investment and market dominance we analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment special cases include incremental investment patent races learning by doing and network externalities we investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments to this end we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes which applies to our investment game finally we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient

the union impact on profits in the supermarket industry a number of studies have found that unions lower profits but controversy continues over whether the union impact is or is not greater in more concentrated markets this empincal controversy is linked to two underlying issues whether unions distort capital investment decisions and the total volume of monopoly profits in the u s economy research on the supermarket industry reveals that unions lower profits substantially in this sector and that indeed their impact is greater when local markets are more concentrated recently there has been an explosion of research concerning the union impact on profits and the associated question of whether or not unions reduce profits more in noncompetitive than competitive sectors for a review of studies see voos and mishel 1986 this has become an important empirical issue for a variety of reasons one concern has been whether unions distort capital investment decisions insofar as unions merely capture monopoly rents as opposed to reducing the rate of return in competitive industries the presumption is that unions create less distortion a separate issue has been whether or not previous research has underestimated the extent of total monopoly rents in the u s economy this would occur if observed profits are less than total profits in noncompetitive sectors because in those sectors a portion of monopoly rents is being redistributed to unionized employees while most studies find that unions lower profits there is some controversy regarding whether or not unions reduce profits more in industries with less competitive market structures freeman 1983 and karier 1985 both find that unions have a much larger effect in concentrated industries however hirsch and connolly 1985 question that conclusion and clark 1984 reports contrary evidence with regard to market share all previous investigations of this issue utilize manufacturing inter industry data cross sections of predominantly manufacturing firms or 2 digit sic manufacturing industry observations disaggregated by state this paper reports the results of research designed to ascertain whether unions reduce profits in one relatively homogeneous nonmanufacturing industry supermarkets and if their impact is larger when local markets are more concentrated lamm 1982 and marion et al 1979a and 1979b have explored the impact of unions and of concentration respectively on food prices moreover excellent data on supermarket profits exist the data give our study several unique qualities because observations are on firms in specific geographic markets in a single disaggregate industry any estimated union profit effect cannot be said to result from a correlation between unionism and unobserved industry specific factors the study is also the first to be based on evidence from the nonmanufacturing sector the data utilized and the model estimated the data on which this research was based were gathered under subpoena by the joint economic comreceived for publication july 8 1985 revision accepted for publication october 17 1985 university of wisconsin and industrial union department afl cio respectively special thanks to frederick geithman for many helpful suggestions and for research assistance and to bruce marion for making the data available to us and for commenting on our results all opinions as well as errors are the authors own funds for a portion of this research came from the university of wisconsin graduate school during a portion of this research mishel was affiliated with cornell university

union nonunion compensation differentials and industry structure abstract this paper examines the impacts of industry output and labor input market structures on workers total compensation in u s manufacturing for empirical analysis cps may 1983 data were matched with 1982 census of manufacturing results indicate that employees in highly concentrated product markets proxied by four firm concentration ratio crr earn more independent of their union membership second union members in the smaller plant sizes have the most to gain and the union advantage disappears for medium to large plants third and perhaps most important the joint effects of unionism and crr on earnings depend on the size of the manufacturing plant in conclusion the paper finds support for dowrick s 1989 conjecture that profits enhancing product market conditions generally tend to increase earnings

installed base and compatibility innovation product preannouncements and predation a good is often more valuable to any user the more others use compatible goods the authors show that this effect may inhibit innovation if an installed base exists and transition to a new standard must be gradual early adopters bear a disproportionate share of transient incompatibility costs this can produce excess inertia the installed base however is stranded if the new standard is adopted this may create excess momentum these dynamic effects have strategic implications temporary price cutting can permanently prevent entry and product preannouncements can be critical in innovation these strategic actions have ambiguous welfare effects

cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games abstract we reconsider the cournot oligopoly problem in light of the theory of supermodular games invoking the recent ordinal version of this theory proposed by milgrom and shannon we generalize novshek s existence result derive the associated uniqueness result give an extension of a classical existence result under symmetry and provide conditions making a cournot oligopoly into a log supermodular game with the natural order on the action sets we also provide extensive and precise insight as to why decreasing best responses are widely regarded as being typical for the cournot model with production costs several illustrative examples are provided journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 l10 l13

strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic oligopolies we characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets if governments can commit to future policies optimal first period intervention should diverge from the profit shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by fudenberg and tirole s animal spirits taxonomy of business strategies without government commitment there is an additional basis for intervention whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions we consider a variety of applications to rd spillovers consumer switching costs etc and also extensions to constrained second best policies

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

sequential product innovation and industry revolution a certain sequence of innovations in a vertically differentiated good is considered two firms are engaged in a series of bidding games to acquire the infinitely lived patents to these managerial diseconomies restrict firms to producing a single good which is chosen optimally from the set of patents owned by the firm product market equilibrium is bertrand two theorems provide 1 a sufficient condition for the current leader to be overthrown action reaction and 2 a necessary and sufficient condition for persistent dominance an illustrative example shows that sequences satisfying these conditions can always be constructed copyright 1987 by royal economic society

innovation and industry evolution the theoretical literature on innovation has been concerned with a single innovation produced by a number of identical agents by contrast we consider a market in which one firm is the current incumbent while the remaining firms are challengers moreover we consider a sequence of innovations so that success does not imply that the successful firm reaps monopoly profits forever after but only until the next better innovation is developed we begin with a fully optimizing behavioral model and derive the equivalent of the schumpeterian process of creative destruction that is a firm enjoys temporary monopoly power but is soon overthrown by a more inventive challenger the essential point to grasp is that in dealing with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process the fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers goods the new methods of production or transportation the new markets the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates schumpeter 1942 pp 82 83

the union impact on profits evidence from industry price cost margin data this paper uses industry price cost margin data to estimate the extent to which unions reduce profits estimates allowing for the endogeneity of union status are contrasted with estimates that assume union status is exogenous and not determined in part by either profitability or industry structure endogeneity is found to be an important consideration in estimating the union impact on profits two stage estimates are considerably larger than ols estimates the final section explores the total estimated redistribution from capital to labor in the manufacturing sector an important conclusion is that unions raise prices less than was previously believed

coordination economies advertising and search behavior in retail markets we introduce a model of the retail firm in which consumers and active firms benefit collectively from coordination of sales at fewer firms using this model we show that ostensibly uninformative advertising plays a key role in bringing about coordination economies by directing consumer search toward firms that offer the best deals optimal consumer search takes the form of a simple rule of thumb that uses observed advertising information to guide search both industry concentration and social surplus are higher in the presence of advertising relative to a no advertising benchmark jel d83 l15 many observed advertisements seem to be at odds with rational behavior in a variety of ads mostly on tv and radio multiproduct sellers provide little hard information choosing instead to impart only vague slogans that are suggestive of good deals examples are plentiful a hardware store

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

the evolution of market structure when there is a sequence of innovations the paper explores the question of how market structure evolves when there is a sequence of opportunities to innovate does one firm extend its technological superiority to become increasingly dominant or does technological leadership constantly change hands in a process of actionreaction a simple duopoly model is proposed in which the answer to this question depends upon the nature of product market behaviour in that model highly competitive product market behaviour leads to increasing dominance whereas cournot behaviour may lead to action reaction

competition and growth with step by step innovation an example this paper develops a simple example to analyse the relationship between product market competition and growth in a model with step by step innovations where laggards can never leapfrog the current industry leaders but instead must first catch up with the leaders before battling for technological leadership in the future unlike in existing schumpeterian models of growth more intense product market competition and or imitations may be growth enhancing

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

london and beyond taking a closer look at urban energy policy this paper considers the field of urban energy policy a neglected yet important topic cities account for approximately two thirds of global primary energy consumption creating significant benefits and costs as a result there has been growing interest in the contribution of cities to global energy policy issues such as climate change but a number of significant questions remain e g how do energy policy processes differ between national and urban scales and how can cities contribute most effectively to global policy goals we present the results of interviews with key stakeholders in london to illustrate some unique features of the urban energy policy cycle we then take a wider view proposing a research agenda with three key goals describing the global variety of urban energy consumption and policy understanding the resulting diversity in responsibility vulnerability and capacity and developing shared procedures and solutions tackling these questions is vital if cities are to contribute fully to current energy policy efforts

the sensitivity of strategic and corrective r d policy in oligopolistic industries abstract we evaluate the case for r d subsidies in export sectors when the outcome of r d is uncertain and the product market is oligopolistic when r d reduces expected costs in the particular sense of first order stochastic dominance a national strategic basis for r d subsidies exists whether firms choose prices or quantities this must be balanced against a corrective incentive to tax r d whenever the number of domestic firms exceeds one however when r d increases the riskiness of the cost distribution as well the results may switch there emerges a strategic incentive to tax and a corrective incentive to subsidize r d

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

dynamic retail price and investment competition we develop a model of retail competition in which retailers select prices and investments in cost reduction an equilibrium is constructed in which several identical firms enter and then engage in a phase of vigorous price competition this phase is concluded with a shakeout as a low price low cost firm comes to dominate the market a central feature of the equilibrium is that low prices are complementary with large investments in cost reduction even though the dominant firm s price rises through time and initially may be below marginal cost we argue that an interpretation of predatory pricing may be inappropriate

do unions capture monopoly profits this paper challenges the conclusion reached in recent studies that unions reduce profits exclusively in highly concentrated industries from their review of previous studies and their analysis of 1977 data on 367 fortune 500 firms the authors conclude that there is no convincing evidence that concentration produces monopoly profits for unions to capture moreover they find that the union wage effect is not greater in concentrated industries as suggested by the hypothesis that unions capture concentration related profits evidence is found suggesting that a firm s market share its expenditures on research and development and its protection from foreign competition provide more likely sources for union rents than does industry concentration several recent studies have found that unions reduce profits significantly and some have concluded that this profit reduction is restricted to highly concentrated industries both conclusions are important the finding that unions reduce profitability indicates that in general the cost increasing effects of unions outweigh any positive productivity effects they may bring to the workplace such a

rationalizability learning and equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities we study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition macroeconomic coordination failures arms races bank runs technology adoption and diffusion r d competition pretrial bargaining coordination in teams and many others for all these games the sets of pure strategy nash equilibria correlated equilibria and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds also for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best response dynamics and bayesian learning the players choices lie eventually within the same bounds these bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters we study the class of noncooperative supermodular games introduced by topkis 1979 and further analyzed by vives 1985 1989 who also pointed out the importance of these games in industrial economics supermodular games are games in which each player s strategy set is partially ordered the marginal returns to increasing one s strategy rise with increases in the competitors strategies so that the game exhibits strategic complementarity 2 and if a player s strategies are multidimensional marginal returns to any one com ponent of the player s strategy rise with increases in the other components this class turns out to encompass many of the most important economic applications of noncooperative game theory in macroeconomics diamond s 1982 search model and bryant s 1983 1984 rational expectations models can be represented as supermodular games in each of these models more activity by some members of the economy raises the returns to increased levels of activity by others in oligopoly theory some models of bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products qualify as supermodu lar games in these games when a firm s competitors raise their prices the marginal profitability of the firm s own price increase rises a similar structure is present in games of new technology adoption such as those of dybvig and spatt 1983 farrell and saloner 1986 and katz and shapiro 1986 when more users hook into a communication system or more manufacturers adopt an interface standard the marginal return to others of doing the same often rises similarly in some specifications of the bank runs model introduced by diamond and dybvig 1983 when more depositors withdraw their funds from a bank it is more worthwhile for other depositors to do the same in the warrant exercise

international r d rivalry and industrial strategy this paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for industrial strategy policies such as r d or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets domestic net welfare is improved by the capture of a greater share of the output of rent earning industries although the subsidy ridden noncooperative international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal behaviour of governments and firms is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect nash equilibrium the assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms

on the existence of cournot equilibrium this paper examines the existence of n firm cournot equilibrium in a market for a single homogeneous commodity it proves that if each firm s marginal revenue declines as the aggregate output of other firms increases which is implied by concave inverse demand then a cournot equilibrium exists without assuming that firms have nondecreasing marginal cost or identical technologies also if the marginal revenue condition fails at a potential optimal point there is a set of firms such that no cournot equilibrium exists the paper also contains an example of nonexistence with two nonidentical firms each with constant returns to scale production