endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets abstract this paper endogenizes the borrowing constraints on capital in a production economy with incomplete markets we find that these limits get looser with income a property that is consistent with us data on credit limits the framework with endogenous limits is then used to study the effects of a revenue neutral tax reform that eliminates capital income taxes our results illustrate that it is very important to take into account the effects of tax policies on the limits throughout the transition these effects can be big enough to change the overall conclusion about the desirability of a tax reform

agents with and without principals who sets ceo pay our standard answer to this question has been shaped by principal agent theory shareholders set ceo pay they use pay to limit the moral hazard problem caused by the low ownership stakes of ceos through bonuses options or long term contracts shareholders can motivate the ceo to maximize firm wealth in other words shareholders use pay to provide incentives a view we refer to as the contracting view an alternative view championed by practitioners such as crystal 1991 argues that ceos set their own pay they manipulate the compensation committee and hence the pay process itself to pay themselves what they can the only constraints they face may be the availability of funds or more general fears such as not wanting to be singled out in the wall street journal as being overpaid we refer to this second view as the skimming view in this paper we investigate the relevance of these two views

the dating game do managers designate option grant dates to increase their compensation we provide evidence of two variants of a dating game that entails picking a grant date ex post that is after the board s compensation decision is made back dating picking a date before the board decision date and forward dating waiting after the board decision date to observe the stock price behavior consistent with back dating we find stock return behavior around the grant date to be positively related to reporting lag in the promptly reported sample we find stock return behavior and the pattern of reporting lags consistent with forward dating our calculations show that managers can obtain economically significant benefits by playing the dating game

optimal bankruptcy code a fresh start for some abstract what is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law i answer this question using an incomplete markets life cycle model with a planner who can choose state contingent bankruptcy costs i develop two main theoretical characterizations first whenever debt discharge is allowed it should occur without cost second bankruptcy should always be allowed for highly indebted households quantitatively the optimal policy can generate a welfare gain as large as 11 6 however attractive informal default asymmetric information and moral hazard can reduce the welfare gain to as little as 0 7

wealth distribution in life cycle economies abstract this paper compares the age wealth distribution produced in life cycle economies to the corresponding distribution in the us economy the idea is to calibrate the model economies to match features of the us earnings distribution and then examine the wealth distribution implications of the model economies the findings are that the calibrated model economies with earnings and lifetime uncertainty can replicate measures of both aggregate wealth and transfer wealth in the us furthermore the model economies produce the us wealth gini and a significant fraction of the wealth inequality within age groups however the model economies produce less than half the fraction of wealth held by the top 1 percent of us households

strategic interdependence in models of property rights the concept of strategic interdependence has opened a wide spectrum of explanation beyond the robinson crusoe economy this essay explores the implications of strategic interdependence for the theory of property rights and the new institutional economics schotter it attempts to clarify some of the linkages from institutional economics to micro and macroeconomic theory by considering how property institutions result from strategic interdependence confer payoffs to individual agents and reflect collective choices based on individual preferences

default and aggregate income abstract this paper studies how default varies with aggregate income we analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed idiosyncratic income by allowing for default default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance default penalties ensure that only these agents default we show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income we provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous

aggregate consequences of limited contract enforceability we study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts because of enforceability problems contracts are constrained efficient we show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output this implies that economies with lower enforceability of contracts are characterized by greater macroeconomic volatility a key assumption for the amplification result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market

on the future of macroeconomics a new monetarist perspective this article argues that a pressing goal for macroeconomics is to incorporate financial considerations but we need models with solid microfoundations in particular the use of assets in facilitating exchange as well as different credit or other financial arrangements should be outcomes of not inputs to theories as a preview i suggest that mainstream macro does a good job explaining many phenomena and a financial crisis does not disprove such theory but understanding crises requires better incorporating factors related to money credit banking and liquidity the approach called new monetarist economics can help a lot in this regard

financial intermediary capital we propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries that are better able to collateralize claims than households that is have a collateralization advantage intermediaries require capital as they have to finance the additional amount that they can lend out of their own net worth the net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity such as investment and financing the accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector the model is consistent with key stylized facts about macroeconomic downturns associated with a credit crunch namely their severity their protractedness and the fact that the severity of the credit crunch itself affects the severity and persistence of downturns the model captures the tentative and halting nature of recoveries from crises

private capital flows capital controls and default risk abstract what has been the effect of the shift in emerging market capital flows toward private sector borrowers are emerging market capital flows more efficient if not can controls on capital flows improve welfare this paper shows that the answers depend on the form of default risk when private loans are enforceable but there is the risk that the government will default on behalf of all residents private lending is inefficient and capital controls are potentially pareto improving however when private agents may individually default capital flow subsidies are potentially pareto improving

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets this paper compares two different models in a common environment the first model has liquidity constraints in that consumers save a single asset that they cannot sell short the second model has debt constraints in that consumers cannot borrow so much that they would want to default but is otherwise a standard complete markets model both models share the features that individuals are unable to completely insure against idiosyncratic shocks and that interest rates are lower than subjective discount rates in a stochastic environment the two models have quite different dynamic properties with the debt constrained model exhibiting simple stochastic steady states while the liquidity constrained model has greater persistence of shocks

the cyclical and secular behaviour of the labour input comparing efficiency units and hours worked summary a monthly labour input series designed to correct for the fact that all hours worked are not of the same quality is constructed and its properties compared with unadjusted hours worked this efficiency units series is constructed from bls data on hours worked and earnings by age and sex the cyclical fluctuations displayed by the efficiency units series are smaller on average than those displayed by hours worked although the difference is not large however the secular behaviour of the series is quite different hours worked per capita displays a significant positive trend while efficiency units per capita does not

endogenous debt constraints in a life cycle model with an application to social security this paper develops a simple life cycle model that embeds a theory of debt restrictions based on the existence of inalienable property rights a la kehoe and levine 1993 debt constrained asset markets review of economic studies 60 4 865 888 2001 liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets econometrica 69 3 575 598 in our environment net debtors have the option of defaulting on unsecured debt at the cost of being subjected to wage garnishment and or having some or all of their future assets seized by creditors one advantage of our framework is that it encompasses two standard versions of the life cycle model one with perfect capital markets and one with a non negative net worth restriction we study the impact of a payroll financed social security system to illustrate the role of endogenous debt constraints and compare our results to a model with exogenous debt constraints whereas the aggregate effects are similar under both types of constraints the distributional consequences are found to be significantly different across debt regimes

consumer bankruptcy a fresh start consumer bankruptcy provides partial insurance against bad luck but by driving up interest rates makes life cycle smoothing more difficult we argue that to assess this trade off one needs a quantitative model of consumer bankruptcy with three key features life cycle component idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty and expense uncertainty exogenous negative shocks to household balance sheets we find that transitory and persistent earnings shocks have very different implications for evaluating bankruptcy rules more persistent shocks make the bankruptcy option more desirable larger transitory shocks have the opposite effect our findings suggest the current us bankruptcy system may be desirable for reasonable parameter values jel d14 d91 k35

social security reform with impure intergenerational altruism abstract this paper studies the long run aggregate and welfare effects of eliminating social security in a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium life cycle model where parents and their children are linked by voluntary and accidental bequests social security in this model with impure altruism has a smaller effect on capital accumulation than in a pure life cycle model a bigger effect than in a model with two sided altruism the welfare gain of eliminating social security system under impure altruism is smaller than that in a pure life cycle model and bigger than that in a model with two sided altruism

social security and individual welfare precautionary saving borrowing constraints and the payroll tax this paper examines the impact of social security on national saving and individual welfare in the presence of realistic capital market imperfections market failure in the private provision of annuities and restrictions on borrowing against anticipated future wages the introduction of social security increases lifetime welfare and reduces national saving if borrowing restrictions are absent however the increase in individual welfare is reduced and in some cases eliminated when borrowing constraints are taken into consideration the substantial difference suggests the importance of reexamining the proportional payroll tax finance of social security copyright 1987 by american economic association

the market evaluation of human capital the case of indentured servitude this paper examines the market for human capital created by the institution of indentured servitude in colonial america the indenture system allowed english emigrants to obtain passage to the colonies by selling claims on their future labor with the size of the debt approximately equal for all emigrants the length of the term for which a servant was bound is predicted to have varied inversely with expected productivity in the colonies analysis of two collections of contracts made in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries supports the prediction age skill and literacy were negatively related to length of indenture women received shorter terms than men at young ages while servants bound for the west indies and those bound in periods of high colonial demand for labor also received reductions

lack of recall and centralized monetary trade we introduce lack of recall of past transactions as an alternative assumption to anonymity in a model where trade is centralized in environments where there is an intertemporal lack of double coincidence of wants problem and lack ofcommitment lack of recall can give rise to monetary equilibria that dominate nonmonetary outcomes in terms of welfare

the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption a cross sectional analysis this paper examines the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption expenditures using a single year cross section data set a reduced form equation for consumption is estimated on high saving households by the tobit procedure to account for the selectivity bias since high saving households are not likely to be liquidity constrained the estimated equation is an appropriate description of how desired consumption that would be forthcoming without liquidity constraints is related to the variables available in the cross section data when the reduced form equation is used to predict desired consumption the gap between desired consumption and measured consumption is most evident for young households

might makes rights a theory of the formation and initial distribution of property rights this paper is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the formation and initial distribution of property rights violence is singled out as a major constraint on this formation process its role is explicitly modeled in a choice theoretic framework and some of the implications are tested using data collected from contracts written during the california gold rush of 1848

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

board independence and ceo pay this paper presents a model where a board of directors not completely independent from the ceo set the ceo s pay we show that the board s monitoring intensity and the equilibrium pay performance sensitivity of ceo s pay are increasing in the board s independence d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

shifting foundations of agricultural policy analysis welfare economics when risk markets are incomplete the neat alignment of resources output and prices specified by the perfect competition model is far from duplicated in free markets and the equally neat alignment assumed under the constraints of a program is not experienced when programs are in effect in particular areas under empirically determined supply curves are unlikely to represent opportunity costs the basic theory is invaluable in providing a conceptual orientation for the analysis of programs but the assumptions implicit in the literal use of simple forms of it for policy conclusions are breathtakingly heroic

international coordination of fiscal policy in limiting economies we examine the limiting behavior of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policies as countries market power goes to zero we show that these policies converge if countries raise revenues through lump sum taxation however if there are unremovable domestic distortions such as distorting taxes there can be gains to coordination even when a single country s policy cannot affect world prices these results differ from the received wisdom in the optimal tariff literature the key distinction is that contrary to the tariff literature the spending decisions of governments are explicitly modeled

incentive design under loss aversion compensation schemes often reward success b ut do not penalize failure fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature yet the standard principal agent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance this paper shows that under loss aversion there will be intervals over which pay is insensitive to performance with the use of carrots but not sticks is frequently optimal especially when risk aversion is low and reference income is e ndogenous a further benefit of capping losses for example through options is to discourage reckless behavior by executives seeking to resurrect their fortunes jel f3 f4

a model of capital and crises we develop a model in which the capital of the intermediary sector plays a critical role in determining asset prices the model is cast within a dynamic general equilibrium economy and the role for intermediation is derived endogenously based on optimal contracting considerations low intermediary capital reduces the risk bearing capacity of the marginal investor we show how this force helps to explain patterns during financial crises the model replicates the observed rise during crises in sharpe ratios conditional volatility correlation in price movements of assets held by the intermediary sector and fall in riskless interest rates

jointly optimal regulation of bank capital and liquidity in an economy with financial frictions banks endogenously choose excessive leverage and maturity mismatch in equilibrium as they fail to internalize the risk of socially wasteful fire sales macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints which require less information than pigouvian taxes the liquidity coverage and net stable funding ratios of basel iii can implement efficiency additional microprudential regulation of leverage is required when bank failures are socially costly micro and macroprudential rules are imperfect substitutes optimally macroprudential policy reacts to systematic risk and credit conditions over the cycle while microprudential policy reacts to systematic and idiosyncratic risk

self command in practice in policy and in a theory of rational choice an increasingly familiar occurrence for obstetricians is being asked by patients to withhold anesthesia during delivery the physician often proposes that a facemask be put beside the patient who may inhale nitrous oxide as she needs it but some determined patients ask that no such opportunity be provided if gas is available they will use it and they want not to be able to the request is interesting for decision theory and raises questions of ethics policy and physician responsibility even if the woman is merely making a mistake if she simply does not know how painful labor will be and how glad she will be even in retrospect if the pain is relieved but some women who make this request have had earlier deliveries during which they demanded anesthesia and received it they are acquainted with the pain they anticipate asking for relief and they want it withheld when they do they expect to regret afterwards any recourse to anesthesia this particular instance of attempted selfdenial has features that are special but many that are common the woman is so far as we know in good health physically and mentally she anticipates a transient period when her usual values and preferences will be suspended or inaccessible she has reasons for wanting to frustrate her own wishes at the critical time she needs cooperation she may ratify her choice afterward by expressing herself grateful that no anesthesia was offered even when requested there are ethical dilemmas and legal issues and there is conflict if say the husband disagrees with the physician in the delivery room about what his wife really wants

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

consumption over the life cycle facts from consumer expenditure survey data this paper uses consumer expenditure survey data and a seminonparametric statistical model to estimate life cycle profiles of consumption controlling for demographics cohort and time effects we construct age profiles for total and nondurable consumption as well as expenditure patterns for consumer durables special emphasis is placed on the comparison of different approaches to control for changes in demo graphics over the life cycle we find significant humps over the life cycle for total nondurable and durable expenditures changes in household size account for roughly half of these humps bootstrap simulations suggest that our empirical estimates are tight in that standard errors are small

analyst following and pay performance sensitivity evidence from china we examine whether analyst following is associated with pay performance sensitivity in china based on our analyses of 17 020 chinese firm years from 2007 to 2015 we find that pay performance sens

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

toward a theory of induced institutional innovation in this paper we elaborate a theory of institutional innovation in which changes in the demand for institutional innovation are induced by changes in relative resource endowments and by technical change we illustrate from agricultural history how changes in resource endowments and technical change have induced changes in private property rights and in the development of non market institutions we also consider the impact of advances in social science knowledge and of cultural endowments on the supply of institutional change in a final section we present the elements of a model of institutional innovation that maps the relationships among resource endowments cultural endowments technology and institutions

the household bankruptcy decision personal bankruptcy filings have risen from 0 3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1 35 percent in 1998 and 1999 transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event lenders lost about 39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy filings but economists have little understanding of why households file for bankruptcy or why filings have increased so rapidly until very recently studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult because no household level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings in this paper we use new data from the panel study of income dynamics which includes information on bankruptcy filings to estimate a model of households bankruptcy decisions we find support for the strategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households are more likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher our model predicts that an increase of 1 000 in households financial benefit from bankruptcy would result in a 7 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings our model also predicts that if the 1997 national bankruptcy review commission s proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented there would be a 16 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings each year but if the 100 000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the u s senate were adopted our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of filings we find little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households file when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay finally controlling for state and time fixed effects our model shows that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate filing rates

public versus private provision of liquidity is there a trade off abstract to what extent is public debt private liquidity much policy advice given in the aftermath of the financial crisis rests on the assumption that increasing public debt relaxes borrowing constraints of private households this is the case for ad hoc debt limits which are exogenous to public policy instead if debt limits are fully endogenous as e g in the case of the natural borrowing limit public debt has no impact we assume that borrowing limits arise because of limited contract enforceability and are therefore determined as equilibrium outcomes using an incomplete markets economy in which households are subject to uninsurable earnings shocks we show that public debt provides some liquidity but less so than it would if constraints were imposed ad hoc we show that generating borrowing constraints as an equilibrium outcome substantially alters the answers to other important questions such as for the welfare effects of government debt or its impact on real economic activity

common property and collective action in economic development abstract a fundamental issue in many ldcs is the degree to which natural resource mismanagement is caused by common property arrangements this view has led to widespread attempts to privatize forests rangelands and water resources many of these efforts have failed to stop overuse and have contributed to inequality in resource distribution this paper seriously questions this approach and describes a number of reasons why common property may continue to be both efficient and equitable complementing and combining with private rights in a way consistent with the resource endowments of village economies a theoretical approach is outlined showing that the tragedy of the commons is an unsatisfactory model of common property an alternative model is presented together with a call for research into institutional alternatives in resource management

macroeconomic fluctuations as sources of luck in ceo compensation macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates exchange rates and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad luck for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations based on a sample of 2 091 us firms we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of ceo compensation our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing ceo incentive schemes it adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard and ceo compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the ceo in an asymmetric and non linear reward system will be inclined to prioritize his her own cash flow at the expense of fulfilling an assumed agency role the policy conclusion for remuneration committees and board of directors is to filter out macroeconomic influences on performance to be rewarded whenever an asymmetric compensation scheme has been opted for

empirical measures of factors affecting social rates of discount economists have long considered possible divergences between private and social rates of time preferences in this paper we investigate factors hypothesized to affect this potential divergence results indicate that time preferences of individuals may be influenced by 1 whether the resource in question is publicly or privately managed respondents tend to have lower rates of time prefernce for publicly managed resources and 2 the type of good being managed respondents tend to have lower rates of time preference for income derived from a forest than for income derived from a portfolio of stocks and bonds additional factors which may influence the revealed rate of time preference include the pattern of benefits derived over time and various personal characteristics of the respondent although numerous methodological problems cloud the issues our results suggest that capital markets may fail to aggregate utility over individuals and between goods and that it may therefore be appropriate for governments to consider using lower rates of discount than the private sector and to vary the rate used according to the type of good being evaluated

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

educational policy in a credit constrained economy with skill heterogeneity an overlapping generations model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented education enhances productivity but needs to be financed by borrowing because of the possibility of default lenders may ration credit we characterize the steady state equilibrium with and without credit constraints and show that credit constraints are associated with lower education and a lower real interest rate we then study the role of public policy in remedying the inefficiency which occurs with credit market imperfections and examine whether public education can improve on the constrained equilibrium

the role of local depositors in controlling expenses in small scale financial intermediation an empirical analysis using data on irish loan funds a nineteenth century quasi bank system we explore how the capital structure affects managerial agency to impact non interest expenses these organizations had no equity holders and were financed by deposits and capital comprising donations and accumulated profits creating problems of managerial moral hazard higher net income before non interest expenses is associated with higher salaries and other non interest expenses more surprisingly higher capital deposit ratios led to higher expenses even after controlling for net income while this institution is unique the findings suggest that depositors could assist in controlling expenses in microfinance organizations

on endogenous formation of price expectations abstract we study a two period exchange economy with complete financial markets and endogenous borrowing constraints contrary to perfect foresight paradigm we assume that agents are heterogeneous in their ability to forecast future prices we introduce a new equilibrium concept called informationally constrained equilibrium where the formation of price expectations is endogenous and reflects the revelation of information from observing bounds on liabilities designed to ensure solvency at any contingency we prove that under standard assumptions an equilibrium always exists and we characterize the degree of information revealed by the endogenous debt limits

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

u s consumer bankruptcy choice the importance of general equilibrium effects abstract we study the implications of u s personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare our analysis shows that general equilibrium considerations along with bankruptcy chapter choice and production matter crucially for the effects of policy reform contrary to previous work we find that completely eliminating bankruptcy provisions causes significant declines in output and welfare by reducing capital formation and labor input furthermore subjecting chapter 7 filers to means testing as suggested by recent legislative proposals would not improve upon current bankruptcy provisions and at best leave aggregate filings output and welfare unchanged however we do find that an alternative tightening of chapter 7 in the form of lower asset exemptions can increase economic efficiency

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

optimal taxation in a limited commitment economy this paper studies optimal ramsey taxation when risk sharing in private insurance markets is imperfect due to limited enforcement in a limited commitment economy there are externalities associated with capital and labor because individuals do not take into account that their labor and saving decisions aect aggregate supply wages

ejido reforms in mexico conceptual issues and potential outcomes the evolving privatization of the ejido system in mexico represents a challenge to standard economic models of common property regimes these models tend to emphasize human interrelations while discounting the ecological conditions which form the environment for human interactions a risk spreading safety first model capturing interrelationships between nature and humans is developed to analyze the potential implications of mexico s privatization efforts recognizing that the majority of ejido lands are communal not parcelized located primarily in arid areas the model supports the prediction that privatization will occur and be most successful on irrigated ejido lands with modern social and economic infrastructure

collateral motivated financial innovation collateral frictions have a profound effect on our economic landscape ranging from the design of financial securities laws and institutions to various rules and regulations we analyze a model with disagreement where securities and collateral requirements are endogenous it shows that the security that isolates the variable with disagreement is optimal in the sense that alternative securities cannot generate any trading in an economy with n states investors may introduce more than n securities and markets are still incomplete the model has several novel predictions on the behavior of basis the spread between the prices of an asset and its replicating portfolio

debt constrained asset markets we develop a theory of general equilibrium with endogenous debt limits in the form of individual rationality constraints similar to those in the dynamic consistency literature if an agent defaults on a contract he can be excluded from future contingent claims markets trading and can have his assets seized he cannot be excluded from spot markets trading however and he has some private endowments that cannot be seized all information is publicly held and common knowledge and there is a complete set of contingent claims markets since there is complete information an agent cannot enter into a contract in which he would have an incentive to default in some state in general there is only partial insurance variations in consumption may be imperfectly correlated across agents interest rates may be lower than they would be without constraints and equilibria may be pareto ranked

welfare implications of endogenous credit limits with bankruptcy this paper studies the aggregate welfare consequences of changes in the prescribed penalty for personal bankruptcy and in social insurance policies when borrowing limits may respond to these changes it uses a dynamic general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with incomplete markets and a continuum of agents the borrowing constraint and the risk of default are endogenous and the default penalty restricts an individual s access to the markets for a fixed period of time the effect on the stationary equilibrium of an exogenous reduction of 1 and 2 years in this exclusion period is explored quantitatively for comparison purposes the same experiment is carried out under the assumption made in related studies that the borrowing limit is fixed a small welfare loss follows in either case in contrast in a small open economy welfare may increase substantially but only if the borrowing constraint is endogenous similar results follow from an exogenous change in social policy that reduces individual income variability