toward natural implementation the authors identify some fundamental conditions that a natural mechanism should satisfy in exchange economies first they provide necessary and sufficient conditions for social choice correspondences to be implemented in nash equilibria by natural mechanisms second they show that the class of social choice correspondences implementable by price and two quantity mechanisms is equivalent to the class of social choice correspondences implementable by price and allocation mechanisms third the authors find that the no envy correspondence is implementable by a two quantity mechanism and the fair correspondence is implementable by a price quantity mechanism copyright 1996 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty we consider full implementation in complete information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty we offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies

implementation of nash bargaining solutions with non convexity abstract nash solutions for two player bargaining problems with non convexity are shown to be dictatorial selections of nash product maximizers in recent literature in this paper we show that these solutions are implementable as unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocations of a sequential game

dynamic implementation in two agent economies abstract the dynamic mechanisms that implement pareto efficient and individually rational allocations in standard public good economies suppose that agents communicate by exchanging as messages their marginal rates of substitution in some familiar models such as economies with non monotonic preferences marginal rates of substitution are not well defined or do not characterize preferences and therefore cannot play the role of communication messages we define a dynamic mechanism that implements pareto efficient and individually rational allocations in a general two agent economy

interest rate uncertainty and the optimal debt maturity structure as demonstrated by boyce and kalotay 1979 and brick and ravid 1985 the use of long term debt may be preferred because of tax related advantages brick and ravid show that if there exists a tax advantage to debt and nonstochastic interest rates long term debt will increase the present value of the tax benefits of debt if the term structure of interest rates adjusted for risk of default is increasing a decreasing term structure on the other hand calls for short term debt the present paper extends the tax induced argument of brick and ravid to allow for the presence of stochastic interest rates once interest rates are uncertain pricing even under risk neutrality becomes a complex issue we analyze the debt maturity decision under two competing pricing equations the return to maturity expectations hypothesis and the local expectations hypothesis this terminology is used in cox ingersoll and ross 1981 and campbell 1986 under uncertainty a debt capacity factor will create an additional incentive to issue long term debt our other results may be interpreted to indicate that if the term premium the difference between the implied forward interest rate and the future expected spot rate is positive sufficiently negative then long term short term debt maturity strategy is optimal

a simple auctioneerless mechanism with walrasian properties abstract a simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described in which no auctioneer is required outcomes are determined solely from traders actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium the mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the walrasian auctioneer both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path if individuals are price takers and if the number of individuals is large to approximately duplicate the auctioneer s performance even when individuals behave strategically each taking account of his own influence on prices

implementing just and efficient decision making in an economy with one public good one private good and quasi linear utilities we explore decision making mechanisms to non cooperatively implement an efficient outcome by auctioning the leadership role among agents one implements egalitarianism namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo a refinement of this mechanism so called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome it achieves egalitarianism above the vickrey clarke groves decision

undominated nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation abstract this article looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other if renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity then any pareto efficient social choice function can be implemented if there are at least three agents who play undominated nash equilibria the mechanism does not use modulo or integer games has no bad mixed strategy equilibria and is bounded journal of economic literature classification number d71

learning dynamics for mechanism design an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms in a repeated interaction public goods economy incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information oneshot game an experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations this provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations these predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice the simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested

are incentives against economic justice abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains but is not restricted to quasi linear preferences we analyze the manipulability of the generalized money rawlsian fair gmrf solutions i we show that the nash and strong nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each gmrf solution coincide with the no envy solution in equilibrium efficiency is preserved according to agents true preferences ii a corollary is that the gmrf solutions naturally implement the no envy solution in nash and strong nash equilibria

union management cooperation in the united states lessons from the 1920s this paper presents an analysis of several experiments in union management cooperation that took place during the 1920s the author examines the economic and social factors that influenced the form

efficiency and voluntary implementation in markets with repeated pairwise bargaining we examine a simple bargaining setting where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other we begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting we then study the allocations which can result in equilibrium when the matched buyers and sellers bargain through some extensive game form we take an implementation approach characterizing the possible allocation rules which result as the extensive game form is varied we are particularly concerned with the impact of making trade voluntary imposing individual rationality on and off the equilibrium path no buyer or seller consummates an agreement which leaves them worse off than the discounted expected value of their future rematching in the market finally we compare and contrast the efficient allocations with those that could ever arise as the equilibria of some voluntary negotiation procedure

surplus sharing with a two stage mechanism in this article we consider environments where agents jointly produce a private output good by contributing privately owned resources an efficient outcome may not be realized due to strategic behavior and conflicting interests of the agents we construct a two stage mechanism building on a varian mechanism the modified mechanism ensures an equilibrium for a large class of preferences and guarantees the feasibility of outcomes

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships in this paper we dealwith the probl em of incentive mechanism design which yields efficient allocations for general mixed ownership economies when preferences individual endowments and coalition patterns among individuals are unknown to the planner we do so by doubly implementing the proportional solution for economies with any number of private sector and public sector commodities and any number of individuals as well as the coexistence of privately and publicly owned firms with general convex production possibility sets furthermore the mechanisms work not only for three or more agents but also for two agent economies journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d61 d71 d82 2000 academic press

undominated nash implementation in bounded mechanisms we study implementation in undominated nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms an undominated nash equilibrium is a nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy a mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy we identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation these conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature for economic settings we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies

knightian analysis of the vickrey mechanism we analyze the vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences in this model the vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant strategy and we prove that all dominant strategy mechanisms are inadequate however we also prove that in undominated strategies the social welfare produced by the vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good but also essentially optimal

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution given a finite set of alternatives players alternate making offers player 1 offers some alternative that 2 can accept or veto if 2 accepts it is enforced and the game ends otherwise 2 makes a counteroffer among the remaining alternatives and so on if all alternatives are vetoed a disagreement alternative is enforced first we characterize the unique outcome of any subgame perfect equilibrium of this game then we show that this outcome converges to the area monotonic solution if the alternatives are uniformly distributed over the bargaining set and as the number of alternatives tends to infinity

implementation in undominated nash equilibria without integer games a mechanism which uses neither integer games nor modulo games is shown to implement any social choice function in a production economy with private and excludable public goods more precisely th

toward a structural account of union participation in management the case of western airlines in 1983 and 1984 four unions at western airlines agreed to wage cuts work rule changes two tier wage plans and other concessions in return for seats on the board of directors a health services program financial information sharing and an employee involvement program the author uses data from interviews conducted with all parties between 1983 and 1987 to argue that meaningful and lasting employee participation occurred only when the union had enough power to induce management to forgo some of its traditional prerogatives a structural factor the union and management shared a vision of how participation could serve both parties interests a cognitive factor and the union had substantial institutional security a second structural factor

manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism abstract given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities consider the n person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution any constrained equal income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d71

positive information from equity issue announcements abstract the myers and majluf 1984 model predicts a nonpositive price reaction to an announcement of a new issue of equity this paper shows that the myers and majluf result is a direct outcome of their assumption that all potential projects facing the firm have a nonnegative net present value refining the myers and majluf model by allowing for the realistic possibility of potential projects having negative net present values leads to different predictions the refined model predicts positive as well as negative stock price responses consistent with recent empirical evidence concerning the stock price effects of new stock issues

on the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences the paper reexamines the foundations of the axiomatic nash bargaining theory more specifically it questions the interpretation of the nash bargaining solution and extends it to a family of non expected utility preferences a bargaining problem is presented as x d 2 where x is a set of feasible agreements described in physical terms d is the disagreement event and 1 and 2 are preferences defined on the space of lotteries in which the prizes are the elements in x and d the ordinal nash bargaining solution is defined as an agreement y satisfying for all p e 0 1 and for all x e x if px 1 y then py 2 x and if px 2 y then py x where px is the lottery which gives x with probability p and d with probability 1 p revisions of the pareto symmetry and iia axioms characterize the ordinal nash bargaining solution in the expected utility case this definition is equivalent to that of the nash bargaining solution however this definition is to be preferred since it allows a statement of the nash bargaining solution in everyday language and makes possible its natural extension to a wider set of preferences it also reveals the logic behind some of the more interesting results of the nash bargaining solution such as the comparative statics of risk aversion and the connection between the nash bargaining solution and strategic models

debt financing under asymmetric information the authors analyze the optimal design of debt maturity coupon payments and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information they show that if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around long term cash flows firms finance with coupon bearing long term debt that partially restricts dividend payments if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near term cash flows and there exists considerable refinancing risk firms finance with coupon bearing long term debt that does not restrict dividend payments finally if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across dates firms finance with short term debt

the determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues we document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7 369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993 our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum this pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation but are screened out of the long term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution traditionally capital structure research has focused on how much of a firm s future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders instead of equityholders an equally important issue is when future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders a firm that finances its projects with short term debt risks serious financial difficulty if the debt cannot be extended similarly a firm that finances its activities with long term debt can sacrifice profits by needlessly risking mismanagement of resources after cash flows are returned from investments but before they are due to debtholders this study investigates the factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their liabilities we document the determinants of the maturity of 7 368 public debt issues made by u s corporations between 1982 and 1993 our empirical tests are based on existing theoretical models that relate the maturity of a firm s borrowings to the riskiness of its cash flows the time until investments pay off the quality of information held by outsiders the expected

beyond nash bargaining theory the nash set abstract we extend nash s bargaining theory to non convex and coalitional problems this paper investigates the implications of nash like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings the result is a characterization of the nash set of ntu games defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the nash product of their utilities subject to efficiency is critical the intersection of the nash set and the core is also characterized with the same axioms for the class of games where the core is non empty journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c78

relationships between concession bargaining and labor management cooperation in the last few years much attention has been focused on collective bargaining s adaptation to severe economic adversity the recent recession has prompted union negotiated concessions of unpreced

a nonparametric efficient public good decision mechanism undominated bayesian implementation abstract it is known that with incomplete information there are bayesian mechanisms that undertake public projects achieving ex post efficiency and budget balance however there are two shortcomings in these mechanisms first the mechanism designer is required to know the agents prior beliefs which is quite demanding second the mechanism may possess multiple equilibria including undesirable ones this paper presents a bayesian mechanism that is nonparametric in that the mechanism designer cannot incorporate any information other than that received from the agents moreover at all undominated bayesian equilibria of the mechanism the public project is undertaken efficiently and budget is balanced journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d78 d82

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing

subgame perfect implementation of bargaining solutions abstract this paper provides simple four stage game forms that fully implement a large class of two person bargaining solutions in subgame perfect equilibrium the solutions that can be implemented by our game forms are those that maximize a monotonic and quasi concave function of utilities after normalizing each agent s utility function so that the maximum utility is 1 and the utility of the disagreement outcome is 0 this class of solutions includes the nash kalai smorodinsky and relative utilitarian solutions the game forms have a structure of alternating offers and contain no integer device

nash demand game and the kalai smorodinsky solution we introduce two new variations on the nash demand game in one as in all past variants of nash demand games the nash bargaining solution is the equilibrium outcome the other demand game allows for probabilistic continuation in cases of infeasible joint demands specifically with probability 1 p the game terminates and the players receive their disagreement payoffs but with probability p the game continues to a second stage in which one of the two incompatible demands is randomly selected and implemented surprisingly the kalai smorodinsky solution is always the outcome of the most robust equilibrium of this game moreover ranking other solution concepts is impossible

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

characterizing natural implementability the fair and walrasian correspondences abstract we characterize natural implementability in exchange economies when a social choice correspondence possibly recommends a pareto efficient allocation where the common marginal rate of substitution is not determined uniquely we find that the no envy and efficient or fair correspondence cannot be implemented by any natural mechanism with a price and a quantity announcement but can be implemented by a natural mechanism with a price and two quantity announcement on the other hand the constrained walrasian correspondence can be implemented by a natural price quantity mechanism with budget balance journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d51 d63 d78

dominant strategy implementation in economic environments abstract we study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments we first show that in general environments strategy proofness and quasi strong non bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism we next prove that in weak separable environments strategy proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by jackson palfrey and srivastava jackson m o palfrey t r srivastava s 1994 undominated nash implementation in bounded mechanisms games econ behav 6 474 501 moreover we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium and which implements all strategy proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria

let s agree that all dictatorships are equally bad this paper shows that a minimal degree of consideration for other people s well being enables society to agree that one social policy is the best i offer axioms that imply that this best policy maximizes a weighted sum of individual utilities the weight of each individual is the inverse of his or her maximal possible utility from social endowments the suggested policy is not sensitive to the choice of the von neumann morgenstern utilities the key axiom is that individuals agree that giving all the endowments always to one person is as bad as giving them to any other person

bargaining and the value of money abstract search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on nash 1950 the bargaining problem econometrica 18 155 162 bargaining or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome to determine the terms of trade by considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a search model with divisible money we show that the properties of the bargaining solutions do matter both qualitatively and quantitatively for questions of first degree importance in monetary economics such as i the efficiency of monetary equilibrium ii the optimality of the friedman rule and iii the welfare cost of inflation

efficient repeated implementation this paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function scf with innitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of possibly history dependent mechanisms such that i its nash equilibrium set is non empty and ii every nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty we show with minor qualications that in the complete information environment an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if and only if it is ecient we also discuss several extensions of our analysis including constructions employing only nite mechanisms

fair allocation when players preferences are unknown suppose an arbitrator needs to allocate an asset among two players whose claims on the asset are incompatible the allocation outcome is said to be fair if the arbitrator awards an outcome that brings the same utility payoff to the two players whenever the two players claims are symmetric and the allocation set is symmetric in conjunction with other natural axioms this fairness requirement implies a unique allocation outcome for any claims problem we propose a mechanism which can be used by the arbitrator to implement this allocation outcome even when the players preferences are unknown to the arbitrator jel c78 d63 j52

robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions abstract most real life bargaining is resolved gradually during this process parties reach intermediate agreements these intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds we identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions the nash proportional and as a special case to the egalitarian solution and discrete raiffa solutions we show that the robustness of intermediate agreements plus additional well known and plausible axioms provide novel axiomatizations of the above mentioned solutions hence we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutions bargaining theories

sharing the cost of a public good an incentive constrained axiomatic approach we study the problem of provision and cost sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion complete or partial is possible we search for incentive constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good in the sense of a first order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged under suitable domain restrictions we give an explicit characterization of all incentive constrained efficient allocation rules we then show that there exists a unique incentive constrained efficient and demand monotonic allocation rule the so called serial rule in the binary public good case the serial rule is also the only incentive constrained efficient and population monotonic rule

collusive dominant strategy truthfulness abstract we show that collusion and wrong beliefs may cause a dramatic efficiency loss in the vickrey mechanism for auctioning a single good in limited supply we thus put forward a new mechanism guaranteeing efficiency in a very adversarial collusion model where the players can partition themselves into arbitrarily many coalitions exchange money with each other and perfectly coordinate their actions our mechanism bypasses classic impossibility results such as those of green and laffont and of schummer by providing the players with a richer set of strategies making it dominant for every coalition c to instruct each of its members to report truthfully not only his own valuation but also his belonging to c our mechanism is coalitionally rational which implies being individually rational for independent players

implementation in undominated strategies a look at bounded mechanisms this paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems it is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies an example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features in part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded this sort of tail chasing construction common in the constructive proofs of the literature is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium if such mechanisms are ruled out then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition called strategy resistence for social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy proofness this contrast suggests that this issue should be examined as it applies to other solution concepts used in implementation theory the last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to nash implementation and undominated nash implementation

implementing coordinated team play abstract this note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination the mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

implementing the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution the bargaining game is proposed where the agents bid fractions of dictatorship that are used by all non winners of the auction to threaten acceptance of the winner s proposal that procedure non cooperatively implements the kalai smorodinsky bargaining solution

on the relevance of debt maturity structure in this paper we present a tax induced framework to analyze debt maturity problems we show that under some modifications of the existing u s tax code debt maturity is irrelevant even in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs that yield an optimal capital structure if this restrictive structure is relaxed and assuming the miller 15 equilibrium does not prevail tax reasons would usually imply the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure if there exists a gain from leverage then an increasing term structure of interest rates adjusted for default risk results in long term debt being optimal a decreasing term structure under similar circumstances renders short term debt optimal in the absence of agency costs a miller 15 type result emerges at equilibrium and irrelevance prevails we also argue that agency costs could again reverse the irrelevance and imply a firm specific optimal debt maturity structure there has been extensive discussion in the literature concerning the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure kraus 13 states without proof that efficient capital markets preclude the existence of an optimal debt maturity stiglitz 20 demonstrates the irrelevance of debt maturity but in an economic environment in which the entire financing decision is irrelevant due to the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs in contrast morris 16 argues that the issuance of short term debt can reduce the risk to stockholders and thereby increase equity value if the covariance between the net operating income and future interest rates is positive this result by morris is obtained even in the absence of taxes and when there is no probability of default the discrepancy between morris and stiglitz arises because morris uses the bogue and roll 31 multiperiod capital asset pricing model to incorporate uncertain future interest rates which implicitly assumes that investors cannot diversify away intertem

the relation between risk and optimal debt maturity and the value of leverage this paper considers the capital structure and debt maturity choice for a value maximizing corporation in the model interest expense is tax deductible bankruptcy is costly and debt is fairly priced at issue in contrast to the results of kane marcus and mcdonald 1985 optimal debt maturity does not always approach zero in the absence of transaction costs and is increasing in the volatility of the assets of the firm the model predicts a positive association between the value of leverage and total risk in some circumstances

complexity and repeated implementation this paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an ecient social choice function when the agents preferences evolve randomly we show that the freedom to set dierent mechanisms at dierent histories can give the planner an additional leverage to deter undesirable behavior even if the mechanisms are restricted to be simple and nite specically we construct a history dependent sequence of simple mechanisms such that with minor qualications every pure subgame perfect equilibrium delivers the correct social choice at every history while every mixed equilibrium is strictly pareto dominated more importantly when faced with agents with a preference for less complex strategies at the margin the ecient social choice function can be repeatedly implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies our results demonstrate a positive role for complexity considerations in mechanism design

implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems abstract this note analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisms and the hypothesis of agents behavior considered in the nash equilibrium concept we analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations by employing two types of mechanisms the first mechanism is a now or never choice process that permits us to implement in undominated nash equilibria the set of all the stable allocations the second choice process is the classic algorithm in matching theory the gale shapley mechanism a reversal property is observed in such a mechanism when agents act strategically the use of a mechanism which selects the best solution for one side of the market in the absence of strategic behavior yields the best stable solution for the agents on the other side under dominance solvability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d78 j41

experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades the possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here the specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms the reason for this remains an open question

fair divisions as attracting nash equilibria of simple games abstract we give a mechanism fully implementing envy free divisions such that strategy spaces are symmetric the set of nash equilibria is a global attractor for the best reply dynamics as a byproduct undesired mixed strategy equilibria are weeded out by the adjustment process

the conditional auction mechanism for sharing a surplus a first bid auction to allocate the leadership role is used to choose a public decision and a balanced set of transfers the mechanism is shown to implement an equal sharing of the surplus above the average utility level at the equilibrium an agent s message reveals the other agent s utility when only two players are involved and the exact value of the joint surplus a variety of other contexts allow for the construction of similar auction like mechanisms displaying the same mirror image effect

the call sinking fund and term to maturity features of corporate bonds an empirical investigation do bond issuing firms attempt to choose the call sinking fund and term to maturity features of bonds to improve shareholder wealth this paper develops and tests two hypotheses about the determinants of bond features using a conditional logistic model the model is estimated on a sample of bonds issued between 1982 and 1986 model estimates show that a bond s call sinking fund and term to maturity features are statistically related to the issuing firm s retention ratio ratio of convertible to long term debt two year change in net operating income and whether the firm is listed on the nyse and included in the s p400 these findings support the view that firms financing highquality projects but facing information asymmetries choose shorter term medium term callable bonds with and without the sinking fund feature

convertible call policies an empirical analysis of an information signaling hypothesis abstract this paper tests an information signaling hypothesis as a potential explanation for corporate convertible bond call policies and for the negative share price reaction to the announcement of the calls we test this hypothesis by trying to ascertain whether the information signaled is realized our results show an unexpected decline in the firm s performance subsequent to the call we also find significant negative cumulative returns during a sixty month period following the calls

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

the optimal design of a market we study the optimal design of the rules of trade in a two period market given that agents arrive at different times and may only trade with agents present contemporaneously first period agents face a fixed cost of trading across periods given the non convexities associated with the fixed cost competitive trading rules can result in inefficiencies in such a market and anonymity must be sacrificed to achieve efficiency efficient trading rules have a market maker who is given a monopoly right to trade across periods who faces some competition within period trading but not across periods the efficient choice of who should be market maker can be made by auctioning rights to this position with uncertainty across periods efficient mechanisms may involve multiple market makers and the optimal number of market makers depends on the cost of trading level of risk aversion and presence of asymmetric information journal of economic literature classification numbers d40 d78 g10

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

implementation in minimax regret equilibrium this note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents we postulate the concept of minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are maskin monotonic and satisfy the no veto power condition are implementable in minimax regret equilibrium for all 0 1

on some recent results in incomplete information implementation this paper provides a review of some recent results on implementation in incomplete information environments this literature is concerned with characterizing the class of social choice functions that can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of appropriately constructed games different game forms normal and extensive forms and different equilibrium concepts nash equilibrium sequential equilibrium etc lead to different characterizations the discussion focuses on the key difficulties that arise in implementing social choice functions in incomplete information environments and describes some of the alternative characterizations