learning wage dynamics and firm specific human capital we introduce a dynamic and fully strategic model of wage determination in the presence of firm specific human capital in this model human capital is interpreted as information we show that equilibrium exists and is efficient and that it gives rise to a unique distribution of the social surplus we show further that the equilibrium wage is determined by three factors consideration of these factors allows us to determine when and how the market mechanism enables the worker to capture some of the returns to firm specific human capital we relate our findings to the ongoing empirical debate concerning the return to tenure

nonrenewable resource scarcity nonrenewable resource theory often is summarized by hotelling s rule this paper reviews theoretical extensions and empirical investigations of resource extraction models observed data are often inconsistent with the hotelling rule suggesting that other characteristics of nonrenewable resource supply including exploration heterogeneous ore quality technological progress and capital investment are important determinants of the dynamic behavior of resource prices given the persistent recurrence of concern about nonrenewable resource scarcity measures of nonrenewable resource scarcity and the empirical evidence for the time trends of those measures are reviewed finally the implications of nonrenewable resource scarcity for economic growth are examined

non cooperative and cooperative climate policies with anticipated breakthrough technology abstract global warming can be curbed by pricing carbon emissions and thus substituting fossil fuel with renewable energy consumption breakthrough technologies e g fusion energy can reduce the cost of such policies however the chance of such a technology coming to market depends on investment we model breakthroughs as an irreversible tipping point in a multi country world with different degrees of international cooperation we show that international spill over effects of r d in carbon free technologies lead to double free riding strategic over pollution and underinvestment in green r d thus making climate change mitigation more difficult we also show how the demand structure determines whether carbon pricing and r d policies are substitutes or complements

long term bilateral monopoly the case of an exhaustible resource we construct a model of long term bilateral competition between the supplier of an exhaustible resource and a consuming country capable of producing a perfect substitute for the resource the technology for producing the substitute is known and the strategy of the consuming country is to choose an investment program for installing the substitute we derive equilibrium configurations of investment and extraction for the case of linear demand under three scenarios 1 the resource supplier is a von stackelberg leader 2 the consuming country is a von stackelberg leader and 3 buyers and sellers of the resource engage each other period by period a comparison of these cases reveals incentives for long term commitment on the part of one or both parties and also suggests that there may be gains from strategic intervention into resource markets by governments of consuming nations

limit pricing and the in effectiveness of the carbon tax we present a theory of limit pricing monopoly in non renewable resource production facing a very inelastic demand an oil monopoly seeks to induce the highest price that does not destroy its demand unlike the conventional hotellian analysis the monopoly tolerates some ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high potential ones with limit pricing policy induced extraction changes do not obey the usual logic for example oil taxes have no effect on current oil production extraction increases when high potential substitutes are promoted but can be effectively reduced by supporting ordinary substitutes the carbon tax not only applies to oil it also penalizes its ordinary carbon substitutes whose market shares are taken over by the monopoly thus the carbon tax ambiguously affects current and long term oil production and carbon emissions

cellular telephones in the israeli market the demand the choice of provider and potential revenues this study presents the methodology the estimates and a scenario for forecasting the demand for cellular telephones and their use in israel the analysis was based on the integration of three sub models the estimate of the consumer s decision on whether to purchase a cellular telephone and what type was obtained by using a discrete choice model of the multinomial logit type the total number of cellular telephone purchases to be made in israel during the years 1998 2008 was estimated using a logistic growth model employing aggregate data over time the anticipated demand for airtime was based on findings of a survey carried out on a national sample and on actual usage data on the various consumers during the years prior to the survey the research shows the substantial economic potential of israel s cellular telephone market

do oil producers act as oil igopolists in this paper the author analyzes an oligopoly model of exhaustible resource extraction and develop predictions about relative extraction patterns of different producers using the open quote oil close quote igopoly model of loury one can show that producers with large stocks produce a larger amount but a smaller percentage of their stocks than producers with small stocks the authors extend loury s model to cases where extraction costs differ among producers and where costs are a function of cumulative extraction an increase in extraction costs for a producer causes it to produce less relative to its rivals when extraction costs rise with cumulative extraction producers with large reserves tend to have lower extraction costs and a smaller ratio of cumulative production to initial reserves than producers with small reserves the authors test the predictions of the model using oil industry data and find that the empirical results are consistent with the predictions of open quotes oil close quotes igopoly theory producers with larger reserves extract a smaller share of their reserves and have lower production costs than producers with smaller reserves this pattern holds for 73 countries with oil reserves during the time period 1970 1989 and for approximately 400 us oil companies in 1983 and 1984 more the observed pattern of production for both opec and non opec producers is consistent with open quote oil close quote igopoly theory opec producers do not appear to restrain production given their level of reserves relative to non opec producers thus viewing the oil market as containing one dominant firm opec with a competitive fringe may be misleading further the pattern of extraction observed in oil markets is inconsistent with the pattern predicted by competitive theory 29 refs 5 figs 6 tabs less

oligopoly equilibria in nonrenewable resource markets abstract most nash cournot oligopoly models of nonrenewable resources apply open loop equilibrium concepts and are based on physical resource depletion this paper studies feedback equilibria and economic depletion assuming affine quadratic functional forms the existence uniqueness and explicit solutions for the equilibria are derived for duopoly and n player oligopoly with multiple resource stocks for the cases of nonquadratic criteria we develop a numeric solution scheme for the nash feedback equilibrium this scheme is an application of a discrete time discrete state controlled markov chain approximation method originally developed for solving deterministic and stochastic dynamic optimization problems in our nash cournot equilibrium the degree of concentration in supply declines over time whereas the previous models with physical depletion and open loop equilibrium concepts predict that a nash cournot resource market will develop in the direction of monopoly supply

monopoly resource extractions under the presence of predetermined substitute production abstract decisions concerning the production level of a substitue for a natural resource must often be taken well ahead of the time when the substitute is supplied if the natural resource is owned by a monopolist this may lead to an equilibrium in which the resource extracting firm takes the output path of the substitute as given in this equilibrium the transition from resource extraction to substitute production takes place gradually furthermore the price path of this equilibrium is lower than the price path one finds when the decision period of substitute production is ignored

resource prices and planning horizons abstract this paper shows that a seemingly simple assumption that agents use a rolling planning horizon can reconcile the puzzling long run price dynamics of exhaustible resources such as oil gas and metals a rolling horizon has the effect of removing the scarcity consideration of resource owners when stocks are large hence extraction will be non decreasing and resource prices non increasing for a long period of time and there will be no connection between the price growth and the interest rate in line with the trends of a majority of exhaustible resources in the last century a calibration of the model to the oil market yields a price which closely fits the gradually falling real oil price after wwii and the sharply increasing price after 1998 this suggests that while long run scarcity was not an important parameter on the oil market in the 20th century it has been important in shaping the oil price from around 1998 and onwards

strategic considerations in invention and innovation the case of natural resources strategic considerations may induce a resource importing country to invent a substitute earlier than it intends to put it to use there are also circumstances in which it would wish to delay an invention date even if it could obtain it at an earlier date at no extra cost similar paradoxical results obtain if resource cartels behave strategically setting prices high may be a way of deterring invention if those engaged in r d are not resource users and the cartel has access to similar r d technology it will pre empt rivals this may not be the case if resource users can also engage in r d

strategic resource dependence we consider a situation where an exhaustible resource seller faces demand from a buyer who has a substitute but there is a time to build delay for the substitute we find that in this simple framework the basic implications of the hotelling model 1931 are reversed over time the stock declines but supplies increase up to the point where the buyer decides to switch under such a threat of demand change the supply does not reflect the current resource scarcity but it compensates the buyer for delaying the transition to the substitute the analysis suggests a perspective on costs of oil dependence

natural resource economics under the rule of hotelling abstract natural resource stocks held in situ are physical assets equilibrium in the assets market requires that their rates of return be such that their owners are just willing to hold on to them rather than invest elsewhere i discuss a number of factors relating to the evolution of extraction costs to the durability of the resource to market structure and to uncertainty that are important in correctly characterizing the rate of return on holding exhaustible natural resource stocks the emphasis is put on how those factors can potentially help bridge the gap between the basic hotelling s rule of natural resource exploitation and the historical behaviour of the flow price of a number of resources i also highlight some theoretical and empirical issues that need further attention

the unstudied barriers to widespread renewable energy deployment fossil fuel price responses abstract renewable energy policy focuses on supporting the deployment of renewable power generators so as to reduce their costs through scale economies and technological learning it is expected that once cost parity with fossil fuel generation is achieved a transition towards renewable power should continue without the need for further renewable energy subsidies however this reasoning implicitly assumes that the cost of fossil fuel power generation does not respond to the large scale penetration of renewable power in this paper we build a standard economic framework to test the validity of this assumption particularly in the case of coal and gas fired power generation we find that it is likely that the cost of fossil fuel power generation will respond to the large scale penetration of renewables thus making the renewable energy transition slower or more costly than anticipated more analysis is needed in order to be able to quantify this effect the occurrence of which should be considered in the renewable energy discourse

carbon taxation opec and the end of oil abstract i develop a differential game between an oil cartel and an importer investing in research and development r d to reduce the cost of a green substitute to oil in equilibrium the cartel is forced to deter the substitute which thus imposes a price ceiling falling over time credible carbon taxes are below the pigovian level implying the importer cannot internalise the full pollution externality much less capture resource rents without carbon pricing the importer curtails long run pollution using a costly r d programme normatively climate policy will be more expensive if relying on green r d programmes only

large dynamic covariance matrices second moments of asset returns are important for risk management and portfolio selection the problem of estimating second moments can be approached from two angles time series and the cross section in time series the key is to account for conditional heteroscedasticity a favored model is dynamic conditional correlation dcc derived from the arch garch family started by engle 1982 in the cross section the key is to correct in sample biases of sample covariance matrix eigenvalues a favored model is nonlinear shrinkage derived from random matrix theory rmt the present article marries these two strands of literature to deliver improved estimation of large dynamic covariance matrices supplementary material for this article is available online

dynamic causality between the u s stock market the chinese stock market and the global gold market implications for individual investors diversification strategies this paper proposes a generalization of the prior var and egarch model to explore the linkage between returns and volatility transmissions in the u s stock market the chinese stock market and th

a theory of oil igopoly cournot equilibrium in exhaustible resource markets with fixed supplies the emergence of an effective and powerful cartel in the international petroleum market has stimulated considerable effort among economists to develop models of pricing and supply behavior for this industry 2 this modeling task poses two basic difficulties first as in the standard oligopoly problem one must characterize the behavior of several sellers in a market aware of each other and of their effect on market price second there is here the added difficulty of treating the explicitly intertemporal nature of suppliers decision wherein a limited stock must be optimally allocated over time this paper studies the implications of the simplest non trivial postulates about these two aspects of the problem it is assumed that suppliers are non cooperative cournot nash players each of whom is imagined to select an optimal supply strategy taking as given the strategies of the others moreover it is hypothesized that the feasible strategies are limited to open loop paths chosen at the initial date to maximize the present value of profits in light of the paths of supply which the others have chosen 3 these basic postulates together with a few technical assumptions concerning the structure of resource demand permit one to demonstrate the existence of at least one non cooperative equilibrium concerning thisequilibrium we show that 1 the average and marginal return on resource stocks is inversely related to the size of a player s initial endowment 2 aggregate production decreases over time until all stocks are exhausted while firms with smaller stocks exhaust their supplies no later than firms with larger stocks do 3 the present value of price net of extraction cost declines over time 4 industry production maximizes a weighted average of intertemporal consumer s surplus and producers profits

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

the supply side of co2 with country heterogeneity several recent articles have analyzed climate policy paying explicit attention to the fact that carbon resources are non renewable in most of this body of literature the economy is treated as a single unit and in the context of climate policy it seems reasonable to interpret this as the whole world however carbon taxes and other climate policies differ substantially across countries with such heterogeneity the effects on the emission paths of changes in taxes costs and subsidies might be very different from what is found for a hypothetical world of identical countries

learning and strategic pricing we consider the situation where a single consumer buys a stream of goods from different sellers over time the true value of each seller s product to the buyer is initially unknown additional information can be gained only by experimentation for exogeneously given prices the buyer s problem is a multi armed bandit problem the innovation in this paper is to endogenize the cost of experimentation to the consumer by allowing for price competition between the sellers the role of prices is then to allocate intertemporally the costs and benefits of learning between buyers and sellers we examine how strategic aspects of the oligopoly model interact with the learning process all markov perfect equilibria mpe are efficient we identify an equilibrium which besides its unique robustness properties has a strikingly simple seemingly myopic pricing rule prices below marginal cost emerge naturally to sustain experimentation intertemporal exchange of the gains of learning is necessary to support efficient experimentation we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the equilibria

volatility spillover and multivariate volatility impulse response analysis of gfc news events abstractthis article applies two measures to assess spillovers across markets the diebold and yilmaz s 2012 spillover index and the hafner and herwartz s 2006 analysis of multivariate garch models using volatility impulse response analysis we use two sets of data daily realized volatility rv estimates taken from the oxford man rv library for the s p500 and the ftse plus 10 years of daily returns series for the new york stock exchange index and the ftse 100 index both data sets capture both the global financial crisis gfc and the subsequent european sovereign debt crisis esdc the spillover index captures the transmission of volatility to and from markets plus net spillovers the volatility impulse responses virf have to be calibrated to conditional volatility estimated at a particular point in time we explore the impact of three different shocks the onset of the gfc the height of the gfc and the impact of the esdc our modelling includes leverage and asymmetric effects applying a mu

a martingale characterization of the price of a nonrenewable resource with decisions involving uncertainty abstract this paper presents a general model of nonrenewable resource consumption and exploration decisions involving uncertainty about the time of occurrence of an event such as exhaustion stock discovery or a substitute development the resulting price process is characterized in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions under which the price is expected to rise at a rate equal to greater than or less than the discount rate the general model is illustrated and the price process and the optimal decisions are characterized by examining the three types of uncertainty indicated above

asymmetric volatility transmission in international stock markets abstract the transmission mechanism of price and volatility spillovers across the new york tokyo and london stock markets is investigated the asymmetric impact of good news market advances and bad news market declines on volatility transmission is described by an extended multivariate exponential generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic egarch model using daily open to close returns we find strong evidence that volatility spillovers in a given market are much more pronounced when the news arriving from the last market to trade is bad a before and after october 1987 crash analysis reveals that the linkages and interactions among the three markets have increased substantially in the post crash era suggesting that national markets have grown more interdependent

disadvantageous oil tariffs and dynamic consistency a large importer who places relatively greater weight on future than current oil consumption will import less oil in the future than if it were able to commit itself in advance to future tariffs and may find itself worse off than if it were unable to impose tariffs at all futures markets and storage modify these adverse effects and may avoid the problem of dynamic inconsistency copyright 1990 by american economic association

piecewise closed loop equilibria in differential games with regime switching strategies we propose a new methodology exploring piecewise closed loop equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching actions we develop a general game with two players players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable and decide on the switching time from one regime to another compared to the optimal control problem with regime switching necessary optimality conditions are modified for the first player to switch when choosing her optimal switching strategy this player considers the impact of her choice on the other player s actions and consequently on her own payoffs in order to determine the equilibrium timing of regime changes we derive conditions that help eliminate candidate equilibrium strategies that do not survive deviations in switching strategies we then apply this new methodology to an exhaustible resource extraction game

dynamic correlation and equicorrelation analysis of global financial turmoil evidence from emerging east asian stock markets abstractthis study investigates the dynamic conditional correlations dccs between eight emerging east asian stock markets and the us stock market and analyses the dynamic equicorrelation among these nine stock markets we find a significant increase in the conditional correlations and equicorrelation in the first phase of the global financial crisis we refer to this finding as contagion from the us stock market to the emerging east asian markets we also find an additional significant process of increasing correlations and equicorrelation herding in the second phase of the global financial crisis further we employ two new models namely dccx mgarch a dcc multivariate garch model with exogenous variables and decox mgarch a dynamic equicorrelation multivariate garch model with exogenous variables to identify the channels of contagion we find that an increase in the vix index increases the conditional correlations and equicorrelation while increases in ted spreads decrease the conditional corre

agricultural water management and poverty in ethiopia the main focus of this article is to explore whether access to selected agricultural water management awm technologies has led to significant reduction in poverty and if they did so to identify which technologies had higher impacts in measuring impact we estimated the average treatment effect for the treated on crop income and measured the differences in consumption expenditures per adult equivalent of those with access and without access using matched data the estimated average treatment effect was significant and amounted to usd 82 per season moreover there was 24 less poverty incidence among users of awm technologies compared to nonusers all technologies were found to have significant poverty reducing impacts with micro dams deep wells river diversions and ponds leading to 37 26 11 and 9 reduction in poverty incidence compared to rainfed system finally our study identified the most important correlates of poverty on the basis this we made the policy recommendations to build assets awm technologies livestock etc to enhance human resource development and improve the functioning of labor markets for enhanced impact of awm technologies on poverty

what do discounted optima converge to a theory of discount rate asymptotics in economic models abstract this paper considers a sequence of stochastic dynamic problems in which the discount rate goes to zero sufficient conditions are given under which the limit of discounted optimal policies and normalized values are a i long run average optimal and ii catching up optimal policy and value these conditions are shown to be satisfied in many economic models a new decision criterion for the undiscounted problem the strong long run average is introduced this criterion refines the long run average is often equivalent to the catching up and is easier to use than the latter since it has a recursive representation a generalization of fatou s lemma which has wider applicability is also proved

innovation and natural resources a dynamic game with uncertainty we analyze a dynamic game between a resource exporting country and an importing country that is seeking to invent a substitute technology the time of innovation is an uncertain function of the importer s r d efforts which cannot be committed in advance the game has a unique equilibrium in markov strategies the importer s r d efforts grow over time the exporter s output often decreases with time before innovation occurs but strategic factors imply that the opposite can happen the output path is characterized by a simple modification of hotelling s rule to account for uncertainty and strategic behavior

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

economic growth and transitions between renewable and nonrenewable energy resources abstract we study transitions between nonrenewable and renewable energy forms at different development stages of an economy it is shown that in the historical context the emphasis on energy production may evolve from renewables to nonrenewables and back to renewables typically both energy forms are used simultaneously along the equilibrium path nonrenewable resource consumption may increase and their price decrease an inverted u relation between carbon emissions and income level may follow even without environmental policy

the demand for commodity packages the case of telephone custom calling features the demand for two custom calling services is investigated the services may be bought individually or in a discounted package a micro theory based on discrete choice model is formulated that explicitly accounts for these purchase options the model is estimated assuming both dependence and independence of the unobservable choice influencing variables the estimated parameters are used to simulate the revenue impact of price and discount changes copyright 1993 by mit press