rural transformation inequality and the origins of microfinance abstract what determines the development of rural financial markets starting from a simple theoretical framework we derive the factors shaping the market entry of rural microfinance institutions across time and space we provide empirical evidence for these determinants using the expansion of credit cooperatives in the 236 eastern counties of prussia between 1852 and 1913 this setting is attractive as it provides a free market benchmark scenario without public ownership subsidization or direct regulatory intervention furthermore we exploit features of our historical set up to identify causal effects the results show that declining agricultural staple prices as a feature of structural transformation leads to the emergence of credit cooperatives similarly declining bank lending rates contribute to their rise low asset sizes and land inequality inhibit the regional spread of cooperatives while ethnic heterogeneity has ambiguous effects we also offer empirical evidence suggesting that credit cooperatives accelerated rural transformation by diversifying farm outputs

the role of investment specific technological change in the business cycle this is a quantitative investigation of the importance of technological change speci c to new investment goods for postwar us aggregate uctuations a growth model that incorporates this form of technological change is calibrated to us data and simulated using the relative price of new equipment to identify the process driving investmentspeci c technology shocks the analysis suggests that this form of technological change is the source of about 30 of output uctuations 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information abstract we study a competitive credit market equilibrium in which all agents are risk neutral and lenders a priori unaware of borrowers default probabilities admissible credit contracts are characterized by the credit granting probability the loan quantity the loan interest rate and the collateral required the principal result is that in equilibrium lower risk borrowers pay higher interest rates than higher risk borrowers moreover the lower risk borrowers get more credit in equilibrium than they would with full information no credit is rationed and collateral requirements are higher for the lower risk borrowers

electoral cycles in savings bank lending we provide evidence that german savings banks which are controlled by county level politicians systematically adjust lending policies in response to local electoral cycles the different timings of county elections across states and the existence of a comparable group of cooperative banks that are very similar to savings banks but lack their political connectedness allow for identification of the effects of county elections on savings bank lending these effects are economically meaningful and very robust to various specifications we find that election induced lending negatively impacts savings bank profitability and is associated with an increase in credit defaults roughly three years after an election examining the political economy aspects of our findings we provide evidence that savings bank excess lending and public spending at the county level are substitute levers for county politicians finally we find indications that subpar pre election economic county performance hurts re election prospects and increases the intensity of lending cycles

forming priors for dsge models and how it affects the assessment of nominal rigidities abstract we discuss prior elicitation for the parameters of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models and provide a method for constructing prior distributions for a subset of these parameters from beliefs about steady state relationships and second moments of the endogenous variables the empirical application documents how the specification of the prior distribution affects our assessment of the relative importance of price and wage rigidities in a new keynesian dsge model

the effects of formal and informal contracting in credit availability this paper investigates how the use of collateral formal contracting along with the market power of banks which facilitates relational contracts affects the availability of credit for business firms using loan data from the spanish credit register we show that the average credit quality of borrowers in a provincial market decreases with market concentration and the availability of collateral additionally the marginal effect of each variable decreases with the higher values of the other variable we also find that credit line interest rates increase with the availability of collateral although the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets therefore market power relations and collateral formal contracting act as substitutes to increase the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information

functional equivalence between intertemporal and multisectoral investment adjustment costs abstract two types of adjustment cost specifications coexist in macroeconomic models with investment intertemporal adjustment costs which involve a nonlinear substitution between capital and investment in capital accumulation and multisectoral costs which are captured by a nonlinear transformation between consumption and investment this paper demonstrates a functional equivalence between these two specifications one surprising result is that an increase in multisectoral adjustment costs can be equivalent to a decrease in intertemporal adjustment costs depending upon the size of the intertemporal costs we then observe that the functional equivalence implies a problem in identifying the two types of adjustment costs and show ways to solve the problem

rural finance and agricultural technology adoption in ethiopia does the institutional design of lending organizations matter summary it has now become almost a stylized fact that sustained agricultural growth is central to rapid poverty reduction and economic development yet world poverty is largely concentrated in the agrarian societies which have the potential for agricultural productivity growth this is particularly true for sub saharan african countries where the gaps between potential and actual yields remain high minimizing this gap through the promotion of modern inputs such as fertilizer and modern seeds has been at the core of almost all development strategies in ethiopia among other initiatives the country has promoted microfinance institutions and member owned financial cooperatives to alleviate credit constraints of the smallholder farmers this paper analyzes the impacts of these institutions using household survey data and a propensity score matching technique we examine the effects that institutional financial services have on farmers adoption of agricultural technology in ethiopia the results suggest that access to institutional finance has a significant positive impact on both the adoption and extent of technology use however when impacts are disaggregated by type of financial institution and farm size heterogeneities are observed in particular financial cooperatives have a greater impact on technology adoption than microfinance institutions and the results appear to vary depending on farm size and types of inputs the paper concludes with implications for policies to promote adoption of modern agricultural inputs

deregulation market power and risk behaviour in spanish banks abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of regulatory changes in the market power of spanish banks it also analyses the response of banks in terms of risk taking behaviour as a result of a reduction in economic profits we find that liberalisation measures have increased competition and eroded banks market power we observe that banks with lower charter values tend to have lower equity assets ratios lower solvency and to experience higher credit risk the last evidence is new in the literature and calls for strengthening regulatory concerns about credit risk management by banks in situations of increased competition

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

why do financial systems differ history matters abstract we describe a dynamic model of financial intermediation in which fundamental characteristics of the economy imply a unique equilibrium path of bank and financial market lending yet we also show that economies whose fundamental characteristics have converged may continue to have very different financial structures because setting up financial markets is costly in our model economies that emphasize bank lending are more likely to continue doing so in the future all else equal

optimal multiperiod contracts and the gain from enduring relationships under private information informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts in an illustrative risk sharing model even relatively short two period contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information though one period contracts suffice otherwise further contracts which are pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized an example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems the obvious borrowing lending schemes are not private information pareto optimal in these period by period actions are not sufficiently constrained discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions

evaluating the information matrix in linearized dsge models abstract in this note we show how the stochastic general equilibrium dsge models can be evaluated analytically the result is useful for the estimation and identification analysis of such models

identification robust analysis of dsge and structural macroeconomic models abstract full and limited information identification robust methods are proposed for structural systems notably dsge models which are valid whether identification is weak or strong theory intrinsic or data specific the proposed methods are applied to a standard new keynesian system for the u s single and multi equation estimation and fit are also compared when a unique rational expectation stable equilibrium is imposed the model is rejected in contrast limited information inference produces informative results regarding forward looking behavior in the nkpc and precise conclusions on feedback coefficients in the reaction function which cannot be reached via single equation methods

collateral type of lender and relationship banking as determinants of credit risk abstract this paper analyses the determinants of the probability of default pd of bank loans we focus the discussion on the role of a limited set of variables collateral type of lender and bank borrower relationship while controlling for the other explanatory variables the study uses information on the more than three million loans entered into by spanish credit institutions over a complete business cycle 1988 2000 collected by the bank of spain s credit register central de informacion de riesgos we find that collateralised loans have a higher pd loans granted by savings banks are riskier and finally that a close bank borrower relationship increases the willingness to take more risk

why does liquidity matter in investment equations that liquidity variables affect investment spending is widely accepted despite important recent empirical work questions remain concerning the interpretation of liquidity variables in investment equations and the sources and economic importance of finance constraints these questions are addressed by estimating a variety of econometric models that exploit distinctive canadian institutional features to identify firms that face relatively severe information problems the initial econometric evidence confirms the existence of finance constraints and identifies their source as the problems faced by firms in credibly communicating private information to outsiders this conclusion is robust to biases from the capitalization of finance constraints into asset prices scale economies or imperfect competition which are accounted for directly in the econometric specifications copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

secured lending and default risk equilibrium analysis policy implications and empirical results the authors examine collateral in a competitive equilibrium in which borrowers can choose hidden actions and may additionally possess hidden knowledge apart from explaining the widespread use of collateral despite deadweight costs they show that an increase in the riskless interest rate causes equilibrium loan rates and collateral requirements to increase a decline in the deadweight costs of collateral reduces the equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard and an increase in the borrower s project size reduces equilibrium collateral use under moral hazard some of these predictions are tested and found to be supported by the data copyright 1991 by royal economic society

technology shocks in the new keynesian model in the new keynesian model preference cost push and monetary shocks all compete with the real business cycle model s technology shock in driving aggregate fluctuations a version of this model estimated via maximum likelihood points to these other shocks as being more important for explaining the behavior of output inflation and interest rates in the postwar u s data these results weaken the links between the current generation of new keynesian models and the real business cycle models from which they were originally derived they also suggest that federal reserve officials have often faced difficult trade offs in conducting monetary policy

bank competition and firm creation we investigate the effects of competition in the financial sector on the creation of firms in the nonfinancial sector explicitly allowing for heterogeneous effects across borrowers characterized by different degrees of asymmetric information we find evidence of a bell shaped relationship between bank competition and firm creation in addition consistently with theories arguing that competition may reduce the availability of credit to informationally opaque firms we find that bank competition results less favorable to the emergence of new firms in industrial sectors where informational asymmetries are more important

does information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device this is the authors accepted refereed and final manuscript to the article publisher s version available at http dx doi org 10 1016 j jbankfin 2014 02 010

investment banks as corporate monitors in the early twentieth century united states we study the effect of financial relationships on firms investment decisions and access to external finance in the early twentieth century securities underwriters commonly held directorships with american corporations section 10 of the clayton antitrust act prohibited bankers from serving on the boards of railroads for which they underwrote securities we find that following the implementation of section 10 railroads with strong preexisting relationships with underwriters saw declines in their investment rates valuations and leverage and increases in their costs of external funds reassuringly we do not observe similar effects among industrials and utilities which were not subject to section 10 our results are consistent with underwriters on corporate boards acting as delegated monitors and highlight the potential for regulations intended to address conflicts of interest to disrupt valuable information flows

capital market information and industrial performance the role of west german banks in orthodox theory external capital markets play a dual role supplying various forms of investment finance and disciplining firms which are inefficient or fail to pursue profit goals an extensive literature speaks of the efficiency of external capital markets meaning that firms can make production investment decisions and investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms activities under the assumption that security prices at any time fully reflect all available information fama i970 1 however this concept of efficiency is purely technical it depends critically on what information is available and we know there are problems of appropriability and failure in information markets deriving ultimately from certain peculiarities of information as a commodity arrow i962 thus another growing literature focusses on problems of achieving equilibrium in markets where agents are imperfectly or asymmetrically informed amongst other things this literature shows that informational failures of the kind in question can lead to capital rationing in loan and credit markets and the use of strict collateral requirements as screening devices jaffee and russell i976 stiglitz and weiss i98i cable and turner i983 these may then be expected to affect the efficiency of individual firms and the system as a whole capital shortage implies that some profitable investment opportunities are foregone and production choices may also be distorted by the need to satisfy additional financial constraints contrived to elicit signals of creditworthiness of the firms undertaking them similarly the disciplining role of external capital markets can be impaired by information impactedness williamson i975 and the costs of mobilising and giving effect to shareholders preferences thus in the principal agent framework developed by jensen and meckling i976 and fama i980 the degree of constraint on managerial pursuit of non profit goals as posited by managerial theorists depends on the transactions costs of stock owner intervention the result is an optimal degree of departure from cost minimising profit maximising behaviour determined by the level of transactions costs institutional factors which affect the way information is distributed amongst agents can therefore have an important bearing on allocative and technical efficiency and the west german system of industrial finance provides an in

facts and challenges from the great recession for forecasting and macroeconomic modeling this paper provides a survey of business cycle facts updated to take account of recent data emphasis is given to the great recession which was unlike most other postwar recessions in the united states in being driven by deleveraging and financial market factors we document how recessions with financial market origins are different from those driven by supply or monetary policy shocks this helps explain why economic models and predictors that work well at some times do poorly at other times we discuss challenges for forecasters and empirical researchers in light of the updated business cycle facts

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements loan contracts with provision for collateral are of two general types in one the collateral may be an existing asset of the borrowing firm which is pledged to a lender in the event of default in this case collateral does not increase the assets that the borrower would lose if there is default since all the borrower s assets are attachable therefore the expected marginal cost to the borrower of providing an additional unit of collateral includes principally transactions costs associated with the collateral l this describes the usual type of commercial loan arrangement with the collateral being either equipment real estate accounts receivable or inventories in the other type of loan contract the collateral is an additional asset that is given up by the borrower if there is default that is in addition to the usual assets that are available to its lenders the borrower assigns as collateral to a creditor an asset that would normally not be legally attachable this arrangement is more common in small business loans that are secured by a personal asset e g a house of the entrepreneur likewise debt issued by a legally separate subsidiary may be secured by an asset of the parent firrn in these cases the expected marginal cost to the borrower the owner manager of the small firm or the parent corporation in the latter example of providing an additional unit of collateral

historical financing of small and medium size enterprises we focus on the economies of the north atlantic core during the 19th and early 20th centuries and find that an impressive variety of local financial institutions emerged to supply the needs of smes wherever there was sufficient demand for their services although these intermediaries had significant weaknesses they were able to tap into local information networks and so extend credit to firms that were too young or small to secure funds from large regional or national institutions in addition by raising the return to savings for local households they helped to mobilize significant new resources for economic development

collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information the authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered the principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts specifically some well known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept two somewhat surprising results emerge first high quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits second high quality borrowers may put up more collateral this paper explores the allocational consequences of alternative credit market competitivity specifications and explains the different economic roles of collateral under these specifications we model banks that lend to borrowers financing projects with payoffs depending on a priori unknown borrower attributes and ex post unobservable borrower actions borrowers are assumed to have unconstrained access to collateral our analysis is based on two concepts of competitive equilibrium under both banks compete in the sense that they earn zero expected profits however under the first concept of equilibrium ti as in jaffee and russell 11 all rents accrue to borrowers whereas under the second concept t2 all rents accrue to depositors as in stiglitz and weiss 17 our research makes two main points first we demonstrate that the manner in which a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized importantly influences the characterization of equilibrium credit allocations specifically one of the findings is that the rationing equilibria of stiglitz and weiss 17 and others should be viewed as rather delicate things in that they are very sensitive to the competitivity specification used for instance

delegated monitors large and small germany s banking system 1800 1914 banks play a greater role in the german financial system than in those of the united states or britain germany s large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the united states others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance many discussions distort the german banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups tracing the historical development of the german banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context

monetary policy analysis with potentially misspecified models abstract the paper proposes a novel method for conducting policy analysis with potentially misspecified dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models and applies it to a new keynesian dsge model along the lines of christiano eichenbaum and evans jpe 2005 and smets and wouters jeea 2003 we first quantify the degree of model misspecification and then illustrate its implications for the performance of different interest rate feedback rules we find that many of the prescriptions derived from the dsge model are robust to model misspecification jel classification c32 key words bayesian analysis dsge models model misspecification 1 introduction the quantitative evaluation of monetary policy rules plays an important role in the design of stabilization policies much of the recent debate about optimal monetary policy rules has been carried out with new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models see woodford 2003 dsge models have the advantage that one can explicitly assess the effect of policy regime changes on expectation formation and decision rules of private agents yet until recently these models were scarcely used by central banks because they were perceived as being inferior to less structural model in terms of fit recent work by christiano eichenbaum and evans 2005 and smets and wouters 2003 has changed this perception these papers show that the fit of large scale new keynesian dsge models is comparable to that of more heavily parameterized models as a consequence a number of central banks have begun to show interest in these models as tools for quantitative policy analysis despite the success in improving the empirical performance of dsge models misspecification remains a concern as shown in del negro schorfheide smets and wouters 2004 accounting for misspecification and model uncertainty in general is an important aspect of the assessment of monetary policies after all it has long been recognized that model and parameter uncertainty affects optimal policies e g brainard 1967 chow 1975 and craine 1979 1 this paper proposes a new method for taking model misspecification into account when assessing the performance of alternative interest rate feedback rules we apply this approach to evaluate different policies in the context of a new keynesian dsge model including the estimated volcker greenspan rule a natural approach in the presence of model uncertainty is to evaluate policy rules within all the model specifications that are under consideration in choosing the best performing rule one can either follow a bayesian route assigning probabilities to models and minimizing the overall posterior expected loss alternatively one can follow a minimax strategy by adopting a policy that minimizes the worst case loss across models the literature contains numerous applications of these ideas e g mccallum 1988 levin wieland and williams 1999 2003 rudebusch 2001 2003 onatski and stock 2002 onatski and williams 2003 brock durlauf and west 2004 cogley and sargent 2005 and hansen and sargent 2005 all these papers differ with regard to the type of models included in the model set and the formulation of the decision problem that leads to the choice of a preferred policy our analysis differs from previous work with respect to the method that is used to construct a model set and assign probabilities to these models so that a bayesian calculation of posterior expected performance is possible we start from a dsge model in which monetary policy is modelled through an interest rate feedback rule the dsge model imposes cross coefficient restrictions on a vector autoregressive representation of the data while we are assuming that the data obey a vector autoregressive law of motion we allow for potential deviations from the cross coefficient restrictions at the same time we maintain the assumption that monetary policy follows the same interest rate rule as in the dsge model

investment shocks and business cycles abstract the origins of business cycles are still controversial among macroeconomists this paper contributes to this debate by studying the driving forces of fluctuations in an estimated new neoclassical synthesis model of the u s economy in this model most of the variability of output and hours at business cycle frequencies is due to shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment imperfect competition and to a lesser extent technological frictions are the key to their transmission although labor supply shocks explain a large fraction of the fluctuations in hours at very low frequencies they are irrelevant over the business cycle this finding is important because the microfoundations of these disturbances are widely regarded as unappealing

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

relationship banking liquidity and investment in the german industrialization close bank relationships are thought to ameliorate firms liquidity constraints a phenomenon frequently measured by liquidity sensitivity of investment using german firms during the formative years of universal banking 1903 1913 this paper shows that even controlling for selection bias investment is more sensitive to internal liquidity for bank networked firms than unattached firms the firm exhibiting the greatest liquidity sensitivity however faced no apparent liquidity constraint the findings yield two implications they support recent research rejecting a linear relationship between liquidity sensitivity and financing constraints and they suggest that relationship banking provides no consistent lessening of firms liquidity sensitivity

thy neighbor s keeper the design of a credit cooperative with theory and a test economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by non firm economic institutions however our theories of non firm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy this paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from german credit cooperatives from the nineteenth and early twentieth century germany we build a model of credit cooperatives designed to provide monitoring incentives and test this using nineteenth century data authors

banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality abstract competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality following arrow and debreu 1954 6 i formulate a standard growth model with externality a two period version of romer 1986 39 as a game among consumers firms and intermediaries the walrasian equilibrium with an auctioneer does not achieve the social optimum without an auctioneer or intermediaries i show that no nash equilibrium exists with several banks strategically intermediating capital a nash equilibrium emerges with a realistic institution i e an interbank market with a negotiation process in the loan market the equilibrium outcome is uniquely determined and socially optimal

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

local identification in dsge models abstract the issue of identification arises whenever structural models are estimated lack of identification means that the empirical implications of some model parameters are either undetectable or indistinguishable from the implications of other parameters therefore identifiability must be verified prior to estimation this paper provides a simple method for conducting local identification analysis in linearized dsge models estimated in both full and limited information settings in addition to establishing which parameters are locally identified and which are not researchers can determine whether the identification failures are due to data limitations such as lack of observations for some variables or whether they are intrinsic to the structure of the model the methodology is illustrated using a medium scale dsge model

on the fit of new keynesian models this article provides new tools for the evaluation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge models and applies them to a large scale new keynesian model we approximate the dsge model by a vector autoregression and then systematically relax the implied cross equation restrictions and document how the model fit changes we also compare the dsge model s impulse responses to structural shocks with those obtained after relaxing its restrictions we find that the degree of misspecification in this large scale dsge model is no longer so large as to prevent its use in day to day policy analysis yet is not small enough to be ignored

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

credit ratings collateral and loan characteristics implications for yield this article studies how collateral affects bond yields using a large data set of public bonds we document that collateralized debt has higher yield than general debt after controlling for credit rating our model of agency problems between managers and claim holders explains this puzzling result by recognizing imperfections in the rating process we test the model s implications consistent with our model and in results new to the literature we find the yield differential between secured and unsecured debt after controlling for credit rating is larger for low credit rating nonmortgage assets longer maturity and with proxies for lower levels of monitoring

identifying the sources of model misspecification abstract conventional macroeconomic models fail to predict to the great recession is it because they are misspecified we propose an empirical method for detecting and identifying misspecification in structural economic models our approach formalizes the common practice of adding shocks in the model and identifies potential misspecification via forecast error variance decomposition and marginal likelihood analyses the simulation results based on a small scale dsge model demonstrate that our method can correctly identify the source of misspecification our empirical results show that state of the art medium scale new keynesian dsge models remain misspecified pointing to asset and labor markets as the sources of the misspecification

financial development and economic growth views and agenda this critique argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth the body of work would push even most skeptics toward the belief that the development of financial markets and institutions is a critical and inextricable part of the growth process and away from the view that the financial system is an inconsequential sideshow responding passively to economic growth many gaps remain however and the paper highlights areas in acute need of additional research