price inertia and market structure empirical evidence from austrian manufacturing 1993 price inertia and market structure empirical evidence from austrian manufacturing applied economics vol 25 no 9 pp 1175 1186

industry structure and the speed of price adjustment recent work has suggested that there is an association between the degree of concentration in an industry and the speed at which prices adjust to changes in prime costs cagan 8 domberger 12 13 scherer 21 p 356 and the references cited therein apart from its intrinsic interest to students of industrial economics there would seem to be three reasons for investigating this association first to see what light if any it throws upon the influence of industrial structure on the price level together with the rate and process of inflation secondly to test the assumption made in some influential studies e g godley and nordhaus 15 coutts godley and nordhaus 10 and haig and wood 18 that the size of the lag between cost and price changes is solely dependent upon the length of the fabrication production and delivery period in the various industries the third reason is a belief held by the author that distributed lag coefficients in econometric studies should be subject to analysis and not left hanging in the air as part of the development of a large scale econornetric model of the australian economy the imp model a team of researchers under the direction of dr brain at melbourne university have estimated price prime cost equations for 43 manufacturing sectors using annual data referring to the period 1948 49 1973 74 1 the estimating equation is of the form

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

macro scale economic influences on tropical forest depletion abstract the paper examines the influence of global and domestic factors on forest depletion in 45 tropical developing countries from 1967 to 1985 it links forest depletion with conditions in the international markets and with domestic macroeconomic and demographic factors calculated elasticities suggest that real exchange rate devaluation debt service food self sufficiency income and export prices of forestry and agricultural output had significant influence on the depletion of tropical forests during the study period

consistent solutions in atomless economies we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we prove for an atomless economy with possibly satiated preferences any solution that is efficient equitable and consistent must select allocations that are supported by equal budget walrasian equilibria with slack we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we search for systematic methods or solutions of resolving this problem for a solution to be considered desirable we propose that it should satisfy several requirements first it should be efficient second it should be equitable a variety of distributional require ments have been proposed in the literature the requirement we will impose here is that it select allocations at which no agent would prefer the equal division of the social endowment to his own consumption in addition to these two basic efficiency and equity conditions we require that the solution be consistent the recommendations it makes for any economy are never contra dicted by the recommendations it makes for any reduced economy obtained by allowing some subgroup of agents to leave the scene with their allotted consumptions the requirement of consistency is very natural here is a motivation for it offered by thomson 1988 consider all the resources available on the planet earth one would like not only that they be distributed fairly when the planet is considered as a whole but also that whatever resources end up in each continent country city be fairly distributed among the members of that subpopulation when considered in isolation in this paper we study economies with a large number of agents modelled as a complete atomless measure space our main result is a characterization of the solutions that satisfy all three requirements of efficiency equity and con sistency it follows from our result that under standard assumptions on preferences any such solution must select allocations that are supported by equal income walrasian equilibria however our characterization holds for more general economies since it applies to economies in which preferences are possibly satiated mas colell 1988 extended traditional general equilibrium theory to the class of such economies by introducing the notion of walrasian

globalisation transport and the environment new perspectives for ecological economics this article aims to offer an overview of key issues centred around the relationship between globalisation and transport related environmental decay in the ecological economics literature of the past decade followed by an exploration of new research endeavours the scientific contribution of 10 years of ecological economics to issues of environmental sustainability in relation to international trade and transport is certainly not impressive hence also contributions from other environmental economics journals are considered two themes which apparently have received less attention in the ecological economics literature are addressed namely 1 the influence of global trade on the environment and 2 the environmental effects of international transport induced by trade the total effect of globalisation and transportation on the environment originates from complex changes in the scale structural technological and product effects of our industrial system various conflicts between global trade transportation and the environment are pointed out on the basis of these four effects the paper argues that the net effects of these changes are still uncertain ecological economics however should contribute to the challenging task of analysing more thoroughly the effects of global trade and transport on the environment

a note on the measurement of mobility abstract this paper shows that the minimum discrimination information statistic suggested by kullback can be regarded as a measure of mobility we also show the use of the kullback measure for testing certain statistical hypotheses concerning mobility

international trade and environmental quality a survey abstract international trade has been incorporating various aspects of environmental issues since 1970 the extent to which environmental problems might affect many facets of trade or vice versa has been the subject of considerable debate over these years in this article we have attempted to establish some of the links between international trade and environmental quality by performing a comprehensive literature review we discuss issues such as establishing direct and indirect effects of international trade on environmental quality effects of trade on economic development environmental quality and energy and their relation with each other and finally the role of governments and international organizations in this context studies have so far revealed some linkages between trade and environment through conventional trade theory however interactions between international trade and types of pollution their sink and assimilative capacity need to be analyzed using a general equilibrium approach currently very little knowledge and agreement on the nature of interactions between trade theories development process and environmental quality exist existing studies have shown that the structure of environmental regulations should be modified to reflect the existence of trade under imperfect competition therefore further research on the interaction between new trade theory and environmental regulation is needed also theoretical and quantitative analysis regarding the effects of environmental regulations on competitiveness and location decision is needed the intensity and type of environmental measures vary across issues and countries therefore harmonizing environmental measures creates an inefficient atmosphere and to assume that trade restrictions will either improve or reverse the environmental damages is a serious mistake given the dynamic and intricate nature of the problem trade and environment debate continues despite vast research and poses a challenge for researchers and policy makers in the foreseeable future

trade environment and development the issues in perspective abstract this special issue on trade and the environment brings together a number of papers that are constructively critical of the conventional economic wisdom on the topic we think that this criticism is warranted because of the decidely uncritical way in which free trade has been advocated in much of the literature and especially in policy the papers analyse the validity of the underlying assumptions on which the conventional wisdom is based and provide suggestions for ways to facilitate trade that is also adequately protective of the environment sustainability and other social values in this introductory piece we discuss trade the environment and sustainability summarizing arguments in the papers included in this issue and adding a few additional points not covered by them

collusion fluctuating demand and price rigidity we study an infinitely repeated bertrand game in which an i i d demand shock occurs in each period each firm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period at the end of each period all information but the private signals becomes public we consider the optimal symmetric perfect public equilibrium sppe mainly for patient firms we show that price rigidity arises in the optimal sppe if the accuracy of the private signals is low we also study the implications of more firms and firms impatience on collusive pricing empirical evidence shows that prices in oligopolistic markets tend to be more rigid than prices in competitive markets dixon 1983 carlton 1986 this suggests that collusion may result in firms inflexible pricing behavior it is not obvious however that collusion causes price rigidity why do colluding firms not adjust prices according to changing environments by which they can potentially earn higher profits what limits colluding firms ability to coordinate thereby leading to price rigidity in this article we study how information asymmetry among firms limits colluding firms ability to respond to demand shocks and characterize the conditions under which prices are rigid specifically we consider private information about demand in an infinitely repeated bertrand game with two identical firms in which an i i d binary demand shock occurs in each period each firm receives a conditionally independent private signal about the underlying demand state at the beginning of each period and then charges a price the accuracy of private signals is measured by the probability of receiving a high respectively low signal conditional on a high respectively low underlying demand state therefore the lower the accuracy the higher the degree of informational asymmetry at the end of each period firms observe the underlying demand and the prices but they never observe their rivals signals we adopt symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe as our solution concept which requires that at each period firms pricing schemes

forest resource trade between japan and southeast asia the structure of dual decay abstract forest resource trade between southeast asia and japan has been noteworthy because of its documented effects on the deforestation of southeast asia s environment this paper expands the focus of this issue to include an examination of the effects of this trade on japanese domestic forests our goal is to redefine the scope of discussions of trade environment issues we assert that the environmental problems of the importer and the exporter can be understood as a set of structurally connected phenomena which we refer to as dual decay we examine the underlying dynamics of renewable resource trade and the effects of trade liberalization on both importers and exporters environments

false prophet or genuine savior assessing the effects of economic openness on sustainable development 1980 99 while many herald globalization the increasing interconnectedness of national economies to be associated with rising standards of living across the globe others fear its effects on sustainability antiglobalization forces and environ mentalists view these developments as a threat to the welfare of future generations because of profligate and excessive current consumption this study is the first to estimate the effects of dependence on trade foreign direct investment fdi and an index of economic freedom on the world bank s measure of sustainability the gen uine savings rate which measures the rate at which investment in the total stock of manufactured human and natural capital exceeds its depreciation contrary to pessi mists fears our indicators of economic openness show positive effects on sustain ability results that are robust to sample size testing procedure and several alternative specifications the results support those who suggest that distorted economies tend to be both inefficient and damaging to future generations if increasing trade fdi and economic freedom are hallmarks of globalization then worries about its effects on future well being are misplaced

collusive equilibrium in cournot oligopolies with unknown costs the article studies collusive equilibria in an infinitely repeated cournot oligopoly with unknown costs i look at collusive pooled perfect bayesian equilibria and separating equilibria either with signaling or with communication in the separating equilibria with signaling the firms play the strictly separating bayesian nash equilibrium in period 1 and produce the optimal incentive compatible collusive quantity vector from period 2 onwards in the separating equilibrium with communication the optimal incentive compatible quantity vector is produced from period 1 onwards among these the optimal separating equilibrium with communication gives the highest expected discounted joint profits

trade development and sustainability a critical assessment of the free trade dogma abstract mainstream economic theory argues that trade and especially free trade isbeneficial to everyone involved this fundamental idea which has the character of a dogma still plays an important role in international discussions on trade issues notably in relation to development and environment the purpose of this article is to critically assess the free trade dogma and to investigate the validity of widely used arguments concerning the relations between trade and development and between trade and environment it is argued that the trading system is not something inherently good and especially the developing countries benefits from trade have been very dubious furthermore the trading system has contributed to environmental problems in several ways e g generating undervaluation of natural resources stimulating economic growth with environmental deterioration as a consequence and magnifying and creating externalities the critical approach makes a case for reducing trade

collusion and price rigidity we consider an in nitely repeated bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each rm receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period we focus on symmetric perfect public equilibria sppe wherein any punishments are borne equally by all rms we identify a tradeoff that is associated with collusive pricing schemes in which the price to be charged by each rm is strictly increasing in its cost level such fully sorting schemes offer efficiency bene ts as they ensure that the lowest cost rm makes the current sale but they also imply an informational cost distorted pricing and or equilibrium path price wars since a higher cost rm must be deterred from mimicking a lower cost rm by charging a lower price a rigid pricing scheme where a rm s collusive price is independent of its current cost position sacri ces efficiency bene ts but also diminishes the informational cost for a wide range of settings the optimal symmetric collusive scheme requires i the absence of equilibrium path price wars and ii a rigid price if rms are sufficiently impatient however the rigid pricing scheme cannot be enforced and the collusive price of lower cost rms may be distorted downward in order to diminish the incentive to cheat when the model is modi ed to include i i d public demand shocks the downward pricing distortion that accompanies a rm s lower cost realization may occur only when current demand is high

the dynamics of willingness to consume abstract it is increasingly acknowledged that the growing consumption in the north constitutes an important part of global environmental problems to improve the possibilities of dealing with this aspect of the problems this paper explores some of the driving forces behind the growth in consumption the first section introduces the environmental debate on consumption including the relationship between final consumption and the consumption of resources the recent political acceptance of dealing with consumption and the fundamental conditions for consumption growth in the north in the following sections a cross disciplinary approach is applied in a broad search for the driving forces behind the willingness to consume throughout the exposition two questions are explored 1 why are productivity increases largely transformed into income increases instead of more leisure 2 why is such a large part of these income increases used for the consumption of goods and services with a relatively high materials intensity instead of less material intensive alternatives the explanations are divided into three groups first the economic explanations including socio economic aspects related to the institutional set up of the economy second socio psychological explanations focusing on consumption from the perspective of the human being embedded in specific social relations third historical and socio technological explanations focusing on different aspects of everyday life the paper concludes with some reflections on the political implications of the analysis

relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks abstract this paper extends levin s 2003 relational contract model by having not only the agent s cost of effort agent s type but also the value of that effort to the principal principal s type subject to i i d shocks when optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types for multiple principal types it is also pooled across those principal types when optimal effort separates some agent types for multiple principal types efforts of those agent types may be separated across principal types but then somewhat perversely some agent type s effort is decreasing in the principal s value of effort when agent type is uniformly distributed that applies to agent types with lower effort cost so reducing the difference in effort between low and high effort cost types this result extends to the principal s type being observed only by the principal if the marginal cost of effort to the agent is sufficiently convex

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

ecologically unsustainable trade abstract international trade although balanced in monetary terms may be unequal in terms of the exchange of biomass and sink capacity it may also be unilaterally or mutually unsustainable if it implies the overuse of the biocapacity in either one or both of the trading partners in this article the ecological footprint concept is used to distinguish different types of ecologically unsustainable trade but the issue of the possible effects of trade on the ecological footprints is also raised we distinguish four such effects an allocative effect an income effect a rich country illusion effect and a terms of trade effect since international trade can be a subtle mechanism by which ecological sustainability is preserved locally by means of importing biomass and sink capacity from other countries it can also blur the view of responsibility for the ecological effects of production and consumption at the end of this article some ethical and political dilemmas related to these issues are raised

when are cartels stable contracts why do some industry cartels survive for decades while others are quickly undermined by price wars and entry variation in cartels longevity can be explained by differences in their costs of self enforcement and service value to members analyzing legal cartel contracts formed under the webb pomerene export trade act i find that longer lived cartels tended to export to small buyers to have wide industry coverage to operate in periods of stable prices and growing demand and to sell under side agreements with foreign competitors contracts in which the cartel centralized its control through a common sales agency tended to be more stable however cartels usually grew less stable with age and when there was a recent and long history of cartelization in the industry finally cartels whose primary rationale was to fix price tended to be particularly unstable because these contracts invited fringe competition and entry

colombian international trade from a physical perspective towards an ecological prebisch thesis abstract prebisch s approach to economic development was based on the notion that there is an international historical division of labour peripheral countries are specialised in exporting primary goods while centre countries export industrial goods the terms of trade for peripheral countries tend to deteriorate this approach can be extended to ecological issues the international centre periphery division does not only involve the monetary exchange of goods and capital but also the physical exchange in which southern countries provide materials and energy so that northern countries can develop their socioeconomic metabolism this metabolic process is guaranteed through cheap prices for primary goods this paper aims to apply and extend prebisch s thought on unequal exchange both monetary and ecological in relation to colombian trade in the period 1970 2002 using material flow analysis

trade and the environment from a southern perspective the relationship between free trade and the environment is one of the main issues of contention between environmental and ecological economics environmental economics assumes a positive relationship between free trade economic growth and environmental policies environmental externalities may cause important damage however trade is not to be blamed for this instead the fault lies with policy inadequacies at the national level on the other hand some ecological economists criticise the assumptions of environmental economics especially the immobility of production factors and the positive correlation between income and environmental quality they plead for measures to prevent deterioration of northern environmental standards in a race to the bottom due to ecological dumping from the south in this paper we argue that neither environmental economics nor northern ecological economics take into account the structural conditions determining the international trade system based on some new empirical evidence on material flows we stress the notion of environmental cost shifting if physical and political ecology perspectives are adopted a southern approach to the trade and environment issue may arise 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

non monotonic group size effect in repeated provision of public goods abstract this paper analyzes the effect of a change in group size on incentives to contribute in repeated provision of pure public goods we develop a model in which group members interact repeatedly and might be temporarily unable to contribute to public goods production during some periods we show that an increase in the group size generates two opposite effects the standard free riding effect that suppresses cooperation and the novel large scale effect that enhances cooperation our results indicate that the former effect dominates in relatively large groups while the latter dominates in relatively small groups we therefore provide a rationale for a non monotonic group size effect that may explain previous empirical and experimental findings

the effect of environmental taxes on the volume of international trade abstract this paper is a response to ropke s 1994 question whether environmental taxes increase or decrease the volume of international trade using a three country heckscher ohlin samuelson model it is shown that the effect can be in either direction in the absence of pollution haven and three country effects that reverse natural comparative advantage environmental taxes decrease increase the volume of trade between any two countries when the tax is larger in the country that exports imports the pollutive good the environmental tax can also generate strong trade effects between two of the countries changing production costs and thereby reversing the expected tax effect on a third country the effects on trade are likely to be smaller when comparable pollution damage is global rather than local

efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive abstract efficient anonymous and continuous mechanisms for exchange environments with a finite number of individuals are dominant strategy incentive compatible if and only if they are perfectly competitive i e each individual is unable to influence prices or anyone s wealth equivalently in such a mechanism each individual creates no externalities for others by her announcement of a type the characterization applies whether preferences are ordinal or quasilinear and it also applies to continuum economies perfectly competitive mechanisms are non generic although non vacuous in finite economies and are generic but non universal in continuum economies we use these results to provide bridges to related work journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d51 d62

the relative rigidity of oligopoly pricing abstract evidence on canadian daily newspaper prices shows that unlike in rotemberg and saloner american economic review 1987 77 917 926 monopolies change prices more frequently than oligopolies

envy freeness and distributive justice the criterion of envy freeness according to which no agent should prefer any of his neighbours allocation to his own has become a central part of the economic theory of distributive justice it essentially corresponds to the need to express an ideal of equality in societies where preferences and endowments are heterogeneous this paper surveys various formulations of the idea of envy freeness starting with the simple distribution model then adding the possibility for agents to have different native talent endowments and finally moving to models with production many classical results are displayed but emphasis is also put on recent developments mainly the ideas of minimizing envy and of absence of domination five major difficulties facing envy freeness are identified and listed as directions of future research copyright 1994 by blackwell publishers ltd

complementary system perspectives in ecological macroeconomics the example of transition investments during the crisis globally societies are facing a number of interrelated environmental economic and social crises this paper is intended to contribute to the development of an ecological macroeconomics that addresses these multiple crises in combination insights from different research communities will be included in this effort taking an ecological economic understanding of sustainability as the point of departure and inspired by systems thinking it is discussed which economic sub systems should be in focus for sustainability transitions and whether relevant guides for sustainability can be formulated for these systems in particular the focus is on systems that are decisive for resource consumption and pollution although their influence on these is indirect a simple typology of sub systems is suggested and applied in relation to an example that highlights the importance of the interplay between macroeconomic provision and distribution systems the example concerns investments in sustainability transitions of provision systems and demonstrates the complexities of implementing such transformations during the economic crisis it also addresses the need for ecological macroeconomics to develop a third position beyond austerity policies and keynesian approaches

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

a theory of hub and spoke collusion abstract we develop a model of hub and spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers demand is stochastic and collusion between retailers is difficult the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient rotemberg and saloner 1986 in the hub and spoke collusive agreement retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier the supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price by organizing the collusion the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain we show that surprisingly this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare

price dynamics in uk manufacturing a microeconomic view this paper examines the response of prices to cost and demand shocks in seventy five three digit and four digit industries in the united kingdom during the 1980s the results suggest that prices responded sluggishly to costs but virtually not at all to demand the short run response to materials and fuel shocks was much larger than the response to unit labor cost shocks and some of this difference persisted into the long run prices responded more sluggishly to cost and demand shocks when aggregate inflation was lower and finally pricing dynamics were more sluggish in less competitive industries copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

a note on incentives in large economies nash equilibria of anonymous and efficient mechanisms are studied in economies with a continuum of traders conditions are given under which some or all the nash equilibria of such mechanisms yield competitive allocations particular attention is payed to the case of direct mechanisms where the truth constitutes a nash equilibrium

the rigidity of prices this paper uses evidence on individual transaction prices to analyze price behavior the evidence shows that for many transactions pricesremain rigid for periods exceeding one year the rigidity of price ispositively correlated with industry concentration for several productsthe correlation of price changes across buyers is low the paper alsoinvestigates the relationship between price rigidity price change andthe length of time a buyer and seller have been doing business together the author interprets the evidence as emphasizing the importance of nonprice rationing and the inadequacy of models in whichprice movements alone clear markets copyright 1986 by american economic association

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

collusive price rigidity under price matching punishments by analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price matching punishment strategy we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close this provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve in contrast to the kinked demand curve it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits the relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high cost phase the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms in the market are also investigated

openness and the politics of potable water improving access to potable water has become an increasingly urgent concern for developing nations in the current era of globalization according to standard wisdom if developing countries undertake certain domestic reforms such as investing in infrastructure and engineering then safe and clean drinking water will improve this analysis uncovers however that in addition to such domestic efforts one of the greatest factors affecting water uncertainty is in fact internationally induced trade surprisingly both scholars and practitioners have neglected the potential impacts of expanding trade on access to potable water this analysis is the first large n cross national study of water that focuses on the interplay of trade and politics both international and domestic as the primary driving forces behind improvements in or constraints to water access the author hypothesizes that growing export pressures are constraining drinkable water in poor countries but a particular domestic condition can mit

price rigidities and market structure conventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of keynesian unemployment is the observed rigidities of wages and prices what has been lacking however is a satisfactory theory or conjunction of theories which explains how wages and prices can be at non market clearing levels the objective of this paper is to sketch out several alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon each in contrast with keynesian theory is consistent with the observation that as the economy goes into a recession real product wages do not increase and may in fact decrease all of the theories assume rational profit maximizing firms and all entail some important departure from the standard competitive paradigm the first three explanations represent minor adaptations of standard models

collusion over the business cycle we present a theory of collusive pricing for markets in which demand alternates stochastically between fast growth boom and slow growth recession phases we show that 1 the most collusive prices are weakly procyclical countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively negatively correlated through time and 2 the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle is larger when the expected duration of boom phases decreases and when the expected duration of recession phases increases we also offer a generalization of rotemberg and saloner s 1986 model interpreting their findings in terms of transitory demand shocks that occur within broader business cycle phases

strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies in this paper we introduce the concept of a strictly fair allociation and investigate the set of strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies we prove that when agents utility functions are differentiable the set of strictly fair allocations coincides with the set of equal income walrasian equilibria this is shown using both the limit theorem approach and the limit economy approach we also extend the analysis to economies that have both atoms and an atomless sector these results substantially improve upon the existing characterizations of equal income walrasian equilibria in terms of economic efficiency and economic equity

greenhouse economics learn before you leap in virtually no area of the human enterprise is there more uncertainty than in matters of national defense how well armed trained allied clever and persevering an aggressor might be is often uncertain moreover the nature of an attack the direction of and with what weapons and strategy a strike might be made is normally deliberately concealed in response to this great uncertainty the united states has military bases around the world nuclear submarines patrolling the remotest parts of the oceans missiles poised to strike against any land or airborne target and military satellites orbitin g the entire planet thousands of highly trained intelligence officers filter through the minutia of activities of perceived enemies and prepare elaborate contingency plans the u s has carefully negotiated verifiable international arms control treaties finally it has developed the most advanced and sophisticated weapons and communications technology in the world to serve these functions the cost of this form of military security currently consumes about a third of the united states federal budget indeed the u s has spent in the last decade alone more than 1 5 trillion 1012 dollars to build up an arms apparatus against an enemy whose chance of attacking the u s in the last quarter century was never rated higher than about 3 now consider the stance of the current u s administration on global warming nearly every sector of the american economy could be adversely affected by climatic change and nothing short of our national security and quality of life may be at stake most climatologists believe the chances of unprecedented climate change are at least 50 yet offering as justification the uncertainty in timing and location of the strike the bush administration is doing virtually nothing to prepare a defense against this threat

fair allocations in large economies the purpose of this paper is the study of problems of equity in an economy with many agents conditions are given under which every equitable and pareto optimal allocation is a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for all agents the results are also of potential relevance for the literature on incentive compatibility since the allocations that are obained through incentive mechanisms in large economies turn out to be equitable

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

coffee in mexico international market agricultural landscape and ecology abstract the amount of energy and land devoted to the production of export crops in developing countries is associated with the economic behavior of the commodity in the international market stable increments in the international price of cash crops are expected to drive farmers and agricultural institutions in producing countries to increase production and yields of export crops the increase in crop production which can take place by incorporating new land into agricultural production and or by introducing technological innovations to increase yield may in turn affect the regional landscape and ecology the present study examines the effects of the international coffee price during the 1970s and 1980s upon the regional landscape and coffee farm ecology of mexico s coffee regions the effects upon the landscape and ecology of coffee production in mexico are discussed within the framework of the debate on trade and environment