lobbying by ethnic groups and aid allocation we develop a political economic model of foreign aid allocation each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government to allocate more aid to its country of origin and the government accepts political contributions from lobby groups initial per capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium we also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption aid fatigue and ethnic composition in the donor country on the allocation of aid

aid and growth what meta analysis reveals abstract recent literature in the meta analysis category where results from a range of studies are brought together throws doubt on the ability of foreign aid to foster economic growth and development this article assesses what meta analysis has to contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid in terms of growth impact we re examine key hypotheses and find that the effect of aid on growth is positive and statistically significant this significant effect is genuine and not an artefact of publication selection we also show why our results differ from those published elsewhere

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

shared producer and consumer responsibility theory and practice abstract over the past decade an increasing number of authors have been examining the nexus of producer versus consumer responsibility often dealing with the question of how to assign responsibility for internationally traded greenhouse gas emissions recently a similar problem has appeared in drafting the standards for the ecological footprint while the method traditionally assumes a full life cycle perspective with full consumer responsibility a large number of producers businesses and industry sectors have started to calculate their own footprints see www isa org usyd edu au adding any producer s footprint to other producers footprints or to population footprints which all already cover the full upstream supply chain of their operating inputs leads to double counting the sum of footprints of producers and consumers is larger than the total national footprint the committee in charge of the footprint standardisation process was hence faced with the decades old non additivity problem posing the following dilemma for the accounting of footprints or any other production factor if one disallows double counting but wishes to be able to account for producers and consumers then one cannot impose the requirement of full life cycle coverage the supply chains of actors have to be curtailed somehow in order to avoid double counting this work demonstrates and discusses a non arbitrary method of consistently delineating these supply chains into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive portions of responsibility to be shared by all actors in an economy

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

environmental protection and the private provision of international public goods final version received 11 september 2008 international environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of publicgoods in the international arena no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free rider incentives therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach topursue ef cient international environmental protection we propose a scheme which is based on the ideasof coasean negotiations and pigouvian taxes the negotiating entities offer side payments to counterpartsin order to in uence their taxation of polluting consumption side payments in turn are self nanced bymeans of externality correcting taxes as we show a pareto ef cient outcome can be attained

to brand or not to brand a theoretical and empirical question a firm s brand name is a valuable asset that can greatly enhance the demand for its products this fact is widely recognized in both the economics and marketing literatures surprisingly though little rigorous analysis has been devoted by either of these literatures to the question of when a firm will identify one of its new products with an established brand name it is on this question that our research is focused the economics literature in this general area has focused on issues that are related to but quite distinct from the issue we examine the traditional industrial organization literature discusses and attempts to capture empirically the relationships among advertising brand names and market power for some representative work we develop and test a model that predicts 1 whether a multiproduct firm will brand a new product with the established company name and 2 where the new product will be located in relation to the reputation estabished by the firm in other markets hotelling s 1929 model of spatial location serves as the basis for our theoretical investigation however we extend hotelling s model to the case of experience goods whose qualities can only be known with certainty after the product is purchased and consumed the logic that underlies our model is tested on a sample of firms from the u s liquor industry we employ a mixed logit approach to capture the simultaneous decisions that are made by the firms in our sample the views expressed in this paper are our own and not necessarily those of the bell system we are grateful to 0 gur arie the michigan liquor control commission peter ochshorn and srinivasan balakrishnan for valuable assistance with data collection and programming and to the national science foundation for support through grant ist 8315690 the helpful comments of roger klein pablo spiller and an anonymous referee are also gratefully acknowledged any errors are of course our responsibility

new methodology for the ecological footprint with an application to the new zealand economy abstract sustainable development has become a primary objective for many countries throughout the world since the late 1980s a major difficulty associated with sustainable development objectives however is the absence of reliable indicators to measure progress towards the goal of sustainability the ecological footprint provides an estimate of the land area necessary to sustain current levels of resource consumption for a given population on an aggregate basis the ecological footprint may be compared with the amount of ecologically productive land available to give an indication of whether consumption patterns are likely to be sustainable this paper proposes the use of a modified form of input output analysis to calculate the ecological footprint the input output approach provides a consistent means of calculating an ecological footprint using data collected as part of the system of national accounts in most developed countries in addition it makes explicit the link between the level of economic activity in a country and its corresponding impact on the environment an application of this methodology to new zealand indicates that it takes 3 49 has of ecologically productive land per year to sustain the average new zealander s current level of consumption

the responsibility for carbon emissions and carbon efficiency at the sectoral level evidence from china this work reviews benefit based principles to measuring responsibility for carbon emissions at the sectoral level using environmental input output analysis several new emissions multipliers are proposed to measure sectoral carbon efficiency these principles are used in an empirical analysis of carbon emissions in china and differences between the principles are compared the results indicate that all principles considered can prevent double counting of emissions but that different principles may lead to significantly different attributions of responsibility for carbon emissions and to different multiplier values for particular sectors electricity and heat supply is found to be the sector with the highest emissions responsibility under all but the consumer responsibility principle as well as the highest carbon multiplier under all principles however this sector s responsibility under producer responsibility principles is greater than that under other principles basic metals and transportation and post and telecommunication are among the top five sectors with the greatest responsibilities under all but the consumer responsibility principle whereas construction has the highest consumer responsibility among all sectors the pros and cons and policy implications of each principle are also discussed

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

development aid and climate finance this paper discusses the implications of climate change for official transfers from rich countries the north to poor countries the south when the motivation for transfers is ethical rather than strategic traditional development transfers to increase income and reduce poverty are complemented by new financial flows to reduce greenhouse gas emissions mitigation transfers and become climate resilient adaptation transfers we find that in the absence of barriers to adaptation mitigation or development climate change will make isolated transfers less efficient a large part of their intended effect to increase income reduce emissions or boost climate resilience dissipates as the south reallocates its own resources to achieve the mitigation adaptation and consumption balance it prefers only in the case of least developed countries which are unable to adapt fully due to income constraints will adaptation support lead to more climate resilience in all other cases if the north wishes to change the balance between mitigation adaptation and consumption it should structure its transfers as matching grants which are tied to the south s own level of funding alternatively the north could provide an integrated climate compatible development package that recognizes the combined climate and development requirements of the south if the aim is to increase both mitigation and adaptation in the south development assistance that increases the income level can be an effective measure but only if there is an international agreement and the recipient country is not income constrained if the recipient country is very poor development aid may reduce adaptation effort

applying physical input output analysis to estimate land appropriation ecological footprints of international trade activities in the last few years some studies have been presented which link land use accounting and input output analysis based on monetary input output tables miots for the calculation of direct and indirect land appropriation of production and consumption activities the compilation of the first comprehensive physical input output tables piots for some western european countries in the 1990s opened new possibilities for linking physical accounting and input output analysis using a physical multiplier for this kind of calculation is more appropriate as the most land intensive sectors are also the sectors with the highest amounts of material flows physical input output analysis illustrates land appropriation in relation to material flows of each of the sectors which is more appropriate from the point of view of environmental pressures than land appropriation in relation to monetary flows of a miot physical input output analysis has so far not been applied for any land related studies based on a physical input output model of the eu 15 physical input output analysis is applied in this paper in order to calculate direct and indirect land requirements for the production of exports from eu 15 to the rest of the world

allocating ecological footprints to final consumption categories with input output analysis we present and discuss a method that allows the disaggregation of national ecological footprints by economic sector detailed final demand category sub national area or socio economic group this is done by combining existing national footprint accounts with input output analysis calculations in the empirical part are carried out by using supply and use tables for the united kingdom covering the reporting period 2000 ecological footprints are allocated to detailed household consumption activities following the coicop classification system and to a detailed breakdown of capital investment the method presented enables the calculation of comparable ecological footprints on all sub national levels and for different socio economic groups the novelty of the approach lies in the use of input output analysis to re allocate existing footprint accounts in the detail of disaggregation by consumption category and in the expanded use of household expenditure data this extends the potential for applications of the ecological footprint concept and helps to inform scenarios policies and strategies on sustainable consumption the method described in this paper can be applied to every country for which a national footprint account exists and where appropriate economic and environmental accounts are available the approach helps to save time in data collection and improves the consistency between ecological footprint estimates for a particular human society from different researchers for these reasons the suggested methodology includes crucial steps on the way towards a standardisation of ecological footprint accounts

weakest link public goods giving in kind or transferring money abstract this paper extends the analysis of weakest link public goods whose level equals the smallest of the agents provision levels by permitting an agent either to increase one s own provision or else augment both one s own provision and that of the other agent s nash equilibria may be either symmetric with agents matching one another s provision or else asymmetric with an in kind transfer by one agent to another an equilibrium with cash transfers but no in kind transfers may be pareto superior to one with only in kind transfers if agents differ in their efficiency then in kind transfers by the low cost agent may dominate a cash transfer the possibility of pareto improving transfers is enhanced as the number of agents increases

a three perspective view of greenhouse gas emission responsibilities in new zealand abstract while responsibility for the environmental impacts of production has been commonly assigned to producers production is driven by consumer demand and it is valid to question whether impacts should instead be assigned to consumers however in each of these approaches producers and consumers either bear the full burden of responsibility or none at all an example of this is the kyoto protocol where all greenhouse gas emissions are assigned to the producer and no consideration is given to where goods are finally consumed rather than taking the conventional producer or consumer responsibility approach a third perspective is possible in which responsibility is shared we use input output analysis to apply all three of these responsibility perspectives to new zealand s domestic greenhouse gas emissions our main findings from the shared responsibility approach are that new zealand producers are responsible for 44 of domestic emissions new zealand consumers take 28 and 27 are exported a shared responsibility approach appears to distribute the burden of responsibility and associated liability between parties more fairly and is likely to be more widely acceptable than pure producer or consumer perspectives

strategic information acquisition and the mitigation of global warming abstract we consider the strategic role of uncertainty and information acquisition for the mitigation of global warming before the countries decide on their contribution to a mitigation of global warming they may invest in information about the country specific benefit of reductions of the emissions of greenhouse gases we show that information acquisition has a substantial strategic value countries may prefer not to learn their benefit of climate protection even if information acquisition does not involve a direct cost this strategic information choice may further decrease the efficiency of the public good provision

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

international public goods and contribution productivity differentials abstract this paper investigates the impacts of productivity differentials in contributing to the public good on national welfare in the context of non cooperative voluntary provision of a pure public good a country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare subsidizing the other country in a contribution game may lead to a strong paradoxical result while a lump sum transfer will lead to a weak paradoxical result we also explore the relationship between the price of the public good and the size of an open club in a multi club model

aid and growth what does the cross country evidence really show abstract we examine the effects of aid on growth in cross sectional and panel data after correcting for the possible bias that poorer or stronger growth may draw aid contributions to recipient co

unconditional aid and green growth abstract environmentally motivated aid can help developing countries to achieve economic growth while mitigating the impact on emission levels we argue that the usual practice of giving aid conditionally is not effective and we therefore study aid that is given unconditionally our framework is a differential open loop stackelberg game between a fully developed leader country and a developing follower country the leader chooses the amount of mitigation aid given to the follower which the follower either consumes or invests in either costly non polluting capital or cheap high emission capital we show that giving aid conditionally is only rarely effective and if so is based on a forced intertemporal savings effect in all other cases it is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst moreover we find that the leader gives unconditional mitigation aid only when sufficiently rich or when caring sufficiently about environmental quality if unconditional aid is given in steady state it decreases the steady state level of high emission capital and capital investments in the recipient country as well as the global pollution stock but it has no effect on the levels of non polluting capital and non polluting investments transitional aid accelerates the economic growth of the follower moreover we find that the increase in growth takes place in the non polluting sector

contracting for aid abstract foreign aid is analyzed as a contract where the north gives a transfer to the south in return for poverty reduction regarded as an international public good the issue of conditionality is first discussed in a moral hazard framework and then under asymmetric information about the degree of altruism of the government of the south additional actors like local ngos and multilateral aid institutions are then added to the model the optimal contracts to avoid free riding or collusion are then presented