the acid rain game as a resource allocation process with an application to the international cooperation among finland russia and estonia we consider optimal cooperation in transboundary air pollution abatement among several countries under incomplete information i e local information only on marginal emission abatement costs and damage costs directions of emission abatement in each country are determined that generate a succession of emissions programs shown to converge to an economic optimum a cost sharing scheme that results from appropriately designed international transfers guarantees that the individual costs of all parties are nonincreasing along the path towards the optimum a version of maler s 1989 acid rain game is used for a numerical application

buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game abstract we consider a two player asymmetric differential game of pollution control one player is non vulnerable to pollution or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non cooperative game we characterize the feedback nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution we establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non vulnerable player to control her emissions we further use the nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff

credit market constraints consumption smoothing and the accumulation of durable production assets in low income countries investments in bullocks in india in this paper we formulate and estimate a finite horizon structural dynamic model of agricultural investment behavior that incorporates the major features of low income agricultural environments income uncertainty constraints on borrowing and rental markets and the use of investment assets to generate income and smooth consumption the model is fit to longitudinal indian household data on farm profits bullock stocks and pump sets the estimated structural parameters are used to assess the effects on the life cycle accumulation of bullocks agricultural profits and welfare associated with complete markets and bullock liquidity and with second best policies that provide assured sources of income to farmers and weather insurance

the impact of ec environmental policy on british coal the courts and legal services act 1990 legalized a form of contingent contract between lawyers and clients in england and wales however it maintained the historic ban on american style contracts where lawyers receive a percentage of winnings in a successful case but nothing in the event of case loss the paper looks at the economic rationale for such american style contingent fees it then analyses the arguments used for and against them in britain in the 1989 90 pre legislation debate this is done with reference to the theoretical and empirical economic literature such fees have generated the arguments discussed concern access to justice the possibility of excessive contingent fees client lawyer conflicts of interest and the quantity of litigation under the fees the conclusion reached is that the british government s position on american style fees is acceptable except on the issue of excessive fees and that it should continue to consider introducing contingent fees copyright 1993 by oxford university press

optimal acid rain abatement policy for europe an analysis for the year 2000 acid rain causes greater environment damage than would occur if countries act cooperatively based on new estimates of sulphur abatement cost functions the potential gains from cooperation are calculated for europe various cooperative abatement rates are compared with the rates implied by recent international agreements the 30 club and the second sulphur protocol it is shown that the monetary gains from cooperation may be smaller than previously thought the distinction is made between primary and secondary abatement and their respective roles are discussed it is shown that agreed targets can only be met if primary measures eg fuel switching are adopted

a tale of two collectives sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in europe a theoretical model of emission reductions is specified that accounts for voluntary and non voluntary behaviour regarding the adherence to the helsinki and sofia protocols which mandated emission reductions for sulphur s and nitrogen oxides nox respectively from this model we derive an econometric specification for the demand for emission reductions that adjusts for the spatial dispersion of the pollutant when tested for 25 european nations the model performs well for sulphur cutbacks less satisfying results are obtained for nox because the model s assumption of a unitary actor at the national level is less descriptive collective action considerations indicate that sulphur emissions are easier to control than those of nox

the economics of forced migration abstract this article reviews the economics literature on the impacts of forced migration the literature is divided into two parts impacts on forced migrants and impacts on host communities studies exploring the impact of forced migration due to wwii suggest that the long term impact is often positive the literature for developing countries suggests that there are serious consequences of forced migration for those forced to migrate these consequences range from worse labour market outcomes to less consumption smoothing the impact on host communities seems to be mixed and there are winners and losers the article provides suggestions for future research

vulnerability of victims of civil conflicts empirical evidence for the displaced population in colombia summary internal conflicts and the forced displacement often caused by such conflicts impose a heavy burden on the civilian population and greatly damage a community s overall welfare the present study employs a household level survey administered to 2 322 colombian displaced households to estimate changes in household welfare after displacement and to assess aggregate consumption levels in destination sites we also assess whether households are able to smooth consumption and we analyze the strategies they are compelled to adopt in order to cope our results indicate that victims of civil conflict face difficulties in generating income are unable to rely on usual risk sharing mechanisms and are forced to draw upon costly coping strategies in order to smooth consumption the vulnerability of displaced households and the possibility of falling into poverty traps highlight the need to design and implement specific policies for victims of internal conflict in order to cope with the displacement shock

behavioral responses to risk in rural china does risk perpetuate poverty in a credit constrained economy jalan and ravallion study portfolio and other behavioral responses to measured risk using household panel data for rural china one quarter of wealth is held in unproductive liquid forms but only a small share of this appears to be a precaution against income risk the authors estimate that eliminating income risk would reduce the share of wealth held in liquid form by less than 1 percentage point moreover that effect is confined largely to middle income groups high income households do not it seems need to hold unproductive cautionary wealth and the poor probably cannot afford to do so the authors find no evidence that income risk discourages schooling but risk does inhibit the out migration of labor generally the results provide only limited support for the idea that uninsured risks promote unproductive portfolio behavior in this setting there is such an effect but it is small in magnitude and cannot be deemed an important cause of poverty

protecting consumers through protection the role of tariff induced technology transfer abstract we consider a duopolistic trade model where a tariff induces the foreign firm to transfer its superior technology to the domestic rival contrary to the conventional wisdom such a tariff raises consumers surplus relative to the free trade situation we characterize the optimal tariff with and without precommitment on the part of the local government possibility of technology transfer reduces the optimal tariff rate compared to the no transfer situation

informal insurance arrangements with limited commitment theory and evidence from village economies recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk pooling we attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk pooling we provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by limited commitment and test the model using data from three indian villages we find that the model can fully explain the dynamic response of consumption to income but that it fails to explain the distribution of consumption across households

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

prices credit markets and child growth in low income rural areas in this paper it is argued that fluctuations in child growth in rural areas of bangladesh during and after severe floods in i988 can provide insight into the structure of credit markets a model of intertemporal resource allocation is developed and euler equations relating growth patterns of children to the cost of borrowing by household are then derived from the model the evidence indicates that although some of the variation in growth patterns over the relevant period may be attributed to variation in illness and the price of rice growth patterns for children in landless households were influenced by credit market imperfections this paper links two prominent strands of research in economic development the first strand examines the extent to which households in poor rural economies are able to protect themselves from the adverse weather and other shocks that importantly influence earnings in underdeveloped areas while it has long been thought that credit market imperfections and other forms of market failure make it difficult for poor individuals in these economies to smooth consumption both within and across years there remains some question about the magnitude and pervasiveness of these imperfections while there is evidence that fluctuations in economic conditions result in inefficient allocation of resources e g morduch 1990 rosenzweig and wolpin i993 some recent papers have emphasised the fact that consumption patterns of households in the same village comove in a manner consistent with the idea that a substantial fraction of idiosyncratic variation in income is effectively

the formation of risk sharing networks this paper examines the formation of risk sharing networks in the rural philippines we find that geographic proximity possibly correlated with kinship is a major determinant of mutual insurance links among villagers age and wealth differences also play an important role in contrast income correlation and differences in occupation are not determinants of network links reported network links have a strong effect on subsequent gifts and loans gifts between network partners are found to respond to shocks and to differences in health status from this we conclude that intra village mutual insurance links are largely determined by social and geographical proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversification of income risk the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of dyadic models

identifying the free riders a simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good abstract when a heterogeneous group of people provide themselves with a pure public good the resulting nash equilibrium outcome will divide the group into contributors and free riders this paper proposes a general algorithm for discovering which individuals in the group fall into which of these two classes the algorithm is based on identifying for each individual how much of the public good must be provided by others to drive that individual s contribution to zero

international technology transfer under potential threat of entry a cournot nash framework abstract this paper analyses the possibility of technology transfer from a technologically advanced foreign firm to a domestic firm of a less developed country when the product market is characterized by cournot nash competition the foreign firm is not allowed to enter the home market by a prohibitive tariff but the backward firm may not face any such resistance in the foreign markets this means that technology transfer under this situation involves potential threat of competition from the latecomer it is shown that by designing a suitable payment policy the host country government can induce the foreign firm to transfer the best technology however there are possible equilibria where worse than the best technologies are transferred

valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics 1 valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics relevance and scope h folmer e van ierland part i the valuation of public goods 2 non market asset prices a comparison of three valuation approaches r c d arge j f shogren 3 valuing public goods in a risky world an experiment p o johansson 4 recreational values pareto optimality and timber supply p o johansson k g lofgren k g maler 5 estimating social benefits of environmental improvements from reduced acid rain deposition a contingent valuation survey s navrud part ii the valuation of health and life 6 benefits of reduced morbidity from air pollution control a survey m dickie s gerking 7 valuing a public good direct and indirect valuation approaches to the measurement of the benefits from air pollution abatement m shechter m kim l golan 8 environmental regulation and the valuation of life interindustry mobility and the market price of safety h w herzog jr a m schlottmann part iii cost benefit analysis 9 disequilibrium cost benefit rules an exposition and extension p o johansson k g lofgren 10 macroeconomic cost benefit analysis of environmental programmes a nentjes part iv aspects of policy making 11 benefit estimation for complex policies a randall j hoehn 12 the acid rain game k g maler index

adjusting the labor supply to mitigate violent shocks evidence from rural colombia this paper studies the use of labor markets to mitigate the impact of violent shocks on households in rural areas in colombia it examines changes in the labor supply from on farm to off farm labor as a means of coping with the violent shock and the ensuing redistribution of time within households it identifies the heterogeneous response by gender because the incidence of violent shocks is not exogenous the analysis uses instrumental variables that capture several dimensions of the cost of exercising terror as a response to the violent shocks households decrease the time spent on on farm work and increase their supply of labor to off farm activities non agricultural ones men carry the bulk of the adjustment in the use of time inasmuch as they supply the most hours to off farm non agricultural work and formal labor markets labor markets do not fully absorb the additional labor supply women in particular are unable to find jobs in formal labor markets and men have increased time dedicated to leisure and household chores additional off farm supply does not fully cover the decrease in consumption the results suggest that in rural colombia labor markets are a limited alternative for coping with violent shocks thus policies in conflict affected countries should go beyond short term relief and aim at preventing labor markets from collapsing and at supporting the recovery of agricultural production

optimal abatement of sulphur emissions in europe this study presents a mathematical model for determining cost effective emissions control strategies in europe by minimizing sulphur abatement costs subject to different pollution control targets the purpose is to compare the efficiency of a uniform percentage emissions reduction with a scenario that takes variation in environmental conditions into account underlying the proposed model is the belief that a full cost benefit analysis of acid rain abatement is infeasible the model focuses on the costs of abatement and provides an estimation of the gains or losses that countries could achieve if they co operate in their policies rather than act independently

income smoothing and consumption smoothing one way that risk averse households protect consumption levels is to borrow and use insurance mechanisms another way common in low income economies is to diversify economic activities and make conservative production and employment choices households thus tend toward limiting exposure only to shocks that can be handled with available credit and insurance typically both types of mechanisms are studied independently but much more can be learned by studying them together first we obtain a more complete picture of risks costs and insurance possibilities second it opens the way to considering biases in standard tests of credit and insurance

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

optimal control of upstream pollution under asymmetric information this paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontieremissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter sconcern for the environment in a model in which the starting point forthe negotiations on emission reduction is a cournot nash equilibrium itis shown that transfers from the victim induce the polluting country toexaggerate its concern for the environment as a consequence in thesecond best solution abatement of all but the least caring type isdistorted downward and optimal bribes may be such that more caring typesturn them down these results are in sharp contrast to earlier policyproposals derived for a non equilibrium starting point they indicatethat under asymmetric information the binding incentive problem is toprevent the polluting country from claiming not to care about theenvironment and that optimal bribes from the victim should be restrictedto sufficiently environmentally concerned polluters

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

imitative innovation and international joint ventures a dynamic analysis abstract in this paper we deal with some dynamic issues of international joint venture in the context of a developing country we provide a rationale for international joint venture formation as well as its subsequent instability where instability is interpreted as payoff readjustments between the partners in the venture although the joint venture is formed in response to government restrictions on foreign equity holdings in the first period its subsequent instability is caused by both the change in government policy as well as the outcome of imitative technological innovation undertaken by the host partner it is also shown that uncertainty about the government policy in the second period plays an important role in the formation of joint venture in the first period

government failure the cause of global environmental mismanagement abstract this paper argues that although pollution may move across national boundaries and polluters are mobile governments should be able to coordinate a sound management of the environment through transfer payments or commitments however governments may respond to political pressure rather than maximize social welfare because pollution tends to hurt large unorganized groups future generations and those who are uninformed there is likely to be a government failure resulting in too little protection of the environment government failure in one country may also reduce the desirable level of cleaning in other countries brief analyses of atmospheric emissions the destruction of the tropical rainforest consumption of tobacco and the development and diffusion of new technology by multinational corporations further suggest that government failure is a major cause of environmental mismanagement it is advocated that an international body should be instituted to compensate for this

risk and insurance in village india comment the protection of poor households in high risk agrarian economies from shocks to their incomes has often been seen as a compelling motive for various forms of policy intervention including transfers of cash or food credit subsidies and public employment schemes for a survey see lipton and ravallion 1995 the desirability of such safety net policies clearly depends on how well pre existing risk sharing arrangements work while it is commonly thought that without effective policy intervention rural households are vulnerable to village wide shocks such as adverse prices or poor rains it is less clear to what extent risk sharing institutions within the village mitigate the effects of idiosyncratic income risk stemming for instance from ill health or localized crop damage 2 several recent papers have used household level data to implement tests of risk sharing that might inform such concerns 3 these tests are based on the proposition that with perfect risk sharing consumption at the household level should be insured against idiosyncratic risks and thus depend solely on the realization of the aggregate risk wilson 1968 diamond 1967 townsend 1994 tests this implication of perfect intra village risk sharing using longitudinal household data on consumptions and incomes for three villages in india he reports that the full insurance hypothesis provides a surprisingly good benchmark in that household consumptions co move and do not appear to be much influenced by contemporaneous own income our aim here is to examine the robustness of this potentially important finding we have two main concerns the first is that the specification townsend adopts potentially biases his test towards the null hypothesis of full insurance because it yields inconsistent estimates of the key test parameter under a plausible alternative we therefore estimate a different specification that generates consistent estimates under both the null and the alternative our second concern is that a particular form of measurement error in the consumption data townsend uses may have further biased his results toward the null hypothesis of full insurance to address this concern we use an instrumental variables procedure when we implement the test of consumption insurance with townsend s consumption data we also re estimate the test equations with a measure of consumption derived from the same underlying primary data by an alternate method finally townsend reports 1discussions with robert townsend stimulated our interest in this investigation the staff of the

a note on environmental awareness and cross border pollution considering a nash equilibrium in which a developed country chooses the amount of foreign aid and a developing country sets the emission tax rate and the proportion of the received aid allocated to public abatement of pollution it is shown that an increase in the recipient country s environmental awareness will reduce the level of cross border pollution and benefits the donor though its foreign aid is increased

on a non cooperative theory of technology transfer abstract this paper shows that it might be profitable for a firm with advanced technology to sell the knowledge to a competing firm with less efficient technology and still remain in the business a non corperative equilibrium with technology transfer may pareto dominate the initial equilibrium without technology transfer in this paper it is shown that technology agreement is likely to occur between firms which are reasonably close in terms of their initial technologies such an equilibrium is an interesting possibility in the absence of credibly sustainable collusive outcomes

impure public goods and transfers in a three agent model abstract this paper extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods the analysis is developed in the context of international public goods under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical if the preferences are divergent a country may gain by giving a transfer the receiver may lose and these two phenomena may appear at the same time

using weather variability to estimate the response of savings to transitory income in thailand this paper measures the extent to which farmers are able to use savings and dissavings to smooth consumption in response to unexpected shocks to income time series information on regional rainfall is used to construct estimates of transitory income due to rainfall shocks the relationship between these measures of transitory income and savings indicates that farm households save a significantly higher fraction of transitory income than nontransitory income jel d91 016 the incomes of farm households in developing countries are notorious for being both low and uncertain policies that increase the incomes of farmers may well be different

smoothing consumption by smoothing income hours of work responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural india while research has demonstrated that farm households in developing economies are able to protect consumption from idiosyncratic crop shocks little evidence shows how this is achieved this paper examines the extent to which labor markets allow households to shift labor from farm to off farm employment and the extent to which such a shift explains the observed lack of correlation between consumption and idiosyncratic crop shocks the empirical analysis uses a novel measure of the idiosyncratic crop income shock which utilizes information on start of season cropping choices to more accurately estimate household expectations of weather

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

an equilibrium framework for global pollution problems abstract the paper analyzes global pollution problems from the point of view of the benefit approach to the allocation of public costs special attention is paid to the possibility that the optimum abatement vector may have negative elements an appropriate cost share equilibrium is defined and characterized and conditions under which the equilibrium is beneficial to all parties are derived an implementation mechanism whose nash equilibrium yields positive abatement levels under appropriate conditions is described

risk financial markets and human capital in a developing country this paper explores the link between financial market incompleteness and human capital accumulation we examine how child school attendance responds to seasonal fluctuations in the income of agrarian households using panel data from rural india to pinpoint market imperfections we study responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic as well as to anticipated and unanticipated income shocks our main finding is that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self insurance but one which does not result in a substantial loss of human capital on average

on licensing policies in bertrand competition abstract three licensing policies the auction the fee and the royalty are studied in a bertrand type duopoly with differentiated goods the analysis is conducted in terms of a multistage noncooperative game involving an external patentee and two firms each producing a differentiated good in bertrand price competition a principal finding is that for a patentee the royalty may be superior to the other two policies journal of economic literature classification numbers 026 611 621

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

effects of technology transfers on the provision of public goods in this paper we examine the viability ofcooperative policies oriented to the resolution oftransboundary pollution problems using the theory ofprivate provision of public goods in a two countrymodel we analyze the effects on economic welfare ofvoluntary technological transfers oriented to reducingthe emission of pollutants

international public goods and contribution productivity differentials abstract this paper investigates the impacts of productivity differentials in contributing to the public good on national welfare in the context of non cooperative voluntary provision of a pure public good a country with high productivity does not necessarily enjoy high welfare subsidizing the other country in a contribution game may lead to a strong paradoxical result while a lump sum transfer will lead to a weak paradoxical result we also explore the relationship between the price of the public good and the size of an open club in a multi club model

international environmental problems a simple taxonomy of international environmental problems is developed based on economic considerations the unidirectional externalities are illustrated by the case of one upstream and one downstream country the main problem in this case is an informational one the analysis of regional reciprocal externalities is illustrated by the acid rains in europe it is shown that an efficient solution could be achieved by transferable export rights finally global external problems are discussed with reference to greenhouse effects and extinction of species copyright 1990 by oxford university press

increasing returns and the evolution of violent crime the case of colombia abstract this paper presents an explanation of the recent escalation of violent crime in colombia the paper considers three implicit models that isolate different types of externalities among criminals in the first model criminals make crime more appealing to nearby residents by congesting the law enforcement system and hence lowering the probability of punishment in the second model the interaction of career criminals and local crooks speeds up the diffusion of criminal know how and criminal technology in the third model the daily contact of youth with criminal adults and criminal peers results in the erosion of morals and hence in a greater predisposition toward crime the paper shows that a myriad empirical evidence both statistical and anecdotal lends support to the previous models in general and to the congestion in law enforcement model in particular

a finnish soviet acid rain game noncooperative equilibria cost efficiency and sulfur agreements abstract this study analyzes cost effectiveness in environmental cooperation between finland and the soviet union it is assumed that the aim of both countries is to attain a given target deposition level at minimum possible sulfur abatement costs cost effective cooperation is compared to noncooperative equilibrium and to the agreement on sulfur emissions between these two countries it is shown that the agreement is not cost effective implies higher abatement costs than under noncooperation and is strategically unstable however the cost differences and the incentives to cheat are small the computations reveal that the main source of potential cooperation benefits is not asymmetrical emission transportation or differences in abatement costs but rather different target deposition levels for finland and the soviet union

imperfect commitment altruism and the family evidence from transfer behavior in low income rural areas in this paper we examine empirically whether risk pooling is more advantageous among altruistic compared to selfish agents in a framework where individuals cannot make binding commitments in particular we incorporate altuism into a model of risk sharing under imperfect commitment and use simulation methods to establish tests of the roles of both altruism and commitment problems in determining the extent of insurance and the intertemporal movements in interhousehold transfers the tests are carried out using three panel data sets from two countries of rural south asia that provide detailed information on transfers and enable the measurement of income shocks the estimates provide strong support for the notion that imperfect commitment substantially constrains informal transfer arrangements whether kin based or not but also provide evidence that altruism plays an important role in ameliorating commitment constraints and thus in increasing the gains from income pooling