collusion collective action and protection theory and evidence this paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying we show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high the empirical evidence from the u s supports the theory greater collusionreduces the level of pac contributions

dollar depreciation and us industry performance abstract this study analyzes the effects of the real exchange rate and the real interest rate on domestic sales exports and imports for 19 manufacturing industries and selected non merchandise sectors in the usa the estimates are combined with a simulation of an exogenous dollar depreciation to infer net industry effects of a non policy induced drop in the value of the dollar the results indicate that the direct impacts of the depreciation are concentrated in net exports with only limited effects on home sales hoewver the indirect effects of the depreciation which work through the domestic interest rate and foreign and domestic income and prices have a significant impact on domestic sales as well as net trade in both merchandise and non merchandise sectors

boon or burden the effect of private sector debt on the risk of sovereign default in developing countries i introduction the past two decades witnessed a strong increase in private foreign borrowing in emerging markets and developing countries although in 1990 the private sector accounted for a mere 16 of all external loans disbursed to developing countries this share has increased to 77 in 2006 figure 1a likewise in 2006 the private sector s non publicly guaranteed debt liabilities accounted for 44 of developing countries total external debt up from a mere 5 in 1990 figure 1b 1 a key question in light of the ongoing global financial turmoil is what the boom in private sector external indebtedness will imply for sovereign risk in developing countries in this paper we empirically investigate the record of the past three decades to throw some light on this issue on theoretical grounds there are arguments both in favor and against a stabilizing effect of private sector borrowing on sovereign risk a critical view of private sector exposure is based on the notion that large scale private borrowing creates vulnerabilities that may eventually lead to a sovereign default a sudden stop may force the public sector to assume at least part of the private debt and this may eventually cause debt service difficulties for the government following this logic both public and private external debt pose a threat to sovereign creditworthiness the opposite argument that private sector borrowing does not harm government creditworthiness can be made by invoking the idea that the private sector is exposed to greater competitive pressure which raises the incentives to use the borrowed funds productively more importantly a potentially stabilizing role of private sector borrowing can also be linked to the distributional consequences of sovereign defaults agents who are reliant on foreign credit are particularly vulnerable to the disruptions that come along with sovereign default a larger share of the private sector in total external debt a proxy of the relative size and stake of agents that would be hurt by sovereign default would thus raise the political costs of default given the competing theoretical arguments the role of the private sector for sovereign creditworthiness is an empirical question a first impression of how these magnitudes may be related is provided in figure 2 which plots the institutional investor s measure of country creditworthiness iiccr against the level of external debt relative to gni figure 2a and the share of private long term external debt in countries total long term external debt figure 2b 2 not surprisingly the correlation between debt and creditworthiness is negative 0 37 by contrast the correlation between private sector share and the iiccr is positive 0 54 3 although this picture obviously does not prove a causal relationship it suggests that relative private sector exposure and perceived creditworthiness might be positively related figure 1 omitted figure 2 omitted further evidence that private and public debt are likely to have very different effects on the risk of sovereign default is provided in table 1 the entries in this table are cross country averages of various debt related variables just before the onset of 5 yr periods in which a sovereign default did or did not take place 4 the first column of table 1 shows that initial debt relative to gni is on average much higher before a default period than before a non default period conversely column 2 indicates that the average share of the private sector in total external debt is much higher before non default periods than before default periods a first look at the data thus seems to point into the direction that a higher share of private debt in total external debt is associated with higher perceived creditworthiness as reflected by the institutional investor s country credit ratings and with a lower likelihood of sovereign default

inflation tax rules and the accumulation of residential and nonresidential capital the present paper analyses the effect of the interaction between tax rules and inflation on the size and allocation of the capital stock with particular emphasis on the role of owner occupied housing the analysis is developed in the framework of an economy that is in equilibrium and in which a constant fraction of disposable income is saved in this model i show that with current u s tax laws an increase in the rate of inflation reduces the equilibrium amount of business capital employed in the economy and raises the amount of housing capital the analysis also shows that a higher rate of inflation lowers the real net of tax rate of return to the provider of business capital in a richer model than the current one i e in a model in which the rate of personal saving was an increasing function of the net rate of return a higher inflation rate would therefore lower the rate of saving the present analysis also shows that permitting firms to depreciate investments more rapidly for tax purposes increases the accumulations of business capital but that unless firms are permitted to expense all in vestment immediately an increase in in lat ion continues to depress the accumulation of business capital this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

taxes housing and capital accumulation in a two sector growing economy abstract it is sometimes argued that the favorable tax treatment afforded to housing may lead to an oversupply of housing at the expense of capital this issue is examined in the context of a growing two sector economy in the basic model where the rate of time preference is constant and labor is instantaneously sectorally mobile the long run response of the capital stock to a tax on housing depends upon the relative capital intensities of the two sectors while the long run relative asset price of housing remains unchanged the robustness of these propositions to changes in the model are considered taxes on capital are also analyzed

politicians and protection tariffs and elections in australia an index of manufacturing industry tariff protection is calculated for each australian federal electoral division and used to test for the presence of voting factors in the electoral incidence of tariff protection there is a strong positive relationship between the level of tariffs and the labor vote in an electorate though this is more likely to be evidence for the effect of levels of manufacturing activity than for systematic electoral manipulation of tariffs smaller samples of electorates do suggest that governments shift the largest tariff increases into electorates which they won at the previous election

political economic markets perts and pests in food and agriculture j i lyniversity of california berkeley jjept of agricultural and resource economic l working paper al cljdare i lorking paper 0 231 politic eco lic l rxets a d pests i j food l ti achiculture by per ts cordon c rausser ja nlnl tt junot tlon a riii ent st ticn giannini fou 1cl itiol1of ar ricultllrnj econo ll i cs july 11 w

positive feedback the impact of trade liberalization on industry demands for protection contrary to widely accepted theories of interest group demand for protection industries that experience high and rising import competition after a reduction in trade barriers often become less rather than more protectionist in the long term to unravel this paradox i propose and test a theory that explains variation in domestic producer groups demand for protection over time this model of industry behavior suggests that trade liberalization has a positive feedback effect on the policy preferences and political strategies of domestic industries compelling them to adjust to more competitive market conditions and thereby reducing their future demand for protection

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

the political economy of international factor mobility we model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility in a common agency setting domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters welfare and contributions collected we characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome we establish a similar result for quotas allowing for partial rent capturing for the strategic environment under consideration we also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

a test of a theory of strategically retaliatory trade barriers within a game theoretic lobbying model the formation of strategic trade barriers is examined trade barriers are modeled as comprising a political component as well as a strategically retaliatory component that serves to deter foreign protectionism within this theoretical framework the optimal policy is to erect retaliatory barriers against all imports even though the partner country protects only a subset of goods that are traded the theory is described and tested using cross industry u s nontariff barrier ntb data against nine developed countries in 1983 a three equation simultaneous tobit model is estimated for this purpose whether u s ntbs against these partner countries are retaliatory and if so whether the cross industry structure of protection validates the predictions of the theory are empirically addressed

tariff endogeneity evidence from 19th century europe abstract this paper tests an endogenous tariff model for six european countries from around the mid 19th century until the eve of world war 1 ww1 the tariff rate was generally cointegrated with real gnp real wages the price level and the external trade balance results from granger causality tests suggest that real gnp and the price level may be important endogenous determinants of tariff levels

inflation capital taxation and housing the long run in a small open economy this paper deals with the consequences of inflation and capital income taxes for the accumulation of wealth in a small open economy with a housing sector particular attention is paid to the incentive and intergenerational redistribution effects stemming from the interaction of inflation and capital income taxation and to portfolio shifts between housing assets and other assets the authors find that the intergenerational distribution effects and the incentive effects on overall savings tend to offset and sometimes even to dominate several of the expected interasset substitution effects of a change in inflation and capital taxes

fiscal institutions fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in emu we investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of eurozone countries deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads the effect of deficits is significantly lower under emu this effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions after controlling for institutional changes fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in emu better institutions are connected with lower risk premia furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

sovereign bond yield spreads and sustainability an empirical analysis of oecd countries abstract we study whether and how a country s environmental social and governance esg performance relates to its sovereign borrowing costs in international capital markets we hypothesize that good esg performance plays an economic role it signals a country s commitment to sustainability and long term orientation and is a buffer against negative shocks leading to lower sovereign bond yield spreads using a sample of 20 oecd countries over the period 1996 2012 we show that countries with good esg performance are associated with lower default risk and lower sovereign bond yield spreads moreover we show that the social and governance dimensions have a significant negative association with sovereign bond yield spreads whereas the environmental dimension does not

oligopolistic behavior by public agencies in international trade the world wheat market a model of the world wheat market is presented which treats public policies as endogenous the oligopolistic nature of international wheat trade is captured by assuming policy makers form conjectures on the slope of the excess demand function they face and use that information to determine domestic and trade policies the policies reflect differing influences of political interest groups a u s crop shortfall scenario illustrates the different results with endogenous policies compared to the traditional model

on the incidence of us tariffs this paper provides evidence on the incidence of tariffs on products of export interest to developing countries by investigating the relationship between per capita incomes of us trading partners and tariff rates it constitutes the first attempt to assess the incidence of tariffs imposed by the us on countries that span the entire range of per capita incomes average tariff rates are lower for the poorest and richest countries and higher for countries in the middle of the income distribution this finding is not consistent with the widely held view that tariffs used by industrial nations bear more heavily on products of export interest to poorer developing countries than on imports from industrial nations it is consistent with the tariff escalation pattern reported in earlier studies if advanced countries account for most products at the high end of the fabrication scale results show that poorest countries will find it difficult to escape tariffs by attaining higher levels of economic development

the effects of anticipated inflation on housing market equilibrium an increase in the anticipated rate of inflation causes distortions in the housing market due to a nonindexed tax system since nominal rather than real interest payments are tax deductible an increase in inflation decreases the aftertax cost of capital for homeowners which in turn increases the demand for housing and increases its real price this tax gain is shown to be larger for rental housing than for owner occupied housing in a competitive market this implies that although the real price of housing increases with a rise in anticipated inflation real rental rates fall in the last decade the real price of corporate capital fell while the price of housing increased dramatically during this same period the rate of inflation increased substantially empirical studies have found a negative relationship between stock returns and the inflation rate 1 while housing has been found to have been a good hedge against inflation 2 tax distortions related to the change in the rate of inflation provide one popular explanation for the negative relationship between stock prices and inflation 3 the effect of similar tax induced distortions on the equilibrium in the housing market will be studied in this paper it is shown that the real price of housing increases with the anticipated rate of inflation while the real rental rate declines these results are consistent with published data for the period 1967 77 during which the anticipated rate of inflation increased substantially 4 the general price level as measured by the consumer price index increased 81 5 percent between 1967 and 1977 5 in this

protection for sale in a developing country democracy vs dictatorship for a genuine small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy we find support for the predictions of the grossman helpman 1994 protection for sale model in contrast to previous studies we use various protection measures including tariffs the direct measure of the theoretical model and perform both single year and panel regressions using turkish industry level data the government s weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions more importantly we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship

evidence and explanation for the tariff lobbying paradox endogenous tariffs fall as protectionist lobbying rises recent empirical evidence suggests that u s protectionist lobbying expenditures rose while u s trade barrier fell we find that the same result holds in our panel data sample from 28 countries be

the political economy of international trade essays in honour of robert e baldwin part 1 theory of trade policy with imperfect information avinash dixit strategic trade policy and the new international economics a critical analysis gottfried haverlay the role of services in production and international trade a theoretical framework ronald w jones and henry kierzkowski the coefficient of trade utilization back to the baldwin envelope james e anderson and j peter neary part 2 trade policy issues reflections on uniform taxation arnold c harberger intellectual property rights and north south trade judith c chin and gene m grossman optimal tariff retaliation rules david f burgess international trade in capital and capital goods rachel mcculloch and j david richardson part 3 political economy of trade policy asymmetries in policy between exportables and import competing goods anne d krueger trade policy development and the new political economy gerald m meier does 1992 come before or after 1990 on regional versus multilateral integration andre sapir part 4 empirical studies of trade issues the structure and effects of tariff and non tariff barriers in 1983 edward leamer a computational analysis of alternative safe guards of policy scenarios in international trade alan v deardorff and robert m stern direct foreign investments and trade in east and southeast asia seiji naya

fiscal space and sovereign risk pricing in a currency union abstract we examine how membership in a currency union affects public debt sustainability and market assessments of default risk in eurozone countries we argue that there exist offsetting effects expectations of bailouts tend to make a given level of debt more sustainable lowering bond yields and cds rates but constraints on the use of monetary policy would tend to have the opposite effect pushing rates up especially as room for fiscal maneuver gets exhausted we develop a formal concept of fiscal space which takes account of the notion of fiscal fatigue under which there are limits to the government s ability to raise the primary surplus in response to higher debt and apply it to the eurozone countries investigating in particular how currency union membership affects cds and bond rates during both quiet and turbulent times for a given amount of fiscal space we find that in quiet times cds and bond rates for eurozone members were below what would be expected given their fiscal space a bonus from currency union membership but when the crisis erupted cds and bond yields rose more sharply for eurozone members than would be predicted based on their available fiscal space our interpretation is that sovereign bailouts did not occur with the hoped for alacrity in euro crisis countries generating sharper penalties for sovereigns that belong to a currency union

union membership in the united states 1973 1981 this paper reports estimates of union membership gathered from may current population surveys from 1973 to 1981 the authors present data by occupation industry selected states and smsas race gender and educational attainment the paper both extends and differs from that by freeman and medoff which presents unionism estimates for the private sector for 1968 75 to facilitate longitudinal analysis this paper reports three year moving averages of occupational and industry data and annual estimates of demographic classifications the data include public sector as well as private sector workers and they exclude workers not covered by the national labor relations act also the authors provide only union membership estimates not estimates on workers covered by union contracts this paper suggests that the percentage of all workers that are unionized in the united states remained fairly constant over the 1973 81 period

politically realistic objective functions and trade policy profs and tariffs abstract this paper demonstrates a mathematical correspondence between the deus ex machina tariff formation approach and political economy approach the correspondence implies that the tariff chosen by lobbying influenced policy makers will be equivalent to a tariff chosen by a deus ex machina government that gives too much weight to profits this result allows many political economy issues to be addressed in the simple framework of a deus ex machina government which faces a politically realistic objective function prof

directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities this paper propses directly unproductive profit seeking dup activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities including the subset of rent seeking activities considered by krueger it then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the dup activity thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved

does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets empirical evidence from oecd countries this paper examines how government ideology has influenced deregulation of product markets in oecd countries i analyze a dataset of non manufacturing regulation indicators covering energy transport and communication industries in 21 oecd countries over the 1980 2003 period and employ two different indices of government ideology the results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on the deregulation process market oriented governments promoted the deregulation of the energy transport and communication industries this finding identifies remarkable differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and basic elements of political order

us non tariff barriers as privately provided public goods abstract the endogenous theory of protection is empirically investigated in a different light rather than emphasizing the determinants of the supply of protection the present study emperically investigates the micro level demand side behavior of firms predictions from bergstrom et al journal of public economics 1986 2 25 49 about the private provision of public goods provide a theoretical foundation for such a demand side econometric investigation if rational lobbies are observed to behave in a manner consistent with the theory of the private provision of public goods then it must be the case that they are able to influence trade policy the econometric specification is also consistent with the special interest models of olson the logic of collective action public goods and the theory of groups harvard university press 1965 stigler bell journal of economics and management science 1971 2 137 146 baron quarterly journal of economics 1989 1 45 72 and grossman and helpman american economic review 1994 84 833 850 hence evidence presented in this study from the demand side behavior of firms has the deeper implication that it validates the theory of endogenous protection an issue that is still controversial among trade theorists

the bias in favor of pro tariff lobbies abstract we show that the probability of success of the pro tariff lobby defined as a decreasing function of the ratio of consumer loss to producer gain rent generated by the tariff rises with the tariff under very general conditions this appears as an exception to becker s view that less distortionary measures tend to be adopted over their more distortionary counterparts we then provide a micro foundation for our probability definition using the imperfectly discriminating lobbying framework

how trade politics affect invasive species control abstract trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally which constitutes a market failure rooted in international trade unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero the external costs may justify a tariff in this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into grossman and helpman s gh well known political economy model we show that our measure of disguised protectionism the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game is equal to the tariff that would be set if there were no invasive species and no international disciplines on trade policy the informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public goods protection are formidable

the allocation of capital between residential and nonresidential uses taxes inflation and capital market constraints we have constructed a simple two sector model of the demand for housing and corporate capital economic growth and an increase in the inflation rate were then simulated with a number of model variants the model and simulation experiments illustrate both the tax bias in favor of housing and the manner in which the increase in inflation between 1965 and 1978 magnified it the existence of capital market constraints offsets the bias against corporate capital but it introduces a sharp inefficient reallocation of housing from less wealthy constrained households to wealthy households who do not have gains on mortgages and are not financially constrained

why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform initiating public enterprise reform is a complex decision influenced by economic factors as well as the ideological biases and personalities of political leaders nevertheless the use of a contracting framework yields important generalizations about what drives the decision this article argues that the decision depends fundamentally on the potential efficiency gains from the reform and its associated transactions costs costs arise because of asymmetries in information and opportunism problems that usually plague contract negotiations the article identifies observable variables that may affect either the potential gains or the transactions costs uses them to construct a simple probit decision making model and tests the model using data from fifteen developing countries over a twenty year period

protectionist responses and declining industries abstract this paper employs a three factor ricardo viner model of a small economy to analyse the effect of a falling world import price on the domestic price of the economy s importable good in the presence of an endogenously determined tariff the outcome is seen to depend on a the way in which the recycled tariff revenue is allocated to the three factor groups and b differences in relative risk aversion across those groups however under reasonable assumptions hillman s 1982 result that a declining industry will continue to decline is seen to hold in our general equilibrium framework

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

trade wars and trade talks when governments meet in the international arena their actions reflect the political situations at home previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations we study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned both with providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special interest groups our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in non cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy this paper considers trade policies in a small open economy in which two influential interest groups lobby the government since competitive lobbying leads to excessive rent seeking expenditures the lobbies have an incentive to cooperate the outcome of cooperative lobbying is characterized in terms of lobbying and bargaining power of the two groups two important results are derived first if the power of competing interest groups is balanced then cooperation leads to free trade second if it is unbalanced cooperation may on the contrary increase protection

macroeconomic imbalances financial stress and fiscal vulnerability in the euro area before the debt crises a market view abstract this paper tries to identify the macro financial imbalances that exposed the euro area countries to fiscal stress before the outbreak of the european debt crises contrary to conventional wisdom that interprets fiscal stress in terms of fiscal sustainability we focus on short term fiscal vulnerability as reflected by the conditions of debt refinancing in the sovereign bond markets we find that market based indicators capturing risk perceptions of sovereign debts have been influenced by the indicators defined in the european macroeconomic imbalance procedure mip and by variables of financial vulnerability when pricing the risk of sovereign bonds the holders of government debts take into account not only the macroeconomic imbalances but also factors such as banking distress corporate bond risk liquidity risks in the interbank market or the volatility of stock prices

the economics of special interest politics the case of the tariff this paper investigates the interaction of politicians and special interest lobbies the goal is to model the equilibrium levels of redistributive policies such as taxes subsidies tariffs and regulatory decisions the model is applied throughout to the setting of tariffs by contributing to political campaigns special interest lobbies generate economic returns higher tariffs generate revenue for import competing industries through higher product prices higher milk support prices raise dairy farm income and so forth the lobby invests to maximize these net economic returns in evaluating their chances of election politicians weigh the favorable effects of special interest money against the unfavorable association with the lobby and the social cost of the redistributive policy section i explores the lobby s problem it describes a formalization of mancur olson s discussion of the voluntary provision of public goods and optimal contributions by lobbies to political campaigns section ii describes determination of the equilibrium tariff positions of each politician in a political campaign

living wages protection for or protection from low wage workers living wage laws are touted as anti poverty measures yet they apply to only a small fraction of workers most commonly covering only employers with city contracts the apparent contradiction between broad anti poverty goals and narrow coverage suggests that goals other than poverty reduction may partly underlie living wage campaigns this paper considers the hypothesis that living wage laws act to maintain or increase rents among unionized municipal workers by raising the wages that city contractors would have to pay living wage laws may reduce the incentives for cities to contract out work that would otherwise be done by unionized municipal employees hence increasing the bargaining power of municipal unions and leading to higher wages for their members the evidence presented here from an analysis of cps data for 1996 2000 indicates that the wages of unionized municipal workers are indeed increased as a result of living wage laws covering contractors

polluters and collective action theory and evidence 1 introductionthe seminal theory by olson 1965 predicts that industries with fewer firms have a greater ability to undertake collective action they organize cooperative political action more easily because greater concentration lowers the cost of political action 1 the empirical evidence is inconclusive however andres 1985 masters and keim 1985 heywood 1988 and humphries 1991 find positive effects of industry concentration on the probability of making political action committee pac contributions see also mckeown 1994 pittman 1976 finds that concentrated industries generate greater contribution levels grier munger and roberts 1991 find an inverted u shaped relationship between the level of pac formation and industry concentration with a maximum political participation rate occurring at a four firm concentration ratio around 0 45 esty and caves 1983 and zardkoohi 1985 report ambiguous effects of concentration on pac contributions 2in this paper we suggest an alternative perspective on firms ability to organize collective action which to our knowledge has been ignored so far the novel argument is that industries that face multiple regulations a greater number of policy issues find it easier to overcome collective action problems and sustain lobbying in particular we focus on the difference between firms in polluting and clean industry sectors using a simple repeated game framework similar to spagnolo 2000 we argue that firms in industries that are naturally polluting because of their input requirements and therefore incur pollution abatement costs will face an additional policy battle compared with other industries everything else equal 3 this enables such industries to sustain greater cooperation and lobbying this is because firms seeking to form a lobby group face a free riding problem due to a limited amount of enforcement power available to punish deviation and ensure cooperation firms that face multiple areas of regulation have an advantage in the formation of lobby groups because they have a greater amount of enforcement power available to reallocate between policy issues when joint lobbying gives large gains in environmental policy this surplus can be reallocated to trade policy for example free riding behavior on trade policy lobbying may more easily be disciplined the prediction that emerges from our theoretical model is that polluting industries are relatively less affected by the free riding problems involved in organizing political action and we thus expect the level of political contributions to be higher in these sectors 4we evaluate this prediction using a cross section data set of u s manufacturing industries our empirical model builds on a multiple equation model by gawande and bandyopadhyay 2000 who test the well established theory of grossman and helpman 1994 on the pattern of protection their theory takes lobby group formation as given we augment gawande and bandyopadhyay s model with an additional equation for environmental policy stringency 5 the empirical results lend support to our theory industry pac contributions and thus the level of lobby group cooperation are greater in industries with larger pollution abatement costs this result is robust to several measures of lobby group formation and environmental policy the present paper contributes to the recent literature on the formation of lobby groups in the area of pollution taxation damania and fredriksson 2000 argue that collusive industries may more easily form lobby groups that oppose such taxes using a related setup damania and fredriksson 2003 discuss the effect of exogenous trade liberalization on environmental policy formation when lobby group formation is endogenous pecorino 1998 and mitra 1999 discuss the formation of trade lobby groups 6 neither of these papers explore the relationship between collective action and the number of policy instruments however

an analysis and critique of the bis proposal on capital adequacy and ratings abstract this paper examines two specific aspects of stage 1 of the bank for international settlement s bis s proposed reforms to the 8 risk based capital ratio we argue that relying on traditional agency ratings could produce cyclically lagging rather leading capital requirements resulting in an enhanced rather than reduced degree of instability in the banking and financial system despite this possible shortcoming we believe that sensible risk based weighting of capital requirements is a step in the right direction the current risk based bucketing proposal which is tied to external agency ratings or possibly to internal bank ratings however lacks a sufficient degree of granularity in particular lumping a and bbb investment grade corporate borrowers together with bb and b below investment grade borrowers severely misprices risk within that bucket and calls at a minimum for that bucket to be split into two we examine the default loss experience on corporate bonds for the period 1981 1999 and propose a revised weighting system which more closely resembles the actual loss experience on credit assets

the newly industrializing countries in the international system explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries nics by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies different social configurations state structures and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export oriented east asian nics korea and taiwan and the more inward looking countries of latin america particularly mexico and brazil these different strategic choices in turn account for variations in the patterns of external dependency that characterize countries in the two regions

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

environmental and financial performance of fossil fuel firms a closer inspection of their interaction abstract we investigate the relationship between environmental and financial performance of fossil fuel firms to this extent we analyze a large international sample of firms in chemicals oil gas and coal with respect to several environmental indicators in relation to financial performance for the period 2002 2013 we find that these firms have significantly higher scores on environmental performance efforts than other firms we use a simultaneous equations system to identify the direction of the relationship between environmental and financial performance of the firms we find that environmental outperformance has no impact on financial performance for chemical firms reduces returns and risks for coal companies has a mixed impact on returns in oil and gas and reduces financial risks for oil and gas firms financial outperformance reduces environmental performance in all fossil fuel sub industries investigated our findings mainly support the opportunistic view regarding the impact of financial returns which holds that financial performance negatively impacts social performance regarding financial risk we find support for the stakeholder perspective where good environmental performance is beneficial from a finance perspective we conclude to substantial differences in the environmental financial performance relationship along fossil fuel firms in different subindustries

sovereign bonds and socially responsible investment this article investigates how the mean variance efficient frontier defined by sovereign bonds of 20 developed countries is affected by the consideration of socially responsible indicators for countries in investment decision making for a global rating of socially responsible performances we show that it is possible to build portfolios with an increased average rating without significantly harming the risk return relationship this result differs when considering sub ratings related to the environment social concerns and public governance the results are good news for responsible investors and suggest that socially responsible portfolios of sovereign bonds can be built without a significant loss of mean variance efficiency

sovereign bond yield spreads a time varying coefficient approach abstract we study the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads across 10 emu countries between q1 1999 and q1 2010 we apply a semiparametric time varying coefficient model to identify to what extent an observed change in the yield spread is due to a shift in macroeconomic fundamentals or due to altering risk pricing we find that at the beginning of emu the government debt level and the general investors risk aversion had a significant impact on interest differentials in the subsequent years however financial markets paid less attention to the fiscal position of a country and the safe haven status of germany diminished in importance by the end of 2006 two years before the fall of lehman brothers financial markets began to grant germany safe haven status again one year later when financial turmoil began the market reaction to fiscal loosening increased considerably the altering in risk pricing over time period confirms the need of time varying coefficient models in this context

explaining price policy bias in agriculture the calculus of support maximizing politicians a model is developed to explain observed patterns of policy intervention in agriculture we analyze the interaction between political support seeking politicians and supportsupplying citizens society consists of a rural and urban group we determine the effects on transfers of relative group size disparities in income endowments between groups and the deadweight loss of redistribution the framework advanced is an alternative to that of the interest group model and is used to explain for example why the export sectors in developing countries are taxed more and why the united kingdom is less adamant for higher price supports than germany

voting for protection an electoral model of tariff policy politicians want to please their constituents and will attempt to manipulate trade policy to further this goal this article elaborates a model of the electoral incidence across congressional districts of the interindustry structure of tariff protection with an application to the mckinley tariff of 1890 it may contribute to a neglected area of research on the domestic politics of tariffs to the history of a period of tariff formation in which there has been little recent work and to the debate over legislative representation of constituency interests models of the domestic political market for trade policy endogenous tariff theory can be divided into four categories with classification based on whether they are formal or empirical and on whether they focus on the demand or the supply side of the political market many of the formal models are too abstract to produce readily testable propositions 1 wolfgang mayer s model for example assumes that tariffs are set by a national popular referendum and deduces tariff structures from median voter results 2 there is no government in this type of model the demanders and suppliers of policy are the same william brock and stephen magee s model assumes a singleissue election in which politicians bid for votes by offering tariff protection up to the point at which marginal gains votes plus campaign contributions equal marginal costs lost votes plus lost contributions 3

lobbying under political uncertainty abstract this paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge we characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence we also offer some results for the general case including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

inflation taxes and housing a theoretical analysis abstract this paper examines the real effects of inflation under a distortionary tax system the presence of a tax subsidy to housing substantially alters the effects of inflation on the capital intensity of production and on the market interest rate the analysis suggests that not taxing the flow of services from housing has caused inflation to reduce capital intensity thereby decreasing u s productivity furthermore this tax subsidy has caused inflation to raise the real interest rate while reducing the after tax real returns to assets

political systems and distortions an empirical study this paper studies empirically why price distortions are more prevalent in some countries than in others we find no significant difference between democracies and dictatorships but frequent regime changes reduce distortions political systems factional subordinate that encourage redistributive activities rda tend to have more distortions allowing for different effects of rda in democracies and dictatorships there is a positive and significant effect of rda on distortions in dictatorships in democracies distortions destroying lobbying seems more important since no significant relation between rda and distortions can be found

heterogeneity of the determinants of euro area sovereign bond spreads what does it tell us about financial stability abstract in this paper we assess the movements of euro area sovereign bond yield spreads vis a vis the german bund as processes specified across different levels of volatility and subject to movements in asset prices and economic conditions the determinants we use are grouped into domestic and euro area aggregates thus allowing us to derive results on their relative explanatory power and compare them across time and the spectrum of countries we find that volatility influences the deterministic processes of the euro area sovereign spreads and that identical determinants have effects on spreads that vary considerably across countries furthermore we find that variables reflecting investment confidence conditions and perceptions for the upcoming economic activity are significant determinants and their significance remains to a large extent even when controlling for fiscal variables

an exogeneity test for a simultaneous equation tobit model with an application to labor supply a test of weak exogeneity in the simultaneous equation tobit model is proposed and illustrated using a female labour supply model estimated using cross section data the test statistic can be simply output from any standard tobit maximum likelihood package and is asymptotically efficient the procedure provides consistent estimators for the simultaneous tobit model whose asymptotic covariance matrix is a simple extension of the usual tobit formula we also provide the lagrange multiplier test of weak exogeneity this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

analysing the link between environmental performance and sovereign credit risk this study investigates the effects of a country s environmental performance on sovereign credit risk we use sovereign credit default swap cds spreads for a large panel of countries to analyse w

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes