the irish case of dependency an exception to the exceptions the dependency approach has recently been criticized by authors who quote the exceptional east asian cases the irish case is used to refute these new modernizationist arguments on two counts 1 countries such as ireland not the east asian countries have regimes with characteristics that tend to set dependency relations in motion these characteristics include radical free trade free enterprise andforeign industrial domination 2 because of these characteristics ireland has endured economic stagnation and tendencies toward higher inequality irish economic growth under foreign dominated industrialization was slowed by decapitalization and by the absence of linkages between foreign and domestic industry time series models show that foreign penetration and free trade are related to slower economic growth because of slower investment growth and other reasons inequality increased primarily because of rising unemployment although social welfare programs reduced the effects of direct income inequality their effects have been reduced by regressive taxation and austerity programs

influence costs and capital structure this paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities the hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions in corporations for example top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees while at the same time they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making this creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management s discretionary decisions as a result divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm this incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs for example in the event of a divestiture since the firm s capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers incentives to influence top management s decisions the control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions hence there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions the findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations we identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure the top management s prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers and the difference in the valuation of the division s assets in the current firm and under alternative uses

why is bank debt senior a theory of asymmetry and claim priority based on influence costs this theory can explain why bank debt is universally senior consistent with the presence of conflict lawyers and absolute priority violations in financial distress better organized banks would more strongly contest priority in financial distress if they were junior because deterrence can reduce creditors total expenses in a priority contest the ex post stronger lobbyist litigant should be senior ex ante for equivalent reasons the theory can advise when public debt should be senior to trade credit and or implicit contracts and can even suggest one rationale for the absolute priority rule apr this article further shows that chapter hi creditor reimbursement procedures can lower overall costs article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

fdicia after five years at year end 1991 congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts the fdic improvement act this reform followed the failure of more than 2 000 depository institutions in the 1980s many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks this article reviews these changes and evaluates early results

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

estimation of an asymmetric stochastic volatility model for asset returns a stochastic volatility model may be estimated by a quasi maximum likelihood procedure by transforming to a linear state space form the method is extended to handle correlation between the two disturbances in the model and applied to data on stock returns

bank risk within and across equilibria abstract the global financial crisis highlighted that the financial system can be most vulnerable when it seems most stable this paper models non linear dynamics in banking small shocks can lead from an equilibrium with few bank defaults straight to a full freeze the mechanism is based on amplification between adverse selection on banks funding market and moral hazard in bank monitoring our results imply trade offs between regulators microprudential desire to shield individual weak banks and the macroprudential consequences of doing so moreover limiting bank reliance on wholesale funding always reduces systemic risk but limiting the correlation between bank portfolios does not

dynamic conditional score models a review of their applications abstractin this paper applications of dynamic conditional score dcs models are reviewed and those models are discussed in relation to classical time series models from the literature dcs models

default and punishment in general equilibrium we extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools the equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates along with the usual prices of assets and commodities by reinterpreting the variables our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive general equilibrium framework perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates it also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets we show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model and that default in conjunction with refinement opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets the market chooses the promises default penalties and quantity constraints of actively traded assets

when do banks take equity in debt restructurings this article examines the conditions under which bank lenders make concessions by taking equity in financially distressed firms i show that the role banks play in debt restructurings depends on the financial condition of the firm the existence of public debt in the firm s capital structure and the ability of public debt to be restructured empirically i find that for firms with public debt outstanding banks never make concessions unless public debtholders also restructure their claims when banks do take equity on average they obtain a substantial proportion of the firm s stock and they maintain their position for over two years article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

organizational form and risk taking in the savings and loan industry abstract i hypothesize that risk taking is greater in stock thrifts than in mutual thrifts because the residual and fixed claims are separable i find that stock thrifts exhibit greater profit variability during the 1982 1988 period and that conversions from mutual to stock ownership are associated with increased investment in risky assets and increased profit variability these findings illustrate the relation between the structure of residual claims incentives and firm performance as well as the unintended consequences resulting from changes in thrift regulations

breaking the bank a probabilistic assessment of euro area bank profitability this paper explores the determinants of profitability across large euro area banks using an approach based on conditional profitability distributions the most reliable determinants of bank profitability are real gdp growth and the nonperforming loan npl ratio the estimated conditional distributions reveal that while higher growth would raise profits on average a large swath of banks would most likely continue to struggle even amid a strong economic recovery therefore for some banks a determined reduction in npls combined with cost efficiency improvements and customized changes to their business models appears to be the most promising strategy for durably raising profitability

opacity and risk taking evidence from norway abstract this paper investigates how balance sheet opacity affects banks risk taking behavior we measure bank balance sheet opacity according to two metrics the ratio of available for sale afs securities and the ratio of off balance sheet items we show that balance sheet opacity is positively correlated with realized bank risk specifically banks with more afs securities have lower realized risk while banks with more off balance sheet items have higher realized risk the correlation between opacity and risk depends on both macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics the positive relationship between bank opacity and bank risk is weaker for better capitalized banks and banks that are subject to more market discipline the relationship is also weaker during periods of favorable market conditions motivated by this analysis we then investigate how regulation affects bank opacity we show that higher capital requirements reduce bank opacity and bank risk through a portfolio rebalancing channel

corporate governance of banks a survey this paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance of banks we start by highlighting the main differences between banks and nonfinancial firms and focus on three characteristics that make banks special i regulation ii the capital structure of banks and iii the complexity and opacity of their business and structure next we discuss the characteristics of corporate governance in banks and how they differ from the governance of nonfinancial firms we then review the evidence on three governance mechanisms i boards ii ownership structures and iii executive compensation our review suggests that some of the empirical regularities found in the literature on corporate governance of nonfinancial institutions such as the positive negative association between board independence size and performance do not hold for banks also existing work provides no conclusive results regarding the relationship between different governance mechanisms and various measures for banks performance we discuss potential explanations for these mixed results

bank capital and dividend externalities dividend payouts erode equity capital and affect the relative value of claims on a bank through this channel when banks have contingent claims on each other one bank s capital policy affects the equity value and risk of default for other banks when such externalities are strong bank capital becomes a public good whereby the private equilibrium features excessive dividends and inefficient recapitalization relative to the efficient policy that maximizes total banking sector equity we relate these implications to the observed bank behaviour during the crisis of 2007 2009

dependency disarticulation and denominator effects another look at foreign capital penetration less developed countries desparately need capital to develop but countries dependent on foreign capital face slower economic growth higher income inequality and possibly impaired domestic capital formation these conclusions emerge from a reassessment of glenn firebaugh s broad critique of capital dependency research which exposed an important error in earlier studies the solution charts new theoreticall ground by factoring dependency effects into the differential productivity of foreign and domestic investment and the negative externalities from foreign capital penetration the revised formulation is applied to cross national analyses of economic growth decapitalization and income inequality the findings consistently support capital dependency theory

a look inside amlf what traded and who benefited abstract the federal reserve s amlf program was designed to provide liquidity to money market funds mmfs between september 2008 and may 2009 the program made 217 billion in non recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies to purchase asset backed commercial paper from mmfs jp morgan and state street dominated the program accounting for over 90 of all loans made our analysis suggests that jp morgan exhibited more self dealing behavior than state street we find that jp morgan and state street earned economically and statistically significant cumulative returns of 2 28 and 2 49 respectively over the first seven days of the program after controlling for market returns and heteroscedasticity

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

an empirical investigation of u s firms in reorganization the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter 11 from an empirical examination of thirty firms that have emerged from reorganization we find the recontracting framework of chapter 11 to be complex lengthy and costly violations of absolute priority in favor of stockholders are frequently encountered these deviations may result from the bargaining process of chapter 11 or from a recontracting process between creditors and stockholders which recognizes the ability of stockholder oriented management to preserve firm value an example of such recontracting addresses myers underinvestment problem an investigation of the effects of chapter 11 on the pricing of risky debt is also provided the purpose of this paper is to understand the institutional features of chapter

export led development labour market conditions and the distribution of income the case of singapore the newly industrialising countries nics of east asia have attracted considerable attention in recent years and the impressive economic performance of the gang of four hong kong taiwan singapore and south korea in particular has played an important part in what little 1982 describes as the resurgence of neo classical economics in development thinking the experience of these outward looking export oriented economies is contrasted with the record of the more inward looking import substituting policies adopted by many other less developed countries ldcs and is interpreted as confirmation of the neoclassical thesis that economies which permit the market mechanism to establish a structure of equilibrium prices and incentives can expand in accordance with their comparative advantage generating significant employment gains rapid economic growth and improvements in income distribution the employment gains represent the predictable consequences of the expansion of labour intensive manufactured exports as little 1981 notes in his comparative study of south korea taiwan hong kong and singapore the major lesson is that labour intensive export oriented policies were the prime cause of an extremely rapid and labour intensive industrialisation p 42 the employment intensity of the export oriented industrialisation eoi strategy is in turn seen as the central factor behind improvements in income distribution thus balassa 1982 argues that gains in employment may also be obtained as exports increase the demand for labour and thereby improve income distribution p 59 fields 1984 reiterates the point quite simply if everyone in the labour force is employed at a market clearing wage inequality is less than if some are employed at higher than market clearing wages and others are unem ployed and earn nothing p 81 minimum government intervention has facilitated the efficient operation of the market fields 1984 for example regards the difference in wage setting processes supply and demand in the east asian nics institutional wage

dependency theory and taiwan analysis of a deviant case the case of taiwan represents a challenge to two predictions from dependency theory that foreign economic penetration leads to slow economic growth and also to heightened inequality since the early 1950s taiwan has received massive foreign aid and investment but it has also had one of the highest sustained rates of growth in the world while income inequality on the island has decreased substantially an examinatin of this deviant case is pursued by consideration of the various mechanisms dependency theorists claim are responsible for the linkage of foreign economic penetration to stagnation and inequality in the taiwan case none of these mechanisms work out as predicated instead a variety of factors including the nature of the japanese colonial experience the emphasis on labor intensive enterprise and the absence of an entrenched burgeoisie created a situation in which both rapid growth and increasing equality could occur consideration of taiwan draws attention to flaws in the arguments of most

why bank governance is different this paper reviews the pattern of bank failures during the financial crisis and asks whether there was a link with corporate governance it revisits the theory of bank governance and suggests a multi constituency approach that emphasizes the role of weak creditors the empirical evidence suggests that on average banks with stronger risk officers less independent boards and executives with less variable remuneration incurred fewer losses there is no evidence that institutional shareholders opposed aggressive risk taking the financial stability board published principles for sound compensation practices in 2009 and the basel committee on banking supervision issued principles for enhancing corporate governance in 1999 2006 and 2010 the reports have in common that shareholders retain residual control and executive pay continues to be aligned with shareholder interests however we argue that bank governance is different and requires more radical departures from traditional governance for non financial firms

the effectiveness of bank governance reforms in the wake of the financial crisis a stakeholder approach this study examines the impact of bank corporate governance reforms in the wake of the financial crisis these reforms correspond to criticism of shareholder focused agency based corporate governance practices and a renewed focus on the stakeholder impact of corporate governance lapses in the financial sector this study differs from previous studies of corporate governance in the financial sector in using performance indicators that proxy the interests of customers and the community drawing on data from 134 countries over an eight year period from 2004 to 2011 we find that the post crisis corporate governance reforms in the banking sector appear to be effective in promoting greater bank attention to non shareholder stakeholders interests this study provides a means to conceptualize measures of bank performance from a stakeholder perspective in order to test emerging ideas about governance effectiveness in the financial sector

the effect of capital structure on a firm s liquidation decision abstract a firm s liquidation can impose costs on its customers workers and suppliers an agency relationship between these individuals and the firm exists in that the liquidation decision controlled by the firm as the agent affects other individuals the customers workers and suppliers as principals the analysis in this paper suggests that capital structure can control the incentive conflict problem of this relationship by serving as a pre positioning or bonding mechanism appropriate selection of capital structure assures that incentives are aligned so that the firm implements the ex ante value maximizing liquidation policy

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

the lender of last resort a twenty first century approach the classical bagehot conception of a lender of last resort lolr that lends to illiquid banks has been criticized on two grounds on the one hand the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is not clear cut on the other a fully collateralized repo market allows central banks to provide the adequate aggregate amount of liquidity and leave to the banks the responsibility of lending uncollateralized the object of this paper is to analyze these issues rigorously by providing a framework in which liquidity shocks cannot be distinguished from solvency ones and then asking whether there is a need for a lolr and how it should operate in the absence of systemic threats determining the optimal lolr policy requires a careful modeling of the structure of the interbank market and of the closure policy in our setup the results depend upon the existence of moral hazard if the main source of moral hazard is the banks lack of incentives to screen loans then the lolr may have to intervene to improve the efficiency of an unsecured interbank market in crisis periods if instead the main source of moral hazard is loan monitoring then the interbank market should be secured and the lolr should never intervene jel e58 628

bank capital in the crisis it s not just how much you have but who provides it abstract bank capital is the cornerstone of bank regulation and is considered a key determinant of a bank s ability to withstand economic shocks in the area of bank capital regulation the general view is that more bank capital is better irrespective of who provides it in this paper we investigate whether the investment horizon of bank capital providers matters for bank performance during the recent financial crisis we observe that banks with more short term investor ownership have worse stock returns during the crisis further exploration suggests that this is partially because banks with higher short term investor ownership took more risk prior to the crisis but mainly because they experienced higher selling pressure during the crisis our results confirm the economic benefit of bank capital in helping banks to perform better during crises however when we decompose bank capital by the nature of its providers we show that more capital is associated with worse performance when it is provided by short term institutional investors

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

do bondholders lose from junk bond covenant changes this article documents that firms can and do change the covenants of their public debt indentures through consent solicitations a game theoretic model shows that bondholders may consent to covenant changes even when it is not in their collective interest to do so despite this finding bondholder returns around solicitations are positive further analysis indicates that bondholders coordinate their actions to modify or defeat disadvantageous proposals and therefore can demand some of the gains resulting from covenant modifications the policy implication of this study is that bondholders may not need additional regulatory or judicial protection in the solicitation process copyright 1993 by university of chicago press

solvency rule and capital centralisation in a monetary union brancaccio and fontana 2013 have suggested that the central bank influences the solvency conditions of firms and households in the economic system this solvency rule is examined here within a stylised model of a monetary union characterised by different rates of accumulation and inflation across its two member countries the rule highlights the existence of a relationship between the interest rate set by the central monetary authority and the allocation of ownership of existing physical capital among the member countries of the monetary union i e the rates of capital centralisation the paper also shows the nexus between solvency and government debt sustainability and examines the implications of deflationary or currency devaluation policies for the solvency conditions

opportunistic underinvestment in debt renegotiation and capital structure abstract this paper models debt renegotiation as a bargaining game between debtholders and shareholder oriented management in which management credibly threatens to run down firm assets to force concessions from the creditors creditors anticipate this opportunistic behavior by management creating an upper bound on debt capacity that is less than the value of the firm if an advantage to debt is introduced such as favorable tax treatment an interior optimal capital structure obtains even in the absence of realized bankruptcy costs our model also explains variations in debt equity ratios and the use of certain puzzling debt covenants

moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts we study equilibria for economies with hidden action in environments in which the agents contractual relationships with competing financial intermediaries cannot be monitored or are not contractible upon we fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts for such economies as well as discuss their welfare properties depending on the parameters of the economy either the optimal action choice is not sustained in equilibrium or if it is agents necessarily enter into multiple contractual relationships and intermediaries make positive profits even under free entry conditions the main features and implications of these environments are consistent with several stylized facts of markets for unsecured loans

turning bagehot on his head lending at penalty rates when banks can become insolvent ever since bagehot s 1873 pioneering work it is a widely accepted wisdom that in order to alleviate ex ante bank moral hazard a lender of last resort should lend at penalty rates only in a model in which banks are subject to shocks but can exert effort to affect the likelihood of these shocks we show that the validity of this argument crucially relies on banks always remaining solvent the reason is that when banks become insolvent bagehot s prescription dictates to let them fail penalty rates charged when banks are illiquid but solvent then reduce banks incentives to avoid insolvency ex ante and thus increase bank moral hazard we derive a condition which shows precisely when this effect on ex ante incentives outweighs the traditional one and show that it is fulfilled under plausible scenarios

does collateral fuel moral hazard in banking this paper presents two models in which the fluctuating value of loan collateral real estate generates the problem of moral hazard between a bank and a deposit insurance agent the bank finances risky projects against collateral and relies on the rising collateral value if the collateral value later appreciates the bank enjoys handsome profits otherwise the bank fails the findings are rather consistent with the characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis

banking finance and the role of the state this paper provides an overview of the issue it considers the existing structure of financial regulation the deficiencies that were encountered during the financial crisis and the proposed reforms it discusses whether these are likely to be adequate and argues that there are fundamental failures in product markets capital markets and government relations with financial institutions highlighted in the articles in this issue that question whether current reforms will prove sufficient in particular the article argues that a clearly defined partnership between the state and the banking system needs to be established by which the state protects certain core components of the banking system that perform key functions in an economic system and well specified rules are put in place to avoid renegotiation and lobbying copyright 2011 oxford university press

income inequality development and dependence a reconsideration we reconsider the role of foreign investment in income inequality in light of recent critiques that question the results of quantitative cross national research on foreign capital penetration we analyze an unbalanced cross national data set in which countries contribute different numbers of observations with a maximum of 88 countries and 488 observations dated from 1967 to 1994 random effects regression models that control for unmeasured country heterogeneity are used to investigate effects of foreign capital penetration on inequality measured as the gini coefficient against the background of an internal developmental model of inequality we adapt firebaugh s 1992 1996 critique of the literature on the effect of foreign investment on economic growth to the study of income inequality and find that the stock of foreign direct investment has an effect on inequality that is independent of the mechanisms identified by firebaugh we explore tsai s 1995 claim that the effect of foreign capital penetration is spurious and find that foreign stock has a significant positive effect on inequality net of region specific differences an alternative interpretation of the findings of the foreign investment inequality literature is discussed in light of the discovery of an inverted u shaped relationship between income inequality and foreign investment stock per capita we conclude that thinking on the relationship between income inequality and investment dependence should be revised in light of an investment development path relating the inflow and outflow of foreign capital to economic development

cash holdings and credit risk intuition suggests that rms with higher cash holdings are safer and should have lower credit spreads yet empirically the correlation between cash and spreads is robustly positive and higher for lower credit ratings this puzzling nding can be explained by the precautionary motive for saving cash in our model endogenously determined optimal cash reserves are positively related to credit risk resulting in a spurious positive correlation between cash and spreads by contrast spreads are negatively related to the exogenous component of cash holdings independent of credit risk factors similarly although rms with higher cash reserves are less likely to default over short horizons longer term endogenously determined liquidity may be positively related to the probability of default our empirical analysis conrms these predictions suggesting that endogenous precautionary savings are central to understanding the eects of cash on credit risk

uncertainty in an interconnected financial system contagion and market freezes this paper studies contagion and market freezes caused by uncertainty in financial network structures our model demonstrates that in a financial system where financial institutions are interconnected a negative shock to an individual financial institution could spread to other institutions causing market freezes because of creditors uncertainty about the financial network structure our model also reveals that when both a large creditor and a continuum of small creditors are present the size of the large creditor will affect the severity of market freezes substantially moreover our model is used to examine central bank policies to alleviate market freezes

monetary policy in a systemic crisis summary this paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisis from the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort it is argued that standard monetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through which monetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbank market as the crisis developed liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted by standard monetary policy models at the same time as the interbank market did not allow for the redistribution of liquidity among ban ks central banks had to design new channels for liquidity injection

rediscounting under aggregate risk with moral hazard freeman 1999 proposes a model in which discount window lending and open market operations have different effects this is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

labour s record on financial regulation in 1997 the new labour government launched major initiatives in the area of financial regulation setting up the financial services authority as a comprehensive regulatory body supported by the legislative framework of the financial services and markets act 2000 we evaluate the labour government s record on financial regulation in terms of its achievements and failures especially in dealing with the global financial crisis that started in 2007 while we identify some clear flaws in regulatory design and enforcement our evaluation highlights some inherent difficulties of financial regulation

a dynamic multivariate heavy tailed model for time varying volatilities and correlations we propose a new class of observation driven time varying parameter models for dynamic volatilities and correlations to handle time series from heavy tailed distributions the model adopts generalized autoregressive score dynamics to obtain a time varying covariance matrix of the multivariate student t distribution the key novelty of our proposed model concerns the weighting of lagged squared innovations for the estimation of future correlations and volatilities when we account for heavy tails of distributions we obtain estimates that are more robust to large innovations we provide an empirical illustration for a panel of daily equity returns

security pricing and deviations from the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings claims ultimately awarded to shareholders of firms in reorganization were examined for a sample of 30 filings under the 1978 bankruptcy reform act we measured the amount paid to shareholders in excess of that which they would have received under the absolute priority rule and found that this amount represents on average 7 6 of the total awarded to all claimants evidence is also reported that common share values reflect a significant proportion of value ultimately received in violation of absolute priority suggesting that deviations from the rule were expected by the equity markets the absolute priority rule hereafter apr states that a bankrupt firm s value is to be distributed to suppliers of capital such that senior creditors are fully satisfied before any distributions are made to junior creditors and junior creditors are paid in full before common shareholders bankruptcy reorganization proceedings however are leaving shareholders and junior creditors with valuable assets even when senior claimants receive only partial settlements as barrett and sullivan 1988 noted traditionally shareholders have been last in line their claims on a troubled company s assets have had the lowest priority and their impact on the course of bankruptcy code proceedings generally has been next to nil but lately the balance of power has been shifting warner 1977 provided one of the early discussions of the implications of deviations from the apr baldwin and mason 1983 pp 510 511 examined the resolution of claims in the massey ferguson reorganization and provided no support for the hypothesis that the market believes absolute priority rules will be enforced if the firm defaults on its financial obligations franks and torous 1989 analyzed a sample of bankruptcies that occurred during the period 1970 through 1984 and found that 21 of 27 sample cases exhibited departures from the apr more recently weiss 1990 examined 37 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1980 and 1986 and reported that 27 of the cases involved apr violations

banks as monitors of other banks evidence from the overnight federal funds market this study provides evidence that banks are effective monitors of their peers by showing that the interest rate paid on federal funds transactions reflects differences in credit risk across borrowers in addition the size and relative importance in the funds market of the trading institutions are shown to affect the rates charged for overnight borrowing thereby providing insight into the nature of competition in the federal funds market transaction volume and size of transaction effects are uncovered as is evidence of relationship banking between banks these results are made possible by unique data identifying individual federal funds transactions copyright 2001 by university of chicago press

information sharing in credit markets we present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously lenders incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers to the size of the credit market and to advances in information technology such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants in addition information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market these predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market a large body of literature on credit markets has shown that asymmetric information may prevent the efficient allocation of lending leading to credit rationing e g jaffee and russell 1976 stiglitz and weiss 1981 or to a wedge between lending and borrowing rates e g king 1986 in this literature informational asymmetries are taken to be exogenous lenders fail to observe some relevant characteristic or action of potential borrowers and have no way of learning about it in some countries however lenders can improve their knowledge about new customers by exchanging information with other lenders through information brokers generally known as credit bureaus the latter collect file and distribute the information voluntarily supplied by their members and operate on the principle of reciprocity lenders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau s files in other countries instead these institutions do not exist the literature offers no guide to identify the factors that lead to endogenous communication between lenders this paper is an attempt to fill the gap information sharing is important for a number of reasons it may increase the degree of competitiveness within credit markets vives 1990 improve

debt valuation renegotiation and optimal dividend policy the valuation of debt and equity reorganization boundaries and firm s optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants two formulations of reorganization are presented debt equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions we study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity induced defaults from strategic defaults we derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies the debt capacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized

optimal long term financial contracting we develop an agency model of financial contracting we derive long term debt a line of credit and equity as optimal securities capturing the debt coupon and maturity the interest rate and limits on the credit line inside versus outside equity dividend policy and capital structure dynamics the optimal debt equity ratio is history dependent but debt and credit line terms are independent of the amount financed and in some cases the severity of the agency problem in our model the agent can divert cash flows we also consider settings in which the agent undertakes hidden effort or can control cash flow risk

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

growth effects of foreign and domestic investment over tha past few years numerous studies in sociology have concluded that foreign investment harms poor nations these studies have focused on the coefficient for foreign capital stock controlling for flow new investment and defying logic have inferred that a negative coefficient for stock reflects dependency effects that retard economic growth since capital stock is the denominator for investment rate the greater the stock the lower the investment rate for a given level of new investment hence the negative coefficient for capital stock found in dependency studies indicates a beneficial investment effect not a harmful effect this point is demonstrated by reanalysis of the data used in dependency studies in these data foreign investment spurs growth earlier analysts have concluded otherwise only because their conclusions have belied their findings

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

who should act as lender of last resort an incomplete contracts model this paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort two govern ment agencies may perform this function a central bank and a de posit insurance corporation the agencies share supervisory information which provides a nonverifiable signal of the bank s fi nancial condition and use it to decide whether to support it it is shown that the optimal institutional design involves the two agen cies the central bank dealing with small liquidity shocks and the deposit insurance corporation with large shocks furthermore ex cept for very small shocks they should lend at penalty rates