scientific ambiguity and climate policy economic evaluation of climate policy traditionally treats uncertainty by appealing to expected utility theory yet our knowledge of the impacts of climate policy may not be of sufficient quality to be described by unique probabilistic beliefs in such circumstances it has been argued that the axioms of expected utility theory may not be the correct standard of rationality by contrast several axiomatic frameworks have recently been proposed that account for ambiguous knowledge in this paper we apply static and dynamic versions of a smooth ambiguity model to climate mitigation policy we obtain a general result on the comparative statics of optimal abatement and ambiguity aversion and then extend our analysis to a more realistic dynamic setting where we introduce scientific ambiguity into the well known dice model of the climate economy system for policy relevant exogenous mitigation policies we show that the value of emissions abatement increases as ambiguity aversion increases and that this ambiguity premium can in some plausible cases be very large in these cases the effect of ambiguity aversion on welfare is comparable to that of other much studied welfare parameters thus ambiguity aversion may be an important neglected aspect of climate change economics and seems likely to provide another argument for strong abatement policy

a multiplicative model of optimal ceo incentives in market equilibrium this paper presents a unified theory of both the level and sensitivity of pay in competitive market equilibrium by embedding a moral hazard problem into a talent assignment model by considering multiplicative specifications for the ceo s utility and production functions we generate a number of different results from traditional additive models first both the ceo s low fractional ownership the jensen murphy incentives measure and its negative relationship with firm size can be quantitatively reconciled with optimal contracting and thus need not reflect rent extraction second the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value divided by annual pay is independent of firm size and therefore a desirable empirical measure of incentives third incentive pay is effective at solving agency problems with multiplicative impacts on firm value such as strategy choice however additive issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring jel d2 d3 g34 j3

multiproduct short run hospital cost functions empirical evidence and policy implications from cross section data economists and policymakers have been interested in hospital costs and the structure of hospital technologies for several decades now early interest was focused on the possibility of scale economies which implied increased efficiency for larger hospitals 6 8 12 13 18 20 while more recent interest has been stimulated by the inflationary spiral of hospital costs 1 15 17 22 as hospital costs have risen important policy questions concerning the impact on costs of the hospitals diagnostic case mix the hospitals admitting physicians the hospitals size and the hospitals efficiency have emerged and researchers have attempted to deal with these issues within the context of increasingly complex econometric models 1 2 5 24 27 however in attempting to analyze these important policy issues researchers have been forced to make two major types of compromises on the one hand appropriate data are often not available for estimating a well specified cost function e g information on admitting physicians and diagnostic case mix are often missing so that problems of specification error often plague the econometric results conversely in using imaginative ways to deal with data problems e g weighting in patient and out patient care to form a single index of hospital services 1 27 or estimating separate cost functions for each department in the hospital 2 researchers sometimes place unrealistic and unnecessary constraints on their econometric models the purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of several of the primary hospital characteristics mentioned above on the short run costs of hospitals within a theoretically consistent framework in the following discussion we also develop the theoretical

factor substitution price elasticity of factor demand and returns to scale in police production evidence from michigan budget problems facing many state and local governments together with declining public sector subsidies have forced these governments to search for more efficient ways of providing services such as public safety and public health the provision of public safety like many other service industries is labor intensive with personnel cost usually accounting for between 50 and 70 percent of total cost the principal labor input is police officers the relatively large increases in police wages partly aided by arbitration thus puts increased pressures on city budgets apparently efforts at reducing cost of providing public safety have included attempts at factor substitution for example the last decade has seen an increasing use of civilian employees mostly in administration so that the ratio of police officers to civilians has declined in addition there has been a decline in the use of sidewalk beats by some police departments and an increase in the use of patrol cars for surveillance evidently there is a possible output as well as a substitution effect in the demand for these factors

on welfare frameworks and catastrophic climate risks recent theoretical work in the economics of climate change has suggested that climate policy is highly sensitive to fat tailed risks of catastrophic outcomes weitzman 2009 68 such risks are suggested to be an inevitable consequence of scientific uncertainty about the effects of increased greenhouse gas concentrations on climate criticisms of this controversial result fall into three categories the first suggests that it may be irrelevant to cost benefit analysis of climate policy the second challenges the fat tails assumption and the third questions the behavior of the utility function assumed in the result this paper analyses these critiques and suggests that those in the first two categories have formal validity but that they apply only to the restricted setup of the original result which may be extended to address their concerns they are thus ultimately unconvincing critiques in the third category are shown to be robust however they open up new ethical and empirical challenges for climate economics that have thus far been neglected how should we value catastrophes as a society i demonstrate that applying results from social choice to this problem can lead to counterintuitive results in which society values catastrophes as infinitely bad even though each individual s utility function is bounded finally i suggest that the welfare functions traditionally used in climate economics are ill equipped to deal with climate catastrophes in which population size changes drawing on recent work in population ethics i propose an alternative welfare framework with normatively desirable properties which has the effect of dampening the contribution of catastrophes to welfare

climate change policy what do the models tell us very little a plethora of integrated assessment models iams have been constructed and used to estimate the social cost of carbon scc and evaluate alternative abatement policies these models have crucial flaws that make them close to useless as tools for policy analysis certain inputs e g the discount rate are arbitrary but have huge effects on the scc estimates the models produce the models descriptions of the impact of climate change are completely ad hoc with no theoretical or empirical foundation and the models can tell us nothing about the most important driver of the scc the possibility of a catastrophic climate outcome iam based analyses of climate policy create a perception of knowledge and precision but that perception is illusory and misleading jel c51 q54 q58

the structure of costs and production in new zealand public hospitals and application of the transcendental logarithmic vaiable cost funcation new zealand s public hospitals provide free secondary health care to the public through taxation funding since these hospitals vary by both size and range of services provided the possibility of more porductive resource use is of explicit interest a translog variable cost function is estimated for new zealand public hospitals using 1987 cross section data an analysis of sthe function reveals the marginal costs short run and long run economies of scale and input factor substitution possibilities results suggest that a transfer of both patients with less severe conditions and staff from teachin hospitals to say country hospitals will result in a short run decareased total cost to the system the long run economies of scale estimates suggest that efficiency gains could result from downsizing large hospitals merging smaller hospitals and increasing patient turnover partial elasticites of demand indicate the asymmetric nature of factor substitution and the effect of specific inputs such as nurses

precautionary principle and the optimal timing of environmental policy under ambiguity i consider a problem in environmental policy design in which i focus on stock pollutants in particular i consider stock pollutants that cause severe damage on the environment and do not depreciate at all once they are released into the atmosphere and the ocean the purposes of this paper are 1 to provide an economic foundation for environmental policies based on the precautionary principle and the 1992 rio declaration on environment and development and 2 to show that this optimal timing rule has a reservation property furthermore i analyze the effect of an increase in ambiguity on the optimal timing of adopting some environmental policy and show that an increase in ambiguity decreases the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policy

on the relative performance of linear vs piecewise linear threshold intertemporal incentives this paper employs numerical simulations to compare the relative performance of linear contracts with piecewise linear threshold contracts in the case where the agent chooses actions over time these contracts are restricted to be functions of the ending value of aggregate output we find strong evidence that only linear contracts need be considered in comparison with piecewise linear threshold contracts in the situation where cumulative output is only updated periodically and the agent s utility function is exponential this finding holds even when there are only two periods and hence one change of action by the agent however we find that the best piecewise linear threshold contract is significantly superior to the best linear contract when the agent has a power utility function these numerical simulations also call into question the use of a cap when the agent s compensation is based on the ending value of aggregate output and the agent s effort takes place over time

uncertainty risk and incentives theory and evidence uncertainty has qualitatively different implications than risk in studying executive incentives we study the interplay between profitability uncertainty and moral hazard where profitability is multiplicative with managerial effort investors who face greater uncertainty desire faster learning and consequently offer higher managerial incentives to induce higher effort from the manager in contrast to the standard negative risk incentive trade off this learning by doing effect generates a positive relation between profitability uncertainty and incentives we document empirical support for this prediction this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

production cost structure of us hospital pharmacies time series cross sectional bed size evidence there are current concerns about potential factor substitutions and their implications for factor employments and cost containment in us hospital pharmacies a translog production cost model is estimated for these pharmacies using 1981 9 times series data consisting of seven cross sectional bed size classes per year zellner s joint gls estimation of three factor cost share equations and the parent translog cost function reveals that pairwise factor substitutions are severely limited production is non homothetic occurring in the range of scale diseconomies biased and pure technical change effects dominate the scale augmenting component implications of findings are rationalized in the context of the emerging biopharmaceutical technologies

top executive rewards and firm performance a comparison of japan and the united states this paper studies top executive turnover and compensation and their relation to firm performance in the largest japanese and u s companies japanese executive turnover and compensation are related to earnings stock returns and to a lesser extent sales performance measures the fortunes of japanese top executives therefore are positively correlated with stock performance and current cash flows or with factors contributing to such performance the relations for the japanese executives are generally economically and statistically similar to those for their u s counterparts there is some evidence however that the fortunes of japanese executives are more sensitive to low income but less sensitive to stock returns than those of u s executives

a theory of subjective compound lotteries abstract we develop a savage type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries our theory permits issue preference that is agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues hence we establish subjective foundations for the anscombe aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities we define second order risk as risk that resolves in the first stage of the compound lottery and show that uncertainty aversion implies aversion to second order risk which implies issue preference and behavior consistent with the ellsberg paradox

inventories as factors of production and economic fluctuations this paper presents a theory of inventory investment by stage of processing and uses it to examine the role of inventory investment in economic fluctuations the model in which inventories are treated as factors of production is estimated for four durable goods industries three conclusions emerge from the estimation first the estimates generally satisfy the theoretical restrictions second the elasticity of inventory demand with respect to output is high indicating an important accelerator effect finally the estimates suggest that shifts in the demand for inventories are an important source of economic fluctuations copyright 1989 by american economic association

wealth and executive compensation using new data on the wealth of swedish ceos i show that higher wealth ceos receive stronger incentives since high wealth excluding own firm holdings implies low absolute risk aversion this is consistent with a risk aversion explanation to examine whether wealth is likely to proxy for power i use lagged wealth typically measured before the ceo was hired and the results remain for one of two incentive measures also the wealth incentive result is not stronger for ceos likely to face limited owner oversight finally wealth is unrelated to pay levels and is hence unlikely to proxy for skill the compensation of chief executives of large listed companies is often largely in the form of risky instruments such as shares and options since share prices are affected by many factors outside management control this exposes ceos to risk according to standard agency theory the risk inherent in incentive compensation should reduce optimal incentives looking across firms the evidence that volatile stock prices reduce incentives in actual compensation has been mixed see e g aggarwal and samwick 1999 core and guay 2001 and prendergast 2002 for different views the importance of risk for incentives is thus in dispute 1 this paper takes another look at ceo incentives exploiting variation in risk aversion rather than risk decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that a wealthy ceo is less risk averse than a similar same coefficient of relative risk aversion but less wealthy ceo wealth should therefore proxy for risk aversion wealth may also be related to ceo skill and power obviously using wealth variation empirically hinges on having adequate data on individual wealth i use swedish tax filings to construct a proxy of wealth in sweden tax authorities provide data on aggregate yearly income

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

are policymakers ambiguity averse we investigate the ambiguity preferences of a unique sample of real life policymakers at the paris un climate conference cop21 we find that policymakers are generally ambiguity averse using a simple design we are moreover able to show that these preferences are not necessarily due to an irrational behaviour but rather to intrinsic preferences over unknown probabilities exploring the heterogeneity within our sample we also show that the country of origin and the degree of quantitative sophistication affect policymakers attitudes towards compound risk but not towards ambiguity robustness results are obtained in a lab experiment with a sample of university students

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

uncertainty risk neutral measures and security price booms and crashes abstract this paper provides a general analysis of intertemporal utility based on the multiple priors model of aversion to knightian uncertainty then the existence of equilibrium is proven for a representative agent security market model it is shown that uncertainty aversion can invalidate the existence of a risk neutral measure representation for prices in addition an example suggests an intriguing link between uncertainty aversion and the possibility of abrupt changes in security prices the analysis relies heavily on a fubini type theorem for analytic functions due to dellacherie and meyer probabilities and potential c north holland new york 1988 journal of economic literature classification numbers g12 d81 d90

subjective expected utility with incomplete preferences this paper extends the subjective expected utility model of decision making under uncertainty to include incomplete beliefs and tastes the main results are two axiomatizations of the multiprior expected multiutility representations of preference relations under uncertainty the paper also introduces new axiomatizations of knightian uncertainty and the expected multiutility model with complete beliefs

a review of the stern review on the economics of climate change the stern review calls for immediate decisive action to stabilize greenhouse gases because the benefits of strong early action on climate change outweighs the costs the economic analysis supporting this conclusion consists mostly of two basic strands the first strand is a formal aggregative model that relies for its conclusions primari ly upon imposing a very low discount rate concerning this discount rate aspect i am skeptical of the review s formal analysis but this essay points out that we are actual ly a lot less sure about what interest rate should be used for discounting climate change than is commonly acknowledged the review s second basic strand is a more intuitive argument that it might be very important to avoid possibly large uncertain ties that are difficult to quantify concerning this uncertainty aspect i argue that it might be recast into sound analytical reasoning that might justify some of the review s conclusions the basic issue here is that spending money to slow global warming should perhaps not be conceptualized primarily as being about consump tion smoothing as much as being about how much insurance to buy to offset the small change of a ruinous catastrophe that is difficult to compensate by ordinary savings

model uncertainty in climate change economics a review and proposed framework for future research we review recent models of choices under uncertainty that have been proposed in the economic literature in particular we show how different concepts and methods of economic decision theory can be directly useful for problems in environmental economics the framework we propose is general and can be applied in many different fields of environmental economics to illustrate we provide a simple application in the context of an optimal mitigation policy under climate change

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

dual approaches to the analysis of risk aversion we present a dual formulation of choice under uncertainty based on a few simple assumptions about preferences it is shown that the additive separability restriction on preferences key to expected utility theory can be dropped with little loss of analytic power for a broad class of choice problems dual risk premiums are characterized and it is shown that placing various invariance restrictions on them leads naturally to generalizations of the concepts of cara crra and lrt familiar from expected utility theory each of these generalizations conforms to a notion of homotheticity

food scares in an uncertain world we develop a model that explains the stylized facts of food scares an immediate and sharp decline in consumption of the product followed by a slow and frequently partial recovery of demand after the scare passes the model is used in conjunction with the natural experiment afforded by the mad cow crisis to elicit empirical information on decision makers perception of uncertainty our theoretical and quantitative results suggest that observed behavior is consistent with sharp changes in beliefs and the presence of knightian uncertainty as measured by the degree of imprecision in our model

a more robust definition of subjective probability the goal of choice theoretic derivations of subjective probability is to separate a decisionmaker s underlying beliefs subjective probabilities of events from their preferences attitudes toward risk classical derivations have all relied upon some form of the marschak samuelson independence axiom or the savage sure thing principle which imply that preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypothesis this paper presents a choice theoretic derivation of subjective probability in a savage type setting of purely subjective uncertainty which neither assumes nor implies that the decisionmaker s preferences over lotteries necessarily conform to the expected utility hypothesis copyright 1992 by the econometric society

production of public safety are socioeconomic characteristics of local communities important factors this paper uses the translog cost function and cross section data from florida to investigate the importance of socioeconomic characteristics sec of local communities in the production of public safety the approach used is noteworthy in four respects 1 the underlying production function is specified as an agem production function 2 sec are treated as non purchased fixed inputs 3 two variables are used to proxy sec in estimation and 4 the paper test for the existence of endogenous quality differences in safety it is shown that exclusion of sec from the production cost function of safety leads to misspecification and hence they provide a misleading guide to policy

risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities expected utility with rank dependent probability theory is a model of decision making under risk where the preference relations on the set of probability distributions is represented by the mathematical expectation of a utility function with respect to a transformation of the probability distributions on the set of outcomes this paper defines based on g teaux differentiability measures of risk aversion for such preferences which characterize the relation more risk averse and applies these measures to the analysis of unconditional and conditional portfolio choice problems

maxmin expected utility over savage acts with a set of priors abstract this paper provides an axiomatic foundation for a maxmin expected utility over a set of priors mmeu decision rule in an environment where the elements of choice are savage acts this characterization complements the original axiomatization of mmeu developed in a lottery acts or anscombe aumann framework by i gilboa and d schmeidler 1989 j math econ 18 141 153 mmeu preferences are of interest primarily because they provide a natural and tractable way of modeling decision makers who display an aversion to uncertainty or ambiguity the novel axioms are formulated using standard sequence techniques which allow cardinal properties of utility to be expressed directly through preferences journal of economic literature classification number d81

time to change what to sow risk preferences and technology adoption decisions of cotton farmers in china this paper examines the role of individual risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new form of agricultural biotechnology in china i conducted a survey and a field experiment to elicit the risk preferences of chinese farmers who faced the decision of whether to adopt genetically modified bt cotton a decade ago in my analysis i expand the measurement of risk preferences beyond expected utility theory to incorporate prospect theory i find that farmers who are more risk averse or more loss averse adopt bt cotton later farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt bt cotton earlier

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

constructing confidence intervals using the bootstrap an application to a multi product cost function a multi product cost function system is estimated for 387 banks in states that allow branch banking the bootstrap resampling method is used to construct confidence intervals for marginal costs output cost elasticities economies of scale and scope and allen elasticities of substitution confidence intervals for these measures are usually constructed using a first order variance approximation under a normality assumption but such confidence intervals are inexact if the measures are not normally distributed or the variance approximations are imprecise we find that the bootstrap standard error estimates can differ significantly from the usual estimates furthermore we use the bootstrap to expand the analysis of cost function regularity properties copyright 1990 by mit press

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

ambiguity reasoned determination and climate change policy abstract this paper examines climate change benefit cost analysis in the presence of scientific uncertainty in the form of ambiguity the specific issue addressed is the robustness of benefit cost analyses of climate change policy alternatives to relaxation of savage s original axioms two alternatives to subjective expected utility seu are considered maximin expected utility meu and incomplete expected utility ieu among other results it is demonstrated that polar opposite recommendations can emerge in an ambiguous decision setting even if all agree on society s rate of time preference society s risk attitudes the degree of ambiguity faced and the scientific primitives we show that for a simple numerical simulation of our model an meu decision maker favors policies which immediately tackle climate change while an ieu decision prefers business as usual each agency shall assess the costs and benefits of the intended regulation and recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its cost executive order 12866 of the us president

a general index of technical change this paper outlines a procedure for estimating a general index of technical change within the context of a quite general production technology specifically when panel data are available for firms in an industry time specific dummies can be combined in a nonlinear estimation procedure to yield a general index of technical change that may be both nonneutral and scale augmenting this approach offers numerous advantages over the traditional time trend representation of technical change for example the general index can serve as the basis for analysis of the determinants of technical change results for a sample of 30 electric utilities over the period 1951 78 show that the productivity decline of the 1970s can be attributed primarily to sulphur oxide restrictions and secularly declining capacity utilization due to rapidly increasing peak load demands

are factor substitutions in hmo industry operations cost saving past research on the potentials for cost saving scale and scope economies in multiproduct hmo operations in the united states are incomplete in their economics of the underlying technology structure this article exploits the translog cost model estimates of all past studies of hmo production to infer the extent to which pairwise factor substitutions e g administrative services vs medical care resources e g hospital days physician services suggest potential for cost savings in groups and independent practice associations given the industry s nonhomothetic production over a 20 year period the conceptually valid morishima elasticity measure at constant output reveals limited cost saving potentials from factor interchange and input demands these opportunities differ for groups and ipas across medicare and non medicare products my findings add a timely and significant dimension to understanding potential cost savings in hmo operations policy suggestions and cost implications are rationalized in light of the declining medicare hmo enrollment and recent changes in factor input prices

optimism and pessimism in games this paper considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations it extends the earlier literature by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity ambiguity is modelled by ceu preferences we propose a new solution concept for players who may express ambiguitypreference then we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity attitude in games with strategic complements this gives a precise statement of the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour

risk sharing in the small and in the large abstract this paper analyzes risk sharing in economies with no aggregate uncertainty when agents have non convex preferences in particular agents need not be globally risk averse or uncertainty averse in the sense of schmeidler 1989 we identify a behavioral condition under which betting is inefficient i e every pareto efficient allocation provides full insurance and conversely if and only if agents supporting probabilities defined as in rigotti et al 2008 have a non empty intersection our condition is consistent with empirical and experimental evidence documenting violations of convexity in either outcomes or utilities our results show that the connection between speculative betting and inconsistent beliefs does not depend upon global notions of risk or ambiguity aversion

a definition of uncertainty aversion a definition of uncertainty or ambiguity aversion is proposed it is argued that the definition is well suited to modelling within the savage as opposed to anscombe and aumann domain of acts the defined property of uncertainty aversion has intuitive empirical content behaves well in specific models of preference multiple priors and choquet expected utility and is tractable tractability is established through use of a novel notion of differentiability for utility functions called eventwise differentiability

the risk preferences of u s executives in this paper i elicit risk attitudes of u s executives by calibrating a subjective option valuation model for option exercising data 1996 to 2008 yielding approximately 65 000 values of relative risk aversion rra for almost 7 000 executives the observed behavior is generally consistent with moderate risk aversion and a median mean rra close to one three values are validated for chief executive officers ceos by testing theory based predictions on the influence of individual characteristics on risk preferences such as gender marital status religiosity and intelligence senior managers such as ceos presidents and chairpersons of the boards of directors are significantly less risk averse than non senior executives rra heterogeneity is strongly correlated with sector membership and firm level variables such as size performance and capital structure alternative factors influencing option exercises are tested for their influence on rra values this paper was accepted by brad barber finance

are company founders underpaid this article examines the relation between founder status and ceo compensation in publicly listed us firms the results suggest that ceo founders receive lower cash pay and total compensation compared to professional managers in contrast ceos who are relatives of the founders receive similar cash pay and total compensation to that of professional managers different compensation levels also emerge in terms of stock option awards the findings underline the importance of distinguishing among these three ceo types when examining the determinants of executive compensation

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis

ceo incentives and firm size we develop a model that clarifies how to measure ceo incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms the crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of ceo productivity with respect to firm size we find that ceo marginal products rise significantly with firm size confirming rosen s conjecture that ceos of large firms have a chain letter effect on firm performance and overall ceo incentives are roughly constant or decline slightly with firm size we employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems

on the mis use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion tests of risk sharing in the contracting literature often rely on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion the intuition behind these tests is that since contract choice is monotonic in the coefficients of risk aversion which are themselves assumed monotonic in wealth the effect of a change in wealth on contract choice is clearly identified we show that tests of risk sharing relying on wealth as a proxy for risk aversion are identified only insofar as the econometrician is willing to assume that a the principal is risk neutral or her preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion cara and b the agent is risk neutral

executive compensation a modern primer this article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general interest reader we analyze assignment models of the level of pay and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives and compare their predictions to empirical findings we make two broad points first traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by ceos however more modern shareholder value theories that arguably better capture the ceo setting do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient second seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup often made for tractability or convenience can lead to significant differences in the model s implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices we close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research