the profits of foreign firms in a less developed country ghana abstract using a proxy for the rate of profit this study does not confirm for ghana 1970 the hypothesis that foreign firms make excessive profits as compared with other ownership groups of firms instead the general tendency of the data is to rank the rates of profit for mixed private local foreign and private local firms higher than those of wholly foreign mixed state foreign and wholly state owned firms explanations of these observations in terms of transfer pricing through imports and differential cost reduction incentives available to the firms are attempted

do norms on contribution behavior affect intrinsic motivation field experimental evidence from germany abstract this paper studies how imposing norms on contribution behavior affects individuals intrinsic motivation we consider the church levy which the catholic church in germany collects as a charitable donation despite the fact that the levy is legally a tax we design a randomized field experiment with treatments informing individuals that the levy is a tax we demonstrate that treatment effects differ across motivational types among weakly intrinsically motivated individuals communicating the legal norm results in a significant crowd out of intrinsic motivation in contrast strongly intrinsically motivated individuals do not show any treatment response

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

what policies increase prosocial behavior an experiment with referees at the journal of public economics the peer review process familiar to all academic researchers offers a classic example of the positive externalities from prosocial behavior the reviewer bears the costs from submitting a high quality referee report quickly while the gains to the authors of the paper and to society from the knowledge produced are potentially large we evaluate the impacts of economic and social incentives on peer review using an experiment with 1 500 referees at the journal of public economics the specific aim of the experiment is to understand how to improve the speed and quality of peer review an issue of particular importance to the economics profession given the slowdown of the publishing process ellison 2002 our broader objective is to evaluate commonly used methods of increasing prosocial behavior and to test the predictions of competing theories in our experiment we randomly assign referees to four groups a control group with a six week 45 day deadline to submit a referee report a group with a four week 28 day deadline a cash incentive group rewarded with 100 for meeting a four week deadline and a social incentive group in which referees were told that their turnaround times would be publicly posted the experiment yields four sets of results first shortening the deadline from six weeks to four weeks reduces median review times from 48 days to 36 days because missing the deadline has no direct

white collar crime writ small a case study of bagels donuts and the honor system for more than a decade an mit trained economist has meticulously recorded the results of nearly 75 000 deliveries of bagels and donuts to corporate offices these bagels and donuts are left in workplaces in the morning along with a list of prices and a lockbox office workers purchase the products on the honor system later that day the uneaten goods and the lock box are collected and the relevant data for each office are recorded in a spreadsheet these data provide a unique opportunity for understanding the extent to which individuals behave honestly in this setting and the factors that influence the level of honesty an analysis of the discrepancy between the prices of the goods consumed and the actual payments deposited in the lock box yields a number of insights first the base payment rate is quite high on average payments represent almost 90 percent of the posted price in a model of pure self interest one would expect very low payment rates because there would seem to be many opportunities for individuals to take the products with almost no chance of their nonpayment being detected moderating the tendency to take the products without paying is the fact that low payment rates will increase the probability the delivery company stops serving the company paying for one s bagels and donuts viewed in this light is a public good for other office workers thus one might expect a strong negative relationship between office size and payment rates which is not present in the data rather the data appear more consistent with a model in which there are internal nonpecuniary costs associated with stealing the bagels and donuts i e people overwhelmingly pay for the products because it would be wrong not to do so the observed payment rates are systematically related to a variety of observable factors for instance payment rates fall in response to increases in the posted price this is consistent with the increase in financial costs pushing some marginal consumers to be willing to sustain the moral cost associated with not stealing the goods or paying less than full price payment rates are higher when many of the bagels and donuts go uneaten suggesting that the marginal consumer pays a lower share of the posted price than the inframarginal consumer purchasers of donuts appear to be more likely to pay less than the full price there is a sharp and persistent increase in the payment rate following the september 11 terrorist attacks

an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection this article presents an econometric analysis of income tax evasion and its detection based on individual level data drawn from the internal revenue service 1982 and 1985 taxpayer compliance measurement programs i specify a model consisting of two equations the first measures the extent of evasion the second the fraction of evasion detected the empirical analysis explores the effects of income the marginal tax rate and various socioeconomic characteristics on filer evasion behavior and it assesses the variability in detection rates among irs examiners finally i use the empirical estimates to construct new estimates of the income tax gap the new estimates are very close to the previous irs estimates

the labor market return to academic fraud abstract academic fraud by undergraduate students is pervasive but should it be taken seriously as an economic problem our research suggests so using a unique data set from the caucasus we estimate a large positive effect of academic fraud on the probability of employment econometrically we deal with endogenous selection into academic fraud and possible measurement error in the reporting of academic fraud using partial identification techniques the findings demonstrate that incentives to commit academic fraud are strong and point towards the potentially damaging consequences of academic fraud in broader settings

can indifference make the world greener we test whether people s tendency to stick with the default option can help save resources in a natural field experiment we switch printers default settings from simplex to duplex printing at a large swedish university the results confirm that roughly one third of all printing is determined by the default alternative and hence daily paper consumption drops by 15 percent due to the change the effect is immediate lasts throughout the experimental period and remains intact after six months we also investigate how the more conventional method of encouraging people to save resources performs and find it has no impact recent theoretical and empirical contributions indicate that the default effect works through recommendation depends positively on the number of alternatives in the choice set and is reinforced for difficult decisions we demonstrate that the default option matter in a simple non dynamic decision task with only two alternatives and where people have been explicitly informed about the recommended course of action

honest on mondays honesty and the temporal separation between decisions and payoffs abstract we show that temporally distancing the decision task from the payment of the reward increases honest behavior each of 427 israeli soldiers fulfilling their mandatory military service rolled a six sided die in private and reported the outcome to the unit s cadet coordinator for every point reported the soldier received an additional half hour early release from the army base on thursday afternoon soldiers who participated on sunday the first work day of the week are significantly more honest than those who participated later in the week we derive practical implications for eliciting honesty

taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit evidence from a controlled experiment in minnesota abstract in 1995 a group of 1724 randomly selected minnesota taxpayers was informed by letter that the returns they were about to file would be closely examined compared to a control group that did not receive this letter low and middle income taxpayers in the treatment group on average increased tax payments compared to the previous year which we interpret as indicating the presence of noncompliance the effect was much stronger for those with more opportunity to evade in fact the difference in differences is not statistically significant for those who do not have self employment or farm income and do not pay estimated tax surprisingly however the reported tax liability of the high income treatment group fell sharply relative to the control group

why can modern governments tax so much an agency model of firms as fiscal intermediaries we develop an agency model explaining why third party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful while third party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion we embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development showing that the tax take evolves as an s shape driven by changes in third party information we show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development

the success and failure of dependency theory the experience of ghana dependency theory is a set of ideas with a strong potential for influencing policy actions in the third world originally developed during the late 1960s to explain the problems of development in latin america by scholars working in that region the theory has attracted a great deal of attention both in the literature and in third world countries though the logical consistency and empirical validity of the theory have been questioned evidence about the influence of dependency theory on the economic policies of specific countries has been scant in this article i provide some such evidence i also evaluate the potential for devising viable economic policies within the theory

stackelberg versus cournot equilibrium we reconsider stackelberg s classical critique of the cournot duopoly in the framework of endogenous timing for two player games for quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions directly on the demand and cost functions yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play while our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions no extraneous assumptions such as concavity existence or uniqueness of equilibria are needed and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games classification numbers b21 c72 d43 l13 c 1999 academic press

honesty on the streets a field study on newspaper purchasing many publishers use an honor system for selling newspapers in the street we conducted a field experiment to study honesty in this market finding that a moral reminder increases the level of honesty in payments whereas the same message has no effect on whether one is honest reminding customers of the legal norm has no effect we argue that these results are consistent with a preference for honesty based on an internalized social norm auxiliary evidence suggests that the moral message remains effective when it is posted for longer periods and even when it is removed again authors abstract

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

why do people keep their promises an experimental test of two explanations numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games this paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect the first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word the second assumes that people dislike letting down others payoff expectations according to the latter account promises affect behavior only indirectly because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others i conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations the results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations this suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se

leadership games with convex strategy sets a basic model of commitment is to convert a two player game in strategic form to a leadership game with the same payoffs where one player the leader commits to a strategy to which the second player always chooses a best reply this paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets we apply them to mixed extensions of finite games which we analyze completely including nongeneric games the main result is that leadership is advantageous in the sense that as a set the leader s payoffs in equilibrium are at least as high as his nash and correlated equilibrium payoffs in the simultaneous game we also consider leadership games with three or more players where most conclusions no longer hold

bunching at the kink implications for spending responses to health insurance contracts abstract a large literature in empirical public finance relies on bunching to identify a behavioral response to non linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually we conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in medicare part d where a kink in the individual s budget set generates substantial bunching in annual drug expenditure around the famous donut hole we show that different alternative economic models can match the basic bunching pattern but have very different quantitative implications for the counterfactual spending response to alternative insurance contracts these findings illustrate the importance of modeling choices in mapping a compelling reduced form pattern into an economic object of interest

page limits on economics articles evidence from two journals abstract over the past four decades the median length of the papers published in the top five economic journals has grown by nearly 300 percent we study the effects of a page limit policy introd

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

foreign ownership market structure and industrial performance brazil s electrical industry abstract using an industrial organization approach this article tests the hypothesis that the ownership of firms exerts an independent influence on industrial performance we compare the behavior of foreign and domestic firms in brazil s electrical industry in four areas the association of firms with particular types of domestic market structures their technology their trade conduct and their profitability regression analysis shows that tncs tend to produce in tightly organized differentiated oligopolies they generally employ a more capital intensive technology they import more per unit of sales but do not necessarily export more finally reported earnings of tncs are found not to be any higher than domestic firms but reported profits of all firms are positively related to the level of industrial concentration and product differentiation markets which tend to be the domain of tncs rather than domestic enterprises it is concluded that ownership is a strong variable of market structure in brazil s electrical industry and that the systematic effect of foreign ownership on industrial performance is not always helpful in attaining development objectives

tax me if you can an artifactual field experiment on dishonesty in this paper we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die under cup paradigm participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and thus have an incentive to over report we find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act in addition we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty we find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes these results warn policy makers about the non trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty

dependence on foreign investment and economic growth in the third world estimates of the extent to which third world countries have experienced slower rates of growth than those in the industrialized west since i960 indicate a weak relation between initial wealth and subsequent economic growth that follows an inverted u shape pattern while the lowest growth rates are found among the poorest countries of the third world the highest growth rates are found not in the industrialized west but in the wealthiest third world countries drawing on contending arguments associated with modernization and dependency perspectives the relationship between foreign investment and growth within the third world is examined results undermine the idea that foreign investment inhibits growth suggesting instead that flows of foreign investment may facilitate growth especially among the initially wealthier countries of the third world

why do we lie a practical guide to the dishonesty literature over the last decade a massive body of research has been devoted to uncovering human dishonesty in the present paper we review more than a hundred papers from this literature and provide a comprehensive overview by first listing the existing theoretical frameworks and then covering the common empirical approaches synthesizing the demographic and personal characteristics of those who cheat identifying the behavioural mechanisms found that affect dishonesty and finally we finish by discussing how the empirical evidence fit theory overall the review concludes that many people behave dishonestly but also that it is a highly malleable behavior sensitive to elements such as decision contexts behaviour of others state of mind and depletion the review can be used as an overview of the dishonesty literature or as a guide or work of reference for selected topics of interest

auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud the credibility issue abstract this paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims we assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists the insurer policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game in which the insurer decides to audit or not the market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strategies we show that a no commitment equilibrium results in a welfare loss for honest individuals which may even be so large that the insurance market completely shuts down we also show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget balanced common agency would mitigate the commitment problem

corruption and culture an experimental analysis article i nfo article history why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions in 2005 we conducted a bribery experiment and found that among undergraduates we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country among graduate students we could not in 2007 we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the uk was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour we conclude that while corruption may in part be a cultural phenomenon individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin

deception the role of uncertain consequences abstract we study how decisions to lie extend to risky environments we provide experimental evidence from a sender receiver game where there is uncertainty over the amount by which a sender s lie reduces its receiver s payoff which is known only to potential liar even though all reduction amounts are equiprobable ex post beliefs elicited from senders suggest that unlike truth tellers most liars underestimate the extent of the actual reduction in the receiver s payoff and appear to exploit this self serving bias resulting in substantially more lying relative to a baseline treatment without the uncertainty subsequent treatments confirm the bias by either providing additional evidence or by removing possible confounds an intervention treatment nudging senders toward correcting the bias reduces lying