who gains from capital market integration tax competition between unionized and non unionized countries the welfare effects of capital market integration are examined under a model of tax competition with two asymmetric countries the asymmetry is expressed through the labour market one country has a perfect labour market whereas the other country s labour market is unionized our results indicate that the welfare effects of capital market integration differ depending on whether governments are active or passive in attracting capital in the absence of active governments capital market integration benefits the country with a competitive labour market whereas it harms the unionized country capital market integration benefits both countries if governments are active and compete for mobile capital using taxes subsidies

tax base effects and fiscal externalities of local capital taxation evidence from a panel of german jurisdictions abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the tax base effects of local capital taxation using a large panel of german municipalities it tests whether both the local tax rate and the tax rate in adjacent jurisdictions affect the local tax base the results obtained from a spatial gmm approach confirm a strong negative impact of the local tax rate whereas the average tax rate of neighboring municipalities proves insignificant only if interacted with the relative population size of neighbors a significant positive impact is found indicating that externalities from taxing decisions of adjacent jurisdictions are experienced only by relatively small municipalities

official and parallel cereals markets in senegal empirical evidence abstract senegal s experience with cereals market regulation grows out of a colonial legacy that accepts a preeminent role for the state as protector of producers and comsumers yet the reality of cereals market operation in senegal differs substantially from that specified in regulatory texts and satisfaction of certain performance objectives is achieved largely because of illegal parallel market activity involving violations of official rules and policies survey data collected in northern and central senegal provide valuable insights into the operation of a heterogeneous cereals marketing system made up of parallel channel marketing agents authorized private traders public sector marketing organizations and parastatals

smuggling and price disparity abstract this paper proposes a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of smuggling legal trade and price disparity defined as a domestic price which exceeds is less than the return from legal export import these phenomena have been found to characterize indonesian smuggling a framework is presented in which legal trade is used to cloak smuggling activity with the implication that the greater the volume of legal trade the less the costs of smuggling this model is then used to explain the observation noted above and to show that smuggling may be welfare increasing vis a vis the non smuggling situation and that even if the suppression of smuggling is costless tax revenue maximization may require a positive level of smuggling in addition the model is applied to coffee and rubber exports from indonesia

evading the use tax on cross border sales abstract a use tax is similar to a sales tax except that it is imposed on purchases made from out of state firms historically the use tax has been widely evaded this paper uses a spatial model to analyze the welfare effects of such evasion the analysis shows that the ability of consumers to evade the use tax alters their behavior in a way that leads firms to charge lower prices this reduces the welfare loss created by the sellers market power and implies that evasion can increase welfare even when tax rates are adjusted to offset the effect of evasion on tax revenue

rational escalation of costs by playing a sequence of unfavorable gambles the martingale playing the martingale strategy is an anomaly reverse to that observed in the st petersburg paradox this paper rationalizes the demonstrated irrationality of playing by characterizing necessary and sufficient conditions under which a utility maximizing decision maker would play the strategy an individual willing to play the martingale may not be deterred by a finite cap on wagers individuals will continue with the strategy in the face of mounting consecutive losses which is thus sequentially rational these results give insight into instances of escalating commitment to a losing cause by analyzing one specific instance of such behavior

on the importance of the participation margin for labor market fluctuations abstract conventional analyses of labor market fluctuations ascribe a minor role to labor force participation we show by contrast that flows based analyses imply that the participation margin accounts for around one third of unemployment fluctuations a novel stock flow apparatus establishes these facts delivering three further contributions first the role of the participation margin appears robust to adjustments for spurious transitions induced by reporting error second conventional stocks based analyses are subject to a stock flow fallacy neglecting offsetting forces of worker flows on the participation rate third increases in labor force attachment among the unemployed during recessions are a leading explanation for the role of the participation margin

the cyclicality of labor market flows a multiple shock approach abstract in this paper we aim to establish some stylized facts about the relative contributions of the job finding and separation rates to unemployment dynamics depending on the nature of structural shocks the shocks in our bayesian structural var model are identified using a sign restriction approach and capture shifts in the three conditions determining labor market equilibrium in matching models the beveridge curve and the job creation and job destruction conditions using both us and french data we identify an aggregate shock to match profitability the aggregate profitability shock a shock specific to existing jobs the reallocation shock and a shock to the efficiency of the matching process the matching efficiency shock we find that the relative contributions of the job finding and separation rates are notably different across shocks in both countries but are similar across countries for each type of shock labor market dynamics appear to be transatlantic despite well known institutional differences however it must be emphasized that the reaction of the labor market variables to the matching efficiency shock seems more muted in the us than in france

the theory of taxation for developing countries tax policy has far reaching implications for economic development and public administration this book which presents a modern theory of public finance brings together many of the most distinguished economists who have written on the subject they provide coherent principles for tax design and a systematic framework for the analysis of practical questions of tax reform and pricing policy in developing countries the book is especially timely as countries experience increasing shortages of government revenue and the distortions brought about by poorly designed tax systems it pays particular attention to the special problems of developing countries such as the taxation of agriculture the aim throughout is to develop techniques that can be quantitatively applied given the data available and empirical case studies illustrate the methods in action the authors analyze the links between tax theory social cost benefit analysis and the pricing of publicly supplied goods and services they also explore the empirical and econometric problems of identifying the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency other topics treated include the analysis of labor markets the taxation of foreign private investment and of fuel and the pricing of education although the models used concentrate on developing countries most of the methods and discussion apply as well to the problems of more affluent countries

on hotelling s competition with non uniform customer distributions abstract hotelling s competition in a two stage location price game is examined with increasing densities of consumers towards the centre it is shown that there is a range of rather even distributions for which firms locate at opposite ends of the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated duopolists will tend to move inside the market

no taxation without information deterrence and self enforcement in the value added tax abstract claims that the vat facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread vat adoption worldwide but there is surprisingly little evidence this paper analyzes the role of third party information for vat enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400 000 chilean firms announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail indicating the paper trail s preventive deterrence effect this leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the vat chain these findings confirm that when taking evasion into account significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation jel d83 h25 h26 k34 o17

equilibrium unemployment job flows and inflation dynamics this paper develops a general equilibrium model to explain a set of facts regarding job flows unemployment and inflation dynamics it integrates a theory of equilibrium unemployment into a monetary model with nominal price rigidities the labor market displays matching frictions and endogenous job destruction the model can explain the cyclical behavior of unemployment job creation job destruction and the joint fluctuations of the labor input along both the extensive and the intensive margin conditional on a shock to monetary policy allowing for variation of the labor input at the extensive margin leads to a significantly lower elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output this helps to explain the sluggishness of inflation and the persistence of output after a monetary policy shock

indirect tax evasion and product efficiency though a number of papers have considered the issues of income tax evasion few have considered indirect tax evasion one of the exceptions is a paper which considers the very special case of a risk averse monopolist producer the present paper addresses the issue of indirect tax evasion in competitive markets evasion in such a market is shown to be associated with production inefficiency the results also suggest that laffer type curves could arise due to evasion

patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income we study the effects of cross border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions we use a salop model with a high middle and low income region in each region a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation in equilibrium regions with higher income offer better quality which creates an incentive for patient mobility from lower to higher income regions assuming a prospective payment scheme based on drg pricing we find that lower non monetary administrative mobility costs have i no effect on quality or welfare in the high income region ii a negative effect on quality but a positive effect on welfare for the middle income region and iii ambiguous effects on quality and welfare for the low income region lower monetary mobility costs copayments might reduce welfare in both the middle and low income region thus health policies that stimulate cross border patient mobility can be counterproductive when regions differ in income

dynamics of worker flows and vacancies evidence from the sign restriction approach this paper establishes robust dynamic features of the worker reallocation process in the us labor market i use structural vars with sign restrictions which take the form of restricting the short run negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment i e beveridge curve despite the weakness of these restrictions they reveal a clear unambiguous pattern that when unemployment increases and vacancies drop i both the separation rate and gross separations rise quickly and remain persistently high ii the job finding rate and vacancies drop in a hump shaped manner and iii gross hires respond little initially but eventually rise these results point to the importance of job loss in understanding us labor market dynamics this pattern also holds with respect to different kinds of shocks that induce the same beveridge curve relationship this paper also considers the disaggregate model which uses data disaggregated into six demographic groups and incorporates transitions into and out of the labor force i show that the separation rate continues to play a dominant role among prime age male workers while for other groups changes in the job finding rate are more important copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence evidence from the states abstract this paper formalizes and tests the notion that states expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states we find that even after allowing for fixed state effects year effects and common random shocks among neighbors a state government s level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors ceteris paribus a one dollar increase in a state s neighbors expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents

black markets and optimal evadable taxation in a simple model of evadable indirect taxation some surprises emerge because of a market thinning effect of high prices high taxes induce multiple equilibria low price black markets and high price legal markets further evadability introduces a bifurcation to optimal taxation for less effective tax administrations the optimal tax system follows a cash cow pattern with one sector bearing all of the tax but for relatively effective administrations the optimum follows a slightly modified ramsey rule this discontinuity results from the mathematics of evasion incentives and may help explain tax reforms commonly seen over the course of economic development

revenue sharing and information exchange under non discriminatory taxation the international exchange of tax information and its merits compared to withholding taxes is the central topic in current debates in international tax policy the purpose of this paper is to characterize and compare the tax regimes that emerge with and without information exchange under the assumption that countries are unable to differentiate between the taxes they apply to residents and non residents it focuses in particular on the role of asymmetries in country size capturing a key feature of tax havens and on the impact and potential desirability of schemes to share the revenue raised by withholding as under the new eu savings tax arrangements or more innovatively as a consequence of information exchange it is shown that irrespective of country size difference pareto efficiency requires that all revenue collected from nonresidents be transferred to the residence country which would require taking the eu practice even further from the norm but is currently the norm in relation to information exchange a withholding scheme with revenue fully reallocated in this way pareto dominates information sharing whatever the allocation under the latter comparing schemes in which there is no revenue sharing however shows that information exchange pareto dominates simple withholding

coveting thy neighbor s manufacturing the dilemma of state income apportionment abstract this paper investigates the economic impact of the apportionment formulae used to divide corporate income taxes among the states most apportionment formulae by including payroll turn the state corporate income tax at least partially into a payroll tax using panel data from 1978 1994 the results show that this distortion has an important effect on state level employment for the average state reducing the payroll weight from one third to one quarter increases manufacturing employment around 1 1 concentrated in durable goods manufacturing and with larger effects in the long run the results also suggest that apportionment changes have important negative externalities on other states on average the aggregate effects of apportionment formula changes are close to zero

in a world without borders the impact of taxes on internet commerce the rapid rise in sales over the internet and the fact that most internet buyers pay no sales tax has ignited a considerable debate over taxes and the internet this paper uses new data on the purchase decisions of approximately 25 000 online users to examine the effect of local sales taxes on internet commerce the results suggest that controlling for observable characteristics people living in high sales taxes locations are significantly more likely to buy online the results are quite robust and cannot be explained by unobserved technological sophistication shopping costs or other alternative explanations the magnitudes in the paper suggest that applying existing sales taxes to internet commerce might reduce the number of online buyers by up to 24 percent

horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition theory and some evidence from the usa this paper provides a simple theoretical framework for analysing simultaneous vertical and horizontal competition in excise taxes and estimates equations informed by the theory on a panel of us state and federal excise taxes on cigarettes and gasoline we also examine the role played by smuggling the results are generally consistent with the theory when the characteristics of the markets for the goods are taken into account for neither good do federal excise taxes affect state taxes taxes in neighbouring states have a significant and large effect in the case of cigarettes and a much weaker effect in the case of gasoline we also find that in the setting of cigarette taxes concerns about cross border shopping play a more important role than concerns about smuggling

dynamics of part time employment to an aggregate shock a sign restriction approach abstract this paper provides new stylized facts about the responses of the part time employment share the transition probability from full time to part time and the one from part time to full time jobs to a negative aggregate shock the recessionary aggregate shock is identified within a sign restriction var framework by imposing a short run negative co movement between unemployment and vacancies the negative aggregate shock pushes the part time employment share up the latter increase is mainly due to a rise in the probability at which full time work is transformed into part time work without an intervening spell of unemployment given that such transitions mainly take place at the same firm worker pair these findings indicate that us firms use in addition to the creation destruction process within employment reallocation to adjust their labor input in recessionary episodes

2 00 gas studying the effects of a gas tax moratorium there are surprisingly few estimates of the effects of sales taxes on retail prices especially at the firm level we consider the temporary suspension and subsequent reinstatement of the gasoline sales tax in illinois and indiana following a price spike in 2000 earlier laws set the timing of the reinstatements providing plausibly exogenous changes in the tax rates using a unique dataset of daily prices at the gas station level 70 of the tax suspension is passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices while 80 100 of the tax reinstatements are passed on to consumers some evidence suggests that these short run pass through estimates are smaller near the state borders with the tax reinstatements associated with relatively higher prices up to an hour s drive into neighboring states

escalation errors and the sunk cost effect an explanation based on reputation and information asymmetries this paper is concerned with explaining a paradox of human behavior consider the following example a department manager makes a large investment in new production equipment and soon after learns of different equipment that could perform the same operations at lower cost incremental analysis favors switching but the manager refuses saying he does not want to waste the investment already made such real world examples have been extensively documented and studied by social scientists see thaler 1980 and staw 1981 in these examples the decision maker having commited to a course of action subsequently discovers new information that indicates that continuing the earlier commitment would likely result in worse consequences than switching in spite of this he clings to and even escalates his earlier

do independent director departures predict future bad events following surprise independent director departures affected firms have worse stock and operating performance are more likely to restate earnings face shareholder litigation suffer from an extreme negative return event and make worse mergers and acquisitions the announcement returns to surprise director departures are negative suggesting that the market infers bad news from surprise departures we use exogenous variation in independent director departures triggered by director deaths to test whether surprise independent director departures cause these negative outcomes or whether an anticipation of negative outcomes is responsible for the surprise director departure our evidence is more consistent with the latter

on pareto improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition this paper shows that when a noncooperative fiscal equilibrium of the mintz tulkens 1986 model of tax competition is inefficient pareto improving changes are positive for the taxes of both regions under concavity of the regions welfare functions it also identifies a class of such equilibria that are always efficient

revenue erosion through exemption and evasion in cameroon 1993 abstract the administration of tax statutes materially determines their economic effects a survey of cameroonian businesses a country seemingly typical of its economic level demonstrates widespread erosion of the tax bases paid by businesses through exemptions and evasion businesses seem willing to provide information on these potentially confidential activities the survey provides information on the number of businesses evading taxes or having exemptions on the characteristics of these businesses relative to others on whether businesses maintain information of use to the tax administration on the contacts between the administration and businesses affecting evasion and on penalties imposed by the administration

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

turnover in top management and de escalation of commitment we explore how de escalation of commitment is linked to top management turnover and economic changes at the firm escalation of commitment occurs when managers continue investment in a project afte

transfer pricing rules and corporate tax competition abstract a multinational parent sells a non marketed commodity to a foreign subsidiary that uses the product as an input to produce a product it then sells the subsidiary is controlled by a local managing partner whose compensation consists of a lump sum payment plus a share of the subsidiary s profit the parent chooses an optimal transfer price taking into account incentives for the subsidiary s managing partner and taxes home and host governments impose corporate income taxes on the parent and subsidiary s respective profits subject to a transfer pricing rule e g cost plus price method or comparable profit method a nash equilibrium is derived for effective tax rates chosen by home and host governments we then examine harmonization and suggest that tax rates would be reduced

state and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with a uniformly populated line that is divided into local jurisdictions and or states if one level of government imposes sales and residential property taxes and if the spatial extent of each taxing jurisdiction is positive and finite then in nash equilibrium the sales tax rate is less than residential property tax rate housing consumption is suboptimal and the public good is underprovided in each jurisdiction if a very large state or country is divided into local jurisdictions and if both levels of government choose tax rates endogenously then under some assumptions there is an efficient outcome

the transhipment problem smuggling and welfare in paraguay abstract this paper studies the effects of contraband on resource allocation and welfare using parguayan data a major portion of exports from this economy involves the transhipment of goods from third countries through paraguay to brazil and argentina to avoid trade taxes both explicit and implicit via quantitative restrictions and multiple exchange rates using international and paraguayan databases for 1990 we calculate that contraband accounted for 58 of exports and 31 of imports finally we estimate that such trade increased welfare by 2 1 of gdp

vertical versus horizontal tax externalities an empirical test abstract we study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base one can observe two types of externalities a horizontal externality working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum and a vertical externality working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates building on the model of keen and kotsogiannis keen michael j kotsogiannis christos 2002 does federalism lead to excessively high taxes american economic review 92 1 363 370 we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables this test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of swiss municipalities that feature direct democratic fiscal decision making so as to maximize the correspondence with the benevolent governments of the theory we find that vertical externalities dominate they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition

the role of information asymmetry in escalation phenomena empirical evidence abstract economic rationality dictates that only incremental costs and benefits should affect decisions observed behavior often seems to violate this principle resulting in unwarranted commitment to past choices and their escalation in this paper we present experimental results that show that information asymmetry plays a key role in determining when such escalation behavior occurs this finding opens new avenues for mitigating escalation behavior since information asymmetry is an environmental feature that can be modified by organization design and explicit economic rewards

asymmetric tax competition abstract the paper analyzes nash equilibrium when two jurisdictions set tax rates on a tax base which is mobile between them population differences imply tax differences the smaller jurisdiction levies a lower tax rate in equilibrium and its residents are better off than those in the larger jurisdiction the nash equilibrium is inefficient if the two jurisdictions merged the resulting allocation would be efficient however if differences in population are great enough residents of the small jurisdiction would be made worse off by such a merger

optimal taxation with costly enforcement and evasion abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between optimal taxation and optimal tax enforcement a central question concerns the extent to which revenue should be raised through higher tax rates which distort behavior or greater enforcement which distorts behavior and also entails direct resource costs in the models examined some expenditure on enforcement may be optimal despite its resource cost its distortionary effect and the availability of other revenue sources having no enforcement costs rules for optimal tax rates and enforcement expenditures are derived which also indicate the marginal cost of government funds and optimal enforcement priorities for a tax collection agency

did the single market cause competition in excise taxes evidence from eu countries tax competition theory predicts that the introduction of the eu single market in 1993 should have caused excise tax competition and thus increased strategic interaction in the setting of excise taxes among eu countries we test this prediction using a panel data set of 12 eu countries over the period 1987 2004 we find that for excise duties on still and sparkling wine beer and ethyl alcohol strategic interaction significantly increased after 1993 there is weaker evidence of increased interaction in cigarette taxes possibly because cigarettes are widely smuggled giving rise to tax competition even before the single market

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

building a composite help wanted index abstract this paper builds a measure of vacancy posting over 1951 2009 that captures the behavior of total print and online help wanted advertising and can be used for time series analysis of the us labor market

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

a spatial tax harmonization model abstract policies to harmonize value added tax rates are controversial in the european union this paper formulates a multi country model over a one dimensional space as a non cooperative nash game in which each country aims at maximizing its tax revenue subject to the constraint that its tax rate lies within a given common band then we examine the effects of changes in the common band on tax rates tax revenues and the number of cross border shoppers at nash equilibrium we also analyze the effects of geographical variation in country size and location

tax compliance and fiscal externalities evidence from u s diesel taxation abstract fiscal externalities across jurisdictions can arise from tax evasion and avoidance while the tax competition literature has generally focused on base shifting and the resulting positive fiscal externalities we show theoretically and empirically that negative fiscal externalities can dominate when the tax base is apportioned across jurisdictions this can lead to a negative relationship between jurisdiction size and the desired tax rate interstate truckers in the united states owe state diesel taxes based on diesel consumption which is apportioned based on the miles driven in each state we find that own state diesel sales fall when the diesel tax rates of other states rise suggesting that tax base evasion is the predominant source of externalities we then estimate a tax reaction specification finding that the own state tax rate is negatively correlated with the tax rates set in other states and with state size both consistent with the sign of the estimated fiscal externality

the ins and outs of unemployment an analysis conditional on technology shocks we analyze how unemployment job finding and job separation rates react to neutral and investment specific technology shocks neutral shocks increase unemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility investmentspecific shocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hours worked volatility movements in the job separation rates are responsible for the impact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements along its adjustment path the evidence warns against using models with exogenous separation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technology shocks in search and sticky price models

tax regimes tariff revenues and government spending this paper develops a model that describes the role of tariffs as a source of government revenue the model takes a public finance perspective and treats as part of the optimum revenue raising tax package relating the behavior of tariff rates and revenues to observable macroeconomic variables such as income and government spending although the approach is quite general the model is constructed to fit the stylized facts concerning the changing role of the tariff in u s history it is shown that relative collection costs for tariffs and other forms of taxes interact with changes in macroeconomic variables to explain the regime shifts qualitative changes in the relative importance of tariffs and other taxes found in u s tariff history copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

crossing the border does commodity tax evasion reduce welfare and can enforcement improve it this paper compares discrete equilibria in which consumers do and do not evade commodity taxes by making cross border purchases when the government faces a revenue requirement the comparison shows that border crossing reduces welfare if resources wasted by evasion exceed the benefit of consumption changes where these changes reflect lower prices across the border and induced changes in domestic tax rates enforcement reduces welfare if administrative and uncertainty costs outweigh the benefits of consumption changes and the reduction in resource costs the analysis shows that the welfare effect of evasion depends on how well designed the tax system is and how effective enforcement resources are in deterring border crossing

interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents abstract this paper considers the manner in which an unequal distribution of consumers affects the commodity tax policies of neighboring jurisdictions the paper uses a spatial model in which the residents of two states are distributed non uniformly and employs a variety of assumptions about the behavior of governments and firms throughout the paper shows that at a nash equilibrium in tax levels the sparsely populated state imposes a lower tax than does its densely populated neighbor the paper also demonstrates how equilibrium state taxes differ depending on whether firms employ marginal cost or profit maximizing pricing

income misattribution under formula apportionment abstract alternatives to the current system of separate tax accounting such as the proposed common consolidated corporate tax base in europe would apportion a firm s worldwide profits using formulas based on the location of employment capital or sales this paper offers a new method of evaluating the accuracy of these apportionment rules and the ownership distortions they create evidence from european company accounts indicates that apportionment formulas significantly misattribute income since employment and other factors on which they are based do a very poor job of explaining a firm s profits for example the magnitude of property employment and sales explains less than 22 of the variation in profits between firms and the prediction estimates from using such a formula exceed half of predicted profits 64 of the time and exceed twice predicted income 11 of the time as a result the use of formulas rewards or punishes international mergers and divestitures by reallocating taxable income between operations in jurisdictions with differing tax rates the associated ownership distortion is minimized by choosing factor weights to minimize weighted squared prediction errors for which based on the european evidence labor inputs should play little if any role in allocation formulas but even a distortion minimizing formula creates large incentives for inefficient ownership reallocation due to the enormous variation in profitability that is unexplained by formulary factors implying that significant resource allocation costs would accompany european adoption of formulary apportionment methods

business cycles and labor market search the quantitative implications of labor market search for economic fluctuations are evaluated in the context of a real business cycle model incorporating labor market search into the model is found to improve its empirical performance along several dimensions in particular hours now fluctuate substantially more than wages and the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity falls in addition the model replicates the observation that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons overall the empirical results suggest that the labor market search environment embodies a quantitatively important propagation mechanism copyright 1996 by american economic association

an analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths implications for the managerial labor market abstract certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive s continued employment these wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty three events these abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive s status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive s talents and decision making responsibility and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement

fuel tax incidence and supply conditions abstract the incidence of taxes on consumers and producers plays a central role in evaluating energy tax policy yet the literature testing the main predictions of the tax incidence model is sparse in this paper we examine the pass through rate of state gasoline and diesel taxes to retail prices and importantly we estimate the dependence of pass through on factors constraining the gasoline and diesel supply chains we consider several factors that alter the elasticity of supply including within state heterogeneity in gasoline content requirements refinery capacity utilization inventory constraints and variation in the demand for untaxed uses of diesel in general we find that in periods of time when the supply chain is constrained and the constraint is plausibly unrelated to shifts in demand the pass through rate of fuel taxes declines we describe several potential implications for tax policy including tax breaks during peak driving season and during times of supply disruptions such as after major hurricanes

managers with and without style evidence using exogenous variation in a large panel of compustat firms we find that firm policy changes after exogenous ceo departures do not display abnormally high levels of variability casting doubt on the presence of idiosyncratic style effects in policy choices after endogenous ceo departures we do detect abnormally large policy changes these changes are larger when the firm is likely to draw from a deeper pool of replacement ceo candidates suggesting the presence of causal style effects that are anticipated by the board our evidence suggests that managerial styles are not transferred across employers and that standard f tests are inappropriate for identifying style effects the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

the spatial incidence of local retail taxation this paper examines the effects of local retail taxation in two simple models of spatial competition suppose that a suburb or central city imposes an excise tax or subsidy on a particular commodity such as gasoline liquor restaurant meals or groceries or imposes a general sales tax that affects many commodities simultaneously to what extent does this lead to higher prices within the jurisdiction and in neighboring jurisdictions section ii presents the basic model of spatial competition that forms a component of the fixed locations model of section iii and the entry model of section iv infinitely many stores are located along an infinite line and demand density is completely inelastic and uniform along the line the main endogenous variables of interest are the prices charged by the different stores throughout the paper a nash equilibrium in prices is assumed section iii presents the fixed locations model in which the tax is imposed after stores have already established themselves store locations are fixed due to location specific sunk costs if a suburb containing a single store imposes an excise tax on a commodity the store that is taxed and its first second and third nearest neighbors on each side increase their prices by 57 7 percent 15 5 percent 4 2 percent and 1 1 percent of the tax respectively this result is independent of the spacing of the stores and independent of whether or not they are evenly spaced if a suburb containing several stores imposes an excise tax the changes in price follow directly by adding the effects of taxes on several adjacent stores if a central city taxes all stores on the right half line the results are given by 12 the taxed and untaxed stores closest to the boundary

optimal trade taxes on agriculture in developing countries subsistence foodcrops and incomes are hard to tax in developing countries it is easy and common to tax agricultural imports and exports if domestic transactions cannot be taxed how should agricultural trade taxes be set and how should indirect taxes on nonagricultural consumer goods be set this paper derives and quantifies formulas for the optimal export tax on a nonfood agricultural product ghanaian cocoa in which the country has market power and the level of indirect taxes on taxable consumer goods it asks whether starting from free trade on cereals there should be import tariffs or subsidies copyright 1990 by royal economic society

sales taxes and internet commerce we estimate the sensitivity of internet retail purchasing to sales taxes using ebay data our first approach exploits the fact that a seller s location and therefore the applicable tax rate is revealed only after a buyer has expressed interest in an item we document how adverse tax surprises reduce the likelihood of purchase and shift subsequent purchases toward out of state sellers we then use more aggregated data to estimate that every one percentage point increase in a state s sales tax increases online purchases by state residents by almost 2 percent while decreasing their online purchases from state retailers by 3 4 percent jel h71 l81 l86

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

prices taxes and automotive fuel cross border shopping abstract the aim of the present paper is to determine whether differences in automotive fuel prices among neighboring autonomous communities i e spanish political administrative regions affect the decisions taken by individuals regarding the region in which to purchase fuel in particular the intention is to discover if price increases in certain autonomous communities as a result of the application of the regional tranche of the hydrocarbon retail sales tax hrst has affected fuel purchases in neighboring communities in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives the monthly purchases of automotive diesel in aragon between january 2001 and march 2007 is estimated from the fuel price in aragon the relation between prices in each of the bordering communities and aragon weighted by density of traffic the number of vehicles registered in that community and three dummy variables representative of the implementation of the regional tranche of the hrst in madrid catalonia and valencia the paper finds empirical evidence to demonstrate a positive effect of the relative prices in the neighboring communities and vehicle registrations and also a negative effect of prices in aragon upon the acquisition of diesel in this region in the case of catalonia some evidence suggests that the price effect may have been strengthened following the introduction of the regional tranche of the hrst in august 2004

cross border shopping from small to large countries abstract contrary to predictions of theoretical models there are many examples in the real world of cross border shopping from small to large countries we demonstrate that a sufficient wedge between marginal costs of public funds in small and large countries can explain this phenomenon

welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation abstract the european commission is currently seeking a rapid accelaration of the process of commodity tax harmonisation within the european community substantial changes in domestic tax structures are envisaged yet the welfare theoretic basis of the policy has remained obscure this note goes some way towards suggesting a welfare argument for harmonisation as a collective response to tax induced trade distortions intentional or otherwise it is shown that a programme of multilateral domestic tax reform involving convergence towards an appropriately weighted average of pre existing tax structures a kind of harmonisation is potentially pareto improving

tax competition tax exporting and higher government choice of tax instruments for local governments abstract this paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction of the land in each local jurisdiction there are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area n 1 and many metropolitan areas in a world economy the paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source based wage taxes by local jurisdictions first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence based lump sum taxes and how this depends on and n the paper then examines the choice of a world national or state government as to whether to allow local metropolitan or sub metropolitan governments to use business property taxes wage taxes or both assuming that the local governments choose the actual tax rates

tacit collusion and international commodity taxation the paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other s home market we consider both the choice of international tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting where production costs differ between countries and a setting where exogenous tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry the conclusions derived from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

a theory of risk smuggling and welfare abstract this paper argues that the existing models of smuggling do not provide a proper treatment of risk the paper develops a smuggling model which is an application of james tobin s celebrated risk analysis to the smuggling situation the paper shows that a large number of existing key smuggling related results are fundamentally modified the paper then develops special cases using this properly specified risk model these special cases help identify the assumptions one needs to obtain results in the existing smuggling literature it is shown that the required assumptions for these results to hold are generally quite unrealistic

price controls and rent seeking behavior in developing countries abstract when the price of a good is controlled a nonprice allocation rule must necessarily be substituted for allocation by price examples are first come first served allocation which gives rise to rationing by waiting and allocation by an explicit system of ration coupons with rationing by waiting consumers are induced to pursue activities that economize on waiting costs such as buying a larger quantity per purchase although such responses are individually rational they are socially self defeating in the sense that they lower equilibrium consumer welfare rationing by coupons can avoid some but typically not all of these losses these ideas are developed with examples of model economies and their practical relevance is illustrated with evidence from developing countries

a three input model of the spatial effects of a central city wage tax abstract this paper considers the short run and long run spatial effects on wages employment and business capital as functions of location of a localized increase in wage tax rates the model is most applicable to a central city that has a higher wage tax rate than the surrounding suburbs the inclusion of land as a third input in production significantly reduces the long run effects of a central city wage tax on employment near the central city boundary as compared with a model in which labor and capital are the only two inputs the short run effects are significantly less than the long run effects

spatial competition between jurisdictions which tax perfectly competitive retail or production centers abstract this paper examines the taxes that jurisdictions choose to impose on perfectly competitive retail centers or production centers within their boundaries retail centers are located on a line and jurisdictions are segments of the line a jurisdiction maximizes the sum of tax revenues and residents consumer surplus the tax chosen by a jurisdiction is a function of the spacing between retail centers the locations of interjurisdictional boundaries and the taxes imposed by neighboring jurisdictions an exporting jurisdiction chooses a positive tax an importing jurisdiction chooses a zero tax even if neighboring jurisdictions have taxes or subsidies if all jurisdictions with retail centers use endogenous fiscal policy then each imposes a positive or zero tax

the market for public office why the indian state is not better at development abstract how and why officials are transferred from one post to another can in india does have far reaching consequences for the effectiveness of public service organizations such as irrigation agriculture forestry and soil conservation departments the transfer mechanism used in many departments of indian states involves a kind of internal labor market a truer market than in the way that term is often used by labor market economists it allows pressures for corrupt behavior to bear down on the incumbents of certain posts and itself amplifies those pressures frequently the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary to the ostensible objectives of their departments why is the indian state not better at promoting development to an important degree because of the corruption transfer mechanism and its effects on bureaucratic initiatives