a theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining this paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games with transfers supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play although the bargaining phase is cheap talk following a generalized alternating offer protocol sharp predictions arise from three axioms two axioms allow the players to meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan the third embodies a theory of disagreement that play under disagreement should not vary with the manner in which bargaining broke down equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all discount factors and are simple to construct all equilibria generate the same welfare optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bargaining protocol the theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitoring and heterogeneous discount factors and yields new insights into classic relational contracting questions

why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor recent macroeconomic research discusses credit market imperfections as a key channel through which inequality retards growth with convex technologies progressive transfers increase aggregate output because marginal returns become more equalized across investment opportunities we argue that this reasoning may not hold in general equilibrium since the investment functions are concave in wealth reducing inequality increases capital demand and the interest rate hence through the impact on capital costs shifting wealth from the rich to the middle class depletes the poorest investors access to credit but because the poor face the highest marginal returns the net effect on output may be negative we find however that redistributing towards the bottom end of the distribution has a clear positive impact finally we discuss the implications of our theoretical findings for future empirical research

market structure and borrower welfare in microfinance motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures considering a benevolent non profit lender a for profit monopolist and a competitive credit market to understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the mix market database our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non profit lending in addition for profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non profits

bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets abstract in a credit market with enforcement constraints we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract as well as on borrower payoffs the results crucially depend on the allocation of bargaining power between the borrower and the lender we prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down but if the borrower has less power than this threshold her expected payoff must come down with her outside options in the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about say by better enforcement must create a lorenz improvement in state contingent consumption in particular borrower consumption rises in all bad states in which loans are taken in the latter case in contrast the borrower s consumption must decline at least for all the bad states these disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way

labor tying in a poor agrarian economy a theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper we show how tied labor contrary to its common characterization as a feudal relic and as a symptom of economic stagnation may actually be strengthened by capitalist agricultural development we construct a simple two period theoretical model of a two tiered labor market to show how the proportional importance of voluntary labor tying contracts may increase with yield increasing improvements and with a tightening of the labor market we then provide in support of these hypotheses some general historical as well as more detailed econometric evidence from a variety of cross sectional data in rural india

balancing search and stability interdependencies among elements of organizational design we examine how and why elements of organizational design depend on one another an agent based simulation allows us to model three design elements and two contextual variables that have rarely been analyzed jointly a vertical hierarchy that reviews proposals from subordinates an incentive system that rewards subordinates for departmental or firm wide performance the decomposition of an organization s many decisions into departments the underlying pattern of interactions among decisions and limits on the ability of managers to process information interdependencies arise among these features because of a basic general tension to be successful an organization must broadly search for good sets of decisions but it must also stabilize around good decisions once discovered an effective organization balances search and stability we identify sets of design elements that encourage broad search and others that promote stability the adoption of elements that encourage broad search typically raises the marginal benefit of other elements that provide offsetting stability hence the need to balance search and stability generates interdependencies among the design elements we pay special attention to interdependencies that involve the vertical hierarchy our findings confirm many aspects of conventional wisdom about vertical hierarchies but challenge or put boundary conditions on others we place limits for instance on the received wisdom that firm wide incentives and capable subordinates make top level oversight less valuable we also identify circumstances in which vertical hierarchies can lead to inferior long term performance

developing successful trust based international exchange relationships trust is a central construct in relationship marketing yet the literature provides mixed empirical evidence on the trust performance linkage also there is limited research on how to build trusting international buyer seller relations we develop a comprehensive model integrating performance enhancing mechanisms and antecedent processes of trust in import export relationships our survey results from importers trading with overseas manufacturers suggest that existing levels of trust have a positive effect on relationship performance outcomes achieved 1 year later importantly trust takes on greater importance in enhancing performance under conditions of high interdependence whereas in circumstances of low interdependence trust has no discernible effect the findings also indicate that interfirm psychic distance internal uncertainty and exporter transaction specific assets and opportunism are related to importer trust implications for academics and practitioners are addressed

risk and insurance in a rural credit market an empirical investigation in northern nigeria credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern nigeria repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders the paper develops two models of state contingent loans the first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts the second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions but that a fully efficient risk pooling equilibrium is not achieved the research is based on a year long survey in zaria nigeria conducted by the author

the taking of land when should compensation be paid the analysis focuses on the question of whether the payment of compensation for land taken by eminent domain is efficient when the taking decision is independent of land use zero compensation is efficient but full compensation is not when the project decision is no longer independent of land use and can be affected by investor decisions neither compensation rule is generally efficient because of the moral hazard problem with risk averse consumers and risk neutral firms the previous conclusions remain essentially unchanged however when the project decision rule involves a budgetary fiscal illusion additional compensation may be necessary to correct the incentives facing the project decision maker

contractual structure and wealth accumulation can historical wealth distributions affect long run output and inequality despite rational saving convex technology and no externalities we consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability if agents have no bargaining power poor agents have no incentive to save poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes with no interclass mobility if instead agents have all the bargaining power strong saving incentives are generated the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and history does not matter eventually d31 d91 i32 o17 q15

the hazards of piecemeal reform british civil courts and the credit market in colonial india abstract the colonial experience of developing countries provides valuable evidence regarding the impact of legal and institutional innovations on economic growth however there has been little effort by economists to study colonial policies to gain theoretical insights into the process of institutional reform this paper considers the introduction of civil courts in colonial india and its impact on agricultural credit markets in the bombay deccan drawing on historical records and a formal analysis of the credit market the paper finds that the reform led to increased competition among lenders ex ante we expect that this would have raised farmers welfare but increased competition also reduced lenders incentives to subsidize farmers investments in times of crisis leaving them more vulnerable in bad times

incentives and the de soto effect this paper explores the consequences of improving property rights to facilitate the use of fixed assets as collateral popularly attributed to the influential policy advocate hernando de soto we use an equilibrium model of a credit market with moral hazard to characterize the theoretical effects and also develop a quantitative analysis using data from sri lanka we show that the effects are likely to be nonlinear and heterogeneous by wealth group they also depend on the extent of competition between lenders there can be significant increases in profits and reductions in interest rates when credit markets are competitive however since these are due to reductions in moral hazard that is increased effort the welfare gains tend to be modest when cost of effort is taken into account allowing for an extensive margin where borrowers gain access to the credit market can make these effects larger depending on the underlying wealth distribution

determinants of trust in supplier relations evidence from the automotive industry in japan and the united states abstract this study examines the determinants of inter organizational trust by using survey data from over 1000 suppliers in the automotive industry drawing on transaction cost economics game theory and sociological exchange theory we define trust and derive a model of its determinants regression analysis results indicate that determinants of trust are different from determinants of opportunism us japanese differences are found in three respects i the way trust is conceptualised by suppliers is more complex in japan than in the us ii the level of trust is higher in japan than in the us and iii the factors facilitating trust and those attenuating opportunism differ in the us and japan

the firms that feed industrial districts a return to the italian source italian industrial districts comprise a great variety of firms and are criss crossed by various networks and business groups although the vast majority of industrial district firms are relatively small it is a mistake to assume that they are organizationally symmetrical and that they mimic the supposedly dominant norms of the communities in which they are located larger firms frequently organize production among groups of smaller firms introduce technological innovations and expand existing markets copyright 1999 by oxford university press

knowledge transfer capacity and its implications for the theory of the multinational corporation this study updates and extends research on foreign entry modes by examining the impacts of knowledge transfer capacity and knowledge tacitness research on international corporate expansion has long emphasized that deploying intangible knowledge based assets is required for successful international expansion more recently research from a knowledge based perspective has addressed the role of tacitness in constraining a firm s ability to transfer knowledge internationally we combine these perspectives to describe how knowledge tacitness affects the relative suitability of four archetypal entry modes exporting licensing establishing an alliance and wholly owned entry we then examine and develop conceptually a seldom studied firm characteristic knowledge transfer capacity we offer predictions that describe the combined effects of knowledge tacitness and transfer capacity on entry mode choice we distinguish between the transfer capacity of the organization that develops knowledge source transfer capacity and that of the organization that seeks to access that knowledge recipient transfer capacity the discussion addresses how our model generalizes to knowledge seeking strategies and to the study of ongoing multinational networks the study enriches and reconciles multiple theoretical perspectives on entry strategy it brings together the study of knowledge characteristics and firm heterogeneity in the theory of the multinational corporation and in international and strategic management more generally journal of international business studies 2003 34 356 373 doi 10 1057 palgrave jibs 8400037

managing tacit and explicit knowledge transfer in ijvs the role of relational embeddedness and the impact on performance drawing on organizational learning and economic sociology we address how relational embeddedness between the foreign parent and international joint venture ijv managers influences the type of knowledge i e tacit and explicit transferred to the ijv and how the importance of relational embeddedness varies between young and mature ijvs we also examine the influence of tacit and explicit knowledge on ijv performance our results show the importance that tie strength trust and shared values and systems play in the transfer of tacit knowledge especially for mature ijvs our findings are consistent with uzzi s tenets tacit learning is accumulative assists in explaining explicit knowledge and is enhanced by social embeddedness we also find that the influence of transferred tacit knowledge on ijv performance stems principally from its indirect effect on the learning of explicit knowledge

relational contracts and the value of relationships this article studies optimal relational contracts when the value of the relationship between contracting parties is not commonly known i consider a principal agent setting where the principal has persistent private information about her outside option i show that if the principal has the bargaining power she wants to understate her outside option to provide strong incentives and then renege on promised payments while if the uninformed agent has the bargaining power the principal wants to overstate her outside option to capture more surplus i characterize how information is revealed how the relationship evolves and how this depends on bargaining power jel c78 d82 d83 d86

learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances building relational capital one of the main reasons that firms participate in alliances is to learn know how and capabilities from their alliance partners at the same time firms want to protect themselves from the opportunistic behavior of their partner to retain their own core proprietary assets most research has generally viewed the achievement of these objectives as mutually exclusive in contrast we provide empirical evidence using large sample survey data to show that when firms build relational capital in conjunction with an integrative approach to managing conflict they are able to achieve both objectives simultaneously relational capital based on mutual trust and interaction at the individual level between alliance partners creates a basis for learning and know how transfer across the exchange interface at the same time it curbs opportunistic behavior of alliance partners thus preventing the leakage of critical know how between them copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

measuring performance of international joint ventures international joint ventures ijvs are increasing in frequency and strategic importance however efforts to identify variables associated with ijv performance have been constrained by disagreements regarding the comparability and reliability of alternative performance measures and methods this study tests several hypotheses regarding the reliability and comparability of a range of objective and subjective measures of ijv performance as well as evaluating the relative utility of different data collection approaches

optimal cognitive distance and absorptive capacity in this paper we test the relation between cognitive distance and innovation performance of firms engaged in technology based alliances the key finding is that the hypothesis of an inverted u shaped effect of cognitive distance on innovation performance of firms is confirmed moreover as expected we found that the positive effect for firms is much higher when engaging in more radical exploratory alliances than in more exploitative alliances the effect of cumulative r d turns out to be mixed it appears to increase absorptive capacity as expected but there is clear evidence that it also reduces the effect of cognitive distance on novelty value making it increasingly difficult to find additional novelty

knowledge acquisition from foreign parents in international joint ventures an empirical examination in the hungarian context in this paper we examine organizational characteristics structural mechanisms and contextual factors that influence knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent in international joint ventures ijvs we in turn relate assessments of knowledge acquisition to ijv performance the data come from a survey of ijvs in the hungarian context where learning and knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent is thought to be particularly critical adaptation mechanisms such as capacity to learn articulated goals and structural mechanisms such as the provision of training technology and managerial assistance by foreign parents all were positively associated with the degree to which ijvs reported acquiring knowledge from their foreign parents we also found limited support for the belief that cultural conflicts can impede knowledge acquisition but only for two party joint ventures with 50 50 equity arrangements we also looked at the relationship between knowledge acquisition and different dimensions for evaluating ijv performance the relationship between knowledge acquisition and performance was significant for all indicators of performance through knowledge acquisition from the foreign parent and the organizational characteristics hypothesized to enhance ijv knowledge acquisition affected assessments of some dimensions of performance more than others our findings contribute to advancing knowledge about the relationship between organizational characteristics and organizational knowledge acquisition in ijvs as well as the relationships between knowledge acquisition and different dimensions of ijv performance

how does trust affect performance in the supply chain the moderating role of interdependence abstract this paper focuses on the positive relationship between trust and performance in the supply chain and investigates whether and how the interdependence structure of the supply chain moderates this relationship interdependence occurs in supply chains because supply chain partners depend upon one another for product and process accomplishments and for the tangible and intangible resources owned by their partners framing the supply chain as a complex adaptive system we argue that in supply chain contexts both the degree of interdependence i e the average number of interactions among the supply chain firms and the overall interdependence pattern which maps with who each supply chain firm interacts moderate the relationship between trust and supply chain performance the proposed conceptual framework is operationalized through the nk fitness landscape model and tested using simulation and tobit regression analyses results confirm that the specific interdependence pattern that characterizes the supply chain has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between trust and supply chain performance while the moderating effect exerted by the degree of interdependence is not statistically significant

an ising based dynamic model to study the effect of social interactions on firm absorptive capacity abstract we present a dynamic model of firm absorptive capacity which is consistent with a process oriented conceptualization and based on the teaching learning approach to investigate the effect of social interactions among the firm members on the firm absorptive capacity in particular two main learning processes are considered the explorative and the transformative learning to develop the model the ising approach which is a very well established framework to study the dynamics of social interactions is employed furthermore a simulation analysis is carried out to investigate the effect of two patterns and four levels of social interactions on the firm absorptive capacity results show that block diagonal patterns where interactions occur inside groups and not between groups such as in modular organizations lead to higher absorptive capacity compared to hierarchical patterns e g those exhibited by centralized organizations we also show that the relationship between the level of social interactions and the firm absorptive capacity follows an inverted u shape in the block diagonal patterns while the absorptive capacity decreases as the level of interactions rises in the hierarchical patterns finally we find that the social network also plays a moderating role on the relationship between the complementary knowledge and the firm absorptive capacity

an optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism in a federal system of government each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide and what types of taxes and which tax rates to use in funding the public goods in this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision making in particular we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions the paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision making

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

tenure security and urban squatting while recent studies have shown that up to 35 of the total urban population of the third world live in squatter settlements there is a dearth of economic analysis on the phenomenon of squatting this paper attempts to fill this gap the equilibrium model argues that the difference in unit housing prices between the non squatting formal sector of a city and its squatting informal sector reflects the premium associated with a secure tenure status the empirical portion of this paper uses hedonic price techniques to derive the average premium on tenure security in a medium sized philippine city davao results show that formal sector unit dwelling prices are about 18 renters to 58 owners more than in the informal sector these equilibrium price differentials were found to be greater for lower income groups larger household sizes and households with older heads for renters and younger heads for