complementarity and external linkages the strategies of the large firms in biotechnology in biotechnology large firms enter into different kinds of linkages with universities and small medium sized research intensive firms we test the hypothesis that the strategies of external linkage of the large firms with other parties are complementary to one another we show that if any two strategies are complementary i e undertaking more of one strategy raises the marginal value of the other then they are positively correlated using data for a sample large us european and japanese chemical and pharmaceutical producers we find that the strategies above are positively correlated even after controlling for firm specific characteristics

concentration in ownership of plant variety rights some implications for developing countries this paper explores concentration levels in the ownership of intellectual property rights over plant varieties worldwide an analysis of data for 30 upov member countries shows a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops at the national level in the developed world much of this concentration has arisen owing to the rapid consolidation of the seed industry through mergers and acquisitions especially in the 1990s a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights in combination with recent efforts to strengthen plant variety protection regimes is likely to have significant effects on the prospects for future innovation in plant breeding and the distribution of market power between companies for developing countries concentration in intellectual property right ownership may have important implications for the structure of domestic seed industries and access to protected varieties and associated plant breeding technologies these implications for developing countries are likely to become apparent in the context of the rapid spread of plant variety protection and access legislation emerging changes in the international exchange regime for plant material and liberalised investment policies permitting foreign investment in the seeds sector

if you cannot block you better run small firms cooperative innovation and appropriation strategies abstract this empirical study examines small firms strategies for capturing returns to investments in innovation we find that small firms strategies are qualitatively different from those found in earlier studies of both small and large firms most of the small firms examined here find informal means of protection such as speed to market or secrecy more important than patenting only firms with university cooperation typically r d intensive and science based small firms were likely to identify patents as the most important method of appropriating innovation returns in their field thus the strategic choice for most small firms is between secrecy and speed to market firms that cooperate in innovation with horizontal partners or significantly depend on vertical partners tend to prefer speed whereas process innovators with modest r d investments or few cooperative r d activities display a preference for trade secrets indeed cooperation activities greatly influence the choice of intellectual property strategy for small firms earlier research has emphasized patents and trade secrets as key strategies of appropriation yet these strategies do not appear to be very beneficial for small firms engaged in cooperative innovation these results raise policy questions regarding the functionality of the existing system of intellectual property rights

competition and irreversible investments abstract incumbent monopolists frequently claim that the introduction of competition will reduce future profits and therefore delay future investments in this paper we show that not only is this not generally true but in the oligopolistic industry model of dixit and pindyck investment under uncertainty 1994 this is never the case we extend this result to situations in which investments have positive externalities and situations in which the monopolist has multiple investment opportunities

information revelation through option exercise in many real world situations agents must formulate option exercise strategies with imperfect information in such a setting agents may infer the private signals of other agents through their observed exercise strategies the building of an office building the drilling of an exploratory oil well and the commitment of a pharmaceutical company toward the research of a new drug all convey private information to other market participants this article develops an equilibrium framework for option exercise games with asymmetric private information many interesting aspects of the patterns of equilibrium exercise are analyzed in particular informational cascades where agents ignore their private information and jump on the exercise bandwagon may arise endogenously article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

investment in technological innovations an option pricing approach abstract this paper develops a model of the optimal investment strategy for a firm confronted with a sequence of technological innovations we incorporate many of the most important characteristics of real world technology markets for example we permit innovations to be stochastic in their arrival times and their profitability we also incorporate learning so that firms adopting current innovations become better able to benefit from future innovations the model yields four distinct investment strategies the model is then used to predict actual firm policy these implications are discussed and compared with observed firm behavior

strategic timing of adoption of new technologies under uncertainty abstract in this paper we introduce experience effects into a duopoly game of timing of adoption of new technologies which exhibit exogenous technological progress departing from the existing literature with this model we obtain continuous and downward sloping reaction functions we find that a higher level of uncertainty increases the extent of dispersion between the equilibrium timings of adoption furthermore we find that the equilibrium timings are even more dispersed when the leader takes the follower s reaction into account when firm roles are made endogenous we find that if there is an incentive to lead follow the equilibrium timings are more less dispersed finally we show that it is possible for collusive adoption to improve welfare

regulation and preemptive technology adoption two rival firms must decide if and when to adopt a new technology knowing how adoption costs decline over time and how profit flows vary with adoption patterns in many cases price and entry regulations beneficially slow technology adoption by making preemption strategies less attractive in some cases these regulations can so discourage a firm from preemption as to change the order in which firms adopt new technologies speeding one firm s adoption date and slowing the other s in the context of a particular scenario for cable and telephone companies adoption of new fiber optic technologies the case for lifting the cross ownership ban depends on the extent to which telephone companies are able to implement a superior technology reregulation of cable companies strengthens this case

agricultural biotechnology s complementary intellectual assets we formulate and test a hypothesis for the dramatic restructur ing that the plant breeding and seed industry has recently undergone the reorganization can be explained in part by the desire to exploit comple mentarities between intellectual assets needed to create genetically mod ified organisms this hypothesis is tested using data on agricultural biotechnology patents notices for field tests of genetically modified organisms and firm characteristics the presence of complementarities is identified with a positive covariance in the unexplained variation of asset holdings results indicate that coordination of complementary assets has increased under the consolidation of the industry ne of the central problems in the economics of inno vation concerns how industries change as they absorb fundamental research breakthroughs rarely has change been more pronounced than in agriculture following the introduction of recombinant dna technology and affiliated techniques of genetic engineering by offering breeders the ability to alter plant traits by directly manipulating se quences of genetic code tools of agricultural biotechnology change the possibilities for crop improvement profoundly the new techniques enhance the speed and precision of agricultural research and development r d while ex panding the space of potential new products seed firms now offer farmers crop varieties embodying new ap proaches for controlling pests managing physical stresses on plants increasing crop yields and growing differenti ated quality enhanced crops concurrent with these technical changes in the r d process the agricultural inputs industry has over the past two decades witnessed a comprehensive restructuring sev eral large chemical firms including monsanto dow and dupont moved aggressively into plant biotechnology mak ing huge investments in the life sciences as newly minted agronomic systems companies these firms acquired all of the large national seed firms in north america including pioneer dekalb asgrow garst and others meanwhile the research intensive agricultural biotechnology sector from its appearance in the 1980s as a large set of small startup firms had by the end of the 1990s already reached a second stage with most of the startups either folded or acquired by the new agronomic systems giants the industry s consoli dation was surprising not only for its rapid pace and com prehensive scope but also for the extremely high valuations at which some firms were acquired in 1997 for example monsanto acquired holdens foundation seeds of wil liamsburg iowa together with two marketing subsidiaries for 1 02 billion 25 times the annual sales of the mature privately held firm whose revenues derived entirely from the breeding and distribution of corn seed the emergent industry structure with a relatively small number of tightly woven alliances each organized around a major life sciences firm each vertically integrated from basic r d through to marketing stands in contrast to the more diffuse structure of twenty years ago this structure is likewise noteworthy when one considers trends in other research intensive fields the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry for example maintains a large number of free standing firms specializing in r d and earning revenues through various licensing agreements majewski 1998 hall and ziedonis 2001 observe that the u s semiconduc

irreversible investment and r d spillovers in a dynamic duopoly investments in new production processes usually involve a significant amount of rd an increase in uncertainty delaying the equilibrium calls for higher subsidization rates third numerical simulations show that the spillover reduces the difference between the leader s and the follower s maximum value functions accordingly our model can help generate realistic market betas

timing of investments in oligopoly under uncertainty a framework for numerical analysis abstract we present a modeling framework for the analysis of investments in an oligopoly market for a homogenous commodity the demand evolves stochastically and the firms carry out investment projects in order to adjust their production cost functions or production capacities the model is formulated as a discrete time state space game where the firms use feedback strategies the firms are assumed to move sequentially to ensure a unique markov perfect nash equilibrium once the equilibrium has been solved monte carlo simulation is used to form probability distributions for the firms cash flow patterns and accomplished investments such information can be used to value firms operating in an oligopoly market an example of the model is given in a duopoly market the example illustrates the trade off between the value of flexibility and economies of scale under competitive interaction

intellectual capital in a q theory of ag biotech mergers tobin s q theory of investment has been linked to firm merger activity by jovanovic and rousseau jr they showed that firms with higher q values that is the ratio of market to book values tend to be the ones buying other firms and not the ones being acquired market values should theoretically equal book values a firm s assets as they appear on the balance sheet equal to their cost less accumulated depreciation in reality book value often differs from market value especially in knowledge intensive industries indicating the premium above measurable assets that shareholders are willing to pay for a company s unique combination of market position tangible and intangible capital goodwill and other favorable characteristics firms with greater q values are in a position to acquire more capital possibly through mergers and acquisitions to make further use of their advantages this article extends the jr analysis to consider the role of intellectual capital in merger activity we analyze the connection between intangible capital and the q theory of mergers in the agricultural biotechnology ag biotech industry this industry underwent significant technological change beginning in the late 1980s as new biotechnology techniques were integrated with plant breeding and other agricultural practices the number of patent applications in the field grew from less than a 100 a year in the late 1980s to more than 500 applications per year by the mid 1990s bennett et al along with this technological change

technology ladders and r d in dynamic cournot markets abstract motivated by dramatic and unpredictable technological advances in energy production for instance drilling and extraction of shale oil we extend cournot models of competition to incorporate research and development rd for example the potential of future monopoly can spur r d investment now even if the firm is presently uncompetitive and not actively producing we also show that surprisingly random innovations have an ambiguous effect on r d this feature which is driven by the cournot framework contrasts with the common situation whereby uncertainty lowers innovation and delays r d investments finally we demonstrate that increased competition may actually increase efforts to innovate through higher desire to achieve dominance this would match the anecdotal evidence that the threat of market entrants forces incumbents to maintain high r d

timing of investment under technological and revenue related uncertainties the effects of two forms of uncertainty on the timing of irreversible investment are considered technological uncertainty is modeled as a poisson arrival process that reduces the cost of investment while revenue uncertainty is modeled as a diffusion process technological uncertainty has no effect on the optimal investment policy when revenue uncertainty is absent however when combined with revenue uncertainty increased technological uncertainty makes investment less attractive relative to waiting the paper also makes a more general point in clarifying the difference in how diffusion type of uncertainty and unidirectional stochastic progress affect investment timing

investment uncertainty and pre emption this paper examines irreversible investment in a project with uncertain returns when there is an advantage to being the first to invest and externalities to investing when others also do so we show that the possibility of pre emption can have significant qualitative and quantitative effects on the relationship between uncertainty and investment in a single agent real options model the trigger threshold for investment increases without bound as uncertainty grows in contrast the investment trigger of a leader faced with pre emption is bounded above as uncertainty increases in fact we show that under certain parameter values greater uncertainty can lead the leader to invest earlier these findings reinforce the importance of extending real options analysis to include strategic interactions between players applications to industry situations are also discussed

real options and preemption under incomplete information abstract this paper introduces incomplete information and preemption into an equilibrium model of firms facing real investment decisions the optimal investment strategy may lie anywhere between the zero npv trigger level and the optimal strategy of a monopolist depending on the distribution of competitors costs and the implied fear of preemption our model implies that the equity returns of firms which hold real options and are subject to preemption will contain jumps and positive skewness

bundling and licensing of genes in agricultural biotechnology we examine the strategic incentive for gene holders to vertically integrate with seed companies and chemical input companies with homogeneous conventional seeds we find that a pure bundling strategy produce the genetically modified seed only is dominant when the gene holder and breeder are respectively the monopolistic producers of genetically modified and conventional seeds they may commit to mixed bundling supply both genetically modified and conventional seed to deter potential entry to the conventional seed market a vertical merger may solve the credibility issue of the mixed bundling commitment through third party licensing agreements in the conventional seed market copyright 2009 oxford university press

imitation costs and patents an empirical study it has long been recognised that the costs of imitating new products have an important effect on the incentives for innovation in a market economy as arrow i962 and others have pointed out if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially below the cost to the innovator of developing the innovation there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to carry out the innovation in their discussions of the innovation process economists frequently have called attention to the major role played by the costs of imitation but there has been little or no attempt to measure these costs to test various hypotheses concerning the factors influencing them or to estimate their effects in this paper we report some findings of what seems to be the first study of this topic in addition we present data regarding the effects of patents on imitation costs and on the rate of innovation

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

crowding out deficits and interest rates comment cebula s investigation along with the work of the other participants in this controversy is grounded in the is lm framework this comment utilizes the same framework to demonstrate that the amount of crowding out may be inversely related to the size of the interest rate change therefore cebula s claim that his evidence establishes a transmission mechanism for crowding out is unfounded indeed full crowding out in a simple is lm world is possible with or without increases in the interest rate at the other end of the spectrum zero crowding out can occur with or without increases in the interest rate a similar indeterminacy applies to partial crowding out scenarios the statistical significance of the relationship between deficits and the interest rate is irrelevant as far as the issue of a transmission mechanism for crowding out is concerned the appropriateness of cebula s econometric procedures is not the issue our contention is that it does not make any difference what the procedures show thus our comment applies with equal force to cebula s antagonists those who argue that a transmission mechanism does not exist because their empirical work shows no relationship between budgetary deficits and the interest rate

r d spillovers patents and the incentives to innovate in japan and the united states national surveys of r d labs across the manufacturing sectors in the us and japan show that intraindustry r d knowledge flows and spillovers are greater in japan than in the us and the appropriability of rents due to innovation less patents in particular are observed to play a more central role in diffusing information across rivals in japan and appear to be a key reason for greater intraindustry r d spillovers there suggesting that patent policy can importantly affect information flows uses of patents differ between the two nations with strategic uses of patents particularly for negotiations being more common in japan

investment in oligopoly under uncertainty the accordion effect this paper studies investments in new markets where more than two anticipated identical competitors are present in case of three firms an accordion effect is detected an exogenous demand shock results in a change of the wedge between investment thresholds of the first and second investor that is qualitatively different from the change of the wedge between the second and third investment threshold furthermore it turns out that in the three firm case the investment timing of the first investor lies in between the one and the two firm case these results are numerically extended to the n firm case

investment and demand uncertainty this paper investigates the effects of uncertainty on the investment decisions of a sample of italian manufacturing firms using information on the subjective probability distribution of future demand for firms products according to the entrepreneurs the results support the view that uncertainty weakens the response of investment to demand thus slowing down capital accumulation consistent with the predictions of the theory there is considerable heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty on investment it is stronger for firms that cannot easily reverse investment decisions and for those with substantial market power we show that the negative effect of uncertainty on investment cannot be explained by uncertainty proxying for liquidity constraints

second mover advantages in the strategic adoption of new technology under uncertainty abstract this paper introduces technological uncertainty into a timing game of new technology adoption it is shown that the timing neither necessarily involves first mover advantages in precommitment equilibria reinganum review of economic studies xlviii 1981 395 405 nor rent equalization due to the threat of preemption fudenberg and tirole review of economic studies lii 1985 383 401 rather there may be second mover advantages because of informational spillovers furthermore the model predicts that the equilibrium payoffs will typically be discontinuous and non monotonic in the probability that the new technology is profitable a welfare analysis reveals several market failures and suggests that policy intervention should adequately depend on the nature of uncertainty and the rate of technological progress

impact of bayesian learning and externalities on strategic investment we investigate the interplay between learning effects and externalities in the problem of competitive investments with uncertain returns we examine a game theoretic duopoly investment model in which i a firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance of the first mover and ii externalities exist between the investments of two firms we find a region of a war of attrition between the two firms in which the interplay between externalities and learning gives rise to counterintuitive effects on investment strategies and payoffs in particular we find that contrary to the conventional war of attrition where an increase in benefits for the follower generally delays the first move an increase in the rate of learning which tends to benefit the follower can hasten the first investment this paper was accepted by james smith decision analysis

first mover advantage and the speed of competitive entry 1887 1986 abstract this paper examines historical changes in the duration of the interval between the commercial introduction of a new product and the time when entry by later competitors begins a priori reasons are examined why the duration of this interval in the u s economy may either expand or contract data for 46 major product innovations however show a systematic tendency for the interval identified above to contract over the last century the average time span was almost 33 years at the turn of the century and has declined to 3 4 years for innovations in 1967 86 empirical evidence suggests this change resulted largely from a lowering of absolute cost advantages of first movers through easier transfer of knowledge and skills across firms and was also facilitated by the growth of markets

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development we study innovation timing and socially optimal intellectual property rights iprs when firms facing market uncertainty invest strategically in product development if demand growth and volatility are high attrition occurs and iprs should ensure the cost of imitation attains a lower bound we identify if demand growth and volatility are low then provided that the private imitation incentive is socially excessive iprs should set the cost of imitation high enough to induce preemption and possibly winner take all preemption moreover the welfare achieved with optimal iprs is then greater with endogenous innovation than if firm roles are predetermined illustrating the importance of fostering dynamic competition in extensions we show how firms benefit from open standards takeovers have ambiguous welfare effects and simple licensing schemes are welfare improving

strategic technology switching under risk aversion and uncertainty abstract firms devising green investment strategies within a deregulated environment must take into account not only economic and technological uncertainty but also strategic interactions due to competition also further complicating green investment decisions is the fact that firms are likely to exhibit risk aversion since alternative energy technologies entail risk that cannot be diversified therefore we develop a utility based real options framework for pre emptive and non pre emptive competition in order to analyse how economic and technological uncertainty interact with risk aversion to impact the adoption of an existing technology in the light of uncertainty over the arrival of an improved version we confirm that greater risk aversion delays investment and show that technological uncertainty accelerates the follower s entry delays the entry of the pre emptive leader and intriguingly does not affect the non pre emptive leader s investment decision also we show how the relative loss in the leader s value due to the follower s entry is affected by economic and technological uncertainty as well as risk aversion and how the risk of pre emption under increasing economic uncertainty raises the value of direct investment in the new technology relative to stepwise investment