political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

the taylor principle fights back part ii abstract the existing literature holds that the taylor principle often leads to indeterminacy in new keynesian models that allow for capital accumulation and limited asset market participation this conclusion is special however to the case of continuous full employment when the assumption of perfect wage flexibility is relaxed very slightly so that the labor market clears quickly but not instantaneously determinacy is the norm the threat of indeterminacy is limited to a tiny irrelevant corner of the parameter space where the elasticity of labor supply is unusually high and real wage adjustment is unbelievably fast everywhere else the taylor principle guarantees a unique rational expectations equilibrium the dramatic difference in results reflects the sensitivity of the monetary transmission mechanism to the speed of adjustment in the labor market

the international penetration of ibusiness firms network effects liabilities of outsidership and country clout the burgeoning of ibusiness firms in the modern digital economy challenges the received internationalization theory given that ibusinesses such as social networking sites create value by providing a digital platform for users to interact with one another we employ a user network perspective and externalization logic suggesting that ibusinesses internationalization process depends critically on users collective interactions instead of being solely driven by firms market commitments as noted by the uppsala model however ibusinesses may suffer from liabilities of outsidership due to the boundedness of international network effects drawing on social network theory we demonstrate that such liabilities can be mitigated by first diffusing the ibusiness platform in countries with higher clout our analysis using a unique dataset of mobile ibusiness platforms finds empirical support for the hypotheses we discuss theoretical implications for the network approach of the uppsala model in the digital era

monotone equilibria in bayesian games of strategic complementarities for bayesian games of strategic complementarities we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least bayes nash equilibrium each one in strategies that are monotone in type our main assumptions besides strategic complementarities are that each player s payoff displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types and that each player s interim beliefs are increasing in type with respect to first order stochastic dominance e g types are affiliated the result holds for general action and type spaces single multi or infinite dimensional continuous or discrete and no prior is assumed we also provide the following comparative statics result the greatest and least equilibria are higher if there is a first order stochastic dominant shift in the interim beliefs we apply this result to strategic information revelation in games of voluntary disclosure

quantifying uk capital adjustment costs this paper estimates uk capital adjustment costs using manufacturing and service industry data for 19702000 there is evidence of significant adjustment costs with a 1 increase in investment reducing value added by 0 05 this implies an elasticity of investment with respect to tobin s q of 2 5 and a convergence time for capital of 12 years the results suggest that adjustment costs may have caused half of the slowdown in uk total factor productivity tfp growth during the second half of the 1990s the impact is larger than that reported for the united states reflecting larger adjustment costs and higher investment growth

extent and intensity of investment with multiple capital goods overall investment is the product of the number of capital goods for which triggering has occurred the extensive or reductive margin and the depth of investment per capital good intensive margin based on a longitudinal plant level data and using dynamic panel techniques we investigated the validity of the hypothesis that the intensity of investment increases as its extent increases our results indicate a strong linkage between the extent and intensity of investment decisions finding which holds both for positive and negative investment decisions this linkage suggests that the decision on how many capital types to initiate investment is closely connected to the decision regarding the depth of investment expenditures moreover the intensity extent derivative remains positive but its magnitude decreases with plant size providing indirect evidence for higher complementarity between capital types for smaller plants

trade liberalization through asset markets abstract political economy expositions of trade policy have traditionally described asset or factor ownership as not subject to change asset markets however allow individuals to change the composition of income sources we consider an economy with stochastic productivity to show how the equilibrium composition of asset portfolios influences individual attitudes toward free trade the model links financial market completeness and trade liberalization in the second half of the 20th century and provides a contributing answer to why governments in poorer countries without well developed financial markets have failed to liberalize trade

the impact of information and communication technology adoption on multinational firm boundary decisions this article evaluates the effect of adopting internet enabled information and communication technology ict adoption on the decision to reorganize production across national borders foreign boundary decision by multinational enterprises mnes using a transaction cost framework we argue that ict adoption influences foreign boundary decisions by lowering coordination costs both internally and externally for the firm we propose that the heterogeneity in the technology s characteristics namely complexity and the production processes degree of codifiability moderate this influence using a difference in differences methodology and exploiting the richness of confidential us census bureau microdata we find that overall ict adoption is positively associated with greater likelihood of in house production as measured by increases in intra firm trade shares furthermore we find that more complex forms of ict are associated with larger increases in intra firm trade shares finally our results indicate that mnes in industries in which production specifications are more easily codified in an electronic format are less likely to engage in intra firm relative to arm s length trade following ict adoption

refinements on macroeconomic modeling the role of non separability and heterogeneous labor supply abstract this paper proposes a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model characterized by heterogenous labor schedules and non separability between consumption and labor in the utility function the model successfully describes output consumption investment and interest rates after a monetary expansion the proposed formulation improves on standard models by using preferences favored by the data and by requiring investment adjustment costs and habit formation parameters more in line with the micro based evidence

a comparison between economic systems with an application to transition abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium theory of endogenous firm and class formation under non contractibility with heterogeneous individuals a collectivist economy a private ownership economy and a mixed economy are compared on the basis of identical economic fundamentals methodological symmetry each economic system generates specific inefficiencies so that none dominates the others in general the main trade off is between the welfare loss associated with risk taking in the private ownership economy and the informational problems in the collectivist economy we then use this framework to study the political economy of transition between economic systems and provide detailed welfare results

rain emotions and voting for the status quo abstract do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo we exploit exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870 000 municipal vote outcomes in switzerland to address this question the empirical tests are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data we find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change our robustness checks suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate and changes in information acquisition in addition we provide evidence that rain might have altered the outcome of several high stake votes we discuss the psychological mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks a pattern that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change

investment in greek manufacturing under irreversibility and uncertainty the message in used capital expenditures this article contributes to the existing literature by showing that uncertainty produces a nonuniform impact to the extent that different types of capital goods exhibit heterogeneous irreversibility which we define as asset specific irreversibility hence asset specific irreversibility is responsible for asymmetries in responses across types of capital goods to uncertainty we also show that for a given type of capital good uncertainty produces a variety of responses across sectors which we define sector specific irreversibility in other words sectoral differences in terms of the ability to substitute a given type of capital with labour introduce a second order effect of uncertainty on investment

dynamic commitment and incomplete policy rules considering the dynamics of commitment highlights some neglected features of time inconsistency problems we modify the standard rules versus discretion question in three ways 1 a government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow 2 the government s commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules and 3 the government s ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted three results stand out first the option to wait makes the incumbent regime rules or discretion relatively more attractive second the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes the incumbent regime more attlwactive third because the commitment decision takes place in real time policy choice displays hysteresis when monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistencies optimal policy requires some precommitment by the central bank despite a proliferation of mechanisms designed to address this problem work in this area has continued to assume a once and for all choice between rules and discretion this paper asks two closely related questions first what happens if commitment decisions are made in real time so that failure to commit today does not rule out the possibility of commitment tomorrow second if governments can make only commitments that are difficult but not impossible to reverse what determines the dynamics of commitment and reversal the assumption of once and for all choice enforces simplistic dynamics on the policy process if the standard models are interpreted literally for example the commitment problem for u s monetary policy is moot having been resolved with the founding of the federal reserve system in 1914 if not at the constitutional convention of 1789 much of the interest in dynamic inconsistency however arises pre

cheap talk coordination and entry we show how costless nonbinding nonverifiable communication cheap talk can achieve partial coordination among potential entrants into a natural monopoly industry where the payoffs are qualitatively like the battle of the sexes the analysis would apply equally in other economic situations with such payoffs for example bargaining under complete information or choosing compatibility standards while cheap talk helps achieve asymmetric coordination in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium it cannot achieve complete coordination if the game involves even a small amount of conflict

the composition of international capital flows risk sharing through foreign direct investment abstract evidence on international capital flows suggests that foreign direct investment fdi is less volatile than other financial flows to explain this finding i model international capital flows under the assumptions of imperfect enforcement of financial contracts and inalienability of fdi imperfect enforcement of contracts leads to endogenous financing constraints and the pricing of default risk inalienability implies that it is not as advantageous to expropriate fdi relative to other flows these features combine to give a risk sharing advantage to fdi over other capital flows this risk sharing advantage of fdi translates into a lower default premium and lower sensitivity to changes in a country s financing constraint the model offers the new implication that financially constrained countries should borrow relatively more through fdi this is because fdi is harder to expropriate and not because fdi is more productive or less volatile using several creditworthiness and country risk ratings to measure financing constraints i present new evidence linking fdi and financing constraints moreover numerical simulations of the model generate stronger serial correlation for fdi than for other flows into developing countries this corroborates the view that non fdi flows are more short term and more likely to change direction

gradualism versus big bang speed and sustainability of reforms a beneficial reform may be blocked by a majority if it is implemented by a big bang but the same reform may succeed with an optimally designed gradualist approach a gradualist approach can sometimes split opposition force and is in this sense more politically sustainable on the other hand if both approaches are politically preferred to no reform a big bang is often preferred to gradualism in terms of both political support as well as economic efficiency

selection vs accountability an experimental investigation of campaign promises in a moral hazard environment abstract we examine retrospective and prospective voting considerations in an experiment implementing a simple voting model in each period the official chooses how much rent to appropriate from a social endowment announcement of this choice is followed by an election between the official and a randomly selected challenger with the winner becoming the official in the next period we vary two features of the setting a the discount factor and b whether candidates can make costless non binding campaign promises about their behaviour if elected consistent with the model s predictions both raising the discount factor and introducing campaign promises lead to lower rent appropriation by officials and worse electoral outcomes other things equal for incumbents campaign promises despite being cheap talk have real effects promising less appropriation is rewarded by voters but breaking such promises is punished finally we find a weak positive association between campaign promises and officials subsequent behaviour

the cost of business cycles under endogenous growth robert e lucas jr argued that the welfare gains from reducing aggregate consumption volatility are negligible subsequent work that revisited his calculation continued to find small welfare benefits further reinforcing the perception that business cycles do not matter this paper argues instead that fluctuations can affect welfare by affecting the growth rate of consumption i show that fluctuations can reduce growth starting from a given initial consumption which can imply substantial welfare effects as lucas himself observed empirical evidence suggests the welfare effects are likely to be substantial about two orders of magnitude greater than lucas original estimates

returns to regionalism the past decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional trade agreements with many policymakers and academics seeming to believe that these provide more than the traditional gains from trade this article examines several possible benefits that regional trade agreements may confer on their partners including credibility signaling bargaining power insurance and coordination it assesses the necessary conditions for each possible channel to work gives stylized examples of specific types of policy where the benefit might be applicable examines cases where the explanation might be relevant and discusses their overall plausibility it concludes by examining the north american free trade agreement and the europe agreements

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

norms and contracting we argue that contracts establish the norms of a relationship and that individuals incur disutility when deviating from these norms in a laboratory experiment we allow agents to make simple contracts before they play one of four games and the most effective contract always includes an unenforceable handshake agreement to take the first best action in three games a contract with only this handshake agreement is at least weakly optimal the handshake is particularly effective in games with strategic complements our results highlight an explanation for contractual incompleteness establishing a norm can effectively substitute for weak enforceable restrictions this paper was accepted by brad barber teck ho and terrance odean special issue editors

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

the role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation an empirical investigation in this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which moore and repullo s subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth telling in practice both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good s value we nd that moore repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good this failure to implement truthtelling is due to beliefs about the irrationality of one s trading partner therefore although the mechanism should in theory provide incentives for truth telling many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their expected monetary payo by lying the deviations from truth telling become signicantly more frequent and more persistent when agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good s value our results thus suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of moore repullo mechanisms in practice

non convexities in the adjustment of different capital inputs a firm level investigation recent developments in investment research have highlighted the importance of non convexities and irreversibilities in firms adjustment of quasi fixed inputs aggregation across capital goods may smooth out the discontinuities associated with the adjustment of individual assets lack of suitable data is one of the reasons why empirical work has typically relied on the assumption of capital homogeneity in this paper we exploit a data set of 1539 italian firms which allows us to disaggregate capital into equipment and structures and purchases and sales of assets we construct measures of fundamental q to capture investment opportunities associated with each asset we uncover the pattern of dynamic adjustment by using non parametric techniques to relate each individual investment to its own fundamental q

income distribution human capital and economic growth in colombia abstract colombian income distribution has followed a clear path during the last two decades in the second half of the 1970s human capital accumulation reduced the dispersion of income distribution and lead to a period of stagnation between 1983 and 1990 when mobility declined after the structural reforms a skill bias technological change the wage differential for skilled workers increased inequality by a polarization in the bi modal distribution of income these topics are discussed in the paper along some dynamic aspects of income and educational mobility in colombia

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

negative uncertainty sensitivity of investment and market structure this paper examines how industry competition changes the sensitivity of investment to uncertainty using japanese firm data a switching regression model is employed to test the predictions of the real options theory regarding the uncertainty investment relationship under different industry competition attributes we find that the negative uncertainty sensitivity of investment is increased by industry concentration but decreased by market share the latter finding supports the view of strategic investment behavior of rival firms under uncertainty rather than the erosion of option values by competition

another look at the linear q model an empirical analysis of aggregate business capital spending with maintenance expenditures the paper revisits the empirical investment literature which has established that aggregate business fixed investment is not found to be related linearly to marginal or average tobin s q the theoretical background is extended here by developing a supply side model where the depreciation rate of private capital is determined endogenously the firm can either invest in new capital which adds directly to the existing capital stock at the presence of convex adjustment costs or extend the durability of installed capital through maintenance expenditure which affects its depreciation rate the model shows that tobin s q is then a positively related sufficient statistic for both components of aggregate capital expenditures this central implication is tested empirically using aggregate time series survey data from canada on new investment and maintenance expenditures covering the period 1956 93 the estimated relationships produce significant and plausible parameter estimates for the structural parameters of the q model le texte examine la litterature empirique sur l investissement qui a etabli que le niveau d investissement agrege des entreprises en capital fixe n est pas relie de facon lineaire au coefficient moyen ou marginal q de tobin on enrichit l arriere plan theorique en developpant un modele d offre dans lequel le taux de depreciation du capital prive est determine de facon endogene l entreprise peut soit investir dans du capital nouveau ce qui ajoute directement au stock de capital existant soit allonger la vie du capital en place par des depenses de maintenance qui modifient le taux de depreciation le modele montre que le coefficient q de tobin est alors positivement relie aux deux composantes des depenses agregees en capital cette implication importante est mise au test empiriquement en utilisant les series chronologiques en provenance des enquetes de statistiques canada sur les nouveaux investissements et les depenses de maintenance pour la periode 1956 93 les relations estimees produisent des parametres plausibles et significatifs pour les parametres structurels du modele q

leviathan resists the endogenous relationship between privatization and firm performance using a panel dataset of privatized cement firms in turkey this paper models and finds support for the simultaneous relationship between privatization and firm performance it is found that favorable short run performance weak market potential higher employment lower socio economic development concentrated voter preferences and weaker representation of right wing parties in the firms locality delay the timing of privatization the paper also finds that privatization increases output in the medium term by reducing the labor stock and promoting the adoption of more advanced technology such that production shifts from constant to decreasing returns to scale

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

towards an equilibrium level of market reform how politics affects the dynamics of policy change in this article we examine the dynamics of economic reforms that are implemented by incumbent policy makers interested in maintaining their political power we use a sample of 86 countries over a time period going from 1980 to 2001 and find that the achievement of an equilibrium level of market liberalization is highly costly our results are robust to endogenity and model specification

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

why do people keep their promises an experimental test of two explanations numerous psychological and economic experiments have shown that the exchange of promises greatly enhances cooperative behavior in experimental games this paper seeks to test two theories to explain this effect the first posits that individuals have a preference for keeping their word the second assumes that people dislike letting down others payoff expectations according to the latter account promises affect behavior only indirectly because they lead to changes in the payoff expectations attributed to others i conduct an experiment designed to distinguish between and test these alternative explanations the results demonstrate that the effects of promises cannot be accounted for by changes in payoff expectations this suggests that people have a preference for promise keeping per se

tax reform and the political economy of the tax base abstract this paper studies the political prospects for reform in a model where the tax base and statutory rate are separate instruments of tax policy the model suggests that large changes in the tax code may be easier to enact than marginal reforms the tax base faces a tipping point where even the beneficiaries from tax exemptions support reform at this tipping point tax reform is pareto improving politically feasible tax reform occurs when fiscal needs are large but may nonetheless involve reductions in marginal tax rates there is strategic complementarity in lobbying for tax exemptions resulting in multiple equilibria the model s main predictions are consistent with recent tax reforms in oecd countries

imperfect credibility and inflation persistence in this paper we formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model with staggered nominal contracts in which households and rms use optimal ltering to disentangle persistent and transitory shifts in the monetary policy rule the calibrated model accounts quite well for the dynamics of output and insation during the volcker disinsation and implies a sacri ce ratio very close to the estimated value our approach indicates that insation persistence and substantial costs of disinsation can be generated in an optimizing agent framework without relaxing the assumption of rational expectations or relying on arbitrary modi cations to the aggregate supply relation jel classi cation e31 e32 e52

nonlinear response of firm investment to q abstract abel and eberly 1994 study optimal investment behavior in the presence of flow fixed costs proportional costs and convex costs a clear prediction is that investment will alternate between regimes of insensitivity and responsiveness to q separated by unknown threshold levels of q at the firm level we find evidence for different regimes of sensitivity to q but not for a regime of zero sensitivity our finding that investment has a nonlinear relationship to q is important because it implies an elasticity of aggregate investment to q and fundamentals that is high and variable over time

zeros and lumps in investment empirical evidence on irreversibilities and nonconvexities the objective of this paper is to investigate if and how capital adjustment departs from the smooth pattern implied by standard model based on convex adjustment costs using norwegian micro data we start by documenting the intermittent and lumpy nature of investment rates we then present two pieces of econometric evidence on these issues first we estimate a discrete hazard model to determine the probability of having an episode of high investment conditional on the length of the interval from the last high investment episode second we estimate a switching regression model that allows for the response of the investment rate to fundamentals to differ across regimes in both cases we investigate the aggregate implications of our results

a representation theorem for guilt aversion guilt aversion has been shown to play an important role in economic decision making in this paper we take an axiomatic approach to guilt by deducing a utility representation from a list of easily interpretable assumptions on an agent s preferences it turns out that our logarithmic representation can mitigate the problem of multiplicity of equilibria to which psychological games are prone we apply the model in three well known games and show that its predictions are consistent with experimental observations

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

optimal investment with lumpy costs abstract in this paper we analyze a continuous time model of investment with uncertainty irreversibility and a broad class of lumpy adjustment costs we show that the two components of the optimal investment strategy the investment trigger and the investment increment can be found sequentially and that the optimal investment increment maximizes a closed form function solving the model numerically we find that adding a relatively small amount of variable adjustment costs often leads firms to invest in much smaller increments we derive a measure of user cost that incorporates lumpy investment and use it to show that as firms invest in bigger increments the investment trigger increases as well

is free trade passe abstract if there were an economist s creed it would surely contain the affirmations i understand the principle of comparative advantage and i advocate free trade yet the case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at any time since the 1817 publication of ricardo s principles of political economy and this is due to changes that have recently taken place in the theory of international trade while new developments in international trade theory may not yet be familiar to the profession at large they have been substantial and radical in the last ten years the traditional constant returns perfect competition models of international trade have been supplemented and to some extent supplanted by a new breed of models that emphasizes increasing returns and imperfect competition these new models call into doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by comparative advantage they also open the possibility that government intervention in trade via import restrictions export subsidies

growth effects of shifting from a graduated rate tax system to a flat tax i introduction recently the debate concerning fundamental u s tax reform has led to a number of proposals that involve a shift toward a consumption based system 1 one such proposal is the so called flat tax of hall and rabushka 1995 the flat tax would apply a single tax rate to all labor income above a given threshold and to all capital income after fully expensing investment expenditures hall and rabushka 1995 argue that the adoption of their proposal would provide an enormous boost to the u s economy by dramatically improving incentives to engage in productive activities and would save taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars in compliance and administration costs 2 in this article we develop a quantitative general equilibrium model to assess the growth effects of adopting a flat tax plan similar to the one proposed by hall and rabushka 1995 the model captures many of the features of the current u s tax code such as graduated personal tax rates a standard personal deduction separate tax rates applied to personal and business income double taxation of business income and differential tax treatment of physical and human capital under appropriate parameter settings the model can exhibit either endogenous or exogenous long run growth our choice of functional forms facilitates a closed form solution to the model this allows us to characterize explicitly the economy s transition path following the reform a central issue in the debate over fundamental tax reform is the effect that such a reform would have on economic growth the present analysis builds on the work of stokey and rebelo 1995 who use an endogenous growth framework to identify the key model features and parameters that are important for determining the quantitative impacts of distortionary taxes on long run growth 3 our study differs from theirs and the bulk of the dynamic tax literature in one fundamental respect here we evaluate the growth effects of shifting from a graduatedrate tax system to a flat rate system stokey and rebelo 1995 consider only flat rate systems in which the marginal tax rate is equal to the average tax rate we approximate the graduated rate tax system in the u s economy by an empirical tax rate function that allows the personal tax rate to depend positively on household taxable income in equilibrium household decisions are influenced by both the level and slope of the tax schedule to implement the flat tax reform we shift the parameters of the tax rate function to flatten the marginal tax schedule while maintaining revenue neutrality our methodology treats the hall rabushka proposal as one that in effect moves a representative household from one tax rate schedule to another we view this setup as a reasonable approximation to gauge the growth effects of tax reform at the macro level a more elaborate setup would of course allow for household heterogeneity at a given point in time in this regard we note that caucutt et al 2003 have recently examined the growth effects of graduated rate taxes in a two period overlapping generations model that includes both skilled and unskilled agents in their model a flatter tax schedule increases the fraction of skilled agents in the economy the share of total output devoted to education rises accordingly and the economy s long run growth rate is observed to increase the quantitative implications of their model are difficult to compare to ours however because their two period framework implies a very long time horizon between household decisions about 30 years moreover their model abstracts from many of the features of the u s tax code that we include here in addition to examining the consequences of flattening the marginal tax schedule we investigate the growth effects attributable to other parts of the flat tax proposal such as allowing full investment expensing eliminating the double taxation of business income and increasing the standard personal deduction

the need for enemies we develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage creating an incentive to underperform in the task we test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents using colombian data the main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them especially in electorally salient places we find that after the largest victories against farc rebels the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts especially in politically important municipalities politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage

international evidence on investment and fundamentals abstract if a firm s costs of installing capital are not quadratic then its optimal investment is not a linear function of fundamentals such as the returns and costs of capital this study specifies a model in which a firm may face fixed linear and convex costs of investing and estimates the resulting investment function using firm level data from 11 countries the evidence suggests important nonlinearities consistent with the presence of fixed or other non quadratic costs in the relationship between investment and fundamentals for most countries these findings are statistically signficant at the level of the firm and economically significant when aggregated by country

moral rules the moral sentiments and behavior toward a theory of an optimal moral system how should moral sanctions and moral rewards the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue be employed to govern individuals behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare in the model that we examine guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility we also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their use we show that the moral sentiments should be used chiefly to control externalities and further that guilt is best to employ when most harmful acts can successfully be deterred whereas virtue is best when only a few individuals can be induced to behave well we also contrast the optimal use of guilt and virtue to optimal pigouvian taxation and discuss extensions of our analysis

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

internationalization in the information age a new era for places firms and international business networks the new techno economic paradigm of the information age has brought about new structures and processes in international business ib in this article we examine the changing nature of the competitive advantages of places the competitive advantages and strategies of firms and the governance structure of ib networks in what has also been called the third industrial revolution these three areas of change in ib activities can be mapped respectively to the location l ownership o and internalization i advantages of the eclectic paradigm we interpret these oli factors as dynamic constructs in order to depict analytically the shifts in the ib environment and their implications for ib

the hump shaped behavior of inflation and a dynamic externality we propose a general equilibrium model that explains the empirical evidence of the hump shaped response of inflation to a monetary policy shock the model replaces backward looking indexation a la christiano et al 2005 nominal rigidities and the dynamic effect of a shock to monetary policy journal of political economy 113 1 1 45 with a dynamic externality into the production function of firms the model armed with sticky wages and variable capital utilization has two offsetting effects on real marginal cost over the business cycle first increasing factor prices raise real marginal cost in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock in the intermediate run second a dynamic externality reduces real marginal cost in the short run because it raises productivity in response to an increase in output following the shock overall the resulting short run decrease and intermediate run increase in marginal cost replicate the hump shaped behavior of inflation under purely forward looking price and wage phillips curves

cooperative and noncooperative r d in experimental duopoly markets abstract we analyze the relation between technological spillovers and r d cooperation in a duopoly experiment based on the well known model of d aspremont and jacquemin for scenarios without and with full spillovers two noncooperative treatments are run one without and one with non binding communication possibilities and one cooperative treatment with binding contract possibilities we find that without technological spillovers binding r d contracts are needed for r d decisions to deviate from the subgame perfect nash r d level towards the cooperative level with full spillovers the possibility of non binding cheap talk may suffice to move closer to r d cooperation

temptation in vote selling evidence from a field experiment in the philippines abstract we report the results of a randomized field experiment in the philippines on the effects of two common anti vote selling strategies involving eliciting promises from voters an invitation to promise not to vote sell is taken up by most respondents reduces vote selling and has a larger effect in races with smaller vote buying payments the treatment reduces vote selling in the smallest stakes election by 10 9 percentage points inviting voters to promise to vote your conscience despite accepting money is significantly less effective the results are consistent with a behavioral model in which voters are only partially sophisticated about their vote selling temptation

testing uncertainty s effect in real options with multiple capital goods the irreversible investment theory with heterogeneous capital predicts a negative relationship between uncertainty and the investment extensive margin we empirically explore this prediction using plant level data for investment across multiple fixed assets and employ a discrete ordered choice model our results indicate that uncertainty even after controlling for financial constraints induces a negative effect on the extensive margin thereby decreasing the likelihood of investment triggering in more types of capital this effect takes the form of both a higher probability of investment inactivity but also a lower probability of investment triggering in a higher number of capital types

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution language is a powerful coordination device we generalize the cheap talk approach to pre play communication by way of introducing a meaning cor respondence between messages and actions and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages players have a lexicographic preference second to material payoffs against deviating from the meaning correspondence under two sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n coordination games a nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique pareto efficient out come of the underlying game we extend the analysis to one sided communica tion in arbitrary finite two player games jel c72 c73 z 3

asset pricing with limited risk sharing and heterogeneous agents we develop a model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents that generates a large equity premium while simultaneously matching stock market participation and individual asset holdings the high risk premium is driven by incomplete risk sharing among stockholders which results from the combination of aggregate uncertainty borrowing constraints and a realistically calibrated life cycle earnings profile subject to idiosyncratic shocks we show that it is challenging to simultaneously match asset pricing moments and individual portfolio decisions while limited participation has a negligible impact on the risk premium contrary to the results of models where it is imposed exogenously

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation

when does communication improve coordination we study costless pre play communication of intentions among inexperienced players using the level k model of strategic thinking to describe players beliefs we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 2 games one way communication weakly increases coordination on nash equilibrium outcomes although average payoffs sometimes decrease two way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 2 games we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination jel c72 d83

europe vs america institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model we show how the differences in us and european institutions can arise in a normative model the paper focuses on the labor market and the government s decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock the government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse incentive effects whereby benefits increase unemployment it is found that when an adverse shock occurs benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post oil shock benefits remained high in europe but not in the us desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non negative and self correcting empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed

credible commitment and success with public enterprise reform abstract this paper studies why some efforts at public enterprise reform fail and why others succeed economic reforms are intended to increase efficiency and thus help sustain long term growth yet many governments have had difficulty sustaining the reforms they initiated and have reintroduced rigid controls over markets and enterprises this is because either in the process of implementation the government discovers that the costs of carrying the reform further are greater than the expected efficiency gains or the public is skeptical that the new policies can be sustained and does not take the actions necessary for the gains to be realized this paper develops a new institutionalist framework and employs various measures of policy commitment and net gain from continued reform to analyze these issues the paper suggests ways in which the potential success or failure of a reform can be assessed with implications for the steps that reformers might take to increase the chances of success

the zero lower bound the dual mandate and unconventional dynamics abstract this paper examines monetary policy when it is constrained by the zero lower bound zlb on the nominal interest rate our analysis uses a nonlinear new keynesian model with technology and discount factor shocks specifically we investigate why technology shocks may have unconventional effects at the zlb what factors affect the likelihood of hitting the zlb and the implications of alternative monetary policy rules we initially focus on a new keynesian model without capital model 1 and then study that model with capital model 2 the advantage of including capital is that it introduces another mechanism for intertemporal substitution that strengthens the expectational effects of the zlb four main findings emerge 1 in model 1 the choice of output target in the taylor rule may reverse the effects of technology shocks when the zlb binds 2 when the central bank targets steady state output in model 2 a positive technology shock at the zlb leads to more pronounced unconventional dynamics than in model 1 3 the presence of capital changes the qualitative effects of demand shocks and alters the impact of a monetary policy rule that emphasizes output stability and 4 in model 1 the constrained linear solution is a decent approximation of the nonlinear solution but meaningful differences exist between the solutions in model 2

reciprocated unilateralism in trade reforms with majority voting this paper shows how unilateral liberalization in one country can increase the voting support for reciprocal reduction in trade barriers in a partner country when trade policies are determined simultaneously in the two countries we show the possibility of multiple political equilibria one in which the countries are both protectionist and another in which they trade freely with each other starting with trade protection in both countries a unilateral reform in one country is shown to bring about a free trade equilibrium that obtains majority support in both countries

a theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games abstract we formalize an equilibrium model in which altruism and decision error parameters determine the distribution of contributions for linear and quadratic public goods games the equilibrium density is exponential for linear games and normal for quadratic games our model implies i contributions increase with the marginal value of the public good ii total contributions increase with the number of participants iii mean contributions lie between the nash prediction and half the endowment these predictions which are not implied by a nash analysis are consistent with laboratory data maximum likelihood estimates of altruism and error parameters are significant and plausible

can enforcement constraints explain the patterns of capital flows after financial liberalizations abstract a standard small open economy model would have problems accounting for the pattern of capital flows into capital poor economies that open to the rest of the world such types of models would predict extremely large and very sudden capital flows putting these predictions at odds with the data while the bulk of the literature has focused on the role of inputs frictions to produce slower capital flows this article presents an exploration into the role of financial frictions in particular enforcement constraints to produce endogenously slow capital flows we are left with three main findings first enforcement constraints are helpful frictions for producing slow capital flows however these flows do not exhibit the degree of persistence observed in the data finally when we extend our model to mimic declining values of financial autarky the model is able to produce more persistent capital inflows that are more in line with the data although these deficits revert into surpluses more quickly than in the data we are left with a finding that leads to a promising line of research models that include endogenously increasing costs of defaulting are better suited to reproduce the patterns of capital flows into opening economies

convergence capital accumulation and the nominal exchange rate this paper develops a exible price two sector growth model with a nominal side in order to study the role of the exchange rate regime in transition dynamics capital and nancial wealth accumulation we adopt a standard model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods and enrich its structure with costly investment and a preference for real money holdings we show analytically that i the choice of the exchange rate regime in uences the transition dynamics of a small open economy ii a one sector model does not adequately capture the channels through which the nominal side interacts with real variables

tfp growth in british and german manufacturing 1950 1996 the paper considers the accuracy of traditional tfp growth estimates using an econometric methodology which takes account of scale economies fixed factors of production and adjustment costs to reveal underlying pure technological change the results suggest that these biases vary substantially over time but do not impact heavily on anglo german comparisons in both countries the early post war years are a period when adjustment costs from a rising supply price of capital goods hold down tfp growth below that which could have accrued from pure technological progress as might be expected this problem largely disappeared in the later globalization period

ecosystem specific advantages in international digital commerce we consider the applicability to digital platforms of extant international business scholarship the organization of digital platforms has been seen to such an extent as predicated upon the bundling of external resources for collective value creation that their expansion may follow the logic of externalization we further that literature contrasting the governance of network multinationals with that of platform centric ecosystems building on and extending the theory of the ecosystem we propose the concept of ecosystem specific advantages we identify costs and difficulties in the transfer of such advantages to new markets emphasizing in particular the idea of bottlenecks we then propose a framework that can be applied to future research on digital platforms focusing on the users suppliers of complementary products and platform firms we also call for research on the dynamic process of creating transferring and upgrading ecosystem specific advantages

a meeting of the minds informal agreements and social norms using coordination games we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists we combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior we demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion we estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10 of total earnings and more than 120 in the bertrand game we show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs this paper was accepted by uri gneezy behavioral economics

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

marital investments time consistency and emotions abstract a benchmark model of a married couple s educational investment yields an inefficient outcome due to the possibility of opportunistic divorce motivated by findings in social psychology i use psychological game theory to incorporate belief dependent guilt feelings multiple equilibria become possible some marriages have inefficient under investment some have efficient outcomes and preclude divorce if guilt is sufficiently important a life long efficient marriage is implied because a spouse may signal a trust so strong as to force the partner to hold beliefs that make divorce unattractive

on the dynamics of trade reform abstract empirical studies of trade reforms suggest that these reforms have a surprisingly small impact on a country s industrial configuration this industrial structure inertia is difficult to rationalize in standard trade models this paper develops a two sector industry dynamics model in which industrial composition inertia arises naturally the model is then used to study the consequences of different types of trade reforms e g permanent temporary gradual pre announced on investment employment composition and income distribution

structural identification of high and low investment regimes abstract we propose a structural model to investigate the existence and possible differences between low and high regimes of investment expenditures in equipment at the firm level the existence of such differences is predicted by recent theoretical studies of investment behavior stressing the role of asymmetries and non convexities in the adjustment cost technology the structural spike model is estimated for a balanced panel of dutch firms operating in 13 different industrial sectors the flexibility of the structural approach explains why the proposed method outperforms models applying ad hoc spike definitions often encountered in the empirical literature of lumpy investments

promises and conventions an approach to pre play agreements abstract i analyze how informal agreements can be sustained by moral emotions with regard to a large class of two player games specifically i assume that people feel guilty if they breach an agreement and that the guilt increases according to the degree of the harm inflicted on the other a central insight is that it is easier to sustain efficient informal agreements if actions are strategic complements than if they are strategic substitutes i complement this general insight by studying two specific cases where negotiators face uncertainty about the breach of the agreement i show that while the optimal agreement in a game with strategic substitutes must compromise on surplus maximization and efficiency the optimal agreement in a game with sufficiently strong strategic complements tends to maximize both the surplus and the probability of compliance especially if the game is symmetric

insider ownership human resource strategies and performance in a transition economy researchers and potential investors in transition economies need to understand the human resource management hrm strategies of target firms since human resources are arguably their most valuable assets understanding is difficult however because hrm strategies help to determine firms performance but are in turn influenced by corporate governance particularly insider ownership this paper employs a structural equation modeling methodology to examine the relations between governance hrm strategies and performance in the context of a novel dataset of ukrainian industrial firms it is found that insider ownership is positively associated with high commitment hrm strategies and negatively with low commitment cost cutting hrm strategies cost cutting hrm strategies are in turn associated with weaker firm performance these outcomes correspond broadly with theoretical expectations

the political economy of food subsidy reform the case of egypt abstract this paper examines the political economy of food subsidy reform efforts in egypt egypt provides a case of a country with a large food subsidy program that has been relatively effective as a social safety net but a program that is also expensive and poorly targeted to the needy policy discussions about strategies to improve the system s performance run into the extreme political sensitivity of the issue of food subsidies in egypt food subsidies are perceived to be important in promoting political stability and providing some legitimacy to a political system where civil liberties are limited egypt therefore illustrates the dilemmas facing policymakers and others contemplating food subsidy reform in developing countries where there are concerns that reform may spark political unrest this paper argues that even in cases where food subsidy reform is a highly politicized issue there are still a number of pragmatic policy steps that can be taken that meet the twin goals of reforming the system in ways that better target the poor while functioning more efficiently

economic reform and political transition in africa the quest for a politics of development the 1980s were bracketed by crises in africa as protracted economic malaise was succeeded by a wave of political reform analysts have sought to understand the sources of economic decline as well as the political requisites for recovery in the region neoclassical and structuralist analyses have been challenged by state centric views of economic change the latter perspective emphasizes the need for capable developmental states as a basis for long term adjustment but a political theory of economic change is still lacking such a theory must address the institutional foundations of growth as well as the shifting basis of social coalitions in african regimes political liberalization suggests the possibility of a new setting for economic reform though the effects of political reform on institutions and coalitions remain ambiguous and democratization cannot be regarded as a panacea for the region s developmental failure future research must look more closely at the interests and structures in transitional regimes and scholars should adopt a more comparative vantage on africa s challenges of reform

a reform dilemma in polarized democracies abstract we study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in democracies we develop a simple election model where i reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change and ii politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently we identify a so called reform dilemma which manifests itself in two variants from a static perspective low reform ability politicians are elected when political parties are polarized who then impose high costs on citizens for each reform step this property of elections arises as low reform ability is a substitute for policy commitment from a dynamic perspective incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re elected regardless of their reform ability

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

loss aversion in politics we study how loss aversion affects the political equilibrium in a simple majority voting model first we show a status quo bias which leads to path dependence second loss aversion implies a moderating effect on the most extreme voters third in a dynamic setting the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters however in the presence of a projection bias majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt to a new policy this makes changes less likely and induces time inconsistency policy changes are timid at the beginning while in later periods they are made progressively more radical fourth in a stochastic environment loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk but also a smaller attachment to the status quo the application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications

guilt in games a clear conscience is a good pillow why does this old proverb contain an insight the emotion of guilt holds a key psychologists report that the prototypical cause of guilt would be the infliction of harm loss or distress on a relationship partner roy baumeister arlene m stillwell and todd f heatherton 1994 245 june price tangney 1995 moreover guilt is unpleasant and may affect behavior to render the associated pangs counterfactual baumeister stillwell and heatherton state if people feel guilt for hurting their partners and for failing to live up to their expectations they will alter their behavior to avoid guilt in ways that seem likely to maintain and strengthen the relationship avoided guilt is the down of the sound sleeper s bolster how can guilt be modeled how are human interaction and economic outcomes influenced we offer a formal approach for providing answers start with an extensive game form which associates a monetary outcome with each end node say that player i lets player j down if as a result of i s choice of strategy j gets a lower monetary payoff than j expected to get before play started player i s guilt may depend on how much he lets j down player i s guilt may also depend on how much j believes i believes he lets j down we develop techniques to analyze equilibria when players are motivated in part by a desire to avoid guilt the intellectual home for our exercise is what has been called psychological game theory this framework originally developed by john geanakoplos david pearce and ennio stacchetti 1989 and recently extended by battigalli and dufwenberg 2005 henceforth b d allows players utilities to depend on beliefs about choices states of nature

communication coordination and nash equilibrium i note a methodological problem in studying the role of pre play communication in ensuring equilibrium to deal with this problem i define a solution concept for the extended game in which talk is followed by play that is intermediate between nash equilibrium and rationalizability in some games our solution concept implies a nash outcome while in others it does not