dynamic conjectural variations in a lanchester oligopoly an approach based on dynamic conjectural variations is advanced for developing dynamic advertising strategies in a lanchester oligopoly differential game the approach allows competitors to anticipate rival reactions to market share state variables and maintains the computational advantage of open loop nash equilibrium strategies in an empirical application to the ready to eat cereal industry it is shown that advertising strategies based on dynamic conjectural variations can better explain the advertising of the cereal competitors than can open loop advertising strategies

dynamic competition valuation and merger activity we model the interactions between product market competition and investment valuation within a dynamic oligopoly to our knowledge the model is the first continuous time corporate finance model in a multiple firm setting with heterogeneous products the model is tractable and amenable to estimation we use it to relate current industry characteristics with firm value and financial decisions unlike most corporate finance models it produces predictions regarding parameter magnitudes as well their signs estimates of the model s parameters indicate strong linkages between model implied and actual values the paper uses the estimated parameters to predict rivals returns near merger announcements

targeting maps an asset based approach to geographic targeting summary proper targeting of policy interventions requires reasonable estimates of the benefits of the alternative options to inform such decisions we develop an integrated approach stemming from the small area estimation literature that estimates the marginal returns to a range of assets across geographically defined subpopulations we create a series of maps that can be overlaid with traditional poverty maps to identify strong candidate areas for intervention though an efficiency equity tradeoff sometimes exists we apply our method using recent ugandan data results are consistent with independent empirical findings and suggest asset specific transfer schemes would improve with a spatially targeted strategy

imperfect information and dynamic conjectural variations this article analyzes oligopoly interaction in an environment where firms are imperfectly informed about the evolution of the market demand curve the analysis develops a two period cournot framework under the assumptions that demand shifts are positively serially correlated that firms never directly observe the demand curve and that firms never observe the previous quantity decisions of rivals firms do draw inferences about the position of the demand curve from past observations on prices consequently the current output of a firm will influence the current market price which will then influence rivals inferences about future demand the future output decisions of rivals will respond accordingly the theory predicts negative dynamic conjectural variations essentially a firm perceives that an increase in its output will lower the current market clearing price which will cause rival firms to think that the demand curve has shifted down and hence induce them to lower their outputs in the future

on modeling the advertising operations interface under asymmetric competition abstract using a market share attraction structure of advertising competition and following a supermodular game approach this article demonstrates for an asymmetric oligopoly the directional impact of changes in model parameters on the marketing controlled variables of all rivals advertising budgets and the operations controlled variables of all rivals ordered quantities importantly the various changes are examined analytically empirically and numerically in both non dominated and dominated asymmetric oligopolies in this regard the results indicate that firms in a dominated oligopoly one firm of market share larger than or equal to 50 behave differently compared to firms in a non dominated oligopoly each firm of market share less than 50 in response to changes in model parameters furthermore changes in model parameters are investigated in terms of their relative influential impact on a variety of equilibrium measures in this regard the findings indicate that for the analyzed model the marketing parameters exert much more influence on the equilibrium measures than the operations parameters additionally a change in the mode of competition from non cooperation oligopoly to cooperation joint ownership dictates that strong asymmetric firms of favorable marketing and operations parameters continue advertising but at lower levels and weak asymmetric firms of less favorable parameters cease advertising altogether

industrial centralization in indonesia in certain situations economic liberalization policies can increase the degree of spatial centralization of resources and spatial concentration of manufacturing in large metropolitan areas in addition historical patterns of location make it difficult to alter the degree of centralization this article explores these issues by specifying and estimating a nested logit model of industrial location of manufacturing activity in java focusing on the unincorporated sector the results indicate that plants strongly prefer locations with mature plants in related industries which offer a built up stock of local knowledge in addition the 1983 liberalization in indonesia was associated with increased centralization of the unincorporated sector although the liberalization gave unincorporated firms better access to government and other centralized services firms needed to centralize to take advantage of these opportunities because the bureaucratic process is centralized and communications are poor the relative increased growth of the corporate sector following liberalization may also have helped to further draw unincorporated plants into centralized locations

dynamic optimal control models in advertising recent developments this paper presents a review of recent developments that have taken place in the area of dynamic optimal control models in advertising subsequent to the comprehensive survey of the literature by sethi in 1977 the basic problem underlying these models is that of determining optimal advertising expenditures and possibly other variables of interest over time for a firm or a group of competing firms under consideration this optimization is done subject to some dynamics that define how these variables translate into sales and in turn into profits the purpose of this update is twofold on the one hand new contributions in the areas already treated in the earlier survey are reviewed on the other hand new trends in the advertising literature since 1977 such as quality as an additional marketing instrument cumulative sales models pulsing advertising and advertising as a part of corporate models of the firm are discussed the models covered in this update are organized under six headings models with ca

the impact of competitive entry in a developing market upon dynamic pricing strategies this paper analyzes dynamic pricing strategies for new durable goods in a two period context the first period is characterized as a monopoly market structure for a new product having dynamic demand the second period begins when a new firm enters the market and thereby changes the market structure to a duopolistic one we begin by analyzing the pricing strategies of three types of monopolists nonmyopic myopic and surprised a nonmyopic monopolist is a first entrant who perfectly predicts the competitive entry a myopic monopolist totally discounts the duopolistic period and a surprised monopolist is a first entrant who has the longer time horizon of the nonmyopic monopolist but who does not foresee the competitive entry our results indicate that the nature of these pricing strategies may be quite different it is optimal for the nonmyopic firm to price its product at a higher level than the myopic monopolist additional results indicate under what circumstances the surprised monopolist will p

general human capital as a shared investment under asymmetric information the paper examines the firm s optimal wage and layoff policies in situations where only general training is provided and the firm providing training has an advantage in information over other firms the asymmetric information among firms creates adverse selection which seriously impairs the mobility of labour and consequently affects the firn s optimal policies general human capital is shown to have the same layoff and cost sharing implications as firm specific human capital furthermore the contracts prespecifying rigid wages are proven to be optimal le capital humain general en tant qu investissement conjoint quand l information est asyme trique ce m6moire examine les politiques optimales de salaires et de mises a pied d une firme quand seulement une formation generale est foumie et quand la firme qui donne la formation a un avantage informationnel sur les autres firmes l information asym6trique entre firmnes cree une selection adverse qui reduit serieusement la mobilite des travailleurs et en consequence affecte les politiques optimales de la firmne le capital humain a vocation generale a les meme implications que le capital humain a vocation specifique pour ce qui est des mises a pied et du partage des coufts de plus les contrats qui prespecifient des salaires rigides s averent optimaux

optimal pricing strategies for new products in dynamic oligopolies this paper deals with the determination of optimal pricing policies for firms in oligopolistic markets the problem is studied as a differential game and optimal pricing policies are established as nash open loop controls cost learning effects are assumed such that unit costs are decreasing with cumulative output discounting of future profits is also taken into consideration initially the problem is addressed in a general framework and we proceed to study some specific cases that are related to models presented in recent literature three basic classes of sales dynamics are analyzed competition with price effects only competition with price as well as adoption effects and competition with adoption effects only in some cases it turns out that results which hold for the monopoly case carry over to the multi firm case in the sense that the qualitative structure of optimal pricing strategies is the same in the monopoly and the oligopoly cases however due to competitive interdependencies differences certainly exist in the levels as well as the rates of change of optimal prices

on the robustness and strategic implications of a parsimonious advertising inventory competitive model with extensions to pricing competition abstract using a market share attraction structure of advertising competition this research introduces first a parsimonious inventory advertising model for which competition is limited to two symmetric firms thus obtaining its related comparative statics following a supermodular game approach the derived comparative statics remain robust upon considering non dominant firms each with a market share of less than 50 competing in an asymmetric oligopoly of n rivals where each firm controls the inventory advertising decision variables furthermore changes in model parameters are investigated in terms of their relative impact on equilibrium measures in this regard the findings indicate that for the analyzed model the marketing parameters possess much more influence on the equilibrium measures than the operations parameters the generalization appears applicable to both non dominated oligopolies as well as dominated oligopolies where one firm has a market share equal to or greater than 50 where each firm controls the inventory advertising decision variables in addition to price however changes in shift parameters elicit a response from the dominant firm which will differ from its non dominant rivals for products and services additionally while the literature shows that the non dominant firm will pursue a defensive strategy of decreasing both the equilibrium price and the amount of equilibrium advertising in response to competitive entry our findings show that results for a fixed market potential may not continue to be robust once inclusion of the operations variables of order quantity are considered finally the study explores the implications of the free entry equilibrium for which the number of firms in the industry is determined endogenously

an empirical analysis of dynamic nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry this article develops a dynamic model of nonprice competition in an oligopolistic industry and uses it to analyze advertising competition in the u s cigarette industry the model generalizes existing studies by allowing advertising to affect both firm market shares and the total size of the market the model also allows dynamic conjectural variations to arise from the intertemporal links created by the durability of advertising we use these dynamic conjectural variations to distinguish alternative models of competitive interaction we estimate the complete model of firm production demand and advertising choice by using data for u s cigarette producers the results indicate that firm advertising primarily affects the level of market demand with a firm s effect on rival firms market shares arising through variations in the number of brands sold empirical results on firm behavior suggest that firms act as if their advertising choices will alter the future advertising choices of rival firms in both the high tar and low tar cigarette markets

an empirical investigation of advertising strategies in a dynamic duopoly the equilibrium profit maximizing advertising policies of firms operating in a dynamic duopoly are derived by linking in a single framework the econometric estimation of the market response function and the technique of differential games that characterizes dynamic competitive behavior we use the lanchester model of combat to represent the system dynamics that capture the competitive shifts due to investments in advertising by the two market rivals we determine the equilibrium advertising levels using both closed and open loop policies we also compare these equilibrium advertising policies for each firm to those obtained using an optimal control theory formulation wherein the advertising spending levels of the rival are assumed to be known the empirical results obtained by analyzing the advertising rivalry between coke and pepsi for the period 1968 1981 under the above three alternative spending policies provide some interesting insights into the nature of competition between these two market rivals a significant contribution of this paper is to extend the existing literature on advertising competition by integrating theoretical and empirical analyses

identifying spatial efficiency equity tradeoffs in territorial development policies evidence from uganda abstractwe contribute to the debate on the spatial allocation of infrastructure investments by examining where these investments generate the highest economic return spatial efficiency and identifying trade offs when infrastructure coverage is made more equitable across regions spatial equity we estimate models of firm location choice in uganda drawing on insights from the new economic geography literature the main findings show that manufacturing firms gain from being in areas that offer a diverse mix of economic activities public infrastructure investments in other locations are likely to attract fewer private investors and will pose a spatial efficiency equity trade off

estimating equilibrium models of sorting across locations while there is growing interest in measuring the size and scope of local spillovers it is well understood that such spillovers cannot be distinguished from unobservable local attributes using solely the observed location decisions of individuals or firms we propose an empirical strategy for recovering estimates of spillovers in the presence of unobserved local attributes for a broadly applicable class of equilibrium sorting models our approach relies on an iv strategy derived from the internal logic of the sorting model itself we show practically how the strategy is implemented provide intuition for our instruments discuss the role of effective choice set variation in identifying the model and carry out a series of monte carlo simulations to demonstrate performance in small samples

markov perfect equilibrium advertising strategies of lanchester duopoly model a technical note we propose a numerical approach to compute stationary markov perfect nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the lanchester model the algorithm can be implemented using a standard mathematical package and importantly it does not require that the players discount their future earnings at a zero rate an assumption that has been made in the literature

recent developments in dynamic advertising research a variety of continuous time differential functions have been developed to investigate dynamic advertising problems in business and economics fields since major dynamic models appearing before 1995 have been reviewed by a few survey papers we provide a comprehensive review of the dynamic advertising models published after 1995 which are classified into six categories i nerlove arrow model and its extensions ii vidale wolfe model and its extensions iii lanchester model and its extensions iv the diffusion models v dynamic advertising competition models with other attributes and vi empirical studies for dynamic advertising problems for each category we first briefly summarize major relevant before 1995 models and then discuss major after 1995 models in details we find that the dynamic models reviewed in this paper have been extensively used to analyze various advertising problems in the monopoly duopoly oligopoly and supply chain systems our review reveals that the diffusion models have not been used to analyze advertising problems in supply chain operations which may be a research direction in the future moreover we learn from our review that very few publications regarding dynamic advertising problems have considered the supply chain competition we also find that very few researchers have used the diffusion model to investigate the dynamic advertising problems with product quality as a decision variable and the pricing decision has not been incorporated into any extant lanchester model the paper ends with a summary of our review and suggestions on possible research directions in the future

policy and non policy barriers to trade and implicit taxation of exports in uganda uganda has made significant progress in reducing policy induced anti export bias in its trade policy in the 1990s taxes on exports have been abolished and import protection has been reduced considerably such trade barriers are only a component of thee transaction costs associated with trade poor infrastructure notably by increasing transport costs and institutional inefficiencies can significantly increase trade costs the effective protection of imports and implicit tax on exports due to transport costs is calculated and compared to effective protection due to trade policy barriers for uganda the results reveal that transport costs are often very high in many cases representing a greater cost tax to exporters than trade policy

empirical analysis of closed loop duopoly advertising strategies closed loop perfect equilibria in a lanchester duopoly differential game of advertising competition are used as the basis for empirical investigation two systems of simultaneous nonlinear equations are formed one from a general lanchester model and one from a constrained model two empirical applications are conducted in one involving coca cola and pepsi cola a formal statistical testing procedure is used to detect whether closed loop equilibrium advertising strategies are used by the competitors rather than open loop strategies in the second application involving anheuser busch and miller the general model is estimated results indicate that closed loop equilibria better explain dynamic advertising competition than do open loop equilibria also closed loop equilibrium advertising strategies implied by model estimates show that competitive advertising levels may or may not be monotonic in market share