does bank competition reduce cost of credit cross country evidence from europe abstract despite the extensive debate on the effects of bank competition on economic welfare and growth only a handful of single country studies deal with the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit we contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit in a cross country setting using a panel of firms from 20 european countries covering the period 2001 2011 we consider a broad set of measures of bank competition including two structural measures herfindahl hirschman index and cr5 and two non structural indicators lerner index and h statistic we find that bank competition increases the cost of credit and observe that the positive influence of bank competition is stronger for smaller companies our findings accord with the information hypothesis whereby a lack of competition incentivizes banks to invest in soft information and conversely increased competition raises the cost of credit this positive impact of bank competition is however influenced by the institutional and economic framework as well as by the crisis

the effects of welfare and tax reform the material well being of single mothers in the 1980s and 1990s abstract the tax and welfare programs that provide income and in kind benefits to single mothers have changed dramatically in recent years these changes began as far back as the mid 1980s and culminated with the 1996 welfare law that ended welfare as we knew it these tax and welfare changes have sharply increased the employment of single mothers and cut welfare rolls however little is know about the effects of these policy changes on the material well being of single mothers and their children studies of those leaving welfare have found that a substantial percentage have problems paying rent purchasing enough food and paying utility bills other studies found a decline in income among the worst off single mothers after 1994 or 1995 the goal of this paper is to examine the material well being of single mothers and their families before and after recent welfare and tax reforms using data from two nationally representative household surveys we examine the consumption patterns of single mothers and their families from 1984 2000 we find that the material conditions of single mothers did not decline in recent years either in absolute terms or relative to single childless women or married mothers this pattern holds for the average single mother as well as for low educated single mothers at both the 15th and 25th percentiles of the consumption distribution in most cases our evidence suggests that the material conditions of single mothers have improved slightly

blame game politics in a coalition government abstract delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics this paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision making process nor politicians preferences for a reform we show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption thus delaying it until after the next election and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non adoption we refer to this strategy as blame game politics we then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame game one is to make an issue salient in the next election a second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue a third reason is to enhance bargaining power during the formation of the next government

the effect of safety net programs on food insecurity we investigate to what extent major safety net program benefits affect food insecurity in families we impute program eligibility and benefits in each state for 2001 2009 accounting for cross program eligibility rules we use simulated eligibility and benefits for a nationally representative sample as instruments for imputed eligibility and potential benefits among nonimmigrant low income single parent families 1 000 in potential cash or food benefits reduces the incidence of food insecurity by 1 1 percentage points on a base of 33 percent cash and food both reduce food insecurity the results highlight the importance of jointly considering a full range of safety net programs

coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game we examine a legislative voting game where decisions are being made over both ideological and distributive dimensions and legislators preferences are separable over the two dimensions in equilibrium legislators prefer to make proposals for the two dimensions together rather than offering sequential proposals on the two dimensions separately the equilibria exhibit interaction between the ideological and distributive dimensions and in any equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is made and approved which excludes the median legislator as defined over the ideological dimension in contrast with a game where no distributive decision is being made moreover in any stationary equilibrium there is more than one ideological decision that has a positive probability of being proposed and approved we show that legislators can gain from forming political parties and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of parties we discuss the impact of political parties on the outcome

does bank market power affect sme financing constraints this paper examines the extent to which bank market power alleviates or magnifies sme credit constraints using a large panel dataset of more than 118 000 smes across 20 european countries over the period 2005 2008 to our knowledge this is the first study to examine bank market power and sme credit constraints in an international developed economy setting moreover our study is the first to address a number of econometric considerations simultaneously in particular by controlling for the availability of profitable investment opportunities using a structural q model of investment our results strongly support the market power hypothesis namely that increased market power results in increased financing constraints for smes additionally we find that the relationship exhibits heterogeneity across firm size and opacity in a manner that suggests that the true relationship between bank market power and financing constraints might not be fully explained by the existing theory finally we find that the effect of bank market power on financing constraints increases in financial systems that are more bank dependent

incentive effects of the u s welfare system a review the author would like to acknowledge support for prior work on this topic from the u s department of health and human services and helpful comments from three anonymous referees rebecca blank howard chernick john fitzgerald irwin garfinkel peter gottschalk edward gramlich david greenberg judith gueron james heckman v joseph hotz robert hutchens michael keane frank levy larry mead michael murray robert plotnick anuradha rangarajan philip robins howard rolston jeffrey smith and daniel weinberg all opinions and errors are those of the author alone

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

factors determining participation of the elderly in supplemental security the same low participation rates which plague many welfare programs have been observed among the elderly eligible for supplemental security income ssi a number of hypotheses have been offered to explain the low enrollment but none has attracted universal acceptance in this paper i use the survey of income and program participation sipp to examine the participation of the elderly in ssi because of the high quality of the data i am able to determine eligibility more accurately than in most previous studies in this sample only 56 percent of those whom i determine to be eligible for ssi are presently receiving benefits i model the decision to participate as a probit equation but modify the likelihood function to account for measurement error in the expected benefit the results indicate that participation is primarily determined by the financial situation of the eligible individuals although all those eligible for ssi are poor those with little in the way of other resources are significantly more likely to participate this finding differs from widespread beliefs that eligible individuals are discouraged by the difficulty of the application process or that many are uninformed about the program

welfare for the elderly the effects of ssi on pre retirement labor supply abstract this paper studies pre eligibility age labor market disincentives created by the supplemental security income ssi program asset and income limits might induce individuals nearing the eligibility age to work less we exploit states supplementation of federal ssi benefits to estimate the effects of ssi on pre retirement labor supply using sipp data we find some evidence that generous ssi benefits reduce the pre retirement labor supply and earnings of men who are likely to participate in ssi after retirement as they near the eligibility age especially men who are eligible for early social security benefits which may be used to offset their reduced labor income

inequity aversion may increase inequity inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games i show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required this is because responders may be willing to accept a lower share rather than risk being left out inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics the advantage of being the proposer can decrease as players become more impatient game theory usually assumes that players care only about their own material payoffs this hypothesis is clearly refuted by the experimental evidence in the ultimatum and related games see camerer 2003 for a recent survey inequity aversion theories have been developed in order to account for the stylised facts observed in the laboratory see fehr and schmidt 1999 and bolton and ockenfels 2000 inequity aversion means that people are willing to give up some material payoffs in order to achieve more equitable outcomes inequity averse responders prefer to reject small offers in the ultimatum game and the proposers anticipating this make higher offers in this article i examine the implications of inequity aversion for bargaining games in which unanimity is not required e g legislative bargaining games and show that it may lead to a more inequitable outcome than would occur with selfish preferences the leading model of legislative bargaining is due to baron and ferejohn 1989 in this model n symmetric players must divide a budget by simple majority each player has an equal chance of being chosen to propose a division of the budget once a proposal is made the remaining players vote yes or no if a majority of the players supports the proposal it is implemented and the game ends otherwise the procedure is repeated this model predicts that minimal winning coalitions will form and that the proposer will receive a disproportionate share of the proceedings thus the equilibrium of the baron ferejohn model with selfish preferences exhibits a substantial amount of inequity some players are excluded almost half of them if the decision rule is simple majority and the proposer receives a substantial share more than half of the total payoff if the decision rule is simple majority the advantage of the proposer increases as players become more impatient or more risk averse the baron ferejohn model has led to many applications and extensions 1 in its simplest form it assumes that parties are selfish risk neutral and only concerned with their share of cabinet posts as opposed to policy the predictions of the model under these assumptions have been tested by ansolabehere et al 2005 using data on the

trade offs in means tested pension design abstract the means testing of age pension programs allows governments to control the receipt of pension benefits extensive margin and the benefit level intensive margin we investigate how the presence of the extensive margin influences the trade off between protecting the poorer elderly and the economic costs of distorting incentives to work and save of young individuals the means test effect via the extensive margin improves the insurance aspect but introduces opposing impacts on incentives that potentially have ambiguous welfare outcomes we characterize combinations of the maximum pension benefit and taper rate that balance the negative incentive effects and positive insurance effects

optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice dynamic bargaining versus liquidation abstract we model a firm s optimal capital structure decision in a framework in which it may later choose to enter either chapter 11 reorganization or chapter 7 liquidation creditors anticipate equityholders ex post reorganization incentives and price them into the ex ante credit spreads using a realistic dynamic bargaining model of reorganization we show that the off equilibrium threat of costly renegotiation can lead to lower leverage even with liquidation in equilibrium if reorganization is less efficient than liquidation the added option of reorganization can actually make equityholders worse off ex ante even when they liquidate on the equilibrium path

a bargaining model of collective choice we present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space in contrast to other bargaining models the status quo is not assumed to be bad and delay may be pareto efficient we prove existence of stationary equilibria the possibility of equilibrium delay depends on four factors risk aversion of the legislators the dimensionality of the policy space the voting rule and the possibility of transfers across districts if legislators are risk averse if there is more than one policy dimension and if voting is by majority rule for example then delay will almost never occur in one dimension delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule and then it is the only possible outcome this core selection result yields a game theoretic foundation for the well known median voter theorem our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights i if the status quo is close to the core t hen equilibrium policy outcomes will also be close to the core a moderate status quo produces moderate policy outcomes and ii if legislators are patient then equilibrium proposals will be close to the core legislative patience leads to policy moderation

the effect of expanding medicaid eligibility on supplemental security income program participation abstract low income adults without dependent children have historically had few paths to obtain public health insurance unless they qualified for supplemental security income ssi cash benefits because of a disability however in states that expand their medicaid programs childless adults may obtain medicaid without undergoing an intensive ssi disability review process and with substantially higher income and assets than the ssi program allows this expanded availability of medicaid coverage independent of ssi participation creates an opportunity to increase earnings and savings without jeopardizing health insurance coverage in this paper we use the natural experiments created by state decisions to expand medicaid to nondisabled nonelderly adults without dependent children to study the effect of decoupling medicaid eligibility and cash assistance using a difference in differences study design we collected data on the income eligibility limits enrollment caps and coverage characteristics of state medicaid expansions to childless adults from 2001 to 2013 we combine these data with the nationally representative american community survey to estimate the effects of state expansion on ssi participation we find relative declines in ssi participation of 0 17 percentage points on average after the introduction of medicaid coverage for childless adults a 7 relative decrease this finding suggests the potential for small but important efficiency gains from separating ssi and medicaid eligibility

the interaction of public retirement income programs in the united states around 1 2 million elderly individuals currently receive income through the supplemental security income ssi program a welfare program intended to provide income assistance to individuals age 65 or above whose earnings histories do not support an adequate retirement benefit under the old age insurance oai component of social security in this paper we explain how the two programs interact and present basic empirical evidence on how this interaction affects the timing of a first oai claim which may take place as early as age 62 we are fortunate to have unusually complete data on individuals experiences with both the oai and ssi systems due to access to administrative data from the social security administration ssa matched to individuals in the surveys of income and program participation sipp by special arrangement our essential point is that ssi creates incentives for individuals to claim their oai benefits earlier than they otherwise would two factors underlie this first the availability of an early i e pre age 65 retirement option in oai makes ssi participation itself more attractive to those who are oai qualified the ability to combine early oai retirement with later ssi participation enhances the value of participating in ssi second the ssi benefit computation formula creates strong financial incentives to claim oai as early as possible given a person plans to enter ssi and is qualified for oai both of these phenomena are generated by the form of the ssi benefit formula as is typical in a welfare program other income sources are subject to a heavy implicit tax there is also an asset limit for ssi eligibility which we ignore in the interests of simplicity see neumark and powers 1998 for an empirical analysis of this feature in general monthly ssi benefits are reduced dollar for dollar with other income beyond the first 20 two thirds of ssi recipients receive oai income almost none receive private pension income or earnings so most face a 100 percent marginal tax rate on their social security retirement benefits due to participation in the ssi program theory predicts that this implicit confiscatory tax imposed by ssi on oai benefits above 20 discourages work prior to turning age 65 to the extent that people work to enhance postretirement income neumark and powers 2000 the constraint on acting upon the incentives to reduce labor supply prior to age 65 is the maintenance of current consumption clearly this may be a binding constraint for the sorts of lifetime poor individuals who participate in ssi in old age now consider that people may claim oai benefits as early as age 62 early oai benefits enable prospective ssi recipients to curtail their labor supply in the years prior to ssi participation enhancing the value of the ssi program from a lifetime utility perspective while in the absence of ssi the actuarial reduction in oai benefits for early retirement might discourage early claims this is not the case under ssi when ssi determines the government old age transfer actuarial reductions are effectively lifted at age 65 implying that there are no long run adverse financial consequences of making an early first old age insurance oai claim in fact the rules strongly encourage future ssi recipients to claim oai early if they powers institute of government and public affairs and department of economics university of illinois 1007 w nevada st urbana il 61801 e mail epowers uiuc edu neumark public policy institute of california 500 washington st suite 800 san francisco ca 94111 and national bureau of economic research this research was supported by grants from the u s social security administration to the michigan retirement research center and the center for retirement research at boston college and nia grant 1 r01 ag17619 01a2 the opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of any agency of the federal government the centers or the public policy institute of california the authors thank sarah jackson for excellent research assistance and alison del rossi for comments 1 people may also enter ssi through disability we restrict our attention to the aged component

bank competition and firm creation we investigate the effects of competition in the financial sector on the creation of firms in the nonfinancial sector explicitly allowing for heterogeneous effects across borrowers characterized by different degrees of asymmetric information we find evidence of a bell shaped relationship between bank competition and firm creation in addition consistently with theories arguing that competition may reduce the availability of credit to informationally opaque firms we find that bank competition results less favorable to the emergence of new firms in industrial sectors where informational asymmetries are more important

why should majority voting be unfair the common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling in theory it inequitably favors the proposer and paradoxically it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse in practice however outcomes are equitable the present paper analyzes data from a novel experimental design to identify the underlying social preferences our experiment compares one shot and indefinite horizon versions of random proposer majority bargaining the baron ferejohn game which allow us to disentangle behaviors compatible with altruism inequity aversion and reference dependent altruism most subjects are classified as reference dependent altruists around 10 are inequity averse subjects are egoistic when their payoff is below their reference point they become efficiency concerned when satisfied and the reference point is either the ex ante expectation or the opponent s payoff finally we successfully test rda out of sample on a number of distribution and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments

legislative bargaining with teams abstract we study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals teams come closer to the predictions of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium passing minimum winning coalitions mwcs more often and having significantly more proposer power the increase in proposer power results from increased numbers of mwcs along with increased proposer power within an mwc we investigate the driving forces behind teams coming closer to the theoretical predictions the results favor their greater insightfulness as opposed to being more aggressive or more selfish

testing the relationship between competition and efficiency in banking a panel data analysis the relationship between competition and efficiency in the banking sectors of five eu countries is investigated using granger type causality test estimations we find positive causation between market power and efficiency whereas the causality running from efficiency to competition is weak

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values theory and experiments we study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations in that case each player receives an exogenous disagreement value we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q majority rules under unanimity rule equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values under all less than unanimity rules expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values we conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule finding qualitative support for several but not all of our main predictions having a high disagreement value is indeed an advantage under unanimity under majority the player with the highest disagreement value is more likely to be excluded but this does not consistently result in a lower average payoff

the effect of means tested income support for the elderly on pre retirement saving evidence from the ssi program in the u s abstract we attempt to draw inferences about behavioral responses to means tested income support for the elderly by examining the effects on saving of the supplemental security income ssi program for the aged in the u s part of this program provides payments to the poor elderly operating as a means tested public retirement program we exploit state level variation in ssi benefits to estimate the effects of ssi on saving using data from the 1984 survey of income program participation we find evidence that high ssi benefits reduce saving among households with heads who are approaching the ssi eligibility age and are likely participants in the program

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

bank competition and access to finance international evidence using a unique database for 74 countries and for firms of small medium and large size we assess the effect of banking market structure on the access of firms to bank finance we find that bank concentration increases obstacles to obtaining finance but only in countries with low levels of economic and institutional development a larger share of foreign owned banks and an efficient credit registry dampen the effect of concentration on financing obstacles while the effect is exacerbated by more restrictions on banks activities more government interference in the banking sector and a larger share of government owned banks

financing patterns around the world are small firms different using a firm level survey database covering 48 countries we investigate how financial and institutional development affects financing of large and small firms our database is not limited to large firms but includes small and medium size firms and data on a broad spectrum of financing sources including leasing supplier development and informal finance small firms and firms in countries with poor institutions use less external finance especially bank finance protection of property rights increases external financing of small firms significantly more than of large firms mainly due to its effect on bank finance small firms do not use disproportionately more leasing or trade finance compared with larger firms so these financing sources do not compensate for lower access to bank financing of small firms we also find that larger firms more easily expand external financing when they are constrained than small firms finally we find suggestive evidence that the pecking order holds across countries

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

cooperation and punishment under repeated majority voting in light of the extensive theoretical evidence suggesting absence of equilibrium in voting models tullock 1981 asks why so much stability our results suggest the following answer political agents engaged in long term relationships can sustain highly stable allocations if there are strongly held norms for punishment of defectors 1

on the implications of market power in banking evidence from developing countries abstract this paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies it sheds light on the competition stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators the degree of market power bank cost and profit efficiency and overall firm stability the results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency despite significant cost efficiency losses the findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies

greasing the wheels pork and public goods contributions in a legislative bargaining experiment abstract when a legislature bargains over funds for pork and public goods and the funds come from a common budget increased spending on the public good means greater payoff equality since it comes at the expense of pork this paper explores whether inequity aversion then leads to greater public goods spending using both theory and a laboratory experiment we show inequity aversion generally decreases inequity within a coalition by limiting proposer power however this does not always mean greater public goods contributions because the types of proposals passed change in equilibrium in addition the experiment investigates the theoretical prediction that increasing players relative preference for pork can increase public goods contributions we show that while average public goods contributions remain unchanged there is evidence at the individual level that subjects hold out for higher public goods contributions as predicted

strategic thinking in public goods games with teams abstract we experimentally investigate team behavior in repeated public goods games and use team chat logs to study motives for contribution subjects are matched into two person teams and each team makes a joint decision in each period we compare teams with individuals and find similar overall contributions however initial contribution is higher and endgame effects are more pronounced for teams we examine strategic discussions within teams and find strong evidence of concern for repeated game effects and limited backward induction we also find evidence of confusion and explore its potential sources

wage declines among older men we examine the evidence on whether real wages decline with age among older men while the general human capital model of wage growth over the life cycle predicts that wages will fall as workers approach the end of their career alternative models of wage growth do not predict these wage declines we find that in longitudinal estimates of age wage profiles wage declines only set in for workers in their 60s furthermore these longitudinal declines are at least partly due to interactions with the social security system the earnings cap or other effects of social security appear to lead some workers to choose jobs and job characteristics associated with lower wages copyright 1996 by mit press

competition and credit procyclicality in european banking abstract this paper empirically assesses how competition in the banking sector affects credit procyclicality by estimating both an interacted panel var model using macroeconomic data and a single equation model with bank level data these two empirical approaches show that a deviation of actual gdp from potential gdp leads to greater credit fluctuations in economies where bank competition is weak this suggests that increased market power for banks increases the financial accelerator mechanism which is consistent with recent macroeconomic models showing that monopolistic banking tends to increase macroeconomic volatility by making credit cheaper during booms and more expensive during recessions

fiscal discipline and the budget process the critical economic policy issue for many oecd countries developing countries and transition economies currently is fiscal consolidation and the maintenance of long run fiscal balance two related components underlie this general goal first several countries face the issue of deficit reduction particularly those countries with high debt gdp ratios second it is becoming increasingly apparent that major reforms of the welfare system and specifically of social security systems are critical ingredients of a long lasting fiscal consolidation see alesina and perotti 1995a in the case of monetary policy a constructive discussion has generated a widespread consensus about the benefits of different monetary institutions relatively few economists dispute the benefits of a certain amount of central bank independence even though different commentators and policymakers may disagree on the optimal degree of independence also a contracting approach has highlighted the benefit of inflation targeting and of certain institutional relationships contracts between the executive and the central bank a similar theoretical and empirical discussion on the role of budget procedures and budget institutions is just beginning in this paper we ask the following two questions i do budget procedures matter for the determination of the budget balance and its composition ii are there certain institutional reforms that one should feel comfortable in recommending based on the relatively scarce empirical evidence available we tentatively answer yes to the first question budget procedures matter on the second question we suggest that the two critical areas of reform are first more transparency second a strengthening of the roles of the executive branch vis a vis the legislature and of the treasury minister vis a vis the rest of the executive branch in order to achieve a centralized and top bottom approach to the budget process

voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions to test key predictions of these models we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001 these predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties minimal integer voting weights we calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties in addition we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts we find that for parties that join but did not form the government there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts the party that forms the government the formateur receives a substantial bonus relative to its voting weight the latter finding is more consistent with proposal based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power

old sick alone and poor a welfare analysis of old age social insurance programmes all individuals face some risk of ending up old sick alone and poor is there a role for social insurance for these risks and if so what is a good programme a large literature has analysed the costs and benefits of pay as you go public pensions and found that the costs exceed the benefits this article instead considers means tested social insurance mtsi programmes for retirees such as medicaid and supplemental security income we find that the welfare gains from these programmes are large moreover the current scale of mtsi in the u s is too small in the following sense if we condition on the current social security programme increasing the scale of mtsi by 1 3 benefits both the poor and the affluent when a payroll tax is used to fund the increase

does means testing welfare discourage saving evidence from a change in afdc policy in the united states abstract this paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of a welfare program s asset test on the saving behavior of its target population the approach exploits a policy experiment the essential federalization of the afdc program s asset testing policy in 1981 data on female headed households from the national longitudinal survey young women are used to test the hypothesis that likely afdc users adjusted their asset stocks in response to this change the findings indicate additional saving between 1978 and 1983 of about 25 cents for each additional 1 increase in the limit in most states

bargaining and inequity aversion on the efficiency of the double auction abstract in a bargaining setting with asymmetrically informed inequity averse parties a fully efficient mechanism i e the double auction exists if and only if compassion is strong less compassionate parties do not trade in the double auction in the limit of strong envy

a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers abstract we extend the stahl rubinstein s alternating offer model ton person coalitional bargaining the key feature of the model is the random selection of proposers at every round no delay of agreement occurs in equilibrium for a super additive game in contrast to the fixed order model of chatterjeeet al rev econ stud 60 1993 463 477 when the discount factor of future payoffs is sufficiently high the agreement on the grand coalition is reached if and only if it has the largest value per capita among all coalitions moreover in the limit as the discount factor goes to one all players divide equally the value of the grand coalition regardless of who makes a proposal journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 c73 c78

a noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions this noncooperative theory is based on a model that incorporates an institutional structure that reflects the sequential process of agenda formation and voting in a legislature that has the task of allocating particularistic benefits among legislative districts the theory is intended to identify the incentives for the formation of proposal coordinating coalitions as a function of characteristics of the political system and the rules that govern agenda formation coalition proposals allocate all the benefits to their districts and whenever the coalition has discipline or controls the chair it will be of minimal winning size when proposals are governed by a closed rule when coalition discipline is absent and the chair is neutral the coalition will be comprised of approximately 70 of the legislature a legislative rule that allows amendments may result in larger coalitions coalition composition is also considered

the benefits of relationship lending in a cross country context a meta analysis relationship lending may create benefits for borrowers by reducing information asymmetries however empirical evidence is mixed we conduct a meta analysis to summarize and explain the heterogeneity in the results in the literature using hand collected information from 101 studies in the united states europe asia and latin america from 1970 to 2010 we find that strong relationships are generally beneficial for borrowers but lending outcomes differ across the relationships dimensions long lasting exclusive and synergy creating bank relationships are associated with higher credit volume and lower loan rates these benefits are more likely in the united states and in countries where bank competition is high they are not related to the importance of small and medium sized enterprises in an economy suggesting that prevalence of relationship lending does not necessarily come along with borrower benefits our inferences are robust when we control for observed systematic heterogeneity in the original

does welfare inhibit success the long term effects of removing low income youth from the disability rolls i estimate the effects of removing low income youth with disabilities from supplemental security income ssi on their earnings and income in adulthood using a regression discontinuity design based on a 1996 policy change in age 18 medical reviews i find that youth who are removed from ssi at age 18 recover one third of the lost ssi cash income in earnings ssi youth who are removed and stay off ssi earn on average 4 400 annually and they lose 76 000 in present discounted observed income over the 16 years following removal relative to those who do not receive a review jel i30 i38 j14 supporters of welfare programs defend them as vital lifelines for those who face barriers to work while critics charge that these programs create perverse incentives to qualify and perpetuate dependency encapsulating this debate is the controversy over the us supplemental security income ssi program a program that provides cash payments and medicaid eligibility to low income children and adults with disabilities and the aged elderly after three decades of rapid expansion ssi is now the largest nonwork based cash welfare program in the united states paying about 50 billion each year to 8 million recipients including 1 3 million children 1 ssi has been singled out by policymakers and the media for potential perverse incentives

communication in multilateral bargaining one of the most robust phenomena in the experimental literature on multilateral bargaining is the failure of proposers to extract equilibrium rents however all previous experiments have overlooked the fact that outside the lab committee members are allowed to and do engage in sometimes intense communication processes prior to voting on a proposal we conduct an experimental test of the baron ferejohn model in which we allow committee members to engage in unrestricted cheap talk communication before a proposal is submitted we find that proposers extract a significantly higher share of resources when communication is allowed communication increases proposer power through two channels first it mitigates the uncertainty surrounding the amount a coalition member is willing to accept second it allows potential coalition members to compete for a place in the coalition by lowering this stated price

seniority in legislatures we construct a stochastic game model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system we model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents in an infinitely repeated divide the dollar game each legislative session must make a decision on redistributional issues modeled as a divide the dollar game however each session begins with a vote in which the legislators decide by majority rule whether or not to impose on themselves a seniority system legislative decisions on the redistributional issues are made by the baron ferejohn rule an agenda setter is selected by a random recognition rule which in our model is a function of the seniority system selected the agenda setter makes a proposal on redistributional issues and the legislature then votes whether to accept or reject the agenda setters proposal if the legislature rejects the proposal another agenda setter is randomly selected and the process is repeated if the legislature accepts the proposal the legislative session ends and the voters in each legislative district vote whether to retain their legislator or throw it out of office the voters verdict determines the seniority structure of the next period legislature we find a stationary equilibrium to the game having the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non trivial seniority system and that legislators are always reelected