the role of monitoring of corruption in a simple endogenous growth model i introduction during the last 30 years economists from various fields have contributed to the analysis of corruption the first paper to receive widespread attention was published in 1975 rose ackerman 1975 since then a large literature has developed and much attention has been paid to the relationship between corruption and economic growth in the analysis of the consequences of corruption the literature supports two opposing positions on one hand common wisdom views corruption as an obstacle sand to development and growth on the other hand other researchers since the pioneering works of left 1964 and huntington 1968 have suggested that corruption may promote efficiency by allowing firms to bypass government failures of various sorts grease corruption more recent expositions of efficiency enhancing corruption can be found in lui 1985 acemoglu and verdier 1998 2000 and barreto 2000 barreto 2000 presents a simple neoclassical endogenous growth model where the public sector s monopolistic position is explicitly considered results indicate that a corruption equilibrium is characterized by lower growth rates compared to the ideal situation in which public goods are provided competitively barreto 2000 also shows that if the public sector is subject to significant bureaucratic red tape all of the agents within the economy may prefer the corruption equilibrium as corruption can bypass bureaucratic obstacles from a theoretical point of view there are several ways in which corruption may reduce economic growth corruption can act as a tax and thus lower incentives to invest corruption could cause talented people to engage in rent seeking rather than productive activities corruption may distort the composition of government expenditure as corrupt politicians could be expected to invest in large non productive projects from which considerable bribes can be extracted more easily than from productive activities empirical analysis has also provided evidence of the negative effects of corruption on economic growth mauro 1995 shows that corruption reduces economic growth via reduced private investment 1 similar results are obtained by keefer and knack 1995 using other measures of corruption and a different selection of countries 2 recently the grease the wheels hypothesis has been tested and statistically supported see aidt 2009 campos dimova and ahmad 2010 meon and sekkat 2005 among others in this article we develop a theoretical endogenous growth model which incorporates corruption in our model the social loss brought about by corruption stems from the fact that firms must bribe a bureaucrat in order to invest and consequently devote fewer resources to the accumulation of capital therefore in our model corruption has a negative effect on private investment other models share our framework ehrlich and lui 1999 claim that individuals have an incentive to compete over the privilege of becoming bureaucrats the so called investment in political capital since they obtain economic rents through corruption this investment in political capital consumes economic resources which could otherwise be used for production or investment in human capital in del monte and papagni 2001 corruption arises when bureaucrats manage public resources to produce public goods and services corruption reduces the quality of public infrastructure resulting in a negative effect on economic growth the novel feature of this article is the study of the impact of monitoring of corruption on economic growth 3 in our theoretical model we derive a nonlinear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth as well as between corruption and economic growth 4 at low monitoring levels the economy experiences widespread corruption and medium growth rates whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels but low growth rates are recorded

competitive investment in higher education the need for policy coordination abstract when aggregate advanced skills determine an economy s capacity to attract external capital they function as an impure public good education subsidies are indicated but nash equilibrium in education policies yields excessive subsidies if the supply of capital is not elastic

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

the culture of corruption tax evasion and economic growth this study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth the model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries the calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates the corruption associated with public investment projects and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue the presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant but not large negative effects on economic growth the relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross country data the model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare jel h3 o4

credibility of policies versus credibility of policymakers standard models of policy credibility defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility whether a policy is carried out however will also reflect the state of the economy we present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no devaluation pledge in subsequent periods we test this implication on ems interest rates and find support for our hypothesis

endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model abstract the following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent the model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income consumption and growth are identifiable bureaucratic red tape is then added to the model the results suggest that a priori corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution

corruption fertility and human capital abstract we build an overlapping generations model in which reproductive households face a child quantity child quality trade off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital by integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth corruption and fertility choices we show that the negative relation between fertility and economic development may also be affected by differences in the magnitude of bureaucratic corruption

wage inflation electoral uncertainty and the exchange rate regime theory and uk evidence the authors extend the rational partisan model of inflation to allow for the effects of unemployment persistence on the dynamics of inflation the authors combine this model with the exchange rate regime model of inflation and examine the experience of the united kingdom outside the fixed exchange rate regime of bretton woods persistently high inflation can be attributed to the failure of political parties to precommit to price stability in the light of unemployment persistence election times are associated with higher inflation with the exception of the thatcher period there is no evidence that the labour party is in general more tolerant to inflation than the conservatives copyright 1992 by royal economic society

the incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development abstract economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth bribery and tax evasion corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government these incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which in turn depends on the incidence of corruption the model produces multiple development regimes transition between which may or may not occur in accordance with recent empirical evidence the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

a macroeconomic model on the quality of government and economic performance i introduction the empirical analysis of hall and jones 1999 suggests that the fundamental determinant of a country s economic performance is its social infrastructure the institutions and government policies that provide incentives for individuals those incentives can encourage productive activity or predatory behavior like rent seeking and corruption although suppression of rent seeking appears to be most efficient if it is carried out by the government the power to make and enforce rules makes the government itself particularly prone to expropriation for instance while bureaucrats protect property by suppressing private rent seeking that interferes with productive activity they may also seek rents themselves by soliciting bribes from citizens 1 how do the efficiency of bureaucrats in protecting property rights and the degree of their corruption affect the relative rewards received by producers private rent seekers and bureaucrats and how does the reward structure interact with the allocation of talent between productive and unproductive activity and hence influence a country s economic performance 2 to address the above issues we work with an essentially standard macroeconomic model of production and trade externality based on the work of diamond 1982 in which productive activity is subject to private and public expropriation private rent seekers and bureaucrats do not produce they are completely dependent on producers efforts one important feature is the presence of a negative externality the unproductive activity exerts on the relative rewards that determine the allocation of agent across activity see murphy shleifer and vishny 1993 we first consider as a benchmark a model where the size of bureaucracy is exogenously given and then endogenize it as an individual s choice under an exogenous bureaucracy an agent chooses to be a producer or a private rent seeker producers conduct transactions in the decentralized markets more productive activity yields higher returns to both producers and private rent seekers and this strategic complementarity results in multiple pareto rankable equilibria the equilibrium with a larger population of producers and less rent seeking features higher welfare by choosing a small size of bureaucracy the government can establish the superior equilibrium as the unique outcome that also achieves the constrained optimum social welfare however is decreasing in the size of bureaucracy in this equilibrium the implication is that the smaller the size of bureaucracy the higher the welfare the optimal size of bureaucracy depends on two opposite influences on producers incentives one is the positive effect through better property rights protection the other includes various negative effects as a result of corruption tax burdens and the fact that resources taken up in the public sector could otherwise be devoted to production if the population of bureaucrats is endogenously determined equilibria exist as long as bureaucrats efficiency is high and corruption is low the equilibrium with a larger bureaucracy is associated with higher production and welfare the reason is that with sufficient efficiency in deterring private rent seeking and low corruption a larger bureaucracy makes private production more profitable by reducing resources allocated to private rent seeking and the resulting externality further improves the relative rewards to productive activity in general the equilibrium size of the bureaucracy is not optimal one resulting implication is that for the equilibrium with a smaller bureaucracy society would benefit by increasing the size of bureaucracy despite the fact that bureaucrats are corrupt many believe that the size of government is an important factor for determining economic performance however hall and jones 1999 p 111 argue that the characteristics of an economy such as the size of government should better be thought as outcomes rather than determinants

endogenous growth and government debt the feasibility of the policy of perpetual debt financing given a particular path for expenditures and taxation has been questioned over the years sargent and wallace 17 argue that such a policy is not feasible in the sense that the debt gnp ratio will explode mccallum 8 and darby 2 argue that this policy will be feasible if and only if the long run growth rate of gnp exceeds the after tax real interest rate this particular condition was derived under the assumption of ricardian equivalence where the growth rate of gnp and the interest rate are exogenously given and are not affected by the path of debt miller and sargent 9 and weil 20 make the point that once the assumption of ricardian equivalence is dropped then simple comparisons of long run growth rates and interest rates are not sufficient to determine stability tirole 19 and o connell and zeldes 10 demonstrate in diamond s 3 model without ricardian equivalence that ponzi games such as this are feasible if and only if the economy is dynamically inefficient without debt all of these studies assume that the long run growth rate of gnp is exogenously given this assumption is particularly strong in the absence of ricardian equivalence in a separate literature a new generation of equilibrium growth models has recently been developed with positive sustained growth in the long run equilibrium in these models long run growth is endogenously determined rather than being imposed on the model as some exogenously given process 7 11 12 14 15 1 all of these models find some way of introducing increasing returns to scale into the neoclassical growth model and yet preserving the fact that it can be interpreted as a decentralized equilibrium this paper considers the feasibility of perpetual debt financing in an economy where the growth rate of gnp is endogenously determined and is a function of debt levels the model of endogenous growth presented here is a modified version of the one given in prescott and boyd 12 this particular model is chosen for two reasons first agents live for finite lengths of time so ricardian equivalence will not hold in general in this model also the production function is linear in the capital stock as will become clear below this implies that the equilibrium paths of the state variables can be characterized as first order linear difference equations

insider power unemployment dynamics and multiple inflation equilibria this paper incorporates employment dynamics due to insider power into the barro gordon theory of inflation unlike in the static barro gordon case and even though our infinitehorizon model is linear quadratic there can be two markov perfect equilibria so that the same unemployment may correspond to either low or high inflation both equilibrium inflation rates measured per unit of the gap between the insiders and government s employment targets are higher than the corresponding rate in the static case the low inflation equilibrium has intuitive comparative statics properties in that inflation is increasing in insider power and the discount factor but the high inflation equilibrium behaves in the opposite way the highinflation equilibrium can be eliminated by a future precommitment to a fixed inflation regime e g erm but only if this precommitment can be made with certainty contrary to the static model inflation may be lower when the union puts a positive weight on a wage target than when it cares only about employment even when this wage target is consistent with a lower employment level than the employment target

monetary policy cooperation and multiple equilibria abstract we consider international monetary policy regimes in a world of two identical economies characterized by unemployment persistence in the non cooperative regime markov perfect nash equilibrium policies are generally not unique furthermore policies may be asymmetric in this otherwise symmetric model monetary policy cooperation also exhibits multiple equilibria but these are fewer and always symmetric cooperation may be counterproductive or beneficial for either country depending upon the initial non cooperative and resulting cooperative outcome

sustaining policy cooperation between economies of different size abstract i consider an example of a two country model featuring national heterogeneity and demonstrate that heterogeneity plays an important role for the countries gains from international policy cooperation and just as important for the incentives to break the cooperative agreement i find that national heterogeneity unambiguously reduces trigger strategies support for policy cooperation in other words the more countries differ the harder it is to sustain policy cooperation

intergenerational earnings mobility inequality and growth abstract we examine a model in which per capita income inequality intergenerational mobility and returns to education are all determined endogenously individuals earn wages depending on their ability which is a random variable they purchase an education with transfers received from their parents and are subject to liquidity constraints in the model multiple steady state equilibria are possible countries with identical tastes and technologies can reach differing rates of mobility inequality and per capita income equilibria with higher levels of output also have lower inequality higher mobility and more efficient distribution of education

endogenous growth with public education abstract we investigate balanced aggregate growth in a model in which new knowledge is produced as an intermediate input and becomes embodied in all workers knowledge is a public input in the public goods sense we examine the institutional arrangement of taxing all labor income to pay for new knowledge production an optimal tax rate is characterized

education technologies wages and technological progress abstract we analyze the worker s incentives to acquire skills under technological progress when the costs of education are endogenous and depend on the wage distribution we show that the agent s intergenerational elasticity of substitution plays then a relevant role in determining how incentives and the long run wage distribution react to technological progress moreover whenever poverty traps of unskilled workers exist higher rates of technological progress can even decrease the incentives of low skill workers to acquire skills we also analyze the effects of educational subsidies in contrast with previous analytical findings we obtain that subsidies always decrease the long run skill premium finally we study the efficiency of the resulting competitive equilibria

bargaining a monetary union abstract two governments bargain over the benefits of a monetary union in a cash in advance world a novel feature of the model is that because households trade every period market behavior affects and is affected by the government negotiations as a result in addition to objective costs of delay market expectations about the bargaining outcome emerge as crucial determinants of a monetary union there is a continuum of bargaining outcomes indexed by market expectations some outcomes imply that the monetary union is delayed for an arbitrary number of periods journal of economic literature classification numbers f4 c7

clientelism corruption and the allocation of resources corruption has been shown to have more serious effects upon allocation than simply drawing resources into rent seeking activities if politicians anticipate gains from corruption in the policy making process sub optimal policies will be the result typical examples include excessive nationalization of industry excessive regulation of the private sector through practices such as licensing and quotas with a view to extract the rent created by these measures in addition further misallocation will result at the execution state it has been shown that the revisionists were wrong in assuming that licenses and contracts will be allocated to the most efficient producers that rent will be eliminated in government employment and that corruption increases the efficiency of the bureaucracy moreover differential access to government services leads to additional allocative losses

corruption and the environmental kuznets curve empirical evidence for sulfur abstract we investigate how corruption influences the income level at the turning point of the relationship between sulfur emissions and income using a wide cross national panel of countries at different levels of development and with different degrees of corruption our results support the environmental kuznets curve hypothesis for sulfur we find evidence that the higher the country s degree of corruption the higher the per capita income at the turning point suggesting different income pollution paths across countries due to corruption we build upon a new specification for the ekc developed by bradford et al 2005 that avoids using nonlinear transformations of potentially nonstationary regressors in panel estimation also we account for the indirect impact of corruption on emissions through its impact on per capita income our main findings remain unchanged when we investigate additional heterogeneity allowing for different income slopes across richer and poorer countries

endogenous formation of coalitions the formation of coalitions is a fundamental problem in game theory by a coalition is meant a group of players e g economic or political agents which decide to act together as one unit relative to the rest of the players this includes the instances of syndicates unions cartels blocks political parties parliamentary coalitions etc we would like to emphasize that forming a coalition does not eliminate the individual players as decision makers in all interactions with the other players coalition members act as one unit it may be useful to think of a representative agent taking their place 2 however this arrangement will continue only as long as each player finds it desirable to act this way further bargaining occurs among the members of each coalition on how to divide what they obtained together thus the existence of coalitions implies that the interactions among the players will be conducted on two levels first among the coalitions and second within each coalition most of the existing models in economics and game theory assume that the coalition structure is given exogenously instead we try here to obtain it as an endogenous outcome of our model namely we want to be able to predict which coalitions will in fact form in each given situation 3 our theory combines two kinds of game theoretic concepts value and stability the basic idea is first to evaluate the players prospects in the various coalition structures and then based on these values to find which ones are stable we will call this value coalition structure value or cs value for short the reason we are considering coalition structures i e partitions of the set of players into disjoint coalitions rather than just coalitions is that in general players may find it to their advantage to join forces in some situations and to act separately in others all depending on the way the other participants are organized this implies that both the value and the stability concepts should depend on the entire coalition structure the cs value we analyze in this paper was first developed by owen 7

corruption as an occupational choice endogenous corruption and tax policy corruption is endemic in many countries and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously we endogenize corruption as an occupational choice workers choose private or public employment public employees can be honest or corrupt corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self esteem those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt when a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate the economy has two self sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue an increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high corruption equilibrium paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low corruption equilibrium

the forward method as a solution refinement in rational expectations models this paper generalizes the standard forward method of recursive substitution to a general class of linear rational expectations models with potentially multiple fundamental solutions we propose a key property embedded in the forward solution the no bubble condition as an economically sensible solution renement in the class of fundamental solutions in the literature the no bubble condition has been assumed to rule out non fundamental bubble solutions however since the condition involves expectations of the future endogenous variables it must be veried for every rational expectations equilibrium we show that the forward solution is the only fundamental solution satisfying the no bubble condition and that it is hard to justify economically fundamental solutions violating this condition we provide several economic examples where the fundamental solutions obtained by other solution methods and rened by other solution selection criteria violate

corruption and international trade an empirical investigation of african countries this paper attempts to estimate the effect of corruption on the flows of exports and imports of african countries using the gravity model approach and annual data for the period 1998 2007 we obtain negative and statistically significant correlations between the values of exports and imports and the levels of corruption in africa and trading partners thus the results support the view that corruption adversely affects international trade our estimates suggest that if a country with africa s average corruption perception index of 2 8 were to improve its corruption level to botswana s 5 9 its exports would improve by about 15 per cent and imports by about 27 per cent

a limit theorem for the core of betrand oligopoly games with externalities abstract this paper formulates the concept of betrand oligopoly partition games furthermore it is demonstrated that such well defined games have positive externalities more importantly the core is proved to approximate the equal division solution in infinite markets

monetary policy games inflationary bias and openness abstract when a country s central bank has higher output objectives than those of wage setters the noncooperative nash equilibrium contains an inflationary bias which is higher the flatter the economy s aggregate supply curve an economy s openness from the input side is an exogenous observable characteristic that provides a direct way of testing the theory when the imported intermediate goods displace capital labor in production a higher degree of openness flattens steepens the economy s aggregate supply curve and increases decreases the inflationary bias

rent seeking and growth the case of growth through human capital accumulation this paper follows the work of h uzawa 1965 and r e lucas 1988 by presenting an endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation as the engine of growth agents make time allocation decisions in an economy where quantitative restrictions are employed in the trade regime agents may allocate time to obtain valuable import licences the effect of this activity on the growth rate is found to be dependent upon whether agents specialize in the rent seeking activity when agents do not specialize the rent seeking activity reduces growth by reducing the incentive to accumulate productive human capital

fiscal centralization versus decentralization growth and welfare effects of spillovers leviathan taxation and capital mobility abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods leviathan taxation and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare we show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth however the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non monotonic and displays a hump shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition some tax competition is desirable but fierce tax competition may be harmful we also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare as in previous studies however if spillovers are below this critical level capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems

economic underdevelopment the case of a missing market for human capital abstract this paper demonstrates that the coexistence of developed and underdeveloped countries can be a stationary equilibrium in a world economy with free trade in consumption goods and physical capital an underdeveloped country is characterized by a high ratio of unskilled workers in the labor force a small stock of physical capital a low gross national product a high rate of return on human capital and a corresponding large wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers the critical assumptions are that future labor earnings cannot serve as collateral on a loan and indivisibilities in education

fiscal federalism decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis the theoretical literature on fiscal federalism has identified several channels through which government decentralization could affect economic growth much of the literature focuses on the efficiency aspects of a decentralized provision of public services but decentralization may also increase growth by raising the ability of the political system to innovate and carry out reforms in contrast some authors argue that decentralization increases corruption and government inefficiency and thus may diminish growth given this theoretical ambiguity several studies have attempted to identify the effect of decentralization on economic growth empirically over the last two decades we review and conduct a meta analysis of this empirical literature based on our analysis we point out open questions and discuss possible ways to answer them jel h77 043 c52 i introduction building on various theoretical contributions an empirical literature analyzing the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth has emerged since the 1990s the relevant studies vary as to whether they use cross sectional time series or panel data as to whether they rely on cross country or single country samples and they vary in estimation methods decentralization measures and sample composition given the size and heterogeneity of the empirical literature it is useful to review the individual studies and summarize their main findings conducting a comprehensive search we identify 31 published and unpublished studies on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth each of these studies estimates several models resulting in over 400 individual estimates while we first review these studies in a traditional manner our main aim is to analyze these estimates quantitatively specifically the main contribution of this article is to offer a meta analysis of the empirical findings on fiscal decentralization and economic growth a meta analysis is a useful methodology in our context as it is difficult to obtain clear cut conclusions with only a traditional survey of empirical literature the individual studies vary substantially in their characteristics and correspondingly in the findings they report by conducting a meta analysis however we can identify how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular study relate to its findings the meta analysis approach thus addresses model uncertainty with regard to each individual estimate in addition it can also serve as a partial response to the methodological critique of empirical research on fiscal decentralization by rodden 2004 as it helps to clarify the quantitative effects of different decentralization measures and estimation techniques finally as meta analytical techniques are rarely used in economics we also aim at contributing to the further establishment of this methodology stanley 2001 2008 the next section briefly discusses the various theoretical arguments as to why fiscal decentralization may affect economic growth we then provide a short traditional survey of the empirical studies in section iii we review this literature more systematically and quantitatively in section iv in section v we report the results of meta regressions and discuss how the idiosyncratic characteristics of a given study are related to its specific findings finally section vi provides a discussion of the results and some conclusions ii how could fiscal federalism affect economic growth theoretical approaches within the framework of the solow swan model solow 1956 swan 1956 fiscal federalism may be associated with a different level of efficiency in governance than unitary systems leading to a different value of solow s a the level of technology a regime change toward federalism would then be associated with temporarily different growth rates and eventually different levels of income but not with persistent growth differences

ability biased technological transition wage inequality and economic growth thispaper develops a growthmodel characterizedbyability biasedtechnological transition in which the evolution of technology education attainment and wage inequality is consistent with the observed pattern in the united states and other advanced countries over the past several decades it argues that an increase in the rate of technological progress raises the return to ability and simultaneously generates an increase in wage inequality between and within groups of skilled and unskilled workers an increase in average wages of skilled workers a temporary decline in average wages of unskilled workers an increase in education and a productivity transitory slowdown

technological progress mobility and economic growth this paper analyzes the relationship between technological progress wage inequality intergenerational earnings mobility and economic growth in periods of major technological inventions a decline in the relative importance of initial conditions raises inequality enhances mobility and generates a larger concentration of high ability individuals in technologically advanced sectors stimulating future technological progress and growth however once technologies become more accessible mobility is diminished and inequality decreases but becomes more persistent the reduction in the concentration of ability in technologically advanced sectors diminishes the likelihood of technological breakthroughs and slows future growth user friendliness therefore becomes unfriendly to future economic growth copyright 1997 by american economic association

public infrastructure non cooperative investments and endogenous growth two countries strategically invest in productive infrastructure within a general equilibrium model with endogenous growth these public investments generate externalities dynamic analysis reveals that 1 under constant returns the two countries growth rates differ during the transition but are identical on the balanced growth path 2 a country with decreasing returns can experience sustained growth provided that the other country grows at a positive constant rate 3 cooperation does not necessarily lead to higher growth for each country and it can increase or decrease the gap between countries growth rates depending on the countries consumption preferences regarding domestic and foreign goods comportements non cooperatifs en matiere d investissement dans les infrastructures publiques et croissance endogene deux pays investissent strategiquement dans des infrastructures productives au sein d un modele d equilibre general avec croissance endogene ces capitaux publics generent des externalites l analyse dynamique revele que 1 quand les rendements sont constants les taux de croissance des deux pays different au cours de la transition mais sont identiques sur le sentier de croissance equilibree 2 un pays avec des rendements decroissants peut connaitre une croissance soutenue a condition que l autre croisse a un rythme constant positif 3 la cooperation ne conduit pas necessairement a une croissance plus elevee pour chaque pays et elle peut augmenter ou diminuer l ecart des taux de croissance entre les pays en fonction des preferences

international fiscal policy coordination and economic growth this paper examines the effects of policy coordination in a two country model of endogenous growth governments choose taxes to provide public inputs and public consumption goods tax rates affect the rewards to investment and rates of economic growth two regimes are examined one with independent policy making and one with policy coordination whatever the regime the choice of public inputs is always efficient without coordination however governments choose inefficient tax rates but taxes may be either higher or lower than under policy coordination as a consequence growth rates may be lower or higher than those under policy coordination copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

efficiency in coalition games with externalities a natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present we provide a condition analogous to convexity that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the appropriately defined core is nonempty moreover we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division