cost uncertainty and the rate of investment abstract this paper examines the effect of cost and price uncertainty on the optimal rate of investment by firms within a general equilibrium framework former works which have studied this issue like hartman 1972 and abel 1983 1984 1985 have come to the conclusion that this effect is positive since increased price uncertainty raises expected profitability but these studies assume a fixed discount rate which is equivalent to assuming that consumers are risk neutral this paper shows that if consumers are risk averse the effect of uncertainty may be reversed and investment may be depressed when price or cost uncertainty is increased

uncertainty investment and industry evolution we study the effects of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty on the entry of firms total investment and prices in a competitive industry with irreversible investment we first use standard dynamic programming methods to determine firms entry decisions and we describe the resulting industry equilibrium and its characteristics emphasizing the effects of different sources of uncertainty we then show how the conditional distribution of prices can be used as an alternative means of determining and understanding the behavior of firms and the resulting industry equilibrium finally we use four digit u s manufacturing data to examine some implications of the model

irreversible investment with regime shifts under the real options approach to investment under uncertainty agents formulate optimal policies under the assumption that firms growth prospects do not vary over time this paper proposes and solves a model of investment decisions in which the growth rate and volatility of the decision variable shift between different states at random times a value maximizing investment policy is derived such that in each regime the firm s investment policy is optimal and recognizes the possibility of a regime shift under this policy investment is intermittent and increases with marginal q moreover investment typically is very small but in some states the capital stock jumps implications for marginal q and the user cost of capital are also examined

one man one bid abstract we compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice e g adopt one of two proposals we show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome we introduce a simple bidding mechanism where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost and voters receive rebates equal to the average of others payments this mechanism is budget balanced individually rational and fully efficient in the limit moreover the mechanism redistributes from those that gain from the outcome to those that lose and everyone is better off under bidding compared to voting we test the two mechanisms in the lab using an environment with moderate and extremist voters the observed efficiency losses under voting are close to theoretical predictions and significantly larger than under bidding because of redistribution the efficiency gain from bidding benefits mostly the moderate voters

a note on competitive investment under uncertainty uncertainty over future output prices or input costs can affect investment by a riskneutral firm in two opposing ways first it can increase the value of the marginal unit of capital which leads to more investment this only requires that the stream of future profits generated by the marginal unit be a convex function of the stochastic variable by jensen s inequality the expected present value of that stream is increased this result was demonstrated by richard hartman 1972 and later extended by andrew abel 1983 and others in their models constant returns to scale and the substitutability of capital with other factors ensure that the marginal profitability of capital is convex in output price and input costs even with fixed proportions however this convexity can result from the ability of the firm to vary output so that the marginal unit of capital need not be utilized at times when the output price is low or input costs are high if investment is irreversible and can be postponed a second effect of uncertainty is to create an opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting for new information to arrive before committing resources this increases the full cost of investing in a marginal unit of capital which reduces investment 2 hence the net effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment depends on the size of this opportunity cost relative to the increase in the value of the marginal unit of capital the sign of the net effect is significant because of its possible policy implications pindyck 1988 and giuseppe bertola 1989 developed models in which a firm faces a downward sloping demand curve and found the net effect to be negative ricardo caballero 1991 has recently studied investment by an individual firm facing a stochastically shifting demand curve he shows that as returns to scale become constant and the elasticity of demand faced by the firm rises this opportunity cost of investing now rather than waiting approaches zero thus in the limit of constant returns and an infinitely elastic demand curve an increase in uncertainty tends to raise rather than decrease current investment even if that investment is irreversible it is important to stress that caballero s limiting result treats the firm in isolation and describes the effect of a meanpreserving increase in price uncertainty and not an increase in industry wide demand uncertainty this note shows that in a competitive market the key interactions between irreversibility and uncertainty occur at the industry level and can only be understood by making price and industry output endogenous 3 doing so restores the positive opportunity cost associated with irreversible investment in addition caballero s result is based on a model with convex adjustment costs an innovative aspect of the model is that these costs can be asymmetric thereby allowing for partial or complete irreversibility complete irreversibility corresponds to a cost of massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02139 this work was supported by the national science foundation under grant no ses 8618502 and by mit s center for energy policy research my thanks to julio rotemberg and especially ricardo caballero for very helpful comments and discussions 1then the marginal profit of capital at each time t in the future is max o pt ct where ct is variable cost thus a unit of capital represents a set of all options on future production which are worth more the greater the variance of pt or ct 2for a detailed discussion of this point and a survey of the recent literature on irreversibility and its implications for investment and market evolution see pindyck 1991 3studies that make price endogenous include steven lippman and richard rumelt 1985 avinash dixit 1989 1991 and john leahy 1990

real investment decisions under adjustment costs and asymmetric information abstract we study the cost of adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners the principal and managers the agent information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types and a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range in an observationally different way than when fixed adjustment costs or irreversibilities cause a similar phenomenon uncertainty in the form of an increase in the spread of agents types tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition the model gives a new interpretation of tobin s q under asymmetric information explaining some results of the mergers and acquisition literature

is the investment uncertainty relationship nonlinear an empirical analysis for the netherlands we examine the investment uncertainty relationship for a panel of dutch non financial firms the system generalized method of moments gmm estimates suggest that the effect of uncertainty on investment is nonlinear for low levels of uncertainty an increase in uncertainty has a positive effect on investment while for high levels of uncertainty an increase in uncertainty lowers investment this result is in line with a number of theoretical studies but has never been documented empirically

the role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation an empirical investigation in this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which moore and repullo s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth telling in practice both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good s value we nd that moore repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good this failure to implement truthtelling is due to beliefs about the irrationality of one s trading partner therefore although the mechanism should in theory provide incentives for truth telling many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their expected monetary payo by lying the deviations from truth telling become signicantly more frequent and more persistent when agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good s value our results thus suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of moore repullo mechanisms in practice

learning dynamics for mechanism design an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms in a repeated interaction public goods economy incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information oneshot game an experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations this provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations these predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice the simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested

the interaction of debt financing cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty abstract significant progress has been made toward understanding a levered firm s optimal investment policy under uncertainty to date however not much work has concentrated on the time scale trade off and collectively held real options we employ a game theoretic real option model between a firm and a government to analyze the effect of uncertainty and investment stimulus in the form of cash grants on optimal investment timing financing and investment scaling we find that the jointly held real option between the firm and the government leads to underinvestment regardless of whether the firm has the possibility to issue debt subsidies however reduce the level of underinvestment notably the results indicate that even though levered firms receive less support they invest more than unlevered firms this challenges recent findings that a firm s optimal investment level is not affected by the way it finances a project similarly we find that for realistic parameter constellations the levered firm s optimal investment threshold can be higher than that of its unlevered counterpart this indicates that the availability of tax shield benefits does not necessarily serve as an incentive to invest earlier finally we show that the effect of cash flow uncertainty on the equilibrium level of grants is ambiguous and triggers the switch from a subsidy to non subsidy regime

exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design a basic goal in mechanism design is to construct mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy efficiency voluntary participation and dominant strategy incentive compatibility previous work has shown that this is impossible unless the agents and planner have sufficient information about each other and common knowledge these results have remained largely theoretical because the required information is generally not available in practical applications however recent work has shown that these limitations can be overcome in simple settings using neurometric technologies that provide noisy signals of subjects preferences that can be used in the mechanism design problem here we build on this work by carrying out two new experiments designed to test the extent to which these neurometrically informed mechanisms nims can be applied to more complicated and realistic environments we find robustness to large type and action space and to the degrees of loss and risk aversion observed in most of our sample

economic status and health in childhood the origins of the gradient the well known positive association between health and income in adulthood has antecedents in childhood not only is children s health positively related to household income but the relationship between household income and children s health becomes more pronounced as children age part of the relationship can be explained by the arrival and impact of chronic conditions children from lower income households with chronic conditions have worse health than do those from higher income households the adverse health effects of lower income accumulate over children s lives part of the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status may work through the impact of parents income on children s health

secure implementation experiments do strategy proof mechanisms really work strategy proofness requiring that truth telling is a dominant strategy is a standard concept used in social choice theory saijo et al 2003 argue that this concept has serious drawbacks in particular announcing one s true preference may not be a unique dominant strategy and almost all strategy proof mechanisms have a continuum of nash equilibria for only a subset of strategy proof mechanisms do the set of nash equilibria and the set of dominant strategy equilibria coincide for example this double coincidence occurs in the groves mechanism when preferences are single peaked we report experiments using two strategy proof mechanisms where one of them has a large number of nash equilibria but the other has a unique nash equilibrium we found clear differences in the rate of dominant strategy play between the two

excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt abstract this paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders risk taking decisions we show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders it also implies a lower leverage which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields we then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt we find that this option mitigates equityholders risk shifting incentives compared to standard short term debt this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution

real options delay vs pre emption do industrial characteristics matter this paper presents an empirical study of the channels of influence from uncertainty to fixed investment suggested by real options theory using panel data from the confederation of british industry cbi industrial trends survey we report ols estimates of the impact of uncertainty on investment where the regressors are augmented by cross sectional averages of the dependent variable and of the individual specific regressors as recently suggested by pesaran pesaran m h 2006 estimation and inference in large heterogeneous panels with a multifactor error structure econometrica 74 967 1012 the cross industry pattern of results is checked for consistency with the pattern predicted by real options theory using a specially constructed data set of industrial characteristics we find that irreversibility is able to predict the pattern detected but only when combined with a measure of the information advantage of delay there is also evidence for expansion options effects industries with high r d and advertising intensities tend to have positive uncertainty effects

investment in new activities and the welfare cost of uncertainty abstract recent literature has shown that trade distortions are associated with first order costs stemming from the induced drop in the formation of new activities we demonstrate that uncertainty may induce similar welfare costs and that these costs apply also to a closed economy this argument is illustrated in romer s model of a dependent economy where foreign direct investment is needed to enable the importation of capital goods and intermediate products used in domestic production we show that knightian uncertainty inhibits the formation of new activities leading to first order losses whereas risk aversion alone leads to second order losses

relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment we compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments one mechanism the falkinger mechanism rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good falkinger mechanism the other the compensation mechanism allows agents to subsidize the other agents contributions compensation mechanism it is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods however the falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism

industry wide versus firm specific uncertainty and investment british company panel data evidence this paper presents evidence on the prediction that the impacts of firm specific and industry wide uncertainty on investment will be different results show that these work in opposing directions and that the effect of industry specific uncertainty is stronger in concentrated industries

the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a real options model abstract this paper examines the effect of uncertainty on investment timing in a canonical real options model we show that the critical value of a project that triggers the exercise of the investment option exhibits a u shaped pattern against the volatility of the project this is due to the two countervailing risk and return factors in effect we further show that such a u shaped pattern is inherited by the expected time to exercise the investment option thus for relatively safe projects greater uncertainty shortens the expected exercise time and thus enhances investment this is in sharp contrast to the negative investment uncertainty relationship commonly found in the extant literature finally we show that the positive investment uncertainty relationship is more likely for high growth projects than for low growth projects

investment under uncertainty and policy change in this paper the impact of a policy change on the investment behavior of the firm is studied in an incomplete information setting the policy change occurs when a stochastic process describing the state of the economic environment reaches a certain trigger the firm has incomplete information about the trigger and knows only its probability distribution consequently both the firm s conjecture concerning the trigger value as well as the precision of this conjecture serve as input parameters we derive the optimal investment rule maximizing the value of the firm and show that the impact of the trigger value uncertainty on the optimal investment threshold is non monotonic the threshold decreases with uncertainty for its low levels while the reverse is true if uncertainty is high furthermore we provide results concerning the valuation of the firm s investment opportunity and present some policy implications

on the investment uncertainty relationship in a real options model abstract it appears to be widely accepted in the real options literature that an increase in uncertainty should have an inhibiting effect on investment our article demonstrates that the notion of a negative uncertainty investment relationship is not always correct we show that in certain situations an increase in uncertainty can actually increase the probability of investing and thereby have a positive impact on investment

the effect of mean reversion on investment under uncertainty abstract mean reverting processes are appropriate for most real option investment models yet geometric brownian motion gbm processes are generally used for tractability hassett and metcalf j econom dyn control 19 1995 1471 1488 argue that using a gbm process is justified because mean reversion has two opposing effects it brings the investment trigger closer and also reduces the conditional volatility thereby lowering the likelihood of reaching the trigger and the overall effect on investment should be negligible for most reasonable parameter values this paper extends the hassett and metcalf model by incorporating a third factor the effect of mean reversion on systematic risk the main result is that mean reversion in general does have a significant impact on investment moreover this effect could be either positive or negative depending on various factors such as project duration cost of investing interest rate etc thus it is generally inappropriate to use the gbm process to approximate a mean reverting process

investment under alternative return assumptions comparing random walks and mean reversion abstract many recent theoretical papers have come under attack for modeling prices as geometric brownian motion this process can diverge over time implying that firms facing this price process can earn infinite profits we explore the significance of this attack and contrast investment under geometric brownian motion with investment assuming mean reversion while analytically more complex mean reversion in many cases is a more plausible assumption allowing for supply responses to increasing prices we show that cumulative investment is generally unaffected by the use of a mean reversion process rather than geometric brownian motion and provide an explanation for this result

education and family health care spending michael grossman s seminal work on the demand for health extended the concept of a household production function to the commodity good health in this framework education represents an environmental variable that enhances the monetary returns to investments in health through the use of time and medical care in health production using data from the 2004 to 2012 medical expenditure panel survey meps we examine the association between parental education and family health care spending in single mother and two parent families we estimate one and two part expenditure models for total family health care spending for specific components of such spending and also examine the impact of parental education on selected measures of family health controlling for family income and health insurance status we find consistent evidence that parental education beyond 12 years of schooling is associated with increases in family health care spending and with reductions in the likelihood of adverse health conditions

the groves ledyard mechanism an experimental study of institutional design the groves ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the free rider problem in public good provision in certain environments two questions are of overriding importance in implementing the mechanism the first is related to the actual performance of the mechanism in general the second is the choice of a punishment parameter which is the only parameter that is available for those who may want to actually use the mechanism thus the determination of the role of this variable on mechanism performance is fundamental for any advances along the lines of actual implementation in studying the groves ledyard mechanism we show that the punishment parameter plays a crucial role in the performance of the mechanism by using 1 and 100 we show that under the higher punishment parameter the groves ledyard equilibrium is chosen much more frequently a higher level of the public good is provided and efficiency is higher by examining two behavioral models we show that a higher leads to an increase in the probability of an individual choosing a best response predicted by the model the parameter alone explains nearly 70 of the data in both the cournot and the carlson auster behavioral model we also found that convergence to cournot behavior is faster and more stable under a high than under a low

the heterogeneous investment horizon and the capital asset pricing model theory and implications this paper generalizes the risk return relationship implied by the traditional capital asset pricing model with finite investment horizons it examines the effect of heterogeneous investment horizons on the functional form of capital asset pricing and proposes a translog model for estimating the risk return relationship in addition this paper contends that some empirical findings that are inconsistent with the traditional capm have resulted from misspecification of the capm by ignoring the discrepancy between the observed data periods and the true investment horizons finally the paper shows that under various conditions the translog model is a suitable function for estimating the relationship between risk and expected returns

incomplete markets ambiguity and irreversible investment abstract the problem of irreversible investment with idiosyncratic risk is studied by interpreting market incompleteness as a source of ambiguity over the appropriate no arbitrage discount factor the maxmin utility over multiple priors framework is used to model and solve the irreversible investment problem multiple priors are modeled using the notion of ignorance this set up is used to analyze finitely lived options for infinitely lived options the notion of constant ignorance is introduced for these sets of density generators the corresponding optimal stopping problem is solved for general in finite horizon optimal stopping problems driven by geometric brownian motion it is argued that an increase in the set of priors delays investment whereas an increase in the degree of market completeness can have a non monotonic effect on investment

finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment abstract this paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncertainty which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates investment typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual however in today s economy firms face a fast changing technology environment implying that investment projects are usually considered to have a finite life the present paper studies investment projects with finite project life and we find that in contrast with the existing theory investments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty it is shown that this particularly happens at low levels of uncertainty and when project life is short

firms investment decisions in response to demand and price uncertainty we investigate the effect of demand and price uncertainty on firms planned and realized investment from a panel of manufacturing firms uncertainty measures are derived from firms own expectations about demand and prices and firm s sales we find that demand uncertainty at the time of planning depresses planned and subsequent realized investment firms do not revise their plans due to demand uncertainty at the time of spending suggesting that reducing demand uncertainty will only have lagged effects on investment we do not find any effect of price uncertainty our results are consistent with the behaviour of monopolistic firms with irreversible capital

investment in risky r d programs in the face of climate uncertainty we analyze how the socially optimal technology rd and that uncertainty in damages interacts with uncertainty in the returns to rd and r d that reduces the emissions to output ratio and argue that this is a good representation of r d into fossil fuel technologies for r d programs into non carbon technologies optimal investment is higher in riskier programs our empirical model indicates that the optimal investment in a risky program is about 3 1 2 times larger than in a program with certain returns for r d programs aimed at reducing emissions in fossil fuel based technologies our results show that qualitatively investment is higher in less risky programs under most uncertain damage scenarios our empirical model shows however that the risk profile of fossil fuel based r d programs generally has little quantitative impact on optimal investment the exception is that when the probability of a catastrophe inducing full abatement is very high investment is about twice as high in risky programs compared to programs with certain returns

investment timing and learning externalities abstract we study a duopoly model of investment in which each player learns about the quality of a common value project by observing some public background information and possibly the experience of his rival investment costs are private information and the background signal takes the form of a poisson process conditional on the quality of the project being low the resulting attrition game has a unique symmetric equilibrium which depends on initial public beliefs we determine the impact of changes in the cost and signal distributions on investment timing and how equilibrium is affected when a first mover advantage is introduced

on the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship understanding the effects of uncertainty over any decision variable has fascinated economists for a long time risk aversion and incomplete markets are likely to make the investment uncertainty relationship negative e g roger craine 1989 joseph zeira 1989 what happens in the absence of risk aversion and incomplete markets is however ambiguous richard hartman 1972 and andrew b abel 1983 1984 1985 found that in the presence of symmetric convex costs of adjustment mean preserving increases in price uncertainty raise investment of a competitive firm as long as the profit function is convex in prices on the other hand the recent literature on irreversible investment e g robert s pindyck 1988 giuseppe bertola 1988 has shown that increases in uncertainty lower investment all these results have been derived under either risk neutrality or complete markets intuition suggests that the explanation for such a difference lies with the asymmetric nature of adjustment costs in the irreversible investment case as compared with the symmetry of the adjustment cost mechanisms proposed by abel and hartman although this intuition is confirmed in this paper asymmetric adjustment costs are shown not to be sufficient to explain why the results differ in fact a more hidden but at least as important difference between these two literatures is that the former assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale whereas the latter assumes either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both 2 the purpose of this paper is to highlight the role of the decreasing marginal return to capital assumption due to either imperfect competition or decreasing returns to scale or both in determining the effects of adjustment cost asymmetries on the sign of the response of investment to changes in uncertainty under risk neutrality for this the paper develops a simple model with a cost of adjustment mechanism general enough to consider both symmetric convexity and irreversibility as special cases one of the most important findings is the lack of robustness of the negative relationship between investment and uncertainty under asymmetric adjustment costs3 to changes in the degree of competition in fact when firms are nearly competitive the conclusion of hartman and of abel holds no matter how asymmetric adjustment costs are studying adjustment cost mechanisms has a central role in understanding the dynamics of investment and its business cycle implications but conclusive results about the sign of the instantaneous relationship between uncertainty and investment should not be department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 i am grateful to giuseppe bertola prajit dutta glen hubbard anil kashyap richard lyons and the referees for their useful comments 1the financial literature on investment has considered risk aversion through a premium in the discount rate determined by the capm capital asset pricing model intertemporal capm or consumption capm however often this discount rate is left unchanged when studying the response of investment to uncertainty changes e g pindyck 1988 pp 974 5 thereby omitting the effect of changes in uncertainty on investment due to risk aversion and incomplete markets 2in the typical version of the irreversible investment problem there is no cost of upward adjustments thus imperfect competition and or decreasing returns to scale are required to bound the size of the firm 3in this paper asymmetric adjustment cost refers to the case in which it is more expensive to adjust downward than upward certainly the opposite case is a trivial extension of the case studied in this paper

exit in duopoly under uncertainty this paper examines a declining duopoly where the firms must choose when to exit from the market the uncertainty is modeled by letting the revenue stream follow a geometric brownian motion we consider the markovperfect equilibrium in firms exit strategies with a low degree of uncertainty there is a unique equilibrium where one of the fi rms always exits before the other however when uncertainty is increased another equilibrium with the reversed order of exit may appear ruining the uniqueness whether this happens or not depends on the degree of asymmetry in the firm specifi cp arameters

optimal r d investment for a risk averse entrepreneur abstract entrepreneurs investing in r d projects face technical uncertainty associated with the cost to completion of the project which is idiosyncratic and inherently unhedgeable we extend existing real options models of r d investment to incorporate the cost of bearing this unhedgeable risk and find it decreases risk averse entrepreneurs valuations of r d projects and increases the minimum npvs required for continued investment in r d threshold npvs relative to unpriced risk values and threshold npvs as in the unpriced risk case for less risk averse entrepreneurs with small r d projects threshold npvs remain negative and decrease with technical uncertainty however for sufficiently risk averse entrepreneurs with sufficiently large r d projects threshold npvs can become positive and increase with technical uncertainty

zeros and lumps in investment empirical evidence on irreversibilities and nonconvexities the objective of this paper is to investigate if and how capital adjustment departs from the smooth pattern implied by standard model based on convex adjustment costs using norwegian micro data we start by documenting the intermittent and lumpy nature of investment rates we then present two pieces of econometric evidence on these issues first we estimate a discrete hazard model to determine the probability of having an episode of high investment conditional on the length of the interval from the last high investment episode second we estimate a switching regression model that allows for the response of the investment rate to fundamentals to differ across regimes in both cases we investigate the aggregate implications of our results

an experiment in the demand revealing process the principal findings of this experiment are it is somewhat time consuming but not otherwise difficult to employ the demand revealing process in groups of 10 to 60 the ability of the demand revealing process to take account of intensities of preferences is appreciated by many of the persons who have used the process but the departure from one man one vote is strongly resisted by others the outcomes reached by demand revealing differed from majority rule in about one tenth of the cases the improvement in efficiency associated with these reversals of majority rule was 2 25 percent of the net benefit of making the efficient decisions the clarke taxes which would decline in percentage terms as group size increased were 3 04 percent of the net value of efficient decisions for the decisions studied

optimal capital structure and investment with real options and endogenous debt costs we examine the joint optimization of financial leverage and irreversible capacity investment in a real options framework with risky debt and endogenous interest costs higher capacity ceteris paribus increases operating leverage and default probability but lowers ex post adjustment costs and generates larger tax shields a key insight is that financial leverage and capacity are substitutes in the debt market equilibrium we develop novel predictions about the effects of capital adjustment costs operating costs and uncertainty on optimal financial leverage and capacity that may potentially help explain ambiguous empirical results in the literature regarding the determinants of capital structure and investment received march 17 2016 editorial decision july 8 2017 by editor itay goldstein

adjustment costs uncertainty and the theory of investment the case of non renewable natural resources abstract this paper examines the effects of mineral price and extraction cost uncertainty on the investment program of a competitive resource extracting industry that faces convex costs of adjustment the results show that depletion of mineral reserves will slow down if the marginal adjustment cost function is concave or linear whereas the effect will be ambiguous if the function is convex

dynamic investment and capital structure under manager shareholder conflict abstract this paper investigates the interactions between the investment and financing decisions of a firm under manager shareholder conflicts arising from asymmetric information in particular we extend the manager shareholder conflict problem in a real options model by incorporating debt financing we show that manager shareholder conflicts over investment policy increase not only the investment and default triggers but also coupon payments which lead to a decrease in the equity value moreover given the presence of manager shareholder conflicts debt financing increases investment and decreases total social welfare as a result there is a trade off between the efficiency of investment and total social welfare with debt financing these results fit well with the findings of previous empirical work in this area

aggregate uncertainty investment and asymmetric adjustment in the uk manufacturing sector theory suggests that the level of uncertainty facing firms should affect both the rate of adjustment to and the steady state level of investment although there is ambiguity about the sign of the effect a non linear model of investment behaviour incorporating time varying adjustment speeds with threshold effects is estimated for the uk manufacturing sector the most general non linear specification is found to be most congruent with the data uncertainty has a large and significant effect on both levels and rates of adjustment

the demand for health and health concerns after 30 years michael grossman s seminal model stressed that health production requires both goods and time yet recent empirical health research focuses primarily on personal medical care to the exclusion of other inputs to health future research should place greater emphasis on the roles of non medical consumption goods population level inputs and time in producing health capital improved information technology will allow researchers to dissect how education promotes efficiency in combining goods and time to produce health economic analyses of child health which is the antecedent of adult health must proceed in tandem with medical advances in understanding health development in childhood

irreversible investment real options and competition evidence from real estate development abstract we examine the extent to which uncertainty delays investment and the effect of competition on this relationship using a sample of 1214 condominium developments in vancouver canada built from 1979 1998 we find that increases in both idiosyncratic and systematic risk lead developers to delay new real estate investments empirically a one standard deviation increase in the return volatility reduces the probability of investment by 13 percent equivalent to a 9 percent decline in real prices increases in the number of potential competitors located near a project negate the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and development these results support models in which competition erodes option values and provide clear evidence for the real options framework over alternatives such as simple risk aversion

implementation via approval mechanisms abstract we focus on the single peaked domain and study the class of generalized approval mechanisms g a m s first players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative and then a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented our main finding is that essentially for every nash implementable welfare optimum including the condorcet winner alternative there exists a gam that nash implements it importantly the gam that nash implements the condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature

experiments with the pivot process for providing public goods interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades the possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here the specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms the reason for this remains an open question

machine replacement under evolving deterministic and stochastic costs the infinite horizon cost minimization and the real option stopping problem are used to analyze serial replacement of a single asset under improving technology it is shown that both techniques produce the same equal life replacement policy when exponential technological improvements affect the operating cost and new asset cost in the same way next this result is extended to the stopping problem under evolving stochastic costs under general improving technology the expected asset lifetimes appear to be different for sequential replacement cycles and depend on the future cost evolution numeric experiments are provided and managerial implications of the obtained outcomes are discussed

investing in finite life carbon emissions reduction program under risk and idiosyncratic uncertainty this paper aims at emphasizing the ability of new frameworks of real option model to highlight key characteristics of industrial carbon emissions reduction program investment decision we develop both theoretical arguments and numerical simulations with structural parameters calibrated on real life data we find that both radical uncertainty and risk lead to speed up green investments compared to the predictions of real option models that are normally used in green investment literature the conventional wait and see attitude questioned in recent developments of the real option theory is not validated in conclusion our results should foster companies to implement green investments and help governments to define appropriate incentives to encourage green investments of particular note the paper highlights that finance theory is not necessarily an obstacle to green investment decisions

investment timing asymmetric information and audit structure a real options framework abstract this paper examines investment timing by the manager in a decentralized firm in the presence of asymmetric information in particular we incorporate an audit technology in the agency model developed by grenadier and wang 2005 investment timing agency and information journal of financial economics 75 493 533 the implied investment trigger in the agency problem with auditing is larger than in the full information problem and smaller than in the agency problem without auditing nevertheless the audit technology does not necessarily reduce inefficiency in the total social welfare

quadratic voting and the public good introduction this introduction to the public choice special issue on quadratic voting qv and the public good provides an opinionated narrative summary of the contents and surveys the broader literature related to qv qv is a voting rule proposed by one of us weyl quadratic vote buying http goo gl 8yeo73 2012 lalley and weyl quadratic voting https papers ssrn com sol3 papers cfm abstract id 2003531 2016 building off earlier work by groves and ledyard econometrica 45 4 783 810 1977a hylland and zeckhauser a mechanism for selecting public goods when preferences must be elicited kennedy school of government discussion paper d 70 1980 where individuals buy as many votes as they wish by paying the square of the votes they buy using some currency an appreciation of the history of research in the field suggests that qv is uniquely practically relevant compared to the other approximately pareto efficient mechanisms economists have proposed for collective decisions on public goods however it faces a number of sociological and ethical concerns regarding how a political system organized around qv would achieve the efficiency aims stated in abstract theory and whether the pure aggregate income maximizing definition of efficiency qv optimizes in its simplest form is desirable the papers in this volume flesh out and formalize these concerns but also provide important responses in two ways by suggesting domains where they are unlikely to be applicable primarily related to survey research of various kinds and versions of qv using an artificial currency that maintain many of qv s benefits while diffusing the most important critiques together this work suggests both a practical path for applying qv in the near term and a series of research questions that would have to be addressed to broaden its application

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

product innovation and the decision to invest in fixed capital assets evidence from an sme survey in six european union member states abstract this work explores the relationship between product innovation and the decision to invest in fixed capital assets among a sample of smes in six european union countries located in both peripheral and more central areas we find that the presence of product innovation reduces the probability to invest a firm s size exerts a direct inverted u shape effect on the probability to invest and an indirect effect through the linear effect of size on the probability to innovate the gap in the probability to invest between innovative and non innovative firms increases with size

time varying impact of uncertainty shocks on the us housing market abstract this paper investigates the impact of uncertainty shocks on the housing market of the united states using the time varying parameter factor augmented vector autoregression tvp favar we use a comprehensive quarterly time series dataset on real economic activity price and financial variables besides housing market variables covering the period 1963 q1 to 2014 q3 in addition to housing prices we also consider variables related to home sales permits and starts in general the results of the cumulative response of housing variables to a one standard deviation positive uncertainty shock at the one four eight and twelve quarter horizon tends to change over time both in terms of sign and magnitude with the uncertainty shock primarily negatively affecting the housing variables in particular prices permits and starts in longer runs i e two and three years ahead horizons