how do payments for environmental services affect land tenure theory and evidence from china we gratefully acknowledge the financial support from renmin university for the research on land market development in the forest tenure reform project no 11xnc002 the british academy reference sg121920 the cambridge humanities research grants scheme and the economy and environment program for southeast asia reference pco13 0308 009

nash implementation a complete characterization the authors extend e maskin s results on nash implementation first they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient for nash implementability if there are three or more agents the case covered by maskin s sufficiency result second and more important they examine the two agent case for which there existed no general sufficiency results the two agent model is the leading case for applications to contracting and bargaining for this case too they establish a condition that is both necessary and sufficient the authors use their theorems to derive simpler sufficiency conditions that are applicable in a wide variety of economic environments copyright 1990 by the econometric society

on constant maskin monotonic social choice functions abstract a social choice function satisfying a dual dominance condition is maskin monotonic if and only if it is constant hence any non constant social choice function satisfying dual dominance is not nash implementable among the important examples are all social choice functions on unrestricted domains on the other hand non constant social choice functions such as a walrasian performance function in economic environments need not satisfy dual dominance

playing games in the forest state local conflicts of land appropriation this paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation three typical cases are discussed corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration the local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs market and behavioral assumptions and less on the structure of the game cournot or stackelberg the state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure roads which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs the game structure is however important for total deforestation this paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forestland appropriation three typical cases are discussed corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration the local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs market and behavioral assumptions and less on the structure of the game cournot or stackelberg the state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure roads which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs the game structure is however important for total deforestation

coase theorem complexity and transaction costs this paper by introducing complexity considerations provides a dynamic foundation for the coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining negotiation outcomes we show when the players have a preference for less complex strategies the coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs specifically complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs we also show the latter is true in the rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs

coordination problems in local level resource management starting from the observation of important returns to scale effects in conservation of common property resources we identify some of the factors that impinge upon the chances of success of a decentralized group based management of local natural resources particular attention is paid to the influence of asset inequality among resource users in particular it is shown that by redistributing incentives among landowners land reform has an ambiguous impact on the latter s willingness to undertake conservation investments

bargaining and markets complexity and the competitive outcome abstract rubinstein and wolinsky rev econ stud 57 1990 63 78 consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade they show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome here i consider rubinstein and wolinsky s model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences together with the standard payoff in the game then every equilibrium is stationary markov and induces the unique competitive price thus i demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome

a note on exchange rate expectations and nominal interest differentials a test of the fisher hypothesis this note tests the hypothesis that nominal interest differentials between similar assets denominated in different currencies can be explained entirely by the expected change in the exchange rate over the holding period this proposition often called the fisher open hypothesis or the hypothesis of perfect asset substitutability has been a major component of recent theories of exchange rate determination and has important implications for monetary policy 1 the fisher hypothesis differs from the covered interest parity theorem enunciated by keynes 11 while covered interest parity equates the nominal interest differential between financial centers to a known premium or discount on forward foreign exchange and is thus in principle riskless fisher parity involves risk in an essential way the two conditions are equivalent only when forward exchange rates equal expected future spot rates recent theoretical work for example that of grauer litzenberger and stehle 8 kouri 12 and frankel 6 shows that this need not be the case when market participants are risk averse thus while covered interest parity must always hold exactly in an informationally efficient asset market with no transactions costs fisher parity need not nominal interest differentials may reflect risk premia in addition to expected exchange rate movements 2 it should be emphasized at the outset that the tests conducted in this paper are really joint tests of the fisher hypothesis and a weak form of foreign exchange market informational efficiency levich 14 has argued that tests of market efficiency are always joint tests involving some hypothesized structure of normal equilibrium returns below we assume informational efficiency and instead test fisher s hypothesized arbitrage condition that nominal interest differentials equal expected percentage changes in exchange rates

common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources abstract the literature on common property based resource management comprises many important studies that seek to specify the conditions under which groups of users will self organize and sustainably govern resources upon which they depend using three of the more comprehensive such studies and with an extensive review of writings on the commons this paper demonstrates that the enterprise of generating lists of conditions under which commons are governed sustainably is a flawed and impossibly costly research task for a way out the paper examines the relative merits of statistical comparative and case study approaches to studying the commons it ends with a plea for careful research design and sample selection construction of causal mechanisms and a shift toward comparative and statistical rather than single case analyses such steps are necessary for a coherent empirically relevant theory of the commons

payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging under weak property rights the case of indonesia decentralization reforms in indonesia have led to local communities negotiating logging agreements with timber companies for relatively low financial payoffs and at high environmental cost this paper analyzes the potential of payments for environmental services pes to provide an alternative to logging for these communities and to induce forest conservation we apply a game theoretical model of community firm interactions that explicitly considers two stylized conditions present in the indonesian context i community rights to the forest remain weak even after decentralization and ii the presence of logging companies interested in the commercial exploitation of the forest intuition may suggest that pes design should focus on those communities with the lowest expected payments from logging deals however we show that these communities may not be able to enforce a pes agreement i e they may not be able to prevent logging activities by timber companies moreover some communities would conserve the forest anyway in these cases pes would not lead to additional environmental gains most important the introduction of pes may increase a community s expected payoff from a logging agreement a failure to consider this endogeneity in expected payoffs could lead to communities opting for logging agreements despite pes simply allowing communities to negotiate better logging deals our results indicate that pes design is a complex task and that the costs of an effective pes system could potentially be much higher than expected from observing current logging fees using data collected in indonesia on actual logging fees received by communities we illustrate how the theoretical results could be used in empirical analysis to guide pes design our results are likely to be useful in other cases where local people make resource use decisions but have weak property rights over these resources and where external commercial forces are present the results highlight the importance of understanding the details of the local context in order to design pes programs appropriately

mechanism design with interdependent valuations efficiency ggagents valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals or types of all agents under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome decision payoffs previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals efficient design is impossible this paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome e g allocation of the goods is determined then the agents observe their own outcome decision payoffs and then final transfers are made

undominated nash implementation in bounded mechanisms we study implementation in undominated nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms an undominated nash equilibrium is a nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy a mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy we identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation these conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature for economic settings we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies

the carry trade and fundamentals nothing to fear but feer itself the carry trade is the investment strategy of going long in high yield target currencies and short in low yield funding currencies recently this nave trade has seen very high returns for long periods followed by large crash losses after large depreciations of the target currencies based on low sharpe ratios and negative skew these trades could appear unattractive even when diversied across many currencies but more sophisticated conditional trading strategies exhibit more favorable payos we apply novel within economics binary outcome classication tests to show that our directional trading forecasts are informa tive and out of sample loss function analysis to examine trading performance the critical conditioning variable we argue is the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate feer expected returns are lower all else equal when the target currency is overvalued like traders researchers should incorporate this information when evaluating trading strategies when we do so some questions are resolved negative skewness is purged and market volatility vix is uncorrelated with returns other puzzles remain the more sophisticated strategy has a very high sharpe ratio suggesting market ineciency

hugging trees claiming de facto property rights by blockading resource use this paper explores conflicts between two groups the industry and theenvironmentalists over whether an indivisible resource e g an ancient tree should be harvested or preserved in a complete information war ofattrition the environmentalists willingness to blockade harvest attemptsmay control resource use as effectively as if they held property rights optimal government intervention will override this ability for somebenefit cost combinations but may augment it for other combinations introducing uncertainty about the environmentalists benefits results inextended disputes and consequent lack of efficiency governmentintervention for welfare reasons generally reduces these efficiencylosses

robust implementation in direct mechanisms a social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile in an interdependent value environment with single crossing preferences we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism including indirect ones the contraction property requires that the interdependence is not too high in a linear signal model the contraction property is equivalent to an interdependence matrix having all eigenvalues smaller than one

on the endogeneity of resource comanagement theory and evidence from indonesia we examine theoretically the emergence of participatory comanagement agreements that share between state and user the management of resources and the benefits from use going beyond user user interactions our state user model addresses a critical question when will comanagement arise in order to consider the right baseline for evaluating comanagement s forest and welfare impacts we then compare our model s hypotheses concerning de facto rights negotiated agreements and transfers all endogenous with community level data including observed agreements in a protected indonesian forest these unique data could refute the model despite being limited but instead offer support

implementation in undominated nash equilibria without integer games a mechanism which uses neither integer games nor modulo games is shown to implement any social choice function in a production economy with private and excludable public goods more precisely th

complexities of decentralization in a globalizing world in many developing countries decentralization programmes for natural resource management aim to induce incentives for sustainable resource management at the local level the effectiveness of such programmes has however suffered from weak property rights to the resource and by the presence of externalities growing economic integration among countries has exacerbated these problems by increasing the exposure of local user groups to commercial actors interested in resource extraction in this paper the interplay of decentralization and globalization in affecting environmental outcomes and community welfare is analysed through a game theoretic model of community firm interactions the results highlight the complexities of policy design first by raising the extractive value of the resource globalization may lead to communities negotiating resource extraction agreements with firms second with a lack of effective state enforcement of community resource rights communities may be unable to assume de facto ownership over the resource while commercial actors succeed in exploiting resources without community consent no single policy option provides a panacea to counteracting these negative effects instead a mix of policies combining incentive payments along with the provision of more secure property rights and poverty alleviation is shown to have the potential to improve both environmental outcomes and community welfare

property rights and liability for deforestation under redd implications for permanence in policy design reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation redd is critical in efforts to mitigate the effects of anthropogenic climate change despite uncertainty about the exact form of a future international redd system redd carbon property rights would need to be created and allocated with liability assigned for the potential loss of climate benefits in the event of carbon reversal from deforestation this commentary explores the links between forest property rights and liability to different redd policy options and their implications for permanence should national governments retain liability for permanence then project level activities that have individually assigned redd carbon rights may have a higher risk of carbon reversal than policies where rights are assigned to the state knowledge of pre existing forest rights is necessary for some policies implemented with government assigned redd rights in order to compensate for potential income losses from policy implementation

complexity and competition extensive form market games typically have a large number of noncompetitive equilibria in this paper we argue that the complexity of noncompetitive behavior provides a justification for competitive equilibrium in the sense that if rational agents have an aversion to complexity at the margin then maximizing behavior will result in simple behavioral rules and hence in a competitive outcome for this purpose we use a class of extensive form dynamic matching and bargaining games with a finite number of agents in particular we consider markets with heterogeneous buyers and sellers and deterministic exogenous sequential matching rules although the results can be extended to other matching processes if the complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players preferences lexicographically with the standard payoff then every equilibrium strategy profile induces a competitive outcome

choosing how to choose self stable majority rules and constitutions constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society we study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society constitutions are stylized here to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly a different voting rule for making changes to the constitution we define an equilibrium notion for constitutions called self stability whereby under the rules of a self stable constitution the society would not vote to change the constitution we argue that only self stable constitutions will endure we prove that self stable constitutions always exist but that most constitutions even very prominent ones may not be self stable for some societies we show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic and there are many societies for which no such constitution is self stable we conclude with a characterization of the set of self stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business

on the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games abstract we show that any feasible individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available

land tenure and property rights theory and implications for development policy this article explores the nature of property rights systems their evolution and their effect on resource allocation it is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets of particular relevance to developing countries the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems an appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices the intensity of cultivation and the use of credit empirical evidence from thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model

governance institutions resource rights regimes and the informal mining sector regulatory complexities in indonesia summary this study examines how shifting resource governance regimes affect labor inequities in the small scale mining sector in indonesia it focuses on the implications of governance decentralization processes and mining regulation reforms for indigenous and migrant populations who rely on informal unlicensed mining for income in central kalimantan while the findings illustrate the territorially uneven impacts of recent reforms they highlight how dominant paradigms that prioritize the enforcement of property rights schemes have contributed to problems of livelihood insecurity and poor environmental governance the article urges for more nuanced attention to contested articulations of power as well as local resource rights and institutional arrangements to assist rural communities in reversing marginalization

for better or for worse local impacts of the decentralization of indonesia s forest sector this paper quantifies the local impacts of mechanized logging on forest dependent communities in indonesia before and after decentralization a conceptual framework incorporates financial social enforcement rent seeking and environmental impacts using data from 60 communities in east kalimantan the empirical results suggest that significantly more households received financial and in kind benefits after decentralization compared to before many communities engaged in self enforcement activities against firms both before and after decentralization post decentralization a significantly higher proportion of households perceived community forest ownership there were few significant differences in perceived environmental impacts little evidence exists of a post decentralization trade off between environmental and financial contractual provisions

symposium on management of local commons in the public image of industrially advanced countries the commons problem relates to global warming acid rain depletion of the ozone layer and the like in the developing countries the daily livelihood of the poor depends more substantially and directly on the local commons irrigation forestry grazing in shore fisheries and so on these restricted access common property resources usually involve small local communities which opens the possibility for local level community organizations to manage resources and resolve conflicts as an alternative to the polar opposites of private and state control which usually hog the limelight in public policy discussion in fact many developing countries have a long history of balanced resource management under highly informal local community institutions in these countries the erosion of the local commons set in only with major demographic and institutional changes in recent years often accelerated by private commercialization or bureaucratic appropriation of the traditional historical rights of local communities over these resources

tests of rational expectations and no risk premium in forward exchange markets abstract this paper tests the simple efficiency hypothesis i e that traders have rational expectations and charge no risk premium in the forward exchange market it uses a statistical procedure which is consistent under a large class of heteroscedasticity and a set of data which takes into account the institutional features of the forward exchange market the results show that this procedure leads to stronger rejections of the simple efficiency hypothesis than do procedures using the standard assumption of homoscedasticity

overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions consider a bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information we provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself this is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that the frequency of preferences across problems mirrors the underlying distribution of preferences and then arguing that agents incentives are to satisfy their budget by being as truthful as possible we also show that all equilibria of the linking mechanisms converge to the target utility levels the mechanisms do not require transferable utility or interpersonal comparisons of utility and are immune to manipulations by coalitions

subgame perfect implementation this paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules it is shown that in many economic environments virtually an y choice rule can be implemented to illustrate the power of this approach the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first best although it wouldn t have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms the diversity of these models suggests that subgame perfect implementation may find wide application copyright 1988 by the econometric society

are foreign exchange forecasts rational new evidence from survey data abstract tests of rationality in foreign exchange markets have been inconclusive because of disagreement over the relevant asset pricing model this paper uses a newly available set of data on foreign exchange expectations to directly test the rationality of four foreign currency markets overall the results reject the rational expectations hypothesis

efficient repeated implementation this paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function scf with innitely lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of possibly history dependent mechanisms such that i its nash equilibrium set is non empty and ii every nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to the desired social choice at every possible history of past play and realizations of uncertainty we show with minor qualications that in the complete information environment an scf is repeated implementable in nash equilibrium if and only if it is ecient we also discuss several extensions of our analysis including constructions employing only nite mechanisms

community industry contracting over natural resource use in a context of weak property rights the case of indonesia decentralization in indonesia has resulted in an increased influence of local communities over the terms of logging agreements with timber companies the outcomes of such community company negotiations vary significantly across communities what are the conditions that cause this variation and how can the outcomes be more effectively and efficiently influenced by third party actors such as the local government or ngos this paper addresses these questions by developing a game theoretic model to illustrate the strategic interactions between communities and companies the model allows for endogeneity of de facto property rights and bargaining positions we show that third party actions to improve the community s bargaining position by raising its reservation utility may result in an increase in the area logged and thereby harm the environment our results indicate that the strategy of intervention matters in particular strategies that raise the sensitivity of interventions to local logging threats are likely to be more cost effective in supporting communities and reducing forest degradation than more indiscriminatory strategies the model will be relevant to other situations where communities negotiate contracts over natural resource use with outside actors in a context of weak property rights a situation increasingly observed in other developing countries

implementation in undominated strategies a look at bounded mechanisms this paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems it is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies an example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features in part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded this sort of tail chasing construction common in the constructive proofs of the literature is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium if such mechanisms are ruled out then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition called strategy resistence for social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy proofness this contrast suggests that this issue should be examined as it applies to other solution concepts used in implementation theory the last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to nash implementation and undominated nash implementation

formal informal sector interaction in rural credit markets abstract the majority of small cultivators in the less developed countries are not regarded as credit worthy by the formal sector financial institutions and are forced to borrow from the moneylenders in the informal credit market this paper shows that when such borrowers differ in their likelihood of default and the moneylenders are asymmetrically informed about the client specific degree of risk the policy of providing cheap credit through the formal sector can generate adverse composition effects which worsen the terms of credit and the availability of loans in the informal sector

complexity and repeated implementation this paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an ecient social choice function when the agents preferences evolve randomly we show that the freedom to set dierent mechanisms at dierent histories can give the planner an additional leverage to deter undesirable behavior even if the mechanisms are restricted to be simple and nite specically we construct a history dependent sequence of simple mechanisms such that with minor qualications every pure subgame perfect equilibrium delivers the correct social choice at every history while every mixed equilibrium is strictly pareto dominated more importantly when faced with agents with a preference for less complex strategies at the margin the ecient social choice function can be repeatedly implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies our results demonstrate a positive role for complexity considerations in mechanism design

equity and tradeoffs in a tax based incomes policy a tax based incomes policy tip is a tax incentive that tries to induce employers and or workers to reduce wage and or price increases it is intended as a complement to the basic anti inflation policy of gradual monetary deceleration and fiscal restraint its purpose is to reduce the capital stock and output loss that would otherwise accompany such a policy see my 1978 1979a articles this article is divided into two sections section i examines the capital stock and output loss under monetary deceleration that is uncomplemented by tip this loss is due primarily to wage growth inertia a central feature of modern capitalist economies such inertia provides not only the rationale for a tip on wage increases but also implies that special effort is required to assure that the design of a complete tip package is fair to labor section ii analyzes the tradeoffs confronting two alternative methods of making tip more equitable to labor profit and or price restraint insurance and a tip on price increases of the largest firms the original tip limited to wage increases at first glance is often perceived as unbalanced and inequitable this section tries to contribute to the development of a balanced equitable tip

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive