improving supply chain performance and managing risk under weather related demand uncertainty we consider a manufacturer retailer supply chain for a seasonal product whose demand is weather sensitive the retailer orders from the manufacturer supplier prior to the selling season and then sells to the market we examine how a manufacturer can structure a weather linked rebate to improve his expected profit the proposed class of rebate contracts offers several advantages over many other contract structures including no required verification of leftover inventory and or markdown amounts and no adverse effect on sales effort by the retailer we provide a thorough analysis of the manufacturer s and retailer s decisions in this context we show that the weather linked rebate can take many different forms and this flexibility allows the supplier to design contracts that are pareto improving and or limit his risk in offering the contract and the retailer s risk in accepting it for weather rebates with certain characteristics the manufacturer can fully hedge his risks of offering a weather rebate by paying a risk premium we show how this can be accomplished we also show that the basic structural results extend to settings in which the two parties would like to limit their risk

information transmission cournot and bertrand equilibria we examine how incentives for two duopolists to honestly share information change depending upon the nature of competition cournot or bertrand and the nature of the information structure while in earlier papers uncertainty is about an unknown common demand intercept in the present paper uncertainty is about unknown private costs the different information structure reverses the incentives to share information while with unknown common demand sharing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition with unknown private costs sharing is a dominant strategy with cournot competition and concealing is a dominant strategy with bertrand competition

cournot oligopoly with information sharing this paper studies the incentives for information sharing among firms in a cournot oligopoly facing a linear uncertain demand and an affine conditional expectation information structure no information sharing is found to be the unique equilibrium in two cases in which the signals with equal precision are assumed indivisible and infinitely divisible however the nonpooling equilibrium converges to the situation where the pooling strategies are adopted as the amount of information increases hence the efficiency is achieved in the competitive equilibrium as the number of the firm become large

the effects of taxation price control and government contracts in oligopoly and monopolistic competition abstract many government contracts with or policies towards oligopolistic sectors essentially involve private firms selling a given proportion or quantity of output to the government at a fixed price p r with the remainder being sold on the open market often this is combined with consumer rationing examples include cement and sugar in india and health housing and defence in many countries the paper investigates the effects of these schemes including sales and excise taxation on prices output and household welfare under oligopoly and monopolistic competition less government control reduced may raise prices and tax shifting can be above or below 100 percent

quantity competition with access fees abstract we analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm in a nash equilibrium of the game played by firms the per unit prices equal marginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus as the number of firms increases access fees fall below net consumer surplus and toward zero existence is guaranteed if marshallian consumer surplus is not too concave with open entry quantity competition with access fees may be less efficient than without access fees

does price uncertainty really reduce private investment a small model applied to chile the recent literature emphasizes the negative impact of price uncertainly on private investment as result of a higher risk premium the price to wait this paper argues that the uncertainly concerning the cost of capital should be compared with uncertainly in the price of output using a simple analytical model we conclude that the efficiency of policies aimed to reduce the price of capital or the basic accelator between investment and output growth may be enhanced if 1 the volatility of the output price is greater than the volatility of the cost of capital and 2 there is a positive correlation between changes in the cost of capital prices in both cases private investment will be more responsive beacuse firms will minimize profit flutuations in the second part of the paper the model is applied to the case of chile over the 1980 90 period this country has earned earned the reputation of being the sucess story of structural adjustment and has acheived fairly stable growth in the past eight years

competition and unilateral dumping this paper presents an analysis of the effects of market structure on the propensity of firms to dump goods the analysis of brander and krugman is extended to show that in the presence of transportation costs bilateral intra industry trade is not possible without dumping contrary to the conventional wisdom this paper finds that firms in markets with a large number of domestic competitors are more prone to dump unilaterally than firms in less competitive markets this dumping is not predatory but may result in export prices being below average cost

monotone comparative statics in games with non monotonic best replies contests and cournot oligopoly abstract in this paper we employ lattice theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest a class of games for which best replies are generically non monotonic using the same approach we obtain several comparative statics in a cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes our analysis illustrates how lattice theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non monotonic best replies

facilitating practices the effects of advance notice and best price policies even if firms in a market choose discount prices noncooperatively the use of most favored customer and meet or release contracts enables those firms to adopt quantity choice strategies consequently there can be a range of list prices that are impervious to unilateral nonselective discounts but this range does not include prices above the level determined in a cournot equilibrium the practice of advance public notification of list price increases can facilitate the establishment of such supracompetitive list prices as was argued in the recent ftc ethyl case the possibility of offering discounts selectively results in a much more competitive situation

cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games abstract we reconsider the cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by milgrom and shannon we generalize novshek s existence result derive the associated uniqueness result give an extension of a classical existence result under symmetry and provide conditions making a cournot oligopoly into a log supermodular game with the natural order on the action sets we also provide extensive and precise insight as to why decreasing best responses are widely regarded as being typical for the cournot model with production costs several illustrative examples are provided journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 l10 l13

the econometrics of kinked budget constraints in the last several years a branch of applied econometrics has developed which is devoted to the development of techniques for the estimation of demand and other functions when the budget constraint is piecewise linear or kinky that is when the constraint consists of a number of segments joined together at kink points such constraints most frequently arise from government tax and transfer programs for example the federal income tax imposes a piecewise linear schedule by the use of constant marginal tax rates within brackets a problem analyzed by hausman 1981 the payroll tax in the social security system likewise generates a kinked schedule inasmuch as the marginal tax rate on earnings is zero above a certain earnings maximum federal and state transfer programs for the poor result in piecewise linear constraints because transfer benefits are taxed in the sense of a negative income tax as income rises and because that tax rate falls to zero at the kink point where an individual or family loses eligibility for the benefit altogether many government transfer programs impose additional nonlinearities by altering this tax rate by discrete amounts over the range of positive benefits as well but kinked constraints sometimes arise in nongovernment contexts a well known example being the block pricing schedule commonly set by utilities and volume discounting in general kinked budget constraints create two difficulties that have several interesting facets one difficulty is that changes in tax and transfer schedules can have unexpected effects that can be exactly the opposite in sign to those expected from economic theory examples of this phenomenon are given below the second difficulty that with which this paper is mostly concerned relates to the implications of kinked budget

the efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition abstract this paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit taxes in imperfectly competitive markets we provide a simple proof that ad valorem taxes are welfare superior to unit taxes in the short run when production costs are identical across firms the proof covers differentiated products and a wide range of market conduct cost asymmetries strengthen the case for ad valorem taxation under cournot competition but unit taxation may be welfare superior under bertrand competition with product differentiation ad valorem taxation is superior with free entry under cournot competition but not necessarily under price competition when consumers value variety

information use and acquisition in price setting oligopolies asymmetric price setting multi product suppliers have access to multiple sources of information about demand conditions where the publicity of each source corresponds to the cross industry correlation of signals received from it a signal s influence on suppliers prices is increasing in its publicity as well as in its precision the emphasis on relatively public information is stronger for smaller suppliers who control narrower product portfolios when information is endogenously acquired suppliers listen to only a subset of information sources this subset is smaller when products are less differentiated and when the industry is less concentrated smaller suppliers focus attention on fewer information sources the inefficiencies arising from information acquisition and use are identified the associated externalities depend upon the extent of product differentiation the concentration of the industry and the degree of decreasing returns to scale

generalized quantity competition for multiple products and loss of efficiency we study a generalized model of quantity cournot oligopolistic competition the impact of competition on social surplus and firms profit is analyzed firms produce multiple differentiated products and face production constraints we compare the social surplus produced by competing firms and by colluding firms with the maximum achievable total surplus in the market similarly we quantify the loss of profit that firms incur by competing instead of colluding our goal is to understand how the presence of competition affects the firms and society as a whole but also to determine what are the key drivers of the inefficiencies that arise due to competition

efficiency and surplus bounds in cournot competition we derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under cournot competition to do so we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of concavity and convexity the more concave is demand the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus the smaller is consumer surplus relative to producer surplus and the lower the ratio of deadweight loss to producer surplus deadweight loss over total potential surplus is at rst increasing with demand concavity then eventually

mixed oligopoly privatization subsidization and the order of firms moves several types of objectives abstract we show the robustness of results in earlier works for a subsidy in mixed oligopoly these results do not depend upon the fact that each private firm maximizes its own profits

insisting on a non negative price oligopoly uncertainty welfare and multiple equilibria i study cournot competition under incomplete but symmetric information about the intercept of the linear demand function while assuming that market price must be non negative for all demand realizations although the non negativity assumption is very natural it has only rarely been made in the earlier literature yet it has important economic consequences 1 expected demand effectively becomes convex which means that multiple symmetric pure strategy equilibria can exist and 2 expected total surplus can be larger when the firms do not know demand than when they do the arguments of the paper are relevant also for price competition and for uncertainty about e g cost or the number of firms and these issues are discussed

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

testing a theoretical model of mortgage demand on uk data mortgage demand is a poorly understood and under researched aspect of the financial behaviour of households this paper tests empirically the basic results of brueckner s model of mortgage demand on uk mortgage market data the choice of mortgage instrument is used to identify impatient debt maximizers and patient borrowers who borrow at intermediate levels thus the research confirms the conditions under which households will use the largest possible mortgage and the circumstances under which savings are invested in the property a unique contribution of the work is the estimation of mortgage demand equations corrected for endogenous housing demand for a single housing finance system where borrowers face different opportunity costs of equity in their owner occupied property allowing a purer test of the theoretical model

a continuous approach to oligopolistic market equilibrium we provide an algorithm for computing cournot nash equilibria in a market that involves finitely many producers the algorithm amounts to following a certain dynamical system all the way to its steady state which happens to be a noncooperative equilibrium the dynamics arise quite naturally as follows let each producer continuously adjust the planned production if desired as a response to the current aggregate supply in doing so the producer is completely guided by myopic profit considerations we show under broad hypothesis that this adjustment process is globally asymptotically convergent to a nash equilibrium

computing cournot nash equilibria this paper examines convergence criteria of an algorithm for the computation of cournot nash economic equilibria the method is based on formulating the equilibrium problem as that of finding a solution to a nonlinear complementarity problem solved by sequential linearization and lemke s algorithm conditions for local and global convergence are developed and the technique is applied to homogeneous segmented and differentiated product markets

exchange of cost information in oligopoly when do oligopolists gain by sharing their private information about their costs with one another what are the social welfare effects of such information exchange i study these questions by comparing the oligopolists expected profits under a cost sharing agreement with their expected profits in the bayesian equilibrium that would arise without cost sharing i also analyse the firms decisions to form a trade association to share their cost data under conditions of linear demand and cournot behaviour industrywide information exchange is the unique point in the core of the trade association membership game the exchange of cost data increases expected profits and welfare but reduces expected consumer surplus cost sharing increases efficiency by raising the market shares of lower cost firms and reducing the variability of aggregate output consumer surplus is diminished however because the variance of output is reduced and consumer surplus is a convex function of output

tax subsidies to owner occupied housing an asset market approach inflation reduces the effective cost of homeownership and raises the tax subsidy to owner occupation this paper presents an asset market model of the housing market and estimates how changes in the expected inflation rate affect the real price of houses and the equilibrium size of the housing capital stock simulation results suggest that the accelerating inflation of the 1970s which substantially reduced homeowners user costs could have accounted for as much as a 30 percent increase in real house prices persistent high inflation rates could lead ultimately to a sizable increase in the stock of owner occupied housing

trade association disclosure rules incentives to share information and welfare in this article i propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers firms and society this framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot influence aggregate market magnitudes and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations i report two main results first a policy of nonexclusionary disclosure destroys the incentives to share information while exclusionary disclosure preserves them second information sharing increases expected total surplus with cournot competition but decreases it with bertrand competition in the context of a quadratic normal model with demand uncertainty

the capital asset pricing model an evaluation of its potential as a strategic planning tool in this paper we provide a summary of the capital asset pricing model capm and point out how it might possibly be used as a tool for strategic planning by corporations that own a portfolio of businesses we also point out some of the assumptions underlying the capm which must be satisfied if it is to be used for strategic planning next we include a critical appraisal of the capm as a strategic planning tool finally we state the case for linking competitive strategy models capm models and business simulation models

semiparametric estimation of selection models some empirical results among the central theoretical developments in the econometric analysis of nonexperimental microeconomic data has been the analysis of selectivity bias following the work of james heckman 1974 statistical techniques were developed in the 1970s to consistently estimate the parameters of these models one potential drawback to the application of these techniques is their sensitivity to the assumed parametric distribution of the unobservable error terms in the model in recent years a number of estimation methods for selection models have been developed which do not impose parametric forms on error distributions these methods are termed semiparametric since only part of the model of interest the regression function is parametrically specified while the statistical theory of these semiparametric estimators has received much attention practical applications of the methods are lacking an exception being the paper by joel horowitz and george neumann 1987 in this paper we use semiparametric methods to reanalyze data on the labor supply of married women first studied by thomas mroz 1987 using parametric methods the object of this reanalysis is to determine whether mroz s results are sensitive to his parametric assumptions

market structure and organizational form this paper studies the determinants of a firm s organizational form in the context of an imperfectly competitive industry there are two kinds of organizational forms the multi divisional form m form and the unitary form u form an m form firm suffers from ignorance of demand externalities among different products and double marginalization is eliminated in contrast in a u form firm demand externalities are taken into consideration and double marginalization exists a firm s optimal choice of organizational form depends on the market structure

note the capital asset pricing model and strategic planning we make two clarifying comments on a recent paper by naylor and tapon naylor t h f tapon 1982 the capital asset pricing model an evaluation of its potential as a strategic planning tool management sci 28 1166 1173 the conclusions of their paper are significantly affected by this

on the existence of a unique price equilibrium for models of product differentiation abstract we prove the existence of a unique price equilibrium for models of product differentiation these models are characterized by demand functions that depend on differences in prices and have log increasing differences in own price and other prices which implies that best response correspondences are increasing many discrete choice models satisfy these conditions including logit models and nested logit models and the existence theorem can be applied directly with the logarithmic transformation the existence theorem can be extended to models with homogeneous demand functions which characterizes representative consumer models

an econometric analysis of choice of mortgage design in the united kingdom the research seks to better understand the choice of mortgage design by households in the united kingdom family expenditures survey data is used to test the various hypotheses on the determinants of the choice between an endowment and a repayment mortgage a bivariate probit model with sample selection is estimated to detect any likely selectivity bias arising out of tenure choice the theoretical modelling reflects the behaviour of liquidity constrained households comparing comparative periodic mortgage costs and households concerned with the oppurtunity cost of equity in a property actual choices appear to reflect the impact of nominal interest rates income and cash flow considerations there is little direct evidence that the choice of mortgage repayment vehicle is motivated by portfolio design there is some tentative evidence of supply side pressure on endowment mortgage take up

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

strategic complements and substitutes and potential games abstract we show that games of strategic complements or substitutes with aggregation are pseudo potential games the upshot is that they possess nash equilibria in pure strategies ne even if the strategy sets are not convex and that various dynamic processes converge to ne in particular ne exist in cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models

welfare changes in the cournot setting with an empirical application to the telecommunications industry i characterize the efficiency of the cournot equilibrium and provide bounds for the loss in consumer surplus producer surplus and welfare when the number of firms in the market changes i only assume that demand is decreasing in price and costs increasing in the quantity produced as long as equilibrium exists i show how price demand and average cost before and after the number of firms in the market changes can be used to compute these bounds i apply these bounds to the portuguese wireline market and conclude that welfare increased significantly when the monopolist was split in 2007

measuring tax incidence an application to mortgage provision in the uk this paper derives measures of the average and marginal incidence of a tax or subsidy in imperfect competition in the context of the uk housing market we argue that one form of mortgage common in the uk but not elsewhere the endowment mortgage exists primarily because of the structure of taxation in the uk we estimate the determinants of the choice of the type of mortgage and the size of mortgage conditional on the choice using data from the building societies association on 43 000 individual mortgages taken out between 1985 and 1989 the estimated parameters are an input to the incidence measures results suggest that between 70 and 80 of the additional subsidy to endowment mortgages is captured by lenders rather than borrowers

rethinking the product portfolio a generalized investment model a generalized financial product portfolio theory is developed based on the underlying economic factors determining product profitability and risk for applications involving the firm s product investment decisions the model developed provides a means for differentiating market related risk and return from firm specific risk and return for each product two hypothetical illustrations of the model are described and the managerial implications are discussed

cross licensing and competition we study bilateral cross licensing agreements between n 2 firms that engage in competition after the licensing phase it is shown that the most collusive cross licensing royalty i e the one that allows the industry to achieve the monopoly profit is sustainable as the outcome of bilaterally efficient agreements in a symmetric setting if the terms of the cross licensing agreements are not observable to third parties the monopoly royalty is the unique symmetric bilaterally efficient royalty however when the terms of the agreements are public the most competitive royalty i e zero can also be bilaterally efficient policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross licensing agreements are derived from these results

mortgage risks debt literacy and financial advice a limited understanding of mortgage contracts and the risks involved may have contributed to the outbreak of the 2007 2008 financial crisis we developed a special questionnaire relating mortgage loan decisions to financial knowledge and financial advice our results demonstrate that homeowners appear to be well aware of mortgage risks large loans relative to home value are perceived as riskier as are loans with large mortgage payments relative to income and loans linked to investment vehicles homeowners with riskier mortgages indicated that they could encounter financial problems should house prices or their income decline homeowners with relatively low debt literacy are more likely to take out traditional mortgages with principal repayments over the maturity of the loan riskier mortgages are more prevalent among homeowners with a better understanding of loan contracts financially less sophisticated homeowners consulting mortgage brokers too hold riskier mortgages

competitive intelligence and disclosure competitive intelligence ci activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information we show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less more likely with cournot bertrand competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies when ci costs are independent of information characteristics each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a bertrand competitor with customer information only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival

iterative computation of cournot equilibrium abstract in a homogeneous coumot model with quasi concave profit functions the problem of determining an equilibrium can be posed as one of solving an equation in one real variable total sales if the response functions are monotone or firms are identical then a certain iterative process based on averaging converges to an equilibrium such iterations have the interpretation that every firm responds to the average of sales by other firms in brevious periods

on noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader follower game abstract in this paper we provide new proofs of existence and uniqueness of a stackelberg market equilibrium for a multiple leader follower noncooperative oligopoly model in which heterogeneous firms compete on quantities to this end we consider a two stage game of complete and perfect information in which many leaders interact strategically with many followers the stackelberg market equilibrium constitutes a pure strategy subgame perfect nash equilibrium of this game existence and uniqueness are more difficult to handle in this framework insofar as the presence of several leaders and followers displays a richer set of strategic interactions then to prove existence we notably provide a new procedure to determine the conditions under which the optimal behavior of the followers may be written as functions of the sole strategy profile of the leaders some examples outline our procedure and discuss our assumptions

distributional assumptions in the theory of oligopoly information exchange abstract we analyze the profitability of information sharing among cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand in this setting previous authors showed information exchange to be unprofitable when firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes we introduce a measure of the increase in the accuracy of firms demand forecasts when information is shared we provide two examples showing when this measure is large information exchange is profitable even though firms marginal costs are constant and outputs are perfect substitutes moreover we show that in the linear conditional expectations framework which has been standard in the literature this measure reveals these accuracy gains to be severely limited

perfectly competitive markets as the limits of cournot markets a perfectly competitive partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a bounded continuum of infinitesimal firms is considered cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms a sequence net of cournot markets each with a finite number of firms which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distributioon of firm technologies is introduced and it is shown that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a cournot equilibrium and all the cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market

duopoly information equilibrium cournot and bertrand abstract in a duopoly model where firms have private information about an uncertain linear demand it is shown that if the goods are substitutes not to share information is a dominant strategy for each firm in bertrand cournot competition if the goods are complements the result is reversed furthermore the following welfare results are obtained 1 i with substitutes in cournot competition the market outcome is never optimal with respect to information sharing but it may be optimal in bertrand competition if the products are good substitutes with complements the market outcome is always optimal 2 ii bertrand competition is more efficient than cournot competition 3 iii the private value of information to the firms is always positive but the social value of information is positive in cournot and negative in bertrand competition

duopoly information exchange the case of unknown slope abstract we model information exchange between duopolists facing a common random demand the slope of the common demand curve facing the firms is assumed unknown and firms observe private signals about this slope we show that for sufficiently large variation in the demand slope firms earn strictly higher profit when they share their information rather than keeping it private even with constant marginal costs and homogeneous goods in this case it is a nash equilibrium for the duopolists to share their information in a quid pro quo information exchange consistent with earlier models information exchange raises welfare

robust optimization of the 0 1 knapsack problem balancing risk and return in assortment optimization abstract retailers face the important but challenging task of optimizing their product assortments the challenge is to find for every category in every store the assortment that maximizes expected category profit adding to the complexity of this 0 1 knapsack problem retailers should also consider the risk associated with every assortment while every product in the assortment offers an expected return there is also uncertainty around its expected demand and profit contribution therefore retailers face the difficult task of designing a portfolio of products that balances risk and return in this paper we develop a robust approach to optimize retail assortments that offers this balance since the dimensionality of this robust 0 1 knapsack problem in practice often precludes full enumeration we propose a novel efficient and real time heuristic that solves this problem the heuristic constructs an approximation of the risk return efficient frontier of assortments we find that the robust solutions offer the retailer a considerable reduction in risk variance yet only imply a small reduction in expected return the constructed approximations contain assortments that are optimal solutions to the robust assortment optimization problem moreover they represent insightful visualizations of the solution space allowing for interactivity what risk premium should the retailer pay in real time matter of seconds

divisionalization franchising and divestiture incentives in oligopoly a two stage game is used to model firms strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization franchising or divestiture firms simultaneously choose their number of competing units which then engage in cournot competition while it is costly to form autonomous units each firm does so in equilibrium thus reducing firm profits and increasing social welfare relative to the case where firms cannot form competing units with linear demand and costs duopolists choose the socially optimal number of competing units oligopolies with larger numbers of firms choose too many the case of nonlinear demand is also examined copyright 1996 by american economic association

price vs quantity in oligopoly games abstract price setting and quantity setting oligopoly games lead to extremely different outcomes in the market one natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some firms use price while the remaining firms use quantity as their decision variable we introduce a mixed oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria in addition we consider an extension of this mixed oligopoly game through which the choice of the decision variables can be endogenized we prove the emergence of the cournot game

choice of mortgage instrument liquidity constraints and the demand for housing debt in the uk the research uses microdata to estimate reduced form mortgage demand equations based on truncated regressions dissagregated by choice of mortgage instrument the choice is between a standard annuity mortgage and a balloon type mortgage the endowment the estimates are used to indicate the differential impact of credit market rationing and financial liberalization on households the results indicate significant variations in mortgage demand by choice of mortgage instrument econometric testing demonstrates that the choice between an endowment and a repayment mortgage can be used as an exogenous indicator of liquidity and portfolio positions and different user costs of owner occupation

cournot competition and the social value of information in a differentiated product cournot model each supplier receives informative signals about demand the cross industry correlations of the signals differ more public signals have higher correlation coefficients in equilibrium information is used inefficiently from the industry s perspective information is over used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively public signals from the consumer s perspective information is under used and too much emphasis is placed on relatively private signals welfare is enhanced by increasing the use of information as desired by consumers but re balancing that use away from public signals as desired by the industry if information is costly and endogenously acquired then suppliers acquire too much new information but they use it too little

research joint ventures and the cost paradox abstract we consider the impact of the cost paradox on the likelihood of cooperative firms to use a cost reducing research joint venture rjv to increase research levels when spillovers are large the cost paradox cp occurs whenever industry wide cost reductions would lead to such intense competition that profits would fall we give a restriction on cost reducing research which guarantees that an rjv will prefer marginal reductions in research to the noncooperative levels whenever cp would arise and spillovers are less than perfect in such cases firms use an rjv to lessen competition rather than to lower costs

welfare optimal patent royalties when imitation is costly we identify welfare optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation entry and imperfect competition when the social planner may impose a compulsory license optimal royalties either blockade imitation facilitating unregulated monopoly or yield an aggregate zero profit efficient duopoly when duopoly is optimal the optimal per unit royalty pins the equilibrium price at the aggregate average cost and the optimal fixed royalty shifts surplus so the patentee and imitator break even efficient duopoly yields higher welfare than monopoly for sufficiently low invention cost and may also yield higher welfare than a prize system interestingly royalty payments may be negative because of this efficient duopoly may not be feasible if the planner must instead direct the courts to use such royalties

fully aggregative games abstract a game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player s own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players we characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

supermodularity and complementarity in economics an elementary survey the literature on supermodular optimization and games is surveyed from the perspective of potential users in economics this methodology provides a new approach for comparative statics based only on critical assumptions and allows a general analysis of games with strategic complementarities the results are presented in a simplified yet rigourous manner without reference to lattice theory for the special case of one dimensional parameter and actions sets with the emphasis being on wide accessibility detailed applications are presented for well known models of consumer behavior monopoly pass through bertrand and cournot competition strategic r d search and matching wherever appropriate useful tricks for applications and comparative comments are inserted

note the capital asset pricing model and strategic planning response to wernerfelt a response to wernerfelt b 1983 the capital asset pricing model and strategic planning unpublished paper graduate school of business administration university of michigan october

lechatelier samuelson principle in games and pass through of shocks abstract the lechatelier samuelson principle states that as a reaction to a shock an agent s short run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long run adjustment when the agent can also adjust other related actions we extend the principle to strategic environments where the long run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies we show that the principle holds for supermodular games strategic complements satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide sufficient conditions for the principle to hold in games of strategic substitutes heterogeneity we discuss the principle s implications for cost pass through of multiproduct firms

commodity taxation and imperfect competition a note on the effects of entry abstract this paper looks at the effects of allowing the number of firms to vary in seade s model of oligopoly and taxation we show that the normative and positive consequences of a specific commodity tax are affected by entry in significant ways

mixed oligopoly with consistent conjectures abstract in this paper we consider a model of mixed oligopoly with conjectural variations equilibrium cve the agents conjectures concern the price variations depending upon their production output s increase or decrease we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium called an exterior equilibrium for any set of feasible conjectures to introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium we develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures referred to as influence coefficients and prove the existence theorem for the interior equilibrium understood as a cve with consistent conjectures to prepare the base for the extension of our results to the case of non differentiable demand functions we also investigate the behavior of the consistent conjectures in dependence upon a parameter representing the demand function s derivative with respect to the market price

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

on the existence of pure and mixed strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous games a game is better reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x and every payoff vector limit u resulting from strategies approaching x some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i even if the others deviate slightly from x if strategy spaces are compact and convex payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner s strategy and the game is better reply secure then a pure strategy nash equilibrium exists better reply security holds in many economic games it also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy nash equilibria

tax compliance and firms strategic interdependence we focus on a relatively neglected area of the tax compliance literature in economics the behaviour of firms we examine the impact of alternative audit rules on receipts from a tax on profits in the context of strategic interdependence of firms the enforcement policy can have an effect on firms behaviour in two dimensions their market decisions as well as their compliance behaviour an appropriate design of the enforcement policy can thus have a double dividend by manipulating firms in both dimensions

oligopoly structure and the incidence of cigarette excise taxes abstract a model of oligopoly price behavior and tax incidence for the u s cigarette industry for the period 1955 1990 is presented a cost function is estimated and shows manufacture to be subject to increasing returns to scale the mean price elasticity of demand is 0 71 the model indicates that competition among manufacturers has been decreasing since 1980 a simulation shows that an increase in the federal excise tax causes a greater increase in price and a greater decrease in consumption than does the same increase in the average of state and local tax rates

on the effects of entry in cournot markets in the framework of symmetric cournot oligopoly this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that as the number of firms increases the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to i decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per firm output and ii increasing industry price and decreasing per firm output in both cases per firm profits are decreasing the analysis relies crucially on lattice theoretic methods and yields general unambiguous and easily interpretable conclusions of a global nature as a byproduct of independent interest new insight into existence of cournot equilibrium is developed

estimating the effect of tax reform in differentiated product oligopolistic markets abstract the incidence of taxation has been extensively discussed in the public finance literature but mainly within a competitive market setting or within a homogenous good cournot type oligopoly in a differentiated product oligopoly the effect of taxation can be more complex as the rate of taxation may affect not only the prices but also the profile and quality of products that are sold in the market in this paper we examine the effects of changing tax regimes in a differentiated product oligopoly in order to illustrate our approach we employ data from one such market the automobile market in israel

imperfect durability and the coase conjecture this article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time we show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria a coase conjecture equilibrium a monopoly equilibrium and a reputational equilibrium when the depreciation rate is low the coase conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for intermediate values of the depreciation rate all three equilibrium types coexist when the depreciation rate is high the monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium consequently when selling a good of sufficiently low durability the monopolist does not lose any of her monopoly power furthermore the steady state output in the reputational equilibrium falls below the monopoly quantity hence in durable goods markets welfare losses due to monopoly power may be larger than in markets for perishables

entry deterrence and overexploitation of the fishery abstract two stackelberg game models open access and restricted entry of a poaching fishery situation are proposed only the long run noncooperative solution of managing resource stocks is assumed feasible the optimal stock under open access for poachers is shown to be lower than under restricted entry and the latter to be lower than under exclusive ownership deterrence is completely successful under open access but is partially successful only under restricted entry the game models considered are shown to be equivalent to a constrained ownership fishery control problem or its surrogate

a dynamic analysis of mortgage arrears in the uk housing market summary the uk economy has enjoyed an unprecedented period of positive economic growth since the early 1990s the absence of recession for more than a decade has been accompanied by a sustained decline in the level of mortgage arrears as reported by major lenders this paper seeks to examine the factors which have driven the reduction in mortgage arrears and in doing so identify those factors which are most likely to cause arrears to increase in the future should economic conditions deteriorate the paper employs the johansen methodology to test for the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors an error correction model is estimated in order to examine long run and short run dynamics in mortgage arrears in line with previous research concerning the causes of mortgage arrears the results presented here emphasise the importance of changes in the rate of unemployment loan income and debt service ratios more importantly our results highlight the statistical significance of unwithdrawn housing equity as an explanatory variable with respect to mortgage arrears

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production