asset pricing implications of pareto optimality with private information we compare the empirical performance of a standard incomplete markets asset pricing model with that of a novel model with constrained pareto optimal allocations we represent the models stochastic discount factors in terms of the cross sectional distribution of consumption and use these representations to evaluate the models empirical implications the first model is inconsistent with the equity premium in the united states united kingdom and italy the second model is consistent with the equity premium and the risk free rate in all three countries if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is roughly 5 and the quarterly discount factor is less than 0 5

what determines bits abstract similar to bilateral or regional preferential trade agreements ptas bilateral investment treaties bits have proliferated over the past 50 years the purpose of this study is to provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the economic determinants of bits and of the likelihood of bits between pairs of countries using a qualitative choice model in a manner consistent with explaining ptas we develop the econometric specification for explaining the two based upon a general equilibrium model of world trade and foreign direct investment with three factors two products and trade and investment costs among multiple countries in the presence of national and multinational firms the empirical model for bits and ptas is bivariate in nature and supports a set of hypotheses drawn from the general equilibrium model using the preferred empirical model for a sample of 12 880 country pairs in the year 2000 we predict correctly 88 of all pairs with a bit and a pta 81 with a bit but no pta and 84 with a pta but no bit

an adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance abstract we ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous population we adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in shavell and weiss 1979 supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents job opportunities our main theoretical contribution is a quasi recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem including a geometric characterization of the state space our main economic result is that optimal contracts for bad searchers tend to be upward sloping due to an adverse selection effect this is in contrast to the well known optimal decreasing time profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environments that continue to be optimal for good searchers in our model

factor mobility and international trade this paper develops a two country model of trade and factor mobility in which capital is sector specific but internationally mobile the model avoids the indeterminacy and propensity to specialize of heckscher ohlin models and exhibits a rich variety of responses to exogenous shocks including transfers capital taxes and tariffs the results throw light on the relationship between goods and factor trade reconciling the conflicting views of previous writers it is argued that the model holds out the possibility of a new paradigm in international trade theory in which international factor movements play a central rather than a peripheral role

optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets borrowing constraints and constant discounting for a wide class of infinitely lived agent models chamley has shown that the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in the long run lucas has argued that for the u s economy there is a significant welfare gain from switching to this policy this paper shows that for the bewley class of models with incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive even in the long run therefore cutting the capital income tax to zero may well lead to welfare losses

immigrant specificity and the relationship between trade and immigration theory and evidence studies routinely document that immigrant employment concentrates in non traded goods sectors and that many immigrants have low inter sectoral mobility we consider these observed characteristics of immigrant employment with regard to the question of how immigration affects a nation s pattern of production and trade we model an economy producing three goods one is non traded domestic labor and capital are domestically mobile but internationally immobile allowing that some new immigrants will become specific to the non traded goods sector the model indicates that the effects of immigration on output and trade depend importantly on the sectoral pattern of employment of both new and existing immigrants empirical investigation in a panel data set of oecd countries supports the model s prediction that immigration raises the output of non traded goods consistent with the model we also find that immigration and trade are complements given its empirical support the model s implications for immigration policy are then discussed

is a policy of free movement of workers sustainable this paper studies the costs and benets of the adoption of the policy of free movement for workers for the countries to agree on uncontrolled movement of workers the short run costs must be outweighed by the long term benets that result from better labor market exibility and income smoothing we show that such policies are less likely to be adopted when workers are impatient and less risk averse workers when production technologies display decreasing returns and when countries trade a share of their products

default and aggregate income abstract this paper studies how default varies with aggregate income we analyze a model in which optimal contracts enable risk sharing of privately observed idiosyncratic income by allowing for default default provisions allow agents with low idiosyncratic income realizations to repay less and thus provide insurance default penalties ensure that only these agents default we show that default can occur under the optimal contract and that default provisions vary with aggregate income we provide conditions such that both the amount of default and default penalties vary countercyclically with aggregate income and show that the default rate can be discontinuous

computing multi period information constrained optima this paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to compute solutions to a multi period including infinite period continuum agent unobservedeffort economy actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross sectional variability in consumption and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual over time the optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of excess variability is addressed by consideration of the analogue full information economy and various restricted contracting regimes

banking a new monetarist approach we develop a model where i banks take deposits and make investments ii their liabilities facilitate third party transactions other models have i or ii not both although we argue they are intimately connected we show that they both emerge from limited commitment we describe an environment characterize desirable allocations and interpret the outcomes as banking arrangements banks are essential without them the set of feasible allocations is inferior as a technical contribution we characterize dynamically optimal credit allocations with frictions show they involve backloading and analyse how this interacts with banking we also confront the theory with economic history copyright 2013 oxford university press

optimal contracting with dynastic altruism family size and per capita consumption we use a barro becker model of endogenous fertility in which parents are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that are private information either to labor productivity or taste for leisure to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run the planner uses the trade off between family size and future consumption and leisure to provide incentives for workers to reveal their shocks we show that in this environment the optimal dynamic contract no longer features immiseration in consumption we also discuss the implications of the model on the long run properties of family size in the optimal contract and show that the long run trend in dynasty size can be either positive or negative depending on parameters

oligarchies and development in a global economy a tale of two elites this paper studies how comparative advantage and the political elites endowments shape long run performance in economies with imperfect political institutions the trade regime interacts with industrial policy and regulations on capital mobility in governing capital accumulation in a capital scarce economy capitalist oligarchs striving for import substitution industrialization isi initially shelter the economy from trade while promoting industrial policies that promote total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector this gradually shifts the comparative advantage toward manufacturing and renders the economy attractive to foreign investors allowing for trade and foreign capital inflows are thus complementary policies that spur growth in the capital oligarchy by contrast landed oligarchs in a capital scarce economy favor openness to trade at an early stage of development neglect industrial policies and block foreign capital to maximize extractable rents the policy mix causes the economy to stagnate consistent with the experiences of south korea and argentina in the postwar era the model predicts that the success of isi policies depends crucially on the conditions governing the incentives for capital accumulation jel f10 f20 p40 p50 o10 o24

household heterogeneity and real exchange rates we assume that individuals can fully insure themselves against cross country shocks but not against individual specifi cs hocks we consider two particular models of limited risk sharing domestically incomplete markets di and private information pareto optimal pipo risk sharing for each model we derive a restriction relating the cross sectional distributions of consumption and real exchange rates we evaluate these restrictions using household level consumption data from the us and the uk we show that the pipo restriction fits the data well when households have a coefficient of relative risk aversion of around 5 the restrictions implied by the complete risk sharing model and the di model fare poorly this paper was prepared for the economic journal lecture at the 2006 royal economic society meetings kocherlakota thanks winnie choi for many stimulating conversations about real exchange rates kocherlakota acknowledges the support of nsf 0305833 and 0606695 we thank an associate editor of the journal george alessandria and ivan werning for helpful comments jaromir nosal and sonam sherpa for research assistance orazio attanasio and andrew leicester for help with the fes data and joan gieseke and hakki yazici for editorial assistance the views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the federal reserve bank of minneapolis or the federal reserve system

efficient allocations in dynamic private information economies with persistent shocks a first order approach this article studies efficient allocations in a dynamic private information economy with a continuum of idiosyncratic shocks that are persistent i develop a first order approach for this environment and show that the problem has a simple recursive structure that relies on only a small number of state variables making the problem tractable i find sufficient conditions that guarantee that the first order approach is valid to illustrate the first order approach i numerically compute the efficient allocations in a mirrleesean economy with productivity shocks that follow a random walk and verify the validity of the first order approach i show that persistent shocks create a new trade off where the social planner decreases the informational rent of the agent today at the cost of providing higher insurance in the future copyright 2013 oxford university press

markov perfect risk sharing moral hazard and limited commitment abstract we define characterize and compute markov perfect risk sharing contracts in a dynamic stochastic economy with endogenous asset accumulation and simultaneous limited commitment and moral hazard frictions we prove that markov perfect insurance contracts preserve standard properties of optimal insurance with private information and are not more restrictive than a long term contract with one sided commitment markov perfect contracts imply a determinate asset time path and a non degenerate long run stationary wealth distribution quantitatively we show that markov perfect risk sharing contracts provide sizably more consumption smoothing relative to self insurance and that the welfare gains from resolving the commitment friction are larger than the gains from resolving the moral hazard friction at low asset levels while the opposite holds for high asset levels

endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design abstract we create a dynamic theory of endogenous risk sharing groups with good internal information and their coexistence with relative performance individualistic regimes which are informationally more opaque inequality and organizational form are determined simultaneously numerical techniques and succinct reformulations of mechanism design problems with suitable choice of promised utilities allow the computation of a stochastic steady state and its transitions regions of low inequality and moderate to high wealth utility promises produce the relative performance regime while regions of high inequality and low wealth produce the risk sharing group regime if there is a cost to prevent coalitions risk sharing groups emerge at high wealth levels also transitions from the relative performance regime to the group regime tend to occur when rewards to observed outputs exacerbate inequality while transitions from the group regime to the relative performance regime tend to come with a decrease in utility promises some regions of inequality and wealth deliver long term persistence of organization form and inequality while other regions deliver high levels of volatility

repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model with an application to deposit insurance abstract we consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs the insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level we characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents we then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance our results suggest in a deposit insurance context that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on and to make deposit insurance payments only later or not at all

capital flows under moral hazard abstract i analyze a model with moral hazard and limited enforcement in a small open economy i find that when state contingent contracting is allowed adding the moral hazard friction improves the model s predictions along several dimensions first it justifies why non contingent debt is an optimal way to finance an emerging economy second it explains the limited consumption risk sharing and high volatile and counter cyclical interest rates third it generates realistic crisis like dynamics in which capital inflows are brought to a halt and interest rates sky rocket the model also has a strong internal propagation mechanism limited enforcement friction alone or together with moral hazard has nearly no effect on the model s performance i also construct a simple empirical test to distinguish between the two frictions and it favors moral hazard over limited enforcement friction

capital income taxation wealth distribution and borrowing constraints the theorem of zero taxation of capital income is reexamined and is shown to hinge critically on the assumptions of a long horizon and perfect markets for the inter temporal allocation of resources the theorem does not hold when borrowing constraints prevent individuals from insuring against idiosyncratic shocks and have a precautionary motive for savings structural assumptions are made such that with no taxation aggregate savings are socially excessive in the long run i e the rate of return is smaller than the discount rate sufficient conditions for a pareto efficient taxation or subsidization of capital in the long run depend on the correlation between individuals consumption and savings a subsidy may be efficient when individuals incomes follow a predictable pattern of life cycles with no negative bequest 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the utility of annual reports an international study this article reports on a major study which is part of ongoing international research into the use and usefulness of financial statements for investment decisions the survey reported covered 4 000 individual investors 900 institutional investors and 900 financial analysts in 3 countries it was found that the 3 groups in all 3 countries revealed a strong belief in the importance of financial statements for investment decisions whether buy or hold sell it was also found that the individual investor group was far less homogeneous than previous research has assumed and that cultural or social differences between countries do exist in this field

adverse selection and moral hazard quantitative implications for unemployment insurance abstract a model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed the model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance qualitatively for some agents incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non employment calibrating the model to a stylized version of the u s economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions the optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1 94 relative to the current u s system an additional 0 87 of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard

optimal policy in a model of endogenous fluctuations and assets assets are coupled to endogenous aggregate output fluctuations in a model of heterogeneous agents those agents wish to avoid reacting inadvertently to an unobservable noise process but to do so must elicit reactions to that noise from each other an abstract institution is modeled that optimizes this elicitation by strategically transmitting information about aggregates i designate this feedback feedback is used by agents and so influences the characteristics of aggregate fluctuations the optimal feedback policy minimizes asset rates of return maximizes the persistence of aggregate output fluctuations and causes the distribution of wealth to widen continually and without limit

growth and risk sharing with private information abstract we examine the impact of incomplete risk sharing on growth and welfare the source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information a household s idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others risk sharing between households occurs through long term contracts with intermediaries we find that incomplete risk sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk sharing benchmark numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth effect of private information are small

trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection abstract wto rules prohibit disguised protection in the form of domestic policies how then do governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation s domestic tax reduction is a protective measure or a reaction to a production externality in this paper each government privately observes whether a production externality associated with its import competing good is high or low this paper finds that in an optimal agreement disguised protection with domestic policies is never used by governments with a high externality and is never commonly realized moreover in an optimal agreement tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies

opportunity and social mobility the fact that the children of rich parents have better economic prospects than the children of poor parents unequal opportunity is generally thought to be one of the weak points of modem capitalist societies the ability of the descendants of poor families to eventually become rich and the descendants of rich families to eventually become poor social mobility is commonly considered to be one of the strong points of these societies here i argue that both of these characteristics are in fact necessary implications of an efficient societal arrangement when incentives to work hard must be provided i argue this point using a generational version of the model of phelan and townsend 1991 an infinitely repeated general equilibrium economy with incentive constraints in my model each household s stochastic output is a function of its level of effort since effort is assumed to be costly and privately observed households can shirk higher than minimal effort levels must be induced by making a household s present or future consumption dependent on the household s observed output history a large literature considers models similar to this including green 1987 atkeson and lucas 1992 phelan 1994 1995 wang 1995 hopenhayn and nicolini 1997 khan and ravikumar 2002 the main difference between the economies in that literature and here is that here instead of a household consisting of a single infinitely lived individual a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals a familial dynasty each of whom lives for one period this difference affects the appropriate societal ranking of allocations when households consist of a single infinitely lived individual allocations can be ranked according to their implied distributions of ex ante lifetime utilities if one allocation delivers a distribution of ex ante utilities dominated by another allocation then the first allocation is inefficient however if a household consists of a sequence of altruistically linked individuals then the appropriate ranking of allocations is no longer obvious how those in the first generation rank allocations will in general differ from how their descendants rank allocations this paper addresses this conflict between generations by ranking allocations according to a rawlsian veil of ignorance criterion rawls 1971 that is here society seeks to maximize the expected dynastic utility utility including altruism toward descendants of an individual who does not know into which generation he will be born and the identity or output levels of his ancestors 1 i argue that this corresponds to a societal ranking which does

incentives and aggregate shocks this paper presents an incentive based theory of the dynamics of the distribution of consumption in the presence of aggregate shocks the paper builds on the models concerning the distribution of income or consumption and incentive problems of green 1987 thomas and worrall 1991 phelan and townsend 1991 and atkeson and lucas 1992 by incorporating aggregate production shocks the model allows an examination of the interactions between individual and aggregate consumption series given incomplete insurance further the methodology outlined allows the incorporation of incentive considerations to macroeconomic environments similar to rogerson 1988 and hansen 1985

optimal unemployment insurance with human capital depreciation and duration dependence this paper studies the effect of human capital depreciation and duration dependence on the design of an optimal unemployment insurance ui scheme our results partially confirm those obtained in most previous studies benefits should decrease with unemployment duration the optimal program also generates two main novel features which are not present in stationary models first if human capital depreciates rapidly enough during unemployment ui transfers are bounded below by a minimal assistance level that arises endogenously in the efficient program second we study the optimality of imposing a history contingent wage tax after reemployment our numerical simulations based on the spanish and us economies show that the wage tax should decrease with the length of worker s previous unemployment spell and become a wage subsidy for long term unemployed workers as a by product of our study we develop a systematic approach suitable for studying recursively a wide range of dynamic moral hazard problems and other models with similar characteristics

on ramsey s conjecture efficient allocations in the neoclassical growth model with private information abstract in his seminal paper of 1928 ramsey conjectured that if agents discounted the future differently in the long run all agents except the most patient would live at the subsistence level the validity of this conjecture was investigated in different environments in particular it has been confirmed in the neoclassical growth model with dynamically complete markets this paper studies this conjecture in a version of this model that includes private information and heterogeneous agents a version of bayesian implementation is introduced and a recursive formulation of the original allocation problem is established efficient allocations are renegotiation proof and the expected utility of any agent cannot go to zero with positive probability if the economy does not collapse if the economy collapses all agents will get zero consumption forever thus including any degree of private information in the neoclassical growth model will deny ramsey s conjecture if efficient allocations are considered

payments systems design in deterministic and private information environments abstract the first setup we study is a deterministic model with spatial separation where we consider alternative payments systems institutions and their implications for allocation and welfare a payments system with period by period settlement in outside money improves on decentralized exchange an efficient allocation is supported by a payments system where settlement is not imposed in the second model there is random matching and unobserved productivity shocks and preference shocks we explore how risk should be shared optimally in this economy and interpret the results in terms of how actual payments systems should operate journal of economic literature classification numbers e4 e5

reevaluating the role of trade agreements does investment globalization make the wto obsolete abstract international ownership alters the role of multilateral trade institutions by redefining pecuniary externalities among countries regardless of the underlying cause whether foreign direct investment international portfolio diversification cross country mergers or multinational firms international ownership can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs at the same time however foreign ownership introduces the potential for expropriation by investment host countries which can extract rent from foreign owners by manipulating local prices the basic principle of reciprocity continues to serve as an important guide to efficiency though its application must account for the pattern of international ownership in addition to traditional measures of market access

dynamic contracting with persistent shocks abstract in this paper we develop continuous time methods for solving dynamic principal agent problems in which the agent s privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time we characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that under this contract the agent s utility converges to its lower bound immiserization occurs unlike under risk neutrality the wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and a low productivity agent s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure will not vanish permanently at her first high productivity report also the wedge increases with the duration of a low productivity report we apply the methods to numerically solve the mirrleesian dynamic taxation model and find that the wedge is significantly larger than that in the independently and identically distributed i i d shock case

moral hazard optimal unemployment insurance and experience rating abstract this paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance ui schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard we consider changes in the size and duration of ui benefits and the effects of experience rating and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation radical changes in the current ui system increase welfare but not by much a move to full experience rating has distributional effects but the aggregate effects are negligible

a theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics there is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival in this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing lending relationship with asymmetric information we show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long term lending contract and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower s claim to future cash flows increases we also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics in agreement with the empirical evidence as age and size increase mean and variance of growth decrease and firm survival increases

communication commitment and growth abstract we study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure we show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected in contrast enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patters and economic growth we adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models

the equivalence of lending equilibria and signalling based insurance under asymmetric information i present a model in which a continuum of individuals have stochastic idiosyncratic income shocks complete insurance is physically feasible but unattainable due to an information asymmetry income shocks are observable only by the individuals receiving them any insurance institution must therefore rely on self reporting of income innovations two ways of achieving incentive compatible self reporting are presented the first is a debt market with an explicit lending restriction the second is an insurance contract that linearly filters a signal transmitted by individuals the two are then demonstrated to be identical equilibrium consumption fluctuates in a random walk which is inefficient given the physical potential for complete insurance but is efficient given the information constraints the results are complementary to those of green 1987 but permit more general stochastic processes of income to be analyzed serial correlation of income reduces the efficiency of the insurance

subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice this chapter provides an axiomatic foundation for a particular type of preference shock model called the random discounting representation where a decision maker believes that her discount factors change randomly over time for this purpose we formulate an infinite horizon extension of dekel lipman and rustichini econometrica 69 891 934 2001 and identify the behavior that reduces all subjective uncertainties to those about future discount factors we also show uniqueness of subjective belief about discount factors moreover a behavioral comparison about preference for flexibility characterizes the condition that one s subjective belief second order stochastically dominates the other finally the resulting model is applied to a consumption savings problem

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

consumption commitment and cycles abstract this paper examines the properties of efficient allocations of risk in an economic environment in which the outside enforcement of risk sharing arrangements is infinitely costly in these allocations unanticipated relative productivity movements have effects on both the current and future distribution of consumption across individuals if preferences over consumption and leisure are nonhomothetic these changes in the allocation of consumption will generate persistent cycles in aggregate output that do not occur in efficient allocations when enforcement is costless

currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms i study a pure exchange economy with many agents whose marginal utility of consumption is stochastically heterogeneous and independent of wealth with realized marginal utility of wealth private information i show that currency and credit are equivalent to a contract that is efficient when the privacy of information is viewed as a constraint and that the cash in advance constraint is an expression of an incentive constraint

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

trade and capital flows a financial frictions perspective the classical heckscher ohlin mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ow to capital scarce countries in this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous nancial development the classic conclusion does not hold in particular in less nancially developed economies south trade and capital mobility are complements within a dynamic framework the complementarity carries over to nancial capital ows this interaction implies that deepening trade integration in south raises net capital in ows or reduces net capital out ows it also implies that at the global level protectionism may back re if the goal is to rebalance capital ows when these are already heading from south to north our perspective also has

repeated principal agent relationships with lending and borrowing abstract it is shown optimal long term contracts are strictly better than a series of unrelated short term contracts for two reasons long term contracts allow risk to be spread over time and the agent s intertemporal choices provide information about the unobservable random variable

intertemporal distortions in the second best we consider a very general class of public nance problems that encompasses ramsey models of optimal taxation as well as economies with limited commitment private information and political economy frictions we identify a su cient condition to rule out permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the rst best steady state then all intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best we analyze a series of applications to illustrate the signi cance of this result

idiosyncratic production risk growth and the business cycle we introduce a neoclassical growth economy with idiosyncratic production risk and incomplete markets each agent is an entrepreneur operating her own technology with her own capital stock the general equilibrium is characterized by a closed form recursion in the cara normal case incomplete markets introduce a risk premium on private equity which reduces the demand for investment as compared to complete markets the steady state can thus have both a lower capital stock due to investment risk and a lower interest rate due to precautionary savings furthermore the anticipation of high real interest rates in the future feeds back into high risk premia and low investment in the present thus slowing down convergence to the steady state our results highlight the importance of private risk premia for capital accumulation and business cycles

optimal monetary policy distribution efficiency versus production efficiency this paper investigates the trade off between distribution effect and production effect of monetary policy when there exist unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in the absence of risk sharing arrangements such as a credit market monetary policy serves to provide ex post insurance to smooth consumption specifically issuing interest bearing bonds restores credit transactions on money through bond money exchanges such a policy has a positive distribution effect but the resulting inflation hampers production efficiency it is demonstrated that the trade off between distribution efficiency gain and production efficiency loss would result in net welfare enhancement if consumers are relative risk averse enough politique monetaire optimale efficacite dans la distribution versus efficacite dans la production ce memoire examine la relation d equivalence entre l effet sur la distribution et l effet sur la production de la politique monetaire quand existent des chocs de liquidite idiosyncratiques non observables en l absence d arrangement pour le partage des risques tel qu un marche du credit la politique monetaire sert d assurance ex post pour lisser les variations dans les niveaux de consommation specifiquement emettre des obligations qui paient des interets restore les transactions monetaires de credit via les echanges obligations monnaie une telle politique a un effet positif sur la distribution mais l inflation qui en resulte nuit a l efficacite de la production on montre que la relation d equivalence entre les gains d efficacite dans la distribution et la perte d efficacite dans la production resultent en une amelioration du niveau net de bien etre si les consommateurs ont une aversion suffisamment grande au risque relatif

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

on repeated moral hazard with discounting in this paper we analyze optimal contracts in an infinitely repeated agency model in which both the principal and agent discount the future we show that there is a stationary representation of the optimal contract when the agent s conditional discounted expected utility is used as a state variable this representation reduces the multi period problem to a static variational problem which can be analyzed using standard variational techniques this reduction is used to obtain several properties of the contract

investor protection optimal incentives and economic growth does investor protection foster economic growth to assess the widely held affirmative view we introduce investor protection into a standard overlapping generations model of capital accumulation better investor protection implies better risk sharing because of entrepreneurs risk aversion this results in a larger demand for capital this is the demand effect a second effect the supply effect follows from general equilibrium restrictions better protection i e higher demand increases the interest rate and lowers the income of entrepreneurs decreasing current savings and next period s supply of capital the supply effect is stronger the tighter are the restrictions on capital flows our model thus predicts that the positive effect of investor protection on growth is stronger for countries with lower restrictions cross country data provide support for this prediction as does the detailed examination of the growth experiences of south korea and india

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

dynamics of income distribution in this paper we have obtained closed form solutions in cass koopmans growth models with heterogeneous agents the relationship between the form of the production function and the dynamics of income distribution is made explicit we then use this relationship to determine what production structure is simultaneously consistent with facts on growth and income inequality our empirical findings give support to models with decreasing returns in the reproducible factor jel classification d3 o1 o4 dans ce memoire les auteurs obtiennent des solutions pour des modeles de croissance a la cass koopmans dans le cas ou les agents sont heterogenes on explicite la relation entre la forme de la fonction de production et la dynamique de la repartition des revenus on utilise alors cette relation pour determiner quelle structure de production est arrimee aux faits connus a la fois quant a la croissance economique et a la repartition des revenus les resultats empiriques supportent les modeles ou les rendements sur les acteurs de production reproductibles sont decroissants

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

interest rates in a credit constrained economy when households face credit constraints in an economy with inside as well as outside money stationary equilibrium real interest rates are below the household rate of time preference they also depend significantly upon household risk aversion the demand for inside versus outside money bank costs bank reserves inflation and the marginal productivity of capital and capital depreciation rates in addition changes in financial variables affect per capita capital and output to a greater extent when households are credit constrained copyright 1994 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the political economy of intergenerational income mobility the intergenerational elasticity of income is considered one of the best measures of the degree to which a society gives equal opportunity to its members while much research has been devoted to measuring this reduced form parameter less is known about its underlying structural determinants using a model with exogenous talent endowments endogenous parental investment in children and endogenous redistributive institutions we identify the structural parameters that govern the intergenerational elasticity of income the model clarifies how the interaction between private and collective decisions determines the equilibrium level of social mobility two societies with similar economic and biological fundamentals may have vastly different degrees of intergenerational mobility depending on their political institutions we offer empirical evidence in line with the predictions of the model we conclude that international comparisons of intergenerational elasticity of income are not particularly informative about fairness without taking into account differences in politico economic institutions jel e24 j62 j68 p16