international institutions and the volatility of international trade during the past half century states have established a large number of international trade institutions both multilateral and regional in scope the existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers namely reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country s output to terms of trade shocks governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions particularly the world trade organization wto and preferential trading arrangements ptas we hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce we further hypothesize that because market actors prefer price stability trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability this article conducts the first large scale multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001 the tests provide strong support for our arguments ptas and the wto regime significantly reduce export volatility in so doing these institutions also increase export levels

democracy volatility and economic development growth stability is an important objective because development requires sustained increases in income because volatility is costly for the poor and because volatility deters growth we study the determinants of average growth and its volatility as a two equation system and find that higher levels of democracy and diversification lower volatility whereas volatility itself reduces growth muslim countries instrument for democracy and measures of diversification identify volatility in contrast to the lack of consensus on the democracy growth relationship the democracy stability link is robust rather than focus on growth this paper forges an alternative link between democracy and development through the volatility channel

price setting during low and high inflation evidence from mexico this paper provides new insight into the relationship between inflation and the setting of individual prices by examining a large data set of mexican consumer prices covering episodes of both low and high inflation when the annual rate of inflation is low below 10 15 the frequency of price changes comoves weakly with inflation because movements in the frequency of price decreases and increases partly offset each other in contrast the average magnitude of price changes correlates strongly with inflation because it is sensitive to movements in the relative shares of price increases and decreases when inflation rises beyond 10 15 few price decreases are observed and both the frequency and average magnitude are important determinants of inflation i show that a menu cost model with idiosyncratic technology shocks predicts the average frequency and magnitude of price changes well over a range of inflation similar to that experienced by mexico

the quantitative analytics of the basic neomonetarist model this paper constructs a dynamic macroeconomic model with less than perfect price flexibility which has a classical side consistent with real business cycle theory augmented by investment adjustment costs increasing returns to scale and a new flexible formalization of imperfect competition something akin to the classical dichotomy is justified by a mode of approximation appropriate for a model in which one state variable adjusts quickly while another state variable adjusts slowly even with investment adjustment costs monetary expansions are found to raise the real interest rate the determinants of real rigidity and the macroeconomic rate of price adjustment are investigated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

real rigidities and the non neutrality of money rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks and by themselves small frictions in nominal adjustment such as costs of changing prices create only small non neutralities but this paper shows that substantial nominal rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions the paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for two specific sources of real rigidity one arising from goods market imperfections and the other from labour market imperfections

good for living on the relationship between globalization and life expectancy this paper analyzes the relationship between three dimensions economic social and political of globalization and life expectancy using a panel of 92 countries covering the 1970 2005 period using different estimation techniques and sample groupings we find that economic globalization has a robust positive effect on life expectancy even when controlling for income nutritional intake literacy number of physicians and several other factors the result also holds when the sample is restricted to low income countries only in contrast political and social globalization have no such robust effects

electoral politics interest groups and the size of government electoral politics interest groups and the size of government i introduction interest groups have been considered main actors in the political drama for some time now by political scientists as in bentley 1908 schattschneider 1935 and truman 1951 and more recently by economist also such as olson 1965 and stigler 1975 despite the widespread consensus on their importance there have been few formal attempts to analyze their impact on public policies thus borooah and van der ploeg 1983 90 were moved to declare that theory based on the importance of different interest groups is badly needed in economics an important exception is becker s 1983 1985 analysis of interest group competition becker draws insights about the nature of the trade offs that occur when interest groups compete for political influence but becker consciously avoids incorporating into his model political institutions such as voting voting rules and candidates 1983 391 4 1985 330 rather he assumes that the political process operates as a veil through which the underlying strengths and demands of various interest groups are revealed this paper takes a different tack but one complementary to becker s approach the analysis is based on an explicit model of the political process that includes interest groups in the model interest group influence is a potential supply of votes for which parties or candidates compete each party seeks a winning coalition of voters and thus engages in implicit logrolling tullock 1959 572 an equilibrium exists in the competition for the support of interest groups and the nature of the equilibrium electoral platforms is identified below embodied in the characterization of the equilibria is a set of parameters that can be said to measure the strengths of the various interest groups and which enable one to identify how candidates change their policy positions in response to a change in the strength of an interest group it is therefore possible to analyze simultaneously the existence of an electoral equilibrium its nature including its normative properties and changes in equilibrium due to shifts in the balance of forces between competing groups 1 in contrast to becker 1983 1985 these analytical features are not assumed outright rather they are based on an underlying model of elections the theoretical underpinnings for this model are discussed in section ii interest groups are often alleged to be responsible in part for recent increases in the size of government in western democracies 2 therefore in sections iii and iv a model of the political process is used to study the impact of an increase in the influence of a particular interest group on government size in the simple models of the public sector considered here increasing group influence per se does not cause the size of the government to increase but an increase in the government s size does result when i there are constraints on the government s ability to change tax shares in response to a shift in group power or ii there is a publicly provided good which benefits one untaxed group and that group s sole concern with government policy is to maximize the amount of the good that it gets the paper concludes by considering some of the normative implications of the results ii interest groups in the electoral process there are two sets of actors in the model parties and interest groups and two sets of relationships which must be analyzed the relationships between interest groups and the parties and the relationship between the parties themselves with respect to the first question this paper investigates the determinants of each interest group s influence on the platforms proposed by the parties with respect to the second it explores whether the competition for votes between the parties produces an equilibrium and if so what its properties are

closely competing firms and price adjustment some findings from an online marketplace we investigate retailers price setting behavior using a unique dataset containing by the second records of prices offered by closely competing retailers on a major japanese price comparison website first we find that when the average price of a product across retailers falls rapidly the frequency of price adjustments increases and the size of price adjustments becomes larger second we find positive autocorrelation in the frequency of price adjustments implying that there tends to be clustering where price adjustments occur in succession in contrast there is no such autocorrelation in the size of price adjustments these two findings indicate that the behavior of competing retailers is characterized by state dependent pricing rather than time dependent pricing

democracy and social spending in latin america 1980 92 what is the effect of regime type on public expenditures for social programs we investigate the relationship between democracy and the change in social spending controlling for gdp the debt inflation and age structure of the population through a time series cross sectional panel data set for 17 latin american countries from 1980 to 1992 the results show that especially in poor countries during economic crisis democracies increase the allocation of resources to social programs relative to authoritarian regimes this suggests that the latter are more constrained by economic forces whereas democracies are more constrained by popular demands hence calls to abandon broad categorizations of regime type appear to be premature democracy can matter in systematic and substantial ways

price changes in the euro area and the united states some facts from individual consumer price data prices of goods and services do not adjust immediately in response to changing demand and supply conditions this paper characterizes the average frequency and size of price changes in the euro area and its member countries investigates the determinants of the probability of price changes and compares the evidence for the euro area with available u s results the facts documented in this paper are based on evidence from individual price data recorded at the store level in all euro area countries except ireland and greece that is in datasets covering austria belgium finland france germany italy luxembourg the netherlands portugal and spain which together account for around 97 percent of euro area gdp the data used are the monthly price records underlying the computation of national consumer price indices and harmonized consumer price indices these data cover a large number of products selected on the basis of extensive household budget surveys

openness external risk and volatility implications for the compensation hypothesis a central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility based on this assumption schol ars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated eco nomic instability the openness volatility link is dubious however on both theoret ical and empirical grounds in this study i revisit the volatility assumption focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatil ity my statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries 1950 2002 finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates but a largely insignificant effect of openness these findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness spending nexus calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two the general growth of government in the post world war ii era is one of the most important empirical regularities in political science measured by general govern ment consumption or sectoral expenditures government size grew dramatically during most of the postwar period intrigued by this phenomenal government growth political scientists offered numerous accounts some viewing this growth as a corollary of economic phenomena such as modernization industrialization income distribution or fiscal illusion and others attributing government growth to political causes such as bureaucratization interest group politics and electoral competition 1

a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits in this paper the joint problem of ordering and offering price discount by a supplier to his sole major buyer is analyzed the objective is to induce the buyer to alter his order schedule and size so that the supplier can benefit from lower set up ordering and inventory holding costs we generalize the quantity discount pricing model of monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 6 720 726 to 1 explicitly incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of discount that can be offered and 2 relax the implicit assumption of a lot for lot or order for order policy adopted by the supplier an algorithm is developed to solve the supplier s joint ordering and price discount problem

note comment on a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits lee and rosenblatt lee h l m j rosenblatt 1986 a generalized quantity discount pricing model to increase supplier s profits management sci 32 9 1177 1185 considered the joint problem of ordering and offering discount by a supplier to his sole buyer the objective of the supplier being to induce the buyer to alter his order quantities in order to increase the supplier s yearly profit they determined the optimal ordering and pricing policy for the supplier under the constraint on the amount of discount offered to the purchaser this restriction on the amount of price discount seems unreasonable when the objective of the supplier in all likelihood is to increase his own profits it is possible that higher discounts in purchase price may lead to greater economies for the supplier in this note a much simpler approach is being offered for determining the optimal ordering and pricing policy for the supplier

small states small problems income growth and volatility in small states abstract small states have attracted a large amount of research in this paper we test whether small states are any different from other states in terms of their income growth and volatility outcomes we find that controlling for location small states have higher per capita gdp than other states this income advantage is largely due to a productivity advantage constituting evidence against the idea that small states suffer from an inability to exploit increasing returns to scale small states also do not have different per capita growth rates than other states small states do have greater volatility of annual growth rates which is in part due to their greater volatility of terms of trade shocks this terms of trade based volatility is in turn due to small states greater openness their greater openness on balance has however a positive net payoff for growth the one differential policy measure that might be relevant for small states is to further open up to international capital markets in order to better diversify risk but the benefits of even that are still unresolved in the literature we conclude that small states are no different from large states and so should receive the same policy advice that large states do

dependency revisited international markets business cycles and social spending in the developing world while increased exposure to the global economy is associated with increased welfare effort in the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd the opposite holds in the developing world these differences are typically explained with reference to domestic politics tradables unions and the like in the developing world are assumed to have less power or interests divergent to those in the oecd interests that militate against social spending i claim that such arguments can be complemented with a recognition that developed and developing nations have distinct patterns of integration into global markets while income shocks associated with international markets are quite modest in the oecd they are profound in developing nations in the oecd governments can respond to those shocks by borrowing on capital markets and spending countercyclically on social programs no such opportunity exists for most governments in the developing world most of which have limited access to capital markets in tough times more significant incentives to balance budgets and as a result cut social spending at the times it is most needed thus while internationally inspired volatility and income shocks seem not to threaten the underpinnings of the welfare state in rich nations it undercuts the capacity of governments in the developing world to smooth consumption and particularly consumption by the poor across the business cycle the author would like to thank steph haggard kristin bakke wongi choe tim jones and seminar participants at duke university penn state university washington university mit and the university of new mexico for their helpful comments nancy brune mark hallerberg and rolf strauch and nita rudra were very generous in providing their capital account oecd fiscal and potential labor power data respectively

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

global markets and national politics collision course or virtuous circle increasing exposure to trade foreign direct investment and liquid capital mobility have not prompted a pervasive policy race to the neoliberal bottom among the oecd countries one reason is that there are strong political incentives for governments to cushion the dislocations and risk generated by openness moreover countries with large and expanding public economies when balanced with increased revenues even from capital taxes have not suffered from capital flight or higher interest rates this is because the modern welfare state comprising income transfer programs and publicly provided social services generates economically important collective goods that are undersupplied by markets and that actors are interested in productivity value these range from the accumulation of human and physical capital to social stability under conditions of high market uncertainty to popular support for the market economy itself as a result arguments about the demise of national autonomy in the global economy are considerably overdrawn

democracy and national economic performance the preference for stability appear to arise because democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages another mechanism that might explain democratic stability when growth and volatility are jointly examined democracies reveal highly favorable economic results oes democracy affect national economic performance and if so how no question is more central to the study of political economics almost all previous work on democracy and economic performance has focused exclusively on growth rates with contradictory and confusing results in this article we argue that to reveal the impact of democratic institutions on economic performance scholars must consider two dimensions of economic performance growth rate and volatility we begin with a novel hypothesis economic policy in democracy is risk avoiding relative to policy in nondemocracies 1 because voters are riskaverse they penalize incumbent governments for economic volatility and democratic governments respond accordingly in nondemocracies we posit that elites are more likely to seek risk that voters would reject consequently autocracies produce systematically more economic volatility than

a classification of literature on determining the lot size under quantity discounts abstract determining a lot size in the presence of either all units or incremental discounts has represented one of major interests of materials managers it is a common practice that the suppliers offer quantity discount to entice the buyers to purchase more and to achieve economies of scale for transportation and processing costs this paper will classify the literature on lot sizing determination under several types of discount schemes and discuss some of the significant literature in this area over two decades also some future research areas have been identified

menu costs and phillips curves this paper develops a model of a monetary economy in which individual firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as general inflation sellers can change price only by incurring a real menu cost we calibrate this cost and the variance and autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic shock using a new u s data set of individual prices due to klenow and kryvtsov the prediction of the calibrated model for the effects of high inflation on the frequency of price changes accords well with international evidence from various studies the model is also used to conduct numerical experiments on the economy s response to various shocks in none of the simulations we conducted did monetary shocks induce large or persistent real responses

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

microeconomic rigidities and aggregate price dynamics abstract this paper is an attempt to enrich the characterization of the sluggish behavior of the aggregate price level our contribution to this vast literature is to explicitly consider microeconomic heterogeneity and its interaction with nonlinear microeconomic price adjustment policies the model we propose outperforms the constant probability of adjustment partial adjustment model in describing the path of postwar u s inflation using only aggregate data we infer that the probability that a firm adjusts its price depends on the sign and the magnitude of the deviation of the price from its target level at the aggregate level we find that the aggregate price level responds less to negative shocks than to positive shocks that the size of this asymmetry increases with the size of the shock and that the number of firms changing their prices and therefore the flexibility of the price level to aggregate shocks varies endogenously over time in response to changes in economic conditions

note comments on a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits monahan monahan j p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci june 720 726 adapted the quantity discount model of inventory theory to the problem of determining an optimal quantity discount schedule from a vendor s point of view and opened up an important direction of research however his one item one customer one vendor model is based on several implicit assumptions that must be judged unreasonable monahan must account for the vendor s inventory carrying charges and redefine his variable s2 it is shown that a rational vendor s manufacturing frequency would not be identical to the buyer s ordering frequency if the vendor s manufacturing setup costs are substantially larger than the buyer s ordering costs a numerical example presented in this note also questions the practical usefulness of monahan s model even after its theoretical inaccuracies axe corrected monahan s model may explain discounts that are a fraction of 1 of the price of an item but it fails to explain commonly observed magnitudes of quantity discounts such as 10 of the unit price

wagner s hypothesis in time series and cross section perspectives evidence from real data for 115 countries internationally comparable data on income and government expenditure for 115 countries covering the period 1950 80 are used to assess the validity of wagner s hypothesis individual country time series data and several intercountry cross sections are studied besides a tremendous diversity in the position for various countries the results indicate that while there is support for the hypothesis in some time series data sets such support is lacking in most cross section estimates much of the support for the hypothesis reported in many earlier studies therefore was probably due to either use of limited samples or inadequate data comparability across the observations studied copyright 1987 by mit press

entitlement to assort democracy compromise culture and economic stability abstract we propose a simple model to support rodrik s 2000 conjecture that democracy lowers economic instability through breeding compromise culture in the model a population of compromisers and opportunists collectively bargain over the assortativity level of matching through a democratic political institution we show that compromisers are able to achieve a positive level of assortativity which helps them to avoid matching with opportunists this in turn raises compromisers payoffs above opportunists and eventually compromisers dominate the population through cultural evolution

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

participatory politics social cooperation and economic stability few would doubt the proposition that political institutions matter for economic development yet robust generalizations and systematic evidence on how exactly they do so are lacking in this paper attention is drawn to regularity in the cross national data that has received little attention to date participatory political regimes are associated with significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability after presenting some of the evidence it is speculated that the reason has to do with the propensity of democracy to moderate social conflict and induce compromise three distinct arguments as to why this may be the case are presented

joint inventory replenishments with group discounts based on invoice value the study focuses attention on a grouping procedure for the purpose of joint inventory replenishments from a single supplier the grouping procedure exploits the group discounts available on the total purchase value of a group of index and the economies of scale of order placing costs in particular it is shown that the optimal groups are formed such that the annual dollar usage values of the items do not decrease may increase or stay the same from the first to the last group this is similar in concept to the well known abc classification of inventory items the grouping problem is modeled as a shortest path using the above property

reset price inflation and the impact of monetary policy shocks abstract many business cycle models use a flat short run phillips curve due to time dependent pricing and strategic complementarities to explain fluctuations in real output but in doing so these models predict unrealistically high persistence and stability of us inflation in recent decades we calculate reset price inflation based on new prices chosen by the subsample of price changers to dissect this discrepancy we find that the models generate too much persistence and stability both in reset price inflation and in the way reset price inflation is converted into actual inflation our findings present a challenge to existing explanations for business cycles jel e31 e52

a generalized discount structure and some dominance rules for selecting the price break eoq abstract this paper introduces a generalized discount structure that combines the features of incremental and all units quantity discount policies general properties of the eoq model under this discount structure are studied and dominance rules for comparing order quantity intervals under either type of discount policy are established in addition procedures for developing an iso cost function and the minimal feasible set for optimal order quantity are proposed

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

union organization in advanced industrial democracies i suggest a new explanation of cross national differences in unionization rates the size of the labor force size matters because the gains unions are able to achieve in collective bargaining depend on the proportion of substitutable workers who are organized while the costs of organizing depend in part on the absolute number to be recruited the comparison of the costs and benefits of organizing new workers yields the conclusion that unions in larger labor markets will accept lower levels of unionization statistical analysis of cross national differences in unionization rates among advanced industrial societies in the late 1970s indicates that the size of the labor force and the cumulative participation of leftist parties in government explain most of the variance

is globalization reducing absolute poverty summary using data from 114 countries 1983 2007 we examine the relationship between globalization and world bank absolute poverty estimates we find a significant negative correlation between globalization and poverty robust to several econometric specifications including a fixed effect panel a long run first difference and a pooled ols regression introducing two instruments for globalization we also show that results are robust to correction for potential endogeneity we motivate and test the instruments in several ways in particular information flows and more liberal trade restrictions robustly correlate with lower absolute poverty

the dynamics of political compromise we characterize efficient self enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly the party in power can decide the allocation and the parties political strength changes according to a markov process we find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power we find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

the kinked demand curve a game theoretic approach in a simple model of duopoly firms price moves are modelled as an extensive form game where firms can respond to undercutting without delay when firms are not too dissimilar kinked demand strategies enforcing an arbitrary price may be nash equilibria however these strategies are dominated and perfect equilibrium is unique at the minimum optimal common price rather than implying price rigidity kinked demand strategies are a device for ensuring compliance with a collusive price leadership

price stickiness in ss models new interpretations of old results abstract what is the relation between infrequent price adjustment and the dynamic response of the aggregate price level to monetary shocks the answer to this question ranges from a one to one link calvo g 1983 prices in a utility maximizing framework journal of monetary economics 12 383 398 to no connection whatsoever caplin a spulber d 1987 menu costs and the neutrality of money quarterly journal of economics 102 703 726 the purpose of this paper is to provide a unified framework to understand the mechanisms behind this wide range of results in doing so we propose new interpretations of key results in this area which in turn suggest the kind of ss model that is likely to generate substantial price rigidity among these new interpretations we revisit caplin and spulber s monetary neutrality result we show that when price stickiness is measured in terms of the impulse response function this result is not a consequence of aggregation as is often assumed but is due instead to the absence of price stickiness at the microeconomic level we also show that the selection effect according to which units that adjust their prices are those that benefit the most is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the higher aggregate flexibility of ss type models compared to calvo models instead the key concept is the contribution of the extensive margin of adjustment to the aggregate price response the aggregate price level is more flexible than suggested by the microeconomic frequency of adjustment if and only if this term is positive

multi buyer discount pricing abstract this article gives an exact optimal solution to the problem of finding the optimal discount price and price break quantity for a seller dealing with one buyer it also gives a method for solving the problem when one seller offers a single quantity discount schedule to many buyers the discount is of the all quantity type and the model of the cost structure was originally proposed by crowther

government size and economic growth a new framework and some evidence from cross section and time series data a study of the impact of government size on economic performance and growth is important theoretically one point of view suggests that a larger government size is likely to be detrimental to efficiency and economic growth because for example i government operations are often conducted inefficiently ii the regulatory process imposes excessive burdens and costs on the economic system and iii many of government s fiscal and monetary policies tend to distort economic incentives and lower the productivity of the system at the other extreme one can identify some points of view that assign to the government a critical role in the process of economic development and could argue that a larger government size is likely to be a more powerful engine of economic development there are several arguments on which the latter point of view is based these include besides others i role of the government in harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests ii prevention of exploitation of the country by foreigners and iii securing an increase in productive investment and providing a socially optimal direction for growth and development

openness country size and government abstract this paper shows that smaller countries have a larger share of public consumption in gdp and are also more open to trade these empirical observations are consistent with recent theoretical models explaining country formation and break up and may account for the observed positive empirical relationship between trade openness and government size

state dependent or time dependent pricing does it matter for recent u s inflation in the 1988 2004 micro data collected by the u s bureau of labor statistics for the cpi price changes are frequent every 4 7 months depending on the treatment of sale prices and large in absolute value on the order of 10 the size and timing of price changes varies considerably for a given item but the size and probability of a price change are unrelated to the time since the last price change movements in aggregate inflation reflect movements in the size of price changes rather than the fraction of items changing price due to offsetting movements in the fraction of price increases and decreases neither leading time dependent models taylor or calvo nor 1 st generation state dependent models match all of these facts some 2 nd generation state dependent models however appear broadly consistent with the empirical patterns

evidence on macroeconomic complementarities this paper provides empirical evidence on macroeconomic complementarities a restriction on the nature of interaction between individuals in a multiagent setting these models imply that activities across agents will be positively correlated that discrete decisions will be synchronized and that disturbances will be magnified and propagated the paper shows that these implications are consistent with aggregate observations as well as some microeconomic evidence further looking at certain historical episodes such as the national industrial recovery act as well as seasonal fluctuations provides additional support for models with macroeconomic complementarities copyright 1996 by mit press

an incremental discount pricing schedule with multiple customers and single price break abstract this paper analyzes how a supplier can formulate the terms of a quantity discount pricing schedule assuming a single incremental discount system a model is developed from which an algorithm is derived for an optimal discount schedule the cases are investigated in which both the discount rate and the break point are unknown and either one is prescribed a numerical example is presented to illustrate the algorithm developed

an eoq model for perishable product with special sale and shortage abstract in this paper for the first time an inventory control model to determine the optimal order and shortage quantities of a perishable item when the supplier offers a special sale is developed four possible cases based on decision that the purchaser might make about the first replenishment policy using regular economic order quantity model at reduced price or regular price if he did not take the special order and coincidence of special period length with positive or negative inventory level of the last regular period length during the special period are investigated moreover several useful theorems are suggested through which one can find closed form solution directly when there are integer operators involved in an objective function at the end in order to illustrate the proposed theorems and the solution method some numerical examples are solved and a sensitivity analysis is reported too

microeconomic adjustment hazards and aggregate dynamics the basic premise of this paper is that understanding aggregate dynamics requires considering that agents are heterogeneous and that they do not adjust continuously to the shocks they perceive we provide a general characterization of lumpy behavior at the microeconomic level in terms of an adjustment hazard function which relates the probability that a unit adjusts to the deviation of its state variable from its moving target we characterize rich cross sectionally dependent aggregate dynamics generated by nonconstant hazards we present an example based on u s manufacturing employment and job flows and find that increasinghazard models outperform constant hazard partial adjustment models in describing aggregate employment dynamics

note on a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits monahan monahan james p 1984 a quantity discount pricing model to increase vendor profits management sci 30 june 720 726 develops a model for establishing an optimal quantity discount schedule from a vendor s viewpoint in this note we show that this model is limited to the case where the vendor buys from another supplier incorporating vendor s inventory carrying costs we develop a generalized version of monahan s model and demonstrate its equivalence with the joint economic lot size approach suggested by banerjee banerjee avijit 1986 a joint economic lot size model for purchaser and vendor decision sci 17 summer 292 311

the political economy of international trade enduring puzzles and an agenda for inquiry a similar set of concepts has been central to the literatures on the formation of trade policy coalitions and the new economics of institutions the political and economic consequences of the degree to which assets are specific to a particular economic activity in this survey the authors take the necessary first step of summarizing the main findings of these two literatures and then suggest ways in which the issue might be joined in addition to providing a more coherent understanding of the findings of these two literatures and some new directions for them the authors show that many puzzles remain in the field of trade politics puzzles for which there are no appealing answers or where there are answers no strong evidence in support of them this essay then in addition to being a theoretical review of the literature puts forward an agenda for future study of international trade politics

the effects of capital mobility trade openness and democracy on social spending in latin america 1980 1999 empirical studies measuring the impact of globalization on social spending have appeared recently in leading journals this study seeks to improve upon previous work by 1 employing a more sophisticated and comprehensive measure of financial openness 2 using a more accurate measure of trade openness based on purchasing power parities and 3 relying on social spending data that are more complete than those used by previous studies on latin america our estimates suggest that several empirical patterns reported in previous work deserve a second look we find that trade openness has a positive association with education and social security expenditures that financial openness does not constrain government outlays for social programs and that democracy has a strong positive association with social spending particularly on items that bolster human capital formation t he international integration of markets for goods and services over the past two decades is unprecedented amidst a broader context of international integration latin america has experienced the most dramatic change in its economic policy orientation since world war ii few regions have undergone as rapid and thorough an economic transformation how has economic integration affected the social welfare policies of latin american governments has it forced them to reduce spending on social programs in order to compete in the world economy or has it induced them to provide social safety nets for those hurt by economic competition has democratization in latin america compelled governments to spend more on social programs in relatively open economies

risk and trade regimes another exploration an analysis of a small sample of countries shows that the higher the level of termsof trade risk that a nation faces in international markets the more likely it is to increase barriers the analysis also shows that the greater the availability of social insurance programs mounted by a nation s government the less likely it is to block free trade in comparison with the small open economies of western europe therefore developing countries may remain protectionist because they lack the resources to mount internal programs of transfer payments as a means of coping with risk from international markets

globalization domestic politics and social spending in latin america a time series cross section analysis 1973 97 this study examines the effects of globalization democratization and partisanship on social spending in fourteen latin american countries from 1973 to 1997 using a pooled time series error correction model the authors examine three sets of issues first following debates in the literature on oecd countries they want to know whether social spending has been encouraged or constrained by integration into global markets within this context they examine the extent to which such outcomes might be influenced by two additional sets of domestic political and institutional factors discussed in work on developed countries the electoral pressures of democratic institutions and whether or not popularly based governments are in power the authors show that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital markets this is the strongest and most robust finding in the study neither democratic nor popularly based governments consistently affect overall social spending the authors then disaggregate spending into social security transfers and expenditures on health and education they find that popularly based governments tend to protect social security transfers which tend to flow disproportionately to their unionized constituencies but they have a negative impact on health and education spending conversely a shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending which reaches a larger segment of the population the authors conclude by emphasizing the contrasting political logics of the different types of social spending

exogenous shocks foreign aid and civil war the recent civil war literature suggests that negative economic shocks in low income countries increase the risk of civil war foreign aid can be an effective conflict prevention tool in times of severe economic conditions aid cushions government spending from the downward pressures of economic shocks providing recipient governments with resources they can use to make rebellion a less attractive option for aggrieved domestic groups using official development assistance oda data covering 1990 through 2004 we find that foreign aid appears to be a useful tool for preventing civil wars in the wake of negative economic shocks and as such aid should be assessed by donors with these conflict suppressing aspects in mind

incorporating quantity discounts to the eoq model with transportation costs abstract this article extends a previous economic order quantity eoq model with two modes of transportation namely truckload tl and less than truckload ltl carriers by introducing all units and incremental quantity discount structures into the analysis exact algorithms are developed for each quantity discount structure to compute optimal policies for single stage models over an infinite planning horizon

globalization and the decline of the welfare state in less developed countries why have trends in government welfare spending in developing countries diverged from those in developed countries i address this question by investigating the effects of capital and trade flows on government welfare spending in fifty three developing countries using an original measure of labor power in developing countries i test the links between international markets labor s political strength and the welfare state i argue that labor s collective action problems caused by large populations of low skilled and surplus workers offset labor s potential political gains from globalization i show that when the proportion of low skilled workers in a nation is high globalization will lead to a decline in welfare spending most significantly the results suggest that in nations where labor market institutions are not yet well developed government social welfare spending is constrained by international market forces

why are prices sticky the dynamics of wholesale gasoline prices the menu cost interpretation of sticky prices implies that the probability of a price change should depend on the past history of prices and fundamentals only through the gap between the current price and the frictionless price we find that this prediction is broadly consistent with the behavior of nine philadelphia gasoline wholesalers nevertheless we reject the menu cost model as a literal description of these firms behavior arguing instead that price stickiness arises from strategic considerations of how customers and competitors will react to price changes

government size and growth accounting for economic freedom and globalization we examine the relationship between government size and economic growth controlling for economic freedom and globalization and using bayesian averaging over classical estimates in a panel of rich countries

frequency of price adjustment and pass through we empirically document using u s import prices that on average goods with a high frequency of price adjustment have a long run pass through that is at least twice as high as that of low frequency adjusters we show theoretically that this relationship should follow because variable mark ups that reduce long run pass through also reduces the curvature of the proflt function when expressed as a function of the cost shocks making the flrm less willing to adjust its price lastly we quantitatively evaluate a dynamic menu cost model and show that the variable mark up channel can generate signiflcant variation in frequency equivalent to 37 of the observed variation in the data on the other hand the standard workhorse model with constant elasticity of demand and calvo or state dependent pricing has di culty matching the facts

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association

government expenditure and economic growth a cross country study this paper examines the relationship between the share of government consumption expenditure in gdp and the rate of growth of real per capita gdp the work of the u n international comparison project has recently made available new estimates for over 100 countries of both per capita gdp and the share of government consumption these new estimates are based on direct price comparisons rather than exchange rate conversions as a result the statistics for different countries are more comparable and cross country studies will be more reliable