multi issue allocation situations abstract this paper introduces a new class of transferable utility games called multi issue allocation games these games arise from various allocation situations and are based on the concepts underlying the bankruptcy model as introduced by o neill math social sci 2 1982 345 in this model a perfectly divisible good estate has to be divided amongst a given set of agents each of whom has some claim on the estate contrary to the standard bankruptcy model the current model deals with situations in which the agents claims are multi dimensional where the dimensions correspond to various issues it is shown that the class of multi issue allocation games coincides with the class of non negative exact games the run to the bank rule is introduced as a solution for multi issue allocation situations and turns out to be shapley value of the corresponding game finally this run to the bank rule is characterised by means of a consistency property in the spirit of o neill

non manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations abstract when resources are divided among agents the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration a simple example is the bankruptcy problem where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims we characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics within the group by allowing agents characteristics to be multi dimensional and choosing the meaning of variables appropriately our model can subsume a number of existing and new allocation problems such as cost sharing social choice with transferable utilities income redistribution bankruptcy with multiple types of assets probability updating and probability aggregation a number of existing and new results in specific problems are obtained as corollaries

comment on the relative deprivation curve and its applications the article by kakwani 1984 introduced a measure of inequality that is weighted to take account of a sense of deprivation an individual may feel on seeing others who are better off in the second part of the article kakwani presented estimates of deprivation using australian data i would like first to comment on the welfare implications of the measure of relative deprivation proposed in the article and second to point out some crucial assumptions underlying the use of household incomes in the empirical work the measure of relative deprivation is based on a utility function for the representative individual of the form w u y x with uy x uy 0 for y o where x is own income and y denotes the incomes of other individuals the condition uy x is interpreted as the deprivation an individual suffers with an increment in the income of any individual who is better off the conditions on uy introduce a crucial asymmetry in the individual s utility function the individual suffers deprivation on observing incomes above x but derives no sense of satisfaction from observing individuals on incomes below x under this condition a social welfare function of the form w u w u o does not necessarily satisfy the pareto criterion it may be possible to increase social welfare by making some people worse off without making anyone better off in particular it may be possible to increase social welfare by reducing incomes of individuals just above x who may be relatively poor if x is sufficiently low clearly this is the case when the utility function is specified as

balanced contributions for tu games with awards and applications abstract calleja et al calleja p borm p hendrickx r 2005 multi issue allocation situations european journal of operational research 164 730 747 introduced multi issue allocation situations with awards in this paper we extend the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility to the cooperative games with transferable utility and awards we define a run to the bank rule for cooperative games with transferable utility and awards and characterise it in terms of a property of balanced contributions we apply our main result to bankruptcy problems and multi issue allocation situations with awards

a pie allocation among sharing groups this paper deals with a pie allocation problem to users who are divided intosharing groups that are not necessarily disjoint the pie is allocated among the groups rather than the users the portion of a sharing group is a public good for its members that is all of them can enjoy it a non cooperative game for allocating the pie and a special equilibrium outcome strongly disappointment free allocation are defined we prove the existence of a unique such allocation and show that it coincides with the nash solution of the related bargaining problem journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c70 c71 c72 and c78

priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods in a rationing problem each agent demands a quantity of a certain commodity and the available resources fall short of total demand a rationing method solves this problem at every level of resources and individual demands we impose three axioms consistency with respect to variations of the set of agents upper composition and lower composition with respect to variations of the available resources in the model where the commodity comes in indivisible units the three axioms characterize the family of priority rules where individual demands are met lexicographically according to an exogeneous ordering of the agents in the more familiar model where the commodity is divisible these three axioms plus scale invariance independence of the measurement unit characterize a rich family of methods it contains exactly three symmetric methods giving equal shares to equal demands these are the familiar proportional uniform gains and uniform losses methods the asymmetric methods in the family partition the agents into priority classes within each class they use either the proportional method or a weighted version of the uniform gains or uniform losses methods

income splitting specialization and intra family distribution income splitting for tax purposes results in more specialization of wives but does this in turn generate more gender inequality in my dynamic bargaining model with a divorce threatpoint i find that who controls the couple s labour supply plays a crucial role in establishing this link if spouses choose their labour supply non cooperatively only the husband s increase but not her own decrease in labour supply introduces a negative term in the wife s change in welfare if the wife does not control her own labour supply a decrease in her own labour supply introduces an additional negative term la fragmentation du revenu aux fins d impot resulte en une plus grande specialisation des epouses mais est ce que cela engendre davantage d inegalite entre genres dans un modele de marchandage dynamique avec menace de divorce a la cle on decouvre que la personne qui controle l offre de travail du couple joue un role crucial dans la reponse a cette question si les epoux choisissent leurs offres de travail de maniere non cooperative seul l accroissement de l offre de travail de l epoux et non le declin de l offre de travail de l epouse introduit un terme negatif dans le changement de niveau de bien etre de l epouse si l epouse ne controle pas sa propre offre de travail un declin dans son offre de travail introduit un element negatif additionnel

stable allocations of risk abstract the measurement and the allocation of risk are fundamental problems of portfolio management coherent measures of risk provide an axiomatic approach to the former problem in an environment given by a coherent measure of risk and the various portfolios realization vectors risk allocation games aim at solving the second problem how to distribute the diversification benefits of the various portfolios understanding these cooperative games helps us to find stable efficient and fair allocations of risk we show that the class of risk allocation and totally balanced games coincide hence a stable allocation of risk is always possible when the aggregate portfolio is riskless the class of risk allocation games coincides with the class of exact games as in exact games any subcoalition may be subject to marginalization even in core allocations our result further emphasizes the responsibility involved in allocating risk

on the taxation of trade within and between households abstract tax reform proposals affect individual welfares in ways which strongly depend on the nature of specialisation in household production and the pattern of trade within households variation in the degree of specialisation in domestic production across households strongly influences the impacts on individual tax burdens of a given tax reform the standard models of the economics literature cannot be used to analyse these issues because they ignore the two person nature of households and the existence of household production and trade this paper proposes a simple and tractable model to remedy this and uses it to analyse the impacts of the types of tax reform that have been the subject of recent policy debate

game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the talmud abstract for three different bankruptcy problems the 2000 year old babylonian talmud prescribes solutions that equal precisely the nucleoli of the corresponding coalitional games a rationale for these solutions that is independent of game theory is given in terms of the talmudic principle of equal division of the contested amount this rationale leads to a unique solution for all bankruptcy problems which always coincides with the nucleolus two other rationales for the same rule are suggested in terms of other talmudic principles needless to say the rule in question is not proportional division

labour supply welfare rankings and the measurement of inequality abstract this paper presents an analysis of inequality using utility based measures of welfare derived from different approaches to modelling household labour supplies the almost ideal demand system specification of preferences is selected for the estimation of a neoclassical household model and of individual decision models which incorporate different assumptions concerning the intra household distribution of income using the rosen 1976 tax perception methodology the study also explores the implications of a model which does not constrain time at home to leisure welfare rankings and inequality measures defined on equivalent income are compared for each type of model the analysis uses australian unit record data on 3 352 households drawn from the australian bureau of statistics 1981 82 income and housing sample survey file the results indicate the sensitivity of welfare orderings and inequality measures to the choice of decision model and to the specification of lump sum transfers between family members a comparative study of equivalent incomes and selected money income variables also illustrates the limitations of observed household and individual incomes as welfare indicators for the analysis of inequality and for policy design

labour supply household production and intra family welfare distribution abstract this paper demonstrates the importance in conceptual and empirical terms of incorporating household production in models of labour supply to avoid misleading results concerning the intra family distribution of income and behavioural responses to economic policy

distributive justice in taxation abstract a classical criterion for apportioning taxes is that all should sacrifice equally in loss of utility suppose that a method of apportioning taxes is continuous and has the following four properties i the way that taxpayers split a given tax total depends only on their own taxable incomes ii an increase in the tax total implies that everyone pays more iii every incremental increase in tax is apportioned according to taxpayers current after tax incomes iv the ordering of taxpayers by pre tax income and after tax income is the same then there exists a utility function relative to which all sacrifice equally

taxation and the household abstract previous analyses of demand systems and the welfare effects of taxing male and female labour supplies suppress the analysis of household resource allocation by assuming a household utility function to analyse the implications of assuming this is not the case we construct a simple but fairly general model of household resource allocation and use the properties of the equilibrium of this model to characterise the effects of tax policy on individual utilities as determined by the household resource allocation process

population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility abstract an allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to allocate the worth of every coalition it is population monotonic if each player s payoff increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger we show that essentially a game has a population monotonic allocation scheme pmas if and only if it is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto control a dual characterization is also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a pmas include convexity and increasing average marginal contributions if the game is convex its extended shapley value is a pmas classification number 026

institutional inequality and tax incidence abstract this paper analyses the effects of taxation when inequality is not innate a theory of institutional inequality is presented which employs a trade model with circular production and the theory of clubs inequality is introduced by constraints on entry into sectors and local groups within sectors individual time is treated as a fixed factor of production and work and leisure are re defined the analysis suggests that when inequality is institutional and government policy does not alter the mechanisms by which institutions translate the distribution of power into the distribution of income a redistribution of income by conventional tax transfer schemes may not always be feasible

the enfranchisement of women and the welfare state abstract we offer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico economic model where men are richer than women women display a higher preference for public goods and women s disenfranchisement carries a societal cost men and women are matched within households which are the center of the decision process we derive the optimal tax rate under two alternative regimes a males only enfranchisement regime and a universal enfranchisement regime the latter is associated with a higher tax rate but as industrialization raises the reward to intellectual labor relative to physical labor women s relative wage increases thus decreasing the difference between the tax rates when the cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under universal enfranchisement the male median voter is better off extending the franchise to women a consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively high cost of disenfranchisement we empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870 1930 period we proxy the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income and the cost of disenfranchisement with the presence of catholicism which is associated with a more traditional view of women s role and thus a lower cost the gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability of divorce which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women consistently with the model s predictions women s suffrage is correlated positively with per capita income and negatively with the presence of catholicism and the availability of divorce while women s suffrage increases the size of government only in non catholic countries

dynamic learning and context dependence in sequential attribute based stated preference valuation questions a hybrid stated preference model is presented that combines the referendum contingent valuation response format with an experimentally designed set of attributes a sequence of valuation questions is asked to a random sample in a mailout mail back format econometric analysis shows greater discrimination between alternatives in the final choice in the sequence and the vector of preference parameters shifts lead and lag choice sets have a structural influence on current choices and unobserved factors induce positive correlation across the responses these results indicate that people learn about their preferences for attributebased environmental goods by comparing attribute levels across choice sets

nonmarket household time and the cost of children raising children demands a considerable amount of parental time obliging working parents either to reduce their leisure time further or to buy childcare services in the market parents may face additional opportunity costs upon deciding to participate in the labor market but these are difficult to measure using a survey instrument in belgium and germany we estimate the income compensation needed to maintain family well being when adults work versus when they do not enter the labor market in both countries we find that full time working parents face extra child costs and require higher labor market participation compensation compared with childless adults