the political economy of ngos and information sharing abstract to a large extent information sharing is what nongovernmental organizations ngos do and the costs of sharing information are falling dramatically joining politics and economics this paper builds an analytical framework to illuminate how these falling costs are affecting information intensive ngos in latin america case studies describe the various information sharing outputs and inputs of nonprofit ngo production i argue that the participatory activity of ngos affects both political and economic realms and that as the costs of sharing information fall ngos will be a more powerful link in the changing balance between states markets and civil society

vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

the state popular participation and the voluntary sector abstract a key determinant in the development contribution of nongovernment organizations ngos is the relationship between ngos and the state ngos may run parallel activities they may play oppositional roles or they may represent weaker members of society organizing them to become more influential in decision making and resource allocation this civil society function entails moving from a supply side approach concentrating on project delivery to a demand side emphasis helping communities articulate their concerns and participate in development processes donors can use the policy dialogue to encourage governments to foster a more enabling environment for ngo activities

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

volume flexibility and capacity investment under demand uncertainty the paper considers optimal capacity investment decisions under uncertainty taking a real options approach concerning the production decision we study a flexible and an inflexible scenario the flexible firm can costlessly adjust production over time with the capacity level as the upper bound while the inflexible firm fixes production at capacity level from the moment of investment onwards we find that the flexible firm invests in higher capacity than the inflexible firm where the capacity difference increases with uncertainty for the flexible firm the initial capacity utilization rate can be quite low especially when investment costs are concave and the economic environment is uncertain as to the timing of the investment there are two contrary effects first the flexible firm has an incentive to invest earlier because flexibility raises the project value second the flexible firm has an incentive to invest later because costs are larger due to the higher capacity level the latter effect dominates in highly uncertain economic environments our model being dynamic enables us to derive the at first sight counterintuitive result that an increase in capacity holding cost raises the capacity level the firm invests in

sacrifice and stigma reducing free riding in cults communes and other collectives this paper presents an economic analysis of religious behavior that accounts for the continuing success of groups with strange requirements and seemingly inefficient prohibitions the analysis does not presuppose any special motives for religious activity rather religion is modeled as a club good that displays positive returns to participatory crowding the analysis demonstrates that efficient religions with perfectly rational members may benefit from stigma self sacrifice and bizarre behavioral restrictions the model also addresses sacrifice in nonreligious social clubs fraternities communes political parties work groups and families

capacity investment under postponement strategies market competition and demand uncertainty we consider duopoly models where firms make decisions on capacity production and price under demand uncertainty capacity and price decisions are made respectively ex ante and ex post demand realizations the interplay between the timings of demand realization and production decision endows firms with different capabilities flexible firms can postpone production decisions until the actual demand curve is observed but inflexible firms cannot under general demand structures and cost functions we characterize the equilibrium for a symmetric duopoly and establish the strategic equivalence of price and quantity competitions when firms are flexible we investigate the stochastic order properties of capacity and profit and show that they both increase for a flexible firm when the market is more volatile we find that flexibility allows a firm to increase investment in capacity and earn a higher profit while benefiting customers by keeping the price in a narrower range strategic equivalence implies that

evaluating natural resource investments notwithstanding impressive advances in the theory of finance over the past 2 decades practical procedures for capital budgeting have evolved only slowly the standard technique which has remained unchanged in essentials since it was originally proposed see dean 1951 bierman and smidt 1960 derives from a simple adaptation of the fisher 1907 model of valuation under certainty under this technique expected cash flows from an investment project are discounted at a rate deemed appropriate to their risk and the resulting present value is compared with the cost of the project this standard textbook technique reflects modern theoretical developments only insofar as estimates of the discount rate may be obtained from crude application of single period asset pricing theory but see brennan 1973 bogue and roll 1974 turnbull 1977 constantinides 1978 the inadequacy of this approach to capital budgeting is widely acknowledged although not widely discussed its obvious deficiency is its the evaluation of mining and other natural resource projects is made particularly difficult by the high degree of uncertainty attaching to output prices it is shown that the techniques of continuous time arbitrage and stochastic control theory may be used not only to value such projects but also to determine the optimal policies for developing managing and abandoning them the approach may be adapted to a wide variety of contexts outside the natural resource sector where uncertainty about future project revenues is a paramount concern

returns system with rebates we consider a variant of the newsvendor problem atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand after the orders are filled the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not we show that in this setting a returns system with rebates with previously set buy back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold implements the optimal production and sales strategy attaining maximum expected profit in the channel

investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand this paper extends the real options literature by discussing an investment problem where a firm has to determine optimal investment timing and optimal capacity choice at the same time under conditions of irreversible investment expenditures and uncertainty in future demand after the project is installed with a certain maximum capacity this capacity is fixed as an upper boundary to the output and cannot be adjusted later on it turns out that in the framework of this once and for all decision uncertainty in future demand leads to an increase in optimal installed capacity but on the other hand it causes investment to be delayed to an extent that even small uncertainty makes waiting and accumulation of further information the optimal decision for large ranges of demand limiting the capacity which may be installed weakens this extreme effect of uncertainty

multi period modeling of two way price commitment under price dependent demand abstract this paper examines the use of price commitment policies in dynamic contracting in multiple period finite time horizons two specific forms of price commitment are considered one on the part of the retailer through a retail fixed markup contract and one on the part of the manufacturer through a price protection contract optimal policies for each form of price commitment are analytically derived as are optimal policies for the traditional price only and centralized supply chain scenarios that we use as comparisons we prove that optimal retail price and order size solutions exist in each period under the assumption of non increasing price dependent demand we show that the existence of retailer inventory between periods causes the optimal policies to differ from a static single period model further we show that a supplier offers a price protection policy as a signal to the retailer to resolve the gaming that naturally occurs under price only this effectively decouples the multi period dynamic contracting setting into repeated single period scenarios however the resulting behavior can actually inhibit supply chain performance on the retail commitment side we find that retail fixed markup policies are quite effective in improving supply chain efficiency we show that such policies can lead to pareto improvement over price only contracts and can even coordinate the supply chain in some situations

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

resource flexibility with responsive pricing this article studies two types of flexibility used by firms to better respond to uncertain market conditions resource flexibility and responsive pricing we consider a situation in which a single flexible resource can be used to satisfy two distinct demand classes while the resource capacity must be decided based on uncertain demand functions the resource allocation as well as the pricing decision are made based on the realized demand functions we characterize the effects of two key drivers of flexibility demand variability and demand correlation assuming normally distributed demand curve intercepts demand variability creates opportunity costs and with fixed prices decreases the firm s profit we show that with the additional flexibility gained from responsive pricing the firm can maximize the benefits of favorable demand conditions and mitigate the effects of poor demand conditions ultimately profiting from variability positive demand correlation on the other hand remains undesirable under responsive pricing the optimal capacity of the flexible resource is always increasing in both demand variability and demand correlation this contrasts with the scenarios based on fixed prices highlighting the crucial difference that responsive pricing makes in the management of flexible resources we further quantify the value of flexibility for the firm and its customers by considering as a benchmark a firm relying on two dedicated resources the value of flexibility is most significant if the demand levels are highly variable and negatively correlated in such cases the firm benefits from demand variability due to responsive pricing while facing limited demand risk due to resource flexibility finally we endogenize the input price of the flexible resource by considering the pricing decision of the resource supplier

sect subsidy and sacrifice an economist s view of ultra orthodox jews israeli ultra orthodox men study full time in yeshiva until age 40 on average why do fathers with families in poverty choose yeshiva over work draft deferments subsidize yeshiva attendance yet attendance typically continues long after exemption fertility rates are high tfr 7 6 and rising a social interaction approach explains these anomalies yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community which provides mutual insurance to members prohibitions strengthen communities by effectively taxing real wages inducing high fertility historically the incursion of markets into traditional communities produces ultra orthodoxy subsidies induce dramatic reductions in labor supply and unparalleled increases in fertility illustrating extreme responses social groups may have to interventions

the political limits to nongovernmental organizations in jordan abstract nongovermental organizations ngos are frequently touted as important actors in democratization yet despite the proliferation of ngos since the advent of political liberalization and democratization in jordan they remain circumscribed by the realities of continued state power because the political transition was informed by a desire to perpetuate regime survival in the midst of economic crisis ngos continue to experience political limits to their activities the regime primarily relies upon three strategies to control the ngo community a administrative repression and oversight b civil society infiltration through royal nongovernmental organizations and other government ngos and c centralization through the general union of voluntary societies

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

the economics of planning electricity transmission to accommodate renewables using two stage optimisation to evaluate flexibility and the cost of disregarding uncertainty abstract aggressive development of renewable electricity sources will require significant expansions in transmission infrastructure we present a stochastic two stage optimisation model that captures the multistage nature of transmission planning under uncertainty and use it to evaluate interregional grid reinforcements in great britain gb in our model a proactive transmission planner makes investment decisions in two time periods each time followed by a market response uncertainty is represented by economic technology and regulatory scenarios and first stage investments must be made before it is known which scenario will occur the model allows us to identify expected cost minimising first stage investments as well as estimate the value of information the cost of ignoring uncertainty and the value of flexibility our results show that ignoring risk in planning transmission for renewables has quantifiable economic consequences and that considering uncertainty can yield decisions that have lower expected costs than traditional deterministic planning methods in the gb case the value of information and cost of disregarding uncertainty in transmission planning were of the same order of magnitude approximately 100 m in present worth terms further the best plan under a risk neutral decision criterion can differ from the best under risk aversion finally a traditional sensitivity analysis based robustness analysis also yields different results than the stochastic model although the former s expected cost is not much higher

government versus private ownership of public goods there has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and public private partnerships this paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision we show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the beneets generated by it relatively more this is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor or other aspects of the technology

the effects of advertising on resale price maintenance this research combines the market power and market competition perspectives on advertising under the framework of a generalized theoretical model in minimum resale price maintenance rpm in order to investigate the effects of advertising on rpm using the real options approach the effects of advertising on retail price will impact the value of rpm further influence the incentive of manufacturers to impose rpm through brand penetration and promotional pricing effects advertising is likely to influence rpm under the condition of retail price competition when the brand penetration effect is dominant advertising will discourage manufacturers from imposing rpm advertising will encourage manufacturers to impose rpm when the promotional pricing effect is dominant rpm not only substitutes advertising but also complements advertising

demand uncertainty inventories and resale price maintenance we show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers in our model discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand full price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell we show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer s wholesale demand and profits and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase

resale price maintenance and spatial price discrimination abstract in this article we examine resale price maintenance rpm in a classic model of downstream retailers engaging in spatial price discrimination we show that a resale price floor increases the total profit of the upstream monopoly when transport cost product differentiation is relatively low importantly this profitable rpm floor can also enhance social welfare and even consumer surplus a resale price ceiling can also be profitable and always improves consumer surplus and social welfare we argue that such findings support a rule of reason approach to rpm

an arrgh chy the law and economics of pirate organization this article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law economics and organization of pirates to effectively organize their banditry pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation minimize crew conflict and maximize piratical profit pirates devised two institutions for this purpose first i analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation second i examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history

religion terrorism and public goods testing the club model abstract can rational models once theological explanations are discredited explain why certain radical religious rebels are so successful in perpetrating suicide attacks the fundamental barrier to success turns out not to be recruiting suicide attackers there is a rational basis for volunteering rather the barrier is the danger of other operatives defecting a club model portraying voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods explains how they weed out potential defectors by requiring sacrifices as signals of commitment they are thereby able to succeed in risky terrorist attacks the model has testable implications for tactic choice and damage achieved by clubs and other rebel organizations data spanning a half century on both terrorists and civil war insurgents much from middle east sources and israel palestine reveal that a missions organized by radical religious clubs that provide benign local public goods are both more lethal and are more likely to be suicide attacks than missions organized by other terrorist groups with similar aims and theologies and b suicide attacks are chosen when targets are hard i e difficult to destroy our results suggest benign tactics to counter radical religious terrorism and insurgency

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

political competition and violence in mexico hierarchical social control in local patronage structures many countries that have recently undergone transitions to democracy have experienced increases in violent crime yet sociological theories have generally failed to consider the impact of political factors on crime the author examines the relation between greater electoral competition and homicide at the subnational level in a country undergoing an uneven transition to democracy in societies characterized by the presence of patronage networks social and political changes that undermine the source of unequal exchange between actors at different levels in the social hierarchy result in a temporary loss of social control and an increase in crime the relation between electoral competition and homicide is tested using electoral results from a sample of 1 800 mexican municipalities greater electoral competition is associated with higher homicide rates across municipalities and over time even after controlling for standard correlates of violent crime consistent with the hypothesis that the increase is due to the disruption of patronage networks this association is present only in rural areas where patron client relations are more common

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

resale price maintenance and forward integration into a monopolistically competitive industry in this paper we adopt the ces model of product differentiation for the downstream stage of the industry with an upstream monopolist we first show that resale price maintenance is equivalent to forward integration and that both increase profits then we demonstrate that forward integration by an upstream monopolist will reduce welfare for the industry prices fall with forward integration but the integrating firm contracts the number of downstream subsidiaries so drastically that the reduced diversity more than offsets the gains from lower prices

why parallel trade may raise producers profits abstract this paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade in addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period for these types of products letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit the model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles clothes toys consumer electronics musical recordings cosmetics and perfumes

pirational choice the economics of infamous pirate practices abstract this paper investigates the economics of infamous pirate practices two closely related economic theories the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building explain these practices first i examine the pirate flag jolly roger which pirates used to signal their identity as unconstrained outlaws enabling them to take prizes without costly conflict second i consider how pirates combined heinous torture public displays of madness and published advertisement of their fiendishness to establish a reputation that prevented costly captive behaviors pirates infamous practices reduced their criminal enterprise s costs and increased its revenues enhancing the profitability of life on the account

trafficking networks and the mexican drug war abstract drug trade related violence has escalated dramatically in mexico since 2007 and recent years have also witnessed large scale efforts to combat trafficking spearheaded by mexico s conservative pan party this study examines the direct and spillover effects of mexican policy toward the drug trade regression discontinuity estimates show that drug related violence increases substantially after close elections of pan mayors empirical evidence suggests that the violence reflects rival traffickers attempts to usurp territories after crackdowns have weakened incumbent criminals moreover the study uses a network model of trafficking routes to show that pan victories divert drug traffic increasing violence along alternative drug routes jel d72 d85 k42 o17 z13

optimal regime switching under risk aversion and uncertainty abstract technology adoption is key for corporate strategy often determining the success or failure of a company as a whole however risk aversion often raises the reluctance to make a timely technology switch particularly when this entails the abandonment of an existing market regime and entry in a new one consequently which strategy is most suitable and the optimal timing of regime switch depends not only on market factors such as the definition of the market regimes as well as economic and technological uncertainty but also on attitudes towards risk therefore we develop a utility based regime switching framework for evaluating different technology adoption strategies under price and technological uncertainty we assume that a decisionmaker may invest in each technology that becomes available compulsive or delay investment until a new technology arrives and then invest in either the older laggard or the newer technology leapfrog our results indicate that if market regimes are asymmetric then greater risk aversion and price uncertainty in a new regime may accelerate regime switching in addition the feasibility of a laggard strategy decreases increases as price uncertainty in an existing new regime increases finally although risk aversion typically favours a compulsive and a laggard strategy a leapfrog strategy may be feasible under risk aversion provided that the output price and the rate of innovation are sufficiently high

dedicated vs product flexible production technology strategic capacity investment choice this paper studies the optimal investment strategies of an incumbent and a potential entrant that can both choose between a product flexible and dedicated technology in a two product market characterized by uncertain demand the product flexible production technology has certain advantages especially when the economic environment is uncertain on the other hand the dedicated production technology allows a firm to commit to production quantities this gives strategic advantages which can outweigh the value of flexibility it turns out that both firms prefer for some scenarios the dedicated production technology however we find that in a game with sequential technology choices both firms investing dedicated will not be an equilibrium especially when the economic environment is more uncertain the incumbent overinvests in product flexible capacity to force the entrant to choose the dedicated technology then the incumbent is the only firm with the product flexible production technology which results in a high payoff

reply to do returns policies intensify retail competition returns policies are common in many sectors of retail distribution padmanabhan and png 1997 showed that with demand uncertainty a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions wang 2004 showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive we show that returns policies do increase manufacturer profitability by attenuating retailer price competition when demand is low and intensifying competition when demand is high importantly this effect holds only in the presence of demand uncertainty further the conditions under which a returns policy raises the manufacturer s profit are weaker when retailing is a duopoly than when retailing is a monopoly this suggests that returns policies serve both to manage competition and mitigate demand uncertainty

the governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization how do drug trafficking organizations organize drug trafficking organizations continue to operate effectively despite incentives for members to defect pressure from damaged communities and government interdiction efforts this paper identifies the problem of defection in this context and applies insights from the literatures on club goods and extralegal governance institutions to explain the puzzling organization and activities of one of mexico s most dangerous drug trafficking organizations la familia michoacana the group uses a reward and punishment scheme to prevent defection from members and to elicit cooperation from the community and government

preference modification vs incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment the role of culture terrorism is a tactic much more likely to be used when combatants have asymmetric numerical strength and weaponry only if one side is comparatively very weak will it use terror tactics this weakness requires a means of controlling strong incentives for free riding or defection from the weaker side there are two nonexclusive answers 1 atttract or inculcate recruits with an innate preference for cooperation even if it results in the recruit s own death 2 create a set of incentives that reward loyalty by giving access to excludable near public club goods culture is the key to achieving either of these solutions culture is defined here as the set of inherited beliefs attitudes and moral strictures that a people use to distinguish outsiders to understand themselves and to communicate with each other the primary question is whether culture creates a preference for cooperation as a primitive or accommodates incentives such as excludable club goods that can only be obtained by cooperation the difference between the two accounts matters greatly for determining the correct strategy to fight terrorism if terrorists are selected for having unusual cooperative from the perspective of the terror group preferences then recruitment must be disrupted somehow if on the other hand terrorists allow themselves to be recruited to gain access to club goods then the intervention strategy must be the disruption of social networks that credibly guarantee access to those club goods

democratic governance and sectoral policy reform tracing linkages and exploring synergies abstract effective democratic governance influences how societies and economies progress and prosper for many people in developing and post socialist countries the action and impact of democratic governance happens through sectoral reforms efforts to improve democratic governance can have strong impacts on sectoral reforms how these are implemented who participates in them at various stages and what outcomes are achieved conversely sectoral policy reforms and program interventions can serve to promote and enhance democratic governance this article discusses these linkages and provides selected examples of the synergies among them it raises the political dimension of democratic governance and offers several suggestions regarding where when and how donor agencies can intervene both to promote democratic governance and to advance sectoral policy reforms

entry and exit decisions based on a discount factor approach abstract entry and exit decisions under price uncertainty are discussed by a discount factor approach to investment the approach makes it possible to express the value of the firm as a function of a set of trigger prices at which investment takes place and to determine the optimal policy by simple maximization starting with a standard entry exit model by dixit 1989 entry and exit decisions under uncertainty journal of political economy 97 3 620 638 the paper expands to construction and scrapping decisions investment lags diminishing production capacity and limits to the number of lay up periods economic implications are investigated using experimental data and empirical shipping data

entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework this paper examines a dynamic incumbent entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the inverse demand in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly considered we find that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry deterrence is achieved through timing rather than through overinvestment this is because the incumbent invests earlier and in a smaller amount compared to a scenario without potential entry if on the other hand the size of the investment is exogenously given the investment order changes and the entrant invests before the incumbent does

price versus production postponement capacity and competition this article presents a comparative analysis of possible postponement strategies in a two stage decision model where firms make three decisions capacity investment production inventory quantity and price typically investments are made while the demand curve is uncertain the strategies differ in the timing of the operational decisions relative to the realization of uncertainty we show how competition uncertainty and the timing of operational decisions influence the strategic investment decision of the firm and its value in contrast to production postponement price postponement makes the investment and production inventory decisions relatively insensitive to uncertainty this suggests that managers can make optimal capacity decisions by deterministic reasoning if they have some price flexibility under price postponement additional postponement of production has relatively small incremental value therefore it may be worthwhile to consider flexible ex post pricing before production postponement reengineering while more postponement increases firm value it is counterintuitive that this also makes the optimal capacity decision more sensitive to uncertainty we highlight the different impact of more timely information which leads to higher investment and inventories and of reduced demand uncertainty which decreases investment and inventories our analysis suggests appropriateness conditions for simple make to stock and make to order strategies we also present technical sufficiency and uniqueness conditions under price postponement these results extend to oligopolistic and perfect competition for which pure equilibria are derived interestingly the relative value of operational postponement techniques seems to increase as the industry becomes more competitive

the politics of government ngo relations in africa abstract non governmental organizations ngos deservedly or not have gained a reputation as the leading practitioners of rural development in africa african governments have responded ambiguously to the presence of these new agencies on the one hand valuing the economic resources ngos can raise but resisting the political pluralization implied by popular development action this article describes the growth of ngos in africa and proposes a framework for analyzing the dynamics of government ngo relations by means of examples drawn from kenya and zimbabwe among other african countries the article illustrates the strategies used by governments to exercise control and by ngos to assert autonomy an argument is made that politics rather than economics best explain the contribution of ngos to development as well as the attitude of governments toward the burgeoning voluntary sector

effects of sourcing structure on performance in a multiple product assemble to order supply chain abstract this paper addresses the strategic pricing decisions of a decentralized assemble to order system and the effects of sourcing structure on system performance we consider an assemble to order system consisting of two substitute products and three components manufactured by different suppliers demand for the products is price sensitive the selling prices for the products are jointly determined by firms in the system we study the system under both centralized and decentralized decision making situations for the centralized system we demonstrate that there exists a unique optimal pricing solution for the decentralized system we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium in the players pricing game we further analyze the effects of different sourcing structures on the system performance and the assembler s performance we find that reduction of suppliers in the system does not guarantee improvement of system performance different sourcing structures have different impacts on performance when the two dedicated components are sourced from a single supplier and the common component is sourced from another independent supplier the system and the assembler s performance become worse we show that the decentralized system can be effectively coordinated and the system performance can be improved with a simple profit sharing contract finally we provide comprehensive numerical examples to demonstrate some important managerial insights

capacity optimization under uncertainty the impact of operational time lags time lags in switching operational modes are typical in the manufacturing and power sectors but are not treated in most real options models in this paper we consider a firm that has the opportunity to suspend and to resume production infinitely many times subject to a time lag after each startup decision we contribute to the literature by allowing the firm to determine its level of installed capacity in conjunction with its optimal investment timing we find that an increase in the length of the time lag results in an increase in the optimal capacity level capacity optimization also interacts with the length of the time lag to affect investment timing and the triggers to suspend and resume production thereby weakening the result about hysteresis from a standard real options model under the assumption of a fixed level of capacity a longer lag speeds up the decision to resume operations due to a positive upside to the revenue but delays the suspension of operations by contrast with capacity optimization a longer time lag results in a larger capacity choice which can indirectly delay the investment decision and the timing to resume operations this indirect effect dominates when the level of market uncertainty is low and the time lag is initially small

the value of flexibility in make to order systems the effect of demand correlation we consider a manufacturer of mass customized modular products who orders components under demand uncertainty and sets prices produces to order and trades excess components in a secondary market after this uncertainty is resolved the sequence of events reflects in a parsimonious fashion the considerable reduction in demand uncertainty between the procurement stage and the selling season typical of industries with long supply lead times and short product life cycles we prove that in contrast to conventional wisdom the value of production flexibility and expected profit increase with demand correlation if and only if commonality between the corresponding products does not exceed a threshold we also prove that the value of flexibility and expected profit may each increase or decrease with demand variability depending on demand correlations and component commonalities across the entire product line finally we prove that when demand shocks are independent the optimal product prices are positively correlated if and only if the degree of commonality between the corresponding products exceeds a threshold

demand uncertainty and returns policies manufacturers facing uncertain demand may induce distributors to carry ample stocks of their products by agreeing to accept returns of unsold goods for credit the authors model the manufacturer s decision to accept returns showing that this decision depends crucially on the nature of the demand uncertainty uncertainty over customer arrivals favors returns while uncertainty over consumers valuation of the manufacturer s product leads distributors to set retail prices too high from the manufacturer s standpoint when returns are allowed the authors show that returns can be expected to raise retail prices while maintaining shrinking distributor margins copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

women s participation in local organizations conditions and constraints abstract civic organizations have a capacity to contribute to economic growth and an equitable distribution of welfare by reducing information asymmetries and transaction costs while donors increasingly recognize that group based projects are a means to advocate organizational capacities of target groups it is not clear whether group based organizations always increase efficiency and equity this article analyses the determinants of participation in local development groups ldgs using data from two projects funded by undp in kashmir and gtz in chad a major result of the empirical analysis is the identification of a middle class effect of participation the exclusion of the majority of the poor can be explained by high opportunity costs to join the group especially for income earning women in addition it can be shown that an existing social network is a pre condition for participation finally the assumption has been confirmed that bargaining power of the members is important for their decision to participate in groups