strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases dynamic pricing offers the potential to increase revenues at the same time it creates an incentive for customers to strategize over the timing of their purchases a firm should ideally account for this behavior when making its pricing and stocking decisions in particular we investigate whether it is optimal for a firm to create rationing risk by deliberately understocking products then the resulting threat of shortages creates an incentive for customers to purchase early at higher prices but when does such a strategy make sense if it is profitable to create shortages what is the optimal amount of rationing risk to create we develop a stylized model to study this problem in our model customers have heterogeneous valuations for the firm s product and face declining prices over two periods customers are assumed to have identical risk preferences and know the price path and fill rate in each period via its capacity choice the firm is able to control the fill rate and hence the rationing risk faced by customers customers behave strategically and weigh the payoff of immediate purchases against the expected payoff of delaying their purchases we analyze the capacity choice that maximizes the firm s profits first we consider a monopoly market and characterize conditions under which rationing is optimal we examine how the optimal amount of rationing is affected by the magnitude of price changes over time and the degree of risk aversion among customers we then analyze an oligopoly version of the model and show that competition reduces the firms ability to profit from rationing indeed there exists a critical number of firms beyond which a rationing equilibrium cannot be supported

optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons in many industries managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline we investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm s objective is to maximize expected revenues examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry which markets space such as seats on airline flights cabins on vacation cruises and rooms in hotels that become worthless if not sold by a specific time we formulate this problem using intensity control and obtain structural monotonicity results for the optimal intensity resp price as a function of the stock level and the length of the horizon for a particular exponential family of demand functions we find the optimal pricing policy in closed form for general demand functions we find an upper bound on the expected revenue based on analyzing the deterministic version of the problem and use this bound to prove that simple fixed price policies are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity finally we extend our results to the case where demand is compound poisson only a finite number of prices is allowed the demand rate is time varying holding costs are incurred and cash flows are discounted the initial stock is a decision variable and reordering overbooking and random cancellations are allowed

optimal preorder strategy with endogenous information control in this paper we investigate the integrated information and pricing strategy for a seller who can take customer preorders before the release of a product the preorder option enables the seller to sell a product at an early stage when consumers are less certain about their valuations we find that the optimal pricing strategy may be highly dependent on the amount of information available at preorder and that a small change in the latter may cause a dramatic change in the proportion of consumers who preorder under optimal pricing furthermore the seller s optimal information strategy depends on a key measure the normalized margin which is the ratio between the expected profit margin and the standard deviation of consumer valuation although the seller may want to release some information or none she should never release all information finally under the optimal information and pricing strategy the benefit of preorder is most pronounced when the normalized margin is in a medium range this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

risk preferences and pesticide use by cotton farmers in china abstract despite that insect resistant bt cotton has been lauded for its ability to reduce the use of pesticides studies have shown that chinese bt cotton farmers continue to use excessive amounts of pesticides using results from a survey and an artefactual field experiment we find that farmers who are more risk averse use greater quantities of pesticides we also find that farmers who are more loss averse use lesser quantities of pesticides this result is consistent with our conceptual framework and suggestive evidence where farmers behave in a loss averse manner in the health domain and place more weight on the importance of health over money in the loss domain

dynamic pricing strategies with reference effects we consider the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm in a market with repeated interactions where demand is sensitive to the firm s pricing history consumers have memory and are prone to human decision making biases and cognitive limitations as the firm manipulates prices consumers form a reference price that adjusts as an anchoring standard based on price perceptions purchase decisions are made by assessing prices as discounts or surcharges relative to the reference price in the spirit of prospect theory we prove that optimal pricing policies induce a perception of monotonic prices whereby consumers always perceive a discount respectively surcharge relative to their expectations the effect is that of a skimming or penetration strategy the firm s optimal pricing path is monotonic on the long run but not necessarily at the introductory stage if consumers are loss averse we show that optimal prices converge to a constant steady state price characterized by a simple implicit equation otherwise the optimal policy cycles the range of steady states is wider the more loss averse consumers are steady state prices decrease with the strength of the reference effect and with customers memory all else equal offering lower prices to frequent customers may be suboptimal however if these are less sensitive to price changes than occasional buyers if managers ignore such long term implications of their pricing strategy the model indicates that they will systematically price too low and lose revenue our results hold under very general reference dependent demand models

implications of agency theory for optimal land tenure contracts explores landowner tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation introduction of principal agent models influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner tenant risk sharing need to study adequate tenant incentives this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fiscal incidence in an overlapping generations model with a fixed asset abstract we analyze a model of overlapping generations with a fixed factor land malleable capital and labor we consider the dynamic effects of various fiscal policies including taxes on rent wages and creation of public debt on capital accumulation land prices and intergenerational welfare minimal assumptions uniqueness and stability imply that a land tax may initially raise land values but the upper bound is less than one half of the tax revenues assuming homothetic utility the ratio between the long run capital responses to a land tax and to a lump sum transfer of equivalent revenue from the young to the old depends solely on the share of labor

when equal opportunity is not enough training costs and intergenerational inequality this paper develops an individual optimization model with persistent intergenerational immobility its key feature is that training costs are negatively correlated with family background leading to differences in privately optimal training levels across population groups heterogeneity of innate abilities is shown to reduce but not eliminate the importance of family backgrounds conversely wage thresholds which result from indivisibilities in the production or training functions or noncompetitive elements in the economy such as segmented labor markets increase the scope for inequality in the steady state

consumption during retirement the missing link in the life cycle this study presents the first evidence on the relation of consumption to lifetime wealth based on data from the 1973 and 1975 retirement history survey that have been linked to social security earnings records nearly 500 white married fully retired couples ages 62 69 form the basis of the analysis on average their consumption early in retirement exceeds by 14 percent the income that their financial pension and social security wealth can generate this implies that their saving both private and through social security is insufficient to sustain consumption throughout the rest of their lives additional evidence based on changes in spending between 1973 and 1975 shows that these households respond by reducing their real consumption at a rate sufficient to generate positive changes in net financial worth within a few years after retirement these two pieces of evidence can be rationalized by a rate of time preference much higher than the interest rate coupled with either a bequest motive or uncertainty about the length of life they also imply that even when combined with private pensions and savings social security in the united states today does not enable most recipients to maintain their living standard at the levels they enjoyed before they retired this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

revenue management by sequential screening abstract using a mechanism design approach we consider a firm s optimal pricing policy when consumers are heterogeneous and learn their valuations at different times we show that by offering a menu of advance purchase contracts that differ in when and for how much the product can be returned a firm can more easily price discriminate between privately informed consumers in particular we show that screening on when the return option can be exercised increases firm profits relative to screening on the size of the refund alone only if the expected gains from trade are higher for consumers who learn later we show that in some settings mean preserving spread the firm can achieve the complete information profits and analyze the optimal contract in other settings first order stochastic dominance in which the first best allocation is not always feasible

the role of intergenerational transfers and life cycle saving in the accumulation of wealth he purpose of this paper is to review what economists know at present about the following question how large a portion of the existing wealth is the result of a bequest motive that is of accumulation for the specific purpose of leaving bequests i will also endeavor to clarify why an answer to this question is of interest in the early keynesian period when the study of national saving first attracted wide interest relatively little attention was paid to what led people to save though it was generally understood that the main systematic reason was to leave bequests j m keynes in the famous chapter 9 of the general theory of employment interest and money 1936 had listed seven distinct motives for saving besides the leaving of bequests but five of these which include to increase one s future income or to insure one s independence and power implied that all or nearly all the accumulation would finally wind up as bequeathed wealth this in turn meant that most private wealth originated through bequests that is it either had been received through bequests or was destined to be bequeathed and indeed how else could society accumulate wealth however keynes 1936 p 107 also mentioned two further motives precaution that is to build up a reserve against unforeseen contingencies and foresight that is to provide for an anticipated future relation between the income and the needs of the individual or his family different from that which exists in the present as for example in relation to old age family education or the maintenance of dependents these motives in contrast to most of the previous ones have the

contracts biases and consumption of access services we study theoretically and empirically the consumption of access services we demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure pay per use versus three part tariffs even if the optimal consumption plans are identical we find that although there is extensive individual heterogeneity on average consumers choices follow a structure that is similar to a nearly optimal heuristic and correctly react to imbalances between the number of free calls and call opportunities remaining however consumers use the free units too quickly leading to overconsumption and lost surplus these errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution we also measure subjects willingness to pay for a contract with free access units and we find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per unit price with a substantial fraction willing to overpay in response the optimal firm strategy offers a three part tariff at a very small discount which increases revenue by 8 14 compared to only offering a pay per use contract data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2013 1889 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

perishable asset revenue management with markovian time dependent demand intensities many industries face the problem of selling a fixed stock of items over a finite horizon these industries include airlines selling seats before planes depart hotels renting rooms before midnight theaters selling seats before curtain time and retailers selling seasonal items with long procurement lead times given a sunk investment in seats rooms or winter coats the objective for these industries is to maximize revenues in excess of salvage value when demand is price sensitive and stochastic pricing is an effective tool to maximize expected revenues in this paper we address the problem of deciding the optimal timing of price changes within a given menu of allowable possibly time dependent price paths each of which is associated with a general poisson process with markovian time dependent predictable intensities we show that a set of variational inequalities characterize the value functions and the optimal possibly random time changes in addition we develop an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal value functions and the optimal pricing policy

consumption externality and yield uncertainty in the influenza vaccine supply chain interventions in demand and supply sides we study the impact of yield uncertainty supply side and self interested consumers demand side on the inefficiency in the influenza vaccine supply chain previous economic studies focusing on demand side find that the equilibrium demand is always less than the socially optimal demand because self interested individuals do not internalize the social benefit of protecting others via reduced infectiousness positive externality in contrast we show that the equilibrium demand can be greater than the socially optimal demand after accounting for the limited supply due to yield uncertainty and manufacturer s incentives the main driver for this result is a second negative externality self interested individuals ignore that vaccinating people with high infection costs is more beneficial for the society when supply is limited we show that the extent of the negative externality can be reduced through more efficient and less uncertain allocation mechanisms to investigate the relative effectiveness of government interventions on supply and demand sides under various demand and supply characteristics we construct two partially centralized scenarios where the social planner i e government intervenes either on the demand side or the supply side but not both we conduct an extensive numerical analysis this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

revenue management with partially refundable fares we introduce and analyze an intertemporal choice model where customer valuations are uncertain and evolve over time the model leads directly to the study of call options on capacity that are similar to partially refundable fares we show that the capacity provider earns significantly higher revenues by selling real options on capacity than on low to high pricing we also investigate the social implications and show that the use of options is both socially optimal and socially efficient

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior customer choice behavior such as buy up and buy down is an important phenomenon in a wide range of revenue management contexts yet most revenue management methodologies ignore this phenomenon or at best approximate it in a heuristic way in this paper we provide an exact and quite general analysis of this problem specifically we analyze a single leg reserve management problem in which the buyers choice behavior is modeled explicitly the choice model is very general simply specifying the probability of purchase for each fare product as a function of the set of fare products offered the control problem is to decide which subset of fare products to offer at each point in time we show that the optimal policy for this problem has a quite simple form namely it consists of identifying an ordered family of efficient subsets s 1 s m and at each point in time opening one of these sets s k where the optimal index k is increasing in the remaining capacity x and decreasing in the remaining time that is the more capacity or less time available the further the optimal set is along this sequence we also show that the optimal policy is a nested allocation policy if and only if the sequence of efficient sets is nested that is s 1 s 2 s m moreover we give a characterization of when nesting by fare order is optimal we also develop an estimation procedure for this setting based on the expectation maximization em method that jointly estimates arrival rates and choice model parameters when no purchase outcomes are unobservable numerical results are given to illustrate both the model and estimation procedure

the effect of social security on lifetime wealth accumulation and bequests this paper is an empirical study of the effects of social security on lifetime wealth accumulation and bequests using a sample of wisconsin males we have matched lifetime earnings records from income tax returns with their social security account records and their bequests obtained from probate court records since the cohort of males was born between 1890 and 1899 they represent a cohort that saw a great change in the size and coverage by occupation of the system hence there is substantial within cohort variation in social security wealth from which effects can be estimated for nearly 30 years the life cycle theory of savings has enjoyed an enormous amount of academic support in the no bequest variant individuals save with the sole intention of consuming their savings in later years the economy wide stock of capital can therefore be generated by this pattern without any reliance on bequests modigliani 1966 such a model will lead to rather strong predictions about the effect of a pay as you go public pension hereafter social security on private savings as feldstein 1974 points out social security should displace private savings as well as reduce macro saving since the programme is unfunded this result follows from the assumption that each household will consume all of its assets during its own lifetime some recent research however has been at odds with the no bequest variant of the life cycle model see kurz 1984 and included references darby 1979 claims that life cycle assets savings consumed later in the life cycle constitute only 13 29 per cent of total assets kotlikoff and summers 1981 report that the major share nearly 80 per cent of capital stock in the united states is due to intergenerational transfers 2 indeed these authors write life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers p 706 in addition recent empirical work suggests that people tend to accumulate or fail to significantly decumulate wealth wealth in old age a finding at odds with the strict life cycle model 3 given the potentially large role of bequests in the process of capital accumulation it is important to know how bequests are affected by the large public programme that social security has become even if social security depresses private savings among those near or at retirement if people bequeath it is conceivable that saving during retirement is augmented by the programme 4 aside from the issue of savings effects the response of people s bequests to their old age benefits might allow one to assess the target efficiency of the social security system since the original objective of the system was to ensure adequate levels of consumption among the elderly a finding that benefits

the role of risk and transaction costs in contract design evidence from farmland lease contracts in u s agriculture the objective of this article is to provide new empirical evidence on landlord tenant choices of share versus cash rent contracts in u s agriculture the focus is on the contribution of explanatory variables that represent transaction costs risk sharing incentives or both an empirical model of contract choice is tested against the 1999 agricultural economics and land ownership survey aelos and finds mixed evidence for low transaction cost and risk sharing incentive motives for landlord tenant choices of a share versus cash rent contract however the behavior of landlords and tenants is consistent with them being risk averse although it is standard to control for the riskiness of the principal s task that is contracted we find that other attributes of the landlord are an important part of a relatively complex story for u s land tenancy contacting the latter results have generally been ignored in other published landlord tenant contracting studies

strategic waiting for consumer generated quality information dynamic pricing of new experience goods in this paper we study the impact of consumer generated quality information e g consumer reviews on a firm s dynamic pricing strategy in the presence of strategic consumers such information is useful not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product but also to the firm the informativeness of the consumer generated quality information depends however on the volume of consumers who share their opinions and thus depends on the initial sales volume hence via its initial price the firm not only influences its revenue but also controls the quality information flow over time the firm may either enhance or dampen the quality information flow via increasing or decreasing initial sales the corresponding pricing strategy to steer the quality information flow is not always intuitive compared to the case without consumer generated quality information the firm may reduce the initial sales and lower the initial price interestingly the firm may get strictly worse off due to the consu

the efficiency of advance purchase discounts in the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty abstract the pricing behavior of two airlines is examined one is operated by a welfare maximizing social planner the other by an unregulated monopolist total capacity is fixed and aggregate demand is uncertain it is shown that advance purchase discounts can assist in attaining an efficient allocation of capacity when it is not feasible to operate a spot market on the day of the flight it is further shown that the planner may offer larger or smaller discounts than the monopolist

contract choice in modern agriculture cash rent versus cropshare e conomists have expended enormous effort examining the rationale for various contractual arrangements in agriculture particularly sharecropping while economists have made considerable theoretical efforts to understand agricultural contracts few empirical studies have been undertaken the dearth of empirical analyses of agricultural contracts is particularly striking for modern western agriculture this is an important omission not only because the existing empirical work tends to focus on the question of efficiency but also because the theoretical models tend to examine contracts that bear little resemblance to those found in the united states today

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

price discrimination on booking time abstract even if consumers are forward looking and free to choose when to purchase a firm can price discriminate on booking time if consumers learn their valuations at different times and consumers who learn later have higher valuations the model is related to our work on optimal screening with returns contracts akan ata and dana 1 but here we consider a simpler binary valuation distribution and consider more realistic consumer learning assumptions the main contribution is to show that the profitability of screening on time is robust to relaxing the assumption that consumers learn instantaneously in addition to analyzing a bad news model in which information arrives gradually we characterize a general bound on consumer optimism that guarantees that the instantaneous learning results are robust

effects of technology on incentive design of share contracts do observed contracts have the properties predicted by the principal agent model with moral hazard in contract theory this paper tests the predictions of such an agency model in the context of sharecropping in north india the most well known explanation for sharecropping is based on the principal agent model with a trade off between risk and incentives even though sharecropping contracts are quite prevalent in rural areas of developing countries there is very little evidence on factors determining the instruments used to provide incentives in such contracts using information in the data giving rise to exogenous variation in technology across regions this paper tests for the effect of cultivation technology on the incentive structure of share contracts as predicted by the agency model existing empirical evidence on sharecropping seems to indicate that yield on sharecropped plots is lower than on owner operated plots i e there is an incentive problem or moral hazard radwan a shaban 1987 jean jacques laffont and mohamed s matoussi 1995 there is some informal evidence that landowners use various mechanisms to improve efficiency in sharecropping by participating in cost sharing and by repeating contracts robert m townsend and rolf a mueller 1994 examine the nature of these mechanisms in detail but their data do not permit econometric tests more generally though the principal agent model has been widely studied there is little existing empirical evidence for it michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 find that executive compensation is only weakly sensitive to firm performance in recent work rajesh k aggarwal and andrew a samwick 1999 find that executive s pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of firm s performance however their results are sensitive to the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms in the regressions as pierre a chiappori and bernard salanie 2003 note in a recent survey empirical work on contract theory using nonexperimental data needs to be careful in adequately correcting for underlying heterogeneity across agents otherwise the parameters of interest would be hard to interpret if such heterogeneity affects contract choice for example douglas w allen and dean lueck 1995 find no role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contracts but they do not take the heterogeneity across agents into account in a recent paper addressing the issue of heterogeneity across agents ackerberg and botticini 2002 find a significant role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contract after correcting for endogenous matching between landowners and tenants they find that wealthier tenants are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts in this paper we are able to address such estimation issues and check for the robustness of our results regarding the relationship between technology and the design of share contracts department of economics pennsylvania state university university park pa 16801 e mail pxp22 psu edu this paper derives from related work done earlier in my dissertation i am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions i thank james heckman lars stole robert townsend kala krishna and seminar participants for useful comments financial support from the andrew mellon foundation for both rounds of fieldwork is gratefully acknowledged any errors remain my own 1 see nirvikar singh 1991 for a survey of various theories of sharecropping including steven n cheung 1969 c h hanumantha rao 1971 joseph e stiglitz 1974 david newbery and stiglitz 1979 avishay braverman and stiglitz 1982 mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal 1985 and sudhir shetty 1988 a common feature of the different theories is an emphasis on uncertainty and asymmetric information 2 an exception is daniel a ackerberg and maristella botticini 2002 ackerberg and botticini differ from our paper in that they examine the role of tenant s risk aversion in the choice between fixed rental contract and share contract they do not examine share contracts per se 3 see john e core and wayne guay 2000

a language theory of discrimination any advanced industrial society is composed of a number of speech communities with different verbal and nonverbal languages in particular in the united states blacks and whites and men and women have sharply differing methods of speaking and listening this paper develops a model in which people can only work together if they speak the same language and in which it is costly to learn a second language the competitive market will tend to minimize communication through segregation but if interaction is required the cost will be borne by the minority a number of nontrivial predictions are derived from the model

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

the family inheritance and the intergenerational transmission of inequality unequal inheritance of material wealth is commonly considered a major cause of inequality in consumption however theoretical models of the intergenerational transmission of inequality by becker blinder and ishikawa imply that unequal inheritance may either increase or reduce consumption inequality differences in inherited wealth resulting from unequal parental incomes increase inequality in recipients consumption however unequal bequests caused by differences among families in the endowed ability of children or the costs of producing human capital are equalizing empirical results confirm these predictions the inheritance received by children is inversely related to both children s income and parental education thus bequests are compensatory in that ceteris paribus low income children inherit more than their advantaged contemporaries

electronic tickets smart cards and online prepayments when and how to advance sell advance selling occurs when sellers allow buyers to purchase at a time preceding consumption shugan and xie 2000 electronic tickets smart cards online prepayments and other technological advances make advance selling possible for many if not all service providers these technologies lower the cost of making complex transactions at a greater distance from the seller s site they also give sellers more control over advance selling by decreasing arbitrage as technology enhances the capability to advance sell more academic attention is vital this paper strives to exploit these technologies by developing advance selling strategies until recently advance selling research focused on the airline industry and specific characteristics of that industry these characteristics included the price insensitivity of late arrivals e g business travelers compared with early arrivals e g leisure travelers demand uncertainty across flights on the same day and capacity constraints recent findings by shugan and xie 2000 show that advance selling is a far more general marketing tool than previously thought it does not require these industry specific characteristics it only requires the existence of buyer uncertainty about future valuations moreover sellers without the ability to price discriminate can use advance selling to improve profits to the level of first degree price discrimination this finding is important because buyers are nearly always uncertain about their future valuations for most services e g the utility of next year s vacation or a future college education in this paper we take the next step from shugan and xie 2000 we show that advance selling profits do not come from buyer surplus but from more buyers being able to purchase we determine when and how to advance sell in a variety of situations including situations with limited capacity second period arrivals refunds buyer risk aversion exogenous credibility continuous preference distributions and premium pricing we determine when advance selling improves profits and when it does how to set advance prices we ask and answer seven questions first when should sellers advance sell second how much can advance selling improve profits compared with only spot selling third what factors impact the profitability of advance selling and how fourth should advance prices be higher or lower or the same as spot prices fifth how do capacity constraints impact advance selling strategies sixth should sellers limit the number of advance sales finally what is the possible impact of buyer risk aversion first we provide precise conditions when sellers should advance sell for example without capacity constraints we show that sellers should advance sell when marginal costs are sufficiently low to make it profitable to sell to buyers with low valuations and sufficiently high to convince buyers that the spot price will be higher than the advance price second we find that advance selling can almost double the profits from optimal spot selling to early arrivals we also show that advance selling has no impact on consumer surplus in markets with homogenous consumers and no capacity constraints therefore advance selling can increase social welfare because seller profits increase third we find that two very important factors impacting the profitability of advance selling are seller credibility and marginal costs buyers only advance buy when they expect an advantage from advance buying over spot buying without capacity constraints sellers must credibly convince buyers that the advance price is at a discount to the spot price we show that this condition is met under different circumstances for example large marginal costs can create credibility because buyers believe that these costs will lead to high spot prices fourth we find although optimal advance prices can be at a discount to the spot price that sometimes a premium is optimal premiums are optimal when capacity is large but limited and marginal costs are not too large buyers advance purchase at a premium to spot prices when capacity is limited and spot prices are low note that this is not a risk premium and risk aversion is not required no prior research has suggested this strategy because that research relies on the assumption that early arrivals are more price sensitive than later ones without that assumption premium advance pricing is sometimes optimal fifth we find that binding capacity constraints can impact the profitability of advance selling in opposite ways on one hand capacity constraints create seller credibility buyers believe that spot prices will be high when they know spot capacity is limited and perhaps more limited by advance sales on the other hand when capacity is limited the need to increase sales from discounted advance prices diminishes sixth consistent with desiraju and shugan 1999 we find that limiting advance sales can be profitable but only under restrictive conditions these conditions are 1 selling to all early arrivals would leave insufficient capacity in the spot period to sell to all second period arrivals with high valuations 2 the optimal spot price is high and 3 marginal costs are sufficiently small to make advance selling profitable finally we find that buyer risk aversion can sometimes increase the profitability of advance selling our findings provide precise guidelines for a large number of service providers that will have the technical capability to advance sell for those service providers advance selling provides a creative pricing strategy that can potentially provide substantial improvements in profits

a neoclassical perspective on budget deficits i n the 1988 presidential campaign virtually every serious candidate spoke of the urgent need to trim government budget deficits public opinion polls have identified federal deficits as a key economic issue second only to unemployment while many economists are relieved by what they perceive to be a long overdue political response to a critical economic problem others regard the fuss as much ado about nothing it is indeed remarkable that economists can disagree so severely over an issue which commands such a uniform reaction from laymen of widely different ideologies and political affiliations generally speaking there are three schools of thought concerning the economic effects of budget deficits neoclassical keynesian and ricardian before proceeding further it is useful to review the basic structure and implications of each paradigm the neoclassical paradigm envisions farsighted individuals planning consumption over their own life cycles budget deficits raise total lifetime consumption by shifting taxes to subsequent generations if economic resources are fully employed increased consumption necessarily implies decreased saving interest rates must then rise to bring capital markets into balance thus persistent deficits crowd out private capital accumulation in the current economic environment most economists would agree that these consequences would be highly detrimental

optimal price skimming by a monopolist facing rational consumers this paper considers the intertemporal pricing problem for a monopolist marketing a new product the key feature differentiating this paper from the extant management science literature on intertemporal pricing is the assumption that consumers are intertemporal utility maximizers a subgame perfect nash equilibrium pricing policy is characterized and shown to involve intertemporal price discrimination we compare this policy to the optimal policy for a monopolist facing myopic consumers and find that for any given state prices are always lower with rational consumers than with myopic consumers for plausible parameter values the assumption of consumer rationality can be shown to lead to large differences in optimal prices moreover if a monopolist facing rational consumers implements the optimal myopic consumer pricing policy profits can be significantly less than if the monopolist follows the equilibrium pricing policy for rational consumers

savings and wealth in models with altruistic bequests during recent years much attention has been given to the role of bequests in explaining various aspects of economic behavior for example authors have studied the impact of bequests on physical wealth accumulation laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 the interest elasticity of savings owen evans 1983 tax reform laurence seidman 1984 and the distribution of wealth alan blinder 1976a more recently economists have begun to distinguish between human and physical bequests gary becker and nigel tomes 1986 acknowledging the presence of bequest in human form is important in analyzing each of the issues mentioned above outlays on children affect the shape of the family s labor supply and expenditure profiles upon which the level of aggregate savings crucially depends if these outlays are interest sensitive substitutes for physical bequests they will also influence the interest elasticity of savings in the area of tax reform the neutrality of the consumption tax depends on the ability of the government to identify human capital bequests from general consumption raymond batina 1987 if this is not possible the portfolio choice of investment in human versus physical capital may be distorted at the margin finally the unequal transmission of wealth across generations may be explained by the lack of physical bequests and the inefficiently low levels of human bequests made by wealthconstrained households becker and tomes 1986 to distinguish clearly the behavior of constrained households from unconstrained households who make sizeable physical bequests both types of bequests must be recognized this paper introduces a model that makes explicit examination of these issues possible it extends lord s 1989 multiperiod model of life cycle savings and adult human capital investment by adding altruistically motivated human and physical bequests 2 the model is calibrated using microeconomic data on earnings time and goods expenditures on children s human capital and physical bequests we then use the model to examine the contribution of bequests to wealth accumulation and the level of savings this topic is the source of an important but yet unresolved debate between franco modigliani 1988 and kotlikoff 1988 kotlikoff maintains that u s wealth accumulation is primarily the consequence of bequests as opposed to life cycle savings for retirement one type of evidence cited by kotlikoff comes from simulation results demonstrating the failure of realistically calibrated life cycle models to generate sufficiently high saving rates and wealth income ratios alan auerbach and kotlikoff 1987 we show however that if a pure life cycle

do landlord tenant relationships influence rental contracts for farmland or the cash rental rate a considerable portion of north america s farmland is rented out by nonfarmer landlords our survey of farmers in southern ontario canada provides a refined understanding of who these landlords are and whether variations in landlord tenant relationships influence rental contract choice and or the magnitude of cash rent we find that crop share arrangements are more likely to emerge among family relations however we do not find strong evidence that family relations explain variation in the magnitude of cash rental rates

the role of risk and risk aversion in adoption of alternative marketing arrangements by the u s farmers the objective of this article is to analyse the relationship between farmers risk aversions and the riskiness of various agricultural enterprises to see which marketing arrangements would typically emerge relying on the basic agency theory model we hypothesize the prevalence of alternative marketing arrangements amas in situations with high risk averse farmers and high risk enterprises and the prevalence of spot cash markets for low risk averse participants and less risky enterprises our empirical tests are carried out using the 2004 agricultural resource management survey arms the empirical results are largely supportive of the agency theory of contract choice

advance selling when consumers regret we characterize the effect of anticipated regret on consumer decisions and on firm profits and policies in an advance selling context where buyers have uncertain valuations advance purchases trigger action regret if valuations turn out to be lower than the price paid whereas delaying purchase may cause inaction regret from missing a discount or facing a stockout consumers whom we describe as emotionally rational act strategically in response to the firm s policies and in anticipation of regret in this context regret explains two types of behavioral patterns inertia delayed purchase and frenzies buying early at negative surplus we show how firms should optimally respond to consumer regret and also characterize a normative regret threshold above which they should not advance sell action regret reduces profits as well as the value of advance selling and booking limit policies for price setting firms inaction regret has the opposite effects these effects are diminished by capacity constraints and are reversed for firms facing price pressure in the advance period owing e g to competition or market heterogeneity regret heterogeneity explains premium advance selling for the capacity constrained firm which may benefit from larger shares of regretful buyers finally we show how the negative effects of regret on profits can be mitigated by regret priming marketing campaigns and by offering refunds or options or allowing resales our results highlight the importance of assessing the relative strength of regret within and across market segments and of accounting for these factors in pricing and marketing policies this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

uncertain lifetime consumption and dissaving in retirement this paper asks whether the continued accumulation or mild dissaving observed among the retired can be explained by uncertain lifetime in the absence of annuities after an initial period influenced by borrowing constraints under constant relative risk aversion uncertain lifetime depresses consumption by a proportion increasing with age if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is small illustrative computations based on actual income and survival data show that plausible elasticities are sufficiently small to give this effect the reduction in consumption is large enough to explain much of the lack of decumulation by the elderly

dynamic pricing in the presence of inventory considerations research overview current practices and future directions the benefits of dynamic pricing methods have long been known in industries such as airlines hotels and electric utilities where the capacity is fixed in the short term and perishable in recent years there has been an increasing adoption of dynamic pricing policies in retail and other industries where the sellers have the ability to store inventory three factors contributed to this phenomenon 1 the increased availability of demand data 2 the ease of changing prices due to new technologies and 3 the availability of decision support tools for analyzing demand data and for dynamic pricing this paper constitutes a review of the literature and current practices in dynamic pricing given its applicability in most markets and its increasing adoption in practice our focus is on dynamic intertemporal pricing in the presence of inventory considerations

advance selling effects of interdependent consumer valuations and seller s capacity we examine the impact of consumer valuation interdependence and capacity on a firm s optimal selling strategies we consider a seller who can offer a single product to consumers twice in advance and in spot consumers choose whether and when to buy but if they buy in advance they are uncertain about their own valuations whether they buy in advance or in spot consumers valuations are realized in the spot period and they may range from fully independent to perfectly correlated creating markets with different characteristics of aggregate demand for the seller facing these consumers the seller chooses a portion of the total capacity to offer in advance and prices in both periods we describe how the optimal strategy and benefits of advance selling depend on the interdependence of consumer valuation as well as capacity level and other market parameters we find that a change in valuation interdependence can lead to dramatically different policies for the seller for example when individual valuations are highly diverse and the consumer population is large the seller must offer a discount during advance selling but may limit the advance sales on the other hand when valuations are highly correlated the seller can charge a premium price during advance selling for the same valuation interdependence the qualitative nature of the optimal strategy changes with available capacity this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

on the mis use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion tests of risk sharing in the contracting literature often rely on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion the intuition behind these tests is that since contract choice is monotonic in the coefficients of risk aversion which are themselves assumed monotonic in wealth the effect of a change in wealth on contract choice is clearly identified we show that tests of risk sharing relying on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion are identified only insofar as the econometrician is willing to assume that a the principal is risk neutral or her preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion cara and b the agent is risk neutral

insecure land rights and share tenancy evidence from madagascar most studies of tenurial insecurity focus on its effects on investment this paper studies the hitherto unexplored relationship between tenurial insecurity and land tenancy contracts based on distinct features of formal law and customary rights in madagascar this paper augments the canonical model of sharecropping by making the strength of the landlord s property right increasing in the amount of risk she bears within the contract using data on landlords subjective perceptions in rural madagascar empirical tests support the hypothesis that insecure property rights drive contract choice but offer little support in favor of the canonical risk sharing hypothesis