determinants of u s direct investment in the e e c revisited abstract this paper expands upon an earlier work in this review concerning the specification of a model to identify the determinants of u s direct foreign investment dfi in the e e c compared to earlier studies a longer data series is used an improved tariff discrimination proxy is employed and predicted sales are estimated and used as the output variable in the empirical work a variable to capture the effect of the u s capital control programs is also included the findings reaffirm the importance of market size especially in the plant and equipment equations as being an important determinant of dfi strong support was also found for the growth hypothesis consistent statistical support was found for the tariff discrimination hypothesis in addition the findings imply that a variable to capture the effects of fluctuating exchange rates should be included in future studies

cycles in american national electoral politics 1854 2006 statistical evidence and an explanatory model are there cycles in american politics in particular does the proportion of the democratic republican vote share for president and or seat share in congress rise and fall over extended periods of time if so are the cycles regular and what are the cycling periods moreover if there are regular cycles can we construct an integrated model such as a negative feedback loop that identifies political forces that could generate the observed patterns first we use spectral analysis to test for the presence and length of cycles and show that regular cycles do in fact exist with periods that conform to those predicted by the schlesingers for swings between liberalism and conservatism but with durations much shorter than those most commonly claimed by burnham and others in characterizing american political realignments second we offer a voter party interaction model that depends on the tensions between parties policy and office motivations and between voters tendency to sustain incumbents while reacting against extreme policies we find a plausible fit between the regular cycling that this model projects and the time series of two party politics in america over the past century and a half

coordination and policy moderation at midterm coordination and policy moderation at midterm eligible voters have been coordinating their turnout and vote decisions for the house of representatives in midterm elections coordination is a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium stochastic choice models estimated using individual level data from nes surveys of years 1978 1998 support the coordinating model and reject a nonstrategic model the coordinating model shows that many voters have incentives to change their votes between presidential year and midterm after learning the outcome of the presidential election but this mechanism alone does not explain the size of midterm cycles the largest source of loss of support for the president s party at midterm is a regular pattern in which the median differences between voters ideal points and the parties policy positions have become less favorable for the president s party than they were at the time of the presidential election nonvoters show the same pattern the interelection changes are not consistent with the theory of surge and decline do americans coordinate their electoral choices in midterm congressional elections we use coordination to describe a situation in which two conditions hold for everyone who is eligible to vote i e every elector each elector combines information that each elector has privately with information that everyone has in common to make the best possible prediction of the election outcome and each elector makes the choice consistent with the elector s prediction that is most likely to produce the best possible result for the elector each elector s prediction takes into account what all electors best strategies would be given the information they have in common a condition described by saying that each elector has rational expectations the choice each elector makes is part of the elector s private information when every elector makes choices according to a strategy that is consistent with the elector s rational expectations and no elector can produce a personally better outcome by using a different strategy then there is a noncooperative equilibrium coordination is defined as the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium that is based on everyone having rational expectations beyond implications for the regularity with which the president s party loses vote share in midterm elections which we discuss below the existence of coordination is important because coordination implies that electors take one another into account in a constitutionally significant way in american elections coordination is based on the separation of powers between the president and congress coordination occurs when electors anticipate how election outcomes will affect bargaining about policy within the legislature and between the legislature and the executive by instituting the constitutional separation of powers madison believed that elected officials pursuit of their selfish interests and ambitions would lead them to act with regard to one another in ways that would prevent governmental tyranny carey 1978 159 160 even electors who did not coordinate might hope with madison that the separation of powers would affect officials in that way but if coordination exists electors shift from being mere observers of consequences the constitutional provisions may produce to being agents who are led to counteract one another by the constitutional incentives coordinating electors are as wary of one another as they are of officials

coordination moderation and institutional balancing in american presidential and house elections outcome in the theoretical equilibrium the proportion of voters who split their ticket in order to balance the house with the president has been small but large enough to affect election outcomes moderation has usually been based on voters expectations that the president will be at least an equal of the house in determining postelection policy d o americans coordinate their votes for president and for congress suppose a voter knows that policy outcomes are compromises between the positions taken by the president and congress and believes the two political parties push for distinct policy alternatives then the voter believes that different combinations of party control of the presidency and congress will produce different policy outcomes if the voter cares about the policy outcomes then the voter s choices among candidates should depend on the combination of party control the choices will help bring

economic growth strategies the effects of ideological partisanship on interest rates and business taxation in the united states we reformulate the partisanship thesis in light of four claims leveled against it the reformulated version ideological partisanship is based upon the theory that similar rates of economic growth may follow from the different use of policy instruments owing to their role as determinants of investment and growth interest rates business taxation rates and the redistribution of the tax burden between capital gains and earned income are examined we advance models that take into account other views of politics beside the partisan one and test for political influences the united states is characterized by very pronounced partisan differences in national economic policy with democratic administrations seeking to promote growth through a consumption driven while republican administrations promote an investment driven strategy democratic administrations also seek to shift the tax burden toward corporations and owners of capital these findings are examined in light of the comparative political economy literature we conclude that the forms and institutional foundations of left partisan policies differ among democratic capitalist countries

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

u s presidential elections 1968 80 a spatial analysis a methodology is presented for empirical estimation of spatial models of voting in mass elections the basic choice model posits utility functions that depend on spatial distance and a random error term the parameters of the utility functions are estimated by a polytomous logit model which is applied to spatial maps of voters and candidates for all presidential elections since 1968 these maps indicate that presidential candidates take positions at the periphery of the distribution of voters results based on these maps support the hypothesis of sincere spatial voting in two candidate elections in three candidate elections the coefficients of the voter utility function adjust to proxy for the lesser viability of the minor party candidate in contrast to choice turnout shows only weak spatial effects the data are inconsistent with the proposition that turnout is low because voters are not offered distinct alternatives while the utility function used by voters appears stable through time and candidate and voter positions appear stable in the last few months prior to an election voter and candidate positions exhibit substantial change over longer time periods

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

presidential coattails versus the median voter senator selection in us elections abstract we show that senators elected in presidential elections are more ideologically extreme than senators elected in midterm elections this finding is in contrast to the literature suggesting that voters in presidential elections are more ideologically moderate than voters in midterm elections to explain this incongruence we propose a theory of spillover effects in which party labels enable voters to update their beliefs about candidates across contemporaneous races for office unexpected support for a candidate in one race carries marginal candidates from the same party in other races our theory implies that presidential coattails may skew representative government away from the median voter ideal

presidential and congressional vote share equations three vote share equations are estimated and analyzed in this paper one for presidential elections one for on term house elections and one for mid term house elections the sample period is 1916 2006 considering the three equations together allows one to test whether the same economic variables affect each and to examine various serial correlation and coattail possibilities the resulting three equation model can then be analyzed dynamically which is done in section 4 the main conclusions are briefly 1 there is strong evidence that the economy affects all three vote shares and in remarkably similar ways 2 there is no evidence of any presidential coattail effects on the on term house elections the presidential vote share and the on term house vote share are highly positively correlated but this is because they are affected by some of the same variables 3 there is positive serial correlation in the house vote in that the previous mid term house vote share positively affects the on term house vote share and the previous on term house vote share positively affects the mid term house vote share 4 the presidential vote share has a negative effect on the next mid term house vote share the most likely explanation for this is a balance argument where voters are reluctant to let one party become too dominant ruled out as possible explanations for this fourth result is any reversal of a coattail effect since there is no evidence of an effect in the first place and a regression to the mean since the positive serial correlation in the house vote implies no such regression also it is not simply voting against the party in the white house because the presidential variable is a vote share variable not a 0 1 incumbency variable

a synthesis of foreign direct investment theories and theories of the multinational firm this paper first presents a taxonomy of the foreign direct investment theories following the market imperfections paradigm it then focuses on recent developments pertaining to the theory of the multinational firm specifically the appropriability internalization and diversification theories subsequently the multinational phenomenon is seen as the result of an international differentiation of activities and an intrafirm integration across national borders all this within a markets and hierarchies approach last the paper points to areas for future research

divided we vote divided government is known to correlate with limited government but less is understood about the empirical conditions that lead to divided government this paper estimates the determinants of continuous and categorical measures of divided government in an empirical macro political economy model using 30 years of data from the american states voters support more divided government after increased government spending per dollar of tax revenues but more unified government after worsening incomes and unemployment rates only conditional support is found for the strategic moderating theory alesina and rosenthal in econometrica 64 6 1311 1341 1996 that focuses purely on midterm cycles and split ticket voting absent economic conditions

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

incomplete information and ideological explanations of platform divergence one of the paradoxes of formal spatial voting models is the robustness of the theoretical result that candidates will converge toward centrists positions and the empirical observation of persistent policy divergence of candidates a solution is that candidates are ideological have policy preferences when candidates have policy preferences and incomplete information about voter preferences then platform divergence is theoretically predicted experimental tests of the ideological model are presented it is shown that platform divergence is significant when candidates are ideological and have incomplete information about voter preferences however candidate positions are more convergent on average than the theory predicts suggesting that subjects value winning independently of the expected payment

the political costs of taxes and government spending the marginal political costs of different types of taxes and government spending as well as voter preferences over different fiscal variables are examined using two different specifications for political cost one based on the probability of incumbent defeat and the other based on the incumbent s percentage of the vote models associated with these two specifications in which voting behaviour depends on disaggregated taxes and government expenditures are estimated using clata from canadian provincial elections the empirical results which indicate that different types of taxes and expenditures have quite different marginal political costs have important implications for models that incorporate voter pref erences

do political parties matter evidence from u s cities are cities as politically polarized as states and countries no is the answer from our regression discontinuity design analysis which shows that whether the mayor is a democrat or a republican does not affect the size of city government the allocation of local public spending or crime rates however there is a substantial incumbent effect for mayors we investigate three mechanisms that could account for the striking lack of partisan impact at the local level and find the most support for tiebout competition among localities within metropolitan areas

foreign direct investment in the united states an analysis by country of origin given the large size and rapid growth of foreign direct investment in the united states this subject is a central concern of u s firms and u s government policymakers this study explores the factors that contribute to the explanation of fdi in the united states by country of origin of investment evidence from the past twelve years shows that the main significant positive influences are home country s exports to the united states and home country market size significant negative influences include the home country s imports from the united states the cultural and geographic distances of the home country from the united states and the exchange rate fx

political parties world demand and unemployment domestic and international sources of economic activity this article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983 changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects namely that unemployment falls under left wing governments and rises under right wing governments however the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies that is economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity and that in addition to politicians strategic incentives political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained transitory or absent with respect to the latter on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office where one party or dominant partner coalitions form the effect on unemployment is transitory whereas where broad coalitions form it is sustained or absent finally ceteris paribus any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities

partisan views on the economy in this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented this model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y the policy maker sets x directly there exist two views on the relationship between x and y model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on we show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences

macroeconomic conditions voter turnout and the working class economically disadvantaged party vote in developing countries working and lower status citizens are more sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations than their better off counterparts in the developing world due to the higher personal stakes involved this heightened sensitivity affects fluctuations in voter turnout and voter choice across developing democracies macroeconomic downturns result in increased voter participation as more lower status voters express their grievances at the polls this benefits political parties and coalitions with expressly working and lower class appeals this article describes the impact of shifts in voter turnout on party support the impact of macroeconomic shifts on voter turnout and the impact of macroeconomic shifts on support for parties that are working class economically disadvantaged oriented using regression analysis of aggregate pooled time series data from 10 countries in latin america the caribbean africa and asia although increased turnout primarily helps parties that are working class economically disadvantaged orient

a new view of political accountability for economic performance most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote hungry politicians drawing on macroeconomic theory we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies we find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts the results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy

equity ownership in international joint ventures the impact of source country factors this study examines the impact of four source country factors on the equity ownership in international joint ventures ijvs these factors are exchange rate cost of borrowing export capability and management orientation based on a sample of 8 078 ijvs in china this study shows that equity ownership tends to be higher for parent firms from a source country with strong currency low cost of borrowing strong export capability and high uncertainty avoidance

a theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of porto alegre participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation the aim of this paper is to understand how participatory democracy operates and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes to this end we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of participatory budgeting implemented in the brazilian city of porto alegre that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by osborne et al 2000 meetings with costly participation american economic review 90 927 943

presidential popularity and macroeconomic performance are voters really so naive f ollowing the pioneering work of kramer 1971 numerous studies have analyzed the relationships between the macroeconomic performance of political administrations and their popularity or vote getting ability kramer s work showed that the aggregate congressional vote for an incumbent party can be explained rather well by variables indicating recent economic performance subsequent works have extended kramer s research by explaining presidential vote or gallup poll popularity data with similar models on one point almost all of these studies agree 2 votes and popularity can be explained well by models which suppose that voters judge policymakers on the basis of retrospective evaluation of past macroeconomic outcomes most authors interpret their results as being supportive of the hypothesis of rational voters since the evidence indicates that voting decisions are not based purely upon personalities party affiliation or chance kramer argued that if voters regard past macroeconomic performance of an administration to be indicative of future performance then a concern with past performance indicates a concern for future performance voters who simply extrapolate from the past to predict the future are rather naive however a sophisticated voter who has an understanding of the important intertemporal constraints embodied in the structure of the economy would be able to forecast future consequences of current policy choices more accurately than one who simply extrapolates if votes and popularity are simply functions of past outcomes then voters must either be ignorant of the basic structure of the economy or unconcerned with the future the supposition that voters are so naive might run counter to the intuition of most economists who generally assume individual rationality as a central behavioral postulate nevertheless the empirical results noted above have been accepted by many as evidence that voters do misperceive their own long run interest the implications of the naive voter hypothesis for macroeconomic policymaking are disturbing nordhaus 1975 has developed a model which shows that voter naivete can encourage vote maximizing politicians to induce political business cycles and an inflationary bias there is some but not unanimous empirical support for the existence of politically motivated business cycles and casual empiricism also suggests that politicians themselves believe in the naive voter 3 while studies show that empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that voters are concerned with the recent past the results do not reject a sophisticated voter hypothesis none of the aforementioned studies has tested a model consistent with a sophisticated voter hypothesis i e a model in which voters understand what outcomes are feasible in the long and short runs and are concerned with future as well as current and past economic performance in this paper we develop such a model and estimate it using gallup poll data on presidential popularity results of this model are compared to results from a naive voter model similar to those employed in previous research received for publication february 4 1982 revision accepted for publication july 30 1982 university of south carolina i am grateful for helpful comments provided by ray fair douglas hibbs william keech daniel richards abel l da costa fernandes and an anonymous referee i also wish to thank william keech for providing me with the gallup poll data on presidential approval rates aurel schubert provided excellent research assistance fair 1978a bloom and price 1975 arcelus and meltzer 1975 and pollard 1981 a 1981 b have all estimated models to explain voting while frey and schneider 1978 and hibbs i 982a 1982b have developed models to explain presidential popularity 2 an exception is provided by arcelus and meltzer 1975 3nordhaus 1975 and tufte 1978 have provided evidence of political business cycles for a number of western democracies and frey and schneider 1978 and maloney and smirlock 1981 have estimated policy reaction functions suggesting that the timing of elections affects policymaking see tufte for a discussion of casual empirical evidence indicating that politicians believe that current economic conditions affect electoral outcomes

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

majority rule and election models abstract this paper surveys the theoretical work that has been done on majority rule and economic models of elections section i provides an overview of the topic section 2 reviews the most important results that have been obtained about majority rule as an abstract collective choice rule section 3 identifies some alternative inferences that can be made from those results section 4 covers some models that include additional features that are present in political institutions where majority rule is used section 5 concentrates on some alternative election models and equilibrium concepts section 6 focuses on election models with abstentions and or candidate uncertainty about voter behaviour section 7 compares and contrasts models where candidates are certain about what the voters choices will be contingent upon about the choices made by the candidates and models where they are uncertain about those choices section 8 closes the survey by identifying some emerging areas of research

motives of non american firms investing in the united states non american firms have recently begun investing larger sums of money in the u s such increased activity has created a great deal of interest and concern the growth in foreign direct investment and findings of a mailed questionnaire will be reviewed in this article factor analysis was utilized to help isolate the salient motives for these investment activities although the size of the u s market and the attractiveness of a new market or the desire to preserve the existing u s market were the most frequently cited reasons for new investment in the u s factor analysis reveals that these reasons merely reinforce the primary motive namely the desire to benefit from a higher level of u s technology and innovation

institutions sans frontieres international agreements and foreign investment we examine whether the presence of international investment agreements iias negotiated among countries for foreign investor protection lowers political risk faced by multinational enterprises mnes drawing on research from international business political science and international law we argue that iias increase expected future cash flows and hence the value of foreign assets by limiting the ability of host governments to make discriminatory policy changes however the need for iia protection and the ability to benefit from it varies with firm characteristics using detailed transaction level data for sale of petroleum assets in 45 countries we find that mnes pay significantly higher amounts for those protected by iias than similar but unprotected assets an effect moderated by the firm s reserve size and state ownership

economic performance voting and political support a unified approach a presidential vote function and a presidential approval ratings function are jointly estimated for u s postwar observations the estimation technique treats the two equations as seemingly unrelated regressions with unequal numbers of observations cross equation restrictions implying that voters and poll respondents use identical standards in judging the economic performance of incumbents are imposed and tested estimates show that both votes and approval ratings are influenced by gnp growth and inflation the results suggest that poll respondents are more inflation averse than voters however tests of this hypothesis are not conclusive copyright 1990 by mit press

a positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt this paper considers an economy in which policymakers with different preferences alternate in office as a result of elections government debt is used strategically by each policymaker to influence the choices of his successors if different policymakers disagree about the desired composition of government spending between two public goods the economy exhibits a deficits bias that is debt accumulation is higher than it would be with a social planner the equilibrium level of debt is larger the larger is the degree of polarization between alternating governments and the less likely it is that the current government will be re elected

the economics of split ticket voting in representative democracies in u s elections voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and congress voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative the authors develop a model of split ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes the benefits from this spending are concentrated while the model generates split ticket voting overall spending is too high only if the president s powers are limited overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system the authors model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits copyright 1997 by american economic association

national culture and expatriate deployment we hypothesize that expatriate deployment is a control function predicted by home country culture dimensions with transaction cost and agency repercussions rather than culture in the aggregate this departure from the traditional conceptualization and measurement of cultural impact also yields a hypothesized asymmetrical effect which is tested for a multi country sample of 236 multinational subsidiaries using multiple measures of national culture hypotheses are supported with assertiveness and power distance confirmed as prime predictors of expatriate deployment

gubernatorial midterm slumps this article studies gubernatorial midterm slumps in u s state legislative elections we employ a regression discontinuity design which allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the midterm slump simply reflects a type of reversion to the mean generated by simple partisan swings or the withdrawal of gubernatorial coattails or anticipatory balancing our results show that the party of the governor experiences an average seat share loss of about 3 5 percentage points we also find evidence suggesting that a large share of the variation in gubernatorial midterm slumps can be accounted for by 1 crude partisan balancing and 2 referendums on state economic performance with approximately equal weight given to each

us presidential elections and real gdp growth 1961 2004 in this paper i show that since 1960 an electoral cycle in us output growth can both be seen by the naked eye in the raw data and confirmed by a statistical analysis that allows for rational partisan effects as well as a wide range of control variables that is controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes inflation money growth energy prices lagged output growth government spending or its growth and temporary partisan effects the timing of elections exerts a significant influence on quarterly real gdp growth

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

a theory of divided government this paper extends the spatial theory of voting to an institutional structure in which policy choices depend upon not only the executive but also the composition of the legislature voters have incentives to be strategic since policy reflects the outcome of a simultaneous election of the legislature and the executive and since the legislature s impact on policy depends upon relative plurality to analyze equilibrium in this game between voters we apply coalition proof type refinements the model has several testable implications which are consistent with voting behavior in the united states for instance the model predicts a split tickets where some voters vote for one party for president and the other for congress b for some parameter values a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature and c the midterm electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in midterm congressional elections

the effect of political events on united states direct foreign investment a pooled time series cross sectional analysis this paper examines the effect of political events on the manufacturing direct foreign investment mdfi decisions of u s multinational corporations the relationship between political events and nonpolitical factors and mdfi is investigated through regression analysis of pooled time series 21 years and cross sectional 24 countries data and through various tests of the homogeneity of the relationship across groups of countries the study finds that the relationship between political events in mdfi is different for less developed countries as opposed to developed countries for the less developed countries both inter nation and intra nation conflict and cooperation affect mdfi in contrast u s mdfi in developed countries appears to be affected only by inter nation conflict and cooperation

home country political risk and foreign direct investment in the united states this study investigates the proposition that home country political risk factors influence outward foreign direct investment investment data from the u s department of commerce is used to model investment activity in the united states from various industrialized source countries foreign direct investment is regressed on home country domestic and international economic and political risk measures for the western industrial countries results indicate that investment activity from the ics in the u s is dependent on home country economic and political conditions

economic efficiency of greek retail smes in a period of high fluctuations in economic activity a dea approach this study aims to analyse the economic efficiency of greek small and medium retail enterprises before and after the crisis that started in 2008 based on the accounting equation we use data envelopment analysis dea to estimate variable returns of scale efficiency scores and to conclude on specific characteristics that efficient companies have for example on capital structure our results from the dea application show a high degree of inefficiency we found that smes on the islands are more efficient than those on the mainland and that smes in the cities are the least efficient size seems to be important more so on the islands and on the mainland than in the cities we conclude that companies should act more conservatively in terms of operating cost when the first signs of a recession appear in addition during a recession period companies that have evidences that their operations will continue positively should strengthen their operations by raising more own capital finally our study clarifies

evolutionary voter sophistication and political business cycles the concept of the sophisticated electorate is central to many contemporary political economic models however no existing studies have yet clarified how voters could develop a sophisticated way of evaluating economic performance this study suggests a transitional hypothesis that removes the constraint that voters have prior knowledge about the macroeconomic environment and the true economic intent of the incumbent government the hypothesis permits behavioral innovation from learning and predicts that the evolutionary process toward sophistication may be triggered by socially suboptimal political business cycles that reveal the self serving characteristic of the government the empirical analyses using recent japanese experiences show that japanese political support behavior shifted from naivete to sophistication in the early 1970s after political manipulation occurred in the 1969 and 1972 parliamentary elections

peasants or bankers the american electorate and the u s economy t he usual model of electoral reaction to economic conditions assumes the retrospective economic voter who bases expectations solely on recent economic performance or personal economic experience voter as peasant a second model assumes a sophisticated economic voter who incorporates new information about the future into personal economic expectations voter as banker using the components both retrospective and prospective of the index of consumer sentiment ics as intervening variables between economic conditions and approval we find that the prospective component fully accounts for the presidential approval time series with aggregate consumer expectations about long term business conditions in the approval equation neither the usual economic indicators not the other ics components matter moreover short term changes in consumer expectations respond more to current forecasts than to the current economy the qualitative result is a rational expectations outcome the electorate anticipates the economic future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen economics moves political behavior with hard times administrations lose support with good times they gain it we know this to be true but when we ask how by what processes the political translation of economic experience occurs the an

vote splitting as insurance against uncertainty the present article offers a rational choice explanation for political ticket splitting it considers a game theoretic model of voting and bargaining within congress and between congress and the president when parties are ideologically oriented and voters utilities are state dependent the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world ticket splitting emerges as a tool risk averse voters use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature

polarized platforms and moderate policies with checks and balances abstract in standard spatial models of elections parties with policy preferences take divergent positions their platform positions are less separated than are the parties ideal policies if policy is the result of an executive legislative compromise the policy preferences of the parties can be moderated by voter behavior divided government may result since parties anticipate the moderated outcomes they have an added incentive to choose separated platforms consequently divergence in platforms is greater than in the standard model especially when uncertainty is high and the legislature more powerful than the executive for some parameters parties may even posture by adopting platforms that are more extreme than their true ideal points

the political manipulation of macroeconomic policy conventional wisdom and some research indicate that macroeconomic policies follow cycles corresponding to political as well as economic forces using vector autoregression analysis i test three models of monetary policy determination for the united states 1953 1984 the electoral cycle model that reelection motivations on the part of presidents create a policy cycle the party differences model that policy changes reflect revolving presidential party administrations and the referendum model that changes in presidential approval create in effect a continuing referendum allowing presidents to monitor their success and change macroeconomic policies when necessary analysis shows that monetary policies as measured by the monetary base and short term interest rates respond to the election cycle and presidential approval although the effect on macroeconomic outcomes is ambiguous party differences are found in real income but are not very significant in other variables

flip flopping ideological adjustment costs in the united states senate models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost predict the convergence of platforms in a two candidate election such convergence is at odds with empirical observation in this paper i undertake a study of candidate positioning in the united states senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by senators using over 50 years of roll call voting data i use a simulated method of moments approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for u s senators the ndings support a model in which senators face convex costs to changing position with the best tting model being one with linear costs of adjustment the model thus predicts severe punishments for ip opping senators those who make large changes in position as a result of the signi cant costs associated with adjusting position the empirical validity of the median voter theorem which depends upon candidates being able to change position at no cost is called into question

foreign direct investment in the united states the state of knowledge in research this article categorizes and summarizes the major writings published during the 1970s concerning foreign direct investment in the united states it is based on the authors analysis of more than 100 works published in the english language in addition to analyzing what has been published the article also suggests directions for future research

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

divided government in the american states a byproduct of legislative professionalism s since world war ii divided government has become increasingly common in the american states a significant component of the increase is the deterioration of republican fortunes in state legislatures after the 1990 and 1992 elections for example only five state legislatures were controlled by the republicans i shall examine the hypothesis that the professionalization of state legislatures makes legislative service more attractive to democratic candidates and less attractive to republican candidates because full time legislative service is incompatible with another career and democrats on average have less lucrative career opportunities than republicans statistical analysis of post world war ii legislative elections outside the south is consistent with the argument other things being equal every ten thousand dollar increase in real biennial legislative compensation is associated with approximately a 1 increase in democratic legislators

policy oriented voting in response to economic issues this study explores the hypothesis that voting in response to economic problems is policy oriented voters concerned about unemployment ore predicted to give greater support to democratic candidates while those concerned about inflation are predicted to vote more republican in light of evidence from previous research this study investigates the electoral effects of inflation and unemployment as 1 problems directly experienced by the individual and 2 problems deemed serious for the nation as a whole support is strongest for the unemployment side of the hypothesis voters personally affected by unemployment gave a modest boost to democratic candidates in virtually every election and in years of high unemployment the large percentage of voters who fell it was a serious national problem voted heavily democratic as well this study concludes by discussing the important implications these findings have for our understanding of how economic conditions influence voting behavior in american national elections

international strategies of non dominant firms there has been a growing interest in how follower firms can compete with industry leaders this article documents the use of international strategies by some non dominant firms to avoid direct competition with industry leaders twenty five cases of international strategies used by non dominant firms in a variety of industries were cluster analyzed to identify common strategies seven different strategies were identified together with their attendant firm characteristics stage of industry internationalization and underlying competitive logic

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

economic performance and political outcomes an analysis of the turkish parliamentary and local election results between 1950 and 2004 the results of twenty five turkish elections for parliament and local administrations between 1950 and 2004 are studied turkish voters are found to take government s economic performance into account but not look back beyond one year furthermore they are found to hold the major incumbent party responsible for both growth and inflation but minor incumbent parties only for inflation also they appear to vote strategically especially in local and parliamentary by elections to diffuse power finally all parties exhibit a steady depreciation in their political capital while in office these conclusions are essentially in conformity with the literature on other countries

macro determinants of fdi inflows to japan an analysis of source country characteristics this paper examines the source country determinants of fdi into japan the paper highlights certain methodological and theoretical weaknesses in the previous literature and offers some explanations for hitherto ambiguous results specifically the paper highlights the importance of panel data analysis and the identification of fixed effects in the analysis rather than simply pooling the data indeed we argue that many of the results reported elsewhere are a feature of this mis specification to this end pooled fixed effects and random effects estimates are compared the results suggest that fdi into japan is inversely related to trade flows such that trade and fdi are substitutes moreover the results also suggest that fdi increases with home country political and economic stability the paper also shows that previously reported results regarding the importance of exchange rates relative borrowing costs and labour costs in explaining fdi flows are sensitive to the econometric specification and estimation approach the paper also discusses the importance of these results within a policy context in recent years japan has sought to attract fdi though many firms still complain of barriers to inward investment penetration in japan the results show that cultural and geographic distance are only of marginal importance in explaining fdi and that the results are consistent with the market seeking explanation of fdi as such the attitude to risk in the source country is strongly related to the size of fdi flows to japan 2007 the authors journal compilation 2007 blackwell publishing ltd

labor market regulations and cross border mergers and acquisitions this article exploits changes in country level employment protection regulations as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in labor laws and finds that these regulations play an important role in cross border merger activity over the 1991 2009 period countries that tighten employment regulations attract more foreign acquirers especially those from countries with relatively more flexible labor regulations the results appear to be robust to alternative specifications importantly these patterns are pronounced in those recipient country sectors in which foreign acquirers may find attractive targets at bargain prices sectors with relatively high productivity and skill the article also provides evidence suggesting that because pro labor reforms allow foreign acquirers to cherry pick more skilled and productive local firms these transactions are associated with greater deal synergies and improved post merger operating performance

an explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single member congressional districts a formal rational expectation model is developed to explain why congressional single member districts smd s were mandated in 1842 and why that mandate has repeatedly been re affirmed the tendency of voters to moderate the dominant party in the federal government combined with the single party sweep effect of multi member districts mmd s creates the incentives for the strongest party to support a smd mandate this model performs empirically much better than alternative theories the model s prediction that the current smd mandate is permanent is an example of how an institutional change can endure even if it no longer reflects voter preferences

influences on foreign equity ownership level in joint ventures in china this study examines the determinants of foreign equity ownership in joint ventures in china drawing upon duning s ownership locational and internalization paradigm and the literature on bargaining power eleven variables that impact foreign ownership preferences and concessions are examined these variables are advertising intensity foreign capital input country risk of china ejv investment amount ejv contractual duration cultural distance competitive intensity local partner state ownership local partner alignment foreign partner alignment and ejv location the empirical findings are largely consistent with the hypotheses the empirical findings are largely consistent with the hypotheses further interesting differences were found among u s european and japanese firms with respect to the impact of these determinants

the political economy of inaction abstract this paper develops a simple model of political inaction in a two party democracy i e it shows the conditions under which both parties will prefer to live with an unsatisfactory and inefficient status quo rather than to raise an issue the risk of raising the issue to either party is the fear of ending up with the other party s policy for example by losing the electron regarded as even worse than the status quo the model shows that the problem is likely to be particularly serious the more evenly matched is political competition the more risk averse the parties the less voters trust the parties the more divided is public opinion and the more important the issue the model is illustrated with a number of examples of real world inaction e g on fiscal deficits abortion the transition to socialism and the fall of the weimar republic in general the analysis also suggests that over a range more representation of political viewpoints implies a smaller likelihood of political action so that democracy implies a tradeoff between representation and the capacity for political action

the state as strategist in international business research no matter what strategy managers choose cross national differences in states strategic capabilities and objectives affect multinational corporations capabilities to manage interdependent operations in this paper we develop four attribute dimensions along which states strategic economic capabilities vary we then apply these dimensions to show how they contribute to familiar international business models of managerial process mnc strategy and organizational structure and country competitiveness

partisan cycles in congressional elections and the macroeconomy in the postwar united states the president s party has always done worse in the midterm congressional elections than in the previous congressional election republican administrations exhibit below average and democratic administrations above average economic growth in the first half of each term whereas in the latter halves the two see equal growth our rational expectations model is consistent with these two regularities in presidential elections voters choose between two polarized candidates they then use midterm elections to counterbalance the president s policies by strengthening the opposition in congress since presidents of different parties are associated with different policies our model predicts a spurious correlation between the state of the economy and elections our predictions contrast with those of retrospective voting models in which voters reward the incumbent if the economy is doing well before the election our model performs empirically at least as well as and often better than alternative models

partisan political business cycles in the german labour market empirical tests in the light of the lucas critique this paper focuses on alternative specifications ofpartisan political business cycles partisan theory rational partisan theory and hysteresis augmentedrpt it elaborates on analogies of the natural ratehypothesis underlying all specifications and thecointegration concept accordingly problems of thespecification of hypotheses estimation and inferencein a cointegrating framework with politicalinterventions are treated super exogeneity tests areshown to be equivalent to tests of the lucas critiqueand the rpt therefore the concept ofsuper exogeneity is transferred to empirical tests ofpartisan cycles by this a new testing framework ofpartisan cycles is developed and applied to germanlabour market data

presidential elections and federal reserve policy an empirical test traditional macro economic models of federal reserve fed behavior typically assume that the fed enjoys a well defined objective function based on social welfare and generally predict counter cyclical monetary policy the increasing observation of procyclical monetary policy has led many researchers to investigate new models of fed behavior several recent papers imply that procyclical fed behavior is due to a lack of political accountability friedman 7 toma 23 and shughart and tollison 21 all attribute considerable bureaucratic discretion to the fed and seek to explain monetary policy by examining typical bureaucratic objectives other papers such as pierce 19 20 weintraub 26 and kane 10 11 argue that the fed operates in an arena filled with political constraints that cause sub optimal monetary policy but these constraints are not modeled explicitly one possible political constraint on fed behavior is the incumbent president s desire for re election in the political business cycle pbc literature presidential re election opportunities are enhanced by the production of a precise set of inflation and unemployment outcomes leading up to the election thus to the extent that presidents desire cyclical macro economic outcomes there will be executive pressure on the fed to create or accommodate such outcomes the effect this pressure will have on fed policy is ultimately an empirical question but most models deal with it by assumption traditional macro modeling assumes a zero effect while the pbc models implicitly assume that a favorable election cycle is a primary goal of all economic policymakers this paper examines presidential influence on the federal reserve by testing for an election cycle in money growth the major result is the identification of a regular 16 quarter cycle in money growth corresponding with presidential elections this cyclical effect is found to be stable over time and significant under a wide range of model specifications further when the cyclical component of money growth is used to simulate a simple macro model it produces a classic political business cycle in inflation and real output growth

the ecological fallacy revisited aggregate versus individual level findings on economics and elections and sociotropic voting several aggregate level studies have found a relationship between macroeconomic conditions and election outcomes operating in intuitively plausible directions more recent survey based studies however have been unable to detect any comparable relationship operating at the individual voter level this persistent discrepancy is puzzling one recently proposed explanation for it is that voters actually behave in an altruistic or sociotropic fashion responding to economic events only as they affect the general welfare rather than in terms of self interested pocketbook considerations it is argued here that the discrepancies between the macro and micro level studies are a statistical artifact arising from the fact that observable changes in individual welfare actually consist of two unobservable components a government induced and politically relevant component and an exogenous component caused by life cycle and other politically irrelevant factors it is shown that because of this individual level cross sectional estimates of the effects of welfare changes on voting are badly biased and are essentially unrelated to the true values of the behavioral parameters of interest they will generally be considerable underestimates and may even be of the wrong sign an aggregate level time series analysis on the other hand will often yield reasonably good if somewhat attenuated estimates of the underlying individual level effects of interest thus in this case individual behavior is best investigated with aggregate rather than individual level data it is also shown that the evidence for sociotropic voting is artifactual in the sense that the various findings and evidence which ostensibly show sociotropic behavior are all perfectly compatible with the null hypothesis of self interested pocketbook voting

party identification retrospective voting and moderating elections in a federal system west germany 1961 1989 the hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in u s presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis here these hypotheses are applied to the german federal system that is characterized by staggered national and land provincial elections they are tested using data on real gnp growth at the national and land levels party vote shares in national and land elections party seat shares in national and land parliaments and the party composition of national and land governments over the time period 1961 1989 perhaps surprisingly all three hypotheses party identification retrospective voting and moderating elections find empirical support when applied to the german federal system although these hypotheses were formulated with reference to u s political institutions they travel well bar some modifications that take into account special features of the german political system

the rationality of economic voting and the macroeconomic regime since voter rationality plays a major role in theories of political economics it is important for political analysts to investigate the extent of voter sophistication a conventional strategy for addressing this question is to determine what decision rule voters appear to use by estimating rival political support models that embody varying assumptions about voter rationality however under some circumstances such a strategy may be incapable of identifying the descriptively superior model due to an observational equivalence problem the paper estimates the competing political support models under alternative macroeconomic regimes and finds evidence favoring the nonrationalist or adaptive model

dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda we consider dynamic decision making in a legislature in which in each period legislators vote between the status quo previous period s policy and a new bill however the agenda formation process is captured by interest groups that is the new bill on the agenda is determined by an all pay auction among these groups we show that convergence to the median voter of the legislature arises if interest groups are patient enough but not necessarily otherwise we characterize the bound on the speed of convergence in a family of stationary equilibria in which policy bounces between right wing and left wing policies we also show that convergence may be faster if organized interest groups represent only one side of the policy space e g when only business and not consumer interests are organized

economic and referendum voting a comparison of gubernatorial and senatorial elections we compare vote choice in senate and gubernatorial elections from 1986 and 1990 with two retrospective voting hypotheses the national referendum hypothesis and an economic retrospective hypothesis despite the similarities between the office of u s senator and governor same constituency high levels of campaign spending highly visible candidates etc we find that different types of retrospective evaluations are used with respect to vote choice as members of the national legislative branch senators fortunes are linked to the success or failures of the president in contrast governors as state executives are held accountable for perceived state economic conditions while senators escape unscathed from the same general economic evaluations these findings shed some light on the nature of vote choice in a political system complicated by federalism and separation of powers

policy preferences of fomc members as revealed by dissenting votes the composition of the federal open market committee the ability to predict the effect of policy decisions on economic and f1nancialvariables and political influence from the white house and the congress are all potentially significant determinants of monetary policy decisions this study uses the record of dissenting votes from federal open market committee meetings to consider the relevance of these influences tests for differences between voting patterns of bank presidents versus members of the board of governors and differences during various historical periods provide insight into four questions 1 are the policy preferences of bank presidents different from those of the members of the board 2 does uncertainty about the economic and financial results of policy actions influence the level of dissent 3 is there a difference in the pattern of dissent under different chairmen and 4 is there effective political influence on monetary policymakers the legitimacy of district bank presidents serving on the fomc has been challenged in the courts and the legislature challengers fear that district bank presidents who serve without executive or legislative approval prefer policy that produces lower inflation and higher unemployment relative to the policy preferred by members of the board who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate rogoff 1985 argues that in the presence of market distortions it is better for society to have central bankers who attach a larger weight than the society s

a partisanship theory of fiscal and monetary regimes this paper indicates that income redistribution motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort thi s suggests that newly elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income estimated reaction from function s support these predictions a measure of income redistribution the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to gnp has a positive significant effect on money growth in addition when the presidency changes from conservative to liberal there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

busy voters agenda control and the power of information t he correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes is often affected by the existence of information asymmetries among electoral participants and the presence of individuals or groups who exercise some form of agenda control while the effects of agenda control in political decision making are widely recognized the effects of information asymmetries are not as well understood since information asymmetries are fundamental characteristics of most elections a deep understanding of the correspondence between individual preferences and electoral outcomes requires a serious consideration of the effects of information i develop a generalizable agenda control model that takes as given the observation that most voters are not naturally inclined to invest in political information the model allows me to provide a dynamic description of how voters and political elites can adapt to the information problems that characterize political decision making it also allows me to demonstrate the effect of these adaptations on electoral outcomes