entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross market price constraints abstract we examine how universal service provisions and price restrictions across markets impact strategic entry and pricing we develop a simple multi market model with an oligopolistic profitable urban market and entry auctions for unprofitable rural service cross market price restrictions induce a firm operating in both markets to become a softer competitor thus placing the firm at a strategic disadvantage when we account for entry incentives and strategic bidding the downstream strategic disadvantage becomes advantageous leading to higher prices and profits price restrictions may also put outside firms even relatively inefficient ones at a strategic advantage

efficiency and surplus bounds in cournot competition we derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under cournot competition to do so we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of concavity and convexity the more concave is demand the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at rst increasing with demand concavity then eventually

the timing of monetary policy shocks a vast empirical literature has documented delayed and persistent effects of monetary policy shocks on output we show that this finding results from the aggregation of output impulse responses that differ sharply depending on the timing of the shock when the monetary policy shock takes place in the first two quarters of the year the response of output is quick sizable and dies out at a relatively fast pace in contrast output responds very little when the shock takes place in the third or fourth quarter we propose a potential explanation for the differential responses based on uneven staggering of wage contracts across quarters using a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model we show that a very modest amount of uneven staggering can generate differences in output responses similar to those found in the data

allocating and funding universal service obligations in a competitive market abstract we examine in a network market open to competition various mechanisms for allocating and funding universal service obligations among agents rival firms and consumers the obligations we consider are geographic ubiquity and nondiscrimination we analyze from both the efficiency and equity point of views the respective advantages of a restricted entry system where the entrant is not allowed to serve high cost consumers and a pay or play system we show that pay or play regulation always dominates restricted entry regulation under ubiquity constraint alone this result no longer holds when the regulator imposes also the nondiscrimination constraint

wage rigidities and labor market adjustment in europe based on an ad hoc firm level survey on wage and pricing policies conducted in a large number of european countries this study finds that about 60 of firms change base wages once a year with some clustering of wage changes observed in january differences in the frequency of wage changes between firms are mainly attributable to the institutional framework of the labor market in which they operate there is evidence of both nominal and real downward wage rigidity moreover when facing a negative shock european firms prefer to reduce the amount of labor rather than cutting wages among those that decide to cut wages a majority prefers to cut flexible wage components rather than base wages the rigidity of base wages is largely explained by fairness and efficiency considerations jel e24 j30

to vote or not to vote the paradox of nonvoting one paradox of voting states that in a general election in which many citizens vote the probability that a single voter can affect the outcome is so small that in general citizens have no rational reason for voting however if all citizens accept this reasoning then none will vote and so each vote has a large probability of affecting the outcome hence all should vote after all the adoption of mixed strategies resolves this paradox if each citizen adopts a certain small probability of voting then the actual number of citizens voting will be just enough to make it worth those citizens while to vote a nash equilibrium point thus occurs here we compute nash equilibria for the simple case of majority voting for the more complicated case of composite voting for example as in a presidential election we draw certain qualitative inferences

monopoly price discrimination and demand curvature this paper presents a general analysis of the eects of monopolistic third degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served su cient conditions involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the dierent mar kets are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive eects on

price discrimination and patent policy patent and antitrust policy are often presumed to be in conflict as an important example there is ongoing controversy about whether price discrimination by a patent holder is an illegal or socially undesirable exploitation of monopoly power in this article we show that no conflict exists in many price discrimination cases even ignoring the dynamic effects on incentives for innovation third degree price discrimination by patent holders can raise static social welfare in fact pareto improvements may well occur welfare gains occur because price discrimination allows patent holders to open new markets and to achieve economies of scale or learning further even in cases where discrimination incurs static welfare losses it may be efficient relative to other mechanisms such as length of patent life for rewarding innovators with profits

pricing and entry in regulated industries the role of regulatory design abstract this paper studies the optimal regulatory policy in a market where entry may occur in the event of entry the regulator regulates the incumbent but not the entrant we show that the effect of entry on prices depends on the length of the interval between regulatory reviews if the gap is long then the market outcome following entry has a higher price than it would have with a shorter gap 1997 elsevier science s a

price discrimination and social welfare studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory features of the reservation model presented quasi linear utility and consumers surplus upper and lower bounds on welfare change bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination from ebsco

regulating a dominant firm unknown demand and industry structure in this article we study the optimal regulation of a dominant firm when an unregulated firm actively competes generally the existence of an active rival imposes new and binding constraints on regulatory problems we characterize optimal policies both when demands are known complete information and unknown incomplete information to the regulator optimal policies under complete information may set the price at the dominant firm above or below its marginal cost optimal policies under incomplete information may be either pooling or separating constant over a range of the prior distribution of the firm s private information and leave no information rent to the firm

equity justifications for universal service obligations abstract equity is often invoked as a possible justification for the imposition of universal service obligations usos however no previous analysis supports a formal link between equity and uso in this paper we describe the extent to which the imposition of usos in oligopolistic network industries can meet the objectives of an inequality averse regulator we show that usos can be used for equity purposes provided that the regulator is able to control the competitive structure of the industry we also show that the uniform pricing constraint which is an obligation to offer the same price conditions to all consumers is welfare enhancing but rather surprisingly it does not necessarily improve equity

differential pricing when costs differ a welfare analysis this article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important but largely neglected case where costs of service differ across consumer groups cost based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens we discuss why cost based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand based counterpart third degree price discrimination we also provide sufficient conditions for welfare improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups

skimming the other s cream competitive effects of an asymmetric universal service obligation abstract we consider a common situation in energy markets an incumbent firm provides an essential good under ubiquity and uniform pricing requirements while competing in two part tariffs with an entrant providing a non essential substitute we find that consumers captivity to the essential good allows the incumbent to partly appropriate the surplus brought to the economy by the entrant surprisingly the ubiquity requirement induces more aggressive pricing by the incumbent below marginal cost and reduced entry despite cream skimming by the entrant far from being a burden universal service obligations might thus confer strategic advantages to incumbents

partial adjustment and staggered price setting this paper compares taylor style staggered price setting to partial adjustment of prices or calvo staggering in a small optimizing is lm model in contrast to the overwhelming perception in the literature the models are not similar for most parameterizations in particular the dynamic response of the economy to shocks is quite different in the two models and the welfare cost of price rigidity is eight or more times larger in the calvo model than in the taylor model for typical calibrations suggestions for calibrations under which the models are more similar are also presented

expressive voting and government redistribution testing tullock s charity of the uncharitable models of expressive voting postulate that voters will consume ideological stances on issues by voting for them even when they are against the voter s own narrow selfinterest if the probability of being a decisive voter is low when a voter is unlikely to sway the outcome the odds that avoter will incur any real personal cost a higher tax burden for example from her own expressive vote is small we testand find support for tullock s straightforward empiricalimplication of this model that government welfare transfer payments are inversely related to the probability of being thedecisive voter

efficiency of uniform pricing in universal service obligations we provide an efficiency justification for the imposition of the uniform pricing constraint in universal service obligations uso where uso are defined as a set of constraints imposed on firms belonging to a network industry in addition to the uniform pricing up constraint which is an obligation to serve all consumers at an identical price constraints considered are the coverage constraint cc which is an obligation imposed on one of the firms to serve a given segment of the market and the license constraint lc which is a minimum or a maximum coverage restriction that is imposed on entrants we show that adding the up constraint to both a cc and a lc leads to an increase in welfare our contribution comes from the full recognition of the role of a lc in well designed uso and we illustrate this role with the particular case of linear demand

some macroeconomic and monetary policy implications of new micro evidence on wage dynamics this paper investigates the macroeconomic relevance of new findings regarding nominal wage stickiness wage indexation wage staggering and synchronisation and downward nominal and real wage rigidity in the euro area quantifying the relevance of this evidence for monetary policy remains to be fully resolved but our results suggest that countries with lower indexation and higher wage stickiness for newly hired workers experience higher employment volatility and lower inflation volatility and that wage staggering and synchronisation of wage changes in particular months result in less persistence in real wages and inflation jel e24 e52

downward wage rigidities and optimal monetary policy in a monetary union this paper analyses the implications of heterogeneity in the type of downward wage rigidity nominal or real for optimal monetary policy in a monetary union with asymmetric wage adjustment costs indexation in one region of the union reduces optimal grease inflation in the presence of common productivity shocks large common shocks may have sizeable and persistent effects on the intra union terms of trade whereby the region characterized by downward real wage rigidity adjusts with a persistent loss of competitiveness in response to asymmetric productivity shocks there is no role for grease inflation because relative price changes facilitating the real wage changes dominate the adjustment mechanism

market opening under third degree price discrimination there are frequently regulatory and antitrust pressures for firms to cease price discrimination and practice uniform pricing such pressures however generally have negative welfare consequences when they lead to weaker markets not being served this paper derives conditions that determine when price discrimination will induce service to a market market opening that would not be served under a regime of price uniformity the factors that favor market opening under price discrimination are a large market share for the strong market profit margins in the two markets that are far apart and concave rather than convex demand curves copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

groups in rational turnout models a model of the strategic calculus of voting that incorporates the behavior of groups is presented if candidates choose different positions positive turnout is possible in partial equilibrium and is generally larger than that without group rationality nevertheless if candidates are probability maximizers and a unique general equilibrium exists the candidates will choose equivalent positions and turnout will be zero even with group rationality but if candidates care about both policy and winning they will choose different positions and cause positive turnout this turnout will be larger than that that would occur without group rationality group rationality alone cannot explain positive turnout in a general equilibrium theory of elections it does imply larger turnout in conjunction with policy oriented candidates than would be predicted solely by individualistic rational behavior

price discrimination competition and regulation this paper analyzes some effects of price discrimination policy in a model where a dominant incumbent firm faces an endogenous degree of competition in one of its two markets banning price discrimination tends to encourage more entry which is desirable if the entrant is as efficient as the incumbent but has ambiguous welfare effects more generally prices in both markets might fall price discrimination policy under different forms of price regulation is also examined if the incumbent s average price level is regulated then allowing price discrimination can lead to pricing below marginal cost with possible anticompetitive consequences

wage rigidity collective bargaining and the minimum wage evidence from french agreement data using several unique data sets on wage agreements at both industry and firm levels in france we document stylized facts on wage stickiness and the impact of wage setting institutions on wage rigidity first the average duration of wages is a little less than one year and around 10 percent of wages are modified each month by a wage agreement data patterns are consistent with predictions of a mixture of calvo and taylor models the frequency of wage change agreements is rather staggered over the year but the frequency of effective wage changes is seasonal the national minimum wage has a significant impact on the probability of a wage agreement and on the seasonality of wage changes negotiated wage increases are correlated with inflation the national minimum wage increases and the firm profitability

de centralization and voter turnout theory and evidence from german municipalities a vast academic literature illustrates that voter turnout is affected by the institutional design of elections e g compulsory voting electoral system postal or sunday voting in this article we exploit a simple downsian theoretical framework to argue that the institutional framework of public good provision and in particular the distribution of political and administrative competences across government levels likewise affects voters turnout decisions by influencing the expected net benefit of voting empirically we exploit the institutional variation across german municipalities to test this proposition and find supportive evidence

the rational voter paradox revisited the rational voter paradox rests on two fundamental assumptions first that voters are risk neutral second that voters make decisive vote computations the implications of maximizing the expected utility of wealth rather than the utility of expected wealth are explored the validity of decisive vote computations are examined through concepts of weak and strict in the limit free rider assumptions the paper proposes a margin of victory model of voting behavior based on information levels and the political division of labor

the effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms i present a game theoretic model of competition between a national firm and local firms in which the introduction of most favored customer clauses into the sales contracts of the national firm decreases all industry prices the reason is that the price restriction makes the national firm a weak price competitor in each local market this produces a prisoners dilemma situation in which each local firm has the unilateral incentive to be more aggressive in nonprice decisions this increase in nonprice competition by all local firms causes prices to fall across the industry