endogenous entry and self selection in private value auctions an experimental study this paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry in first price independent private value auctions n potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in an auction or receive a known outside option in the second stage entrants submit bids after learning their own private values and the number of entrants an equilibrium model of heterogeneous risk averse bidders implies a self selection effect where bidding in the auction is lower with endogenous entry because only less risk averse bidders enter this effect is confirmed by the experiment we also observe excessive entry relative to the theoretical model

bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the online world as each day thousands of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per year 1 this large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers competing for buyers the obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce and any competitive edge a seller can find could be important one such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders away from their competitors when designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one the entry decision of prospective bidders is rarely considered most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and randomly determined it should be clear however that the most crucial part of a successful auction is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate in general this should be expected to have a positive effect on revenue at least in noncommon value environments and in certain types of auctions it may help combat the possibility of bidder collusion because there are typically competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue when auctions are for unique goods it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction format can effect the entry decision of a bidder consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or even identical objects how does this bidder make the decision of which auction to enter the obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes his or her expected utility so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value the real question then is how are these expected utilities constructed profit from participating in the auction is an obvious argument there are also a number of environmental considerations that might effect this decision that would be difficult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the auctioneer quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature it is also possible that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder this latter point will be the issue of this study the particular focus will be looking at bidder preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the field the sealed bid first price will be abbreviated as just the sealed bid auction and the ascending or english auction the other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than the ascending and second price or first price and descending is that it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic differences between them such differences lead to substantial differences in terms of the difficulty of deciding how to bid and also in the possibility that an outcome leads to a bidder experiencing some form of regret regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below his value as he may think that if only he had bid higher he could have won although such feelings of regret may be considered irrational that does not preclude their existence such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending auction if one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that differ only in regard to whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format it is not immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric independent private values environment were all bidders risk neutral then of course revenue equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indifferent

using industrial ecology and strategic management concepts to pursue the sustainable development goals abstract the subjectivity complexity and often competing interests of sustainable development have limited the effectiveness of integrating these important ideas into mainstream business strategy with the adoption of the un sustainable development goals sdgs in january 2016 there are now global sustainability benchmarks that apply across diverse sectors and national contexts allowing public and private organizations to orient and evaluate their activities strategies and business outcomes however it is not directly apparent where the advantage for business lies in pursuit of these actions within the prevailing economic paradigm highlighting the need for new analytical frameworks and tools industrial ecology ie has been successfully used in engineering practice for decades and has been suggested as a method that can provide the concepts and methods necessary to bridge the gap between traditional business practice and sustainable development to test this literature bridging the fields of industrial ecology business strategy and sustainable development was collected and analyzed using the textual analysis software leximancer the analysis showed that while the sdgs are primarily aimed at the national level they also hold relevance for business through innovation partnerships and strategic positioning inter alia the analysis found that the integration of ie and business strategy is highly relevant for three of the sdgs but captures elements of all 17 to varying degrees ie has a strong focus on innovation and its potential in new markets products and business models ie is also consciously aimed at the efficient use of energy and resources ideas that are relevant to mitigating adapting and building resilience in a changing future but are also relevant to traditional concepts of business strategy and competitive advantage this paper shows that through the combination of ie and strategic management theory commercial organizations can positively contribute to the sustainable development goals while building competitive advantage

defining the rebound effect abstract this paper gives rigorous definitions of the rebound effect not only in the well described single commodity case khazzoom 1980 the energy journal 1 4 21 40 but also for a multiple commodity case it is shown that the familiar laws for the single case do not hold for the multiple case the paper describes the state of the art of empirical estimation of the rebound effect with special focus on the estimates done for the netherlands we conclude that according to every definition empirical evidence shows that the re is probably small between 0 and 15

endogenous information flows and the clustering of announcements we consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model because investors don t know whether or when the firm is informed the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately we show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms conversely good market news slows the release of information by firms thus our model generates clustering of negative announcements surprisingly this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information these results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns jel d21 d83 g12 g14 l11

on favoritism in auctions with entry abstract we examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders we show that unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal

sustainable innovation business models and economic performance an overview sustainable development requires radical and systemic innovations such innovations can be more effectively created and studied when building on the concept of business models this concept provides firms with a holistic framework to envision and implement sustainable innovations for researchers the concept provides an analytical tool that allows them to assess the interplay between the different aspects that firms combine to create ecological economic and social value in addition the business model concept provides a link between the individual firm and the larger production and consumption system in which it operates this paper provides an introduction to the special issue which emerged from selected papers presented at the erscp emsu 2010 conference held in delft the netherlands papers in the special issue cover a broad range from a conceptual discussion resulting in a research agenda the assessment of diffusion of specific business models such as product service systems the introduction of new management tools for business transition management to case studies on how specific business models evolved in specific communities together these papers provide insight into the promise of the business model concept for understanding and advancing sustainable innovation

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

evolving choice inconsistencies in choice of prescription drug insurance we study choice over prescription insurance plans by the elderly using government administrative data to evaluate how these choices evolve over time we find large foregone savings from not choosing the lowest cost plan that has grown over time we develop a structural framework to decompose the changes in foregone welfare from inconsistent choices into choice set changes and choice function changes from a fixed choice set we find that foregone welfare increases over time due primarily to changes in plan characteristics such as premiums and out of pocket costs we estimate little learning at either the individual or cohort level

fostering change to sustainable consumption and production an evidence based view this note from the field is an edited version of a policy brief summarizing the key findings from the first half of the sustainable consumption research exchange network score for the policy programs in the field of sustainable consumption and production scp we recommend a framework for action to change to scp that mentions the key domains to include food mobility and energy use housing the last two clearly related to urban development it should use a systemic perspective on the scp challenge and differentiate between developed fast developing and base of the pyramid economies score focuses mainly on developed economies and here we propose to differentiate between 1 measures that fit with mainstream beliefs and paradigms here governments could make operational agreements on implementation of instruments like green public procurement stimulating ecodesign etc 2 problems where a rough agreement on goals exists but where change is radical or means are uncertain and hence planning difficult here governments could foster visioning experimentation and support e g international collaboration in leapfrogging programs 3 problems that outright clash with the mainstream beliefs and paradigms here governments could foster informed deliberation on the more fundamental issues related to markets governance and growth 2007 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

appropriate design of auctions for renewable energy support prequalifications and penalties abstract auctions are a promising tool to accomplish renewable energy support res however they involve diverse risks for the auctioneer and the bidders the major risk for the auctioneer with respect to the expansion target and the acceptance of auctions for res in general is the risk of non realization awarded bidders do not realize their projects the main reasons are bidders uncertainties concerning their project costs the auctioneer can reduce the non realization risk by taking various measures the most discussed and implemented measures are financial and physical prequalifications and penalties an evaluation of these measures has relevant implications for an appropriate auctions design for res the non realization option induces lower bids a suitable combination of financial and physical prequalifications can reduce the non realization risk significantly however involves sunk costs counterintuitively first price auction and second price auction lead to different expected award prices and different realization probabilities penalties bear a high risk of inefficient auction outcomes the appropriate parametrization and combination of the measures is challenging under consideration of all implications we recommend high financial and adjusted physical prequalifications to achieve a sufficiently high realization rate while maintaining efficiency

auctions with a stochastic number of bidders abstract auction theory is generalized by allowing the number of bidders to be stochastic in a first price sealed bid auction with bidders having constant absolute risk aversion the expected selling price is higher when the bidders do not know how many other bidders there are than when they do know this thus the seller should conceal the number of bidders if he can moreover a bidder s ex ante expected utility is the same whether or not there is a policy of concealing the number of bidders concealment therefore pareto dominates announcement with risk neutral bidders the optimal auction is the same whether or not the bidders know who their competitors are

bridging sustainable business model innovation and user driven innovation a process for sustainable value proposition design with an increasing population a growing middle class and increased resource use our current ways of living and doing business are unsustainable next to the implementation of innovative technology sustainable development based on innovative business models better understating of customer needs and behavioural change are crucial this research aims at combining principles from both sustainable business model innovation and user driven innovation to develop more successful radical and user centred sustainable value propositions sustainable business model innovation entails developing value propositions that create value for multiple stakeholders at the same time including customers shareholders suppliers and partners as well as the environment and society user driven innovation allows developing solutions that are meaningful for people and profitable for business by involving potential customers users and or other stakeholders in an experimental and iterative design process the study adopts a research through design methodology a qualitative research approach that uses design practice to inform research to this end a design project in the framework of the climate kic the largest european partnership addressing the challenge of climate change was investigated as a result this paper proposes a process for sustainable value proposition design which adopts a thorough dynamic and iterative perspective talking to stakeholders thinking about the problem testing the product service that leads to an actual sustainable value proposition and to a superior problem solution fit in practice managers are provided with an initial methodological framework for mapping and understanding the stakeholders in a broad sense including and especially users identifying their needs and interests and progressively combining them into a more meaningful and enriching value proposition

optimal auctions revisited in symmetric privately known values oral auctions with costly entry for bidders the seller can do no better than by committing ex ante to a reservation price and entry fees or subsidies which result in no fewer and at most one more bidders than a reservation price equal to the seller s value would in the absence of entry fees or subsidies journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c72

ranking equilibrium competition in auctions with participation costs this paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with costly participation and shows that when bidders valuation distribution is concave there is a simple condition to rank the equilibrium competition of those auctions it also investigates how the results are related to stochastic ordering of bidders valuation distributions and provides some illustrative examples

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

robustness of bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction the answer to the question of how bidders choose to enter one auction versus an alternative competing auction is important to understand in providing a complete picture of the nature of endogenous entry decisions into auctions the issue of how a bidder chooses which among alternative auctions to enter as well as whether to enter an auction at all is of substantial importance to auctioneers attempting to attract bidders to their auctions there is a growing literature addressing issues in endogenous entry in auctions there are several papers such as engelbrecht wiggans 1993 pevnitskaya 2004 and palfrey and pevnitskaya 2008 that consider the decision of whether to enter an auction or not and study the effect of endogenous entry on bidding behavior there is a much larger group for example harstad 1990 engelbrecht wiggans 1993 levin and smith 1994 mcafee 1993 and mcafee and mcmillan 1987 that considers competition between auctioneers in which the auctioneers are competing along some characteristic such as entry price we consider the case in which auctioneers may be competing with each other based on the choice of auction mechanism our interest is in the degree to which the auction mechanism itself might impact the entry decisions of potential bidders of course there would be a direct pecuniary impact of the mechanism in that bidders should be more likely to enter auction mechanisms that they believe allow them to get lower prices but there may be other cognitive issues in regard to the structure of the mechanism that may also impact the choice behavior in ivanova stenzel and salmon iss 2004a we introduced an experimental design aimed at eliciting and measuring preferences subjects might possess for different auction institutions and applied the design to testing bidder preferences between ascending a dynamic mechanism and sealed bid first price a static mechanism auctions it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between these two auction mechanisms due to the strategic differences between them in a first price auction the winner pays a price equal to his own bid whereas in the ascending auction he pays a price that is an increment above the second highest bid these differences might result in difficulty of deciding how to bid and in the possibility of experiencing some form of regret 1 the design involved having subjects make a choice between entering into a two bidder sealed bid first price auction versus a two bidder ascending auction each with different entry prices by varying the entry prices we could measure the subjects willingness to pay for either auction our main finding in the paper was that while subjects exhibited strong preferences for the ascending auction at equal entry prices they were not willing to pay up to the expected profit difference between the two auctions to participate in an ascending auction thus they ended up entering the supposedly less preferred sealed bid first price auction even in situations in which they would expect to make a higher net surplus including the cost of the entry fee by entering into the ascending auction instead that paper proposed one possible answer to the puzzle that involved assuming that bidders were risk averse in their bidding behavior and then risk averse to the same degree in their auction choice behavior this explanation worked because neither risk averse nor approximately risk neutral bidders should be expected to pay much to enter into an ascending auction instead of a sealed bid first price auction just as we observed in the experiment for the most risk averse bidders this is because while they bid the highest in the first price auction and therefore expected little surplus in the event that they win they consequently end up winning with higher probability than less risk averse bidders this is a trade off risk a verse bidders are willing to accept and consequently it is easy to show that highly risk averse bidders should not be willing to pay much to get into the more lucrative though risky ascending auction

equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders abstract the number of rivals may be unknown when a bidding strategy is formulated in an auction in a symmetric model with risk neutral bidders holding independent information we obtain explicit equilibrium bidding functions for first price and second price auctions with uncertainty about the number of rivals five auctions are revenue equivalent first price and second price auctions each with the number of bidders known or uncertain and english auctions

auctions an introduction abstract this is a detailed introduction to auction theory it begins with a simple analysis of standard auctions and then uses a strikingly simple general solution of symmetric private values auctions to prove the payoff equivalence of many auction rules the basic framework is then modified to admit risk aversion multi unit and repeated auctions as well as collusion then follows an introduction to optimal auctions with and without stochastic entry and to common value auctions and the winner s curse problem the survey closes with a sample of applications from the regulation of natural monopolies to price competition in oligopoly and the government securities market

marking to market versus taking to market while the debate on cost and market value accounting has been raging for years economists lack a framework allowing a comparison of their relative merits this paper considers an agency model in which the measurement of an asset can be based on public market data marking to market and or on the realization of its value through costly resale to an informed buyer taking to market at the optimal contract noisier market data lead to cost accounting and gains trading selling winners keeping losers whereas accurate data naturally favor market value accounting the quality of market data and the magnitude of resale costs both depend on the volume of transactions and therefore on accounting rules the paper studies the mutual feedback between individually optimal accounting rules and asset market liquidity this equilibrium approach reveals a socially excessive use of market value accounting that dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals

detecting collusion on highway procurement this paper proposes a procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first price procurement the main objective is twofold first to provide a methodology to detect collusion using a structural approach and second to apply the methodology to field data on procurement auctions for highway construction in california i identify two different sets of firms as potential ring members relying on an exogenous number of bidders and the assumption that within each type bidders are symmetric i find evidence supporting the collusive scheme for the two mentioned sets of firms by comparing a model of competition and a model of collusion

comparison friction experimental evidence from medicare drug plans consumers need information to compare alternatives for markets to function efficiently recognizing this public policies often pair competition with easy access to comparative information the implicit assumption is that comparison friction the wedge between the availability of comparative information and consumers use of it is inconsequential because information is readily available and consumers will access this information and make effective choices we examine the extent of comparison friction in the market for medicare part d prescription drug plans in the united states in a randomized field experiment an intervention group received a letter with personalized cost information that information was readily available for free and widely advertised however this additional step providing the information rather than having consumers actively access it had an impact plan switching was 28 percent in the intervention group versus 17 percent in the comparison group and the intervention caused an average decline in predicted consumer cost of about 100 per year among letter recipients roughly 5 percent of the cost in the comparison group our results suggest that comparison friction can be large even when the cost of acquiring information is small and may be relevant for a wide range of public policies that incorporate consumer choice

innovation process of new ventures driven by sustainability abstract since the brundtland report appeared in 1987 various approaches to realising sustainable consumption and production have come into practice while more traditional approaches like ecodesign and design for sustainability often emphasize optimizing existing products processes and businesses more radical approaches like product service systems and system innovation for sustainability emphasize developing new innovative products and services with higher environmental gains although these studies increased our understanding of sustainability in relation to product design they are criticized for failing to draw on existing theoretical frameworks in the organizational innovation literature berchicci 2005 this paper seeks to explore the innovation process within new ventures driven by sustainability since 1 conventional wisdom suggests that young and new firms have advantages in innovation acs and audretsch 1990 and as such they are the potential candidates of offering radical solutions to the challenges of sustainability and 2 there are few studies that address exploiting sustainable product ideas through new organizations the paper reports on the results of an explorative study involving the use of generative techniques during 19 individual semi structured interviews with eight entrepreneurs and seven innovation support organizations the results suggest that the relative impact of internal and external factors on the innovation process change over time as the new organization forms in addition creating new businesses from sustainability ideals is influenced by the firms ability in understanding and managing the differences between intended and created value and in finding an overlap between customer benefits and clearly defined prioritized sustainability goals

alternative common value auction procedures revenue comparisons with free entry the logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants rather than being fixed responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating in a thoroughly symmetric model a seller may prefer that competition be indirect an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely this insight allows a complete revenue ranking of standard auction procedures with endogenous entry

sustainable business model adoption among s p 500 firms a longitudinal content analysis study in this study we examine the diversity of sustainable business models adopted by the largest global corporations those listed in the s p 500 index over the period 2005 2014 we examine press release communications during this period which represent public data about business relevant events we expect that examining this communication can reveal longitudinal patterns in the adoption of sustainable business activities and models empirically we utilize academic and practitioner expert panels to build a set of keywords across nine sustainable business model archetypes and utilize automated content analysis to examine the breadth and nature of a firm s sustainable business activities and practices we find evidence of the increasing prominence of different types of sustainable business models over time in particular the results show that large capitalized firms have mostly adopted the environmentally oriented archetypes and to much lesser extent the societal and organizational ones

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

auctions with an inexpert bidder abstract we consider an auction in which the behavior of one potential bidder departs mildly from full rationality we show that the presence of such an inexpert bidder can be enough to discourage all of an infinitely large population of fully rational potential bidders from entering an auction furthermore this departure from full rationality does not reduce the inexpert bidder s payoff

endogenous market thinness and stock price volatility thin equity markets cannot accommodate temporary bulges of buy or sell orders without large price movements the resulting volatility can induce risk averse transactors who face transaction costs to desert these markets thus thinness and the related price volatility may become joint self perpetuating features of an equity market irrespective of the volatility of asset fundamentals if however appropriate incentive schemes are adopted to encourage entry by additional investors this vicious circle can be broken eventually shifting the market to a selfsustaining superior equilibrium characterized by a higher number of transactors lower price volatility and larger supply of the asset a number of empirical studies cohen et al 1976 telser and higimbotham 1977 pagano 1986 tauchen and pitts 1983 have found that thin speculative markets are ceteris paribus more volatile than deep ones a plausible explanation for this finding is that thin markets are generally characterized by small numbers of transactors per unit time and thus their prices are more sensitive to the impact of individual traders demand shocks conversely in deep markets transactors are so many that the uncorrelated demand shocks experienced by individual traders tend to offset each other and leave market prices largely unaffected while this suggests a rationale for the observed relationship between market size and price volatility it does so by taking market size as the exogenous factor however the volatility of a speculative market may feed back on its size in the sense that the high liquidation risk implied by very volatile prices can induce potential entrants to keep out of the market this paper shows that in a stock market with transaction costs this interaction between thinness and volatility can produce multiple steady state equilibria some characterized by low trade and high volatility and others by high trade and low volatility whether the market will settle in one equilibrium or another depends entirely on the expectations held by economic agents sections 2 and 3 the existence of these multiple bootstrap equilibria can be explained heuristically as follows each additional trader generates a positive externality for other actual or potential traders by decreasing the riskiness of the stock lower risk in turn tends to attract more investors with the effect of raising stock prices and inducing corporations to issue additional equity we thus have a feedback loop between market size and price volatility where market size is measured both along the dimension of the number of traders and along that of the total stock of equities if however investors face transactions costs in the stock market this positive feedback may fail to be operative if the volume of trade is expected to be small investors with relatively high transaction costs will abstain from trading thus the market

prescription drug use under medicare part d a linear model of nonlinear budget sets abstract medicare part d enrollees face a complicated decision they dynamically choose prescription drug consumption in each period given difficult to find prices and a nonlinear budget set we use part d claims data to estimate a flexible model of consumption that accounts for nonlinear prices dynamic responses and salience we use reduced form price responses from a linear regression of consumption on coverage range prices to compare performance under several models of behavior we find small price elasticities substantial myopia and that salient characteristics impact consumption beyond their effect on prices a hyperbolic discounting model with salience fits the data best

on optimal reservation prices in auctions the theory of auction design examines how various factors affect the outcome of an auction most of the existing literature focuses on how varying the amount of information available to each bidder affects the bid taker s expected revenue when all other factors remain constant this paper studies how the bid taker s expected revenue varies with changes in the auction format when such changes affect the number of bidders and in turn the bidders maximum value for the object being sold specifically we examine how varying the reservation price or screening level affects the bid taker s expected revenue though its effect on the number of bidders for two simple examples the losses associated with a reduced number of bidders outweighs any benefits that nontrivial reservation prices might have had in models with an exogonously set number of bidders

optimal monitoring policies in agencies this article considers a principal agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monitoring technology that can be used to acquire additional information about the agent s actions subsequent to observing the agent s output although randomized monitoring policies are feasible we show that in a variety of contexts optimal monitoring policies are deterministic and lower tailed that is there exists some critical level of output such that further investigation of the agent s actions occurs if and only if output falls below this critical level

disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry abstract this paper models research contests as an all pay auction with stochastic entry and analyzes the effect of disclosing the actual number of participants on the expected winning bid i find that the classic disclosure irrelevance principle on expected revenue does not extend to the ranking on expected winning bid the ranking on expected winning bid crucially depends on the number of potential bidders participation probabilities and the distribution of bidders valuations when there are more than two potential bidders fully concealing the actual number of participants elicits a higher expected winning bid if potential bidders have low participation probabilities whereas the rank reverses if bidders have high participation probabilities and high chances of being high types

financial intermediaries and liquidity creation trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets these securities which can arise endogenously have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents bank debt deposits is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content high grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples implying that a money market mutual fund based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits

sinking swimming or learning to swim in medicare part d under medicare part d senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance offered by numerous private insurers we examine nonpoor enrollees actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data our sample reduced overspending by 298 on average with gains by 81 percent of them the greatest improvements were by those who overspent most in 2006 and by those who switched plans decisions to switch depended on individuals overspending in 2006 and on individualspecific effects of changes in their current plans the oldest consumers and those initiating medications for alzheimer s disease improved by more than average suggesting that real world institutions help overcome cognitive limitations

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

paying attention or paying too much in medicare part d we study whether people became less likely to switch medicare prescription drug plans pdps due to more options and more time in part d panel data for a random 20 percent sample of enrollees from 2006 2010 show that 50 percent were not in their original pdps by 2010 individuals switched pdps in response to higher costs of their status quo plans saving them money contrary to choice overload larger choice sets increased switching unless the additional plans were relatively expensive neither switching overall nor responsiveness to costs declined over time and above minimum spending in 2010 remained below the 2006 and 2007 levels

incumbency and entry in license auctions the anglo dutch auction meets another simple alternative the existence of ex ante strong incumbents may constitute a barrier to entry in auctions for goods such as licenses favoring the allocation to entrants is a way to induce entry and thus create competition designs such as the anglo dutch auction have been proposed with this goal in mind we first show that the anglo dutch auction does indeed foster entry and increases the revenues of the seller however we argue that a more effective way could be to stage the allocation of the good so that each stage reveals information about the participants we show that a sequence of english auctions with high reserve prices in early rounds fulfils this property and is more efficient than any one stage entry auction moreover it also outperforms the anglo dutch auction in terms of seller s revenues

ask your doctor direct to consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals we measure the impact of direct to consumer television advertising dtca by drug manufacturers our identification strategy exploits shocks to local advertising markets generated by the political advertising cycle and a regulatory intervention affecting a single product we find evidence of significant business stealing effects among branded advertised drugs in addition we show positive spillovers from drug advertisements to non advertised competitors in the same class we decompose the effect and show it is primarily due to new customers finally we provide evidence that dtca is cost effective from a societal standpoint in our setting

entry coordination and auction design with private costs of information acquisition i introduction in most auction literature bidders are passively endowed with private information about their valuations the analysis then focuses on optimal elicitation of private information on many occasions bidders may instead have to incur costs to collect this information 1 auction design in these cases has to balance between information acquisition and information elicitation which are interdependent the performance of an auction depends not only on the bidding equilibrium but also crucially on the information acquisition equilibrium 2 as a salient feature auction design with information acquisition costs has been complicated by entry coordination among bidders due to multiple entry equilibria issue in a symmetric independent private value ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 with fixed information acquisition cost levin and smith 1994 note that the ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auction a second price auction with no entry fee and no reserve induces many asymmetric entry equilibria other than the targeted symmetric one the existence of asymmetric entry equilibria in this setup fundamentally lies in bidders constant marginal cost of entry 3 information acquisition costs could be private information of bidders just as with their private information about values for example in the cases of construction procurements or u s timber auctions many aspects of prebid information acquisition and analyzation are private knowledge of bidders 4 clearly when information acquisition costs are private information of bidders auction design has to additionally take into account information elicitation at the information acquisition stage this aspect of analysis has yet to be reflected in the literature while the case with fixed information acquisition costs has been thoroughly studied by milgrom 1981 mcafee and mcmillan 1987 engelbrecht wiggans 1987 1993 harstad 1990 levin and smith 1994 mcafee quan and vincent 2002 ye 2004 2007 and cremer spiegel and zheng 2009 among others a widely recognized insight of these studies is that ex ante efficiency can be achieved through a second price auction while setting the reserve at the seller s valuation if ex ante entry fees can be used to extract all the expected surplus of bidders then there is a congruence between the revenue and total surplus 5 this article advances this line of research by studying the implications of private acquisition costs on auction design with an emphasis on bidders coordination at the information acquisition stage specifically we consider the ipv setting of mcafee and mcmillan 1987 and levin and smith 1994 while allowing the information acquisition costs to be bidders private information which follow a continuous distribution in light of our previous discussion this article attempts to answer the following questions 1 how are ex ante efficient and revenue maximizing auctions affected by this additional dimension of private information in other words how does information rent extraction at the entry stage affect the auction designs 2 can this private information alleviate rather than aggravate the problem of entry coordination with the dispersion in private information acquisition costs the multiplicity of entry equilibria arising from the constant marginal cost in levin and smith 1994 might be avoidable the types with higher information acquisition costs must have less incentive to enter which could reduce the number of entry equilibria the questions are will sufficient dispersion coordinate bidders and induce a unique entry if yes how much dispersion is enough due to the potential multiplicity of entry equilibria for any given mechanism it is rather difficult to compare performances across varieties of mechanisms to overcome this difficulty we come up with an alternative approach our analysis begins with characterizing efficient and revenue maximizing auctions for any given feasible entry pattern which can be described through a vector of bidders entry thresholds of acquisition costs

what happens when the insurer can say no assessing prior authorization as a tool to prevent high risk prescriptions and to lower costs abstract insurers are increasingly requiring physicians to obtain prior authorization before prescribing drugs that are costly or have high abuse potential these prior authorization requirements have the potential to reduce risky prescriptions and to lower prescription drug costs but little is known about their ability to do either this study estimates the effect of a prior authorization requirement for certain costly and abuse prone drugs on prescription drug use and costs for work related injuries in texas the findings indicate that the prior authorization requirement reduces the likelihood that claimants receive non preferred drugs as well as insurers spending on non preferred drugs while there is some substitution to preferred drugs i do not find evidence of large increases in spending on preferred drugs the estimated effects on average total pharmacy spending are imprecise though there is suggestive evidence that the prior authorization requirement reduces the likelihood that a claim has high prescription drug costs the results provide strong evidence that the prior authorization requirement drastically reduces the likelihood that patients receive combinations of drugs that have contributed disproportionately to the rise in prescription drug overdoses despite the success of prior authorization in lowering spending on non preferred drugs and in reducing high risk prescriptions i find little evidence that prior authorization has disproportionately large effects on the most dangerous prescription drug use and only weak suggestive evidence that it has larger effects on prescription drug use that likely arises because physicians are not fully informed suggesting that prior authorization requirements do not necessarily target the riskiest drug use

strategic ignorance in a second price auction abstract suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second price auction with costly bidding all equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price

on absolute auctions and secret reserve prices from a theory viewpoint the use of auctions with zero public reserve prices also called absolute auctions or of auctions with secret reserve prices is somewhat puzzling despite being common by allowing that buyers differ in their processing of past data regarding how the participation rate varies with the auction format and how reserve prices are distributed when secret we show in a competitive environment that these auction formats may endogenously emerge we also analyze how buyers with various sophistications and sellers with various costs sort into the different formats thereby offering a range of testable predictions alternative approaches are reviewed

auctions with heterogeneous entry costs it is well known that if bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs a rst or second price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller s value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue and leaves bidders with no surplus further in mixed strategy entry equilibria social surplus and seller revenue decrease with the number of bidders we show that when entry costs are heterogeneous and private information the revenue maximizing reserve price is above the seller s value a positive inspection fee and a reserve price equal to the seller s value generates even more revenue and in either case bidders capture informational rents further seller revenue and social surplus may either increase or decrease with the number of bidders nevertheless seller revenue is asymptotically the same whether entry costs are homogeneous or heterogeneous our results are framed in terms of screening values rather than reserve prices and apply to any standard auction

choice inconsistencies among the elderly evidence from plan choice in the medicare part d program we evaluate the choices of elders across their insurance options under the medicare part d prescription drug plan using a unique data set of prescription drug claims matched to information on the characteristics of choice sets we document that elders place much more weight on plan premiums than on expected out of pocket costs value plan financial characteristics beyond any impacts on their own financial expenses or risk and place almost no value on variance reducing aspects of plans partial equilibrium welfare analysis implies that welfare would have been 27 higher if patients had all chosen rationally

on discrimination in auctions with endogenous entry abstract when entry is exogenous strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues myerson 1981 when entry is endogenous so that entrants expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism optimal discrimination takes a completely different form the revenue maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics besides those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength these predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large the optimality of first price auctions is also discussed jel d44 h57

is mark to market accounting destabilizing analysis and implications for policy abstract fundamental economic principles provide a rationale for requiring financial institutions to use mark to market or fair value accounting for financial reporting the recent turmoil in financial markets however has raised questions about whether fair value accounting is exacerbating the problems in this paper we review the history and practice of fair value accounting and summarize the literature on the channels through which it can adversely affect the real economy we propose a new model to study the interaction of accounting rules with regulatory capital requirements and show that even when market prices always reflect fundamental values the interaction of fair value accounting rules and a simple capital requirement can create inefficiencies that are absent when capital is measured by adjusted book value these distortions can be avoided however by redefining capital requirements to be procyclical rather than by abandoning fair value accounting and the other benefits that it provides

adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets when nudging hurts this paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets where adverse selection is a potential concern we leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk we use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia when aggregated these improved individual level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection jel d82 g22 i13 a number of potential impediments stand in the way of efficient health insur ance markets the most noted of these is adverse selection first studied by akerlof 1970 and rothschild and stiglitz 1976 in insurance markets prices reflect the expected risk costs of the insured pool whether the reason is price regulation or private information when insurers cannot price all risk characteristics riskier consumers choose more comprehensive health plans this causes the equilibrium prices of these plans to rise and healthier enrollees to select less comprehensive coverage than they would otherwise prefer

the impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions a number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively this widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty we examine the impact of a policy change by the oklahoma department of transportation that led to the release of the state s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects we perform a differences in differences analysis comparing bidding in texas a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis to bidding in oklahoma our results show that in comparison to texas auctions the average bid in oklahoma fell after the change in engineers cost estimate ece policy this decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater moreover the within auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ece policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty

participation in auctions participation preparing offers in auction and procurement games e g bidding for spectrum rights or for control of corporations is very costly which calls for analyzing participation no less than how to play the games as part of equilibrium the result is a model with bi dimensional distribution of types as in jackson m o 1999 nonexistence of equilibria in auctions with both private and common values mimeo http www stanford edu jacksonm nonexist pdf and endogenous distribution of participants players with low production but high participation costs may decide not to participate forcing the auctioneer to pay higher than necessary prices to mitigate this phenomenon auctioneers may consider partially reimbursing participants for the costs they incur in preparing offers restricting attention to symmetric games we prove that the game we consider has a unique symmetric equilibrium with and without the reimbursement mechanism

public trading and private incentives this article studies the link between public trading and the activity of a firm s large shareholder who can affect firm value public trading results in the formation of a stock price that is informative about the large shareholder s activity this increases the latter s incentives to engage in value increasing activities indeed if he has to liquidate part of his stake before the effect of his activity is publicly observed a more informative price rewards him for his activity implications are derived for the decision to go public capital structure and security design we consider a firm with a large shareholder and otherwise dispersed shares which are publicly traded the block holder is an insider in the sense that he can undertake actions that directly affect the firm s value moreover the insider might not take all value increasing actions as at least some of them involve a private cost for him in other words there is an incentive problem the article s main premise is that public trading as part of the price formation process generates information not only about exogenous factors affecting firm value but also about the insider s activity for instance as a result of public trading a firm s stock price will incorporate the market s evaluation of how a controlling shareholder allocates corporate resources we identify two sources of incentives for the insider to engage in activities that will increase firm value the first one is his stake in the firm since the insider participates in a value increase in proportion to his equity stake a larger stake increases the benefit to him from the firm value being high the view that large shareholders affect firm value is indeed widespread shleifer and vishny 1997 they alleviate the free rider problem pervasive in firms with passive dispersed investors unable or unwilling to affect the firm s operations that is outsiders

behavioral models for first price sealed bid auctions with the one shot decision theory abstract we build an auction model with the one shot decision theory which describes the process of a bidder deciding his her bidding price in first price sealed bid auctions the decision making procedure involves two steps first for each of his her possible bidding prices the bidder examines every possible highest bidding price provided by the other bidders and chooses one as a focus point of this bidding price of him her then the bidder determines such a bidding price as the optimal one that generates the best outcome when its focus point occurs the optimal bidding price can be obtained and two common phenomena in auction markets throwing away and overbidding are well explained

medicare part d are insurers gaming the low income subsidy design this paper shows how in medicare part d insurers gaming of the subsidy paid to low income enrollees distorts premiums and raises the program cost using plan level data from the first five years of the program i find multiple instances of pricing strategy distortions for the largest insurers instrumental variable estimates indicate that the changes in a concentration index measuring the manipulability of the subsidy can explain a large share of the premium growth observed between 2006 and 2011 removing this distortion could reduce the cost of the program without worsening consumer welfare

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices