the european court of justice national governments and legal integration in the european union we develop a game theoretic model of the conditions under which the european court of justice can be expected to take adverse judgments against european union member governments and when the governments are likely to abide by these decisions the model generates three hypotheses first the greater the clarity of eu case law precedent the lesser the likelihood that the court will tailor its decisions to the anticipated reactions of member governments second the greater the domestic costs of an ecj ruling to a litigant government the lesser the likelihood that the litigant government will abide by it and hence the lesser the likelihood that the court will make such a ruling third the greater the activism of the ecj and the larger the number of member governments adversely affected by it the greater the likelihood that responses by litigant governments will move from individual noncompliance to coordinated retaliation through new legislation or treaty revisions these hypotheses are tested against three broad lines of case law central to ecj jurisprudence bans on agricultural imports application of principles of equal treatment of the sexes to occupational pensions and state liability for violation of eu law the empirical analysis supports our view that though influenced by legal precedent the ecj also takes into account the anticipated reactions of member governments

a hybrid algorithm for simultaneous scheduling of production and distribution in multi echelon structures this paper presents a dynamic programming algorithm for simultaneous determination of production batch sizes in an assembly network and distribution batch sizes in a conjoined distribution arborescent network the objective is to minimize average cost per period over an infinite horizon costs consist of processing costs at each node and linear holding costs for inventory final product demand rates may vary among the retail nodes but at each retail node the demand rate is assumed to be known constant and continuous all demand must be met backorders are not permitted the model can be used for a single product or for several products that are temporarily combined for distribution or for scheduling production in a system where several end products are produced from the same intermediate product as in some biochemical manufacturing processes

a general framework for evaluating executive stock options abstract motivated by recent recommendations by both european and american accounting standards boards that executive stock options be expensed in firms statements we provide an analytical and flexible framework for their evaluation our approach takes into account the vesting period american style resetting and reloading provisions that are features of many option programs and also considers the trading restriction on executives we identify a recursive structure in the stream of options that are granted to the executive over the course of her employment by exploiting this we are able to obtain a near explicit formula for the option value this enables us to discuss the joint effects of the different features on the exercising strategies and firms granting cost especially we highlight some significant interactions among these features

the war of information we analyse political contests campaigns between two parties with opposing interests parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy the information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit parties actions are strategic substitutes increasing one party s cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less information for voters parties actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged party s cost may be beneficial asymmetric information adds a signalling component resulting in a belief threshold at which the informed party s decision to continue campaigning offsets other unfavourable information

94 effective policies for a two stage serial inventory system with stochastic demand a two stage inventory system is considered where poisson demand occurs at stage 1 and stage 1 replenishes its inventory from stage 2 which in turn orders from an outside supplier with unlimited stock each shipment either to stage 2 or to stage 1 incurs a fixed setup cost under the assumption that the supply leadtime at stage 2 is zero we characterize a simple heuristic policy whose long run average cost is guaranteed to be within 6 of optimality i e a 94 effective policy the paper also provides heuristic policies for more general inventory systems and reports computational results

98 effective integer ratio lot sizing for one warehouse multi retailer systems a warehouse supplies n retailers constant external demand occurs at each retailer and shortages are not allowed there are linear holding costs and fixed costs for ordering at the warehouse and at each retailer the goal is to minimize the long run average cost over an infinite time horizon we define a new class of policies for this problem whose simple structure facilitates both computation and implementation the cost of a policy that is optimal within this class is shown to be within 2 of the cost of an optimal policy for the original problem in the worst case such a policy can be computed in on log n time

an operational policy for a three stage distributive supply chain system with retailers backorders abstract this research deals with a production inventory problem consisting of three stage tree type single producer multi distributor and multi retailer supply chain network where a model has been developed for achieving the lowest total cost for operating a supply chain system with allowable shortage in this research the shortage is assumed to occur in a form of backorder the refrigerator manufacturing can suitably be used to illustrate the scenario which makes the situation more rational and realistic by assumptions the customers will not go somewhere else the cost of lost sale is not included in this case the total cost of this tree type distributive supply chain system is comprised of setup costs and holding costs at all echelons and the backorder cost at retailer level only a replenishment policy is sought to operate the system at a minimum cost the problem is formulated as an unconstrained mixed integer programming problem and a newly developed doubly hybrid meta heuristic algorithm is adopted as the solution procedure the solutions which determine the desired replenishment policy for the producer distributors and retailers are obtained to minimize the total system cost a sensitivity analysis is performed to evaluate the outcome of the proposed solution procedure presented in this research numerical results are generated to demonstrate the solution procedure and future research is indicated for further study

absolute and relative gains in international relations theory the problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism the former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation the latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states preferences using a simple game theoretic model this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states behavior the feasibility of cooperation and especially the states concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model

venture capital financing moral hazard and learning we consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model the value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project the allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard the optimal contract is a time varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option the option itself is based on the control of the funds the dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project a positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities finally relationship financing including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting

optimal entry timing abstract a player of privately known strength chooses when to enter a market and an incumbent chooses whether to compete or concede information about the potential entrant s type is revealed publicly according to an exogenous news process and the timing of entry i analyze stationary equilibria using the public belief as a state variable no equilibria in pure strategies exist and smooth pasting conditions need not hold under both d1 and a novel refinement the informed player has nondecreasing value functions and her strategy has the following structure for high states both types enter with certainty for a possibly empty interval of intermediate states no type enters and for low states the high type enters while the low type mixes i obtain closed form solutions and analyze comparative statics for such equilibria the welfare effects of the presence of news relative to no news depend on the starting belief however for a fixed equilibrium a marginal increase in news quality always helps the informed player regardless of her type and always hurts total welfare

reputation and survival learning in a dynamic signalling model we consider the impact of reputation on the survival of a monopolist selling single units in discrete time periods whose quality is learned slowly if the seller learns her own quality at the same rate as customers a sufficiently bad run of luck could induce her to stop selling when she knows her quality a good seller never stops selling though at low reputations a bad seller does with some probability furthermore a seller with positive though imperfect information sells for the same number of periods whether her information is private or public we further consider the robustness of the central result when the seller s opportunities for strategic behaviour are limited

when do institutions bite historical institutionalism and the politics of institutional change historical institutionalist theories of endogenous change have enhanced our understanding of institutional development by providing a theoretical vocabulary for analyzing how institutions may be renegotiated over the long run by social and political actors in these theories however the causal impact of institutions themselves on political outcomes including their own change and reform is less developed a significant problem for an institutional research program this paper addresses this problem by proposing strategies that integrate historical institutionalism s insights into endogenous institutional change with a systematic analysis of the institutional conditions under which bottom up processes of gradual change are likely to be counteracted in particular the institutionalization of cultural categories and the allocation of power over the timing of reform within institutional and policy configurations are important variables for understanding how pre existing institutions may enable institutional incumbents to channel delay or prevent institutional change

strategic real options abstract i study hidden investment in quality in a dynamic persuasion game a seller such as a project manager or startup company controls an asset and wants to convince a potential buyer such as an acquiring company or a regulator that it has high quality the buyer observes exogenous news with quality dependent drift and holds a call option on the asset the seller is privately informed about quality and can wait at a flow cost upgrade at a fixed cost or exit the market for low upgrade costs multiple equilibria exist and exhibit novel reputational dynamics resetting barriers and skew brownian motion a generalization of a reflected stochastic process in one type of equilibrium a seller with low quality waits until his reputation hits rock bottom and then upgrades with some probability inducing upward reputational jumps in equilibrium the seller may exit at an intermediate reputation in a second type the low quality seller mixes over exiting at low reputations and upgrading in an intermediate sweet spot region the results suggest a social benefit to setting high expectations for effort when agents start with low reputations and help explain why agents respond to adversity in drastically different ways across environments

how do incumbents respond to the threat of entry evidence from the major airlines this paper examines how incumbents respond to the threat of entry of competitors as distinguished from their response to competitors actual entry it uses a case study from the passenger airline industry specifically the evolution of southwest airlines route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly when southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a route but not the route itself this dramatically raises the chance they will start flying that route in the near future we examine the pricing of the incumbents on threatened routes in the period surrounding such events we find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by southwest s entry into their routes this is true even after controlling in several ways for airport specific operating costs the response of incumbents seems to be limited only to the threatened route itself and not to routes out of nearby competitor airports where southwest does not operate e g fares drop on routes from chicago midway but not chicago o hare the largest responses appear to be restricted to routes that were concentrated beforehand incumbents do experience short run increases in their passenger loads concurrent with these fare cuts this is consistent with theories implying incumbents will try to generate some longer term loyalty among current customers before the entry of a new competitor we examine evidence relating this demand building motive to frequent flyer programs and find suggestive evidence in favor of this notion there is only weak evidence that incumbents increase capacity on the routes

the optimal and heuristic solutions of a distribution network abstract competitive environment of global networking and customization call for cost reduction in arborescent tree like inventory system one of the keys to cost reduction is the integration of the supply chain much practical research has been done in the area of integrating the inventory system in recent years integration involves the joint decision making among the producer the distributors and the retailers in the supply chain by revising goyal s model an optimal solution is derived in this paper a heuristic solution model is also developed for a producer distributors retailers inventory system using the principle of strategic partnership numerical results indicate the heuristic solution is a good estimation of the optimal solution

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

the financing of innovation learning and stopping we consider the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success we distinguish between two financing modes namely relationship financing where the allocation decision of the entrepreneur is observable and arm s length financing where it is unobservable we find that equilibrium funding stops altogether too early relative to the efficient stopping time in both financing modes the rate at which funding is released becomes tighter over time under relationship financing and looser under arm s length financing the tradeoff in the choice of financing modes is between lack of commitment with relationship financing and information rents with arm s length financing

the politics of dispute settlement design explaining legalism in regional trade pacts dispute settlement mechanisms in international trade vary dramatically from one agreement to another some mechanisms are highly legalistic with standing tribunals that resemble national courts in their powers and procedures others are diplomatic requiring only that the disputing countries make a good faith effort to resolve their differences through consultations in this article i seek to account for the tremendous variation in institutional design across a set of more than sixty post 1957 regional trade pacts in contrast to accounts that emphasize the transaction costs of collective action or the functional requirements of deep integration i find that the level of legalism in each agreement is strongly related to the level of economic asymmetry in interaction with the proposed depth of liberalization among member countries

the joint economic lot size problem a review abstract this article reviews lot size models which focus on coordinated inventory replenishment decisions between buyer and vendor and their impact on the performance of the supply chain these so called joint economic lot size jels models determine order production and shipment quantities from the perspective of the supply chain with the objective of minimizing total system costs this paper first describes the problem studied introduces the methodology of the review and presents a descriptive analysis of the selected papers subsequently papers are categorized and analyzed with respect to their contribution to the coordination of different echelons in the supply chain finally the review highlights gaps in the existing literature and suggests interesting areas for future research

three s a crowd third parties and wto dispute settlement in spite of the recent failure of two referendums the drafting of a constitution for the second biggest economic power in the world the european union eu remains a major event in the history of european integration whether the constitution or a revised version of it will come into force or not several important questions emerge how did an increased number of twenty five member states reach a conclusion whereas a lower number of fifteen had failed at previous intergovernmental attempts in particular how did the constitutional convention differ from previous intergovernmental conferences igcs at which the eu exclusively bargained its treaty documents in the past how can one explain the outcomes of the convention which proposes redistribution of power and resources among twenty five or more member states this article uses the positions of the delegates of the eu s constitutional convention to examine bargaining in a setting with few formal rules the authors use theoretical insights from a spatial model and new survey data to determine the implicit voting rule used at the convention they find that the convention differed from previous igcs because the convention was governed by consensus whereas previous eu bargains on treaties had always required unanimous support the level of consensus was higher than simple majority rule but lower than unanimity since this threshold impacted who won and who lost at the convention the authors also examine the sources of bargaining power such as delegates distance to the status quo distance to the median population size and domestic constraints the results confirm several findings in the eu bargaining and two level game literature for example that actors closer to the status quo hold a stronger bargaining position and that actors from larger member states are neither more likely nor less likely to win at the negotiating table than are actors from smaller states the findings on the irrelevance of domestic constraints also indicate why the popular votes in france and the netherlands failed

the structure and dynamics of eu federalism this article analyzes european union eu politics through the lens of comparative federalism the article assesses the contributions that rationalist and constructivist approaches can make to the analysis of eu federalism focusing on two broad questions first what explains shifts in authority from the state i e member states to the federal i e eu level second what explains the degree to which the federal government constrains state discretion this article develops testable hypotheses based on the rationalist and constructivist perspectives and presents a set of initial plausibility probes the article shows that there is considerable room for dialogue between rationalist and constructivist perspectives and together they can provide a more comprehensive explanation for the dynamics of eu federalism

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function