inflationary bias of the federal reserve system the creation of the federal reserve system coincides with a turning point in the inflationary history of the united states before 1914 there was no overall trend in the price level generally during war time periods the consumer price index increased significantly but during the intervening periods prices gradually declined to approximately their former levels however since the creation of the fed there has been an unmistakable and almost continuous upward trend in prices l

the use of inputs by the federal reserve system reply in our 1983 paper we offered evidence that the law of demand operates inside the federal reserve in particular the fed faces a requirement that it return all revenues in excess of operating expenses to the treasury and this constraint lowers the price of amenities in terms of foregone profits the monetary authority accordingly buys more of the wage and nonwage perquisites of office than otherwise because we treated amenities as a monotone transformation of federal reserve system employment our theory suggested that the fed would pad its operating expenses by increasing the number of employees on its payroll moreover given that expansionary open market operations raise the interest income earned by the fed on its securities portfolio bureaucratic incentives would impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy in subsequent tests of the theory we found a positive and significant ceteris paribus relationship between changes in the monetary base and the size of the fed this result suggested that one motivation for expansions in the money supply is to finance the growth in the fed s bureaucracy we also found evidence that employment causes money in the sense of christopher sims 1972 but not the reverse and that the growth in fed employment over time does not appear to have been due to the fact that more people are required to manage larger money stocks in their comments john boyd and john strong suggest that there are methodological and empirical problems with our paper both comments focus primarily on the causality tests but each raises other issues designed to cast doubt on the strength of our results in what follows we discuss the main points raised by our critics i causality

bureaucratic theory and the choice of central bank goals economists have frequently asserted that central bank priorities among economic goals have not been appropriate to the public s desires for example one interpretation of the results of reuber s pioneering study of central bank preferences was that the bank of canada s reactions reflect the placing of a very heavy implicit weight on price stability compared with higher employment presumably based on a judgement about the relative economic costs of more unemployment and more price inflation the evidence examined on the relative economic costs of price inflation and unemployment suggests that the economic costs of inflation are not as high relative to the costs of unemployment as the reactions and statements of the authorities have implied reuber p 132 1

theoretical approaches to monetary disinflation abstract during the 1980s many countries adopted tight monetary policies to reduce high inflation rates which were the legacy of the 1970s as inflation threatens to rise at the beginning of this decade this paper provides a survey of the 1980s literature which sought to provide theoretical understandings of how monetary disinflation is achieved four models are presented monetarist neo keynesian new classical and post keynesian each model s explanation of the recession which accompanies the monetary disinflation is outlined as well as possible policy measures to reduce the extent of the recession and to hasten the return to full employment

the federal reserve as a bureaucracy an examination of expense preference behavior in this paper the federal reserve system is viewed as a bureaucracy with a bureau s incentive to increase expenses beyond the profit maximizing point moreover the bureau consists of divisions the district banks that exhibit their own expense prefer ence behavior an empirical investigation of labor demand by the boar d and district banks reported in this paper demonstrates that the fed eral reserve has engaged in expense preference behavior and that the centralization of the monetary authority amplified this type of behav ior copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

does price uncertainty really reduce private investment a small model applied to chile the recent literature emphasizes the negative impact of price uncertainly on private investment as result of a higher risk premium the price to wait this paper argues that the uncertainly concerning the cost of capital should be compared with uncertainly in the price of output using a simple analytical model we conclude that the efficiency of policies aimed to reduce the price of capital or the basic accelator between investment and output growth may be enhanced if 1 the volatility of the output price is greater than the volatility of the cost of capital and 2 there is a positive correlation between changes in the cost of capital prices in both cases private investment will be more responsive beacuse firms will minimize profit flutuations in the second part of the paper the model is applied to the case of chile over the 1980 90 period this country has earned earned the reputation of being the sucess story of structural adjustment and has acheived fairly stable growth in the past eight years

rent seeking over time the continuity of capture recently in this journal skaggs and wasserkrug 1983 presented a model of bureau monitoring and related it to federal reserve behavior central to their argument was that bureau constituencies may pressure congressmen in maintaining the monitoring status quo if competition is to be expected between self interested parties for the property rights associated with regulation and regulatory commissions then bureau monitoring or lack of it should have value the capture of a commission by others is made more costly when information on a bureau s activities is restricted in general the issues surrounding bureau monitoring bring out the dynamic nature of the capture theory of regulation once captured commissions must remain captured if benefits are to accrue to rent seekers over time empirical support for the capture perspective however only relates personal characteristics of the appointed regulators commissioners to characteristics preferred by the regulated to reveal the dynamic nature of capture one must also account for the continuity of commission membership a captured regulatory body can only remain captured if there is a continuity of desirable characteristics by compiling characteristics of appointed members previous studies have examined the output of the appointment process that resulted from competition for positions on regulatory boards however the lack of synchronization between appointments to federal regulatory commissions and presidential elections suggests that the distribution of influence among self interested groups in the selection process may vary over time thus continuous successful capture is more easily achieved if appointees remain on boards for full terms and if possible land reappointments but the process is complicated further because regulators

fed behavior in periods of price and wage controls there is a literature which addresses the bureaucratic behavior and incentives of the federal reserve system some of the papers along these lines include acheson and chant 1973 kane 1980 levy 1981 toma 1981 friedman 1982 shughart and tollison 1983 and allen 1986 this paper brings to bear some additional evidence on the behavior and the incentives of the fed in particular we examine the behavior of the fed during periods of price and wage controls the public interest approach to fed behavior suggests that the fed should pursue a monetary policy that is consistent with price and wage controls in order to control inflationary forces the private interest approach suggests that price and wage controls make seigniorage operations more profitable for the fed and make it more difficult for fed overseers to monitor fed performance in both cases leading the fed to pursue monetary expansion in its own self interest during a period of price and wage controls the setting of price and wage controls therefore provides a test of public versus private interest hypotheses about fed behavior the paper proceeds as follows section 2 develops the competing explanations of federal reserve behavior section 3 presents the estimates of a structural money supply reaction function and an arima transfer function model of fed behavior in each case controlling for ceteris paribus conditions and periods of wage and price controls the results of both models indicate a falsification of the public interest explanation of fed policy section 4 offers some concluding remarks

the use of inputs by the federal reserve system comment in a recent article in this review 1983 william shughart and robert tollison s t argue that an important motivation for expansion of the money supply is to finance the growth of the fed s bureaucracy specifically that the level of fed employment is a determinant of the nominal monetary base using a public choice framework they present a money supply equation which yields a positive and statistically significant relationship between the monetary base and the total employment of the federal reserve system while this conclusion is certainly interesting the analysis suffers from a number of important conceptual empirical and methodological problems shughart tollison point out that the revenue side of the federal reserve s budget is closely linked to its monetary policy operations through open market purchases of securities the fed generates a stream of interest payments because monitoring of this income stream is difficult and costly congress has elected to impose the constraint that excess revenues be returned to the treasury as a result the fed pays its current operating expenses out of this current interest income and then turns over the remainder to the treasury because the central bank cannot retain the profits it generates s t argue that the fed will exhibit a form of expense preference behavior in purchasing more amenities than are justified by costminimizing money production in particular by expanding fed employment in addition since expansionary monetary policy increases opportunities for this profit amenities tradeoff fed policies are likely to have a built in inflationary bias to test this hypothesis s t develop a regression model that estimates the monetary base as a function of fed employment real gnp a number of financial variables and linear and nonlinear time trend variables using annual time series data from 1915 to 1981 they find that the employment variable is a significant determinant of the money supply with their model explaining about 95 percent of the variation in the monetary base to check that employment causes monetary expansion and not the other way around s t employ the test of causality developed by c w j granger 1969 and christopher sims 1972 this test estimates two sided

actively learning about demand and the dynamics of price adjustment by observing the quantity demanded at particular prices a firm may learn about the parameters of its demand curve in such an environment price changes obstruct the learning process by inducing additional noise the authors paper constructs a dynamic model where a price setting firm endogenously controls the speed of learning the model provides a possible explanation for price inertia as a stable pricing policy allows the firm to learn more rapidly which improves future expected profits furthermore even in the long run learning continues to affect the firm s optimal price copyright 1990 by royal economic society

bureaucracy altruism and monetary policy it has recently been argued that the fiscal relationship between the federal reserve and the treasury by which the fed keeps a portion of its earnings imparts an inflationary bias to monetary policy because that relationship gives the fed an incentive to increase its earnings by increasing the monetary base this hypothesis is tested within the framework of a federal reserve objective function incorporating bureaucratic and social goals and no evidence is found to support it

a decade of dissent explaining the dissent voting behavior of bank of england mpc members we examine the dissent voting record of the bank of england monetary policy committee contrary to findings in the fomc literature for example havrilesky and schweitzer in the political economy of american monetary policy pp 197 210 1990 chappell et al in q j econ 108 1 185 218 1993 the effects of members career backgrounds and the political channel of appointment on voting behavior are negligible reflecting the distinct institutional constraints and incentives associated with uk monetary policy our findings also suggest that literature which characterizes voting behavior as being predominantly determined by members internal or external status is overly simplistic this view is supported by econometric results appertaining to the introduction of member specific fixed effects which account for possible unobserved heterogeneity

bureaucracy altruisme and monetary policy a note from a forecasting perspective sets over the period 1916 1987 their structured critique is consistent with the earlier work of strong 1984 boyd 1984 allen mccrickard cartwright and delorme 1988 mester 1994 and others in general all question the findings of toma 1982 shughart and tollison 1983 boyes mounts and sowell 1988 and others that bureaucratic effects and institutional incentives have had a significant impact on the development and conduct of monetary policy an underlying issue in this debate is whether variables proxying bureaucratic or institutional effects emanating from the incentives contained in the structure

rethinking macroeconomics what failed and how to repair it the standard macroeconomic models have failed by all the most important tests of scientific theory they did not predict that the financial crisis would happen and when it did they understated its effects monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth after the crisis broke policymakers relying on the models floundered notwithstanding the diversity of macroeconomics the sum of these failures points to the need for a fundamental re examination of the models and a reassertion of the lessons of modern general equilibrium theory that were seemingly forgotten in the years leading up to the crisis this paper first describes the failures of the standard models in broad terms and then develops the economics of deep downturns and shows that such downturns are endogenous further the paper argues that there have been systemic changes to the structure of the economy that made the economy more vulnerable to crisis contrary to what the standard models argued finally the paper contrasts the policy implications of our framework with those of the standard models

endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime a bureaucratic incentive model public choice submits that legal changes can be endogenous in such a way that they are manipulated by bureaucrats who want to maximize rents from transactions with various interest groups this paper takes the change in exchange rate regimes to empirically examine the premise it offers a two stage method in which we first show that the exchange rate is influenced by interest group pressures and subsequently that the 1990 market average regime mar as a phase in policy in korea was introduced mainly to serve bureaucratic incentives this method is expected to be useful to a host of countries for various studies attempting to test a possible existence of bureaucratic or other hidden motivations behind any isolated event of policy change

congressional influence on u s monetary policy abstract congressional influence is generally discounted or ignored in political models of federal reserve behavior here i show that changes in the leadership of the senate banking committee are significantly correlated with monetary base growth more liberal committee leaders are associated with significantly higher base growth other factors held constant the result is shown to hold across several econometric specifications and different definitions of the congressional preference variable

the contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics in the e eld of economics perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information it is now recognized that information is imperfect obtaining information can be costly there are important asymmetries of information and the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals this recognition deeply affects the understanding of wisdom inherited from the past such as the fundamental welfare theorem and some of the basic characterization of a market economy and provides explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand i introduction the century coming to a close has seen vast changes in economics in both ideas and methodology upon ree ection it is remarkable however how many of the seeds of advances in this century were sowed in the previous i would argue that perhaps the most important break with the past one that leaves open huge areas for future work lies in the economics of information the recognition that information is imperfect that obtaining information can be costly that there are important asymmetries of information and that the extent of information asymmetries is affected by actions of e rms and individuals has had profound implications for the wisdom inherited from the past and has provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand in this essay i wish to argue that information economics has had directly and indirectly a profound effect on how we think about economics today eighteenth and nineteenth century antecedents to be sure marshall and other nineteenth century economists talked about problems of imperfect information but with one exception discussions of information were obiter dicta caveats at the end of the analysis they were never at the center

the benefits of central bank s political independence abstract we consider a two tier model of monetary policy where the central banker is both subject to the explicit influence of elected political principals through contracts and the implicit influence of interest groups willing to capture monetary policy we analyze the impact of granting independence to the central banker on the scope for capture and the agency costs of delegating the monetary policy to a central banker political independence increases those agency costs but significantly stabilizes the politically induced fluctuations of inflation and improves ex ante social welfare

where modern macroeconomics went wrong this paper provides a critique of the dsge models that have come to dominate macroeconomics during the past quarter century it argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong microfoundations which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour e g incorporating insights from information economics and behavioural economics inadequate modelling of the financial sector meant they were ill suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis and a reliance on representative agent models meant they were ill suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality the paper proposes alternative benchmark models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them

preliminary evidence on the determinants of federal reserve open market operations in the absence of a fixed policy rule the federal reserve bank fed has significant discretion in setting monetary policy the existence of professional fedwatchers attests to the fact that fed policy actions are difficult to interpret recent literature has focused on the motivations behind fed policy making and the need for secrecy and ambiguity we investigate one aspect of fed behavior the propensity of the fed to buy and sell government securities beyond that required to implement stated policies milton friedman 1982 26 called attention to this issue when he wrote

federal reserve transparency the more things change the more they stay the same the calculus of electoral politics and the central bank s bureaucratic objectives can explain the recent trend toward greater federal reserve transparency and can shed light on the likelihood that this trend will continue if incumbent politicians see no electoral advantage in pressuring the fed to become still more transparent and if the fed sees no benefit to greater transparancy then further changes in current practice are unlikely private sector agents will continue to face a significant degree of uncertainty about the fed s policy objectives and about the information that policymakers consider in the monetary policy decision process

saving out of different income categories in greece abstract the aim of the present paper is to investigate whether in the case of greece and within the framework of the existing national accounting system significantly different marginal propensities to save are attached to different income categories we establish that the marginal propensity to save out of property income is significantly higher in fact double than the marginal propensity to save out of agricultural income and income from wages and salaries of the other sectors of the economy

historical considerations property rights and budgets a comment on the use of inputs by the federal reserve when considered in an alternative historical setting with a property right perspective the extended public choice model found in amcd offers strong confirmation for the s t view of monetary authority behavior

of finance and development neglected and unsettled questions abstract the article analyzes some of the neglected and still unsettled issues on the interrelationship of finance and development and in the subdiscipline of finance notably the implications of the dichotomy of formal and informal finance the modalities and sequencing of financial reform the challenge of maintaining competition in oligopolistic systems the scope for market related monetary policy instruments the case for autonomy of central banks and divestiture of their developmental role and revamping of their prudential functions it argues for a sharply focused country specific issues oriented research agenda

the influence of elections on federal reserve behavior a political business cycle is tested in a monetary reaction function positive evidence is a result of the 1930s and 1940s and not post war elections in addition there is no evidence of such a cycle in a rational expectations model

factor demand under conditions of product demand and supply uncertainty the paper develops a theory of factor demand under uncertainty that encompasses neo classical factor demand and keynesian effective factor demand as special cases the model allows factor demand and output to move positively with product demand even with a constant product price this in turn permits real wages to move pro cyclically in response to product demand shocks in addition the model provides a new perspective on the adding up problem which posits that total factor payments exceed output if increasing returns to scale exist and generates positive uncertainty profits that are similar in spirit to those of frank knight

the ruthless fed a critique of the ast hypothesis this paper examines the hypothesis that the great contraction was the result of rational rent seeking by members of the federal reserve system in contrast to the ast hypothesis evidence on the share prices of member banks that survived the contraction suggests that the owners of these banks suffered an absolute decline in real wealth and a decline relative to a broad spectrum of other investment alternatives furthermore monetary surprises had no statistically discernible effect on the share prices of these banks this evidence conflicts with the notion that rational rent seeking would lead the owners of member banks and their bureaucratic conspirators in the federal reserve system to unleash a policy with the goal of contracting the money supply by 35 percent

toward a theory of rigidities this paper presents a theory of rigidity or more properly inertia in the responses of economic variables to changing environments the theory rests on three fundamental assumptions 1 that firms are risk averse 2 that firms are uncertain of the impacts of changing decision variables and 3 that this uncertainty increases with the size of deviations in decision variables from appropriately defined past level under these circumstances an optimal portfolio of incremental decision variable adjustments exists which a takes variance minimizing adoptions to environmental change as a point of departure and then b is weighted in favor of changes in variables whose effects are less uncertain in considering price and quantity adjustments this implies that price and wage adjustments should largely incorporate expected inflation and from that point should be small relative to quantity adjustments since in most situations the uncertainties associated with the consequences of quantity adjustment should be smaller than those associated with price adjustments this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the use of inputs by the federal reserve system comment in a recent issue of this review 1983 william shughart and robert tollison s t hypothesize that the fed pursues a bureaucratic objective which results in an inflationary bias in monetary policy they test this hypothesis empirically and conclude that it is supported by the data this comment however shows that their statistical procedures are flawed and when corrected provide little support for the inflationary bias theory the data actually suggest a different but not very interesting or surprising interpretation

the use of inputs by the federal reserve system an extended model recently it has been argued that bureaucratic incentives play an important role in the formulation of policy and the inflationary bias of the federal reserve system shughart and tollison 1983 hereafter s t 1 in particular s t maintain that the fed can retain profits denominated in amenities but not in dollars as a result of the congressional constraint that excess profits be returned to the treasury this constraint provides bureaucratic incentives for the fed to purchase more amenities than a for profit organization and ex plains s t 1983 291 in part the fed s apparent inflationary bias expansionary monetary policy then enlarges the fed s profit amenities choices and allows it to pursue its goal of bureaucratic enhancement s t assume that the dollar value of these amenities is a monotonic transformation of fed employment using this public choice framework they develop a model in which the monetary base is a function of a number of variables including employment in the federal reserve system sysemp

the phillips curve as a long run phenomenon in a macroeconomic model with complex dynamics abstract in this paper we derive a phillips curve as the image of a chaotic attractor of the state variables of a non linear dynamical system describing the evolution of an economy this has two important consequences the phillips curve in our model is a true long run phenomenon but to exploit the apparent unemployment inflation trade off may require unrealistically complex policy measures the model is based on an overlapping generations non t tonnement approach involving temporary equilibria with stochastic rationing in each period and price adjustment between successive periods in this way we are able to obtain complex sequences of consistent allocations allowing for recurrent unemployment and inflation

a political model of monetary policy with application to the real fed funds rate abstract we construct an empirical model of u s monetary policy assuming that the federal reserve is an ordinary federal bureaucracy we use the real federal funds rate as our policy measure and show the existence of significant executive legislative and bureaucratic influence on the real rate of interest from 1961 to 1996 we find that presidential party is an adequate statistical measure of executive influence and that the voting scores of the senate banking committee leadership best represent legislative influence we argue that political changes cause systematic and predictable changes in monetary policy

dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions the paper asks whether members of central bank decision making committees should communicate with the public in a collegial manner by conveying the consensus or majority view of the committee or in an individualistic way by providing the diversity of views among the committee members it finds that more active as well as more consistent communication by committee members improves the predictability of monetary policy decisions significantly this effect is sizeable as communication dispersion across committee members accounts on average for one third to one half of the market s prediction errors of fomc policy decisions moreover more active and more consistent communication are found to also reduce the degree of uncertainty about the future path of interest rates these findings suggest that a collegial communication which stresses the consensus view on policy inclinations can enhance the effectiveness of central bank communication

a duopoly theory of government money production the 1930s and 1940s abstract during the 1930s and 1940s the treasury and fed possessed significant monetary powers to explain the interaction of these agencies during this period i develop a theory of money production which assumes each party is interested in increasing the seigniorage associated with their production the theory implies that the two agencies will engage in specific forms of cooperation an examination of monetary policy procedures in the 1930s and 1940s indicates that the cooperation view of the fed and treasury relationship has more explanatory power than traditional views

a public choice theory of the great contraction the conventional chicago wisdom about the great contraction is that it was the result of a massive policy failure according to this view the collapse of the economy was brought about mostly by the fact that the monetary policymakers of the day were more concerned with internal power struggles than with supplying reserves to member banks an explanation which with apologies to professor stigler must have elicited uproarious laughter at the bankers club it has been our purpose in this paper to suggest an alternative theory briefly stated the restrictive monetary policy pursued by the fed from 1929 to 1933 was motivated by the economic interests of member banks the fed s policy produced a massive differential failure rate between member and nonmember banks in which the latter were eliminated at a rate at least five times higher than the former fed member banks faced substantially less competition in the banking market after the house cleaning than before although all banks suffered net losses in the short run in the long run member bank profitability was enhanced by the reduction in the number of nonmember competitors at the same time the fed itself benefitted from a substantial increase in the proportion of the total banking system within its bureaucratic jurisdiction and from a change in its method of finance putting the great contraction in interest group terms we suggested that the fed was acting as the agent of congressmen serving on important oversight committees who in turn were representing the interests of the member banks in their states due to interstate branching restrictions the state is the relevant geographic market within which banks compete we tested this hypothesis using bank failure rate data across states and found that holding other things equal the failure rates of nonmember banks in the early 1930s were significantly higher in states with representation on the house banking and currency committee of course not even friedman and schwartz 1963 299 301 argue that fed policy was the sole direct cause of the great contraction but instead maintain that the fed acted in such a way as to take a relatively severe contraction and turn it into by far the most severe business cycle contraction in the whole of u s history but to the extent that the great contraction was worsened by fed policy and this in turn led to the succession of events called the great depression the latter was a side effect of economically rational interests of federal reserve member banks to say the least this would appear to have been an enormously inefficient method of obtaining the postulated benefits certainly there were other less costly methods available by which member banks could have reduced the number of their nonmember rivals this is perhaps the most difficult problem our theory of the great contraction confronts we can offer two responses first although the literature on the great depression tends to focus on fluctuations in national macroeconomic aggregates e g the money supply unemployment and so on it is clear that the severity of the depression differed radically across states states with relatively large agricultural sectors tended to be especially hard hit suffering the highest rates of unemployment and the most significant numbers of bank failures by contrast states in some other areas most notably new england and the southeast seemed to be less seriously affected we note that in some of our regressions the number of nonmember bank failures was negatively and significantly related to state unemployment rates in 1934 this is certainly not conclusive evidence but it does suggest a pattern of differential costs associated with the great contraction that is the costs of providing benefits to federal reserve member banks in states with representation on the relevant oversight committees may have fallen more heavily on the economies of states not so represented if so this would cast a very different light on the actual costs of these policies to the relevant political decision makers second the potential dilemma in this case is no worse than that encountered in the application of the economic theory of politics to many other kinds of government behavior economists since adam smith have ascribed protectionist trade policies to the influence of special interest groups who benefit modestly at the cost of relatively huge economic inefficiencies many other government actions that might be plausibly explained from an interest group perspective would similarly seem to involve costs to the economy which grossly outweigh the benefits special interests might reasonably expect presumably even in such seemingly extreme cases marginal benefits equal marginal costs to the relevant actors some writers have suggested that the political marketplace in modern democracies is characterized by much larger transactions costs than are normally encountered in ordinary markets see demsetz 1982 this might help explain the seemingly huge discrepancies we observe between apparent concentrated benefits and diffused costs in depression era monetary policy in any event this problem is not peculiar to our theory but is shared by many applications of the interest group model of government it is worth emphasizing that the events we have described do fall into the interest group model s stylized depiction of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs moreover without having a complete picture of all of the options available to the monetary policymakers we cannot be sure that any of the alternatives was in fact more efficient we do know the path that was chosen and that contrary to the conventional wisdom this path had a rationally motivated interest group basis

allocation of goods and services in vat this paper examines the allocation of goods and services in three hypothetical rates of the planned greek value added tax vat this allocation is based on six criteria i e the revenue criterion the luxuriousness criterion the regressivity of indirect taxes the relation of goods and services the criterion of import component of domestic demand and on the social criterion when drawn together the six criteria suggest a final classification of goods and services in the greek vat based on this final classification the microeconomic bases of the vat are estimated for the average greek household and also for households of different socioeconomic characteristics

exchange rate shocks and the speed of trade price adjustment 1 introduction theoretical and empirical work in the international trade literature dealing with the relationship between exchange rate and trade prices has been dominated and guided by the static pass through and profit markup model see e g feinberg 1986 mann 1986 fisher 1989 hooper and mann 1989 knetter 1989 gagnon and knetter 1995 feenstra gagnon and knetter 1996 and lee 1997 the shortcoming of such models is well captured by william branson 1989 p 333 difference in adjustment response signals to me the need for a reconsideration of the theoretical framework for the analysis of the pass through question by now we should be thinking about optimizing price policy for investors and exporters who know that they face an exchange rate that follows some sort of stochastic process over time these differences call for a revision of pass through theory along the lines of time series analysis our explicit incorporation of profit maximizing firms facing adjustment costs develops the model introduced by krugman 1987 it transforms the traditional markup and pass through model to explain from first principles a dynamic markup and a price adjustment speed both depending on fundamental characteristics of the firms involved krugman 1989 concludes his paper on pricing to market by calling for further research on the adjustment cost model regarding the adjustment cost approach he states krugman 1989 p 44 it is still a speculative idea not grounded in solid empirical tests but it is a good story and if it is correct it has extremely important implications for economic policy the present paper provides the quantity adjustment cost approach that krugman calls for as such it complements the work of gagnon 1989 and kasa 1992 while gagnon and kasa employ quantity adjustment cost models with many of the same features as the model developed here they provide only approximate solutions and focus on a quite different set of issues gagnon examines the effect of exchange rate variability on trade volume kasa investigates the importance of mean reversion in exchange rates as an explanation for the pricing to market hypothesis in contrast our focus is on the relation between adjustment speeds and pass through thus our contribution relative to gagnon 1989 and kasa 1992 is that we provide the passthrough issue in a dynamic context with exact analytical solutions that relate the degree of passthrough to adjustment speeds and identify the determinants of commodity specific adjustment speeds in response to exchange rate shocks the remainder of the paper is organized as follows in section 2 we develop a partial equilibrium model taking exchange rates as given of the pricing policies of a profit maximizing firm competing in foreign markets and subject to a convex quantity adjustment cost section 3 develops testable implications directly from the model section 4 discusses the data and empirical methodology for preliminary two stage time series and cross sectional tests section 5 provides the tentative estimation and section 6 concludes 2 a simple partial equilibrium model consider a representative firm producing fox export that maximizes the expected discounted value of infinite horizon real profits the firm generates its revenue abroad in foreign currency it has no influence on the exchange rate may adjust its price at any point in time but is subject to a convex cost of quantity adjustment the firm maximizes where x is the exogenously given real exchange rate at time t we define x as the units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency multiplied by the export destination country s price index and divided by the home country s price index instantaneous profits are discounted at a rate r which is specific to the firm this rate accounts for a standard risk premium inherent in the riskiness of the firm s activities