party systems and electoral volatility in latin america a test of economic institutional and structural explanations three different theoretical explanations are tested for the exceptionally high level of electoral volatility found in contemporary latin america economic voting institutional characteristics of political regimes and party systems and the structure and organization of class cleavages a pooled cross sectional time series regression analysis is conducted on 58 congressional elections and 43 presidential elections in 16 latin american countries during the 1980s and 1990s institutional variables have the most consistent effect on volatility while the influence of economic performance is heavily contingent upon the type of election and whether the dependent variable is operationalized as incumbent vote change or aggregate electoral volatility the results demonstrate that electoral volatility is a function of short term economic perturbations the institutional fragilities of both democratic regimes and party systems and relatively fluid cleavage structures

electorally unstable by supply or demand an examination of the causes of electoral volatility in advanced industrial democracies the stability of voters partisan choices from election to election is a key feature of democratic politics but why it varies across advanced industrial democracies and elections is not well understood this study makes several key contributions to explaining electoral volatility firstly it is argued and demonstrated that strategic voting plays an independent role in inducing vote switching secondly the analysis shows that demand side factors such as socio economic cleavages and organizations do not predict voter stability whereas supply side factors such as the party system government performance and strategic incentives do thirdly earlier contradictory findings with respect to the role of the electoral system are clarified as its effects are shown to be indirect rather than direct and finally the importance of the temporal dimension to stability is demonstrated as the time since the previous election is found to have a positive effect on volatility the results are based on a comprehensive statistical analysis of 336 elections in 21 countries between 1950 2005 where the significance as well as the robustness of individual variables across different model specifications inform the conclusions

strategic voting in the 1996 japanese general election japan s new electoral system may or may not be good for japanese democracy but it is almost ideally designed for the study of strategic voting no other existing electoral system provides political scientists with data on such neatly separated but simultaneous single member districts smd and proportional representation pr votes using candidate level aggregate data i find strong evidence for strategic voting candidates with a good chance of winning receive more smd than pr votes and those with little chance of winning receive more pr votes strategic voting explains not only the basic pattern but also several exceptions to the rule in addition i find that a realistic but relatively inaccurate ex ante prediction of a candidate s probability of victory produces a superior explanatory model than does a perfect ex post prediction calculated from the final electoral results these results support the hypothesis that voters base their strategic voting calculations on simple cues available to them befo

input demand elasticities for heterogeneous labor firm level estimates and an investigation into the effects of aggregation labor economists have paid increasing attention to the estimation of demand elasticities for heterogeneous labor the majority of these studies investigate the effect on wage rates resulting from exogenous changes in factor quantities i e the measurement of elasticities of complementarity examples of these studies abound borjas for example investigates the impact of differences in labor market representation on the earnings of racial groups 8 in another paper borjas defines immigrants as a separate labor group and is able to determine the impact of immigration on the wages earned by natives 9 berger defines labor inputs along education and gender lines thereby allowing for the investigation of changes in the age education composition of the work force on wage rates 5 and grant and hamermesh study the effect of increasing female labor force participation on the wages earned by youth and adults 17 less attention has been paid to the study of the responsiveness of employment to exogenous changes in wage rates i e the measurement of elasticities of substitution less attention has been focused on this issue because the data requirements are more stringent since in order to presume that wage rates are exogenously determined the unit of observation must be small ideally establishmentor firm level data would be used the relative inaccessibility of these type of data has led researchers to use more aggregated figures such as smsa level or industry level data to address microissues as long as wage rates are determined exogenously the unit of observation chosen is appropriate there are real concerns however about the adequacy of more aggregated units to describe the behavior of firms 2 this study addresses the issue of whether micro level data are in fact needed to accurately measure elasticities of substitution among labor groups a firm level data set that includes input

on supply constrained equilibria abstract the paper gives sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with price rigidities and quantity rationing where i demand is never rationed ii net trades of an a priori chosen numeraire are never rationed and iii supply is rationed only when relative prices are downward rigid

temporary pareto optimum theory abstract the purpose of this paper is to introduce bounded rationality in the framework of pareto optimality this is done by altering the usual definition of the attainable set to take account of the fact that agents are represented by expectation functions induced by their learning processes two polar cases are examined first we show that a temporary pareto optimum is a temporary competitive equilibrium when expectations are strongly roy consistent second in the general case of weak roy consistency the temporary version of the second welfare theorem cannot always be true moreover the characterizations of a temporary pareto optimum bear some resemblance to those of optimal taxation in an atemporal second best framework

marginal tax reform externalities and income distribution the paper examines welfare improving and revenue neutral directions marginal policy reforms for an economy with nonidentical individuals and an externality that has a feedback effect on the consumption of taxed goods it considers three types of policy instruments the indirect taxes the uniform poll transfer and public abatement this extends the framework set up by ahmad and stern 1984 bovenberg and de mooij 1994 and schob 1996 the theoretical model is illustrated for a specific externality namely congestion caused by peak car transport

the political impact of economic crisis in latin america in the 1980s research on the political implications of economic conditions is separated into two relatively distinct bodies of literature i bridge the theoretical gap between them by examining the effects of economic crisis on electoral outcomes in latin america from 1982 to 1990 an analysis of 21 competitive elections indicates that crisis conditions undermine support for incumbents and provoke high levels of electoral volatility but without necessarily fostering the growth of political extremism or the exhaustion of elite consensus associated with the breakdown of democracy the results also suggest that the relationship between economic conditions and electoral instability is mediated by party system structure rather than democratic age paradoxically the findings buttress prior research on electoral outcomes in the comparatively stable and homogeneous organization for economic cooperation and development oecd nations while undercutting theoretical frameworks elaborated with specific reference to the breakdown and consolidation of third world democracy

democracy and national economic performance the preference for stability appear to arise because democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages another mechanism that might explain democratic stability when growth and volatility are jointly examined democracies reveal highly favorable economic results oes democracy affect national economic performance and if so how no question is more central to the study of political economics almost all previous work on democracy and economic performance has focused exclusively on growth rates with contradictory and confusing results in this article we argue that to reveal the impact of democratic institutions on economic performance scholars must consider two dimensions of economic performance growth rate and volatility we begin with a novel hypothesis economic policy in democracy is risk avoiding relative to policy in nondemocracies 1 because voters are riskaverse they penalize incumbent governments for economic volatility and democratic governments respond accordingly in nondemocracies we posit that elites are more likely to seek risk that voters would reject consequently autocracies produce systematically more economic volatility than

a model of tax reform for belgium abstract the paper deals with determining second best optima and existence conditions of pareto improving directions of tax reform for an economy experiencing keynesian unemployment i e characterised by excess supply of labour and commodities it is then tested whether these existence conditions were fulfilled in belgium in 1982 the model considers the taxation of seven consumption goods plus labour in a ten consumer economy empirical evidence suggests that welfare improving price directions can be found the whole set of these directions is then constructed

union work rules and efficiency in the building trades this paper estimates the effect of union work rules in the building trades on employment and costs by comparing factor demand elasticities for union and nonunion contractors and subcontractors over micro data from two different types of construction the results show that the elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs and own price elasticities for nonlabor inputs are about the same for union and nonunion contractors in contrast the elasticities of substitution among different skill categories of labor and the own price elasticities for each category are much lower under unionism

second best analysis with markets in disequilibrium public sector pricing in a keynesian regime the paper develops pricing rules for a public sector subject to a budget constraint in an economy where the private sector experiences keynesian unemployment excess supply of labour and of commodities both second best and welfare improving pricing rules are studied it is found that such rules can be defined in operational terms in general they are quite complex involve quantities which are not directly observable reservation wages and prices and require evaluation of income and employment multipliers the general equilibrium approach to second best theory thus involves standard macroeconomic concepts and techniques some discussion of methodological issues and of policy objectives inflation versus unemployment is offered in order to facilitate interpretation the corresponding results for an economy with a competitive private sector are first restated

work rules featherbedding and pareto optimal union management bargaining this article examines a model of semiefficient bargaining in which the union and the firm bargain over wages and various types of work rules the results are compared to the outcomes that are associated with fully efficient bargaining i e over wages and the level of employment and bargaining solely over wages

industries with private and public enterprises in this paper attention will be focussed on an industry consisting of public enterprises and institutions rather than on a public enterprise itself public enterprises can be used by the government as an instrument to implement an industrial policy since there exist a variety of instruments and objectives we firstly categorize industries as well as market structures section 2 next we mention some recent results section 3 in the last section a general equilibrium model is introduced that offers a framework to policy makers when designing an efficient organization of an industry with external effects

unemployment equilibrium in an economy with linked prices wage inflexibility has been widely regarded in modern writing as a cause of unemployment almost any keynesian or non walrasian equilibrium which involves equilibrium excess supplies also contain some form of wage or price inflexibility yet the micro mechanism of wage inflexibility its causes and form remains somewhat a mystery in this paper we study the allocation of resources in an economy in which prices of some goods or services are linked to other goods or services this is not wage rigidity in the traditional sense but it is a form of rigidity which is widely observed following the recent literature on non walrasian equilibrium see for example dreze 1975 barro and grossman 197 l grandmont and laroque 1976 malinvaud 1977 and many others one would expect the allocation to be attained via a set of quantity constraints on net trades we show in this paper however that the allocation mechanism in the economy will not require a general set of limitations on excess supplies and excess demands but rather will tend to have the following two properties

public production and shadow pricing in a model of disequilibrium in labor and capital markets abstract this paper develops second best rules for public investment and employment in various regimes of disequilibrium on the capital and the labour markets the model used is very simple so as to imply rules which can easily be interpreted and contrasted with the current literature on the subject another issue considered is that of possible changes of regimes within a process of welfare improvement involving adjustments in the public production plan it is dealt with through a numerical example which points out that such changes can indeed occur

the own wage elasticity of labor demand a meta regression analysis firms labor demand responses to wage changes are of key interest in empirical research and policy analysis however despite extensive research estimates of labor demand elasticities remain subject to considerable heterogeneity in this paper we conduct a comprehensive meta regression analysis to re assess the empirical literature on labor demand elasticities building on 942 elasticity estimates from 105 different studies we identify sources of variation in the absolute value of this elasticity heterogeneity due to the theoretical and empirical specification of the labor demand model different datasets used or sectors and countries considered explains more than 80 of the variation in the estimates we further find substantial evidence for the presence of publication selection bias as estimates of the own wage elasticity of labor demand are upwardly inflated

tax reform from the gradient projection viewpoint abstract this paper examines the problems of gradual tax reform desirable small moves of the tax system are determined using the principles of the well known gradient projection algorithm three classical models of public finance are considered for each of them a continuous time dynamic process is exhibited along which the social welfare function increases until convergence to local second best extrema although the selection of trajectories according to the gradient projection method has some arbitrariness it leads to intuitively and economically appealing rules such as a tax reform analog of the classical optimal taxation result on production efficiency

do unions contract for added employment the efficient contract model predicts unions will contract for added employment that is a level of employment higher than would be predicted by the demand curve for labor using three data sets on canadian industries in 1971 81 u s industries in 1972 and u s construction projects in 1973 74 and several estimation techniques the author estimates and compares labor demand equations for both union and nonunion firms some regressions that control for few variables support the added employment hypothesis but those with more complete specifications reject it

the impact of affirmative action on labor demand a test of some implications of the le chatelier principle this paper presents an alternative approach to measuring the impact of affirmative action on firms affirmative action is modeled as a series of hiring quotas if the quotas are binding then a firm subject to affirmative action will operate with greater costs of production have less elastic demand for inputs and be less able to substitute between most inputs the results are consistent with the hypothesis that affirmative action regulations significantly constrain firms behavior own wage elasticities are less elastic and most inputs are less substitutable for constrained firms further affirmative action raises costs by 6 5 percent for firms subject to the program copyright 1992 by mit press

privatization internal control and internal regulation abstract this paper develops a theory of the privatization of public enterprises the relevant decisions are modelled as a three stage process internal control internal regulation and privatization privatization is a move from an overcontrolled public firm to an overcontrolled private firm the firm never achieves the optimal extent of control because the necessary replacement of public by private managers leads not only to the desired reduction of bureaucracy but also to an undesired increase in profits moreover the reduction of overbureacratization is matched by a reduction in the quality of the supplied goods

random walk or planned excursion continuity and change in the left right positions of political parties implicit in theories of democratic elections is the idea of change or at least the potential for change elections provide the opportunity for citizens to change their party preferences and thus al

the optimal choice of privatizing state owned enterprises a political economic model we study the choices of two types of maximizing public servants over how far to carry privatization of industries and in what order to privatize two stylizations of the public servant s objectives are considered a niskanen style bureaucrat who maximizes a surplus budget subject to the constraint of staying in office and a populist who maximizes popularity consumer welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget other things being equal the bureaucrat will privatize the sector firms with the least market power and the largest subsidy first the populist will adopt the same policy if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high with respect to the marginal utilities if the marginal costs are too high however the populist will privatize the sector with the largest market power first we also show that privatization is easier and faster in less democratic societies

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

principle vs pragmatism policy shifts and political competition this article investigates the electoral effect of party policy shifts i argue that whether party policy shifts are damaging or rewarding depends on whether the shift occurs in the pragmatic or principled issue domain on pragmatic issues voters value getting things done policy shifts in this domain signal responsiveness to the changing environment and are likely to be rewarded principled issues however concern core beliefs and values any policy shift in this domain is a sign of inconsistency and lack of credibility which is likely to lead to voter withdrawal these arguments are supported by evidence from 23 advanced democracies over a period of 40 years

a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment this paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment the underlying economic model is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and public spending increases such policies are fiscally costly but can be financed by issuing government debt policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts the theory provides a positive account of the simultaneous determination of fiscal policy and unemployment the most important implication of the theory is that debt and unemployment levels should be positively correlated some evidence in support of this prediction is provided using data from a panel of developed countries

privatization of public enterprises in this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained the manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient in a privatized firm the manager s effort is chosen efficiently the reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient in the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient on the other hand the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently it is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government s multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive compatible reward for the manager

optimal fiscal policy in open economies with labour market distortions abstract we set up a general equilibrium model with unemployment owing to distortions in the labour market it is shown that a public expansion financed by a distortionary income tax may give rise to a decrease in unemployment even if public goods are pure waste such an expansion may give rise to an increase in welfare if it is associated with a decrease in unemployment since part of the gain from a fiscal expansion is achieved at the expense of welfare in other countries non cooperative policies tend to be too expansionary

general equilibrium when some firms follow special pricing rules in this paper we study the existence of a general equilibrium in an economy in which some of the firms behave competitively whereas others follow special pricing rules an even casual observation of economic reality confirms the need for the inclusion of price setting firms in the study of general equilibrium models and in fact this has been emphasized in the economic literature for some time we consider this a sufficient justification to present a general equilibrium model which allows for both types of behavior price setting as well as price taking behavior the model to be presented will account for a wide range of price setting rules we however find it appropriate to point out at the start that not all economically relevant price setting rules are covered although our model permits the drawing of useful conclusions for the general equilibrium theory of oligopolistic competition through prices it is not especially designed for that purpose in particular our results are not applicable to the general equilibrium analysis with price making monopolistic firms a subject on which there exists some literature 2 our motivation as well as our modelling options and assumptions are directed to two fields where an increased interest in the theoretical foundations recently could be noticed

optimal administered pricing under capacity constraints abstract this paper addresses the question of how pricing policies can improve the utilization of existing production capacities an optimizing input output model for the indian economy is developed for this purpose where the government s objective is to maximize growth subject to capacity constraints it is found that the optimal prices are related to the keynesian income multipliers associated with increases in the consumption of goods

shadow prices and public policies in a disequilibrium model of an open economy the paper focuses on the interaction between the goals of optimal stabilization and of allocative efficiency in project evaluation in an economy that is small as an exporter which must maintain trade balance and where some disequilibrium may prevail on goods and labour markets the criteria that are developed reflect an aggregation of profitability and reduction of unemployment additional foreign demand foreign currency savings should be evaluated in welfare terms after weighting by the gap between the relevant market and shadow prices the shadow prices also lead to the definition of an optimal taxation system

crisis and convergence how the combination of a weak economy and mainstream party ideological de polarization fuels anti system support when do radical parties gain support previous studies cite the economy and mainstream party ideological convergence as important responding to earlier inconsistent findings i provide evidence fo

the impact of unionization on motor carrier costs i introduction the increasingly competitive markets fostered by the motor carrier act of 1980 have forced motor carriers to focus on cost saving strategies intended to reduce operating miles fuel consumption and capital and labor expenses there are two reasons unions firms may be at a competitive disadvantage in these efforts first although the union nonunion wage differential has decreased following regulatory reform rose 1987 and hirsch 1988 find that union firms still pay higher wages second managers of unionized firms may have less flexibility in the use of inputs since union work rules restrict the activities and substitutability of drivers terminal workers and terminal facilities indeed harrington 1987 reports that post 1980 trucking expenses are still 40 higher for unionized motor carriers than for nonunion firms unionization may affect carrier cost both by increasing the price of labor and by potentially affecting cost function parameters if union rules make labor less productive the entire cost function will shift upwards for a given set of factor input prices further freeman and medoff 1982 argue that work rules may be expected to result in reduced elasticities of substitution between labor and other inputs in the unionized setting indeed they find that substitution between production labor and other labor in manufacturing is generally lower in unionized settings the impact of unionization on production has been investigated in industries such as construction coal mining hospitals and the cement industry by allen 1984 1986a 1986b byrnes et al 1988 and clark 1980a 1980b the results have been inconclusive with unionized firms being more productive than nonunion firms in some instances and less productive in others studies such as allen 1986c and addison and hirsch 1989 have utilized production function methodologies that use restrictive functional forms which impose homogeneity and identical elasticities of substitution between pairs of inputs allen 1986c examines the relative efficiency of union and nonunion firms with a translog cost function allowing for union effects using intercept and slope parameters that vary by union status in his study of different types of construction projects he finds significant differences between the cost functions for union and nonunion firms but no evidence of the inelasticity of factor substitutions as hypothesized by medoff and freeman in fact his estimates of factor demand elasticities show no discernible pattern for union versus nonunion firms leading him to conclude that work rules do not have the anticipated impact on elasticity the purpose of this study is to test whether unionization impacts motor carrier costs and if so to determine the direction of the impact of particular interest is whether the work rules imposed by the teamster s union have had a significant impact on factor substitutability in unionized firms as argued by freeman and medoff 1982 friedlaender and spady 1981 daughety et al 1985 mcmullen and stanley 1988 grimm et al 1989 and ying s 1990 studies of motor carrier industry costs have used translog cost functions which implicitly assume that union and nonunion cost functions arise from the same production technology this is equivalent to accepting the hypothesis that unionization does not affect the production structure of motor carrier firms if unionization does affect a firm s production process the results from these studies could be biased accordingly this study uses a translog cost function to test for differences in the cost structure of union and nonunion carriers not only is the translog cost function standard in the motor carrier literature permitting comparison of these results with those of previous work it also allows the flexibility necessary to examine the differential impact of unions on cost function parameters and elasticities of substitution between factors

double inefficiency in optimally organized firms abstract the management of a single product monopoly sets the number of employees and the number of production teams which are to be established however it is well known that employees shirk in teams moreover there is yet another inefficiency which is caused through the management s adjustment to its uncertain environment the management will not choose the internal organization of the firm which minimizes costs because this would reduce the expected revenue or surplus if it manages a public firm public firms are more likely to choose a technology where cost inefficiency and shirking reinforce each other government price regulation fails to eliminate cost inefficiency

electoral systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states scholars studying electoral systems have consistently found that single member plurality elections tend to constrain the number of parties operating in a polity to a much greater extent than multimember proportional representation systems this article tests this hypothesis in the postcommunist context by examining the effects of proportional representation and single member district elections on the number of parties in five postcommunist states it is shown that some postcommunist states most notably poland and hungary have followed the standard pattern of party consolidation over time in reaction to incentives of electoral systems while others most notably russia and ukraine have not the author argues that the different effects of electoral systems can be attributed to different levels of party institutionalization found in postcommunist states these findings have policy implications under conditions of extreme party underdevelopment the electoral system that promotes the use of party labels proportional representation may be more effective than the plurality system in constraining the number of parties provided a legal threshold is used this runs counter to the conventional wisdom that plurality elections offer the greatest constraint on the number of parties

elections economic outcomes and policy choices in canada 1870 2015 in this paper we examine the relationship between economic and electoral outcomes in canada since confederation 1867 and the role that economic policy has played in influencing this relationship