contracting with wealth constrained agents we examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input e g effort when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and if necessary a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts the project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators under plausible conditions limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner

on the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first price auctions we establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first price auctions with asymmetric bidders interdependent values and affiliated one dimensional signals by extending a monotonicity result due to milgrom and weber 1982 we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational we avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second price auctions

sealed bids sunk costs and the process of competition how do firms recover precontract costs for example suppose 10 firms compete in a sealed bid auction for the right to explore and develop an offshore oil field each spends 500 000 to estimate the value of the field and to prepare its bid suppose this investigation reveals that the tract is worth approximately 20 million if sunk costs do not matter competition dictates that the winner must bid 20 million but if the winner is to recover its prebid costs the maximum offer can be only 19 5 million furthermore long run industry equilibrium considerations suggest that the highest bid will be only 15 million 20 million minus the total bid preparation costs of 5 million if competition forces firms to charge marginal cost why do firms ever invest in resources which become sunk in some industries inframarginal rents can be used to recover these costs however the example above as well as many others involves an all or none deci

a robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of a homogeneous product antitrust enforcement agencies and courts use net effect on price as a touchstone for the legality of mergers this paper derives a simple condition for implementing that standard when industry equilibrium is static nash in quantities cournot and that condition is robust to different specifications of demand and cost 1998 elsevier science s a

equilibrium in auctions with entry the authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic the presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare the authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness i e the relative abundance of buyers their analysis extends well known revenue equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies e g reservation prices in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry copyright 1994 by american economic association

optimal privatisation using qualifying auctions this article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets in our model a single insider bidder possesses information about the asset s common value bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset due to the insider s presence uninformed bidders face a strong winner s curse in standard auctions we show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder it can be implemented via a two stage qualifying auction in the first stage non binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage which consists of a standard second price auction augmented with a reserve price

optimal auctions revisited in symmetric privately known values oral auctions with costly entry for bidders the seller can do no better than by committing ex ante to a reservation price and entry fees or subsidies which result in no fewer and at most one more bidders than a reservation price equal to the seller s value would in the absence of entry fees or subsidies journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c72

non existence of monotone equilibria in games with correlated signals abstract participation in economic games such as auctions is typically costly which means that players potential bidders must consider whether to participate such decisions may be no less crucial than how to bid and yet the literature has been mostly concerned with bidding assuming an exogenously given number of bidders see krishna auction theory academic press new york 2002 landsberger and tsirelson correlated signals against monotone equilibria preprint ssrn 222308 social science research network electronic library may 2000 available online http papers ssrn com abstract 222308 have shown that fundamental results established in symmetric auction theory with correlated signals such as the existence of a monotone equilibrium may not hold if participation decisions are part of equilibrium the major goal of this paper is to illustrate and explain this result that may be considered counter intuitive given the emphasis placed on monotone equilibria in the auction literature

selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry an asymptotic analysis we study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction like setting for venture capital vc funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the vc can only finance the best entrepreneurs with asymmetric information vcs can only assess entrepreneurs by the progress of development which in equilibrium reveals the quality of the new technology using an asymptotic analysis we prove that in attractive industries having a large number of entrepreneurs competing for vc funding could lead to underinvestment in technology by entrepreneurs as the effort exerted by losing entrepreneurs is wasted the study then proceeds to characterize the conditions under which a greater number of competing entrepreneurs is better the model also demonstrates that vcs could possibly increase their payoff by concentrating on a single industry in addition the study also provides some insights on the effects of multiple investments by vcs and the effects of competition among vcs on the same investments

auctions and information acquisition sealed bid or dynamic formats the value of an asset is generally not known a priori and it requires costly investments to be discovered in such contexts with endogenous information acquisition which selling procedure generates more revenues we show that dynamic formats such as ascending price or multistage auctions perform better than their static counterpart this is because dynamic formats allow bidders to observe the number of competitors left throughout the selling procedure thus even if competition appears strong ex ante it may turn out to be weak along the dynamic format thereby making the option to acquire information valuable this very possibility also induces the bidders to stay longer in the auction just to learn about the state of competition both effects boost revenues and our analysis provides a rationale for using dynamic formats rather than sealed bid ones

indicative bidding an experimental analysis indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale furthermore there exist alternative bid procedures that in theory at least guarantee 100 efficiency and higher revenue for the seller we employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures the data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis

regulating bidder participation in auctions regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry we show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms a standard first price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism as an empirical application we estimate parameters from first price auctions with free entry for bridge building contracts in oklahoma and texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

overuse of wood based bioenergy in selected sub saharan africa countries review of unconstructive challenges and suggestions excessive wood consumption for energy and over dependence on fossil fuel based energy are fundamental issues of importance regarding the destruction of environmental sanity in this respect international communities are seeking to explore opportunities on how to encourage aggressive deployment of technologies for clean and sustainable development and possibly renewable the kyoto protocol on climate change meeting in 1997 with about 160 countries in attendance has been used as one of the platform of discourse on carbon emissions reduction strategies advocated strategies agreed include increase in renewable energy consumption via modern techniques massive deployment of renewable energy systems on a global scale will ensure a reasonable displacement of oil based energy production which is the main source of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in sub saharan africa limited access to modern energy in the region has stepped up reliance on bioenergy consumption in form of wood fuel and charcoal resulting to attendant effects on human health environment and the biodiversity in general in view of the foregoing this study presents a review on the current situations of unconstructive effects in the overuse of fuel wood and its charcoal derivative for energy consumption in three selected sub saharan african countries nigeria ghana and uganda in conclusion suggestions on how to confront the challenges associated with the over exploitation conditions of fuel wood in the region are put forward the suggestions could be part of the pursuit to increase electricity availability reliability and security with lower level of emissions in the region

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

rational expectations information acquisition and competitive bidding most rational expectations market equilibrium models are not models of price formation and naive mechanisms leading to such equilibria can be severely manipulable in this paper a bidding model is developed which has the market like features that bidders act as price takers and that prices convey information higher equilibrium prices convey more favorable information about the quality of the objects being sold than do lower prices bidders can benefit from trading only if they have a transactions motive or if they have access to inside information apart from exceptional cases prices are not fully revealing a two stage model is developed in which bidders may acquire information at a cost before bidding and for which the equilibrium price is fully revealing resolving a well known paradox

selection bias demographic effects and ability effects in common value auction experiments inexperienced women along with economics and business majors are much more susceptible to the winner s curse as are subjects with lower sat act scores there are strong selection effects in bid function estimates for inexperienced and experienced subjects due to bankruptcies and bidders who have lower earnings returning less frequently as experienced subjects these selection effects are not identified using standard econometric techniques but are identified through experimental treatment effects ignoring these selection effects leads to misleading estimates of learning

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

asymmetric all pay auctions with interdependent valuations abstract i show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two player all pay auction with a discrete signal structure correlated signals and interdependent valuations the proof is constructive and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics i also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced

forest biorefineries a business opportunity for the finnish forest cluster abstract bioenergy and biomass based products offer the greatest new opportunities for diversifying business in the forest cluster in particular biorefineries which can be integrated into the pulp and paper industry seem to have immense future potential this article aims to explore the biorefinery concept and related new products and business operations as well as new business strategies and company models which are part of the biorefinery value chain these factors which contribute to the establishment and success of forest biorefineries were examined using internet survey responses and compared between scandinavia north america and south america this article looks at the results of the survey primarily from the finnish perspective to help identify competitive advantages upon which successful business operations in the finnish forest cluster can be built according to the survey the outlooks for technical and raw material choices as well as barriers to biorefinery diffusion are very similar in all the studied areas biorefineries and related energy products are considered the way to sustainably guarantee the forest cluster s success an increase in the price of oil motivates the development of forest biorefineries and wood based biofuels however it is obvious that there is a need to revaluate from a fresh perspective the utilisation of wood and the wood refining chain in the forest cluster the survey respondents consider wood based biofuel and chemical production a serious business opportunity for the forest cluster in finland there is a strong confidence in the production of biofuels however all the countries included in the study trust in their own national strengths and in their chance to be a leading actor in the forest biorefinery business worldwide the forest biorefinery business seems to have market potential and global competition can thus be expected

redefining innovation eco innovation research and the contribution from ecological economics while innovation processes toward sustainable development eco innovations have received increasing attention during the past years theoretical and methodological approaches to analyze these processes are poorly developed against this background the term eco innovation is introduced in this paper addressing explicitly three kinds of changes towards sustainable development technological social and institutional innovation secondly the potential contribution of neoclassical and co evolutionary approaches from environmental and innovation economics to eco innovation research is discussed three peculiarities of eco innovation are identified the double externality problem the regulatory push pull effect and the increasing importance of social and institutional innovation while the first two are widely ignored in innovation economics the third is at the least not elaborated appropriately the consideration of these peculiarities may help to overcome market failure by establishing a specific eco innovation policy and to avoid a technology bias through a broader understanding of innovation finally perspectives for a specific contribution of ecological economics to eco innovation research are drawn it is argued that methodological pluralism as established in ecological economics would be very beneficial for eco innovation research a theoretical framework integrating elements from both neoclassical and evolutionary approaches should be pursued in order to consider the complexity of factors influencing innovation decisions as well as the specific role of regulatory instruments and the experience gathered in ecological economics integrating ecological social and economic aspects of sustainable development is highly useful for opening up innovation research to social and institutional changes 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

investments into forest biorefineries under different price and policy structures abstract increasing scarcity of oil reserves and the high co2 emissions from using oil have contributed to the development of renewable biofuels pulp and paper mill integrated forest biorefineries offer one important means to increase biofuel production this study analyzes the effects of policies to support biofuel production in the pulp and paper sector we study the relative effectiveness of three biofuel supporting policy instruments namely production subsidy input subsidy and investment subsidy we present a partial equilibrium pulp and paper market model with a biorefinery investment option a numerical model is used to evaluate the impacts of policy instruments on wood prices as well as input choices and investment strategies of pulp and paper industries the data represent the finnish pulp and paper sector we evaluate the values and direct costs of the policy instruments in a situation of exogenous biofuel production targets the direct costs of input and investment subsidies are higher than those of a production subsidy with all the policy instruments finnish pulp and paper mills would invest in wood gasifying technology instead of black liquor based one the number of biorefinery units is dependent on the subsidy type investment and input subsidies are likely to result in more numerous but smaller biofuel production units than a production subsidy with all the policy instruments the demand for wood increases in finland leading to higher wood prices this in turn could reflect negatively on the profitability of the pulp and paper industries to a significant degree the model and the results can be generalized to other countries and markets where integrated pulp and paper mills are operating

implementing efficient multi object auction institutions an experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents abstract we study three alternative implementations of the vickrey multi unit demand auction vickrey s original static sealed bid auction and two dynamic ausubel auctions with and without public dropout information reported during the auction although implemented by a weaker solution concept behavior in the dynamic vickrey auction with the public dropout information comes significantly closer to the theoretical prediction of sincere bidding bidding one s valuations than either the static vickrey auction or the dynamic auction without dropout information this suggests a possible tradeoff between the simplicity and transparency of a mechanism and the strength of its solution concept when agents are still learning and or when players are not fully rational drawing on results from related single unit and multi unit demand auctions and the results of a new single unit demand auction experiment we provide important insights into the behavioral mechanism underlying the superior performance of the ausubel auction with feedback information

gender effects in private value auctions abstract in a two stage auction women are significantly more likely to go bankrupt than men bidding more aggressively than the men in both phases of the auction process

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

horizontal mergers comment joseph farrell and carl shapiro 1990a present an interesting and elegant analysis of horizontal mergers in the context of a cournot model under quite general demand and cost conditions one section of their paper deals with the effects of mergers on price or consumer welfare in it they show that in a cournot model mergers that do not lower costs always raise price and that mergers that lower costs still raise price unless they lower costs quite a lot these results are much more general than anything in the prior literature another section of the paper deals with the effects of mergers on nonmerging firms and consumers which farrell and shapiro term external with some minor additional assumptions they show that a merger is externally welfare enhancing if but not only if

all pay auctions with affiliated binary signals abstract we analyze all pay auctions with affiliated values and binary signals we analyze the unique symmetric equilibrium with any number of bidders and show that the bidders earn positive rents only if the equilibrium is monotone we also characterize the symmetric equilibrium of the closely related two player war of attrition we compare expected revenues across these formats all pay auctions result in lower expected rents to the bidders than standard auctions but they also induce inefficient allocations in some models with affiliated private values with two bidders the effect on rent extraction dominates and the all pay auctions outperform standard auctions in terms of expected revenue with many bidders standard auctions may result in higher expected revenue the war of attrition outperforms the standard auctions in terms of revenue but its ranking relative to all pay auctions is ambiguous

participation in auctions participation preparing offers in auction and procurement games e g bidding for spectrum rights or for control of corporations is very costly which calls for analyzing participation no less than how to play the games as part of equilibrium the result is a model with bi dimensional distribution of types as in jackson m o 1999 nonexistence of equilibria in auctions with both private and common values mimeo http www stanford edu jacksonm nonexist pdf and endogenous distribution of participants players with low production but high participation costs may decide not to participate forcing the auctioneer to pay higher than necessary prices to mitigate this phenomenon auctioneers may consider partially reimbursing participants for the costs they incur in preparing offers restricting attention to symmetric games we prove that the game we consider has a unique symmetric equilibrium with and without the reimbursement mechanism

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

commercial development of energy environmentally sound technologies for the auto industry the case of fuel cells abstract the economic importance of energy and environmental issues is continuously increasing affecting both process and product design in business the energy crisis in california in 2001 made this basic issue universal new technologies are expected to reduce pollution derived both from production processes and products with costs that are still unknown and in competition with more mature technologies high nevertheless until now there is still little but growing knowledge concerning the process of technological innovation in the fields of energy and environment in this paper we analyze the development of zinc air fuel cell zafc and its transfer from a research laboratory to potential mass production zafc are a new environmentally sound technology proven to have commercial value that can be used for substituting internal combustion engines ices and meeting zero emission vehicles zev regulations although zafc performances are higher than traditional electric batteries ones commercial costs are still high hence the pathway to mass production may come from stationary application of fuel cells for power in contrast to the conventional paradigmatic approach we argue that the existing economic and organizational literature concerning technological innovation is not able to fully explain steps followed in commercializing energy environmentally sound technologies existing models mainly consider adopting problems which are due to market uncertainty weak application lack of a dominant design and problems in reconfiguring existing organizational routines above all market power exists in terms of control over technological innovation and its commercial application barriers are erected that prevent new technologies such as fuel cells from becoming adapted through pro active government intervention such as the case in california new advanced technologies can move rapidly into the marketplace from this discussion we draw some conclusions and issues for further research concerning policy making for sustaining the process of technological transfer and firms strategies in technological innovation

comparing drivers barriers and opportunities of business models for renewable energies a review abstract this article systematically reviews the emerging field of research on business models for renewable energies differentiating between developing and industrialized countries the key findings on developing countries are as follows first there is a lack of quantitative data second opportunities are driven primarily by unfulfilled basic needs and micro finance whereas corruption and weak electricity grids are the main barriers and third business models should be replicable the key findings on industrialized countries are as follows first opportunities are driven primarily by climate change mitigation and energy efficiency improvements second stuck thought patterns and high costs of energy storage are important barriers and third cooperation is a key in future business models to handle increasing complexity this review reveals implications for researchers and policy makers promising avenues for future research are the analysis of intermodal business models and opportunities concerning energy self supply and renewable district heating policy makers are advised to design legal frameworks that account for the global nature of the renewable energy challenge and are simultaneously adapted to regional disparities

theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities abstract we investigate a private value auction in which a single entrant on winning imposes a negative externality on two regular bidders in an english auction when all bidders are active regular bidders free ride exiting before price reaches their values in a first price sealed bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist limiting free riding compared to the english auction we find substantial though incomplete free riding in the clock auction in first price auctions regular bidders bid more aggressively than the entrant and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality predictions regarding revenue efficiency and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press