reciprocal relationships and mechanism design we study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves we model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players commitments we differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down we fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment we use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non participants the difference stems from the players ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts we discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal

prices and the winner s curse we usually assume that increases in supply allocation by rationing and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices but all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common value assets are sold furthermore when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these anomalies for symmetric buyers small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions we illustrate our results in the wallet game and in another new game we introduce the maximum game

repeated auctions with impatient bidders and externalities author affiliation ki eun rhee krhee kdischool ac kr acknowledgment i am grateful to kyle bagwell for providing invaluable advice and support throughout the research process i also thank michael riordan eiichi miyagawa and two anonymous referees for helpful comments 1 introductioncollusive bidding behavior has been conventionally studied in a static setup often relying on some unspecified repeated interaction story for the enforcement of a cartel 1 it is not clear however whether the results from static auctions immediately carry over to a repeated setup when bidders are impatient and the enforcement or the participation constraint is binding moreover many empirical analyses for detecting collusion rely on an explicitly repeated structure rendering a theoretical analysis of collusion in a repeated setup necessary 2 several recent theoretical developments in repeated auctions have been made by aoyagi 2003 2007 skrzypacz and hopenhayn 2004 and blume and heidhues 2006 taking standard auctions as stage games these articles present various collusive bidding schemes with asymmetric punishments that outperform the bid rotation scheme which is known to be optimal in static auctions mcafee and mcmillan 1992 this article studies collusive bidding behavior in repeated auctions among both patient and impatient bidders when the outside option of the participation constraint is endogenized because of externalities a stage game involves negative externalities among the bidders when any losing bidder is worse off if a rival wins the good than if no one wins it auctions with externalities have been introduced most notably by jehiel and moldovanu 1996 and jehiel moldovanu and stacchetti 1996 these auctions describe environments in which the outcomes of auctions affect the nature of ensuing market interactions among potential bidders a wide variety of situations in which bidders are a set of oligopoly firms competing in the same market apply to this setting for example procurement auctions for highway construction contracts studied empirically by porter and zona 1993 may qualify as repeated independent private value auctions with negative externalities except that the lowest bidder wins 3 consecutive highway lettings were distributed by the department of transportation dot to a set of oligopoly firms competing in the same industry negative externalities may arise because a firm that wins the auction may experience learning by doing which provides the winning firm with a comparative cost advantage or because the winning firm may gain a reputation that gives the firm an advantage in future private sector competition as jehiel and moldovanu 1996 and jehiel moldovanu and stacchetti 1996 discuss the issue of participation is nontrivial in auctions with externalities because the ex ante payoff a bidder expects by not participating is no longer zero as in standard auctions but is rather endogenously determined by the actions of the other bidders thus an analysis of collusive bidding behavior under both nonbinding and binding participation constraints seems especially worth studying for these auctions the main findings of this article are that i there are no bidding wars along the equilibrium path and bidders expect to receive the maximal continuation values when they are both patient and impatient when bidders are impatient the optimal collusive bidding scheme involves ii a lower threshold type above whom bidding starts when externalities are small or iii more frequent jumps i e more sorting of bidders types when externalities are large in both cases seller s ex ante profit is higher when bidders are impatient if we consider patient bidders to be the ones that are interacting in a stable market 4 results carry an empirical implication either less frequent sales or fewer bid levels in auctions that are let out in stable markets will be observed

dynamic processes of social and economic interactions on the persistence of inefficiencies an economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered an exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition at each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability and he chooses a coalition a feasible new state to move the economy to and side payments between the agents in the coalition the setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining coalition formation or exchange economies whenever agents are unable to write long term contracts but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude there can be long run inefficiencies with cycles or inefficient steady states however when agents are sufficiently patient the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run moreover when there exists an efficient state that is free of negat

mechanism design with incomplete information a solution to the implementation problem the main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private value models if agents do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium we show that in such settings any incentive compatible allocation can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism we derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation which implies that the positive result for private value models applies with considerably less generality to common value settings and to situations in which an agent s information does not index the agent s preferences

collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects with and without complementarities collusive equilibria exist in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects even with large complementarities in the buyers utility functions the bidders collude by dividing the objects among themselves while keeping the prices low in the most collusive equilibrium the complementarities are never realized the scope for collusion however narrows as the ratio between the number of bidders and the number of objects increases

markets for ownership the prevailing economic theory of the firm based on a property rights perspective has demonstrated that ownership by dispensable outside parties is an inefficient outcome relative to ownership by productive agents in order to better understand observed patterns of ownership this paper considers the outcome of ma rkets for ownership that operate prior to production taking place the main result is that outside parties will often become the equilibrium asset owners this is precisely because but for ownership such parties would not earn rents in contrast productive agents earn rents even when they do not own assets given that their contribution is complementary with other productive agents their willingness to pay for ownership is less than that of an outside party this result is robust to the introduction of moderate levels of inefficiency arising from outside ownership and to a consideration of opportunities for re sale before production begins the main conclusion drawn is that the nature of the operation of markets for ownership stands alongside incentive effects as important predictors of firm boundaries journal of economic literature classification numbers d23 l22

country of origin effects of foreign investments in the people s republic of china this paper investigates the existence of country of origin effects occurring in foreign investments in the people s republic of china the eclectic theory of international production posits that the pattern of foreign investments should vary by country of origin this aspect of the eclectic theory is difficult to test directly especially in developing countries because of the relatively small numbers of foreign investment projects in a single country the data used in this research cover 1 665 sino foreign joint ventures jvs from 1979 to 1985 allowing a more reliable test of this aspect of the theory statistical evidence suggests that country of origin effects are indeed present in foreign investment activities in china

optimal second degree price discrimination and arbitrage on the role of asymetric information among buyers the traditional theory of second degree price discrimination tackles individual self selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could form a coalition to conduct arbitrage we study the optimal sale mechanism that takes into account both individual and coalition incentive compatibility we show that the monopolist can achieve the same profit regardless of whether or not buyers can form a coalition although marginal rates of substitution are not equalized across buyers of different types in the optimal sale mechanism they fail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costs in coalition formation generated by asymmetric information

business groups in a market economy abstract the purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and significance of the interfirm relationship called the business group first the nature of the japanese business group is discussed it is then pointed out that the business group is not a phenomenon unique to japan and an effort is made to explain the significance of the business group in the context of a market economy using the williamsonian approach to questions of internal organization and the market finally the relationship between the input output relationship of the firms and their group affiliation is tested

stationary optimal policies with discounting in a stochastic activity analysis model we consider optimal capital accumulation in a nonlinear activity analysis model in which production and primary resource supplies are affected by a stationary stochastic process of exogenous shocks the optimality criterion is the sum of discounted expected future social utilities under various neoclassical conditions on technology and preferences i there exists an optimal policy of investment and consumption expressible as a continuous time invariant function of the capital stocks and the history of stochastic shocks and ii there is a stationary stochastic process of capital stocks that is consistent with the optimal policy

coase revisited business groups in the modern economy ronald coase s celebrated query as to why economic actors typically aggregate into entities called firms rather than transacting as individuals in a market has engendered a vigorous stream of research this paper asks a parallel question why is it that in all modern economies firms themselves aggregate into larger entities often more stable than any literature predicts which are here referred to as business groups after establishing some working definitions and discussing the curious conjunction of empirical importance and analytical invisibility of business groups an attempt is made to establish the most significant dimensions along which such groups vary we end with some speculations on the role of these groups in economic development copyright 1995 by oxford university press

ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy evidence from china we examine innovation performance of firms in a transition economy from an ownership perspective we focus specifically on the relationship between ownership structures and firm innovation performance drawing on data from 548 chinese firms we find volume of patent registration to be most strongly influenced by foreign ownership in the firm along with firm affiliation within a business group the influence of state and institutional ownership on innovation performance is positive but lagged contrary to expectations insider ownership leads to lower innovation performance and concentrated ownership has no significant impact our study has two principal contributions firstly we utilize a comprehensive treatment of ownership characteristics overcoming weakness in previous studies that have used a more narrow focus on ownership type secondly we contribute to understanding of how firms in transition economies build indigenous capabilities for innovation by drawing attention to the interplay of foreign and domestic control of agents innovation

participation constraints in adverse selection models abstract this paper characterizes the optimal contract offered by an uninformed principal to an informed agent when the latter s reservation utility depends on his type the informational rent is nonmonotonic so that interior types may have a vanishing rent or be excluded from trade the paper identifies conditions for the optimal contract to be separating to be nonstochastic and to induce full participation it also discusses the nature of the solution when bunching occurs the results are applied to nonlinear pricing under price cap regulation and bypass competition and to competition in nonlinear pricing journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 d42 d23 d78 l51 l15

an economic perspective on auctions the recent spectrum auctions in europe have shown that serious problems can wise in auctions where multiple complementary objects are being sold such as blocks of radio spectrum that will subsequently be used by the wining bidders to compete against each other in downstream markets other important instances of such situations include take off and landing slots at airports and rights for electricity and gas transmission t i first review some of the theory describing multi object auctions i i next outline the importance of strategic effects arising in auctions that are followed by competition between the bidders and the tension arising between various goals such as efficiency and revenue maximization although more flexible auction formats can have virtues particularly in taking into account complementarities they can also be manipulated by bidders to build market power to the detriment of consumers we next apply these insights to the recent european umts licence auctions finally we draw the main conclusions and policy implications

estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets business groups confederations of legally independent firms are ubiquitous in emerging economies yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms we conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs in doing so we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets argentina brazil chile india indonesia israel mexico peru the philippines south africa south korea taiwan thailand and turkey we find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups moreover membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine this runs contrary to the wisdom conventional in advanced economies that unrelated diversification depresses profitability overall our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another copyright 2001 john wiley sons ltd

collusion in the presence of externalities i examine collusive bidder behavior in auctions with negative externalities and show that the optimal bidding scheme exhibits only partial rigidity because of externalities a cartel not only has incentive to maximize gains from trade but also to minimize the probability of sales i identify the tension between the two incentives and show that the more rigid the bidding scheme the higher the possibility of sales as the extent of externalities increases the cartel finds it more important to keep a low probability of sales than to minimize payment to the seller this results in a partially rigid optimal collusive bidding scheme

stochastic turnpike property and stationary equilibrium abstract i study the stability properties of a stochastic equilibrium growth model with a finite number of infinitely lived consumers the exogenous stochastic environment is represented by a stationary stochastic process that influences preferences technology and primary resources consumers maximize the expected sum of discounted utilities production is intertemporal and primary resources are assumed to be necessary for the production of capital goods by adapting standard assumptions in general equilibrium theory and turnpike theory i show that if consumers have homogeneous discount factors close enough to one the allocation of an interior equilibrium converges to the allocation of a stationary equilibrium with transfer payments this result is used to prove the existence of a stationary equilibrium

engineering growth business group structure and firm performance in china s transition economy business groups have received increasing attention from academics interested in interorganizational relations and their impact on firms as part of industrial reform the chinese government began in the mid 1980s to encourage firms to form business groups with structural characteristics that promised to enhance financial performance and productivity using 1988 90 panel data on china s 40 largest business groups and their 535 member firms the study finds that the presence and predominance of interlocking directorates and finance companies in business groups improved the financial performance and productivity of the groups member firms in addition firms in groups with nonhierarchical organizational structures performed better than firms in hierarchical groups suggesting that complete integration into a hierarchical organization is not an optimal strategy

springboard internationalization by emerging market firms speed of first cross border acquisition according to the springboard perspective emerging market multinationals seek strategic assets aggressively from the outset in this paper we investigate the role of firms institutional embeddedness in terms of age and affiliation to business group on their aggressive internationalization pursuits an issue which has remained less explored in international business scholarship this study based on 8163 indian listed firms over 18 years identifies a trend that younger firms founded in the liberalized era post 1991 and unaffiliated firms are more likely to pursue aggressive internationalization by conducting their first cross border acquisition cba faster among affiliated firms younger ones are relatively faster in conducting their first cba furthermore the evidence signals a moderating impact of inter group heterogeneity in terms of group level assets and foreign investments on the relationship between firm age and aggressive internationalization

local governments as industrial firms an organizational analysis of china s transitional economy despite widespread skepticism about government ownership in transitional economies china s rapid industrial growth has been led by public enterprises kornai s theory of soft budbet constraints born of the failure of earlier hungarian reforms fosters such skepticism but it assumes as fixed organizational characteristics that in fact vary widely across government jurisdictions local governments with smaller industrial bases have clearer financial incentives and constraints fewer nonfinancial interests in enterprises and a greater capacity to monitor them in china s vast public sector the fastest growth in output and productivity has occurred where government ownership rights are clearest and most easily enforced which enables officials to manage public industry as a diversified market oriented firm

collusion in auctions with externalities in standard auctions collusion among buyers eliminates bidding competition despite informational asymmetries collusion can however be imperfect when the situation involves externalities among buyers that is when a buyer is worse off if one rival wins the goon rather than if nobody gets it for intermediate values of the externality and under various objective functions the seller finds it optimal to design an auction that leads in equilibrium to a collusive outcome that is ex post inefficient for the group of buyers an ex ante incentive efficient collusion mechanism for the buyers is characterized in this situation

theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities abstract we investigate a private value auction in which a single entrant on winning imposes a negative externality on two regular bidders in an english auction when all bidders are active regular bidders free ride exiting before price reaches their values in a first price sealed bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist limiting free riding compared to the english auction we find substantial though incomplete free riding in the clock auction in first price auctions regular bidders bid more aggressively than the entrant and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality predictions regarding revenue efficiency and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied

market culture and authority a comparative analysis of management and organization in the far east three frameworks purport to explain industrial arrangements and practices a market approach that emphasizes economic characteristics a cultural approach that sees organization as the expression of patterned values and an authority approach that explains organization as a historically developed structure of domination the efficacy of each approach is tested in explaining the organizational structures of three rapidly growing east asian economies japan south korea and taiwan the paper argues through comparative analysis that organizational growth is best explained by market and cultural factors but that authority patterns and legitimation strategies best explain organizational structure

robustly collusion proof implementation a contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to collusion we show that agents collusion imposes no cost in a large class of circumstances with risk neutral agents including both uncorrelated and correlated types in those circumstances any payoff the principal can attain in the absence of collusion including the second best level can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust to many aspects of collusion behavior the collusion proof implementation generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may collude provided that noncollusive agents incentives can be protected via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism our collusion proof implementation also sheds light on the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally respond to collusion