income dispersion and counter cyclical markups recent advances in measuring cyclical changes in the income distribution raise new questions how might these distributional changes affect the business cycle itself we show how counter cyclical income dispersion can generate counter cyclical markups in the goods market without any preference shocks or price setting frictions in recessions idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks raise income dispersion lower the price elasticity of demand and increase imperfectly competitive firms optimal markups the calibrated model explains not only many cyclical features of markups but also cyclical and long run patterns of standard business cycle aggregates

the low skill trap recently it has become popular to argue that certain workers have fallen into a trap in which they have poor skills few job opportunities and a low return on training while others have not this paper demonstrates how such a trap can occur within a simple matching model with rent sharing rent sharing diminishes the worker s incentive to acquire skills however since firms also benefit from training rent sharing likewise induces job creation the subsequent improved matching prospects may offset the initial disincentive to invest however for this mechanism to be effective firms and workers must coordinate their actions if they do not the trap occurs

time series analysis of market power evidence from g 7 manufacturing abstract this paper estimates the mark up of price over marginal cost in manufacturing for the seven major oecd countries applying hall s approach to market power measurement we have estimated the cyclical behaviour of the mark up a substantial degree of market power has been estimated in all countries examined and procyclical movements in the mark up competition seems to affect the level of mark up negatively

optimal card payment systems abstract this paper presents a model of a card payment system to address the pricing and rules that govern such systems it evaluates the social optimality of privately set interchange fees and the adoption of a rule by payment systems to prevent merchants surcharging for card transactions using two extremes of merchant pricing monopolistic pricing and perfect competition both types of merchant pricing constrain the ability of card schemes to use interchange fees and the no surcharge rule in anticompetitive ways although for quite different reasons the positive role of the no surcharge rule in preventing excessive merchant surcharging is also highlighted

unionisation structures and innovation incentives this paper examines how dierent unionisation structures aect rms innovation incen tives and industry employment we distinguish three modes of unionisation with increasing degree of centralisation 1 decentralisation where wages are determined independently at the rm level 2 coordination where one industry union sets individual wages for all rms and 3 centralisation where an industry union sets a uniform wage rate for all rms while rms investment incentives are largest under centralisation investment in centives are non monotone in the degree of centralisation decentralisation carries higher investment incentives than coordination labour market policy can spur innovation by decentralising unionisation structures or through non discrimination rules

international marketing ethics from an islamic perspective a value maximization approach international marketing practices embedded in a strong ethical doctrine can play a vital role in raising the standards of business conduct worldwide while in no way compromising the quality of services or products offered to customers or surrendering the profit margins of businesses adherence to such ethical practices can help to elevate the standards of behavior and thus of living of traders and consumers alike against this background this paper endeavors to identify the salient features of the islamic framework of international marketing ethics in particular it highlights the capabilities and strengths of this framework in creating and sustaining a strong ethical international marketing culture at the heart of islamic marketing is the principle of value maximization based on equity and justice constituting just dealing and fair play for the wider welfare of the society selected key international marketing issues are examined from an islamic perspective which it is argued if adhered to can help to create a value loaded global ethical marketing framework for mncs in general and establish harmony and meaningful cooperation between international marketers and muslim target markets in particular

two sided search marriages and matchmakers this article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two sided search agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on 0 1 their utility is equal to the index of their mate in a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure if the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure if the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary

unemployment institutions and reform complementarities re assessing the aggregate evidence for oecd countries there is no or limited consensus on the quantitative impact of institutions on unemployment which has led some to question the case for structural reforms recent studies suggest also that institutions interact with each other and cannot be analysed in isolation in this paper we estimate a standard reduced form model to explore the institutional determinants of unemployment and assess its robustness using a large battery of robustness checks we show that although the impact of each individual policy varies across countries due to policy interactions the simple linear model can be used to draw inferences for countries with an average mix of institutions the model is then extended to encompass systemic interactions in which individual policies interact with the overall institutional framework we find relatively robust evidence of broad reform complementarities

testing rent sharing using individualized measures of rent evidence from domestic helpers wing suen the market for resident domestic helpers offers a rare opportunity where the surplus from employment relationship can be quantitatively measured for each individual employee using the difference between employer s cost of time and employee s wage as a measure of rent it is found that wages for domestic helpers are positively related to rent however the apparent sharing of rent is better explained by matching than by efficiency wage models rent sharing is observed even in households where monitoring or turnover costs are low rent sharing is not observed among newly arrived foreign domestic helpers whose ability remains to be revealed jel j41 i introduction this article studies the pattern of wages for resident domestic helpers in hong kong no one would lure economists into paying attention to this arcane labor market were it not for one feature of the market for housework a measure of employment rent can be plausibly assigned to each individual employee having an individualized measure of rent at the worker level instead of a general measure at the firm level will shed considerable light on the large and growing literature of rent sharing in wage determination since 1975 the hong kong government has allowed the importation of foreign domestic helpers into the territory because of large wage differences between hong kong and some of its asian neighbors the program is highly popular the census and statistics department 1995 estimates that 92 700 households or 5 6 of all domestic households in hong kong employed domestic helpers in 1993 the figure is even more dramatic for high income households 44 of households with monthly income of over hk 50 000 had one or more domestic helpers 1 one consequence of the availability of market procured housework is that women who employ helpers have more time for market work in suen 1994 i estimate that the probability of labor force participation among married women who had domestic helpers is 22 percentage points higher than that for women without domestic help other things equal if hiring a helper enables a married woman to engage in market work then a plausible measure for the rent or surplus from this employment relationship is the difference between the woman s wage and her helper s wage if a woman with a domestic helper decides to stay home nonetheless the size of the surplus can be measured by the difference between the shadow value of leisure and the helper s wage wage information is readily available from census data and shadow wages can be estimated using standard techniques this article utilizes this rare opportunity to impute a measure of rent for each employer employee pair studying how the wages of domestic helpers vary wi th the magnitude of rent will provide direct evidence for rent sharing in the labor market there is a large literature which documents the fact that the characteristics of the employer such as industry affiliation and firm size are significantly correlated with the employees wages krueger and summers 19881 brown and medoff 1989 groshen 1991 helwege 1992 and many others offer convincing evidence that inter industry wage differentials and employer wage effects exist rent sharing is often invoked to account for such wage patterns however few studies in the literature offer a plausible account for the existence of or a measure for the size of the rent that is supposedly shared 2 at the industry level dickens and katz 1987 use variables such as concentration ratio capital labor ratio research and development expenditures and average rate of return on capital as covariates in wage equations these variables provide at best an indirect and error prone measure of employment rent campbell 1993 makes use of firm level characteristics instead of industry characteristics but t here is no information on profits in his firm level data

first party content and coordination in two sided markets the strategic use of first party content by two sided platforms is driven by two key factors the nature of buyer and seller expectations favorable versus unfavorable and the nature of the relationship between first party content and third party content complements or substitutes platforms facing unfavorable expectations face an additional constraint their prices and first party content investment need to be such that low zero participation equilibria are eliminated this additional constraint typically leads them to invest more less in first party content relative to platforms facing favorable expectations when first and third party content are substitutes complements these results hold with both simultaneous and sequential entry of the two sides with two competing platforms incumbent facing favorable expectations and entrant facing unfavorable expectations and multi homing on one side of the market the incumbent always invests weakly more in first party content relative to the case in which it is a monopolist this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

negative intra group externalities in two sided markets two types of agents interact on a pre existing free platform agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type we ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit we show that this might be impossible if intra group negative externalities are sufficiently but not too strong with respect to positive inter group externalities

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

subjective and objective measures of governmental regulations in oecd nations abstract since government regulations may have an important impact on the macroeconomic performance of market economies it is necessary to devise quantitative indicators of the regulatory regime which raises some difficult methodological issues after reviewing some of these problems we compare the results of several recent quantitative studies of regulation in oecd nations some based on an extensive review and quantification of laws and regulations others based on observational data of those familiar with these regulations despite their very different methodologies and coverage of particular types of governmental regulation the results of the three studies are significantly correlated which suggests that they all capture the same underlying reality

the impact of cross national carriers of business ethics on attitudes about questionable practices and form of moral reasoning the study explores the impact of cross national carriers of ethics on attitudes about questionable business practices and form of moral reasoning across mexican spanish and u s mbas results show substantial agreement across cultures on twelve personally most objectionable practices while form of moral reasoning varied significantly social cognitive theory is used to address the theoretical and practical implications

differences in managerial values a study of u s hong kong and prc managers in this study of convergence divergence of managerial values four western developed measures machiavellianism locus of control intolerance of ambiguity and dogmatism and the four dimensions of the eastern developed chinese value survey confucian dynamism human heartedness integration and moral discipline were the measures used the findings indicate that often times both culture and the business environment interact to create a unique set of managerial values in a country

a cross national investigation of industrial salespeople s ethical perceptions this study examines ethical perceptions of industrial salespeople in the united states japan and south korea marketing ethics in general and selling ethics in particular have experienced increasing research attention many of the empirical studies have focused on ethical situations confronting marketing and sales practitioners despite the abundance of research in the general topic of marketing ethics as well as the globalization of competition in recent years a topic that has been virtually ignored is whether ethical perceptions of sales personnel are consistent across countries this paper reports a cross national comparison of business ethics of industrial salespeople across the three countries the findings indicate that nationality influences salespeople s beliefs about the ethics of selling practices and the need for company policies to guide those practices

exclusive dealing with network effects abstract this paper explores the ability of an incumbent to use introductory offers to dominate a market in the face of a more efficient rival when network effects rather than scale economies are present both in the case of one sided and two sided markets for introductory offers to be profitable when consumers can multihome they need to be discriminatory and exclusive in this setting exclusivity as opposed to just commitment to purchase is critical consumers must commit not to purchase from the rival in the future in order that introductory offers can work the use of such contracts is anticompetitive and inefficient but does not necessarily result in complete foreclosure

the creation and capture of rents wages and innovation in a panel of u k companies this paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of british firms a head count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information innovating firms are found to have higher average wages but rival innovation tends to depress own wages this appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation in other words innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability quasi rents or tobin s average q instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0 29

platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products we study a two sided market where a platform attracts firms selling differentiated products and buyers interested in those products in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game the platform fully internalises the network externalities present in the market and firms and consumers all participate in the platform with probability one the monopolist intermediary extracts all the economic rents generated in the market except when firms and consumers can trade outside the platform in which case consumers obtain a rent that corresponds to the utility they would get if they did trade outside the platform the market allocation is constraint efficient in the sense that the monopoly platform does not introduce distortions over and above those arising from the market power of the differentiated product sellers an increase in the number of retailers increases the amount of variety in the platform but at the same time increases competition as a result the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges in contrast an increase in the extent of product differentiation raises the value of the platform for the consumers but weakens competition in this case the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms

wage compression within the firm evidence from an indexation scheme we revisit the role of labour market institutions by showing how they affect the sharing of firm specific rents between employers and employees we look at an italian wage indexation mechanism scala mobile that compressed the distribution of wages imposing real wage increases at the bottom of the distribution after developing a simplified version of a search model with intra firm bargaining and on the job search we document that skilled workers received lower wage adjustments when employed at firms with many unskilled workers and they tended to move towards more skill intensive firms moreover the system drove the least skill intensive firms out of the market

rent sharing and workers bargaining power an empirical cross country cross industry panel analysis this paper studies how rents are shared between capital and labour using industry level panel data for 19 oecd countries over the 1988 2007 period the first step is an explanation of the rent creation process we provide evidence of a significant impact of regulation on value added prices at the industry level relative to the value added price for the overall economy rent in the second step we dissect the value added sharing process running ols and iv estimations our results confirm the blanchard giavazzi 2003 prediction the impact of rents on the capital share depends on workers bargaining power this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

profit margins and the business cycle evidence from uk manufacturing firms this paper presents some empirical models of profitability using panel data covering 709 large u k companies ove r the 1970s and 1980s focusing specifically on the role of aggregate demand shocks in shaping firm level profitability in basic regressi ons and in quite complex econometric models the results suggest that firm level profit margins fell heavily during the deep manufacturing recession of the early 1980s and as such are consistent with model s predicting the procyclical nature of profit margins this result hol ds across different product groups producer goods consumer durables a nd nondurables though the timing of the impact of aggregate shocks appears to differ copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

rent creation and rent sharing new measures and impacts on total factor productivity this analysis proposes new measures of rent creation and rent sharing and assesses their impact on productivity on cross country industry panel data we find first that 1 anticompetitive product market regulations positively affect rent creation and 2 employment protection legislation boosts hourly wages particularly for low skill workers however we find no significant impact of this employment legislation on rent sharing as the hourly wage increases are offset by a negative impact on hours worked second using regulation indicators as instruments we find that rent creation and rent sharing both have a substantial negative impact on total factor productivity jel e22 e24 o30 l50 o43 o47 c23

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

distributive justice theoretical foundations and empirical findings abstract the first part of this paper discusses various theories of distributive justice such as utilitarianism rawlsianism approaches within cooperative bargaining theory and the notion of fair allocations the focus is on the different informational bases used in these solution concepts the second part reports some results from empirical investigations where a particular distributive problem had to be solved by undergraduate students of economics and business administration the question we are posing is whether the respondents behaviour can to some extent at least be rationalized in terms of utilitarian ethics

contracts and externalities how things fall apart a single principal interacts with several agents offering them contracts the crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or free agents there are we study how such a principal unwelcome though he may be approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out two variants are considered when the principal cannot re approach agents there is a unique equilibrium in which contract provision is split up into two phases in phase 1 simultaneousoffers at good though varying terms are made to a number of agents in phase 2 offers must be made sequentially and their values are discontinuously lower they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options when the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent there is a multiplicity of equilibria in some of these the agents have the power to force delay they can hold off the principal s overtures temporarily but they must succumb in finite time in both models despite beingable to coordinate their actions agents cannot resist an invasion by the principal and hold to their best payoff it is in this sense that things eventually fall apart

macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in goods and labor markets product and labor market deregulation reduce and redistribute rents leading economic players to adjust to this new distribution it typically comes with distribution and dynamic effects to study these effects we build a macroeconomic model on two central assumptions monopolistic competition in the goods market which determines the size of rents and bargaining in the labor market which determines the distribution of rents product market regulation determines entry costs and the degree of competition labor market regulation determines the bargaining power of workers we show the effects of deregulation we then use our results to discuss the political economy of deregulation and recent macroeconomic evolutions in europe

rent sharing and collective bargaining coverage evidence from linked employer employee data using a linked employer employee data set this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage to address this issue we distinguish sector specific wage agreements firm specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm specific rents in the non union sector and under firm specific contracts industry wide wage contracts however seem to suppress firm level rent sharing while pooled ols estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi rents under centralised contracts estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coefficient of zero differenced gmm estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our profitability measure even point to a negative relationship under centralised contracts

competition and the capital labor conflict abstract this paper analyzes the distributional effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition the focus is on the interaction between imperfect competition in product markets and bargaining in the labor market the main result is that while a uniform intensification of product market competition increases employment it may cause real wages to fall in the short run as well as in the long run this is especially likely if labor market regulations are favorable to workers therefore product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce each other politically and compensatory fiscal transfers may be needed in order to enact employment enhancing deregulation policies

capital market imperfections and countercyclical markups theory and evidence during recessions output prices seem to rise relative to wages and raw material prices one explanation is that imperfectly competitive firms compete less aggressively during recessions that is markups of price over marginal cost are countercyclical the authors present a model of countercyclical markups based on capital market imperfections during recessions liquidity constrained firms boost short run profits by raising prices to cut their investments in market share the authors provide evidence from the supermarket industry in support of this theory during regional and macroeconomic recessions more financially constrained supermarket chains raise their prices relative to less financially constrained chains copyright 1996 by american economic association

cooperation among competitors some economics of payment card associations we analyze platforms in two sided markets with network externalities using the specific context of a payment card association we study the cooperative determination of the interchange fee by member banks the interchange fee is the access charge paid by the merchants banks the acquirers to cardholders banks the issuers we develop a framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card after drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative determination of the interchange fee we describe in detail the factors affecting merchant resistance compare cooperative and for profit business models and make a first cut in the analysis of system competition

the decline of the labor income share in mexico 1990 2015 abstract the paper studies the decline of the labor income share lis in mexico during the period 1990 2015 the decline is mostly explained by reductions within the economy s major sectors including manufacturing tradables and non tradables rather than by a recomposition of value added towards sectors with low labor shares in contrast to agriculture where lis fell due to a shift of labor force from self employment to wage employment in other major areas of the economy the fall in lis is explained by reductions within the wage employment sector econometric estimations indicate that parallel declines in the wage share and relative productivity of non tradables and in the us manufacturing labor share all played a large role in the reduction of the manufacturing wage share in mexico more generally the analysis suggests that the lagging productivity of the economy s informal non tradable sector itself a reflection of the country s low aggregate rate of economic growth is a crucial factor in the fall of lis in the formal sectors the paper concludes by discussing possible explanations for the paradox of the slow rate of economic growth in mexico despite the rise in the profit share

endogenous scope of firm union bargaining with vertical pay comparisons abstract there is strong evidence that employees motivation and incentives in the workplace are affected by vertical pay comparisons in a stylized cournot duopoly model with firm specific unions that institutionalize workers vertical fairness concerns we show that universal wage employment w e bargaining may arise as the equilibrium scope of bargaining institution we thus propose that intra firm vertical fairness concerns may resolve the mismatch between recent findings in the empirical literature on labor market institutions and the predictions of traditional models that universal w e bargaining will never arise in equilibrium the scope of bargaining puzzle we derive a number of testable hypotheses that address the recent shift towards more decentralized bargaining institutions the decline in unions bargaining power and the prevalence of w e bargaining

coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities divide and conquer abstract the paper studies bilateral contracting between n agents and one principal whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents it examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from i coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium and ii making different contracts available to different agents these effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more the prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case and have little or no effect in the latter case the inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions

firm wage premia industrial relations and rent sharing in germany the authors use three distinct methods to investigate the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in germany first ordinary least squares ols regressions for the firm effects from

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

naked exclusion comment the ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject of contention in the antitrust literature the courts concern with such exclusionary contracts has been challenged by those who argue that an incumbent faced with buyers whose interest is to promote entry and competition would have to pay buyers more for the inclusion of exclusionary provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion in a provocative article eric b rasmusen et al 1991 henceforth rrw have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably using such contractual provisions because it can exploit buyers lack of coordination in essence if buyers expect other buyers to sign such provisions then they may see little reason not to do so themselves the rrw argument is potentially an important one because most alleged instances of entry deterrence through exclusionary contracts with customers occur in situations with multiple buyers unfortunately however rrw s two main results contain errors in this note we reconsider the rrw model providing correct characterizations of the likelihood and cost of exclusion for an incumbent firm our results indicate that while the intuition suggested by rrw is valid the equilibrium likelihood and cost of exclusion differ from what rrw derive moreover our analysis illuminates some further aspects of exclusionary contracting with multiple buyers among these issues we focus on how an incumbent can use discriminatory offers to exploit the externalities that exist among buyers in the provision of competition in section i we review the basic assumptions of the rrw model in sections ii and iii we then consider in turn the cases of simultaneous and sequential offers studied by rrw for the simultaneous model we distinguish between settings in which the incumbent can and cannot discriminate in its offers to different buyers this distinction is the source of the problem in rrw s analysis their simultaneous offer model assumes no discrimination but the proof of their proposition 2 assumes at times that discrimination is feasible we show that absent the ability to discriminate the incumbent can exclude profitably only when buyers fail to coordinate on their most preferred continuation equilibrium in contrast we show that when discrimination is possible the incumbent need not rely on a lack of buyer coordination to segal department of economics landau building stanford university stanford ca 94305 e mail ilya segal stanford edu whinston department of economics northwestern university 2003 sheridan road evanston il 60208 e mail mwhinston nwu edu we thank eric rasmusen john wiley and participants in the berkeley stanford iofest the university of copenhagen vertical restraints conference and a seminar at the antitrust division of the u s department of justice for helpful comments we thank federico echenique for excellent research assistance 1 for example a recent department of justice investigation concerned the use of exclusive contracts by the leading provider of computerized ticketing services ticketmaster most major cities have several large concert sports venues in many cities ticketmaster has exclusive contracts with a very large share of these venues 2 the other leading response to the argument that contracts with buyers cannot be a profitable method of exclusion is given in philippe aghion and patrick bolton 1987 section i one factor limiting the applicability of the aghion and bolton theory however is that it involves partial exclusion the contracts signed are not fully exclusionary they involve finite stipulated damages and the profitability of the strategy arises from extracting rents from an entrant when entry occurs indeed in the aghion and bolton model contracts that fully exclude offer no benefits over writing no contract at all in section iii of their paper aghion and bolton also discuss a two buyer version of their model in which externalities arise across buyers in contrast to the analysis here and in rrw they allow the incumbent to make an offer to a buyer i that is conditional on the acceptance decision of the other buyer 3 r innes and r j sexton 1994 also discuss the use of discriminatory offers in the context of a model in which buyers can form coalitions with the entrant

the political economy of technological innovation and employment building on the varieties of capitalism thesis of comparative advantages in technological innovation the authors theorize the effect of sociopolitical coordination from a dynamic perspective and then apply the dynamic theories to the political economy of employment in comparison to the existing employment literature situated in a constant technology context based on cross sectional survey as well as pooled time series aggregate data the authors argue that new technologies not only increase productivity through process innovation but also generate rents through product innovation by preventing opportunistic behavior between firms sociopolitical coordination intensifies reciprocal sharing of innovation which increases productivity returns but dilutes rents leading to comparative advantage in process over product innovation because process innovation is labor saving but product innovation is employment friendly interfirm coordination further leads to comparative disadvantage in job creation from in

bargaining sorting and the gender wage gap quantifying the impact of firms on the relative pay of women there is growing evidence that rm specic pay premiums are an important source of wage inequality these premiums will contribute to the gender wage gap if women are less likely to work at high paying rms or if women negotiate worse wage bargains with their employers than men using longitudinal data on the hourly wages of portuguese workers matched with balance sheet information for rms we show that the wages of both men and women contain rm specic premiums that are strongly correlated with employer productivity we then show how the impact of these rm specic pay dierentials on the gender wage gap can be decomposed into a combination of bargaining and sorting eects consistent with the bargaining literature we nd that women receive only 90 of the rm specic pay premiums earned by men notably we obtain very similar estimates of the relative bargaining power ratio from our analysis of between rm wage premiums and from analyzing changes in

information gatekeepers on the internet and the competitiveness of homogeneous product markets we examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information controlled by a gatekeeper and the homogenous product market it serves the gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where a the product market exhibits price dispersion b access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe c advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels thus inducing partial firm participation and d advertised prices are below unadvertised prices introducing the market for information has ambiguous social welfare effects