does competition for capital discipline governments decentralization globalization and public policy competition among countries or regions within them to attract mobile capital is often thought to discipline their governments motivating them to invest more in infrastructure reduce waste and corruption and spend less on non productive public goods the result should be convergence on business friendly policies we argue that this requires an assumption units start out very similar that is often unrealistic if units are heterogeneous in natural resources geographical location inherited human capital or infrastructure capital mobility often weakens discipline on the poorlyendowed units this may help explain disappointing results of liberalizing capital flows within russia and sub saharan africa jel f36 h73 h87

why small centrist third parties motivate policy divergence by major parties plurality based elections between two major parties or candidates sometimes feature small cen trist third parties we modify the standard two party spatial model of policy seeking parties to incorporate a centrist third party and we show that the presence of such a party even if it has no chance of winning motivates the major parties to propose policies that are much more divergent than without the third party we derive explicit formulas for party locations at a three party equilibrium and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence ofthat equilibrium we show that over time the major parties can be expected to shift their policies in the same direction relative to each other but in the opposite direction relative to the minor party the predictions of this model are compared with estimates of party policy locations during appropriate periods in postwar britain for the past half century a small british party first the liberals now the liberal demo crats has occupied a policy position in between the two major british parties labour and the con servatives during much of the same period the free democrats in germany have held a similar posi tion between the social democrats and the christian democrats in addition recent american presidential elections have featured the candidates john anderson in 1980 and ross perot in 1992 and 1996 who had no realistic chance of winning and who were arguably located between the democratic and republican nom inees 1 what are the policy consequences of the existence of such small centrist parties or candidates on what political institutions do these consequences depend do these consequences benefit the policy aspirations of the centrist party or do they undermine these goals under proportional representation it is well known that a small centrist party such as the free democrats in germany may hold the balance of power bargaining with each of the major players as they attempt to form governing coalitions but in a plurality based system as in britain or the united states the consequences are far

externalities property rights and the allocation of resources in major league baseball most economists who have analyzed professional baseball have concluded that two distinctive features of its labor market the reserve clause and player draft influence the distribution of wealth between players and owners but do not affect the allocation of playing talent among teams such conclusions which are strongly at variance with laymen s views of such matters are derived from theoretical considerations rather than empirical examinations our paper examines data from the two decades of major league history and concludes that on the basis of that data the empirical generalizations of previous economists do not appear to be justified

rhetoric on the economy have european parties changed their economic messages abstractthis study analyses the determinants of dispersion of economic issue mentions in european party manifestos we examined three main economic domains governmental control of the economy free market capitalism and support for the welfare state as consequences of globalization forces economic conditions partisanship and electoral turnout employing aggregate level comparative manifesto project cmp data from legislative elections in 15 european countries from 1970 to 2010 we confirm that parties hold a common view of the salience of economic control of the state as a consequence of globalization pressure and economic growth levels partisanship of the cabinets regardless of the political orientation counteracted issue salience concentration in the welfare domain government size favoured dispersion in the free market realm our results do not indicate clear homogenization of parties economic messages in elections over the last 40 years

centripetal and centrifugal incentives under different electoral systems inaseminalarticle cox 1990 suggestedthatelectoralsystemswithlargerdistrictmagnitudesprovideincentivesforparties to advocate more extreme policy positions in this article we put this proposition to the test informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters we then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways we find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules by contrast smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules results carry implications for the strategies of vote maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition

partisan governments the international economy and macroeconomic policies in advanced nations 1960 93 this article examines the impact of parties domestic institutions and the international economy on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies using time series cross section data from nineteen oecd countries for the years between 1960 and the mid 1990s the results are as follows partisan governments have affected alone and in interaction with the organization of labor markets the pattern of macroeconomic management still their impact has varied over time partly as a function of economic conditions but fundamentally as a function of the degree of financial liberalization and the exchange rate system in place after following broadly similar macroeconomic policies in the 1960s oecd governments pursued divergent monetary and fiscal policies in response to the economic slowdown of the 1970s even when they initially adopted countercyclical measures conservative governments quickly favored tight monetary policies and strove to achieve fiscal discipline by contrast taking advantage of generalized capital controls and floating exchange rates socialist cabinets embraced demand management policies in a systematic fashion mostly through budget deficits in corporatist countries and through both loose monetary and loose fiscal measures in noncorporatist settings as financial liberalization progressed in the early 1980s partisan and institution led differences in macroeconomic policies waned across countries

endogenous credible commitment and party competition over redistribution under alternative electoral institutions political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters i argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution the model i develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules parties efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment thus left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation the model also generates new insights about the anti left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device i find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies

reliant behavior in the united states and japan yoshiharu mataga japanese economic success is often attributed to culturally reinforced psychological conditioning that promotes interpersonal reliance cooperation and a group interest orientation this article provides direct experimental evidence on differences in behavior among future businesspeople in the united states and japan utilizing a simple two person extensive form game of perfect information introduced by selten 1975 we provide evidence that contrary to some views the japanese can be less reliant on the behavior of others and are more likely to take actions at variance with group welfare in some settings thus popular explanations of japanese economic achievements may require further exploration jel a14 f00 m14 p52 i introduction the role of culture in economic behavior is an important but controversial topic although it is widely believed that cultural influences affect economically relevant behavior such effects can present difficulties for conventional economic theory discussions of the differences between the united states and japan in the business sphere provide a good example of both the high degree of academic and popular interest in this topic and the complexities involved in obtaining useful characterizations a common popular conclusion in the japan versus united states debate is that japanese business practices differ fundamentally from united states practices and that these differences stem from dissimilar sociological conditioning in the two countries while united states or western culture stresses individualism personal initiative and risk taking the japanese are said to place a higher value on consensus cooperation favoritism toward within group peers and stability 1 therefore a citizen in japan may be more interested in how he or she fits into the social context and his or her relationship with others 2 these contrasting orientations are assumed to manifest themselves in different patterns of behavior having economic implications this article offers a direct controlled experimental test of potentially significant differences in behavior between future japanese and american businesspeople utilizing a simple two person game of perfect information we examine the degree to which united states and japanese business students make differing assessments of the reliability of the behavior of their compatriots and we provide evidence on the implications of these assessments for observed behavior our simple game template introduced by selten 1975 was the focus of a study by beard and beil 1994 and allows comparison of a kind of behavior reliance on maximizing play by others that may have important economic implications in our usage reliance means merely that one player assigns a sufficiently high probability to self interested behavior by other players to induce the first player to take actions that are desirable only when others maximize their own monetary payoffs thus reliance differs from trust as usually defined in gam e theory and the former appears considerably weaker our experiments use as subjects business students in roughly comparable american and japanese universities and we offer nontrivial immediate money payoffs to participants in order to solicit serious efforts on their parts several versions of the basic experiment are conducted to establish payoff dominance and evaluate hypotheses on subject behavior our findings are quite surprising first subjects in both the united states and japan are loath to rely on others maximizing behavior even when that behavior is as in the united states highly reliable second contrary to the assumptions underlying some analysis of japanese business practices subjects in japan appear less reliant than their united states counterparts the article is divided into five sections section ii provides a literature review on the role of culture in u

ownership of property rights and the allocation of talents under the reserve clause system that assigns the property rights on the major league baseball players services to teams player transfers are negotiated between teams without the involvement of players in contrast under the current free agency system players with free agent status negotiate directly with potential suitors thus the system assigns the property rights to players using data extracted from the baseball archive http baseball1 com this article examines the effect of the change in the property rights assignment on the allocation of talents across teams we find that the change increased large market teams shares of veteran all star players and the concentration of senior players

nonparametric nonlinear cotrending analysis with an application to interest and inflation in the united states given the assumption that the components of a vector time series are stationary around nonlinear deterministic time trends nonlinear cotrending is the phenomenon that one or more linear combinations of the time series are stationary around a linear trend or a constant hence the series have common nonlinear deterministic time trends in this article i develop nonparametric tests for nonlinear cotrending and i derive nonparametric estimators of the cotrending vectors i apply this approach to the federal funds rate and the consumer price index inflation rate in the united states using monthly data to analyze the price puzzle

the new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the american political science association september 1 5 atlanta ga and the 2000 annual meeting of the midwest political science association april 27 30 chicago il the authors thank steffen ganghof philip genschel mark hallerberg alex hicks william keech dennis quinn and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and dennis quinn for generously sharing data duane swank thanks the german marshal fund of the united states and marquette university for support of work incorporated in this paper data utilized in this paper are available from duane swank marquette edu

final offer arbitration in final offer arbitration the two parties to a dispute submit final offers to an arbitrator the arbitrator then chooses as the binding solution that offer which is closest to his own view of the appropriate outcome because the disputants are imperfectly informed about the arbitrator s preferences final offer arbitration can be modeled as a game of imperfect information interesting questions arise concerning the nature of the optimal strategies and how they are affected by different characteristics of the arbitrator and the disputants we provide conditions for an equilibrium to exist in a final offer arbitration game when there are k issues the probability function is not specified and the disputants are either risk averse or risk neutral furthermore the players may have differing beliefs about the arbitrator s probability function we demonstrate that increased risk aversion by one of the parties will result in both players choosing positions farther away from the more risk averse party we also discover the affect of bias as well as the effect of increased sensitivity by the arbitrator on the positions taken by the players

equilibrium strategies for final offer arbitration there is no median convergence final offer arbitration is a procedure for settling disputes between two parties in which an arbitrator chooses the final offer of the party closest to what he considers a fair settlement this procedure is modeled as a two person zero sum game of imperfect information in which the parties are assumed to know the probability distribution of the arbitrator s fair settlements and to make bids in an infinite strategy space that maximize their expected payoffs necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be local and global equilibria in pure strategies are derived and necessary conditions for mixed strategies in a particular case are found such equilibria when they exist in pure strategies represent bids which are symmetric about the median and for most common distributions are separated from one another by two or more standard deviations this finding suggests that final offer arbitration may not accomplish its avowed purpose of inducing the two parties to converge on what they perceive to be t

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

arbitration procedures with multiple arbitrators abstract we consider two final offer arbitration procedures in the case where there is more than one arbitrator two players labeled 1 and 2 and interpreted here as labor and management respectively are in dispute about an increase in the wage rate they submit final offers to a referee there are n arbitrators each of the arbitrators has her own assessment and selects the offer which is closest to her assessment after that each arbitrator informs the referee about her decision the referee counts the votes and declares the player obtaining the most votes to be the winner under the second arbitration scheme the referee takes into account only the assessments which lie between the players offers the game is modeled as a zero sum game the nash equilibrium in this arbitration game is derived

a comparison of conventional final offer and combined arbitration for dispute resolution two widely used forms of arbitration are conventional arbitration in which the arbitrator makes an unconstrained settlement choice and final offer arbitration in which the arbitrator must choose between disputants final offers under an innovative as yet unused approach called combined arbitration if the arbitrator s notion of a fair settlement lies between the disputants final offers final offer arbitration rules are used otherwise conventional arbitration rules are used theoretically by combining the risks that the two standard forms of arbitration pose for disputants who do not voluntarily settle combined arbitration should generate convergent final offers the results of this controlled laboratory study show however that dispute rates are highest in combined arbitration and lowest in conventional arbitration these results challenge the theoretical predictions for combined arbitration as well as claims that final offer arbitration should reduce disputes compared to conventional arbitration the results are however consistent with a simple theory of disputant optimism

did globalization restrict partisan politics an empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries this paper evaluates empirically how in the course of globalization partisan politics affected social expenditures in a panel of oecd countries i introduce an updated indicator of government ideology and investigate its interaction with the kof index of globalization two basic results emerge first at times when globalization proceeded at an average pace partisan politics had no effect on social expenditures but leftist governments increased social expenditures when globalization was proceeding rapidly second policies differed in the 1980s and 1990s leftist governments pursued expansionary policies in the 1980s yet partisan politics disappeared in the 1990s but not because of globalization

how economic integration affects party issue emphases the economic dimension has typically been considered the primary dimension of political party competition however parties often rally voters on the basis of non economic issues in this article we argue that integration into global markets and into the european union eu constrains parties abilities to credibly differentiate themselves on economic issues given these constraints and voters awareness of them parties activate other non economic issues along which to compete using data across 49 countries between 1961 and 2010 this study shows that increased economic integration is associated with increased emphasis on non economic issues during election campaigns this effect persists over time and remains robust to a number of alternative explanations and modeling strategies we also explore the proposed causal mechanisms and show that integration is indeed associated with convergence of party positions on economic issues and that all types of parties not just new and niche parties respond to int

party policy diffusion do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems this research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating foreign successful incumbent parties spatial econometric analyses of parties election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed by showing that parties respond to these foreign incumbent parties this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition furthermore we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion as we suggest that political parties are important vehicles through which public policies diffuse

reinterpreting arbitration s narcotic effect an experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining field evidence suggests that arbitration increases negotiation dispute rates we study repeated bargaining in a laboratory to understand the reasons why our results represent a reinterpretation of an explanation known as the narcotic effect the standard interpretation assumes that the probability of dispute without arbitration is constant across negotiations but field evidence suggests that experienced bargainers have fewer disputes to properly assess arbitration s impact we compare bargainer learning with and without arbitration under otherwise comparable laboratory conditions and develop a model to measure learning we find strong evidence that learning occurs in both cases but is slower with arbitration journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c92 d77 j52 q 1998 academic press

an empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures abstract models of government formation processes in multi party democracies are usually highly sensitive to the rules that govern the selection of formateurs i e the parties selected to propose a potential government the theoretical literature has focused on two selection rules selection proportional to seat share and selection in order of seat share in this paper we use a new data set on government formations in 11 parliamentary democracies to empirically assess which selection rule most closely approximates the data we find that while there is little empirical support for selection in order of seat share proportional selection fits the data well however we also find that a simple alternative that combines the insights of the two selection rules outperforms both of them in their ability to explain the data

the global award for entrepreneurship research the international award for entrepreneurship and small business research was introduced in 1996 and it is now firmly established as the most prestigious award for outstanding research contributions in this subject area thanks to a generous donation from the swedish entrepreneur rune andersson it has been possible to make a number of changes aimed at strengthening global recognition of the prize even further the name is being changed to the global award for entrepreneurship research the financial side to the prize is being roughly doubled to 100 000 euros and the system for nomination evaluation and selection of future award winners is becoming more structured and transparent we present here the background to and the organization s behind the award briefly categorize the winners in the 1996 2008 period describe the present and the future system for nomination evaluation and selection of award winners and discuss the criteria for the selection of prize candidates and award winning contributions

collective bargaining in the public sector the effect of legal structure on dispute costs and wages this paper examines the impact of collective bargaining legislation on dispute costs and wages using a panel of canadian public sector contracts the authors results suggest that policymakers designing collective bargaining legislation face a trade off between reducing dispute costs and increasing wages dispute costs are lower under compulsory arbitration than under the right to strike or when no collective bargaining legislation exists hence a switch to compulsory arbitration could potentially make both the union and the employer better off by reducing dispute costs however the authors find that wages are higher under compulsory arbitration than under other legal structures copyright 1991 by american economic association

globalization veto players and welfare spending this article examines the role of globalization and its interaction with domestic political institutions veto players in shaping welfare spending in 18 advanced industrial countries from 1960 to 2000 first the author evaluates how integrated world markets have influenced welfare expenditures results suggest that globalization increased welfare spending in this sample second the author studies how domestic political institutions mediate the impact of globalization on welfare spending with a new data set on veto players for the years 1960 to 2000 the author finds that as the number of and ideological distance among veto players increases the upward pressure of globalization on welfare spending is reduced the results show that globalization has pressured states to expand welfare spending but the extent to which states have responded to pressure critically depends on the number of and ideological distance among veto players whose agreement is required to change welfare policy

evolutionary theorizing in economics modern economic analysis oriented toward understanding the workings of economies that make extensive use of markets came into existence with three guiding questions all central in adam smith s 1776 1937 the wealth of nations one question concerned order without any central authority guiding and commanding action how is economic activity coordinated the second question was the challenge of explaining the prevailing constellation of prices inputs and outputs what explains the price of labor and the rent of land the third question addressed the processes of economic progress or development smith and other early economists clearly were impressed by the inventiveness the energy and the growing productivity generated by the evolving market economy how to understand its dynamics the first two questions have defined continuing central concerns of the discipline of economics since they first were posed over two centuries ago when not posed in the context of an economy that is understood as in the process of developing they seem to pull the focus of theorizing toward equilibrium conditions the third question concerned with the processes driving economic progress pulls the theorizing toward an evolutionary orientation the question of economic development has waxed and waned in centrality to the discipline as has the importance of evolutionary theorizing during the first several decades of the twentieth century evolutionary thinking and language was widespread in economics but as one contrasts the economic

comparative productivity the ussr eastern europe and the west this paper compiles comparative measures of output per worker in 1975 in four socialist and seven western market economy wme countries and explores sources of observed differences between the two groups of countries in that regard such differences seem explicable only partially by reference to differences in per worker capital stock and farm land a residual disparity of 25 to 34 percent in favor of wme countries appears to testify to superior efficiency in the latter copyright 1987 by american economic association

money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining abstract this paper synthesizes recent work on delay and multiple equilibria in complete information rubinstein bargaining we identify a general principle money burning underlying prior results and develop a general model of the phenomena money burning is a threat by one player to destroy surplus which can serve to enhance that player s bargaining power if it is credible our results show that the uniqueness and efficiency properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium of rubinstein bargaining are vulnerable to players ability to burn money journal of economic literature classification number 026

salary arbitration and pre arbitration negotiation in major league baseball two assumptions in this analysis of baseball salary arbitration are that 1 players and clubs to serve their interests in pre arbitration negotiation submit final offers to maximize and minimize

what moves parties the role of public opinion and global economic conditions in western europe do western european political parties adjust their ideological positions in response to shifts in public opinion and to changing global economic conditions based on a time series cross sectional analysis of parties ideological dynamics in eight western european democracies from 1976 1998 the authors conclude that both factors influence parties ideological positions but that this relationship is mediated by the type of party specifically they find that parties of the center and right react to both public opinion and the global economy whereas parties of the left display no discernible tendency to respond to public opinion and also appear less responsive to global economic conditions the findings on leftist parties distinctiveness support arguments about these parties long term policy orientations as well as about their organizational structures the authors also find little support for neoliberal convergence arguments

when politics and models collide estimating models of multiparty elections theory the spatial model of elections can better be represented by using conditional logit models which consider the position of the parties in issue spaces than by multinomial logit models which only consider the position of voters in the issue space the spatial model and random utility models in general suffer from a failure to adequately consider the substitutability of parties sharing similar or identical issue positions hypotheses multinomial logit is not necessarily better than successive applications of binomial logit conditional logit allows for considering more interesting political questions than does multinomial logit the spatial model may not correspond to voter decision making in multiple party settings multinomial probit allows for a relaxation of the iia condition and this should improve estimates of the effect of adding or removing parties methods comparisons of binomial logit multinomial logit conditional logit and multinomial probit on simulated data and survey data from multiparty elections results multinomial logit offers almost no benefits over binomial logit conditional logit is capable of examining movements by parties whereas multinomial logit is not multinomial probit performs better than conditional logit when considering the effects of altering the set of choices available to voters estimation of multinomial probit with more than three choices is feasible

final offer arbitration and risk aversion in bargaining negotiations are often conducted under the stipulation that an impasse is to be resolved using final offer arbitration foa in fact foa frequently is not needed in major league baseball for instance more than 80 of the salary negotiations that could go to arbitration instead reach a bargained agreement we show that the risk aversion of at least one side explains this phenomenon we then model pay negotiation in baseball by applying a bargaining solution with a variable disagreement outcome representing foa studying the existence of pure nash equilibrium initial offers and their effects on the player s eventual pay and considering the nash solution as a special case

the distribution of schumpeterian and kirznerian opportunities despite their presence in modern entrepreneurship theories empirical investigations of opportunity types are scarce we develop a 5 dimensional bipolar scale to measure the extent in which opportunities are schumpeterian or kirznerian drawing on this measure we examine the shape of the opportunity distribution in relation to the environment and the characteristics of individuals who exploit them across a sample of 181 new products introduced by high tech entrepreneurs we find that pure schumpeterian and kirznerian types are rare but rather opportunities display varying degrees of membership to one or the other type the distribution is more skewed toward schumpeterian opportunities for larger ventures with a strategic focus on future needs and operating in growing markets in contrast kirznerian opportunities are more frequently pursued by small ventures and by entrepreneurs that are young with a strategic focus on present needs and who are less innovative in their behavior

the causes of bargaining failure evidence from major league baseball abstract final offer arbitration in major league baseball provides an ideal setting for examining the empirical regularities that are associated with bargaining failure since final offers salaries and player statistics which provide the fundamental facts for the case are all readily available using data for players eligible for arbitration for 1990 93 we conduct a wide variety of empirical tests regarding the relationship between aggressive offers and arbitration outcomes we find that aggressive offers by players trigger arbitration and that more aggressive offers are associated with inferior financial outcomes in arbitration overall clubs appear to outperform players in arbitration unexpectedly high or low offers are less common for players who have previously been through arbitration which suggests that learning occurs our results are inconsistent with simple one sided asymmetric information models of arbitration the results are more consistent with an optimism model or a model in which so

rewards experience and decision costs in first price auctions consistent with a model of asymmetric risk aversion subjects in first price auctions consistently bid above the risk neutral nash prediction it has been argued that this is due to low opportunity cost of deviating from the risk neutral bid we increase opportunity cost and payoff levels by factors of 0 1 5 10 and 20 from the normal levels generating payoffs up to 250 for risk neutral subjects and observe an insignificant increase in the slope of individual bid functions the rmse of bids declines significantly this is consistent with a reward decision cost model of bidding behavior

globalization party positions and the median voter the authors argue that the effects of economic globalization on social democratic parties in western europe are conditional on the position of the median voter if the median is far enough to the right such parties will adopt business friendly policies because they are required to win office only when the median is relatively far to the left will globalization constrain social democratic parties forcing them to adopt policies further to the right in order to retain credibility it is on this basis the authors argue that empirical studies are misspecified unless they include an interaction between measures of globalization and the position of the median in addition to presenting formal theoretical arguments the article reports empirical findings from fifteen countries in the period from 1973 to 2002 that support the conclusion that the effects of globalization are indeed contingent on the median the authors find that the effects of globalization are significant for social democratic parties only in circumstances in which the median is relatively far to the left

contestable markets an uprising in the theory of industry structure presents a transcript of the presidential address delivered at the 94th meeting of the american economic association on december 29 1981 discussion of developments in the theory of industry structure welfare attributes of contestable markets behavior characteristics of oligopoly equilibrium intertemporal vulnerability to inefficient entry ebsco

a model of candidate location when one candidate has a valence advantage that under some fairly weak assumptions for all levels of the valence advantage the advantaged candidate chooses a more moderate position than the disadvantaged candidate empirical studies of congressional elections by fiorina 1973 and ansolabehere snyder and stewart 2001 support this result d owns 1957 seminal work presents a puzzle for scholars of u s elections why do candidates not converge to the median voter one of the best explanations is that the candidates themselves have ideological preferences as calvert 1985 and wittman 1977 1983 have shown when candidates have such preferences and they are sufficiently uncertain about the preferences of the median voter then they do not converge although they may moderate their positions from their ideal point the basic version of the calvert wittman model however does not account for another basic fact of u s elections often one of the candidates has an advantage due to a nonpolicy factor such as incumbency greater campaign funds better name recognition superior charisma superior intelligence and so on stokes has dubbed such factors valence factors and he has noted their importance in u s elections stokes 1963 1992 1 in this article i extend the basic calvert wittman model by giving one candidate a valence advantage over the other i show that if the valence characteristics of the candidates are approximately equal then when a candidate s valence advantage increases this causes her to move toward the

the alert and creative entrepreneur a clarification israel m kirzner is the 2006 winner of the international award for entrepreneurship and small business research the fsf nutek award in this prize lecture he argues that a number of those who have commented on his work have misunderstood certain aspects of his theoretical system and as a result the common distinction in the literature between schumpeterian and kirznerian entrepreneurs is flawed he also argues that his understanding of the market process set in motion by entrepreneurial decisions provides a theoretical underpinning for public policy vis a vis entrepreneurship professor kirzner s main contributions to the economics of entrepreneurship were also presented and evaluated by douhan et al small business economics 29 1 2 213 223 2007

the effects of alternative power sharing arrangements do moderating institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs advocates of consensual political institutions i e institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs to date however there exists little research either theoretical or empirical that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties policy declarations we develop a multiparty spatial model with policy seeking parties operating under proportional representation in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party we determine parties optimal nash equilibrium policy positions and conclude that power sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations in fact policy positioning under power sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single party dominance consistent with previous research however we find that power sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs our results have implications for parties election strategies for the design of political institutions and for representative government

an experimental comparison of dispute rates in alternative arbitration systems this paper reports the results of a systematic experimental comparison of the effect of alternative arbitration systems on dispute rates the key to our experimental design is the use of a common underlying distribution of arbitrator fair awards in the different arbitration systems this allows us to compare dispute rates across different arbitration procedures where we hold fixed the amount of objective underlying uncertainty about the arbitration awards there are three main findings first dispute rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes dispute rates were much lower in cases where arbitration was not available so that the entire pie was lost in the event of a dispute this confirms the empirical importance of the so called chilling effect on bargaining that has been conjectured is produced by the adoption of arbitration systems second the dispute rate in a final offer arbitration system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional arbitration system contrary to the usual argument we find no evidence that final offer arbitration eliminates the chilling effect third dispute rates are inversely related to the uncertainty costs of disputes dispute rates were lower in conventional arbitration treatments where the variance of the arbitration award was higher and imposed greater costs on risk averse negotiators our results can also be interpreted as providing tentative evidence that the negotiators were risk averse on average finally we find general agreement between the dispute rates in our experiment and dispute rates found in the field in comparable settings

effects of multiple arbitrators on final offer arbitration settlements abstract we examine final offer arbitration foa in the case where there is more than one arbitrator the two disputants submit final offers to a referee and each of the arbitrators submits an assessment to the referee the referee then aggregates the arbitrator input and declares one of the disputants the winner three aggregation schemes are considered average assessment median assessment and majority vote in all cases the gap between final offers becomes smaller as the number of arbitrators is increased moreover average aggregation gives a slightly smaller gap than does median aggregation and median aggregation is shown to be equivalent to majority vote aggregation

learning in equilibrium models of arbitration this paper analyzes strategic communication in equilibrium models of conventional and final offer interest arbitration both models emphasize the role of learning by the arbitrator from the parties offers about the state of the employment relationship which is known to the parties but not to the arbitrator in both models the arbitrators equilibrium behavior is identical to the reduced form decision rule typically assumed in the empirical literature the paper thereby provides a structural interpretation for the existing empirical work the paper also represents progress towards a complete theory of arbitration because it satisfies three conditions that will be required of any such theory first the models predictions match the existing empirical evidence second the models describe equilibrium behavior and third the models are built on a common set of assumptions about preferences information and commitment the paper therefore not only provides an equilibrium foundation for the intuition that the arbitrator might learn from the parties offers but also uses the idea of learning to develop a unified analytical treatment of the two major forms of interest arbitration this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

how robust is the kearney foreign policy globalisation index we argue that the kearney foreign policy kfp index of globalisation is constructed by making some problematic assumptions about the measurement normalisation and weighting of the variables included in the index we propose alternative measurement normalisation and weighting rules and using these rules recalculate the ranking of the fifty countries using the original kfp data specifically we use in various combinations i variables adjusted for geographical characteristics of countries ii statistically optimal weights obtained by principal components analysis iii a normalisation rule that treats different years of observations separately we find that the country rankings change significantly when adjusted variables are used indicating that the original kfp index is partially measuring geographical differences between countries

political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial societies in this article we evaluate two claims made in recent studies of the welfare states of advanced industrial societies first that welfare states have remained quite resilient in the face of demands for retrenchment and second that partisan politics have ceased to play a decisive role in their evolution addressing the first claim we present analysis from a new data set on unemployment insurance and sickness benefit replacement rates for 18 countries for the years 1975 99 we find considerably more evidence of welfare retrenchment during the last two decades than do recent cross national studies second we examine the end of partisanship claim by estimating the effects of government partisanship on changes in income replacement rates in sickness and unemployment programs our results suggest that contrary to claims that partisanship has little impact on welfare state commitments traditional partisanship continues to have a considerable effect on welfare state entitlements in the era of retrenchment

who uses interest arbitration the case of british columbia s teachers 1947 1981 several researchers have attempted to identify the circumstances under which parties subject to compulsory interest arbitration will actually push a contract dispute to arbitration in this paper a simple model that incorporates elements of the leading hypotheses is tested using a unique data set spanning 35 years of compulsory conventional arbitration experience among teachers in british columbia the strongest empirical finding is that bargaining units that used arbitration in the previous round of negotiations were at least ten percent more likely than other units to use it in the current round on the other hand variables intended to capture attitudes toward risk changes in the degree of uncertainty associated with arbitral outcomes differing beliefs about likely arbitral outcomes and principal agent problems were found to have little impact on the estimated probability of using arbitration

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

final offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties abstract final offer arbitration foa is a widely used binding dispute resolution mechanism where an impartial arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the two final offers proposed by two disputing parties we build an equilibrium model of foa with players averse to arbitral uncertainty to study three important issues the role of foa in incentivizing negotiated settlements the convergence of final offers and the normative effect of diversity of arbitrator opinion we show that increase in arbitral uncertainty increases the likelihood of negotiated agreements and make the final offers converge to each other risk aversion is not necessary for convergence of offers precision and mean of arbitral uncertainty matter differently and can be controlled separately moreover as also argued by the industry practitioners carefully selected level of diversity of opinion in the arbitrator roster increases the welfare of negotiating parties

does globalization affect growth evidence from a new index of globalization the study develops an index of globalization covering its three main dimensions economic integration social integration and political integration using panel data for 123 countries in 1970 2000 it is analysed empirically whether the overall index of globalization as well as sub indexes constructed to measure the single dimensions affect economic growth as the results show globalization indeed promotes growth the dimensions most robustly related with growth refer to actual economic flows and restrictions in developed countries although less robustly information flows also promote growth whereas political integration has no effect

distribution and redistribution the shadow of the nineteenth century the authors present an alternative to power resource theory as an approach to the study of distribution and redistribution while they agree that partisanship and union power are important they argue that both are endogenous to more fundamental differences in the organization of capitalist democracies specifically center left governments result from pr consensus political systems as opposed to majoritarian systems while strong unions have their origins in coordinated as opposed to liberal capitalism these differences in political representation and in the organization of production developed jointly in the early twentieth century and explain the cross national pattern of distribution and redistribution the clusters have their origins in two distinct political economic conditions in the second half of the nineteenth century one in which locally coordinated economies were coupled with strong guild traditions and heavy investment in cospecific assets and one in which market based economies were coupled with liberal states and more mobile assets

remodeling the competition for capital how domestic politics erases the race to the bottom this paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital using the analogy of a tournament as a substitute for the race to the bottom model our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms while countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility we examine the capital tax policies in oecd countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform we define two potential sources of political costs of reform transaction costs due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process and constituency costs due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms hat are the policy consequences of the elimination of various barriers to international capital and labor mobility robert frost in mending wall instructed that good fences make good neighbors scholars have increasingly expressed this sentiment s converse i e the pessimistic viewpoint that as the mobility of factors of production increases international competition assumes a beggar thy neighbor character when fences separate countries and make it difficult for factors of production to move from country to country governments can operate essentially as monopolistic suppliers of services governments can extract a price from the owners of productive resources in the form of taxes or can place regulatory restrictions on production without fear that factors of production will emigrate when the fences fall and governments must compete with each other for the same resources a state s or country s ability to tax or regulate diminishes in the extreme countries lose sovereignty over domestic policymaking e g andrews 1994 and lee and mckenzie 1989 the model that most scholars employ implicitly or explicitly to understand international or interstate competition is known commonly by its central prediction the race to the bottom e g oates 1972

a theoretical and empirical comparison of free agent and arbitration eligible salaries negotiated in major league baseball this paper presents a theoretical and empirical comparison of determination of negotiated salaries in baseball s free agent market to that in its final offer arbitration foa system the theoretical bargaining model of each system is based on nash 1950 it is argued that farber s 1980 model of foa is not fully applicable in explaining baseball s foa process the free agent market and the arbitration system each determine negotiated salaries that are dependent on the different disagreement outcomes of the negotiators in the respective systems it is thus concluded theoretically that the two systems will determine salaries differently the theoretical analysis also suggests that there may be selection bias present when one empirically analyzes only negotiated settlements using a straightforward regression model that controls for productivity playing experience and the potential selection bias the empirical analysis substantiates the theory s results a method is then developed to estimate the effect that free agent salaries have on salaries for arbitration eligible players it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between them but the systems do not determine equal salaries for comparable players

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

a letter to the editor on wage bargaining abstract the rubinstein perfect information alternating offers bargaining model is problematic when applied to wage negotiations a strike or any other industrial action is not an automatic consequence of a delay in reaching an agreement because production can continue normally also when negotiations take place this paper extends the rubinstein model to incorporate the choice of calling a strike and it is shown that in this model there is no longer a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and that strikes with a length in real time can occur in equilibrium

ideology and voter preferences as determinants of financial globalization we propose that the global spread of ideas affects international economic openness policies and that to omit ideology as an explanatory variable for economic globalization is to risk omitted variable bias using voting data we create measures of global ideology regarding economic openness and propose that changes in both global and domestic ideology influence how open or closed to international finance an economy is we also test other influences on liberalization including proposed state centered diffusion mechanisms using pcsts and system gmm models we estimate the determinants of change in international capital account regulation for 82 countries 1955 to 1999 we thereby examine diffusion of both liberalizations 1950s and 1990s and closures 1960s and 1970s changes in both global and domestic ideology robustly influence liberalization and closure the capital account policies of neighboring countries positively and of the leading economies negatively also influenced a country s capital account liberalization

israel m kirzner an outstanding austrian contributor to the economics of entrepreneurship israel m kirzner is the 2006 winner of the international award for entrepreneurship and small business research in this essay we present and evaluate his main contributions to the economics of entrepreneurship

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

bargaining with surplus destruction in a two player alternating offer bargaining model if one player can destroy the surplus to be allocated then the value to bargain for is endogenous except at the beginning even with complete information the model has perfect equilibria with delayed agreement and or surplus destruction the model therefore explains inefficiency and destruction that may appear irrational we characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and its limiting be haviour as the time between offers vanishes real time delay remains possible even in the limit we also consider the case of surplus destruction that is exogenously limited by the

arbitration and conflict resolution in labor management bargaining compulsory arbitration is frequently employed to resolve labor management bargaining disputes when the union is legally prohibited as are for example many public employees unions from striking in this form of arbitration an arbitrator is empowered to impose a settlement on the bargaining parties if their negotiations break down various compulsory arbitration schemes are now in use in many states including alaska connecticut iowa maine massachusetts michigan minnesota nebraska nevada new jersey new york oregon pennsylvania rhode island south dakota washington wisconsin and wyoming but there has been little formal analysis of the various schemes that are employed in these states and as a result the basis available for choice among them remains incomplete this paper classifies the theoretical problems that must be resolved before a more careful comparison of these compulsory arbitration schemes is possible provides a brief overview of the work that has been done on each of these problems and indicates what appear to be the most promising directions for future research along these lines four kinds of compulsory arbitration are considered here conventional ccmpulsory arbitration cca in which the arbitrator imposes a settlement of his unrestricted choice if negotiations break down finaloffer arbitration foa in which the arbitrator must choose without compromise between bargainers final offers if negotiations break down multiple foa a variant of foa originally suggested by donn and on occasion issue by issue foa which is like simple foa except that the arbitrator is permitted to fashion his settlement from the components of bargainers final offers cca simple foa and issue by issue foa are already in widespread use while multiple foa which is similar but not identical to a scheme used in eugene oregon has been suggested by donn and my 1979a article as an improvement on simple foa in the literature of industrial labor relations compulsory arbitration schemes have been judged primarily by three criteria the quality of the arbitral settlements they generate when negotiations break down their freedom from bias which is usually defined as the distortion of negotiated settlements away from what they would have been in ordinary bargaining with both strikes and lockouts permitted and the extent to which they create environments conducive to negotiated settlements an integrated analysis in which bargainers choosing their stategies consider the effects of their actions on negotiated and arbitral settlements as well as on the probabilities of these possibilities would be ideal but in beginning the study of the effects of arbitration schemes it is convenient and probably not misleading to simplify the problem by dividing it thus i shall propose separate analyses of the quality of arbitral settlements under noncooperative behavioral assumptions the bias of negotiated settlements under cooperative assumptions and the probability of a negotiated settlement under a blend of both noncooperative and cooperative assumptions each section of this paper in turn discusses existing work that is relevant to judging arbitration schemes by one of the above three criteria university of california san diego this research was supported by the national science foundation many of the observations made here evolved in discussions and correspondence with clifford donn who by no means agrees with all or even most of them i am grateful to him and to joel sobel and participants in a workshop presentation at the university of chicago who also made helpful comments

on the evolution of competitive balance the impact of an increasing global search the coase theorem maintains that where free market precepts exist the allocation of property rights does not impact the distribution of resources an application to major league baseball suggests that institutions such as free agency and the reverse order amateur draft would not impact player distributions and therefore would not impact competitive balance the present study finds that the distribution of wins is generally consistent with the precepts of the coase theorem and therefore suggests a course for those who wish to alter the level of competitive balance major league baseball should increase its focus on expanding the size of its labor pool jel o15 l83 c22

bargaining with random implementation an experimental study abstract we use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation we modify the standard nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome rather with exogenous probability q one bargainer receives his her demand with the other getting the remainder we use an asymmetric bargaining set favouring one bargainer and disagreement payoffs of zero and we vary q over several values our results mostly support game theory s directional predictions as with conventional arbitration we observe a strong chilling effect on bargaining for q near one extreme demands and low agreement rates increasing q reinforces the game s built in asymmetry giving the favoured player an increasingly large share of payoffs but also raising efficiency these effects are non uniform over sizable ranges increases in q have minimal effect but for some q small additional increases lead to sharp changes in results

on the evolution of competition an application of nonlinear tests a corollary of the coase theorem maintains that where free market precepts exist the allocation of property rights would not impact the level of competition within an industry within the major league baseball industry for example the theorem would suggest that institutional arrangements such as free agency would not impact player distributions and therefore would fail to alter competitive balance in order to examine this implication the present paper investigates the univariate behaviour of competition balance in the end it appears that an increased labour pool rather than institutional changes is responsible for movements in competitive levels within the industry specifically the evidence suggests that competitive balance measures are trend stationary however the trend is nonlinear and is common to baseball s labour pool i e the two co trend

strategic bargaining with destructive power abstract this note studies a two player alternating offers bargaining model in which one of the agents has the ability to damage permanently the pie bargained over beside the rubinsteinian bilateral monopoly outcome i show that it is possible to select a harming equilibrium in which the sequence of damages to the pie is endogenously determined

vote trading in power sharing systems a laboratory investigation in theory decentralized vote trading in power sharing systems promotes a efficiency by assigning greater decision making power to individuals that care a lot about the election s outcome and b dispersion of benefits since even individuals that have little interest about the electoral result can profit by selling their votes we experimentally test these intuitions in the laboratory and find that indeed allowing real subjects to trade votes for money in such systems increases collective welfare and substantially redistributes it towards those that are less concerned about the election importantly these findings hold true under alternative trading institutions thus reinforcing their empirical relevance

compulsory arbitration arbitral risk and negotiated settlements a case study in bargaining under imperfect information the effect of conventional and final offer compulsory arbitration on negotiated settlements is characterized using nash s variable threats bargaining solution with particular attention to the interaction between arbitral risk and bargainers risk preferences when there is no arbitral risk both schemes are shown to have the same effect on negotiated settlements under very general conditions even when bargaining is over several issues whether or not there is arbitral risk negotiated settlements favour a bargainer more if his opponent is more risk averse on the other hand increases in arbitral risk need not improve the position of the less risk averse bargainer as a by product of the analysis kihlstrom roth and schmeidler s risk sensitivity results for the nash and raiffa kalai smorodinsky solutions are generalized from fixed threats to variable threats bargaining

an analysis of the selection of arbitrators this paper analyzes alternative mechanisms for the selection of arbitrators the authors review key institutional features of the threemost prevalent mechanisms for selecting arbitrators rank veto alternate strike and rotating panel they present a more formal analysis in which these mechanisms are treated as economic games andanalyze the alternative mechanisms in terms of the incentives they provide for strategic behavior and the efficiency of any equilibrium strategies that exist some implications of varying selected parametersof each mechanism are derived and the general role of arbitrator selection mechanisms in the process of bargaining under the threat ofarbitration are considered copyright 1986 by american economic association

preferences over solutions to the bargaining problem there are several solutions to the nash bargaining problem in the literature since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right we identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution which turns out to be the solution of nash

arbitrator behavior and the variances of arbitrated and negotiated wage settlements the variance of arbitrated wage settlements is significantly lower than the variance of negotiated wage settlements in a sample of teachers contracts even when possible selection of contracts into arbitration is accounted for this result is consistent with the hypothesis that arbitrated settlements do not incorporate all of the information that is reflected in negotiated settlements

racial integration as an innovation empirical evidence from sports leagues this paper treats racial integration as an innovation in economic process in which economic entities find it advantageous to utilize potentially more productive inputs previously unavailable due to law custom or managerial discretion data on the racial integration of major league baseball and atlantic coast conference basketball are employed to address this issue the central question examined is which type of team integrated first losers or winners the results strongly support the idea that entrepreneurship trumps competitive rivalry that is winning teams led the process of racial integration jel li j7 one of the watershed events in u s history is the struggle to achieve a racially integrated society while the civil rights laws and court rulings in the 195o s 196o s and 197o s are among the major changes in public policy that gradually led to a breakdown of jim crow rule in the american south other changes in law and custom also motivated the process of racial integration across time and place indeed segregation was not limited to the south but was a prominent feature of many national organizations and markets despite the extensive commentary on these events from various perspectives there has been very little economic analysis of the actual process of racial integration economists have focused their efforts on the economics of discriminatio n while the actual process by which individuals firms and

perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration abstract we consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement the main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator who can only become active with the consent of both parties in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome we compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options journal of economic literature classification number c78

the politics of inequality voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted and why is it that in other countries where inequality has increased much less the left has become substantially more redistributive the answer the authors argue has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low income voters the authors make two points in this article first high levels of inequality move left parties to the left second although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of left parties to the left it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics the authors argue that left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low income voters are politically mobilized they explore these claims through a comparative analysis of left party programs in 10 organisation for economic cooperation and development countries over the period 1966 to 2002

arbitration and bargaining across the pacific this paper reports laboratory experiments comparing arbitration behavior between and across two countries with extensive trade relations the united states and japan besides comparing disputes in both locations we evaluate disputes between them while we find nominal differences between the countries we observe significant changes in both groups behavior when facing someone from the other country specifically americans seek larger profits when facing a japanese counterpart and japanese subjects settle more frequently with an american counterpart our results suggest that the literature on bargaining behavior across cultures paints an incomplete picture of international comparisons by failing to consider bargaining interactions

how constraining is capital mobility the partisan hypothesis in an open economy a growing literature argues that international financial integration has eliminated the possibility for distinct partisan macroeconomic strategies i test this hypothesis by reformulating the partisan hypothesis in an open economy context and conducting pooled timeseries analysis of budget balances real interest rates and capital controls for fourteen oecd countries between 1970 and 1994 the analysis provides little evidence that financial integration has eliminated distinct partisan macroeconomic policies under fixed exchange rates leftist governments run larger deficits than rightist governments and use capital controls to reduce interest rate premia under floating exchange rates leftist governments pursue looser monetary policies than rightist governments while partisan distinctions do weaken in the 1990s in countries with fixed exchange rates this is attributed to the recession of the early 1990s and to important institutional changes in the european union international financial integration therefore does not prevent governments from pursuing distinct partisan macroeconomic policies

electoral rules strategic entry and polarization abstract how does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system i e the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties by studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits a a first order negative effect on platform polarization b a second order negative effect on the number of parties as polarization decreases centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter and c an additional third order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties we then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model

globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democracies this article contributes to the growing literature on the role that domestic political institutions play in mediating globalization pressures by arguing that the capital tax constraints arising from international economic integration are the most severe for countries with majoritarian political institutions in doing so the author solves a tax puzzle that challenges conventional thinking about how institutions condition the relationship between economic globalization and domestic politics he presents a formal game theoretic model to sharpen the basic logic of his argument and then tests some of the model s predictions empirically using both quantitative and qualitative evidence

economic globalization and the welfare state in affluent democracies 1975 1998 prior scholarship is sharply divided on how or if globalization influences welfare states globalization s effects may be positive causing expansion negative triggering crisis and reduction curvilinear contributing to convergence or insignificant we bring new evidence to bear on this crucial debate with a pooled time series analysis of two measures of the welfare state and 16 indicators of economic globalization for 17 affluent democracies from 1975 to 1998 the analysis suggests that 1 state of the art welfare state models warrant revision in the globalization era 2 most indicators of economic globalization do not have significant effects 3 the few significant globalization effects are in different directions and often inconsistent with extant theories 4 the globalization effects are far smaller than the effects of domestic political and economic factors and 5 these effects are not systematically different for liberal vs nonliberal welfare state regimes european vs non european countries or with four alternative dependent variables increased globalization and a modest convergence of the welfare state have occurred but globalization does not unambiguously cause welfare state expansion crisis and reduction or convergence bisherige befunde der sozialwissenschaftlichen forschung zum kausalen verhaltnis von globalisierung und wohlfahrtsstaat sind nicht eindeutig danach kann globalisierung positive effekte haben und zu einem ausbau an wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit fuhren eine krise des wohlfahrtsstaates oder leistungsreduktionen herbeifuhren kurvilineare wirkungen aufweisen und zu konvergenz beitragen als auch vollkommen insignifikant sein unsere gepoolte zeitreihenanalyse von wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und globalisierung in 17 reichen demokratien 1975 1998 hat folgende befunde zu tage gefordert 1 im zeitalter der globalisierung erscheinen bestehende wohlfahrtsstaatsmodelle revisionsbedurftig 2 die mehrzahl der okonomischen globalisierungsindikatoren weist keine signifikanten effekte auf 3 die wenigen signifikanten effekte zeigen in unterschiedliche richtungen und stimmen haufig nicht mit bestehenden theoretischen annahmen uberein 4 die globalisierungseffekte sind deutlich kleiner als die effekte binnenpolitischer variablen und okonomischer faktoren 5 diese effekte unterscheiden sich in liberalen und nicht liberalen wohlfahrtsregimen bzw europaischen und nicht europaischen landern nicht systematisch von einander im analysezeitraum konnen wir sowohl einen anstieg der verschiedenen globalisierungsindikatoren sowie eine moderate konvergenz der verschiedenen wohlfahrtsstaaten konstatieren jedoch kann der prozess der globalisierung nicht eindeutig als kausale ursache fur die unterschiedlichen entwicklungsrichtungen in den verschiedenen wohlfahrtsstaaten identifiziert werden

the meaning of the market process essays in the development of modern austrian economics part i the market process approach 1 market process theory in defence of the austrian middle ground 2 the meaning of the market process part ii the emergence of the austrian view 3 the austrian school of economics 4 carl menger and the subjectivist tradition in economics 5 menger classical liberalism and the austrian school of economics 6 the economic calculation debate lessons for austrians 7 ludwig von mises and friedrich von hayek the modern extension of austrian subjectivism part iii some new explorations in the austrian approach 8 prices the communication of knowledge and the discovery process 9 economic planning and the knowledge problem 10 knowledge problems and their solutions some relevant distinctions 11 welfare economics a modern austrian perspective part iv some related issues emerging from the austrian approach 12 self interest and the new bashing of economics 13 discovery private property and the theory of justice

electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions why some democracies redistribute more than others standard political economy models of redistribution notably that of meltzer and richard 1981 fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies we develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others we show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions hence redistribution our argument implies 1 that center left governments dominate under pr systems whereas center right governments dominate under majoritarian systems and 2 that pr systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems we test our argument on panel data for redistribution government partisanship and electoral system in advanced democracies w hy do some countries redistribute more than others most work on the politics of redistribution starts from the premise that democratic institutions empower those who stand to benefit from redistribution the basic logic is succinctly captured in the meltzer richard 1981 model where the voter with the median income is also the decisive voter with a typical right skewed distribution of income the median voter will push for redistributive spending up to the point where the benefit of such spending to the median voter is outweighed by the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation this argument implies that redistibution is much greater in democracies than in nondemocracies at least of the right authoritarian variety and that among the latter inegalitarian societies redistribute more than egalitarian ones there is some evidence to supportthefirstimplication althoughitisdisputed see ross 2005 but most of the variance in redistribution is probably within the same regime type according to datafromtheluxembourgincomestudy forexample the reduction in the poverty rate in united states as a result of taxation and transfers was 13 in 1994 whereas the comparable figure for sweden was 82 thepovertyrateisthepercentageofhouseholdsbelow 50 of the median income to explain this variance we have to look at political and economic differences

perfect equilibria in a negotiation model rubinstein s alternating offers bargaining model is enriched by assuming that players payoffs in disagreement periods are determined by a normal form game it is shown that such a model can have multiple perfect equilibria including inefficient ones provided that players are sufficiently patient delay is possible even though there is perfect information and the players are fully rational the length of delay depends only on the payoff structure of the disagreement game and not on the discount factor not all feasible and individually rational payoffs of the disagreement game can be supported as average disagreement payoffs indeed some negotiation games have a unique perfect equilibrium with immediate agreement