politics growth and inequality in rural china does it pay to join the party abstract economic reform is often constrained because rank and file bureaucrats responsible for implementation have vested interests that oppose change drawing on an unusual longitudinal survey data set for a representative rural county in northern china we show an alternative positive scenario consistent with the presence of an implicit performance based incentive contract that ties the household incomes of local officials to market liberalization increases in consumer demand and the provision of local public goods the mechanisms appear to be tolerated as the fruits of growth are shared fairly equitably thus allowing implementation of a politically and economically self reinforcing reform process

regulatory discretion and the unofficial economy johnson kaufmann and shleifer 1997 find that the share of the unofficial economy in gdp is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post communist economies exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the oecd latin america and transition economies we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of gdp when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker while these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy the problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption a high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy

dodging the grabbing hand the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries across 69 countries higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of gdp but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption dodging the grabbing hand in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total gdp as a result corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

closely competing firms and price adjustment some findings from an online marketplace we investigate retailers price setting behavior using a unique dataset containing by the second records of prices offered by closely competing retailers on a major japanese price comparison website first we find that when the average price of a product across retailers falls rapidly the frequency of price adjustments increases and the size of price adjustments becomes larger second we find positive autocorrelation in the frequency of price adjustments implying that there tends to be clustering where price adjustments occur in succession in contrast there is no such autocorrelation in the size of price adjustments these two findings indicate that the behavior of competing retailers is characterized by state dependent pricing rather than time dependent pricing

interfirm relationships and informal credit in vietnam trading relations in vietnam s emerging private sector are shaped by two market frictions the difficulty of locating trading partners and the absence of legal enforcement of contracts examining relational contracting we find that a firm trusts its customer enough to offer credit when the customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier a longer duration of trading relationship is associated with larger credit as is prior information gathering customers identified through business networks receive more credit these network effects are enduring suggesting that networks are used to sanction defaulting customers

guaranteed lowest prices do they facilitate collusion abstract the effects of a policy guaranteeing lowest price are analyzed in a two stage game where firms first decide whether to adopt such a policy and then choose prices symmetric and asymmetric games are solved to examine the extent to which prices can rise to collusive levels

why do firms hide bribes and unofficial activity after communism abstract our survey of private manufacturing firms finds the size of hidden unofficial activity to be much larger in russia and ukraine than in poland slovakia and romania a comparison of cross country averages shows that managers in russia and ukraine face higher effective tax rates worse bureaucratic corruption greater incidence of mafia protection and have less faith in the court system our firm level regressions for the three eastern european countries find that bureaucratic corruption is significantly associated with hiding output

the pros and cons of spot pricing electric utility perspective abstract until recently spot pricing of electrical energy has been an academic curiosity electric utilities by and large do not vary the price of their product by time of day or cost of generation even though such costs vary considerably from peak to off peak periods the primary reason for not using spot or real time pricing has been communication and administrative costs recent advancements in technology have reduced the costs to a level where spot pricing is being considered a viable option for many utilities the remaining obstacles to be resolved are development of hardware and software to administer real time prices customer education to understand and participate in spot pricing programmes and reaching agreements with regulators on appropriate rates

chinese institutional innovation and privatization from below one of the most distinctive features of china s transition to a market economy has been the role played by rural township and village enterprises tve s in the face of sustained rapid growth of tve s the share of total industrial output produced by state owned enterprises soe s has fallen below half despite steady state sector growth and the absence of significant privatization yet most tve s are collectives a form of publicly owned enterprise this feature seems to make them unique in no other transitional economy has public ownership played such a dynamic role china presents the unusual picture of an economy that has made a transition to a primarily market economy but in which publicly owned enterprises still produce the bulk of manufacturing output surprisingly also the collective ownership form does not have a precise legal definition in china leading to some uncertainty about ultimate property rights martin weitzman and chenggang xu 1993 point out that public ownership with vaguely defined ownership ought to represent a recipe for economic disaster to them tve success suggests instead advantages to the internal institutional form of tve s which are seen to facilitate cooperation through implicit contracts among community members locked into an ongoing relationship victor nee 1992 advances a similar interpretation arguing that long time community residents create forms of income sharing that may be optimal in the absence of an independent legal system an alternative perhaps complementary view is presented here the success of tve s i argue is due largely to a set of external conditions to which tve s are an effective adaptation tve s are responses to one of the most distinctive characteristics of the chinese transition as a whole the early creation of product markets which exist for a prolonged period without well developed markets for factors of production or assets tve s are a flexible and effective but basically ordinary adaptation to this environment

the kinked demand curve revisited abstract in a stackelberg oligopoly with cost asymmetry and possibility of entry the stackelberg leader faces a kinked demand curve for a robust interval of cost of the leader the equilibrium price is rigid with respect to small changes in demand and costs of active firms

the invisible hand and the grabbing hand evidence from a survey of 105 shop owners in moscow and warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection as well as the burden of regulation and corruption are much greater in moscow the evidence suggests that the invisible hand model of government better fits the warsaw local government and the grabbing hand model is more appropriate for moscow the evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced and that the quality of government may be as essential this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

on the past and future of china s township and village owned enterprises abstract this paper proposes an explanation of the historical success of industrial enterprises owned by township and village governments in china i argue that conditions peculiar to china s prereform economy fostered the growth of a skilled workforce and high savings created unusual market niches and encouraged entrepreneurial undertakings by local political elites especially in areas adjacent to certain cities i then discuss the allocative and technical efficiency of local public enterprises in china from a theoretical standpoint and review some relevant econometric findings finally i consider proposals for reform of town and village enterprise tve ownership and discuss the possible advantages of cooperative forms

the distribution of price changes in oligopoly econometric analysis of the skew of price change distributions for an eighty industry sample over an eleven year period indicates that the distributions are less skewed in times of rapidly changing prices in concentrated oligopolies and in markets with little product heterogeneity the results provide evidence of less price staggering and greater pricing coordination by firms in times of high inflation and in oligopolistic markets respectively tight oligopolies also appear to have more symmetric distributions when prices are falling than when they are rising suggesting that price decreases are more readily followed than increases copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

entry deterrence in markets with consumer switching costs in many markets consumers have transaction or learning switching costs between functionally undifferentiated brands new entry into such markets may be deterred either by large customer bases and or large switching costs which deny customers to an entrant or by small customer bases and or small switching costs which mean an incumbent will respond aggressively to an entrant an incumbent threatened by entry may therefore price either lower or higher than otherwise a firm with the right to enter early may make less profits over time than an otherwise identical firm that is unable to enter the market until later

quick responses in duopoly ensure monopoly pricing if firms in a homogeneous duopoly game can respond with negligible delay to their rival s price changes equilibrium is unique at the monopoly price

property rights and finance which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment weak property rights or limited access to external finance from a survey of new firms in post communist countries we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits even when bank loans are available where property rights are relatively strong firms reinvest their profits where they are relatively weak entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

does having a cadre parent pay evidence from the first job offers of chinese college graduates abstract we estimate the wage premium associated with having a cadre parent in china using a recent survey of college graduates carried out by the authors the wage premium of having a cadre parent is 15 and this premium cannot be explained by other observables such as college entrance exam scores quality of colleges and majors a full set of college human capital attributes and job characteristics these results suggest that the remaining premium could be the true wage premium of having a cadre parent

spot pricing of electricity arguments and prospects abstract the paper in this issue extend the early literature on spot pricing but differences of opinion still remain between proponents and critics mathematical models designed to prove that spot pricing is socially optimal are unpersuasive regrettably there are no further empirical estimates of the consequences costs and benefits of spot pricing but previous studies suggest that it would be profitable and economic for a significant subset of large industrial users current moves to deregulate and privatize electricity industries are likely to stimulate rather than hinder the adoption of spot pricing

friends with benefits how political connections help to sustain private enterprise growth in china by analysing data from a survey of 511 chinese private enterprises we find that their owners respond to government discrimination by developing political connections with government officials a one standard deviation increase in the insecurity of property rights has the effect of increasing the number of friends in the government by a substantial 22 these friends significantly help to mitigate by half the negative effect arising from the difficulties of obtaining land and excessive regulations on enterprise growth this explains why an institutional environment of weak property rights has not stopped private enterprises in china from developing rapidly

testing a model of the kinked demand curve this paper analyzes survey data on the responses firms expect from their competitors when they change prices there is evidence of an assymmetry in expected responses which provides some support for modified versions of the kinked demand curve the asymmetry in responses is found to be cyclically sensitive and to differ with certain firm characteristics copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

campaign contributions as investments the u s house of representatives 1980 1986 this paper treats the market for special interest campaign contributions and political favors as a simple asset market the model yields a simple equilibrium relationship among three variables the total amount of investor contributions a candidate receives the monetary value of the favors he has promised and his probability of winning using data on open seat races for the u s house of representatives i confront the model with a series of tests despite the starkness of the model the results of these tests are highly supportive

do lenders favor politically connected firms rent provision in an emerging financial market corruption by the politically connected is often blamed for economic ills particularly in less developed economies using a loan level data set of more than 90 000 rms that represents the universe of corporate lending in pakistan between 1996 and 2002 we investigate rents to politically connected rms in banking classifying a rm as political if its director participates in an election we examine the extent nature and economic costs of political rent provision we nd that political rms borrow 45 percent more and have 50 percent higher default rates such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in government banks private banks provide no

the kinked demand curve a game theoretic approach in a simple model of duopoly firms price moves are modelled as an extensive form game where firms can respond to undercutting without delay when firms are not too dissimilar kinked demand strategies enforcing an arbitrary price may be nash equilibria however these strategies are dominated and perfect equilibrium is unique at the minimum optimal common price rather than implying price rigidity kinked demand strategies are a device for ensuring compliance with a collusive price leadership

kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation this paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand we show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games

can prices be insensitive to unit cost variations a game theoretic alternative to the kinked demand curve explanation abstract we provide a game theoretic alternative of the kinked demand curve explanation of rigid prices we analyze a duopoly where firms choose quantities and objectives we identify cases under which firms choose to maximize their revenue under these cases prices are insensitive to unit costs

do businessmen make good governors this paper evaluates the economic performance of u s state governors with a business background chief executive officer ceo governors applying a matching method i find first that businesspeople tend to take office in times of economic and fiscal strain second the tenures of ceo governors are associated with a 0 5 percentage points pp higher annual income growth rate a 0 4 pp higher growth rate of the private capital stock and a 0 6 pp lower unemployment rate than are the tenures of non ceo governors state level income inequality is not affected by ceo governors holding office indicating that low income households benefit from the economic upswing

red tape and corruption abstract we study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal bureaucrat agent hierarchy the principal is to provide the agent with a unit of a good that involves externalities so that market mechanisms fail to achieve first best red tape produces information but is costly to the agent and is administered by a corrupt bureaucrat first the bureaucrat may extort bribes from the agent in exchange for reducing the amount of red tape second the bureaucrat may take bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape even though the former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape we show that the equilibrium level of red tape is above the social optimum

political connections ownership structure and private equity placement decision evidence from chinese listed firms in contrast with many other countries chinese listed firms must obtain approval to make private equity placements peps from the chinese security regulatory commission csrc a state bureau that regulates capital market financing we analyse the role of political connection pc and ownership structures when accessing private equity pe market while investigating the mechanisms through which political ties operate within the regulatory process of peps the findings suggest that pcs do not contribute to the firm s decision to apply for peps but firms with state ownership demonstrate a higher propensity to apply for peps pc and state ownership appear to help firms to obtain approval from the csrc and these firms are treated more favourably than their rivals without such connections politically connected firms spend less time in managing bureaucracy but pc and state ownership negatively affect proceeds from the pe market in china firms with politically connected directors with professional busines

political connections and firm value in china an event study on 19 october 2013 the chinese government issued the opinions on further regulation on party and political leaders and cadres working part time holding office in enterprises also known as the 18th decree to regulate government officials employment with businesses the 18th decree is widely perceived as having had a significant impact on the use of independent directors with political backgrounds by firms given the prevalence of this business practice this paper examines the market reaction to the 18th decree to ascertain the value effect of political connections in china we note a negative relationship between the political connections of independent directors and market reaction we also note that the negative relationship between political connections and market reaction is moderated by ownership type and state of regional development specifically we find that the negative relationship holds only for private firms in less developed regions these results support our prediction that political connections add value to chinese firms and that the value effect of political connection is contingent on institutional factors

player and referee roles held jointly the effect of state ownership on china s regulatory enforcement against fraud this article examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system respectively as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors in line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud for the state owned enterprises soes however larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of enforcement actions this is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent soes and the regulatory commission a new regulation solutions for listed firm checks promulgated in march 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the severity of regulatory conditions our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory environment and investor protection in the chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory reform and development

principal principal conflicts and corporate philanthropy evidence from chinese private firms the principal principal perspective suggests that controlling shareholders have excessive influence on corporate philanthropy and may direct corporate funds to charitable causes to support their personal interests analysis of a sample of chinese private firms listed on the shenzhen or shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 shows that 1 there is a significant and negative relationship between corporate giving and the share held by the largest shareholders suggesting that controlling shareholders are opportunistic in directing corporate charitable contributions 2 there is a significant and positive relationship between corporate giving and the political connections of the largest shareholders and their agents suggesting compatibility between corporate contributions and the personal interests of the controlling shareholders 3 there is a stronger negative relationship between corporate giving and the share of the company held by the largest shareholders in politically connected firms suggesting that political connections contribute to increased opportunistic corporate giving overall our study provides important evidence for the one dominant controlling shareholder phenomenon yigududa by testing and extending the principal principal framework and showing that the largest shareholders of chinese firms appear to donate to charitable causes that ultimately serve their personal interests at the expense of minority shareholders

information technology and efficient pricing providing a competitive edge for electric utilities abstract electricity has traditionally been generated and sold as a homogeneous commodity with a single price this practice has less to do with the nature of electricity than with the lack of technology to distinguish among each kilwatthour based on what and when it is used this article argues that with the recent advances in information and communication technologies the time has arrived to market electricity as something other than a homogeneous commodity by pricing electricity according to its time of use for example electricity will be more efficiently utilized benefitting both the customers and the electric companies

collusive price rigidity under price matching punishments by analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price matching punishment strategy we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close this provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve in contrast to the kinked demand curve it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits the relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high cost phase the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms in the market are also investigated

does support from government help firms survive evidence on financial and political assistance in china 1998 2007 using the national bureau of statistics data set over the period 1998 2007 this article examines the dual roles of financial assistance and strong political links on firm survival in china by applying a semi parametric duration model we find that generally either financial assistance or strong political links had a positive effect on the likelihood of firm survival furthermore if firms received both types of support from government their survival rate was around two times as high compared to only receiving a single support the likelihood of survival depended on the amount of assistance a firm received we also find firm ownership impacts on its survival pattern lastly china joining the world trade organisation wto coincided with cet par higher firm failure especially with regard to state owned firms however this period also saw the authorities targeting political and financial help on the better firms especially soes with characteristics likely to increase their chance of survival

do institutions affect citizens selection into politics traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents however as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of policy commitments are limited this perspective needs to be complemented with an economics of political selection that takes into account the quality of those elected to political office we review the emerging literature which investigates institutional conditions that impact the selection of politicians we discuss pay in politics electoral rules institutions enhancing transparency in politics and institutions which govern dual office holding in different branches of government we argue that further comparative analyses are essential in order to gain an improved understanding of the impact that institutions have on political outcomes not only via the channel of accountability but also via the channel of selection

government in transition abstract the speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical survey evidence shows that russia lags significantly behind poland in the transition of its government which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms i argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians may account for the poor performance of the russian government and suggest some strategies for improving the situation

why do entrepreneurs enter politics evidence from china this article examines the determinants of the entrepreneur s political participation by employing a unique matched firm institution data set from china we find that the likelihood of an entrepreneur s participation can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets and market supporting institutions according to our estimates the probability of entering politics decreases by 8 20 from the mean when the institutional indices improve by one standard deviation our findings support the view that the institutional environment shapes the private entrepreneur s motivation to participate in politics they also provide an example of how private entrepreneurs respond to state market failure in developing and transition countries jel g1 h00 o10 p2 p3

public versus private ownership of firms evidence from rural china why are many of china s successful rural enterprises publically owned by local communities using a set of provincial data we find that the share of community public firms township village enterprises or tves relative to private enterprises is higher where the central government s influence is greater the community government s power is stronger and the level of market development is lower we also find that tves help achieve the community government s goals of increasing government revenue rural nonfarm employment and rural income however tves do not increase rural income given the levels of nonfarm employment and local public goods provision indicating possible inefficiency as compared with private enterprises