optimal commercial policy with quality differentiated products abstract this paper examines the optimal tariff policy for an importer of a quality differentiated product when tariff levels are allowed to vary with the quality of the good the deadweight loss due to changes in the matching of consumers to goods under tariffs is emphasized it is shown that if the objective is to transfer income to products there is a presumption that the optimal policy will require consumers to choose lower quality goods than under free trade quality downgrading if all qualities are improved an ad valorem tariff cannot be the optimal policy

policies and international trade agreements on technical compatibility for industries with network externalities abstract the paper considers a country home in which consumers have heterogeneous preferences over ex ante incompatible domestic and imported products and benefit from a network externality we analyze the cases with trade under perfect competition and the international duopoly in which both governments strategically use policies toward compatibility but cannot use conventional trade policies in both cases the equilibrium outcome of the non cooperative game depends upon the strength of the network externality effect and involves either an excessively high equilibrium level of compatibility in combination with either too much or too little trade or very low equilibrium levels of both compatibility and trade the paper concludes with the analysis of the international agreements on policies toward compatibility and evaluates the existing provisions in the wto legal system aimed at minimizing the trade inhibiting impact of standards and regulations in the area of technical compatibility

optimal liquidity management and bail out policy in the banking industry abstract we characterize the profit maximizing reserves of a commercial bank and the generated probability of a liquidity crisis as a function of the penalty imposed by the central bank the probability of depositors liquidity needs and the return on outside investment opportunities we demonstrate that banks do not fully internalize the social cost associated with the bail out policy if the liquidity needs of individuals are correlated and that competitive interbank markets will induce banks to raise their reserves under reasonable conditions the marginal benefits from an interbank market decrease as the correlation between the liquidity shocks of banks increases

environmental quality competition and eco labeling abstract a three stage game of investment environmental quality provision and price competition is developed to study the impact of green technology investment eco labeling in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation the firms incentives to invest in green technologies depend on their relative cost structure when firms are identical with respect to fixed costs both firms will always invest but if one firm is more efficient in investing then the other firm may or may not invest depending on the level of unit cost of investment quality competition will be tighter when the low quality firm is more efficient and looser when the high quality firm is more efficient in investing socially optimal investment for both firms is always positive but lower than in the duopoly solution in the absence of environmental externalities the quality dispersion chosen by profit maximizing firms may be too high or too low while environmental externalities increase the possibility low quality dispersion that is too low within the market solution finally and importantly ecolabeling can be used as a means of reducing excessive investment and increasing environmental quality that is too low

the execution of monetary policy a tale of two central banks money markets and at the inception of economic and monetary union emu an open question was whether execution of monetary policy by the eurosystem could effectively stabilize liquidity and short term interest rates potential problems could arise from the central bank s limited knowledge of the new euro area market s response to shocks and from market participants limited understanding of the monetary authorities policy execution framework which minimizes the central bank s presence in the market and assigns a key liquidity stabilization role to standing facilities and to depository institutions own reserve management we find that the euro area money market has displayed a remarkable degree of stability since the inception of emu overnight euro rates have behaved very similarly to us federal funds rates which are managed much more actively by the us federal reserve recent operational changes by both the eurosystem and the federal reserve are leading to convergence in style of policy execution on the two sides of the atlantic and may foster even closer similarity in the next few years leonardo bartolini and alessandro prati

export subsidies and high productivity cause or effect according to the emerging strategic theory of trade policy countries selling in imperfectly competitive world markets may benefit from export subsidies this paper demonstrates that the theory predicts that it is the countries with the lowest production costs that offer the highest subsidies it is argued that this result diminishes the attraction of the theory as a positive explanation of trade policy

bank reserve adjustment process and the use of reserve carryover as a reserve management tool a microeconometric approach this papers examines the impact of bank use of the reserve carryover provision on the reserveadjustment process and federal funds rate volatility a discussion of the newly proposed change to contemporaneous reserve accounting is also given the empirical purposes of this paper are accomplished by specifying and estimating a model of bank reserve adjustment behavior in which the interrelatedness of reserve adjustment instruments is explicitly taken into account we conclude that to the extent banks use carryover to express their funds rate forecasts in the market and the federal reserve clearly signals its intended open market course variability in the funds rate and the monetary aggregates is reduced by the carryover provision

discipline and liquidity in the interbank market using 20 years of panel data i demonstrate that high risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity the economic importance of this effect was relatively small until the mid 1990s when regulatory and institutional changes began to impose more of the costs of bank failure on uninsured creditors subsequently interbank market price discipline roughly doubled and risk based rationing effects increased by a factor of six in imposing this discipline lenders seem to care most about credit risk at borrowing institutions

strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs abstract this paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an ldc and a developed country firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive third country market under bertrand competition unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low quality ldc and an investment tax by the developed country whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation under cournot competition unilateral policy is also reversed from the bertrand outcome but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries

the federal funds market excess reserves and unconventional monetary policy abstract following the bankruptcy of lehman brothers interbank borrowing and lending dropped whereas reserve holdings of depository institutions skyrocketed as the fed injected liquidity into the u s banking sector this paper introduces bank liquidity risk and limited market participation into a real business cycle model with ex ante identical financial intermediaries and shows in an analytically tractable way how interbank trade and excess reserves emerge in general equilibrium investigating the role of the federal funds market and unconventional monetary policy for the propagation of aggregate real and financial shocks i find that federal funds market participation is irrelevant in response to standard supply and demand shocks whereas it matters for uncertainty shocks i e mean preserving spreads in the cross section of liquidity risk liquidity injections by the central bank can absorb the effects of financial shocks on the real economy although excess reserves might increase and federal funds might be crowded out as a side effect

cross country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates volatility abstract volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models designed to replicate the features of individual countries markets cannot account for this paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks our model is consistent with central banks practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short term interest rates conflicts with another high frequency objective such as an exchange rate target

fixed costs and the behavior of the federal funds rate abstract this paper presents an equilibrium model of the federal funds market that ties movements in the funds rate to changes in the supply of reserves and to a fixed cost facing banks that borrow at the discount window it is found that the existence of the fixed cost is capable of explaining a number of features of the funds market in particular it is critical for explaining occasional instances of extremely high funds rates it also provides an explanation for heterogeneous behavior across banks towards the discount window and for higher average funds rates at the end of maintenance periods

the liquidity effect in the federal funds market evidence at the monthly frequency in this paper we argue that much of the research into the link between money and interest rates suffers from misspecification the measure of money and the measure of interest rates are not always well matched in examining the transmission of monetary policy we show that using an appropriate measure of money federal reserve balances and the appropriate interest rate the federal funds rate a clear liquidity effect exists furthermore we explain how a lack of a clear institutional understanding may have contributed to the finding of a liquidity puzzle in the past

sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality abstract in this paper we examine how the timing of investment affects the levels of quality chosen by firms we show that in a model with vertical quality differentiation a game with sequential quality choice induces both firms to make smaller quality investments than they would in a game with simultaneous quality choice furthermore we show that while aggregate profit is higher both consumer and social surplus are lower under sequential quality choice

oligopolistic competition and international trade quantity and quality restrictions abstract we examine trade restrictions such as quantity and quality limitations on imports in an oligopolistic industry consisting of foreign and domestic firms we find that the effects of trade policy hinge on the location of the quality produced by the firms in the quality spectrum a quota leads to positive protection while minimum quality standards leads to negative protection furthermore minimum standards lower national welfare and a quota has an ambiguous effect on welfare

liquidity regulation and the implementation of monetary policy in addition to revamping existing rules for bank capital basel iii introduces a new global framework for liquidity regulation one part of this framework is the liquidity coverage ratio lcr which requires banks to hold sufficient high quality liquid assets to survive a 30 day period of market stress as monetary policy typically involves targeting the interest rate on loans of one of these assets central bank reserves it is important to understand how this regulation may impact the efficacy of central banks current operational frameworks we introduce term funding and an lcr requirement into an otherwise standard model of monetary policy implementation our model shows that if banks face the possibility of an lcr shortfall then the usual link between open market operations and the overnight interest rate changes and the short end of the yield curve becomes steeper our results suggest that central banks may want to adjust their operational frameworks as the new regulation is implemented

interest on reserves and the flexibility of monetary policy in the euro area this paper shows that remunerating required reserves can increase the flexibility of monetary policy the remuneration at the current policy rate implies constant net marginal interest costs of holding required reserves this allows the central bank to change the policy rate also within a reserve maintenance period without inducing a problematic reserve shifting on behalf of the banks in the euro area required reserves are remunerated at an average rate therefore the way in which reserves are remunerated has to be changed in order to make use of the advantage of a higher flexibility of monetary policy

voluntary reserve targets we study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets vrts operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade as they have since the financial crisis we show that no matter the abundance of reserves vrts encourage market activity and support the central bank s control over interest rates we consider i the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and ii a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the federal reserve overall a vrt framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks

on the persistence of leadership or leapfrogging in international trade when two countries starting from different quality levels reflecting different conditions on domestic market demands open to trade two possible equilibria arise in the first the quality leader maintains its position in the second leapfrogging occurs however the latter is possible only if the initial quality gap is not too wide further when the risk dominance criterion is used only the former equilibrium is selected these results suggest that initial conditions such as domestic market size or home demand preferences are important factors in determining relative competitiveness of firms in international markets

day of the week effects in federal funds rates further empirical findings abstract we extend the spindt and hoffmeister 1988 model of the daily operation of an institution s federal reserve account to show strong inter and intra period incentives to borrow and lend in the federal funds market at predictable points in the 10 trading day settlement period using intraday high and low prices we demonstrate changes in the federal funds rate consistent with our model s predictions we provide evidence of predictable changes in the variance of fed funds returns on a daily and intraday basis our analysis confirms that federal reserve requirements result in daily and intraday variances which are not constant

the micromechanics of the federal funds market implications for day of the week effects in funds rate variability the federal funds rate arguably is the most important interest rate in the u s capital market because it plays a central role in monetary policy and the term structure this paper examines the micromechanics of the funds market we show that in a continuous market with asynchronous trading regulatory constraints and accounting conventions that focus agents attention on discrete time instants have important implications for the dynamics of trading activity and realized market prices we also exhibit a model of the market that explains observed regularities in the intertemporal behavior of the funds rate

trade policy and its impact on quality of imports this paper examines the role of trade policies in influencing a foreign monopolist s decision on price quantity and in particular the quality of its product we show that a specific tariff leads to higher quality whereas an ad valorem tariff usually does the opposite quotas and specific tariffs are shown to be equivalent and both dominate an ad valorem tariff in terms of welfare we also show that subjecting imports to minimum quality requirements hampers national welfare finally we present a comprehensive ranking of all the policy instruments considered in this paper

national treatment at the wto the roles of product and country heterogeneity this paper analyzes the world trade organization s wto s national treatment nt clause in a two country model where quality of goods and or market size are heterogenous across countries when market size is symmetric across countries a reciprocal nt agreement i benefits the high quality country ii hurts the low quality country and iii delivers higher aggregate world welfare however such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high quality country s market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small i e goods are sufficiently alike the qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined

a computational model of banks optimal reserve management policy abstract this paper uses numerical methods to model the demand for excess reserves by a representative bank in a framework that includes many realistic features of the current reserve market structure in the united states in particular the model incorporates a 14 day maintenance period and an accurate representation of carryover provisions we use the model to evaluate the effect of various changes to the operating environment increased uncertainty modified penalties and changes to policy paying interest on reserves

bank reserve adjustment process and the use of reserve carryover as a reserve management tool abstract in light of vogt s 1989 comment on our original paper we reexamine the empirical evidence on how banks use reserve carryover we dispute vogt s characterization of the evidence as contradictory and find nothing in the results to undermine our original conclusion that banks use the reserve carryover provision primarily to hedge reserves costs over time we also correct a computational error that appeared in the original paper

the response of term rates to fed announcements in february 4 1994 the federal reserve began the practice of announcing changes in the targeted level for the federal funds rate immediately after such decisions were made this paper investigates to what extent the policy of the announcement affected a key ingredient in the monetary transmission mechanism the term structure of nominally risk free treasury securities we find that term rates react much more in unison during announcement days than at any other time moreover the practice of circumscribing almost all changes in the federal funds rate target to federal open market committee fomc meeting dates regiments the formation of market expectations in the overnight rate and the price discovery process of term rates thus facilitating the fed s goal of controlling long term rates

excess reserves and economic activity abstract this paper examines endogenous excess reserve holdings in the banking sector of an otherwise standard dsge environment excess reserves act as an extensive margin of bank lending that is inactive in traditional limited participation models where banks hold minimal reserves by assumption the results suggest that this extensive margin of bank lending can dampen and even overturn the standard liquidity effect of monetary contractions when the liquidity effect is overturned a monetary contraction results in an increase in output in addition the model predicts that changes in the interest rate paid on reserves can deliver large short run responses

the sensitivity of strategic and corrective r d policy in oligopolistic industries abstract we evaluate the case for r d subsidies in export sectors when the outcome of r d is uncertain and the product market is oligopolistic when r d reduces expected costs in the particular sense of first order stochastic dominance a national strategic basis for r d subsidies exists whether firms choose prices or quantities this must be balanced against a corrective incentive to tax r d whenever the number of domestic firms exceeds one however when r d increases the riskiness of the cost distribution as well the results may switch there emerges a strategic incentive to tax and a corrective incentive to subsidize r d

the carry forward provision and management of bank reserves the 1968 amendment to regulation d of the federal reserve code permits banks to carry forward one sequential reserve excess or deficiency into the next reserve accounting period this was intended to reduce the weekly pressure on individual banks to adjust their reserve position we find instead that the carry forward provision gives individual banks an incentive to alternate weekly between reserve excesses and reserve deficiencies thus the carry forward provision tends to induce reserve position adjustments even in the absence of changes in the level of deposits in addition the carry forward provision reduces the impact of interest rate changes on the desired level of excess reserves since the 1968 amendment to regulation d of the federal reserve code reserve requirements have been based on the level of deposits two weeks earlier1 and banks have been permitted to carry forward into the next accounting period one week a reserve excess or deficiency of not more than two percent of their required reserves a bank may not however carry forward two consecutive reserve excesses nor two consecutive reserve deficiencies this paper examines the effect of the carry forward provision on individual bank reserve positions following orr and mellon 7 we approach reserve position management by an individual bank as an inventory problem our analysis shows that the carryforward provision gives individual banks an incentive to alternate weekly between deficient and excess reserve positions this oscillatory behavior is observed in the available data our analysis also suggests that the carry forward provision reduces the impact of interest rate changes on the desired level of excess reserves and generally increases the pressure on individual banks to alter their reserve positions the carry forward provision has already received some attention in the literature coats 3 suggests that the potential to carry over reserves alters the meaning of free reserves while gilbert 5 argues that the reserve adjustment pressure is the same with or without the carry forward provision the effect of

quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice abstract in a vertical product differentiation model under cournot competition both foreign and domestic firms respond by lowering their investment in long run quality for a quantity restriction at and in the neighborhood of the free trade import level average quality increases only when the low quality foreign firm faces a substantially restrictive quota voluntary export restraint the change in quality depends on whether the foreign firm is of high or low quality and upon the restrictiveness of the quota the imposition of quantity restrictions has important strategic effects on the long run choice of quality

tariffs versus quotas with endogenous quality this paper analyzes the effects and desirability of tariffs quotas and quality controls when the quality of the imported good is endogenous and the foreign producer is a monopolist a crucial determinant of the direction of these effects is shown to be the valuation of increments in quality by the marginal consumer relative to that of all consumers on average a way of comparing infinitesimal equivalent policies is developed and used to compare import equivalent policies

political models of the business cycle should be revived political models of the business cycle have typically been ignored because they appear inconsistent with rational behavior and because empirical evidence is inconclusive this paper addresses the second issue demonstrating for u s real gnp unemployment and inflation that electoral cycles persistent patterns across electoral terms are significant but apparently only for republican incumbents and that partisan cycles persistent differences between parties are also significant these findings are consistent with the conjecture that a minority party is more constrained by electoral concerns whereas a majority party is freer to pursue partisan objectives

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

technical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities we examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology the relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality the clash between the foreign firm s choice and the local government s ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm ce texte examine les preferences d une firme etrangere et d un gouvernement du pays hote quant a deux modes d investissement direct de l etranger entree de novo de la firme etrangere versus acquisition d une firme domestique en place deux facteurs pris en compte sont la presence d externalites de reseau et d incompatibilite partielle entre la technologie locale et celle introduite par la firme etrangere l impact relatif des modes d entree sur le mieux etre local depend du degre de concurrence sur le marche et de l importance des externalites de reseau le conflit entre les preferences de l entreprise etrangere et les preferences du gouvernement local peuvent etre a la source de politiques qui limitent le degre de proprieteetrangere permis

import competition product quality reversal and welfare abstract we investigate product quality in an import competing country using the framework of vertical product differentiation comparison of three polices suggests that the quality based r d subsidy brings quality reversal leading to a win win win equilibrium in consumer surplus domestic profit and social welfare

voluntary export restraints profits and quality adjustment this paper develops a model of vertical differentiation to assess the impact of output constraints on the profits and quality choices of firms subject to them a competitive environment is developed with the automobile industry in mind multiproduct oligopolists producing differentiated goods who behave as coumot competitors the results show that an output constraint will not induce constrained firms to upgrade their product line when their unconstrained competitors produce higher quality models it is also shown that an output constraint can raise the profits of constrained firms despite output increases by unconstrained firms