asset pricing in multiperiod securities markets the intertemporal models developed in this paper have been stimulated by the capital asset pricing model capm of sharpe and lintner and the role of factor structure in ross arbitrage pricing theory apt suppose that some one dimensional stochastic process s provides a sufficient statistic for aggregate consumption then a heuristic dynamic programming argument shows that s market wealth and the wealth derivative of the value function for any agent are all locally perfectly correlated it follows from merton s work that there is a linear relationship between the local mean return on a security and the local covariance of that return with the return on the market portfolio the formal development uses martingale representation and martingale projection to obtain an intertemporal capm the history of a scalar brownian motion plays the role of a sufficient statistic we motivate the assumption of a sufficient statistic for aggregate consumption by considering a countable set of securities whose payoffs have an approximate factor structure where the factor components are in the information set generated by an n dimensional brownian motion and the idiosyncratic components are weakly correlated the approximate factor structure on the security payoffs implies that the rates of return have locally an approximate factor structure the role of the market portfolio can now be played by a set of n well diversified portfolios

real sources of european currency policy sectoral interests and european monetary integration in the thirty years before economic and monetary union was achieved european currency policies varied widely among countries and over time in this article i argue that the sectoral impact of regional exchange rate arrangements in particular their expected real effects on european trade and investment exerted a powerful influence on the course of european monetary integration the principal benefit of fixing european exchange rates was facilitation of cross border trade and investment within the european union eu the principal cost of fixed rates was the loss of national governments ability to use currency policy to improve their producers competitive position empirical results indeed indicate that a stronger and more stable currency was associated with greater importance of manufactured exports to the eu s hard currency core while depreciations were associated with an increase in the net import competition faced by the country s producers this suggests a powerful impact of real factors related to trade and investment and of private interests concerned about these factors in determining national currency policies

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

redistribution and non consumption smoothing in an open economy this paper presents a model where income distribution and redistributive fiscal policy interact to affect the budget deficit and the pattern of net borrowing of a country according to the standard representative agent paradigm a small open economy should smooth consumption by borrowing from lending to the rest of the world when its income increases declines over time the simple model of this paper delivers exactly the same predictions in the absence of income dispersion when income distribution is not degenerate however the same model gives rise to a surprising wealth of results in particular poor economies with high inequality may exhibit completely counter intuitive patterns of fiscal policy and external borrowing the country s production path declines over time because the more mobile agents leave the country to escape taxation yet the country might end up having a budget deficit and borrowing from abroad thereby reinforcing rather than smoothing the asymmetry in consumption between the two periods an important feature of this outcome is that it is backed by both the poor and the rich who gain from the fiscal system at the expense of the middle class

the reductionist gamble open economy politics in the global economy international political economy ipe should transition to third wave scholarship because open economy politics oep which dominates current american ipe scholarship can generate inaccurate knowledge oep can produce inaccurate knowledge because it studies domestic politics in isolation from international or macro processes this methodological reductionism is often inappropriate for the phenomena ipe studies because governments inhabit a complex social system as a result the political choices that oep strives to explain are typically a product of the interplay between domestic politics and macro processes when oep omits causally significant macro processes from empirical models the models yield biased inferences about the domestic political relationships under investigation although scholars tolerated such errors when the gains from oep were large these errors are less tolerable now that oep has matured consequently the field should transition toward research that is nonreductionist problem driven and pluralistic

arbitrage and diversification in a general equilibrium asset economy this paper presents a theory of equilibrium asset pricing that generalizes the recent work of connor the model extends connor s results to more general sets of asset returns and consumer preferences introduces production and provides a framework for analyzing exact and approximate equilibrium asset pricing the other major contribution of the paper is the introduction of geometric arguments that exploit the properties of induced prefer ences over assets this method of analyzing asset pricing provides an intuitively appealing way of analyzing equilibrium asset pricing theories unifies several well known asset pricing models this paper extends connor s finite asset model in a number of directions these extensions are nontrivial because they allow the theory to encompass asset pricing models that were excluded by connor s assumptions the second major contribution of the paper is to introduce a method of argument that exploits the geometric properties of induced preferences over assets and characterizes asset prices using these proper ties this technique provides an intuitively appealing way of analyzing asset pricing theories for a simple geometric exposition of the main ideas in this paper see milne 1987 0 2 to place this paper in the context of the literature it is important to appreciate the development of asset pricing models over the last two decades the first and perhaps the most famous asset pricing model is the capital asset pricing model capm developed by sharpe 1964 and lintner 1965 the model demonstrated a striking result assuming i consumers characterize portfolios in terms of the means and variance of rates of return ii there exists a risk free asset and iii asset market equilibrium then any asset s expected rate of return could be written as a linear function of the riskless interest rate and the expected rate of return on the endowment of risky assets the so called market portfolio the original capm result was derived from a one period model but merton 1973 showed that in a continuous time model where returns could be char acterized by a diffusion process the same mean variance argument could be applied to obtain the capm formula it was well known that if consumers had von neumann morgenstern prefer ences then either quadratic utility and or multivariate normality of returns were

the terms of trade and the current account the harberger laursen metzler effect the paper examines the effect of terms of trade changes on a small country s spending and current account assuming optimizing behavior in an intertemporal framework with perfect international capital mobility a temporary future terms of trade deterioration implies a deterioration improvement of the trade balance whereas a permanent terms of trade deterioration has an ambiguous effect depending on the rate of time preference nominal and real variables are considered via exact price indexes two periods and an infinite horizon are examined

public sector unions corporatism and macroeconomic performance what accounts for the apparent breakdown of the positive relationship between powerful trade union organizations and macroeconomic performance is corporatism a relic of a different age a luxury o

societal preferences partisan agents and monetary policy outcomes if different producer groups have divergent interests concerning macroeconomic policies how do societal preferences translate into state policy outcomes i develop and test a party as agent framework for understanding the importance of societal preferences with regard to monetary policy under capital mobility following the principal agent model political parties function as agents for different societal principals rightist parties tend to represent internationally oriented business groups with preferences for monetary convergence while leftist parties do the same for domestically oriented groups preferring monetary autonomy under capital mobility i present statistical evidence showing that oecd leftist governments have been associated with more monetary autonomy and currency variability than their rightist counterparts even after controlling for basic economic indicators such as inflation the statistical evidence also shows that societal group size tends not to explain either autonomous monetary policy choices or exchangerate stability thus even large and wealthy societal groups may be unable to obtain their preferred policy outcome when their respective partisan agents do not hold government power

inflation and unemployment the world economy today is vastly different from the 1930s when seymour harris the chairman of this meeting infected me with his boundless enthusiasm for economics and his steadfast confidence in its capacity for good works economics is very different too both the science and its subject have changed and for the better since world war ii but there are some notable constants unemployment and inflation still preoccupy and perplex economists statesmen journalists housewives and everyone else the connection between them is the principal domestic economic burden of presidents and prime ministers and the major area of controversy and ignorance in macroeconomics i have chosen to review economic thought on this topic on this occasion partly because of its inevitable timeliness partly because of a personal interest reaching back to my first published work in 1941

sovereign risk premia the link between fiscal rules and stability culture abstract there is a growing empirical literature studying whether permanent constraints on fiscal policy such as fiscal rules reduce sovereign risk premia nevertheless it remains an open question whether these rules are effective genuinely or just because they mirror fiscal preferences of politicians and voters in our analysis of european bond spreads before the financial crisis we shed light on this issue by employing several types of stability preference related proxies these proxies refer to a country s past stability performance government characteristics and survey results related to general trust we find evidence that these preference indicators affect sovereign bond spreads and dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules yet the interaction of stability preferences and rules points to a particular potential of fiscal rules to restore market confidence in countries with a historical lack of stability culture

the political economy of monetary institutions in recent decades countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions including alternative exchange rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions emphasizing their role in resolving both the time inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy this first generation work however suffers from a central limitation it studies exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other by contrast the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and central bank independence together and in so doing present a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions the articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions investigating how political institutions democratic processes political party competition and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives

grey power and the economy aging and inflation across advanced economies what explains the cross national variation in inflation rates across countries in contrast to most literature which emphasizes the role of ideas and institutions this article focuses on electoral politics and argues that aging leads to lower inflation rates countries with a larger share of elderly exhibit lower inflation because older people are both more inflation averse and politically powerful forcing parties seeking their votes to pursue lower inflation logistic regression analysis of survey data confirms that older people are more inflation averse and more likely to punish incumbents at the ballot box for inflation panel data regression analysis shows that social democratic parties have more economically orthodox manifestos in european countries with more elderly people and that the share of elderly is negatively correlated with inflation in both a sample of 21 advanced economies and a larger sample of 175 countries aging therefore pushes governments to pursue lower inflation

income distribution in the united states political action has affected postwar income distribution in the united states mainly through policy induced variations in macroeconomic activity and government transfer benefits in proportion to total income we present a small dynamic model of the connections among the partisan balance of power macroeconomic fluctuations transfer spending trends and income distribution outcomes the model is based on the premise that the parties have different distributional goals and it is designed to identify how shifts in party control of the presidency and the strength of the parties in congress have affected the distribution of after tax after transfer income by influencing cyclical economic performance and the flow of resources to transfer programs we therefore extend the partisan theory of macroeconomic policy to the domain of income distribution outcomes

partially independent central banks politically responsive governments and inflation theories of central bank independence have more exact implications regarding inflation in different political economic environments than generally understood or empirically examined they imply that inflation in any given country time will be a weighted average of what it would be if the central bank completely controlled monetary policy and what it would be if the government completely controlled it with the degree of central bank independence weighting the former an equation embodying this theoretical expectation is estimated by constrained least squares from a time series cross section of inflation rates in developed democracies since the bretton woods era the results confirm that the antiinflationary benefit of central bank independence is not constant but rather depends on every variable in the broader politicaleconomic environment to which wholly autonomous central banks and governments would respond differently conversely the inflationary impacts of all such political economic variables depend on the degree of central bank independence

asset demands without the independence axiom an important application of the theory of choice under uncertainty is to asset markets and an important property in these markets is a preference for portfolio diversification if an investor is an expected utility maximizer then s he is risk averse if and only if s he exhibits a preference for diversification this paper examines the relationship between risk aversion and portfolio diversification when preferences over probability distributions of wealth do not have an expected utility representation

checks and balances private information and the credibility of monetary commitments the authors develop and test several new hypotheses about the anti inflationary effect of central bank independence and exchange rate pegs in the context of different institutions and different degrees of citizen information about government policies theory provides strong reason to believe that while central bank independence will prove more effective as a commitment mechanism in countries where multiple players in government have veto power checks and balances the number of veto players will have no effect on the credibility of exchange rate pegs conversely the authors argue that central bank independence does not solve the problems of commitment that arise when citizens are imperfectly informed about the contribution of government policy to inflation exchange rate pegs however mitigate these problems the authors present extensive evidence from cross country tests using newly developed data that provide strong support for their propositions

public inflation aversion and the political economy of macroeconomic policymaking do the macroeconomic priorities of citizens differ across countries if so what accounts for this variation and what are its consequences for explanations of the choice of monetary institutions macroeconomic policy and international monetary cooperation this article uses survey data from twenty advanced economies to examine individual preferences about macroeconomic priorities the analysis establishes three key findings first the results suggest that economic context defined by inflation and unemployment performance has a substantial impact on the public s economic objectives in a way that is broadly consistent with the specification of utility loss functions in the theoretical political economy literature second the results suggest that there is significant cross country variation in inflation aversion controlling for economic context third some of this variation is accounted for by national level factors affecting the aggregate costs of inflation and unemployment these results have significant implications for optimal monetary policymaking the explanation of variation in economic outcomes and for accounts of the choice of institutional frameworks for policymaking i thank the bank of england the center for basic research in the social sciences and the institution for social and policy studies for research support and jim alt andrew bailey bill bernhard lawrence broz john freeman jeff frieden jim granato shigeo hirano david lake jeff lax simon price rose razaghian ron rogowski david stasavage gabriel sterne mike tomz jim vreeland the editor and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments all views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the bank of england

the german public and its trust in the ecb the role of knowledge and information search abstract in this paper we analyse the effects of objective and subjective knowledge about monetary policy as well as the information search patterns of german citizens on trust in the ecb we rely on a unique representative public opinion survey of german households conducted in 2011 we find that subjective and factual knowledge as well as the desire to be informed about the ecb foster citizens trust specific knowledge about the ecb is more influential than general monetary policy knowledge objective knowledge is more important than subjective knowledge however an increasing intensity of media usage especially newspaper reading has a significantly negative influence on trust we conclude that the only viable way for the ecb to generate more trust in itself is to spread monetary policy knowledge

risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities expected utility with rank dependent probability theory is a model of decision making under risk where the preference relations on the set of probability distributions is represented by the mathematical expectation of a utility function with respect to a transformation of the probability distributions on the set of outcomes this paper defines based on g teaux differentiability measures of risk aversion for such preferences which characterize the relation more risk averse and applies these measures to the analysis of unconditional and conditional portfolio choice problems

a unified beta pricing theory abstract this paper derives ross s mutual fund separation theory and a new equilibrium version of ross s arbitrage pricing theory as special cases of a general theory the paper also reveals that the two theories are identical in their predictions of asset prices and portfolio returns the capital asset pricing model a restricted case of the mutual fund separation theory receives special treatment

exchange rate proclamations and inflation fighting credibility if governments choose economic policies that often run counter to their public commitments are those commitments meaningless we argue that govern ment proclamations can be critical in signaling economic policy intentions we focus on the realm of exchange rate policy in which countries frequently implement an exchange rate regime that differs from the officially declared regime we argue that the official exchange rate regime is one of the most important signals of a government s economic policy preferences when a government makes a de jure public commit ment to a fixed exchange rate it sends a signal to domestic and international markets of its strict monetary policy priorities in contrast a government that proclaims a floating exchange rate signals a desire to retain discretion over monetary policy even if it has implemented a de facto fixed rate we use data on 110 developed and devel oping countries from 1974 to 2004 to test two hypotheses first that governments that adopt de facto fixed exchange rates will experience less inflation when they back up their actions with official declarations and second that governments that abide by their commitments as demonstrated by a history of following through on their public declarations of a fixed exchange rate regime will establish greater inflation fighting credibility within developing countries democratic institutions enhance this credibility results from fixed effects econometric models provide strong support for our hypotheses

incremental risk aversion and diversification preference abstract the class of mean independent incremental risks defined with respect to an initial risk or status quo is shown to coincide with the vector space of incremental risks generated from risks that are individually independent of the status quo using this characterization of mean independence aversion toward independent risk increases together with diversification preference for mean independent risk increases implies aversion toward mean independent risk increases by contrast a nondiversifier who is averse to independent risk increases may nonetheless strictly prefer certain mean preserving increases in risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d80 d81

the american political economy macroeconomics and electoral politics here is the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on relationships between the economy and politics in the years from eisenhower through reagan extending and deepening his earlier work which had major impact in both political science and economics hibbs traces the patterns in and sources of postwar growth unemployment and inflation he identifies which groups win and lose from inflations and recessions he also shows how voters perceptions and reactions to economic events affect the electoral fortunes of political parties and presidents hibbs s analyses demonstrate that political officials in a democratic society ignore the economic interests and demands of their constituents at their peril because episodes of prosperity and austerity frequently have critical influence on voters behavior at the polls the consequences of eisenhower s last recession of ford s unwillingness to stimulate the economy of carter s stalled recovery were electorally fatal whereas johnson s nixon s and reagan s successes in presiding over rising employment and real incomes helped win elections the book develops a major theory of macroeconomic policy action that explains why priority is given to growth unemployment inflation and income distribution shifts with changes in partisan control of the white house the analysis shows how such policy priorities conform to the underlying economic interests and preferences of the governing party s core political supporters throughout the study hibbs is careful to take account of domestic institutional arrangements and international economic events that constrain domestic policy effectiveness and influence domestic economic outcomes hibbs s interdisciplinary approach yields more rigorous and more persuasive characterizations of the american political economy than either purely economic apolitical analyses or purely partisan politicized accounts his book provides a useful benchmark for the advocacy of new policies for the 1990s a handy volume for politicians and their staffs as well as for students and teachers of politics and economics

who supports the ecb evidence from eurobarometer survey data this paper contributes empirically to the long debated issue of the legitimacy of the european central bank ecb with regard to european polities using micro level data from the eurobarometer survey we shed light on the socio demographic determinants of public opinion support for the ecb we find that people with higher level of education and income and centre to right wing political orientation tend to support the ecb as well as people with optimistic expectations on the economic situation by contrast the unemployed tend to distrust the ecb the policy relevance of such results is important for ecb s communication strategy with the general public

inflation in open economies abstract this paper relates the time consistent inflation rate to the degree of trade openness of an economy the mechanism linking the welfare effects of monetary surprises and hence the incentives to inflate to openness does not rely on a large country terms of trade effect but rather is due to imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity in the non traded sector the empirical evidence supports the main predictions of the model 1997 elsevier science b v

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination