capital controls global liquidity traps and the international policy trilemma the zero bound on interest rates introduces a new dimension to the trilemma in international policy the openness of the international financial market might render monetary policy ineffective even within a system of fully flexible exchange rates because shocks that lead to a liquidity trap in one country are propagated through financial markets to other countries however the effectiveness of monetary policy can be restored by the imposition of capital controls we derive the optimal response of monetary policy to a global liquidity trap in the presence of capital controls we show that even though capital controls might facilitate effective monetary policy capital controls are not generally desirable in terms of welfare

exchange rate pass through into import prices revisited what drives it a large sample of developed and emerging economies is utilized to investigate import exchange rate pass through panel models reveal that various economic aspects of the destination country can explain about one third of the total variation in pass through elasticities and the remaining variation comes largely in the form of unobserved country specific effects inflation exchange rate volatility openness and relative wealth play a clear role as drivers of emerging markets pass through whereas the output gap and protectionism appear influential more generally nonlinearity regarding large versus small changes in the exchange rate is quite pervasive our evidence challenges the widely held view that pass through has been universally falling in developed markets and that it is higher for emerging markets the economic drivers are shown to play a role as out of sample predictors of pass through the findings confirm pricing to market theories and have implications for the optimal conduct of monetary policy

a theory of credibility this paper presents models in which one agent must decide whether to trust another whose motives are uncertain reliability can only be communicated through actions in this context it pays for people to build a reputation based on reliable behaviour someone becomes credible by consistently providing accurate and valuable information or by performing useful services the theory provides a justification for long term arrangements without binding contracts it also describes those situations where it pays an agent to cash in on his reputation many decisions depend on trusting someone consumers must decide whether to believe advertisements banks need to judge the reliability of loan applicants and employers must decide how much responsibility to delegate to their employees this paper attempts to model situations that arise when someone is uncertain about whether to trust the people he deals with in this context reputations for reliability are valuable an agent becomes credible by consistently providing accurate valuable information or by always acting responsibly i analyse a series of simple abstract models of information transmission in the basic model there are two agents the sender s and the receiver r who are to play the game a known finite number of times at each stage both players learn the value of a parameter measuring the importance of that period s play of the game that is the value of making a correct decision and s obtains payoff relevant information s then sends a signal to r who makes a decision that affects the welfare of both players after both players learn the consequences of r s decision the process repeats at each stage r must decide what action to take in order to do that he must assess the credibility of s the difficulty arises because r is uncertain about s s preferences when play begins i model this by assuming that with positive probability s has identical preferences to r s is a friend and with positive probability s has completely opposed preferences to r s is an enemy this uncertainty creates a trade off for enemy senders at each stage providing honest information enhances s s reputation but only at the expense of foregoing an opportunity for immediate gain by duping r the possibility that s is a friend lends credibility to what he says but this credibility may also be exploited by an enemy s the principal equilibrium has the following form in the basic model where s has no control over the importance of a given play s typically conveys accurate information for the first several periods r raises the probability he places on s being friendly after receiving accurate information if he believes that an enemy would have lied to him with positive probability the more important the information the more likely an enemy will attempt to deceive r an enemy will eventually take advantage of r by misleading him when this happens the sender loses all opportunities for deception in the future i

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy rules for a country that chooses not to permanently fix its exchange rate through a currency board or a common currency or some kind of dollarization the only alternative monetary policy that can work well in the long run is one based on the trinity of i a flexible exchange rate ii an inflation target and iii a monetary policy rule while not often put into this threepart format the desirability of such a monetary policy in an open economy is in my view the clear implication of three corresponding strands of recent monetary research i research on fixed exchange rates regimes including the influential 1995 article the mirage of fixed exchange rates by maurice obstfeld and kenneth rogoff and the many analyses of the breakdown of fixed exchange rate regimes in the late 1990 s ii research on the practical success with inflation targeting by ben bernanke et al 1999 and iii research on the benefits of simple monetary policy rules see e g taylor 1999a this clear policy implication however does not end the debate about how exchange rates should be taken into account in formulating monetary policy even if one excludes capital controls and sterilized exchange market intervention from consideration because they are not effective or attractive ways to de link exchangerate movements from the domestic interest rate a crucial question remains how should the instruments of monetary policy the interest rate or a monetary aggregate react to the exchange rate should policymakers avoid any reaction and focus instead on domestic indicators such as inflation and real gdp or is the rule of thumb that a substantial appreciation of the real exchange rate furnishes a prima facie case for relaxing monetary policy as characterized by obstfeld and rogoff 1995 p 93 a better monetary policy rule or perhaps policymakers should heed the obstfeld rogoff warning that substantial departures from ppp purchasing power parity in the short run and even over decades make such a policy reaction to the exchange rate undesirable more generally if one accepts the trinity concept of monetary policy in an open economy then what is the role of the exchange rate in the monetarypolicy rule

how much should inflation targeters care about the exchange rate abstract a dsge model is used to examine whether including the exchange rate in the central bank s policy rule can improve economic performance smoothing the exchange rate helps both financially robust economies and financially vulnerable emerging economies in handling risk premium shocks and given a small weight placed on the exchange rate the effects on inflation and output volatility are minimal with demand and cost push shocks financially vulnerable economies are especially likely to benefit from exchange rate smoothing due to perverse movements of the exchange rate they experience when hit by demand shocks and being more prone to risk premium shocks

a model of expertise we study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees when the decision maker consults only a single expert the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker we ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker sequentially consult two experts we first show that there is no perfect bayesian equilibrium in which full revelation occurs when both experts are biased in the same direction it is never beneficial to consult both in contrast when experts are biased in opposite directions it is always beneficial to consult both indeed in this case full revelation may be induced in an extended debate by introducing the possibility of rebuttal

information access and contributions a signaling model of lobbying interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker if their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker s constituency they have costless access and report their private information truthfully if their interests conflict they are forced to pay a strictly positive contribution in order to enhance the credibility of their reports the policymaker bases her policy decision on the competing reports and the size of the contributions accompanying these reports the interest groups contribution decisions are plagued by a free rider problem i derive the implications of this problem for the size and pattern of contributions and for the degree of information aggregation

nominal stability and financial globalization over the past four decades advanced economies experienced a large growth in gross external portfolio positions this phenomenon has been described as financial globalization over roughly the same time frame most of these countries also saw a substantial fall in the level and variability of inflation many economists have conjectured that financial globalization contributed to the improved performance in the level and predictability of inflation in this paper we explore the causal link running in the opposite direction we show that a monetary policy rule which reduces inflation variability leads to an increase in the size of gross external positions both in equity and bond portfolios this appears to be a robust prediction of open economy macro models with endogenous portfolio choice it holds across different modeling specifications and parameterizations we also present preliminary empirical evidence which shows a negative relationship between inflation volatility and the size of gross external positions

reserve accumulation and monetary sterilization in singapore and taiwan asian economies have embraced the globalization of production trade and capital flows one dimension of contemporary globalization has been the heavy exchange rate management by and rapid and massive stockpiling of foreign exchange reserves in asia this article undertakes an empirical investigation to assess the extent of de facto sterilization and capital mobility in singapore and taiwan using quarterly data between 1990 and 2008 our empirical results suggest that since 2001 both singapore and taiwan have a high degree of but not perfect de facto capital mobility to date this high effective capital mobility has not undermined the ability of the central bank in either economies to sterilize their respective foreign exchange intervention but may make the process increasingly difficult over time

lobbying and asymmetric information informational lobbying the use by interest groups of their alleged expertise or private information on matters of importance for policymakers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies is often regarded as an important means of influence this paper analyzes this phenomenon in a game setting on the one hand the interest group is assumed to have private information which is relevant to the policymaker whilst on the other hand the policymaker is assumed to be fully aware of the strategic incentives of the interest group to mis report or conceal its private information

should the exchange rate be a shock absorber this paper examines the welfare case for the exchange rate as a shock absorber cushioning an economy in face of shocks to world demand for its good we provide an example in which although the exchange rate acts perfectly as a shock absorber stabilizing output around the natural rate and eliminating the impact of nominal rigidities it may in fact be better to prevent the exchange rate from adjusting at all the explanation for this is that with incomplete international financial markets the natural rate is inefficient it does not respond enough to demand shocks while fixing the exchange rate increases the volatility of consumption the pro cyclical nature of monetary policy under a fixed exchange rate allows for a more efficient composition of consumption between home and foreign goods furthermore for the shocks examined a welfare maximizing monetary rule always dampens exchange rate volatility relative to that of a free float and in some cases may imply a fixed exchange rate d 2004 elsevier b v all rigths reserved

moral hazard in work organizations a comment on gaynor eswaran and kotwal and holmstrom a key question in the economics of organization is whether it is possible to induce a group of employees to produce some quota of labor desired by the director of their organization holmstrom 1982 argued that it is possible to achieve the desired result via a simple incentive scheme the essence of the scheme is to pay the employees only if they reach the quota if they fail the director is allowed to take what they have produced and use it for his own compensation in response eswaran and kotwal 1984 pointed out that because the director s compensation is smaller if the employees succeed in reaching the quota than if they fail he has an incentive to bribe an employee to shirk thus guaranteeing that the quota is not reached the director in other words is subject to moral hazard in a recent issue of public choice gaynor 1989 criticized the eswaran kotwal argument by suggesting that it is possible to design incentive schemes which eliminate the director s moral hazard problem in this note we defend the eswaran kotwal argument and raise further questions about the assumptions upon which holmstrom s incentive scheme is based

globalisation pass through and the optimal policy response to exchange rates abstract in this paper we examine how monetary policy should respond to nominal exchange rates in a new keynesian open economy model that allows for a non trivial role for sterilised intervention the paper develops the argument against the backdrop of the evolving policy making environment of asian economies sterilised intervention can be a potent tool that offers policymakers an additional degree of freedom in maximising global welfare we show that the gains to sterilised intervention are greater when goods market integration is low and exchange rate pass through is high however increased financial internationalisation reduces the effectiveness of sterilised intervention as the international policy trilemma becomes more relevant unsterilised intervention may also have a role to play although the potential welfare gains from this are generally smaller most central banks in asia have actively used sterilised foreign exchange intervention as a policy tool to smooth exchange rates but over time declining exchange rate pass through and the increasing international integration of financial and goods markets will tend to reduce the efficacy of sterilised intervention given the limited effectiveness of unsterilised intervention our model implies that the role of exchange rate movements in the optimal setting of monetary policy in asia is decreasing

a model of reputation in cheap talk building on sobel 1985 we study a dynamic game of advice where the sender s preferences are unknown to the receiver the novel feature of the model is that there is more than one type of biased sender our main result is that the more equal are the proportions of different biases in the sender population the more information can credibly be transmitted somewhat surprisingly however we also find that the receiver does not benefit from this equality we discuss our results in the context of political lobbying and show that institutions that increase transparency lower lobbyists incentives for truthtelling but unambiguously promote the policymaker s welfare

campaign contributions and access an important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given in this story access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy relevant information under complete information regarding donors policy preferences i argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups and the recipient legislators preferences are similar however one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive relaxing the informational assumption on donors preferences i reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the informational value of access to any agent is endogenous

financial integration and international risk sharing abstract conventional wisdom suggests that financial liberalization can help countries insure against idiosyncratic risk there is little evidence however that countries have increased risk sharing despite widespread financial liberalization we show that the key to understanding this puzzling observation is that conventional wisdom assumes frictionless international financial markets while actual markets are far from frictionless financial contracts are incomplete and contract enforceability is limited when countries remove official capital controls default risk is still present as an implicit barrier to capital flows if default risk were eliminated capital flows would be six times greater and international risk sharing would increase substantially

exchange rate regimes in the modern era fixed floating and flaky this paper provides a selective survey of the incidence causes and consequences of a country s choice of its exchange rate regime i begin with a critical review of michael klein and jay c shambaugh s 2010 book exchange rate regimes in the modern era and then proceed to provide an alternative overview of what the economics profession knows and needs to know about exchange rate regimes while a fixed exchange rate with capital mobility is a well defined monetary regime floating is not thus it is unclear whether it is theoretically sensible to compare countries across exchange rate regimes this comparison is quite difficult to make empirically it is often hard to figure out what the exchange rate regime of a country is in practice since there are multiple conflicting regime classifications more importantly similar countries choose radically different exchange rate regimes without substantive consequences for macroeconomic outcomes like output growth and inflation that is the profession knows surprisingly little about either the causes or consequences of national choices of exchange rate regimes but since the consequences of these choices are small understanding their causes is of only academic interest jel e52 f33

incomplete pass through and the welfare effects of exchange rate variability abstract this paper considers the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass through for optimal monetary and exchange rate policy a two country model is presented which allows an explicit derivation of welfare functions in terms of a weighted sum of the second moments of producer prices and the nominal exchange rate from a single country perspective the optimal exchange rate variance depends on the degree of pass through the size and openness of the economy the elasticity of labour supply and the volatility of foreign producer prices welfare may be decreasing or increasing in the volatility of the exchange rate

using privileged information to manipulate markets insiders gurus and credibility access to private information is shown to generate both the incentives and the ability to manipulate asset markets through strategically distorted announcements the fact that privileged information is noisy interferes with the public s attempts to learn whether such announcements are honest it allows opportunistic individuals to manipulate prices repeatedly without ever being fully found out this leads us to extend sobel s 1985 model of strategic communication to the case of noisy private signals our results show that when truthfulness is not easily verifiable restrictions on trading by insiders may be needed to preserve the integrity of information embodied in prices

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

does financial globalization promote risk sharing article i nfo in theory one of the main benefits of financial globalization is that it should allow for more efficient international risk sharing in this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of the patterns of risk sharing among different groups of countries and examine how international financial integration has affected the evolution of these patterns using a variety of empirical techniques we conclude that there is at best a modest degree of international risk sharing and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory in addition only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization developing countries have by and large been shut out of this benefit even emerging market economies many of which have reduced capital controls and all of which have witnessed large increases in cross border capital flows have seen little change in their ability to share risk we find that the composition of flows may help explain why emerging markets have not been able to realize this presumed benefi to f financial globalization in particular our results suggest that portfolio debt which had dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently is not conducive to risk sharing