the effect of imf lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises abstract this paper explores empirically how the adoption of imf programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term we find that imf programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1 5 2 percentage points these results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously furthermore imf programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of imf triggered debt runs however are also possible

the international monetary fund and developing countries a review of the evidence and policy options as its systemic role evaporated with the collapse of the bretton woods system so the international monetary fund imf became drawn into a much more specific role in the context of the balance of payments bop problems that developing countries were encountering at its inception the imf had been seen as having no specific role in developing countries but now it became exclusively these countries that formed its clientele while during the 1970s the imf had continued to make a few relatively large loans to a limited number of industrial countries italy and the united kingdom beyond the mid 1970s industrial countries ceased to draw any resources from it

the political economy of bilateral bailouts imf loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues these bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises we analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress creditor governments want to stabilize crisis countries by providing additional liquidity particularly if the crisis country is economically or politically important to them but they are constrained by domestic politics politicians aim to balance these countervailing pressures they provide bailouts when their own economy is exposed to negative spillover effects and when the crisis country is important for geostrategic military or political reasons domestic economic and political constraints on the other hand limit their ability to bail out other countries we test our hypotheses using an original data set on bilateral bailouts by the g7 countries to countries that experienced financial crises between 1975 and 2010 the findings of our statistical analysis support our theoretical argument and contribute to a deeper understanding of international cooperation s complex structure during financial crises

debt leases taxes and the endogeneity of corporate tax status we provide evidence that corporate tax status is endogenous to financing decisions which induces a spurious relation between measures of financial policy and many commonly used tax proxies using a forward looking estimate of before financing corporate marginal tax rates we document a negative relation between operating leases and tax rates and a positive relation between debt levels and tax rates this is the first unambiguous evidence supporting the hypothesis that low tax rate firms lease more and have lower debt levels than high tax rate firms many theories of capital structure imply that all else equal the incentive to use debt financing increases with a firm s marginal tax rate due to the tax deductibility of interest expense e g modigliani and miller 1963 deangelo and masulis 1980 conversely leasing models generally predict that firms with low marginal tax rates employ relatively more leases than do firms with high marginal tax rates the logic behind the leasinlg prediction is that leases allow for the transfer of tax shields from firms that cannot fully utilize the associated tax deduction lessees to firms that can lessors e g myers dill and bautista 1976 smith and wakeman 1985 ross westerfield and jaffe 1996 despite these straightforward predictions empirically testing for tax effects is difficult because a spurious relation exists between the financing decision and many commonly used tax proxies specifically both interest expense and lease payments are tax deductible thus a firm that finances its operations with debt or leases reduces its taxable income potentially lowering its expected marginal tax rate if not properly addressed this endogeneity of the tax rate can bias an experiment in favor of finding a negative

dynamic interaction between markets for leasing and selling automobiles we develop a model of dynamic interactions between price variations in leasing and selling markets for automobiles our framework assumes a differential game between multiple bertrand type competing firms which offer differentiated products to forward looking agents empirical analysis of our model using monthly us data from 2002 to 2011 shows that variations in selling cash market prices lead rapidly dissipating changes of leasing market prices in the opposite direction we discuss the practical implications of these results by augmenting a standard leasing valuation formula the additional terms represent the leased asset value changes that can be expected on the basis of past variations in automobile selling market prices

imf programs do they work can they be made to work better abstract a central issue in the debate about a new international financial architecture has been whether programs of policy reform supported by the international monetary fund work the fund claims that on balance they do because of their positive effect on the balance of payments others claim that programs are ineffective and suggest that they should be discontinued this paper reviews the econometric evidence dealing with the macroeconomic effects of imf programs it goes on to provide additional evidence and judges success against alternative criteria although the record is not good the paper argues that it would be unwise for the fund to cease lending and to abandon conditionality altogether imf programs need to be redesigned and refocused the paper concludes by identifying a number of principles that should underpin reform

dollars debt and international financial institutions dedollarizing multilateral lending financial dollarization is increasingly seen as a concern because of its tendency to contribute to financial crises and output volatility as a result the debate on financial dollarization has shifted in favor of a more proactive stance on dedollarization while often neglected lending from international financial institutions is an important source of financial dollarization in emerging economies and must be considered in any dedollarization strategy this article revisits old and new arguments in favor of international financial institution lending in the local currency and argues that any such initiative should rely at least initially on demand from residents seeking stable returns in units of the local consumption basket but who are reluctant to take on sovereign risk superior enforcement capacity enables international financial institutions to intermediate these savings currently invested in dollarized foreign assets back into the local economy the international financial institutions can offer investment grade local currency bonds and use the proceeds to dedollarize their own lending to noninvestment grade countries thereby reducing financial dollarization and fostering the development of local currency markets

news and sovereign default risk in small open economies this paper builds a unified model of sovereign debt default risk and news shocks news shocks improve the quantitative performance of the sovereign default model in a number of empirically relevant dimensions first with news shocks not all defaults occur during downturns second the news shocks help account for key differences between developing and more developed economies as the precision of news improves the model predicts lower variability of consumption less countercyclical trade balance and interest rate spreads as well as a higher level of debt in line with more developed economies third the model captures the hump shaped relationship between default rates and the precision of news obtained from the data finally the news shocks have a nonmonotonic effect on welfare

the usefulness of the wind up measure of pension liabilities a labor market perspective financial economists have long favored the use of a wind up measure of the firm s pension liabilities yet the pension liabilities of the firm also represent the pension wealth of its workers it is reasonable to presume that workers and shareholders have a common view of the pension contract if the wind up measure depicts the true pension liabilities of the firm then the wage concession granted by its workers must reflect the fact that the firm may choose to terminate the plan at any time data on the wageservice characteristics of the membership of a sample of final earnings plans in canada suggest contrary to the implications of the wind up measure that workers wages do not internalize accruing pension benefits on a year to year basis instead the data suggest that pension plans may be a vehicle through which a significant portion of the total compensation of individual employees is deferred until their later work years and that the wind up measure may well understate the pension liabilities of an on going firm the financial accounting standards board 4 or fasb recently proposed that net pension assets or liabilities appear on the corporate balance sheet in order to make operational the concept of the augmented balance sheet one must construct measures of both pension assets and pension liabilities the noncontroversial view at least among economists is that pension assets be valued at market the fasb endorses this view the measurement of pension liabilities on the other hand remains controversial financial economists such as sharpe 10 have traditionally advocated a market or wind up measure of the firm s pension liabilities the pensions due under the terms of the plan if it were to be immediately terminated are calculated and these pensions are then costed at current annuity rates the accrued benefit method without salary projection is the actuarial valuation method used in the calculation the wind up measure is the market value of the firm s pension liabilities since it identifies the precise amount that the firm would require to discharge its legal obligation if the plan were terminated 1 yet the fasb now rejects the use of this method of calculating the firm s

a quantitative model of sovereign debt bailouts and conditionality in times of sovereign debt crises international financial institutions provide temporary financial support contingent on the implementation of specific macroeconomic policies this paper develops a model of sovereign debt and default with endogenous participation rates in bailout programs conditionality enters as a constraint on fiscal policy in the model the insurance character of bailouts generates incentives for debt accumulation quantitative results suggest that bailouts prevent sovereign defaults in the short run but may come at a cost of a greater default probability in the long run increasing the intensity of conditionality lowers the bailout participation rate and generates a hump shaped pattern of sovereign default risk

determinants of corporate leasing policy the existing finance literature assumes the real operating cash flows from leasing or owning are invariant to the ownership of the asset and focuses on tax related incentives for corporate leasing policy our analysis suggests that taxes are important in identifying potential lessees and lessors but are less important in identifying the specific assets leased we provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease versuspurchase decision we then show how these incentives explain the use of contractual provisions such as maintenance clauses deposits options to purchase the asset and metering when a firm buys an asset it obtains both the right to the services of that asset over the period it is owned plus the right to sell the asset at any future date with a lease the firm acquires only the right to the asset s services for a period specified in the contract the existing finance literature analyzing corporate leasing policy concentrates on the tax related incentives to lease or buy e g see miller and upton 19 myers et al 21 lewellen et al 13 franks and hodges 11 and brealey and young 4 we believe that taxes play an important role in explaining certain dimensions of leasing policy for example the choice between manufacturer and third party leasing however taxes provide only a limited explanation of why specific assets are leased rather than owned and for the choice of provisions in lease contracts in this paper we want to accomplish two things 1 to provide a unified analysis of the various incentives affecting the lease versus buy decision and 2 to employ that analysis to explain observed variation in corporate leasing policy in deriving testable hypotheses about the characteristics of lessees lessors the assets leased and provisions in lease contracts we extend the standard leaseversus buy analysis found in corporate finance textbooks e g brealey and myers

a comment on excess asset reversions and shareholder wealth this study re examines the earlier finding of alderson and chen 1986a that financial markets do not consider excess pension assets in determining share prices and that significant increases in shareholder wealth occur when an overfunded pension plan is terminated the results document that specific event time contamination corporate restructuring announcements provides the driving force for all the earlier findings alderson and chen ac 1986a attempt to empirically determine whether the reversion of the excess pension assets represented by overfunded definedbenefit pension plans leads to increases in the market value of the reverting firms ac s results suggest support for those who maintain that the assets of a firm s pension funds are separate and distinct from the assets of the sponsoring firm the separation hypothesis rather than those who maintain that pension assets are priced prior to reversion the integration hypothesis this comment modifies ac s study for the purpose of strengthening their approach in terms of its agreement with both known corporate behavior and conventional event study methodology following these modifications no evidence remains that share prices are significantly affected by pension terminations

the imf a bird s eye view of its role and operations the international monetary fund imf is the world s premier international financial institution with 184 member countries and active programmes in a significant number of them at any one time the fund attracts a great deal of attention much of it critical but the discussion is often polemic in style strongly held but frequently opposing views are expressed this survey attempts to examine in an objective way the theory and evidence relating to the fund s operations many aspects of the empirical research are relatively recent and a universal consensus is yet to emerge as a consequence there is scope for disagreement to persist however the research is also gradually clarifying many important issues the format for the survey is to examine the life cycle of imf arrangements what makes a country turn to the fund for assistance should the imf be lending what influences the outcome of negotiations and the design of programmes are imf programmes effective and why do some countries make prolonged use of imf resources for completeness there is also some discussion of the history of the imf the extent to which fund policies have been influenced by advances in economic theory and the fund s systemic role important organisational and governance issues are also covered briefly although primarily adopting an economist s perspective the survey reflects the growing recognition that in order to understand the imf s operations economics has to be combined with politics examining the imf is an exercise in applied political economy copyright 2007 the author journal compilation 2007 blackwell publishing ltd

the case for gdp indexed bonds gds indexed bonds this paper seeks to revive the case for countries to insure against economic growth slowdowns by issuing bonds indexed to the rate of growth of gdp we show that gdp indexed bonds could provide substantial benefits in reducing the likelihood of default crises and allowing countries to avoid pro cyclical fiscal policies we simulate the effects of gdp indexed bonds under different assumptions about fiscal policy reaction functions and their output effects and find that they could substantially reduce the likelihood of debt gdp paths becoming explosive the insurance premium would likely be small because cross country comovement of gdp growth rates is low and cross country gdp growth risk is thus largely diversifiable for an investor holding a portfolio of gdp indexed bonds potential obstacles to the emergence of a market for these bonds include the verifiability of gdp data the trade off between insurance and moral hazard and the need for liquidity theory and past experience suggest that financial innovation often requires official intervention and its timing and form are difficult to predict we discuss institutional fixes and suggest an approach for attempting to start up a market eduardo borensztein and paolo mauro

tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries abstract based on a sample of 56 countries we show that fiscal policy in the g7 countries appears to be acyclical while fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical i e fiscal policy is expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times to explain this puzzle we develop an optimal fiscal policy model in which running budget surpluses is costly because they create pressures to increase public spending given this distortion a government that faces large fluctuations in the tax base as is the case for developing countries will find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy

the imf as a biased global insurance mechanism asymmetrical moral hazard reserve accumulation and financial crises a large literature has established that the international monetary fund imf is heavily politicized we argue that this politicization has important consequences for international reserve accumulation and financial crises the imf generates moral hazard asymmetrically reducing the expected costs of risky lending and policies for states that are politically influential vis a vis the institution using a panel data set covering 1980 to 2010 we show that proxies for political influence over the imf are associated with outcomes indicative of moral hazard lower international reserves and more frequent financial crises we support our causal claims by applying the synthetic control method to taiwan which was expelled from the imf in 1980 consistent with our predictions taiwan s expulsion led to a sharp increase in precautionary international reserves and exceptionally conservative financial policies

hedging and financial fragility in fixed exchange rate regimes currency crises that coincide with banking crises tend to share at least three elements first banks have a currency mismatch between their assets and liabilities second banks do not completely hedge the associated exchange rate risk third there are implicit government guarantees to banks and their foreign creditors this paper argues that the first two features arise from banks optimal response to government guarantees we show that guarantees completely eliminate banks incentives to hedge the risk of a devaluation our model also articulates one reason why governments might be tempted to provide guarantees to bank creditors guarantees lower the domestic interest rate and lead to a boom in economic activity but this boom comes at the cost of a more fragile banking system in the event of a devaluation banks renege on foreign debts and declare bankruptcy

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

non defaultable debt and sovereign risk abstract we quantify gains from introducing limited financing through non defaultable debt into a model of equilibrium sovereign risk for an initial sovereign spread of 4 2 introducing the possibility of issuing non defaultable debt for up to 10 of aggregate income reduces immediately the spread to 1 5 and implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent consumption increase of 0 8 nevertheless the spread reduction achieved by the introduction of non defaultable debt is short lived our findings shed light on different aspects of proposals to introduce common euro area sovereign bonds that could be virtually non defaultable

excess asset reversions and shareholder wealth the ownership of pension assets in a defined benefit pension plan is an unresolved issue in corporate finance the issue is important because it defines the appropriate investment policy for a pension fund in this paper we summarize the ownership debate in the form of two mutually exclusive theories we then focus on a recently popular event in pension finance excess asset reversions our paper demonstrates the valuation effects associated with this event in a stochastic dominance framework under certain conditions a reversion constitutes an expropriation of wealth from the participants and beneficiaries of the plan to the firm using data provided by the pension benefit guaranty corporation and the center for research in security prices tape we examine the returns to the shareholders of 58 companies which conducted excess asset reversions between 1980 and 1984 our results show that large abnormal returns accrued to these shareholders around the time of the reversion these findings have implications both for the appropriate investment policy of pension funds and for public policy with respect to plan terminations

are micro and macro labor supply elasticities consistent a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins we evaluate whether state of the art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins we find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady state hicksian elasticities relevant for cross country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins however micro estimates of intertemporal substitution frisch elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences the key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different

co ordination failure moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures we study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co ordination and debtor moral hazard solving the sovereign debtor s incentives leads to excessive rollover failure by creditors when sovereign default occurs we discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures involving contractibility of sovereign debtor s payoffs suspension of convertibility in a discovery phase and penalties in case of malfeasance in relation to the current debate this is more akin to the imf s sovereign debt restructuring mechanism than the collective action clauses promoted by others

the effect of imf programs on economic growth abstract using a bivariate dynamic version of the heckman selection model we estimate the effect of participation in international monetary fund imf programs on economic growth we find evidence that governments enter into agreements with the imf under the pressures of a foreign reserves crisis but they also bring in the fund to shield themselves from the political costs of adjustment policies program participation lowers growth rates for as long as countries remain under a program once countries leave the program they grow faster than if they had remained but not faster than they would have without participation

how do official bailouts affect the risk of investing in emerging markets we analyze the effects of bailout expectations on sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets the non bailout of russia in august 1998 is interpreted as an event that decreased the perceived probability of future crisis lending to emerging markets if official rescues are expected to mitigate the losses of investors in the event of a crisis such an event should raise the cross country dispersion of spreads because investors pay more attention to differences in risk characteristics across countries we find strong evidence for such an effect this is consistent with the existence of investor moral hazard at least prior to 1998

a public choice approach to international organization the purpose of this paper has been to develop a positive theory of international organization which can supplement the conventional normative theory used as a positive theory the conventional approach draws much of its plausibility from the fact that it relies on the reasons given by the decision makers and reported in the media and on the lofty objections stated in the charters of international agencies the public choice approach by its very nature is precluded from accepting such evidence in some respects it must appear dismal and perhaps cynical it is a positive theory which tries to explain but just as the conventional normative theory tends also to be used as a positive theory our positive theory is likely to have normative implications as well it does not imply that international organization is generally undesirable but it can be used to emphasize the advantages of decentralized policy making and to warn against a naive internationalism which welcomes international agreements for their own sake regardless of what is being agreed upon international organization can be and is abused and the cause is not an occasional lack of virtue among politicians but a systematic built in tendency toward collusion at the expense of the citizens such collusion is not only undesirable in itself there is also the danger that it discredits and crowds out unambiguously desirable forms of international cooperation agreements to remove non market obstacles to market interdependence in the field of international trade and capital movements

what determines individual trade policy preferences abstract this article provides new evidence on the determinants of individual trade policy preferences using individual level survey data for the united states there are two main empirical results first we find that factor type dominates industry of employment in explaining support for trade barriers second we find that home ownership also matters for individuals trade policy preferences independent of factor type home ownership in counties with a manufacturing mix concentrated in comparative disadvantage industries is correlated with support for trade barriers this finding suggests that in addition to current factor incomes driving preferences as in standard trade models preferences also depend on asset values

sovereign default private sector creditors and the ifis abstract the data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from international financial institutions ifis is small intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors the ifi loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them taking these contractual differences as given this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of ifi loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the ifis

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

the term structure of lease rates with endogenous default triggers and tenant capital structure theory and evidence this paper focuses on the defaultable lease rate term structure with endogenous default we combine the competitive lease market argument proposed by grenadier 1996 and the endogenous default structural model proposed by leland and toft 1996 to examine the interaction between the lessee s capital structure and the equilibrium lease rate under this framework determining the lease rate is a simultaneous equation problem that captures the tradeofi between debt and lease flnancing using data on 2 482 real estate lease transactions we empirically conflrm the predictions derived from the numerical analysis of the model

spinoff terminations and the value of pension insurance this paper derives the value of pension benefit guarantee corporation pbgc pension insurance under two scenarios of interest the first allows for voluntary plan termination which appears to be legal under current statutes in the second scenario termination is prohibited unless the firm is bankrupt empirical estimates of pbgc liabilities are calculated these show that prospective pbgc liabilities greatly exceed current reserves for plan terminations that even under a bankruptcy only termination rule pbgc liabilities still would be quite sensitive to discretionary funding policy and that the increasingly common practice of pension spinoff terminations substantially increases the present value of the pbgc s contingent liabilities the pension benefit guarantee corporation pbgc was established by the employee retirement income security act of 1974 erisa to guarantee the benefits of workers who belong to defined benefit pension plans if a pension plan is terminated with insufficient assets to pay guaranteed benefits the pbgc assumes responsibility for those benefits the pbgc can take some comfort from the fact that most large pension plans are currently overfunded surplus plan assets provide a cushion for adverse investment experience that reduces the value of pbgc contingent liabilities recently however terminations of overfunded plans have become more common 7 these spinoff terminations typically allow firms to split their pension plans into two parts one for active employees and one for retirees to place all surplus assets into the retiree plan and then to terminate that plan thereby recapturing the entire surplus the pbgc is left insuring a continuing plan that has been stripped of surplus assets the current value of pbgc contingent liabilities obviously increases under spinoff terminations one approach to valuing pbgc liabilities is provided by the options pricing framework several authors 3 4 5 6 9 11 12 17 and 19 already have used option pricing methodology to study the valuation of pbgc insurance the provisions of erisa allow firms to transfer their pension liabilities to the pbgc in return for pension fund assets plus 30 percent of the market value of the firm s net worth thus viewing pbgc insurance as a put option the pension liabilities play the role of the exercise price while the fund assets plus 30 percent of net worth play the role of the underlying asset or stock price however while the analogy between put options and the option to terminate a pension plan appears straightforward the correspondence between the two is not at all clear with respect to the effective time to maturity of the pension put

multilateral indexed loans and debt sustainability we evaluate the benefits and costs of indexing multilateral loans to variables related to developing countries ability to pay i e whether a reform of multilateral lending is feasible and eco nomically justified the analysis covers 40 international development association ida countries from 1990 to 2010 and focuses on three types of debt gdp indexed loans export indexed loans infla tion indexed loans denominated in local currency the insurance that indexed debt might offer against macroeconomic shocks depends on the conditional covariances of gdp growth real exchange rate depreciation and net exports that we estimate as the covariances of the forecast errors obtained from a vector autoregression var model the analysis shows that both gdp indexed loans and inflation indexed local currency loans would help to stabilize the debt ratio of the majority of ida countries in our sample however the adverse policy incentives created by local currency debt tends to favour gdp indexed debt the cost of indexation would be small the estimation of a capital asset pricing model capm suggests that loans indexed to gdp could be introduced at current interest rates since the estimated risk premium is less than 1 per cent any additional risk for multilateral lenders would be more than offset by a lower frequency of debt crises

why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it abstract this paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies contrary to existing practices instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries the actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance this explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices first it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies second competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks which otherwise conceal the recipient s choice of action this enables the donor to give aid more efficiently

budget support versus project aid a theoretical appraisal should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid to answer this question we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality we show that budget support is preferable to project aid when the preferences of donors and recipients are aligned and when assistance is small relative to the recipients own resources furthermore when donors cannot observe the recipient s type they may impose higher levels of conditionality to separate committed governments from uncommitted ones

many happy returns recidivism and the imf abstract imf programs are designed to provide a temporary source of finance for countries with balance of payments disequilibria consequently borrowing from the imf should occur infrequently and be widely distributed among member countries however some countries are recurrent users of fund resources this paper investigates which variables account for multiple borrowings from the imf we use models of count data to examine the impact of the need for financing domestic policies external shocks and structural and institutional factors on borrowings between 1980 and 1996 we find that recidivist borrowers have lower reserve holdings larger current account deficits and capital outflows lower but less volatile terms of trade larger debt service and external debt ratios lower investment rates and per capita income and weak governance

money talks supplementary financiers and international monetary fund conditionality what explains the changes in international monetary fund imf conditionality i argue that imf conditionality agreements are influenced by supplementary financiers the imf regularly relies on external financing to supplement its loans to countries facing payments imbalances as a result these supplementary financiers are able to exercise leverage over the imf and the design of its conditionality programs i consider the influence of one type of supplementary financier private financial institutions on imf conditionality conclusions are supported by a data set of 249 conditionality arrangements coded according to their terms and two case studies

the political economy of imf lending in africa why has imf lending achieved such poor results in africa is it because the fund imposes the wrong conditions or because it fails to enforce them analysis of monthly data on 53 african countries from 1990 to 2000 shows that the imf s loans for reform contract lacks credibility because donor countries intervene to prevent rigorous enforcement countries that have influence with developed country patrons as measured by u s foreign aid membership in postcolonial international institutions and voting profiles in the un are subject to less rigorous enforcement shorter program suspensions they have more frequent program suspensions because they violate their conditions more often the imf will have to become more independent in order to become an effective champion of reform

banks government bonds and default what do the data say abstract this paper analyzes sovereign bondholdings by 20 000 banks in 191 countries and 20 sovereign default episodes over 1998 2012 establishing two robust facts first banks hold many government bonds on average 9 of assets in normal times particularly banks making fewer loans and operating in less financially developed countries second during default years banks with the average exposure to government bonds exhibit a lower growth rate of loans than banks without bonds 7 percentage points lower these results indicate that the dangerous embrace between banks and their government plays a key role during sovereign defaults and its strength depends on local conditions

the revolving door duration and recidivism in imf programs quarterly evidence on participation in imf programs for the period 1974 2003 is examined statistically using the techniques of hazard analysis and error correction estimation three hypotheses are proposed and tested and the results support a revolving door explanation of participation in imf programs first an increase in cumulative prior participation in imf programs is found to cause a reduction on average in the length of a new spell of participation second the length of time between participation spells is reduced significantly with an increase in cumulative prior participation in imf programs third the evolution of reserve adequacy is shown to be significantly and positively affected by participation in imf programs the results depict a revolving door to imf participation and for those countries with prior participation the door revolves more rapidly this result is shown to depend critically upon the mix of countries considered the increase in recidivism is a phenomenon most strongly observed among the least developed countries while the reduction in duration is more strongly observed in the emerging and transition economies these results are derived while controlling for country specific unobserved heterogeneity year specific demand effects external shocks and pre existing policy distortions

on corporate governance a study of proxy contests abstract this paper examines a sample of firms experiencing proxy contests for seats on their board of directors dissident shareholders usually fail to obtain a majority of board seats nevertheless they capture some seats via mechanisms such as cumulative voting in over half of the sample contests regardless of proxy contest outcome positive and statistically significant share price performance is associated with the contest that finding is predicted by the standard economic analysis of proxy contests in which the challenges benefit shareholders by improving corporate performance the finding runs counter to the claim of berle 1962 that the economists view of proxy contests is a wholly imaginary picture a portion of the positive share price changes taking place in the early stages of some proxy contests is not permanent however and as suggested by manne 1962 is at least partially attributable to temporary increases in the market value of the vote attached to corporate shares

welfare gains of bailouts in a sovereign default model abstract we examine the welfare effects of bailouts in economies exposed to sovereign default risk when a government of a small open economy requests a bailout from an international financial institution it receives a non defaultable loan of size g that comes with imposed debt limits the government endogenously asks for the bailout during recessions and repays it when the economy recovers hence the bailout acts as an imperfect state contingent asset that makes the economy better off the bailout duration is endogenous and increases with its size the bailout size creates non trivial tradeoffs between receiving a larger amount of relatively cheap resources precisely in times of need on the one hand and facing longer lasting financial constraints and accumulated interest payments on the other hand we characterize and quantify these tradeoffs and document that welfare gains of bailouts are hump shaped in the size of bailout loans

reversions of excess pension assets after takeovers this article evaluates pension asset reversions as a source of takeover gains in our sample of 413 takeovers pension funds were reverted by 15 1 of acquirers in the two years following hostile takeovers compared to 8 4 in the two years following friendly takeovers reversions following takeovers tend to occur in unit benefit plans where the potential for wealth transfer is the greatest these results are consistent with the view that hostile takeovers breach implicit contracts between firms and employees we estimate that the reversions can on average explain approximately 11 of the takeover premium in cases where they actually occur reversions are too small to be the sole or even dominant source of takeover gains

origins of the federal reserve system international incentives and the domestic free rider problem from the civil war to 1914 the united states had one of the worst e nancial systems in the world the dominant institutional feature of the system was the absence of a central bank and its most salient performance characteristics were the recurrence of banking panics and severe seasonal interest rate e uctuations these e nancial problems were economically costly panics were accompanied by sharp declines in the money supply reduced economic activity and increased unemployment and business failures in 1913 congress created the federal reserve system to safeguard the nation from panics and smooth out interest rate seasonals in more general terms the federal reserve was established to provide the national public good of e nancial system stability in this study i explain how american society overcame the collective action problems that normally constrain the production of public goods to inadequate levels in other words the article is about the political effort that produced an infrastructural cornerstone of the modern u s economy in the face of incentives that should have left few people with sufficient motivation to pay for the improvement i bring to bear a joint products selective incentives argument to explain the voluntary collective action behind the federal reserveact 1 the lobbying effort was aboutsolving thepanic problem tobe sure but becausethisexpected benee t approximated a societywide public good it did not on its own motivate collective action instead the united states faced a second problem of e nancial organization before 1914 and it was this problem that created a private inducement to lobby for the federal reserve the structure of the domestic e nancial machinery contributed not only to instability at home but also to the near complete absence of the u s dollar in global e nancial affairs indeed the united states was the only major trading country whose currency did not function as an international currency before 1914 the new this article is a revision of a paper delivered at the 1996annual convention of the southern economic association washington d c 23 25 november i thank michael bordo marc busch william r clark benjamin j cohen barry eichengreen jeffry frieden william keech stephen krasner charles lipson jameslivingston louispauly georgeselgin bethsimmons richardtimberlake danielverdier eugene n white and two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments 1 see olson 1965 and sandler 1992

the high politics of imf lending analysts have long suspected that politics affects the lending patterns of the international monetary fund imf but none have adequately specified or systematically tested competing explanations this paper develops a political explanation of imf lending and tests it statistically on the developing countries between 1985 and 1994 it finds that political realignment toward the united states the largest power in the imf increases a country s probability of receiving an imf loan a country s static political alignment position has no significant impact during this period suggesting that these processes are best modeled dynamically an analysis of two subsamples rejects the hypothesis that the imf has become less politicized since the end of the cold war and suggests that the influence of politics has actually increased since 1990 the behavior of multilateral organizations is still driven by the political interests of their more powerful member states

financial integration and international risk sharing abstract conventional wisdom suggests that financial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyncratic risk there is little evidence however that countries have increased risk sharing despite widespread financial liberalization we show that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international financial markets while actual markets are far from frictionless financial contracts are incomplete and contract enforceability is limited when countries remove official capital controls default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital flows if default risk were eliminated capital flows would be six times greater and international risk sharing would increase substantially

sovereign default interest rates and political uncertainty in emerging markets abstract a large body of the empirical literature shows that high turnover rates length of tenure of policymakers and the degree of conflict within a country affects sovereign spreads debt and default rates we help to rationalize such claims by including these political features in a dynamic stochastic small open economy model of sovereign debt and default in this way we offer a complementary approach to the econometric analyses in the literature consistent with the data the quantitative analysis shows that politically unstable and more polarized economies experience higher default rates and larger level and volatility of sovereign interest rate spreads

miller s equilibrium shareholder leverage clienteles and optimal capital structure the purpose of this paper is twofold first we examine the individual portfolio decisions when income from stocks and bonds is taxed at different rates second a rationale for the existence of risky debt in the presence of leverage related costs and differential personal income taxation is provided previous studies on capital structure with differential personal income taxation have ignored either the portfolio risk consideration and or the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields due to insufficient taxable earnings e g 8 2 3 14 13 6 7 1 9 19 20 21 23 in section i of this paper both the portfolio risk consideration and the possibility of losing personal and corporate interest tax shields are explicitly introduced this enables us to provide a rationale for the shareholder leverage clientele phenomenon within a mean variance framework we also demonstrate a non corner solution for the optimal corporate capital structure in a tax environment similar to that of miller s debt and taxes 14 in sections ii and iii of this paper miller s world is further modified to include risky debt and the attendant costs we re examine and synthesize recent studies on the theory of optimal capital structure which have appeared since the publication of debt and taxes e g 4 6 7 13 19 20

intertemporal substitution in labor supply evidence from micro data the sensitivity of the supply of labor to intertemporal variation in the wage is an important issue in macroeconomics the analysis of social security and pensions and the study of life cycle patterns of work this paper explores two approaches to the measurement of intertemporal substitution that have appeared in the literature the first approach is to use consumption to control for wealth and unobserved expectations about future wages in the labor supply equation the second approach is to estimate a first difference equation for hours in which labor supply from the previous period serves as a control for wealth and wage expectations the results indicate that intertemporal substitution elasticity for married men is positive but small

the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth sell off activities arise when a firm sells part of its assets e g a segment a division etc but continues to exist in essentially the same form this study investigates the effect of voluntary sell offs on stock returns from a sample of over 1000 sell off events first public announcements the evidence shows that both sellers and buyers earn significant positive excess returns from these transactions the excess returns earned by buyers are smaller than those earned by sellers there is also evidence that sell off announcements are preceded by a period of significant negative returns for the sellers which suggests that the sellers on average performed poorly prior to their sell off activities substantial research has been undertaken in recent years on mergers acquisitions tender offers capital structure changes and other financial planning topics this research has considerably expanded our knowledge about the association of these decisions with the welfare of the stockholders involved in these transactions selling a portion of the firm s assets is another important financial planning decision 2 this paper investigates the effect of voluntary sell off announcements on shareholder wealth a sell off is defined as selling part of a firm s assets e g a segment a division etc while the firm continues to exist in essentially the same form as that prior to the sell off this study does not examine the effects of involuntary ordered by the government sell offs and other similar activities such as spin offs leveraged buy outs liquidations reorganizations etc 3

congressional politics of financing the international monetary fund we address the question of how international public goods are financed by analyzing voting in the u s congress on legislation to increase the u s contri bution to the international monetary fund imf we argue that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of an increase 1 the more campaign contributions they obtain from banks that specialize in international lending and 2 the greater the share of high skilled proglobalization workers in their districts the first argu ment supports the inference that a financially strong imf mitigates the risks of international lending to the benefit of the lending banks the second reflects our claim that voters view the imf as a positive force for global economic integration that following stolper samuelson reasoning benefits high skilled workers lastly we analyze imf loan decisions and find modest support for the claim that imf policy reflects the interests of major international banks overall our results sug gest that private actors within the united states have individual stakes in funding the imf the primary mandate of the international monetary fund imf or fund is to safeguard the stability of the global financial system an international public good the imf obtains the resources it needs for its stabilization operations from mem ber governments with large members contributing most of the funds in this arti cle we analyze the politics of funding the imf from the perspective of its largest contributor the united states rather than treating the united states as a single entity with a unified national interest at the fund we consider the preferences of political actors within the united states who exert power over financing the

the origins of central banking solutions to the free rider problem certain domestic institutions are sources of international power by way of their abilities to encourage investment and to mobilize social resources in wartime for example states with democratic institutions almost always win the wars they e ght a regularity known as the democratic advantage 1 this result is intriguing since it rests on intuition about the effects of military competition on domestic institutions rivalry among states may put pressure on sovereigns to provide the political foundations for secure markets in order to enlarge future military capabilities in this article i address the role of war in inducing domestic institutions that allowed governments to credibly commit to promises to pay their debts a probable source of democracies edge in war rather than investigate the entire range of protections affected by democratic institutions a life s endeavor as the work of douglass north attests i focus on a single e nancial element of the reforms the innovation of central banking britain s superior e nancial economic and military performance after 1689 rested in large part on the establishment of the bank of england 2 the central bank provided a commitment technology that improved the government s ability to borrow a need impelled by intense military competition 3 my motivation derives from puzzles concerning the origins and the diffusion of credibility enhancing institutions like central banks institutions resolve collective action problems but institutions themselves are public goods meaning that their origins are subject to the same dilemmas they are meant to resolve 4 what then explains the incentives of self interested and free riding individuals to contribute to

pricing derivatives on financial securities subject to credit risk this article provides a new methodology for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two types of credit risks are considered the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default the second is where the writer of the derivative security may default we apply the foreign currency analogy of jarrow and turnbull 1991 to decompose the dollar payoff from a risky security into a certain payoff and a spot exchange rate arbitrage free valuation techniques are then employed this methodology can be applied to corporate debt and over the counter derivatives such as swaps and caps the purpose of this article is to provide a new theory for pricing and hedging derivative securities involving credit risk two sources of credit risk are identified and analyzed the first is where the asset underlying the derivative security may default paying off less than promised this is the case for example with imbedded options on corporate debt the second is the credit risk introduced by the writer of the derivative security who may also default examples include over the counter writers of options on eurodollar futures swaps and swaptions for pricing derivative securities involving credit risk there are currently two approaches the first views these derivatives as contingent claims not on the financial securities themselves but as compound options on the assets underlying the financial securities this is the case for example with the pricing of imbedded options on corporate debt see merton 1974 1977 black and cox 1976 ho and singer 1982 chance 1990 and kim ramaswamy and sundaresan 1993 or the pricing of vulnerable options see johnson and stulz 1987 in practice however this valuation methodology is difficult to use first the assets underlying the financial security are often not tradeable and therefore their values are not observable this makes application of the theory and estimation of the relevant parameters problematic second as in the case of corporate debt all of the other liabilities of the firm senior to the corporate debt must first and simultaneously be valued this generates significant computational difficulties as a result this approach has not

international bailouts moral hazard and conditionality international bailouts the imf s role the large international bailouts of the 1990s have been criticized for generating moral hazard at the expense of the global taxpayer we argue that this criticism is misleading because international bailouts create no or very few costs to the international community instead the problem is to ensure that bailouts are not used to facilitate bad domestic policies thus creating moral hazard at the expense of domestic taxpayers this may require a shift towards ex ante conditionality in the sense that the availability and size of official crisis lending need to be conditional on government policies before the crisis olivier jeanne and jeromin zettelmeyer

time varying volatility default and the sovereign risk premium this paper studies how changes in the volatility of aggregate income aect the sovereign spread i document a positive correlation between sovereign spreads and aggregate income volatility for a set of european economies then i propose a model with endogenous sovereign spread and time varying volatility to understand this fact i nd that volatility changes aect savings and the sovereign spread however the impact of volatility shocks is state dependent when the economy is relatively rich an increase in volatility generates precautionary savings instead when the economy is relatively poor an increase in volatility induces an increase in foreign debt and a higher spread this mechanism is absent in standard business cycle models and only appears because of the default option moreover this mechanism can generate a substantial variability of spreads only due to volatility shocks in this way the model is able to rationalize the positive correlation between sovereign spreads and volatility observed in the data

the integration of insurance and taxes in corporate pension strategy this paper examines the implications of the joint effects of insurance and taxes for the optimal corporate pension strategy it is shown that neither the mini max nor the maxi min strategy advocated by previous authors is necessarily best in corporate pension management in the presence of capital market imperfections the analysis via a single period contingent claims model indicates that optimal corporate pension strategy in both asset allocation and funding decisions can be a noncorner interior solution since the passage of the employee retirement income security act erisa in 1974 considerable attention has been given to the development of optimal strategies for corporate pension management under erisa the corporate pension liabilities have become parts of corporate liabilities and consequently the management of corporate pension plans has become an integral dimension of the overall corporate financial policy at present corporate pensions are subject to special tax treatments in the internal revenue code as well as various erisa regulations therefore it is important to analyze the complex tradeoffs among various explicit and implicit benefits and costs in order to derive an optimal corporate pension strategy several important contributions in the area of corporate pension strategy have been developed in finance and economic literature for instance sharpe 18 has shown that in the absence of taxes and under the current structure of a fixed insurance premium charged by the pension benefit guaranty corporation pbgc the insurance effect calls for the mini max corporate pension strategy that involves a minimum level of pension plan funding and a maximum level of pension investment in risky assets conversely black 1 and tepper 19 have argued that in the absence of default risk and pension insurance the tax effect calls for the maxi min corporate pension strategy that suggests a maximum level of plan funding and a minimum level of investment in the lowtax risky assets in their recent work harrison and sharpe 8 and marcus 12 have shown that the corner solutions in pension strategy are optimal even when the insurance and tax effects are considered jointly the purpose of this study is to examine the joint insurance and tax effects on corporate pension strategies in the presence of some relevant market imperfections the single period contingent claim analysis is applied to examine these important effects on corporate pension strategies

official credits to developing countries implicit transfers to the banks this paper investigates the impact on the wealth of bank share holders on the transfer of official resources to the debtor countries the main aim was to derive actual estimates of increases in shareholder wealth following important news concerning future transfers from the multilaterals to the debtor nations the main result is that stock market expects virtually all additional resources provided to debtor countries to be used for debt service to commercial banks while the estimated magnitude of these effects are informative the emphasis should be on the direction of these effects as they are robust to overestimation problems clearly official resources provided to debtor countries do devolve to creditor banks however the debtor countries should at least gain in so far as the reduction of a debt overhang eliminates investment distortions the results stem from the fact that some of the monies provided by the multilaterals are specifically earmarked for debt service or are in the form of general balance of payments support that the developing countries can use for private debt service official creditor resources that are specially provided to finance development projects are less likely to be allocated to bank debt service

who supports global economic engagement the sources of preferences in american foreign economic policy in this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand u s foreign policy in particular foreign trade and aid using votes in the u s house of representatives from 1979 2004 we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy we assess the impact of domestic factors namely political economy and ideological preferences versus foreign policy pressures our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas first aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences second trade preferences but not economic aid ones are shaped by the president s foreign policy concerns for economic aid domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones third aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones but ideology plays a different substantive role in each different constituencies support aid and trade this finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability the internationalist coalition in u s foreign policy statist theories of foreign policy and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting

pension plan terminations excess asset reversions and securityholder wealth abstract the total firm valuation impact of an excess pension asset reversion is an unresolved issue prior studies focusing on stockholder wealth provide varied evidence this study examines the valuation effects of excess asset reversions on bondholders straight and convertible and stockholders of the sponsoring firm the redeployment and the negative signalling hypotheses provide a framework for the analysis we provide evidence of wealth expropriation from straight bondholders to stockholders convertible debtholders are not impacted by plan terminations contingency table analysis also reveals evidence in support of the negative signalling hypothesis for a significant portion of the sample cross sectional regression identifies financial weakening of the firm reversions undertaken for restructuring purposes and takeover defense related terminations as significant determinants of bond holder excess returns

multilateral aid and domestic economic interests existing studies of foreign aid suggest that donor countries economic groups such as exporters should be generally opposed to multilateral aid because multilateral flows do not allow donor countries to tie their aid implicitly or explicitly to the promotion of their domestic economic interests however economic groups can actually benefit from some types of multilateral aid and this serves as an incentive for donor governments to support international organizations generating the benefits i test my argument using data on aid allocated to the multilateral fund for the implementation of the montreal protocol and the global environment facility and international trade by commodity i find robust empirical support for the argument that when donors domestic economic groups are likely to gain from opportunities created by international environmental organizations programs donor governments increase aid allocations to these organizations

international institutions and domestic compensation the imf and the politics of capital account liberalization certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross border movement of capital how can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s we argue that imf stabilizationprogramsprovideawindowofopportunityforgovernmentstoinitiatefinancialreforms butthatpolicymakers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high large loans from the imf shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government s ex ante promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms we test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002 we employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in imf programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion the results provide strong support for the interactive effect of imf programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization

heterogeneous borrowers in quantitative models of sovereign default we extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power we show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions under high political stability political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions a higher and more volatile spread and lower borrowing levels after a default episode

imf conditionality government partisanship and the progress of economic reforms the international monetary fund imf often seeks to influence countries domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality linking financial support to borrowing governments commitment to policy reforms when does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them we argue that rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms the effects of stricter imf conditionality depend on domestic partisan politics more imf conditions can pressure left wing governments into undertaking more ambitious reforms with little resistance from partisan rivals on the right under right governments however more conditions hinder reform implementation by heightening resistance from the left while simultaneously reducing leaders ability to win their support through concessions or compromise using data on post communist imf programs for the period 1994 2010 we find robust evidence supporting these claims even after addressing the endogeneity of imf programs via instrumental variables analysis

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

security price reactions around corporate spin off announcements abstract we examine security price reactions around the announcements of 123 voluntary spin offs by 116 firms between 1963 and 1981 involving a pro rata distribution of the common stock of a subsidiary to the stockholders of the parent firm the median spin off in the sample is 6 6 of the original equity value and is associated with an abnormal return of 7 0 from 50 days prior to the announcement through completion of the spin off no evidence is found to indicate the gains to stockholders represent wealth transfers from senior securityholders over the entire event period we find positive gains for firms engaging in spin offs to facilitate mergers or to separate diverse operating units but negative returns to firms responding to legal and or regulatory difficulties in the two day interval surrounding the first press announcement we find positive average excess returns for all groups

long duration bonds and sovereign defaults abstract this paper extends the baseline framework used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default by assuming that the government can borrow using long duration bonds this contrasts with previous studies which assume the government can borrow using bonds that mature after one quarter we show that when we assume that the government issues bonds with a duration similar to the average duration of sovereign bonds in emerging economies the model generates an interest rate that is substantially higher and more volatile than the one obtained assuming one quarter bonds this narrows the gap between the predictions of the model and the data which indicates that the introduction of long duration bonds may be a useful tool for future research about emerging economies our analysis is also relevant for the study of other credit markets

why are some people and countries more protectionist than others we analyze two cross country data sets that contain information on attitudes toward trade as well as a broad range of socio demographic and other indicators we nd that pro trade preferences are signi cantly and robustly correlated with an individual s level of human capital in the manner predicted by the factor endowments model preferences over trade are also correlated with the trade exposure of the sector in which an individual is employed individuals in non traded sectors tend to be the most pro trade while individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage are the most protectionist third an individual s relative economic status has a very strong positive association withpro trade attitudes finally non economic determinants in the form of values identities and attachments play an important role in explaining the variation in preferences over trade high degrees of neighborhood attachment and nationalism patriotism are associated withprotectionist tendencies c

a model for the determination of fair premiums on lease cancellation insurance policies lease cancellation insurance protects the lessor against early termination of a cancellable operating lease this paper presents a contingent claims model for determining the fair premium for this type of insurance policy comparative statics are considered and some numerical examples are presented to illustrate the model among other things the insurance premium is sensitive to the expected rate of economic depreciation of the leased asset and to the leased asset s systematic and nonsystematic risk

an empirical test of the redistribution effect in pure exchange mergers merger transactions involve differing degrees of change in capital structure and asset distribution as a result different forms of merger could have different effects on security values of the firms involved previous empirical studies primarily used samples that included all types of mergers the present study examines the effect of one type of merger pure stock exchange on the values of the debt and equity of the firms involved

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

portfolio theory and currency substitution one of the major reasons friedman 1953 and johnson 1972 advocated flexible exchange rates was to eliminate supply side monetary substitutability which can incapacitate domestic monetary policy however contributors to the currency substitution literature including miles 1978 girton and roper 1981 and mckinnon 1982 have argued that when economic agents hold both domestic and foreign monies variations in foreign interest rates or expected future exchange rates can make domestic money demand functions unstable as economic agents shift resources in response to changes in prospective relative returns as a result they and others have claimed that flexible exchange rates may not secure domestic monetary autonomy l the major purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the conditions under which foreign and domestic monies are substitutes in demand when economic agents have motives to hold both and to contrast the determinants of currency substitutability with those of the more general concept of asset substitutability importantly it is demonstrated that the usual portfolio theoretic justification for including opportunity cost variables such as foreign interest rates foreign inflation rates or expected

the priority structure of corporate liabilities most discussions of corporate capital structure effectively assume that all debt is the same yet debt differs by maturity covenant restrictions conversion rights call provisions and priority here we examine priority structure across a sample of 4995 compustat industrial firms from 1981 to 1991 we analyze the variation in the use of capital leases secured debt ordinary debt subordinated debt and preferred stock both as a fraction of the firm s market value and as a fraction of total fixed claims our evidence provides consistent support for contracting cost hypotheses mixed support for tax hypotheses and little support for the signaling hypothesis

endogenous deposit dollarization this paper explores sources of deposit dollarization unrelated to standard moral hazard arguments we argue that the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims on a bank in the event of default can induce banks to attract dollar deposits above the socially desirable level the distortion arises because dollar depositors are the only source of default risk in the model but they share the burden of the default with peso depositors as interest rates cannot be set contingent to the unobserved level of deposit dollarization the incentive to dollarize is reinforced by common banking system safety nets such as deposit and bank insurance our findings suggest that regulators in bi currency economies should depart from the currency blind benchmark and instead distinguish across currencies in a way that prevents undesirable currency mismatches even in the absence of moral hazard related to the relaxation of market discipline