meta paradigm change and the theory of the firm many seemingly unrelated debates on the theory of the firm are in fact part of a single deeper transformation of the social sciences as the foundational assumptions of 20th century social science have slowly been shown by science to be false new sub paradigms have emerged which cumulatively drop i theoretical assumptions about markets to explain firms ii epistemological assumptions about knowledge to explain diversity and iii metaphysical assumptions about causality to explain technical change debates occur across each of these levels

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

commitment and fairness in a dynamic regulatory relationship this paper considers a multiperiod model of a regulated firm that has stationary private information which may be revealed through performance if it cannot make commitments to future policies the regulator has an incentive to exploit any information the firm reveals and laffont and tirole show that there is no regulatory policy that is separating over any closed interval a fairness arrangement is proposed in which the firm agrees not to quit if in future periods the regulator allows it to earn a nonnegative profit given the type it revealed in earlier periods the properties of such arrangements are studied and an example is presented in which both the firm and the regulator prefer a fairness arrangement to a policy feasible without commitment

should renewable energy policy be renewable political flexibility brings about trade offs for policy makers aiming to support the deployment of renewable energy sources res on the one hand it allows incorporating new information on ex ante uncertain benefits and costs of res policy on the other hand it may deter res investments this paper scrutinizes how these trade offs play out economically and politically when res policy makers choose the degree of flexibility as well as the instruments to implement flexibility the analysis builds on a theoretical framework distinguishing between flexibility by design and by adjustment it is complemented by a discussion of three case studies res support schemes in germany and the united kingdom and the eu emissions trading scheme theoretical as well as empirical results suggest that the politically chosen degree of flexibility by policy design may be sub optimally low in contrast flexibility by policy adjustment is often excessively high

coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high tech manufacturing organizations htmos abstract this paper uses economic mechanisms to coordinate supply chains within high tech manufacturing organizations htmos it models the one shot initial production and allocation decisions involved in the production and marketing of new technologies these decisions are driven by the economic objectives of the firm and of the employees with private information the experts it analyzes and compares the efficiency of three coordination policies centralized command and control centralized revelation and decentralized revelation it shows that decentralized policies introduce an additional cost and it proposes rules of thumb for coordinating supply chains within firms that use many experts

new jobs worklessness and households in poland abstract has the new polish labour market created opportunities for all or has the distribution of work been split unequally across household types are low unemployment outflows caused by increased congestion from employed job seekers or by low entry wages relative to benefit levels using data from waves of the polish labour force survey beginning in may 1992 we document the type of new jobs created and analyse the household groups most likely to benefit from the transformation process in order to assess the likely distributional consequences of the employment generation process

the income distribution frontier and taxation of migrants abstract the output distribution frontier which traces out the economy s output and income distribution options is used to confirm and explain intuitively the bhagwati hamada results on the taxation of migrants from ldcs by their native country it is shown that freedom of migration without taxation may reduce the welfare of those who remain in the ldc but that taxation and free migration can be superior for them to either prevention of migration or freedom of migration without taxation an externalities argument shows why even migrants may benefit

on the role of the production and consumption assumptions for optimum taxation abstract the sensitivity of optimum tax rates to a variety of factors has sustained many different lines of enquiry this paper attempts to demonstrate by computational procedures the role of the production and consumption leisure assumptions in the light of recent research in particular the work of stern will be extended to provide an assessment of the allen analysis it will be shown that optimum negative marginal tax rates are no longer a curiousity and that our production and consumption leisure assumptions are of considerable importance for variable wage tax models

taxation and the international mobility of inventors we study the eect of top tax rates on superstar inventors international mobility since 1977 using panel data on inventors from the u s and european patent oces we exploit the dierential impact of changes in top tax rates on inventors of dierent qualities superstar inventors location choices are signicantly aected by top tax rates in our preferred specication the elasticity to the net of tax rate of the number of domestic superstar inventors is around 0 03 while that of foreign superstar inventors is around 1 these elasticities are larger for inventors in multinational companies an inventor is less sensitive to taxes in a country if his company performs a higher share of its research there

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

regulator selection methods and electricity prices proponents of regulator change argue that elected utility commissions would perform better than appointed commissions but an unresolved issue is whether the method of regulator selection influences rate levels and rate structures this analysis presumes that regulators are more than mediators between producers and consumers i e that they act in their self interest to maximize their preference functions the authors hypothesize that directly elected regulators reflecting relatively higher voter input to regulatory decisionmaking permit lower electricity prices and that elected regulators will reflect strong opposition to rate increases economic analysis of the relevance of regulatory arrangement finds that this hypothesis is not valid although the direction in the movement of relative rates through time is consistent with their expectations 23 references 7 tables

optimum taxation with errors in administration abstract the paper compares the welfare levels which can be achieved by two distinct tax regimes lump sum taxation where one attempts to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies on the basis of characteristics and income taxation where characteristics are not observed but personal incomes are measured and taxed where there are no errors in classifying individuals lump sum taxation is superior but where mistakes are made in the allocation of lump sum grants or subsidies income taxation may be more attractive the level of errors where the regimes are equally desirable in terms of social welfare is computed in simple models following that of feldstein 1973 where there is strong aversion to inequality then income taxation becomes preferable at quite small errors in analysing income taxation it is shown that in the feldstein model with endogenous wages the marginal tax rate in optimum income taxation on the more skilled is negative and that on the less skilled is positive in contrast to the standard results see seade 1977 with exogenous wages

active labor market policies job matching and the czech miracle abstract a common explanation of low unemployment rates in the czech republic cr is the stance of active labor market policies almps in particular the extensive use of almp instruments and an effective delivery system using a large panel of quarterly data from employment office districts we estimate the effects of almps on the job matching process in the cr in doing so we address potential endogeneity in the provision of resources to district labor offices we continue to find a small but statistically significant effect of almp expenditures job creation and program intakes on outflows from unemployment into employment

the age of electricity the age of electricity is coming driven by rapid technological change on the demand side the digitalization of many processes is leading to technologies that require electricity rather than liquid or solid fuels on the supply side renewable energy technologies provide electricity directly at falling cost electrification directly and indirectly e g using electricity to produce hydrogen fuel can aid the decarbonization of the economy strong climate policy would accelerate electrification the big question is when not if and the transition is not occurring anywhere near fast enough to meet the paris climate goals the immediate impact of the coming age of electricity is the transformation of electricity markets which need to adapt to near zero marginal costs and intermittency in the longer term the impact on fossil fuels will be radical fossil fuel prices will fall with demand and the oil and gas majors will either completely transform themselves or will harvest profits and exit

trade climate change and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments the lack of real progress at the durban climate change conference in 2011 postponing effective action until at least 2020 has many causes one of which is the failure to address trade issues and in particular carbon leakage this paper advances two arguments first it argues that the conventional view of border carbon adjustments bcas as a dirty trade barrier should be turned on its head rather the absence of a carbon price comprises an implicit subsidy to dirtier production in non regulated markets second bcas could act as a game changer when climate policy negotiations move at a glacial pace if at all materially stronger progress could be achieved indirectly from the threat of unilateral trade policies the paper shows how this could come about using a simple political game theory model the appropriate game form is one in which parties move unilaterally and sequentially given the failure to agree on a common course of action and are fully aware of the impacts of their actions the paper shows that properly crafted bcas could help reduce trade distortions limit the competiveness effects and help build a broader coalition of interests for more global actions

a general equilibrium model of guest worker migration the source country perspective abstract this paper examines the problem of guest worker migration from an economy populated by identical utility maximizing individuals with finite working lives the decision to migrate the rate of saving while abroad as well as the length of a migrant s stay in the foreign country are all viewed as part of a solution to an intertemporal optimization problem in addition to studying the microeconomic aspects of temporary migration the paper analyses the determinants of the equilibrium flow of migrants the corresponding domestic wage and the level of welfare enjoyed by a typical worker effects of an emigration tax are also investigated

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

redistributive policy with labour mobility across countries it is generally believed that international labour mobility lowers the level of redistribution each country wishes to undertake this paper considers a model with two countries where each government redistributes income between two types of individuals using a general equilibrium model it is shown that there are situations where the level of redistribution in one of the two countries is in fact higher than in the absence of individual mobility this higher level of redistribution is explained by the migration induced changes in the structure of the population in both countries namely by the increase in the proportion of high income individuals in the country that may experience excessive redistribution

economic theories of the firm past present and future we explore the current state of the theory of the firm with attention to its historical origins answers to the crucial theoretical question of why an organization controlled by a central authority cannot always duplicate the performance of a decentralized organization are presented finally we describe some important current directions in the theory of the firm and point out promising avenues for continuing research

agriculture after brexit the paper considers the impact of the common agricultural policy cap on the uk and sets out three options for a new british agricultural policy after brexit these options are carrying over the subsidy regime with an emphasis on food security and self sufficiency maintaining the cap architecture but shifting more of the cap subsidies away from payments for land ownership towards more spending on environmental schemes and providing public money only for public goods the third option is advocated after a transitional path allows time for farmers to adapt

does hierarchical governance facilitate adaptation to changed circumstances abstract the transaction cost theory of economic organization maintains that by merging and adopting a hierarchical governance structure two firms can circumvent the bargaining problem which would impede adaptation to changing circumstances if they remained independent i analyze this claim in a simple model which allows the costs of hierarchical organization imperfect selective intervention to be evaluated alongside the costs due to the bargaining problem delays and disagreement both costs are due to informational asymmetries which are assumed to be unaffected by the choice of governance structure examples are presented which support the fundamental transaction cost proposition that hierarchical governance is preferred when parties are highly interspecific and there are significant gaps in the contract the intuition is that rational bargainers make less attractive offers in precisely those circumstances where adaptation is likely to be extremely valuable integration effectively separates the decision to adapt from the division of the resulting surplus and so is relatively efficient when substantial quasi rents are at stake

a resource based theory of the firm knowledge versus opportunism this paper develops a resource based knowledge based theory of the firm its thesis is that the organizational mode through which individuals cooperate affects the knowledge they apply to business activity we focus on the polar cases of organization within a firm as compared to market contracting there will be a difference in the knowledge that is brought to bear and hence in joint productivity under the two options thus as compared to opportunism based transaction cost theory we advance a separate yet complementary answer to the question why do firms exist our aim is to develop an empirically relevant and complementary theory of why firms are formed a theory based on irreducible knowledge differences between individuals rather than the threat of purposeful cheating or withholding of information we assume limited cognitive abilities on the part of individuals bounded rationality and assume that opportunistic behavior will not occur the latter allows us to determine whether resource based

regulatory capture a review this article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture the scope is broad but utility regulation is emphasized i begin by describing the stigler peltzman approach to the economics of regulation i then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information in the spirit of laffont and tirole 1993 i discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions including models of common agency revolving doors informational lobbying coercive pressure and influence over committees i discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes i also review evidence on the revolving door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes the last section contains open questions for future research copyright 2006 oxford university press

a voluntary brain drain tax abstract a major roadblock to the implementation of bhagwati s proposal to allow developing countries to tax skilled emigrants residing in developed countries the brain drain is the administrative problems associated with collecting this tax in the absence of developed country cooperation this paper provides a partial solution to these problems involving the tax treatment of emigrants who return to their countries of origin the tax system is structured so that returning emigrants who previously paid the brain drain tax face lower tax payments than those who evaded the brain drain tax given the expected value of this tax benefit emigrants are willing to pay the brain drain tax in the basic model a source country s optimal tax system includes this brain drain tax and does not distort migration decisions

formalizing internationalization in the eclectic paradigm the paper presents a simple general equilibrium model that formalizes internationalization in the eclectic paradigm based on a reconfiguration of concepts taken from the new classical economics literature the model enables us to address simultaneously the role of ownership location and internalization advantages and their interaction in the emergence of the multinational enterprise mne through a set of mathematical inequalities our model offers a bridge between the detached perceptions of the mne often held by international trade economists and international business scholars and makes specific aspects of the eclectic paradigm empirically testable

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

institutions transaction costs and economic growth this essay develops a theoretical framework which explores the historical obstacles to economic growth these obstacles are examined in the context of the political economic institutional framework of economies in history and consequent transaction costs that determine economic performance and growth the essay concludes with specific suggestions for the study of economic growth

a market based evaluation of the election versus appointment of regulatory commissioners this paper examines the elected versus appointed commissioner dichotomy from a market value perspective previous empirical analysis tends to concentrate on rates rather than examining the impact on shareholders wealth we examine life insurance industry data during the period surrounding the passage of california s proposition 103 the primary impact of the referendum on life insurers is to change the method of commissioner selection from appointment to popular vote we find that this change significantly reduced the value of life insurers doing business in california this result is consistent with the recent findings of boyes and mcdowell 1989 and smartt 1994 using alternative evaluation procedures for firms in other regulated industries this implies that the change to a popular election of commissioners either increases the level of risk and or decreases the expected cash flows of regulated firms

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

the cost of energy review and its implementation the cost of energy review recommended that in the face of radical technical change government should move towards an equivalent firm power capacity auction integrating the renewables establish independent public system operators at the national and regional levels and move towards an economy wide carbon price these have met resistance from vested interests in defence of the economic rents that have accumulated from the dense web of interventions that have accumulated the paper shows that the first two of these reforms are nevertheless inevitable with active demand storage and decentralized generation technologies inverting the old assumptions of passive demand no storage and ever larger scale generation that have underpinned the electricity industry for the past century delay in implementation means continued excess costs of energy and delays innovation

the fiscal impact of high skilled emigration flows of indians to the u s abstract what are the fiscal consequences of high skilled emigration for source countries this paper develops methodologies for inferring these consequences and applies them to the recent sizable emigration of high skilled workers from india to the u s this wave of emigration from india to the u s is shown to be unusually concentrated amongst the prime age work force the highly educated and high earners in order to calculate the fiscal losses associated with these emigrants estimates of their counterfactual earnings distributions are generated using two distinct methods and integrated with a model of the indian fiscal system to calculate fiscal consequences conservative estimates indicate that the annual net fiscal impact to india of high skilled emigration to the u s is one half of 1 of gross national income or 2 5 of total fiscal revenues the sensitivity of these results to the method of predicting counterfactual incomes and the implications of these estimates for other developing countries is discussed in detail

the scope for taxation and public expenditure in an open economy in this survey of some central issues of tax and expenditure policy in an open economy we consider the implications for policy of free although not necessarily perfect international mobility of commodities capital and labour we examine the issues both from a positive and a normative point of view trying to identify both the incidence and welfare effects of international mobility one general conclusion is that tax distortions may increase in magnitude in comparison with a closed economy but they may also increase in kind as when otherwise neutral taxes become distortionary because of factor mobility

labour market reforms in transition economies several lessons can be drawn from the natural experiments of central and eastern european countries with labour market policies two of them are particularly relevant also for oecd countries first it is not wise to reduce the duration of unemployment benefits when the length of unemployment spells are on the rise unless i unemployment is still low and there is the administrative capacity to implement active labour market policies on a wide scale or ii there are income support schemes of the last resort in place and an administration capable of cost effectively enforcing work tests for those falling off unemployment benefit compensation rolls the second and perhaps more positive lesson in the light of the above is that it is possible to transform institutions and create an efficient policy delivery mechanism within a short time span copyright 1997 by oxford university press

tax policy in the presence of emigration recent policy and theoretical discussions of the effects of highly skilled migration from the underdeveloped countries the so called brain drain have focused on a proposal bhagwati 1972 to levy a supplementary income tax on those who migrate the proceeds of such a tax to be transmitted to the developing country of origin or to developing countries en bloc for developmental spending the welfare implications of such a tax were analyzed in an earlier paper of ours bhagwati and hamada 1974 in the context of a model of the country of emigration characterized by sticky wages and harrisstodaro 1971 type of unemployment in subsequent papers the tax has been analyzed also in the context of modified models still incorporating the unemployment phenomena by rodriguez 1975 and mcculloch yellen 1975 2 essentially these models analyze the impact of the income tax on emigrants incomes as arising primarily through the reduced differential

revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion in this article i study how the presence of a revolving door and potential collusion between a regulator and a regulated firm affect the regulator s performance incentives contrary to the conventional wisdom these seemingly undesirable features of the regulatory system may serve the interests of the government because i the regulator s efforts to enhance her industry qualifications may have a complementary effect on her regulatory performance and ii the regulator may become more aggressive in regulation so as to signal her industry qualifications to the firm collusion between a regulator and a firm also can be beneficial because a regulator may increase her monitoring effort in order to increase the chance of achieving a profitable side contract with the firm and side contracting may not always succeed

transaction cost institutions and evolution abstract we suggest an operational definition of transaction cost as the expected value of strategy information in games played by individuals randomly matched from a large population we relate the concept of a transaction cost minimum to those of nash equilibrium efficiency and evolutionary stability and apply it in a simple model of the coasean firm in particular we identify circumstances in which evolutionary dynamics will minimize transaction cost which allows various informal hypotheses about the relation between institutional evolution and transaction cost to be addressed in a precise sense

optimal linear income taxation in the presence of emigration abstract this paper examines optimal linear income taxation when individuals are able to escape taxation by migrating a model is presented in which closing the economy to migration must raise the optimal marginal tax however this result may be reversed under an alternative definition of a closed economy

on the choice between capital and labour mobility trade theorists since the pioneering work of kemp 1966 have considered the question of national advantage from international factor mobility by considering only one factor to be so mobile kemp analyzed elegantly the question of optimal policies in 2 x 2 x 2 model and showed that since monopoly power could exist in both the goods and factor markets in consequence of international capital mobility the optimal policy intervention would generally involve two policy instruments tariffs cum subsidies on goods and duties cum subsidies on international capital flows jones 1967 subsequently extended kemp s argument to the secondbest context by examining the optimal level of one of these instruments when the other was arbitrarily set at zero elsewhere in this issue brecher 1983 shows in an elegant and original contribution that the jones policy problem is in fact a third best rather than a second best problem as generally believed and that if only one of the tariff and capital mobility taxes cumsubsidies can be used it is generally possible to improve welfare further by admitting an altogether different domestic policy instrument namely a production or consumption tax cum subsidy as the case may be the research of bhagwati was supported by the german marshall fund grant no l 34015 the problem analyzed in the paper was posed in bhagwati 1979 and an early ingenious and neglected analysis in ramaswami 1968 was noted by bhagwati we have profited greatly from these contributions also from reading webb 1970 ramaswami 1970 and a recent paper of calvo and wellisz 1983 on this problem this result is in consonance with the results of bhagwati ramaswami and srinivasan 1969 for the case without international capital mobility but the consonance is intuitive only after the result was established for the case with international capital mobility