the evolving landscape of banking the structure of the financial services industry is in flux liberalization deregulation and advances in information technology have changed the financial landscape dramatically interbank competition has heated up and banks face increasing competition from nonbanking financial institutions and the financial markets the predictability of the industry with low levels of financial innovation little innovation in distribution channels and well defined and rigid institutional structures is gone product innovations new distribution channels and emerging new competitors are in abundance moreover the subprime crisis that has hit the financial sector in 2007 2008 appears to have a major impact on the structure of the industry this article emphasizes the importance of understanding the economics of banking for assessing the changes in the industry in particular we point at relationship banking as a prime source of the banks comparative advantage the proliferation of transaction oriented banking trading and financial market activities does however seriously challenge relationship banking in order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market underwriting securitization etc activities we also address the issue of the optimal conglomeration of bank activities including the empirical evidence on scope and scale economies we analyze the strategic positioning of banks in the currently highly uncertain competitive arena and link this to the theory of the firm and particularly firm boundaries and learning

banking relationship numbers and new business bankruptcies this paper examines the effect of the number of correspondent financial institutions for small and medium sized enterprises smes at the first settlement of accounts on subsequent firm bankruptcy risk using survival models we use a unique firm level data set of 2667 unlisted smes incorporated in japan between april 2003 and december 2009 moreover in the nature of the analysis we focus on firms that transact with at least one financial institution and disclose information about profit at the first settlement we find that more correspondent financial institutions for smes at the first settlement increase subsequent firm bankruptcy risk furthermore we check the robustness of this result with the method of instrumental variables iv methods and obtain similar results in other words the risk of firm bankruptcy increases with the number of correspondent financial institutions

financial intermediary coalitions abstract in this article an environment in which the investment opportunities of agents are private information is studied and it is shown that financial intermediaries arise endogenously within that environment it is established that financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement in the sense that they are needed to support the authors private information core allocations these intermediaries which are coalitions of agents exhibit the following characteristics in equilibrium they borrow from and lend to large groups of agents they produce information about investment projects and they issue claims that have different state contingent payoffs than claims issued by ultimate borrowers

do banks provide financial slack we study the decision to choose bank debt rather than public securities in a firm s marginal financing choice using a sample of 500 firms over the 1980 to 1993 time period we find that firms are relatively more likely to choose bank loans when variables that measure asymmetric information problems are elevated the sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank debt to information problems is greater for firms with no public debt outstanding these results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks help alleviate asymmetric information problems and that firms weigh these information benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing bank financing why do some firms borrow from public sources while others rely exclusively on private lenders the answer to this question is not well understood existing theories suggest that a firm must consider the tradeoff between the benefits and costs of bank debt financing relative to other potential financing choices the potential benefits of bank financing include low moral hazard and adverse selection costs and ease of renegotiation in financial distress 1 the potential costs of bank financing include monitoring costs suboptimal liquidation outcomes and distortions induced by information monopolies 2 the goal of this paper is to identify whether adverse selection problems influence a firm s choice between new bank debt public debt or common stock in particular we are interested in assessing the empirical validity of the hypothesis that banks have the ability to accurately price a firm s claims thus inducing a preference for firms that are undervalued by the market to

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

does competition from new equity mitigate bank rent extraction insights from japanese data previous research shows that bank information production mitigates asymmetric information problems however this literature has ignored the concern that firms with better growth prospects are more vulnerable to bank rent extraction this paper points out that funding competition from new equity as an effective natural mechanism solves this important concern using japanese data from 1983 to 1997 we show that the relationship between loan to debt ratio and growth while starting significantly negative consistent with holdup theory turns significantly positive towards the high end of the growth spectrum we confirm that high growth firms raise more new equity than do low growth firms and use more equity relative to bonds in external finance this is consistent with a generalized myers majluf framework these results suggest that for high growth firms when competition from public debt lessens due to increased growth based valuations competition from new equity steps in to restrain bank rent extraction

communication in repeated games with private monitoring abstract the paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed we address the following question what is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes the main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs when the discount factor tends to one contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at leasttwoother players journal of economic literatureclassification number c73

can the trade off theory explain debt structure we examine the optimal mixture and priority structure of bank and market debt using a tradeoff model where banks have the unique ability to renegotiate outside formal bankruptcy flexible bank debt offers a superior tradeoff between tax shields and bankruptcy costs ease of renegotiation limits bank debt capacity however optimal debt structure hinges upon which party has bargaining power in private workouts weak firms have high bank debt capacity and utilize bank debt exclusively strong firms lever up to their lower bank debt capacity augment with market debt and place the bank senior therefore the tradeoff theory offers an explanation for i why young small firms use bank debt exclusively ii why large mature firms employ mixed debt financing and iii why bank debt is senior the tradeoff theory also generates predictions consistent with international evidence in countries where the bankruptcy regime entails soft tough enforcement of contractual priority bank debt capacity is low high implying greater less reliance on market debt

the choice between bank debt and trade credits in business start ups this paper investigates the choice between bank debt and trade credit in business start ups while trade credit is more expensive than bank debt suppliers tend to follow a more lenient liquidation policy when client firms encounter financial distress as a result suppliers are more willing to renegotiate the outstanding debt or grant additional debt whereas banks are more likely to liquidate borrowers upon default given the risky nature of business start ups we argue that the entrepreneur s choice of debt instruments reflects these differences in liquidation policy between lenders and is thus determined by the venture s failure risk the entrepreneur s private control benefits that are lost upon liquidation and the liquidation value of firm assets using unique data on 325 first time business start ups we find that firms in industries with high historical start up failure rates and entrepreneurs who tend to highly value private benefits of control use less bank debt these effects are especially prevalent in start ups where assets have a high liquidation value and thus banks are more likely to liquidate the venture following default

bank information monopolies and the mix of private and public debt claims this article examines the determinants of the mix of private and public debt using detailed information on the debt structure of 250 publicly traded corporations from 1980 through 1990 we find that the relationship between bank borrowing and the importance of growth opportunities depends on the number of banks the firm uses and whether the firm has public debt outstanding for firms with a single bank relationship the reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth opportunities in contrast among firms borrowing from multiple banks the relationship is positive

safety net losses from abandoning glass steagall restrictions this paper evaluates the redistribution of gains surrounding regulatory relaxations in 1996 and 1997 and ultimate passage of the financial services modernization act fsma of 1999 gains in financial institution stocks may come from projected increases in efficiency increases in the bargaining power of financial institutions or greater access to the federal safety net for customers seeking improved access to capital markets gains in efficiency should result in increased benefits but increases in bank bargaining power could increase funding costs and or decrease capital market access customers may also lose as taxpayers who support the federal safety net this paper finds evidence of potential taxpayer losses and increased bank bargaining power especially vis a vis credit constrained customers for whom safety net subsidies are unlikely to be shifted forward the stock prices of credit constrained customers declined during fsma event windows and in event windows associated with regulatory relaxations

banks lending decisions after loan acquisitions do banks favour pre existing relationships this article examines the lending decisions of korean banks after they acquire loan portfolios from failed banks we find that a firm s pre existing relationships positively affect the continuation of those relationships and that pre existing relationships negatively impact increases in loan size once those relationships are maintained these results suggest that banks have a conflict of interest that comes with pre existing lending relationships and that bank quality does not necessarily convey the risk classes of its client firms

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

bank information monopoly and trade credit do only banks have information about small businesses according to previous studies a bank can set a higher interest rate for small firms by establishing a lending relationship since information asymmetry limits competition between banks therefore the bank can acquire monopoly rent from small firms however if small firms can use trade credit which is another financial source the bank cannot extract monopoly rent in this article we examine whether small firms can use trade credit if the bank sets a higher interest rate using panel data of small firms in japan our analysis shows that when the interest rate the bank sets is too severe or worsened for the borrower the ratio of trade payables increases and the bank loses its amount of loans this result implies that trade creditors alleviate the problems of bank information monopolies in japan

traders cops and robbers abstract we propose a simple model of trade outside the law preyed on by robbers and possibly protected by private cops we establish the conditions for trade collapse secure trade and insecure trade endogenous predation and enforcement can explain both puzzling failures of commonly observed state policies against illegal trade and puzzlingly large trade responses to liberalization in licit goods

optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority the dynamic behavior of a price fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed consistent with preceding static theories the cartel s steady state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection however contrary to those theories it is independent of the level of fixed fines it is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages

what s different about banks abstract negotiable certificates of deposit cd s trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers acceptances if cd s must pay lenders competitive monetary interest the reserve tax on cd s is borne by bank borrowers viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk moreover there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with cd s

a theory of trade secrets in firms this article provides a simple theoretical model of trade secrets in hierarchical firms a crucial assumption is that each manager has access to trade secrets pertaining to his own hierarchical level as well as to all lower levels the article explores some implications of this assumption for optimal degree of trade secrets accumulation and protection as well as for the wage structure in firms in addition the model implies that managers may have an incentive to overpay their subordinates and protect their firms trade secrets too much

bond covenants and delegated monitoring this paper examines alternative contracting arrangements available to a firm seeking to finance an investment project the authors consider the choice between loan contracts with covenants based on noisy indicators of the firm s financial health and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring specialist in one interpretation the specialist is a financial intermediary the firm s choice is shown to depend upon the firm s credit rating the accuracy of financial indicators of the firm s condition the loss from premature liquidation of the firm s project and the cost of monitoring

product market competition and the cost of bank loans evidence from state antitakeover laws abstract the extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability i investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm s cost of bank loans after taking into account the industry composition of borrowers i find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers but only in concentrated industries in the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms firms followed by analysts firms with existing credit ratings non family firms and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place taken together the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems

real flexibility and financial structure an empirical analysis i examine the empirical relation between real flexibility and financial structure i test whether real flexibility increases debt capacity by lowering default risk and making assets more marketable or decreases debt capacity by facilitating risk shifting and asset substitution i measure real flexibility as the sensitivity of marginal production and investment decisions to variations in the economic environment i find that financial leverage is negatively related to production flexibility but positively related to investment flexibility this split in results suggests that although asset substitution facilitated by investment flexibility can be prevented contractually risk shifting facilitated by production flexibility is intractable copyright 2003 oxford university press

managerial task assignment and promotions a two period model of managerial task assignment is developed where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager while outside employers can observe only the assign ments optimal contracts are rigid but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient the author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e as a consequence the model has the appealing property of small ab ility based wage differentials within a task as well as large ones b etween tasks copyright 1988 by the econometric society

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

crime and social interactions the high variance of crime rates across time and space is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences this variance appears too high to be explained by changes in the exogenous costs and benefits of crime we present a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross city variance of crime rates this model provides an index of social interactions which suggests that the amount of social interactions is highest in petty crimes moderate in more serious crimes and almost negligible in murder and rape

the pecking order debt capacity and information asymmetry abstract we quantify the empirical relevance of the pecking order hypothesis using a novel empirical model and testing strategy that addresses statistical power concerns with previous tests while the classificatory ability of the pecking order varies significantly depending on whether one interprets the hypothesis in a strict or liberal e g modified pecking order manner the pecking order is never able to accurately classify more than half of the observed financing decisions however when we expand the model to incorporate factors typically attributed to alternative theories the predictive accuracy of the model increases dramatically accurately classifying over 80 of the observed debt and equity issuances finally we show that what little pecking order behavior can be found in the data is driven more by incentive conflicts as opposed to information asymmetry

some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing abstract price dynamics are characterized for a price fixing cartel antitrust laws reduce cartel prices even though cartel detection occurs with probability zero in response to cheating the non collusive price gradually moves from the collusive price to the static nash equilibrium price

human capital and the productivity of suicide bombers the authors empirical analysis suggests that older and more educated suicide bombers are being assigned by their terror organization to more important targets they find that more educated and older suicide bombers are less likely to fail in their mission and are more likely to cause increased casualties when they attack

financial contracting and the choice between private placement and publicly offered bonds the financial contracting in private placement bonds and publicly offered bonds are different our data show that private placement bonds are more likely to have restrictive covenants than public bonds private placement bonds are also more likely to be issued by smaller and riskier firms for investment grade firms that issue bonds in both markets our analysis shows that firms select the bond type to minimize financing costs we find significant differences in the pricing of private placement and publicly offered bonds and some of these differences appear to be related to the different institutional features between the two markets

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

does corporate lending by banks and finance companies differ evidence on specialization in private debt contracting this paper establishes empirically the existence of specialization in private market corporate lending adding a new dimension to the public versus private debt distinctions now common in the literature comparing corporate loans made by banks and by finance companies we find that the two types of intermediaries are equally likely to finance information problematic firms however finance companies tend to serve observably riskier borrowers particularly more leveraged borrowers evidence supports both regulatory and reputation based explanations for this specialization in passing we shed light on various theories of debt contracting and intermediation and present facts about finance companies

creditor concentration an empirical investigation most of the literature on multiple banking assumes equal financing shares however unequal asymmetric or concentrated bank borrowing is widespread and creditor concentration is only weakly correlated with the number of bank relationships this paper therefore investigates the determinants of creditor concentration for german firms using a comprehensive firm bank level dataset for the time period between 1993 and 2003 we document that corporate borrowing from banks is very often concentrated even for the largest firms in our sample leveraged firms and firms with more redeployable assets concentrate their borrowing from banks as are firms dealing with a relationship lender that is profitable that has lower monitoring costs or that operates in a concentrated regional lending market

deregulation disintermediation and agency costs of debt evidence from japan abstract many japanese firms reduced dependence on banks following financial deregulation in the 1980s the financial architecture of japanese firms after liberalization provides an opportunity to investigate the choice of financing with public bonds versus monitored bank loans examination of accounting and stock price data for a sample of japanese firms in the late 1980s suggests that debt structure is related to variables that serve as proxies for agency costs of debt in particular we find that the proportion of bond debt is inversely related to growth opportunities while the proportion of bank debt is positively related to growth opportunities

an empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt ownership structure i examine the relation between corporate debt ownership structure and several firm characteristics suggested by recent theory the results demonstrate the importance of monitoring and information costs the likelihood and costs of inefficient liquidation and borrowers incentives in affecting firms debt source preferences several theoretical predictions receive support while others do not the results also suggest important differences between bank and private non bank debt which contrasts with most theoretical models additionally i find evidence of systematic use of bank debt by firms with access to public debt suggesting the benefits attributed to bank debt in theoretical models remain important after firms gain access to public debt markets although different lenders appear to have different maturity preferences the results also suggest debt maturity and debt ownership decisions may be separable

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

capital structure and debt structure using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation relative to high credit quality firms lowcredit quality firms are more likely to have a multi tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non bank debt with loose covenants we discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts jel g32

bank interest rates and credit relationships in italy abstract when evaluating the performance of a financial system in supporting the investment activity of the corporate sector a distinction is usually drawn between banking economies and market economies the former being characterized by long term relations between banks and the industrial sector although theoretical studies and empirical results seem to agree that lending relationships increase the available quantity of capital to firms they have little to say on the cost of bank credit it is not clear whether a close relationship with a main bank would allow the borrower to pay a lower interest rate or expose him to a monopolistic rent using a unique data set reporting detailed information on the evolution over time of individual bank borrower relationships in italy we show evidence that a main bank provides credit at a lower cost and that some competition helps to reinforce the commitment between the borrower and the bank

dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion abstract we explore how the timings of compensation payments and contract terminations are jointly determined in a continuous time principal agent model under the discretionary termination policy of investors the principal when the manager agent has loss averse preferences our theoretical findings provide several new empirical implications for backloaded compensation and forced managerial turnover our model also shows that mandatory deferral regulation governing incentive pay induces investors to terminate the contract relation earlier and results in the more frequent replacement of managers

arm s length financing and innovation evidence from publicly traded firms using a large panel of u s companies i document that firms that rely more on arm s length financing such as public debt and equity innovate more and have higher quality innovations than firms that use other sources such as relationship based bank financing i hypothesize that one possible reason for this finding is the greater flexibility and tolerance to experimentation associated with arm s length financing i find support for this hypothesis by showing that firms with more arm s length financing have greater volatility of innovative output and are more likely to innovate in new technological areas furthermore focusing only on bank financing i demonstrate that firms have more novel innovations if they borrow from multiple banks use predominantly credit lines and have less intense covenants i address potential endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variable analysis and by showing that innovation increases significantly after new public debt offerings and seasoned equity offerings but d

an investigation of cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt abstract we examine the cost differences between public sales and private placements of debt for a sample of public utility issues the lowest cost method depends on a firm s transaction costs which comprise flotation costs agency costs and the costs of searching the market our findings suggest that firms minimize the cost of issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest transaction costs

debt and communications technology diffusion retrospective evidence this study has evaluated the relationship between debt in the capital structure of firms and the dynamics of broadband and digital technology adoption in the united states based on a large dataset on local exchange carriers in the united states over a contemporary historical fourteen year period from 1988 to 2001 using treatment effects modeling the impact of debt in impacting the levels of firms broadband deployment has been found to be negative and significant the primary source of debt in the sector has been in the form of arm s length corporate bonds and the assumptions of the monitoring hypothesis associated with such debt that lenders in the face of information and collective actions problems might not be able to control managers and hence invest less in highly technology intensive situations are supported by the data additionally the data set has been split into separate sets for two periods one between 1988 and 1995 for the period before the telecommunications act of 1996 came into force and the other set between 1996 and 2001 and the results have stayed consistent a test of the coefficients between the two periods has shown that the negative impact of leverage on broadband deployment has become stronger after the introduction of competition in the sector and this has suggested that the change in the institutional logics between the two periods has been of material impact in influencing lenders perceptions

capital market access and corporate loan structure in this article we use a sample of 14 075 loan packages issued between 1993 and 2007 to examine if borrower access to external capital markets influences corporate loan structure we classify firms into three access categories private unrated public and rated public private firms have the lowest access and to date no large sample investigation of their loans has been done in the literature rated public firms access the capital markets the most we find the level of access influences loan structure in ways that are consistent with having greater or fewer financing alternatives as well as theories on information asymmetry agency and monitoring in particular loans to firms with higher levels of access have shorter maturities fewer loan facilities per package and a lower probability of being secured we also find that a higher level of access results in a higher incidence of single lender loans but among multiple lender loans it leads to a larger number of lenders furthermore we find evidence

can web courses replace the classroom in principles of microeconomics the proliferation of economics courses offered partly or completely online arnold katz and william e becker 1999 raises important questions about the effects of the new technologies on student learning do students enrolled in online courses learn more or less than students taught face to face can we identify any student characteristics such as gender race act scores or grade averages that are associated with better outcomes in one technology or another how would the online or face to face students fare if they had taken the course using the alternative technology this paper addresses these questions using student data from our principles of microeconomics courses at michigan state university

the impact of leniency and whistle blowing programs on cartels antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements these programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion we compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals including firm employees can deter collusion in a more effective way we discuss possible adverse effects of whistle blowing programs on firms behavior and particularly on turnover incentives to innovate and cooperation we also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence

virtual classrooms how online college courses affect student success online college courses are a rapidly expanding feature of higher education yet little research identifies their effects relative to traditional in person classes using an instrumental variables approach we find that taking a course online instead of in person reduces student success and progress in college grades are lower both for the course taken online and in future courses students are less likely to remain enrolled at the university these estimates are local average treatment effects for students with access to both online and in person options for other students online classes may be the only option for accessing college level courses

multiple versus single banking relationships theory and evidence a theory of the optimal number of banking relationships is developed and tested using matched bank firm data according to the theory relationship banks may be unable to continue funding profitable projects owing to internal problems and a firm may thus have to refinance from nonrelationship banks the latter however face an adverse selection problem as they do not know the quality of the project and may refuse to lend in these circumstances multiple banking can reduce the probability of an early liquidation of the project the empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model

direct versus intermediated finance an old question and a new answer we consider a closed economy where a risk neutral bank competes with a competitive bond market firms can finance a risky project either by a bank credit or by issuing a bond which is directly sold to risk averse investors who also hold safe deposits at the bank we show that the bank tends to allocate more capital to lower quality projects but there are some interesting qualifications if the asymmetric information concerns only the success probability then we observe adverse selection while if it concerns only the expected return bad types are driven out of the market

understanding the rise and decline of the japanese main bank system the changing effects of bank rent extraction this paper shows how main bank rent extraction affects corporate decisions about investment and financing during financial regulatory reform our model predicts that limited loanable funds can initially contain main bank controlled overinvestment even when new equity is available to the firm abundant funds facilitate overinvestment to the detriment of firm profitability a shift of control rights back to the firm due to financial deregulation produces an equity for upside potential and bank debt for downside risk bias against the banks a stock market and real estate boom in japan made it harder than ever for the banks to diversify risk the insights from this analysis help explain why japan s main bank system was beneficial in the capital constrained postwar period but became harmful during the capital abundant and even bubbly 1980s and why the adverse shocks of the post deregulation 1990s had such severe effects on the banking system

the determinants of contract terms in bank revolving credit agreements the paper examines the determinants of contract terms on bank revolving credit agree ments revolvers of medium large publicly traded companies we model the duration maturity secured status and pricing decisions within a simultaneous decision frame work thereby overcoming the biased and inconsistent estimates in prior single equation studies of debt contract terms we find strong interrelationships between contract terms with significant bi directional relationships between duration and secured status and be tween the all in spread and commitment fees and a unidirectional relationship from both duration and secured status to all in spread we also illustrate how several single equa tion studies of contract terms draw incorrect conclusions because of their inappropriate assumption that other contract terms and leverage were exogenous finally our results sup port the hypothesis that the setting of contract terms plays an important role in alleviating contracting problems

on the costs of a bank centered financial system evidence from the changing main bank relations in japan we examine the effects of bank firm relationships on firm performance in japan when access to capital markets is limited close bank firm ties increase the availability of capital to borrowing firms but do not lead to higher profitability or growth the cost of capital of firms with close bank ties is higher than that of their peers this indicates that most of the benefits from these relationships are appropriated by the banks finally the slow growth rates of bank clients suggest that banks discourage firms from investing in risky profitable projects however liberalization of financial markets reduces the banks market power the close relationship between manufacturing firms and financial institutions in japan has recently been at the center of the debate on the appropriate financial system for the reforming economies of eastern europe as opposed to the anglo saxon separation of finance and industry long term ties between main banks and their client firms involving bank loans bank equity holding and some bank appointed personnel which are common in japan and germany have often been described as a growth oriented financial system that could serve the needs of developing and reformed economiies better than anonymous capital markets modeled after the arnerican and british financial systems the claim that close ties between investmentoriented banks and industrial firms could help overcome the difficulties of relative backwardness dates back to gerschenkron 1962 who investigates european development rosovsky 1961 applies gerschenkron s framework to the analysis of japanese growth more recently aoki patrick and sheard 1994 hoshi kashyap and loveman 1994 and teranishi 1993 among others portray the close ties between finance and industry in japan as an important factor in the international competitiveness of modern japanese

the value of postsecondary credentials in the labor market an experimental study we study employers perceptions of the value of postsecondary degrees using a field experiment we randomly assign the sector and selectivity of institutions to fictitious resumes and apply to real vacancy postings for business and health jobs on a large online job board we find that a business bachelor s degree from a for profit online institution is 22 percent less likely to receive a callback than one from a nonselective public institution in applications to health jobs we find that for profit credentials receive fewer callbacks unless the job requires an external quality indicator such as an occupational license jel i23 i26 j24 j44 j63 m51

the not so dark side of trust does trust increase the size of the shadow economy this paper reports a negative relationship between the size of the shadow economy and generalized trust in a sample of countries both developed and developing that relationship is robust to controlling for a large set of economic policy and institutional variables to changing the estimate of the shadow economy and the estimation period and to controlling for endogeneity it is independent from trust in institutions and from income inequality and is mainly present in the sample of developing countries those findings suggest that the tax compliance effect of trust dominates its role as a substitute for the formal legal system

how to organize crime in criminal organizations diffusing information widely throughout the organization might lead to greater internal efficiency in particular since these organizations are self sustaining through enhancing trust however this may come at the cost of leaving the organization more vulnerable to external threats such as law enforcement we consider the implications of this trade off and characterize the optimal information structure rationalizing both hierarchical structures and organization in cells then we focus on the role of the external authority characterize optimal detection strategies and discuss the implications of different forms of enforcement on the internal structure of the organization and policy finally we discuss a number of applications and extensions in this paper we study the interplay between trust within an illegal organization and its vulnerability to the authorities illegal organizations function more effectively when the people who constitute them trust each other we argue that information sharing is an important factor in building internal trust and cohesion but that can leave the organization vulnerable understanding how this trade off affects an organization s information structure and productivity can allow us to assess detection policies designed to destabilize such organizations since 9 11 the u s congress has passed a 400 billion annual budget for the war on terror new domestic institutions have been created or enhanced among many others the counterterrorism section at the u s department of justice s criminal division international intelligence cooperation has been strengthened and new protocols and controversial legal tools such as the patriot act have been developed however these new agencies and institutions face the same basic questions that have challenged the prosecutors fighting organized crime in italy south america and eastern asia as well as authorities fighting terrorism all over the world now and in the past how can we learn about the internal structure of criminal organizations how should we go about investigating a criminal organization in order to break its internal cohesion how does a criminal organization react to investigation policies we highlight the fact that simply understanding the information links within an organization gives us insight into addressing these questions the anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a wide heterogeneity across the information structures of different criminal organizations the most credited theory about the mafia developed in the early 1990 s has identified the so called cupola as the highest level of the organization supposedly consisting of agents who hold large amounts of information about the organization itself and carry out the enforcement needed for the organization to function 2 these crucial agents are shielded from the authorities since they are typically not directly involved in criminal activities this theory suggests a centralized information and enforcement structure 1 previous drafts have circulated under the titles power and organizational structure under an external threat

collateral and the choice between bank debt and public debt this paper tests how collateral value affects a firm s choice between bank debt and public debt by considering the exogenous variation in the market value of a firm s real estate assets caused by fluctuations in local real estate prices using local land supply elasticities as an instrument for local real estate prices i estimate that a one standard deviation increase in collateral value causes bank debt as a fraction of total debt to increase by six percentage points this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

can online learning bend the higher education cost curve we examine whether online learning technologies have led to lower prices in higher education using data from the integrated postsecondary education data system we show that online education is concentrated in large for profit chains and less selective public institutions we find that colleges with a higher share of online students charge lower tuition prices we present evidence of declining real and relative prices for full time undergraduate online education from 2006 to 2013 although the pattern of results suggests some hope that online technology can bend the cost curve in higher education the impact of online learning on education quality remains uncertain

some evidence on the uniqueness of initial public debt offerings debt initial public offerings ipos represent a major shift in a firm s financing policy by both extending debt maturity and altering the public private debt mix in contrast to findings for seasoned debt offerings we document a significantly negative stock price response to debt ipo announcements this result is consistent with debt maturity and debt ownership structure theories the equity wealth effect is negatively related to the offer s maturity and positively related to the degree of bank monitoring we find that firms with less information asymmetry and firms with higher growth opportunities experience a less adverse stock price response the decision to access the public debt market for the first time represents a major change in a firm s financing policy an initial public debt offer alters the firm s debt structure in two significant ways not only does this policy choice affect the firm s debt ownership structure by altering its mix of public relative to private debt but it also extends the average debt maturity of the firm substantially this study provides empirical evidence on the validity of some important debt structure theories by focusing on the information content of initial public debt offers debt ipos two major strands of theories have evolved in the literature the debt ownership choice theories model corporate choice of private and public debt mix see e g fama 1985 diamond 1991a and rajan 1992 while the other set of theories models corporate debt maturity choice easterbrook 1984 flannery 1986 and kale and noe 1990 a number of recent studies empirically test some of the predictions of these models barclay and smith 1995 guedes and opler 1996 houston and james 1996 johnson 1997 and stohs and mauer 1996

the benefits of lending relationships evidence from small business data this paper empirically examines how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm we analyze data collected in a survey of small firms by the small business administration the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases we find smaller effects on the price of credit attempts to widen the circle of relationships by borrowing from multiple lenders increases the price and reduces the availability of credit in sum relationships are valuable and appear to operate more through quantities rather than prices

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

lock in effects in relationship lending evidence from dip loans do prior lending relationships result in pass through savings lower interest rates for borrowers or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry higher switching costs and limited access to capital markets they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders firms in chapter 11 seeking debtor in possession dip financing often fit this profile we investigate the presence of lock in effects using a sample of 348 dip loans we account for endogeneity using the instrument variable iv approach and the heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock in effect under certain circumstances such as dip financing

what determines outstanding corporate debt mix evidence from fractional multinomial logit estimation abstractthis study employs the fractional multinomial logit setting proposed by papke and wooldridge 1996 to examine factors driving the choice among nonbank private 144a debt bank loans and public debt made by 988 nonfinancial firms during 1993 2007 we document that the majority of firm level factors have persistent effects on corporate outstanding debt mix across economic conditions we also highlight the importance of macroeconomic variables on firms borrowing decisions as predicted by diamond 1991 finally we document a substitution effect among debt financing sources due to credit rating downgrades which is inconsistent with rauh and sufi 2010

how have borrowers fared in banking mega mergers previous studies of event returns surrounding bank mergers show that banks gain value in megamergers and additional value when they absorb in market competitors a portion of these gains has been traced to the increased bargaining power of banks vis a vis regulators and other competitors we demonstrate that increased bargaining power of megabanks adversely affects loan customers of the acquired institution wealth losses are greater when loan customers are credit constrained the loan customer is smaller or the acquisition is an in market deal these findings reinforce complaints that the ongoing consolidation in banking has unfavorably affected the availability of credit for smaller firms and especially capitalconstrained firms

effect of the number of banking relationships on credit availability evidence from panel data of spanish small firms this paper investigates how the choice between single or multiple banking relationships affects credit availability for a complete panel of small and medium sized spanish firms the results seem to indicate the existence of rationing since a substitution relation has been found between trade and bank credit we also analyse the relationship between the level of indebtedness and the interest rate for each group of firms the results show that those smes that work with fewer financial intermediaries obtain fewer funds for the same increase in the interest rate which indicates that these companies have more financial restraints

optimal corporate leniency programs this study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward it is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony