revealed social preferences of dutch political parties we measure the redistributive preferences of dutch political parties using unique detailed information from their election proposals by employing the inverse optimal tax method we calculate the political weights across the income distribution for each political party we find that all dutch political parties give a higher political weight to middle incomes than to the poor moreover the political weights of the rich are close to zero furthermore we detect a strong political status quo bias as the political weights of all political parties hardly deviate from the weights implied by the pre existing tax system we argue that political economy considerations are key in understanding these results

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

a test of lazear s theory of delayed payment contracts according to lazear workers and firms enter into long term implicit contracts that discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract such delayed payment contracts are less likely to occur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker effort this paper uses data from the national longitudinal survey and the dictionary of occupational titles to test that hypothesis in particular it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions mandatory retirement long job tenures and high wages for older workers

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

does commercialization undermine the benefits of decentralization for local services provision evidence from mexico s urban water and sanitation sector summary decentralization has been promoted as a means to better reflect citizen preferences and improve local services many developing countries decentralized and promoted neoliberal policies such as commercialization simultaneously leaving mayors with the responsibility of improving public services through self financing reforms this study evaluates experiences in three mexican cities to assess whether decentralization and commercialization practices have resulted in improved water and sanitation services it finds that commercialization has increased social conflict surrounding urban services provision and that local institutional constraints further undermine mayor s ability to adopt politically contentious policies the result has been stalled and uneven service improvements

promoting the sustainability of development institutions a framework for strategy abstract this article presents a generic framework for understanding institutional sustainability in development its lessons draw from the agriculture and health sectors the framework treats institutions as a systems that function in relationship to their environments b organized and managed entities whose organizational structures and procedures must match the tasks products people resources and contexts they deal with and c settings intimately concerned with the exchange of resources where economic and political relationships intertwine to create varying patterns of power and incentive application of the analytic framework has shown that institutional sustainability depends upon maintaining responsive output flows high quality and valued goods and services cost effective goods and services delivery mechanisms organization and management and resource flows recurrent costs capital investments human resources

intergovernmental fiscal transfers international lessons for developing countries abstract this paper reviews the central issues that arise in designing intergovernmental transfers and surveys the approaches adopted in a number of countries with special emphasis on developing countries since circumstances and objectives differ from country to country no simple uniform pattern of transfers is universally appropriate but experience around the world makes it clear that if services are to be efficiently provided transfers must be designed so that those receiving them have a clear mandate adequate resources sufficient flexibility to make decisions and are accountable for results

are workers paid their marginal products status is like coase s social costs a reciprocal phenomenon given that one person s gain in status can occur only at the expense of a loss in status for others and that workers are free to choose their coworkers it follows that the competitive wage structure within a firm must be one in which individual wage differences understate individual differences in marginal products the purpose of this paper is to examine a variety of empirical evidence that relates to this proposition about the firm s internal wage structure the paper is organized as follows section i briefly summarizes the theoretical considerations that govern competitive wage determination when status matters to people and firms are viewed as voluntary associations of workers section ii then confronts the predictions of section i by examining pay and productivity schedules for a group of sales occupations for which these schedules are relatively easily observed section ii also examines the relationship between wages and productivity for a sample of university professors an occupation in which individual productivity differences are for a variety of obvious reasons relatively more difficult to measure all of the evidence examined is consistent with the hypothesis that within firms wage rates vary substantially less than do individual productivity values section iii discusses additional observations and evidence that bear on this same hypothesis it suggests that the implicit market for status may strongly influence the ways in which firms are organized to carry out the tasks they perform section iv concludes by considering the claim that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of equity considerations it argues that the concept of equity appears very closely linked to the concept of status and suggests a strategy for assigning monetaty value to the equity considerations that so often dominate public policy decisions

are micro and macro labor supply elasticities consistent a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins we evaluate whether state of the art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins we find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady state hicksian elasticities relevant for cross country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins however micro estimates of intertemporal substitution frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences the key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different

who talks with whom the role of repeated interactions in decentralized forest governance summary this article suggests that efforts to study decentralization outcomes would benefit from widening the unit of analysis from the local government administration to the local governance system many individual local governments especially in developing countries lack the human and physical resources to be effective governors by themselves it is thus useful to recognize the linkages between different governance actors the empirical analysis based on observations in bolivia s forestry sector finds that the degree of connectivity between the actors in a municipal governance system helps explain why some systems are more effective than others 2003 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

estimating the effect of unearned income on labor supply earnings savings and consumption evidence from a survey of lottery players this paper provides empirical evidence about the effect of unearned income on earnings consumption and savings using an original survey of people playing the lottery in massachusetts in the mid 1980 s the effects of the magnitude of lottery prizes on economic behavior are analyzed the critical assumption is that among lottery winners the magnitude of the prize is randomly assigned it is found that unearned income reduces labor earnings with a marginal propensity to consume leisure of approximately 11 percent with larger effects for individuals between 55 and 65 years old after receiving about half their prize individuals saved about 16 percent

innovative sources of development finance global cooperation in the twenty first century this paper argues that in view of the resource crunch confronting many developing countries and the fall in overseas development aid flows to them new sources of development finance need to be found we consider international taxes fees and levies that

frames of mind in intertemporal choice recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed kahneman and tversky s prospect theory kahneman d a tversky 1979 prospect theory an analysis of decision under risk econometrica472 363 391 explains many of these framing effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated this paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference point concept to intertemporal choice three experiments demonstrate that when people choose between immediate and delayed consumption the reference point used to evaluate alternatives can significantly influence choice the first study elicited relative preference for immediate and delayed consumption using three methods each of which differently framed choices between alternatives offering identical end state consumption the conventional discounted utility model predicts that the three methods of elicitation should yield similar estimates of time preference but preferences were found to differ in accordance with a reference point model the second and third studies extend and replicate the results from the first the third using real rather than hypothetical choices

the emergence of local capacity lessons from colombia abstract the paper analyzes the process of capacity development in a sample of colombian local governments which resulted from a strategy of state decentralization initiated in the mid 1980s the central message of the study is that competition for political office opened the door to responsible and innovative leadership that in turn became the driving force behind capacity building efforts more widespread community participation expanded the range of possibilities open to local governments and provided the basis to sustain capacity over time the experience of these municipios suggests that capacity can be enhanced through skillful innovations even under difficult circumstances

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

job matching with finite horizon and risk aversion the consequences of introducing risk averse workers with a known finite retirement age into a simple job matching framework are explored the job matching model includes two jobs in the primary job workers and firms learn about the worker s productivity by observing his output over time in the secondary job productivity of any worker is known with certainty at the outset workers start off in the primary job but based on their observed performance may choose to switch to the secondary job the model is developed in two stages first the finite retirement age is introduced while the usual assumption of risk neutral workers is retained in this model it is shown that all workers who achieve at least a certain cumulative output record denoted r by a certain age denoted t will thereafter remain in the primary job until retirement those who do not achieve r by age t switch to the secondary job at or before age t and remain there second risk aversion is introduced along with finite retireme

incentives in academics why is there tenure this paper models ancademic department as an internal labor market the major problem facing the university administration is to ensure that members of its departments are willing to hire the best possible candidates academic tenure is seen to be a necessary condition for this the analysis is also consistent with other aspects of the academic environment including tenure track appointments contract buy outs early retirement plans and when a budget crunch hits the elimination of entire departments the results extend in a simple way to other organizations in which members have an input into overall decisions

political determinants of state capacity in latin america summary in this article we argue that both democracy and governments partisanship have a bearing on state capacity in latin america we also maintain that state capacity is a condition rooted in history and society it can be built or purposefully undermined in particular in latin america parties of the left have frequently operated to reallocate social and political clout in favor of underprivileged groups the inclusion of the latter in the political process helped states to thwart pressures from dominant elites opposing redistribution and tax increases these mobilized groups have also pushed for universal public services as high quality education health care or public housing which required well functioning administrations and an adequate institutional capacity thus contributing to consolidate stateness in the area whereas previous qualitative studies analyzed the mechanisms that relate democracy and political partisanship to state capacity we test this hypothesis quantitatively to this end we estimate the effect over time of democracy political parties and other socio demographic factors on a composite measure of stateness obtaining supportive evidence in particular we find that higher democracy levels and left leaning governments favored the growth of state strength in the area during 1975 2009 and discuss these findings with reference to the political experience of latin america

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

pay equality and industrial politics personnel managers often argue that equitable pay treatment manifested as wage compression is useful because it reduces disharmony among workers but it is far from obvious that a compressed salary structure is morale improving since better workers may feel disenchanted by this scheme however when workers rewards are based on relative comparisons salary compression reduces uncooperative behavior that is detrimental to the firm relative comparisons imply that some reference group must be selected the major result is that within the relevant groups some wage compression is efficient

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

on the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules abstract in an economy which primitives are exactly those in mirrlees 1971 we investigate the efficiency of tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle for a given exogenous government consumption level we assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one for our preferred parametrizations we find that inefficiency only arises at the top of the income distribution for marginal tax rates well above the ones we currently observe in most countries we also recover the implicit marginal social weights associated with the equal sacrifice schedule and find them not to be monotonic in types for the environments we study

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

job security provisions and employment european countries have enacted various job security provisions over the last 30 years employers are required to pay workers on separation or to give advance notice of termination in anything less than a perfectly functioning market there are effects of the provisions on employment incumbents are more likely to retain their jobs but new workers are less likely to be hired an examination of the european data suggests that severance pay requirements reduce employment

the laffer curve revisited abstract laffer curves for the us the eu 14 and individual european countries are compared using a neoclassical growth model featuring constant frisch elasticity cfe preferences new tax rate data is provided the us can maximally increase tax revenues by 30 with labor taxes and 6 with capital taxes we obtain 8 and 1 for the eu 14 there 54 of a labor tax cut and 79 of a capital tax cut are self financing the consumption tax laffer curve does not peak endogenous growth and human capital accumulation affect the results quantitatively household heterogeneity may not be important while transition matters greatly

ecotourism and indigenous micro enterprise formation in northern australia opportunities and constraints abstract indigenous australians suffer considerable social and economic disadvantage the challenge for indigenous communities and policy makers is to discover or create opportunities that will provide sustainable development tourism is seen as one sector that could possibly provide such opportunities indigenous tourism enterprises are in most situations likely to be micro businesses micro businesses indigenous and non indigenous have relatively high failure rates so it is important to undertake substantial planning to avoid failure this paper presents the results of a planning process undertaken by an indigenous clan planning to operate their own ecotourism micro enterprise within ngukurr an indigenous community in northern australia the study highlights the fact tourism does provide potential for economic development because indigenous enterprises often have some competitive advantages in addition the study highlights the fact that communities often do not have the capacity to undertake all the tasks necessary to establish and operate a commercially successful ecotourism enterprise partnerships with other stakeholders within the region can help overcome this constraint finally it is noted that the cdep scheme has the potential to satisfy the need for funds that cannot be satisfied through normal channels

optimal income taxation of lone mothers an empirical comparison of the uk and germany optimal tax rules are used to evaluate the optimality of taxation for lone mothers in germany and britain the theoretical model is combined with elasticities derived from the structural estimation of lone mothers labour supply for both countries we do not find that in work credits with marginal tax rates are optimal however we show that when the government has a low taste for redistribution out of work transfers and transfer for the working poor are very similar implying very low marginal tax rates further the current tax and transfer systems in both countries are shown to be optimal only if governments have a much higher welfare value for income received by the non workers than the working poor government run transfer and redistribution programmes are of major importance in most developed countries such countries spend large amounts of public funds to provide income support to the poor although the precise structure of these pro grammes differs substantially as expenditures on public income support programmes count for a sizeable share of the government s budget in welfare states and because of their alleged negative work incentive effects there is an ongoing public debate about policy reforms in this area this controversy can be best described by the trade off between equity and efficiency income transfers increase the disposable income of the disadvantaged and thus their well being but the programmes introduce distortions that might lead to substantial disincentives in the labour market the aim of this article is to apply recent results from the optimal tax literature to analyse the design of personal income tax and welfare benefits empirically and to discuss its optimality we focus on the tax and transfer systems for lone mothers in germany and the uk

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

delayed payment contracts and a firm s propensity to hire older workers there are jobs for which firms employ older workers but tend not to hire new older workers this may be attributable in part to implicit contracts that discourage worker shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract such delayed payment contracts can introduce a form of fixed costs into the employment relationship much as with hiring and training costs these fixed costs lead firms to hire primarily young long term workers while firms employ older workers workers who are serving out the last years of their contract they tend not to hire them this paper presents empirical evidence that is consistent with this argument

labor economics and the psychology of organizations this essay is a discussion of how economists are attempting to understand institutions within the organizations of the labor market the institutions and issues discussed include mandatory retirement discontinuous jumps in wages pay compression rights of tenure up or out hierarchies timing of raises promotions and evaluations the existence of partnerships the use of bonuses vs penalties and pay as a motivator

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

from local strongman to facilitator institutional incentives for participatory municipal governance in latin america efforts to engage citizens in democratic forms of governance in developing societies are complicated by deeply rooted socioeconomic and political inequalities in this article the authors analyze

decentralization and participation the governance of common pool resources in nepal s terai summary decentralization has emerged as an important instrument of environmental and development policy in the last two decades presumed benefits of environmental policy decentralization depend in significant measure on broad participation in the programs that governments create to decentralize decision making related to resource management this paper uses data from protected areas in nepal s terai to examine who participates in environmental decentralization programs on the basis of our statistical analysis we highlight the fact that the likelihood of participation in community level user groups is greater for those who are economically and socially better off we also find that individuals who have greater access to and who visit government offices related to decentralization policies more often are also more likely to participate in user groups created by state officials finally we find a negative correlation between education and levels of participation our study and analysis support the argument that for decentralization policies to be successful on equity issues it is important to build institutional mechanisms that encourage poorer and more marginal households to access government officials improve access to educational opportunities and create incentives to promote more interactions between less powerful rural residents and government officials 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

identifying laffer bounds a sufficient statistics approach with an application to germany we derive a simple sufficient statistics test for whether a nonlinear tax transfer system is second best pareto efficient if it is not then it is beyond the top of the laffer curve and there exists a tax cut that is self financing the test depends on the income distribution extensive and intensive labor supply elasticities and income effect parameters a tax transfer system is likely to be inefficient if marginal tax rates are quickly falling in income we apply this test to the german tax transfer system and we find that the structure of effective marginal tax rates is likely to be inefficient in the region where transfers are phased out

inheritance taxation and wealth effects on the labor supply of heirs abstract the taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs through wealth effects this leads to an increase in labor income tax revenue on top of direct bequest tax revenue we first show in a theoretical model that a simple back of the envelope calculation based on existing estimates for the reduction in earnings after wealth transfers fails the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect because i heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply already prior to inheriting and ii when bequest receipt is stochastic even those who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change in their distribution of net bequests we quantitatively elaborate the size of the overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state of the art life cycle model that we calibrate to the german economy besides the joint distribution of income and inheritances quasi experimental evidence regarding the size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration we find that for each euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates it obtains an additional 9 cents of labor income tax revenue in net present value through higher labor supply of non heirs