an analysis of interfirm cooperation theory and evidence from electric power pools this paper develops and tests a model for analyzing the extent to which an individual utility participates in a power pool it incorporates the benefits and costs of pool membership in a profit maximization model of an individual utility the study finds that coordination reflects the benefits and costs the degree to which other utilities are committed to the pool and the utility s behavior toward other utilities the results show that large firms are reluctant to pool with small firms and the us pools tend to be loosely coordinated policy implications are that regulatory commissions can be instrumental in coordination efforts and that interstate cooperation among regulatory authorities is needed to encourage pooling and obtain regional solutions to regional problems it is also important to reduce the transactional costs of pooling wherever possible 37 references 3 figures 1 table

industry self regulation without sanctions the chemical industry s responsible care program industry self regulation the voluntary association of firms to control their collective action has been proposed as a complement to government regulation proponents argue that the establishment of

monitoring moral hazard asymmetric information and risk sharing in procurement contracting this article characterizes the optimal procurement contract for a monopsonistic purchaser who contracts with a risk averse supplier with private information about his costs and who contributes an unobservable effort the costs incurred by the supplier may be uncertain and the purchaser has access to a monitor of costs that may be subject to noise that complicates risk sharing the purchaser prefers to respond to the observability problem with afixed price contract and to respond to the private information problem with a cost plus contract with uncertain costs and a perfect monitor the optimal contract relieves the supplier of some risk and the purchaser prefers that the effort of the supplier be subsidized with deterministic costs and a noisy monitor the optimal contract places risk on the supplier and the purchaser may prefer that the effort of the supplier be taxed procurement of goods and services is an important form of economic exchange that is often characterized by bargaining and contracting rather than by exchange in a competitive market the procurement setting analyzed here corresponds to the case in which the purchaser is a monopsonist who contracts with a single supplier as in the case of the department of defense contracting for the delivery of a military system in such a setting a principalagent model may be a reasonable representation of the relationship between the purchaser and the supplier and the economics of the procurement arrangement is then captured in the contract when the item procured is standardized the relevant information is likely to be common knowledge and risk may be minimal in such a case a fixed price contract may satisfactorily resolve the purchaser s contracting problem in contrast the model considered here is intended to represent the procurement of a nonstandardized item about which information is incomplete costs are uncertain and observability of supplier costs by the purchaser is limited procurement thus is complicated by the conjunction of adverse selection risk sharing and moral hazard problems

what can we learn from the grand policy experiment lessons from so2 allowance trading stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199822 2912 3a3 3c69 3awcwlft 3e2 0 co 3b2 tthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgtue jun 26 16 25 17 2007

the distribution of school leaver unemployment within scottish cities this paper examines the phenomenon of intra urban unemployment in the context of school leaver unemployment in scottish cities unlike much of the previous work in this area the paper avoids the ecological fallacy by utilising data on individual school leavers from the 1981 scottish school leavers survey in conjunction with detailed small area statistics from the 1981 decennial census probit analysis is employed to avoid certain statistical problems the results indicate that in terms of employment probabilities there is little evidence of any area effects within scottish cities in this sense there is one urban labour market in which personal characteristics matter but where area of residence is of little import these findings were found to hold in aberdeen dundee edinburgh and glasgow within each of these cities the effects of inter city variations in unemployment rates was found to fail disproportionately on the less qualified and less advantaged young job seekers

entrepreneurship social mobility and income redistribution in south india development economists have been preoccupied with the problem of increasing the size of the gnp pie to the relative neglect of its distribution despite the recent disenchantment with the viewpoint that all classes share in the benefits of industrial growth empirical data on the distribution of income business opportunity and economic power are in short supply many of the studies on entrepreneurship and economic development when they are not apologetics for ruthless capitalist exploitation as paul baran suggests extol the achievements of the capitalist entrepreneur without examining class origins and monopoly advantage joseph schumpeter sees entrepreneurs irrespective of class origin as heroic figures with the dream and will to found a private kingdom to conquer adversity to achieve success for its own sake and to experience the joy of creation for gustav papanek 1967 the private entrepreneur who is frugal diligent far sighted remarkably able and willing to take political risks is in large part responsible for the success of pakistan in achieving rapid industrialization

x inefficiency and interfirm rivalry evidence from the electric utility industry competition from the natural gas industry is shown to increase the efficiency of the work force of electric power utilities this conclusion is qualified to the extent that duopoly rivalry does not represent perfect competition in a free market as natural gas reserves decline however the impetus to improve efficiency will diminish but this will be offset by technological advances in both power generation and power transmission if regulators develop policies to encourage competitive interplay utility performance is more likely to improve 38 references 3 tables dck

effects of regulation on utility financing theory and evidence standing of these cross sectional variations might be afforded by the detailed examination of specific industry characteristics and their relationship to firms financing patterns the present study offers a methodology for approaching this issue the first step is to assemble joint theories of industry and financial structure in order to identify the ways in which changing industry conditions might be associated with changes in financing evidence on such simultaneous changes can then be examined in an attempt to identify the most plausible joint theory the methodology is used to investigate the effects of state commission regulation on the financing of electric utilities this is a natural candidate for study since regulation is such a salient feature of the industry in addition the regulatory system imparts some interesting special features to the very nature of utility capital structures inherent in all capital structures for example are opportunities for shifting wealth between bondholders and shareholders but under regulation these wealth shifting opportunities are expanded to encompass consumers as well finally the study of regulation has resulted in several relatively well specified theories of why regulation is imposed and what its observable effects should be in section i the different theories of capital structure and regulation are discussed and their joint implications are derived the capital structure theories include the perfect capital market theory the debt capacity theory and the financing hierarchy theory the regulatory theories include the public interest or market failure theory the political economy theory and the imperfect monitoring theory in section ii financing data from the early days of state commission utility regulation are used to try to distinguish

urban unemployment a causal modelling approach intra urban variations in male unemployment are hypothesised to depend on residential variations in the personal characteristics of adult males age marital status family size skill level housing tenure and local characteristics manufacturing employment the number of married working women and unemployment in previous years a causal modelling approach is adopted in which the nature and direction of the causal relationships between the highly correlated personal and local characteristics are carefully specified a priori the hypothesised linkages between the standardised variables are tested in a systematic manner using step wise regression yielding beta coefficients post code sector data for 29 scottish cities and towns from the small areas statistics of the 1971 and 1981 censuses of population were analysed as a whole and in seven subsets 4 cities strathclyde excluding glasgow new towns and the rest of scotland the typical pattern suggests that unemployment is related to lack of

regulation of administered prices an empirical analysis of the microeconomics of price movement in finland 1972 77 curiously enough the concept of administered prices launched by gardiner means in his 1934 report to the u s secretary of agriculture still shows up in discussions on price policy and control today almost fifty years since it was coined and three decades after the discussion2 in which it should have been buried even more astonishing is the fact that its spin off administered inflation a term introduced by the kefauver committee in 1957 3 is still a part of economic language in some instances in the basic formulation that of means in 1935 administered prices are not assumed to be explicitly linked with market power but simply prices set by administrative action and held constant for a period of time means 12 p 78 although the hypothesis in this form was based on no economic reasoning of acceptable clarity it might still be accepted for the simple truism it is clearly some prices will change more seldom than others since for one thing costs of price changes will vary as is intuitively clear and as shown by sheshinski and weiss 17 pp 294 95 the optimal strategy of a firm in an inflationary environment will consist of longer intervals between successive price changes the higher the cost of such a change is under some very special assumptions risk aversion may also serve as an explanation to a decrease in the number of price changes relative to the number of changes in cost as indicated by the results of schramm and sherman 1 5 4 the administered inflation hypothesis as forwarded by means in his 1957 testimony before the kefauver committee means 12 pp 101 29 and by

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article by akira takayama discusses an earlier paper by harvey averch and leland l johnson on fair rate of return regulation of public utilities although takayama p 255 agrees with averch and johnson s general conclusions that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint on its rate of return he criticizes the a j argument as being confusing ambiguous and in error takayama then attempts a clarification and presents a new formulation which leads to the a j result quoted above this comment will discuss several of takayama s criticisms in addition to showing that the so called a j effect cannot be derived from the basic assumptions made by both averch and johnson and takayama 1 we will show that the very assumptions used to prove the a j effect by defining the region of x require an assumption that the a j effect exists in the first place

structural change power politics and community organizations in africa challenging the patterns puzzles and paradoxes abstract this paper explores two phenomena shaping processes of local institutional and organizational change in rural africa the first is the complexity of institutional layering and dissonance in which local organizations and institutions in rural africa coexist the second is the paradox often found in state local relations in africa central governments encourage local communities to take on responsibilities which the center cannot manage should significant organizational strength emerge at the local level however central powers often move expeditiously to destroy it illustrative material comes primarily from kenya and zimbabwe and selectively from several other countries we ask what new structures are emerging and what old ones are being adapted to new functions we argue that local organizations are critical for addressing ecological decline and restoring the productivity and sustainability of rural africa both localities and national governments have much to gain if the capacities of local organizations can become themselves a valued resource in the resource scarce setting comprising much of rural africa

the influence of the economic approaches to regulation on banking regulations a short history of banking regulations this article highlights the theoretical foundations of the regulations at work in the banking sector and examines their responsibility in the onset of the 2007 2008 financial crisis drawing a parallel between the main changes in banking regulations since the 1960s and the evolutions in the economic analyses of regulation over the same period it shows that the shift from the public interest theory of regulation that prevailed until the late 1960s towards the private interest theory of regulation accounts for the substitution of micro prudential regulations for macro prudential ones and explains a paradigmatic change in the conception of the regulatory instruments of the banking authorities it also shows that although the outcome of several factors the 2007 2008 crisis was also a consequence of the fact that the economic analysis of banking regulations supported micro prudential regulations that fail to take the global features and impact of banking activities into account and have proved unable to recommend effective solutions in a context of crisis

social science knowledge and institutional change over the last several decades agricultural economists have made major contributions to our understanding of the impact of advances in natural science knowledge on technical change and of the impact of technical change on economic growth we have also significantly advanced our understanding of the sources of demand for and supply of technical change work carried out within the framework of the induced technical change paradigm has demonstrated that technical change can be treated as largely endogenous to the development process hayami and ruttan 1971 binswanger and ruttan we have made less progress in our attempts to understand the contributions of advances in social science knowledge to institutional innovation or of the contribution of institutional innovation to economic political or social change and our knowledge of the sources of demand for and supply of institutional change remains rudimentary in this paper i suggest an approach to thinking about the sources of demand and supply for institutional change i then proceed to explore the use of social science knowledge and the role of social scientists in the design and evolution of institutional innovations finally i examine the contribution of agricultural economics research and of agricultural economists to the design and evolution of the direct payment approach to farm price and income policy i follow the lead of commons and knight and define institution to include both the behavioral rules that govern patterns of relationships and action as well as decision making units such as government bureaus firms and families the term institutional change will at times be used to refer to both institutional innovation and to changes in institutional performance i

efficiency based rank assessment for electric power industry a combined use of data envelopment analysis dea and dea discriminant analysis da abstract this study discusses a combined use of dea data environment analysis and dea da discriminant analysis to determine the efficiency based rank of energy firms this type of performance evaluation is important because we often have a difficulty in accessing a large sample on energy firms to derive reliable empirical results the proposed approach is useful in dealing with such a limited number of energy firms often found in previous dea studies on energy industries in the world the proposed approach uses dea to classify energy firms into efficient and inefficient groups based upon their efficiency scores then it utilizes dea da to assess their efficiency scores and ranks in this stage we can find an adjusted efficiency score for each energy firm the proposed approach provides us with the following analytical capabilities all of which cannot be found in a conventional use of dea in assessing energy firms first the proposed dea approach can avoid zero in all multipliers on efficient energy firms by incorporating scsc strong complementary slackness condition so that it can handle an occurrence of multiple reference sets and multiple projections the dea result classifies all energy firms into efficient and inefficient groups second dea da applied to the two groups evaluates all energy firms by an industry wide evaluation not depending upon a limited number of efficient energy firms in a reference set as found in a conventional use of dea the analytical capability can reduce the number of efficient energy firms third the proposed approach can provide their efficiency based ranking scores finally we can conduct a rank sum test based upon their ranking scores to obtain a statistical inference as an application this study uses the proposed approach to examine the performance of japanese electric power industry we find two economic implications one of the two implications is that no major change has occurred in the operational performance of japanese electric power industry because of japanese sluggish economy from 2005 to 2009 the other implication indicates that there are strategic differences in the operation of japanese electric power firms after the liberalization

capital vintage time trends and technical change in the electric power industry beginning with tinbergen in 1942 economists have employed a time trend in cost or production functions to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced into the production unit in sufficiently flexible models of the production process the time trend may be used to obtain estimates of the rate as well as direction of technical change the use of the time trend is generally defended on pragmatic grounds as no theoretical justification exists for assuming that new technology is introduced at a steady rate that is independent of a firm s investment in r d education capital of a more recent vintage etc in recent years alternatives to the traditional time trend have been sought to represent the rate at which new technology is introduced research in this area has been concentrated in the telecommunications industry where the stock of r d or the percentage of calls completed by direct dialing or modern switching facilities have been employed as technological indices by nadiri and schankerman 32 denny et al 14 and christensen et al 7 the latter two studies indicate that explicit technological indices provide a better representation of the pace of innovation than the time trend this conclusion must remain tentative however as it is not possible to determine what is the true direction of technical change in these studies this shortcoming is overcome in a recent study by kopp and smith 24 who compare the performance of time trends and explicit technological indices in a study using pseudo data generated by process analysis models their results unambiguously support the use of technologically explicit indicators of technical change and indicate that the use of a time trend may not provide a consistent estimate of the direction of technical change this study does not however shed any light on the ability of a time trend to accurately reflect the rate of technical change the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of alternative technological indices on the estimated rate and direction of technical change in the electric power industry the performance of a time trend is compared with that of a vintage index computed as the average age of a firm s steam generating capacity this latter index is consistent with the notion that new technology is embodied in newly constructed capital an assumption sup

regulation asymmetric information and auditing this article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator by auditing at a cost however the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm if the regulator finds that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set he can order a refund to consumers in the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated given the original report a separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision the auditing decision however depends on the price that was initially set the optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified the methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable

cost efficiency of electric grid utilities in china a comparison of estimates from sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls with the purpose of estimating the range of cost efficiency levels of the power grid sector in china we assembled a data set including 23 provincial power grid companies spanning from 2005 to 2009 and conducted an empirical study based on the sfa mle sfa bayes and stoned cnls methodologies empirical results show that the average values of efficiency from different models vary from 0 85 to 0 92 depending especially on the assumptions underlying inefficiency content further results demonstrate that there is exogenous technical progress during the sample period and per capita gdp of the province is negatively related to the costs of the electric grid company located in the corresponding province we hope this empirical study will contribute to the debate on an efficiency based regulation scheme which was introduced to the chinese electric grid sector on a pilot base in 2014

service quality in the electricity industry the role of privatization and managerial behavior abstract this paper analyzes the relationship between privatization and service quality in the electricity industry and tests the hypothesis that managerial behavior is a significant intervening factor the sample includes 31 italian distributors over the period 1998 2004 their quality performance is represented by continuity of supply an aspect of quality that is both contractible and regulated results of the empirical analysis suggest that the transfer of shareholdings to private investors does not lead to quality degradation the results also suggest that managerial dominance translates into a reduction in supply quality this effect is likely to be particularly strong for public sector utilities

behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint a recent article in this review by averch and johnson 3 on the fair rate of return regulation in public utilities industries or more generally regulated industries attracted the attention of many economists in essence averch johnson argues that the introduction of an active constraint of a fair rate of return type would induce the firm to invest more than the original profit maximizing value of capital and this would create an inefficient allocation of inputs in addition to frequent citations in verbal arguments it has invited some thieoretical extensions by economists such as wvestfield 8 and klevorick 5 all of the writers seem to accept the basic theoretical foundations set by averch and johnson for example klevorick 5 recently proposed that the fair rate of return should be inversely related to the size of the capital of a firm the intuitive basis for this is apparent for it in effect creates a penalty as the amount of capital used by the firm increases however it seems to me that averchjohnson s original arguments are sketchy and contain somewhat ambiguous logic at several important points although their conclusion for which they tried to find empirical support that a firm will tend to increase its investment with the introduction of an active constraint seems to be correct it does not follow from their arguments in particular there seems to be a serious error which arises from confusing movements along a curve and shifts of a curve in section ii we clarify those ambiguities and if necessary correct the mistakes in the third section of this paper we shall provide a new formulation of the problem we shall find that the new formulation will give the same answer as averchjohnson namely that a firm will tend to invest more with the iiltroductioin of an active constraint it should be noted however that while the conclusion happens to be the same this was not the necessity for we needed a completely new formulation to obtain the old conclusion

beyond export led growth abstract in light of the adverse conditions in the current international economic environment this paper reassesses the feasibility of continuing to rely on manufacturing export led growth as the major development dynamic for most ldcs during the next decade this paper argues that after the initial stages of industrial development the emphasis in policy toward agriculture should shift from surplus extraction to surplus creation and to the generation of demand linkages with the rest of the economy the author compares the relative merits of two alternative open development strategies export led industrialization and agricultural demand led industrialization adli by means of several simulation experiments the experiments are performed with a computable general equilibrium model of a small low income semi industrial open economy which is a stylization of south korea of 1963 they are carried out in an international environment assumed to represent the next decade based on a rate of growth of international demand for imports of about half the 1960 1973 rate the results support the adli approach on all counts

toward a theory of induced institutional innovation in this paper we elaborate a theory of institutional innovation in which changes in the demand for institutional innovation are induced by changes in relative resource endowments and by technical change we illustrate from agricultural history how changes in resource endowments and technical change have induced changes in private property rights and in the development of non market institutions we also consider the impact of advances in social science knowledge and of cultural endowments on the supply of institutional change in a final section we present the elements of a model of institutional innovation that maps the relationships among resource endowments cultural endowments technology and institutions

time of use pricing for load management programs in taiwan power company load management programs have been actively performed by the utilities to reduce peak demand and improve system load factor in recent years the time of use tou tariff based on the peak load pricing theory has been one of the most effective load management strategies proper tou rate structure can actually reflect the generation cost of electricity supplying and give a guideline for customers to modify the power consumption pattern so that the system load factor can be improved the inverse electricity pricing rule can be applied as the basis of tou pricing in this paper the price elasticities of industrial customers of taipower system are solved by the statistical regression model with 2620 data samples

regulator heterogeneity and endogenous efforts to close the information asymmetry gap abstract the now standard principal agent model of regulator firm interactions typically assumes the presence of a single regulator and an exogenously determined information asymmetry between the principal and the agent in this paper we draw upon a unique data set of regulatory inspections conducted by the u s food and drug administration fda to explore the consistency of these assumptions with the actual practice of regulators we find that the canonical assumptions of the agency paradigm are strained by if not altogether inconsistent with the key practical realities of regulation by the fda our analysis uncovers several dimensions along which regulators actively and endogenously seek to close the information asymmetry gap we also find considerable regulator heterogeneity which in turn depends in part upon the specific training and experience of individual regulators

regulated equity returns a puzzle abstract based on a database of u s electric utility rate cases spanning nearly four decades the returns on equity authorized by regulators have exhibited a large and growing premium over the riskless rate of return this growing premium does not appear to be explained by traditional asset pricing models often in direct contrast to regulators stated intent we suggest possible alternative explanations drawn from finance public policy public choice and the behavioral economics literature however absent some normative justification for this premium it would appear that regulators are authorizing excessive returns on equity to utility investors and that these excess returns translate into tangible profits for utility firms

the multiproduct firm quality choice and regulation a monopolist facing a market of heterogeneous consumers will distort the quality a rray this paper explores three regulatory remedies minimum quality s tandards mqs maximum price regulation mpr and rate of return re gulation rorr that can counteract this distortion mqs and mpr rais e the quality offered to consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality while mqs have no effect on the quality offered to consumers with a high willingness to pay mpr decreases the quality offered to this group if production of high low quality goods is capital i ntensive rorr increases decreases the quality offered to both grou ps copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

institutional innovation and agricultural development abstract this paper elaborates a theory of institutional innovation in which shifts in the demand for institutional change are induced by changes in relative resource endowments and by technical change the supply of institutional innovations responds to advances in social science knowledge and changes in cultural endowments case studies drawing on 1 innovations in land tenure and labor relations in the philippines 2 export promotion and import substitution of agricultural commodities in east asia and 3 farm commodity policy in the united states are presented elements of a general institutional innovation model are outlined

pricing efficiency under rate of return regulation some empirical evidence for the electric utility industry the authors test quasi optimal pricing rules for rate of return regulation for a sample of electric utilities they estimate the regulated cost function and demand equations by class of customer for the sample to yield the cost and demand parameters required to assess the utility rate structures the results indicate that the price structure of electricity by class of customer is not quasi optimal and that welfare improvement might be possible under alternative prices searching for the price structure which satisfies the criteria they find that commercial users rates have been too high relative to residential and to a lesser extent industrial rates they note that commercial uses tend to be less organized and more poorly represented in the rate making process 16 references 8 tables

regulatory and life cycle influences on managerial incentives an important controversy persists in economics concerning the appropriateness of profit maximization as opposed to various competing nontraditional theories of the firm 13 of particular interest has been the comparative relevance of the sales maximization hypothesis suggested by baumol 4 and others a typical methodology employed to empirically analyze the profit versus sales maximization issue has been to question whether the financial rewards of top executives are more strongly influenced by corporate profit or sales performance it is implicitly assumed that the firm has a well defined set of organizational goals and that the structure of executive compensation is designed to provide executives with a consistent set of incentives therefore should profit performance constitute a significant determinant of executive compensation support for the profit maximization hypothesis would be gained on the other hand if executive compensation is closely related to firm sales then the nontraditional sales maximization hypothesis would be supported in an early empirical analysis of the issue mcguire chiu and elbing 14 found that sales and compensation were more highly correlated than were profits and compensation and therefore that the baumol hypothesis seemed most relevant lewellen and huntsman 12 pointed out however that mcguire et al had neglected to consider the deferred and contingent stock options etc elements of executive compensation and in so doing had perhaps biased their analysis against the profit maximization hypothesis by correctly considering the impact of corporate performance on the total compensation of top corporate executives lewellen and huntsman found strong support for the profit maximization hypothesis and no support for sales maximization in fact so convincing were the lewellen and huntsman results that they seemed to resolve the managerial motivation issue in favor of the traditional profit maximization model more recent empirical analyses however have tended to suggest that the issue is far from resolved baker 3 boyes and schlagenhauf 5 and ciscel and carroll 6 have all

regulatory restructuring and incumbent price dynamics the case of u s local telephone markets prior to the telecommunications act of 1996 many u s states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate of return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long distance markets and adopting price regulation price caps and price freezes using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services i investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators rate structures i find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross subsidization present in local telephone markets in addition the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition

behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture in this essay we develop a framework for analysing the major institutions governing the production and exchange of output and the primary factors of production in rural areas the analysis incorporates general considerations of risk and information constraints jointly with the principal material attributes of agriculture and of agricultural production factors the framework is used to analyse barriers to the existence of the major intertemporal and factor markets it is applied specifically to land scarce environments for which it provides an internally consistent explanation for many of the well documented institutional features of such settings in addition the analysis provides new implications for among other phenomena the inter relationships among ownership holdings operational scale family size and factor productivity for the scarcity of animal rental markets and use of animals as collateral for the renting out of land by small landowners and for the existence of plantations for certain crops

product complementarities capabilities and governance a dynamic transaction cost perspective the organization and governance of the transactions that comprise a bundling arrangement depend on the distribution of capabilities among firms and the amount of time during which the window of opportunity for earning rents is expected to remain open firms engaged in inter firm collaboration must undertake support transactions related to billing marketing customer support and product repair these support transactions differ from the core transactions that have traditionally been perceived as sufficient to provide a product bundle since support transactions create costs of their own the market may turn out to be an expensive means of governing collaborative arrangements undertaken for bundling purposes the telecommunications service sector provides an illustration copyright 1997 by oxford university press

cultural endowments and economic development what can we learn from anthropology this article discusses a pattern model used to map the general equilibrium relationship relationship between resource endowments cultural endowments technology and institutions one advantage of the pattern model is that helps to identify areas of ignorance our capacity to model and test the relations between resource endowments and technical change is relatively strong our capacity to model and test the relations between cultural endowments and either technical or institutional change is relatively weak a second advantage of the model is that it is useful in identifying the components that enter into other attempts to account for secular economic and social change failure to analyze historical change in a general equilibrium context tends to result in a unidimensional perspective on the relations bearing on technical and institutional change for example historians working within the marxist tradition often tend to view technical change as dominating both institutional and cultural change cultural endowments including religion and ideology exert at least some influence on the supply of institutional innovation cultural endowments make some forms of institutional change less costly to establish and impose severe costs on others there are a number of reasons that one might look to the field of anthropology for guidance in attempting to understand the sources and impact of cultural endowments on economic development one is that anthropology has traditionally embraced a broad conception of culture ethnographic research through its examination of alternative culture patterns has made substantial contributions to institutional reform

an examination of the effect of ownership on the relative efficiency of public and private water utilities the behavior of privately and publicly owned water utilities is examined by estimating a generalized variable cost function containing the regular characteristics of the neoclassical cost function without requiring that cost minimization subject to market prices be imposed as a maintained hypothesis assuming that unobserved shadow prices reflect the regulatory environment of the water industry tests for cost minimization are obtained by deriving shadow prices as functions of market prices the empirical results provide evidence that public water utilities are more efficient than private utilities on average but are more widely dispersed between best and worst practice