second best property value capitalization abstract a simple model of distortive local finance shows how lump sum finance models are misleading what information local prices contain in the presence of distortions and the feasibility of adjusting observed property value changes to infer resident net benefits of public goods

on the capitalization of land improvement projects abstract a model of two cities is presented to provide sufficient conditions for the value of a capital improvement to be underestimated by the change in land rents

market entry waves and volatility outbursts in stock markets abstract we develop a simple agent based financial market model in which speculators market entry decisions are subject to herding behavior and market risk in addition speculators orders depend on price trends market misalignments and fundamental news using a mix of analytical and numerical tools we show that a herding induced market entry wave may amplify excess demand triggering lasting volatility outbursts eventually however higher stock market risk reduces stock market participation and volatility decreases again simulations furthermore reveal that our approach is also able to produce bubbles and crashes excess volatility fat tailed return distributions and serially uncorrelated price changes moreover trading volume is persistent and correlated with volatility

side effects of nonlinear profit taxes in an evolutionary market entry model abrupt changes coexisting attractors and hysteresis problems in order to demonstrate that nonlinear tax systems may have surprising and potentially undesirable side effects we develop an evolutionary market entry model in which firms decide on the basis of past profit opportunities whether or not to enter a competitive market our main focus is on the case of a proportional tax on positive profits such a piecewise linear tax scheme induces a kink in the firms profit functions and may lead to abrupt changes in a market s dynamics coexisting attractors and hysteresis problems since these phenomena can also be observed in more general models a proper understanding of their basic mechanism may be helpful to explain the intricate behavior of many economic systems

interactions between stock bond and housing markets abstract we develop a model in which investors can participate in stock bond and housing markets investors market entry decisions are subject to herding effects and depend on the markets price trends and on their mispricings the dynamics of our model is governed by a four dimensional nonlinear map and its unique inner steady state is characterized by standard present value relations between dividends rents and the bond rate amongst other things we show that endogenous stock and housing market dynamics emerge countercyclical to each other if investors react strongly to the markets price trends such a cross feedback reflects investors tendency to transfer their enthusiasm from one speculative market to another

quality competition with profit constraints abstract firms in markets such as health care and education are often profit constrained due to regulation or their non profit status and they are often viewed as being altruistic towards consumers we use a spatial competition framework to study incentives for cost containment and quality provision by altruistic firms facing profit constraints if prices are regulated profit constraints lead to lower cost containment efforts but higher quality if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic under price competition profit constraints reduce quality and cost containment efforts but lead to lower prices if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic profit constrained firms cost containment efforts are below the first best while their quality might be too high or too low if prices are regulated profit constraints can improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price depending on the degree of altruism

the persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressure abstract in this paper we study the long run outcome if firms are repeatedly matched to play a n firm cournot oligopoly game and can select their type of business objective firms can either be profit maximizing or socially concerned also pursuing consumer welfare we use an indirect evolutionary approach to distinguish between the endogenous profit maximizing choice of the firms business objectives and their corresponding market behavior our main result is that the prospects of long run survival of firms pursuing social strategies strongly depends on the number of firms in the industry if a social strategy entails higher marginal production costs it is best suited if the number of firms in the industry is not too large in particular we demonstrate that the relation between long survival and the level of competitiveness of the industry is inverse u shaped we confirm this result by using the concept of coalition stability and further show that if a high number of firms adopt a social strategy welfare might be lower than with just profit maximizing firms

price specification and the demand for public goods abstract nearly all public expenditure demand studies define the marginal price for publicly provided goods as the household s share of the local property tax burden or what is often called the tax price such a definition is at odds with two familiar facts taxes are ordinarily distortionary and property values are often influenced by the value of local services this paper constructs a theoretically consistent marginal tax price measure incorporating these considerations the new measure demonstrates that previous estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand for public services are biased except under very restrictive circumstances moreover the direction of this bias will depend upon the actual incidence of public spending and the tenure status of residents

evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms abstract in this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities confronting remarks by milton friedman and gary becker we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non profit motives we find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit maximizing rivals one insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare but that the level of social concern should not be too high based on a strategy s profitability we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity here we observe that the consumers willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm if the firms propensity to switch between a social or a profit maximizing strategy is sufficiently large steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur

evolutionary efficacy of a pay for performance scheme with motivated agents the paper studies the short run and long run effects of the introduction of a team oriented pay for performance p4p payment scheme when agents may differ in their degree of intrinsic motivation toward the job suppose that new potential employees were able to assess the expected pay offs of current workers then they may modify their approach to work in order to follow the employee type that earned the highest expected pay off we show that the definition of the scheme needs to take into consideration the effects produced on the evolution of the motivation of new generations in particular the desirability and success of a p4p scheme strongly depend on the way incentives are allocated to the members of a team on the power of the quality related financial incentive and on the economic and social context in which the scheme is introduced the analysis is in part motivated by the introduction in uk in 2004 of a p4p scheme for family practitioners in the uk quality and outcomes framework qof and of a new system of assessing the quality of academic research completed in 2014 research excellence framework ref

a note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies abstract in this note we show that the results developed in n singh and x vives 1984 rand j econ 15 546 554 are sensitive to the duopoly assumption if there are more than two firms prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition this will be the case if quality differences are large and goods are complements if goods are substitutes high quality firms may earn higher profits under price competition than under quantity competition hence it is not evident which kind of competition is more efficient journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

property value maximization and public sector efficiency abstract this paper analyses the efficiency implications of property value maximization communities are open so that utilities are parametric to housing producers and the local government each local government chooses its public good output to maximize aggregate property value in the community ignoring feedback effects on the composition of the housing stock it is shown that this type of government behavior generates an equilibrium in which all communities are internally pareto efficient

communities competition spillovers and open space we explore the impact of the spatial distribution of developers on the private provision of open space our analysis yields three main findings first we demonstrate that the mixed public good nature of open space relative to private lot consumption can lead a single land rent maximizing developer to over supply open space relative to the utility maximizing level second by explicitly incorporating the spatial distribution of open space spillovers we show how competition can lead not only to inefficient levels of open space but also to inefficiencies in its spatial distribution finally we evaluate the impact of market based open space instruments

conjectural variations equilibrium in a mixed duopoly we study a mixed duopoly model in which a state owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus and a private foreign firm compete under general enough assumptions we first justify the concept of conjectural variations equilibrium cve applied to the model by demonstrating concavity of the expected profit function of each agent next we establish existence and uniqueness results for the conjectural variations equilibrium in the described duopoly a particular case of a cve with constant influence conjecture coefficients is also examined

a test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector abstract this paper develops a test for pareto efficiency in the local public sectorusing the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the samuelson condition for efficiency by using cross section data it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property value maximizing and hence efficient fashion the empirical results show no systematic tendency to either under or over provide public goods in a sample of massachusetts communities

state enterprise relation local economic priority and corporate environmental responsibility this paper empirically investigates how the state enterprise relation and local government s economic priority affect corporate environmental responsibility in a sample of chinese polluting enterpr

mixed oligopoly with differentiated products abstract the paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly with horizontal product differentiation firms choose their location and price in a model a la hotelling with quadratic transport costs and the solution concept is a subgame perfect nash equilibrium this enables one to determine how the presence of one or several public firms competing with private ones affects social welfare and how the results depend on the total number of firms n and their relative positions it is shown that is only for n 2 or n 6 that a mixed oligopoly with one public firm is socially preferable to the private oligopoly

do local governments use their tax bases efficiently abstract this paper analyzes an economy with multiple governments and with mobility of individuals across jurisdictions where each government is constrained to raise revenue for public expenditures using distortionary taxes a government is said to be competitive if the total benefits and costs of its decisions including the excess burden are perceived to be internalized the competitive equilibrium allocations are not constrained efficient in general there exists another set of distortionary taxes and public expenditures such that when private sector behavior adjusts to maintain equilibrium all individuals in the economy are better off thus competitive decentralized decision making does not lead to an efficient use of the available tax instruments it is also shown that the source of the failure can be interpreted as a missing market and the form of the best decentralized remedy which involves pricing the tax base is derived

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

firm location political geography and environmental information disclosure abstractas the subjective and objective factors that influence corporate behaviours political region and firm location are of great importance to environmental information disclosure eid with spatial and political geography as a research perspective this article makes a study by using the samples of manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2011 as a result we determine that regulatory distance and political geography had negative effects on eid while political geography weakens regulatory distance s function after considering an enterprise s administrative rank we determined that when the rank is higher regulatory distance has negative effects on eid when the rank is lower the effects are the opposite regarding political geography it always weakened the regulatory distance s function moreover the effects are significant only when the enterprises had low governmental regulation the study shows the effects that firm location and political geography have made on eid at the same time th

an evolutionary cournot model with limited market knowledge abstract in this paper we analyze a dynamic game of cournot competition with heterogeneous firms choosing between two different adaptive behavioral rules in deciding output strategies the underlying oligopoly structure is standard using a constant return to scale technology n firms produce homogeneous goods which are sold in a market characterized by constant price elasticity in this setup we assume that a fraction of firms employs a quite rough rule of thumb the so called local monopolistic approximation lma whereas the complementary fraction plays best reply br a more demanding strategy in terms of information and computation requirements the model is first considered with exogenously fixed fractions of firms in the two complementary groups then it is generalized by considering an endogenous evolutionary switching process between the two behavioral strategies based on profit driven replicator dynamics the role of the number of firms information costs and inertia or anchoring attitude in production decisions is analyzed as well as the influence in the evolutionary process of random noise in the demand function and memory of past profits global properties of the oligopoly with evolutionary pressure between behavioral rules are discussed with particular regard to cases in which the nash equilibrium is unstable

opec the seven sisters and oil market dominance an evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling approach abstract a methodological toolkit comprised of evolutionary game theory and agent based modeling is used to study opec and the seven sisters as they struggled for control over global petroleum markets during the 1960s and 1970s an evolutionary game theory model incorporates heterogeneous populations energy specific variables and behavioral considerations to capture the fundamentals of the applied problem an agent based model is used to provide detailed results and demonstrate the importance of the natural resource to the outcome of the model

csr in an asymmetric duopoly with environmental externality we investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation a la ramsey and a negative environmental externality pollution in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility csr in its statute and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function if the market is sufficiently large the csr firm sells more accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit seeking rival

pigou tiebout property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods abstract pigou s proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper a simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services the case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered

partial privatization in mixed duopoly abstract we investigate a quantity setting duopoly involving a private firm and a privatized firm jointly owned by the public and private sectors the private firm maximizes profits while the privatized firm takes both profits and social welfare into consideration we consider how many shares the government should hold in the privatized firm we find that neither full privatization the government does not hold any shares nor full nationalization the government holds all of the shares is optimal under moderate conditions

majority choice of tax systems in single and multi jurisdictional economies abstract we examine majority choice of tax instruments in an economy with heterogeneous households in our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set we examine single and multi jurisdictional economies we identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types with multiple jurisdictions strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating in spite of local incentives to use alternative tax instruments to redistribute wealth if relocation costs preclude inter community mobility the equilibrium tax system is fundamentally affected with redistribution incentives then dominating choice of instruments and tax rates limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification public good provision levels and tax systems

a critique of tiebout s theory of local public expenditures the last section of this paper presents a rigorous version of tiebout s theory of local public goods it is shown that equilibria exist and are pareto optimal this rigorous theory follows closely the more rigorous part of tiebout s work this rigorous theory makes a number of very special assumptions which make local public goods essentially private the body of this paper presents a series of examples which show that if one tries to generalize the rigorous version of tiebout s theory in a number of interesting directions then equilibria may no longer exist or may not be pareto optimal the conclusion is that tiebout s idea does not lead to a satisfactory general theory of local public goods the goal of this paper is to point out that tiebout s notion of equilibrium with local governments does not have the nice properties of general competitive equilibrium except under very restrictive assumptions tiebout 39 suggested that there are competitive forces which tend to make local governments allocate resources in a pareto optimal fashion consumers choose to live in those towns with the mix of taxes and public goods they prefer local governments choose this mix so as to attract inhabitants this idea may seem intriguing for it suggests that the invisible hand solves an important part of samuelson s perplexing public goods problem 32 tiebout in fact makes an argument which is nearly rigorous i give a rigorous version of his argument at the end of the paper however in this rigorous version so many restrictive assumptions are made that public goods become essentially private in the body of the paper i give a series of examples with which i try to convince the reader that one is forced to adopt tiebout s restrictive assumptions the idea is that if one changes any of his assumptions then either equilibria may not exist or may not be pareto optimal my examples are presented in the context of a general class of tiebout models i consider several subclasses one of which is the special case considered by tiebout in each of the subclasses except that considered by tiebout i give a counterexample either to the existence of equilibrium or to its pareto optimality the subclasses are so chosen that the difficulties they reveal would be shared by any reasonable tiebout model which differed from his special case i believe that my examples controvert tiebout s suggestion 39 last paragraph that his theory compares favorably with competitive equilibrium theory most of the examples in this paper have already appeared in the literature i cite related work as i go along what is new here is that i assemble the examples in a unified argument

does competition destroy ethical behavior explanations of unethical behavior often neglect the role of competition as opposed to greed in assuring its spread using the examples of child labor corruption excessive executive pay corporate earnings manipulation and commercial activities by universities this paper clarifies the role of competition in promoting censured conduct when unethical behavior cuts costs competition drives down prices and entrepreneurs incomes and thereby reduces their willingness to pay for ethical conduct nonetheless i suggest that competition might be good for ethical behavior in the long run because it promotes growth and raises incomes higher incomes raise the willingness to pay for ethical behavior but may also change what people believe to be ethical for the better this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

are profit maximisers the best survivors a darwinian model of economic natural selection abstract this paper demonstrates that the friedman conjecture that profit maximisation summarises appropriately the conditions for firm survival is not generally true if firms have market power profit maximisers are not necessarily the best survivors because of the possibility of spiteful behaviour of the following kind say a firm forgoes profit maximisation and thus decreases its survival chances but its deviation from maximisation harms its profit maximising competitors more than itself though the firm will be less likely to survive than it would if it maximised its profits it will still be more likely to survive than its competitors

rivalry between strategic alliances abstract rivalry between strategic alliances is investigated in a model where each alliance member maximizes its own profit and some share of its partner s profit a complementary alliance confers a strategic advantage by allowing the partners to credibly commit to greater output owing to both within alliance complementarities and cross alliance substitutabilities although rivalry between different alliances can sometimes lead to a prisoners dilemma for firms it tends to improve economic welfare on the other hand an alliance that arises due purely to the threat of entry may reduce welfare

endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in cournot competition abstract an evolutionary game theoretic model of cournot competition is investigated individuals choose from a finite set of different behavioral rules each rule specifies the quantity to be produced in the current period as a function of past quantities using more sophisticated rules may require extra information costs based upon realized payoffs the fractions of the population choosing a certain behavioral rule are updated according to the replicator equation with noise the long run behavior of the evolutionary system consisting of the population dynamics coupled with the quantity dynamics of the cournot game may be complicated and endogenous fluctuations may arise we consider a typical example where firms can choose between two rules the nash rule and the best reply rule we show that a homoclinic tangency between the stable and unstable manifold of the equilibrium occurs as evolutionary pressure increases implying bifurcation routes to complicated dynamics and strange attractors

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

individual firm and market dynamics of csr activities this paper investigates how firms should plan corporate social responsibility short csr this dynamic analysis starts with a firm s intertemporal optimization problem and proceeds to analyze interactions with other firms which are crucial if csr is profitable for firm a then it is most likely also profitable for competitors b and c and these simultaneous decisions affect the gain each would achieve from trying to advance its own position we find that multiple equilibria exist irrespective of whether interactions with other firms are taken into account interactions can eliminate or create additional steady states and can lead to a situation in which history is insufficient to determine the long run outcome among multiple steady states so that coordination is beneficial