nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

effects of piracy on quality of information goods it is commonly believed that piracy of information goods leads to lower profits which translate to lower incentives to invest in innovation and eventually to lower quality products manufacturers policy makers and researchers all claim that inadequate piracy enforcement efforts translate to lower investments in product development however we find many practical examples that contradict this claim therefore to examine this claim more carefully we develop a rigorous economic model of the manufacturer s quality decision problem in the presence of piracy we consider a monopolist who does not have any marginal costs but has a product development cost quadratic in the quality level produced the monopolist faces a consumer market heterogeneous in its preference for quality and offers a quality level that maximizes its profit we also allow for the possibility that the manufacturer may use versioning to counter piracy we unexpectedly find that in certain situations lower piracy enforcement increases the monopolist s incentive to invest in quality we explain the reasons and welfare implications of our findings this paper was accepted by lorin hitt information systems

optimization and analysis of the profitability of tariff structures with two part tariffs abstract service providers often offer tariff structures with several two part tariffs that consist of a fixed fee and a usage price such that consumers may pick the tariff they prefer prices of tariffs have significant impacts on service providers profit because they simultaneously influence consumers tariff choices and their usage the number of tariffs also plays an important role because more tariffs segment the market better but also increase the administrative burden and require more marketing effort this article presents a mixed integer nonlinear programming optimization problem to determine profit maximizing tariffs compares several heuristic search methods in particular the gradient method stochastic search and simulated annealing to solve this problem analyses the profitability of different tariff structures and outlines the factors that drive differences in profitability across various tariff structures the results show that especially for large samples of more than 100 consumers simulated annealing performs best and deviates only 0 2 from the optimum structures with fewer two part tariffs are generally sufficient because additional two part tariffs only negligibly increase service providers profit

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

rational prepayments and the valuation of collateralized mortgage obligations absteract this article presents a procedure for evaluating collateralized mortgage obligation cmo tranches the solution procedure is in the spirit of a dynamic programming problem in which an individual mortgagor s decision to prepay is the feedback control variable the mortgagor seeks to minimize the value of the mortgage subject to refinancing costs we employ a two step procedure to solve this dynamic programming problem the first step uses an implicit finite difference backward solution procedure to determine the optimal prepayment boundary for a class of mortgagors each of whom confronts the same proportional refinancing cost this step is repeated for several different classes of mortgagors that differ in the level of refinancing costs that they confront the outcome of this first step is a series of prepayment boundaries one set of boundaries for each level of refinancing costs i e one set of boundaries for each refinancing cost category of mortgagors in the second step the prepayment boundaries determined in the first step are used in conjunction with monte carlo simulation to value the cmo tranches the essence of the second step is that when the simulated interest rate hits the boundary for a particular class it triggers a prepayment scenario for that class of mortgagors we conduct extensive sensitivity analysis to determine the robustness of this approach and our solution procedure to alternative single factor models of the term structure of interest rates and to alternative specifications of the distribution of refinancing cost levels confronted by mortgagors the sensitivity analysis indicates that cmo tranche valuation is not particularly sensitive to alternative models of the term structure so long as the models are consistent with the current yield curve but even when alternative specifications of the refinancing cost categories generate nearly identical values for the collateral underlying the cmo i e the generic mortgage backed securities the resulting tranche values can differ widely between the two specifications the results point out the importance of accurate estimation of the distribution of refinancing costs when the rational valuation model is used for the analysis of cmo tranches

the bidder s curse traditional explanations for the popularity of auctions are efficiency and revenue maximization we argue that another reason is the potential for overbidding i e buyers bidding above their willingness to pay outside the auction the auction mechanism ensures that even if only few buyers overbid they affect prices and allocations we employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field comparing auction prices to simultaneous fixed prices for identical items on the same ebay webpage we argue that fixed prices provide an upper bound for auction bids in a detailed data set of board game auctions we find that the final price exceeds the simultaneous fixed price in 42 percent of the auctions the result is not explained by differences in item quality shipping costs or seller reputation prior auction experience does not eliminate overbidding the finding replicates in a second broad data set of a cross section of auctions 48 percent overbidding the substantial fraction of overbid auctions is induced by a small number of bidders only 17 percent ever bid above the fixed price using a simple model of second price auctions with alternative fixed prices we show that transaction costs of switching between auctions and fixed prices cannot explain the results given that even the expected auction price is higher than the fixed price consistent with limited attention the closer the fixed price is listed relative to an auction the less likely are overbids this effect is strongest for bidders first bids when they are likely to examine the auction and fixed price listings more closely

network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly abstract network externalities characterize the consumption of many products in a setting where a monopolist does not price discriminate without externalities we show that presence of network externalities induces the monopolist to price discriminate and segment its market

trading complex assets we perform an experimental study of complexity to assess its eect on trading behavior price volatility liquidity and trade eciency subjects were asked to deduce the value of a particular asset from information they were given about the composition and price of several portfolios following that subjects traded with each other anonymously in a well dened simple bargaining process portfolio composition ranged from requiring simple analysis to more complicated computation in order to deduce the value of the asset complexity altered subjects bidding strategies decreased liquidity increased price volatility and decreased trade eciency however in follow up experiments we show that uncertainty over private values does not lead to the same changes in trading behavior therefore while complexity induces estimation errors and higher uncertainty this is not what drives our results

securitization bubbles structured finance with disagreement about default risk abstract an additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets when risk neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists demand on risky tranches with disagreement about default correlation low correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless high correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

research note when is versioning optimal for information goods this paper provides insights about when versioning is an optimal strategy for information goods our characterization of this class of goods is that variable costs are invariant with quality including the special case of zero variable costs our analysis assumes a monopoly firm that has an existing product in the market and has an opportunity to segment the market by introducing additional lower quality versions we derive a simple decision rule for determining the optimality of versioning based on the solution to a single product maximization problem versioning is optimal when the optimal market share of the lower quality version offered alone is greater than the optimal market share of the high quality version offered alone a firm can profitably employ versioning for an information good if it can design the lower quality in a way that relative to their valuations for the high end version high type consumers have a lower relative valuation for the lower quality than do low type consumers when variable costs increase a firm that offered only one product version need not consider adding another version when variable costs decrease the firm should explore adding a lower quality version

a one factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options 1990 a one factor model of interest rates and its application to treasury bond options financial analysts journal vol 46 no 1 pp 33 39

information goods vs industrial goods cost structure and competition we study markets for information goods and find that they differ significantly from markets for traditional industrial goods markets for information goods in which products are vertically differentiated lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods as a result a monopoly will offer only a single product competition leads to highly concentrated information good markets with the leading firm behaving almost like a monopoly even with free entry and without network effects we study how the structure of the firms cost functions drives our results this paper was accepted by barrie r nault information systems

mathematical modelling in the wake of the crisis a blessing or a curse what does the economics profession say the economics profession has been heavily criticised for not anticipating the economic crisis that began in 2007 and even now economists seem unable to suggest ways out of this crisis it is widely acknowledged that the emphasis of modern economics over the last 50 years has been heavily mathematical and formalistic the aim of this paper is to examine whether in the wake of the crisis academic economists have examined this emphasis on mathematics and further to investigate the extent to which they are considering changing their methodological orientation the results of our field study show that many economists have tended to reaffirm their position and argued for the use of newer better mathematical models in economics

signalling to experts we study competitive equilibria in a signalling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers in terms of the classic spence 1973 the quarterly journal of economics 87 355 374 model of job market signalling firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types in addition to observing their education firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information i e their expertise in equilibrium some high type workers forgo signalling and are hired by better informed firms which make positive profits workers education decisions and firms use of their expertise are strategic complements allowing for multiple equilibria that can be pareto ranked we characterize wage dispersion and the extent of signalling as a function of the distribution of expertise among firms our model can also be applied to a variety of other signalling problems including securitization corporate financial structure insurance markets or dividend policy

is the market for mortgage backed securities a market for lemons this paper models and provides empirical evidence for the quality of assets that are securitized through bankruptcy remote special purpose vehicles spvs the model predicts that assets sold to spvs will be of lower quality lemons compared to assets that are not sold to spvs we find strong empirical support for this prediction using a comprehensive data set of sales of mortgage backed securities freddie mac participation certificates or pcs to spvs over the period 1991 through 2002 valuation estimates based on a structural two factor model indicate that pcs sold to spvs are on average valued 0 39 lower per 100 of face value relative to pcs not so sold for the four largest coupon groups in our full sample of freddie mac pcs we find a lemons spread of 4 6 basis points in terms of yield to maturity and this spread accounts for 13 45 of the overall prepayment spread of these securities jel d82 g13 g14 g21

stock auction bidding behavior and information asymmetries an empirical analysis using the discriminatory auction model framework abstract this paper empirically analyzes bidding behavior and information asymmetries of stock auctions using a discriminatory auction model framework analyzing stock auctions using auction theory is important because it provides a logical framework for explaining observable behaviors and a solid foundation for empirical testing because of limited availability of stock auction data existing empirical research based on auction theory focus mainly on treasury auctions away from the treasury markets however there is a significant paucity of literature on this subject in this study we make use of a detailed stock auction data set from the taiwan stock exchange to empirically examine the behaviors of the taiwan stock auction market within the framework of the auction theory our results show that the level of competition the dispersion of opinion among bidders and the bidder s risk aversion are significant in determining auction prices results also show that if the offering prices are set equal to the average offering prices the first day post initial public offering abnormal return will be equal to zero additionally we find institutional bidders possess superior bidding skills compared to small bidders and that underwriter s characteristics influence the bidding results

the valuation of complex derivatives by major investment firms empirical evidence this article examines the auction of a portfolio of collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major broker dealers and institutional investors the unique data set allows us to analyze a number of important empirical questions related to the valuation of cmos by the bidders and the elasticity of demand for the securities the results reveal that the valuations differ substantially implying a significant elasticity of demand this article is designed to shed light on two related questions first it extends the work of bagwell 1991 1992 brown and ryngaert 1990 and bradley desai and kim 1988 among others on shareholder heterogeneity and the elasticity of the demand for financial assets to date the empirical research on investor heterogeneity has focused on common stock this article supplements previous work by examining an auction of another class of securities complex collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major securities dealers and institutional investors second it provides perspective on fixed income valuation models in the spirit of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 and black derman and toy 1990 virtually all of these models even those that specify relatively complex interest rate processes assume homogeneous beliefs this implies that within the constraints imposed by estimation error sophisticated investors should place equal values on fixed income securities bagwell observes that investors can be heterogeneous along several dimensions first heterogeneity can be induced by tax rules to the extent that different investors are taxed in different ways their demand for securities will be affected second transaction costs can cause heterogeneity by driving a wedge between buyers sellers and owners of a security third investors can differ in their assessments of the value of a security either because they possess different information or because they analyze that information in different ways fourth investors can face different nontradeable risks and thus can have different assessments of the value of a security depending on how it interacts with these risks finally it has been suggested by lee shleifer and thaler 1991 among others that investors may differ for idio