salvaging gresham s law the good the bad and the illegal contrary to the claims of arthur rolnick and warren weber gresham s law is not a fallacy nor does it rest on the unrealistic assumption of an operational fixed disequilibrium exchange rate between two economically distinct monies here i interpret gresham s law as a result of coercive legal tender laws aimed at discouraging agents from discriminating among alternative monies such laws can systematically drive good money out of circulation by placing buyers and sellers in a prisoner s dilemma in which the use of bad money represents a unique noncooperative equilibrium i offer some historical examples which are not readily explainable using rolnick and weber s proposed alternative to gresham s law copyright 1996 by ohio state university press

line item veto where is thy sting roponents of giving the president the authority to use a line item veto argue that the institutional change is needed to limit special interest legislation and restrain spending opponents respond that it would grant too much added power to the president thereby upsetting the delicate balance wisely crafted by the founding fathers this article focuses on the presumption evidently shared by both sides in the debate that adoption of item veto authority will have significant consequences in terms of budget outcomes and the distribution of power 1 curiously there presently exists little empirical support for the presumption that item veto authority is important most studies comparing states with various types of veto authority have failed to detect significant effects associated with item veto additional tests of our own are consistent with these results after reviewing the empirical evidence we reconsider the alleged effects of item veto authority by seating the popular depiction in an explicit model of the budgetary process formal modeling exposes logical inconsistencies contained in popular veto discourse further the model makes clear that the predicted consequences of item veto commonly projected as ubiquitous in fact arise only in select settings

bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the u s congress explaining why committee systems emerge there but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries to analyze the effects of different constitutional features on the internal organization of legislatures we adopt a vote buying model and consider the incentives to delegate decision rights in a game among legislative chambers we show how presidential veto power and bicameral separation can encourage a legislative chamber to create internal veto players or supermajority rules while a unicameral structure can encourage legislators to delegate power to a leader

regulation and the theory of legislative choice the interstate commerce act of 1887 this article concerns the economic incidence of the interstate commerce act of 1887 ica our focus is the short haul pricing constraint a provision of the ica that prohibited railroads from charging higher rates to isolated primarily agrarian shippers than it charged to intercity shippers of similar commodities utilizing the event study methodology we find that the impending passage of the ica generated a distribution of abnormal returns to railroads and shipping firms that is consistent with the theoretical implications of our analysis of the short haul pricing constraint shpc however early interpretations of the shpc by the interstate commerce commission reduced some of the abnormal returns to railroads in a manner that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the short haul pricing constraint was an important mechanism of early railroad regulation the analysis does support a multiple interest interpretation of the interstate commerce act and has implications for the positive theory of regulation

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

estimation of distance decay functions to account for substitution and spatial heterogeneity in stated preference research in a site selection choice experiment various hypotheses are tested related to spatial heterogeneity in willingness to pay wtp for environmental improvements spatial heterogeneity is measured through distance decay effects substitute sites inside and outside the experiment s choice set and spatial trend variables we demonstrate that distance decay functions differ between users and nonusers and across study sites also the distance to substitutes outside the choice set explains spatial variation in wtp we show that further extending the model with spatial trend variables reveals additional spatial heterogeneity in choices accounting for spatial heterogeneity patterns results in significantly different wtp estimates for environmental improvements jel q25 q51

agent discretion regulatory policymaking and different institutional arrangements this paper examines agent discretion that is a result of the structure of the legislative process based on several distributions of lawmaking powers different games are analyzed in which players decide on regulatory policies the analysis shows that agent discretion increases as lawmaking powers are differentiated and assigned to specialized players particularly monopoly initiation power which allows a player to act as a gatekeeper has a substantial impact on discretion agent discretion will be even larger when these players also have heterogenous preferences the framework that is developed in this paper permits comparisons across different political systems with regard to agent discretion and legislative control on policymaking

circumventing formal structure through commitment presidential influence and agenda control although the formal institutional structure that defines the temporal order of play in a policy game between the congress and president ought to provide congress with agenda power the president is traditionally treated as the dominant player in this relationship we show that if the president can make clear cut commitments presidential commitment can counter the dominance hierarchy and the complexion of equilibrium outcomes thus the details of political interactions in particular the possibilities for commitment may be as important as the formal specification of institutional structure

a model of political competition in the underlying space of ideology this study makes use of the concept of ideology to answerimportant questions of political competition i develop amulticandidate model in which voters use ideology as asimplifying device that helps them to choose a candidate in anoisy environment three important results arise for thehomogeneous polity case first the candidate with moreresources is the one more likely to win the election second a merger between two parties might yield to a higher expectedplurality for the candidate of the newly formed party third political convulsion yields to a decrease in the expectedplurality for the incumbent candidate

rules and games this paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes we develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of pareto improved equilibria points we then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules including examples from malaysia india brazil turkey and canada we show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy

why democracies may actually be less reliable allies recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies this need not be the case alliances serve as commitment devices adding ex ante credibility to states claims about ex post behavior variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments put simply democracies are most improved by formal commitments we offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically we test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention rather than on the duration or the number of commitments our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies

bureaucratic discretion or congressional control regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission this paper extends stigler and peltzman s approach to regulation by incorporating a legislature the model yields comparative statics results and hence testable implications the paper then tests between two opposing approaches about regulatory agency behavior the first assumes agencies operate independently of the legislature and hence exercise discretion the second assumes that congress controls agency decisions the recent behavior of the federal trade commission provides the empirical setting substantial evidence is found for the specific predictions of the model including the hypothesis of systematic congressional influence over ftc decisions

applied general equilibrium welfare analysis harberger has long advocated a particular technique for measuring the sum of all effects of an intervention both in the intervened in and related markets the technique is to calculate consumer and producer surplus changes behind demand and supply curves that are explicitly general equilibrium ge that is along curves that hold constant demand and supply conditions in related markets but not prices by calculating surplus changes with respect to such curves one simulates the equilibrium price paths in other markets resulting from the intervention and captures the sum of the welfare effects several authors have elaborated on harber

the necessity for substitute prices recreation demand analyses omitting substitute prices from a travel cost model is shown to cause a significant bias in consumer surplus estimates three sets of travel cost models are developed from a common data base representing 60 000 day users of u s army corps of engineer reservoirs in kansas and missouri the firzt set of models omitted substitute prices the latter two sets included them an analysis of variance test showed that consumer surplus estimates from the first set of models were significantly higher than the other two f 26 2 with 2 20 degrees of freedom the theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed economic theory postulates that the demand for a good is a function of its price the price of related goods and services and income still many empirical estimates of demand for recreation sites have ignored the price of substitute recreation sites the most common technique for estimating recreational demand is the travel cost model tcm a comprehensive literature review of the tcm conducted by dwyer kelly and bowes showed that only six of twenty clearly defined tcm demand functions included substitute prices as an argument in the demand function most of the models they reviewed were old but considerable debate remains about incorporating substitutes in the tcm consider the diversity of approaches that have recently been used to incorporate substitute prices into tcm demand functions when modeling recreation demand at corps of engineer reservoirs desvousges smith and mcgivney omitted any

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

political preferences for the pork barrel a generalization this paper provides a rational explanation for the observation of oversized coalitions often approaching unanimous size in the realm of distributive policies distributive policies are those which concentrate benefits in specific geographic areas states congressional districts while spreading costs through general taxation the explanation offered here that legislators may rationally prefer universalism to hard ball coalition politics generalizes earlier work of weingast and fiorina in particular it extends their results to pork barrel politics i e projects that are economically inefficient and demonstrates how packages of economically inefficient projects can nevertheless be politically popular the main theoretical feature that induces preferences for universalism is uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions and consequently the desire for the political insurance that universalism provides

the cost of governing strategic behavior of the president and legislators in brazil s budgetary process several characteristics of a political system have been identified as increasing the cost of governing such as presidentialism federalism an open list with proportional representation a multiparty system and coalition governments although brazil suffers from all of these pathologies the authors argue that other characteristics of the brazilian system have the opposite effect and allow high levels of governability at low cost in particular the authors examine the role of legislators amendments to the budget which provide the executive a low cost means of obtaining support the authors provide evidence that the brazilian president routinely uses his or her powers to reward and punish legislators for supporting or opposing his or her interests in congress although legislators have a limited role in the budgetary process that role can have important electoral consequences for their political careers

a note on the welfare effects of omitting substitute prices and qualities from travel cost models the bias to welfare estimates from omitting substitute prices or qualities in travel cost models is examined the presence of bias depends on whether single or multiple site changes are examined and the degree of correlation between the omitted and included prices for a multiple site price or quality change even when omitted price is uncorrelated with included price welfare estimates may be biased alternatively if omitted price is perfectly correlated the welfare measure may not be biased the presence of the bias depends equally on both the degree of correlation and whether a single or multiple change occurs this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

do states free ride in antitrust enforcement i introduction recent research has examined the role of state governments in the united states in antitrust enforcement over the past 20 years what has not been explored is the extent to which states make strategic decisions on their involvement in antitrust litigation in particular while most state antitrust cases involve purely local matters a significant number of these concern more than one state states then need to decide whether to invest in leading an investigation or letting other states take the lead and participating in some lesser role which includes simply signing on to a settlement we view the decision by a state to delay entry into antitrust litigation to be a type of free tiding behavior 1 in this paper we analyze this issue of free riding by states in antitrust activity ii previous literature one of the defining characteristics of a pure public good is the nonexcludability of the benefits from its consumption as benefits can be received by individuals without having to pay for the goods this nonexcludability creates the possibility for a free rider problem as a consequence of this free tiding behavior the private market cannot exact a price for this good and this may mean the private market will provide a suboptimal amount of the good free riders are usually used as justification for government intervention into the private market to allocate these so called public goods in order to correct the market failure while this behavior would seem rational it is not easily observed so the extent of free riding is not generally known researchers have employed experimental game evidence to measure the extent of free riding with results ranging from none to an extreme amount factors found in this literature that appear to decrease the degree of free riding behavior under certain conditions include smaller group size isaac walker and thomas 1984 experience through repeated game play fischbacher and gachter 2010 pregame communication among participants and an ability to exclude players from the group or other sanctions delmas and keller 2005 while the free rider problem and the experimental evidence have focused on private market decision makers it is straightforward to extend these behaviors to self interested governments one possibility is that governments reduce the amount of certain appropriations as a result of private contributions becker and linsday 1994 find a considerable degree of government free riding behavior in the context of appropriations to public higher education institutions an alternative source of free riding does not involve the private sector but is between government activities particularly those with significant spillover effects lee 1988 considers the issue of free riding among countries in their efforts devoted to fighting terrorism more recently sav 2010 finds a similar impact chati and kehoe 2007 provide a theoretical discussion of what they call a free rider problem among members of a monetary union in their fiscal and regulatory policies caused by an inability of the monetary authority to commit to their policies sigman 2002 finds that water pollution control is affected by the degree of spillovers crossing international borders somewhat closer to the focus of this paper konisky and woods 2010 investigate whether u s states free tide in environmental regulatory actions their results are somewhat mixed while they report some impact in reducing state enforcement of the clean air act in their counties adjacent to international borders they do not find this pattern in counties bordering other u s states a recent theoretical paper by choi and gerlach 2012 raises the concern that national antitrust enforcement in a global economy with multi market contact among exporters may be suboptimal due to free riding on the antitrust activity of other countries however no empirical evidence is provided

the travel cost model for lake recreation a comparison of two methods for incorporating site quality and substitution effects this paper empirically illustrates how different assumptions regarding recreationists decision making behavior affect the predicted changes in recreational activity given a water quality improvement a multinomial logit model which reallocates visits away from other sites to the improved site predicts a smaller outward shift of the recreationist s demand curve than the more traditional travel cost model which does not assume any reallocation of visits among sites

antitrust economics and consumer protection economics in policy and litigation why the disparity the lag in the use of microeconomics in consumer protection policy and litigation as compared with the use of microeconomics in antitrust competition policy and litigation has at least three causes a considerably shorter period of intellectual development the specific historical origins and culture of the u s federal trade commission ftc where this disparity is especially noticeable and the splintering of consumer protection responsibilities across a very large number of federal and state agencies this paper will expand on these themes and discuss their implications including the opportunities for expanded research in the area of consumer protection economics jel b12 b13 b21 d18 l41

putting the puzzle together why people join public interest groups why people join organizations especially public interest groups has been an unsolved puzzle in this analysis choice based probability methods are employed to combine data from the 1980 national election study with comparable information about common cause members and to estimate models of the participation calculus that put the pieces of the puzzle together the results demonstrate the primary importance of political interest and policy preferences for the membership choice citizens who are politically interested and have preferences that roughly match an organization s reputation find that associational membership has both greater benefits and lower costs for them than it does for others variations in the costs of communication to the degree that they can be measured are unimportant for the joining decision an ability to pay is also irrelevant regardless of educational attainment and despite members high incomes organizational leaders deliberately keep the costs of membership low relative to most citizens ability to pay this encourages potential contributors to join in order to learn about the organization

polarization politics and property rights links between inequality and growth most efforts to trace the effects of income inequality on growth have focused on redistribution however empirical investigation has not substantiated either the positive association of income inequality with redistribution or the negative association of redistribution with economic growth the authors analyze the effects of inequality in the broader context of social polarization they argue that social polarization whether rooted in income inequality or in ethnic tension makes large changes in current policies including those guaranteeing the security of contract and property rights more likely under a wide range of institutional arrangements the resulting uncertainties in the policy and contractual environment hinder growth they find strong empirical support for both parts of this argument the policy implications of their argument are quite distinct from those of arguments that inequality reduces growth by increasing pressures for redistribution if redistributive policies per se were to blame for the low growth resulting from inequality governments that seek to mitigate income inequality must inevitably confront a tradeoff between equity and growth if on the other hand the insecurity of property rights slows growth in unequal or otherwise polarized societies governments that commit over the long run to particular redistributive policies incur less risk of slowing economic growth fiscal redistribution that reduces inequality may actually increase growth by reducing the risks of political uncertainty

augmenting travel cost models with contingent behavior data this paper proposes contingent behavior survey questions as a valuable supplement to observed data in travel cost models of non market demand for recreational resources a set of observed and contingent behavior results for each survey respondent allows the researcher to control for individual heterogeneity by taking advantage of panel data methods when exploring the nature of respondent demands the contingent scenarios also provide opportunities to a test for differences between observed and contingent preferences and or b assess likely demands under conditionsbeyond the domain of observed variation in costs or resource attributes most importantly contingent scenarios allow the researcher to imposeexogenously varying travel costs exogenous imposition of travel costs together with panel methods reduces the omitted variables bias that plagues observed data travel cost models of recreational demand using a convenience sample of data for illustrative purposes we show how to estimate the demand for recreational angling by combining observed and contingent behavior data we begin with simple naive pooled poisson models and progress to more theoretically appropriate fixed effects panel poisson specifications

a positive model of tax structure the model of tax structure developed in this paper is one in which the composition of revenues and the structure of specific taxes arise naturally as the result of self interested political behavior it is assumed that political agents choose tax structure so as to minimize the political costs or expected net loss in votes associated with raising a budget of given size several hypotheses concerning the nature of political cost functions are developed and applied to an explanation of the differences among u s states in their reliance on income taxation the empirical application emphasizes differences in political constraints across jurisdictions in the belief that much can be learned about the choice of policy instruments by studying structural adjustments in response to varying constraints the paper discusses how the proposed approach differs from or is consistent with that adopted by other authors and how the estimating equation relates to other empirical research in the literature

electoral majorities political parties and collective representation in practice democracies privilege plurality parties theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice abstract social choice theory wonders whether an elec

the median voter setters and non repeated construction bond issues the median voter model pervades the literature concerning the estimation of demands for collective expenditures but with some unanswered criticism the general issue addressed in this paper is whether observed collective expenditure levels and the characteristics of observed majorities are more adequately described by the median voter model or the romer and rosenthal setter model on a sample of non repeated hospital construction referenda bond issues the median voter model and the romer and rosenthal setter model are compared in both full information and uncertainty contexts little empirical support of the setter model is found indeed the evidence supports the absence of expenditure maximizing behavior the specific conclusions are 1 the standard median voter model explains quite well for this sample of non repeated bond issues 2 the explanatory power of the median voter model appears to vary across both voting arrangements and types of reversion threats 3 the explanation of hospital expenditures which have been judged too large may be due to how benefits and costs are distributed among voters and 4 the preponderance of large majorities for hospital construction in the face of evidence that such facilities typically become a burden on the general tax fund is consistent with setters offering the median ideal in the presence of a reversion below the ideal

political authority expertise and government bureaucracies by applying the revelation principle we focus on how a sponsor who possesses political authority could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts that is when they control information about the true costs of public services production our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement in a two types setting and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms we find that the agency is productively efficient under certain conditions the agency is also allocatively efficient while under others the low cost bureau oversupplies and the high cost agency undersupplies its output

a direct test of direct democracy new england town meetings representative democracies govern most locales in the us making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy new england states however provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level this article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in new england towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks contrary to previous evidence we find no differences between direct and representative democracy the results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government providing support for wider applicability of median voter based empirical models of local government behaviour in the us

recontracting trustworthiness and the stability of vote exchanges tullock 1981 has recently restated a discrepancy between theory and observation that exists in collective decisions and made a start toward explaining the discrepancy the discrepancy stated simply is this the theory of rational action in collective decisions implies that any outcome which requires vote exchanges to be achieved is unstable in that it can be overturned by a coalition all of whom find it their interest to do so yet a high degree of stability is observed in legislation despite the fact that much of this legislation required vote exchanges in order to be passed tullock accounts for this stability in part by pointing out that defections necessary to create the instability e g a defector induced to become an aristocrat in an inegalitarian coalition create an exposed position for the defector and the possible instability is likely to inhibit the defection in the first place tullock looks at two extreme forms that a winning coalition could take given a set of bills each of which has a special interest for one legislator a logrolling form which encompasses all of nearly all the legislature and a minimal winning coalition although the latter dominates the former in a game theoretic sense tullock argues that the latter will be unstable because of the power of enticement held by the excluded minority logrolling which includes nearly all the legislature is although formally dominated stable because of the absence of this potential enticement thus for tullock if i understand correctly his argument the potential instability of minimal winning coalitions leads any one of them to be succeeded not by another minimal winning coalition but by a non minimal winning coalition that it formally dominates shepsle and weingast in a subsequent paper argue that the institutional structure of actual legislatures restricts the richness of logrolling and coalition possibilities that under pure majority rule without such institutions could overturn a proto coalition or reverse an outcome shepsle and weingast 1981 511 thus they explain stability by stability inducing institutions

redistribution tax under non benevolent governments i analyze redistribution policies of majority governments in one kind of representative voting system i employ these assumptions members gain special benefits in the majority parties act strategically by using redistribution transfers the member s utility function is given in a quasi linear function the government s objective functions are the weighted summation of utilities and i classify governments according to the weight the four main results are a stable majority dose not support myopic government the stable redistribution policy of benevolent government is expressed by a scope of transfers the stable transfer of non benevolent governments depends on private utilities of the majority and opportunity costs of the minority and the altruistic government is not displayed by any other majority because it offers the total welfare of the majority to the minority as a subsidy

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

agent heterogeneity and consensual decision making on the federal open market committee the consensual aspects of decision making are essential for understanding policy made by administrative organizations that take the form of a commision or board consensual decision making reflects the degree of policy cohesion exhibited by high level officials within administrative organizations it is proposed here that this type of behavior may differ between heterogeneous agents the federal open market committee fomc of the federal reserve system serves as a salient setting for testing these propositions in a time series context the empirical results indicate that major intra institutional differences exist between board of governor bog and regional bank president rbp members of the federal open market committee fomc regarding consensual behavior in terms of policy decision making the econometric evidence clearly demonstrates that the consensual behavior of these agents are fundamentally different from one another this in turn has important implications for the study of other commission and board policy making bodies that consist of agents who are not all homogeneous

a political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments one of the main themes of partisan dispute in the recent past and doubtless in the foreseeable future is whether or not the value of detailed governmental regulation of the economy exceeds the cost this is exactly the kind of dispute that might be resolved by raising it from the level of mere partisan interest to the level of economic and political science unfortunately however it has not been raised because we do not have the necessary intellectual apparatus namely a theory about the motivation for the operation of and the consequences of regulation as a result most of the discussion consists of biased ad hoc explanations of particular cases with little effort to formulate and test alternative generalizations we have therefore nothing but unresolved and unresolvable disputes about a more or less random collection of stories and some contradictory recipes about cause and effect

a correction in elementary public choice geometry this paper corrects a long standing errorin elementary geometrical constructionsthat involve collective choices inmultidimensional settings the seeminglyinnocuous assumption of separability amongarguments in individual utility functionsdoes not imply symmetric indifferencecontours in shared goods space sharedgoods necessarily become gross substituteswhen resource or budgetary constraints areintroduced the corrected constructionsuggests that issue by issue voting is lessefficacious than is indicated in theconventional analysis

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

bureaucratic agenda control imposition or bargaining niskanen s economic model of bureaucratic behavior assumes that bureaucratic agenda control allows the bureau to impose upon a passive legislature its most preferred alternative from among the set of alternatives that dominate the status quo but does a monopoly on the agenda give bureaus this degree of influence over a voting body this article reports on experiments that demonstrate that a monopoly on the agenda puts the agenda monopolist in a position to bargain with a voting body without being able to impose his or her most preferred alternative on that body this evidence supports theories of bureaucratic legislative bargaining at the expense of theories of bureaucratic imposition

transaction costs and coalition stability under majority rule 1 introduction under a majority voting rule representatives of specific political districts must bargain with representatives of other districts to build a coalition for enacting legislation that benefits their narrow constituencies but the theoretical public choice literature warns of potential for unstable majorities minimum winning coalitions divide program benefits just among their members creating incentives for those left out to entice defection by offering rewards to those who leave and form a different coalition as noted in mueller 1989 new coalitions emerge undermining the old ones leading to cyclical majorities short term programs and highly skewed distributions of program benefits 1 despite these dire predictions there is a general consensus in the literature such as tullock 1981 that programs are more stable and allocations more equal than the theory suggests 2 in an effort to explain the discrepancy between prediction and observation researchers have pointed to institutional rules and practices in congress for example as stated in shepsle and weingast 1981a and weingast and marshall 1988 the committee system provides a structure induced equilibrium that limits the possible range of vote trading and thereby helps maintain coalitions further shepsle and weingast 1981b miller and oppenheimer 1982 and collie 1988 argue that universalist sharing of program benefits enlarges the winning coalition and extends its political support 3 in this article we offer additional evidence of broad stable sharing in many programs enacted by congress by describing interstate distributions from the federal highway trusts fund htf the allocation formula for the htf was initiated in 1916 but despite wide divergence across the states in growth of various economic factors over the rest of the twentieth century such as vehicle registration and population that might have led to redirection of highway funds there were comparatively limited htf allocation adjustments analysis of state receipts from the htf relative to tax payments into the fund reveals that some states collect much more than they contribute whereas others pay in more than they receive even so interstate ratios of htf apportionments to payments have remained stable across the years varying less than changes in highway use measures would suggest going beyond this specific program we examine overall federal expenditure and tax shares among the states from 1975 to 1997 and show that there has been a similar continuity in the interstate distribution of federal funds and taxes 4 as with the highway program there is broad stable sharing of federal expenditures across the states with some receiving more than they contribute in taxes to the federal government to better understand this observed stability and use of relatively egalitarian sharing rules and to go beyond existing explanations we emphasize the desire of politicians to minimize the high transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing political coalitions politicians have incentive to prevent unraveling of political agreements to avoid the costs of searching for new coalition partners reaching agreement on the nature and distribution of program benefits and costs and verifying compliance these activities detract from a legislator s ability to address other voter concerns moreover legislators seek to protect constituent benefits accruing from long term programs that would be lost if coalitions unraveled 5 accordingly we argue that politicians assemble greater than minimum sized coalitions to build broad political support for their legislative programs offering benefits to a larger constituency in exchange for additional votes considerable negotiation over the distribution of program benefits a nd costs may be required so that once agreements are reached politicians will be loath to consider a major reallocation that could undermine the coalition

political solutions to market problems for some market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention however the fact that self interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion it is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions and hence to analyze self interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector our approach emphasizes this institutional structure warts and all and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance

valuing environmental quality weak complementarity with sets of goods in practice it is frequently impossible to identify a single good which is a weak complement to an environmental amenity for which welfare measures are desired however a set of goods exhibiting this property sometimes exists e g water related recreational activities when the nonmarket good to be valued is water quality a set of weak complements is defined and implications for welfare measurement presented the proper welfare measure now involves evaluation of a line integral and simple additions of areas under demand curves will not always be correct however under certain econometric circumstances approximate welfare measures can be obtained from estimated functions

state antitrust enforcement in the us and implications for small business entry and relocation this article examines the impact of the important yet little studied state level antitrust enforcement activity on entry and relocation behaviour by small us firms feinberg and husted 2011 have shown that this enforcement especially nonhorizontal cases may be viewed by potential entrants as a negative aspect of the state business climate however they did not pursue a more disaggregate analysis of small firm entry behaviour nor did they investigate different responses between manufacturing wholesaling and retailing firms another related issue is the extent to which state cases filed in tandem with federal investigations have the same impact on establishment entry as do purely independent cases these considerations are dealt with in this article the author uses annual state level data from the statistics of us business to examine entry and relocation reactions to state antitrust enforcement by firms within three small business categories 1 19 employees 20 99 employees 100 499 employees g

welfare effects omitted variables and the extent of the market this paper offers an economic interpretation of kling s 1989 finding that single price change measures of consumer surplus will provide an unbiased measure for a multiple price change provided the prices are perfectly correlated the explanation lies in recognizing that correlation in this case serves to define the commodity extent of the market using this link the paper demonstrates how the insights involved in defining general equilibrium demand functions or equivalently residual demand models can be adapted to fit the issues raised with travel cost models in accounting for the effects of substitutes

why so much stability the impact of agency determined stability in this article i have shown that institutionally induced stability models can be expanded to incorporate the role of implementing agencies acting in conjunction with the legislature by so extending stability models inferences can be made on agency behavior as well as on legislative behavior in particular the expanded model can be used to show how the two actors together determine the ultimate location of stable policies coalition building considerations jurisdictional limitations and the other customs and institutional considerations that restrict the legislature s policy space make it possible for committees to produce a stable policy mandate but these stability inducing arrangements do not directly apply to agencies the policy mandate constrains but does not completely restrict the area of the policy space open to the agency thus legislative structures do not in and of themselves induce stable policy outcomes legislative policy mandates are changed and defined by the acts of the implementing agency in its role as a non voting decision making actor in the policy process endless cycling by the agency among possible implementation points is prevented by the agency s organizational goal of a stable environment i suggest then that legislative arrangements acting in conjunction with an agency executive s need to create a certain regular and predictable environment lead to the creation of an agency determined stability