unit root tests on real wage panel data for the g7 abstract using a unit root test for panel data we find that real wage innovations in most g7 economies are temporary rapidly mean reverting and have no permanent component results are sensitive to an identical cross equation restriction on all series

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the baron ferejohn model abstract we consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs for games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs with this characterization we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs for the case where the players have the same discount factor we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer for the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c78 d70

resource and waste taxation in the theory of the firm with recycling activities the management of solid waste has become an urgent problem in nations with a great population density accordingly waste reduction through source reduction and recycling has become increasingly important our purpose is to show how prevention recycling and disposal of waste could be part of a theory of the firm we first derive efficient production functions from production processes with waste as a by product waste obtained as new scrap can partially be recycled by using additional inputs in order to cut back the purchase of virgin material waste not completely recyclable will leave the firm as disposal which also entails cost to the firm we use the dual cost function approach to develop a theory of the firm under solid residual management since the producer does not bear the full cost of disposal there will be a bias toward virgin materials and away from recycling the goal of the government is to stimulate the firms to recycle with respect to the preservation of exhaustible resources an incentive to recycle is a tax on resources or on waste in order to determine the tax levels the government maximizes welfare subject to the dynamic constraint for decumulation of land fill for waste deposits this gives the user cost and its time profile for taxing waste disposal or virgin material in a comparative statics analysis we compare the effect of taxes on waste vs virgin material on effort to produce in a resource saving manner on the quantity of recycled material on output and on the reduction of waste since the impact of environmental regulation on employment is important our model detects seven effects on labor demand as part of resource conservation policy we finally carry out a comparative statics analysis of waste intensive firms operating in different market structures of interest is the impact of a resource or waste taxation on market volume on the number of firms on resource saving effort and on profit

coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

economic analysis of paper recycling vis a vis wood as raw material abstract concerns for the environment has forced many firms define policies that protect the environment within which they operate this paper presents a linear optimization model for paper industry to compare total system cost of wood as a raw material with recycling of waste paper objective of the proposed model is to minimize the cost of paper in the supply chain costs included in the objective functions are costs for collection of raw material transportation inventory manufacturing segregation and disposal during recycling the model also includes the economic implications of using these alternative material sources on environment as well as quality of final product to gain further insights into system behavior sensitivity analysis shortage analysis and indifference curve analysis have been performed the analysis clearly reveals that the paper recycling is an economical option compared to wood as a raw material the paper analysis highlights various strategies that could be followed under different market conditions

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

bargaining one dimensional social choices we analyze bargaining over the one dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes q 2 stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol we provide a monotonicity condition satisfied by all single peak strictly quasi concave and concave utilities that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player s utilities are symmetric around the peak without symmetry the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities q n 2 provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition

is there persistence in the growth of manufactured exports evidence from newly industrializing countries abstract applying cointegration techniques in a panel data setting we document persistent growth of manufactured exports from certain developing countries to complement the investigation of persistence measured by the country fixed effects we analyze asymmetries in income elasticities for all developing countries the decline in exports with world income contraction is sharper than is the rise on the upswing the decline is however especially pronounced for countries with low or negative persistence the results are consistent with long term buyer supplier relationships that create insiders and outsiders in manufactured goods trading exports are also influenced by the transactional infrastructure proxied by telecommunications penetration

markets technology and environmental regulation price ambivalence of waste paper in germany abstract we examine the price ambivalence of low quality waste paper grades 1 02 and 1 04 on the german market since 1990 the price of these grades is at times positive and at times negative the underlying reason is the combination of three institutional and technical characteristics of the market i as a result of waste management legislation the supply of waste paper is mostly independent of its price and its demand supply is bounded from below by collection and utilization quotas fixed by the regulation on packaging waste enacted in 1991 ii the only alternative to costly disposal of waste paper by dumping or incineration is its use as a secondary resource in the production of new paper as only the paper industry is capable of using waste paper in a productive manner in significant amount iii yet its use as a substitute for primary inputs is technically limited in this article we describe the technical and institutional conditions leading to price ambivalence and discuss the consequences for supply demand and trade of waste paper

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers abstract the paper analyzes a simple discrete time noncooperative coalitional bargaining game in which at each stage there is a contest for the right to make a proposal the pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoff set is equal to the core journal of economic literature classification numbers 026

uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining we study a model of sequential bargaining in which in each period before an agreement is reached the proposer s identity is randomly determined the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer the theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique this generalizes eraslan 34 insofar as a there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions b different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions c there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected

uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one dimensional policies under super majority rules article history we consider negotiations selecting one dimensional policies individuals have instanta neous preferences represented by continuous concave and single peaked utility functions and they are impatient decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and super majority approval ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and we provide its explicit characterization the uniqueness of the equilibrium permits an analysis of the set of pareto optimal voting rules for symmetric distributions of peaks and uniform recognition probabilities unanimity is the unanimously preferred ma jority rule

does international harmonization of environmental policy instruments make economic sense harmonization of the instruments used in environmental policy has beenconsidered necessary to guarantee fair competition in internationalmarkets we examine the economic costs of harmonizing paper recyclingstandards in countries where the urgency of the waste disposal problemsdiffer using data of seven european countries we estimate thetechnologically feasible input combinations of pulp and waste paper forpaper production short term effects of two environmental policy measures minimum content requirement and utilization rate target are analyzed bytranslating the two administrative instruments into taxes and subsidies weshow that the shadow costs of the harmonization vary considerably betweencountries the difference in the domestic availability of waste may explainthe variation and a modification of the policy measures to incorporate thisaspect is suggested

order independent equilibria we study a noncooperative game of coalition formation based on an underlying game in coalitional form we introduce order independent equilibria oie a strategy profile is an oie if for any specification of first movers in the sequential game it remains an equilibrium and leads to the same payoff our results are 1 payoffs in oie that use pure stationary strategies must be in the core of the underlying game in coalitional form 2 if the underlying game has the property that all its subgames have nonempty cores then for each payoff vector there exists an oie with the same payoff journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71 c72 c78

the relationship between waste paper and other inputs in the swedish paper industry a number of life cycle assessment studies havecompared the environmental impacts of materialrecycling and incineration of waste paper theyhave shown that in most cases a recyclingscenario results in lower total energy use butgreater use of fossil fuels if waste paper andfossil fuels are complements parts of theenvironmental argument for recycling isabolished this paper estimates a cost functionfor the swedish paper industry if the costshares are co integrated an error correctionmodel will be used to model the dynamics short and long run elasticities are thencalculated to address the relationship betweenwaste paper and the other inputs capital labor purchased pulp fiber fossil fuels andelectricity contrary to the life cycleassessment studies the results show that wastepaper and fossil fuels are substitutes andthat waste paper and electricity arecomplements

cyclical dumping and correlated business cycles in imperfect markets empirical applications to the canadian pulp and paper industry this paper deals with theoretical and empirical aspects of firm behaviour under imperfect competition and uncertainty it contains an analysis of the behaviour of a firm facing a stochastic demand

trade reform uncertainty and export promotion mexico 1982 88 abstract this paper uses a simple portfolio optimization framework to analyze both the direct impact of liberalization measures and the impact of reduced relative riskiness of exporting vs producing for the domestic market arising from a commitment to an outward orientation we allow for uncertainty in both the domestic and foreign markets and examine the very counterintuitive implications of the covariance for export behavior we use firm level export data in a dynamic panel context bi variate garch techniques and the levin and lin tests for unit root stationarity in panel data to examine the mexican liberalization from 1983 88

on the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria abstract this note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games a first example shows non convergence to the asymmetric nash bargaining solution a second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits

optimal policies for solid waste disposal taxes subsidies and standards abstract pricing trash collection and disposal services can be politically unpopular and may lead to increased illegal disposal of trash several studies have shown that deposit refund systems can act like disposal charges without the illegal disposal problem and thus can generate an optimal amount of solid waste disposal we assess the efficiency implications of an alternative policy currently in use in some states in the u s and considered at the federal level recycled content standards these are requirements that a certain fraction of total material use in production be comprised of secondary materials we find that such standards by themselves cannot generate the optimal amount of disposal but must be combined with additional taxes on both the final product and other inputs to production moreover the information requirements for setting the optimal standards and accompanying taxes are high the deposit refund approach would be preferred in most cases

trade and economic impacts of destination based business cash flow taxes proposals for destination based business cash flow taxes dbcft that effectively combine a value added tax and a wage subsidy have received enormous attention in the united states and are being proposed as a major tax reform worldwide much controversy has focused on trade impacts but this paper shows that a dbcft would not create long term trade barriers or export subsidies if prices and wages are flexible it would leave business profits and rents untaxed providing an unambiguous benefit to foreign investors relative to an origin based corporate tax domestic wage earners would be compensated for higher prices by the wage deduction while the position of domestic investors would depend on whether their gains from abolition of origin based taxes outweighed their losses from higher consumer prices a key concern is small volatile and vulnerable net revenues even with high tax rates at current us consumption and labour shares a 20 corporate cash flow tax with a wage subsidy would generate less than 2 of gdp in net revenues which could be obtained with much less volatility from a 2 8 consumption tax alone under a dbcft revenues would become negative if consumption and labour shares returned to their historical norms or if difficult to tax sectors like owner occupied housing were excluded

industrial electricity demand and energy efficiency policy the role of price changes and private r d in the swedish pulp and paper industry abstract the objective of this paper is to analyze electricity demand behaviour in the swedish pulp and paper industry in the context of the increased interest in so called voluntary energy efficiency programs in these programs tax exemptions are granted if the participating firms carry out energy efficiency measures following an energy audit we employ a panel data set of 19 pulp and paper firms and estimate both the own and cross price elasticities of electricity demand as well as the impact of knowledge accumulation following private r d on electricity use the empirical results show that electricity use in the swedish pulp and paper industry is relatively own price insensitive and the self reported electricity savings following the voluntary so called pfe program support the notion of important information asymmetries at the company level however the results display that already in a baseline setting pulp and paper firms tend to invest in private r d that have electricity saving impacts and our model simulations suggest that up to about one third of the industry sector s self reported electricity savings in pfe could be attributable to pure baseline effects future evaluations of voluntary energy efficiency programs must increasingly recognize the already existing incentives to reduce energy use in energy intensive industries

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

one dimensional bargaining we study a model of multilateral bargaining over social outcomes represented by the points in the unit interval the acceptance or rejection of a proposal is determined by an acceptance rule represented by the collection of decisive coalitions the focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies as the players become infinitely patient we show that along any sequence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria the social acceptance set collapses to a point this point called the limit of bargaining equilibria is independent of the sequence of equilibria and is uniquely determined by the set of players the utility functions the recognition probabilities and the acceptance rule the central result of the paper is a characterization of the limit of bargaining equilibria as a unique zero of the characteristic equation

functional forms for labor supply and commodity demands with and without quantity restrictions one of the most important current questions in economic analysis is whether or not labor markets clear in the short run to answer this it is necessary to be able to distinguish between restricted and unrestricted behavior by consumers supplying labor this paper investigates the forms of preferences which lie behind linear models of labor supply and derives the functional forms for commodity demands which accompany them both with and without quantity restrictions in the labor market simple linkages between restricted and unrestricted demands are also considered as is the question of perfect aggregation over consumers in the presence of quantity restrictions

strategic voting over strategic proposals prior research on strategic voting has reached the conclusion that unanimity rule is uniquely bad it results in destruction of information and hence makes voters worse off we show that this conclusion depends critically on the assumption that the issue being voted on is exogenous that is independent of the voting rule used we depart from the existing literature by endogenizing the proposal that is put to a vote and establish that under many circumstances unanimity rule makes voters better off moreover in some cases unanimity rule also makes the proposer better off even when he has diametrically opposing preferences in this case unanimity is the pareto dominant voting rule voters prefer unanimity rule because it induces the proposing individual to make a more attractive proposal the proposing individual prefers unanimity rule because the acceptance probabilities for moderate proposals are higher we apply our results to jury trials and debt restructuring

uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one dimensional model of bargaining abstract we prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities for an arbitrary common discount factor for general concave utilities we prove existence and uniqueness of a minimal stationary equilibrium and of a maximal stationary equilibrium we provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave nonquadratic utilities

interrelated factor demands for manufacturing a dynamic translog cost function approach abstract in this paper we report the results of estimating a joint model for labour capital and energy using the transcendental logarithmic cost function of christensen jorgenson and lau 1973 this allows us to determine both the own price and cross elasticities of substitution between labour capital and energy we combine a model of factor shares with a dynamic adjustment process for each factor we also impose on the cross equation restrictions necessary to provide additivity homogeneity and symmetry since the covariance matrix in systems of share relationships is singular we follow the suggestions of anderson and blundell 1982 and employ a mullivariate error corrrection model the results suggest that additivity symmetry and homogeneity restrictions do hold and that there are short run increasing returns to scale

simulating fundamental tax reform in the united states this paper uses a new large scale dynamic life cycle simulation model to compare the welfare and macroeconomic effects of transitions to five fundamental alternatives to the u s federal income tax including a proportional consumption tax and a flat tax the model incorporates intragenerational heterogeneity and a detailed specification of alternative tax systems simulation results project significant long run increases in output for some reforms for other reforms namely those that seek to insulate the poor and initial older generations from adverse welfare changes long run output gains are modest