efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

a bargaining approach to profit sharing in joint ventures profit sharing arrangements in joint ventures are analyzed as a bayesian bargaining game between two parents with incomplete information about each other s cost function for inputs provided using the mathematics of mechanism design this article explores the sensitivity of the bargaining agreement to the timing of private information about costs a condition on demand and costs is derived under which the balanced budget constraint does not preclude the joint venture from achieving an ex post efficient level of production the proposed mechanism is then extended to the second best environment under the criteria of 1 ex ante optimality and 2 r b myerson s axiomatic neutral bargaining solution the direct revelation mechanisms are interpreted as corresponding indirect transfer pricing mechanisms a major result is that in all cases the outcome calls for equal allocation of realized joint venture net profit copyright 1989 by the university of chicago

stability of functional rational expectations equilibria abstract in this paper we examine a representative agent forecasting prices in a first order self referential overlapping generations model we first consider intermediate stage learning where agents update the forecasting rule every m periods we show that in theory and simulations the learning rule does not converge to the rational expectations equilibrium ree we next consider two stage learning where agents learn the functional mapping between the current forecast function and the previous forecast function we show that in theory and simulations the two stage learning rule converges to the ree journal of economic literature classifications numbers c62 c63 d83

perspectives on mechanism design in economic theory economics began with xenophon s oeconomicus c 360 bce in which socrates interviews a model citizen who has two primary concerns he goes out to his farm in the country to monitor and motivate his workers there then he goes back to the city where his participation in various political institutions is essential for maintaining his rights to own this farm such concerns about agents incentives and political institutions are also central in economic theory today but they were not always two centuries ago economics developed as an analytical social science by focusing on produc tion and allocation of material goods developing methodologies of national income accounting and price theory questions about resource allocation seemed particularly amenable to math ematical analysis because flows of goods and money are measurable and should satisfy flowbalance equations and no arbitrage conditions from this perspective the classical economic problem was that people s ability to satisfy their desires is constrained by limited resources the classical economic result was that unrestricted free trade can achieve allocative efficiency in the sense that reallocating the available resources cannot improve everyone s welfare a shift of focus from allocation of resources back to analysis of incentives began from the time of augustin cournot 1838 when economic theorists began to analyze optimal decisions of rational individuals as a tool for understanding supply and demand in price theory see jurg

characterizing efficiency in stochastic overlapping generations models abstract we introduce uncertainty about production in diamond s olg model we compare any two feasible consumption production allocations using stochastic ordering and define two types of efficient allocations given initial capital stock for stationary allocations it is shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency type i is that e log r is greater or equal to log 1 n where r generates the stationary interest factors corresponding to this allocation n is the population growth rate a complete characterization of type ii efficient allocations is derived using the property of cyclical monotonicity between each generation s consumption allocation and the relevant interest rates

a theory of sticky rents search and bargaining with incomplete information abstract this paper offers the first theoretical explanation of housing rent stickiness and differential stickiness by housing structure type key features of rental markets worldwide previous theoretical work on the subject is sparse and explains why some landlords charge below market rents not stickiness apart from its interest for understanding housing markets and overall inflation rent stickiness is intriguing because it shows that stickiness can emerge in markets where the typical menu cost logic does not apply and where market participants typically engage in repeated bargaining over contracts our model involves search and bargaining with incomplete information in a two period game and generates stickiness in a novel manner the key decision is the landlord s choice of whether to renegotiate or not crucially landlords do not know tenant perceptions of unit quality the key force generating stickiness is that offering the identical contract preempts tenant search thus limiting tenants outside options and resolves uncertainty early risk aversion reinforces this mechanism and yields differential stickiness by landlord type renegotiation risk for large landlords disappears because the different outcomes rent increase rent decrease and vacancy average out landlords who manage only one unit loathe vacancy and are highly motivated to avoid renegotiation

optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders abstract we analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer depending on the realization of the privately observed valuations the concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified traders the traders virtual valuations now depend on the choice of the trading mechanism and are generally nonmonotonic we show that the trading mechanisms that maximize a broker s expected profit or expected total gains from trade are generalized double auctions which maximize the gains from trade measured in some modified monotonic virtual valuations for the traders the bunching phenomena will be a general feature in these mechanisms we also show that the optimal mechanisms converge towards simple bid ask price mechanisms as the number of participants in the market increases journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82

a neo schumpeterian model of health services innovation the paper presents and empirically applies a neo schumpeterian model of innovation capable of studying interactions between service providers patients and policy makers and how these complex interactions determine the timing direction and success of innovations in the public sector the model is tested using a case study that traces the introduction and development of ambulatory surgery in a spanish hospital the multi agent model applies the ideas of schumpeter to services encompassing schumpeter s five types of innovation and re introducing the policy maker as a key agent in the innovation process the model has a number of advantages over previous reduced form models first it can analyse the interactions between the economic social and political spheres that make up the complex selection environment of innovations second it captures the recursive impact of radical innovations on agents competences and preferences and their relative power this brings politics power and rhetorical persuasion to the fore third it provides an improved set of definitions for radical and incremental innovation these are not only important for understanding the sources and drivers of innovation but also for the accurate measurement of innovation

from technological catch up to innovation based economic growth south korea and taiwan compared abstract this paper sets out to analyse the divergent models pursued by south korea and taiwan in regard to technological catching up and their ongoing transition towards innovation based economies it is found that south korea s former high debt and chaebol dominated model inclined it to pursue a schumpeterian scale based technological development while taiwan s former pro stability small and medium sized enterprise sme based model tended to favour its emphasis on a neo marshallian network based technological development it will be argued that the state s approach to economic liberalisation and firms demand for capital for technological upgrading are the major factors that have underpinned the adjustment efforts of these two countries

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

existence and optimality of currency equilibrium in stochastic overlapping generations models the pure endowment case abstract we consider a pure exchange stochastic overlapping generations economy sufficient conditions for the existence of a monetary equilibrium and a characterization of optimality are provided it is shown that in a monetary equilibrium currency provides partial insurance and that the equilibrium allocation is optimal it is also shown that if an allocation is optimal the contingent claim prices associated with it are such that in an average sense the present value of the social endowment is bounded

money and market incompleteness in overlapping generations models abstract this paper investigates the extent to which the character of equilibria in stochastic overlapping generations models stems from the model s generic market incompleteness in addition it addreses the question of whether money serves to complete markets in these models we show that money does not complete markets in the sense of expanding the set of state contingent commodities that an individual may trade the introduction of money effects state contingent transfers of wealth between individuals this is a generalization of a result obtained by marshall sonstelie and gilles 1987 numerical simulation of the model suggests that the risk sharing induced in the monetary economy leads to substantial increases in welfare levels relative to the nonmonetary economy

stationary pareto optimality of stochastic asset equilibria with overlapping generations abstract a way of establishing the stationary pareto optimality of asset equilibria in stochastic settings with age diversity among the agents is suggested difficulties in obtaining such results arise because agents behavior is affected by random future state variables while pareto optimality defined in terms of expected lifetime utility of representative agents conditioned on their first period state involves redistributions of consumption among agents with different histories of realized states frobenius theorem is used to establish the existence of weights for which the so weighted sum of representative agents conditional expected utilities is maximized at the asset equilibrium allocation

stochastic olg models market structure and optimality for a general class of pure exchange olg economies under uncertainty we provide a complete characterization of the efficency properties of competitive equilibria when markets are only sequentially complete and the criterion of efficency is conditional pareto optimality we also consider a particular case in which markets fail to be even sequentially complete and provide a characterization when the criterion of efficency is weakened to ex post pareto optimality

a non cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information verifiable types abstract we consider a non cooperative sequential bargaining game with incomplete information where two players negotiate for mechanisms with ex post verifiable types at the interim stage we prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game where the ex post nash bargaining solution with no delay is asymptotically implemented with probability one further the ex post nash bargaining solution is a unique outcome of a stationary equilibrium under the property of independence of irrelevant types iit whereby the response of every type of a player is independent of allocations proposed to his other types and under a self selection property of their belief

mechanism design with interdependent valuations efficiency ggagents valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals or types of all agents under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome decision payoffs previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and independent signals efficient design is impossible this paper shows that an efficient mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome e g allocation of the goods is determined then the agents observe their own outcome decision payoffs and then final transfers are made

the ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects in a differential information economy with quasi linear utilities monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints the associated ex ante core is generically non empty however we exhibit a wellbehaved exchange economy in which this core is empty even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms

stationary monetary equilibria in overlapping generations models with incomplete markets abstract the objective of this paper is to study the stationary monetary equilibria of a stochastic overlapping generations model with a general incomplete asset structure it is proved that a stationary equilibrium with a nonzero price of money generically exists and is locally isolated when there is outside money for an open set of economies there is an equilibrium with positive money prices in all states the equilibrium is also given a neat characterisation in terms of the properties of the underlying state prices with only inside money there will instead be a continuum of equilibria journal of economic literature classification numbers d52 d90 e40

bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply abstract rate regulation is studied as a bargaining process in which consumers and the firm negotiate output and payments under asymmetric information the feasible set of transactions given incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints is characterized the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms for the direct revelation game is also characterized sufficient conditions are given for efficient mechanisms to be full information efficient efficient mechanisms are identified which correspond to nonlinear monopoly pricing monosony compensation schedules and the baron myerson regulation model

final offer arbitration and risk aversion in bargaining negotiations are often conducted under the stipulation that an impasse is to be resolved using final offer arbitration foa in fact foa frequently is not needed in major league baseball for instance more than 80 of the salary negotiations that could go to arbitration instead reach a bargained agreement we show that the risk aversion of at least one side explains this phenomenon we then model pay negotiation in baseball by applying a bargaining solution with a variable disagreement outcome representing foa studying the existence of pure nash equilibrium initial offers and their effects on the player s eventual pay and considering the nash solution as a special case

why do sellers usually prefer auctions we compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly a simple simultaneous auction and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding the sequential process is always more efficient but preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers because the auction is more conducive to entry precisely because of its inefficiency it usually generates higher expected revenue we also discuss the effects of lock ups matching rights break up fees as in takeover battles entry subsidies etc

private information wage bargaining and employment fluctuations shimer 2005 pointed out that although we have a satisfactory theory of why some workers are unemployed at any given time we don t know why the number of unemployed workers varies so much over time the basic mortensen pissarides 1994 model does not generate nearly enough volatility in unemployment for plausible parameter values this paper extends the mortensen pissarides model to allow for informational rents productivity is subject to publicly observed aggregate shocks and to idiosyncratic shocks that are seen only by the employer it is shown that there is a unique equilibrium provided that the idiosyncratic shocks are not too large the main result is that small fluctuations in productivity that are privately observed by employers can give rise to a kind of wage stickiness in equilibrium and the informational rents associated with this stickiness are sufficient to generate relatively large unemployment fluctuations

interim third party selection in bargaining abstract third party intervention can reduce the risk of conflict in situations where the bargaining failure is due to asymmetric information in this paper i consider the selection of a third party in a two person bargaining problem where each disputant has private information about its relative strength or weakness for a class of problems i find that the disputants choose the third party that is best for the strong type but worst for the weak type due to the incentive of each disputant to avoid seeming weak to their adversary the selected third party s intervention entails a higher ex ante chance of conflict than intervention by any other alternative this paper shows how the process of interim third party selection can have important consequences for the outcome of a third party intervention in bargaining

a theoretical and empirical comparison of free agent and arbitration eligible salaries negotiated in major league baseball this paper presents a theoretical and empirical comparison of determination of negotiated salaries in baseball s free agent market to that in its final offer arbitration foa system the theoretical bargaining model of each system is based on nash 1950 it is argued that farber s 1980 model of foa is not fully applicable in explaining baseball s foa process the free agent market and the arbitration system each determine negotiated salaries that are dependent on the different disagreement outcomes of the negotiators in the respective systems it is thus concluded theoretically that the two systems will determine salaries differently the theoretical analysis also suggests that there may be selection bias present when one empirically analyzes only negotiated settlements using a straightforward regression model that controls for productivity playing experience and the potential selection bias the empirical analysis substantiates the theory s results a method is then developed to estimate the effect that free agent salaries have on salaries for arbitration eligible players it is found that there is a significant positive relationship between them but the systems do not determine equal salaries for comparable players

observable contracts strategic delegation and cooperation the role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented one way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game in this paper the authors study a delegation game in which the players can use agents strategically to play on their behalf and the contracts they sign with them are common knowledge they show that in such cases every pareto optimal outcome of the game can become the unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the delegation game the authors demonstrate this result by discussing the cournot type duopolistic game copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

gifts as economic signals and social symbols gift giving has often puzzled economists especially because efficient gifts like cash or giving exactly what a person asks for seem crass or inappropriate it is shown in a formal game theoretic model that gifts serve as signals of a person s intentions about future investment in a relationship and inefficient gifts can be better signals other explanations for the inefficiency of gift giving are advanced and some stylized facts about gift giving practices are described many of which are consistent with the signaling view of gifts

on the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence abstract this paper examines the strategic role of high levels of debt and bankruptcy threats in deterring entry into monopolistic markets in the context of an infinite horizon entry game we show that if a potential entrant has access to debt financing with limited liability the unique sub game perfect equilibrium involves the entrant successfully issuing a high level of debt entering the market and being met with cooperation if in addition to the entrant the incumbent also has access to debt with limited liability it will be highly levered and will completely pre empt any entry in equilibrium finally if the incumbent faces a variety of potential entrants with differing abilities to capture market shares its optimal capital structure will help pre empt the entry of the tougher entrants while allowing the weaker ones to share the market the results of extreme leverage are also shown to hold in an alternative formulation analyzed by kreps and wilson 1982 and milgrom and roberts 1982 and thus are robust to model specifications the empirical implications and possible application to high leverage industries are briefly discussed

sunspot like effects of random endowments abstract random endowments can affect economic outcomes in two ways directly by affecting resources and indirectly by endogenously affecting expectations this second effect which we call a sunspot like effect allows prices to overreact to movements in fundamentals we prove that sunspot equilibria can be viewed as the limiting case of markets overreacting to small shocks to fundamentals two examples illustrate the theorem and show that sunspot like effects can be present even with significant shocks to fundamentals

on the existence of optimal stationary equilibria with a fixed supply of fiat money i the case of a single consumer this paper generalizes samuelson s well known analysis concerning the use of fiat or outside money to support pareto optimal allocations in an overlapping generations framework while maintaining an elementary demographic structure butexpanding the list of available commodities in each period we establish the following result if there is a fixed supply of fiat money and individuals are also permitted to issue bonds or inside money then there always exists at least one stationary equilibrium yielding a pareto optimal allocation

competitive equilibrium with type convergence in an asymmetrically informed market this article studies an asymmetric information game with type convergence in which under some realizations of a common uncertainity inducing informed agents to reveal their types through self selection by contract choice is either costly or impossible under other realizations self selection permits costless distinctions between informed agents i obtain sufficient conditions under which contracting with options prior to the realization of the common uncertainity leads to the existence of a perfectly separating costless nash equilibrium applications to variable rate loan commitments and life insurance contracting are discussed article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

a note on the existence of monetary equilibria in overlapping generations models with storage abstract wallace s result for an og model with nonstochastic storage is extended by provision of a necessary and sufficient condition for fiat currency to be valued in equilibrium in an og model with stochastic storage it is shown that a monetary equilibrium exists if and only if the real rate of return on currency that would obtain in the stationary monetary equilibrium exceeds the risk free real rate of return that obtains in the nonmonetary equilibrium

the 2007 nobel memorial prize in mechanism design theory this paper provides an overview of mechanism design theory and explains the roles played by leonid hurwicz eric maskin and roger myerson in the development of this field

bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games in this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form a multistage bargaining procedure for n players the proposer commitment procedure is presented it is inspired by nash s two player variable threat model a key feature is the commitment to threats we establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions such as the shapley value in the transferable utility case however we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable jel c70 c71 c78 d70

dominant root characterization of pareto optimality and the existence of optimal equilibria in stochastic overlapping generations models abstract we characterize pareto optimality of interior stationary allocations in single good overlapping generations models with stochastic aggregate shocks and heterogeneous but recurring generations an interior stationary allocation is pareto optimal if and only if it is an equilibrium allocation and the associated contingent claims price matrix has a dominant root less than or equal to unity we then use this characterization to show that there always exists an optimal equilibrium with or without valued fiat money

on the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic olg model with production abstract we analyze the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic olg model with production we give a complete characterization of interim pareto optimal competitive equilibrium allocations furthermore we provide tests of pareto optimality suboptimality based on risky rates of return only

technical note revenue management with bargaining static game theoretic models of bilateral bargaining assume that the seller knows his valuation for the item that is up for sale that is how the seller may determine this quantity is exogenous to these models in this paper we develop and analyze a stylized markov decision process that endogenizes the seller s computation of his marginal inventory valuation in an infinite horizon revenue management setting when each sale occurs according to a given bilateral bargaining mechanism we use this model to compare both analytically and numerically the seller s performance under four basic bilateral bargaining mechanisms with a tractable information structure these comparisons provide insights into the seller s performance under the following trading arrangements buyer and seller posted pricing negotiated pricing and rule based pricing

cooperation in strategic games revisited for two person complete information strategic games with transferable utility all major variable threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide this confluence of solutions by luminaries such as nash harsanyi raiffa and selten is more than mere coincidence staying in the class of two person games with transferable unility the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution specifically it presents 1 a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components 2 an intuitive and computable closed form formula for the solution 3 an axiomatic justification of the solution and 4 a generalization of the solution to games with private signals along with an arbitration scheme that implements it the objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications jel codes c71 c72 c78 copyright 2013 oxford university press

conditional pareto optimality of stationary equilibrium in a stochastic overlapping generations model abstract in this paper i describe and analyze a pure exchange overlapping generations model in which endowments and the dividends of an asset in fixed supply are exogeneous and random they follow a finite state markov process it is shown that no stationary allocation is pareto superior to any stationary equilibrium allocation where pareto superiority is defined in terms of the conditional expected utilities agents maximize in the competitive setting the main contribution of the paper is the optimality proof

bargaining with random implementation an experimental study abstract we use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation we modify the standard nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome rather with exogenous probability q one bargainer receives his her demand with the other getting the remainder we use an asymmetric bargaining set favouring one bargainer and disagreement payoffs of zero and we vary q over several values our results mostly support game theory s directional predictions as with conventional arbitration we observe a strong chilling effect on bargaining for q near one extreme demands and low agreement rates increasing q reinforces the game s built in asymmetry giving the favoured player an increasingly large share of payoffs but also raising efficiency these effects are non uniform over sizable ranges increases in q have minimal effect but for some q small additional increases lead to sharp changes in results

optimal information transmission in a holdup problem this article examines the optimal contract in a bilateral trade model with unobservable relationship specific investment and renegotiation in such a setting a contract plays an additional role that it does not have in the standard holdup model namely that of transmitting information between the parties the article shows that a partial disclosure contract may be optimal and describes the optimal contract if the investment is cooperative and the information between the trading parties is asymmetric the optimal contract generally cannot result in the first best but dispensing with either of these assumptions makes the first best achievable

the veil of public ignorance abstract a theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting and have agreed on a utilitarian standard of evaluation governing choices under complete information the task is to extend this standard to situations of incomplete information our first main result generalizes harsanyi s j polit econ 63 1955 309 classical result to situations of incomplete information assuming that group preferences satisfy bayesian coherence and interim pareto dominance these axioms are mutually compatible if and only if a common prior exists we argue that this result partly resolves the impossibility of bayesian preference aggregation under complete information

endogenous games and mechanisms side payments among players we characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played this does not always lead to efficient outcomes despite complete information and costless contracting the characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples including voluntary contribution public good games cournot and bertrand oligopoly principal agent problems and commons games among others

informational diversity over time and the optimality of monetary equilibria abstract the temporal realizations of a random state variable in an overlapping generations model create an informational diversity between members of different generations and require a reexamination of the optimality that competitive equilibria might display in such an environment using an optimality criterion that reflects this informational diversity we prove the optimality of competitive equilibrium in a model with a fixed stock of fiat money a single spot market and good endowments that follow a markov process the need for an optimality criterion that incorporates informational diversity is further motivated by studying the same model with the operation of complete contingent commodities markets

social security and demographic shocks an overlapping generations model of social security with shocks to the productivity of labor and capital and demographic shocks is studied we focus attention on stationary long run allocations an allocation is interim optimal if there does not exist another feasible allocation that improves the expected welfare of all generations computed conditionally on the state of the world when they are born we characterize the set of interim optimal allocations and study the equilibria associated with various institutional forms of social security from the point of view of this optimality criterion we obtain the analogs of the two traditional welfare theorems of microeconomic theory assume that there exists a financial asset in fixed quantity which supports some non null intergenerational transfers then the rational expectations equilibrium allocation of this economy is interim optimal conversely any stationary interim optimal allocation can be supported by such an equilibrium with adequate lump sum transfers

weighted randomized dictatorship and the asymmetric nash solution a characterization of the asymmetric nash bargaining solution is presented in it a weighted randomized dictatorship axiom plays a central role

rational expectations in the overlapping generations model abstract this paper reports results on the character of the rational expectations equilibria of a stochastic overlapping generations model with heterogenous markets the model considered is a stationary overlapping generations model in which the endowments of young agents are subject to i i d random shocks the main result shown is that if there are l 1 commodities traded in every period then for most preferences the rational expectations equilibrium stochastic process of prices and allocations necessarily exhibits serial correlation this is in marked contrast to the one commodity model in which there always exists an equilibrium which is measure isomorphic to the endowment process

virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information abstract the core is extended to games with incomplete information the feasible set is characterized by incentive compatible mechanisms blocking is organized at the interim stage by an incentive compatible mediation plan membership of the blocking coalition itself may be determined randomly by the blocking mediator nonemptiness of an interim fine core is proven for games with a balanced structure independent types and sidepayments an offer of severance payments may be needed to inhibit blocking core allocations are characterized in terms of virtual utility scales that generalize the weighted utility scales of the inner core mechanisms that achieve core allocations are coalitionally durable

posted pricing vs bargaining in sequential selling process we study the role of bargaining in a firm s sequential selling process the seller firm under consideration sequentially sells a fixed amount of stock to a random arrival stream of potential buyers who are heterogeneous in product valuation based on the stock level and the time to the end of the selling season the seller may dynamically choose either to post a take it or leave it price or to engage in bargaining with an arriving buyer we introduce a stochastic order called the scaled pricing order for the buyer s valuation distribution the scaled pricing order measures the average portion of trade surplus that the seller can obtain by posting a price for distributions with increasing length biased hazard rate checking the property of increasing decreasing scaled pricing order boils down to verifying the concavity convexity of the mills ratio we fully characterize the family of distributions that are invariant in the scaled pricing order which includes uniform and exponential distributions

optimal severance pay with incomplete information this paper contrasts optimal employment contracts in a world of full information and in a world in which the worker s alternative employment possibilities cannot be observed by the firm the difference between income and severance pay that is the opportunity cost of separating will be higher in more productive states of nature with complete wage insurance no longer possible we therefore have an explanation of higher ability individuals receiving high wages in the short run in long term contracts the explanation does not rely as past explanations have done on the imperfections in bonding arrangements or in loan markets

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

service innovation in developing economies evidence from latin america and the caribbean abstractthis paper proposes a framework for understanding key aspects of service innovation in developing economies based on four dimensions first the integration of services in national innovation systems second competences and preferences third networking and cooperation and fourth outcomes in terms of socio economic impacts this conceptual framework is matched with new evidence from case studies performed in six different latin america and the caribbean countries argentina chile brazil uruguay costa rica and jamaica and nine sectors tourism software ict outsourcing mining logistics retail creative services sport services and biotech services the results reveal the importance of specificities in service innovation and suggest policy and managerial implications

innovation in services the purpose of this article is to lay the foundations of a theory that can be used to interpret innovation processes in the service sector the hypothesis underpinning this article is based on lancaster s definition of the product in both manufacturing and services as a set of service characteristics the article follows the example of those who have sought to apply lancaster s work to technological phenomena various modes of innovation in the service sectors are highlighted and illustrated