leadership and politics a perspective from the growth commission the paper attempts via case studies to illustrate the nature and importance of political structures and transitions in the course of rapid growth and development the cases are drawn principally from asia where the pattern has often been a dominant single party structure evolving into a full multi party democratic structure this results from the interaction of the politics and changes that result from the growth process itself such as the emergence of politically active middle and entrepreneurial classes the role of political leadership in managing sequencing and pacing these transitions is discussed we do not yet have a general model for which these cases would be instances the hope is that an in depth understanding of the case dynamics will be a useful input to the development and testing of more general theories copyright 2009 oxford university press

judo economics in markets with asymmetric firms abstract i study a market entry game with price competition and perfectly substitutable products limiting the initial capacity judo economics is a plausible entry strategy i show that under asymmetry in production cost or product quality capacity limitation can become obsolete

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

strategic pricing models and interpretation of price war data abstract price wars cartel breakdowns and other seemingly disequilibrium pricing phenomena are examined questions of interest include when do breakdowns occur how long do they last what determines their severity and are they characterized by increased cross sectional price dispersion and or temporal price volatility the first half of the paper explains how the choice of punishment strategy the specification of the stochastic shocks to the system and the assumptions regarding observability determine the pricing dynamics implicit in several theoretical price war models theories are classified into imperfect monitoring models in which players actions cannot be observed learning models in which structural parameters are unknown to the players and cyclical models in which observability is perfect but business cycles affect the difficulty of colluding the second half in contrast examines data on prices actually set by firms in industries which are subject to periodic wars when the models are confronted with the data we can see how well oligopoly theory explains the behavior of the firms in these industries the object of the exercise is not to pick a winner instead the role of industry characteristics in determining pricing dynamics is assessed and the reasons why simple models may fail to explain complex pricing patterns are examined finally directions for future research are suggested by the empirical regularities which are uncovered

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

competitive advantage and collusive optima cost differences may often be important in real oligopolies if side payments are impossible the standard cartel objective total industry profits lacks plausibility when costs differ this essay considers plausible alternatives four different technologies for effecting collusion which are essentially identical when costs are equal define sets of possible profits axiomatic bargaining models are used to select unconstrained optima from among these possibilities simple functional forms are employed low cost firms with large shares in cournot equilibrium may have little to gain from collusion if collusion is effective low cost firms will have relatively low estimated conjectural variations

social security and the retirement decision the effect of social security and private pensions on individual retirement decisions is modeled relaxing in turn three commonly maintained assumptions perfect capital markets actuarial fairness and certain lifetimes which together imply that there is no effect in each case raising the contribution level can cause systematic changes of either sign in general in individual retirement decisions for social security the effects associated with forced saving and deviations from actuarial fairness probably tend to advance retirement but those effects that arise solely from the insurance aspect of social security and private pensions are ambiguous in sign owing to the presence of a substitution effect that tends to delay retirement because the insurance benefits can be fully realized only by working longer

the rise of europe atlantic trade institutional change and economic growth the rise of western europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the atlantic ocean and with substantial trade with the new world africa and asia via the atlantic this trade and the associatedcolonialism affected europe not only directly but also indirectly by inducing institutional change where initial political institutions those established before 1500 placed significant checks on the monarchy the growth of atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights these changes were central to subsequent economic growth

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

profit margins and the business cycle evidence from uk manufacturing firms this paper presents some empirical models of profitability using panel data covering 709 large u k companies ove r the 1970s and 1980s focusing specifically on the role of aggregate demand shocks in shaping firm level profitability in basic regressi ons and in quite complex econometric models the results suggest that firm level profit margins fell heavily during the deep manufacturing recession of the early 1980s and as such are consistent with model s predicting the procyclical nature of profit margins this result hol ds across different product groups producer goods consumer durables a nd nondurables though the timing of the impact of aggregate shocks appears to differ copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

oligopoly supergames some empirical evidence on prices and margins this paper is a panel data study on the behavior of prices and margins of oligopolies involved in repeated games the authors examine two supergame models which generate very different predictions about the cyclical behavior of prices and margins evidence on the levels of price cost margins indicates that oligopolies achieve equilibria that more closely resemble a one shot cournot nash outcome than monopoly the authors find however that industries with high price cost margins exhibit cyclical price behavior which is quite different from that of unconcentrated industries little evidence of price wars during either recessions or booms is found copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

savings and pensions some uk evidence the sort of problem we shall be interested in is the following how much does a small change in a mature pay as you go pension scheme change aggregate current consumption in the context of a community of workers and pensioners with a variable retirement date and a pension scheme where the government taxes workers to pay pensions two sorts of effects have been posited first changes in pensions re distribute current disposable income this may lead to changes in aggregate consumption the redistribution effect secondly future pension rights constitute a form of wealth and unanticipated changes in the size or composition of wealth holdings may affect current consumption plans wealth effects see gultekin and logue i979 for a survey and references looking at the redistribution effect we observe that if pensioners have a higher short run marginal propensity to consurme than workers and the same long run marginal propensity to consume then an increase in pensions will ceteris paribus raise aggregate consumption initially but cause it to fall in the medium run the long run elasticity will be zero turning to wealth effects we distinguish two principal elements firstly an unanticipated increase in pensions in a pay as you go scheme increases the lifetime income of pensioners and workers close to retirement for workers who intend retiring at pensionable age this will lead to an increase in current consumption so long as it is a normal good this income effect will be less marked for workers at the beginning of their working life since the net income effect may even be negative for many workers as time goes by the aggregate net income effect consequent on a rise in pensions is diminished so that we would expect to see an initial rise in consumption followed by a very slow decline in incremental consumption the long run elasticity of mean consumption with respect to a rise in pensions would be zero note that imperfections in the capital market are unlikely to modify these conclusions since those who wish to increase their consumption are likely to have savings that can be reduced whilst those for whom borrowing constraints are binding i e younger workers are unlikely to wish to increase current consumption by much anyway there are two important caveats to the above the first is that workers who intend to work after the pensionable age may decrease current consumption if the increase in pensions induces a large enough fall in planned post pensionable age labour supply see crawford and lilien i98i for a theoretical discussion

correlated demand shocks and price wars during booms the supergame theoretic model of price competition rotemberg and saloner 1986 is re examined in the case of serially correlated demand shocks the equilibrium price is shown to exhibit the same counter cyclical movement as in the i i d case if the discount factor and the number of firms satisfy certain relationship

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

aggregate consumption function and public social security the first time series study for a developing country turkey this article is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the effects of public social security on aggregate consumption in a time series setting for a developing country turkey that has one of the most generous social security systems in the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd region in order to quantify the social security variable this article uses the social security wealth ssw series calculated for turkey in a separate study this study indicates that ssw is the largest part of the household wealth in turkey and therefore should not be ignored in the aggregate consumption studies the results show that its effect on consumption is positive and robust

business cycles and the relationship between concentration and price cost margins using a newly constructed panel data base we examine changes in price cost margins in 284 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1981 a key finding is a dramatic narrowing of the spread between the margins of concentrated and unconcentrated industries over this period we provide evidence that this narrowing is a result of the greater sensitivity of price cost margins in more concentrated industries to demand fluctuations this finding is robust to the inclusion of other industry variables and to measures of import competition the results indicate that cross sectional estimates of the concentration margins relationship are likely to be both biased and misleading

bankruptcy limited liability and the modigliani miller theorem this paper examines the validity of the modigliani miller theorem in the presence of bankruptcy the theorem asserts that the value of a firm and the set of return patterns that the capital markets offer to private investors are independent of firm debt equity ratios the usual proof of the theorem is based on the presumption that in perfect capital markets borrowing by firms and borrowing by individuals can be perfect substitutes it is unclear whether this presumption is valid when there is a positive probability that either the firm or the individual who borrows to invest in the firm goes bankrupt on the one hand joseph stiglitz 1969 and robert merton have argued that the modigliani miller theorem remains valid even with bankruptcy if agents who borrow to invest in a firm can limit their liability to the amount of collateral they put up on the other hand vernon smith 1972 has argued that a margin loan which is secured by a pure equity collateral has a different return pattern from a direct loan to the firm and cannot serve as a substitute for the latter see also david baron smith s argument raises a number of issues first it brings out the important fact that return patterns for limited liability borrowing and lending depend on the composition of the portfolio that serves as collateral if a firm goes bankrupt a pure equity collateral is worthless whereas a collateral that contains some bonds may still earn a positive return because the bonds have a privileged claim to the firm s remaining assets in general margin contracts with different collateral compositions will generate different return patterns both for the borrower and the lender given this multiplicity of return patterns on margin loans one would not expect that all margin loans can be used as substitutes for direct loans to the firm this intuition is confirmed by smith s demonstration that a particular margin loan namely the loan on pure equity collateral cannot serve this purpose the question remains open whether this is actually needed for the modiglianimiller theorem it might be enough if some appropriate margin loan could be used as a substitute for lending to the firm in pursuing this problem one finds a gap in the standard proof of the modiglianimiller theorem usually one applies an arbitrage argument to show that as a firm changes its debt equity ratio investors in shares and bonds adjust their portfolios so as to leave their overall return patterns unchanged no such arguments are given for other securities related to the firm in particular for margin investments and for margin loans that serve to finance those margin investments without an analysis of professor of economics university of bonn research on this paper was supported by nsf grant soc 75 13437 at princeton university and by the deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft i have benefited from the advice of dwight jaffee and an anonymous referee in a similar vein stiglitz 1972 asserts the value of the firm decregses because there is a divergence in the estimation of the chances of bankruptcy between the lender and the borrower p 467 this analysis rests upon a form of market segmentation that is without economic merit in his model there are two groups of agents optimists and pessimists the optimists invest all their wealth in the firm s equity valued to make the rate of return equal to that on the riskless asset the pessimists are indifferent between the risky firm s bonds and the riskless asset it follows that the optimists being more optimistic than the pessimists must prefer the risky bond to the riskless asset and hence to the equity yet stiglitz assumes that the optimists invest in the equity and not in the risky bond of course if one group invests all its wealth into one asset that asset need not satisfy a marginal equality condition at all a correct analysis of his model leads to the results of this paper

the behavioral life cycle hypothesis self control mental accounting and framing are incorporated in a behavioral enrichment of the life cycle theory of saving called the behavioral life cycle blc hypothesis the key assumption of the blc theory is that households treat components of their wealth as nonfungible even in the absence of credit rationing specifically wealth is assumed to be divided into three mental accounts current income current assets and future income the temptation to spend is assumed to be greatest for current income and least for future income considerable empirical support for the blc theory is presented primarily drawn from published econometric studies

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

market structure and price cost margins in a paper that has become a standard reference in the structure conductperformance approach to industrial economics cowling and waterson 1976 developed a theoretical rationale for expecting industry profitability to be positively correlated with the level of concentration their model based on a simple algebraic description of oligopoly behaviour has been interpreted as providing a justification for the common empirical practice of cross industry regression analysis of price cost margins in terms of concentration levels in the present paper we show that on further examination this model implies a joint determination of margins and concentration this provides some interesting comparative static results of relevance to inter industry differences in concentration levels equally however it leads to various cautionary insights concerning the meaning of price cost margin versus concentration regressions

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

cooperation in prices and capacities trade associations in brewing after repeal this study s main contribution is examination of the excess capacity held by brewers during a period in which they tacitly cooperated on price the analysis covers the industry in the united states between repeal of prohibition in 1933 and wartime rationing of raw materials in 1942 from april 1933 to may 1935 destructive price cutting among brewers was illegal under the national industrial recovery act subsequent rivalry among trade associations facilitated the development of tacitly cooperative pricing arrangements the trade associations appear to have adopted a different agenda as cooperation spread among all brewers instead of just facilitating cooperation on price the associations may have facilitated cooperation in the distribution of responsibility for enforcement members apparently distributed responsibility by coordinating the allocation of excess capacity these and other results are interpreted to suggest additional avenues for research on the distribution of responsibility for punishme

unions and the capture of economic rents an investigation using british firm level data this paper considers the relationship between unions and profitability in a sample of large british firms in 1984 and 1985 the initial finding is that unionised firms have significantly lower profit margins than otherwise comparable non union firms tests of whether the ability of unions to influence profit margins varies with the product and labour market characteristics of the firms in which they are located are then conducted the ability of unions to capture economic rents is seen to be significantly greater in firms which have a high market share and or operate in highly unionised industries

old age longevity and mortality contingent claims this paper analyzes the savings and longevity impacts of mortality contingent claims defined here as income measures such as annuities and life insurance under which earned income is contingent on the length of one s life the postwar increase in mandatory annuity and life insurance programs as well as the rapid increase in the life expectancy of older ages motivates a better understanding of the incentive effects that mortality contingent claims have on longevity related behavior we claim that these incentives in often alter the standard conclusions obtained about old age support when mortality is treated exogenously in particular we argue that annuities involve moral hazard effects that increase longevity and among other things introduce a positive interaction between public programs for health care and income support for the elderly programs that have grown enormously in developed countries

holding idle capacity to deter entry in this journal dixit i980 carefully analysed the extent to which an established firm facing a prospective entrant might make an investment in capacity beyond that which is optimal for its pre entry output in his model both the established firm and prospective entrants understand that a quantity setting nash equilibrium would be established in any post entry game dixit showed that spence i977 had studied an imperfect equilibrium that is an equilibrium that depended upon a threat that was not credible to obtain his result that firms might hold excess capacity to deter entry in a perfect equilibrium a firm would not wish to install capacity that would be left idle if entry did not occur dixit s conclusion however depends on his assumption that each firm s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other s output this is quite a restrictive assumption for example it is never satisfied in the relevant range for economists second favourite demand curve constant elasticity demand the basic point is unchanged if the firms anticipate price competition with differentiated products rather thanquantity competition in any post entry game under quite plausible conditions rational firms facing rational potential entrants may install capacity that will certainly be left idle we are thus able to rehabilitate spence s original proposition in a perfect equilibrium setting

the effects of investing social security funds in the stock market when fixed costs prevent some households from holding stocks with fixed costs of participating in the stock market consumers with high income will participate in the stock market but consumers with lower income will not participate if a fully funded defined contribution social security system tries to exploit the equity premium by selling a dollar of bonds per capita and buying a dollar of equity per capita consumers who save but do not participate in the stock market will increase their consumption thereby reducing saving and capital accumulation calibration of a general equilibrium model indicates that this policy could reduce the aggregate capital stock substantially by about 50 cents per capita

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

social security investment in equities this paper explores the general equilibrium impact of social security portfolio diversification into private securities either through the trust fund or private accounts the analysis depends critically on heterogeneities in saving production assets and taxes limited diversification weakly increases interest rates reduces the expected return on short term investment and the equity premium decreases safe investment increases risky investment and increases a suitably weighted social welfare function however the effects on aggregate investment long term capital values and the utility of young savers hinges on assumptions about technology aggregate investment and long term asset values can move in opposite directions jel h55

savings and portfolio choice in a two period two asset model we extend arrow s analysis of portfolio choice in a one period model to savings and portfolio choice in a two period model this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

collusion among asymmetric firms the case of different discount factors abstract this study investigates collusive behavior among asymmetric firms for this purpose we develop a selection criterion for deriving a unique collusive outcome and apply it to the case when firms have different discount factors our analysis reveals that for collusion to be self enforcing it is unnecessary that all firms have sufficiently high discount factors but rather only that firms on average have a sufficiently long run view the optimal collusive outcome entails a strict ordering of output quotas in which firms with relatively low discount factors receive a disproportionate share of market demand as found in the case of a common discount factor a fall in a firm s discount factor reduces the likelihood of successful collusion this effect reduces firm profits on the other hand in the event that firms can collude a lowering of a firm s discount factor increases its output quota so that its profits rise

declining public pensions in an era of demographic ageing will private provision fill the gap abstract demographic crisis and imprudent commitments have induced a crisis in public pension programmes in oecd countries will present and prospective cutbacks lead to greater private saving either in the form of private pension provision or in other forms of saving the paper surveys existing evidence and provides new results on three questions do individuals substitute private for public provision of savings when public pension programmes are cut back voluntarily do individuals respond to incentives to join sponsored or tax subsidised arrangements if encouraged by the government and if individuals are prepared to make such arrangements and where saving is voluntary do they save enough to replace previous prospective public pension flows

consumption and risk sharing over the life cycle a striking feature of u s data on income and consumption is that inequality increases with age this paper asks if individual specific earnings risk can provide a coherent explanation we find that it can we construct an overlapping generations general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable earnings shocks over the course of their lifetimes earnings inequality is exogenous and is calibrated to match data from the u s panel study on income dynamics consumption inequality is endogenous and matches well data from the u s consumer expenditure survey the total risk households face is decomposed into that realized before entering the labor market and that realized throughout the working years in welfare terms the latter is found to be more important than the former

margins concentration unions and the business cycle theory and evidence for britain abstract a number of recent studies have examined the cyclical relationship between price cost margins concentration and unions u s data has concluded that unions reduce margins margins vary over the cycle and concentration unionisation and the cycle interact in their effect on margins however there is almost no theory to account for these results we propose a simple theory that assumes only that there is overhead labour present at the firm this produces theoretical predictions that can explain these results and discriminate between existing theories we present results of our own using u k panel data and show similar findings to the u s

collusion versus differential efficiency testing alternative hypotheses the predictions of collusion and efficiency based static equilibrium explanations of interindustry profitability differences are formally developed and tested using appropriate econometric techniques with intraindustry data on seventy u s internal revenue service minor manufacturing industries in 1963 and 1972 none of the explanations has much explanatory power the 1963 data are consistent with collusion based models while the 1972 data are inconsistent with all non null hypotheses considered patterns of profitability are sharply different in the two years in complex ways apparently unrelated to cyclical forces or the phase ii price controls implications of these results are discussed copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

collusion in dynamic oligopolies in the presence of entry threats this paper considers a generalized oligopoly supergame where an endogenous entry decision is included the author proves that strategies based on most severe symmetric punishments can sustain some degree of collusion even with arbitrarily small entry barriers provided that the discount rate is sufficiently small the model provides a justification for a view suggesting that neither substantial barriers to entry nor strategic or informational asymmetries are necessary for an oligopoly with some degree of cooperation to prevail copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

electoral systems and institutional choice a case study of the 1988 korean elections this article shows how the ruling party of korea the djp chose and implemented a strategy to win the 13th national assembly election of 1988 and explains why that strategy failed in addition this election is analyzed in a more general context the authors find for example that the preference of a party over electoral systems is determined by the spatial distribution of its votes and that the choice of an electoral system is the outcome of a bargaining process among the parties in the context of democratization the korean experience shows that the democratic reform policies of an authoritarian government are shaped by the interplay between the ruling party s desire to create a political system wherein they maintain power and the constraints to create a system that would channel the opposition s activities into electoral or institutional outlets

active vs passive decisions and crowd out in retirement savings accounts evidence from denmark using 41 million observations on savings for the population of denmark we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice subsidies for retirement accounts which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts we estimate that each 1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent in contrast policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts increase wealth accumulation substantially we estimate that approximately 15 of individuals are active savers who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts 85 of individuals are passive savers who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated we conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons i subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond ii they generate substantial crowd out conditional on response and iii they do not increase the savings of passive individuals who are least prepared for retirement jel codes h2 h3

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

the determination of price and output quotas in a heterogeneous cartel applying a selection criterion that uses both subgame perfection and the nash bargaining solution this paper investigates the relationship between firms cost functions and collusive behavior it is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price that the low cost firm would set if it was a monopolist comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low cost firm s unit cost but is decreasing in the high cost firm s unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large copyright 1991 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

pension plan funding technology choice and the equity risk premium in this paper the impact of lazear contracts with defined benefit pensions on aggregate technology composition and the aggregate risk premium is examined in the presence of capital market constraints affecting workers defined benefit pensions bias the economy towards risk free production leveraging the risky technology relaxes the constraints and results in more risky production and a fall in the aggregate risk premium this effect holds with risky debt and low pension shortfall risk but breaks down with high pension shortfall risk a key prediction is that as lazear contracts become less common risky production will increase and the aggregate risk premium will fall

list pricing and discounting in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly list or retail pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice we modify the standard bertrand edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount or not in a subsequent stage we show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome this is true for a general class of rationing rules further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader

the political economy of development an assessment research in the field of economic development is increasingly engaged with questions of political economy of how political choices institutional structures and forms of governance influence the economic choices made by governments and citizens we summarize recent developments in the field and introduce a set of papers that illustrate key themes and methodological innovations associated with the new political

a price setting supergame between two heterogeneous firms when firms attempt to tacitly collude they inevitably face a market sharing problem this problem is further complicated when firms have asymmetries this paper studies a price setting supergame between two firms with different costs the paper investigates sustainability of tacit collusion and solves the market sharing problem under tacit collusion the resulting equilibrium from the supergame is used to study limit pricing government policies toward entrants and welfare change due to technological progress and a change in the time discount rate the paper shows that even costlessly achieved technological progress can decrease social welfare