how do market reforms affect china s responsiveness to environmental policy a large percentage of total investment in china is allocated by the central government at below market interest rates in pursuit of non economic objectives this has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non performing loans threatening the future health of the chinese economy as a result reform of capital markets is a high priority of the chinese government at the same time the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues in this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax this allows us to assess how china s willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by china s current efforts to reduce investment subsidies we compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy we find that in the subsidized economy the tax interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy importantly we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy in fact for lower levels of reductions the carbon tax is actually welfare improving these results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition the carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies however the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies

are environmental taxes a free lunch issues in modelling the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxes applied analysis of output and employment effects from revenue neutral environmental taxation depends critically on how the supply side of the economy is modelled despite the long history of theoretical and computable general equilibrium supply side models the empirical basis of much of this work has been quite weak until recently however most econometric attempts to capture factor substitution effects have not been based on theoretically consistent structures this paper examines the methodological issues that underlie these problems and compares the results of imposing environmental taxes in two different econometric modelling structures the implications of theories of endogenous technical progress on the simulation properties of such models are discussed and a simple empirically based model that embodies some of these features is presented

environmental taxation in open economies unilateralism or partial harmonization there are two reasons why countries might set weak environmental policies transboundary pollution and concerns for competitiveness this article explores the full interactions between these two features within a unified general equilibrium framework first we show that competitive concerns change the structure of output taxes but not that of emission taxes they lead to a lowering of output taxes lower polluting good prices an increase in emission taxes adoption of less or same polluting technologies increased aggregate emissions and lower overall welfare levels second we show that partially harmonizing commodity taxes above their unrestricted nash equilibrium value can potentially hurt as well as improve the pollution technology overall quality of the environment and welfare the three attributes move positively together on the other hand harmonizing of emission taxes above their nash equilibrium values appear to always lead to improvements in the environment and welfare via adoption of cleaner technologies

customer and retailer rebates under risk aversion abstract in a supply chain setting we analyze a manufacturer s customer and retailer rebates which are sales incentives offered to the end buyers and retailers respectively the performance of both rebates is influenced by the retailer s objective and response to the promotion due to his intermediary position in the channel earlier studies investigating rebates in distribution channels have traditionally assumed that the retailer is risk neutral with the objective of maximizing expected profits in our paper we consider a risk averse retailer we formally model risk aversion by adopting the conditional value at risk cvar decision criterion using a stochastic and effective price dependent demand we analyze the manufacturer s rebate amount decisions and the retailer s joint inventory and pricing decisions in a game theoretical framework we provide several structural properties of the objective functions and show monotonicity of the retailer s decisions in the degree of risk aversion for the case of retailer rebates we characterize the unique equilibrium and for the case of customer rebates we prove the existence of an equilibrium using numerical examples we provide further insights on the impact of risk aversion for example given an exogenous wholesale price we observe a threshold value on the retailer s risk aversion parameter below above which the manufacturer is better off with retailer rebates customer rebates implying that the manufacturer s preferred rebate type can be different depending on whether the retailer is risk neutral or sufficiently risk averse

efficient environmental taxation under worker firm bargaining we study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm worker bargaining over each firm s surplus and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments an uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment implying a tradeoff between the two when tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms hiring or investments employment may also increase creating a double dividend from the pollution tax a pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm we show that the hypothetical pollution tax implementing the first best solution exceeds the pigouvian tax the second best tax exceeds this first best tax when we have a double dividend and is below it when we do not

commuting transport tax reform and the labour market employer paid parking and the relative efficiency of revenue recycling instruments in this paper the welfare effects of a budget neutral increase in taxes on car commuters are studied in a model that takes into account the presence of employer paid parking at the workplace it is found that the presence of employer paid parking substantially increases the welfare effect of such a tax reform independent of the use of the revenues congestion taxes not only correct congestion externalities they also reduce the inefficiency caused by employer paid parking moreover different congestion effects of alternative recycling instruments and the presence of employer paid parking jointly imply that recycling the tax revenues via higher public transport subsidies may yield much more favourable welfare effects than previously believed it can easily outperform recycling the tax revenues via lower labour taxes finally cashing out parking costs to public transport users is found to generate substantial positive welfare effects numerical analysis confirms the theory

cross border shopping and the optimum commodity tax in a competitive and a monopoly market using a partial equilibrium model optimality rules for a commodity tax are derived for an economy that is exposed to cross border shopping in a competitive market the conventional inverse elasticity rule is shown to be valid with the qualification that it is the elasticity of domestic rather than total demand that matters with a foreign monopoly the inverse elasticity is modified by a tax shifting effect when the supplier is a multinational firm price repercussions abroad should be taken into account the implications for domestic taxation of the prices and taxes set abroad are also examined

managing strategic inventories via manufacturer to consumer rebates manufacturer to consumer rebates are a staple of modern supply chains such rebates are typically viewed as a means of price discrimination because of partial redemption by consumers however the proliferation of universally redeemed instant rebates suggests the practice may be motivated by additional considerations an issue we tackle in this paper our results demonstrate that consumer rebates can be particularly useful when a supply chain encounters inefficiencies stemming from strategic inventory buildup by retailers wary of high wholesale prices a retailer may hold excess inventory to convey a lower willingness to pay in future interactions and thereby strategically undercut future wholesale prices as a retaliatory consequence the manufacturer sets high near term wholesale prices the pull promotion from consumer rebates encourages more timely retail sales and in doing so undercuts but does not eliminate the retailer s strategic inventories in other words the introduction of consumer rebates can serve as an enticement for retailers to sell not just for consumers to buy perhaps surprisingly we find that the manufacturer retailer and consumers alike all benefit from the use of rebates this despite the fact that the manufacturer uses the rebates in self interest and as a strategic weapon this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

tax competition and tax co ordination under destination and origin principles a synthesis this paper proposes a general framework for analysing commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles based on three possible tax spillovers the consumer price spillover the producer price terms of trade spillover and rent spillovers a model is presented which can be extended to accommodate all three spillovers using this model many of the results in the existing literature can be derived compared and extended

second best taxation of emissions and polluting goods abstract this paper studies the problem of the design of an integrated system of second best emission and output taxes in a model where production costs are negatively correlated with their emissions it shows that i the first best pigouvian rule of equating the marginal private benefit of emissions in production to the marginal social damage of emissions must be modified in the second best ii implementation of the modified pigouvian rule requires all firms to face the same marginal emission tax equal to the marginal social damage of emissions plus an adjustment term reflecting optimal tax objectives iii it may not be necessary to directly tax the polluting goods the latter taxes can be subsumed in the emission tax function iv output taxes must be set solely on the basis of optimal tax objectives no pigouvian adjustment is required v if emission taxes are restricted to be proportional and commodity taxes are constrained the modified pigouvian rule will no longer be optimal vi if preferences are weakly separable in emissions and other goods the pigouvian rule remains valid the marginal emission tax is pigouvian and emission and commodity tax instruments can be set separately to address different objectives a proportional emission tax corrects for externalities while commodity taxes are determined solely on the basis of optimal tax considerations

labour quality and aggregate real wage dynamics the real wage plays an important role in many aggregate econometrics studies of the labour market however average wages like any other average quantity can change for two reasons either through an underlying movement in the earnings potential of a unit of labour of given quality or alternatively through compositional changes which alter the relative proportions of different types of labour within the employed labour force using data from the general household survey to estimate earnings functions the paper seeks to examine the contribution of these two factors for britain from 1979 to 1989 it is shown that in periods of rising unemployment compositional changes can have a bigger effect on real earnings growth than any underlying change in reward to labour of give quality this raises the question of what economists actually are measuring when considering the behaviour of the aggregate real wage

comment on m hoel emission taxes versus other environmental policies the choice of the appropriate instrument in environmental policy is not only a question of theoretical importance it is also of considerable political relevance while environmental taxes are sometimes used to control pollution quotas and direct controls dominate in practice if this observed bias is only due to the nature of policymaking and not supported by economic reasoning politicians are not well advised to use quotas and direct controls instead of environmental taxes hoel discusses popular arguments that are often used by politicians in favour of direct controls and concludes that the results are typically not clear cut in this comment i would like to focus on the employment effects of revenue raising and nonrevenue raising instruments politicians as well as special interest groups often claim that emission taxes increase the cost of production thereby harming employment clearly in the face of high rates of unemployment in many industrialized countries potentially negative employment effects of environmental regulation raise political resistance to green policy the ongoing debate has put

the double dividend second best worlds and real world environmental policy abstract the recent series of papers by bovemberg goulder parry and others argue that the double dividend is unlikely to exist because of second best problems they argue that the imposition of environmental tax in an economy already distorted by income taxes will further distort the economy by reducing incentives to supply labor our paper argues that this is not likely to be the case because of the restrictive assumptions made by these models and because of the role of the environment as a factor of production

studying optimal paternalism illustrated by a model of sin taxes the classical economic approach to policy analysis assumes that people always respond optimally to the costs and benefits of their available choices a great deal of evidence suggests however that in some contexts people make errors that lead them not to behave in their own best interests economic policy prescriptions might change once we recognize that humans are humanly rational rather than superhumanly rational and in particular it may be fruitful for economists to study the possible advantages of paternalistic policies that help people make better choices we propose an approach for studying optimal paternalism that follows naturally from standard assumptions and methods of economic theory write down assumptions about the distribution of rational and irrational types of agents about the available policy instruments and about the government s information about agents and then investigate which policies achieve the most efficient outcomes in other words economists ought to treat the analysis of optimal paternalism as a mechanism design problem when some agents might be boundedly rational this approach has many advantages first and foremost by explicitly addressing when and how people do and don t pursue their own best interests economists will be better able to contribute to policy debates to contribute to debates over regulating private financial decisions we must study whether financial decisions are based on fallacious statistical reasoning and whether self control problems lead people to borrow too heavily to contribute to debates over teenage smoking we must study whether teenagers become smokers against their long run best interest economists will and should be ignored if we continue to insist that it is axiomatic that constantly trading stocks or accumulating consumer debt or becoming a heroin addict must be optimal for the people doing these things merely because they have chosen to do it a second advantage of our approach is that it forces us to look for the best feasible policy our

slippage in rebate programs and present biased preferences present biased preferences capture the idea that individuals may find immediate payoffs significantly more salient than any future payoffs rather than simply discounting the future in a time consistent manner in this paper we show that consumers present biased preferences can generate slippage and we explore whether this can explain firms use of mail in rebates we assume that the consumer population comprises members who have various degrees of present bias the model demonstrates that if consumers have homogeneous willingness to pay for a product and thus rebates do not serve as a mechanism for traditional price discrimination rebates may still profitably exploit slippage but to do so they must generate very high slippage rates this is because the rebate must greatly exceed the price markup because the rebate must compensate consumers for the cost of redemption and the delay in receiving the rebate the ability of rebate programs to take advantage of present biased consumers is quite limited in settings where there is significant variance in the degree of present bias within the population unless the extent of consumers present bias is highly correlated with their rebate redemption costs

how robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns abstract this paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework we characterize the drivers for non uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences quantitatively assessing the case of price based co2 emissions control in the u s economy we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax the deviation from uniform emissions pricing however becomes non negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target downstream vs upstream taxation pre existing distortionary taxes and parametric uncertainty in firms and households equilibrium tax responses

tax incidence when individuals are time inconsistent the case of cigarette excise taxes abstract one of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups we argue that traditional quantity based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive time consistent model of consumption of sin goods a model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot this self control function benefits lower income groups more since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking calibrations show that as a result cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values

cyclic pricing by a durable goods monopolist in the model of this paper a monopoly seller of a durable good holds periodic sales as a means of price discrimination a new cohort of consumers enters the market in each period interested in purchasing the good either immediately or after a delay within each cohort consumers vary in their tastes for the good under broad conditions the seller will vary the price over time in most periods he will charge a price just low enough to sell immediately to consumers with a high willingness to pay periodically however he will drop the price far enough to sell to an accumulated group of consumers with a low willingness to pay

optimal gasoline tax in developing oil producing countries the case of mexico this paper uses the methodology of parry and small 2005 to estimate the optimal gasoline tax for a less developed oil producing country the relevance of the estimation relies on the differences between less developed countries ldcs and industrial countries we argue that lawless roads general subsidies on gasoline poor mass transportation systems older vehicle fleets and unregulated city growth make the tax rates in ldcs differ substantially from the rates in the developed world we find that the optimal gasoline tax is 1 90 per gallon at 2011 prices and show that the estimate differences are in line with the factors hypothesized in contrast to the existing literature on industrial countries we show that the relative gasoline tax incidence may be progressive in mexico and more generally in ldcs

a price discrimination theory of coupons the objective of this paper is to analyze the consumer s decision in electing to use cents off coupons distributed by manufacturers of consumer products arguing that the decision to use coupons is based on the tradeoff between costs of using coupons and the savings obtained it is shown that coupons can serve as a price discrimination device to provide a lower price to a particular segment of consumers based on a price theoretic model it is shown that the users of coupons are more price elastic than nonusers of coupons and that the opportunity cost of time and other household resource variables are determinant factors in consumers decisions implications derived from the model are tested using diary panel data

can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening a model of tax competition most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies full coordination is not however always feasible and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal withholding taxes on interest income we show that partial coordination can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred

unemployment in britain male unemployment in britain has risen from around 2 per cent in the 1950s to around 17 per cent in 1985 see figure 1 the figures are for male unemployment because there is no consistent series for women 1 even more remarkably unemployment has fallen in only three years out of the last twenty 1973 1978 and 1979 to account for this we need a model that explains both changes in the natural or non accelerating inflation rate of unemployment nairu and deviations from it we use a three equation supply side model centred on the labour market this has two main features the first concerns the determination of employment in the short run the labour demand function that we use cuts through the fruitless debate now raging especially in europe as to whether current unemployment is classical or keynesian according to the classical view employment is too high because real wages are too high according to the keynesian view real wages are not binding and unemployment is high because the product market does not clear with prices too high relative to nominal demand the whole debate is set in the framework of perfect competition yet in perfect competition prices are set by impersonal forces and it is not clear what could possibly stop prices clearing the market it is much more reasonable to think of prices as being set by imperfectly competitive firms existing prices being the best they can think of given the demand they face in this context firms demand for labour will depend on both the real product wage and the level of real aggregate demand this is the demand function we estimate and it conforms both to common sense and to the data however this does not imply that employment can be made to grow without limit by pumping up real demand for in the medium term when price surprises are eliminated our model determines three variables employment real wages and real demand on the basis of three equations an employment equation a price equation and a wage equation thus in the medium term there is a natural level of employment and corresponding to this a natural level of real aggregate demand the second key feature of our model concerns the medium term determination of unemployment in the medium term the planned mark up of wages over prices in wage settlements must be consistent with the mark up of prices over wage costs in employers pricing behaviour for if wage setters try to set real product wages higher than is consistent with employers pricing behaviour this generates ever increasing inflation thus the key to understanding unemployment in the medium term is the behaviour of wage setters if events occur that push them towards too high real wages then unemployment has to rise to offset these influences we shall call these influences wage pressure variables or push factors and they are clearly crucial in understanding unemployment the variables here include the social security system employment protection

optimal differentiation of international environmental taxes in the presence of national labor market distortions we explore the implication of the doubledividend debate for international environmentaltaxes in our scenario small open economies withdifferent labor market distortions follow a commonenvironmental policy and use national environmentaltax revenues to finance labor tax cuts since thedouble dividend hypothesis does not hold a high labortax implies a low environmental tax relative to othercountries the optimal differentiation ofinternational environmental taxes is proven to be afunction of the national labor tax rates and theuncompensated elasticities of labor supply

choosing the right instrument the role of public revenues for environmental policy this paper analyses the optimal choice of second best optimal environmental policies using a partial equilibrium model the paper first reconfirms the well known result that the existence of a double dividend in its weak definition favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income without uncertainty environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate in the presence of uncertainty however the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good in the second part the paper therefore analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty the paper shows that the first best choice rule between price and quantity regulation weitzman 1974 remains valid in a second best world with distortionary taxation

the role of rebates in the hybrid competition between a national brand and a private label with present biased consumers abstract over the past years rebates have been increasingly used by national brand nb manufacturers conventional wisdom suggests that rebates are beneficial to firms as long as positive slippage exists based on the present biased preference theory we investigate the performance of nb rebates as a counterstrategy to the retailer s private label pl game theoretic models are developed to characterize channel dynamics involving consumers knowledge levels of the present biased preferences our model reveals multiple insights first a positive slippage rate does not necessarily benefit the nb manufacturer if the rebates fail to expand the demand of the nb second the retailer s commitment to the original nb price plays a positive role in improving the equilibrium profits of both parties third for loss averse consumers under preference uncertainties the nb manufacturer and the retailer prefer a low redemption cost in contrary to the conventional idea that sellers take advantage of consumers with high redemption costs

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax the carrot or the stick abstract this paper provides an analytical framework to examine the relative efficiencies of a revenue neutral biofuel subsidy and a gas tax in the presence of pre existing distortions and growing substitutability between fuels both policies are set to achieve a targeted reduction in gasoline use at the state level the model is then calibrated for a small open economy such as illinois which is one of the largest producers of biofuels such as ethanol in the u s the main result of the paper shows that raising the biofuel subsidy use reduces overall welfare by more than a higher gas tax both aimed to achieve a targeted reduction in pure gasoline the relative efficiency of the higher gas tax is primarily due to it exacerbating the pre existing distortion in the biofuel market by less than the subsidy moreover for current parameter estimates welfare improving policy combinations for achieving a targeted amount of energy security are higher gas taxes combined with lower biofuel subsidies and a lower tax on income however the preference for a gasoline labor tax swap shrinks as the elasticity of substitution between the two fuels rises

energy taxation and the double dividend effect in taiwan s energy conservation policy an empirical study using a computable general equilibrium model abstract faced with pressure from greenhouse gas reductions and energy price hikes the taiwan government is in the process of developing an energy tax regime to reflect environmental external costs and effectively curb energy consumption as well as mitigate co2 emissions through an adequate pricing system this study utilizes a cge model to simulate and analyze the economic impacts of the draft energy tax bill and its complementary fiscal measures under the assumption of tax revenue neutrality the use of energy tax revenue generated for the purpose of reducing income tax is the best choice with double dividend effects since it will effectively stimulate domestic consumption and investment and consequently mitigate the negative impacts of the distortionary tax regime the double dividend effect is less significant however when the supplementary measures being used are for government expenditure nevertheless all supplementary measures have effectively reduced energy consumption which means they have delivered at least the first dividend in the sense of co2 emissions control it has been verified in this study that having adequate public finance policy measures is the key to realizing the double dividend effect

prices promotions and channel profitability was the conventional wisdom mistaken abstract because of the lack of empirical evidence supporting the shift of economic power from manufacturers to retailers it has been claimed that the conventional wisdom that retailers benefit more from the use of consumer promotions was mistaken this paper assesses this claim and examines how two different pricing approaches during manufacturers instant price promotions targeted at consumers impact on channel profits in a bilateral monopoly we found that manufacturers should only offer rebates when they keep their prior to promotion wholesale prices unchanged consistent with the conventional wisdom retailers do indeed take the lion s share of the promotion incremental profits surprisingly however we found that in the largest part of the parameter space manufacturers still earn more total channel profits than retailers over time the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed

relative prices and the demand for labour in british manufacturing the existence of an aggregate demand for labour schedule derived from profit maximization of the individual firm and giving a negative relationship between the labour capital ratio and the real wage is central to most traditional theoretical macroeconomics even though such a relationship is typically not embodied in macroeconomic models but beginning with the work of dunlop 1938 and tarshis 1939 the negative relationship could not be found in the data a more modern reference is bodkin 1969 this evidence led naturally to disequilibrium analysis notably that of barro and grossman 1971 more recently sargent 1978 has attempted with some success to rehabilitate the demand for labour schedule by showing that costly adjustment of the workforce obscures the current relationship between the wage and labour demand while leaving it essentially intact that paper and the related one by neftci 1978 was criticized by geary and kennan 1979 because it had used retail prices to represent output prices and they showed that for a number of countries employment could not be explained satisfactorily by the real product wage however geary and kennan failed to allow for the simultaneous effect of the real prices of raw materials and capital services in this paper we shall see that allowing for the effects of other relative prices notably the price of inputs relative to output and the real interest rate the real wage has a powerful but slow acting negative effect on the demand for labour the long run elasticity is about 2 and the mean lag is over 18 months we also find that the price of inputs has a long run elasticity of about 2 and that high values of the real interest rate have a powerful depressant effect on the level of employment in manufacturing the most striking implication for policy of our analysis is that measures of demand output money government spending do not have a significant influence on manufacturing employment controlling for the effects of relative prices thus government macroeconomic policy can affect the level of employment in manufacturing if and only if it can affect relative prices

environmental levies and distortionary taxation pigou taxation and pollution i note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second best world and the optimal level of environmental quality using an analytical general equilibrium model i show that for reasonable parameter values an increase in tax distortions arising from an increase in required tax revenues leads to a fall in the optimal pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves in general knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

a simple model of commodity taxation and cross border shopping this paper sets up a simple model in which two countries differing in geographical extent engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross border shopping the non cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating i costs of transportation for goods and ii border inspection among the more surprising results are the following with i pure profits accrue to sellers near the border but subjecting them to tax may lower the country s total tax revenue with ii the volume of cross border shopping may well increase jel classification h20 h87 h26

commodity tax competition between member states of a federation equilibrium and efficiency we first describe regional market equilibria whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices taxes and transportation costs next regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived the tax of the other region being held constant fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other

a theory of channel price promotions manufacturers can stimulate sales by a temporary wholesale price reduction for the retailer a rebate directed toward consumers or a combination of both the trade offs between these price promotions are analyzed providing insights about their roles profitability and welfare properties retailers rebates are also studied while price discrimination is a common explanation for rebates to consumers when a product is sold through a distribution channel the manufacturer may also use rebates to motivate retail participation in the promotion this explains why rebates may be offered even when all consumers use them and price discrimination does not occur copyright 1991 by american economic association

insider forces and wage determination this paper investigates the relative importance of firm specific factors i e insider forces in wage determination using firm level data on 219 u k companies over 1974 82 it finds that a 1 percent rise in a firm s prices or productivity relative to the aggregate economy leads to a rise in relative wages of 0 1 0 2 percent as a corollary to this outside factors like the aggregate wage and the unemployment rate also play an important role there is evidence for insider based hysteresis effects but these are inversely related to the extent to which firms take national agreements into account copyright 1990 by royal economic society

optimal control of externalities in the presence of income taxation optimal control of externalities a substantial literature examines second best environmental policy focusing particularly on how the pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation additional literature is motivated by the possibility that distributive concerns should amend the internalization prescription it is demonstrated however that simple first best rules unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution are correct in a natural basic formulation of the problem specifically setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms and subsidies equal to marginal benefits can generate a pareto improvement likewise a marginal reform in the direction of the first best can yield a pareto improvement for other reforms a simple efficiency test characterizing when a pareto improvement is possible is offered qualifications and explanations for the substantial departure from results in previous work are also elaborated

neoclassical demand for labour functions for six major economies can real factor prices and in particular the real wage explain the level of employment over the business cycle the question is of fundamental importance for macroeconomic policy and is of course the subject of longstanding controversy dunlop i938 failed to find the expected negative relationship between employment and the wage in the data and the subsequent debate is summarised in bodkin i969 crudely the data seemed to refute the competitive model of the labour market for if product markets are competitive and firms operate on their demand curves employment should be explained by real factor prices relative to product prices the capital stock and the state of technology to explain the lack of relationship barro and grossman i97i suggested that at times mutuality reinforcing quantity constraints could emerge in labour and output markets so that firms employed fewer workers than one would predict from the level of real wages and other relative prices however recently sargent i978 has attempted with some success to rehabilitate the demand for labour function by showing that costly adjustment of the workforce obscures the current relationship between the wage and labour demand while leaving it essentially intact in his account firms adjust slowly towards an employment level which is influenced by future expected real wages which might themselves reflect the past history of real wages his paper and the related one by neftci i978 was criticised by geary and kennan i979 for using retail prices to represent output prices and they showed for a number of countries that employment could not be satisfactorily explained by the real product wage taken on its own however geary and kennan failed to allow for the simultaneous effect of the real price of raw materials in symons i 982 one of us showed that allowing for this effect the real wage has a powerful elasticity about 2 but slow acting two year mean lag negative effect of the demand for labour in british manufacturing this was strong evidence but it was not completely conclusive the model fitted well only over subperiods and whereas the various breakdowns of the model could be ascribed to firms discounting certain transient shifts in the real wage there still seemed to be scope for reasonable doubt about the results however recently andrews and nickell i 982 a b working with annual rather than quarterly data and for the british economy as a whole have developed a demand for labour function with similar dynamics and with signifi

optimal dynamic carbon taxes in a climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy how should carbon be taxed as a part of fiscal policy the literature on optimal carbon pricing often abstracts from other taxes however when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes carbon levies have fiscal impacts while they raise revenues directly they may shrink the bases of other taxes e g by decreasing employment this article theoretically characterizes and then quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a dynamic general equilibrium climate economy model with distortionary fiscal policy first this article establishes a novel theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income this link arises because carbon emissions destroy natural capital they accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease future output consequently this article shows how the standard logic against capital income taxes extends to distortions on environmental capital investments second this article characterizes optimal climate policy in sub optimal fiscal settings where income taxes are constrained to remain at their observed levels third this article presents a detailed calibration that builds on the seminal dice approach but adds features essential for a setting with distortionary taxes such as a differentiation between climate change production impacts e g on agriculture and direct utility impacts e g on biodiversity existence value the central quantitative finding is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 8 24 lower when there are distortionary taxes compared to the setting with lump sum taxes considered in the literature

paternalism and tax competition when consumers make mistakes the government may wish to use paternalistic taxation as a corrective measure we analyse the extent to which tax competition undermines the feasibility of paternalistic taxation we show that the paternalistic component of a tax on a harmful good is reduced when there is cross border shopping but it does not disappear altogether in a model with tax competition between two countries only one of which has a paternalistic objective we show that a minimum tax rate requirement can be pareto improving despite the divergence in policy objectives tax harmonization however reduces welfare in the non paternalistic country

energy taxes in the netherlands what are the dividends in this paper the environmental and economic effects of the introduction of a unilateral energy tax in the netherlands are analysed using an applied general equilibrium age model the effects of a small user energy tax and a general energy tax are compared while taking into account different tax recycling mechanisms the model contains a great level of detail with respect to emissions and environmental indicators greenhouse effect acidification eutrophication and waste which is helpful for assessing environmental quality the results show that the introduction of a small environmental tax reform not only improves the environment but also raises non environmental welfare which is due to an improvement of the efficiency of the tax structure

the origin principle tax harmonization and public goods abstract this paper takes up two tasks firstly it shows that the conclusion drawn in lucas 2001 lucas v 2001 tax harmonisation and the origin principle economic letters 71 111 115 regarding potential pareto improvement in small open economies needs to be amended secondly in large open economies it verifies that some reasonable conjectures concerning the welfare effects of a particular tax harmonizing reform hold under the origin based tax system when public goods are present

optimal taxation global externalities and labor mobility this paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model we assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the dirty good that is causing damage to the environment the purpose is to compare the globally optimal second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium we show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of i transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments ii interaction effects between environmental and other policies and iii labor mobility

price discrimination through a distribution channel theory and evidence price discrimination practices are common but they typically are analyzed in a framework in which firms sell directly to end users louis phlips 1981 richard schmalensee 1981 hal varian 1985 gerstner and holthausen 1986 this direct channel framework is valid for service industries such as entertainment and travel where senior citizens buy reduced price tickets to musical concerts and children receive discounts on airfares and movietheater tickets in the packaged goods and durable goods industries however manufacturers sell to retailers who sell to consumers in indirect channels like these price discrimination occurs when manufacturers target pull discounts1 to price conscious consumers in the form of coupons and rebates consumers who do not use these discounts pay higher net prices because manufacturers cannot dictate consumer prices to retailers analysis of price discrimination ought to take into account the pricing behavior of retailers michael katz 1987 gerstner and hess 1991 while some researchers have studied coupons as a means for price discrimination william levedahl 1984 chakravarthi narasimhan 1984 they have done so in a direct channel context and have ignored the role of retailers or other middlemen in the pricing and couponing process in this paper we study price discrimination within a channel of distribution consisting of a single manufacturer and competitive retailers in the model the manufacturer pricediscriminates using a pull discount targeted at consumers with low reservation prices to reduce the net price these consumers pay for the product some consumers with higher reservation prices who self select not to use the discount pay the full retail price for the product the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price for the firm s product and the size of the price discriminating pull discount taking as given the markup percentage used by retailers joint determination of the manufacturer discount and retail markup is also considered the paper s major finding is that a higher retail markup percentage influences the manufacturer to use price discrimination in a less intensive way i e to reduce the size of the equilibrium pull discount as well as the wholesale price the intuition behind this result is as follows the greater the retail markup percentage for a given wholesale price the greater will be the retail price the greater the retail price the larger the pull discount will have to be to keep the low reservation price consumers in the market but the manufacturer bears the entire cost of the discount and a larger discount induces more nontargeted customers to use it these two effects make price discrimination less profitable when markup percentage increases so the manufacturer reduces its pull discount and in gerstner graduate school of management university of california davis ca 95616 and department of economics haifa university haifa 31999 israel hess department of business administration university of illinois champaign il 61820 holthausen department of economics north carolina state university box 7507 raleigh nc 27695 we thank alastair hall jeongwen chiang randy cooke and nick ruotolo for their comments and assistance 1manufacturers who distribute products through retailers use push or pull techniques to increase sales under push manufacturers offer inducements to retailers when consumers shop for the product the retailer has an incentive to promote the brand thus pushing it through to consumers under pull manufacturers offer incentives such as coupons or rebates directly to consumers the manufacturers hope that demand will be pulled through the channel by consumers asking retailers for the promoted brand

the employment real wage relationship an international study the neoclassical and keynesian theories of employment both predict an inverse relationship between employment and real wages in the short run the observed correlation between employment and real wages however has usually failed to conform to this prediction dunlop 1938 and tarshis 1939 reported a positive correlation between real and money wages which given procyclical movement of money wages was interpreted as evidence against the theoretical prediction the statistical significance of these results was however challenged by ruggles 1940 and tobin 1948 more recent studies by kuh 1966 and bodkin 1969 failed to detect a significant relationship between real wages and employment these findings stimulated a series of contributions by solow and stiglitz 1968 barro and grossman 1971 1976 and others developing alternative models not apparently refuted by the evidence barro and grossman recast macro theory under the assumption that markets did not clear modigliani 1977 argued that the observed relationship between employment and real wages could be accounted for in an oligopolistic model of firm behavior thus both the competitive and equilibrium assumptions of the classical model were diagnosed as the sources of its apparent empirical refutation

on environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage this paper addresses optimal taxation when therelationship between the consumption of a dirty good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers the main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty if on the other hand thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump sum tax in addition to the commodity tax it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion a similarresult emerges although for different reasons if the lump sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax

pareto improving indirect tax harmonisation abstract indirect tax harmonisation is central to the european commission s proposals for completion of the internal market by 1993 this paper is concerned with the possibility that such tax coordination might be justified on efficiency grounds as a response to tax induced trade distortions necessary and sufficient conditions characterising welfare improving multilateral tax reforms are given and specific forms of harmonisation are shown to be strictly pareto improving without any need for compensation if the initial situation is one in which protectionist tendencies in domestic taxation are sufficiently pronounced

rebates inventories and intertemporal price discrimination richard p saba we demonstrate that universally redeemed rebates can increase manufacturer profits by reducing the incentives of downstream retailers to hoard inventories when optimal wholesale prices vary predictably over time by bypassing retailers and making direct contracts with buyers the manufacturer can increase the variations in effective prices paid by consumers without concomitantly creating larger incentives for retailers to hold inventories during profitable high demand periods manufacturer revenues are ordinarily constrained by competition from retailer inventories thus limiting profits however by selectively offering rebates to consumers while maintaining high wholesale prices low demand periods can be accommodated without inducing retailer hoarding jel d4 l1 general motors corp is emptying its bag of marketing tricks in an all out effort to force its u s market share back up to 30 of light vehicle sales that is good news for gm customers because the manufacturer is offering financing at less than 1 or cash rebates of as much as 3 000 a vehicle wall street journal sept 16 1998 i introduction we tackle a fundamental economic question if general motors or any manufacturer wants to increase unit sales why does the necessary price cut occur indirectly in the form of a rebate it is well known that in cases of perfect competition or monopoly a tax or subsidy on buyers is equivalent to the same tax or subsidy on sellers in that each leads to the same net prices and the same equilibrium quantities a rebate is effectively a subsidy offered to the buyer whereas a cut in the wholesale price is effectively a subsidy to the seller under conditions of perfect competition or monopoly a manufacturer should be able to achieve identical outcomes in either of the two ways the challenge is to explain why rebates or coupons are used redemption of coupons and rebates is costly to both consumers and issuers while a price cut of equivalent size can be implemented at a much lower cost one would expect the price reduction strategy to dominate the strategy of issuing coupons or rebates to all buyers yet it apparently does not throughout the 1990s for example chrysler ford and general motors consistently offered a more extensive array of consumer oriented indirect price cuts via rebates than dealer incentive programs 1 the most common explanation for the use of rebates and coupons is that they enable either manufacturers or retailers who possess some monopoly power to engage in third degree price discrimination 2 consumers whose reservation prices lie below the price charged by the manufacturer or retailer are induced to purchase the item by a sufficiently large rebate or coupon yet certain aspects of the practice of offering coupons and rebates are inconsistent with the standard price discrimination explanation rebates often are given automatically to all customers at the time of purchase purchasers of automobiles and other big ticket items are given the option of applying the rebate to their down payment or receiving the cash as noted by hanley 1987 and higgins 1989 sellers of less costly items recenfly have started providing instant rebates or on package coupons which can easily be used by all buyers at the time of purchase these innovations have dramatically lowered redemption costs for consumers and boosted redemption rates 3 moreover bowman 1980 demonstrates that holding redemption costs constant there is a positive relationship between the size of the coupon rebate and the likelihood of consumer redemption the implication of this empirical regularity is expressed succinctly by gerstner and hess 1991b p 5 while price discrimination is a reasonable exp lanation for cents off coupons for dollars off rebates such as those given by manufacturers of household appliances it is not

welfare effects of commodity tax harmonisation abstract the european commission is currently seeking a rapid accelaration of the process of commodity tax harmonisation within the european community substantial changes in domestic tax structures are envisaged yet the welfare theoretic basis of the policy has remained obscure this note goes some way towards suggesting a welfare argument for harmonisation as a collective response to tax induced trade distortions intentional or otherwise it is shown that a programme of multilateral domestic tax reform involving convergence towards an appropriately weighted average of pre existing tax structures a kind of harmonisation is potentially pareto improving

jeux sans frontieres tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size closer international integration is putting increasing pressure on existing national tax structures this paper uses a simple two country model to address a range of consequent policy concerns focusing particularly on the role of country size differences in size exacerbate the inefficiency from noncooperative behavior harming both countries the smaller country loses from harmonization to any tax rate between those set in the noncooperative equilibrium but both countries gain from the imposition of a minimum tax anywhere in that range the fully optimal response to freer cross border trade however may be to do nothing jel h20 h77

a note on optimal taxation in the presence of externalities abstract i consider the problem of optimal taxation with externalities in a general setup encompassing most of optimal taxation models found in the literature it is demonstrated that when direct taxation of externalities is possible optimal taxes can be expressed as the sum of the optimal pigouvian taxes and the optimal taxes in a related problem without externalities regardless of what other tax instruments are available this result generalizes the so called principle of targeting

the costs of recession the paper measures the cost of business cycles by asking what proportion of consumption representative households whose head is currently employed would be prepared to give up to avoid the risk of unemployment previous estimates by lucas suggested that the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations measured in this way are surprisingly small the first part of the paper presents a critique of the lucas aggregate method showing that his estimates are not robust an alternative disaggregated framework is then developed and shows that the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations are significantly higher than those obtained by lucas consequently the view that inflation matters whereas business cycles are unimportant events is questioned copyright 1994 by royal economic society

dealing temporary price cuts by seller as a buyer discrimination mechanism this paper is concerned with temporary price cuts deals sales and specials as a mechanism for the seller to price discriminate between buyers with different intensities of demand we analyze why a seller offers such price cuts which buyers take advantage of them and what the parameters are that determine the amount and frequency of the discount offered in the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature on price deals 1 in section ii simple models of buyer and seller behavior are developed and we show why and how a seller adopts a dealing strategy section iii summarizes the key implications of the model and indicates how the price discrimination hypothesis could be tested in practice section iv suggests possible extensions of the model finally section v gives our conclusions in the marketing literature the issue of who is deal prone has been extensively researched an explanation for temporary price cuts usually called deals sales or specials is provided we hypothesize that they are a mechanism that discriminates between more intense and less intense demanders we further hypothesize a positive relationship between demand elasticity and holding costs buyers with more intense demand with high holding costs are those who will be buying the product at its regular price the low holdingcost buyers take advantage of deals by forward buying the model is applicable to three relationships 1 manufacturer reseller where the reseller may be a wholesaler or a retailer 2 resellerreseller for example wholesaler retailer and 3 retailer consumer we are grateful to michael mussa and albert madansky for their comments we also benefited from comments made by the marketing faculty of the wharton school at a seminar where an earlier version of this paper was presented neil beckwith in particular is acknowledged 1 for a more detailed review of deals and similar pricecutting mechanisms e g mail in rebates cents off labels coupons etc see narsimhan 1982 chan 2 journal of business 1985 vol 58 no 3 1985 by the university of chicago all rights reserved 0021 9398185 5803 0004 01 50

fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending much attention has been given to the impact of fiscal competition on the level of public expenditure but relatively little to the impact on its composition using a broadly familiar and reasonably rich model of fiscal competition in the presence of mobile capital this paper establishes a systematic bias in public spending patterns starting from the non cooperative equilibrium and holding tax rates constant welfare would be improved by a coordinated reduction in the provision of local public inputs and a corresponding increase in the public provision of local public goods benefiting immobile consumers c 1997 elsevier science s a