speculative attacks unique equilibrium and transparency abstract models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks morris and shin 1998 have shown that in the context of those models unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced in this paper we apply the method of morris and shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies that their results continue to hold even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents we provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack for the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks

effort and wages evidence from the payroll tax this is a pre copy editing author produced pdf file of an article accepted for publication canadian journal of economics following peer review this accepted manuscript is being archived under the conditions specified in the bu open access policy

industrial fatigue redux abstract this paper presents a gift exchange labor market model in which workers are prone to exhaustion although norms of reciprocity and fairness indicate that firms and workers must exchange gifts in the form of higher wages and higher effort respectively these incentives are mitigated by the evolution of fatigue and therefore the dynamic efficiency wage is lower than its static counterpart

post layoff earnings among semiconductor workers this study uses administrative data from california s unemployment insurance program to analyze the post layoff earnings of displaced and recalled workers in silicon valley s semiconductor industry

group reputations stereotypes and cooperation in a repeated labor market reputation effects and other regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria existing reputation building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions this paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium fre with stereotyping perceived type correlation in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions new experiments generate results in line with the fre prediction including final period reversions to stage game equilibrium and non cooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

coordinating regime switches the canonical model of strategic complementarities between individual actions which exhibits multiple equilibria under perfect information is extended with heterogeneous agents and imperfect information agents observe their own cost of action and the history of the levels of aggregate activity the distribution of individual characteristics evolves through a random process and individuals are rational bayesians under plausible conditions there is a unique equilibrium with phases of high and low activity and random switches applications may be found in macroeconomics and revolutions

financial contagion through capital connections a model of the origin and spread of bank panics financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic setting with incomplete information and multiple banks the equilibrium probability of bank failure is uniquely determined we explore how the cross holding of deposits motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious eects conditional on the failure of a financial institution we show that contagion is possible in the unique equilibrium of the economy and characterize exactly when it may exist at the same time we identify a direction of flow for contagious eects which provides a rationale for localized financial panics simulations identify the optimal level of interbank deposit holdings in the presence of contagion risk our results suggest that when the probability of bank failure is low maximal levels of interbank holdings are optimal when cross holding of deposits is complete we demonstrate that the intensity of contagion is increasing in the size of regionally aggregate liquidity shocks

advances in supervision technology and economic welfare a general equilibrium analysis abstract we analyze the impact of improvements in the technology by which employers monitor their workers it is unclear a priori whether workers should benefit or not from such advances on the one hand they decrease the total costs of hiring workers and stimulate labor demand on the other hand as supervision becomes less costly employers tend to substitute monitoring for wages as a means of motivating workers we show how the impact on firms and workers of such technological progress depends on the nature of the labor market equilibrium i e whether there is full employment or not and the cost technology of monitoring a distinct possibility is that unemployed workers welcome the changes in supervision because they promote employment while employed workers resist such changes and the more intensive supervision they encourage

fair wages and effort provision combining evidence from a choice experiment and a field experiment the presence of workers who reciprocate higher wages with greater effort can have important consequences for firms and labor markets knowledge about the extent and determinants of reciprocal effort choices is however incomplete we investigate the role of fairness perceptions and social preferences in a field experiment in which workers were hired for a one time job we show that workers who perceive being underpaid at the base wage increase their performance if the hourly wage increases whereas those who feel adequately paid or overpaid at the base wage do not change their performance moreover we find that only the workers who display reciprocity in a choice experiment show reciprocal effort responses in the field the workers who lack reciprocity in the choice experiment do not respond to the wage increase even if they feel underpaid at the base wage our findings suggest that fairness perceptions and social preferences are key in workers performance response to wage increases in our study the wage increase affects effort mainly through the removal of perceived unfairness i e the elimination of negative reciprocity toward the firm rather than positive reciprocity these results are the first direct evidence of the fair wage effort hypothesis in the field and also help interpret previous contradictory findings in the literature data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1970 this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

efficiency wage models of unemployment one view h lorne carmichael persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies what could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models this paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments it concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment persistent involuntary unemployment of workers is a recurrent problem in labor markets all over the world unemployed workers seem unable to find work even though they are willing to accept lower wages than those being paid employed workers with similar skills what could be preventing wages from adjusting to clear these markets many recent papers known collectively as the efficiency wage literature now claim to have the answer this paper will survey the efficiency wage literature and critically evaluate some of its accomplishments efficiency wage models have already been examined by yellen 1984 katz 1986 and stiglitz 1987 and have received generally favorable reviews this paper is more critical its overall conclusion is that efficiency wage models provide some useful insights into the workings of the labor market but they do not provide a satisfactory account of wage rigidity or involuntary unemployment there are at least five separate versions of the efficiency wage model they share a common structure however and this is outlined in the first section of the paper this section also attempts to relate efficiency wage models to other recent models of unemployment section ii examines and criticizes the different approaches in detail section iii evaluates the achievements of this approach and suggests some directions for future work i a general efficiency wage model efficiency wage models as the name suggests are first of all models of wages they generate unemployment by showing that firms will sometimes want to set wages at non market clearing levels it is useful to begin therefore by reviewing how wages and employment are determined in some related models in a perfectly competitive labor market the wage for each type of labor is adjusted constantly to maintain equality of supply and demand overall employment fluctuates in response to demand changes as workers move up and down their labor supply curves unemployment is voluntary in that anyone who is not working prefers that state to employment at the going wage for people of his skills as well the value of a worker s marginal product is equal to the marginal value of his leisure so there are no unexploited wage bargains between unemployed workers and firms this model is successful in predicting the long term response of wages to shifts in demand and supply but it is clear that in the short run its depiction of voluntary unemployment and flexible wages is unrealistic a natural way to generate more realism is to assume that wages are inflexible in the short run in this case a reduction in demand away from a long run equilibrium will lead to rationing of jobs by employers as they attempt to stay on their labor demand curves the unemployment here is involuntary in that the unemployed would prefer to be working at the going wage and is inefficient in that there are lost gains from trade between these workers and firms the weakness of this model is that it is silent about the mechanism that keeps wages rigid unemployed workers who offer to work for less than the fixed wage ought to find work the early implicit contract models of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 provide one explanation for wage rigidity these models introduced the idea that wages can do more than just clear the market for labor wages in an implicit contract model are used to shift the risk generated by uncertain output market conditions from risk averse workers to the risk neutral firm

contagion of self fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios abstract we look at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the same group of investors each country might face a self fulfilling crisis agents withdrawing their investments fearing that others will a crisis in one country reduces agents wealth this makes them more averse to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country increasing their incentive to withdraw their investments consequently the probability of a crisis there increases this generates a positive correlation between the returns in the two countries since diversification affects returns in our model its welfare implications are non trivial

exchange rate rules and macroeconomic stability this paper discusses exchange rate rules in their role as macroeconomic instruments we abstract throughout from the trend part of exchange rate behaviour a crawling peg necessitated by differences in trend inflation and emphasise instead the implications of exchange rate rules in providing flexibility of real wages or in affecting the stability of output or prices

the dispersion of employees wage increases and firm performance previous studies examining intra firm wage dispersion and firm performance have focused on wage levels the authors of this study argue that for purposes of comparing wage dispersion s positive inc

partial gift exchange in an experimental labor market impact of subject population differences productivity differences and effort requests on behavior we report a gift exchange experiment firms make wage offers workers respond by determining an effort level higher effort is more costly to workers and firms have no mechanism for punishing or rewarding workers consistent with the gift exchange hypothesis workers provide more effort at higher wages but undergraduates provide substantially less effort than mbas evidence suggests this results from differences in prior work experience firms nonbinding effort requests are at least partially honored resulting in increased overall effort for undergraduates although higher wages are relatively more costly for lower productivity firms workers do not provide them with more effort

real exchange rate targeting and inflation in turkey an empirical analysis with policy credibility abstract in this paper we make an empirical investigation into the conflict among objectives under a real exchange rate policy i e between the trade balance and domestic inflation this occurs when the nominal exchange rate is managed to achieve a certain level of the real exchange rate in order to main external competitiveness our empirical analysis draws on the turkish case whereby the exchange rate has been the key policy instrument since the 1980s the results from the simulation experiments with a well defined macromodel where the devaluation expectations are explicitly considered indicate moderate inflationary consequences of a real exchange rate policy based on the relative purchasing power parity ppp rule in turkey moreover a real exchange rate appreciation is found to be contractionary these are common characteristics of the demand determined output case another major conclusion is that the exchange rate policy can provide an anchor for price stability only if it is credible

the role of career and wage incentives in labor productivity evidence from a two stage field experiment in malawi we study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self selection and incentive effect channels using a two stage field experiment in malawi first recent secondary school g

the efficiency wage hypothesis applying a general model of the interaction between labor quantity and quality abstract the efficiency wage is analyzed in the context of a market for labor quality units the model is equivalent to that of a perishable one period form of firm specific human capital which is most efficiently financed by the employer indirectly through higher wages the hypothesis also assumes a labor market in which the quantity units have zero price i e labor earns no rent which can occur in the absence of unemployment only if the supply of some quality attribute is subject to constant costs on the intensive margin this constant cost condition is implicit in w a lewis original description of the traditional sector in a dual economy otherwise the zero rent assumption requires unemployment in which case it can not be used to explain the existence of unemployment the general applicability of the constant cost condition and of the efficiency wage hypothesis is questioned

efficiency wages and industry wage differentials a comparison across methods of pay efficiency wage considerations should be less important for piece rate pay than for time wages therefore if industry wage differentials reflect efficiency wage factors then these pay differences should be less sizable and have less explanatory power for piecework than for timework we test this proposition using wage data for male production workers employed in the swedish metalworking industries in 1985 the data are partitioned into two groups of workers in our preferred sub sample of workers who received pay under both piece rates and time wages our results are uniformly consistent with efficiency wage implications for industry wage differentials for the subsample of workers who received pay under either piece rates or time wages industry wage differentials are of equal importance under either pay scheme these latter results however may also be influenced by unaccounted for sorting of workers and employers across methods of pay overall our examination of industry wage differentials across m

dynamic global games of regime change learning multiplicity and the timing of attacks global games of regime change coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attack it have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks bank runs debt crises and political change we extend the static benchmark examined in the literature by allowing agents to take actions in many periods and to learn about the underlying fundamentals over time we first provide a simple recursive algorithm for the characterization of monotone equilibria we then show how the interaction of the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks with the arrival of information over time or with changes in fundamentals leads to interesting equilibrium properties first multiplicity may obtain under the same conditions on exogenous information that guarantee uniqueness in the static benchmark second fundamentals may predict the eventual fate of the regime but not the timing or the number of attacks finally equilibrium dynamics can alternate between phases of tranquility where no attack is possible and phases of distress where a large attack can occur even without changes in fundamentals

efficiency wage models of unemployment a second view kevin lang and shulamit kahn efficiency wage models in which firms find it profitable to pay wages above workers reservation wages provide a promising explanation for unemployment and interindustry wage differentials one criticism of such models is they imply firms should sell jobs by requiring up front bonds from new workers however only some efficiency wage models imply this moreover firms might not require bonds for many reasons we show that moral hazard and adverse selection models together explain many labor market phenomena the efficiency wage model conforms well to empirical finding but certain anomalies suggest the need to consider rent sharing models carmichael s paper in this volume is an important contribution to the debate over the importance of efficiency wages he clearly outlines some of the deficiencies in the theory and thus points out areas needing further research nevertheless his conclusions are far too negative he greatly exaggerates the theoretical weakness of the efficiency wage model and gives insufficient recognition to the empirical implications generated by this model and to tests of these implications i shirking models there is direct empirical evidence that shirking is a serious problem for firms firms spend significant sums monitoring workers levine 1987 reviews the evidence that worker shirking is widespread and costly the evidence in burroway 1979 and mars 1982 also demonstrates the importance of shirking and stealing carmichael s primary argument against shirking models is that if the payment of efficiency wages to deter shirking led to an excess supply of workers workers would buy their jobs by posting bonds since we do not observe workers posting bonds he concludes that firms do not pay efficiency wages either given the importance of shirking the absence of market clearing bonds needs explaining one explanation is that the market has found some reasonable substitute for bonds such as deferred wage payments it is theoretically feasible to substitute deferred wage payments for up front bonds as noted by akerlof and katz 1989 however the empirical evidence of industries with deferred payments i e where low beginning wages are balanced by high subsequent wages is mixed dickens and katz 1987b krueger and summers 1988 and abraham and farber 1987 indicate that industries which pay high wages to high tenure workers tend to pay high wages to low tenure workers on the other hand high wage industries also tend to have steeper earnings profiles which may be evidence of deferred earnings in these industries as shapiro and stiglitz 1984 note a second possible explanation for the absence of market clearing bonding is that bonding gives firms an incentive to fire workers immediately upon collecting their bonds however this explanation assumes that a firm will immediately fire every worker who posts a bond if there are any reputation costs at all some firms sometimes will not fire bond posting workers and we should observe some bonding yet with finite length contracts there must be some reputation costs because otherwise firms would never pay workers in the last period thus firm incentives to cheat and fire workers cannot explain the complete absence of bonding clearly the absence of market clearing bonding is not fully understood and further theoretical work is needed dickens katz lang and summers 1989 review a wide variety of possible reasons that bond posting is limited the important point is that there are many potential reasons for limited bonding other than the absence of efficiency wages on the other hand the lack of bonding despite the importance of shirking does not demonstrate that firms pay efficiency wages there may be reputation or other costs to the worker caught shirking even in the absence of bonding as dickens katz lang and summers 1989 demonstrate in the absence of bonding whether paying efficiency wages dominates relying solely on increased monitoring depends on the parameters of the model and is therefore an empirical issue

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

rational irrationality some economics of self management abstract the paper first reviews some of the main challenges posed to our received economic paradigm by a variety of behaviors documented by psychologists and discusses possible responses to this challenge it then describes a specific attempt at unifying a number of themes in social psychology using a parsimonious modeling of human behavior

monetary policy and inflation under the crawling peg some evidence from vars for colombia abstract this paper investigates the effects of monetary policy under the crawling peg in colombia utilizing granger causality tests variance decompositions and impulse response functions from vars several alternative lag selection criteria are used to specify the lag structures of the vars variations in domestic credit appear to affect the balance of payments but not the exchange rate in colombia suggesting that the crawling peg has functioned more like a fixed than a flexible exchange rate the size of the balance of payments offset is relatively large but the models differ on its size domestic credit appears to have a weak effect on national output neither domestic credit nor the exchange rate play much of a role in explaining variation in inflation in colombia inflation appears to be primarily inertial and the result of demand shocks the results are consistent with the recent difficulties encountered in maintaining monetary targets in colombia and the persistence of inflation under contractionary monetary policy

allocation under dictatorship research in stalin s archives we survey recent research on the soviet economy in the state party and military archives of the stalin era the archives have provided rich new evidence on the economic arrangements of a command system under a powerful dictator including stalin s role in the making of the economic system and economic policy stalin s accumulation objectives and the constraints that limited his power to achieve them the limits to administrative allocation the information flows and incentives that governed the behavior of economic managers the scope and significance of corruption and market oriented behavior and the prospects for economic reform

on crises contagion and confusion abstract since the tequila crisis of 1994 1995 the asian flu of 1997 and the russian virus of 1998 economists have been busy producing research on the subject of contagion yet few studies have examined empirically through which channels the disturbances are transmitted if there are indeed fundamental reasons for the spillovers we observe we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing how both trade links and the largely ignored financial sector links influence the pattern of fundamentals based contagion we examine the role of international bank lending the potential for cross market hedging and bilateral and third party trade in the propagation of crises

whither the nonprofit wage differential estimates from the 1990 census this article provides new estimates of the nonprofit for profit wage differential in the u s economy using observations on 4 1 million private sector employees from the 1990 census i find either zero or slightly positive economy wide wage differences between nonprofit and for profit employees in a standard earnings equation format significant wage differentials are found at the disaggregated occupation and industry level and provide a basis for testing hypotheses explaining nonprofit for profit wage differences

reducing public private sector pay differentials the single spine pay policy as a natural experiment in ghana empirical studies have documented the existence of the public private pay differentials in both developed and developing countries the implementation of policies aiming to reduce this gap has however been mitigated or inconclusive this paper exploits the single spine pay policy sspp in ghana as a natural experiment to examine the effectiveness of wage policies in developing countries the sspp was implemented in 2010 by the government of ghana to address the public private sector wage gap and improve productivity in the public sector using a quantile treatment effect approach based on a difference in difference did estimation we show that the sspp has yet to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors across the entire distribution of earnings in ghana the improvement observed is only at the lower tail of the distribution of earnings however the sspp has a larger effect on the earnings of female workers than that of males in the education and health services sector suggesting that the policy was successful in reducing the gender wage gap in that sector moreover the sspp has decreased the productivity of workers across the distribution of earnings mainly due to a decrease in the effort of female public sector workers nevertheless the sspp has had some successes and could be improved by putting in place a good managerial quality in the government agencies in addition it is important that the government pays much attention to various macroeconomic factors that have challenged the success of the sspp

shirking and choking under incentive based pressure a behavioral economic theory of performance production abstract significant empirical evidence exists within psychology and economics that greater incentives under pressure can lead to lower performance outcomes however standard economic theory does not account for this possibility efficiency wage models for example conclude a positive relationship between wage incentives and productivity while efficiency wage models are shown to describe productivity behavior in numerous settings said models do not describe labor markets featuring counterproductive performance pressure we put forth a theoretical model of performance production in which performance incentives induce productive effects and counterproductive effects the model treats explicit monitoring and distraction as distinct counterproductive processes within a cohesive theory of performance production in settings featuring performance pressure we find that higher levels of performance contingent compensation may decrease not only labor output i e likelihood of task success but also labor input i e effort if counterproductive processes decrease the marginal effectiveness of effort sufficiently the latter finding challenges a common view that performance decrements under pressure occur despite greater effort levels

a critical evaluation of exchange rate policy in turkey abstract this paper reviews and critically evaluates the exchange rate policy followed in turkey in the post 1980 period during which a far reaching program of liberalization has been launched we conclude that the new exchange rate policy has been essential for turkey s regaining its creditworthiness furthermore it has positively contributed to growth of output and exports and to expansion of tradables production relative to nontradables persistence of inflation and weakness of private investment in tradables overshadow the successes recorded in other areas and cast doubt over the sustainability of turkey s outward orientation we argue that the root cause of these problems has been inconsistencies between overall economic policies rather than the exchange rate policy itself we compare the period of real appreciations since late 1998 with the earlier period of real depreciations and draw policy implications

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

a reputational model of authority abstract the paper provides a model where authority relaionships are founded on reputation the viability of authority is the result of subordinates free riding on each other s challenges reducing the frequency of challenges and making reputation worth defending the party with authority secures subordinates compliance through the payment of rents to influence the extent of their failure to act collectively and exacerbate the free rider problem they face the model provides a framework to explain how the magnitude and form of these rents depend on the primitives of the environment and on the authority s design of its reputation applications to employment relationships dictatorships and the notion of legitimacy are considered

information based contagion and the implications for financial fragility abstract this paper explores a global game model of information based financial contagion by revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm the model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights while contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous i consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero moreover the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure

informational channels of financial contagion two main classes of channels are studied as informational sources of financial contagion one is a fundamental channel that is based on real and financial links between economies and the second is a social learning channel that arises when agents base their decisions on noisy observations about the actions of others in foreign markets using global games i present a two country model of financial contagion in which both channels can operate and i test its predictions experimentally the experimental results show that subjects do not extract information optimally which leads to two systematic biases that affect these channels directly base rate neglect leads subjects to underweight their prior and thus weakens the fundamental channel an overreaction bias strengthens the social learning channel since subjects rely on information about the behavior of others even when this information is irrelevant these results have significant welfare effects rooted in the specific way in which these biases alter behavior

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

is work special justice and the distribution of employment i investigate from an egalitarian welfarist standpoint the issue of whether state guaranteed employment should be offered as a matter of right to able bodied poor citizens who suffer chronic or persistent unemployment an affirmative answer is defended one consideration supporting this right to work is that provision of transfer aid in the form of jobs rather than cash screens nonneedy bohemians from the class of beneficiaries the main conclusion of the essay is defended from one objection based on efficiency wage models of the labor market and from another based on the alleged impossibility of maintaining the self respect and self esteem of able bodied individuals who fail to earn their own keep independently in a market economy

unions and interindustry wage differentials abstract we investigate the importance of trade unions in collective bargaining in the context of a developing country manufacturing labor market the methodology we adopt to estimate wage differentials follows the method proposed by haisken denew j p and schmidt c m 1997 review of economics and statistics 79 516 521 since it improves on the standard procedure popularized by krueger a b and summers l h 1988 econometrica 56 193 259 our findings indicate that wage dispersion is far greater in the unionized sector of brazilian manufacturing in contrast to evidence from other countries

information and economic analysis a perspective ten years ago i delivered a paper before this group with the title information and economic analysis i chose the title deliberately i did not call the subject on which i was speaking the economics of information because to do so would have been to suggest that my topic like the economics of agriculture or the economics of industry or the economics of labour represented another branch of specialisation within economics i wanted to suggest that informational considerations were in fact central to the analysis of a wide variety of phenomena that they constituted a central part of the foundations of economic analysis at the time though economists had long paid lip service to the importance of information there was little formal literature the last decade has seen a burgeoning of the literature it has become to the late 7o s and early 8o s what growth theory was to the early 6o s and it has been greeted with some of the same scepticism there seems to be a myriad ofspecial cases and few general principles the little examples are often contrasted unfavourably with the generality of general equilibrium theory what have we learned have diminishing returns set in are there fruitful directions for future research and if so what are they these are the questions which i wish to address here the work of the past decade has made i think a fundamental and lasting contribution to economic analysis the contributions have been both negative and positive we have learned that much of what we believed before is of only limited validity that the traditional competitive equilibrium analysis though having the superficial appearance of generality in terms of superscripts and subscripts is indeed not very general the theory is not robust to slight alterations in the informational assumptions it is but a special and not very plausible example among the possible set of informational assumptions which can be employed to characterise an economy at the same time the theory has been able to provide insights into phenomena about which the traditional model had nothing to say or which seemed inconsistent or inexplicable within the competitive paradigm it has provided some of the micro foundations for macro economics it has provided the basis of a new theory of the firm of a new new welfare economics and of a theory of economic organisation including a comparison of economic

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

targeting the real exchange rate theory and evidence abstract this paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of policies aimed at setting a more depreciated level of the real exchange rate an intertemporal optimizing model suggests that in the absence of changes in fiscal policy a more depreciated level of the real exchange rate can only be attained temporarily this can be achieved by means of higher inflation and or higher real interest rates depending on the degree of capital mobility evidence for brazil chile and colombia supports the model s prediction that undervalued real exchange rates are associated with higher inflation

just cause employment policies in the presence of worker adverse selection the free market may not lead to the efficient level of just cause employment protection if workers are heterogeneous any firm that switches to just cause will attract a disproportionate share of workers that provide low effort yet are difficult to dismiss with cause thus there is an externality concerning each firm s just cause policy if all firms had just cause policies then the efficiency gains of just cause might outweigh the burden of the undesirable workers nevertheless no single firm may find it in its interest to switch to just cause it is possible for laws that require just cause to increase efficiency

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

interindustry wage differentials and the gender wage gap using data from the march 1988 current population survey the authors find that the wages of female workers differ significantly by industry even when the analysis controls for workers productivity related characteristics although these interindustry wage differentials are at least as large as men s and are highly correlated with them as well there are statistically significant differences between the two of the overall gender wage gap the average female worker earns about 65 as much as the average male worker 12 22 can be explained by differences between the patterns of interindustry wage differentials of men and women and 15 19 by differences in the distribution of male and female workers across industries thus the combined industry effects explain about one third of the overall gender wage gap

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

asset commonality debt maturity and systemic risk we develop a model in which asset commonality and short term debt of banks interact to generate excessive systemic risk banks swap assets to diversify their individual risk two asset structures arise in a clustered structure groups of banks hold common asset portfolios and default together in an unclustered structure defaults are more dispersed portfolio quality of individual banks is opaque but can be inferred by creditors from aggregate signals about bank solvency when bank debt is short term creditors do not roll over in response to adverse signals and all banks are ine ciently liquidated this information contagion is more likely under clustered asset structures in contrast when bank debt is long term welfare is the same under both asset structures

a test of dual labor market theory despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate policy response to the existence of poverty neither the proponents of dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive tests of the dual market hypothesis this paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual market theory 1 the existence of two distinct labor markets with different wage setting mechanisms and 2 the existence of barriers to mobility between the labor markets we find considerable support for both hypothesis estimation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two distinct wage equations the one which most workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital regression with significant returns to education and experience the other equation is flat with no returns to human capital these two equations resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the primary and secondary markets respectively further we present evidence that at least some non white workers are involuntarily confined to the secondary market this crowding of minority workers into the low wage labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white non white wage differences we interpret these results as providing empirical support for the dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wagemodels in addition combining the efficiency wage argument with the observation that much of the white non white wage difference is explained by the exclusion of non whites from the primary sector suggests an explanation for the persistance of wage differences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

industry wage premia evidence from the wage distribution abstract we argue that under the unobserved quality explanation of industry wage differentials industries with high average premia will have even higher premia among high wage workers we find however that the ols premia correctly illustrate the industry impact across the distribution

inducing political action by workers a firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders such as workers this article studies the behavior of such a firm showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage the firm may therefore profit from paying above market wages and from hiring what might appear to be an inefficiently large number of workers and because unions may overcome free rider problems of uncoordinated political effort a firm may favor unionization or be less opposed to unionization than it would otherwise be the results of this article can also explain why firms may little reduce wages in a recession and why the higher wages paid by unionized firms do not reduce survival rates of these firms

when in peril retrench testing the portfolio channel of contagion abstract the impact of past gains and losses on international investors risk aversion is an important factor in the propagation of financial shocks across countries we first present a stylized model illustrating how changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio decisions and stock prices we then examine empirically the behavior of international mutual funds when funds returns are below average they reduce their exposure to countries in which they were overweight and vice versa an index of financial interdependence that reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds helps explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries and the pattern of contagion during crises

sectoral wage rigidity in the canadian and french economies abstract this paper estimates the degree of wage flexibility in seven french major sectors and 16 canadian manufacturing industries in order to test the predictions of efficiency wage theory and to compare the degree of wage flexibility with the u s we estimate industry wage flexibility with disaggregated phillips curves and find that efficiency wage theory explains the inter industry pattern of wage flexibility in france and canada quite well using previous estimates from the u s we find that wages are usually more flexible in french and canadian industries than in the corresponding u s industry and that the industries with the most flexible wages in france and canada tend to have the most flexible wages in the u s

policy fundamentals interest rates differential and expected devaluation in the presence of an active crawling peg system abstract one of the most interesting theoretical issues that comes up from the analysis of the tablita period in the southern cone economies argentina chile and uruguay is the interpretation of why interest rates on domestic currency loans were much higher than the rate on foreign currency loans adjusted for devaluation of the domestic currency even though the rate of devaluation was set by the monetary authorities six months ahead and published in a little table tablita this was particularly puzzling in the case of uruguay which had practically perfect capital mobility we show that the reason rational economic agents were willing to pay high domestic interest rates rather than borrowing in foreign currency was that they realized that policy fundamentals were inconsistent with the sustainability of the exchange rate policy using data for uruguay we show that a second systematic component of expectations of devaluation is what we call the policy risk factor and modeled as a function of the fiscal and monetary variables jel 41 31

markets in hierarchies organizational and market influences on gender inequality in a state pay system a pivotal issue in sociological theories of labor markets as well as legal and policy debates on pay equity is the relative importance of market and organizational forces in determining pay differences between jobs held predominantly by men and those held predominantly by women this article develops two models of the market organization relationship an administered efficiency model and a bureaucratic politics model quantitative analyses of individual and job level data in a state government pay system indicate that the administered efficiency model does not adequately explain malefemale earnings differences documentary testimonial and interview data strongly suggest the significance of bureaucratic politics in the pay determination process we conclude that market forces influence wage rates but are heavily mediated by organizational factors unrelated to efficiency considerations in the type of organization studied here

limits to environmental bonds abstract bonds have recently been promoted as an alternative tool to control environmental damages particularly in those instances when the innovative activities of a firm have uncertain future impacts under this mechanism a firm would post a bond ex ante forfeiting all or a portion of the bond if its activities harmed environmental resources while the benefits of bonds have been developed there has been little systematic effort to explore their limitations in contrast the labor literature has extensively studied the limits of bonds as a mechanism to prevent worker shirking using insights from this parallel problem this paper explores the limits to environmental bonds focusing on the problems of moral hazard liquidity constraints and legal restrictions each limit offers a challenge to the success of environmental bonds we explore the use of bonds in surface mining and agricultural nonpoint pollution as motivating examples we also consider how other incentive schemes suggested by the labor literature might prove useful in the context of environmental management we consider the labor mechanisms of efficiency wages increasing wage profiles trust funds and rank order tournaments

exchange rate management and stabilization policies in developing countries abstract we outline three channels via which a devaluation has a direct contractionaly impact on the aggregate supply side of the economy local currency costs of intermediate imports wage indexing in the presence of food imports and reduced volume of real credit to firms contractionary effects via the supply side are more damaging than krugman taylor effects via aggregate demand since a cut in aggregate supply leads to upward pressure on inflation while a cut in aggregate demand tends to abate inflation upward pressure on inflation may over time threaten the increase in competitiveness a nominal devaluation also intends to achieve we also discuss the implications of a substantial foreign debt we demonstrate that a successful devaluation raises the real in terms of domestic goods debt service burden causing a krugman taylor like contractionary effect on aggregate demand we then analyse the effects of a preannounced slowdown of the rate of depreciation our results of course do not imply that a devaluation should never be considered they do suggest however that a devaluation is likely to be an ineffective tool for demand management since it may cut aggregate supply as much or more in the short run

inter industry and occupational wage differentials in italy the vast literture on wage determination in the post war era extensively documents the existence of large and persistent wage differentials among industries and workers of comparable skills this paper addresses the issue of wage dispersion in the context of the italian economy the stability over time of industry relative wages confirme previous results obtained for the other countries a wide class of earings equations is estimated using microdata for the italian manufacturing industry the results provide little evidence in support of the view that wage dispersion can be explained by either unmeasured workers charcteristics or by compensating wage differentials conversely the estimated pattern of industry occupation wage differentials is consistent with the existence of rent sharing mechanisms and fairness considerations

common elements of efficiency wage theories what relevance for developing countries conventional labour economics argues that wages are determined by supply and demand and that the typical firm is a wage taker efficiency wage theories state that wages are endogenous to a firm s own optimising behaviour and that the wage rate determines the labour productivity these theories raise questions regarding the effectiveness of expenditure reducing and expenditure switching adjustment policies this article reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on efficiency wages it examines alternative models highlights the emphasis of empirical research towards industrial countries and points out the need for a test based on the major implications of the theory

tenure issues in higher education the system of tenure that dominates american higher education has long been a source of controversy the institution of tenure has been attacked for entrenching a lazy professoriate more interested in attending faraway conferences and producing unreadable research than in teaching or developing practical insights while on the other hand it has long been defended as an absolute necessity for the defense of open intellectual inquiry the tenure controversy has been sharpened in recent years by several events the end of mandatory retirement which was abolished by federal law effective january 1 1994 has heightened concerns about the productivity and commitment of professors who received tenure long ago and who no longer have the same incentives to invest in long term reputation there is also ongoing concern over the steadily rising cost of higher education which raises the question of what students as well as the taxpayers who support public institutions of higher education are getting for their money 1 the idea that tenure is a wasteful institution for universities runs up against the puzzling fact that the commitment to tenure is one that academic institutions impose on themselves although the american association of university professors aaup provides a powerful lobby in favor of tenure generally colleges and universities most notably private ones are under no legal requirement to observe tenure constraints although as administrators we certainly feel the weight of those constraints our view is that a tenure system in fact provides important benefits to society and to colleges and universities we argue here that the role of tenure is

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation

work intensity gender and sustainable development abstract is labour intensive employment compatible with social justice and environmental sustainability this paper examines the question of how far small scale intermediate technology based on energy intensive human work which is central to prescriptions for poverty alleviation and sustainable development is compatible with development objectives emphasizing gender equity work intensity is a neglected characteristic of labour but significant in the determination of human well being and in the intra household distribution of welfare the intensification of energy expenditure does not affect men and women in a uniform way and needs to be gender disaggregated in order to reveal potential trade offs between development strategies based on labour intensive growth and the well being of men and women the paper draws upon the experience with treadle pumps for irrigation in bangladesh as an illustration of such potential trade offs and argues for more rigorous analyses of gender divisions of labour which include work intensity in combination with time allocation

contagion of a liquidity crisis between two firms abstract this paper presents a model in which the contagion of a liquidity crisis between two nonfinancial institutions occurs because of learning activity within a common creditor pool after creditors observe what occurs in a rollover game for a firm they conjecture one another s type or attitude toward the risk associated with the firm s investment project creditors inference about one another s type then influences their decision to lend to the next firm by providing an analysis of the incidence of failure the threshold for a liquidity crisis for each firm this paper demonstrates that the risk of contagion increases sharply if it originates ex ante from a firm facing a low probability of failure in addition the paper proposes some policy measures for mitigating the severity of contagion during a liquidity crisis

evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector domestic workers in south africa what happens when a previously uncovered labor market is regulated we exploit the introduction of a minimum wage in south africa and variation in the intensity of this law to identify increases in wages for domestic workers and no statistically significant effects on employment on the intensive or extensive margins these large partial responses to the law are somewhat surprising given the lack of monitoring and enforcement in this informal sector we interpret these changes as evidence that strong external sanctions are not necessary for new labor legislation to have a significant impact on informal sectors of developing countries at least in the short run

risk and wealth in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks market participants risk attitudes wealth and portfolio composition in uence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and therefore may have important efiects on the sustainability of currency pegs we analyze such efiects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices generating a rich set of theoretical comparative static predictions related to often discussed but rarely modelled accounts of the onset and timing of currency crises the model can be solved in closed form and the methods could be used to study other economic issues in which coordination and risk aversion play important roles

equilibrium wage distributions the observation that different firms charge different prices for what appears to be the same commodity or pay different wages for what appears to be equivalent labour has long been explained in economics by a reference to imperfect information this paper is concerned with characterising market equilibrium with imperfect information we do not present a general theory rather we develop in some detail an example of importance in its own right imperfect information in the labour market several properties of our example in particular the existence of equilibria with price wage dispersion unemployment excess supply of labour positive profits multiple equilibria and the nonoptimality or some of all of the equilibria are of more general validity other results may not be this paper is concerned with two kinds of imperfect information a individuals may not know the wage paid in any particular firm or whether there is a vacancy in any particular firm until they apply for a job 1 b there are several characteristics besides the wage rate associated with a job which are important to the individual some like the normal length of a work week become known when the individual applies for the job information about other characteristics e g personalities of colleagues is acquired only gradually there is one important difference between the two kinds of imperfect in