sequential auctions price trends and risk preferences abstract we analyze sequential auctions in a general environment where bidders are heterogeneous in risk exposures and exhibit non quasilinear utilities we derive a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium for the sequential dutch and vickrey auctions respectively with an arbitrary number of identical objects for sale when bidders are risk averse preferring the equilibrium price sequences must be downward upward drifting the declining price anomaly is thus evidence of bidder risk aversion in this general environment these results derive from a key assumption that bidders marginal utilities are log supermodular in payment and type

sequential auctions with informational externalities and aversion to price risk decreasing and increasing price sequences a large body of empirical research has shown that prices of identical goods sold sequentially sometimes increase and often decline across rounds this article introduces a tractable form of risk aversion called aversion to price risk and shows that declining prices arise naturally when bidders are averse to price risk when there are informational externalities there is a countervailing effect which pushes prices to raise along the path of a sequential auction even if bidder s signals are independent the article shows how to decompose the effect of aversion to price risk from the effect of informational externalities

credible public policy abstract credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame perfect nash equilibrium behavior for the government it is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of abreu 1988 for repeated games the results are then extended to systems with state variables simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example

structural changes in the uk energy market abstract energy use in the uk has undergone substantial structural changes since the rapid rise in the price of oil in 1979 this paper traces the effect of the second round of oil price increases on the adoption of effective energy saving methods in industry and in private households in the uk the analysis shows the largest decrease of energy consumption occurred in industry which is both the most energy intensive as well as the most sensitive to energy prices

optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

sequential auctions theory and evidence from the seattle fur exchange we develop a model that incorporates salient features of the seattle fur exchange identical lots of furs are auctioned sequentially bids must be raised by specified increments and the winner of a lot has the privilege of beginning the bidding on the subsequent lot predictions of the theory are consistent with the data revenue implications of the theory are also explored

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

the declining price anomaly abstract data from wine auctions indicate that identical products sold sequentially typically follow a decreasing pattern of prices known as the declining price anomaly this is explained for both first and second price auctions by appealing to risk averse bidders earlier bids are then equal to expected later prices plus a risk premium associated with the risky future price we show that this logic rests on the assumption of nondecreasing absolute risk aversion which is necessary for pure strategy equilibrium bidding functions to exist thus decreasing absolute risk aversion implies ex post inefficiency with positive probability data from wine auctions are used to confirm the existence of the declining price anomaly journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d44 d81 d82 l81

pattern of uk fuel use abstract this paper provides an analysis of the historical development of the uk primary energy market more specifically of coal gas and heavy fuel oil the period considered for this investigation is 1960 83 a theoretical framework is set up and the significant shifts in the market are traced accordingly as it turns out the shifts in the energy market of the uk have been similar to those in other european countries despite indigenous oil and gas resources

equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions abstract we study a model where bidders have perfectly correlated valuations for two goods sold sequentially in two ascending price auctions the seller sets a reserve price before the beginning of each auction despite the lack of commitment by the seller we characterize an equilibrium and study its properties strategic non disclosure of information takes the form of non participation in the early auction by low valuation bidders while high valuation bidders bid up to their true valuations some buyers who would profitably buy at the reserve price refrain from participating in order to decrease the second auction reserve price

how auctions work for wine and art interview auctioneers and even to buy a little wine in the meantime i have also had the opportunity with john abowd 1988 to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings this paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that i and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items in view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain 2

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

perfect equilibria in budget constrained sequential auctions an experimental study this article presents an experimental study of bidding behavior in sequential auctions in which there are budget constraints and perfect information our experiments test both the properties of such auctions and the predictive power of a refinement of the nash equilibrium concept we find that budget constraints affect the behavior of bidders and that the trembling hand perfect equilibrium is generally a good predictor of prices

environmental policies market responses and incentives abstract environmental degradation cannot be cured by relying solely on the public sector debating and introducing policies and control to prompt the market to develop the technology for reducing emission there has to be a more tangible evidence of an economic gain and a much higher return than currently prevails for new investment there is a tendency within industry to favour revenue generation projects against those for cost reduction by requiring shorter gestation and payback periods for the latter even though the former is the dual of the latter thus energy efficiency projects tend to receive low priorities by industry by requiring much higher return and faster payback periods for them sometimes as low as three months it is possible that a supply shock may need to occur to induce the market to invest and develop the required technology in order to redress some of the current environmental imbalance

sequential procurement with subcontracting two symmetric sellers are approached sequentially by fragmented buyers each buyer conducts a second price auction and purchases from the seller who offers the lower price winning an auction affects bidding for future contracts because the sellers have nonconstant marginal costs we assume that the sellers are completely informed and we study the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if subcontracting between the sellers is impossible the final allocation of contracts is generally inefficient if postauction subcontracting is possible the sellers can be worse off ex ante than when subcontracting is impossible

the evolution of market structure when there is a sequence of innovations the paper explores the question of how market structure evolves when there is a sequence of opportunities to innovate does one firm extend its technological superiority to become increasingly dominant or does technological leadership constantly change hands in a process of actionreaction a simple duopoly model is proposed in which the answer to this question depends upon the nature of product market behaviour in that model highly competitive product market behaviour leads to increasing dominance whereas cournot behaviour may lead to action reaction

optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital abstract this paper is concerned with the structure and time consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital in a dynamic context optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare maximizing way for a barter economy our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure an optimal policy if one exists is time consistent in a monetary economy the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an inflation tax and we find that time consistency does not carry over an optimal inflation tax requires commitment by rules in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes the reason time consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should from a welfare maximizing point of view always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of capital levy this emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital

simultaneous vs sequential auctions with risk averse bidders abstract in this paper we ask a basic question that is interesting for auctioneers and regulators when multiple units are on sale should multiple identical units be sold simultaneously through a single shot auction or sequentially we consider the risk effect of such a decision on bidders and show that in the independent private values setting the answer unambiguously depends on the pricing rule a bidder s payoff uncertainty increases when the sale is sequenced under a pay as bid rule but decreases under the vickrey rule we find that as a result the sequential auction is less desirable from revenue and ex post efficiency points of view under the pay as bid rule and more desirable under the vickrey rule when the reserves in all auctions are set revenue optimally

output growth the real wage and employment fluctuations this paper is an attempt to contribute to the integration of business cycle analysis with long term growth a real business cycle model with endogenous growth is developed and estimated with u s data in the present framework wage movements do not have to be transitory to generate fluctuations in labor effort the reduced form is a constrained bivariate output hours or real wage hours vector autoregressive process the bivariate setup provides a useful framework for analyzing the persistence of output fluctuations given that the theory implies that hours of work contain information about future output movement copyright 1991 by american economic association

fiscal policy inflation and the accumulation of risky capital the effect of government policies on the level of investment and inflation has become a major concern of policy makers in a number of industrial countries proposals to raise the level of business investment have included overall tax cuts tax incentives to spur investment and a reduction in the level of government spending this paper presents a theoretical apparatus to explore the relationships between fiscal policy government debt inflation and capital accumulation it develops a one sector growth model embodying a stochastic production function and government fiscal policy atomistic agents in the economy choose consumption levels and allocate their wealth between risky capital and risky government debt to maximize expected discounted utility over an infinite horizon fiscal policy by affecting asset yields affects the composition of portfolios the price of government bonds and the accumulation of capital the model is used to answer three general questions 1 does the level of government expenditure affect the rate of capital accumulation and inflation in steady state 2 does the mode of government finance when the choice is between an income tax and deficit finance affect these magnitudes 3 what is the effect of uncertainty in the productivity of capital on growth the analysis relates to several areas of literature 1 the analysis of the relationship between capital accumulation and debt 2 the theory of the demand for government debt 3 considerations of the effect of income taxation on risk bearing and 4 the analysis of capital accumulation under uncertainty 1 the effects on output and the capital stock of the government s expenditure decision and its decision to finance its expenditure by taxation or debt issue are explored in two major bodies of economic theory the literature on the burden of the debt as developed by modigliani 1961 diamond 1965 and phelps and shell 1969 for example implies that policies which increase the value of outstanding government debt will tend to lower the level of the capital stock by displacing capital with public debt in private wealth the theory of money and growth as represented by tobin 1965 and sidrauski 1967b also implies that government debt displaces capital but specifically recognizes the role of capital gains on government debt

optimal fiscal policy public capital and the productivity slowdown abstract this paper develops a quantitative theoretical model for the optimal provision of public capital we show that the ratio of public to private capital in the us economy since 1925 evolves in a manner that is broadly consistent with an optimal transition path derived from a simple growth model the model is used to quantify the conditions under which an increase in the stock of public capital is desirable and to investigate the degree to which nonoptimal fiscal policies can account for the us productivity slowdown

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

bottom fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions abstract we study standard sequential auctions in which the seller chooses the order of sale and right to choose auctions in which the winner chooses her preferred item from the remaining items empirically prices in sequential auctions tend to decline and sellers often hold right to choose auctions in our setting the right to choose format guarantees declining prices and efficiency in the standard auction a buyer may submit a low bid for the first item bottom fishing despite its being her less preferred item an example shows that the standard auction has declining prices is inefficient and gives lower expected revenue than the right to choose journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

structural change and energy use the case of the manufacturing sector in taiwan abstract this paper examines the role of sectoral shift and improvements in energy intensity of individual industries in aggregate manufacturing sector energy intensity changes in taiwan during 1971 1985 the divisia index approach is employed to decompose sectoral shift and energy intensity effects a major finding of this analysis is that changes in energy intensities of individual industries were the main influence in changes in aggregate manufacturing sector fuel and electricity intensities during the period sectoral shifts were found to contribute very little to the energy intensity changes

the welfare cost of capital income taxation in a growing economy the welfare cost of capital income taxation is analyzed in a general equilibrium framework where the private sector is represented by a competitive household endowed with perfect foresight and an infinite life the value of the welfare cost depends essentially on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in the production function numerical estimates are presented for different values of the parameters of the model the welfare gain obtained by the abolition of the capital income tax is smaller when the private sector is not endowed with perfect foresight it is reduced by about 40 percent when expectations are myopic the allocation efficiency cost of the corporate tax dwarfs the intertemporal welfare cost

the welfare cost of monopolistic competition revisited abstract this paper quantifies the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in a human capital based endogenous growth model with analytical solution for conservative calibrations it is shown that this welfare cost may be 2 of consumption well beyond conventional estimates

budget constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information i study a budget constrained private valuation sealed bid sequential auction with two incompletely informed risk neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non monotonic functions of a bidder s type multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation efficiency and revenue the sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders the sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods if a particular good say is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale then auction revenue and the price of good are higher when good is sold first

the welfare cost of factor taxation in a perfect foresight model this paper examines the marginal efficiency cost of various factor taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium model the au thor solves for the excess burden of anticipated and unanticipated t emporary and permanent tax policies using a range of estimates for taste and technology parameters he finds excess burdens larger than those indicated by previous studies that use static models these exc ess burdens are sensitive to parameter values and timing however th e rankings of alternative tax policies turn out to be insensitive to structural parameter values copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

auctions with endogenous valuations the persistence of monopoly revisited it is shown that the standard arguments for a monopoly to persist break down when many units of capacity become available sequentially the reason is that deterring entry at one st age affects the cost of doing so in later stages this force can be so powerful that entry is deterred only at the final stage the persistence of monopoly or its erosion over time depends on the timi ng of arrival of capacity the size of early versus subsequent capacity availability the length of the capacity acquisition stage relative to the life of the industry and the discount factor copyright 1993 by american economic association

sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects two completely informed but possibly asymmetric bidders buy or sell identical claims in sequential auctions they subsequently receive monetary prizes that depend upon the final allocation of claims iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies leaves a unique nash equilibrium for any prize schedule prices weakly decline as the auctions progress and points of strict decline have a simple characterization for one class of prize schedules which arises naturally if duopolists bid for a scarce input the equilibrium is completely characterized many initial allocations generate the same final unequal division of claims which may be interpreted as the natural market structure journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d44 l11