money and capital abstract the effects of money anticipated inflation on capital formation is a classic issue in macroeconomics previous papers adopt reduced form approaches putting money in the utility function or imposing cash in advance but using otherwise frictionless models we follow instead a literature that tries to be explicit about the frictions making money essential this introduces new elements including a two sector structure with centralized and decentralized markets stochastic trading opportunities and bargaining these elements matter quantitatively and numerical results differ from findings in the reduced form literature the analysis also reduces a gap between microfounded monetary economics and mainstream macro

a theory of commerce abstract the theory of commerce advanced here captures prominent features of retail trade large employment congestion effects anonymous posted prices and quantity discounts this theory is built around a directed search model where buyers preferences are private information the analytical solution is easily inserted in a neoclassical growth framework in this framework the parameters of retail trade are calibrated using commercial margins and employment welfare properties depend on the sellers ability to charge two tier prices with two tier prices the directed search equilibrium is efficient otherwise it is not this contrasts with the full information benchmark where directed search is always efficient

incomplete wage posting we consider a directed search model in which workers differ in productivity productivity becomes observable to firms after assessing their workers on the job but it is not verifiable firms with vacancies choose between posting a noncontingent wage and leaving wages subject to bargaining with the worker under wage bargaining firms cannot optimize the trade off between paying higher wages and having a larger probability of filling vacancies but wage bargaining makes wages increasing in worker productivity and so may allow firms to attract better workers into the vacancy when workers heterogeneity is large and bargaining powers come close to satisfying hosios s rule firms opt for bargaining yet equilibria with bargaining fail to maximize aggregate net income and sometimes are not constrained pareto optimal

asset pricing with loss aversion using standard preferences for asset pricing has not been very successful to match asset price characteristics such as the risk free interest rate equity premium and the sharpe ratio to time series data behavioral nance has recently proposed more realistic preferences such as preferences with loss aversion to model asset pricing research has now started to explore the implications of behaviorally founded preferences for asset price characteristics encouraged by some studies of benartzki and thaler 1995 and barberis et al 2001 we study asset pricing with loss aversion in a production economy we here employ a stochastic growth model and use a stochastic version of a dynamic programming method with adaptive grid scheme to compute the above mentioned asset price characteristics of a model with loss aversion in preferences as our results show a model with loss aversion performs considerably better than pure consumption based asset pricing models

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

labour im mobility and monopsonistic exploitation of workers in the urban informal sector lessons from a field study it is well recognised in labour economics that employers in monopsonistic competition have market power to set wages below the productivity of workers if workers are immobile which causes monopsonistic exploitation of workers monopsonistic exploitation is propelled by employers expectations about the degree of im mobility of workers and therefore by ex post mobility of workers it hence begs a question of what determines the relative im mobility of informal workers which has significant implications for monopsonistic exploitation and working poverty in the urban informal sector from our field study of urban and peri urban labour markets in bangladesh by modifying the method of stochastic frontier analysis we explain the behavioural foundation to the relative im mobility of informal workers we thereby unravel the effects of individual and household characteristics sociological institutional factors and household ties including worker s kinship on the relative immobility of a worker that can in turn explain monopsonistic exploitation and working poverty widely prevalent in the urban informal sector of south asia

bargaining search and outside options abstract this paper studies a two sided incomplete information bargaining model between a seller and a buyer the buyer has an outside option which is modeled as a sequential search process during which he can choose to return to bargaining at any time two cases are considered in regime i both agents have symmetric information about the search parameters we find that in contrast to bargaining with complete information the option to return to bargaining is not redundant in equilibrium however the no delay result still holds in regime ii where agents have asymmetric information about the outside option delay is possible the solution characterizes the parameters for renegotiation and those for search with no return to the bargaining table

risk taking global diversification and growth this paper develops a continuous time stochastic model in which international risk sharing can yield substantial welfare gains through its effect on expected consumption growth the mechanism linking global diversification to growth is an attendant world portfolio shift from safe low yield capital to riskier high yield capital the presence of these two types of capital captures the idea that growth depends on the availability of an ever increasing array of specialized hence inherently risky production inputs calibration exercises using consumption and stock market data imply that most countries reap large steady state welfare gains from global financial integration copyright 1994 by american economic association

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

fairness price stickiness and history dependence in decentralized trade this chapter investigates the implications that social preferences have for the stationary strategic equilibrium of such a decentralized market agents are supposed to be averse to unfairly unfavorable as well as unfairly favorable deals in the spirit of fehr and schmidt 1999 but we stay rather close to standard individualistic preferences the negative weights on advantageous and disadvantageous deviations from what is considered as the fair benchmark are such that utility remains strictly increasing in own surplus share and in contrast to the original fehr schmidt model the fair split need not automatically be a 50 50 division any price between sellers cost and buyers willingness to pay may be the one which for whatever reasons is agents reference point in a given market this makes it possible to consider a more flexible notion of fairness than is usually done it is in line with cognitive dissonance theory from psychology and the noteworthy experiments of binmore et al 1991 1993 where subjects who were triggered to play different bargaining equilibria ended up considering very different surplus distributions as fair

search theoretic models of the labor market a survey we survey the literature on search theoretic models of the labor market we show how this approach addresses many issues including the following why do workers sometimes choose to remain unemployed what determines the lengths of employment and unemployment spells how can there simultaneously exist unemployed workers and unfilled vacancies what determines aggregate unemployment and vacancies how can homogeneous workers earn different wages what are the tradeoffs firms face from different wages how do wages and turnover interact what determines efficient turnover we discuss various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process including recent models of directed search

a note on simple strategic bargaining for models of money or credit many papers on liquidity have bilateral trade with buyers constrained by their money holdings or debt limits axiomatic bargaining typically nash determines the terms of trade however there are reasons to prefer strategic bargaining i analyze a bargaining game that is useful in models of liquidity advantages include i it has simple microfoundations both in and out of steady state ii it is more tractable than nash but the outcomes share interesting features iii the benchmark version is consistent with axiomatic approaches in the literature while another version is not but can still be used and iv it is arguably realistic

screening in a matching market contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting if the informed party s reservation value does not depend on its private information its type it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers low types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to high types we challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment we consider a market where players meet pairwise and where in each match either side may be chosen to make a take it or leave it offer as frictions become sufficiently low we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information in particular all contracts are free of distortions

equilibrium using credit or money with indivisible goods this note studies the trade of indivisible goods using credit or money in a frictional market we show how indivisibility matters for monetary equilibrium under different assumptions about price determination bargaining generates a price and allocation that are independent of the nominal interest or inflation rate over some range this is not the case with price posting and directed search in either case we provide conditions the nominal rate cannot be too high under which stationary monetary equilibrium exists and we show it is unique or generically unique

frictions in project based supply of permits emissions trading in climate change can entail large overall cost savings and transfers between developed and developing countries however the search for acceptable ji or cdm projects implies a deviation from the perfect market framework used in previous estimations our model combines the search market for projects with a frictionless permit market to quantify the supply side frictions in the co2 market we also decompose the effects of frictions into the effects of search friction bargaining and bilateralism a calibration using previous cost estimates of co2 reductions illustrate changes in cost savings and allocative implications

competing for order flow in otc markets we develop a model of a two sided asset market in which trades are intermediated by dealers and are bilateral dealers compete to attract order flow by posting the terms at which they execute trades which can include prices quantities and execution times and investors direct their orders toward dealers that offer the most attractive terms of trade equilibrium outcomes have the following properties first investors face a trade off between trading costs and speeds of execution second the asset market is endogenously segmented in the sense that investors with different asset valuations and different asset holdings will trade at different speeds and different costs for example under a leontief technology to match investors and dealers per unit trading costs decrease with the size of the trade in accordance with the evidence from the market for corporate bonds third dealers implicit bargaining powers are endogenous and typically vary across sub markets finally we obtain a rich set of comparative statics both analytically by studying a limiting economy where trading frictions are small and numerically for instance we find that the relationship between trading costs and dealers bargaining power can be hump shaped

dynamic matching and bargaining games a general approach this paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies this result is informed by the analysis of non cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions a central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions in particular does the trading outcome become walrasian when frictions become small existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers the characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games

sorting and decentralized price competition we investigate the role of search frictions in markets with price competition and how it leads to sorting of heterogeneous agents there are two aspects of value creation the match value when two agents actually trade and the probability of trading governed by the search technology we show that positive assortative matching obtains when complementarities in the former outweigh complementarities in the latter this happens if and only if the match value function is root supermodular that is its nth root is supermodular where n reflects the elasticity of substitution of the search technology this condition is weaker than the condition required for positive assortative matching in markets with random search

managerial incentives risk aversion and debt we investigate the risk choices of risk averse ceos following recent theoretical work we expect ceo risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability we find that the ceos of these firms reduce firm risk even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of ceo wealth to stock price changes firm risk determinants the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on ceo incentives unobserved firm and market effects and debt governance the impact of ceo risk aversion is economically significant

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

equilibrium portfolios in the neoclassical growth model abstract this paper studies equilibrium portfolios in the standard neoclassical growth model under uncertainty with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete markets preferences are purposely restricted to be quasi homothetic the main source of heterogeneity across agents is due to different endowments of shares of the representative firm at date 0 fixing portfolios is the optimal equilibrium strategy in stationary endowment economies with dynamically complete markets however when the environment displays changing degrees of heterogeneity across agents the trading strategy of fixed portfolios cannot be optimal in equilibrium very importantly our framework can generate changing heterogeneity if and only if either minimum consumption requirements are not zero or labor income is not zero and the value of human and non human wealth are linearly independent

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

directed search with multiple job applications we develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs the main result is that all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion despite the fact that workers and firms are homogeneous wage dispersion is driven by the simultaneity of application choice risk neutral workers apply for both safe and risky jobs the former yield a high probability of a job oer but for low pay and act as a fallback option the latter provide with higher potential payo but are harder to get furthermore the density of posted wages is decreasing consistent with stylized facts unlike most directed search models the equilibria are not constrained ecient

an empirical equilibrium model of a decentralized asset market i estimate a search and bargaining model of a decentralized market to quantify the effects of trading frictions on asset allocations and asset prices and to quantify the effects of intermediaries that facilitate trade using business aircraft data i find that relative to the walrasian benchmark 12 4 percent of the assets are misallocated and prices are approximately 27 3 percent lower dealers play an important role in reducing frictions in a market with no dealers 15 7 percent of the assets would be misallocated perhaps surprisingly in a market with no dealers prices would increase by 2 8 percent because sellers outside options improve relative to buyers thus counteracting the effects of higher search costs and slower trade on asset prices

money in search equilibrium in competitive equilibrium and in competitive search equilibrium we compare three market structures for monetary economies bargaining search equilibrium price taking competitive equilibrium and price posting competitive search equilibrium we also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry we study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure under bargaining trade and entry are both inefficient and inflation implies first order welfare losses under price taking the friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second and inflation may actually improve welfare under posting the friedman rule yields the first best and inflation implies second order welfare losses

for profit search platforms we consider optimal pricing by a profit maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time meet and bargain under private information the optimal centralized mechanism which involves posting a bid ask spread can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary to both sides the sum of buyers and sellers fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates of the marginal types and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers and sellers bargaining weights we also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare enhancing

unemployment dynamics with international capital mobility abstract we study the response of domestic unemployment rates to shocks in total factor productivity for economies with high capital mobility and low labour mobility we show that high capital mobility amplifies the impact on the domestic unemployment rate of domestic fluctuations in total factor productivity shortens the lag of the response to shocks and raises the variability of unemployment but average unemployment is unaffected capital flows increase the riskiness of labour income and reduce the riskiness of capital income but do not reduce mean welfare

targeted search with horizontal differentiation in the marriage market abstract we develop a search matching model in the marriage market with heterogeneous men a continuum of types and heterogeneous women a finite number of types the model has two distinguishing features first men and women are also horizontally differentiated second the search is targeted each type of woman constitutes a distinctive submarket and men are able to choose beforehand in which submarkets to participate but the search is random within each submarket we show that there is always a unique equilibrium in which men are endogenously segmented into different submarkets and that the equilibrium matching pattern is weakly positive assortative we then explore how the equilibrium marriage pattern changes horizontally and vertically as some exogenous shocks occur in particular we show that an internet induced increase in search efficiency would make the marriage pattern overall more assortative while an increase in the dispersion of the horizontal match fitness could make the marriage pattern overall less assortative

intertemporal labour supply with search frictions starting in the 1970 s wage inequality and the number of hours worked by employed u s prime age male workers have both increased we argue that these two facts are related we use a labour market model with on the job search where by working longer hours individuals acquire greater skills since job candidates are ranked by productivity greater skills not only increase worker s productivity in the current job but also help the worker to obtain better jobs when job offers become more dispersed wage inequality increases and workers work longer hours to obtain better jobs as a result average hours per worker in the economy increase this mechanism accounts for around two thirds of the increase in hours observed in data part of the increase is inefficient since workers obtain better jobs at the expense of other workers competing for the same jobs copyright oxford university press

search for a monetary propagation mechanism abstract this paper examines a monetary propagation mechanism in an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search it is shown that an increase in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is low but reduces steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is already high the model produces persistent hump shaped responses in employment and output to money growth shocks even when the shocks have no persistence the model also generates desirable features in job vacancy sales inventory and the velocity of money all these features emerge here in an economy with perfectly flexible prices and wages journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e40 e30

a walrasian rubinstein and wolinsky model we provide a full dynamic analysis of a continuous time variant of rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 matching and bargaining model with unbalanced flows of buyers and sellers the focus is on the price limit as the frictions of search are removed it is found that a necessary and sufficient condition for the limit price to be walrasian at all times is the alignment of the initial buyer and seller stocks with the flows

buyers sellers and middlemen variations on search theoretic themes we study exchange that is bilateral but indirect it involves chains of intermediaries or middlemen in markets with frictions these frictions include search and bargaining problems we show how and how many intermediaries might get involved in a chain and how bargaining with one depends on upcoming negotiations with those downstream the roles of buyers sellers money and prices are discussed allowing us to clarify some neglected connections between different branches of search theory pursuing one such connection with monetary economics we show how bubbles can emerge in intermediation even with fully rational agents and perfect foresight

selection on observed and unobserved variables assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools in this paper we measure the effect of catholic high school attendance on educational attainment and test scores because we do not have a good instrumental variable for catholic school attendance we develop new estimation methods based on the idea that the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables in a model provides a guide to the amount of selection on the unobservables we also propose an informal way to assess selectivity bias based on measuring the ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on observables that would be required if one is to attribute the entire effect of catholic school attendance to selection bias we use our methods to estimate the effect of attending a catholic high school on a variety of outcomes our main conclusion is that catholic high schools substantially increase the probability of graduating from high school and more tentatively attending college we find little evidence of an effect on test scores

animal spirits financial crises and persistent unemployment this article uses a rational expectations model with multiple equilibrium unemployment rates to explain financial crises the model has equilibria where asset prices are unbounded above i argue that this is an important feature of any rational agent explanation of a financial crisis since for the expansion phase of the crisis to be rational investors must credibly believe that asset prices could keep increasing forever with positive probability i explain the sudden crash in asset prices that precipitates a financial crisis as a large shock to expectations that leads to a permanent increase in the unemployment rate

academic probation student performance and strategic course taking we use a regression discontinuity design to study how academic probation affects outcomes and course taking behaviors at a large public university in the united states consistent with past work students placed on probation improve their grade point average gpa in the subsequent semester we document that part of this gpa improvement is attributable to strategic course taking and there is significant heterogeneity in these behaviors across race non minority students placed on probation attempt fewer credits easier courses and are more likely to withdraw from courses in the following term in contrast underrepresented minorities exhibit few of these behaviors consistent with past work that suggests black and hispanic students are less likely to possess helpful institutional knowledge and use available support systems such as academic counseling jel i20 i23

sorting through search and matching models in economics toward understanding assortative matching this is a self contained introduction to research on search and matching we first explore the nontransferable and perfectly transferable utility matching paradigms and then a unifying imperfectly transferable utility matching model motivated by some unrealistic predictions of frictionless matching we flesh out the foundational economics of search theory we then revisit the original matching paradigms with search frictions we finally allow informational frictions that often arise such as in college student sorting

the equity premium in brock s asset pricing model abstract in this paper we combine dynamic programming methods with projection methods for solving stochastic growth models as an application of these methods we solve brock s asset pricing model with a variety of parameterizations we focused on finding parameterizations that result in an equity premium that is high relative to the variation in consumption we show both analytically and numerically that the equity premium can be higher in a production based asset pricing model than it is in the consumption based asset pricing model even when the real output level is the same in both models

on the segmentation of markets this paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable there exist infinitely many marketplaces and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium where agents match with the first person they meet all equilibria have the same matching pattern although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models

capital market equilibrium with externalities production and heterogeneous agents abstract the paper studies general equilibrium in an economy with externalities production and heterogeneous agents the model developed builds on brock brock w a 1982 asset prices in a production economy in mccall j j ed the economics of information and uncertainty university of chicago press chicago pp 1 43 and merton merton r c 1987 a simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information journal of finance 42 483 510 it involves both a stock market and a market for loans together with negative externalities produced by a subset of firms importantly the technological production structure of the firms is reflected in the properties of the shares traded in the stock market agents are heterogeneous in their financial choices potentially discriminating against the firms producing a negative externality the model sheds light on the utility costs of the discriminating behavior and on the impact on the price of the stock issued by the firm which is responsible for the externality the model is used to study the factors which may magnify or reduce the impact of discrimination a set of discriminated firms may be seriously affected only if the discriminating investors command a large portion of overall wealth and or they do not represent important diversification instruments the model can be applied to understanding the effects of socially responsible investment whereby investors discriminate against companies belonging to some sectors which are perceived as socially dangerous or unethical

the role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining can it be good for efficiency abstract we consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of mortensen and wright 2002 we find that private information typically deters entry but the welfare can actually be higher under private information

open market operations abstract in an open market operation the central bank swaps currency for bonds we show how injecting money in this way is different from transfers the way policy is usually formulated the model captures liquidity explicitly by modeling the roles of assets in frictional exchange under various specifications for market structure and the acceptability or pledgeability of assets we discuss implications for the fisher and quantity equations the possibility of negative nominal yields liquidity traps and market segmentation when liquidity is endogenized using information theory multiple equilibria emerge with different policy predictions interest on reserves and quantitative easing are discussed

sorting versus screening search frictions and competing mechanisms in a market where sellers compete by posting trading mechanisms we allow for a general search technology and show that its features crucially affect the equilibrium mechanism price posting prevails when meetings are rival i e when a meeting by one buyer reduces another buyer s meeting probability under price posting buyers reveal their type by sorting ex ante only if the meeting technology is sufficiently non rival price posting is not an equilibrium multiple buyer types then visit the same sellers who screen ex post through auctions

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

efficiency of simultaneous search this paper presents an equilibrium labor search model in which workers can simultaneously apply to multiple firms to increase their search intensity they observe firms wage postings before choosing where to apply owing to coordination frictions a firm may not receive any applications otherwise it is able to hire unless all its applicants have better offers it is shown that the equilibrium converges to the efficient walrasian outcome as application costs vanish even for nonnegligible application costs the entry of firms the search intensity and the number of filled vacancies are constrained efficient wage dispersion is essential for constrained efficiency

incentives in competitive search equilibrium this paper proposes a labor market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and eort firms use wage contracts to motivate workers in addition wages are also used to attract employees we de ne and characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context and show that it satis es a simple modi ed hosios rule the model is used to address the shimer puzzle related to the low volatility of the unemployment rate relative to the volatility of output observed in the data we nd that private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in productivity and in particular to changes in

more on middlemen equilibrium entry and efficiency in intermediated markets this paper generalizes rubinstein and wolinsky s 1987 model of middlemen intermediation by incorporating production and search costs plus more general matching and bargaining this allows us to study many new issues including entry efficiency and dynamics in the benchmark model equilibrium exists uniquely and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others sometimes intermediation is essential the market operates if and only if middlemen are active if bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient if not there can be too much or too little economic activity this is novel compared to the original rubinstein wolinsky model where equilibrium is always efficient

competitive equilibrium with search frictions a general equilibrium approach abstract when the trading process is characterized by search frictions traders may be rationed so markets need not clear we build a general equilibrium model with transferable utility where the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity in the spirit of the arrow debreu theory prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics but also on the probability that their trade is rationed the standard definition of competitive equilibrium is extended by replacing the market clearing condition with an exogenous matching function which describes a trading technology that is not frictionless as is typical in search models the matching function relates the rationing probabilities of buyers and sellers to the ratio of buyers to sellers in the market when search frictions vanish our model is equivalent to the continuous assignment model of gretsky et al 20 we adapt their approach which uses linear programming techniques and duality theory to show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is constrained efficient in our environment our competitive equilibrium notion is equivalent to that of directed or competitive search the strength of our formulation and the linear programming approach is that they allow us to generalize the constrained efficiency and existence results in the directed search literature to a much broader class of economies our framework also opens the door to the use of existing algorithms for computing equilibria and taking these models to the data

heaping induced bias in regression discontinuity designs heaping induced bias in rd designs this study uses monte carlo simulations to demonstrate that regression discontinuity designs arrive at biased estimates when attributes related to outcomes predict heaping in the running variable after showing that our usual diagnostics may not be well suited to identifying this type of problem we provide alternatives and then discuss the usefulness of different approaches to addressing the bias we then consider these issues in multiple non simulated environments

holdups and efficiency with search frictions a natural holdup problem arises in a market with search frictions firms have to make a range of investments before finding their employees and larger investments translate into higher wages in particular when wages are determined by ex post bargaining the equilibrium is always inefficient recognizing that capital intensive production relations have to pay higher wages firms reduce their investments this can only be prevented by removing all the bargaining power from the workers but this in turn depresses wages below their social product and creates excessive entry of firms in contrast to this benchmark we show that efficiency is achieved when firms post wages and workers can direct their search toward more attractive offers this efficiency result generalizes to an environment with imperfect information where workers only observe a few of the equilibrium wage offers we show that the underlying reason for efficiency is not wage posting per se but the ability of workers to direct their search toward more capital intensive jobs

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

an empirical stationary equilibrium search model of the housing market this article specifies and estimates a computationally tractable stationary equilibrium model of the housing market the model is rich and incorporates many of its unique features buyers and sellers simultaneous search behavior heterogeneity in their motivation to trade transaction costs a trading mechanism with posting prices and bargaining and the availability of an exogenous advertising technology that induces endogenous matching estimation uses maximum likelihood methods and multiple listing services data the estimated model is used to simulate housing market outcomes when a the amount of information displayed on housing listings increases and b real estate agent s commission rates change

grade inflation and course choice a conflict exists between the incentives offered to students and the institutional goal of increased science and math education students make their course choices in response to a powerful set of incentives grades these incentives have been systematically distorted by the grade inflation of the past 25 years as a consequence of inflation many universities have split into high and low grading departments economics along with chemistry and math tends to be low grading art english philosophy psychology and political science tend to be high grading this paper presents evidence from nine colleges and universities that grade inflation has led to a divergence among departments in grading policies we then discuss the results of an econometric study we conducted at williams college of the influence of grading policies on course choice the impact that differences in grading policies across departments have on the distribution of enrollments was also estimated and policy implications of the findings are discussed

on the job search productivity shocks and the individual earnings process individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex highly persistent dynamics we investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with i i d productivity shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics such as the covariance structure of earnings the evolution of individual earnings mean and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment or the distribution of year to year earnings changes specifically we show within an otherwise standard job search model how the combined assumptions of on the job search and wage renegotiation by mutual consent act as a quantitatively plausible internal propagation mechanism of i i d productivity shocks into persistent wage shocks the model suggests that wage dynamics should be thought of as the outcome of a specific acceptance rejection scheme of i i d productivity shocks this offers an alternative to the conventional linear arma type approach to modelling earnings dynamics structural estimation of our model on a 12 year panel of highly educated british workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic earnings structure which is remarkably consistent with the data

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

higher cognitive ability is associated with lower entries in a p beauty contest abstract beauty contests are well studied dominance solvable games that generate two interesting results first most behavior does not conform to the unique nash equilibrium second there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior in this work we explore the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability we find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the nash equilibrium

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

bilateral matching and bargaining with private information we study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game dmbg with two sided private information bilateral bargaining the model is a private information replica of mortensen and wright 2002 there are two kinds of frictions time

the empirical content of the job search model labor mobility and wage distributions in europe and the us abstract job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other this paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a three year panel of individual worker data covering 10 european countries and the u s we find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well this also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions our results suggest that cross sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the magnitude of labor market frictions as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model finally we use our results in a cross country comparison of the intensity and nature of job to job turnover we arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity we further show that the nature of job to job turnover is very different between those two groups turnover is predominantly voluntary in low turnover countries whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high turnover countries

on the adjustment speed of smes to their optimal capital structure the aim of this paper is to analyse the speed of adjustment of small and medium sized enterprises smes to the target leverage by applying a system gmm technique to spanish panel data collected during the period 1995 2005 we estimate a partial adjustment model in which both target leverage and speed of adjustment are simultaneously endogenized we provide empirical evidence on the determinants of target leverage and the speed of adjustment more specifically the rate of financial flexibility growth opportunities and size are positively related to the speed of adjustment whereas the distance to the optimal ratio of debt shows a negative impact our findings demonstrate that in terms of sample mean a high percentage of spanish smes adjust rationally to their target additionally the smes analysed appeared to be over levered and fairly motivated to adjust annual adjustment speed 26

technological competition uncertainty and oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly context the present technological choice of a firm which expects to receive private revelant information just prior to the uncertain market stage has both a flexibility value and a strategic commitment value in contrast to some common wisdom ideas we provide a natural two stage competition framework in which an increase in uncertainty always raises the commitment value of the technological choice of the firm and may decrease its flexibility value when the increased uncertainty takes the form of more variable beliefs the first result tends to reinforce therefore the findings of the strategic commitment literature under certainty

long run implications of investment specific technological change an attempt is made to disentangle its effects from the more traditional hicksneutral form of technological progress the balanced growth path for the model is characterized and calibrated to u s national income and product account nipa data the quantitative analysis suggests that investment specific technological change accounts for the major part of growth jel e13 030 041 047

mobility costs frictional unemployment and efficiency with imperfect job information flows it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed with word of mouth communication this condition is derived given this condition steady state equilibrium is not efficient with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral in this way workers become more selective in the jobs they accept

leaning against the wind during financial disruptions market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure they buy when the pressure is large accumulate inventories and sell when the pressure alleviates this paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure and order execution delays i show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity provided they have access to sufficient capital if raising capital is costly this suggests a policy role for lenient central bank lending during financial disruptions

foundation of competitive equilibrium with non transferable utility abstract this paper investigates the dynamic foundation of a competitive equilibrium studying a sequence of random matching models between ex ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers under two sided incomplete information with no entry where each agent is endowed with non transferable utility the economy is populated with two sets of infinitesimal agents buyers and sellers who have private information about their own valuations of the object in each period buyers and sellers in the pool are matched to draw randomly a pair of expected payoffs which will realize if the long term relationship is formed each player decides whether or not to agree to form a long term relationship conditioned on his private information if both parties agree then they leave the pool receiving the expected payoff in each period while the long term relationship continues the existing long term relationship is terminated either by will or by a random shock upon which both parties return to the respective pools of agents we quantify the amount of friction by the time span of each period we demonstrate that as the friction vanishes any sequence of stationary equilibrium outcomes in which trade occurs with a positive probability converges to the competitive equilibrium under a general two sided incomplete information about the private valuation of each agent

the impact of firing restrictions on labour market equilibrium in the presence of on the job search job to job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer or may be induced to accept one that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package we formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the diamond mortensen pissarides model that allows for employed job search we find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job to job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on the job search leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment

adverse selection and liquidity distortion this article develops a tractable model with two dimensional asymmetric information in asset markets sellers are privately informed about their asset quality and distress positions illiquidity arises endogenously and manifests itself through two distinct market outcomes the first outcome features limited market participation resulting in a dry up in trading volume the second outcome involves a large volume at a depressed price only in the latter outcome do distressed sellers engage in fire sales quickly unwinding their positions at a steep price discount the article further establishes that this equilibrium can arise only when buyers expect that sellers with a higher need for immediacy will on average have higher quality assets hence both the information structure and the distribution of sellers distress are crucial for the existence of fire sales

why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries an empirical investigation we examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ows of capital from rich to poor countries the lucas paradox the theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections we show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation for example improving peru s institutional quality to australia s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long run development

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search abstract this paper studies constrained efficiency in guerrieri et al s 2010 model of adverse selection and directed search buyers post contracts and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade if the guerrieri shimer wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not ex ante constrained efficient under certain conditions the planner achieves an allocation that even pareto dominates the equilibrium i e the equilibrium is not interim constrained efficient under other conditions the planner can completely undo the effects of adverse selection and achieves the first best cross subsidization is the key to these results

do capm results hold in a dynamic economy a numerical analysis in this research we use the projection method reported by judd to find numerical solutions to the euler equations of a stochastic dynamic growth model the mode1 that we solve is brock s asset pricing model for a variety of parameterizations of the production functions using simulated data from the model conjectures which are not analytically tractable can be verified we show that the market portfolio is mean variance efficient in this dynamic context we also show a result that is not available from the static capm theory the efficient frontier shifts up and down over the business cycle

re entitlement effects with duration dependent unemployment insurance in a stochastic matching equilibrium in the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework this paper considers how a duration dependent unemployment insurance ui system affects the dynamics of unemployment and wages in an economy subject to stochastic job destruction shocks it establishes that re entitlement effects induced by a finite duration ui program generate intertemporal transfers from firms that hire in future booms to firms that hire in current recessions these transfers imply a net hiring subsidy in recessions which stabilizes unemployment levels over the cycle

asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets an inversion result abstract i consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations the seller makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller observes the buyer s valuation symmetric information bilateral trade is trivially efficient if the seller cannot observe the valuation asymmetric information bilateral trade is inefficient this bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market in the steady state equilibrium of the market game the relation between the informational regime and efficiency is inverted with small frictions efficiency obtains if information is asymmetric if information is symmetric however the trading outcome can be very inefficient even if frictions vanish