government policy with time inconsistent voters behavioral economics presents a paternalistic rationale for benevolent government intervention this paper presents a model of public debt where voters have self control problems and attempt to commit using illiquid assets in equilibrium government accumulates debt to respond to individuals desire to undo their commitments which leads individuals to rebalance their portfolio in turn feeding into a demand for further debt accumulation as a consequence i large and distortionary government debt accumulation occurs and ii banning illiquid assets could improve individuals welfare these results offer a new rationale for balanced budget rules in constitutions to restrain governments responses to voters self control problems

scarce collateral the term premium and quantitative easing abstract a model of money credit and banking is constructed in which the differential pledgeability of collateral and the scarcity of collateralizable wealth lead to a term premium an upward sloping nominal yield curve purchases of long maturity government debt by the central bank are always a good idea but for unconventional reasons a floor system is preferred to a channel system as a floor system permits welfare improving asset purchases by the central bank

correlation neglect voting behavior and information aggregation in this paper we analyse elections when voters underestimate the correlation between their information sources correlation neglect we find that this cognitive bias can improve political outcomes we show that the extreme beliefs which result from correlation neglect induce some voters to base their vote on information rather than on political preferences we characterise conditions on the distribution of preferences under which this induces higher vote shares for the optimal policies and better information aggregation

common agency and coordination general theory and application to government policy making we develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with nontransferable utility and we prove that the principals nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action we apply this theory to the construction of a positive model of public finance where organized special interests can lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump sum taxes or transfers the lobbies use only the nondistorting transfers in their noncooperative equilibrium but their intergroup competition for transfers turns into a prisoners dilemma in which the government captures all the gain that is potentially available to the parties

is protection for sale evidence on the grossman helpman theory of endogenous protection grossman and helpman 1994 present a theory of endogenous protection by explicitly modeling government industry interactions for which mere black box models previously existed they obtain a ramsey pricing type solution to the provision of protection which emphasizes the role of inverse import penetration ratios and import elasticities on the lobbying side the model makes predictions about lobbying competition and lobbying spending according to deadweight costs from protection the model not only makes for richer theory in terms of rigor and elegance but its predictions are directly testable whether the grossman helman model stands up to real world data is investigated in this paper predictions from both the protection side and lobbying side are tested using cross sectional u s nontariff barrier data we also compare the second generation grossman helpman model with a more traditional specification our results call for serious consideration of this model in the political economy literature

competitive search equilibrium in monetary economies abstract competitive search was recently introduced in monetary economics by rocheteau and wright money in search equilibrium in competitive equilibrium and in competitive search equilibrium econometrica 73 2005 175 203 we extend their work by eliminating the restriction that the fees market makers charge to enter a submarket must be either non negative or identical for buyers and sellers without this restriction buyers pay a positive fee to enter the submarket they visit and nothing else when they meet a seller sellers are remunerated by the market makers from the entry fees collected from the buyers this trading arrangement allows buyers to perfectly predict their expenses so the opportunity cost of holding idle money balances is eliminated

competing for endorsements endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest group leaders and group members the members who share policy concerns may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues if their leaders cannot fully explain the issues they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party when interest groups endorse legislative contenders the candidates may compete for backing policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public the authors examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed and the normative properties of the political equilibria

general equilibrium with nonconvexities and money in a general equilibrium economy with nonconvexities there are sunspot equilibria with good welfare properties sunspots can ameliorate the effects of the nonconvexities for these economies we show that agents act as if they have quasi linear utility functions we use this result to construct a new model of monetary exchange along the lines of lagos and wright where trade occurs in both centralized and decentralized markets but instead of quasi linear preferences we assume general preferences but with indivisible labor this suggests that modern monetary theory is more robust than one might have thought it also constitutes progress on the classic problem of integrating monetary economics and general equilibrium theory

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

money interest rates and exchange rates with endogenously segmented markets we analyze the effects of money injections on interest rates and exchange rates when agents must pay a baumol tobin style fixed cost to exchange bonds and money asset markets are endogenously segmented because this fixed cost leads agents to trade bonds and money infrequently when the government injects money through an open market operation only those agents that are currently trading absorb these injections through their impact on these agents consumption these money injections affect real interest rates and real exchange rates the model generates the observed negative relation between expected inflation and real interest rates as well as persistent liquidity effects in interest rates and volatile and persistent exchange rates

a uniqueness proof for monetary steady state abstract the framework in lagos and wright 2005 20 combining decentralized and centralized markets is used extensively in monetary economics much is known about that model but there is a loose end only under special assumptions about bargaining power or decentralized market preferences has it been shown that the monetary steady state is unique for general decentralized market utility and bargaining i prove uniqueness for generic parameters with fiat money and for all parameters with commodity money as a corollary i get monotone comparative statics

anti herding and strategic consultation in this paper i analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others i find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to anti herding i e they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others recommendations i also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless moreover advisers to the decision maker may not report their information truthfully even if the advisers care only about the outcome they bias their recommendation since they anticipate inefficient anti herding behavior by the decision maker

a search theoretic approach to monetary economics the essential function of money is its role as a medium of exchange the authors formalize this idea using a search theoretic equilibrium model of the exchange process that captures the double coincidence of wants problem with pure barter one advantage of the framework described here is that it is very tractable the authors also show that the model can be used to addre ss some substantive issues in monetary economics including the potenti al welfare enhancing role of money the interaction between specializat ion and monetary exchange and the possibility of equilibria with multip le fiat currencies copyright 1993 by american economic association

the war of information we analyse political contests campaigns between two parties with opposing interests parties provide costly information to voters who choose a policy the information flow is continuous and stops when both parties quit parties actions are strategic substitutes increasing one party s cost makes that party provide more and its opponent provide less information for voters parties actions are complements and hence raising the advantaged party s cost may be beneficial asymmetric information adds a signalling component resulting in a belief threshold at which the informed party s decision to continue campaigning offsets other unfavourable information

liquidity and asset prices in a monetary model with otc asset markets abstract we study how asset prices are affected by the amount of liquidity that is available in over the counter asset markets where dealers post prices and quantities at which they are willing to buy and sell assets we find that higher levels of market liquidity lead to higher asset prices and lower bid ask spreads hence an increase in inflation which lowers market liquidity increases asset returns and decreases asset prices when agents immediate consumption needs are stochastic asset prices will fluctuate even though asset fundamentals are unchanging the fluctuations in asset prices reflect the stochastic availability of market liquidity that results from agents changing consumption opportunities

decision making in committees transparency reputation and voting rules in this paper i analyze the effect of the transparency of the decision making process in committees on the decisions that are eventually taken i focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns so that each member tries to enhance his own reputation when the decision making process is secretive the individual votes of the committee members are not exposed to the public but only the final decision thus individuals are evaluated according to the group s decision i find that in such a case group members are induced to comply with preexisting biases for example if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform individuals vote more often against reforms and exacerbate the conservatism of the voting rule when the decision making process becomes transparent and individual votes are observed this effect disappears and such committees are then more likely to accept reforms i also find that coupled with the right voting rule a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one

anti dumping what are the numbers to discuss at doha while tariff barriers have decreased worldwide through various gatt rounds anti dumping has surged to play a crucial role as the most important non tariff barrier after much debate and opposition anti dumping is on the agenda of the doha round of multilateral trade negotiations and it is one of the most important issues especially for developing countries as they are the main targets of this policy instrument with this prospect it is important to assess the relevance of anti dumping not only by focusing on traditional users but by analysing the experience of new users which are now major players in the field this paper improves upon existing studies by providing a comprehensive assessment on the use of anti dumping first data on the time pattern of worldwide implementations of anti dumping laws are presented this time profile shows interesting relationships with legal developments in gatt and wto dispositions second usual sources of data are complemented with various other sources this allows the inclusion of recent heavy users like china russia taiwan and ukraine which are ignored in similar studies but important for their trade volumes this enlarged and updated dataset shows that new users are even more important than previously thought with implications for the doha negotiations

sticky prices a new monetarist approach why do some sellers set nominal prices that apparently do not respond to changes in the aggregate price level in many models prices are sticky by assumption here it is a result we use search theory with two consequences prices are set in dollars since money is the medium of exchange and equilibrium implies a nondegenerate price distribution when the money supply increases some sellers may keep prices constant earning less per unit but making it up on volume so profit stays constant the calibrated model matches price change data well but in contrast to typical sticky price models money is neutral jel e52 e31 e42

barter and monetary exchange under private information the authors develop a model of production and exchange with uncertainty concerning the quality of commodities and study the role of fiat money in ameliorating frictions caused by private information the model is specified so that without private information only high quality commodities are produced and there is no welfare gain from using money with private information there can be equilibria and sometimes multiple equilibria where low quality commodities are produced and money can increase welfare money works by promoting useful production and exchange in efficient monetary equilibria agents adopt strategies that increase the probability of acquiring high quality output copyright 1994 by american economic association

a model of money with multilateral matching we develop a model of decentralized monetary exchange to examine the distributional effects of inflation across heterogeneous agents the agents have private information about their productivity preferences or money holdings matching is multilateral and each seller is visited by a stochastic number of buyers the good is allocated according to a second price auction in money in equilibrium homogeneous buyers hold different amounts of money leading to price dispersion we find the closed form solution for the distribution of money holdings entry of sellers is suboptimal except at the friedman rule inflation acts as a regressive tax

optimal money creation in pure currency economies a conjecture in a pure currency economy money is the only durable object and people have private histories in such economies taxation is not feasible and in some of them trade is enhanced through the use of money for economies of that kind in which a nondegenerate distribution of money part of the state of the economy affects trades and real outcomes and in which trades affect the state at the next date the conjecture is that there are transfer schemes financed by money creation that improve ex ante representative agent welfare relative to what can be achieved holding the stock of money fixed jel codes e52 e58 copyright 2014 oxford university press

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

search inflation and capital accumulation abstract this paper constructs a model to integrate the search monetary theory into a neoclassical growth model with divisible goods and money the model is used to examine the relationship between money growth and capital accumulation the framework uncovers a distinct extensive effect that an increase in the money growth rate increases the frequency of successful trades by increasing the number of agents in the market this positive extensive effect on the number of trades can dominate the conventional negative intensive effects of money growth on individuals labor input and real money balance in which case increasing the money growth rate increases aggregate capital and output

coexistence of money and interest bearing securities abstract a random matching model with money is used to study the nominal yield on small denomination bearer safe discount securities issued by the government there is always one steady state with matured securities circulating at par and for some parameters another with them circulating at a discount in the former a necessary and sufficient condition for a positive nominal yield on not yet matured securities is exogenous discriminatory treatment of them by the government in the latter the post maturity discount on securities induces a deeper pre maturity discount even without such discriminatory treatment

monetary policy and asset prices a mechanism design approach we investigate the eects of monetary policy on asset prices in economies where assets are traded periodically in over the counter otc markets with bilateral meetings between buyers and sellers the trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is designed to maximize social welfare taking as given the frictions in the environment e g lack of commitment and limited enforcement and monetary policy we show that asset price bubbles emerge in a constrained e cient monetary equilibrium only if liquidity is abundant and the rst best allocation is implementable in contrast if liquidity is scarce assets are priced at their fundamental value in any constrained e cient monetary equilibrium in which case an increase in in ation has no eect on asset prices but it reduces output and welfare finally for low in ation rates the bursting of an asset price bubble can be an optimal response to a shock that reduces assets resalability

interest rates and inflation a consensus has emerged among practitioners that the instrument of monetary policy ought to be the short term interest rate that policy should be focused on the control of inflation and that inflation can be reduced by increasing short term interest rates at the center of this consensus is a rejection of the quantity theory such a rejection is a difficult step to take given the mass of evidence linking money growth inflation and interest rates increases in average rates of money growth are associated with equal increases in average inflation rates and interest rates these observations need not rule out a constructive role for the use of short term interest rates as a monetary instrument one possibility is that increasing short term rates in the face of increases in inflation is just an indirect way of reducing money growth sell bonds and take money out of the system another possibility is that while control of monetary aggregates is the key to low long run average inflation rates an interest rate policy can improve the short run behavior of interest rates and prices the shortrun connections among money growth inflation and interest rates are very unreliable so there is much room for improvement these possibilities are surely worth exploring but doing so requires new theory the analysis needed to reconcile interest rate policies with the evidence on which the quantity theory of money is grounded cannot be found in old textbook diagrams

payments and liquidity under adverse selection informational asymmetries regarding the future value of assets affect their role in exchange i construct a random matching economy composed of two assets a risk free bond and a lucas tree whose terminal value is privately known to its holder no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements the main finding supports a pecking order theory of payments agents use their risk free bonds first in order to finance their spending shocks and they use their information sensitive assets only if their holdings of bonds are depleted the theory has implications for the optimal provision of risk free bonds the structure of asset returns and liquidity

indivisible labor lotteries and equilibrium abstract this paper considers an economy where labor is indivisible and agents are identical although the discontinuity in labor supply at the individual level disappears as a result of aggregation it is shown that indivisible labor has strong consequences for the aggregate bahavior of the economy it is also shown that optimal allocations involve lotteries over employment and consumption

eu anti dumping and tariff cuts trade policy substitution the world trading system in its current form aims at reducing multilateral trade barriers across the board indeed the last successfully concluded multilateral trade negotiations led to substantial tariff concessions on the part of most developed economies what however happened to other forms of import protection have substantial tariff concessions subsequently been replaced by the use of alternative forms of import protection in this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between negotiated external tariff cuts and the subsequent use of anti dumping actions by the eu evidence is found for larger uruguay round tariff cuts increasing the probability of subsequent anti dumping investigations

a monetary explanation of the equity premium term premium and risk free rate puzzles this paper develops and estimates a monetary model that offers an explanation of some puzzling features of observed returns on equities and default free bonds the key feature of the model is that some assets other than money play a special role in facilitating transactions which affects the rate of return that they offer the model is capable of producing a low risk free rate a high equity premium and an average positive relationship between maturity and term premium for default free bonds the model s implications for the joint distribution of asset returns velocity inflation money growth and consumption growth are also compared to the behavior of these variables in the u s economy

political pressure deflection much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes political pressure deflection pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to sell is valuable to politicians the puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger essentially like entry deterrence u s trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example especially antidumping law and its evolution

money and credit with limited commitment and theft we study the interplay among imperfect memory limited commitment and theft in an environment that can support monetary exchange and credit imperfect memory makes money useful but it also permits theft to go undetected and therefore provides lucrative opportunities for thieves limited commitment constrains credit arrangements and the constraints tend to tighten with imperfect memory as this mitigates punishment for bad behavior in the credit market theft matters for optimal monetary policy but at the optimum theft will not be observed in the model the friedman rule is in general not optimal with theft and the optimal money growth rate tends to rise as the cost of theft falls

the political economy of administered protection trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by congress though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism in this paper we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the form of the paper is not novel a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty antidumping and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979 this is the period over which the trade act of 1974 was in force because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

the politics of ambiguity politicians face a trade off between the policies that maximize their chances of reelection and their most preferred policies or the policies most preferred by the constituency which they represent this paper analyzes this trade off in a dynamic electoral model in which the voters are not fully informed about the preferences of the incumbent first we show that the incumbent follows a policy which is intermediate between the other party s ideal policy and his own ideal policy second we show that often the incumbent has an incentive to choose procedures which make it difficult for voters to pinpoint his preferences with absolute precision thus politicians may prefer to be ambiguous

exit strategies for monetary policy abstract in response to the financial crisis of 2007 08 all major central banks decreased interest rates to historically low levels and created large excess reserves central bankers and academics currently discuss how to implement monetary policy going forward we find that paying interest on reserves ior is optimal if the central bank has full fiscal support if the central bank has no fiscal support reducing reserves is optimal this can be achieved by reserve absorbing operations which hold the size of the balance sheet constant or by selling assets which reduces the size of the balance sheet

pandering and electoral competition abstract we study an election with two perfectly informed candidates voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them voters elect one of the candidates effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates we explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters optimal policy the model is extended to include strategic voting policy motivated candidates imperfectly informed candidates and heterogeneous preferences

welfare costs of the u s antidumping and countervailing duty laws abstract the antidumping ad and countervailing duty cvd laws in the united states have become the most pervasive form of import relief sought by domestic producers this paper estimates the collective economic effect of the hundreds of active u s ad cvd orders using a computable general equilibrium model we estimate that the collective net economic welfare cost in 1993 of these orders to be 4 billion this welfare estimate is sensitive to various modeling assumptions which are explored in the paper with the implementation of the uruguay round agreements the ad cvd laws remain one of the costliest programs restraining u s trade

liquidity monetary policy and the financial crisis a new monetarist approach a model of public and private liquidity integrates financial intermediation theory with a new monetarist monetary framework nonpassive fiscal policy and costs of operating a currency system imply that an optimal policy deviates from the friedman rule a liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from the friedman rule and there exists a permanent nonneutrality of money driven by an illiquidity effect financial frictions can produce a financial crisis phenomenon that can be mitigated by conventional open market operations working in an unconventional manner private asset purchases by the central bank are either irrelevant or they reallocate credit and redistribute income jel e13 e44 e52 e62 g01 liquidity is a class of assets that is useful in exchange some of these liquid assets are government liabilities federal reserve notes treasury bills and treasury notes some are private liabilities the deposit liabilities of banks and some asset backed securities for example conventional wisdom holds that the main role of a central bank is to manage public liquidity in a manner that controls inflation and enhances the provision of private liquidity and credit however the mechanism by which central bank actions work to perform this role still appears to be poorly understood as has been highlighted by the financial crisis and the ensuing policy responses the purpose of this paper is to build a model of public and private liquidity that captures the features of modern economies essential to the analysis of monetary policy and that can be used to shed light on some current monetary policy problems and questions what is a liquid asset and what roles do privately provided and publicly provided liquid assets play in exchange in a model where we capture these roles for liquid assets what are the implications for monetary policy under what circumstances can a liquidity trap occur how does monetary policy work when there is a positive quantity of excess reserves held by banks what does a financial crisis do to the supply of private liquidity and what should monetary policy do in response

hiding information in electoral competition abstract we model a two candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy relevant state of the world the candidates receive private signals about the true state which are imperfectly correlated we study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their information to voters through their choice of policy platforms our results show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the candidates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward the electorate s prior information transmission becomes more difficult the less correlated are the candidates signals the lower is the signals quality and the stronger is the electorate s prior indeed for weak priors welfare decreases as the prior becomes stronger and welfare always decreases as the signals become less correlated

monetary policy in a channel system abstract channel systems for conducting monetary policy are becoming increasingly popular despite its popularity the consequences of implementing policy with a channel system are not well understood we develop a general equilibrium framework of a channel system and study the optimal policy a novel aspect of the channel system is that a central bank can tighten or loosen its policy without changing its policy rate this policy instrument has so far been overlooked by a large body of the literature on the optimal design of interest rate rules

trade dynamics in the market for federal funds we develop a model of the market for federal funds that explicitly accounts for its two distinctive features banks have to search for a suitable counterparty and once they have met both parties negotiate the size of the loan and the repayment the theory is used to answer a number of positive and normative questions what are the determinants of the fed funds rate how does the market reallocate funds is the market able to achieve an efficient reallocation of funds we also use the model for theoretical and quantitative analyses of policy issues facing modern central banks

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

context dependent voting and political ambiguity abstract in recent decades psychologists have shown that the standard model of individual choice is often violated one regularly observed violation is that choices are influenced by the decision context to incorporate these effects into politics we introduce a theory of context dependent voting and apply it to the puzzle of why candidates are so frequently ambiguous in their policy pronouncements we show that context dependent voters develop a taste for ambiguity even when they evaluate distances quadratically and exhibit traditional risk aversion turning to aggregate effects we incorporate context dependent voting into a model of electoral competition and show that strategic candidates respond in equilibrium to context dependent voters by offering ambiguous platforms thereby affecting the policy outcome

confirmation bias and signaling in downsian elections how do voters behavioural biases affect political outcomes we study this question in a model of downsian electoral competition in which office motivated candidates have private information about the benefits of policies and voters may infer candidates information from their electoral platforms if voters are bayesian candidates have strategic incentives to anti pander they choose platforms that are more extreme than is justified by their private beliefs however anti pandering incentives are ameliorated if voters inferences are subject to confirmation bias voter confirmation bias can thus counteract distortions due to the strategic interaction between candidates potentially leading to welfare improvements indeed we show that all observers whether biased or bayesian would like the representative voter in our model to exhibit more confirmation bias than they do themselves

domino dumping ii anti dumping abstract domino dumping anderson american economic review 1992 82 65 83 arises when exporting firms dump to obtain more export licenses in the future when there is a positive probability of a future ver anti dumping policy may then be in the public interest for the importing country via lowering the probability of a ver increased enforcement may perversely lead to a rise in dumping also it may increase the probability of a ver and may reduce the probability of free trade it is possible for the public interest to require some enforcement however it is normally in the public interest to permit some dumping

liquidity provision interest rates and unemployment abstract the effective liquidity supply of the economy the weighted sum of all assets that serve as media of exchange matters for interest rates and unemployment we formalize this idea by adding an over the counter market with collateralized trades to the mortensen pissarides model an increase in public liquidity through a higher supply of real government bonds raises the real interest rate crowding out private liquidity and increasing unemployment if unemployment is inefficiently high keeping liquidity scarce can be socially optimal a liquidity crisis affecting the acceptability of private assets as collateral widens the rate of return difference between private and public liquidity also increasing unemployment

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

scarcity of safe assets inflation and the policy trap abstract a goal of this paper is to make sense of the seemingly puzzling behavior of interest rates and inflation and the role of central banks in that behavior during and after the great recession particularly in the united states to this end we construct a model in which government debt plays a key role in exchange and can bear a liquidity premium if asset market constraints bind then there need not be deflation under an indefinite zero interest rate policy zirp further zirp may not be optimal under these circumstances a taylor rule central banker could be subject to a zirp trap and persistently undershoot target inflation as well a liquidity premium on government debt creates additional taylor rule perils because of a persistently low real interest rate we make a case that this is the key policy predicament currently faced by many central banks in the world

government transaction policy media of exchange and prices abstract we study government transaction policies in search theoretic models of money we model government as a subset of agents who are subject to the same random matching technology and other constraints as private agents but who behave in an exogenous way regarding which objects they accept in trade and at what price the objective is to see how these policies affect private agents strategies and hence the set of equilibria we analyze how the effects depend on factors like the size of government the intrinsic properties of money and the availability and efficacy of substitutes like barter or foreign currency journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 e31 e42

do credible domestic institutions promote credible international agreements we examine the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy reputation when both are self sustaining we show that domestic policy commitment does not necessarily facilitate international cooperation rather efficient policies may be most easily sustained when governments are unable to pre commit to policy domestically moreover the lack of domestic commitment is more likely to facilitate international cooperation the larger the international spillovers of domestic policies are

sluggish responses of prices and inflation to monetary shocks in an inventory model of money demand we examine the responses of prices and inflation to monetary shocks in an inventory theoretic model of money demand we show that the price level responds sluggishly to an exogenous increase in the money stock because the dynamics of households money inventories leads to a partially offsetting endogenous reduction in velocity we also show that inflation responds sluggishly to an exogenous increase in the nominal interest rate because changes in monetary policy affect the real interest rate in a quantitative example we show that this nominal sluggishness is substantial and persistent if inventories in the model are calibrated to match u s households holdings of m2

liquidity a new monetarist perspective this essay surveys the new monetarist approach to liquidity work in this literature strives for empirical and policy relevance plus rigorous foundations questions include what is liquidity is money essential in achieving desirable outcomes which objects can or should serve in this capacity when can asset prices differ from fundamentals what are the functions of commitment and collateral in credit markets how does money interact with credit and intermediation what can and should monetary policy do the research summarized emphasizes the micro structure of frictional transactions and studies how institutions like monetary exchange credit arrangements or intermediation facilitate the exchange process

essential interest bearing money i examine optimal monetary policy in a lagos and wright a unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis j polit econ 113 2005 463 484 model where trade is centralized and all exchange is voluntary i identify a class of incentivefeasible policies that improve welfare beyond what is achievable with zero intervention any policy in this class necessarily entails a non negative inflation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate despite the absence of a lump sum tax instrument there exists an incentive feasible policy that implements the first best allocation

contingent prices and money price posting with directed search is a widely used trading mechanism coles and eeckhout showed that if sellers are allowed to post prices contingent on realized demand instead of one price then there is real market indeterminacy in this article we fit this contingent price posting protocol into a monetary economy we show that as long as holding money is costly there exists a unique equilibrium rather than a continuum in this equilibrium sellers post a low price for when the buyer is alone a high price for when several buyers show up and buyers randomize between sellers and money holdings

price level targeting and stabilization policy we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary stabilization policy prices are fully flexible and money is essential for trade our main result is that if the central bank pursues a price level target it can control inflation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short run shocks to the economy the optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates that effectively smooths consumption across states

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

open market operations abstract in an open market operation the central bank swaps currency for bonds we show how injecting money in this way is different from transfers the way policy is usually formulated the model captures liquidity explicitly by modeling the roles of assets in frictional exchange under various specifications for market structure and the acceptability or pledgeability of assets we discuss implications for the fisher and quantity equations the possibility of negative nominal yields liquidity traps and market segmentation when liquidity is endogenized using information theory multiple equilibria emerge with different policy predictions interest on reserves and quantitative easing are discussed