implementing marketable emissions permits the environmental protection agency is introducing bubbles offsets and banks as a way of controlling pollution with market incentives to obtain standards for each source and guide the reallocation of emissions the new method is not a true market because polluters must go through the permitting procedure in order to trade emission allowances this study examines whether an efficient market without source by source review is feasible it considers the importance of enough participants competitiveness sensitivity to geographic emission patterns and trading flexibility to sustain marketable permits the design features that address these problems are permit life market definition market initiation and market operation a stable permit market eliminates some of the uncertainties in decision making because it allows firms to select a preferred level of risk 9 references dck

attitudes toward risk and compliance in emission permit markets we investigate the effects of uncertainty and concomitant risk aversion as they impact the incentive structure and subsequent operation of an emissions permit market modeled after the u s s02 market our theoretical results suggest that uncertainty dulls incentives to achieve cost savings through permit trading and inhibits efficient allocation of abatement efforts by firms we test hypotheses in an experimental laboratory setting and find that the irreversibility of investment in abatement technology may present countervailing incentives for potential sellers of permits resulting in a wait and see attitude toward adoption of efficient levels of abatement technology

sulfur dioxide control by electric utilities what are the gains from trade title iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments caaa established a market for transferable sulfur dioxide so2 emission allowances among electric utilities this market offers firms facing high marginal abatement costs the opportunity to purchase the right to emit so2 from firms with lower costs and this is expected to yield cost savings compared to a command and control approach to environmental regulation this paper uses econometrically estimated marginal abatement cost functions for power plants affected by title iv of the caaa to evaluate the performance of the so2 allowance market specifically we investigate whether the much heralded fall in the cost of abating so2 compared to original estimates can be attributed to allowance trading we demonstrate that for plants that use low sulfur coal to reduce so2 emissions technical change and the fall in prices of low sulfur coal have lowered marginal abatement cost curves by over 50 percent since 1985 the flexibility to take advantage of these chan

market barriers to energy efficiency abstract discussions of energy policy in an environmentally constrained world often focus on the use of tax instruments to internalize the external effects of energy utilization or achieve specified reductions in energy use in the most cost effective manner a substantial literature suggests however that significant opportunities exist to reduce energy utilization by implementing technologies that are cost effective under prevailing economic conditions but that are not fully implemented by existing market institutions this paper examines the theory of the market for energy using equipment showing that problems of imperfect information and transaction costs may bias rational consumers to purchase devices that use more energy than those that would be selected by a well informed social planner guided by the criterion of economic efficiency consumers must base their purchase decisions on observed prices and expectations of post purchase equipment performance if it is difficult or costly for individuals to form accurate and precise expectations the level of energy efficiency achieved by competitive markets will vary from the socially efficient outcome such market barriers suggest a role for regulatory intervention to improve market performance at prevailing energy prices

normal markets market imperfections and energy efficiency abstract the conventional distinction between economic and engineering approaches to energy analysis obscures key methodological issues concerning the measurement of the costs and benefits of policies to promote the adoption of energy efficient technologies the engineering approach is in fact based upon firm economic foundations the principle of lifecycle cost minimization that arises directly from the theory of rational investment thus evidence that so called market barriers impede the adoption of cost effective energy efficient technologies implies the existence of market failures as defined in the context of microeconomic theory problems of imperfect information and bounded rationality on the part of consumers for example may lead real world outcomes to deviate from the dictates of efficient resource allocation a widely held contrary view that the engineering view lacks economic justification is based on the fallacy that markets are normally efficient

price and order postponement in a decentralized newsvendor model with multiplicative and price dependent demand we analyze the effect of price and order postponement in a decentralized newsvendor model with multiplicative and price dependent demand wherein the manufacturer sets the wholesale price and possibly offers a buyback rate and the retailer determines the order quantity and retail price such postponement strategies can be used by the retailer by delaying his operational decisions order quantity and retail price until after demand uncertainty is observed we show how the equilibrium values of the contract parameters and profits are affected by i vertical competition ii type of contract wholesale price only or buyback iii demand distribution iv form of the expected demand function and v the timing of the retailer s operational decisions although in most cases postponement is quite beneficial for the channel members we show that for some model parameters due to vertical competition the expected value of perfect information about demand for price postponement and order postponement may be negative for the channel and even surprisingly for both members we also show that when a buyback option is offered neither order postponement nor price postponement has an effect on the equilibrium wholesale price profit allocation ratio between the manufacturer and the retailer and channel efficiency and that the equilibrium wholesale price expected retail price profit allocation ratio between the manufacturer and the retailer and channel efficiency in the model with buyback options under either order or price postponement further coincide with their counterparts in the corresponding deterministic model

market failure in incentive based regulation the case of emissions trading abstract among the existing evaluations of the us epa s emissions trading program a consensus has emerged while the program has resulted in significant cost savings it has not even approximately achieved a cost effective allocation of the control responsibility the cost savings have been smaller and the trades fewer than might have been expected at the outset of the program in this article we explore one hypothesis which purports to explain the divergence between the cost minimizing and the observed pattern of trades for nonuniformly mixed pollutants the trading process hypothesis attributes some significant proportion of this divergence to the nature of the process by which emission reduction credits are traded under the bubble policy an examination of actual bubble trades reveals that the actual trading process is sequential and bilateral and hence differs considerably from the implicit process modeled in the existing empirical studies simulations of this more realistic trading process suggest that the resulting equilibria deviate considerably from cost effective allocations of the control responsibility

an interim evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading ide iv of the 1990 clean air act amendments established the first large scale long term environmental program to rely on tradable emissions permitscalled allowances in this program to control pollution this program was designed to cut acid rain by reducing sulfur dioxide so2 emissions from electric generating plants to about half their 1980 level beginning in 1995 it is of interest both as a response to an important environmental issue and as a landmark experiment in environmental policy this experiment comes at a particularly important time since emission trading is under serious consideration with strong u s backing for use to deal with global climate change by curbing emissions of carbon dioxide co2 the economic stakes in climate change surpass those in acid rain by several orders of magnitude intergovernmental panel on climate change 1996 this article summarizes the results to date of our ongoing empirical analysis of compliance costs and allowance market performance under the u s acid rain program

rejecting renewables the socio technical impediments to renewable electricity in the united states if renewable power systems deliver such impressive benefits why do they still provide only 3 percent of national electricity generation in the united states as an answer this article demonstrates that the impediments to renewable power are socio technical a term that encompasses the technological social political regulatory and cultural aspects of electricity supply and use extensive interviews of public utility commissioners utility managers system operators manufacturers researchers business owners and ordinary consumers reveal that it is these socio technical barriers that often explain why wind solar biomass geothermal and hydroelectric power sources are not embraced utility operators reject renewable resources because they are trained to think only in terms of big conventional power plants consumers practically ignore renewable power systems because they are not given accurate price signals about electricity consumption intentional market distortions such as subsidies and unintentional market distortions such as split incentives prevent consumers from becoming fully invested in their electricity choices as a result newer and cleaner technologies that may offer social and environmental benefits but are not consistent with the dominant paradigm of the electricity industry continue to face comparative rejection

transaction costs in pollution markets an empirical study this paper studies a market in pol lution permits launched in los angeles in 1994 this tradable permit market has been projected to lead to substantial cost savings due to the flex ibility it provides firms in terms of compliance with environmental regulation this paper shows that transaction costs can play an important role in the initial years of the program the transac tion cost variables have been defined to include search costs and information costs these costs are significant in explaining non participation of some firms in the market the study also draws policy implications for the development of future emissions trading programs jel q28 q25

new directions in emissions trading the potential contribution of new institutional economics abstract once an arcane topic even among environmental economists emissions trading systems have substantially increased during this past decade in the usa moreover the implementation of these systems has necessitated increased involvement of professionals in many fields besides economics this paper reviews the practical experience of the six major types of emissions trading systems focusing on credit market development participation and results including transaction costs five more recent applications of emissions trading also are considered as well as the possibility of inter pollutant trading while inter pollutant trading has been successfully used for chlorofluorocarbons cfcs the applicability of this experience is probably very limited additionally it would be highly premature to attempt an evaluation of these newer emissions trading systems some of which have yet to be even partially implemented in order to improve these latter and future programs the paper considers the potential contribution of the new institutional economics nie to emissions trading the nie is used to develop theoretical insights and a series of predictions about the performance of a range of emissions trading systems

economic incentives for environmental protection integrating theory and practice for decades economists have been extolling the virtues of market based or economic incentive approaches to environmental protection some 70 years ago arthur cecil pigou 1920 suggested corrective taxes to discourage activities that generate externalities a half century later j dales 1968 showed how the introduction of transferable property rights could work to promote environmental protection at lower aggregate cost than conventional standards from these two seminal ideas corrective taxes and transferable property rights a substantial body of research has developed both environmental taxes and marketable permits are coming of age in the policy arena examples include the introduction of marketable permits in the united states to control acid rain the use of changes in europe to limit air and water pollution and the employment of deposit refund schemes for products ranging from beverage containers to batteries the introduction of these tools on a large scale provides a unique opportunity to extend the frontiers of knowledge this essay strives to identify prominent issues that merit investigation 8 refs

economic implications of emissions trading rules for local and regional pollutants in 1975 the united states environmental protection agency initiated an historic process of regulatory reform now known as the emissions trading program for nonuniformly mixed pollutants such as sulfur dioxides air quality is a function not only of the level of emissions but their location and stack heights as well the focus of this paper is how to protect local air quality and limit long range pollutant deposition caused by emission trades while allowing as much cost reducing trading activity as possible the authors examine the implications of two trading rules in two different airsheds using programming simulation models they find that the use of either trading rule represents a substantial improvement over relying exclusively on the current allocation of control responsibility

a note on tradeable permits this note offers a perspective on whether tradeable permits are a passing fad or an enduring trend it does so in noting how various types of tradeable permit systems relate to conventional environmental permits what are the unique requirements of tradeable permit systems and why they might be preferred to alternative instruments a final observation concerns the analogy between tradeable permits for environmental goods and private property in land

the political economy of market based environmental policy the u s acid rain program the u s acid rain program enacted in 1990 gave valuable tradable sulfur dioxide emissions permits called allowances to electric utilities we examine the political economy of this allocation though no senate or house votes were ever taken hypothetical votes suggest that the actual allocation would have beaten plausible alternatives while rent seeking behavior is apparent statistical analysis of differences between actual and benchmark allocations indicates that the legislative process was more complex than simple models suggest the coalition of states that produced and burned high sulfur coal both failed to block acid rain legislation in 1990 and received fewer allowances than in plausible benchmark allocations some of these states may have received additional allowances to cover 1995 99 emissions by giving up allowances in later years and some major coal producing states seem to have focused on benefits for miners and on sustaining demand for high sulfur coal

economic prescriptions for environmental problems how the patient followed the doctor s orders o ne of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved and the range of potential solutions as one who frequently engages in this exercise i can attest to this fact in my view this loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics which often emphasizes elegance at the expense of realism in this paper i will argue that both normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management the particular set of policies examined here involves two tools which have received widespread support from the economics community marketable permits and emission charges pigou 1932 dales 1968 kneese and schultze 1975 both tools represent ways to induce businesses to search for lower cost methods of achieving environmental standards they stand in stark contrast to the predominant command and control approach in which a regulator specifies the technology a firm must use to comply with regulations under highly restrictive conditions it can be shown that both of the economic approaches share the desirable feature that any gains in environmental quality will be obtained at the lowest possible cost baumol and oates 1975 until the 1960s these tools only existed on blackboards and in academic journals as products of the fertile imaginations of academics however some countries have recently begun to explore using these tools as part of a broader strategy for managing environmental problems

the market for sulfur dioxide emissions the 1990 clean air act amendments initiated the first large scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control the theoretical case for this approach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights the authors empirical analysis shows that the emission rights market created by the 1990 amendments had become reasonably efficient by mid 1994 they also show that the auctions specified in the amendments to jump start trading had become a small part of the overall market finally the authors demonstrate that the strategic bidding behavior discussed in the literature has had no effect on market prices copyright 1998 by american economic association

transaction costs and tradeable permits abstract tradeable permit systems are at the center of current interest and activity in market based reforms of environmental policy because these systems can offer significant advantages over conventional approaches to pollution control unfortunately claims made for their relative cost effectiveness have often been exaggerated transaction costs which may be significant in these markets reduce trading levels and increase abatement costs in some cases equilibrium permit allocations and hence aggregate control costs are sensitive to initial permit distributions providing an efficiency justification for politicians typical focus on initial allocations

compensating corporate venture managers this article reports the results of a questionnaire survey addressed to ceos of fortune 500 companies concerning incentive practices for venture managers data was also collected for venture performance history in these companies highlights of the results are most companies are not providing different incentives for venture managers than for other managers companies that do and companies that do not provide special incentives seem to agree on the types of incentives which would promote improved venture performance which include milestone bonuses equity and or options in the new venture variable bonuses based on venture roi the primary obstacle to installing such incentives is reported by firms without special incentives in place to be concern about internal equity firms with special incentives already in place have less concern with this problem a moderate problem to such firms is difficulty in defining venture objectives there is no evidence from this study that special incentives for venture managers affected the outcome in venture performance when such performance was measured by the percentage of successes and failures about 50 success rate was reported by each group the article deals with these questions are performance incentives essential certainly not from the data in this sample but this was a head count of successes and failures a study of overall economic performance might yield a different result one expensive failure can wipe out the gains from many small successes are the incentives reported effective obviously not enough to show a difference between those who use them and those who don t analysis of the incentive elements used and the earnings limits imposed suggest that the special incentives are not particularly special nor very much of an incentive further the most common incentive reported based on venture roi fails to consider the time period usually required to achieve a positive roi and the many changes of management which occur during that period what criteria should be used for designing an incentive program for venture managers recognition of the probability of management change incentives which promote early identification of need for change of direction or to abort focus on event completion milestones rather than the calendar the relationship of reward potential to risk potential including job security and actual financial risk by the venture manager achievability and simplicity are factors to be considered what kind of financial incentives might be included in incentive design depending on the life cycle stage of the venture fixed and variable bonuses options for equity or shadow equity in the venture itself actual equity in the new venture and to a lesser extent salary increases and equity or equity options in the parent are suggested how can the obstacles to installation of performance incentives for venture managers be reduced to reduce perception of internal inequity relating potential risk to potential reward and extending performance incentives to other managers is suggested the problem of defining venture objectives as an obstacle is instantly solved as an incentive issue by making ownership possibility a reality for venture management especially with financial investment required by venture management

exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights abstract strategic price manipulation can affect the distribution of transferable pollution rights across polluters and the efficiency of pollution control efforts prior research has concentrated on market manipulation by firms seeking only to minimize the sum of pollution rights costs and pollution abatement costs in this paper we explore the potential for the exclusionary manipulation of pollution permit markets intended to drive up the costs of one s rivals and we distinguish between the resource allocation effects of exclusionary manipulation and cost minimizing manipulation we find that exclusionary manipulation can sometimes worsen and sometimes ameliorate the abatement inefficiency which occurs under cost minimizing manipulation and that an overbuying rule can obviate or at least limit damages from this form of strategic behavior

the political economy of pollution markets historical lessons for modern energy and climate planners this article explores some of the central economic and political problems with the use of tradable permits to solve environmental problems drawing from transaction cost economics political economy and market theory it does so by looking at the history of three programs for curbing pollution in the united states the clean air act the leaded gasoline phase out and water permits in wisconsin the article begins by briefly summarizing the history of each of these programs before looking at a host of challenges related to political compromises in program design transaction costs spatial distortions such as geographic sensitivity and wrong way trading of credits temporal distortions such as the episodic nature of pollution and volatility of market prices and market abuses these concerns are raised with an eye for how historical experience may inform the current debate about how to design effective market mechanisms to respond to climate change and other forms of energy related environmental degradation

tradable emission rights and strategic interaction the use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy this paper presents an analysis of how and under what conditions emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes

corporate venturing obstacles sources and solutions abstract there is a fundamental conflict between new venture and mature company management requirements as an enterprise evolves the focus for success shifts from sensing and seizing opportunity to protecting and utilizing the resources that have been acquired in surviving companies management practices change to accommodate this changing need the conflict arises when the mature company attempts to initiate internal new venture activities application of mature company practices to management of new corporate ventures is not only inappropriate but breeds failure to succeed with new ventures top corporate management must first understand the inherent differences in management needs for new ventures versus the mature organization and must then adapt a pluralistic management style that accommodates both needs this paper examines the rationale for ten establishment practices and the adverse effects they can have on new ventures from this analysis alternative entrepreneurial management practices are recommended the ten management practices examined are 1 enforce procedures to avoid mistakes 2 manage resources for efficiency and roi 3 control against plan 4 plan long term 5 manage functionally 6 avoid moves that risk the base business 7 protect the base business at all costs 8 judge new steps from prior experience 9 compensate uniformly and 10 promote compatible individuals some of the adverse effects of these practices include blockage of innovative solutions loss of competitive lead time entrepreneur failures high venture failure costs missed opportunities fluctuating venture strategies misread markets reduced motivation to take risks and loss of innovative employees recommended entrepreneurial management practices include restricting standard procedures to those appropriate for the venture controlling ventures by milestone planning rather than calendar budgets being more responsive to market feedback in adjusting plans focusing on critical issues for early determination of venture viability assessing and choosing affordable risks and making venturing a mainstream function of the business

designing more efficient markets lessons from los angeles smog control market based approaches for environmental protection are beginning to take root around the world this article attempts to improve our understanding of the performance of environmental markets by constructing and evaluating an information base on trades in los angeles which includes the first detailed data on trading prices the analysis suggests that trading activity has been shaped by the detailed regulations governing the market in addition transaction costs have played a crucial role we argue that the move toward adopting market based approaches for environmental protection needs to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to assess the properties of these systems as they are actually implemented

tradeable emission permits regulations in the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets welfare implications in the present paper we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market it is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions however when the product market is oligopolistic it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms it has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control although this argument is clearly correct under full information it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information in particular it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation