speculative attacks unique equilibrium and transparency abstract models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks morris and shin 1998 have shown that in the context of those models unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced in this paper we apply the method of morris and shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies that their results continue to hold even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents we provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack for the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks

the hyperinflation model of money demand revisited in this paper we propose a test of the hyperinflation model of money demand which is valid under any assumption concerning agents expectations subject only to the restriction that forecasting errors are stationary it is also demonstrated that highly efficient parameter estimates can be obtained and restrictions on them tested under the same weak assumption finally it is shown how these first stage estimates can be utilized to test the stronger assumption of rational expectations the arguments are illustrated by analysis of the classic data on european hyperinflations previously analyzed by cagan 1956 barro 1970 and abel dornbusch huizinga and marcus 1979 copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

optimal inflation tax under precommitment theory and evidence the authors develop and test the orthogonality conditions implied by a dynamic model of the inflation tax a distinguishing feature of the analysis is that the welfare loss from inflation the money demand function and the time path of inflation are jointly derived from first principles of government and private sector intertemporal optimization quarterly data for argentina brazil and israel are used in implementing the model although the overidentifying restrictions of the model are not rejected in most cases there are several data points characterized by higher rates of inflation than the optimal rates under precommitment copyright 1992 by american economic association

money demand and seigniorage maximizing inflation conventional estimates of the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate often make use of the cagan form which implies a constant semielasticity of money demand with respect to inflation this paper shows that the elasticity of substitution in transactions between money and bonds determines how the inflation semielasticity of money demand changes as inflation rises allowing for a variable semielasticity estimates of seigniorage maximizing inflation for a panel of eleven high inflation countries are lower than those obtained by using the cagan form estimates based on the correct measure of the opportunity cost of money also differ sharply from those obtained when using conventional inflation measures copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

attention misallocation social welfare and policy implications we examine how agents allocate attention between private and public signals to reduce the uncertainty about observation noises when coordination is an important concern in this setting the attention allocation may not be monotone in endowed attention capacity agents may decrease their attention on or even ignore the more accurate signal when capacity increases as a result social welfare may decrease when they have more attention to process information and it can be even higher when agents possess a finite amount of capacity than when they have an infinite amount of capacity we derive sufficient and necessary conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge and study the implications of equilibrium multiplicity for macroeconomic policies

the demand for money in developing countries assessing the role of financial innovation traditional specifications of money demand have commonly been plagued by persistent overprediction implausible parameter estimates and highly autocorrelated errors the authors argue that some of these problems stem from the failure to account for the impact of financial innovation they estimate money demand for ten developing countries using various proxies for financial innovations they also assess the relative importance of this variable finding financial innovation can be better modeled as a stochastic random walk trend rather than a deterministic time trend financial innovation plays an important role in determining fluctuations of the demand for money the importance of this role increases with the rate of inflation

characterizing social value of information abstract this paper characterizes the social value of information in bayesian games with symmetric quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed public and private signals the main result provides a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public or private information in so doing we represent welfare as a linear combination of the variance of a common term in an equilibrium strategy and that of an idiosyncratic term which are referred to as the common variance and the idiosyncratic variance of actions respectively the ratio of their coefficients is a key parameter in our condition if the coefficient of the common variance is relatively large welfare necessarily increases but if it is relatively small welfare can decrease using our condition we find eight types of games with different welfare effects of information

the tale of the tails canadian income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s we present new evidence on levels and trends in after tax income inequality in canada between 1980 and 2000 we argue that existing data sources may miss changes in the tails of the income distribution and that many of the changes in the income distribution have been in the tails for this reason we turn to an alternative source in particular we construct data on after tax and transfer income using census files augmented with predicted taxes based on information available from administrative tax data using these data we find that canadian after tax inequality levels are substantially higher than has been previously recognized primarily because income levels are lower at the bottom of the distribution than in commonly used survey data we also find larger long term increases in after tax income inequality and far more variability over the economic cycle this raises interesting questions about the role of the tax and transfer system in mitigating both trends and fluctuations in market income inequality les auteurs presentent de nouveaux resultats sur les niveaux et tendances de l inegalite des revenus apres impots au canada entre 1980 et 2000 on suggere que les donnees existantes peuvent avoir ignore des changements dans les extremites de cette distribution alors que le gros des changements y etait concentre pour cette raison les auteurs se sont tournes vers une autre source de donnees ils ont construit une base de donnees sur les revenus apres impots et les paiements de transfert en utilisant les donnees du recensement ainsi que des donnees additionnelles sur les impots prevus a partir de renseignements disponibles dans les dossiers administratifs on decouvre que les niveaux d inegalite des revenus apres impots sont beaucoup plus eleves que ce qu on a suggere jusqu ici d abord parce que les niveaux de revenus sont plus bas au pied de la distribution que ne le suggerent les donnees d enquetes on decouvre aussi un accroissement plus grand a long terme de l inegalite des revenus apres impots et une plus grande variabilite au cours du cycle economique voila qui souleve des questions interessantes a propos du role de la fiscalite et du systeme de paiements de transfert dans la modulation de la tendance et des fluctuations dans l inegalite des revenus du marche

transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities how do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in economies with investment complementarities and what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed for example by economic statistics policy announcements or news in the media we first consider an environment where the complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no matter the structure of information an increase in the precision of public information may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate volatility nevertheless as long as there is no value to lotteries welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision of public information hence full transparency is optimal this is because more transparency facilitates more effective coordination which is valuable from a social perspective on the other hand when complementarities are strong enough that multiple equilibria are possible more transparency permits the market to coordinate more effectively on either the bad or the good equilibrium in this case constructive ambiguity becomes optimal if there is a high risk that more transparency will lead to coordination failures this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

labor supply responses and welfare effects of tax reforms during the late 1 980s and early 1 990s taxation of wage income has undergone a change towards a proportional tax regime in many countries our analysis shows that gradual tax reforms in norway may have removed some of the distortions on worker behavior moreover we find that proportional taxes may reduce the inequality in the distribution of disposable household income yet when the distributional consequences are related to changes in individual welfare we find that rich households may benefit far more than households at the other tail of the income distribution because they earn more without any significant increase in effort

survey forecasts in brazil a prismatic assessment of epidemiology performance and determinants abstract this paper assesses the behavior of survey forecasts in brazil during the inflation targeting regime when managing expectations is one of the cornerstones of the conduct of monetary policy the distinctive database of the survey conducted by the central bank of brazil bcb among professional forecasters allows for a thorough investigation of the epidemiology determinants and performance of forecasts the main results are i top performing forecasters are influential to other forecasters ii survey forecasts perform better than vector autoregressive model based forecasts iii common forecast errors prevail over idiosyncratic components across respondents iv inflation targets play an important role in inflation expectations and v agents perceive the bcb as following a taylor rule consistent with inflation targeting the last two suggest high credibility of the monetary authority

managing expectations instruments vs targets should policymakers offer forward guidance in terms of a path for an instrument such as interest rates or a target for an outcome such as unemployment we study how the optimal approach depends on a departure from rational expectations people have a limited understanding of the behavior of others and of the general equilibrium ge effects of policy the bite of such bounded rationality on implementability and welfare is minimized by target based guidance if and only if ge feedbacks are strong enough this offers a rationale for why central banks should shine the spotlight on unemployment when faced with a prolonged liquidity trap a steep keynesian cross or a large financial accelerator

one leader and multiple follower stackelberg games with private information this study analyzes one leader and multiple follower stackelberg games with demand uncertainty we demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower when the relationship is strategic complement the leader can exit from a market the threshold is determined by the intensity of cournot competition among the followers

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

public information and coordination evidence from a credit registry expansion this paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing to isolate the coordination channel from lenders joint reaction to new information we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers we show that lenders while learning nothing new about the firm reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders reaction to the negative news about the firm the results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress

money demand and exchange rate determination under hyperinflation conceptual issues and evidence from yugoslavia a modified monetary model of exchange rate determination is advanced and tested for the yugoslav hyperinflation of 1992 94 stating that the exchange rate is determined directly in the money market thus implying that private agents due to dollarization denominate their real money holdings in foreign currency empirical evidence supports the advanced model apart from the last seven months of the yugoslav hyperinflation the exact re present value model of the exchange rate is accepted while that of the price level is rejected for the whole period of hyperinflation the modified money demand schedule with money holdings denominated in foreign currency is nonlinear with decreasing semielasticity of money demand

optimal degree of public information dissemination financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterised by positive external ities in these environments transparency may reduce expected welfare public announcements serve as focal points for higher order beliefs and affect agentsbehaviour more than justified by their informational contents some scholars conclude that reducing public signalsprecision or entirely withholding information may improve welfare this article shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision but under certain conditions not to all agents restricting the degree of publicity is a better suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are there is a general presumption that higher central bank transparency in terms of information disclosure to a wider audience improves the effectiveness of monetary policy and is beneficial to markets as it reduces information asymmetries helps to assess risk better and arrive at more informed decisions thus enhancing market efficiency while practitioners in central banks and international institutions agree on the desirability of informative announcements and promote higher transparency on the ground that any information is valuable to markets recent academic literature distin guishes private and public information and argues that public announcements may destabilise markets and reduce efficiency by their effects on higher order beliefs if markets are characterised by positive externalities morris and shin 2002 henceforth m s have shown that noisy public announcements may be detrimental to welfare from an ex ante point of view they conclude that a commitment to withholding relevant information or deliberately reducing its precision may be welfare enhancing in this article we challenge this conclusion by distinguishing two components of transparency precision ofinformationanddegreeofpublicity the degreeof publicity is the proportion of agents who receive a signal using a stylised coordination game introduced by m s we show that information should always be provided to the market

optimal monetary policy and transparency under informational frictions this paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions the economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms desired markups to minimize the welfare reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms the central bank controls firms incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks this paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information

the social value of public information with convex costs of information acquisition in a beauty contest framework welfare can decrease with public information if the precision of private information is exogenous whereas welfare necessarily increases with public information if the precision is endogenous with linear costs of information acquisition the purpose of this paper is to reconcile these results by considering nonlinear costs of information acquisition the main result of this paper is a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public information using it we show that costs of information acquisition are linear if and only if welfare necessarily increases with public information thus welfare can decrease with public information for any strictly convex costs this is because convex costs mitigate the so called crowding out effect of public information on private information thereby making the social value of public information with endogenous precision closer to that with exogenous precision

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

cagan s paradox and money demand in hyperinflation revisited at daily frequency using daily data the cagan money demand is estimated and accepted for the most severe portion of serbia s 1992 1993 hyperinflation i e its last 6 months an implication is that the public adjusted daily throughout this extreme period moreover the obtained semi elasticity estimates are by far lower than those previously found using monthly data sets consequently the daily estimates reject the longstanding cagan s paradox based on monthly studies by showing that the economy has been on the correct increasing side of the laffer curve almost through the end of hyperinflation this strongly supports the view that hyperinflation is triggered and driven all way through its end by the government s hunt for non decreasing seigniorage daily adjustments of public in hyperinflation can account for the difference between the results obtained at daily and monthly frequencies calling into question the latter some evidence is offered that the findings of this paper may hold for other hyperinflations

optimal policy intervention and the social value of public information svensson 2006 argues that morris and shin s 2002 analysis is contrary to what is claimed actually pro transparency this paper re examines the issue but with an important modification to the original morris and shin framework recognizing that central banks impact on the economy not only indirectly via their public announcements but also directly through their policy actions we consider the social value of public information in the presence of active policy intervention our results strengthen morris and shin s conclusions considerably in particular we find that public disclosure of the central bank s information is always undesirable

accounting for inequality trends decomposition analyses for the uk 1971 86 eight explanations for uk income inequality trends between 1971 and 1986 are assessed by pooling evidence from inequality index decompositions by population sub group and by income source the principal causes of the aggregate trends were a mixture of changes in earnings inequality employment structure and unemployment but this mixture changed over time the impact of wage inequality changes on income inequality changes fell during the 1970s and 1980s reflecting the secular decline in the importance of employment earnings for household income packages unemployment changes had their largest impact at the start of the 1980s between 1981 and 1986 self employment income changes appear to have had the largest influence

learning and complementarities in speculative attacks we study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision we show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions we show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market depending on how it is implemented

heterogeneous private sector information central bank disclosure and stabilization policy conventional wisdom has it that a central bank that uses an informational advantage to undertake active policy intervention can do as well at least so far as real outcomes are concerned by making its information publicly available and abstaining from stabilization this notion is examined using a framework incorporating heterogeneous private sector information concerning aggregate demand shocks an activist regime in which the central bank exploits its own information to engage in stabilization is found to be unambiguously superior to a noninterventionist regime where the central bank maintains a constant setting of policy but publicly discloses its own information

non welfarist optimal taxation and behavioral public economics research in behavioral economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions in these situations the government might want to intervene indeed individuals might want the government to intervene to induce behavior that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing the analysis of such corrective interventions through taxes and subsidies might be called behavioral public economics however such analysis where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals is not new in public economics in these cases the government is said to be non welfarist in its objectives and there is a long tradition of nonwelfarist welfare economics especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behavior are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes the object of this paper is to first of all present a unified view of the non welfarist optimal taxation literature and secondly to present behavioral public economics as a natural special case of this general framework

strategic complementarity stabilization policy and the optimal degree of publicity this paper examines the welfare implications of public information dissemination within a model in which information is heterogeneous across agents and where a strategic complementarity is present the focus of the analysis is on how the presence of stabilization policy affects the case for transparency in considering this issue it extends james and lawler s 2011 contribution by incorporating an alternative payoff function and by employing a different representation of public disclosure the study s key finding is that the conclusions drawn in its precursor are robust to these modifications specifically in the presence of optimally designed policy intervention zero transparency maximizes welfare

policy with dispersed information information regarding economic fundamentals is widely dispersed in society is only imperfectly aggregated through prices or other indicators of aggregate activity and cannot be centralized by the government or any other institution in this paper we seek to identify policies that can improve the decentralized use of such dispersed information without requiring the government to observe this information we show that this can be achieved by appropriately designing the contingency of taxation on ex post public information regarding the realized fundamentals and aggregate activity when information is common as in the ramsey literature or when agents have private information only about idiosyncratic shocks as in the mirrlees literature the contingency on fundamentals alone suffices for efficiency when instead agents have private information about aggregate shocks the contingency on aggregate activity is crucial an appropriate combination of the two contingencies permits the government to i dampen the impact of noise and hence reduce non fundamental volatility without also dampening the impact of fundamentals ii induce agents to internalize informational externalities and hence improve the speed of social learning iii restore a certain form of constrained efficiency in the decentralized use of information and iv guarantee that welfare increases with the provision of any additional information jel c72 d62 d82

cointegration and cagan s model of hyperinflation under rational expectations when money and prices are integrated of order two philip cagan s 1956 model of hyperinflation will give rise to two different levels of cointegration in most of the literature on the german hyperinflation one of these cointegrating relationships has been ruled out a priori by assuming that velocity shocks follow a random walk using data from the german hyperinflation the author finds this assumption to be unjustified based on a straightforward extension of the cointegrated var approach suggested by john y campbell and robert j shiller 1987 a method to evaluate the cagan model under rational expectations and no bubbles is proposed and implemented to the german data copyright 1993 by ohio state university press

matriculation in u s economics ph d programs how many accepted americans do not enroll using a sample of 26 u s economics ph d programs in fall 2003 we estimate that only about 12 percent of the u s and canadian students accepted for doctoral study did not enroll in any u s economics ph d program in fall 2003 or fall 2004 it is not possible to increase the supply of new ph d economists substantially by closing the sale on accepted applicants additional qualified applicants are needed nonmatriculants are remarkably similar to enrollees in demographics prior education test scores and fields of special interest but express less interest in economic research and are less likely to have been offered financial aid an expected financial aid deficiency was also the most cited reason for deciding not to matriculate followed by how long it takes to earn an economics ph d and the expectation of higher lifetime earnings in a career other than economics most who decided against an economics ph d enrolled in an alternative graduate program this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fomc forecasts as a focal point for private expectations we explore empirically the theoretical prediction that public information acts as a focal point in the context of the u s monetary policy we aim at establishing whether the publication of federal open market committee fomc inflation forecasts affects the cross sectional dispersion of private inflation expectations our main finding is that publishing fomc inflation forecasts has a negative effect on the cross sectional dispersion of private current year inflation forecasts this effect is found to be robust to another survey data set and to various macroeconomic controls moreover we find that the dispersion of private inflation forecasts is not affected by the dispersion of views among fomc members

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

observing and shaping the market the dilemma of central banks while the central bank observes the market activity to assess economic fundamentals it shapes the market outcome through its policy interventions the more the central bank influences the market the more it spoils the informational content of economic aggregates how should the central bank act and communicate when it derives its information from observing the market this paper analyses the optimal central bank s action and disclosure under endogenous central bank s information for three operational frameworks pure communication action and communication and signaling action when the central bank takes an action it would be optimal for the central bank to be fully opaque to prevent its disclosure from deteriorating the information quality of market outcomes however in the realistic case where central bank s action is observable it may be optimal to refrain from implementing any action

communication and monetary policy recent trends toward greater central bank independence and the adoption of formal inflation targeting by several countries have served to emphasize the importance of communication policy in this paper we explore some of the economic effects of public information that arise whenever public information serves the dual role of conveying fundamental information as well as serving as a focal point for better coordination more precise public information is a double edged tool while it is very effective in influencing actions through coordination sometimes it can be too effective and coordinate actions away from fundamentals copyright 2002 oxford university press

does transparency of central banks produce multiple equilibria on currency markets a recent strand of literature shows that multiple equilibria in models of markets for pegged currencies vanish if there is slightly diverse information among traders see morris and shin 2001 it is known that this approach works only if the common knowledge in the market is not too precise this has led to the conclusion that central banks should try to avoid making their information common knowledge we develop a model in which more transparency of the central bank implies better private information because each trader utilises public information according to her own private information thus transparency makes multiple equilibria less likely

exchange rate manipulation and constructive ambiguity i consider dynamic models in which investors are heterogeneously informed about both foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate fundamentals and show that transparency sometimes exacerbates misalignment between the exchange rate and fundamentals although transparency reveals information about fundamentals it also increases the precision of the exchange rate as a signal of those fundamentals that remain unknown the signal precision effect of transparency if a central bank announcement reveals little information about fundamentals then this effect dominates and transparency magnifies misalignment one implication is that ambiguity can increase the effectiveness of intervention to support a declining currency during times of crisis

information acquisition and welfare we study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information first we relate the in efficiency in the acquisition of information to the in efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition next we show how the acquisition of private information affects the social value of public information i e the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the quality of public information finally we illustrate the implications of the results in a monetary economy with price rigidities and dispersed information about productivity shocks

central bank communication design in a lucas phelps economy abstract in a lucas phelps island economy an island has access to many informative signals about demand conditions each signal incorporates both public and private information the correlation of a signal s realizations across the economy determines its publicity if information sources differ in their publicity then price formation and expectations formation processes separate causing output gaps to open an output stabilizing central bank prefers averagely public information and sometimes limits the clarity of its policy announcements to achieve this the bank s incentive to engage privately in costly information acquisition and transmission is strongest not for the most influential signals but instead for those which drive the largest wedge between prices and expectations signals that are far from averagely public

optimal policy intervention constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information we study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation when policy makers ability to obfuscate information is constrained increasing public information precision can be welfare improving

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

money and interest in a cash in advance economy the authors analyze an aggregative general equilibrium model in which the use of money is motivated by a cash in advance constraint applied to purchases of a subset of consumption goods the system is subject to both real and monetary shocks which are economy wide and observed by all they develop methods for verifying the existence of characterizing and explicitly calculating equilibria copyright 1987 by the econometric society

sources of disagreement in inflation forecasts an international empirical investigation abstract central to the conduct of monetary policy are inflation forecasts inflation forecasts are not unique central banks and professional organizations generate inflation forecasts while households are surveyed about their inflation outlook this paper estimates inflation forecast disagreement for nine economies over the 1999 2009 period five of which target inflation i find that central bank transparency tends to increase forecast disagreement to the extent this reflects the attention paid to inflation performance the implication is that transparency is beneficial moreover this finding does not appear to be a feature that applies only to central banks that must adhere to an inflation target

marital sorting inequality and the role of female labor supply evidence from east and west germany this paper examines to what extent marital sorting affects cross sectional earnings inequality in germany over the past three decades while explicitly taking into account labor supply choices using rich micro data the observed distribution of couples earnings is compared to a counterfactual of randomly matched spouses hypothetical earnings are predicted based on a structural model of household labor supply for west germany a positive effect of marital sorting on inequality is found after adjusting for labor supply behavior while the effect is limited when earnings are taken as given this means that there is positive sorting in earnings potential which is veiled by relatively low female labor force participation in east germany the impact of marital sorting on inequality is highly disequalizing irrespective of adjusting for labor supply choices this is mainly due to the fact that east german women are much more attached to the labor market

money demand during hyperinflation and stabilization bulgaria 1991 2000 the demand for money in bulgaria is estimated over a ten year period 1991 2000 of high inflation and inflation uncertainty the paper distinguishes between three well defined sub periods high variable but not systematically accelerating inflation from 1991 until april 1996 the near hyperinflation period from may 1996 to february 1997 and the subsequent stabilization after the adoption of a currency board the empirical analysis utilizes a standard methodology of cointegration and error correction the functional determinants of the demand for money change during the different sub periods during the hyperinflation episode cagan s model is employed

heterogeneous information quality strategic complementarities and optimal policy design abstract the beauty contest framework of morris and shin 2002 is extended to allow sub groups within the population of agents to differ in the quality i e precision of their private information we discuss the inefficiency of the resulting model s equilibrium and assess the relative effectiveness in remedying this inefficiency of i a pigouvian tax scheme ii direct policy intervention by means of an instrument which can modify the state of the world the disclosure policy implications of each of these two policy approaches are also analyzed

changes in relative wages and family labor supply the large changes in relative wages that occurred during the 1980s provide fertile ground for studying the behavioral responses of married couples to the wage changes of husbands and wives i find estimates of own wage and cross wage elasticities for men that are very small the own wage elasticity for women is positive and the cross wage elasticity for women suggests a strong negative response of female labor supply to changes in their husband s wages family labor supply behavior determines how changes in individual wage rates translate into family earnings changes the responses of women to changes in their husband s wages attenuated somewhat the increases in individual wage inequality at the family level the results suggest that the earnings of the wives of low income men would actually have fallen over the decade if women s labor supply did not respond to changes in their husbands wages however assortative mating implies that wage changes of husbands and wives are correlated and so family earnings inequality still grew during the decade of the 1980s

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

misspecification versus bubbles in hyperinflation data comment abstract in this article i critically review some of the claims and analyses made by hooker j int money financ 19 2000 583 in his study of the cagan hyperinflation model i argue that i contrary to what hooker claims cointegration tests can be used to discriminate between bubbles and no bubbles ii contrary to hooker s claim his empirical results for the interwar european hyperinflations do not in general imply that the cagan model is misspecified iii although hooker s analyses build directly on the durlauf and hall bounds on the variances of specification errors in models with expectations nber working paper 2936 massachusetts cambridge 1989 methodology he neglects an important part of that methodology namely the measurement of the magnitude of noise i present such measures and together with reported cointegration tests the noise measures help reinterpreting hooker s empirical results

the social value of public information with costly information acquisition abstract in a beauty contest framework public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition more precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

majoritarian preference utilitarian welfare and public information in cournot oligopoly abstract can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from condorcet cycles in a cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity decisions we show that the majoritarian preference of consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a condorcet winner always exists under a monotonicity condition on the demand function we characterize the condorcet winning precision in terms of the demand function and the number of firms under which the condorcet winning precision i hurts consumers surplus and profits or ii remains conflict free these results have interesting implications on collective bayesian persuasion by agencies representing consumers showing that when full transparency maximizes expected consumers surplus collective bayesian persuasion can lead to full opacity and vice versa

pitfalls in testing for explosive bubbles in asset prices a number of studies e g robert j shiller 1981 olivier j blanchard and mark watson 1982 kenneth d west 1988 have argued that dividend and stock price data are not consistent with the market fundamentals hypothesis in which prices are given by the present discounted values of expected dividends these results have often been construed as evidence for the existence of bubbles or fads related arguments have been made with respect to gold bonds and foreign exchange a major problem with such arguments e g james hamilton and charles whiteman 1985 is that apparent evidence for bubbles can be reinterpreted in terms of market fundamentals that are unobserved by the researcher behzad t diba and herschel i grossman 1984 1988b and hamilton and whiteman 1985 have recommended the alternative strategy of testing for rational bubbles by investigating the stationarity properties of asset prices and observable fundamentals 1 in essence the argument for equities is that if stock prices are not more explosive than dividends then it can be concluded that rational bubbles are not present since they would generate an explosive component to stock prices 2 using unit root tests autocorrelation patterns and cointegration tests to implement this procedure diba and grossman 1988b p 529 state that the analysis supports the conclusion that stock prices do not contain explosive rational bubbles this paper shows that the above battery of tests is in fact unable to detect an important class of rational bubbles the point is demonstrated by constructing rational bubbles that appear to be stationary when unitroot tests are applied even though they are explosive in the relevant sense simulations show that when such bubbles are present stock prices will not appear to be more explosive than dividends on the basis of these tests even though the bubbles are substantial in magnitude and volatility the presence of rational bubbles in actual stock prices thus remains an open question