moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk for example a bank and a finance company or a good bank bad bank structure such bipartite structures may prevent risk shifting in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders by insulating safer loans from riskier loans a bipartite structure reduces risk shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower

children as collective goods and divorce settlements the failure of many divorced fathers to comply with court mandated child support awards has been identified as a major reason why a growing number of children live in poverty in female headed households this paper presents a model that seeks to explain why so many divorced fathers allow their children s welfare to suffer as a consequence of divorce the point of departure is the recognition that children are collective consumption goods from the point of view of the father and mother within marriage proximity and altruism serve to overcome the free rider problem associated with the provision of public goods however on divorce the noncustodial parent suffers a loss of control over the allocative decisions of the custodial parent and it is not feasible for the couple to achieve a pareto optimal allocation of their joint resources a model of optimal marriage contracts is constructed in which a couple decides on the allocation of resources within marriage and on the terms of a settlement in the event

interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention we develop a simple model of the interbank market where banks trade a long term safe asset when there is a lack of opportunities for banks to hedge idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks the interbank market is characterized by excessive price volatility in such a situation a central bank can implement the constrained efficient allocation by using open market operations to fix the short term interest rate it can be constrained efficient for banks to hoard liquidity and stop trading with each other if there is sufficient uncertainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic liquidity demand

the effect of child support payments on the labor supply of female family heads an econometric analysis recent census bureau statistics show that women who receive child support payments have higher earnings and work longer hours than women who do not does this suggest that child support unlike all other nonwage income does not deter work effort or are women who receive it simply different we use 1979 1982 cps data on divorced or separated women to estimate the determinants of hours worked when afdc participation and child support are endogenous we find evidence of unobservable differences between women who receive child support and those who do not controlling for these both child support and other nonwage income appear to reduce hours worked but the deterrent effect of child support is considerably less

fdicia after five years at year end 1991 congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts the fdic improvement act this reform followed the failure of more than 2 000 depository institutions in the 1980s many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks this article reviews these changes and evaluates early results

the effect of child support policies on visitations and transfers recent research on child support issues has been concerned with normative problems involvingthe distribution of welfare between divorced parents and their children as well as with the assess ment of the behavioral responses of parents to child support orders and custody arrangements see e g del boca and flinn 1995 gar nkel and klawitter 1990 bartfeldt and gar nkel 1996 del boca 1996 del boca and ribero 1998 and flinn 2000 while there is bynow an extensive literature analyzing the e ects of child support policies on monetary transfersof noncustodial parents and the extent of compliance with child support orders little researchhas been done on the relationship between monetary transfers between parents and the divisionof the child s time while income transfers to the custodial parent are no doubt importantfor the child s consumption and general well being there exists considerable empirical evidencesuggesting that the division of the child s time between the parents has important e ects on thechild s welfare beller and graham 1993 there have been few analyses of this relationship weiss and willis 1985 provide one theoretical motivation for the positive relationship betweenthe noncustodial parent s contact time with the child and their level of transfers they claimthat increased contact time allows better monitoring of the custodial parent s expenditures onthe child which induces higher levels of transfers to the custodial parent we have developed a model del boca and ribero 1999 in which visitations and childsupport are the outcomes of a negotiation process whereby the father exchanges income forvisitation time institutional agents such as judges state legislatures etc can impact thewelfareofthemembersofthenonintactfamilybyalteringtheendowmentsofeachofthe1

debt and seniority an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management we argue that long term debt has a role in controlling management s ability to finance future investments a company with high widely held debt will find it hard to raise capital since new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors conversely for a company with low debt we show there is an optimal debt equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments we derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior

leverage and the central banker s put among the many unusual aspects of the ongoing financial crisis is the unprecedented provision of backstop liquidity by central banks around the world the federal reserve alone had committed 4 400 billion by mid novem ber 2008 the fed funds rate is almost equal to zero these are extraordinary numbers this paper establishes a formal relationship between the recent monetary developments and the trends in private leverage and its structure over the last few years some traditional insti tutions for example broker dealers have relied more and more on markets securitization money market for their funding some banks have also increased their dependence on mar kets the standard illustration is northern rock a uk mortgage bank which prior to its bailout relied on short term wholesale markets for 75 percent of its funding a second factor contributing to the reliance on wholesale markets is the overall shift from a bank based system to a market based one the expanding so called shadow banking system conduits hedge funds investment banks monolines has engaged in substantial transfor mation and unlike commercial banks could not avail itself of stable insured deposits mutual funds are under the threat of redemptions and may well face liquidity shortages as well adding subprime borrowers who are heavily dependent on high housing prices and for those with adjustable rate mortgages arms on low short term interest rates and highly lever

intra household allocation of resources inferences from non resident fathers child support payments a large proportion of divorced and separated fathers form new partnerships the new partner s preferences are not likely to put much weight on expenditures on the man s children from his previous union thus his own and his partner s income would have different impacts on his child support payments if partners relative incomes affect bargaining power in household decisions this article exploits within father variation in the british household panel survey 1991 2005 to estimate the impacts of the intra household income distribution on child support payments and the father s welfare we find that a higher share of father s income in household income increases the probability of paying child support and its amount relative to household income

bank regulation risk and return evidence from the credit and sovereign debt crises in this paper we analyze whether regulation reduced risk during the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis for a cross section of global banks in this regard we examine distance to default laeven and levine 2008 systemic risk acharya et al 2010 idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk we employ world bank survey data on regulations to test our conjectures we find that regulatory restrictions official supervisory power capital stringency along with private monitoring can explain bank risk in both crises additionally we find that deposit insurance schemes enhance moral hazard as this encouraged banks to take on more risk and perform poorly during the sovereign debt crisis finally official supervision and private monitoring explains the returns during both crisis periods

the president and the political use of force throughout the post world war ii period the president has been called upon to make decisions concerning the use of force as a political instrument the explanation that is offered is based upon a characterization of the president as a cybernetic human decision maker facing limitations these limitations in conjunction with the complexity of the environment lead presidents to develop and use a relatively simple decision rule the dependent variable which is the probability of the use of force at any point in time is explained in terms of enduring and essential concerns which are operationalized as coming from the international domestic and personal environments data are taken from blechman and kaplan s force without war on the basis of our estimation and evaluation presidential decisions to use force are based on factors in all three arenas

the open society assesses its enemies shocks disasters and terrorist attacks abstract this paper conducts a systematic investigation of the incidence and economic costs of terrorist attacks at the country level we use newly assembled datasets on terrorist attacks natural disasters and currency crises to answer three different questions what are the determinants of terrorism is there an output cost following a terrorist attack and is that cost larger or smaller in the case of democracies we find that rich countries are the most prone to suffer attacks while democracies are if anything less vulnerable than other countries the cost to output of a terrorist attack is quantitatively small and closely associated with the occurrence of an event rather than the number of casualties finally we find robust evidence that a terrorist attack imposes a lower output cost the more democratic a country is

lending booms smart bankers and financial crises this paper develops a theory that explains why financial crises follow profitable lending booms when agents exhibit the availability heuristic and there is a long period of banking profitability all agents banks their investors and regulators end up in an availability cascade overestimating bankers risk management skills and underestimating the probability that observed outcomes are due to good luck consequently banks profitably invest in riskier assets subsequently if a public signal reveals that outcomes are luck driven investors withdraw funds liquidity evaporates and a crisis ensues a loan resale market improves liquidity but increases the probability of a crisis

does deposit insurance increase banking system stability an empirical investigation based on evidence of 61 countries in 1980 97 the authors find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors and where the scheme is funded and run by the government rather than the private sector

a cournot nash model of family decision making this paper models a two person family each family member is utility maximising yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family the two family members interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non cooperative or cournot nash game theoretic framework the cournot nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game the paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands a full analysis of the determinants of intra household resource allocation including the effect of varying household bargaining power and consideration of policy implications

the revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation abstract this paper traces career transitions of federal and state u s banking regulators from a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae and provides basic facts on worker flows between the regulatory and private sector resulting from the revolving door we find strong countercyclical net worker flows into regulatory jobs driven largely by higher gross outflows into the private sector during booms these worker flows are also driven by state specific banking conditions as measured by local banks profitability asset quality and failure rates the regulatory sector seems to experience a retention challenge over time with shorter regulatory spells for workers and especially those with higher education evidence from cross state enforcement actions of regulators shows gross inflows into regulation and gross outflows from regulation are both higher during periods of intense enforcement though gross outflows are significantly smaller in magnitude these results appear inconsistent with a quid pro quo explanation of the revolving door but consistent with a regulatory schooling hypothesis

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

a model of the political economy of the united states we develop and test a model of joint determination of economic growth and national election results in the united states the formal model which combines developments in the rational choice analysis of the behavior of economic agents and voters leads to a system of equations in which the dependent variables are the growth rate and the vote shares in presidential and congressional elections our estimates support the theoretical claims that growth responds to unanticipated policy shifts and that voters use both on year and midterm elections to balance the two parties on the other hand we find no support for rational retrospective voting we do reconfirm in a fully simultaneous framework the naive retrospective voting literature s finding that the economy has a strong effect on presidential voting we find congressional elections unaffected by the economy except as transmitted by presidential coattails

a theory of political cycles abstract we study how the proximity of elections affects policy choices in a model in which policymakers want to improve their reputation to increase their reelection chances policymakers equilibrium decisions depend on both their reputation and the proximity of the next election typically incentives to influence election results are stronger closer to the election for a given reputation level as argued in the political cycles literature and these political cycles are less important when the policymaker s reputation is better our analysis sheds light on other agency relationships in which part of the compensation is decided upon infrequently

does an intra household flypaper effect exist evidence from the educational fee reduction reform in rural china abstract we test for evidence of an intra household flypaper effect by evaluating the impact of an educational fee reduction reform in rural china on different categories of household expenditure including spending on individual children using pre and post reform data this study exploits cohort comparisons variation in the extent of school fee reductions across different villages and variation in the subsidies received by children enrolled in different grades within the same family to identify the impact of the reform the results show that educational fee reductions are matched by increased voluntary educational spending on the same children who receive the fee reductions providing strong evidence of an intra household flypaper effect

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

implicit bank debt guarantees costs benefits and risks the expectation by market participants that public authorities might bailout the creditors of banks that are considered too important for financial system stability or another reason to be allowed to fail is commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee public authorities do not have any explicit commitment to intervene they may even honestly state that they not want to do so ex ante but may feel compelled to do so ex post a declared policy aim is to limit the value of implicit guarantees by making banks stronger more easily resolvable in case of distress as well as by imposing extra charges that rise as banks become more systemically important as part of the latter approach globally systemically important banks are identified and subjected to more costly and intrusive regulation there is little evidence that specific approach has been successful so far there is some evidence that the introduction of new resolution frameworks has been helpful while the use of newly available resolution tools and the involvement of bank creditors in the burden sharing associated with bank failure resolution has significantly reduced the value of implicit bank debt guarantees where it occurred in that sense actions speak louder than words

war politics an economic rational voter framework the frequency of foreign conflict initiations in the united states is found to be significantly greater following the onset of recessions during a president s first term than in other periods the authors develop an economic theory of the political use of wars which links the election cycle war decisions and economic performance consistent with the observed relationships among these events an incumbent leader with an unfavorable economic performance record may initiate a war to force the learning of his war leadership abilities and thus salvage with some probability his reelection this obtains despite voter rationality and informational symmetry copyright 1995 by american economic association

domestic politics and international conflict this paper explores the interactions between domestic politics and international conflict the analysis shows that electoral uncertainty associated with competition between political parties each representing a specific group of the electorate imparts a negative bias on the nation s military spending given military spending by other nations in turn electoral uncertainty lowers other nations incentive to arm as well in this context democratic institutions can be thought of as a possible precommitment mechanism that reduces the severity of conflict between nations and thereby increases the amount of resources available globally for consumption copyright 1994 by american economic association

financial system architecture this article builds a theory of financial system architecture we ask what is a financial market what is a bank and what determines the economic role of each starting with basic assumptions about primitives the types of agents and the nature of the informational asymmetries we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesce to form banks and which trade in the capital market it is shown that borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financial market moreover a financial system in its infancy will be bank dominated and increased financial market sophistication diminishes bank lending article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

liquidity efficiency and bank bailouts governments can efficiently provide liquidity as when the banking system is bailed out we study a model in which not all assets can be used to purchase all other assets at every date agents sometimes want to sell projects the market price of the projects sold depends on the supply of liquidity which is determined in general equilibrium while private liquidity provision is socially beneficial since it allows valuable reallocations it is also socially costly since liquidity suppliers could have made more efficient investments ex ante there is a role for the government to supply liquidity by issuing government securities

how much does violence tax trade abstract we investigate the empirical effect of violence as compared to other trade impediments on trade flows our analysis is based on a panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 1999 which brings together information from the rose data set the iterate data set for terrorist events and data sets of external and internal conflict we explore these data with traditional and theoretical gravity models we calculate that for a given country year the presence of terrorism together with internal and external conflict is equivalent to as much as a 30 tariff on trade this is larger than estimated tariff equivalent costs of border and language barriers and tariff equivalent reduction through generalized systems of preference and wto participation

bank resolution a framework for the assessment of regulatory intervention more than ever the current crisis has highlighted the cost of banking crises in budgetary and economic growth terms whether or not to restructure a bank is a key determinant of who bears the costs the present article surveys the main issues concerning banks restructuring by considering the bargaining game that is played between regulators and shareholders when a bank is in distress this revolves around the framework of negotiation that was established by the regulator the fall back position which is determined by bankruptcy legislation and the objective function of the regulator in this context we argue that it is possible to improve upon existing restructuring mechanisms by making banks bail outs less costly to taxpayers and improving the ex ante incentives of banks managers and shareholders the authors 2012 published by oxford university press

capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks abstract i study the consequences of capital regulations on the portfolio choices of commercial banks elaborating on previous work by kareken and wallace 1978 koehn and santomero 1980 and kim and santomero 1988 i obtain the following results if the objective of commercial banks is maximization of the market value of their future profits value maximizing banks capital regulations cannot prevent banks from choosing very specialized and very risky portfolios risk based insurance premia are in fact the relevant instrument for that purpose on the other hand if banks behave as portfolio managers utility maximizing banks capital regulations can be effective but only if the weights used in the computation of the ratio are proportional to the systematic risks of the assets their betas because of limited liability of commercial banks a minimum capital regulation or a closing rule may become necessary as well to prevent failing banks from betting for resurrection

marital transfer and intra household allocation a nash bargaining analysis this paper explores the implications of inter generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household adopting a nash bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child than to a single child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public goods and because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage

source of income effects for demand decisions and taxable consumption the relationship between sources of income and demand decisions by the household is examined here with an eye toward the ramifications on consumption tax bases income sources may be important when households attach psychic and transaction costs to individual purchases or when sources are assigned via a mental accounting process in either case general and specific sales tax bases may be affected by changes in income composition empirical results indicate two important findings first tax exemptions can introduce significant income source effects for a general consumption tax base second the importance of differential tax rates for gasoline and food at home strongly depends on the mix of labour capital retirement and non retirement transfer pay

credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies we study a credit model where because of adverse selection unprofitable projects may nevertheless be financed indeed they may continue to be financed even when shown to be low quality if sunk costs have already been incurred we show that credit decentralization offers a way for creditors to commit not to refinance such projects thereby discouraging entrepreneurs from undertaking them initially thus decentralization provides financial discipline nevertheless we argue that it puts too high a premium on short term returns the model seems pertinent to two issues soft budget constraint problems in centralized economies and differences between anglo saxon and german japanese financing practices

optimal debt structure and the number of creditors within an optimal contracting framework we analyze the optimal number of creditors a company borrows from we also analyze the optimal allocation of security interests among creditors and intercreditor voting rules that govern renegotiation of debt contracts the key to our analysis is the idea that these aspects of the debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default debt structures that lead to inefficient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager s control the optimal debt structure balances these effects we characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as its technology its credit rating and the market for its assets

principal agent problems in s l salvage new legislation and traditional fdic insolvency resolution procedures transform and intensify the principal agent problems most responsible for the fslic mess these problems explain counterproductive constraints on the governance and operating policies of the agency responsible for rescuing and salvaging assets in insolvent thrifts the rtc the constraints slow insolvency resolution increase interim financing costs and undermine rtc recovery of asset value operationalizing its task as preserving evanescent and economically misconceived franchise values the rtc allows insolvents to seek financing on an unconsolidated basis initiates bidding for one institution at a time holds back seriously troubled assets and recruits an overly narrow range of bidders although the federal savings and loan insurance corporation fslic is officially defunct its corporate corpse lives on in two successor institutions its deposit insurance business has been taken over by the savings association insurance fund saif while its liquidation or salvage business has been assigned to the resolution trust corporation rtc both saif and rtc have the same stockholder principals federal taxpayers also both are operated by the federal deposit insurance corporation fdic nevertheless their governing structures differ markedly and in a perverse way to maximize net returns from salvage experience suggests the theory that a salvage or value recovery operation requires the aggressive operating flexibility of an automobile junkyard in a junkyard essentially everything in the salvor s inventory is open for inspection stripping and sale to anyone at any time hardto market hulks are compacted into scrap metal i e pooled and shipped out on what can be compared to a bulk sales or auction basis on a strict timetable the yard either owns or transacts with a fleet of tow trucks and has enough operating capital to bring in new wrecks as they appear this paper argues that unlike a private salvor the rtc is saddled with the additional objective of slowing down official recognition of the full size of fslic s losses to this end the financial institutions reform recovery and enforcement act firrea underfunds the rtc requires delayed sales of residential properties ostensibly to promote the availability of affordable housing and creates a superfluous five person rtc oversight board whose incentives are to deprive rtc decisionmakers of desirable operating flexibility the rtc oversight board creates an appearance of improved accountability to taxpayers that runs exactly opposite to its true economic effects three of the

inconsistent regulators evidence from banking we find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented we study supervisory decisions of u s banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors state regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently under federal regulators banks report worse asset quality higher regulatory capital ratios and lower return on assets leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds the discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and to some extent differences in regulatory resources we find no support for regulator self interest which includes revolving doors

is financial inclusion good for bank stability international evidence abstract financial inclusion has become an important public policy priority following the recent global financial crisis yet we know very little of how it impacts soundness of the providers of financial services using an international sample of 2635 banks in 86 countries over the period 2004 12 we find that higher level of financial inclusion contributes to greater bank stability the positive association is particularly pronounced with those banks that have higher customer deposit funding share and lower marginal costs of providing banking services and also with those that operate in countries with stronger institutional quality the results are robust to instrumental variables analysis controlling for bank fixed effects alternative measures of financial inclusion among several other robustness tests our results highlight that the importance of ensuring inclusive financial system is not only a development goal but also an issue that should be prioritised by banks as such a policy drive is good for their stability

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

implicit bank debt guarantees costs benefits and risks implicit bank debt guarantees the expectation by market participants that public authorities might bailout the creditors of banks that are considered too important for financial system stability or another reason to be allowed to fail is commonly referred to as an implicit guarantee public authorities do not have any explicit commitment to intervene they may even honestly state that they not want to do so ex ante but may feel compelled to do so ex post a declared policy aim is to limit the value of implicit guarantees by making banks stronger more easily resolvable in case of distress as well as by imposing extra charges that rise as banks become more systemically important as part of the latter approach globally systemically important banks are identified and subjected to more costly and intrusive regulation there is little evidence that specific approach has been successful so far there is some evidence that the introduction of new resolution frameworks has been helpful while the use of newly available resolution tools and the involvement of bank creditors in the burden sharing associated with bank failure resolution has significantly reduced the value of implicit bank debt guarantees where it occurred in that sense actions speak louder than words

a sheep in wolf s clothing can a central bank appear tougher than it is abstract central banks cbs in europe and the us have been providing virtually unlimited amounts of liquidity to banks for quite some time now this may lead banks to expect that these cbs will be lenient in the future will this expectation be justified i present a model in which a commercial bank subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks faces uncertainty about whether the cb is tough hawk or lenient dove specifically the cb knows its nature but the bank does not when uncertainty is high the cb can use this to its advantage and try to build a reputation for toughness in response the bank chooses higher liquidity reserves in equilibrium furthermore increasing bank capital and penalty rates make it easier to build a reputation while bailouts by the fiscal government make it more difficult

bank capital interbank contagion and bailout policy abstract this paper develops a theoretical framework in which asset linkages in a syndicated loan agreement can infect a healthy bank when its partner bank fails we investigate how capital constraints affect the choice of the healthy bank to takeover or liquidate the exposure held jointly with the failing bank and how the bank s ex ante optimal capital holding and possibility of contagion are affected by anticipation of bail out policy capital requirements and the joint exposure we identify a range of factors that strengthen or weaken the possibility of contagion and bailout recapitalization with common stock rather than preferred equity injection dilutes existing shareholder interests and gives the bank a greater incentive to hold capital to cope with potential contagion increasing the minimum regulatory capital does not necessarily reduce contagion while the requirement of holding conservation capital buffer could increase the bank s resilience to avoid contagion

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

the labeling effect of a child benefit system child benefit systems exist in many countries while they show a lot of differences in terms of eligibility rules amounts involved and implementation tax deduction tax credit or direct benefit the common motivation for their existence is to increase children s welfare in the dutch child benefit system the case i focus on in this paperone of the parents usually the mother is entitled to an untaxed child benefit amount which only depends on the child s age and the number of children in the household thus child support does not depend on household income marital status or labor market status as a result child benefit is exogenous to the household given the presence of children this is in contrast with the situation in many other countries including germany france the united kingdom and the united states where government provided child support is partly means tested see jonathan bradshaw et al 1993 in the netherlands child benefit is generally a nonnegligible addition to the household income the median share of child benefit in the total net income of households with children is 8 percent on the national level expenditures on child benefits amount to 1 2 percent of gnp the use of the child benefit is completely at the discretion of the parent there are no legal requirements that a certain amount be spent on particular goods or services nor does the government provide any guidelines regarding expenditure on children a policy question that arises is to what extent children benefit from child benefits standard microeconomic demand theory allows no role for effects of the composition of income given the fungibility of income sources it is only the sum of income components that is relevant in explaining expenditure patterns thus within that framework the answer would be that the marginal propensity to consume child goods from one guilder of child benefits is no different than from one guilder of any other income source in the more general class of gametheoretic models of household behavior however the composition of household income will generally affect expenditure patterns see e g shelly j lundberg and robert a pollak 1993 and martin browning et al 1994 if fathers and mothers have different preferences and mothers have control over child benefits the effect of child benefits on expenditures will differ from the effect of other income sources lundberg et al 1997 provide empirical evidence showing that a transfer of control over child benefits from fathers to mothers in the united kingdom due to a change in legislation resulted in a significant increase in expenditures on child clothing daniela del boca and christopher j flinn 1994 have analyzed the effect of income composition on expenditure decisions of divorced mothers they find that the coefficients associated with child support and alimony income differ from those for other income in engel curves for expenditures on childspecific goods their results can be explained in terms of a noncooperative nash model in which the child support transfer decisions of the noncustodial father and the expenditure decisions of the mother are determined simultaneously in contrast to del boca and flinn s analysis in which child support is a decision variable the present paper focuses on the possible differential effect of government provided child support which is truly exogenous in this paper i analyze the effects of child benefits on expenditures by running regressions in which child benefit enters as a separate explanatory variable the enipirical analysis is based on a time series of 17 cross section consumer expenditure surveys in the netherlands covering the period 1978 through 1994 it is important to note that in a single cross section it department of economics university of groningen p o b 800 9700 av groningen the netherlands e mail p kooreman eco rug nl i am indebted to two anonymous referees for constructive comments helpful comments were also provided by rob alessie maarten allers chris bojke werner de bondt bert schoonbeek and tom wansbeek i thank vincent linderhof for organizing the data financial support was provided by the dutch organization for scientific research nwo homes project grant

broad and narrow bracketing in gift certificate spending abstract we survey 1050 consumers who have just redeemed one or more open loop gift certificates to learn whether they view gift certificate income cash gifts and non gift income as substitutes we find that the majority 83 of recipients spend the certificates in the same way as cash the other respondents 17 bought an item they would not have bought otherwise but adjustments in their shopping pattern do not seem to result from constraints in redeeming the certificates 80 of all respondents in this group says they have used the certificate to buy an item they really love to have while inconsistent with standard microeconomic demand theory this behavior can be explained by narrow bracketing in spending gift certificates these consumers consider a limited choice set of nice personal items our data show that females are more likely to narrow bracket gift certificate income and that positive reciprocity towards the giver induces narrow bracketing in case the giver is a household member who suggests to buy a particular item using the certificate previous studies have found that both giving in kind gifts waldfogel 1993 as giving gift cards offenberg 2007 entail a welfare loss of 10 30 when compared to giving cash we find that the welfare effects of open loop gift certificates among users are limited the consumption of broad bracketing consumers is unaffected and narrow bracketing consumers seem to value the possibility to separate gift certificate income from other income sources

the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism abstract we perform an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic consequences of international terrorism and interactions with alternative forms of collective violence our analysis is based on a rich unbalanced panel data set with annual observations on 177 countries from 1968 to 2000 which brings together information from the penn world table data set the iterate data set for terrorist events and data sets of external and internal conflict we explore these data with cross sectional and panel growth regression analysis and a structural var model we find that on average the incidence of terrorism may have an economically significant negative effect on growth albeit one that is considerably smaller and less persistent than that associated with either external wars or internal conflict as well terrorism is associated with a redirection of economic activity away from investment spending and towards government spending however our investigation also suggests important differences both regarding the incidence and the economic consequences of terrorism among different sets of countries in oecd economies in particular terrorist incidents are considerably more frequent than in other nations but the negative influence of these incidents on growth is smaller

liquidity shortages and banking crises we show in this article that bank failures can be contagious unlike earlier work where contagion stems from depositor panics or contractual links between banks we argue that bank failures can shrink the common pool of liquidity creating or exacerbating aggregate liquidity shortages this could lead to a contagion of failures and a total meltdown of the system given the costs of a meltdown there is a possible role for government intervention unfortunately liquidity and solvency problems interact and can cause each other making it hard to determine the cause of a crisis we propose a robust sequence of intervention banks are often found at the center of systemic financial crises the causes of these crises have long been debated do they stem from depositor panics or do they arise because bank balance sheets are exposed to common factors if it is the latter then is there any sense in which bank failures can be contagious can anything be done to prevent these crises or stop them from propagating once they begin our purpose in this paper is to reexamine whether bank failures can start and propagate systemic crises even if we assume that depositors do not panic that is even if depositors actions are coordinated and they do not run simply because they fear others will run our focus is not because we think that panics are empirically unimportant the jury is still out on that instead we show that contagion can stem from an underlying real general equilibrium problem rather than just from lack of coordination among depositors from a policy perspective attempts to reassure investors through confidence building measures will not work if panic and lack of coordination are not the reasons for a crisis we begin in this paper with a model of a bank that we developed in diamond and rajan 2001 assets in this model are illiquid they cannot be borrowed against or sold for the full value of resources they will generate in their best use because the human capital necessary to generate that full value cannot

economic conditions elections and the magnitude of foreign conflicts abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the business cycle the election cycle and the timing and magnitude of foreign conflict we propose a theoretical model which suggests that in the presence of a reelection motive the frequency of war will be greater following recessions than otherwise however if partially benevolent leaders can influence the size of conflicts then the consequences may be limited to conflicts of relatively small magnitude we test the predictions of the theory using data for the united states for the cold war period and obtain results consistent with the theory when leaders are partially benevolent

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

expenditure decisions of divorced mothers and income composition in this paper we analyze the relationship between the income sources of custodial divorced parents and their expenditure patterns we use data from the consumer expenditure survey to directly investigate the issue of whether or not divorced mothers receiving child support income spend larger amounts on child goods than those not receiving child support holding total household income constant by comparing the estimated coefficients on child support income and other income in an endogenous engel curve specification we argue that we can classify child goods as being public or private and say something about the expenditure patterns of noncustodial fathers under a nash equilibrium model of parental expenditures on public child goods and some plausible assumptions regarding the manner in which child support transfer decisions are made by noncustodial fathers our empirical results indicate that income composition does affect the expenditure patterns of divorced mothers and that consumption externalities exist even among divorced parents

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

bank liquidity interbank markets and monetary policy a major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending market is crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs this paper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds we consider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to di erent implications for optimal policy by the central bank we show that when confronted with a distribu tional liquidity shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held among banks the central bank should lower the interbank rate this view implies that the traditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and mon etary policy should be abandoned in addition we show that during an aggregate liquidity crisis central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity two di erent instruments interest rates and liquidity injection are therefore required to cope with the two di erent types of liquidity shocks finally we show that failure to cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the risk of bank runs