campaign spending and senate elections 1978 84 this paper uses a sample of recent senate election results and estimates vote equations that show challenger spending hurts and incumbent spending helps incumbent re election while both types of spending have diminishing returns the effects are asymmetrical challenger spending is more productive at lower levels of spending but incumbents can spend greater amounts more profitably than can challengers these results can explain why senate incumbents spend money why they typically outspend their challenger and why incumbents who can outspend their challenger would tend to be against spending limits or public financing

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

buying less but shopping more the use of nonmarket labor during a crisis households allocating time between market and non market uses should respond to income variations by adjusting the time devoted to shopping search and other home production activities in this paper we exploit high frequency household expenditure data to examine the use of changes in shopping intensity as a method of mitigating the effects of the 2002 argentine economic crisis although the total quantity and real value of goods purchased fell during the crisis consumers are found to be doing more shopping search this increase in shopping is shown to enable households to seek out lower prices and locate substitutes allowing a given level of expenditure to buy more goods the magnitude and prevalence of these effects suggest that this non market use of labor can be an important coping strategy for households during a recession

a test of the structure of pac contracts an analysis of house gun control votes in the 1980s enactment of the bill was a major victory for the national rifle association which had worked for years to win relaxation of the landmark gun control act of 1968 congressional quarterly almanac 1986 p 82 i introduction every election the same political action committees pacs contribute millions of dollars to candidates for office well informed participants in the political process surely must get value for their money yet empirical research fails to provide systematic evidence that campaign contributions influence congressional roll call votes 1 a mischaracterization of the exchange between pacs and politicians may produce these contradictory results empirical studies of roll call voting typically use pac contributions from only one election cycle earlier studies generally assume prepayment in the prior congress while more contemporary studies assume a spot exchange recent empirical work however suggests another possibility interest groups may buy current influence with money spent over multiple election cycles stratmann 1995 shows that contributions from both the current and the previous election cycles influence floor votes on agricultural price supports snyder 1990 1992 presents evidence that interest groups make long term investments in politicians previous studies by arbitrarily imposing a payment structure may have produced erroneous estimates of the influence of pac money on legislative votes we examine roll call votes on gun control in the u s house of representatives during the 1980s to determine whether pacs make spot market purchases prepay for votes in the prior election cycle or make long term investments we investigate whether pac contributions have a durable long term investment effect as snyder 1992 suggests we consider two types of evidence concerning the campaign contribution contract first we examine the pattern of expenditures by the two dominant interest groups concerned with gun control the national rifle association nra and hand gun control hgc their expenditures provide strong evidence against the spot market exchange hypothesis both groups made significant expenditures in sessions of congress in which no floor vote occurred nor were these expenditures purchasing services such as committee work in a spot market exchange further 1986 nra expenditures are significantly higher for first term representatives which is consistent with long term investments but contradicts a spot exchange since freshmen have the least influence to sell second we include expenditures from both the current and the five previous election cycles as separate independent variables in a model of roll call voting to date no empirical paper tests whether pac money from more than two cycles influences roll call voting and only stratmann 1995 and grenzke 1989 use a model that specifies money from more than one cycle in an equation explaining roll call votes our probit estimates indicate that nra expenditures in the three most recent election cycles and hgc expenditures in the two most recent cycles buy votes the independent effect of expenditures from different cycles suggests that contributions are neither an unqualified one session prepayment nor a spot exchange the influence of nra expenditures two sessions prior to the roll call votes is evidence of a long term investment the literature on the determinants of roll call voting assumes that pac contributions alter representatives votes interest groups might instead simply provide campaign assistance to their supporters to affect the composition of congress stratmann 1991 bronars and lott 1997 if a difficult to quantify variable and thus omitted from regressions signals a representative s true position and interest groups make campaign contributions on the basis of this variable pac contributions might appear to influence votes the pattern of contributions and votes on gun control however indicates attempts by the nra and hgc to influence votes not merely the composition of congress

law and employment lessons from latin america and the caribbean analyzing the effects of regulation and deregulation on latin american labor markets law and employment joins the ongoing debate about the virtues and costs of legislating mandatory benefits for workers of the numerous labor regulations that were altered or created in latin america during the last thirty years many have had unintended and far reaching results nobel prize winning economist james j heckman and carmen pages document the behavior of firms attempting to stay in business and be competitive while facing the high costs of complying with these labor laws they challenge the prevailing view that labor market regulations affect only the distribution of labor incomes and have little or no impact on efficiency or the performance of labor markets this volume shows that mandated benefits reduce employment have a disruptive impact on turnover rates and labor market flexibility promote inequality and discriminate against marginal workers along with in depth studies of colombia peru brazil argentina chile and uruguay law and employment provides comparative analysis from a range of european countries and the united states while also covering important changes in reg

earning through learning in legislatures this inquiry applies gary becker s theoretical notions of general and specific training to the experiential learning that occurs within political institutions in particular the u s congress in the process we isolate economic facets of these legislative experiences that influence the rental value of human capital derived from congressional training we identify four factors that structure legislators post elective wages pre congressional salary year of entry tenure and variables closely related to general training in congress specifically assignment to powerful legislative committees acquisition of broad skill packages investment in expanding skill set proficiencies and to a lesser extent life cycle driven declines in such investments

constituency opinion and pac contributions a case of the national abortion and reproductive rights action league to test whether interest group politics doharm to a representative democracy thispaper simulates congressionaldistrict level constituency opinion onabortion analyzing the relationshipbetween the constituency opinion andnaral s contributions in the 102nd and103rd congresses this paper presentsempirical evidence that naral scontribution decision is influenced byconstituency opinion the evidence however is mixed constituency opinioninfluences naral s decision on who will getits money constituency opinion however does not influence naral s decision on whowill get more money according to theseresults financial representation byinterest groups does not seriously causeharm to a representative democracy but itcan still bias the representativeness tosome extent an interest group may selectlegislators whose districts support itsposition less strongly and contribute agreater amount of money to the legislators

selection and influence interest groups and congressional voting on trade policy studies of the effects of interest groups on congressional roll call voting typically view party and ideology as competing factors and rely on a factoral model of interests or a sectoral model including only interest groups with a direct stake in the vote we depart from that strategy in several ways we define interest groups at the level of standard industrial classification two digit codes and observe the universe of interests for 1979 90 we use measures of geographically and nongeographically based economic interests to estimate the representative s party and ideology we also consider the factor endowments of individuals within a district to examine their impact on floor votes we then investigate the influence of these interests on members party affiliation and ideology as well as a pool of five floor votes on foreign trade using instrumental variables for party and ideology economic interests account for a substantial portion of the variance in all cases and models that also include other explanatory variables are highly accurate in estimating floor votes

competition policy for elections do campaign contribution limits matter this paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes states are a natural laboratory to examine this issue we analyze elections to assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions we find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation we also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race

financial systems financing constraints and investment empirical analysis of oecd countries this paper investigates the influence of cash flow on corporate investment in 11 oecd countries we find that the sensitivity of investment levels to internally available funds differs significantly across countries and is lower in countries with predominantly close bank firm relationships than in countries with predominantly arm s length bank firm relationships at the same time we find no relationship of the levels of financial constraints to indicators of overall financial development our results are consistent with the view that information and incentive problems in the capital market have important effects on corporate investment and that close bank firm relationships can reduce these problems and thus improve the access of firms to external finance

corruption is bad for growth even in the united states we estimate the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in u s states we improve on existing studies of the cost of corruption by using a better specified empirical model focusing on a study population that is less likely to be affected by parameter heterogeneity and controlling for endogeneity using political variables to instrument for corruption we find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment across the states

closeness expenditures and turnout in the 1982 u s house elections students of elections have repeatedly found that the closeness of an election is modestly correlated with turnout this may be due to a direct response of instrumentally motivated voters but recent theoretical work casts doubt on the adequacy of this explanation another possibility is that elite actors respond to closeness with greater effort at mobilization we explore the latter possibility by using fec and state data on campaign expenditures in house senate and gubernatorial races our results indicate that closeness has an effect at both the mass and elite levels we also provide quantitative estimates of the effect of senate and gubernatorial expenditure on house turnout

money and votes reconsidered congressional elections 1972 1982 the evolution of congressional campaign finance over the past decade is characterized by steady growth in campaign spending and other notable changes in campaign finance practices the main purpose of the research reported here was to determine whether these changes have altered the effects of campaign spending on election outcomes this required reexamination of auxiliary questions concerning how sending effects operate and can be measured it also required facing the limits of what analysis of aggregate campaign spending data can tell us about money in elections replication of ols and 2sls analyses of campaign spending effects produced solidly consistent results over the six congressional elections held between 1972 and 1982 taken at face value the evidence is overwhelming that the challenger s level of spending has a strong impact on the vote whereas that of the incumbent has virtually no impact at all but the evidence remains open to doubt on two grounds one is the probable inadequacy of the 2sls model or perhaps any possible model leaving the issue of simultaneity bias unsettled if bias remains the estimates exaggerate the electoral effects of the challenger s campaign expenditures the issue cannot be resolved with more of the same data but rather requires data of a different sort surveys taken over the course of a sample of campaigns would do the trick meanwhile i think it would be foolish to make policy on the assumption that bias is in fact substantial the greatest likelihood remains that restrictions on campaign money will have the general effect of hurting challengers jacobson 1979 the other doubtful albeit equally stable finding is that incumbents do not gain votes by spending in campaigns no incumbent seems to believe it and there is at least circumstantial evidence from for example the 1982 elections that their skepticism is quite justified if so the problem lies in the limits of what aggregate data of the kind analyzed here can tell us few incumbents do not spend heavily when they are strongly challenged if both candidates spend beyond the point needed to become thoroughly familiar to voters then the substance of the campaigns the contents of campaign messages become the dominant factors incumbents may need to spend money in order to change the message as new circumstances arise to frame new issues that would help them most or damage them least to win the battle of establishing the real issues like nonincumbents sitting members may sometimes need to spend beyond a certain threshold to remain competitive but nearly all of them do so when the necessity arises so aggregate spending data are largely uninformative how the money is spent rather than how much is what matters the two most notable developments in congressional campaign finance have opposing implications national party organizations particularly the republican have assumed an increasingly important role in financing campaigns greater central control leads to a more efficient distribution of the party s collective campaign resources which among other things promises to raise the overall level of electoral competition it also leads to more coordinated campaigning with greater emphasis on national themes and programs thus it should foster more cooperation and loyalty among fellow partisans in congress but pacs have also grown in numbers and in financial importance because most concentrate on gaining access to incumbents they do little to make elections more competitive because they usually pursue narrowly defined interests their influence fragments the congress and weakens party coalitions in this and other ways parties and pacs are natural rivals the most consequential decisions taken in the next round in campaign finance policy will be those which affect the relative importance of parties and pacs see u s congress 1984 for comments on this and other current campaign finance issues

life cycle prices and production we use scanner data and time diaries to document how households substitute time for money through shopping and home production we document substantial heterogeneity in prices paid for identical goods for the same area and time with older households shopping the most and paying the lowest prices doubling shopping frequency lowers a good s price by 7 to 10 percent we estimate the shopper s price of time and use this series to estimate an elasticity of substitution between time and goods in home production of roughly 1 8 the observed life cycle time allocation implies a consumption series that differs markedly from expenditures

spatial competition with heterogeneous firms i model endogenous horizontal and vertical product differentiation with arbitrarily many heterogeneous firms firms are asymmetric in that they differ in their marginal costs i prove that under an equilibrium refinement all economically relevant firm outcomes are uniquely determined across all strict subgame perfect nash equilibria there are two central results first a firm s price market share and profit are independent of its neighbors marginal costs conditional on the average marginal cost in the market second more productive firms are more isolated all else equal in particular the distance between two firms is strictly decreasing in their average marginal cost

why democracies may actually be less reliable allies recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies this need not be the case alliances serve as commitment devices adding ex ante credibility to states claims about ex post behavior variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments put simply democracies are most improved by formal commitments we offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically we test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention rather than on the duration or the number of commitments our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies

engines of liberation electricity was born at the dawn of the last century households were inundated with a flood of new consumer durables what was the impact of this consumer durable goods revolution it is argued here that the consumer goods revolution was conducive to liberating women from the home to analyse this hypothesis a beckerian model of household production is developed households must decide whether or not to adopt the new technologies and whether a married woman should work can such a model help to explain the rise in married female labour force participation that occurred in the last century yes the housewife of the future will be neither a slave to servants nor herself a drudge she will give less attention to the home because the home will need less she will be rather a domestic engineer than a domestic labourer with the greatest of all handmaidens electricity at her service this and other mechanical forces will so revolutionize the woman s world that a large portion of the aggregate of woman s energy will be conserved for use in broader more constructive fields thomas alva edison as interviewed in good housekeeping magazine lv no 4 october 1912 p 436

the theory of economic regulation and public choice and the determinants of public sector bargaining legislation in this study we used the theory of economic regulation and public choice to derive a model to explain the pattern of public sector bargaining laws among the states we find this type of legislation is influenced by the following demand factors 1 the extent of public sector union membership which represents the interest group hypothesis has a positive influence on pro union legislation 2 the extent of employer opposition to unions as measured by unfair labor practice charges against employers in representation elections has a negative effect on bargaining laws 3 two taste variables the salaries of public employees and the percent of nonwhite employment in the state have a positive influence on these laws a result which will be surprising to many people is that the extent of private sector union membership has no significant influence on the passage of public sector bargaining legislation

bureaucrats legislators and the size of government some recent theories have blamed the growth of government on budget maximizing bureaucrats who are assumedly capable of imposing their most preferred budget output combination on legislatures subject to cost and demand constraints however theoretical examination of the range of bargaining outcomes that might occur between bureau and legislature shows that budget maximizing behavior does not necessarily lead to super optimal levels of production nor do the suggested reforms of competition and privatization necessarily improve the situation in this bargaining model the central determinants of governmental growth are not budget maximizing bureaucrats but the legislature s decisions regarding mode of oversight and form of internal organization

homework in development economics household production and the wealth of nations we introduce home production into the neoclassical growth model and examine its consequences for development economics in particular we study the extent to which one can account for international income differences with differences in policies that distort capital accumulation in models with home production such policies not only reduce capital accumulation but also change the mix of market and nonmarket activity hence these models can generate larger differences in output than standard models for a given policy differential we also show how the welfare implications change when we incorporate home production

interest groups and the electoral control of politicians abstract we develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition in each period of the game an interest group attempts to buy an incumbent s policy choice and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger the voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance the model predicts that above average incumbents face little discipline but others are disciplined increasingly and re elected at a higher rate as the interest group becomes more extreme extensions of the model consider term limits long lived groups and multiple groups

the urban informal sector in uruguay its internal structure characteristics and effects abstract the literature on third world urbanization has focused increasingly on the informal sector as a mechanism to explain first the survival strategies of the poor excluded from regular employment and second the strategies of formal firms to bypass regulatory constraints and reduce costs this paper pursues these lines of research in a special context namely that of uruguay a small country which followed a protective labor policy for many years but reversed it during the 1970s and early 1980s data come from a sample of 700 households in montevideo which are representative of the low income neighborhoods that comprise approximately two thirds of the city s population interviews were held in 1983 1984 the analysis focuses on the following issues 1 the proportion of individuals and households who participate in the informal economy 2 the types of informality that exist in both principal and secondary occupations 3 the effects of informal employment on income 4 differences in age sex and education between different types of workers 5 changes in informal employment over time implications of findings for general definitions and hypotheses about the informal sector are examined the relationship of results to the neoliberal experiments attempted in uruguay between 1973 and 1984 is discussed

market price and income elasticities of new vehicles demand recent evidence from aggregate models of automobile demand indicates that when not corrected for quality differences market price elasticity of demand is substantially biased downwards this note presents new information on market price and income elasticities derived from a disaggregate demand model that controls for cost household income vehicle attributes and perceived quality consumer search and manufacturer based on an extensive household survey of new vehicle purchasers in 1989 market price and income elasticities are estimated to be 0 87 and 1 70 respectively moreover excluding vehicle quality from a well specified model is found to have little effect upon the estimated market elasticities copyright 1996 by mit press

the resurgence of inventory research what have we learned abstract recent empirical and theoretical research on business inventories is surveyed and critically evaluated while most inventory research has had macroeconomic motivations we focus on its microtheoretic basis and on potential conflicts between theory and evidence the paper asks two principal questions first how can inventories which are allegedly used by firms to stabilize production nonetheless be a destabilizing factor at the macroeconomic level second why if firms are following the production smoothing model is production more variable than sales in many industries we suggest that the so called s s model may help answer both questions

market place trading and the transformation of retail space in the expanding latin american city the global spread of the supermarket and the planned shopping centre is transforming retail space in the latin american city nevertheless market place trading has continued to flourish in most cities and is itself a key element of retail change a case study of quito shows how new periodic markets have been established and that as demand density grows these are consolidated into daily markets much of the dynamism in market place trading is associated with government intervention with principal policies being the creation of markets in poorly served urban areas and a reduction in the concentration of market place trading in the historic centre speculations about competition and complementarity between supermarket and market underline the need for further research and an understanding of the consumption patterns which support the continued heterogeneity of retail forms in the latin american city

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

competitive lobbying and supermajorities in a majority rule institution this paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically valuable resources to legislators legislators have three roles first they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist s offer second they act as agenda setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote third they vote on the agenda the stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral counteractive and preemptive lobbying supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist

explaining cross country productivity differences in retail trade many macroeconomists argue that productivity is low in developing countries because of frictions that impede the adoption of modern technologies i argue that in the retail trade sector developing countries rationally choose technologies with low measured labor productivity my theory is that the adoption of modern retail technologies is optimal only when household ownership of complementary durable goods such as cars is widespread because income is low in the developing world households own few such durables the theory implies that policies that increase measured retail productivity do not necessarily increase welfare

sustainable urban livelihoods and marketplace social capital crisis and strategy in petty trade urban growth has been accompanied by the development of bimodal labour markets and increasing inequalities in both north and south in southern cities many of the poor have turned to the informal sector in particular to street trade this has resulted in a multiplicity of urban conflicts and has led to pressure on urban managers to undertake formalisation for which an increasingly developmental approach has been advocated nevertheless for traders the formalisation of street trade has very uneven outcomes the starting point for this article is the premise that not enough is known about the social fabric upon which trading careers depend adopting sustainable livelihoods as a conceptual framework and drawing on social capital theory four questions are addressed how do trading careers survive over time are there differences in the survival strategies for which social capital is employed among traders operating in different political cultural and socioeconomic contexts in the new processes of urba

rebuttal to jacobson s new evidence for old arguments in salvation for the spendthrift incumbent green and krasno 1988 we argue that incumbent spending has a sizable effect on the house vote this stands in direct contrast to professor jacobson s well known view that campaign spending by incumbents is not related to how well they do at the polls jacobson 1983 42 emphasis in the original in his rebuttal jacobson criticizes our findings on three grounds first he argues that the instrument we use in our twostage least squares model for incumbent spending is invalid second he complains that our model fails to account for diminishing marginal returns finally jacobson asserts that our findings for the 1978 election do not hold for subsequent years in this paper we briefly respond to these criticisms using data drawn from the 1976 86 elections we demonstrate that incumbent spending has a substantial influence on the vote we then critique the assumptions underlying jacobson s individual level analysis in the end we find little empirical support for jacobson s contention that the effects of incumbent spending are substantively small and statistically insignificant much of jacobson s essay focuses on the question of whether incumbent spending is as effective as challenger spending this comparative question however occupies a minor place in our salvation essay our main objective was to show that incumbent spending has more than a trivial influence on electoral outcomes we do not disagree in fact with jacobson s position that the marginal effect of challenger spending exceeds that of incumbent spending but this is not the only way to gauge the relative importance of incumbent and challenger spending another way would be to compare the yield the number of votes purchased by challengers and incumbents in each district this standard takes into account the fact that incumbents typically outspend their opponents data from 1976 86 indicate that the yield from incumbent spending is both considerable and on par with the yield from challenger expenditures in sum access to financial resources represents one of the important advantages of incumbency for the spendthrift incumbent is able to offset the effects of campaign expenditures by the opposition

party competition in a heterogeneous electorate the role of dominant issue voters this paper provides a theoretical model of party competition in a heterogeneous electorate the latter consists of numerous groups of dominant issue voters who base their voting decision primarily on one issue of the political agenda parties follow a lexicographic objective function aiming to gain power at minimum programmatic concessions the emerging pattern of movement in policy platforms is fundamentally different to the concept of convergence proposed by the spatial theory of voting rather than the centre of the scale of policy preference its extreme ends occupied by dominant issue voters attract the policy platforms the difference in policy platforms is not reduced the conclusions are found to be compatible with some major empirical findings of the manifesto research group

public members on occupational licensing boards effects on legislative regulatory reforms those concerned with the effects of occupational regulation have long argued the need for greater protection of consumer interests one area of concern is the domination of occupational licensing boards by practitioners of the licensed profession the professions were very successful in negotiating licensing statutes so that most if not all of the positions on licensing boards were allocated to members of the profession 10 this practice could encourage capture of the regulatory process by the regulated profession during the 1960s and 70s various state legislatures responded to this concern by requiring consumer representation on occupational licensing boards although this reform was widely adopted its effects are largely unknown existing research assessing the effects of public board membership is sparse limited to single states or professions schutz 36 identified no significant effects from increased public membership on california licensing boards on several board output measures this study however only encompassed the two years before and the two years after the increase in public membership given the difficulty in finding appointing and then training and orienting new public members it is not surprising that no effects were found in fact if past patterns regarding appointments prevailed it is likely that many of the public member seats remained vacant during the entire study period 38 moreover even if the public members were seated and oriented quickly it is likely that they would take some time to become acquainted with board roles and responsibilities before seeking significant reforms in the licensing process schneider 35 however found similar results in her study of the 1983 performance of missouri licensing boards she found no effects from public membership on four measures of board performance lammers 24 found that public members on boards regulating nursing home administrators affected only one regulatory policy the extensiveness of the agency s continuing we appreciate the cooperation and effort of many licensing board directors and staff members we especially want to thank ellen hume of the national clearinghouse on licensure enforcement and regulation for her assistance partial support for this research was provided by the university of southern california faculty research and innovation fund 1 the legislative empowerment act determines the composition of the boards the governor of each state is usually responsible for appointing members of occupational licensing boards although some states may require the governor

economic and political foundations of tax structure this paper derives the essential elements of tax systems as the outcome of rational behavior in a model w here government maximizes expected support and where opposition to ta xation depends on the loss in full income the analysis treats the le vel of expenditures as endogenous and integrates the influence of adm inistration costs with that of political and economic factors tax st ructure is shown to be a system of related components in equilibrium a final section compares results to two alternative approaches opti mal taxation and the leviathan model copyright 1988 by american economic association

modeling informality formally households and firms i introduction recent estimates indicate that around 10 of gross domestic product gdp in the united states is produced by individuals or firms that evade taxes schneider and enste 2000 in latin america approximately 50 of all salaried employees work informally an important question is therefore what are the determinants of informality unfortunately three decades of research have not yet yielded a consensus opinion on this point the traditional explanation initiated with the work of lewis 1954 assumes the existence of segmented labor markets in which some workers do not have access to jobs in the regulated formal sector these workers are forced to accept lower paying informal sector jobs that usually involve inferior working conditions while this view has become prevalent in the development literature direct empirical tests of the premise that informal workers would expect higher wages in the formal sector yield mixed results for instance magnac 1991 maloney 2004 and pratap and quintin 2004 do not find compelling evidence of segmentation between the formal and the informal sectors using data from colombia mexico and argentina respectively it is nonetheless certainly plausible that the presence of unions might segment the labor market layard et al 1991 however even if we believe that unionization has been an important factor in determining labor market segmentation in the past the pronounced decline of unionization throughout latin america over the last two decades seems to be a less satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon at the present time especially since informality increased in most countries in latin america during the same period gasparini and tornarolli 2006 another approach emphasizes the role of labor market regulation and taxation as the main cause of informality a pioneering study by de soto 1989 describes how informal workers develop their own laws and institutions to make up for the shortcomings of the official legal system it is certainly true that the size of the shadow economy is affected by the burden of taxes and social security contributions as well as by the many other regulations governing the official economy the problem with adopting this explanation of informality unreservedly however is that it overlooks the fact that workers have nonpecuniary preferences for the sector they work for and these preferences play a role in determining the equilibrium level of formality of an economy in particular workers in the informal sector are not eligible for socially mandated benefits three stylized facts characterize informality 1 small firms tend to operate informally while large firms tend to operate formally 2 unskilled workers tend to be informal while skilled ones have formal jobs 3 ceteris paribus secondary workers a worker other than the household head are less likely to operate formally than primary workers in this paper we present a model of an economy in which the sizes and wages of the formal and informal sectors are endogenously determined that accounts for these three facts our model entails a continuum of types on both sides of the labor market i e firms and workers firms choose whether to operate formally or informally and workers choose in what sector they work in equilibrium managerial talent determines size dualism at the firm level and human capital is the factor that determines whether workers are employed in the formal or informal sector in our model both heterogeneous firms and workers have preferences over the sectors they operate and choose optimally whether to function formally or informally by contrast a prominent feature of the preexisting literature is the idea that workers decisions play no role in determining the equilibrium of the economy thus our model is the first one in which policies that affect workers preferences as well of course as firm preferences over the formal or the informal sector such as pension plans public health issues and unemployment and any social benefits will affect the sizes and wages of the formal and the informal sectors

latin america in the rearview mirror abstract latin american countries are the only western countries that are poor and that are not gaining ground on the u s this paper evaluates why latin america has not replicated western economic success we find that this failure is primarily due to tfp differences latin america s tfp gap is not plausibly accounted for by human capital differences but rather reflects inefficient production we argue that competitive barriers are a promising channel for understanding low latin tfp we document that latin america has many more international and domestic competitive barriers than do western and successful east asian countries we also document a number of microeconomic cases in latin america in which large reductions in competitive barriers increase latin american productivity to western levels

what determines productivity lessons from the dramatic recovery of the u s and canadian iron ore industries following their early 1980s crisis great lakes iron ore producers had faced no competition from foreign iron ore in the great lakes steel market for nearly a century as the 1970s closed in the early 1980s as a result of unprecedented developments in the world steel market brazilian producers were offering to deliver iron ore to chicago the heart of the great lakes market at prices substantially below prices of local iron ore the u s and canadian iron ore industries faced a major crisis that cast doubt on their future in response to the crisis these industries dramatically increased productivity labor productivity doubled in a few years whereas it had changed little in the preceding decade materials productivity increased by more than half capital productivity increased as well i show that most of the productivity gains were due to changes in work practices work practice changes reduced overstaffing and hence increased labor productivity by increasing the fraction of time equipment was in operating mode changes in work pra

displacement and the new spaces for informal trade in the latin american city centre using evidence from cusco peru the paper examines the effects of the planned displacement of informal traders from city centre streets although more than 3500 traders were relocated to new off centre markets the research identifies the emergence of unplanned alternative city centre locations for informal trade especially the new courtyard markets the municipal led changes influenced strongly by concerns to enhance tourism reveal a process which displays many of the hallmarks of gentrification lower class traders were displaced from city centre streets for the benefit of middle class tourists and local people there was also gentrification of the trading activity itself by manipulating stall allocation and pricing structures to exclude the poorest traders from the new higher quality municipal markets the changing pattern of informal trading can be viewed as an unconventional barometer of the progress of policy led gentrification applicable to other cities in the developing world

the ideological component of senate voting different principles or different principals evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator specific ideologically driven shirking of constituent interest occurs in this paper we use a well known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter state constituent interests the role of campaign contributions and hence the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection we find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators finally accounting for inter state constituent interests shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection thus it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically driven shirking

barriers to entry and development we ask whether barriers to entry are a quantitatively important reason for the income gap between developing countries and the united states we develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the effects of barriers to entry and the other main distortions typically considered in the development literature we carry our model to the data and ask it to match the main development facts from the penn world table we find that this requires large barriers to entry in developing countries which account for about half of the income gap with the united states

the political economy of used automobile protection in latin america i n the wake of the debt crises of the early 1980s latin america embarked upon a process of trade liberalisation the levels of both average tariffs and tariff dispersions fell throughout the region as did the coverage of non tariff barriers in the case of used automobiles however this liberalisation has not in general taken place many latin american countries retain significant restrictions on the imports of used automobiles even as liberalisation has occurred in the new automobile sector from a factor proportions standpoint these restrictions are difficult to justify for a number of reasons elucidated by sen 1962 used machinery should be imported relatively intensively into labourabundant countries such as those of latin america further this insight was specifically applied to the case of used automobiles by grubel 1980 the key factor identified by grubel is the lower repair costs of used automobiles in developing countries importantly grubel s analysis suggests that the bulk of the gains from trade in used automobiles would accrue to the developing countries explaining latin american protection against imports of used automobiles requires an exploration of the political economy of the protective measures in this paper we make a preliminary attempt at this exploration we begin in the following section by presenting the degree of used passenger automobile protection in 24 latin american and caribbean countries this is followed by a

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

electoral competition and agricultural support in oecd countries agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue we consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers based on cox 1987 1990 and myerson 1993 we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to appeal to a narrow constituency tend to have a higher level of agricultural support we test this theoretical hypothesis using oecd agricultural support data disaggregated by commodity and country a cross classified multilevel model is employed to account for complex variation of agricultural support across countries commodities and time our empirical results show that electoral systems that encourage politicians to target narrow broad constituencies are associated with relatively high low levels of agricultural subsidies

credit channel trade credit channel and inventory investment evidence from a panel of uk firms abstract in this paper we use a panel of 609 uk firms over the period 1980 2000 to test for the existence of a trade credit channel of transmission of monetary policy and for whether this channel plays an offsetting effect on the traditional credit channel we estimate error correction inventory investment equations augmented with the coverage ratio and the trade credit to assets ratio differentiating the effects of the latter variables across firms more or less likely to face financing constraints and firms making a high or low use of trade credit our results suggest that both the credit and the trade credit channels operate in the uk and that the latter channel tends to weaken the former

legislative voting and the economic theory of politics empirical studies of legislative voting have multiplied since the mid 1970s early work 13 distinguished two modes of representation delegates who vote as voters want and trustees who use their own judgment more recently researchers have considered only delegates claiming that legislators who use their own ideology are shirking following principal agent theory representatives are conceived as conduits through which citizens transmit and express interests empirical work on this question however has found that the legislator s ideology explains more variation in vote choices than is explained by measures of constituent interest the seeming contradiction has led some 9 10 17 to reject the economic theory of legislator behavior as erroneous the truth is that no such theory has ever been fairly stated much less tested estimating equations have been ad hoc and the usual approach to measuring ideology has imposed correlation between the equation error and an explanatory variable 8 in both cases the result is

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

additional incumbent spending really can harm at least some incumbents an analysis of vote share maximization the literature on the effects of campaign expenditures on electoral outcomes implicitly suggests that incumbent spending cannot have a negative marginal impact on the incumbent s vote share indeed that literature has spent a great deal of effort finding positive and significant effects of incumbent spending this paper shows that there are circumstances under which theory predicts zero and even negative impacts of incumbent spending estimating equations derived from the theory provide strong support for the base model though only weak support for the extensions which predict nonpositive marginal products for incumbents

the changing structure of petty production in ecuador abstract this article deals with the extent to which the economic activities of the urban poor in third world cities will disappear stagnate or increase as capitalism develops first it seeks to develop a theoretical framework which allows us to make sense of the economic changes which are taking place in the cities of the developing world this is followed by an empirical analysis which shows that while the number of petty manufacturing workshops in key areas of quito remained remarkably constant over a seven year period of rapid economic growth this stagnation was the net result of gross changes in the structure of production whereby production of the means of subsistence declined and production of the means of production increased in addition the nature of the latter was modified in terms of the type of work undertaken the changes which took place varied across the city and were inadvertently affected by government housing policy

who supports global economic engagement the sources of preferences in american foreign economic policy in this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand u s foreign policy in particular foreign trade and aid using votes in the u s house of representatives from 1979 2004 we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy we assess the impact of domestic factors namely political economy and ideological preferences versus foreign policy pressures our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas first aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences second trade preferences but not economic aid ones are shaped by the president s foreign policy concerns for economic aid domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones third aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones but ideology plays a different substantive role in each different constituencies support aid and trade this finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability the internationalist coalition in u s foreign policy statist theories of foreign policy and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting

mr smith and the economy the influence of economic conditions on individual legislator voting this paper estimates the influence of macroeconomic conditions on individual legislator voting over time previous work shows legislator voting to be stable over careers in this paper voting on an ideological issue space ada scores and a fiscal issue space ntu scores from 1976 to 2002 exhibits significant short term cyclicality with economic conditions individual legislators polarize by party in response to rising unemployment and converge in response to rising inflation as legislators accumulate tenure they become more ideologically conservative but more fiscally liberal results are also reported on presidential party divided government and region all results are weaker in the senate than in the house

interest group politics under majority rule abstract we develop a model of interest group politics in which the groups and coalitions that arise and the form of redistributive policies sought are jointly determined the model generates three key results first programs intended to reduce income inequality are more likely to involve direct payments than are programs that redistribute wealth across groups with similar incomes second nonequalizing redistribution is unlikely unless the various participants in the political process face significantly different political and economic costs of obtaining transfers third many policies that induce asymmetries among interest groups also impose significant deadweight costs stable nonequalizing redistribution will therefore tend to involve indirect and economically inefficient methods of transferring income

the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes a data envelopment analysis data envelopment analysis is used to analyze the efficiency of candidate campaign spending analysis of the measured efficiency scores of the incumbents and challengers shows that there are significant systematic effects of both district and candidate characteristics the incumbent s residuals from the efficiency score regressions indicate those candidates who do well because of the nature of their district and those who do well because of their own abilities incumbents are ranked according to their observed efficiency their unobserved efficiency and their vote share correlations among the rankings are significant and of the expected signs more efficient candidates receive higher vote shares

the effects of campaign spending in house elections new evidence for old arguments the question of how campaign spending affects election results remains open because the simultaneity problem has proven so intractable green and krasno s 1988 recent attempt to solve the problem and to demonstrate that marginal returns on spending are as great for incumbents as for challengers again comes up short a panel feature of the abc newslwashington post congressional district poll conducted during the 1986 elections offers a fresh perspective on the question analysis of changes in voting intentions during the final six weeks of the campaign shows that as the tainted ols studies have invariably suggested the amount spent by the challenger is far more important in accounting for voter s decisions than is the amount spent by the incumbent

evidence on the role of cash flow for investment abstract recent work in macroeconomics argues that imperfections in capital markets may lead to business cycle fluctuations by propagating relatively modest shocks evidence for such a mechanism also known as the financial accelerator consists largely of firm level studies showing that cash flow is an important predictor of investment but this evidence is often viewed with skepticism because cash flow is also a good indicator of investment opportunities in this paper we develop a framework for estimating the extent to which the predictive power of cash flow can be attributed to its role as a fundamental versus its role in alleviating credit frictions for firms with access to commercial paper and bond markets we find that the perfect capital markets model of investment can fully account for the role of cash flow for firms with only limited access to capital markets as indicated by lack of participation in public debt markets however investment appears to be excessively sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow these results thus clarify the role of cash flow in investment equations and provide support for the existence of a financial accelerator

judicial lobbying the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation this paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary the resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation of powers systems we provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues we apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in argentina and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory

growth constraints on small scale manufacturing in developing countries a critical review abstract the question raised in this review is whether small scale producers in developing countries can expand or whether they are up against constraints which stunt their growth most of the literature has been optimistic on this score while internal constraints e g lack of managerial ability or external constraints e g discrimination from government are identified expansion is seen as an open ended process in other contributions this view has been severely criticized some allege that the small producers are exploited through various mechanisms others suggest that their road to expansion is blocked as a result of factors such as the pre existence of very advanced technology the control of large firms over product markets or difficulties in access to raw materials in discussing the arguments put forward in the debate an attempt is made to assess their theoretical bases and examine the extent to which they are supported empirically while most studies express explicitly or implicitly a definite view on the growth potential of small producers such judgement is rarely based on a comprehensive examination of the context which determines this potential

pacs lobbies and political conflict the case of gun control previous research has shown that pac contributions from the national rifle association as well as letters and lobbying by handgun control inc significantly affected congressional voting on the firearms owners protection act of 1986 holding constant ideology party constituency characteristics and a proxy for prior position on the issue using data from that study this paper shows that contributions have a somewhat different effect than lobbying contributions from nra were primarily targeted at nra supporters and had the net effect of making the progunners even more so contributions from handgun control while they did not significantly reinforce the proclivities of the gun controllers were directed only at that group at least in this case money appears to exacerbate conflict by contrast the police lobby directed its attention at both gun controllers and pro gunners the lobby effectively induced pro gunners to moderate their position

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

what is the price of tea in china goods prices and availability in chinese cities author s feenstra robert c xu mingzhi antoniades alexis abstract abstract we examine the price and variety of a sample of consumer goods at the barcode level in cities within china unlike the position in the united states in china the prices of goods tend to be lower in larger cities we explain that difference between the countries by the more uneven spatial distribution of manufacturers sales and retailers in china and we confirm the pro competitive effect of city size on reducing markups there in both countries there is a greater variety of goods in larger cities but that effect is more pronounced in china combining the lower prices and greater variety the price indexes in china for the goods we study fall with city size by around seven times more than in the united states

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

the determinants of industry political activity 1978 1986 c ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees pacs are increasingly important and controversial in u s elections influence purchasing is often alleged by pundits and campaign finance reform is continually debated in congress in the academy social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation few however have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups we shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit maximizing behavior we assume that corporate pac contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986 both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries we argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output by government s ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions and by the industry s ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance the costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry we also make a methodological contribution previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken we explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems the results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity we can explain between 60 and 80 of the variation in contributions in our sample first we review existing work on corporate political activity particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate pac spending by industry then we present an organization cost constrained industryprofit maximizing model based on a comparison between an idealized zero organization cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult the independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined next we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method then the results are presented followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity to make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns we give examples using five actual industries

does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents the theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name the existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate s stock of brand name this simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent s campaign spending and how well he does

interest group competition and the organization of congress theory and evidence from financial services political action committees we develop a positive theory of how interest group competition shapes the organization of congress and use it to explain campaign contribution patterns in financial services since interest groups cannot enforce fee for service contracts with legislators legislators have an incentive to create specialized standing committees which foster repeated dealing between interests and committee members the resulting reputational equilibrium supports high contributions and high legislative effort for the interests contribution patterns by competing interests in the congressional battle over whether banks can enter new businesses support the theory which also has implications for term limits and campaign reform

dutch inventory investment are capital market imperfections relevant this paper analyses inventory investment using a balanced panel of 82 dutch firms we start from the lovell 1961 inventory model and amend it with cash flow to introduce capital market imperfections the empirical evidence provides support for the relevance of capital market imperfections in explaining dutch inventory investment the results suggest that cash flow is a relevant variable omitted from the original lovell model the study provides a better understanding of inventory behaviour in general

bailout for sale the vote to save wall street this paper provides a public choice analysis of the 2008 banking bailout in the united states the paper introduces heterogeneity of congressional districts into the common agency problem in special interest politics district heterogeneity implies district specific electoral constraints on legislators ability to collect rents from and cast dissonant votes in support of special interests an empirical analysis examines legislative voting on the initial bailout proposal using campaign contributions to legislators from special interest groups and the importance of financial services for employment within congressional districts as the main explanatory variables the empirical analysis corrects for possible endogeneity bias using valid instruments and considers several intuitive sub sample estimations as alternative methods for addressing the endogeneity issue the paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions from the financial services sector influenced legislative voting on the banking bailout