peer group formation in an adverse selection model this paper develops an adverse selection model where peer group systems are shown to trigger lower interest rates and remove credit rationing in the case where borrowers are uninformed about their potential partners and ex post state verification or auditing by banks is costly peer group formation reduces interest rates due to a collateral effect namely cross subsidisation amongst borrowers acts as collateral behind a loan by uncovering such a collateral effect this paper shows that peer group systems can be viewed as an effective risk pooling mechanism and thus enhance efficiency notjust in the full information set up a well known family of adverse selection models in the stiglitz and weiss 1981 tradition demonstrates that when banks are imperfectly informed about the riskiness of borrowers projects and therefore cannot discriminate against risky borrowers interest rates become inefficiently high and worthy borrowers are driven out of the credit market the extent of this problem is substantially magnified when borrowers do not have adequate collateral to secure a loan typically adverse selection combined with lack of collateral leads to prohibitively high interest rates poorly endowed individuals e g students immigrants the unemployed and a vast majority of poor individuals in developing countries often face such high rates and therefore cannot take advantage of profitable investment opportunities a peer group formation system represents a possible solution to the above problem under this system a bank lends to borrowers without collateral on condition that the borrowers organise themselves into groups and that participant borrowers within each group accept to take joint responsibility for a loan thus in addition to repaying their own share of the loan each group member must accept to repay the obligations of their defaulting peers otherwise the entire group is denied access to future refinancing systems of this kind have been very successful in practice they have generated lower interest rates for the rural poor in for example bangladesh the philippines bolivia and the state of arkansas in the united states moreover group lending has also been successfully implemented in large urban areas such in the cities of dhaka and chicago 1

group lending with endogenous group size this paper focuses on the size of the borrower group in group lending we show that when social ties in a community enhance borrowers incentives to exert eort a pro t maximizing nancier chooses a group of limited size borrowers that would be fundable under moral hazard but have insu cient social ties do not receive funding the result arises because there is a trade obetween raising pro ts through increased group size and providing incentives for borrowers with less social ties the result may explain why many micro lending institutions and rural credit cooperatives lend to groups of small size

the economic impact of social ties evidence from german reunification we use the fall of the berlin wall in 1989 to show that personal relationships which individuals maintain for noneconomic reasons can be an important determinant of regional economic growth we show that west german households who had social ties to east germany in 1989 experienced a persistent rise in their personal incomes after the fall of the berlin wall moreover the presence of these households significantly affects economic performance at the regional level it increases the returns to entrepreneurial activity the share of households who become entrepreneurs and the likelihood that firms based within a given west german region invest in east germany as a result west german regions that for idiosyncratic reasons have a high concentration of households with social ties to the east exhibit substantially higher growth in income per capita in the early 1990s a one standard deviation rise in the share of households with social ties to east germany in 1989 is associated with a 4 7 percentage point rise in income per capita over six years we interpret our findings as evidence of a causal link between social ties and regional economic

the supply and demand side impacts of credit market information abstract we utilize a unique pair of experiments to isolate the ways in which reductions in asymmetric information alter credit market outcomes a guatemalan microfinance lender gradually started using a credit bureau across its branches without letting borrowers know about it one year later we ran a large randomized credit information course that described the existence and workings of the bureau to the clients of this lender this pairing of natural and randomized experiments allows us to separately identify how new information enters on the supply and the demand sides of the market our results indicate that the credit bureau generated large efficiency gains for the lender and that these gains were augmented when borrowers understood the rules of the game the credit bureau rewarded good borrowers but penalized weaker ones increasing economic differentiation

information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace this paper examines the interaction of information provision product quality and pricing decisions by competitive firms to explore the following question in a competitive market where consumers face uncertainty about product quality and or their preference for quality which firms those that sell higher or lower quality products have the higher incentive to provide what type of information we find that while the higher quality firm should always provide information resolving consumer uncertainty on product quality the lower quality firm under certain conditions will have the higher incentive to and will be the one to provide information resolving consumer uncertainty about their quality preferences in the analysis we trace the latter result to competition and to free riding on the information provision specifically in a monopoly market or when consumer free riding is restricted by the costliness of store visits the lower quality firm would have a lower incentive to provide information resolving consumer preference uncertainty than otherwise the model is also adapted to examine product returns as a possible strategy of information provision

group lending repayment incentives and social collateral abstract in this paper we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment this type of scheme especially in the guise of the grameen bank in bangladesh has received increasing attention we set up and analyze the repayment game which group lending gives rise to our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates the positive effect is that successful group members may have an incentive to repay the loans of group members whose projects have yielded insufficient return to make repayment worthwhile the negative effect arises when the whole group defaults even when some members would have repaid under individual lending we also show how group lending may harness social collateral which serves to mitigate its negative effect

pricing frills and customer ratings this paper explores whether and how a firm should adapt its strategy in view of consumer use of prior customer ratings specifically we consider optimal pricing and whether the firm should offer an unexpected frill to early customers to enhance their product experiences we show that if price history is unobserved by consumers a forward looking firm should always modify its strategy from single period optimal one but it may be optimal to do so by lowering price by lowering price and offering frills or by raising price and offering frills depending on the market growth rate specifically the last strategy becomes optimal when market growth rate is high enough the results are similar when the price history is observed by consumers except that no deviation from single period profit maximization choices is optimal when market growth is low enough we also analyze whether the firm should prefer that the price information be stated in or left out of consumer reviews in addition in considering the effects of consumer heterogeneity we conclude that the optimal firm s effort to affect ratings is higher when the idiosyncratic part of consumer uncertainty is larger

you can t save alone commitment in rotating savings and credit associations in kenya abstract this article examines one reason why individuals develop and maintain local level financial savings organizations known as rotating savings and credit organizations or roscas economic theories suggest that individuals form roscas to finance the purchase of a lumpy durable good in response to intrahousehold conflict over savings or to provide themselves with insurance the article proposes an additional hypothesis for rosca participation saving requires discipline and some roscas may be formed to provide a collective mechanism for commitment in the presence of time inconsistent preferences data from 70 roscas located in western kenya indicate that the commitment hypothesis is plausible and broadly consistent with the design and patterns of participation in these roscas as many rosca participants put it you can t save alone

the microfinance promise in the past decade microfinance programs have demonstrated that it is possible to lend to low income households while maintaining high repayment rates even without requiring collateral the programs promise a revolution in approaches to alleviating poverty and spreading financial services and millions of poor households are served globally a growing body of economic theory demonstrates how new contractual forms offer a key to microfinance success particularly the use of group lending contracts with joint liability for the most part however high repayment rates have not translated into profits and studies of impacts on poverty yield a mixed picture in describing emerging tensions the paper highlights the diversity of innovative mechanisms beyond group lending contracts the measurement of financial sustainability the estimation of economic and social impacts the costs and benefits of subsidization and the potential to reduce poverty through savings programs rather than just credit the promise of microfinance has pushed far ahead of the evidence and an agenda is put forward for addressing critical empirical gaps and sharpening the terms of policy discussion

signaling quality with a money back guarantee the role of transaction costs direct marketing is witnessing explosive growth as consumers increasingly purchase products from their homes their ability to judge the quality of products they buy is significantly reduced in this paper we study how money back guarantees can signal product quality in such environments we interpret product quality broadly to mean both the level of attributes promised as well as the firm s consistency in delivering on those promises key aspects of our formulation are the explicit consideration of transaction costs and alternative signals of product quality transaction costs are the costs the seller or buyer faces when redeeming a money back guarantee we show that money back guarantees signal quality by exploiting the higher probability of returns for a lower quality product and the attendant higher transaction costs however if the seller s transaction costs are very large then there are less costly ways to signal namely charging a high price we compare the signaling performance of 1 price 2 price with uninformative advertising and 3 price with a money back guarantee whereas uninformative advertising does not work at all in our model under certain conditions a money back guarantee is necessary to signal and under other conditions a money back guarantee is a useful supplement to price

a theory for market growth or decline market growth is fundamental to marketing frank bass s seminal diffusion theory explains growth in new product markets we develop an analogous theory for established markets exhibiting sporadic growth or intermittent declines our theory suggests that market participants repeatedly take successful and unsuccessful actions that cause them to change or to mutate in myriad and often unpredictable ways the environment sorts these mutations determining winners and losers abundant mutations often cause different market participants to become winners displacing past winners abundant mutations also often cause market growth because the natural selection mechanism leaves more surviving favorable mutations so one nonobvious falsifiable implication of our theory is that displacement precedes growth and stability precedes decline another is that risk taking diversity of opinions and experimentation should precede growth we develop a metric for measuring displacement using multiple publicly available data sets one including sales for top firms for 55 years and another including sales for all automobile models for 25 years we find that our metric provides a practical way to measure the rate of mutation and confirm our theory s predictions our easily replicated tests show that our displacement metric can predict intermittent market growth or decline in very different contexts without the need for exogenous idiosyncratic explanations moreover other alternative covariates trends lagged growth new product entry macroeconomic indicators etc are unable to predict growth or decline

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

patterns of technological accumulation the comparative advantage and relative impact of asian emerging economies in low carbon energy technological systems abstract this paper highlights the specificities of the patterns of low carbon energy technological innovations in selected asian emerging economies china and the members of asean 4 thailand malaysia indonesia and the philippines are included in this analysis for their identical structure of developing economy we outline a synthetic framework to cluster together the technologies with similar characteristics and analyse the changes of these characteristics over time this is in order to elucidate the scope of sectoral composition and specialisation of the selected economies and thereby understand the relative impact of science based low carbon energy technologies on the niches of technological excellence the findings show that china was keen to pursue its diversification strategy and develop its capability in low carbon energy technologies since the turn of the millennium however china has been gradually losing its momentum in more traditional areas like biomass hydroelectric power natural gas and fossil fuels the asean 4 economies on the other hand are showing interest in building a number of niches of technological excellence this highlights a contrasting relative technological advantage between larger and smaller economies our findings also indicate that many of the low carbon technologies in selected economies have yet to attain strong scientific grounding for development the findings of this paper are expected to provide some insights into low carbon energy technological development of emerging economies and be useful for other developing economies to establish their strategic moves for energy technology development

market structure and borrower welfare in microfinance motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures considering a benevolent non profit lender a for profit monopolist and a competitive credit market to understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the mix market database our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non profit lending in addition for profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non profits

technological capabilities and industrialization abstract this paper reviews the implications for industrial strategy of recent research on technological capabilities at the firm and national levels after exploring the nature and determinants of microlevel technological development a simple framework for explaining the growth of national capabilities is set out based on the interplay of incentives capabilities and institutions each may suffer market failure and so require corrective intervention the experience of some industrializing countries is described to assess the validity of this framework it is concluded that interventions carefully and selectively applied are necessary for industrial success

learning tastes through social interaction abstract this paper offers an information based model of social interaction and analyzes optimal investment and pricing of services that facilitate interaction in a duopoly agents have uncertainty over their preferences but are aware that they are correlated with others so there exists an incentive to communicate with others in the population when a firm s good can be bundled with a coordination mechanism for its consumers its value is endogenously determined due to a consumption externality although this mechanism increases total surplus it is underprovided and consumer surplus decreases

facilitating fit revelation in the competitive market this study examines firms strategic decisions in the competitive market regarding whether to engage in marketing activities to assist consumers in finding the fit between their personal tastes and products horizontal attributes we find that competitive firms strategies to facilitate fit revelation critically depend on the product qualities they offer in particular a firm offering a high quality product is more likely to facilitate fit revelation in the competitive market than it would as a market monopolist whereas a firm offering a low quality product is less likely to do so in addition the firm offering the high quality product implements fit revealing activities in a greater intensity than its rival that offers the low quality product if the quality difference between the two products is small and both products qualities are sufficiently high

is grameen lending efficient repayment incentives and insurance in village economies many believe that a key innovation by the grameen bank is to encourage borrowers to help each other in hard times to analyse this we study a mechanism design problem where borrowers share information about each other but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts we derive a lending mechanism which efficiently induces mutual insurance it is necessary for borrowers to submit reports about each other to achieve efficiency such cross reporting increases the bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers and is robust to collusion against the bank copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

group credit a means to improve information transfer and loan repayment performance information asymmetries plague credit markets in developing countries leading to selective rationing and market segmentation with adverse income distributional consequences for small borrowers data collected from the finca group credit programme in costa rica were used to study the viability and cost effectiveness of group credit as a means to transmit information on borrower creditworthiness groups that screened members and used local information had lower delinquency rates than those that did not however less than half the groups had positive rates of economic return suggesting that group lending may improve information flow but is a cost sensitive institutional design

lessons from the kibbutz on the equality incentives trade off the first kibbutz was established southwest of the sea of galilee in 1910 but the vast majority of kibbutzim were established in the 1930s and 1940s shortly before the creation of the state of israel in 1948 founders aimed to create a new human being who cared about the group more than about himself a homo sociologicus who would challenge the selfish homo economicus this idealistic view can explain many of the key features of kibbutzim equal sharing in the distribution of income no private property a noncash economy communal dining halls where members ate their meals together high provision of local public goods for use by kibbutz members separate communal residences for children outside their parents homes which were supposed to free women from their traditional role in society and allow them to be treated equally with men collective education to instill socialist and zionist values communal production whereby kibbutz members worked inside their kibbutzim in agriculture or in one of the kibbutz plants and no use of hired labor from outside kibbutzim because hiring labor was considered exploitation under the reigning socialist ideology to an economist steeped in thinking about incentives that self interested individuals face there are three reasons why an equal sharing arrangement of this sort seems unlikely to last first high ability members have an incentive to exit equal sharing arrangements to earn a wage premium so called brain drain second low ability individuals have an incentive to enter equal sharing arrangements so that they can be subsidized by more able individuals so called adverse selection third in context of equal sharing shirking and free riding are likely to be prevalent however kibbutzim have survived successfully for the past century and currently consist of 120 000 members living in 268 kibbutzim in a number of ways the kibbutzim offer an exceptional environment to examine the potential trade off between equality and incentives

rural financial markets in low income countries recent controversies and lessons abstract recently some researchers have criticized traditional agricultural credit policies in low income countries this article identifies the major points of controversy between traditional views and these new views and also summarizes the primary lessons learned from these controversies savings mobilization more flexible interest rate policies less loan targeting and greater emphasis on improving the quality of financial services in rural areas are new views that are emphasized

reward programs and tacit collusion reward programs a promotional tool to develop customer loyalty offer incentives to consumers on the basis of cumulative purchases of a given product or service from a firm reward programs have become increasingly common in many industries the best known examples include frequent flier programs offered by airlines frequent guest programs offered by hotels and frequent shopper programs offered by supermarkets despite the widespread business practice of reward programs research efforts on reward programs particularly in marketing have been scarce our paper takes an important step towards understanding the design of reward programs and its implications on pricing strategies we study a market that consists of two segments heavy and light user segments the key distinction between the two segments is that the heavy user segment purchases in each period and thus is a candidate for the reward programs in contrast the light user segment exits the market after one purchase and is not in a position to exploit reward programs an important feature of our model is that we allow for different price sensitivity between heavy user and light user segments our model closely examines the type of rewards a reward worth a dollar to the consumer might have different cost implications for the offering firm depending on the type of reward for example cash rewards have higher unit reward cost inefficient reward for the firm than a free product of the firm such as an airline ticket or long distance minutes efficient reward specifically we examine an interesting puzzle observed in the marketplace several firms offer a cash reward or a product not made by the firm such as jackets electronic items etc these firms could offer their own product as rewards and significantly lower their cost we examine whether there is any reason for such a seemingly suboptimal practice our analysis shows that reward programs weaken price competition by offering the incentives for repeat purchases reward programs increase a firm s cost to attract competing firms current customers because firms gain less from undercutting their prices equilibrium prices go up moreover as consumers become unwilling to switch because of potential rewards the firm with a larger market share in the heavy user segment charges higher prices therefore a low price in the first period which leads to a larger market share in the heavy user segment will always be followed by a high price in the second period in our model consumers are rational and can correctly anticipate firms incentive to offer lower prices initially to enroll them into the reward programs our paper offers an explanation as to why the type and amount of reward may vary across the programs we identify two determining factors for the selection of rewards size and relative price sensitivity of the heavy user segment we find that in a market with a small heavy user segment that is also much more price sensitive than the light user segment it is optimal for firms to offer the most inefficient rewards the intuition is based on the firms incentive to exploit the price insensitive light user segment by offering inefficient rewards firms are able to commit to weaker competition and therefore higher prices when the heavy user segment is large or not very price sensitive when compared to the light user segment competing firms should adopt the most efficient rewards to maximize their profit this may well be the case in a number of real world situations in which efficient rewards are quite prevalent we also find that optimal reward amount has a negative relationship with unit reward cost because both firms use rewards to attract the heavy users they tend to offer more when they adopt the more efficient rewards finally our paper identifies the relationship between market characteristics and theimpact of reward programs on firms profits and consumers benefits we find that firms gain from the adoption of reward programs as long as light users are not too price sensitive when light users are very price sensitive firms engage in intense price competition thus benefiting little from the loyalty of heavy users created through rewards because reward programs increase market prices light users who do not get the reward earn strictly lower benefit in contrast heavy users often stand to gain more from the reward program in most cases firms and the heavy users are better off at the expense of light users

commercialization and the decline of joint liability microcredit abstract numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit and rise in individual liability lending but empirical evidence is lacking and there have been no rigorous analyses of possible causes we first show using the well known mix market dataset that there is evidence for a decline second we show theoretically that commercialization an increase in competition and a shift from non profit to for profit lending both of which are present in the data drives lenders to reduce their use of joint liability loan contracts third we test the model s key predictions and find support for them in the data

credit markets in northern nigeria credit as insurance in a rural economy this article addresses the issues of imcomplete markets and imperfect information in the context of credit markets in rural northern nigeria in much recent theoretical literature the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions in contrast it is found that in the four villages surveyed credit transactions take advantage of the free flow of information within rural communities information asymmetries between borrower and lender are unimportant and their institutional consequences the use of collateral and interlinked contracts are absent credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between households through the use of contracts in which the repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random production shocks by both the borrower and the lender

a new product growth for model consumer durables this article originally appeared in management science january 1969 volume 15 number 5 pp 215 227 published by the institute of management sciences a growth model for the timing of initial purchase of new products is developed and tested empirically against data for eleven consumer durables the basic assumption of the model is that the timing of a consumer s initial purchase is related to the number of previous buyers a behavioral rationale for the model is offered in terms of innovative and imitative behavior the model yields good predictions of the sales peak and the timing of the peak when applied to historical data a long range forecast is developed for the sales of color television sets

the role of targeted communication and contagion in product adoption the two main influences leading to adoption at the individual consumer level are marketing communication and interpersonal communication although evidence of the effect of these two influences is abundant at the market level there is a paucity of research documenting the simultaneous effect of both influences at the individual consumer level thus the primary objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by documenting the existence and magnitude of both influences at the individual customer level while controlling for unobserved temporal effects the pharmaceutical industry provides an appropriate context to study this problem it has been conjectured that adoption and usage patterns of a new drug by physicians contagion acts as a consumption externality as it allows a given physician to learn about the efficacy and use of the drug in addition pharmaceutical companies target individual physicians via marketing activities such as detailing sampling and direct to consumer adverti

enhancing capabilities through credit access creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information article i nfo creditworthiness and trustworthiness are almost synonyms because under asymmetric information the act of conferring a loan has the indirect effect of signaling the trustworthiness of the borrower we test the creditworthiness trustworthiness nexus in an investment game experiment on a sample of participants non participants in a microfinance program in argentina and find that trustors give significantly more to and believe they will receive more from microfinance borrowers the first and second order beliefs of trustees are also consistent with this picture our findings then show that mf participants appear more trustworthy and this may help microfinance to work a related consequence is that if and only if borrower s trustworthiness is not public information the mere loan provision acts as a reputation enhancing signal increasing the borrower s attractiveness as a business partner in such case we have a channel through which a private financial intermediary contributes to the provision of a public good like information thereby

the effect of social capital on group loan repayment evidence from field experiments an important question to microfinance is the relevance of existing social capital in target communities to the performance of group lending this research presents evidence from field experiments in south africa and armenia in which subjects participate in trust and microfinance games we present evidence that personal trust between group members and social homogeneity are more important to group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between members we also find some evidence of reciprocity those who have been helped by other group members in the past are more likely to contribute in the future during the past decade exploring the role that social capital plays in economic behaviour has emerged as one of the most fascinating and fertile areas of economic research although precise definitions of social capital are notoriously difficult to pin down one of the early pioneers of the concept coleman 1988 defines social capital as social structure that facilitates certain actions of actors within the structure in his definition coleman specifically highlights the roles of mutual obligation expectations and trustworthiness social norms social sanctions and the transmission of information important studies in both developed and developing countries have analysed the impact of social capital in economic relationships putnam s celebrated work making democracy work civic traditions in modern italy 1993 and bowling alone america s declining social capital 1995 brought attention to the role that social capital plays in the development of the modern state udry s ground breaking 1994 work in nigeria illustrated how the social capital existing in traditional societies may allow for more efficient credit contracts than in developed economies with weaker social

disciplining firms the impact of trade reforms on profit margins in indian industry the paper analyses the effects of increased trade exposure on the profitability of firms in indian industry while trade reforms are often expected to decrease profit margins as firms struggle to compete in international markets there is the possibility that increased competition may improve firm efficiency and provide a positive impetus to firm profitability this paper is different from many others in this area in that it considers both these possibilities an efficiency index is created to directly analyse the impact of changing efficiency levels on firm profit margins results indicate that liberalization significantly influenced profit margins however its main effect is through the impact that it has had on other firm variables market shares advertising r d and exports all of which changed after 1991 while exports have had a pro competitive effect on profit margins in the selected sample ad and r d both cause an increase in profit margins it is also found that neither capital nor manageri

introduction strategy for new products with positive and negative word of mouth existing innovation diffusion models assume that individual experience with the product is always communicated positively through word of mouth for certain innovations however this assumption is tenuous since communicators of the product experience may transfer favorable unfavorable or indifferent messages through word of mouth this paper examines a diffusion model for products in which negative information plays a dominant role discusses its implications for optimal advertising timing policy and presents an application to forecast attendance for the movie gandhi in the dallas area

repayment and exclusion in a microfinance experiment microfinance groups often engage in a variety of collective activities not directly related to credit we design a three stage repayment game to examine how the existence of these ancillary activities affect repayment behavior and group attrition in the first stage the group borrows under joint liability each member undertakes a risky project and decides whether or not to contribute to loan repayment in the second stage contributing members can vote to expel others from the group those remaining engage in a public goods game in the last stage the public good game represents the non credit collective activity that members can be involved in we identify repayment equilibria with and without exclusion and show that exclusionary equilibria are most likely when loans are large and there is significant within group heterogeneity in the gains from the public good results from a laboratory experiment that embodies the main features of the repayment game are consistent with the theoretical predictions individual decisions to contribute to loan repayment depend on gains from the public good and groups with the largest debt burdens have the highest rates of default and attrition

exports of manufactures by developing countries emerging patterns of trade and location developing countries are rapidly increasing their shares of manufactured trade not just in labour intensive products but also in capital and skill intensive ones their shares are rising particularly rapidly in the high technology area however manufactured exports remain highly concentrated in the developing world with a few countries dominating all forms of export within the successful exporting countries there are significant differences in the technology content of exports these trends are difficult to explain with received trade theory even taking human capital into account or with reference to broad economic policies it is useful to bring in learning along with scale economies increasing returns and agglomeration as determinants of comparative advantage these factors imply market failures and so a role for policy in developing genuine comparative advantages this article suggests that emerging trade and location patterns in the developing work are explained by market imperfections and government policies to overcome them

welfare economics of review information implications for the online selling platform owner abstract the review system is a core component of the online market as it provides user generated content to support consumer purchase decisions we investigate the welfare based effects of review information features i e the amounts of quality information and match information and the accuracy of quality information on the sellers and consumers and discuss their implications for the online selling platform owner we find that the amount of review information positively influences social welfare but quality information and match information play different roles in the process of welfare enhancement quality information reduces the sellers profits but significantly increases consumer welfare while match information benefits the sellers more than it hurts the consumers the inaccuracy of quality information negatively affects the welfare enhancement function of review information considering the sellers quality information manipulation we derive the conditions of inaccuracy information controlling and find that a higher manipulation cost coefficient eases the prisoner s dilemma for the sellers and increases consumer welfare we discuss the implications and also note some counterintuitive insights for review system management

an analysis of offer functions of banks and credit unions in guatemala economists have sought to identify institutions which might fill the gap in household access to credit arising from rationing by formal lenders credit unions have been identified as institutions which might use informational and monitoring advantages to fill that gap using information on household perceptions of their access to credit this article analyses the impact of certain credit unions on the access to credit of households in guatemala regression results indicate that credit unions serve markets unserved by formal lenders and that information on household perceptions of their access to credit is important in making inferences about lender lending activities

moral hazard and nonmarket institutions dysfunctional crowding out or peer monitoring the authors examine a situation in which insurance is characterized by moral hazard when market insurance is provided supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends unobservable to market insurers will occur when nonmarket insurers have no better information than market insurers the mutual assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore dysfunctional alternatively when nonmarket insurers can observe each other s effort perfectly mutual assistance is beneficial these results point to the potential importance of peer monitoring mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard copyright 1991 by american economic association

perspectives on the sources of heterogeneity in indian industry abstract this paper examines technical efficiency variation across four industrial sectors in india using a stochastic production frontier technique the results obtained are comparable to technical efficiency distribution patterns obtained in other countries heterogeneity in firm level efficiency is examined against internal firm level and external industry and location characteristics the results suggest that managerial effectiveness significantly influences efficiency and that there are considerable benefits deriving from location within established industrial clusters for particular industries the methodology and findings indicate that the study of industry specific technical efficiency patterns is a useful analytic tool for tracking firm response to ongoing liberalization

common pool resource appropriation under costly cooperation abstract in addition to the usual fixed costs we introduce variable costs in a community s effort to cooperate in extracting from a common pool resource using a standard supervision mechanism these variable costs are shown to be an increasing function of individual members incentives to default the model explains why we frequently observe communities that all cooperate and have relatively similar resource endowments and yet achieve very different levels of extraction

microfinance spillovers a model of competition in informal credit markets with an application to indian villages despite widespread interest in the development of microfinance spillover effects on the non using population and redistributive issues remain largely unexplored i study a competition game between microfinance institutions mfis offering joint liability loans and moneylenders offering individual loans in presence of adverse selection i show that one unintended consequence of the entry of a microfinance sector in local credit markets can be to trigger an increase in the equilibrium informal interest rate because mfis tend to attract a disproportionately safe share of the borrower pool away from incumbent moneylenders the existence of such composition externality depends crucially on the size of the microfinance sector and the risk composition of the borrower pool the model predicts a non linearly increasing relationship between informal interest rates and mfis capacity in relatively safe credit markets and no relationship in risky villages i show evidence supporting these predictions using a first hand panel database that records all credit transactions over 8 years for a sample of about 1000 households living in indian villages with extensive space and time variation in the size of their microfinance sector

social connections and group banking lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening monitoring and enforcement costs group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections using data from finca peru i exploit a quasi random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint liability loans individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members i e either living closer or being of a similar culture have higher repayment and higher savings furthermore i observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate after default and that through successful monitoring individuals know who to punish and who not to punish after default

third party product review and firm marketing strategy product reviews by third parties are growing in popularity this paper examines when and how a manufacturing firm should adapt its marketing strategies to such reviews for example should a firm receiving an unfavorable review reduce its price or adjust its advertising should a winning product of a product review e g editor s choice boost its advertising expenditure to spread the good news how should firms strategic responses to product reviews differ across different types of product reviews description vs recommendation and different advertising media the reviewer s publication vs other media we develop a theory to address these issues and derive firms optimal responses to product reviews under different product market review media conditions we show that firms should chooseadvertising rather thanprice as a strategic variable in response to product reviews when enough consumers value horizontal product attributes surprisingly we find that using a review endorsedadvertising format i e advertisements containing third party award logos to broadcast its victory can hurt the winning product of a product review also it is not necessarily wise for the winning products to boostadvertising expenditures to spread the good news data from two industries printers and running shoes are used to illustrate some of our findings

the changing pattern of foreign trade specialization in indian manufacturing this paper examines the pattern of international trade specialization in indian manufacturing since the mid 1980s by using data on trade flows low technology sectors still dominate the categories for which india exhibits the largest degree of trade specialization by contrast high technology sectors are prevalent among the categories for which india is import dependent significantly india has experienced an improvement in the degree of specialization in some of the most dynamic sectors of world trade

the rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations abstract this paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts earnings expectations mbe enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations further such a premium to mbe although somewhat smaller exists in the cases where mbe is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management the findings also indicate that the premium to mbe is a leading indicator of future performance this premium and its predictive ability are only marginally affected by whether the mbe is genuine or the result of earnings or expectations management

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

joint liability borrowing and suicide the case of japan abstract this paper develops a model for joint liability borrowings that facilitates credit market transactions ex ante but may induce the borrower s suicide ex post through the stigma associated with default a japanese suicide survey provides some supportive evidence

using repayment data to test across models of joint liability lending theories rationalising joint liability lending are rich in implications for repayment rates we exploit this fact to test four diverse models we show that the models repayment implications do not always coincide for example higher correlation of output and borrowers ability to act cooperatively can raise or lower repayment depending on the model data from thai borrowing groups suggest that repayment is affected negatively by the joint liability rate ceteris paribus and social ties and positively by the strength of local sanctions and correlated returns further the relative fit of the adverse selection versus informal sanctions models varies by region

optimal partial group liability in microfinance lending abstract this paper develops a model of group borrowing that incorporates partial group liability where borrowers are penalized if their group members default but are not held responsible for the entirety of the failed loan the model illustrates a trade off of group liability lending while higher levels of group liability increase within group risk sharing if liability is too high borrowers strategically default the model predicts the existence of an optimal partial liability that maximizes transfers between group members while avoiding strategic default consistent with this prediction loan officers from a large microfinance institution in southern mexico who rarely allow one group member to repay while the other defaults achieve substantially lower default rates than loan officers for whom the practice is commonplace or for those for whom it has never occurred structural estimation using repayment data suggests that while a partial liability below full liability may reduce default rates the incidence of strategic default is rare

group lending with sequential financing contingent renewal and social capital this paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of group lending in particular sequential financing and contingent renewal we examine the efficacy of these two schemes in harnessing social capital we find that for the appropriate parameter configurations there is homogenous group formation so that the lender can ascertain the identity of a group without lending to all its members thus screening out bad borrowers partially moreover under certain parameter configurations negative assortative matching occurs as a robust phenomenon

firm strategies in the mid tail of platform based retailing while millions of products are sold on its retail platform amazon com itself stocks and sells only a very small fraction of them most of these products are sold by third party sellers who pay amazon a fee for each unit sold empirical evidence clearly suggests that amazon tends to sell high demand products and leave long tail products for independent sellers to offer we investigate how a platform owner such as amazon facing ex ante demand uncertainty may strategically learn from these sellers early sales which of the mid tail products are worthwhile for its direct selling and which are best left for others to sell the platform owner s cherry picking of the successful products however gives an independent seller the incentive to mask any high demand by lowering his sales with a reduced service level unobserved by the platform owner we analyze this strategic interaction between a platform owner and an independent seller using a game theoretic model with two types of sellers one with high demand and one with low demand we show that it may not always be optimal for the platform owner to identify the seller s demand interestingly the platform owner may be worse off by retaining its option to sell the independent seller s product whereas both types of sellers may benefit from the platform owner s threat of entry the platform owner s entry option may reduce consumer surplus in the early period although it increases consumer surplus in the later period we also investigate how consumer reviews influence the market outcome

microfinance and dynamic incentives dynamic incentives where incentives to repay are generated by granting access to future loans is one of the methodologies used by microfinance institutions mfis in this paper i present a model of dynamic incentives where lenders are uncertain over how much borrowers value future loans loan terms are determined endogenously and loans become more favorable as the probability of default becomes lower i show that in all equilibria but one all borrowers default including the most patient ones i then compare equilibria with and without double dipping i show that when credit constrained borrowers have access to multiple loans equilibrium loan terms have to become more favorable to overcome increased gains from default if borrower s access to multiple loans is unforseen by lenders then the default rates go up in the short run finally if lenders use group loans it generates endogenous hyperbolic discounting even though the borrowers are exponential discounters

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations supported by the center for energy policy studies m i t and the japanese corporate associates program at the kennedy school of government

offshore pariahs small island economies tax havens and the re configuration of global finance the stock of wealth held offshore is estimated at us 6 trillion many small island economies sies host offshore finance centers and some sies are highly dependent upon offshore finance extreme examples have over 90 of government revenues derived from finance sector activities since 1998 a series of international initiatives have been launched to combat harmful tax practices money laundering and inadequate financial regulation these initiatives will transform the economies of many sies this paper explores the dependence of many sies upon offshore finance and the barriers to diversification arising from their smallness and unique political economies

the limits of equality insights from the israeli kibbutz what limits the capacity of society to redistribute what determines the structure of compensation in organizations striving for income equality this paper addresses these questions by investigating the economic and sociological forces underlying the persistence of the israeli kibbutzim communities based on the principle of income equality to do this i exploit newly assembled data on kibbutzim and a financial crisis in the late 1980s that affected them differentially the main findings are that 1 productive individuals are the most likely to exit and a kibbutz s wealth serves as a lock in device that increases the value of staying 2 higher wealth reduces exit and supports a high degree of income equality and 3 ideology facilitates income equality using a simple model i show that these findings are consistent with a view of the kibbutz as providing optimal insurance when members have the option of leaving more generally these findings contribute to an understanding of how mobility limits redistribution and to an understanding of the determinants of the sharing rule in other types of organizations such as professional partnerships cooperatives and labor managed firms

here today gone tomorrow can dynamic incentives make microfinance more flexible this paper presents a model of microfinance lending to individuals that uses dynamic incentives in the form of access to additional loans to discourage borrowers from strategic default or the unwillingness to repay a loan once a positive outcome is realized we propose an improvement on contracts currently used by microfinance institutions mfis by endogenizing the default penalty while constraining the mfi to maintain sustainable lending operations furthermore accounting for the risks that the poor face by including a negative economic shock we show that under certain circumstances the punishment for default need not be a lifetime without loans

policies and impact an analysis of village level microfinance institutions this paper uses variation in policies and institutional characteristics to evaluate the impacts of village level microfinance institutions in rural thailand to identify impacts we use policies related to the successful unsuccessful provision of services as exogenous variation in effective financial intermediation we find that institutions particularly those with good policies can promote asset growth consumption smoothing and occupational mobility and can decrease moneylender reliance specifically cash lending institutions production credit groups and especially women s groups are successful in providing intermediation and its benefits to members while buffalo banks and rice banks are not the policies identified as important to intermediation and benefits the provision of savings services especially pledged savings accounts emergency services and training and advice surprisingly much publicized policies such as joint liability default consequences or repayment frequency had no measured impacts jel 012 016

group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral abstract we construct a dynamic model of self enforcing insurance provision and lending to a community of borrowers who are connected by risk sharing arrangements that are themselves subject to enforcement problems as in kocherlakota 1996 we show that an outside lender offering constant consumption contracts can earn a higher profit if he conditions his repeated interactions with each borrower on the history of his interactions with all the group members a joint liability contract rather than on his history with that borrower only individual liability contracts this result holds even in the absence of informational asymmetries the observation driving it is that with individual liability contracts a joint welfare maximizing group may prefer to have one or more group members default on their contracts so that the group can consume a mix of outside funds and the defaulters stochastic income one contribution of our work is to give precise economic content to the concept of social collateral as the per agent surplus from group risk sharing over autarky the group can deter its members from defaulting on their contracts with the principal by threatening to reduce that surplus

response to competitive entry a rationale for delayed defensive reaction empirical studies examining responses to new product entries come to the puzzling conclusion that in general an incumbent reacts to a new entrant after a significant delay even easy to implement price cuts are observed after significant lag following entry these findings seem to contradict the existing literature that either implicitly assumes or strongly advocates immediate defensive responses to limit competitive encroachment when a competing firm enters the market consumers may be uncertain about the entering firm s product quality the incumbent firm through rigorous tests may fully know the entrant s quality suppose the incumbent aggressively lowers price this may cause the consumers to wonder if indeed the entrant s quality is high in other words an incumbent s reaction may cause the consumers to make inferences about the entrant s quality such strategic implications of the incumbent s reactions have to be carefully analyzed before determining the optimal response by the incumbent in this paper we propose a conceptual framework for understanding differences in the magnitude and timing of incumbents responses to competitive entries we consider a model in which a monopolist incumbent firm faces competitive entry the incumbent firm knows the true quality of the entrant with certainty although consumers are aware of the incumbent s product quality through their prior experience they are initially uncertain of the entrant s product quality in such a situation a high quality entrant has the incentive to signal her true quality through her strategic price choice however the uncertainty about the entrant s quality is favorable to the incumbent in the sense that consumers believe with a high probability that the entrant s quality is low as a result the strategic incentives facing the incumbent and the entrant oppose each other while the entrant wants to signal her high quality the incumbent wants to prevent her from doing so we demonstrate that one way the incumbent can prevent the quality signaling is to select a higher than his optimal competitive duopoly price in other words the incumbent can prevent or jam the entrant s quality signaling by choosing a price higher than his optimal competitive price when consumers are fully informed about the entrant s true quality though the signal jamming price is lower than the monopoly price the price is substantially higher than the competitive price this marginal reduction in the incumbent s price from the pre entry monopolistic price represents a muted or lack of response by the incumbent to the competitive entry however once the entrant s quality gets revealed in subsequent periods through consumer usage and word of mouth the entrant has no incentive to engage in quality signaling and the incumbent has no incentive to jam it therefore the market reverts to the complete information competitive prices and the incumbent lowers his price considerably this temporal pattern of muted price reduction in the first period followed by a sharp price reduction in the second period corresponds to a delayed defensive reaction in our model although the empirical studies suggest that the delayed reaction may arise due to factors such as managerial inertia or indecision we demonstrate that such a behavior is indeed an optimal strategy for a profit maximizing firm thus our model reconciles empirical results with the equilibrium outcome of a strategic analytical framework furthermore in an experimental setting we test the predictive power of our framework and establish that consumers indeed form conjectures about the entrant s quality based on the incumbent s reactions in the first experimental study we find strong support for the notion that the incumbent s price reaction may indicate entrant s quality in a follow up study we observe that whenever the incumbent lowers prices respondents judge the quality of the entrant to be higher as compared to the case when prices are the same or increased the managerial implication of this paper is that well established incumbent firms should be cautious in the implementation of their defensive responses to product introductions of uncertain quality by competitors of particular concern are situations where the reactions are easily observable by consumers a strong reaction may suggest that the incumbent takes the competitive threat seriously leading consumers to believe in the quality of the competitor s product

group lending sequential financing lender monitoring and joint liability abstract we develop a simple model of group lending based on peer monitoring and moral hazard we find that in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring group lending schemes may involve under monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects moreover under certain parameter configurations group lending schemes involving either sequential financing or a combination of lender monitoring and joint liability are feasible in fact group lending schemes with sequential financing may succeed even in the absence of joint liability though the repayment rate will be lower in the absence of joint liability however group lending with lender monitoring is unlikely to be feasible

can social cohesion be harnessed to repair market failures evidence from group lending in guatemala the success of group lending in developing countries has been attributed to the ability of the institution to mitigate asymmetric information problems in credit markets previous research has offered a number of explanations for this phenomenon social ties between borrowing group members internal group pressure to repay loans and peer monitoring this research presents empirical tests on borrowing group data from guatemala which indicate that peer monitoring significantly effects borrowing group performance through stimulating intra group insurance group pressure is found to have a small effect in deterring moral hazard while the effect of social ties among members is statistically insignificant

micro credit in chiapas mexico poverty reduction through group lending micro credit mc programs lend money to poor borrowers using innovative mechanisms such as group lending under joint liability while successfully accounting for the presence of asymmetric information in underdeveloped financial markets mc programs have achieved what the conventional financial institutions and the government have not been able to lend to the poor impressive loan recuperation and a positive impact in poverty reduction this article analyzes the performance of alsol an mc program in chiapas mexico for 2151 participants in urban and rural areas for the time period between july 2000 and july 2001 while loan recuperation is high 95 administrative costs also remain high socially responsible lenders and donors play a key role in providing continuous funding to mc programs and assisting in reducing the level of poverty

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

group lending with adverse selection abstract we focus on adverse selection as a foundation of group lending in a simple static model we show that there is no collateral effect if borrowers do not know each other if the borrowers know each other group lending implements efficient lending however it is not robust to collusive behavior when transfers are allowed between colluding partners finally we characterize the optimal collusion proof group contract

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

networks in economic development this chapter surveys the implications of some studies in network economics research for economic development we focus on information flow and risk sharing two topics where work in theory empirics and policy analysis have been especially intensive and complementary in analysing information we distinguish models of information diffusion and aggregation highlight how different models imply very different guidance regarding the right way to seed information in discussing risk sharing we look at the key frictions that impede efficient informal insurance and some potential unintended consequences when policymakers intervene to help throughout we stress practical insights that can be used with limited measurement of the details of networks

repayment performance in group based credit programs in bangladesh an empirical analysis abstract this paper analyzes the repayment rates of 128 credit groups belonging to three group based credit programs in bangladesh the association for social advancement asa the bangladesh rural advancement committee brac and the rangpur dinajpur rural service rdrs using tobit analysis specific tests are performed on the following hypothesized determinants group size size of loans degree of loan rationing enterprise mix within groups demographic characteristics social ties and status and occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks the paper concludes that if basic principles of prudential banking are adhered to repayment rates can be good even in poor and remote communities the important thing for financial institutions is to tailor services such that it becomes worthwhile for the poor to establish a profitable long term association in addition more freedom to members in the process of group formation is recommended

add on pricing by asymmetric firms this paper uses an analytical model to examine the consequences of add on pricing when firms are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and there is a segment of boundedly rational consumers who are unaware of the add on fees at the time of initial purchase we find that consumers who know the add on fees can be penalized and increasingly so by the existence of boundedly rational consumers our consideration of quality asymmetries on base goods and add ons plus the inclusion of boundedly rational consumers leads to several novel findings regarding firm profits when quality asymmetry is on base goods only and with boundedly rational consumers add on pricing can diminish profit for a qualitatively superior firm and increase profit for an inferior firm i e a lose win result compared to when add on pricing is prohibited or infeasible when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and without boundedly rational consumers the opposite win lose result prevails when quality asymmetries exist on both base goods and add ons and with boundedly rational consumers the result can be win win win lose or lose win depending on the magnitude of quality differentiation on add ons this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

liability structure in small scale finance evidence from a natural experiment microfinance the provision of small individual and business loans has witnessed dramatic growth reaching over 150 million borrowers worldwide much of its success has been attributed to overcoming the challenges of information asymmetries in uncollateralized lending yet very little is known about the optimal contract structure of such loans there is substantial variation across lenders even within a particular setting this paper exploits a plausibly exogenous change in the liability structure offered by a microfinance program in india which shifted from individual to group liability lending the analysis finds compelling evidence that contract structure matters for the same borrower required monthly loan installments are 6 percent less likely to be missed under the group liability setting relative to individual liability in addition compulsory savings deposits are 19 percent less likely to be missed under group liability contracts

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory this article presents evidence of the failure of government intervention in rural credit markets of ldcs in the past three decades it then shows how lessons for policy analysis can be drawn from modern theory particularly those theories focussing on credit rationing in competitive markets and interlinking of credit contracts with labor and land contracts the article outlines the policy implications of these theories and finds them insufficient to account for the empirical evidence it contends that a more systematic and rigorous analysis of institutions and institutional environments is essential for understanding and implementing effective policy reforms of rural credit markets it presents suggestions for undertaking such an analysis

migrants ancestors and foreign investments we use 130 years of data on historical migrations to the u s to show a causal effect of the ancestry composition of u s counties on foreign direct investment fdi sent and received by local firms to isolate the causal effect of ancestry on fdi we build a simple reduced form model of migrations migrations from a foreign country to a u s county at a given time depend on 1 a push factor causing emigration from that foreign country to the entire u s and 2 a pull factor causing immigration from all origins into that u s county the interaction between time series variation in origin specific push factors and destination specific pull factors generates quasi random variation in the allocation of migrants across u s counties we find that doubling the number of residents with ancestry from a given foreign country relative to the mean increases the probability that at least one local firm engages in fdi with that country by 4 percentage points we present evidence that this effect is primarily driven by a reduction in information frictions and not by better contract enforcement taste similarities or a convergence in factor endowments

screening by the company you keep joint liability lending and the peer selection effect we look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other s projects that lenders do not we show that joint liability lending contracts similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group lending schemes will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information this can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable

microcredit social capital and common pool resources abstract the paper presents a conceptual scheme for understanding the impact of microcredit small loans to poor borrowers on common pool resources impacts on common pool resources are posited to occur through changes in household production and consumption the focus on women and the social capital created from group training decision making and risk bearing with the group lending techniques characteristic of many microcredit programs enhanced human and social capital can improve environmental outcomes a nonrandom survey of microfinance organizations suggests increased environmental awareness and potential cpr stewardship through microcredit but empirical research is needed to demonstrate actual impacts

the economics of consanguineous marriages the institution of consanguineous marriage a marriage contracted between close biological relatives has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world this paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom when marriage contracts are incomplete dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage when these transactions are costly however consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost the paper s model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions it also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity an empirical analysis using data from bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model

india s manufactured exports comparative structure and prospects abstract the technological structure of export matters for their growth learning and path dependence mean that structures are difficult to change as technologies evolve trade liberalization per se is insufficient countries need to upgrade domestic skill and technology and attract sophisticated foreign direct investment fdi to dynamise their export structures a comparative analysis of indian manufactured exports suggests that their structure and positioning are not suited to sustained growth the base for rapid structural change through fdi or domestic capabilities is weak the current export slowdown in india reflects external conditions and may end soon however this does not assure rapid future growth

social capital formation and credit access evidence from sri lanka summary while previous studies evaluate the impact of social capital on development outcomes there are very few empirical studies on determinants of social capital formation we use unique long panel data from sri lanka to examine the mechanism of social capital formation in an imperfect credit market we show that households facing credit constraints reduce investments in social capital furthermore temporal declines in investment persistently reduce general trust trust in villagers and trust in business partners while previous studies argue that social capital improves access to informal credit we show the reverse causality combining these findings suggests a potential poverty trap

a matter of relational style loan officer consistency and exchange continuity in microfinance social scientists have long considered what mechanisms underlie repeated exchange three mechanisms have garnered the majority of this attention formal contracts relational contracts and relationally embedded social ties although each mechanism has its virtues all three exhibit a common limitation an inability to fully explain the continuation and stability of intertemporal exchange between individuals and organizations in the face of change drawing on extensive quantitative data on approximately 450 000 microfinance loans made by a microfinance institution in mexico from 2004 to 2008 that include random assignment of loan officers this research proposes the concept of relational styles to help explain how repeated exchange is possible in the face of personnel change we define relational styles as systematically reoccurring patterns of interaction employed by social actors within and across exchange relationships in this paper between microfinance clients and loan officers we show that relati

the benefits and costs of microfinance evidence from bangladesh abstract using the latest developments from the evaluation literature namely the technique of matching this paper shows a positive but lower than previously thought effect of microfinance on expenditure per capita supply of labour and level of school enrolment for boys and girls for instance participants spend 3 per cent more on average than non participants in control villages this paper also takes into account repayment delays to calculate the cost of credit provision it shows how a better investigation at the individual level of the benefits brought and the cost borne could help microfinance institutions to better select their customers jel classification c14 d10 g21 i38 o12 o16