questioning the empirical basis of the environmental kuznets curve for co2 new evidence from a panel stationarity test robust to multiple breaks and cross dependence abstract this paper investigates the time series properties of per capita co2 emissions and per capita gdp levels for a sample of 86 countries over the period 1960 2000 for that purpose we employ a state of the art panel stationarity test which incorporates multiple shifts in level and slope thereby controlling for cross sectional dependence through bootstrap methods our analysis renders clear cut evidence that per capita gdp levels are nonstationary for the world as a whole while per capita co2 is found to be regime wise trend stationary the analysis of country groups shows that for africa and asia per capita co2 is best described as nonstationary while per capita gdp appears stationary around a broken trend in addition we find evidence of regime wise trend stationarity in both variables for the country groups consisting of america europe and oceania the results of our analysis carry important implications for the statistical modelling of the environmental kuznets curve for co2 since the differing order of integration in both variables for the world as a whole and for africa and asia calls into question the validity of panel cointegration techniques which assume that both variables are nonstationary and cointegrated with one another cointegration techniques would not be appropriate either for the case of america europe and oceania which are characterised by per capita gdp and co2 emissions being stationary around a broken trend similar conclusions are reached when we analyse country groups based on levels of development failure to properly characterise the time series properties of the data by not controlling for an unknown number of structural breaks and for cross sectional dependence could be responsible for the fragility and lack of robustness surrounding the estimation of environmental kuznets curves

implementing marketable emissions permits the environmental protection agency is introducing bubbles offsets and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions the new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances this study examines whether an efficient market without source by source review is feasible it considers the importance of enough participants competitiveness sensitivity to geographic emission patterns and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits the design features that address these problems are permit life market definition market initiation and market operation a stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk 9 references dck

consistent solutions in atomless economies we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we prove for an atomless economy with possibly satiated preferences any solution that is efficient equitable and consistent must select allocations that are supported by equal budget walrasian equilibria with slack we consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them we search for systematic methods or solutions of resolving this problem for a solution to be considered desirable we propose that it should satisfy several requirements first it should be efficient second it should be equitable a variety of distributional require ments have been proposed in the literature the requirement we will impose here is that it select allocations at which no agent would prefer the equal division of the social endowment to his own consumption in addition to these two basic efficiency and equity conditions we require that the solution be consistent the recommendations it makes for any economy are never contra dicted by the recommendations it makes for any reduced economy obtained by allowing some subgroup of agents to leave the scene with their allotted consumptions the requirement of consistency is very natural here is a motivation for it offered by thomson 1988 consider all the resources available on the planet earth one would like not only that they be distributed fairly when the planet is considered as a whole but also that whatever resources end up in each continent country city be fairly distributed among the members of that subpopulation when considered in isolation in this paper we study economies with a large number of agents modelled as a complete atomless measure space our main result is a characterization of the solutions that satisfy all three requirements of efficiency equity and con sistency it follows from our result that under standard assumptions on preferences any such solution must select allocations that are supported by equal income walrasian equilibria however our characterization holds for more general economies since it applies to economies in which preferences are possibly satiated mas colell 1988 extended traditional general equilibrium theory to the class of such economies by introducing the notion of walrasian

cyclical fluctuation patterns and decoupling towards common eu 28 environmental performance abstract the eu 28 is one of the largest emitters of co2 in the world and the most committed to reducing emissions however the national environmental strategies of the member states are still diverse this study is aimed at evaluating the environmental performance of european economies by analysing the fluctuations of co2 emissions and their links with economic activity over the period 1950 2012 the methodological framework is based on a dynamic factor analysis to determine an index of the eu fluctuation of co2 emissions in parametric form this index can be used to monitor the progress towards common behaviour across member states with a time varying recursive method following this approach we also track the efforts made to decouple co2 emissions from gdp based on these analyses we develop a co2 emissions gdp linkage matrix to attain useful information on the eu member state environmental performance

what money canʼt buy efficient mechanism design with costly signals i study the ex ante efficient allocation of a set of quality heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk neutral agents agents have independent private values which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality the designer faces a trade off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening because the cost sustained is wasted the optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distributes objects to higher ranked agents the ranking is independent of the scarcity of objects or the extent of their heterogeneity if the hazard rates of the distributions of values are increasing agents are ranked according to their expected values if hazard rates are decreasing and agents are symmetric the objects are allocated to the agents that sustain the highest costs in general optimal mechanisms combine both pooling and screening of values

the problem of global environmental protection what distinguishes global common property problems and global unidirectional externalities from the ones that arise under a single jurisdiction is that there is no global authority empowered to intervene and regulate use of global environmental resources cooperation is needed the paper discusses when cooperation is most needed and how it might be obtained cooperation might emerge from a noncooperative setting if supergames are played if the actions of any one country are explicitly contingent on the actions undertaken by other countries or if moral concerns lead countries to consider the consequences of their actions for others cooperation emerges in an explicit though limited form when countries commit to regulate themselves in signing international agreements in these cases the signatories cooperate but the agreements are self enforcing an attempt is made to relate these theoretical concepts to the practice of global environmental protection copyright 1990 by oxford university press

per capita carbon dioxide emissions convergence or divergence understanding and considering the distribution of per capita carbon dioxide co2 emissions is important in designing international climate change proposals and incentives for participation i evaluate historic international emissions distributions and forecast future distributions to assess whether per capita emissions have been converging or will converge i find evidence of convergence among 23 member countries of the organisation for economic co operation and development oecd whereas emissions appear to be diverging for an 88 country global sample over 1960 2000 forecasts based on a markov chain transition matrix provide little evidence of future emissions convergence and indicate that emissions may diverge in the near term i also review the shortcomings of environmental kuznets curve regressions and structural models in characterizing future emissions distributions

the utilitarian maximin social welfare function and anomalies in social choice two major criteria of distributive justice are the utilitarian criterion and the maximin criterion we offer a simple axiomatic characterization of a mixed utilitarian maximin social welfare function this social welfare function explains recent empirical violations of the standard cardinal social choice theory such as the social allais paradox and the social common ratio effect in addition it offers a new foundation for the positively skewed wealth distributions in society it also provides an objective function for mechanism design applications that trades off maximizing surplus and minimizing inequality

let s get real a factor analytical approach to disaggregated business cycle dynamics this paper develops a method for analysing the dynamics of large cross sections based on a factor analytic model we use law of large numbers arguments to show that the number of common factors can be determined by a principal components method the economy wide shocks can be identified by means of simple structural var techniques and that the parameters of the unobserved factor model can be estimated consistently by applying ols equation by equation we distinguish between a technological and a non technological shock identification is obtained by minimizing the negative realizations of the technology shock empirical results on 4 digit industrial output and productivity for the u s economy from 1958 to 1986 show that 1 at least two economy wide shocks both having a long run effect on sectoral output are needed to explain the common dynamics 2 although the technological shock accounts for at least 50 of the aggregate dynamics of output it cannot by itself explain dynamics at business cycle frequencies 3 sector specific shocks explain the main bulk of total variance but generate mainly high frequency dynamics 4 both the technological and the non technological component of output show a peak for positive sectoral comovements of output at business cycle frequencies 5 technological shocks are strongly correlated with the growth rates of the investment in machinery and equipment sectors and their inputs many interesting questions about cyclical fluctuations and economic growth can be answered only by studying the dynamic behaviour of sectoral variables when data contain information on time for a large cross section of sectors traditional econometric techniques used in the macroeconomic literature such as vector autoregressive var and vector autoregressive moving average varma models are not appropriate since they require the estimation of too many parameters this is why new methods which allow for the reduction of the parameter space need to be developed the objective of this paper is both methodological and descriptive at the methodological level we develop a simple framework for the dynamic analysis of large cross sections the basic model is a dynamic factor analytic model as in sargent and sims 1977 the sectoral variables are decomposed into two unobservable components a common component driven by macroeconomic shocks and a purely sectoral component when

trade offs in designing markets with multiple objectives abstract this paper explores some of the problems involved in designing markets with multiple objectives the first part of the paper considers the issue of how such markets are designed in theory while the second part reviews some evidence on actual applications in the field of air pollution control

global unemployment shocks in this paper we use oecd unemployment data 1960 2002 to infer the nature of shocks to unemployment using factor analysis we find that two principal components can account for a large part of the variance of unemployment between and within countries

reserve design unintended consequences and the demise of boston s walk zones we show that in the presence of admissions reserves the effect of the precedence order i e the order in which different types of seats are filled is comparable to the effect of adjusting reser

bootstrap inference in econometrics the astonishing increase in computer performance over the past two decades has made it possible for economists to base many statistical inferences on simulated or bootstrap distributions rather than on distributions obtained from asymptotic theory in this paper i review some of the basic ideas of bootstrap inference the paper discusses monte carlo tests several types of bootstrap test and bootstrap confidence intervals although bootstrapping often works well it does not do so in every case

the empirical properties of two classes of designs for transferable discharge permit markets abstract previous work by atkinson and lewis j environ econ manag 1 237 250 1974 and anderson et al an analysis of alternative policies for attaining and maintaining a short term no2 standard mathtech inc princeton n j 1979 has indicated the tremendous cost advantages to be achieved by moving from a policy based on emission standards to one based on marketable emission permits as tietenberg land econ 56 391 416 1980 points out however neither of the major permit designs treated in the literature are optimal from all points of view this has triggered a search for alternative permit designs which while they may not minimize compliance costs have sufficient other virtues as to make them attractive on other grounds the purpose of this paper is to examine within the context of an empirical mathematical programming model the air quality emission and cost consequences of two classes of the permit designs which can be implemented in the absence of information on control costs this case study involves particulate control in st louis

optimal allocation without money an engineering approach we study the allocation of heterogeneous services to agents with incomplete information and without monetary transfers agents have private multidimensional utilities over services drawn from commonly known priors the social planner s goal is to maximize a potentially complex public objective for tractability we take an engineering approach in which we solve a large market approximation and convert the solution into a feasible finite market mechanism that still yields good results we apply this framework to real data from boston to design a mechanism that assigns students to public schools in order to maximize a linear combination of utilitarian and max min welfare subject to capacity and transportation constraints we show how to optimally solve a large market formulation with more than 868 types of students and 77 schools and we translate the solution into a finite market mechanism that significantly outperforms the baseline plan chosen by the city in terms of efficiency equity and predic

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

are co2 emission levels converging among industrial countries time paths of carbon dioxide emissions intwenty one industrial countries are examinedfrom 1960 1997 to test for stochastic andconditional convergence both panel unit roottests and cross section regressions areperformed overall we find significantevidence that co2 emissions haveconverged

bretton woods blueprint for a greenhouse gas agreement abstract this paper describes the remarkable parallels between the problems faced in the drafting of the 1944 bretton woods agreement which established the rules and institutions governing the international financial system and the problems faced in drafting a greenhouse gas agreement the parallels include the need to induce countries to sacrifice economic sovereignty in order to provide a public good the need to facilitate capital investment and provide adjustment loans to be fair to developing versus developed nations to offer technical assistance monitor behavior punish offenders and promote a globally efficient allocation of resources it is claimed that between them the organizations which emerged from the bretton woods agreement namely the imf gatt and world bank have the necessary attributes of the needed global atmospheric control agency furthermore it is argued that there are striking parallels between the reserve accounts at the imf and the crediting and debiting of greenhouse gas emissions and absorptions between special drawing rights sdrs and rights for greenhouse gas emissions as well as in numerous other characteristics the paper concludes by noting that the almost half century of influence of the bretton woods institutions suggests we might borrow from their charters organizational designs membership incentives and procedures for adaptation and change

cardinal bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers abstract in allocating goods with no use of monetary transfers random allocation mechanisms can be designed in order to elicit information on preference intensities i study the nontransfer allocation of two ex ante identical objects under bayesian incentive compatibility with symmetric agents and independent private valuations i find the ex ante utilitarian optimal mechanism in which the probability of receiving a specified object is used as numeraire to purchase probability units of the other object i characterize this mechanism as an appropriate combination of lotteries auctions and insurance the latter element ensures that efficient auctions are feasible if the problem is constrained to guarantee exactly one object per agent then the optimal mechanism uses no information other than the agents ordinal preferences

pricing and design of differentiated services approximate analysis and structural insights we consider a model of a service system that delivers two nonsubstitutable services to a market of heterogenous users the first service is delivered subject to a guaranteed g processing rate and the second is a best effort be type service in which residual capacity not allocated to the guaranteed class isshared among be users users in turn are sensitive to both price and congestion related effects the service provider s objective is to optimally design the system so as to extract maximum revenues the design variables in this problem consist of a pair of static prices for the two services a policy that controls admission of g users into the system and the mechanism by which users are informed of the state of congestion in the system because these objectives are difficult to address using exact analysis we pursue approximations that are tractable and lead to structural insights specifically we first solve a deterministic relaxation of the original objective to obtain a fluid optimal solution that is subsequently evaluated and refined to account for stochastic fluctuations using diffusion limits we derive approximations that yield the following structural results 1 pricing rules derived from the deterministic analysis are almost optimal 2 the optimal operational regime for the system is close to heavy traffic and 3 real time congestion notification results in increased revenues numerical results illustrate the accuracy of the proposed approximations and validate the aforementioned structural insights

asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents a yes or no decision must be made about some issue all agents must agree the coase theorem asserts that the efficient outcome will always result suppose the value positive or negative that an individual attaches to an affirmative decision is privately known to that individual it is proved under very mild conditions that with independent types as the number of agents increases the probability of an affirmative efficient decision goes to zero an example in which it is common knowledge that an affirmative decision is efficient and yet the probability of such a decision goes to zero is given

strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies in this paper we introduce the concept of a strictly fair allociation and investigate the set of strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies we prove that when agents utility functions are differentiable the set of strictly fair allocations coincides with the set of equal income walrasian equilibria this is shown using both the limit theorem approach and the limit economy approach we also extend the analysis to economies that have both atoms and an atomless sector these results substantially improve upon the existing characterizations of equal income walrasian equilibria in terms of economic efficiency and economic equity

how to control controlled school choice we characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body the stable or fair assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools preferences for diversity we show that the conflict can be useful in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations we also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed

co fluctuation patterns of per capita carbon dioxide emissions the role of energy markets abstract this paper applies principal component analysis to investigate the linkages or dominant co fluctuation patterns of per capita carbon dioxide emissions across countries for the time period 1950 2000 energy resource world markets are investigated as an offsetting mechanism possibly coordinating emission fluctuations between countries the results of the analysis provide evidence that world energy resource markets are acting as a coordinating mechanism for emission fluctuations in most cases the results also suggest that until recently the dominant emission co fluctuation pattern for developed countries differs from the dominant emission co fluctuation pattern for developing countries the common fluctuation pattern found in the 1984 2000 time period suggests that an offsetting mechanism does exist and will help contain global per capita emissions into the future the strong degree that emissions are linked between countries and energy markets acting as an offsetting mechanism suggests that to be successful a global agreement to address climate change must require emission reductions by all major emitters not just the developed countries

distribution dynamics of co2 emissions this paper uses nonparametric methods to examine the convergence in co2 emissions per capita on a sample of 100 countries for the period 1966 1996 industrial countries show a convergence pattern however there is little evidence of convergence for the whole sample

international environmental problems a simple taxonomy of international environmental problems is developed based on economic considerations the unidirectional externalities are illustrated by the case of one upstream and one downstream country the main problem in this case is an informational one the analysis of regional reciprocal externalities is illustrated by the acid rains in europe it is shown that an efficient solution could be achieved by transferable export rights finally global external problems are discussed with reference to greenhouse effects and extinction of species copyright 1990 by oxford university press

pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules we consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives independent private values and no monetary transfers the utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule where agents weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen it is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex ante incentive efficient we also discuss efficiency in the class of anonymous mechanisms and the stability of weighted majority rules