spatial competition monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity abstract this is a republication of a passage from william vickrey s 1964 book microstatics which presents important results in spatial competition and monopolistic competition

the transition to market economies in an endogenous growth model with altruistic agents this paper considers an endogenous transition from a self sufficient traditional economy to a market economy and its consequences on fertility and growth the transition can occur if private intergenerational transfers are unable to secure old age consumption as adequately as savings on capital markets otherwise individuals stay in the traditional economy unless the mass production technology in the market economy is sufficiently more advanced than individually accessible technologies markets emerge only if per capita output exceeds a certain level given a fixed cost of forming markets the transition reduces fertility and promotes growth under plausible restrictions jel classification e20 j13 o10

imported inputs in an optimising model of a small open economy abstract this paper addresses two issues first a model of optimising behaviour in a small open economy is presented and analysed a solution is presented to the problem of inconsistency between the domestic discount rate and the world interest rate using rawl s criterion for economic justice the resulting model of a small open economy has sensible properties and resembles non optimising models used in open economy macroeconomics second the analysis is extended to allow for a single imported factor of production and the impacts of a rise in its world price are examined the long run effects are a loss of economic welfare a reduction in the domestic capital stock on plausible assumptions about hicks allen complementarity a possible appreciation of the exchange rate in the long run although a short run depreciation is also possible and an ambiguous effect on the stock of foreign equities owned by the small economy

fragmented property rights and incentives for r d where product innovation requires several complementary patents fragmented property rights can limit firms willingness to invest in r d we consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous r d contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around a measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed the multiple patent product involves an important hold up problem that can reduce the overall r d effort invent around options moderate this problem we also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of r d can be to hold up a rival

the social costs of monopoly and regulation posner reconsidered focuses on social costs of monopoly and trade regulation in the united states benefit of marginal changes on antitrust activities equality of cost in obtaining monopoly and expected profit of monopolist elasticity of inputs in obtaining monopoly ebsco

contests with multiple rounds this paper studies contests where players have the flexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage it is found that 1 contrary to previous findings the stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium 2 there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occurring on the underdog s usual one shot reaction function in between and including the one shot cournot nash and stackelberg outcome with the favorite leading 3 the total equilibrium effort is typically greater than or equal to what a one shot cournot nash play would predict and 4 in settings where players can choose whether or not to disclose their early actions to the rival both the favorite and the underdog disclose in equilibrium applications in sports lobbying and r d races are discussed

competition among contests when several contests compete for the participation of a common set of players a contest s allocation of prizes not only induces incentive effects but also participation effects our model predicts that an increase in the sensitivity with which contest outcomes depend on players efforts makes flatter prize structures more attractive to participants in equilibrium contests that aim to maximize the number of participants will award multiple prizes if and only if this sensitivity is sufficiently high moreover the prize awarded to the winner is decreasing in the contests sensitivity we provide empirical evidence from professional road running using race distance as a measure of sensitivity we show that steeper prize structures are more attractive to top ranked runners in longer that is less sensitive races in line with our theory longer races do in fact offer steeper prize structures

monotone comparative statics in games with non monotonic best replies contests and cournot oligopoly abstract in this paper we employ lattice theoretic techniques to derive a number of comparative statics in a logit contest a class of games for which best replies are generically non monotonic using the same approach we obtain several comparative statics in a cournot oligopoly model without imposing the usual assumptions that ensure the game is one of strategic substitutes our analysis illustrates how lattice theoretic techniques can deliver powerful insights in games with non monotonic best replies

economic development and the division of production between households and markets a model is presented in which scale economies give market production a cost advantage over household production but in which market production is limited by the extent of the market the production process is viewed as a series of stages each further refining and specializing the product of the previous stage as processing proceeds the number of intermediate goods increases and markets thin out firms specialize in the early stages of production and house holds in the later stages as an economy grows production shifts out of households and into the market several other changes associated with economic development are also accounted for

efforts in two sided contests the degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two sided contests that in volve two types of efforts while usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize potential recipients of the rent seeking efforts also participate in the con test this is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent seeking efforts by try ing to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize we show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation

bad loans to good friends money politics and the developmental state in south korea why has the literature on asian development not addressed the issue of money politics in south korea how can we reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in south korea before 1997 with reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and 1999 politics is central to the answer in this study i make two arguments first money politics was extensive in south korea both during and after the high growth era second political not economic considerations dominated policymaking this study explains both past and present and compares the patterns of money politics in the early post independence era with those that arose after the democratic transition in 1987 while during the park era a balance of power between businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control the transition to democracy altered the basic business state relationship allowing business to exert greater influence over policy decisions the political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our research about the developmental state

contests with small noise and the robustness of the all pay auction this paper considers all pay contests in which the relationship between bids and allocations reflects a small amount of noise prior work had focused on one particular equilibrium however there may be other equilibria to address this issue we introduce a new and intuitive measure for the proximity to the all pay auction this allows in particular to provide simple conditions under which actually any equilibrium of the contest is both payoff equivalent and revenue equivalent to the unique equilibrium of the corresponding all pay auction the results are shown to have powerful implications for monopoly licensing political lobbying electoral competition optimally biased contests the empirical analysis of rent seeking and dynamic contests

the structure of equilibria in market share attraction models a market share attraction model of competitive effort allocation by two firms is formulated as a constant sum two person game the dependence of optimal competitive effort allocations on factors such as gross profit margins relative effectiveness of effort and attraction elasticity of effort is studied two versions of the model are developed in the first version effort budgets of both competitors are exogenously fixed in the second the competitors each choose both budget levels and allocations in each version of the model an important function of the parameters called the competitive advantage ratio indicates when it is optimal to either increase or decrease effort allocated in a market in response to changes in various measures of effectiveness implications of differences in the cost associated with each competitor s budget on equilibrium allocations are derived

endogenous timing in contests with delegation i introduction contests with delegation where each player hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player s behalf to win a prize are common 1 an example is litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney who expends his effort to win the lawsuit on behalf of his client another example is a rent seeking contest in which each firm hires a lobbyist who expends his effort to acquire a monopoly or a procurement contract from the government on behalf of his client yet another example is a patent contest in which each firm hires a group of independent researchers or university professors who conduct research to obtain a patent on behalf of their employer delegation is attractive to players because they each can use superior ability by hiring a delegate with more ability than herself and achieve strategic commitments through delegation in such contests with delegation we believe delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts indeed pursuing their self interest the delegates may well endogenize the order of their moves and communicate it with each other before they expend their effort we believe also that players take it into account when designing their contracts for the delegates that the delegates will endogenize the order of their moves it is these ideas that motivate this paper accordingly the purpose of this paper is to systematically study contests with delegation in which delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort after signing delegation contracts and before they expend their effort we study two player contests with delegation focusing on not only the equilibrium delegation contracts between players and their delegates but also the equilibrium orders of the delegates moves specifically we set up and analyze the following three stage game in the first stage two players each hire a delegate and they simultaneously announce their contracts written with their delegates each player s contract specifies how much her delegate will be paid if he wins the contest and how much if he loses it in the second stage each delegate decides when to expend his effort and the delegates announce their decisions simultaneously in the third stage the delegates expend their effort according to their decisions in the second stage to win the prize on behalf of their employers we show that in equilibrium the delegate hired by the higher valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart s and his expected payoff is greater than that of his counterpart this advantage of the delegate of the higher valuation player can be explained by the fact that his employer the higher valuation player offers better contingent compensation as it will be defined in section ii to him than the lower valuation player does to her delegate we compare the outcomes of the endogenous timing framework the three stage game presented above with those of the simultaneous move framework the game which is the same as the three stage game with the exception that the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and this order of their moves is given exogenously an interesting result is that each player offers her delegate a better contract in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework another interesting result is that unless the valuation for the prize of the higher valuation player is significantly greater than that of the lower valuation player then each delegate s expected payoff is greater in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework whereas each player s expected payoff is less in the endogenous timing framework than in the simultaneous move framework in summary pursuing their self interest the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort given contracts between the players and the delegates

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

patent races and the persistence of monopoly patent races are important determinants of market structure for a new firm a patent can be an entry ticket into the market for an incumbent firm already in the market patents for related technologies can ensure that no new firm enters in this spirit recent work has explored the implications of patenting for the persistence of monopoly see for example dasgupta i982 gilbert i98i gilbert and newbery i982 much attention has been given to pre emptive patenting the strategic acquisition of patents by an incumbent firm solely to prevent potential rivals from entering the market in this context it is important to distinguish between two kinds of patent race a standard race is a competition in which a prize is awarded to the first player to reach the finishing line an asymmetrical race is a competition in which one player loses something of value if one of his rivals reaches the finishing line he is content if nobody wins but a prize is won by the first of the other players to reach the finishing line if any of them does so a patent race in which an incumbent firm s sole concern is to prevent potential rivals from entering his market is an asymmetrical race and not a standard race the distinction between the two kinds of race can be captured only in models with a sufficiently rich dynamic structure this and other advantages of a properly dynamic model are explained in section ii a model of an asymmetrical race with two firms is presented in section iii in this model the challenger wins a prize and the incumbent loses a prize if the challenger is first to reach the finishing line it is shown that the challenger is often automatically deterred from making any effort to win the race because the strategic interactions between the players are such that the incumbent would outdo any reasonable effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being first to reach the finishing line then the incumbent has no need to make any effort in the race in order to maintain his existing monopoly the reason is that the incumbent unlike the challenger does not need to go all the way to the finishing line to achieve his objective on the other hand it may be truedepending on the parameters describing the firmsthat the challenger wins the patent proceeding to the finishing line just as if he were the only contender for the patent of particular interest is the case in which the firms are identical

understanding rent dissipation on the use of game theory in industrial organization game theory has had a deep impact on the theory of industrial organization in a similar but less controversial way as the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics the reason it has been embraced by a majority of researchers in the field is that it imposes some discipline on theoretical thinking it forces economists to clearly specify the strategic variables their timing and the information structure faced by firms as is often the case in economics the researcher learns as much from constructing the model the extensive form as from

aggregate comparative statics abstract in aggregative games each player s payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players many common games in industrial organization political economy public economics and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games this paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games we focus on two classes of games 1 aggregative games with strategic substitutes and 2 nice aggregative games where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies we provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate the results are illustrated with applications to public good provision contests cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly

incorporating policymaker costs and political competition into rent seeking games 1 introductionrent seeking in politics involves agents who lobby policymakers for potential benefits in a seminal contribution tullock 1980 modeled rent seeking as a lottery game a major weakness of tullock s game was that it lacked verisimilitude to actual rent seeking because it omitted politics the absence of politics meant that the game essentially assumed that there are no costs to the policymakers of supplying rents but as tollison 1997 and others have pointed out these costs are not zero and the politics surrounding the policy decision influence the pattern of lobbying and the rent seeking outcome in this paper we address two aspects of those politics the costs to policymakers of supplying rents and the variable intensity of political competition among a given number of rent seekers including these aspects increases the similarity of the game to actual rent seeking situations and makes clearer the incentives to rent seekers costs to supplying rents arise due to various constraints legislators must build coalitions acquire parliamentary rights maintain a positive image and service constituent interests policymakers in agencies must follow procedural rules submit to congressional oversight and budgeting pass omb reviews and so forth lower policymaker costs should increase the effectiveness of lobbying and this should attract greater lobbying efforts among rent seekers 1 increasing policymaker costs makes lobbying less effective indeed because of these costs policymakers often turn away lobbies empty handed in short policymakers have constraints that affect the policies they design and this affects lobbying expenditures dougan and snyder 1993 this paper introduces policymaker costs in monetary units such that they are comparable to the value of the rent and rent seeking expenditures political competition among rent seekers also influences the rent seeking outcome competition traditionally has been modeled by varying the number of rent seeking agents actual or potential or their relative lobbying expenditures e g posner 1975 rogerson 1982 sun and ng 1999 competition can vary however even among a given number of rent seekers and for a given profile of expenditures for example two agents may lobby a policymaker for the same unique and exclusive political good then one agent directly opposes the other and only one agent can win the good alternatively the same two agents may lobby a policymaker for two separate political goods in that case the agents oppose each other only indirectly this situation is frequent in politics as rent seeking agents compete for space on the political agenda for policymakers time and for portions of a particular government budget in this situation success by one agent does not necessarily result in failure by the other but it does lower the probability that the other agent will succeed competition is more intense in the first example even though the examples involve the same number of firms industrial organization economists have shown that a single parameter can determine incumbent firms competition in price and quantity regardless of the number of firms present 2 this paper introduces rent seeking competition analogously allowing a parameter to alter the competitiveness of the rent seeking game among a fixed number of firms we incorporate monetized policymaker costs and the political competition parameter into the success probabilities of the standard rent seeking game the resulting model is a game in which the agents simultaneous maximization of expected net returns or profits determines a nash equilibrium in their expenditures incorporating politics into the standard game makes the game more accurate because equilibrium and comparative statics depend in part on the politics of the rent seeking contest more specifically increasing political competition decreases rent seeking expenditures unless the value of the rent is sufficiently large relative to policymaker costs and dissipation rates are lower than in previous research because of policymaker costs

a dynamic duopoly investment game without commitment under uncertain market expansion abstract we model capacity building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth capacity building is achieved through the addition of production units that are durable and lumpy and whose cost is irreversible while building their capacity over time firms compete a la cournot in the product market given their installed capacity there is no exogenous order of moves no commitment regarding future decisions and no finite horizon we investigate markov perfect equilibrium mpe paths of the investment game which may include episodes during which firms invest at different times a preemption pattern and episodes in which firms invest simultaneously a tacit collusion pattern these episodes may alternate and are typically several when firms have yet to invest in capacity the sole pattern that is mpe compatible is a preemption episode firms invest at different times but have equal value the first such investment may occur earlier and therefore be riskier than socially optimal when both firms hold capacity tacit collusion episodes may be mpe compatible firms invest simultaneously at a postponed time hence holding back production in the meantime thereby generating an investment wave in the industry such investment episodes are more likely with higher demand volatility faster market growth and lower cost of capital discount rate

general equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor abstract we study a general equilibrium model with specialization and division of labor the market coordinates all individuals decisions in choosing their patterns of specialization in order to utilize positive network effects of division of labor net of transaction costs we establish the equilibrium existence theorem the first and second welfare theorems and the core equivalence for a family of general equilibrium models with both possible increasing returns and transaction costs using an analytical framework with consumer producers economies of specialization and transaction costs we resurrect the spirit of the classical economics of the division of labor in a modern body of mathematical formalism

imported input price and the current account in an optimizing model without capital mobility abstract this paper analyses the effect of an oil price increase in an economy which cannot borrow in the international capital markets current account surpluses and deficits are matched by reserve changes at the central bank it is shown in an optimizing setup that an unanticipated oil price increase worsens the current account and lowers the real interest rate contrary to models which assume perfect capital markets

political culture and discrimination in contests abstract many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize the nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture the main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the contestants the weights assigned to the public well being and the contestants efforts represent the political culture while discrimination is an endogenous variable that characterizes the mechanism allocating the prize we consider situations under which the optimal bias of the designer is in favor of the contestant with the larger or smaller prize valuation and examine the effect of changes in the political culture and in valuation asymmetry on the designer s preferred discrimination between the contestants focusing on the two most widely studied types of contest success functions deterministic all pay auctions and logit csfs we show that an all pay auction is always the preferred csf from the point of view of the contest designer this result provides a new political economic micro foundation to some of the most commonly used models in the contest literature

the assessment the economics of sport the study of sports economics has expanded rapidly in recent years in response to significantly increased demand for sport itself for economic analysis relevant to commercial litigation in sport for lively teaching material in schools and universities and for research into the incentive properties of sporting contests while much of the literature has focused on the issue of competitive balance and how to achieve it there have still been relatively few studies that apply the lessons of the economic theory of contests to the analysis of sports there remain huge opportunities both to develop our theoretical understanding of incentive mechanisms in sport and to conduct empirical research in the operation of incentives in sporting contests copyright 2003 oxford university press

financial liberalization and adjustment the cases of chile and new zealand abstract this paper analyzes macrodynamic adjustments during financial liberalization in chile and new zealand during the adjustment to more open capital accounts in the late 1970s or mid 1980s both countries experienced a real exchange rate appreciation and a collapse of net exports while domestic interest rates slowly converged to international levels this paper develops and estimates a two sector dynamic model with current and time varying parameter techniques the domestic interest rate is relatively more responsive to shocks under imperfect capital mobility while the real exchange rate becomes more responsive under perfect mobility therefore capital account liberalization does not eliminate but rather shifts volatility from the domestic interest rate to the real exchange rate jel e65 f33

the power of money wealth effects in contests abstract the relationship between wealth and power has long been debated nevertheless this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game in this paper we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game two opposing effects arise wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also reduces the marginal benefit of winning the contest we consider three types of contests which vary depending on whether rents and efforts are commensurable with wealth our theoretical analysis shows that the effects of wealth are strongly contest dependent it thus does not support general claims that the rich lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality spur conflicts

homework in development economics household production and the wealth of nations we introduce home production into the neoclassical growth model and examine its consequences for development economics in particular we study the extent to which one can account for international income differences with differences in policies that distort capital accumulation in models with home production such policies not only reduce capital accumulation but also change the mix of market and nonmarket activity hence these models can generate larger differences in output than standard models for a given policy differential we also show how the welfare implications change when we incorporate home production

internal rent seeking works councils and optimal establishment size abstract using a microeconomic model and data from the establishment panel of the german institute for employment research we analyze the optimal establishment size against the background of rent seeking workers and the influence of works councils the theoretical part shows that establishment size has not only a discouragement effect on the level of individual rent seeking but also a quantity effect as the number of rent seekers increases the interplay of both effects together with technological considerations determines whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large establishment size introduction of a works council restores efficient establishment size although it is purely used as rent seeking device whether the employer benefits from a works council or not depends on the degree of contract incompleteness and the degree of worker coordination via a works council the empirical part indicates dominance of the discouragement effect over the quantity effect in establishments without works council as theoretically predicted works councils are beneficial by disentangling rent seeking and production issues thus eliminating the influence of the two rent seeking effects

a generalized model of rent seeking behavior in this paper i present a formal analysis of rent seeking games in which the players valuations for the prize are represented as vectors the players in this game are risk neutral and may not be indifferent to who wins the contestable rent if it is someone else both tullock s original rent seeking model and the public goods rent seeking model by katz et al turn out to be special cases of this more general model

the economic design of sporting contests what is the optimal number of entrants in a race or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league what is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship how evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the nascar or formula one championships what is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the olympic games that should be permitted what quota of qualifying teams to the soccer world cup should be allocated to the developing nations

mixed oligopoly cost reducing research and development and privatisation abstract we develop a mixed oligopoly model to examine the role of r d subsidies and evaluate the welfare effects of privatisation in solving the oligopoly model we propose a novel use of aggregative games techniques our analysis reveals that privatisation reduces the optimal r d subsidy furthermore privatisation improves social welfare but only when the number of firms is sufficiently large implementing solely a subsidy to r d does not lead to a privatisation neutrality theorem or irrelevance result

the distribution sector and the development process are there patterns yes roger r betancourt i introduction in this article we bring together three separate strands of literature that have a bearing on the issue of whether or not there are patterns in the role of the distribution sector during the course of economic development the first strand of literature extends the kuznets 1966 tradition by searching for empirical regularities in the evolution of the share of services in gross domestic product gdp during the process of development both chenery and syrquin 1975 176 and syrquin and chenery 1989 21 26 use time series data for a cross section of countries to conclude that the share of services rises during the course of economic development measured by per capita income kravis et al 1983 corroborate this finding for a given year 1975 when per capita gdp expenditures are converted into a common unit using exchange rates but they find the share of services to be constant across per capita income levels when per capita gdp expenditures are converted at purchasing power parity rates panagariya 1 988 develops a general equilibrium three sector model that explains how economies of scale in the industrial sector and constant returns in agriculture and services can generate both of these results because services represent a rather heterogeneous category including telecommunications and domestic service within its fold the question immediately arises as to whether any of the services subcategories exhibit the same or a different pattern as the aggregate category the distribution sector defined as retail plus wholesale trade is a well established subcategory of services that accounts for a substantial portion of gdp in most countries 13 5 is the average share over the 74 countries and time period 1950 1983 in our data set should we expect the share of the distribution sector in gdp to exhibit the same rising pattern with the level of development as the share of services by juxtaposing two strands of recent literature we shall argue that on the contrary one should expect an inverted u pattern instead of a rising pattern for the share of the distribution sector as development proceeds one thread of recent literature focuses on the economic function of the distribution sector in this second subsection of literature betancourt and gautschi 1988 relying on earlier work by bucklin 1973 argue that the economic function of the retail sector is to provide consumers with a set of distribution services or implicit outputs together with the explicit items bought at retail betancourt 1993 adapts the analysis to encompass the wholesale sector a key finding in this literature is the existence of economies of scale with respect to the provision of distribution services ofer 1973 oi 1992 and betancourt and malanoski 1999 this finding contradicts directly one of the basic assumptions on which panagariya 1988 based his explanation of the pattern for services another area of recent literature focuses on development as specialization and stresses the increasing returns associated with specialization ray 1998 chs 4 5 provides an overview of various aspects of this literature romer 1987 is an early contributor to this thread of literature in the context of endogenous growth models locay 1990 stresses that the association of development with specialization leads to an increase in the variety of products available this increasing variety implies higher levels of assortment need to be provided by the distribution sector and it provides the link between the two recent strands of literature that allows us to explain how the inverted u pattern emerges the production of assortment is subject to increasing returns and by embedding this production in a simple economy wide model we generate a share for the distribution sector that increases in the early stages of development but eventually declines the arguments are elaborated in detail in the next section

bidding for contests the procurement of product development and production services brings special strategic considerations to the buyer seller relationship in industrial and institutional markets multiple sourcing in particular dual sourcing is a likely way of dealing with the increased risks faced by buyers however there is lack of dual sourcing models that analyze the selection and control process in an integrated fashion this omission had led to apparently contradictory findings in agency and auction theory the paper models the strategic issues for a cost containment contest between two suppliers the suppliers are drawn from several vendors who participate in a bidding competition the supplier with the lower final cost in the contest wins a larger share of the pooled profit fee propositions are derived for the optimal cost plus contest and comparisons are made with the common incentive contract for the integrated selection and control model the larger the winner s share the greater the effort the buyer can make a credible commitment to the optimal winner s share as the winner s share rises however the bid prices increase due to increased contract risk this incentive risk tradeoff determines a the optimal winner s share that minimizes expected procurement price b the corresponding profit fee bid by suppliers c the ensuing cost control effort and d the final price for the procurement comparisons with the common incentive contract tell us when the cost plus contest induces more effort and when bidding for a contest results in a lower final procurement price

selection in dynamic entry games abstract this paper proposes a game theoretic framework to study dynamic competition with entry deterrence sufficient conditions are given such that the competition process results in the most efficient firm being eventually selected we show this selection property for asymmetric firms to be the natural economic extension to the rent dissipation property obtained for symmetric firms this framework is used to discuss previous models in which the selection property had not been studied dynamic limit pricing and capacity renewal or may fail to hold quantity competition journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l12

on the limits to rent seeking waste the general equilibrium framework developed in this paper for analyzing the limits to rent seeking waste goes beyond the existing literature by incorporating tax financed public subsidies and rent protecting activities into a rent seeking environment we show that the limits to rent seeking waste depend on the extent to which government subsidizes rent seekers and rent defenders through tax financed grants contracts and favors as observed by tullock 1967 the diversion of resources toward efforts to acquire a monopoly rent causes a social waste in addition to the excess burden of monopoly pricing measured by the harberger triangle in the absence of government subsidies to rent seeking and under competitive conditions this additional waste cannot exceed the maximum monopoly rent attainable however if government subsidizes expenditures on rent seeking then the additional waste can exceed the tullock rectangle of monopoly rent and in the limit equal the economy s maximum potential social surplus

spatial preemption with finitely lived equipments abstract this paper proposes a dynamic approach to potential competition in a spatial framework where productive investments are location specific and have finite duration we define a notion of strategic sustainability against multiple entries in which spatial preemption comes from anticipated renewal policies of plants we show that in an infinite horizon model with no discounting potential competition leads to average cost renewal but a positive value can be attached to incumbency the conditions for the existence of such strategically sustainable structures are determined in the model of the circular city under mill or discriminatory pricing rules our results are finally related to the usual two stage notion of free entry equilibrium in spatial models

strategic r d policy this paper uses a natural extension of lee and wilde s 1980 model to show that the outcome of technological competition between firms or countries depends on the resolution of two forces the profit incentive and the competitive threat using a duopoly model of a patent race the paper illustrates that by understanding the relative strength of these two forces one can not only go a long way to understanding the outcome of these races but also obtain crucial insights into the desirability of various r d policies the particular example considered in the paper is the subsidizing of r d effort copyright 1989 by royal economic society

reexamining efficient rent seeking in laboratory markets given millner and pratt s 1989 finding of behavior inconsistent with theory we reexamine efficient rent seeking in experimental markets we show that a when r 3 no nash equilibrium exists and therefore behavior has no theoretical benchmark to judge consistency and b when r 1 with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix rent seeking behavior is consistent with both nash equilibrium and dissipation hypotheses

entry exit and imperfect competition in the long run an infinite horizon stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed simple examples provide insights into 1 the relationship between sunk costs and industry concentration 2 entry when current profits are negative and 3 the relationship between entry and the length of the product cycle a subgame perfect nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite horizon equilibria this equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history under very general conditions it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

a dynamic game of r and d patent protection and competitive behavior a theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to r and d in an n firm industry is developed using differential games this technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem static game theory and optimal control the use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the nash equilibrium in investment rules this paper addresses the problem of resource allocation to research and development among the important issues that a firm engaging in r and d must evaluate are uncertainty regarding the feasibility and profitability of a particular innovation the possibility of a protracted development period the possibility that a rival firm may innovate first capturing either a patent or a significant share of the new market the possibility that a rival firm may imitate the innovation and appropriate some of the profits in the new market in what follows we will develop a theory of optimal resource allocation to research and development which incorporates the aspects of r and d enumerated above we will use a dynamic game theoretic analysis determining the nash equilibrium strategies for n identical firms the availability of perfect patent protection is shown to accelerate development of the innovation and the effect of increasing rivalry is addressed the impact of increasing rivalry on nash equilibrium investment in r and d depends upon the degree of appropriability of rewards if patent protection is perfect then increasing the number of nash rivals results in increased r and d effort however when imitation is rewarded the opposite may be true finally some notions of competitive and perfectly competitive equilibrium are examined in the context of the model developed below

a tug of war team contest this paper analyzes a tug of war contest between two teams in each round of the tug of war a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug of war there exists a unique markov perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player s valuation and the current state of the tug of war we derive rich comparative statics for this equilibrium by using the fact that the state of the tug of war evolves according to a time homogeneous absorbing markov chain

the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games i theory the article presents information about the existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games in this paper and its sequel presents study the existence of nash equilibrium in games where agents payoff functions are discontinuous the enquiry is motivated by a number of recent studies that have uncovered serious existence problems in seemingly innocuous economic games in the sequel to this paper authors have explained the utility function in the economic games referred to earlier are neither continuous nor quasi concave however they demonstrate that the payoff functions in mildly modified versions of these constructs exhibit two weaker forms of continuity which together with the requirement of quasi concavity suffice for the existence of an equilibrium from this one may conclude that at least in the modified versions of these models discontinuities in the payoff functions are not the real source of the problem rather it is the failure of the payoff functions to the quasi concave which is responsible for the non existence of equilibrium these observations bear on the existence of nash equilibrium in pure strategies

the dynamics of smithian growth this paper analyzes the evolution of an economy where growth is driven by increased specialization caused by the geographical expansion of markets it proves that such smithian growth exhibits generic threshold behavior below a critical density of transport linkages the economy is split into isolated local markets with limited specialization above the critical density these markets begin to fuse into a large economywide market causing growth to accelerate this allows an explicit test of the consensus among historians of sung dynasty china that the economic revolution during that period was a result of commercialization caused by the creation of a national waterway network

the extent of the market and stages of agricultural specialization this paper provides empirical evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship between crop specialization in a village economy and the extent of the market size of the urban market relevant for the village the results suggest that the portfolio of crops in a village economy becomes more diversified initially as the extent of the market increases however after the market size reaches a threshold the production structure becomes specialized again this evidence on the stages of agricultural diversification is consistent with the stages of diversification identified in the recent literature for the economy as a whole and also for the manufacturing sector the evidence highlights the importance of improving farmers access to markets through investment in transport infrastructure and removal of barriers to trading

rule changes and competitive balance in formula one motor racing this article provides an economic explanation of the frequent rule changes in the formula one f1 motor racing series in a two stage model the fia the organizer of the f1 first decides whether to change the rules or not and then the racing teams compete in a contest it turns out that a rule change reduces the teams performances but also improves competitive balance between the teams the rule change is implemented if the fia s revenue gain from the latter effect overcompensates the fia s revenue loss from the former effect we provide empirical evidence from f1 seasons in the period 1950 to 2005 which supports the main implications of the model

equilibrium contingent compensation in contests with delegation we consider two player contests in which each player hires a delegate who expends his effort to win a prize on the player s behalf endogenizing delegation contracts we focus on the equilibrium contracts between the players and their delegates we first show that each player s equilibrium contract is a no win no pay contract then we examine the delegates equilibrium compensation spreads effort levels probabilities of winning expected payoffs and the players equilibrium expected payoffs we show that economic rents for the delegates may exist

incentives in lottery contests with draws abstract we investigate the incentive consequences of introducing the possibility of draws into lottery contests equilibrium total effort unambiguously decreases when draws are introduced whereas the equilibrium expected winner s effort increases when the contestants valuations of the prize become sufficiently dispersed

do the economies of specialization justify the work ethics an examination of buchanan s hypothesis buchanan 1991 1994 proposes an interesting hypothesis explaining the prevalence of an ethic encouraging more work economies of specialization mean that more division of labour may increase productivity if everyone works more it increases the extent of the market which enables higher degree of division of labour and hence higher productivity individual choice between leisure and work thus results in a sub optimal level of work one way to counteract this is to maintain a work ethic this chapter examines the validity and significance of this hypothesis in the yang ng framework of inframarginal analysis a simultaneous artificial decrease in preference for leisure by all individuals decreases intrinsic utility evaluated at the original preference however using a more realistic model allowing for both home and firm market production developed by ng and zhang 2005 and discussed in chapter 9 a strong support is provided for buchanan s hypothesis as a shift in preference by everyone from leisure to market goods produced under increasing returns average cost pricing increases utility even if evaluated in accordance with the original preference buchanan s thesis probably has more relevance in ancient times when the work ethics originated but is less significant in the current world of global trade where the billions of individuals involved is sufficient to sustain specialization without artificial encouragement of additional work effort on the contrary the competition for relative standing the materialistic bias caused by our accumulation instinct and advertising and the environmental disruption of material production and consumption suggest that the discouragement of long working week may be more conducive to welfare

specialization household production and the measurement of economic growth our concern in this paper is with the measurement of economic growth or more precisely the mismeasurement of growth that may occur from ignoring household production as an economy develops production shifts from households to markets traditional measures of economic growth which ignore most household production may therefore be biased upward the existence of household production also complicates international comparisons of real gnp as there are significant differences in the relative size of the household sector across developed and developing economies there is an extensive empirical literature on the size of the household sector most estimates place the value of household production in the united states for recent years at 30 40 percent of gnp 2 previous studies have found that the relative size of the household sector has remained fairly constant over time implying that measured growth rates provide a reasonable proxy for overall growth rates existing estimates of household production however have little theoretical grounding for the most part they also ignore the use of capital in the household sector in addition most estimates relate to a single point in time 3 finally existing studies relate to time periods after which the large movements out of the household and into the market may have taken place in this paper we provide new estimates of the value added in household production for selected years from 1930 to 1985 we find that the relative size of the household sector in recent times is smaller than is commonly estimated we also find contrary to the results of others that the relative size of the household sector has fallen continuously since 1930 we conclude that real per capita output has grown from 1930 to 1985 at a rate that is significantly below the rate implied by conventional measures of output we develop in the next section a formal model of household production which we hope will help us to clear up such issues as the appropriate value to impute to household labor how to treat time spent transacting and how to deflate household production in order to obtain real output the model is not a general equilibrium model its role is not to derive implications for growth but rather to guide us in our accounting exercise

on being asset constrained in litigation contests this paper establishes that being asset constrained may be advantageous for defendants in litigation contests an active asset constraint of defendants i may increase decrease defendant plaintiff contest effort ii may lower the sum of plaintiff and defendant contest effort iii lowers expected defendant payment and iv makes a symmetric contest asymmetric

contest efforts in light of behavioural considerations this study shows that distortion of probabilities is a possible reason for rent under dissipation incontests with relatively small number of participants such distortion may also result however inover dissipation of the contested rent focusing on contests with homogeneous contestants and thecommonly studied contest success function our main results clarify under what circumstances i rents are more under dissipated relative to the standard situation where probabilities are notdistorted ii rents are under dissipated yet less intensely relative to the standard situation whereprobabilities are not distorted iii rents are over dissipated and iv the contest does not possess asymmetric interior equilibrium in pure strategies

risk taking in selection contests abstract we study contests where the strategic variable is the degree of risk taking rather than the amount of effort the selection efficiency of such contests is examined we show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by limiting the competition in two ways by having a small number of contestants and by restricting contestant quality

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

bertrand edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms abstract we examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and there is discrete pricing if firms are symmetric then for a large class of residual demand functions there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever for a fixed grid size the number of firms is sufficiently large moreover this equilibrium price is within a grid unit of the competitive price the results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the tie breaking rule is weakly manipulable

the incidence of overdissipation in rent seeking contests tullock s analysis of rent seeking and overdissipation is reconsidered we show that while equilibrium strategies do not permit overdissipation in expectation for particular realizations of players mixed strategies the total amount spent competing for rents can exceed the value of the prize we also show that the cross sectional incidence of overdissipation in the perfectly discriminating contest ranges from 0 50 to 0 44 as the number of players increases from two to infinity thus even though the original analysis of overdissipation is flawed there are instances in which rent seekers spend more than the prize is worth

preemption and rent dissipation under price competition abstract we study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous price competition on a market of finite size driven by stochastic taste shocks different patterns of equilibria may arise depending on the importance of the real option effect if the average growth rate of the market is close to the risk free rate or if the volatility of demand shocks is high no dissipation of rents occurs in equilibrium despite instantaneous price competition if these conditions do not hold the equilibrium investment timing is suboptimal and the firms long run capacities may depend on the initial market conditions our conclusions contrast sharply with standard rent dissipation results

ambiguous political power and contest efforts when there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power only one of which determines the contests winning probabilities our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants aggregate effort in a symmetric simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power specifically we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants private signals i e the probability that a signal is correct and the degree of correlation between them our benchmark case is the standard tullock s model in which the source of power is known i e the contestants signals are perfectly informative we show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative however in any intermediate case the contestants aggregate effort is lower provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated in other words there is a u shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest the lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0 85 in this case efforts are reduced by about one fifth in comparison with the benchmark case from a rent dissipation of 50 to slightly over 40

firms r d decisions under incomplete information abstract the paper considers a patent race in which firms do not know their relative positions in this setting firms that start in the same position proceed at the highest possible speed and if one firm has an initial advantage it preempts the rival but at the cost of dissipating a significant part of its monopoly rent so the paper shows that incomplete information in a patent race leads to rent dissipation the latter is higher the higher the value of the prize and the lower the cost of r d thus for innovations that provide relatively high profits the time to discovery is shortened but the social losses are likely to be high due to duplication of effort

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed

preemptive investments under uncertainty credibility and first mover advantages we present a continuous time game in which two firms must decide at each instant of time whether to be in or out of a market that expands up to a random maturity date and declines thereafter firms are initially inactive and they differ only in the opportunity costs of using their assets e g owing to different redeployment or resale values after characterizing the unique markov perfect equilibrium of the entry and exit game under demand uncertainty we challenge the result that the threat of preemption can partially or even totally dissipate a first mover advantage when post entry profits can be negative the preemption threat of a firm may become weaker because its rival may force it out of the market after entering as a result there may be little or no dissipation of the first mover advantage when post investment profits are not assumed to be always positive

the elementary economics of social dilemmas a social dilemma is in essence a prisoners dilemma in a continuous strategy space i discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention offer an elementary diagrammatic synthesis of them and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture including incentives for pre commitment finally i model pre commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences l economie elementaire des dilemmes sociaux un dilemme social est essentiellement un dilemme du prisonnier dans un espace continu de strategie l auteur discute d un certain nombre de dilemmes sociaux qui ont retenu son attention il en propose une synthese graphique elementaire et discute certaines des suggestions economiques qui decoulent de ces diagrammes comme par exemple les incitations a se pre engager finalement l auteur construit un modele de pre engagement par delegation et relie ses resultats a la litterature sur l evolution des references

comparative statics of contests and rent seeking games this paper develops the comparative statics properties of a contest encountered in patent races and rent seeking games the author shows that symmetric equilibrium expenditure and profit per player decrease with the number of competitors and the discount rate but increase with the value of the prize a fundamental lemma established in the paper shows that a stability condition usually imposed on the model is automatically satisfied the author identifies a class of likelihood or hazard rate functions for which aggregate expenditure increases with the number of competitors and total profits converge to zero copyright 1997 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the division of labor coordination costs and knowledge this paper considers specialization and the division of labor a more extensive division of labor raises productivity because returns to the time spent on tasks are usually greater to workers who concentrate on a narrower range of skills the traditional discussion of the division of labor emphasizes the limitations to specialization imposed by the extent of the market we claim that the degree of specialization is more often determined by other considerations especially emphasized are various costs of coordinating specialized workers who perform complementary tasks and the amount of general knowledge available