reducing inventory system costs by using robust demand estimators applications of inventory theory typically use historical data to estimate demand distribution parameters imprecise knowledge of the demand distribution adds to the usual replenishment costs associated with stochastic demands only limited research has been directed at the problem of choosing cost effective statistical procedures for estimating these parameters available theoretical findings on estimating the demand parameters for s s inventory replenishment policies are limited by their restrictive assumptions the impact on total system cost of using the sample mean and standard deviation as compared to robust parameter estimators has not been tested this paper explores the circumstances under which the cost due to statistical estimation can be substantially reduced by a better choice of estimators specifically an exponentially smoothed average and a modified exponentially smoothed mean absolute deviation are shown to outperform the sample mean and standard deviation for a wide range of computer simulated and u s air force empirical demands when the s s policies are calculated using ehrhardt s power approximation those situations in which the method of demand parameter estimation has negligible impact on total system cost are also indicated

determinants of donations in private nonprofit markets abstract we estimate the responsiveness of donations to a number of economic variables including price advertising and the availability of revenue from such other sources as government grants and program service sales utilizing a set of irs data on individual nonprofit organizations in each of seven industries including hospitals and higher education for the years 1982 1994 we find distinct overall patterns as well as notable variation across industries a nonprofit organization s fundraising expenditures are estimated to exert two countervailing effects on donations the direct advertising and information effect augments donations while the indirect effect on the price of donating has a negative effect we do not find evidence that fundraising is carried to the profit maximizing levels in some industries fundraising is substantially short of that level while in other industries it is excessive implying that the marginal return to fundraising is exceeded by the cost focusing on whether revenue from other sources affects donations to a nonprofit organization we find evidence that revenue from either government grants or from the organization s own program sales activity generally does not crowd out private donations to the contrary in most industries there are significant positive effects

the frequency and magnitude of earnings management in china earnings management is an indicator of the corporate governance quality and investor protection standard we study the frequencies and magnitudes of earnings management under two different thresholds zero earnings and prior earnings in the chinese market from 1997 to 2004 we model earnings as a mixed normal distribution and obtain parameter estimators that measure the frequency and magnitude of earnings management we show that the practice of earnings management has gone up both in frequency and magnitude during the post 2000 period we also find that the frequency and magnitude of earnings management are higher when firms try to avoid negative earnings than when firms try to report earnings increase our findings reflect the current economic environment in china and caution investors on the low disclosure quality in the chinese stock market

an equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation abstract this paper develops an agency model in which stock based compensation is a double edged sword inducing managers to exert productive effort but also to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance we examine how the potential for manipulation affects the equilibrium level of pay for performance sensitivity and derive several new cross sectional implications that are consistent with recent empirical studies in addition we analyze the impact of recent regulatory changes contained in the sarbanes oxley act of 2002 and show how policies intended to increase firm value by reducing misrepresentation can actually reduce firm value or increase the upward bias in manipulated disclosures

order quantity and timing flexibility in supply chains the role of demand characteristics we study how differences in product demand characteristics affect the strategic value of different types of supply chain flexibility for accurate response we propose a single period inventory modelling framework with two ordering opportunities the second order reflects updated demand information and potentially capitalizes on supply chain flexibility we consider two complementary forms of flexibility quantity flexibility in production and timing flexibility in scheduling in this framework we analyze the total inventory cost of a firm for alternate demand types we model functional products through the standard assumption of independent demand over the period fashion driven innovative products through a bayesian model and innovative products with evolving demand through a martingale process the three demand processes exhibit very different behavior with respect to the value of the alternate forms of flexibility we observe that quantity flexibility is of moderate value for functional goods and of high value for fashion driven products for all lead times quantity flexibility is of low value for goods with evolving demand with long lead times but of high value for short lead times alternately we observe timing flexibility is of highest value for functional goods especially for cases of high holding cost and is of lesser value for fashion driven goods it is of least value for goods with evolving demand both quantity and timing flexibility capabilities are required to significantly reduce the relevant supply chain costs for evolving demand innovative goods when the lead times are long

ceo characteristics and firm r d spending over the past fifteen years a number of studies have examined the determinants of firm r d spending these studies however almost invariably focus on the role of firm or external ownership characteristics in predicting r d spending while overlooking the attributes of the top managers involved in allocating corporate resources in this study we change that focus by empirically examining how r d spending as compared to industry competitors varies at firms based on the characteristics of their ceos using a sample of publicly traded firms we find that ceo characteristics explain a significant proportion of the sample variance in firm r d spending even when corporate strategy ownership structure and other firm level attributes are controlled in terms of individual ceo characteristics we find that r d spending is greater at firms where ceos are younger have greater wealth invested in firm stock and signifacant career experience in marketing and or engineering r d in contrast to existing theory we find that the amount of a ceo s formal education had no significant association with r d spending once a ceo has attained a college degree however significant r d spending increases are found at firms where ceos have advanced science related degrees from subgroup analyses we further find that ceo effects on relative r d spending increase with longer ceo tenure implying that ceos over time may mold r d spending to suit their own preferences from these results we make implications for both research on determinants of r d spending and managerial practice

integrating replenishment decisions with advance demand information there is a growing consensus that a portfolio of customers with different demand lead times can lead to higher more regular revenues and better capacity utilization customers with positive demand lead times place orders in advance of their needs resulting inadvance demand information this gives rise to the problem of finding effective inventory control policies under advance demand information we show that state dependent s s and base stock policies are optimal for stochastic inventory systems with and without fixed costs the state of the system reflects our knowledge of advance demand information we also determine conditions under which advance demand information has no operational value a numerical study allows us to obtain additional insights and to evaluate strategies to induce advance demand information

executive incentives and the horizon problem an empirical investigation abstract this paper investigates the hypothesis that ceos in their final years of office manage discretionary investment expenditures to improve short term earnings performance we examine the behavior of r d expenditures for a sample of firms in industries that have significant ongoing r d activities the results suggest that ceos spend less on r d during their final years in office however we find the reductions in r d expenditures are mitigated through ceo stock ownership there is no evidence that the reduced r d expenditures are associated with either poor firm performance or reductions in investment expenditures that are capitalized for accounting purposes

welfare measurement for environmental improvements using the hedonic model the case of nonparametric marginal prices abstract research in environmental and natural resource economics frequently requires the use of hedonic models because of the differentiated products involved this is true for studies of the relationship between environmental quality and property values or wages or between the characteristics of a recreation site and the demand for its services an obvious use of such studies is in estimating willingness to pay for improvements with differentiated products there are usually nonlinear hedonic price schedules and thus nonlinear budget constraints this makes welfare analysis difficult because standard duality results no longer hold this paper develops a technique for estimating a psuedo demand system that can be used to derive exact measures of consumer welfare change similar techniques are developed for producers with a psuedo profit function that can be converted to an exact measure of the change in quasi rents or rents the paper also shows that the distance function can be used to develop an ex ante measure of welfare change

an empirical examination of the relation between debt contracts and management incentives abstract prior research on the factors influencing the use of debt covenants restricting dividends and additional borrowing is extended by considering management incentives when alternative incentive variables are considered separately we find covenants have a significant negative relation to ceo cash compensation an insignificant relation to the value of ceo equity held and significant positive relations to both the ratio of the value of ceo equity holdings to cash compensation and the fraction of equity held by the ceo in two stage simultaneous equations models only the latter is significant when jointly considered with each of the other incentive variables

dynamic incentives and retirement abstract this paper examines multi period compensation contracts when retirement is anticipated short term contracts in long term employment relationships are equivalent to a long term renegotiation proof contract the dynamic of incentive rates is determined by i how and in which periods managerial effort affects the contractible performance measures and by ii the time series correlation of error terms in performance reports the model explains why long term investments can decrease while incentive rates increase as managers approach retirement earnings persistence is negatively associated to earnings based incentive rates but towards retirement high earnings persistence implies increasing earnings based incentive rates

political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry abstract this study tests political costs theory by examining the cable television industry during periods of congressional scrutiny earnings management is measured using discretionary accruals and data are consistent with managerial incentives to mitigate the effects of political scrutiny and potential industry reregulation tests are also done using within sample comparisons of firms firms for which proposed regulations are expected to be more harmful have greater income decreasing accruals and for some tests firms for which cable television operations are more important have greater income decreasing accruals test results are robust to the inclusion of control variables for firm performance and size

board composition and nonprofit conduct evidence from hospitals abstract this study uses data from hospitals to test the hypothesis that management representation on nonprofit boards leads to excessive ceo pay defined as compensation that exceeds the level predicted by a market wage model we document a relatively small but statistically significant positive association between ceo pay and insider boards that include the ceo and other employees as members additional tests confirm that this result is not driven by endogenous board structure and that excess pay is greater in the absence of competition from for profit hospitals we then examine whether management board representation is associated with larger underlying agency concerns that lead to reduced donations our tests do not support this hypothesis but do however reveal a negative correlation between donations and physician representation on the board suggesting a potential conflict between the interests of donors and non employee physicians our overall evidence provides empirical support for modeling nonprofit organizations as consisting of competing stakeholders

factors associated with the year end decline in working capital working capital is an important indicator of firm operational efficiency all else being equal lower levels signal greater efficiency managers are thus likely to be motivated to report lower levels of working capital at times of greater external attention we find that working capital levels decrease in the fourth fiscal quarter significantly more than expected conditional on seasonal changes in economic activity the decrease subsequently reverses in the following first fiscal quarter evidence indicates that firms manage down year end working capital through transactions that increase year end operating cash flow and that firms spread this activity over all working capital accounts finally the temporary decrease in year end working capital is correlated with compensation benchmarks and analysts annual cash flow forecasts the temporary drop is also more pronounced for firms with industry dominance this paper was accepted by mary barth accounting

enforceability of non compete covenants discretionary investments and financial reporting practices evidence from a natural experiment abstract non compete covenants are widely used in employment contracts to promote employee stability using legal amendments of non compete enforceability as a natural experiment we find that as non compete enforceability increases firms display an increased likelihood of meeting short term earnings benchmarks lower discretionary expenditures and declining future performance these effects are more pronounced when ceos have lower ability or shorter tenures and when firms have more growth opportunities or operate in localized industries our results suggest that managers actively adapt investment and financial reporting practices to the changing environment that affects their contractual relations with firms

estimating compensating and equivalent income variations from hedonic price models abstract estimates of welfare changes obtained from hedonic price models usually consist of changes in marshallian consumer s surplus this note shows how compensating and equivalent income variations can be computed from the information available in hedonicprice models

employment horizon and the choice of performance measures empirical evidence from annual bonus plans of loss making entities we examine the extent to which employment horizon concerns affect the relative emphasis on financial versus nonfinancial performance measures in annual bonus plans we argue that managers of loss making firms are likely to voluntarily or forcibly depart in the near future and consequently have a shorter employment horizon loss making firms then need to increase the emphasis on forward looking nonfinancial performance measures to motivate long term effort of their managers thus we hypothesize that the emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures is greater in loss making than in profitable firms even after controlling for the informativeness of earnings we find consistent support for our hypothesis using different archival survey and field data sources and various proxies for short employment horizon and the emphasis on nonfinancial performance measures

industry product market competition and managerial incentives abstract while some studies suggest that industry product market competition can substitute for managerial incentives other studies suggest a complementary relation the underlying assumption behind these studies is that competition can be uni dimensionally proxied for by industry concentration however recent studies suggest that competition can reflect several dimensions product substitutability market size and entry costs given the level of industry concentration using these determinants of competition this study contributes to the literature by showing that a firms provide stronger incentives when industry competition is greater b competition is multi dimensional in its relation to incentives and c industry characteristics play a major role in influencing incentives

the relation between earnings based measures in firm debt contracts and ceo pay sensitivity to earnings abstract i investigate how implicit incentives provided by earnings based debt covenants affect the structure of ceo compensation contracts this provides a new and unique view of how the ceo s incentives are shaped by not only his compensation contract but also debt contracts i find when debt contracts contain an earnings based covenant the ceo s pay sensitivity to earnings is muted additionally i find some evidence that pay sensitivity to earnings varies with earnings based covenant slack this study provides evidence consistent with shareholders rebalancing the ceo s earnings incentives in the presence of earnings based covenants thereby tilting incentives away from earnings performance

effect of derivative accounting rules on corporate risk management behavior abstract i examine the effect of the accounting standard for derivative instruments sfas no 133 on corporate risk management behavior i classify a derivative user as an effective hedger eh firm if its risk exposures decreased after the initiation of the derivatives program and as an ineffective hedger speculator is firm otherwise i find that volatility of cash flows and risk exposures related to interest rate foreign exchange rate and commodity price decrease significantly for is firms but not for eh firms suggesting that is firms engaged in more prudent risk management activities after the adoption of sfas no 133

bonus pools and the informativeness principle abstract previous work on moral hazard problems has shown that under certain conditions bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk neutral workers in our paper we demonstrate that if a firm employs at least two workers it may further benefit from combining worker compensation via a bonus pool contract and relative performance evaluation such combination leads to saved rents under a wide class of luck distributions in addition if the employer is wealth constrained complementing individual bonus contracts by the possibility of pooling bonuses can increase the set of implementable effort levels all our results hold even though workers outputs are technically and stochastically independent so that in view of holmstrom s informativeness principle individual bonus contracts would be expected to dominate bonus pool contracts

chief executive officer equity incentives and accounting irregularities this study examines whether chief executive officer ceo equity based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports while several prior studies have examined this important question the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between ceo equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices we use propensity score matching and assess hidden omitted variable bias within a broader sample in contrast to most prior research we do not find evidence of a positive association between ceo equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching ceos on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments instead we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where ceos have relatively higher levels of equity incentives

empirical tests of budget ratcheting and its effect on managers discretionary accrual choices abstract in this paper we investigate whether budgets ratchet using business unit data from a large multinational corporation we find evidence consistent with ratcheting where favorable budget variances result in performance budget increases that are larger than decreases associated with unfavorable variances of the same magnitude we argue that under ratcheting the cost of reporting positive transitory earnings surprises outweigh the short term benefits of the current period bonus consequently we hypothesize that managers make income decreasing discretionary accruals to offset transitory earnings surprises beyond the level expected under fixed budgets using a proxy for transitory earnings surprise we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis

earnings management and accounting income aggregation quarterly earnings allow aggregation into annual earnings in four different ways fiscal year earnings is one measure of annual earnings the others being earnings for annual periods ending at interim quarter ends we investigate earnings management in fiscal year earnings relative to these alternative measures of firms annual earnings we confirm prior findings in burgstahler and dichev 1997 earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses journal of accounting and economics 24 99 126 of discontinuities around zero and prior year earnings in histograms of earnings subsequent research questions whether these discontinuities are evidence of earnings management using histograms of our alternative annual earnings measures we offer evidence suggesting earnings management is responsible for the discontinuities

earnings quality research advances challenges and future research abstract this discussion makes several observations regarding the earnings quality research reviewed in dechow ge and schrand 2010 dgs i discuss some of the factors that led to the large growth in the earnings quality literature over the past two decades and note a few of the important contributions from this literature i also present what i view as several major challenges the literature faces as well as some avenues for future research in addition i discuss the difficulties in evaluating such a diverse body of literature and comment on dgs s major conclusions

corporate earnings facts and fiction investors cone dence in the quality and integrity of corporate e nancial reports has been seriously shaken of late the ever increasing procession of headlines about fraudulent earnings ine ated asset values and understated liabilities reported by erstwhile leading companies the likes of enron tyco worldcom xerox and a host of lesser household names all audited by major accounting e rms suggests systematic dee ciencies in the accounting standards and governance systems that generate e nancial information of public companies not to mention in the regulatory systems overseeing them both aggregate data and cross sectional research cone rm the anecdotal evidence that the correspondence to reality of reported earnings deteriorated throughout the 1990s for example the gap between aggregate earnings and taxable corporate income which abstracts according to internal revenue service rules from most estimates and provisions often used to manipulate earnings has been continuously widening throughout the 1990s desai 2002 also increasing during the 1990s was the gap between earnings and the corporate proe ts reported in the national income and product accounts which are based on e rms taxable income adjusted for current values of inventory and depreciation while part of the difference between earnings and taxable income is probably due to increasing corporate sophistication of tax management manipulation of earnings played a major role in the widening gap lev and nissim 2002a firm specie c data corroborate the increasing vulnerability of earnings to manipulation the number of earnings restatements by public companies often in the wake of admitted reporting improprieties has skyrocketed in the last three to four years wu 2002 also the frequency of e rms beating analysts forecasts of

substitutes or complements a configurational examination of corporate governance mechanisms we conduct an exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis of the s p 1500 firms with the aim of elaborating theory on how corporate governance mechanisms work together effectively to do so we integrate extant theory and research to specify the bundle of mechanisms that operate to mitigate the agency problem among publicly traded corporations and review what previous research has said about how these mechanisms combine we then use the fuzzy set approach to qualitative comparitive analysis qca to explore the combinations of governance mechanisms that exist among the s p 1500 firms that achieve high and not high profitability our findings suggest that high profits result when ceo incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms work together as complements rather than as substitutes furthermore they show that high profits are obtained when both internal and external monitoring mechanisms are present at the same time however monitoring mechanisms evidently combine in complex ways such that the

the asymmetric relationship between executive earnings management and compensation a panel threshold regression approach abstractprior research shows that chief executive officers ceos are rewarded for their earnings management we re examine this issue using a panel threshold regression approach which allows the effect of earnings management on the ceo compensation to change across the level of earnings management and ceo compensation our results show that the effect of ceos discretionary accounting choices on their compensation is not homogeneous across various degrees of earnings management and compensation in particular for firms with moderate inordinate levels of earnings management and ceo compensation earnings management is rewarded penalized

the welfare economics of land use planning abstract this paper presents an empirical methodology for the evaluation of the benefits and costs of land use planning the technique is applied in the context of the town and country planning system of the uk and examines the gross and net benefits of land use regulation and their distribution across income groups the results show that the welfare and distributional impacts can be large

exact consumer s surplus and deadweight loss consumer s surplus is a widely used tool in applied welfare economics both economic theorists and cost benefit analysis often use consumer s surplus despite its somewhat dubious reputation the basic idea is to evaluate the value to a consumer or his willingness to pay for a change in price of a good from say pricep to pricep because price changes affect consumer welfare an evaluation of this effect is often a key input to public policy decisions yet consumer s surplus is probably the most controversial of widely used economic concepts both paul samuelson and ian little conclude that the economics profession would be better off without it it is my feeling of the situation that substantial agreement exists on the correct quantities to be measured the amount the consumer would pay or would need to be paid to be just as well off after the price change as he was before the price change the quantities correspond to john hicks compensating variation measures an alternative measure which takes ex post price change utility as the basis of comparison is hicks equivalent variation the controversy arises in the measurement of these quantities the usual measurement procedure is to use the area to the left of the marshallian market demand curve between two price levels jules dupuit originated this measure of welfare change and alfred marshall and hicks derived appropriate conditions for its use the primary condition for the area to the left of the demand curve to correspond to the compensating variation is to have constant marginal utility of income marshall gave this condition and if it holds the same quantity will be derived as the area to the left of the compensated hicksian demand curve this area to the left of the compensated demand curve is exactly what the compensating variation and equivalent variation measure thus the constant marginal utility of income is a sufficient condition for marshallian consumer s surplus to be equal to hicks consumer s surplus in this case arnold harberger s plea to use the welfare triangle as one half times the product of the price change times the quantity change to measure deadweight loss corresponds to the correct theoretical amount of welfare change in a recent paper robert willig derives bounds for the percentage difference between the correct measure of either the compensating or equivalent variation and the marshallian measure derived form the market demand curve his bounds which depend on the income elasticity of demand for the single good in the region of price change being considered as well as the proportion of the consumer s income spent on the good demonstrate that the marshallian consumer s surplus is often a good approximation to hicks consumer s surplus the fact that the proportion of the consumer s income spent matters as well as the income elasticity was first pointed out by harold hotelling willig contends that the approximation error will be less than the errors involved in estimating the demand curve thus he hopes to remove the need for apology that applied economists often need to give to theorists who remark on the inappropriateness of using marshallian consumer s surplus to measure welfare change however in this paper i show that for the case primarily considered by willig of a single price change which is also the situation in which consumer s surplus is often used in applied work no approximation is necessary professor of economics massachusetts institute of technology and research associate national bureau of economic research i would like to thank peter diamond erwin diewert daniel mcfadden robert merton robert solow hal varian joel yellin and the referees for help and comments research support from the national science foundation is acknowledged the reason that we still have two rather than one of samuelson s six measures of consumer s surplus arises from an index number problem of the correct basis for the welfare comparison i will give both measures but plan to concentrate on the compensating variation

debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals abstract this paper examines the abnormal accruals of a sample of 94 firms that reported debt covenant violations in annual reports we expect debt covenant restrictions to influence accounting choices in the year preceding and the year of violation time series and cross sectional models are used to estimate normal accruals in the year prior to violation both models indicate that abnormal total and working capital accruals are significantly positive in the year of violation there is evidence of positive abnormal working capital accruals after controlling for management changes and auditor going concern qualifications

the investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice abstract this paper provides evidence on the cross sectional relation between firms investment opportunities their debt and compensation contracts their size and financial leverage and their accounting procedure choices this evidence is important because previous studies hypothesize that the link between firms investment opportunities and their accounting choices helps explain extant results on the size debt equity and bonus plan hypotheses however while i find that firms investment opportunities do affect the nature of their contracts i also find that the traditional explanations for accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the investment opportunity set

pre season stocking and pricing decisions for fashion retailers with multiple information updating abstract motivated by the industrial practice we investigate in this paper the pre season inventory and pricing decisions for fashion retailers before the selling season a retailer can place orders for a seasonal fashion product from her supplier at two distinct stages via two different delivery modes market information from the sales of a pre seasonal product is collected and used to update the demand forecast of the seasonal product at the succeeding stages by using bayesian approach we formulate a dynamic optimization problem and obtain the optimal stocking policy after the ordered seasonal product has arrived and just before the start of the selling season the retailer can determine the optimal selling price of the product with respect to the latest demand information and the amount of product on hand we study the pricing policy under different objectives sensitivity analysis is carried out and the features of the policies are revealed managerial insights are generated

assessing the effects of using demand parameters estimates in inventory control and improving the performance using a correction function inventory models need some specification of the distribution of demand in order to find the optimal order up to level or reorder point this distribution is unknown in real life and there are several solutions to overcome this problem one approach is to assume a distribution estimate its parameters and replace the unknown demand parameters by these estimates in the theoretically correct model earlier research suggests that this approach will lead to underperformance even if the true demand distribution is indeed the assumed one this paper directs the cause of the underperformance and quantifies it in case of normally distributed demand furthermore the formulae for the order up to levels are corrected analytically where possible and otherwise by use of simulation and linear regression simulation shows that these corrections improve the attained performance

real investment implications of employee stock option exercises this paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings per share dilution in equity related compensation we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option eso exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks we further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance as measured by return on assets for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance collectively our findings indicate that eso exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities

empirical research on accounting choice abstract we review research from the 1990s that examines the determinants and consequences of accounting choice structuring our analysis around the three types of market imperfections that influence managers choices agency costs information asymmetries and externalities affecting non contracting parties we conclude that research in the 1990s made limited progress in expanding our understanding of accounting choice because of limitations in research design and a focus on replication rather than extension of current knowledge we discuss opportunities for future research recommending the exploration of the economic implications of accounting choice by addressing the three different reasons why accounting matters

scarf s state reduction method flexibility and a dependent demand inventory model we consider a finite horizon inventory model with linear holding shortage and ordering costs the demand random variables are dependent and average demand is described by an exponential smoothing formula this model can be formulated as a two state variable inventory level weighted past demands dynamic program using a procedure first developed by scarf for a bayesian inventory model we are able to reformulate the model as a one state variable dynamic program resulting in a considerable computational saving over the two state variable formulation we also show that this dependent demand model orders less than or equal the amount ordered by a comparable independent demand model we establish this result under the assumption that demand represents failures that are repaired by the beginning of the next period

agency costs and innovation abstract stylized facts indicate that small firms are responsible for a disproportionate share of innovative research there are many possible explanations for this fact the paper seeks to understand this phenomenon as the outcome of an optimal assignment of tasks across individuals and organizations it is shown that incentive costs associated with a given task depend on the total portfolio of tasks that an individual or an organization undertakes mixing hard to measure activities innovation with easy to measure activities routine is particularly costly since it will either lead to misallocation of attention across tasks or to misallocation of risk larger firms are at a comparative disadvantage in conducting highly innovative research because of the costs associated with managing a heterogeneous set of tasks it is further argued that optimal organizational responses to coordination and control of routine tasks will lead to bureaucratization within the firm and to financial constraints imposed by capital markets both of which are hostile to innovation

horizon problem and firm innovation the influence of ceo career horizon exploitation and exploration on breakthrough innovations abstract building on labor market evaluations and legacy conservation motivation perspectives we propose a mechanism to explain the relationship between ceo career horizons and breakthrough innovations using 10 year panel data from 681 u s firms we find that firms that have a ceo with a short career horizon tend to produce fewer breakthrough innovations we also find that the relationship between ceo career horizon and breakthrough innovation is partially mediated by r d spending and also moderated by organizational learning behavior exploration vs exploitation this study highlights how a ceo s motivation to protect success in the short term affects the firm s innovativeness

design for postponement a comprehensive characterization of its benefits under unknown demand distributions recent papers have developed analytical models to explain and quantify the benefits of delayed differentiation and quick response programs these models assume that while demands in each period are random they are independent across time and their distribution is perfectly known i e sales forecasts do not need to be updated as time progresses in this paper we characterize these benefits in more general settings where parameters of the demand distributions fail to be known with accuracy or where consecutive demands are correlated here it is necessary to revise estimates of the parameters of the demand distributions on the basis of observed demand data we analyze these systems in a bayesian framework assuming that our initial information about the parameters of the demand distributions is characterized via prior distributions we also characterize the structure of close to optimal ordering rules in these systems for a variety of types of order cost functions

on cross sectional analysis in accounting research abstract this paper examines cross sectional analysis procedures common to many market based accounting research papers both the economic and econometric properties of levels and returns studies are discussed topics covered include the relations between the accounting studies and cash flow valuation models the role of expectations of accounting variables deflators spurious inference risk adjustment and its relation to growth size and leverage residual dependence dependence among explanatory variables and the effect of scale differences across firms major conclusions are that market value is the correct deflator in returns studies and that levels and returns studies are economically but not econometrically equivalent

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

what affects innovation more policy or policy uncertainty motivated by a theoretical model we examine for 43 countries whether it is policy or policy uncertainty that affects technological innovation more innovation activities measured by patent based proxies are not on average affected by which policy is in place innovation activities however drop significantly during times of policy uncertainty measured by national elections the drop is greater for more influential innovations citations in the right tail exploratory rather than exploitative innovations and for innovation intensive industries we use close presidential elections and ethnic fractionalization to address endogeneity concerns we uncover the mechanism underlying the main result by showing that the number of patenting inventors decreases with policy uncertainty political compromise we conclude encourages innovation

how common are intentional gaap violations estimates from a dynamic model this paper uses data on detected misstatements earnings restatements and a dynamic model to estimate the extent of undetected misstatements that violate gaap the model features a ceo who can manipulate his firm s stock price by misstating earnings i find the ceo s expected cost of misleading investors is low the probability of detection over a five year horizon is 13 91 and the average misstatement if detected results in an 8 53 loss in the ceo s retirement wealth the low expected cost implies a high fraction of ceos who misstate earnings at least once at 60 with 2 22 of ceos starting to misstate earnings in each year 2003 2010 inflation in stock prices across ceos who misstate earnings at 2 02 and inflation in stock prices across all ceos at 0 77 wealthier ceos manipulate less and the average misstatement is larger in smaller firms this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

the effect of owner versus management control on the choice of accounting methods abstract this paper examines the relationship between the ownership control status of firms and the accounting methods they adopt the arguments of watts and zimmerman s positive theory are integrated with those of managerial economists to generate the prediction that management controlled firms are more likely than owner controlled firms to adopt accounting methods which increase reported earnings this prediction is inconsistent with fama s hypothesis that the market for managerial talent will prevent management controlled firms from acting differently than owner controlled firms this paper compares the depreciation methods used by a sample of management and owner controlled firms for financial reporting purposes the comparison considers and controls for the factors of firm size leverage and the depreciation method used for tax reporting purposes the comparison reveals that there is a significant difference in the depreciation methods adopted by management controlled and owner controlled firms for financial reporting purposes

style goods pricing with demand learning for many industries e g apparel retailing managing demand through price adjustments is often the only tool left to companies once the replenishment decisions are made a significant amount of uncertainty about the magnitude and price sensitivity of demand can be resolved using the early sales information in this study a bayesian model is developed to summarize sales information and pricing history in an efficient way this model is incorporated into a periodic pricing model to optimize revenues for a given stock of items over a finite horizon a computational study is carried out in order to find out the circumstances under which learning is most beneficial the model is extended to allow for replenishments within the season in order to understand global sourcing decisions made by apparel retailers some of the findings are empirically validated using data from u s apparel industry

industry wide corporate fraud the truth behind the volkswagen scandal corporate fraud committed under climate mitigation pressures is becoming more frequently observed in line with the ever increasing environmental standards and relevant regulation enforcements one example is the volkswagen emission gate scandal using firm level panel data of major automobile manufacturers from 2000 to 2015 this study empirically identifies the motives behind the corporate deception scandal we develop a conceptual model summarising the factors affecting decision making and the firms environmentally responsible investments eris including the truthfulness of related public communications our findings identify legal and regulatory pressures the firm s existing level of eris competency and expertise pressures from emission regulation market competitors consumers owners or shareholders as the key factors inducing the scandal the empirical findings show that firms are more likely to experience corporate fraud if their senior managers are paid with substantial variable components that may lead them to engage in riskier business behaviour and to be more short term focused thereby supporting the well established contract theory to avoid corporate fraud and engage in legitimate business competitiveness we suggest that firms should focus on technological innovation as well as improving corporate governance and leverage ratios to effectively control and monitor management in addition policy makers should be more realistic about practical and commercial limitations in the policy setting process and take on a more supporting role in achieving technological innovations and effective corporate governance in summary we argue that cleaner production is not only the result of technologically progress and research but importantly it also involves issues associated with corporate governance and business ethics

economic consequences of firms depreciation method choice evidence from capital investments abstract this study identifies several interrelated reasons why firms depreciation method choice is likely to influence managers capital investment decisions we find that firms that use accelerated depreciation make significantly larger capital investments than firms that use straight line depreciation further we find that there has been a migration away from accelerated depreciation to straight line depreciation over the past two decades firms that make such accounting changes make smaller capital investments in the post change periods than in the pre change periods these results suggest that a choice made for external financial reporting purposes influences managers capital investment decisions

r d and ceo departure date do financial incentives make ceos more opportunistic the purpose of this article is to examine whether research and development r d expenditure is biased downward because of self serving behavior of highly incentivized managers this offers an insight into the general relationship between incentives and opportunism using instrumental variables and panel data methods for a sample of high r d spenders in the uk we examine whether r d is reduced in cases of imminent departure of the ceo results show evidence for this but only for the sample above the median in intensity of stock and options in the compensation package this suggests that opportunism is enhanced by inappropriately strong incentives the main results are robust to the inclusion of a number of corporate governance variables jel classification g30 o30

earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses this paper provides evidence that firms manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses specifically in cross sectional distributions of earnings changes and earnings we lind unusually low frequencies of small decreases in earnings and small losscs and unusually high frequencies of small increases in earnings and small positive income we find evidence that two components of earnings cash flow from operations and changes in working capital are used to achieve increases in earnings we present two theories based on stakeholder use of information processing heuristics and prospect theory about the motivation for avoidance of earnings decreases and losses

a comparison of the optimal ordering levels of bayesian and non bayesian inventory models although it is often the case that the parameters of the distribution of demand are not known with certainty and that a bayesian formulation would be appropriate such an approach is generally not used in inventory calculations for computational reasons since one often resorts to a non bayesian formulation it is of interest to compare bayesian policies with a comparable non bayesian policy using the concept of flexibility it was anticipated that the quantity ordered under the non bayesian policy would be greater than or equal to that under a bayesian policy this result is established for the n period nondepletive inventory model however a two period counterexample is given for the standard depletive inventory model

asymmetric stationarity in national stock market indices an mtar analysis a procedure is developed using a momentum threshold autoregressive model and asymmetric stationarity tests designed to identify periods of asymmetric stationary divergences from nonstationary paths in time series and is applied to major national stock indices the results reveal the existence of asymmetric stationary periods in each of these indices these results suggest an explanation for the counterintuitive positive forecasting results of technical traders for various time periods we explore this possibility further by using a representative moving average technical trading strategy and find significantly different results higher returns when information from the procedure is incorporated into a trading rule

proactive r d management and firm growth a punctuated equilibrium model the external environment is characterized by periods of relative stability interspersed with periods of extreme change implying that high performing firms must practice exploration and exploitation in order to survive and thrive in this paper we posit that r d expenditure volatility indicates the presence of proactive r d management and is evidence of a firm moving from exploitation to exploration over time this is consistent with a punctuated equilibrium model of r d investment where shocks are induced by reactions to external turbulence using an unbalanced panel of almost 11 000 firm years from 1997 to 2006 we show that greater fluctuations in the firm s r d expenditure over time are associated with higher firm growth developing a contextual view of the relationship between r d expenditure volatility and firm growth we find that this relationship is weaker among firms with higher levels of corporate diversification and negative among smaller firms and those in slow clockspeed industries

accounting earnings and top executive compensation abstract this paper investigates the role of accounting earnings in top executive compensation contracts it provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that earnings based incentives help shield executives from market wide factors in stock prices the paper demonstrates that earnings reflect firm specific changes in value but are less sensitive to market wide movements in equity values as a result the inclusion of earnings based performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control the hypothesis is shown to explain cross sectional variation in the use of earnings based incentives

dynamic agency with renegotiation and managerial tenure this paper proves the renegotiation proofness principle for a dynamic len linear contracts exponential utility normal distributions model and examines the impact of repeated renegotiation on incentives and managerial tenure when performance information is serially correlated in addition to providing a general solution to a multiperiod agency problem with serially correlated performance measures this paper characterizes optimal managerial tenure turnover policies as a function of the time series properties of performance measures with negatively correlated performance measures the principal prefers longer managerial tenure and no turnover is optimal with positively correlated performance measures absent a switching cost turnover every period is optimal in the presence of a fixed switching cost interior optimal turnover policies exist if the performance measures are positively correlated switching costs are necessary but not sufficient for interior optimal tenure the optimal turnover policies present an alternative to theories of performance driven managerial turnover and are consistent with evidence that a majority of managerial turnovers are age related normal retirements

implicit contracts and the explanatory power of top executive compensation for future performance recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties we derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance if corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable to outsiders measures of executive performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with future firm performance then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance further compensation should be more positively associated with future performance when observable measures are less useful for contracting our results are consistent with these hypotheses

how do nonprofit hospitals manage earnings abstract we hypothesize that unlike for profit firms nonprofit hospitals have incentives to manage earnings to a range just above zero we consider two ways managers can achieve this they can adjust discretionary spending hoerger t j 1991 profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals journal of health economics 10 259 289 and or they can adjust accounting accruals using the flexibility inherent in generally accepted accounting principles gaap to test our hypothesis we use regressions as well as tests of the distribution of earnings by burgstahler and dichev burgstahler d dichev i 1997 earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses journal of accounting and economics 24 99 126 on a sample of 1 204 hospitals and 8 179 hospital year observations our tests support the use of discretionary spending and accounting accrual management like hoerger 1991 we find evidence that nonprofit hospitals adjust discretionary spending to manage earnings however we also find significant use of discretionary accruals e g adjustments to the third party allowance and allowance for doubtful accounts to meet earnings objectives these findings have two important implications first the previous evidence by hoerger that nonprofit hospitals show less variation in income may at least partly be explained by an accounting phenomenon second our findings provide guidance to users of these financial statements in predicting the direction of likely bias in reported earnings

on interdependent supergames multimarket contact concavity and collusion abstract following bernheim and whinston 1990 this paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms ability to collude real world imperfections tend to make firms objective function strictly concave and market supergames interdependent firms payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others then multimarket contact always facilitates collusion it may even make collusion sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any the effects of conglomeration are discussed multigame contact is shown to facilitate cooperation in supergames other than oligopolies as long as agents objective function is submodular in material payoffs journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13 l21

managerial incentives and collusive behavior abstract i characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long run oligopolistic competition when managers have a preference for smooth time paths of profits as revealed by the empirical literature on income smoothing manager led firms can sustain collusive agreements at lower discount factors capped bonus plans and incumbency rents with termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor independent of contracts duration when managers have these preferences incentives and demand fluctuates price wars during booms need not occur the most collusive price may then be pro cyclical

profit variability in for profit and not for profit hospitals this paper proposes two tests of the hypothesis that not for profit hospitals nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals the profit variability test states that the profits of an nfp will be less variable over time than profits of a for profit hospital if the nfp maximizes utility subject to a profit constraint the second test examines whether nfp profits respond less to change in exogenous factors such as medicare reimbursement rates than profits of for profit hospitals both tests performed on panel data from 1983 to 1988 support the hypothesis that nfps behave differently than for profit hospitals

is there a link between executive equity incentives and accounting fraud we compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting fraud by the securities and exchange commission sec during the period 1996 2003 with two samples of firms not accused of fraud we measure equity incentives in a variety of ways and employ a battery of empirical tests we find no consistent evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud these results stand in contrast to assertions by policy makers that incentives from stock based compensation and the resulting equity holdings increase the likelihood of accounting fraud

an analysis of value destruction in at t s acquisition of ncr abstract at t s 7 5 billion acquisition of ncr decreased the wealth of at t shareholders by between 3 9 billion and 6 5 billion and resulted in negative synergies of 1 3 to 3 0 billion we find that at t paid a documented 50 million and possibly as much as 500 million to satisfy pooling accounting thus boosting eps by roughly 17 but leaving cash flows unchanged we conclude that at t s decision to acquire ncr in what the market perceived as a value destroying transaction was related at least in part to the 1984 consent decree with the department of justice that led to the break up of at t

additional evidence on bonus plans and income management abstract we extend healy 1985 by examining the relation between discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms for the 1980 1990 period contrary to healy we find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound managers select income increasing discretionary accruals and vice versa we believe that our results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis than with healy s bonus hypothesis however mechanical selection bias in portfolio formation cannot be entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for our results

smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings abstract recent theory argues that concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to smooth earnings in consideration of both current and future relative performance we find support for this theory our evidence suggests that when current earnings are poor and expected future earnings are good managers borrow earnings from the future for use in the current period conversely when current earnings are good and expected future earnings are poor managers save current earnings for possible use in the future however sensitivity analysis indicates that we cannot rule out selection bias as a potential alternative explanation for our findings

an explanation for accounting income smoothing it is widely believed that corporate managers often engage in income smoothing taking actions to dampen fluctuations in their firms publicly reported net income one reason given for this is that managers think that investors pay more for a firm with a smoother income stream see ronen and sadan 1981 while there have been many empirical studies attempting to document whether or not income smoothing actually occurs there has been little exploration of why a manager might rationally want to smooth his firm s income explaining why smoothing might be observed and how it can result in an increased stock price is the focus of this paper in two recent studies lambert 1984 and dye 1988 demonstrate in agency settings that a risk averse manager who is precluded from borrowing and lending in the capital markets has an incentive to smooth his firm s reported income in this paper in contrast it is shown that within a market setting an incentive exists for a manager to smooth income that is independent of either risk aversion or restricted access to capital markets the market setting is also useful in that it allows for the analysis of the effect of income smoothing on stock prices it is shown here that if a manager can choose which of two periods to recognize certain income he may prefer the choice that is expected to

real effects of accounting rules evidence from multinational firms investment location and profit repatriation decisions we analyze survey responses from nearly 600 tax executives to better understand corporate decisions about real investment location and profit repatriation our evidence indicates that avoiding financial accounting income tax expense is as important as avoiding cash income taxes when corporations decide where to locate operations and whether to repatriate foreign earnings this result is important in light of the recent research about whether financial accounting affects investment and in light of the decades of research on foreign investment that examines the role of cash income taxes but heretofore has not investigated the importance of financial reporting effects our analysis suggests that financial reporting is an important factor to be considered in the policy debates focused on bringing investment to the united states

the optimal shape of compensation contracts with earnings management the research question of why earnings management occurs is decomposed into two questions in this article which component of executive compensation generates incentives for earnings management and why is the compensation structured that way in the first place we first use as a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model to show that big bath and earning overstatement can co exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies when thresholds are used in compensation contracts in order to understand the use of performance thresholds as a prevailing compensation strategy in practice we then derive the optimal compensation contract when the manager is privately informed about economic earnings and his expertise in managing earnings equilibria exist in which the inactive region below a threshold in compensation should be economically significant

ceo stock based compensation an empirical analysis of incentive intensity relative mix and economic determinants the use of stock based compensation for u s ceos has increased significantly throughout the 1990s research interest in particular on stock option compensation has similarly increased yet contradictory results create questions about the theoretical underpinnings therefore we revisit the controversy surrounding stock option awards and we further the understanding of restricted stock grants which have escaped similar research focus using a recent data set we obtain convincing empirical support for most theoretical predictions about stock option awards we also find that restricted stock due to its linear payoffs is relatively inefficient in inducing risk averse ceos to accept risky value increasing investment projects copyright 2000 by university of chicago press