success survive or escape aspirations and poverty traps i present a model of occupational choice where an agent decides whether to invest in a project that yields risky returns or a project that yields safe returns an agent s utility is affected by the presence of an aspiration level which will only be satisfied if their final income is above the poverty line i show that agents who are sufficiently above the poverty line will invest in the risky project and are able to aspire for success an agent however who is just above the poverty line may be so concerned about falling into poverty that they choose to invest in the safe project these individuals aspire only to survive alternatively if an agent is sufficiently below the poverty line then they will invest in the risky project even if expected returns are lower than the safe project these individuals have nothing left to lose and therefore aspire to escape two forms of poverty traps emerge from the resulting equilibria one above the poverty line and one below the poverty line finally i offer empirical support for the model based on individual level survey data across a large number of countries

decentralization and corruption evidence from u s federal transfer programs while some recent evidence suggests that more decentralization is associated with reduced corruption no empirical work has examined whether different types of decentraliz ation have differential effects on corruption the theoretical literature has emphasized that expenditure decentralization will only be effective if accompanied by the devolution of rev enue generation to local governments in this paper we examine this hypothesis empirically by studying the mismatch between revenue generation and expenditure in u s states larger federal transfers are associated with higher rates of conviction for abuse of public office supporting the theory that soft budget constraints created by federal transfers are potentially problematic

capture and governance at local and national levels 135 despite the importance of this issue not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture here we describe a model of two party electoral competition with probabilistic voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on david baron 1994 and gene grossman and elhanan helpman 1996 that helps identify determinants of relative capture at different levels of government these include relative levels of voter awareness and interest group cohesiveness electoral uncertainty electoral competition heterogeneity of districts with respect to inequality and the electoral system while some of these uphold the traditional madisonian presumption others are likely to create a tendency for lower capture at the local level so the net effect is theoretically ambiguous this suggests that the extent of relative capture may be context specific and needs to be assessed empirically

pre matching gambles abstract this paper investigates pre matching gambles and provides a new reason to gamble matching concerns examples of pre matching gambles include occupational choices before the marriage market college major choices before the labor market and portfolio management before attracting future clients in the financial market i show that people make risky investments they would not have made if not for their subsequent participation in a competitive matching market a fundamental and unique feature of the competitive matching market which i call the competitive matching effect induces gambling the paper also illustrates the relationship between social efficiency and inequality in this setting and shows how progressive taxation eliminates social inefficiency reduces inequality and generates government revenue

social comparisons and contributions to online communities a field experiment on movielens we design a field experiment to explore the use of social comparison to increase contributions to an online community we find that after receiving behavioral information about the median user s total number of movie ratings users below the median demonstrate a 530 percent increase in the number of monthly movie ratings while those above the median decrease their ratings by 62 percent when given outcome information about the average user s net benefit score above average users mainly engage in activities that help others our findings suggest that effective personalized social information can increase the level of public goods provision

status intertemporal choice and risk taking this paper takes the position that an individual s concern for relative status is expressed in her preferences we embed this hypothesis in an otherwise conventional model of economic growth and examine its consequences the model generates two kinds of equilibrium in the first all individuals always follow a deterministic consumption and investment strategy such a strategy must be linear in output is independent of payo s and technology and only depends on the discount factor this sort of equilibrium exists when the individual cares only about status and the individual production function is convex in investment in contrast the other kind of equilibrium involves convergence to a steady state in which there is persistent and endogenously generated gambling this kind of equilibrium exists in more plausible circumstances the individual has a utility function that may depend on consumption per se as well as implied status and individual production functions are concave we characterize the unique steady state in such a situation and prove that any dynamic equilibrium path must converge to it risk taking arises not from the presumption of a utility function with strictly convex segments as in friedman savage but naturally from a view of utility as depending on relative status our steady state is broadly consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and to gamble over upside risk and generates similar patterns of risk taking and avoidance across environments with quite di erent overall wealth levels finally in contrast to friedman 1953 endogenous risk taking here is generally pareto ine cient

competition among officials and the abuse of power traditional economic theory suggests that competition among officials providing government goods tends to reduce corruption however empirical evidence does not yet support this view in this paper i show that a corrupt and powerful central authority can use competition among officials to amass resources for itself while competition reduces corruption at the lower level of government corruption at the higher level of government is increased to avoid widespread theft from the central authority competing officials are monitored more intensively than a monopolist hence even though competition among officials generates more consumer surplus it may reduce welfare

cartel code attributes and cartel performance an industry level analysis of the national industrial recovery act abstract this paper uses the cartel enabling national industrial recovery act nira of 1933 to gain insight into cartel performance i employ a monthly panel of 66 industries that passed an nira code of fair competition to examine how specific attributes of these cartel codes affected the ability to achieve collusive outcomes i find that output growth was significantly lower during cartel months consistent with cartel theory and that industries with more complex codes were more successful than those with simpler ones furthermore industries with code restrictions on new productive capacity production quotas and requirements to file data with a central board were the most successful at reducing output which suggests that these types of provisions were the most effective in helping firms attain collusive outcomes finally i find that the effectiveness of data filing provisions was limited to the early months of the nira prior to a wave of cartel breakdown occurring in spring 1934

macroeconomic implications of conspicuous consumption a sombartian dynamic model this chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model in which consumers have status preference i investigate the manner in which capital accumulation is impeded by conspicuous consumption a la corneo and jeanne j public econ 66 55 71 1997a following the literature social norms are given as either bandwagon type or snob type i then show that when the economy is characterized by a bandwagon type social norm capital accumulation exhibits interesting patterns those patterns include for example an oscillating convergence path the rise of the economy feeds its decay through conspicuous consumption and that decay suppresses conspicuous consumption and engenders prosperity as predicted by sombart liebe luxus und kapitalismus reprinted 1967 deutscher taschenbuch verlag munchen 1912

multi market contact and competition evidence from the depression era portland cement industry abstract theoretical work has suggested that contact between firms in different markets can facilitate tacit collusion empirical work on this link has been limited we address the paucity of empirical evidence with a novel plant level dataset for the cement industry during the great depression we find that multi market contact fosters tacit collusion and higher prices based on a new measure of contact that accounts for capacity utilization a one standard deviation increase in our measure of contact increases prices by around 4 3 we then examine the effect of the national industrial recovery act s codes of fair conduct introduced in 1933 to stem deflation through cooperative behavior within industries we find that the effects of the codes were most strongly felt in markets with the highest level of multi market contact this suggests that multi market contact can be a useful tool for firms to support collusive outcomes tacit or otherwise

optimal income tax in the presence of status effects abstract the existence of distortions from individuals competing to attain social status by using consumption signals justifies some measure of income tax as a counter acting distortion the question posed here is whether it also constitutes a reason for a more progressive income tax schedule the answer is found to be broadly negative if progressiveness is interpreted as a more convex tax schedule unless the rich are more concerned with status seeking than the poor on the other hand status seeking makes the optimal tax schedule steeper so that redistribution is increased essentially the analysis of status seeking based on a signaling approach confirms and strengthens the existing view of an optimal tax schedule and can be incorporated into the diamond american economic review 88 1998 83 95 approach

taxing the rich affluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the rest of the population such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage this article studies an economy in which an inequality averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax avoidance technology with subadditive costs and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit subadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the top this in turn may trigger excessive risk taking when the avoidance technology consists in costly migration between two countries that compete fiscally we show that an endogenous increase in inequality due to risk taking makes progressive taxation more fragile which vindicates in turn risk taking and can lead to equilibria with regressive tax rates at the top and high migrations of wealth towards the smaller country

correlated payoffs in the inspection game some theory and an application to corruption the inspection game as formulated by tsebelis am polit sci rev 83 77 91 1989 has the counterintuitive implication that crime is unaffected by the magnitude of the penalty this paper demonstrates that to attain this outcome it is necessary to assume independence of enforcer and offender payoffs given correlated payoffs the comparative statics of the equilibrium yield an inverse relationship between crime and the severity of the sanction in an application we enrich the framework of tsebelis by adding corruption stages and show that this can imply such a correlation of payoffs another interesting finding is that harsher anticorruption measures can increase crime incentives

on the determinants of school district efficiency competition and monitoring abstract a number of researchers have asserted that inefficiency in the u s school system arises from a lack of incentives for public schools to behave efficiently this paper uses a shephard input distance function to model educational production and a switching regressions estimation to explore the relationship between school district efficiency and two existing incentive mechanisms competition and voter monitoring we find evidence that ease of monitoring enhances both technical and allocative efficiency of urban school districts and that increased competition reduces allocative inefficiency in communities above a competitive threshold we find no evidence that competition is related to technical inefficiency

the social contingency of wants abstract economic models typically assume that individual wants are determined by forces exogenous to the economic system social psychology and consumer research in contrast support the view that the perceived benefits of goods and services are strongly affected by endogenously determined social norms we present a selective overview of the literature on the relationship between consumption and well being exploring the ways in which informal arguments from social science might be linked to formal models of economic behavior we find that the fixed preferences hypothesis leads to the systematic undervaluation of environmental services and the underprovisioning of environmental goods

organizational costs sticky equilibria and critical levels of concentration jn the thirty years since joe bain s seminal i study 1951 many economists have attempted to determine whether or not there exists a critical level of market concentration at which a discontinuity occurs in the relation between industry concentration and profitability in this paper we develop and test a more general model based on organizational costs which posits the existence of two critical levels of market concentration one at which an existing cooperative equilibrium will break down as concentration declines and one at which a cooperative equilibrium will become attainable as concentration increases we show that the standard model of the critical level of concentration can be regarded as a special case of our more general model and also that the more general model attains a statistically superior fit in section ii we briefly review some of the previous literature in this area we develop our model in section iii and specify and estimate it in sections iv and v in sections vi and vii we summarize and interpret our results and present some policy implications of our findings

choosing your pond location choices and relative income do individuals care about their relative income while this is a long standing hypothesis revealed preference evidence remains elusive we provide a unique test by studying residential choices in

social organization status and savings behavior abstract we develop a model of status seeking in the presence of incomplete information and derive its implications for aggregate savings status seeking endogenously takes the form of conspicuous consumption its impact on savings depends on the scheduling of the contests for status over the life cycle if individuals engage in conspicuous consumption when old aggregate savings are increased we also study the role of social segmentation while social segmentation reduces the inequality across status seekers and fuels social rivalry under complete information we show that under incomplete information social segmentation weakens the incentive to strive for greater status

political decentralization and corruption evidence from around the world abstract how does political decentralization affect the frequency and costliness of bribe extraction by corrupt officials previous empirical studies using subjective indexes of perceived corruption and mostly fiscal indicators of decentralization have suggested conflicting conclusions in search of more precise findings we combine and explore two new data sources an original cross national data set on particular types of decentralization and the results of a firm level survey conducted in 80 countries about firms concrete experiences with bribery in countries with a larger number of government or administrative tiers and given local revenues a larger number of local public employees reported bribery was more frequent when local or central governments received a larger share of gdp in revenue bribery was less frequent overall the results suggest the danger of uncoordinated rent seeking as government structures become more complex

inequality and growth in the presence of competition for status abstract we investigate a simple endogenous growth model where agents care about their social status as greater equality tends to provide greater incentives to differentiate oneself redistribution may increase wasteful competitive consumption and lead to lower growth

equilibrium income inequality among identical agents the paper offers a theory of income differences in which income inequality exists and persists despite identical tastes and talents teams of unskilled labor supervised by schooled managers produce goods with increasing returns to scale agents are assumed unable to borrow to fund the human capital investment needed to become managers despite ex ante identical agents the model displays the following equilibrium phenomena i risk averse agents accept fair gambles implying an unequal ex post distribution of unearned income ii agents agree to publicly subsidize education although those receiving the subsidy have the highest material wealth and iii income and educational differences are perpetuated from generation to generation

decentralization of governance and development all around the world in matters of governance decentralization is the rage even apart from the widely debated issues of subsidiarity and devolution in the european union and states rights in the united states decentralization has been at the center stage of policy experiments in the last two decades in a large number of developing and transition economies in latin america africa and asia the world bank for example has embraced it as one of the major governance reforms on its agenda for example world bank 2000 burki perry and dillinger 1999 take also the examples of the two largest countries of the world china and india decentralization has been regarded as the major institutional framework for the phenomenal industrial growth in the last two decades in china taking place largely in the nonstate nonprivate sector india ushered in a landmark constitutional reform in favor of decentralization around the same time it launched a major program of economic reform in the early 1990s on account of its many failures the centralized state everywhere has lost a great deal of legitimacy and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of benee ts it is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental competition and checks and balances it is viewed as a way to make government more responsive and efe cient technological changes have also made it somewhat easier than before to provide public services like electricity and water supply relatively efe ciently in smaller market areas and the lower levels of government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks in a world of rampant ethnic cone icts and separatist movements decentralization is also regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local cultural and political autonomy these potential benee ts of decentralization have attracted a very diverse range

empirical determinants of corruption a sensitivity analysis many variables have been proposed by past studies as significant determinants of corruption this paper asks if their estimated impact on corruption is robust to alteration of the information set a global sensitivity analysis based on the leamer s extreme bounds analysis gives a clear answer five variables are robustly related to corruption corruption is lower in richer countries where democratic institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period and the population is mainly protestant corruption is instead higher where political instability is a major problem finally a country s colonial heritage appears to be a significant determinant of present corruption

competition and corruption in an agency relationship abstract the paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account it is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents namely low powered incentives and greater competition the paper concludes with a brief empirical exploration of the relationship between competitiveness and corruption on african data

the rational racketeer pasta protection in depression era chicago this study evaluates a depression era chicago pasta racket against predictions generated by alternative economic models assuming varying levels of racketeer control over the industry models of an all powerful racketeer and of a racketeer in an omnipotent alliance with a dominant firm are rejected because the actual protection payments were much lower than those implied by the models moreover the regressive structure of the payments made per macaroni press a portion of the total racketeer levied tax was contrary to the models predictions that the most efficient large press firms would pay the highest tax rates in contrast all of the available information on the racket is consistent with a model in which the racketeer acts as a cartel ringmaster whose primary duties are to monitor and control members output levels in addition the regressive tax would block entry by any displaced workers seeking to produce pasta using small previously mothballed presses

what determines cartel success following george stigler 1964 many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output but the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well theory cannot tell us a priori which effect will dominate whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question we examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions 1 can cartels succeed 2 if so for how long 3 what impact do cartels have 4 what causes cartels to break up we conclude that many cartels do survive and that the distribution of duration is bimodal while the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years many cartels break up very quickly i e in less than a year but there are many others that last between five and ten years and some that last decades limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits to varying degrees cartels can also affect other non price variables including advertising innovation investment barriers to entry and concentration cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry

the impact of the national industrial recovery act on cartel formation and maintenance costs antitrust regime shifts represented by the 1933 adoption and 1935 annulment of the national industrial recovery act are postulated to have effects analogous to temporary achievement of bradburd and over s integrative concentration level bradburd and over 1982 a level at which cartel formation and maintenance costs are outweighed by collusive spoils regime switching analysis of census of manufactures data reveals a critical concentration level of 60 percent in 1933 which disappears in 1935 and reemerges at 38 percent in 1937 the empirical results support the bradburd and over framework and suggest that temporary shifts in antitrust regimes may have lasting impacts on the ability of an industry to exercise market power copyright 1994 by mit press

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

a reason for quantity regulation in a variety of situations governments regulate undesirable activities by controlling quantities rather than charging taxes blue laws prohibit all liquor sales on sundays rather than impose higher taxes on that day zoning restrictions limit commercial construction in residential areas rather than charge for nuisance to neighbors anti smoking and anti trust laws restrict rather than tax particular conduct fishing and hunting rules allow hunting during particular time periods rather than tax the catch pollution controls impose limits rather than tax emissions quantity regulations are common in the financial sphere as well in the united states banking regulations for many years prohibited interstate banking as well as ownership of investment banks by commercial banks in many countries commercial banks are limited in the amount of various activities they can pursue such as real estate investments or borrowing in foreign currency in some countries banking laws prohibit all lending to the parties related to the owners of the bank the so called related lending rather than impose liability rules on loans to related parties that are found to be fraudulent or unsafe rafael la porta et al 2000 despite this common practice economists generally prefer taxes and liability rules to quantity controls and property rights rules robert ellickson 1973 louis kaplow and steven shavell 1996 1997 nathaniel keohane et al 1998 as the instrument for reducing undesirable conduct when explaining why quantity regulations are so pervasive they first make the political economy argument that quantity restrictions are favored by incumbent firms that wish to deter entry james buchanan and gordon tullock 1975 but this argument is not general it does not explain such quantity restrictions as blue laws and hunting and fishing regulations which affect all market participants equally some academics also argue that because certain activities such as smoking are seen as morally wrong by the community their level is regulated at zero in other instances however such as pollution and hunting positive but limited levels of activity are allowed inconsistent with the moral argument that the reason for quantity regulation is the special attraction of zero in this paper we present an alternative reason for quantity regulations one from the perspective of a benevolent government we begin with the observation of gary becker and george stigler 1974 that law enforcement is not free but is fundamentally an economic problem throughout human history and throughout the world today there are chronic problems of under enforcement witness the low level of tax compliance in much of the developing world and over enforcement by politically motivated prosecutors or regulators an analysis of pigouvian taxes versus quantity restrictions must recognize that in reality neither policy is free and automatic to enforce in general the choice of policies itself can facilitate or discourage enforcement in two ways first policies can shape the incentives for enforcement second policies can influence the costs of enforcement in our earlier work glaeser and sheifer 2000 glaeser et al 2001 we have focused on incentives and shown that quantity regulations can be used as an optimal instrument to raise the rewards to law enforcers for identifying violations here we focus not on the incentives for the enforcers but on the costs of finding violations these costs are often lower in the case of quantity restrictions we show that even when quantity regulations unlike taxes restrict some socially efficient conduct the reduced costs of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency such reliance of quantity regulation is especially important when private enforcement is crucial as in the case of enforcing department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 we thank the national science foundation for financial support and louis kaplow for extremely helpful comments

inequality and risk taking behaviour this paper investigates social in uences on attitudes to risk and ofiers an evolutionary explanation of risk taking by young low ranked males becker murphy and werning 2005 found that individuals about to participate in a status tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both wealth and status here their model is generalised by use of the insight of hopkins and kornienko 2010 that in a tournament or status competition one can consider equality in terms of the status or rewards available as well as in initial endowments while becker et al found that risk taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament further it is shown that the poorest will be risk loving if the lowest level of status awarded is su ciently low thus the disadvantaged in society rationally engage in risky behavior when social rewards are su ciently unequal finally as greater inequality in terms of social status induces gambling it can cause greater inequality of wealth

eight questions about corruption this paper will discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption 1 what is corruption 2 which countries are the most corrupt 3 what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption 4 what is the magnitude of corruption 5 do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption 6 can competition reduce corruption 7 why have there been so few recent successful attempts to fight corruption 8 does corruption adversely affect growth

on optimal economic growth with changing technology and tastes characterization and stability results in this paper we consider a framework of optimal growth in which technology and tastes are changing over time the model is an aggregative one and follows closely those studied by brock 1971 and brock and gale 1969 in this framework we address two important issues in the area of optimal intertemporal allocation of resources first we provide price characterizations of weakly maximal and optimal programs weak maximality and optimality are defined following the approach of brock 1970 and gale 1967 respectively in section 2 second we provide asymptotic stability properties of weaklymaximal and optimal programs price characterizations are of importance since they imply that socially desirable allocations can be attained by decentralized maximizing decision making of firms and consumers 2 the decentralization being accomplished through a pricesystem provided an appropriate additional condition on asymptotic behavior of input values3 is satisfied in the literature it is this additional condition which has not been precisely characterized in a model with changing technology and tastes to find this additional condition we have found it useful to draw on the results obtained in the theory of efficient allocation of resources which deals with a similar problem of price characterization of efficient programs for weakly maximal programs the appropriate condition is that the reciprocal of the input values should not be summable theorem 3 1 for optimal programs the input values should be uniformly bounded theorems 4 1 and 4 2 the results of brock 1971 and benveniste and gale 1975 are particularly important in obtaining these results it should be noted that criteria for the existence of optimal programs in various particular cases of our framework have been given by mirrlees 1967 phelps 1966 and inagaki 1970 a unified elegant treatment of this question is given in brock and gale 1969 consequently we do not address this issue in our paper the asymptotic stability properties of weakly maximal and optimal programs

testable competing hypotheses from structure performance theory efficient structure versus market power this paper provides a structure performance theory that can accommodate leading firm efficiency as well as several competing market power hypotheses the author derive s testable implications distinguishing the simple collusion product differentiation and scale economy hypotheses from the innovative lea ding firm alternative it is shown that recent evidence of a positive market share price cost margin pcm relationship and a nonpositive concentration pcm relationship can reject the scale economy and simpl e collusion hypotheses in homogeneous product markets unfortunately this same evidence cannot reject the product differentiation hypothe sis in favor of leading firm efficiency copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

the system of administrative and political corruption canal irrigation in south india the paper describes how some irrigation engineers raise vast amounts of illicit revenue from the distribution of water and contracts and redistribute part to superior officers and politicians it argues that the corruption system which is centred on control of personnel transfers is an important supply side reason for poor performance of canal irrigated agriculture insofar as the same system operates in other government departments it may be more important for understanding indian politics and the political influences on economic development than has previously been realised

facilitating practices and the path dependence of collusion abstract this paper exploits major shifts in american antitrust policy during the 1930s to investigate the impact of facilitating practices on industrial profitability while the national industrial recovery act effectively legalized collusion in many industries this paper suggests only industries that adopted certain trade practices were able to overcome cartel enforcement problems consistent with previous theories of the path dependence of collusion the effects on price cost margins are found to have persisted after the act s repeal the government s pattern of granting facilitating practices is also investigated and is found to contravene the political rhetoric of the day antitrust policy implications are discussed

the folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs abstract the folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other s past action here we consider a general model where players can buy precise information every period each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period when a player does not pay the cost he obtains only imperfect private signals observational decisions are unobservable to others known strategies such as trigger strategies do not work since they fail to motivate players to pay for information this paper shows that the folk theorem holds for any level of observation costs unlike existing folk theorems with private monitoring ours imposes virtually no restriction on the nature of costless imperfect signals the theorem does not use explicit or costless communication thereby having implications on antitrust laws that rely on evidence of explicit communication the main message is that accurate observation alone however costly enables efficient cooperation in general repeated games

perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring this paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this concept is a refinement of myerson s myerson r b 1982 optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems j math econ 10 67 81 communication equilibrium a communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game after every history of messages of the mediator we provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a folk theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

positional deprivation and support for radical right and radical left parties we explore how support for radical parties of both the left and right may be shaped by what we call positional deprivation where growth in income of individuals at a given point in the income distribution is outpaced by income growth elsewhere in that distribution we argue that positional deprivation captures the combination of over time and relative misfortune that can be expected to distinctly spur support for radical left and right parties we explore this possibility by matching new measures of positional deprivation to individual level survey data on party preferences in 20 european countries from 2002 to 2014 we find that positional deprivation is robustly correlated with supporting radical populist parties first positional deprivation generally measured as average income growth across deciles of a country s income distribution minus a respondent s own decile s growth is associated with respondents retreat from mainstream parties and with support for both radical right and particularly radical left parties second positional deprivation relative to the highest and the lowest ends of the income spectrum play out differently for radical right and for radical left support a respondent s positional deprivation relative to the wealthiest decile s growth in his or her country tends to spur support for radical left but not radical right parties in contrast positional deprivation relative to the poorest decile s growth in a respondent s country tends to spur support for radical right but not left parties the results suggest that the combination of over time and relative economic misfortune may be key to how economic experience shapes radical backlash of the left and right

the effect of unionism on fringe benefits this study analyzes the impact of unionism on fringes paid to production workers using data on individual establishments it compares fringe expenditures in establishments having the same level of compensation per hour and finds that unionism raises the share of compensation allotted to fringes particularly to pensions vacation pay and life accident and health insurance in addition since unionism also raises the straight time wage rate itself a prime determinant of expenditures on fringes unionism has a very sizeable impact on total fringe expenditures as well as on the fringe share of compensation the union fringe effect exceeds in percentage terms the union wage effect and is sufficiently large to suggest that standard union wage studies understate the union effect on total compensation the study also compares the fringe expenditures of production and non production workers within the same establishment controlling for within establishment pay policies the findings suggest that the pres

decentralization and corruption evidence across countries the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design the theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists the authors make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically by looking at the cross country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption moreover they find that the origin of a country s legal system for example civil versus common legal code performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization the estimated relationship between decentralization when so instrumented and corruption is even stronger the evidence suggests a number of interesting areas for future work including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check

cost allocation and opportunity costs one explanation for the widespread use of allocated fixed costs is that they can serve as a proxy for difficult to calculate opportunity costs this explanation is pursued by modeling a service department as an m m s s queueing system two main results are that the expected value of opportunity costs equals both the incremental productivity of capacity and the optimal transfer price when the cost of capacity is of the form cs as and is close to one we show that allocated fixed costs are a good proxy for average opportunity costs however if there are great economies of scale is close to zero then a method which charges users only for the variable costs of the service department is recommended finally the economic efficiency of transfer prices based on either variable cost or full cost is compared with optimal transfer pricing policies

diagram for a small planet the production and ecosystem possibilities curve abstract with the development of the gpi there is now an ecological alternative to gdp for measuring a country s economic performance but we still lack an ecological alternative to the ppc for illustrating a country s economic problem the diagram suggested here illustrates a country s production and ecosystem possibilities including climate stability flood control carbon sequestration aquifer recharge scenery recreation biological diversity and so on burning a rainforest to clear the land shifts a country s ppc outward giving the visual impression of an unmitigated improvement but such development causes a movement along the country s pepc as ecosystem services are transformed into gdp the slope of the pepc is the marginal rate of transformation which equals the ratio of the land s marginal marketable product to its marginal ecosystem product changes in technology create substitution and income effects that help explain the enclosure movement and the environmental kuznets curve much as employment of the human resource can be restrained to allow more leisure development of the natural resource can be restrained to preserve more ecosystem services commercial lobbying interests and rivalries for positional goods create distortions that move a country along its pepc to a materialistic misallocation with too little conservation an idealistic misallocation is also possible with too much preservation of the natural environment small is beautiful up to a point and that is evident in this diagram jacob viner s viner j 1937 studies in the theory of international trade harper and brothers new york analytical objections to the ppc are revived

the equilibrium distribution of income and the market for status this paper explores the implications for risk taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption in contrast to previous analyses we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market we show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a status good and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good the main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income status and consumption is the same that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner

the operation of the hospital sector towards a diagnosis it is not surprising to find that most of the existing medical economics research has focused attention on the hospital sector since over 50 percent of all health care expenditures in most western countries cover hospital expenses what is surprising is the lack of a unified economic model for the operation of the hospital sector that goes beyond a piecemeal explanation for some specific institutional regularity it is the intent of this paper to use a traditional economic model of maximizing behavior to develop a general analysis of the hospital sector behavioral models of hospitals are surveyed by jacobs 28 many of the approaches are variants of the classic baumol model of output maximization 2 newhouse 36 and feldstein 17 consider utility maximization subject to a budget constraint with utility a function of both the quality and quantity of medical services in contrast pauly and redisch 38 examine a model in which physicians take an active role in determining the behavior of the not for profit hospital physicians with fixed hours of work maximize net per capita income recently harris 26 has offered a description of the internal operation of hospitals in which both physicians and administrators take an active role in management although the models mentioned provide specific predictions they do not provide a general analysis of the hospital sector furthermore questions concerning market segmentation alternative reimbursement procedures cost management waiting times bed management and occupancy rates are not addressed these issues are addressed in the model formulated in this paper the formal analysis of the present paper is developed within the environment of third party insurance in which all medical services offered by hospitals are financed out of general insurance revenues while consumers face no user charges 2 the technique of equalizing differences formalized by rosen 41 is used to analyze hospitals under competi

irrigation reform in conditions of populist anarchy an indian case abstract it is true that the performance of india s canal irrigated agriculture could be substantially and cheaply improved by change in canal operating and maintenance procedures but current procedures allow some farmers and state officials to capture disproportionate benefits for themselves through a well institutionalised system of corruption these beneficiaries of the status quo make up powerful interes groups against reform the paper illustrates just how intensely political irrigation reform can be by tracing what happened when an attempt was made to carry out an apparently simple improvement in water allocation rules under a south indian canal the events suggest a wider process of cumulative causation making for low rates of growth of food production and weaker political authority the process is not inevitable however and the paper ends with some suggestions about how in the irrigation context public policy might help to offset the decline

local capture evidence from a central government transfer program in uganda according to official statistics 20 percent of uganda s total public expenditure was spent on education in the mid 1990s most of it on primary education one of the large public programs was a capitation grant to cover schools nonwage expenditures using panel data from a unique survey of primary schools we assess the extent to which the grant actually reached the intended end user schools the survey data reveal that during 1991 1995 the schools on average received only 13 percent of the grants most schools received nothing the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians the data also reveal considerable variation in grants received across schools suggesting that rather than being passive recipients of flows from the government schools use their bargaining power to secure greater shares of funding we find that schools in better off communities managed to claim a higher share of their entitlements as a result actual education spending in contrast to budget allocations is regressive similar surveys in other african countries confirm that uganda is not a special case

bribery and public procurement an experimental study a procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat the auctioneer who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider procurement is thus a multi dimensional bidding contest with one dimensional type space the privately known cost the optimal price and bribe bid is derived based on an iid private cost assumption in the experiment bribes are negatively framed to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low although bid prices are lower than predicted behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction when bribes generate a negative externality there is a significant increase in the variability of the data

dynamic asset allocation with relative wealth concerns in incomplete markets abstract in dynamic portfolio choice problems stochastic state variables such as stochastic volatility lead to adjustments of the optimal stock demand referred to as hedge terms or merton breeden terms by deriving an explicit solution in a two agent framework with a stochastic opportunity set we show that relative wealth concerns give rise to new hedge terms beyond the ordinary ones this is because the agents hedge against both exogenous changes in the state variable and endogenous decisions of the other agent depending on the parametrization of the model these new terms can significantly change the investors hedging demands we also show that both heterogeneity in risk aversion or relative wealth concerns can have similar effects on the heterogeneity in portfolio decisions formally we study a non cooperative non zero sum stochastic differential game for which we prove a verification theorem in a setting with an unspanned state variable

relative consumption and tax evasion abstract relative consumption effects or status concerns that feature jealousy in the sense of dupor and liu 2003 boost consumption expenditure if consumption is financed by labour income such status considerations increase labour supply and hence the tax base a higher taxable income in turn can make tax evasion more attractive we show for various specifications of preferences that the tax base effect generally dominates consequently relative consumption effects tend to reduce tax evasion this is true irrespective of whether tax parameters are exogenous guarantee a balanced budget or are set optimally

another look at the impact of the national industrial recovery act on cartel formation and maintenance costs alexander s 1994 finding that the national recovery administration s codes of fair competition led to a change in the critical concentration level during the 1930s is questioned no regime switch is detected when a common industry sample is employed also when industries with and without codes are analyzed codes appear to have no effect on price cost margins during the period this absence of effect is postulated to be a result of the unenforceability of trade practice provisions contained in many codes the empirical results of this paper suggest that the existence of codes was not sufficient to enable industries to overcome cartel formation costs only easily enforceable trade practice provisions appear to have affected the structure performance relation in the period following repeal of the national industrial recovery act

endogenous monitoring in a partnership game i consider a repeated game in which due to imperfect monitoring no collusion can be sustained i add a self interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms actions and sends a public message the monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return first with a low monitoring cost collusive equilibria exist second collusive equilibria are monitor preferred third in monitor preferred equilibria firms payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor my model helps explain cartel agreements between self interested parties and firms in legal industries in the united states and europe

fighting corruption to improve schooling evidence from a newspaper campaign in uganda what are the most effective ways to increase primary school enrollment and student learning we argue that innovations in governance of social services may yield the highest return since social service delivery in developing countries is often plagued by inefficiencies and corruption we illustrate this by using data from an unusual policy experiment a newspaper campaign in uganda aimed at reducing capture of public funds by providing schools parents with information to monitor local officials handling of a large education grant program the campaign was highly successful and the reduction in capture had a positive effect on enrollment and student learning jel d73 i22 o12

global economic crisis and corruption we study the effects of the 2008 2009 global economic crisis on the household experience of bribing public officials the data come from the life in transition 2 survey conducted in 2010 in 30 post socialist economies of central and eastern europe and central asia we find that households hit by crisis are more likely to bribe and among people who bribe crisis victims bribe a wider range of public officials than non victims the crisis victims are also more likely to pay bribes because public officials ask them to do so and less likely because of gratitude the link between crisis and bribery is stronger in the poorest countries of the region our findings support the conjecture that public officials misuse sensitive information about crisis victims to inform bribe extortion decisions

taking credit redistribution and borrowing in an age of economic polarization several recent studies link rising income inequality in the united states to the global financial crisis arguing that us politicians did not respond to growing inequality with fiscal redistribution instead americans saved less and borrowed more to maintain relative consumption in the face of widening economic disparities this article proposes a theory in which fiscal redistribution dampens the willingness of citizens to borrow to fund current consumption a key implication is that pretax inequality will be more tightly linked with credit in less redistributive countries the long run partisan composition of government is in turn a key determinant of redistributive effort examining a panel of eighteen oecd democracies the authors find that countries with limited histories of left wing participation in government are significantly more likely see credit expansion as prefisc inequality grows compared to those in which the political left has been more influential

the market for sweepstakes this paper studies the market for monopolistically supplied sweepstakes we derive equilibrium demands for fixed prize and variable prize sweepstakes and determine the profit maximizing prize level and pay out ratio respectively it can be profitable to offer each type of sweepstake when there is a large enough number of weighted utility consumers who have constant absolute risk attitudes are strictly averse to small as well as symmetric risks and display longshot preference behaviour moreover for the variable prize sweepstake the supplier will generally find it profitable to combine sweepstakes targeting two smaller populations and offer a single sweepstake to the combined population this implication is corroborated by the recent spate of mergers of smaller state lotteries into larger ones

the effect of competition on trade evidence from the collapse of international cartels how do changes in competitive intensity affect trade patterns some cartels may find it advantageous to eliminate cross hauling and divide markets geographically we exploit a quasi natural experiment associated with increased antitrust enforcement to determine if market division strategies were used in seven recently prosecuted international cartels since antitrust activity is unlikely to affect spatial patterns of demand and supply other than through its effect on the competitive environment enforcement induced changes are ideally suited to study the effect of competition on trade patterns analyzing the cartels individually and as a group we find no significant change in spatial patterns of trade following cartel breakup in particular there is no systematic change in the effect of distance on trade these results suggest that cross hauling is not uncommon under collusion and hence that the existence of cross hauling by itself does not provide evidence of effective competition

conspicuous consumption snobbism and conformism abstract we develop a model in which consumers purchase a conspicuous good in order to signal high income and thereby achieve greater social status in equilibrium the signalling value of conspicuous consumption depends in an identifiable way on the number of consumers and consumer behaviour is characterized by either snobbism or conformism the market demand curve for the conspicuous good may exhibit a positive slope if consumers are conformist we derive some unconventional policy implications concerning the taxation of luxuries and the voluntary provision of public goods

financial market globalization symmetry breaking and endogenous inequality of nations this paper investigates the effects of financial market globalization on the inequality of nations the world economy consists of inherently identical countries which differ only in their levels of capital stock each country is represented by the standard overlapping generations model modified only to incorporate credit market imperfection an integration of financial markets affects the set of stable steady states as it changes the balance between the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the unequalizing force of the wealth dependent borrowing constraint the model is tractable enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states in the absence of the international financial market the world economy has a unique steady state which is symmetric and stable in the presence of the international financial market symmetry breaking occurs under some conditions that is the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable asymmetric steady states come to exist in the stable asymmetric steady states the world economy is endogenously divided into the rich and poor countries the borrowing constraints are binding in the poor but not in the rich the world output is smaller the rich are richer and the poor are poorer in any of the stable asymmetric steady states than in the unstable symmetric steady state

status the distribution of wealth private and social attitudes to risk this paper supposes an individual cares about his her own wealth not only directly but also via the relative standing that this wealth induces the implications for risk taking are investigated in particular such a model provides a natural explanation of the concave convex concave utility described by friedman and savage however there are a number of key differences between the present model and any model based on own wealth alone for example an equilibrium wealth distribution here may have a middle class further the status interaction involves an externality and an equilibrium wealth distribution may be pareto inefficient but also about the implied relative standing in the distribution of wealth has a long but checkered history an early exponent of such ideas was of course veblen 1899 it is indeed a notion which most economists reject albeit usually without explicit comment a notable and articulate exception however is frank 1985 for example see also the references frank cites on pp 33 34 it is however a notion with substantial intuitive appeal and it seems useful to ascertain its consequences before coming to a final judgement as to its merits the present paper is concerned with deriving the consequences of such valuation of status for risk taking what seems to be the sharpest possible model is adopted here this assumes that what is essentially ordinal rank in the wealth distribution enters von neumann morgenstern utility as an argument in addi tion to wealth itself thus higher wealth increases utility not only directly but also indirectly via higher status in the interests of both simplicity and drama it is typically assumed here that all individuals have identical utility functions which are concave in wealth but convex in status section 2 discusses how the model provides a natural explanation of the fundamental phenomenon addressed by friedman and savage 1948 that individuals may simultaneously purchase insurance and participate in lotteries although each individual here has a utility function which is concave in wealth itself utility can nevertheless be convex in wealth over some range when the indirect effect via status is included this effect is enhanced by the convexity of utility in status but will follow in any case if increasing wealth entails moving up in status much more rapidly than losing wealth entails moving down it is shown

status effects and negative utility growth this paper explains the observed stagnation of happiness measures through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption normal goods confer direct utility while status goods confer utility only at the expense of others firms can improve the quality of both goods through r d the nash equilibrium of the consumer game results in the share of expenditure on status goods increasing with the number of times the status good has been improved as the economy grows resources for innovation are transferred entirely to status good r d the resulting long run rate of utility growth is negative

social comparisons status and driving behavior abstract the establishment of desirable social norms is an integral part of a well functioning civil society while recent evidence has demonstrated that social comparison can affect behavior in a variety of contexts it is not clear what type of comparative social information is most effective using a large scale field experiment to study driving practices we sent text messages containing different types of social information to drivers in tsingtao china we find two types of social information to be particularly effective in reducing traffic violations the driving behavior of those similar to oneself and the driving behavior of those with high status cars our results indicate that the combination of descriptive norms with social status is a cost effective yet powerful intervention for establishing better driving behavior in emerging markets

getting ahead of the joneses when equality increases conspicuous consumption among bottom tier consumers it is widely believed that increasing the equality of material possessions or income in a social group should lead people at the bottom of the distribution to consume less and save more however this prediction and its causal mechanism have never been studied experimentally five studies show that greater equality increases the satisfaction of those in the lowest tier of the distribution because it reduces the possession gap between what they have and what others have however greater equality also increases the position gains derived from status enhancing consumption since it allows low tier consumers to get ahead of the higher proportion of consumers clustered in the middle tiers as a result greater equality reduces consumption when consumers focus on the narrower possession gap but it increases consumption when they focus on the greater position gains i e when consumption is conspicuous social competition goals are primed and the environment is competitive

the dynamics of inequalities and unequal exchange of labor in intertemporal linear economies abstract introducing a concept of fairness of economic allocations namely exploitation as the unequal exchange of labor henceforth ue exploitation by generalizing roemer s 1981 1982a seminal models this paper aims to answer the following two questions in the context of an intertemporal economy with linear technology how is income and wealth inequality related or unrelated to the existence and persistence of ue exploitation what are the mechanisms driving the persistent existence of ue exploitation in growing economies agents are ue exploited resp exploiters if the amount of labor that they contribute to the economy is bigger resp smaller than the amount of labor received by them via their income it is proved first that ue exploitation is monotonically correlated to functional income inequality second it is shown that unless agents discount the future asset inequalities are necessary but not sufficient for the persistence of ue exploitation and capital accumulation leading to the disappearance of ue exploitation cannot be ruled out in equilibrium third it is shown that regardless of whether agents discount the future labor saving technical progress may yield sustained growth with persistent ue exploitation by keeping labor abundant relative to capital which restrains wages from rising unlike in models with differentiable production functions this mechanism does not rely on changes in the marginal productivity of inputs and it is entirely driven by the interaction between innovation and labor markets

work sharing during the great depression did the president s reemployment agreement promote reemployment the president s reemployment agreement pra of 1933 directed firms to reduce workweeks during the great depression so existing jobs could be spread into additional employment opportunities similar work sharing policies have recently been implemented across europe in hopes of reducing unemployment i find that ceteris paribus the work sharing aspects of the pra created nearly 2 5 million new employment opportunities in around four months however the programme also required firms to raise hourly wage rates offsetting close to half of these gains furthermore most of the remaining employment gains were wiped out after cartel oriented industry specific codes of fair competition supplanted the pra