optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information abstract consider a revenue maximizing seller who can sell an object to one of n potential buyers each buyer either has hard information about his valuation i e evidence that cannot be forged or is ignorant the optimal mechanism is characterized it turns out that more ignorance can increase the expected total surplus even when the buyers are ex ante symmetric the object may be sold to a buyer who does not have the largest willingness to pay nevertheless an additional buyer increases the expected total surplus in the symmetric case whereas more competition can be harmful if there are ex ante asymmetries

efficient non contractible investments in large economies abstract do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions we present a two sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching once matched buyer and seller bargain over the price taking into account outside options efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium we characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient we also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d51

did the elimination of mandatory retirement affect faculty retirement a special exemption from the 1986 age discrimination act allowed colleges and universities to enforce mandatory retirement of faculty at age 70 until 1994 we construct a survey that permits us to compare faculty turnover rates before and after the law changed at a large sample of institutions with defined contribution pension plans after the elimination of compulsory retirement the retirement rates of 70 and 71 year olds fell by two thirds and were comparable to rates of 69 year olds these findings indicate that u s colleges and universities will experience a rise in the number of older faculty over the coming years jel j26 i21

repudiation and renegotiation the case of sovereign debt a model of sovereign debt is analyzed in this model renegotiation arises in a natural way because information is incomplete the renegotiation game has many equilibria the standard contract theory approach suggests that the parties should agree to choose the efficient equilibrium strategies when the contract is written refinements of the equilibrium notion such as strategic stability suggest that a very inefficient equilibrium may be chosen the tension between these two approaches raises deep questions about the correct way to analyze a large class of contracting problems copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

cash by any other name evidence on labelling from the uk winter fuel payment standard economic theory implies that the labelling of cash transfers or cash equivalents e g child benefits food stamps should have no effect on spending patterns the empirical literature to date does not contradict this proposition we study the uk winter fuel payment wfp a cash transfer to older households exploiting sharp eligibility criteria in a regression discontinuity design we find robust evidence of a behavioural effect of the labelling on average households spend 41 of the wfp on fuel if the payment was treated as cash we would expect households to spend approximately 3 of the payment on fuel

the illusory effects of saving incentives on saving the authors evaluate research on how tax based saving incentives iras and 401 k s affect saving previous research overstates the impact of the incentives on saving by failing to account for several issues households with saving incentives have stronger tastes for saving than others saving incentives have interacted with debt nonfinancial assets financial markets and pensions and saving incentives represent pretax balances whereas taxable accounts represent posttax balances accounting for these issues essentially eliminates the impact of saving incentives on saving the authors conclude that little if any of the contributions to existing saving incentives have raised saving

investments holdup and the form of market contracts the authors analyze incomplete contracts to induce efficient investment with exogenous switching costs fixed price contracts are efficient generate some rigidity in prices are renegotiated intermittently by possibly small amounts and when inflation is positive generate asymmetric responses to shocks all consistent with evidence on prices and wages with two sided specific investments efficiency requires prices to have sufficient escalator clauses to avoid renegotiation as observed in many long term contracts a third case with one sided specific investments can generate take or pay contracts and explain why firms sometimes pay for specific investments that appear to benefit employees directly

pension plan characteristics and framing effects in employee savings behavior abstract defined contribution pensions in many postsecondary institutions are funded by a combination of an employer premium and a mandatory employee premium individuals can also contribute to a supplemental savings account holding constant total compensation standard reasoning suggests that supplemental savings should depend negatively on the sum of the employer and employee pension contributions contrarily we find that the supplementary savings of professors are significantly more sensitive to employee contributions than to employer contributions this asymmetry is consistent with different marginal propensities to save out of the salary and pension components of compensation nevertheless impacts on lifetime utility are relatively modest

paying not to go to the gym how do consumers choose from a menu of contracts we analyze a novel dataset from three u s health clubs with information on both the contractual choice and the day to day attendance decisions of 7 752 members over three years the observed consumer behavior is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs first members who choose a contract with a flat monthly fee of over 70 attend on average 4 3 times per month they pay a price per expected visit of more than 17 even though they could pay 10 per visit using a 10 visit pass on average these users forgo savings of 600 during their membership second consumers who choose a monthly contract are 17 percent more likely to stay enrolled beyond one year than users committing for a year this is surprising because monthly members pay higher fees for the option to cancel each month we also document cancellation delays and attendance expectations among other findings leading explanations for our findings are overconfidence about future self control or about future efficiency overconfident agents overestimate attendance as well as the cancellation probability of automatically renewed contracts our results suggest that making inferences from observed contract choice under the rational expectation hypothesis can lead to biases in the estimation of consumer preferences

how retirement saving programs increase saving this paper summarizes the authors work on the effect of ira and 401 k contributions on net personal saving they consider many different nonparametric approaches to controlling for heterogeneity in individual saving behavior and conclude that the weight of the available evidence suggests that contributions to both iras and 401 k s largely represent new saving the authors devote particular attention to reconciling their results with the findings in other studies that reach different conclusions sometimes using the same databases that the authors analyze methodological limitations that undermine the reliability of results in other studies explain many of these disparities

household saving micro theories and micro facts in this survey we review the recent theoretical and empirical literature on household saving and consumption the discussion is structured around a list of motives for saving and how well the standard theory captures these motives we show that almost all of the motives for saving that have been suggested in the informal saving literature can be captured in the standard optimizing model particular attention is given to recent work on the precautionary motive and its implications for saving and consumption behavior we also discuss the behavioral or psychological approach that eschews the use of standard optimization techniques and focuses instead on direct consideration on saving we provide a section on facts who save and how much we then discuss informally the recent decline in the u s saving rate and whether the theory is of much use in understanding this and other changes in aggregate saving rates over time we do not find any convincing explanation for the change in saving rates we also discuss some analyses of saving behavior over the life cycle addressing such questions as whether households save enough for retirement and whether the consumption patterns of older households can be rationalized within a simple life cycle model we also review a great number of studies of the consumption euler equations based on our analysis of the studies cited we conclude that there is still mixed evidence that consumption is excessively sensitive to income we also examine in depth the recent empirical literature on the precautionary motive we conclude that although some households do seem to have a significant precautionary motive at some points in their life cycle this motive is not so strong empirically as some investigators suggest

valuation equilibrium with clubs abstract this paper considers model worlds in which there is a continuum of individuals who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities we show how through a suitable choice of commodity space restrictions on the composition of feasible groups can be incorporated into the specification of the consumption and production sets of the economy we also show that if there are a finite number of types then the classical results from the competitive analysis of convex finite agent economies can be reinterpreted to apply journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d51 h41

marriage specialization and the gender division of labor we consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition in our formal model agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market we show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor this division is not pareto improving both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase

truthtelling in matching markets we analyze a search and matching model with non transferable utility and asymmetric information randomly paired agents go through an evaluation phase at the end of which they discover each other s types and choose to match or not before deciding to enter this phase agents can communicate through cheap talk we provide conditions for this communication to be informative and we examine how it affects agents welfare we show that communication is pareto improving only when the matching is assortative in the absence of communication and left unchanged by information transmission

appropriation and efficiency a revision of the first theorem of welfare economics the first theorem of welfare economics rests on the assumption that individuals have neither price making nor market making capacities we offer a revision in which individuals have such capacities the revision emphasizes two keys for market efficiency i the need to align private rewards with social contributions called full appropriation and ii the need for an assumption to counter the possibility of coordination failures in the choice of produced commodities called noncomplementarity we also emphasize that information about prices of unmarketed commodities involves decentralized knowledge available only to product innovators and that pecuniary extemalities are important potential sources of market failure jel d51 d60 d62

a theory of the consumption function with and without liquidity constraints fifteen years ago milton friedman s 1957 treatise a theory of the consumption function seemed badly dated dynamic optimization theory had not been employed much in economics when friedman wrote and utility theory was still comparatively primitive so his statement of the permanent income hypothesis never actually specified a formal mathematical model of behavior derived explicitly from utility maximization instead friedman relied at crucial points on intuition and verbal descriptions of behavior although these descriptions sounded plausible when other economists subsequently found multiperiod maximizing models that could be solved explicitly the implications of those models differed sharply from friedman s intuitive description of his model furthermore empirical tests in the 1970s and 1980s often rejected these rigorous versions of the permanent income hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis that many households simply spent all of their current income today with the benefit of a further round of mathematical and computational advances friedman s 1957 original analysis looks more prescient than primitive it turns out that when there is meaningful uncertainty in future labor income the optimal behavior of moderately impatient consumers is much better described by friedman s original statement of the permanent income hypothesis than by the later explicit maximizing versions furthermore in a remarkable irony much of the empirical evidence that rejected the permanent income hypothesis as specified in tests of the 1970s and 1980s is actually consistent both with friedman s original description of the model and with the new version with serious uncertainty there are four key differences between the explicit maximizing models

retirement security in an aging population abstract elderly individuals exhibit wide disparities in their sources of income for those in the bottom half of the income distribution social security is the most important source of support program changes would directly affect their well being income from private pensions assets and earnings are relatively more important for higher income elderly individuals who have more diverse income sources the trend from private sector defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans has shifted responsibility for retirement security to individuals a significant subset of the population is unlikely to be able to sustain their standard of living in retirement without higher pre retirement saving

a spillover based theory of credentialism i propose a model in which credentials such as diplomas are instrumentally valuable to workers the model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker s wage to their output a worker s productivity is influenced by the skills of their co workers where such skills arise from an ability augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co workers credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market thereby allowing them to match with high skill co workers in equilibrium despite the positive externality associated with a worker s investment i show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium

procrastination and obedience in this lecture i shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large thus in my examples decision makers are quite close to the intelligent well informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics this lecture discusses and illustrates several pathological modes of individual and group behavior procrastination in decision making undue obedience to authority membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise in each case individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior the standard assumption of rational forwardlooking utility maximizing is violated the nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness for example present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs

efficient investments in the implementation problem abstract this paper identifies a condition for an efficient social choice rule to be fully implementable when we take into account investment efficiency to do so we extend the standard implementation problem to include endogenous ex ante and ex post investments in our problem the social planner aims to achieve efficiency in every equilibrium of a dynamic game in which agents strategically make investments before and after playing the mechanism our main theorem shows that a novel condition commitment proofness is sufficient and necessary for an efficient social choice rule to be implementable in subgame perfect equilibria the availability of ex post investments is crucial in our model there is no social choice rule that is efficient and implementable in subgame perfect equilibria without ex post investments we also show that our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting

humps and bumps in lifetime consumption in this article we argue that the life cycle model that allows demographics to affect household preferences and relaxes the assumption of certainty equivalence can generate hump shaped consumption profiles over age that are very similar to those observed in household level data sources and in particular match the differences in shape across different education groups liquidity constraints or myopia are not required to explain the empirical features of observed life cycle patterns

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

liquidity provision banking and the allocation of interest rate risk abstract the paper studies the efficient allocation of technology induced interest rate risk and the implications of such risk for efficient liquidity provision complete immunization against interest rate risk is shown to be undesirable as it precludes the exploitation of favourable reinvestment opportunities under the assumptions of diamond dybvig 1983 interest induced valuation risks of long term assets should be born by early withdrawers reinvestment opportunity risks of short term assets by late withdrawers efficient liquidity provision thus entails no shifting of interest rate risk in the absence of additional moral hazard second best allocations can be implemented through unregulated competition among banks

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

capital structure under costly enforcement we consider financial structure and repayment behavior in a setting where cash flows are private information to the entrepreneur and the cost of enforcing repayment differs across security holders if enforcement costs are lower for shareholders than for creditors a mixed capital structure with debt and equity can obtain in equilibrium under a mixed capital structure creditors intervene in low cash flow states while shareholders intervene in high cash flow states moreover strategic defaults costly bankruptcy shareholder intervention and violation of absolute priority occur with positive probability on the equilibrium path several of the predictions from our framework are consistent with evidence not readily explainable by existing theories

individual financial decisions in retirement saving plans the role of participant direction abstract workers with individual retirement saving accounts often make decisions about contribution rates and asset allocation that affect ultimate retirement income this paper presents econometric evidence from two data sets on the role that participant investment choice plays in asset allocation contributions and account balances my preferred estimates indicate that participants with investment choice are 36 percent more likely to make an annual contribution these participants are estimated to invest 13 percentage points more in stocks contribute between one and three percentage points more of salary and have at least 9000 more in their account than comparable participants without investment choice

investment in schooling and the marriage market we present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns the labor market return resulting from higher wages and a marriagemarket return defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles this asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses when the labor market returns to schooling rises home production demands less time and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken more women may invest in schooling than men

non economic engagement and international exchange the case of environmental treaties we examine the role of non economic partnerships in promoting international economic exchange since far sighted countries are more willing to join costly international partnerships such as environmental treaties environmental engagement tends to encourage international lending countries with such non economic partnerships also find it easier to engage in economic exchanges since they face the possibility that debt default might also spill over to hinder their non economic relationships we present a theoretical model of these ideas and then verify their empirical importance using a bilateral cross section of data on international crossholdings of assets and environmental treaties our results support the notion that international environmental cooperation facilitates economic exchange

prompting microfinance borrowers to save a field experiment from guatemala abstractcan microfinance borrowers use the discipline of regular loan repayments in order to accumulate savings if prompted to do so in an experiment we offered commercial savings products to the microfinance borrowers of guatemala s largest public sector bank we find that giving these borrowers the opportunity to develop a savings plan and be reminded of saving at the time of loan repayment caused no increase in the opening of savings accounts but led to balances among savers that were two and a half times those in the control a second treatment arm that proposed a default savings contribution of 10 of the loan payment caused the fraction of clients using linked savings accounts to double as well as elevated deposits among savers leading to final savings balances that were more than five times the control the savings treatments also generate faster pay down of debt and weakly better overall repayment performance suggesting that simultaneous saving and borrowing can be complementary activities a

expropriation risk and technology abstract this paper develops a unified framework to analyze the dynamics of firm investment in countries with poor legal enforcement the firm s technology edge over the government generates endogenous property rights industry variation in the technology gap predicts a sectoral pecking order of expropriations long run investment distortions may be pareto superior relative to persistent investment at the static optimum the dynamics of investment and transfers depend on whether incentives backloading or efficiency frontloading concerns dominate at the initial division of surplus an increase in government efficiency may reduce its welfare the model provides a technology driven rationale for the widespread use of conglomerate structures in emerging market countries

on the asset allocation of a default pension fund we characterize the optimal default fund in a dened contribution dc pension plan using detailed data on individuals and their holdings inside and outside the pension system we nd substantial heterogeneity among default investors in terms of labor income nancial wealth and stock market participation we build a life cycle consumption savings model incorporating a dc pension account and realistic investor heterogeneity we examine the optimal asset allocation for dierent realized equity returns and investors and compare it with age based investing the optimal asset allocation leads to less inequality in pensions while it moderates the risks through active rebalancing

holdups and efficiency with search frictions a natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees and larger investments translate into higher wages in particular when wages are determined by ex post bargaining the equilibrium is always inefficient recognizing that capital intensive production relations have to pay higher wages firms reduce their investments this can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers but this in turn depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms in contrast to this benchmark we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers this efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers we show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital intensive jobs

on the optimality of resetting executive stock options the practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect initial incentives resetting can still be an important value enhancing aspect of compensation contracts even from an ex ante standpoint in fact we find that some resetting is almost always optimal the relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to influence the resetting process greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers

investment and competitive matching we study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching additional equilibria may arise in this sunk investment setting even though our matching market is competitive these equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures all allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition we identify sufficient conditions most notably quasiconcave utilities for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions most notably a single crossing property for agents to be matched positive assortatively with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations

innovation market structure and the holdup problem investment incentives and coordination abstract i analyze the innovation incentives under monopoly and duopoly provision of horizontally differentiated products purchased via bilateral negotiations integrating the market structure and innovation literature with the holdup literature i show that competition can improve local incentives for non contractible investment because innovation levels are generally strategic substitutes however there can be multiple duopoly equilibria in some circumstances monopoly can provide a coordination device that can lead to greater expected welfare despite inferior local innovation incentives the conditions for this to be the case however are quite restrictive

what accounts for the variation in retirement wealth among u s households even among households with similar socioeconomic characteristics saving and wealth vary considerably life cycle models attribute this variation to differences in time preference rates risk tolerance exposure to uncertainty relative tastes for work and leisure at advanced ages and income replacement rates these factors have testable implications concerning the relation between accumulated wealth and the shape of the consumption profile using the panel study of income dynamics and the consumer expenditure survey we find little support for these implications the data are instead consistent with rule of thumb mental accounting or hyperbolic discounting theories of wealth accumulation jel di d91 e21

competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two sided ex ante investments abstract we analyze a competitive price taking search model where workers and firms make costly investments e g in education and physical capital respectively before they enter the labor market the environment features transferable utility and symmetric information a key novelty with respect to existing work is that we allow for multidimensional heterogeneity on both sides of the market the probabilities of finding and filling different jobs and the corresponding wages are determined endogenously in equilibrium we show that constrained efficient allocations can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem whereas the prices supporting these allocations and the associated expected payoffs for workers and firms correspond to the solutions of the dual of that linear program we use this characterization to show that an equilibrium exists and is constrained efficient under very general conditions the fact that linear programming techniques are used for the structural estimation of frictionless matching models suggests that our framework is potentially useful for empirical studies of labor markets and other markets where search frictions are prevalent

education matching and the allocative value of romance societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non market goods such as marital partnerships we explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labour supply decisions of partnered couples we consider two separate matching paradigms for agents with heterogeneous abilities one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt these generate different investment incentives and therefore have a real impact on the market economy while marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency romantic matching generates greater allocative efficiency since more high ability individuals participate in the labour market the analysis offers the possibility of explaining cross country differences in educational investments and labour force participation based on matching regimes

the effects of pensions on household wealth a reevaluation of theory and evidence this paper examines the extent to which households offset pension wealth with reductions in other wealth systematic econometric biases imply that the estimated offsets in previous empirical studies are smaller than the true offset and may even have the wrong sign new empirical estimates that do not correct for the biases generate little offset between pensions and other wealth estimates that correct for the biases show substantially more offset a smaller impact of pensions on overall saving than in most previous studies the estimates also indicate that the effects of pensions on wealth vary significantly across households

specialization and competition in marriage models abstract i present a marriage model that includes pre marital investments in human capital individuals expect the future role specialization in marriage the specialization effect but at the same time before marriage individuals have the incentive to invest in order to make themselves more attractive the competition effect the interaction of two effects generates multiple equilibria no equilibria are ex ante efficient when the benefits of role specialization exist the competition effect is a source of coordination failure in the match formation this result stands in contrast to those of other models in which the competition effect leads to efficiency in some equilibrium

pre match investment with frictions the paper explores an environment in which agents are motivated to make unproductive investments with the sole aim of improving their matching opportunities in contrast to existing work i add frictions by allowing the investment to be imperfectly observed the analysis allows for a deeper understanding of the trade off inherent in related models investments waste resources but facilitates more efficient matching patterns i show that greater frictions i do not always lead to inferior matching patterns and ii can force the economy into to a pareto preferred equilibrium

clubs and the market this paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market can belong to several clubs and care about the characteristics of the other members of their clubs the space of agents is a continuum but clubs are finite it is shown that i competitive equilibria exist and ii the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states the central subtlety is in modeling club memberships and expressing the notion that membership choices are consistent across the population

the labeling effect of a child benefit system child benefit systems exist in many countries while they show a lot of differences in terms of eligibility rules amounts involved and implementation tax deduction tax credit or direct benefit the common motivation for their existence is to increase children s welfare in the dutch child benefit system the case i focus on in this paperone of the parents usually the mother is entitled to an untaxed child benefit amount which only depends on the child s age and the number of children in the household thus child support does not depend on household income marital status or labor market status as a result child benefit is exogenous to the household given the presence of children this is in contrast with the situation in many other countries including germany france the united kingdom and the united states where government provided child support is partly means tested see jonathan bradshaw et al 1993 in the netherlands child benefit is generally a nonnegligible addition to the household income the median share of child benefit in the total net income of households with children is 8 percent on the national level expenditures on child benefits amount to 1 2 percent of gnp the use of the child benefit is completely at the discretion of the parent there are no legal requirements that a certain amount be spent on particular goods or services nor does the government provide any guidelines regarding expenditure on children a policy question that arises is to what extent children benefit from child benefits standard microeconomic demand theory allows no role for effects of the composition of income given the fungibility of income sources it is only the sum of income components that is relevant in explaining expenditure patterns thus within that framework the answer would be that the marginal propensity to consume child goods from one guilder of child benefits is no different than from one guilder of any other income source in the more general class of gametheoretic models of household behavior however the composition of household income will generally affect expenditure patterns see e g shelly j lundberg and robert a pollak 1993 and martin browning et al 1994 if fathers and mothers have different preferences and mothers have control over child benefits the effect of child benefits on expenditures will differ from the effect of other income sources lundberg et al 1997 provide empirical evidence showing that a transfer of control over child benefits from fathers to mothers in the united kingdom due to a change in legislation resulted in a significant increase in expenditures on child clothing daniela del boca and christopher j flinn 1994 have analyzed the effect of income composition on expenditure decisions of divorced mothers they find that the coefficients associated with child support and alimony income differ from those for other income in engel curves for expenditures on childspecific goods their results can be explained in terms of a noncooperative nash model in which the child support transfer decisions of the noncustodial father and the expenditure decisions of the mother are determined simultaneously in contrast to del boca and flinn s analysis in which child support is a decision variable the present paper focuses on the possible differential effect of government provided child support which is truly exogenous in this paper i analyze the effects of child benefits on expenditures by running regressions in which child benefit enters as a separate explanatory variable the enipirical analysis is based on a time series of 17 cross section consumer expenditure surveys in the netherlands covering the period 1978 through 1994 it is important to note that in a single cross section it department of economics university of groningen p o b 800 9700 av groningen the netherlands e mail p kooreman eco rug nl i am indebted to two anonymous referees for constructive comments helpful comments were also provided by rob alessie maarten allers chris bojke werner de bondt bert schoonbeek and tom wansbeek i thank vincent linderhof for organizing the data financial support was provided by the dutch organization for scientific research nwo homes project grant

iras and household saving this paper examines the effects of individual retirement accounts iras on private and national saving the authors construct a formal model of dynamic utility maximization that generates closed form equations for ira and other saving their empirical estimates indicate that raising the annual ira contribution limit between 1983 and 1986 would have resulted in little if any increase in national saving results from sensitivity analysis imply substantially smaller effects on national saving than most previous researchers have estimated the authors results are consistent with new evidence they present indicating considerable potential among ira holders to shift taxable forms of saving into iras copyright 1994 by american economic association

adaptability productivity and educational incentives in a matching model abstract we study the connections between the labour market and the education sector in a matching framework with ex post wage bargaining workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology education is a time consuming activity and determines jointly the scope or adaptability and intensity or productivity of individual skills we establish three main results first unemployment provides incentives to schooling by raising the need for adaptability second private returns to productivity are below social returns but no hold up phenomenon is involved third due to wage and congestion externalities private returns to adaptability exceed social returns as a consequence both over and under education may take place in equilibrium

the certification value of private debt renegotiation and the design of financial contracts empirical evidence from europe abstract by using a sample of bank loan renegotiations by european firms i show that the renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification value while deeply changing the contractual features of the loan over time to the benefit of shareholders i find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase the cumulative abnormal returns of a borrowing firm by 10 15 early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturities also imply a positive stock market reaction amendments signaling the early accrual of new and positive information allow increasing firm value

sovereign debt as intertemporal barter author s kletzer kenneth m wright brian d abstract borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk averse party subject to endowment shocks the surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign the sole punishments consist of renegotiation proof changes in the path of future payments we show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever that is borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater long term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short term loans the analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved

the timing of education we study an assignment with investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before ex ante system and after ex post system matching on the labor market the ex post system is better at coordinating investment within firms whereas the ex ante system is better at reducing mismatches we further show that the ability to transfer surplus within firms affects mismatches and the relative performance of the two systems at high degrees of transferability they are equivalent but when transferability is very low the ex post system outperforms the ex ante system although with moderate transferability the reverse is true jel i21 i28 j31 j42

does competition solve the hold up problem in an environment in which heterogeneous buyers and sellers undertake ex ante investments the presence of market competition for matches provides incentives for investment but may leave inefficiencies namely hold up and coordination problems this paper shows using an explicitly non cooperative model that when matching is assortative and investments precede market competition buyers investments are constrained efficient while sellers marginally underinvest with respect to what would be constrained efficient however the overall extent of this inefficiency may be large multiple equilibria may arise one equilibrium is characterized by efficient matches but there can be additional equilibria with coordination failures

active vs passive decisions and crowd out in retirement savings accounts evidence from denmark using 41 million observations on savings for the population of denmark we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice subsidies for retirement accounts which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts we estimate that each 1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent in contrast policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts increase wealth accumulation substantially we estimate that approximately 15 of individuals are active savers who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts 85 of individuals are passive savers who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated we conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons i subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond ii they generate substantial crowd out conditional on response and iii they do not increase the savings of passive individuals who are least prepared for retirement jel codes h2 h3

default and renegotiation a dynamic model of debt we analyze the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash e ows rather than to divertthem in the e rstpartof the paper we study the optimal debt contract specie cally the trade off between the size of the loan and the repayment under the assumption that some debt contract is optimal in the second part we consider a more general class of nondebt contracts and derive sufficient conditions for debt to be optimal among these

consumption versus expenditure previous authors have documented a dramatic decline in food expenditures at the time of retirement we show that this is matched by an equally dramatic rise in time spent shopping for and preparing meals using a novel data set that collects detailed food diaries for a large cross section of u s households we show that neither the quality nor the quantity of food intake deteriorates with retirement status we also show that unemployed households experience a decline in food expenditure and food consumption commensurate with the impact of job displacement on permanent income these results highlight how direct measures of consumption distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated shocks to income whereas measures of expenditures obscure the distinction

optimal defaults and active decisions defaults often have a large influence on consumer decisions we identify an overlooked but practical alternative to defaults requiring individuals to make an explicit choice for themselves we study such active decisions in the context of 401 k saving we find that compelling new hires to make active decisions about 401 k enrollment raises the initial fraction that enroll by 28 percentage points relative to a standard opt in enrollment procedure producing a savings distribution three months after hire that would take 30 months to achieve under standard enrollment we also present a model of 401 k enrollment and derive conditions under which the optimal enrollment regime is automatic enrollment i e default enrollment standard enrollment i e default non enrollment or active decisions i e no default and compulsory choice active decisions are optimal when consumers have a strong propensity to procrastinate and savings preferences are highly heterogeneous financial illiteracy however favors default enrollment over active decision enrollment