buyer initiated vs seller initiated information revelation sales presentations are the core of the selling process where salespeople provide information to prospects one challenge is that the amount of information available to be potentially communicated may exceed salespeople s ability to communicate or customers ability to process there is limited bandwidth between the firm and customers one important decision then is which information should customers see what the firm chooses to tell customers may be informative in itself when constrained to a seller initiated information revelation format where the firm chooses which feature to show the firm never finds it optimal to offer more features than it is able to inform customers about consequently customers never find credible a claim that the product has all features the important implication is that price alone cannot serve as a signal of quality in this setting in contrast a buyer initiated information revelation format where customers decide which information to receive increases the probability of a sale and also results in the production of higher quality products in a competitive setting by adopting buyer initiated information revelation firms are able to attain positive profits this is due to the fact that customers infer the product s quality from the price along with the information revelation format customers know that at some prices firms find it profitable to produce high quality products and at other lower prices this is not the case thus customer empowerment leads to higher profits

the hidden information content of price movements dynamic patterns of prices in different markets may motivate strategic consumers who could be monitoring price movements over time to game vendors do past price movements carry information about the probability and magnitude of future price drops conducting empirical work in the airline industry on near 1000 us domestic routes we find that some price metrics carry information about future price swings these variables can assist in predicting the likelihood and magnitude of price drops these price metrics yield significantly different signals which also vary as the prediction horizon changes

the principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity the so called principle of minimum differentiation stated by hotelling has been challenged by many authors this paper restores the principle by showing that n firms locate at the center of the market and charge prices higher than the marginal cost of production when heterogeneity in consumers tastes is large enough

promotion effect on endogenous consumption over the years researchers have found that promotion makes consumers switch brands and purchase earlier or more however it is unclear how promotion affects consumption especially for product categories that are perceived to be versatile and substitutable in this paper we propose a dynamic structural model with endogenous consumption under promotion uncertainty to analyze the promotion effect on consumption this model recognizes consumers as rational decision makers who form promotion expectations and plan their purchase and consumption decisions in light of promotion schedule applying the proposed model to packaged tuna and yogurt we find that endogenous consumption responds to promotion as a result of forward looking and stockpiling behavior this is the first empirical paper that recognizes consumption as an endogenous decision variable and proposes a structural model to offer behavioral explanations on whether how and why promotion encourages consumption for product categories with flexible consumption

research note additional learning and implications on the role of informative advertising observers argue that evidence for the persuasive role of advertising comes from competitive categories where increases in advertising lead to higher average prices conversely others claim that advertising serves a purely informational role here higher levels of advertising lead to better informed consumers and this should increase competition and stimulate lower prices the objective of this study is to neither confirm nor refute either of these perspectives it is rather to show that increases in informative advertisingalone can lead to both higher or lower prices i further show that the direction of this relationship depends on the level of differentiation between competing firms similar to grossman and shapiro 1984 i examine conditions where the differences between competing products are small but i also examine conditions where the differences are significant the role of advertising is to inform consumers about individual products and higher advertising for a product means that more of the potential market knows about it higher levels of advertising increase the relative importance of fully informed consumers compared to partially informed consumers this dynamic is the basis for explaining why informative advertising can push prices either up or down in a uniformly distributed spatial market

price dispersion in the small and in the large evidence from an internet price comparison site this paper examines four million daily price observations for more than 1 000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http shopper com we find little support for the notion that prices on the internet are converging to the law of one price in addition observed levels of price dispersion vary systematically with the number of firms listing prices the difference between the two lowest prices the gap averages 23 per cent when two firms list prices and falls to 3 5 per cent in markets where 17 firms list prices these empirical results are an implication of a general clearinghouse model of equilibrium price dispersion

an efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets abstract we examine joint tradable permit markets as a self enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems by correlated we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities e g smog and global warming by self enforcing we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions we find that joint domestic and international permit markets are pareto efficient for a wide class of preferences

intertemporal pricing and consumer stockpiling we study a dynamic pricing problem for a class of products with stable consumption patterns e g household items staple foods consumers may stock up the product at current prices for future consumption but they incur inventory holding costs we model this situation as a dynamic game over an infinite time horizon in each period the seller sets a price and each consumer chooses how many units to buy we develop a solution methodology based on rational expectations by endowing each player with beliefs we decouple the dynamic game into individual dynamic programs for each player we solve for the rational expectations equilibrium where all players make optimal dynamic decisions given correct beliefs about others behavior in equilibrium the seller may either charge a constant fixed price or offer periodic price promotions at predictable time intervals we show that promotions are useful when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more for the product than are occasional shoppers we also develop several model extensions to study the impact of consumer stockpiling on the seller s inventory production and rationing strategies

strategic state level environmental policy with asymmetric pollution spillovers this paper examines the strategic behavior of state level utility regulators in the context of the federal tradable emissions permits market when state to state pollution spillovers are asymmetric strategic behavior is possible because a state s environmental policy indirectly affects the price of permits and therefore abatement in other states we show that the optimal pollution penalty is comprised of two parts i a pigouvian tax adjusted for state to state spillovers and ii an optimal tariff designed to improve the terms of trade in permits generally abatement costs are not minimized and the outcome is pareto inefficient regardless of the size of the market 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

price match announcements in a consumer search duopoly using a model of sequential search we show that announcements to price match raise prices by altering consumer search behavior first price matching diminishes firms incentives to lower prices to attract consumers who have no search costs second for consumers with positive search costs price matching lowers the marginal benefit of search inducing them to accept higher prices finally price matching can lead to asymmetric equilibria where one firm runs fewer sales and both firms tend to offer smaller discounts than in a symmetric equilibrium price increases grow in the proportion of consumers who invoke price matching guarantees and in the level of equilibrium asymmetry

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games ii applications in part i of this study we established two existence theorems for mixed strategy equilibrium in games with discontinuous payoff functions see theorems 4 4 and 5 5 in dasgupta and maskin 1986 hereafter d m 1986 in this second part we use the second of these two theorems to prove the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium in some wellknown discontinuous economic games that fail to have pure strategy equilibria the models we analyse are the bertrand edgeworth example of price setting duopolists with capacity constraints see section 2 2 price competition among firms producing differentiated products hotelling 1929 and d aspremont gabszewicz and thisse 1979 see section 2 3 spatial competition eaton and lipsey 1975 and shaked 1975 see section 3 and models of market dependent information rothschild and stiglitz 1976 and wilson 1977 section 4 the paper concludes section 5 with a classification of these models

pricing differentiated products with indifferent consumers abstract i analyze a linear city duopoly in which a fraction of consumers switchers travel without incurring transportation costs roughly a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if the number of switchers is small a mixed strategy equilibrium generally exists

hotelling s spatial competition as a model of sales abstract hotelling s spatial competition model is used to explain the existence of sales it is shown that 1 an equilibrium in randomized strategies exists when a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist 2 with more dissimilarity among brands prices are chosen from a wider interval

correlated pollutants interregional redistribution and labor attachment in a federation we examine the efficiency of federal policies in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership imperfect labor mobility and transboundary pollution selfish regional governments regulate correlated pollutant emissions by choosing pollution tax and abatement levels in anticipation of the center s redistributive policy the center s objective function obeys a proportional equity principle which implies that its choice of interregional transfer satisfies the equalization of weighted regional welfare levels regional and central governments make their choices subject to migration incentives we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game played by regional and central governments yields socially optimal policies

decentralized and efficient control of transboundary pollution in federal systems abstract decentralized control of transboundary pollution in federal systems can be efficient when population crowding is socially costly in this paper an upstream region abates pollution or makes an interregional income transfer to the downstream region with the sole intent of deterring immigration because either instrument abatement expenditure or interregional income transfer alone implements an efficient population distribution between the regions interregional income transfers are unnecessary for efficiency without explicit income transfers each region provides the efficient portion of the aggregate level of pollution abatement in the nash equilibrium

population mobility and transboundary environmental problems abstract a standard result in the literature on environmental economics is that efficient environmental policies regulating transboundary pollution will be adopted only if there is interjurisdictional coordination efficient policies can be adopted as a result of interregional treaties or mandated by a central authority the present paper demonstrates that if there is perfect population mobility between the regions affected by the transboundary pollution the efficient outcome is a nash equilibrium of the policy game between regional authorities this is true independently of what policies are available to the regional authorities however there may be more than one nash equilibrium so that policy coordination may be necessary in order to achieve the best equilibrium

a price discrimination theory of coupons the objective of this paper is to analyze the consumer s decision in electing to use cents off coupons distributed by manufacturers of consumer products arguing that the decision to use coupons is based on the tradeoff between costs of using coupons and the savings obtained it is shown that coupons can serve as a price discrimination device to provide a lower price to a particular segment of consumers based on a price theoretic model it is shown that the users of coupons are more price elastic than nonusers of coupons and that the opportunity cost of time and other household resource variables are determinant factors in consumers decisions implications derived from the model are tested using diary panel data

the rational effect of price promotions on sales and consumption we explore the rational effect of price variation on sales and consumption in markets where consumers are uncertain about the future price of goods we first derive an optimal ordering policy which expresses the amount a consumer should purchase and consume in a given period as a function of the observed price of the good the distribution of future prices and the nature of his or her inventory this policy extends previous normative models of inventory control such as those by golabi 1985 and kalymon 1970 to the case where the amount to consume in a given period is an explicit decision variable and prices follow a first order stochastic process we then use this model to explore how changes in the long run frequency and temporal correlations of price promotions should normatively affect the contemporaneous relationship between purchase consumption and price among the predictions which follow from the model are that consumption should rationally increase with the size of existing inventories the short term sensitivity of sales to prices should be greater than that of consumption to price and this discrepancy increases with decreases in the temporal correlation of price deals and the long term relative frequency of price deals

it takes two to tango equilibria in a model of sales we show that the varian model of sales with more than two firms has two types of equilibria a unique symmetric equilibrium and a continuum of asymmetric equilibria in contrast the 2 firm game has a unique equilibrium that is symmetric for the n firm case the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked by first order stochastic dominance this enables one to rule out asymmetric equilibria on economic grounds by constructing a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this metagame is symmetric

why competition may drive up prices abstract we show that the expected price of an incumbent firm may increase in response to increasing competition as it may become more profitable to exploit a rather immobile fraction of consumers instead of capturing a larger but more contested segment of the market to derive this result we consider two approaches of modelling the degree of competition first in a duopolistic setting competition is said to be more intense if the entrant s product becomes more attractive to the mobile fraction of buyers in this case we find that all buyers i e both the mobile and the immobile fraction may lose if the market becomes more competitive secondly in a model with two entrants competition is said to become intense if entrants serve an overlapping segment of the market for mobile buyers

the bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets a well established phenomenon of consumer buying behavior is that consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference point and exhibit loss aversion i e their propensity to buy is more negatively affected by prices above the reference point than it is positively affected by prices below the reference point the objective of this paper is to analytically examine how the competitive strategy and profitability of firms are affected by the presence of consumer loss aversion in the price dimension although we assume that consumer loss aversion increases consumer propensity to search for lower prices we find that it does not necessarily lead to lower prices or profits when firms compete over multiple periods and when the consumer reference price in subsequent periods is affected by current prices specifically consumer loss aversion could lead to higher prices and profits when consumer valuation is sufficiently high relative to search costs and the proportion of consumers with positive search costs is in an intermediate range we also show that when forward looking firms incorporate the negative effect of price promotions on future profits the equilibrium range of price promotions may actually increase

pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility abstract we examine the non cooperative provision of a pure public good by regional governments in a federation similar to the european union where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and the central government is a stackelberg follower a federation with decentralized leadership the center makes interregional income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments policies by establishing residence in their most preferred region despite the degree of labor mobility we show that the pure public good and interregional transfers are generally allocated efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership

personalized pricing and advertising an asymmetric equilibrium analysis we study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality cost differentiated firms strategies involve mixing over both prices and whether to advertise in equilibrium only the top two firms advertise earning bertrand like profits welfare losses initially rise then fall with the ad cost with losses due to excessive advertising and sales by the wrong firm when firms are symmetric the symmetric equilibrium yields perverse comparative statics and is unstable our key results apply when demand is elastic when ad costs are heterogeneous and with noise in consumer tastes

the existence of low end firms may help high end firms two models of competition between high end and low end products benefiting the high end firms are presented one is a quantity competition model and the other is a price competition model with product differentiation the key factor is the existence of two heterogeneous consumer groups those who demand only high end name brand products and those who care little whether products are high or low end we show that under certain conditions the profits of firms in the high end market are larger when there are firms producing low end products than when there are not the existence of price sensitive consumers who care little about product quality intensifies competition among the high end firms the existence of low end firms functions as a credible threat which induces the high end firms not to overproduce because price sensitive consumers buy products from the low end firms the result provides a new theoretical mechanism concerning the profitability and pricing of national brand firms after the entry of private labels it has an implication for pricing and marketing strategies established firms should not decrease their prices after the entry of nonestablished firms

can a decline in search cost increase prices this paper provides a new explanation of why a decline in consumers price search cost may not lead to lower prices in a duopoly with price competition i show that when some consumers are captive to one firm there may be a non monotonic relationship between search cost and market power firms may charge high prices with higher probability and the average price charged may be higher when consumers price search cost falls below a critical level furthermore when firms have asymmetric captive segments expected prices charged by each firm may move in opposite directions as search cost declines resume est ce qu un declin dans le cout de la recherche accroit les prix ce texte propose une nouvelle explication des raisons pour lesquelles un declin dans le cout de la recherche des consommateurs pour le meilleur prix peut ne pas entrainer un declin du niveau des prix dans un duopole avec competition par les prix on montre que quand certains consommateurs sont prisonniers d une firme il peut y avoir une relation non monotone entre cout de la recherche et pouvoir dans ce marche les firmes peuvent imposer des prix plus eleves avec une plus grande probabilite et le prix moyen charge peut etre plus eleve quand le cout de recherche du meilleur prix des consommateurs tombe au dessous d un seuil critique de plus quand les firmes ont des segments captifs asymetriques le prix charge anticipe pour chaque firme peut se deplacer dans des directions opposees a proportion que les couts de recherche declinent

critical issues suggested by trends in food population and the environment to the year 2020 this article reviews the emerging trends in global food supply and demand up to 2020 and discusses policy challenges and obstacles to meeting this demand data were obtained from the international food policy research institutes international model for policy analysis of commodities and trade rosegrant et al the country specific data pertains to 37 countries and regions and 17 food commodities and prices in the world market cereal prices are expected to decline by about 11 by 2020 meat prices may decline by 6 after 2010 cereal prices are expected to dramatically decline cereal demand will change with changes in income and urbanization maize and coarse grains will be replaced by wheat and rice life style changes may lead to a switch from rice to wheat growth in food consumption in developed countries will slow a projected 82 of growth in global cereal consumption and almost 90 of increased global meat demand will occur in developing countries during 1993 2020 asia alone will account for 48 of increased cereal consumption and 61 of increased meat consumption 88 of food production growth will occur in developing countries through increased yields and 94 in developed countries world trade in cereals will increase from an estimated 185 million metric tons annually to 328 million during 1993 2020 food security for the poor and child malnutrition will remain unimproved yield growth is affected by agricultural research fertilizer and energy use land degradation water scarcity and bad policy water scarcity is the most limiting on yield growth malnutrition problems present multiple challenges

online shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements we study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a nonmonetary cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information we derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the firm moreover we consider the effectiveness of discounts store credit as a means to influence the consumers registration decision finally we confirm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2595 this paper was accepted by j miguel villas boas marketing

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

interregional spillovers in the presence of perfect and imperfect household mobility abstract when households are immobile across regions the decentralized provision of public goods that generate interregional benefit spillovers is inefficiently low we analyze this problem in an environment of interregional household migration and obtain the following results if households are perfectly mobile across regions then the decentralized provision of public goods generating spillovers is socially efficient there is no need for central government intervention if households are attached to particular regions for cultural or nationalistic reasons however at least one of two regions undersupplies the public good central government intervention can enhance efficiency

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

valuing the impact of trade on local blue water international trade of agricultural goods impacts local water scarcity by quantifying the effect of trade on crop production on grid cell level and combining it with cell and crop specific virtual water contents we are able to determine green and blue water consumption and savings connecting the information on trade related blue water usage to water shadow prices gives us the possibility to value the impact of international food crop trade on local blue water resources to determine the trade related value of the blue water usage we employ two models first an economic land and water use model simulating agricultural trade production and water shadow prices and second a global vegetation and agricultural model modeling the blue and green virtual water content of the traded crops our study found that globally the international trade of food crops saves blue water worth 2 4 billion us this net saving occurs despite the fact that europe exports virtual blue water in food crops worth 3 1 billion us countries in the middle east and south asia profit from trade by importing water intensive crops countries in southern europe on the other hand export water intensive agricultural goods from water scarce sites deteriorating local water scarcity

westernization of asian diets and the transformation of food systems implications for research and policy abstract rapid economic and income growth urbanization and globalization are leading to a dramatic shift of asian diets away from staples and increasingly towards livestock and dairy products vegetables and fruit and fats and oils while the diversification of diets away from the traditional dominance of rice with rising incomes is expected and observed current food consumption patterns are showing signs of convergence towards a western diet the diet transition is characterized by increased consumption of wheat temperate fruit and vegetables and high protein and energy dense food globalization and the consequent global interconnectedness of the urban middle class is the driving force behind the convergence of diets the rapid spread of global supermarket chains and fast food restaurants is reinforcing the above trends the growing demand for diet diversity cannot be met solely by the traditional food supply chain it requires the modernisation of the food retail sector and the vertical integration of the food supply chain in effect linking the consumers plate to the farmers plow as a consequence asian agriculture is on an irreversible path leading away from its traditional pre occupation with cereal crop production especially rice towards a production system that is becoming increasingly commercialized and diversified this paper describes the determinants and trends in the diversification and westernization of asian diets implications of the evolving demand trends for food supply and retail systems are presented the paper discusses the prospects for small farmer participation in the emerging food supply system with a particular emphasis on asian rice production systems finally the paper considers emerging challenges for food policy small holder welfare and agricultural research and development priorities

search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets abstract a leading explanation for price dispersion in posted price markets is search costs we incorporate this insight into a model of competing second price auctions similar to ebay by doing so we extend the narrow literature on competing auctions to capture price dispersion and grow the already large literature on price dispersion to include auctions we provide evidence on search costs and price dispersion using data collected from ebay identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to ebay s search tool

consumer privacy and marketing avoidance a static model we introduce the concept of marketing avoidance consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect marketing the setting is one in which sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers who differ in their benefit from the item and suffer harm from receiving solicitations concealment by one consumer induces sellers to shift solicitations to other consumers whereas deflection does not solicitations cause two externalities direct harm on consumers and the indirect cost of consumer concealment and deflection we find that in markets where the marginal cost of solicitation is sufficiently low efforts by low benefit consumers to conceal themselves will increase the cost effectiveness of solicitations and lead sellers to market more however concealment by high benefit consumers leads sellers to market less furthermore concealment by low benefit consumers increases direct privacy harm and consumer welfare is higher with deflection than concealment finally it is optimal to impose a charge on solicitations

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

federal acid rain games abstract federal environmental policy designed to control acid rain is shaped after the hierarchy of the system and is controlled simultaneously by regional and central governments each governmental level controls one of two policy instruments pollution abatement production and pollution tax in a two stage game where regional governments are stackelberg leaders and control pollution taxes the subgame perfect equilibrium is socially efficient but the subgame perfect equilibrium for a two stage game where the central government is the stackelberg leader and controls pollution taxes is inefficient it corresponds to the nash equilibrium for a game where regional governments control both policy instruments

attachment to home and efficient purchases of population in a fiscal externality economy abstract this paper examines the efficiency properties of an economy characterized by strategically competing regions and individuals with varying degrees of attachment to home in an otherwise standard fiscal externality setting regional authorities may make interregional transfers in purchasing preferred populations however there is a range of distributions of resources over which neither region makes transfers nevertheless all equilibrium allocations resulting from the nash behavior of regional authorities including those that involve no transfers are efficient therefore in contrast to the standard conclusions of the fiscal externality literature there is no efficiency role for a central authority

optimal control of acid rain in a federation with decentralized leadership and information abstract we examine some aspects of the acid rain problem in the european union acid rain is a by product of electricity production and the eu is a federal system characterized by decentralized leadership that is regional governments are leaders and the center is a common follower regional governments design environmental policies and the center designs an interregional income redistribution policy in a setting with decentralized information information is decentralized in that an upwind regional power plant is privately informed about its technology we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of a game with decentralized leadership and information is constrained socially optimal

capacity sharing between competitors market competition may lead to mismatch between supply and demand that is overpricing may give rise to underselling and underpricing may yield stockout capacity sharing is a common practice to

are virtual water flows in spanish grain trade consistent with relative water scarcity abstract virtual water adds a new dimension to international trade and brings along a new perspective about water scarcity and water resource management most virtual water literature has focused on quantifying virtual water flows and on its application to ensure water and food security nevertheless the analysis of the potential gains from international trade at least from a water resources perspective needs to take into account both spatial and temporal variations of blue groundwater and stream flow and green soil moisture water as well as the socioeconomic and policy conditions this paper evaluates whether spanish international trade with grains is consistent with relative water scarcity for this purpose the study estimates the volume and economic value of virtual water flow through international grain trade for the period 1997 2005 which includes 3 years with different rainfall levels the calculations show that spain is a net virtual water importer through international grain trade the volume of net virtual water imports amounts to 3420 4383 and 8415 million m 3 in wet 1997 medium 1999 and dry 2005 years respectively valuing blue water at its shadow price or scarcity value blue water exports oscillate between 0 7 and 34 2 million euros for a wet and dry year respectively overall grain trade is apparently consistent with relative water scarcity as net imports increase in dry years however the evolution of grain exports expressed as a variation in quantity and volume does not match the variations in resource scarcity a disaggregated crop analysis reveals that there are other factors such as quality product specialization or the demand for a standardized product which also influence trade decisions and are not included in the notion of virtual water these facts among others can therefore create potential distortions in the application of virtual water to the analysis of specific trade patterns nevertheless from a water resources perspective virtual water can bring important insights across countries for improving water and land management globally fostering adaptation strategies to climate change and to transboundary resource management

tax evasion tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies abstract this note extends janeba and peters econ j 109 1999 93 paper on tax evasion and tax competition by allowing for equilibrium mixed strategies it shows that discrimination is still the weakly dominant strategy for both countries

consumer stockpiling and competitive promotional strategies an examination of brand prices in several categories reveals that the distribution of prices is multimodal with firms offering shallow and deep discounts another interesting feature of these distributions is that they may have holes in the interior of the support these pricing distributions do not occur in extant theoretical models of price promotions we develop a dynamic model of competition in which some price sensitive consumers stockpile during periods of deep discounts a game theoretic analysis of our model generates a multimodal pricing distribution with a hole in the interior of the support consumer stockpiling in our model also gives rise to negative serial correlation in prices this is consistent with our empirical observation of the pricing distribution of several brands across multiple categories in the iri marketing data set we generate several interesting insights into firms optimal promotional strategies and their interplay with the clientele mix market structure and other market factors we find that in equilibrium stockpiling by price sensitive consumers neither harms nor benefits firms when they adopt equilibrium strategies interestingly when price sensitive consumers stockpile even increased consumption as a result of stockpiling does not lead to higher profits for firms

transboundary environmental problems with mobile but heterogeneous populations most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant ignoringpopulation mobility we showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions and populations are homogeneous asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting even without any internationalenvironmental agreement in the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population and showthat when people differ a non cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient we alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient finally we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility butinefficient when there is population mobility

theoretical models of sales promotions contributions limitations and a future research agenda our objective in this paper is to review theoretical models of sales promotions we highlight the key contributions of these models discuss their limitations and outline an agenda for future research managerial questions examined in these models include some very fundamental issues such as why firms resort to the use of sales promotions in mature markets and why the use of sales promotions has increased dramatically during the last two decades also included in this review are models that address firm level strategic issues such as the allocation of dollars between advertising and sales promotions and the relative emphasis on trade promotions vis a vis consumer promotions we also review theoretical models that explain how consumers respond to price promotions and what type of sales promotion tools may be superior to others in a particular market the review concludes with a possible agenda for future research

dealing temporary price cuts by seller as a buyer discrimination mechanism this paper is concerned with temporary price cuts deals sales and specials as a mechanism for the seller to price discriminate between buyers with different intensities of demand we analyze why a seller offers such price cuts which buyers take advantage of them and what the parameters are that determine the amount and frequency of the discount offered in the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature on price deals 1 in section ii simple models of buyer and seller behavior are developed and we show why and how a seller adopts a dealing strategy section iii summarizes the key implications of the model and indicates how the price discrimination hypothesis could be tested in practice section iv suggests possible extensions of the model finally section v gives our conclusions in the marketing literature the issue of who is deal prone has been extensively researched an explanation for temporary price cuts usually called deals sales or specials is provided we hypothesize that they are a mechanism that discriminates between more intense and less intense demanders we further hypothesize a positive relationship between demand elasticity and holding costs buyers with more intense demand with high holding costs are those who will be buying the product at its regular price the low holdingcost buyers take advantage of deals by forward buying the model is applicable to three relationships 1 manufacturer reseller where the reseller may be a wholesaler or a retailer 2 resellerreseller for example wholesaler retailer and 3 retailer consumer we are grateful to michael mussa and albert madansky for their comments we also benefited from comments made by the marketing faculty of the wharton school at a seminar where an earlier version of this paper was presented neil beckwith in particular is acknowledged 1 for a more detailed review of deals and similar pricecutting mechanisms e g mail in rebates cents off labels coupons etc see narsimhan 1982 chan 2 journal of business 1985 vol 58 no 3 1985 by the university of chicago all rights reserved 0021 9398185 5803 0004 01 50

dynamic targeted pricing with strategic consumers abstract we investigate in this paper whether dynamic targeted pricing based on consumer purchase history could benefit a practicing firm even when consumers are strategic in that they actively seek to avail themselves of a low price in the future such strategic behavior on the part of consumers has been shown in the literature to render such dynamic targeted pricing unprofitable even for a monopoly firm we show that dynamic targeted pricing can benefit competing firms when they actively pursue customer recognition based on consumer purchase history this is because in order to pursue customer recognition competing firms need to price high to screen out price sensitive consumers and hence price competition is moderated as a result all competing firms can become better off with targeted pricing than without even when consumers behave strategically interestingly because of this competition moderation effect the paradoxical outcome occurs where dynamic targeted pricing may not benefit a monopolist but it may benefit competing firms we also show that dynamic targeted pricing can expand the market such that social welfare unambiguously improves

storable good monopoly the role of commitment we study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time the literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive for consumers the key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling this stockpiling motive can be present in the case of standard durables as well in environments unmodeled in the prior literature we show that if the monopolist cannot commit then prices are higher in all periods and social welfare is lower than in the case in which the monopolist can commit this is in contrast with the durable goods analysis in the literature on the coase conjecture