reputation in dynamic games abstract we analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long lived small players in which state variables affect players payoffs the large player s type is private information we give conditions under which in every nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game while our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government policy we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail to improve the monopolist s payoff journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73

perfect equilibria in a trade liberalization game the credibility of temporary protection is examined in a simple infinite horizon perfect information game of timing in which the domestic government uses the threat of future liberalization to induce the domestic firm to invest all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria are cyclical and surprisingly one of them implements optimal temporary protection however this equilibrium fails to pass another credibility criterion called renegotiation proof the game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies copyright 1990 by american economic association

the political economy of declining industries senescent industry collapse revisited many observers have noted a strong tendency for protection once it is instituted to persist over time this paper first shows that persistent protection arises whenever lobbying is an alternative to costly adjustment with endogenous protection the level of tariffs is an increasing function of past tariffs the more an industry lobbies the greater the current protection it receives and the less it adjusts and the less the industry adjusts the more effective it is as a lobby in the future when the costs of lobbying and adjustment are fully variable declining industries contract more slowly over time and never fully adjust however the paper shows that adding a fixed cost of lobby formation or maintenance is sufficient to generate an endogenous collapse of protection such as that predicted by cassing and hillman 1986 american economic review 76 516 523 in which an industry abruptly terminates its lobbying and loses its protection finally the paper examines the well documented bias against growing industries in the lobbying process

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

an empirical test of the infant industry argument the basic infant industry argument maintains that the cost of a new activity is initially high it does not pay any individual to enter an infant industry at free trade prices if developed the industry will permit a reasonable return on initial losses and a temporary period of protection is required this paper has attempted two things to develop an empirical test for the validity of the infant industry argument and to use that test on turkish data the test is simple and straightforward input per unit of output must fall more rapidly in more protected industries if there is to be any rationale for infant industry protection in the turkish case there was no such tendency over the period covered the fact that protected turkish industries did not experience rapid increases in output per unit of input is sufficient to prove that protection was not warranted it does not however prove that there were no infant industries the trade regime might have provided the wrong incentives and under an alternative structure output per unit of input might have grown more rapidly in some or possibly all turkish industries in conclusion protection did not elicit the sort of growth in output per unit on which infant industry proponents base their claim for protection

aggregate implications of factor substitution in industrial processes abstract using a number of recently completed studies of the scope for factor substitution in industrial processes we estimate the total private benefits of systematic adoption cost minimizing technology as compared with capital intensive technology obstacles to the choice of such technology are examined and presented within a benefit cost framework the reasons for some of the current choices of technology are analyzed and policies necessary to alter these are suggested

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

unemployment insurance recall expectations and unemployment outcomes this paper empirically examines the importance of explicitly accounting for the layoff rehire process in the analysis of unemployment outcomes in the united states we find that the spells of individuals who initially expect to be recalled account for much more of the unemployment of unemployment insurance ui recipients than do spells actually ending in recall our results indicate that the recall and new job escape rates from unemployment have quite different time patterns and are often affected in opposite ways by explanatory variables we also find that the probability of leaving unemployment both through recalls and new job finding increases greatly around the time that ui benefits lapse over the past fifteen years many studies have empirically analyzed the determinants of individual unemployment spell durations in the united states much of this literature has used a job search framework in which the unemployed are viewed as permanently displaced workers who are unattached to jobs the possibility of recall to a former job a process not requiring search has been omitted from explicit consideration in the majority of these studies 2 an explicit treatment of the layoff rehire process is necessary for a proper understanding of the determinants of unemployment durations and of the impacts of unemployment policies in the united states for at least three reasons first temporary layoffs in which workers are often rehired by their original employers are a quantitatively quite important feature of the u s labor market 3 second expectations concerning the likelihood of recall are likely to affect the responses of employers and unemployed workers to labor market interventions such as reemployment bonuses and subsidies

credibility of trade policy reform and investment the mexican experience abstract this paper assesses whether the program of trade liberalization undertaken by mexico after 1985 was undermined by lack of credibility it provides an empirical counterpart to some of the credibility issues that have been discussed elsewhere in the literature and proposes a methodology based on the estimation of a probit model to measure the probability of trade policy reversal due to the likelihood of occurrence of a balance of payments crisis it is shown that the probability of trade policy reversal reduced indeed the rate of capital accumulation during the first years of the reform

opportunity cost trade policies and the efficiency of firms abstract this paper analyzes the effects of trade policies on the technological effort of a firm entering a new market in the context of a developing country we depart from previous literature by bringing into focus the opportunity cost of technological effort a firm that spends time in acquiring a more efficient technology delays the commercialization of its products thus incurring an opportunity cost in terms of profits forgone protection increases both the opportunity cost and the benefits from technological effort in the case of linear demand function and constant returns to scale technology protection is shown to unambiguously reduce the protected firm s technological effort export subsidy is also shown to reduce technological effort when the potential level of exports under free trade is high

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

policy designs in a dynamic model of infant industry protection abstract this paper takes the neoclassical infant industry model allows agents to respond to future expectations and reveals previously unexplained relationships between protection and outcome policy which projects to protect the industry until international competitiveness may not necessarily succeed consistent to the mixed empirical evaluations to guarantee success protection has to last longer however for success to be an equilibrium protection can last shorter decline after take off is also an equilibrium when adjustment speed is bounded increasing the protection rate is not isomorphic to decreasing its duration in policy design adjustment speed critical industry scale and policy duration are all relevant

job search and savings wealth effects and duration dependence this article studies a risk averse worker s optimal savings and job search behavior as she moves back and forth between employment and unemployment we show that job search effort is negatively related to wealth under the assumption of additively separable utility consequently job search exhibits positive unemployment duration dependence because wealth is drawn down to smooth consumption as the spell progresses finally given optimal search savings still provide imperfect insurance against income fluctuations precautionary savings are built up during employment spells and run down during unemployment spells but the consumption path will not be perfectly smooth over states

female labor force intermittency and current earnings a switching regression model with unknown sample selection using the health and retirement survey from the usa this paper finds a 16 selectivity corrected wage penalty among women who engage in intermittent labour market activity this penalty is experienced at a low level of intermittent activity but appears to not play an important role in a woman s decision to undertake such activity in addition employer preferences appear to play a larger role than human capital atrophy in the determination of the wage penalty

labor market search effort with reference dependent preferences we incorporate forward looking reference dependent preferences into a simple job search framework and show that people with strong aversion to losses may choose not to search for a job despite economic incentives to do so we also discuss the policy implications

labor market discrimination against hispanic and black men h ispanic american men have lower average wage rates than white non hispanics in 1975 the average white non hispanic male wage earner in the united states earned 5 97 an hour mexican men earned 4 31 72 as much as white non hispanics puerto rican men earned 4 52 76 as much and cuban men earned 5 33 89 as much as white non hispanics by way of comparison black men s average wages in 1975 were 4 65 78 of the white male wage several possible reasons for the hispanics lower wages come to mind among them are age and education geographic location immigration language difficulties and discrimination for example as shown in table 1 mexicans and puerto ricans are younger on average than the white non hispanic population and earnings tend to rise with age hispanics have lower average levels of education than white non hispanics and wages are positively associated with education many mexican americans live in the southwest where prices are relatively low moreover hispanics are more likely to be recent immigrants and to lack fluency in english than white non hispanics and so to be at a disadvantage in the labor market in addition there is a widespread belief that hispanics suffer from employment discrimination and cannot obtain the wages that their human capital would command if they were non hispanic whites how much of the wage differentials described above are due to each of these factors and to other inter group differences in wage related characteristics in particular how much impact does labor market discrimination have on the average hispanic man s wage and how does this compare with discrimination against blacks this paper provides answers to these questions a few other efforts have been made to analyze the relative earnings of hispanic and white nonhispanic men using 1960 and 1970 census data fogel 1966 poston and alvirez 1973 poston alvirez and tienda 1976 long 1977 and gwartney and long 1978 we use more recent data from the 1976 survey of income and education this data set enables us to measure wage rates more accurately and to specify the wage function more completely than does the census unlike previous analysts in estimating the wage function we take account of possible selectivity bias due to the distinction between average wage offers and average observed wages thus we hope to obtain a more accurate and up to date measure of labor market discrimination against hispanic men section ii explains the method used to separate the minority white non hispanic wage differential into the portions due to differences in average characteristics and the portion due to differences in unobserved factors and discrimination taking into account the possibility of selectivity bias in the observed wage sample section iii describes the data used in the study and the specification of the wage equation the breakdown of the observed wage differentials into components due to differences in participation in the wage and salary sector local price levels average characteristics and discrimination are presented in section iv section v summarizes our findings and discusses their implications for efforts to improve the economic situation of hispanics in the united states

reference dependent job search evidence from hungary we propose a model of job search with reference dependent preferences with loss aversion relative to recent income the reference point in this model newly unemployed individuals search hard since consumption is below their reference point over time though they get used to lower income and thus reduce their search effort in anticipation of a benefit cut their search effort rises again then declines once they get accustomed to the lower postcut benefit level the model fits the typical pattern of exit from unemployment even with no unobserved heterogeneity to distinguish between this and other models we use a unique reform in the unemployment insurance ui benefit path in 2005 hungary switched from a single step ui system to a two step system with overall generosity unchanged the system generated increased hazard rates in anticipation of and especially following benefit cuts in ways the standard model has a hard time explaining we estimate a model with optimal consumption endogenous search effort and unobserved heterogeneity the reference dependent model fits the hazard rates substantially better than plausible versions of the standard model including habit formation our estimates indicate a slow adjusting reference point and substantial impatience likely reflecting present bias jel codes d03 j64 j65

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

at what level of labor market intermittency are women penalized a common explanation offered for the observed wage differential between men and women is that women are less attached to the labor market they exhibit a greater degree of labor market intermittency than do men there are several theories that explain this link between intermittency and lower wages including differences in human capital attainment atrophy of skills during absences and preferences of employers see e g solomon w polachek and w stanley siebert 1993 joyce p jacobsen and laurence m levin 1995 james w albrecht et al 2000 the goal of this paper is to explore in greater depth the role past labormarket intermittency plays in the determination of a woman s current wage and at what level of intermittent activity women can expect to have that activity affect her wage previous methods employed to measure the penalty associated with intermittent activity have either classified workers as intermittent if they have at least one spell of absence from the labor market jacobsen and levin 1995 or have relied on the percentage of time out of the labor force to classify intermittent workers elaine j sorenson 1993 however if employers perceive intermittent behavior as a signal then both the frequency of intermittent spells and the duration of the spells should be taken into account we contribute to this literature by creating an intermittency index that captures both of these factors we also statistically determine at what level of intermittency a woman will incur a penalty for absence from the labor force this index is used to determine the magnitude of the penalty associated with intermittent participation in the labor force the analysis is limited to women as intermittent behavior is more prevalent for women and to avoid potential confounding factors associated with gender discrimination