speculative attacks unique equilibrium and transparency abstract models with multiple equilibria are a popular way to explain currency attacks morris and shin 1998 have shown that in the context of those models unique equilibria may prevail once noisy private information is introduced in this paper we apply the method of morris and shin to a broader class of probability distributions and show using the technique of iterated elimination of dominated strategies that their results continue to hold even if we allow for sunspots and individual uncertainty about strategic behavior of other agents we provide a clear exposition of the logic of this model and we analyze the impact of transparency on the probability of a speculative attack for the case of uniform distribution of noisy signals we show that increased transparency of government policy reduces the likelihood of attacks

the international monetary fund and developing countries a review of the evidence and policy options as its systemic role evaporated with the collapse of the bretton woods system so the international monetary fund imf became drawn into a much more specific role in the context of the balance of payments bop problems that developing countries were encountering at its inception the imf had been seen as having no specific role in developing countries but now it became exclusively these countries that formed its clientele while during the 1970s the imf had continued to make a few relatively large loans to a limited number of industrial countries italy and the united kingdom beyond the mid 1970s industrial countries ceased to draw any resources from it

banking panics information and rational expectations equilibrium this paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon we demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive story that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled if individuals observe long lines at the bank they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run however bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations banking panics were a recurrent phenomenon in the united states until the 1930s they have re emerged as a source of public concern and much theoretical research recently in this paper we provide an information theoretic rationale for bank runs the traditional story is that contagion is an important aspect of bank runs the idea seems to be that when the general public observes large withdrawals from the banking system fears of insolvency grow resulting in even larger withdrawals of deposits in our model some individuals withdraw because they get information that future returns are likely to be low uninformed individuals observing this also have an incentive to liquidate their investments in addition some individuals need to withdraw deposits for other than informationally based reasons thus if the random realization of such a group of individuals is unusually large then the uninformed individuals will be misled and will precipitate a run on the bank the technology is such that a large volume of withdrawals involves liquidation costs consequently runs on the bank do impose social costs a mechanism that may reduce these costs in our model is to suspend convertibility if withdrawals are high however those individuals who need to withdraw their assets for liquidity reasons are worse off ex post our model provides a rationalization for restrictions in demand deposits that were widespread prior to 1929 friedman and schwartz 7 suggest that restrictions of payments ensured

catalytic finance when does it work in a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort this model helps us understand a debate about the role of the imf in catalyzing lending to developing countries

transparency of information and coordination in economies with investment complementarities how do public and private information affect equilibrium allocations and social welfare in economies with investment complementarities and what is the optimal transparency in the information conveyed for example by economic statistics policy announcements or news in the media we first consider an environment where the complementarities are weak so that the equilibrium is unique no matter the structure of information an increase in the precision of public information may have the perverse effect of increasing aggregate volatility nevertheless as long as there is no value to lotteries welfare unambiguously increases with an increase in either the relative or the absolute precision of public information hence full transparency is optimal this is because more transparency facilitates more effective coordination which is valuable from a social perspective on the other hand when complementarities are strong enough that multiple equilibria are possible more transparency permits the market to coordinate more effectively on either the bad or the good equilibrium in this case constructive ambiguity becomes optimal if there is a high risk that more transparency will lead to coordination failures this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

why do bank runs look like panic a new explanation this paper demonstrates that even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria a bank run may still occur when depositors expectations on the bank s fundamentals do not change more specifically a bank run may occur when depositors learn that noisy bank specific information will be revealed or when they learn that precise bank specific information will not be revealed the results in this paper are consistent with the empirical evidence about bank runs it also implies that suspension of convertibility can improve the efficiency of bank runs

world bank directives domestic interests and the politics of human capital investment in latin america recent studies underscore the importance of international organizations in transmitting norms ideas and values to developing countries but has this diffusion influenced government policy in less developed countries during the past two decades the world bank has emphasized the need for third world governments to increase the stock of human capital by investing in education and health specifically it has encouraged developing countries to shift an increasing share of their resources toward primary education the authors examine 13 latin american countries between 1980 and 1992 to establish the relationship between world bank project lending and government investment in human capital they combine time series cross sectional analysis with field research to evaluate the world bank s influence on government spending on education and health although the world bank may be successful in convincing developing country technocrats to invest in people this research suggests that it is less successful in co

a real options approach to bankruptcy costs evidence from failed commercial banks during the 1990s literature identifies three main aspects of liquidation costs firm size asset specificity and industry concentration this paper unifies the theory behind these aspects of bankruptcy costs by treating them as components of a broader option valuation problem faced by the liquidating trustee testing the hypothesized asset price relationships on fdic failed bank liquidation data yields the appropriate results furthermore it appears that liquidation time alone can be used as an effective second order proxy for asset value growth where market value estimates are unavailable

not the opium of the people income and secularization in a panel of prussian counties the interplay between religion and the economy has occupied social scientists for a long time we construct a unique panel of income and protestant church attendance for 175 prussian counties in 1886 1911 the data reveal a marked decline in church attendance secularization coinciding with increasing income the cross section also shows a negative association between income and church attendance but the association disappears when using the panel structure in first differenced models of the 1886 1911 change counties with larger increases in income did not see significantly larger reductions in church attendance in panel models with county and time fixed effects counties with earlier increases in income than others did not see earlier reductions in church attendance and in panel granger causality tests initial income is not related to lower subsequent church attendance or vice versa these findings cast doubt on causal interpretations of the religion economy nexus during this important phase of secularization in prussia i concepts

religious adherence and county economic growth in the us abstract we estimate a barro type conditional convergence model using religious adherence data from the american religious data archive to analyze independent effects of church adherence rates on economic growth in the united states at the county level per capita income growth is modeled as a function of initial per capita income initial human capital stock and a set of control and related variables including religious adherence religious diversity and regional indicator variables we also investigate the independent effects of three main denominations namely catholics evangelical christians and mainline christians on county economic growth our results indicate that the religious adherence in general is significantly greater than zero and not beneficial for us county income growth we find mixed results for effects of various denominations

knowing what others know coordination motives in information acquisition we explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models when a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity information choices exhibit complementarity as well if an agent wants to do what others do they want to know what others know this makes heterogeneous beliefs di cult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria in models with substitutability agents prefer to difierentiate their information choices we use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price setting models and to propose modeling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness

the impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking abstract from 1863 1935 regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to discourage risk taking using data from 1900 to 1915 i find that banks subject to stricter liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility hold a lower proportion of risky assets and are less likely to increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines consistent with the hypothesis that stricter liability discourages commercial bank risk taking these findings provide lessons for current bank regulatory policy and show that the shape of the residual claimant s payoff function has a significant impact on managerial incentives and firm performance

theories of policy diffusion lessons from latin american pension reform what accounts for the waves of policy diffusion that increasingly sweep across regions of the world why do many diverse countries adopt similar changes focusing on the spread of chilean style pension privatization in latin america this article assesses the relative merit of four theoretical explanations that scholars of diffusion have proposed as the principal mechanism driving innovations spread these approaches emphasize external pressures emanating especially from international financial institutions the quest for symbolic or normative legitimacy rational learning and cost benefit calculation and cognitive heuristics respectively the article assesses which one of these frameworks can best account for the three distinctive features of diffusion namely its wavelike temporal pattern its geographical clustering and the spread of similarity amid diversity while several approaches contribute to understanding policy diffusion the analysis suggests that the cognitive psychological framework offers a particularly persuasive account of the spread of pension reform

the relevance of p star analysis to uk monetary policy recent articles have attempted to restore the use of a simple measure of the money supply as an indicator of future price levels p star and to reestablish a causal link from money to prices in this paper we argue that the p star approach is flawed it is certainly more complex than traditional monetarist approaches but the fundamental questions of causality are in no way either affected or resolved we argue that the p star relationship does not have a causal link with prices but rather the causality runs from prices to money we also find that there is some causality running from money to real income so that monetary conditions do seem to have some predictive power for future levels of activity copyright 1994 by royal economic society

opacity and risk taking evidence from norway abstract this paper investigates how balance sheet opacity affects banks risk taking behavior we measure bank balance sheet opacity according to two metrics the ratio of available for sale afs securities and the ratio of off balance sheet items we show that balance sheet opacity is positively correlated with realized bank risk specifically banks with more afs securities have lower realized risk while banks with more off balance sheet items have higher realized risk the correlation between opacity and risk depends on both macroeconomic variables and bank characteristics the positive relationship between bank opacity and bank risk is weaker for better capitalized banks and banks that are subject to more market discipline the relationship is also weaker during periods of favorable market conditions motivated by this analysis we then investigate how regulation affects bank opacity we show that higher capital requirements reduce bank opacity and bank risk through a portfolio rebalancing channel

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

social capital barriers to production and capital shares implications for the importance of parameter heterogeneity from a nonstationary panel approach recent advances in the growth literature have proposed that difficult to quantify concepts such as social capital may play an important role in explaining the degree of persistent income disparity that is observed among countries other recently explored possibilities include institutional mechanisms which generate barriers to aggregate production an important limitation for empirical work in this area stems from the fact that it is difficult to distinguish sources of heterogeneity when direct observations are not available in this study we show how developments in the analysis of nonstationary panels can aid in this endeavor in contrast to traditional dynamic panel data analysis this approach focuses explicitly on low frequency behavior under relatively mild assumptions the approach can be used to infer properties of aggregate production which are robust to the presence of large classes of unobserved features in this framework we are able to estimate and test the distribution of production function parameters that would be required in order to generate conditional forecast convergence of per capita incomes even when some of the key factors required to explain growth are unobserved the results indicate that in order to fully explain the observed persistence in the disparity of per capita incomes the manner in which unobserved mechanisms influence production must go beyond merely accounting for differences in the trending behavior of aggregate productivity specifically if such mechanisms are to be successful empirically they must also be able to account for cross country heterogeneity in steady state capital shares this adds to a growing literature that provides support for models with multiple production regimes copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

distinguishing panics and information based bank runs welfare and policy implications in this paper we contrast panics and information based bank runs in an effort to provide a robust and empirically plausible model of how bank runs are triggered the model of information based runs is characterized by two sided asymmetric information the bank cannot observe the true liquidity needs of the depositors while depositors are asymmetrically informed about bank asset quality we also examine the relative degrees of risk sharing provided by bank deposit contracts and traded equity contracts we show that the choice of deposit or equity depends on the attributes of and information about the underlying investment returns

people s opium religion and economic attitudes since max weber there has been an active debate on the impact of religion on people s economic attitudes much of the existing evidence however is based on cross country studies in which this impact is confounded by differences in other institutional factors we use the worldvalues surveys to id entify the relationship between intensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes controlling for country fixed effects we study several economic attitudes towardcooperation the government working women legal rules thriftiness andthe market economy we also distinguish across religious denominations differentiating on whether a religion is dominant in a country we find that on average religious beliefs are associated with good economic attitudes where good is defined as conducive to higher per capita income andgrowth yet religious people tendto be more racist andless favorable with respect to working women these effects differ across religious denominations overall we find that christian religions are more positively associatedwith attitudes conducive to economic growth r 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification a1 e0 n4 z1

promoting policy reforms the twilight of conditionality abstract for the past 15 years the world bank often in cooperation with the international monetary fund and sometimes also with bilateral donors has tried to encourage policy reforms through conditions attached to structural or sector adjustment loans in the 1990s however such loans are a rapidly dwindling portion of the bank s disbursements this article examines major reasons for this shift including increased flows of private capital democratization the changing nature of the reform agenda itself and growing bank emphasis on ownership reduced direct conditionality is likely to be replaced in part by growing selectivity the results may well be constructive but will not ease tensions in the aid relationship

the fragile capital structure of hedge funds and the limits to arbitrage abstract during a financial crisis when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash the paper explains this phenomenon we argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds combined with low market liquidity creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds arbitrage capabilities we present a model of hedge funds optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors we show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions the model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage

reflections on northern rock the bank run that heralded the global financial crisis in september 2007 television viewers and newspaper readers around the world saw pictures of what looked like an old fashioned bank run that is depositors waiting in line outside the branch offices of a united kingdom bank called northern rock to withdraw their money the previous u k bank run before northern rock was in 1866 at overend gurney a london bank that overreached itself in the railway and docks boom of the 1860s bank runs were not uncommon in the united states up through the 1930s but they have been rare since the start of deposit insurance backed by the federal deposit insurance corporation in contrast deposit insurance in the united kingdom was a partial affair funded by the banking industry itself and insuring only a part of the deposits at the time of the run u k bank deposits were fully insured only up to 2 000 pounds and then only 90 percent of the deposits up to an upper limit of 35 000 pounds when faced with a run the incentive to withdraw one s deposits from a u k bank was therefore very strong for economists the run on northern rock at first seemed to offer a rare opportunity to study at close quarters all the elements involved in their theoretical models of bank runs the futility of public statements of reassurance the mutually reinforcing anxiety of depositors as well as the power of the media in galvanizing and channeling that anxiety through the power of television images however the storyline of the northern rock bank run does not fit the conventional narrative on september 13 2007 the bbc s evening television news broadcast first broke the news that northern rock had sought the bank of england s support the next morning the bank of england announced that it would provide emergency liquidity support it was only after that announcement that is after the

liquidity traps and expectation dynamics fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity we examine global dynamics under infinite horizon learning in new keynesian models where the interest rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound as in evans guse and honkapohja 2008 the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable unstable deflationary paths emerge after large pessimistic shocks to expectations for large expectation shocks that push interest rates to the zero bound a temporary fiscal stimulus or a policy of fiscal austerity appropriately tailored in magnitude and duration will insulate the economy from deflation traps however fiscal switching rules that automatically kick in without discretionary fine tuning can be equally effective

do banks have a future abstract are banks special intermediaries do they play any unique role in the economy and if so will they retain their specialness in the ever faster changing world of finance the rapid evolution of finance over the last two decades and the breathtaking e age revolution have persuaded many that eventually banks will be indistinguishable from other financial intermediaries since all their functions can at least as efficiently be carried out by nonbanks this study re explores the issue of the specialness of banks in light of the large existing literature on the subject and presents an approach which identifies the banks specialness with their unique capacity to lend out claims on their own debt which the public accepts and uses as money the study discusses various structural and policy implications deriving from the approach and draws on it to point to the continuing relevance of banking in a world where nonbanks are taking business away from banks lending to production has become relatively less important and the use of e money may soon be dominating financial transactions

imperfect competition risk taking and regulation in banking abstract we asses the welfare implications of banking competition under various deposit insurance regimes in a model of imperfect competition with social failure costs and where banks are subject to limited liability we study the links between competition for deposits and risk taking incentives and conclude that the welfare performance of the market and the appropriateness of alternative regulatory measures depend on the degree of rivalry and the deposit insurance regime specifically when competition is intense and the social failure costs high deposit rates are excessive both in a free market and with risk based insurance if insurance premiums are insensitive to risk then the same is true even if there is no social cost of failure we find also that in an uninsured market with nonobservable portfolio risk or with flat premium deposit insurance deposit regulation rate regulation or deposit limits and direct asset restrictions are complementary tools to improve welfare in an uninsured market with observable portfolio risk or with risk based insurance deposit regulation may be a sufficient instrument to improve welfare

what factors drive systemic risk during international financial crises abstract we analyze the determinants of the contribution of international banks to both global and local systemic risk during prominent financial crises we find no empirical evidence supporting conjectures that bank size leverage non interest income or the quality of the bank s credit portfolio are persistent determinants of systemic risk across financial crises in contrast our results show that global systemic risk in particular is predominantly driven by characteristics of the regulatory regime we also confirm for the subprime crisis that the banks contribution to moderately bad tail events in the past predicts the financial sector s crash risk

banking panics the role of the first come first served rule and information externalities this paper proposes that both the first come first served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs the first come first served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors this payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks therefore failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks contagious runs may occur even if i depositors choose the pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and ii the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare the feasibility of reforming the fdic to impose market discipline is also investigated

economic crisis and policy choice the politics of adjustment in the third world the acute economic pressures of the 1980s have forced virtually all of latin america and africa and some countries in asia into painful austerity programs and difficult economic reforms scholars have intensively analyzed the economics of this situation but they have given much less attention to the political forces involved in this volume a number of eminent contributors analyze the politics of adjustment in thirteen countries and nineteen governments drawing comparisons not only across the full set of cases but also within clusters selected to clarify specific issues why do some governments respond promptly to signs of economic trouble while others muddle indecisively for years why do some confine their response to temporary macroeconomic measures while others adopt broader even sweeping programs of reform what leads some countries to experiment with heterodox approaches while most however reluctantly pursue orthodox courses why confronted with intense political protest have some governments persisted while others have altered or abandoned course the answers to these questions are political not economic and they are examined here by thomas m callaghy stephan haggard miles kahler robert r kauman joan m nelson and barbara stallings

financial intermediation and delegated monitoring this paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders it presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs even in a risk neutral economy the paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems in the environment assumed in the model debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal the analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries

the religious transition a long run perspective we use factor analysis to derive a robust measure of religiosity from items reported in five waves of the world value survey our measure of religiosity is negatively correlated with per capita income development apparently causes religiosity to fall to about half its pre modern level most components of the demand for religion are reduced by development the supply of religion declines once churches lose control over the institutions providing collective goods like education health and social security these goods used to be supplied by churches jointly with religious services but tend to be supplied by the state with rising levels of development aspects of supply and demand are integrated in a ces production function framework that can explain the direction of causality in the observed negative correlation between income and religiosity

cointegration how short is the long run abstract when testing for cointegration and faced with short sample periods it is common for researchers to turn to more frequently sampled observations that is to move from annual to quarterly or monthly data in order to increase the number of observations we argue that such a gain in the degrees of freedom is more apparent than real essentially cointegration is a long run concept and hence requires long spans of data to give tests for cointegration much power rather than merely large numbers of observations using monte carlo simulations we demonstrate this for four popular tests for cointegration

delegated monitors large and small germany s banking system 1800 1914 banks play a greater role in the german financial system than in those of the united states or britain germany s large universal banks are admired by those who advocate bank deregulation in the united states others admire the universal banks for their supposed role in corporate governance and industrial finance many discussions distort the german banking system by overstressing one of several types of banks and ignore the competition and cooperation between the famous universal banks and other banking groups tracing the historical development of the german banking system from the early nineteenth century places the large universal banks in context

uninsured deposits as a monitoring device their impact on bond yields of banks abstract we empirically analyze the impact of uninsured deposits on a bank s cost of public debt uninsured depositors can exert market discipline over a bank and potentially reduce its agency cost of debt through informed monitoring we use a sample of public bond issues by u s bank holding companies from 1994 to 2013 and find statistically strong evidence that banks with more uninsured deposits relative to their assets issue bonds with a lower interest rate findings suggest a one standard deviation increase in uninsured deposits is associated with a 46 64 basis point decrease in bond yield in addition we find that bonds issued by banks with higher default risk or lower reputation benefit more from uninsured savers our paper contributes to the literature that explores market discipline and provides evidence that banks can benefit from it through a lower borrowing cost

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

religion and economy religion has a two way interaction with political economy with religion viewed as a dependent variable a central question is how economic development and political institutions affect religious participation and beliefs with religion viewed as an independent variable a key issue is how religiosity affects individual characteristics such as work ethic honesty and thrift and thereby influences economic performance in this paper we sketch previous studies of this two way interaction but focus on our ongoing quantitative research with international data

squeaky wheels and unequal policy executive authority and education reform in latin america the world bank has been increasingly involved in reforming latin america s education systems however compliance with world bank directives varies greatly recent scholarship has made significant progress in fashioning an explanation for this variation by focusing on the presence of democracy this article takes the literature a step further by identifying the mechanism by which democracy matters specifically variations in executive authority are key factors in explaining the adoption of controversial world bank directives the authors argue that a government s ability to implement world bank reforms and overcome popular dissent if present is a function of executive authority they examine executive authority using several measures to test their hypotheses on a 20 year panel of 17 american states from 1980 to 2000 results indicate that newly democratized governments and strong executives are indeed more successful in passing world bank reforms

uncertainty and currency crises evidence from survey data this paper studies empirically how uncertainty aects speculation in the foreign ex change markets we use the dispersion of survey forecasts of key macroeconomic variables to measure uncertainty about fundamentals we nd that uncertainty has a non monotone eect on exchange rate pressures namely uncertainty heightens speculative pressures when expected fundamentals are good and eases them when they are bad we prove that this prediction arises from a broad class of currency crisis theories ranging from rst generation to global game models we also show that the proposed empirical strategy remains valid in the presence of forecasters with strategic objectives and use a novel set of instrumental variables to address potential endogeneity bias

public information private information and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games abstract i study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher order beliefs as the players signals become more and more precise the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals the same condition also determines the convergence of common p belief to common knowledge which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

the shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management we study the role that repos play in a bank s financing structure in our model the bank s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos long term debt deposits and equity repos are a cheap source of funding but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk we show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect shadow costs on the bank s shareholders first it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk second it adds to the cost of long term debt financing these shadow costs limit the bank s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding this effect is however weakened under poor returns on risky assets access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule we also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank s reliance on repos

heterogeneous fragility systematic panic and optimal transparency abstract in this study we provide a model of systematic panic among financial institutions with heterogeneous fragility during a systematic panic institutions characterized by a higher degree of fragility are more aggressive to withdrawals and such aggressiveness increases linearly with their fragility we derive an analytical solution for this linear relationship using a global game framework and demonstrate that transparency does not always endanger the regime when the outside option is large transparency increases the strength of the regime

religiosity and income a panel cointegration and causality analysis abstractin this article we examine the long run relationship between religiosity and income using retrospective data on church attendance rates for a panel of countries from 1930 to 1990 we employ panel cointegration and causality techniques to control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias and test for the direction of causality we show that there exists a negative long run relationship between the level of religiosity measured by church attendance and the level of income measured by the log of gdp per capita the result is robust to alternative estimation methods potential outliers different samples different measures of church attendance and alternative specifications of the income variable long run causality runs in both directions higher income leads to declining religiosity and declining religiosity leads to higher income

dynamic seemingly unrelated cointegrating regressions we propose the parametric dynamic seemingly unrelated regression dsur estimator for simultaneous estimation of multiple cointegrating regressions dsur is efficient when the equilibrium errors are correlated across equations and is applicable for panel cointegration estimation in environments where the cross section is small relative to the available time series we study the asymptotic and small sample properties of the dsur estimator for both heterogeneous and homogeneous cointegrating vectors we then apply the method to analyse two long standing problems in international economics our first application revisits the estimation of long run correlations between national investment and national saving our second application revisits the question of whether the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate

introduction epistemic communities and international policy coordination the growing technical uncertainties and complexities of problems of global concern have made international policy coordination not only increasingly necessary but also increasingly difficult if decision makers are unfamiliar with the technical aspects of a specific problem how do they define state interests and develop viable solutions what factors shape their behavior under conditions of uncertainty what are the origins of international institutions and how can we best study the processes through which international policy coordination and order emerge while a variety of analytic approaches have been used to address the problems of international cooperation the approaches have yielded only fragmentary insights at its core the study of policy coordination among states involves arguments about determinism versus free will and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and transformed among the overlapping topics of debate are whether national behavior is determined or broadly conditioned by system level factors unit level factors or some complex interplay between the two whether state policymakers can identify national interests and behave independently of pressures from the social groups they nominally represent and whether states respond consistently to opportunities to create defend or expand their own wealth and power to enhance collective material benefits or to promote nonmaterial values a related question of

intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation abstract this paper examines the incentive problem between a bank and depositors or deposit insurer limited liability makes risk shifting lucrative we show how intertemporal diversification of lending decisions i e bank s loan portfolio consists of overlapping long term loans and is thus gradually renewed may solve the incentive problem of risk shifting a new or expanding bank sets a high equity level and acquires depositors confidence subsequently it can allow its equity to depreciate to a permanently lower level depositors can control the bank by monitoring equity and realized credit losses ex post they do not have to monitor bank s lending choices ex ante maturity mismatch illiquidity of long term loans and liquidity of deposits is optimal the analysis can be extended more generally to the borrower lender relationship

religious participation and income the relationship between religion and income has been explored in several studies in this paper we extend this inquiry by arguing that religious participation through its effects on preferences and net earnings potential reduces participants incomes similarly we argue that high incomes discourage religious participation by encouraging individuals to substitute market work for religious activities in an empirical model we simultaneously estimate the effects of religious participation on income and income on religious participation using us state data on per capita personal income and church membership the results strongly support our hypotheses 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

was weber wrong a human capital theory of protestant economic history max weber attributed the higher economic prosperity of protestant regions to a protestant work ethic we provide an alternative theory protestant economies prospered because instruction in reading the bible generated the human capital crucial to economic prosperity we test the theory using county level data from late nineteenth century prussia exploiting the initial concentric dispersion of the reformation to use distance to wittenberg as an instrument for protestantism we find that protestantism indeed led to higher economic prosperity but also to better education our results are consistent with protestants higher literacy accounting for most of the gap in economic prosperity

secularization and long run economic growth in a consumer culture the consumer not christ is king skye jethani i introduction this paper proposes a novel theory of identity choice and endogenous economic growth in which secularization is both cause and consequence of successful economic development it contributes to the literature on the fundamentals of economic growth acemoglu 2009 by proposing a theory of how culture driven by economic change may change rapidly and where cultural change in turn drives further economic development the core idea is that through abandoning their religious identity their strife for salvation from the dire situation on earth individuals are able to derive more pleasure from material possessions and consumption activities the prospect of pleasure in this world motivates them to work harder and save more for future consumption increasing labor supply and capital accumulation induces technological progress and income growth which entices further individuals to abandon religion in order to derive more pleasure from material possessions which motivates them to supply more labor and capital etc through this feedback loop the economy takes off when religiosity declines and industrialization is observed in conjunction with secularization following the literature i define religious as believing in a god or a group of gods and following the rules of a religion mckendrick brewer and plumb 1982 although the proposed theory is perhaps more general the paper focuses on economic and religious developments of the western world which means it focuses on christian beliefs i define as the core creed of christian religion that through belief in and acceptance of the death and resurrection of jesus christ sinful humans can be reconciled with god and thereby are offered salvation and the promise of eternal life metzger and coogan 1993 the christian church is the agent specialized in promoting the desire for these immaterial heavenly values and goals ekelund et al 1997 i define as religious identity the self identification with christian religious values in section ii i argue that individuals identify with either immaterial self transcendence values religion or with material self enhancement values materialism i argue that individuals using individual possessions or consumption activities as identity fixers have chosen a secular materialistic identity i define as secularization the decline in the social significance of religion manifested by the decline in the number of religious people individuals identifying with religion measured by declining church attendance bruce 2011 most scholars of religion agree that for christians church attendance is a good measure of religiosity brierley 1999 bruce 2011 warner 2010 attending the sunday service was obligatory for protestants of most denominations as well as for members of the anglican church and deliberate failure to attend sunday mass is still considered to be a grave sin according to catholic canon law in the economists language church attendance is a revealed preference because church is the only place where sins can be forgiven not attending shows a loss of interest in salvation and eternal life the main goods offered by the church attendance is strongly but not perfectly correlated with adherence in particular attendance declines before membership declines bruce 2011 moreover there exists a temporary phase of fuzzy fidelity in which many individuals claim that while religion is not important in their life they continue to consider themselves christians and occasionally appear in church voas 2008 this temporary state is not explicitly taken into account in the theory below but considered to be best described by a secular identity as industrialization secularization is a general phenomenon observed throughout the western world the first data point however is only observed in 1851 for england when church attendance was about 60 brierley 1999

the limits of international organization systematic failure in the management of international relations contributors to the literature on international organization io have traditionally been overly optimistic about the ability of multilateral management to stabilize in ternational relations and have tended to ignore the destabilizing effects of io while recent revisionist scholarship has acknowledged both the potential for organizational failure and the conditionality of management it has tended to focus on how io fails within specific issue areas and institutions this article offers a typology of the inherent systematic failures of io across issue areas and institutions and thereby seeks to bridge the gaps in our understanding of why many different institutions and managerial schemes have adverse effects it argues that io is prone to failure 1 when it attempts to manage complex tightly coupled systems of relations and issues 2 when it serves as a substitute either for more substantive and long term resolutions to international problems or for responsible domestic or foreign policy 3 when it intensifies international disputes and 4 when it generates moral hazard in offering a general theoretical approach to understanding the destabilizing effects of io the analysis is intended to serve both as a focal point for understanding critical approaches to the study of io and as an alternative rationale for eliminating the excesses of multilateral management

introduction to the economics of religion after a very long hiatus economists have begun again to study the relationship between economics and religion this article seeks to summarize and evaluate the principal themes and empirical findings that have appeared in some 200 recent papers on the economics of religion although some of the research concerns the economic consequences of religiosity most applies standard economic theory to the study of individual religious activity the characteristics of religious groups and the impact of regulation and competition on religious markets

free banking and information asymmetry a traditional argument against free banking is that it will collapse because of information externalities it is impossible for depositors to tell whether a high deposit rate offered by a bank is due to its high efficiency or risky lending strategy this paper shows that in a separating equilibrium a higher quality bank offers a lower deposit rate and holds a smaller proportion of risky loans than a lower quality bank to signal its underlying quality hence free banking is not inherently unstable the empirical results for the hong kong banking system during 1964 65 are consistent with the hypothesis of a separating equilibrium

the long run relationship between outward fdi and domestic output evidence from panel data abstract we find for 14 industrialized countries over the period 1971 2005 that outward fdi has positive long run effects on domestic output our results suggest that increased outward fdi is both a cause and a consequence of increased domestic output

building an incentive compatible safety net abstract bank safety nets originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems have become an important destabilizing influence government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net

optimal bank transparency increasing transparency is recurrently offered as a centerpiece of bank regulation we study a competitive banking sector whose illiquid assets are funded by short term debt that must be refinanced we show that welfare is a nonmonotonic function of the level of transparency increasing transparency fosters efficient liquidation but has an adverse effect on rollover risk given the level of risk banks may compensate this adverse effect by taking more risk these offsetting effects render an intermediate level of transparency optimal moreover the existence of negative social externalities of bank failures calls for making banks more opaque rather than more transparent

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

the role of interbank markets in monetary policy a model with rationing the empirical research on monetary transmission has reported a number of puzzles challenging extant theoretical models of the transmission mechanism in this paper we argue that asymmetric information in the interbank market may be important to have a better understanding of the mechanisms at work in the transmission process we show that asymmetric information may induce an equilibrium with rationing this in turn has two major implications first it reconciles the apparent irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy magnitude puzzle and second it shows that this impact will not be limited to short term credit supply but will also affect long term lending even if the corresponding interest rate is unaffected composition puzzle

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

structural change and cross country growth empirics one of the most striking features of economic growth is the process of structural change whereby the share of agriculture in gdp decreases as countries develop the cross country growth literature typically estimates an aggregate homogeneous production function or convergence regression model that abstracts from this process of structural change this paper investigates the extent to which assumptions about aggregation and homogeneity matter for inferences regarding the nature of technology differences across countries using a unique world bank dataset it estimates production functions for agriculture and manufacturing in a panel of 40 developing and developed countries for the period from 1963 to 1992 it empirically models dimensions of heterogeneity across countries allowing for different choices of technology within both sectors the paper argues that heterogeneity is important within sectors across countries implying that an analysis of aggregate data will not produce useful measures of the nature of the technology or productivity it shows that many of the puzzling elements in aggregate cross country empirics can be explained by inappropriate aggregation across heterogeneous sectors

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

to aggregate pool or neither it is well known that even if all forecasters are rational unbiasedness tests using consensus forecasts are inconsistent because forecasters have private information however if all forecasters face a common realization pooled estimators are also inconsistent in contrast we show that when predictions and realizations are integrated and cointegrated microhomogeneity ensures that consensus and pooled estimators are consistent therefore contrary to claims in the literature in the absence of microhomogeneity pooling is not a solution to the aggregation problem we reject microhomogeneity for a number of forecasts from the survey of professional forecasters therefore for these variables unbiasedness can only be tested at the individual level