bounded price variation and rational expectations in endogenous switching model of the u s corn market a model that includes bounded price variation and rational expectations by producers is estimated for the u s corn market the resulting model specification is highly nonlinear though since the probability of market equilibrium must be determined endogenously unlike previous research the cross equation restrictions implied by the rational expectations hypothesis are incorporated in the bounded prices model by using fair and taylor s 1983 procedure for obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of nonlinear rational expectations models the resulting model is compared against a standard equilibrium model with naive expectations the results show the bounded prices model is a superior specification copyright 1989 by mit press

who gains from capital market integration tax competition between unionized and non unionized countries the welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries the asymmetry is expressed through the labour market one country has a perfect labour market whereas the other country s labour market is unionized our results indicate that the welfare effects of capital market integration differ depending on whether governments are active or passive in attracting capital in the absence of active governments capital market integration benefits the country with a competitive labour market whereas it harms the unionized country capital market integration benefits both countries if governments are active and compete for mobile capital using taxes subsidies

a note on unemployment and capital tax competition abstract we introduce a labor market imperfection into the capital tax competition literature to study the equilibrium tax formulae and their efficiency in the presence of unemployment since we allow for labor market imperfection the standard conclusions of the tax competition literature would be generalized in the case of non full employment our first result shows that even when head taxes on immobile residents are available the optimal capital tax rate for jurisdictional governments is not zero our second finding is that decentralized equilibrium might be characterized by the overprovision of local public goods when the labor market is imperfect

employment protection legislation and firm growth evidence from a natural experiment a swedish reform in 2001 made it possible for firms with less than 11 employees to exclude two from the last in first out principle in case of layoffs the reform increased employment growth with o

a theory of interregional tax competition a general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels an exact definition of tax competition is provided and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible it is argued however that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled the amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms

welfare reform and the race to the bottom theory and evidence economists have argued that welfare migration leads to a race to the bottom in the choice of welfare benefits although a system of federal matching grants can remedy this problem the recent welfare reform law replaced the existing matching grant structure with block grants a policy change that appears undesirable to judge whether this critique of welfare reform is justified this paper evaluates the evidence in favor of a race to the bottom after explaining the theoretical effects of welfare migration the paper surveys the empirical evidence on the occurrence of such migration concluding that the evidence is mixed the discussion also considers recent empirical tests for strategic interaction which show that benefit levels in nearby states affect a given state s benefit choice the most plausible source of such interaction is a concern about welfare migration which leads policymakers to look at benefits in neighboring states when making their own choices judging that the evidence appears consistent with the existence of a race to the bottom the paper concludes that the demise of matching grants may be undesirable from a policy perspective

do states play welfare games abstract this paper uses a panel of state level annual data from 1983 to 1994 for each of the contiguous united states and the district of columbia to explore the degree to which states simultaneously set welfare benefits using instrumental variables estimation we find substantial empirical evidence that is supportive of the notion of welfare competition furthermore we find that state responses to neighbor benefit decreases tend to be significantly larger in magnitude as their responses to neighbor benefit increases our results therefore have potential implications for public policy in the wake of the increased decentralization of welfare policy associated with the welfare reform of 1996

a theoretical and empirical approach to the value of information in risky markets a reply the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty is used to develop a money metric of a producer s willingness to pay for additional information this concept is extended to the market by formulating ex ante and ex post measures of the value of a rational expectations forecast the empirical feasibility of these measures are demonstrated by application to a simple two equation model of an agricultural market this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

habitual entrepreneurs in the making how labour market rigidity and employment affects entrepreneurial re entry we investigate the impact of country level labour market regulations on the re entry decision of experienced entrepreneurs whereby they become habitual entrepreneurs multilevel logit models on entry decisions among 15 709 individuals in 29 european countries show that labour market regulations have a positive influence on the decision to re enter into entrepreneurship this positive impact is stronger among individuals holding wage jobs at the time of re entry compared to those that do not our results indicate that novice and habitual entrepreneurs may respond very differently to labour market rigidity we discuss and provide tentative explanations for these differences and outline potential policy implications

bidding for firms recently toyota sought a plant location in the united states the 800 million plant will employ 3000 workers and numerous states offered toyota generous investment incentives hoping this would induce toyota to select their state the commonwealth of kentucky won this competition but the price was high the present value of the payments exceeds 125 million the payment of investment incentives for the toyota plant is not unique in 1976 pennsylvania paid 75 million to attract a volkswagen plan nissan honda and mazda received generous investment incentives when locating plants in the united states and this bidding is not limited to states to attract the headquarters of the presbyterian church usa with its 1300 jobs and 38 million annual payroll civic leaders in louisville kentucky offered the church a warehouse and 6 2 million for renovation of the structure bidding the church away from kansas city missouri in this paper we contend that this competition may result from the average cost pricing of publicly provided goods and services 2 when the marginal cost of providing a firm and its workers with public services is less than the tax revenue they generate a government may offer the firm subsidies that reduce the distortions the average cost pricing of the public service creates thus this competition for industry is not a zero sum game where the subsidies are only transfers from the government to the firm rather these subsidies may facilitate the efficient location of industry

strategic capital tax competition a pecuniary externality and a corrective device abstract d e wildasin journal of urban economics25 193 212 1989 identifies a source of inefficiency in capital tax competition models with price taking jurisdictions and provides a pigovian correction this paper identifies a second source of inefficiency in a non price taking environment when a jurisdiction increases its capital tax it affects the price of capital and thus other jurisdictions returns from trade in capital the pigovian correction to internalize this pecuniary externality is derived since a focus of recent research is on non price taking environments the existence of the pecuniary externality is important in qualifying existing results in the literature

bounded price variation models with rational expectations and price risk abstract the bounded price variation model under rational expectations is extended to include higher moments of price in the supply equation the resulting framework is then used to estimate a disequilibrium model of the u s corn market that includes price risk

competing in taxes and investment under fiscal equalization the paper considers a model of federation with two heterogeneous regions that try to attract the capital by competing in capital income taxes and public investment that enhance the productivity of capital regions choices determine allocation of capital across the regions and their revenues under a tax sharing scheme this framework allows for the examination of different approaches to fiscal equalization schemes boadway r flatters f 1982 efficiency and equalization payments in a federal system of government a synthesis and extension of recent results canadian journal of economics 15 613 633 weingast b r 2006 second generation fiscal federalism implication for decentralized democratic governance and economic development working paper hoover institution stanford university we show that tax competition distorts downwards public investments and that the equalization grants discourage public investments with a little effect on equilibrium taxes however the equalization schemes remain beneficial not only for the federation and under a low degree of regional asymmetry also for each region c 2008 elsevier b v all rights reserved

modeling expectations of bounded prices an application to the market for corn the presence of farm programs should directly affect the expectations of producers this paper analyzes the formation of price expectations when price supports constitute an effective lower bound on the distribution of the expectations we first investigate what the expected price would be if the usual rational expectations formula is used this leads to a relationship that is not estimable we suggest two alternatives one based on a tobit approximation and the other based on a perfect prediction of when the support is going to be effective using a simplified model of the u s corn market the methodology is demonstrated and compared to an alternative method of using futures prices as the expectation of harvest price the analysis of supply response for the major u s field crops is made difficult due to government intervention in these markets this intervention has been characterized by the use of price supports acreage diversion storage incentives etc during the last thirty years many studies have analyzed producer behavior in the presence of governmental involvement such studies have typically been concerned with modeling the effect of supports and diversions in an ex post sense rather than with how producers used the knowledge of farm programs to form their expectations if producers are rational economic agents their expectations of harvest prices should be conditioned both by free market forces and the type and degree of governmental intervention in the market of course farm programs have varied in nature and extent during the past thirty years and it is doubtful that any structural model could capture their complexities in this paper we attempt to introduce rational expectations in a simplified model of the u s corn market in essence we focus on the formation of price expectations when price supports constitute an effective lower bound on the distribution of the expectations we proceed by developing a theoretical model that connects the rational expectations model with a model of bounded price variation it is shown that one representation that may characterize the corn market is a triangular structural system with endogenous switching a full information maximum likelihood estimator is proposed for the system next an empirical model is specified and estimated the model is evaluated in comparison to an augmented model that contains a futures price so that some inferences may be made concerning the rational expectations model s success in summarizing relevant market information expectations under bounded prices consider a market that may be represented by a simple supply and demand system q a pt a2w el supply function pt b qt b2xt e2t demand function 1 where p and q represent market price and quantity w and x represent supply and demand shifters and p represents the rational expectation of product price at the time production decisions are made note that this system has a familiar recursive structure when the expected price variable is specified in terms of one or more lagged prices when the restricted reduced form of the structural system is solved for in terms of the expected price and this expression is used to replace pj wallis 1980 then models similar to those of goodwin and sheifrin 1982 and shonkwiler and emerson 1982

are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting abstract this paper reexamines the main findings of cardarelli et al cardarelli r taugourdeau e vidal j p 2002 a repeated interactions model of tax competition journal of public economic theory 4 19 38 and catenaro and vidal catenaro m vidal j p 2006 implicit tax co ordination under repeated policy interactions recherches economiques de louvain 72 1 17 who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition in particular this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination it is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination

factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game abstract this paper addresses capital tax competition among an arbitrary number of countries countries are asymmetric not only in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per inhabitant national governments tax capital and labor in order to finance a fixed public budget asymmetric capital taxation arises at equilibrium leading to a distortion on the international capital market we fully characterize how equilibrium taxes and welfare levels depend upon countries population and capital endowments we compare it to the autarky situation and show that fiscal competition erodes some but not all of the gains from capital markets liberalization

social protection and political competition this paper analyses how the level of social protection is determined when its choice depends on political competition first this is done under autarky then the analysis is extended to take account of the existence of an international capital market we show that social protection never increases under international competition and in several circumstances drastically decreases

methods of estimation for models of markets with bounded price variation introduction there has been a considerable amount of literature on the estimation of models which are in disequilibrium see fair and jaffe 1972 fair and kelejian 1974 amemiya 1974 maddala and nelson 1974 goldfeld and quandt 1975 laffont and garcia 1977 bowden 1978 etc the main feature of these models is that there is a demand function a supply function a min condition and in some models a price adjustment equation the cornerstone equation in these models is q1 min d1 s where d t quantity demanded at time t s t quantity supplied at time t q t quantity transacted at time t this equation which says that the short side of the market always prevails separates the sample points into those belonging to demand and those belonging to supply one can classify the models into two categories those with sample separation known and those with sample separation unknown but the important point is that the min condition implies under the usual assumptions that the probability of equilibrium is zero for any t however there are many practical cases where some of the observations refer to equilibrium points and some to disequilibrium points this is because trading in many markets is confined to some limits on price and the disequilibrium occurs only when these limits are violated there are minimum wage laws in labor markets usury laws in credit markets and trading limits in commodity markets in all such cases the markets are sometimes in equilibrium and sometimes in disequilibrium the present paper discusses methods of estimation for models of such markets

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

market size and tax competition abstract with international externalities different country sizes imperfect competition and trade costs tax competition for mobile firms is efficiency enhancing with respect to the free market outcome under both scenarios the resulting inefficiencies in international specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough otherwise only international tax coordination can implement the efficient spatial distribution of firms

interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents abstract this paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions the paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms throughout the paper shows that at a nash equilibrium in tax levels the sparsely populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely populated neighbor the paper also demonstrates how equilibrium state taxes differ depending on whether firms employ marginal cost or profit maximizing pricing

should trade unions appreciate foreign direct investment abstract it is often argued that fdi hurts workers in the home country because jobs are moved abroad contrary to that view businessmen often argue that fdi benefits home workers because there will be an expansion in the firm we show that both views may be correct and whether home workers gain or lose on fdi depends on which kinds of activities the firm moves to the host country if there is a big degree of substitutability complementarity between activities in the home country and activities in the host country it is likely that the workers lose gain on fdi

do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials we address the role of labor cost differentials for national tax policies modeling a tax competition race between two countries competing for a population of mobile firms we show that in equilibrium the high wage country charges a lower tax than the low wage country moreover under tax competition the high wage country attracts more firms than in a setting without taxation exploiting exogenous variation in labor cost differentials induced by the breakdown of communism in eastern europe we find that tax policies are in line with the model prediction our most conservative estimates suggest that a one dollar increase in the compensation cost differential in prices as of 2000 triggers a cut of the statutory corporate income tax rate by about one percentage point

unionized labor markets and globalized capital markets abstract this paper studies the effects of international integration of capital markets in a world where countries differ in their labor market institutions one country has a perfectly competitive labor market while the other is unionized we show that workers should favor autarky in the unionized country but oppose it in the non unionized country and vice versa for owners of capital aggregate gains from integration however are negative we also show that under capital mobility an increase in relative bargaining power of unions does not always improve workers welfare

methods of estimation for models of markets with bounded price variation under rational expectations abstract the present paper extends the analysis in an earlier paper by maddala on estimation of disequilibrium market models with controlled prices to the case where the supply function depends on expected prices and expectations are formed rationally as suggested by muth

inter jurisdictional competition for firms regions inhabited with an immobile population of disabled and able individuals compete to attract mobile firms that provide jobs the redistributive goal of regional governments is to support the disabled who cannot work able individuals may work be involuntary unemployed because of frictions in the labor market or choose to be voluntary unemployed labor force participation decisions depend on regional redistributive policies both the size of workforce and tax on firms affect profits and therefore firms location decisions allowing regions to engage in tax competition may be efficient if regions cannot tax firms they compete by implementing inefficient redistributive policies

uniform and non uniform second best input taxes we investigate second best input based taxes foragricultural nonpoint pollution control when marketprices are endogenous and production isheterogeneous theoretically we derive the optimalforms of taxes which take account of heterogeneity non uniform taxes and a tax which does not auniform tax empirically we use a multi factor market equilibrium simulation model to determineoptimal tax rates and associated equity effects particularly differences in landowner gains lossesacross a heterogeneous region when market prices areendogenous second best tax policies result inpecuniary externalities that affect existingenvironmental externalities in particular thepecuniary externalities amplify the effect of producerheterogeneity on determination of sub regionaldifferences in tax rates and returns to land particularly for the uniform policy with endogenousprices the uniform tax rate is considerably higherthan any of the non uniform rates and ironically thenon uniform taxes result in less dispersion oflandowner gains across sub regions than the uniformtax

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

price and quantity controlled agricultural markets and disequilibrium econometrics a survey abstract this survey reviews the literature on estimating single markets in disequilibrium in the presence of regulated price and or quantity controls e g minimum price regimes and or marketing quotas most of the literature is found to describe pure econometric technique with only a few applications having emerged to date various reasons for the broad non acceptance of this literature are offered including a perceived lack of realism proposals to close this econometric theory application gap are put forward including the use of effective demand concepts in specifying demand and supply functions synthesizing some closely related literature on agricultural price quantity controls with disequilibrium econometrics i e endogenous government policy and the effects controls have on yield uncertainty and price risk and outlining more applicable econometric technique extensions