the dynamic cost and persistence of asset inequality in an agrarian economy abstract a growing literature suggests that asset inequality can be economically costly in the presence of agency costs that constrain labor and capital markets unclear in this literature is whether asset markets and optimal individual accumulation of self finance capacity suffice to eliminate costly inequality over time this paper uses numerical dynamic programming methods to explore this question with a model of an initially inegalitarian agrarian economy while an egalitarian asset distribution emerges over time the process involves sufficiently great productivity losses along the way that a redistributive policy could improve on the market s performance by both equity and efficiency criteria

occupational choice and the process of development this paper models economic development as a process of institutional transformation by focusing on the interplay between agents occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth because of capital market imperfections poor agents choose working for a wage over self employment and wealthy agents become entrepreneurs who monitor workers only with sufficient inequality however will there be employment contracts otherwise there is either subsistence or self employment thus in static equilibrium the occupational structure depends on distribution since the latter is itself endogenous we demonstrate the robustness of this result by extending the model dynamically and studying examples in which initial wealth distributions have long run effects in one case the economy develops either widespread cottage industry self employment or factory production employment contracts depending on the initial distribution in the other example it develops into prosperity or stagnation

wealth effects distribution and the theory of organization abstract we construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem because incentives vary with an agent s wealth different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances when borrowing is not costly firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently but when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth with enough inequality it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d2 d31 j41 l2

on the effect of business and economic university education on political ideology an empirical note we empirically test the hypothesis that a major in economics management business administration or accounting for simplicity referred to as business economics leads to more conservative right wing political views we use a panel dataset of individuals repeated observations for the same individuals over time living in the netherlands drawing data from the longitudinal internet studies for the social sciences from 2008 through 2013 our results show that when using a simple fixed effects model which fully controls for individuals time invariant traits any statistically and quantitatively significant effect of a major in business economics on the political ideology of these individuals disappears we posit that at least in our sample there is no evidence for a causal effect of a major in business economics on individuals political ideology

occupational choice and dynamic incentives we study an overlapping generations version of the principal agent problem where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium all individuals are workers when young but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital these rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints with a labour market that is subject to moral hazard the increased effort raises social welfare policies that reduce credit market imperfections or redistribute income may reduce welfare by dampening this effect

why farmers sometimes love risks evidence from india abstractusing a unique data set collected among farmers in india s semiarid tropics we document the surprising prevalence of risk taking behavior in the face of realistically framed high stakes gambles we hypothesize that this apparently anomalous behavior is due to a combination of credit constraints and nonconvexities in production in particular the high stakes nature of the gambles creates the potential for a farmer to undertake a productive investment that would normally be unaffordable and thereby move to a permanently higher level of income we show that the degree to which farmers are willing to accept risk in return for this opportunity appears to relate in an intuitive way to their current agricultural production technology as well as the demographic composition of their household

the build up of cooperative behavior among non cooperative selfish agents abstract we develop a theoretical model in which each individual is in some ultimate sense motivated by purely egoistic satisfaction derived from the goods accruing to him but there is an implicit social contract such that each performs duties for the others in a way that enhances the satisfaction of all we introduce a state variable that acts as a proxy for social capital of trustworthiness and that we call the stock of cooperation we show that non cooperative agents might condition their action on this state variable agents build up the society s stock of cooperation and gradually overcome the free riding problem in a game of private contribution to a public good we assume that there are neither penalties in the sense of trigger strategies nor guilt and that each individual is rational

expanding the life cycle model precautionary saving and public policy one of the key puzzles in understanding saving behavior is not so much why people save the title of this session but why people don t save according to the familiar life cycle model households should accumulate wealth to provide for their retirement consumption the surprising result from the data is the sizable fraction of the population who have accumulated so little even among those nearing retirement given that earnings will almost surely decline when households retire such behavior can imply poor living standards for the elderly some might interpret the low wealth accumulation as being evidence of myopia irrationality or a failure of households to enforce mental accounting richard thaler 1994 while others might view the low level of wealth accumulation as evidence of high individual rates of time preference determining the underlying causes of low wealth is crucial for public policies that seek to alleviate low aggregate saving rates in the united states as well as policies that seek to buttress the adequacy of financial resources for the elderly in this paper we outline what we believe to be the causes of why many people do not save we conclude by speculating about government policies that may be most effective at encouraging saving much of the research examining levels of consumption saving and wealth as well as their responsiveness to policy has been done using a life cycle model with the simplifying assumption of perfect certainty alan auerbach and laurence kotlikoff 1987 for example developed a model with 55 overlapping generations of individual lifecycle households each with empirically plausible age earnings profiles and utility parameters and used the model to address tax policy and demographic issues in a regime in which all households are identical within a generation and all generations know future earnings and interest rates more recently a line of inquiry has examined the effects of uncertainty on saving generally in the context of highly stylized models this research has shown that in these models uninsured earnings uncertainty can alter optimal saving behavior in a variety of important ways for a partial review of this precautionary saving literature see hubbard et al 1994 in two recent papers hubbard et al 1993 1994 we have combined these two strands of the literature by examining the implications of a life cycle model of consumption saving and wealth accumulation subject to what we think are the three most important sources of uninsured idiosyncratic risk facing households uncertainty about earnings medical expenses and length of life our intent has been to create a realistic model in which families live for many periods working for part of their lives and retiring later in life to parameterize the uncertainty facing families we estimate tdiscussants christopher carroll federal reserve board john b shoven stanford university laurence kotlikoff boston university

inequality control rights and rent seeking sugar cooperatives in maharashtra this paper presents a theory of rent seeking within farmer cooperatives in which inequality of asset ownership affects relative control rights of different groups of members the two key assumptions are constraints on lump sum transfers from poorer members and disproportionate control rights wielded by wealthier members transfers of rents to the latter are achieved by depressing prices paid for inputs supplied by members and diverting resulting retained earnings the theory predicts that increased heterogeneity of landholdings in the local area causes increased inefficiency by inducing a lower input price and a lower level of installed crushing capacity predictions concerning the effect of the distribution of local landownership on sugarcane price capacity levels and participation rates of different classes of farmers are confirmed by data from nearly 100 sugar cooperatives in the indian state of maharashtra over the period 1971 93

anonymity efficiency wages and technological progress although the industrial revolution is often characterized as the culmination of a process of commercialisation the precise nature of such a link remains unclear this paper provides an analysis of one such link the role of commercialisation in raising wages as impersonal labour market transactions replace personalized customary relations in the presence of an aggregate capital externality we show that the resulting shift in relative factor prices will under certain conditions lead to higher capital intensity in the production technology and hence a faster rate of technological progress we provide historical evidence using european data to show that england was among the most urbanized and the highest wage countries at the onset of the industrial revolution the model highlights the effects of changes in the availability of information typical of a modernising country on efficiency wages and technological progress

joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts abstract i offer an explanation for the coexistence of joint liability and individual liability microcredit contracts i show that both contracts maximize welfare when credit is rationed due to limited liability but for different borrowers borrowers monitor each other when liability is joint while the lender monitors individual loans joint liability offers poorer borrowers larger loans with less monitoring effort than would have to be exerted by the lender individual liability offers the wealthier among credit constrained borrowers larger loans even without monitoring the theory explains why individual loans serve the wealthier among poor borrowers and are larger and why businesses funded with individual loans grow more

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

poor but allocatively efficient evidence from the eastern amazon this research empirically investigates the well known poor but efficient hypothesis formulated by schultz 1964 assuming that small scale farmers in developing countries are reasonably efficient in allocating their scarce resources by responding positively to price incentives deviating from schultz it is assumed here that scale effects explain a considerable proportion of small scale farmers relative efficiency the theoretical underpinnings of the scale efficiency concept are briefly reviewed before a normalized generalized leontief gl profit function is modeled by using its output supply and input demand system to capture the joint production of cassava flour and maize by a sample of small scale farmers in the bragantina region of the eastern amazon brazil the discussion of theoretical consistency and functional flexibility is considered by imposing convexity on the gl profit framework the empirical results confirm our revised hypothesis that small farmers in traditional development settings are poor but allocatively efficient by clearly suggesting considerable inefficiency with respect to the scale of operations

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

access to capital and agrarian production organisation there are two problems both universal that entrepreneurs in any economy must contend with firstly an agent generally has access only to a limited amount of working capital secondly workers hired by an agent are subject to moral hazard and this necessitates their supervision this paper models for an agrarian economy the constraints imposed on entrepreneurs activities by these two problems and endogenously determines the various organisational forms of production as well as the allocation of resources that will obtain with a simple model we endeavour to explain a diverse set of empirical observations pertaining to the less developed countries in terms of the general processes that determine the distribution of income among the various agents and the hierarchical relationships that develop among them agricultural production typically involves a period of several months between the time the inputs are purchased and the time the output is marketed access to working capital and hence to the credit market thus plays an important role in a farmer s production decisions the distribution of access to credit in turn tends to be an important determinant of income distribution in poor agrarian economies credit is invariably rationed according to the ability to offer collateral the amount of working capital a farmer can mobilise therefore depends on the amount of land he owns which is often a good proxy for his overall wealth and thus his ability to offer collateral further since hired hands have a propensity to shirk they need to be supervised and therefore the

contractual structure and wealth accumulation can historical wealth distributions affect long run output and inequality despite rational saving convex technology and no externalities we consider a model of equilibrium short period financial contracts where poor agents face credit constraints owing to moral hazard and limited liability if agents have no bargaining power poor agents have no incentive to save poverty traps emerge and agents are polarized into two classes with no interclass mobility if instead agents have all the bargaining power strong saving incentives are generated the wealth of poor and rich agents alike drift upward indefinitely and history does not matter eventually d31 d91 i32 o17 q15

global capital flows and financing constraints firms often cite financing constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment global capital flows by bringing in scarce capital may ease the financing constraints of host country firms but if incoming foreign investors borrow heavily from domestic banks foreign direct investment may exacerbate financing constraints by crowding host country firms out of domestic capital markets combining a unique cross country firm level panel with time series data on restrictions on international transactions and capital flows harrison love and mcmillan find that different measures of global flows are associated with a reduction in firm level financing constraints first the authors show that one type of capital inflow foreign direct investment is associated with a reduction in financing constraints second they test whether restrictions on international transactions affects the financing constraints of firms the results suggest that only one type of restriction those on capital account transactions negatively affects firms financing constraints the authors also show that multinational firms are not financially constrained and do not appear to be sensitive to the level of foreign direct investment this implies that foreign direct investment eases financing constraints for non multinational firms finally the authors show that 1 foreign direct investment only eases financing constraints in the non g7 countries and 2 other kinds of flows such as portfolio investment have no impact on financing constraints

consumption versus asset smoothing testing the implications of poverty trap theory in burkina faso abstract despite solid theoretical foundations for the notion that poor borrowing constrained households will intertemporally manage assets to smooth consumption the consumption smoothing hypothesis has not always withstood empirical scrutiny this paper reassesses the intertemporal asset management problem with a poverty trap model and shows that we would expect to see asset smoothing not consumption smoothing in the neighborhood of critical asset levels at which optimal accumulation behavior bifurcates we then employ threshold estimation techniques to empirically confirm the co existence of consumption and asset smoothing regimes using a household panel data set from west africa households above the estimated threshold almost completely insulate their consumption from weather shocks whereas those below the threshold do not these results not only indirectly provide evidence of the existence of poverty traps but also speak to the level and incidence of the costs of uninsured risk

the second theorem of the second best abstract this paper interprets many results from the literature on incentive compatibility and cost benefit analysis as illustrations of a second theorem of the second best the theorem states that if there exists any restriction on transactions required for first best efficiency then there is no presumption that a social welfare maximum entails equal marginal social utilities of income across individuals one reason is that incentive constraints shift with redistributions of wealth so that redistributions have an instrumental role in relaxing constraints that make the economy second best two examples relate such wealth effects to countervailing incentives and hostage taking

risk bearing and entrepreneurship abstract in the knightian theory of entrepreneurship entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production this paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as occupational self selection moral hazard prevents full insurance increases in an agent s wealth then entail increases in risk borne thus even under decreasing risk aversion there are robust instances in which workers are wealthier than entrepreneurs this empirically implausible result suggests that risk based explanations for entrepreneurship are inadequate

self control and the rise and fall of factory discipline abstract we propose a dynamic general equilibrium model that accounts for the historical pattern of the rise and fall of factory discipline in the course of economic development firms have two alternative means to increase work effort discipline and control vs monetary incentives a key ingredient of our model lies in the fact that workers suffer from present bias we show that this lack of self control makes discipline relatively cheap when workers outside option is low even in the absence of moral hazard then as one economy develops it endogenously goes through three stages where firms successively use low powered monetary incentives factory discipline and then high powered monetary incentives when moral hazard is introduced multiple development paths may emerge

speaking platitudes to power observing american business ethics in an age of declining hegemony over the last generation american business ethics has focused excessively on the process of managerial decision making while ignoring the collective impact of these decisions and avoiding other approaches that might earn the disapproval of corporate executives this narrowness helped the field establish itself during the 1980s when american management under pressure from finance and heightened competition was unreceptive to any limitations on its autonomy relying however on top down approaches inspired by aristotle locke and kant while ignoring the consequentialism of mill and rawls made the field totally reliant upon the good will of these same corporate executives for generating any impact trends in employee compensation finance regulation government procurement and taxpayer subsidies suggest that business ethics has failed to significantly influence corporate behavior a result that would have not surprised the realists of the post war generation of business and society scholars if business ethics is to prove relevant in the contemporary world the field needs to acknowledge past failures and develop new approaches the decline of american economic hegemony coupled to the increased internationalization of the discipline may create the opportunity to do so

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

patent protection and strategic delays in technology development implications for economic growth we present an endogenous growth model in which both the investment to develop a new technology that upgrades the quality of machines and entry of imitators are determined endogenously according to the model how soon the new technology machine is launched after the patent is granted is influenced by two factors returns to scale in technology development and strategic delays strategic delays in technology development are most likely to occur when earlier dates of success enable imitators to enter an industry i e when imitation is swift and relatively cheap and or patent protection is relatively lengthy we then explore the link between the optimal patent length and economic growth and find that the equilibrium investment in technology development and thus the expected rate of technological progress exhibit an inverted u shape relationship with respect to the legal patent length our results further suggest that in order to minimize the strategic delays in technology development and spur technological progress legal patent lengths should be shorter in industries where barriers to entry are relatively low

the impact of higher standards in patent protection for pharmaceutical industries under the trips agreement a comparative study of china and india a comparative study is undertaken that explores chinese and indian pharmaceutical industries under different patent regimes it is found that relative to india which had implemented process patent protection until 2005 china with a product patent regime since 1993 suffers from both lower drug accessibility and availability the latter is a missing parameter in the literature also china lags behind in both lower r d investment and patents filed by chinese nationals based on these findings and associated legal interpretation we conclude that higher patent protection in china generates negative impacts on the pharmaceutical industries thus governments should utilise trips flexibilities and other regimes such as price control to offset the anticompetitive effect in designing patent policies

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

innovation intellectual property rights and economic development a unified empirical investigation two important strands of literature investigate the way the effect of intellectual property rights ipr on innovation depends on either the initial ipr level or the level of economic development we expand on this by studying their joint effect in a single unified empirical framework we find that the effect of ipr on innovation is more complex than previously thought displaying important nonlinearities depending on the initial levels of both ipr and per capita gdp the policy implications of this are examined and include the conclusion that a single global level of ipr is in general sub optimal

endogenous effective discounting credit constraints and wealth inequality models of nonexponential time discount ing help to explain a variety of regularities in economic behavior including contract choice stefano dellavigna and ulrike malmendier 2004 procrastination ted o donoghue and matthew rabin 1999 dan ariely and klaus wertenbroch 2002 and life cycle consumption patterns david laibson andrea repetto and tobacman 2007 this paper applies the quasi hyperbolic time discounting model to the study of wealth inequality a large literature analyzes the nature and causes of inequality and poverty traps 1 here first i theoretically examine a simple autarkic mechanism that can cause exogenous dispersion in wealth to persist and grow specifically quasi hyperbolic discount functions endogenously

wealth as a determinant of comparative advantage abstract this paper shows that a country s wealth can be an important determinant of comparative advantage when access to credit differs across sectors of the economy wealthier nations exhibit a comparative advantage toward goods produced in sectors facing more severe financial imperfections these sectors are typically populated by small firms empirically this paper documents that these sectors are also labor intensive consequently this theory partially offsets traditional sources of comparative advantage and offers an explanation for trefler s missing trade mystery and the leontief paradox furthermore the theory makes the relation between trade and income distribution endogenous

on the competitive pressure created by the diffusion of innovations abstract we consider the decision of a dominant firm to adopt a sequence of potential cost reducing innovations where the latest technology adopted diffuses to a competitive fringe at an exogenous rate with price competition on the product market the leader optimally spaces apart the adoption dates of successive innovations so the industry is characterized by schumpetarian cycles of alternating innovation and diffusion an increase in the rate of diffusion has ambiguous effects on innovative activity and up to a point hastens the pace of innovation these results may however be reversed in the case of quantity competition

wealth risk and activity choice cattle in western tanzania abstract imperfect credit markets force households to use their savings for investment profitable activities often require lumpy investments limiting entry by poorer households resulting in increasing welfare differences in tanzania cattle are a profitable but lumpy investment and a liquid asset for consumption smoothing richer households own substantial cattle herds while poorer households specialize in low return low risk activities a dynamic programming model and simulations are presented to analyze entry into asset accumulation under income risk the evidence suggests that households with lower endowments are less likely to own cattle and returns to their endowments are lower

the division of labor coordination costs and knowledge this paper considers specialization and the division of labor a more extensive division of labor raises productivity because returns to the time spent on tasks are usually greater to workers who concentrate on a narrower range of skills the traditional discussion of the division of labor emphasizes the limitations to specialization imposed by the extent of the market we claim that the degree of specialization is more often determined by other considerations especially emphasized are various costs of coordinating specialized workers who perform complementary tasks and the amount of general knowledge available

equity and efficiency in human capital investment the local connection a general model of community formation and human capital accumulation with social spillovers and decentralized school funding is used to analyse the causes of economic segregation and its consequences for equity and efficiency significant polarization arises from minor differences in endowments preferences or access to capital markets this makes income inequality more persistent across generations but the same need not be true for wealth equilibrium stratification tends to be excessive resulting in low aggregate surplus whether state equalization of school resources can remedy these problems hinges on how purchased social and family inputs interact in education and in mobility decisions

inside the black box technology and economics economists have long treated technological phenomena as events transpiring inside a black box and on the whole have adhered rather strictly to a self imposed ordinance not to inquire too seriously into what transpires inside that box the purpose of professor rosenberg s work is to break open and examine the contents of the black box in so doing a number of important economic problems be powerfully illuminated the author clearly shows how specific features of individual technologies have shaped a number of variables of great concern to economists the rate of productivity improvement the nature of learning processes underlying technological change itself the speed of technology transfer and the effectiveness of government policies that are intended to influence technologies in particular ways the separate chapters of this book reflect a primary concern with some of the distinctive aspects of industrial technologies in the twentieth century such as the increasing reliance upon science but also the considerable subtlety and complexity of the dialectic between science and technology other concerns include the rapid growth in the development of costs associated with new technologies as well as the difficulty of predicting the eventual performance characteristics of newly emerging technologies

the firm as a communication network this paper analyzes how organizations can minimize costs of processing and communicating information communication is costly because it takes time for an agent to absorb new information sent by others agents can reduce this time by specializing in the processing of particular types of information when these returns to specialization outweigh costs of communication it is efficient for several agents to collaborate within a firm it is shown that efficient networks involve centralization that individuals delegate tasks to subordinates only if they are overloaded and that the number of transits to the top tends to be equalized across individual information items

escape from the market negotiating work in lancashire list of figures list of tables preface glossary list of abbreviations 1 introduction the myth of the lancashire labour market part i labour market failure 2 custom against the market the early labour market 3 principals and agents the labour market into the second generation 4 who s minding the mill the supervision problem part ii the economics of piece rate bargaining 5 the fair wage model part iii how did labour markets really work 6 fair and unfair wages 1825 50 7 short hours and seniority in the hungry forties 8 rules and standards wage lists in lancashire part iv conclusion 9 more lessons from the cotton mills notes bibliography index

the labor market and corporate structure abstract we analyze the impact of labor demand and labor market regulations on the corporate structure of firms higher wages are associated with lower monitoring irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labor market regulations unions or higher labor demand we also find that the organization of firms has important macroeconomic implications in particular monitoring is a type of rent seeking activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring labor market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce employment

on efficient distribution with private information this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with many consumers each of whom is subject to private idiosyncratic taste shocks we propose a recursive method for finding feasible allocations that are incentivecompatible and that are pareto optimal within this set the method is applied to several parametric examples we find that in an efficient allocation the degree of inequality continually increases with a diminishing fraction of the population receiving an increasing fraction of the resources we discuss the extent to which these allocations can be decentralized via market arrangements this paper is a study of the dynamics of the efficient distribution of consumption in an exchange economy with private information the economy we study has a constant endowment flow of a single non storable consumption good which is to be allocated each period among a large number of consumers each period these consumers experience unpredictable idiosyncratic privately observed taste shocks affecting their marginal utility of current consumption efficiency dictates that more resources be allocated to those consumers who in any given period have a high marginal utility of current consumption

market structure innovation and optimal patent life m uch work has been directed at determining the relative efficiency of various market structures in the allocation of resources to invention while the conclusions are not entirely clear it seems certain that no single market structure results in a pareto efficient allocation of resources to research and development r d in the light of this certain secondbest procedures must be examined social controls may provide an attractive method of lessening the inefficiencies described above 2 while government research and development subsidies and award programs do exist the most prevalent form of social control is the patent system granting the inventor a monopoly on the use of the discovery for a specified period of time eliminates the free rider problem thus restoring the incentive to invent extension of the duration of protection will increase incentives for private resource allocation toward technical advance unfortunately extension of patent protection by definition brings with it the social inefficiencies recognized in a monopolistic market the

on the origins of comparative advantage this paper proposes a simple theory of international trade with en dogenous technological dierences across countries the core of our analysis lies in the determinants of the division of labor we consider a world economy comprising two large countries with a continuum of goods and one factor of production labor each good is characterized by its complexity de ned as the number of tasks that must be per formed to produce one unit there are increasing returns to scale in the performance of each task which creates gains from specialization and uncertainty in the enforcement of each contract which create transac tion costs the trade obetween these two forces pins down the size of productive teams across sectors in each country under free trade the country where teams are larger specializes in the more complex goods in our model it is the country where the product of institutional qual ity and human per worker capital is larger hence better institutions and more educated workers are complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more complex industries

economic underdevelopment the case of a missing market for human capital abstract this paper demonstrates that the coexistence of developed and underdeveloped countries can be a stationary equilibrium in a world economy with free trade in consumption goods and physical capital an underdeveloped country is characterized by a high ratio of unskilled workers in the labor force a small stock of physical capital a low gross national product a high rate of return on human capital and a corresponding large wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers the critical assumptions are that future labor earnings cannot serve as collateral on a loan and indivisibilities in education

risk taking behavior in the presence of nonconvex asset dynamics a growing literature on poverty traps emphasizes the links between multiple equilibria and risk avoidance however multiple equilibria may also foster risk taking behavior by some poor people we illustrate this idea with a simple analytical model in which people with different wealth and ability endowments make investment and risky activity choices in the presence of known nonconvex asset dynamics this model underscores a crucial distinction between familiar static concepts of risk aversion and forward looking dynamic risk responses to nonconvex asset dynamics even when unobservable preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion observed behavior may suggest that risk aversion actually increases with wealth near perceived dynamic asset thresholds although high ability individuals are not immune from poverty traps they can leverage their capital endowments more effectively than lower ability types and are therefore less likely to take seemingly excessive risks in general linkages between behavioral responses and wealth dynamics often seem to run in both directions both theoretical and empirical poverty trap research could benefit from making this two way linkage more explicit jel d81 o12 d90

learning about the prospects for mobility economic and political dynamics following fundamental policy reform abstract the political left turn in latin america which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior this paper generalizes the forward looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic possibly non concave income processes under full information the model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present in contrast modeling voters evolving beliefs about an unknown income dynamic process shows a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that this imperfect information perspective accounts for latin america s right to left political shift and offers additional insights about political dynamics in the face of economic polarization

dynamic insurance with private information and balanced budgets this paper studies a dynamic insurance problem with bilateral asymmetric information and balanced budgets there are two infinitely lived agents in our model both risk averse and each has an i i d random endowment stream which is unobservable to the other in each period each agent must have a non negative consumption and together they must consume the entire aggregate endowment dynamic incentive compatibility in the nash sense is defined we give sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a constrained efficient contract we show that a constrained efficient contract can be characterized in a bellman equation we demonstrate that the long run distribution of expected utilities of each agent is not degenerate we also develop an algorithm for computing the efficient contract and in a numerical example we find that the consumption processes of the agents form stationary markov chains

limited liability wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies abstract an explanation is provided for two observations concerning variations in the choice of tenants and their welfare differences in tenants wealth imply corresponding differences in liability when default is possible on fixed rental commitments in this context the inability of landlords to specify their tenants effort lead to effort choices that vary with the type of contract offered the selection of tenants and the contract terms they receive thus depend on wealth with wealthier tenants being preferred and receiving fixed rent contracts these results also predict that wealthier tenants earn higher profits on their leased plots

a model of multiproduct price competition abstract we provide a simple model of price competition in a multiproduct oligopoly market the products are of general nature we find that a pure strategy equilibrium exists and every equilibrium consumption maximizes the total social surplus consumers are characterized by a set function which determines their willingness to pay for every subset of products if this function is convex the set of equilibrium prices coincides with the core of a cooperative game generated by this set function and the firms extract total industry surplus if it is concave the only equilibrium price of a product is its marginal contribution to the consumer s total willingness to pay journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d21 d41 d43 l13

stochastic wealth dynamics and risk management among a poor population we use herd history data collected among pastoralists in southern ethiopia to study stochastic wealth dynamics among a poor population although covariate rainfall shocks plainly matter household specific factors including own herd size account for most observed variability in wealth dynamics we find no support for the tragedy of the commons hypothesis past studies may have conflated costly self insurance with stocking rate externalities biophysical shocks move households between multiple dynamic wealth equilibria the lowest suggesting a poverty trap according to nonconvex path dynamics these findings have broad implications for development and relief strategies among a poor population vulnerable to climatic shocks a vast economic literature on risk management rests explicitly or implicitly on the classic friedmanite permanent income hypothesis studies of portfolio management consumption smoothing social insurance and the like all depend on the canonical assumption that stochastic income realisations are drawn from a stationary income distribution leading to consumption smoothing off a stable asset base the possibility of asset accumulation connects this literature to the immense literature on the theory and empirics of economic growth

a theory of trickle down growth and development this paper develops a model of growth and income inequalities in the presence of imperfect capital markets and it analyses the trickle down effect of capital accumulation moral hazard with limited wealth constraints on the part of the borrowers is the source of both capital market imperfections and the emergence of persistent income inequalities three main conclusions are obtained from this model first when the rate of capital accumulation is sufficiently high the economy converges to a unique invariant wealth distribution second even though the trickle down mechanism can lead to a unique steady state distribution under laissez faire there is room for government intervention in particular redistribution of wealth from rich lenders to poor and middle class borrowers improves the production efficiency of the economy both because it brings about greater equality of opportunity and also because it accelerates the trickle down process third the process of capital accumulation initially has the effect of widening inequalities but in later stages it reduces them in other words this model can generate a kuznets curve

the dynamics of the wealth distribution and the interest rate with credit rationing are uniquely determined and wealth dispersion among individuals or firms is irrelevant introducing credit rationing into the solow model modifies these conclusions multiple stationary interest rates and wealth distributions can exist because higher initial rates can be self reinforcing through higher credit rationing and lower capital accumulation the wealth accumulation process is ergodic in every steady state but wealth mobility is lower with higher steady state interest rates aggregate output is higher in steady states with lower interest rates because credit is better allocated short run interest rate or distribution shocks can be self sustaining and can have long run effects on output through the induced dynamics of the wealth distribution and credit rationing

income fluctuation and asymmetric information an example of a repeated principal agent problem we examine a simple repeated principal agent model with discounting there are a risk averse borrower with an unobservable random income and a risk neutral lender the efficient contract is characterized it tends to the first best constant consumption contract as the discount factor tends to one and the time horizon extends to infinity if the time horizon is infinite and the contract is legally enforceable the borrower s utility becomes arbitrarily negative with probability one if the borrower has constant absolute risk aversion consumption is transferred between any two states at a constant interest rate which is less than the rate of time preference

restoring the promise of american labor law the product of an october 1993 conference on labor law reform jointly sponsored by the school of industrial and labor relations at cornell u and the department of economic research at the afl cio this volume both argues the need for fundamental reform of the legal and institutional underpinnings o

poverty in canada and the united states measurement trends and implications although canada and the united states are two of the richest countries in the world many canadians and americans perceive themselves and are perceived by others to be poor which raises the issue of how best to measure poverty within canada there are widespread worries that the self image of canada as a place with relatively little poverty somewhat kinder and gentler than the united states may be a bit outdated see graves dugas and beauchamp 1999 angus reid 1999 poverty in canada has been rising while in the united states it has been falling in recent years which raises the issues of why that has been happening and what it will mean in the longer term for canada and the united states as a whole in this paper therefore i begin by asking how poverty in affluent countries should be measured before examining recent evidence on poverty intensity and its social significance in section 1 the use of the sen shorrocks thon index of poverty intensity is advocated and the poverty box is introduced as a summary graphical representation in section 2 recent data are presented on poverty in europe and north america and it is noted that between 1994 and 1997 canadian provinces became quite similar to many u s states in poverty intensity a fixed effects model is used in section 3 to examine whether changes in trade exposure the unemployment rate unemployment insurance and social assistance are significant determi

heterogeneity stratification and growth macroeconomic implications of community structure and school finance this paper examines how socioeconomic stratification and alternative systems of education finance affect inequality and growth agents interact through local public goods or externalities school funding neighborhood effects and economywide linkages complementary skills knowledge spillovers sorting families into homogeneous communities often minimizes the costs of existing heterogeneity but mixing reduces heterogeneity faster integration therefore tends to slow down growth in the short run yet raise it in the long run a move to state funding of education presents society with a similar intertemporal trade off local and global complementarities play major roles in determining the efficient social and educational structures copyright 1996 by american economic association

on the long run implications of repeated moral hazard abstract this paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long run consumption or utility given exponential utility it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments next it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents results in essentially the same outcomes as with a continuum of agents finally it is shown that the key characteristic determining whether the utility of almost all agents becomes arbitrarily low is whether lim c u c is bounded away from zero journal of economic literature classification numbers d30 d31 d80 d82