cultural conflict and merger failure an experimental approach we use laboratory experiments to explore merger failure due to conflicting organizational cultures we introduce a laboratory paradigm for studying organizational culture that captures several key elements of the phenomenon in our experiments we allow subjects in firms to develop a culture and then merge two firms as expected performance decreases following the merging of two laboratory firms in addition subjects overestimate the performance of the merged firm and attribute the decrease in performance to members of the other firm rather than to situational difficulties created by conflicting culture

stabilizing a previously centrally planned economy poland 1990 stabilization in poland guillermo a calvo and fabrizio coricelli we examine the dynamics of the january 1990 stabilization programme in poland focusing on the substantial and sudden collapse in industrial output and inflation persistence we discuss three non mutually exclusive explanations of these phenomena 1 excessive initial stocks of inventories 2 an exogenous fall in household demand and 3 tight credit we conjecture that tight credit was at centre stage it helped to magnify the fall in output and to coordinate such a fall across sectors we base such a conjecture on the existence of substantial credit segmentation and on the underdevelopment of private credit markets the latter may explain the substantial shrinkage of interenterprise credit compounding the initial contraction of bank credit they argue that credit tightness is reflected in firms offering wages below the programme s ceilings especially given that firms are controlled by workers councils this conjecture is further strengthened by the fact that wages increased and even went beyond the programme s ceilings as credit expanded during the year we argue that the wage hike may be the reason why credit expansion did not result in a major output recovery and inflation persisted during the year

loss aversion and learning to bid bidding challenges learning theories even with the same bid experiences vary stochastically the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss in such an environment the question arises of how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics we analyse the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction using the experienced weighted attraction model of learning our experimental results suggest that individual learning dynamics are highly heterogeneous and affected by loss aversion to different degrees apart from that the experiment shows that loss aversion is not specific to rare decision making

the case against intellectual property according to a common argument the presence of strong intellectualproperty rights spurs innovation which leads to higher economic growthand increasing benefits for all the argument seems coherent theestablishment of secure property rights is a fundamental pillar of a wellfunctioning market economy no economic agent exercises productiveeffort without the certainty of controlling its fruits what is true forphysical effort must be true for the intellectual one if strong propertyrights provide good incentives for the production of potatoes they mustalso provide good incentives for the production of ideas why then do we argue a case against intellectual property are wearguing that while stealing potatoes is bad stealing ideas is good weare not economic efficiency and common sense argue that ideasshould be protected and available for sale just like any other commodity but intellectual property has come to mean not only the right to ownand sell ideas but also the right to regulate their use this creates asocially inefficient monopoly and what is commonly called intellectualproperty might be better called intellectual monopoly when you buy apotato you can eat it throw it away plant it or make it into a sculpture current law allows producers of a cds and books to take this freedomaway from you when you buy a potato you can use the idea of a potatoembodied in it to make better potatoes or to invent french fries currentlaw allows producers of computer software or medical drugs to take thisfreedom away from you it is against this distorted extension ofintellectual property rights that we argue it is a long jump from the assertion that inventors deserve the fruits oftheir efforts to the conclusion that current patent and copyrightprotection are the best way of providing such reward statements such

the realization effect risk taking after realized versus paper losses abstract understanding how prior outcomes affect risk attitudes is critical for the study of choice under uncertainty a large literature documents the significant influence of prior losses on risk attitudes the findings appear contradictory some studies find greater risk taking after a loss whereas others show the opposite that people take on less risk i reconcile these seemingly inconsistent findings by distinguishing between realized versus paper losses using new and existing data i replicate prior findings and demonstrate that following a realized loss individuals avoid risk if the same loss is not realized a paper loss individuals take on greater risk jel d11 d14 d81 g11

myopic loss aversion revisited in this paper we reexamine several experimental papers on myopic loss aversion by analyzing individual rather than aggregate choice patterns we find that the behavior of the majority of subjects is inconsistent with the hypothesis of myopic loss aversion

does this sound like a fair deal antecedents and consequences of fairness expectations in the individual s decision to participate in firm innovation the internet has given rise to new organizational forms of integrating users into firm innovation companies willing to make use of external resources can now outsource innovation related tasks to huge crowds outside the company the extant literature on participation motives assumes a symbiotic relationship between the firm and external contributors in which both parties have largely complementary motives and are only interested in their own utility in two experimental simulations we show that this understanding has to be amended potential contributors not only want a good deal they also want a fair deal fairness expectations with regard to the distribution of value between the firm and contributors distributive fairness and the fairness of the procedures leading to this distribution procedural fairness impact the likelihood of participation beyond considerations of self interest fairness expectations are formed on the basis of the terms and conditions of the crowdsourcing system and the ex ante level of identification with the firm organizing it in turn they impact the individuals transaction specific reactions and also inform their future identification with the firm these findings contribute not only to research on open and user innovation but also to theories on organizational fairness by enhancing our understanding of the emergent field of fairness expectations

risk rationality and time diversification the validity of the concept of time diversification is the subject of long running debate supporters of the concept argue that risk decreases as investment horizon increases detractors suggest that the concept is false on the face of it we argue that time diversification is consistent both theoretically and empirically with current conceptions of risk and rationality and we also note the implications of changes in investment horizon for stock market behavior

corruption investments and contributions to public goods experimental evidence from rural liberia we analyze how corruption affects incentives to invest or contribute to public goods we obtain a proxy for corruption among liberian community leaders by keeping track of a flow of inputs associated with a development intervention measuring these inputs before and after giving them in custody to the chief we then use the gap between these measurements missing inputs to explain variation in investment behavior of villagers investment behavior is gauged with two simple artefactual field experiments our main results are that corruption i undermines incentives for voluntary contributions to local public goods and ii may reduce private investments of individuals subject to rent seeking by the chief in real life we also provide weaker evidence that the impact of corruption on investments and contributions to public goods is heterogeneous this impact may be gender specific and appears to vary with accessibility of communities

risk aversion in a dynamic asset allocation experiment we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment in the spirit of merton 1971 in which subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a risk free and risky asset using the optimal allocation of an investor with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion hara utility we fit the experimental choices to characterize the risk profile of our participants despite substantial heterogeneity decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing relative risk aversion are the predominant types we also find some evidence of increased risk taking after a gain finally the session level risk attitudes show a different profile than the individual descriptions of risk attitudes

causes consequences and cures of myopic loss aversion an experimental investigation we examine in an experiment the causes consequences and possible cures of myopic loss aversion mla for investment behaviour under risk we find that both investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to the effects of mla longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to higher investments however when given the choice subjects prefer on average shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback exploiting the status quo bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention that increases investment levels

consistency of risk preference measures an artefactual field experiment from rural china a variety of measures have been developed to elicit individual risk preferences how these measures perform in the field in particular in developing countries with non student subjects is still a

rank matters the impact of social competition on portfolio choice tournament incentives schemes have been criticized for inducing excessive risk taking among financial market participants in this paper we investigate how relative performance based incentive schemes and status concerns for higher rank influence portfolio choice in laboratory experiments we find that both underperformers and over performers adapt their portfolios to their current relative performance preferring either positively or negatively skewed assets respectively most importantly these results hold both when relative performance is instrumental for higher payoffs in a tournament and when it is only intrinsically motivating and not payout relevant we find no effects when no relative performance information is given

do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis two behavioral concepts loss aversion and mental accounting have been combined to provide a theoretical explanation of the equity premium puzzle recent experimental evidence supports the theory as students behavior has been found to be consistent with myopic loss aversion mla yet much like certain anomalies in the realm of riskless decision making these behavioral tendencies may be attenuated among professionals using traders recruited from the cbot we do indeed find behavioral differences between professionals and students but rather than discovering that the anomaly is muted we find that traders exhibit behavior consistent with mla to a greater extent than students

social identity and governance the behavioral response to female leaders this paper uses data from artefactual field experiments and surveys conducted in 61 villages in india to examine whether men and women respond differently to women as leaders we investigate the extent to which behavior towards female leaders is influenced by experience with women in leadership positions we find evidence of significant male backlash against female leaders which can be attributed to the transgression of social norms and in particular a violation of male identity when women are assigned to positions of leadership through gender based quotas increased exposure to female leaders reduces the extent of bias

specific and general information sharing among competing academic researchers we examine information sharing among academics during the research process and show it is context dependent because of differences in trade offs when researchers respond to specific requests for information or materials potential future reciprocity is weighed against the current loss of competitiveness while general sharing intermediate results in an open forum is driven by the need for feedback versus potential misappropriation we formally model these trade offs and empirically test for differences using a survey of german and uk bio scientists increased competition has a negative impact on sharing in both contexts but career stage has an effect only on specific sharing with untenured faculty less likely to share further scientists in larger teams are more likely to share specifically but less likely to share generally the importance of patents for one s reputation reduces sharing in both contexts but the effect is greater for general information sharing

the effects of income mobility and tax persistence on income redistribution and inequality we explore the effect of income mobility and the persistence of redistributive tax policy on the level of redistribution in democratic societies an infinite horizon theoretical model is developed and the properties of the equilibrium tax rate and the degree of after tax inequality are characterized mobility and stickiness of tax policy are both negatively related to the equilibrium tax rate however neither is sufficient by itself social mobility has no effect on equilibrium taxes if tax policy is voted on in every period and tax persistence has no effect in the absence of social mobility the two forces are complementary tax persistence leads to higher levels of post tax inequality for any amount of mobility the effect of mobility on inequality is less clear cut and depends on the degree of tax persistence a laboratory experiment is conducted to test the main comparative static predictions of the theory and the results are generally supportive

disappointment in decision making under uncertainty decision analysis requires that two equally desirable consequences should have the same utility and vice versa most analyses of financial decision making presume that two consequences with the same dollar outcome will be equally preferred however winning the top prize of 10 000 in a lottery may leave one much happier than receiving 10 000 as the lowest prize in a lottery this paper explores the implications of disappointment a psychological reaction caused by comparing the actual outcome of a lottery to one s prior expectations for decision making under uncertainty explicit recognition that decision makers may be paying a premium to avoid potential disappointment provides an interpretation for some known behavioral paradoxes and suggests that decision makers may be sensitive to the manner in which a lottery is resolved the concept of disappointment is integrated into utility theory in a prescriptive model

decision support for retirement portfolio management overcoming myopic loss aversion via technology design as firms continue to abandon pensions in favor of employee managed retirement plans tremendous demands are being placed on the decision making proficiency of future retirees as reflected in the equity premium puzzle individual investors tend to hold overly conservative portfolios that provide meager payoffs over time consequently there is growing concern that the vast majority of retirement accounts might be insufficiently funded when employees reach retirement given that most retirement plans can now be managed online a potential solution lies in designing a web based decision support system dss that helps future retirees make more profitable portfolio management decisions this paper reports the results of a study in which 159 retirement plan participants were asked to use an experimental website to manage a portfolio of retirement investments over a simulated 30 year period using a psychological approach toward designing the dss myopic loss aversion is put forth as a theoretical explanation for the psychological mechanisms that encourage investors to hold overly conservative portfolios armed with this knowledge three design features information horizon system restrictiveness and decisional guidance are implemented as part of an overarching design strategy targeted at increasing investors willingness to take calculated risks the results indicate that investor conservatism diminishes when the dss presents prospective probabilities and payoffs over long time horizons in contrast short term information horizons constitute a major stumbling block for investors however when confronted with short term information horizons risk aversion can be successfully counteracted by configuring a dss to either restrict the frequency of decisions or to suggest a relatively aggressive portfolio allocation these findings carry important implications for theory and practice

adjustment and social costs in chile during the 1980s abstract traditional analysis of adjustment programs tends to underestimate the welfare costs because it assumes that a contraction of nontradable production will close the expenditure income gap while the resulting excess supply of tradables will automatically be exported in chile however tradable output contracted sharply falling almost two thirds as much as nontradable output the conventional analysis also ignores the effect of adjustment on unemployment rates and on real wages this paper argues that the adjustment measures of the 1980s were regressive even though the government was successful in targeting its expenditures toward the very poor during the period of fiscal retrenchment among the regressive adjustment measures were the subsidies to holders of dollar denominated debt provided by the central bank in addition policies to reduce expenditures raised the unemployment rate over 26 reduced real wages by 20 for almost five years and reduced health housing and education budgets by 20 per capita finally the required real devaluation raised the cost of living for the poor

a theory of disappointment aversion an axiomatic model of preferences over lotteries is developed it is shown that this model is consistent with the allais paradox includes expected utility theory as a special case and is only one parameter beta richer than the expected utility model allais paradox type behavior is identified with positive values of beta preferences with positive beta are said to be disappointment averse it is shown that risk aversion implies disappointment aversion and that the arrow pratt measures of risk aversion can be generalized in a straight forward manner to the current framework copyright 1991 by the econometric society

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

regulatory performance of audit tournaments and compliance observability this paper examines the effectiveness of traditional regulatory schemes and newly emerging social information schemes for achieving compliance our experiment focuses on two stochastic audit schemes for enforcing regulatory compliance in the random audit mechanism firms are randomly chosen for inspection in the tournament audit mechanism the probability of inspection increases with the degree of estimated underreporting to study the effects of social information the experiment varies the observability of identity output and compliance decisions optimal output is theoretically independent of the auditing scheme but equilibrium reporting is higher under the tournament mechanism than random auditing experimental findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions for reporting but deviate modestly for output in particular we find that average output is lower and reporting is higher in the tournament treatment compared to the random audit treatment at the individual level a majority of participants misreported in most periods social observability does not affect output or reporting significantly in either of the audit treatments

the effect of myopia and loss aversion on risk taking an experimental test myopic loss aversion is the combination of a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently two implications of myopic loss aversion are tested experimentally 1 investors who display myopic loss aversion will be more willing to accept risks if they evaluate their investments less often 2 if all payoffs are increased enough to eliminate losses investors will accept more risk in a task in which investors learn from experience both predictions are supported the investors who got the most frequent feedback and thus the most information took the least risk and earned the least money language en

can losing lead to winning individuals groups and teams who are behind their opponents in competition tend to be more likely to lose in contrast we show that through increasing motivation being slightly behind can actually increase success analysis of more than 18 000 professional basketball games illustrates that being slightly behind at halftime leads to a discontinuous increase in winning percentage teams behind by a point at halftime for example actually win more often than teams ahead by one or approximately six percentage points more often than expected this psychological effect is roughly half the size of the proverbial home team advantage analysis of more than 45 000 collegiate basketball games finds consistent though smaller results experiments corroborate the field data and generalize their findings providing direct causal evidence that being slightly behind increases effort and casting doubt on alternative explanations for the results taken together these findings illustrate that losing can sometimes lead to winning this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

myopic loss aversion and stock investments an empirical study of private investors abstract myopic loss aversion was suggested by benartzi and thaler 1995 as an explanation for the equity premium puzzle its main prediction is that loss averse investors who evaluate their investment performance too frequently and therefore often observe small losses on their stock portfolios would invest too little in equity we investigate the link between myopic loss aversion and actual investment decisions of individual investors using survey data our results are consistent with the predictions of benartzi and thaler higher myopic loss aversion is associated with lower stock investment as a share of total assets investors tend to evaluate their stock portfolio performance too often which contributes to the prevalence of myopic loss aversion the effect of myopia is most apparent when investors both evaluate their portfolios frequently and trade stocks regularly

an experimental test of the under annuitization puzzle with smooth ambiguity and charitable giving abstract in a life cycle model with a bequest motive we study the impact of smooth ambiguity aversion to uncertain survival probabilities on the optimal demand for annuities we implement a theory driven laboratory experiment first a subject s ambiguity attitude is elicited in a simple experimental setting able to make the smooth ambiguity model operational then in a two period annuity bequest decision problem the subject s bequest in the second period is presented as a donation to a previously chosen charity contingent to the subject being active after the first period in line with the theoretical predictions we find that ambiguity averse resp loving subjects invest less resp more in annuities than ambiguity neutral ones furthermore subjects contingent donation to the chosen charity increases in their investment in annuities only for sufficiently high levels of warm glow altruism

paying is believing the effect of costly information on bayesian updating the supposed irrelevance of historical costs for rational decision making has been the subject of much interest in the economic literature in this paper we explore whether individual decision making under risk is affected by the cost of information to do so one must distinguish the effect of cost from self selection by individuals who value information the most outside of the laboratory it is difficult to disentangle these two effects we thus create an experimental environment where subjects are o ered additional useful and identical information on the state of the world across treatments we find a systematic effect of sunk costs on the manner in which subjects update their beliefs subjects over weigh costly information relatively to free information which results in a push of beliefs towards the extremes this shift does not necessarily lead to behavior more attuned with bayesian updating we find that an intensification of representativeness bias due to cost is the most likely explanation of our results

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

cooperation between rivals informal know how trading it has long been recognized that it is difficult for an innovating firm to fully appropriate the benefits arising from its innovations and that desired research might therefore not be performed nelson 1959 pp 297 306 one sometimes possible solution to this dilemma is cooperative r d conducted by firms who share the costs and benefits of particular r d projects johnson 1973

risk taking by agents the role of ex ante and ex post accountability we study the role of accountability in situations where an agent makes risky decisions for a principal we observe that in the absence of accountability agents choose less risk averse investments for the principal than investors who invest for their own account accountability mitigates the observed decrease in risk aversion differences are observed between situations where agents are accountable for their decision ex ante and where they are accountable for the outcome ex post

an experiment on risk taking and evaluation periods does the period over which individuals evaluate outcomes influence their investment in risky assets results from this study show that the more frequently returns are evaluated the more risk averse investors will be the results are in line with the behavioral hypothesis of myopic loss aversion which assumes that people are myopic in evaluating outcomes over time and are more sensitive to losses than to gains the results have relevance for the equity premium puzzle and also for the marketing strategies of fund managers

team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion one acclaimed role of managers is to monitor workers in team production processes and discipline them through the threat of terminating them from the team alchian and demsetz 1972 we extend a standard weakest link experiment with a manager that can decide to replace some of her team members at a cost the amount of contractual commitment termination possibilities and the precision of the manager s monitoring information serve as treatment variables our results show that the fear of exclusion has a profound effect on team performance even if workers are imperfectly monitored the most flexible contract induces the highest output while the one with no firing possibilities leads to the lowest production however once the fear is eliminated for some workers because permanent workers cannot be fired after a probation phase effort levels steadily decrease

informal risk sharing in an infinite horizon experiment author s charness gary b genicot garance abstract this paper presents the first laboratory study of risk sharing without commitment our experiment captures the main features of a simple model of voluntary insurance between two agents in the model two individuals interact over a potential infinite horizon and suffer random income shocks risk averse individuals have incentives to smooth consumption by making transfers to each other these transfers being voluntary only self enforcing risk sharing arrangements are possible transfers can never be so large as to tempt individuals to renege on them this constraint when binding has strong implications for the shape of the constrained optimal risk sharing arrangement in our experiment participants are matched in pairs each period one of them randomly drawn receives a given amount in addition to its regular income after observing both incomes each person in a pair chooses a non negative transfer to make to the other person two features of the experimental design are crucial first it is common information that all pairs will be dissolved at the end of each period with a given probability participants are informed when this occurs and randomly re matched this replicates the effect of infinite horizon and discounting in the model second at the end of the experiment a single period is randomly drawn to count for cash payment this feature is essential for individuals to care about the utility outcome of each period we find evidence generally consistent with risk sharing with most transfers coming from individuals who received h in the period moreover in support of the theory transfers are much higher with a higher continuation probability and they also are highly correlated with the individual s degree of risk aversion however while the model predicts an increase in transfers with ex ante inequality we observe the opposite effect this may reflect considerations of identity or group membership

limited farsightedness in network formation pairwise stability jackson and wolinsky 1996 is the standard stability concept in network formation it assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted related stability concepts have been proposed we design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theories but find evidence against both of them the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior which we interpret as a form of limited farsightedness on aggregate the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks and the performance of farsighted stability crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them and not on efficiency or cooperative considerations individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation and suggests in general a low level of farsightedness around two steps on the part of the agents

evidence for countercyclical risk aversion an experiment with financial professionals countercyclical risk aversion can explain major puzzles such as the high volatility of asset prices evidence for its existence is however scarce because of the host of factors that simultaneously change during financial cycles we circumvent these problems by priming financial professionals with either a boom or a bust scenario subjects primed with a financial bust were substantially more fearful and risk averse than those primed with a boom suggesting that fear may play an important role in countercyclical risk aversion the mechanism described here is relevant for theory and may explain self reinforcing processes that amplify market dynamics jel e32 e44 g01 g11 g12

the architecture of participation does code architecture mitigate free riding in the open source development model this paper argues that the architecture of a codebase is a critical factor that lies at the heart of the open source development process we define two observable properties of an architecture 1 modularity and 2 option value developers can often make informed judgments about modularity and option value from early partially implemented code releases we show that codebases that are more modular or have more option value 1 increase developers incentives to join and remain involved in an open source development effort and 2 decrease the amount of free riding in equilibrium these effects occur because modularity and option value create opportunities for the exchange of valuable work among developers opportunities that do not exist in codebases that are not modular or have no option value

strategizing niceness in co opetition the case of knowledge exchange in supply chain innovation projects abstract in this paper we take a novel approach to address the dilemma of innovation sharing versus protection among supply chain partners the paper conducts an exploratory study that introduces factors affecting a firm s optimum supply chain innovation strategy we go beyond the conventional prisoners dilemma with its limiting assumptions of players preferences and symmetry to explore a larger pool of 2 2 games that may effectively model the problem after classifying firm types according to collaboration motive and relative power we use simulation to explore the effects of firm type opponent type and payoff structure on repeated innovation interactions or equivalently long term relations and optimality of niceness surprisingly we find that opponent type is essentially irrelevant in long term innovation interactions and focal firm type is only conditionally relevant the paper contributes further by introducing reciprocation of strategy type nice versus mean showing that reciprocation is recommended while identifying and explaining the exceptions to this conclusion

disappointment and dynamic consistency in choice under uncertainty the central proposition of disappointment theory is that an individual forms expectations about uncertain prospects and that if the actual consequence turns out to be worse than or better than that expectation the individual experiences a sensation of disappointment or elation generating a decrement or increment of utility which modifies the basic utility derived from the consequence by incorporating a simple disappointment elation function into a model of individual choice many observed violations of conventional expected utility axioms including violations of savage s sure thing principle and the isolation effect can be predicted and defended as rational and dynamically consistent behaviour

labor markets and adjustment in open asian economies the republic of korea and malaysia this article deals with the adjustment following external shocks in two open asian economies the republic of korea and malaysia there were important differences in the economic structure of the two countries as well as significant differences in the way external events produced crises that interrupted their dynamic economic growth detailed analyses of economic cycles in the two decades preceding 1987 88 show that the behavior of factor markets particularly the markets for labor and foreign exchange helped korea to adjust quickly to the shocks but in malaysia actually caused the crisis to deepen for economies heavily dependent on exports the unit cost of labor in dollars is of central importance as an index of the competitiveness of exports and hence of their ability to mount a sustained recovery after a difficult period accordingly the heart of the analysis is the determination of the unit cost of labor and the factors affecting its change throughout the cycles concentration on this critical variable helps to spotlight the crucial differences in the factor markets of the two economies

myopic risk taking in tournaments abstract there is a common notion that incentive schemes in the financial industry trigger myopia and risk taking in some sense this contrasts with the concept of myopic loss aversion mla which implies that myopia mitigates risk taking a number of experimental studies support the mla hypothesis by showing that people take less risk the more frequently their investments are evaluated in this paper we show experimentally that if subjects are exposed to tournament incentives the standard mla effect disappears rather there is a tendency towards more risk taking the more frequently investments are evaluated

are teams prone to myopic loss aversion an experimental study on individual versus team investment behavior abstract myopic loss aversion mla has been found to have a persistent influence on individual decision making under risk in this paper i show that team decision making attenuates mla but that teams are also prone to mla

the postsocialist transitions in comparative perspective policy issues and recent experience abstract this paper examines the postsocialist transition in eastern europe the reforms in china and the postdirigiste transitions in latin america the paper analyzes the initial conditions that gave rise to processes of reform in the different countries the main strategies for economic reform shock treatment gradualism and mixed strategies discussing their conditioning factors and rationale the actual record of these policies in terms of key indicators of economic performance such as inflation gdp growth external sector sustainability progress in privatization and the social costs of adjustment in addition the paper discusses interdependencies between economic and political reforms during the course of systemic transformation

the effect of short selling on bubbles and crashes in experimental spot asset markets a series of experiments illustrate that relaxing short selling constraints lowers prices in experimental asset markets but does not induce prices to track fundamentals we argue that prices in experimental asset markets are influenced by restrictions on short selling capacity and limits on the cash available for purchases restrictions on short sales in the form of cash reserve requirements and quantity limits on short positions behave in a similar manner a simulation model based on delong et al 1990 generates average price patterns that are similar to the observed data asset market bubbles are persistent deviations of prices from fundamentals to the extent that bubbles exist they can influence investment levels and the allocation of capital and thereby have considerable economic effects in recognition of their potential importance the question of the existence and pervasiveness of bubbles has been a focus of extensive empirical investigation see e g shiller 1981 blanchard and watson 1982 diba and grossman 1988 and west 1988 these studies yield mixed results regarding the empirical relevance of bubble phenomena one source of the differences in conclusions may be that because the fundamental value of the assets cannot be observed tests of the presence of bubbles are joint tests with the particular specification of the process guiding the evolution of fundamentals also being tested the availability of short selling is widely believed to make bubble formation less likely one rationale for such a belief is the notion that the cause of asset market bubbles is a constraint on the ability of traders to speculate on future downward price movements see e g miller 1977 jarrow 1980 diamond and verrecchia 1987 or figlewski and webb 1993 in the absence of short sales traders may sell only the shares in their portfolios the availability of short sales relaxes this constraint in this paper we study empirically the effect of allowing short sales on both the incidence and magnitude of market bubbles we choose a setting in which the fundamental value of the asset is clearly and unambiguously defined and known at all times and bubbles typically occur namely we use the experimental environment that smith suchanek and williams 1988 introduce while

does commitment or feedback influence myopic loss aversion an experimental analysis empirical research has shown that a lower feedback frequency combined with a longer bind ing period decreases myopia and thereby increases the willingness to invest into a risky asset in an experimental study we disentangle the intertwined manipulation of feedback frequency and binding period to analyze how both variables alone contribute to the change in myopia and how they interact we find a strong effect for the length of commitment a much less pro nounced effect for the feedback frequency and a strong interaction between both variables the results have important implications for real world intertemporal decision making

stereotypes and false consensus how financial professionals predict risk preferences abstract we analyze the prediction of risk preferences of others using an artefactual field experiment with financial professionals and students for their prediction the subjects receive information on multiple demographic characteristics and a self assessment of risk taking of the target when analyzing the predictions we find three significant effects subjects use the demographic information for stereotyping as well as the target s self assessment on risk taking and we find a considerable false consensus effect the false consensus effect is the strongest for experienced professionals regarding the prediction s accuracy we find that the forecasts of the professionals are more accurate than the forecasts of the students

risk taking for oneself and others a structural model approach economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk we examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality and compare them to individual decisions by estimating a structural model we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses we also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter these results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature they also have implications for financial agency which we discuss

portfolio choice and risk attitudes an experiment i introduction suppose an investor is faced with a decision concerning how to allocate financial resources between a risky lottery asset with a higher expected return and an asset with a fixed and guaranteed lower return is the choice of portfolio independent of preferences outside the standard neoclassical model in experiments with financial incentives we study how portfolio choice depends on three well documented behavioral phenomena ambiguity aversion the illusion of control and myopic loss aversion we also investigate whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money to indulge such preferences pay for more perceived control less ambiguity or more frequent opportunities to change the portfolio based on feedback about its performance while standard finance theory presumes that investors successfully identify and process information relevant to reaching optimal decisions in recent years a body of empirical evidence suggests that there are systematic departures from this behavior behavioral finance is concerned with psychological influences in financial decision making and markets investors make decisions while trying to stay afloat in a sea of uncertainty when predictability is low people may be prone to unjustified beliefs that may survive and even flourish in such an environment 1 people may resort to rules of thumb on a conscious or subconscious level to the extent that psychological influences are present it is economically important to consider which of these actually affect risk attitudes and portfolio choice a key issue is whether any such influences disappear when monetary incentives are present we pursue a systematic experimental comparison of three of the most prominent behavioral phenomena documented in the literature the illusion of control langer 1975 is concerned with greater confidence in one s predictive ability or in a favorable outcome when one has a higher degree of personal involvement even when one s involvement is not actually relevant ambiguity aversion ellsberg 1961 is the desire to avoid unclear circumstances even when this will not increase the expected utility myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 combines loss aversion kahneman and tversky 1979 tversky and kahneman 1992 and a tendency to evaluate outcomes frequently this combination leads investors to be more willing to invest a greater proportion of their portfolio in risky assets if they evaluate their investments less frequently we show that these phenomena are present with monetary incentives and also investigate whether people are willing to pay money to accommodate such preferences or whether they are closer to the rational model when incentives are present with the procedure we chose the willingness to actually pa for such preferences depends on the preference the great majority of investors pay for less ambiguity or more frequent feedback investment opportunities but fewer than 10 pay to roll a determinative die themselves 2 we then examine how the preferences between lotteries in the different treatments affect portfolio choice we have participants allocate their investment capital between an asset with a sure return and a risky asset with a higher expected rate of return in fact there is very little variation in investment behavior across any of the illusion of control or ambiguity aversion treatments in contrast the results found in previous experimental studies of myopic loss aversion suggest that participants invest less in their preferred option the main conclusion we draw from these findings is that the relation between which procedure or lottery people prefer and how much they are willing to actually invest in this lottery is not trivial at all people are generally unwilling to pay even small amounts of money to indulge the illusion of control and it does not influence their portfolio choice people are generally willing to pay money for less ambiguity but having less ambiguity does not influence their portfolio choice finally in some cases people are willing to pay money for more frequent feedback and opportunities to change their portfolio but again previous studies have shown that people invest less with this additional information and greater flexibility

knowledge based approaches to the theory of the firm some critical comments it is argued that kogut and zander kogut b u zander 1992 knowledge of the firm combinative capabilities and the replication of technology organ sci 3 383 397 and conner conner k r 1991 a historical comparison of resource based theory and five schools of thought within industrial organization economics do we have a new theory of the firm j management 17 121 154 erred in the specific way in which they claimed that a distinct theory of the multi person firm can be constructed on the basis of a theory of organizational knowledge or from resource based insights it is not possible to tell very much of a story about why there should be firms in lieu of notions such as opportunism or moral hazard however properly interpreted knowledge based theories may help shed light on issues relating to the boundaries and internal organization of the firm

transition to the market economy poland 1989 93 in comparative perspective poland the economic outcomes leszek balcerowicz the principal architect of poland s radical reform strategy in 1990 analyses here its economic outcomes prior to reform the characteristics which distinguished the polish economy from other socialist economies in central europe were the critical nature of the hyperinflation and accompanying macroeconomic crisis in 1989 the magnitude of the country s external debt the particularly strong socio political position of the labour movement in general and of the employees of state enterprises in particular a level of dependence of the ussr which though dramatic was less than that of its neighbours less economic centralization and a greater degree of private ownership in agriculture than elsewhere the last two factors were favorable but the first three most particularly the heavy legacy of hyperinflation were economically unfavorable on balance poland entered reform with a substantial disadvantage nonetheless its macroeconomic performance in the four years which followed reform was relatively better than that of its neighbours the crown jewel of poland s success was the halt of hyperinflation this was not achieved at a relatively greater cost in output cumulative gdp decline was less than elsewhere though after adjustment for the effects of the cmea shock the differences are not large balcerowicz attributes poland s relative success to the salient characteristics of its reform programme it was rapid radical comprehensive and consistent romania for one followed the opposite course of stop go gradualism that country s accelerating inflation and deep decline in output suggests what might have happened to poland had it followed a softer approach

initiating private collective innovation the fragility of knowledge sharing incentives to innovate are a central element of innovation theory in the private investment model innovators privately fund innovation and then use intellectual property protection mechanisms to appropriate returns from these investments in the collective action model public subsidy funds public goods innovations characterized by non rivalry and non exclusivity in using these innovations recently these models have been compounded in the private collective innovation model where innovators privately fund public goods innovations private collective innovation is illustrated in the case of open source software development this paper contributes to the work on this model by investigating incentives that motivate innovators to share their knowledge in an initial situation before there is a community to support the innovation process we use game theory to predict knowledge sharing behavior in private collective innovation and test these predictions in a laboratory setting the results show that knowledge sharing is a coordination game with multiple equilibria reflecting the fragility of knowledge sharing between innovators with conflicting interests the experimental results demonstrate important asymmetries in the fragility of knowledge sharing and in some situations more knowledge sharing than theoretically predicted a behavioral analysis suggests that knowledge sharing in private collective innovation is not only affected by material incentives but also by social preferences such as fairness the results offer general insights into the relationship between incentives and knowledge sharing and contribute to a better understanding of the initiation of private collective innovation

relative pay and labor supply we examine the impact of relative wages on labor supply in a laboratory experiment we test the hypothesis that ceteris paribus making a given wage high low relative to other wage levels will lead to an increase decrease in labor supply we find that labor supply does respond significantly to relative pay and in the expected direction however when a strong enough reason for the relative low pay is given this difference disappears

narrow bracketing and dominated choices an experiment by tversky and kahneman 1981 illustrates that people s tendency to evaluate risky decisions separately can lead them to choose combinations of choices that are first order stochastically dominated by other available combinations we investigate the generality of this effect both theoretically and experimentally we show that for any decisionmaker who does not have constant absolute risk averse preferences and who evaluates her decisions one by one there exists a simple pair of independent binary decisions where the decisionmaker will make a dominated combination of choices we also characterize as a function of a person s preferences the amount of money that she can lose due to a single mistake of this kind the theory is accompanied by both a real stakes laboratory experiment and a large sample survey from the general u s population replicating tversky and kahneman s original experiment where decisionmakers with prototypical prospect theory preferences will choose a dominated combination we find that 28 of the participants do so in the survey we ask the respondents about several hypothetical large stakes choices and find higher proportions of dominated choice combinations a statistical model that estimates preferences from the survey results is best fit by assuming people have utility functions that are close to prospect theory value functions and that about 83 of people bracket narrowly none of these results varies strongly with the personal characteristics of participants we also demonstrate directly that dominated choices are driven by narrow bracketing when we eliminate the possibility of narrow bracketing by using a combined presentation of the decisions the dominated choices are eliminated in the laboratory experiment and are greatly reduced in the survey

creating a lab in the field economics experiments for policymaking in this paper i focus on the role that artefactual and certain framed field experiments what i term lab like field experiments or lfes play in informing policymaking using examples primarily from rural contexts in developing countries i identify four main purposes of lfes 1 to test theories or heuristic principles 2 to identify and estimate parameters associated with characteristics 3 to explore the structural nature of parameters derived from empirical methods including other types of experiments and 4 to assess methodological difficulties associated with lfes and how these can impact parameter estimates i address the importance of generalizability for lfes that are intended to inform policymaking and in the process emphasize the complementary role between lfes and other empirical methods in particular other experiments finally i discuss nine basic principles for conducting lfes and suggest four directions for future research

the effect of short term information on long term investment an experimental study abstract we present a multi trial experiment that extends the classic experiment of thaler et al 1997 by adding short term information to long term investment the allocation to the risky asset is reduced in the long term when we add short term information

investment flexibility and the acceptance of risk abstract the hypothesis examined in this paper is that the greater the investor s flexibility the easier it is for him to change his portfolio depending on his results the more willing he will be to accept risks when the investor has no control on the size of the risky investment but can choose between one risky and one riskless asset this conjecture is shown to be correct however if there is more than one risky asset each period counterexamples demonstrate that flexibility rarely ensures greater risk taking for the standard portfolio problem in which investors are free to determine the size of their investment in a risky asset flexibility always raises the demand for the risky asset if constant relative risk aversion is less than unity but counterexamples can always be found when the constant relative risk aversion is larger than unity journal of economic literatureclassification numbers g11 d81 d84

structural adjustment and international trade in eastern europe the case of poland poland andrew berg and jeffrey sachs the polish economic programme is important not only in its own right hut as a key example of the benefits and possible costs of a rapid movement to convertibility this paper proposes an analytical framework and new estimates of the costs and benefits the framework shows that convertibility revolves around the relationship of two nominal variables the money supply and the nominal exchange rate return to convertibility is achieved not mainly through a real depreciation but through a nominal depreciation which helps to bring the overall price level back into line with nominal aggregate demand and particularly with the money supply the new estimates show that the costs a drop in living standards and output are less than commonly believed given the extreme inflationary conditions in 1989 and the shock following the disintegration of cmea trade the loss of output was not caused in any important way by the rapid move to free trade

economic reform in china since 1978 china has undergone a series of radical economic reforms which officially constitute a logical step in the initial stage of socialism and imply a transition from central planning to a mixed economy the author argues that in fact the transition taking place is from a soviet type of state capitalism towards private capitalism the rural reforms involve the restoration of pre revolutionary production relations while the urban reforms introduce new capitalists drawn from the ranks of the state administration to the detriment of the poor and unskilled there has been a retreat from marxism as the official ideology and the legitimacy of the regime is now based on modernisation as a national goal

an index of loss aversion to a considerable extent risk aversion as it is commonly observed is caused by loss aversion several indexes of loss aversion have been proposed in the literature the one proposed in this paper leads to a clear decomposition of risk attitude into three distinct components basic utility probability weighting and loss aversion the index is independent of the unit of payment the main theorem shows how the indexes of different decision makers can be compared through observed choices

how price path characteristics shape investment behavior abstract price paths are often the only graphical representation of financial products investors receive before making an investment decision we argue that price paths serve as graphical frames that influence the perceived attractiveness of an asset by highlighting specific asset characteristics in a controlled lab experiment we find that price paths have an impact on investment decisions in a regression we test a simple model relating the perception of price path shapes to several heuristics these heuristics are focusing on more recent outcomes deriving implicit reference prices from focal prices focusing on losses and estimating risk from the amplitude of the path we conclude that investment decisions are systematically biased due to the shape of an asset s price path

myopic loss aversion information feedback vs investment flexibility we experimentally disentangle the effect of information feedback from the effect of investment flexibility on the investment behavior of a myopically loss averse investor our findings show that varying the information condition alone suffices to induce behavior that is in line with the hypothesis of myopic loss aversion

evaluation periods and asset prices in a market experiment we test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change it influence her risk attitude in markets in line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion benartzi and thaler 1995 we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced this result supports the findings from individual decision making and shows that markets do not eliminate such behavior

myopic loss aversion disappointment aversion and the equity premium puzzle abstract this paper takes a close look at the behavioural finance explanations of the equity premium puzzle namely myopic loss aversion benartzi s thaler r h 1995 myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle quarterly journal of economics 110 73 92 and disappointment aversion ang a bekaert g liu j 2005 why stocks may disappoint journal of financial economics 76 471 508 the paper proposes a simple specification of loss and disappointment aversion and brings these theories to the data the main conclusion is that a highly short sighted investment horizon is required for the historical equity premium to be explained by loss aversion while reasonable values for disappointment aversion are found also for long investment horizons stocks may not only lose in the short term but also disappoint in the long term

procedural justice strategic decision making and the knowledge economy collective knowledge building is a key strategic task for firms success today but creating and sharing knowledge are intangible activities that can neither be supervised nor forced out of people they happen only when individuals cooperate voluntarily a key challenge facing strategic management is obtaining the voluntary cooperation of individuals as firms formulate and implement their strategic decisions this essay draws on the rich body of procedural justice research to address this critical issue we argue that when people feel their strategic decision making processes are fair they display a high level of voluntary cooperation based on their attitudes of trust and commitment conversely when people feel that the processes are unfair they refuse to cooperate by hoarding ideas and dragging their feet in conceiving and executing strategic decisions we further develop this argument into team performance wherein the attitudinal and behavioral effects of procedural justice are corroborated with theory and initial evidence of their bottom line performance consequences we then build a theory which we call intellectual and emotional recognition theory that can explain why procedural justice invokes the side of human behavior that goes beyond outcome driven self interests and that is so critical in the knowledge economy 1998 john wiley sons ltd

reference dependent consumption plans we develop a rational dynamic model in which people are loss averse over changes in beliefs about present and future consumption because changes in wealth are news about future consumption preferences over money are reference dependent if news resonates more when about imminent consump tion than when about future consumption a decision maker might to generate pleasant surprises overconsume early relative to the optimal committed plan increase immediate consumption following surprise wealth increases and delay decreasing consumption following surprise losses since higher wealth mitigates the effect of bad news people exhibit an unambiguous first order precautionary savings motive

is roger federer more loss averse than serena williams using data from the high stakes 2013 dubai professional tennis tournament we find that compared with a tied score i male players have a higher serve speed and thus exhibit more effort when behind in score and their serve speeds get less sensitive to losses or gains when score difference gets too large and ii female players do not change their serve speed when behind while serving slower when ahead thus male players comply more with prospect theory exhibiting more loss aversion and reflection effect our results are robust to controlling for player fixed effects and characteristics with player random effects

firm dynamics and industrialization in the chinese economy in transition implications for small business policy abstract this article first presents a review of the development of different types of domestic enterprises state owned enterprise soes collectiveowned enterprises coes and other enterprises oes which include mainly private enterprises compared with other transition economies coes are actually an important source of china s rapid economic growth they are vaguely defined cooperative without a well defined ownership structure there is no equivalent organizational structure similar to coes in western economies the purpose of this article is to study the empirical relationship between the size of domestic enterprises including state owned enterprises collective owned enterprises and other enterprises and their firm dynamics growth by investigating whether they grow according to gibrat s law the majority of coes and oes were formed after the economic reform the rapid growth of these non state enterprises especially coes is actually the driving force behind the rapid development of the industrial sector our empirical results suggest that gibrat s law does not hold for all types of enterprises the rejection is especially strong for coes moreover small enterprises are growing faster than their larger counterparts in terms of employment and output this conclusion leads to at least three implications 1 there has been little research into the dynamics of soes and coes in an economy in transition our results not only help stimulate further research in this area but also provide information for designing policies to speed up the economic reforms 2 until now the chinese government has not had a comprehensive small business policy given our empirical results there is an implication for government policy prescription to achieve china s development targets of rapid industrialization and lower unemployment or underemployment the chinese economy can reap more dynamic benefits by breaking up a giant and inefficient enterprise especially inefficient soe into a number of smaller enterprises in addition more small enterprises also improve competition in the marketplace and force other inefficient soes to improve their performance further research should be undertaken to examine the viability of this policy 3 because coes are the majority of small manufacturing enterprises the rapid growth of coes after their formation that are simply the opposite of the type of private organizations the center of the central and east european reforms is rather surprising to academics although some hypotheses like cooperative culture and moral framework for rights are put forward to explain their superior performance the validity of such hypotheses has not been empirically tested yet this is a fruitful area for further research

effective demand enterprise reforms and public finance in china economic reform in china athar hussain and nicholas stern this paper examines some problems of transition from a command to a market economy through an analysis of the most important example to date the reforms in the chinese economy since the late 1970s our focus is on the links between enterprise reforms effective demand and public finance the reforms have created a curious and problematic hybrid of market and command economies with serious problems of coordination they have concentrated almost exclusively on the delegation of decision making to enterprises from the higher to lower tiers of the government without taking into account its implications for investment consumption and public finance an understanding of future policy and lessons for other countries requires a careful examination of the effects of these past policies granting discretion to enterprises over investment and wages has resulted in both an investment and consumption boom but paradoxically a fall in profits there are strong reasons to suppose that the investment ratio has been too high in recent years fuelling inflation and slowing additions to supply by prolonging the gestation period of investment there has been a large increase in liquid assets in the hands of households which makes their expectations increasingly important for macroeconomic policy there is need for concerted financial innovation to diversify household wealth away from liquid assets finally the changes in the composition of government revenue and expenditure are disturbing there is an urgent need for a flexible and broad based tax system and for reducing price subsidies and subsidies to loss making enterprises

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training