how do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects evidence from a large panel of countries conventional wisdom is that good economic conditions and expansionary fiscal policy help incumbents get reelected but this has not been tested in a large cross section of countries we test these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960 2003 we find no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries developed and less developed new and old democracies countries with different government or electoral systems and countries with different levels of democracy in developed countries and in old democracies election year deficits actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected with similar although smaller negative electoral effects of deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent s term in office higher growth rates of real gdp per capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies but voters are affected by growth over the leader s term in office rather than in the election year itself and apparently only by growth not attributed to global growth low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries the effects we find are not only statistically significant but also quite substantial quantitatively we also suggest how the absence of a positive electoral effect of deficits can be consistent with the political deficit cycle found in new democracies

commitment coordination failures and delayed reforms abstract economic reforms are often postponed even if they are clearly beneficial i argue that this may reflect a government s need to improve its reputation before it can enact a reform successfully i study a model in which the government has a commitment problem in setting taxes that pay for reform market expectations about future policy which determine investment become fundamental for the reform s success reform may be postponed as the government builds credibility with a period of low taxes depending on expectations better equilibria may exist the robustness of this explanation and its policy implications are discussed

lending booms latin america and the world recent theories of crisis put lending booms at the root of financial collapses yet lending booms may be a natural consequence of economic development and fluctuations so are lending booms dangerous in this paper we investigate empirically this question using a broad sample of lending boom episodes over 40 years with a special eye for latin america our results indicate that 1 lending booms are often associated with i a domestic investment boom ii an increase in domestic interest rates iii a worsening of the current account iv a declines in reserves v a real appreciation vi a decline in output growth 2 typical lending booms do not increase substantially the vulnerability of the banking sector or the balance of payments comparing latin america and the rest of the world we find that latin america lending booms make the economy considerably more volatile and vulnerable to financial and balance of payment crisis

mexico s experiments with bank privatization and liberalization 1991 2003 during the 1990s mexico conducted two experiments with its banking system in the first experiment 1991 96 it privatized the banks this experiment took place with weak institutions to enforce contract rights it also took place without institutions that encourage prudent behavior by bankers the result was reckless behavior by banks and a collapse of the banking system in the second experiment 1997 2003 mexico reformed many of the institutions that promoted bank monitoring and it opened up the industry to foreign investment it was less successful however in reforming the institutions that promote the enforcement of contract rights the result was that bankers behaved prudently but prudent behavior in the context of weak contract rights implies that banks are reluctant to extend credit to firms and households

political credit cycles the case of the euro zone we study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the euro delayed rather than advanced economic reforms in the euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries we show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration in turn not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident we analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in greece spain ireland and portugal and by way of contrast in germany a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the euro

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

the role of lawyer legislators in shaping the law evidence from voting on tort reforms abstractattorneys elected to the us congress and to state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation but more likely to support bills that extend tort law than are legislators with different professional backgrounds this finding is based on the analysis of 64 roll call votes at the federal and state levels between 1995 and 2014 it holds when controlling for legislators ideology and is particularly strong for term limited lawyer legislators the empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer legislators at least in part pursue their private interests when voting on tort issues our results highlight the relevance of legislators identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making

symposium on the economics of liability son s liability is another s asset hence with every complaint that the u s liability system is imposing a crippling tax on suppliers of risky goods and services there also comes a cry that liability is essential to compensate the victims of accidents widespread visible concern about the liability crisis reached a peak during the mid 1980s without question there was a proliferation of lawsuits by those asserting their rights to recover for damages caused by others malpractice pollution defective products and so on with a consequent restructuring of economic activity as several of the authors in this symposium point out liability insurance premiums skyrocketed even as insurance coverage was reduced many people saw public parks and swimming pools closed for lack of liability insurance coverage less visible were the many decisions continuing to this day to withdraw products or set aside possible new products for fear of liability exposure while liability receives less press attention now than several years ago it remains an area that many suspect is sorely in need of reform and where economists have much to contribute the legal scope of liability has expanded markedly during the past 30 years raising the question of whether liability has become overly broad there are some signs that the pendulum is starting to swing the other way reducing the scope and expense of liability some states have imposed caps on punitive damages or have abolished joint and several liability which makes each defendant in a liability action potentially liable for the entire damages at the

mexico s balance of payments crisis a chronicle of a death foretold this paper claims that the roots of mexico s balance of payments crisis are found in the prevailing high degree of capital mobility and financial globalization under these circumstances shifts in foreign capital flows and anticipation of a banking system bailout may produce large imbalances between stocks of financial assets and foreign reserves threatening the sustainability of currency pegs econometric analysis suggests that half of mexico s reserve losses could be accounted for by these phenomena large financial imbalances are also fertile ground for self fulfilling prophesy crises which lead devaluations to produce deep recessions these difficulties can be partly remedied by appropriate policies

privatization political risk and stock market development in emerging economies this paper investigates whether privatization in emerging economies has a significant indirect effect on local stock market development through the resolution of political risk we argue that a sustained privatization program represents a major political test that gradually resolves uncertainty over political commitment to a market oriented policy as well as to regulatory and private property rights we present evidence suggesting that progress in privatization is indeed correlated with improvements in perceived political risk our analysis further shows that changes in political risk in general tend to have a strong effect on local stock market development and excess returns in emerging economies we conclude that the resolution of political risk resulting from successful privatization has been an important source for the rapid growth of stock markets in emerging economies

barriers to investment in polarized societies i present a tractable dynamic model of political economy where disagreements about the composition of public spending result in implementation of short sighted policies the relative price of investment to consumption is excessively large in equilibrium due to over taxation investment rates are too low which slows down growth along the transition in the long run this results in output consumption and welfare being inefficiently low the larger is the degree of polarization the greater is the inefficiency political stability mitigates the effects of polarization by making the incumbent internalize the dynamic inefficiencies introduced by the choice of growth retarding policies

political capital mexican financial policy under salinas market reform is advocated in developing countries to improve economic efficiency and prevent privileged groups from obtaining rents from the policy making process yet this prescription fails to address the complex political process that governments are likely to confront when moving toward the market this study shows how political considerations during president salinas s administration distorted economic reform in mexico during the 1990s mexican finance policy contradicted the government s declared neoliberal principles while the banks were reprivatized and deregulated they were also given a high degree of protection from competition enabling the new owners to charge excessive interest rates in addition the government artificially inflated the value of the currency through exchange rate intervention these contradictory policies are best understood as a coherent political response to the electoral vulnerability of the ruling party pri at the end of the 1980s when viable political opposition threatened the pri s ability to maintain power it responded by using financial policies to distribute economic benefits to social groups particularly business the middle class and the poor whose support was critical for electoral victory

political booms financial crises political booms measured by the rise in governments popularity predict financial crises above and beyond better known early warning indicators such as credit booms this predictive power howev

who wants a good reputation we examine a market in which long lived firms face a short term incentive to exert low effort but could earn higher profits if it were possible to commit to high effort there are two types of firms inept firms who can only exert low effort and competent firms who have a choice between high and low effort there is occasional exit and competent and inept potential entrants compete for the right to inherit the departing firm s reputation consumers receive noisy signals of effort choice and so competent firms choose high effort in an attempt to distinguish themselves from inept firms a competent firm is most likely to enter the market by purchasing an average reputation in the hopes of building it into a good reputation than either a very low reputation or a very high reputation inept firms in contrast find it more profitable to either buy high reputations and deplete them or buy low reputations

a theory of political and economic cycles abstract we develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined these cycles are driven by three political economy frictions policymakers are non benevolent they cannot commit to policies and they have private information about the tightness of the government budget and rents our first main result is that in the most favorable equilibrium to the households distortions to production emerge and never disappear even in the long run this result is driven by the interaction of limited commitment and private information on the side of the policymaker since in the absence of either friction there are no long run distortions to production our second result is that if the variance of private information is sufficiently large there is equilibrium turnover in the long run so that political cycles never disappear finally our model produces a long run distribution of taxes distortions and turnover where these all respond persistently to temporary economic shocks

heterogeneous preferences regarding global climate change we examine the structure of preferences for mitigating impacts of global climate change that will not occur during the lifetimes of most who are alive today because no market data exist for such distant markets a statedpreference approach is used the analysis is based on the random parameters logit model and the results indicate substantial heterogeneity in respondent preferences that mean willingness to pay is a significant and increasing function of the scope of the impact and provocatively that respondents have the same preferences over the two very different time horizons that we consider e examine the structure of preferences for mitigating impacts of global climate change that will not occur during the lifetimes of most who are alive today studies using current market data have estimated the potential costs of climate change on agriculture mendelsohn nordhaus shaw 1994 and on other aspects of measured production nordhaus 1994 but market data can not reveal the willingness of those currently alive to pay for measures to mitigate impacts that may not happen for 100 years or more there is serious public discussion involving diplomats at the highest levels about measures to mitigate emissions that would cost the united states alone 100 to 200 billion dollars annually therefore estimating the willingness of those currently alive to pay for mitigation measures is not a fanciful exercise but rather a crucial effort to determine how much mitigation should be undertaken it is the preferences of those alive today regarding acceptable levels of climate impacts and not the unknowable preferences of those who do not yet exist that will ultimately determine how much mitigation we pursue in the next quarter century as this question cannot be answered with market data we use the stated preference sp approach and elicit preferences for preventing climate change induced impacts a host of climate change impacts have been enumerated this study focuses on one type of impact that may be important but has received little attention from economists scientists have predicted that widespread ecosystem shifts may accompany changes in climate vemap 1995 ecosys tem shifts are likely to evolve slowly indicating that lost use values are likely to be small for those alive today yet the public may still be willing and asked to pay for mitigation measures that are designed to slow the transformation of ecosystems the current debate over climate change demon strates two things the first is that some people do care about long term changes that will never affect them or perhaps even their children the second is that preferences regarding the impacts of climate change are very heterogeneous as other members of the public appear much less concerned long term horizons combined with heterogeneous prefer ences makes ecosystem shifts a useful place to begin analyzing preferences for mitigating climate change im pacts a stated preference survey was designed that asked respondents to choose their most preferred program to reduce ecological impacts from a set menu of five or six different programs the programs varied in terms of costs the degree of ecosystem change and in the mitigation method four different menus provided to each respondent yielded four distinct valuation responses section ii de scribes the random parameters logit model for repeated choices that allows for a flexible correlation structure based on heterogeneous preferences the ecosystem change and the stated preference survey are discussed in section iii in section iv we estimate the random parameters model and estimate the willingness to pay to prevent various levels of ecosystem change section v concludes with a discussion of how the scope of the impact preference heterogeneity and the time horizon affect willingness to pay

inequality and institutions abstract this paper presents theory and evidence on the relationship between inequality and institutional quality we exhibit a model in which the two may dynamically reinforce each other and set to test this relationship with a broad array of institutional measures the double causality between institutional strength and a more equal distribution of income is empirically established using dynamic panel and linear feedback analysis

why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries an empirical investigation we examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ows of capital from rich to poor countries the lucas paradox the theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections we show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation for example improving peru s institutional quality to australia s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long run development

pigouvian penalty for oil spills abstract the imposition of ex ante taxes on expected spilled oil in addition to ex post payments for damages under tort liability would foster economic efficiency this paper begins the analysis of the joint approach with the case in which pigouvian taxes are used exclusively a model is developed in which the volume of spilled oil causing environmental damage is reduced first by spill prevention expenditures by shippers and then by clean up expenditures by the government the efficient pigouvian tax on expected spilled oil equals marginal environmental damage which equals the net marginal cost of prevention which equals marginal clean up cost

what drives international financial flows politics institutions and other determinants abstract this paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending first employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed effects framework the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance second cross sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending third instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows the results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of lucas lucas robert e 1990 why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries american economic review papers and proceedings 80 2 92 96 1990 paradox of why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries the analysis also does a first step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking