adapting contract theory to fit contract farming this article discusses the current state of contract theory and its usefulness for conceptualizing issues related to agricultural contracting i will discuss the limitations of existing theory for applied work and what methodological improvements are needed to enhance the usefulness of the theory to agricultural economists one pervasive problem is that the canonical economic literature on contracts is rather fragmented and the various methodological strands are narrow in their focus as such there is a need for agricultural economists to engage in methodological research to develop applied contracting models that can capture higher order features of real world agricultural contracts while delivering generalizable comparative statics predictions the need for such research is obvious as contracting continues to expand along the entire modern food marketing channel in the latter part of this article i develop a simple model to illustrate how classic methodological approaches can be combined with recent developments in contract and game theory to construct applied theory models that are useful for capturing some important features of agricultural contracts

the impact of minimum wages on youth employment in portugal textabstractfrom january 1 1987 the legal minimum wage for workers aged 18 and 19 in portugal was uprated to the full adult rate generating a 49 3 increase between 1986 and 1987 in the legal minimum wage for this age group this shock is used as a natural experiment to evaluate the impact of the minimum wage change on teenagers employment by using a large firm level micro data set it is shown that by comparing the employment growth of 18 19 year old workers with their 20 25 year old counterparts one can identify the employment effects of the minimum wage hike the same comparisons are done with 30 35 year old workers this study finds that the rise in the minimum wage significantly reduced employment this conclusion is reinforced by evidence showing that these employment effects are concentrated in firms more likely to be affected by the change in the law

the performance of agricultural market advisory services in corn and soybeans the purpose of this article is to evaluate the performance of market advisory services for the 1995 2003 corn and soybean crops a new database from the agricultural market advisory services agmas project is used in the evaluation this database should not be subject to survivorship and hindsight biases overall the results provide little evidence that advisory services as a group outperform market benchmarks particularly after considering risk the evidence is more positive versus the farmer benchmarks even after taking risk into account results also suggest that it is difficult to predict the pricing performance of advisory services across crop years

using local labor market data to re examine the employment effects of the minimum wage using quarterly census data for 1996 2000 the author evaluates how minimum wages affected teenage employment at the county level an analysis that includes all counties yields small and statistically insignificant effects consistent with previous research using state panels however in counties where the minimum wage was likely binding above the market clearing wage for teens the negative impact on employment was considerably larger the effect was strongest in small counties was restricted to transitory jobs and new hires and apparently was not experienced by young adults ages 19 22 the small employment effects found in much of the literature the author argues at least partly reflect the estimates inclusion of local labor markets where the minimum wage is not binding by averaging the effects across all areas with no disaggregation based on where the minimum wage is binding and where it is not these studies overlook important regional variation

public procurement with unverifiable quality the case for discriminatory competitive procedures unverifiable quality may affect the enforcement of procurement contracts even when the award procedure is able to select the most efficient firm in the market in this paper we show that a discriminatory competitive mechanism which awards the contract on the basis of price and firms past performance yields an efficient allocation of the contract and allows the buyer to implement her desired quality quality enforcement arises out of relational contracting whereby the buyer handicaps a contractor in future competitive tendering processes if it fails to provide the required quality we study an infinitely repeated procurement model with two firms and one buyer imperfectly informed on the firms cost in which in each period the buyer runs a discriminatory auction we restrict our analysis to the case of a buyer committed to her handicapping strategy a case which captures some of the features of a public buyer when players use either grim trigger or stick and carrot strategies we find that the buyer can induce the delivery of optimal unverifiable quality with a variety of handicap levels and when applicable durations of the punishment period for some values of the handicap and the length of the punishment period both firms remain active in the market even when punished

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

a note on information seasonality and the disappearance of the weekend effect in the uk stock market the weekend effect in uk stock prices has disappeared in the 1990s beneath the surface however there remain systematic day of the week effects only visible when returns are partitioned by the direction of the market a systematic pattern of market wide news arrivals into the uk stock market is discovered and found to provide an explanation for these day of the week effects

exploring the determinants of emerging bioenergy market participation abstract individual biomass producers will play a strong role in the emergence of robust and sustainable bioenergy markets research on what drives their participation however is substantial but fragmented despite a recognition of producer heterogeneity there have also been few comparative analyses of drivers of bioenergy market participation across feedstock types producer groups and geographic regions through narrative review and network analysis the following review of the bioenergy market participation literature generates both an increased appreciation of how bioenergy market participation is assessed in existing research and how social network analysis may be further employed as a tool for literature review across 41 studies selected for qualitative review and a subset of 22 selected for quantitative review the analysis reaches two central conclusions the first pertains to the findings of the literature itself suggesting that a variety of non production objectives structural and social constraints and market related attributes influence bioenergy market participation decisions a second conclusion is that the assessment of these factors varies significantly across the literature for both user group and feedstock type further examination of the individual variables within these segments of the literature as well as of authorship patterns across them suggests that this variation may rise from differences in the subject matter itself and not from differing perspectives of the researchers undertaking the work should disparities in the literature be reflective of actual socio economic differences in their respective markets policies or programs targeted to individual feedstock types or user groups may be more effective in encouraging participation than uniform national policy initiatives

implicit contracts moral hazard and unemployment this paper considers a firm whose marginal revenue product of labor is a random variable we derive the form of an optimal long term contract between workers and the firm under the assumption that labor s marginal product is observed by the firm but not by the workers we show that the existence of asymmetric information causes unemployment to be greater than in a situation where information about labor s marginal product is public or where employment is determined in spot markets in particular unemployment can occur when the marginal product of labor exceeds the reservation wage

reputation and hierarchy in dynamic models of employment the employment relationship with employees ability and their actions both private information thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard is modeled as a repeated game with self enforcing contracts being perfect bayesian nash equilibria under termination contracts the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks finite in number even though ability is continuous reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment selection by bonding is not in general incentive compatible but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is many other features correspond to observed employment structures

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

happy birthday you re fired the effects of an age dependent minimum wage on youth employment flows in the netherlands the dutch minimum wage for workers aged 15 to 23 is defined as a stepwise increasing function of a worker s calendar age using dutch administrative records the author shows that the birthday disc

the effect of value line investment survey rank changes on common stock prices abstract the information content of value line investment survey rank changes is investigated the results suggest rank changes affect common stock prices but the effect varies by the type of rank change changes from rank 2 to rank 1 have the most dramatic impact on prices a cross sectional analysis finds small firms have a greater reaction to a rank change than larger firms which supports theories on the frequency of report arrival and precision of information a speed of adjustment test concludes the prices of individual securities adjust to the information in a rank change over a multiple day period

rewarding performance by promotion to a different job abstract use of promotions rather than performance related pay to provide incentives can be justified if performance is non verifiable information this does not explain why promotion is to a different job rather than simply a better paid job the effectiveness of tournaments is undermined however if unsuccessful workers are equally suited to higher paid jobs and can engage in bribery or other influence activity a promotion based reward structure with pay tied to jobs can be made immune to such activity if misallocations of employees to jobs are costly to the firm

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication abstract this paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment by allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature s common but overly restrictive focus on one shot direct communication in addition general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment first they allow us to identify the local downward incentive constraints as the relevant ones if the agent s preferences satisfy a single crossing property second we show how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communication device an example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one shot direct communication

conditioning the return generating process on firm specific events a discussion of event study methods empirical investigations into the codetermination of security prices and eco nomic events are called event studies there are several ways of estimating the codetermination of interest since fama fisher jensen and roll 8 it has been general practice to first translate variables into rates of return then net out gen eral market movements and finally examine the relationship between residual returns and events the methodology in all of its variants fails under the rubric of 4 residual analysis empirical methods used in residual analysis deviate from the structure and terminology generally found in classical econometrics while this is not a criticism of residual analysis it results in a communication problem that is more than simply pedantic in nature a broad body of econometric literature dealing with parameter estimation statistical inference and hypothesis testing often goes untapped by empiricists in finance who within internally consistent sets of as sumptions have created a separate body of statistical methods in this paper a union of the two disciplines is advocated to provide a forum for comparing and contrasting alternative empirical methods the event study problem is broken down into three phases the parameterization of informa tion arrival applicable to the problem an examination ofthe relationship between parameters in the information arrival process and the estimates resulting from alternative estimation methods and aggregation across firms experiencing simi

the existence of self enforcing implicit contracts implicit contracts are nontrivial nash equilibria to the post hiring trading game between a worker and the employer these are supported by intrafirm rather than labor market reputations the existence of an implicit contract that supports efficient trade is proved in a simple model

the interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency abstract in a repeated principal agent model in which the agent s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court the agent s incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior explicit short term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite horizon implicit contract between principal and agent in a constrained efficient equilibrium bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries total consumption and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 d8

farmers willingness to contract switchgrass as a cellulosic bioenergy crop in kansas farmers adoption of cellulosic biofuel feedstock enterprises plays an important role in the future of agriculture and the renewable fuels industry however no set markets currently exist for bioenergy feedstocks outside of very localized geographic locations and farmers may be reluctant to produce the feedstocks without contracts that help mitigate uncertainty and risk this study examines farmers willingness to grow switchgrass under contract using a stated choice approach data were collected using an enumerated survey of kansas farmers and analyzed using latent class logistic regression models farmers whose primary enterprise is livestock are less inclined to grow switchgrass shorter contracts greater harvest flexibility crop insurance and cost share assistance increase the likelihood that farmers will grow switchgrass for bioenergy production

renegotiation and information revelation over time the case of optimal labor contracts the paper analyzes the issue of commitment in grossman and hart s model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability we extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time at equidistant intervals when both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract this replicates the grossman hart outcome each subperiod when precommitment is not possible information revealed through the contract can create pareto improving renegotiation opportunities and the issue of optimal information revelation arises the paper analyzes the impact of ex post pareto improving renegotiations on the optimal contract

gift giving and worker productivity evidence from a firm level experiment abstract we present results from a field experiment designed to measure worker response to a monetary gift from their employer the experiment took place inside a tree planting firm paying its workforce incentive contracts firm managers told a crew of tree planters they would receive a pay raise for one day as a result of a surplus not attributable to past planting productivity we compare planter productivity the number of trees planted per day on the day the gift was handed out with productivity on previous and subsequent days of planting on the same block and thus under similar planting conditions we find direct evidence that the gift had a significant and positive effect on daily planter productivity controlling for planter fixed effects weather conditions and other random daily shocks

earnings losses of displaced workers revisited recent literature reviews conclude that job displacement results in sustained earnings losses bruce c fallick 1996 lori g kletzer 1998 and that estimates of the size of those reductions vary with the type of data used in the analysis the industry within which displacement occurs and business cycle conditions the largest estimated losses were obtained using administrative data from pennsylvania during the 1970s and 1980s louis s jacobson robert j lalonde and daniel g sullivan 1993a the data covered a period of high unemployment in a heavily indus trialized state characterized by disproportionate job losses in manufacturing thus the ability to generalize those results to more favorable economic times and states with a greater reliance on service sector employment has been questioned to address these issues administrative data are used to similarly examine the impact of job displacement on earnings losses of workers in connecticut from 1993 to 2004 the work of jacobson lalonde and sullivan jls also provided important methodologi cal advancement by adapting analytical techniques developed for program evaluation james j heckman and v joseph hotz 1989 to the context of job displacement the same techniques fixed effects and time trend estimators as those used in the original jls publication are initially employed here then the methods are extended to include matching estimators developed since their publication both nearest neighbor estimators of average treatment on the treated att and differenced average treatment on the treated datt are adapted to the context of this study heckman hidehiko ichimura and petra todd 1997 heckman et al 1998 and rajeev h dehejia and sadek wahba 1999 2002 the results presented here for connecticut differ in some ways from those found in the work of jls using data from pennsylvania in the period immediately following job loss regardless of the technique employed earnings reductions for workers displaced through mass layoff range from 32 percent to 33 percent jls reported immediate losses of more than 40 percent six years later using the same estimators as jls earnings reductions in connecticut range from 13 percent to 15 percent they report sustained losses in pennsylvania of 25 percent the smaller long term impacts in connecticut demonstrate that under more ordinary economic times esti mated losses from administrative data lie within the range observed using other data sources this finding resolves a long standing conflict among the results of high quality studies that have used differing data sources to study earnings reductions following job loss 1 using two different matching estimators earnings losses six years after mass layoff are 12 percent the matching estimators compare those who experienced mass layoff to compari sons with the same ex ante probability of the event these smaller losses are consistent with the

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

public service motivation as an argument for government provision a public service motivation psm inclines employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service though deemed to be important in the literature on public administration this motivation has not been formally considered by economists when a psm exists this paper establishes conditions under which government bureaucracy can better obtain psm motivated effort from employees than a standard profit maximizing firm the model also provides an efficiency rationale for low powered incentives in both bureaucracies and other organizations producing social services 2000 elsevier science s a all rights reserved

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

evaluating the minimum wage exemption of the long term unemployed in germany the authors evaluate the exemption of long term unemployed job seekers from germany s national minimum wage using linked survey and administrative micro data they rely on a regression discontinui

restricting the means of exchange within organizations abstract this paper considers why firms often ban monetary exchange between their employees while encouraging these trades through other means such as through the reciprocation of favours or barter despite classical inefficiencies associated with non monetary exchange we illustrate two themes as to why non monetary trade may be preferred to allowing money first the use of non monetary trade may affect the allocation of rents in surplus enhancing ways as agents respond strategically to the existence of these rents second non monetary trade improves the ability of agents to impose sanctions on those who act dishonestly

formal measures in informal management can a balanced scorecard change a culture abstract we extend traditional agency theory by exploring the roles for formal measures when managerial behavior is not governed by rules formulas or contracts part i describes relational incentive contracts with informal weights on formal performance measures more importantly it also explores how formal measures could be used in models of informal management such as adaptation and coordination politics and influence leadership and informal authority part ii considers the benefits from allowing key stakeholders to develop their own potentially inferior performance measures the collaboration to create a balanced scorecard of performance measures can help change an organization s culture

contract theory and implications for perennial energy crop contracting abstract this article provides an overview of modern contract theory and discusses the implications of the theory for contracting for perennial dedicated energy crops we discuss some of the unique challenges of contracting for dedicated energy crops used for the production of advanced biofuels and survey some of the relevant concepts and research from the contract theory literature to address these challenges we focus primarily on the mechanism design or complete contracts approach to contracting which involves optimizing some objective function e g profits costs etc with respect to contract terms subject to important incentive constraints the solution to these optimization problems typically highlight important tradeoffs that a contract designer needs to consider in order to maximize profits and or minimize costs

cross country evidence on labor market institutions and young adult employment through the financial crisis i develop and analyze a set of cross country facts regarding employment and wage setting institutions over the decade surrounding the 2008 financial crisis among long industrialized countries young adult employment declined more than prime age employment over this time period i show that differences in countries wage setting institutions strongly predict variations in the magnitude of declines in young adult employment both unconditionally and conditional on changes in macroeconomic conditions young adult employment declined 5 percentage points less in countries where wage setting is driven by collective bargaining arrangements than in countries with statutory wage floors evidence on the evolution of legislated minimum wage rates and of an asymmetry in the relationship between growth and young adult employment suggest an important role for a standard wage rigidity mechanism

productive low morale abstract this paper models employment relationship as a repeated principal agent problem with private evaluation the efficient contracts exhibit correlated movements between lagged wage and current effort that are consistent with the positive feedback between pay and morale in practice low morale therefore is an integral part of a well functioning relationship

incentives between firms and within this paper reviews the significant progress in agency theory i e the economic theory of incentives during the 1990s with an eye toward applications to supply transactions i emphasize six recent models in three pairs 1 new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts 2 new directions in incentive theory and 3 new applications to supply transactions by reviewing these six models i hope to establish three things first the theory of incentive contracts needed and received new foundations second new directions in incentive theory teach us that incentive contracts are not the only source of incentives finally and especially relevant to supply transactions the integration decision is an instrument in the incentive problem

show me the money the value of college graduate attributes as expressed by employers and perceived by students employers of agricultural undergraduates are presented with hypothetical job candidates with different attributes and salaries and are asked which candidate if any they would hire the employer choices are then used to estimate the additional salary they will pay for undergraduates with certain attributes students are administered similar surveys where they indicate which hypothetical candidate they think will be hired which can be used to estimate students perceived salary increase associated with each attribute employers stated values are then compared to students perceived values to identify any misperceptions regarding the monetary return of select attributes

commitment through renegotiation proof contracts with third parties the paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment that is commitment against outside parties to the agreement it considers the example of an incumbent firm which enters a contractual relationship with its workers in order to deter entry it assumes away the possibility for the parties to precommit not to make pareto improving renegotiations of the agreement once entry has taken place under symmetric information the contract is thus found to be useless for entry deterrence if the incumbent firm or workers possess some private information excessive post entry production levels can however be sustained ex post since output reductions may not be incentive compatible while information asymmetries are usually welfare decreasing when the goal is optimal risk sharing they can thus be welfare improving for the contracting parties when commitment against outsiders is the goal of the contract the role of the renegotiation process as a constraint on sustainable agreements is stressed in the paper and the general relevance of strategic contractual commitment is discussed

market reactions to messages from brokerage ratings systems one dimension of the strategies investment houses use to present investment advice is the number of categories in their rating systems we studied three four and five level systems and found that in all rating systems upgrades outnumber downgrades price reactions are more pronounced to multiple level than to single level recommendation changes and to recommendation upgrades to the highest rating category these price reactions confirm that the market gleans new information from analysts research but suggest that investors at least partially recognize analysts tendency toward optimism and thus react more strongly to downgrades the price effects also show that adding more rating categories is not simply a way to portion out information in smaller bits some of the largest price reactions are to changes between the top two categories in a five level system even though the descriptions of the categories would not signal a portfolio action our results are consistent with the view that firms try to

biomass feedstock contracts role of land quality and yield variability in near term feasibility abstract in the absence of an infrastructure for the harvest storage and purchase of cellulosic biomass contracting is an important mechanism through which biorefineries can ensure adequate feedstock supply we develop an optimization model to assess the economic potential of dedicated energy crops when profit maximizing farmers allocate croplands of varying quality toward biomass in response to multi year contracts we evaluate the economic competitiveness of perennial grasses with traditional commodity crops in a case study of switchgrass production in tennessee assuming short term contracts we consider the importance of payment structure land quality energy crop yield and projected commodity crop returns on a farmer s decision to accept a contract for biomass production we find that a wholesale contract in which the farmer is guaranteed a price per unit biomass is most effective on the highest quality of land while a contract in which the farmer is guaranteed a price per acre is most effective on lower quality land from the biorefinery perspective a wholesale contract is most effective for short term contracts while an acreage contract is most effective for long term contracts breakeven pricing will only secure feedstock from farmers who produce commodity crops with unfavorable price outlooks on lower quality land therefore the contract price must include a premium in order to compete for space in the crop mix the yield profile of energy crops has a significant effect on the terms at which short term contracts will be accepted and land allocated toward feedstock production the extent to which energy crop yields observed in field trials can be maintained at commercial scale also has a substantial effect on the scale at which farmers would be willing to participate in energy crop production

the effect of minimum wages on youth employment in canada a panel study previous u s panel estimates of minimum wage effects have been criticized on the grounds that their identification rests on comparisons of low wage and high wage workers using canadian panel data for 1988 90 i compare estimates based on the traditional u s methodology with those based on samples of low wage workers exclusively the results would appear to vindicate the critics the minimum wage effect from the latter approach is virtually zero yet estimates from different subgroups of low wage workers indicate that there is a significant disemployment effect for those with longer low wage employment histories this highlights the heterogeneity within low wage workers and the importance of carefully defining the target group not solely based on workers wages

minimum wage effects on employment substitution and the teenage labor supply evidence from personnel data using personnel data from a large us retail firm i examine the firm s response to the 1996 federal minimum wage increase compulsory increases in average wages had negative but statistically insignificant effects on overall employment however increases in the relative wages of teenagers led to significant increases in the relative employment of teenagers especially younger and more affluent teenagers further analysis suggests a pattern consistent with noncompetitive models where the legislation affected mainly the wages of teenagers and so was only moderately binding it led both to higher teenage labor market participation and to higher absolute employment of teenagers

disentangling the minimum wage puzzle an analysis of worker accessions and separations changes in the legislation in the mid 1980s in portugal provide remarkably good conditions for analysis of the employment effects of mandatory minimum wages as the minimum wage increased sharply for a very specific group of workers relying on a matched employer employee panel data set we model gross worker flows accessions and separations in continuing firms as well as in new firms and those going out of business using a count regression model applied to proportions employment trends for teenagers the affected group are contrasted to those of older workers before and after the raise in the youth minimum wage the major effect on teenagers of a rising minimum wage has been the reduction of separations from the employer which during the period under analysis has compensated for the reduction of accessions to new and continuing firms in this sense our results can reconcile some of the previous evidence in the empirical literature when analyzing the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on youth employment without decomposing it by type of worker flow jel d21 j23 j38

unemployment and the efficiency wage hypothesis there has been much recent discussion of the reasons why prices in certain markets and in particular in labour markets may not adjust to eliminate excess supply the absence of speedy adjustment of prices is an essential feature of the recent models of disequilibrium macroeconomics but for the most part no explanation for this absence is provided from within those models one explanation that has been around in the literature for some time and has been receiving increasing attention recently is the efficiency wage hypothesis initially applied to developing economies see leibenstein i957 it has more recently been adapted to developed economies by weiss i 980 and used in the context of a keynesian macroeconomic model by hart i 980 similar concepts have been applied to the credit market by stiglitz and weiss i98i the purpose of the present paper is to explore further the conditions under which the notion of an efficiency wage is applicable and can provide an explanation of involuntary unemployment the essential feature of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that the productivity of a firm s employees increases as their wage is increased at least over an economically relevant part of its range if the wage paid by the firm is denoted by w the number of employees by l and the productivity of each employee by p w where p w o then the effective labour force of the firm e can be represented by

subjective evaluations with performance feedback this paper models two key roles of subjective performance evaluations their incentive role and their feedback role the paper shows that the feedback role makes subjective pay feasible even without repeated interaction as long as there exists some veri able measure of performance it also shows that while subjective pay is helpful it cannot achieve full e ciency however fully e cient incentives are achievable if the rm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers with a small number of workers a forced distribution is valuable only if the veri able measure is poor

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization in a world in which employment contracts are incomplete it is costly for a firm to establish credibility for honoring implicit terms of employment agreements by monitoring the employment relationships between the firm and its workers the labor union may provide the workforce with valuable information regarding the firm s adherence to these implicit agreements thus the union provides a signaling mechanism that allows workers to coordinate their actions in order to discipline the firm for a breach of the implicit contract this mechanism enhances the firm s credibility when forming employment contracts and facilitates increased employment levels

the effect of the minimum wage on the fast food industry using a longitudinal survey of fast food restaurants in texas the authors examine the impact of recent increases in the federal minimum wage on a low wage labor market less than 5 of fast food restaurants were using the new youth subminimum wage in july august 1991 even though the vast majority paid a starting wage below the new hourly minimum wage immediately before it became effective although some restaurants increased wages beyond the level needed to comply with higher minimum wages in both 1990 and 1991 those federal minimum wage increases greatly compressed the distribution of starting wages in the texas fast food industry two findings at variance with conventional predictions are that 1 employment increased more in those firms likely to have been most affected by the 1991 minimum wage increase than in other firms and 2 price changes were unrelated to mandated wage changes

the minimum wage and the great recession evidence of effects on the employment and income trajectories of low skilled workers abstract we estimate the minimum wage s effects on low skilled individuals employment and income trajectories following the great recession our approach exploits two dimensions of the data we analyze first we compare individuals in states that were fully bound by the 2007 to 2009 increases in the federal minimum wage to individuals in states that were not second we use variation in the minimum wage s bite across skill groups to separate our samples into target and within state control groups using the 2008 panel of the survey of income and program participation we find that binding minimum wage increases had significant negative effects on the employment and income growth of targeted workers although there are important limitations to our research designs our estimates are robust to adopting a range of alternative strategies to construct our analysis samples and to account for variation in the great recession s underlying severity across states in aggregate our estimates suggest that this period s minimum wage increases reduced aggregate employment rates by at least half of a percentage point in states that were bound by the federal minimum wage increases because our estimates are large relative to what one would infer from past research we emphasize the relevance of the historical episode we analyze

investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information this article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information bayesian environment an agent faces a hold up situation while making a cost reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal to prevent the hold up the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract the informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment for a large class of cost functions the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a power distribution

incentive compatible long term contracts and job rationing this article presents a model in which markets for long term contractual employment coexist with spot markets for labor assuming the absence of third party enforcement wage contracts are required to be incentive compatible as a consequence contract wages yield higher expected utility to the worker than spot market wages so that in equilibrium contractual long term jobs are rationed

incentives equality and contract renegotiations theory and evidence in the chinese banking industry renegotiation plays an important role in contract theory but the empirical study of renegotiation is almost non existent in the literature using a unique dataset from the chinese banking industry we find that the large majority of managerial incentive contracts are renegotiated after performances are realized we develop a model of contract renegotiation where supervisors and managers sign incentive contracts and then renegotiate them in the unique equilibrium of the model incentive contracts are almost always renegotiated ex post even though renegotiation is fully anticipated incentive contracts affect performance the predictions of the model find strong support from our empirical results

the impact of minimum wages on labour market transitions we investigate dierences in labour market transition rates in high versus low minimum wage regimes using canadian data spanning 1979 to 2008 the data include consistent questions on job tenure and reason for job separation for the whole period over the same time frame there were over 140 minimum wage changes in canada we nd that higher minimum wages are associated with lower hiring rates but also with lower job separation rates importantly the reduced separation rates are due mainly to reductions in layos occur in the rst 6 months of a job and are present for unskilled workers of all ages our estimates imply that a 10 increase in the minimum wage generates a 3 9 reduction in the layo rate we present a search and matching model that ts with these patterns and test its implications overall our results imply

when good measurement goes wrong new evidence that new york state s minimum wage reduced employment hoffman s 2015 replication of sabia burkhauser and hansen sbh 2012 suggests that unlucky measurement error in low skilled employment in the current population survey outgoing rotation group

on the relevance and composition of gifts within the firm evidence from field experiments we investigate the economic relevance and the composition of gifts within a firm where output is contractible we develop a structural behavioral model that identifies workers optimal reaction to monetary gifts received from their employer we estimate the model using data from two separate field experiments conducted within a tree planting firm we use the estimated structural parameters to generalize beyond the experiment simulating how workers would react to different gifts on the part of the firm within different labor market settings we find that gifts have a role to play within this firm increasing in importance when the workers outside alternatives deteriorate profit maximizing gifts would increase profits within slack labor markets by up to 10 on average and by up to 17 for certain types of workers

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

minimum wage shocks employment flows and labor market frictions we provide the first estimates of the effects of minimum wages on employment flows in the u s labor market identifying the impact using policy discontinuities at state borders we find that minimum wages have a sizable negative effect on employment flows but not stocks separations and accessions fall among affected workers we interpret our findings using a job ladder model in which minimum wage increases can reduce job to job transitions we find that a standard calibration of the model generates predicted relative magnitudes of the employment stock and flow elasticities that are very close to our reduced form estimates

do wage cuts damage work morale evidence from a natural field experiment employment contracts are often incomplete leaving many responsibilities subject to workers discretion high work morale is therefore essential for sustaining voluntary cooperation and high productivity in firms we conducted a field experiment to test whether workers reciprocate wage cuts and raises with low or high work productivity wage cuts had a detrimental and persistent impact on productivity reducing average output by more than 20 percent an equivalent wage increase however did not result in any productivity gains the results from an additional control experiment with high monetary performance incentives demonstrate that workers could still produce substantially more output leaving enough room for positive reactions altogether these results provide evidence consistent with a model of reciprocity as opposed to inequality aversion

on indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts abstract i examine the theoretical foundations underlying the incomplete contracts literature a common justification for the assumption that contracts are not fully contingent on the state of nature is to point out that some aspects of the state may be unforeseen or indescribable to the contracting partners at the time the contract is written i argue however that as long as risk averse parties can foresee the probabilities of their possible payoffs then the fact that they cannot describe the possible physical states does not matter even with renegotiation the parties can attain the same welfare as when full description is possible

optimal incentives for teams much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction this static assumption is not only unrealistic but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations the current paper introduces possible long term interaction among agents and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit and interact with the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents the optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular teams such as the use of low powered group incentives