distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods economists have long been concerned with finding an efficient level of public expenditure the classic statement of the problem was given by paul samuelson 1954 an optimal level of expenditure is where the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and a reference good equals the marginal rate of transformation between the public good and the reference good mrs mrt however samuelson s formula assumes that all of the revenue needed to finance public goods can be raised with lump sum taxes since this is not generally possible the formula must be modified to account for the distortionary effects of the tax system an appropriate modification is to multiply the cost side of the equation by a term that is commonly called the marginal cost of public funds mcf in the case of samuelson s formula where government is entirely financed with lump sum taxes the mcf would be exactly 1 0 in the traditional view of economists distortionary taxes cause the mcf to be greater than one thus raising the cost of providing public goods in this paper we discuss some cases where the mcf may be less than one we will illustrate this possibility using numerical examples for labor taxes

popular acceptance of inequality due to innate brute luck and support for classical benefit based taxation abstract u s survey respondents views on distributive justice differ in two specific related ways from what is conventionally assumed in modern optimal tax research when expressing their preferences over allocations in stylized hypothetical scenarios meant to isolate key features of the tax problem a large share of respondents resist the full equalization of unequal outcomes due to innate brute luck that standard analyses recommend a similar share prefer a classical benefit based logic for taxes over the conventional logic of diminishing marginal social welfare moreover these two views are linked respondents who more strongly resist equalization are more likely to prefer the classical benefit based principle though the amazon mechanical turk survey population is not a representative sample of the u s population robustness of these results across demographic traits and political views suggests that a large share of the american public holds views inconsistent with standard welfarist objectives

progressive taxation and the social marginal cost of public funds abstract this paper describes the calculation of the social marginal cost of public funds smcf for a progressive tax system which distorts individuals labour supply decisions a formula for the smcf indicates that the income and substitution effects of the labour supply response are weighted by the changes in individuals average and marginal tax rates respectively other well known formulas for the smcf are shown to be special cases of this formula the difference between this formula and the mayshar 1991 formula is shown to be due to different but equally valid ways of computing the change in the average tax rate the condition under which a marginal tax rate increase may lead to a reduction in revenues is derived

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

taking versus taxing an analysis of conscription in a private information economy most countries currently man their militaries through conscription i e a draft conventional wisdom suggests that by lowering the budgetary cost of the military a draft reduces distortionary taxation especially when military needs are large we find that this intuition is misguided when income taxes are set optimally voluntary enlistments lead to less distortionary taxation than a draft because the tax base left behind by a volunteer army tends to be more productive than that after a draft for reasonable parameter values drafts are more distortionary and less socially desirable when military needs are large

on the sign of the optimum marginal income tax this paper studies a central aspect of optimal income taxation as modelled in mirrlees original paper on the topic identical leisure consumption preferences qualitatively homogeneous skills in production namely whether given concave utilitarianism alone the optimal marginal income tax will be non negative a well known positive answer to this question in weak inequality form was given in the said paper which however we show requires additive separability of individual utility in the ordinal and cardinal senses our main result here is to derive the required strict positivity of the marginal tax under weak conditions slightly wider than noninferiority of consumption and leisure with preferences otherwise arbitrary

using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates this paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates a simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution in the general non linear income tax problem this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of mirrlees the optimal non linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution these formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters

income maintenance and labor force participation the paper studies the optimal tax subsidy schedules in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to work or not with an application to the case of france given an income guarantee provided by the welfare state the tax schedule that maximizes government revenue provides a benchmark the laffer bound above which it is inefficient to tax in fact under mild conditions a feasible allocation is second best optimal if and only if the associated taxes are lower than the laffer bound the only restriction that efficiency puts on the shape of the tax scheme is this upper laffer bound the laffer tax scheme itself can be computed from the joint distribution of the agents productivities and work opportunity costs depending on the economy it can take widely different forms and exhibit for instance negative marginal tax rates after estimating the joint distribution of productivities and work opportunity costs on french data i compute the laffer bound for two subpopulations single women and married women with two children or more quite surprisingly the actual incentives to work appear to be very close to the bound

bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions a synthesis of micro and macro evidence on labor supply how can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment costs or inattention i derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed effect of a price change on demand the size of the price change and the degree of frictions the degree of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum the bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin elasticities i apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1 of earnings as a result small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities extensive and intensive margin elasticities and other disparate findings pooling estimates from existing studies i estimate a hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0 33 on the intensive margin and 0 25 on the extensive margin after accounting for frictions

household bargaining and the design of couples income taxation this paper studies the design of couples income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made by maximizing a weighted sum of the spouses utilities bargaining weights are given but specific to each couple information structure and labor supply decisions follow the mirrleesian tradition however while the household s total consumption is publicly observable the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable with a utilitarian social welfare function we show that the expression for a spouses marginal income tax rate includes a pigouvian paternalistic and an incentive term the pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy tax for the high weight low weight spouse whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low high the sign and the magnitude of the incentive term depends on the weight structure across couples in some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low weight spouse who may be female and a negative one for the high weight spouse possibly the male this is at odds with the traditional boskin and sheshinski results our conclusions can easily be generalized to more egalitarian welfare functions finally we present numerical simulations based on a calibrated specification of our model the calculations confirm that the male spouse may well have the lower and possibly even negative marginal tax rate

technical change wage inequality and taxes this paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design a task to talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks the overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes while raising those on middle to high incomes the reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom jel d31 h21 h23 h24 j31 o33

are external shocks responsible for the instability of output in low income countries external shocks such as commodity price fluctuations natural disasters and the role of the international economy are often blamed for the poor economic performance of low income countries the author quantifies the impact of these different external shocks using a panel vector autoregression var approach and compares their relative contributions to output volatility in low income countries vis a vis internal factors he finds that external shocks can only explain a small fraction of the output variance of a typical low income country internal factors are the main source of fluctuations from a quantitative perspective the output effect of external shocks is typically small in absolute terms but significant relative to the historic performance of these countries

relativity mobility and optimal nonlinear income taxation in an open economy abstract recent evidence suggests that globalization has reduced the barriers to international labor mobility and induced more cross country social comparisons in an open economy with tax driven migration and consumption externalities relativity we derive an optimal tax formula that subsumes existing ones obtained under a maximin social objective and additively separable utility and sign the second best mirrleesian marginal tax rates for all skill levels we establish the thresholds of the elasticity and level of migration to determine when relativity and inequality act as complements or substitutes in shaping the optimal top tax rate under both nash and stackelberg tax competition if the migration probability of top income workers is approximately 50 numerical calculation using parameter estimates from empirical studies shows that the country with labor inflow outflow implements over 10 lower higher marginal tax rates than suggested by the autarky equilibrium of kanbur and tuomala 2013

sharing the sacrifice minimizing the pain optimal wage reductions abstract faced with temporary revenue shocks employers may implement wage reductions a common response to covid 19 for u s universities i provide a framework for optimal reductions when labor is inelastic wherein a planner balances minimizing the pain and sharing the sacrifice i show that for a broad class of utility functions the optimal schedule includes 1 a cutoff wage below which the reduction is zero and 2 weakly progressive reduction rates above the cutoff wage i illustrate the results using data from a large u s university

the theory of reform and indian indirect taxes abstract given a set of value judgements an initial state and a model of the economy one can ask whether some feasible tax change would increase welfare we do this by defining the marginal cost in terms of welfare of raising an extra rupee from the i th good the inverse optimum problem is the calculation of non negative welfare weights on households which imply that the initial state is optimum if no such welfare weights exist then a pareto improvement is possible we illustrate the concepts and results using data from the indian economy for 1979 1980 directions of tax reform for a number of specific social welfare functions and for pareto improvements are presented

impact of hurricanes strikes on international reserves in the caribbean in this study we investigate the impacts of hurricane shocks on the international reserves of caribbean countries to this end we use a panel varx vector auto regressive with exogenous variable

migration trade unions and the informal sector a note on calvo tends to be very sticky a feature which renders some of the standard policies for reducing urban unemployment or underemployment totally ineffective in particular it is observed that in the calvo model a first best optimum cannot be obtained without the imposition of some migration barriers in this note we attempt to generalize the calvo model by incorporating the following new features first we distinguish between the two components of the urban sector the modern formal part and the traditional informal part secondly the individuals are assumed to migrate from the rural to the urban sector in response to a differential in expected utility rather than in expectedincome thereby highlighting the role of risk aversion in individual migration decisions finally following the new literature on trade union behavior 2 the present model posits a utilitarian objective function for the trade union a formulation which is considered an improvement over the one put forward by calvo an important conclusion of the present exercise which sharply contrasts calvo s conclusion is that the government by setting its policies correctly can achieve a first best optimum for the economy this difference in result is due obviously to the differences in specification in particular of the objective function of the trade union

differential taxation and occupational choice we develop a framework to study optimal sector specific taxation where each agent chooses an occupation by comparing her skill differential with the tax burden differential across sectors because skills are not perfectly transferable the diamond mirrlees theorem according to which the second best entails production efficiency fails social welfare can be increased by inducing some agents to join the sector in which their productivity is not the highest at the optimum income taxes balance the marginal losses from inter sector migration with the marginal gains from tailoring tax schedules to the distribution of productivities in each sector tagging a calibrated model indicates that sector specific taxation generates substantive welfare gains when skill transferability decreases with income as it enables the government to increase average taxes on high earners with large wage premia

the macroeconomic consequences of disasters abstract natural disasters have a statistically observable adverse impact on the macro economy in the short run and costlier events lead to more pronounced slowdowns in production yet interestingly developing countries and smaller economies face much larger output declines following a disaster of similar relative magnitude than do developed countries or bigger economies a close study of the determinants of these adverse macroeconomic output costs reveals several interesting patterns countries with a higher literacy rate better institutions higher per capita income higher degree of openness to trade and higher levels of government spending are better able to withstand the initial disaster shock and prevent further spillovers into the macro economy these all suggest an increased ability to mobilize resources for reconstruction financial conditions also seem to be of importance countries with more foreign exchange reserves and higher levels of domestic credit but with less open capital accounts appear more robust and better able to endure natural disasters with less adverse spillover into domestic production

taxation and redistribution of residual income inequality this paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality caused by the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market we study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms the optimal redistribution can be attained using a positive unemployment benefit and an increasing and regressive labor income tax the positive unemployment benefit serves the purpose of lowering the search risk faced by workers the increasing and regressive labor tax serves the purpose of aligning the cost to the firm of attracting an additional applicant with the value of an application to society

progressive estate taxation we present a model with altruistic parents and heterogeneous productivity we derive two key properties for optimal estate taxation first the estate tax should be progressive so that parents leaving a higher bequest face a lower net return on bequests second marginal estate taxes should be negative so that all parents face a marginal subsidy on bequests both properties can be implemented with a simple nonlinear tax on bequests levied separately from the income tax these results apply to other intergenerational transfers such as educational investments and are robust to endogenous fertility choices both estate or inheritance taxes can implement the optimal allocation but we show that the inheritance tax has some advantages finally when we impose an ad hoc constraint requiring marginal estate taxes to be nonnegative the optimum features a zero tax up to an exemption level and a progressive tax thereafter

inherent inequality and the optimal graduation of marginal tax rates in most countries marginal tax rates increase with income this is at variance with the results of the optimal income taxation literature whose numerical calculations have established the presumption that optimal marginal tax rates should decline with income have the existing results of optimal income tax literature therefore established a presumption that the observed pattern is suboptimal the object of this paper is to attempt to answer this question the numerical calculations that followed mirrlees s 1971 pioneering contribution tried many variations on his basic parametrisation including different preference structures and different functional forms however so far as we are aware most of the reported results maintain his basic assumption of a log normal distribution of abilities or wages with a standard deviation of logs of 0 39 mirrlees 1971 himself appealed the work of lydall 1969 for this figure but it has become the industry standard we show in this paper that departures from this assumption in particular increases in inherent inequality can alter the qualitative pattern of optimal marginal tax rates dramatically contrary to the currently available calculations we show that the optimal graduation can indeed be such that marginal tax rates increase for the majority of the population which is consistent with the observed pattern but that there continues to exist a significant income range at the top where marginal tax rates decline which of course is counter to the observed pattern

bootstrap based bias correction for dynamic panels abstract the within or least squares dummy variable estimator is inconsistent for homogeneous dynamic panel models with fixed time dimension t we present a bias correction for this estimator based on an iterative bootstrap procedure monte carlo simulations show that for panels with small to moderate t this procedure provides a good alternative for existing dynamic panel data estimators

capital taxation under political constraints this paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform a policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform thus sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or u shaped so that savings are subsidized for the poor and or the middle class but are taxed for the rich u shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals political behavior is purely determined by economic motives

political competition and mirrleesian income taxation a first pass we study downsian competition in a mirrleesian model of income taxation the competing politicians may dier in competence if politicians engage in vote share maximization the less competent politician s policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents whereas those of the competent politician are attractive to the majority of poor agents the less competent politician wins with positive probability which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of besley and coate 1998 political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities nevertheless the two equilibria cannot be pareto ranked the minority may be better o under vote share maximization

the elasticity of taxable income evidence and implications abstract a central tax policy parameter that has recently received much attention but about which there is substantial uncertainty is the overall elasticity of taxable income we provide new estimates of this elasticity which address identification problems with previous work by exploiting a long panel of tax returns to study a series of tax reforms throughout the 1980s this identification strategy also allows us to provide new evidence on both the income effects of tax changes on taxable income and on variation in the elasticity of taxable income by income group we find that the overall elasticity of taxable income is approximately 0 4 the elasticity of real income not including tax preferences is much lower we estimate small income effects of tax changes on reported income implying that the compensated and uncompensated elasticities of taxable income are very similar we estimate that this overall elasticity is primarily due to a very elastic response of taxable income for taxpayers who have incomes above 100 000 per year who have an elasticity of 0 57 while for those with incomes below 100 000 per year the elasticity is less than one third as large moreover high income taxpayers who itemize are particularly responsive to taxation our estimates suggest that optimal tax structures may feature tightly targeted transfers to lower income taxpayers and a flat or even declining marginal rate structure for middle and high income taxpayers