public trust the law and financial investment abstract how does trust evolve in markets what is the optimal level of regulation and how does this affect trust formation and economic growth in a theoretical model we analyze these questions given the value of social capital and the potential for growth in the market when social capital is valuable regulation and trustfulness are substitutes in this case regulation may cause lower aggregate investment and decreased economic growth when the social capital is less valuable regulation and trustfulness may be complements in the paper we analyze the optimal level of regulation and highlight the novel predictions of the model

gender wage gap across the wage distribution in different segments of the indian labour market 1983 2012 exploring the glass ceiling or sticky floor phenomenon abstractwomen s participation in the indian labour market is not only low but they are also engaged in low productivity and low paying jobs further the labour market is segmented by gender type of employment sector and location of residence this study makes an important contribution by examining gender wage gap in india across different segments of the labour market over the wage distribution using national level representative data spanning the period 1983 to 2012 the empirical results suggest that i the male female raw wage gap has declined over time across the wage distribution ii the gender wage gap attributable to differing returns to characteristics has increased over time and there is evidence of convergence of productive characteristics of men and women iii sticky floor rather than glass ceiling phenomenon is observed in all segments of the labour market and iv the adjusted wage gap suggests that women at the bottom of the distribution face higher discrimination than those at the t

is there a glass ceiling in sweden using 1998 data we show that the gender log wage gap in sweden increases throughout the wage distribution and accelerates in the upper tail we interpret this as a strong glass ceiling effect we use quantile regression decompositions to examine whether this pattern can be ascribed primarily to gender differences in labor market characteristics or in the rewards to those characteristics even after extensive controls for gender differences in age education both level and field sector industry and occupation we find that the glass ceiling effect we see in the raw data persists to a considerable extent

the use of quantile regressions in estimating gender wage differentials a case study of the philippines quantile regressions are used to analyse the size components and nature of the gender earnings differentials as well as the returns to education by gender in the philippines over the entire conditional distribution of earnings using data from the 1999 apis survey this approach allows more focused conclusions about the nature of gender earnings differentials incorporating the quantile regression approach to the oaxaca blinder decomposition allows the localization of gender discrimination to particular quantiles of the earnings distribution and permits more targeted policy intervention

the influence of production technology on risk and the cost of capital this paper uses a time state preference valuation model to examine how the firm s choice of technology and production method affects its equilibrium level of risk and as a result the firm s cost of capital a fixed and flexible method of production is analyzed for a firm using a cobb douglas production function in both cases it is found that risk and the cost of capital decrease with the level of capital intensity implications are drawn for the specification of empirical tests of the determinants of risk

raising children to work hard altruism work norms and social insurance children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market moreover parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non credible to promote work

counterfactual decomposition of changes in wage distributions using quantile regression we propose a method to decompose the changes in the wage distribution over a period of time in several factors contributing to those changes the method is based on the estimation of marginal wage distributions consistent with a conditional distribution estimated by quantile regression as well as with any hypothesized distribution for the covariates comparing the marginal distributions implied by different distributions for the covariates one is then able to perform counterfactual exercises the proposed methodology enables the identification of the sources of the increased wage inequality observed in most countries specifically it decomposes the changes in the wage distribution over a period of time into several factors contributing to those changes namely by discriminating between changes in the characteristics of the working population and changes in the returns to these characteristics we apply this methodology to portuguese data for the period 1986 1995 and find that the observed increase in educational levels contributed decisively towards greater wage inequality copyright 2005 john wiley sons ltd

why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes an evolutionary approach abstract two bargaining parties play the nash demand game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party s investment decision various investment levels are subgame perfect adding the investment decision to young s evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long run outcome efficient investment prevails and the investor s share of the pie approximates die maximum of i the smallest share that induces efficient investment even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment and ii half of the pie the result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold ups journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 l14

is there a glass ceiling over europe exploring the gender pay gap across the wages distribution using harmonised data from the european union household panel we analyse gender pay gaps by sector across the wages distribution for ten countries we find that the mean gender pay gap in the raw data typically hides large variations in the gap across the wages distribution we use quantile regression qr techniques to control for the effects of individual and job characteristics at different points of the distribution and calculate the part of the gap attributable to differing returns between men and women we find that first gender pay gaps are typically bigger at the top of the wage distribution a finding that is consistent with the existence of glass ceilings for some countries gender pay gaps are also bigger at the bottom of the wage distribution a finding that is consistent with sticky floors third the gender pay gap is typically higher at the top than the bottom end of the wage distribution suggesting that glass ceilings are more prevalent than sticky floors and that these prevail in the majority of our countries fourth the gender pay gap differs significantly across the public and the private sector wages distribution for each of our eu countries

on optimal production and the market to book ratio given limited shareholder diversification our purpose is to examine a firm s optimal output decision and valuation when its shareholders hold a limited number of risky assets the primary theoretical result indicates that the market to book ratio is a function of the degree of shareholder diversification our theory suggests a negative relationship between a firm s market to book ratio and shareholder diversification

differences in pollution levels among civil law countries a possible interpretation abstract the aim of this paper is to shed light on the way the legal systems of different countries can explain the discrepancies in their pollution levels in particular we underline the factors of capital accumulation and the financial market development that are driven among other things by the various levels of protection accorded by the legal system to both shareholders and creditors the research develops in two directions firstly we supply a theoretical analysis to explain how constraints on the process of capital accruement affect the pollution level in the model a crucial role is assigned to the rate of interest and its relationship with discount rates which constitutes an important variable in decisions to implement anti pollution devices secondly we perform an econometric analysis using the data of eighty five countries belonging to the legal family of civil law for the period from 1992 to 2003 adopting four pollution indicators as dependent variables our main findings are that legal families and financial market development can help to explain the differences in environmental indicators observed among nations

minimum wages and the gender wage gap estimates are made of the effect of minimum wages on the size and composition of the gender wage gap in canada in 1986 it is found that minimum wages close the wage gap substantially for young workers and less so for adults the reduction in the gap is most attributable to the adverse employment effects of minimum wages the results also indicate that most of the reduction in the gap is realized through a fall in the discriminatory component

relationships and growth on the dynamic interplay between relational contracts and competitive markets in economic development this paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how different contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements emerge endogenously and are linked dynamically with the process of economic development formal contracts are enforced by third party institutions courts whereas relational contracts are self enforcing agreements without third party involvement the novel feature of our model is that it demonstrates the co evolution of these different enforcement modes and market equilibrium conditions all of which are jointly determined we then characterise the equilibrium paths of such dynamic processes and show the time structure of relational contracting in the process of development in particular we show that relational contracting fosters the emergence of a market based economy in the growth phase of development however its role declines as the economy enters a mature phase

market structure uncertainty and the cost of equity capital the cost of capital plays a key role in the allocation of funds between different sectors of the economy the linkage between the cost of capital and market power has been hinted at by several authors however no rigorous development has been made this paper uses the simple static analysis of the capital asset pricing model to show that with more market power a firm s cost of equity capital declines hence firms with more market power will be able to raise equity capital at lower market rates than would the competitive firm if the product market had been perfectly competitive

glass ceiling and double disadvantage effects women in the us labour market gender pay issues in the us labour market are examined using 1990 and 2000 us census data for three groups the native born immigrants from english speaking countries and immigrants from non english speaking countries quantile regression estimates reveal different patterns of wage effects across the wage distribution females have lower rates of pay across the entire wage scale there is minimal evidence of glass ceiling effects immigrant women from non english speaking countries are argued to experience a double disadvantage effect

fighting corruption to precommit or not we consider a differential game with a corrupt government and civil society as its players we characterize open loop and feedback nash equilibria and find that whereas it is in the best interest of the government not to commit to a repression policy civil society is better off precommitting to fight corruption

workers of the world unite franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in europe 1820 1938 abstract we test the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise in europe was related to the threat of revolution we contend that international diffusion of regime contention and information about revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries generate the necessary variation in the perceived threat of revolution using two samples of european countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938 we find robust evidence which is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis we also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform

after the big bang obstacles to the emergence of the rule of law in post communist societies when russia launched mass privatization it was widely believed that it would create a powerful constituency for the rule of law that didn t happen we present a dynamic equilibrium model of the political demand for the rule of law and show that beneficiaries of mass privatization may fail to demand the rule of law even if it is the pareto efficient rule of the game the reason is that uncertainty about the legal regime can lead to asset stripping and stripping can give agents an interest in prolonging the absence of the rule of law this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

who trusts others community and individual determinants of social capital in a low income country this study presents new evidence on individual and community specific determinants of social trust using data from 96 villages in bangladesh we find perceived institutional trust to be positively correlated with stated inter personal trust at the same time there is significant social distance among various faith groups in our data both hindus and muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions moreover hindus trust christians buddhists and ngo workers more than muslims and are not distrustful of the wider society trust towards non muslims is negatively correlated with islamic school attendance among muslim respondents while religiosity tends not to play any role compared to religion the effects of institutional trust and local economic development are modest these findings are robust to control for a range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects

corporate chartering an exploration in the economics of legal change the corporate form of business organization characterized principally by limited liability share transferability and perpetual life existed far in advance of its official recognition by government in the early nineteenth century and before the unincorporated joint stock company offered through private contracts many of the advantages typically thought to reside exclusively in the corporation 1 despite these deep historical roots however the legal framework surrounding the corporation as we know it today is a relatively recent phenomenon permission to incorporate was long granted sparingly by the state and when granted was accompanied by restrictions on the amount of authorized capital on the scope of operations and on the length of the corporate franchise permission to incorporate for any lawful purpose was not common until 1875 2 thus while corporateness flourished early regulation delayed the beginning of the chartered corporation s rise to prominence until not much more than a century ago

wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective abstract this paper develops a one population indirect evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer supplier and many a sufficiently large number of retailers to study how the retailer s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price its observability the error probability of the observed result on the rival s preference the market scale and the retailer s bargaining power this paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer we find that the profit revenue maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high low given an appropriate wholesale price the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers population the larger the market scale the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price the cross effects of the retailer s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process

governance and growth abstract because of its inappropriability protection of property rights is widely recognized as being the state s responsibility moreover recent empirical evidence suggests that it leads to higher investment levels and faster growth nevertheless the extent of property rights protection differs significantly across countries this paper endogenizes the emergence of property rights within a simple growth framework drawing on north north d 1990 institutions institutional change and economic performance cambridge university press a model is presented where economic performance and enforcement of property rights may reinforce each other initial conditions determine the economy s convergence to a high income or a low income steady state the existing empirical evidence offers a tentative support for this theory

do people play nash equilibrium lessons from evolutionary game theory evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational and when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a nash equilibrium and if it is reasonable which equilibrium the traditional answers are not compelling and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer evolutionary game theory suggests that in a range of settings agents do eventually play a nash equilibrium moreover evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different nash equilibria

on the evolution of attitudes towards risk in winner take all games abstract a long standing conjecture is that winner take all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk takers and the extinction of risk averters in many species a winner take all game determines the males right to reproduce and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk takers psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk taking than females using an evolutionary model of preference formation we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk taking in winner take all environments journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 d8

cooperation in community interaction without information flows we study cooperative behaviour in communities where the flow of information regarding past conduct is limited or missing players are initially randomly matched with no knowledge of each other s past actions they endogenously decide whether or not to continue the repeated relationship there is incomplete information regarding player types a subset of the population is myopic while the remainder have discount factors that permit cooperation in principle we define social equilibrium in such communities such equilibria are characterized by an initial testing phase followed by cooperation if the test is successful it is precisely the presence of myopic types that permit cooperation by raising barriers to entry into new relationships we examine the implications of increased patience which takes two forms an increase in the number of non myopic types and an increase in the discount factor of non myopic types these two notions turn out to have strikingly different implications for the degree of cooperation that can be sustained

intergenerational transmission of preferences we propose a perfect empathy model of cultural transmission to capture the evolution of preferences in a population unlike existing imperfect empathy models focusing on stable interior equilibria we demonstrate that a corner outcome will eventuate however which corner outcome emerges is unknown and depends on the interplay of history and expectations

corruption inequality and fairness bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption we formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model a positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population this feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality multiple steady states exist in some cases

the taxman tools up an event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax abstract the introduction of income taxation was a landmark in the historical development of the fiscal state of the now developed world this paper presents an event history study of the adoption of the income tax in 17 countries from western europe north america oceania and japan between 1815 and 1939 we find evidence that spending pressures reductions in tax collection costs and to a lesser extent social learning played a significant role for the adoption decision we also find evidence that the extension of the franchise at first reduced the likelihood of adoption of the income tax but eventually as universal suffrage was approached increased the likelihood

male female earnings differentials and the role of language in canada ontario and quebec 1970 recent studies by robb 1978 and gunderson 1979a have analysed malefemale earnings differentials in ontario and canada respectively both authors first estimated sex specific earnings functions and then employed the estimated coefficients to decompose the observed or gross earnings differential into a portion attributable to differences in mean characteristics or endowments and a portion attributable to discrimination i discrimination is measured both by differential returns to the same productivity generating characteristics the estimated coefficients of the characteristics and by other forms of discrimination which do not appear explicitly in the earnings equation the estimated intercepts the purpose of this note is to report the results obtained from performing a similar decomposition analysis for quebec and to compare our results with those of robb and gunderson given the comparative nature of our study we have chosen to use the same data base sample characteristics model specifications and control variables as did robb and gunderson 2 the major difference between our study and those of robb and gunderson is the treatment of language robb did not include language variables in her earnings functions for ontario while gunderson employed what we term a narrow definition of language for canada in his earnings equations gunderson measured language skills by the ability to communicate in canada s official

the extent of the market and the supply of regulation we present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost as a consequence the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market we test three implications of this model first jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it second jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more this implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely consistent with the model we find that higher population u s states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states we also find that the regulation of entry the regulation of labor and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations as well as in civil law countries where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower

nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences abstract a population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game g the payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences however these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs when evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take the distribution of aggregate play must be a nash equilibrium of g weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification number c72

deadweight costs and the size of government abstract we provide a model for analyzing effects of the tax system and spending programs on the determination of government spending and taxpayer welfare an improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending would reduce political pressure for suppressing the growth of government and thereby increase total tax revenue and spending we demonstrate the similarity of the political responses to revenue shocks spending shocks changes in tax efficiency and changes in spending program efficiency empirical analysis of oil shocks intergovernmental grants and other autonomous changes in taxes or spending indicates that cause and effect is not only from spending to tax structures

trust social capital and economic development many argue that elements of a society s norms culture or social capital are central to understanding its development however these notions have been difficult to capture in economic models here we explore ap ossible role for trustworthiness as corresponding to social capital individuals are trustworthy when they perform in accordance with promises even if this does not maximize their payoffs the usual focus on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here instead we emphasize more deep seated modes of behaviour and consider trustworthy agents being socialized to act as they do to model this socialization we borrow from a process of preference evolution pioneered by bisin and verdier 2001 the model developed endogenously accounts for social capital and explores its role in the process of economic development it captures in a simple formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy s productive processes the results obtained caution against rapid reform and provide an explanation for why late developing countries may not easily be able to transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the west

a reason for quantity regulation in a variety of situations governments regulate undesirable activities by controlling quantities rather than charging taxes blue laws prohibit all liquor sales on sundays rather than impose higher taxes on that day zoning restrictions limit commercial construction in residential areas rather than charge for nuisance to neighbors anti smoking and anti trust laws restrict rather than tax particular conduct fishing and hunting rules allow hunting during particular time periods rather than tax the catch pollution controls impose limits rather than tax emissions quantity regulations are common in the financial sphere as well in the united states banking regulations for many years prohibited interstate banking as well as ownership of investment banks by commercial banks in many countries commercial banks are limited in the amount of various activities they can pursue such as real estate investments or borrowing in foreign currency in some countries banking laws prohibit all lending to the parties related to the owners of the bank the so called related lending rather than impose liability rules on loans to related parties that are found to be fraudulent or unsafe rafael la porta et al 2000 despite this common practice economists generally prefer taxes and liability rules to quantity controls and property rights rules robert ellickson 1973 louis kaplow and steven shavell 1996 1997 nathaniel keohane et al 1998 as the instrument for reducing undesirable conduct when explaining why quantity regulations are so pervasive they first make the political economy argument that quantity restrictions are favored by incumbent firms that wish to deter entry james buchanan and gordon tullock 1975 but this argument is not general it does not explain such quantity restrictions as blue laws and hunting and fishing regulations which affect all market participants equally some academics also argue that because certain activities such as smoking are seen as morally wrong by the community their level is regulated at zero in other instances however such as pollution and hunting positive but limited levels of activity are allowed inconsistent with the moral argument that the reason for quantity regulation is the special attraction of zero in this paper we present an alternative reason for quantity regulations one from the perspective of a benevolent government we begin with the observation of gary becker and george stigler 1974 that law enforcement is not free but is fundamentally an economic problem throughout human history and throughout the world today there are chronic problems of under enforcement witness the low level of tax compliance in much of the developing world and over enforcement by politically motivated prosecutors or regulators an analysis of pigouvian taxes versus quantity restrictions must recognize that in reality neither policy is free and automatic to enforce in general the choice of policies itself can facilitate or discourage enforcement in two ways first policies can shape the incentives for enforcement second policies can influence the costs of enforcement in our earlier work glaeser and sheifer 2000 glaeser et al 2001 we have focused on incentives and shown that quantity regulations can be used as an optimal instrument to raise the rewards to law enforcers for identifying violations here we focus not on the incentives for the enforcers but on the costs of finding violations these costs are often lower in the case of quantity restrictions we show that even when quantity regulations unlike taxes restrict some socially efficient conduct the reduced costs of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency such reliance of quantity regulation is especially important when private enforcement is crucial as in the case of enforcing department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 we thank the national science foundation for financial support and louis kaplow for extremely helpful comments

evolution of time preference by natural selection this paper entertains the hypothesis that human time preferences are in evolutionary equilibrium i e that no mutation changing time preferences could be favored by natural selection this hypothesis implies that the marginal rate of substitution mrs holding darwinian fitness constant must equal the mrs holding utility constant furthermore in a market economy the latter must equal the mrs in exchange exploiting these principles the author finds that the long term real interest rate should equal ln 2 per generation about 2 percent per year and that young adults should discount the future more rapidly than their elders copyright 1994 by american economic association

the evolution of monetary equilibrium abstract the hahn problem is that even if a monetary equilibrium with valued fiat money exists in general equilibrium a nonmonetary equilibrium with a zero price on money generally also exists why should we expect the former over the latter here i consider the preferences that will survive repeated trading in an exchange economy where agents compete in biological fitness with unobservable preferences and positive assortativity in matching evolutionarily stable preferences implement the competitive equilibrium that maximizes the sum of agents fitnesses in a standard bewley townsend model this implies selection of the monetary over the nonmonetary equilibrium and also implies the survival of agents with money in the utility function trust in fiat money is only a recent development and even today such faith is hardly universal cass and shell 1980

regulation and distrust in a cross section of countries government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital we document this correlation and present a model explaining it in the model distrust creates public demand for regulation while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation leading to multiple equilibria a key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt we test this and other implications of the model using country and individual level data on social capital and beliefs about government s role as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism

union firm bargaining and the influence of product market power and production technology on systematic risk the relationship between the capm firm beta and the firm s microeconomic decisions is studied by a model under uncertainty which combines the feature of an ex ante inputs substituable production technology and the existence of a union which bargains over various economic dimensions of the firm it is shown that the earlier findings of a relationship between the firm beta the firm product market power and the labor capital ratio may be reinforced through the indirect channel of labor market bargaining but the relationship becomes more complex and heavily depends on the scope of the union firm bargaining process this yields the empirical prediction confirmed for a panel of belgian firms that any proper estimation of the determinants of firm beta must control for firms in the sample being unionized

us and them the origin of identity and its economic implications we investigate the origins of identity and the innate proclivity to draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we propose an evolutionary explanation we argue that identity arises because it facilitates survival in an evolutionary setting we endogenize preferences and demonstrate that the evolutionarily stable preferences fashioned by natural selection would draw a distinction between insiders and outsiders we then work out the implications of such preferences in two contemporary scenarios one entailing rent seeking behavior and the other involving public good provision our results are in conformity with empirical evidence

private politics and public regulation public regulation is increasingly facing competition from private politics in the form of activism and corporate self regulation however its effectiveness welfare consequences and interaction with public regulation are poorly understood this article presents a unified dynamic framework for studying the interaction between public regulation self regulation and boycotts we show that the possibility of self regulation saves on administrative costs but also leads to delays without an active regulator firms self regulate to preempt or end a boycott and private politics is beneficial for activists but harmful for firms with an active regulator in contrast firms self regulate to preempt public regulation and private politics is harmful for activists but beneficial for firms our analysis generates a rich set of testable predictions that are consistent with the rise of private politics over time and the fact that there is more self regulation and activism in the u s while public regulation continues to be more common in europe

evolution of preferences we endogenize preferences using the indirect evolutionary approach individuals are randomly matched to play a two person game individual subjective preferences determine their behaviour and may differ from the actual objective pay offs that determine fitness matched individuals may observe the opponents preferences perfectly not at all or with some in between probability when preferences are observable a stable outcome must be efficient when they are not observable a stable outcome must be a nash equilibrium and all strict equilibria are stable we show that for pure strategy outcomes these conclusions are robust to allowing almost perfect and almost no observability with the notable exception that inefficient strict equilibria may fail to be stable with any arbitrarily small degree of observability despite being stable with no observability

on the cultural transmission of preferences for social status abstract we study the formation of preferences for social status as the result of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits we characterize the behavior of parents with preferences for status in terms of socialization of their children to this particular cultural trait we show that degenerate distributions of the population whereby agents have either all status preferences or all non status preferences are dynamically unstable moreover under some conditions there exists a unique stationary distribution which is non degenerate in which both status and non status preferences co exist in the population and this distribution is locally stable finally we study the dependence of the stable stationary distribution of status preferences on institutional technological and policy parameters which affect agents economic conditions

does islamic finance spur banking sector development abstract islamic finance is one of the most prominent phenomena over the last decade in the banking industry in the middle east and south east asia in spite of the substantial size and growth of this segment recently the role of islamic banking in the economy is still heavily debated and very few empirical work is available this paper studies the empirical impact of islamic banking on banking sector development it circumvents the lack of data through a newly constructed and comprehensive database ifirst covering islamic commercial banks worldwide over the period 2000 2005 this database is to our knowledge unique in the industry we find strong and consistent empirical evidence that the development of islamic banking in muslim countries leads to a higher banking sector development as measured by the amount of private credit or bank deposits scaled to gdp this effect occurs through the development of a new shariah compliant banking industry which does not crowd out the conventional banking system additionally we provide evidence that the islamic banking sector acts as a complement to the conventional banking in muslim countries when both systems co exist and the islamic sector reaches a medium penetration in the total banking sector

statehood experience legal traditions and climate change policies this study investigates how the implementation of modern climate change policies is related to former colonies length of state history and their legal heritage we argue that countries with longer statehood experience around the time of colonization were better equipped to implement the legal philosophies transplanted by their colonial powers therefore the implications of receiving british common law versus french civil law should be particularly important in countries with a greater accumulated history of statehood using a cross section of up to 78 former colonies our results provide support for this hypothesis in particular our estimates demonstrate that common law countries have weaker modern climate change policies than civil law countries and the difference is inflated by a longer statehood experience measured by the length of state history from 1 to 1800 ad legal origin has no effect in areas which by the time of colonization had no statehood experience finally we report similar results for the pattern of labor market regulations jel k15 k31 k32 o44 q54 q58

beta firm size and concentration the asset beta of a firm is defined as the uncertainty about the firm s future value scaled by its current value empirically beta is negatively related to a firm s size and concentration in its major product market this relation has been interpreted as evidence that monopoly power affects beta this paper shows that this empirical result is also consistent with competitive product markets where greater firm size and concentration are due to greater efficiency in production thus the correlation between beta firm size and concentration is not prima facie evidence of widespread monopoly power

family values and the regulation of labor flexible labor markets requires geographically mobile workers to be e cient otherwise rms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents in cultures with strong family ties moving away from home is costly thus individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of rms even though regulation generates lower employment and income empirically we do nd that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile have lower wages are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations there are also positive cross country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities finally we nd positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty rst century and family values prevailing before world war ii which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

rank regressions wage distributions and the gender gap in this paper we propose a novel rank based procedure to decompose changes in the gender wage gap into three components changes in the skill distribution changes in the wage structure and improvements in the position of women in a distribution of reference using cps data from 1979 and 1991 we perform the decomposition at each percentile of the wage distribution and show that the results are sensitive to the choice of distribution of reference male versus overall wage distribution we also find that relative wage gains of women may have been a source of increasing wage inequality among men

which countries have state religions among 188 countries 72 had no state religion in 2000 1970 and 1900 58 had a state religion throughout and 58 had 1 or 2 transitions we use a hotelling spatial competition model to analyze the likelihood that the religion market would be monopolized similar forces influence a government s decision to establish a state religion consistent with the model the probability of state religion in 1970 and 2000 is increasing with the adherence rate to the main religion has a nonlinear relation with population and has little relation with per capita gdp the probability of state religion decreases sharply under communism but lagged communism has only a weak effect with costly adjustment for institutions the probability of state religion in 1970 or 2000 depends substantially on the status in 1900 this persistence is much stronger for countries with no major regime change than for countries with such a change

an evolutionary approach to pre play communication we add a round of pre play communication to a finite two player game played by a population of players pre play communication is cheap talk in the sense that it does not directly enter the payoffs the paper characterizes the set of strategies that are stable with respect to a stochastic dynamic adaptive process periodically players have an opportunity to change their strategy with a strategy that is more successful against the current population any strategy that weakly improves upon the current poorest performer in the population enters with positive probability when there is no conflict of interest between the players only the efficient outcome is stable with respect to these dynamics for general games the set of stable payoffs is typically large every efficient payoff recurs infinitely often

if homo economicus could choose his own utility function would he want one with a conscience reply in my model of the evolution of honesty 1 i assumed the existence of a signal a blush perhaps extreme values of which served to identify some individuals as being honest with certainty joseph harrington notes that without this assumption honest individuals have difficulty invading a population initially dominated by defectors for readers who do not wish to work through the algebra in his comment the argument is easily summarized in nontechnical terms suppose two honest mutants a and b arrive in an uncountably large population consisting entirely of dishonest persons and suppose that the probability that an honest person exhibits an intense blush is say 0 999 while the corresponding probability for everyone else is only 0 001 when a sees an intense blush on the face of b what will then be his estimate of the probability that b is honest assuming that a knows the laws of elementary probability and corrects for the base rate of honest persons in the population it will be zero when virtually everyone in the population is dishonest even a person with an intense blush will be pegged as dishonest provided that even the smallest fraction of dishonest persons also shows an intense blush with

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

trust regulation and market failures abstract government regulation of firms is associated with more negative externalities and unofficial activity across countries i argue that this correlation mainly reflects causality going from concerns about market failures to demand for government intervention using trust in others as a proxy for such concerns i show that differences in trust explain a great deal of variation in entry regulations then controlling for trust in the regression of market failures on regulation the latter is no longer associated with worse economic outcomes the same result is confirmed when i exploit country population as an alternative source of variation in regulation

cooperation secret handshakes and imitation in the prisoners dilemma building on a j robson 1990 j theoret biol 144 379 396 we introduce into the repeated prisoners dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a costly signal i e the secret handshake before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent we show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities we obtain similar results surprisingly in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 d60

is the food and drug administration safe and effective in the united states the food and drug administration fda provides public oversight of the safety and efficacy of drugs medical devices biologics like vaccines and blood products cosmetics radiation emitting electronic products veterinary products and all foods except meat and poultry which are regulated by the department of agriculture according to the fda the products it regulates account for more than one fifth of u s consumer spending in the area of medical products the fda is responsible for determining whether marketed products are both safe and effective before and after they have been marketed in this paper we will explore whether the policies of the agency itself are safe and effective we stress two issues one static and one dynamic the static issue concerns the potential duplication inefficiency when product safety is protected not only by the fda but also by the private sector through product liability law put another way what is the rationale for using product liability and the fda to regulate drug safety while intuitively it may seem that two systems must be better than one in ensuring drug safety each system comes with costs we then turn to the dynamic issue the speed safety trade off and consider the extent to which higher safety is achieved at a cost of later market entry of effective and even life saving products we assess the prescription drug user fee acts pdufas which increased the speed of the agency s regulatory process starting in 1992 although according to some at the cost of reducing drug safety we conclude by suggesting a research agenda for future work on the food and drug administration

cultural integration and its discontents a community s culture is defined by the preferences and equilibrium behaviours of its members contacts among communities alter individual cultures through two interrelated mechanisms behavioural adaptations driven by pay offs to coordination and preference changes shaped by socialization and self persuasion this paper explores the workings of these mechanisms through a model of cultural integration in which preferences and behaviours vary continuously it identifies a broad set of conditions under which cross cultural contacts promote cultural hybridization the analysis suggests that policies to support social integration serve to homogenize preferences across communities thereby undermining a key objective of multiculturalism yielding fresh insights into strategies pursued to influence cultural trends it also shows that communities benefit from having other communities adjust their behaviours

the unequal enforcement of liberalization evidence from russia s reform of business regulation we document the unequal enforcement of liberalization reform of business regulation across russian regions with different governance institutions which leads to unequal effects of liberalization national liberalization laws were enforced more effectively in subnational regions with more transparent government a more informed population a higher concentration of industry and stronger fiscal autonomy as a result liberalization had a substantial positive effect on the performance of small firms and the growth of the official small business sector in regions with stronger governance institutions in contrast in regions with weaker governance institutions we observe no effect of reform and in some cases even a negative effect

hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences we present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences in which players face in each period a simplified hold up problem in our model both the distribution of preferences in the population and the investment policies in the long run influence one another and are determined endogenously and simultaneously in the stable steady state of the economy there is a mixed distribution of preferences where both selfish and other regarding preferences are present in the population moreover the presence of a significant fraction of individuals with other regarding preferences alleviates post contractual opportunism and improves efficiency in the investment decisions 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the effects of taxes on purchases of sugar sweetened carbonated soft drinks a quantile regression approach the consumption of large quantities of sugar sweetened carbonated soft drinks sscsd may lead to obesity which is associated with health problems such as diabetes cardiac diseases and mental health problems the effects of increasing the value added tax vat on purchases of sscsd are estimated obesity is more likely among heavy drinkers than among light or moderate drinkers therefore the effects on high and low purchasing households are estimated by using quantile regressions qrs on norwegian household purchase data since many households did not purchase sscsd during each survey period censored as well as ordinary qrs are used our results suggest that a vat increase from 13 to 25 will have the highest percentage effect among low purchasing households but the absolute effect is highest among high purchasing households low purchasing households will reduce their purchases by about 5 l while the reduction is almost 20 l among high purchasing households however the effects among high purchasi

homo moralis preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching what preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs we show that when individuals preferences are their private information a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable we call individuals with such preferences homo moralis a t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff at the opposite end is homo kantiensis who does what would be the right thing to do in terms of payoffs if all others would do likewise we show that the stable degree of morality the weight placed on the moral goal is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact

malthusian selection of preferences the authors study natural selection of preferences using a golden age model with endogenous population in equilibrium all agents have preferences with maximum biological fitness given resource constraints and total population is the maximum the environment can sustain naturally selected agents follow the golden rule acting as if they maximize the undiscounted sum of per capita felicities of current and future generations selected preferences and hence work saving consumption and population density vary predictably with environmental differences copyright 1990 by american economic association

cultivating trust norms institutions and the implications of scale we study the co evolution of honesty norms and institutions new trading opportunities require institutional changes to be realised since the initial vulnerability of institutions to opportunistic behaviour leads to the deterioration of norms we show how an escape from opportunism requires that institutional improvements outpace norm deterioration a key prediction emerges larger economies are more likely to evolve to steady states with strong honesty norms but need not have better institutions this prediction is tested using a cross section of countries population has a significant positive relationship with trust even when controlling for standard trust determinants and institutional quality

globalization and the dynamics of cultural identity this paper presents a simple model where micro founded dynamics of cultural identity are endogenous and interact with an international trade equilibrium this process generates a strong home bias under autarky we then show that goods market integration causes a phenomenon of cultural divergence whereby the distributions of cultures become more dissimilar across countries and one of the cultures that existed under autarky ultimately disappears by way of contrast we show that social integration causes cultural convergence and can counterbalance the effects of goods market integration

presidential address institutions and culture how and why does distant political and economic history shape the functioning of current institutions this paper argues that individual values and convictions about the scope of application of norms of good conduct provide the missing link evidence from a variety of sources points to two main findings first individual values consistent with generalized as opposed to limited morality are widespread in societies that were ruled by non despotic political institutions in the distant past second well functioning institutions are often observed in countries or regions where individual values are consistent with generalized morality and under different identifying assumptions this suggests a causal effect from values to institutional outcomes the paper ends with a discussion of the implications for future research jel a10 d7 e00

affirmative action and dynamics of work ethic preferences this study examines the cultural transmission effects of compensatory discrimination affirmative action policies on work ethic preference dynamics for a population in a caste based segregated economy in which some high paid jobs are reserved for historically disadvantaged lower caste individuals cultural attitudes toward preferences for work loving and leisure loving traits evolve endogenously the compensatory discrimination policies affect differently the preference dynamics for insiders entitled to employment quota and outsiders not entitled to employment quota efficient and inefficient equilibria are possible with larger or smaller proportions of individuals with a work ethic among the insider and outsider populations the model shows that the commonly conceived conclusion that a job reservation policy benefits a disadvantaged group at the cost of efficiency and economic growth is not a necessary outcome jel a12 c62 j71

efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching abstract this paper investigates the sensitivity of recent evolutionary models of learning to the specification of the matching mechanism we study a literally random matching mechanism combined with a process of strategy adjustment based on the realized average performance of each strategy in the key class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games the pareto efficient equilibrium per se is selected rather than the risk dominant equilibrium as the probability of experimentation or mutation goes to zero furthermore convergence to the equilibrium is relatively fast we extend these results for example to games of common interest journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991