what explains household stock holdings abstract this is an empirical study of the determinants of stock holdings using data from the us survey of consumer finances from 1992 to 2001 there is a great heterogeneity in the way households form their portfolios stock ownership is positively correlated with various measures of wealth age retirement savings and having sought financial advice it is negatively correlated with holdings of alternative risky investments such as investments in private businesses and with the willingness to undertake non financial investments in the future while we can predict reasonably well who holds stocks we have less predictive power about the share of stocks owned by those who hold positive amounts

the dynamics of real estate prices institute of university of i business and v california at i economic research berkeley fisher center for real estate and urban economics p working paper series working paper no 88 151 the dynamics of real estate prices by these papers are preliminary in nature their purpose is to i e z i d 2f iz e ey bradford case are nottobccited ortluotedin john mq quigley any publication without the ex press permission of the author walter a haas school of business

altruism and time consistency the economics of fait accompli this paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal interaction between two economic agents who have overlapping concerns such as altruistic concerns for each other s welfare the agents may be two individuals a social bureau and a client or two units in an organization we show how the presence of such common concerns may lead to socially inefficient outcomes in which one economic agent free rides on the other s concern we also briefly how this inefficiency and free riding in the context of interaction between individuals might be mitigated by compulsory social security systems as another example we interpret the inefficiency in terms of kornai s soft budget constraints within organizations

local market and national components in house price appreciation abstract we analyze real home price appreciation using a long time series 1971 1989 and large cross section 56 metro areas our findings yield important new insights into two outstanding issues in real estate finance and economics the first deals with the implications for investment opportunities in housing across metro areas a striking result is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal appreciation rates across locales a priori the results are suggestive of equal expected appreciation across the different local markets however it is noteworthy that we find significant serial correlation in some local appreciation series this is consistent with previous findings by case and shiller 6 and suggests that prescient market timers might have been able to make money in selective markets we then consider the potential implications of equal appreciation rates across cities for housing market equilibrium in light of the fact that price levels do materially differ across metro areas we argue that equal real appreciation rates starting from different price levels imply increasingly divergent prices of local traits in terms of foregone consumption without special assumptions with respect to income and productivity differentials across locations or to local trait income elasticities of demand the appreciation rates in high housing price level areas ultimately have to fall below those in low price level areas preliminary evidence indicates that higher priced areas tend to have significantly lower appreciation rates controlling for local fixed effects and a common time varying effect

the end of cheap chinese labor abstract in recent decades cheap labor has played a central role in the chinese model which has relied on expanded participation in world trade as a main driver of growth at the beginning of chi

optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints abstract consider the optimal incentive compatible contract offered by a firm with private information to its risk averse employees if the firm is subject to a binding limited liability or bankruptcy constraint then the contract will yield underemployment in low productivity states relative to full information efficiency such contracts either yield underemployment in all states or excessively high variability in employment

a further look at household portfolio choice and health status abstract this paper investigates the effect of changes in health status on household financial wealth and financial portfolio choice it is shown that the impact of health events on household financial and non financial wealth is asymmetric a diagnosis of a new disease leads to a larger decrease in financial wealth than in non financial wealth moreover we find that the puzzle pertaining to the relationship between health status and portfolio choice discussed in the extant literature generally disappears after controlling for differences in the amount of financial assets held by healthy and sick people the results suggest that the effect of changes in health status on household financial portfolios is indirect a health shock significantly reduces household total financial wealth in turn leading households to restructure the composition of their financial assets

does adversity affect long term financial behaviour evidence from china s rustication programme abstract this paper examines the long term effects of adversity on financial behaviour it draws on the largest forced migration experiment in history china s rustication programme evidence from the chinese twins survey and chinese household income project shows that rusticated individuals behave conservatively with respect to finances over the long term compared with their age eligible but nonrusticated peers they reduce housing consumption and its share of total assets increase savings accumulate more safe assets and invest less in risky assets such patterns are consistent with evidence from manually collected county gazetteer data possible mechanisms include reduced productivity habit formation and psychological changes

intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints a growing body of evidence indicates that liquidity constraints could affect a substantial proportion of u s consumers but little is known about why these constraints might exist an important but little explored issue is the relationship between inter vivos intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints these transfers can ease borrowing constraints empirical transfer patterns match those predicted from a model in which transfers are allocated to liquidity constrained consumers in particular the distinction between current and permanent incomes of potential recipients is a key aspect of private transfer behavior the findings have important implications for our understanding of consumer behavior

government policy and the firm s capital structure abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of commonly observed forms of government intervention on the firm s capital structure we show that since market claims against the firm are always properly priced the firm is forced to take market claimants interests into account on the other hand since government claims are usually not adjusted for risk the firm can take advantage of the government it does so by choosing strategies that extract maximum value minimum cost from these policies in particular the firm uses its capital capital structure to maximize the value of the policy thus leading to a determinate capital strucure

wealth and portfolio composition theory and evidence we examine a survey of 6010 u s households and estimate a model for household portfolio allocation we extend the conventional portfolio choice model in order to capture the observed incompleteness of household portfolios we show that the empirical specification of the joint discrete and continuous choice that characterizes household portfolio behavior is a switching regressions model with endogenous switching we go on to examine the impact of taxes on portfolio composition using detailed survey data to calculate precisely the marginal tax rate facing each household finally we estimate wealth elasticities of demand for a range of assets and liabilities

counter compensatory inter vivos transfers and parental altruism compatibility or orthogonality the intersection of the standard altruism hypothesis with the quite strong evidence that bequests tend to be equal suggests that inter vivos transfers should be strongly compensatory yet the available evidence is not in congruence with this implication it has therefore been inferred that the motive underlying inter vivos transfers is not parental altruism in this paper we present an argument showing why parents who are equally altruistic toward their children optimally transfer more to the child whose earnings are higher we show that rather than being orthogonal to parental altruism counter compensating transfers emanate from such altruism a key point in the analysis is that parents and children are interlinked in a rich web of vertical and possibly horizontal transfers reverse transfers direct transfers and indirect transfers

home sweet home home bias and international diversification among individual investors abstract a striking feature of international portfolio investment is the extent to which equity portfolios are concentrated in the domestic market of the investor we investigate differences in home bias on an individual level by studying portfolios formed as a part of the new defined contribution pension plan in sweden we estimate the likelihood of home bias and use individuals demographic and socioeconomic features as explanatory variables our findings indicate that the likelihood of home bias is caused by both rational and irrational factors moreover we relate home bias to investors desire to hedge against inflation sophistication and overconfidence

the impact of transaction costs and the expected length of stay on homeownership abstract economic theory suggests that an increase in the expected length of stay in a dwelling increases the probability of a household choosing to own a house rather than rent this hypothesis is derived from recognition that there are substantial transaction costs associated with homeownership and increased expected time in the home reduces the annualized transaction cost using a military data set we confirm that expected length of stay in a dwelling and the transaction costs of selling are very important to the ownership decision our best estimate of the transaction costs of selling a home are the sum of 3 of house value and 4 of household earnings

the costs of low birth weight birth weight has emerged as the leading indicator of infant health and welfare and the central focus of infant health policy this is because low birth weight lbw infants experience severe health and developmental difficulties that can impose enormous costs on society but would the prevention of lbw generate equally sizable cost savings and health improvements estimates of the return to lbwprevention from cross sectional associations may be biased by omitted variables that cannot be influenced by policy such as genetic factors to address this we compare the hospital costs health at birth and infant mortality rates between heavier and lighter infants from all twin pairs born in the united states we also examine the effect of maternal smoking during pregnancy the leading risk factor for lbw in the united states on health among singleton births after controlling for detailed background characteristics both analyses imply substantially smaller effects of lbw than previously thought suggesting two possibilities 1 existing estimates overstate the true costs and consequences of lbw by at least a factor of four and by as much as a factor of 20 or 2 different lbw preventing interventions have different health and cost consequences implying that policy efforts that presume a single return to reducing lbw will necessarily be suboptimal

bankruptcy warranties and the firm s capital structure this paper examines the role of capital structure as an instrument for shifting risk between real and financial markets the author considers a firm whose contractual agreements involve both consumers and debtholders and shows that if consumers are risk averse whereas equity and debtholders are risk neutral the firm uses its capital structure to shift risk away from consumers the optimal allocation of risk across real and financial markets leads the firm to be fully equity financed copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

efficiency in housing markets which home buyers know how to discount abstract we test for efficiency in the swedish co op market by examining the negative relationship between the sales price and the present value of future monthly payments or rents if the co op housing market is efficient the present value of co op rental payments due to underlying debt obligations of the cooperative should be fully reflected in the sales price however a one hundred kronor increase in the present value of future rents only leads to an approximately 75 kronor reduction in the sales price these inefficiencies are larger at the lower end of the housing market and in poorer less educated regions and appear to reflect both liquidity constraints and the existence of more sophisticated buyers in higher educated areas overall our findings suggest that there is some systematic failure to properly discount the future stream of rent payments relative to the up front sales price

testing the present value relation for housing prices should i leave my house in san francisco abstract we examine the efficiency of residential housing markets by examining price rent and cost of capital indices generated from a transactions level data base for alameda and san francisco counties in northern california we can reject both constant and nonconstant discount rate versions of the housing price present value relation in the short run long run results are consistent with the housing price present value relation when we adjust the discount factor for changes in both tax rates and borrowing costs that characterize our 1970 1988 sample period our preferred explanation for the short run rejection of but long run consistency with the present value model is the high transaction costs that characterize the housing market however we cannot rule out the possibility that deviations of actual and present value price are due to asset market bubbles or nonrational expectations

tied transfers and paternalistic preferences why do parents make inter vivos transfers to their children and leave them postmortem bequests 1 gary becker s notions of altruism 1981 ch 8 by which he means that children s utilities are arguments of their parents utility function provides one explanation denoting the children s utility functions by u ci where ci denotes consumption by child i the preferences of parents with two children can be represented by a utility function of the form w cp u1 c1 u2 c2 where cp is the parents own consumption 2 in the altruistic model parents sole motive for intergenerational transfers is to increase their children s utility in other models however parents may have nonaltruistic as well as altruistic motives for transferring resources to their children the literature on economic development emphasizes old age support as a motive for fertility and to a lesser degree as a motive for providing children with human capital as part of an explicit or implicit intergenerational contract when human capital formation is the primary focus of the analysis as in discussions of education and earnings it is useful to decompose inter vivos transfers into human capital formation and other inter vivos transfers such a decomposition can mislead in discussing intergenerational transfers however because it obscures the fact that the provision of human capital by parents constitutes an intergenerational transfer laurence kotlikoff and avia spivak 1981 analyze another old age support model one in which the family operates as an incomplete annuities market in their model children make regular transfers to their aging parents and the share that each child contributes to the parents determines his or her share of the parental estate although the prospect of old age support may be an important motive for downstream intergenerational transfers i e from parents to children in some societies in the united states today upstream transfers appear too small and too uncertain to make this motive credible to explain downstream transfers in the united states today economists have investigated other models in which parents have selfish as well as selfless motives for example b douglas bernheim andrei shleifer and lawrence summers propose a model in which parents use the prospect of bequests to exact services from their children we envision a testator who though altruistic is also affected by actions taken individually by a number of potential beneficiaries he may e g enjoy receiving attention from his children 1985 p 1046 bernheim et al assume that such actions increase parents utility and decrease children s utilities in their model the children s utility functions become u1 ai ci where ai denotes services the ith child provides the parents and the parents utility function becomes w cp al a2 ul al c1 u2 a2 ca to measure these services bernheim et al use frequency of contact i e visits plus telephone calls between parents and children this approach expands the concept of child services to include those provided by adult children who live outside the parents household in an attempt to explain bequests and inter vivos transfers child services originally appeared in discussions of fertility and the allocation of resources to young children living with their parents and thus tends to evoke the joys of young parenthood university of pennsylvania philadelphia pa 19104 and university of washington i am grateful to the national science foundation and the national institutes of health for financial support to gary becker samuel preston david stapleton and paul taubman for helpful comments and to judith farnbach for editonal assistance 1 even if bequests are unplanned as some versions of the life cycle savings model assume inter vivos transfers must be intentional 21 ignore the possible dependence of the children s utility on their own children s utility etc because it is not relevant to the issues discussed in this paper

implicit contracts labor mobility and unemployment firms inability to monitor their employees search effort forces a tradeoff between risk bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment related insurance since the provision of insurance against firm specific shocks adversely affects workers incentives to find better jobs the optimal contract provides only partial insurance it prescribes low high wages and under over employment to encourage workers to leave stay at low high productivity firms and it employs quits and layoffs as alternative means of inducing separations at low productivity firms with the mix depending upon the relative efficiency of the on and off the job search technologies our analysis of implicit contracts with asymmetric search information establishes that any consistent explanation for worksharing layoffs severance pay quits and unemployment must focus on questions of labor mobility this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

from the cradle to the labor market the effect of birth weight on adult outcomes lower birth weight babies have worse outcomes both short run in terms of one year mortality rates and longer run in terms of educational attainment and earnings however recent research has called into question whether birth weight itself is important or whether it simply reflects other hard to measure characteristics by applying within twin techniques using an unusually rich dataset from norway we examine the effects of birth weight on both short run and long run outcomes for the same cohorts we find that birth weight does matter despite short run twin fixed effects estimates that are much smaller than ols estimates the effects on longer run outcomes such as adult height iq earnings and education are significant and similar in magnitude to ols estimates

is the extended family altruistically linked direct tests using micro data this paper uses panel study of income dynamics data on parents and their adult children to test the standard altruism model this model predicts that within the extended family the distribution of consumption is independent of the distribution of resources the authors findings strongly reject this prediction copyright 1992 by american economic association

portfolio choice in the presence of personal illiquid projects personal projects such as a private business or the purchase of a home influence individuals portfolio choice we conduct a theoretical analysis of this influence when financial assets are required to provide liquidity to personal projects due to this liquidity consideration individuals behave in a more risk averse fashion when there is a large penalty for discontinuing or underinvesting in the final stages of the projects in addition using data from the 1995 survey of consumer finances we find that households that are saving to invest in their own businesses or in their own homes indeed have significantly safer financial portfolios a large portion of private assets are invested in personal illiquid projects these are projects that must be partly self financed and are costly to sell according to the 1995 survey of consumer finances scf residential housing and capital invested in unincorporated businesses account for 41 2 percent and 19 1 percent respectively of household wealth in this paper we study the impact of these personal illiquid projects on individuals portfolios of financial assets personal projects influence portfolio choice in two ways first financial assets can be used to provide diversification against bad outcomes of personal projects this interaction is well recognized in the literature as it emanates from standard portfolio theory second financial assets can be used to provide liquidity to personal projects when the timing of investment in these projects is important this latter interaction is the focus of our paper we show that it helps explain why individuals particularly young investors and entrepreneurs have larger than expected holdings of safe financial assets in the financial planning literature young investors are advised to hold a larger share of risky assets in their financial portfolios in order to capture the superior expected return of these assets as investors grow older they are advised to gradually reduce their holdings of risky assets jagannathan and kocherlakota 1996 show that this advice is economically sound as long as the investor s human wealth is relatively uncorrelated with stock returns

the political economy of the tariff cycle how can protectionism and free trade succeed one another our answer focuses on the changing balance of private actors political demands these actors acquire interests in tariff policies because their assets are spatially concentrated and trade in these assets is subject to various limitations actors in regions experiencing no new investment in an established industry old regions have interests that sometimes differ from those in regions where there is new investment we show that old regions have no reason to be involved in tariff politics at business cycle peaks during troughs whether a state becomes more or less protectionist depends ceteris paribus on the relative political strength of old import competing and old exporting interests if old import competing industries outweigh the old exporters then protection will tend to increase at the trough and decrease at the peak of a business cycle the opposite result occurs when old exporters are more influential

optimal labour contracts under asymmetric information an introduction the review of economic studies has instituted a new series of lectures to be given annually by a younger british economist at the association of university teachers of economics meetings the choice of lecturer is determined by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay this paper is a revised version of the first lecture in the series it was presented at the aute meeting held at the university of surrey in april 1982 and was refereed in the usual way mak

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

do population control policies induce more human capital investment twins birthweight and china s one child policy in this paper we address the issues of whether reductions in fertility increase human capital investments per child and whether twinning can identify the quantity quality q q trade off we show that estimates of the effects of twinning at higher parities on the outcomes of older children in prior studies do not identify family size effects but are confounded by inter child allocation effects because of the endowment deficit and close spacing of twins however examining the effects of twinning by birth order net of the effects stemming from the endowment deficit of twins can provide upper and lower bounds on the trade off between the family size and average child quality our estimates based on data from china indicate that an extra child at parity one or at parity two net of one component of birth endowment effects associated with birth weight significantly decreases the schooling progress the expected college enrolment grades in school and the assessed health of all children in the family despite the evident significant trade off between number of children and child quality in china the findings suggest that the contribution of the one child policy in china to the development of its human capital was modest copyright wiley blackwell

endogenous altruism theory and evidence from chinese twins this paper studies the endogenous formation of intersibling altruism the theory suggests that parental incentive to foster children s fraternal love is positively related to efficiency gains from

are tournaments optimal over piece rates under limited liability for the principal a highly acclaimed result is that tournaments are superior to piece rates when the agents are risk averse and their production activities are subject to a relatively large common shock the reason is that tournaments allow the principal to trade insurance for lower income to the agents our analysis shows that this celebrated result does not carry over to the case when a limited liability bankruptcy constraint limits the payments the principal can make provided that the liquidation value of the firm is sufficiently small this finding has important implications for the vast number of limited liability firms even though limited liability becomes an issue for different ranges of liquidation values under the two schemes tournaments are still superior when the liquidation value of the firm is intermediate or large even though the limited liability constraint is still binding for intermediate values surprisingly uncertainty in the price of output strengthens the need for tournaments by expanding the range of liquidation values over which tournaments are dominant because price uncertainty introduces additional bankruptcy risk these findings provide insight into policy implications in the contracting out of services by state and local governments in procurement in rent seeking contests and in tournaments used by hmos

renegotiation proof labour and credit contracts with worker mobility this paper investigates the interaction between a privately informed firm s contracts for labour and its contracts for credit the analysis shows that if the worker has no ex post outside opportunities or if the liquidation value of the firm is large then the credit contract can always be state independent if the worker has outside opportunities and the liquidation value is small then the credit contract must be state dependent however if the worker is unable to precommit not to renegotiate with the firm then the credit contract must be state independent to ensure renegotiation proofness and protect the interests of the creditor this leads to credit rationing and under investment

the term structure of interest rates with housing abstract this paper develops a general equilibrium model to study the link between the amount of capital invested in housing assets and the term structure of interest rates in the model the production of housing assets is irreversible and housing assets can be used as collateral for borrowing funds agents decisions about consumption and investments in housing and non housing assets generate a time varying market price of risk that drives the dynamics of the term structure the calibration to u s data using the simulated method of moments technique captures the dynamics of consumption and the short and long term interest rates

fertility restrictions and life cycle outcomes evidence from the one child policy in china this study considers the experience of china s one child policy to examine how fertility restrictions affect economic and social outcomes over a lifetime using variations in these penalties across

labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy abstract this paper investigates the interaction between a firm s contracts for labor and its contracts for credit under asymmetric information and limited liability when workers are either always committed to their contract or they lack the power to commit ex post because arbitrage opportunities are available to them the analysis contains two main results first contrary to the perceptions of the limited liability literature where limited liability is thought of causing both underemployment and income underinsurance limited liability is in fact shown to only cause underemployment existence of outside sources of credit eliminates the underinsurance side of the inefficiency but can not eliminate underemployment second the factor that does cause underinsurance is the existence of ex post arbitrage opportunities for the worker worker mobility leads to underinsurance regardless of whether limited liability is binding or not and even if outside sources of credit exist thus underemployment stems from limited liability and underinsurance stems from worker mobility

residential buildings and the cost of construction new evidence on the efficiency of the housing market present value studies of asset market efficiency are controversial because they compare asset prices to unobserved discounted streams of future rents as an alternative if housing markets are efficient then the price of residential capital or buildings should satisfy the following two conditions i deviations between new building prices and construction costs should disappear faster than construction lags and have no effect on construction and ii temporary building price shocks should dissipate at a similar rate for different vintage buildings results from an error correction model support both hypotheses for single family housing in vancouver british columbia this implies that the implicit market for residential buildings is efficient and that any inefficiencies in the housing market must lie in the market for land itself

implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy the effect of interest rates on layoffs this paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability we show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment level is inefficient relative to a situation of symmetric information the firm is then embedded into a partial equilibrium model in which the real rate of interest is exogenously determined we show that increases in the real rate of interest increase the inefficiency of the optimal employment contract and lead to layoffs in more states of nature than would occur at lower real interest rates recent literature in the area of implicit contracts has shown considerable interest in the assumption of asymmetric information henceforth a i papers by azariadis 1982 green and kahn 1982 and grossman and hart 1981 have all shown that a i will interfere with optimal risk sharing but although these models produce non walrasian outcomes it is not clear that they are capable of explaining the observed variations in employment over the business cycle in the absence of a link between the level of employment and other macroeconomic variables these new versions of contract theory are open to the charge that they are presenting a complicated explanation of frictional unemployment one potential link between variations in output and variations in intertemporal prices is suggested by models which explicitly allow for the possibility of bankruptcy sappington 1983 has shown that bankruptcy will generate inefficient outcomes even between risk neutral agents and farmer 1984 has shown that if sappington type contracts are incorporated into a macroeconomic structure then the resulting model predicts that bankruptcies will vary countercyclically over the business cycle although bankruptcy is important however it is unlikely that bankruptcies alone will account for all of the output loss during a recession the purpose of this paper is to show that the assumptions of a i and limited liability will generate a model in which the employment level is inefficient and in which the magnitude of this inefficiency varies systematically with the expected real rate of interest this model predicts that the observed increase in the incidence of layoffs during recessions is directly attributable to the effects of high interest rates on aggregate supply some evidence of the phenomenon to be explained is presented below

limited liability contracts between principal and agent abstract the optimal strategy of the principal is examined in an environment where there are ex post limitations on the maximum penalty that can be imposed on a riskneutral agent contrary to the case in which such limitations are not imposed it is in the principal s interest to deliberately forego the opportunity to induce socially efficient behavior and to instead design a contract that induces the agent to realize an efficient outcome only in the most productive state of nature and perhaps in certain very unproductive states the properties of the contract are examined in detail

empirical age earnings profiles the human capital earnings function in which earnings are expressed as a quadratic in potential experience is probably the most widely accepted empirical specification in economics in spite of its widespread acceptance the human capital earnings function provides a very poor approximation of the true empirical relationship between earnings and experience the standard formulation understates early career earnings growth by about 30 50 and overstates midcareer growth by 20 50 however simple alternative specifications that fit the data are available

a fresh look at the rotten kid theorem and other household mysteries gary becker s rotten kid theorem asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income i show by examples that the rotten kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility i find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a rotten kid theorem while restrictive these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the rotten kid theorem in an interesting class of examples

health nutrition and economic development the relationship between health and economic development is explored focusing on nutrition based health indicators the spotlight is placed on the inter related feedbacks between the influence of health on productivity on one hand and the influence of income on health status on the other disentangling causality in these relationships has preoccupied much of the literature we evaluate different empirical strategies that have been adopted and assess the results there is now a body of evidence based on careful empirical studies that demonstrates a causal relationship between health and labor productivity there is also evidence that at least among the very poor additional income is spent on improved nutrition there are two issues that have received little attention although we argue they are likely to be very important first measurement of health is discussed in detail evidence is presented on how taking into account differences in the extent of measurement error is critical for interpreting the impact of health on wages the same theme emerges in studies of the effect of income on health specifically calorie intake the key role of non linearities in these relationships is highlighted and we demonstrate that a good deal of the variation in estimates of income elasticities of demand for calories can be ascribed to the role of measurement and functional form authors

testing for micro efficiency in the housing market using highly granular transaction level data for the norwegian housing market over the period 2002 2014 we investigate whether excessive prices persist or revert in repeat sales excessiveness in prices is detected by comparing selling prices to predicted prices implied by a hedonic model which includes a rich set of attributes persistence is rejected and there is substantial reversion in excessive prices our results also show little scope for profitable arbitrage by investing in apparently underpriced units we suggest that excessive prices are related to the stochastic arrival of interested purchasers at public showings which we show is nonrepeatable

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

why do so few hold stocks the authors investigate why 75 percent of u s households do not hold stocks despite the equity premium and predictions of expected utility models the question is relevant for privatization asset pricing and tax progressivity issues they show that risk aversion per se heterogeneity of beliefs habit persistence time nonseparability and quantity constraints on borrowing do not account for the phenomenon a wedge between borrowing and lending rates and minimum investment requirements are plausible but empirically weak factors more promising explanations are inertia and departures from expected utility maximization there is also qualified support for nondiversifiable income risk as a contributing factor copyright 1995 by royal economic society

healthy bodies and thick wallets the dual relation between health and economic status there is abundant evidence of a quantitatively large association between many measures of economic status including income and wealth and a variety of health outcomes such as mortality or morbidity however considerable and often heated debate remains especially across disciplines about the direction of causation and about why the association arises although medical scientists are often convinced that the dominant if not exclusive pathway is that variation in socioeconomic status produces health disparities they are increasingly debating among themselves about why low economic status might lead to poor health at least for modern industrial countries 1 the old standby arguments the less well to do have access to less or lower quality medical care or a stronger pattern of deleterious personal behaviors have been rejected as insufficient instead a series of intriguing competing theories have arisen that emphasize long term impacts of early childhood or even inter uterine environmental factors the cumulative effects of prolonged exposures to individual stressful events or reactions to macro societal factors such as rising levels of income inequality a common link is that each theory attempts to document the physiological processes through which low economic status leads to poorer health while these scientific questions are extremely important this research has taken place with little input from economists economists are now making contributions about the alternative pathway the impact poor health may have on economic resources poor health may restrict a family s capacity to earn income or to accumulate assets by limiting work or by raising medical expenses at a minimum this work should provide a caution against exaggerating the magnitude of causation from economic status to health outcomes but the potential contribution runs deeper as people age the evolving variation in individual health outcomes may offer additional statistical information to estimate parameters of household savings and consumption behavior that so far have proven to be somewhat elusive thus incorporating health uncertainty and risk into economic models should eventually enrich our understanding of basic tenets of household behavior the first section of this paper documents the size of the association between health and one prominent economic status measure household wealth section two deals with how health influences economic status by sketching out reasons why health may alter household savings and eventually wealth and then providing estimates of the empirical magnitude of these effects section three shifts attention to the alternative pathway the links between economic status and health and summarizes 2major controversies and evidence surrounding these issues

do parents favor boys in an optimizing model of parental allocation systematic differences in human capital investments betwen the sexes may originate in at least 3 ways 1 parents may respond to expected gender wage differentials 2 parents may respond to systematic differences by gender in the price of human capital investments 3 parental preferences may favor girls or boys in the sense that they value identical outcomes at the same cost more highly for one sex than for the other this paper analyzes the role of parental preferences in general and unequal concern in particular in the allocation of human capital investments among children the authors generalize their earlier model of the human capital investments among children to incorporate the possibility that the returns to such investments may include not only the childs own ecpected earnings but also the expected earnings of his or her spouse thus the model assumes that parents may value returns that accrue trough the marriage market as well as through education the relevant returns to education may include marrying a spouse with higher expected earnings the empirical analysis indicates that gender wage differentials like endowment differentials are mildly reinforced by the parental allocation of human capital investments marriage market outcomes are significant determinants of the allocation of human capital investments among children there is no evidence that parental preferences favor boys this study shows that parental preferences either exhibit equal concern or slightly favor gils

parental altruism and inter vivos transfers theory and evidence this paper uses psid data on the extended family to test whether inter vivos transfers from parents to children are motivated by altruism specifically the paper tests whether an increase by one dollar in the income of parents actively making transfers to a child coupled with a one dollar reduction in that child s income results in the parents increasing their transfer to the child by one dollar this restriction on parental and child transfer income derivatives is derived for the standard altruism model augmented to include uncertainty and liquidity constraints these additional elements pin down the timing of inter vivos transfers the method used to estimate income transfer derivatives takes into account unobserved heterogeneity across families in the degree of altruism the findings strongly reject the altruism hypothesis redistributing one dollar from a recipient child to donor parents leads to less than a 13 cent increase in the parents transfer to the child far less than the one dollar increas

inequality within and between families between family differences in expenditures and output reflect the effect of simultaneous increases in children s ability on the willingness of parents to transfer resources to them within family differences also reflect the attitudes of parents toward disparity among children in this paper we characterize the conditions on parents preferences that determine whether between family differences exceed within family differences for additive utility within family differences in expenditures always exceed between family differences this may also be true for the max min utility function if an increase in ability reduces the marginal utility of income within family differences in output utility or income can also exceed between family differences in this case the implication for income distribution is that equality is enhanced by a higher correlation of ability between brothers

endowments and the allocation of schooling in the family and in the marriage market the twins experiment 03 we show how comparisons between the within twin correlations of human capital outcomes across identical and nonidentical twins can be used to identify the variability in the individual specific component of endowments and the responsiveness of schooling to individual specific endowments in the family and in the marriage market even when schooling is measured with error estimates from two twins samples indicate that 27 42 percent of the variance in log earnings obesity is due to variability in individual specific endowments allocations of schooling reinforce specific endowments and individual specific earnings endowments of men and their wives schooling are negatively associated

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling

early health shocks intra household resource allocation and child outcomes an open question in the literature is whether families compensate or reinforce the impact of child health shocks discussions usually focus on one dimension of child investment this paper examines multiple dimensions using household survey data on chinese child twins whose average age is 11 we find that compared with a twin sibling who did not suffer from negative early health shocks at ages 0 3 the other twin sibling who did suffer negative health shocks received rmb 305 more in terms of health investments but received rmb 182 less in terms of educational investments in the 12 months prior to the survey in terms of financial transfers over all dimensions of investment the family acts as a net equalizer in response to early health shocks for children we estimate a human capital production function and establish that for this sample early health shocks negatively affect child human capital including health education and socioemotional skills compensating investments in health as measured by bmi reduce the adverse effects of health shocks by 50 but exacerbate the adverse impact of shocks on educational attainment by 30

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

nominal loss aversion housing equity constraints and household mobility evidence from the united states abstract this paper exploits the recent variation in us house prices to examine the effect of equity constraints and nominal loss aversion on household mobility detailed data from the 1985 1996 national longitudinal survey of youth nlsy79 were matched with house price data from 149 metropolitan areas to estimate instrumental variables linear probability and semi parametric proportional hazard models of intra metropolitan mobility household mobility is significantly influenced by nominal loss aversion there is little evidence that low equity because of fallen house prices constrains mobility

the manipulation of children s preferences old age support and investment in children s human capital we consider the link between parents influence over the preferences of children parental investments in children s human capital and children s support of elderly parents it may pay for parents to spend resources to manipulate children s preferences in order to induce them to support their parents in old age since parents invest more in children when they expect greater support manipulation of child preferences may end up helping children and parents a new result which we call the rotten parent theorem demonstrates that if children are altruistic then even selfish parents will make the optimal investment in their children s human capital

natural natural experiments in economics the recent literature exploiting natural events as natural experiment instruments is reviewed to assess to what extent it has advanced empirical knowledge a weakness of the studies that adopt this approach is that the necessary set of behavioral market and technological assumptions made by the authors in justifying their interpretations of the estimates is often absent the methodology and findings from twenty studies are summarized and simple economic models are used to elucidate the implicit assumptions made by the authors and to demonstrate the sensitivity of the interpretations of the findings to the relaxation of some of these assumptions

nobel lecture the economic way of looking at behavior an important step in extending the traditional theory of individual rational choice to analyze social issues beyond those usually considered by economists is to incorporate into the theory a much richer class of attitudes preferences and calculations while this approach to behavior builds on an expanded theory of individual choice it is not mainly concerned with individuals it uses theory at the micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the group or macro level the lecture describes the approach and illustrates it with examples drawn from my past and current work