grand innovation prizes a theoretical normative and empirical evaluation abstract this paper provides a systematic examination of the use of a grand innovation prize gip in action the progressive automotive insurance x prize a 10 million prize for a highly efficient vehicle following a mechanism design approach we define three key dimensions for gip evaluation objectives design and performance where prize design includes ex ante specifications ex ante incentives qualification rules and award governance within this framework we compare observations of gips from three domains empirical reality theory and policy to better understand their function as an incentive mechanism for encouraging new solutions to large scale social challenges combining data from direct observation personal interviews and surveys together with analysis of extant theory and policy documents on gips our results highlight three points of divergence first over the complexity of defining prize specifications secondly over the nature and role of incentives particularly patents thirdly the overlooked challenges associated with prize governance our approach identifies a clear roadmap for future theory and policy around gips

patents or prizes monopolistic r d and asymmetric information abstract in this paper a model of r d regulation is analysed to compare the effect of two types of asymmetric information on the welfare properties of patents and prizes as r d incentive instruments when there is a technological leader using the case of full information as a benchmark it is found that the trade off between patents and prizes does not change if the innovator s r d costs are private information whereas the relative efficiency of patents decreases if the government is less informed about the market for the innovation

how to best ensure remuneration for creators in the market for music copyright and its alternatives the focus of this essay is to examine the market for copyrighted works with a particular emphasis on the sound recording market this market is currently in a state of flux some would say disarray due to the ability of the internet to lower transmission costs for both authorized and unauthorized copies with the latter being at this time far more prevalent in this essay we discuss the intent of copyright the role of copying and file sharing and some alternative production consumption schemes meant to strengthen or to replace copyright

design and analysis of simulated consumer choice or allocation experiments an approach based on aggregate data the authors integrate concepts in conjoint analysis and discrete choice theory in econometrics to develop a new approach to the design and analysis of controlled consumer choice or resource allocat

regulation of multiagent research and development this article focuses on the regulation problems raised by two specific characteristics of research and development first it is normally desirable that several units pursue the same goal and second that only the best of the final products made by these units is worthwhile to society when firms have private information these characteristics are seen to generate a substitution effect which in some situations implies that the resources allocated to r d under asymmetric information are excessive relative to the full information allocation i thus identify asymmetric information as one possible source of excessive allocations to research and development

the crash of the knowledge economy this paper advances the hypothesis that some of the roots of the present crisis are to be found in the present institutions of the knowledge economy while protectionism is seen as a possible dangerous outcome of the crisis the extent of protectionism inherent to the strengthening and globalisation of intellectual property rights iprs associated in particular with the signing of the trade related aspects of intellectual property rights agreement is not generally perceived as one of its possible causes indeed iprs have acted as super tariffs they have particularly raised the cost of investments for countries that had neither abundant cheap labour nor high amounts of intellectual property resources moreover iprs may have later exerted negative effects even on ip rich firms as the proliferation of conflicting rights has led firms to increasingly inhibit each other s investments the resulting investment strike has manifested itself as a saving glut and has mainly affected the usa in a situation aggravated by inadequate regulations if intellectual monopolies are one of the causes of the crash the remedies should not only focus on monetary policy financial regulations or even on standard keynesian policies aggregate demand stimulus should be coupled with policies that decrease the level of intellectual monopolisation of the economy

the generalized multinomial logit model accounting for scale and coefficient heterogeneity the mixed or heterogeneous multinomial logit mixl model has become popular in a number of fields especially marketing health economics and industrial organization in most applications of the model the vector of consumer utility weights on product attributes is assumed to have a multivariate normal mvn distribution in the population thus some consumers care more about some attributes than others and the iia property of multinomial logit mnl is avoided i e segments of consumers will tend to switch among the subset of brands that possess their most valued attributes the mixl model is also appealing because it is relatively easy to estimate recently however some researchers have argued that the mvn is a poor choice for modelling taste heterogeneity they argue that much of the heterogeneity in attribute weights is accounted for by a pure scale effect i e across consumers all attribute weights are scaled up or down in tandem this implies that choice behaviour is simply more random for some consumers than others i e holding attribute coefficients fixed the scale of their error term is greater this leads to a scale heterogeneity mnl model s mnl here we develop a generalized multinomial logit model g mnl that nests s mnl and mixl by estimating the s mnl mixl and g mnl models on 10 data sets we provide evidence on their relative performance we find that models that account for scale heterogeneity i e g mnl or s mnl are preferred to mixl by the bayes and consistent akaike information criteria in all 10 data sets accounting for scale heterogeneity enables one to account for extreme consumers who exhibit nearly lexicographic preferences as well as consumers who exhibit very random behaviour in a sense we formalize below

the limits of pension privatization lessons from argentine experience summary the paper studies the operation of the mixed pension system established in argentina in 1994 it points to the limitations that the new system has encountered to achieve some of the most important objectives of pension policy and pension reform the analysis looks at the mechanisms affecting pension system performance with particular attention to the way in which the new pension rules have interacted with the local macroeconomic social and political context the empirical analysis of this experience is oriented to provide lessons for argentina s future reforms as well as for many latin american countries with similar pension arrangements

the evolution of the industrial organisation of the production of knowledge this work elaborates the notion of localised technological knowledge based upon the distinction between information competence and knowledge and analyses the emergence of the new knowledge industry the evolution of the organisation of knowledge production is analysed through four stylised modes scientific entrepreneurship institutional variety vertical integration and technological cooperation the new trends towards the growth of knowledge intensive business service industries are detected and underlined they are considered as the outcome of the institutional formation of a market for knowledge based upon a process of increasing appropriability of localised knowledge based on the blending of generic scientific information and competence and growing scope of applicability via computercommunication systems deverticalisation of research activities from the boundaries of corporations the specification of a demand for technological competence and the specialising of independent firms in the production of technological competence and knowledge

two stage residual inclusion estimation addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling the paper focuses on two estimation methods that have been widely used to address endogeneity in empirical research in health economics and health services research two stage predictor substitution 2sps and two stage residual inclusion 2sri 2sps is the rote extension to nonlinear models of the popular linear two stage least squares estimator the 2sri estimator is similar except that in the second stage regression the endogenous variables are not replaced by first stage predictors instead first stage residuals are included as additional regressors in a generic parametric framework we show that 2sri is consistent and 2sps is not results from a simulation study and an illustrative example also recommend against 2sps and favor 2sri our findings are important given that there are many prominent examples of the application of inconsistent 2sps in the recent literature this study can be used as a guide by future researchers in health economics who are confronted with endogeneity in their empirical work

efficient division of profits from complementary innovations abstract many products including microprocessors telecommunications devices computer software and on line auction services make use of multiple technologies each of which is essential to make or sell the product the owner of one technology benefits from the existence of complementary technologies we show that despite this externality the structure of payoffs that support efficient r d investment by duopolists racing to discover a single innovation generalizes to the structure that supports efficient investment for complementary innovations the paper also examines how alternative intellectual property regimes and legal institutions affect r d investment in complementary technologies the results have policy implications for the organization of r d the assessment of damages for patent infringement and allocations of value in patent pools

using rank data to estimate health state utility models in this paper we report the estimation of conditional logistic regression models for the health utilities index mark 2 and the sf 6d using ordinal preference data the results are compared to the conventional regression models estimated from standard gamble data and to the observed mean standard gamble health state valuations for both the hui2 and the sf 6d the models estimated using ordinal data are broadly comparable to the models estimated on standard gamble data and the predictive performance of these models is close to that of the standard gamble models our research indicates that ordinal data have the potential to provide useful insights into community health state preferences however important questions remain

patents versus ex post rewards a new look abstract economic studies that aim at comparing the patent system social efficiency versus an ex post reward system rest on an outdated view of patents they assume that firms use the patent system only in order to be granted a short term commercial monopoly rent this assumption is convenient because it allows straightforward comparisons between patents and rewards but it is not confirmed by empirical studies which stress that in many industries most firms use patents as strategic devices to trade technologies and to ease r d collaborations this change leads to rethinking the framework of the patent reward debate

estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals a case study of quinolones in india under the trips agreement wto members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals the debate about the merits of this requirement has been extremely contentious many low income economies claim that patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines with adverse consequences for the health and well being of their citizens on the other hand research based global pharmaceutical companies argue that prices are unlikely to rise significantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes in this paper we empirically investigate the basis of these claims central to the ongoing debate is the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where because health insurance coverage is so rare almost all medical expense are met out of pocket using a detailed product level data set from india we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply side parameters for the fluoroquinolones sub segment of the systemic anti bacterials i e antibiotics segment of the indian pharmaceuticals market we then use these estimates to carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices profits and consumer welfare would have been had the fluoroquinolone molecules we study been under patent in india as they were in the u s at the time our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of trips may have some basis we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory licensing the total annual welfare losses to the indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub segment would be on the order of u s 450 million or about 73 of the sales of the entire systemic anti bacterials segment in 2000 of this amount foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly 50 million or 11 the overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare in contrast the profit gains to foreign producers in the absence of any price regulation are estimated to be only around 53 million per year

impact of pension privatization on foreign direct investment summary we explore the causal effect of market oriented pension reform on net foreign direct investment fdi inflows in latin america and among the transitional economies of eastern europe and central asia both of which have experienced waves of pension privatization and fdi over the last two decades with our balanced panel of 42 countries over the 1991 2006 period we implement fixed effects models controlling for the decision to enact full or partial privatization of the public pension system and several other covariates whose choice is informed by the rich empirical literature on fdi our econometric results indicate that pension privatization triggers a significant increase in net fdi inflows and that the effect does not wane over time we estimate that full privatization increases fdi as a percentage of gdp by about 57 ceteris paribus

equality efficiency and market fundamentals the dynamics of international medical care reform public opinion surveys uniformly show low support for medical care systems in developed countries the longstanding conflict between equal access to care and efficient service provision partly explains this dissatisfaction but the trade off is particularly acute in medical care as new technologies developed over time have increased the cost of care and made the equity commitment even more expensive countries first dealt with rising costs by maintaining equal access and restricting total spending efficiency suffered however as a result many countries are considering a move away from spending controls and toward incentive based medical care reform

ideas versus resources explaining the flat tax and pension privatization revolutions in eastern europe and the former soviet union this article examines the rapid spread of pension privatization and the flat tax in former communist countries to understand why new policy ideas take hold and to elucidate the role played by mater

innovation policy for directing technical change in the power sector this paper discusses policy instruments for redirecting technical change within the electricity sector to mitigate climate change first we unravel the mechanism behind directed technical change explaining why markets may underprovide innovations in expensive renewable technologies in comparison to innovations in energy efficient fossil fuel generators subsequently we characterize technical change in electricity generation technologies stressing the heterogeneity of knowledge spillovers both within and between clean electricity generation technologies we argue that there exists a rationale for a portfolio approach to innovation in the electricity sector i e optimal innovation policies are neither fully generic nor fully specific and they need to be adapted in response to new information learned by the government the existing innovation literature does not however provide a clear cut answer for designing such a policy we compare policy instruments and argue that public r d support to clean technologies either in the form of subsidies or prizes seems to be the prime candidate for implementing non generic innovation policy

encouraging private sector research for tropical agriculture summary agricultural needs in poor tropical countries differ significantly from those in temperate rich countries yet little agricultural research is performed on products for the tropics private research is particularly concentrated in rich countries this is a result of significant failures in the market for research and development r d in particular the difficulty of preventing the resale of seed in developing countries to encourage private r d in tropical agriculture traditional funding of research may be usefully supplemented by a commitment to reward developers of specific new agricultural technologies rewards tied to adoption may be especially useful in increasing up take an illustration of how a commitment to reward developers of new agricultural technologies might work is provided

on the winner take all principle in innovation races what is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race should the winner take all or is it preferable that the original inventor shares the market with subsequent independent duplicators some recent papers in law and economics have argued that the latter more permissive solution is socially preferable under mild conditions we re examine that issue arguing that a permissive regime may turn the innovation race into a waiting game reducing the power of incentives and may invite socially wasteful duplicative r d expenditures in a model that accounts for these effects the winner take all system turns out to be preferable in a broad set of circumstances especially in highly innovative industries jel k11 l1 o34

instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous this paper compares qualitatively and quantitatively the welfare effects of emissions taxes auctioned emissions permits and free grandfathered permits when technological innovation is endogenous we find that there is no unambiguous case for preferring any of these policy instruments the relative welfare ranking of instruments depends on the costs of innovation the extent to which innovations can be imitated the slope and level of the marginal environmental benefit function and the number of polluting firms we illustrate the types of situations when there can be significant welfare discrepancies between the policies and when there are not

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

pro poor agricultural biotechnology can the international research system deliver the goods abstract while global investment in agricultural research by the private sector is increasing with growth in developing country markets and the emergence of new technologies complementary public sector investment is stagnating or declining in many developing countries this review argues that the changing roles of the public and private sectors in generating new scientific knowledge may adversely affect the diffusion of explicitly pro poor technologies technologies that are simultaneously yield enhancing and poverty reducing comparing historical evidence from the green revolution with recent evidence from the emerging era of agricultural biotechnology this review argues that a more pluralistic international system for agricultural research will be more responsive to poverty only if the strategic leadership role of the public sector is strengthened certain research functions are reallocated to the private sector and new policy and organizational mechanisms are used to stimulate pro poor research in and for developing country agriculture

labor disputes and the economics of firm geography a study of domestic investment in india abstract acrimonious relations between employers and employees in developing countries have often been cited as impediments to progress this article considers various measures of labor disputes and investigates whether these have detrimental effects on the location choice of new domestic investment across the various states of india conventional wisdom holds that an increase in measures such as the number of strikes the number of man days lost in work stoppages and the percentage of unionized workers would hinder the location of new projects using panel data and a fixed effects methodology that controls for the effect of state specific unobservables we find significant evidence that this is indeed the case in india furthermore disaggregation by industrial classifications shows that although labor disputes continue to exert negative effects location choices are also conditioned on factors such as proximity to raw materials and minerals

two sided expropriation and international equity contracts abstract the paper considers a model in which investors in two symmetrical countries can trade equity claims on their endowments the governments of the two countries expropriate the foreign owned securities if doing so raises domestic welfare in spite of the possibility of expropriation agents may still choose to hold completely pooled portfolios depending on preferences in the two countries increases in the level of domestic output can increase or decrease the probability of expropriation in the equilibria we consider agents hold too much foreign equity a reduction in foreign investment raises welfare by reducing the probability of expropriation

the insurance value of medical innovation abstract economists think of medical innovation as a valuable but risky good producing health benefits but increasing financial risk for consumers and healthcare payers this perspective overlooks how innovation can lower physical risks borne by healthy patients facing the prospect of future disease we present an alternative framework that accounts for all these sources of value and links them to the value of healthcare insurance we show that any innovation worth buying reduces overall risk and generates positive insurance value on its own we conduct a stylized numerical exercise to assess the potential empirical significance of our insights our calculations suggest that conventional methods meaningfully understate the value of historical health gains and disproportionately undervalue treatments for the most severe illnesses where physical risk to consumers is the costliest these calculations also suggest that the value of physical insurance from new technologies may exceed the financial spending risk that they pose

the interaction between forms of insurance contract and types of technical change in medical care a simple three parameter description of medical technology is introduced to investigate the relationships between technical change welfare and type of insurance contract the value of a particular change in technology depends on the existing form of contract the marginal equilibrium expected utility to consumers of different types of technical change hinges on the manner in which the insurance arrangement is designed to mitigate moral hazard these results open the way for a positive model of the effects of insurance arrangements on the types of technology that are adopted and the effects of technical changes on the prevalent forms of insurance contract

patents and other intellectual property rights in this article the author reviews intellectual property rights iprs with some emphasis on the protection of agricultural and life sciences innovations the main institutional features of iprs are first discussed along with a brief historical background and an articulation of the main rationale for the existence of such rights this is followed by an overview of the principal economic issues related to iprs the author explains the main benefit cost trade offs of allowing patents and other iprs and then analyzes specific issues in some depth including the scope of patent protection the effects of patent races and the problems arising when iprs concern cumulative and or complementary innovations the author further illustrates the economics of iprs by considering instruments alternative to patents such as prizes and government procurement contracts finally the author briefly discusses some open policy issues in this area

inducement prizes and innovation we examine the effect of prizes on innovation using data on awards for technological development offered by the royal agricultural society of england at annual competitions between 1839 and 1939 we find large effects of the prizes on competitive entry and we also detect an impact on patents especially when prize categories were set by a strict rotation scheme thereby mitigating the potentially confounding effect that they targeted only hot technology sectors prizes encouraged competition and medals were more important than monetary awards the boost to innovation we observe cannot be explained by the re direction of existing inventive activity

using discrete choice experiments to estimate a preference based measure of outcome an application to social care for older people this paper reports the results of a study that used discrete choice experiment dce methodology to estimate quality weights for a of social care outcome measure to reflect different states of need a five dimensional profile measure was developed experimental design techniques were used to derive a sample of states for which preferences were elicited the dce approach was employed to elicit values and regression techniques used to estimate a model that could predict index scores for all 243 possible outcomes the utility model estimated on the basis of 297 responses had good test retest reliability and converged with preferences elicited from a rating exercise

medical care costs how much welfare loss hardly a week goes by without a front page newspaper article on rising health care costs and the uninsured in this article i focus mainly on costs arguing that the issue has been somewhat misconceived while the level of medical care spending in the u s is a cause for concern the welfare losses associated with rises in that level of spending may not be as large as the public rhetoric can make them seem in fact cost containment may not be as urgent as is widely supposed and some proposed cost containment policies may result in welfare losses for the insured and even increase the number of uninsured

insurance and incentives for innovation in medical care economists have frequently pointed to the distorting effects of health insurance as a major contributor to rapidly increasing health costs relatively little is known however about the influence of changing medical technology on expenditures if increases in expenditures are in part the result of development of costly but worthwhile new technologies a common view among noneconomists failure to take account of this may lead to over statement of the distortive effects of insurance on the other hand some observers have questioned whether the benefits derived from expensive medical innovations always exceed the costs 18 others have suggested that resources devoted to the development of very expensive technologies might be better used for other kinds of medical research 16 3 in light of these arguments it appears that the relationships between medical insurance and technological change may be quite important if the extent of insurance coverage influences the rate and direction of technological change in medicine then the long run welfare effects of insurance are more complex than current models 5 6 allow it is sometimes argued informally that such an influence existsthat the presence of insurance biases the system toward innovations that expand capabilities while increasing expenditures and away from those that reduce costs 15 20 such a hypothesis has however never been developed as an implication of a formal economic model even the term bias in the argument is unclear it appears to be used in a normative sense but it has not been explained clearly why such a bias if it exists leads to welfare losses even if it is true for example that the presence of insurance leads to the adoption of a more costly mix of medical innovations than would otherwise occur this is not obviously undesirable to facilitate the purchase of costly but beneficial medical care is the purpose of insurance this paper defines bias in technological change in a normative sense it employs a simple model of insurance and profit maximizing innovators and develops sufficient

designing climate mitigation policy this us paper provides an exhaustive review of critical issues in the design of climate mitigation policy by pulling together key findings and controversies from diverse literatures on mitigation costs damage valuation policy instrument choice technological innovation and international climate policy the authors begin with the broadest issue of how high assessments suggest the near and medium term price on greenhouse gases would need to be both under cost effective stabilization of global climate and under net benefit maximization or pigouvian emissions pricing the remainder of the paper focuses on the appropriate scope of regulation issues in policy instrument choice complementary technology policy and international policy architectures

medical insurance technological change and welfare concerns have been expressed about the welfare effects of expensive innovations in medical care financed largely through medical insurance this paper develops a model which considers such issues it is shown that even if insurance is purchased optimally subject to a plausible constraint on the form of the contract innovations may be adopted that have the effect of reducing expected welfare the question of how the benefits of medical innovations ought to be measured in the presence of insurance is also explored

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

the multinational corporation and monopoly of patents in nigeria abstract this paper examines the effects of foreign monopoly of patents grants in nigeria and the implications for technology development in that country the findings show that multinational corporations mncs own an overwhelming proportion of the patent grants in nigeria and that the nigerian patent system does not positively encourage domestic inventiveness in fact apart from attracting foreign patents in large numbers the nigerian patent system has failed to achieve all the other objectives including the disclosure of patented knowledge and working of patented invention which are explicitly stated in the decree that established the system in 1970 consequently the ultimate objective of the system which is the enhancement of technological development in the country seems centuries away from realization this is attributed to the combined effect of three factors the monopolist practices including restrictive practices of the mncs the abject inefficiencies of the patent system itself and the nature and lack of political willpower of the government of nigeria the paper concludes that the failure of the nigerian government to make advantageous use of the patent system is the greatest handicap

emissions pricing spillovers and public investment in environmentally friendly technologies in a second best world of below optimal pollution pricing the public return to r d may be greater than under pigouvian pricing due to excess benefits of increasing abatement or it may be lower since private actors lack the incentives to take full advantage of the new cleaner technologies this paper uses a simple model to demonstrate the interaction between environmental policies r d externalities and the social return to innovation the results indicate that strong public support for innovation in abatement technologies is only justified if at least a moderate emissions policy is in place and spillover effects are significant if emissions policy can adjust to cost changes the public role may be enhanced since private actors will prefer to avoid ratcheting social gains from innovation increase only if innovation can allow emissions to be more fully priced technology policy is more effective with fuller emissions pricing and is better viewed as a complement to than a substitute for mitigation policy

the optimal allocation of prizes in contests we study a contest with multiple not necessarily equal prizes contestants have private information about an ability parameter that affects their costs of bidding the contestant with the highest bid wins the first prize the contestant with the second highest bid wins the second prize and so on until all the prizes are allocated all contestants incur their respective costs of bidding the contest s designer maximizes the expected sum of bids our main results are 1 we display bidding equlibria for any number of contestants having linear convex or concave cost functions and for any distribution of abilities 2 if the cost functions are linear or concave then no matter what the distribution of abilities is it is optimal for the designer to allocate the entire prize sum to a single first prize 3 we give a necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that several prizes are optimal if contestants have a convex cost function

mandates and the incentive for environmental innovation mandates which establish minimum use quotas for certain goods are becoming increasingly popular policy tools to promote renewable energy use in addition to mitigating the pollution externality of conventional energy clean energy mandates have the goal of promoting research and development r d investments in renewable energy technology but how well do mandates perform as innovation incentives to address this question we develop a partial equilibrium model to examine the r d incentives induced by a mandate and compare this policy to two benchmark situations laissez faire and a carbon tax innovation is stochastic and the model permits an endogenous number of multiple innovators we present both analytical results and conclusions based on numerical simulations we find that the optimal mandate is larger than it would be without the prospect of innovation that neglecting the outlook for innovation significantly reduces welfare and that the optimal mandate is more sensitive to assumptions about the innovation process than an optimal carbon tax furthermore we find that mandates create relatively strong incentives for r d investment in low quality innovations but relatively weak incentives to invest in high quality innovations we also rank policies by expected welfare an optimal carbon tax has higher expected welfare than an optimal mandate and both have higher expected welfare than laissez faire moreover in our endogenous innovation setting a stronger result obtains a simple carbon tax equal to the damage from pollution unadjusted for the prospect of innovation has higher expected welfare than an optimal mandate

the optimal patent term under uncertainty this paper investigates the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion on the optimal patent term two types of uncertainty are discussed uncertainty over the size of cost reduction and uncertainty about the output demand of the invention using industry with cost reduction uncertainty and risk neutral inventors the optimal patent term will be shorter than in the certainty case risk aversion increases the optimal patent life vis a vis risk neutrality

capital controls and foreign direct investment abstract this paper examines the effect of three types of capital control policies on fdi a the existence of multiple exchange rates b restrictions on capital account and c restrictions on the repatriation of export proceeds we find that the impact of capital controls on fdi varies by region and has changed over time in the 1970s and 1980s none of the policies had a significant impact on fdi in the 1990s all three were significant furthermore capital controls have no effect on fdi to sub saharan africa and the middle east but affects fdi to east asia and latin america adversely

on the optimality of the patent renewal system the patent system is mainly a renewal system the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees i ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research in such a model i show that renewal mechanisms possibly with subsidies are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on regardless of the objective function under plausible circumstances patents should have a uniform life rather than varying in length as typically occurs under a renewal system

altruism and innovation in health care abstractthe joint presence of technological change and consumption externalities is central to health care industries around the world because medical innovation drives the expansion of the health care sector and altruism seems to motivate many public subsidies although traditional economic analysis has proposed well known remedies to deal with consumption externalities and inefficient technological change in isolation it lacks clear principles for addressing them jointly we argue that standard remedies to each of the two problems are inadequate focusing on u s health care we provide illustrative calculations of the dynamic inefficiency in the level of research and development r d spending when innovators are unable to appropriate the altruistic surplus of nonconsumers we calibrate that altruistic gains amount to about a quarter of consumer surplus in the baseline scenario and that r d spending may be underprovided by as much as 60 percent

host country reforms and fdi inflows how much difference do they make summary this study examines the effects of various policies on foreign direct investment fdi flows from the perspective of the eclectic theory of international investment and hence the advantages of foreign ownership host country location and internationalization host country policies can influence fdi flows primarily through their influence on the advantages of location in the host country pooled cross section and time series data for 49 less developed countries ldcs over 1970 95 are used to examine the effects of several different types of policy institutional variables including corporate tax rates tariff rates the degree of openness to international capital flows exchange rate distortions contract enforcement nationalization risk bureaucratic delay and corruption a multivariate analysis of the effects on fdi flows of each type of policy with and without controls for other relevant determinants is conducted two different sources of fdi data are employed as well as two different measures of capital controls although there are methodological problems in estimation and especially collinearity problems and relatively severe availability constraints for some of the relevant measures the results demonstrate the relevance and importance for fdi flows of many of the policy institutional variables under study they also indicate that the results from panel methods yield results that differ rather significantly from those obtained from pure cross section analysis because of complementarity between the various elements of a healthy investment climate the effects of some policy reforms estimated from models which do not control for changes in other policies may overstate the effectiveness of individual policy reforms

a theory of grand innovation prizes abstract the past decade has witnessed a resurgence in innovation awards in particular of grand innovation prizes gips which are rewards to innovators developing technologies reaching performance goals and requiring breakthrough solutions gips typically do not preclude the winner also obtaining patent rights this is in stark contrast with mainstream economics of innovation theories where prizes and patents are substitute ways to generate revenue and encourage innovation building on the management of innovation literature which stresses the difficulty to specify ex ante all the technical features of the winning technologies we develop a model in which innovative effort is multi dimensional and only a subset of innovation tasks can be measured and contracted upon we show that in this environment patent rights and cash rewards are complements and that gips are often preferable to patent races or prizes requiring technologies to be placed in the public domain moreover our model uncovers a tendency for patent races to encourage speed of discovery over quality of innovation which can be corrected by gips we explore robustness to endogenous entry costly public funds and incomplete information by gip organizers on the surplus created by the technology

patents and patent policy a patent is the legal right of an inventor to exclude others from making or using a particular invention this right is sometimes termed an intellectual property right and is viewed as an incentive for innovation this article surveys the evidence on patent effectiveness in encouraging innovation and reviews the current controversies in patent policy

capital market liberalization economic growth and instability summary this paper reviews briefly the arguments for capital market liberalization and identifies their theoretical and empirical weaknesses this provides the foundations for the argument for intervention in short term capital flows the paper concludes with a brief discussion of the various ways in which such interventions may be implemented 2000 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

pools and streams a stochastic process model of applied research abstract applied research is often viewed as a process of testing ideas drawn from a pool of candidate innovations this model is formalized for the case in which the pool of ideas is continually replenished through basic research the intensity of applied research is determined by the equilibrium of an n person non cooperative game where players choose dynamic strategies for exploiting the pool the presence of a pool cannot be detected in a stationary state but when the number of applied researchers is finite transient responses to exogenous shifts in basic research policy may reveal the pool s existence

eliciting gps preferences for pecuniary and non pecuniary job characteristics abstract this study examines general practitioners preferences for pecuniary and non pecuniary job characteristics in the context of choosing a general practice in which to work a discrete choice experiment is used to test hypotheses about the nature of the utility function marginal rates of substitution between income and non pecuniary characteristics are calculated the results suggest that policies aimed at influencing general practitioners location choices should take account of both non pecuniary and pecuniary factors particularly out of hours work commitments

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

consumer s surplus without apology the purpose of this paper is to settle the controversy surrounding consumer s surplus and by so doing to validate its use as a tool of welfare economics i will show that observed consumer s surplus can be rigorously utilized to estimate the unobservable compensating and equivalent variations the correct theoretical measures of the welfare impact of changes in prices and income on an individual i derive precise upper and lower bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the compensating and equivalent variations with consumer s surplus these bounds can be explicitly calculated from observable demand data and it is clear that in most applications the error of approximation will be very small in fact the error will often be overshadowed by the errors involved in estimating the demand curve the results in no way depend upon arguments about the constancy of the marginal utility of income consequently this paper supplies specific empirical criteria which can replace the apologetic caveats frequently employed by those who presently apply consumer s surplus moreover the results imply that consumer s surplus is usually a very good approximation to the appropriate welfare measures to preview below i establish the validity of these rules of thumb for a

hybrid innovation in meiji japan japan s hybrid innovation system during the meiji era provides a useful laboratory for examining the effectiveness of complementary incentives to patents patents were introduced in 1885 and by 1911 1 2 million mostly nonpecuniary prizes were awarded at 8 503 competitions prizes provided a strong boost to patents especially in less developed prefectures and they also induced large spillovers of technical knowledge in prefectures adjacent to those with prizes relative to distant control prefectures without prizes linking competition expenditures with the expected market value of patents induced by the prizes permits a cost benefit assessment of the prize competitions to be made

the effects of compensation plans for employee inventions on r d productivity new evidence from japanese panel data abstract this article reports the first results on how monetary compensation plans for employee inventions affect r d productivity based on the notable panel data of japanese firms the study finds that the introduction of revenue based compensation plans that are linked to patent performance lead to an increase in the number of high cited patents while this never leads to an increase in the number of patent applications furthermore this is strongly effective in smaller firms these results indicate that the monetary incentives based on patent performance are effective on enhancing the motivation of employee inventors

the incentive subsidy for government support of private r d abstract an incentive subsidy policy for subsidizing private rd in addition the firm receives a small fraction of the resulting invention s social value this mechanism comes close to being perfectly incentive compatible the firm chooses itself whether it wants to be covered under the incentive subsidy generally the firm s choice coincides with three social aims first a project that the firm would conduct in any case should not be subsidized second a project should not be subsidized if its social value is negative third the subsidy should provide an incentive to maximize a project s social value using a simulation over a range of hypothetical research projects it is shown that the efficiency of conditional loans and normal grants declines drastically as the government s information about project parameters becomes poorer while the incentive subsidy performs consistently well

market power screens willingness to pay what is the best way to reward innovation while prizes avoid deadweight loss intellectual property selects high social surplus projects optimal innovation policy thus trades off the ex ante screening benefit and the ex post distortion it solves a multidimensional screening problem in the private information held by the innovator research cost quality and market size of the innovation the appropriate degree of market power is never full monopoly pricing and is determined by measurable market characteristics the inequality and elasticity of innovation supply making the analysis open to empirical calibration the framework has applications beyond ip policy to the optimal pricing of platforms or the optimal procurement of public infrastructure

alfred marshall lecture intellectual property rights protection in developing countries the case of pharmaceuticals patent enforcement in developing countries generates considerable controversy especially when patents involve potentially life saving drugs this paper argues that common concerns regarding the effects of patents on prices and on research incentives of pharmaceutical multinationals are misplaced rather the most significant effects are likely to concern access to patented drugs in poor countries because prices in developing countries are much lower than in the developed world multinationals may choose to enter such markets with a delay or not at all implying a complete loss of access to patented drugs in developing countries even when multinationals enter countries like india their marketing and distribution networks are not currently built out leading to limited access within the country such considerations may provide a justification for policies targeting access in the short and medium run such as compulsory licensing

market structure innovation and optimal patent life m uch work has been directed at determining the relative efficiency of various market structures in the allocation of resources to invention while the conclusions are not entirely clear it seems certain that no single market structure results in a pareto efficient allocation of resources to research and development r d in the light of this certain secondbest procedures must be examined social controls may provide an attractive method of lessening the inefficiencies described above 2 while government research and development subsidies and award programs do exist the most prevalent form of social control is the patent system granting the inventor a monopoly on the use of the discovery for a specified period of time eliminates the free rider problem thus restoring the incentive to invent extension of the duration of protection will increase incentives for private resource allocation toward technical advance unfortunately extension of patent protection by definition brings with it the social inefficiencies recognized in a monopolistic market the

using a discrete choice experiment to estimate health state utility values in this study we explored a novel application of the discrete choice experiment dce that resembles the time trade off tto task to estimate values on the health utility scale for the eq 5d the dce was tested in a survey alongside the tto in a sample of english speaking canadians recruited by a market research company the study found that the dce is able to derive logical and consistent values for health states valued on the full health dead scale the dce overcame some issues identified in the version of tto currently used to value eq 5d notably allowing for fewer data exclusions and incorporating values considered worse than dead without introducing a separate valuation procedure this has important implications for providing robust values that represent the preferences of all respondents

market structure and innovation a survey economics we all recite deals with allocation of limited resources towards satisfaction of unlimited wants resources are typically identified as land labor and capital plus a technology that determines their transformation into consumer goods disparity between the available goods and services and the desired gives rise to scarcity and the question of what how and for whom to produce the focus then shifts to description and evaluation of alternative resource allocation mechanisms for making the choices the pareto criterion by which an allocation of resources is deemed efficient if any reallocation improving the position of some individual worsens the position of others is a commonly employed gauge of a mechanism s performance in the absence of externalities increasing returns to scale and uncertainty a perfectly competitive market system yields a pareto optimal allocation of resources this underlies the view that individual self interest is compatible with society s interest the further conclusion that pareto optimality may not be achieved via the market system in the presence of monopoly elements provides an economic rationale for antitrust laws the objective of a resource allocation mechanism appears to be according to the analysis described above to make the best of available resources the alternative objective of relaxing constraints through expanding the resource base or developing new technology seems to be beyond its scope thus until rather recently technical advance had been regarded in the mainstream of economic theory as unmotivated by the quest for profits and substantially unaffected by resource allocation instead as j schmookler observed technology had been viewed as a parameter like the weather affecting the outcome of resource allocations but itself unaffected by them 84 1965 evidence that technological progress has significantly contributed to growth in productivity together with a substantial increase in research and development activity largely financed by government and carried out by industry see f machlup 51 1962 may have spurred reconsideration of this view once technical advance is regarded as an economic variable it is natural to in

the institutional environment for infrastructure investment the empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years however virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades this paper extends this empirical framework by performing a two century long historical analysis of the determinants of infrastructure investment in a panel of over 100 countries the results demonstrate that political environments that limit the feasibility of policy change are an important determinant of investment in infrastructure copyright 2002 oxford university press

performance responses to competition across skill levels in rank order tournaments field evidence and implications for tournament design tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation we study individual data on 2775 contestants in 755 software algorithm development contests with random assignment the performance response to added contestants varies nonmonotonically across contestants of different abilities precisely conforming to theoretical predictions most participants respond negatively whereas the highest skilled contestants respond positively in counterfactual simulations we interpret a number of tournament design policies number of competitors prize allocation and structure number of divisions open entry and assess their effectiveness in shaping optimal tournament outcomes for a designer

health insurance as a two part pricing contract monopolies appear throughout health care we show that health insurance operates like a conventional two part pricing contract that allows monopolists to extract profits without inefficiently constraining quantity when insurers are free to offer a range of insurance contracts to different consumer types health insurance markets perfectly eliminate deadweight losses from upstream health care monopolies frictions limiting the sorting of different consumer types into different insurance contracts restore some of these upstream monopoly losses which manifest as higher rates of uninsurance rather than as restrictions in quantity utilized by insured consumers empirical analysis of pharmaceutical patent expiration supports the prediction that heavily insured markets experience little or no efficiency loss under monopoly while less insured markets exhibit behavior more consistent with the standard theory of monopoly

physician reimbursement and technology adoption this study analyses the incentives of health care providers to adopt new technologies in a world with ex post moral hazard it is shown that in a second best efficient world with respect to insurance coverage a linear remuneration scheme implements the adoption of second best efficient technologies only in special cases under a third best standard coinsurance contract the adequate reimbursement rule is characterised depending on the characteristics of the technology and on patients demand elasticities with respect to monetary and non monetary costs a shift from fee for service to capitation is likely to display undesirable incentives for very severe illnesses by inducing a reduction in the technically feasible level of healing or an increase in non monetary costs of treatment

measurement of health state utilities for economic appraisal health status measurement for use in economic appraisal of health care programmes is reviewed in this paper with particular emphasis on utility measurement a framework for economic appraisal is presented displaying the various components that must be measured and showing how the three forms of analysis cost effectiveness analysis cost benefit analysis and cost utility analysis relate to the framework and to each other one of the components in the framework is health status it can be measured using ad hoc numeric scales willingness to pay receive or health state utilities the determination of health state utilities is reviewed covering the following issues alternative sources of utilities health state descriptions multi attribute utility approach determination of appropriate subjects utility aggregation and accuracy three measurement techniques for health state utilities are described in detail rating scale standard gamble and time trade off the use of these methods is described for both chronic and temporary health states and for both health states considered better than death and those considered worse than death

privatization strategic foreign direct investment and host country welfare recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment fdi we show that there is a two way causality between privatization and greenfield fdi privatization increases the incentive for fdi which in turn increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no fdi the optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms and on the foreign firm s mode of entry

fdi productivity and financial development this paper examines the effect of foreign direct investment fdi on growth factor accumulation physical and human capital does not seem to be the main channel through which countries benefit f rom fdi instead we f ind that countries with well developed financial markets gain significantly

optimal patent life vs optimal patentability standards abstract this note considers a new dimension in optimal patent design by treating strategic roles as a policy instrument it is shown that contrary to established wisdom welfare is not always maximized when the patent office optimizes over patent life and plays the role of stackelberg leader when innovations are not difficult leadership is irrelevant and setting a high minimum patentability standard is more valuable than setting patent life

myth and reality of pension reform the latin american evidence abstract starting in 1981 with chile to the end of 2000 10 countries in latin america implemented structural pension reforms totally or partially privatizing their former public systems the latin american models have shaped similar reforms in eastern europe and influenced changes in western europe and the current debate in the united states in 1999 the then chief economist of the world bank nobel laureate joseph stiglitz coauthored with peter orszag a provocative paper examining the myths of the narrowly interpreted reform model sponsored by the bank but without using crucial data from latin america this article contrasts 12 myths of structural pension reforms in that region with data collected from eight countries in the last seven to 20 years confirming and expanding several of orszag and stiglitz s conclusions

international investment location decisions abstract in international location tournaments governments compete for foreign investment with tax and other short run incentives such tournaments can be won if agglomeration economies are sufficiently powerful to overcome investors desire to spread investments as a hedge against risk we focus on manufacturing investments by u s multinationals in the 1980s our econometric results suggest that agglomeration economies are indeed the dominant influence on investor calculations paradoxically short run incentives have limited apparent impact on location choice we conclude that high cost tournament play is unnecessary for countries with good infrastructure development specialized input suppliers and an expanding domestic market

the role of knowledge in r d efficiency past research has recognized that both demand and capability influence the allocation of r d resources scholars have had an easier time getting a grip on demand than on capability while it has been recognized that knowledge is an important part of capability to date formalization of knowledge and its role in r d activity has been unsatisfactory this paper models the role of knowledge in r d various sources of such knowledge are considered the model throws a different light on analyses that employ a knowledge capital stock and also illuminates the dual private and public nature of technological knowledge

patent replacement and welfare gains abstract patents were chosen in an era when modern public finance tools were unavailable the same innovation outcomes can be achieved with higher welfare if patent elements are replaced by modern features this paper constructs two theoretical models of product innovation and simulates the welfare effects of replacing patents with an intertemporal bounty arrangement we find that replacing patents with this alternative has the potential to increase welfare in the united states through reform of pharmaceutical patents by 43 9 194 billion when measured in present value terms this is 0 3 1 3 of annual gdp based on simulations involving four selected drug sectors the potential to increase welfare would be higher if applied to the larger sector of drugs as a whole in principal patents could be replaced in other sectors as well

the merits of new pollutants and how to get them when patents are granted the performance of market based environmental regulation is affected by patents and vice versa this interaction is studied for a type of innovation where a new technology reduces emissions of a specific pollutant but at the same time causes a new type of damage if the new pollutant associated with this technology is sufficiently different from existing ones such that marginal damage is increasing in each of them but additive across pollutants a diversification of the pollution portfolio is socially desirable in a situation where the incentives to develop such a technology are created by patents the efficiency of permits is affected by monopoly pricing of the patent holding firm this result carries over to other types of innovation the performance of taxes is limited by either the inability to implement specific pollution mixes or monopoly pricing for constant returns to scale at the industry level the combined use of taxes and permits ensures the first best mix of technologies and provides positive research incentives

the effect of imf programs on labor abstract previous studies find that imf programs have negative effects on income distribution the international monetary fund and latin america economic stabilization and class conflict westview press boulder 1987a world dev 15 1987b 365 world dev 28 2000 1031 no study however has used parametric methods to control for nonrandom selection using a dynamic version of the heckman selection model i study the effect of imf programs on the labor share of income from manufacturing my conclusions are supported by 2 095 observations of 110 countries during 1961 93

regulating innovative activity abstract without spillovers and under the winner take all hypothesis there is overinvestment in r d in a non cooperative equilibrium due to duplication of effort we show that a public firm can represent an effective instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem in particular it is proved that in a mixed duopoly i each firm invests less than in a private duopoly and ii although the expected time of innovation is postponed social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly