labor productivity and local industry size further issues in assessing agglomeration economies a great deal of attention recently has been focused on issues related to spatial differentials in labor productivity and the external economies of size historically size economies have been related to scale economies and plant capacity 2 more recently industry and city size externalities often termed localization and urbanization economies or simply agglomeration economies have been analyzed to determine the direction and extent to which these size factors affect labor productivity and economies of scale 15 a variety of issues characterize this literature among which are the magnitude and direction of these effects the appropriate estimating equation and the relation between size returns to scale and the neutrality or factor bias of these effects despite their apparent success in identifying the relation between various size and productivity measures past studies are not without their shortcomings the purpose here is to address these issues and shortcomings in the context of estimating the external effects of industry size on labor productivity along the way we will indicate the shortcomings of approaches recently employed and consider the empirical importance of different measures of industry size and capital the next section reviews some of the shortcomings of past studies they are of particular interest for they are avoided by the approach and data of this study the analytical approach is formulated in section ii which includes a report of the empirical analysis and its major findings the final section summarizes and discusses the implications of this analysis

variable returns to agglomeration and the effect of road traffic congestion abstract this paper investigates the links between returns to urban density productivity and road traffic congestion a generalised translog production inverse input demand function is estimated to test for the existence of variable returns to agglomeration in manufacturing construction and service industries two separate measures of urban density in which proximity is represented by straight line distance or by generalised cost are constructed and included in the translog to identify the effect of road traffic congestion the results show that for some sectors of the economy diminishing returns to urban density can set in causing the magnitude of agglomeration elasticity to fall as effective densities increase the generalised cost based measure of agglomeration produces higher elasticities because it captures both time and distance dimensions of density a comparison of spatial variance in estimates indicates that road traffic congestion plays an important role in explaining diminishing returns for the most highly urbanised locations

the effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions abstract this paper examines the effect of collusion on allocative efficiency in a second price sealed bid auction in which bidders valuations have both private and common value components we present a theoretical model which shows that explicit collusion improves average efficiency furthermore a reduction in common value signal variance increases the efficiency of allocations when a cartel is present we test for the presence of these patterns in a laboratory experiment subjects can choose whether to compete or to form a cartel colluding bidders can communicate and make side payments using a knockout auction our results show that a large majority of bidders joins a cartel and collusion has a negative impact on efficiency

agglomeration economies and industrial decentralization the wage productivity trade offs abstract this paper examines the industrial location trade offs between the productivity advantages of the metropolitan center and the lower land and the labor costs in outlying regions within the state of sao paulo brazil the results indicate that while plant productivity is enhanced by the considerable agglomeration economies existing within metropolitan sao paulo firms must pay for these benefits in high wages and land costs offsetting labor cost savings can be achieved by locating in outlying regions the evidence presented in this paper suggests that market forces may lead eventually to a spontaneous decentralization of industry

multi unit demand auctions with synergies behavior in sealed bid versus ascending bid uniform price auctions abstract we construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed bid uniform price auctions the essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are 1 a demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential and 2 bidding above stand alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units the latter creates a potential exposure problem as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed bid auctions however there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium with patterns of out of equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats these patterns of out of equilibrium play are analyzed along with their effects on revenue and efficiency

competition and cooperation in divisible good auctions an experimental examination an experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multiunit auction designs discriminatory uniform price with fixed supply and uniform price with endogenous supply we find the actual strategies to be inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium strategies the discriminatory auction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than either uniform price auction and so contrary to theoretical predictions and previous experimental results it generates the lowest average revenue consistent with theoretical predictions the actual bid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatory pricing than in the uniform price auction with fixed supply

competition cooperation and innovation organizational arrangements for regimes of rapid technological progress abstract discussions of the link between firm size and innovation are outmoded because the boundaries of the firm have become fuzzy in recent decades strategic alliances constellations of bilateral agreements among firms are increasingly necessary to support innovative activities such alliances can facilitate complex coordination beyond what the price system can accomplish while avoiding the dysfunctional properties sometimes associated with hierarchy antitrust law and competition policy need to recognize that these new organizational forms are often the functional antithesis of cartels though they may have certain structural similarities a more complete understanding of bilateral contracts and agreements ought to reveal when and how cooperation can support rather than impede innovation and competition

the winner s curse experiments with buyers and with sellers this paper explores the winner s curse phenomena as it was studied experimentally by kagel and levin experiments with the winner s curse are complicated by the fact that subjects can lose money and the experimenter has only a limited means of collecting it from them thus subjects enjoy only limited liability which has theoretical implications for behavior in the kagel and levin experiments subjects were removed from the bidders competition after losses reached a predetermined value this experimental procedure has unknown implications for the results so ambiguity exists about whether the winner s curse was actually observed in this study their results were replicated in an environment in which subjects were not removed the case in which competitors are sellers is also studied bankruptcy cannot be a problem in sellers competition in both cases the winner s curse is observed thus the limited liability cannot be an explanation for the phenomenon reported by kagel and levin in addition the paper examines the bidding behavior of all individuals and shows that this behavior does not fit any of the tested theories either on the aggregate or individual level the winner s curse did not disappear over time during the conduct of the research

patterns of control in u s uk and european multinational corporations this paper examines the type and level of control exercised by the parent headquarters of 50 u s uk and european multinational corporations over their foreign subsidiaries patterns of control in the 3 national groups differ in significant ways and these differences seem to have important implications for other characteristics of a company s organization design and managerial style

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

a study of collusion in first price auctions this paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in florida and texas during the 1980s in both states firms were convicted of bid rigging the data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways one cartel divides the market among members while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding we show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large in the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non cartel bidders the presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction the selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non cartel bidder the data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels

collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions we study bidder collusion and test the power of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle in experimental multi object ascending auctions in these institutions low price collusive equilibria exist along with competitive payoff inferior equilibria achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation we provide the first systematic evidence of successful bidder collusion in such complex environments without communication the results demonstrate that in repeated settings bidders are often able to coordinate on payoff superior outcomes with the choice of collusive strategies varying systematically with the environment auctions for timber cars oil drilling rights and spectrum bandwidth are just a few examples of markets where multiple heterogeneous lots are offered for sale simultaneously in multi object ascending auctions the applied issue of collusion and the theoretical issue of equilibrium selection are closely linked in these auctions bidders can profit by splitting the markets by acting as local monopsonists for a disjoint subset of the objects the bidders lower the price they must pay as opposed to the sealed bid auction the ascending auction format provides bidders with the opportunity to coordinate tacitly on dividing markets and to punish non collusive bidding thus low price collusive equilibria co exist along with high price competitive equilibria even in a non repeated setting brusco and lopomo 2002 if there are complementarities in bidder values across objects and auctions are repeated bidders may further benefit by splitting the markets over time and taking turns in buying packages at low prices these opportunities make the multi object ascending auction an ideal institution for the study of equilibrium selection assuming that communication between the bidders is limited to the bidding any splitting of the markets must be tacitly coordinated in the early stages of the auction thus achieving payoff superior collusive outcomes requires complex strategies that depending on the environment may involve signalling market splitting and bid rotation while such tacit coordination is possible in theory it is an empirical question of whether it may be achieved in practice

collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions models of collusive bidder behavior at single object second price and english auctions are provided the ind ependent private values model is generalized to permit the formulatio n of coalitions and a strategic response by the auctioneer cooperati ve strategies are found to be dominant in these models coalitions of any size are viable and the payoff to each member increases with th e size of the coalition in addition the collusive strategies of the coalition represent a noncooperative equilibrium the optimal respon se of the auctioneer is to establish a reserve price that is a functi on of the coalition s size these and other features of the model are found to be consistent with the essential features of actual behavio r copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

how risk sharing may enhance efficiency of english auctions we investigate the possibility of enhancing efficiency by awarding premiums to a set of highest bidders in an english auction in a setting that extends maskin and riley 1984 econometrica 52 1473 1518 in three aspects i the seller can be risk averse ii the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences and iii the auction can have a binding reserve price our analysis reveals that the premium has an intricate joint effect on risk sharing and expected revenue which in general benefits risk averse bidders when the seller is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder a condition often verifiable by deduction prior to the auction the premium also benefis the seller and therefore leads to a pareto improvement of the english auction the advantage of such premium tactics is directly related to a the seller s degree of risk aversion b the reserve price c the riskiness of the object for sale d the degree of heterogeneity in risk preferences among the bidders and e the number of the potential bidders

localised production of technology for global markets given the trends towards increasing globalization of markets and of production the globalization of technology remains a subject of considerable interest to analysts and policymakers in the 1990s the main conclusion of this paper is that there is no systematic evidence to suggest that widespread globalization of technological activities occurred in the 1980s the evidence based on the u s patenting activities of 569 of the world s largest firms based in 13 countries and covering 17 product groups shows that for an overwhelming majority of them technology production remains close to the home base the analysis also shows the dangers of generalizing on the basis of anecdotal evidence from a small sample of firms from a particular country or sector c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

collusion in uniform price auctions experimental evidence and implications for treasury auctions in uniform price auctions of shares there exist collusive equilibria in which bidders capture the entire surplus from the auction as well as competitive equilibria in which the auctioneer captures the entire surplus from the auction we provide experimental evidence that in uniform price auctions non binding pre play communication facilitates convergence to collusive equilibrium outcomes on the other hand regardless of the opportunities for communication in discriminatory auction experiments subject strategies conform closely with the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in which bidders gains are equal to the smallest tick size in the bidding schedule this evidence suggests that uniform price auctions of treasury securities may result in lower revenues than the currently employed discriminatory procedure

tacit collusion in repeated auctions abstract this paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values and with limited public monitoring mcafee and mcmillan show that the extent of collusion is tied to the availability of transfers monetary transfers allow cartels to extract full surplus a folk theorem proved by fudenberg et al econometrica 62 1994 997 1039 shows that transfers of future payoffs are almost as good if players are patient and communicate before auctions we ask how the scope of collusion is affected if players dispense with explicit communication and their monitoring is limited collusion better than bid rotation is still feasible but full surplus cannot be extracted this constraint becomes less severe with more players and large cartels can become asymptotically efficient even with very limited monitoring

optimal second degree price discrimination and arbitrage on the role of asymetric information among buyers the traditional theory of second degree price discrimination tackles individual self selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to conduct arbitrage we study the optimal sale mechanism that takes into account both individual and coalition incentive compatibility we show that the monopolist can achieve the same profit regardless of whether or not buyers can form a coalition although marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers of different types in the optimal sale mechanism they fail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information

intra metropolitan productivity variations of selected manufacturing and business service sectors what can we learn from los angeles this paper explores an empirical issue the extent to which access to various labour skills and other economic activity in los angeles can explain observed intra urban variations in productivity of selected manufacturing and business service sectors in addressing this issue an empirical model is developed based on traditional location theory and productivity methodologies the empirical results indicate that the influence of skilled labour access on firm productivity is stronger than the influence of access to other firms in the metropolitan area thus employment decentralisation is the rational response of firms to the residential choices of a skilled labour force the findings raise questions about the mobility of labour within metropolitan areas and the impact of policies that would improve the mobility of less skilled labour between central cities and the suburban employment centres

uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions abstract for the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high bid auction is unique when i buyers reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint ii buyers have private values and iii buyers preferences are log supermodular for more than two buyers we obtain the same result under the additional assumptions that iv buyers with the same reservation price have the same preferences v buyers are risk neutral or risk averse with non increasing absolute risk aversion and vi the supports of the different buyers distributions of reservation prices have the same upper endpoint

location and the multinational enterprise a neglected factor this article first traces the changing world economic scenario for international business over the past two decades and then goes on to examine its implications for the location of foreign direct investment and multinational enterprise activity it suggests that many of the explanations of the 1970s and early 1980s need to be modified as firm specific assets have become mobile across natural boundaries a final section of the article examines the dynamic interface between the value added activities of multinational enterprises in different locations

ireland s emerging information economy recent trends and future prospects grimes s 2003 ireland s emerging information economy recent trends and future prospects reg studies 37 3 14 this paper examines the emergence of information economy related activity through inward investment and the indigenous sector in one of europe s most peripheral regions ireland s recent economic resurgence has benefited considerably from international corporate restructuring as us multinationals in particular reconfigured their operations within europe s single market despite the on going concern about over dependence on fdi policy makers in ireland seek to ensure that both skills and infrastructural requirements are adequately provided in order to solidify ireland s attractiveness for investment while at the same time encouraging the growth of indigenous high technology companies although internationally traded services sectors such as software financial services telemarketing and shared services have expanded considerably in recent years the overall level of regionalization of th

the globalisation of technology what remains of the product cycle model this paper reexamines two hypotheses associated with earlier versions of the product cycle model the first hypothesis that innovations are almost always located in the home country of the parent company is rejected on the basis of evidence drawn from one hundred years of u s patent office data the second hypothesis that the international dispersion of activity is led by technology leaders is historically valid however over the last twenty years technology leaders have been ahead instead in the globalization of technology that is in developing internal international networks to exploit the locationally differentiated potential of foreign centers of excellence c 1995 academic press inc copyright 1995 by oxford university press

information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions abstract this paper examines the allocative properties of the sealed bid institution when different aspects of the available information to bidders are considered specifically we examine a the effect on price determination in repeated sealed bid auctions of post auction revelation of losing bids and b the effect on price determination when conspiratorial discussions are allowed

transnational firms and the changing organisation of innovative activities it is suggested that a transition is taking place towards new modes of organising transnational corporations innovative activities first different units of multinational firms including foreign based subsidiaries are increasingly involved in the generation use and transmission of knowledge secondly multinationals are developing external networks of relationships with local counterparts through which foreign affiliates gain access to external knowledge sources and application abilities as a result of this evolutionary process multinationals organisation is subject to both centripetal and centrifugal forces considerable efforts are then necessary to innovate coordination procedures and mechanisms in order to enhance the generation circulation and use of knowledge a number of empirical works are reviewed providing some evidence of the evolutionary process discussed in the paper 1 transnational companies as networks of innovators economists have long viewed innovation as being primarily generated by firms in their home countries classic contributions in the economics of multinational corporations have consolidated this view referring mainly to the us based multinationals vernon 1966 kindleberger 1969 and stopford and wells 1972 theorised a quasi colonial relationship between the parent company and foreign subsidiaries wherein the latter are in charge of replicating the former s activities abroad with strategic decisions including r d and innovation strategies being rigidly centralised particularly vernon emphasised that coordinating international innovative activities would be too costly owing to the difficulties of collecting and controlling relevant information across national borders host countries and foreign subsidiaries would then play a role almost exclusively in the adoption and diffusion of centrally created technology this view was supported mainly by us economists and based on us evidence from the early post world war ii period but it was very influential for the development of studies on the economics of transnational companies tncs and the internationalisation of

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

collusion in private value ascending price auctions we investigate the effects of bid improvement rules and bidder value asymmetry on bidder collusion in experimental ascending price auctions without communication we find that the strict bid improvement rule and private values are not always sufficient to break collusion among well motivated bidders collusion still occurs as long as bidder gains from collusion are high

productivity growth in british manufacturing spatial variation in the role of scale economies technological growth and industrial structure this paper investigates the role of scale economies technological growth and industrial structure in creating spatial variation in manufacturing labour and total factor tfp productivity in britain separate estimates of a translog specification are presented for british manufacturing firms located in defined areas of the country over the period 1994 1998 the results show that tfp change due to scale economies and technological growth has been of much less important in influencing the output growth of manufacturing firms than input growth or industrial structure regarding the components of tfp technological growth has been the dominant force at play the analysis of average labour productivity identifies shifts to other factors of production and industrial structure as being the main determinants of change scale economies appear to have had a marginal role the results identify spatial patterns indicating that more favourable locational effects arise for firms in areas adjacent to large urban centre

fighting collusion in auctions an experimental investigation the danger of collusion presents a serious challenge for auctioneers in this paper we compare the collusive properties of two standard auctions the english auction and the first price sealed bid auction and a lesser known format the amsterdam second price auction in the amsterdam auction the highest losing bidder earns a premium for stirring up the price we study two settings in one all bidders can collude and in another only a subset is eligible the experiments show that the amsterdam auction triggers less collusion than the standard auctions we compare experimental results to theoretical predictions and provide an explanation where they differ

bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions this paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible it presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme which coordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders payoffs the paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payoffs in a general environment with affiliated signals and private or interdependent values with ipv it is shown that this dynamic scheme yields a strictly higher payoff to the bidders than any static collusion scheme which coordinates bids based only on the current reported signals

optimal collusion proof auctions abstract we study an optimal collusion proof auction in an environment where subsets of bidders may collude not just on their bids but also on their participation despite their ability to collude on participation informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power the second best auction i e the optimal auction in a collusion free environment can be made collusion proof if at least one bidder is not collusive or there are multiple bidding cartels or the second best outcome involves a non trivial probability of the object not being sold regardless optimal collusion proof auction prescribes non trivial exclusion of collusive bidders i e a refusal to sell to any collusive bidder with positive probability

manufacturing productivity and city size in canada 1975 and 1985 does population matter this paper analyses the relationship between manufacturing productivity and city size based on canadian data for 1975 and 1985 the results differ in some respects from those of us studies in particular in canada city size appears to have a weaker impact on manufacturing productivity and an impact which is diminishing over time these findings may be a consequence of several differences in the characteristics of canadian and us firms as well as differences between the two urban systems urbanisation economies in canada may also have been weakened by regional development policies there are at the same time some striking similarities in the industries which show positive urbanisation economies in the us and canada there is also a tendency in canada for both industries with smaller firms and industries with higher rates of domestic ownership to exhibit greater urbanisation economies

productive efficiency and region based on estimates of cobb douglas production function this study has found that significant spatial variation in labor productivity exists even after adjusting for capital intensity the adjustment for capital intensity reduces the regional variation by 38 to 69 and the ciy size variation by 75 the results reveal a 6 to 8 producitivity advantage for non south census regions relative to the south and productivity increases of 1 5 with each doubling of smsa population nevertheless lower wages in the south and in smaller cities make it and them an attractive location for manufacturing firms the study has also found that the sveikauskas conjecture that labor productivity can be substituted for hicks neutral productivity in an analysis of the latter is false if metropolitan data are used by so doing capital intensity effects and total factor productivity effects are confounded to study spatial variations in total factor productivity productive efficiency it is necessary to control for spatial variations in captial intensity the results of this study indicate that absent better data on capital the approach offered by aberg yields satisfactory results 14 references 2 tables

premium auctions and risk preferences abstract in a premium auction the seller offers some payback called premium to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction this paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders risk preferences we analyze a two stage english premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium we show that the premium causes the expected revenue to increase in the bidders risk tolerance a net premium effect is key to this result

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

agglomeration economies in urban manufacturing industries a case of japanese cities abstract the effects of urban agglomeration economies on productivities in two digit manufacturing industries is estimated using the cross section data of japanese cities in 1979 urbanization and localization economies which are major forms of urban agglomeration economies are explicitly separated the estimates of these economies vary considerably among industries light industries receive more productive advantages from urbanization economies than from localization economies but heavy industries experience these economies more from localization economies than from urbanization economies

collusion and information revelation in auctions abstract the theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings however such analyses neglect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts wherein information revealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behaviour we experimentally test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation in first price auctions the results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first price mechanism failed collusion attempts distort bidding behaviour resulting in a loss of seller revenue and efficiency moreover the first price mechanism does not result in less collusion than the second price mechanism we conclude that while the features of the first price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behaviour make it highly susceptible to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism

notes and comments the amsterdam auction the amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the dutch capital for centuries by awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder the amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of myerson s 1981 optimal auction in a series of experiments we compare the standard first price and english auctions the optimal auction and two variants of the amsterdam auction with strongly asymmetric bidders the second price amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction

a state transformed by information texas regional economy in the 1990s tu w and sui d z a state transformed by information texas regional economy in the 1990s regional studies the structural change of the texas regional economy in the 1990s is analysed using input output and shift share analyses as the fastest growing economic sectors in all thirteen texas regions the information segment is also found to be more important as an input factor in the production processes the informatization of the texas economy is found to be accompanied by a widening development gap between the core and the periphery region in the state a better understanding of the dynamics of growth processes and spatial patterns of the information economy is essential to prepare for future regional development plans tu w et sui d z un etat transforme par l information l economie regionale de texas dans les annees 1990 regional studies on analyse la transformation structurelle de l economie regionale de texas dans les annees 1990 a partir des tableaux des echanges interindustriels et d une

collusive practices in repeated english auctions experimental evidence on bidding rings the repeated meeting of buyers at english auctions where multiple units are sold is a common occurrence the art auctions at sotheby s christie s and other prestigious auction houses are attended by a regular group of institutional buyers more mundanely the same taxicab buyers meet at vehicle auctions for used police cars jon p nelson 1995 commission order buyers attend the same livestock and agricultural commodity auctions these buyers may be agents for multiple meat processors u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration 2001 the 1946 american tobacco antitrust case american tobacco co et al v united states 328 u s 781 1946 is a well known account of how buyers of tobacco operated to hold down the price of auctioned leaf tobacco at various sites buyers for the big three cigarette manufacturers had developed facilitating practices that helped them purchase raw tobacco at relatively low prices these buyers voluntarily restricted themselves to attend the same auctions buyers were aware of the amount of leaf and the tobacco grades available at auction sites they had instructions from the cigarette makers on the highest bid prices they could pay and communication among these buyers seemed evident from a coordinated practice of buying low grade tobacco that was not used by the makers in the sale of livestock cattle producers have claimed that packer buyers act to hold down cattle prices at the auction site there are a few large processors who give their agents buy orders these orders along with further communication between the processor and agent instruct the agent on the number of cattle to purchase during a given week and provide a schedule of prices they can pay for varying types of cattle some agents represent more than one processor or packer and therefore have multiple buy orders agents repeatedly meet each other at regional cattle auctions they may not be the only buyers but they are the largest purchasers of slaughter cattle brought to market and at most auction sites have substantial monopsony power this paper documents the impacts of several practices that may facilitate low sale prices when multiple units are sold at repeated english auctions laboratory english auction markets are created the number of symmetric buyers attending the auction is either six or two with total demand in these two environments held constant the six buyer market is intended to represent a relatively competitive environment while auctions with two buyers represent rivalry with substantial monopsony power held by each agent we use these two market environments to study how selected treatments or facilitating influences affect the behavior of buying agents the six buyer market generally is viewed as a control for comparison to the dominant twobuyer environment but very collusive behavior may be observed in the six buyer auctions depending upon market practices phillips department of economics and finance university of wyoming p o box 3985 laramie wy 82071 e mail owenphil uwyo edu menkhaus department of agricultural and applied economics university of wyoming p o box 3354 laramie wy 82071 e mail menkhaus uwyo edu coatney u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration competition branch aurora co 80011 e mail kalyn t coatney usda gov this work has been supported by the u s department of agriculture under grant numbers usdagipsnc5418 and usdag00354009126 the findings and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agency 1 these are regional auctions houses where slaughter cattle primarily cull cows and fed steers and heifers and feeder cattle are sold cull cows are animals taken out of a herd and slaughtered because of age inability to produce calves or reduced milk production concerns regarding slaughter cow possessors sharing common purchasing agents have been raised in assessment of the cattle and hog industries calendar year 2000 u s department of agriculture grain inspection packers and stockyards administration june 2001

robustly collusion proof implementation a contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion we show that agents collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents including both uncorrelated and correlated types in those circumstances any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion including the second best level can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior the collusion proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude provided that noncollusive agents incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism our collusion proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion