public procurement with unverifiable quality the case for discriminatory competitive procedures unverifiable quality may affect the enforcement of procurement contracts even when the award procedure is able to select the most efficient firm in the market in this paper we show that a discriminatory competitive mechanism which awards the contract on the basis of price and firms past performance yields an efficient allocation of the contract and allows the buyer to implement her desired quality quality enforcement arises out of relational contracting whereby the buyer handicaps a contractor in future competitive tendering processes if it fails to provide the required quality we study an infinitely repeated procurement model with two firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms cost in which in each period the buyer runs a discriminatory auction we restrict our analysis to the case of a buyer committed to her handicapping strategy a case which captures some of the features of a public buyer when players use either grim trigger or stick and carrot strategies we find that the buyer can induce the delivery of optimal unverifiable quality with a variety of handicap levels and when applicable durations of the punishment period for some values of the handicap and the length of the punishment period both firms remain active in the market even when punished

political variables in cross country growth analysis the recent boom in cross country growth analysis has renewed the empirical interest in political sources of economic growth a large number of studies have tested political variables in growth regressions and a very heterogenous set of variables has been proposed to measure economically relevant differences in the political systems of countries this paper distinguishes five categories of relevant political variables democracy government stability political violence policy volatility and subjective perception of politics for each of these categories the specification testing method and results of the most relevant studies are presented and are critically discussed the paper concludes that measures of democracy are least successful and measures of policy volatility and subjective perception of politics most successful as explanatory variables in cross country growth regressions

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

incentives and transactions costs within the firm estimating an agency model using payroll records we estimate an agency model using the payroll records of a copper mine that paid a production bonus to teams of workers we estimate the cost of incomplete information due to insurance and incentives considerations and the inefficiency caused by the simple form of the incentive contract itself at the estimated parameters the cost of worker risk aversion insurance is of similar magnitude to moral hazard incentives overall incomplete information accounted for one half of the bonus system s inefficiency relative to potential full information profits the other half is attributed to the bonus system s inefficient generation of incentives and insurance relative to the optimal incentive contract

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

a model of efficiency wages as a signal of firm value we consider performance contracts with firm private information the verifiable components of the contract an up front wage and employment may serve both as a signal and a performance incentive job rent may be necessary for signaling and since efficient signaling is multidimensional there is an inextricable link between job rent and underemployment signaling can explain the lack of explicit bonding in actuality though our basic model is static our underemployment result is not a consequence of firm myopia when the firm is farsighted it will not maximize the joint future surplus if it cannot extract the worker s share at present copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment the employment relationship with employees ability and their actions both private information thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard is modeled as a repeated game with self enforcing contracts being perfect bayesian nash equilibria under termination contracts the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks finite in number even though ability is continuous reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment selection by bonding is not in general incentive compatible but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is many other features correspond to observed employment structures

barter for price discrimination abstract we study barter as a discriminatory instrument in oligopoly with asymmetric information buyers producers of final goods differ in the quality of their products sellers producers of inputs use barter as a screening device the higher quality buyers pay in cash while the lower quality ones pay in kind barter identified with non monetary contracts that give a seller control over a buyer s output emerges in equilibrium even in the absence of financial constraints there is a positive relationship between market concentration and the level of barter barter disappears as the market becomes more competitive barter and no barter equilibria coexist for a range of market structures

mandated countertrade as a strategic commitment abstract mandated countertrade is a policy to restrict unilateral imports a country s government thereby in effect commits domestic firms not to purchase from a foreign trading partner unless there are reciprocal sales we argue that the policy may be a rational response to fundamental contracting failures our key assumption being that sellers are incompletely informed about buyers valuations in line with observed practices the analysis suggests that an optimal mandated countertrade policy will target high mark up imports and low mark up exports implications for global welfare are ambiguous and depend upon the extent of a double coincidence of wants

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

rewarding performance by promotion to a different job abstract use of promotions rather than performance related pay to provide incentives can be justified if performance is non verifiable information this does not explain why promotion is to a different job rather than simply a better paid job the effectiveness of tournaments is undermined however if unsuccessful workers are equally suited to higher paid jobs and can engage in bribery or other influence activity a promotion based reward structure with pay tied to jobs can be made immune to such activity if misallocations of employees to jobs are costly to the firm

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

credibility of rules and economic growth a business environment characterized by incredible rules such as unclear property rights constant policy surprises and reversals uncertain contract enforcement and high corruption most likely translates into lower investment and growth the literature on growth and policies has suggested different ways to measure the relevant uncertainties this article proposes a new measurement approach based on firm level surveys and an indicator of the credibility of rules using data from a private sector survey conducted in 73 countries and covering more than 3 800 enterprises standard cross country growth and investment analysis indicates that low credibility of rules is associated with lower rates of investment and growth the survey was designed to capture local entrepreneurs views of the predictability of changes in laws and policies of the reliability of law enforcement of the impact of discretionary and corrupt bureaucracies and of the danger of policy reversals due to changes in governments conf

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

restricting the means of exchange within organizations abstract this paper considers why firms often ban monetary exchange between their employees while encouraging these trades through other means such as through the reciprocation of favours or barter despite classical inefficiencies associated with non monetary exchange we illustrate two themes as to why non monetary trade may be preferred to allowing money first the use of non monetary trade may affect the allocation of rents in surplus enhancing ways as agents respond strategically to the existence of these rents second non monetary trade improves the ability of agents to impose sanctions on those who act dishonestly

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

formal measures in informal management can a balanced scorecard change a culture abstract we extend traditional agency theory by exploring the roles for formal measures when managerial behavior is not governed by rules formulas or contracts part i describes relational incentive contracts with informal weights on formal performance measures more importantly it also explores how formal measures could be used in models of informal management such as adaptation and coordination politics and influence leadership and informal authority part ii considers the benefits from allowing key stakeholders to develop their own potentially inferior performance measures the collaboration to create a balanced scorecard of performance measures can help change an organization s culture

informal family insurance and the design of the welfare state we study unemployment benefit provision when the family also provides social insurance in the benchmark case more generous state transfers crowd out family risk sharing one for one an extension gives the state an advantage in enforcing transfers through taxes whereas families rely on self enforcement more generous state transfers lead to more than one for one reductions in intra family insurance so that total transfers to the unemployed fall as the state s generosity increases this does not imply that the optimal size of the welfare state is zero our results still hold when families are assumed to be better than the state at monitoring job search activities of unemployed

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

productive low morale abstract this paper models employment relationship as a repeated principal agent problem with private evaluation the efficient contracts exhibit correlated movements between lagged wage and current effort that are consistent with the positive feedback between pay and morale in practice low morale therefore is an integral part of a well functioning relationship

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

modelling the energy output ratio abstract the elasticity of energy use with respect to national output has been estimated by various methods with sometimes seemingly contradictory results this study attempts to reconcile these various estimates by modelling the energy output ratio and deriving the corresponding cross section and time series elasticities from this model

involuntary layoffs in a model with asymmetric information concerning worker ability this paper examines the contract between a risk neutral firm and its risk averse employees assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment employers in an external spot labour market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm such as the number of workers it lays off the threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels a seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability

where has all the education gone cross national data show no association between increases in human capital attributable to the rising educational attainment of the labor force and the rate of growth of output per worker this implies that the association of educational capital growth with conventional measures of total factor production is large strongly statistically significant and negative these are on average results derived from imposing a constant coefficient however the development impact of education varied widely across countries and has fallen short of expectations for three possible reasons first the institutional governance environment could have been sufficiently perverse that the accumulation of educational capital lowered economic growth second marginal returns to education could have fallen rapidly as the supply of educated labor expanded while demand remained stagnant third educational quality could have been so low that years of schooling created no human capital the extent and mix of these three phenomena vary from country to country in explaining the actual economic impact of education or the lack thereof

unemployment and the efficiency wage hypothesis there has been much recent discussion of the reasons why prices in certain markets and in particular in labour markets may not adjust to eliminate excess supply the absence of speedy adjustment of prices is an essential feature of the recent models of disequilibrium macroeconomics but for the most part no explanation for this absence is provided from within those models one explanation that has been around in the literature for some time and has been receiving increasing attention recently is the efficiency wage hypothesis initially applied to developing economies see leibenstein i957 it has more recently been adapted to developed economies by weiss i 980 and used in the context of a keynesian macroeconomic model by hart i 980 similar concepts have been applied to the credit market by stiglitz and weiss i98i the purpose of the present paper is to explore further the conditions under which the notion of an efficiency wage is applicable and can provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment the essential feature of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that the productivity of a firm s employees increases as their wage is increased at least over an economically relevant part of its range if the wage paid by the firm is denoted by w the number of employees by l and the productivity of each employee by p w where p w o then the effective labour force of the firm e can be represented by

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization in a world in which employment contracts are incomplete it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements by monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm s adherence to these implicit agreements thus the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract this mechanism enhances the firm s credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

the combinatorial assignment problem approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes this paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment for example assigning schedules of courses to students based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes ceei in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together the main technical result is an existence theorem for approximate ceei the mechanism is approximately efficient satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness and is strategyproof in large markets its performance is explored on real data and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets and most are both manipulable and unfair

did american welfare capitalists breach their implicit contracts during the great depression preliminary findings from company level data it has been claimed that american employers experiments in private welfare capitalism collapsed during the great depression giving place to the welfare state and industrial unionism recent studies however reveal considerable differences in experience across firms the author of this study who characterizes private welfare capitalism as a set of human resource management practices constituting an implicit contract equilibrium tests the implications of implicit contract theory using data from fourteen leading manufacturing firms the repudiation of implicit contracts she finds was positively correlated with the severity of the depression s impact experienced by firms and negatively correlated with the effectiveness of internal enforcement mechanisms instituted by firms furthermore she finds that greater breaches of implicit contracts were associated with greater employee support for industrial unions and more explicit employment contracts concluded under the new deal a comparative case study c

political sources of growth a critical note on measurement this note critically reviews the research on the link between political systems and economic growth empirical attempts to capture this patent relationship have been met with mixed success we conclude that the political variables used in these studies i e democracy and political instability do not adequately reflect the investors problem we suggest that a political variable that encompasses all kinds of potential discretionary state interventions would be more effective in explaining cross country differences in economic growth

time is not money in an ultimatum bargaining experiment we study how subjects bargain over the returns to their investments of money and time the most notable finding is that a third of the subjects demand no compensation for their time investments whereas almost all subjects demand compensation for equally costly monetary investments

incentive compatible long term contracts and job rationing this article presents a model in which markets for long term contractual employment coexist with spot markets for labor assuming the absence of third party enforcement wage contracts are required to be incentive compatible as a consequence contract wages yield higher expected utility to the worker than spot market wages so that in equilibrium contractual long term jobs are rationed

the contingent effect of management practices this article investigates how the success of a management practice depends on the underlying values articulated by the management a large u s transportation company is in the process of fitting its trucks with an electronic on board recorder eobr to provide drivers with information on their driving performance the company also has commenced a multi year initiative to remake its internal operations the first phase of which focuses exclusively on changing values toward a greater emphasis on teamwork and empowerment in this setting a natural question is whether the optimal managerial practice consists of 1 letting each driver know his or her individual performance only or also 2 providing drivers with information about their performance with respect to other drivers using the eobr provided driver performance data we randomize these practices across sites the main result of our experiment is that 2 leads to better performance than 1 in a particular site if and only if the site has not yet received the values intervention and worse performance if it has the result is consistent with the presence of a conflict between competition based managerial practices and a shift to a cooperation based value system more broadly it highlights the role of intangible factors in determining the optimal set of managerial practices

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

governance and contract choice theory and evidence from groundwater irrigation markets abstract this paper examines the role governance institutions play in the adoption of contracts we develop a simple model of the contracting relationship in a setting where unverifiable outcomes exist and use it to interpret data on groundwater irrigation contracts in bangladesh a distinguishing feature of this market is the variety of village level institutions which impose different degrees of punishment for contract violation consistent with the model we find households adopt contracts that rely on unverifiable outcomes which are not formally contractible when punishment for contract violation is weak conversely households adopt contracts that rely on formally contractible and verifiable outcomes when punishment is severe this evidence is consistent with contract terms being chosen optimally given what is or is not formally contractible

infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers this paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers it is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick and carrot punishments a fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors

national competitive advantage and the roles of economic and political freedom evidence from hong kong the equivocal interrelationships between economic performance and the institu tions of respectively economic and political freedom are examined using data from firms op erating in hong kong an economy where both an erstwhile paramount international business reputation for competitiveness and the institutional basis on which it was predicated have come into question in recent years it is hypothesized that i both economic and political freedom declines will be associated with a proxy for future economic performance competitiveness decline but that ii the correlation of economic freedom declines with competitiveness de cline will be mediated by political freedom declines hierarchical regression analyses tend to support these hypotheses although results vary by firm origin

rent seeking versus productive activities in a multi task experiment incentive instruments like asset ownership and performance pay often have to strike a balance between the productive incentives and the rent seeking incentives they provide standard theory predicts that these instruments become less attractive when the effectiveness of rent seeking activities increases in contrast theories that emphasize the importance of reciprocity suggest that this relationship may go the other way around in this paper we test these predictions by means of a laboratory experiment by and large our findings confirm standard theory incentive instruments typically become less attractive when the scope for rent seeking activities increases however reciprocity motivations do seem to mitigate the adverse effects of rent seeking opportunities to a considerable extent

investing in a relationship a principal can make an investment anticipating a repeated relationship with an agent but the agent may appropriate the returns through ex post bargaining i study how this holdup problem and efficiency depend on the contracting environment when investment returns are observable informal contracts ex post can be more efficient than formal contracts as they induce higher investment ex ante the principal invests not only to generate direct returns but also to improve relational incentives unobservability of returns increases the principal s ability to appropriate the returns but reduces her ability to improve incentives the optimal information structure depends on bargaining power

adjustment and energy dangers of a demand side obsession abstract short term energy adjustment based on the now dominant imf model is in strong conflict with that required for longer term development and growth the world economic recovery is threatened by structural cyclical and other factors including the debt problem of developing countries commodity price surges and potential energy problems short term adjustment impacts on longer term policy and investment in the energy sector assuring that economic recovery will demand rapid increases in oil imports for oil importer developing countries national policies in industrial countries to squeeze energy have been very successful but have likely deepened the recession and intensified some cyclic aspects of investment and development oil supply is still strongly influenced by opec and only through heightened appreciation of recession recovery cycles will the tremendous importance of the potential resources of oil importer developing countries be recognized a first step towards the inevitably multilateral framework needed for their development

on the relevance and composition of gifts within the firm evidence from field experiments we investigate the economic relevance and the composition of gifts within a firm where output is contractible we develop a structural behavioral model that identifies workers optimal reaction to monetary gifts received from their employer we estimate the model using data from two separate field experiments conducted within a tree planting firm we use the estimated structural parameters to generalize beyond the experiment simulating how workers would react to different gifts on the part of the firm within different labor market settings we find that gifts have a role to play within this firm increasing in importance when the workers outside alternatives deteriorate profit maximizing gifts would increase profits within slack labor markets by up to 10 on average and by up to 17 for certain types of workers

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion

global economic change and new energy a proposal for enhanced economic growth in low income countries abstract an energy economic transfer plan is presented which would involve an organized small cut in oil imports to the industrial countries to provide the initial stimulus for enhanced growth in the poorer developing countries it is presented as a means of extending the dialogue on energy and development issues with a view to establishing more direct and effective measures to stimulate economic development in the lower income countries and subsequently worldwide

testing dynamic models of worker effort this article derives three dynamic models of worker effort determination based on a shirking efficiency wage model a compensating differentials model and a union firm bargaining model it shows that all of these three models have the same long run comparative statics but differ in their short run dynamics we use these different predictions about the dynamics as a basis for testing the models euler equations for each model are estimated using panel data on 486 u k companies the evidence supports the shirking model in firms with low levels of unionization but the bargaining model in highly unionized industries

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives