the role of wages and auditing during a crackdown on corruption in the city of buenos aires abstract we study the prices paid for basic inputs during a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of buenos aires argentina during 1996 97 we find a well defined negative effect on the measures used to capture corruption prices paid by hospitals for basic homogeneous inputs decrease by 15 percent during the first 9 months of the crackdown after this period prices increase but they are still 10 percent lower than those prevailing before the crackdown relative to the precrackdown period higher wages play no role in inducing lower input prices when audit intensity can be expected to be maximal during the first phase of the crackdown but have a negative and well defined effect when audit intensity takes intermediate levels the last phase of the crackdown controlling for fixed effects we find that the wage elasticity of input prices exceeds 20 these results are consistent with the standard model of bribes of gary becker and george stigler

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

forests fuelwood and livelihoods energy transition patterns in eastern indonesia the central thesis of the energy ladder model is a unidirectional transition from primitive to advance fuel with increased affluence of households although now largely discredited this assumption remains a foundation of laissez faire policies that anticipate energy transition resulting spontaneous forest recovery with economic development our results suggest that such policies can undermine broader policy objectives and actually worsen forest conditions in rural indonesia based on a case study of forest margin communities in eastern indonesia we demonstrate that fuel subsidy reform did little to reduce rural household demand for fuelwood while dramatically increasing fuelwood demand for processing agricultural products our results show how household decisions related to fuel sources are affected by non economic considerations and external factors such as opportunities to sell fuelwood we argue that policy interventions that encourage energy transition of households do not necessarily improve forest conditions as household fuelwood use may be a symptom rather than a driver of deforestation and forest degradation thus policies to improve forest conditions should focus more on addressing the market environment of forest margin communities providing energy alternatives to small industries that are often the larger consumers of fuelwood

the culture of corruption tax evasion and economic growth this study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth the model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries the calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates the corruption associated with public investment projects and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue the presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant but not large negative effects on economic growth the relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross country data the model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare jel h3 o4

endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model abstract the following paper presents a simple neoclassical growth model where corruption is an endogenous result of competition between a public agent and a private agent the model provides a simple theoretical framework in which the level of corruption as well as the effects of corruption on income consumption and growth are identifiable bureaucratic red tape is then added to the model the results suggest that a priori corruption is neither efficiency enhancing nor efficiency detracting with respect to growth but always results in some income redistribution

the informal sector in developed and less developed countries a literature survey the main goal of this study is two fold 1 to provide ageneral overview of the contributions to the literature on theinformal sector with a special focus on the public choiceapproach and 2 to compare these contributions across twoinstitutionally different types of countries developed andless developed developing and transition countries thepaper focuses on the criteria used to define the informalsector the relationship between the formal and informaleconomy tax evasion and public choice analysis it isstressed throughout this paper that the distinction betweenthe two types of countries is of key importance

a comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets abstract this paper compares bribery to competitive bidding in a government purchasing context while competitive bidding is one method of procurement bribery is a common alternative in many third world countries although bribery is often considered to be the ethical antithesis of competitive bidding the analysis shows there is a fundamental isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the transaction

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

the impact of managerial change on performance the role of team heterogeneity when a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks to subordinates these subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their talents as a new manager is less well acquainted with these talents this incentive mechanism is reinvigorated after a management change but only when the team is suciently homogenous otherwise a new manager quickly makes similar choices as the old one did we investigate this hypothesis using a large data set on coach dismissals in the german football league where the selection of players is indeed a key task of the coach indeed we nd substantial evidence that coach replacements enhance team performance only in homogenous teams moreover from a methodological point of view we argue that there is typically a negative selection bias when evaluating succession eects which might reconcile previous ndings of no or even negative eects with the vast number of dismissals

tax evasion and public expenditures on tax revenue services in an endogenous growth model abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between tax evasion and the two main policy instruments affecting tax compliance namely the announced tax rate and the share of tax revenues allocated to tax monitoring mechanisms for doing so we adopt a simple one sector endogenous growth model modified under tax evasion following the roubini and sala i martin 1995 analysis on income taxes and tax compliance our model confirms barro s 1990 theoretical finding stating that the optimal tax rate is equal to the elasticity of public capital however introducing a welfare function where governments care also about the degree of fiscal corruption in the economy the effective tax rate is lower than the output elasticity of public capital in line with futagami et al 1993 and turnovsky 1997 theoretical results finally our model is calibrated using data on tax evasion from 35 oecd and 110 non oecd countries for 2011 simulation results suggest that both tax evasion and output growth are decreasing with the share of tax revenues allocated to monitoring expenses while government s utility maximization imply an announced tax rate lower from the elasticity of public capital for both groups of countries

bribery inefficiency and bureaucratic delay abstract we examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy the presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants consequently efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses or may never receive licenses as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them an increase in the proportion of honest officials while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions can also induce greater inefficiencies misallocation and delay from corrupt officials as a result social welfare may be non monotonic in the proportion of honest officials and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption competition between officials can hurt efficiency its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants ability to pay bribes

favoritism in asymmetric contests head starts and handicaps abstract i examine a contest with identity dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous a contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start the former reduces the contestant s score by a fixed percentage the latter is an additive bonus although total effort increases if the weak contestant is favored with a head start the optimal use of handicaps is not as clear cut depending on the nature of the asymmetry it may or may not be optimal to handicap the strong contestant moreover it is generally optimal to combine the two instruments for instance when contestants are sufficiently heterogeneous the weak contestant should be given both a head start and a handicap it may also be possible to induce higher effort and at the same time make both contestants better off ex ante

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

household cooking fuels and technologies in developing economies abstract a major energy challenge of the 21 st century is the health and welfare of 2 7 billion people worldwide who currently rely on burning biomass in traditional household cooking systems this special issue on clean cooking fuels and technologies in developing economies builds upon an iaee workshop on this subject held in istanbul in 2008 foell et al 2008 it includes several papers from that workshop plus papers commissioned afterwards the major themes of that workshop and this special issue are analytical and decision frameworks for analysis and policy development for clean cooking fuels making energy provisioning a central component of development strategies strategies business models of suppliers of modern fuels and technologies analysis of successes failures of past policies and programs to improve access to clean cooking this introductory paper serves as a preamble to the 11 papers in this special issue it provides a brief background on household cooking fuels and technologies including 1 their implications for sustainable development health and welfare gender impacts and environment climate issues 2 options and scenarios for improved household cooling systems and 3 discussions of institutions programs and markets it closes with research and action agendas initially developed during the 2008 workshop

how much income redistribution an explanation based on vote buying and corruption this paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture a model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters in equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption when rich voters can bribe the government an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible the link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model

are we a nation of tax cheaters new econometric evidence on tax compliance the theoretical basis for the economic approach to tax compliance has at least until recently been inadequate and the limited empirical work based on it is seriously flawed in this paper we briefly review both as well as new theoretical and especially empirical work on the tax compliance problem with respect to the latter we present preliminary results based cm a state level time series cross section data set drawn in part from the annual reports of the commissioner of internal revenue

induction stoves as an option for clean cooking in rural india abstract as part of a programme on access to clean cooking alternatives in rural india induction stoves were introduced in nearly 4000 rural households in himachal pradesh one of the few highly electrified states in india analysis of primary usage information from 1000 rural households revealed that electricity majorly replaced liquid petroleum gas lpg generally used as a secondary cooking fuel but did not influence a similar shift from traditional mud stoves as the primary cooking technology likewise the shift from firewood to electricity as a primary cooking fuel was observed in only 5 of the households studied country level analysis indicates that rural households falling in lower monthly per capita expenditure mpce classes have lesser access to electricity and clean cooking options than those falling in higher mpce classes again only three states in india with high levels of rural household electrification report consumption statuses more than 82 kwh per month the estimated mean for electricity consumption by induction stoves overall the results of the study indicate that induction stoves will have limited potential in reducing the consumption of firewood and lpg if included in energy access programmes that too only in regions where high levels of electrification exist

a note on competitive bribery games abstract within a competitive bribery game in which each player has incomplete information we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium which is symmetric similar results hold for another bribery game form that prevails in the literature implications for corrupt practices in relation to economic development are also discussed

notes on bribery and the control of corruption abstract existing models of corruption that allow for bribery have ignored an important recursive problem when an auditor or a policeman bargains over a bribe with a person he has arrested he has to take into account the fact that he may in turn be caught for taking this bribe and be involved in a similar bargain but from the other side the purpose of this paper is to provide a simple model for capturing this recursion having done so it goes on to analyse some conditions for the control of corruption these turn out to be different from what conventional wisdom suggests

corruption and allocation efficiency abstract in this paper we investigate the possibility of allocation inefficiencies associated with corrupt practices specifically we consider the case in which two firms compete via bribery of a corrupt government official for a to be awarded project the economy may suffer allocation inefficiencies whenever there is some degree of discrimination given additional assumptions it is shown that the possibility of inefficient allocations increases as the degree of discrimination increases although empirical verification of discrimination is difficult due to the observational equivalence of an alternative imperfect knowledge model two possible explanations for the determination of discrimination coefficients indicate that it is a general phenomenon in competitive bribery games

can corruption foster regulatory compliance the legal and economic literatures overwhelmingly support the notion that regulatory compliance is always less in the presence of corruption this paper departs from those literatures and shows that whenever public officials are paid fixed wages an increase in corruption may actually foster compliance the conditions that make this possible are laid down in a theoretical model empirical evidence that corroborates the theoretical findings is provided using firm level data for 26 transition economies

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

corruption in tax administration abstract we extend the game theoretic model of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 to allow for corruption in tax administration in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence in fact in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited moreover when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue

can tax evasion tame leviathan governments this paper asks to what extent institutional features that facilitate tax evasion may keep leviathan governments at bay the specific feature we look at is banking secrecy abroad the analysis draws on a 16 generation olg model in which tax rates are determined in a repeated game between voters and a rent seeking leviathan government key insights are 1 effects on any generation alive when change takes place may differ substantially from steady state effects that accrue for generations yet to be born 2 there is considerable intergenerational diversity in these effects that is not monotonic as we move from young to old combined these results suggest that the political economy of pertinent institutional change may be quite complex

biased contests for symmetric players in a biased contest one of the players has an advantage in the winner determination process we characterize a novel class of biased contest success functions pertaining to such contests and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for zero bias to be a critical point of arbitrary objectives satisfying certain symmetry restrictions we however challenge the common wisdom that unbiased contests are always optimal when contestants are symmetric ex ante or even ex post we show that contests with arbitrary favorites i e biased contests of symmetric players can be optimal in terms of various objectives such as expected aggregate effort the probability to reveal the stronger player as the winner or expected effort of the winner

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

corruption as a gamble abstract in the following model of corruption a simple game is set up whose players are a government official granting a permit conditional on a test and a candidate requesting the permit the game is solved under different assumptions as to the information sets of the players perfect information asymmetric information and imperfect information on both sides in the latter case after characterizing the solution and presenting some important comparative statics results the paper moves on to show the emergence of multiple equilibria in corruption illustrating the interaction of corruption at different hierarchical levels of an administration

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game abstract we consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency in other cases the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific we present conditions under which each result obtains our results indicate that it is socially optimal to run an unfair contest in order to redress the allocation inefficiency introduced when contestants are asymmetric we show however that a selfish income maximizing bribee will discriminate in the opposite direction to that which society would prefer

corruption as an occupational choice endogenous corruption and tax policy corruption is endemic in many countries and empirical studies have demonstrated how it impacts on macroeconomic indicators theoretical studies have generally assumed an exogenously given proportion of the population are corrupt or that the public sector is fixed in size far fewer explore how corruption emerges endogenously we endogenize corruption as an occupational choice workers choose private or public employment public employees can be honest or corrupt corruption is subject to a social sanction that results in a loss of self esteem those who care little about the social sanction choose to be corrupt when a firm meets a corrupt public employee it pays a bribe to secure a reduction in the tax rate the economy has two self sustaining equilibria with different levels of corruption corruption reduces tax revenue and the tax rate that maximizes revenue an increase in the social sanction reduces corruption but also reduces tax revenues if the economy is in a high corruption equilibrium paying a wage premium to public sector workers can result in all public sector workers being corrupt public sector audits to detect corrupt workers always reduce corruption but can only increase welfare when they are cheap to conduct and the economy is in a low corruption equilibrium

a tug of war team contest this paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams in each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug of war there exists a unique markov perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player s valuation and the current state of the tug of war we derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug of war evolves according to a time homogeneous absorbing markov chain

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

fuelwood subsistence foraging and the decline of common property abstract ideally common property can adapt to particularities in the social and physical environment to create environmentally sustainable regimes in practice common fuelwood foraging has been subject to numerous problems intimately linked to the historically changing role of common property schematic histories of fuelwood and forests in europe and java illustrate how common property systems have been undermined and the different implications their dissolution can have both cases indicate that fuelwood problems may be best interpreted within the rubric of subsistence foraging and the decline of common property rather than that of energy shortage and tree mismanagement

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

business culture and tax evasion why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist abstract this paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria in bad equilibria high cheating and corruption increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating the source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures as tax evasion and corruption become more common they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered a third externality that between firms and inspectors is the source of the perverse effect more cheating by firms is good for bribe taking inspectors and more bribe taking inspectors are good for cheating firms

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

local capture evidence from a central government transfer program in uganda according to official statistics 20 percent of uganda s total public expenditure was spent on education in the mid 1990s most of it on primary education one of the large public programs was a capitation grant to cover schools nonwage expenditures using panel data from a unique survey of primary schools we assess the extent to which the grant actually reached the intended end user schools the survey data reveal that during 1991 1995 the schools on average received only 13 percent of the grants most schools received nothing the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians the data also reveal considerable variation in grants received across schools suggesting that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding we find that schools in better off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements as a result actual education spending in contrast to budget allocations is regressive similar surveys in other african countries confirm that uganda is not a special case

the implementation of decentralised biogas plants in assam ne india the impact and effectiveness of the national biogas and manure management programme abstract the indian government s national biogas and manure management programme nbmmp seeks to deliver renewable energy services to households across the country by facilitating the deployment of family sized 3 anaerobic biogas digesters nbmmp policy is implemented at three levels from government and state nodal agency via private contractors to households creating multiple institutional arrangements we analysed the scheme in assam north east india focusing on how policy was implemented across two districts and interviewing stakeholders in rural households state and non state institutions the top down supply side approach to policy enables government to set targets and require individual states to deploy the scheme which benefits households who can afford to participate nbmmp delivered improved energy service outcomes to a majority of households although the level of knowledge and understanding of the technology amongst users was limited training and education of householders and particularly women is needed in relation to the maintenance of digesters feedstock suitability and the environmental and potential livelihood benefits of digestate a revised bottom up approach to policy which highlights the contextual and demand side issues around adopting the technology may deliver monetary benefits from market competition and enable development of community focused microfinance schemes to improve the affordability of biogas systems

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

cultural constraints on innovation based growth to what extent does the cultural composition of a society impose a constraint on its long run growth potential we study this question in the context of an innovation based model of growth where cultural attitudes are endogenously transmitted from one generation to the next focusing on attitudes regarding patience we analyze the two way interaction between economic growth and the intergenerational transmission of patience exploiting this interaction we compare the long run growth performance of a culturally heterogeneous society where patience is initially underrepresented in the population with a culturally homogeneous society where all agents are perfectly patient our main result is that in the absence of any intrinsic preferences of patient parents to transmit their attitudes to their children the development paths of the two societies are bound to diverge with the culturally heterogeneous society experiencing lower growth rates yet if patient parents ceteris paribus prefer their children to be patient like them we show that the two societies can in the long run grow at the same rate jel d91 e24 o30 o40 z10

asymmetric information in competitive bribery games abstract in this paper competitive bribery games with incomplete information about the nature of the potential bribee are considered given a common uniform cost distribution function we characterize the closed form nash equilibrium some properties of the equilibrium are derived therein

improved stoves in india a study of sustainable business models burning of biomass for cooking is associated with health problems and climate change impacts many previous efforts to disseminate improved stoves primarily by governments and ngos have not been successful based on interviews with 12 organizations selling improved biomass stoves we assess the results to date and future prospects of commercial stove operations in india specifically we consider how the ability of these businesses to achieve scale and become self sustaining has been influenced by six elements of their respective business models design customers targeted financing marketing channel strategy and organizational characteristics the two companies with the most stoves in the field shared in common generous enterprise financing a sophisticated approach to developing a sales channel and many person years of management experience in marketing and operations and yet the financial sustainability of improved stove sales to households remains far from assured the only company in our sample with demonstrated profitability is a family owned business selling to commercial rather than household customers the stove sales leader is itself now turning to the commercial segment to maintain flagging cash flow casting doubt on the likelihood of large positive impacts on health from sales to households in the near term

rent seeking political influence and inequality a simple analytical example a simple model allowing an analysis of the interaction between economic policy decisions and rent seeking by private agents competing for political influence is developed rent seeking may be of the directly unproductive type requiring resources that are withdrawn from productive activities or it may manifest itself as income transfers corruption to political decisionmakers

corruption tax evasion and the laffer curve in a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators it is shown that in somecircumstances this may bring about laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue i e a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment further a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration these outcomes become more likely

costs of distrust the virtuous cycle of tax compliance in jordan tax compliance has been extensively researched yet the classic question why do people pay taxes remains unanswered in jordan tax evasion is widespread the state and citizens have been trapped in a continuous hide and seek game which has taken the form of a virtuous cycle this paper investigates tax evasion along with the most noticeable features of the jordanian tax system it also highlights how the virtuous cycle of tax evasion has been established and what could possibly be a way out of it we argue that sociocultural values are the most prominent cause for tax evasion that is the procedures of state formation and functionality in jordan have created mutual distrust between the state and its citizens having been raised in a community characterized by deep distrust tax evasion is no longer considered immoral by substantial numbers of the jordanian population we argue that successive governments need to create a high trust based culture and formulate strategies that serve to acquire normative ethical values in order to enhance voluntary compliance the way to accomplish this necessity is through enforcing the state s transparency and accountability the taxation system needs to concentrate on income tax rather than raise tax rates on essential commodities to collect substantial tax revenues thus further reform of the taxation system along with a reduction in tax incentives need to be considered moreover lowering the exceptionally high personal income tax threshold would bring jordan in line with its peers expand the base and introduce more progressivity there would also be a scope to introduce a minimum tax based on sales as a tool to address tax evasion

bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic growth there appears to be significant diversity in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption across countries at different stages of economic development and under different political and economic regimes little theoretical or empirical analysis has been offered however on the link between corruption government and growth the paper attempts to fill the void through equilibrium models of endogenous growth balanced growth is derived as a balancing act between accumulating human capital which engenders growth and accumulating political capital which mainly assures bureaucratic power the analysis focuses on the interplay between investment in these two types of capital and its implications for long term growth under alternative political regimes some propositions are tested and confirmed empirically

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

corruption and culture an experimental analysis article i nfo article history why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions in 2005 we conducted a bribery experiment and found that among undergraduates we could predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home country among graduate students we could not in 2007 we replicated our result and also found that time spent in the uk was associated with a decline in the propensity to bribe although this does not explain our inability to predict graduate behaviour we conclude that while corruption may in part be a cultural phenomenon individuals should not be prejudged with reference to their country of origin

the computational experiment an econometric tool an economic experiment consists of the act of placing people in an environment desired by the experimenter who then records the time paths of their economic behavior performing experiments that use actual people at the level of national economies is obviously not practical but constructing a model economy and computing the economic behavior of the model s people is such experiments are termed computational this essay specifies the steps in designing a computational experiment to address some well posed quantitative question the authors emphasize that the computational experiment is an econometric tool used in the task of deriving the quantitative implications of theory

inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics this paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in myerson s american political science review 87 856 869 1993 model of redistributive politics regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties transfers to different voter segments parties have incentive to stochastically shift resources away from voter segments with large relative efficiency gaps between the two parties transfers towards voter segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps because of this dependence on relative and not absolute levels of efficiency the parties optimal strategies may lead to large discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective transfers

a political economy perspective on technology innovation in the kenyan clean cookstove sector abstract in kenya as in many sub saharan african countries clean cookstoves are promoted as a solution to various health environmental and livelihood challenges after decades of programs there is a need to better understand if clean cookstoves are really transforming household energy use and if not why not combining theory from technological innovation systems literature and political economy the article highlights key weaknesses in the sector and offers explanations for the limited success of efforts to introduce clean cookstoves to date clean cookstoves remain a nascent innovation system in kenya its main weaknesses being lack of strategic direction low levels of legitimacy among government and consumers and weak knowledge accumulation and learning in the absence of meaningful government engagement technological choices and business models are influenced by the interests and norms of external actors including a stronger emphasis on health outcomes than other livelihood or environmental benefits going forward achieving a transformation in cooking energy use will depend on what role national and county governments play fiscal incentives introduced in 2016 and work on the country s sustainable energy for all action plan are early signs of greater engagement with household energy challenges

achieving optimal fines for political bribery a suggested political reform allowing appropriately high fines for political bribery would eliminate 1 the large and allocatively arbitrary bribes paid to our most senior retiring politicians 2 the more moderate but ubiquitous and still allocatively arbitrary bribes paid to less senior but strategically successful politicians and 3 the permanent loss through censure or expulsion of some highly proficient but strategically less successful legislative representatives moreover with fines appropriately set the incentives theoretically describing the entire political system would be elevated from allocative arbitrariness to approximately pareto optimal levels

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

delegation as commitment the case of income tax audits in this article we study the value of delegating authority over income tax audit policy arising from the incompleteness of contracts consider a utilitarian government whose ability to commit is limited to aggregate dimensions of its audit policy as publicly verifiable information about detailed allocations of audit budgets is not available we show that the welfare level associated with the full commitment solution can be attained by delegating authority over audit policy to a manager the latter is offered a simple incentive scheme based only on the aggregate variables which are publicly observable in contrast if the government retains authority direct commitment to these same variables does not allow the full commitment welfare level to be achieved thus despite sharing a common informational basis delegation may perform better than centralized arrangements in the presence of incomplete contracts

the market for public office why the indian state is not better at development abstract how and why officials are transferred from one post to another can in india does have far reaching consequences for the effectiveness of public service organizations such as irrigation agriculture forestry and soil conservation departments the transfer mechanism used in many departments of indian states involves a kind of internal labor market a truer market than in the way that term is often used by labor market economists it allows pressures for corrupt behavior to bear down on the incumbents of certain posts and itself amplifies those pressures frequently the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments why is the indian state not better at promoting development to an important degree because of the corruption transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives

does competition kill corruption corrupt agents officials or gangsters exact money from firms corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium the degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures increases in competition may not lower corruption the model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare