bequest as a public good within marriage a note bequest to and marriage of children can lead to a pareto inefficient allocation the inefficiency or market failure arises because one family making a bequest to its own child ignores the contribution to the utility of the other family whose child enters the marriage this note shows that an assortative mating rule based on bequests can improve or even restore pareto efficiency when parents take account of the rule in deciding the amount of bequests to their own children

auctions aftermarket competition and risk attitudes with the experience of the sequence of umts auctions held worldwide in mind we consider a situation where firms participate in license auctions to compete in an aftermarket it is known that when a monopoly right is auctioned auctions select the bidder that is least risk averse this firm will choose a higher value of the aftermarket strategic variable than any other firm will do thereby implying a higher market price under price setting behavior and a lower price due to higher quantity under quantity setting behavior this paper extends the analysis to oligopoly aftermarkets and analyzes whether the monopoly result carries over to oligopoly settings we argue that with multiple licenses and demand uncertainty auctions actually perform even worse from a welfare point of view than the monopoly case would suggest a strategic effect strengthens the monopoly result with respect to prices but weakens the result with respect to quantities

the price of marriage net vs gross flows and the south asian dowry debate the rise in dowry payments in india has been taken as evidence that women increasingly are at a disadvantage on the marriage market and must pay for marriage moreover high dowries it is argued add to the plight of parents of daughters and have thus contributed to the scarcity of women brides however the logic is curious and this paper argues flawed the term dowry can mean different things and it may be useful to distinguish between the assets the bride brings at the time of marriage gross dowry and those netted against the groom payments net dowry the former is what is generally meant by dowry while the latter is a concept used mainly by economists i show that there is no evidence of an increase in real net dowries post 1950 in the icrisat data set a data set that has featured prominently in the literature i take this to suggest that the widespread reports of dowry inflation refer to an increase in gross dowry a development which may merely reflect greater parental affluence jel j12 j16

bequests and the size of population when population is endogenous the consequences of interfamily bequests and endogenous population size for optimal and competitive population sizes and bequests are explored when individuals utility is a function of own consumption the number of children and the welfare of their children when a bequest benefits each member of a second generation family we show that competition leads to underprovision for future generations under a separability assumption the number of children is also shown to be too large

on optimal reservation prices in auctions the theory of auction design examines how various factors affect the outcome of an auction most of the existing literature focuses on how varying the amount of information available to each bidder affects the bid taker s expected revenue when all other factors remain constant this paper studies how the bid taker s expected revenue varies with changes in the auction format when such changes affect the number of bidders and in turn the bidders maximum value for the object being sold specifically we examine how varying the reservation price or screening level affects the bid taker s expected revenue though its effect on the number of bidders for two simple examples the losses associated with a reduced number of bidders outweighs any benefits that nontrivial reservation prices might have had in models with an exogonously set number of bidders

auctions with anticipated regret theory and experiment this paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret felt when bidders lose at an affordable price different information structures are created to elicit regret bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose loser regret condition or the second highest bid if they win winner regret condition or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid however bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret jel d44

optimal reservation prices in auctions the risk neutral independent private values ipv auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices no matter how many bidders the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value this is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice the authors relax the ipv assumption characterize optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions and show that when information is correlated the seller s optimal reservation price converges to his true value often monotonically and rapidly as the number of bidders grows copyright 1996 by royal economic society

saving and bequest in china an analysis of intergenerational exchange particularly high saving rates among the elderly in both rural and urban china call for an investigation of the involved bequest motive utilizing unique survey data from a diverse group of chinese households we document that the magnitude of the bequest from parent to child is associated with the level of personal assistance from child to parent moreover we find indicative evidence that both bequest and assistance are increasing in the parent s income and decreasing in the child s income comparing with the predictions from a stylized intergenerational model these findings are consistent with an exchange based bequest motive our findings have potential implications for how public policies and transfer schemes should be designed in order to contribute to the chinese government objective of increased private consumption our results are conditional on the inclusion of housing wealth as part of the bequest which indicates that transfer of housing is key to understanding the intergenerational assistance and bequest motives and subsequently the high saving levels among the elderly in china

marital transfer and intra household allocation a nash bargaining analysis this paper explores the implications of inter generational marital transfers on the allocation of resources within a conjugal household adopting a nash bargaining framework with alternative models of the threat points it is argued that parents have greater incentive to make transfers to a married child than to a single child because of the efficiency gains from joint consumption and production of family public goods and because of the increase in bargaining power of the child in the allocation of private consumption such transfers also enhance marital stability by increasing the efficiency gains from marriage

auctions with anticipated emotions overbidding underbidding and optimal reserve prices the experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second price auctions regardless of the valuations of bidders in contrast in first price auctions there tends to be overbidding for large valuations but underbidding for small valuations we show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model where bidders anticipate constant positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing even if the emotional dis utilities are very small the revenue maximizing reserve price r might be significantly different from the standard model moreover r decreases with the number of bidders

secret reserve prices in first price auctions this article offers a theoretical explanation for the use of secret reserve prices in auctions i study first price auctions with and without secret reserve price in an independent private values environment with risk neutral buyers and a seller who cares at least minimally about risk the seller can fix the auction rules either before or after she learns her reservation value fixing the rules early and keeping the right to set a secret reserve price can be strictly optimal moreover i describe the relation of using a secret reserve price to phantom bidding and non commitment to sell

endogenous price expectations as reference points in auctions the paper models auctions with bidders who have reference dependent payos the reference point is endogenised as the expected price of the good in the auction the model predicts that in equilibrium bidders both overbid and underbid in comparison to the standard bidding function without reference dependent utility the model predicts that more bidders overbid than underbid and that bidders bid more aggressively as the number of bidders or the reserve price increases finally it is shown perhaps surprisingly that revenue equivalence continues to hold between rst and second price

marriage markets and assortative mating with household public goods theoretical results and empirical implications this paper analyzes marriage market equilibria when the gains from marriage result from joint consumption of household public goods assuming transferable utility within marriage the paper proves that marriage markets will be characterized by positive assortative mating on wealth when spouses differ only in endowments and the gains to marriage result only from public goods when spouses differ in wages and household public goods are produced at home the results imply offsetting effects with public good economies creating an incentive for positive assortative mating on wages and gains from specialization creating an incentive for negative assortative mating on wages the results help explain the persistent lack of empirical support for becker s prediction of negative assortative mating on wages and have implications for empirical analysis of all joint living arrangement decisions

a note on probability distributions with increasing generalized failure rates distributions with an increasing generalized failure rate igfr have useful applications in pricing and supply chain contracting problems we provide alternative characterizations of the igfr property that lead to simplify verifying whether the igfr condition holds we also relate the limit of the generalized failure rate and the moments of a distribution

optimal reserve prices in sealed bid auctions with reference effects abstract the reference effect and loss aversion are incorporated into the buyer s utility in the symmetric independent private value models of sealed bid auctions the buyer s equilibrium bidding strategy and the seller s optimal reserve price are derived for the first price and second price sealed bid auctions in both auction mechanisms the seller s optimal reserve price and expected revenue are increasing in the reference point we compare the seller s expected revenues as well as the optimal reserve prices in the two auctions the results show that the seller will set a higher optimal reserve price but obtain lower optimal expected revenue in the second price auction compared to the first price auction further we extend the model to the gain seeking case and endogenize the reference point as the ex ante expected price of the item in equilibrium in contrast to the loss averse case the seller will set a lower optimal reserve price but obtain higher optimal expected revenue in the second price auction compared to the first price auction if the buyers are gain seeking with an endogenous reference point similar results are obtained in terms of revenue comparison between the two auctions

the effects of class size on student achievement new evidence from population variation abstract i identify the effects of class size on student achievement using longitudinal variation in the population associated with each grade in 649 elementary schools i use variation in class size driven by idiosyncratic variation in the population i also use discrete jumps in class size that occur when a small change in enrollment triggers a maximum or minimum class size rule the estimates indicate that class size does not have a statistically significant effect on student achievement i rule out even modest effects 2 to 4 percent of a standard deviation in scores for a 10 percent reduction in class size

polygyny fertility and savings sub saharan africa has a high incidence of polygyny it is also the poorest region of the world in this paper i ask whether banning polygyny could play any role for development using a quantitative model of polygyny i find that enforcing monogamy lowers fertility shrinks the spousal age gap and reverses the direction of marriage payments polygyny leads to high bride prices to ration women which makes buying wives and selling daughters a good investment thus crowding out investment in physical assets for reasonable parameter values i find that banning polygyny decreases fertility by 40 percent increases savings by 70 percent and increases output per capita by 170 percent

gender bias investments in children and bequests the impacts of pure sex preference and differential earnings opportunities by gender on investments in children are modelled with altruism if bequest constraints do not bind human investments are privately efficient with the higher earning gender receiving more education education does not depend on parental wealth the gender differential in bequests is ambiguous however even in this case when bequest constraints bind education may depend on wealth and it is also possible for the gender with better earnings opportunities to get less education the model is tested with data from philippine villages where bequest constraints are generally nonbinding the schooling differential slightly favors daughters estimated bequest behavior however reflects pure sex preference in terms of our model copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

multi dimensional reference dependent preferences in sealed bid auctions how most laboratory experiments differ from the field abstract we study bidding behavior in first and second price sealed bid auctions with loss averse agents our model predicts overbidding in first price induced value auctions consistent with evidence from most laboratory experiments substantially different bidding behavior could result in commodity auctions where money and auction item are consumed along different dimensions of the consumption space differences also result in second price auctions our study thereby indicates that transferring qualitative behavioral findings from induced value laboratory experiments to the field may be problematic if subjects are loss averse