the contribution of tourism development to economic growth in the korean economy abstract this study investigates the causal relations between tourism growth and economic expansion for the korean economy by using engle and granger two stage approach and a bivariate vector autoregression var model two principle results emerge from this study first the results of a cointegration test indicate that there is no long run equilibrium relation between two series second the outcomes of granger causality test imply the one way causal relationship of economic driven tourism growth the hypothesis of tourism led economic growth is not held in the korean economy this consequence is supported by testing the sensitivity of causality test under different lag selections along with the optimal lag

setting standards for credible compliance and law enforcement in this paper we examine the setting of optimal legal standards to simultaneously induce parties to invest in care and to motivate law enforcers to detect violators of the law the strategic interaction between care providers and law enforcers determines the degree of efficiency achieved by the standards our principal finding is that some divergence between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of providing care is required to control enforcement costs further the setting of standards may effectively substitute for the setting of fines when penalties for violation are fixed in particular maximal fines may be welfare reducing when standards are set optimally nous considerons dans cet article la determination en information incomplete de normes legales optimales pour a la fois inciter les citoyens a faire preuve de diligence prevention et motiver les agents de la paix a veiller au respect des lois l interaction strategique entre citoyens et agents de la paix determine l efficacite des normes choisies notre resultat principal est a l effet qu un ecart entre benefices marginaux et couts marginaux de la diligence est necessaire afin de reduire les couts d application des lois de plus les normes peuvent etre un substitut aux amendes lorsque les penalites pour infraction sont fixes des amendes maximales peuvent en particulier etre contre indiquees lorsque les normes sont optimalement determinees

standard essential patents a major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex ante not that important by being included into a standard may become standard essential patents in an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create most standard setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to litigation this paper builds a framework for the analysis of these patents identifies several types of inefficiencies attached to the lack of price commitments and shows how structured price commitments restore competition and why such commitments may not arise spontaneously in the marketplace

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

non convexities and the efficiency of equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract the nature of the efficiency frontier in models with adverse selection has not been studied in the literature we show that this frontier cannot always be strictly concave we obtain however that there is always a one to one correspondence between market equilibrium and second best efficiency whatever the shape of the efficiency frontier the results are illustrated with an insurance example

transitory shock or structural shift the impact of the early 1980s recession on british regional unemployment this paper examines the impact of the early 1980s recession on regional unemployment in britain more specifically it seeks to evaluate the hypothesis that this recessionary shock was so severe that it caused an upward structural shift in the underlying mean unemployment rates of the regions this proposition is analysed using dickey fuller tests for difference versus trend stationarity and the augmented structural shift and trend break time series models developed by perron the results suggest that the apparent stochastic non stationarity in regional unemployment over the period 1965 95 is in fact due to an upward structural shift in regional mean unemployment rates in 1980 furthermore the nature of this shift appears to have differed as between the northern and southern regions of the country

default and aggregate income abstract this paper studies how default varies with aggregate income we analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed idiosyncratic income by allowing for default default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance default penalties ensure that only these agents default we show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income we provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous

real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information abstract we study the cost of adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners the principal and managers the agent information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types and a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range in an observationally different way than when fixed adjustment costs or irreversibilities cause a similar phenomenon uncertainty in the form of an increase in the spread of agents types tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition the model gives a new interpretation of tobin s q under asymmetric information explaining some results of the mergers and acquisition literature

the efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information abstract this paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information using the definition of second best efficiency proposed by harris and townsend 1981 for environments characterized by informational assmmetry the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined we find an analogue to the first optimality theorem a miyazaki wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation

optimal regulation of network expansion we model the optimal regulation of continuous irreversible capacity expansion where a regulated firm has private information about capacity costs investments are financed from the firm s cash flows and demand is stochastic the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a revenue tax that increases with the level of the price cap if the asymmetric information has large support then the optimal mechanism consists of a laissez faire regime for low cost firms that is the firm s price cap corresponds to that of an unregulated monopolist and it is not taxed this maximal distortion at the top is necessary to provide information rents as direct subsidies are not feasible

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

the conservation reserve program as a least cost land retirement mechanism mechanism design theory is used to characterize the properties of a least cost crp if marginal land rents decrease with acres farmed then a least cost crp is a set of nonlinear price schedules if marginal land rents are independent of acres farmed then an offer system constitutes a least cost crp the least cost offer system gives a useful estimate of the upper bound of a least cost crp empirical results suggest that a 34 million acre crp should have cost no more than 1 billion per year

anarchy the market and the state the characteristics of private and public goods and the conditions defining the pareto optimal allocation of each are as opposite as are anarchy and dictatorship pareto optimality with private goods requires the horizontal summation of demand schedules the equation of each individual s marginal rate of substitution to the price ratio pareto optimality with public goods requires vertical summation of demand schedules the equation of the summation of marginal rates of substitution to the price ratio increasing the number of buyers and sellers improves the allocation of private goods as does increasing their mobility the orderly anarchy of the market achieves a pareto optimal allocation of resources for pure private goods if there is either a large number of buyers and sellers or perfect mobility into and out of all markets in contrast pareto optimality in the anarchic provision of a pure public good can be assumed with certainty only in the trivial case of a community of one once crusoe is joined by friday public goods provision becomes a prisoners dilemma with non pareto outcomes likely with small numbers pareto optimality may still emerge in an anarchic prisoners dilemma game if the same players repeat the game indefinitely through the familiar logic of the prisoners dilemma supergame 12 ch 2 1 thus small numbers and immobility favor the anarchic achievement of pareto optimality for public goods provision just as large numbers and high mobility favor the anarchic achievement of pareto optimality in private goods markets this dichotomous view of the potential for a pareto optimal allocation of resources under anarchy has the obvious twin implication that the case for government intervention is strongest when the numbers of buyers and sellers of private goods are small and mobility absent and for public goods when numbers are large and mobility high although this dichotomous depiction of the allocation problem is highly simplified it does provide some insight into where we can should expect to find governments intervening where we can should not now consider the further implication the characteristics of a community in terms of the number of members and their mobility are usually the same with respect to both private goods allocation and public goods allocation a medieval village consisted of a small number of families most of whose members never traveled more than a few kilometers from the village throughout their lives this same small group of people would confront each other in the many public good prisoners dilemma situations a community faces as they would in whatever market transactions that took place one expects from the discussion above that the provision of public goods in a medieval village e g law and order and the resolution of other prisoners

simple menus of contracts in cost based procurement and regulation in an influential paper jean jacques laffont and jean tirole 1986 formulated a principal agent model of cost based procurement and regulation and showed that the principal can implement the optimal mechanism by offering the agent a menu consisting of a continuum of linear contracts two related problems with applying this theory in practice have been that the economic logic and the underlying mathematics involved in calculating the optimal menu are quite complex and the principal must be able to specify the agent s entire disutility of effort function in order to calculate the optimal menu as a result the model has not been widely used in practice to either calculate actual incentive contracts or even to develop useful qualitative guidance about the nature of the optimal solution and how it is affected by various economic factors the purpose of this paper is to show that dramatically simpler menus which are easy to understand and calculate and which have lower informational requirements can at least in some cases capture a substantial share of the gains achievable by the fully optimal complex menu in particular this paper considers two item menus where one item is a cost reimbursement contract and the other item is a fixed price contract such menus are called fixed price cost reimbursement fpcr menus for the case where the agent s utility is quadratic and the agent s type is distributed uniformly it is shown that the optimal fpcr menu always captures at least three quarters of the gain that the optimal complex menu achieves where the gain is measured relative to the result of using a cost reimbursement contract this paper s research was originally motivated by a policy issue in defense procurement in the united states the department of defense dod purchases almost all major weapons systems from sole source contractors using contracting methods that essentially amount to using cost reimbursement contracts the best way to understand why dod uses costreimbursement contracting methods is that they perform precisely the function identified in laffont and tirole s principal agent model they guarantee in a situation that amounts to a bilateral monopoly that dod and the firm can reach an agreement i e they guarantee that the agent will always produce the good of course the use of cost reimbursement contracting methods

downsizing with labor sharing and collusion abstract in this paper we develop a model with adverse selection on the productive efficiency of workers in the private sector to analyze the downsizing problem in a public enterprise workers are distinguished by an inside productivity factor our result shows that reallocation of labor in the optimal downsizing mechanism depends on the comparative advantage of workers in public versus private production and on the size of asymmetric information in particular if information asymmetry is small random downsizing mechanisms may become optimal we also show that collusion between workers and the manager in charge of downsizing may induce more screening than in the absence of collusion if information asymmetry is large enough finally we study how risk aversion of workers affects the optimal downsizing mechanism

an analysis of the impact of open entry on price and the quality of service in the airline industry d uring the past three years there has been a gradual transition toward deregulation of the airline industry by the civil aeronautics board cab as originally proposed in the federal aviation act of 1975 and finally enacted in the airline deregulation act of 1978 this move is intended to allow for competitive pricing and freedom of entry and exit in the domestic airline markets during 1981 so far the price competition has been restricted by the cab to the offering of discount and standby fares the impact on price has been a reduction in revenue per passenger mile from 8 24 in 1977 to 8 02 in june of 1979 1 over this same period the quality of service has declined as measured by an increase in the load factor from 56 1 to 63 6 this result is consistent with most predictions regarding the impact of price competition in this industry 2 alfred kahn 1978 has argued that price competition by itself would and should result in a variety of services for consumers but that it could reduce the average quality of service via higher load factors price competition is however only one dimension of a fully competitive airline market while price competition will certainly tend to increase load factors the effect of entry should be to lower them as firms compete through scheduling frequency the interaction between these forms of competition produces a technical tradeoff between lower prices and higher quality of service and thus raises the question of what a truly competitive airline market will provide the consumer of airline services this paper examines this intrinsic tradeoff between price and quality in the provision of airline service and analyzes the implications for a competitive airline industry the presence of this tradeoff has been suggested in the theoretical models of douglas and miller 1974b and devany 1975 in both models there is purported to be an inverse relation between the load factor and the number of firms in a market due to scheduling competition and an inverse relation between the load factor and the fare level due to profit maximizing supply responses of firms serving the market 3 it is these theoretical propositions that produce a tradeoff between fare level and the quality of service and make the effects of competition in the typical airline market difficult to predict using these theoretical models as a basis this paper develops an empirical analysis of the relation between fare level open entry and the quality of service and its implications for a competitive airline market this involves first estimating the equilibrium price and load factor which results from competition in a market with a fixed number of firms then the independent effect of open entry on the competitive market outcome is identified by varying the number of firms and examining the capacity response due to scheduling competition this analysis yields the zero profit price and load factor for varying degrees of market concentration jthe profitmaximizing and output maximizing price quality combinations are also generated for the same market conditions a comparison of these alternative market solutions provides the basis for analyzing the inherent price quality tradeoff in the provision of airline service and some insight into the nature of a fully competitive airline market crucial to the analysis proposed above is an empirical estimate of the supply response of firms serving a city pair market to changes in received for publication april 23 1980 revision accepted for publication april 15 1981 university of texas at arlington and southern university of new orleans respectively i these figures are computed using data on domestic trunk carriers in all u s markets they are taken from air transport 1979 2 this prediction follows from the generally accepted theoretical model as developed by devany 1975 and douglas and miller 1974b i douglas and miller 1974a b provide some empirical evidence of the inverse relation between the average load factor and the number of firms serving the market using a crosssection sample of city pair markets operating in the united states similarly devany 1975 provides some preliminary empirical tests of his model and finds the results to be generally consistent with these theoretical propositions

essential facility financing and market structure abstract the paper analyzes the funding of an infrastructure project when an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers money an open access policy raises welfare but may make the project non viable since funding must be provided by operators capital contributions we characterize the optimal market structure the regulator can ask the incumbent to bear a higher share of investment cost if the latter insists on an exclusive use yet the incumbent is willing to pay more for exclusivity the higher the demand that is precisely when competition yields the highest benefits at the optimum the incumbent s information is not used to determine market structure we further investigate the implications of this basic result in a dynamic context we show that the monopoly franchise policy is time consistent while an open access policy is not we also demonstrate that a threat of regulatory capture creates an open access presumption last we show that when the decision involves multiple projects monopoly segments should cross subsidize open access ones

external markets and regulation abstract regulated firms often sell to external markets in addition to their regulated or internal markets the welfare of consumers in these external markets is typically outside of the regulator s domain of concern as a result external markets provide the regulator with additional policy options for the strategic influence of firm behavior in the presence of asymmetric information without an external market asymmetric information introduces an incentive cost and consequently the optimal policy is forced to distort internal production below the first best level we show that profit opportunities presented by an external market can be used to absorb some all when the firm is an external price taker of the incentive cost and thus insulate the internal market from quantity distortions

optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity we consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity averse monopolist the monopolist s subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by contamination of an additive probability we find that under a maxmin utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract and the distortion at the bottom is reduced other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity but they get a greater discount

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy a survey public choice economists began studying anarchy in the 1970s since then the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned this article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy following early public choice economists many economists are researching how individuals interact without government from non public interested explanations of the creation of government to historical studies of internalizing externalities under anarchy public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective of human interaction with and without government although the economics of politics receives more attention the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice

noisy observation in adverse selection models we consider a principal agent contracting problem under incomplete information where some of the agent s actions are imperfectly observable contracts take the form of reward schedules based on the noisy observation of the agent s action we first review situations where the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence of noise then we focus on the use of linear reward schedules which allow universal implementation i e implementation of a given mechanism for any unbiased noise of observation and on quadratic reward schedules which only require the knowledge of the variance of the noise we exhibit sufficient conditions under which linear reward schedules implement a given mechanism finally we characterize necessary conditions for a mechanism to be implementable under noisy observation by a linear schedule and by quadratic schedules we give the geometric intuition behind all results

advantageous selection in insurance markets this article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision risk tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk averse types taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients allowing a strict pareto gain this result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies as does the novel finding of a pure strategy partial pooling subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the insurance market copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

optimal risk sharing under adverse selection and imperfect risk perception the present paper thoroughly explores second best efficient allocations in an insurance economy with adverse selection we start with a natural extension of the classical model assuming less than perfect risk perception we characterize the con straints on efficient redistribution and we summarize the incidence of incentives on the economy with the notions of weak and strong adverse selection finally we show in what sense improving risk perception enhances welfare a typical situation where the risk perception of the insurer and that of policy holders differ is one in which each party knows something that the other does not the insurer may correctly assess the impact on risk of an individual s character istics without observing them all whereas policyholders may know all their characteristics without relating them correctly to their risks these simple obser vations call for a modelling of imperfect risk perception and adverse selection

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

designing a private industry government auctions with endogenous market structure abstract this paper considers government mechanisms for auctioning production rights in which both the winners and the market structure doupoly dual sourcing monopoly sole sourcing or government owned production are a function of the bids in designing the optimal mechanism the government considers the tradeoffs among consumer surplus producer surplus and revenue under incomplete information doupoly is implemented less frequently and government production more frequently than under complete information when bidders are symmetric the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a modified second price auction applications to privatization deregulation and defense procurement are discussed

eliminating price supports a political economy perspective abstract this paper characterizes information and politically constrained government programs for eliminating price supports the issues which we examine in this model include i to what extent is it possible to reduce the size of oversubscribed industries in light of the information and political constraints that exist is a complete decoupling of a worker s compensation from her output possible or desirable ii which type of workers as characterized by their skill levels and outside employment opportunities remain in the industry iii which type of worker is harmed by the relocation program which coalitions of workers will oppose the reorganization

tourism expansion tourism uncertainty and economic growth new evidence from taiwan and korea abstract this study examines the causal relationship between tourism expansion and economic growth in two asian countries taiwan and south korea an egarch m model with uncertainty factors is employed to examine the direction of causality between tourism expansion and economic growth as well as the impulse impacts of uncertainty on both variables the results indicate that the tourism led economic growth hypothesis is supported for taiwan while a reciprocal causal relationship is found for south korea the significant impacts of uncertainty on growth are also identified

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

detrending stylized facts and the business cycle the stylized facts of macroeconomic time series can be presented by fitting structural time series models within this framework we analyse the consequences of the widely used detrending technique popularised by hodrick and prescott 1980 it is shown that mechanical detrending based on the hodrick prescott filter can lead investigators to report spurious cyclical behaviour and this point is illustrated with empirical examples structural time series models also allow investigators to deal explicitly with seasonal and irregular movements that may distort estimated cyclical components finally the structural framework provides a basis for exposing the limitations of arima methodology and models based on a deterministic trend with a single break

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

the importance of ordering in sequential auctions to date the largest part of literature on multi unit auctions has assumed that there arek homogeneous objects being auctioned where each bidder wishes to win exactly one or all ofk units these modeling assumptions have made the examination of ordering in sequential auctions inconsequential the aim of this paper is to introduce and highlight the critical influence that ordering can have on the efficiency of an auction we study a buyer who outsources via sequential 2nd price auctions two heterogeneous jobs and faces a diverse set of suppliers with capacity constraints

regulation with non price discrimination abstract this paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges and the effect such regulation has on incentives for non price discrimination i show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non price measures optimal access charges must be set higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible since the level of the access charge affects incentives to practice foreclosure furthermore i show that whether the access charge should be used to level or tilt the playing field in favour of the more efficient firm depends on the cost associated with non price discrimination

auctionin entry into tournaments a research tournament model with heterogeneous contestants is presented for a large class of contests the optimal number of competitors is two this insight makes designing the tournament easier and highlights the importance of selecting highly qualified contestants while customary uniform price and discriminatory price auctions are intuitively appealing mechanisms for solving this adverse selection problem in practice they generally will not be efficient mechanism for selecting contestants instead we propose an alternative auction format that is equally simple to implement and efficiently selects the most qualified contestants to compete regardless of the form of contestant heterogeneity

optimal border policies for invasive species under asymmetric information this paper analyzes the problem faced by a border protection agency if endogenous exporter abatement activities affect invasive species risk allowing for unobservable differences in abatement cost we show how the optimal inspection penalty regime differs from the symmetric information case departing from previous literature we allow for technical assistance a policy instrument specifically permitted and commonly employed under article 9 of the world trade organization sanitary and phytosanitary agreement we find the information asymmetry can make it optimal for the importing country to provide technical assistance grants for exporter risk abatement even if it would otherwise be inefficient further we show that fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy affects the qualitative nature of optimal policy if technical assistance has no outside value in the exporter s country optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts balancing higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive if technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter s economy it can introduce countervailing incentives making a uniform tariff penalty combination optimal

evaluation of credit risk based on firm performance abstract this paper investigates whether productive inefficiency measured as the distance from the industry s best practice frontier is an important ex ante predictor of business failure we use samples of french textiles wood and paper products computers and r d companies to obtain efficiency estimates for individual firms in each industry these efficiency measures are derived from a directional technology distance function constructed empirically using non parametric data envelopment analysis dea methods estimating binary and ordered logit regression models we find that productive efficiency has significant explanatory power in predicting the likelihood of default over and above the effect of standard financial indicators

on the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility abstract implementability conditions in rochet 1987 are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer or linear in the type for the case where agents information is one dimensional but actions become multidimensional the results obtained are relevant for the characterization of optimal mechanisms in adverse selection and moral hazard problems

optimal capital structure in agency relationships we analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency relationships when a risk averse principal controls the agent s capital structure she awards a larger equity stake to outsiders the smaller the agent s productivity when she controls both the timing and the terms of the agent s financing the principal shifts to equityholders all risk associated with stochastic production and with the agent s unknown productivity when the principal dictates only the terms of financing only the former risk is borne by equityholders when the principal is sufficiently averse to risk she affords the agent no choice among incentive schemes

the optimal income taxation of couples this paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples a multidimensional screening problem each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market but makes an hours of work choice and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work if second earner participation is a signal of the couple being better worse off we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax subsidy on secondary earnings and that the tax subsidy on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically we present calibrated microsimulations for the united kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs

a reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax abstract this paper investigates mirrlees model of optimal income taxation it provides a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual first order model is not implementable i e and example where the first order approach does not work adding second order conditions leads to an extended model and to implementable solutions if these conditions are binding one gets a kink in the optimal net income schedule and bunching of individuals occurs the properties of an optimal nonlinear income tax are reexamined within the extended model

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

the goals of u s agricultural policy a mechanism design approach this article examines motivations underlying the government s choice of alternative policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture optimal policies are analyzed for three government objectives one where the government wishes to ensure a minimum level of net income for all farmers a second where the government s only concern is to transfer income from consumers and taxpayers to the farm sector and a final augmented income transfer objective the analysis offers an explanation for agricultural policy mechanisms that involve overproduction by high cost producers relative to a free market equilibrium such a distortion might arise from the existence of nonmarket values for the production of relatively high cost farmers in the government s objective

on the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection abstract this paper characterizes a class of optimal incentive schemes in a simple principal agent model which allows for moral hazard and adverse selection we show that incentive compatible allocation can always be approximately implemented through a menu of quadratic incentive schemes it is also proved that the set of incentive compatible allocations is independent of the distribution of the additive uncertainty which affects the outcome informational requirements and economic interpretation of quadratic and linear schemes are discussed

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

pareto optima and competitive equilibria with adverse selection and moral hazard this paper explores the extent to which standard general equilibrium analysis of pareto optima and of competitive equilibria can be applied to environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems allowing for lotteries contracts with random components we first establish that an adverse selection insurance economy a moral hazard insurance economy a signaling economy and a private information labor market economy are all special cases of a simple general structure we then show that techniques for characterizing pareto optimal contracts as solutions to concave programming problems are useful and nice and appear to be broadly applicable allowing for lotteries we show how to characterize the optimal allocations for the adverse selection insurance and labor market economies we then show that standard existence and optimality theorems for competitive equilibria apply in the linear space containing lotteries if agents with characteristics which are distinct and privately observed at the time of initial trading enter the economy wide resource constraints in a homogeneous way other kinds of diversity are not critical for economies with moral hazard which satisfy the homogeneity condition competitive contract markets single out a subset of the optima and thus can be consistent with apparent unemployment and with a random allocation of labor supplied though all households are averse to risk the adverse selection insurance and signaling economies however do not satisfy the homogeneity condition and are difficult to decentralize efficiently with a price system

insider trading and the value of the firm previous studies of insider trading have examined the profitability to executives of their stock trading with a view to evaluating the informational efficiency of securities markets the authors examine empirically whether insider trading raises or lowers firm value to correctly identify the effects on firm value at the margin they correct for the simultaneity of earnings insider holdings and the amount of insider trading the authors explicitly deal with simultaneity by using a two part testing procedure their results suggest that insider trading lowers the value of the firm at the margin but that greater executive stock ownership raises the value copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

regulation competition and asymmetric information abstract this article studies a model of regulation under asymmetric information when there exists a competitive fringe of unregulated alternative producers the correlation between the unknown cost parameters of the fringe and of the regulated firm allows the regulator to use the threat of entry by the fringe to reduce the informational cost of regulation the presence of the fringe is welfare enhancing the allocative distortions can be larger or smaller than those in the no fringe case and the optimal contract sometimes allows inefficient entry the optimal contract can exhibit non standard bunching phenomena and discontinuities

regulating nitrogen pollution with risk averse farmers under hidden information and moral hazard we consider a model of pollution regulation for a risk averse farmer involving hidden information moral hazard and risk sharing the representative farmer faces a production risk originating from nitrogen leaching and privately observes the soil capacity in retaining nitrogen only after the regulation contract is signed the latter specifies a transfer and a nitrogen quota whose decomposition by the farmer among different production stages is unknown to the regulator we first characterize the optimal solution to the regulator s problem the sequential decision model is estimated on french crop production data and the results are used to calibrate and simulate the optimal contract

the target incentive system vs the price incentive system under adverse selection and the ratchet effect abstract in a dynamic adverse selection type of principal agent relationship where the principal is committed over time to a particular incentive system with fixed structure but variable parameters but not to any intertemporal incentive scheme with both fixed structure and parameters the ratchet effect arises but varies with different incentive systems we show that compared with using prices as the sole planning mode the principal can attenuate the ratchet effect by stipulating targets as well as a result the target incentive system entails higher expected welfare than the price incentive system in a perfect bayesian equilibrium

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

the structure of firms abstract this paper studies different organizational forms within a single framework the u form is modelled as a two round communication game between a principal and agents with unobservable efforts and adverse selection problems the m form is modelled by considering a one round communication game with pure adverse selection feasible and optimal mechanisms are characterized the profit functions are derived and an extension of hotelling s lemma proved in the absence of the control loss problems flowing form the unobservability of agent effort levels the u form will be superior to the m form both forms will be superior to the corrupted m form

examination of taiwan s travel and tourism market cycle through a two period markov regime switching model abstract this study analyzes the taiwan travel and tourism t t market cycle according to data of the weighted taiwan tourism stock index from january 1997 to august 2015 the two period markov regime switching model identifies two distinct regimes of the t t cycle and incorporates a specific set of mean and variance parameters for each period to control for the structural changes in taiwan s t t market the effect of china visitor arrivals to taiwan on the t t market is also verified the empirical findings offer essential information and policy implications for taiwan s government tourism policymakers and business managers

the efficiency effects of categorical discrimination in the insurance industry recent public policy debate has focused concern on the equity dimensions of categorical discrimination based on sex age or race in insurance and similar markets we consider the efficiency effects of such discrimination and establish that costless imperfect categorization always enhances efficiency when categorization entails a nonnegligible resource cost however no unambiguous efficiency ranking of informational regimes is possible when categorization is costless we demonstrate that government having no better information than market participants can effect redistribution without assuming dictatorial control of the market implying that a market equilibrium with costless categorization is potentially pareto superior to one without it when categorization is costly however the market may categorize when pareto improvements are not possible

experimentation and project selection screening and learning firms must strike a delicate balance between the exploitation of well known business models and the exploration of risky untested approaches in this paper we study financial contracting between an investor and a firm with private information about its returns from exploration and exploitation the investor optimal mechanism offers contracts with different tolerance for failures to screen returns from exploitation and with different exposure to the project s revenues to screen returns from exploration we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for private information about returns from exploration to have zero value to the firm when these conditions fail private information about exploration may even decrease the firm s payoff

competition between insurers with superior information abstract we analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers we show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage this explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments are persistently profitable we also show robustness to competition in menus or mechanisms our analysis of the contrary of adverse selection competition between principals with common value and exclusivity is suitable for other markets lawyers doctors mechanics etc

tourism demand for italy and the business cycle this study provides a strategy for modelling the effect of the business cycle on tourism demand under the rationale that tourism cycles are heavily influenced by lagged effects of the overall business cycle using quarterly data on overnight stays in italian hotels both domestic and inbound between 1985 and 2004 we adopt a structural time series approach to evaluate two alternative models the first with a latent cycle component lcc and the second based on specific economic explanatory variables xcv the two models are compared in terms of explanatory power best fit residual diagnostics and forecasting ability the results show similar performances the policy implication is that the xcv model can be used for calibrating countercyclical interventions in tourism policy

contract design and bargaining power abstract it is a common assumption in contract theory that the uninformed side makes a take it or leave it proposal in contrast this paper explores a model which allows a shift in bargaining power continuously between the two parties endowing the informed side with more bargaining power gradually reduces distortions

redistribution by means of lotteries a government designs transfers to agents in the absence of information on their preferences the second best allocation is equal sharing among citizens when the awards are deterministic we provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which lotteries improve upon the egalitarian outcome the condition requires that the citizens with large social weights have low risk aversion and that the left tail of the distribution of risk aversion be sufficiently dispersed

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

incentives for conservation and quality improvement by public utilities the author examines the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service e g electricity supply local telephone service and service enhancements e g energy conservation services improved clarity and speed of voice communication the optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly depending upon the information available to the regulator the price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation 35 refs 2 figs

optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy abstract we study the optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy when i the regulator does not know the firms abatement costs ii penalties for tax evasion are limited and iii monitoring of pollution is costly we show that the threat of being audited alter the usual firms incentives to over estimate their abatement costs in particular depending on the firms abatement costs the optimal policy may involve over or under deterrence compared to the full information outcome we then investigate the properties of a pollution standard we show that this policy comes close to an environmental tax once the economic incentives of the accompanying enforcement policy are considered