bureaucratic minimal squawk behavior theory and evidence from regulatory agencies this paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye the policy implications of this minimal squawk behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of capture an empirical test using data from us state public utility commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis longer puc terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills jel d73 l51 l97 l98

can multinational enterprises light up developing countries evidences from the access to electricity in sub saharan africa summary this paper examines the role that multinational enterprises mnes and foreign direct investments fdi can have in enhancing the access to electricity for local communities in developing countries based on the quality of home and host institutions access to electricity is a marker for development but it is far from being universal in developing countries the shortage of electricity is mainly the consequence of inability of governments in planning financing and developing necessary electricity infrastructure in this context investments from other actors can be essential particularly we focus on the role of fdi and mnes we claim that when mnes invest in developing countries they are incentivized to solve the lack of electricity infrastructure mainly for two reasons to guarantee their business activities and to gain legitimacy with their local stakeholders in addition we argue that mnes and fdi from institutionally underdeveloped countries will be more prone to develop infrastructure for the provision of electricity to local population as generally they suffer from a negative stereotype for this study we rely on 1 547 observations composed of pairs of 83 home countries and 15 host countries in sub saharan africa observed from 2005 to 2011 due to the nature of the database we adopt panel data techniques i e system gmm and corrected least square dummy variable estimators we find that fdi promotes access to electricity in developing countries with weak institutions and this is more likely true when fdi come from institutionally underdeveloped countries these results are far from obvious as they controvert common idea among institutional scholars that a regulatory authority is essential in the provision of infrastructure in conclusion with this paper we partially rehabilitate the image of mnes investing in developing countries by demonstrating that under certain conditions they could contribute to energy poverty alleviation of local population

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

optimal regulation of network expansion we model the optimal regulation of continuous irreversible capacity expansion where a regulated firm has private information about capacity costs investments are financed from the firm s cash flows and demand is stochastic the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a revenue tax that increases with the level of the price cap if the asymmetric information has large support then the optimal mechanism consists of a laissez faire regime for low cost firms that is the firm s price cap corresponds to that of an unregulated monopolist and it is not taxed this maximal distortion at the top is necessary to provide information rents as direct subsidies are not feasible

essential facility financing and market structure abstract the paper analyzes the funding of an infrastructure project when an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers money an open access policy raises welfare but may make the project non viable since funding must be provided by operators capital contributions we characterize the optimal market structure the regulator can ask the incumbent to bear a higher share of investment cost if the latter insists on an exclusive use yet the incumbent is willing to pay more for exclusivity the higher the demand that is precisely when competition yields the highest benefits at the optimum the incumbent s information is not used to determine market structure we further investigate the implications of this basic result in a dynamic context we show that the monopoly franchise policy is time consistent while an open access policy is not we also demonstrate that a threat of regulatory capture creates an open access presumption last we show that when the decision involves multiple projects monopoly segments should cross subsidize open access ones

industrial policy in an imperfect world theoretical analyses of industrial policy normally restrict the range of possible outcomes by abstracting from either market or government failures this paper thus studies industrial policy and its effectiveness in a model that includes both market and government imperfections we introduce a public agency responsible for industrial policy into the model of hausmann and rodrik 2003 and assume that this agency has limited information and is partly politically motivated we further extend the model to allow the public agency to communicate with entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs to engage in rent seeking we find that industrial policies are ineffective if the public agency is poorly informed but that they are not necessarily ineffective if the public agency is highly politically motivated given a highly politically motivated public agency industrial policies are effective if and only if the institutional setting ensures that such policies are modest e g by restricting the public agency s budget moreover our model helps us to understand why the same industrial policies that have failed elsewhere have been relatively successful in south korea and taiwan

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

technological progress and energy rebound effect in china s textile industry evidence and policy implications abstract although energy efficiency improvement can reduce energy consumption reduction of the effective price will also increase the demand for energy services part of this reduction is then offset because of the energy efficiency improvement the magnitude of this energy rebound effect is one of the important factors that must be considered in the formulation and implementation of energy policies the textile industry is a traditional pillar industry in china it is an important part of the national economy and contributes significantly to international trade this study uses the morishima elasticities of substitution mes model combined with asymmetric energy prices trans log cost function and other econometric methods to establish a framework to measure the rebound effect in china s textile industry the empirical results of this paper indicate that the rebound effect for china s textile industry is 20 991 this reveals that energy efficiency improvement is conducive for energy saving to a certain degree notwithstanding these results also prove that energy efficiency improvement is not the only way for china s textile industry to realize energy saving and emission reduction finally based on the analysis future policy priorities are suggested

sustaining long term supply chain partnerships using price only contracts abstract in this paper we study how an informal long term relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer performs in turbulent market environments characterized by uncertain demand we show that the long term partnership based on repeated interaction is sustainable under price only contracts when the supply chain partners are sufficiently patient that is the channel can be coordinated over a long time horizon when the factor whereby the members discount the future value of this trusting relationship is sufficiently high second above the minimum discount factor a range of wholesale prices exists that can sustain the long term partnership and there are different possible profit divisions between the two players third when the market is turbulent i e either the expected demand or the demand variance changes from period to period according to a probabilistic law it is typically less possible to sustain the long term partnership in a booming market or in a market with low demand variability finally obtaining more information about future market fluctuation may not help the supply chain to sustain the long term partnership due to partners strategic considerations with the availability of the market signal total supply chain profits increase but the retailer may even be worse off

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

four approaches to commodity market stabilization a comparative analysis the effects of four alternative price stabilization programs for soybeans are compared using a rational expectations model and simulation for a given government expenditure subsidized private storage is the most efficient way to stabilize market price for a given deadweight loss a program of direct payments is the most efficient stabilizer of the effective farm price this program does not stabilize market price all four programs including a buffer stock program and one involving both direct payments and buffer stocks tend to destabilize quasi rent programs that involve an initial build up of stocks increase producer benefits and hurt consumers

the domestic politics of banking regulation this article seeks to ground financial regulatory choices in domestic politics based on evidence from twenty two industrialized countries we argue that electoral rules specifically the extent to which they are centrifugal or centripetal have a significant effect on whether the banks or their consumers pay for the security of the banking system moreover despite the homogenizing effects of global financial integration the political dynamics generated by these electoral rules continue to shape the nature and extent of prudential regulations that countries adopt in the place of banking cartels

european competition policy in manufacturing and services a two speed approach the paper examines whether differences in the nature of competition between manufacturing and service activities are reflected by similar differences in ec competition the two differences between manufacturing and services which are mainly emphasized are local versus global competition and regulatory controls the paper finds that the implementation of ec competition policy instruments has differed significantly between manufacturing and services in terms of both the time profile and the type of instrument it also finds that the conflicts between competition industrial and trade policies are generally far greater in manufacturing than in services because trade offs between competition and competitiveness are less likely in the latter copyright 1993 by oxford university press

delegated monitoring versus arm s length contracting abstract this paper analyzes the optimal organization of input suppliers in a procurement context we discuss when a top firm chooses to induce information sharing and active coordination between its suppliers consolidation rather than having them contract at arm s length delegation in designing the organization the firm anticipates that different supplier networks have different costs of inducing information revelation from suppliers when the cost of information sharing varies the optimal organization exhibits various discrete degrees of consolidation there is excessive arm s length contracting compared to the case where the top firm controls this organizational choice itself the paper offers also a methodology to study in a unified framework various organizational forms separately analyzed in the literature

an empirical test of the resource based theory strategic regulation in the dutch audit industry the resource based view of the firm is a recent strategic management theory that seeks to identify the resources that may provide firms with a sustainable competitive advantage this paper has two purposes first the paper relates strategic management arguments to parallel lines of reasoning in industrial organization theory and argues that strategic regulation is a major source of sustainable competitive advantage the second purpose of the paper is to report the results of an empirical test of the resource based theory on the basis of a longitudinal data set on the postwar history of the dutch audit industry a key determinant of this history proves to be strategic regulation which stimulates demand for audit services and protects rent producing resources

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the market impact and the cost of environmental policy evidence from the swedish green car rebate we quantify the effects of the swedish gcr a program to reduce oil dependence and greenhouse gas emissions in the automobile industry we find the gcr to increase the market shares of green cars and its cost to be 109 tonco2 saved thus 5 times the price of an emission permit since the main green cars in sweden are ffvs flexible fuel vehicles which can switch between petrol gasoline and ethanol we also account for fuel choice which increases the cost of the program finally we show that consumers would have purchased ffvs regardless of the rebate provided by the gcr

the impact of standards and regulation on innovation in uncertain markets abstract this study analyses the impact of formal standards and regulation on firms innovation efficiency considering different levels of market uncertainty we argue that formal standards and regulation have different effects depending on the extent of market uncertainty derived from theoretical considerations about information asymmetry and regulatory capture our empirical analysis is based on the german community innovation survey cis the results show that formal standards lead to lower innovation efficiency in markets with low uncertainty while regulations have the opposite effect in cases of high market uncertainty we observe that regulation leads to lower innovation efficiency while formal standards have the reverse effect our results have important implications for the future application of both instruments showing that their benefits heavily depend on the market environment

fiscal corruption a vice or a virtue abstract recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues in allowing fiscal corruption by strengthening the bargaining power of corrupt tax officers it is argued that tax evasion may be reduced and tax revenues increased but does such an intriguing paradox justify policies that stimulate corruption our answer is no and this note puts forward three arguments to support our view first while an increase in corruption may raise revenues in the short run in general the opposite will be the case in the longer run second the instrumental value of reducing corruption goes far beyond its effects on tax evasion and tax revenues accepting corruption as a policy strategy to increase tax revenues may undermine values of democracy and good governance third eliminating corruption should be considered an end in itself thus contrary to recent suggestions on incentive reforms in tax administration the reasonable starting point for policy debates in this area should still be that an increase in fiscal corruption is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues sustained development cannot occur in an institutional framework that fosters corruption and extra legal tax enforcement

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

tax competition rent seeking and fiscal decentralization abstract the present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self defeating we find that rent seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost