a political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution we present a two country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor migration can be exogenous and or endogenous i e determined by labor income differentials political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups where the latter can be affected by immigration we show that immigration can increase the transfers to and the income of the mobile group we also investigate the possibility of migration regulation tax transfer policy competition and coordination and finally coordination of regulation policies it is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries

competitive investment in higher education the need for policy coordination abstract when aggregate advanced skills determine an economy s capacity to attract external capital they function as an impure public good education subsidies are indicated but nash equilibrium in education policies yields excessive subsidies if the supply of capital is not elastic

using maimonides rule to estimate the effect of class size on scholastic achievement the twelfth century rabbinic scholar maimonides proposed a maximum class size of 40 this same maximum induces a nonlinear and nonmonotonic relationship between grade enrollment and class size in israeli public schools today maimonides rule of 40 is used here to construct instrumental variables estimates of effects of class size on test scores the resulting identiecation strategy can be viewed as an application of donald campbell s regression discontinuity design to the class size question the estimates show that reducing class size induces a signiecant and substantial increase in test scores for fourth and efth graders although not for third graders when asked about their views on class size in surveys parents and teachers generally report that they prefer smaller classes this may be because those involved with teaching believe that smaller classes promote student learning or simply because smaller classes offer a more pleasant environment for the pupils and teachers who are in them mueller chase and walden 1988 social scientists and school administrators also have a longstanding interest in the class size question class size is often thought to be easier to manipulate than other school inputs and it is a variable at the heart of policy debates on school quality and the allocation of school resources in many countries see e g robinson 1990 for the united states ofsted 1995 for the united kingdom and moshel ravid 1995 for israel this broad interest in the consequences of changing class size

public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition we show that in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition this in turn brings about a loss of efficiency in this environment a minimum tax counters the reduction in the intensity of tax competition thereby enhancing efficiency split the difference tax harmonization also potentially enhances efficiency but would not be agreed upon by governments because it lowers the payoff to at least one of them this paper also presents an explanation for how traditionally high tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have become more integrated

micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the tiebout and median voter hypotheses responses to questions given to a random sample of michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions while income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner a relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the tiebout mechanism works this interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice

international tax competition and the deficit bias i analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits i find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization when countries differ in terms of capital mobility further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge consistent with theory i find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of oecd countries controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits jel e62 f62

imperfectly mobile households and durable local public goods does the capitalization mechanism work abstract a complication in the decision making of local governments is that a community s residents may move before the future benefits associated with current tax and expenditure policies are fully realized it has been argued that the capitalization of these benefits into current property values can induce local governments to behave efficiently this paper drops two assumptions behind the capitalization hypothesis perfect labor mobility and the absence of uncertainty about the future benefits it is shown that these benefits may be overcapitalized or undercapitalized depending on a critical aspect of the uncertainty consequently there is underinvestment in some projects but overinvestment in others

where should the elderly live and who should pay for their care we consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons elderly care is publicly provided there is one big city where congestion effects and agglomeration forces are at work and a number of small villages we show how the externalities related to population mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees and we characterize the second best solution decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalism structure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners and retired persons living in the city and the villages

government size government debt and globalization this article empirically investigates the effect of globalization on government size and debt using panel heterogeneous cointegration techniques to a panel of developing and developed countries i

factor ownership taxes and specialization this paper examines the incentives of regions to levy source based capital taxes when the tax revenue is not needed to finance the regional public sector it is assumed that capital is completely mobile among regions but that labour is completely immobile since each region can produce the same two tradable goods using the same technology then differences in tax rates on capital will lead to some specialization if residents of one region own more of the nation s capital per person then these tax differences may be an equilibrium phenomenon regions with below average capital endowment per person will levy capital taxes to lower the cost of the capital they import even though these taxes lead to capital flight and specialization in the labour intensive good

competitive tax theory in open economies constrained inefficiency and a pigovian remedy abstract in an economy with multiple governments each is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes on a directly mobile tax base a government is said to be competitive if the total cost of its decisions including the excess burden is perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there is another set of distortionary taxes and associated public expenditures for which all individuals in the economy are better off it is shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy is derived

politician family networks and electoral outcomes evidence from the philippines we demonstrate the electoral importance of politician family networks and provide evidence of the mechanisms behind the relationship we use a 20 million person dataset allowing us to reconstruct intermarriage networks for over 15 000 villages in 709 municipalities in the philippines we show that politicians are disproportionately drawn from more central families and that controlling for candidate fixed e ects candidates receive a higher vote share in villages where their families are more central we present evidence that centrality confers organizational and logistical advantages that facilitate clientelistic transactions such as vote buying and do not operate through popularity name recognition or through the choice of policies more aligned with their constituents preferences

public education under capital mobility the paper considers a two country model of overlapping generations economies with intergenerational transfers motivated by altruism and investment in human capital we examine in a non stationary competitive equilibrium the optimal provision of education with and without capital market integration first we explore how regimes of education provision public private or mixed arise and how they affect the dynamics of autarkic economies second we study the effects of capital market integration in equilibrium on the optimal provision of education third we show that capital market integration enhances government intervention in the provision of public education to improve the welfare of its constituents and consider various solutions to such a competition

tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility in this paper we look at corporate fiscal policies set by two competing regions in an environment where firms are heterogonous regarding to their mobility costs we show that if regions are allow to tax domestic and foreign capital at different rates they will offer a preferential treatment to foreign firms even if mobility costs are symmetrically distributed across regions preventing such type of preferential treatment raises revenues for both regions unless there exist a high density of firms with low moving costs because preferential tax treatment promotes firms movement for fiscal raisons such tax regime always generates more social loss due to unnecessary delocalization we also investigate the effect of heterogeneity among regions

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

taxation and the tiebout model the differential effects of head taxes taxes on land rents and property taxes on the theory of state and local public finance is the seminal paper by charles tiebout 1956 tiebout constructed a multijurisdictional model in which independent local governments offer a wide variety of expenditure and tax policies and perfectly mobile consumers reveal their preferences for local public goods through their choice of residential community he argued that under such circumstances local public service provision would be efficient the tiebout model has formed the basis of a vast number of subsequent articles in the state and local public finance literature and has also been very influential in urban and regional economics the efficiency properties of various tiebout type models of local public good provision have been examined and the role of politics in these models has been debated at length in this literature of more direct relevance to this paper however is the fact that although tiebout had little to say directly about taxation simply assuming the existence of head taxes subsequent analyses have used adaptations of this model to examine the effects of local head taxes land taxes and property taxes it is the literature on the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative local taxes that is the subject of this survey 1

trade and the distribution of economic well being in an economy with local public goods abstract this paper models a small open economy containing many identical communities and two types of workers who are perfectly mobile across communities but not internationally competitive firms produce two tradable private goods and local governments provide residents with a single public good trade patterns differ across communities in equilibrium this observation is used to prove a modified version of the stolper samuelson theorem simply stated workers who are relatively concentrated in those communities that export a given good gain from a rise in the relative price of this good whereas the other workers lose

the effect of intensive margin changes to task content on employment dynamics over the business cycle previous empirical studies investigating the employment impact of technological change have relied on cross sectional measures of occupational tasks here the author links microdata on individual

the spillover effects of good governance in a tax competition framework with a negative environmental externality we investigate the impact of a political regime shift affecting consumers business interests and lobby contributions when countries engage in tax competition in capital and a polluting resource when consumers have more influence than resource owners the resource tax rate and public spending rise while environmental damages lobbying contribution and the capital tax rate fall this response can spillover to other countries leading to lower welfare capital tax harmonization improves welfare of consumers and resource owners resource tax harmonization and governance harmonization both reduce the influence of lobbying and improve consumer welfare but resource owners are worse off

locational competition a neglected paradigm in the international division of labour krugman s verdict that competitiveness of countries is a largely meaningless concept is a serious misjudgement of the economics profession countries compete for the mobile factors of production most importantly for capital and technology the exit option of these factors and of firms changes the calculus of national governments this paper sets out the main elements of the concept of competition between locations locational competition and analyses its impact on welfare and employment of the capital exporting country it also looks at whether competition between countries necessarily results in a race to the bottom or whether it can function as a controlling mechanism for governments and as a discovery device the paper discusses under which conditions common rules are needed to reduce transaction costs and to prevent strategic opportunistic behaviour of countries and which common rules thus reduce transaction costs finally it deals with the question whether one institutional equilibrium in the world economy can be expected or whether many national equilibriums can coexist

a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector abstract this paper develops a test for pareto efficiency in the local public sectorusing the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the samuelson condition for efficiency by using cross section data it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property value maximizing and hence efficient fashion the empirical results show no systematic tendency to either under or over provide public goods in a sample of massachusetts communities

a spatial model of tax competition with multiple tax instruments abstract this paper presents a model of tax competition with two local jurisdictions in each metropolitan area located along a line segment and many metropolitan areas in the world economy the residents in each local jurisdiction are allowed to commute at a constant cost per mile to work in the other jurisdiction if a lump sum tax can be used then other taxes are not used if source based wage and business capital taxes can both be used then only the former is used in this case or if only a business capital tax can be used the local public good is underprovided

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration the role of the modern welfare state abstract according to traditional trade theory heckscher ohlin free trade and free migration are equivalent measures of economic integration leading both to an equalization of factor prices this prediction is in sharp opposition to the observed preference of rich countries for free trade over free migration we provide an explanation for this inconsistency the redistribution policies in the countries social welfare in countries with a relatively small number of low skilled native workers is higher with free trade than with free migration due to redistribution of income towards immigrating workers

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

economic versus political symmetry and the welfare concern with market integration and tax competition abstract the paper studies the implications of increased capital market integration and the associated increased tax competition for world welfare we consider a population with heterogeneous endowments of capital in a model of redistributive politics we show that if countries have the same average capital endowments but differ with respect to the endowments of their decisive majority autarky may be socially preferred to integration under any aversion to inequality we then reverse the conclusion by assuming that the decisive majority has the same endowment but countries differ in their average capital endowments in proving these results we show that integration may decrease world output and increase the utility of the poorest members of the economy

have air pollutant emissions converged among u s regions evidence from unit root tests previous studies of income distribution have found evidence indicating that incomes across u s regions have converged supporting the prediction of the neoclassical growth model a potential shortcoming in these studies is that only one measure of well being is considered a measure of wealth linked to incomes or production this paper examines whether income convergence was accompanied by air pollutant emission convergence results from unit root tests provide some evidence that indicators of environmental quality have converged across u s regions during the 1929 1994 period

the persistence and inefficiency of property tax finance of local public expenditures abstract i both characterize and evaluate equilibrium outcomes in multiple jurisdiction economies with property and land taxation but where direct taxation of residents is not possible the model contains perfectly mobile capital and population and competitive entrepreneurial governments that choose local taxes and expenditures to maximize after tax land rent when the cost of public goods is proportional to population the property tax emerges as the sole source of local finance even though the land tax has no deadweight loss it is shown that equilibria are not constrained efficient in general hence decentralized decision making is not consistent with the best use of the available tax instruments

federal fiscal constitutions risk sharing and redistribution the paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers specifically it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a tradeoff between risk sharing and redistribution different constitutions produce very different results in particular a federal social insurance scheme chosen by voting provides overinsurance whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme chosen by bargaining provides underinsurance

the politics of 1992 fiscal policy and european integration the internal market in europe will greatly increase the international mobility of resources how will this affect fiscal policy in different countries we consider taxation of capital in a two country model where a democratically chosen government in each country chooses tax policy higher capital mobility changes the politico economic equilibrium in two ways on the one hand it leads to more tax competition between the countries this economic effect tends to lower tax rates in both countries on the other hand it alters voters preferences and makes them elect a different government this political effect offsets the increased tax competition although not completely

tax incidence majority voting and capital market integration we re examine from a political economy perspective the standard view that higher capital mobility results in lower capital taxes a view in fact that is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence we show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility the change of incidence of a tax on capital from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor may interact in such a way with political decision making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax this can happen whether or not the immobile factor labour can be taxed and whether or not savings can be subsided under capital mobility d 2005 published by elsevier b v

do local governments use their tax bases efficiently abstract this paper analyzes an economy with multiple governments and with mobility of individuals across jurisdictions where each government is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes a government is said to be competitive if the total benefits and costs of its decisions including the excess burden are perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there exists another set of distortionary taxes and public expenditures such that when private sector behavior adjusts to maintain equilibrium all individuals in the economy are better off thus competitive decentralized decision making does not lead to an efficient use of the available tax instruments it is also shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy which involves pricing the tax base is derived

labor market integration investment in risky human capital and fiscal competition this paper presents a general equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region specific earnings risk interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks state contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency with perfect capital markets labor market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality if instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes labor market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition shifting the burden of taxation to low skilled immobile workers decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient

when parties meet voters assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in argentina and chile this article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party voter linkages from the perspective of voters where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits in the former case partisan networks mediate access to goods in the latter beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks we show that these different access mechanisms shape voters distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks we test it using original survey data from argentina and chile and show variation both across and within countries on party voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties organizational capacity

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

how low business tax rates attract mne activity municipality level evidence from germany most existing empirical evidences on the impact of profit taxation on multinational firm activity are based on cross country data one major drawback of such data is that countries differ not only with regard to taxes but also with other dimensions which might be hard to capture by means of observable characteristics we compile a database of more than 11 000 municipalities in germany to analyze the sensitivity of location decisions of foreign mnes in germany with respect to business tax rates which are levied directly by the municipalities we find that higher business tax rates have a negative effect on three alternative measures of mne activity after controlling for other determinants of firm location decisions the number of foreign mnes mne employment and mne fixed assets our results suggest that tax competition among regional entities for foreign investors is a game of a few in cross section instrumental variable regressions a one percent reduction of the municipal business tax rate equivalent to a decline by about 0 14 percentage points leads to an increase in the number of legally independent foreign owned firms by about 0 45 the average municipality would have to reduce its business tax rate by about 2 2 percentage points or 15 from its average level to attract one foreign mne hence municipalities need to be attractive in other dimensions to be able to use tax instruments to attract foreign firms at the margin

putting tasks to the test human capital job tasks and wages using original representative survey data we document that analytical routine and manual job tasks can be measured with high validity vary substantially within and between occupations are significantly related to workers characteristics and are robustly predictive of wage differences between occupations and among workers in the same occupation we offer a conceptual framework that makes explicit the causal links between human capital endowments occupational assignment job tasks and wages which motivate a roy model of the allocation of workers to occupations we offer two simple tests of the model s gross predictions for the relationship between tasks and wages both of which receive qualified empirical support

the monopoly of violence evidence from colombia many states in latin america africa and asia lack the monopoly of violence even though this was identified by max weber as the foundation of the state and thus the capacity to govern effectively in this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence we build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors paramilitaries in a democracy the model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections since paramilitaries have preferences over policies this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them we then investigate these ideas using data from colombia between 1991 and 2006 we first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive next we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well finally we use roll call votes to illustrate a possible quid pro quo between the executive and paramilitaries in colombia language en

factor movements and commodity trade as complements abstract several models are presented in which factor mobility leads to an increase in the volume of world trade the models share the common characteristic that the basis for trade is something other than differences in relative factor endowments these alternative bases for trade include returns to scale imperfect competition production and factor taxes and differences in production technology taken together the models suggest a more general idea the widely held notion that trade in goods and factors are substitutes is in fact a rather special result which is a general characteristic only of factor proportions models

varieties of clientelism machine politics during elections although many studies of clientelism focus exclusively on vote buying political machines often employ diverse portfolios of strategies we provide a theoretical framework and formal model to explain how and why machines mix four clientelist strategies during elections vote buying turnout buying abstention buying and double persuasion machines tailor their portfolios to the political preferences and voting costs of the electorate they also adapt their mix to at least five contextual factors compulsory voting ballot secrecy political salience machine support and political polarization our analysis yields numerous insights such as why the introduction of compulsory voting may increase vote buying and why enhanced ballot secrecy may increase turnout buying and abstention buying evidence from various countries is consistent with our predictions and suggests the need for empirical studies to pay closer attention to the ways in which machines combine clientelist strategies

migration with fiscal externalities abstract this paper analyses the distribution of a country s population among regions when migration involves fiscal externalities the main question addressed is whether a decentralized decision making of regional governments can produce an optimal population distribution as recently asserted or a centralized intervention is indispensable as argued before in the literature in analysing this issue it is assumed that migration is costly and accordingly the problem is modelled in a dynamic setup it turns out that while with costless mobility the fiscal externality is fully internalized by voluntary interregional transfers with costly mobility centrally coordinated transfers still remain indispensable for achieving the socially optimal allocation

the race between man and machine implications of technology for growth factor shares and employment we examine the concerns that new technologies will render labor redundant in a framework in which tasks previously performed by labor can be automated and new versions of existing tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage can be created in a static version where capital is fixed and technology is exogenous automation reduces employment and the labor share and may even reduce wages while the creation of new tasks has the opposite effects our full model endogenizes capital accumulation and the direction of research towards automation and the creation of new tasks if the long run rental rate of capital relative to the wage is sufficiently low the long run equilibrium involves automation of all tasks otherwise there exists a stable balanced growth path in which the two types of innovations go hand in hand stability is a consequence of the fact that automation reduces the cost of producing using labor and thus discourages further automation and encourages the creation of new tasks in an extension with heterogeneous skills we show that inequality increases during transitions driven both by faster automation and introduction of new tasks and characterize the conditions under which inequality is increasing or stable in the long run

globalization trade and income my purpose in this paper is to address two questions that confront our discipline repeatedly these days first what is a useful classification of the symptoms and the determinants of globalization a phase used in a remarkable variety of contexts to economists globalization is generally thought of as the increasing internationalization of the production distribution and marketing of goods and services the term is used less precisely in the popular literature perhaps best exemplified by kenichi ohmae s book the borderless world and when used loosely it invokes a wide variety of political sociological environmental and economic trends that are the concern of media attention almost daily however one defines globalization it is surely a development that is having a profound impact on the subject of economics as a whole and ought to have on the field of international economics in particular my second purpose is to ask how globalization is affecting our profession s view of theory and empirical work in international economics traditional trade theory was concerned with a set of fairly well defined questions regarding the determinants of trade the pattern of trade and the welfare consequences of various trade policy instruments the last two decades and perhaps the last decade in particular has led to a much wider interpretation of what living in an open economy means the change that is occurring on a wide range of economic social scientific and

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility abstract a single region s optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility in this model property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods e g residential property the key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods the role of labor mobility is also investigated

nimby taxes matter the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes this paper links the theoretical and empirical literatures on interjurisdictional tax and regulatory competition focusing on the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes it begins by demonstrating that local environmental taxes can be inefficient and that the inefficiency depends on the tax elasticity of polluters responses the paper then uses panel data from the toxics release inventory to estimate the magnitude of the tax elasticities and to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the theoretical inefficiency of local taxes 1999 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

assessing the importance of tiebout sorting local heterogeneity from 1850 to 1990 this paper argues that long run trends in geographic segregation are inconsistent with models where residential choice depends solely on local public goods the tiebout hypothesis we develop an extension of the tiebout model that predicts as mobility costs fall the heterogeneity across communities of individual public good preferences and of public good provision must weakly increase given the secular decline in mobility costs these predictions can be evaluated using historical data we find decreasing heterogeneity in policies and proxies for preferences across i a sample of u s municipalities 1870 1990 ii all boston area municipalities 1870 1990 and iii all u s counties 1850 1990

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

redistribution fiscal competition and the politics of economic integration the paper examines the consequences of the economic integration of factor markets in a model with two countries that redistribute income among their residents the social benefits in each country are financed by a source based tax on capital which is democratically chosen by its inhabitants if either capital or labour is internationally mobile the countries engage in fiscal competition and the partial integration of capital or labour markets is detrimental to the countries redistributive ability a move from partial to full integration however may alleviate rather than intensify fiscal competition particularly if the two countries face sufficiently similar economic and political conditions in such a situation for example tax competition for mobile capital is softened as the labour market becomes more integrated and even vanishes if both factors are fully mobile as a result there is more redistribution in equilibrium and a majority of the population in each country is strictly better off copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

small aggregates big manipulation vote buying enforcement and collective monitoring vote buying is widespread in developing democracies despite the secret ballot what explains its resilience i argue that brokers condition future payments on published electoral results to enforce these transactions and that this is effective at inducing voters compliance only when the results of small voting groups are available using monitors and citizens reports of electoral manipulation and survey data from colombia i find a robust negative correlation between the average polling station size and various measures of vote buying evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that this relationship can be attributed to aggregate monitoring sustaining these transactions and not to the brokers increased ability to identify compliers or other characteristics of places where polling stations are small replication materials the data code and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the american journal of political science dataverse within the harvard dataverse network at http dx doi org 10 7910 dvn k6zoow

openness government size and the terms of trade this paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments both theoretically and empirically we argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels 1 a terms of trade externality whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and 2 the demand for insurance whereby trade raises risk and public transfers we provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods moreover while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare the second is instead optimal in the empirical part of the paper we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants consistently with the terms of trade externality channel we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments

strategic aspects of public finance in a world with high capital mobility abstract in a world with high capital mobility an increase in equity taxes is likely to induce a capital out flow it is commonly believed that in consequence there may be an under provision of public goods when governments have only equity taxes at their disposal this paper compares the provision of public goods under cooperative and non cooperative tax policies suprisingly the non cooperative regime may result in either an over or an under provision of public goods it is also shown that the gains from coordination increase as countries become atomistic

imperfect mobility and local government behaviour in an overlapping generations model abstract this paper reconsiders the implications of land value maximizing local governments in an overlapping generations model with imperfect mobility specifically residents develop an attachment to place or location specific capital once they reside in a town for a single time period the analysis shows that attempts by governments to capture the resulting rents from less mobile individuals create inefficient migration leave all workers worse off in an ex ante sense and place relatively high burdens on those workers who have high migration costs public good levels are also inefficiently chosen

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

imperfect tax competition for profits asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens abstract we present a model of tax competition for real investment and profits and show that the presence of tax havens in some cases increases the tax revenue of countries in the first part of the paper we argue that tax competition for profits is likely to be imperfect in the sense that the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate does not necessarily attract all shifted profits under this assumption tax competition between a large number of identical countries may lead to either a symmetric equilibrium with no profit shifting or an asymmetric equilibrium where firms shift profits from high tax to low tax countries in the second part of the paper we introduce tax havens starting from a symmetric equilibrium tax havens unambiguously reduce the tax revenue of countries due to a leakage effect tax havens attract tax base from countries and a competition effect the optimal response to the increased tax sensitivity of tax bases involves a reduction of tax rates starting from an asymmetric equilibrium however tax havens also raise the tax revenue of countries through a crowding effect tax havens make it less attractive to compete for profits and thus induce low tax countries to become high tax countries we demonstrate that the latter effect may dominate the former effects so that countries on balance benefit from the presence of tax havens

trade capital mobility and tax competition this paper examines a system of governments national state or local that finance public expenditures with taxes on mobile capital e g a property tax unlike previous research on tax competition explicit consideration is given to the general equilibrium determination of the prices at which goods are traded between regions the analysis identifies inefficiencies in government behavior that are not apparent in models in which the terms of trade are exogenously given capital taxation is shown to create an inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions accompanied by an inefficient pattern of trade a model is presented in which the chosen levels of public good outputs differ across regions containing identical residents and production possibilities there is a wasteful diversity of public good supplies

taxation of investment and savings in a world economy the equilibrium of capital and equilibrium market prices are derived for a world economy with a unified securities market mobile capital no uncertainty and varying tax rates on different sources of income in each country the paper then characterizes optimal tax rates for a small country in this setting focusing on the peculiar incentives created when the before tax rate of return differs among securities due to differences in their typical tax treatment copyright 1986 by american economic association

why do most countries set high tax rates on capital abstract we consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility modeled as mobile and immobile capital an agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed relatively lightly in particular one or two of the smallest countries measured by their stocks of immobile capital choose relatively low tax rates thereby attracting mobile capital away from the other countries which are then left to set revenue maximizing taxes on their immobile capital this conclusion holds regardless of whether countries choose their tax policies sequentially or simultaneously in contrast unrestricted competition for mobile capital results in the preferential treatment of mobile capital by all countries without cross country differences in the taxation of mobile capital nevertheless our main result is that the non preferential regime generates larger expected global tax revenue despite the sizable revenue loss from the emergence of low tax countries by extending the analysis to include cross country differences in productivities we are able to resurrect a case for preferential regimes but only if the productivity differences are sufficiently large

capital markets integration growth and income distribution the paper considers a two country model of overlapping generation heterogenous economies with intergenerational transfers carried out in the form of bequest and investment in human capital we examine in competitive equilibrium the transitory and long run effects of capital markets integration first we explore how the regime of public education affects the dynamics of the integrated economy second we study the effects of capital markets integration in equilibrium on the intragenerational income distribution in both the host and investing country

a note on the dynamic analysis of fiscal competition this note presents an analysis of dynamic aspects of fiscal competition in a model with local capital accumulation this shows that even when a head tax is available the optimal capital tax rate is generally non zero in addition a decentralised equilibrium without a head tax might be characterised by overprovision of local public goods in a dynamic fiscal competition model the source of inefficiency is overaccumulation of local capital

trade and the political economy of redistribution this paper shows how international trade affects the support for policies which redistribute income between workers across sectors and how the existence of such policies changes the support for trade liberalization workers who are imperfectly mobile across sectors vote on whether to subsidize ailing sectors thereby redistributing income but also distorting the labor allocation we present three main findings first redistributive policies are more likely to arise in a small open than in a closed economy for a broad range of parameters second if a redistributive policy is adopted in both situations income differences across sectors tend to be lower in the open economy third the possibility to redistribute income across sectors raises the political support for trade liberalization in the first place

new technologies and the labor market abstract using newspaper job ad text from 1960 to 2000 we measure job tasks and the adoption of individual information and communication technologies icts most new technologies are associated with an increase in nonroutine analytic tasks and a decrease in nonroutine interactive routine cognitive and routine manual tasks we embed these interactions in a quantitative model of worker sorting across occupations and technology adoption through the lens of the model the arrival of icts broadly shifts workers away from routine tasks which increases the college premium a notable exception is the microsoft office suite which has the opposite set of effects

trade in a tiebout economy the purpose of this paper is to explore both the positive and normative aspects of commodity trade in a tiebout economy by tiebout economy i mean an economy with a large number of small regions for example communities or states and no impediments to the mobility of individuals between these regions this type of economy has received widespread attention since the appearance of charles tiebout s classic 1956 article on local public goods in part because it bears a close relation to the standard competitive model this relation suggests that tiebout economies may serve as an

migration between home country and diaspora an economic analysis this paper investigates the distribution of a population group between a home country and diaspora given sequential decision making regarding migration at the individual level the home country is attractive to the members of the group yet their presence there requires a fixed amount of public spending e g on defense the per capita tax burden depends then on the size of the domestic population reflecting a case of fiscal externality this results in an inefficient distribution of the group between the home country and the diaspora encouraging immigration to the home country is an interest not only of those individuals who are currently in the home country but also of those residing in the diaspora however only when the burden of public spending in the home country is large enough do the latter volunteer to bear part of it even then in general this part is smaller than socially optimal

income taxes property values and migration we consider the effects of income redistribution when people can migrate from one country to another and when land within each country is heterogeneous taxes related to income can then affect property values and can induce migration which further affects property values we show that under these conditions a utilitarian government should never equalize after tax incomes if migration is impossible it may even transfer income from the poor to the rich reducing the rents earned by absentee landlords the redistributive tax on the rich may be higher or lower when the rich can migrate than when they cannot a rawlsian government in the absence of mobility will equalize after tax incomes under mobility rawlsian governments cut their taxes if and only if the relative pre tax income of the poor is sufficiently low

on the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations abstract we compare the efficiency and social welfare properties of equilibria resulting from different governmental objectives in a federal system with a mobile population the objectives considered are total utility average utility representative resident s utility and profit maximization the representative resident approach is unique in that it depends only on utility it yields the best efficient allocation from the perspective of a government s residents average utility yields an efficient allocation that non residents prefer both the profit maximizing and total utility approaches may lead to inefficient allocations we also show that the representative resident approach is socially preferred to a total utility approach