where do markets come from production markets have two sides producers are a fully connected clique transacting with buyers as a separate but aggregated clique each producer is a distinctive firm with a distinctive product each side continually monitors reactions of the other through the medium of a joint social construction the schedule of terms of trade each producer is guided in choice of volume by the tangible outcomes of other producers not by speculation on hypothetical reactions of buyers to its actions each producer acts purely on self interest based on observed actions of all others summarized through a feedback process the summary is the terms of trade schedule which reduces to constant price only in limiting cases the market emerges as a structure of roles with a differentiated niche for each firm explicit formulae both for firms and for market aggregates are obtained by comparative statics methods for one family of assumptions about cost structures and about buyers evaluations of differentiated products not just any set of firms can sustain terms of trade with any set of buyers there prove to be three main kinds of markets and three sorts of market failure within a parameter space that is specified in detail one sort of market paradox has a madison avenue flavor another is more conventional grind and a third crowded is a new form not included in any existing theory of markets current american industrial markets are drawn on for 20 illustrations of which three are presented in some detail inequality in firms market shares measured by gini coefficients is discussed

to elect or to appoint bias information and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians in this paper we address empirically the trade offs involved in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians in order to do this we map institutions of selection and retention of public officials to the type of public officials they induce we do this by specifying a collective decision making model and exploiting its equilibrium information to obtain estimates of the unobservable types we focus on criminal decisions across us states supreme courts we find that justices that are shielded from voters influence bureaucrats on average i have better information ii are more likely to change their preconceived opinions about a case and iii are more effective make less mistakes than their elected counterparts politicians we evaluate how performance would change if the courts replaced majority rule with unanimity rule

do voters vote ideologically abstract in this paper we address the following question to what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically i e they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically closest to them testable or falsifiable we show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election on the other hand using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested

revealed political power this paper adopts a revealed preference approach to the question of what can be inferred about bias in a political system we examine a dynamic environment in which individuals dier by income each period long run preference profiles are unobserved to an outside observer but are known to belong to a well behaved class in which individual preferences are ordered by income in each state policy data is summarized by a markov policy rule the observer makes inferences about the underlying distribution of political power as if political power were derived from a wealth weighted voting system with weights that can vary across states the weights determine the nature and magnitude of the wealth bias positive weights on relative income in any period indicate an elitist bias in the political system whereas negative weights indicate a populist one we ask what class of weighted systems can rationalize a given policy rule as a weightedmajority outcome each period our first result shows that without further knowledge all forms of bias are possible any markov policy rule can be shown to be rationalized by any system of wealth weighted voting an additional single crossing restriction on preferences can however rule out certain weighting systems we then augment policy data with polling data and show that the set of rationalizing wealth weights are bounded above and below in some cases polls can provide information about the change in political inequality across time

agricultural revolution and elite reproduction in qing china the transition to capitalism debate revisited recent actor centric theory about the historical rise of capitalism emphasizes the role of the autonomous agrarian elite in fostering a sustained agricultural revolution this revolution generated ample agrarian surplus in the form of rural elite s elevated income to fuel a capitalist industrial takeoff in late eighteenth century england the nontransition to capitalism in eighteenth and nineteenth century china despite the vast surplus generated in its advanced agrarian sector shows that high agricultural productivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a capitalist takeoff by comparing qing china with eighteenth century england where capitalist industrialization erupted spontaneously and nineteenth century japan where capitalist industrialization succeeded under intensive state sponsorship this article argues that a strong urban entrepreneurial elite capable of centralizing the agrarian surplus and investing it in productive industrial innovation were as important as the existence of the surplus itself in fomenting capitalist transition the reproduction of the elite in eighteenth century china was constrained not by the anticommercial oriental despotic state as presumed in earlier literature but by the state s paternalist disposition in managing urban class conflict capitalist industrial development in china was further impeded in the nineteenth century when a nexus of local predatory military elite emerged in response to millenarian uprisings and wasted most of the agrarian surplus in their accumulation of means of violence the negative case of china helps us advance the actor centric model of capitalist transition by bringing urban entrepreneurs and class politics back in

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

expressive vs strategic voters an empirical assessment abstract leading theories of how voters choose between candidates are rooted in two very different paradigms with starkly different behavioral implications exploiting the incentive structure of germany s electoral system i develop a novel set of empirical tests that pit the canonical pivotal voter model against alternative accounts according to which individuals derive expressive utility from supporting their most preferred candidate the results show that neither paradigm can explain the most salient features of the data in addition the evidence suggests that voters cannot be neatly categorized into sincere and strategic types

capital formation in japan introduction this chapter analyses the relationship between the input of capital and economic growth in japan during the past century the assigned task of exploring the role of investment in japan necessarily imposes a certain sectoral as well as temporal emphasis only relatively little attention will have to be devoted to agriculture since this sector never became an important recipient of either public or private capital in japan at least an understanding of the advances created by a rising level of investment deals largely with the growth of modern nonagricultural industry this also means that unlike taira and yamamura we must concentrate especially on the history of the twentieth century when factories machines and new social overhead implements reached sizeable dimensions for the first time of course no attempt will be made to slight the crucial transitional years of the meiji era or even the preceding years of tokugawa rule but one should always keep at the forefront the sharp distinction between the hesitant beginnings of economic modernization in the late nineteenth century and its full flowering during the past sixty odd years one further limiting item should be mentioned at the outset we are concerned with the input of capital i e with the investment rather than the saving side of the equation how the necessary funds were raised by individuals banks the state or foreigners will be treated only as a side issue but to a considerable extent this matter has been studied by other authors

two round elections one round determinants evidence from the french municipal elections using a new database of french municipalities that covers 821 towns and two elections 2001 and 2008 we examine how the budget structure degree of electoral competition and the economic context affect the share of votes for the incumbent we take into account the institutional details of the two round structure of the electoral process created by french electoral rules dual ballot under plurality rules we show that in the first round of the electoral process spending on equipment including infrastructures can influence the voter and that electoral competition has a strong impact on the incumbent s score in the second round the incumbent s vote is affected more by national considerations and local budget variables have no effect we show that the dynamics between the first and the second rounds are intense the results suggest that the determinants of each round s outcome in a two round electoral process are different

identifying structural models of committee decisions with heterogeneous tastes and ideological bias in practice members of a committee often make different recommendations despite a common goal and shared sources of information we study the nonparametric identification and estimation of a structural model where such discrepancies are rationalized by the members unobserved types which consist of ideological bias while weighing different sources of information and tastes for multiple objectives announced in the policy target we consider models with and without strategic incentives for members to make recommendations that conform to the final committee decision we show that pure strategy bayesian nash equilibria exist in both cases and that the variation in common information recorded in the data helps us to recover the distribution of private types from the members choices building on the identification result we estimate a structural model of interest rate decisions by the monetary policy committee mpc at the bank of england we find some evidence that the external committee members are les

a note on the use of industry relative ratios in bankruptcy prediction abstract the potential for industry relative financial ratios to improve the prediction of firms in financial distress motivated this comparison of model specifications based on either unadjusted or industry relative ratios both specifications yielded stable parameter estimates over the time periods examined however the industry relative specification appeared to add incremental information not contained in the model based on the unadjusted financial ratios the converse case did not hold in addition with the industry relative specification ex post forecast accuracy was slightly improved relative to the ex ante forecast while with the unadjusted model specification ex post forecast accuracy declined from that obtained ex ante

the statistical analysis of roll call data modern studies of legislative behavior focus upon the relationship among the policy preferences of legislators institutional arrangements and legislative outcomes in spatial models of legislatures policies are represented geometrically as points in a low dimensional euclidean space each legislator has a most preferred policy or ideal point in this space and his or her utility for a policy declines with the distance of the policy from his or her ideal point see davis hinich and ordeshook 1970 for an early survey the primary use of roll call data the recorded votes of deliberative bodies 1 is the estimation of ideal points the appeal and importance of ideal point estimation arises in two ways first ideal point estimates let us describe legislators and legislatures the distribution of ideal points estimates reveals how cleavages between legislators reflect partisan affiliation or region or become more polarized over time e g mccarty poole and rosenthal 2001 roll call data serve similar purposes for interest groups such as americans for democratic action the national taxpayers union and the sierra club to produce ratings of legislators along different policy dimensions second estimates from roll call analysis can be used to test theories of legislative behavior for instance roll call analysis has been used in studies of the u s congress both contemporary and

an asian route to capitalism religious economy and the origins of self transforming growth in japan modern capitalism is a self transforming dynamic that proliferates market niches new products and techniques the industrial revolution could take place only in the context of preexisting agricultural capitalism that in turn required a breakout from the obstacles constituted by agrarian coercive societies organizational conditions necessary for self sustaining capitalist growth included markets not only for commodities but for all factors of production land labor and capital combined under control of entrepreneurs motivated by an economic ethic of future oriented calculation and investment weber was mistaken in holding that the capitalist breakthrough occurred only in christian europe the author proposes a neo weberian model in which the initial breakout from agrarian coercive obstacles took place within the enclave of religious organizations with monasteries acting as the first entrepreneurs the model is illustrated by the case of buddhism in late medieval japan the leading sector of monastic capitalism spread into the surrounding economy through religious movements of mass proselytization which narrowed the gap between clergy and laity confiscation of buddhist property at the transition to the tokugawa period transferred the capitalist dynamic to the secular economy of an agricultural mass market opening the way for a distinctive japanese path through the industrial revolution

a group rule utilitarian approach to voter turnout theory and evidence this paper explores a group rule utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout inspired by the theoretical work of john c harsanyi 1980 and timothy j feddersen and alvaro sandroni 2002 it develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in texas liquor referenda the results are encouraging the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well the structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model

sequentially rationalizable choice a sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same xed set of asymmetric binary relations rationales to remove inferior alternatives these con cepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments we study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full character ization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales

the value of information in the court get it right keep it tight one should always subordinate his own personal views whether they be economic social political or whatever they may be because when you are talking about your own views you are only one of millions of individuals in the country when you are interpreting the law perhaps you have a special skill and special training that does give you the right to pass on these questions i have to confess that in this open area sometimes inevitably a man is the product of his own background and he may be somewhat influenced but i will do my very best to subordinate those considerations because i think that is the duty of any judge justice john stevens in his senate confirmation hearing

sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium yet there is little empirical support for this result this paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an arbitrarily large proportion of voters

indifference or indecisiveness choice theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences abstract a commonly held belief in economics is that an individual s preferences that are revealed by her choices must be complete this paper takes issue with this position by showing that one may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon observing her choice behavior we relax the standard weak axiom of revealed preferences warp and show that a potent theory of individual choice with and without risk can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with some other standard postulates the most notable features here are that an agent is allowed to be indifferent between certain alternatives and indecisive about others moreover an outside observer can identify which of these actually occur upon examining the observable choice behavior of the decision maker as an application we also show how our theory may be able to cope with the classical preference reversal phenomenon

on the testable implications of collective choice theories we analyze collective choices in game forms from a revealed preference viewpoint we call the joint choice behavior of n agents nash respectively pareto rationalizable if there exist n preferences over the conceivable joint actions such that the joint actions selected from each game form coincide with the nash equilibria respectively the pareto optima of the corresponding game in the two agent case we show that every deterministic joint behavior which is nash rationalizable is also pareto rationalizable the converse is false we further identify general necessary and sufficient conditions for nash rationalizability of an n agent joint choice behavior we also define and characterize partial versions of the nash and pareto rationalizability requirements journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c92

historical sociology s puzzle of the missing transitions a case study of early modern japan prominent accounts of the transition to capitalism have a far too limited understanding of pre capitalist agrarian economies potential for dynamism recent research shows that conditions earlier accounts identify as triggers for a transition to capitalism could be present without a transition occurring i expand on implications of these cases of missing transitions for theorizing the dynamics of pre capitalist agrarian economies i present a theoretical framework that shows how phenomena previously associated with the transition to capitalism such as flexible property rights in land and labor extensive markets and accumulation of industrial and mercantile wealth emerged in pre capitalist societies without leading to capitalist development i illustrate the analytic upshot of this framework by considering the case study of japan in the tokugawa era 1603 to 1868 for historical sociologists early modern japan has long been seen as an anomalous case puzzlingly mixing developments thought to represen

revealed preference analysis of characteristics models characteristics models have been found to be useful in many areas of economics however their empirical implementation tends to rely heavily on functional form assumptions in this paper we develop a revealed preference approach to characteristics models we derive the necessary and su cient empirical conditions under which data on the market behaviour of heterogeneous price taking consumers are nonparametrically consistent with the consumer characteristics model where these conditions hold we show how information may be recovered on individual consumer s marginal valuations of product attributes in some cases marginal valuations are point identi ed and in other cases we can only recover bounds where the conditions fail we highlight the role which the introduction of unobserved product attributes can play in rationalising the data we implement these ideas using consumer panel data on the danish milk market

a structural model of turnout and voting in multiple elections this paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections the theoretical setting combines an uncertain voter model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior we apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in u s presidential and congressional elections we structurally estimate the model using individual level data for the 2000 elections and quantify the relationships between observed individual characteristics and unobserved citizens ideological preferences information and civic duty we then use the estimated model which replicates the patterns of abstention selective abstention split ticket voting and straight ticket voting observed in the data to assess the effects of policies that may increase citizens information and sense of civic duty on their turnout and voting behavior

economic theories of voter turnout i the voting paradox why would the rational individual bother to spend time and resources to become well informed go to the polls on the election day and maybe even wait in a queue why would a rational voter vote downs 1957 ii the paradox of indeterminacy if they vote why do they care who they vote for kirchgassner 1992 kirchgassner and pommerehne 1993 iii the paradox of ignorance to the extent that information is costly the rational voter must be ignorant about relevant aspects of his decision making downs 1957

inferring strategic voting we estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes we adopt a set estimator using japanese general election data we nd a large fraction 75 3 80 3 of strategic voters only a small fraction 2 4 5 5 of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred misaligned voting existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting accordingly while our estimate of strategic voting is high our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

economic interests and sectoral relations the undevelopment of capitalism in fifteenth century tuscany1 many preconditions for a rapid transition to industrial capitalism existed in tuscany in the late medieval early modern period including relatively efficient agricultural production a well developed commercial manufacturing sector the absence of a powerful feudal nobility and feudal obligations a large precocious urban economy and the development of a territorial state no such transition occurred however previous explanations for this are inadequate because they discount the strength of the tuscany economy or downplay the presence of these preconditions to explain the tuscan outcome this article draws on sectoral theories agriculture vs manufacturing from the neoclassical and marxist literature since these theories often give the wrong prediction because they are based on formal attributes of actors the author combines them with a weberian conceptualization of substantively specific economic interests