the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

underemployment irreversibilities and growth under trade unionism the effects of irreversibility and uncertainty are analyzed in a unionized economy with overlapping generations irreversible decisions about technology and physical and human capital are made under uncertainty and generate underutilization of labor and equipment not only over the convergence path but also at steady state the related inefficiency negatively affects the accumulation process by reducing the per capita capital stock at teady state the effect of union power on capital is ambiguous and depends crucially on the presence of irreversible decisions

understanding the impacts of the 2007 08 global financial crisis on sustainable forest management in the brazilian amazon a case study abstract in 2007 and 2008 the world experienced a significant global financial crisis gfc several factors were perceived as drivers of the crisis however its dynamics and consequences for natural resources and the environment remain largely unknown particularly in brazil combining grounded theory and case study methodologies this research explores and contrasts the perspectives of highly knowledgeable stakeholders on how the gfc impacted sustainable forest management in the brazilian amazon using the state of para as a case study our findings indicate that the gfc cannot be considered as a unique phenomenon impacting sfm and that it is intimately linked to other political social and environmental events unfolding within brazil and at the global level decreased deforestation was perceived to have occurred due to restrained production increased risk aversion increased public awareness and enhanced government efforts towards law enforcement the forest based exporting segment was seen to suffer the most severe impacts of the crisis environmentally friendly initiatives were perceived to offer forest product differentiation in the market while investments in non market oriented initiatives were restrained our results suggest that in times of economic crisis forest policy makers need to focus on both formal and informal forest economies in order to promote sustainable forest management objectives

expropriation and control rights a dynamic model of foreign direct investment abstract this paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country we analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of creeping expropriation once his investment is sunk it is shown that this hold up problem may cause underinvestment if the outside option of the investor is too weak and overinvestment if it is too strong we also analyze the impact of spillover effects we give a rationale for tax holidays and we examine how stochastic returns affect the strategic interaction of investor and host country

the financial crisis and its impacts on global agriculture the financial crisis arose in the industrial countries but has affected developing countries through higher interest rates sharp changes in commodity prices and reductions in investment trade migration and remittances for most low income countries shocks that affect food prices or wage rates for unskilled workers seem likely to have the largest impact on poverty with the declines in key food prices associated with the crisis helping to reduce poverty while declining trade investment and remittance flows have had adverse impacts on the poor policies to address the crisis must include measures to deal with financial sector problems the resulting reductions in aggregate demand and the particular vulnerabilities of poor people given the complexity of the impacts from financial crises and commodity price shocks there is a strong case for developing better social safety net policies that can offset the adverse impacts of a wide range of different shocks on poor people without creating costly market distortions

impact of the financial crisis on indian commodity markets structural breaks and volatility dynamics the shocks transmitted across the financial markets during the financial crisis resulted in structural changes in commodity volatility hence understanding volatility dynamics in changing scenario is vital for derivative pricing risk management and monetary policy stabilization this paper studies the impact of the financial crisis by analyzing the following aspects 1 presence of structural break regime shift in volatility by deploying markov and wavelet model during financial crisis and 2 crisis impact on volatility dynamic behavior such as persistence leverage and long memory by deploying hybrid wavelet egarch and fractional integration spot prices of 18 commodities were examined including all sub sectors of energy metals and agriculture indian commodity indices sub indices global benchmark indices and also stock indices such as sp agricultural commodities showed faster convergence to long run equilibrium while metal and energy experienced higher persistence and attracted more financial speculation the impact of the crisis on agricultural commodities was limited to internationally traded commodities such as sugar and rubber the common breaks and different volatility dynamics have been attributed to systematic risk and to idiosyncratic components respectively it was also found that during and after the crisis more than idiosyncratic risk it was systematic risk that contributed significantly to the volatility patterns of indian commodity markets

productivity and long term growth potential in the uk economy 1924 1968 this paper examines the long term structural determinants of labour productivity for the uk economy using a panel data set from 1924 to 1968 trade union product market competition and human capital explanations are embedded within the model and compared labour quality or human capital is found to be the most important of the explanations considered

entry deterrence under trade unions this paper argues for the integration of labor unions in the analysis of industrial organization such a linkage is important for at least two reasons first unions are often concentrated in big firms which tend in general to face an imperfectly competitive environment in their product markets second unions are usually able to extract in the form of higher wages some rents which result from the market power of firms see for example freeman and medoff 1984 on the impact of unions on firm profitability in the u s a firms should thus take union behavior into account and in particular realize that strategies toward rival firms will tend to affect unions ability to extract rents we illustrate here the impact of unions in industrial organization by focusing on the topic of entry deterrence ed in section 2 we first argue that unions tend to lower the profitability of two standard widely studied ed strategies limit pricing under incomplete information and the use of sunk costs section 3 then turns to union contracts as a possible alternative ed strategy available to incumbent tirms finally section 4 assesses the welfare impact of unions in these settings while section 5 suggests directions for research

new lending to less developed countries the effect of the imf among the institutions which determine the international financial environment the international monetary fund imf or the fund is arguably the most prominent its effect on capital flows however has not been analyzed in detail this paper examines empirically the effect of the imf on lending to less developed country ldc governments previous studies of capital flows have led to mixed results regarding the effect of the imf the overwhelming majority of early investigators concluded that the imf was able to induce new capital flows to ldcs through the use of its conditional lending agreements the problem with this complementarity hypothesis was the absence of strong theoretical support 1 and the weakness of the empirical evidence proponents of the complementarity hypothesis relied primarily on anecdotal evidence although some limited systematic support was offered by mccauley 1986 despite the limitations of the evidence the hypothesis that imf conditional arrangements induced new lending became a stylized fact since the late 1980s more sophisticated empirical evidence has arisen to challenge the complementarity hypothesis papers by hajivassiliou 1987 faini de melo senhadji semlali and stanton 1991 and ozler 1993 indicated that the presence of fund agreements may actually be viewed unfavourably by capital markets from a borrower s point of view imf agreements appeared to have an adverse effect on new lending and risk premia the most serious difficulty with accepting this new evidence is that the research was not designed to examine specifically the complementarity hypothesis of particular concern is the fact that the presence of the imf was often used explicitly as a proxy for past or present financial difficulties the empirical analysis provided in this paper is designed to overcome these difficulties

a note on mechanization and wage bargaining abstract collective wage bargaining may bias firms choice of production techniques but not in favour of mechanization it is most profitable to install relatively more equipment which is complementary to labour power than equipment which is a substitute

co determination and innovation this paper examines the effect of the german co determination law of 1976 mitbestg on the innovative activity of german firms co determination applies to firms with 2 000 employees or more data from 1971 1976 and 1981 1990 on 148 firms are used to compare the number of patents granted to co determined firms before and after the introduction of the law several control variables are applied and in particular in order to avoid a possible bias from specific effects of firm size we compare the co determined firms with others before and after 1976 the results do not support the view that co determination slows down technological progress and reduces innovativity

structural adjustment policies and productive efficiency of socialist enterprises abstract the paper uses panel data from a five percent stratified random sample of yugoslav industrial enterprises to test several hypotheses about the determinants of productive efficiency the estimating procedure selects the production function best supported by the data and allows for industry specific production function parameters as well as from firm specific fixed or random effects the instrumental variable estimates suggest that productive efficiency is unaffected by the four structural policy variables whose effect we examine the extent of export orientation joint venture status divisionalization of the firm and the firm s market share

payment discipline depends on management ethics the main aim of the study was to identify if management ethics have a positive impact on payment discipline our sample includes 273 slovene enterprises which represent 9 1 of 2978 slovenian enterprises with 10 or more employees selected from the database of the slovenian rating agency i d o o to determine management ethics we used the corporate ethical virtues measurement instrument questionnaire the data concerning average late payments were also obtained from the database the slovenian rating agency i d o o we conducted a factor analysis using the enter method we confirmed that the influence of management ethics have a positive impact on average payment delays expressed in days

towards a green economy through innovations the role of trade union involvement abstract in this paper we address the overlooked issue of whether and how industrial relations might play a role in the process of greening the economy primarily through the levers of innovation adoption and organisational change we address our objective econometrically assessing the quality of industrial relations as a driver of environmental innovation adoption through the use of micro data on manufacturing firms the results yield two interesting main findings being a unionised firm is not associated with the adoption of environmental innovation however when we consider the industrial relations climate we observe a positive relationship between a cooperative industrial relations climate union involvement and the propensity to introduce environmental innovation two models are relevant a managerially oriented model unions are informed and a participatory model unions bargain on innovation adoption the contents of environmental innovations are also important union involvement is more relevant for adopting more complex and radical innovations to abate co2 and ems and iso practices

on the prevalence of labor contracts with fixed duration the prevalence of labor contracts with fixed duration seems surprising why is a fixed duration preferred to a stochastic duration that depends on the consumer price index in this paper the specification of the contract duration is determined endogenously the wage rate can be indexed to the consumer price index but there is a loss since the indexation must be the same for different types of shocks this loss increases with the variability of the contract duration since the loss due to the contracting cost depends on the expected discounted duration only a fixed duration is chosen copyright 1992 by american economic association

local versus central wage bargaining with endogenous investments investment behavior may depend on whether wage bargaining takes place centrally or locally at the firm level the outcome of the wage bargain will in turn depend on previous investments ignoring other differences between the two bargaining regimes endogenous investments imply that wages are lower and profits higher under local wage bargaining than under central bargaining this does not necessarily imply that employment is highest under local bargaining since investments may differ in the two cases with a nash bargaining solution however reasonable assumptions imply that employment is highest under local wage bargaining

capitalists and workers knowledge and the strategic role of investment within the firm does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm the formation of a firm frequently represents an attempt by an individual to secure a return on knowledge and we demonstrate that in this context there can be an incentive to precommit capital before contracting with other members of the firm that is to be the capitalist results are also obtained on the investment level and wage rate the key ingredient of the model is emergence of a product market entry threat from within the firm this contrasts with the anonymous external potential entrant prevalent in the literature

sunk investment bargaining and choice of capital structure this paper shows how a firm might optimally choose debt to affect the outcome of bilateral bargaining with workers or other input suppliers it is shown that debt may alleviate the well known underinvestment problem associated with the inability to write precommitment contracts also in such circumstances debt could be pareto improving over complete equity financing the relationship between the optimal level of debt and asset specificity of investment and bargaining power of the firm vis a vis the workers is explored the williamson conjecture that higher asset specificity will lead to less debt is shown not to be valid in general

ldc creditworthiness and foreign capital inflows 1980 86 abstract this paper estimates the determinants of foreign capital inflows and shows that they are jointly determined with ldc creditworthiness the paper demonstrates that foreign capital inflows respond to government restrictions and the cost of foreign transactions previous research based on single equation models has concluded that the amount of capital inflows is a positive indicator of ldc creditworthiness by contrast this paper estimates a simultaneous limited dependent variable model in order to capture the endogeneity of capital inflows the estimate yields a reversal in sign for the coefficient of the capital inflows variable the paper suggests that defensive lending may explain this finding

the effects of imf and world bank lending on long run economic growth an empirical analysis summary the international monetary fund and the world bank frequently and often repeatedly extend loans to developing nations these loans have been blamed for generating adverse economic outcomes the growth impact of fund and bank loan programs is assessed using an empirical growth model that controls for other determinants of growth a unique feature of this study is the use of the value of loans rather than the number of programs the estimates indicate that bank lending stimulates growth in some cases primarily by increasing public investment fund lending is either neutral or detrimental to growth the channel for this effect is a negative impact of fund lending on public as well as private investment

the economic and political determinants of imf and world bank lending in the middle east and north africa mena assumes both political and economic significance politically it is arguably the epicentre of world crisis chronically war prone and the site of the world s most protracted conflicts hinnebusch 2003 p 1 economically it owns the bulk of the world s oil reserves driving in particular the usa economic engine in light of the region s geopolitically and economically strategic position in the world economy it is clear that economic and political factors are inextricably linked when it comes to the manner in which the west particularly the usa responds to the region s needs

the macroeconomics of specificity specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences resources are underutilized factor markets are segmented production suffers from technological sclerosis job creation and destruction are unbalanced recessions are excessively sharp and expansions run into bottlenecks while depending on the shock expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization recessions should typically be softened in the long run institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation technology choice will also be affected with the appropriated factor partially excluding the other from production to reduce appropriation

tolerance of arrearages how imf loan policy can effect debt reduction a model of bargaining with asymmetric information is applied to the case of sovereign debt and imf intervention debtors and creditors are assumed to bargain over the price to be paid by the debtors for their outstanding debt and the ability of the debtors to delay an agreement is private information it is shown that an imf policy of no lending in arrears increases the price of the debt increases any delay to agreement and increases the likelihood that the creditor will demand the highest price an imf policy of lending in arrears in contrast decreases the price of the debt decreases the delay time to agreement and my increase the likelihood that the creditor accepts the lowest price as it shifts the locus of bargaining power predictions of the model are consistent with results from recent debt agreements and implications for current debate on debt reduction strategies are discussed

bargaining structures and delay in innovation it is sometimes argued that fears about the employment consequences of introducing new technology may lead unions to wish to delay innovations and this may reduce incentives for firm to carry out r d we explore these issues in a model of two countries that compete over both market share and r d and we restrict attention to cases where unions would wish to delay innovation we show that allowing unions to bargain over the timing of innovation need not reduce the possibility of a firm successfully competing for r d however simulations suggest that for a particular model allowing unions to delay innovation does not help a firm compete over r d

unions taxes and the structure of multinational enterprises abstract this note analyzes how a firm s relationship with unions or tax authorities influences its basic structure in particular it is shown that the prospect of capture by unions or tax authorities of part of the rents associated with the firm s investments leads it to open more plants than is technologically efficient thus unions and taxes are an independent reason for a firm s expansion nationally and for foreign direct investment

complexity and renegotiation a foundation for incomplete contracts the paper considers a hold up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented as the environment becomes more complex n the outcome under any message contingent long term contract converges to that of the incomplete contracting model where trade is contractible ex post but not ex ante when trades are costly to describe both ex ante and ex post the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments

unions in a frictional labor market abstract a labor market with search and matching frictions where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup with full commitment to future wages the union achieves efficient hiring in the long run but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate rents from firms without commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium hiring is too low both in the short and the long run the quantitative impact is demonstrated in an extended model with partial union coverage and multiperiod union contracting

unionization and plant closure in canada this paper examines for the first time the role of unionization as a determinant of plant closings in canada using the 1999 to 2001 canadian workplace and employee survey the paper contributes to the north american evidence by showing that the share of a plant s workers covered by collective bargaining has a robust positive partial correlation with the probability of larger plants closing for smaller plants the extent of unionization tends to be much lower and its variation plays no role in plant closure the study highlights the theoretical and statistical importance of examining closure separately for large and small plants ce memoire examine pour la premiere fois le role de la syndicalisation en tant que determinant de la fermeture d usines au canada a l aide des resultats de l enquete sur le milieu de travail et les employes de 1999 et de 2001 emte le texte contribue a enrichir le dossier qui montre qu il y a correlation positive partielle robuste entre la portion des travailleurs d usines couverts par une convention collective et la probabilite de fermeture des grandes usines pour les plus petites usines le degre de syndicalisation tend aetre plus faible et sa variation ne joue pas de role dans le processus de fermeture d usines cette etude montre l importance theorique et pratique qu il y a aetudier separement les fermetures des grandes et des petites usines

employee share ownership and privatisation some theoretical issues the purpose of this paper is to discuss some of the theoretical issues involved with employee share ownership in the privatization situation the share purchase decision by employ ees is generally a one off decision and there is a sequential aspect to the problem the author concludes that simple theoretical models of the type will generally unambiguously predict that employee share ownership is beneficial in privatizations indeed the results are som ewhat surprising showing that the creation of additional shares for employees actually increases rather than decreases the value of non e mployee shares even though the money paid for the employee shares go es to the government and does not stay in the company copyright 1987 by royal economic society

discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market jobs in the primary sector require firm specific training with wages determined as a result of bargaining firms pay for the training and since they are imperfectly informed about worker productivity they test workers before hiring them the secondary sector is competitive taking a job in the secondary sector signals low productivity and therefore workers in the secondary sector are unable to get jobs in the primary sector open unemployment coexists with unfilled vacancies for low wage jobs

the layoff rat race we investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs after investments are made firms may have to lay off workers and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates greater skill investments especially in specific human capital contribute more to a firm s bottom line so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last we show that as long as workers bargaining positions are not too weak workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities indeed workers over invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough even though they only receive a share of any investment more generally we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms the probability that a firm will downsize and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy

unobservable investment and the hold up problem we study a two person bargaining problem in which the buyer may invest and increase his valuation of the object before bargaining we show that if all offers are made by the seller and the time between offers is small then the buyer invests efficiently and the seller extracts all of the surplus hence bargaining with frequently repeated offers remedies the hold up problem even when the agent who makes the relation specific investment has no bargaining power and contracting is not possible we consider alternative formulations with uncertain gains from trade or two sided investment

the impact of trade unions on incentives to deter entry in this article i illustrate the impact of trade unions on strategic product market behavior i discuss entry deterrence through capital durability in a model developed by eaton and lipsey in the presence of unions sunk capital scares away potential entrants but can also raise workers bargaining power firms have thus to trade off these two effects in making their capital decisions i analyze the impact of potential entry and unions on capital durability and welfare and i discuss briefly the influence of unions on strategic product market behavior in general

sluggish institutions in a dynamic world can unions and industrial competition coexist during the 1930s and 1940s collective bargaining emerged as the workplace governance norm in much of the u s industrial sector following its peak in the 1950s union density in the u s private sector fell steadily to only 7 4 percent in 2006 governance shifted from a formalized union norm to one of constrained managerial discretion in competitive and dynamic economic environments a union tax on company earnings and slow response to economic shocks combine to produce poor performance by union companies two industries automotives and airlines are used to illustrate these points if worker based institutions are to flourish they must add value and permit companies to perform at levels similar to those obtained under evolving nonunion governance norms

hold up with a vengeance when contracts are incomplete or unenforceable inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold up if individuals care for negative reciprocity these problems may be reduced as revenge becomes a credible threat however negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds we explore this issue analytically deriving predictions for hold up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control we also test and support these predictions in an experiment

wage employment determination and a union tax on capital can theory and evidence be reconciled if unions appropriate quasi rents from relation specific capital observed factor prices no longer reflect effective costs unionism has effects akin to a partial factor tax on capital demand curve settlements need not imply higher k l among union firms

the economic consequences of labor unionization evidence from stock price crash risk this study investigates the impact of labor unionization on stock price crash risk we find that labor unionization is negatively associated with stock price crash risk such negative relation is more pronounced when firms can intimate more credible evidence on unfavorable prospects and when firms face more powerful labor unions our findings are consistent with the notion that firms take strategic actions to reduce the bargaining advantages enjoyed by labor unions and that labor unions force firms to take less risky investments and discontinue underperformed projects more timely which leads to lower stock price crash risk

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

does competition solve the hold up problem in an environment in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers undertake ex ante investments the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies namely hold up and coordination problems this paper shows using an explicitly non cooperative model that when matching is assortative and investments precede market competition buyers investments are constrained efficient while sellers marginally underinvest with respect to what would be constrained efficient however the overall extent of this inefficiency may be large multiple equilibria may arise one equilibrium is characterized by efficient matches but there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures

constitutional rules reputation and sovereign debt abstract the inability of governments to pre commit to certian policies often results in pareto inefficient equilibria a policy is not time consistent if it requires a course of action that will subsequently become undesirable this paper examines the possibility of creating constitutional rules which can support sovereign debt contracts which would otherwise violate the requirement of time consistency the possibility of establishing international reputation with internal enforcement mechanisms is sensitive to the constitutional environment which will also determine the appropriate form of the constitutional rules