsecured debt with the optimal choice of credit limit endogenous limits and positive default coexist a numerical exercise illustrates the consequences of various factors for indebtedness credit limits and bankruptcy

debt relief and debtor outcomes measuring the effects of consumer bankruptcy protection consumer bankruptcy is one of the largest social insurance programs in the united states but little is known about its impact on debtors we use 500 000 bankruptcy filings matched to administrative tax and foreclosure data to estimate the impact of chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on subsequent outcomes exploiting the random assignment of bankruptcy filings to judges we find that chapter 13 protection increases annual earnings by 5 562 decreases five year mortality by 1 2 percentage points and decreases five year foreclosure rates by 19 1 percentage points these results come primarily from the deterioration of outcomes among dismissed filers not gains by granted filers jel d14 i12 j22 j31 k35

consumer durables and risky borrowing the effects of bankruptcy protection abstract there exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across u s states this paper exploits cross state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self insurance against bad shocks to earnings the generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth the gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small a more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle in addition the optimal level of exemption is positive but low

personal bankruptcy and credit market competition we document a link between u s credit supply and rising personal bankruptcy rates we exploit the exogenous variation in market contestability brought on by banking deregulation the relaxation of entry restrictions in the 1980s and 1990s at the state level we find deregulation explains at least 10 of the rise in bankruptcy rates we also find that deregulation leads to increased lending lower loss rates on loans and higher lending productivity our findings indicate that increased competition prompted banks to adopt sophisticated credit rating technology allowing for new credit extension to existing and previously excluded households the last quarter century saw a dramatic increase in the share of u s con sumers filing for personal bankruptcy thereby seeking a discharge of their unsecured debt in 2005 this increase led to the most comprehensive change to u s bankruptcy law since 1978 while several causes for the rise in bankruptcies have been advanced and it is the subject of ongoing research two potentially significant changes occurred during this period banking deregulation the relaxation of bank entry restrictions in the 1980s and 1990s and technological change in consumer lending banking deregulation by removing barriers to entry increases credit market competition and there fore affects the supply of credit new screening technologies change the way loans are made allowing for interest rates to better reflect underlying risk and thus facilitating lending to riskier borrowers in this paper we examine whether banking deregulation and technological change played a role in the increase in consumer bankruptcy the empirical literature has mostly focused on cross sectional differences in personal bankruptcy in particular it has revolved around legal institutions as a way to answer whether consumers file due to adverse events as part of a rational financial calculation or as a consequence of unfair or deceptive lending practices usually researchers have exploited the different asset exemptions across u s states i e the amount of personal assets protected from creditors

liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets this paper compares two different models in a common environment the first model has liquidity constraints in that consumers save a single asset that they cannot sell short the second model has debt constraints in that consumers cannot borrow so much that they would want to default but is otherwise a standard complete markets model both models share the features that individuals are unable to completely insure against idiosyncratic shocks and that interest rates are lower than subjective discount rates in a stochastic environment the two models have quite different dynamic properties with the debt constrained model exhibiting simple stochastic steady states while the liquidity constrained model has greater persistence of shocks

commercial industrial customer response to time of use electricity prices some experimental results this article analyzes a time of use pricing experiment involving over 700 small and medium size commercial industrial firms two basic rate structures were implemented one with time varying demand kw charges and a flat energy kwh charge and the other with time varying energy charges and a flat kw charge a small but statistically significant elasticity of substitution between peak and offpeak kwh consumption is estimated for the summer season in the overall sample for firms facing the time of use demand rate a substantially larger response is estimated in the summer season for the subgroup of large firms in the experiment that faced a time of use demand rate and this response translates into a welfare gain that in just the first year more than offsets the additional metering costs involved under mandatory implementation

income redistribution consumer credit and keeping up with the riches in this study we set up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with upward looking consumption comparison and show that consumption externalities are an important driver of consumer credit dynamics our model economy is populated by two different household types investors who hold the economy s capital stock own the firms and supply credit and workers who supply labor and demand credit to finance consumption furthermore workers condition their consumption choice on the investors level of consumption we estimate the model and find a significant keeping up mechanism by matching business cycle statistics in reproducing credit moments our proposed model significantly outperforms a model version in which we abstract from consumption externalities

consumer bankruptcy a fresh start consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck but by driving up interest rates makes life cycle smoothing more difficult we argue that to assess this trade off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features life cycle component idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty and expense uncertainty exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets we find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules more persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect our findings suggest the current us bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values jel d14 d91 k35

welfare implications of the bankruptcy reform act of 1999 abstract in recent years personal bankruptcy has become an important issue to consumers creditors and legislators alike over 40 billion dollars of unsecured debt were discharged in 1998 by 1 44 million households these losses have led legislators to propose a variety of changes in bankruptcy law the most important and recent of which is the bankruptcy reform act of 1999 ba99 i develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of personal bankruptcy to investigate the trade off between the consumption smoothing role of bankruptcy and the interest rate and deadweight costs it imposes i find that stringent means tests would reduce filing rates only slightly and would have only modest welfare consequences on the other hand the elimination of bankruptcy altogether is found to have substantial benefits this result is robust to income shock persistence and to stringency in the application of means tests

borrowing during unemployment unsecured debt as a safety net this paper examines whether unsecured credit markets help disadvantaged households supplement temporary shortfalls in earnings by investigating how unsecured debt responds to unemployment induced earnings losses results indicate that very low asset households those in the bottom decile of total assets do not borrow in response to these shortfalls however other low asset households do borrow increasing unsecured debt by more than 11 cents per dollar of earnings lost in contrast wealthy households do not increase unsecured debt during unemployment the evidence suggests that very low asset households do not have sufficient access to unsecured credit to smooth consumption over transitory unemployment spells

household debt and income inequality 1963 2003 i construct an economy with heterogeneous agents that mimics the time series behavior of the earnings distribution in the united states from 1963 to 2003 agents face aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and accumulate real and financial assets i estimate the shocks that drive the model using data on income inequality aggregate income and measures of financial liberalization i show how the model economy can replicate two empirical facts the trend and cyclical behavior of household debt and the diverging patterns in consumption and wealth inequality over time while business cycle fluctuations can account for the short run changes in household debt its prolonged rise of the 1980s and the 1990s can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality

learning and the dynamics of consumer unsecured debt and bankruptcies during the great moderation the consumer unsecured debt to income ratio nearly doubled and the personal bankruptcy filing rate more than quadrupled this historically tranquil period ended in 2008 with a severe recession and a protracted credit crunch we develop a theory of learning in which consumers and lenders adjust their beliefs about the riskiness of the economic environment over time in response to the realized sequence of aggregate shocks and then embed it into an otherwise standard quantitative model of consumer default simulations of the model suggest that learning can explain as much as half of the recent boom and bust cycle in consumer unsecured debt and a modest fraction of the rise in bankruptcy filings prior to 2005

union behavior industry rents and optimal policies abstract this paper examines the welfare gains from strategic industrial policy in the u s steel industry focusing on the role of capacity utilization and the potential gains from capturing labor rents with underutilized capacity strategic policies to capture labor rents lead to an endogenous response that diminishes their importance on the other hand reducing domestic labor market distortions results in welfare gains nearly as large as those from the optimal subsidy this suggests that the focus on labor rents as the subject of industrial policy is overstated at least in manufacturing industries such as integrated steel

what happens when information leaves a market evidence from postbankruptcy consumers federal law mandates the removal of personal bankruptcies from credit reports after 10 years the removal s effect is market efficiency in reverse the short term effect is a spurious boost in apparent creditworthiness especially for the more creditworthy bankrupts delivering a substantial increase in both credit scores and the number and aggregate limit of bank cards the longer term effect is lower scores and higher delinquency than initial full information scores predict these findings relate to both the debate over the bankruptcy code and the wisdom of influencing market clearing by removing information

recent developments in consumer credit and default literature consumer credit and default literature this survey discusses recent contributions to the quantitative literature on unsecured consumer debt and default and some ongoing challenges for the literature key topics include the sources of the rise in personal bankruptcies the importance of asymmetric information and the effects of developments in information technologies on consumer credit markets delinquency and informal bankruptcy debt collection and restructuring of distressed debt the cyclical behavior of consumer debt and default and the insurance role of household debt implications for welfare analysis and policy design are discussed several theoretical contributions and approaches to modeling the consumer credit markets are also highlighted

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

an empirical analysis of personal bankruptcy and delinquency this article uses a new dataset of credit card accounts to analyze credit card delinquency personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models we estimate duration models for default and assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting default we investigate how the propensity to default has changed over time disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default rates a deterioration in the risk composition of borrowers versus an increase in borrowers willingness to default due to declines in default costs even after controlling for risk composition and economic fundamentals the propensity to default significantly increased between 1995 and 1997 standard default models missed an important time varying default factor consistent with a decline in default costs debt issued by consumers is an understudied asset class there has been particularly little academic study of recent trends in default on this debt between 1994 and 1997 the number of personal bankruptcy filings in the united states rose by about 75 the 1 35 million filings in 1997 represented well over 1 of u s households delinquency rates on credit cards rose almost as sharply federal reserve bank of cleveland 1998 the resulting losses to lenders amounted to a sizable fraction of the interest payments they collect potentially raising the average cost of credit these trends in default both in bankruptcy and delinquency are especially surprising in light of the strong economy over the period they provide an unusually rich source of variation to test the stability of models that forecast personal default and of credit risk models more generally there are two leading explanations for these trends first the risk composition of borrowers might have worsened under the risk effect less

minimal adjustment costs and the optimal choice of inputs under time of use electricity rates in time of use tou pricing schemes utilities charge rates that depend on the time of day and the season of the year at which electricity is used estimates of the effects of tou rates on business customers in the u s and israel demonstrate that most firms do not appear to respond at all to newly introduced tou rates but those that do respond make substantial adjustments in this paper we show that adjustment costs associated with changing the level of employment can explain the observed pattern of behavior in the u s and israel we apply our model to large industrial firms in israel and show that it predicts their actual responses to tou rates quite well

macroeconomic effects of bankruptcy and foreclosure policies i study the implications of two major debt relief policies in the united states the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act bapcpa and the home affordable refinance program harp

savings and wealth accumulation measurement influences and institutions savings and wealth accumulation type main savings and wealth accumulation are important dimensions of policy and research debates this special issue comprises a collection of survey articles on topical issues ranging from the effects of access to credit the rise of islamic finance and sovereign wealth funds the measurement of wealth inequality and genuine savings the distribution of wealth across generations and retirement savings

the household bankruptcy decision personal bankruptcy filings have risen from 0 3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1 35 percent in 1998 and 1999 transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event lenders lost about 39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy filings but economists have little understanding of why households file for bankruptcy or why filings have increased so rapidly until very recently studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult because no household level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings in this paper we use new data from the panel study of income dynamics which includes information on bankruptcy filings to estimate a model of households bankruptcy decisions we find support for the strategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households are more likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher our model predicts that an increase of 1 000 in households financial benefit from bankruptcy would result in a 7 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings our model also predicts that if the 1997 national bankruptcy review commission s proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented there would be a 16 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings each year but if the 100 000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the u s senate were adopted our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of filings we find little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households file when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay finally controlling for state and time fixed effects our model shows that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate filing rates

efficiency and the role of default when security markets are incomplete this paper argues that default plays an important positive role in the economy if markets are incomplete and traders are only able to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute regardless of future events contingent contracting may be severely restricted moreover opening new markets may not relieve these restrictions default promotes efficiency in a way that opening new markets does not by making it possible for traders to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute with high probability but not with certainty copyright 1993 by american economic association

why don t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages redefaults self cures and securitization we document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007 having performed payment reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans we show that this reluctance does not result from securitization servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation including the one most likely to be affected by securitization and to different definitions of delinquency our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small and for subprime loans we use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation and self cure risk the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will become current without renegotiation make renegotiation unattractive to investors

savings and wealth accumulation measurement influences and institutions savings and wealth accumulation are important dimensions of policy and research debates this special issue comprises a collection of survey articles on topical issues ranging from the effects of access to credit the rise of islamic finance and sovereign wealth funds the measurement of wealth inequality and genuine savings the distribution of wealth across generations and retirement savings

the importance of adverse selection in the credit card market evidence from randomized trials of credit card solicitations analyzing unique data from multiple large scale randomized marketing trials of preapproved credit card solicitations by a large financial institution we find that consumers responding to the lender s inferior solicitation offers have poorer credit quality attributes this finding supports the argument that riskier type borrowers are liquidity or credit constrained and thus have higher reservation loan interest rates we also find a more severe deterioration ex post in the credit quality of the booked accounts of inferior offer types relative to superior offers after controlling for a cardholder s observable risk attributes demographic characteristics and adverse economic shocks we find that cardholders who responded to the inferior credit card offers are significantly more likely to default ex post our results provide evidence on the importance of adverse selection effects in the credit card market

optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable this paper analyzes choice theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur an intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions the goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts the paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable theorem 1 in contrast stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex ante optimal decisions theorem 2 the paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect bayesian nash equilibrium

u s consumer bankruptcy choice the importance of general equilibrium effects abstract we study the implications of u s personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare our analysis shows that general equilibrium considerations along with bankruptcy chapter choice and production matter crucially for the effects of policy reform contrary to previous work we find that completely eliminating bankruptcy provisions causes significant declines in output and welfare by reducing capital formation and labor input furthermore subjecting chapter 7 filers to means testing as suggested by recent legislative proposals would not improve upon current bankruptcy provisions and at best leave aggregate filings output and welfare unchanged however we do find that an alternative tightening of chapter 7 in the form of lower asset exemptions can increase economic efficiency

using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions this article studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions for risk averse borrowers who use unsecured contracts but have the possibility of defaulting in a large class of economies knowledge of four variables is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal or should be increased or decreased these variables are 1 the composition of households liabilities 2 the sensitivity of the credit supply schedule to exemption changes 3 the probability of filing for bankruptcy with non exempt assets and 4 the value given by households to a marginal dollar in different states which can be mapped to changes in households consumption i recover empirical estimates of the sufficient statistics using u s data over the period 2008 16 and find that increasing exemption levels improves overall welfare although there is substantial variation in estimated welfare gains across u s states and income quintiles

fresh start or head start uniform bankruptcy exemptions and welfare abstract the 1990s witnessed a historically unprecedented number of personal bankruptcy filings in response congressional debate over bankruptcy law has recently led to several proposals aimed at making it more difficult to exempt wealth in a bankruptcy in this paper i evaluate uniform exemption policy primarily within the context of the recent congressional proposal h r 975 i develop an incomplete markets model where secured and unsecured assets coexist and are treated differentially in a bankruptcy proceeding i find that exemptions are associated positively with filing rates equity holdings in bankruptcy and welfare i find however that exemptions are strongly negatively associated with the availability of unsecured credit nonetheless the welfare effects of exemptions result from changes in borrowing costs changes in an implicit tax on self insurance and most crucially changes in the level of state contingency provided by unsecured debt as a quantitative matter these effects are resolved in a favor of a minor but positive role for exemptions

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked