information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

deposit insurance and external finance i introduction capital markets serve an essential purpose in the growth and development of modern economies they provide for the efficient channeling of funds from savers to investors there are two basic methods for financing capital investment primary issuance of equity or bonds and securing of bank loans looking around the world we see that countries differ substantially in the relative importance of banks and capital markets in providing investment financing equity market capitalization currently ranges from close to zero in countries like austria argentina and greece to nearly two times gross domestic product gdp in the united kingdom south africa and malaysia the importance of bank loan financing is essentially the mirror image of this what accounts for the cross country differences in the importance of banks and capital market financing of investment the purpose of this article is to address this question directly we contend that much of the variation across countries in the depth and breadth of capital markets can be explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and the extent to which a country s banking system is state owned because of the importance of financial intermediation and the difficulties associated with potential bank failures governments in most countries have established a set of institutional structures to ensure the stability of their banking systems primary among these is the creation of deposit insurance by insuring deposits banks liability holders are significantly less likely to request the return of callable deposits reducing the chances of bank runs but at the same time deposit insurance subsidizes bank risk taking activities and allows the payment of lower interest rates to depositors 1 this channels money through banks and away from financial markets direct state bank ownership has a similar impact see barth et al 2001 la porta et al 2000 we present a simple three sector model in which the economy is composed of firms banks and households the firms require operating capital and can obtain it either through equity issuance or from bank loans banks take deposits from households and make loans to firms while households both allocate their wealth and purchase the firms output the model allows us to show how increases in deposit insurance or the percentage of the banking system that is state owned both reduces the size of the capital market and shrinks the amount of bank credit to the private sector and may decrease the number of firms seeking equity financing to examine the predictions of the model we study a data set composed of 49 countries of these 33 currently have explicit deposit insurance and 42 have some state ownership of banks ranging from less than 2 to almost 90 the data confirm the predictions of the model an increase in either state bank ownership or presence of deposit insurance both decreases the size of capital markets and the extent of bank lending for example we would predict that decreasing the percentage of the banking system that is state owned from 36 as it is in italy to zero would increase in the size of the capital market from less than 10 to over 30 of gdp and a raise in the level of bank lending from 57 to close to 90 of gdp our conclusions are in contrast with those in la porta et al 1997 who study the relationship between law and finance la porta et al note the importance of the countries legal system in determining the structure of the financial system in particular they point out that investors provide capital to firms only if they believe they will get their money back for equity holders this means that they must be able to vote out directors and managers who do not pay them for creditors and holders of bonds this means that they must have authority to repossess collateral furthermore these nominal legal rights must be accompanied by confidence that the laws will be enforced

dividend taxes corporate investment and q abstract taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a double tax on corporate income this view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view one explanation of why firms in the united states pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions this capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation s decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings this alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions this paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation by extending tobin s q theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived the competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory s predictions british time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions the econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions

the incidence and allocation effects of a tax on corporate distributions abstract to study the effects of double taxation first at the corporation level then at the shareholder level this paper analyzes a model with a tax on all corporate distributions to equity owners and no other taxes contrary to the common view the tax is shown to have no subtitution effect and in particular no effect on the corporate choice between debt and equity via retained earnings finance the analysis opens to question certain arguments commonly used to support integration of corporation and individual income taxes via dividend relief

a general proposition on the design of a neutral business tax abstract a simple and general means of levying a business tax that is neutral in the sense that it does not affect the firm s decisions at the margin is discussed in particular we analyze the effect of a business tax of our design on the investment decision of the firm the well known imputed income and immediate write off methods of levying a neutral business tax are found to be special cases of our general tax design the implication of our results is that a neutral pure profits tax can be levied without the informational difficulties of the imputed income method or the cash flow disadvantages of the immediate write off method

stabilising properties of discretionary monetary policies in a small open economy this article sets out a simple new keynesian open economy model and shows that the conduct of discretionary monetary policy in an open economy differs substantially from the closedeconomy framework the article shows analytically that the existence of the direct exchange rate channel in the open economy phillips curve impairs the perfect stabilising property of monetary policy in the face of demand side disturbances under domestic inflation targeting if cpi inflation is instead the target then the perfect stabilising property of monetary policy breaks down even in the absence of the direct exchange rate channel in the phillips curve

endogenous timing in duopoly games stackelberg or cournot equilibria abstract simultaneous versus sequential play is studied in an extended game in a preplay stage players decide whether to select actions in the basic game at the first opportunity or to wait until observing their rivals first period actions in one extended game players first decide when to select actions without committing to actions in the basic game the equilibrium has a simultaneous play subgame unless payoffs in a sequential play subgame pareto dominate those payoffs in another extended game deciding to select at the first turn requires committing to an action both sequential play outcomes are the equilibria only in undominated strategies

viewpoint innovations in the theory and practice of redistribution policy we present a survey of key results from second best optimal redistribution theory and their implications for tax transfer policy the core results include the corlett hague theorem the deaton conditions the production efficiency theorem the atkinson stiglitz theorem and the mirrlees saez characterization of the optimal non linear income tax system these have been augmented in recent years by optimal participation tax rates the implications of involuntary unemployment the use of unconventional instruments such as minimum wages in kind transfer and workfare and the optimal taxation of capital income and bequests l auteur presente un survol des principaux resultats theoriques de la redistribution optimale de second ordre et de leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts les resultats fondamentaux incluent le theoreme de corlett hague les conditions de deaton les theoremes d efficacite en production le theoreme d atkinson stiglitz ainsi que la caracterisation du systeme optimal d imposition non lineaire du revenu a la mirrlees saez ces derniers resultats ont ete enrichis au cours des dernieres annees par certains autres portant sur les taux d imposition decoulant des allocations conditionnelles les implications du chomage involontaire l usage d instruments non conventionnels tels que le salaire minimum les transferts en nature le workfare ainsi que l imposition optimale des revenus du capital et des legs ces resultats sont exposes et leurs implications pour les politiques d imposition et de transferts sont discutees

why do countries combine the exemption system for the taxation of foreign profits with domestic double taxation relief many european countries exempt foreign profits from domestic corporate taxation at the shareholder level however all corporate profits are taxed and double taxation relief is granted only for domestic corporate taxes this paper attempts to rationalize this tax policy in the presence of double taxation agreements which exempt foreign profits from domestic corporate taxation countries may use shareholder taxes to tax these profits the disadvantage of shareholder taxes is that they create incentives to sell domestic firms to foreigners but double taxation relief for domestic profits may preserve domestic ownership our results imply that national dividend tax policies may be a factor contributing to the empirically observed home bias in investment

sticky prices as coordination failure this paper links the coordination failure and menu cost approaches to the microeconomic foundations of keynesian macroeconomics if a firm s desired price is increasing in others prices then the gain from price adjustment after a nominal shock is greater if others adjust this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity thus nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes jel e12 e30 keynesian macroeconomics waned in the 1970 s because economists grew disenchanted with its weak microeconomic foundations the central difficulty was that keynesian models were based on ad hoc rigidities in nominal wages and prices the 1980 s produced two approaches to reviving keynesian theory the menu cost literature n gregory mankiw 1985 george akerlof and janet yellen 1985 seeks to provide rigorous explanations for nominal rigidities these papers argue that small frictions in price setting are enough to produce large nominal rigidities in contrast the coordination failure literature russell cooper and andrew john 1988 abandons nominal rigidities and seeks alternative foundations for keynesian models the central idea is that many economic activities such as production e g john bryant 1983 trade e g peter diamond 1982 and investment e g nobuhiro kiyotaki 1988 exhibit synergism or strategic complementarity one agent s optimal level of activity depends positively on others activity strategic complementarity can lead to multiple equilibria with high activity equilibria superior to low activity equilibria thus an economy may be stuck in an underemployment equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists models with nominal rigidities and models with coordination failures are often presented as competing paradigms 1 this paper shows that this view is incorrect we take a step toward unifying the foundations of keynesian economics by showing that the two sets of ideas are highly complementary nominal rigidity arises from a failure to coordinate price changes this failure has the essential features of coordination failures in previous models flexibility in one firm s price increases the incentives for other firms to make their prices flexible this strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity equilibria with less rigidity more active price adjustment are often pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity these results contribute to our understanding both of coordination failure and of nominal rigidity the range of keynesian phenomena explained by coordination failures is greatly expanded previous coordination failure models contain only real variables and thus ascribe no role to monetary policy or other determinants of nominal spending our results suggest that coordination failure is at the root of inefficient nonneutralities of money theories of nominal rigidities gain new empirical and policy im

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

rational expectations and price rigidity in a monopolistically competitive market this paper analyses monopolistically competitive markets under incomplete information facing unanticipated disturbances firms determine their prices before they have information about other firms prices and form their expectations about the average price rationally if the market becomes very competitive in the sense that the price elasticity of individual demand is close to infinity then the average price is completely insensitive to short run unanticipated disturbances in the intermediate case if a cost disturbances are uniform and b demand and cost disturbances are correlated then the average price is sensitive to cost and insensitive to demand

european monetary union adjustment and exchange rate variability abstract this paper uses a three country three good factor specific model of trade with wage rigidities to investigate how european monetary union is likely to affect exchange rate variability focusing on international macroeconomic adjustment under both exogenous and optimizing monetary policies it shows that the relative variability against external currencies of the euro and a basket of predecessor currencies depends on the relative sizes and specialization patterns of countries and the relative importance of different shocks monetary union is likely to decrease increase aggregate european exchange rate variability for shocks to industries in which large small euro area countries specialize

r d and endogenous asymmetries between firms abstract we endogenize competitiveness asymmetries between firms through commitment power asymmetries in r d we show that relatively to firms with no commitment power in r d firms with a first mover advantage in r d achieve higher competitiveness levels

inflation and productive activity in a multiple matching model of money abstract this paper investigates the relationship between money growth inflation and productive activity in a dynamic general equilibrium multiple matching framework where trade frictions are manifested by limited consumption variety productive activity and matching in the goods market are endogenized by a time allocation decision of work and search effort we find that a high degree of complementarity between participation in the labor and goods markets creates a channel by which inflation can positively influence production and output this feature arises when household preferences for consumption variety is sufficiently large and it can also lead to the multiplicity of monetary equilibria

a quantized approach to rational inattention abstract in this paper i propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables and still only a finite amount of information is being used this holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous that is the mapping from the realization of the exogenous variables to the endogenous ones is piece wise constant thus limited information is now a source of lumpiness in behavior rather than a source of noise the approach is applied to a simple static model of price setting where individual price setters face aggregate monetary shocks and idiosyncratic productivity shocks the effect of aggregate money shocks on output and prices is studied it is shown that as the variance of idiosyncratic shocks become large the aggregate log price level converges to a linear function of the aggregate money shock with a coefficient which is strictly between 0 and 1 consequently unanticipated aggregate money shocks have real effects on output in contrast to the sticky price model of caplin and spulber 1987 but these effects are smaller than in standard rational inattention models or in the lucas 1972 misperception model

problems with integrating corporate and personal income taxes in an open economy abstract this paper analyzes income tax integration in a small open economy when agents exploit all legal tax arbitrage opportunities the analysis shows that integration does not accomplish the objectives that have been attributed to it instead of eliminating the double taxation of equity income it simply removes the primary taxation of savings done through the corporation the analysis has implications for the choice of a personal tax base and for the design of the corporate tax

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

theoretical developments in the light of macroeconomic policy and empirical research macroeconomics is surveyed with emphasis on the implications of the new classical and rational expectations critiques for the keynesian paradigm and the role of macro policies at the background are the main macro developments of the 1 970s and 1 980s as well as the specific lessons of recent high chronic inflation processes a synthesis is emerging in which the basic keynesian view of the existence of market and price coordination failures as well as room for pareto improving policy intervention are maintained at the same time the theoretical underpinnings are undergoing substantial change mainly due to a rational expectations reformulation

asymmetric effects of money supply shocks and trend inflation in recent years a number of empirical studies have presented evidence that money supply shocks have asymmetric effects that is unexpected negative changes in the money supply slow the economy more than unexpected positive changes accelerate the economy evidence of asymmetry was documented by cover 1992 for the postwar u s economy and his finding was confirmed by de long and summers 1988 morgan 1993 rhee and rich 1995 and karras 1996a b stimulated by these empirical works several attempts have been made to provide microeconomic foundations for the asymmetric effects of money supply shocks 1 among those theories this paper examines the one that focuses on asymmetric price adjustment and let us call it a sticky price theory money supply shocks will have asymmetric effects on real output if prices are less flexible downward than upward this sticky price theory was proposed by tsiddon 1993 ball and mankiw 1994 and caballero and engel 1992 by employing a menu cost model the above researchers show that positive trend inflation can produce the asymmetric effects of money supply shocks the logic of their theory is the following along with price adjustment costs positive trend infla

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

internationally mobile firms and tax policy abstract this paper analyses how the government should tax internationally mobile firms the analysis finds that if tax authorities are unable to observe firms true mobility and domestic and foreign profitability are uncorrelated then 1 information rents are acquired by immobile inefficient firms and 2 the optimal policy will stimulate investment in the immobile sector compared to the complete information case another result of the paper is that the optimal allocation is implementable within the framework of a corporate income tax system where mobile firms self select more unfavourable capital allowances than immobile firms

rational expectations and the theory of aggregate investment abstract this paper shows that net aggregate investment satisfies a modified acceleration principle in a neoclassical economy with rational expectations net aggregate investment depends mostly on changes in net national income and in some cases it is also influenced by changes in aggregate consumption

value of an additional firm in monopolistic competition the paper develops a model of monopolistic competition in which the satisfaction levels consumers get from products are independently and identically distributed potential substitution among products then generates demand curves through the mechanism of order statistics the value of extra variety can be calculated directly pareto lognormal and beta distributions are investigated using numerical integration some but not all cases support the argument that the optimal number of firms exceeds the equilibrium number

the simple macroeconomics of profit sharing this paper is in the spirit of the temporary equilibrium approach to macroeconomics it basically extends that framework to cover a profit sharing system and then compares the macroeconomic characteristics with those of the more familiar wage system a first preliminary step is to demonstrate how a microeconomic model of monopolistic competition can be built up into a junior member of the keynesian macro family the methodology is to create from first principles including a careful formulation of a monopolistically competitive product market structurea natural underpinning for the standard aggregate demand specification the primary goal of the paper is to apply the integrated monopolistic competitionkeynesian type apparatus described above to investigate the macroeconomic properties of a profit sharing economy the existence of a consistent general framework covering both cases invites meaningful comparisons that indicate clearly why an economy based on profit sharing principles possesses natural immunity to stagflation by contrast the wage economya system we have largely accepted without critically examining its macroeconomic consequences is more prone to suffer from unemployment and inflation the policy implications for aggregate demand management in wage and share systems are analyzed and contrasted in writing this paper my philosophy has been to not shirk from using those reasonable parameterizations and functional forms which yield nice crisp results and permit me to focus sharply on the essential logic of basic issues it is certainly possible to present the main results in a somewhat more general formulation as the astute reader will appreciate but i fear only at some cost of distracting attention from those central features i wish to highlight

the new open economy macroeconomics a survey since the 1995 publication of obsteld and rogoff s redux model there has been an outpouring of research on open economy dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate imperfect competition and nominal rigidities this paper offers an interim survey of this recent literature 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

taxation corporate financial policy and the cost of capital the cost of capital plays an important role in the allocation of resources among competing uses in a decentralized market system the purpose of this paper is to organize and present what is known and what is hypothesized about the effects of taxation on the incentive to invest via the cost of capital taking full account of important issues that arise independently from the question of taxation included in the analysis is a discussion of empirical findings about the interaction of inflation and taxation in influencing the incentive to invest and a treatment of taxation and uncertainty this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

what determines aggregate returns to scale abstract this paper develops a unified framework that incorporates four features important in existing models with increasing returns fixed costs decreasing marginal costs product variety and market power when fixed costs are not allowed to vary and profits are imposed to be zero in every period only the degree of returns to variety determines the degree of aggregate increasing returns to scale when fixed costs respond to changes in aggregate activity or the zero profit condition does not hold in the short run aggregate returns depend not only on product variety but also on diminishing marginal costs or market power the degree of market power however does not affect input prices which are critical to determine the uniqueness of equilibrium

price rigidities and market structure conventional wisdom has it that a large part of the explanation of keynesian unemployment is the observed rigidities of wages and prices what has been lacking however is a satisfactory theory or conjunction of theories which explains how wages and prices can be at non market clearing levels the objective of this paper is to sketch out several alternative theoretical explanations of this phenomenon each in contrast with keynesian theory is consistent with the observation that as the economy goes into a recession real product wages do not increase and may in fact decrease all of the theories assume rational profit maximizing firms and all entail some important departure from the standard competitive paradigm the first three explanations represent minor adaptations of standard models

small menu costs and large business cycles a macroeconomic model of monopoly i introduction the conflict between modern neoclassical and traditional keynesian theories of the business cycle centers upon the pricing mechanism in neoclassical models prices are fully flexible they represent the continuous optimization of economic agents and the continuous intersection of supply and demand in keynesian models prices are often assumed to be sticky they do not necessarily equilibrate all markets at all times one of the reasons for the resurgence of the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics has been the absence of a theoretical underpinning for this keynesian price stickiness this note shows that sticky prices can be both privately efficient and socially inefficient the business cycle results from the suboptimal adjustment of prices in response to a demand shock to the extent that policy can stabilize aggregate demand it can mitigate the social loss due to this suboptimal adjustment in some keynesian models prices are simply exogenously fixed 2 in others agents must set their prices in advance of the transaction date the act of altering a posted price is certainly costly these costs include such items as printing new catalogs and informing salesmen of the new price yet these menu costs are small and therefore generally perceived as providing only a weak foundation for these fixed price models however this inference is flawed small menu costs can cause large welfare losses the claim that price adjustment costs are small does not rebut the claim that they are central to understanding economic fluctuations

increasing returns and the foundations of unemployment theory current approaches to macroeconomic theory divide roughly into two basic schools of thought one approach typically associated with rational expectations views the economy as basically at or near walrasian market clearing equilibrium in which case it becomes very difficult to explain away convincingly the undeniable persistence at times of involuntary unemployment another approach views the underemployed economy as being in a state of temporary fixed price disequilibrium in which case aside from having to repress suspicions that the essence of effective demand failure might not have to do with prices fixed at wrong values there is a lot of rationalising to be done about why profitable adjustments are so slow this paper argues that something like an internally consistent theory of steady state involuntary unemployment is possible and even plausible the cornerstone of this third approach is increasing returns to scale which blocks unemployed agents from breaking out of a low level equilibrium trap unless there is overall coordination or stimulation a simple model is presented which contains the basic ideas

excess capacity in a fixed cost economy abstract this paper proposes a new mechanism that can explain persistent economic slack the theory shows that when producers face negligible marginal costs and desired spending is below the economy s capacity the economy features slack in equilibrium even when prices are flexible and there are no other frictions a heterogeneous household version of the model demonstrates how an economy can enter a capacity trap in response to a temporary negative demand shock when demand by some consumers falls temporarily other consumers permanent income and hence their desired consumption also falls since output is determined by demand the permanent fall in desired consumption causes a permanent state of excess capacity

differential information monopolistic competition and investment the behavior of investment in a monopolistically competitive industry is investigated under the assumption of imperfect information about the average investment firms profits are affected by productivity shocks these shocks consist of two types of disturbances industry wide and idiosyncratic ones the main results are investment under imperfect information is more volatile than that under perfect information if firms can observe their own productivity conditions but not their components and increased competition always destabilizes investment and raises its volatility the rigidity of rational expectations plays a crucial role copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

cross border investing with tax arbitrage the case of german dividend tax credits german dividends typically carry a tax credit which makes the dividend worth 42 86 more to a taxable german shareholder than to a tax exempt or foreign shareholder this results in a penalty for foreign investors who buy and hold german dividend paying stocks i document that as a result of the credit the ex day drop exceeds the dividend by more than one half of the tax credit and show that futures and option prices embed more than one half of the tax credit the existence of the credit creates opportunities for cross border tax arbitrage in which foreign holders of german stock transfer the dividend to german shareholders and implies that it is tax efficient for foreign investors to hold derivatives rather than investing directly in german stocks the empirical findings are consistent with costly tax arbitrage activity by german investors who face tax risk due to antiarbitrage rules since dividend tax credits exist in many other countries the findings are potentially of broad interest

wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the united kingdom abstract this paper analyses the effects of a non linear tax system on wage bargaining the main conclusions are an increase in the marginal income or payroll tax rate reduces the pre tax wage in the isoelastic case an increase in the average tax rate increases the pre tax wage by more than the tax increase and a measure of the progressivity of the tax system residual income progression is a sufficient measure of the effect of the tax system on wage pressure empirical evidence is presented to support these propositions and the predictions of the model regarding the effect of recent changes to the u k tax system on the distribution of earnings discussed

taxation of investment and savings in a world economy the equilibrium of capital and equilibrium market prices are derived for a world economy with a unified securities market mobile capital no uncertainty and varying tax rates on different sources of income in each country the paper then characterizes optimal tax rates for a small country in this setting focusing on the peculiar incentives created when the before tax rate of return differs among securities due to differences in their typical tax treatment copyright 1986 by american economic association

taxation unemployment and growth dynamic welfare effects of green policies abstract this paper analyzes the effects of environmental tax reforms on a small open economy the labor market is characterized by union wage setting the carbon tax acts as an implicit tariff which gives rise to terms of trade gains the terms of trade effect together with the union wage setting leads to a positive relationship between the capital labor ratio and net foreign wealth in the short run the disinvestments in real and financial capital give temporary room for higher consumption and instantaneous utility the long run effect on instantaneous utility is more uncertain a strong double dividend may exist

public policy towards r d in oligopolistic industries the importance of determining optimal policy towards r d cannot be exaggerated given the worldwide interest in fostering r d and given the significant differences between european and u s policies towards interfirm cooperation on r d moreover the problem is an inherently difficult one because of the complex nature of the r d process since r d is a component of fixed costs industries where it is important tend to be concentrated hence r d policy must go hand in hand with competition policy at the same time r d is like any form of investment in that it precedes the production stage hence issues of time consistency and strategic commitment inevitably arise in considering the choice of r d policy finally r d by one firm typically leads to spillovers wbich benefit other firms so that r d exhibits many of the character department of economics university college dublin belfield dublin 4 ireiatid for helpful discussions and comments we are grateful to two anonymous referees to pedro bartos steve martin massimo motta and damien neven and to participants at seminars in birmingham st andrew s and warwick at a cepr workshop on r d spillovers in lausanne at erwit 94 in caslel gandolfo eea 95 in prague the 1996 conference on industrial economics at universidad carlos iii de madrid and a meeting of the dublin economics workshop this paper was produced as part of the international economic performance programme of the centre for economic performance london school of economics supported by the u k esrc an earlier version was circulated as cepr discussion paper no 1243 see alexis jacquemin 1988 and stephen martin 1996 istics of a public good albeit one that is mostly privately produced tbe degree to which such spillovers occur and can be internalized is another crucial influence on the desirable pattem of intervention