stock option repricing and its alternatives an empirical examination in this paper i examine the likelihood of ceo stock option repricing and its alternatives namely option grant stock grant and do nothing multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility moreover repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important finally i find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing my results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention and not by agency cost considerations

the democratic political economy of progressive income taxation why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two dimensionality of the issue space to give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two dimensional nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two party game whose players have complete preferences over a two dimensional policy space generically fails to exist i introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games based on the fact of factional conflict within parties each party is supposed to consist of reformists militants and opportunists each faction has a complete preference order on policy space but together they can only agree on a partial order nash equilibria of the two party game where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions and each party is represented by its partial order exist and it is shown that in such equilibria both parties propose progressive income taxation

asymmetric benchmarking in compensation executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad abstract principal agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm s own performance recently it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests that is they can enjoy pay for luck as well as pay for performance we first show that this argument is incomplete the positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk if executives pay is tied to market movements they can only expect to receive the market determined return for risk bearing this argument however assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck if executives can truly influence the setting of their pay they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest namely when the benchmark has fallen using industry benchmarks we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down in which case pay for luck would reduce compensation than when it is up these empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks and they suggest that the average executive loses 25 45 less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck

applications of behavioural economics to tax evasion the paper reviews recent models that have applied the techniques of behavioural economics to the analysis of the tax compliance choice of an individual taxpayer the construction of these models is motivated by the failure of the yitzhaki version of the allingham sandmo model to predict correctly the proportion of taxpayers who will evade and the effect of an increase in the tax rate upon the chosen level of evasion recent approaches have applied non expected utility theory to the compliance decision and have addressed social interaction the models we describe are able to match the observed extent of evasion and correctly predict the tax effect but do not have the parsimony or precision of the yitzhaki model

what fraction of stock option grants to top executives have been backdated or manipulated we estimate that 13 6 of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996 2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at the money of which we estimate that 18 9 were manipulated the fraction is 23 0 before the new two day filing requirement took effect on august 29 2002 and 10 0 afterward for the minority of grants that are not filed within the required two day window the fraction of manipulated grants remains as high as 19 9 we further find a higher frequency of manipulation among tech firms small firms and firms with high stock price volatility in addition firms that use smaller non big five auditing firms are more likely to file their grants late finally at the firm level we estimate that 29 2 of firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 and 2005

a brain gain with a brain drain abstract we study human capital depletion and formation in an economy open to out migration as opposed to an economy which is closed under the assumption of asymmetric information the enlarged opportunities and the associated different structure of incentives can give rise to a brain gain in conjunction with a brain drain migration by high skill members of its workforce notwithstanding the home country can end up with a higher average level of human capital per worker

consumers and the brain drain product and process design and the gains from emigration abstract we consider the welfare effects of skilled worker emigration in a context where skilled labor plays a role in product or process design we show such emigration can benefit the residents left behind even when consumers tastes exhibit a form of home bias this is because emigration improves the design of goods designed by skilled emigrants but consumed in the sending country in contrast to existing models of beneficial brain drain our results do not require agglomeration economies education related externalities remittances return migration or an emigration lottery instead they are driven purely by differences in market size that induce skilled emigrants to design better products or production processes abroad than at home

tax evasion on a social network abstract we relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on social comparison in judgements taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their social network the unique nash equilibrium of the model relates optimal evasion to a bonacich measure of network centrality more central taxpayers evade more given that tax authorities are now investing heavily in big data tools that aim to construct social networks we investigate the value of acquiring network information we do this using networks that allow for celebrity taxpayers whose consumption is seen widely and who are systematically of higher wealth we show that there are pronounced returns to the initial acquisition of network information especially in the presence of celebrity taxpayers

union negotiations and corporate policy a study of labor concessions in the domestic steel industry during the 1980s abstract this paper studies managerial compensation financial reporting and dividend policies of the seven major domestic steel producers during requests for union concessions substantial layoffs reported losses and sacrifices by nonunion stakeholders buttressed managers case for union concessions from 1980 to 1988 sample firms reduced their work force by about 300 000 almost two thirds and annual wage payments from 16 1 to 8 6 billion reported income is lower during union negotiations controlling for cash flows as is managerial pay with average ceo salary plus bonus declining 18 dividend reductions and white collar pay cuts are substantial pervasive and clustered during union negotiations

the repricing of executive stock options abstract we examine a sample of firms that reset the exercise prices on their executive options these repricings follow a period of about one year of poor firm specific performance in which the average firm loses one fourth of its value no other offsetting changes to option terms or compensation are made and many firms reprice more than once without repricing a majority of the options would have been at the money within two years we find that when faced with circumstances in which repricing might be chosen firms with greater agency problems smaller size and insider dominated boards are more likely to reprice

stock option repricing heads i win tails you lose recent scandals at enron worldcom and global crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before however these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice as professor joseph badaracco of harvard business school points out the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right where both choices can be justified yet one must be chosen over the other whether or not to reprice stock options represents one such ethical dilemma repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance however it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline

a theory of collective reputations with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by his past behaviour and because his track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper thus studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality 1 collective reputations collective reputations play an important role in economics and the social sciences countries ethnic racial or religious groups are known to be hard working honest corrupt hospitable or belligerent some firms enjoy substantial rents from their reputations for producing high quality products some departments are reported to treat their faculty or students fairly the paper is a first attempt at modelling the idea of group reputation as an aggregate of individual reputations a member s current incentives are affected by her past behaviour and because her track record is observed only with noise by the group s past behaviour as well the paper studies the joint dynamics of individual and collective reputations in a model in which current generations are progressively replaced by new ones and derives the existence of stereotypes from history dependence rather than from a multiplicity of equilibria or from the existence of a common trait as is usually done in the literature see section 2 for a detailed comparison with the literature it shows that new members of an organization may suffer from an original sin of their elders long after the latter are gone and it derives necessary and sufficient conditions under which group reputations can be rebuilt last the paper applies the theory to analyse when a large firm can maintain a reputation for quality let us spell out the building blocks of our theory in more detail a a group s reputation is only as good as that of its members each member is characterized by individual traits such as talent diligence or honesty past individual behaviour conveys information about these traits and generates individual reputations

human capital bankruptcy and capital structure we derive a firm s optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk while equity holders can diversify this risk away in the presence of corporate taxes our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice it also makes a number of predictions for the cross sectional distribution of firm leverage consistent with existing empirical evidence it implies persistent idiosyncratic dierences in leverage across firms an important new empirical prediction of the model is that ceteris paribus firms with more leverage should pay higher wages

underwater options and the dynamics of executive pay to performance sensitivities we empirically analyze the dynamics of executives pay to performance sensitivities option pay to performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay to performance sensitivity in other ways building a detailed data set on executives portfolios of stock and options we find that the responsiveness of pay to performance sensitivities created by all executive holdings of stock and options to changes in stock price is large the elasticity of pay to performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0 7 and is larger for high option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater the dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay to performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines on average these larger grants restore approximately 40 of the stock price induced pay to performance sensitivity declines option repricings are inconsequential in this regard despite the attention they have attracted in looking at positive returns we find the reverse higher returns both directly increase pay to performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants which raise pay to performance sensitivities further thus option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases

an analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects however one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts 2 this absence is related in part to the problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation that is compensation contracts are

brain drain and human capital formation in developing countries winners and losers using new data on emigration rates by education level we examine the impact of brain drain migration on human capital formation in developing countries we find evidence of a positive effect of skilled migration prospects on gross human capital formation in a cross section of 127 countries for each country of the sample we then estimate the net effect of the brain drain using counterfactual simulations countries combining relatively low levels of human capital and low emigration rates are shown to experience a beneficial brain drain and conversely there are more losers than winners and the former tend to lose relatively more than what the latter gain

encouraging private sector research for tropical agriculture summary agricultural needs in poor tropical countries differ significantly from those in temperate rich countries yet little agricultural research is performed on products for the tropics private research is particularly concentrated in rich countries this is a result of significant failures in the market for research and development r d in particular the difficulty of preventing the resale of seed in developing countries to encourage private r d in tropical agriculture traditional funding of research may be usefully supplemented by a commitment to reward developers of specific new agricultural technologies rewards tied to adoption may be especially useful in increasing up take an illustration of how a commitment to reward developers of new agricultural technologies might work is provided

migration and the skill composition of the labour force the impact of trade liberalization in ldcs the purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the conditions under which trade liberalization in the developing countries is likely to cause an increase or a decrease in out migration we also examine the impact of trade liberalization on the skill composition of migration and of the labour force for this purpose we explicitly incorporate four additional features in the heckscher ohlin model heterogeneity of labour skills international migration migration costs and constraints on financing migration excerpt summary in fre

individual morality and reputation costs as deterrents to tax evasion abstract empirical evidence suggests some taxpayers never evade evasion increases with the tax rate and evasion decisions are interdependent these findings are not easily explained by the existing theory which models evasion as an independently made amoral gamble this paper uses nonpecuniary costs of evasion to reconcile theory with evidence once individuals are assumed to differ by an honesty characteristic taxpayers dichotomise into groups the more honest of which responds to a tax change as the evidence suggests a further extension is to introduce an endogenous reputation cost this suggests a positive relationship between the number of evaders and the tax rate

international protection of intellectual property corrigendum in our recent paper grossman and lai 2004 we studied the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy we considered a world economy with ongoing innovation in two or more countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation in section iv we compared the strength of patent protection in an efficient world agreement with harmonized rates of protection to the strength of patent protection in a nash equilibrium with policies chosen by two welfaremaximizing governments we claimed in proposition 5 that as long as the elasticity of substitution between human capital and labor in the research activity is no greater than one then efficient harmonization requires a strengthening of patent protection in both the north and the south and that the north must gain while the south may gain or lose unfortunately there was an error in our proof it is correct that for all elasticities of substitution no greater than one 0 efficient harmonization requires a strengthening of patent protection in the south and in the world as a whole moreover patent protection in the north must be stronger in an efficient agreement with harmonization than in the nash equilibrium if the elasticity of substitution between human capital and labor in r d is equal to one 0 however if the elasticity of substitution between labor and human capital is less than one efficient harmonization may require a weakening of patent protection in the north when mn ms hn hs and 0 a sufficient condition for the north to gain from efficient harmonization is hn hs mn ms

regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability this paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance in the random audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection in the tournament audit mechanism the probability of inspection increases with the degree of estimated underreporting to study the effects of social information the experiment varies the observability of identity output and compliance decisions optimal output is theoretically independent of the auditing scheme but equilibrium reporting is higher under the tournament mechanism than random auditing experimental findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions for reporting but deviate modestly for output in particular we find that average output is lower and reporting is higher in the tournament treatment compared to the random audit treatment at the individual level a majority of participants misreported in most periods social observability does not affect output or reporting significantly in either of the audit treatments

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

education economic growth and brain drain abstract this paper constructs a two sector overlapping generations model of endogenous growth to study the effects of brain drain on growth education and income distribution it is shown that brain drain reduces the economic growth rate and generally hurts the non emigrants through the static income distributional effects and the dynamic damage on economic growth and human capital accumulation if the initial rate of human capital accumulation is relatively low brain drain could deteriorate both the sum of discounted income and lifetime discounted utility of a representative non emigrant the government can choose to spend more on education to lessen the detrimental growth effects of brain drain

enforcement socioeconomic diversity and tax filing compliance in the united states in this article we examine the determinants of tax filing compliance in the united states we use county level data on non filing rates for the tax year 2000 obtained directly from the internal revenue service we include explanatory variables identified in the rational compliance framework including an enforcement index against identified non filers the audit rate of filers and the average penalty rate for both filers and non filers we also examine the role of socioeconomic diversity on tax compliance testing whether within county heterogeneity in household income language race and religion can help explain variation in non filing rates we find that non filing is increasing with heterogeneity by race although not by income or language and that non filing is decreasing with heterogeneity by religious membership as for enforcement variables we find that non filing rates tend to fall with the enforcement index other variables have somewhat mixed results

bidding for brains intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers we introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of nash equilibrium ipr policy choice among countries we show that governments have incentives to use iprs in a bidding war for global talent resulting in nash equilibrium iprs that can be too high rather than too low from a global welfare perspective these incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth thus allowing them to prevent the poaching of their brains by larger wealthier markets

altering the terms of executive stock options abstract we examine the practice of resetting the terms of previously issued executive stock options we identify properties of reset options develop a model for valuing resettable options and characterize the firms that have reset options we find the vast majority of options are reset at the money resulting on average in the strike price dropping 40 our valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex ante value of an option award but the ex post gain can be substantial finally we find resetting has a strong negative relation with firm performance even after correcting for industry performance

intellectual property rights licensing and innovation in an endogenous product cycle model abstract we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the product cycle to study the effects of stronger intellectual property rights iprs in the south on the incentives of firms in the north to innovate and to license advanced technologies innovation and licensing are random processes requiring resources stronger iprs increase the licensor s share of rents and reduce the costs of licensing contracts thus the returns to both licensing and innovation would rise while additional resources would be available for r d in consequence innovation and technology transfer would rise however the effect of stronger iprs on relative wages between regions is ambiguous

the timing of option repricing we investigate whether executive stock option repricings are systematically timed to coincide with favorable movements in the company s stock price for a sample of 236 repricing events we observe sharp increases in stock price in the 20 day period following the repricing date in addition repricing dates tend to either precede the release of good news or follow the release of bad news in the quarterly earnings announcements since information about stock option repricing is not generally released to the public around the repricing date these findings suggest that ceos opportunistically manage the timing of the option repricing date

an economic model of welfare stigma perhaps the most basic assumption of the economic theory of consumer demand is that more is better than less virtually all of the major propositions of consumer theory can in a certain sense be derived from the assumption that goods are good interestingly however this tenet seems to be violated by the behavior of many individuals in the low income population for many turn out to be eligible for a positive welfare benefit but do not in fact join the welfare rolls for example it has been estimated that in 1970 only about 69 percent of the families eligible for afdc aid to families with dependent children participated in the program see richard michel 1980 the corresponding percentage for afdc u the program for which families with an unemployed male are eligible was only 43 percent and the participation rate in the food stamp program was only 38 percent see maurice mcdonald 1977 this phenomenon has puzzled many investigators because such individuals do not locate on the boundaries of their budget sets consequently most investigators ignore the problem when studying the effects of welfare programs on behavior in this paper this seemingly irrational rejection of an increase in income is modeled as resulting from welfare stigma that is from disutility arising from participation in a welfare program per se 1 the existence of stigma has been amply documented in the sociological literature patrick horan and patricia austin 1974 lee rainwater 1979 where interviews of recipients have often uncovered feelings of lack of self respect and negative self characterizations from participation in welfare nevertheless this phenomenon has not been modeled and many questions consequently remain when is the disutility of participation strong enough to prevent participation shouldn t we expect individuals to weigh the disutility of participation against the potential benefit in their decisions what is the elasticity of participation with respect to the potential benefit also in a slightly different vein how are the work disincentives of welfare affected by stigma these questions have been given scant attention by economists yet they are crucial for our ability to predict the impact of various welfare programs on the lowincome population here these questions are addressed by modeling nonparticipation as a utility maximizing decision the model is developed and estimated for the afdc program 2 the model posits an individual utility function containing not just disposable income but

income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma based model of tax evasion abstract this paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma based model of tax compliance the paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge precisely multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous because the social coordination effect dominates the individual characteristics effect numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two step audit policies on the part of the tax agency under the presumption that the best or good equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria as a byproduct the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two step audit policy the equilibrium compliance and fiscal revenue is analyzed

understanding welfare stigma taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination abstract welfare stigma is widely regarded to be of central importance in understanding the impact of welfare programs in their goal of alleviating poverty it affects both the decision to take up benefits and the well being of those who actually do this paper develops alternative models of the determinants of welfare stigma we identify two views a statistical discrimination approach and a taxpayer resentment view we discuss how each may be formalized and derive their implications we then examine what they imply about the relationship between stigma and program design

can a brain drain be good for growth in the source economy this paper analyzes the interaction between income distribution human capital accumulation and migration it shows that when migration is not a certainty a brain drain may increase average productivity and equality in the source economy even though average productivity is a positive function of past average levels of human capital in an economy it is also shown how the temporary possibility of emigration may permanently increase the average level of productivity of an economy

interdependent behavior and the effect of taxes abstract the paper studies the effect of taxes on labor supply in a model with interdependent behavior i e individuals preferences depend on other people s behavior it is found that not taking the interdependency into account can lead to a serious bias in the predicted effects of a tax change it is also shown that interdependent behavior can give rise to spikes in the hours distribution such spikes often have been attributed to quantity constraints

tax progressivity income distribution and tax non compliance this article examines the determinants of tax non compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive tax advice industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability we apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry this tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence the level of noncompliance is the convexity of the demand schedule we show that in this context this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre tax income the progressivity of the tax schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income it is shown that lower pre tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities therefore the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline one way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions

the consequences of the fasb s 1998 proposal on accounting for stock option repricing abstract we examine repricing activity surrounding the fasb s 1998 announcement regarding accounting for repriced options we find that repricing increases during and decreases after the 12 day window between the announcement and proposed effective dates consistent with firms timing repricings to avoid recording an expense we find that firms experiencing increasing earnings patterns firms with earnings around zero and growth firms are more likely to reprice in the window but having repriced recently decreases the likelihood of doing so the evidence suggests that firms trade off financial reporting benefits against reputation costs in decisions to time repricings to get favorable accounting treatment

tax evasion and capital gains taxation this paper uses time series data to investigate how changes in capital gains tax rates affect taxpayer compliance it finds that a one percent increase in the marginal tax rate reduces voluntary compliance by between one half and one percent these results confirm the findings of previous studies based on individual household data they also suggest that at least one quarter of the observed capital gain realization response to changes in marginal tax rates is due to changes in reporting behavior rather than portfolio behavior this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

equilibrium selection in imperfectly competitive economies with multiple equilibria this paper investigates the selection of an equilibrium in an economy with multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria a history dependent selection criterion is proposed which induces correlated behavior in equilibrium even though agents are playing one shot games and disturbances are not correlated over time the model economy may experience prolonged periods in which a low productivity technology is in use and then as a consequence of a large real disturbance may switch to an alternative equilibrium in which a high productivity technology is utilized thus the model qualitatively matches observations of serially correlated movements in output and employment and generates procyclical productivity though there are no exogenous technology shocks copyright 1994 by royal economic society

globalization brain drain and development this paper reviews four decades of economics research on the brain drain with a focus on recent contributions and on development issues we first assess the magnitude intensity and determinants of the brain drain showing that brain drain or high skill migration is becoming a dominant pattern of international migration and a major aspect of globalization we then use a stylized growth model to analyze the various channels through which a brain drain affects the sending countries and review the evidence on these channels the recent empirical literature shows that high skill emigration need not deplete a country s human capital stock and can generate positive network externalities three case studies are also considered the african medical brain drain the exodus of european scientists to the united states and the role of the indian diaspora in the development of india s information technology sector we conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for education immigration and international taxation policies in a global context

intellectual property rights and quality improvement this paper explores why theories about the effects of intellectual property rights ipr protection on foreign direct investment fdi and innovation have reached mixed conclusions in our model northern firms innovate to improve the quality of existing products and may later shift production to the south through fdi southern firms may then imitate the products of multinationals we find that imitation can increase fdi and innovation for quality improvements whereas the opposite occurs when innovators develop new varieties hence stronger ipr protection by reducing imitation may shift innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products

income tax compliance in a principal agent framework previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a portfolio problem deriving the optimal consumption of the risky asset unreported income under the assumption of a fixed probability of detection the purpose of this paper is to examine some of these issues in tax compliance starting from a different set of assumptions in particular we compare alternative audit policies to the standard random audit policy we focus on an audit cutoff policy in which an agent triggers an audit if his or her reported income is too low and is not audited if reported income is sufficiently high this paper establishes two major results first random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules it can be shown given lump sum taxes and fines that these audit cutoff rules are the least cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income second the dominance of audit cutoff rules over random audit rules holds for lump sum as well as proportional taxation in fact the equilibrium consequences of the two are equivalent

the north s intellectual property rights standard for the south abstract we build a multi sectoral north south trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights ipr protection by comparing the nash equilibrium ipr protection standard of the south the developing countries with that of the north the developed countries we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter moreover we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the south to harmonize its ipr standards with those of the north and the north to liberalize its traditional goods market this demonstrates the merits of multi sectoral negotiations in the gatt wto

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

stock and compensation compensation planning within firms creates important corporate financial problems theoretical models and empirical tests of hypotheses in this area should play a much larger role than currently in the modern theory of corporate finance employees fund a large proportion of their firm s activities through deferred compensation arrangements tied to the performance of their company these arrangements are generally put in place for incentive reasons to align the interests of employees more closely with those of shareholders moreover tax rules encourage or discourage these arrangements at various times currently both tax rules and incentive considerations encourage stock buyback programs to fund deferred compensation arrangements prior to the 1980s however tax rules favored funding in other than company stock implying that employees likely held company stock for incentive and not for tax reasons during this time period copyright 1991 by american finance association

a dynamic model of corruption deterrence abstract this paper presents a model of corruption deterrence with a simple overlapping generations structure built into it a crucial assumption is that when corruption becomes more prevalent in the economy it is harder to audit a corrupt official effectively it is shown that this assumption may give rise to several stationary equilibrium levels of corruption this possibility has been exploited to explain why sometimes a government may temporarily resort to an extremely severe deterrence policy and why the same deterrence scheme may imply quite different levels of corruption a case study is provided to give empirical support to the model

corruption tax evasion and social values we provide a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corruption and tax evasion in which countries often fall into we address this issue in the context of a model with two distinct groups of agents citizens and politicians citizens decide the fraction of their income for which they evade taxes politicians decide the fraction of the public budget that they peculate we show that multiple self fulfilling equilibria with different levels of corruption can emerge based on the existence of strategic complementarities indicating that corruption may corrupt furthermore we find that standard deterrence policies cannot eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria instead policies that impose a strong moral cost on tax evaders and corrupt politicians can lead to a unique equilibrium

ceo compensation in financially distressed firms an empirical analysis this paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987 almost one third of all ceos are replaced and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions newly appointed ceos with ties to previous management are typically paid 35 less than the ceos they replace in contrast outside replacement ceos are typically paid 36 more than their predecessors and are often compensated with stock options on average ceo wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts however managers compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors claims

on the optimality of resetting executive stock options the practice of resetting strike prices on underwater executive stock options has drawn criticism for weakening managerial incentives our model shows that although the anticipation of resetting can negatively affect initial incentives resetting can still be an important value enhancing aspect of compensation contracts even from an ex ante standpoint in fact we find that some resetting is almost always optimal the relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to influence the resetting process greater relative importance of external factors on stock performance and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers

relative consumption and tax evasion abstract relative consumption effects or status concerns that feature jealousy in the sense of dupor and liu 2003 boost consumption expenditure if consumption is financed by labour income such status considerations increase labour supply and hence the tax base a higher taxable income in turn can make tax evasion more attractive we show for various specifications of preferences that the tax base effect generally dominates consequently relative consumption effects tend to reduce tax evasion this is true irrespective of whether tax parameters are exogenous guarantee a balanced budget or are set optimally

what happens when you tax the rich evidence from executive compensation this paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995 the data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income indeed this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period one person alone can account for more than 2 percent the decline however is almost entirely a short run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income the short run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net of tax share exceeds one in this sample but the elasticity after one year is at most 0 4 and probably closer to zero breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short run responses come almost entirely from a large inc

top management compensation and capital structure the interrelationship between top management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied the optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus we analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are 1 equity and risky debt and 2 equity and convertible debt in addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt the optimal management compensation derived has low pay performance sensitivity with convertible debt instead of straight debt the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay to performance sensitivity a negative relationship between pay performance sensitivity and leverage is derived our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of jensen and murphy 1990 with agency theory other testable implications include 1 a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top management compensation structures and 2 the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices the model yields implications for management compensation in banks and federal deposit insurance reform our results explain the dynamics of top management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization

executive option repricing incentives and retention while many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing this article investigates the determinants of firms repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention firms that have better internal governance that use more powerful stock based incentives or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines when share price declines are severe restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options the past several years have witnessed tremendous growth in the use of stock options to compensate corporate executives indeed virtually all of the largest publicly traded u s firms now rely on stock option plans and option grants constitute more than half of the annual pay for chief executive officers murphy 1999 a natural consequence of this growth has been an increasing awareness and sophistication among academics practitioners and the popular press about how the design and administration of option plans can help to enhance or destroy shareholder value although a number of corporate practices pertaining to executive options have elicited controversy perhaps no such practice has been more controversial than repricing which involves effectively lowering the exercise prices of previously granted options on the one hand firms often describe repricing as a useful means for restoring incentives and retaining executive talent and most stock option plans currently in existence permit repricing on the other hand shareholders and institutional investors have voiced intense opposition to the practice on the grounds that it apparently rewards managers for poor performance for instance the council of institutional investors an organization of pension funds controlling over 1 5 trillion in assets has adopted a policy statement calling on companies to restrict repricing according to ann yerger director of research at the council member funds generally detest

managerial legacies entrenchment and strategic inertia this paper argues that the legacy potential of a firm s strategy is an important deter minant of ceo compensation turnover and strategy change a legacy makes ceo replacement expensive because firm performance can only partially be attributed to a newly employed manager boards may therefore optimally allow an incumbent to be entrenched moreover when a firm changes strategy it is optimal to change the ceo because the incumbent has a vested interest in seeing the new strategy fail even though ceos have no specific skills in our model legacy issues can explain the empirical association between ceo and strategy change this paper proposes a model of ceo replacement and puts forward a novel determinant for turnover decisions the legacy potential of a firm s strategy we mean by this the extent to which a manager s decisions affect future firm cash flows potentially beyond the manager s own tenure the replacement of a ceo is arguably one of the most important decisions a firm takes yet the theoretical and empirical finance literature has relatively little to say about the firm and manager specific characteristics that lead to one manager being fired and replaced by another as brickley 2003 points out the only variable that predicts turnover empirically is poor firm performance but it has little pre dictive power theoretical papers on managerial turnover tend to reduce ceo successions to a sequence of static interactions see below for more details as such they do not distinguish between a ceo who is hired and can start a fresh project or one who is constrained in this choice because he inherits a prede cessor s long term strategy our paper focuses on this latter phenomenon and investigates turnover decisions when strategy choices have a legacy potential the fact that a dynamic link exists between a ceo and his predecessor is probably more recognized in the accounting literature than in finance pourciau both authors are from the toulouse school of economics and the institut d administration des

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

developing science scientific performance and brain drains in the developing world abstract establishing a strong scientific community is important as countries develop and requires both producing and retaining of important scientists we show that developing countries produce a sizeable number of important scientists but that they experience a tremendous brain drain education levels population and per capita gdp are positively related to the number of important scientists born in and staying in a country our analysis indicates that democracy and urbanization are associated with the production of more important scientists although democracy is associated with more out migration

predictive analytics and the targeting of audits the literature on audit strategies has focused on random audits or on audits conditioned only on income declaration in contrast tax authorities employ the tools of predictive analytics to identify taxpayers for audit with a range of variables used for conditioning the paper explores the compliance and revenue consequences of the use of predictive analytics in an agent based model that draws upon a behavioral approach to tax compliance the taxpayers in the model form subjective beliefs about the probability of audit from social interaction and are guided by a social custom that is developed from meeting other taxpayers the belief and social custom feed into the occupational choice between employment and two forms of self employment it is shown that the use of predictive analytics yields a significant increase in revenue over a random audit strategy

the resolution of claims in financial distress the case of massey ferguson when a firm s business deteriorates to the point where it cannot meet its financial obligations the firm is said to have entered the state of financial distress the first signals of distress are usually violations of debt covenants coupled with the omission or reduction of dividends some financially distressed firms eventually go bankrupt others recover or manage to settle the claims against them out of court 1 the behavior of firms in financial distress is interesting for two reasons first the costs of financial distress are an important element in capital structure theory in many models 2 these costs are hypothesized to counteract the tax benefits of leverage and lead to an internal optimum for the capital structure of the firm second financial distress has come to be recognized as a state in which contractual claims are incompletely specified standard terms of the debt equity contract are violated when the firm enters financial distress and claimants may then decide not to act according to previously agreed upon rules or legal formulas recent history has provided a number of examples of firms in financial distress including massey ferguson international harvester chrysler and braniff the resolution of claims in these situations often differs from what is predicted by legal rules or standard theoretical models this paper examines the actual resolution of claims in the reorganization of massey ferguson ltd in part i we use time series data on daily stock returns to test different specifications of priority rules for debt and equity claims in part ii we consider whether massey ferguson avoided deadweight costs of financial distress through the restructuring of claims negotiated among creditors during the winter of 1980 81

the theory of international factor flows the basic model abstract the basic model used to discuss the simultaneous international flow of labor and capital is a one commodity model in which a common technology is shared between countries the ramaswami result wherein an optimal restriction of labor inflows is superior to an optimal restriction on capital outflows for a capital abundant country is extended to reveal that optimality requires inflows of both factors box diagrams and iso welfare contours are used to show how optimal policy rankings are reversed if foreign labor must be paid higher home wages

how trade related are intellectual property rights abstract there is little empirical evidence about whether differing international levels of patent protection influence trade flows if a nation strengthens its patent laws it could experience higher or lower imports we specify an empirical model in which deviations of bilateral sectoral imports from anticipated levels are related to income trade barriers and patent laws patent regulations in the importing country are corrected for endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables the results of the final equations indicate that increasing patent protection has a positive impact on bilateral manufacturing imports into both small and large developing economies

tax evasion and orders of risk aversion abstract the classic allingham and sandmo s journal of public economics 1 1972 323 338 portfolio choice approach to income tax evasion has been increasingly criticised because it requires an excess degree of risk aversion to explain the observed rate of tax compliance in this paper we argue that there may not necessarily be excess risk aversion and that the evidence can be explained by the distinction between orders of risk aversion as defined by segal and spivak journal of economic theory 51 1990 111 125 and considered in regard to the same problem of anomalous excess risk aversion in financial and insurance markets

corporate performance and managerial remuneration an empirical analysis abstract economic theories of efficient compensation predict a positive relationship between executive pay and corporate performance and yet efforts to document this relationship have been largely unsuccessful in this paper we argue that previous cross sectional studies have omitted important variables which seriously bias their results using data that focus on individual executives over time we find that executive compensation is strongly positively related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales the results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized

tax evasion is not a gamble a report on two experiments abstract a tax evasion experiment and an equivalent gambling experiment indicate that contrary to the standard model of evasion tax evasion and gambling are quite different although the standard model provides a good basis for analysis of evasion

avoiding tax avoidance a repeated game theoretic approach abstract we propose an optimal auditing scheme for the tax authorities who face a given tax and penalty functions and a given budget constraint under our proposed strategy individuals can be classified into one of three groups each group is characterized by two parameters i the probability of being audited in that group and ii into which group will an individual move if ii a he reported truthfully ii b he cheated it is then shown that there is a choice of these parameters so that in equilibrium i e when every individual maximizes his payoff given the auditing strategy the percentage of individuals that cheat is arbitrarily small

international protection of intellectual property we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy we consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation after describing the determination of national patent policies in a non cooperative regime of patent protection we ask why is intellectual property better protected in the north than in the south we also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency jel o34 f13 during the 1980 s and early 1990 s the united states and several european countries expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of intellectual property in many developing countries the developed countries made the upgrading of intellectual property rights iprs one of their highest priorities for the uruguay round of trade talks their efforts bore fruit in the agreement on traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights trips which was approved as part of the final act of the uruguay round trips establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intellectual property for example in the area of new technology it essentially harmonizes

the role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options we explore how ceo power affects the repricing of executive options the spread between an option s exercise or strike price and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing

are company founders underpaid this article examines the relation between founder status and ceo compensation in publicly listed us firms the results suggest that ceo founders receive lower cash pay and total compensation compared to professional managers in contrast ceos who are relatives of the founders receive similar cash pay and total compensation to that of professional managers different compensation levels also emerge in terms of stock option awards the findings underline the importance of distinguishing among these three ceo types when examining the determinants of executive compensation

contracts intellectual property rights and multinational investment in developing countries abstract the policy debate between multinational firms favoring strong contract law and host country governments who often oppose such protection motivates the paper local agents managers learn the multinational s technology and can defect to start a rival firm contract enforcement including binding the multinational itself makes the multinational better off outcomes for the host country are more complex depending on mode switches induced by enforcement if enforcement induces the multinational to switch from exporting to local production welfare improves if local production was occurring anyway enforcement may result in the loss of rents to local agents and lower welfare

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

reward for luck in a dynamic agency model this paper studies a continuous time principal agent problem of a rm whose cash ows are determined by the manager s unobserved eort the rm s cash ows are further subject to persistent and publicly observable shocks that are beyond the manager s control while standard contracting models predict that compensation should optimally lter out these shocks empirical evidence suggests otherwise in line with this evidence our model predicts that the manager is rewarded for luck

a fairness approach to income tax evasion abstract the tax that a taxpayer wishes to evade is determined on the basis of his perception of the fairness of his fiscal treatment with respect to both governmental supply of public goods and the perceived behaviour of other taxpayers the coercive powers of the state and the taxpayer s attitude toward risk determine the extent to which this desired level is undertaken in practice this approach is able to produce implications for the relationship between public expenditure tax rates and tax evasion which are more consistent with empirical evidence than the results of the conventional portfolio choice approach