rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

optimal progressive labor income taxation and education subsidies when education decisions and intergenerational transfers are endogenous abstract we quantitatively characterize the optimal mix of progressive income taxes and education subsidies in a model with endogenous human capital formation borrowing constraints income risk and incomplete financial markets in addition to the distortions of labor supply progressive taxes weaken the incentives to acquire education the latter distortion can potentially be mitigated by an education subsidy we find that the welfare maximizing fiscal policy is indeed characterized by a substantially progressive labor income tax code and a positive subsidy for college education both the degree of tax progressivity and the education subsidy are larger than in the current us status quo

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

the optimum quantity of debt abstract we find that the welfare gains to being at the optimum quantity of debt rather than the current us level are small and therefore concerns regarding the high level of debt in the us economy may be misplaced this finding is based on a model of a large number of infinitely lived households whose saving behavior is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints this model incorporates a different role for government debt than is found in standard models and it captures different cost benefit trade offs on the benefit side government debt enhances the liquidity of households by providing an additional means of smoothing consumption and by effectively loosening borrowing constraints on the cost side the implied taxes have adverse wealth distribution and incentive effects in addition government debt crowds out capital via higher interest rates and lowers per capita consumption

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

taxation of human capital and wage inequality a cross country analysis wage inequality has been significantly higher in the united states than in continental european countries ceu since the 1970s moreover this inequality gap has further widened during this period as the us has experienced a large increase in wage inequality whereas the ceu has seen only modest changes this paper studies the role of labor income tax policies for understanding these facts we begin by documenting two new empirical facts that link these inequality differences to tax policies first we show that countries with more progressive labor income tax schedules have significantly lower before tax wage inequality at different points in time second progressivity is also negatively correlated with the rise in wage inequality during this period we then construct a life cycle model in which individuals decide each period whether to go to school work or be unemployed individuals can accumulate skills either in school or while working wage inequality arises from differences across individuals in their ability to learn new skills as well as from idiosyncratic shocks progressive taxation compresses the after tax wage structure thereby distorting the incentives to accumulate human capital in turn reducing the cross sectional dispersion of before tax wages we find that these policies can account for half of the difference between the us and the ceu in overall wage inequality and 76 of the difference in inequality at the upper end log 90 50 differential when this economy experiences skill biased technological change progressivity also dampens the rise in wage dispersion over time the model explains 41 of the difference in the total rise in inequality and 58 of the difference at the upper end

favoritism in asymmetric contests head starts and handicaps abstract i examine a contest with identity dependent rules in which contestants are privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous a contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start the former reduces the contestant s score by a fixed percentage the latter is an additive bonus although total effort increases if the weak contestant is favored with a head start the optimal use of handicaps is not as clear cut depending on the nature of the asymmetry it may or may not be optimal to handicap the strong contestant moreover it is generally optimal to combine the two instruments for instance when contestants are sufficiently heterogeneous the weak contestant should be given both a head start and a handicap it may also be possible to induce higher effort and at the same time make both contestants better off ex ante

household search and the aggregate labor market we develop a theoretical model with labour market frictions incomplete financial markets and with households which have two members households face unemployment risks but their members adjust their labour supplies to insure against unemployment we use the model to explain the cyclical properties of aggregate employment and participation as in the u s data the model predicts that the participation rate the fraction of individuals that want jobs is not strongly correlated with aggregate economic activity this property is in sharp contrast to the strongly procyclical participation predicted by both neoclassical models and models with search frictions when we assume bachelor households or households with infinitely many members complete markets in the two member household model and in the data primary earners are always in the labour force secondary earners have a mildly countercyclical participation rate and a mildly procyclical employment rate their behaviour insures the household against unemployment risks

the individual life cycle annuity market imperfections and economic growth we study the effects of an annuity market imperfection on individual agents life cycle decisions and on the macroeconomic growth rate in an overlapping generations model with single sector endogenous growth our model features both age dependent mortality and labour productivity we model imperfect annuities by introducing a load factor on the annuity rate faced by finitely lived agents our main finding is that annuity market imperfections decrease economic growth because less assets are necessary for consumption late in life in addition we find that both the quantitative and qualitative effects of annuity market imperfections are grossly overestimated in a partial equilibrium analysis because it disregards general equilibrium repercussions

taxing capital along the transition not a bad idea after all this paper quantitatively characterizes optimal tax systems in a model of overlapping generations when transitional cohorts are explicitly taken into account we use the recent study of conesa et al 2009 as an example but extend it by transitional dynamics we furthermore develop a general and coherent way of aggregating welfare effects of different individuals and cohorts in the short and long run our welfare measure includes the case of a utilitarian social welfare function yet is not limited to this perspective we show that the optimality of a high capital income tax rate along the transition crucially depends on the assumption of a utilitarian social welfare function this objective of the policy maker comprises implicit redistributive objectives across and within cohorts based on pure economic efficiency and insurance effects however we find a zero capital income tax rate and a less progressive labor income tax schedule to be optimal such a tax system receives political support from initial cohorts a high capital income tax regime on the other hand doesn t

equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions there is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high bid auctions auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid see for example vickrey 1961 myerson 1981 riley and samuelson 1981 milgrom and weber 1982 matthews 1983 maskin and riley 1984 holt 1980 cox smith and walker 1988 a critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers bidding strategies are monotonic in their types this enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes and to compare the welfare properties of the high bid auction with those of other auction institutions one case in which the existence of monotonic equilibrium is readily established is that in which buyers types are distributed smoothly independently and symmetrically in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium one in which all bidders share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations and this bid function is the solution to a first order differential equation

diversity and economic performance in a model with progressive taxation is a more heterogeneous population beneficial or harmful to long term economic performance this paper addresses this and other questions in a dynamic general equilibrium model where consumers have different labour productivity and time preference we show how differences in the cross sectional distribution of these characteristics can affect the economy via two channels the first one involves changing the composition of the labour force and the second one involves changing the cross sectional distribution of marginal tax rate we show how these channels are respectively determined by the shape of the labour supply function and the curvature of the marginal tax function

optimal indirect and capital taxation we consider an environment in which agents skills are private information and follow arbitrary stochastic processes we prove that it is typically pareto optimal for an individual s marginal benefit of investing in capital to exceed his marginal cost of doing so this wedge is consistent with a positive tax on capital income we also prove that it is pareto optimal for the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption goods to equal the marginal rate of transformation this lack of a wedge is consistent with uniform taxation of consumption goods within a period

revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions abstract the revenue equivalence theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player s valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his her distribution function

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

the risk free rate in heterogeneous agent incomplete insurance economies abstract why has the average real risk free interest rate been less than one percent the question is motivated by the failure of a class of calibrated representative agent economies to explain the average return to equity and risk free debt i construct an economy where agents experience uninsurable idiosyncratic endowment shocks and smooth consumption by holding a risk free asset i calibrate the economy and characterize equilibria computationally with a borrowing constraint of one year s income the resulting risk free rate is more than one percent below the rate in the comparable representative agent economy

lottery versus all pay auction models of lobbying i first provide a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium of the lottery game by n lobbyists with asymmetric valuations and then compare the lottery and the all pay auction models of lobbying i show that the exclusion principle discovered by baye kovenock and de vries 1993 for all pay auction does not apply to lottery i also show that the perverse effect that an exogenous cap may increase the total lobbying expenditure in a two bidder all pay auction discovered by che and gale 1998 does not apply to lottery

optimal taxation in a limited commitment economy this paper studies optimal ramsey taxation when risk sharing in private insurance markets is imperfect due to limited enforcement in a limited commitment economy there are externalities associated with capital and labor because individuals do not take into account that their labor and saving decisions aect aggregate supply wages

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

taxing capital not a bad idea after all we quantitatively characterize the optimal capital and labor income tax in an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable income shocks and permanent productivity difierences of households the optimal capital income tax rate is signiflcantly positive at 36 percent the optimal progressive labor income tax is roughly a at tax of 23 percent with a deduction of 7 200 relative to average household income of 42 000 the high optimal capital income tax is mainly driven by the life cycle structure of the model whereas the optimal progressivity of the labor income tax is attributable to the insurance and redistribution role of the tax system jel e62 h21 h24

taxation and household labor supply we evaluate reforms to the u s tax system in a life cycle setup with heterogeneous married and single households and with an operative extensive margin in labor supply we restrict our model with observations on gender and skill premia labor force participation of married females across skill groups children and the structure of marital sorting we concentrate on two revenue neutral tax reforms a proportional income tax and a reform in which married individuals flle taxes separately separate flling our flndings indicate that tax reforms are accompanied by large increases in labor supply that difier across demographic groups with the bulk of the increase coming from married females under a proportional income tax reform married females account for more than 50 of the changes in hours across steady states while under separate flling reform married females account for all the change in hours

optimal linear and two bracket income taxes with idiosyncratic earnings risk abstract this paper quantitatively characterizes optimal linear and two bracket income taxes we consider a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which tax design involves redistributing income for both equity and social insurance substantive findings include i a significant fraction of agents supply zero labor or hold zero assets at the optimum ii neglecting tax distortion imposed on either of labor leisure and consumption saving decisions will lead to the prescription of tax codes that deviate substantially from the optimum and iii the optimal two bracket tax schedule will turn from regressivity to progressivity in the marginal tax rate once the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks becomes sufficiently large the last finding is consistent with the results in apps et al forthcoming and it also reconciles the contradictory results regarding the optimal two bracket tax schedule between slemrod et al 1994 and strawczynski 1998

heterogeneity and government revenues higher taxes at the top abstract how effective is a more progressive tax scheme in raising revenues we answer this question in a life cycle economy with heterogeneity across households and endogenous labor supply our findings show that a tilt of the u s income tax schedule towards high earners leads to small increases in revenue maximal revenue in the long run is only 6 8 higher than in our benchmark about 0 8 of initial gdp while revenues from all sources increase by just about 0 6 our conclusions are that policy recommendations of this sort are misguided if the aim is to exclusively raise government revenue

u s tax policy and health insurance demand can a regressive policy improve welfare abstract the u s tax policy on health insurance is regressive because it subsidizes only those offered group insurance through their employers who also tend to have a relatively high income moreover the subsidy takes the form of deductions from the progressive income tax system giving high income earners a larger subsidy to understand the effect of the policy we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents and an endogenous demand for health insurance a complete removal of the subsidy may lead to a partial collapse of the group insurance market reduce the insurance coverage and deteriorate welfare there is however room for improving the coverage and welfare by extending a refundable credit to the individual insurance market

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

capital taxation quantitative explorations of the inverse euler equation economies with private information provide a rationale for capital taxation in this paper we ask what the welfare gains from following this prescription are we develop a method to answer this question in standard general equilibrium models with idiosyncratic uncertainty and incomplete markets we find that general equilibrium forces are important and greatly reduce the welfare gains once these effects are taken into account the gains are relatively small in our benchmark calibration these results do not imply that dynamic aspects of social insurance design are unimportant but they do suggest that capital taxation may play a modest role

equal sacrifice and incentive compatible income taxation abstract the concepts of equal sacrifice and incentive compatibility in income taxation have been of interest to economists for some time here we attempt to integrate the two literatures in a model that offers a labor leisure choice to consumers while imposing an equal relative or absolute sacrifice tax system the main result is that equal sacrifice incentive compatible income tax systems generally exist and are locally unique examples are presented where this tax system is easy to compute comparative statics are calculated finally some remarks about the welfare properties of these tax systems are made

benchmarking machine learning software and hardware for quantitative economics abstract we investigate the performance of machine learning software and hardware for quantitative economics we show that the use of machine learning software and hardware can significantly reduce computational time in compute intensive tasks using a sovereign default model and the least squares monte carlo option pricing algorithm as benchmarks we show that specialized hardware and software speed up calculations by up to four orders of magnitude when compared to programs written in popular high level programming languages such as matlab julia python numpy and r and high performing low level languages such as c

tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy what levels of redistribution maximize growth and efficiency this paper studies the effects of progressive income taxes and education finance in a dynamic heterogeneous agent economy such redistributive policies entail distortions to labor supply and savings but also serve as partial substitutes for missing credit and insurance markets the resulting tradeoffs for growth and efficiency are explored both theoretically and quantitatively in a model that yields complete analytical solutions progressive education finance always leads to higher income growth than taxes and transfers but at the cost of lower insurance overall efficiency is assessed using a new measure that properly reflects aggregate resources and idiosyncratic risks but unlike a standard social welfare function does not reward equality per se simulations using empirical parameter estimates show that the efficiency costs and benefits of redistribution are generally of the same order of magnitude resulting in plausible values for the optimal rates aggregate income and aggregate welfare provide only crude lower and upper bounds around the true efficiency tradeoff

flat tax reform a quantitative exploration abstract this paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the u s is replaced by a flat tax as proposed by hall and rabushka 1995 the flat tax 2nd ed hoover the central aspects of such reform the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply as well as its distributional consequences are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model main results are that i the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive effect on capital accumulation ii mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems but aggregate labor in efficiency units increases iii in all circumstances analyzed the distributions of earnings income and especially wealth become more concentrated

labor dependent capital income taxation abstract capital taxation which is negatively correlated with labor supply is proposed this paper uses a life cycle model of heterogeneous agents that face idiosyncratic productivity shocks and shows that the tax scheme provides a strong work incentive when households possess large assets and high productivity later in the life cycle when they otherwise would work less the system also adds to the saving motive of prime age households and raises aggregate capital the increased economic activities expand the tax base and the revenue neutral reform results in a lower average tax rate the negative cross dependence generates a sizable welfare gain in the long run relative to the tax system that treats labor and capital income separately as a tax base the reform however can hurt the elderly during the transition with a high marginal tax on their capital income

auctions with almost homogeneous bidders abstract we prove that around the symmetric case where the values are identically distributed the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder specific parameters of the value distributions we show that the revenue equivalence between the first price and the second price auctions to the first order in the size of the parameters is an immediate consequence of this differentiability and the revenue equivalence theorem thereby formally establishing the first order equivalence fibich et al g fibich a gavious a sela revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions j econ theory 115 2004 309 321 noticed for their particular perturbation

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

retirement financing an optimal reform approach we study policy reforms aimed at overhauling retirement financing we develop a novel approach by considering optimal reforms policy reforms that minimize the cost for the government while respecting the distribution of welfare in the economy our model is an olg model with life cycle features and bequest motives where individuals are heterogeneous in their earning ability and mortality theoretically we show that due to the negative correlation between earnings ability and mortality postretirement distortions to saving decisions are a robust feature of any optimal policy we then use this framework to quantitatively analyze optimal reforms our quantitative exercise shows that an optimal reform relative to the status quo must have three key features first post retirement assets must be subsidized while bequests must be taxed on average optimal marginal subsidies on assets for individuals above age 65 is 3 2 percent while optimal marginal tax on their bequest is 60 percent second pre retirement transfers must increase while social security benefits must become less generous in the aggregate and more progressive towards low income groups finally earnings tax reform does not contribute to optimal reforms i e optimal marginal taxes on earnings remain very close to the status quo the optimal policies reduce the present discounted value of net tax and transfers to each generation by 15 percent

social insurance and occupational mobility this paper studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the matching of workers to occupations we propose an equilibrium dynamic assignment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility workers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncertainty risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain in unfitting occupations we estimate the model using microdata from the united states and germany higher earnings uncertainty explains the u s higher mobility rate when workers in the united states enjoy germany s higher progressivity mobility rises output and welfare gains are large

on the optimal progressivity of the income tax code this paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor pro ductivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution a progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare these bene cial eects of a progressive tax system have to be traded oagainst the e ciency loss arising from distorting endoge nous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions a determination of the optimal progressivity of the income tax code therefore calls for a quantitative exploration using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we nd that the optimal us income tax is well approximated by a at tax rate of19 5 and a xed deduction of about 3 700 the steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 0 4 higher consumption in each state of the world an explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates however that a majority of the population currently alive would suer welfare losses calling into question the political feasibility of such

rent seeking contests with incomplete information we consider rent seeking contests with two players who each have private information about their own cost of effort we consider both discrete and continuous distributions of costs and give results for each case focusing on existence of equilibrium

tapping the supercomputer under your desk solving dynamic equilibrium models with graphics processors this paper shows how to build algorithms that use graphics processing units gpus installed in most modern computers to solve dynamic equilibrium models in economics in particular we rely on the compute unified device architecture cuda of nvidia gpus we illustrate the power of the approach by solving a simple real business cycle model with value function iteration we document improvements in speed of around 200 times and suggest that even further gains are likely

a hardware approach to value function iteration abstract this paper proposes a novel approach for the computation of dynamic stochastic equilibrium models we design an fpga specialized in the computation of a bellman equation via value function iteration vfi our hardware approach exhibits significant speed gains vis a vis gpu based data parallelization techniques the speed gains arise from two layers of parallelism accessible to hardware developers instruction level and pipeline parallelism at the logical resources level by and large the paper documents significant computational speed gains from hardware specialization so far unexplored by the macroeconomic literature

rent seeking with bounded rationality an analysis of the all pay auction the winner take all nature of all pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors which we introduce with a logit formulation the equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs we prove existence uniqueness and symmetry properties in contrast to the nash equilibrium the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments our model predicts this property

optimal taxation in life cycle economies abstract we use a very standard life cycle growth model in which individuals have a labor leisure choice in each period of their lives to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income the intuition for our result is straightforward in a life cycle model the individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an individual s lifetime one way to achieve this goal is to use capital and labor income taxes that vary with age if tax rates cannot be conditioned on age a nonzero tax on capital income is also optimal as it can imperfectly mimic age conditioned consumption and labor income tax rates journal of economic literature classification numbers e62 h21

the cyclical and secular behaviour of the labour input comparing efficiency units and hours worked summary a monthly labour input series designed to correct for the fact that all hours worked are not of the same quality is constructed and its properties compared with unadjusted hours worked this efficiency units series is constructed from bls data on hours worked and earnings by age and sex the cyclical fluctuations displayed by the efficiency units series are smaller on average than those displayed by hours worked although the difference is not large however the secular behaviour of the series is quite different hours worked per capita displays a significant positive trend while efficiency units per capita does not

on the distributional effects of reducing capital taxes this article asks whether household heterogeneity and market incompleteness have quantitatively important implications for the welfare effects of tax changes we compare a representative agent economy to an economy in which households face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk the income process is consistent with empirical estimates and implies a realistic wealth distribution we find that capital tax cuts imply large welfare gains in the representative agent economy however when households are heterogeneous substantial redistribution during transition means that only a minority will support capital tax cuts whereas most households can expect large welfare losses

on the consequences of eliminating capital tax differentials in the united states structure and equipment capital are eectively taxed at dierent rates recently president obama joined the group of policy makers and economists who propose to eliminate these dierentials this paper analyzes the consequences of such a reform using an incomplete markets model with equipment skill complementarity we nd that the reform increases average welfare by 0 1 importantly we nd that the reform does not involve the usual eciency vs equality trade o it improves both jel classication e62 h21

accounting for the u s earnings and wealth inequality we show that a theory of earnings and wealth inequality based on the optimal choices of ex ante identical households that face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments of efficiency labor units accounts for the u s earnings and wealth inequality almost exactly

effective tax rates in macroeconomics cross country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption abstract this paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics using this method we construct time series of tax rates for large industrial countries the method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases this method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework these tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates and highlight important international differences in tax policy

rent seeking with regretful agents theory and experiment abstract we investigate both theoretically and experimentally the role that information disclosure has on behavior in all pay environments in which all agents must exert costly effort but only the winner is rewarded through the lens of all pay auctions we show that bidders who have regret concerns when they lose an auction may alter their bids whether or not information about the winning bid is disclosed all losing bidders regret not bidding 0 however when feedback on the winning bid is provided those bidders who lost at an affordable price may regret not bidding more we show that the former effect causes bidders to lower their bids while the latter effect causes bidders to raise their bids our experimental results indicate overbidding whether or not the winning bid is disclosed to losing bidders however disclosing the winning bid leads to even more aggressive bidding increases revenues decreases the frequency of dropouts and also leads to more efficient allocations thus our results show that information disclosure is a powerful tool that mechanism designers may wish to exploit to extract more rents in all pay environments

information in conflicts abstract we consider two player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value for settings where one player knows the value of the prize while the other only knows its prior distribution we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent in the special case of a lottery contest equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed

on the optimality of age dependent taxes and the progressive u s tax system abstract in life cycle economies where an individual s optimal consumption work plan is almost never constant the optimal marginal tax rates on capital and labor income vary with age conversely the progressivity imbedded in the u s tax code implies that marginal tax rates vary with age because tax rates vary with earnings and earnings vary with age using numerical simulations this paper shows that if the tax authority is prevented from conditioning tax rates on age some degree of progressivity is desirable as progressive taxation better imitates optimal age dependent taxes than an optimal age independent tax system this role for progressive taxation emanates from efficiency reasons and does not rely on any insurance nor re distribution arguments

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

on the optimal provision of social insurance progressive taxation versus education subsidies in general equilibrium in this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk but distort the education decision of households optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions we highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits we also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation we find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium

progressive taxation in a dynastic model of human capital abstract we develop a quantitative theory of economic inequality to investigate the effects of replacing the current u s progressive income tax system with a proportional one the cross sectional implications of the theory are used to discipline the assessment of the effects of tax policy and circumvent the lack of conclusive micro evidence on the parameterization of the human capital production technology we find that the elimination of progressive taxation increases steady state level of output by 12 6 capital by 21 8 and consumption by 13 2 moreover it increases economic inequality and its persistence across generations

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

effort levels in a cournot nash contest with asymmetric information abstract many contests exist where one player does not know his opponent s value of a fixed prize e g unobservable non market preferences for preservation this paper explores how changes in the nature of a one sided information asymmetry affect effort levels in a cournot nash contest the results indicate that the uninformed player s effort is an uncertain input such that his effort is inversely related to risk this reduces his average odds of success comparative static results are driven by the perceived odds of success and risk for the uninformed player and the actual odds of success for the informed player

dividend and capital gains taxation under incomplete markets motivated by the jobs and growth tax relief reconciliation act jgtrra of 2003 the effects of capital income tax cuts are investigated in an economy with heterogeneous households and a representative mature firm dividend tax cuts contrary to capital gains tax cuts lead to a decrease in investment and capital this is because they increase the market value of existing capital and households require a higher return to hold this additional wealth in line with empirical evidence the model predicts substantial increases in dividends and stock prices overall the tax cuts lead to a welfare reduction equivalent to a consumption drop of 0 5

short run fiscal policy welfare redistribution and aggregate effects in the short and long run abstract this paper quantifies the effects of two short run fiscal policies a temporary tax cut and rebate transfer that are intended to stimulate economic activities a reduction in income taxation provides immediate incentives to work and save more raising aggregate output and consumption a temporary rebate is mostly saved and increases consumption marginally both policies improve the overall welfare of households and the rebate policy benefits especially low income households in the long run however the debt accumulated to finance the stimulus and a higher tax to service the debt can crowd out capital and lower output and consumption causing welfare to deteriorate

incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests abstract in a deterministic contest or all pay auction all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical as one contestant becomes stronger that is values the prize more total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically thus asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation recently this result has been shown to hold for other non deterministic contest success functions as well thereby suggesting a certain robustness in this paper however the complete information assumption is shown to be crucial i examine a tractable incomplete information model for which the complete information model is a special case with incomplete information regardless of how little total expenditures in a deterministic two player contest increase when one contestant becomes marginally stronger starting from a symmetric contest in fact both contestants expend resources more aggressively with complete information neither of them do so thus there is a discontinuity in the information structure

optimal taxation merging micro and macro approaches efficient provision of social insurance and efficient redistributionofresourcesamongindividualsaresomeofthemostimportantandchallenging questions in macroeconomics and public finance a seminal contribution of mirrlees 1971 is the starting point for the modern approach to answering these questions a trade off between efficiency and insurance or equity is inherent to this approach and is a key determinant of the optimal policy in this paper we argue that the large body of research that follows mirrlees approach has been developing in two quite separate directions referred to in this paper as the micro and macro approaches we argue that merging the two directions

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information the two player case abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of bayesian equilibrium for a class of generally asymmetric all pay auctions with incomplete information due to its importance in applications some prominence is given to the first price all pay auction for which a detailed characterization of equilibrium and an approximation to equilibrium of its well studied complete information version are supplied furthermore we relate our uniqueness result to the well known multiplicity of equilibria in the war of attrition second price all pay auction which emerges as a limit point of the class of two player auction games considered journalof economic literature classification numbers d44 c62 c72

gradual tax reforms if you like it you can keep it abstract one of the key practical challenges facing by tax reforms are their short run welfare consequences in this paper i focus on a consumption based tax reform for which despite long run welfare gains it generates welfare for some groups such as retirees or the working poor falls during transition between steady states using a life cycle model with heterogeneous households i show how to devise a transition path from the current u s federal tax system to a consumption based tax system that improves the welfare of current as well as future generations in a nutshell all households alive at the time of the policy change can choose when they want to switch to the new tax system or whether they want to switch at all i find that implementing a tax reform with this feature improves the welfare of 95 of population in the short run compared to less than a quarter of population in the conventional case with no choice it takes about twenty years for half of the population to pay their taxes under the new tax code

the evolution of wealth inequality over half a century the role of taxes transfers and technology over the last 50 years the u s tax system went through a striking transformation that reduced the effective tax rates for top income groups and raised transfers to seniors this paper investigates the macroeconomic repercussions of this change in policy particularly for the distributions of income wealth and consumption changes in taxes and transfers account for nearly half of the rise in wealth concentration nonetheless their impact on the distributions of income and consumption has been minor due to changes in equilibrium prices and the offsetting effects of tax cuts and transfers on the dispersion of consumption results highlight the role of increasing wage dispersion during this period as the main driver of trends in inequality

on the consequences of demographic change for rates of returns to capital and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the industrialized world the population is aging over time reducing the fraction of the population in working age consequently labor is expected to be scarce relative to capital with an ensuing decline in the real return on capital this paper uses demographic projections together with a large scale multi country overlapping generations model with uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty to quantify the distributional and welfare consequences of these changes in factor prices induced by the demographic transition in our model capital can freely flow between different regions in the oecd the u s the eu and the rest of the oecd thus international capital flows may in principle mitigate the decline in rates of returns one would expect in the u s if it were a closed economy we find exactly the opposite in the u s as an open economy rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 if the u s were a closed economy this decline would amount to only 78 basis points this result is due to the fact that other regions in the oecd will age even more rapidly therefore the u s is importing the more severe aging problem from these regions especially europe a similar conclusion is reached if we let capital flow freely between the oecd and the rest of the world row while row currently has a younger population structure it is predicted to age even more severely in the next decades giving rise to an even more pronounced decline in world rates of return to capital in order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic transition we ask the following hypothetical question suppose a household economically born in 2005 would live through the economic transition with changing factor prices induced by the demographic change but keeping her own survival probabilities constant at their 2005 values how would its welfare have changed relative to a situation without a demographic transition we find that households experience significant welfare losses due to the demographic transition in the order of 2 5 of consumption depending on their initial productivity level and the design of the pension system these losses are mainly due to the fact that lower future returns to capital make it harder for households to save for retirement on the other hand if the oecd suddenly opens up to row in 2005 and row has higher returns to capital before the world capital market integration then these losses are reduced to 1 5 2 5

difference form contests and the robustness of all pay auctions abstract in much of the existing literature on rent seeking games the outcome of the contest is either infinitely sensitive or relatively insensitive to contestants efforts the current paper presents a family of contest games that permit characterization of equilibrium for all levels of sensitivity of the outcome to contestants efforts specifically the outcome of the contest depends on the difference between efforts which encompass the lottery and the all pay auction as polar cases the equilibrium converges to that of the all pay auction as the probability of winning the prize grows infinitely sensitive to one s effort and the main qualitative features of equilibrium persist over a large parameter region journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d72

determining the motives for a positive optimal tax on capital previous literature demonstrates that in a computational life cycle model the optimal tax on capital is positive and large given the computational complexities of these overlapping generations models it is helpful to to determine the relative importance of the economic factors driving this result i highlight the impact of changing two common assumptions in a benchmark model that generates a large optimal tax on capital similar to the model in conesa et al 2009 first the utility function is altered such that it implies an agent s frisch labor supply elasticity is constant as opposed to increasing over his lifetime second the government is allowed to tax accidental bequests at a separate rate from ordinary capital income the main nding of this paper is that these two changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half furthermore i nd that the welfare costs of adopting the high optimal tax on capital from the benchmark model in the model with the altered assumptions which calls for a lower tax on capital are equivalent to 0 35 percent of total lifetime consumption quantifying the impact of these assumptions in the benchmark model is important because the rst has limited empirical evidence and the second although included for tractability confounds a motive for taxing capital with a motive for taxing accidental bequests jel e62 h21

a dynamic model of housing demand estimation and policy implications a dynamic model of housing demand using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid we specify estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of housing demand our model generalizes previous applied econometric work by incorporating realistic features of the housing market including non convex adjustment costs from buying and selling a home credit constraints from minimum downpayment requirements and uncertainty about the evolution of incomes and home prices we argue that these features are critical for capturing salient features of housing demand observed in the psid after estimating the model we use it to simulate how consumer behavior responds to house price and income declines as well as tightening credit these experiments are motivated by the u s recession starting in december of 2007 that saw large falls in home prices large negative income shocks for many households and tightening credit standards in the short run relatively few households adjust their housing stock households respond instead by reducing non housing consumption and reducing wealth because they wish to avoid losing their home and the associated adjustment costs households that adjust in the short run are those hit with a series of bad shocks such as a negative income shock and a home price decline a larger proportion of households do adjust their consumption in the long run increasing their housing stock since housing is less expensive however such changes may occur several years after the shocks listed above

a theory of affirmative action in college admissions i introduction race conscious preferential admissions have been widely practiced by selective colleges and universities to enhance minority representation in higher education for example the college of arts and sciences at the university of michigan automatically added 20 points out of a possible 150 points to a minority applicant s score in its rating system harvard university has an unofficial lift scheme which also targets minority applicants however controversy has surrounded affirmative action ever since its inception for instance california texas and florida have already terminated the use of race conscious admissions at state funded institutions this debate culminated in the recent supreme court ruling regarding admissions procedures at the university of michigan which endorsed admissions rules that took into account race as a qualifying characteristic unfortunately positive studies on this issue have been scarce relative to the high profile of the debate according to holzer and neumark 1999 theoretical studies of the efficiency of affirmative action on education are virtually nonexistent some have argued that affirmative action is merely a patronage program and necessarily results in mediocracy rather than meritocracy in the debate on affirmative action practices in college admissions a major criticism is that affirmative action designed to create diversity comes at the cost of academic quality a competing view offered by those opposed to affirmative action is that it weakens school applicants incentives to achieve academic excellence for instance justice thomas wrote in his opinion in grutter v bollinger that there is no incentive for the black applicant to continue to prepare for the lsat once he is reasonably assured of achieving the requisite score supporters of this practice tend to emphasize the importance of diversity and the positive influence of diversity on the pedagogical environment steele 1990 these views however do not fully recognize the incentive structure behind affirmative action admissions rules it is unclear how a college admissions rule affects high school students incentives to achieve academic excellence which adds to their human capital stock and future productivity the process of college admissions by and large resembles a contest in which contestants exert costly effort in order to win a limited number of prizes in the context of college admissions to compete for a limited number of seats in the incoming class college candidates have to present their academic credentials such as gpa and sat score to the admissions officer to win the seat high school students have to invest in their human capital which improves the academic performance whereas the academic investments are costly and nonrefundable regardless of the outcome for example the tuition the money spent on books the salary paid to tutors the time and energy and so on all of these features may be approximated by an all pay auction mechanism we propose a simple theoretical framework that models the process of college admissions as an all pay auction to investigate two major questions is there any theoretical rationale for an affirmative action admissions rule how do such rules affect college candidates incentives to invest in academic effort two candidates one a minority and the other a nonminority simultaneously choose their academic efforts human capital investments to compete for a seat in a college we show that an academic quality oriented college prefers to adopt an admissions rule that scales up the test score of the minority relative to the nonminority although this rule is designed purely to maximize the expected academic quality of the incoming class it turns out to favor the minority and create ethnic diversity we show that the unique equilibrium affirmative action admissions rule creates a positive cross group interaction between college candidates incentives to make educational effort

the long run effects of changes in tax progressivity abstract this paper compares the steady state outcomes of revenue neutral changes to the progressivity of the tax schedule our economy features heterogeneous households who differ in their preferences and permanent labor productivities but it does not have idiosyncratic risk we find that increases in the progressivity of the tax schedule are associated with long run distributions with greater aggregate income wealth and labor input average hours generally declines as the tax schedule becomes more progressive implying that the economy substitutes away from less productive workers toward more productive workers finally as progressivity increases income inequality is reduced and wealth inequality rises many of these results are qualitatively different than those found in models with idiosyncratic risk and therefore suggest closer attention should be paid to modeling the insurance opportunities of households

on the efficiency of equal sacrifice income tax schedules abstract in an economy which primitives are exactly those in mirrlees 1971 we investigate the efficiency of tax schedules derived under the equal sacrifice principle for a given exogenous government consumption level we assess whether there is an alternative tax schedule that raises more revenue while delivering less utility to no one for our preferred parametrizations we find that inefficiency only arises at the top of the income distribution for marginal tax rates well above the ones we currently observe in most countries we also recover the implicit marginal social weights associated with the equal sacrifice schedule and find them not to be monotonic in types for the environments we study

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

altruism incomplete markets and tax reform abstract we compute the welfare effects of different revenue neutral tax reforms that eliminate capital income taxation in two general equilibrium models calibrated to the u s economy in our dynastic model the reform with the largest welfare gain is the one that eliminates all income taxation and increases the consumption tax to 35 75 of the population alive at the time of the reform benefit from it individuals use intervivos transfers and bequests to redistribute the long run benefits in a pure life cycle economy that lacks this redistribution technology we find that the same reform would benefit only 9 of the population

optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents abstract in this paper we develop a new approach for finding optimal government policies in economies with heterogeneous agents using the calculus of variations we present three classes of equilibrium conditions from government s and individual agent s optimization problems 1 the first order conditions the government s lagrange euler equation and the individual agent s euler equation 2 the stationarity condition on the distribution function and 3 the aggregate market clearing conditions these conditions form a system of functional equations which we solve numerically the solution takes into account simultaneously the effect of the government policy on individual allocations the resulting optimal distribution of agents in the steady state and therefore equilibrium prices we illustrate the methodology on a ramsey problem with heterogeneous agents finding the optimal limiting tax on total income

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

negative income taxes inequality and poverty we use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the redistributive effects of a negative income tax system which combines a flat rate tax with a fully refundable credit demogrant we show that changing the demogrant to output ratio causes significant changes in the distribution of income specifically we find that increasing the demogrant to output ratio sharply reduces the level of inequality as well as both relative and absolute poverty all measured in terms of post tax total income however these reductions in inequality and poverty come at the expense of a significant reduction in output

nit picking the macroeconomic effects of a negative income tax i study a revenue neutral reform of the u s income tax and welfare system that involves the adoption of a negative income tax nit the reform is undertaken in a life cycle economy with individual heterogeneity and uninsurable idiosyncratic labor risk the optimal nit consists of a 22 rate and a transfer equivalent to 11 of per capita gdp the ex ante average welfare gain is a 2 1 annual increase of individual consumption i show that a nit outperforms a flat tax reform income tax plus deduction by a considerable margin the key consequence of the reform is that high productivity agents increase their relative importance in the labor supply at the expense of low productivity agents