optimal state dependent rules credibility and inflation inertia abstract we use a state dependent model where pricing rules are optimal to examine the costs of a money based disinflation under various assumptions about the credibility of the policy change our analysis allows us to relate actual credibility and future inflation inertia to the asymmetry of the price deviation distribution an important implication of our state dependent setting is that disinflation can be attained without substantial cost even in a situation of low credibility provided that a mechanism of price alignment eliminates the asymmetry of the price deviation distribution we also develop an analytical framework for analyzing intermediate imperfect credibility cases

violence during democratization and the quality of democratic institutions abstract this paper investigates the impact of violent civil conflicts during the process of democratization on the institutional quality of the emerging democracies we propose a theory of endogenous regime transition in which violent conflict can arise in equilibrium peaceful transitions lead to a social contract that provides all groups with political representation and leads to better protection of civil liberties than violent transitions empirical evidence from the third wave of democratization based on a difference in difference methodology supports the theoretical predictions the findings suggest that compared to peaceful transitions violent conflicts during the democratic transition have persistent negative effects on the institutional quality of the emerging democracies

democracy volatility and economic development growth stability is an important objective because development requires sustained increases in income because volatility is costly for the poor and because volatility deters growth we study the determinants of average growth and its volatility as a two equation system and find that higher levels of democracy and diversification lower volatility whereas volatility itself reduces growth muslim countries instrument for democracy and measures of diversification identify volatility in contrast to the lack of consensus on the democracy growth relationship the democracy stability link is robust rather than focus on growth this paper forges an alternative link between democracy and development through the volatility channel

the resource curse revisited governance and natural resources the paper analyzes the impact of natural resource abundance on selected governance indicators we use a panel data set with observations on a large number of countries over an extended period of time and employ an instrumental variable technique to account for endogeneity the results show that exports of natural resources have above all led to an increase in corruption this result is robust to both different model specifications and an alternative indicator for natural resource abundance for other governance indicators such as law and order and bureaucratic quality we either find no results or results that lack robustness

education and propaganda tradeoffs to public education provision in nondemocracies abstract nondemocratic regimes face a tradeoff when investing in public education education promotes human capital acquisition expanding the tax base yet it also enhances political sophistication and participation at a cost to nondemocratic regimes to relax this tradeoff a regime can disseminate propaganda through its education system i show that even bayesian citizens can be influenced by propaganda by deterring political opposition propaganda can induce nondemocracies to invest in education when they otherwise would not improving social welfare when propaganda is too strong however it can generate a backlash using cross country and survey data i find evidence consistent with the predictions

proxies in the new political economy caveat emptor i introduction today proxies for cultural political and institutional variables abound in econometric studies and strong policy recommendations are based on results obtained with them unlike the traditional data of economists they are neither market generated nor the fruit of large official or semi official statistical projects the main providers are ideological or public interest organizations such as transparency international and freedom house supplemented by scholars corporations and miscellaneous organizations the diverse and perhaps suspect origins of these data are reasons to use them cautiously yet even the prudent robert barro 1999 takes freedom house s ratings of international political and civil liberty on faith in his recent study of the determinants of democracy the trust standard what i shall call the correlation test is a common way to assess multiple proxies for an intangible variable which also breeds complacency because it often is used as a substitute for direct appraisal of them alberto alesina and beatrice weder 1999 p 10 use it in a study of corruption s relation to foreign aid claiming that these relatively high correlations among proxies for corruption provide some confidence in the measures of corruption since most of them were compiled by different institutions using very different methodologies the same spirit infuses what i shall call the mutual corroboration test for regression results it is considered probative that different proxies for the same intangible variable produce similar or at least mutually compatible regression estimates the correlation and corroboration tests also appear in a recent world bank study kaufman et al 2000 p 11 utilizing measures of the quality of governance the authors write that if the data were not informative we would not expect to see the strong agreement across sources about the quality of governance particularly striking is the broad consensus that emerges among many diverse raters they acknowledge the conceptual differences among the literally hundreds of measures used in their study all qualitative but omit none from their composite indicators finally a pioneer in the new data gerald scully 1992 constructs eight economic freedom indexes plus an average of them to be the economic freedom variable in one of his projects he cites high rank correlations among them approvingly these tests use mutual resemblance or consistency as substitutes for directly assessing the suitability of proxies for a particular project one by one evaluation is to be sure a laborious and inconvenient task but ease and convenience are not tests of the validity of evaluation procedures correlation among the proxies or results obtained with them must not be confused with aptness of the proxies or results the correlation and corroboration tests assume for instance that only measurement error differentiates proxies from one another yet political institutional variables normally are defined differently from one another good governance is already a subjective judgment broad consensus allows differences of opinion identical policy conclusions cannot follow from regressions based on measures having different meanings so the quotation from alesina and weder is an indictment of their study not a defense of it the main purpose of this article is to show that the trust standard and the correlation and corroboration tests are pseudo criteria for judging the quality of proxies and results based on them because they are capable of supporting fallacious statistical estimates these tests i show endorse statistical nonsense in an interesting familiar case the nonsense is attributable in part to the inapposite use of proxy regressors in estimations of a simple and well known model specifically bivariate regressions often cited in support of the strict free market school of thought

the interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption a panel cross country analysis abstract this paper examines the effects of economic freedom democracy and its interaction term on controlling corruption interactive results indicate that economic freedom and democracy significantly combat corruption economic freedom reduces corruption in any political environment democracy increases corruption when economic liberalization is low

reevaluating the modernization hypothesis we revisit and critically reevaluate the widely accepted modernization hypothesis which claims that per capita income causes the creation and the consolidation of democracy existing studies find support for this hypothesis because they fail to control for the presence of omitted variables controlling for these factors either by including country fixed effects in a linear model or by including parameterized random effects in a nonlinear double hazard model removes the correlation between income and the likelihood of transitions to and from democratic regimes in addition the estimated fixed effects from the linear model are related to historical factors that affect both the level of income per capita and the likelihood of democracy in a country this evidence is consistent with the idea that events during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political economic development paths some leading to prosperity and democracy others to relative poverty and non democracy

comment on stopping inflations big and small response to article in this issue p 759 dynamic effects of monetary policy to interpret observations on the apparent output losses associated with stabilizing large and small inflations peter ireland constructs and calibrates a model with occasional costs of adjusting nominal prices in interpreting the observations with this model ireland takes for granted that the stabilizations described in papers by robert gordon and myself were responses to credible deflations credible in the sense that once they began they were anticipated as ireland stresses the assumption that these stabilizations were anticipated is critical in diiterentiating the adjustment dynamics presented in the current paper from the very diiterent dynamics exhibited in a companion paper ireland 1995 ireland 1995 follows fischer 1986 in interpreting an adaptive expectations scheme as a shorthand description of what application of bayes law might imply in the context of an equilibrium analysis in which the public is unsure of the monetary authority s purposes for example its type and uses the history of what the government does gradually to infer its purpose its type thus ireland and fischer interpreted adaptive expectations in terms of a learning scheme with cho and matsui s 1995 inductive property through particular patterns of behavior the government can eventually manipulate the key state variable the public s beliefs about inflation ireland 1995 describes how this specification aitects a government s optimal plan for stabilizing a high inherited inflation economy the induction property discourages gradualism and rewards policies that rapidly persuade the public of the government s intentions to sustain low inflation these dynamics are entirely driven by the process of acquiring credibility the present paper studies an opposite case in which the government so freely sets the public s beliefs that they disappear as state variables the only reason that prices appear as state variables is ireland s specification of the technology for setting nominal prices ireland s specification is designed to build in a short term trade oit between inflation and output and an impact eitect of monetary expansion it would be easy to undo the nonneutrality by tampering with ireland s specification of the price setting technology for example by letting firms set the pair pt pt l during

income and democracy evidence from system gmm estimates abstract does higher income cause democracy accounting for the dynamic nature and high persistence of income and democracy we find a statistically significant positive relation between income and democracy for a postwar period sample of up to 150 countries our results are robust across different measures of democracy and instrumentation strategies

religion and female educational attainment the paper reviews the literature on the education gender and religion nexuses and identifies plausible hypotheses that religion adversely affects female education the link between major religions and female educational attainment is examined using the barro lee data set for a sample of 97 countries the estimates include control variables for colonial heritage urbanization labor force participation and young adult mortality the estimates show powerful negative links between female educational attainment and the proportion of ethnoreligions hindu and muslim adherents in a country with similar results for the gender gap the paper offers some interpretative thoughts and research agendas

credit constraints and growth gains from governance this paper contributes to the governance literature by analyzing the specific mechanisms through which governance affects economic growth the credit channel specifically it investigates the grow

workers of the world unite franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in europe 1820 1938 abstract we test the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise in europe was related to the threat of revolution we contend that international diffusion of regime contention and information about revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries generate the necessary variation in the perceived threat of revolution using two samples of european countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938 we find robust evidence which is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis we also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

clientelism contagious voting and governance this paper explains inferior quality of governance in less affluent countries in terms of a patron client relationship between political parties and a large section of voters the client voters resort to strategic voting which is shown to be contagious leading to suboptimal effort choice by the incumbent government and a higher probability for the incumbent to remain in power the possibility of competition between the incumbent and the opposition in terms of expenditure on political propaganda actually helps the incumbent and reinforces these results

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

talent growth and income distribution a model with heterogeneous individuals and bequests between generations is constructed to analyze income distribution and educational choice the introduction of an imperfection in the credit market is shown to influence the allocation of talent both ability and bequest are of relevance in deciding whether or not to invest in education with learning by doing between generations the allocation of talent affects not only the level of production but also the growth rate copyright 1993 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

structural differences in economic growth an endogenous clustering approach this article addresses heterogeneity in determinants of economic growth in a data driven way instead of defining groups of countries with different growth characteristics a priori based on for example geographical location we use a finite mixture panel model and endogenous clustering to examine cross country differences and similarities in the effects of growth determinants applying this approach to an annual unbalanced panel of 59 countries in asia latin and middle america and africa for the period 1971 2000 we can identify two groups of countries in terms of distinct growth structures the structural differences between the country groups mainly stem from different effects of investment openness measures and government share in the economy furthermore the detected segmentation of countries does not match with conventional classifications in the literature

wealth as a determinant of comparative advantage abstract this paper shows that a country s wealth can be an important determinant of comparative advantage when access to credit differs across sectors of the economy wealthier nations exhibit a comparative advantage toward goods produced in sectors facing more severe financial imperfections these sectors are typically populated by small firms empirically this paper documents that these sectors are also labor intensive consequently this theory partially offsets traditional sources of comparative advantage and offers an explanation for trefler s missing trade mystery and the leontief paradox furthermore the theory makes the relation between trade and income distribution endogenous

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

the influence of political distortions on economic performance alberto alesina is the nathaniel ropes professor of political economy and chairman of the department of economics at harvard university in this interview he discusses with brian snowdon his views on several important contemporary issues including politics and the business cycle budget deficits currency unions the european union the size of nations economic growth inequality democracy foreign aid ethnic fractionalisation and the welfare state in the us and europe

inequality and democracy why inequality harms consolidation but does not affect democratization under what conditions do democracies emerge and consolidate recent theories suggest that inequality is among the leading determinants of both democratization and consolidation by contrast this article argues that inequality harms consolidation but has no net effect on democratization the author shows that the existing theories that link inequality to democratization suffer from serious limitations 1 they are useful only for understanding transitions from below and thus do not apply to many other transitions that is those from above 2 even for democratization from below their predictions are unlikely to hold since inequality actually has two opposite effects and 3 they ignore collective action problems which reduces their explanatory power however these objections do not affect the relationship between inequality and consolidation in particular while inequality has two opposite effects on the probability of transition to democracy it unambiguously increases the probability of transition away from democracy this article conducts the most comprehensive empirical test to date of the relationship between inequality and democracy it finds no support for the main democratization theories contrary to what they predict estimation suggests neither a monotonic negative nor an inverted u shaped relationship yet inequality increases the probability of backsliding from democracy to dictatorship

a dynamic theory of the transition to democracy abstract a model of the transition to democracy is presented within a dynamic general equilibrium framework we demonstrate that democratic transitions occur endogenously in the course of economic growth or with economic contraction being fundamentally driven by the economic position of the middle class democratic transitions can occur rapidly or slowly because the autocrat faces an informational asymmetry regarding the effect of his policies on the political economic environment the model shows that the primary factors affecting the speed of democratic transitions are inequality the planning horizon of the autocrat the autocrat s perceived legitimacy and the rate of economic growth

climate instability urbanisation and international migration abstractthis paper focuses on climate induced migration we construct a simple theoretical model where in a first step climate shocks accelerate the transition from the traditional to the modern sector leading rural workers to move to urban centres within national borders while in a second step downward pressures on wages due to the greater labour supply in cities push people to engage in international migration to test this hypothesis we exploit a rich panel dataset displaying a representative picture of bilateral migration flows and climatic data across 222 countries for the period 1960 2000 findings suggest that in the next few years the climate induced growth rate of migrant stocks might be in a range between 8 6 per cent and 12 8 per cent especially from developing countries where the level of rural employment is more likely to be affected by climatic shocks

long lasting effects of socialist education abstract political regimes influence the content of education and criteria used to select and evaluate students we study the impact of a socialist education on the likelihood of obtaining a college degree and on several labor market outcomes by exploiting the reorganization of the school system in east germany after reunification our identification strategy uses cutoff birth dates for school enrollment that lead to variation in the length of exposure to the socialist education system within the same birth cohort an additional year of socialist education decreases the probability of obtaining a college degree and affects longer term labor market outcomes for men

likelihood based estimation of dynamic panels with predetermined regressors this article discusses the likelihood based estimation of panel data models with individual specific effects and both lagged dependent variable regressors and additional predetermined explanatory variables the resulting new estimator labeled as subsystem limited information maximum likelihood ssliml is asymptotically equivalent to standard panel generalized method of moment as n for fixed t but tends to present smaller biases in finite samples as illustrated in simulation experiments simulation results also indicate that the estimator is preferred to other alternatives available in the literature in terms of finite sample performance finally to provide an empirical illustration i revisit the evidence on the relationship between income and democracy in a panel of countries using the proposed estimator

the impact of international trade on democracy a long run perspective the likely endogeneity between democracy and trade is addressed with an instrumental variables strategy in this article about whether international trade fosters democracy the authors use a measure of natural openness to obtain estimates of the causal impact of openness on democratization in three separate samples spanning the last 130 years a positive impact of openness on democracy is apparent in the data over the long run the post world war ii results suggest that with a rise in trade with other countries equal to a one standard deviation increase countries such as indonesia russia and venezuela could eventually become as democratic as the u s great britain or france there is some variation in the impact of openness by region that may be because trade seems to have a positive impact only when the capital to labor ratio is sufficiently high this is consistent with the idea that openness promotes democracy when it strengthens the economic fortunes of the middle class

public education and intergenerational economic mobility this paper examines the role of public education in determining intergenerational economic mobility it considers a model in which education is free and admission to schools is competitive the results indicate that for mobility to increase during the process of development the share of resources devoted to public education needs to be large enough to offset the relative advantage of having educated parents in academic attainment

determinants of democracy a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights the propensity for democracy rises with per capita gdp primary schooling and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment for a given standard of living democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle class share of income the apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant similarly the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation however negative effects from muslim and non religious affiliations remain intact

the impact of economic development on democracy any account of the social and economic conditions of democracy must come to terms with the central finding of the cross national statistical research a sturdy though not perfect association between economic development and democracy to tackle these questions of causation we adopted a strategy of analytic induction based on comparative historical research our program of comparative historical research confirmed the conclusion of the cross national statistical analyses of the correlates of political democracy the level of economic development is causally related to the development of political democracy however the underlying reason for the connection in our view is that capitalist development transforms the class structure enlarging the working and middle classes and facilitating their self organization thus making it more difficult for elites to exclude them politically simultaneously development weakens the landed upper class democracy s most consistent opponent

trade democracy and the gravity equation abstract does democracy affect trade there are several channels by which democracy may affect trade with differing implications first democratization in the exporting country can improve product quality and reduce trade costs increasing bilateral trade second democratization in the importing country may increase trade barriers and thus reduce imports in this paper i analyze the effect of democracy on trade by augmenting the gravity equation with democracy using a rich panel data set and controlling for the endogeneity of democracy i find empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that democracy fosters trade this finding is robust to various econometric methods and to the use of disaggregated specifications

oil and women a re examination abstract in a seminal article ross 2008 reports a negative correlation between oil production and women s representation in the labour force and politics across countries this article re examines these relationships exploiting variations in oil endowments to address endogeneity concerns we confirm that oil production causes decline in women s representation additionally we show that consistent with dutch disease effects oil production decreases women s employment in the traded sector however it also leads to an increase in women s employment in the nontraded sector we explore some social consequences of oil production and show that it results in women marrying earlier and having more children

does microfinance reduce income inequality this study addresses the question whether participation of the poor in microfinance contributes to reducing a country s level of income inequality using data from 70 developing countries we show that higher levels of microfinance participation are indeed associated with a reduction of the income gap between rich and poor people we also show however that the effects of microfinance on reducing income inequality are relatively small the results of this study add to the discussion on the impact of microfinance on poverty by showing that although access to microfinance does seem to improve the relative income position of the poor this improvement is modest which is probably because the use of microfinance is generally small as compared to the size of the economy of the countries in our sample microfinance should therefore not be seen as a panacea for bringing down income inequality in a significant way

endogenous time dependent rules and inflation inertia in this paper we endogenize fixed price time dependent rules to examine the output effects of monetary disinflation we derive the optimal rules in and out of inflationary steady states and develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through time because of strategic complementarities we have to solve both problems simultaneously this allows us to reassess the output costs of monetary disinflations including aspects such as the roles of the initial level of inflation and of the degree of strategic complementarity in price finally we relax the strict assumption of pure time dependent rules by allowing price setters to re evaluate their rules at the time disinflation is announced

the art of the possible power sharing and post civil war democracy this article focuses on the role that power sharing arrangements play in making it possible for some countries to make the transition to democracy successfully after civil war the authors hypothesize that the adoption of multiple forms of power sharing measures constructed to end particularly difficult civil wars facilitate the emergence of a minimalist form of democracy following some intrastate conflicts by helping to assuage warring groups security concerns the authors use a bivariate probit model to account for the possibility that the decisions by wartime rivals to engage in power sharing and whether to adopt democracy or not are interrelated employing panel data for all civils wars concluded between 1945 and the end of 2006 they find support for their hypothesis

world welfare is rising estimation using nonparametric bounds on welfare measures abstract i take a new approach to measuring world inequality and welfare over time by constructing robust bounds for these series instead of imposing parametric assumptions to compute point estimates i derive sharp bounds on the atkinson inequality index that are valid for any underlying distribution of income conditional on given fractile shares and gini coefficients while the bounds are too wide to reject the hypothesis that world inequality may have risen i show that world welfare rose unambiguously between 1970 and 2006 this conclusion is valid for alternative methods of dealing with countries and years with missing surveys alternative survey harmonization procedures alternative gdp series or if the inequality surveys used systematically underreport the income of the very rich or suffer from nonresponse bias

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

keeping one step ahead of the joneses status the distribution of wealth and long run growth assuming that the utility of each agent depends on its relative wealth position in the society this chapter constructs an endogenous growth model it is shown that even if the subjective discount rates differ across agents there exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which each agent owns a positive share of the world wealth it is also shown that if the agents are identical then an increase in savings incentives always raises the long run growth rate but if they are heterogeneous then an increase in savings incentives may lower the long run growth rate

on the number and size of nations this paper studies the equilibrium determination of the number of countries in different political regimes and in different economic environments with more or less economic integration we focus on the trade off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity of large and diverse populations our model implies that i democratization leads to secessions ii in equilibrium one generally observes an inefficiently large number of countries iii the equilibrium number of countries is increasing in the amount of economic integration

revisiting the modernization hypothesis longevity and democracy summary modernization theory claims that changes in economic fundamentals like e g income per capita and education levels affect the political structure of a country in a causal way as an important marker of development life expectancy can also be conjectured to have a direct effect on political structures in this paper we estimate the impact of improvements in life expectancy on democracy for the purpose of identification we use data from the international epidemiological transition to construct an instrument for life expectancy we find a statistically and economically significant positive causal effect of improvements in life expectancy on democracy

revolt on the nile economic shocks religion and political power using centuries of nile flood data i document that during deviant nile floods egypt s highest ranking religious authority was less likely to be replaced and relative allocations to religious structures increased these findings are consistent with historical evidence that nile shocks increased this authority s political influence by raising the probability he could coordinate a revolt i find that the available data provide support for this interpretation and weigh against some of the most plausible alternatives for example i show that while nile shocks increased historical references to social unrest deviant floods did not increase a proxy for popular religiosity together the results suggest an increase in the political power of religious leaders during periods of economic downturn publication abstract

international comparisons of rural urban educational attainment data and determinants we study cross country differences in rural and urban educational attainment by using a data set comprising 56 countries we focus on the determinants of rural urban educational inequality which is measured by the ratio of rural to urban average years of schooling within each country we find that riskier human capital investment less credit availability a colonial heritage a legal system of french origin and landlockedness of nations are all associated with relatively lower rural educational levels and greater rural urban educational inequality conversely larger formal labor markets better infrastructure and a legal system of british origin are associated with relatively higher rural educational levels and lower rural urban educational inequality we also identify an interaction effect between economic development level and some of these factors in particular we find that as development level increases the negative positive relationship between french british legal systems and rural urban educational inequality is reversed and becomes positive negative

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

democracy rent seeking public spending and growth abstract does democratization imply faster growth less corruption and less inefficiency past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth we develop a simple two sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization producing a u effect this effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods rent seekers act as monopolistic competitors initially more democracy increases their number raising aggregate rents however rents per rent seeker fall with the number of rent seekers due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers aggregate rents fall in mature democracies thus rents show an inverted u effect in relation to democracy we find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter

risk bearing and the theory of income distribution this paper develops the stochastic theory of distribution with a dynamic model which focuses on the role of incomplete insurance in generating inequality unlike previous work our approach takes explicit account of the reason for market incompleteness in modeling agents behaviour in particular the amount of risk borne is endogenous using a model of growth with altruism in which agents are risk averse and there is moral hazard we show that lineage wealth follows a markov process which converges globally to an ergodic distribution this also represents the long run population distribution of wealth we discuss the role of particular assumptions such as availability of production loans and unboundedness of utility in yielding the qualitative properties of the distribution of wealth the choice of occupation and the prevention of poverty traps