the market for blood donating blood the gift of life is among the noblest activities and it is performed worldwide nearly 100 million times annually the economic perspective presented here shows how the gift of life albeit noble and often motivated by altruism is heavily influenced by standard economic forces including supply and demand economies of scale and moral hazard these forces shaped by technological advances have driven the evolution of blood donation markets from thin one to one marriage markets in which each recipient needed a personal blood donor to thick impersonalized diffuse markets today imbalances between aggregate supply and demand are a major challenge in blood markets including excess supply after disasters and insufficient supply at other times these imbalances are not unexpected given that the blood market operates without market prices and with limited storage length about six weeks for whole blood yet shifting to a system of paying blood donors seems a practical impossibility given attitudes toward paying blood donors and concerns that a paid system could compromise blood safety nonetheless we believe that an economic perspective offers promising directions to increase supply and improve the supply and demand balance even in the presence of volunteer supply and with the absence of market prices

cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

measuring the financial sophistication of households many households invest in ways that are hard to reconcile with standard financial theory and that have been labelled as investment mistakes campbell 2006 calvet campbell and sodini henceforth ccs 2007 there is increasing interest among household finance research ers in the concept of financial sophistication defined as the ability of a household to avoid making such mistakes a growing empirical lit erature documents a cross sectional correlation between household characteristics and invest ment mistakes richer better educated house holds tend to be better diversified marshall blume and irwin friend 1975 ccs 2007 william goetzmann and alok kumar 2008 annette vissing jorgensen 2003 display less inertia julie agnew pierluigi balduzzi and annika sunden 2003 yannis bilias dimitris georgarakos and michael haliassos 2008 campbell 2006 ccs 2009 vissing jorgensen 2002 and have a weaker disposition to hold losing and sell winning stocks ccs 2009 ravi dhar and ning zhu 2006 than other house holds one feature of these earlier papers is that mistakes are investigated one at a time often

labor unions and the adoption of new technology the paper examines whether unionization by workers discourages the adoption of labor saving techniques this is done in the context of an oligopolistic industry with a small number of firms some of which are unionized we find that unionization can actually encourage the adoption of labor saving technology provided that the technological improvement is mild and that demand is sufficiently high or demand elasticity sufficiently low if there is an effective threat of entry that causes the union to moderate its wage demands then unionization may encourage the adoption of new technology even at low levels of demand

waiting to give stated and revealed preferences we estimate and compare the effect of increased time costs on consumer satisfaction and behavior we are able to move beyond the existing literature which focuses on satisfaction and intention and estimate the effect of waiting time on return behavior further we do so in a prosocial context and our measure of cost is the length of time a blood donor spends waiting we find that relying on satisfaction data masks important time cost sensitivities namely it is not how the donor feels about the wait time that matters for return behavior but rather the actual duration of the wait consistent with theory we develop our results indicate that waiting has a significant longer term social cost we estimate that a 38 increase equivalent to one standard deviation in the average wait would result in a 10 decrease in donations per year this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

prices or knowledge what drives demand for financial services in emerging markets this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled prices or knowledge what drives demand for financial services in emerging markets conducted in 2008 in indonesia the study observed that financial development is critical for growth but its micro determinants are not well understood financial literacy training has no impact on the probability of opening a bank account although it does have an impact among those with low levels of education and financial literacy a change from 3 to 14 led to a 7 6 percent increase in the probability of owning a bank account the results hold two years after a study funding for the study derived from world bank hbs division of research and faculty development

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

charitable giving by married couples who decides and why does it matter we examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is primarily responsible for giving decisions looking first at single person households we find men and women to have significantly different tastes for giving setting up a potential conflict for married couples we find that with respect to total giving married households tend to resolve these conflicts largely in favor of the husband s preferences bargaining over charitable giving rather than letting one spouse take charge reduces giving by about six percent when the woman is the decision maker she will still make a significantly different allocation of those charity dollars preferring to give to more charities but to give less to each our results give new insights into both the demographics of charitable giving and the costliness of household bargaining

ageing and unused capacity in europe is there an early retirement trap we address the issue of how early retirement may interact with limited use of financial markets in producing financial hardship later in life when some risks such as long term care are not insured we argue that the presence of financially attractive early retirement schemes in a world of imperfect financial and insurance markets can lead to an early retirement trap indeed europe witnesses many early retired individuals in financial distress in our analysis we use data on 10 european countries which differ in their pension and welfare systems in prevailing retirement age and in households access to financial markets we find evidence that an early retirement trap exists particularly in some southern and central european countries people who retired early in life are more likely to be in financial hardship in the long run our analysis implies that governments should stop making early retirement attractive let retirees go back to work improve access to financial markets and make sure long term care problems are adequately insured viola angelini agar brugiavini and guglielmo weber

the effect of entry on r d networks we investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of r d networks considering farsighted firms we show that the presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbent firms to establish an r d link in particular incumbent firms may choose to form an otherwise undesirable r d collaboration in order to deter the entry of a new firm moreover an incumbent firm may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable r d collaboration expecting to form a more profitable r d link with the entrant finally potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market we also perform a welfare analysisand show that market and societal incentives are often misaligned

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

wage elasticities in working and volunteering the role of reference points in a laboratory study we experimentally test how effort responds to wages randomly assigned to accrue to individuals or to a charity in the presence of expectations based reference points or targets when individuals earn money for themselves higher wages lead to higher effort with relatively muted targeting behavior when individuals earn money for a charity higher wages instead lead to lower effort with substantial targeting behavior a reference dependent theoretical framework suggests an explanation for this differential impact when individuals place less value on earnings such as when accruing earnings for a charity instead of themselves more targeting behavior and a more sluggish response to incentives should result results from an additional experiment add support to this explanation when individuals select into earning money for a charity and thus likely place a higher value on those earnings targeting behavior is muted and no longer generates a negative effort response to higher wages data and the online appe

social incentives and voter turnout evidence from the swiss mail ballot system this paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior the main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act this incentive is particularly high in small and close knit communities empirically i analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in switzerland optional postal voting decreased the voting costs but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote in spite of the large reduction in voting costs the effect on aggregate turnout was small however voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities this lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people s voting decisions jel h0 z13

financial literacy and participation in the derivatives markets we set out in this study to determine whether individuals with higher levels of financial literacy are more likely to be active participants in the derivatives markets our empirical results based upon an official national survey undertaken by the financial supervisory commission of taiwan reveal that even after controlling for stock market participation rates financial literacy represents a significant benefit to individuals since it helps them to lower the entry barriers to purchasing complex derivatives products we also find that household wealth gender residential location and diverse sources of information have significant effects on participation rates in the derivatives markets furthermore when taking into consideration issues of accessibility or measurement error the positive effects of financial literacy on derivatives market participation are found to remain largely unchanged

networks of collaboration in oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly prior to competing in the market firms have an opportunity to form pair wise collaborative links with other firms these pair wise links involve a commitment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms we study the incentives of firms to form links and the architecture of the resulting collaboration network we find that incentives to form links are intimately related to the nature of market competition our analysis also suggests that collaborations are used by firms to generate competitive advantage and that strategically stable networks are often asymmetric with some firms having many links while others have few links or are isolated specifically we show that networks with the dominant group architecture stars and inter linked stars are stable we also present some results on the architecture of socially efficient networks

revenue management for operations with urgent orders this article is motivated by the case of a company manufacturing industrial equipment that faces two types of demand on the one hand there are the so called regular orders for installations or refurbishing of existing facilities these orders have a relatively long lead time on the other hand there are urgent orders mostly related to spare parts when a facility has a breakdown the delay in such case is much shorter but higher margins can be obtained we study the order acceptance problem for a firm that serves two classes of demand over an infinite horizon the firm has to decide whether to accept a regular order or equivalently how much capacity to set aside for urgent orders in order to maximize its profit we formulate this problem as a multi dimensional markovian decision process mdp we propose a family of approximate formulations to reduce the dimension of the state space via aggregation we show how our approach can be used to compute bounds on the profit associated with the optimal order acceptance policy finally we show that the value of revenue management is commensurate with the operational flexibility of the firm

altruism or diminishing marginal utility abstract we challenge a commonly used assumption in the literature on social preferences and show that this assumption leads to significantly biased estimates of the social preference parameter using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate that the literature s common restrictions on the curvature of the decision makers utility function can dramatically bias the altruism parameter we show that this is particularly problematic when comparing altruism between groups with well documented differences in risk aversion or diminishing marginal utility i e men versus women giving motivated by pure versus warm glow motives and wealthy versus poor we conclude by proposing two approaches to address this bias

financial knowledge and financial literacy at the household level there is evidence of a relation between numeracy and wealth held outside of pensions and social security with pensions and social security accounting for half of wealth at retirement and evidence that those with pensions save more in other forms one would expect to find knowledge of pensions and social security influencing retirement saving yet we find no evidence that knowledge of pensions and social security is related to nonpension non social security wealth to numeracy or that it plays an intermediate role in the numeracy wealth relation our findings raise questions about policies that would enhance numeracy to increase retirement saving

harmful competition in insurance markets there is a general presumption that competition is a good thing in this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly the reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross subsidization between different risk types cream skimming behavior on the contrary prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers in effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance performing simulation for different distributions of risk we find that monopoly in general performs much better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium

excusing selfishness in charitable giving the role of risk decisions involving charitable giving often occur under the shadow of risk a common finding is that potential donors give less when there is greater risk that their donation will have less impact while this behaviour could be fully rationalized by standard economic models this article shows that an additional mechanism is relevant the use of risk as an excuse not to give in a laboratory study participants evaluate risky payoffs for themselves and risky payoffs for a charity when their decisions do not involve tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity they respond very similarly to self risk and charity risk by contrast when their decisions force tradeoffs between money for themselves and the charity participants act more averse to charity risk and less averse to self risk these altered responses to risk bias participants towards choosing payoffs for themselves more often consistent with excuse driven responses to risk additional results support the existence of excuse driven types

financial illiteracy and mortgage refinancing decisions we analyze the effect of an exogenous shock to the italian mortgage market where a reform has abolished prepayment fees and simplified mortgage refinancing making it a virtually cost free decision for households this law along with the considerable drop in market interest rates has generated important gains for fixed rate borrowers which we quantify at up to 15 of the principal balance nevertheless only about 13 of borrowers have locked in this opportunity we study the relationship between this sluggish behavior and their level of financial literacy

are you risk averse over other people s money decisions with uncertain outcomes are often made by one party in settings where another party bears the consequences whenever an individual is delegated to make decisions that affect others such as in the typical corporate structure does the individual make decisions that reflect the risk preferences of the party bearing the consequences we examine this question in two simple settings lottery choices and sealed bid auctions using controlled laboratory experiments we find that when an individual makes a decision for an anonymous stranger there is a tendency to exhibit less risk aversion this reduction in risk aversion is relative to his or her own preferences and it is also relative to his or her belief about the preferences of others this result has significant implications for the design of contracts between principals and agents

destructive behavior in a fragile public good game a b s t r a c t socially destructive behavior in a public good environment like damaging public goods is an under exposed phenomenon in economics in an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be in fluenced by the very nature of an environment to that purpose we use a fragile public good fpg game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior taking on a level playing field with constructive behavior contributing we find substantial evidence of destructive decisions sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior while positive framing induces fewer destruc tive decisions shifting the selfish nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20

locus of control and savings abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between individuals locus of control and their savings behavior i e wealth accumulation savings rates and portfolio choices locus of control is a psychological concept that captures individuals beliefs about the causal relationship between their own behavior and life events we find that households with an internal reference person a main respondent who believes that he she can generally control relevant aspects of life save more in terms of levels and in some cases as a percentage of their permanent incomes although the locus of control gap in savings rates is largest among rich households the gap in wealth accumulation is particularly large for poor households finally our findings indicate that households with an internal reference person are in a better position to save in forms that are harder to access such as pension wealth than otherwise similar households with an external reference person

farsighted r d networks we analyze the formation of bilateral r d collaborations in an oligopoly when each firm benefits from the research done by other firms it is connected to in contrast to myopic stability farsighted stability leads to r d networks consisting of two minimally connected components with the largest one comprising three quarters of firms

money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators abstract this paper presents the results of an experiment in oxford where relative standing can be improved by randomly chosen dictators only by reducing burning the money of the coplayers at a cost to themselves almost 50 of the subjects engage in money burning and 75 of burners appear rank egalitarian

cognitive abilities and portfolio choice we study the relation between cognitive abilities and stockholding using the recent survey of health ageing and retirement in europe share which has detailed data on wealth and portfolio composition of individuals aged 50 in 11 european countries and three indicators of cognitive abilities mathematical verbal fluency and recall skills we find that the propensity to invest in stocks is strongly associated with cognitive abilities for both direct stock market participation and indirect participation through mutual funds and retirement accounts since the decision to invest in less information intensive assets such as bonds is less strongly related to cognitive abilities we conclude that the association between cognitive abilities and stockholding is driven by information constraints rather than by features of preferences or psychological traits

social image concerns and prosocial behavior field evidence from a nonlinear incentive scheme abstract using longitudinal data on the entire population of blood donors in an italian town we examine how donors respond to a nonlinear award scheme that rewards them with symbolic prizes medals when they reach certain donation quotas our results indicate that donors significantly increase the frequency of their donations immediately before reaching the thresholds for which the rewards are given but only if the prizes are publicly announced in the local newspaper and awarded in a public ceremony the results are robust to several specifications sample definitions and controls for observable and unobservable heterogeneity our findings indicate that social image concerns are a primary motivator of prosocial behavior and that symbolic prizes are most effective as motivators when they are awarded publicly we discuss the implications of our findings for policies aimed at incentivizing prosocial behavior

planning and financial literacy how do women fare many older us households have done little or no planning for retirement and there is a substantial population that seems to undersave for retirement of particular concern is the relative position of older women who are more vulnerable to old age poverty due to their longer longevity this paper uses data from a special module we devised on planning and financial literacy in the 2004 health and retirement study it shows that women display much lower levels of financial literacy than the older population as a whole in addition women who are less financially literate are also less likely to plan for retirement and be successful planners these findings have important implications for policy and for programs aimed at fostering financial security at older ages

how did distributional preferences change during the great recession abstract to better understand how support for redistributive policies is shaped by macroeconomic shocks we explore how distributional preferences changed during the recent great recession we conducted identical modified dictator games during both the recession and the preceding economic boom the experiments capture subjects selfishness the weight on one s own payoff and equality efficiency tradeoffs concerns for reducing differences in payoffs versus increasing total payoffs which we then compare across economic conditions subjects exposed to recession exhibit greater selfishness and higher emphasis on efficiency relative to equality reproducing recessionary conditions inside the laboratory by confronting subjects with possible negative payoffs weakly intensifies selfishness and increases efficiency orientation bolstering the interpretation that differing economic circumstances drive our results

r d networks we develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition firms incentives to invest in r d and the architecture of collaboration networks in the absence of firm rivalry the complete network where each firm collaborates with all others is uniquely stable industry profit maximizing and efficient by contrast under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint this suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

focusing the financial flow of supply chains an empirical investigation of financial supply chain management the objective of this paper is to establish a theoretical foundation for financial supply chain management fscm in order to strengthen managerial decisions concerning financial flows in supply chains although such decisions are made frequently and partial aspects of fscm are already understood in business practice empirical knowledge about fscm is in its early stages the study provides fundamental information derived from eight case studies based on 40 interviews the analysis extends previous studies of the interface between operations management and finance by i contributing to a mid range theory of fscm by exploring two distinct but not exclusive fscm categories their antecedents and performance effects ii empirically deriving a testable framework for fscm iii relating fscm to established theories in the field of scm and iv basing the analysis on transaction cost economics managerial insights reveal that weak working capital causes firms to focus on fscm more specifically the study identifies two fscm categories pre shipment fscm before invoice release and post shipment fscm after invoice release managers can improve upstream supply chain working capital with pre shipment fscm whereas post shipment fscm strengthens the buying firm s working capital position based on transaction cost economics we analyze how these improvements stem from risk reductions which are more effective if firms are integrated internally and externally

deciding for others reduces loss aversion we study risk taking on behalf of others both when choices involve losses and when they do not a large scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the danish population is conducted we find that deciding for others reduces loss aversion when choosing between risky prospects for which losses are ruled out by design subjects make the same choices for themselves as for others in contrast when losses are possible we find that the two types of choices differ in particular we find that subjects who make choices for themselves take less risk than those who decide for others when losses loom this finding is consistent with an interpretation of loss aversion as a bias in decision making driven by emotions and that these emotions are reduced when making decisions for others

is consumption growth consistent with intertemporal optimization evidence from the consumer expenditure survey in this paper we show that some of the predictions of models of consumer intertemporal optimization are in line with the patterns of nondurable expenditure observed in u s household level data we propose a flexible specification of preferences that allows multiple commodities and yields empirically tractable equations we estimate preference parameters using the only u s micro data set with complete consumption information we show that previous rejections can be explained by the simplifying assumptions made in previous studies we also show that results obtained using good consumption or aggregate data can be misleading

modelling imperfectly appropriable r d via spillovers abstract we provide an extensive comparison of the well known r d models of d aspremont jacquemin and kamien muller zang exposing full or partial conflict in key conclusions and policy prescriptions using a mix of formal and or intuitive criteria we argue that the first model is of questionable validity for large spillover values the latter being characterized by jointly increasing returns to scale in the r d process an argument leading to equivalence between the two r d processes but not to agreement on some key conclusions is exposited in conclusion the models emerge as fundamentally different although a unilateral shift in the cost function of the first leads to agreement in all equilibrium outcomes

the new science of cities by michael batty the opinion of an economist cities are the cradle of a wide range of cultural social and technological innovations that are at the heart of modern economic growth and development half of humanity today lives in cities but until the last two decades economists have paid much less attention to cities than have other social scientists by contrast geographers have long studied the role of cities in human affairs michael batty a distinguished scholar in the field of human geography has recently written the new science of cities a synthesis of his work and of some other prominent urban geographers a review of his book is the first objective of this essay the second is to discuss and compare the tools and concepts developed by urban economists with those of urban geographers in the hope of triggering a fruitful debate between those two groups of social scientists

the economic importance of financial literacy theory and evidence this paper undertakes an assessment of a rapidly growing body of economic research on financial literacy we start with an overview of theoretical research which casts financial knowledge as a form of investment in human capital endogenizing financial knowledge has important implications for welfare as well as policies intended to enhance levels of financial knowledge in the larger population next we draw on recent surveys to establish how much or how little people know and identify the least financially savvy population subgroups this is followed by an examination of the impact of financial literacy on economic decision making in the united states and elsewhere while the literature is still young conclusions may be drawn about the effects and consequences of financial illiteracy and what works to remedy these gaps a final section offers thoughts on what remains to be learned if researchers are to better inform theoretical and empirical models as well as public policy jel a20 d14 g11 i20 j26

on the convergence to the nash bargaining solution for action dependent bargaining protocols we consider a non cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action dependent bargaining protocol that is the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected an important example is the frequently studied rejector becomes proposer protocol we focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on the rejection by another player we consider the limit as the bargaining friction vanishes in case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection each player receives his utopia payoff conditional on being recognized otherwise equilibrium proposals of all players converge to a weighted nash bargaining solution where the weights are determined by the probability to propose conditional on one s own rejection

baby boomer retirement security the roles of planning financial literacy and housing wealth abstract we compare wealth holdings across two cohorts of the health and retirement study the early baby boomers in 2004 and individuals in the same age group in 1992 levels and patterns of total net worth have changed relatively little over time though boomers rely more on housing equity than their predecessors most important planners in both cohorts arrive close to retirement with much higher wealth levels and display higher financial literacy than non planners instrumental variables estimates show that planning behavior can explain the differences in savings and why some people arrive close to retirement with very little or no wealth

working for the warm glow on the benefits and limits of prosocial incentives abstract we study whether using prosocial incentives where effort is tied directly to charitable contributions may lead to better performance than standard incentive schemes in a real effort task individuals indeed work harder for charity than for themselves but only when incentive stakes are low when stakes are raised effort increases when individuals work for themselves but not when they work for others and as a result the difference in provided effort disappears individuals correctly anticipate these effects choosing to work for charity at low incentives and for themselves at high incentives the results are consistent with warm glow giving and have implications for optimal incentive design

strategic union delegation and strike activity we develop a model of wage determination with private information in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus maximizing delegates or to wage maximizing delegates such as senior union members we show that the wage outcome in case of surplus maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage maximizing delegates even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information however if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic then delegating to wage maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium the maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage maximizing delegates instead of surplus maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero

ageing cognitive abilities and retirement we investigate the relationship between ageing cognitive abilities and retirement using the survey on health ageing and retirement in europe share a household panel that offers the possibility of comparing several european countries using nationally representative samples of the population aged 50 the human capital framework suggests that retirement may cause an increase in cognitive decline since after retirement individuals lose the market incentive to invest in cognitive repair activities our empirical results based on an instrumental variable strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity of retirement confirm this key prediction they also indicate that education plays a fundamental role in explaining heterogeneity in the level of cognitive abilities

intensifying financial inclusion through the provision of financial literacy training a gendered perspective this study examines the impact of financial literacy training on financial inclusion and its intensity using data collected from a randomised control trial an additive index of financial inclusion

corporate philanthropy and productivity evidence from an online real effort experiment contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and nonprofit sectors as well as in firms that engage in corporate philanthropy or other corporate social responsibility policies this paper compares the effectiveness of a social incentive that takes the form of a donation received by a charity of the subject s choice to a financial incentive we find that social incentives lead to a 13 rise in productivity regardless of their form lump sum or related to performance or strength the response is strong for subjects with low initial productivity 30 whereas high productivity subjects do not respond when subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation with women more likely to do so than men furthermore offering subjects some discretion in choosing their own payment schemes leads to a substantial improvement in performance comparing social incentives to equally costly increases in private compensation for low productivity subjects reveals that the former are less effective in increasing productivity but the difference is small and not statistically significant data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1985 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

r d collaboration networks in mixed oligopoly we develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for r d collaboration in a mixed oligopoly our analysis reveals that the complete network where each firm collaborates with all others is uniquely stable when r d subsidies are not available in addition to the complete network the private partial and the private hub star networks are pareto efficient however the complete network becomes the unique pareto efficient network when r d is subsidized this result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur it also highlights the role of a public firm as policy instrument in aligning individual incentives for collaboration with the objective of efficiency independently of whether r d subsidies are provided by the regulator

optimal financial knowledge and wealth inequality we show that financial knowledge is a key determinant of wealth inequality in a stochastic life cycle model with endogenous financial knowledge accumulation where financial knowledge enables individuals to better allocate lifetime resources in a world of uncertainty and imperfect insurance moreover because of how the us social insurance system works better educated individuals have most to gain from investing in financial knowledge our parsimonious specification generates substantial wealth inequality relative to a one asset saving model and one in which returns on wealth depend on portfolio composition alone we estimate that 30 40 percent of retirement wealth inequality is accounted for by financial knowledge

don t lapse into temptation a behavioral explanation for policy surrender abstract many policyholders surrender their life insurance policies early leading to substantial monetary losses for private households surrender can be explained rationally if it constitutes the last resort providing liquidity in the event of an urgent need of cash yet we find clear evidence in german panel data that for more than half of all surrendered contracts investors had cheaper options available to provide the required liquidity this finding demonstrates that there must be other factors influencing this important life decision we provide a behavioral explanation focusing on the role of individual decision heuristics financial literacy and financial advice in particular we show that financial literacy and financial advice can mitigate the behavioral temptation to lapse while the tendency to rely on heuristics increases lapse probability

teaching teenagers in finance does it work abstract many initiatives worldwide aim at improving financial literacy through targeted education programs yet there is little evidence regarding their effectiveness we examine the impact of a short financial education program on teenagers in german high schools our findings reveal that the training program significantly increases teenagers interest in financial matters and their financial knowledge especially their ability to properly assess the riskiness of assets behaviorally we observe a decrease in the prevalence of self reported impulse purchases but at the same time find no evidence of a significant increase in savings

financial literacy financial education and downstream financial behaviors policy makers have embraced financial education as a necessary antidote to the increasing complexity of consumers financial decisions over the last generation we conduct a meta analysis of the relationship of financial literacy and of financial education to financial behaviors in 168 papers covering 201 prior studies we find that interventions to improve financial literacy explain only 0 1 of the variance in financial behaviors studied with weaker effects in low income samples like other education financial education decays over time even large interventions with many hours of instruction have negligible effects on behavior 20 months or more from the time of intervention correlational studies that measure financial literacy find stronger associations with financial behaviors we conduct three empirical studies and we find that the partial effects of financial literacy diminish dramatically when one controls for psychological traits that have been omitted in prior research or when one uses an instrument for financial literacy to control for omitted variables financial education as studied to date has serious limitations that have been masked by the apparently larger effects in correlational studies we envisage a reduced role for financial education that is not elaborated or acted upon soon afterward we suggest a real but narrower role for just in time financial education tied to specific behaviors it intends to help we conclude with a discussion of the characteristics of behaviors that might affect the policy maker s mix of financial education choice architecture and regulation as tools to help consumer financial behavior this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

wealth accumulation and the propensity to plan why do similar households end up with very different levels of wealth we show that differences in the attitudes and skills with which they approach e nancial planning are a signie cant factor we use new and unique survey data to assess these differences and to measure each household s propensity to plan we show that those with a higher such propensity spend more time developing e nancial plans and that this shift in planning is associated with increased wealth these e ndings are consistent with broad psychological evidence concerning the benee cial impacts of planning on goal pursuit those with a high propensity to plan may be better able to control their spending and thereby achieve their goal of wealth accumulation we e nd direct evidence supporting this effortful self control channel in the very strong relationship we uncover between the propensity to plan and budgeting behavior

the effects of unions on research and development an empirical analysis using multi year data a link between unionization and research and development rates research and development expenditures divided by output is tested for in thirteen aggregate canadian industries a balanced panel of thirteen industries covering 1968 to 1986 reveals a negative relationship between industry unionization rates and research and development the results hold when a number of techniques are used to control for unobserved industry heterogeneity and non linear responses to unionization in an industry that moves from the 25th to the 75th percentile of unionization research and development is predicted to fall by about 40 per cent jel classification j51 les effets des syndicats sur l intensite de la recherche et developpement une analyse empirique sur plusieurs annees ce memoire examine le lien entre le degre de syndicalisation et les taux de depenses en recherche et developpement en proportion de la production dans treize industries canadiennes pour ces treize secteurs industriels entre 1968 et 1986 il semble qu il y ait une relation negative entre les taux de syndicalisation et les taux de depenses en recherche et developpement ces resultats sont robustesmeme quand on utilise des techniques pour tenir compte de l heterogeneite des secteurs et des reponses non lineaires a la syndicalisation pour une industrie qui voit son taux de syndicalisation passer du 25e au 75e percentile on prevoit une chute de 40 dans la recherche et developpement

the determination of r d empirical evidence on the role of unions abstract this paper examines the empirical evidence of the role of union bargaining on innovation we review the existing empirical evidence and emphasis some of the problems with the theoretical assumptions we outline a simple model of strategic rd b the union bargains only over wages

exponential growth bias and household finance exponential growth bias is the pervasive tendency to linearize exponential functions when assessing them intuitively we show that exponential growth bias can explain two stylized facts in household finance the tendency to underestimate an interest rate given other loan terms and the tendency to underestimate a future value given other investment terms bias matters empirically more biased households borrow more save less favor shorter maturities and use and benefit more from financial advice conditional on a rich set of household characteristics there is little evidence that our measure of exponential growth bias merely proxies for broader financial sophistication what drives household financial decisions the canonical economic model assumes that consumers choose to consume borrow or save based on their preferences their expectations and the costs and benefits of borrowing and saving a growing body of work applies insights from psychology to enrich specifications of three of the model s key pieces preferences expectations and problem solving conditional on parameter values 1 in this paper we bring psychological evidence to bear on a fourth specification issue how consumers perceive the costs and benefits of borrowing and saving we begin by tying together existing and new evidence on these cost perceptions to show that most consumers err systematically when given information commonly available in the market on the saving side consumers display future value bias a systematic tendency to underestimate a future value given

labour markets and innovation ex post bargaining abstract there is considerable interest in how labour market conditions affect innovation lying behind much of the existing work on this question is a simple model of a single union bargaining with a single firm in which in the absence of binding contracts the union reduces the returns to innovation without bearing any of the costs this misses an important feature of some rd with efficient contracts there are cases where being faced with a stronger union will help a firm to win a patent race it would otherwise have lost

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

till mortgage do us part mortgage switching costs and household s bank switching abstract we investigate the role of mortgage switching costs in shaping the households decision to change their main bank to this end we use a unique panel dataset that enables us to infer household s bank switching in conjunction with a legal reform that exogenously slashed down the mortgage switching costs the empirical evidence which survives to a variety of robustness checks supports the hypothesis that the explicit switching costs in the retail banking market are a weighty factor in shaping households bank switching despite any potential informational lock in dissecting the results we show that the effects of the reform were not uniform across households the more educated households those with a longer or broader relationship with their previous bank and those residing in ex ante less competitive banking markets were at the forefront of the wave of bank switching

defaults and donations evidence from a field experiment we study the effects of defaults on charitable giving in a large scale field experiment on an online fundraising platform we exogenously vary default options along two choice dimensions the chari

the importance of being marginal gender differences in generosity do men and women have different social preferences previous findings are contradictory we provide a potential explanation using evidence from a field experiment in a door to door solicitation men and women are equally generous but women become less generous when it becomes easy to avoid the solicitor our structural estimates of the social preference parameters suggest an explanation women are more likely to be on the margin of giving partly because of a less dispersed distribution of altruism we find similar results for the willingness to complete an unpaid survey women are more likely to be on the margin of participation

the role of negotiators in union firm bargaining differences between the objectives of union leaders and those of the rank and file have traditionally been thought the result of political processes or irrationality this paper shows that such differences will naturally arise as part of a rational bargaining strategy since delegation of authority to a negotiator permits the union members to achieve advantageous commitment this use of negotiators leads to revised interpretation of many popular theories of wage and employment determination such as the efficient bargain and the right to manage models and has implications for the interpretation of econometric modeling of union behavior

risk attitudes in first price auction experiments a bayesian analysis non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to risk or are all risk neutral this paper constructs an explicit bayesian prior distribution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsiders the experimental results it finds that observed bidding behavior is still inconsistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk attitudes thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes non cooperative bidding theory for sealed bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents archetypical of this result is the nash equilibrium prediction for first price auctions for an object that is valued by agents in an independent and private manner received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to riskor are all risk neutral in this paper we construct an explicit prior distrlbution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsider the experimental results we find that observed bidding behavior is indeed consistent with the nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk aversion however when one allows for risk loving subjects as well observed behavior is inconsistent with nash predictions thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes in section i we consider a specific nash equilibrium ne bidding model due to cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1988 that clearly illustrates the risk sensitivity of the theoretical predictions in section ii we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by harrison 1986a this evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of constant relative risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section i in section iii we reconsider the evidence from the first price fp experiments reported in cox roberson and smith 1982 and cox smith and walker 1983a 1983b i a specific bidding model cox roberson and smith 1982 hereafter crs present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i ui y y 1 received for publication august 31 1987 revision accepted for publication december 18 1989 university of south carolina i am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments although they are not responsible for my conclusions

charitable giving emotions and the default effect we report an experiment to study the effect of defaults on charitable giving in three different treatments participants face varying default levels of donation in three other treatments that are paired with the first three they receive the same defaults but are informed that defaults are thought to have an effect on their donation decisions the emotional state of all individuals is monitored throughout the sessions using facereading software and some participants are required to report their emotional state after the donation decision we find that the default level has no effect on donations and informing individuals of the possible impact of defaults also has no effect the decision to donate is independent of prior emotional state unless specific subgroups of participants are considered donors experience a negative change in the valence of their emotional state subsequent to donating when valence is measured with facereading software this contrasts with the selfreport data in which donating correlates with a more positive reported subsequent emotional state

national culture and financial literacy international evidence we examine to what extent aspects of national culture can explain cross country variations in financial literacy our results for a sample of 92 countries show that hofstede s dimensions of pow

financial literacy externalities this paper uses unique administrative data and a quasi field experiment of exogenous allocation to apartments in sweden to estimate medium and longer run effects on financial behavior from exposure to financially literate neighbors it contributes evidence of causal impact of financial literacy and points to a social multiplier of effective programs to enhance it exposure promotes saving in private retirement accounts and stockholding especially when neighbors have economics or business education but only for educated or male headed households findings point to relevant knowledge transfer through social interactions rather than to labor market or other channels linked to local economic conditions

the effects of pension funds on markets performance a review the worldwide reforming process of pension systems triggered by the demographic transition and globalization has led several countries to implement multi pillar pension systems and enhance pension funds for this reason the studies on the effects that pension funds exert on markets performance have been flourishing in the last decades in this paper we provide an updated review of the empirical advances in this field of study with particular focus on the effects that pension funds produce on labour markets financial markets and economic growth

networks of knowledge among unionized firms we develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of r d networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry whenever firms settle wages the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough however when unions settle wages the complete network is the unique stable network in other words the stronger the union bargaining power is the more symmetric stable r d networks will be in terms of network efficiency the partially connected network when firms settle wages does not pareto dominate the complete network when unions settle wages and vice versa

investment in financial literacy and saving decisions abstract we present an intertemporal consumption model of investment in financial literacy consumers benefit from such investment because financial literacy allows them to increase the returns on wealth since literacy depreciates over time and has a cost in terms of current consumption the model delivers an optimal investment in literacy furthermore literacy and wealth are determined jointly and are positively correlated over the life cycle the model drives our empirical approach to the analysis of the effect of financial literacy on wealth and saving and indicates that the stock of financial literacy early in life is a valid instrument in the regression of wealth on financial literacy using microeconomic and aggregate data we find strong support for the model s predictions