public provision of private goods as a redistributive device in an optimum income tax model public provision of a private good can alleviate the informational problems that restrict redistribution through the tax transfer system when the identity of high and low skill persons is hidden a pareto improvement may be achieved by publicly providin

valuation and control in venture finance this paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm i assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm i show that to separate the entrepreneur s value of control from the firm s expected payoff the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment the entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information and improved risk sharing venture capital firms often finance projects which at the time of funding have neither revenues nor even a product in existence however by using an intricate system of control rights venture capitalists can overcome many failures inevitable in a complex task of converting entrepreneurial talent into companies products and markets

financial contracting theory meets the real world an empirical analysis of venture capital contracts we compare the characteristics of real world financial contracts to their counterparts in financial contracting theory we do so by studying the actual contracts between venture capitalists vcs and entrepreneurs the distinguishing characteristic of vc financings is that they allow vcs to separately allocate cash flow rights board rights voting rights liquidation rights and other control rights we describe and measure these rights we then interpret our results in relation to existing financial contracting theories we also describe the interrelation and the evolution across financing rounds of the different rights query 1 query 2

unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts we scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature this literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing or of even foreseeing the possible states of nature in advance we argue however that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting i e transaction costs need not be relevant provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast in other words all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature the foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate moreover we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality however even if renegotiation is allowed the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse

welfare improving user charges for publicly provided private goods it is argued that free provision of publicly provided goods or services is rarely optimal the argument is simple if optimal lump sum transfers are not available then the government will wish to use all handles which provide information about the distribution of welfare one such handle may be the usage of publicly provided goods and services as long as this is not uniform then it is a potentially valuable index for redistributive purposes this is illustrated using two models one in which usage of the publicly provided good is legislated by the government and another in which it is determined in part by the private costs of consuming public services

topping up or opting out the optimal design of public provision schemes there is extensive public provision of private goods in all developed countries the public provision scheme is often designed so that individuals can opt out but not top up supplement the publicly provided quantity quality using an optimal income ta

the optimal public provision of private goods abstract this paper sets out conditions for the optimal public provision of in kind transfers rules are derived governing their marginal and optimal use in the presence of linear taxes because of the difficulty of using these conditions to examine what impact optimal transfers would have on optimal tax systems a simple two good simulation model is used to illustrate the problem

information and control in ventures and alliances this paper develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence of objectives and applies it to nancial contracting between an investor and a privately informed entrepreneur we show that formal investor control is i increasing in the information asymmetries ex ante ii increasing in the uncertainty surrounding the venture ex post iii decreasing in the entrepreneur s resources and iv increasing in the entrepreneur s incentive consict in contrast real investor control that is actual investor interference is decreasing in information asymmetries control rights are further such that control shifts to the investor in bad states of nature

what do economists tell us about venture capital contracts venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment all kinds of agency problems are present moral hazard adverse selection hold up problems window dressing etc entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into contracts that influence their behavior and mitigate the agency costs in particular they select an appropriate kind and structure of financing and specify the rights as well as the duties of both parties the typical features of venture capital investments are an intensive screening and evaluation process an active involvement of venture capitalists in their portfolio companies a staging of capital infusions the use of special financing instruments such as convertible debt or convertible preferred stock syndication among venture capitalists or a short investment horizon

robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists we derive a role for inside investors such as venture capitalists in resolving various agency problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting problem absent an inside investor the choice of securities is unlikely to reveal all private information and overinvestment may occur an inside investor however always makes optimal investment decisions if and only if he holds a fixed fraction contract where he always receives a fixed fraction of the project s payoff and finances that same fraction of future investments this contract also eliminates any incentives of the venture capitalist to misprice securities issued in later financing rounds in this article we develop a model of financial contracting with multiple investment decisions and show how conflicts of interest and informational asymmetries can be effectively resolved by an inside investor i e an investor who not only provides capital but also works closely with the firm monitors it frequently and is generally very well informed about the firm s prospects and investment opportunities venture capitalists are obvious examples of inside investors and their function has been an important motivation for this article banks especially in japan and germany are also involved in monitoring and can be viewed as playing the role of inside investors in this article we examine the potential benefits of inside investors in a context where there are no restrictions beyond limited liability on the type of financial contracts that can be written we address a basic financial contracting problem involving an entrepreneur who has an idea for a project but does not have sufficient capital to fund it an important assumption is that there are several stages in the project s development and that a decision must be made at each stage whether the project should be continued or abandoned if the project is continued the amount of additional capital to be invested must also be determined we assume that the entrepreneur as an insider observes private information about the project s profitability at each stage this information is not

financial intermediaries ownership structure and monitored finance evidence from japan this paper introduces new and unique data from 127 japanese private equity funds that enable a first ever direct comparison of individual owner manager structures versus financial intermediation structures in terms of the governance provided to investee companies through private equity funds the data indicate individual owner manager structures financial disintermediation give rise to much smaller portfolios of entrepreneurial firms and more advice to entrepreneurs across the scope of different financial intermediation structures including banks life insurance companies securities firms corporations and government bodies there are further differences in the provision of governance and value added advice provided to investees the data further indicate us affiliated funds in japan are more likely to have smaller portfolios and provide more advice to entrepreneurial companies possibly due to a greater skill set in providing advice to facilitate the development of small entrepreneurial firms

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

excess entry vertical integration and welfare this article provides a systematic analysis of the welfare effects of vertical integration by a monopolist input supplier into a monopolistically competitive downstream industry we give sufficient conditions on consumer preferences that lead to pareto improving vertical integration and demonstrate a close relationship between assumptions on preference for variety excess entry in monopolistically competitive markets and the welfare effects of vertical integration excess entry in downstream markets tends to give rise to pareto improving vertical integration we extend the analysis to vertical oligopoly and access price regulation

venture capital financing moral hazard and learning we consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model the value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project the allocation of the funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard the optimal contract is a time varying share contract which provides intertemporal risk sharing between venture capitalist and entrepreneur the share of the entrepreneur reflects the value of a real option the option itself is based on the control of the funds the dynamic agency costs may be high and lead to an inefficient early stopping of the project a positive liquidation value explains the adoption of strip financing or convertible securities finally relationship financing including monitoring and the occasional replacement of the management improves the efficiency of the financial contracting

preplanned exit strategies in venture capital abstract this paper empirically considers the role of preplanned exits the investor s initial strategy to sell the investee firm via an acquisition or an initial public offering ipo at the time of initial contract with the entrepreneur legal conditions and investor versus investee bargaining power in the allocation of cash flow and control rights in entrepreneurial finance we introduce a sample of 223 entrepreneurial investee firms financed by 35 venture capital funds in 11 continental european countries and these data indicate the following first preplanned acquisition exits are associated with stronger investor veto and control rights a greater probability that convertible securities will be used and a lower probability that common equity will be used the converse is observed for preplanned ipos second investors take fewer control and veto rights and use common equity in countries of german legal origin relative to socialist scandinavian and french legal origin third more experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to get financed with common equity and less likely to be financed with convertible preferred equity while more experienced investors are more likely to use convertible preferred equity and less likely to use common equity

public provision of private goods government may provide a good that can if legally permitted be supplemented by private purchases policy is determined by majority rule under standard assumptions on preferences a majority voting equilibrium exists a regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual provision regime than under either of the alternatives under some preference configurations the median income voter is pivotal under others a voter with income below the median is pivotal

repeated interaction and the public provision of private goods the literature suggests that governments can use in kind transfers to design efficient and targeted redistribution schemes if individual incomes are not directly observable we investigate the extent to which the self selection property of in kind transfers carries through if redistributive transfers are made repeatedly in a two period setting the government may gain information about the individuals incomes in the first period and exploit this information for making targeted transfers in the second period this however also triggers changes in the individuals behavior if the government can commit to its future policy the least cost policy may involve randomization between cash and in kind transfers without commitment the dynamic setting works against the government s interest it may no longer be able to use in kind transfers to generate information about the individuals types jel classification h42 h2

a theory of debt and equity diversity of securities and manager shareholder congruence this paper shows how the optimal financial structure of a firm complements incentive schemes to discipline managers and how the securities return streams determine the claim holders incentives to intervene in management the theory rationalizes 1 the multipucity of securities 2 the observed correlation between return streams and control rights of securities and 3 the partial congruence between managerial and equity holder preferences over policy choices and monetary rewards as well as the low level of interference of equity in management the theory also offers new prospects for a reappraisal of the earlier corporate finance literature

new resources and new ideas private equity for small businesses abstract private equity for rapidly growing small business is raised primarily from the organized venture capital market and the informal market comprised of high net worth individuals or angel investors we discuss commercially and publicly available data on private equity the research findings of studies that use these data and some of the more important questions that the available data have been unable to address