dynamic adverse selection a theory of illiquidity fire sales and flight to quality we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection there exists a unique equilibrium in which better quality assets trade at higher prices but with a lower price dividend ratio in less liquid markets sellers of high quality assets signal quality by accepting a lower trading probability we show how the distribution of sellers private information affects an asset s price and liquidity how a change in that distribution can cause a re sale and a ight to quality and how asset purchase and subsidy programs may raise prices and liquidity and reverse the ight to quality jel d82 g12 this paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of asset markets with adverse selection the owners of heterogeneous assets are privately informed about the quality of their assets sellers set prices for their assets recognizing that sales may be rationed at high prices buyers set prices recognizing that the quality of available assets may depend on the price selected in equilibrium sellers of high quality assets are willing to set a high price despite the low sale probability because the continuation value from failing to sell a high quality asset is high conversely sellers of low quality assets opt for a low price buyers are indifferent between paying a low price for a low quality asset and a high price for a high quality asset we prove these results in a deliberately stylized dynamic general equilibrium framework assets are perfectly durable and pay a constant dividend each period some amount of a perfectly perishable consumption good better quality assets pay a higher dividend but only the asset s current owner observes the dividend this is the source of private information and the root of the adverse selection problem as in akerlof 1970 the only permissible trades are between the consumption good and the asset individuals are risk neutral and have a discount factor that changes over time independently across individuals creating gains from trade finally discount factors are observable which ensures that patient individuals never sell assets since there are no gains from trade we believe this framework is useful for capturing

the trick is to live is the estate tax social security for the rich because estate tax liability usually depends on how long one lives it implicitly provides annuity income in the absence of annuity markets lump sum estate taxation may be used to achieve the first best solution for individuals with a sufficiently strong bequest motive calculations of the annuity embedded in the u s estate tax show that people with 10 million of assets may be effectively receiving more than 100 000 a year financed at actuarially fair rates by their tax payments according to my calibrations the insurance effect reduces the marginal cost of funds mcf for the estate tax by as much as 30 percent and the resulting mcf is within the range of estimates for the mcf for the income tax

survival of the gene intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving abstract this paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children s human capital at low incomes it posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line the model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework moreover it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving in contrast with the existing literature the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one s own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children s income uncertainty

labor supply and the optimality of social security abstract traditional economic theory predicts that an unfunded public pension system can be justified on the basis of its ability to provide intergenerational transfers and also for its ability to provide partial insurance against mortality and labor income risks in this paper i demonstrate that the quantitative importance of these traditional roles depends on how the pension system distorts households labor supply decisions using a general equilibrium life cycle consumption model calibrated to the u s economy i show that these distortions can be large enough to erase much of the traditional welfare gains from social security i also find that this fact is robust within the range of labor supply elasticities usually encountered in the macroeconomic literature

capital accumulation in a stochastic overlapping generations model with social security abstract this paper analyzes the impact of pay as you go financed social security on the stochastic process for the capital stock in a stochastic overlapping generations model it is shown that the probability distribution of the capital stock in absence of social security dominates that in a pay as you go system in the sense of stochastic dominance furthermore the study demonstrates that the sufficient conditions ensuring the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a pay as you go system are more restrictive than in the model without social security journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 h55

is unemployment really scarring effects of unemployment experiences on wages joblessness leaves permanent scars on individuals they not only lose income during periods of joblessness they are also further scarred by these experiences when they find employment a spell of unemployment is found to carry a wage penalty of about 6 on re entry in britain and after three years they are earning 14 less compared to what they would have received in the absence of unemployment the scars are also carried into their second employment spell the first spell of joblessness is found to cause the most damage redundancy seems to be less stigmatising

social security and the failure of annuity markets abstract this paper investigates the effect of asymmetric information on the market for annuities when individuals are assumed to differ in the probability distribution of dying individual behaviour under life insured and term insured annuities is investigated the market for such annuities is studied when the insurer cannot distinguish long lived from short lived retirees unlike the well known results of rothschild and stiglitz it is shown that if an equilibrium exists it can be either a pooling or a separating equilibrium given the same information as the private sector a planner will be able to achieve an optimum under certain circumstances

the distribution of wealth with imperfect altruism abstract in this paper we study the distribution of wealth in an economy with infinitely lived families individual generations of each family may or may not be altruistic this is represented as a preference shock which follows a first order markov process within each family a feature representingimperfect altruism altruistic individuals care about the welfare of their children and are likely to leave bequests selfish ones do not this results in a non trivial distribution of wealth among families at any point in time we study an economy with a risk free linear production technology and show that a stationary distribution of wealth exists this distribution is discrete and approximates the pareto distribution under additional restrictions we also characterize conditions on the production technology which yields perpetual growth with increasing inequality journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d31 d91 e21

the effect of social security on the steady state distribution of consumption abstract abel has shown that the introduction of a fully funded social security ss would decrease the variances of the steady state distribution of young period and old period consumptions eckstein et al have shown that a perfect ss would increase the steady state expected utility of consumptions we intend to give a caveat on their positive results by showing that the assumptions from which the above propositions are derived have some unrealistic implications and that by replacing these assumptions with more reasonable ones we may obtain very different results the only positive conclusion we are certain of is that a marginal ss insurance in the no insurance situation can always reduce the steady state coefficient of variation of both young and old period consumption distributions

aggregate and distributional effects of fair social security abstract in an overlapping generations economy with production endogenous labor supply a bequest motive and uncertain lifetime we show that a fair fully funded social security program reduces the aggregate levels of output employment capital and savings we determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for this social security program to increase the inequality of the income distribution the conclusions apply to the entire non stationary competitive equilibrium path taken by the economy following the introduction of social security

consumption income and retirement the authors use canadian family expenditure survey data to estimate consumption and income age profiles for married couple families paying attention to the transition between work and retirement the common presumptions of numerical simulation life cycle models upward sloping consumption age profiles and dissaving in retirement are not supported there is some evidence that the consumption of certain blue collar households declines discontinuously near retirement which casts doubt upon the frequently encountered assumption that the marginal utility of consumption is independent of the quantity of leisure consumed the results also imply that the functional form of euler equations should be sufficiently flexible to permit preretirement consumption to have an inverted u shape in addition the paper shows that the uncertain lifetime model with the addition of a bequest motive can rationalize the empirical results

a theory of intergenerational altruism modeling intergenerational altruism is crucial to evaluate the long term consequences of current decisions and requires a set of principles guiding such altruism we axiomatically develop a theory of pure direct altruism altruism is pure if it concerns the total utility rather than the mere consumption utility of future generations and direct if it directly incorporates the utility of all future generations our axioms deliver a new class of altruistic forward looking preferences whose weight put on the consumption of a future generation generally depends on the consumption of other generations the only preferences lacking this dependence correspond to the quasi hyperbolic discounting model which our theory characterizes our approach provides a framework to analyze welfare in the presence of altruistic preferences and addresses technical challenges stemming from the interdependent nature of such preferences

government intervention as a bequest substitute abstract a subsequent generations model is used in order to characterize consumption allocation under the future generation s income uncertainty altruistic concerns towards future generations give rise to precautionary bequests which act as a hedge on risk it is shown that given a first order correlation between mean future income and the present generation s income government can provide a pareto improvement through a tax transfer policy with universal participation this policy acts as a substitute for precautionary bequests distributional aspects of government tax transfer policy are also discussed

unemployment insurance and precautionary saving abstract models of precautionary saving imply that households will hold more assets when faced with greater income uncertainty however previous empirical studies of income uncertainty have produced somewhat mixed support for the precautionary saving hypothesis in this paper we note that differences in the state contingent income stream available to workers through the unemployment insurance ui program provides an excellent source of variation for testing the presence of a precautionary savings motive simulations of a stochastic life cycle model suggest that a ui system similar to the type currently in place in the u s can lead to a significant reduction in the assets accumulated by a median worker moreover there is considerable variation in the ui benefit schedules for workers living in different states in the u s which provides an exogenous source of variation for empirically testing the precautionary saving hypothesis we carry out this test using data on expected ui benefit replacement rates and financial assets held by households in the survey of income and program participation our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model and suggest that reducing the ui benefit replacement rate by 50 percent would increase gross financial asset holdings by 14 percent or 241 for the average worker we also find empirical evidence that this crowd out effect of ui on household saving is stronger for those facing higher unemployment risk and weaker for older workers both of which are implications from our precautionary saving model

national and international privatisation of pensions abstract the paper analyses the switch from pay as you go to funded pensions pensions privatisation in a world with many small open economies it contrasts go it alone privatisation in one country with world wide privatisation in the go it alone case at least one generation necessarily loses in the world wide case the long run gains are substantially larger and depending on the nature of production technology an intergenerational pareto improvement is possible this generates a potential isolation paradox each country may individually reject privatisation because some people will lose but this need not happen if all privatised simultaneously this problem occurs because the adoption of payg pensions in any one country imposes international externalities on other countries via the impact on world interest rates

inter vivos transfers and bequests in three oecd countries reforms reducing the generosity of pensions have distributional effects on future generations if individuals care about their descendants welfare but only affect elderly individuals if bequests are the unintentional result of precautionary savings and safety net programmes such as unemployment insurance may displace sources of private help such as that provided by living parents to their children in need this paper provides comparable measures of how expected bequests and transfers vary with cumulated parental earnings in the united states west germany and the united kingdom the strength of bequest motives is empirically very weak in the available data private inter vivos transfers which appear to depend on the recipients economic situation are partly crowded out by public unemployment insurance programmes together involuntary bequests and intentional inter vivos transfers appear to be an important channel of intergenerational inequality transmission and strengthen substantially the relationship between an individual s and his parents economic status ernesto villanueva

rising longevity education savings and growth this paper examines the impact of declines in adult mortality on growth in an overlapping generations model with public education and imperfect annuity markets a decline in mortality affects growth through three channels first it raises the saving rate and thereby increases the rate of physical capital accumulation second it reduces accidental bequests lowers investment and thereby lowers the rate of physical capital accumulation third it may lead the median voter to increase the tax rate for public education initially but lower the tax rate in a later stage starting from a high mortality rate as found in many third world populations the net effect of a decline in mortality is to raise the growth rate however starting from a low mortality rate such as is found in most industrial populations the net effect of a further decline in mortality is to reduce the growth rate the findings appear consistent with recent empirical evidence

uncertain lifetimes retirement and economic welfare the effect of increased life expectancy on retirement age is ambiguous because a change in the survival probability is analogous to a change in intertemporal prices it is shown that the decision to retire earlier or later depends on the old age saving behavior early retirement could emerge if one saves in old age it is also shown that the effect of intertemporal substitutions arising from the imperfection of the annuity market could produce a tilt to the reservation wage profile which in turn makes early retirement possible copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

the family as an incomplete annuities market families can self insure against uncertain dates of death through implicit or explicit agreements with respect to consumption and interfamily transfers interfamily transfers need have nothing to do with altruistic feelings they may simply reflect risk sharing behavior of completely selfish family members although family annuity markets are incomplete even small families can substitute by more than 70 percent for perfect market annuities given adverse selection and transaction costs family risk pooling may be preferred to public market annuities in the absence of public annuities these risk sharing arrangements provide powerful incentives for marriage and family formation

comment on kotlikoff shoven and spivak in the absence of perfect annuity markets individual consumers generally undertake precautionary saving to provide resources for their future consumption in the event that they live longer than expected kotlikoff shoven and spivak in this issue hereafter kss have provided us with a well conceived and well executed study of the effects of various annuity arrangements on individual and aggregate saving in the presence of lifetime uncertainty each of these authors has had a long standing interest in this area and their current paper reflects their accumulated expertise their results indicate that a potentially sizable fraction of u s household wealth represents precautionary saving resulting from the absence of perfect annuity markets the strategy of the kss paper is to develop simple models of individual saving behavior on the basis of utility maximization and then to aggregate the behavior of individuals both intraand intertemporally by comparing the results of models that differ in the specification of bequest motives and opportunities for creating annuities kss provide insights about the effects of various annuity arrangements on saving and capital accumulation although the models are all conceptually simple analytic solutions cannot be obtained in many cases therefore kss provide numerical solutions to their models in addition because the models are conceptually

operative gift and bequest motives the ricardian equivalence theorem which is the proposition that changes in the timing of lump sum taxes have no effect on assumption or capital accumulation depends on the exist of operative altruistic motives for intergenerational transfers these transfers can be bequests from parents to children or gifts from children to parents in order for the ricardian equivalence theorem to hold one of these transfer motives must be operative in the sense that the level of the transfer is not determined by a corner solution resulting from a binding non negativity constraint this paper derives conditions that determine whether the bequest motive will be operative the gift motive will be operative or neither motive will be operative in a model in which consumers are altruistic toward their parents and their children this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the failure of ricardian equivalence under progressive wealth taxation abstract although the ricardian equivalence theorem holds under a linear estate tax schedule it fails to hold under a nonlinear estate tax schedule in a representative consumer economy a temporary lump sum tax increase reduces contemporaneous consumption if different consumers face different marginal estate tax rates because they leave bequests of different sizes a lump sum tax increase redistributes resources from consumers in low marginal estate tax brackets to consumers in high marginal estate tax brackets aggregate consumption may rise fall or remain unchanged these departures from ricardian equivalence hold more generally under any nonlinear tax on saving wealth or income accruing to wealth

pay as you go social security and the distribution of altruistic transfers this paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of altruistic transfers in a framework where savings are due to both life cycle and random altruistic motivations we show that the effect of social security on the distribution of these transfers depends crucially on the strength of the bequest motive in explaining savings behaviour we measure this strength by the expected weight that individuals attach to the utility of future generations on the one hand if the bequest motive is strong then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents on the other hand when the importance of altruism in motivating savings is sufficiently low the increase in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed

the effect of inheritance receipt on retirement abstract this paper provides new evidence on how wealth shocks influence retirement behavior economic theory generally posits that leisure is a normal good yet it is difficult to obtain reliable empirical estimates of the wealth effect because wealth is correlated with numerous unobservable characteristics that affect labor supply we use inheritance receipt as a wealth shock and find that it is associated with a significant increase in the probability of retirement especially when the inheritance is unexpected this evidence has important implications for how public policies such as pension or tax reform may influence retirement behavior through the wealth effect

effects of aspirations and habits on the distribution of wealth we analyze how the introduction of habits and aspirations affects the distribution of wealth when the labor productivity of individuals is subject to idiosyncratic shocks and when bequests arise from a joy of giving motive in the presence of either bequests or aspirations labor income shocks are transmitted intergenerationally and this transmission together with contemporaneous shocks determines the distribution of wealth we show that the introduction of aspirations habits decreases increases the average wealth and increases decreases both its intragenerational variability and the degree of intergenerational mobility therefore a distinction between aspirations and habits is relevant because they involve different implications for the distribution of wealth

redistribution by insurance market regulation analyzing a ban on gender based retirement annuities we illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation we calibrate and solve a model of the united kingdom s compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender based pricing restrictions we find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous social security like annuity contracts our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis

longevity and public old age pensions i introduction conventional economic analysis of intertemporal or intergenerational resource allocation takes longevity as exogenously determined by biological or technological factors within this framework the institution of a mandatory public old age pensions of a pay as you go type unambiguously reduces capital accumulation the intuition behind this result is that when the young expect an old age pension after retirement and at the same time pay an earmarked payroll tax that lowers disposable income the ability and the incentive to save are reduced such a result however ignores the possibility that an individual who has a survivorship contingent title to an old age pension might use resources to increase the likelihood of survival to acquire the promised pension the fact that over the past century both longevity and the size of old age pensions have risen suggests that a more complete model that incorporates longevity as a choice variable may be useful in understanding the simultaneous increase in longevity and old age pensions ehrlich and chuma 1990 consider the demand for longevity in a world where the certain length of life is a fixed function of health care expenditures thus making longevity endogenous in their model consumers choose the optimal depreciation rate for human capital by choosing the path of health care expenditures their work paves the way for consideration of the effect of longevity contingent property rights on behavior in a more recent paper philipson and becker 1998 build on the work of ehrlich and chuma by modeling longevity contingent claims in the form of old age pensions among other things they find that an increase in a longevity contingent old age pension will induce individuals to live longer as a result of this longer life philipson and becker question the traditional result that pay as you go old age pensions always reduce the capital stock because workers who choose greater longevity may also choose to save more during their working years to finance their longer retirement period in this paper we introduce endogenous and uncertain lifetime into a two period overlapping generations olg model we depart from the traditional diamond type olg model by measuring longevity as the probability of survival into the second period and by allowing individuals to affect their survival probability through spending on longevity extending activities within this framework we examine the effects of a pay as you go old age pension on longevity and capital accumulation under two polar assumptions concerning the existence and absence of a fair intragenerational annuity market in either case the longevity effect of an increase in the old age pension is neutral while the capital stock effect is strictly negative if the interest rate and population growth rate are equal e g if the economy is on a golden rule path surprisingly increasing the old age pension produces both a negative longevity and savings effect for the more relevant case where the interest rate is larger than the population growth rate that an increase in the old age pension produces a negative capital stock effect is anticipated but the neutral or negative effect on longevity is counterintuitive it is counterintuitive because the empirical evidence seems to show lockstep increases in both longevity and government provided retirement benefits in the form of pensions and heath care benefits furthermore longevity insurance conjures up the moral hazard problem where increased utilization is expected with government provision the funding pool expands with use the cost being borne by workers the fact that the workers bear the burden of increasing the old age pension helps explain the longevity results we obtain when the population grows at the same rate as the return on capital an increase in the pension is offset by a dollar for dollar reduction in private savings leaving second period consumption unchanged

new evidence on the ricardian equivalence theorem a multicointegration approach this paper derives major theoretical constructs which underlie richardian equivalence and using multicointegration methodology empirically tests whether they bear out results indicate that government spending and revenues are cointegrated however the cointegrating scalar is less than one therefore in order for government to obey its intertemporal budget constraint debt and government revenue must be multicointegrated they are not additional evidence indicates that saving and debt may be weakly cointegrated the findings suggest that failure of richardian equivalence may be due to public rather than private sector failure

the individual life cycle annuity market imperfections and economic growth we study the effects of an annuity market imperfection on individual agents life cycle decisions and on the macroeconomic growth rate in an overlapping generations model with single sector endogenous growth our model features both age dependent mortality and labour productivity we model imperfect annuities by introducing a load factor on the annuity rate faced by finitely lived agents our main finding is that annuity market imperfections decrease economic growth because less assets are necessary for consumption late in life in addition we find that both the quantitative and qualitative effects of annuity market imperfections are grossly overestimated in a partial equilibrium analysis because it disregards general equilibrium repercussions

income uncertainty bequests and annuities abstract life uncertainty and income uncertainty are modeled simultaneously in order to analyze the influence of perfecting income insurance in the size of bequests and the demand for annuities the main result shows that government intervention aimed at providing intergenerational risk sharing acts as a bequest substitute and if annuities are available reduces the demand for annuities

how inheriting affects bequest plans we present and test the idea that bequest planning is linked with the experience of inheriting we consider a family tradition of bequeathing as a channel through which the intention to bequeath is moulded by and is positively correlated with the experience of inheriting using data from the survey on health ageing and retirement in europe share we find that the experience of inheriting enhances the intention to bequeath independently of the positive impact of wealth we also find that the expectation of inheriting has a positive impact on the intention to bequeath controlling for the expected increase in wealth on account of future inheritances

competitive equilibria on turnpikes in a mckenzie economy i a neighborhood turnpike theorem in his seminal paper bewley 1982 integrates growth theory and competitive equilibrium theory considering a model with finitely many infinitely lived consumers who trade commodities in infinitely many competitive markets from the present through the future in such a model a competitive equilibrium path is an optimal growth path using this property he proves a turnpike theorem for competitive equilibrium paths in growth theory a social welfare function with respect to which optimal growth paths are considered has been assumed to be exogenously given bewley shows that in the competitive market system the market mechanism endogenously determines the social welfare function with respect to which an equilibrium path is regarded as an optimal path in bewley s model the future is discounted by a factor p in growth theory two types of turnpike theorems have been proved when the future is discounted the first type is called a neighborhood turnpike theorem it asserts that given c 0 there is 0 p 1 such that p p 1 implies that an optimal path at the discount factor p eventually stays within the s neighborhood of a stationary path this theorem does not require the social welfare function to be differentiable but only to be strictly concave and is proved by mckenzie 1979 the second type is called an asymptotic turnpike theorem it asserts that there is 0 p 1 such that p p 1 implies that an optimal path at the dicount factor p converges to a stationary path this theorem has been proved only under differentiability assumptions scheinkman 1976 bewley proves an asymptotic turnpike theorem making use of extensive differentiability assumptions the purpose of this paper is to synthesize these two importnat results of bewley and mckenzie namely we will prove a neighborhood turnpike theorem of mckenzie type in a model like that of bewley making no differentiability assumptions we will make a few generalizations of bewley s assumptions among them of importance are relaxing his differentiability assumptions weakening his interiority assumption and replacing his assumption of decreasing returns to

equilibrium turnpike theory with time separable utility abstract the purpose of this paper is to show that under reasonably general conditions intertemporal competitive equilibrium has a turnpike property the model is general because it permits 1 time variant time separable utility functions 2 heterogeneous rates of discount across consumers and 3 matching flatness in utilities and production possibilities the results rely on bounded marginal utility for all consumers and aggregate stationarity of utilities of the set of most patient consumers under these assumptions the neighborhood turnpike result holds with 1 and 2 because of the eventual unimportance of the impatient consumer matching flatness requires the use of a two sided liapounov function and the growth theoretic methods of mckenzie

uncertainty and optimal social security systems this paper examines the annuity aspect of social security within the framework of an overlapping generations model the duration of life is assumed to be uncertain under a fully funded system demand for social security is determined by each generation so as to maximize expected lifetime utility taking into account the welfare of future generations under a pay as you go system with intergenerational transfers demand for retirement benefits by the working population takes into account taxes paid by descendants it is shown that the two modes of finance are equivalent in terms of all real aggregates effects of changes in expected lifetime and in the birth rate are analyzed starting at the optimal level a compulsory balanced increase in social security taxes and benefits is shown to increase short run savings

optimal annuitization with stochastic mortality and correlated medical costs the conventional wisdom since yaari 1965 is that households without a bequest motive should fully annuitize their investments numerous frictions do not break this sharp result we modify the yaari framework by allowing a household s mortality risk itself to be stochastic due to health shocks a lifetime annuity still helps to hedge longevity risk but the annuity s remaining present value is correlated with medical costs such as those for nursing home care thereby reducing annuity demand even without ad hoc liquidity constraints we find that most households should not hold a positive level of annuities and many should hold negative amounts jel d14 d82 g23 i12 j14 j26

intergenerational transfers and savings in recent years the role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation has been the subject of substantial empirical and theoretical analysis the key question stimulating this research is what is the main explanation for savings is it primarily accumulation for retirement as claimed by albert ando richard brumberg and franco modigliani in their celebrated life cycle model of savings is it primarily intentional accumulation for intergenerational transfers or is it primarily precautionary savings much of which may be bequeathed because of imperfections in annuity markets this paper examines a range of findings on the importance of intergenerational transfers the strong conclusion that emerges from this evidence is that intergenerational transfers play a very important if not a key role in aggregate wealth accumulation while intergenerational transfers figure very large in savings the precise motivation for such transfers is unclear intergenerational altruism might appear the most likely candidate but at least sane stylized facts such as the equal allocation of bequests among children are strongly at adds with the altruism model other explanations involving imperfect insurance arrangements or payments for child services do not appear capable of explaining the substantial amounts of transfers actually observed sorting cut the relative contributions of different models to intergenerational transfers and the precise role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation remains an intriguing and exciting enterprise this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

social security national policies with international implications social security policies within individual countries are determined independently by national governments but the resulting outcome is inefficient compared with what would result from the international co ordination of policies this is because national social security policies produce international externalities via their effects on world interest rates an illustrative example suggests that the gains from co ordination are potentially significant virtually all countries operate social security or redistributive policies each chooses policies independently and to my knowledge no one either in a policymaking context or in the large literature on international policy co ordination has suggested that such decisions would benefit from international coordination 1 however a simple argument suggests that independent national social security policies are inefficient more specifically in the long run national governments make policy decisions which are too egalitarian this holds provided that social security lowers national saving in this case each national government faces a trade off between income redistribution and national saving and can be assumed to locate at the nationally optimal point on this trade off taking as given the world interest rate the latter is clearly not independent of the combined effect of all countries policies however if all countries expand social security the resulting fall in world saving will raise the world interest rate with adverse consequences for each national economy each country rationally ignores its own small contribution to the global outcome if this international externality were internalised by co ordination countries would relocate on the trade off between income redistribution and national saving demonstrating the existence of an externality says nothing about its quantitative significance i address this with an example which focuses on pay as you go payg retirement pensions in an economy with a mixture of forward looking and myopic individuals the pensions prevent destitution among retired myopes and thus effectively redistribute life time welfare but they also lower saving because of payg financing for all parameter values considered international co ordination of pensions policy decisions generates welfare gains which are larger for many parameter values substantially larger than recent estimates of the welfare gains from either the entire elimination of all cyclical fluctuations or the reduction of inflation and nominal interest rates from suboptimally high to optimal levels hence the issues addressed in the paper are quantitatively significant when judged against other frequently advocated i am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions they are not responsible for the present version

the distribution of wealth and welfare in the presence of incomplete annuity markets this paper examines the implications of the absence of complete annuity markets on the distribution of wealth and welfare of agents whose saving decisions are obtained under uncertainty regarding the length of their life the absence of annuities is shown to yield a unique nondegenerate intragenerational distribution of wealth which is fully characterized this characterization is then used to evaluate the pareto desirability of an annuity system alternative welfare criteria that can be used when the proposed change has differential impacts on the initial state of subsequent generations are considered

a theory of time preference grant a taylor this article proposes that people generally prefer present consumption to future consumption because their expected utility from consumption eventually falls as their mental and physical abilities eventually decline with age moreover contrary to the ubiquitous intertemporal formulation with a constant rate of time preference and contrary to three recent theories of time preference that predict decreasing discounting as people age this article asserts that discounting increases over the life cycle this hypothesis is supported by data from the panel study of income dynamics as well as evidence from numerous previous studies jel d91 1 introduction despite the almost universal assumption of time preference in models of intertemporal choice an adequate explanation of why people discount the future has not been provided 1 olsen and bailey 1981 make a convincing case for positive time preference by contradiction i e without time preference models of intertemporal choice do not yield predictions consistent with observed behavior but they do not explain why individuals would rationally discount the future 2 three recent studies have attempted to provide the explanation rogers 1994 argues that societies that discount the future at a rate of about 2 will be the long run survivors in an evolutionary fitness situation 3 posner 1995 argues that discounting occurs because individuals have multiple selves that is people are weighting their present consumption far more heavily than their future consumption because the present self and the future self are in some meaningful sense separate persons 92 becker and mulligan 1997 argue that discounting occurs because of a rational defective recognition of future utilities 730 but as will be shown these three theories are inconsistent with empirical evidence on consumption over the life cycle in at least one important aspect this article constructs and empirically supports a new theory of time preference the hypothesis is that people do not have an intrinsic preference for present consumption relative to future consumption instead the instantaneous utility function also known as the felicity function is expected to vary with age just as people s physical and mental abilities vary with age in other words the ability to enjoy consumption eventually deteriorates over the life cycle along with other abilities this life cycle view of the expected utility function causes people to rationally devalue consumption in periods of low expected felicity that is discount future consumption perhaps this is what is meant by the cliche don t wait until you are too old to enjoy it moreover this causes individuals implicit discount rates to vary systematically with age 4 in fact this provides the testable implication of the theory the standard specification of intertemporal preferences holds the discount rate constant over th e life cycle 5 to be more precise in the early stage of the life cycle the capacity to enjoy consumption may be expected to rise hence a young individual s discount rate may be negative figure 1 illustrates this possibility with a hypothetical adult life cycle marginal felicity function for a given level of consumption u sub c c a c denotes consumption and a denotes age and its corresponding discount rate function rho a the vast majority of wealth is held by older people that is those in the declining stage of their abilities thus the preference for present consumption over future consumption appears to hold in the aggregate this view of intertemporal preferences may at first seem inconsistent with practically all dynamic analyses which are based on the notion of stationary utility on further consideration however the hypothesis is quite consistent with modern consumer theory since becker 1965 it has been widely accepted that households derive utility from commodities that are produced with market goods combined with household time and skills i

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

capital accumulation and uncertain lifetimes with adverse selection this paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior with privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities adverse selection causes the rate of return on private annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality however a fully funded social security system with compulsory participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality thus since social security offers a higher rate of return than private annuities consumers cannot completely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private annuity market using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social security reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young the steady state national capital stock rises or falls according to the strength of the bequest motive this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

duration dependence and labor market conditions evidence from a field experiment this article studies the role of employer behavior in generating negative duration dependence the adverse effect of a longer unemployment spell by sending fictitious resumes to real job postings in 100 u s cities our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker s unemployment spell with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months we explore how this effect varies with local labor market conditions and find that duration de pendence is stronger when the local labor market is tighter this result is consistent with the prediction of a broad class of screening models in which employers use the unemployment spell length as a signal of unobserved productivity and recognize that this signal is less informative in weak labor markets jel code j64

quality price and time on market abstract time on market is often interpreted as a negative signal of an asset s quality the lengthier the time on market the greater the probability that past buyers arrived observed some undesirable quality and chose not to buy in this paper i propose a simple model of quality price and time on market the model yields closed form expressions for beliefs prices and rates of sale to demonstrate the accessibility of the model i work out simple comparative statics for time on market and sale price and extend the model by giving the seller a valuable outside option

uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security this paper explores the implications of social security programs and annuity markets through which agents who are characterized by different distributions of length of lifetime share deathrelated risks when annuity markets operate a non discriminatory social security program affects only the intragenerational allocation of resources in the absence of private information regarding individual survival probabilities such a program will lead to a non optimal intragenerational allocation of resources however the presence of adverse selection considerations gives rise to a pareto improving role for a mandatory non discriminatory social security program

policy watch death watch for the estate tax the idea of making death a taxable event infuriates some people winston churchill called estate taxes an attempt to tax dead people rather than the living steve forbes campaigned in favor of no taxation without respiration bruce bartlett 1997 points out that a key plank in the communist manifesto was the abolition of inheritance rights opponents deride the death tax as inefficient inequitable and complex violating every norm of good tax policy supporters counter that the criticisms are overstated or wrong and argue that a highly progressive tax that patches loopholes helps provide equality of opportunity breaks up concentrations of wealth and encourages charitable giving can t be all bad these debates raise a number of research questions for economists in policy circles the death watch for the u s estate and gift tax is on in 1999 in a vote split almost completely along partisan lines the republican majority in

the relative income hypothesis abstract despite its theoretical dominance the empirical case in favor of the permanent income hypothesis is weak contrary to one of its basic implications a growing body of evidence suggests that rich households save a higher proportion of their permanent income than poor households we propose an overlapping generations economy where households care about relative consumption as a result an individual s consumption is driven by the comparison of his lifetime income and the lifetime income of his reference group a permanent income version of duesenberry s 1949 relative income hypothesis across households the savings rate increases with income while aggregate savings are independent of the income distribution

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

an upper bound for wealth distribution in a model of accidental bequests abstract an explicit upper bound is calculated for wealth distribution in a model of overlapping generations with uncertain lifetimes and an imperfect annuities market

convergence of equilibria in an intertemporal general equilibrium model a dynamical system approach abstract in this paper we show that searching pareto optima in an intertemporal equilibrium model is equivalent to solving a family of mckenzie models defined by a vector of the unit simplex we use negishi s method to prove the existence of equilibria we then extend scheinkman s method to demonstrate that when the discount factor of the utility functions is sufficiently near one every equilibrium trajectory converges to a steady state

the effects of annuities bequests and aging in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth we examine the effects of introducing actuarially fair annuity markets into an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth the complete annuitisation of agents wealth is not in general dynamically optimal the degree of annuitisation that is dynamically optimal depends nonmonotonically on the expected length of retirement and on the pay as you go social security tax rate the government has an incentive to restrict the availability of actuarially fair annuities contracts and can often move the economy from a pay as you go to a fully funded social security system via voluntary contributions to a government sponsored actuarially fair pension today accompanied by reductions in social security taxes tomorrow

the pay as you go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device a paygo system may serve as insurance against not having children and as an enforcement device for ungrateful children who are unwilling to pay their parents a pension in fact the latter was bismarck s historic motive for introducing this system it is true that the paygo system reduces the investment in human capital but if it is run on a sufficiently small scale it may nevertheless bring about a welfare improvement if on the other hand the scale of the system is so large that parents bequeath some of their pensions to their children it is overdrawn and creates unnecessarily strong disincentives for human capital investment

birth death and taxes abstract this paper analyzes the effects of lump sum tax policy in an overlapping generations model in which consumers have uncertain longevity it extends previous analyses by considering the case in which private insurance arrangements are actuarially unfair in addition it considers the polar case of actuarially fair insurance and the polar case of no insurance a general condition for debt neutrality is derived this condition depends explicitly on the degree of actuarial unfairness in insurance and on the extent to which parents care about the utility of their children

social security uncertainty adjustments and the consumption decision this paper analyzes the consumption decision focusing on the degree of substitutability between fungible assets and prospective wealth and on the different risk adjustments associated with different types of prospective wealth the results reveal substantial differences among these risk adjustments and imply that a dollar of social security wealth substitutes for about three fifths of a dollar of fungible assets although implying that social security wealth reductions would have a positive and sizeable effect on private saving the results also suggest that such reductions could entail a substantial loss in consumer welfare copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

stochastic turnpike property and stationary equilibrium abstract i study the stability properties of a stochastic equilibrium growth model with a finite number of infinitely lived consumers the exogenous stochastic environment is represented by a stationary stochastic process that influences preferences technology and primary resources consumers maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities production is intertemporal and primary resources are assumed to be necessary for the production of capital goods by adapting standard assumptions in general equilibrium theory and turnpike theory i show that if consumers have homogeneous discount factors close enough to one the allocation of an interior equilibrium converges to the allocation of a stationary equilibrium with transfer payments this result is used to prove the existence of a stationary equilibrium

precautionary saving and accidental bequests this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests this model is used to analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption and capital accumulation a precautionary demand for saving arises because an individual consumer does not know in advance the date at which he will die and he wants to avoid low levels of consumption in the event that he lives longer than expected an implication of this precautionary saving is that when death does occur the consumer is generally holding some wealth which is then passed on to his heirs in the form of an accidental bequest even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities there will be some intracohort variation in the date of death consequently there will be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by consumers in a cohort this nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by one generation induces variation in the distributions of wealth consumption and bequests of subsequent generations the importance of bequests in aggregate saving has been established by laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 who reported that 80 percent of u s household wealth is inherited wealth one interpretation of this finding is that the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of saving behavior in the united states but the model i present demonstrates that accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a potentially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth although some part of bequests especially by the wealthy undoubtedly results from an explicit bequest motive accidental bequests also play a role in the intergenerational transfer of wealth as well as in the intragenerational variation in wealth in order to focus on the role of accidental bequests i purposely exclude a bequest motive from the specification of the utility function the effects of lifetime uncertainty on individual consumption behavior were first examined formally in a seminal paper by menachem yaari 1965 yaari s model provided the basic framework for virtually all subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes including well known papers by nils hakansson 1969 stanley fischer 1973 robert barro and james friedman 1977 david levhari and leonard mirman 1977 and kotlikoff and avia spivak 1981 however all of these papers focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored the effect of accidental bequests on the behavior of the recipients of these accidental bequests 2 as will be shown at various points in this paper changes in the economic environment can have effects on aggregate behavior which differ sharply from the effects on individual behavior because of the endogenous adjustment of bequests the effects of department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 this paper is a revised version of bequests and social security with uncertain lifetimes nber working paper no 1372 june 1984 i thank olivier blanchard john burbidge christopher cavanagh robert clower stanley fischer benjamin friedman elhanan helpman mervyn king nobuhiro kiyotaki laurence kotlikoff robert mcdonald james pesando julio rotemberg lawrence summers lars svensson mark watson and jeffrey wolcowitz for valuable conversations and correspondence i also thank the participants in seminars at boston university columbia university cornell university federal reserve board harvard university university of iowa mit university of minnesota university of montreal national bureau of economic research north carolina state university the wharton school and yale university and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments i also thank the national science foundation for financial support 1 in the presence of perfect annuity and life insurance markets there may or may not be bequests depending on the presence or absence of a bequest motive but there would be no accidental bequests 2 kotlikoff and spivak focus on the role of the family in providing an incomplete annuities market but stop short of a full scale overlapping generations model in which the distribution of bequests is determined endogenously

bequest motives social security and economic growth junxi zhang this article conducts a systematic analysis of four bequest motives in a simple model of endogenous growth it analyzes how bequest motives affect fertility savings growth and the effects of pay as you go social security it is found that altruistic and exchange motives give equivalent outcomes if the discount factors are set the same the outcome under the joy of giving motive may involve a higher bequest ratio higher saving and better growth rates than that under altruism if bequests are accidental the equilibrium values will depend on the probability of survival moreover the results provide testable implications on bequest motives jel d1 d9 h55 j1 i introduction although the importance of bequests in aggregate savings has been established by kotlikoff and summers 1981 who reported that 80 of u s household wealth is inherited wealth what bequest motives lead to inheritance remains an unsolved problem yet it is well known that bequest motives have important implications for the behavior of financial markets the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policies and the intergenerational transmission of inequality in the distribution of wealth at least four hypotheses for the existence of bequests have been discussed in the literature 1 bequests may arise from intergenerational altruism that is parents obtain utility from their heirs utility as well as from their own consumption barro 1974 2 the prospect of bequests is used by parents to induce children to behave as desired by parents bernheim et al 1985 3 bequests may arise from the joy of giving that is parents leave bequests simply because they obtain utility directly from the bequest yaari 1964 1 and 4 bequests may be the unintentional by product of precautionary savings and a stochastic date of death in the absence of an annuity market abel 1985 following barro 1974 and becker 1974 the altruistic bequest motive has been used most frequently however the enormous empirical work using micro data has not led to conclusive evidence on the one hand bernheim et al 1985 cox 1987 and cox and rank 1992 show that bequests are more consistent with exchange than altruism altonji et al 1992 1997 also show that altruism is decisively rejected moreover wilhelm 1996 finds little support for an altruistic theory of bequests on the other hand a recent reexamination of the exchange motive by perozek 1998 shows that the finding of bernheim et al is not robust laitner and juster 1996 find some evidence of altruistic bequests therefore a definite conclusion on bequest motives seems far from over indeed though altruism has not been supported by most of those empirical studies it remains a plausible hypothesis and continues to be used frequently see e g coate 1995 and davies and zhang 1995 abel 1985 argues theoretically that although the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of the savi ng behavior in the united states as found in kotlikoff and summers 1981 accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a sizable fraction of aggregate wealth however little formal empirical work has been done to test whether bequests are accidental or arise from joy of giving given the lack of consensus on bequest motives it is interesting to conduct a systematic theoretical analysis of different bequest motives in a particular context becker et al 1990 and caballe 1995 assume altruism in their models of economic growth wiedmer s 1996 analysis of social security and growth does not consider bequests except ihori 1994 there seems to be no analysis of other bequest motives in the context of economic growth the purpose of this article is to analyze how different bequest motives affect fertility savings and economic growth the article will also examine how the effects of pay as you go social security depend on bequest motives

an existence theorem on the stationary state of income distribution and population growth through a utility maximizing process individuals derive their optimal fertility and bequest decisions both as functions of their initial socioeconomic backgrounds the combination of these two decisions form a multi type galton watson process under weak assumptions it is proved that the economy will converge to a unique stationary state which implies both a constant population growth rate and a time invariant income distribution as such this paper extends the becker willis static micro level fertility demand model to a dynamic macro level population growth model alternatively our model can be viewed as a generalization of laitners stochastic income theory where no differential fertility is allowed excerpt

intergenerational transfers and the accumulation of wealth h t ouseholds acquire wealth from two sources they save out of income they have earned and they receive transfers from other people the first method of wealth accumulation goes under the name of life cycle saving in which people save during their working lives and dissave after retirement the second involves either an inter vivos transfer that is a transfer between living people or a bequest a transfer that occurs at the death of the donor while inter vivos transfers and bequests will arise in dynastic models where preferences include a taste for the well being of one s descendents few empirical life cycle models reflect these concerns indeed a sharp debate has arisen over the ability of the simple life cycle model to explain observed wealth accumulation understanding the relative sizes of these sources of wealth accumulation affects a variety of issues for example the effects of government debt social insurance public transfer programs estate taxes and incentives for charitable giving depend to some extent on the magnitude and nature of private saving and transfers of wealth analyses of the inequality of wealth may depend on whether most of wealth is earned or received as transfers appropriate policies for encouraging private saving may look rather different depending on whether most saving is to be consumed later in life or passed along to the next generation finally evidence on transfer patterns relates to more fundamental

intergenerational transfers and demographic transition abstract this paper presents an analysis of demographic transition based on the endogenous evolution of intergenerational transfers along an economy s endogenous path of development two period lived agents belonging to overlapping generations choose optimally their desired levels of consumption and fertility together with their desired sizes of transfers to both parents and children parents are more efficient than children in producing output but some parental time must be devoted to child rearing at low levels of development fertility is high and the flow of net intergenerational transfers is from the young to the old at high levels of development fertility is low and the flow of net transfers is from the old to the young these results accord strongly with empirical observations and the analysis may be seen as formalising for the first time a long standing and well respected hypothesis in the demographic transition literature

the existence uniqueness and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time in life cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint abstract in life cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint the consumer s wealth must be depleted before the maximum lifetime this paper investigates the existence uniqueness and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time it is proved that the optimal terminal wealth depletion time if such exists must be unique if the equation that determines the optimal terminal wealth depletion has multiple solutions then the location of the optimal solution will depend on the configuration of the solutions an optimality test is developed to verify whether a candidate solution for the terminal wealth depletion time is indeed optimal the paper introduces a method new to economics the dubovitskii milyutin adjoint equation to analyze the properties of the optimal control problem

sustainable forestry timber bequests future generations and optimal tax policy this paper analyzes harvesting and timber bequest behavior in a two period overlapping generations model where the government uses site productivity yield and inheritance taxation the ceteris paribus effects of forest and inheritance taxes are derived first then the paper discusses the optimal design of forest and inheritance taxes by assuming that intergenerational externalities are either absent or operative in the absence of intergenerational externalities it is optimal to use only the site productivity tax and not to introduce yield and inheritance taxes at all in the presence of intergenerational externalities the situation changes the paper demonstrates that the externality can be internalized by introducing either a yield tax or an inheritance subsidy or both if the government is able to use both at the same time it is desirable to use the yield tax to punish excessive harvesting and an inheritance subsidy to bribe to give bequests