the analytics of the pricing of higher education and other services in which the customers are inputs many services provide outputs that depend partially on the customers as inputs the presence of other customers often contributes to the output experienced by each purchaser higher education is the premier example others are legion we provide a simple model that addresses the questions of competitive pricing and allocative efficiency for these types of services prices that charge customers for what they get on net output minus input from the firm both are competitive and support efficient allocations these prices internalize the apparent external effects of customers on each other few examples of such prices exist in the real world

compatibility and bundling of complementary goods in a duopoly this paper presents a simple model of compatibility and bundling in industries where consumers assemble several necessary components into a system that is close to their ideal the authors show that for a wide range of parameters firms will choose to produce compatible components but will offer discounts to consumers who purchase all components from the same firm however firms would be better off if they could commit not to provide such discounts furthermore the equilibrium tends to involve socially excessive bundling finally mixed bundling strategies tend to increase the range of parameters over which socially excessive standardization occurs copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

product introduction with network externalities the authors study the introduction of a new product in a market with network externalities there is a common presumption that such markets exhibit excess inertia i e that they are biased toward existing products in contrast the authors provide conditions under which equilibrium involves insufficient friction i e a tendency to rush into new incompatible technologies they also analyze the firms incentives to make their products compatible and they show that the firm introducing the new technology is biased against compatibility copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

desirability of compatibility in the absence of network externalities i compare the incentives firms have to produce individual components compatible with components of other manufacturers instead of systems composed of components that are incompatible with components of competing manufacturers i show that even in the absence of positive consumption externalities network externalities prices and profits will be higher in the regime of compatibility equilibrium total surplus could be higher in either regime both regimes overprovide variety compared to the surplus maximizing solution in today s environment many products are complex specified by a long array of characteristics part of the decision of the firm is to choose if it should break this long array of features into two or more smaller parts and produce the products corresponding to the smaller arrays instead of the product that embodies the full array we will call the products that correspond to these smaller arrays components and the product that corresponds to the full array a system note that components are by their definition complements components produced by different manufacturers are compatible if it is feasible for the consumers to combine them costlessly into a working system in this paper we will assume that there are two components which make up a system we will discuss competition under full compatibility when components produced by all firms are compatible with each other and under incompatibility when no components produced by different firms are compatible and no hybrid systems can exist 2 assuming availability of the same

empirical studies of financial innovation lots of talk little action this paper reviews the extant empirical studies of financial innovation adopting broad criteria we could find only somewhat more than two dozen studies and since some financial innovations are examined by more than one study they cover only seventeen phenomena especially striking is the fact that only two studies offer tests of the broad hypotheses concerning the environmental conditions spurring financial innovation e g regulation taxes unstable macroeconomic conditions and ripe technologies that have been advanced in descriptive articles we offer some tentative conjectures as to why empirical studies of financial innovation are comparatively rare among our suggested culprits is an absence of accessible data we urge financial regulators to undertake more surveys of financial innovation and to make the survey data more available to researchers

foreclosure of railroad markets a test of chicago leverage theory the possibility of vertical foreclosure arises when at least one firm in a market is vertically integrated and other firms are not for example in the well known alcoa case the production of aluminum ingot is monopolized by a single firm while the aluminum sheet industry is competitive the ingot producer is vertically integrated into sheet rolling nonintegrated sheet rollers are thus dependent for aluminum ingot on their vertically integrated competitor who has a monopoly in the aluminum ingot market 1 foreclosure implies that no transactions among integrated and nonintegrated firms will occur or at least that the quantities exchanged will be less than would occur in the absence of vertically related bargaining power as in the alcoa case the vertically integrated firm can also price squeeze its nonintegrated buyers by raising its price above competitive levels these potential inefficiencies have generated considerable concern in the industrial organization and antitrust literature the long standing legal view which first appeared in the 1911 american tobacco case was

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

network externalities and market segmentation in a monopoly abstract network externalities characterize the consumption of many products in a setting where a monopolist does not price discriminate without externalities we show that presence of network externalities induces the monopolist to price discriminate and segment its market

competition and integration among complements and network market structure this article analyzes the competition and integration among complementary products that can be combined to create composite goods or systems the model generalizes the cournot duopoly complements model to the case in which there are multiple brands of compatible components it analyzes equilibrium prices for a variety of organizational and market structures that differ in their degree of competition and integration the model applies to a variety of product networks including automatic teller machines real estate multiple listing services and airlines crs as well as to nonnetwork markets of compatible components such as computer cpus and peripherals hardware and software and long distance and local telephone services copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

the division of markets is limited by the extent of liquidity spatial competition with externalities liquidity considerations will limit the number of markets in a competitive economy welfare implications are ambigious since liquidity is a positive externality there may be too little liquidity per market at a noncooperative equilibrium and too many markets compared to the surplus maximizing market structure but liquidity is also self reinforcing given an existing equilibrium new markets may not open because nobody wants to use a new market with low liquidity there may be too few markets to achieve efficiency a nondiscriminating monopolist will operate smaller and more numerous markets compared to optimality as well as to the equilibrium of independent auctioneers copyright 1988 by american economic association

brothers from different mothers how distribution fees change investment behavior abstract we ask whether loads affect investment flows in the us mutual fund industry we argue that sales fees make the investment decision partially irreversible under these circumstances investors await for a stronger signal of managerial ability before committing to a new fund this stronger signal can take the form of a particularly strong performance or a particularly long series of positive performance realizations looking at pairs of fund shares with the same portfolio but different sales fee arrangements we show that investment flows in share classes with front loads react disproportionally to good performances higher convexity in the flow performance relationship and react to performance realizations further back in time longer memory a counterfactual example of fund shares with back end loads allows us to rule out the hypothesis that this behavior is due to the incentive structure of brokers finally we show that these behavioral modifications induced by front loads have a negative and significant effect on investors timing ability

the use and abuse of mutual fund expenses prior research shows that mutual fund investors are often aware of up front charges like sales loads but they are less mindful of annual operating expenses even though both types of fees lower overall performance this study documents the historical trend and recent abuse of annual mutual fund expenses as the industry becomes more adept at segmenting customers by level of investment sophistication we claim that load mutual fund companies take advantage of this ability and charge higher expenses to their target customer the less knowledgeable investor no load fund companies which tend to attract the more sophisticated investor offer lower expenses for example over 2000 2004 the average annual expense ratio of load equity funds was 50 basis points higher than no load equity funds we show evidence of this widening cost disparity since the early 1990s among new and existing equity bond and index funds we also document a growing abuse of sales distribution or 12b 1 fees among funds that are closed to new investors almost all of which are load funds thus load fund investors are more susceptible to paying higher expenses and receiving lower returns over time

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

investors distraction and strategic repricing decisions in this paper i analyze investors reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds i show that investment flows response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors performance sensitivity while performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance price sensitivity does not investors who buy top past performers seem to be distracted by the fund s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios moreover price sensitivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases and while looking at data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds information for retail investors finally i show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities and that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this opportunistic behavior

demand curves and the pricing of money management one reason why funds charge different prices to their investors is that they face different demand curves one source of differentiation is asset retention performance sensitive investors migrate from worse to better prospects taking their performance sensitivity with them in the cross section we show that past attrition significantly influences the current pricing of retail but not institutional funds in time series we show that the repricing of retail funds after merging in new shareholders is predicted by the estimated effect on its demand curve this result is robust to other influences on repricing including asset and account size changes copyright 2002 oxford university press

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

terminal railroad revisited foreclosure of an essential facility or simple horizontal monopoly rollowing the supreme court s 1986 decision in aspen ski there has been a renewed interest in the essential facilities doctrine the doctrine as we understand it is inconsistent with economic theory broadly stated the doctrine says that if assets cannot be economically reproduced by another firm but are economically essential to all producers of some good then all producers of that good should have equal access to the assets the doctrine presumes that the firm controlling such assets will not provide access equally to all firms this problem is thought to be particularly acute in cases where the firm owning the asset is one among a group of competitors needing that asset to produce some other good the case that has been cited as establishing the doctrine and the classic essential facilities case 2 is united states v terminal railroad association of st louis 3 several recent articles4 on this case detail three important propositions

hot hands in mutual funds short run persistence of relative performance 1974 1988 the relative performance of no load growth oriented mutual funds persists in the near term with the strongest evidence for a one year evaluation horizon portfolios of recent poor performers do significantly worse than standard benchmarks those of recent top performers do better though not significantly so the difference in risk adjusted performance between the top and bottom octile portfolios is six to eight percent per year these results are not attributable to known anomalies or survivorship bias investigations with a different previously used data set and with some post 1988 data confirm the finding of persistence

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

networks and compatibility implications for antitrust in this paper we draw crucial parallels between the concepts of compatibility and networks and the more traditional concepts of complementarity and vertical relationships we also develop the important distinctions between two way networks and one way networks we then apply our framework to a number of current antitrust issues

product differentiation search costs and competition in the mutual fund industry a case study of s p 500 index funds we investigate the role that non portfolio fund differentiation and information search frictions play in creating two salient features of the mutual fund industry the large number of funds and the sizeable dispersion in fund fees in a case study we find that despite the financial homogeneity of s p 500 index funds this sector exhibits the fund proliferation and fee dispersion observed in the broader industry we show how extra portfolio mechanisms explain these features these mechanisms also suggest an explanation for the puzzling late 1990s shift in sector assets to more expensive and often newly entered funds an influx of highinformation cost novice investors

quality distortion by a discriminating monopolist the standard model of monopolistic imperfect quality discrimination involving consumer self selection has shown that no distortion occurs at the highest quality level while all lower quality levels are degraded in order to maintain profitable market segmentation this result flows from the assumption that consumers with a higher total utility of quality also have a higher marginal utility of quality the paper develops a reasonable model in which the standard assumption is not satisfied and this alternative model yields vastly different conclusions regarding the form of quality distortion in particular quality may be enhanced not degraded to maintain profitable market segmentation copyright 1989 by american economic association

how have borrowers fared in banking mega mergers previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in market competitors a portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis a vis regulators and other competitors we demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit constrained the loan customer is smaller or the acquisition is an in market deal these findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for smaller firms and especially capitalconstrained firms