the futile quest for a grand explanation of long run government expenditure this paper carries out a critical reappraisal of the two contending theories purporting to explain long run government spending wagner s law and different variants of the ratchet effect we analyze data spanning from the early 19 th century until the present day in sweden and the united kingdom hence in contrast to previous studies we evaluate the validity of wagner s law and the ratchet effect hypothesis over a very long time period starting at the beginning of industrialization cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long run relationships between government expenditure and gdp focusing on sub periods and structural breaks moreover we test the ratchet effect hypothesis by estimating models which allow for asymmetric adjustment according to our main results wagner s law does not hold in the long run although the data are consistent with wagner s law between roughly 1860 and the mid 1970s this can be traced to the formation of the modern public sector including the introduction of public education health care and so forth yet wagner s law did not hold during the initial industrialization phase before 1860 and in recent periods gdp only affects the government spending share when we control for population age structure finally we find some evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the uk particularly in the post wwii period however the ratchet effect is not a general cause of the growth of government spending

bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution abstract intertemporal trading of emission permits banking is often identified as one of three promising market mechanisms for controlling pollution along with averaging and trading surprisingly the efficiency properties of permit banking systems have not been investigated using a simple optimal control model this paper investigates firms incentives for banking or borrowing emission permits and compares the emission and output streams firms would choose with the socially optimal solution we find that in many cases firms will suboptimally choose excessive damage and output levels in early periods and correspondingly too few in later periods if given the opportunity to freely move emissions between time periods we propose a simple alternative trading scheme we term modified banking that counters this problem and should be no more difficult for an environmental authority to implement than a straigth banking system

politics time and the laffer curve why should a rationally motivated political decision process generate an inverse relationship between tax rates and tax revenues there would never seem a logical reason for increasing tax rates beyond maximum revenue limits in this note we explain how such a position can emerge and show why once in such a position political decision makers may find it difficult to escape

electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and nash social welfare maxima abstract this paper provides unexpected support to nash s view of how bargaining determines the social choice we first present a spatial model of electoral competition with probabilistic voting and a very close relation between voters preferences and their choice probabilities the outcome of the electoral competition game is then shown to be precisely the social alternative that maximizes a nash type social welfare function theorem 1 this electoral outcome is also interpreted as a unanimity likelihood maximum corollary 1 within our framework existence and uniqueness of such an outcome are guaranteed corollaries 2 and 3

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

privatization in developing countries a review of the issues abstract the theory and early experience of privatization in developing countries are reviewed privatization has been spurred by widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of public enterprises and the need to cut government expenditures unless it is accompanied by liberalization measures privatization of public enterprises is unlikely to result in significant gains in economic efficiency the sequencing of privatization and liberalization reforms will often determine their impact on efficiency but the correct order of implementation is not clear political opposition to privatization is likely to be limited to the state bureaucracy which will often be able to mobilize in order to limit the impact of reforms early implementation experiences suggest technical difficulties are as constraining as political factors

rational irrationality and the microfoundations of political failure models of inefficient political failure have been criticized forimplicitly assuming the irrationality of voters wittman 1989 1995 1999 coate and morris 1995 building on caplan s 1999a 1999b model of rational irrationality the current papermaintains that the assumption of voter irrationality is boththeoretically and empirically plausible it then examinesmicrofoundational criticisms of four classes of political failuremodels rent seeking pork barrel politics bureaucracy andeconomic reform in each of the four cases incorporating simpleforms of privately costless irrationality makes it possibleto clearly derive the models standard conclusions moreover itfollows that efforts to mitigate political failures will besocially suboptimal as most of the literature implicitlyassumes it is a mistake to discount the empirical evidence forthese models on theoretical grounds

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

government growth in the twenty first century public choice explanations of government growth fall into three main categories budget maximization theories rational choice models and path dependent models like the ratchet hypothesis the strengths and weaknesses of these theories as explanations for government growth are considered along with some facts about the actual growth of government to conjecture about its trajectory in the twenty first century government size seems to have been constrained in the past primarily by its ability to raise revenue growth rates in the new century thus appear to depend on factors constraining government s ability to continue to expand the tax base

distributional preferences and the incidence of costs and benefits in climate change policy we explore the relationship between willingness to pay wtp for climate change mitigation and distributional preferences by which we mean individuals opinions about who should be responsible for climate change prevention and whether the share of climate change impacts borne by the poor is a cause for concern we use 1 770 responses to an online stated preference survey the domestic costs in our survey s policy choice scenarios are expressed as a set of randomized shares across four different payment vehicles and the international cost shares are randomized across four groups of countries we also elicit respondents perceptions of the likely regressivity of climate change impacts under a policy of business as usual wtp is higher when larger cost shares are borne by parties deemed to bear a greater responsibility for mitigation and when respondents believe and care that the impacts of climate change may be borne disproportionately by the world s poor that wtp for an environmental policy depends on the distributional consequences of the policy is an unsettling result efficiency assessments are typically assumed to be separate from equity considerations in most benefit cost analyses

who should abate carbon emission we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 4 the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these condition are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

on the efficiency of equilibria in a legislative bargaining model with particularistic and collective goods this study analyzes the efficiency of equilibria in a multilateral bargaining game in which a legislature divides its budget among collective and particularistic goods in order to disentangle the causes of inefficiency we extend the model of volden and wiseman am polit sci rev 101 79 92 2007 by considering quasi linear utility functions and consensus requirements ranging from simple majority to unanimity although unanimous agreements can be reached under weaker consensus requirements we show that pareto inefficiency is associated with non unanimous consent we also study how i the endogenous selection of the legislature s size or ii a sequential choice of collective and particularistic spending eliminates or attenuates the inefficiency problem

effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption a game theoretic analysis abstract a theoretical model is developed for predicting the relative effectiveness of different electoral systems for reducing government corruption we consider voting games in which parties with known corruption levels and known positions on a major policy question compete for legislative seats we find that approval voting and proportional representation are fully effective in the sense that all equilibria exclude corrupt parties from legislative seats plurality voting is partly effective in the sense that there always exist some equilibria that exclude corrupt parties borda voting is ineffective because for some political situations no equilibria can guarantee the exclusion of corrupt parties journal of economic literature classification number d72

factors underlying the growth of local government in the 19th century united states early in the 19th century local governmentsspent less than either the federal or stategovernments by the end of the 19thcentury local governments spent more thanthe federal and state governments combined this growth is obviously related to thegrowth of cities but cities continued togrow in the 20th century while the localgovernment share of total governmentexpenditures fell so the growth of citiescannot be the complete answer anexamination of expenditures and revenues intwo cities boston and baltimore suggests that no one component ofexpenditures was responsible for increasesin total spending rather it appears thatthe primary causal factor was revenuegrowth cities rely heavily on propertytaxes and the increasing value of taxableproperty allowed cities to raise increasingamounts of revenue leading to increasedgovernment spending

did women s suffrage change the size and scope of government this paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote using cross sectional time series data for 1870 1940 we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by u s house and senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting patterns for federal representatives and these effects continued growing over time as more women took advantage of the franchise contrary to many recent suggestions the gender gap is not something that has arisen since the 1970s and it helps explain why american government started growing when it did

towards micropolitical foundations of public finance abstract observed fiscal policy reflects the incentives embedded in political institutions in this paper we illustrate the effects of two general institutional features separation of powers which is common in presidential congressional political systems and legislative cohesion which is typical of parliamentary systems compared to a simple legislative game separation of powers brings about a smaller size of government and lower waste legislative cohesion induces a more equal distribution but more waste and higher taxes than separation of powers

burden sharing in a greenhouse egalitarianism and sovereignty reconciled the allocation of emission entitlements across countries is the single most controversial issue in international climate policy extreme positions within the policy debate range from entitlements based on current emission patterns sovereignty to entitlements based on equal per capita allocations egalitarianism this paper shows that gradual convergence from sovereignty towards egalitarianism could provide a pragmatic solution to the equity debate when combined with international emissions trading the convergence approach stands out for offering the developing countries substantial incentives for participation in the international greenhouse gas abatement effort without imposing excessive burdens on the industrialized countries

the size and scope of government comparative politics with rational politicians we try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system a downsian model of electoral competition and forward looking voting indicates that majoritarian as opposed to proportional elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians more redistribution and larger government a model of legislative bargaining and backward looking voting indicates that presidential as opposed to parliamentary regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters this leads to less public goods less rents for politicians less redistribution and smaller government we confront these predictions with cross country data from around 1990 controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending we nd strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

theoretical comparisons of electoral systems abstract elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced a variety of electoral systems are reviewed cox s threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates positions when the number of serious candidates is given duverger s law and its generalizations are discussed to predict the number of serious candidates duverger s law is interpreted as a statement about electoral barriers to entry and this idea is linked to the question of the effectiveness of democratic competition as a deterrent to political corruption the impact of post electoral bargaining on party structure in presidential and parliamentary systems is discussed

money for nothing politicians rent extraction and political extortion introduction the model 1 background the economic theory of regulation 2 rent extraction the theory of political extortion demonstrations 3 observing extortion the practice of rent extraction 4 validating the model empirical tests of rent extraction 5 contracting for rent preservation the durability problem extensions 6 extraction and optimal taxation excises earmarked taxes and government user charges 7 costs and benefits of interest group organization 8 improving the model worthy yet unanswered questions notes references index

war making and state making governmental expenditures tax revenues and global wars addressing the disputed relationship between war and the expansion of governmental expenditures and revenues box tiao intervention models are applied to a number of british 1700 1980 united states 1792 1980 french 1815 1979 and japanese 1878 1980 spending and taxation series distinguishing between global and interstate wars the more intensive and extensive bouts of warfare global wars tend to bring about abrupt permanent impacts in contrast to the temporary changes associated with most interstate wars the observed displacements are reflected in both war related and nonwar related types of expenditure and are also observed before 1900 although our findings are not universally applicable and are subject to various other qualifications they may be interpreted in general as reinforcing the need for an appreciation of the persistent centrality of war especially global war in the discontinuous growth and expansion of the modern state

privatizing agriculture policy options in developing countries abstract this paper examines the background to and options for privatization of state owned enterprises in the agricultural sector in developing countries it identifies areas of the sector where privatization is feasible and those likely to remain under government control it is concluded that while there is some scope for privatization it is unlikely to be as extensive as in other sectors since much of the production is already in private hands there is limited capacity to pay for services and the capability of the private sector is currently low

climate change policies and international rate of return differentials abstract greenhouse gas abatement can be viewed as an alternative to conventional capital formation somehow society must agree on how to split its limited resources between investment in region specific physical capital and global investment in environmental capital now since restrictions on the international mobility of capital affect regional investment decisions it might be expected that significant interregional differences in rates of return could affect global climate policy decisions this is the issue addressed here with a descriptive view of the world we obtain an invariance result that is the pareto optimal amount of greenhouse gas abatement is virtually independent of the restrictions on capital flows we conclude with conjectures on this outcome

aid effectiveness and the politics of personalism this article examines how political institutions that provide an incentive to cultivate a personal vote condition the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in developing country democracies politicians in aid recipient countries with high levels of personalism are more likely to pursue corruption and target government spending to narrow constituencies because personalism affects these outcomes it provides incentives to use foreign aid for politically motivated spending at the expense of investing foreign aid in growth promoting public goods using panel data from 61 aid recipient democracies from 1961 to 2001 the author finds that aid increases growth in democracies with less personalist institutions but decreases growth in countries with high personalism the author also shows that personalism conditions the relationship between aid and the composition of government spending aid increases spending on public goods relative to narrow particularistic goods in countries with low person

intertemporal permit trading for the control of greenhouse gas emissions this paper integrates two themes in the intertemporal permitliterature through the construction of an intertemporal bankingsystem for a pollutant that creates both stock and flow damages a permit banking system for the special case of a pollutant thatonly causes stock damages is also developed this latter simpler case corresponds roughly to the greenhouse gas emissionreduction regime proposed by the u s department of state as ameans of fulfilling the u s commitment to the frameworkconvention on climate change this paper shows that environmentalregulators can achieve the socially optimal level of emissionsand output through time by setting the correct total sum ofallowable emissions and specifying the correct intertemporaltrading ratio for banking and borrowing for the case ofgreenhouse gases we show that the optimal growth rate of permitprices and therefore the optimal intertemporal trading rate hasthe closed form solution equal to the ratio of current marginalstock damages to the discounted future value of marginal stockdamages less the decay rate of emissions in the atmosphere given a non optimal negotiated emission path we then derive apermit banking system that has the potential to lower net socialcosts by adjusting the intertemporal trading ratio taking intoaccount the behavior of private agents we use a simplenumerical simulation model to illustrate the potential gains fromvarious possible banking systems

co movement of public spending in the g7 abstract the size of government in the g7 countries in the last fifty years follows a common pattern see the left panel of fig 1 below it grows in the first three decades and then turns flat at the beginning of the nineties for all countries alike we highlight this common pattern in a dynamic factor model and argue that a satisfactory explanation for it would be desirable

who should abate carbon emissions an international viewpoint abstract we review the optimal pattern of carbon emission abatements across countries in a simple multi country world we model explicitly with the model in chichilnisky 1993b the fact that the atmosphere is a public good within this framework we establish conditions for it to be necessary for optimality that the marginal cost of abatement be the same in all countries these conditions are quite restrictive and amount to either ignoring distributional issues between countries or operating within a framework within which lump sum transfers can be made between countries these results have implications for the use of tradeable emission permits which as normally advocated will lead to the equalization of marginal abatement costs across countries the observation that the atmosphere is a public good implies that we may need to look at a lindahl equilibrium rather than a walrasian equilibrium in tradeable permits

deadweight costs and the size of government abstract we provide a model for analyzing effects of the tax system and spending programs on the determination of government spending and taxpayer welfare an improvement in the efficiency of either taxes or spending would reduce political pressure for suppressing the growth of government and thereby increase total tax revenue and spending we demonstrate the similarity of the political responses to revenue shocks spending shocks changes in tax efficiency and changes in spending program efficiency empirical analysis of oil shocks intergovernmental grants and other autonomous changes in taxes or spending indicates that cause and effect is not only from spending to tax structures

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

the size of government most research on the causes of growth in government expenditure has focused on the demand for government services in this paper we argue that in fact this growth may have occurred because of changes in supply changes in technology leading to increased specialization and thus increased opportunity costs of self production have led to increased market production and increased record keeping also female labor force participation has increased both of these factors serve to reduce the efficiency cost of collecting taxes if the demand for government spending has not changed this increase in supply would lead to a larger public sector we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for the period 1929 1970 incorporating this hypothesis and the results are consistent with the theory we are able to explain virtually all of the growth of government increases in female labor force participation seems to be a very important variable in this explanation

overlapping generations or infinitely lived agents intergenerational altruism and the economics of global warming do we need an overlapping generations model for the economics of global warming to answer this question an infinitely lived agent ila approach and an overlapping generations olg model are contrasted ila and olg can be viewed as polar representations of intergenerational altruism with ila an immortal agent acts through his investment savings decisions as trustee on the behalf of the future generations with olg agents need not behave altruistic they simply save during working years and dissave completely during retirement nevertheless ila and olg must not differ in their implication for greenhouse policy greenhouse gas abatement is a straightforward alternative to physical capital formation and even without altruism each age cohort has an incentive to provide current abatement in order to reduce future damages attributable to climate change indeed under reasonable assumptions and parameter values our simulations reveal such an invariance result provided carbon taxes are the only policy tool and tax revenues are recycled through socially mandated rules projections of economic growth climate change and energy consumption are only insignificantly affected by the choice of approach

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

government growth and private contributions to charity we exploit the time series properties of charitable giving to provide additional insights into the relationship between charitable contributions and government spending cointegration tests reveal a significant long run relationship between several categories of charitable giving and government spending granger causality tests provide evidence on the short run giving and spending relationship evidence suggests that charitable contributions to education respond quite differently to state and local government education expenditures versus federal government expenditures we argue that the government spending and charitable giving relationship depends on the source of government revenue how this revenue is used and the rational ignorance of private donors

the median voter model in public choice theory the changing perception by public choice theorists about the relevance of the median voter model is a result of excessive extrapolation of the conclusions of theoretical models to the real world early in the 1970s the median voter model was often accepted as implying that the output produced in the public sector was what was most preferred by the median voter this claim is excessive because the median voter model is only a model of demand aggregation under majority rule and has little to say about the supply side of the public sector in the late 1970s many scholars identified several circumstances under which the model would not apply in theory but these critiques of the model were often viewed as reasons to abandon the median voter model altogether the model went from having excessive claims that made the model appear to be more powerful than it really is to excessive claims that made the model appear to be less powerful than it really is these latter claims were often in response to the earlier claims rather than to the model appropriately applied

environmental policy in majoritarian systems abstract this paper sheds new light on the determination of environmental tax policies in majoritarian federal electoral systems such as the u s and derives implications for the environmental federalism debate on whether the national or local government should have authority over environmental taxes in the absence of majority bias the socially preferred policy would be federal district level taxation which accounts both for cross boundary pollution and differences in industry concentration across districts in majoritarian systems however where the legislature consists of geographically distinct electoral districts the majority party at the national or state level favors home districts depending on the location of polluting industries and the associated damages the majority party may therefore impose sub optimally high or low pollution taxes due to a majority bias majority bias can influence the social welfare ranking of alternative environmental tax policies in some cases majority bias may make decentralized or federal uniform taxation the preferred solution

structural adjustment policies in developing economies this paper examines structural adjustment policies in ldcs defined as policy responses to external or internal shocks that are carried out with the objective of regaining the pre shock growth path the introductory section of the paper reports on policy experience that indicates that countries applying an outward oriented development strategy were better able to cope with external shocks than economies following an inward oriented strategy it is further shown that the adoption of realistic exchange rates and interest rates the avoidance of large budget deficits and the productive use of the proceeds of foreign borrowing eased the process of adjustment the paper examines in detail the elements of a policy package that may be applied in response to external or internal shocks in the case prevalent in developing economies when optimal policies are not applied thus the recommendations simultaneously aim at responding to shocks and undertaking incentives incentives to save and to invest the choice of public investments sectoral policies in energy and agriculture budgetary policies and monetary policies in the conclusions the interdependence of the various policy measures is indicated with further attention given to foreign borrowing

differentiating mixed member electoral systems mixed member majoritarian and mixed member proportional systems and government expenditures the increasing use of mixed member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems an analysis of mixed member system policy effects is problematic given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems this article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed member majoritarian mmm and mixed member proportional mmp systems lead to differences in policy outputs the political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixed member systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that mmp systems which are more proportional than mmm systems are correlated with higher levels of government spending thus the mmm mmp

contingent deficit sanctions and moral hazard with a stability pact abstract we show how a stability pact based on deficit sanctions eliminates the exacerbation of debt accumulation that may arise from monetary unification moreover with sanctions contingent on the observed state of the economy the pact avoids aggravating the situation of a country in recession moral hazard problems arise if the state also depends on unobservable politically costly fiscal effort this could explain why sanctions under the actual stability and growth pact are only automatically waived in extreme recessions and why the procedure linking observed deficits and sanctions involves a long and detailed assessment of a country s situation

why so much stability one of duncan black s 1958 more important contributions was a classically simple proof that with complex issues and majority voting a stable outcome is unlikely this very simple proof that there would normally be no motion which can get a majority against all others and hence that any possible outcome is dominated by another has been elaborated and made more precise by later work without most improbable conditions endless cycling would be expected this is particularly true when logrolling is present as it normally is if we look at the real world however we observe not only is there no endless cycling but acts are passed with reasonable dispatch and then remain unchanged for very long periods of time thus theory and reality seem to be not only out of contact but actually in sharp conflict it is the purpose of this article to demonstrate that our existing theory when properly looked at does indeed imply a relatively stable outcome to voting in some cases however this stability will not be a true equilibrium because a random member of a large set will be chosen and then that random outcome will be left unchanged for long periods of time it does not dominate all other outcomes but is retained merely because of its particular history there are already several possible explanations for the observed stability in the literature we will take them up as they become relevant to the general line of reasoning i should however warn the reader that my own previous work including joint work with buchanan will play a major role here this may simply reflect egotism but i think that some of the early work which is now partially forgotten can provide solutions for more modern problems much recent public choice work has involved spatial models and these models frequently ignore logrolling the reason presumably is that it is very hard to put logrolling in a two dimensional diagram we shall begin considering such special models and assume that the issues are the sort that does not lead to logrolling and then turn to more complex logrolling problems with respect to the first situation in which logrolling does not occur there is already one possible explanation for the observed stability in the literature

corruption and the composition of government expenditure abstract this paper asks whether predatory behavior by corrupt politicians distorts the composition of government expenditure corruption is found to reduce government spending on education in a cross section of countries

openness government size and the terms of trade this paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size ofngovernments both theoretically and empirically we argue that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels 1 a terms of trade externality whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and 2 the demand for insurance whereby trade raises risk and public transfers we provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms our main theoretical prediction is that the relative strength of the two explanations depends on a key parameter namely the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods moreover while the first mechanism is inefficient from the standpoint of world welfare the second is instead optimal in the empirical part of the paper we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and government size and we explore its determinants consistently with the terms of trade externality channel we show that the correlation is contingent on a low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods our findings raise warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

does distribution matter efficiency equity and flexibility in greenhouse gas abatement this paper analyses banking and borrowing ofcarbon emission rights within the framework ofa simple integrated assessment model breaking the world economy in just two regionsit will be shown 1 increasing intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gasabatement through banking and borrowing ofcarbon emission permits has a positive effecton welfare for regions with a poor endowment incarbon emission rights but negatively affectsrich endowed regions 2 intergenerationalfairness advocates intertemporal flexibility ingreenhouse gas abatement irrespectively of theinitial allocation of carbon rights 3 optimal carbon accumulation is not independentof the initial allocation of carbon rights different initial sharing rules clearlyinfluence the development of atmospheric carbonconcentration

political cycles in a developing economy effect of elections in indian states the author studies the effect of state legislative assembly elections on the policies of state governments in 14 major states of india from 1960 to 1996 she identifies the effect of the timing of elections using an instrument for the electoral cycle that distinguishes between constitutionally scheduled elections and midterm polls she contrasts two levers of policy manipulation fiscal policy and public service delivery to distinguish between alternative models of political cycles the predictions of three models are tested 1 populist cycles to woo uninformed and myopic voters 2 signaling models with asymmetric information 3 a moral hazard model with high discounting by political agents the empirical results for fiscal policy show that election years have a negative effect on some commodity taxes a positive effect on investment spending but no effect on deficits primarily because consumption spending is reduced with regard to public service delivery elections have a positive and large effect on road construction by state public works departments strikingly the fiscal effects are much smaller than the effect on roads the author argues that the pattern of evidence is inconsistent with the predictions of models of voter myopia and asymmetric information she explores an alternative moral hazard model in which the cycle is generated by high political discounting and career concerns persuade politicians to exert greater effort in election years on the management of public works

political and monetary institutions and public financial policies in the industrial countries institutions and policies vittorio grilli donato masciandaro and guido tabellini why do countries as similar as the industrialized oecd countries go through such different experience in terms of public deficits and debts or in terms of inflation the answer cannot come from macroeconomic policy responses to different disturbances nor from the principles of optimal taxation but rather from politics this article focuses on the role that particular institutions exert in providing constraints and incentives which shape the actions of policymakers the electoral process and political traditions affect the ability of governments to deal with deficits and mounting debts what seems to matter most it is found is the effect of the durability of governments governments with short horizons act myopically and never quite tackle the hard choices such governments typically exist in countries with an electoral system favouring many small political parties central bank independence promotes low inflation with no apparent costs in terms of real economic performance irrespective of the political institutions in fact there is no link between monetary and fiscal discipline these findings carry powerful implications for countries facing high indebtedness or stubborn inflation but also for the construction of the european economic and monetary union

a regional dynamic general equilibrium model of alternative climate change strategies outcomes and noncooperative equilibria this study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries and that high income countries may be the major losers from cooperation jel h41 q4 q2 q20

free trade and global warming a trade theory view of the kyoto protocol this paper demonstrates how three important results in environmental economics true under mild conditions in closed economies are false or need serious amendment in a world with international trade in goods since the three results we highlight have framed much of the ongoing discussion and research on the kyoto protocol our viewpoint from trade theory suggests a re examination may be in order specifically we demonstrate that in an open trading world but not in a closed economy setting 1 unilateral emission reductions by the rich north can create self interested emission reductions by the unconstrained poor south 2 simple rules for allocating emission reductions across countries such as uniform reductions may well be efficient even if international trade in emission permits is not allowed and 3 when international emission permit trade does occur it may make both participants in the trade worse off and increase global emissions

do intergovernmental grants create ratchets in state and local taxes a large literature on the flypaper effect examines how federal grants to states at time period t affect state spending or taxes at time period t we explore the fundamentally different question of how federal grants at time period t affect state tax policy in the future federal grants often result in states creating new programs and hiring new employees and when the federal funding is discontinued these new state programs must either be discontinued or financed through increases in state own source taxes government programs tend to be difficult to cut as goes milton friedman s famous quote about nothing being as permanent as a temporary government program suggesting that it is likely that temporary federal grants create permanent future ratchets in state taxes far from being purely an academic question this argument is why south carolina s governor mark sanford attempted to turn down federal stimulus monies for his state we examine both the impact of federal grants on future state budgets and how federal and state grants affect future local government budgets our findings confirm that grants indeed result in future state and local tax increases of roughly 40 cents for every dollar in grant money received in prior years