a market to implement the core abstract i present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying convex tu game the mechanism resembles an asset market in which one of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade in addition the rules of the mechanism are independent of the coalitional function therefore the mechanism is useful for an incompletely informed designer who wishes to implement the core of these games the mechanism is inspired by the reduced games relevant for the consistency of the core journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 and c72

renegotiations in the greenhouse international climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing negotiations this paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations we analyse how the incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related to renegotiations for this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate economy impacts of greenhouse gas emissions for a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a coalition of china and the united states is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium in a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game consequently several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of china and usa in terms of abatement levels and global payoff the grand coalition however is unstable

sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division this paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors i show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game if stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games furthermore symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players a general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c71 1996 academic press inc

transfers to sustain dynamic core theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control international environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement in a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co operative game by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved however the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required this paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context the possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed

international environmental agreements for river sharing problems we study partial coalition formation and the strategic timing of membership of an iea for environmental issues in the coalitional bargaining game cbg of gomes econometrica 73 1329 1350 2005 we apply the cbg to a specific river sharing problem with two symmetric upstream agents each at a tributary and one downstream agent located at the junction of tributaries we identify five regions in the parameter space of a discount factor and a productivity parameter for water in one region the grand coalition always forms immediately in two other regions immediate formation of the grand coalition and gradual coalition formation both occur with positive probability in another two regions only gradual coalition formation occurs in one of these latter regions a region with discount factors close to one both upstream agents form a monopoly with positive probability formation of the monopoly persists in the limit as the discount factor goes to one

the solution to the tullock rent seeking game when r 2 mixed strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates in tullock s rent seeking model the probability a player wins the game depends on expenditures raised to the power r we show that a symmetric mixed strategy nash equilibrium exists when r 2 and that overdissipation of rents does not arise in any nash equilibrium we derive a tight lower bound on the level of rent dissipation that arises in a symmetric equilibrium when the strategy space is discrete and show that full rent dissipation occurs when the strategy space is continuous our results are shown to be consistent with recent experimental evidence on the dissipation of rents

do too many cooks always spoil the stew an experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer laboratory methods are used to evaluate the effects of institutional arrangements and rent defending activity on rent seeking auction outcomes in part nash equilibrium predictions are a useful behavioral guide as predicted more rents are dissipated in perfectly discriminating auctions where the high bidder wins than in lotteries where relative bids determine the chance of winning also as predicted the introduction of a rent defending buyer reduces social costs nevertheless the social costs of rent seeking consistently exceed predicted levels moreover individual bidding especially by buyers deviates markedly from nash predictions

the stability and effectiveness of climate coalitions a comparative analysis of multiple integrated assessment models we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore the stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation we identify robust results concerning the incentives of different nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement and estimate the extent of greenhouse gas mitigation that can be achieved by stable agreements we also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of climate coalitions in contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature we find substantial scope for self enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation this more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives

cooperative action on greenhouse gas emissions and the distribution of global output and damage this paper compares the performance of two allowance allocation rules in an international climate change treaty i construct a model in which countries differ according to both gdp and an idiosyncratic damage parameter that links global emissions to damage for an individual country allowances are allocated to treaty members according to an allocation rule based on a single allocation parameter the model can be solved analytically to determine upper and lower bounds on this allocation parameter that ensure that a treaty of any given composition is internally and externally stable i focus on grand coalition treaties the first treaty examined uses a simple proportional rule in which allocations are set as some fraction of emissions in the non cooperative equilibrium the second treaty adds a coverage contingent element to the allocation rule such that the emissions reduction required of each treaty member is weighted by the fraction of global emissions that treaty members as a whole emit in the non cooperative equilibrium i show that the coverage contingent treaty outperforms the simpler treaty except when all countries have the same emissions intensity in the non cooperative equilibrium in which case neither treaty can reduce emissions

cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games abstract this paper shows the equivalence between the stable solution set of any cooperative game in characteristic form g1 and the subgame perfect nash equilibria in pure strategies of a certain noncooperative game g2 players of g1 are named agents g2 is played by different players principals who compete in wages to attract agents the equivalence result holds when there are enough principals if the game is superadditive two principals suffice finally another related cooperative game g3 is constructed with both principals and agents as players for g2 and g3 the same result is then proven for any number of principals journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 and c72

rent seeking in general equilibrium a didactic illustration in the first part of the paper a simple general equilibrium model is developed which allows a graphic illustration of some of the basic ideas in rent seeking literature general equilibrium means that the alternative uses of available resources for both consumers and producers are made explicit the standard partial analysis of rent seeking is re interpreted in a general welfare theoretic framework thereby clarifying such diverse terms as consumer and producer surplus profits and rents to be captured the initial models of tullock and krueger are used to describe the social harm done by rent seeking activities in terms of a social cost benefit calculus

migration and intergroup conflict abstract two groups in conflict produce and appropriate internally generated consumable output in a two stage game assuming equal within group sharing and endogenous group sizes it is shown how agents leave groups with high productive efficiency and migrate to groups with high appropriative and defensive capabilities

production and conflict models versus rent seeking models a production and conflict p c model and a rent seeking rs model are compared for one group two groups and k groups adding a new agent enlarges the pie in the p c model but causes the fixed size pie to be allocated on one more rent seeker in the rs model the total production or rent is distributed within and between groups according to the within group and between group decisiveness productive and fighting efficiencies and group sizes play a role the collective action problem is more severe for the rs model as group size increases the ratio of within group to between group fighting increases marginally toward a constant for the p c model while it increases convexly for the rs model adding an additional agent to each of two groups is more detrimental to the utilities in rs groups than in p c groups while adding a second group of agents when there is already one group of agents gives the reverse result the severe between group fighting in the p c model for many groups causes the p c model to be preferable for few groups while the rs model is preferable for many groups applications are considered to intergroup migration inside versus outside ownership divestitures mergers and acquisitions multidivisional versus single tier firms and u form versus m form of economic organization

a multi winner nested rent seeking contest this paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent seeking contest in which there may be several winners we first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest in contrast to the previous work we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large

a theory of endogenous coalition structures consider an environment with widespread externalities and suppose that bind ing agreements can be written we study coalition formation in such a setting our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining game we establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilib rium coalition structures we develop an algorithm that generates under certain conditions an equilibrium coalition structure our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric partition functions in particular we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a cournot oligopoly journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78 d62 q 1999 academic press

two stage rent seeking contests with carryovers we examine a two stage contest in which players in twogroups compete noncooperatively to win a rent in thefirst stage each group selects a finalist the twofinalists compete for the rent in the second stage first stage efforts are carried over to the secondstage in the sense that they are partly effective inthe second stage as well we show the following inthe case of player specific carryovers therent dissipation rate increases in the carryover rate with the carryover rate equal to one the rent isfully dissipated in the case of group specificcarryovers however the rent dissipation rate isindependent of the carryover rate

the fatter the tail the fatter the climate agreement simulating the influence of fat tails in climate change damages on the success of international climate negotiations international climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large in this paper we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages also known as the fat tail on the formation of an international mitigation agreement we systematically vary the shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages using the stochastic version of the applied game theoretical staco model our aim is to identify how changes to the distributional form affect the stability of coalitions and their performance we find that fatter upper tails increase the likelihood that more ambitious coalitions are stable as well as the performance of these stable coalitions fatter tails thus imply more successful or fatter international climate agreements

subgame perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change abstract we model climate change as a dynamic game and prove existence of a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne that is also markov perfect we interpret this unique spne as the business as usual bau equilibrium and show that if the countries are not sufficiently symmetric then the familiar trigger strategy equilibria may not be pareto improvements over the bau equilibrium and may even lack efficiency properties we then motivate and introduce a subgame perfect cooperative agreement as an improvement over the bau equilibrium in the sense that every country or coalition of countries is better off in every subgame irrespective of the extent of heterogeneity of the countries we characterize subgame perfect cooperative agreements and identify sufficient conditions for their existence we show that direct or indirect transfers between countries to balance the costs and benefits of controlling climate change are a necessity and not a matter of approach

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

on the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances to meet its commitment under the kyoto protocol the eu plans to implement an emissions trading system whith grandfathering of allowances besides having distributional impacts the choice of the grandfathering scheme may affect efficiency if firms anticipate how future allocations depend on upcoming decisions in this paper we determine central design rules for optimal grandfathering within a simple two period model we find that for small open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous first best second period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm specific decisions in the first period second best schemes correspond to a ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both previous emissions and output however ofr closed emissions trading systems i e endogeneous allowance prices firstand second best rules coincide and must not depend on previous output levels they consist of an assignment proportional to the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firm specific decisions in either of the two periods

the ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects in a differential information economy with quasi linear utilities monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints the associated ex ante core is generically non empty however we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms

equilibrium binding agreements abstract we study equilibrium binding agreements the coalition structures that form under such agreements and the efficiency of the outcomes that result we analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point unlike the device of a characteristic function explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement a solution concept and its applications are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

rent seeking and entry abstract it is the purpose of this paper to develop a market equilibrium model of rent seeking with entry the model determines the optimal amount of rent seeking activities by individuals the equilibrium number of rent seekers and hence also the total amount of rent seeking in the industry

does ecological economics have a future contradiction and reinvention in the age of climate change abstract this paper addresses the role of neoclassical methodologies in ecological economics and the contradictions these methodologies pose to the field s critical founding principles we first consider robert costanza s treatment of nicholas stern s global deal and then survey climate change related articles published in this journal over the past five years this survey reveals how mainstream neoclassical methodologies dominate discourse and do so by marginalizing more critical political economy analyses this situation imperils the field s founding vision of a no growth steady state it also fails to address the related growth dynamics of capitalism without such a critical treatment the field s formal embrace of methodological pluralism actually entails an ideological empiricism that renders ecological economics theoretically incoherent this situation undermines the field s historical promise as an alternative economic paradigm ecological economics now faces a problematic future its survival in a form faithful to its founding vision will require an explicit choice to address its internal contradictions and reinvent itself in ways relevant to our contemporary context without such a choice ecological economics will likely succumb to an implicit acceptance of the hegemony of mainstream economic methodologies and their pro growth imperatives

transfer seeking and avoidance on the full social costs of rent seeking we would like to thank gordon tullock and an anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful comments and suggestions this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra group sharing rules this paper explores the interactions among intra group sharing rules the competition between two groups over the common pool of output and the allocation of resources between productive and appropriate activities in the interior solution the use of egalitarian method for the distribution of group income among members plays no distributional role but only affects the allocation of resources it releases resources into the productive sector from the group that adopts the egalitarian rule by making the internal conflict among the members less intense the sequential choice of intra group sharing rules and resource allocations produce the adoption of fully egalitarian intra group sharing rules in both groups these rules minimize the amount of resources allocated to appropriate activities and maximize the welfare level of all individuals in the economy this result suggests that inter group competition with the use of egalitarian principle in the distribution of group income among group members which is not available to the hobbesian state of nature is one of the cheaper social devices in restraining individuals from engaging in costly appropriative activities

endogenous sharing rules in collective group rent seeking this paper examines the possibility of endogenous determination of intra group sharing rules in a collective group rent seeking game collective group rent seeking is considered as a two stage nash cournot game in which sharing rules are determined prior to individual decision on voluntary contribution the solution is subgame perfect and is obtained by backward induction in competition between two groups of the same size the nash equilibrium sharing rule of each group is to distribute rent to each according to relative effort total rent seeking outlays in this case are equal to those obtained by tullock 1980 when more than two groups compete for a rent the sharing rule based on relative effort is again likely to be the nash equilibrium strategy of each group the amount of total rent seeking outlays is also equal to that in tullock 1980 in a nutshell the rent is substantially dissipated if sharing rules are endogenously determined

a strategic analysis of global warming theory and some numbers we model the global warming process as a dynamic commons game in which the players are countries their actions at each date produce emissions of greenhouse gases and the state variable is the current stock of greenhouse gases the theoretical analysis is complemented by a calibration exercise the first set of results establishes theoretically and then with illustrative numbers the over emissions due to a tragedy of the commons the power of simple sanctions to lower emissions and increase welfare is then examined as is the effect of cost asymmetry finally a complete theoretical charactrization is provided for the best equilibrium and it is shown that it has a very simple structure it involves a constant emission rate through time

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

seeking rents by setting rents the political economy of rent seeking in recent years there has been a large number of papers on the subject of rent seeking most such works on rent seeking have taken the rent as exogenously determined by regulators regulators howeve r may also be expected and indeed have been shown to be rent seeke rs and hence the determination of the rent itself should be endogeniz ed to reflect the fact that the rent setters are themselves rent se ekers in this paper the authors do this by presenting an analysis o f the interaction of regulators firms and consumers within a rent s eeking framework where all three groups are assumed to be self motiva ted the analysis is carried out under alternative assumptions regard ing the nature of the market and the reaction functions of the partic ipants policy implications are drawn where appropriate copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests incentives crowd out cooperation modern societies are characterized by competing organizations that rely predominantly on incentive schemes to align the behavior of their members with the organizations objectives this study contributes to explaining why in so many cases incentive schemes have gradually crowded out cooperation as an organization device our explanation does not draw on free riding the obvious achilles heel of cooperation but relies completely on fundamental group contest mechanisms by investigating a canonical rent seeking model and adopting an evolutionary perspective the analysis identifies shortcomings in previous results sets the record straight and explains why the process of incentivizing organizations is protracted

risk averse rent seeking with shared rents this paper presents a nash equilibrium model of rent seeking behavior in which risk averse players expend resources to obtain a share of a rent as for example in contests for import quota licences results are obtained relating the equilibrium level of lobbying effort by each player to the value of the rent in particular reduced individual lobbying effort is associated with higher rents contested if players are sufficiently risk averse the question of whether the value of rents is a good measure of the resource cost of rent seeking is also considered a simple approximation involving risk and risk aversion parameters is derived for the proportion of rents dissipated in long run equilibrium risk and risk aversion are seen to reduce the rent dissipation ratio below unity copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the coalitional nash bargaining solution the coalitional nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players payoffs is maximal we consider a non cooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period the grand team consisting of all players generates the largest surplus but a smaller team may form we show that as players get more patient if an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists it must deliver payoffs that correspond to the coalitional nash bargaining solution we also characterize when an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists which requires conditions that go beyond the nonemptiness of the core

interpreting bargaining strategies of developing countries in climate negotiations a quantitative approach despite the efforts made during the last climate conferences cops countries participating in the negotiation process are still far from reaching an agreement on the implementation of a new post kyoto climate regime the growing role played by developing countries in negotiations is one of the main causes behind the deadlock further attention should therefore be paid to the composition of the alliances formed by developing countries in order to better understand the key structural features driving their bargaining positions by applying a cluster analysis this paper aims to investigate the role played by heterogeneity in specific characteristics of developing countries in explaining divergent costs and benefits associated with alternative climate negotiation outcomes by clustering developing countries according to their economic geographic environmental energy and social characteristics the paper presents some considerations on climate political economy strategies in these countries with respect to existing bargaining coalitions

international equity and differentiation in global warming policy ne of the major obstacles to reaching a comprehensive agreement on global warming is the setting of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for individual countries long standing tensions between industrialized and developing countries have raised the issue of equity in burden sharing moreover individual industrialized nations have pleaded special circumstances and have sought differentiation in their obligations this paper analyzes alternative rules for distributing tradable carbon dioxide emissions permits a non linear programming model which distinguishes between allocation based and outcome based rules is used to analyze the relative welfare outcomes the model is applied to the world body of nations and yields several important policy implications

private information group contests best shot competition abstract we model competing groups when players values for winning are private information each group s performance equals the best effort best shot of its members and the group with the best performance wins the contest at the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests increasing the number of competing teams may increase or decrease each team s performance but it unambiguously increases the overall expected best shot depending on the elasticity of the distribution of players values individual team and contest performance may increase or decrease with team size considering just two competing groups that differ only in size we show members of the smaller group use the more aggressive strategy but depending on the nature of uncertainty either team may be more likely to win more generally when teams value cdfs differ increasing one team s size decreases increases that team s chance of winning if its value cdf is elastic inelastic

the anti paradox of cooperation diversity may pay abstract this paper considers the stability and success of a public good agreement we allow for any type and degree of asymmetry regarding benefits and costs we ask the question whether asymmetry and which type and degree of asymmetry is conducive to cooperation we employ a simple non cooperative game theoretic model of coalition formation and derive analytical solutions for two scenarios an agreement without and with optimal transfers a central message of the paper is that asymmetry does not have to be an obstacle for successful cooperation but can be an asset we qualify two central results in the literature firstly the paradox of cooperation known since barrett 1994 and reiterated by many others afterwards stating that under those conditions when cooperation would matter most stable agreements achieve only little secondly a kind of coalition folk theorem known without proof in the literature for a long time stating that without transfers stable coalitions will be smaller with asymmetric than symmetric players we show that even without transfers the grand coalition can be stable if there is a negative covariance between benefit and cost parameters with massive gains from cooperation moreover with transfers many distributions of benefit and cost parameters lead to a stable grand coalition again some of them implying huge gains from cooperation stability and success greatly benefit from a very skewed asymmetric distribution of benefit and costs i e diversity may pay

the use and effect of political propaganda in democracies this paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised by propaganda semi truths are distributed among the electorate the decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives the analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate the pecuniary interest of an interest group is however also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group it has finally become appar ent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies

contests with group specific public goods and complementarities in efforts abstract this paper starts from the observation that in public goods group contests group impact can in general not be additively decomposed into some sum of functions of individual efforts we use a ces impact function to identify the main channels of influence of the elasticity of substitution on the behavior in and the outcome of such a contest we characterize the nash equilibria of this game and carry out comparative static exercises with respect to the elasticity of substitution among group members efforts if groups are homogeneous i e all group members have the same valuation and efficiency within the group the elasticity of substitution has no effect on the equilibrium for heterogeneous groups the higher the complementarity of efforts of that group the lower the divergence of efforts among group members and the lower the winning probability of that group this contradicts the common intuition that groups can improve their performance by solving the free rider problem via higher degrees of complementarity of efforts

games of perfect information predatory pricing and the chain store paradox the thesis of this paper is that finite noncooperative games possessing both complete and perfect information ought to be treated like one player decision problems that is players ought to assign at every move subjective probabilities to every subsequent choice in the game and ought to make decisions via backward induction this view is in contrast with the gametheoretic approach of nash equilibrium after expanding on this view for games in the abstract in sections 2 and 3 attention is turned in section 4 to an example due to reinhard selten called the chain store paradox which possesses the flavor of a situation involving a predatory pricing monopolist it is argued that for the chain store game the decision analytic approach leads under certain assumptions to more realistic outcomes than the standard nash equilibrium approach

climate contracts a game of emissions investments negotiations and renegotiations the paper presents a dynamic game where players can contribute to a public bad invest in technologies and write incomplete contracts despite the n 1 stocks in the model the analysis is tractable and the symmetric markov perfect equilibrium unique the framework helps to analyze emissions investments and international environmental agreements if only the emission levels are contractible then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short term or close to its expiration date to encourage investments the optimal contract is more ambitious if it is short term and it is tougher to satisfy close to its expiration date and for countries with small investment costs if renegotiation is possible such an incomplete contract implements the rst best the results have important lessons for how to design a climate treaty

changes in budgetary allocations and international comparisons of the social cost of rent seeking a critical note the katz rosenberg measure of rent dissipation across countries fails to encompass the consequences of different political systems wherein allocations are made observations about fiscal federal structures and the particular political structures of different countries affect political discretion in allocating government transfers owing both to the absence of these considerations which are indeed self evident and some other considerations regarding the measure the cross country rankings that katz and rosenberg present are meaningless at best and at worst misleading

subgame perfect cooperation in an extensive game abstract we propose a new solution concept for games in extensive form that incorporates both cooperation and subgame perfection from its definition and properties the new solution concept named the subgame perfect core is a refinement of the core of an extensive game in the same sense as the set of subgame perfect nash equilibria is a refinement of the set of nash equilibria to further characterize the subgame perfect core we show that each subgame perfect core payoff vector can be implemented as a non cooperative solution as it is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium payoff vector of an extensive form game that is closely related to the original game we also motivate and introduce a related concept of subgame perfect strong nash equilibrium of an extensive game that is coalition proof

stability of international climate coalitions a comparison of transfer schemes abstract this paper studies the impact of pragmatic and optimal transfer schemes on the incentives for regions to join international climate agreements with an applied model that comprises twelve world regions we investigate i a benchmark without transfers ii scenarios with allocation based rules where coalition members receive tradable emission permits proportional to initial or future emissions iii scenarios with outcome based rules where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to emissions and iv a scenario based on an optimal sharing rule where the coalition surplus is distributed proportional to outside option payoffs we find that well designed transfer schemes can stabilise larger coalitions and increase global abatement levels in our applied setting we find that for allocation based and outcome based rules only small coalitions are stable and in the case of grandfathered emission permits there is no stable coalition at all some obstacles associated with grandfathered emission permits can be overcome by incorporating the expected growth of emissions in developing countries in the distribution of emission permits for the optimal transfer scheme we find that larger coalitions which include key players such as the united states and china can be stable but no transfer scheme is capable of stabilising the grand coalition

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

international cooperation for sale abstract this paper shows that strong asymmetry among countries warrants a change in the rules of the game of global public goods provision with the consequence that cooperation by some countries is bought by others and aggregate welfare is increased perhaps substantially side payments on their own have virtually no effect on the outcomes that can be sustained by self enforcing cooperative agreements but when the rules of the game are changed by strong asymmetry when some countries are effectively committed to being non signatories to an agreement eschewing money transfers side payments become the vehicle for increasing participation in a cooperative agreement

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

long run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking the lure of excess profits or rents associated with monopoly power gives rise to expenditures to obtain these rents competitive rent seeking behavior is recognized as a factor which must be included among the wastes associated with monopoly power tullock 1967 posner 1975 1 the expenditures are aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society how important rent seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits

rent seeking with non identical sharing rules the primary object of this paper is to examine the role of differential sharing rules within a collective rent seeking setting on the possible non existence of nash equilibrium focusing on groups that distribute part of the rent equally among their members and the residual according to relative effort we show that in rent seeking societies applying the two polar sharing rules equilibrium never exists in the general case where groups apply different but not necessarily the polar sharing rules we study the relationship between group variability in distributing rents and the problem of non existence of equilibrium in the rent seeking game

constraining equitable allocations of tradable co2 emission quotas by acceptability since the signing of the kyoto protocol future commitments are likely to be framed in terms of tradable quotas the discussions on the allocation of the quotas among countries will be based at least partly on rules corresponding to a certain conception of equity for instance allocating quotas in direct proportion to population in relation to gdp or according to past emissions has been advocated taking a long term perspective we compute such allocations of tradable quotas with a dynamic closed loop model the total amount of quotas to be distributed at each period corresponds to the world optimal amount of emissions to be realized at each period we observe that most equitable allocation rules do not make the agreement individually rational for every country along the entire time path we then propose a mechanism which determines allocations of quotas that are as close as possible to any equitable allocation while satisfying individual rationality

a noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core a noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility the implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible in the model proposed time is continuous this idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated

rent seeking with non identical sharing rules an equilibrium rescued nitzan s 1991 analysis of differential sharing rules in a collective rent seeking setting is reconsidered two groups each with more than one member are presumed to use different linear combinations of two sharing rules one based on an equal division of the prize and the other on each member s relative effort we show that an equilibrium always exists for this type of game and then characterize the equilibrium our result is contrary to nitzan s claims that a in the general case an equilibrium often does not exist and b an equilibrium never exists when the groups use the polar extreme rules

building climate coalitions on preferential free trade agreements in this paper we discuss the endogenous formation of climate coalitions in an issue linkage regime in particular we propose a preferential free trade agreement on which a climate coalition should be built the basic idea is that the gains of free trade can provide strong incentives for countries to join the coalition as a framework a multi stage strategic trade model is employed in which each country may set an emission cap being effective on a permit market in addition a discriminatory import tariff may be imposed on dirty goods however at the heart of our approach is a preferential free trade arrangement among the members of a climate coalition leading to a favourable shift in the terms of trade as a main result trade liberalisation is found as an institution highly effective in building climate coalitions in particular the parametrical simulation of the model shows that participation in joint emission reduction is higher consumption patterns are more environmentally friendly and coalitional welfare is much more improved than in case of a single issue environmental agreement

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40

do rent seeking groups announce their sharing rules i introduction rent seeking can be seen all around us firms or coalitions of firms expend resources to influence government officials who have authority to award monopoly rights self interested pressure groups lobby for government subsidies foreign producers exert effort to avoid imposing tariffs or quotas on their products interest groups or lobbyists contribute to the election of politicians who promise to advance favorable legislation research and development rd then the groups announce their decisions simultaneously before choosing their sharing rules we examine the groups decisions on releasing sharing rule information their sharing rules and the effort levels and payoffs of the individual players in equilibrium we formally consider the following three stage game in the first stage each group decides and announces whether it will release to the rival group the information about its sharing rule which will be determined in the second stage in the second stage the players in each group jointly choose their sharing rule and then each group releases the information about its sharing rule if it decided to do so in the first stage in the third stage all the players in both groups choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently at the end of this third stage the winning player is chosen and the winner shares the prize with the other players in his group according to the sharing rule on which they agreed in the second stage solving the game we find the following first the case where both groups release their sharing rule information never occurs in equilibrium second the case where neither group releases its sharing rule information occurs only if the players are evenly matched third when the players are unevenly matched one group releases its sharing rule information and the other does not

the recursive core core allocations may be defined for infinite horizon capital accumulation models if agents cannot trust each other in the sense of gale then agents may renege on their commitments their decisions appear time inconsistent a core allocation is a recursive core allocation provided no coalition can improve upon its consumption stream at any time given its accumulation of assets up to that period we show for every allocation of consumption in the initial core one can find a distribution of capital stocks among the agents where no coalition of agents will break the initial core contract at any date it follows that if the proper distribution of the streams of capital is achieved then the allocation in the core is also in the recursive core the latter therefore forges a link between the distribution of wealth capital the problem of trust and time consistent intertemporal contracts

bidding in hierarchies this paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single stage contests a condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single stage contest and when the single stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly the outcome depends on inter and intra group heterogeneity and is not driven by free rider incentives

incentives and stability of international climate coalitions an integrated assessment this paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and the stability of the resulting climate coalition using the integrated assessment model witch coalition stability is assessed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference the aggregation of social welfare and the severity of climate damages the profitability stability and strong potential internal stability of a number of coalitions those potentially effective in reducing ghg emissions is explored in the paper the main conclusion is that only the grand coalition i e a coalition where all world regions cooperate to reduce emissions can maintain ghg concentration below 550 ppm co2 eq however this coalition is not internally stable even when allowing for monetary transfers across world regions nonetheless the paper also shows that strongly potentially internally stable coalitions exist though of smaller size which can mitigate global warming and limit ghg concentrations to 600 ppm co2 eq

inefficiency as a strategic device in group contests against dominant opponents i introduction many strategic situations in economics and politics can be understood as contests rd nitzan and ueda 2009 a private good nitzan 1991a 1991b nitzan and ueda 2009 or a mixed good esteban and ray 2001 nitzan and ueda 2011 to a large extent the intensity of free riding or conversely the motivation for individuals to exert effort in a contest is shaped by the intra group incentive scheme or governance structure in standard contests incentives are inseparably linked to the sharing rule i e to the usually exogenous procedure by which the rents acquired in the contest are distributed within the group 1 in a number of economic applications however incentives to exert effort appear to be separate or are even willfully separated from the sharing rule phenomena such as team spirit akerlof and kranton 2005 identification with the group sherif 1966 bornstein and ben yossef 1994 peer pressure kandel and lazear 1992 or social norms to contribute to the social good elster 1989 are examples for this separation alternatively groups could apply selective incentive schemes based on relative performance lazear and rosen 1981 or marginally align individual and group incentives nitzan and ueda 2009 in all these scenarios individuals behave cooperatively i e in the interest of the entire group even if the final distribution of rents follows a standard sharing rule mechanisms to induce cooperation often are costly sanchez pages and straub 2010 may only work under restrictive conditions che and gale 2003 require strategic coordination among individuals hardin 1995 or cannot be ensured to be obeyed unanimously oliver 1980 this might explain why they do not emerge universally or automatically the point we make in this article is even stronger even if there existed perfect and costless solutions to within group free riding problems which will henceforth be called intra group efficient incentive schemes igeis they might not always be adopted why would a group for which an igeis is freely available not wish to utilize it but rather adopt an apparently inefficient governance structure by definition an igeis internalizes all within group externalities and seems to be a safe way to increase one s payoffs however this reasoning ignores repercussions that arise in strategic environments like contests suppose for example that the competing groups have sufficiently unequal strengths say due to unequal sizes or different comparative advantages then the weaker group may refrain from implementing a costless igeis to avoid the contest from heating up adoption of an igeis makes a group more efficient and consequently more aggressive in the contest on one hand higher efforts constitute a cost on the other they affect the share of the rent that this group can hope to acquire or the likelihood of succeeding in the contest 2 an igeis clearly enhances a group s prospects if the other group did not change its behavior however if members of the opponent group reply with a sufficiently strong increase in their contest efforts this diminishes and may potentially more than offset the gains from one s own increased efforts whether this happens depends on the direction of the strategic interaction between groups the detrimental firing back effect can only become relevant if the other group s efforts are sufficiently strong strategic complements to one s own efforts

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back