e ztax tax salience and tax rates this paper examines whether the salience of a tax system affects equilibrium tax rates i analyze how tolls change after toll facilities adopt electronic toll collection etc drivers are substantially less aware of tolls paid electronically i estimate that in steady state tolls are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been without etc consistent with a salience based explanation for this toll increase i find that under etc driving becomes less elastic with respect to the toll and toll setting becomes less sensitive to the electoral calendar alternative explanations appear unlikely to be able to explain the findings

getting to the top of mind how reminders increase saving we provide evidence from field experiments with three different banks that reminder messages increase commitment attainment for clients who recently opened commitment savings accounts messages that mention both savings goals and financial incentives are particularly effective whereas other content variations such as gain versus loss framing do not have significantly different effects nor do we find evidence that receiving additional late reminders has an additive effect these empirical results do not map neatly into existing models so we provide a simple model where limited attention to exceptional expenses can generate undersaving that is in turn mitigated by reminders data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2015 2296 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

do residential customers respond to hourly prices evidence from a dynamic pricing experiment this paper uses the results of a dynamic pricing experiment for households in the district of columbia to determine whether the reduction in demand associated with an hourly price signal is economically different from the demand reduction associated with an equivalent price signal that is four times longer in duration for both regular and all electric customers the percentage demand reduction associated with a given percentage increase in the hourly price is approximately equal to the percentage demand reduction associated with the same percentage price increase of a much longer duration

fiscal decentralization central bank independence and inflation abstract we develop earlier cross sectional studies of inflation rates by adding the degree of tax centralization as another explanatory variable this makes central bank independence perform appreciably better as an explanatory variable also we find that centralized countries have higher inflation

political influence on the central bank international evidence political influence on the central bank is measured bere by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government the governor changes about half the time witbin six months of a nonconstitutional or other radical change of government a military coup or a restoration of democracy the governor is much less likely to change within six months following a routine change in the head of government about one fourth of the time in developing countries and one tenth in industrial countries these indicators vary across countries and correlate statistically with inflation and its variability and with real growth and real interest rates differences in the vulnerability of the central bank to political instability in political instability itself and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periods seem to be a major part of the explanation for why developing countries have on average higher and more variable inflation than industrial countries do

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

time consistency of monetary policy in the open economy abstract this paper shows that in an open economy time consistency problems are created not only by nominal government debt but also by nominal private debt to foreigners given any external nominal debt inflation redistributes wealth between domestic residents and foreigners a government that cares about the welfare of its residents will be tempted to inflate whenever it or its residents have issued nominal debt to foreigners an analysis of the u s net investment position shows that these international considerations have become increasingly relevant for the united states because the recent external deficits have largely been financed in nominal terms

the effect of information on product quality evidence from restaurant hygiene grade cards this study examines the effect of an increase in product quality information to consumers on e rms choices of product quality in 1998 los angeles county introduced hygiene quality grade cards to be displayed in restaurant windows we show that the grade cards cause i restaurant health inspection scores to increase ii consumer demand to become sensitive to changes in restaurants hygiene quality and iii the number of foodborne illness hospitalizations to decrease we also provide evidence that this improvement in health outcomes is not fully explained by consumers substituting from poor hygiene restaurants to good hygiene restaurants these results imply that the grade cards cause restaurants to make hygiene quality improvements

the effect of central bank independence on inflation in developing countries abstract ismihan and ozkan ismihan m ozkan f g 2004 does central bank independence lower inflation economics letters 84 305 309 provide theoretical support for prior studies empirical findings of positive or no significant relationship between central bank independence cbi and average inflation performance the present paper argues that these findings are spurious because the studies use an econometric methodology that does not account for the measurement error in their proxies for cbi this paper employs an econometric methodology that does account for this measurement error and finds a strong negative relationship between cbi and inflation even though the sample is limited to developing countries

identifying electricity saving potential in rural china empirical evidence from a household survey in recent years there has been a fast growing body of literature examining energy saving potential in relation to electricity however empirical studies focusing on non western nations are limited to fill this gap this study intends to examine the electricity saving potential of rural households in china using a unique data set from the china residential electricity consumption survey crecs in collaboration with the china general social survey cgss conducted nationwide at the household level in rural china we use a stochastic frontier model which allows us to decompose residential electricity consumption into the minimum necessary amount of consumption based on physical characteristics e g house size house age number of televisions or refrigerators and estimate the consumption slack i e the amount of electricity consumption that could be saved which depends on various factors we find that rural households in china are generally efficient in electricity saving and the saving potential is affected by fast information feedback and social demographic characteristics instead of by the averaged electricity price or energy efficiency labelling signals in addition we find no evidence of regional heterogeneity on electricity saving potential for rural households policy implications are derived

debt inflation and central bank independence abstract increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence although ex ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently the smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit over time inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt by contrast imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions

knowledge is less power experimental evidence from residential energy use abstract imperfect information about product attributes inhibits efficiency in many choice settings but can be overcome by providing simple low cost information we use a randomized control trial to test the effect of high frequency information about residential electricity usage on the price elasticity of demand informed households are three standard deviations more responsive to temporary price increases an effect that is not attributable to price salience conservation extends beyond pricing events in the short and medium run providing evidence of habit formation and implying that the intervention leads to greenhouse gas abatement survey evidence suggests that information facilitates learning jel d12 d83 l11 l94 q41 q54

does central bank independence lower inflation this paper provides a potential explanation for the recent findings of no significant relationship between central bank independence cbi and lower inflation we argue that although cbi delivers lower inflation in the short term it may reduce the scope for productivity enhancing public investment and so harm future growth potential we also argue that the effects on growth make cbi less likely to achieve lower inflation in the long term

inflation and central bank independence revisited abstract king and ma economics letters 72 2001 95 claim that evidence which they report for a sample of 42 countries shows that central bank independence cbi and inflation are not significantly related the present paper argues that this putative failure of cbi to affect inflation is due to king and ma s use of an econometric methodology that does not account for the inaccuracy of their proxy for cbi employing an alternative econometric methodology that tackles the measurement error problem directly this paper finds a strong negative relationship between cbi and inflation

inflation and central bank independence conventional wisdom redux until recently there existed a broad consensus that an important institution for combating inflation is a central bank insulated from political influence this conventional wisdom has been challenged by among others campillo and miron 1997 who present evidence purporting to show that if an inflation regression equation is expanded to include not only their proxy for central bank independence cbi but other regressors as well then the negative correlation between inflation and cbi vanishes the present paper argues that allegations of the demise of this nexus should not be accepted uncritically this paper which reports the results of an analysis of covariance structures finds a strong negative relationship between inflation and cbi

dynamic corrective taxes with time varying salience abstract economies across the globe are becoming increasingly cashless and many payment systems have become automated driving a temporal wedge between consumption and payment and generally making the costs of consumption intermittently salient since this inconsistent price salience alters demand elasticities it is a particular concern for goods that generate externalities and the price based policies deployed to address them this paper derives optimal dynamic corrective taxes for suboptimal and persistent consumption decisions these taxes depend on the agent s ability to commit to a future consumption path we also characterize a second best constant tax and the excess burden from time invariant tax rates when calibrated to u s residential electricity consumption the model shows that the second best constant tax is more than twice the marginal external cost of carbon emissions

dynamic salience with intermittent billing evidence from smart electricity meters abstract digital tracking and the proliferation of automated payments have made intermittent billing more commonplace and the frequency at which consumers receive price quantity or total expenditure signals may distort their choices while this category of goods has expanded from household utilities toll road access and software downloads to standard consumption goods paid by credit card or other bill me later type systems we know surprisingly little about how these payment patterns affect decisions this paper exploits hourly household electricity consumption data collected by smart electricity meters to examine dynamic consumer behavior under intermittent expenditure signals households reduce consumption by 0 6 1 following receipt of an electricity bill but the response varies considerably by household type and season our results also suggest that spending reminders can reduce peak demand particularly during summer months we discuss the implications for energy policy when intermittent billing combined with inattention induces consumption cycles

goal setting and energy conservation abstract this paper develops a theoretical model of consumer demand for an energy conservation program that involves non binding self set goals we present evidence from a northern illinois goal setting program aimed at reducing residential electricity consumption which is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and is broadly consistent with a model of present biased consumers with reference dependent preferences we find that the need for commitment is correlated with program adoption higher pre adoption consumption and lower responsiveness to goals consumers choosing realistic goals persistently save substantially more achieving savings of nearly 11 than those choosing very low or unrealistically high goals

information provision and consumer behavior a natural experiment in billing frequency abstract in this study i estimate a causal effect of increased billing frequency on consumer behavior i exploit a natural experiment in which residential water customers switched exogenously from bimonthly to monthly billing customers increase consumption by 3 5 5 in response to more frequent information this result is reconciled in models of price and quantity uncertainty where increases in billing frequency reduce the distortion in consumer perceptions using treatment effects as sufficient statistics i calculate consumer welfare gains equivalent to 0 5 1 of annual water expenditures heterogeneous treatment effects suggest increases in outdoor water use

implications of rational inattention abstract a constraint that actions can depend on observations only through a communication channel with finite shannon capacity is shown to be able to play a role very similar to that of a signal extraction problem or an adjustment cost in standard control problems the resulting theory looks enough like familiar dynamic rational expectations theories to suggest that it might be useful and practical while the implications for policy are different enough to be interesting

testing the behavior of rationally inattentive consumers in a residential water market abstract rationally inattentive consumers tend to apply simplified heuristics when making decisions we test the hypothesis of rational inattention in the context of residential water usage where water bills typically account for a small fraction of household expenditures and only attract casual attention we begin by rigorously testing whether or not residential water customers exhibit evidence of rational inattention we then propose a heuristic water demand model to explore the decision making of rationally inattentive consumers and validate the model by comparing the model with the discrete continuous choice model on attentive and fully informed decision makers in out of sample predictions