consumer protection and contingent charges contingent charges for financial services such as fees for unauthorized overdrafts are often controversial we study the economics of contingent charges in a stylized setting with naive and sophisticated consumers we contrast situations where the naive benefit from the presence of sophisticated consumers with situations where competition works to subsidize the sophisticated at the expense of the naive arguably unfairly the case for regulatory intervention in these situations depends in good part but not only on the weight placed on distributional concerns the economic and legal issues at stake are well illustrated by a case on bank charges recently decided by the u k supreme court jel d14 d18 g21 g28 l51

is minsky s financial instability hypothesis valid in this article i reassess the validity of minsky s financial instability hypothesis and the main criticism about its internal coherence starting from this fundamental objection i study minsky s contribution within the scope of a highly simplified macro model it is shown that the financial instability hypothesis increasing debt ratios during economic expansion remains valid in numerous cases it appears amongst other things that a sufficient fall in the retention rate reinforces minsky s conclusions emphasising the destabilising role of shareholders in the distribution of net profits

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

prices and qualities a search model recently there has been substantial interest in the study of price and or quality dispersion in markets with costly information many of these studies focus on the problem of price dispersion assuming that the quality is fixed i e homogeneous good the most distinct feature of these models is the way information is gathered information can either be obtained through the purchase of a newspaper at some cost information purchase models or through costly sequential or nonsequential search search models each of these models identifies the conditions under which a rational expectation price dispersion equilibrium will exist in particular using an information purchase model with two classes of consumers with differential information costs salop stiglitz 15 show that equilibrium may be characterized by a high and a low price for a homogeneous good on the other hand wildeschwartz 18 show that there can be price dispersion if consumers have different propensities to search they assume that one class of consumers will shop only once and the other class will shop an exogenously determined number of times before purchasing in their model only certain price distributions are sustainable in equilibrium the salop stiglitz and wilde schwartz results are due to the ex ante heterogeneity of consumer types in an interesting paper burdett judd 3 have established that price dispersion can exist even when consumers are identical due to ex post heterogeneity in information while the price dispersion models are illuminating in explaining the differential prices in the markets they are limited by their abstraction from the quality uncertainty goods of heterogeneous qualities can be and are offered in a recent paper 6 using an information purchase model with two classes of consumers we have analyzed the price and quality equilibria by examining three different environments involving costly information i quality information costly price information costless ii price information costly

strategic pricing signalling and costly information acquisition abstract consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers upon observing the price buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases under a belief restriction which generalizes the idea of the cho kreps intuitive criterion we establish a version of the grossman stiglitz paradox there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices yet we also resolve the paradox there is a unique equilibrium and as the cost of information becomes small the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing

a minsky crisis a model is developed to illustrate hyman minsky s financial crisis theories a key assumption is that the level of wealth in the economy is determined mac roeconomically with the value of firms assets responding to the state of confidence as reflected by discounted quasi rents on capital the second assumption is that there is high substitutability between liabilities of firms and money in the public s portfolio a downward shift in anticipated profits leads wealth to contract and the public to shift portfolio preferences toward money interest rates rise leading to further dampening of expected profits and a debt deflation crisis can occur

consumer information and competition between nonprofit and for profit nursing homes this paper develops implications of arrow s hypothesis that nonprofit organizations are prevalent in health care because of quality uncertainty the model analyzes the ability of nonprofits to mitigate market failures created by asymmetric information in an environment characterized by potential competition from both explicitly for profit firms and for profits in disguise profit motivated firms who obtain nonprofit status in order to exploit the perceived trustworthiness of the nonprofit sector under certain conditions it is shown that nonprofit status can serve as a credible signal of quality and that nonprofits can decrease the underprovision of quality both by providing high quality services and indirectly via a spillover effect on quality in the for profit sector applicability to long term care and implications for empirical research and policy towards nonprofits in health care are discussed

prices and qualities in markets with costly information this paper extends the seminal work of akerlof and salop and stiglitz in two directions i the sellers can select both the selling prices and quality levels of their good and ii the buyers can acquire price quality information about individual sellers at a cost we observe multiple price quality combinations in equilibrium which depend upon the distribution of information costs of consumers and upon whether quality or price or both are costly observable welfare comparisons of equilibrium are considered we show that welfare will be greater when price advertising is permitted

certification under oligopolistic competition in a symmetric duopolistic market where each firm s choice regarding certain quality attributes such as the environmental friendliness of its product is its own private information the extent of horizontal differentiation between firms plays a crucial role in a certifier s optimal certification policy under a non profit certifier it is always the case that both firms produce the highest quality and opt for certification this is also the case under a for profit certifier but only when the degree of horizontal differentiation is sufficiently high when horizontal differentiation is low the for profit certifier by charging a very high certification fee creates maximum vertical differentiation between firms as a result only one firm produces the highest quality and opts for certification whereas the other firm produces the lowest quality and does not opt for certification this asymmetry under a for profit certifier makes the market inefficient which provides one possible explanation for the existence of mostly non profit certifiers in such markets

the financial instability hypothesis a stochastic microfoundation framework this paper examines the dynamics of financial distress and in particular the mechanism of transmission of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy the analysis is performed by representing the linkages between microeconomic financial variables and the aggregate performance of the economy by means of a microfounded model with firms that have heterogeneous capital structures the model is solved both numerically and analytically by means of a stochastic approximation that is able to replicate quite well the numerical solution these methodologies by overcoming the restrictions imposed by the traditional microfounded approach enable us to provide some insights into the stabilization policies which may be effective in a financially fragile system

oligopolistic competition in price and quality abstract we consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers have heterogeneous information some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered some know only the prices and some know neither we show that if there are sufficiently many uninformed consumers then there exists a unique equilibrium where price is a perfect indicator of quality this equilibrium is characterized by dispersion and pareto inefficiency of the price quality offers where better price quality combinations are associated with lower prices

neuroeconomic foundations of trust and social preferences initial evidence neuroeconomics merges methods from neuroscience and economics to better understand how the human brain generates decisions in economic and social contexts neuroeconomics is part of the general quest for microfoundations in this case the microfoundation of individual decision making in social contexts the economic model of individual decision making is based on three concepts the action set preferences and beliefs economists assume that an individual will choose his preferred action for a given set of available actions and a given belief about the states of the world and the other players actions neuroeconomics provides a microfoundation for individual beliefs preferences and behavior it does so by examining the brain processes associated with the formation of beliefs the perception of the action set and the actual choice moreover since the set of available actions can be framed in different ways and different frames of the same action set sometimes elicit different behaviors neuroeconomics may also contribute to a deeper understanding of framing effects this paper discusses recent neuroeconomic evidence related to other regarding nonselfish behaviors and the decision to trust in other people s nonselfish behavior as we will show this evidence supports the view that people derive nonpecuniary utility i from mutual cooperation in social dilemma sd games and ii from punishing unfair behavior in these games thus mutual cooperation that takes place despite strong free riding incentives and the punishment of free riders in sd games is not irrational but better understood as rational behavior of people with corresponding social preferences finally we report the results of a recent study that examines the impact of the neuropeptide oxytocin ot on trusting and trustworthy behavior in a sequential sd animal studies have identified ot as a hormone that induces

monopoly provision of product quality with uninformed buyers abstract this essay is concerned with a monopolist s incentives to provide high quality goods when some of its customers cannot observe quality prior to purchase we show that if all buyers have the same tastes for quality the monopolist will not try to take advantage of the poorly informed when tastes differ however some quality randomization may become profitable as a means to loosen binding self selection constraints the profitability of randomization is shown to depend upon the relative degrees of risk aversion of the buyers and on the convexity of the firm s cost of quality function we view our results as pointing to some potential benefits from imperfect quality control

a monetary minsky model of the great moderation and the great recession abstract steve keen s model of minsky s financial instability hypothesis keen 1995 displayed qualitative characteristics that matched the real macroeconomic and income distributional outcomes of the preceding and subsequent fifteen years a period of economic volatility followed by a period of moderation leading to a rise of instability once more and a serious economic crisis this paper extends that model to build a strictly monetary macroeconomic model which can generate the monetary as well as the real phenomena manifested by both the great recession and the great moderation

quality uncertainty and informative advertising we present a price signalling model with informative advertising a costly advertisement informs of the good s quality directly and therefore the seller determines the fraction of informed buyers endogenously we show that informative advertising only occurs in pooling equilibria for an advertising pooling equilibrium to exist consumer valuation for high quality advertising cost prior probability that quality is high and inaccuracy of the buyers pre purchase information must be sufficiently high for some parameters there is a unique undefeated advertising pooling equilibrium if advertising is used in equilibrium the adverse selection problem is mitigated

ripoffs lemons and reputation formation in agency relationships a laboratory market study this paper examines the effect of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship where the principal cannot observe the level of service provided by the agent using data from laboratory markets we demonstrate that the presence of moral hazard leads to shirking by agents however this lemons phenomenon occurs only about one half of the time while there is evidence of reputation effects in these markets seemingly reputable agents are often able to use opportunities for false advertising to their advantage and ripoff principals there has been considerable discussion about the price and quality of services provided within certain principal agent relationships for example the securities and exchange commission and congress have focused a great deal of attention on the price and quality of outside audit services to investors the securities and exchange commission and the department of justice have considered the regulation of investment banking contracts because of their concern over the price and level of services provided finally a large and growing literature has focused attention on the conflict between owners and managers and the problem of shirking by managers the above examples share a feature common to most agency relationships in that the services provided by the agent have a hidden characteristic specifically the principal cannot costlessly observe the level of service provided by the agent and thus cannot determine whether an unfavorable outcome is due to the agent s shirking or due to an unfortunate occurrence of a state of nature a large theoretical literature has developed e g shavell 9 which proposes remedies for dealing with the moral hazard problem that arises in these situations yet to our knowledge there has been no direct empirical test demonstrating that the moral hazard problem does in fact lead to shirking by agents furthermore the theoretical literature provides a number of competing models about the market s ability to provide pareto optimal levels of service in the presence of moral hazard

unemployment income distribution and debt financed investment in a growth cycle model abstract as recent experience suggests the most significant economic fluctuations are those that combine real and financial factors this paper works out a simple model that couples a version of goodwin s 1967 growth cycle model of real fluctuations with insights drawn from a model of financial fluctuations based on minsky s financial instability hypothesis vercelli 2000 sordi and vercelli 2006 sordi and vercelli 2012 the model suggested substantially modifies that of keen 1995 who combined insights from goodwin and minsky within a model of fluctuating growth in the real part of the model we introduce the possibility of disequilibrium in the goods market and formalize a mechanism of output adjustment based on the conventional dynamic multiplier the model so obtained may exhibit persistent dynamics and provide insights to enable better understanding of the nature of real world fluctuations

stock market booms endogenous credit creation and the implications of broad and narrow banking for macroeconomic stability abstract in this paper we study the implications of the present broad banking system for macroeconomic stability we show that when commercial banks are allowed to trade in financial assets here equities as a substitute for traditional lending the macroeconomic system is likely to be an unstable one we then consider a narrow banking system defined by a fisherian 100 percent reserve ratio for checkable deposits and the ban for commercial banks from trading in stocks and other financial assets within the stylized theoretical framework set up here we show that in the second system macroeconomic stability is guaranteed by some weak assumptions on the behavior of economic agents moreover while a sufficient loan supply can be guaranteed in such a framework the rationale for bank runs can be eliminated in contrast to what is likely to happen under traditional broad banking though narrow banking is an extreme banking system unlikely to be adopted in the short run its features highlight the stability and efficiency properties that the separation between commercial and investment banking bring about

growth and income distribution with the dynamics of power in labour and goods markets the interaction between economic growth and income distribution is examined using kaleckian post keynesian models in which there are lags in investment and in which the dynamics of income distribution between wages and profits depends on changes in power relations in both the labour market and goods market by examining these two influences on distributional dynamics simultaneously the relative strength of which can change over the growth process it is shown that the growth distributional dynamics can involve non linearities multiple equilibria and instability the implications of policy induced changes including those in macroeconomic policy and labour market and antitrust policies on aggregate demand and distribution are examined for both wage led and profit led growth regimes copyright oxford university press

frames of mind in intertemporal choice recent research has demonstrated that choices between gambles are systematically influenced by the way they are expressed kahneman and tversky s prospect theory kahneman d a tversky 1979 prospect theory an analysis of decision under risk econometrica472 363 391 explains many of these framing effects as shifts in the point of reference from which prospects are evaluated this paper demonstrates the applicability of the reference point concept to intertemporal choice three experiments demonstrate that when people choose between immediate and delayed consumption the reference point used to evaluate alternatives can significantly influence choice the first study elicited relative preference for immediate and delayed consumption using three methods each of which differently framed choices between alternatives offering identical end state consumption the conventional discounted utility model predicts that the three methods of elicitation should yield similar estimates of time preference but preferences were found to differ in accordance with a reference point model the second and third studies extend and replicate the results from the first the third using real rather than hypothetical choices

debt cycles instability and fiscal rules a godley minsky synthesis wynne godley and hyman minsky were two macroeconomists who saw the crisis coming this paper develops a simple macrodynamic model that synthesises some key perspectives of their analytical frameworks the model incorporates godley s financial balances approach and postulates that private sector s propensity to spend is driven by a stock flow norm the target net private debt to income ratio that changes endogenously via a minsky mechanism it also includes two fiscal rules a maastricht type fiscal rule according to which the fiscal authorities adjust the government expenditures based on a target net government debt ratio and a godley minsky fiscal rule which links government expenditures with private indebtedness following a counter cyclical logic the analysis shows that i the interaction between the propensity to spend and net private indebtedness can generate cycles and instability ii instability is more likely when the propensity to spend responds strongly to deviations from the stock flow norm and when the expectations that determine the stock flow norm are highly sensitive to the economic cycle iii the maastricht type fiscal rule is destabilising while the godley minsky fiscal rule is stabilising iv the paradox of debt can apply both to the private sector and the government sector

quality indicators in theory and in fact abstract in recent literature it has been suggested that consumers need have no knowledge of product quality as a number of quality indicators or signals may be used as substitutes very little attention has been paid to the empirical verification of these studies the present paper is devoted to the issue of how well these indicators perform using market data provided by consumer magazines from 3 countries the results strongly indicate that price is a poor quality indicator the paper also presents some evidence which suggests that seller reputation and easily observable characteristics are also poor indicators

quality and the diffusion of innovations in this paper we solve the problem of optimal control of products diffusion by quality in a context of monopolistic competition to do so we introduce a dynamic demand function leaning on two hypotheses first price acts a signal of quality second demand is more sensitive to quality than to price using the maximum principle of pontryagin we then characterize the optimal dynamic trajectory of quality and its qualitative properties

pseudo goodwin cycles in a minsky model goodwin cycles result from the dynamic interaction between a profit led demand regime and a reserve army effect in income distribution the paper proposes the concept of a pseudo goodwin cycle we define this as a counter clockwise movement in output and wage share space which is not generated by the usual goodwin mechanism in particular it does not depend on a profit led demand regime to illustrate this a simple minsky type model is extended by a reserve army distribution adjustment in this model the cycle is generated by the interaction of financial fragility and demand the wage share rises at higher levels of output but this generates no feedback so that by design demand does not react to changes in income distribution but the model does exhibit a pseudo goodwin cycle in the output wage share space this holds true even if we introduce a wage led demand regime this demonstrates that the existence of a counter clockwise movement of output and the wage share cannot be regarded as proof of the existence of a goodwin cycle and a profit led demand regime

dynamic analysis of policy lag in a keynes goodwin model stability instability cycles and chaos abstract in this paper we investigate the impact of government s stabilization policy on the dynamic behavior of the economic system in an analytical framework of a keynes goodwin model of the growth cycle in particular we study the effects of the policy lag on macroeconomic stability analytically and numerically it is shown that the increase of the policy lag contributes to destabilize the system and cyclical behavior and chaotic motion emerge in some ranges of the parameter values

pleasures of cockaigne quality gaps market structure and the amount of grading the article explores under what circumstances high quality producers would not voluntarily submit to grading when low quality firms would readily do so and under what conditions high quality firms would have a lesser proportion of their output graded than would their low quality counterparts it also investigates how market structure affects the decison to grade establishing that a competitive industry carries out the optimal amount of grading when some firms have finite market shares the industry engages in excessive grading

when cheaper is better fee determination in the market for equity mutual funds abstract in this paper we develop a model of the market for equity mutual funds that captures three key characteristics of this market first there is competition among funds second fund managers ability is not observed by investors before making their investment decisions third some investors do not make optimal use of all available information the main results of the paper are that 1 price competition is compatible with positive mark ups in equilibrium and 2 worse performing funds set fees that are greater or equal to those set by better performing funds these predictions are supported by available empirical evidence

experience dependent information diffusion and product quality in a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable to capture this asymmetry our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias consumers may attempt to adjust for bias but are not required to do so correctly as a result quality under perfect information need not be and usually will not be higher than quality under imperfect information in addition the externality exerted by informed consumers on uninformed consumers may not be the traditional beneficial externality jel l15

product quality and imperfect information this paper considers markets in which consumers are imperfectly informed about both product prices and quality levels offered by firms we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of the various equilibrium configurations of price and quality that can arise in two paradigm cases when all consumers prefer higher quality and when all consumers prefer lower quality our results suggest that firms will exploit imperfect information by charging noncompetitive prices as well as by offering other than ideal quality in the former case but only by changing noncompetitive prices in the latter case

reputation and competition this paper shows how competition generates reputation building behavior in repeated interactions when the product quality observed by consumers is a noisy signal of firms effort level there are two types of firms and good firms try to distinguish themselves from bad firms although consumers get convinced that firms which are repeatedly successful in providing high quality are good firms competition endogenously generates the outside option inducing disappointed consumers to leave firms this threat of exit induces good firms to choose high effort allowing good reputations to be valuable but its uncompromising execution forces good firms out of the market jel c7 d8

generic existence of completely revealing equilibria for economies with uncertainty when prices convey information conditions which imply the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria for most static pure exchange economies where prices convey information about the state of the world are analyzed information is aggregated and transmitted by prices because agents have different initial information and maximize the conditional expectation of state dependent utility functions major results state that if with probability one agents characteristics do not vary too much as the state of the world varies then generically there exist equilibrium price functions which reveal all initial information more precisely if the support of the image measure is contained in a compact c1 manifold satisfying some technical conditions which is of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities then existence of completely revealing equilibria is generic any economy satisfying these assumptions can be approximated by a sequence of economies which also obey these assumptions and have completely revealing equilibrium price functions slight perturbations do not destroy the existence property

pricing strategy quality signaling and entry deterrence abstract i investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two period model of a durable goods monopolist there exists an incumbent that is of two types that is high and low quality types they differ in terms of their r d capabilities and the incumbent s type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant if the entrant decided to enter the market nash bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant i show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent s quality type which serves to discourage entry in the prestige pricing the high quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price i also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing

minsky models a structured survey minsky s ideas have recently gained prominence in the mainstream as well as in the heterodox literature however there exists no agreement upon the formal presentation of minsky s insights the aim of this paper is to survey the literature and identify differences and similarities in the ways through which minskyan ideas have been formalised we distinguish between the models that focus on the dynamics of debt or interest with no or a secondary role for asset prices and the models in which asset prices play a key role in the dynamic behaviour of the economy within the first category of models we make a classification between i the kalecki minsky models ii the kaldor minsky models iii the goodwin minsky models iv the credit rationing minsky models v the endogenous target debt ratio models and vi the minsky veblen models within the second category of models we distinguish between i the equity price minsky models and ii the real estate price minsky models key limitations of the models and directions for future research are outlined

advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments advertising and product quality in posted offer experiments i introduction for years the federal trade commission ftc has attacked unfair and deceptive advertising recently it has turned its attention to errors of omission rather than commission by challenging agreements among sellers to limit advertising even when it is truthful one reason for eliminating advertising restrictions is to stimulate competition in the advertised dimension of the good or service for example price advertising may result in more price competition on the other hand professional associations argue that price competition causes product quality to deteriorate because sellers of high quality services are forced to match the lower prices of sellers of low quality products and through their codes professional associations have implicitly or explicitly discouraged some forms of advertising including price advertising restrictions of this nature still exist in some local markets although they have become the subject of ftc litigation 1 the quality deterioration argument of professional associations is plausible only when buyers are unable to observe quality prior to purchase 2 when buyers cannot distinguish quality moral hazard invites sellers to lower cost by providing lower quality adverse selection can result from price advertising causing lower cost products to drive out higher cost products as argued by akerlof 1970 the opposite point of view is that even when quality cannot be determined prior to purchase price advertising may enable sellers to signal quality and develop reputations 3 moreover transactions repeatedly involving the same buyers and sellers may enable buyers to form expectations about seller quality based on their experience that can make it worthwhile for a seller to provide higher quality the series of laboratory experiments described here permits the evaluation of market performance when buyers have very limited information the claim to be investigated is that price advertising prevents quality deterioration and improves market efficiency reputation formation through advertising is emphasized instead of other mechanisms such as warranties that may prevent quality deterioration 4 so that quality can be kept relatively neutral and easily understood by subjects we represent it as the grade of a commodity the structure underlying the experiments is based on holt s model of the determination of industry quality which is summarized in schmalensee 1979 demand is induced through the values for which buyers can redeem their purchases value is linearly related to grade so that no difference between average and marginal valuation of quality can arise to cause nonoptimal quality as it did in spence 1976 the production cost for each seller is quadratic in the grade selected by the seller therefore the efficient grade level is unique the most closely related experimental work on product quality decisions is reported in lynch miller plott and porter 1986 in their experiments sellers chose one of two quality levels prices were determined in an oral double auction efficient price and quality outcomes resulted when prospective buyers were given full information about quality removing the identities of sellers and allowing only post purchase quality information sometimes resulted in a lemons outcome in which sellers offer a low quality product even though the market would be more efficient with the production and sale of a high quality product private information tended to yield less efficient outcomes than full public information the posted offer experiments reported in this paper differ from the oral double auction experiments in lynch miller plott and porter because one of our objectives was to examine the effect of advertising restrictions on market efficiency in our experiments price advertising is implemented in a standard posted offer auction

fly by night firms and the market for product reviews this paper presents a model that permits third party information provision in a market characterized by information asymmetries and reputation formation the model is used to examine how the market for information provision affects prices and supply in the primary market they find that decreasing the cost of providing and using information 1 increases rather than decreases the margins received by reputable service firms 2 decreases the price of new untested service firms so reputation is more costly to build and 3 leads to more high quality firms and less fly by night firms copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

prices product qualities and asymmetric information the competitive case recent developments in the economics of information emphasize the informational content of prices we examine the degree to which prices convey information on product quality to uninformed agents under perfect competition we show that a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist when an equilibrium does exist the information on quality conveyed by prices depends on the shape of the average cost curves and the relative numbers of informed and uniformed agents

ex ante investment ex post remedy and product liability low quality products may cause consumer harm a firm can reduce the probability of low quality through ex ante investment before sales and can take remedy actions such as product recalls if it learns after sales that product quality is low an increase in the firm s product liability increases its incentive for ex post remedy more ex post remedy however may reduce the firm s ex ante quality investment on the other hand higher product liability increases consumer demand for the product resulting in high output and hence greater return to ex ante investment the trade off between these two effects the substitution effect and the output effect can lead to an inverted u shaped relationship between ex ante investment and product liability we find that the firm always prefers full liability whereas consumers might be better off with less than full liability full product liability tends to be socially optimal when the potential consumer loss from low quality is sufficiently high otherwise partial liability can be socially optimal

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

toward an understanding of dynamic moral decision making model free and model based learning in business settings decision makers facing moral issues often experience the challenges of continuous changes this dynamic process has been less examined in previous literature on moral decision making we borrow theories on learning strategies and computational models from decision neuroscience to explain the updating and learning mechanisms underlying moral decision processes specifically we present two main learning strategies model free learning wherein the values of choices are updated in a trial and error fashion sustaining the formation of habits and model based learning wherein the brain updates more general cognitive maps and associations thus sustaining flexible and state dependent behaviors we then summarize studies explaining the neuro computational processes of both learning strategies the calculation of prediction errors and valuation we conclude by emphasizing how the incorporation of dynamic aspects in moral decision making could open new avenues for understanding moral behaviors in a changing world

reputation and uncertainty toward an explanation of quality problems in competitive ldc markets abstract this paper attempts to explain the puzzle of low and variable product qualities in seemingly competitive ldc markets it shows that the cost of overcoming quality moral hazard through seller reputation rises with the rate of interest the rate of seller turnover the amplitude of idiosyncratic cost fluctuations and the relative scarcity of exogenous entry costs since markets with a multiplicity of small producers are more likely to have these characteristics they are more susceptible to suffering from quality problems the model developed here in particular highlights the role of cost variations in impeding the function of reputation in markets with moral hazard and adverse selection the derived conditions for the persistence of quality problems contribute to the explanation of quality differences between similar markets in developed and less developed countries

the tragedy of uk fiscal policy in the aftermath of the financial crisis the evolving response of the uk fiscal authorities to the financial crisis and recession are briefly outlined with a focus on the fiscal austerity programme introduced by the incoming coalition government during 2010 the reasoning for that programme is critically examined and largely dismissed it is argued that the drive for major cuts in public expenditure comes from seeking to achieve a balanced structural budget and reductions in estimated potential output the significance of the latter are discussed the paper is completed by a brief consideration of alternatives

a simplified stock flow consistent dynamic model of the systemic financial fragility in the new capitalism in the last few years many financial analysts and heterodox economists but even some dissenters among orthodox economists have referred to the contribution of hyman p minsky as fundamental to understanding the current crisis however it is well known that the traditional formulation of minsky s financial instability hypothesis shows serious internal logical problems furthermore minsky s analysis of capitalism must be updated on the basis of the deep changes which during the last three decades have concerned the world economy in order to overcome these theoretical and empirical troubles this paper first introduces the reader to the mechanics of the financial instability theory according to the formulation of the traditional minskian literature section 2 second it shows why minsky s theory cannot be regarded as a general theory of the business cycle section 3 third the paper attempts to supply a simplified but consistent re formulation of minsky s theory by inter breeding it with inputs coming from the new cambridge theories and the current formal minskian literature the aim of this is to analyze the impact of both capital asset inflation and consumer credit on the financial soundness of the non financial business sector sections 4 7 some concluding remarks are provided in the last part of the paper section 8

strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality this paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the pricing strategy of a rm that faces a consumer who is rationally inattentive to product quality sims 2003 in a standard sequential pricing game rational inattention to quality produces two types of mixed strategy perfect bayesian equilibria one where sellers pool at a low price and buyers are fully inattentive to quality and one where there is semi pooling at a high price and buyers are selectively attentive to quality i characterize these

minsky from the bottom up formalising the two price model of investment in a simple agent based framework abstract this paper presents a fully formalised version of hyman minsky s two price model of capital investment embedded in a macroeconomic model consisting of an agent based sector of consumption goods firms as well as three strongly simplified aggregated sectors in an innovation to the literature on minsky models the model is calibrated empirically using moments drawn from us data demonstrating that it is capable of producing plausible time series simulations show that the individual investment and financing choices made by the agent based firms lead to the emergence of business cycles at the aggregate level key aspects of the model can be closely related to central concepts from the financial accelerator literature and moreover it is demonstrated through simulation experiments that expectations and sentiment dynamics play an important role being able to amplify or dampen the cycles it is also shown that the introduction of fiscal policy monetary policy or a restriction on firm dividend payouts can contribute to a stabilisation of the model