the causes of preference reversal observed preference reversal cannot be adequately explained by violations of independence the reduction axiom or transitivity the primary cause of preference reversal is the failure of procedure invariance especially the overpricing of low probability high payoff bets this result violates regret theory and generalized nonindependent utility models preference reversal and a new reversal involving time preferences are explained by scale compatibility which implies that payoffs are weighted more heavily in pricing than in choice copyright 1990 by american economic association

non transitive choice event splitting effects or framing effects recent studies have examined possible causes of the robust empirical failure of the transitivity axiom of expected utility theory by pitting regret aversion against alternative explanations such as event splitting effects these tests show that cycles replicate when the latter are controlled but are sensitive to changes in problem representation the control for event splitting effects however does not rule out their contribution to cyclical choices in some circumstances an experiment is reported which investigates this possibility cyclical choices are observed that cannot be due to event splitting effects but appear attributable to within event and between act evaluations of decision problems plus framing effects

planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect abstract central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information the firm in general has more information about its productive possibilities than the central planner from now on for short cp this justifies the use of incentives schemes in which the cp does not directly fix activity levels casual observation of such existing schemes suggests that the time dimensions is crucial for their working typically the cp revises the incentive scheme over time to take into account the information provided by the firm s performance managers of centrally planned economies as well as economists have long recognized that this revision induces firms to underproduce in order to avoid demanding schemes in the future this is the ratchet effect it is purpose of the present paper to study the ratchet effect under the non commitment assumption which we believe to be more realistic the inadequacy of conceptual tools made if difficult in the past to consider such an assumption now basic research on dynamic games with incomplete information recently resulted in new ideas which look particularly relevant for a theoretical analysis of the problem

exploring the price dynamics of co2 emissions allowances in china s emissions trading scheme pilots establishing regional emissions trading scheme pilots in china is a newly transformative and explorative practice in this paper we examine the spot price dynamics asymmetric clustering and regime switching behaviors of co2 emissions allowances in the new china wide emissions trading scheme cets pilots using ar garch ar tarch and mrs ar garch models the regional ets pilots design in china vary widely in their coverage thresholds sector coverage emissions allocation and caps setting methods market trading rules and price stabilization provisions our empirical results indicate that the spot prices of regional emissions allowances exhibit significant dynamic behaviors asymmetric leverage effects and regime switching behaviors in the entire period considered previous market overreactions in the beijing tianjin and guangdong pilots have stronger price clustering effects on future conditional variances than do the shanghai and hubei pilots unexpected market shocks and greater persistence in the beijing tianjin and guangdong ets pilots display stronger market volatility and higher market risks and their asymmetric leverage effects display a decreasing trend in the volatility of the bea tjea and gdea prices the bea and shea prices exhibit significant regime switching behaviors price jumps and higher volatility in addition the changes in the regime switching phases are often related to the political mechanism design and the fundamental market factors those empirical results are beneficial for government decision makers and market participants to strengthen risk management strategies support emission related investment decisions and optimize co benefits of alternative energy environmental policies

the role of emissions trading mechanisms and technological progress in achieving china s regional clean air target a cge analysis in this article a multi regional dynamic computable general equilibrium model is built to study the impacts of so2 emissions trading and technological progress on the economy under the premise of

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

the reform of electricity power sector in the pr of china deregulation was launched as a concept in the united states more than a decade ago the european union commission has also formally announced that electric deregulation must be completed by the end of 2005 deregulation or reform has already been a popular topic on the electricity power sector this paper will discuss the restructuring and regulatory reforms in the pr china s power sector it begins with a discussion of the characteristics of electricity reform or deregulation in other countries including the us the united kingdom and so on it will be followed by the industry structure and regulatory framework that characterized china s power industry during the latter part of the 20th century and the history of china s reform to restructure the power industry to competitive suppliers of generating services in recent years it discusses the role of the state power corporation in the reform and gives a detailed description of the latest electricity reform in the year 2002 the paper concludes with some thoughts regarding future challenges and trends on the reform for china s power sector

erratum standards versus standards the effects of different pollution restrictions when economists refer to pollution standards they almost universally mean uniform restrictions on pollution emissions e g william j baumol and wallace e oates 1975 ch 13 susan rose ackerman 1973 david besanko 1978 however in practice standards take many forms not only emissions restrictions but restrictions on pollution per unit of output or per unit of an input restrictions on the use of a polluting input or mandated use of a particular pollution control technology these specifications of regulations will have a variety of effects on a firm s resource allocation decisions for instance allowing pollution per unit of output as the standard instead of directly restricting the level of pollution gives the firm some choice in addition to reducing pollution it can increase its output to dilute the pollution this paper examines the effects of five different forms of pollution standards on input decisions the level of production and firm profits the results show that the different standards by providing firms with different incentives change the firm s allocation decisions and affect the relative profitability of the standards section i reviews the existing literature on the incentives of different instruments the following section describes the model to be used five different forms of pollution constraints are individually examined in section iii using a graphical approach their relative effects as well as some special cases are assessed in section iv finally section v raises the case of different standards when firms are not identical

cost pass through of the eu emissions allowances examining the european petroleum markets this paper explores the ability of european refineries to pass through costs associated with the introduction of the eu emissions trading scheme eu ets we estimated a sequence of vector error correction models vecm within a multi national setting which covers 14 eu member states using weekly data at the country level this paper finds a significant influence of prices for european union allowances euas on unleaded petrol retail prices during the trial phase of the eu ets from 2005 to 2007 petrol prices are found to be elastic with respect to crude oil prices and exchange rates but rather inelastic with respect to carbon costs the long run elasticity of petrol prices with respect to the eua prices typically ranges between 0 01 and 0 09 furthermore by computing the variance decomposition our analysis shows that a significant fraction of petrol price changes in austria germany france and spain can be explained by changes in allowances prices between 10 and 20

price caps and output floors a comparison of simple regulatory rules we study in this paper a simple alternative to price cap regulation the mechanism which we label output floor regulation requires the regulated firm to supply a given level of output this rule is as simple as price cap regulation and performs identically when the regulated firm is a natural monopoly however we show that in the presence of a competitive fringe output floor regulation yields lower prices and stronger incentives for cost reduction its introduction however is likely to be resisted by the industry since it lowers managerial utility and shareholders profits

dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms prices versus quantities abstract environmental regulators often have imperfect information about regulated firms abatement costs in this paper we compare taxes and emissions permits in a dynamic setting in which firms behave strategically the regulator updates policy over time based upon previous aggregate industry performance assuming that firms are not strategic we find that strategic firms facing an emissions tax have an incentive to overabate in order to obtain a lower tax in the future firms that trade emissions permits have a strategic incentive to reveal an artificially high permit price to obtain more permits in the future whether permits or taxes are preferred from a welfare standpoint depends upon how permit prices are determined taxes generate higher welfare when the low cost firm sets the permit price but permits generate higher welfare when the high cost firm sets the permit price

correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice abstract for two decades environmental economists have generally maintained that benefit uncertainty is irrelevant for choosing between price and quantity instruments but that cost uncertainty matters with the identity of the efficient instrument depending upon the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and cost functions but in the presence of simultaneous correlated uncertainty such policy instrument recommendations may be inappropriate with plausible values of relevant parameters the conventional identification of a price instrument will be reversed to favor instead a quantity instrument the opposite reversal from the choice of a quantity instrument to a price instrument seems less likely to occur

the value of transport safety recent years have witnessed an increasing tendency for public sector and related agencies to reject the traditional but poorly founded lost output approach to the valuation of transport safety in favor of the altogether more defensible willingness to pay approach the purpose of this paper is to examine some of the more significant implications of this revolution in the way in which transport safety is evaluated in particular the paper outlines the case in favor of the willingness to pay approach summarizes the results of empirical work in this area and examines the allocative implications of adopting the kind of values that emerge from such empirical work the paper then considers the extent to which road risks can be regarded as externalities assesses the implications of asymmetries in the treatment of safety on various different transport modes in the u k and finally proposes an agenda for future research in the economics of transport safety copyright 1990 by oxford university press

actions versus prospects the effect of problem representation on regret suppose that you must choose between lotteries s safer and r riskier shown in the top half of figure 1 there are 100 possible states of the world and the consequence of s and r are indicated for each state the states of the world with the consequence win 8 000 are separate from the states with the consequence win 20 000 you may find s less appealing knowing that if you choose it and one of the states 71 100 occurs you would have received 20 000 had you picked r suppose that you must choose between lotteries s and r shown in the bottom half of figure 1 though the prospects probability distribution of consequences of s and r are identical to those of s and r the states of the world with positive payoffs overlap you may find s more appealing knowing that if you choose it and one of the states 1 30 occurs you would have received 20 000 had you picked r but s pays an 8 000 consolation prize a series of papers by graham loomes 1988a b 1989 and chris starmer and robert sugden 1989 provides evidence that in evaluating identical prospects the juxtaposition of consequences against different states of the world has a systematic effect on choice under uncertainty as predicted by regret theory david e bell 1982 peter c fishburn 1982 loomes and sugden 1982 1987a regret effects violate expected utility theory and all other prospect based theories of choice all of the laboratory evidence of regret or juxtaposition effects however has been generated under the problem representation in figure 1 the matrix of state contingent consequences while loomes 1988b p 468 argues that evidence of regret effects indicates that prospect based theories may all be failing to capture an important element in decision making under uncertainty this paper suggests that the experimental evidence of regret effects observed so far is specific to the matrix problem representation nearly 400 subjects completed versions of two questionnaires in which choice problems were presented in different formats the juxtaposition of consequences sways choices but only under the matrix presentation the first questionnaire indicates that regret effects are not observed when statecontingent consequences are described by ticket numbers rather than a matrix the second questionnaire indicates that if the matrix format is changed slightly to a simple proportional format subjects apparently compare prospects and ignore the juxtaposition of consequences regret theory predicts that choice depends on the juxtaposition of consequences but regret effects should be invariant to different representations of state contingent consequences

regulation by prices quantities or both a review of instrument choice choosing appropriate policy instruments is an important part of successful regulation once objectives are agreed and suitable targets adopted policy makers can employ command and control regulation and or economic instruments and choose between fixing a price or a quantity this paper examines the relative advantages of price quantity and hybrid instruments according to their efficiency under uncertainty the trade off between credible commitment and flexibility implementation international considerations and political economy various illustrations of the theory are provided with two detailed applications to climate change and transport policy specifically congestion and safety pricing

regulatory reform capture and the regulatory burden this paper provides a critique of broad aggregate proposals to reduce the regulatory burden it argues that the public debate about regulatory reform and red tape is loose and general with little regard for the complex ways in which regulation imposes costs and benefits on the economy although there are theoretical reasons to expect regulation to be in excess supply there is little empirical analysis to link aggregate regulation with productivity and economic growth regulation is itself a public good and many aspects of economic efficiency require regulation to address market failures the main efficiency issues are better addressed through a disaggregated approach focusing on when where and how to regulate rather than on crude aggregate estimates of the total burden the design of regulation needs to take account of regulatory capture and it is argued that market based instruments and independent regulatory bodies tend to reduce the scope for capture the incentives and employment rules governing regulatory institutions are also discussed in ignoring these disaggregated regulatory design problems crude aggregate targets for the reduction of regulation and rules such as one in one out may be counter productive copyright 2006 oxford university press

on grid electricity tariffs in china development reform and prospects abstract with the introduction of market oriented measures in china s power sector in the mid 1980s electricity sale prices to the grid companies on grid electricity tariffs became the focus of the energy industry thus affecting all related stakeholders including fuel suppliers power generators and end use consumers a number of changes have gradually been undertaken in terms of electricity tariff settings and their implementation to address specific requirements of the expansion of the power industry at each stage of its development on grid electricity tariffs had been used as a key lever to attract investment in power generation at an early stage of reform and then to encourage competition in the power industry in response to the rising concerns about environmental protection and the promotion of clean energy utilisation tariffs have progressively been developed for renewable electricity generation which has contributed to massive expansion of the renewable power industry in china this paper reviews key milestones of the development of on grid electricity tariffs in china examines the tariff setting mechanisms of coal fired power plants and renewable power generation analyses the factors associated with the adjustments of the tariff levels and discusses the options for further reform and more effective electricity pricing

four score and seven years from now the date delay effect in temporal discounting we describe a new anomaly in intertemporal choice the date delay effect discount rates that are imputed when time is described using calendar dates e g on october 17 are markedly lower than those revealed when future outcomes are described in terms of the corresponding delay e g in six months date descriptions not only reduce discount rates but also affect the implied shape of the discount function when inferred from intertemporal choices between options referenced by calendar dates the discount function appears markedly less hyperbolic we discuss potential psychological bases of the date delay effect its implications and other modes of temporal reference

assessing the design of three carbon trading pilot programs in china abstract to help overcome the challenge of growing co2 emissions china is experimenting with market based instruments including pilot co2 emissions trading systems etss in seven regions that serve as precursors of a national co2 ets implementing an ets in a rapidly growing economy in which government authorities exercise significant control over markets poses many challenges this study assesses how well three of the most developed pilot etss in guangdong shanghai and shenzhen have adapted carbon emissions trading to china s economic and political context we base our study on new information gathered through interviews with local pilot ets regulators and experts analysis of recent trading data and extensive legal and literature reviews we point out instances in which pilot regulators have deftly tailored carbon emissions trading to china s unique context and instances in which designs are insufficient to ensure smooth operation we also indicate areas in which broader institutional reforms of china s political economy may be required for carbon emissions trading to operate successfully we make nine recommendations to improve the design and operation of the pilot programs and to inform the construction of a national co2 ets

pollution taxes and revenue recycling abstract discussions of environmental policy and the tax system have emphasized the value of pollution tax revenues which can be used to reduce other tax distortions in the economy however by raising private marginal production costs environmental taxes also tend to reduce gdp and exacerbate the welfare costs of conventional taxes for environmental taxes in consumption goods industries the net welfare change from these two effects is negative unless this good is a relatively weak substitute for leisure an estimate for the optimal pollution tax with full revenue recycling is 63 to 78 of marginal environmental damages

price volatility and risk exposure on market based environmental policy instruments abstract we explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls as environmental policy instruments in a stochastic setting in which agents are risk averse we demonstrate that the assumption of risk aversion may improve the performance of a tax relative to that of a system of tradable quotas and that restricting quota trade may enhance efficiency even though risk aversion in itself limits volumes of trade the government may be able to improve the performance of a tradable quota system by judicious choice of distribution and amount of initial quotas and by trading pro actively in the quota market

combining price and quantity controls to mitigate global climate change abstract uncertainty about compliance costs causes otherwise equivalent price and quantity controls to behave differently and leads to divergent welfare consequences although most of the debate on global climate change policy has focused on quantity controls due to their political appeal this paper argues that price controls are more efficient simulations based on a stochastic computable general equilibrium model indicate that the expected welfare gain from the optimal price policy is five times higher than the expected gain from the optimal quantity policy an alternative hybrid policy combines both the political appeal of quantity controls with the efficiency of prices using an initial distribution of tradeable permits to set a quantitative target but allowing additional permits to be purchased at a fixed trigger price even sub optimal hybrid policies offer dramatic efficiency improvements over otherwise standard quantity controls for example a 50 trigger price per ton of carbon converts the 3 trillion expected loss associated with a simple 1990 emission target to a 150 billion gain these results suggest that a hybrid policy is an attractive alternative to either a pure price or quantity system

estimating the welfare effect of congestion taxes the critical importance of other distortions within the transport system abstract this paper extends the first best analysis of peak period congestion pricing to account for interactions with other distortions within the transport system including congestion on unpriced routes accident and pollution externalities suboptimal transit pricing and gasoline taxes we illustrate how the presence of each of these distortions changes the welfare effect of a congestion tax over a wide range of parameter scenarios in all cases the welfare changes are potentially significant implying that these distortions are important to consider in an economic evaluation of congestion taxes

speeding coordination and the 55 mph limit do laws coordinate or restrain a number of recent papers discuss the optimality of the 55 mph national maximum speed limit nmsl and evaluate the tradeoff of timelost vs lives saved resulting from the lowered speed james jondrow et al 1983 dana kamerud 1983 thomas forester et al 1984 these papers all implicitly accept the conventional wisdom speed kills slower is safer this conventional wisdom leads to laws designed as limits on behavior whereas the crucial element is often coordination people need to do the right things at the right time in relation to what others are doing thomas schelling 1978 p 121 there are indeed some traffic laws that establish conventions of expected conduct we ask that motorists drive to the right not because driving on the left is evil but because it is important that the direction of flow be commonly agreed upon likewise traffic lights are best viewed as a coordinating device allowing free flow to alternating lanes of traffic to reduce the confusion and loss of time in unsignalized intersections for peculiar historical reasons speed laws evolved as limits on driver behavior rather than as signaling devices meant to coordinate it guided by the limit rationale police concentrate on those drivers who exceed the legal speed and tend to ignore those drivers who disrupt coordination by traveling much slower than the norm this paper tests these differing views of the law by examining the current effects of the 55 mph nmsl should it be viewed as a coordinating mechanism or a limiting mechanism i measure the effects of limit defying behavior speeding and absence of coordination speed variance on the fatality rate based on analysis of 1981 and 1982 state cross section data i find that there is no statistically discernable relationship between the fatality rate and average speed though there is a strong relationship to speed variance when most cars are traveling at about the same speed whether it is a high speed or a low one the fatality rate will be low presumably because the probability of collision will be low variance kills not speed

regret theory a bold alternative to the alternatives in their famous 1982 paper in this journal loomes and sugden introduced regret theory now more than 30 years later the case for the historical importance of this contribution can be made

making things stick enforcement and compliance environmental rules and regulations are only useful insofar as firms can be persuaded to comply with them in full or in part we survey the rapidly growing literature on the enforcement aspects of environmental policy the difficulties facing any regulatory agency are likely to be exacerbated by information problems penalty constraints and the evasion efforts of firms and we emphasize the role that recent innovative approaches to implementation can play in bolstering more traditional enforcement instruments copyright 1998 by oxford university press

testing for regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty much of the experimental evidence concerning violations of von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory has been collected fr om experiments designed with conventional theory in mind and does not provide direct tests of alternative models such as regret theory and disappointment theory this paper reports and discusses recent evidence produced by an exp erimentspe cifically designed to test for the impacts of regret and disappointment and to indicate their relative importance copyright 1987 by royal economic society

the impact on electric power industry under the implementation of national carbon trading market in china a dynamic cge analysis abstract as the largest carbon emissions source sector electric power industry is undoubtedly a principal part of the carbon trading market in china aimed at researching the impact on power industry beyond establishing the national carbon trading market a dynamic computable general equilibrium cge model embedded with carbon trading block is introduced in this paper subsequently we design 8 scenarios of which illustrate corresponding industry carbon emissions baselines and free quotas ratios the main simulation results are as follows the implementation of carbon emissions trading would bring a certain negative impact on the overall economy real gdp will be reduced by about 0 08 0 52 in 2030 though low free quotas ratio will cause a relatively high loss of gdp this negative impact would be eliminated in the long run in addition carbon emissions trading would also promote the clean production of electricity indeed the electric power industry would reach carbon emissions peak around 2020 relative to scenarios without carbon trading carbon emissions would reduce more than 1000 million tons in 2030 when industry carbon emissions baseline declines at an annual rate of 2 consequently the carbon market can achieve a more significant reduction in carbon emissions with the influencing of quotas fully auctioned scenario

further evidence of the impact of regret and disappointment in choice under uncertainty a preliminary experimental study of the relative impact of regret and disappointment on individual choice under uncert ainty is followed up and extended in various ways taken in conjuncti on with the earlier work the new results provide further evidence of the limitations of von neumann morgenstern expected utility theory a nd indicate the potential power of the alternative models discussed it is argued that there is sufficient weight of evidence to encourage further systematic investigation copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

emissions trading in china emerging experiences and international lessons grants by the robert bosch foundation under the program sustainable partners partners for sustainability the australian research council and the australian government supported different parts of the project

estimates of the costs of kyoto marrakesh versus the mckibbin wilcoxen blueprint in this paper we update our earlier estimates of the cost of the kyoto protocol using the g cubed model taking into account the new sink allowances from recent negotiations as well as allowing for multiple gases and new land clearing estimates we then compare the protocol to an alternative policy outlined in mckibbin et al brookings policy brief no 17 june the brookings institution washington 1997 climate change policy after kyoto a blueprint for a realistic approach the brookings institution washington 2002a j econom perspect 16 2 2002b 107 that does not impose rigid emissions targets we focus particular attention on the sensitivity of compliance costs under each policy to unexpected changes in future economic conditions to illustrate the issue we evaluate the policies under two plausible alternative assumptions about a single aspect of the future world economy the rate of productivity growth in russia we find that moderate growth in russia would raise the cost of the kyoto protocol by as much as 50 percent but would have little effect on the cost of the alternative policy we conclude that the kyoto protocol is inherently unstable because unexpected future events could raise compliance costs substantially and place enormous pressure on governments to abrogate the agreement the alternative policy would be far more stable because it does not subject future governments to adverse shocks in compliance costs

optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes general equilibrium analyses this paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other distortionary taxes are present we employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which in a second best economy optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the pigovian principle according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages both models indicate contrary to what several analysts have suggested that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the pigovian principle moreover the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre existing taxes this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

non transitive preferences over gains and losses although transitivity is often regarded as an indispensable principle of rational choice under uncertainty some decision models allow nontransitive preferences one of these regret theory is consistent with a particular pattern of choice cycles when payoffs are nonnegative and the opposite pattern of cycles when payoffs are nonpositive this paper presents evidence from an experiment designed to test these implications of regret theory copyright 1992 by royal economic society

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

do non expected utility choice patterns spring from hazy preferences an experimental study of choice errors individuals often have only incompletely known preferences when choosing between pair wise gambles particular presentations of the choice problem may then passively encourage the use of some choice method to clarify the preference different presentational displays can then lead to choice patterns predicted by one or other generalised expected utility theory when a preference is not or cannot be constructed choices will be arbitrary i run an experiment that uses three different presentational displays and incorporates a strength of preference indicator the experiment investigates regret theory as an example of a generalised expected utility theory as preference strength is found to vary by display regret effects event splitting effects and choice reversals are all found to be display dependent it is suggested that the evidence is best explained by assuming incomplete eu preferences which are clarified by constructive heuristics rather than some generalised expected utility model coupled with an error term

dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments a survey abstract in this paper i survey and discuss recent developments on the incentives provided by environmental policy instruments for both adoption and development of advanced abatement technology a main conclusion to be drawn from the literature is that under competitive conditions market based instruments usually perform better than command and control moreover taxes may provide stronger long term incentives than tradable permits if the regulator is myopic if the government can anticipate new technology or is able to react on it optimally regulatory policies by virtue of administered prices taxes and policies by setting quantities issuing tradable permits are almost equivalent the literature also shows that under competitive conditions there is no difference between auctioning permits and grandfathering moreover timing and commitment of environmental policy is not crucial for adoption under competitive conditions commitment has positive incentive effects however if an r d sector has market power in the presence of market imperfections the ranking of the different policy instruments is ambiguous

applying regret theory to investment choices currency hedging decisions we apply regret theory an axiomatic behavioral theory to derive closed form solutions to optimal currency hedging choices investors experience regret of not having chosen the ex post optimal hedging decision hence investors anticipate their future experience of regret and incorporate it in their objective function we derive a model of financial decision making with two components of risk traditional risk volatility and regret risk we find results that are in sharp contrast with traditional expected utility loss aversion or disappointment aversion theories we discuss the empirical implications of our model and its ability to explain observed hedging behavior

the power industry reform in china 2015 policies evaluations and solutions abstract more than a decade ago in china s electric power industry the investment for generation side and power grids was inadequate and the gap between power supply and demand kept enlarging in order to relief the problems above power industry reform has been carried out in 2002 under the guidance of no 5 document by the central government the reform in 2002 has made a series of achievements including the enhancement of operation efficiency of power industry and the fulfillment of power demand all over the country during the past decade as the rapid development of the society and economy the external environment of china s power industry has changed greatly however the pricing and planning mechanism of china s power industry still operates following the requirements of no 5 document this has led to a number of problems including twisted pricing mechanism irrational power system planning inefficient utilization of renewable energy and so on these problems have not only hindered the development of power industry in china for quite a long time but also brought negative influence on the business operation of upstream and downstream industries therefore chinese government has issued no 9 document in 2015 and launched a new round of power industry reform policies were carried out to form new pricing mechanism new policies about renewable energy generation and power system planning process to solve the problems mentioned above this paper has reviewed the history of reform in 2002 and summarized the existing problems of china s power industry besides the main policies of no 9 document were deeply analyzed and their significance as well as backwards were illustrated at last solutions were proposed accordingly and these solutions have considerable theoretical and practical significance to china s electric power industry reform in the future

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

the political economy of electricity dispatch reform in china the transition to a cleaner and more cost efficient electricity system in china is political economic as well as technological an example is the reform of china s method of dispatching power plants which potentially affects the economic relationships between consumers and producers between grid and generating companies and between central and provincial governments historically coal fired power plants in china all received roughly the same number of operating hours regardless of efficiency or cost in 2007 chinese government agencies began to pilot energy efficient dispatch which requires that generators be dispatched on the basis of thermal efficiency using a case study of guangxi zhuang autonomous region in southern china we evaluated potential energy and cost savings from a change to energy efficient dispatch we found that the savings are at best relatively small because large efficient generators already account for a significant share of total generation moreover as an administrative policy that does not change economic incentives energy efficient dispatch exacerbates imbalances and center provincial tensions in the current system we argue that incentive based dispatch reform is likely to produce better outcomes and that the keys to this reform are empowering an independent regulator with pricing authority and establishing a formal transparent ratemaking process

an overview of co2 cost pass through to electricity prices in europe this paper investigates the link between wholesale electricity prices in europe and the co2 cost i e the price of european union allowances euas over the two first phases of the european union emissions trading scheme eu ets we set up a theoretical framework and an empirical model to estimate to what extent daily fluctuations of co2 costs may have impacted electricity prices regarding estimation results for the first phase of the eu ets about 42 of estimated pass through rates appear to be statistically significant while only one third of them are statistically different from zero in the second phase we try to improve those results by proposing alternative estimates based on the eu ets compliance periods

the impact of the european union emission trading scheme on electricity generation sectors in order to comply with their commitments under the kyoto protocol france and germany participate to the european union emission trading scheme eu ets which concerns predominantly electricity generation sectors in this paper we seek to know if the eu ets gives appropriate economic incentives for an e cient and strong system in line with kyoto commitments because if so electricity producers in these countries should include the price of carbon in their costs functions after identifying the di erent sub periods of the eu ets during its pilot phase 2005 2007 we model the prices of various electricity contracts and look at their volatilities around their fundamentals while evaluating the correlation between the electricity prices in the two countries we finnd that electricity producers in both countries were constrained to include the carbon price in their cost functions during the rst two years of operation of the eu ets during this period german electricity producers were more constrained than their french counterparts and the inclusion of the carbon price in the cost function of electricity generation has been so much more stable in germany than in france furthermore the european market for emission allowances has increased the market power of the historical french electricity producer and has greatly contributed to the partial alignment of the wholesale price of electricity in france with those of germany

introducing the emissions trading system to china s electricity sector challenges and opportunities we examine the challenges and opportunities to introduce emissions trading ets in china s electricity sector in which the interaction between ets and electricity market reform plays a major role china s electricity sector is currently in a slow progress towards a more competitive and market based system both equal share dispatching policy and regulated wholesale and retail pricing policies pose significant challenges for implementation of ets in china s electricity sector one of the important points of ets is to give a price for carbon emissions and establish a cost pass through mechanism reminded that the essential of carbon pricing is to put a price on carbon emissions that is equal to discounted value of the external damages it should be regarded as a part of broader policy package for energy and resources price reform this will require that any low carbon power policy should be considered as a part of whole policy package aiming at further liberalizing the electricity sector in china three policy options are identified to incorporate ets with electricity reform under different circumstances a combination of those three options is also proposed to break the lock and reinforce the positive interaction between ets and the transition towards a competitive electricity system in link with current pilot ets designs a roadmap to introduce ets in a stepwise manner is suggested

managing permit markets to stabilize prices the political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity based instruments over price based instruments e g tradable permits over green taxes at least in the united states with cost uncertainty however there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in cases where the marginal damages of emissions are relatively flat such as with greenhouse gases the question arises therefore of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies namely stable permit prices and abatement costs we explore a number of quantity plus policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs they do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments