existence of competitive equilibrium with incomplete markets abstract the existence of competitive equilibrium is proved for a model with incomplete futures markets the security returns in this model are denominated in terms of units which represent certain composite commodities specific to events

rogoff revisited the conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies abstract the paper re examines rogoff s rogoff k 1985 the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target quarterly journal of economics 100 1169 1189 influential monetary policy result it shows that responses of a conservative central banker and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes may be substantially different if interactions with ambitious fiscal policy are taken into account

the structure of financial equilibrium with exogenous yields the case of incomplete markets1 this paper presents an analysis of the structure of competitive equilibrium in a model whose principal feature is incomplete financial markets formulated in the spirit of arrow specifically the overall payoffs or returns from financial instruments are assumed to be fixed or predetermined independently of the operation of the economy and these instruments are assumed to be fewer in number than required to span all potential spot markets for commodities our main result establishes that market incompleteness generates a corresponding degree of allocation indeterminateness suppose there are n 1 spot markets but only 0 m n linearly independent financial instruments so that the deficiency in financial markets is 0 n n m n then subject to some relatively innocuous technical qualifications the set of equilibrium allocations contains a smooth n dimensional submanifold we also indicate how real indeterminacy may increase when returns for example the market price and promised interest on an ordinary bond are treated as variables rather than parameters

rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions thus the issue of how to improve upon the time consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy we present a model with three players the central bark the fiscal authority and wage setters in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled we show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated we also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank

the interaction of monetary and macroprudential policies i analyze a new keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model where the financing of productive investment is affected by a moral hazard problem i solve for jointly ramsey optimal monetary and macroprudential policies i find that when a financial friction is present in addition to the standard nominal friction the optimal policy can replicate the first best allocation if the social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy using monetary policy alone is not enough a policy trade off between stabilizing inflation and output gap emerges when policy follows simple rules the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of the appropriate policy mix

commitment versus discretion in a political economy model of fiscal and monetary policy interaction abstract does price commitment result in lower welfare i pair an independent monetary authority controlling nominal bonds with a fiscal authority microfounded by the political economy model of battaglini and coate 2008 without price commitment time inconsistency is alleviated by interaction between the benevolent monetary authority and the politically distorted fiscal authority with price commitment nominal bonds will be used for wasteful spending by the politically distorted fiscal authority price commitment results in lower welfare because it eliminates monetary control over fiscal decisions

monetary and macroprudential policies in an estimated model with financial intermediation abstract we estimate the smets wouters model featuring the gertler karadi banking sector on us data using real and financial observables we investigate the gains from coordination between a flexible inflation targeting central bank and a macroprudential regulator charged with safeguarding financial stability the potential gains from coordination depend on how much importance is given to the output gap in the macroprudential mandate coordination conflicts can be avoided by assigning similar importance to this common objective in the respective mandates of both policies when we derive optimal mandates for monetary and macroprudential policy under no coordination we find that both policy makers should place a higher weight than society on the output gap

coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies this paper studies noncooperative games between a monetary authority and a macroprudential regulator whose objectives are a subset of those in the social loss function the analysis is based on a new keynesian model with a financial sector and a financial friction a la gertler and karadi 2011 when the friction affects the financing of all factors of production equally macroprudential policy is shown to be a powerful additional tool fully eliminating inefficiencies regardless of the source of the shock and no matter whether the central bank and the regulator cooperate but when trade offs are present and policy is discretionary the institutional arrangements become crucial while coordination leads to higher welfare than a setting in which each authority takes the decision rule of the other as given namely the nash equilibrium our analysis shows that a noncooperative setting in which the macroprudential authority acts as a leader within the period can be superior to cooperation finally our conclusions are unaffected by whether the macroprudential instrument affects funding costs or acts as a liquidity requirement

optimal fiscal policy rules in a monetary union this paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union we use a microfounded new keynesian model of a monetary union which incorporates persistence in inflation and non ricardian consumers and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities we find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation output and the terms of trade but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react on the one hand to national differences in inflation and on the other hand to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade however welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output ignoring inflation

equilibrium with incomplete markets without ordered preferences abstract in this note we prove the existence of radner equilibrium of plans prices and price expectations in an exchange economy with incomplete financial markets without monotonic or ordered preferences

optimal discretionary monetary and fiscal policies in a country size heterogeneous monetary union abstract this paper develops a new keynesian model of a monetary union where atomistic small economies coexist with a large economy it explores how the level of public debt shapes non cooperative discretionary policies it evaluates welfare losses for small and large member countries the paper demonstrates that higher public debt levels hamper business cycle stabilization for the union as a whole and in particular penalize the stabilization performance of small country members while cooperation and monetary leadership is preferable to fiscal leadership for the union as whole and for the small countries the big country prefers fiscal leadership where it explores a larger strategic power vis a vis the common monetary policy authority political support for cooperation may be hard to achieve under low debt levels cooperative stabilization outcomes are relatively similar to the non cooperative ones

inflation targeting as a shock absorber abstract we study the characteristics of inflation targeting as a shock absorber using quarterly data for a large panel of countries to overcome an endogeneity problem between monetary regimes and the likelihood of crises we propose to study large natural disasters we find that inflation targeting improves macroeconomic performance following such exogenous shocks it lowers inflation raises output growth and reduces inflation variability compared to alternative monetary regimes this performance is mostly due to a different response of monetary policy and fiscal policy under inflation targeting finally we show that only hard but not soft targeting reaps the rewards deeds not words matter for successful monetary stabilization

monetary fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union abstract we consider monetary fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union if monetary and fiscal authorities have different ideal output and inflation targets the nash equilibrium output or inflation or both are beyond the ideal points of all authorities leadership of either authority is better fiscal discretion entirely negates the advantage of monetary commitment the optimal monetary rule is equivalent to discretionary leadership of monetary over fiscal policy agreement about ideal output and inflation creates a monetary fiscal symbiosis yielding the ideal point despite disagreement about the relative weights of the two objectives for any order of moves without fiscal co ordination and without monetary commitment

sticky price models of the business cycle can the contract multiplier solve the persistence problem we construct a quantitative equilibrium model with firms setting prices in a staggered fashion and use it to ask whether monetary shocks can generate business cycle fluctuations these fluctuations include persistent movements in output along with the other defining features of business cycles like volatile investment and smooth consumption we assume that prices are exogenously sticky for a short time persistent output fluctuations require endogenous price stickiness in the sense that firms choose not to change prices much when they can do so we find that for a wide range of parameter values the amount of endogenous stickiness is small thus we find that in a standard quantitative model staggered price setting alone does not generate business cycle fluctuations

equilibria with options existence and indeterminacy abstract this paper studies an economy in which trading takes place in spot commodity markets and incomplete futures markets for assets of various types there are real assets stocks or commodity futures options on real assets and a riskless nominal bond we show that for a generic set of economies parametrized by consumers endowments and structure of real assets there exists an equilibrium moreover we show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations of commodities contains a manifold of a high dimension even if the market structure is potentially complete i e the number of assets including options equals or exceeds the number of states of nature and the arrow debreu equilibrium can be achieved through sequential trading in spot and futures markets there are multiple inefficient equilibria without full rank of the asset payoff matrix

restoring the conservative central banker proposition under monetary fiscal interaction abstract in a model with fiscal policy hughes hallett et al hughes hallett a libich j stehlik p 2009 rogoff revisited the conservative central banker proposition under active fiscal policies economics letters 104 140 143 challenge the relevance of the conservative central banker proposition and other standard results by considering an underlying model which makes the macroeconomic relations more explicit we are able to simplify the analysis and restore the conservative central bank result

fiscal sustainability using growth maximizing debt targets this article highlights the importance of debt related fiscal rules and derives growth maximizing public debt ratios from a simple theoretical model on the basis of evidence on the productivity of public capital we estimate public debt targets that governments should maintain if they wish to maximize growth for panels of oecd eu and euro area countries these are not arbitrary numbers but are founded on long run optimizing behaviour assuming that governments implement the golden rule of financing that is they contract debt only to finance public investment our estimates suggest that the euro area should target debt levels of around 50 of gdp if member states are to have common targets that is about 15 points lower than the estimate for the growth maximizing debt ratio in our oecd sample and comfortably within the stability and growth pact s debt ceiling of 60 of gdp we also indicate how forward looking budget reaction functions fit into a debt targeting framework

capital tax competition under a common currency abstract we re examine the view that capital taxes are too low when capital is mobile across tax jurisdictions we do so by emphasising a previously neglected implication of decentralised capital tax setting when jurisdictions share a common currency namely capital taxes give rise to a vertical externality by affecting the revenues of the over arching central bank from issuing the common currency this externality may lead ceteris paribus to too high regional capital taxes and may more than offset the usual effects of tax competition in this case and contrary to conventional wisdom decentralised capital taxes will be too high

asset prices and trading volume in a beauty contest speculators buy an asset hoping to sell it later to investors with higher private valuations if agents are uncertain about the distribution of private valuations and about the beliefs of others about this distribution a beauty contest with an infinite hierarchy of beliefs arises under harsanyi s assumption of a common prior the infinite beliefs hierarchy is readily solved using bayes law this paper shows that common knowledge of the beliefs formation rule mapping the private valuation of each agent into his first order belief also simplifies the beliefs hierarchy while allowing for disagreement among agents we analyse the resulting speculation in a stylized asset market several statistics computed only from readily observable quote return and volume data are evaluated in terms of their power to discriminate between genuine disagreement and the harsanyian case only statistics that relate volume and volatility or volume and changes in best offers have the necessary discriminatory power

independent monetary policies and social equity monetary policy is formulated as a game between the government and the central bank we show that when fiscal policy has a redistributional component there is a conflict between optimally configured monetary policies and equality consequently inflation averse governments interested in social equity will need to limit their use of fiscal policy

the macroeconomics of social pacts in this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions the central bank and the fiscal policymaker we explicitly model unions concern for public expenditure paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions i e the so called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of european countries in the last few decades we also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the maastricht criteria and the stability and growth pact the former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes the latter is likely to backfire

learning from prices and the dispersion in beliefs i study whether investors use an asset s price to update their beliefs about its payos i show that in a dynamic economy the relationship between the dispersion in investor beliefs and returnvolume characteristics can be used to empirically answer this question when investors have rational expectations re and condition on the price i show that belief dispersion is positively related to expected returns return volatility and correlation between volume and absolute returns but negatively related to return autocorrelation when investors do not use the price as in a dierence of opinions do model these relationships are reversed i test these predictions using the crosssection of returns volume and analyst forecast dispersion over dierent horizons the results are consistent with the re model at quarterly and longer horizons but reject both models at the monthly horizon i show that a hybrid model with some do investors and some re investors can match the short horizon evidence the empirical results are consistent with the idea that while some investors do not use the price in the short run they increase their conditioning on the price over time

fiscal stabilization with partial exchange rate pass through this paper examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two country framework that allows for a general degree of exchange rate pass through i derive analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy which are shown to depend on the degree of passthrough in the case of partial pass through an optimizing policy maker uses counter cyclical fiscal stabilization in addition to monetary stabilization however in the extreme cases of complete or zero pass through the fiscal stabilization instrument is not employed there is also no additional gain from the fiscal instrument in the case of coordination between the two countries these results are due to the specific way the optimal fiscal policy rule affects marginal costs rather than being a substitute for monetary policy fiscal policy complements it by increasing the correlation of the marginal cost terms within and across countries this in turn makes monetary policy more effective at stabilizing them

policy cooperation among benevolent governments may be undesirable this paper presents a simple counterexample to the belief that policy cooperation among benevolent governments is desirable it also explains circumstances under which such counterexamples are possible and relates them to the literature on time inconsistency since the work of hamada 1976 investigating the effects of increasing policy cooperation among countries has been a major topic in international economics a standard conclusion of this work is that increasing policy cooperation among countries is desirable in a seminal paper rogoff 1985 has challenged this view using a simple monetary model rogoff shows that cooperation among policy makers can lead to a lower level of welfare than noncooperation does rogoff s result has caused much consternation among those who advocate policy cooperation and his work has been criticized along several dimensions for example some authors including canzoneri and henderson 1988 have noted that a key assumption in rogoff s model is that the objective function of each country s policy maker does not coincide with the objective function of its residents indeed if in his model policy makers maximize the welfare of their country s residents the counterexample is overturned and cooperation strictly dominates noncooperation this feature leads some to interpret rogoff s result as simply saying that if policy makers form a coalition against the private sector they may be worse off than if they do not others such as neck and dockner 1988 have claimed that rogoff s result depends on private agents acting strategically under this interpretation rogoff s result is relevant to say economies with a large trade union but not to economies with a large number of competitive private agents in a somewhat different vein persson 1988 and especially devereux 1986a b have questioned the significance of welfare comparisons across different institutional regimes in a model without a solid foundation for the behavioural relationships this paper presents a simple model in which governments are benevolent but cooperation is still undesirable the model is a two country version of fischer s 1980 optimal tax model in it private agents are competitive in that each agent takes both prices and government policies as uninfluenced by his actions and each government maximizes the welfare of its country s residents in the paper the two different regimes cooperative and noncooperative

grand corruption instead of commitment reconsidering time inconsistency of monetary policy abstract this paper suggests that inflation may be affected differently by grand corruption compared to its positive nexus with petty corruption in an extended barro and gordon 1983a model grand corruption may serve as a quasi commitment device a cheating expropriating government may actually deter a monetary authority from cheating reneging furthermore rogoff s 1985 conservative central banker has an unambiguously beneficial effect she reduces the inflationary bias even more while also rendering fiscal policy more effective the model nests the standard fiscal monetary interaction logic with and without expropriation as well as the diametrical symbiosis result obtained by dixit and lambertini 2003a

symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union we consider the interaction between the monetary policy in a monetary union and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries we use a barro gordon type model extended to many countries and fiscal policies each country s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries and the common monetary policy has its time consistency problem but if the two types of policymakers agree about the ideal levels of output and inflation then this ideal is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives despite ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy without fiscal coordination without monetary commitment and for any order of moves

stochastic equilibria with incomplete financial markets abstract we demonstrate the existence of equilibria with incomplete financial markets for stochastic economies whose information structure is given by an event tree restricting attention to purely financial securities those paying in units of account e g dollars financial markets may be incomplete some consumption streams may be impossible to obtain by any trading strategy securities may be individually precluded from trade at arbitrary states and dates sufficient conditions for the existence of stochastic equilibria are continuous convex strictly monotonic preferences and strictly positive aggregate endowments these conditions are weakened a corollary states that any regime of security prices precluding arbitrage can be embedded in an equilibrium

inflation targeting fiscal rules and the policy mix cross effects and interactions we examine how inflation targeting it and fiscal rules fr affect inflation and fiscal performance in a large panel of countries during 1990 2009 in line with theory both fr and it appear to shape monetary and fiscal outcomes significant cross effects seem to exist as it strengthens fiscal performance whereas the combination of fr and it tends to be associated with more disciplined macroeconomic policies than if only one of these institutions operates our findings suggest that it and fr affect the coordination of the policy mix and point to potential benefits of reforming macroeconomic frameworks in a holistic fashion

fiscal leadership and central bank design this article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives it is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously further it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies jel classification e52 e61 f42

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

debt inflation and central bank independence abstract increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence although ex ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently the smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit over time inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt by contrast imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions

strategic monetary and fiscal policy interactions an empirical investigation this paper identifies leadership regimes in monetary fiscal policy interactions in three countries the uk the us and sweden we specify a small scale structural general equilibrium model of an open economy and estimate it using bayesian methods we assume that the authorities can act strategically in a non cooperative policy game and compare different leadership regimes we find that the model of fiscal leadership gives the best fit for the uk and sweden while in the us the nash or non strategic regime dominates we assess the extent to which policy maker preferences reflect microfounded social preferences

independent fiscal agencies abstract there has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy however the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called independent fiscal agencies this paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects the motivation for the establishment of such agencies their potential design and the experience with these types of institutions

fiscal activism under inflation targeting and non atomistic wage setting this paper presents a game between a fiscal authority an independent central bank and non atomistic wage setters the effects of fiscal activism and inflation targeting on labour market outcomes are analysed the results suggest that inflation targeting provides incentive for wage restraint moreover real wages are increasing in the degree of fiscal activism as wage setters exploit the response of a fiscal authority seeking to promote employment numerical results suggest that the benefits of targeting inflation are larger when the government pursues an activist policy and therefore that there is some substitutability between fiscal and monetary rules

equilibrium in economies with incomplete financial markets abstract this paper analyses an exchange economy in the absence of arrow debreu complete markets it is assumed that trading takes place in the sequence of spot markets and futures markets for securities payable in units of account unlimited short selling in securities is allowed a general equilibrium in such an economy is a set of current and future prices contingent on uncertain events and a set of individual plans such that all markets are cleared the existence of such an equilibrium is proved under usual assumptions this is in contrast to the case of futures markets for contingent futures commodities where an equilibrium may not exist the optimality of equilibrium allocations is also discussed

second order beliefs and the individual investor in a panel survey of individual investors we show that investors second order beliefs their beliefs about the return expectations of other investors influence investment decisions investors who believe others hold more optimistic stock market expectations allocate more of their own portfolio to stocks even after controlling for their own risk and return expectations however second order beliefs are inaccurate and exhibit several well known psychological biases we observe both the tendency of investors to believe that their own opinion is relatively more common among the population false consensus and that others who hold divergent beliefs are considered to be biased bias blind spot

inflation government transfers and optimal central bank independence abstract the problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two stage non cooperative game between the government and the central bank the solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence the results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism the results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker

strategic interactions of fiscal policies in europe a global var perspective abstract the paper analyses the strategic interactions of fiscal policies in the european union context by modelling the interdependencies arising between public and private sectors saving investment balances in a global vector autoregressive framework we use two empirical specifications to reflect some important differences in the sequencing of the policy decision making process in this setting we draw policy implications with respect to fiscal policy coordination and fiscal policy discretion we highlight the importance of several factors such as global capital flows uncertainty with respect to policy actions and nature of the shocks as key elements defining the dimension of the prevailing policy tradeoffs

monopolistic competition and the effects of aggregate demand how important is monopolistic competition to an understanding of the effects of aggregate demand on output we ask the question at three levels can monopolistic competition by itself explain why aggregate demand movements affect output can it together with other imperfections generate effects of aggregate demand in a way that perfect competition cannot if so can it give an accurate account of the response of the economy to aggregate demand movements the answers are no yes and yes

price level volatility a simple model of money taxes and sunspots abstract we investigate sunspot equilibria in a static one commodity model with taxes and transfers denominated in money units volatility in this economy is purely monetary since the only uncertainty is about the price level we construct simple robust examples of sunspot equilibria that are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria we also identify the source of these sses equilibrium in the securities market is determined as if there were no restricted consumers and the unrestricted consumers face intrinsic uncertainty perfect securities markets eliminate allocation uncertainty but they exacerbate price level volatility journal of economic literature classification numbers d50 d52 d84 e31 e62

capital inflows fiscal discretion and exchange rate policy many writers have argued for the benefits of a credible fixed exchange rate a hard peg as a commitment device in an open economy but historically fixed exchange rates have often been associated with large current account deficits and episodes of over borrowing this paper develops a model of capital inflows that are linked to the exchange rate regime because of endogenous fiscal policy the key message of the paper is that a hard peg is undesirable in the absence of commitment in fiscal policy in face of a credible fixed exchange rate the fiscal authority subsidizes capital inflows the economy will engage in inefficiently high international borrowing and in welfare terms may end up worse off than under capital market autarky to eliminate the incentive to subsidize borrowing the monetary authority must follow a flexible exchange rate rule in which capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation if fiscal policy must be financed by money creation rather than direct taxation then a fixed exchange rate rule may cause both over borrowing and a subsequent exchange rate crisis r 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

speculative equilibrium with differences in higher order beliefs modest differences in higher order beliefs may have large price effects we generalize a standard rational expectations equilibrium model with different information by allowing differences in higher order beliefs investors have possibly different dogmatic beliefs about the mean different dogmatic beliefs about other investors beliefs and so on for higher and higher orders of beliefs even when every investor s first order expectations are unbiased overvaluation results when investors have inconsistent higher order beliefs that their own expectations are more optimistic than average this lack of common knowledge destabilizes prices in an unbounded manner as market liquidity disappears this paper was accepted by gustavo manso finance

rationality of self and others in an economic system in this paper i want to disentangle some of the senses in which the hypothesis of rationality is used in economic theory in particular i want to stress that rationality is not a property of the individual alone although it is usually presented that way rather it gathers not only its force but also its very meaning from the social context in which it is embedded it is most plausible under very ideal conditions when these conditions cease to hold the rationality assumptions become strained and possibly even self contradictory they certainly imply an ability at information processing and calculation that is far beyond the feasible and that cannot well be justified as the result of learning and adaptation let me dismiss a point of view that is perhaps not always articulated but seems implicit in many writings it seems to be asserted that a theory of the economy must be based on rationality as a matter of principle otherwise there can be no theory this position has even been maintained by some who accept that economic behavior is not completely rational john stuart mill 1909 bk 2 ch 4 argued that custom not competition governs much of the economic world but he adds that the only possible theory is that standard economic doctrine makes assumptions of rationality that have very strong implications for the complexity of individuals decision processes the most complete assumptions of competitive general equilibrium theory require that all future and contingent prices exist and be known in fact of course not all these markets exist the incompleteness of markets has several side consequences for rationality for one thing each decision maker has to have a model that predicts the future spot prices this is an informational burden of an entirely different magnitude than simply optimizing at known prices it involves all the complexity of rational analysis of data and contradicts the much praised informational economy of the price system it is also the case that equilibria become much less well defined similar problems occur with imperfect competition this research was supported by the office of naval research grant onr n00014 79 c 0685 at the center for research in organizational efficiency institute for mathematical studies in the social sciences stanford university stanford california

equilibrium in capm without a riskless asset in the mean variance capm without a riskless asset the possibility of satiation sometimes leads to non existence of general equilibrium moreover because portfolio preferences are not necessarily monotone equilibrium asset prices when they exist may be negative or zero to demonstrate the possibility of non existence and to develop an intuitive understanding of when and why equilibrium does or does not exist this paper fully investigates the special case of utility functions linear in mean and variance and partially extends the results to the general case

the value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility abstract a central finding of the previous monetary policy research is that commitment to a policy rule results in substantial welfare gains in this paper i reevaluate the value of monetary policy commitment in an environment where monetary and fiscal policies are conducted by separate branches of the government i find that welfare gains from monetary policy commitment can be small if the fiscal authority can exercise a certain degree of commitment on his own i also find that a moderate improvement in fiscal credibility can substantially reduce the welfare gains from full commitment in monetary policy under monetary leadership under fiscal leadership the degree of fiscal credibility does not affect the welfare gains from monetary commitment

political shocks and public debt the case for a conservative central bank revisited abstract we explore the dynamics of public debt and optimal institutions in the presence of political shocks arising from electoral uncertainty under commitment optimal stabilization is established by combining an inflation target with a debt target the inflation target should be contingent on the political shocks while the debt target forces the government to fully absorb the political shocks in the period in which it occurs in the absence of such inflation and debt targets but with monetary commitment a conservative central bank enhances stabilization an even more conservative central bank is optimal if monetary policy cannot commit

monetary and fiscal policies interaction in monetary unions in this paper the literature on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union is surveyed by adopting the concept of symbiosis as a starting point the paper highlights the importance of uncertainty policy makers preferences and targets then the role of commitment to policy rules and coordination is addressed the analysis also focuses on the importance of the data considered for the generation of the policy mix as a final step the paper discusses the main results in the literature on public debt management in a monetary union all the reported theoretical results are then adopted to retrieve policy and institutional implications for the european monetary union

the information content of elections and varieties of the partisan political business cycle this event study uses economic forecasts and opinion polls to measure the response of expectations to election surprise use of forecast data complements older work on partisan cycles by allowing a tighter link between election and response thereby mitigating concerns of endogeneity and omitted variables i find that forecasters respond swiftly and significantly to election surprise i further argue that the response ought to vary across countries with different institutional foundations in support i find that there exist three distinct patterns in forecasters responses to partisan surprise corresponding to hall and soskice s three varieties of capitalism

monetary policy in a forward looking input output economy this paper examines the implications for monetary policy of sticky prices in both final and intermediate goods in a new keynesian model both optimal policy under commitment and discretionary policy under simple loss functions are studied household utility losses under alternative loss functions are compared additionally the robustness of policy performance to model and shock misperceptions and parameter uncertainty is examined targeting inflation in both consumer and intermediate goods performs better than targeting inflation in one sector targeting price levels of both final and intermediate goods performs significantly better moreover targeting price levels in both sectors yields superior robustness properties

when do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union abstract this paper offers a framework to study strategic interactions between private players national fiscal authorities and a common central bank in monetary unions we establish general conditions in terms of restrictions on spillover effects of actions by private and public players under which games that differ in the degree of cooperation and commitment can admit the same equilibrium outcome we use these conditions to characterize benchmark results on the irrelevance of cooperation and commitment established in recent literature moreover we show for a general setting in which the benchmark results do not apply that gains from fiscal cooperation depend on the number of countries and increase as this number gets larger

fiscal deficits and mean reversion in real exchange rates the mean reversion of real exchange rates in g5 countries depends on both countries fiscal deficits surplus in a nonlinear way when the fiscal policy pushes the real exchange rate to be deviated further away from the equilibrium level the mean reversion process is faster

classifying monetary economics fields and methods from past to future we propose a simple yet sufficiently encompassing classification scheme of monetary economics it comprises three fundamental fields and six recent areas that expand within and across these fields the elements of our scheme are not found together and in their mutual relationships in earlier studies of the relevant literature neither is this an attempt to produce a relatively complete systematization our intention in taking stock is not finality or exhaustiveness we rather suggest a viewpoint and a possible ordering of the accumulating knowledge our hope is to stimulate an improved understanding of the evolving nature and internal consistency of monetary economics at large

portfolio choice exchange rates and indeterminacy consider an exchange economy under uncertainty the asset market is incomplete there are fewer assets a than states of nature s assets are nominal and are denominated in n distinct currencies competitive equilibria are distinct if the associated allocations are distinct an economy displays k degrees of indeterminacy if the set of distinct competitive equilibria contains a k dimensional open set generically the economy displays ns a n 1 n degrees of indeterminacy

monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers abstract with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership monetary unification reduces inflation taxes and public spending these disciplining effects of a monetary union which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases are likely to raise welfare two types of arrangements are considered for the union s common central bank ccb making the ccb more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the ccb in contrast to the results of svensson 1997 svensson l e o 1997 optimal inflation targets conservative central banks and linear inflation contracts american economic review 87 98 114 an optimally designed conservative ccb may outperform inflation targeting finally we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification hence subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare

monetary and fiscal policy interaction the current consensus assignment in the light of recent developments in the last few years papers have begun to analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in models incorporating nominal rigidities where social welfare is derived from the utility of agents this article examines whether this analysis provides support for the consensus assignment where monetary policy controls demand and inflation and fiscal policy controls government debt we argue that the basic structure of new keynesian models implies that monetary policy dominates fiscal policy as a means of controlling inflation no similar dominance appears to operate for fiscal policy and debt if debt has to return to its initial level after shocks

stationary equilibria with incomplete markets and overlapping generations recent work on general equilibrium models with incomplete financial markets has demonstrated that when assets pay off in units of account equilibrium prices and allocations are indeterminate the equilibria in such models are also generically constrained suboptimal a central planner can typically reallocate assets in such a way as to pareto dominate the competitive equilibrium in this paper the authors consider an overlapping generations model with incomplete markets in which one asset is fiat money they show that when outside money has value in equilibrium the stationary equilibrium prices and allocations are both locally isolated and constrained optimal copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy abstract this paper analyzes a general equilibrium model of a competitive security market in which traders possess independent pieces of information about the return of a risky asset each trader conditions his estimate of the return both on his own private source of information and price which in equilibrium serves as a noisy aggregator of the total information observed by all traders a closed form characterization of the rational expectations equilibrium is presented a counter example to the existence of fully revealing equilibrium is developed