optimal incentive schemes with many agents the grossman hart principal agent model of moral hazard is extended to the multiple agent case to explore the use of relative performance in optimal incentive contracting under the assumption that the principal chooses incentive schemes to implement agent actions as nash equilibria necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for the optimality of independent contracts of rank order tournaments and for attainability of the first best in this context the relation of the principal s welfare to the correlation between the underlying randomness in outputs of different agents is also investigated finally some problems with the nash equilibrium implementation assumption are discussed in this paper we extend the grossman hart analysis of the principal agent problem to a multiple agent setting in this version of the problem a risk neutral principal is assumed to observe the output or a performance index for each risk averse agent the output of any agent depends on a privately observable action chosen by the agent and an exogenous random variable the realization of which is not observed either by the principal or by the agent before choosing its action we especially focus attention on the role of relative performance evaluation in optimal incentive contracts and the way this depends on properties of the underlying production technology and the joint distribution of the random variables affecting the outputs of different agents in section 2 of the paper we consider the principal s problem of finding an optimal incentive scheme and an action tuple for agents subject to the constraint that the latter be implemented as a nash equilibrium between agents by the chosen incentive scheme where agents must attain at least their reservation utilities a characterization of optimal incentive schemes is derived analogous to the grossman hart characterization for the single agent problem this characterization is then utilized to find sufficient and generically necessary conditions for a optimal contracts for any agent to be independent of the performance of other agents and b optimality of rank order tournaments where payments depend solely on ordinal comparisons of output across agents we then describe a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal to extract maximum advantage from relative performance clauses i e achieve the first best level of expected utility in the multiagent situation an implication of this result is that under fairly weak conditions perfect correlation in the underlying production uncertainties for different agents enables the principal to attain the first best if and only if sufficiently heavy penalties can be inflicted on agents we then enquire what happens in intermediate cases of non perfect correlation it turns out that while in general the principal s welfare is a continuous function of the correlation coefficient it is not always nondecreasing in the latter because the correlation coefficient is not a general measure of association between two random variables but rather a measure of linear association between them

dynamics of niche width and resource partitioning this article examines the effects of crowding in a market center on rates of change in organizational niche width and on organizational mortality it proposes that although firms with wide niches benefit from risk spreading and economies of scale they are simultaneously exposed to intense competition an analysis of organizational dynamics in automobile manufacturing firms in france germany and great britain shows that competitive pressure not only increases the hazard of disbanding but also prompts organizational transformations that give rise to processes of resource partitioning emphasizing the content process distinction in conceptualizing organizational change the article finds that the process effect of changes in niche width and position increases mortality hazards we discuss our findings in light of the processes investigated by the ecological theories of density dependence resource partitioning and structural inertia and point to the theoretical links that help to integrate these theories

divestment response to host country terrorist attacks inter firm influence and the role of temporal consistency abstract host country terrorism poses extreme uncertainty to mnes foreign operations however little is known about how mnes respond to host country terrorist attacks and how they make the related decisions drawing on the research on mnes responses to exogenous shocks and the inter firm imitation literature we argue that mnes obtain relevant information from peers actions under terrorist attacks to inform their own responses thus mnes are more likely to divest under host country terrorist attacks when peers also divest furthermore the impact of peers divestments on focal mnes divestments is magnified by the temporal consistency in peers behavioral pattern under terrorist attacks as temporal consistency reduces inferential difficulties empirical evidence based on 93 fortune us companies and their 8698 foreign subsidiaries over 2005 2015 support our hypotheses our study extends the literature on mnes responses to host country exogenous shocks and on inter firm imitation by demonstrating the social amplification of terrorism threat and the role of temporal consistency in inter firm imitation under extreme uncertainty practically we stress that mne executives should always consider their firms idiosyncratic situations when modeling peer mnes actions and be mindful that they are especially likely to imitate peers temporally consistent behaviors under extreme uncertainty

targeting the poor using community information abstract governments and aid agencies target transfers to the poor but audits to deter the rich are costly this paper analyzes how community information can improve targeting if each community is given a hard budget constraint then targeting costs can be substantially reduced by asking recipients to make reports about each other audits are threatened in the event of a disagreement but never carried out in equilibrium this scheme is immune to collusion

will a second mouse get the cheese learning from early entrants failures in a foreign market we examine the conditions that can facilitate or hinder the effectiveness with which a new entrant learns from the failures of prior entrants by analyzing the experiences of 822 japanese subsidiaries in china founded between 1979 and 2000 our conceptual arguments and empirical findings demonstrate that learning from the failure experiences of prior entrants increases a new entrant s survival chances when entering china further we find that the value of this learning is less effective when there is a greater level of heterogeneity in the causes of these failures however this learning is more effective when a new entrant s parent firm has ownership ties with investors who had ventures that failed previously in china

managerial cognition and the mimetic adoption of market positions what you see is what you do managers planning to abandon a market position need to find a promising alternative and face a choice of inventing a new market position or entering an existing one the great uncertainty on the consequences of different actions leads them to rely on other organizations for information on how to compete making adoption of existing market positions likely their wish to avoid direct rivalry and maximize growth leads them to seek out information on new market positions with few incumbents as a result recently innovated market positions are mimetically adopted by organizations that can easily observe previous adoptions and see them as relevant to their market situations increasing the market differentiation this theory is tested and supported by analysis of the spread of new radio formats in the united states 1998 john wiley sons ltd

strategic reference point theory how can executives achieve a match between expected external environmental conditions and internal organizational capabilities that facilitates improved performance this paper argues that a firm s choice of reference points can help achieve strategic alignment capable of yielding improved performance and potentially even a sustainable competitive advantage building upon prospect theory and other relevant theoretical perspectives the strategic reference point srp matrix is developed a firm s srp consists of three dimensions internal capability external conditions and time a theory is developed which posits an optimal srp structure and propositions are offered which articulate the expected relationships between the srp strategic choice behavior and firm performance the paper closes with some suggestions for using strategic reference points in both research and practice

unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents in this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions we distinguish two cases i when actions are mutually observable among agents ii when actions are not observable at all in i there is a mechanism in which the first best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium in ii we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules however we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi stage mechanism that has a unique second best perfect bayesian equilibrium

efficient and nearly efficient partnerships this paper shows in two ways that the degree to which free riding diminishes the performance of deterministic partnerships may be less than has been generally thought first a necessary and sufficient condition is provided for a partnership to sustain full efficiency it implies that many non trivial partnerships sustain efficiency such as generic ones with finite action spaces and neoclassical ones with leontief technologies second approximate efficiency is shown to be achievable in a large class of partnerships including ones with smooth and monotonic production and disutility functions approximate efficiency is achieved by mixed strategy equilibria one partner takes with small probability an inefficient action the degree to which efficiency is approximated is restricted only by the amount of liability the partners can bear nonetheless their equilibrium payments are not arbitrarily large

learning from age difference interorganizational learning and survival in japanese foreign subsidiaries this paper extends research on experiential learning of foreign subsidiaries by exploring the temporal conditions under which a foreign subsidiary can benefit from the experience of its sister subsidiaries building upon organizational evolution and learning literature we propose that differences in entry timing among sister subsidiaries provide structural conditions that bound the opportunities for inter subsidiary learning we argue that different entry cohorts of sister subsidiaries are beneficial to a focal subsidiary as they provide non redundant complementary experience from their different operational stages and ignite the motivation to learn our empirical analysis of japanese foreign subsidiaries provides strong evidence that survival is enhanced by the experience of different entry cohorts of sister subsidiaries but not by that of similar cohorts qualitative evidence also shows that multiple channels of experience exchange across sister subsidiaries lead to actual learning we further show that the survival benefit derived from different cohorts is contingent on the level of environmental change as well as on the level of experience of the focal subsidiary and its parent firm our research highlights the importance of temporal heterogeneity in the internationalization process and offers implications for the temporal strategy of multinational companies

coordinating development can income based incentive schemes eliminate pareto inferior equilibria individuals inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development in this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high investment outcome a general property of this game is the presence of a crossover investment point at which an individual s incomes from investment and noninvestment are equal we show that arbitrarily small errors in the government s knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high investment outcome we conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government s ability to use income based incentive schemes as a coordination device

to be different or to be the same it s a question and theory of strategic balance this paper addresses the performance consequences of firm level strategic similarity past research observed that firms face pressures to be different and to be the same by differentiating firms reduce competition by conforming firms demonstrate their legitimacy both reduced competition and legitimacy improve performance this paper begins building a theory of strategic balance by synthesizing the differentiation and conformity perspectives the theory directs attention to intermediate levels of strategic similarity where firms balance the pressures of competition and legitimation empirical support for the theory is found in a longitudinal study of commercial banks several suggestions for developing a theory of strategic balance conclude the paper the theory s major implication is that firms should be as different as legitimately possible copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd

implementation of first best allocations via generalized tax schedules abstract the classical problem of optimal taxation introduced by j mirrlees rev econ stud 38 1971 175 208 is addressed and it is argued that by using generalized tax schedules i e schedules which depend not only on individual income but also on the whole profile of incomes announced by the society a planner can implement any pareto optimum which stands in great contrast with the set of second best pareto optima attainable via classical tax schedules the mechanism relies crucially on the fixed probability distribution of characteristics and on a finite number of agents journal of economic literature classification numbers d78 d82 h21

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

the rural non farm sector issues and evidence from developing countries abstract the rural non farm sector has traditionally been viewed as a low productivity sector which produces low quality goods it is often expected to wither away as a country develops recent years have seen a shift away from this position towards recognition that the rural non farm sector can and often does contribute to economic growth rural employment poverty reduction and a more spatially balanced population distribution this paper reviews the literature on the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of this more recent perspective focussing on the experience in developing countries the paper documents the size and heterogeneity of the sector pointing to evidence that in many countries the sector is expanding rather than declining the issues associated with measuring the sector s economic contribution are discussed followed by empirical assessments for several countries and regions the distributional impact of non farm earnings is examined and it is found that a pro poor impact while by no means inevitable can be considerable the sector s trajectory over time in different settings is reviewed and the scope for and experience of various policy interventions is discussed

getting to know you a theory of strategic group identity this paper develops a theory of strategic group identity that explains how strategic groups emerge in an industry and how they can affect firm behaviors and outcomes in so doing it provides a theoretical basis for the existence of strategic groups we argue that managers cognitively partition their industry environment to reduce uncertainty and to cope with bounded rationality social learning theory and social identification theory are used to describe how cognitive groups coalesce into meaningful substructures and how a group level identity emerges we describe the ways in which macro level factors condition the development of groups and their identities we introduce the notion of a strong identity which characterizes any group sufficiently recognized and attended to by members to affect individual action groups with weak identities are no more than transient agglomerations of firms and do not exist in any meaningful sense these ideas are developed into propositions that describe the conditions under which groups with strong identities are likely to emerge a second set of propositions describes their transformation over time identity strength is linked to both positive and negative outcomes in a final set of propositions we show how strategic groups with strong identities can affect firm performance resolving a longstanding problem which has plagued strategic groups research and conclude by suggesting some approaches for measurement and future research 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

bringing it all back home return migration and fertility choices summary return migration exerts a wide ranging influence upon the countries of origin of the migrants we analyze whether returnees adjust their fertility choices to the norms that prevail in their previous countries of destination using egyptian household level data egyptian men migrate predominantly toward other arab countries characterized by a higher number of children per woman relying on a two step instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity of the migration decisions we show that return migration has a positive and significant influence on marital childbearing

coordination failures and government policy a model with applications to east asia and eastern europe abstract poor countries must specialize in standardized labor intensive commodities middle income countries may have a richer menu of options if their labor force is reasonably well educated and skilled the multiplicity of equilibria is due to a coordination problem inherent in activities that require specialized inputs if no intermediate inputs are presently produced there may be little incentive for any single firm to do so on its own the economy may get stuck in a low wage low tech equilibrium an investment subsidy or a minimum wage policy can enhance welfare by moving the economy to a superior equilibrium

adaptation as information restriction the hot stove effect individuals and social systems are often portrayed as risk averse and resistant to change such propensities are characteristically attributed to individual organizational and cultural traits such as risk aversion uncertainty avoidance discounting and an unwillingness to change this paper explores an alternative interpretation of such phenomena we show how the reproduction of successful actions inherent in adaptive processes such as learning and competitive selection and reproduction results in a bias against alternatives that initially may appear to be worse than they actually are in particular learning and selection are biased against both risky and novel alternatives because the biases are products of the tendency to reproduce success that is inherent in the sequential sampling of adaptation they are reduced whenever the reproduction of success is attenuated in particular when adaptation is slowed made imprecise or recalled less reliably the propensity to engage in risky and new activities is increased these protections against the error of rejecting potentially good alternatives on inadequate experiential evidence are costly however they increase the likelihood of persisting with alternatives that are poor in the long run as well as in the short run

implementing coordinated team play abstract this note studies a moral hazard model of joint production in which there are strong gains to coordination the mechanism we propose for resolving the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting makes use of at will contracts which provide the agents with the option to quit at any time journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

confidence in imitation niche width strategy in the uk automobile industry our study examines the imitation behavior of uk automobile manufacturers from 1894 to 1981 and supports previous studies on interorganizational imitation by showing that manufacturers tend to imitate other manufacturers that are similar we also find that the degree of confidence manufacturers have in their imitating behavior affects the intensity of that behavior where an organizations confidence is determined by the variance of the routines used by its reference group and the number of firms in the reference group our results show that 1 manufacturers whose reference groups showed large variance in niche width changes during the previous year are less likely to imitate the mean of those changes 2 manufacturers who have large reference groups are more likely to imitate the changes and 3 the negative effect of variance on the imitating behavior is strengthened as the number of reference organizations increases

decomposing uncertainty and its effects on imitation in firm exit decisions this study examines the effects of different uncertainty types on interorganizational imitation in firm exit decisions we draw on herding models to conceptualize exit decisions as being based on a firm s private information which the firm updates with information inferred from observing the actions of others we posit that different types of uncertainty differentially affect this observational learning process in particular we propose that certain uncertainty types attenuate rather than foster observational learning and subsequent imitation we test this theory using a 29 year panel data set on the exit of private venture capital firms our results indicate that observational learning does influence imitation in firm exit decisions and they also suggest that a common belief that uncertainty enhances imitation does not apply to all types of uncertainty specifically we find that uncertainty fosters imitation only when it is idiosyncratic to the firm uncertainties that are common to all firms in contrast actually reduce reliance on observational learning by decomposing uncertainty into different types and explicating their effects on imitation we demonstrate that this relationship is more nuanced than previously assumed and in addition highlight the role of deliberate information processing in imitation

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive