motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

intergenerational transfers and savings in recent years the role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation has been the subject of substantial empirical and theoretical analysis the key question stimulating this research is what is the main explanation for savings is it primarily accumulation for retirement as claimed by albert ando richard brumberg and franco modigliani in their celebrated life cycle model of savings is it primarily intentional accumulation for intergenerational transfers or is it primarily precautionary savings much of which may be bequeathed because of imperfections in annuity markets this paper examines a range of findings on the importance of intergenerational transfers the strong conclusion that emerges from this evidence is that intergenerational transfers play a very important if not a key role in aggregate wealth accumulation while intergenerational transfers figure very large in savings the precise motivation for such transfers is unclear intergenerational altruism might appear the most likely candidate but at least sane stylized facts such as the equal allocation of bequests among children are strongly at adds with the altruism model other explanations involving imperfect insurance arrangements or payments for child services do not appear capable of explaining the substantial amounts of transfers actually observed sorting cut the relative contributions of different models to intergenerational transfers and the precise role of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation remains an intriguing and exciting enterprise this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the effect of annuity insurance on savings and inequality this paper examines the amount of precautionary savings and wealth inequality arising from life span uncertainty by comparing saving behavior under perfect insurance arrangements with that arising under imperfect arrangements namely when longevity risk can be pooled only with members of one s own family the central findings of the paper are that 1 perfecting insurance arrangements can sharply lower savings in both intergenerationally altruistic and life cycle economies and that 2 in altruistic economies perfecting annuity insurance can greatly influence inequality indeed in the long run in our model switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can mean the difference between absolute inequality and absolute equality

competitive equilibrium and the core in club economies with anonymous crowding in club economies with anonymous crowding competitive equilibrium states of the economy are efficient and coincide with the core when there is only one private good anonymous admission prices permit consumers with different tastes to share facilities consumers might do so when their demands for facility size and crowding coincide in which case sharing is efficient thus similarity of demands is the relevant consideration for efficiently grouping consumers with different tastes

the effect of social security on lifetime wealth accumulation and bequests this paper is an empirical study of the effects of social security on lifetime wealth accumulation and bequests using a sample of wisconsin males we have matched lifetime earnings records from income tax returns with their social security account records and their bequests obtained from probate court records since the cohort of males was born between 1890 and 1899 they represent a cohort that saw a great change in the size and coverage by occupation of the system hence there is substantial within cohort variation in social security wealth from which effects can be estimated for nearly 30 years the life cycle theory of savings has enjoyed an enormous amount of academic support in the no bequest variant individuals save with the sole intention of consuming their savings in later years the economy wide stock of capital can therefore be generated by this pattern without any reliance on bequests modigliani 1966 such a model will lead to rather strong predictions about the effect of a pay as you go public pension hereafter social security on private savings as feldstein 1974 points out social security should displace private savings as well as reduce macro saving since the programme is unfunded this result follows from the assumption that each household will consume all of its assets during its own lifetime some recent research however has been at odds with the no bequest variant of the life cycle model see kurz 1984 and included references darby 1979 claims that life cycle assets savings consumed later in the life cycle constitute only 13 29 per cent of total assets kotlikoff and summers 1981 report that the major share nearly 80 per cent of capital stock in the united states is due to intergenerational transfers 2 indeed these authors write life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers p 706 in addition recent empirical work suggests that people tend to accumulate or fail to significantly decumulate wealth wealth in old age a finding at odds with the strict life cycle model 3 given the potentially large role of bequests in the process of capital accumulation it is important to know how bequests are affected by the large public programme that social security has become even if social security depresses private savings among those near or at retirement if people bequeath it is conceivable that saving during retirement is augmented by the programme 4 aside from the issue of savings effects the response of people s bequests to their old age benefits might allow one to assess the target efficiency of the social security system since the original objective of the system was to ensure adequate levels of consumption among the elderly a finding that benefits

market prices of risk with diverse beliefs learning and catastrophes mies with identical patterns of endowments priors and information flows but two different market structures one with complete markets another in which consumers can trade only a single risk free bond we study how opportuni ties to speculate uncommon priors and learn ing affect market prices of risk two types of consumers have diverse beliefs about the law of motion for a random exogenous endowment one type knows the true law of motion while the other type learns about it via bayes s theo

evidence on wealth age profiles in canadian cross section data this paper reports on one component of a research program in which we are studying household behaviour to establish a set of empirical facts upon which researchers can construct more realistic models evidence on whether wealth age profiles conform to the inverse u shape predicted by the standard life cycle model is mixed here we show that there are significant differences in accumulation behaviour across major household types on average blue collar households decumulate after retirement but white collar do not la relation entre la richesse et l dge profils dr en moyenne les menages de cols bleus font l experience d une decumulation de richesse apres la retraite alors que les menages de cols blancs ne font pas cette experience

should congestion tolls be set by the government or by the private sector the knight pigou debate revisited this paper clarifies issues debated by a c pigou and frank knight about correcting inefficient use of congestible resources focusing for concreteness on their original example of road congestion instead of government imposed pigouvian access fees knight favoured access fees set by private toll setters we consider the case of n 2 congestible roads and an uncongestible road of arbitrary speed knight argued that in the case of a single congestible road a private toll setter would always choose the toll that pigou recommended hence the allocation would minimize aggregate commute time without government meddling we find instead that two or more toll setters would never choose pigouvian tolls except in the special case of a sufficiently fast uncongestible road moreover for uncongestible roads of slower speed the allocation of motorists under knight s proposal is almost never efficient whenever it is inefficient motorists are strictly worse off when they pay tolls set by private firms instead of paying government imposed tolls and aggregate toll revenue is also lower nevertheless if the private sector does set tolls then the full cost to motorists can be limited if the government provides an uncongestible alternative such as a train to offer potential competition along the same route

precautionary saving and accidental bequests this paper presents a simple general equilibrium model of precautionary saving and accidental bequests this model is used to analyze the implications of individual lifetime uncertainty for aggregate consumption and capital accumulation a precautionary demand for saving arises because an individual consumer does not know in advance the date at which he will die and he wants to avoid low levels of consumption in the event that he lives longer than expected an implication of this precautionary saving is that when death does occur the consumer is generally holding some wealth which is then passed on to his heirs in the form of an accidental bequest even if all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities there will be some intracohort variation in the date of death consequently there will be a nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by consumers in a cohort this nondegenerate distribution of bequests left by one generation induces variation in the distributions of wealth consumption and bequests of subsequent generations the importance of bequests in aggregate saving has been established by laurence kotlikoff and lawrence summers 1981 who reported that 80 percent of u s household wealth is inherited wealth one interpretation of this finding is that the simple life cycle model without bequest motives is an inadequate description of saving behavior in the united states but the model i present demonstrates that accidental bequests by selfish consumers can account for a potentially sizeable fraction of aggregate wealth although some part of bequests especially by the wealthy undoubtedly results from an explicit bequest motive accidental bequests also play a role in the intergenerational transfer of wealth as well as in the intragenerational variation in wealth in order to focus on the role of accidental bequests i purposely exclude a bequest motive from the specification of the utility function the effects of lifetime uncertainty on individual consumption behavior were first examined formally in a seminal paper by menachem yaari 1965 yaari s model provided the basic framework for virtually all subsequent work on uncertain lifetimes including well known papers by nils hakansson 1969 stanley fischer 1973 robert barro and james friedman 1977 david levhari and leonard mirman 1977 and kotlikoff and avia spivak 1981 however all of these papers focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored the effect of accidental bequests on the behavior of the recipients of these accidental bequests 2 as will be shown at various points in this paper changes in the economic environment can have effects on aggregate behavior which differ sharply from the effects on individual behavior because of the endogenous adjustment of bequests the effects of department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 this paper is a revised version of bequests and social security with uncertain lifetimes nber working paper no 1372 june 1984 i thank olivier blanchard john burbidge christopher cavanagh robert clower stanley fischer benjamin friedman elhanan helpman mervyn king nobuhiro kiyotaki laurence kotlikoff robert mcdonald james pesando julio rotemberg lawrence summers lars svensson mark watson and jeffrey wolcowitz for valuable conversations and correspondence i also thank the participants in seminars at boston university columbia university cornell university federal reserve board harvard university university of iowa mit university of minnesota university of montreal national bureau of economic research north carolina state university the wharton school and yale university and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments i also thank the national science foundation for financial support 1 in the presence of perfect annuity and life insurance markets there may or may not be bequests depending on the presence or absence of a bequest motive but there would be no accidental bequests 2 kotlikoff and spivak focus on the role of the family in providing an incomplete annuities market but stop short of a full scale overlapping generations model in which the distribution of bequests is determined endogenously

two tier pricing of shared facilities in a free entry equilibrium we explore how well the market will provide shared facilities which are subject to congestion it is usually efficient to have multiple facilities because it is more efficient to spend resources on facilities than to endure crowding costs we assume firms can charge a membership price and a visit price we present a symmetric nash equilibrium in these two prices we show that ifthe number offirms is large the membership price will be small thus the membership price is a measure of market power when entry occurs in response to positive profit but such that entry is deterred by the prospect of negative profit in a symmetric nash equilibrium the endogenous number offirms is bounded below by one fewer than the efficient number thefees paid by a client converge to an appropriately defined competitive price as the economy is replicated

the wealth age relation among the aged aged people face the problem of allocating over the rest of their lifetimes the wealth that they have accumulated during their working years this problem is fairly complex because they are uncertain about the dates of their death and because they may wish to use their wealth to finance general consumption or hold it to meet emergencies leave estates or maintain power or status whether skilled at dynamic programming or not aged people effectively do make these decisions what are the results some studies of the entire lifetime pattern of saving and wealth tend to support the simple life cycle model in which the aged use up their wealth to help finance consumption harold lydall for example found saving rates to increase and then decrease with age in the whole population and to be negative for the group aged 65 and over guarded support for the theory was found by franco modigliani and albert ando in britain and by dorothy projector in the united states more recently a f shorrocks examined the lifetime pattern of wealth holding in estate tax data for a single cohort and found the hump pattern that is characteristic of life cycle saving other evidence on wealth holding runs contrary to this however in a study of estate tax returns in washington d c james d smith found that wealth increased with age among the aged after controlling for other demographic variables examining national estate tax data john brittain found wealth to increase with age in the united states and a b atkinson and a j harrison reported the same pattern in england and wales in a sample of tiaa annuity recipients analyzed by james mulanaphy over half reported that their total savings had increased during retirement and another quarter reported that their savings had remained about the same in this paper i examine wealth holding patterns among aged married couples using survey data representing the entire aged population of the united states in 1968 the statistical analysis serves as a test of the hypothesis that emerges from life cycle theory and provides some further exploration into the economic behavior of the aged i find that the aged tend to increase their wealth over time

capital accumulation and the characteristics of private intergenerational transfers many recent studies of the process of family accumulation in general and household response to social security in particular have revealed growing dissatisfaction with the life cycle theory of saving see for example barro 1978 kotlikoff 1979 darby 1979 kotlikoff and summers 1981 kurz 1981 blinder gordon and wise 1981 david and menchik 1982 leimer and lesnoy 1982 an alternative to the life cycle hypothesis is expressed by defining the preference of each family over its own consumption as well as the welfare of the generations that follow thus each family consists of an infinite chain of generations who have interdependent preferences and for this reason we shall call it the inter generational hypothesis it was recently used by barro 1974 1978 to attack the conclusions of the life cycle hypothesis our purpose in this paper is to start the long road of studying the structure of the private inter generational transfer system with the aim of providing additional tests of the two competing hypotheses

how tame will leviathan become in institutional competition competition among governments in the provision of public goods this article critically examines thehypothesis of brennan and buchanan that competition amonggovernments in the provision of publicgoods can serve as a substitute forconstitutional constraints on governments since leviathan type governments withfree choice of tax instruments will be ableto escape competitive pressure by shiftingtaxes to immobile factors one could thinkof a rule of competition which prohibitstaxes on immobile factors indeed such arule leads to a nash equilibriumwhere the tax burden lies on the mobilefactor however net income of the citizensmay or may not increase as a result fromsuch a rule depending on a number ofvariables presented in this article acomplete substitution of constitutionalconstraints by the rule of competition may depending on the same variables evendecrease net income moreover somepotential for increases in net income maybe forgone since capital allocation andthe supply of public goods will usually beinefficient in equilibrium finally applying the rule in a real worldenvironment will be difficult and may evenlead to further serious inefficiencies forthese reasons such a rule will hardly everbe introduced hence competition amonggovernments cannot be viewed as a propersubstitute for constitutional constraints whoever is afraid of leviathan shouldthus not rely on competition amonggovernments alone

clubs local public goods and transportation models a synthesis abstract clubs local public goods and transportation models are analyzed within a unified model the emphasis is on the derivation of optimal allocation pricing and the size of the sharing group we derive the conditions under which optimal prices will yield surplus or deficit as well as those under which competitive provision will be efficient given heterogeneous tastes we prove that segregation according to tastes is generally efficient although several cases where this result does not hold are also discussed we show that the existing literature is unnecessarily restrictive and that the unified approach suggested here considerably extends the existing analysis of clubs local public goods and the transportation problems

uncertainty and optimal social security systems this paper examines the annuity aspect of social security within the framework of an overlapping generations model the duration of life is assumed to be uncertain under a fully funded system demand for social security is determined by each generation so as to maximize expected lifetime utility taking into account the welfare of future generations under a pay as you go system with intergenerational transfers demand for retirement benefits by the working population takes into account taxes paid by descendants it is shown that the two modes of finance are equivalent in terms of all real aggregates effects of changes in expected lifetime and in the birth rate are analyzed starting at the optimal level a compulsory balanced increase in social security taxes and benefits is shown to increase short run savings

the effect of increased longevity on capital accumulation one of the more startling demographic trends of the 1970 s has been the sharp rise in lifespan in the united states between 1970 and 1980 the life expectancy of 25year old men and women increased by at least two years while longevity has been steadily rising for many decades the recent spurt has hastened the trend the increase for both men and women in the 1970 s more than doubled the improvement of the 1960 s 1 the 1970 s were also characterized by a decline in labor force participation of older workers although rising income and increased disability payments may have explained some of the decline donald parsons 1980 it seems clear that expanding longevity has not been strongly associated with deferred retirement daniel hamermesh 1984 2 thus the retirement years have assumed greater importance in financial planning for the consumer as he or she retires earlier and lives longer the traditional life cycle model would predict greater savings rates as consumers increase accumulation of assets for their retirement consumption while young would drop and there might be an increase in labor supply as individuals substitute leisure while young for greater levels of life cycle consumption even under a social security system as long as the current generation s tax liabilities reflect their longer lifespan total savings private plus public should also rise 3 the predicted increase in savings is substantial a simple example using the modigliani ando brumberg life cycle model can illustrate the extent of the savings shift assume that earnings and consumption are constant over working years and lifespan respectively and that the interest rate is zero consumption is then a constant proportion k of earnings where k is the ratio of working years to one s lifespan if consumers made plans based on average lifespan the representative 25 year old would have saved 18 percent of earnings in 1970 1 40 49 when he plans to retire at age 65 and expects to live until age 74 in 1980 after a rise in life expectancy of two years the representative 25 year old would have increased savings to 21 percent of earnings or a net rise in the savings rate per worker of 17 percent that is this simple life cycle model implies that savings in the last decade should have risen other things held constant by approximately 17 percent or about 80 billion dollars per year the evidence from aggregate time series data appears to contradict the life cycle model s prediction of rising savings rates the net private savings rate in the united states declined from 7 8 percent of nnp in 1970 to 6 2 percent in 1980 while alan auerbach 1982 has suggested that some of the reported decline in savings may be caused by mismeasurement it seems clear that there has been no substantial rise in the savings rate there are numerous explanations for department of economics university of virginia charlottesville va 22901 i am grateful to maxim engers daniel hamermesh william r johnson laurence j kotlikoff john strauss and especially james davies and john r wolfe for helpful suggestions and comments life table data can be found in daniel hamermesh 1985 the life insurance fact book various years or in unpublished form from the national center for health statistics 2john wolfe 1983 provides an ingenious argument for why the social security benefit schedule has induced those with shorter life expectancies to retire early we might therefore expect some rise in the average retirement age as those expecting to live longer defer retirement until age 65 3if the social security taxes do not rise as expected lifespan increases perhaps because current tax proceeds are paid out as current benefits rather than retained in a trust fund young workers will save more to offset the lower expected benefits in the future 4in a two period model the percentage change in savings by the young is equal to the percentage change in aggregate savings

the city network paradigm measuring urban network externalities in recent years network behaviour has been analysed extensively as the emerging model for economic growth by network behaviour a metaphor for co operative behaviour among individuals corporate