international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

political instability corruption and policy formation the case of environmental policy abstract this paper develops a theory of environmental policy formation taking into consideration the degree of corruptibility and political turbulence the predictions that emerge are that the interaction between the two variables is important political instability has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations if the level of corruption is low but a positive effect when the degree of corruption is high corruption reduces the stringency of environmental regulations but the effect disappears as political instability increases the empirical findings are fully consistent with the predictions of the model

learning by doing vs learning from others in a principal agent model abstract we introduce learning in a principal agent model of output sharing under moral hazard we use social evolutionary learning to represent social learning and reinforcement experience weighted attraction ewa and individual evolutionary learning iel to represent individual learning learning in the principal agent model is difficult due to the stochastic environment the discontinuity in payoffs at the optimal contract and the incorrect evaluation of foregone payoffs for iel and ewa social learning is much more successful in adapting to the optimal contract than standard individual learning algorithms a modified iel using realized payoffs evaluation performs better but still falls short of social learning

racing to the bottom and racing to the top the crucial role of firm characteristics in foreign direct investment choices this study builds on the pollution haven and induced innovation arguments as explanations for firm behavior with regard to international environmental management and argues both need to be integrated this implies that foreign direct investment is capable of facilitating a race to the bottom and a race to the top simultaneously using novel and detailed data we test whether environmental capabilities and weaknesses and other characteristics affect us firms foreign direct investment choices in chinese provinces with more or less stringent environmental regulation this enables a more detailed analysis by allowing country regulation to vary spatially and over time our study finds that heterogeneity in capabilities and firm size jointly determine foreign direct investment and in doing so shows the simultaneity of a race to the bottom and to the top specifically firms with environmental capabilities invest in more stringently regulated regions and firms with weaknesses are less likely to target such regions these diverging effects are both moderated by firm size which further amplifies each of them our findings underscore the need to integrate pollution haven and induced innovation arguments in a joint analysis they furthermore show the relevance of methodological choices when testing hypotheses integrating the above arguments empirically

environmental regulation and location of industrialized agricultural production in europe this paper analyzes empirically the extent to which environmental regulation influences production location in the pig industry the analysis is based on a general empirical location model that captures interactions between region and sector characteristics in determining production location and data on pig production in 43 european regions we find that while environmental regulation may not have a measurable effect on the e u pig industry location per se it is a strong influence on the sectoral composition of the industry relatively highly polluting sectors of the pig industry are attracted to relatively lax jurisdictions which become pollution havens hot spots of hog waste

equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition abstract this paper argues that imperfect competition in global markets creates a strategic interaction between governments that can lead to the inefficient distortion of pollution taxes this distortion can be decomposed into a rent capture effect and a pollution shifting effect the rent capture effect lowers equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to gain a competitive advantage over its trading partner and thereby capture foreign rent through net exports the pollution shifting effect raises equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to transfer production and its associated pollution to the other country this effect vanishes if pollution is perfectly transboundary because shifted pollution causes as much damage to the domestic environment as does domestic pollution the net effect on symmetric equilibrium taxes is negative except in the special case of perfect competition with no transboundary pollution in this case the two effects are mutually offsetting and the nash equilibrium is efficient when pollution is at least partially transboundary there also arises the usual transboundary externality and this reinforces the negative net strategic effect giving rise to equilibrium taxes that are lower than what is globally efficient

trade liberalization environmental policy and welfare we analyze how trade liberalization affects environmental policies in the context of bilateral trade and imperfect competition instead of looking at the strategic distortions that trade introduces in environmental policies the focus of most existing studies we analyze how these distortions change in the face of a bilateral reduction in tariffs the incentives to distort environmental protection may be reduced by this move as a consequence environmental policies may be more stringent also welfare is likely and for some instruments certain to increase

is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier an empirical analysis should international trade agreements be extended to include negotiations over environmental policy the answer depends on whether countries distort levels of environmental regulations as a secondary means of providing protection to domestic industries our results suggest that they do previous studies of this relationship have treated the level of environmental regulation as exogenous and found a negligible correlation between environmental regulation and trade flows in contrast we find that when the level of environmental regulation is modelled as an endogenous variable its estimated effect on trade flows is significantly higher than previously reported jel classification fl f14 f18 est ce que la politique environnementale est une barriere commerciale secondaire une analyse empirique est ce que les accords commerciaux internationaux doivent etre etendus pour couvrir la politique environnementale la reponse depend du degre de distorsion que les pays introduisent dans leur politique environnementale pour proteger leurs industries nationales nos resultats suggerent que cet impact est important des etudes anterieures de cette relation ont traite la politique environnementale comme exogene et ont montre qu il existe une co relation negligeable entre politique envir onnementale et flux commerciaux au contraire nous revelons que quand la politique environnementale est consideree comme variable endoge ne son effet sur les flux com merciaux est plus eleve de maniere significative que ce qu on a note anterieurement

competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous abstract a two region model is presented in which an imperfectly competitive firm produces a good with increasing returns at the plant level production of the good causes local pollution the firm decides whether to maintain plants in both regions serve both regions from a single plant or shut down if the disutility of pollution is high enough the two regions will compete by increasing their environmental taxes standards until the polluting firm is driven from the market alternatively if the disutility from pollution is not as great the regions will usually compete by undercutting each other s pollution tax rates

does trade liberalization lead to environmental burden shifting in the global economy abstract does trade liberalization lead to the outsourcing of pollution from industrialized countries to developing countries according to the pollution haven hypothesis international trade is a key channel through which richer countries can geographically dissociate consumption from production of goods we examine whether and how trade liberalization via preferential trade agreements ptas facilitates the shifting of consumption based environmental burdens from developed countries via imports to poorer countries via exports based on panel data analysis of 183 countries from 1987 to 2013 we find partial evidence for trade induced environmental burden shifting while we observe an increase in footprint exports from low income countries when these countries liberalize trade this is not matched by an increase in footprint imports of high income countries our results also show that environmental clauses in ptas and participation in international environmental agreements do not influence the relationship between trade liberalization and ecological footprint movements however domestic institutions have a significant effect on the trade induced distribution of environmental burdens these findings suggest that ptas as a policy tool for trade liberalization are per se unlikely to induce exploitation of low income countries natural capital by wealthier nations however they suggest that political incentives inherent to democratic institutions encourage environmental burden shifting

disguised protectionism and linkages to the gatt wto member states of the gatt wto have linked some issue areas outside trade to the institution and did so with varying depths at the same time they have chosen not to link other issue areas what accounts for this variation the author argues that states establish a legalized linkage between the gatt wto and an issue area outside it when they are uncertain about the possibilities of disguised protectionism such uncertainty exists under two conditions when diversity in regulations in an issue area across states generates a large adverse impact on trade negative externalities but that diversity can be justified at the international level for 1 having an independent objective apart from hampering trade and 2 when there are few alternative policies to achieve that objective legitimacy states establish a highly legalized linkage in these situations to reduce the uncertainty and minimize disguised protectionism by contrast when regulatory diversity exhibits low legitimacy states establish only a weakly legalized linkage in the absence of meaningful externalities they do not establish any linkages the author evaluates this argument in two ways he provides an overview of eleven issue areas about which there have been some debates or conflicts about linkages to the gatt wto in addition he carries out in depth case studies of three issue areas labor standards environmental standards and health safety standards the findings of this article contribute to a better understanding of international institutions and cooperation as well as of the evolution of the multilateral trade institution

the complex integration strategies of multinationals and cross country dependencies in the structure of foreign direct investment abstract the behavior of many multinational enterprises is not well described by existing models of foreign direct investment fdi firms often follow strategies that involve vertical integration in some countries and horizontal integration in others a strategy known as complex integration this paper presents a three country model that is used to analyze why firms might follow a strategy of complex integration my analysis reveals that complex integration strategies create complementarities between potential host countries that have important implications for the structure of fdi the analysis also shows that falling transport cost between countries may increase the importance of complex integration strategies

an empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy abstract using a new dataset on the stringency and enforcement of environmental policy this study is the first to find robust confirmation of a pollution haven effect in a cross country context by accounting for strategically determined environment trade and intellectual property right ipr policies a simple game theoretic approach to policy determination is described which suggests an identification strategy based on other country characteristics it is found that for the top 20th percentile of countries in terms of growth in u s multinational affiliate value added as much as 8 6 of that growth between 1999 and 2003 can be attributed to declining relative stringency and enforcement of environmental policy the results are robust to a number of identification tests weak iv tests and third country spatial effects further evidence is found that relatively footloose industries are more likely to be affected by environmental policy than more traditionally dirty industries and enforcement of environmental policies tends to be a more important deterrent than the stringency of the policy set

environmental regulation and french firms location abroad an economic geography model in an international comparative study abstract in this study we re examine the pollution haven hypothesis by a fresh take on both its theoretical and empirical aspects the originality of our work is twofold first we apply an economic geography model with the aim of deriving a rigorous specification for the impact of environmental regulation on firms location choice second we test a conditional logit model using french firm level data in an international comparative study we confirm evidence of a strong pollution haven effect for our pooled sample of countries receiving french direct investments however through a sensitivity analysis we validate this finding for developed countries and most of emerging economies and central and eastern european countries but not for most countries of the commonwealth of independent states and developing countries where a more stringent environmental regulation seems to attract investments furthermore we highlight a forward looking behavior of firms in terms of their location decision making

vertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy abstract the idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade this paper considers strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the traded good including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strategic environmental trade policy has substantial qualitative effects when vertical contracts are allowed the optimal policy to levy on a polluting input under both quantity and price competition in the international market is the pigouvian tax

footloose and pollution free in numerous studies economists have found little empirical evidence that environmental regulations affect trade flows in this paper we propose and test several common explanations for why the effect of environmental regulations on trade may be difficult to detect we demonstrate that whereas most trade occurs among industrialized economies environmental regulations have stronger effects on trade between industrialized and developing economies we find that for most industries pollution abatement costs are a small component of total costs and are unrelated to trade flows in addition we show that those industries with the largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the least geographically mobile or footloose after accounting for these distinctions we measure a significant effect of pollution abatement costs on imports from developing countries and in pollution intensive footloose industries

spillover effects of economic globalization on co2 emissions a spatial panel approach abstract this paper investigates the spatial effects of economic globalization on co2 emissions in a panel of 83 countries over the period 1985 2013 we apply the spatial panel method to address the problems of spatial dependency and the spillover effect among neighboring countries first the estimation results verify the existence of the spatial correlations in co2 emissions across nations second we find that the indirect effect of economic globalization on co2 emissions is so significantly negative to overcome the positive direct effect which implies a negative and significant total effect so our results suggest that being surrounded by highly globalized countries has a positive effect on the environmental quality finally we also find strong evidence for the inverted u shaped ekc relationship between co2 emissions and income

impacts of the us dollar usd exchange rate on economic growth and the environment in the united states abstract this paper investigates the impact of the usd exchange rate on economic growth and the environment in the united states by using a structural vector autoregression svar model the analysis is based on quarterly country level data on the real trade weighted us dollar index petroleum consumption renewable energy consumption net imports of pollution intensive products real gdp and co2 emissions during the 1989 2015 the result shows that the usd exchange rate is positively related to petroleum consumption net imports of the united states in pollution intensive industries with major u s trading partners real gdp and co2 emissions moreover petroleum consumption increases real gdp and domestic co2 emission levels while net imports of pollution intensive products decrease real gdp and does not significantly affect co2 emissions

strategic interaction among nations negotiable and non negotiable trade barriers trade policy is modelled as a two stage game between governments governments choose a negotiable trade barrier in the first stage of the game which is co operative the level of this barrier is treated as a binding commitment in the second stage of the game where the non negotiable trade barrier is chosen non co operatively hence governments choose trade barriers during negotiations with a view to influencing the equilibrium of the non co operative game to follow this proves to be a convenient framework in which to analyse the idea that trade agreements contain loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments trade negotiations induce substitution toward less efficient instruments of protection but are nevertheless welfare improving as long as the negotiations are relevant i e the negotiable barrier is actually in use and the two instruments are not perfect substitutes

how trade related are intellectual property rights abstract there is little empirical evidence about whether differing international levels of patent protection influence trade flows if a nation strengthens its patent laws it could experience higher or lower imports we specify an empirical model in which deviations of bilateral sectoral imports from anticipated levels are related to income trade barriers and patent laws patent regulations in the importing country are corrected for endogeneity through the use of instrumental variables the results of the final equations indicate that increasing patent protection has a positive impact on bilateral manufacturing imports into both small and large developing economies

environmental regulation in an open economy abstract environmental regulation by a large trading country affects the world price of traded commodities a series of second best environmental taxes are derived which explicitly incorporate trade effects for cases which depend on the type of externality the regulating country s commodity trade balance and the presence or absence of trade taxes in the regulated market a coordinated policy solution using both tax and tariff instruments also is derived the practical implications for domestic environmental policy making which emerge from the theoretical results are evaluated

fdi in space spatial autoregressive relationships in foreign direct investment abstract there are a number of theoretical reasons why foreign direct investment fdi into a host country may depend on the fdi in proximate countries such spatial interdependence has been largely ignored by the empirical fdi literature with only a couple recent papers accounting for such issues in their estimation this paper conducts a general examination of spatial interactions in empirical fdi models using data on us outbound fdi activity we find that estimated relationships of traditional determinants of fdi are surprisingly robust to inclusion of terms to capture spatial interdependence even though such interdependence is estimated to be significant however we find that both the traditional determinants of fdi and the estimated spatial interdependence are quite sensitive to the sample of countries one examines

intellectual property rights environmental regulations and foreign direct investment sustainable development has been a popular buzzword among policymakers and economists for over a decade although a key tenet of maintaining a sustainable development path for many economies rests on attracting mobile capital theoretical and empirical evidence into the institutional policies that attract factors remains largely unresolved this paper takes a positive look at the determinants of attracting capital with particular attention paid to intellectual property rights and environmental regulations

declining output volatility in germany impulses propagation and the role of monetary policy the decline in output volatility in germany is analysed a lower level of variance in an autoregressive model of output growth can be either due to a change in the structure of the economy a change in the propagation mechanism or a reduced error term variance reduced impulses in germany the decline output volatility is due to a decline in the persistence of the growth process this is in contrast to the us results where a break in the variance seems to dominate the decline in persistence a change in the conduct of monetary policy the establishment of another monetary policy regime could be part of an explanation for the change in propagation stochastic simulations with a new keynesian dsge model support the hypothesis

international protection of intellectual property we study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy we consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation after describing the determination of national patent policies in a non cooperative regime of patent protection we ask why is intellectual property better protected in the north than in the south we also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency jel o34 f13 during the 1980 s and early 1990 s the united states and several european countries expressed strong dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be inadequate protection of intellectual property in many developing countries the developed countries made the upgrading of intellectual property rights iprs one of their highest priorities for the uruguay round of trade talks their efforts bore fruit in the agreement on traderelated aspects of intellectual property rights trips which was approved as part of the final act of the uruguay round trips establishes minimum standards of protection for several categories of intellectual property for example in the area of new technology it essentially harmonizes

jurisdiction shopping and foreign location choice the role of market and nonmarket experience in the european solar energy industry several countries provide policy support to specific sectors in order to facilitate industry transitions while industry support policies stimulate the growth of their target sectors little is known about how such policies engender heterogeneous international strategies in this article we investigate how industry support policies influence foreign location choices we argue that firms engage in jurisdiction shopping choosing to invest in countries with more generous policy support but that this tendency varies markedly across firms specifically we suggest that firms nonmarket experience exacerbates the effect of policy support on location choice whereas market experience has less of an impact further we propose that some firms view generous policies more skeptically than others depending on the nature of their nonmarket experience we test and find support for our predictions using a longitudinal dataset of foreign investments of firms entering the solar energy industry in the european union our findings indicate that supportive policies stimulate the energy transition attracting in particular foreign entrants diversifying into renewables or having more policy experience at the same time they suggest that adverse policy changes in one country affect how firms assess policies in other countries highlighting the need for policy coordination at a supranational level

environmental regulation and foreign direct investment evidence from south korea abstract this paper studies how environmental regulation shapes the pattern of foreign direct investment fdi and thereby assesses the pollution haven hypothesis conflicting results exist in the case studies examining the most advanced countries partly due to the deterrent effect of clean technology adoptions on industry migration to minimize the clean technology effect we examine the pattern of south korean fdi over 2000 2007 the period that korean firms relied on old production technologies despite facing rapidly strengthened environmental standards a difference in differences type identification strategy circumvents other potential confounders we find strong evidence that polluting industries tend to invest more in countries with laxer environmental regulations in terms of both the amount of investment intensive margin and the number of new foreign affiliates extensive margin a similar finding is obtained when imports are analyzed

international investment location decisions abstract in international location tournaments governments compete for foreign investment with tax and other short run incentives such tournaments can be won if agglomeration economies are sufficiently powerful to overcome investors desire to spread investments as a hedge against risk we focus on manufacturing investments by u s multinationals in the 1980s our econometric results suggest that agglomeration economies are indeed the dominant influence on investor calculations paradoxically short run incentives have limited apparent impact on location choice we conclude that high cost tournament play is unnecessary for countries with good infrastructure development specialized input suppliers and an expanding domestic market