returns to regionalism the past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements with many policymakers and academics seeming to believe that these provide more than the traditional gains from trade this article examines several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may confer on their partners including credibility signaling bargaining power insurance and coordination it assesses the necessary conditions for each possible channel to work gives stylized examples of specific types of policy where the benefit might be applicable examines cases where the explanation might be relevant and discusses their overall plausibility it concludes by examining the north american free trade agreement and the europe agreements

europe vs america institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model we show how the differences in us and european institutions can arise in a normative model the paper focuses on the labor market and the government s decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock the government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse incentive effects whereby benefits increase unemployment it is found that when an adverse shock occurs benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post oil shock benefits remained high in europe but not in the us desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non negative and self correcting empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed

profits and politics coordinating technology adoption in agriculture abstract this paper examines the political economy of government led coordination of economic activity in a simple two sector model in which individuals choice of agricultural technology affects industrialization we demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria the economy is either characterized by the use of a traditional agricultural technology and a low level of industrialization or the use of a mechanized technology and a high level of industrialization relative to the traditional technology use of the mechanized technology increases output but leaves some population groups worse off we show that the distributional implications of choosing the mechanized technology restrict the possibility of pareto improving coordination by an elected policy maker even when we allow for income redistribution

credible commitment and success with public enterprise reform abstract this paper studies why some efforts at public enterprise reform fail and why others succeed economic reforms are intended to increase efficiency and thus help sustain long term growth yet many governments have had difficulty sustaining the reforms they initiated and have reintroduced rigid controls over markets and enterprises this is because either in the process of implementation the government discovers that the costs of carrying the reform further are greater than the expected efficiency gains or the public is skeptical that the new policies can be sustained and does not take the actions necessary for the gains to be realized this paper develops a new institutionalist framework and employs various measures of policy commitment and net gain from continued reform to analyze these issues the paper suggests ways in which the potential success or failure of a reform can be assessed with implications for the steps that reformers might take to increase the chances of success

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

the need for enemies we develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage creating an incentive to underperform in the task we test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents using colombian data the main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them especially in electorally salient places we find that after the largest victories against farc rebels the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts especially in politically important municipalities politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage

reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting this paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country when trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria one in which the countries are both protectionist and another in which they trade freely with each other starting with trade protection in both countries a unilateral reform in one country is shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium that obtains majority support in both countries

the politics of liberalizing zambia s maize markets abstract this paper discusses the process of agricultural liberalization in zambia the central argument is that maize markets have been more quickly and fully liberalized than maize input markets because the perceived political risks of liberalizing input markets are greater than those of liberalizing maize markets and because economic interest groups benefited from maize liberalization while similar interests benefited from continued government interventions in input markets these finding imply that in order to understand the prospects for economic liberalization in new democracies we must disaggregate both civil society and markets

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

endogenous trade policy through majority voting an empirical investigation abstract the median voter approach to trade policy determination within a heckscher ohlin framework as in mayer am econ rev 74 5 1984 970 predicts that an increase in inequality holding constant the economy s overall relative endowments raises trade barriers in capital abundant economies and lowers them in capital scarce economies we find support for this prediction using cross country data on inequality capital abundance and diverse measures of protection we perform certain robustness checks that include controlling for the effects of political rights and schooling as well as using alternative datasets on factor endowments

the nature and nurture of economic outcomes this paper uses data on adopted children to examine the relative importance of biology and environment in determining educational and labor market outcomes i employ three long term panel data sets which contain information on adopted children their adoptive parents and their biological parents in at least two of the three data sets the mechanism for assigning children to adoptive parents is fairly random and does not match children to adoptive parents based on health race or ability i find that adoptive parents education and income have a modest impact on child test scores but a large impact on college attendance marital status and earnings in contrast with existing work on iq scores i do not find that the influence of adoptive parents declines with child age this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

no trade in second price auctions with entry costs and secret reserve prices we consider a second price private value auction in the presence of an exogenous participation cost and a secret reserve price endogenously set by the seller we show that if the entry cost is strictly positive the only equilibrium outcome is that the seller chooses a reserve price that deters entry and no buyer enters

does increasing women s schooling raise the schooling of the next generation the positive cross sectional relationship between the schooling of mothers and their children is substantially biased upward due to correlations between schooling and heritable ability as well as assortative mating an increase in the schooling of women would not have beneficial effects in terms of the schooling of children increased maternal schooling leads to reduced home time for mothers anticipating the consequences of investing in women s schooling requires attention to the role that schooling plays in the marriage market as well as to opportunities in the labor market for women

income distribution human capital and economic growth in colombia abstract colombian income distribution has followed a clear path during the last two decades in the second half of the 1970s human capital accumulation reduced the dispersion of income distribution and lead to a period of stagnation between 1983 and 1990 when mobility declined after the structural reforms a skill bias technological change the wage differential for skilled workers increased inequality by a polarization in the bi modal distribution of income these topics are discussed in the paper along some dynamic aspects of income and educational mobility in colombia

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in africa critical reflections during the past two decades neopatrimonialism has become the convenient all purpose and ubiquitous moniker for african governance the school of thought behind this research program which the author refers to as the neopatrimonialism school has produced an impressive literature on africa its analysis informs policymakers and its language permeates media reportage on african states while neopatrimonialism has long been a focus of development studies in recent times it has assumed politically and economically exigent status the school identifies causal links between neopatrimonialism and economic performance and makes predictions drawing from what is referred to as the logic of neopatrimonialism neopatrimonialism is said to account for trade policies hyperinflation economic stagnation low investment in infrastructure urban bias andultimately the lack of economic development in africa this article examines the empirical basis of predictions and policy prescriptions it argues that while descriptive of the social practices of the states and individuals that occupy different positions within african societies the concept of neopatrimonialism has little analytical content and no predictive value with respect to economic policy and performance

leviathan resists the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in turkey this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance it is found that favorable short run performance weak market potential higher employment lower socio economic development concentrated voter preferences and weaker representation of right wing parties in the firms locality delay the timing of privatization the paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale

all equilibria of the vickrey auction abstract this paper characterizes the set of nash equilibria in the second price sealed bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders in addition we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

economic statism private capital and the dilemmas of accumulation in nigeria abstract nigeria s persistent economic stagnation is attributable to a mutually reinforcing political dynamic comprising a weak developmental state and pervasive rent seeking within the private sector this syndrome was a source of nigeria s initial economic crisis in the early 1980s and it continues to impede structural adjustment initiatives economic policy reform has been compromised by state strategies designed to preserve the gains of elite rentier groups while private entrepreneurs have responded to policy change by seeking new rental havens in finance and other nontradable sectors in consequence structural adjustment has failed to elicit a supply response or to generate significant political support for a more propitious enabling environment nigeria s experience reinforces the perception that changes in nominal incentives must be accompanied by broader institutional transformation if economic reform is to be effective

capital and opposition in africa coalition building in multiethnic societies under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions in africa s patronage based political systems incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups opposition politicians however must rely on private resources to do the same this article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions it shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries liberalizing financial reforms in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent s pecuniary coalition building strategy a binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim greater financial autonomy for business as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed

the structural adjustment of politics in africa abstract it has long been recognized that the structural adjustment programs currently being proposed by the world bank and the international monetary fund in africa have important political consequences however there has been almost no attention devoted to what structural adjustment if implemented means for the way that politics is actually carried out in african nations the failure to examine the long term consequences of economic reform for politics is particularly surprising given that the major instruments of structural adjustment public sector reform devaluation elimination of marketing boards threaten to change not only the constituencies that african leaders look to for support but the way in which leaders relate to their supporters in the countries south of the sahara the paper examines how structural adjustment if actually implemented would affect politics in african countries the paper finds that structural adjustment makes the political climate much riskier for leaders while weakening the central apparatus of the state on which rulers have long relied to stay in power the implications of the analysis for donors are also discussed

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

the endogeneity between language and earnings international analyses this study is concerned with the determinants of dominant language fluency its effects on earnings and its endogeneity with earnings among immigrants dominant language fluency is hypothesized to

towards an equilibrium level of market reform how politics affects the dynamics of policy change in this article we examine the dynamics of economic reforms that are implemented by incumbent policy makers interested in maintaining their political power we use a sample of 86 countries over a time period going from 1980 to 2001 and find that the achievement of an equilibrium level of market liberalization is highly costly our results are robust to endogenity and model specification

shifting fortunes the political economy of financial liberalization in nigeria abstract on the recommendation of the world bank nigeria began to liberalize its financial sector in 1986 contrary to the prediction of financial repression theory savings and investment decline in the wake of banking deregulation by 1995 the nigerian financial system was in a state of collapse the paper locates the main failure of nigeria s financial deregulation in the political and institutional setting of reform the institutional mechanisms needed to supervise and regulate banking under the new system were absent while private sector banking capacities were weak moreover financial liberalization was quickly captured by a clientalist state as a means of reallocating rents to strategic constituents an additional precipitating factor was macroeconomic instability the paper points to the importance of incorporating political and institutional variables into any model of financial reform or transformation

trade taxes and tribute market liberalizations and the new importers in west africa this paper examines dynamics of state business relations in the era of trade liberalization in senegal and cote d ivoire it challenges the orthodox view that replacing nontariff barriers such as licenses and quotas with tariffs depoliticizes trade reduces commercial rent seeking activities and creates a level playing field which will encourage underground activities to surface allowing the state to capture more revenue the paper illustrates that liberalization failed to suppress commercial rent seeking helped to encourage the ascendancy of new politically connected merchant groups the mourides in senegal and the lebanese in cote d ivoire and to some degree increased tax evasion leading to the further erosion of state revenue flows the cases show that trade centered rentierism is rooted in structural features of these west african economies

capital flight and political risk abstract this paper provides the first serious attempt to examine the relationship between political risk and capital flight for a large set of developing countries the outcomes of the analysis show that in most cases political risk variables do have a statistically robust relationship to capital flight once domestic and international macroeconomic circumstances are added at least when the robustness test as proposed by sala i martin is applied we conclude that on the basis of the analysis in this paper we have found support for the hypothesis that political risk leads to increased capital flight

food market reform the changing role of the state abstract the liberalization and privatization of food markets has been an important feature of economic reform programmes in many developing countries and donor conditionality has been applied to this end however the agenda needs to move beyond this to the establishment of efficient and equitable marketing systems a major constraint on this has been the weak base of theoretical and empirical knowledge about the characteristics of food markets on which reform programmes have been built three principal areas are identified where further research policy experimentation and sharing of experience are required the role of the state in relation to collective action by market participants the problem of food price instability and the delivery of support to the small scale private sector that has taken over many marketing functions

trade liberalization through asset markets abstract political economy expositions of trade policy have traditionally described asset or factor ownership as not subject to change asset markets however allow individuals to change the composition of income sources we consider an economy with stochastic productivity to show how the equilibrium composition of asset portfolios influences individual attitudes toward free trade the model links financial market completeness and trade liberalization in the second half of the 20th century and provides a contributing answer to why governments in poorer countries without well developed financial markets have failed to liberalize trade

economic and mechanical models of intergenerational transmission the author critically examines gary beckers attempt to integrate the theory of income distribution intragenerational differences with the theory of mobility intergenerational differences in an economic model of the family he assesses beckers claims of distinctiveness integration explanatory power and surprise and arrives at a rather skeptical view of the contribution that the core of microeconomics has made to this study of the family a reply by becker is included pp 514 8 excerpt

insider ownership human resource strategies and performance in a transition economy researchers and potential investors in transition economies need to understand the human resource management hrm strategies of target firms since human resources are arguably their most valuable assets understanding is difficult however because hrm strategies help to determine firms performance but are in turn influenced by corporate governance particularly insider ownership this paper employs a structural equation modeling methodology to examine the relations between governance hrm strategies and performance in the context of a novel dataset of ukrainian industrial firms it is found that insider ownership is positively associated with high commitment hrm strategies and negatively with low commitment cost cutting hrm strategies cost cutting hrm strategies are in turn associated with weaker firm performance these outcomes correspond broadly with theoretical expectations

economic crisis and policy choice the politics of adjustment in the third world the acute economic pressures of the 1980s have forced virtually all of latin america and africa and some countries in asia into painful austerity programs and difficult economic reforms scholars have intensively analyzed the economics of this situation but they have given much less attention to the political forces involved in this volume a number of eminent contributors analyze the politics of adjustment in thirteen countries and nineteen governments drawing comparisons not only across the full set of cases but also within clusters selected to clarify specific issues why do some governments respond promptly to signs of economic trouble while others muddle indecisively for years why do some confine their response to temporary macroeconomic measures while others adopt broader even sweeping programs of reform what leads some countries to experiment with heterodox approaches while most however reluctantly pursue orthodox courses why confronted with intense political protest have some governments persisted while others have altered or abandoned course the answers to these questions are political not economic and they are examined here by thomas m callaghy stephan haggard miles kahler robert r kauman joan m nelson and barbara stallings

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

has recovery begun africa s adjustment in the 1980s revisited this article reviews the 1989 debate between the world bank and the economic commission for africa over africa s adjustment and on the basis of most recent statistics concludes that there is little evidence that the region is in throes of a recovery some countries however did relatively better than others in the 1980s and an attempt is made to account for differences in performance it is concluded that success in adjustment results not from world bank international monetary fund programs as such but rather from policy coherence accompanied by healthy movement in key variables namely the real exchange rate and public development expenditure

a comparison between economic systems with an application to transition abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium theory of endogenous firm and class formation under non contractibility with heterogeneous individuals a collectivist economy a private ownership economy and a mixed economy are compared on the basis of identical economic fundamentals methodological symmetry each economic system generates specific inefficiencies so that none dominates the others in general the main trade off is between the welfare loss associated with risk taking in the private ownership economy and the informational problems in the collectivist economy we then use this framework to study the political economy of transition between economic systems and provide detailed welfare results

exploring the political economy of labour market institutions labour markets how reforms took place many economists argue that the european unemployment problem relates to large labour market rigidities this paper argues that many of those inflexibilities and the underlying institutional regulations can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees this is because many policies that increase unemployment actually benefit these insiders an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour market institutions demonstrates that the observations are consistent with this view the findings imply 1 higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection 2 unemployment benefits are lower the more employment reacts to wages 3 a higher level of unemployment and the existence of a right wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage giles saint paul

human capital spillovers in families do parents learn from or lean on their children i model how children s acquisition of a given form of human capital incentivizes adults in their household to either learn from them if children can teach the skill to adults adults cost of learning falls or lean on them if children s human capital substitutes for that of adults in household production adults benefit from learning falls using variation in compliance with an english immersion mandate in california schools i find that english instruction improved immigrant children s english proficiency but discouraged adults living with them from acquiring the language whether family members learn or lean affects the externalities associated with education policies

rain emotions and voting for the status quo abstract do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo we exploit exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870 000 municipal vote outcomes in switzerland to address this question the empirical tests are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data we find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change our robustness checks suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate and changes in information acquisition in addition we provide evidence that rain might have altered the outcome of several high stake votes we discuss the psychological mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks a pattern that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change

intergenerational trade longevity and economic growth we develop an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth in which human capital is the engine of growth and the generations are linked through material and emotional interdependencies within the family parents invest in their children to achieve both old age support care and emotional gratification and material support from children is determined through self enforcing implicit contracts we show that optimal intergenerational trade can then lead to maximization of growth opportunities our model produces a theory of the demographic transition linking longevity fertility and economic growth we also show that while population aging may raise the growth rate an increase in young age longevity is likely to produce a greater increase in the growth rate and a reduction in the fertility rate in a growth equilibrium these predictions and the model s implications concerning the behavior of private savings during the takeoff period appear consistent with empirical evidence

food marketing liberalization and trader entry evidence from madagascar abstract food marketing liberalization was expected to induce massive trader entry and competitive markets in africa despite evidence of trader entry enterprise expansion remains difficult and many claim market power persists though perhaps in different hands this paper confronts this puzzle of substantial market entry that might not foster competition data from madagascar reveal distinct groups within rural food marketing channels separated by intraindustry mobility barriers that limit entry to a few niches moreover individuals place within the rural marketing network is defined largely by a priori social identity so the experience of food marketing liberalization varies across socially distinct subpopulations

tax reform and the political economy of the tax base abstract this paper studies the political prospects for reform in a model where the tax base and statutory rate are separate instruments of tax policy the model suggests that large changes in the tax code may be easier to enact than marginal reforms the tax base faces a tipping point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support reform at this tipping point tax reform is pareto improving politically feasible tax reform occurs when fiscal needs are large but may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal tax rates there is strategic complementarity in lobbying for tax exemptions resulting in multiple equilibria the model s main predictions are consistent with recent tax reforms in oecd countries

intergenerational transmission of human capital is it a one way street studies on the intergenerational transmission of human capital usually assume a one way spillover from parents to children however children may also affect their parents human capital using exogenous variation in education arising from a swedish compulsory schooling reform in the 1950s and 1960s we address this question by studying the causal effect of children s schooling on their parents longevity we first replicate previous findings of a positive and significant cross sectional relationship between children s education and their parents longevity our instrumental variables estimates are not statistically different from zero however they hide substantial heterogeneity by the gender of the child and the parent female schooling is found to affect longevity of fathers and especially those from low socio economic background taken together our results point to the importance of daughters schooling for parental health and to the importance of considering heterogeneous impacts

how should structural adjustment programs be designed abstract more than seven years have elapsed since the onset of the generalized debt crisis of 1982 yet the affected countries have still not managed to stabilize their economies these countries must now attempt structural adjustment in the midst of pervasive macroeconomic and political instability structural adjustment packages should be designed with this reality in mind this paper argues that structural adjustment programs should strive for sustainability rather than the economic liberalization that they presently stress illiberal policies which do not damage overall macro stability are preferable to liberal policies which are inherently unsustainable or engender macro instability liberalization programs that are not sustainable are likely to bring few benefits but have high costs in terms of private investment the paper discusses some of the chief implications of this opinion for the design of adjustment programs

the political economy of food subsidy reform the case of egypt abstract this paper examines the political economy of food subsidy reform efforts in egypt egypt provides a case of a country with a large food subsidy program that has been relatively effective as a social safety net but a program that is also expensive and poorly targeted to the needy policy discussions about strategies to improve the system s performance run into the extreme political sensitivity of the issue of food subsidies in egypt food subsidies are perceived to be important in promoting political stability and providing some legitimacy to a political system where civil liberties are limited egypt therefore illustrates the dilemmas facing policymakers and others contemplating food subsidy reform in developing countries where there are concerns that reform may spark political unrest this paper argues that even in cases where food subsidy reform is a highly politicized issue there are still a number of pragmatic policy steps that can be taken that meet the twin goals of reforming the system in ways that better target the poor while functioning more efficiently

economic reform and political transition in africa the quest for a politics of development the 1980s were bracketed by crises in africa as protracted economic malaise was succeeded by a wave of political reform analysts have sought to understand the sources of economic decline as well as the political requisites for recovery in the region neoclassical and structuralist analyses have been challenged by state centric views of economic change the latter perspective emphasizes the need for capable developmental states as a basis for long term adjustment but a political theory of economic change is still lacking such a theory must address the institutional foundations of growth as well as the shifting basis of social coalitions in african regimes political liberalization suggests the possibility of a new setting for economic reform though the effects of political reform on institutions and coalitions remain ambiguous and democratization cannot be regarded as a panacea for the region s developmental failure future research must look more closely at the interests and structures in transitional regimes and scholars should adopt a more comparative vantage on africa s challenges of reform

secret reserve prices in first price auctions this article offers a theoretical explanation for the use of secret reserve prices in auctions i study first price auctions with and without secret reserve price in an independent private values environment with risk neutral buyers and a seller who cares at least minimally about risk the seller can fix the auction rules either before or after she learns her reservation value fixing the rules early and keeping the right to set a secret reserve price can be strictly optimal moreover i describe the relation of using a secret reserve price to phantom bidding and non commitment to sell

dynamic commitment and incomplete policy rules considering the dynamics of commitment highlights some neglected features of time inconsistency problems we modify the standard rules versus discretion question in three ways 1 a government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow 2 the government s commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules and 3 the government s ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted three results stand out first the option to wait makes the incumbent regime rules or discretion relatively more attractive second the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes the incumbent regime more attlwactive third because the commitment decision takes place in real time policy choice displays hysteresis when monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistencies optimal policy requires some precommitment by the central bank despite a proliferation of mechanisms designed to address this problem work in this area has continued to assume a once and for all choice between rules and discretion this paper asks two closely related questions first what happens if commitment decisions are made in real time so that failure to commit today does not rule out the possibility of commitment tomorrow second if governments can make only commitments that are difficult but not impossible to reverse what determines the dynamics of commitment and reversal the assumption of once and for all choice enforces simplistic dynamics on the policy process if the standard models are interpreted literally for example the commitment problem for u s monetary policy is moot having been resolved with the founding of the federal reserve system in 1914 if not at the constitutional convention of 1789 much of the interest in dynamic inconsistency however arises pre

participation costs and efficient auctions abstract suppose that risk neutral agents have independently and perhaps asymmetrically distributed private valuations for an indivisible object a mechanism assigns the object but it is costly to send messages to the coordinator in these circumstances the second price auction has an equilibrium that is classicallyex anteefficient given general opportunities to invest in information about or enhancements of own valuations in contrast the first price sealed bid auction may have no efficient equilibrium even if buyers are symmetric other properties of the first price auction are proved a semirevelation principle is established for mechanisms with participation costs journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d44 d82

on absolute auctions and secret reserve prices from a theory viewpoint the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices also called absolute auctions or of auctions with secret reserve prices is somewhat puzzling despite being common by allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge we also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats thereby offering a range of testable predictions alternative approaches are reviewed

market reform as a stimulus to particularistic politics we know little about how market reform affects political development especially citizens behavior market reform advocates prescribe that citizens should reduce their reliance on the state turn to nonstate actors for assistance and obtain limited state goods and services through their membership in certain social categories not their particular traits an analysis of three mass surveys and 232 interviews the author conducted in central asia along with additional data from 24 postcommunist countries reveals that market reform can have effects opposite from those prescribed individuals may make particularistic demands of government officials instead of relying on nonstate actors this occurs in countries where state economic intervention was substantial and where reforms reduced the state s economic role but failed to develop market enhancing institutions under these conditions individuals informally seek resources from state officials because nonstate actors do not offer substitute resources and

the option to wait in collective decisions and optimal majority rules abstract we consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision voters can either implement the project in the first period or they can postpone the decision to the second period we analyze the effects of different majority rules individual first period voting behavior may become less conservative under supermajority rules and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajority rule that would not be implemented under simple majority rule we characterize the optimal majority rule which is a supermajority rule in contrast to individual investment problems society may be better off if the option to postpone the decision did not exist these results are qualitatively robust to natural generalizations of our model

a reform dilemma in polarized democracies abstract we study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies we develop a simple election model where i reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change and ii politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently we identify a so called reform dilemma which manifests itself in two variants from a static perspective low reform ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step this property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment from a dynamic perspective incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re elected regardless of their reform ability

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

gradualism versus big bang speed and sustainability of reforms a beneficial reform may be blocked by a majority if it is implemented by a big bang but the same reform may succeed with an optimally designed gradualist approach a gradualist approach can sometimes split opposition force and is in this sense more politically sustainable on the other hand if both approaches are politically preferred to no reform a big bang is often preferred to gradualism in terms of both political support as well as economic efficiency

equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs abstract we investigate equilibria of sealed bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs in the independent private values environment we focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies participate and bid the valuation iff it is greater than the cutoff since if a bidder finds it optimal to participate she cannot do better than bidding her valuation when bidders are symmetric concavity strict convexity of the cumulative distribution function from which the valuations are drawn is a sufficient condition for uniqueness multiplicity within this class we also study a special case with asymmetric bidders and show that concavity convexity plays a similar role

is free trade passe abstract if there were an economist s creed it would surely contain the affirmations i understand the principle of comparative advantage and i advocate free trade yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 publication of ricardo s principles of political economy and this is due to changes that have recently taken place in the theory of international trade while new developments in international trade theory may not yet be familiar to the profession at large they have been substantial and radical in the last ten years the traditional constant returns perfect competition models of international trade have been supplemented and to some extent supplanted by a new breed of models that emphasizes increasing returns and imperfect competition these new models call into doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage they also open the possibility that government intervention in trade via import restrictions export subsidies

bidding off the wall why reserve prices may be kept secret abstract this note shows by means of an example that in a common value auction a seller with a random reservation value can increase her ex ante expected profits by following a policy of conducting an auction in which her reserve price is kept secret compared to an auction in which the reserve price is announced by keeping the reserve price secret the seller is able to encourage greater participation from the bidders and can therefore increase the linkage of the price paid to the value of the purchased object journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d44

the making of a rentier class wealth accumulation and political control in senegal political and economic dynamics set in motion by efforts to consolidate post colonial regimes have contributed to the continuing weakness of indigenous bourgeoisies throughout much of post colonial africa this article suggests that state power has been used to foster private rent seeking rather than productive local private investment in order to promote and sustain the political cohesion of ruling classes the political consolidation of dominant rentier classes forged through state patronage and clientelist mechanisms of control creates obstacles to the emergence of local class strata interested in or capable of using state power to promote the expanded accumulation of capital be it local or foreign a study of senegal illustrates this point

solving the mystery of the africa dummy abstract most empirical studies have reported a negative effect on growth of being an african country even when accounting for ethnic heterogeneity modeling policy choices has reduced this effect in recent studies but these have begged the question of why africa appears adverse to developmental policies this paper uses a cross sectional data set to show that the governments of arbitrary postcolonial states as are most african states face substantial limitations to their power and are constrained in their responses deriving greater relative power payoffs from neo patrimonial than from developmental policies differing levels of state legitimacy account therefore largely for the policy choices which characterize most of africa