the role of risk preferences in pay to bid auctions we analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions assuming risk neutral bidders if risk loving preferences are incorporated in the model expected revenue increases our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices which we test against observed auction data the degree of fit depends on how unobserved parameters are chosen in particular a slight preference for risk has the biggest impact in explaining auction behavior suggesting that pay to bid auctions are a mild form of gambling this paper was accepted by peter wakker decision analysis

contracting with wealth constrained agents we examine how a project owner optimally selects a project operator and motivates him to deliver an essential noncontractible input e g effort when potential operators are privately informed about their limited wealth truthful revelation of wealth is induced by promising a higher probability of operation and if necessary a greater share of realized profit the larger the nonrefundable bond that a potential operator posts the project owner benefits when total wealth is widely dispersed among potential operators under plausible conditions limited knowledge of wealth is not constraining for the project owner

all pay war we study a model of conflicts and wars in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the battlefield as in standard models but because countries lack information about their opponent in this model expected resource levels and production and military technologies are common knowledge but realized resource levels are private information each country decides how to allocate its resources to production and warfare the country with the stronger military wins and receives aggregate production in equilibrium both comparative and absolute advantages matter a larger resource share is allocated to warfare by the country with a comparative advantage in warfare at relatively low realized resource levels and by the country with an absolute disadvantage in warfare at relatively high realized resource levels from an ex ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage in warfare is more likely to win the war unless its military potential is much lower

the optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer abstract this paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling a good to a buyer who may be budget constrained we consider a seller with one unit of a good facing a buyer with a quasilinear utility function if the buyer does not face a binding budget constraint textbook monopoly pricing is optimal by contrast the possibility of a binding budget constraint can make it optimal for the seller to use nonlinear pricing to commit to a declining price sequence to require the buyer to disclose his budget or to offer financing journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 d42 d45 d89 l12

monotone equilibrium of two bidder all pay auctions redux abstract in this paper we revisit the two bidder asymmetric all pay auction of amann and leininger 1996 by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals both values and signals are distributed on continuous supports we provide conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a monotone pure strategy equilibrium mpse and constructively characterize the mpse when it exists we find that given the marginal distributions of the signals the equilibrium allocation is solely determined by how bidders values depend on their signals in particular the equilibrium allocation does not depend on how bidders signals are correlated

multiple object auctions with budget constrained bidders in the last few years governments in many parts of the world have aggressively sought to privatize socially held assets this wave of privatization has included the sale of industrial enterprises in the former soviet union and eastern europe the sale of public transportation systems in britain and scandinavia and the sale of radio spectra in the u s both the enormity and the importance of these sales have naturally led to an examination of how best to accomplish this task auctions have been proposed and have frequently been used as time honoured convenient and attractive mechanisms for such sales this in turn has led to a revival of interest in the theory of auctions particularly those involving multiple objects the magnitude of these privatization sales has meant that in many instances it is realistic to consider that buyers may run up against liquidity or borrowing constraints the presence of these financial constraints introduces important differences into traditional auction theory for instance pitchik and schotter 1986 and che and gale 1996 1998 have shown that when bidders are subject to such constraints the conclusion of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds when multiple objects are auctioned in the presence of budget constraints it may be advantageous for a bidder to bid aggressively on one object with a view to raising the price paid by his rival and depleting his budget so that the second object may then be obtained at a lower price in effect a bidder may wish to raise a rival s costs in one market in order to gain advantage in another thus unlike in traditional auction theory a particular bidder s payoff is affected by the price paid by a rival bidder it is important to note that this effect comes into play only when several objects are sold

using contests to allocate pollution rights in this paper we advocate a new initial allocation mechanism for a tradable pollution permit market we outline a permit allocation contest pac that distributes permits to firms based on their rank relative to other firms this ranking is achieved by ordering firms based on an observable external action where the external action is an activity or characteristic of the firm that is independent of their choice of emissions in the tradable permit market we argue that this mechanism has a number of benefits over auctioning and grandfathering using this mechanism efficiently distributes permits allows for the attainment of a secondary policy objective and has the potential to be more politically appealing than existing alternatives

auctions development and privatization efficient auctions with liquidity constrained buyers abstract we exhibit an efficient auction an auction for which the winner is the buyer with the highest valuation subject to the constraint that buyers may be budget or liquidity constrained

bid costs and endogenous bid caps we study contests where several privately informed agents bid for a price all bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids and moreover bids may be capped we show that regardless of the number of bidders if agents have linear or concave cost functions then setting a bid cap is not profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the average bid on the other hand if agents have convex cost functions i e an increasing marginal cost then affectively capping the bids is profitable for a designer facing a sufficiently large number of bidders

asymmetric reduced form auctions this paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions using this auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only this allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i examine players equilibrium effort levels in two player asymmetric contests with ratio form contest success functions i first characterize the nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game i show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same i also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players probabilities of winning at the nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half then i examine how the equilibrium effort ratio the prize dissipation ratios and the players equilibrium effort levels respond when the players valuations for the prize or their abilities change jel d72 c72 i introduction a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending irreversible effort to win a prize typical examples are various types of rent seeking contests competition among firms to win a monopoly rent secured under government protection or by a government procurement contract competition between domestic and foreign firms to obtain governmental trade policies favorable to them competition among firms to acquire a rent generated by rights of ownership to an import quota and competition among firms to capture rents created by governmental decisions to establish tariffs or other trade barriers other examples of contests include auctions patent races research and development r d competition among firms litigation competition for jobs among job candidates competition among candidates to win promotion to higher ranks election campaigns between political candidates and competition between local governments to invite business firms government institutions or government owned corporations into their districts naturally due to their prevalence and importance in economies such contests have been studied by many economists loury 1979 lee and wilde 1980 tullock 1980 rogerson 1982 rosen 1986 appelbaum and katz 1987 dixit 1987 hillman and riley 1989 hirshleifer 1989 ellingsen 1991 nitzan 1991 1994 krishna and morgan 1997 che and gale 1998 hurley and shogren 1998 and konrad 2000 to name a few in this vast literature on the theory of contests one of the main issues is how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize indeed it is of great interest because the players effort levels determine the profitability of the players engaging in the contest and in some cases they are revenues collected by the contest organizer or bribes given to government officials furthermore they account for other important outcomes of the contest for example in a rent seeking contest efforts expended by the players are viewed as social costs due to rent seeking activities so that total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency in an r d contest effort levels expended by the players these are r d expenditures of the firms determine the expected date of invention this article also addresses the issue how much effort do the players exert in pursuit of the prize but it differs from previous research by dealing with contests with ratio form contest success functions 1 specifically the novelty of this article is to consider two player asymmetric contests in which each player s probability of winning is a function of the ratio of the two players effort levels two player contests with ratio form contest success functions or two player contests that can be best modeled with ratio form contest success functions are easily observed in the real world examples include various types of two player rent seeking contests litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant election campaigns between two parties or candidates and r d competition between two firms consider for example a rent seeking contest in which two firms potential monopolists compete with each other to win a government monopoly franchise contract

on the continuous equilibria of affiliated value all pay auctions with private budget constraints abstract we consider all pay auctions in the presence of interdependent affiliated valuations and private budget constraints for the sealed bid all pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of n bidders budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations we extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments an example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed

selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry an asymptotic analysis we study a model of entrepreneurs who compete in an auction like setting for venture capital vc funding in a setting where limited capital dictates that the vc can only finance the best entrepreneurs with asymmetric information vcs can only assess entrepreneurs by the progress of development which in equilibrium reveals the quality of the new technology using an asymptotic analysis we prove that in attractive industries having a large number of entrepreneurs competing for vc funding could lead to underinvestment in technology by entrepreneurs as the effort exerted by losing entrepreneurs is wasted the study then proceeds to characterize the conditions under which a greater number of competing entrepreneurs is better the model also demonstrates that vcs could possibly increase their payoff by concentrating on a single industry in addition the study also provides some insights on the effects of multiple investments by vcs and the effects of competition among vcs on the same investments

the effect of job displacement on couples fertility decisions this paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using finnish longitudinal register data we focus on couples where one spouse has lost a job due to a plant closure and follow them for several years before and following the job loss the results show that female job loss decreases fertility for every 100 displaced females there are three fewer children born male job loss has no impact on fertility despite resulting in a stronger decrease in family income than female job loss this indicates that the income effect is not the mechanism through which job displacement influences fertility

tax push inflation in a unionized labour market in this paper the effect of changes in the average rate and in the progressivity of direct taxes on a the level of wages and b the extent to which cost of living increases are transmitted to wages are considered for a unionized labour market these effects are derived theoretically for different union objectives and the models applied to data for italian industry in a form which allows discrimination between these different objectives the empirical estimates for the preferred model are then used to determine the effects of the postulated tax changes

standard auctions with financially constrained bidders we develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay we then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms in the simplest case where bidders face absolute spending limits first price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second price auctions the revenue dominance of first price auctions over secondprice auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit these rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats

the optimal initial allocation of pollution permits a relative performance approach the initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes we generalize the analysis of bohringer and lange 2005 eur econ rev 49 8 2041 2055 to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter firm relative performance comparisons including grandfathering and auctions as well as novel mechanisms we show that using firms historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting while using firms historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms instead it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor which is independent of output and emissions we then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism

the effect of taxes on labour in efficiency wage models abstract this paper analyses the effects of labour taxation on wage and employment in a moral hazard efficiency wage model where effort is a continuous variable and workers are risk averse in the model examined ad valorem and specific taxes on labour do not have the same consequences on the real wage both taxes have a negative effect on employment but the imposition of a specific tax causes an increase in the net real wage including firms to raise the quality of their workers these results are compared with those obtained in other versions of the shirking efficiency wage model

expected revenue of all pay auctions and first price sealed bid auctions with budget constraints we show that all pay auctions dominate first price sealed bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints this ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all pay auctions which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format

booms busts and fertility testing the becker model using gender specific labor demand in this paper i present estimates of the effect of local labor demand shocks on birth rates to identify exogenous variation in male and female labor demand i create indices that exploit cross sectional variation in industry composition changes in gender education composition within industries and growth in national industry employment consistent with economic theory i find that improvements in men s labor market conditions are associated with increases in fertility while improvements in women s labor market conditions have smaller negative effects i separately find that increases in unemployment rates are associated with small decreases in birth rates at the state level

optimal prize rationing strategy in all pay contests with incomplete information abstract a contest organizer e g a government regulatory agency is endowed with the capacity to provide unlimited homogeneous prizes e g medals that he can use to incentivize contestants to exert productive effort in an all pay auction with incomplete information each agent at most wins one prize we study the optimal number of prizes the organizer should grant in order to induce maximal expected total effort or expected highest effort from agents both are single peaked under mild regularity conditions when players abilities follow a family of beta distributions expected highest effort maximization requires a smaller set of prizes to be awarded for both goals the optimal number of prizes weakly increases when the pool of contestants expands or contestant quality improves

auctions in which losers set the price we study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values we show that the second price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays and the price only depends on the losers bids in particular we show that the k th price auction generates higher revenue than the second price auction for all k 2 if rationing is allowed with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders then the t 1 st price auction yields the lowest revenue among all auctions with rationing in which only the winners pay and the unit price only depends on the losers bids finally we compute bidding functions and revenue of the k th price auction with and without rationing for an illustrative example much used in the experimental literature to study first price second price and english auctions

do family wealth shocks affect fertility choices evidence from the housing market abstract this paper uses wealth changes driven by housing market variation to estimate the effect of family resources on fertility decisions using data from the panel study of income dynamics we show that a 100 000 increase in housing wealth among home owners causes a 16 to 18 increase in the probability of having a child there is no evidence of an effect of msa level housing price growth on the fertility of renters however we also present evidence that housing wealth growth increases total fertility and that the responsiveness of fertility to housing wealth has increased over time commensurate with the recent housing boom

is subsidizing inefficient bidders actually costly a widespread practice particularly in public sector procurement and dispersal is to subsidize a class of competitors believed to be at an economic disadvantage arguments for such policies vary but they typically assume that benefits of subsidization must be large enough to outweigh a presumed economic cost of the subsidy when disadvantaged competitors compete in auctions the subsidy serves to make them more competitive rivals other bidders rationally respond by bidding more aggressively we consider a model of procurement auctions and show that a policy of subsidizing inefficient competitors can lower expected project cost and also enhance economic efficiency some subsidy is generally better than no subsidy for a wide range of parameters

a symmetric two player all pay contest with correlated information we construct both monotonic and non monotonic symmetric bayesian nash equilibria for a two player all pay contest with binary types and correlated information structures we also employ a class of parametric distributions to illustrate our equilibrium construction explicitly and to derive some comparative statics results

the max min group contest weakest link group all pay auction we investigate a group all pay auction in which each group s effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group specific public good we fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups there are four types of equilibria the pure strategy equilibria in which all active players exert the same effort the semi pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support we then analyze a general contest with n groups

the non equivalence of labour market taxes a real effort experiment under full rationality a labour market tax levied on employers and a corresponding income tax levied on employees are equivalent with boundedly rational agents this equivalence is no longer obvious in a real effort experiment we study the effects of these taxes on preferences concerning the size of the public sector subjective well being labour supply and on the job performance our findings suggest that employer side taxes induce preferences for a larger public sector subjective well being is higher under employer side taxes while labour supply is lower at least at the extensive margin we discuss three mechanisms that may underlie these results

optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers abstract we study the sale of an indivisible good to liquidity constrained buyers they cannot pay more than their budget regardless of their valuation both valuation and budget are private information we derive the symmetric revenue maximizing and constrained efficient auctions in this setting we show an implementation via a modified all pay auction the highest bidder need not win the good outright or stated differently the auction has pooling despite the usual regularity conditions subsidizing low budget buyers cannot increase revenue from a technical standpoint we contribute to auction design with multidimensional private information by working directly with reduced form allocation rules

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

how not to raise money we show that standard winner pay auctions are inept fund raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another s high bid revenues are suppressed as a result and remain finite even when bidders value a dollar donated the same as a dollar kept this problem does not occur in lotteries and all pay auctions where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win we introduce a general class of all pay auctions rank their revenues and illustrate how they dominate lotteries and winner pay formats the optimal fund raising mechanism is an all pay auction augmented with an entry fee and reserve price

patent competition rent dissipation and the persistence of monopoly the role of research budgets abstract the paper investigates how patent rights can contribute to the persistence of monopoly patent competition is modelled as a dollar auction game between two firms incumbent and entrant any bid expenditure on r d in the game constitutes sunk cost whose total amount is constrained by fixed research budgets the explicit solution subgame perfect equilibrium determines who wins the patent and how the winning expenditures depend on order of play and budgets of firms the entrant can win if he moves first and has the higher budget rent may or may not be dissipated by the competition

uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price abstract we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for a general class of two player bidding games we apply our results to the first price auction the combination of first and second price auctions the war of attrition the all pay auction as well as combinations of the latter two auction forms we also treat the first price auction without risk neutrality our results deal with the asymmetric affiliated common values environment in the case where signals are independent our results apply to all equilibria when signals are not independent our uniqueness results hold in the class of nondecreasing strategy equilibria journal of economic literature classification number d44

optimal auctions with endogenous budgets we study the benchmark independent private value auction setting when bidders have endogenously determined budgets before bidding a bidder decides how much money she will borrow bidders incur a cost to borrowing we show that bidders are indifferent between participating in a first price second price and all pay auction the all pay auction gives higher revenue than the first price auction which gives higher revenue than the second price auction in addition when the distribution of values satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition the revenue maximizing auction is implemented by an all pay auction with a suitably chosen reserve price

modeling and analysis of an auction based logistics market we consider a logistics spot market where the transportation orders from a number of firms are matched with two types of carriers through a reverse auction in the spot market local carriers compete with in transit carriers that have lower costs in order to analyze the effects of implementing a logistics spot market on these three parties firms local carriers and in transit carriers and also the effects of various system parameters we develop a two stage stochastic model we first model the auction in a static setting and determine the expected auction price based on the number of carriers engaging in the auction and their cost distributions we then develop a continuous time markov chain model to evaluate the performance of the system in a dynamic setting with random arrivals and possible abandonment of orders and carriers by combining these two models we evaluate the performance measures such as the expected auction price price paid to the carriers distribution of orders between local and in transit carriers and expected number of carriers and orders waiting at the logistics center in the long run we present analytical and computational results related to the performance of the system and discuss operation of such a logistics spot market in turkey

the sunk cost fallacy in penny auctions this article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions a relatively new auction mechanism as in the us dollars or war of attrition players in penny auctions commit higher non refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding i first show that in any equilibria that does not end immediately players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero then using two large data sets covering 166 000 auctions i calculate that average profit margins actually exceed 50 to explain this deviation i incorporate a sunk cost fallacy into the theoretical model to generate a set of predictions about hazard rates and player behaviour which i confirm empirically while players do slowly learn to correct this bias and there are few obvious barriers to competition activity in the market is rising and concentration remains relatively high

information in conflicts abstract we consider two player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value for settings where one player knows the value of the prize while the other only knows its prior distribution we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent in the special case of a lottery contest equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed

procurement and predation dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers abstract this paper studies the relationship between a financially constrained firm and a stronger opponent who is not cash constrained when these firms repeatedly compete in a procurement context we characterize and discuss the procurement agency s optimal strategy when faced with such asymmetric firms we highlight a trade off between the long run benefits from competition and the short run benefits from reduced costs finally we show that to reduce costs in the short run the financially weak firm should be favored in future procurement

did the great recession affect fertility examining the impact of job displacements on the timing of births in the united states we examine the impact of job losses during the great recession on fertility in the united states we find that for married cohabiting couples job losses of males during the recession decreased the likelihood of birth in contrast job losses of married cohabiting females had no impact on average on fertility because of opposing age specific effects although younger women were reducing fertility after job losses to cope with the loss of income older women aged 40 and above were more likely to have a child following their job loss moreover we find that job losses of single noncohabiting females decreased the likelihood of birth particularly for women below the age of 25 this negative effect on fertility persisted in the medium term up to three years following the job losses overall these results suggest that job losses during the recession may be partly responsible for the recent decline in the u s birth rates

rigging the lobbying process an application of the all pay auction textabstractin a world where a politician can explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder the standard auction literature can be used to analyse political behavior the justice system however precludes politicians from explicitly selling the prize to the highest bidder thus politicians cannot let it become public knowledge that they are in the business of selling political favors an institution has emerged in political markets to overcome this constraint which are termed as lobbying lobbyists make implicit payments to the politician through campaign contributions if these up front payments were rebated to those failing to receive the prize it would be clear that the politician was selling favors this article has examined an interesting principle arising in all pay auctions this principle states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize

asymmetric all pay auctions with interdependent valuations abstract i show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two player all pay auction with a discrete signal structure correlated signals and interdependent valuations the proof is constructive and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics i also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced

sequential correlated equilibria in stopping games in many situations such as trade in stock exchanges agents have many opportunities to act within a short interval of time the agents in such situations can often coordinate their actions in advance but coordination during the game consumes too much time an equilibrium in such situations has to be sequential in order to handle mistakes made by players in this paper we present a new solution concept for infinite horizon dynamic games which is appropriate for such situations a sequential normal form correlated approximate equilibrium under additional assumptions we show that every such game admits this kind of equilibrium

income shocks contraceptive use and timing of fertility abstract this paper examines the relationship between income shocks and fertility decisions using panel data from tanzania we estimate the impact of agricultural shocks on pregnancies births and contraception use the likelihood of pregnancies and childbirth are significantly lower for households that experience a crop shock furthermore women have significantly higher contraception use after crop losses the increase in contraceptive use comes almost entirely from traditional contraceptive methods such as abstinence and the rhythm method we argue that these changes in behavior are the result of deliberate decisions of the households rather than the shocks effects on other factors that influence fertility such as women s health status the absence or migration of a spouse the dissolution of partnerships or the number of hours worked we also show that although traditional contraceptives have low overall efficacy households with a strong incentive to postpone fertility are very effective at using them

all pay auctions with a buy price option all pay auctions this paper studies all pay auctions in which there is a buy price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller specified price we analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first and second price all pay auctions with the buy price option while the optimal buy price in the second price is higher than are those in the first price all pay auction both formats maintain the same expected profit with an endogenous entry process all pay auctions with the buy price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted price selling mechanism jel d44 l11 l81

budget constraints and demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions the possibility even if arbitrarily small of binding budget constraints in simultaneous ascending bid auctions induces strategic demand reduction and generates significant inefficiencies under mild conditions on the distributions of the bidders values unconstrained bidders behave as if they were liquidity constrained even as the probability that bidders are budget constrained goes to zero

assigning resources to budget constrained agents this article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget constrained agents schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of utilitarian efficiency the socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount an in kind subsidy and a cash incentive to discourage low valuation individuals from claiming the good copyright oxford university press

the war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information we provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue our example suggests that information non revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact

equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders the two bidder case we study an affiliated value second price auction with two financially constrained bidders we prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium under quite general conditions comparative static results are provided journal of economic literature classification number d44

multi stage sequential all pay auctions abstract we study multi stage sequential all pay contests auctions where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter ability that affects their cost of effort we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants expected highest effort

are children really inferior goods evidence from displacement driven income shocks abstract this paper explores the causal link between income and fertility by analyzing women s fertility response to the large and permanent income shock generated by a husband s job displacement i find that the shock reduces total fertility suggesting that the causal effect of income on fertility is positive a model that incorporates the time cost of children and assortative matching of spouses can simultaneously explain this result and the negative cross sectional relationship i also find that a husband s displacement accelerates childbearing which is consistent with lifecycle models of fertility in which the incentive to delay is driven by expected earnings growth

sequential second price auctions with private budgets abstract we study an auction game in which two units of a good are sold via two second price auctions sequentially to three or more bidders who have private budgets that limit their spending in the auctions we characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium in equilibrium while bidders bid the minimum of their valuations and budgets in the second auction their aggression in the first round depends on two factors the competition from other bidders as measured by the probability of facing high budget bidders and the option value from participating the second auction as measured by the budget difference between various bidders the former factor makes bidders more aggressive and the latter makes them less aggressive in particular when the competition factor dominates the sequential auctions generate higher revenue in expectation than the uniform price auction

when are stabilizations delayed alesina drazen revisited abstract in an influential article alesina and drazen 1991 why are stabilizations delayed american economic review 81 1170 1188 model delay of stabilization as the result of a struggle between political groups supporting reform plans with different distributional implications in this paper we show that ex ante asymmetries in the costs of delay for the groups will reduce the probability of conflict and will lead to a shorter expected delay accurate common information about the cost of delay may lead to no delay at all in an asymmetric conflict a wider divergence in the distributional implications of reform will reduce the probability of conflict but will lead to a longer expected delay we motivate the asymmetric model of delay by reference to latin american episodes of the 1980s

on the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders abstract this paper provides a class of examples of two bidder common value second price auctions in which bidders may be financially constrained and the seller has access to information about the common value we show that the seller s expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy the intuition for the failure of the linkage principle is as follows in the presence of financial constraints the bidders upward response in their bids to the seller s good signals is limited by their financial constraints while their downward response to bad signals is not

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

caps in sequential contests i introduction in many competitions we can often observe situations where severe constraints are imposed on contestants for example in the u s electoral campaign there is a specific maximum campaign contribution that a single agent can make to a candidate 1 in sports where equipment plays a major role e g sailing motor races etc explicit or implicit technological constraints are imposed on the allowed equipment also several sports leagues e g the national basketball association nba implement a salary cap which places a limit on the total amount of money a team can spend on players salaries salary caps are clearly binding and teams are sometimes forced to trade expensive players in order to make place for other needed team members the usual reason for applying salary caps is that they facilitate even competition between small and large city teams otherwise large city teams could pay more buy the best talent and ultimately destroy any semblance of competition in the league the goal of caps imposed by designers of competitions is to create what we call a competitive balance so that many players have a chance to win and not necessarily the strongest ones in addition if the contest is more competitively balanced the uncertainty of the outcome is higher and therefore the contest is more attractive furthermore competitive balance may lead to an improvement of the expected total performance of all the players rather than just the performance of the top player several other ways have been suggested to enhance the competitive balance in contests for example baye kovenock and de vries 1993 showed that in all pay auctions contests by excluding the strongest player the player with the highest value of winning the contest becomes more competitively balanced and then the players expected total bid may increase moldovanu and sela 2001 found that in all pay auctions under incomplete information when cost functions are convex several positive prizes may be optimal for a designer who wishes to maximize the expected total bid in other words by increasing the number of the prizes the chances of the players with relatively low values of winning to win one of the prizes increase and therefore these players will increase their efforts accordingly cohen kaplan and sela 2008 studied all pay auctions with effort dependent rewards under incomplete information and demonstrated that when the designer maximizes the total bid effort and when there is a sufficiently large number of contestants the optimal reward decreases in the contestants bid this means that a designer will offer higher prizes to the players with relatively low values of winning those who exert lower efforts than to the players with relatively high values of winning those who exert higher efforts such a distribution of prizes balances the bids submitted by the players with high and low values of winning we focus here on the role of bid caps to enhance the competitive balance in contests relatively weak players players with low abilities or low values of winning usually exert low efforts which are lower than the level of the bid cap imposed by a designer in a contest with a bid cap if these players exert an effort that is equal to the bid cap they will have a higher chance to win since no one can exert a higher effort than the bid cap thus the weak players exert more effort than they would in a contest without a bid cap however relatively strong players players with high abilities or high values of winning usually exert higher efforts than the level of the bid cap thus the strong players exert less effort than they would in a contest without a bid cap hence the effect of the bid cap on the players total effort depends on the trade off between the increase of the weaker players efforts and the decrease of the stronger players efforts to be fully effective the bid cap system must guarantee that as many players as possible raise their efforts to the level of the bid cap and as less as possible reduce their efforts to this level

the generalized war of attrition abstract we model a war of attrition with n k firms competing for n prizes in a natural oligopoly context the k 1 lowest value firms drop out instantaneously even though each firm s value is private information to itself in a standard setting context in which every competitor suffers losses until a standard is chosen even after giving up on its own preferred alternative each firm s exit time is independent both of k and of other players actions our results explain how long it takes to form a winning coalition in politics solving the model is facilitated by the revenue equivalence theorem jel d43 d44 l13 o30

repeated auctions with budgets in ad exchanges approximations and design ad exchanges are emerging internet markets where advertisers may purchase display ad placements in real time and based on specific viewer information directly from publishers via a simple auction mechanism advertisers join these markets with a prespecified budget and participate in multiple second price auctions over the length of a campaign this paper studies the competitive landscape that arises in ad exchanges and the implications for publishers decisions the presence of budgets introduces dynamic interactions among advertisers that need to be taken into account when attempting to characterize the bidding landscape or the impact of changes in the auction design to this end we introduce the notion of a fluid mean field equilibrium fmfe that is behaviorally appealing and computationally tractable and in some important cases it yields a closed form characterization we establish that an fmfe approximates well the rational behavior of advertisers in these markets we then show how this framework may be used to provide sharp prescriptions for key auction design decisions that publishers face in these markets in particular we show that ignoring budgets a common practice in this literature can result in significant profit losses for the publisher when setting the reserve price this paper was accepted by dimitris bertsimas optimization

long run effects of employment and payroll taxes in an efficiency wage model abstract a long run efficiency wage model with free entry and exit is proposed it is demonstrated that a balanced budget substitution of employment taxes for payroll taxes leads to a higher long run equilibrium level of employment

changing world prices women s wages and the fertility transition sweden 1860 1910 this time series analysis examines during 1860 1910 the impact of changes in local prices of agricultural commodities on wages among men and women in sweden and the impact of changes in wages on fertility decline child mortality urbanization and improved social conditions linear ordinary least squares models are set up to determine whether demand induced increases in womens wages relative to mens are significant factors in explaining swedish total fertility rates data are obtained from 25 counties and the city of stockholm among pooled observations for six time periods during 1860 64 and 1910 14 this period is marked by a total fertility decline of 28 a marital fertility decline of 26 and a child mortality decline of 52 explanatory variables are the relative prices of main agricultural outputs employment outside of agriculture the proportion of urban population and the child mortality rate findings indicate a significant relationship between child mortality and total fertility and specific fertility rates among women aged 20 39 years a doubling of the male real wage rate was significantly associated with earlier marriage higher birth rates among women aged 15 29 years and lower birth rates among women aged 35 49 years the ratio of male wages to female wages was associated with a decline in birth rates at all ages with the exception of teenagers 66 of fertility increase was due to declines in child mortality but this increase was counterbalanced by fertility decline among older women child mortality and urbanization depressed marital fertility male wages increased the proportion married a 10 increase in the male female wage rate was associated with a 25 reduction in the total fertility rate another 25 increase in the male female wage rate was associated with a 50 reduction in child mortality it is concluded that the value of womens time had a key impact on the swedish fertility transition

generalized reduced form auctions a network flow approach we develop a network flow approach for characterizing interim allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints both ceilings and floors applications include a variety of settings of practical interest ranging from individual and group specific capacity constraints set aside sale partnership dissolution and government license reallocation

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

a game theoretic analysis of skyscrapers abstract skyscrapers are urbanism in the extreme but they have received surprisingly little direct attention in urban economics the standard urban model emphasizes differentials in access across locations which determine land price differentials and building heights this explanation leaves out an important force that appears to have historically influenced skyscraper construction an inherent value placed on being the tallest in this paper we present a game theoretic model of skyscraper development that captures this additional force the model predicts dissipative competition over the prize of being tallest a prediction consistent with the historical record the paper discusses the implications of this result for the nature and efficiency of urban development and for the operation of urban real estate markets

contests with three or more heterogeneous agents abstract we study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort bid where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution these differences can either cause a player to drop out that is always choose zero effort regardless of his valuation or use all or nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice neither complete drop out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone bayesian nash equilibrium in a contest with either ex ante identical players or only two distinct participants

full extraction of the surplus in bayesian and dominant strategy auctions we consider auctions for a single indivisible object in the case where the bidders have information about each other which is not available to the seller we show that the seller can use this information to his own benefit and we completely characterize the environ ments in which a well chosen auction gives him the same expected payoff as that obtainable were he able to sell the object with full information about each bidder s willingness to pay we provide this characterization for auctions in which the bidders have dominant strate gies and for those where the relevant equilibrium concept is bayesian nash in both set ups the existence of these auctions hinges on the possibility of constructing lotteries with the correct properties we consider the situation in which an agent the seller possesses one indivisible unit of a good to which he attaches no value but the good has value to a number of potential buyers and its transfer to one of them would increase social welfare in particular the transfer to the buyer with the highest valuation maximizes social welfare in this paper we completely characterize environments in which the seller can design an auction that will enable him to capture for himself the full increase in social welfare induced by the transfer of the good to the bidder with the highest willingness to pay if the seller had full information about the reservation prices of potential buyers his optimal selling strategy would be very simple he would announce a price equal or very close to the highest reservation value the optimal strategy for the bidder with the highest evaluation would be to accept the offer note that we are treating a situation in which the seller can commit himself to a price as a result of the exchange the utility of the seller increases by the full amount of the increase in social welfare and he has been able to fully extract the surplus in many circumstances however a seller has only imperfect knowledge of the buyers willingnesses to pay in this case he must find some mechanism or auction which will enable him to maximize his benefit from the sale of the object the auction literature starts with this observation and shows how the seller can by an astute choice of auction extract the largest possible fraction of the surplus in general the literature has shown that this proportion is strictly less than one in some circumstances the bidders will have information about each other which is not available to the seller for instance in auctions for petroleum drilling rights bidders know the results of geological tests which they have

optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines a seller maximizes revenue from selling an object in a dynamic environment with buyers that differ in their patience each buyer has a privately known deadline for buying and a privately known valuation first we derive the optimal mechanism neglecting the incentive constraint for the deadline the deadline of the winner determines the time of the allocation and therefore also the amount of information available to the seller when he decides whether to allocate to a buyer depending on the shape of the markup that the seller uses this can lead to a violation of the neglected incentive constraint we give sufficient conditions on the type distribution under which the neglected constraint is fulfilled or violated second for the case that the constraint cannot be neglected we consider a model with two periods and two buyers here the optimal mechanism is implemented by a fixed price in period one and an asymmetric auction in period two the asymmetry which is introduced to prevent the patient type of the first buyer from buying in period one leads to pooling of deadlines at the top of the type space

high bids and broke winners abstract this paper analyzes auctions where budget constrained bidders have options to declare bankruptcy it predicts a bidding equilibrium that changes discontinuously in a borrowing rate available to bidders when the borrowing rate is above a threshold high budget bidders win and the likelihood of bankruptcy is low when the borrowing rate is below the threshold the winner is the most budget constrained bidder and is most likely to declare bankruptcy this result explains the high bids and broke winners anomaly in the c block fcc spectrum auction based on its equilibrium analysis the paper proves that a seller can profit from offering to finance the highest bidder at a below market interest rate even with default risk journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d45 d82 g33 l96

market and non market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources a number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents agents have linear utility in money the designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics i solve for the optimal mechanism the choice between market or non market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay

bidding for a group specific public good prize abstract we examine the equilibrium effort levels of individual players and groups in a contest in which two groups compete with each other to win a group specific public good prize the players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently and the winning group is determined by the selection rule of all pay auctions we first prove nonexistence of a pure strategy nash equilibrium and then construct a mixed strategy nash equilibrium at the nash equilibrium the only active player in each group is a player whose valuation for the prize is the highest in that group all the other players expend zero effort and the equilibrium effort levels depend solely on two values the highest valuation for the prize in each group

an analysis of the war of attrition and the all pay auction we study the war of attrition and the all pay auction when players signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed we a find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and b examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 d82 1997 academic press

all pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes abstract we study all pay auctions with multiple prizes the players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value we characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize if the uncertain prize is not the lowest one a player s effort as well as his expected payoff increase in his value for the uncertain prize otherwise if this prize is the lowest one we obtain that a player s effort may decrease in his value for the uncertain prize but his expected utility increases