chaos in oil prices evidence from futures markets abstract we test for the presence of low dimensional chaotic structure in crude oil heating oil and unleaded gasoline futures prices from the early 1980s evidence on chaos will have important implications for regulators and short term trading strategies while we find strong evidence of non linear dependencies the evidence is not consistent with chaos our test results indicate that arch type processes with controls for seasonal variation in prices generally explain the non linearities in the data we also demonstrate that employing seasonally adjusted price series contributes to obtaining robust results via the existing tests for chaotic structure maximum likelihood methodologies that are robust to the non linear dynamics lend support for samuelson s hypothesis on contract maturity effects in futures price changes however the tests for chaos are not found to be sensitive to the maturity effects in the futures contracts the results are robust to controls for the oil shocks of 1986 and 1991

oil price volatility and stock price fluctuations in an emerging market evidence from south korea abstract how important are oil price fluctuations and oil price volatility on equity market performance what are the policy implications if volatility turns out to be significant we assess this issue in an economics finance nexus for korea using a vec model including interest rates economic activity real stock returns real oil prices and oil price volatility our main aim is to capture the effects of crude oil prices on the korean economy thoroughly covering the period of the asian financial crisis of 1997 which heavily affected the country and the oil price hikes in the early 1990s after the gulf war south korea was the country most hit by the financial crisis together with indonesia and thailand results indicate the dominance of oil price volatility on real stock returns and emphasize how this has increased over time oil price volatility can have profound effect on the time horizon of investment and firms need adjust their risk management procedures accordingly this increase in dependency has been found in other net oil importing emerging equity markets we test the relationship between oil price movements and economic activity by using modern time series techniques in a cointegrating framework we expand the standard error correction model by examining the dynamics of out of sample causality through the generalized variance decomposition and impulse response function techniques the evidence from persistence profiles also gives important guidelines based on how fast the entire system adjusts back to equilibrium in addition we find the cointegrating relationship to be stable and find that the linear error correction model to be more favorable than an asymmetric 2 period markov switching model

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

discrete time volatility forecasting with persistent leverage effect and the link with continuous time volatility modeling we first propose a reduced form model in discrete time for s p 500 volatility showing that the forecasting performance can be significantly improved by introducing a persistent leverage effect with a long range dependence similar to that of volatility itself we also find a strongly significant positive impact of lagged jumps on volatility which however is absorbed more quickly we then estimate continuous time stochastic volatility models that are able to reproduce the statistical features captured by the discrete time model we show that a single factor model driven by a fractional brownian motion is unable to reproduce the volatility dynamics observed in the data while a multifactor markovian model fully replicates the persistence of both volatility and leverage effect the impact of jumps can be associated with a common jump component in price and volatility this article has online supplementary materials

roughing it up including jump components in the measurement modeling and forecasting of return volatility a rapidly growing literature has documented important improvements in financial return volatility measurement and forecasting via use of realized variation measures constructed from high frequency returns coupled with simple modeling procedures building on recent theoretical results in barndorff nielsen and shephard 2004a 2005 for related bi power variation measures the present paper provides a practical and robust framework for non parametrically measuring the jump component in asset return volatility in an application to the dm exchange rate the s p500 market index and the 30 year u s treasury bond yield we find that jumps are both highly prevalent and distinctly less persistent than the continuous sample path variation process moreover many jumps appear directly associated with specific macroeconomic news announcements separating jump from non jump movements in a simple but sophisticated volatility forecasting model we find that almost all of the predictability in daily weekly and monthly return volatilities comes from the non jump component our results thus set the stage for a number of interesting future econometric developments and important financial applications by separately modeling forecasting and pricing the continuous and jump components of the total return variation process

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

oil and the macroeconomy since world war ii all but one of the u s recessions since world war ii have been preceded typically with a lag of around three fourths of a year by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum this does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions evidence is presented however that even over the period 1948 72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the u s recessions prior to 1972 by extension energy price increases may account for much of post opec macroeconomic performance

dynamic spillovers between oil and stock markets in the gulf cooperation council countries this article exploits a new spillover directional measure proposed by diebold and yilmaz 2009 2012 to investigate the dynamic spillover of return and volatility between oil and equities in the gulf cooperation council countries during the period 2004 to 2012 our results indicate that return and volatility transmissions are bi directional albeit asymmetric in particular the oil market gives other markets more than it receives in terms of both returns and volatilities these trends were more pronounced in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 as the net contribution of oil has intensified after a burst during the crisis the empirical evidence from the sample is consistent with a system in which oil is playing the dominant role in the information transmission mechanism between oil and equities in the gcc countries

hold your nose and vote corruption and public decisions in a representative democracy this paper analyzes how corruption alters policy decisions in democracy and examines whether this distortion can result in a long term persistence of corruption even when the voters are well informed and rational by applying a citizen candidate model of representative democracy the paper analyzes how corruption distorts the allocation of resources between public and private consumption altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions the outcome is a reduction in real public expenditure and if the median voter s demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic a reduction in taxes in this case some citizens benefit indirectly from corruption the paper also presents some empirical evidence that in democratic countries corruption results in lower tax revenue and proceeds to show that when this occurs citizens anticipating a shift in preferences in favor of public expenditure may support institutions that favor corruption this result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in democracy to some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system it also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community

spatial models of political competition under plurality rule a survey of some explanations of the number of candidates and the positions they take this paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections

electoral rules and political selection theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own this article explores how electoral rules such as district magnitude mediate this trade off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes we show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates results from a unique field experiment in afghanistan are consistent with these predictions specifically representatives selected by elections with a single multi member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences

testing for nonlinear dependence in daily foreign exchange rates the purpose of this article is to investigate whether daily changes in five major foreign exchange rates contain any nonlinearities although the data contain no linear correlation evidence indicates the presence of substantial nonlinearity in a multiplicative rather than additive form further examination reveals that a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model can explain a large part of the nonlinearities for all five exchange rates copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

crude oil corn ethanol nexus a contextual approach this paper offers a holistic study on the complex relationships between crude oil corn and ethanol during a turbulent period between 2006 and end of 2011 through a holistic mapping of the current market situation and a contextual analytical design we show that there exists a strong relationship between crude oil and corn markets on one side and crude oil and ethanol on the other however the price relationship between corn and ethanol was revealed to be less straightforward and is driven by the us government fuel policy furthermore the study indicates that corn markets have became more prone to volatility due to ethanol production especially when the demand for corn is high and or the crude oil prices are high enough to create a competitive market for ethanol

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

does high frequency crude oil futures data contain useful information for predicting volatility in the us stock market new evidence abstract this study examines whether high frequency crude oil futures data contain useful information to forecast the realized volatility rv of the us stock market from both in and out of sample perspectives there are several significant findings first from the in sample analysis crude oil futures rv exhibits a significant positive impact on the future s p 500 volatility second the out of sample results reveal that the prediction models including crude oil futures rv outperform the related competing models implying that crude oil rv is an important predictive factor for the us stock market third we further find that the primary forecasting ability of crude oil rv is reflected in high frequency information negative crude oil rv and high volatility level finally the out of sample empirical results based on different forecasting windows alternative forecast evaluation approaches subsample analysis different prediction models alternative midas lags and controlling the leverage effect are robust to our conclusions

forecasting volatility of crude oil markets abstract this article investigates the efficacy of a volatility model for three crude oil markets brent dubai and west texas intermediate wti with regard to its ability to forecast and identify volatility stylized facts in particular volatility persistence or long memory in this context we assess persistence in the volatility of the three crude oil prices using conditional volatility models the cgarch and figarch models are better equipped to capture persistence than are the garch and igarch models the cgarch and figarch models also provide superior performance in out of sample volatility forecasts we conclude that the cgarch and figarch models are useful for modeling and forecasting persistence in the volatility of crude oil prices

is the business cycle characterized by deterministic chaos abstract tests are conducted on u s macroeconomic data for the presence of low dimensional deterministic chaos where deterministic chaos is defined as in grandmont s 1985 walras bowley lecture or in brock 1986 the idea is to test for evidence of endogenous instability causing the business cycle low order autoregressions are hard to reject with our methods evidence of chaos is weak but our tests may be too weak to detect it evidence of nonlinearity is present in employment 1950 i to 1983 iv unemployment 1949 i to 1982 iv monthly post war industrial production and pig iron production 1877 1937

chaos significance mechanism and economic applications imagine a bargaining model say involving diplomats negotiating tariff levels or a disarmament treaty in which each party has been instructed by higher headquarters to respond to each new offer by her opposite number with a counteroffer that is to be calculated from a simple reaction function provided in advance both negotiating parties are prohibited from revealing their own reaction functions to the other if the perfectly deterministic sequence of offers and counteroffers that must emerge from these simple rules were to begin to oscillate wildly and apparently at random the negotiations could easily break down as each party not understanding the source of the problem came to suspect the other side of duplicity and sabotage yet all that may be involved as we will see is the phenomenon referred to as chaos a case that is emphatically not pathological but in which a dynamic mechanism that is very simple and deterministic yields a time path so complicated that it will pass most standard tests of randomness chaos has become a subject of great interest to specialists and nonspecialists alike besides economics it has entered the literature of geometry physics ecology and meteorology it has been written about at length in the new york times magazine and scientific american as well as technical publications this article seeks to describe what it is how it works and what it means for economics

theoretical comparisons of electoral systems abstract elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced a variety of electoral systems are reviewed cox s threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates positions when the number of serious candidates is given duverger s law and its generalizations are discussed to predict the number of serious candidates duverger s law is interpreted as a statement about electoral barriers to entry and this idea is linked to the question of the effectiveness of democratic competition as a deterrent to political corruption the impact of post electoral bargaining on party structure in presidential and parliamentary systems is discussed

constitutions and economic policy at the rare moments in history when a nation debates constitutional reform the key issues often concern how the reforms might affect economic policy and economic performance for example italy abandoned a system of pure proportional representation where legislators were elected according to the proportions of the popular national vote received by their parties and moved toward including ingredients of plurality rule where legislators are elected in each district according to who receives the highest number of votes key italian political leaders are now considering proposals to introduce elements of presidentialism where the head of government is elected by direct popular vote rather than the current parliamentary regime a common argument in italy was that the electoral reform would help stifle political corruption and reduce the propensity of italian governments to run budget deficits in the 1990s constitutional reforms have been debated and implemented in a number of other countries too for instance new zealand moved away from a pure system of plurality rule in single member districts to a system mixing elements of proportional representation japan also renounced its special form of plurality rule the so called single nontransferable vote in favor of a system that mixes elements of proportional and plurality representation similar proposals have been debated in the united kingdom in latin america questions have been raised as to whether the poor and volatile economic performance of many countries can be traced to their presidential form of government

voter heterogeneity and political corruption abstract we show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on political competition between an honest welfare maximiser and corrupt politicians is studied in our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage there is no asymmetric information no voter bias and voters are fully rational yet corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences

oil prices exchange rates and emerging stock markets abstract while two different streams of literature exist investigating 1 the relationship between oil prices and emerging market stock prices and 2 the relationship between oil prices and exchange rates relatively little is known about the dynamic relationship between oil prices exchange rates and emerging market stock prices this paper proposes and estimates a structural vector autoregression model to investigate the dynamic relationship between these variables impulse responses are calculated in two ways standard and the recently developed projection based methods the model supports stylized facts in particular positive shocks to oil prices tend to depress emerging market stock prices and us dollar exchange rates in the short run the model also captures stylized facts regarding movements in oil prices a positive oil production shock lowers oil prices while a positive shock to real economic activity increases oil prices there is also evidence that increases in emerging market stock prices increase oil prices

rational choice and erratic behaviour in this paper we show that rational choice in a stationary environment can lead to erratic behaviour when preferences depend on experience we mean by erratic behaviour choice sequences that do not converge to a long run stationary value or to any periodic pattern early investigations of the effects of experience on choice goes back to pareto see also benhabib 1979 some keynesian theories of the consumption function incorporate the effects of experience and habit formation on current levels of consumption duesenberry 1949 modigliani 1949 and brown 1952 a general model of experience dependent choice was described in day 1970 and investigated in day and kennedy 1971 while the specific issue of the existence of stable representable long run consumer demand when tastes vary endogenously has been treated by gorman 1967 pollak 1970 1976 weizsaicker 1971 mccarthy 1974 and hammond 1976 pollak gave conditions for the representability of long run choice when the equations of preference dependence are linear and utility additive hammond in a generalization of these findings provides conditions for stable representable long run choice when preferences are acyclic a condition which in essence assures convergence to a long run choice

are the crude oil markets becoming weakly efficient over time a test for time varying long range dependence in prices and volatility this paper analyzes the efficiency of crude oil markets brent and west texas intermediate by means of estimating the fractal structure of these time series we test for time varying degrees of long range dependence using the rescaled range hurst analysis and find evidence that this market has become more efficient over time these results are robust for controlling for short term autocorrelation by means of a shuffling procedure

multi battle contests an experimental study this study examines behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi battle contests in simultaneous contests subjects make positive bids in each battle 80 of the time and bids fall within the predicted boundaries however 35 of the time subjects make positive bids in only two instead of all three battles and they significantly overuse moderately high bids in sequential contests theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles contrary to this prediction subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles consequently instead of always ending in the second battle contest proceeds to the third battle 38 of the time finally in both simultaneous and sequential settings subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted resulting in negative expected payoffs

bipolar multicandidate elections with corruption the goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority s preference on policy questions but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders we consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria among a wide class of single winner scoring rules only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model

on proportional non representation this paper contends the main virtue conventionally attributed to proportional electoral rules i e effective representation of political views it discusses a number of shortcomings that lead too much proportionality to a self defeat it reduces vote mobility through the strong cultivation of voters loyalties it smooths out vote variations when transforming them into seat variations it reinforces intraparty ties to the detriment of vertical attention to constituents and it impinges on the working of checks and balances the paper does not aim at a systematic evaluation of the properties of various voting systems nor is it the proportional principle as such that is under attack however its combination with other institutional features can entrap voters in their own choices thus nurturing political collusion it is because of the ensuing lower influence of the voters on political decision making that too much proportionality can lead to poor representation

are the crude oil markets really becoming more efficient over time some new evidence abstract we replicate the study of tabak cajueiro 2007 are the crude oil markets becoming weakly efficient over time a test for time varying long range dependence in prices and volatility published in energy economics 29 pp 28 36 the results have been mostly confirmed specifically we have confirmed that the crude oil markets efficiency could be rejected up till approximately 1994 and this holds for both studied crude oil commodities brent and wti analyzing an extended dataset up till june 2017 we find that the markets remained efficient at least with respect to long range dependence until the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 this is confirmed by all three applied methods the rescaled range analysis used in the original study and the detrended fluctuation analysis and the geweke porter hudak estimator which were added to strengthen validity of the results the markets returned back to efficiency around 2012 and remained there until 2015 when the hurst exponent started another rally and stayed rather high until the end of the examined sample comparing the two markets the brent crude oil shows stronger signs of inefficiency during the inefficient periods compared to the wti crude oil this is in hand with the results reported in the original study apart from rerunning the analysis on an extended dataset and using two additional methods we also provide a firmer validity check using the moving block bootstrap procedure which outperforms the original shuffling procedure in the provided forecasting study

political selection under alternative electoral rules we study the patterns of political selection in majoritarian versus proportional systems political parties face a trade off in choosing the mix of high and low quality candidates high quality candidates are valuable to voters and thus help to win elections but they crowd out loyal candidates who are most preferred by the parties under proportional representation politicians selection depends on the share of swing voters in the entire electorate in majoritarian elections it depends also on the distribution of competitive versus safe single member districts we show that a majoritarian system with only a few competitive districts is less capable of selecting good politicians than a proportional system as the share of competitive districts increases the majoritarian system becomes more efficient than the proportional system however for a large enough share of competitive districts a non monotonic relation arises the marginal positive effect of adding high quality politicians on the probability of winning the election is reduced and highly competitive majoritarian systems become less efficient than proportional ones in selecting good politicians

rational voting and candidate entry under plurality rule we analyze a formal model of electoral competition under plurality rule that is characterized by two novel features first rather than assuming a fixed field of candidates we allow candidates to make decisions regarding entry as well as location second voters in our model are strategically rational that is they maximize utility over expected policy outcomes rather than simply voting for the ideologically closest candidate given these assumptions all equilibria in this model are such that the set of entrants locates at the median voter s ideal point this result stands in sharp contrast to earlier models of multicandidate competition in which entry is not allowed and voters vote sincerely

threshold arch models and asymmetries in volatility this paper attempts to enlarge the class of threshold heteroscedastic models tarch introduced by zakoian 1991a we show that it is possible to relax the positivity constraints on the parameters of the conditional variance unconstrained models provide a greater generality of the paths allowing for nonlinearities in the volatility cyclical behaviour is permitted as well as different relative impacts of positive and negative shocks on volatility depending on their size we give empirical evidence using french stock returns

forecasting energy market volatility using garch models can multivariate models beat univariate models abstract in this paper we forecast energy market volatility using both univariate and multivariate garch class models first we forecast volatilities of individual assets and find that multivariate models display better performance than univariate models second we forecast crack spread volatility and contrast the performance of multivariate models for two underlyings with the alternative of univariate ones for crack spreads directly our evidence shows that univariate models allowing for asymmetric effects display the greatest accuracy we also discuss the hedging strategy based on multivariate models and its implications for market participants

forecasting oil price realized volatility using information channels from other asset classes motivated from ross 1989 who maintains that asset volatilities are synonymous to the information flow we claim that cross market volatility transmission effects are synonymous to cross market information flows or information channels from one market to another based on this assertion we assess whether cross market volatility flows contain important information that can improve the accuracy of oil price realized volatility forecasting we concentrate on realized volatilities derived from the intra day prices of the brent crude oil and four different asset classes stocks forex commodities and macro which represent the different information channels by which oil price volatility is impacted from we employ a har framework and estimate forecasts for 1 day to 66 days ahead our findings provide strong evidence that the use of the different information channels enhances the predictive accuracy of oil price realized volatility at all forecasting horizons numerous forecasting evaluation tests and alternative model specifications confirm the robustness of our results

tax contracts and elections in this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections policies and welfare we consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically parties have policy preferences about the level of public good provision and benefit from perks when in office a government raises taxes for both purposes we show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government moreover in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

ambiguous volatility and asset pricing in continuous time we formulate a model of utility for a continuous time framework that captures aversion to ambiguity about both volatility and drift corresponding extensions of some basic results in asset pricing theory are presented first we derive arbitrage free pricing rules based on hedging arguments because ambiguous volatility implies market incompleteness hedging arguments determine prices only up to intervals in order to obtain sharper predictions we apply the model of utility to a representative agent endowment economy and study equilibrium asset returns a version of the consumption capital asset pricing model is derived and the effects of ambiguous volatility are described the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

a characterization of erratic dynamics in the overlapping generations model abstract in this paper we characterize and give examples o wide classes of utility functions which generate erratic dynamics in the standard deterministic overlapping generations model erratic dynamics refers to feasible trajectories which are bounded but which do not converge to stationary points or periodic orbits we show that such trajectories are pareto efficient we introduce credit into the model and show how a constant credit expansion rate can result in erratic trajectories in prices and the real value of credit finally we briefly discuss certain technical aspects of the mathematics used and the statistical nature of the dynamics that can arise from deterministic dynamical systems

social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework many observers argue that political polarization particularly on social and cultural issues has increased in the united states how does this influence the political competition on economic issues we analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share in equilibrium candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically liberal voters as well as socially liberal and economically conservative voters we analyze how voters cultural preferences and candidates cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions jel d72 e62 h50 z13 many observers have argued that polarization between the two major parties in the united states particularly on noneconomic cultural matters has increased this is reflected both at the elite level in particular in congress poole and rosenthal 1984 1985 2000 and among democratic and republican activists and voters abramowitz and saunders 2008 harbridge and malhotra 2011 in the american national election survey respondents report their own ideological position on a scale from 1 very liberal to 7 very conservative the number of respondents who report one of the extreme positions 1 2 6 or 7 has grown from 20 and 21 percent in 1972 and 1976 to 31 and 30 percent in the 2004 and 2008 respectively moreover liberal and conservative voters have become considerably more reliable supporters of democrats and republicans respectively over the last generation 1 if we accept the widespread view that reagan s conservative revolution has created a cultural wedge between the parties that only widened in the 1990s and 2000s what consequences for the parties economic policies should we expect

why a clean politician supports dirty politics a game theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption abstract using a theoretical model of repeated political competition among two career politicians i study the incentives of both the corrupt and clean politicians not to adopt a fully effective reform targeting political corruption in the setup i study each politician can credibly adopt the reform as part of his policy platform in the elections yet when the level of political corruption is high neither politician does so in a nash equilibrium intuitively political corruption changes the zero sum nature of political competition the reform eliminates the illegal rents of the corrupt candidate and the competitive advantage of the clean candidate

a structural model of government formation in this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies we use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process the type of coalitions that form and their relative stability

a dynamic duverger s law electoral systems promote strategic voting and affect party systems duverger les partis politiques 1951 proposed that plurality rule leads to bi partyism and proportional representation leads to multi partyism we show that in a dynamic setting these static effects also lead to a higher option value for existing minor parties under plurality rule so their incentive to exit the party system is mitigated by their future benefits from continued participation the predictions of our model are consistent with multiple cross sectional predictions on the comparative number of parties under plurality rule and proportional representation in particular there could be more parties under plurality rule than under proportional representation at any point in time however our model makes a unique time series prediction the number of parties under plurality rule should be less variable than under proportional representation we provide extensive empirical evidence in support of these results

impact of speculator s expectations of returns and time scales of investment on crude oil price behaviors abstract based on time series of crude oil prices daily spot this paper analyses price fluctuation with two significant parameters speculators time scales of investment and e speculators expectations of return by using zipf analysis technique specifically by mapping returns of prices into 3 alphabeted sequences absolute frequencies and 2 alphabeted sequences relative frequencies containing the fundamental information of price fluctuations this paper empirically explores parameters and identifies various types of speculators cognition patterns of price behavior in order to quantify the degree of distortion a feasible reference is proposed an ideal speculator finally this paper discusses the similarities and differences between those cognition patterns of speculators and those of an ideal speculator the resultant analyses identify the possible distortion of price behaviors by their patterns

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

a reappraisal of the chaotic paradigm for energy commodity prices abstract energy commodity prices have been examined over the last 20 years to detect the presence of chaos as an alternative to stochastic models with contrasting results in this paper we wish to reassess the chaotic paradigm in the light of two new pieces of information with respect to the literature the appearance of noise aware estimation methods for the correlation entropy and the availability of longer time series our analysis shows that the literature has heavily underestimated the presence of noise and that chaotic characteristics coexist with stochastic ones in the time series of prices through the recurrence quantification analysis we have also observed the presence of intermittency where periods of regular behaviour are replaced by periods of chaotic behaviour which could explain the emergence of bubbles

analysis of democratic institutions structure conduct and performance t s ahe structure of a democratic political system consists of the offices that politicians may seek the constitutional powers associated with these offices and the procedures by which candidates are elected to these offices these structures together form a complex incentive system for politicians determining what kinds of political decisions and strategies will be rewarded thus the constitutional structure of a democracy may influence the conduct of its politicians and the performance of its government in this way political theory confronts a set of questions that have much in common with the classic economic questions of structure conduct and performance in industrial organization this paper develops this economic perspective on political theory as a guide to some problems and directions of current research economic and political interpretations of a classic model

would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation abstract we investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation we do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account namely strategic voting endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates we consider two classes of voting rules one class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally weighed votes for the different candidates the other class consists of the voting rules where each voter rank orders the candidates we identify conditions under which these voting rules yield policy moderation we also show that these voting rules may yield policy extremism instead of policy moderation if one or several of the conditions is not satisfied finally we find that amongst these voting rules the extent of policy moderation is maximal under the borda count if we consider only equilibria where all candidates are serious contenders however this result does not carry over to spoiler equilibria where approval voting can yield more moderate policy outcomes than the borda count

is there co movement of agricultural commodities futures prices and crude oil even though significant attempts have appeared in literature the current perception of co movement of commodity prices appear inadequate and static in particular we focus on price movements between crude oil futures and a series of agricultural commodities and gold futures a comparative framework is applied to identify changes in relationships through time and various cointegration methodologies and causality tests are employed our results indicate that co movement is a dynamic concept and that some economic and policy development may change the relationship between commodities furthermore we show that biofuel policy buffers the co movement of crude oil and corn futures until the crude oil prices surpass a certain threshold

a drawback of electoral competition in most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters we provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties in our model the larger the number of parties the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition the reason is that when the number of parties increases electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits the analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition thresholds of exclusion runoff electoral systems and majoritarian two party political systems jel d82 l15

news good or bad and its impact on volatility predictions over multiple horizons we examine whether the sign and magnitude of intra daily returns have impact on expected volatility the next day or over longer future horizons we first let the data speak namely with minimal interference we capture the mapping between intra daily returns and future volatility we revisit the concept of news impact curves introduced by engle and ng 1993 overall we find that moderately good intra daily news reduces volatility the next day while both very good news unusual high intra daily positive returns and bad news negative returns increase volatility with the latter having a more severe impact the asymmetries disappear over longer horizons we also introduce a new class of parametric models which feature asymmetries and with close ties to arch type models albeit applicable to a mixture of high and low frequency data models featuring asymmetries dominate especially during the 2007 2008 financial crisis

the domestic politics of banking regulation this article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics based on evidence from twenty two industrialized countries we argue that electoral rules specifically the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system moreover despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels

electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization despite common perception existing theoretical literature lacks a complete for mal argument regarding the relationship between the electoral rule disproportionality and platform polarization in this paper we build a model that incorporates the disproportionality of the electoral system in a standard downsian electoral competition setup with mainly but not necessarily purely policy motivated parties we first show that in equilibrium platform polarization is decreasing in the level of the electoral rule disproportionality we then argue that the number of parties has a positive effect on platform polarization when polarization is measured by the distance between the two most distant platforms this effect does not hold when polarization is measured by the widely used dalton index constructing a dataset covering more than 300 elections our main theoretical findings are empirically supported pointing towards the electoral rule disproportionality as a major determinant of polarization

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

consequences of constitutions the paper presents empirical findings regarding the economic policy consequences of constitutional arrangements in three different dimensions first the data are consistent with several theoretical predictions about the consequences of electoral rules and forms of government for fiscal policy and rent extraction even when non random constitution selection is taken into account second empirical tests of the predictions from a new comprehensive model of parliamentary democracy show that proportional elections raise government spending through their indirect consequences for party structures and types of government rather than through their direct effects on policymaking incentives third new empirical results suggest that constitutional arrangements may have important consequences for structural policies that promote long run economic performance hinting at a missing link in the causal chain from history to current economic performance all these empirical findings appear statistically robust and the estimated effects are large enough to be of genuine economic interest jel d72 e60 h00 o11

do institutions affect citizens selection into politics traditional political economy has paid primary attention to the structuring of the principal agent relationship between citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political agents however as the electoral control of politicians and the credibility of policy commitments are limited this perspective needs to be complemented with an economics of political selection that takes into account the quality of those elected to political office we review the emerging literature which investigates institutional conditions that impact the selection of politicians we discuss pay in politics electoral rules institutions enhancing transparency in politics and institutions which govern dual office holding in different branches of government we argue that further comparative analyses are essential in order to gain an improved understanding of the impact that institutions have on political outcomes not only via the channel of accountability but also via the channel of selection

political competition and mirrleesian income taxation a first pass we study downsian competition in a mirrleesian model of income taxation the competing politicians may dier in competence if politicians engage in vote share maximization the less competent politician s policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents whereas those of the competent politician are attractive to the majority of poor agents the less competent politician wins with positive probability which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of besley and coate 1998 political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities nevertheless the two equilibria cannot be pareto ranked the minority may be better o under vote share maximization

how do electoral systems affect fiscal policy evidence from cantonal parliaments 1890 2000 using a new data set on swiss cantons since 1890 we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy in line with economic theory we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods like education and welfare benefits but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods like roads we find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government an analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout left wing representation and political fragmentation these changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures jel h4 h11 i38

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed

a theory of voting equilibria a voting equilibrium arises when the voters in an electorate acting in accordance with both their preferences for the candidates and their perceptions of the relative chances of various pairs of candidates being in contention for victory generate an election result that justifies their perceptions voting equilibria always exist and the set of equilibria can vary substantially with the choice of voting system we compare equilibria under the plurality rule approval voting and the borda system we consider a candidate positioning game and find that the plurality rule imposes little restriction on the position of the winning candidate in three candidate races while approval voting leads to a winner positioned at the median of the voter distribution we contrast campaign activities intended to influence voter preferences with activities meant to influence only perceptions of candidate viability

politicians outside earnings and electoral competition this paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians outside earnings in our framework politicians face a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings the main hypothesis is that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition we test this hypothesis using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the german federal assembly and find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings

party polarization in legislatures with office motivated candidates we develop a theory of legislative competition in which voters care about local candidate valence and national party positions that are determined by the parties median legislators as long as election outcomes are sufficiently predictable the only stable equilibria exhibit policy divergence between the parties if the degree of uncertainty about election outcomes decreases and if voters place less weight on local candidates valence polarization between the parties increases furthermore a systematic electoral shock makes the party favored by the shock more moderate while the disadvantaged party becomes more extreme finally we examine data on state elections and the ideological positions of state legislatures and find patterns that are consistent with key predictions of our model

application of nonlinear mapping theory to commodity price fluctuatuions abstract the cobweb model of price stability with lagged price elasticities is extended to include nonlinear terms the result falls within nonlinear mapping models such as the logistics map nonlinearities prevent the unbounded oscillation predicted from the unstable linear cobweb but the price time series may exhibit chaotic unpredictable endogenous fluctuations the theory is applied to the u s crude oil market regressing consumption against price gives lagged elasticities greater than current elasticities indicating linear instability this instability is seen in a mapping model of the price time series predictions of the model are given both with and without nonlinear terms indicating large continuing endogenous price fluctuations

volatility spillovers between oil prices and stock sector returns implications for portfolio management abstract in this article we take a recent generalized var garch approach to examine the extent of volatility transmission between oil and stock markets in europe and the united states at the sector level the empirical model is advantageous in that it typically allows simultaneous shock transmission in the conditional returns and volatilities insofar as volatility transmission across oil and stock sector markets is a crucial element for portfolio designs and risk management we also analyze the optimal weights and hedge ratios for oil stock portfolio holdings with respect to the results our findings point to the existence of significant volatility spillover between oil and sector stock returns however the spillover is usually unidirectional from oil markets to stock markets in europe but bidirectional in the united states our back testing procedures finally suggest that taking the cross market volatility spillovers estimated from the var garch models often leads to diversification benefits and hedging effectiveness better than those of commonly used multivariate volatility models such as the ccc garch of bollerslev 1990 the diagonal bekk garch of engle and kroner 1995 and the dcc garch of engle 2002

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

the pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk based on the merton 1977 put option framework we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank to account for the risk of joint bank failures estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks this result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too big to fail above all our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk based deposit insurance with risk based basel capital requirements

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

nonlinear dynamics and stock returns simple deterministic systems are capable of generating chaotic output that mimics the output of stochastic systems for this reason algorithms have been developed to distinguish between these two alternatives these algorithms and related statistical tests are also useful in detecting the presence of nonlinear dependence in time series in this article the authors apply these procedures to stock returns and find evidence that indicates the presence of nonlinear dependence on weekly returns from the center for research in security prices value weighted index copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

oil and stock market volatility a multivariate stochastic volatility perspective abstract this paper models the volatility of stock and oil futures markets using the multivariate stochastic volatility structure in an attempt to extract information intertwined in both markets for risk prediction it offers four major findings first the stock and oil futures prices are inter related their correlation follows a time varying dynamic process and tends to increase when the markets are more volatile second conditioned on the past information the volatility in each market is very persistent i e it varies in a predictable manner third there is inter market dependence in volatility innovations that hit either market can affect the volatility in the other market in other words conditioned on the persistence and the past volatility in their respective markets the past volatility of the stock oil futures market also has predictive power over the future volatility of the oil futures stock market finally the model produces more accurate value at risk estimates than other benchmarks commonly used in the financial industry

do oil prices help forecast u s real gdp the role of nonlinearities and asymmetries there is a long tradition of using oil prices to forecast u s real gdp it has been suggested that the predictive relationship between the price of oil and one quarter ahead u s real gdp is nonlinear in that a oil price increases matter only to the extent that they exceed the maximum oil price in recent years and that b oil price decreases do not matter at all we examine first whether the evidence of in sample predictability in support of this view extends to out of sample forecasts second we discuss how to extend this forecasting approach to higher horizons third we compare the resulting class of nonlinear models to alternative economically plausible nonlinear specifications and examine which aspect of the model is most useful for forecasting we show that the asymmetry embodied in commonly used nonlinear transformations of the price of oil is not helpful for out of sample forecasting more robust and often more accurate real gdp forecasts are obtained from symmetric nonlinear models based

is efficiency of crude oil market affected by multifractality evidence from the wti crude oil market in this paper we investigate the dynamics of relationship between efficiency and multifractality of wti crude oil market based on the cross correlation analysis and the nonlinear granger causality analysis we find that the inefficiency and multifractality of the wti crude oil returns interact positively in a nonlinear mechanism this suggests that the increase of multifractality degree will lead to the lower degree of market efficiency and vice versa our findings have some important implications for oil price forecasting and portfolio management

electoral rules and corruption is corruption systematically related to electoral rules recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer but little is known about the data we try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s we exploit the cross country variation in the data as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform the evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors larger voting districts and thus lower barriers to entry are associated with less corruption whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists and thus less individual accountability are associated with more corruption individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality rule elections even though open party lists also seem to have some effect because different aspects roughly offset each other a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption jel e62 h3

the effects of party competition on budget outcomes empirical evidence from local governments in spain this paper investigates the link between local budget outcomes and the intensity of party competition measured as the margin of victory obtained by the incumbent in the previous local election i e the difference between the vote share and 50 two competing hypotheses are tested in the paper on the one hand the leviathan government hypothesis suggests that the lower the intensity of party competition is the greater is the increase in the size of the local public sector irrespective of the ideology of the party in power on the other hand the partisan government hypothesis suggests that the incumbent will find it easier to advance its platform when intensity of competition is low i e parties on the left right will increase decrease the size of the local public sector when the intensity of the challenge from the opposition is low these hypotheses are tested with information on spending own revenues and deficit for more than 500 spanish local governments over 8 years 1992 1999 and information on the results of two local electoral contests 1991 and 1995 the evidence favors the partisan hypothesis over the leviathan one we found that for left wing governments spending taxes and deficits increased as the electoral margin increases whereas for right wing governments a greater margin of victory led to reductions in all these variables

forecasting crude oil market volatility further evidence using garch class models abstract this paper extends the work of kang et al 2009 we use a greater number of linear and nonlinear generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity garch class models to capture the volatility features of two crude oil markets brent and west texas intermediate wti the one five and twenty day out of sample volatility forecasts of the garch class models are evaluated using the superior predictive ability test and with more loss functions unlike kang et al 2009 we find that no model can outperform all of the other models for either the brent or the wti market across different loss functions however in general the nonlinear garch class models which are capable of capturing long memory and or asymmetric volatility exhibit greater forecasting accuracy than the linear ones especially in volatility forecasting over longer time horizons such as five or twenty days

electoral reform and trade offs in representation we examine the effect of electoral institutions on two important features of representation that are often studied separately policy responsiveness and the quality of legislators theoretically we show that while a proportional electoral system is better than a majoritarian one at representing popular preferences in some contexts this advantage can come at the price of undermining the selection of good politicians to empirically assess the relevance of this trade off we analyze an unusually controlled electoral reform in switzerland early in the twentieth century to account for endogeneity we exploit variation in the intensive margin of the reform which introduced proportional representation based on administrative constraints and data on voter preferences a difference in difference analysis finds that higher reform intensity increases the policy congruence between legislators and the electorate and reduces legislative effort contemporary evidence from the european parliament supports this conclusion

ideologues or pragmatists we study a model of electoral control where the politician is a policy expert but the voter is not first we focus on the case of an ideologue namely a politician who always wants the same policy implemented regardless of the state we show that the voter s lack of policy expertise comes at no cost to him but may come at an electoral cost to the politician next we turn to the case of a pragmatist namely a politician whose preferences are state contingent we show that the voter s lack of policy expertise does come at a cost to him as a consequence the voter may fare better with an ideologue than with a pragmatist this can occur even if the pragmatist s preferences are arbitrarily close to and perfectly correlated with the voter s

the scope and limits of accounting and judicial courts intervention in inefficient public procurement cost inefficiencies in public procurement tend to come from two sources corruption moral hazard and incompetence adverse selection in most countries audit authorities are responsible for monitoring costs but do not distinguish both sources of inefficiency in their audits judicial courts typically rely on these cost audits but only sanction corruption in a model of public procurement by politicians we study how the respective quality of the two courts affects corruption as well as cost efficiency we find that while better courts have the direct effect of decreasing corruption they may have a negative indirect effect on the abilities of the pool of politicians so that the net effect on cost efficiency is ambiguous

electoral accountability and corruption evidence from the audits of local governments we show that political institutions affect corruption levels we use audit reports in brazil to construct new measures of political cor ruption in local governments and test whether electoral account ability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians we find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives these effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punish ment is lower overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician s corrupt behavior jel d72 k42 017

the impact of socio political integration and press freedom on corruption abstract the analyses in this study demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of a previously understood phenomenon that openness has a negative relationship with corruption it is argued that this relationship is substantially influenced by the domestic context a relationship that has been underdeveloped by previous empirical studies focusing on social and political integration i find that the effect of openness on corruption is conditioned by domestic institutions the empirical evidence suggests that while political and social openness have a significant impact in combating corruption given a free press the impact of such international forces are negligible in cases where press freedoms are low

does oil corrupt evidence from a natural experiment in west africa abstract this paper explores the oil discovery announcements in sao tome and principe 1997 1999 to assess the role of natural resources in determining corruption for this purpose we use a natural experiment framework which contrasts sao tome and principe to cape verde a control west african country sharing the same colonial past and important recent economic and political shocks our measurement is based on tailored household surveys we conducted in both island countries the unique survey instrument was retrospective and used personal histories to elicit memories from the respondents we analyze changes in perceived corruption across a wide range of public services and allocations we find clearest increases on vote buying education namely in the allocation of scholarships and customs ranging from 31 to 40 of the subjective scale we interpret these findings as symptoms of increased competition for core state resources