trigger target rules need not be optimal with fixed adjustment costs a simple comment on optimal money holding under uncertainty literature concerning the transactions theory of demand for money often contains the assumption that simple trigger target rules are optimal when each financial transaction is accompanied by a fixed cost the validity of this assumption is examined in this paper using a simple example it is shown that the optimal money rule in discrete time models of money demand may be much more complicated than the simple rules assumed to be optimal in the literature however when considering continuous time models of money demand or when adjustment of the money stock is allowed in one direction only simple trigger target rules are in fact optimal copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

time to build and capacity choice abstract this paper studies how demand uncertainty and time to build interact in affecting irreversible investment activity using impulse control methods we find the optimal timing and size of investment for a firm such as an electric utility that considers expanding its capacity in order to meet an uncertain demand when the construction lag is short uncertainty delays investment while increasing its size once it takes place however for comparatively long and realistic times to build the sensitivity to uncertainty is drastically reduced and the results can even be reversed more uncertainty can speed up investment and reduce its size

optimal welfare to work programs a welfare to work wtw program is a mix of government expenditures on various labour market policies targeted to the unemployed e g unemployment insurance m job search monitoring m social assistance sa wage subsidies this paper provides a dynamic principal agent framework suitable for analysing chief features of an optimal wtw program such as the sequence and duration of the different policies the dynamic pattern of payments along the unemployment spell and the emergence of taxes subsidies upon re employment the optimal program endogenously generates an absorbing policy of last resort social assistance characterized by a constant lifetime payment and no active participation by the agent human capital depreciation is a necessary condition for policy transitions to be part of an optimal wtw program the typical sequence of policies is quite simple the program starts with standard ui then switches into monitored search and finally into sa the optimal benefits are decreasing during unemployment insurance and constant during both jm and sa whereas taxes subsidies can be either increasing or decreasing with duration during ui they must decrease increase during a phase of jm in a calibration exercise we use our model to analyse quantitatively the features of the optimal program for the u s economy with respect to the existing u s system the optimal wtw scheme delivers sizeable welfare gains to unskilled workers because the incentives to search for a job can be retained even while delivering more insurance and using costly monitoring less intensively

job search and unemployment insurance new evidence from time use data article i nfo this paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the u s modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities the major findings are 1 the average u s unemployed worker devotes about 41 min to job search on weekdays which is substantially more than their european counterparts 2 workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less than the average unemployed worker 3 across the 50 states and d c job search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits with an elasticity between 1 6 and 2 2 4 job search intensity for those eligible for unemployment insurance ui increases prior to benefit exhaustion and 5 time devoted to job search is fairly constant regardless of unemployment duration for those who are ineligible for ui

crossroads strategy problems and a theory for the firm in this paper we develop the outlines of a theory for the firm a theory that guides a firm s path to value creation in response to the critique by von hippel and von krogh von hippel e von krogh g 2016 identifying viable need solution pairs problem solving without problem formulation organ sci 27 207 221 henceforth hippel krogh of the problem solving perspective as a theory of value creation hippel krogh argue a that problems and solutions cannot always be separated because they often emerge as problem solution or need solution pairs that are discovered serendipitously and b that deliberately formulating or choosing a single fixed problem restricts the firm from accessing the vast array of external problem solvers and restricts the firm from valuable reformulations of the problem and rich landscape search although hippel krogh raise interesting and important arguments we claim that they miss what is most central about the problem solving approach the comparative organizational a

frictional wage dispersion in search models a quantitative assessment we propose a new measure of frictional wage dispersion the mean min wage ratio for a large class of search models we show that this measure is independent of the wage offer distribution but depends on statistics of labor market turnover and on preferences under plausible preference parameterizations observed magnitudes for worker flows imply that in the basic search model and in most of its extensions frictional wage dispersion is very small notable exceptions are some of the most recent models of on the job search our new measure allows us to rationalize the diverse empirical findings in the large literature estimating structural search models

relaxing the cash in advance constraint at a fixed cost are simple trigger target portfolio rules optimal this paper studies the microeconomic foundations of trigger target rules of portfolio demand such as the demand for money it allows an agent to relax her cash in advance constraint by paying a fixed transactions cost to move between money and the interest bearing asset an example is generated where the potential of being liquidity constrained in order to avoid incurring the transactions cost can cause excessive nonconcavities of the value function in a dynamic program such that simple trigger target rules of money demand are suboptimal

skill mismatch and unemployment in oecd countries marco manacorda this paper uses evidence on employment labour force and wage differentials by education from oecd countries to investigate the characteristics and the consequences of a skill biased shift in the structure of labour demand and supply the empirical analysis shows that there has been some increase in skill mismatch in a few oecd countries over the past two decades but this has not been a generalized phenomenon moreover the rise in mismatch cannot explain much of the rise in unemployment in continental europe while it does explain a significant proportion of the increase in the rate of joblessness in britain

closed or open innovation problem solving and the governance choice scholars have recently highlighted the promise of open innovation in this paper we treat open innovation in it s different forms and manifestations as well as internal or closed innovation as unique governance forms with different benefits and costs we discuss how each governance form whether open or closed is composed of a set of instruments that access a different types of communication channels for knowledge sharing b different types of incentives and c different types of property rights for appropriating value from innovation we focus on the innovation problem as the central unit of analysis arguing for a match between problem types and governance forms which vary from open to closed and which support alternative forms of solution search in all the goal of this paper is to provide a comparative framework for managing innovation where we delineate and discuss four categories of open innovation governance forms markets partnerships contests and tournaments and user or community innovation and compare them with each other and with two internal or closed forms of innovation governance authority and consensus based hierarchy

unemployment vs mismatch of talents reconsidering unemployment benefits we develop an equilibrium search matching model with risk neutral agents and two sided ex ante heterogeneity unemployment insurance has the standard effect of reducing employment but also helps workers to get a suitable job we show through calibrations how the mere difference on unemployment insurance when countries experience a common skilled biased technological shock may result in differences in unemployment productivity growth and wage inequality these results are consistent with the contrasting performance of the labour market in europe and the united states in the last twenty five years the model is used to address some political economy issues

can welfare abuse be welfare improving abstract i analyze quantitatively a model of labor search with unemployment insurance ui savings voluntary quits and various labor attachment requirements in particular i study welfare consequences of a powerful reform giving ui entitlement to workers quitting their jobs voluntarily in order to search for another one results of the model calibrated to the us labor market show that there may be significant welfare gains associated with pursuing a generous entitlement policy for quitters as compared to the us status quo moreover i employ the assumption of monetary search costs and show that it can explain the empirically documented unemployed worker search behavior finally by inducing different unemployment benefit eligibility requirements the model identifies a concrete policy that could help us understand differences in the unemployment rate match quality and income inequality between the us and europe

employment spells and unemployment insurance eligibility requirements in this paper we examine whether the requirements that workers must satisfy to qualify for unemployment insurance ui benefits in any succeeding period of joblessness affect the duration of employment spells this behavioral consequence of a ui system has been neglected in empirical research which has instead focused on the effects of ui parameters on the actions of the unemployed the effect is identified by a unique change in the eligibility requirements of the canadian ui system in 1990 which increased the weeks of employment required to establish ui eligibility we provide a variety of estimates of this behavioral effect in our preferred set of results we find a significant increase in the employment hazard in the week that an individual satisfies the eligibility requirement in many regions of the country in the spirit of feldstein s 1976 study of temporary layoffs the results provide new evidence of the impact of ui system parameters on the actions of employers and workers

qualifying for unemployment insurance an empirical analysis little is known about the effect of unemployment insurance on employment durations in this paper the authors take advantage of a unique accidental experiment in the canadian unemployment insurance system which created an exogenous increase in the entrance requirement the number of weeks an individual must work to qualify for benefits of up to four weeks in some regions the authors identify the effects of this increase primarily by comparing the hazard rate out of employment for the experimental year 1990 with that for the preceding year in regions where other parameters of the unemployment insurance system do not change copyright 1997 by royal economic society

moral hazard vs liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance this paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance ui benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from ui using this evidence i show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by ui benefits is due to a liquidity effect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search moral hazard by combining two empirical strategies first i find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity constrained households second lump sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households i derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities the formula implies that the optimal ui benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage the exact identification approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives

time use during the great recession using data from the american time use survey between 2003 and 2010 we document that home production absorbs roughly 30 percent of foregone market work hours at business cycle frequencies leisure absorbs roughly 50 percent of foregone market work hours with sleeping and television watching accounting for most of this increase we document significant increases in time spent on shopping child care education and health job search absorbs between 2 and 6 percent of foregone market work hours we discuss the implications of our results for business cycle models with home production and non separable preferences jel codes d13 e32 j22

reservation wages and unemployment insurance this paper argues that a risk averse worker s after tax reservation wage encodes all the relevant information about her welfare this insight leads to a novel test for the optimality of unemployment insurance based on the responsiveness of reservation wages to unemployment benefits some existing estimates imply significant gains to raising the current level of unemployment benefits in the united states but highlight the need for more research on the determinants of reservation wages our approach complements those based on baily s 1978 test

the spike at benefit exhaustion leaving the unemployment system or starting a new job in this paper we review the literature on the spike in unemployment exit rates around benefit exhaustion and present new evidence based on administrative data for a large sample of job losers in austria we find that the way unemployment spells are measured has a large effect on the magnitude of the spike at exhaustion both in existing studies and in our austrian data spikes are typically much smaller when spell length is defined by the time to next job than when it is defined by the time spent on the unemployment system in austria the exit rate from registered unemployment rises by over 200 at the expiration of benefits while the hazard rate of re employment rises by only 20 the difference between the two measures arises because many individuals leave the unemployment register immediately after their benefits expire without returning to work the modest spike in re employment rates implies that most job seekers do not wait until their ui benefits are exhausted to return to work fewer than 1 of jobless spells have an ending date that is manipulated to coincide with the expiration of ui benefits this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

unemployment insurance and job duration in canada we use data from the canadian 2 year longitudinal labour market activity survey of 1986 87 to estimate the effect of the unemployment insurance ui system on job duration particular attention is focused on the entrance requirements of the ui system which relate eligibility for ui benefits to an individual s recent employment history the article makes operational the ui entrance requirement provisions which take into account variations in the regional unemployment rate controlling for many personal and job characteristics we find evidence that a significant number of jobs terminate when they have reached the duration that would permit a ui claim

unemployment benefits and search effort in the uk labour market in this paper the impact that receipt of unemployment benefit has on job search effort is investigated utilizing data drawn from the 1984 labor force survey reduced form search effort equations are estimated conditional on the decision to seek work after controlling for potential selectivity bias personal characteristics and demand conditions those claiming benefit are shown to search more extensively than nonclaimants benefit claimants maintain a clear attachement to the labor market and appear more able to prolong search effort receipt of unemployment benefit increases the likelihood of contacting a job vacancy copyright 1991 by the london school of economics and political science

unemployment insurance in europe unemployment duration and subsequent employment stability the disincentive effect of unemployment insurance on unemployment duration has been the focus of the empirical literature the potential effect of unemployment insurance on post unemployment outcomes which may be regarded as beneficial by improving job matching has attracted much less attention this paper provides evidence on the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment and employment duration in europe using individual data from the european community household panel for eight countries country specific estimates based on multivariate discrete time duration models controlling for observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity suggest that although receiving benefits has an adverse effect in the sense of increasing unemployment duration there is also a positive effect by increasing subsequent employment duration this beneficial effect of unemployment insurance on employment stability is pronounced in countries with relatively generous benefit systems and for recipients who have remained unemployed for at least six months these findings are in line with theories suggesting a matching effect of unemployment insurance

smooth adjustment econometrics and inventory theoretic money management abstract a growing number of empirical papers use miller orr s s money management as economic motivation for application of non linear smooth adjustment models this paper shows such models are not implied by the miller orr economy instead the miller orr economy implies non standard smooth adjustment as derived in the neglected and misinterpreted work of milbourne et al 1983 remarkably this function includes a varying weight on the lagged dependent variable capturing static not dynamic effects interpretations of these apparent dynamics are presented some of which may be useful in non monetary s s contexts results imply a new agenda for applied smooth adjustment modeling of money

capabilities structure agency and evolution this paper examines conceptual issues and reviews empirical results bearing on the relationship between research approaches emphasizing organizational capabilities and those based in transaction cost economics tce or in organizational economics more generally following a review of conceptual fundamentals what capability is and why organizations differ in capability it assesses recent progress toward an integration of the capabilities and transaction cost approaches primarily in the context of the analysis of vertical structure and related phenomena this review suggests that progress has been substantial and that the key elements of a promising dynamic synthesis have been identified the paper then considers issues that call for attention if further progress is to be achieved the first of these is the role of agency which must be seen in expansive terms relative to standard economic rationality if its evolutionary significance is to be fully appreciated the second is the role of structure or more specifically industry architecture which affects capability development by way of its effect on the feedback that firms receive after drawing on the recent financial crisis for an illustration of these ideas this paper considers the rise of interest in business models as a useful field of application and it concludes with a discussion of the role of organizational economics beyond tce we argue that whatever the theoretical perspective at the level of the firm analyses must reach beyond that level to grasp the important causal forces affecting capability development firm boundaries and structural features more generally

efficient unemployment insurance this paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk aversion an increase in risk aversion reduces wages unemployment and investment unemployment insurance has the opposite effect insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk an economy with risk neutral workers achieves maximal output without any unemployment insurance but an economy with risk averse workers requires a positive level of unemployment insurance to maximize output therefore moderate unemployment insurance not only improves risk sharing but also increases output

the wealth of the unemployed many studies have investigated the adequacy of unemployment insurance ui benefits as a form of income replacement but few have looked at other resources with which the unemployed can finance their unemployment spells this paper focuses on one form of resources own wealth holdings the author finds that the median worker s financial assets can cover roughly two thirds of the income loss from an unemployment spell wealth holdings vary tremendously however and almost one third of workers are unable to replace even 10 of their income loss moreover predicted wealth holdings decline precipitously with realized unemployment durations both absolutely and especially relative to actual income loss this finding together with the finding that individuals who are eligible for more generous ui draw down their wealth more slowly than do others during unemployment spells suggests that ui benefit adequacy could be increased if the benefits were targeted to those with longer unemployment spells

optimal unemployment insurance and employment history in existing unemployment insurance programmes it is standard to condition eligibility on the previous employment record of unemployed workers the purpose of this article is to study conditions under which the efficient contract exhibits these properties in order to do so we characterize the optimal unemployment insurance contract in asymmetric information environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells we show that if quits cannot be distinguished from layoffs it is optimal to condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history in particular the coverage should increase with the length of previous employment spells copyright wiley blackwell