labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions this paper examines the impact of labor unemployment risk on corporate financing decisions theory suggests that firms choose conservative financial policies partly as a means of mitigating worker exposure to unemployment risk using changes in state unemployment insurance benefit laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells we explore the connection between unemployment risk and the corporate financing decisions of public firms in the united states we find that increases in legally mandated unemployment benefits lead to increases in corporate leverage the impact of reduced unemployment risk on financial policy is especially strong for firms that have greater layoff separation rates labor intensity and financing constraints the estimated premium required to compensate workers for unemployment risk due to financial distress is about 57 basis points of firm value for a bbb rated firm these findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions

food insecurity and public assistance this paper examines if welfare programs reduce the probability that vulnerable households experience food deprivation because of financial constraints although the 1996 welfare reform legislation specifically limited the eligibility of immigrant households to receive assistance many states chose to protect their immigrant populations by offering state funded aid to these groups i exploit these changes in eligibility rules to examine the link between food insecurity and public assistance the evidence indicates that a 10 percentage point cut in the fraction of the population that receives public assistance increases the fraction of food insecure households by about 5 percentage points

household history snap participation and food insecurity abstract food security in an important public policy issue in 2015 approximately 1 in 8 u s households experienced food insecurity at some point in the year low income families are at higher risk for food insecurity than other families and these families may also face higher levels of disruption e g moves loss of income or individuals entering or leaving the household than other families i use data from the survey of income and program participation to explore the relationship between food insecurity the household s history during the previous year and snap participation the results indicate that a number of aspects of the household s recent experience including negative income shocks moves and both increases and decreases in household size increase the probability of being food insecure while snap participation is estimated to reduce the probability of being food insecure

observability and the payback criterion among the enigmas of corporate finance theory that have received little attention is the puzzling use of the payback method as a capital budgeting tool although the payback method has many drawbacks it is widely used in industry see klammer 1972 fremgren 1973 schall sundem and geijsback 1978 1 gordon 1955 attempted to explain this anomaly by observing that the inverse of the payback period is an approximation for the internal rate of return but as sarnat and levy 1969 point out the accuracy of the approximation depends on the life of the project and its irr for low values of irr the inverse of payback is a very poor approximation moreover it is difficult to believe that corporations that use complex and sophisticated technologies need a rule of thumb to approximate something as simple to compute as the irr in fact empirical evidence shows that most firms compute both the irr and the payback period see schall the payback criterion continues to be widely used in industry although there is little support for it among the academicians this paper attempts to find an economic rationale for it by using an incentive model with asymmetric information it argues that when the managers possess private information regarding projects selected for implementation it is in their interest to choose ceteris paribus projects that pay back faster since manager s wages depend on output because their productivity is unknown by choosing projects that pay back fast they hope to improve their reputations i wish to thank milton harris and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions while i retain the responsibility for any remaining errors 1 it has been found that payback is rarely used as a primary capital budgeting method it is used as a secondary criterion to a discounted cash flow method such as npv net present value or irr internal rate of return

good ipos draw in bad inelastic banking capacity and hot markets we posit that screening ipos requires specialized labor which is in fixed supply a sudden increase in demand for ipo financing increases the compensation of ipo screening labor this results in reduced screening encouraging sub marginal firms to enter the ipo market further fueling the demand for screening labor the model s conclusions are consistent with empirical findings of increased underpricing during hot markets positive correlation between issue volume and underpricing and with tipping points between hot and cold markets finally the model makes sharp predictions relating the ipo market to fundamental values of firms and to investment banking returns

the effect of safety net programs on food insecurity we investigate to what extent major safety net program benefits affect food insecurity in families we impute program eligibility and benefits in each state for 2001 2009 accounting for cross program eligibility rules we use simulated eligibility and benefits for a nationally representative sample as instruments for imputed eligibility and potential benefits among nonimmigrant low income single parent families 1 000 in potential cash or food benefits reduces the incidence of food insecurity by 1 1 percentage points on a base of 33 percent cash and food both reduce food insecurity the results highlight the importance of jointly considering a full range of safety net programs

rasch analyses of very low food security among households and children in the three city study the longitudinal three city study tcs of low income families with children measures food hardships using fewer and some different questions from the standard u s instrument the household food security survey module hfssm in the current population survey cps we use a rasch measurement model to identify thresholds of very low food security among households and among children in the tcs that are comparable to thresholds from the hfssm we also use the tcs to empirically investigate the determinants of food insecurity and of these specific food insecurity outcomes estimating a multivariate behavioral rasch model that is adapted to address longitudinal data the estimation results indicate that participation in the supplemental nutrition assistance program and the temporary assistance for needy families program reduce food insecurity while poverty and disability among caregivers increase it besides its longitudinal structure the tcs measures many more characteristics about households than the cps our estimates reveal that financial assistance through social networks and a household s own financial assets reduce food insecurity while its outstanding loans increase insecurity

credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on the job search abstract this note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on the job search renegotiation does not require mutual consent if the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model

macroeconomic conditions at entry and injury risk in the workplace financial support from mineco feder eco2015 70540 p and the compagnia di san paolo to call3 20120119 the popart network is gratefully acknowledged

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

risk self protection and ex ante economic value abstract we develop three propositions about the ex ante value of reduced risk if there is a continuous outcome distribution and if self protection influences outcome probability and severity then 1 unobservable utility terms cannot be eliminated from the ex ante value expressions 2 knowledge of the convexity or the nonconvexity of dose response functions is insufficient to sign changes in these expressions and 3 self protection expenditures need not be a lower bound measure of these expressions therefore many restrictions applied in recent empirical work on the economic value of risk changes are not immediately transferable to settings where endogenous risks prevail

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

why the npv criterion does not maximize npv this article presents a theory of capital allocation that shows how the use of net present value npv as an investment criterion leads to inefficient capital budgeting outcomes and how this criterion may be dominated by other capital budgeting criteria like the internal rate of return and the profitability index the essence of our theory is rooted in the mainstream paradigm of corporate finance while firms use npv to measure the addition to firm value from prospective projects classical informational and agency considerations prevent it from implementing the optimal capital budgeting outcome our theory also identifies conditions when alternative criteria should be used finally we characterize when direct monitoring through capital budgeting dominates compensation contracts in alleviating the agency problem copyright 2004 oxford university press

a reconsideration of minsky s financial instability hypothesis the worst and longest depressions have tended to occur after periods of prolonged and reasonably stable prosperity this results in part from agents rationally updating their expectations during good times and hence becoming more optimistic about future economic prospects investors then increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that would previously have been considered too risky so when a downturn does eventually occur the financial crisis and the extent of default become more severe whereas a general appreciation of this syndrome dates back to minsky 1992 jerome levy economics institute wp 74 and even beyond to irving fisher 1933 econometrica 1 337 357 we model it formally in addition endogenous default introduces a pecuniary externality since investors do not factor in the impact of their decision to take risk and default on the borrowing cost we explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

partial identification methods for evaluating food assistance programs a case study of the causal impact of snap on food insecurity we illustrate how partial identification methods can be used to provide credible inferences on the causal impacts of food assistance programs focusing on the impact that the supplemental nutrition assistance program snap formerly known as the food stamp program has on food insecurity among households with children recent research applies these methods to address two key issues confounding identification missing counterfactuals and nonrandomly misclassified treatment status in this paper we illustrate and extend the recent literature by using data from the survey of income and program participation sipp to study the robustness of prior conclusions the sipp confers important advantages the detailed information about income and eligibility allows us to apply a modified discontinuity design to sharpen inferences and the panel nature allows us to reduce uncertainty about true participation status we find that snap reduces the prevalence of food insecurity in households with children by at least six percentage points

incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations in this paper we examine the problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in determining his optimal job assignment but which might also adversely affect his market value we show that spot contracts are optimal and generate the first best effort level when the manager is risk neutral when the manager is risk averse the optimal contact consists either of a partial insurance contract against downward revisions in compensation or a competitive spot contract depending upon the nature of prior information

job search bargaining and wage dynamics this article constructs and estimates a model of wage bargaining with on the job search to explore three different components of wages general human capital match specific capital and outside options as the workers find better job opportunities the current employer has to compete with outside firms to retain them this between firm competition results in wage growth even when productivity remains the same the model is estimated by a simulated minimum distance estimator and data from the 1979 national longitudinal study of youth the results indicate that the improved value of the outside option raises wages by 14 16 in the first 5 years

managerial career concerns and investments in information we extend the implicit incentives literature by analyzing how career concerns affect a riskneutral manager s decision about how much to learn about a project before investing in it the manager has unknown ability that determines the probability with which a good project is available so the market updates ability assessments from project outcomes while project choice is efficient in equilibrium an unobservable investment in the precision of project evaluation allows the manager to control the probabilities of future reputational states this distorts his investment in precision above first best when project payoffs can be observed only on accepted projects

food security and storage in the middle east and north africa in times of highly volatile commodity markets governments often try to protect their populations from rapidly rising food prices which can be particularly harsh for the poor a potential solution for food deficit countries is to hold strategic reserves which can be called on when international prices spike but how large should strategic stockpiles be this paper develops a dynamic storage model for wheat in the middle east and north africa mena region where imported wheat dominates the average diet the paper uses the model to analyze a strategy that sets aside wheat stockpiles which can be used when needed to keep domestic prices below a targeted price this paper shows that if the target is set high and reserves are adequate the strategy can be effective and robust contrary to most interventions strategic storage policies are counter cyclical and when the importing region is sufficiently large a regional policy can smooth global prices this paper shows that this is the case for the mena region nevertheless the policy is more costly than the pro cyclical policy of a targeted intervention that directly offsets high prices with a subsidy similar to food stamps

repeated moral hazard with a time inconsistent agent abstract i consider a repeated principal agent model with moral hazard in which the agent has preferences which are widely used to capture time inconsistency i analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting i characterize the optimal wage scheme for such an agent and compare it to time consistent benchmarks the marginal cost of rewarding the agent for high output today exceeds the marginal benefit of delaying these rewards until tomorrow in this sense the principal does not smooth the agent s rewards over time when facing a sophisticated agent it is optimal for the principal to reward the good performance more and punish the bad performance more in the early period relative to the optimal wage scheme for a time consistent agent

career concerns contracts and effort distortions a two period career concerns model with symmetric information but uncertainty about each worker s ability is analyzed contracts are unobservable but incomes are observable it is shown that effort is distorted upward by contracts being unobservable and that the distortion depends positively on turnover

the food stamp program and food insufficiency food stamp participants have higher food insufficiency rates than eligible nonparticipants even after controlling for other factors given the food stamp program s prominent role in the alleviation of hunger this is a counterintuitive result we conjecture that these higher rates are due to adverse selection insofar as households more likely to be food insufficient are also more likely to receive food stamps we establish a theoretical framework to address this adverse selection using a simultaneous equation model with two probits we show that once one controls for this adverse selection food stamp recipients have the same probability of food insufficiency as nonrecipients copyright 2001 oxford university press

job assignments signalling and efficiency this article analyzes a model in which information about a worker s ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker other firms however use the worker s job assignment as a signal of ability three results recur throughout the analysis first wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels second there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs i e even when a firm has complete information about a worker s output third the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm specific human capital in the economy

barriers within firms to energy efficient investments abstract many investments in energy efficiency fail to be made despite their apparent profitability internal hurdle rates are often set at levels higher than the cost of capital to the firm reasons for these practices include bounded rationality principal agent problems and moral hazard the policy implication is that government can simultaneously improve overall energy efficiency and increase private sector productivity by providing informational and organizational services that go beyond the traditional regulatory framework

risk aversion and the value of life we show that state non separable preferences a la epstein zin weil ezw provide a tractable and flexible framework to study the economics of health and longevity this utility representation 1 admits a preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty regarding mortality risks 2 links the marginal valuation of survival to the level of survival 3 can preserve homotheticity even for low degrees of intertemporal substitution without generating implausible predictions regarding the value of life and 4 adds needed flexibility to account for the empirical evidence on the value of life we illustrate the implications of ezw preferences for the economic value of observed differences in life expectancy across countries and over time and for the value of life over the life cycle

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

managerial ability compensation and the closed end fund discount this paper shows that the existence of managerial ability combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry implies that the closed end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature we evaluate the model s ability to match the quantitative features of the data and find that it does well although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained the role of delegated portfolio managers in financial markets has puzzled

the payback method of investment appraisal a review and synthesis abstract the payback pb method of investment appraisal has been the subject of considerable comment and criticism in the literature this paper draws together some of those important literature contributions and the results from published uk and usa survey reports over the past twenty five years while many of the surveys have reported an increasing use of the discounted cash flow financial appraisal methods this has not totally been at the expense of the pb which continues to be a popular method used in industry pb has been shown to be a traditional popular primary and important method in both the uk and usa the use of pb has been shown to be positively related to capital budget size however the importance of pb was seen to be inversely related to capital budget size the use of pb has been shown by some researchers to be positively related to firm size while other researchers have reported that its use is inversely related to firm size however it has also been concluded that the use of pb was not significantly influenced by firm size pb has been shown to be less used for strategically important projects than routine replacement projects in moderately sized usa firms while on the other hand it has been shown to be an important method used in the appraisal of advanced manufacturing technology amt projects in both the uk and usa this paper reviews the pb method of investment appraisal as used in industry first as a technique identifying two of its main disadvantages and then commenting on the discounted payback method evidence showing that the pb acts in a supportive role to the sophisticted dcf methods is presented and the following topics are discussed in detail pb and owner manager conflict as a constraint in its communication role as a reciprocal of the internal rate of return as a proxy for a projects duration and pb and amt projects following the conclusions recommendations for further research are proposed

do short term objectives lead to under or overinvestment in long term projects we examine managerial investment decisions in the presence of imperfect information and short term managerial objectives prior research has argued that such an environment induces managers to underinvest in long run projects we show that short term objectives and imperfect information may also lead to overinvestment and we identify how the direction of the distortion depends upon the type of informational imperfection present when investors cannot observe the level of investment in the long run project suboptimal investment will be induced when investors can observe investment but not its productivity however overinvestment will occur there has been in recent years substantial public debate on the question of whether the long run investment decisions of the managers of publicly traded companies may be distorted by market pressures recent work by economists has tried to identify the potential source and nature of such distortions research has naturally focused on situations that are characterized by i short term managerial objectives the managers are concerned not only with the firm s long run stock price but also with the firm s short run stock price due to incentive schemes or the fear of losing control and ii imperfect information the market has less information than the firm s managers about the firm s long run projects the results of this research have indicated that in some situations short term objectives and imperfect information may lead to underinvestment in long run projects this paper seeks to extend prior work on the effects of short term objectives and imperfect information on long run investment decisions we demonstrate that imperfect information together with an emphasis on a firm s short run valuation may lead not only to underinvestment but also to overinvestment in long run projects the direction of the distortion depends

managerial incentives for short term results a reply the purpose of our paper managerial incentives for short term results 3 was to demonstrate that in a world of asymmetric information where only the manager knows the type of the project if the manager has perfect mobility within the labor market he or she has the incentive to choose projects that yield quicker results at the expense of higher net present value projects that yield cash flows later in time one way to provide the manager this perfect mobility is to make his or her wage every period a function of his or her mean perceived ability in that period this way if he or she is equally valuable to all firms any firm that wishes to hire him or her will pay the same wage he or she was earning in his or her old job and the manager can move from job to job without any stigma being attached to quitting in other words quitting does not convey any information in our analysis of managerial incentives we therefore considered only the wage policy where the wage each period is the mean perceived ability in that period i e wt mt for all t the author of the comment darrough correctly points out that the optimization program set up to model the labor market permits wage policies different from what we had implicitly considered that can resolve the problem of shortterm incentives the resolution is achieved by designing wage policies that defer wages and effectively tie the manager to the firm there is no mobility at all darrough goes on to claim that as long as everything about the alternative projects is known to the shareholders the short term incentive problem can be resolved we wish to point out that the paradigm of informational asymmetry and managerial reputation does create incentives for short term results as long as the manager has perfect mobility in the labor market any of the following three minor modifications to our model will restore perfect mobility and hence the incentive for short term results 1 if instead of a long term contract the manager is offered a series of shortterm contracts the optimal wage policy is wt mt for all t given this wage policy the manager has perfect mobility and therefore has incentives for shortterm results 2 another way of ensuring mobility for the manager is to make him or her risk averse the optimal wage policy would now be wt maxo 8 t m z h8 see harris and holmstrom 1 where z is a function of the precision of manager s perceived ability the precision h moves deterministically over time and hence is independent of the manager s decision since the wage at any time

the impact of food stamp program participation on household food insecurity this study examines the impact that participation in the food stamp program has on household food insecurity using data from the panel survey of income dynamics two strategies are used to identify the causal effect of the program first endogenous treatment effect models are estimated using state level errors in payments of benefits as instruments additionally the impact of losing benefits due to a government decision on the food insecurity of program participants is examined the paper finds that program participation lowers food insecurity by at least 18

do drunk drivers pay their way a note on optimal penalties for drunk driving this paper uses a simple framework to describe optimal penalties for drunk driving and reviews available data to judge current policies against this standard the analysis suggests that policies should be designed so that the penalties paid by drunk drivers equal the value of the increased risks drunk drivers impose on others current penalties appear to be too lenient implying that current levels of drunk driving are too high

altruism fertility and the value of children health policy evaluation and intergenerational welfare abstract this paper accounts for the value of children and future generations in the evaluation of health policies this is achieved through the incorporation of altruism and fertility in a value of life type of framework we are able to express adults willingness to pay for changes in child mortality and also to incorporate the welfare of future generations in the evaluation of current policies our model clarifies a series of puzzles from the literature on the value of life and on intergenerational welfare comparisons we show that by incorporating altruism and fertility into the analysis of the recent u s experience the estimated welfare gain of a young adult from reductions in mortality easily doubles

intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations this paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization the organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period this results in intergenerational conflicts of interest the old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits we use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium

resolving the commitment versus flexibility trade off the role of resource accumulation lags we examine how time consuming resource accumulation influences the classic strategy trade off between commitment and flexibility in particular using 1975 95 data from the worldwide petrochemical

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

testing for short termism in the uk stock market this paper uses data on the stock market valuations of a large sample of uk companies to assess if that market displays short termism tests are undertaken of whether discount rates implicit in market valuations applied to cash flows which accrue in the longer term are too high both absolutely and relative to the rates applied to cash flows in the near term i find prima facie evidence that these longer term discount rates are too high a result consistent with the existence of short termism an alternative interpretation of the results is that risk premia applied to expected cash flows systematically increase with the maturity of those flows whether this interpretation is consistent with asset pricing theories is questionable copyright 1993 by royal economic society

optimal lending contracts and firm dynamics we develop a general model of lending in the presence of endogenous borrowing constraints borrowing constraints arise because borrowers face limited liability and debt repayment cannot be perfectly enforced in the model the dynamics of debt are closely linked with the dynamics of borrowing constraints in fact borrowing constraints must satisfy a dynamic consistency requirement the value of outstanding debt restricts current access to short term capital but is itself determined by future access to credit this dynamic consistency is not guaranteed in models of exogenous borrowing constraints where the ability to raise short term capital is limited by some prespecified function of debt we characterize the optimal default free contract which minimizes borrowing constraints at all histories and derive implications for firm growth survival leverage and debt maturity the model is qualitatively consistent with stylized facts on the growth and survival of firms comparative statics with respect to technology and default constraints are derived borrowing constraints are an important determinant of firm growth and survival 1 such constraints may arise in connection to the financing of investment opportunities faced by firms or temporary liquidity needs such as those required to survive a recession this paper develops a theory of endogenous borrowing constraints and studies its implications for firm dynamics in our model debt is constrained by the firm s limited liability and option to default a lending contract specifies an initial loan size future financing and a repayment schedule the choice of these variables in turn determines future growth the firm s future borrowing capacity and its ability and willingness to repay hence borrowing constraints and firm dynamics are jointly determined we study this dynamic design problem our model builds on thomas and worral s 1994 model of foreign direct investment at time zero a risk neutral borrower firm or entrepreneur has a project which requires a fixed initial set up cost every period the project yields revenues that increase with the amount of 1 there is considerable evidence suggesting that financing constraints are important determinants of firm dynamics gertler and gilchrist 1994 argue that liquidity constraints may explain why small manufacturing firms respond more to a tightening of monetary policy than do larger manufacturing firms perez quiros and timmermann 2000 show that in recessions smaller firms are more sensitive to the worsening of credit market conditions as measured by higher interest rates and default premia evans and jovanovic 1989 show that the liquidity constraints are essential in the decision to become an entrepreneur fazzari hubbard and petersen 1988 among others view financial constraints as an explanation for the dynamic behaviour of aggregate investment and cabral and mata 1996 are able to fit reasonably well the size distribution of portuguese manufacturing firms by estimating a simple model of financing constraints for surveys see hubbard 1998 and stein 2003

managerial incentives for short term results a comment in managerial incentives for short term results narayanan 4 examines the manager s incentive to make a suboptimal decision in particular an incentive to choose projects that yield short term profits even when the manager is compensated with a long term contract this incentive to act myopically at the expense of shareholders welfare is attributed to the manager s very concern for the long term impact of current actions that is the desire to enhance reputation earlier to boost wages although this type of myopic behavior is a cause for great concern and narayanan s approach is interesting the particular model he develops has a serious drawback we discuss briefly in this note how the shareholders can easily anticipate and prevent the manager from making a suboptimal decision by providing proper incentive contracts using the model by harris and holmstrom 1 as a benchmark narayanan sets up a multiperiod principal agent relationship in which the manager s ability is unknown and project choice is unobservable by the shareholders since the manager s ability is unknown compensation depends upon the observable output not being able to observe the project choice the shareholders update their prior on the manager s ability according to their conjecture of the manager s project choice the manager in turn chooses a project so as to maximize expected future wage which depends upon the shareholders perception of the manager s ability by choosing a quicker return project the manager may induce the shareholders to attribute the extra dollars to higher ability resulting in greater wages in the future thus we have a game theoretic situation the illustrated game in the paper deals with two alternative projects yielding a 2 x 2 bimatrix nonconstant sum game with payoffs determined by the strategies and cash flows from the project given this game structure narayanan is able to obtain a unique nash equilibrium where both players use dominant strategies the choices of strategies for both players depend upon the value of 5k the difference between the manager s expected total wage from projects a and b regardless of the shareholders strategy conjecture on the project choice if 4k is positive negative both players choose a b as their dominant strategy this equilibrium can be summarized by a usual 2 x 2 matrix as follows

do workers prefer increasing wage profiles we present survey data challenging the assumption implicit in analyses of labor supply that all else being equal workers prefer declining over increasing wage profiles we test several explanations for our results including that a there is something special about wages e g their association with productivity as opposed to other types of payments that induces the preference for increasing wages b utility depends not only on absolute levels of consumption but also on changes in consumption over time and c respondents who prefer increasing wage profiles are irrational and would change their behavior if the rationale for preferring declining wages were explained

occupational specificity of human capital we find that returns to occupational tenure are substantial everything else being constant 5 years of occupational tenure are associated with an increase in wages of 12 20 moreover when occupational experience is taken into account tenure with an industry or employer has relatively little importance in accounting for the wage one receives this finding is consistent with human capital being occupation specific

mutual fund activism and market regulation during the pre ifrs period the case of earnings informativeness in china from an ethical perspective this paper investigates the emerging effect of mutual fund involvement on the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders during the pre ifrs period in china indicated by earnings informativeness from an ethical perspective we find that the presence of mutual fund hampers earnings informativeness implying that mutual funds in general at their early stage in china are not yet capable of serving as an effective monitor this finding is in sharp contrast to the role of institutional investors in mature markets as documented in the literature however mutual funds affiliated with banks have been found to be effective to improve earnings informativeness of chinese listed companies and the impact is more pronounced among those affiliated with joint equity banks compared to their counterparts affiliated with state owned banks

competitive risk sharing contracts with one sided commitment this paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post in any given period after having observed her income the agent can walk away from the contract while the intermediary cannot i e there is one sided commitment we consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses we demonstrate that not only autarky but also partial and full insurance can obtain depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary we then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption savings economy with one period arrow securities and a short sale constraint similar to bulow and rogoff 1989 from this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved

long term wage fluctuations with industry specific human capital exploiting long term interindustry demand shifts this article provides evidence that 1 industry level wages do not respond to industry demand conditions 2 at the industry level the employment of young workers responds more to demand shifts than does the employment of experienced workers and 3 the postdisplacement wages of displaced workers are strongly affected by demand in their predisplacement industries these findings are consistent with a model in which worker s investments in industry specific skills pose a barrier to interindustry labor mobility and wages do not respond to spot labor market conditions

equilibrium long term labor contracts the paper presents a labor market equilibrium analysis of implicit contract theory a two period single good model is used to propose consistent notions of labor market equilibrium for long term employment contracts both when labor is specialized and cannot move in the second period and when there is free mobility without costs the result that long term contracts emerge in equilibrium even without mobility costs is novel and contrary to common beliefs the main features of equilibrium are that risk neutral firms will insure risk averse workers against downside risk yielding downward rigid wages wages are not fully rigid as in earlier work on contract theory because workers may quit and wages have to be bid up to retain them the firm gets its return of the insurance deal by paying less than marginal product in the first period the resulting equilibrium is second best and lies between productive efficiency and full insurance workers gain from long term contracts in comparison to spot markets whereas owners may not in the model with specialized skills there exist transfer payments such that both parties are better off within an equilibrium with long term contracts

why hang on to losers divestitures and takeovers we study the divestiture decisions of managers who care about their reputations managers divestiture and investment decisions are publicly observable but managers privately observe signals with respect to the future payoff distribution of investments they have initiated we establish that in equilibrium there is too little divestiture these inefficiencies create the opportunity for wealth enhancing divestiture motivated takeovers a key result is that only managers of targets with middle of the road asset specificity should consider the takeover threat credible these findings suggest that uniqueness of assets is an important determinant of both agency costs and takeover activity our analysis leads to several empirical predictions overwhelming empirical evidence has documented large gains in shareholder wealth that arise from takeovers jarrell brickley and netter 1988 and jensen and ruback 1983 the source of these gains has remained elusive however although takeovers are followed by some infusion of new managerial talent we have not witnessed the kind of profound post takeover restructuring of the productive activities of target firms that would readily justify the documented wealth gains a commonly observed post takeover initiative is divestiture of some of the target s lines of business bhide 1989 and bhagat shleifer and vishny 1990 what is puzzling is that if the gains from takeovers stem from the anticipation of such divestitures then why were these divestitures not undertaken by the target firm s management in the first place the purpose of this paper is to provide a possible answer to this question our focus is on the divergence in incentives between managers and shareholders with respect to divestitures of ongoing projects we show that managers might rationally decide to hang on to projects that should be divested in

sunflower management and capital budgeting in organizations ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals however those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas this commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior s prior belief we refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices

agency costs and innovation some empirical evidence abstract this paper examines the empirical relation between corporate ownership structure and innovation we test the hypothesis that diffusely held firms are less innovative than firms with either a high concentration of management ownership or a significant equity block held by an outside investor overall the evidence indicates that diffusely held firms are less innovative along the dimensions we examine patent activity growth by acquisition versus internal development and timing of long term investment spending these results are consistent with the conjecture that concentrated ownership and shareholder monitoring are effective at alleviating the high agency and contracting costs associated with innovation

labor contracts under asymmetric information when workers are free to quit this paper examines the impact of workers ability to quit on the performance of labor contracts between workers and privately informed firms while the need to induce workers to remain with the firm necessarily lowers total welfare the effect on employment levels is to reduce the magnitude of the inefficiency due to asymmetric information whether this inefficiency is under or overemployment the model predicts that employment distortions increase with the strength of lock in effects on workers a prediction which contrasts with the results of efficiency wage models and which may help in empirical testing of labor contract theory

omitted ability bias and the increase in the return to schooling over the 1980s there were sharp increases in the return to schooling estimated with conventional wage regressions we explore whether the relationship between ability and schooling changed over this period in ways that would have increased the schooling coefficient in these regressions our empirical results reject the hypothesis that an increase in the bias of the schooling coefficient due to a change in the relationship between ability and schooling has contributed to observed increases in the return to schooling we also find that the increase in the schooling return has occurred for workers with relatively high levels of academic ability

the effect of production technology on trust and reciprocity in principal agent relationships with team production we introduce differently sized teams rather than a single worker and three production technologies to an otherwise standard gift exchange environment to study experimentally whether and to what extent trust and reciprocity is affected moving to a team of workers introduces new motivations such as free riding and coordination burden that are likely to intensify with team size and the technology used by the firm we find that the positive relationship between wages and effort although affected still holds workers reduce their efforts when coordination for efficiency is more difficult using a particular production technology results also suggest that for any given technology firms react to their relevant outcome profitability and not just to workers efforts

managerial incentives and capital management the paper shows how career concerns rather than effort aversion can induce a natural incongruity in risk preferences between managers and superiors a model based on learning about managerial talent is developed to study second best contractual remedies we show that the optimal wage contract is an option of the value of the manager s human capital for insurance reasons and that consequently rationing of capital is often required to counterbalance the manager s resulting incentive to overinvest rationing is strictly superior to price decentralization offering one reason for the prevalence of centralized capital budgeting procedures

political economy of mechanisms we study the optimal mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy in contrast to the standard approach where the taxation mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power we focus on economies in which policy decisions are made by self interested politicians who cannot commit to policies the society controls politicians using elections we show that the provision of incentives to politicians can be partly separated from redistribution across agents and that political economy constraints can be modeled as introducing additional aggregate distortions in the dynamic mirrlees problem we provide conditions under which the political economy distortions persist or disappear in the long run if the politicians are as patient as the agents the best sustainable mechanism leads to an asymptotic allocation where the aggregate distortions arising from political economy disappear in contrast when politicians are less patient than the citizens positive aggregate labor and capital taxes remain even asymptotically we conclude by providing a brief comparison of centralized

repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders abstract this paper considers a first price common value auction with one sided private information among bidders an object is rented each period to the highest bidder without revealing the bids made in previous periods the paper extends single crossing arguments used in static games to show the existence of equilibrium in this repeated auction the model predicts that bidders bid more aggressively in a repeated auction than in a static auction because a higher bid increases the amount of information learned through bidding the aggressive bidding behavior also implies that the per period revenue of the repeated auction is higher than that of the one period counterpart this bidding behavior leads to a theoretical explanation for the winner s curse in repeated auctions in addition the model yields predictions like an increasing wage schedule over time and the institution of a signing bonus that are consistent with labor market observations