expectations about voter choices a comment the only essential differences in the examples analyzed above are in the assumptions that are used to derive or directly specify the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function when the central behavioral assumption from the traditional models was used the equilibrium was a median outcome a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the corresponding unidimensional traditional voting models when the central behavioral assumptions from the probabilistic voting model developed in coughlin and nitzan 1981 were used the equilibrium was at the maximum of the expected log utility function a conclusion directly analogous to what happens in the model in coughlin and nitzan 1981 indeed it was only when the corresponding assumptions from ledyard 1984 were used i e the particular assumptions that ledyard used to derive the choice behavior that the candidates expect from any given voter conditional on his utility function that the conclusions were substantially different from the conclusions derived from earlier models this reflects the important role these assumptions play in making ledyard s conclusions about candidate strategies substantially different from earlier results in the literature on spatial models of elections

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

hitting the jackpot product proliferation by multiproduct firms under uncertainty this paper presents a model of product proliferation by multiproduct firms under uncertainty firms introduce new differentiated products because they want to hit as many jackpots as possible products with high profits and long lives there is uncertainty about the success of new products as the probability of hitting a jackpot increases product proliferation increases more products are introduced and expected in equilibrium the expected number of products in equilibrium is always less than at the optimum but in industries with multiple firms as the probability of hitting a jackpot increases rivalry intensifies and that gap shrinks

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

tenure security and land related investment evidence from ethiopia the authors use a large data set from ethiopia that differentiates tenure security and transferability to explore determinants of different types of land related investment and its possible impact on productivity while they find some support for endogeneity of investment in trees this is not the case for terraces transfer rights are unambiguously investment enhancing the large productivity effect of terracing implies that even where households undertake investments to increase their tenure security this may not be socially efficient in ethiopia government action to increase tenure security and transferability of land rights can significantly enhance rural investment and productivity

entrepreneurs growth and cycles i expound a model of a one good economy where long run growth and output fluctuations are endogenous consequences of the decisions taken by entrepreneurs on the allocation of their resources between production and innovation in a markovian sequence of one period games i show first that the log of output follows a process with random walk characteristics second that contrarywise to the mechanism at work in real business cycle models the variability in the rate of productivity growth does not imply by itself the occurrence of any recession third that a recession is the consequence not of a kydland prescott 1982 negative shock on technology but of the reallocation of factors in the face of an increased opportunity ex ante which the entrepreneurs fail to exploit ex post fourth and finally that although any generation could make itself unilaterally better off by reducing its level of research the onegood economy is intertemporally efficient in that such a move would imply a reduction in the level of welfare of future generations

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

local simple games in public choice mechanisms this paperinitiates an investigation of processes in wlhiclh cooperative games determine at each moment the directioni of motion of the social state attentioln is focused upoin simple games i e uponl games in which a coalitioni cani prevenit either every direction orno direction from beinig choseni as motivation conisider the problem of coinstlructinlg a planning pr ocedule to allocate goods existing procedures as surveyed in tulkenis 1978 specify a local instantaneous game that determnines the direction of change of the allocation vector for example the mdp procedure of malinvaud 1970 1 and dreze and de la valee poussin 1971 specifies the direction of change at each moment as a function of reported marginal rates of substitution assuming that individuals are concerned only with mnaximizing thleir rates of utility increase local games can be constructed so that their diiectionial equilibria will lead the allocation vector to the pareto set various equiilibriuml concepts have been used in mdp local games for exanmple maxmiin equilibria dreze and de la valee poussin 1971 nashi equilibria roberts 1979 scholumaker 1979 and certain cooperative equilibria tulkens and zamir 1979 have been shown to cause convergence to the pareto set whenever a procedure is actually to be implemented account should be taken of the fact that it will be constrained by rules that are effective in the society for example in a dictatorship the social state must move in a direction that is most preferred by the dictator the dictator will simply not abide by the equilibrium direction of a local game unless it is one of his most preferred directions less trivially whenever unanimous disapproval of a motion can prevent its occurrence the society will only agree to a procedure whose equilibrium direction of motion cannot be feasibly changed to a direction that increases everybody s utility at a greater rate these two examples of constrainits on motion are not of the type that is usually imposed in the literature on allocation procedures and furthermore in areas like tax reform e g guesnerie 1977 and majority rule dynamics e g mckelvey 1976 schofield 1978a the constraints oni motion in these studies call be viewed as resulting from a requirement that any motioni must increase the utility

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

the rationally uninformed electorate some experimental evidence this essay reports on a series of twenty four election experiments in which voters are allowed to decide between voting retrospectively and purchasing contemporaneous information about the candidate challenging the incumbent each experiment consists of a series of election periods in which dummy candidates choose spatial positions which represent either their policy while in office or a promise about policy if elected subjects voters are told the value to them of the incumbent s policy but they must decide prior to voting whether or not to purchase information about the value of the challenger s promise in general our data conform to reasonable expectations voters purchase less information and rely more on retrospective knowledge when the candidates strategies are stable and their likelihood of purchasing information during periods of instability is tempered by the likelihood that their votes matter by the reliability of the information available for purchase and by the degree of instability as measured by changes in each voter s welfare

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

an empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity who invests more into r d the incumbent or the challenger the theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the potential entrant invests more into r d has attracted considerable interest this paper reports the results of an empirical study on this question using data of about 3500 german firms over the years 1992 to 1995 the survey explicitly asks the firms for their motives to undertake innovative activity it is thus possible to take account of intended not just completed market entry it turns out that the challenger invests more into r d in order to enter a new market than the incumbent thus the patent racing model by reinganum and others seems to characterize innovative activity more accurately than the competing auction model of gilbert and newbery we use a heteroscedastic tobit as well as a tobit model with selectivity in order to deal with the econometric problems of double censoring

rational expectations in elections some experimental results based on a multidimensional model while our experimental results do not show convincingly the superiority of our model over alternative hypotheses these results do not reject the rational expectations approach to handling incomplete information in elections this is not to say of course that our model provides the most appropriate treatment of incomplete information since it relies primarily on one source of information polls certainly other data exist such as the historical record of the parties primary election outcomes and the coalitions observed at nominating conventions which voters might use for information on their choices what we hope our analysis has begun however is a more rigorous study of how citizens can interpret such data and the role played by the various media in supplying these data

unidimensional median voter results in probabilistic voting models abstract this paper studies the policy outcomes that can be expected to occur when candidates are uncertain about voter behavior its analysis begins with an example that illustrates how the comaner hinich effect i e the possibility of non median outcomes can occur under such circumstances this example is then modified in ways which restore a median outcome after this is done the method of restoration is generalized to obtain a unidimensional median voter result for probabilistic voting models

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

a theory of conscious parallelism abstract in this paper the rationality of conscious parallelism is studied within the context of a dynamic oligopoly model the doctrine of conscious parallelism is modelled as the outcome of a signalling game in which the rules of response are specified axiomatically this will result in a unique solution to the oligopoly problem that is based on firms need to have consistent expectations that subsequently generate collusive behaviour this model can then be used to more precisely define the conditions that facilitate or limit oligopolistic coordination as found in the traditional industrial organization literature

majority rule directions of income tax reform and second best optimality two kinds of directional reforms of a linear income tax system are studied in this article first income tax reform is studied from the perspective of a planner interested in obtaining a second best optimum necessary and sufficient conditions for the existing tax parameters to be a local second best optimum are obtained in addition for nonoptimal tax schedules the set of pareto improving production efficiency preserving directions of tax reform are characterized second majority rule directions of income tax reform are considered a complete characterization of the changes in the values of the tax parameters that would be predicted to result from a majority vote over directions of tax reform is provided

reputation and legislative leadership abstracting away other aspects of legislative leadership such as the nature of the collective action a leader tries to promote or the exact nature of the leader s own goals we have constructed a stylized model of one important aspect of the leader s problem the use of reputation reputation is really a problem of using the uncertainty of followers to the leader s best advantage to make the most of whatever real resources the leader actually has although the leadership game has multiple equilibria when the leader is precisely indifferent between costless punishment and acquiescence the slightest preference between those actions yields a unique equilibrium when the preference is for costless punishment this equilibrium involves creating a reputation and we can use its properties to draw conclusions about 1 the nature and strategy of reputation building and of the reactions of sophisticated followers and 2 the manifestations of these strategic considerations in institutional and political change in congress 1

electoral equilibrium in double member districts the median voter result and the issue of stability in electoral competition generally have been examined from a number of different perspectives out of all these examinations however only a few focus on institutional variables this essay demonstrates that the median voter result is robust under a significant institutional change that entails altering the basic assumption of single member districts after developing a model of electoral competition in a two member first two past the post district i show that if there are three candidates the set of nash equilibria is the set of strategy triples x1 x2 x3 with x1 x2 x3 x and such that x lies between the quantiles of order 1 3 and 2 3 if there are four candidates i show that a unique nash equilibrium exists with all candidates adopting a position at the medianvoter s ideal point

structure induced equilibria and perfect foresight expectations this paper extends the work on structure induced equilibria by explicitly considering voters expectations the standard assumption of myopic expectations is contrasted with the alternative assumption of perfect foresight expectations in the institutional setting examined perfect foresight means voters know how the outcome on the first issue in a sequence of two issues conditions majority rule outcomes on the second issue if voters act on this knowledge when voting on the first issue then several important results follow first voters may possess multipeaked preferences defined over the first issue with a majority cycle resulting so that there is no equilibrium to the whole sequence of elections second even if cycling does not result the exact location of the equilibrium involves a broader conspiracy than previously thought a conspiracy of not only preferences and institutional structure but also voters expectations as conditioned by that structure

a monopoly union model of wage determination with capital and taxes an empirical application to the finnish manufacturing abstract the paper formulates a model of wage determination in which the firm decides on employment after a monopoly union has determined wages the novelty is to incorporate into the model investment and capital decisions by firms the subgame perfect nash equilibrium and its comparative statics for wages capital stock and employment are characterized in a two stage game the model is then estimated by using annual data from the finnish manufacturing sector over the period 1960 1987 the dynamic system of equations describing the determination of capital stock wages and hours of work performs reasonably well there are no obvious signs of misspecifications coefficient estimates are relatively precise and other properties of the models predominantly lie in conformity with our theoretical reasoning the nash equilibrium with dynamics for nominal wages and capital stock encompasses more conventional specifications which can be derived from the neoclassical theory of investment and demand supply theory of labour markets finally diagnostics and various non nested test procedures indicate that the conditional hours of work specification where hours of work are determined recursively after the wage capital stock game outperforms alternative specifications implied by the conventional theory of the demand for factors of production

on adjustment costs and the stability of equilibria in practice one does not expect conflicting agents to move instantaneously to an equilibrium instead the final equilibrium is often the consequence of disequilibrium dynamics this paper through the use of local game theory introduces a general framework for disequilibrium dynamics based on the existence of adjustment costs the analysis is presented within the context of oligopoly theory and shows that the existence of adjustment costs will in many cases result in a unique equilibrium at which market shares are inversely proportional to these costs this paper also introduces two new solution concepts for n person normal form games

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

covering dominance and institution free properties of social change this paper shows that different institutional structures for aggregation of preferences under majority rule may generate social choices that are quite similar so that the actual social choice may be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules specifically in a multidimensional setting where all voters have strictly quasi concave preferences it is shown that the uncovered set contains the outcomes that would arise from equilibrium behavior under three different institutional settings the three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a large electorate cooperative behavior in small committees and sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the agenda is determined endogenously because of its apparent institution free properties the uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a core does not exist a general existence theorem for the uncovered set is proven and for the downsian case bounds for the uncovered set are computed these bounds show that the uncovered set is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of the degree of symmetry of the voter ideal points

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

how risky is r and d a financial approach in order to understand the relationship between market structure and the risk of innovation this paper proposes a synthesis between the capital asset pricing model and simple models of industrial organization the theoretical section of the paper discusses the real determinants of r d riskiness finding that several unique features of r d assets may influence their systematic risk including their strategic nature and random arrival as well as the firm s industry context the empirical results suggest that there is a considerable systematic risk premium associated with r d that can be partially offset by firm size and market concentration copyright 1990 by mit press

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs a differential game approach abstract this paper develops a differential game model of duopoly in which firms incur costs associated with how fast they change their level of output the analysis solves for a subgame perfect equilibrium to the model in which the steady state level of output lies strictly between the static cournot and perfect competition solutions furthermore we demonstrate that the limit game in which the speed of adjustment parameter approaches zero does not tend toward the static cournot equilibrium

pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting this paper studies the pareto optimality properties of policy proposals and electoral outcomes when there is probabilistic voting theorem 1 proves that when the position of one candidate is taken as fixed the other candidate will propose a pareto optimal alternative this implies that whenever there is an electoral equilibrium in pure strategies the electoral outcome is pareto optimal it also implies that even if there is no such equilibrium the electoral outcomes from a sequence of elections will be pareto optimal except possibly for an initial status quo

elections with limited information a fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources a one dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested candidates do not know voter utility functions and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions a fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined using poll and endorsement data as information sources it is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters any equilibrium extracts all available information all participants voters and candidates alike act as if they were fully informed for fixed candidate strategies a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium and this process is shown to imply a bandwagon effect

rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection this paper explores the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a noncooperative game from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess the answer is summarized in a solution concept called rationalizability strategy profiles that are rationalizable are not always nash equilibria conversely the information in an extensive form game often allows certain unreasonable nash equilibria to be excluded from the set of rationalizable profiles a stronger form of rationalizability is appropriate if players are known to be not merely rational but also cautious what constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation this paper explores the issue in the context of a wide class of finite noncooperative games in extensive form the traditional answer relies heavily upon the idea of nash equilibrium nash 17 the position developed here however is that as a criterion for judging a profile of strategies to be reasonable choices for players in a game the nash equilibrium property is neither necessary nor sufficient some nash equilibria are intuitively unreasonable and not all reasonable strategy profiles are nash equilibria the fact that a nash equilibrium can be intuitively unattractive is well known the equilibrium may be imperfect introduced into the literature by selten 20 the idea of imperfect equilibria has prompted game theorists to search for a narrower definition of equilibrium while this research some of which will be discussed here has been extremely instructive it remains inconclusive theorists often agree about what should happen in particular games but to capture this intuition in a general solution concept has proved to be very difficult if this paper is successful it should make some progress in that direction the other side of the coin has received less scrutiny can all non nash profiles really be excluded on logical grounds i believe not the standard justifications for considering only nash profiles are circular in nature or make gratuitous assumptions about players decision criteria or beliefs the following discussion of these points is extremely brief due to space constraints more detailed arguments may be found in pearce 18

necessary and sufficient conditions for single peakedness in public economic models abstract median voter results have played a central role in public economic analyses where there is a linearly ordered set of policy alternatives that is to be voted on in these analyses the median voter results themselves have been based on voters preferences being single peaked with respect to the ordering for this set in this paper we derive conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for such single peakedness to occur whenever we have economic decision makers this leads to certain new median voter results in addition it also reveals some important limitations on median voter analyses

a model of electroral competition with interest groups abstract this letter specifies and analyzes a model of electoral competition with interest groups the assumptions used in the model are drawn from the existing literature we i show that certain assumptions that have been used in empirical analyses of voting provide a sufficient condition for the existence of an electoral equilibrium and ii characterize the equilibrium strategies embodied in the characterization is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the electoral strengths of the interest groups we also state the appropriate definition of the pareto relation for our model and note that each of the equilibrium strategies is pareto optimal

which firms buy licenses market positions and license expenditures this paper presents the empirical results of a comparison of technology licensing expenditures of german companies in order to test implications of the gilbert and newbery 1982 model aside from standard control variables the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account we differentiate between firms intending to secure their present position in the market incumbents and those intending to enter a new market challengers in line with the prediction of the gilbert and newbery model we find that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

tenure security resource poverty public programs and household plot level conservation investments in the highlands of northern ethiopia land degradation poses a serious problem for the livelihoods of rural producers furthermore there is rarely enough private investment taking place to commensurate the scale of the problem this article examines the role of tenure insecurity resource poverty risk and time preferences and community led land conservation on differentiated patterns of household investment in land conservation in northern ethiopia we control for biophysical household characteristics market access conditions and village level factors investments in soil bunds and stone terraces are specifically studied so as to capture the link between these various factors and the durability of conservation investments we introduce the distinction between the determinants of the decision to invest and how much to invest in conservation regression results show that publicly led conservation programs seem to significantly stimulate private investment a host of plot level variables and household perceptions of returns on conservation investments expressed in terms of perceived improvements in land quality and increased crop yields were found to be critical to the decision to invest and intensify soil conservation the evidence on the significance of households attitudes toward risk aversion suggests the important role of risk and the household s risk bearing capacity in the decision to intensify conservation measures at the same time tenure security indicators and households resource endowments resource poverty had weaker effects in increasing willingness to invest and the level of investment made the policy implications of these results point to the importance of agricultural research and extension efforts that target technologies which reduce household risk and poverty while enabling sustainable investments in conservation measures by individual households

electoral equilibria with restricted strategies we construct a spatial election model in which candidates inherit initial positions in the strategy space presumably from previous political activity and they are restricted to strategies close to their initial positions we establish sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium the equilibrium need not entail an expectation of a zero plurality for each candidate we then apply this model to a sequence of elections in which a series of opposition candidates challenge incumbents given certain regularity conditions the result will be an apparent incumbency advantage corresponding to that observed in recent congressional elections

property rights and the role of the state evidence from the horn of africa this study applies extant theories of property rights change to three land tenure systems in imperial ethiopia two of the areas underwent changes in property rights after experiencing changes in the value of land one did not a data set of litigation over land rights is used in conjunction with case studies to understand the mechanisms motivating or impeding property rights change amendments to the role of the state are suggested and two conclusions are reached 1 that movement towards greater specificity of land rights did not always occur and 2 the changes in property rights that occurred were imposed from above rather than occurring endogenously where property rights changes did not occur they appear to have been blocked by the state which was more concerned with political survival than with revenue maximisation

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

a model of electoral competition with incomplete information a model of two candidate electoral competition is developed in which voters are uncertain about the policy either candidate would implement if elected candidates simultaneously announce policy positions from which voters attempt to infer the true positions the candidates would adopt announcing a position different from the true position is costly to the winning candidate with these costs increasing as the difference between the true policy and the announced policy increases a refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept is used to describe the behavior of candidates and voters

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

innovative strategic groups in multinational industries abstract differences in innovative strategies between groups of domestic and multinational enterprises are analyzed within a two stage game model that incorporates the asymmetries in transaction costs between the two species of enterprises nash and cooperative behaviour is shown to result in different equilibrium r d strategies with the multinational companies doing typically more r d for larger markets and domestic companies focusing on specific market segments survey data from companies operating in eleven high tech multinational industries in belgium provide support for these strategic differences and show how they are related to company performance

durable goods market structure and the incentives to innovate a commonly cited finding in the innovation literature is that a monopoly tends to innovate too little this paper demonstrates that a monopoly may devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal if it produces a durable good this possibility occurs because durability creates new innovation incentives once an initial stock of a durable good has been produced the monopoly faces a residual demand for the good innovation may allow the monopoly to more profitably exploit this residual demand and this ability may lead the monopoly to devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

innovation and cooperation under vertical product differentiation abstract this paper analyzes the strategic decisions of two identical duopolists who determine both the timing and the quality of their innovation through their research and development activities the product market is vertically differentiated and the firms choose the prices of their innovations in bertrand competition the firms interact in a two stage non cooperative game where they first decide on the quality and innovation date and then choose the prices in the second stage appropriately the existence of equilibria in pure and mixed strategies is analyzed it is shown that the firms have an incentive to form a research joint venture and to share their research know how even when research results are certain and there are no spillover effects and that cooperation is not socially desirable

racing with uncertainty a patent race experiment this paper presents an experimental test of the multi stage patent race model of harris and vickers rev econ stud 54 1987 1 tied competitors invested more when nearer the end of the race but this may have followed from a more general and unexplained pattern of a positive correlation between investment and progress in the race the relationship between investment and gap between competitors was mostly not as predicted also leaders did not invest more than not heavily lagging followers and the race did not approach monopoly as the gap between competitors widened overall the evidence brings only limited support to the theory

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

n firm oligopolies with production adjustment costs best responses and equilibrium abstract n firm single product oligopolies will be examined without product differentiation and with production adjustment costs the best response functions of the firms will be first determined in terms of the outputs of the rest of the industry and the firm s own outputs of the previous time period this function is always decreasing not necessarily continuous and might have two different values then the best response will be determined when the output of the rest of the industry is replaced by the output of the entire industry we will show that this function might have infinitely many values leading to infinitely many equilibria a complete description of the equilibrium set will also be given the theoretical findings will be illustrated with the case of linear price and linear cost functions

patent races optimal with respect to entry we introduce a patent prize which induces entry at a level which satisfies the basic condition of optimality with respect to the size of the race a second best patent we observe that for the lee wilde model of a patent race the second best prize induces approximately the socially optimal first best outcome the approach of the second best patent provides one explanation for why discoverers should only receive a fraction of the ex post social value of their discovery

complementary resources and cooperative research a model of research joint ventures among competitors we present a model of research joint ventures in which if firms have highly complementary skills and resources then they prefer to cooperate in areas where the technology is highly appropriable as in applied research the model also indicates that large firms have a greater incentive to cooperate because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of a research venture these findings seem to explain why cooperative research among rival firms in japan has been applied rather than basic and conducted frequently among large companies but firms prefer as small a partner as possible to limit the sharing of research results creating a tension that may make cooperative efforts among rivals difficult to manage for this reason cooperation with organizations such as universities or nonprofit institutions may be a viable alternative for firms looking for complementary skills and resources

partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy in the postwar united states the president s party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election republican administrations exhibit below average and democratic administrations above average economic growth in the first half of each term whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities in presidential elections voters choose between two polarized candidates they then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president s policies by strengthening the opposition in congress since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies our model predicts a spurious correlation between the state of the economy and elections our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election our model performs empirically at least as well as and often better than alternative models

tax reform and temporary inefficiency abstract if any type of direct income redistribution is permitted a very weak condition ensures that it will not be desirable or necessary to permit production inefficiency in the process of a pareto improving tax reform inefficiency arises in models which make an implausible set of assumptions about the range of policies available to the government

on 64 majority rule introduction d une definition de consensus social base sur deux restrictions une sur les preferences individuelles et l autre sur la distribution des preferences dans ce cas de consensus une regle de majorite a 64 presente de nombreuses proprietes interessantes par opposition aux regles de super majorite possedant des proprietes paradoxales comme les regles electorales americaines

market leadership with a sequence of history dependent patent races this note extends the results of j vickers 1986 examining the consequences on the evolution of market structure of having payoffs and thus profits and incentives which depend on the technological history of the firms in a simple duopoly model the author determines the conditions under which the technological leadership of a firm is strengthened over time increasing dominance or is progressively eroded by the rival catching up this reformulation of vickers model can also accommodate incremental innovations i e technological changes that do not allow the innovator to overtake the rival copyright 1989 by blackwell publishing ltd

retrospective voting an experimental study this essay reports on some experiments designed to study two candidate electoral competition when voters are retrospective voters the experiments consist of a sequence of elections in which subjects play the part of both voters and candidates in each election the incumbent adopts a policy position in a one dimensional policy space and voters are paid on the basis of single peaked utility function over that space for the position adopted by the incumbent neither voters nor candidates are informed of the voter utility functions and the only information received by the voter is the payoff he has received from the present and previous incumbent administrations despite the severely limited information of candidates and voters we find that generally candidates converge toward the median voter ideal point

risk aversion in rent seeking and rent augmenting games the effects of risk aversion are examined for two types of expenditures in rent seeking contests a rent seeking expenditures which improve the probability that the rent is obtained and b rent augmenting expenditures which increase the size of the rent to be awarded risk aversion is shown to reduce expenditures of type b unambiguously while having an indeterminate effect on those of type a these two contrasting results are shown to derive from the very different effects rent seeking and rent augmenting expenditures have on the riskiness of a player s position

party policy and campaign costs in a multi constituency model of electoral competition in this essay a multi constituency model of electoral competition was developed under the assumption that party candidates possessed no effective autonomy such a model describes the polar extreme opposite that of the more common single constituency framework in which candidates have complete autonomy the existence of a nash equilibrium to the multi constituency election game was established under the assumption that parties maximize the expected number of winning seats or behaved as pure independents under any other reasonable election goal e g maximize probability of winning a majority of constituencies this existence breaks down the nature of any equilibrium was investigated in some detail and the influence of campaign costs both statutory and non statutory on party behaviour analysed this was found to be qualitatively important in particular differingeconomic resources between parties is sufficient to prevent convergence inpolicy space

practical implications of game theoretic models of r and d the purpose of this paper is to survey recent game theoretic models of research and development and to ask whether they yield practical implications or testable hypotheses the papers i will be discussing have been written or published within the past five years they have a good deal in common relying upon similar assumptions and building upon each other because of this the literature surveyed here may seem narrow and some relevant work has probably been inadvertently omitted i apologize for these omissions for want of space i will not discuss the normative conclusions of this literature

voting competitions with interested politicians platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter we examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter preferences if politicians utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election equilibrium strategies will diverge instead of converging to the median voter s preferences as long as politicians have different preferences we present conditions i for political compromise and ii for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement

r d competition between public and private sectors abstract we investigate a mixed market where a welfare maximizing public research institute competes against profit maximizing private firms we investigate r d competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and r d expenditure we find that the innovation size r d expenditure chosen by the public institute is too small too large from the viewpoint of social welfare respectively and so the government should control the public institute appropriately we also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes

undominated directions of tax reform abstract this article considers the reform of a commodity tax system consumers preferences over directions of tax reform are constructed from indirect utility functions a wicksellian decision procedure is used to define a dominance relation on the set of directions of change direction x dominates direction y if and only if a everybody prefers x to y or b x is the status quo and at least one person prefers x to y a number of characterizations of undominated directions of change are provided a related unanimity rule procedure which does not single out the status quo for special treatment is also considered particular attention is paid to the issue of whether wicksellian reforms preserve production efficiency remarks on the relationship between this work previous work in optimal taxation theory and social choice theory are also provided

the political economy of the pharmaceutical industry e conomicsis a practical science since its inception as an independent discipline it has probed the major policy issues of the day the topics that aroused the interests of its practitioners have generally been those that presented government officials with critical choices the modern literature on the economics of the pharmaceutical industry is no exception this body of material originated with the investigations of the kefauver committee in late 1959 public interest was aroused by the spectacle of confrontation between committee and industry the record made by this committee and its successors grew to tens of thousands of pages as claims and counterclaims were offered regarding industry conduct and performance the primary line of attack concerned pharmaceutical prices and profits the committee demonstrated that prices generally exceeded direct costs of manufacturing for 22 major pharmaceutical firms in 1958 costs of goods sold were merely 32 percent of total sales u s senate report 1961 p 31 the committee argued that this fact alone demonstrated the presence of monopoly power while the substantial difference between revenues and production costs permitted high expenditures on research and development it also paid for even higher selling outlays moreover reported rates of return after taxes during this period on the order of 21 to 22 percent exceeded twice the average for all manufacturing the industry replied that on the contrary prices were low relative to the value afforded consumers and high returns on successful products were required to balance the losses from the large numbers of unsuccessful ones the relevant concept of marginal costs according to the industry position must include the costs of developing and marketing new products and therefore prices were not excessive at all although it admitted earning substantial profits the industry argued that without these returns research outlays would be limited and the number of new drugs reduced the committee countered that little of social value arose from industry research molecules were manipulated and the new drugs that resulted were therapeutically similar to those already on the market indeed it suggested that much