interest organizations and distributive politics small business subsidies in mexico summary politicians often use distributive programs to build and maintain electoral linkages with interest organizations this project analyzes the factors that lead mexican state governments to allocate distributive benefits to small business organizations sbos rather than directly to entrepreneurs or to other groups theoretically i address how electoral threats to the ruling party shape the incentives of politicians to deliver benefits to core and non core interest organizations using an original dataset of decentralized small business subsidies i deploy a novel subnational design comparing states governed by parties with different relationships to sbos facing different levels of electoral threat i find that electoral competition shapes politicians incentives for incorporating organizations in distributive spending governors from the pro small business pan increase allocations to sbos when they are electorally strong while governors from the centrist pri allocate more to these organizations when they face an electoral threat case studies provide additional evidence that ruling politicians allocate benefits to sbos when linkages with these groups contribute to their most pressing electoral objectives

linkages and vertical integration in the chinese economy the original concept of vertical integration can be applied only to the analysis of the relationship between final demand and gross output but is unsuitable for most of supply oriented studies where what matters are the interindustry relations for example vertical integration of an industrial district with the rest of the economy cannot be measured with the traditional technique and should be accounted for by a different measure that considers the direct and indirect demand derived from the whole gross output of the district in such a way it is possible to measure the expansionary potential that any industry has on any other one constructing an index of vertical integration these concepts are then applied to the input output table of a developing country like china and they provide some understanding of the routes development strategies have to follow copyright 1991 by mit press

shared producer and consumer responsibility theory and practice abstract over the past decade an increasing number of authors have been examining the nexus of producer versus consumer responsibility often dealing with the question of how to assign responsibility for internationally traded greenhouse gas emissions recently a similar problem has appeared in drafting the standards for the ecological footprint while the method traditionally assumes a full life cycle perspective with full consumer responsibility a large number of producers businesses and industry sectors have started to calculate their own footprints see www isa org usyd edu au adding any producer s footprint to other producers footprints or to population footprints which all already cover the full upstream supply chain of their operating inputs leads to double counting the sum of footprints of producers and consumers is larger than the total national footprint the committee in charge of the footprint standardisation process was hence faced with the decades old non additivity problem posing the following dilemma for the accounting of footprints or any other production factor if one disallows double counting but wishes to be able to account for producers and consumers then one cannot impose the requirement of full life cycle coverage the supply chains of actors have to be curtailed somehow in order to avoid double counting this work demonstrates and discusses a non arbitrary method of consistently delineating these supply chains into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive portions of responsibility to be shared by all actors in an economy

clientelism as persuasion buying evidence from latin america in distributing clientelistic payoffs to citizens the best strategy a party machine can pursue we argue is to target citizens who are opinion leading epicenters in informal conversation networks this persuasion buying strategy carries the highest potential yield for the party because the payoff can create a social multiplier the effect of the clientelistic gift can be magnified via the conversion of multiple voters within a payoff recipient s personal networks using cross sectional survey data from 22 latin american countries and a panel survey from mexico we confirm that individuals who engage in frequent political persuasion and who are located in large political discussion networks are the most likely recipients of clientelistic payoffs we also show that a finding that is key to previous theories namely that loyal partisans are the most likely targets of clientelism is driven by omitted variable and endogeneity bias

a micromodeling approach to investigate the advertising sales relationship the purpose of this paper is to derive a model of advertising effects on the firm s sales a micromodel is postulated and aggregated across individuals and over time to produce a macromodel of the aggregate sales advertising relationship for a single product the micromodel postulated is very simple it incorporates two factors reach of the ads and rate of decay of their effectiveness over time this approach to modeling advertising effects is shown to be fruitful in several respects 1 the coefficients of the aggregate equation are easily interpretable in terms of the reach and decay parameters 2 the model derived is nonlinear yet estimable 3 a special case of the model is very similar to lag models that have been in use 4 the model can be used whatever the unit of time is 5 the carryover effect of advertising as commonly defined is not constant but depends upon the previous spending levels and 6 the model helps illustrate that the duration of advertising may be greatly overstated if aggregate lagged dependent variable models are simplistically interpreted

recovering measures of advertising carryover from aggregate data the role of the firm s decision behavior data interval bias the biased estimation of advertising carryover in aggregate data can be viewed as a misinterpretation of the aggregate advertising sales relationship due to missing micro advertising data this paper argues that if the researcher does not explicitly model the firm s advertising decisions he will incorrectly interpolate the missing data and thereby allow the firm s decision behavior to influence inferences about advertising carryover drawing upon a general model of advertising decision behavior the expected aggregate form of the koyck relationship is developed and compared to existing bias correction methodologies although it is difficult to find any parsimonious procedure which is robust with respect to all types of decision behavior allowing lagged advertising to enter the classical koyck equation emerges as a simple method of obtaining a reasonable estimate of advertising carryover in aggregate data

aggregation in variance of shared responsibility a case study of australia abstract this article deals with shared producer and consumer responsibility a concept aimed at overcoming the non additivity or double counting problem in corporate and national sustainability reporting it reports on the potentially distorting effects that varying sector and business classifications could have on the apportioning of emissions or other sustainability measures amongst producers and consumers in an economy a quantitative in variance analysis is provided which shows that shared responsibility formulations are remarkably stable under extreme aggregation of the underlying input output data value added pegging of the sharing parameters generally reduces variance in comparison to constant sharing parameters these results help in substantiating the robustness of the shared responsibility concept a feature which is critically important if shared responsibility were to become corporate and national reporting practice

incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems a simple model is used to compare under different electoral systems the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters by making campaign promises that favor small groups rather than appealing equally to all voters in this game model each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1 symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank scoring rules approval voting and single transferable vote voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate in this model the most severely unequal campaign promises

water use in the spanish economy an input output approach against the background of the water limitations that often appear in spain the aim of this paper is to study the behaviour of the productive sectors of the spanish economy as direct and indirect consumers of water to that end we employ input output analysis with the particular methodology being based on the linkages analysis known as the hypothetical extraction method hem we have introduced three modifications to this method first the valuation is made in terms of water consumption secondly we obtain the components of the impacts of each block of activity into which the economy is divided with these components being described as the internal effect mixed linkage net or external backward linkage and net or external forward linkage thirdly this methodology is used to detect key sectors our results confirm the marked importance of the agriculture food and other services blocks as regards the direct and indirect consumption of water in general we also find that other services chemicals metals and electronics and agriculture blocks play an important role in explaining the consumption of drinking water moreover the hem analysis allows us to classify productive sectors according to their forward or backward linkage character in a way that is more precise than that permitted by earlier methods finally this methodology can be extended to other types of environmental pressures 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the role of subnational politicians in distributive politics political bias in venezuela s land reform under chavez this article examines how the partisanship of empowered subnational politicians can affect within district benefit distribution i present a theory of the role of subnational politicians in distributive politics and then test this theory on a distributive venezuelan land reform initiative by leveraging unique individual level data on revealed voter preferences and the receipt of particularistic benefits using data from a list of millions of voters who signed petitions to recall former president chavez i match information on recent land grant applicants to petition signers to measure how political preferences affect the likelihood of applying for and receiving land and how state governors condition this relationship i find evidence for both strategic core voter targeting and blockage of benefits to opposition voters these effects however are modified by the political affiliation of governors the findings point to the importance of considering how intervening subnational politicians influence distr

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

redistributive politics and economic efficiency the political process often compensates the losers from technical change or international competition in an economically inefficient way namely by subsidizing or protecting declining industries instead of encouraging the movement of resources to other more productive uses we find that a dynamic inconsistency in the game of redistributive politics contributes to this outcome to achieve economically efficient outcomes it is necessary that those making economically inefficient choices not be given offsetting transfers but the political process distributes income on the basis of political characteristics which are in general different from the economic characteristics that are rewarded by the market we identify circumstances in which the inefficient choosers have desirable political characteristics and are therefore immune from threats of having to face the economic consequences of their choices

intertemporal aggregation of heterogeneous consumers abstract this paper deals with a relatively unexamined facet of stochastic brand switching models their connection to market share models we derive a composite market share model based on aggregation of heterogeneous markovian type individuals each purchasing a brand from the product class several times during the period of analysis the characteristics of this composite model are examined and interestingly suggest a markov type market share model moreover this examination sheds some light on a phenomenon uncovered in econometric studies of market share response to advertising the slow decay of the lagged market share term as the length of the measurement period is increased

a meta analysis of marketing communication carryover effects abstractto optimally set marketing communication marcom budgets reliable estimates of short term elasticities and carryover effects are required empirical generalizations from meta analyses of prior field studies can help guide these decisions however the last such meta analysis of marcom carryover effects was performed on koyck model based estimates collected before 1984 and was confined to mass media advertising the authors update and extend extant empirical generalizations via two meta analyses of carryover estimates compiled from studies encompassing personal selling targeted advertising and mass media advertising using diverse model forms until 2015 the first is focused on and utilizes 918 estimates of the carryover proportion of the total effect termed long term share of the total effect and the second focuses on 863 derivable estimates of 90 implied duration intervals the authors find the mean long term shares of the total effect for personal selling 687 and targeted advertisin

international tax coordination regionalism versus globalism tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor i study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature the model highlights the crucial distinction between global tax coordination and regional coordination with high capital mobility between the tax union and the rest of the world the welfare gain from regional capital income tax coordination is only a small fraction of the gain from global coordination even if the tax union is large relative to the world economy

when parties meet voters assessing political linkages through partisan networks and distributive expectations in argentina and chile this article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party voter linkages from the perspective of voters where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is access to publicly provided benefits in the former case partisan networks mediate access to goods in the latter beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks we show that these different access mechanisms shape voters distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks we test it using original survey data from argentina and chile and show variation both across and within countries on party voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties organizational capacity

carryover effects and temporal aggregation in a partial adjustment model framework this paper discusses the impact of aggregating time series observations on the specification of an econometric model in the framework of a familiar sales response model temporally aggregated specifications are derived it is illustrated that different aggregation schemes provide different models each of them having appealing characteristics furthermore the derived specifications illustrate that frequently calibrated models are misspecified and as such provide biased estimates which significantly affect the interpretation of the results some suggestions are provided for estimating the exact specifications in such a way that the obtained parameter estimates provide correct insights into the underlying response process

estimating micro relationships from macro data a comparative study of two approximations of the brand loyal model under temporal aggregation the data interval bias issue in econometric studies of the relationship between advertising and sales first was discussed in jmr by clarke in 1976 within the last few years several studies report

ideology tactics and efficiency in redistributive politics we model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes respectively ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high clout groups with disproportionately many swing voters which the parties also ply with pork barrel projects our results relate to director s law which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor

temporal aggregation the data interval bias and empirical estimation of bimonthly relations from annual data in an important study reviewing the literature on econometric studies of the relationship between advertising and sales clarke clarke darral g 1976 econometric measurement of the duration of advertising effects on sales j marketing res 13 november 345 357 concluded that the implied duration interval of the effects of advertising on sales were too long when the studies used annual data a theoretical explanation is provided here for the observation of parameter estimates which vary with the data interval employed in the analysis parameter estimates are developed on the basis of data aggregated at various levels of temporal aggregation and compared with theoretical values it is demonstrated that it is possible to recover bimonthly parameters when only annual data are available

small aggregates big manipulation vote buying enforcement and collective monitoring vote buying is widespread in developing democracies despite the secret ballot what explains its resilience i argue that brokers condition future payments on published electoral results to enforce these transactions and that this is effective at inducing voters compliance only when the results of small voting groups are available using monitors and citizens reports of electoral manipulation and survey data from colombia i find a robust negative correlation between the average polling station size and various measures of vote buying evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that this relationship can be attributed to aggregate monitoring sustaining these transactions and not to the brokers increased ability to identify compliers or other characteristics of places where polling stations are small replication materials the data code and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the american journal of political science dataverse within the harvard dataverse network at http dx doi org 10 7910 dvn k6zoow

beyond the machine clientelist brokers and interest organizations in latin america organizational membership is one of the strongest yet overlooked predictors of vote buying across latin america we argue that this relationship is driven by the fact that politicians outsource some of their vote buying efforts to interest associations in contrast to the existing literature that focuses on party brokers who are loyal to a single political machine we introduce the concepts of organizational brokers who represent interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles and hybrid brokers who split their loyalties between an interest association and a single political party we illustrate the operation of these alternative broker types through case studies of street vending organizations in an uninstitutionalized party system colombia and peasant organizations in an institutionalized party system mexico attention to the role of brokers and the organizations that they represent has implications for political accountability collective action and the

the political economy of fertilizer subsidy programs in africa evidence from zambia fertilizer subsidy programs have re emerged as popular policy tools in sub saharan africa despite a burgeoning body of literature on program impacts the political economy of the programs remains poorly understood in particular there is a dearth of empirical evidence to support or refute the conventional wisdoms that governments systematically target subsidized inputs to certain areas based on past voting patterns and that fertilizer subsidies win votes this article discusses the theoretical links between government targeting of subsidized fertilizer and voter behavior then uses panel data from zambia to empirically test these conventional wisdoms results suggest that zambia s movement for multi party democracy governments targeted more subsidized fertilizer to households in areas where it had strong support in the previous presidential election however contrary to conventional wisdom marginal changes in the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program had no statistically significant effect on the share or number of votes won by incumbent presidents

what wins votes why some politicians opt out of clientelism in a context where clientelism is widespread why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior i argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of clientelism clientelism decreases support from nonpoor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives i posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in clientelism i test this claim using an original measure of clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in argentine municipalities the results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with clientelism when poverty is also high only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does clientelism decline

distributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile abstractdistributive politics and spatial equity the allocation of public investment in chile regional studies this paper analyzes the influence of electoral concerns on investment distribution from the central government to chilean municipalities drawing upon panel data it shows that investment is mediated by pork barrel and political budget cycles as well as favouring the relatively better off areas estimations also reveal that resources are channelled to the municipalities where the vote margin in local elections is larger whereas national results are not relevant indicating that local governments lobbying capacity is prioritized over national electoral interests based on these results the implications for regional governance and for reducing the margin of arbitrary allocations are discussed