when today s rewards are tomorrow s endowments the effects of inequality on social competition abstract in this paper we study the role of inequality in a model of repeated social competition where endowments the resources used in the competition and rewards the resources obtained as prizes are connected because the rewards of today s competition determine the endowments of tomorrow s competition we find that the harshness of social competition is maximal for an intermediate level of inequality and that increasing or decreasing inequality beyond that level monotonically mitigates social competition up to completely eliminating it at the extremes if social competition is wasteful utilitarian welfare is maximized in case of equality a greater uncertainty about the connection between today s rewards and tomorrow s endowments mitigates social competition finally there emerge concerns for others resources that are downward and not upward with the value of high social standing which changes non monotonically in the resources of those with lower standing

the opportunity cost of mean variance choice under estimation risk abstract mean variance portfolio choice is often criticized as sub optimal in the more general expected utility framework it is argued that the expected utility framework takes into consideration higher moments ignored by mean variance analysis a body of research suggests that mean variance choice though arguably sub optimal provides very close to expected utility maximizing portfolios and their expected utilities basing its evaluation on in sample analysis where mean variance choice is sub optimal by definition in order to clarify this existing research this study provides a framework that allows comparing in sample and out of sample performance of the mean variance portfolios against expected utility maximizing portfolios our in sample results confirm the results of earlier studies on the other hand our out of sample results show that the expected utility model performs worse the out of sample inferiority of the expected utility model is more pronounced for preferences and constraints under which in sample mean variance approximations are weakest we argue that in addition to its elegance and simplicity the mean variance model extracts more information from sample data because it uses the covariance matrix of returns the expected utility model may reach its optimal solution without using information from the covariance matrix

infrastructure investment the cost of capital and regulation an assessment the paper considers the role of infrastructure in improving economic performance and its compar ative neglect relative to traditional macroeconomic and microeconomic policies it explains why infrastructure matters why britain s infrastructure performance has been poor and summarizes the scale of the challenge for the coming decade privatization liberalization and competition have focused on monopoly market failure and private incentives but they have neglected the time inconsistency problem which confronts investors in networks with high fixed and sunk costs the failure to commit which has characterized british approaches to infrastructure has been partially addressed through the creation of regulated asset bases rabs backed up by the duty on regulators to ensure that functions can be financed the paper considers how the rabs can be developed to provide credible long term contracts over a wide range of activities and how the financial regu latory regime can complement this commitment notably through the split cost of capital and the indexation of the cost of debt approaches the paper concludes by setting out the building blocks of a credible regulatory framework for infrastructure together with the impacts on reducing the cost of capital the role of the state in reinforcing this commitment and the associated institutions are also set out

a model of educational investment social concerns and inequality we consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains signaling power and social status the latter depends on the agent s relative achievement in one of three dimensions innate skills level of schooling and income we study the three scenarios separately and characterize the conditions under which social concerns increase or decrease educational and income inequality inequality increases decreases if education lowers the stigma suffered by low skilled workers less more than it boosts the prestige enjoyed by high skilled workers we discuss the expected results of some policies in light of these findings

marriage and managers attitudes to risk marital status can both reflect and affect individual preferences we explore the impact of marriage on corporate chief executive officers ceos and find that firms run by single ceos exhibit higher stock return volatility pursue more aggressive investment policies and do not respond to changes in idiosyncratic risk these effects are weaker for older ceos our findings continue to hold when we use variation in divorce laws across states to instrument for ceo marital status which supports the hypothesis that marriage itself drives choices rather than it just reflecting innate heterogeneity in preferences we explore various potential explanations for why single ceos may be less risk averse data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1926 this paper was accepted by wei jiang finance

tax evasion on a social network abstract we relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on social comparison in judgements taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their social network the unique nash equilibrium of the model relates optimal evasion to a bonacich measure of network centrality more central taxpayers evade more given that tax authorities are now investing heavily in big data tools that aim to construct social networks we investigate the value of acquiring network information we do this using networks that allow for celebrity taxpayers whose consumption is seen widely and who are systematically of higher wealth we show that there are pronounced returns to the initial acquisition of network information especially in the presence of celebrity taxpayers

dying to win olympic gold medals and longevity abstract this paper compares mortality between gold and silver medalists in olympic track and field to study how achievement influences health contrary to conventional wisdom winners die over one year earlier than losers i find strong evidence of differences in earnings and occupational choices as a mechanism losers pursued higher paying occupations than winners according to individual census records i find no evidence consistent with selection or risk taking how people respond to success or failure in pivotal life events may produce long lasting consequences for health

saving rates and poverty the role of conspicuous consumption and human capital poor families around the world spend a large fraction of their income consuming goods that do not appear to alleviate poverty while saving at low rates we suggest that individuals care about economic status and interpret this behaviour as conspicuous consumption intended to provide a signal about unobserved income we show that if human capital is observable and correlated with income then a signalling equilibrium in which poor individuals tend to spend a large fraction of their income on conspicuous consumption can emerge this equilibrium gives rise to an increasing marginal propensity to save that might generate a poverty trap

the social basis of interdependent preferences abstract most economists are sympathetic to the idea that concerns for relative position are an important aspect of many economic problems there has traditionally been a reluctance to include such concerns primarily because models that included them often allow such a broad range of behavior that there are few if any restrictions on equilibrium behavior and hence such models would have little or no predictive power in this paper we discuss how reduced form models may naturally give rise to utility functions that depend in part on relative standing there are several advantages of modelling concern for relative standing in reduced form utility functions even when there is no similar concern in the deep preferences it provides structure and constraints on the way that relative standing affects utility and further it can yield testable implications about the way that changes in the underlying environment affect the concern for relative standing we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of modelling social concerns in this way and provide examples that illustrate how concerns for relative standing can affect savings investment and labor choice decisions

a theory of tolerance abstract we propose a theory of tolerance where endogenous lifestyles and exogenous traits are invested with symbolic value by people value systems chosen by parents for their children affect the esteem enjoyed by individuals in society intolerant individuals attach all symbolic value to a small number of attributes and are irrespectful of people with different ones tolerant people have diversified values and respect social alterity we study the formation of values attached to various types of attributes and identify circumstances under which tolerance spontaneously arises policy may affect the evolution of tolerance in distinctive ways and there may be efficiency as well as equity reasons to promote tolerance an empirical investigation of tolerance of homosexuality demonstrates that our theory helps to shed light on survey data of endorsed values

a biological basis for expected and non expected utility abstract a biological model is developed here to determine the fittest attitude to risk with a fixed environment the type maximizing expected offspring is selected this yields the expected utility theorem when translated into a criterion for evaluating gambles over commodities with a random environment however the type selected is strictly less averse to idiosyncratic risk than to risk which is correlated across all individuals the implied criterion for choice over gambles does not satisfy the expected utility theorem and may induce choice of a gamble which is first order stochastically dominated journal of economic literature classification number d81

decision making under uncertainty and the evolution of interdependent preferences abstract this paper finds support for the evolution of interdependent preferences under natural selection from a perhaps surprising source decision making under uncertainty individuals choose from sets of risky alternatives the lotteries may involve either idiosyncratic risk or aggregate uncertainty or both robson j econ theory 68 1996 397 424 gives the evaluation criterion for lotteries that maximizes reproductive value and shows that it does not satisfy the expected utility theorem cooper and kaplan j theoret biol 94 1982 135 151 have demonstrated that when lotteries are aggregate the optimal decision rule involves randomization this paper reexamines robson s evaluation criterion using it to solve for the optimal amount of randomization the solution is characterized and an interpretation is offered that links maximizing reproductive value to maximizing expected relative offspring it is shown that when agents preferences arise from their own offspring relative to the average within the population a game is constructed out of the choice of lotteries and that the unique nash equilibrium distribution of actions maximizes reproductive value journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d71 d81

status intertemporal choice and risk taking this paper takes the position that an individual s concern for relative status is expressed in her preferences we embed this hypothesis in an otherwise conventional model of economic growth and examine its consequences the model generates two kinds of equilibrium in the first all individuals always follow a deterministic consumption and investment strategy such a strategy must be linear in output is independent of payo s and technology and only depends on the discount factor this sort of equilibrium exists when the individual cares only about status and the individual production function is convex in investment in contrast the other kind of equilibrium involves convergence to a steady state in which there is persistent and endogenously generated gambling this kind of equilibrium exists in more plausible circumstances the individual has a utility function that may depend on consumption per se as well as implied status and individual production functions are concave we characterize the unique steady state in such a situation and prove that any dynamic equilibrium path must converge to it risk taking arises not from the presumption of a utility function with strictly convex segments as in friedman savage but naturally from a view of utility as depending on relative status our steady state is broadly consistent with the stylized facts that individuals both insure downside risk and to gamble over upside risk and generates similar patterns of risk taking and avoidance across environments with quite di erent overall wealth levels finally in contrast to friedman 1953 endogenous risk taking here is generally pareto ine cient

status seeking and material affluence evaluating the hirsch hypothesis abstract when individuals hold a preference for high relative consumption competition to achieve social status can lead to inefficiently high levels of production and consumption contributing to natural resource depletion and environmental degradation in the 1970s fred hirsch argued that an increasing portion of expenditure is allocated to status seeking as average income rises this paper critiques this hypothesis from two points of view first we note examples from the historical and anthropological literatures suggesting that status seeking is often important in societies with relatively low incomes second we consider a set of analytical models that focus on the economic consequences of status seeking when social status is defined in terms of the algebraic difference between an individual s consumption of a status good and the average consumption level in society hirsch s hypothesis holds true and growth in the level of productivity and output can lead to declines in human welfare if on the other hand status is linked to the ratio of individual and average consumption hirsch s hypothesis is valid only if social status and non status goods are poor substitutes the paper also considers two cases in which social status is defined in terms of the amount of time people devote to status oriented activities under this assumption productivity growth leaves time use unchanged though the value of time devoted to status signaling increases in proportion to total expenditure

location scale portfolio selection with factor recentered skew normal asset returns abstract this paper analyzes the single period portfolio selection problem on the location scale return family the skew normal distribution after recentering and reparameterization is shown to be in this family the recentered and reparameterized distribution called factor recentered skew normal can be expressed as a skew factor model which is characterized by a location parameter and two scale parameters risk preference on scale parameter is non monotonic and risk averse investors prefer larger smaller scale when the scale is negative positive the three parameter efficient set is a part of conical surface bounded by two lines positive skewness portfolios and negative skewness portfolios do not coexist in the efficient set numerical cases under constant absolute risk aversion are analyzed with its closed form certainty equivalent an asset pricing formula which nests the capm is obtained

uk transport policy 1997 2001 the 1997 government announced policies and changes in administration but the statistics show that little else was achieved road traffic growth was temporarily tamed by an increase in the price of fuel which integrated policies on transport environment and land use this was not sustained so there will be more congestion and more road capacity must be provided a coherent policy on charges was absent though congestion charging will help if eventually implemented little freight was transferred to rail neither integration nor social inclusion was improved london became less integrated and policy on the underground was a failure administration of the railways remains confused there are doubts about the technical managerial and financial feasibility of the expansion envisaged the bus was given inadequate attention the treasury dominates through the public spending control process which fetters local authorities and impedes infrastructure investment proven borrowing mechanisms offer alternatives for locally accountable capital financing copyright 2002 oxford university press

social status in economic theory social distinction or status is an important motivation of human behaviour this paper provides a selective survey of recent advances in the economic analysis of the origins and consequences of social status concerns first a selection of empirical research from a variety of scientific disciplines is discussed to underpin the further theoretical analysis i then consider the origins and determinants of tastes for status discuss the endogenous derivation of such preferences for relative standing and assess the different formalizations of these preferences subsequently the consequences of preferences for status are studied for a variety of problems and settings the last section discusses a number of implications of status concerns for normative economics and public policy

accommodating diverse institutional investment objectives and constraints using non linear goal programming abstract institutional portfolio managers face a diverse mix of conflicting investment objectives and constraints such as risk and retum goals institutional liability considerations fund management legal restrictions institutional cash flow requirments and protfolio management performance targets this paper argues that lexicographic goal programming can be used to keep track of an institution s complex investment goals and will provide a best possible solution for the institution s portfolio selection problem three examples illustrate the applicability of non linear goal programming to institutions differing investment requirements

life cycle consumption under social interactions abstract in this paper we examine how social interactions affect consumption decisions at various levels of aggregation in a life cycle economy made up of peer groups for this purpose we consider two analytically solvable life cycle models one under certainty equivalent behavior and one under prudence and explicitly allow for three different forms of social interactions in peer groups namely conformism altruism and jealousy we show that whether social interactions have any effects on individuals optimal consumption decisions critically depends on intertemporal rather than static considerations this is true regardless of whether individuals preferences are time separable or exhibit habit formation and whether information within peer groups is homogeneous or disparate it implies that analyzing the effects of social interactions in static rather than intertemporal settings is likely to be misleading we also show that social interactions when coupled with either habit formation or prudence can significantly strengthen the effects of habit formation or prudence in the direction of resolving two well known puzzles in the literature on the permanent income hypothesis namely excess smoothness and excess sensitivity

social organization status and savings behavior abstract we develop a model of status seeking in the presence of incomplete information and derive its implications for aggregate savings status seeking endogenously takes the form of conspicuous consumption its impact on savings depends on the scheduling of the contests for status over the life cycle if individuals engage in conspicuous consumption when old aggregate savings are increased we also study the role of social segmentation while social segmentation reduces the inequality across status seekers and fuels social rivalry under complete information we show that under incomplete information social segmentation weakens the incentive to strive for greater status

social norms and random matching games abstract nash equilibrium has been tremendously useful in understanding economic problems in which strategic behavior is important the theoretical foundations of the solution concept often include the assumption that the game to be played is common knowledge an unrealistic assumption in games with many players we introduce the concept of norm equilibrium for random matching games a norm equilibrium is a nash equilibrium that relies on substantially less information than common knowledge of the game we use norm equilibria to provide a folk theorem for random matching games and to analyze increasing numbers of players in a random matching game journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72

inequality and growth in the presence of competition for status abstract we investigate a simple endogenous growth model where agents care about their social status as greater equality tends to provide greater incentives to differentiate oneself redistribution may increase wasteful competitive consumption and lead to lower growth

migration for degrading work as an escape from humiliation this paper develops a model of voluntary migration into degrading work the essence of the model is a tension between two bads that which arises from being relatively deprived at home and that which arises from engaging in humiliating work away from home balancing between these two bads can give rise to an explicit voluntary choice to engage in humiliating work the paper identifies conditions under which a migrant will choose to engage in degrading work rather than being forced into it to work abroad as a prostitute say rather than on a farm the paper delineates the possible equilibria and finds that greater relative deprivation will make it more likely that the equilibrium outcome will be engagement in prostitution it is shown that under well specified conditions every individual will work as a prostitute yet every individual would be better off working on a farm put differently when specific conditions are satisfied there is a possibility of a coordination failure if individuals believe that everyone else will choose to be a prostitute this belief will be self fulfilling in this case all the individuals choose to engage in prostitution which renders each of them worse off the paper discusses various policy implications it is shown that a policy intervention a crackdown on migrants engagement in prostitution if implemented strictly can increase everyone s welfare but when the policy is implemented loosely cracking down on prostitution will only reduce individuals welfare without reducing their engagement in prostitution

first in village or second in rome though individuals prefer high quality peers there are advantages to being high up in the pecking order within a group in this environment sorting of agents yields an overlapping interval structure in the type space segregation and mixing coexist in a stable equilibrium with transfers this equilibrium corresponds to a competitive equilibrium where agents bid for relative positions and entails less segregation than the efficient allocation more egalitarianism within organizations induces greater segregation across organizations but can improve the allocation efficiency since competition is most intense for intermediate talent effective personnel policies differ systematically between high quality and low quality organizations

on the distributional conditions for a consumption oriented three moment capm in this paper we develop sufficient conditions on probability distributions for a three moment mean variance and skewness consumption oriented capital asset pricing model capm to price correctly a subset of assets the assumptions that individuals in an allocationally efficient capital market have identical probability beliefs and monotone increasing strictly concave utility functions displaying nonincreasing absolute risk aversion imply an aggregate preference function that exhibits preference for expected return aversion to variance of return and preference for positive skewness for otherwise arbitrary preferences we show that quadratic characteristic lines are sufficient for a subset of assets to be priced according to a three moment consumption oriented capm

developing transport infrastructure for the low carbon society for the uk and other advanced economies the transition to a genuinely low carbon society is a major undertaking within transport changes to vehicle and aircraft technology are likely to be the key drivers of this change underpinned by a more consistent and comprehensive approach to carbon pricing infrastructure investment is likely to be needed to cater for travel growth but this should be on the basis that improvements in carbon efficiency outweigh the upward pressure of growth on emissions a radical shift in the power supply for road transport to support electric vehicles could also have significant infrastructure requirements and there will be potentially significant soft investment requirements associated with improved traffic management travel information systems and road pricing road pricing and an extension of carbon pricing particularly to aviation create income flows which may help to fund transport infrastructure development in a world of constrained public finances

response to aristocratic equilibria a major point of cole mailath and postlewaite 1992 is that the existence of nonmarket decisions leads naturally to multiple equilibria and consequently the possibility that ex ante identical societies might exhibit different patterns of economic growth it was further argued that the multiplicity was not driven by technical aspects of the model but arose naturally from the economic structure of the problem in that paper we focused on two particular types of equilibria wealth isstatus and aristocratic unfortunately the argument in that paper for the existence of aristocratic equilibria is incorrect as the comment by steven landsburg points out landsburg does provide a condition condition 1 there is a positive measure of males with zero wealth that guarantees the existence of aristocratic equilibria the purpose of this response is first to argue that the existence of aristocratic equilibria in environments not covered by condition 1 is important and second to demonstrate by example that aristocratic equilibria do exist in some such environments the reason that aristocratic equilibria exist in a narrower set of environments than wealth is status equilibria is easy to understand in wealth is status equilibria women always accept the offer made by the wealthiest suitor and the parents matching as opposed to saving behavior has no impact on the ability of a son to match with a highendowment woman loosely speaking wealth is status equilibria involve myopically optimal or markovian behavior behavior that depends on only the payoff relevant aspects of history other equilibria in contrast require some degree of intergenerational enforcement since in such equilibria some women will be accepting offers to match from men other than the wealthiest suitor such behavior can be optimal only if deviations from the prescriptions of the social norm result in future negative consequences e g a loss of

forced gifts the burden of being a friend abstract in many developing countries gift expenses escalate with income growth and account for a substantial share of household expenditure we develop a theoretical model to demonstrate how unequal income growth may trigger gift competition and drive up the financial burden associated with gift exchange we use unique census type panel data from rural china to test our model predictions and demonstrate that 1 the value of gifts responds to the average gift in the community 2 the escalation of gift giving may have adverse welfare implications especially for the poor and 3 escalating gift expenses crowd out expenditures on other consumption items

factor pricing in a finite economy abstract prior theoretical derivations of the arbitrage pricing theory apt bound an aggregate measure of the deviation of mean asset returns from that predicted by a linear pricing equation it is conceivable given this bound that some assets might be badly mispriced by the model in this paper a more intuitive derivation of the factor pricing equation is presented which describes the deviation on an asset by asset basis the deviation is shown to be small for assets in a realistic finite economy and is arbitrarily close to zero for those assets with arbitrarily small size relative to aggregate wealth it follows that the linear pricing equation provides a good approximation for the mean returns of all traded assets

running to keep in the same place consumer choice as a game of status if individuals care about their status defined as their rank in the distribution of consumption of one positional good then the consumer s problem is strategic as her utility depends on the consumption choices of others in the symmetric nash equilibrium each individual spends an inefficiently high amount on the status good using techniques from auction theory we analyze the effects of exogenous changes in the distribution of income in a richer society almost all individuals spend more on conspicuous consumption and individual utility is lower at each income level in a more equal society the poor are worse off

status and incentives this article introduces status as reflecting an agent s claim to recognition in her work this is a scarce resource increasing an agent s status requires that another agent s status be decreased higher status agents are more willing to exert effort in exchange for money better paid agents would exert higher effort in exchange for improved status the results are consistent with actual management practices i egalitarianism is desirable in a static context ii in a long term work relationship juniors compensation is delayed and iii past performance is rewarded by pay increases along with improved status within the organization s hierarchy

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

attitudes and allocations status cognitive dissonance and the manipulation of attitudes abstract economic studies of social status have typically focused on individuals engaging in relative comparisons based on certain characteristics e g consumption wealth without considering why these characteristics are deemed status worthy in this paper individuals choose a status earning characteristic in order to reduce mental discomfort dissonance as a result those individuals with the highest marginal utility from income are often the first to misconstrue or abandon these incentives in favor of alternate forms of seeking status the model provides an explanation for endogenous class formation and highlights the role of redistributive taxation in manipulating individuals attitudes towards status

contests for ranks experimental evidence we use experiments to analyze multiple dimensions of the relationship between rank incentives and individual performance in our experiment i rank is defined as subjects relative position in their group based on their performance in a real effort task and ii subjects earnings are independent of their performance we find that any rank incentive improves mean performance than no rank incentive and this result is independent of the group size in the large group the mean performance increases strictly in all except at the highest rank incentive but in the small group the mean performance increases weakly in rank incentives finally the mean performance is significantly higher in the large than in the small group because of a higher prestige effect in additional treatments in which we do not reveal the identity of the statusprize winners we find that average performance is identical to that in the baseline treatment without any status prizes the last result signifies the important role that public revelation plays to enhance the strength of status the results are important for managerial practices

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

social network structure and status competition in status competition studies the utility of heterogeneous individuals typically depends on an economy wide average indicator of status in our model emulative and jealous agents are embedded in an exogenous network where agent specific reference group is determined by the direct link emanating from the agent similarly to ghiglino and goyal 2010 but in a somewhat different framework we show that individual consumption is proportional to the agent s outbound katz bonacich network centrality measure and equilibrium is generally inefficient more important the negative externality associated with each agent depends on her inbound centrality measure the conspicuousness index a tax based on this index combined with a uniform lump sum transfer attains efficiency

portfolio selection and asset pricing three parameter framework idiosyncratic security risks are modelled as following a joint spherical distribution characterized by a mean vector and a generalized covariance matrix skewness is generated by a single factor for the whole economy but upon which different securities have different loadings this results in three fund separation two funds to span the spherical risk and one more fund to span the additional skewness risk a three parameter normative portfolio analysis that allows short sales restrictions is developed in addition a three parameter capital asset pricing model is provided

competing for talents abstract two organizations compete for high quality agents from a fixed population of heterogeneous qualities by designing how to distribute their resources among members according to their quality ranking the peer effect induces both organizations to spend the bulk of their resources on higher ranks in an attempt to attract top talents that benefit the rest of their membership equilibrium is asymmetric with the organization with a lower average quality offering steeper increases in resources per rank high quality agents are present in both organizations while low quality agents receive no resources from either organization and are segregated by quality into the two organizations a stronger peer effect increases the competition for high quality agents resulting in both organizations concentrating their resources on fewer ranks with steeper increases in resources per rank and yields a greater equilibrium difference in average quality between the two organizations

no one likes to be second choice a decision maker is interested in appointing one individual from a group of candidates to a public position with an exogenous wage he must decide in what order to approach them candidates who are more valuable to the decision maker are less likely to be available the candidates preferences have a social component each candidate finds the position more attractive if he is highly ranked by the decision maker relative to the other candidates however the decision maker s preferences are his private information as a result candidates infer the decision maker s evaluation of them based on the number of candidates who have previously turned him down the main result is that when the number of candidates is suficiently large all of the candidates reject the decision maker s offers including those whom he most values moreover the decision maker s payoff is not monotonic in the number of candidates

heterogeneity social esteem and feasibility of collective action abstract in the presence of individual heterogeneity a major problem with egalitarian partnership such as complete income pooling is that individuals of comparatively high ability are induced to exit the arrangement this is nevertheless ignoring the possible impact of social esteem considerations based on a comparison of members performances in this paper drawing inspiration from pooling experiences in a japanese fishery we show that the exit problem can be surmounted if sensitivity to social esteem is neither too strong nor too weak if it is too strong the lower ability agents will exit out of social shame whereas if it is too weak the higher ability agents will not consider it worthwhile to transfer income to their partners when the arrangement is sustainable the lower ability people strive towards limiting the income gap

the origin of utility sexual selection and conspicuous consumption abstract this paper proposes an explanation for the universal human desire for increasing consumption and the associated propensity to trade survival opportunity off conspicuous consumption i argue that this desire was moulded in evolutionary times by a mechanism known to biologists as sexual selection whereby an observable trait conspicuous consumption in this case is used by members of one sex to signal their unobservable characteristics valuable to members of the opposite sex it then shows that the standard economics problem of utility maximisation is formally equivalent to the standard biology problem of the maximisation of individual fitness the ability to pass genes to future generations and thus establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation for including conspicuous consumption in the utility function

an explicit bound on individual assets deviations from apt pricing in a finite economy abstract ross s arbitrage pricing theory apt is a tractible and reasonable alternative to the mean variance model nonetheless understanding of the theory has been obscured by the complexity of the sequence economy models used for motivation by contrast we give a simple and direct derivation of the apt in a finite economy using an explicit bound on the deviations from apt prices across assets a coarse calculation shows that theoretical deviations from apt pricing are negligible in our economy

positional spending and status seeking in rural china focusing on a remote area in rural china we use a panel census of households in 26 villages to show that socially observable spending has risen sharply in recent years we demonstrate that such spending by households is highly sensitive to social spending by other villagers this suggests that social spending is either positional in nature i e motivated by status concerns or subject to herding behavior we also document systematic relations between social spending and changes in higher order terms of the income distribution we find that the implications of status seeking for spending are not unidimensional they vary across income groups and expenditure categories in particular and consistent with theories of rank based status seeking we find that the poor increase spending on funerals and gifts as competition for status intensifies in addition poor families of grooms expend more for wedding ceremonies as local income competition increases while the families of brides do not the welfare implications of spending in order to keep up with the joneses are potentially large particularly for poor households

a testable model of consumption with externalities abstract this paper presents a nonparametric model of interdependent preferences where an individual s consumption may act as an externality on the preferences of other consumers we assume that individual price consumption data is observed for all consumers it is known that the general consumption model with externalities imposes few restrictions on the observed data where the consistency requirement is nash rationalizability we motivate potential games as an important sub class of games where the family of concave potential games is refutable and imposes stronger restrictions on observed data we use this framework to extend the analysis of brown and matzkin d brown r matzkin testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold econometrica 64 1996 1249 1262 on refutable pure exchange economies to pure exchange economies with externalities finally we discuss an application of this model to inter household consumption data

instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two sided matching with non transferable utility in this paper we apply the instrumental approach to social preferences in order to distinguish among various shapes of preferences for social status in particular we consider the shape of reduced preferences that emerge in the equilibrium of a twosided matching model with non transferable utility cole et al 1992 1995 show that under full observability of potential mates attributes instrumental concerns for social status are ordinal i e only one s own rank in the distribution of attributes matters we show that when we depart from full observability instrumental concerns for social status become cardinal i e also other features of the distribution of attributes matter we also show that the actual shape of cardinal concerns depends on how individuals can deal with the informational asymmetry alternatively leading to upward concerns i e making comparisons with higher rank people downward concerns i e making comparisons with lower rank people or bidirectional concerns i e being both upward and downward

estimation risk in portfolio selection the mean variance model versus the mean absolute deviation model konno and yamazaki konno h k yamazaki 1992 mean absolute deviation portfolio optimization model and its applications to tokyo stock market management sci 39 519 531 propose the mean absolute deviation mad model as an alternative to the mean variance mv model they claim it retains all the positive features of the mv model saves the investor computing time and does not require the covariance matrix this paper shows that ignoring the covariance matrix results in greater estimation risk that outweighs the benefits in both models estimation error is more severe in small samples small observations relative to the number of assets and for investors with high risk tolerance the mv model s lower estimation risk is most striking in small samples and for investors with a low risk tolerance

social organization in an endogenous growth model we develop an endogenous growth model in which individuals form matches in order to consume goods that are not explicitly traded the matching process endogenously generates a concern for relative wealth and is thereby beneficial for capital accumulation and economic growth we then study how social segmentation in the matching process affects economic growth under strong segmentation social competition over mates occurs inside homogeneous groups this homogeneity increases the severity of the rat race of wealth accumulation and fosters economic growth

status effects and negative utility growth this paper explains the observed stagnation of happiness measures through a growth model in which agents care about conspicuous consumption normal goods confer direct utility while status goods confer utility only at the expense of others firms can improve the quality of both goods through r d the nash equilibrium of the consumer game results in the share of expenditure on status goods increasing with the number of times the status good has been improved as the economy grows resources for innovation are transferred entirely to status good r d the resulting long run rate of utility growth is negative

roads a utility in need of a strategy british roads are under supplied and irrationally priced estimates of the rate of economic return to investment are high there is no mechanism for consumer protection and current attempts to record and publish the level of service are inadequate this will persist until there is fundamental reform of the governance and possibly ownership of the major road network the paper argues that the uk regulated utility model offers valuable insights other candidates are discussed for reform of corporate governance accountability charging and funding a reformed charging regime designed to deal with road congestion and other externalities would also help with the carbon emission problem the paper discusses the division between central government new bodies to own and regulate the assets and local authorities even in the absence of direct user charging in the short term there is a case for change to enhance the accountability of the national roads infrastructure provider to its customers language en

why do people care about social status abstract this paper shows that complementary interaction can induce people to care about social status because it serves as a signal of non observable abilities there is a unique separating equilibrium in which everyone cares about social status in this equilibrium a person s social status perfectly reveals his abilities and everyone matches with a person of like ability the analysis shows that people s instrumental concern for social status has important welfare and policy implications indeed peoples efforts to keep up with the joneses may be welfare enhancing

community cohesion and assimilation equilibria abstract we study the assimilation behavior of a group of migrants who live in a city populated by native inhabitants we conceptualize the group as a community and the city as a social space assimilation increases the productivity of migrants and consequently their earnings however assimilation also brings the migrants closer in social space to the richer native inhabitants this proximity subjects the migrants to relative deprivation we consider a community of migrants whose members are at an equilibrium level of assimilation that was chosen as a result of the maximization of a utility function that has as its arguments income the cost of assimilation effort and a measure of relative deprivation we ask how vulnerable this assimilation equilibrium is to the appearance of a mutant a member of the community who is exogenously endowed with a superior capacity to assimilate if the mutant were to act on his enhanced ability his earnings would be higher than those of his fellow migrants which will expose them to greater relative deprivation we find that the stability of the pre mutation assimilation equilibrium depends on the cohesion of the migrants community expressed as an ability to effectively sanction and discourage the mutant from deviating the equilibrium level of assimilation of a tightly knit community is stable in the sense of not being vulnerable to the appearance of a member becoming better able to assimilate however if the community is loose knit the appearance of a mutant will destabilize the pre mutation assimilation equilibrium and will result in a higher equilibrium level of assimilation

stochastic dominance tests abstract we develop stochastic dominance tests of a given prospect compared with multiple choice alternatives we account for all types of preferences the tests are formulated in terms of linear as well as mip models and developed based on bayesian analysis which relies on novel markov chain monte carlo procedures empirical results indicate that the market portfolio is prospect stochastic dominance optimal this implies that there are s shaped utility functions that rationalize the market portfolio

individual well being in a dynamic perspective this paper explores the determinants of individual well being as measured by self reported levels of satisfaction with income making full use of the panel data nature of the german socio economic panel we provide empirical evidence for well being depending on absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework this finding holds after controlling for other influential factors in a multivariate setting the main novelty of the paper is the consideration of dynamic aspects individual s own history as well as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well being