analzying trade offs between machine investment and utilization analyzing machine investment opportunities from a systems perspective requires an understanding of interdependencies between machine investment and utilization decisions machine investment decisions involve determining the number of machines to purchase and their types machine utilization decisions involve determining part allocations and production cycles interdependencies between these decisions result in trade offs between investment and operating costs this paper develops an analytical approach for studying machine investment opportunities in a broad systems context it begins with a discussion of the interdependencies between investment and utilization decisions the focus of this research and a review of existing literature related to machine investment decisions are then discussed next a mathematical model that quantifies these interdependencies is formulated the paper ends with a simple example that demonstrates the usefulness of the model and highlights the importance of using a systems app

operating flexibility global manufacturing and the option value of a multinational network the multinational corporation is a network of activities located in different countries the value of this network derives from the opportunity to benefit from uncertainty through the coordination of subsidiaries which are geographically dispersed we model this coordination as the operating flexibility to shift production between two manufacturing plants located in different countries a stochastic dynamic programming model treats explicitly this flexibility as equivalent to owning an option the value of which is dependent upon the real exchange rate the model is extended to analyze hysteresis effects and within country growth options we show that the management of across border coordination has led to changes in the heuristic rules used for performance evaluation and transfer pricing

flexibility and uncertainty the preserving of flexibility when faced with uncertainty is a neglected aspect of behaviour under risk yet it is an important factor in decisions to hold liquid assets or delay irreversible investment this paper formalizes the notion of flexibility in a sequential decision context and relates its value to the amount of information an agent expects to receive a rudimentary money demand model is developed embodying these ideas and the history of flexibility as an economic concept is traced choices are frequently made between alternatives that imply different degrees of future commitment between a short term investment that leaves future options open for example and a long term one that by its very nature forecloses those options the relative attractiveness of the two depends on their probability distributions of payoffs over time a basic consideration in this choice is the recognition that beliefs about the risks governing these payoffs may change current doubts may be partially resolved in the near future this prospect decreases the attractiveness of the longer term commitment in that one is able to respond less fully to new information and even if it does not directly affect the risks associated with shorter term choices enhances their appeal this paper formalizes the above remarks by establishing connections between the following two partial orderings the first is an ordering based on variability of beliefs one set of beliefs is more variable than another if more final risk is resolved at an intermediate stage the more one expects to learn by an intermediate period relative to what one knows today the more variation one is anticipating in beliefs about the final outcome the second is an ordering of current actions or positions based on flexibility one position is more flexible than another if it leaves available a larger set of future positions at any given level of cost these two orderings are incorporated in a simple sequential decision model to suggest the following behavioural principle the more variable are a decision maker s beliefs the more flexible is the position he will choose this principle potentially applies whenever i there will be opportunities to act after further information is received and ii current actions influence either the attractiveness or availability of different future actions

one to many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non renegotiable abstract we study a model where a central player the principal bargains bilaterally with each of several players the agents to create and share the surplus of a coalitional game it is known that if the payments that were previously agreed with each of the remaining agents are renegotiated in case any bilateral negotiation permanently breaks down then the shapley value is the unique efficient and individual rational outcome consistent with bilateral nash bargaining here we show that when instead the agreed payments cannot be renegotiated the outcome is also unique but it now coincides with the nucleolus of an associated bankruptcy problem we provide a strategic foundation for this outcome then we study how such renegotiation affects the principal s payoff according to the properties of the surplus function we find for example that renegotiation benefits the principal when agents are complements and it hurts him when they are substitutes situations with respectively increasing and decreasing marginal contributions

allocation of flexible and indivisible resources with decision postponement and demand learning we consider a firm that uses two perishable resources to satisfy two demand types resources are flexible such that each resource can be used to satisfy either demand type resources are also indivisible such that the entire resource must be allocated to the same demand type this type of resource flexibility can be found in different applications such as movie theater complexes cruise lines and airlines in our model customers arrive according to independent poisson processes but the arrival rates are uncertain thus the manager can learn about customer arrival rates from earlier demand figures and potentially increase the sales by postponing the resource allocation decision we consider two settings and derive the optimal resource allocation policy for one setting and develop a heuristic policy for the other our analysis provides managerial insights into the effectiveness of different resource allocation mechanisms for flexible and indivisible resources

multi resource investment strategies operational hedging under demand uncertainty abstract consider a firm that markets multiple products each manufactured using several resources representing various types of capital and labor and a linear production technology the firm faces uncertain product demand and has the option to dynamically readjust its resource investment levels thereby changing the capacities of its linear manufacturing process the cost to adjust a resource level either up or down is assumed to be linear the model developed here explicitly incorporates both capacity investment decisions and production decisions and is general enough to include reversible and irreversible investment the product demand vectors for successive periods are assumed to be independent and identically distributed the optimal investment strategy is determined with a multi dimensional newsvendor model using demand distributions a technology matrix prices product contribution margins and marginal investment costs our analysis highlights an important conceptual distinction between deterministic and stochastic environments the optimal investment strategy in our stochastic model typically involves some degree of capacity imbalance which can never be optimal when demand is known

estimating the reduction in labor hours due to a new technology under uncertain demand abstract when investing in a new machine one must estimate the reduced labor costs in the past this was usually done in a deterministic way assuming that we have accurate point estimation of demand rates and the reduction in labor costs is proportional to the reduction in labor hours however if demand rates of products are known probabilistically the expected reduction in labor hours follows a probability distribution this distribution not just the mean value is important because 1 it shows the effect of the uncertainty in demand on estimating the reduction in labor hours and 2 it allows better estimation of labor cost savings when labor costs are not proportional to labor hours using the distribution of product demand rates this paper presents a procedure for estimating the distribution of reduction in labor hours obtained from a new machine

sequencing strategically wage negotiations under oligopoly abstract should an industry wide union in a unionized oligopoly e g the united auto workers in the us negotiate new contracts by bargaining with firms simultaneously or should it strategically sequence its bargaining partners the models presented isolate two key factors affecting this decision pre existing contracts and the post negotiation product market game the better the preexisting contracts for the union the more attractive is the option of sequencing moreover a high wage negotiated with the first firm reduces product market competition increasing other firms ability to pay higher wages as well this adds to the attractiveness of strategic sequencing for the union

bargaining binding contracts and competitive wages in a model where many workers bargain with one firm and sign binding contracts we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium if the production function satisfies decreasing return

endogenous incomplete contracts a bargaining approach in this paper we argue that by modelling the contracting process as a bargaining game one can endogenize the choice between complete and incomplete contracts this point is demonstrated within a stylized model in which agents can allocate an endowment stream either via a once for all bargain over the entire stream a long term contract or through a series of bargaining rounds a short term contract within this structure short term contracts arise as equilibrium outcomes under very general conditions because a short term contract implies reduced bargaining costs for one of the agents in essence reduced transaction costs produce a short term contract jel classification l14 c78

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

inventory pooling under heavy tailed demand risk pooling has been studied extensively in the operations management literature as the basic driver behind strategies such as transshipment manufacturing flexibility component commonality and drop shipping this paper explores the benefit of risk pooling in the context of inventory management using the canonical model first studied in eppen eppen gd 1979 effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi location newsboy problem management sci 25 5 498 501 specifically we consider a single period multilocation newsvendor model where n different locations face independent and identically distributed demands and linear holding and backorder costs we show that eppen s celebrated result i e that the expected cost savings from centralized inventory management scale with the square root of the number of locations depends critically on the light tailed nature of the demand uncertainty in particular we establish that the benefit from pooling relative to the decentralized case in term

buyer symmetry in monopoly abstract for a price setting monopolist the aggregate demand curve sufficiently summarizes the demand environment the distribution of demand namely how the demand is distributed among the buyers is not relevant but intuitive notions of strong versus weak buyers suggest that the distribution of demand should be relevant to a monopolist this paper provides a formal justification for such notions using cooperative game theory to model monopoly without an a priori assumption of price setting power the paper shows that a seller will always prefer unitary demand thus implying that the demand distribution does affect how a monopolist assesses the demand environment furthermore if the number of buyers is kept fixed a seller always prefers that when feasible the buyers be symmetric namely that they have the same individual demand curves this result holds for all capacity choices of the seller implying that buyer symmetry is always the most preferred distribution of demand

competitive incentives for manufacturing flexibility abstract a game theoretic model is used in this paper to analyze firms incentives to acquire product flexibility the degree of product flexibility is determined by the cost a firm must incur to produce a new product the model helps to identify characteristics of industries which are likely to encourage product flexibility strategies the model suggests that firms in industries where the ratio of price to variable cost is high are likely to expend more effort to increase product flexibility this hypothesis is then tested empirically

the structural determinants of union bargaining power this paper investigates the structural determinants of variation in union power across manufacturing industries using a pooled sample of unionized establishments from the expenditure on employee compensation surveys of 1968 72 the author estimates wage equations augmented with measures of product market structure bargaining structure and the size distribution of unions the results suggest that union wage gains are greatest where discretionary pricing power enhances employers ability to pay and where unions achieve high coverage practice centralized bargaining and avoid union fragmentation on the other hand centralized bargaining provides no advantage in competitive industries

breakdown in multilateral negotiations abstract we analyze a complete information multilateral bargaining model in which a buyer is to purchase two complementary goods from two sellers binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions in contrast to preexisting literature we do not normalize the parties reservation utilities to zero we show that this assumption holds critical importance by demonstrating that a complete breakdown of negotiations may occur as the unique equilibrium outcome even if only two sellers are present

why do oil prices jump or fall this paper discusses theories that can explain the zig zags of oil prices in general and in particular the recent jump more precisely the following explanations are discussed homo oeconomicus pure profit maximization if demand is dynamic and convex price reaction function price increases and respectively declines depend on capacity utilization cartelization contingent on output or revenues of which the latter can lead to backward bending supply segments and multiple equilibria statistical descriptions mean reversion homo politicus i e arguments for price hikes that are rational public choice despite the long run economic loss finally two approaches are presented that emphasize demand uncertainty one extending the above mentioned dynamic demand framework and the other considers a dynamic game of non competitive suppliers with lumpy investments summing up a demand shock seems to be the most suitable explanation of today s high prices indeed a shock given that international energy agency iea and department of energy doe were promising just a couple of years ago that we are going to have lots of oil at low prices while others and in particular politics have surprisingly little or no explanatory power

union cooperation and nontraded goods in general equilibrium a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with traded and nontraded goods and sector specific trade unions is set up wage formation is either noncooperative or cooperative egalitarian union wage policy is shown to be the equilibrium under cooperation important asymmetries are encountered and an alternative model of cooperative behavior called bargaining cooperation is proposed bargaining cooperation is shown to have qualitatively different implications than simple cooperation the welfare and employment effects of bargaining cooperation compared to simple cooperation are ambiguous

pricing and regulating affect environmental ethics effluent charges and tradeable permits are economically efficient but rarely used a new explanation for this discrepancy is offered pricing may crowd out environmental ethics in the pricing and via spillovers also in non pricing sectors pricing may therefore increase pollution providing a reason why decision makers tend to reject environmental pricing five propositions showing the conditions for counterproductive effects are advanced they are consistent with available empirical evidence regulation by setting standards and subsidies damage environmental ethics less than pricing because pollution is condoned damaging environmental ethics may prevent political action in favor of the environment

inclusion of flexibility benefits in discounted cash flow analyses for investment evaluation a simulation optimization model abstract it has been argued that conventional discounted cash flow dcf techniques which are commonly used for investment justification are inadequate and may even be inappropriate for the justification of advanced manufacturing systems whose strategic value comes from such attributes as flexibility the problem lies in the proper estimation of the value of flexibility in financial or cash flow terms so that the dcf techniques which are otherwise conceptually sound become relevant this involves an assessment of the value of the flexibility of the manufacturing system in dealing with the uncertainties in its operating environment we propose a simulation optimization methodology for this assessment in cash flow terms and use it in a dcf framework we use simulation to generate the environmental parameters in each period of an appropriate evaluation horizon we develop a mathematical programming model to determine the distribution of the possible net revenues of the system in each period by capturing the combined effect of the different types of flexibilities that the manufacturing system may possess we illustrate the application of our methodology using numerical examples and discuss how it can be used to assess the value of flexibility in cash flow terms we show that our approach facilitates the justification of capital investment in advanced manufacturing systems which tend to get undervalued under the traditional dcf approaches it would also help managers address such important questions as how much incremental investment should we be willing to make now for the additional flexibility features and does the expected present value of the future benefits of added flexibility justify the incremental capital investment now in essence our paper addresses the question as to appropriate techniques or approaches for justifying proposed strategic investment decisions

decentralized one to many bargaining we study a one to many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project the order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs we also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium the rotating protocol is in general not self enforcing

non cooperative bargaining theory an introduction the paper provides an informal introduction to some of the main themes of the recent literature on non cooperative or sequential bargaining models it focuses in particular on the relationship between the new approach and the traditional axiomatic approach exemplified by nash bargaining theory it illustrates the new insights offered by the non cooperative approach by reference to a detailed analysis of the manner in which the presence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the negotiated outcome finally the difficulties which arise in extending this analysis to two person bargaining with incomplete information and to n person bargaining are discussed this is a revised version of the fourth review of economic studies lecture presented in april 1985 at the joint meeting of the association of university teachers of economics and the royal economic society held in oxford the choice of lecturer is made by a panel whose members are currently professors hahn mirrlees and nobay and the paper is refereed in the usual way this paper aims to provide an informal and elementary introduction to an approach to bargaining which has received a great deal of attention over the past few years the approach involves writing down some particular sequence of moves offers and replies to be made over time in the course of negotiations and then looking for a non cooperative equilibrium in the game thus specified in practice a perfect equilibrium or in games of incomplete information a sequential equilibrium while the approach appears at first sight to be very different in spirit from the traditional axiomatic approach in which a bargaining solution is specified by appealing to a number of general requirements which are deemed appropriate on the basis of some a priori considerations the two approaches are in fact complementary while the

a note on three player noncooperative bargaining with restricted pairwise meetings abstract a three player bargaining game where only the central player can negotiate with two different partners has a unique perfect equilibrium outcome we discuss when the a priori favored position of the central player is really advantageous in terms of equilibrium payoffs

managing flexible capacity in a make to order environment flexible capacity has been shown to be very effective to hedge against forecast errors at the investment stage in a make to order environment this flexibility can also be used to hedge against variability in customer orders in the short term for that purpose production levels must be adjusted each period to match current demands to give priority to the higher margin product or to satisfy the closest customer however this will result in swings in production inducing larger order variability at upstream suppliers and significantly higher component inventory levels at the manufacturer through a stylized two plant two product capacitated manufacturing setting we show that the performance of the system depends heavily on the allocation mechanism used to assign products to the available capacity although managers would be inclined to give priority to higher margin products or to satisfy customers from their closest production site these practices lead to greater swings in production result in higher operational costs and may reduce profits

non cooperative bargaining and union formation we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar in the first case there is a wage differential which is more less than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller larger than that of the less productive in the second case there is no wage differential in this paper we study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities they may form either a joint union or two separate unions depending on the relative size and productivity of the two groups the whole decision process is modelled as an extensive form bargaining game in which the two groups of workers bargain with each other as well as with a firm the labour market is sharply distinguished from the goods market by the widespread practice of collective bargaining usually several groups of workers with different characteristics for example skill level or geographical location are represented as a single unit and or several employers form a single bargaining unit against a giant union this multiplicity of bargaining units creates a complicated bargaining structure and makes the outcome hard to analyse the purpose of this paper is to provide a model which captures this complexity and at the same time clarifies the underlying structure of bargaining power although economists have been aware of the multiplicity problem for a long time it has been received little rigorous theoretical treatment until recently davidson 1985 examined the possible gains that can be obtained by trade unions through joint bargaining in an oligopolistic industry there is a positive externality due to the fact that a higher wage rate in one firm generates a larger demand hence a higher wage in competing firms when a joint union is organized these externalities are internalized to the benefit of workers horn and wolinsky 1985 investigated the equilibrium pattern of unionization in an industry where a firm employs two types of workers they found that workers tend to form a single union when the two types are substitutes in the sense that the incremental contribution of one group to the firm s revenue is decreasing with respect to the size of the other group since workers bargaining power comes from the loss that they can

inventory management under price based and stockout based substitution abstract we examine a stochastic inventory and pricing problem for a firm that sells two vertically differentiated products the demands for the two products are determined by total random market size and the customers net utility from buying the two products which is determined by the products quality attributes the individual quality valuation unknown to the firm and the selling prices in case the preferred product is out of stock customers may be willing to buy a substitute instead if their net utility is non negative therefore we analyze an inventory and pricing model considering price based and stockout based substitution we show that the demand function is not continuous in price by decomposing the profit function into different price regimes we are able to derive closed form expressions for the stockout based substitution rates upward and downward substitution and the optimal inventory levels under exogenous pricing under endogenous pricing we find that the profit function is not necessarily unimodal however we show that a unique solution exists for the integrated price and inventory problem under price based substitution only numerical results reveal that not considering stockout based substitution i leads to lower profit margins for high quality products and ii may cause severe supply demand mismatches throughout the entire assortment finally we show the performance of two approximated pricing policies

optimizing the use of contingent labor when demand is uncertain abstract we develop a new model for flexible workforce management in environments with uncertainty in the demand for labor in particular we model a workforce comprised of regular workers who have fixed schedules and may work overtime and contingent workers whose working hours are flexible as specified by a contract over a finite planning horizon our model can represent a variety of contracts including temporary workers on call workers with guaranteed minimum pay and comp time arrangements we formulate the model as an optimization problem that determines the regular and contingent worker pool sizes that minimize expected labor and backlog costs embedded within this problem is a dynamic programming problem of making optimal operational staffing decisions with respect to the utilization of contingent and overtime resources numerical examples demonstrate the effect that the timing of information has on the benefits of flexibility we also derive structural results that may be exploited to reduce the computational effort required to use the model

strategic facility location capacity acquisition and technology choice decisions under demand uncertainty robust vs non robust optimization approaches abstract this paper presents a robust optimization ro modeling approach to develop insights into strategic capacity planning and resource acquisition decisions including the facility location problem and the technology choice problem the main purpose of the proposed model and numerical experiments is to examine the effects of economies of scale economies of scope and the combined effects of scale and scope under uncertain demand realizations using robust optimization the type of capacities or technology alternatives that a firm can acquire can be classified on two basic dimensions the first dimension relates to the effects of scale via distinction between labor intensive technologies and capital intensive technologies the second dimension relates to the effects of scope via distinction between product dedicated and flexible technologies moreover each product dedicated and flexible technology can have different levels of labor or capital intensity leading to the joint effects of economies of scale and economies of scope extensive computational results document how the optimal technology choice patterns depend on the cost structures and levels of model robustness specified to accommodate uncertain demand realizations the results obtained by the two stage robust optimization approach are compared to the results obtained by a non robust approach

the game of negotiations ordering issues and implementing agreements abstract we use a two issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining we uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium how the order in which issues are bargained over matters and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have if agreements are implemented as they are reached easy issues are negotiated first and hard issues later if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled then it is size that matters with large issues settled first all parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter

bargining bundling and clout the portfolio effects of horizontal mergers we examine the output and profit effects of horizontal mergers between differentiated upstream firms in an intermediate goods market served by a downstream monopolist if the merged firm can bundle transfer pricing is efficient before and after the merger absent cost efficiencies consumer and total welfare do not change if the merged firm cannot bundle and its bargaining power is sufficiently high transfer pricing is inefficient after the merger absent cost efficiencies welfare typically falls we evaluate the profit effects of mergers for the case of two part tariff contracts rival firms gain lose from mergers that raise lower downstream prices contrary to conventional wisdom a merger that harms the retailer may increase welfare

delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information abstract this paper analyzes a complete information infinite horizon multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash offer contracts are used to govern transactions under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies we characterize the set of equilibria for the game we show that when players are sufficiently patient significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the number of involved parties rises indeed when the number of bargainers is large perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d23 d62

coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities abstract building on genicot and ray g genicot d ray contracts and externalities how things fall apart j econ theory 131 2006 71 100 we develop a model of non cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal allowing for agent coordination we show that the outcome of our bargaining procedure may differ remarkably from those of the offer and the bidding games in particular we find that bargaining can break agents coordination and that the principal s payoff can be decreasing in his own bargaining power

the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets the case of bargaining this article examines the welfare effects of third degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power one of the downstream firms the chain store can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits bargaining weights and concession costs if the chain s integration threat is not credible price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

competition and investment in flexible technologies this paper examines the implications of market structure on investment in flexible manufacturing systems fms we analyze a two stage game in which firms choose between a flexible and a less flexible technology in the first stage then choose production quantities in the second stage in equilibrium a large proportion of fms firms is associated with more concentrated markets our model predicts that a larger market and or a more differentiated product results in a higher proportion of fms firms being sustained these predictions are empirically supported using cross section industry level data from both the us and japan

dynamic capacity management with general upgrading this paper studies a capacity management problem with upgrading a firm needs to procure multiple classes of capacities and then allocate the capacities to satisfy multiple classes of customers that arrive over time a general upgrading rule is considered i e unmet demand can be satisfied using multistep upgrade no replenishment is allowed and the firm has to make the allocation decisions without observing future demand we first characterize the structure of the optimal allocation policy which consists of parallel allocation and then sequential rationing specifically the firm first uses capacity to satisfy the same class demand as much as possible then considers possible upgrading decisions in a sequential manner we also propose a heuristic based on certainty equivalence control to solve the problem numerical analysis shows that the heuristic is fast and delivers close to optimal profit for the firm finally we conduct extensive numerical studies to derive insights into the problem it is foun

between anarchy and leviathan a note on the design of federal states abstract recent research suggests a rationale for the autonomy retained by federal states lower and intermediate level governments by encouraging interjurisdictional competition federal structures constrain the pursuit by public officials of private objectives inconsistent with the public weal but using federal structures to achieve this end has a cost the more decentralized a nation s public sector the more likely that some of the externalities generated by the provision of public goods and services will be ignored this note investigates the balance between the costs and benefits of decentralization that must be struck by a federal state s designers

the role of buying consortia among smes in the electricity market in italy we model the electricity market in italy focusing on the impact of buying consortia among smes on the behaviour of the large electricity producers and sellers we show that consortia may in certain circumstances produce a pro competitive result i e they may induce a reduction of prices not only for consortia members but also for firms not in the consortia

optimal investment in product flexible manufacturing capacity this paper presents a model and an analysis of the cost flexibility tradeoffs involved in investing in product flexible manufacturing capacity flexible capacity provides a firm with the ability to respond to a wide variety of future demand outcomes but at the expense of the increased cost of acquiring flexible manufacturing capacity as compared with dedicated or nonflexible capacity we formulate the product flexible manufacturing capacity investment decision as a two stage stochastic program in the first stage the firm must make its investment decision in manufacturing capacity before the resolution of uncertainty in product demand in the second stage after demand for products are known the firm implements its production decisions constrained by the first stage investments the main contributions of this paper are threefold first we develop a model of the firm s flexible manufacturing investment decision that conceptually captures some of the key characteristics of this complex decision probl

the competition effects of industry wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly this paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry wide resale price maintenance rpm arrangements such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against rpm a bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining we do not find rpm to be universally undesirable however where retailer power is strong the social effects of rpm are likely to be adverse since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising

bargaining frictions bargaining procedures and implied costs in multiple issue bargaining the paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players bargaining costs in multiple issue bargaining settings when bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached issue by issue negotiation can generate bargaining costs different from those that occur if all issues are bargained simultaneously these cost differences result in differences in allocations across bargaining procedures such that players disagree on the desired method of bargaining similar results hold for certain fixed cost bargaining friction specifications this analysis provides a potential explanation of both agenda bargaining and incomplete contracts

economics of efficiency measurement by the dea approach three aspects of efficiency measurement by data envelopment analysis are discussed here analytically these aspects comprise output specific input allocations by each firm flexibility in the production process and the role of learning by doing in efficiency improvement

flexible production resources and capacity utilization rates a robust optimization perspective abstract this paper presents a novel application of robust optimization ro in the context of optimal choices of product dedicated and flexible capacities in a spatial setting specifically we examine the impact of acquiring flexible production technologies on a firm s overall capacity utilization rates under demand uncertainty uncorrelated negatively and positively correlated demands are considered we implement an efficient ro algorithm which can solve large samples of robust min max problems in a realistic amount of time this paper examines the impact of three critical factors that lead to different capacity utilization and resource flexibility outcomes the degree of solution robustness selected by the decision maker to accommodate uncertain demand realizations the flexible capacity costs relative to dedicated capacity costs and the level of correlation between product demands one of our results show that according to robust solutions the total capacity may not be fully utilized because of the distinction between largest in unit terms and costliest demand realizations the second result shows that increasing the proportion of flexible capacity can increase capacity utilization however our results report less than full utilization even when using flexible capacity only we show that the optimal amount of flexible capacity and its impact on overall capacity utilization rate substantially depends on demand correlation

nash in nash bargaining a microfoundation for applied work a nash equilibrium in nash bargains has become the workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly this paper proposes a non cooperative foundation for nash in nash bargaining that extends the rubinstein 1982 model to multiple upstream and downstream rms assuming there exists gains from trade for each rm pair we prove that there exists an equilibrium with immediate agreement and negotiated prices that correspond to rubinstein prices if and only if the marginal contribution of a set of agreements is weakly greater than the sum of the agreements marginal contributions we provide stronger conditions under which equilibrium prices are unique

excess capacity in a fixed cost economy abstract this paper proposes a new mechanism that can explain persistent economic slack the theory shows that when producers face negligible marginal costs and desired spending is below the economy s capacity the economy features slack in equilibrium even when prices are flexible and there are no other frictions a heterogeneous household version of the model demonstrates how an economy can enter a capacity trap in response to a temporary negative demand shock when demand by some consumers falls temporarily other consumers permanent income and hence their desired consumption also falls since output is determined by demand the permanent fall in desired consumption causes a permanent state of excess capacity

flexible service capacity optimal investment and the impact of demand correlation we consider a firm that provides multiple services using both specialized and flexible capacity the problem is formulated as a two stage single period stochastic program the firm invests in capacity before the actual demand is known and optimally assigns capacity to customers when demand is realized sample applications include a car rental company s use of mid sized cars to satisfy unexpectedly high demand for compact cars and an airline s use of business class seats to satisfy economy class demand we obtain an analytical solution for a particular case when services may be upgraded by one class the simple form of the solution allows us to compare the optimal capacities explicitly with a solution that does not anticipate flexibility given that demand follows a multivariate normal distribution we analytically characterize the effects of increasing demand correlation on the optimal solution for the case with two customer classes the effects of demand correlation are intuitive increasing correlation induces a shift from flexible to dedicated capacity when there are three or more classes there are also adjustments to the resources not directly affected by the correlation change as correlation rises these changes follow an alternating pattern for example if the optimal capacity of one resource rises then the optimal capacity of the adjacent resource falls these results make precise conjectures based on numerical experiments that have existed in the literature for some time

the value of flexibility in make to order systems the effect of demand correlation we consider a manufacturer of mass customized modular products who orders components under demand uncertainty and sets prices produces to order and trades excess components in a secondary market after this uncertainty is resolved the sequence of events reflects in a parsimonious fashion the considerable reduction in demand uncertainty between the procurement stage and the selling season typical of industries with long supply lead times and short product life cycles we prove that in contrast to conventional wisdom the value of production flexibility and expected profit increase with demand correlation if and only if commonality between the corresponding products does not exceed a threshold we also prove that the value of flexibility and expected profit may each increase or decrease with demand variability depending on demand correlations and component commonalities across the entire product line finally we prove that when demand shocks are independent the optimal product prices are positively correlated if and only if the degree of commonality between the corresponding products exceeds a threshold

why unions reduce wage inequality a theory of domino effects numerous empirical studies show that unions reduce wage differences i demonstrate that their motive might be a mix of fairness and strategy maximizing the use of union bargaining power in the presence of efficiency wages unions can push primarily for raising the lowest wages and still not sacrifice higher wages much if the employers themselves increase higher wages to protect efficiency enhancing wage differences if these domino effects are strong enough then an egalitarian wage policy might even increase the median wage

component commonality with service level requirements this paper extends recent results of baker et al baker k r m j magazine h l w nuttle 1986 the effect of commonality on safety stocks in a simple inventory model management sci 32 982 988 in understanding the impact of component commonality on stocking levels under service level constraints a model is formulated for an arbitrary number of products with general joint demand distribution the results obtained are not all intuitive while utilizing commonality is beneficial nothing general can be said about the resulting change in the components stock levels when the cost structure is of a particular simple form though some interesting general patterns do emerge we also discuss the case of using a service level measure where rationing of common components might be required and characterize the implied rationing rule

machine and labor flexibility in manufacturing networks abstract many industrial companies today operate under strict employment legislation and work agreements since flexible capacity has been widely recognized as an important hedge against uncertain demand there exist strong efforts to introduce more flexible workforce models in this paper we investigate the benefits of such labor flexibility and its interplay with machine flexibility from a network capacity investment perspective we consider a firm that has to invest simultaneously in labor and machine capacity under uncertain demand and a given network configuration while anticipating the deployment of labor flexibility after demand has been realized instruments of labor flexibility range from temporary employment to personnel transfers between plants the underlying decision problem is formulated as a two stage stochastic program with recourse based on numerical studies and the analysis of a stylized model we demonstrate the impact of labor flexibility on the optimal levels of machine and labor capacity we compare the benefits obtained by personnel transfers with those of temporary workers and find that temporary employment always decreases the number of permanent workers while personnel transfers may even allow for a larger workforce our results further indicate that personnel transfers are more effective in larger manufacturing networks although these benefits are decreasing when most plants in the network are capable of producing more than one product machine flexibility finally we present evidence for the efficiency of a combined usage of personnel transfers and temporary workers

political hierarchies and political shirking abstract we analyze how citizens can screen candidates for high political office in a political hierarchy in our model politicians differ in willingness to misuse discretionary powers of office those politicians willing to abuse the powers of office knaves can be induced in a hierarchy to reveal their type while in low office thus disqualifying themselves for advancement hierarchy s capacity for screening knaves out of high office depends on the conditions for reappointment to low office a seemingly perverse rule that reappoints shirking politicians can perform well to demonstrate an empirical application we analyze shirking in the house bank check bouncing scandal

time to build option value and investment decisions abstract investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially for example the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project this paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments we determine the effects of time to build opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision for reasonable parameter values we show how a simple npv rule can lead to gross errors

pricing and operational recourse in coproduction systems coproduction systems in which multiple products are produced simultaneously in a single production run are prevalent in many industries such systems typically produce a random quantity of vertically differentiated products this product hierarchy enables the firm to fill demand for a lower quality product by converting a higher quality product in addition to the challenges presented by random yields and multiple products coproduction systems often serve multiple customer classes that differ in their product valuations furthermore the sizes of these classes are uncertain employing a utility maximizing customer model we investigate the production pricing downconversion and allocation decisions in a two class stochastic demand stochastic yield coproduction system for the single class case we establish that downconversion will not occur if prices are set optimally in contrast we show that downconversion can be optimal in the two class case even if prices are set optimally we consider the benefit of postponing certain operational decisions e g the pricing or allocation rule decisions until after uncertainties are resolved we use the term recourse to denote actions taken after uncertainties have been resolved we find that recourse pricing benefits the firm much more than either downconversion or recourse allocation do implying that recourse demand management is more valuable than recourse supply management special cases of our model include the single class and two class random yield newsvendor models

learning in sequential wage negotiations theory and evidence when union firm pairs bargain sequentially and when unobserved components of firms abilities to pay are subject to correlated shocks unions that bargain later in a sequence can acquire valuable information by observing previous bargaining outcomes in their industry we derive the implications of this kind of learning in an asymmetric information model of wage negotiations and argue that the most robust implication is a lower incidence of strikes among followers than leaders in wage negotiations considerable empirical support for this implication is found in a long panel of canadian contract negotiations

technology investment under flexible capacity strategy with demand uncertainty abstract this paper investigates technology investment under flexible capacity strategy with demand uncertainty technology investment enables a firm to reduce its total production cost while flexible capacity strategy aims to reduce a firm s production waste by postponing production until demand is known adopting a general technology investment cost we examine how technology investment cost structure affects a firm s technology investment decisions we derive the conditions under which the firm will benefit from technology investment we show that the firm can increase its expected profit through technology investment only when the unit technology investment cost that varies inversely with the basic technology level is below a threshold however even though the technology investment cost is zero the benefit from the increase in technology level is limited furthermore we analytically determine the optimal technology levels and establish their relationships under different technology investment cost structures our findings will help firms evaluate various technology investment options and choose the most proper one