campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

information and legislative bargaining the political economy of u s tariff suspensions this paper studies the political influence of individual firms on congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on u s imports of intermediate goods we develop a legislative bargaining model in which firms influence legislators by transmitting information about the value of protection using verbal messages and lobbying expenditures model estimation using firm level data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures reveals that the probability a suspension is granted decreases with each additional firm that expresses opposition this effect is significantly larger than that of either opponent or proponent lobbying due to the greater information content of verbal opposition and legislative bargaining costs jel f13 d7

the economics of the internet infrastructure and regulation the purpose of this article is to inform users regulators and economists about the basic economics of the internet focusing on regulation of its infrastructure it defines the internet and describes its development and organization it analyses the regulatory and competition issues associated with conveyance on the internet it then discusses three current puzzles of economic interest while the article reaches several conclusions the overall message is that much more work is needed in this area

political economy of the u s temporary duty suspension program an empirical note we examine every tds bill introduced by the house of representatives and approved by the u s international trade commission in the last six years the significant relationship between these bills and campaign contributions coupled with the personal characteristics of proponents and sponsors influence the policy outcomes of the u s tds program

a stochastic equilibrium model of internet pricing abstract perhaps the greatest technological innovation of the next several decades will be universal access and utilization of the internet already congestion is becoming a serious impediment to efficient utilization we introduce a stochastic equilibrium concept for a general mathematical model of the internet and demonstrate that the efficient social welfare maximizing stochastic allocation of internet traffic can be supported by optimal congestion prices we further demonstrate that approximately optimal prices can be readily computed and implemented in a decentralized system by constructing a large computer simulation model we also address the alternative of building excess capacity to avoid congestion

a test of the structure of pac contracts an analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s enactment of the bill was a major victory for the national rifle association which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark gun control act of 1968 congressional quarterly almanac 1986 p 82 i introduction every election the same political action committees pacs contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office well informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes 1 a mischaracterization of the exchange between pacs and politicians may produce these contradictory results empirical studies of roll call voting typically use pac contributions from only one election cycle earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior congress while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange recent empirical work however suggests another possibility interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles stratmann 1995 shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports snyder 1990 1992 presents evidence that interest groups make long term investments in politicians previous studies by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of pac money on legislative votes we examine roll call votes on gun control in the u s house of representatives during the 1980s to determine whether pacs make spot market purchases prepay for votes in the prior election cycle or make long term investments we investigate whether pac contributions have a durable long term investment effect as snyder 1992 suggests we consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract first we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control the national rifle association nra and hand gun control hgc their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of congress in which no floor vote occurred nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange further 1986 nra expenditures are significantly higher for first term representatives which is consistent with long term investments but contradicts a spot exchange since freshmen have the least influence to sell second we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting to date no empirical paper tests whether pac money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting and only stratmann 1995 and grenzke 1989 use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes our probit estimates indicate that nra expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and hgc expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes the independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one session prepayment nor a spot exchange the influence of nra expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long term investment the literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that pac contributions alter representatives votes interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of congress stratmann 1991 bronars and lott 1997 if a difficult to quantify variable and thus omitted from regressions signals a representative s true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable pac contributions might appear to influence votes the pattern of contributions and votes on gun control however indicates attempts by the nra and hgc to influence votes not merely the composition of congress

optimal risk allocation for regulated monopolies and consumers abstract the model shows how a regulated monopolist s price should change as random cost and demand parameters are revealed the regulator has a ramsey type problem with a linear tariff a trade off between allocative efficiency and risk sharing typically exists the attitudes of the consumer and the firm to both income and price risk determine how the price should move sufficient conditions are found for price adjustment schemes used in practice to be optimal these schemes include full partial and zero pass through of marginal costs and price caps average cost pricing and caps on total revenue for demand risk

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

conflict of interest and congressional voting a note results of this study are consistent with those of previous voting studies which have shown that party ideology and constituency characteristics are often significant explanatory variables in equations to explain voting no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that congressmen s voting decisions depend upon their private financial interests this suggests the conclusion that much of the concern about apparent conflicts of interest is unfounded but it must be recognized that this study has examined voting on just a few issues and has used data on financial holdings which were lacking in precision as more data becomes available in the next several years we should be able to resolve this question with greater confidence

simple competitive internet pricing abstract it is widely recognised that pricing is required to control congestion on the internet one lesson that has emerged from many proposals is that any price system should be simple and robust to competition this is highlighted in the question currently under debate in the market for internet services should usage prices should be employed at all in a duopoly model with overall positive network effects it is shown that flat rate pricing can occur in equilibrium even when the costs of measuring variable demand are very small

the politics of public aid to private industry the role of policy networks firms lobby for subsidies along geographic sector or factor lines and as a result receive subsidies with a local sectoral or factorwide scope this article investigates what determines the line of cleavage and thereby the scope of the subsidy the factor mobility hypothesis according to which an economic prior the degree of factor mobility determines the geometry of lobbying coalitions misses the fact that factor mobility is as much the product of policy and policymaking as it is its determinant this article argues instead that politicians maximize their chances of staying in power through the deliberate use of subsidies to structure the political debate and embed factor owners into stable policy networks individual factor owners in turn join these policy networks to lobby for monopoly rents capable of insuring them against adverse economic competition the model yields two testable hypotheses first right governments favor subsidies to capital whereas left governments favor subsidies to lab

efficient and competitive rationing abstract the contracts that interest us here are called priority service contracts the salient feature of such contracts is that they specify each customer s priority in obtaining service that is they specify the tank order in which a customer is served out of the available supply until all customers are served or supply is exhausted such contracts essentially establish queues for customers in section 1 the author provides some background about priority service section 2 formulates a basic model and offer several illustrations also describes two main examples that motivate the theoretical development section 3 derives some key results that show how the prices of priority service contracts are designed to induce customers to self select efficient service orders in section 4 the author discusses various ways that state enterprises can organize markets that implement priority service efficiently in section 5 we study the operation of competitive markets for priority service section 6 concludes with some summary remarks two themes are emphasized one is that a state enterprise can promote substantial efficiency gains by substituting priority service for absent spot markets the other is that oligopolistic firms may have insufficient incentives to offer efficient product diversity consequently allocative efficiency depends on entry of numerous firms even so dispersal of supplies among many firms can prevent productive efficiency when there are advantages from pooling supplies

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

the influence on congress by the thrift industry abstract the investigation of the influential role of the thrift industry on congress as demonstrated by voting behavior on regulatory policy changes in the eighties is the focus of this study specifically we search for the degree to which the inadequately capitalized component of the thrift industry has captured the house of representatives we examine the influence on congress by the thrift industry using the votes by the house of representatives associated with three different legislative acts the garn st germain act the competitive equality banking act and the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act addressing the thrift crisis using a multi chotomous voting model we identify traditional public choice variables that could influence the probability of voting for legislation to capture the variation of the thrifts interests we consider a series of financial variables motivated by the thrift literature of failure prediction models these variables allow us to investigate the influences from the health of the congressional district s thrifts their asset composition characteristics and their reliance on regulatory forbearance

first and second best pricing with uncertain demand as has been well known since at least the work of hotelling 6 marginal cost pricing is the ideal regulatory policy in a simple certainty setting however when economies of scale exist in production such a policy will in general entail a revenue shortfall for the firm ideally the regulator should meet such a short fall by raising lump sum taxes but that solution is liable to prove infeasible ramsey pricing popularized by baumol and bradford 4 examines the second best pricing policy when firms receive no tax subsidy so prices must exceed marginal costs the celebrated inverse elasticity rule shows that with demands for the various goods independent goods whose elasticity of demand is proportionately less should have their price exceed marginal cost proportionately more further complications arise when one takes into account the uncertainty involved in economic decisions in recognition of this there has recently been considerable discussion of first best pricing with stochastic demand 5 the general conclusion of this discussion is that marginal cost pricing continues to be the first best policy in order to reach this conclusion however the literature has in effect assumed that regulators are risk neutral compared to this large literature on stochastic first best pricing the only two papers known to us that treat second best pricing with stochastic demand are by sherman visscher 11 and by wecker upton 15 both these treatments assume the marginal utility of income of the regulator is constant and so also require that there be risk neutrality in this work on the other hand we will consider both first and second best pricing policies when the regulator is explicitly allowed to be risk averse in the former case we will be interested in whether marginal cost pricing will continue to be the first best policy whereas in the latter case we will examine whether the simple inverse elasticity rule can hold despite considerations of risk and the risk behavior of regulators finally we will directly relate the results of our first best analysis to our study of the second best problem in much of the paper the source of demand uncertainty will be arbitrary we will

pacs lobbies and political conflict the case of gun control previous research has shown that pac contributions from the national rifle association as well as letters and lobbying by handgun control inc significantly affected congressional voting on the firearms owners protection act of 1986 holding constant ideology party constituency characteristics and a proxy for prior position on the issue using data from that study this paper shows that contributions have a somewhat different effect than lobbying contributions from nra were primarily targeted at nra supporters and had the net effect of making the progunners even more so contributions from handgun control while they did not significantly reinforce the proclivities of the gun controllers were directed only at that group at least in this case money appears to exacerbate conflict by contrast the police lobby directed its attention at both gun controllers and pro gunners the lobby effectively induced pro gunners to moderate their position

looking for leverage in pac markets corporate and labor contributions considered in this paper we explore the popular perception that political action committees pacs have substantial influence over elected legislators we question whether the leverage in the pac market is on the side of the contribution maker or the contribution taker analysis of the structure of pac markets suggests most markets are sellers markets not buyers markets pac contributions then may be more like protection money than attempts to buy votes or access

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

bailout for sale the vote to save wall street this paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the united states the paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics district heterogeneity implies district specific electoral constraints on legislators ability to collect rents from and cast dissonant votes in support of special interests an empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables the empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias using valid instruments and considers several intuitive sub sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue the paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout