revenue maximizing dutch auctions with discrete bid levels abstract this paper is concerned with setting a predetermined number of bid levels in a dutch auction to maximize the auctioneer s expected revenue as a departure from the traditional methods used by applied economists and game theorists a novel approach is taken in this study to tackle the problem by formulating the auctioning process as a constrained nonlinear program and applying standard optimization techniques to solve it aside from proposing respective closed form formulae for computing the optimal bid levels and the auctioneer s maximum expected revenue we also show that the bid decrements should be increasing if there are two or more bidders in the dutch auction additionally the auctioneer s maximum expected revenue increases with the number of bidders as well as the number of bid levels finally managerial implications of the key findings as well as limitations of this research work are discussed

fiscal implications of aids in south africa abstract the number of people living with hiv is alarmingly large in addition to the incomprehensible human suffering of those directly affected aids also has large negative economic effects in this paper i study the fiscal implications of the hiv aids epidemic in south africa in a standard neo classical growth model i find that an antiretroviral program is to a large extent self financing improvement in dependency ratios and health care cost savings would pay for rand 144 billion of a full epidemiological intervention the indirect effect through the changing demographic structure will be more important than the direct health care cost saving effect i also explore different taxation policies the households would be willing to sacrifice an amount equal to 12 of gdp in the first period to be subject to an optimal ramsey fiscal policy rather than an alternative fixed debt to gdp policy the optimal policy implies an increase in government debt during the peak of the epidemic

equivalence of auctions and posted prices abstract we determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms auctions and posted prices agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices we show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 d44

managing online auctions current business and research issues the internet s computational power and flexibility have made auctions a widespread and integral part of both consumer and business markets though online auctions are a multi billion dollar annual activity with a growing variety of sophisticated trading mechanisms scientific research on them is at an early stage this paper analyzes the current state of management science research on online auctions it develops a broad research agenda for issues such as the behavior of online auction participants the optimal design of online auctions the integration of auctions into the ongoing operation of firms and the use of the data generated by online auctions to inform future trading mechanisms these research areas will draw from applied and theoretical work spanning management science economics and information systems

growth and enduring epidemic diseases abstract this paper analyzes the interplay of human capital formation and economic growth when there is premature adult mortality failing adequate insurance arrangements a long wave of such mortality can so undermine human capital formation as to induce an economic collapse in nuclear family structures random matching of partners is superior to assortative mating only if the shock is not too big and initial levels of human capital are not too low full pooling of mortality risks with equal treatment of all children in extended families may fend off a general collapse depending on the initial conditions and the size and duration of the shock to avoid undesirable effects on expectations awareness campaigns should be complemented by policies that credibly promise to reduce future mortality if mortality depends on the general level of human capital indeterminacy can arise in the form of more than one rational expectations path

interest rates and currency prices in a two country world abstract this paper is a theoretical study of the determination of prices interest rates and currency exchange rates set in an infinitely lived two country world which is subject both to stochastic endowment shocks and to monetary instability formulas are obtained for pricing all equity claims nominally denominated bonds and currencies and these formulas are related to earlier closely related results in the theories of money finance international trade

optimal auctioning and ordering in an infinite horizon inventory pricing system we consider a joint inventory pricing problem in which buyers act strategically and bid for units of a firm s product over an infinite horizon the number of bidders in each period as well as the individual bidders valuations are random but stationary over time there is a holding cost for inventory and a unit cost for ordering more stock from an outside supplier backordering is not allowed the firm must decide how to conduct its auctions and how to replenish its stock over time to maximize its profits we show that the optimal auction and replenishment policy for this problem is quite simple consisting of running a standard first price or second price auction with a fixed reserve price in each period and following an order up to basestock policy for replenishing inventory at the end of each period moreover the optimal basestock level can be easily computed we then compare this optimal basestock reserve price auction policy to a traditional basestock list price policy we prove that in the limiting case of one buyer per period and in the limiting case of a large number of buyers per period and linear holding cost list pricing is optimal list pricing also becomes optimal as the holding cost tends to zero numerical comparisons confirm these theoretical results and show that auctions provide significant benefits when 1 the number of buyers is moderate 2 holding costs are high or 3 there is high variability in the number of buyers per period

optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management we analyze a dynamic auction in which a seller withc units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated intot time periods each group of buyers has independent private values for a single unit buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with buyers in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller the number of buyers in each period as well as the individual buyers valuations are random the model is a variation of the traditional single leg multiperiod revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time for this setting we prove that dynamic variants of the first price and second price auction mechanisms maximize the seller s expected revenue we also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal auctions the optimal auctions are then compared to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which list prices are used in each period together with capacity controls and to a simple auction heuristic that consists of allocating units to each period and running a sequence of standard multiunit auctions with fixed reserve prices in each period the traditional revenue management mechanism is proven to be optimal in the limiting cases when there is at most one buyer per period when capacity is not constraining and asymptotically when the number of buyers and the capacity increases the optimal auction significantly outperforms both suboptimal mechanisms when there are a moderate number of periods capacity is constrained and the total volume of sales is not too large the benefit also increases when variability in the dispersion in buyers valuations or in the number of buyers per period increases

dynamic pricing strategies with reference effects we consider the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm in a market with repeated interactions where demand is sensitive to the firm s pricing history consumers have memory and are prone to human decision making biases and cognitive limitations as the firm manipulates prices consumers form a reference price that adjusts as an anchoring standard based on price perceptions purchase decisions are made by assessing prices as discounts or surcharges relative to the reference price in the spirit of prospect theory we prove that optimal pricing policies induce a perception of monotonic prices whereby consumers always perceive a discount respectively surcharge relative to their expectations the effect is that of a skimming or penetration strategy the firm s optimal pricing path is monotonic on the long run but not necessarily at the introductory stage if consumers are loss averse we show that optimal prices converge to a constant steady state price characterized by a simple implicit equation otherwise the optimal policy cycles the range of steady states is wider the more loss averse consumers are steady state prices decrease with the strength of the reference effect and with customers memory all else equal offering lower prices to frequent customers may be suboptimal however if these are less sensitive to price changes than occasional buyers if managers ignore such long term implications of their pricing strategy the model indicates that they will systematically price too low and lose revenue our results hold under very general reference dependent demand models

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

real exchange rate behavior abstract using random simulations with artificial data with identical sample characteristics to the long sample exchange rate data employed by lothian and taylor lothian j r and taylor m p 1996 the recent float from the perspective of the past two centuries journal of political economy 104 488 509 we show that standard unit root tests have extremely low power over sample sizes corresponding to the recent float the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false is extremely low with 20 years or even 50 years of data and only reaches an acceptable level over much longer spans

fuzzy adaptive decision making for boundedly rational traders in speculative stock markets abstract the development of new models that would enhance predictability for time series with dynamic time varying nonlinear features is a major challenge for speculators boundedly rational investors called chartists use advanced heuristics and rules of thumb to make profit by trading or even hedge against potential market risks this paper introduces a hybrid neurofuzzy system for decision making and trading under uncertainty the efficiency of a technical trading strategy based on the neurofuzzy model is investigated in order to predict the direction of the market for 10 of the most prominent stock indices of u s a europe and southeast asia it is demonstrated via an extensive empirical analysis that the neurofuzzy model allows technical analysts to earn significantly higher returns by providing valid information for a potential turning point on the next trading day the total profit of the proposed neurofuzzy model including transaction costs is consistently superior to a recurrent neural network and a buy hold strategy for all indices particularly for the highly speculative emerging southeast asian markets optimal prediction is based on the dynamic update and adaptive calibration of the heuristic fuzzy learning rules which reflect the psychological and behavioral patterns of the traders

pandemics of the poor and banking stability we first develop a theoretical model that shows that the likelihood of a collapse of the banking industry of a developing country increases as the joint prevalence of large pandemics such as aids and malaria increases we also show that the optimal bank reserves increase as the prevalence increases in the empirical part of the paper we consider a large dataset of developing countries and we exhibit a causality effect from combined prevalence to deposit turnover as well as causality effect from an increase of combined prevalence to an increase in bank reserves those empirical facts therefore support our theoretical findings

the long run economic costs of aids a model with an application to south africa primarily a disease of young adults acquired immuno deficiency syndrome aids imposes economic costs that could be devastatingly high in the long run by undermining the transmission of human capital the main driver of long run economic growth across generations aids makes it harder for victims children to obtain an education and deprives them of the love nurturing and life skills that parents provide these children will in turn find it difficult to educate their children and so on an overlapping generations model is used to show that an otherwise growing economy could decline to a low level subsistence equilibrium if hit with an aids type increase in premature adult mortality calibrating the model for south africa where the hiv prevalence rate is over 20 percent simulations reveal that the economy could shrink to half its current size in about four generations in the absence of intervention programs to combat the disease and to support needy families could avert such a collapse but they imply a fiscal burden of about 4 percent of gross domestic product gdp

auctions versus posted price selling two popular selling methods posted price selling and auctions are compared here in an independent private values model without auctioning costs auctioning is always optimal when auctioning is costly auctions are still preferable if the marginal revenue curve is sufficiently steep the global steepness of the marginal revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions finally the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared copyright 1993 by american economic association

constructive consumer choice processes consumer decision making has been a focal interest in consumer research and consideration of current marketplace trends e g technological change an information explosion indicates that this topic will continue to be critically important we argue that consumer choice is inherently constructive due to limited processing capacity consumers often do not have well defined existing preferences but construct them using a variety of strategies contingent on task demands after describing constructive choice consumer decision tasks and decision strategies we provide an integrative framework for understanding constructive choice review evidence for constructive consumer choice in light of that framework and identify knowledge gaps that suggest opportunities for additional research

public saving and policy coordination in aging economies in the coming decades the share of people of working age will fall significantly in most developed countries according to optimal taxation theory public debts should be reduced before the baby boom generation retires i find that if debts are instead maintained at current levels welfare may be reduced substantially in countries with a large public sector and or a large demographic change since population aging will be less dramatic in the united states than in europe and japan capital will move from europe and japan to the united states these capital movements will facilitate the us demographic transition but aggravate the transition in most european countries

the gift of the dying the tragedy of aids and the welfare of future african generations this paper simulates the impact of the aids epidemic on future living standards in south africa i emphasize two competing effects on the one hand the epidemic is likely to have a detrimental impact on the human capital accumulation of orphaned children on the other hand widespread community infection lowers fertility both directly through a reduction in the willingness to engage in unprotected sexual activity and indirectly by increasing the scarcity of labor and the value of a woman s time i find that even with the most pessimistic assumptions concerning reductions in educational attainment the fertility effect dominates the aids epidemic on net enhances the future per capita consumption possibilities of the south african economy

selecting optimal selling format of a product in b2c online auctions with boundedly rational customers abstract the advancement of internet technology has enabled new formats for selling products in the b2c online auctions at present on the major online auction sites there exist three popular selling formats namely the posted price pure auction and buy price auction formats it is an important decision problem for a firm to select the most profitable format to sell its products through the internet the customer behavior is of course a crucial element of the decision process to the best of our knowledge most models available today assume that customers are perfectly rational to better understand the decision process in this paper we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration we first present a behavior choice function to characterize the behavior of the customers with bounded rationality then corresponding to each selling format we construct a revenue model based on the bounded rationality for analysis finally we conduct some elaborate computational experiments to investigate the performance of each revenue model for developing new managerial insights our computational results clearly demonstrate how the bounded rationality of customer behavior affects the choice of a preferable selling format for a b2c firm in an online auction

dual mechanism for an online retailer abstract while posted price and auction have typically been seen as alternatives to each other we observe web stores selling a product at a posted price and simultaneously running auctions for the identical product a phenomenon that has not been studied fully in this article we study a dual mechanism where an online retailer combines the two conventional mechanisms posted price and auction for multiple units of a product we demonstrate that the dual mechanism can be used to achieve market segmentation when customers discount the expected utility of auctions we characterize the customer s decision rule and formulate a retailer s profit function under the dual mechanism finally we compare the performance of three selling mechanisms posted price auction and dual through computational experiments

purchasing power parity and the behavior of prices and nominal exchange rates across exchange rate regimes abstract the evidence presented in this paper shows that purchasing power parity as a long run proposition is indeed a very useful approximation we see this quite clearly in the panel data for three historical periods examined here the classical gold standard era from 1870 to 1914 the interwar period from 1921 to 1939 and the period after world war ii from 1959 to 1998 price level behavior across countries differs in the way that ppp suggests when monetary arrangements differ and is highly similar when monetary arrangements are themselves similar inflation rates adjusted for exchange rate changes in general are highly correlated and bear a one to one relation to one another within and across the three periods and the varied monetary regimes that prevailed

analysis and design of business to consumer online auctions business to consumer online auctions form an important element in the portfolio of mercantile processes that facilitate electronic commerce activity much of traditional auction theory has focused on analyzing single item auctions in isolation from the market context in which they take place we demonstrate the weakness of such approaches in online settings where a majority of auctions are multiunit in nature rather than pursuing a classical approach and assuming knowledge of the distribution of consumers valuations we emphasize the largely ignored discrete and sequential nature of such auctions we derive a general expression that characterizes the multiple equilibria that can arise in such auctions and segregate these into desirable and undesirable categories our analytical and empirical results obtained by tracking real world online auctions indicate that bid increment is an important factor amongst the control factors that online auctioneers can manipulate and control we show that consumer bidding strategies in such auctions are not uniform and that the level of bid increment chosen influences them with a motive of providing concrete strategic directions to online auctioneers we derive an absolute upper bound for the bid increment based on the theoretical upper bound we propose a heuristic decision rule for setting the bid increment empirical evidence lends support to the hypothesis that setting a bid increment higher than that suggested by the heuristic decision rule has a negative impact on the auctioneer s revenue

equilibrium relationships between money and other economic variables central to the quantity theory of money are a number of important propositions about the long run equilibrium effects of changes in the nominal stock of money on other economic variables a standard way of testing these propositions is to use quarterly or annual data explicitly model the lag structure and then derive the long run solution of the model from the empirical estimates an alternative is to use some type of smoothing procedure to approximate positions of equilibrium and then to use these transformed data directly in testing hypotheses the national bureau technique of averaging data over reference cycle phases is one such method robert lucas s application of fourier transforms in two illustrations of the quantity theory of money 1980 is another and john geweke s method 1982 of frequency decomposition is a third an entirely different way of approaching the problem is to use cross country average rather than time series data as the basic units of observation the advantage according to lucas is that since the two quantity theoretic laws that he examines are obtained as characteristics of steady states or limiting distributions of theoretical models the ideal experiment for testing them would be a comparison of long term average behavior across economies with different monetary policies but similar in other respects p 1006 in this paper i conduct such an experiment the data that i use are for 20 oecd countries over the period 1956 80 the specific relationships that i examine are those between money and the price level money and real income money and interest rates and money and exchange rates in the main the data accord well with the quantity theoretic model classical neutrality holds there is evidence of a fisher effect albeit a less than complete effect on interest rates finally the data are consistent with long run purchasing power parity and hence correspondingly with a long run monetary approach to exchange rate determination

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice abstract we investigate the choice between posted prices and auctions of competing sellers with private valuations assuming that buyers face higher hassle costs in auctions we show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers offer posted prices rather than auctions if and only if they have a sufficiently high reservation value posted prices sell with lower probability but yield a larger revenue in case of trade using an empirical strategy to compare revenues of posted prices and auctions that takes selling probabilities explicitly into account we find our theoretical predictions supported by data from ebay auctions on ticket sales for the euro 2008 european football championship

effects of seller supplied prices on buyers product evaluations reference prices in an internet auction context a field experiment investigated the impact of two external reference points under the seller s control on the final price of an auction when an item s seller specified a high external reference price a reserve price the final bid was greater than when the seller specified a low external reference price a minimum bid when the seller provided both high and low reference prices the reserve influenced the final bid more the low reference price led to a lower outcome compared to when the seller did not communicate any reference price the number of bidders influenced outcomes in the absence of seller supplied reference prices

buy prices in online auctions irrationality on the internet abstract buy prices are puzzling it makes sense for a seller at auction to set a minimum bidding level i e a reserve price surely but a maximum we explore the use of maximum bidding levels buy prices in online auctions and provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism we show that augmenting an english auction with a buy price can improve the seller s profits by partially insuring and therefore increasing the expected payment from some risk averse bidders perhaps more surprising is that the english auction augmented with a buy price can also be superior even to the first price sealed bid and dutch auctions when bidders are risk averse

auctions versus posted price selling the case of correlated private valuations two popular selling methods are compared in a one period correlated private values model the seller of an object has to decide whether to sell it by posting a fixed price or by an auction without auctioning costs an auction with a reserve price is always preferable with positive auctioning costs the authors find that an auction is still preferable when the distribution of buyers valuations is sufficiently dispersed or when the object value is sufficiently high the relations between these and previous results are also discussed