efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

reciprocal relationships and mechanism design we study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves we model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players commitments we differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down we fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment we use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non participants the difference stems from the players ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts we discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal

the impact of minimum wages on youth employment in portugal textabstractfrom january 1 1987 the legal minimum wage for workers aged 18 and 19 in portugal was uprated to the full adult rate generating a 49 3 increase between 1986 and 1987 in the legal minimum wage for this age group this shock is used as a natural experiment to evaluate the impact of the minimum wage change on teenagers employment by using a large firm level micro data set it is shown that by comparing the employment growth of 18 19 year old workers with their 20 25 year old counterparts one can identify the employment effects of the minimum wage hike the same comparisons are done with 30 35 year old workers this study finds that the rise in the minimum wage significantly reduced employment this conclusion is reinforced by evidence showing that these employment effects are concentrated in firms more likely to be affected by the change in the law

a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one sided incomplete information we characterize the sequential equilibria of a class of infinite horizon bargaining games with one sided incomplete information when the seller the uninformed party makes all the offers we prove a folk theorem every incentive compatible individually rational direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria introducing buyer counteroffers eliminates outcomes which are unfavorable to that party as the proportion of buyer offers increases the set of implementable mechanisms shrinks continuously when the proportion reaches one only the single outcome most favorable to the buyer remains thus depending on the offer structure sequentiality may or may not impose restrictions beyond static incentive compatibility

the macroeconomic consequences of raising the minimum wage capital accumulation employment and the wage distribution we study the quantitative impact of a rise in the minimum wage on macroeconomic outcomes such as employment the stock of capital and the distribution of wages our modeling framework is the large firm search and matching model our comparative statics are in line with previous empirical findings a moderate increase in the minimum wage barely affects employment while it compresses the wage distribution and generates positive spillovers on higher wages the model also predicts an increase in the stock of capital next we perform the policy experiment of introducing a 10 dollar minimum wage our results suggest large positive effects on capital 4 0 and output 1 8 with a decrease in employment by 2 8 the introduction of a 9 dollar minimum wage would instead produce similar effects on capital accumulation without harming employment

demand for rural tourism the effects of quality and information the development of rural tourism is regarded as a promising diversification strategy especially for lagging and mountainous areas of the european union research concerning the demand and or supply of rural tourism services has been limited within the agricultural economics domain despite the significance attached to rural tourism by various rural development policy measures and initiatives the article examines the expenditure behavior of rural tourists within a framework of demand for composite heterogeneous goods the proposed framework captures the quality of the tourism experience as the commodity s unit value a quantifiable economic variable examines its effects on expenditures and allows for the estimation of elasticity in prices regarding expenditure and quantity empirical analysis is facilitated by a survey recording the expenditure behavior of 465 tourists in two rural and lagging areas of greece the quality of the tourism experience is significantly and positively affected by the income the source from which information about the trip is retrieved internet newspapers as well as general press and special travel press and by the amount of information sought by the consumer prior to the trip in turn the quality of the tourism experience is the major endogenous factor that positively influences expenditures for rural tourism further research is needed before evidence provided in this work can be used to draw policy conclusions and recommendations

minimum wages and economic outcomes in europe abstract in this paper we review the arguments and consider evidence on the economic effects of minimum wages in europe we begin by outlining the systems of minimum wages that currently operate in european countries and then consider some evidence on the economic effects of minimum wages in four countries france the netherlands spain and the united kingdom we consider the relation between minimum wage floors and two economic outcomes employment and the distribution of income in working households we find little evidence that minimum wages have a bad effect on jobs and some evidence that they have an equalising impact on the distribution of income among families with someone in work

ratifiable mechanisms learning from disagreement in a mechanism design problem participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo if equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players beliefs then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints we investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two stage process consisting of a ratification state followed by the actual play of the chosen game we develop and illustrate a new concept ratifiability that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way

effects of the minimum wage on the employment status of youths an update the large decline in the relative value of the minimum wage during the 1980s makes that period a valuable one for identifying the impact of variation in the minimum wage on youth employment this study produces the robust finding that when the experience of the 1980s is included a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is estimated to reduce teen employment by less than 1 percent the lower end of the range of previous estimates because this small employment effect is offset by a labor force withdrawal effect the study finds no discernible effect on measured unemployment the study also finds no apparent effect of the minimum wage on the employment of young adults aged 20 24

the effects of minimum wages on wage dispersion and employment evidence from the u k wages councils using data on wages council coverage from the united kingdom new earnings survey the authors examine the impact of mandated minimum wages on wage dispersion and employment in the united kingdom in the 1980s they find evidence that a dramatic decline in the toughness of the regulation imposed by the wages councils through the 1980s a decline that is in the level of the minimum wage relative to the average wage significantly contributed to widening wage dispersion over those years there is however no evidence of an increase in employment resulting from the weakening bite of the wages council minimum pay rates instead consistent with the conclusions of several recent u s studies the findings suggest that the minimum wage had either no effect or a positive effect on employment

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

long term impact of minimum wages on workers careers evidence from two decades of longitudinal linked employer employee data i acknowledge the support of the spanish ministry of the economy severo ochoa programme for centres of excellence in r d sev20150563 the aei spain and feder ue grant eco2016 76734 p

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal the case of private values we analyze the principal agent relationship when the principal has private information as a three stage noncooperative game contract proposal acceptance refusal and contract execution we assume that the information does not directly affect the agent s payoff private values equilibrium exists and is generically locally unique moreover it is pareto optimal for the different types of principal the principal generically does strictly better than when the agent knows her information equilibrium allocations are the walrasian equilibria of an economy where the traders are different types of principal and exchange the slack on the agent s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints

happy birthday you re fired the effects of an age dependent minimum wage on youth employment flows in the netherlands the dutch minimum wage for workers aged 15 to 23 is defined as a stepwise increasing function of a worker s calendar age using dutch administrative records the author shows that the birthday disc

using regional variation in wages to measure the effects of the federal minimum wage the imposition of a national minimum wage standard provides a natural experiment in which the treatment effect varies across states depending on the fraction of workers initially earning less than the new minimum the author exploits this fact to evaluate the effect of the april 1990 increase in the federal minimum wage on teenagers wages employment and school enrollment comparisons of grouped and individual state data confirm that the rise in the minimum wage increased teenagers wages there is no evidence of corresponding losses in teenage employment or changes in teenage school enrollment

employment effects of minimum and subminimum wages panel data on state minimum wage laws using panel data on state minimum wage laws and economic conditions for the years 1973 89 the authors reevaluate existing evidence on the effects of a minimum wage on employment their estimates indicate that a 10 increase in the minimum wage causes a decline of 1 2 in employment among teenagers and a decline of 1 5 2 in employment for young adults similar to the ranges suggested by earlier time series studies the authors also find evidence that youth subminimum wage provisions enacted by state legislatures moderate the disemployment effects of minimum wages on teenagers

is there a negative effect of minimum wages on youth employment in france abstract it is often claimed that the national minimum wage has been a major cause of unemployment in france however econometric studies using time series data have been unable to identify any substantial impact in this paper we analyse what happened to the employment of young persons using sectoral data following the 10 increase in the minimum wage that took place in june 1981 we find that there was a statistically significant negative effect on youth employment

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

evaluating the minimum wage exemption of the long term unemployed in germany the authors evaluate the exemption of long term unemployed job seekers from germany s national minimum wage using linked survey and administrative micro data they rely on a regression discontinui

collusion in organizations the principal agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations this theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome at least partially the asymmetries of information he faces by now optimal contracts with adverse selection or hidden knowledge with moral hazard or hidden action or with nonverifiability by a third party of some variables known ex post by both the principal and the agent are relatively well understood despite insightful extensions to multiagent or multiprincipal organizations this body of knowledge falls short of a comprehensive theory of organizations one major reason beyond the restrictive nature of the organizations studied lies in the noncooperative approach generally followed to model multiagent settings indeed in this standard paradigm the cooperation of agents desired by the principal can be induced by the contracts he offers to the agents each of them maximizing his own welfare given the behavior of the other agents what remains is that the principal has complete control of the game played by the agents unwanted communication or side contracting between agents can be prevented this is a rather unrealistic assumption contract theory teaches us that the principal structures the contracts so as to minimize the informational rents given up to the agents because of their informational advantages it is quite natural to expect a collective reaction on the part of the agents to protect their rents we need to understand how agents can react to the rules of an organization and beyond to understand how a principal who is aware of the incentives for collusion should design the organization modeling coalitional or collusive behavior and characterizing the regulatory responses to such behavior is a major task of organization theory the empirical relevance of this line of work is easy to establish a clear example is that of auctions for which the occurrence of cooperative behavior between bidders is a general and well documented phenomenon see porter and zona 1993

disentangling the minimum wage puzzle an analysis of worker accessions and separations changes in the legislation in the mid 1980s in portugal provide remarkably good conditions for analysis of the employment effects of mandatory minimum wages as the minimum wage increased sharply for a very specific group of workers relying on a matched employer employee panel data set we model gross worker flows accessions and separations in continuing firms as well as in new firms and those going out of business using a count regression model applied to proportions employment trends for teenagers the affected group are contrasted to those of older workers before and after the raise in the youth minimum wage the major effect on teenagers of a rising minimum wage has been the reduction of separations from the employer which during the period under analysis has compensated for the reduction of accessions to new and continuing firms in this sense our results can reconcile some of the previous evidence in the empirical literature when analyzing the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on youth employment without decomposing it by type of worker flow jel d21 j23 j38

employment and the introduction of a minimum wage in britain there has been and will continue to be a lot of controversy regarding the introduction of a minimum wage in britain much has been said about the economic effects of a minimum wage about the level at which it should or could be set about how other workers would be affected and about how a minimum wage may interact with the benefit system as the labour or liberal democrat parties will if they win the next election introduce a minimum wage it is evident that a clear and informed discussion of the economic effects is important most of the existing debate has concentrated on its impact on jobs and here the discussion varies from pure ideology to consideration of the statistical evidence the former is typified by the comments of a number of government ministers a recent example is that by ian lang the independent i3 september i995 who said that a minimum wage set at f4 i5 an hour would cost at least 950 000 jobs this comes from assuming large knock on effects from a minimum wage by asserting that the average worker would claim a pay increase of half the magnitude of the increase received by low paid workers when their pay is raised to the minimum and then that this wage increase has to transmit into job loss the qualitative prediction of job loss is of course entirely in line with orthodox models of the labour market which unambiguously predict that increases in minimum wages price workers out of jobs 1 it is also in line with the sentiments outlined in the recent oecd jobs study of i994 which stresses that minimum wages cause job loss in the member countries for example the jobs study argues that governments should ensure sufficient differentiation in wage rates by age and region to prevent the minimum wage from harming employment prospects for young people or low productivity regions oecd jobs study p 46 however a more recent body of work questions this conventional view quite a lot of empirical evidence has been accumulated in recent years that fails to find any evidence ofjob loss associated with minimum wages the emphasis seems to have shifted from how negative are the employment effects to is there an employment effect and in some circles what potential is there for a positive effect after a brief review of the history of minimum wages in britain we discuss this recent work in the next section of the paper on the

is globalization reducing absolute poverty summary using data from 114 countries 1983 2007 we examine the relationship between globalization and world bank absolute poverty estimates we find a significant negative correlation between globalization and poverty robust to several econometric specifications including a fixed effect panel a long run first difference and a pooled ols regression introducing two instruments for globalization we also show that results are robust to correction for potential endogeneity we motivate and test the instruments in several ways in particular information flows and more liberal trade restrictions robustly correlate with lower absolute poverty

the effect of the minimum wage on the fast food industry using a longitudinal survey of fast food restaurants in texas the authors examine the impact of recent increases in the federal minimum wage on a low wage labor market less than 5 of fast food restaurants were using the new youth subminimum wage in july august 1991 even though the vast majority paid a starting wage below the new hourly minimum wage immediately before it became effective although some restaurants increased wages beyond the level needed to comply with higher minimum wages in both 1990 and 1991 those federal minimum wage increases greatly compressed the distribution of starting wages in the texas fast food industry two findings at variance with conventional predictions are that 1 employment increased more in those firms likely to have been most affected by the 1991 minimum wage increase than in other firms and 2 price changes were unrelated to mandated wage changes

the effect of minimum wage laws on the distribution of employment theory and evidence abstract recent research casts doubt on the view that minimum wage laws reduce employment we show that in a simple model of bilateral search with heterogeneous workers a minimum wage law increases employment however the increased competition from higher productivity workers makes lower productivity workers worse off without making higher productivity workers better off we provide evidence that minimum wage laws shift employment from adults to teenagers and students this raises concerns about the distributional consequences of minimum wages even when they increase employment

a reassessment of the new economics of the minimum wage literature with monthly data from the current population survey we estimate the employment effects of federal minimum wage increases using monthly current population survey cps data from 1979 through 1997 we find that the empirical differences in the new minimum wage literature based on cps data primarily can be traced to alternative methods of controlling for macroeconomic conditions we argue that the macroeconomic controls commonly included in models where no employment impact is found are inappropriate we consistently find a significant but modest negative relationship between minimum wage increases and teenage employment using alternative controls or allowing employer responses to the policy to occur with some delay

the organization of regulated production complementarities correlation and collusion we analyze the choice between vertical separation vs and vertical integration vi when two regulated firms produce complementary inputs with correlated costs and are protected by ex post break even constraints first in the absence of collusion the regulator prefers vi vs for negative and weak positive respectively strong positive correlation second if the firms can collude under vs and know all costs then vs is equivalent to vi however if firms collude under asymmetric information then collusion does not affect the choice between vs and vi since the regulator takes advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information

cartel enforcement with uncertainty about costs what cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs in order for a cartel agreement to work it must take into account the incentives for firms to misrepresent their cost information and it must provide sufficient reward so that no firm wishes to defect for private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements with side payments that can be supported as bayesian nash equilibria we show that if defection results in either cournot or bertrand competition the incentive problems in large cartels are severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome in contrast with common cost uncertainty the incentive problems become less severe in large cartels allowing perfect collusion

towards a structural model of the tourist experience an illustration from food experiences in tourism abstract the tourist experience has for a long time been one sidedly understood as either the peak experience or the consumer experience for a better understanding of the tourist experience this paper tries to build a conceptual model in which both dimension of the tourist experience are integrated as a structured and interrelated whole the position and role of each experiential component such as eating sleeping transportation and so on in tourism can be more clearly understood in terms of this model for an illustration of the model food experience in tourism is examined in detail it is demonstrated that food consumption in tourism can be either the peak touristic experience or the supporting consumer experience dependent upon specific circumstances

mediation and peace this article applies mechanism design to the study of international conflict resolution standard mechanisms in which an arbitrator can enforce her decisions are usually not feasible because disputants are sovereign entities nevertheless we find that this limitation is inconsequential despite only being capable of making unenforceable recommendations mediators can be equally effective as arbitrators by using recommendation strategies that do not reveal that one player is weak to a strong opponent a mediator can effectively circumvent the unenforceability constraint this is because these strategies make the strong player agree to recommendations that yield the same payoff as arbitration in expectation this result relies on the capability of mediators to collect confidential information from the disputants before making their recommendations simple protocols of unmediated communication cannot achieve the same level of ex ante welfare as they preclude confidentiality

the effects of minimum bargained wages on earnings evidence from spain abstract this paper provides an empirical evaluation of the effects of spanish sectoral collective bargaining on wages for this purpose we use a sample of workers for whom bargained wage rates and earnings are available using a variant of the meyer and wise approach we are able to estimate wage gains due to minimum bargained wages and their employment effects the most relevant conclusion is that there is evidence of a sword of justice effect by unions but this is limited by non compliance among unskilled workers and the non binding nature of bargained wages for skilled workers

the effects of minimum wages on employment theory and evidence from britain recent work on the economic effects of minimum wages has stressed that the standard economic model where increases in minimum wages depress employment is not supported by empirical work in some labor markets we present a general theoretical model whereby employers have some degree of monopsony power which allows minimum wages to have the conventional negative impact on employment but which also allows for a neutral or positive impact studying the industry based british wages councils between 1975 and 1992 we find that minimum wages significantly compress the distribution of earnings but do not have a negative impact on employment

equilibrium rejection of a mechanism we study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game by refusing to participate in the mechanism a player can revert to playing the default game non cooperatively we show with an example that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms which will be rejected on the equilibrium path in our construction a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the players this information causes the default game to be played under different beliefs and more importantly under different higher order beliefs than the interim ones we find a lower bound on all the implementable payoffs we use this bound to establish a condition on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are truthfully implementable without the need to induce rejection of the mechanism

comment on david neumark and william wascher employment effects of minimum and subminimum wages panel data on state minimum wage laws in their article published in the minimum wage research symposium in the october 1992 issue of this journal industrial and laborrelations review volume 45 number 1 pp 55 81 david neumark and william wascher claim to find empirical support for three propositions 1 a higher minimum wage leads to a lower teenage employmentpopulation rate 2 the effect of the minimum wage on employment can be seen within a year but becomes stronger after two years and 3 in states with legal subminimum wages a significant fraction of teenage employees are paid a subminimum wage and the availability of a subminimum wage blunts the disemployment effect of the minimum wage the same symposium contains three papers by us that present empirical evidence suggesting conclusions opposite those of neumark and wascher 1 since neumark and