the effects of entry regulation on oligopolistic interaction the uruguayan banking sector this article develops a methodology to test alternative oligopoly models and to analyze the effects of entry restrictions on conduct this methodology is applied to the uruguayan banking sector whose legal entry barriers were significantly relaxed during the late 1970s the results are consistent with a von stackelberg type of industry where the degree of oligopolistic interaction among the leading firms is reduced as a consequence of the relaxation of the legal entry barriers

limit cycles in intertemporal adjustment models theory and applications this paper starts from well behaved i e concave one state variable optimal control models the crucial feature is that indigenous growth is present the replacement of the control by an adjustment process and presumably penalizing these adjustments may convert stable and only stable fixed point equilibria into limit cycles indeed given positive growth and proper externalities such that discounting exceeds growth one can generate stable limit cycles with ease e g for a separable framework examples from such diverse fields as renewable resources optimal saving and public choice highlight the economic applicability

new product introduction and incumbent response strategies their interrelationship and the role of multimarket contact in this article the author studies the determinants of both new product introduction and incumbent response strategies in a single integrated framework building on previous research in strategic

investigating the effects of store brand introduction on retailer demand and pricing behavior researchers have recently been interested in studying the drivers of store brand success as well as factors that motivate retailers to introduce store brands in this paper we study the effects of the introduction of a store brand into a particular product category specifically we are interested in the effect of store brand introduction on the demand as well as on the supply side on the demand side we investigate the changes in preferences for the national brands and price elasticities in the category on the supply side we study the effects of the new entrant on the interactions between the national brand manufacturers and the retailer introducing the store brand including how these interactions influence the retailer s pricing behavior in doing so we are also able to test whether the observed data are consistent with some of the commonly used assumptions regarding retailer pricing behavior for the demand specification we use a random coefficients logit model that allows for consumer heterogeneity the model parameters are estimated using aggregate data while explicitly accounting for endogeneity in retail prices our empirical results obtained from the oats product category based on store level data from a multistore retail chain indicate that the store brand introduction generates notable changes within the category the store brand introduction coincides with an increase in the retailer s margins for the national brand we find that the preferences for the national brand are relatively unaffected by the introduction of the store brand while consumers are in general more price sensitive in terms of elasticities than they were prior to store brand introduction a statistical test of the differences inmean price elasticities across stores and between the two regimes fails to reject the hypothesis of no change in these elasticities elasticities in specific stores however do increase after the store brand is introduced we also find that there is considerable heterogeneity in the preferences for the store brand on the supply side we test several forms of manufacturer retailer interactions to identify retailer pricing behavior most consistent with the data our results indicate that the data reject several commonly imposed forms of interactions in examining the nature of manufacturer interactions with the retailer we find that the manufacturer of the national brand appears to take a softer stance in its interactions with the retailer subsequent to store brand entry this finding is consistent with academic research and with articles in the popular press which suggest that the store brand enhances the retailer s bargaining ability vis a vis the manufacturers of the national brands we also provide results from a second product category frozen pasta that are largely consistent with those found in the oats category

practice prize report an assortmentwide decision support system for dynamic pricing and promotion planning in diy retailing the main objective of this report is to describe a decision support system for dynamic retail pricing and promotion planning our weekly demand model incorporates price reference price effects seasonality article availability information features and discounts building on previous research we quantify demand interdependencies and integrate the resulting profit lifting effects into the optimal pricing model the methodology was developed and implemented at baumax an austrian do it yourself retailer along with the practical requirements an objective function was employed that can be used as a vehicle for implementing a retailer s strategy eight pricing rounds with thousands of different stock keeping units have each served as a testing ground for our approach based on various benchmarking methods a positive impact on profit was reported the currently implemented marketing decision support system increased gross profit on average by 8 1 and sales by 2 1

solving empirical bioeconomic models a rangeland management application an empirical bioeconomic model was developed for private ranches conducting firewood cattle and hunting enterprises on california s hardwood rangelands hunting forage cattle and oak firewood production functions were derived nonlinear optimal control was used to solve for two state and four control variables to give optimal time pathways for oak density and cattle stocking risk was considered through use of chance constraints rainfall variability and price expectations commercial hunting is shown to be the dominant economic value on these rangelands inclusion of stochastics shifts production away from cattle to less risky firewood and hunting enterprises

manufacturer allowances and retailer pass through rates in a competitive environment a commonly held belief has grocery and mass merchandise retailers gaining power relative to the upstream consumer package goods manufacturers one of the major justifications for this belief is that manufacturers are now giving retailers more side payments such as trade allowances slotting allowances etc however a number of researchers have shown that these concessions have not translated into increased profit for the retailer relative to the manufacturer this paper explores via an analytic model why one might see retailers getting concessions from the manufacturer without being able to translate them into high profits we do this by representing the interaction between the channel members as a one period profit maximizing game where manufacturers decide on how large a side payment i e a concession to give to each retailer and retailers decide on how much of this side payment to use to promote the manufacturer s product at the heart of our model is a demand function for each product offering i e a specific brand sold by a specific retailer this demand function is linear in own and other s prices but based on empirical evidence is assumed to be nonlinear in the effects of merchandising activities e g short term price discounts better shelf space advertising etc specifically merchandising effects are modeled with a square root function that also acknowledges most short term promotional effects result in brand or store switching versus increase category volume the model is composed of six parameters these are the inherent popularity of the brand at a particular outlet own price sensitivity cross but within the store price sensitivity customer s sensitivity to within store promotion activities customer s sensitivity to between store promotional activities and the degree to which promotional activities yield incremental product category sales we use our underlying demand formulation to find the equilibrium solution to the full information stackelberg leader game for different store and brand loyalty environments as captured by our six parameters these parameters are chosen based on empirical evidence to span possible market conditions that each channel member might have our findings and modeling efforts should be of interest to analytic channel modelers and scholars interested in the mass merchandising and grocery store industries for a theoretical point of view we build upon the case 4 model of lee and staelin 1997 to allow for promotional activities from a substantive point of view we show that manufacturers will freely give retailers side payments even though they know these retailers will pocket a substantial portion of this concession moreover we identify conditions within our model that lead to larger allowances lower pass through rates and lower retail profits outcomes that are compatible with recent industry trends in addition we highlight the difference in effect on profits prices etc of changes in consumers sensitivity to inter store differences in storewide merchandising activities one of the more counter intuitive results of these analyses is that it is in the manufacturer s best interest to help retailers increase their spatial monopoly by decreasing consumers tendency to cross store shop because of merchandising activities

is 75 of the sales promotion bump due to brand switching no only 33 is abstract several researchers have decomposed sales promotion elasticities based on household scanner panel data a key result is that the majority of the sales promotion elasticity approximately 74 on average is attributed to secondary demand effects brand switching and the remainder is attributed to primary demand effects timing acceleration and quantity increases the authors demonstrate that this result does not imply that if a brand gains 100 units in sales during a promotion the other brands in the category lose 74 units the authors offer a complementary decomposition measure based on unit sales the measure shows the ratio of the current cross brand unit sales loss to the current own brand unit sales gain during promotion the authors report empirical results for this measure they also derive analytical expressions that transform the elasticity decomposition into a decomposition of unit sales effects these expressions show the nature of the difference between the two decompositions to ga

the impact of heterogeneity in purchase timing and price responsiveness on estimates of sticker shock effects the notion that individuals have an internal reference price against which they compare observed prices is well supported by several psychological theories empirically several papers in the marketing literature employing scanner panel data have modeled the impact of reference prices on brand choice via the sticker shock formulation in which consumers evaluate choice alternatives using differences between shelf prices and reference prices most of the studies reported thus far have not accounted for heterogeneity in price response among consumers and have typically imputed reference prices from the shelf prices of brands that a consumer is supposed to have observed on previous purchases in the category since category marketing activity can differentially affect the purchase timing of households we argue that this measure of reference price may follow certain systematic patterns across consumers and when combined with unaccounted for price response heterogeneity may result in a spurious sticker shock effect specifically we show that estimates of sticker shock are biased upward if households that are price sensitive in the brand choice decision are also more responsive to category promotion activity in their purchase timing decision we discuss some general conditions under which the bias occurs and conduct a simulation experiment to confirm our specific hypotheses our simulation results show that changes in purchase timing are a critical determinant of the bias in the sticker shock effect we also show that unaccounted for price response heterogeneity can in itself result in a biased sticker shock parameter however this requires very large differences in price sensitivities across consumers far greater than what is normally observed we develop a hierarchical bayes version of the nested logit model which models heterogeneity via individual level parameters in a continuous random effects framework we estimate the model on scanner panel data from the yogurt and ketchup categories we find in both categories that the 95 probability interval of the posterior distribution of the mean sticker shock coefficient contains the value zero therefore at least for the data used in this study there is no evidence for the sticker shock effect at the aggregate level in contrast the corresponding coefficient from a standard model which ignores this heterogeneity is highly significant and supports the existence of a possibly spurious sticker shock effect consistent with our explanation of the underlying cause of the bias households that are more price sensitive in the choice decision are also found to be more responsive to category promotion activity in their decision to purchase in the category the results highlight the measurement problems associated with imputing reference prices from past prices since the frequency duration and price level of a retailer s promotional program depend on its size and prevalence accurate estimates of the sticker shock effect are essential for formulating optimal promotion strategies an adequate accounting of consumer heterogeneity is critical to this effort

the dynamic effect of discounting on sales empirical analysis and normative pricing implications baseline sales measure what retail sales would be in the absence of a promotion abraham and lodish 1993 and models that measure baseline sales are widely used by managers to assess the profitability of promotions bucklin and gupta 1999 this issue estimates of baseline sales and promotional response are typically independent of past promotional activity even though there is evidence to suggest that increased discounting reduces off promotion sales and increases the percentage of purchases made on deal e g krishna 1994 as a result models that do not consider dynamic promotional effects can mislead managers to overpromote given the widespread use of static models to evaluate the efficacy of promotions it is particularly desirable to calibrate a dynamic brand sales model and use it to establish an optimal course of action accordingly we develop a descriptive dynamic brand sales model and use it to determine normative price promotion strategies our descriptive approach consists of estimating a varying parameter sales response model letting model parameters vary with past discounting activity accommodates the possibility that market response changes with firms discounting policies in the normative model we use the estimates obtained in the descriptive model to determine optimal retailer and manufacturer prices over time the results of the descriptive model indicate that promotions have positive contemporaneous effects on sales accompanied by negative future effects on baseline sales the results of the normative model suggest that the higher share brands in our data tend to overpromote while the lower share brands do not promote frequently enough we project that the use of our model could improve manufacturers profits by as much as 7 to 31 more generally the normative results indicate that i if deals become more effective in the current period i e if consumers are more price sensitive promotions should be used more frequently and ii as the negative dynamic effect of discounts on sales increases the optimal level of discounting should go down without our approach it would be difficult to make this trade off exact finally we demonstrate that these dynamic effects provide another perspective to the marketing literature regarding the existence of promotions

embedded premium promotion why it works and how to make it more effective in this paper we define an embedded premium ep as an enhancement that involves a social cause added on to a product or service we characterize ep as a sales promotion strategy and juxtapose it with traditional approaches such as discounts and rebates across three experiments using a nationwide internet panel and employing stated measures and model based inference we find that at low denominations ep is more effective than an equivalent price discount we describe how an ep s social association may influence consumer choice quite differently than price promotions and contrary to the asymmetric price promotion effect documented in the promotions literature we find that ep benefits an unknown brand more than a known brand our hierarchical bayes approach uncovers heterogeneity in ep effectiveness that can be explained by affinity toward the focal charity personal motivations and demographic markers an identifiable segment of individuals prefer the other over self suggesting possible ep optimization and segmentation strategies two such strategies customization and coverage are empirically tested and the former is shown to be very effective our findings have broad implications for brand managers with regard to resource allocation and ep program return on investment roi as well as important social welfare implications

own brand and cross brand retail pass through in this paper we describe the pass through behavior of a major u s supermarket chain for 78 products across 11 categories our data set includes retail prices and wholesale prices for stores in 15 retail price zones for a one year period for the empirical model we use a reduced form approach that focuses directly on equilibrium prices as a function of exogenous supply and demand shifting variables the reduced form approach enables us to identify the theoretical pass through rate without specific assumptions about the form of consumer demand or the conduct of a category pricing manager thus our measurements of pass through are not constrained by specific structure on the underlying economic model the empirical pricing model includes costs of all competing products in the category on the right hand side not only the cost of the focal brand and yields estimates of both own brand and cross brand pass through rates our results provide a rich picture of the retailer s pass through behavior we find that pass through varies substantially across products and across categories own brand pass through rates are on average more than 60 for 9 of 11 categories a finding that is at odds with the claims of manufacturers about retailers in general importantly we find substantial evidence of cross brand pass through effects indicating that retail prices of competing products are adjusted in response to a change in the wholesale price of any given product in the category we find that cross brand pass through rates are both positive and negative we explore determinants of own brand and cross brand pass through rates and find strong evidence in multiple categories of asymmetric retailer response to trade promotions on large versus small brands for example brands with larger market shares and brands that contribute more to retailer profits in the category receive higher pass through we also find that trade promotions on large brands are less likely than small brands to generate positive cross brand pass through i e induce the retailer to reduce the retail price of competing smaller products on the other hand small share brands are disadvantaged along three dimensions trade promotions on small brands receive low own brand pass through and generate positive cross brand pass through for larger competing brands moreover small share brands do not receive positive cross pass through from trade promotions on these larger competitors we also find that store brands are similarly disadvantaged with respect to national brands

price promotions limiting competitive encroachment in this paper we explore equilibrium pricing strategies in an infinite horizon repeated game for an oligopoly we model the interactions between three firms in a market of switchers and loyals our analysis shows that if there are sufficiently large number of switchers in the market the demand parameter is within an acceptable range and the firms have a sufficiently low discount rate alternating promotions between national firms can be an outcome of a perfect nash equilibrium between competing firms this equilibrium results in an implicit collusion between national firms and therefore suggests that price promotions can be interpreted as a long run strategy pursued by national firms to defend their market shares from possible encroachments of a third firm in this way we attempt to provide an explanation for the patterns of promotion observed in some industries and in particular the beverage industry

a reply to a comment on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters liu et al liu y d s putler c b weinberg 2004 is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters marketing sci 23 1 120 133 examine the television broadcast industry using a model in which profit maximizing broadcasters seek to gain viewers by choosing the type of program to offer and by spending money to set program quality allowing broadcasters to sell access to those viewers through inserted advertisements at a fixed rate per viewer wu and chou wu c s chou 2006 commentary on is having more channels really better a model of competition among commercial television broadcasters marketing sci 25 5 541 545 argue that the duopoly result for a certain range of the cost parameter in liu et al is not a pure strategy nash equilibrium they further propose some modifications to the original model to restore liu et al s results in this reply we demonstrate how a single strategy not included in the strategy space of the liu et al duopoly model leads to the difference between our analysis and that of wu and chou while we had intended to rule out this strategy the text was not entirely clear on this issue wu and chou s comment provides an opportunity to clarify the situation we provide both empirical and theoretical support for excluding this strategy which allows us to focus on the more plausible competitive situations in television broadcasting we also reply to wu and chou s other comments on several issues such as the relative importance of program type versus quality

the cyclical exploitation of renewable resource stocks may be optimal abstract the purpose of this paper is to illustrate that stable limit cycles represent a possible generic equilibrium strategy in renewable resource models if the considered resource provides positive externalities this possibility which has been thus far overlooked is demonstrated for a nonlinear variant of the widely quoted model of c w clark f h clarke and g r munro econometrica 47 25 47 1979

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

optimal pest control in greenhouse production of ornamental crops in this study we develop a conceptual bioeconomic model of floriculture production with aesthetic benefits wherein optimal decision rules depend on an intertemporal economic objective to maximize profits subject to economic and biological processes necessary conditions of the model identify optimal trajectories e g simultaneous single or cycling controls that define decision rules and economic thresholds for profit maximizing growers producing crops with aesthetic attributes the necessary conditions also highlight intertemporal trade offs between aesthetic benefits and expected future net benefits of arthropod stocks which have important policy implications the model is applied to the greenhouse production system of ivy geranium

the effect of promotion on consumption buying more and consuming it faster the authors empirically demonstrate the existence of flexible consumption rates in packaged goods products how this phenomenon can be modeled and its importance in assessing the effectiveness of

the bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets a well established phenomenon of consumer buying behavior is that consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference point and exhibit loss aversion i e their propensity to buy is more negatively affected by prices above the reference point than it is positively affected by prices below the reference point the objective of this paper is to analytically examine how the competitive strategy and profitability of firms are affected by the presence of consumer loss aversion in the price dimension although we assume that consumer loss aversion increases consumer propensity to search for lower prices we find that it does not necessarily lead to lower prices or profits when firms compete over multiple periods and when the consumer reference price in subsequent periods is affected by current prices specifically consumer loss aversion could lead to higher prices and profits when consumer valuation is sufficiently high relative to search costs and the proportion of consumers with positive search costs is in an intermediate range we also show that when forward looking firms incorporate the negative effect of price promotions on future profits the equilibrium range of price promotions may actually increase

a note on the effect of cost changes on prices in a recent article in this journal sumner 1981 took an ingenious approach to estimating the level of monopoly power in the cigarette industry he noted that differences in marginal costs exist in the industry due to varying levels of state taxes the sales prices established will satisfy the equation p i liq l mr mc where p price and q the elasticity of demand for the product in question if elasticity is a constant observing the change in marginal cost and the change in price enables one to infer the elasticity of demand perceived by the firm elasticity could then be used as a proxy for the firm s market power this technique turns out to be of very limited applicability however because it is extremely sensitive to the functional form assumed for the demand curve consider the general problem of a firm facing constant marginal costs of c in maximizing profits the firm solves

treating zero brand sales observations in choice model estimation consequences and potential remedies abstract this research focuses on the consequences of and potential remedies for incorporating zero brand sales observations when calibrating choice models on the basis of household panel data as the authors show both analytically and empirically including or excluding zero brand sales observations can bias price elasticities even in cases in which the data are generated by a multinomial logit model the authors show that an appropriate choice of a model form i e specification is influenced by the incidence of missingness and the mechanism presumed to be causing a brand to have no purchases in a given store week the authors propose two model forms that may perform well in the presence of zero brand sales observations and investigate their relative performance on the basis of simulated data and two household panel data sets

estimating the effects of consumer incentive programs on domestic automobile sales we investigate the effects of consumer sales promotion on automobile sales the largest dollar volume durable goods category in retailing between 1985 and 1987 the domestic automakers offered major year end promotions on automobiles using low rate financing and cash rebates to stimulate sales this article uses time series techniques to evaluate the sales patterns for general motors ford and chrysler between 1983 and 1987 explicitly estimating the effects of the incentive programs the analysis indicates that the 1985 and 1986 promotional campaigns were quite successful but that the 1987 campaign was largely ineffective the 1986 and 1987 promotions were also followed by large post promotion drops in sales the analysis contains two notable findings that are in contrast with the considerable body of empirical evidence about the effects of promotion on nondurable goods

editorial does good marketing cause bad unemployment questionable methods for increasing nominal wages reduce real wages i e buying power by creating inflation shortages lower quality and long term unemployment to increase real wages i e the ability to buy more economic principles prescribe increasing productivity i e greater output from less input in contrast marketing principles prescribes increasing the value of output i e greater customer benefits through innovation beyond increasing real wages innovation spawns new occupations better matching individuals with skills and providing greater nonmonetary benefits i e job satisfaction unfortunately threatened entrenched incumbents often solicit protectionist legislation claiming negative externalities e g short term unemployment lower wages and burdens on society innovation does require labor to move from inferior to superior organizations i e unemployment however protectionism only delays and dramatically aggravates the inevitable trauma associated with progress as worker skills firm practices and buyer welfare fall further behind recent attacks demonizing wal mart e g the dubious vlasic pickle claim epitomize this situation they are archaic vanilla protectionism menacing both imperiled consumers and every consumer driven business

an empirical comparison of the validity of a neural net based multinomial logit choice model to alternative model specifications applications of choice models to brand purchase data as a rule specify a linear deterministic utility function we estimate deterministic utility by means of a neural net able to approximate any continuous multivariate function and its derivatives to a desired level of precision we compare this model to related alternatives both with linear and nonlinear utility functions alternatives with nonlinear utility functions are based on generalized additive modeling and taylor series expansion respectively we analyze purchase data of the six largest brands in terms of market share for two product groups neural choice models outperform the alternative models studied w r t posterior probabilities they also attain the best crossvalidated log likelihood values these results demonstrate that the increase in complexity caused by the neural choice model is justified by higher validity in the empirical study the neural choice models imply elasticities different from those obtained by linear utility multinomial logit models for several predictors neural choice models discover inversely s shaped saturation and interaction effects on utility

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presence of a strategic retailer consumer goods manufacturers usually sell their brands to consumers through common independent retailers theoretical research on such channel structures has analyzed the optimal behavior of channel members under alternative assumptions of manufacturer retailer interaction vertical strategic interaction research in empirical industrial organization has focused on analyzing the competitive interactions between manufacturers horizontal strategic interaction decision support systems have made various assumptions about retailer pricing rules e g constant markup category profit maximization the appropriateness of such assumptions about strategic behavior for any specific market however is an empirical question this paper therefore empirically infers 1 the vertical strategic interaction vsi between manufacturers and retailer 2 the horizontal strategic interaction hsi between manufacturers simultaneously with the vsi and 3 the pricing rule used by a retailer the approach is particularly appealing because it can be used with widely available scanner data where there is no information on wholesale prices researchers usually have no access to wholesale prices even manufacturers who have access to their own wholesale prices usually have limited information on competitors wholesale prices in the absence of wholesale prices we derive formulae for wholesale prices using game theoretic solution techniques under the specific assumptions of vertical and horizontal strategic interaction and retailer pricing rules we then embed the formulae for wholesale prices into the estimation equations while our empirical illustration is using scanner data without wholesale prices the model itself can be applied when wholesale prices are available early research on the inference of hsi among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices using scanner data e g kadiyali et al 1996 1999 made the simplifying assumption that retailers charge a constant margin this assumption enabled them to infer wholesale prices and analyze competitive interactions between manufacturers in this paper we show that this model is econometrically identical to a model that measures retail price coordination across brands hence the inferred cooperation among manufacturers could be exaggerated by the coordinated pricing category management done by the retailer we find empirical support for this argument this highlights the need to properly model and infer vsi simultaneously to accurately estimate the hsi when using data at the retail level functional forms of demand have been evaluated in terms of the fit of the model to sales data but recent theoretical research on channels lee and staelin 1997 tyagi 1999 has shown that the functional form has serious implications for strategic behavior such as retail passthrough while the logit and linear model implies equilibrium passthrough of less than 100 lee and staelin call this vertical strategic substitute vss the multiplicative model implies optimal passthrough of greater than 100 vertical strategic complement vsc because passthrough rates on promotions have been found to be below or above 100 chevalier and curhan 1976 armstrong 1991 we empirically test the appropriateness of the logit vss and the multiplicative vsc functional form for the data we perform our analysis in the yogurt and peanut butter categories for the two biggest stores in a local market we found that the vss implications of the logit fit the data better than the multiplicative model we also find that for both categories the best fitting model is one in which 1 the retailer maximizes category profits 2 the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg and 3 manufacturer pricing hsi is tacitly collusive the fact that the retailer maximizes category profits is consistent with theoretical expectations the inference that the vsi is manufacturer stackelberg reflects the institutional reality of the timing of the game retailers set their retail prices after manufacturers set their wholesale prices note that in the stores and product categories that we analyze the two manufacturers own the dominant brands with combined market shares of about 82 in the yogurt market and 65 in the peanut butter market the result is also consistent with a balance of power argument in the literature the finding that manufacturer pricing is tacitly collusive is consistent with the argument that firms involved in long term competition in concentrated markets can achieve tacit collusion managers use decision support systems for promotion planning that routinely make assumptions about vsi hsi and the functional form the results from our analysis are of substantive import in judging the appropriateness of assumptions made in such decision support systems

a decision support system for planning manufacturers sales promotion calendars a common event in the consumer packaged goods industry is the negotiation between a manufacturer and a retailer ofthe sales promotion calendar determining the promotion calendar involves a large number of decisions regarding levels of temporary price reductions feature ads and in store displays each executed at the level of individual retail accounts and brand skus over several months or a year though manufacturers spend much of their marketing budget on trade promotions they lack decision support systems to address the complexity and dynamics of promotion planning previous research has produced insights into how to evaluate the effectiveness of promotional events but has not addressed the planning problem in a dynamic environment this paper develops a disaggregate level econometric model to capture the dynamics and heterogeneity of consumer response by modeling the purchase incidence timing choice and quantity decisions of consumers we decompose total sales into incremental and nonincremental baseline plus borrowed the response model forms the basis of a market simulator that permits us to search for the manufacturer s optimal promotion calendar subject to a set of constraints some of them imposed by the retailer via the simulated annealing algorithm calendar profits are the net result of the contribution from incremental sales minus the opportunity cost from giving away discounts to nonincremental sales and the fixed costs associated with implementing promotional events e g retagging features displays incremental sales result from promotion induced switching the acceleration and quantity promotion effects on those switchers increased consumption and the carryover effect from purchase event feedback we applied our approach to the promotion planning problem of a large consumer packaged goods company in a nonperishable staple product category suggested by company executives canned tomato sauce subject to a retailer pass through constant rate of 80 provided to us by the collaborating firm the optimal promotion calendar produced by the modeling system followed a pattern of frequent and shallow temporary price reductions with no feature or display activity we also analyze how that result would change under different retailer pass through scenarios our findings indicated that the manufacturer could substantially improve the profitability of its sales promotion activity and that there would be a concurrent positive effect on retailer profit and volume levels management reported to us that the insights from the use of the system were implemented in their promotion planning process and produced positive results a validation analysis on follow up data for one market showed that promotion activity could be significantly reduced as recommended with no adverse effect on the brand s market share as predicted to generalize the model beyond the specific category where it was implemented we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the profile of the calendar i e frequency depth and duration of deals with respect to changes in market response competitive activity and retailer pass through first we found that the optimal depth frequency and timing of discounts is stable for price elasticities ranging from near zero to around four in absolute magnitude we also found no systematic impact of competitive promotions on the profile of the optimal calendar for example variation in competitive activity did not affect the optimal depth or frequency of discounts lastly we found changes in retailer pass through to have a significant effect on the optimal depth and number of weeks of trade promotion that a manufacturer should offer this emphasizes the importance to manufacturers of having accurate estimates of pass through for purposes of promotion budgeting and planning

modeling multiple sources of heterogeneity in multinomial logit models methodological and managerial issues we offer a framework to specify and estimate various sources of heterogeneity in multinomial logit brand choice models we let each brand specific intercept and each parameter of the explanatory variable vector vary randomly across households in addition we distinguish loyal households from the rest our results suggest that incorporating multiple sources of heterogeneity improves the model fit and suggests higher impact of marketing mix elements on brand choice we highlight the importance of incorporating multiple sources of heterogeneity the model we implement yields valuable managerial insights

investigating dynamic multifirm market interactions in price and advertising diagnosing the nature and magnitu de of competitive interactions among firms is important for developing effective marketing strategies in this paper we formulate a game theoretic model of firm interaction to analyze the dynamic price and advertising competition among firms in a given p roduct market firm or brand level demand functions account for the contemporaneous and carry over effects of these marketing activities and also allow for the effects of competitor actions firms take into consideration the actions of their rivals as well as their own demand and cost functions both production and advertising when determining the profit maximizing price and advertising levels our formulation enables us to quantify not only the direction and magnitude of competitive reactions but also to identify the underlying form of market conduct that generates the particular pattern of interaction we specify and estimate a fully structural econometric model for three firms constituting a distinct sub market within a personal care product category we estimate the demand and competitive interaction parameters as well as the production and advertising cost functions for each firm we then derive implications for competitive interactions and market structure interestingly we find that while firms seem to compete on advertising they price cooperatively thereby enhancing their price cost margins

a general theory of pass through in channels with category management and retail competition i provide a general formulation of the channel pass through problem as a comparative static of the retail price equilibrium and i analyze the impact of category management and retail competition on pass through focusing on brand and retailer differences and the nature of the cost change being passed through whether it is brand specific retailer specific both or neither with category management a retailer s response to a brand specific cost change is not limited to that brand in general a retailer will also change the prices of other brands the cross brand effect can be positive or negative and depending on its sign it either enhances or attenuates pass through i explain the cross brand effect as an interaction between two forces a demand substitution force that pushes for a negative cross brand effect and a strategic complementarity force that pushes for a positive cross brand effect retail competition adds another layer of strategic complementarity causing other retailers to respond even for retailer specific cost changes and increasing pass through of categorywide cost changes but its effect for brand specific cost changes is ambiguous i apply the theory to two commonly used demand functions linear demand and nested logit and show that they have significantly different pass through properties the paper concludes with a discussion of how the theory relates to the empirical literature including the companion piece by besanko et al besanko d j p duba s gupta 2005 own brand and cross brand retail pass through marketing sci 24 1 123 137

prices promotions and channel profitability was the conventional wisdom mistaken abstract because of the lack of empirical evidence supporting the shift of economic power from manufacturers to retailers it has been claimed that the conventional wisdom that retailers benefit more from the use of consumer promotions was mistaken this paper assesses this claim and examines how two different pricing approaches during manufacturers instant price promotions targeted at consumers impact on channel profits in a bilateral monopoly we found that manufacturers should only offer rebates when they keep their prior to promotion wholesale prices unchanged consistent with the conventional wisdom retailers do indeed take the lion s share of the promotion incremental profits surprisingly however we found that in the largest part of the parameter space manufacturers still earn more total channel profits than retailers over time the theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

note channel of distribution profits when channel members form conjectures it is well known that lower channel profits are achieved in the bilateral manufacturer reseller monopoly if manufacturer and reseller independently optimize their respective profits they take each other s decisions as given i e adopt decision rules that ignore their influence on the other channel member higher profits are achieved if they coordinate their profit maximizing decisions consequently there is an economic justification for 1 vertical integration that by definition prevents conflicting profit objectives or 2 contracts that change channel members incentives to the compatible objectives of shares of total channel profits this paper investigates the possibility that coordination might take place without formal arrangements like vertical integration or contracts the reason for this contention is the casual observation that channel members are often acutely aware of the interdependencies between channel participants we might thus expect that they will form conjectures about other channel members reactions to their own actions we show that rational conjectures lead profit maximizing channel members to adopt modified decisions rules can such conjectural decision making create at least partially channel coordination or cooperation in other words can channel members deviate from the nash equilibrium and thus achieve greater profits the answer given in this paper is a conditional yes

competitive promotional strategies this article analyzes the equilibrium pricing strategies of brands engaged in a pricing game each brand has a monopoly market loyal consumers and competes with others in a common market called brand switchers in the case of a duopoly it is shown that the behavior of the brand switchers characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the duopolists this article focuses on two key comparative statics namely the depth of discounts away from a regular high price and the probability of giving a deal or the frequency of deals how these properties vary with the size of the loyal markets and the behavior of the brand switching population is discussed copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

solvency of counter cyclical policy rules abstract if an accelerationist phillips curve derived from the behaviour of wage and price setters is combined with an aggregate demand curve perpetual battles about the distribution of income and never ending cycles in inflation and unemployment emerge as a result of demand or supply shocks an optimal counter cyclical rule for monetary growth stabilises these conflict cycles but violates principles of sound public finance this paper derives policy rules that ensure solvency of the public sector a larger public sector temporary budgetary expansions and adverse supply shocks push up long run unemployment and inflation attention is also paid to the effects of tax erosion and the effects of nominal anchors on credibility and macroeconomic policy

political economy of monetary and budgetary policy even though all debt and wage contracts are indexed there is an incentive to levy a surprise inflation tax as this erodes the real value of debt service permits a cut in the tax rate and boosts private consumption with rules it is optimal to smooth tax and seigniorage revenues however with discretion associated with the markov perfect equilibrium the government finances an increase in spending through additional interest income paid on assets that are generated through a temporary bout of inflation and taxation the electorate prefers to appoint a central banker more concerned with inflation than the median voter copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

predicting competitive response to a major policy change combining game theoretic and empirical analyses this research uses procter gamble s value pricing initiative as a context for testing whether actual competitor and retailer response to a major policy change can be predicted using a game theoretic model we first estimate demand functions for p g and competitor brands from the period before value pricing was initiated we then formulate a dynamic manufacturer retailer stackelberg model that includes p g a national brand competitor and a retailer the model takes p g s move as given and prescribes the price and promotion response of the competitors and the retailer we substitute the estimated demand parameters into the model to obtain prescriptions for each competitor and the retailer and see whether these prescriptions are related to the actual response we find that the dynamic game theoretic model calibrated with empirical estimates of demand parameters has significant predictive power we also test the predictive power of two benchmark models the first is based on the reaction function approach of leeflang and wittink leeflang peter s h wittink dick r 1992 diagnosing competitive reactions using aggregated scanner data internat j res marketing9 39 57 and the second is a simplification of our dynamic model where the retailer is not strategic the dynamic game theoretic model performs better than either benchmark

competitive reactions to advertising and promotion attacks how do competitors react to each other s price promotion and advertising attacks what are the reasons for the observed reaction behavior we answer these questions by performing a large scale empirical study on the short run and long run reactions to promotion and advertising shocks in over 400 consumer product categories over a four year time span our results clearly show that the most predominant form of competitive response is passive in nature when a reaction does occur it is usually retaliatory in the same instrument i e promotion attacks are countered with promotions and advertising attacks are countered with advertising there are very few long run consequences of any type of reaction behavior by linking reaction behavior to both cross and own effectiveness we further demonstrate that passive behavior is often a sound strategy while firms that do opt to retaliate often use ineffective instruments resulting in spoiled arms accommodating behavior is observed in only a minority of cases and often results in a missed sales opportunity when promotional support is reduced the ultimate impact of most promotion and advertising campaigns depends primarily on the nature of consumer response not the vigilance of competitors

an alternative explanation for lower repeat rates after promotion purchases several authors have observed that average repeat rates are lower after a promotion purchase one interpretation of this result is that a media coupon or cents off promotion undermines the consumer

reference effects of price and promotion on brand choice behavior when consumers are exposed to pricing and promotional activity by frequently purchased packaged goods they may develop expectations that are used as points of reference in evaluating future activi

decomposing the sales promotion bump with store data sales promotions generate substantial short term sales increases to determine whether the sales promotion bump is truly beneficial from a managerial perspective we propose a system of store level regression models that decomposes the sales promotion bump into three parts cross brand effects secondary demand cross period effects primary demand borrowed from other time periods and category expansion effects remaining primary demand across four store level scanner datasets we find that each of these three parts contribute about one third on average one extension we propose is the separation of the category expansion effect into cross store and market expansion effects another one is to split the cross item effect total across all other items into cannibalization and between brand effects we also allow for a flexible decomposition by allowing all effects to depend on the feature display support condition and on the magnitude of the price discount the latter dependence is achieved by local polynomial regression we find that feature supported price discounts are strongly associated with cross period effects while display only supported price discounts have especially strong category expansion effects while the role of the category expansion effect tends to increase with higher price discounts the roles of cross brand and cross period effects both tend to decrease

investigating purchase incidence brand choice and purchase quantity decisions of households we develop a comprehensive utility maximizing framework to study the impact of marketing variables on the category purchase brand choice and purchase quantity decisions of households for frequently purchased packaged goods the model allows for dependence among the three decisions while ensuring that these decisions provide in combination the greatest possible utility to the household by accounting for variations in reservation prices and intrinsic brand preferences across households the modeling framework explicitly captures the effects of unobserved heterogeneity on all three purchase decisions the principal empirical finding from analyzing the a c nielsen data for the yogurt product category is that the substantive implications for the effects of marketing variables are sensitive to whether these effects are determined conditional or unconditional on a product category purchase our results show that reservation prices and intrinsic brand preferences vary across households and not accounting for these variations in the estimation could lead to biased estimates for the coefficients of the marketing variables a comparison of our results to those obtained from a nested logit model of purchase incidence and brand choice reveals that our proposed model performs better using both a formal statistical test as well as the criterion of predictive validity in a holdout sample of panelists further the purchase quantity model compares favorably with two alternative models of quantity choice in the validation sample

the influence of prior beliefs frequency cues and magnitude cues on consumers perceptions of comparative price data a widespread practice in grocery store advertising is to compare the advertised store s prices to a competitor s prices on multiple items an important but largely unexplored issue is how this information is processed and used in conjunction with prior beliefs to influence price perceptions in our initial studies we manipulated prior beliefs and two data based cues frequency of price advantage and magnitude of price advantage to determine their relative influence on consumer price perceptions results indicate that prior beliefs affected price perceptions but that the frequency cue exerted a dominating influence several follow up studies demonstrate the robustness of this phenomenon across a variety of presentational and instructional conditions

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

asymmetric reference price effects and dynamic pricing policies we consider a group of frequently purchased consumer brands which are partial substitutes and examine two situations the first where the group of brands is managed by a retailer and second where the brands compete in an oligopoly we assume that demand is a function of actual prices and reference prices and develop optimal dynamic pricing policies for each situation in addition to researchers studying pricing strategy our results may interest retailers choosing between hi lo pricing and an everyday low price and manufacturers assessing whether to follow procter gamble s lead and replace a policy of funding consumer price reductions through trade deals with a constant wholesale price a reference price is an anchoring level formed by customers based on the pricing environment the literature suggests that demand for a brand depends not only on the brand price but also whether the brand price is greater than the reference price a perceived loss or is less than it a perceived gain the responses to gains and losses are asymmetric broadly speaking we find that when enough consumers weigh gains more than losses the optimal pricing policy is cyclical likewise when they weigh losses more than gains a constant price is optimal thus we provide a rationale for dynamic pricing which is quite distinct from the three explanations previously offered 1 decreasing unit variable costs due to learning effects 2 the transfer of inventory to consumers who face lower inventory holding costs than do retailers and 3 competitive effects our explanations apply even when the other explanations do not i e in mature product categories where learning effects are minimal when retailer inventories are minimized through the use of just in time policies and when competitive effects do not exist as in a monopoly greenleaf 1995 has shown numerically that in the presence of reference price effects the optimal pricing policy for a monopolist can be cyclical we first analytically extend greenleaf s result to a monopolist with a constant cost of goods facing a homogeneous market where all customers either weigh gains more than losses or vice versa using this building block we examine a monopolist retailer managing multiple brands we assume that demand is a linear function of prices of multiple brands and together with an expression which reflects the reference price effect further we assume that the retailer maximizes average profit per period next we analyze a duopoly and extend the results to an oligopoly we assume that the manufacturers are able to set the retail prices as in an integrated channel here we retain the same demand function as for the retailer and derive markov perfect nash equilibria we use two alternative processes of reference price formation the exponential smoothed es past price process which is frequently used in the literature and for the multi brand situations the recently proposed reference brand rb process hardie johnson and fader 1993 in the latter the reference price is the current price of the last brand bought the reference brand we adapt the individual level rb formulation in hardie et al to an aggregate demand specification for the es process we obtain most results analytically for the rb process we use simulation finally we extend our results to a population with two customer segments segment 1 which weighs gains more than losses and segment 2 which does the opposite i e is loss averse when the market consists exclusively of segment 1 customers and es is the reference price process we find that prices are cyclical in all cases analyzed i e for a monopoly a monopolist retailer managing multiple brands a duopoly and an oligopoly if the rb formulation is the underlying process a monopolist retailer managing two brands uses cyclical prices but in a duopoly the equilibrium solution is for the brands to maintain constant prices when all customers belong to segment 2 i e they are loss averse constant prices are optimal in all cases for both reference price formulations when the population consists of both segment 1 and segment 2 and the es process applies we develop a sufficient condition for cyclical pricing policies to be optimal the condition is expressed in terms of the proportion of the two segment sizes the absolute difference between the gain and loss parameters of each segment and their respective exponential smoothing constants interestingly for reasonable values of the latter two factors cyclical policies are optimal even when the proportion of segment 1 is quite small similar magnitudes are obtained numerically for the rb case

a model of balanced choice behavior in some product categories consumers appear to alternate among items in a consistent and purposeful though not entirely deterministic fashion such alternation occurs even in the absence of any apparent external influences on choice to explain such balanced choice behavior we present a model based upon the premise that past consumption influences the utility of items on subsequent choice occasions individuals may seek variety on certain product attributes and exhibit loyalty toward others the model specification yields a logit choice model which may be calibrated using consumption diary panel data at the individual or cross sectional level

brand loyalty and market equilibrium two concepts of brand loyalty are defined inertial brand loyalty resulting from time lags in awareness and cost based brand loyalty resulting from intertemporal utility effects their market level implications are formally derived in a continuous time model it is found that inertial brand loyalty leads to equilibria with price dispersion while cost based brand loyalty also may allow single price equilibria in all cases as brand loyalty vanishes so does the difference between the average trading price and the price which obtains with no brand loyalty consistent with empirical results the theory predicts that the relationship between market share and performance is positive in cross sectional studies but flat in time series studies the theory is also consistent with the view that market share is an asset in itself after developing the theory several strategic implications are drawn in the end some questions for further theoretical and empirical research are raised