how do cartels use vertical restraints reflections on bork s the antitrust paradox abstractin the antitrust paradox robert bork discusses vertical restraints and policy responses to naked and ancillary price fixing empirical research finds that vertical restraints are generally welfare enhancing we examine cartels that used vertical restraints to support collusion we find that one quarter of a sample of convicted contemporary international cartels used vertical restraints some of these cartels used vertical restraints to control downstream firms who might otherwise have undermined collusion in other cases distributors themselves had market power and received a share of cartel rents in return for their willingness to exercise that power as part of a cartel this raises questions for antitrust policy toward vertical restraints in highly concentrated industries or in those with a history of cartel activity

excise taxes with multiproduct transactions i examine excise taxes levied on multiproduct retailers excise taxes reduce equilibrium output and decrease equilibrium product variety in the short run but taxes can raise output per product in the long run and induce entry excise taxes are overshifted into prices in a wide range of cases including under linear and concave demand conditions and excise taxes shift less than one for one into prices only when demand is highly convex multiproduct transactions substantively alter the efficiency of ad valorem and specific forms of excise taxes and affect the comparison of relative tax performance over short run and long run time horizons jel h25 h32 l11 l13 l81

vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

subcontracting and the survival of plants in the road construction industry a panel quantile regression analysis this paper investigates how subcontracting parts of contracted work shapes entrants success and survival we find that newly developed quantile regression approaches can be adapted to study survival of firms competing for government contracts in road construction the method is applied on a data set that includes patterns of firm entry exit and auction related information we find an apparent increase in the business life of firms who subcontract out part of their projects in texas these subcontracting effects appear to be more pronounced for firms with few or no options outside the industry and among firms who contract out part of their work to disadvantaged business enterprises

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

the colorblind crowd founder race and performance in crowdfunding the dearth of minority entrepreneurs has received increasing media attention but few academic analyses in particular the funding process creates challenges for either audit or correspondence methods making it difficult to assess the role or type of discrimination influencing resource providers we use a novel approach that combines analyses of 7 617 crowdfunding projects with an experimental design to identify whether african american men are discriminated against and whether this reflects statistical taste based or unconscious bias on the part of prospective supporters we find that african american men are significantly less likely than similar white founders to receive funding and that prospective supporters rate identical projects as lower in quality when they believe the founder is an african american male we conclude that the reduction in perceived quality does not reflect conscious assumptions of differences in founder ability or disamenity but rather an unconscious assumption that black founders are lower quality in two additional experiments we identify three means of reducing this bias through additional evidence of quality via third party endorsements i e awards evidence of prior support through evidence that african american founders have succeeded previously and by removing indicators of the founder s race the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2017 2774 this paper was accepted by toby stuart entrepreneurship and innovation

vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference the legality of nonprice vertical practices in the u s is determined by their likely competitive effects an optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs which should be guided by empirical evidence empirically vertical restraints appear to reduce price and or increase output thus absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint s effect an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive

on the equivalence of resale price maintenance and quantity restrictions abstract when demand is known with certainty there is a clear mapping between a monopolist s pricing and output decisions this suggests an equivalence between a monopolist manufacturer specifying a minimum maximum retail price and imposing a maximum minimum quantity on its retailers this paper shows that while the effect of maximum rpm can always be replicated by an appropriate quantity floor the minimum rpm outcome cannot always be replicated by an appropriately chosen quantity ceiling as such the analysis provides one reason that manufacturers will choose a price floor rather than quantity ceiling even though a quantity ceiling would appear to lead to lower monitoring costs

lessons from the united states s antitrust history abstract the united states s antitrust policy spans more than 100 years for most of its history the united states has had the toughest antitrust laws and enforcement policies of any country in the world a shift to a more permissive attitude with regard to antitrust matters has occurred in recent years however this paper traces the changes in antitrust policy that have occurred and the concurrent shifts in thinking among economists on antitrust questions following this review the paper offers a critical appraisal of both the economic underpinning of the new learnings on antitrust matters and the changes in antitrust policy that have accompanied them it closes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for european antitrust competition policy

estimating the distortionary effects of ethnic quotas in singapore using housing transactions abstract desegregation is a key policy issue in many countries i investigate a residential desegregation program in singapore the ethnic housing quotas i show that choice restrictions imposed on apartment blocks above the quota limits constrained could have distortionary effects causing price and quantity differences for constrained versus unconstrained blocks i test these predictions by hand matching more than 500 000 names in the phonebook to ethnicities to calculate ethnic proportions at the apartment block level i can then investigate differences for constrained and unconstrained blocks close to the quota limits and test for sorting around the limits i find that price differences are between 3 and 5 quantity effects are economically significant translating to longer time on market durations selection cannot fully explain these results my results point to challenges in achieving desegregation using quantity restrictions

on the nature of competition with differentiated products there is an old debate going back to bertrand 1883 and edgeworth 1925 about the fragility of market equilibrium when competition arises among a few sellers it was hotelling s belief that price instability vanishes when products are differentiated hotelling 1929 recently attention was drawn to the fact that even if product differentiation can weaken the forces leading to price instability it cannot eliminate completely the possibility of price cycles d aspremont et al 1979 the purpose of this paper is to show that vertical and horizontal product differentiation do not operate in the same manner a stable market outcome including an endogenous product specification arises more frequently with the former than with the latter horizontal product differentiation is rooted in taste differences more precisely the potential customers have heterogeneous preferences about the proportion in which the attributes of the product should be combined a wide range of substitute products can then survive in the same market simply because each of them combines the various attributes of the product in a proportion suitable to a particular segment of customers between two products in the range the level of some attributes is augmented while that of others is lowered each variety has its own circle of customers exactly as the inhabitants located around a particular shop form its potential market none the less competitors can raid these privileged market shares by adequate price cuts by contrast vertical product differentiation refers to a class of products which cohabit simultaneously on a given market even though customers agree on a unanimous ranking between them between two products in the range the level of all attributes is augmented or lowered the survival of a low quality product then rests on the seller s ability to sell it at a reduced price compensating thereby for the higher a priori attractiveness of a more desirable quality the seller of a low quality product will specialise in the segment of customers whose propensity to spend on the corresponding range of products is low either because they have relatively lower income or relatively less intensive preferences than other customers at the same time the seller of a high quality product will enjoy an absolute advantage over his competitor 2 interestingly it turns out that price and product competition does not lead to the same results in these two situations regarding the stability of the market equilibrium to stress the differences we have chosen to concentrate on two

market structure and discrimination the case of small businesses this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses the authors analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups this set of variables in combination with information on local bank market structure helps them distinguish among borrower preferences lender tastes and inadequate lender information as likely causes of differences in credit market experiences of small business operators from distinct demographic groups the authors find that white men and women can expect similar treatment in credit markets with some benefits to female owned firms located in concentrated banking markets minorities by contrast fare worse than whites moreover by appealing to becker s 1957 classic theories we find some clear evidence to support the view that prejudicial discrimination is at least partly to blame

anti discrimination or reverse discrimination the impact of changing demographics title vii and affirmative action on productivity this study estimates the changes over time in the relative productivities of minorities and females i find no significant evidence that the productivity of minorities or females decreased relative to that of white males as relative minority and female employment increased during the 1960s and 1970s this study also compares the impact of title vii and affirmative action and presents evidence that title vii litigation has played a significant role in increasing black employment this suggests that the employment of minorities and females has not entailed large efficiency costs and that title vii litigation has had some success in fighting racial discrimination the eeoc has sometimes been credited with opening up new pools of labor that corporations somehow contrived to ignore and occasionally with hastening the breakdown of traditional barriers to labor mobility but in the context of the market s endless search for efficiency these anomalies would have been eliminated anyway leaving only the question of whether they were worth the expenditures compelled by law affirmative action is a net cost to the economy and the true dynamic effects the opportunity cost of all this expense and effort the diminution of competition inefficiencies due to the employment and promotion of marginal labor and the consequent demoralization of good workers can only be a matter of conjecture although they are clearly the most important of all senator orrin hatch 1980

on the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions we provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric rst price auctions connecting their equilibria to the concavity of the underlying type distributions and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions we apply these tools to studying procurement auctions in which as is common in practice one seller is given an advantage re ecting for example better reliability or quality we show conditions under which for any given rst price handicap auction there is a second price auction with bonuses that outperforms it with most of our results involving ex post dominance

product differentiation cost reducing mergers and consumer welfare cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two firm merger and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post merger market we show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre merger empirical estimates indeed we further show that in such markets two firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger s cost savings jel classifica tion l10 l41 differentiation des produits fusions pour reduire les couts et bien etre du consommateur les synergies de couts sont une justification explicitement reconnue pour la fusion de deux firmes et il existe des techniques empiriques vastement utilisees pour mesurer l impact des fusions visant areduire les couts sur les prix et le niveau de bien etre dans le marcheapres la fusion on montre que si la fusion se produit dans un marchede produit differencieintegreverticalement alors la fusion reduit l even tail de produits ce qui limite l utilitedes estimations empiriques faites avant la fusion de plus on montre que dans de tels marches les fusions de deux firmes finissent par engendrer des prix plus eleves quelles que soient les reductions de couts auxquelles on en arrive

resale price maintenance an empirical analysis of uk firms compliance empirical evidence on resale price maintenance rpm is scarce this paper provides novel empirical evidence based on a unique database of rpm complaints lodged in the uk to the office of fair trading oft between 2007 and 2009 we describe the characteristics of the commodity being traded and of the relevant upstream and downstream firms and their sectors we then present an econometric analysis to assess how the probability of compliance to the oft request to withdraw the rpm can be affected by the specific features of the relevant economic context in which this restraint has taken place

releasing constraints to growth or pushing on a string policies and performance of mexican micro firms abstract using firm level data from mexico this paper investigates the firm characteristics associated with participation in credit markets access to training tax payments and membership in business associations we find that firms which participate in these institutions exhibit significantly higher profits moreover firms that borrow from formal or informal sources and those that pay taxes are significantly more likely to stay in business but firms that received credit exhibit lower rates of income growth these results persist when firm characteristics that are arguably correlated with unobserved entrepreneurial ability are controlled for our findings suggest that the significant within country differences in firm productivity observed in developing economies are due in part to market and government failures that limit the ability of micro firms to reach their optimal sizes

affirmative action programs and business ownership among minorities and women affirmative action programs are commonly used as a means to level the playing field for minority and women owned firms in public procurement markets and therefore may be a positive factor in business entry and survival to the extent that affirmative action programs also apply to traditional labor markets however they may alter the opportunity cost of starting a business we utilize the elimination of affirmative action in california and washington states through voter initiatives to identify the effect of affirmative action on minority and female self employment rates in our base specifications we find evidence of modest increases in self employment among minorities and women in both california and washington after elimination of affirmative action consistent with the hypothesis that the opportunity cost of starting a business fell due to restricting opportunities in the traditional labor markets the sign of the estimated effect however is not uniformly positive when considering specific race gender groups and the statistical significance of the main results is somewhat sensitive to the choice of control states

can affirmative action be cost effective an experimental examination of price preference auctions one of the most controversial questions facing our economy and society in recent years is the question of affirmative action the debate centers around an issue of minority representation in which the rights of the majority are depicted as being compromised by affirmative action programs set up to increase the welfare of minorities implicit in this discussion is the assumption that all affirmative action programs must be cost increasing this result it is claimed follows trivially from economic theory since any interference into the competitive process which prevents the most capable from being chosen must be wasteful and costly in this paper we challenge this claim with experimental results demonstrating that pricepreference auctions in which high cost minority firms are given preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts in such a way that it is possible for these firms to win a contract but not have submitted the lowest bid can be programs that both enhance minority representation and are cost effective in that they decrease the cost of government procurement in the theoretical literature on asymmetric auctions eric maskin and john riley 1995 and the optimal auction literature roger myerson 1981 it has been shown that in asymmetric auctions in which firms draw their costs from

presidential address antitrust restrictions on single firm strategies this article offers an overview of selected developments in the law and economics of antitrust regulation of single firm strategies the strategy generating the most cases historically is resale price maintenance here the law has moved sharply in both canada and the u s towards more solid economic foundations yet a gap between the law and economics remains the economics of resale price maintenance is reviewed within a framework that is much simpler and more general than the existing literature the law on a second strategy predatory pricing represents in my view a success story for the influence of economic theory in spite of the absence of a single accepted theory of predatory pricing the remaining single firm strategies are concerned largely with the exclusion by a dominant firm of rivals from a market i review with application to cases the two most basic questions concerning exclusionary strategies are exclusionary anticompetitive contracts ever entered into voluntarily by market participants on the other hand is complete or substantial foreclosure of a market through exclusionary strategies necessarily anticompetitive cette allocution presidentielle a l association canadienne d economique presente une vue d ensemble des developpements dans le droit et l economie de la reglementation antitrust sur les strategies d une firme unique la loi sur la strategie qui genere historiquement le plus de cas le maintien du prix de revente a change dramatiquement au canada et aux etats unis et derive vers une politique qui a des assises economiques solides mais il reste un ecart entre le droit et l economie on reexamine l economie du maintien du prix de revente a l aide d un cadre d analyse qui est a la fois plus simple et plus general que ce qui existe dans la litterature specialisee la loi pour ce qui est d une seconde strategie prix d eviction est a mon avis une grande reussite pour la science economique malgre l absence d une seule theorie du prix d eviction generalement acceptee un troisieme ensemble de strategies concerne l exclusion de ses rivaux d un marche par la firme dominante l auteur reexamine avec un recours extensif aux cas les deux questions de base pour ce qui est des strategies d exclusion est ce que les participants sur un marche entrent jamais volontairement dans un arrangement contractuel qui exclut et est anticoncurrentiel d autre part est ce que la saisie complete ou substantielle d un marche par des man uvres d exclusion est necessairement anticoncurrentielle

subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts this article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions i estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the california department of transportation i model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation the results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions subcontracting decisions and bidding distortions in conclusion i propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes

entry and subcontracting in public procurement auctions we empirically study how the interplay between entry and subcontracting choices is affected by the use of different auction formats in public procurement the difference in differences strategy used exploits a data set of auctions for public works run alternately under first price and average bid auctions we find that the use of first price auctions causes a marked decline in both entry and subcontracting we also find that the type of firms entering first price auctions changes with firms becoming more likely to bid jointly with other firms in ad hoc joint ventures data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 2071 this paper was accepted by teck hua ho behavioral economics

slotting allowances as a facilitating practice by food processors in wholesale grocery markets profitability and welfare effects slotting allowances which are lump sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in return for various retail concessions are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets this article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously have been ignored the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements and the effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus slotting allowances motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices and this raises farm surplus increases total producer surplus and improves consumer welfare in the food system

vertical control and price versus nonprice competition this paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good the mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the product margin whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins given search or travel costs consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins in considering customers on the wrong margin retailers are therefore biased toward price competition this distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

gender biases in bank lending lessons from microcredit in france the evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains controversial to capture gender biases in banks loan allocations we observe the impact on the applicants of a microfinance institution mfi and exploit the natural experiment of a regulatory change imposing a strict eur 10 000 loan ceiling on microcredit descriptive statistics indicate that the presence of the ceiling is associated both with bank mfi co financing and with harsher treatment of female borrowers to investigate causal links we develop an econometric approach that addresses the concerns of selection biases multicollinearity and endogeneity our empirical findings suggest that the change in the mfi s gender related attitude was triggered by banks through co financing hence we speculate that co financing pushes ceiling constrained mfis to import whatever biases in loan granting that the banks are prone to overall this paper stresses that apparently benign regulations such as loan ceilings can significantly harm the women s empowerment efforts made by mfis

mortgage lending in boston interpreting hmda data the home mortgage disclosure act was enacted to monitor minority and low income access to the mortgage market the data collected for this purpose show that minorities are more than twice as likely to be denied a mortgage as whites yet variables correlated with both race and creditworthiness were omitted from these data making any conclusion about race s role in mortgage lending impossible the federal reserve bank of boston collected additional variables important to the mortgage lending decision and found that race continued to play an important though significantly diminished role in the decision to grant a mortgage copyright 1996 by american economic association

affirmative action and the utilization of minority and women owned businesses in highway procurement i introduction affirmative action programs in public procurement are among the more important government programs intended to advance self employment opportunities for minorities and women in 2002 6 75 of federal procurement dollars were awarded to disadvantaged business enterprises dbes through the small business administration and preferential treatment for minority firms is a common feature of many state and local government agencies recent court decisions and state measures have reduced the scope of and in some settings eliminated affirmative action programs based on race or gender which has given renewed importance to understanding the role of affirmative action in the success of self employed minorities and women the use of affirmative action is particularly widespread in the highway procurement industry since the late 1970s and early 1980s most states have employed affirmative action to award contracts to minority owned firms and since 1982 the federal highway administration fhwa has required states use affirmative action in awarding projects using federal funds in 1998 states awarded 14 6 billion of construction and repair contracts using federal funds of which 1 9 billion was awarded to firms owned by minorities and women as blanchflower and wainright 2005 note in the intervening years states have increasingly been able to use race neutral measures to meet goals which has had an adverse effect on utilization of minority owned firms understanding the effects of affirmative action in this industry is made important by the significance of the public sector according to the 2002 census of industries 72 6 of the revenue earned by firms in the highway street and bridge construction industry was from government owned projects as a result changes in public procurement policy will have a strong effect on firms in the highway construction industry despite the importance of affirmative action in this industry our understanding of the effects of these programs is limited states generally use percentage goals for the participation of minority owned subcontractors by prime contractors past research has established the response of dbe utilization to large episodic changes in affirmative action such as the elimination by certain states or cities of affirmative action programs blanchflower and wainright 2005 however little evidence exists regarding the intensive margin of affirmative action in public procurement that is as participation goals are raised or lowered what is the response of the utilization of dbes generally and minority and women owned firms specifically higher dbe goals do not necessarily raise the utilization of firms owned by minorities and women for two reasons first the dbe goal may not be binding in which case the marginal effect of small changes to the goal would be zero second goals for the utilization of dbes are often not perfectly enforced for instance a contractor facing a requirement to subcontract a fraction of a contract to dbes can skirt this requirement by documenting a good faith effort to employ firms owned by minorities and women the goal of this paper is to provide new evidence regarding the effectiveness of affirmative action programs in highway procurement at increasing purchases from firms owned by minorities and women two sources of variation are employed to answer this question the first is variation in dbe goals across states over time and the second is variation across projects within a state i begin by examining state level data regarding affirmative action goals and dbe utilization over the entire history of the fhwa s affirmative action program i utilize changes in affirmative action goals over time within states to identify the effect of affirmative action intensity on the level of dbe purchases i find that increasing goals for the utilization of dbe goals substantially raise the utilization of minority owned business enterprises mbes

firm racial segregation and affirmative action in the highway construction industry in this paper i document that highway construction firms in california particularly those owned by blacks and asians exhibit considerable racial segregation in that they are disproportionately located in zip codes with the greatest concentration of own race residents i find that segregated firms serve a larger market than minority owned firms that are not segregated and that this effect is concentrated in black owned firms i next exploit the segregation of firms to examine the effect of affirmative action on the success of minority owned firms following the significant curtailment of affirmative action in california due to a direct statewide ballot initiative the number of highway construction establishments located in zip codes with the highest concentrations of black and asian residents fell relative to the rest of the state even conditional on the number of non construction establishments this suggests that affirmative action policies may play a role in the net survival rates of minority owned firms

demand uncertainty inventories and resale price maintenance we show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers in our model discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand full price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell we show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer s wholesale demand and profits and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase

who is credit constrained in the u s economy an important assumption of the life cycle model of consumption is the postulate of perfect capital markets this hypothesis has recently been challenged by substantial empirical evidence hall and mishkin 1982 using the panel study of income dynamics estimate that 20 percent of united states families are liquidity constrained mariger 1986 derives a life cycle model with endogenous liquidity constraints and using a cross section estimates this fraction to be 19 4 percent hubbard and judd 1986 simulate a model with a constraint on net worth which shows that with reasonable assumptions about preferences 19 0 percent of united states consumers are liquidity constrained the emerging consensus points therefore to a fraction of approximately 20 percent of the population behaving in a manner that is inconsistent with the pure life cycle model in addition hayashi 1985 and zeldes 1989 investigate the correlation among consumption wealth and income for various population groups and infer that liquidity constraints are more important for younger families with low levels of wealth and saving the main limitation of these studies is that in their data sets constrained consumers are not observable and have to be identified via indirect evidence thus there is as yet little firm evidence about the characteristics of the consumers who are likely to be credit constrained this paper adopts an approach that differs from previous tests for liquidity constraints because it makes use of data where constrained consumers are observable and explicitly links their existence to credit market imperfections and personal characteristics the data drawn from the 1983 survey of consumer finances scf and described in section ii provide information on individuals whose request for credit has been rejected by financial intermediaries in section iii a model is developed in which consumers and lenders behavior jointly determines the probability that a consumer is rationed in the credit market this probability is then

entrepreneurial finance credit cards and race this paper examines the impact of financial deregulation on entrepreneurship we assess the impact of credit card deregulation on transitions into self employment using state level removal of credit card interest rate ceilings following the us supreme court s 1978 marquette decision as a quasi natural experiment we find that credit card deregulation increases the probability of entrepreneurial entry with a particularly strong effect for black entrepreneurs we demonstrate that these effects are magnified in states with a history of racial discrimination and link the results to discriminationbased barriers to entry 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

discrimination in the small business credit market we use data from the 1993 and 1998 national surveys of small business finances to examine the existence of racial discrimination in the small business credit market we conduct an econometric analysis of loan outcomes by race and find that black owned small businesses are about twice as likely to be denied credit even after controlling for differences in creditworthiness and other factors a series of specification checks indicates that this gap is unlikely to be explained by omitted variable bias these results indicate that the racial disparity in credit availability is likely caused by discrimination

the price of launching a new product empirical evidence on factors affecting the relative magnitude of slotting allowances slotting allowances are a relatively recent trend particular to the retail food industry these allowances are lump sum up front transfer payments from manufacturer to retailer when the manufacturer launches a new product the practice has attracted some scrutiny because of uncertainty about its purposes and consequences we draw from the extant literature to identify factors that potentially influence the relative magnitude of slotting allowances based on analysis of primary survey data from retailers and manufacturers we observe that charging and paying of slotting allowances are affected by the relative strength of the players among retailers the relative magnitude of slotting fees increases with retailers informational advantage over the manufacturer about the likely success of the new product even when retailers recognize that the product is likely to be successful additionally and consistent with the first finding retailers with lower costs i e potentially more efficient and powerful retailers received higher slotting allowances furthermore retailers charge higher slotting fees even when concerns about manufacturers fulfilling postlaunch advertising commitments are minimal implying that relatively powerless manufacturers are asked to provide credible commitments regarding postlaunch activitiesand are asked to pay relatively high slotting fees among manufacturers the relative magnitude of slotting fees paid is lower for those who have a strong market share position we discuss the theoretical managerial and public policy implications of our findings

the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption a cross sectional analysis this paper examines the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption expenditures using a single year cross section data set a reduced form equation for consumption is estimated on high saving households by the tobit procedure to account for the selectivity bias since high saving households are not likely to be liquidity constrained the estimated equation is an appropriate description of how desired consumption that would be forthcoming without liquidity constraints is related to the variables available in the cross section data when the reduced form equation is used to predict desired consumption the gap between desired consumption and measured consumption is most evident for young households

naked slotting fees for vertical control of multi product retail markets abstract slotting fees are fixed charges paid by food manufacturers to retailers for access to the retail market this note considers this practice in the context of multi product markets with imperfectly competitive retailers a monopoly supplier of one good and competitive suppliers of other goods we show how the monopolist and the retailers can use naked slotting fees charges imposed on the suppliers of other goods to obtain vertically integrated monopoly profits

demand signalling and screening in channels of distribution this paper examines two ways channel members at the manufacturing and retail ends deal with asymmetric information in the context of new product introduction a manufacturer who has private information that demand for a new product will be high can differentiate itself from a manufacturer less confident of demand by undertaking high levels of pre launch advertising and offering a high wholesale price a retailer for its part can screen potentially high demand from potentially low demand products by stipulating a take it or leave it slotting allowance the assumption being that the offer will be accepted only by manufacturers confident of sufficient demand to recover the high initial cost of slotting allowances it is shown that manufacturers prefer to signal demand through advance advertising and wholesale price retailers to screen demand through slotting allowances it is shown that unless advance advertising is sufficiently effective slotting allowances yield higher total channel profits and higher social welfare

government procurement and international trade abstract we model the bidding for a government contract in which there is imperfect competition each bidder is better informed about his own costs than either his rival bidders or the government and the distribution of the domestic firms costs differs from the distribution of foreign firms costs because of comparative advantage effects we find that the government minimizes its expected procurement cost by operating a price preference policy not necessarily purchasing from the lowest bidder

the effects of resale price maintenance on shareholder wealth the consequences of schwegmann event study methodology is used to assess the effects of the 1951 u s supreme court schwegmann decision which severely weakened the enforcement of resale price maintenance contracts in the united states overall upstream industries with heavy resale price maintenance usage apparently were not adversely affected by the decision among large retailing groups a positive effect of the decision was found for department stores cross section tests of the motives for the adoption of resale price maintenance provide support for hypotheses based on free ridership dealer cartels and to a lesser extent protection of product reputation copyright 1994 by blackwell publishing ltd

social surplus and profitability under different spatial pricing policies one of the most controversial parts of the u s antitrust laws is the robinson patman act posner has argued it should be discarded entirely 34 bork has called it the misshapen progeny of intolerable draughtsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic theory 10 382 the robinson patman act is an amendment passed in 1936 to section 2 of the clayton act in the words of its co sponsor its purpose was to prevent discrimination between competing customers of a seller so that any price differentials should be limited to the sound economic differences in costs 33 5 because of its concern with price discrimination it is the robinson patman act that is relevant to the spatial pricing policies of firms however the precise limitations the law imposes on spatial prices are not exactly well defined one point is relatively clear that no question of unlawful price discrimination would arise so long as the f o b price is 1 uniform and 2 available to all customers on a nondiscriminatory basis no legal requirement exists that the alternative f o b price be of any particular amount or computed in any particular way 85 f t c 1174 1176 1 49 while f o b mill pricing is legally unassailable the legal status of uniform delivered pricing where firms charge the same price at all points of sale is somewhat ambivalent see dunn 16 for a discussion what is certain is that firms charging neither mill nor uniform prices may be open to successful prosecution especially if they set price schedules which have bumpdip changes for example in the utah pie case see breit and elzinga 12 for more details firms were found guilty of price discrimination since their delivered prices were lower in the local utah market than at points closer to their plants

the gains from merger or collusion in product differentiated industries a merger in an industry with differentiated products increases the market power of the merging firms to the extent that their products are close substitutes and that other firms produce only more distant substitutes such a merger makes the residual demand curve of each partner steeper by shifting each in the direction of the industry demand curve 2 the extent of this increase in market power depends upon the own elasticity of demand for each merging firm s product as well as the cross elasticity of demand for each with all other firms products as a result evaluating the effect of a merger between two firms with n 2 other competitors would seem to require the estimation of at least n2 parameters all of the price elasticities of demand a formidable task that extremely difficult estimation task is unnecessary however the necessary information is contained in the slopes of the two single firm residual demand curves before the merger and the extent to which the merged firm will face a steeper demand curve for example suppose a merger between two u s brewing firms say pabst and anheuser busch were proposed it is not particularly important to determine whether it is competition from miller or competition from stroh or from heileman or which puts the most effective brake on anheuser busch s pricing only the total effect of these other firms and the particular effect of competition from pabst are of interest this paper proposes econometric procedures for estimating the demand system that merger partners will face based only on pre merger data the key to the procedures is that the effects of all other firms in the industry are summed together formally we start with a model of an n firm product differentiated industry manipulation of the model removes the prices and quantities of all but two firms this reduces the dimensionality of the problem to manageable size rather than an n firm demand system we estimate a two firm residual demand system in this way the technique extends our econometric method for

tying foreclosure and exclusion in recent years the leverage theory of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism in an important sense though the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory s central concerns here the author reconsiders the leverage hypothesis and argues that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power the mechanism through which this leverage occurs its profitability and its welfare implications are discussed in detail copyright 1990 by american economic association

inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination this paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting a manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates we show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions when the product is highly perishable retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories vertical price floors or inventory buybacks subsidies for unsold inventory can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions when the product is less perishable the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

disadvantaged business enterprise goals in government procurement contracting an analysis of bidding behavior and costs programs that encourage the participation of disadvantaged business enterprises dbe as subcontractors have been a part of government procurement auctions for over three decades in this paper we examine the impact of a program that requires prime contractors to subcontract out a portion of a highway procurement project to dbe firms we study how dbe subcontracting requirements affect bidding behavior in federally funded projects within a symmetric independent private value framework we use the equilibrium bidding function to obtain the cost distribution of firms undertaking projects either with or without subcontracting goals we then use nonparametric estimation methods to uncover and compare the cost of firm bidding on a class of asphalt projects related to surface treatment in texas the analysis shows little differences in the cost structure between projects that have subcontracting goals and those that do not

bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions we use data from highway procurement auctions subject to california s small business preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms bidding and participation decisions which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs we show that incorporating participation responses significantly alters the assessment of preferential treatment policies

the impact of affirmative action on labor demand a test of some implications of the le chatelier principle this paper presents an alternative approach to measuring the impact of affirmative action on firms affirmative action is modeled as a series of hiring quotas if the quotas are binding then a firm subject to affirmative action will operate with greater costs of production have less elastic demand for inputs and be less able to substitute between most inputs the results are consistent with the hypothesis that affirmative action regulations significantly constrain firms behavior own wage elasticities are less elastic and most inputs are less substitutable for constrained firms further affirmative action raises costs by 6 5 percent for firms subject to the program copyright 1992 by mit press

vertical price controls with uncertain demand a manufacturer distributes output before knowing demand and thus risks making more than its rivalrous independent retailers can sell at the monopoly price if demand is low retailers may therefore resell more than the joint profit maximizing output anticipating this they will not pay as much for the merchandise ex ante as they would if the manufacturer could commit to preventing rivalry the manufacturer has many options including vertical integration chain outlets restricted output buy backs just in time deliveries and minimum resale prices the article discusses each option s advantages and disadvantages and concludes that all roads lead to resale price maintenance the article closes with an alternative to the dealercartel hypothesis for minimum resale prices

vertical product differentiation with entry abstract this paper examines the non cooperative behaviour of established firms that compete in product quality and prices while foreseeing the effects of their rivalry on the decisions made by the later entrants we prove an existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and show that the dominant firms engage in maximal product differentiation i e select the highest and lowest technologically feasible qualities later entrant however always selects an intermediate quality moreover we show that the equilibrium configuration is identical to that generated by perfect foresight equilibrium in a model of sequential entry furthermore the profits earned by each firm are ranked in the same order as the qualities implifying that the later entrant despite being the last mover ends up with higher profits and larger market share than one of the incumbents

endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction we show how to numerically solve for a markov perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity constrained firms we find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes otherwise firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric which softens competition and increases procurement costs we also find that forward looking bidding dampens the competition softening effects of asymmetry farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones this can undermine the goal of a bid preference style affirmative action program more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences

slotting allowances as real options an alternative explanation this article offers an alternative explanation for slotting allowances using contingent claims analysis or real option pricing slotting allowances arise because retailers hold call options on their shelf space while suppliers must buy these options to introduce a new product a simulated model of new product introduction shows that stocking a new product contains a significant imbedded real option component we also show that advertising and promotional support can reduce the real option value

a strategic motivation for commodity bundling the analytical literature on commodity bundling explains the practice of selling two or more differentiated products in a single package as a surrogate for direct price discrimination in contrast this paper shows that imperfect competition creates a strategic incentive to bundle the profitability of bundling whether it adversely affects rival producers and whether it yields an overall efficiency gain depends inter alia on the nature of product market competition the role of complementarity in explaining why firms bundle is also explored copyright 1990 by blackwell publishing ltd

mortgage lending to minorities where s the bias this paper examines mortgage lending and concludes that studies based on data created by the boston fed should be reevaluated a detailed examination of these data indicates that irregularities in these data when combined with the most commonly used research methodology appear to have biased previous research toward a finding of discrimination against minority applicants when the most severe data irregularities are eliminated evidence to support a hypothesis of discrimination disappears the currently fashionable flexible underwriting standards of mortgage lenders may have the unintended consequences of increasing defaults for the beneficiaries of these policies

economies of scale and the demand for money cross sectional data from four surveys of small business finance demonstrate that economies of scale in money holding exist that these economies appear to be increasing over time and that the magnitudes are greater than those estimated for large us corporations firms not practising several specific cash management techniques and firms facing constraints in the credit market hold lower money balances minority owned firms exhibit economies of scale similar to the overall sample but cash management practices and credit constraint variables generally do not influence their money holding behavior scale economies vary widely across industries but overall means are relatively stable over time

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

near optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions consider a setting with n sellers having i i d costs with log concave density f from cumulative f and a buyer who puts a premiumi on procuring from seller i we show how for any given 1 n a sim ple second price bonus auction can be chosen which comes surprisingly close to giving the auctioneer the same surplus as an optimal mecha nism the bonuses depend only on the magnitude and monotonicity of the slope of virtual costs given f we show that these in turn depend only on fairly coarse information about f we explore how this result generalizes to asymmetrically distributed costs abstract

market foreclosure and vertical merger a case study of the vertical merger between turner broadcasting and time warner abstract we employ an event study methodology the event being the vertical merger between time warner and turner broadcasting distribution and programming respectively in the cable television industry we assess the effects of the merger on final prices subscriptions and carriage and marketing decisions of time warner the analysis finds several interesting facts first foreclosure in time warner markets following the merger is observed for the rival channels that are not integrated with any cable distributors second the turner broadcasting channels that increased market shares because of this merger appeared to be foreclosed by time warner prior to the merger the preference for own channels by time warner persisted despite a lower quality of channel bundles in its markets efficiency gains from the merger were not passed on to consumers

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

the effect of federal davis bacon and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations on highway maintenance costs the author compares winning bids on state and federal highway maintenance projects in colorado between 2000 and 2011 to determine whether federal prevailing wage and disadvantaged business enterprise regulations are associated with increased construction costs the effect of the davis bacon act is evaluated when average wage rates prevail for almost all workers involved in highway maintenance for most of the period of the study the federal minimum for work completed by disadvantaged businesses is 10 the goal for colorado exceeds this minimum by two to three percentage points summary data indicate that federal projects are more expensive than state projects but projects funded by the federal government are also larger and more complex regression results indicate that with controls for project size and complexity no statistically significant difference is found in the cost of federal and state projects results also indicate that federal regulations are not associated with reduced bid competition a

the rise of economics in competition policy a canadian perspective competition policy in canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics in this article we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy cartels single firm conduct and mergers we focus on canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the united states and europe

mortgage lending in boston a reconsideration of the evidence i introduction discrimination in the marketplace is often measured using statistical methods in order for the results to be interpretable as some form of discrimination it is necessary that these methods be firmly based on economic theories as to how these markets function the reason for this is that it is easy to confuse voluntary acts of segregation from involuntary acts of discrimination by the simple examination of statistical entrails the former is presumably acceptable to society whereas the latter is not any society that values its freedoms will want to ensure that a mis classification of the former as evidence of the latter is avoided claims of racial discrimination in mortgage lending provide an excellent arena to illustrate the issues that arise in statistically measuring discrimination in the united states data on mortgage applications has been collected for several years under the home mortgage disclosure act hmda these data show a persistent tendency for blacks to be denied mortgages at a greater rate than whites leading many political commentators to claim that they prove the existence and severity of racial discrimination one problem with the statistical measurement of discrimination is that the available data are often inadequate the hmda data has been criticized for not collecting all of the information germane to the loan decision such as the credit history or personal characteristics of the loan applicant and co applicant the argument is that blacks are denied loans more than whites because of these characteristics rather than the color of their skin whether or not this in turn reflects prior or concurrent racial discrimination in other markets e g in employment or housing or education is an intriguing question with important implications for policy reform in mortgage lending regulations 1 in an effort to address these concerns the federal reserve bank of boston undertook to augment the basic hmda data in the boston area with ancillary data on loan applicants see munnell et al 1992 1996 the vast bulk of these extra data were collected from the original loan application file at the bank of original application indicating that the information was viewed by the bank as relevant to the loan decision the boston fed study found that allowing for the characteristics of black applicants reduced the statistical importance of the applicant s race but that some racial discrimination remained specifically they find that black and hispanic applicants are roughly 60 more likely to be turned down just because of their ethnic origin the denial rate in this sample is about 17 for such applicants rather than the 11 denial rate for statistically equivalent whites although the study has been the subject of some controversy in the popular press 2 and policy circles 3 it remains an important effort to address these issues by directly collecting the primary data there are however some problems with the way in which these data are interpreted by munnell et al 1992 1996 these problem concern their statistical methods even if one accepts the economic model of mortgage lending decisions underlying their study simple corrections to their statistical procedures removes any evidence of discrimination an important conclusion echoing the boston fed study itself is to point out the dangers of drawing inferences about discrimination based on incomplete data moreover the simple statistical corrections considered here are the standard fare of textbooks and not from the fancy frontiers of econometrics hence it is likely to be useful in general to see why those textbook lessons are there by having them demonstrated explicitly in an important policy setting ii replicating the boston fed results the boston fed study began with the existing hmda database for mortgage applications in the boston area for 1990 4 the fed requested that banks augment their hmda reports for all applications made by blacks and hispanics and by a random sample of applications made by whites

minority entrepreneurship in twenty first century america prior to the 1970s minority owned small businesses were small in size and scope and common in only a few industry niches business owners were severely capital constrained lacking in higher education and training in skilled occupations the median owner today in contrast is college educated access to financing has expanded and opportunities to serve corporate and public sector clients are commonplace nearly 40 of all new firms created nationwide in 2015 were minority owned changing attitudes in mainstream society reduced traditional barriers true equality of opportunity among small minority and white owned firms of similar size and scope has nonetheless not been achieved this issue of small business economics examines lingering barriers impeding the development of a more vibrant minority business community focusing on access to financing and government procurement markets articles in this issue offer explicit analyses of enduring barriers along with explanations of adoptive strategic firm behavior appropriate for reducing those barriers

are vertical restraints pro or anticompetitive lessons from interstate circuit abstract at the heart of antitrust law is the prohibition on horizontal collusion to enforce this prohibition the law must accurately define what collusion entails one of the most controversial areas in antitrust is the issue of vertical restraints in the last 20 years economists have come up with any number of pro and anticompetitive rationales for such restraints given this perhaps one of the most important antitrust cases is interstate circuit v united states a case that combines issues of horizontal collusion and vertical restraints a review of the facts shows that collusion cannot be properly inferred from the behavior of the parties involved and that the relevant vertical restraints had efficiency enhancing properties we then use interstate circuit s behavior to generate a theory of vertical restraints that not only explains the events in the case but also addresses an important controversy in the vertical restraints literature

the effect of court ordered hiring quotas on the composition and quality of police arguably the most aggressive armative action program ever implemented in the united states was a series of court ordered racial hiring quotas imposed on municipal police departments my best estimate of the eect of court ordered armative action on workforce composition is a 14

credible pretrial negotiation pretrial negotiation is a structured environment in which to study bargaining with incomplete information when a plaintiff believes that a defendant owes him damages he may first attempt to reach a private settlement before resorting to a costly court imposed judgment a central issue in their negotiations is whether the plaintiff s threat to litigate is credible it is possible for the plaintiff to undermine the credibility of his litigation threat by making a settlement demand that is insufficient as a result the plaintiff must raise his settlement demand to limit the amount of bad news he can learn if his offer is rejected when this credibility constraint is binding traditional comparative static results are reversed in addition even though the defendant is being sued he wants the plaintiff s threat to be credible

oligopoly intermediation relative rivalry and market conduct we consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games purchasing to stock pts in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices and purchasing to order pto in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices the antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market resulting in anticompetitive effects bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous while cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets the slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices

are bid preferences benign the effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions abstract bid preferences in procurement auctions allow firms from an identifiable group an advantage in bidding against unfavored firms while economic efficiency is expected to fall as a result of bid preferences government procurement costs may either increase or decrease depending on the competitive response of favored and unfavored firms this paper uses data from california auctions for road construction contracts where small businesses receive a 5 percent bid preference in auctions for projects using only state funds and no preferential treatment on projects using federal aid i show that while firms bidding behavior matches theoretical predictions procurement costs are 3 8 percent higher on auctions using preferences the higher procurement cost in preference auctions is attributed to reduced participation by lower cost large firms structural estimates of latent firm costs are then used to evaluate how efficiency and the division of surplus between firms and the government are impacted by bid preferences firm profits are 3 1 percent lower under bid preferences however this is overwhelmed by the efficiency loss due to reduced large firm participation the efficiency loss conditional on firm participation is estimated to represent around 0 1 percent of overall procurement costs including the adverse effect of preferences on the participation of large firms increases the estimated efficiency loss to 3 6 percent which represents 27 cents for each additional dollar awarded to small businesses through the program counterfactual simulations indicate that if participation were instead inelastic to bid preferences the 5 percent bid preference would be close to the optimal level

capturing strategic rent full line forcing brand discounts aggregate rebates and maximum resale price maintenance this paper examines the implications of a retailer s shelf space stocking decisions on the optimal marketing strategy of an upstream multiproduct monopolist when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is known full line forcing brand discounts and maximum resale price maintenance are sufficient to achieve the monopolist manufacturer s first best profit when these strategies are adopted the retailer s profit is reduced to the scarcity rents obtainable on her shelf space when the retailer s opportunity cost of shelf space is unknown the use of aggregate rebates can act as a screening device to maximize channel profit copyright 1991 by blackwell publishing ltd

contract bargaining with symmetric information this paper reviews a recent literature that extends the rubinstein stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining theoretical issues such as the appropriate game form existence and uniqueness of equilibria are discussed the paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework

how costly is affirmative action government contracting and california s proposition 209 abstract this paper investigates the effect of disadvantaged business enterprise subcontractor goals on the winning bids for highway construction contracts using california s proposition 209 which prohibited the consideration of race or gender in awarding state funded contracts after proposition 209 prices on state funded contracts fell by 5 6 relative to federally funded projects for which preferences still applied most of the price decline after proposition 209 resulted from the mix of subcontractors employed which seems to arise from the higher costs of firms located in high minority areas finally short run barriers to entry and expansion may increase the cost of affirmative action

competition small business financing and discrimination evidence from a new survey we analyze credit applications loan denials and interest rates paid by small businesses across owner gender race and ethnicity in addition we examine data from owners who said they did not apply for credit because they believed that their applications would have been turned down after controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables including personal and business credit histories substantial differences in denial rates between firms owned by african americans and white males remain moreover consistent with becker s classic theories 1957 we find evidence that increases in competition in the firm s local banking market reduces these differences

price adjustment policies and firm size i introduction by the fall of 2009 several state departments of transportation in the united states adopted price adjustment policies to mitigate significant fluctuations in the cost of oil based inputs in government procurement price escalation in oil based materials such as asphalt binder or fuel was the main cause behind the trend firms increased bids to offset higher input prices adversely affecting procurement costs damnjanovic et al 2008 because inputs like asphalt experienced significant cost increases e g the price of alphalt increased by 31 in 2005 alone it is not surprising that contractors in general and small firms in particular struggled with construction budgets in response to the growing uncertainty many states introduced price adjustment policies for related inputs effectively dampening losses and profits at times of unanticipated cost fluctuations 1 while the latter part of last decade saw notable oil price price deviates beyond a certain range of the baseline index increases in the recent months firms enjoyed cost savings a percentage of which can be passed on to departments of transportation with the establishment of this policy going beyond industries directly impacted by uncertainty in oil prices the provisions investigated in this paper are common in defense contracting and were added to the health care law in what came to be known as risk corridors 2 as an example the department of defense has embedded such provisions in fixed price contracts with economic price adjustment fpepa these measures are designed to limit contractors exposure to economic uncertainty and market volatility prevalent in long term fixed price arrangements 3 in the same spirit the regional greenhouse gas initiative an emission permit trading program involving nine northeastern states in the united states held down price escalations by placing a price collar on allowances that limits variability we investigate the effect of the price adjustment policy on firm bidding behavior and competition intensity in road construction in oklahoma which can offer insights on the effectiveness of implementing such policies across industries we use data on public construction auctions to study the effect of this policy on firms of different sizes where size heterogeneity is a defining characteristic of the market cho 1986 the construction industry displays market concentration featuring a small number of strong contenders from the pool of over 150 participants in our sample the 11 firms that won most frequently were awarded over a quarter of auctioned projects and more than 38 of contracted value compared with the manufacturing sector surveyed in audretsch and mahmood 1995 a notably higher percentage of new construction companies end up failing many undersized and startup builders compete on the margin and have a low chance of making it to the list of long term players the literature has identified a strong correlation between firm size and financial solvency in association with firm survival and growth see brito and mello 1995 and hubbard 1998 in what follows we frame our empirical analysis with a theoretical model highlighting this connection as noted by gertler and gilchrist 1994 and martinelli 1997 there are asymmetric changes in firms borrowing costs when financial constraints are tightening in the face of uncertainty and they depend on the level of capital accumulation as a result high volatility in input prices is likely to reinforce the imbalance among competitors of different sizes 4 price adjustment policies help to level the playing field between small and large firms without invoking differential treatment toward a group finally there has been considerable interest in the literature in various policies that departments of transportation around the country use to help small businesses such as bid preference policies and setasides see for instance the work of denes 1997 marion 2009 krasnokutskaya and seim 2011 and athey coey and levin 2013