carbon inequality at the sub national scale a case study of provincial level inequality in co2 emissions in china 1997 2007 abstract this study asks whether sub national inequalities in carbon dioxide co2 emissions mirror international patterns in carbon inequality using the case study of china several studies have examined global level carbon inequality however such approaches have not been used on a sub national scale this study examines inter provincial inequality in co2 emissions within china using common measures of inequality coefficient of variation gini index theil index to analyze provincial level data derived from the ipcc reference approach for the years 1997 2007 it decomposes co2 emissions inequality into its inter regional and intra regional components patterns of per capita co2 emissions inequality in china appear superficially similar to though slightly lower than per capita income inequality however decomposing these inequalities reveals different patterns while inter provincial income inequality is highly regional in character inter provincial co2 emissions inequality is primarily intra regional while apparently similar global patterns in co2 emissions are not mirrored at the sub national scale

persistent media bias abstract the news media plays an essential role in society but surveys indicate that the public views the media as biased this paper presents a theory of media bias that originates with private information obtained by journalists through their investigations and persists despite profit maximizing news organizations and rivalry from other news organizations bias has two effects on the demand for news first rational individuals are more skeptical of potentially biased news and thus rely less on it in their decision making this skepticism reduces demand and leads the news organization to set a lower price for its publication the greater is the bias it tolerates lower quality news thus commands a lower price second bias makes certain stories more likely than others given their private information journalists may bias their stories if their career prospects can be advanced by being published on the front page news organizations can control bias by restricting the discretion allowed to journalists but granting discretion and tolerating bias can increase profits if it allows journalists to be hired at a lower wage bias is not driven from the market by a rival news organization nor by a news organization with an opposing bias and the profits of a high bias news organization can be higher than the profits of a low bias one moreover bias can be greater with competition than with a monopoly news organization if individuals collectively choose regulation in place of their individual decision making bias increases the expected stringency of regulation

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

information and strategic political polarisation we develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality policy positions are observed and during the campaign the press reveals some information about quality we demonstrate that when information is imperfect the blackdowns median voter theorem fails to hold for intermediate information levels the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter s bliss point by contrast convergence to the median occurs when quality is almost always or almost never revealed we also show that a profit maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal during the 1995 electoral campaign in belgium the vld a traditionally right wing

imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism we analyze a two candidate downsian model considering that voters use shortcuts e g interest group media endorsements to infer candidates policy platforms that is voters do not observe candidates exact platforms but only which candidate offers the more leftist rightist platform relative positions in equilibrium candidates behavior tends to maximum extremism but it may converge or diverge depending on how voters behave when indifferent policywise between the candidates when the tie breaking rule used by the voters is sufficiently fair candidates converge to the extreme preferred by the median voter but when it strongly favors a certain candidate each candidate specializes in a different extreme

weighting vectors and international inequality changes in environmental indicators an analysis of co2 per capita emissions and kaya factors abstract analyses of international inequality in environmental factors such as the well known co 2 per capita or the kaya factors that is carbon intensity energy intensity and affluence have overlooked the effect that weighting vectors of distance functions and their time variations can have on the evolution of the inequality observed thus for example increases in the relative weight of countries with low emissions tend ceteris paribus to increase the inequality even when the vector of international per capita emissions remains unchanged this effect strictly associated with share variations is assessed in this paper by means of a simple decomposition methodology this methodology allows us to ascertain what part of the time variation of the inequality is attributable to the variations in the shares and or the variations in the environmental variable analysed and in turn suggests extending the analysis to the group components of inequality shorrocks 1980 this proposition is used empirically to assess international inequalities in co 2 per capita and the kaya factors for a variety of sub periods during the 1971 2007 period and for various satisfactory inequality indices

extremist platforms political consequences of profit seeking media we analyze how information about candidate quality affects the choice of electoral platforms made by an office motivated political challenger the incumbent is of known quality and located at the ideal policy of the voter the voter cares for both policy and the candidates quality and can learn about the challenger s quality by buying information a high quality challenger then has an incentive to signal her quality by choosing a policy that induces the voter to buy information we first study the benchmark case in which the information is supplied exogenously and its quality is independent of the challenger s platform this yields multiple equilibria and indeterminacy of equilibrium platforms by contrast when the information is supplied by a profit maximizing media outlet its quality depends on the challenger s platform and we obtain a unique equilibrium platform in particular when the incumbent s quality is relatively low the media coverage rises and the challenger s platform diverges further from the voter s ideal policy as the voter s preference for quality increases

comovement in gdp trends and cycles among trading partners abstract it has long been recognized that business cycle comovement is greater between countries that trade more intensively with one another however nations face shocks to both the cyclical and trend components of their gdp series contrary to the result for cyclical fluctuations we find comovement of shocks to the trend component of real gdp is weaker among countries that trade more intensively with one another we simulate changes in ten year output growth correlations corresponding to the estimated effects of trade and show that the impact of trade on trend comovement is quantitatively more important than its effect on cyclical comovement

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

competence and ideology we develop a dynamic repeated election model in which citizen candidates are distinguished by both their ideology and valence voters observe an incumbent s valence and policy choices but only know the challenger s party our model provides a rich set of novel results in contrast to existing predictions from static models we prove that dynamic considerations make higher valence incumbents more likely to compromise and win re election even though they compromise to more extreme policies consequently we find that the correlation between valence and extremist policies rises with office holder seniority this result may help explain previous empirical findings despite this result we establish that the whole electorate gains from improvements in the distribution of valences in contrast fixing average valence the greater dispersion in valence associated with a high valence political elite always benefits the median voter but can harm a majority of voters when voters are sufficiently risk averse we then consider interest groups igs or activists who search for candidates with better skills we derive a complete theoretical explanation for the intuitive conjectures that policies are more extreme when igs and activists have more extreme ideologies and that such extremism reduces the welfare of all voters

political polarization and the electoral effects of media bias abstract we develop a model in which profits of media firms depend on their audience ratings and maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by suppressing information that the partisan audience does not like hearing while voters are rational understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately important information is lost through bias and can lead to electoral mistakes we characterize those conditions that give rise to electoral mistakes showing that heightened political polarization and asymmetric distributions of voter ideologies make electoral mistakes more likely even if the median ideology is a centrist and centrist voters gain access to unbiased news media bias can generate excessive cross over voting which in turn can lead to the election of the wrong candidate

moving to autarky trade creation and home market effect an exhaustive analysis of regional trade agreements in africa this article analyses the effects of regional trade agreements rtas on bilateral trade in africa a structural gravity equation is estimated over the period 1955 2014 the overall effect of rtas

trade costs and the home market effect most of the theoretical and empirical studies on the home market effect hme assume the existence of an outside good that absorbs all trade imbalances and equalizes wages we study the consequences on the hme of removing this assumption the hme is attenuated and more interestingly it becomes non linear the non linearity implies that the hme is more important for very large and very small countries than for medium size countries the empirical investigation conducted on a database comprising 25 indus tries 25 countries and 7 years con rms the presence of the hme and of its non linear shape

candidate valence evidence from consecutive presidential elections this article develops and estimates a dynamic spatial model of voting the distribution of voters policy positions and candidates valence are recovered using individual level data on voting decisions in two consecutive presidential elections the estimated model is used to provide an equilibrium interpretation of observed individual voting profiles and aggregate electoral outcomes as well as to conduct counterfactual experiments that assess the impact of candidates policy positions valence and voters information on electoral outcomes

on the pervasiveness of home market effects paul krugman s model of trade predicts that the country with the relatively large number of consumers is the net exporter and hosts a disproportionate share of firms in the increasing returns sector he terms these results home market effects this paper analyses three additional models featuring increasing returns firm mobility and trade costs to assess the robustness of home market effects to alternative modelling assumptions we find strikingly similar results for two of the models that relax assumptions about the nature of demand competition and trade costs however a model that links varieties to nations rather than firms can generate opposite results

trade and the location of industries some new results abstract we study a two country two sector model with free entry and monopolistic competition where both industries use labour to produce differentiated goods the two countries are identical except for size labour is freely mobile across industries but it cannot move internationally transport costs affect both industries the location of industries and the pattern of trade are the results of the interaction of two effects the home market effect and the wage differential effect the main results are i if the two countries are sufficiently close in size and demand elasticities differ across industries transport costs being equal a continuous fall in transport costs from a prohibitive level to zero is associated with a reversal in the pattern of trade at some intermediate level for large transport costs the large country is a net exporter of the more differentiated good for lower transport costs the large country becomes a net exporter of the less differentiated good ii if the two countries are very different in size and demand elasticities differ across industries transport costs being equal the larger country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated good

the market for news we investigate the market for news under two assumptions that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs we show that on the topics where readers share common beliefs one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media competition results in lower prices but common slanting toward reader biases on topics where reader beliefs diverge such as politically divisive issues however newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions yet in the aggregate a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective generally speaking reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

demand for slant how abstention shapes voters choice of news media political commentators warn that the fragmentation of the modern media landscape induces voters to withdraw into information cocoons and segregate along ideological lines we show that the option to abstain breaks ideological segregation and generates cross over in news consumption voters with considerable leanings towards a candidate demand information that is less biased towards that candidate than voters who are more centrist this non monotonicity in the demand for slant makes voters ideologies non recoverable from their choice of news media and generates disproportionate demand for media outlets that are centrist or only moderately biased it also implies that polarisation of the electorate may lead to an ideological moderation in news consumption

signaling character in electoral competition we study a one dimensional hotelling downs model of electoral competition with the following innovation a fraction of candidates have character and are exogenously committed to a campaign platform this is unobservable to voters character is desirable and a voter s utility is a convex combination of standard policy preferences and her assessment of a candidate s character this structure induces a signaling game between strategic candidates and voters since a policy platform affects voters utilities not only directly but also indirectly through inferences about a candidate s character the model generates a number of predictions starting with a failure of the median voter theorem jel d72 d82

determinants of carbon inequality in china from static and dynamic perspectives abstract carbon inequality ci is one of the core issues concerning social welfare and economic development to overcome the disadvantages of the widely used theil economic inequality index which does not consider technical efficiency and technological change we developed static and dynamic inequality analysis tools by incorporating production theoretical decomposition analysis a logarithmic mean divisia index and a shapley sun method into the theil index decomposition model we then investigated the determinants of china s ci during the period 2003 2015 using the original and modified theil index decomposition models our key findings are 1 national ci experienced a downward trend with some fluctuations over time 2 intragroup inequality was the main driver of these changes using the original approach 3 the disparities in industrialization investment scale income population share potential carbon factor energy usage technical efficiency and co2 emission technological change accounted for the decreases in ci whereas the disparities in investment rate potential energy intensity industrial investment output share energy usage technological change and co2 emission technical efficiency contributed to increases in ci we offer some policy proposals based on our results