patents or prizes monopolistic r d and asymmetric information abstract in this paper a model of r d regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as r d incentive instruments when there is a technological leader using the case of full information as a benchmark it is found that the trade off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator s r d costs are private information whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation

grand innovation prizes a theoretical normative and empirical evaluation abstract this paper provides a systematic examination of the use of a grand innovation prize gip in action the progressive automotive insurance x prize a 10 million prize for a highly efficient vehicle following a mechanism design approach we define three key dimensions for gip evaluation objectives design and performance where prize design includes ex ante specifications ex ante incentives qualification rules and award governance within this framework we compare observations of gips from three domains empirical reality theory and policy to better understand their function as an incentive mechanism for encouraging new solutions to large scale social challenges combining data from direct observation personal interviews and surveys together with analysis of extant theory and policy documents on gips our results highlight three points of divergence first over the complexity of defining prize specifications secondly over the nature and role of incentives particularly patents thirdly the overlooked challenges associated with prize governance our approach identifies a clear roadmap for future theory and policy around gips

regulation of multiagent research and development this article focuses on the regulation problems raised by two specific characteristics of research and development first it is normally desirable that several units pursue the same goal and second that only the best of the final products made by these units is worthwhile to society when firms have private information these characteristics are seen to generate a substitution effect which in some situations implies that the resources allocated to r d under asymmetric information are excessive relative to the full information allocation i thus identify asymmetric information as one possible source of excessive allocations to research and development

the effect of unanticipated money on the money and foreign exchange markets abstract a number of studies have attempted to determine why unanticipated increases in the money supply are positively correlated with money market interest rates by examining the response of the foreign exchange market to unanticipated changes in the money stock they have found a significant positive relationship between unanticipated increases in the money supply and the foreign exchange value of the dollar and have interpreted this as evidence for the anticipated liquidity effect hypothesis however these results support this hypothesis only if both markets respond simultaneously to unanticipated changes in money this paper examines the cross market consistency of the response using six bilateral exchange rates and the treasury bill rate all measured over a narrow time interval the results show that in general these markets do not respond simultaneously to money announcements

a general model of r d competition and policy this article constructs a model of r d with heterogeneous firms each firm s probability of success is a function of its sunk and recurrent r d expenditures the social gains from an innovation are not fully captured by the successful firm the comparison of the social optimum and the market equilibrium involves balancing spillover and crowding effects pigovian corrective policies as well as strategic policies for a subset of colluding firms are discussed

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

monetary policy and long term interest rates an efficient markets approach abstract this paper is an application of efficient markets theory to analyze empirically the relationship of money supply growth and long term interest rates this approach has the advantage over calier research on this subject in that it imposes a theoretical structure on this relationship that flows easier interpretation of the empirical results as well as more powerful statistical tests on the interest of ascertaining the robustness of the results many different empirical tests are carried out in this paper and they uniformly do not support the preposition that increases in the money supply are correlated with declines in long rates

the simple economics of research portfolios this article identifies biases in market portfolios of parallel research projects arising from the noncongruence of social goals and private aspirations occasioned by those circumstances where the market rewards only the winner and where the winner is awarded the entire social surplus it is shown that under risk neutrality this noncongruence implies that t he market encourages the development of too many discoveries too lar ge a spread in the distribution of the quality of discoveries and an excessive occurrence of multiple discoveries copyright 1987 by royal economic society

domestic and international financial market responses to federal deficit announcements abstract this study examines the response of domestic and international financial variables to announced changes in federal deficit projections over the 1981 1994 period as observed in earlier studies rates on us treasury securities responded positively to announced increases in federal deficit projections new evidence shows that deficit effects are transmitted internationally with foreign long term interest rates also increasing in response to announced increases in us deficit projections the exchange value of the dollar tends to be positively related to announced changes in deficit projections but that result appears to be related to the degree of insulation of foreign financial markets from us financial markets finally the price of gold responded positively to announced changes in deficit projections taken together the results suggest that higher projected deficits raise real interest rates in part because of an increase in an inflation risk premium

money supply announcements interest rates and foreign exchange abstract this paper presents a test of the joint hypothesis that money supply announcements affect the real interest rate and that changes in the real interest rate affect the exchange rate in the short run the test results are consistent with the joint hypothesis for example it is found that announcement of an unexpected jump in the money supply is accompanied by an increase in interest rates and an appreciation of the dollar if the rise in interest rates was entirely due to higher inflationary expectations the dollar should not appreciate

reserves announcements and interest rates does monetary policy matter the author provides evidence on the perceived existence of strong liquidity effect the analysis is based on the response of the term structure of interest rates to the weekly federal reserve announcements of bank reserves during the post october 1979 period it is shown that unanticipated changes in the mix between borrowed and nonborrowed reserves cause expected real interest rates to change after the announcement because they provide information about a future change in the supply of money a precise model is developed and tested during subperiods of nonborrowed and borrowed reserves targeting by the fed

the optimal patent term under uncertainty this paper investigates the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on the optimal patent term two types of uncertainty are discussed uncertainty over the size of cost reduction and uncertainty about the output demand of the invention using industry with cost reduction uncertainty and risk neutral inventors the optimal patent term will be shorter than in the certainty case risk aversion increases the optimal patent life vis a vis risk neutrality

market response to the weekly money supply announcements in the 1970s the hypothesis that the weekly announcement of the money supply affects interest rates is examined the announcement effect is interpreted as a policy anticipation effect that is an unanticipated increase in the money supply leads to an increase in interest rates in anticipation of future tightening by the federal reserve estimates of this effect with proxies for the unanticipated change constructed from a survey of money supply forecasts and an arima model indicate that a financial markets respond very quickly to the announcement and b the response was largest when policymakers emphasized the importance of the monetary aggregates financial market participants are careful observers of the weekly money supply announcement and generally agree that the announcement often leads to changes in interest rates this occurs because the announcement leads market participants to revise their expectations both of future federal reserve policy actions and of future economic conditions in this paper we examine the response of yields on treasury bills to the announcement of the money supply and the extent to which that response has varied in the last ten years money supply announcements may affect market interest rates in three ways first actual expansion of the money supply leads to lower interest rates through a liquidity effect however rapid monetary growth which is not anticipated leads market participants to expect the federal reserve to counteract such growth in the future as a consequence there may be a policy anticipation effect which causes higher interest rates in anticipation of future tightening furthermore prolonged rapid monetary growth also creates inflation and inflationary expectations which lead to higher interest rates thus there may exist a third effect the inflationary expectations effect which also leads to higher interest rates our interest in this paper is in the immediate market response to the weekly announcement of the money supply which as we argue below is most likely to be a policy anticipation effect the policy anticipation effect is best described by example suppose that the announced change in the money supply exceeds that which was expected by

technology adoption learning spillovers and the optimal duration of patent based monopolies abstract the paper analyses an often overlooked aspect of the patent system namely that a monopoly franchise for production of a new good could lead to a second best welfare optimum event when there was no future prospect of inventions being induced by the patent it is shown that a paten may improve economic welfare relative to a regime of competitive supply when there are learning externalities or spillovers from experience in the process of production comparative statics show that stronger learning effects at low levels of experience tend to strengthen the case for ex post grant of a monopoly franchise

portfolio choice in research and development we analyze the effects of a winner take all patent mechanism on the riskiness of the research strategies chosen by competingfirms as well as on thefirms incentives to duplicate research projects nash equilibrium choices are compared with the social optimum in a oneshot simultaneous move game in which competitors choose the riskiness or correlation of their research performances we show that neither society nor firms have any preference for correlation per se while the divergence between social and privately optimal levels of risk depends on skewness characteristics of the probability distribution over discovery dates and on levels of risk aversion

the return of the liquidity effect a study of the short run relation between money growth and interest rates in this article i use band pass filters to investigate the short run relationship between money growth and interest rates i find a negative correlation between short run movements in money growth and interest rates which i interpret as evidence that the liquidity effect dominates the anticipated inflation effect

inflation and the poor using polling data for 31 869 households in 38 countries and allowing for country effects the authors show that the poor are more likely than the rich to mention inflation as a top national concern this result survives several robustness checks also direct measures of improvements in well being for the poor the change in their share of national income the percentage decline in poverty and the percentage change in the real minimum wage are negatively correlated with inflation in pooled cross country samples high inflation tends to lower the share of the bottom quintile and the real minimum wage and tends to increase poverty

how broad should the scope of patent protection be i explore the trade off between a patent s length that is its lifetime and its width that is its scope of coverage a wider patent generally reduces the distortion of consumers choices between the patented brand of the product and unpatented lower priced varieties sold by competitors but also permits higher prices which increase relative to profits the deadweight losses from consumers switching consumption out of the product class i show under what conditions infinitely lived but very narrowly focused patents are the socially efficient way to reward innovation and under what conditions very short lived but very broad patents are optimal

novelty and disclosure in patent law the stringency of the novelty requirement in patent law affects the pace of innovation because it affects the amount of technical information that is disclosed among firms it also affects ex ante profitability of research we compare weak and strong novelty requirements from the standpoint of social efficiency we ask how our answer depends on the rule that determines which firm gets a patent when two firms have patents pending on the same technology the possible rules are first to invent which applies in the u s and first to file which applies everywhere else

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had