boundedly rational versus optimization based models of strategic thinking and learning in games harstad and selten s article in this forum performs a valuable service by highlighting the dominance of optimization based models over boundedly rational models in modern microeconomics and questioning whether optimization based models are a better way forward than boundedly rational models this article complements rabin s response to harstad and selten focusing on modeling strategic behavior i consider harstad and selten s examples and proposed boundedly rational models in the light of modern behavioral economics and behavioral game theory commenting on the challenges that remain and the most promising ways forward

multi unit demand auctions with synergies behavior in sealed bid versus ascending bid uniform price auctions abstract we construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed bid uniform price auctions the essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are 1 a demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential and 2 bidding above stand alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units the latter creates a potential exposure problem as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed bid auctions however there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium with patterns of out of equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats these patterns of out of equilibrium play are analyzed along with their effects on revenue and efficiency

measuring heterogeneous reservation prices for product bundles this paper develops a model for capturing continuous heterogeneity in the joint distribution of reservation prices for products and bundles our model is derived from utility theory and captures both within and among subject variability furthermore it provides dollarmetric reservation prices and individual level estimates that allow the firm to target customers and develop customized and nonlinear pricing policies our experiments show that regardless of whether the products are durables or nondurables the model captures heterogeneity and predicts well models that assume homogeneity perform poorly especially in predicting choice of the bundle furthermore the methodology is robust even when respondents evaluate few profiles self stated reservation prices do not have any informational content beyond that contained in the basic model the direct elicitation method appears to understate overstate the variation in reservation prices across consumers for low priced high priced products and bundles hence this method yields biased demand estimates and leads to suboptimal product line pricing policy the optimization results show that the product line pricing policy depends on the degree of heterogeneity in the reservation prices of the individual products and the bundle a uniformly high price strategy for all products and bundles is optimal when heterogeneity is high otherwise a hybrid strategy is optimal

emotional bidders an analytical and experimental examination of consumers behavior in a priceline like reverse auction e commerce has proved to be fertile ground for new business models which may be patented for up to 20 years and have potentially far reaching impact on the e commerce landscape one such electronic market is the reverse auction model popularized by priceline com there is still uncertainty surrounding the survival of such new electronic markets currently available on the internet understanding user behavior is necessary for better assessment of these sites survival this paper adds to economic analysis a formal representation of the emotions evoked by the auction process specifically the excitement of winning if a bid is accepted and the frustration of losing if it is not we generate and empirically test a number of insights related to 1 the impact of expected excitement at winning and frustration at losing on bids across consumers and biddings scenarios and 2 the dynamic nature of the bidding behavior that is how winning and losing in previous bids influence their future bidding behavior

moral dimensions of the wta wtp disparity an experimental examination abstract contrary to welfare economic theory empirical evidence suggests that the amount of money people are willing to accept wta to forego a commodity will generally exceed the amount of money they are willing to pay wtp to gain the commodity this paper undertakes an experimental examination of the wta wtp disparity using conventional and ecologically produced eggs the results of this experiment reveal that the difference between the mean wtp and wta for conventional eggs is negligible while the mean wta is more than 1 5 times higher than the mean wtp in the case of ecological eggs an explanation for this result is offered following the boyce et al boyce r b brown t c mcclelland g h peterson g l schulze w d 1992 an experimental examination of intrinsic values as a source of the wta wtp disparity am econ rev 82 1366 1373 notion that an asymmetrical assignment of moral responsibility may cause wta to exceed wtp by comparing the two studies a tentative conclusion is that the valuation disparity is likely to increase with a corresponding increase in the degree of assigned moral responsibility

effect of distance of transportation on willingness to pay for food abstract consumers interest in locally produced foods is increasing hence there is a need to decipher and quantify consumers desire for local foods and understand the underlying causes of this demand more specifically we examine in this paper the issue of distance of transportation and its impact on consumer preferences we investigate how consumers willingness to pay wtp for food varies with the distance the food traveled results from non hypothetical second price auctions indicate that average wtp is falling in distance traveled indicating a preference for local production results also indicate that the marginal value of a mile traveled depends on the type of food studied apples vs wine socio demographic characteristics perceptions of freshness taste and food safety as well as support of local economy impact wtp for local foods

preference anomalies preference elicitation and the discovered preference hypothesis there is wide ranging evidence much of it deriving from economics experiments of anomalies in behaviour that challenge standard preference theories this paper explores the implications of these anomalies for preference elicitation methods because methods that are used to inform public policy such as contingent valuation are based on standard preference theories their validity may be called into question by the anomaly data however on a new interpretation these anomalies do not contradict standard theory but are errors in stated preference that can be expected to disappear as people become more experienced in relevant decision environments we explore the evidence for this interpretation and what implications follow for preference elicitation methodology

internet advertising and the generalized second price auction selling billions of dollars worth of keywords we investigate the generalized second price gsp auction a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising although gsp looks similar to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism its properties are very different unlike the vcg mechanism gsp generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth telling is not an equilibrium of gsp to analyze the properties of gsp we describe the generalized english auction that corresponds to gsp and show that it has a unique equilibrium this is an ex post equilibrium with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of vcg

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

when curiosity kills the profits an experimental examination economic theory predicts that in a first price auction with equal and observable valuations bidders earn zero profits theory also predicts that if valuations are not common knowledge then since it is weakly dominated to bid your valuation bidders will bid less and earn positive profits hence rational players in an auction game should prefer less public information we are perhaps more used to seeing these results in the equivalent bertrand setting in our experimental auction we find that individuals without information on each other s valuations earn more profits than those with common knowledge then given a choice between the two sets of rules half the individuals still preferred to have the public information we discuss possible explanations including ambiguity aversion

independent private value auctions bidder behaviour in first second and third price auctions with varying numbers of bidders the symmetric equilibrium of third price auctions is characterized it makes a number of contrasting predictions relative to firms and second price auctions bids exceed private values the marginal effects on bids of an increase in private values is greater than one increasing numbers of bidders reduces bids and risk aversion requires bidding below the risk neutral nash equilibrium in the experiment bidders do not always satisfy the point predictions of the theory however the game theoretic models correctly anticipate at least directionally the important effects of the price rule changes copyright 1993 by royal economic society

reservation price as a range an incentive compatible measurement approach abstract drawing from the literature on buyers uncertainty in preference and product knowledge the authors suggest and empirically test the proposition that a consumer s reservation price for a product is more meaningfully and accurately represented as a range than as a single point given this conceptualization they propose an approach for incentive compatible elicitation of a consumer s reservation price range icerange that builds on becker degroot and marschak s 1964 point of purchase method two empirical applications of the approach provide an assessment of its practicality and its predictive performance relative to current methodologies for reservation price elicitation the results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms the benchmark approaches in terms of predictive validity and yields valuable incremental information about uncertainty in product valuation

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

english auctions with resale an experimental study i design and test a simple english auction and two english auctions with resale but with different informational backgrounds all three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium i find however that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly in the two treatments with resale subjects deviated from both the nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in english auctions subjects tend to overbid when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus in the resale market i employ different models like qre and levels of reasoning and conclude that overbidding can be explained as a rational response to the noisy environment in markets with human participants that is as rational decision making when anticipating others to make errors when the outcome of the resale market is not certain there is significant signaling behavior and auction prices tend to be lower than the nash prediction

secure implementation experiments do strategy proof mechanisms really work strategy proofness requiring that truth telling is a dominant strategy is a standard concept used in social choice theory saijo et al 2003 argue that this concept has serious drawbacks in particular announcing one s true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy and almost all strategy proof mechanisms have a continuum of nash equilibria for only a subset of strategy proof mechanisms do the set of nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide for example this double coincidence occurs in the groves mechanism when preferences are single peaked we report experiments using two strategy proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of nash equilibria but the other has a unique nash equilibrium we found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two

nonstandard bidder behavior in real world auctions empirical work on auctions has found that bidders deviate from standard behavior in important ways we investigate a range of these behaviors including nonrational herding auction fever quasi endowment effect and escalation of commitment our innovations are to more completely control for unobservables by using new data from a field experiment on ebay and by accounting for censoring of bids below the starting price consistent with standard auction theory and in contrast to the predictions of the nonstandard behaviors we find that auction starting price has no effect on bidder willingness to pay in a private values setting we conclude that there is little evidence that these nonstandard behaviors are important in the field

indicative bidding an experimental analysis indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale furthermore there exist alternative bid procedures that in theory at least guarantee 100 efficiency and higher revenue for the seller we employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures the data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis

revenue ranking of discriminatory and uniform auctions with an unknown number of bidders an important managerial question is the choice of the pricing rule we study whether this choice depends on the uncertainty about the number of participating bidders by comparing expected revenues under discriminatory and uniform pricing within an auction model with affiliated values stochastic number of bidders and linear bidding strategies we show that if uncertainty about the number of bidders is substantial then the discriminatory pricing generates higher expected revenues than the uniform pricing in particular the first price auction might generate higher revenues than the second price auction therefore uncertainty about the number of bidders is an important factor to consider when choosing the pricing rule we also study whether eliminating this uncertainty i e revealing the number of bidders is in the seller s interests and discuss the existence of an increasing symmetric equilibrium

the demand for money financial innovation and the welfare cost of inflation an analysis with household data we use microeconomic data on households to estimate the parameters of the demand for currency derived from a generalized baumol tobin model our data set contains information on average currency deposits and other interest bearing assets the number of trips to the bank the size of withdrawals and ownership and use of atm cards we model the demand for currency accounting for adoption of new transaction technologies and the decision to hold interest bearing assets the interest rate and expenditure flow elasticities of the demand for currency are close to the theoretical values implied by standard inventory models however we find significant differences between individuals with an atm card and those without the estimates of the demand for currency allow us to calculate a measure of the welfare cost of inflation analogous to bailey s triangle but based on a rigorous microeconometric framework the welfare cost of inflation varies considerably within the population but never turns out to be very lar

learning to bid the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation we examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good despite the absence of private valuations asymmetric information or risk aversion bidder strategies do not converge to the bertrand nash equilibrium strategies even in the long run deviations from equilibrium strategies depend on uncertainty regarding the value of the good auction structure the agents learning model and the number of bidders although individual agents learn nash bidding strategies in isolation the learning of each agent by flattening the best reply correspondence of other agents blocks common learning these negative externalities are more severe in second price auctions auctions with many bidders and auctions where the good has an uncertain value ex post

the effect of shill bidding upon prices experimental evidence this paper explores through a series of experiments the effect of shill bidding upon revenues and prices in auctions we study the practice of shill bidding in a common value framework our findings are consistent with the prediction that if bidders are aware of the possibility of seller participation in an auction profits will be reduced on average we also study factors that affect bidder and seller participation decisions shill bidding can alleviate the problem of the winner s curse by lowering the price and it can thus provide benefits to bidders

the bidder s curse traditional explanations for the popularity of auctions are efficiency and revenue maximization we argue that another reason is the potential for overbidding i e buyers bidding above their willingness to pay outside the auction the auction mechanism ensures that even if only few buyers overbid they affect prices and allocations we employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field comparing auction prices to simultaneous fixed prices for identical items on the same ebay webpage we argue that fixed prices provide an upper bound for auction bids in a detailed data set of board game auctions we find that the final price exceeds the simultaneous fixed price in 42 percent of the auctions the result is not explained by differences in item quality shipping costs or seller reputation prior auction experience does not eliminate overbidding the finding replicates in a second broad data set of a cross section of auctions 48 percent overbidding the substantial fraction of overbid auctions is induced by a small number of bidders only 17 percent ever bid above the fixed price using a simple model of second price auctions with alternative fixed prices we show that transaction costs of switching between auctions and fixed prices cannot explain the results given that even the expected auction price is higher than the fixed price consistent with limited attention the closer the fixed price is listed relative to an auction the less likely are overbids this effect is strongest for bidders first bids when they are likely to examine the auction and fixed price listings more closely

researching preferences valuation and hypothetical bias a number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty this issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation cv as well as the debate over the divergence between wtp and wta in the context of cv it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses this paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate the model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate the first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value researching preferences the second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid the experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters hypotheticalness information costs and number of agents on the endogenous variables such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid

interdependent value auctions with insider information theory and experiment abstract we develop a model of interdependent value auctions in which two types of bidders compete insiders who are perfectly informed about their value and outsiders who are informed only about the private component of their value because the bidding strategy of outsiders cannot efficiently adjust with that of insiders the second price auction is inefficient the english auction has an equilibrium in which the information outsiders infer from the history of drop out prices enables them to bid toward attaining efficiency the presence of insiders has positive impacts on the seller s revenue a laboratory experiment confirms key theoretical predictions despite evidence of naive bidding

auctions in which losers set the price we study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values we show that the second price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays and the price only depends on the losers bids in particular we show that the k th price auction generates higher revenue than the second price auction for all k 2 if rationing is allowed with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders then the t 1 st price auction yields the lowest revenue among all auctions with rationing in which only the winners pay and the unit price only depends on the losers bids finally we compute bidding functions and revenue of the k th price auction with and without rationing for an illustrative example much used in the experimental literature to study first price second price and english auctions

vertically differentiated simultaneous vickrey auctions theory and experimental evidence we study settings where a number of sellers simultaneously offer vertically differentiated vickrey auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit demand buyers vertical differentiation can arise from differences in item quality item value certainty seller reliability or a combination of these factors we characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller revenue when bidders are restricted to submit at most one bid our theory predicts the existence of a unique bayes nash equilibrium that resembles a form of probabilistic mating of likes allowing unit demand bidders to place an arbitrary number of bids induces complex strategy profiles where bidders place positive bids in all available auctions higher bidder types tend to follow more targeted strategies focusing their serious bids on fewer and generally higher quality auctions the nature of the bidding equilibria introduces allocative inefficiencies that arise from the lack of coordination in auction selection among bidders we test our theoretical propositions in a controlled laboratory experiment while also utilizing a domain specific risk score to help assess how the bidders risk type affects their bidding behavior in support of our theory we find evidence of a probabilistic assortative matching between bidder and auction types we also find that low risk type bidders tend to crowd on the highest auction and will pay a premium for the certainty it offers whereas high risk type bidders fail to appropriately adjust for risk associated with the lowest auction leading to overbidding these lead to an interesting focal anomaly whereby bids are concentrated on the highest and lowest auctions bypassing intermediate auctions

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

an experimental study of precautionary bidding auctions often involve goods exhibiting a common knowledge ex post risk in such auctions precautionary bidding predicts that under expected utility dara bidders reduce their bids by more than the appropriate risk premium because the degree of riskiness of an auctioned good and bidders levels of risk aversion are difficult to observe in field settings we conduct experimental auctions that allow us to identify the precautionary premium directly we find strong evidence for precautionary bidding the effect is robust to changes in experimental design features our experiment provides the first empirical demonstration of precautionary motives in a strategic setting

posted prices and bid affiliation evidence from experimental auctions in most experimental auctions researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple po tentially binding rounds posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds if bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds this practice could result in biased value estimates in this article we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior we find that for familiar items high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions article advances the literature in several im portant ways first we report the design and results of the only study designed specifically to control for the effects of posted prices on bids in subsequent rounds we do this with the aid of confederate bidders who were instructed to bid within a certain narrow range thus we have multiple treatments that vary only by the presence or absence of confederate bidders al lowing for what we believe to be the cleanest possible test of the effect of posted prices on bidding behavior in later rounds while list and shogren 1999 model bids in round t as a function of the posted price in round t 1 through our use of confederate bidders to con trol posted prices we are able to test whether exposure to high posted prices has an effect that accumulates over the course of multiple rounds leading to a gradual increase in mean bids second our methods of analysis are more complete than previous work examining bid af filiation we not only compare summary statis tics from early and late rounds but we also use panel data analysis to understand how in dividual participants bids are affected by the presence of confederate bidders focusing on individuals rather than summary statistics al lows us to understand how individual specific characteristics influence affiliation and it also allows us to better understand the role of out liers

premium auctions and risk preferences an experimental study in premium auctions the highest losing bidder receives a reward from the seller this paper studies the private value english premium auction epa for different risk attitudes of bidders we explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with cara utilities and conduct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions in our experiment subjects are sorted into risk averse and risk loving groups we find that revenues in the epa are significantly higher when bidders are risk loving rather than risk averse these results are partly consistent with theory and confirm the general view that bidders risk preferences constitute an important factor that affects bidding behavior and consequently also the seller s expected revenue however individual subjects rarely follow the equilibrium strategy and revenue in our experiment is lower than in the symmetric equilibrium

information disclosure as a matching mechanism theory and evidence from a field experiment market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants we measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions we argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality this implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues the data confirm these hypotheses these findings have implications for the design of other markets including e commerce procurement auctions and labor markets jel c93 d44 d82 l15

asymmetric auction experiments with out commonly known beliefs abstract are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational

wildlife corridor market design an experimental analysis of the impact of project selection criteria and bidding flexibility in this work we used controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the impact of project selection criteria and bidding flexibility on the economic performance of wildlife corridor auctions bidders coordinated their bids to form valid corridors and compete with other valid corridors to be successful we tested the impact of bidding flexibility in terms of a bidders differentiating their offers for different eligible corridors and b bidders submitting a single offer that would automatically be considered for all eligible corridors within the bidding options we compared the performance of the auctions under a net benefit and a benefit cost ratio selection criteria we found that participants conditioned their offers in terms of corridor benefit information as a consequence allowing multiple offers significantly increased payment and rent extraction on the other hand a single offer restriction facilitated a higher proportion of valid agreements and reduced rent extraction and as a result the agency s payment we could not find any significant difference between project selection criteria in terms of payment and rent extraction these results provide important insights for policy makers engaged in conservation market design throughout the world

sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions this paper considers a housing market with price restrictions on such markets the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles this vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy proof allocation mechanism the main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps these sequences are demonstrated to play key roles in an english auction and a dutch auction respectively for the considered housing market with price restrictions less

experimental auction procedure impact on valuation of quality differentiated goods despite increased use of experimental auctions a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results this study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than english becker degroot marschak bdm and random nth price auctions especially in latter bidding rounds and that random nth price auction yields lower valuations than english and bdm auctions we find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations but the effect varies across auction mechanism

can relaxation of beliefs rationalize the winner s curse an experimental study we use a second price common value auction called the maximal game to experimentally study whether the winner s curse wc can be explained by models which retain best response behavior but allow for inconsistent beliefs we compare behavior in a regular version of the maximal game where the wc can be explained by inconsistent beliefs to behavior in versions where such explanations are less plausible we find little evidence of differences in behavior overall our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the wc is driven by beliefs

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions comment glenn harrison s recent 1989 article in this review has provoked the loudest debate yet heard among experimental economists his critique of the james cox vernon smith and james walker 1983a b 1985a b 1988 henceforth csw laboratory studies of first price sealed bid auctions with independent and private values in my view raises a fundamental methodological issue that is well worth debating and the csw research program deserves further discussion in this short comment i confine myself to what i see as the most important issues and do not try to address all evidence relevant to the ongoing debate first i summarize harrison s central argument very briefly after pointing out two shortcomings in harrison s specific analysis of csw i propose a methodological reconciliation finally and with some trepidation since my own experience with the auction data is relatively slight i suggest an alternative approach to understanding the anomalies discovered by csw

an efficient ascending bid auction for multiple objects when bidders exhibit multi unit demands standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes this article proposes a new ascending bid auction for homogeneous goods such as treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum the auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities items are awarded at the current price whenever they are clinched and the price is incremented until the market clears with private values this dynamic auction yields the same outcome as the sealed bid vickrey auction but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation with interdependent values this auction may retain efficiency whereas the vickrey auction suffers from a generalized winner s curse

a laboratory comparison of uniform and discriminative price auctions for reducing non point source pollution auctions allow regulators to identify land management changes with substantial environmental benefit and low opportunity cost this paper reports an experiment in which seller subjects compete in sealed offer auctions to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the experimenter regulator to subsidize pollution abatement one treatment employs uniform price auction rules whereas another treatment employs discriminative price auction rules we find that most offers in the uniform price auction are within 2 of cost whereas most offers in the discriminative price auction are at least 8 greater than cost nevertheless the discriminativeprice auction has superior overall market performance

speculation and demand reduction in english clock auctions with resale many auctions are followed by a resale market which occurs when the winner of the auction resells the item won to one of the participants from the original auction the existence of such transactions may initially appear counter intuitive however this paper will show that active inter bidder resale results from payoff maximizing decisions in the auction that take into account the incentives of a resale opportunity specifically i examine how the existence of an inter bidder resale opportunity impacts bidder behavior in an english clock auction and to what extent altering the bargaining power of the final buyer and reseller in the resale market determines the strategies followed in the initial auction in an attempt to understand the existence of these inter bidder transactions theoretical and behavioral analysis is used to develop hypotheses of speculation bidding above value and demand reduction bidding below value which are directly tested in a controlled experimental setting while value bidding is a dominant strategy in a standard english clock auction without resale when resale is allowed this theoretical claim is weaker demand reduction is observed when the bargaining power is shifted to the final buyer in resale and when the bargaining power is shifted toward the reseller speculation is observed the revenue achieved in the initial auction depends on the behavior observed in the auction regardless of bargaining power revenue is shown to decrease below what would have been earned in an english auction without resale due to demand reduction when the reseller has the bargaining power and speculation is observed this loss in revenue is somewhat mitigated by increased speculation

out of equilibrium bids in first price auctions wrong expectations or wrong bids deviations from risk neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies e g because of risk aversion regret quantal response mistakes to distinguish between these two explanations we use a novel experimental procedure and study expectations together with best replies in symmetric and asymmetric auctions we extensively test the internal validity of this setup we find that deviations from equilibrium bids do not seem to be because of to wrong expectations but because of deviations from a risk neutral best reply

auction markets for evaluations when the value of a product or service is uncertain outcomes can be inefficient a market for evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided this paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations the mechanisms considered are derived from the oft studied uniform price sealed bid discriminatory price sealed bid english clock auction and dutch clock auction our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that i each of these institutions improves social welfare and ii the performances of the four mechanisms are equivalent this second point is particularly noteworthy given that differing behavior is routinely observed in traditional private value auctions

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

an experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations abstract we study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single indivisible item valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder s own and other bidders signals theoretically the english auction yields efficient allocations while other standard auction formats fail to do so consistent with equilibrium predictions we find that an english auction yields significantly more efficiency than a second price sealed bid auction we also study the seller s expected revenue and the bidders expected profits and find that the experimental results are close to the theoretical predictions

measuring consumers willingness to pay at the point of purchase abstract economists psychologists and marketing researchers rely on measures of consumers willingness to pay wtp in estimating demand for private and public goods and in designing optimal price schedules existing market research techniques for measuring wtp differ in whether they provide an incentive to consumers to reveal their true wtp and in whether they simulate actual point of purchase contexts the authors present an empirical comparison of several procedures for eliciting wtp that are applicable directly at the point of purchase in particular the authors test the applicability of becker degroot and marschak s 1964 well known incentive compatible procedure for assessing the utility of lotteries to measuring consumers wtp in three studies the authors explore the reliability validity and feasibility of the procedure and show that it yields lower wtp estimates than do non incentive compatible methods such as open ended and double bounded contingent valuation they show experimentally t

hindsight foresight and insight an experimental study of a small market investment game with common and private values we experimentally test an endogenous timing investment model in which sub jects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return subjects overinvest relative to nash we separately consider whether subjects draw inferences in hindsight and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity in contrast to nash cursed equilibrium and level k predictions behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief based theories we offer an explanation in terms ofboundedly ratio nal rules of thumb based on insights about the game which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium jel c72 d82 d83 gil

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

revenue equivalence revisited the conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient we re examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats consequently we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue they also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher

nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions the extent to which the behavior of people is consistent with game theoretic principles is investigated in a first price sealed bid auction environment three linear rules of thumb with increasing complexity are used as benchmarks to gauge the accuracy of the constant relative risk aversion model crram in addition the crram is tested against the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis existing competitive bidding experiments cannot clearly distinguish between game theoretic models and linear markdown rules on an individual level within the parametric environments studied and reported in the experimental literature game theoretic solutions are linear over the range of private values in which bid functions are estimated in this study agents drew values from non uniform distributions as a result the game theoretic bidding behavior is nonlinear due to the nonlinearity special econometric and numerical techniques are applied to solve the model and obtain the estimates the crram exhibits good fit of the data the pseudo r2 is greater than 0 8 in 90 percent of the subjects the crram is more accurate than the markdown model mm and the simple ad hoc model simam but not as accurate as the sophisticated ad hoc model sop am the data also supports the relaxation of the rational expectation hypothesis and suggests that substantial increases in the predictive power of game theoretic models can be gained from improvements in the theory of belief formation

verifiable offers and the relationship between auctions and multilateral negotiations we use the experimental method to compare second price auctions with verifiable multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds despite the two institutions seeming equivalence we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second price auctions the difference occurs because low cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second lowest cost we also compare the two institutions to previously studied first price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non verifiable offers second price auctions yield the highest prices followed in order by verifiable negotiations non verifiable negotiations and first price auctions one of the more interesting facets of voluntary exchange is how changes in the strategic environment lead to differences in transaction outcomes for example the pioneering experimental work in chamberlin 1948 and smith 1962 illustrates that changing the nature of the information available to participants can dramatically influence the price and efficiency of an exchange process with this insight in mind in this article we use the experimental method to examine and compare four exchange mechanisms in a procurement setting in which a buyer faces several sellers that have privately known production costs the first two institutions are the first price auction and the second price auction these well known auction formats and their outcome equivalent variants the dutch auction and the english auction are used extensively to allocate products as varied as flowers art produce fish government securities and mineral rights 1 several governments have recently used auctions to allocate such valuable resources as radio spectra electric power and pollution rights 2 the second two institutions are variants of the multilateral negotiations introduced in thomas and wilson 2002 in this common exchange mechanism a buyer solicits price offers from multiple sellers and then he elicits more favourable offers by playing the sellers off one another until he accepts one of the offers or breaks off the negotiations among other settings multilateral negotiations are

implementing efficient multi object auction institutions an experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents abstract we study three alternative implementations of the vickrey multi unit demand auction vickrey s original static sealed bid auction and two dynamic ausubel auctions with and without public dropout information reported during the auction although implemented by a weaker solution concept behavior in the dynamic vickrey auction with the public dropout information comes significantly closer to the theoretical prediction of sincere bidding bidding one s valuations than either the static vickrey auction or the dynamic auction without dropout information this suggests a possible tradeoff between the simplicity and transparency of a mechanism and the strength of its solution concept when agents are still learning and or when players are not fully rational drawing on results from related single unit and multi unit demand auctions and the results of a new single unit demand auction experiment we provide important insights into the behavioral mechanism underlying the superior performance of the ausubel auction with feedback information

a new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions in this paper we present a new improved design for multiobject auctions and report on the results of experimental tests of that design we merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes the simultaneous multiple round smr design used by the fcc to auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the adaptive user selection mechanism ausm of banks et al 1989 allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources an experimental approach rand journal of economics vol 20 no 1 pp 1 25 then by adding one crucial new feature we are able to create a new design the resource allocation design rad auction process which performs better than both our experiments demonstrate that the rad auction achieves higher efficiencies lower bidder losses higher net revenues and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder s problem

silent auctions in the field and in the laboratory we analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions we focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding we then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions as a controlled environment this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field the laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction jel d44 h41

resolving uncertainty about the number of bidders in independent private value auctions an experimental analysis results from first price sealed bid auctions in which there is uncertainty regarding the number of bidders are reported consistent with recent theoretical findings concealing information regarding the number of bidders raises more revenue for the seller than revealing information individual bids show that 1 narrowly interpreted the nash equilibrium bidding theory underlying these theoretical predictions is rejected as less than 50 of all bids satisfy the strict inequality requirements of the theory but 2 a majority of the deviations from these inequality requirements favor the revenue raising predictions of the nash model and in a large number of cases involve marginal violations of the theory

endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions the paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent payos the reference point is endogenised as the expected price of the good in the auction the model predicts that in equilibrium bidders both overbid and underbid in comparison to the standard bidding function without reference dependent utility the model predicts that more bidders overbid than underbid and that bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders or the reserve price increases finally it is shown perhaps surprisingly that revenue equivalence continues to hold between rst and second price

auction fever rising revenue in second price auction formats the prevalent term auction fever visualizes that ascending auctions inconsistent with theory are likely to provoke higher bids than one shot auctions to explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally we design four different strategy proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo endowment effect arguments psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value a control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one shot auction with real endowments we conclude that when bidders are uncertain about their valuations auctions that foster pseudo endowment may raise bids and revenues

theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms two keyword auction mechanisms the generalized second price auction gsp and the vickrey clarke groves mechanism vcg were compared theoretically and experimentally the former is widely used in practice the latter is not but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values in the theoretical investigation by applying the locally envy free nash equilibrium to the vcg we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer s revenue coincide in the two mechanisms a laboratory experiment in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms supported this result

sealed bid auctions with ambiguity theory and experiments this study presents a laboratory experiment of the first and second price sealed bid auctions with independent private values where the distribution of bidder valuations may be unknown in our experimental setting in first price auctions bids are lower with the presence of ambiguity this result is consistent with ambiguity loving in a model that allows for different ambiguity attitudes we also find that the first price auction generates significantly higher revenue than the second price auction with and without ambiguity

using laboratory experimental auctions in marketing research a case study of new packaging for fresh beef this paper illustrates the use of laboratory experimental auctions in a pretest market research program for new products we review the experimental auctions literature discuss the range of auction mechanisms available and present the advantages and disadvantages of using a particular mechanism for a laboratory pretest market we then present a step by step example of how a theoretically incentive compatible auction mechanism fifth price sealed bid was used in a laboratory pretest market for vacuum packaged beef based on the illustration we discuss the potential for using laboratory experimental auctions in pretest market research we present the limitations that may be encountered in such applications and outline research aimed at improving the behavioral properties of the technique

hybrid auctions revisited abstract we examine hybrid auctions with affiliated private values and risk averse bidders and show that the optimal hybrid auction trades off the benefit of information extraction in the ascending bid phase and the cost of reduced competition in the sealed bid phase

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

naturally occurring markets and exogenous laboratory experiments a case study of the winner s curse we examine the relevance of experimental findings from laboratory settings that abstract from the field context of the task that theory purports to explain using common value auction theory as our guide we identify naturally occurring settings in which one can test the theory experienced agents bidding in familiar roles do not fall prey to the winner s curse yet experienced agents fall prey to the winner s curse when bidding in an unfamiliar role we conclude that the theory predicts field behaviour well when one is able to identify naturally occurring field counterparts to the key theoretical conditions

loss aversion and competition in vickrey auctions money ain t no good we present results from an experiment with a within subject design aimed at testing a unique prediction of expectations based reference dependent preferences and loss aversion in private value second price vickrey auctions if bidders have expectationsbased reference dependent preferences the total number of participants in an auction should affect bids in auctions for real objects but not in auctions with induced monetary values our findings are consistent with expectations based reference dependent preferences and loss aversion in real object auctions subjects bids are affected by the number of competitors and on average they decline with the intensity of competition in induced value auctions instead bids are unaffected by the intensity of competition we also successfully replicate an experiment from sprenger 2015 aimed at distinguishing expectations based loss aversion from models of disappointment aversion this provides additional evidence that our findings in the auction experiments are due to expectations based loss aversion

green electricity markets as mechanisms of public goods provision theory and experimental evidence utility based green electricity programs provide market opportunities for consumers to reduce the carbon footprint of their electricity use these programs deploy three types of public goods contribution mechanisms voluntary contribution green tariff and all or nothing green tariff kotchen and moore 2007 we extend the theoretical understanding of the all or nothing green tariff mechanism by showing that an assumption of warm glow preferences is needed to explain widespread participation in programs deploying this mechanism we conduct the first experimental test to compare the revenue generating capacity of a pure public good based on the voluntary contribution mechanism and an impure public good based on the green tariff mechanism in experimental play the voluntary contribution mechanism raises 50 more revenue than the green tariff mechanism with the all or nothing green tariff experimental play and regression estimates show that a warm glow preference positively affects participation as predicted by the theory

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse

better faster cheaper an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback the majority of reverse auctions for procurement use a single attribute price format while providing constraints on nonprice attributes such as quality and lead time alternatively a buyer could choose to conduct a multiattribute auction where bidders can specify both a price and levels of nonprice attributes while such an auction may provide higher theoretical utility to the buyer it is not clear that this theoretical improvement will be realized given the increased complexity of the auction in this research we present an ascending auction mechanism for a buyer whose utility function is known and dependent on three attributes motivated by a supply chain procurement problem setting we consider quality and lead time for the two attributes in addition to price the auction mechanism provides the bidders with restricted feedback regarding the buyer s utility function we explore experimentally the performance of this multiattribute auction mechanism as compared to a price only auction mechanism compared with the price only auction we find that our mechanism design is effective in increasing both buyer utility and bidder supplier profits