informational externalities and emergence of consensus we study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities we prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays we also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus these results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement

acquisitions and investment we derive a simple theoretical framework in which acquisitions are treated as an alternative way of obtaining capital goods our framework predicts that both investment and acquisitions are positively related to a firm s shadow value of capital we transform our theoretical specification into an econometric model which we then estimate using a long panel data set spanning 503 us firms over 15 consecutive years our results indicate that an increase in the shadow value of capital has approximately the same proportionate effect on the level of acquisitions as it does on investment this result proves to be robust to a variety of alternative specifications recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of corporate takeovers this tide of activity raises a number of questions about the causes and consequences of acquisitions what effects do takeovers have on research and development spending do takeovers reduce employment how important are tax considerations in motivating acquisitions do management objectives and or the availability of free cash flow play a role in acquisitions although these questions have been addressed in previous research no specific optimizing model has been put forward to explain the fundamental nature of the acquisition decision in this paper we propose such a model when a firm makes an acquisition it obtains assets in this way acquisitions and investment are similar activities which one might expect to be guided at least to a substantial extent by similar economic principles in this paper we specify and estimate a simple model that explicitly links a firm s acquisition activities to its investment choices the only unusual feature of this model is that these goods can be either purchased directly investment or obtained by taking over another firm acquisitions our model is based on the firm s intertemporal optimization problem under what are with this one exception standard assumptions our specification yields a pair of equations in which a firm s choices regarding acquisitions and investment are jointly determined and are influenced by the shadow value of capital as in many models of investment we assume that firms face convex costs of adjusting their capital stocks consequently the shadow value of capital may exceed its replacement cost firms for which the shadow value of capital is high relative to its purchase price will have an incentive to make relatively large capital purchases in relation to their existing capital stock under standard assumptions the shadow value of capital is reflected in the firm s stock market

stock market volatility and investment do only fundamentals matter the empirical evidence in the volatility literature suggests that movements in stock prices cannot be satisfactorily explained purely in terms of changes in fundamentals this paper shows how to obtain proxies for the fundamental and fad components of changes in stock prices and asks the question do only fundamentals matter for investment decisions we find that changes in investment are significantly associated with movements in both components of stock prices the point estimates suggest that changes in fundamentals have a greater effect than changes in non fundamentals the statistical significance of the difference between their coefficients depends upon the financing regime these conclusions are shown to be robust to modifications and extensions of the model

dividend taxes corporate investment and q abstract taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a double tax on corporate income this view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view one explanation of why firms in the united states pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions this capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation s decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings this alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions this paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation by extending tobin s q theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived the competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory s predictions british time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions the econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions

a revealed preference test of rationing abstract this paper derives a revealed preference test for utility maximization under rationing and can detect for which goods rationing is binding without specifying a functional form or imposing rationing constraints prior to estimation for uk data from 1920 55 we find evidence of utility maximization under rationing with rationing binding for food and other services estimated virtual prices exceed observed food prices by 16 5 in 1947 and observed prices of other services by 10 9 in 1952

recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning this article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively to improve the incentives for early exploration the optimal design trades off fully transparent disclosure by selectively overrecommending the product or spamming to a fraction of users under the optimal scheme the designer spams very little on a product immediately after its release but gradually increases its frequency she stops it altogether when she becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the product the recommender s product research and intrinsic naive users seed incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning potential applications for various internet recommendation platforms and implications for review ratings inflation are discussed

the importance of reporting conventions for the theory of corporate taxation abstract this paper shows that for the analysis of a tax policy it is important to be explicit about the reporting convention to which a corporation tax is required or allowed to adhere the paper shows that the corporation tax cannot be used to alter capital formation under uniform reporting a convention required by the majority of the oecd countries this tax is however a more useful policy tool in those oecd countries that have created the privilege of separate reporting fiscal depreciation makes the marginal valuation of equity differ from the marginal valuation of capital use of tax allowances directed to investment stimulus operates rather differently under the two reporting conventions

aggregate investment the stock market and the q model robust results for six oecd countries abstract modern macroeconomists prefer the q approach for modelling aggregate investment despite the empirical superiority of jorgenson s neo classical approach this paper revisits this conflict its theoretical and empirical results make the case that in contrast to the original static q investment equation a new dynamic q equation is as satisfactory as jorgenson s equation from an empirical standpoint while being more satisfactory from a theoretical standpoint the paper identifies a theoretical and an empirical line of research in resolving the conflict between theorists and empiricists on the theory side the possibility of generating lags in a q investment equation via the structural q model is explored this period s investment cost depends on the investment level achieved last period the interpretation of this intertemporality combines adjustment costs and gestation lags the closed form q equation is an armax the explicit generation of lagged investment therefore accounts for the key stylized fact characterizing the investment data process the empirical line of research turns to data puzzles in the specification of a viable q equation it reconciles inter alia the non q evidence which claims a paramount link between stock prices and investment with the q non evidence which denies such a link exists more importantly the armax q equations is systematically gauged against the jorgenson and accelerator specifications across six oecd countries this comparative analysis established that the superiority of the new q equations over jorgenson s is robust

the incidence and allocation effects of a tax on corporate distributions abstract to study the effects of double taxation first at the corporation level then at the shareholder level this paper analyzes a model with a tax on all corporate distributions to equity owners and no other taxes contrary to the common view the tax is shown to have no subtitution effect and in particular no effect on the corporate choice between debt and equity via retained earnings finance the analysis opens to question certain arguments commonly used to support integration of corporation and individual income taxes via dividend relief

dynamic delegation of experimentation i study a dynamic relationship where a principal delegates experimentation to an agent experimentation is modeled as a one armed bandit that yields successes following a poisson process its unknown intensity is high or low the agent has private information his type being his prior belief that the intensity is high the agent values successes more than the principal does so prefers more experimentation the optimal mechanism is a cutoff rule in the belief space the cutoff gives pessimistic types total freedom but curtails optimistic types behavior pessimistic types over experiment while the most optimistic ones under experiment this delegation rule is time consistent

the vanishing harberger triangle this paper shows that the double taxation of corporate dividends or profit repatriations implies a nucleus theory of the corporation after the firm is set up with a small stock of original capital it enters a phase of purely internal growth during which no dividends are paid and no shares are issued the phase terminates when an efficient stock of capital has been accumulated and dividends are paid during the growth phases the tax distortion is inversely related to the tax burden and it is larger than conventional formulae for the cost of internal and external equity finance suggest

continuous time repeated games in this paper the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case the model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time the set of equilibria in this game may be large in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s the authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a cournot duopoly example copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

gradual reforms of capital income taxation this paper analyzes the intertemporal allocation effects of anticipated tax rate changes reconsidering the recommendations of the meade committee in a perfect foresight general equilibrium model of economic growth it is shown that the r base or consumption tax can be more distortionary than an income tax and that a revenue neutral integration of corporate and personal taxation will lower social welfare moreover it is argued that a dividend tax dominates the r base tax because it places its distortions on the financial rather than on the real side of the economy copyright 1989 by american economic association

the effect of the stock market on investment a comparative study this paper is concerned with examining whether exogenous events whose only direct effect is to change stock prices can indirectly affect corporate investment through the stock price mechanism it is argued that the actual effect of share price changes depends on institutional considerations which affect the degree of managerial autonomy e g the extent of the use of the takeover mechanism gearing ratios and the role of employees in corporate decision making therefore it would be reasonable to expect the stock market to be less influential in japan or germany when compared with the u s or u k this paper provides some econometric evidence which supports this view in that once one has allowed for other influences on investment share prices provide no additional explanatory power for investment behaviour in japan or germany but they do affect investment in the u k and u s if one believes that the stock market is sometimes swayed by irrational considerations the absence of an influence of share prices on investment in japan or germany may then be regarded as an advantage

contests for experimentation we study contests for innovation with learning about the innovation s feasibility and opponents outcomes we characterize contests that maximize innovation when the designer chooses a prize sharing scheme and a disclosure policy a public winner takes all contest dominates public contests where any success is immediately disclosed with any other prize sharing scheme as well as winner takes all contests with any other disclosure policy yet jointly modifying prize sharing and disclosure can increase innovation in a broad class of mechanisms it is optimal to share the prize with disclosure following a certain number of successes under simple conditions a hidden equal sharing contest is optimal

subsidizing research programs with if and when uncertainty in the face of severe informational constraints we study government optimal subsidy policies for research programs in the face of servere information asymmetry when firms have private information about the likelihood of project viability but the government cannot form a unique prior belief about this likelihood the paper makes two contributions first we show that the way in which rd under r d competition the first best outcome can also be achieved through a simple combination of a matching subsidy and an unrestricted subsidy if the shadow cost of public funds is positive an ex post equilibrium in general does not exist either under monopoly or competition we then consider two alternative policy decision criteria that are appropriate for belief free games rationalizability and max min criteria we argue that the max min criteria is preferable in our context and by way of doing so establish that the set of max min subsidy policies under either monopoly or competitive r d consists entirely of simple pure matching subsidies we further establish that allowing firms to form an r d consortium reduces the matching rate for the highest max min subsidy suggesting that cooperative r d has the potential to economize on the shadow costs of public funding of subsidies

good news and bad news in two armed bandits abstract this note provides a characterization of optimal policies in a class of two armed bandits that allows for correlated arms this characterization extends previously known results in the literature in particular it implies under a mild continuity assumption the optimality of cutoff belief strategies for this class of bandits cutoff beliefs are not unique though

price dispersion and learning in a dynamic differentiated goods duopoly we study the evolution of prices set by duopolists who are uncertain about the perceived degree of product differentiation customers sometimes view the products as close substitutes sometimes as highly differentiated as the informativeness of the quantities sold increases with the price differential there is scope for active learning by firms when information has low value to the firms they charge the same price as would be set by myopic players and there is no price dispersion when firms value information more highly on the other hand they actively learn by creating price dispersion such price dispersion arises in a cyclical fashion and is most likely to be observed when the firms environment changes sufficiently often but not too frequently firms payoffs are higher when they use correlated pricing strategies contrary to what one might expect such coordination need not hurt consumers provided they are sufficiently impatient

negatively correlated bandits we analyse a two player game of strategic experimentation with two armed bandits either player has to decide in continuous time whether to use a safe arm with a known pay off or a risky arm whose expected pay off per unit of time is initially unknown this pay off can be high or low and is negatively correlated across players we characterize the set of all markov perfect equilibria in the benchmark case where the risky arms are known to be of opposite type and construct equilibria in cut off strategies for arbitrary negative correlation all strategies and pay offs are in closed form in marked contrast to the case where both risky arms are of the same type there always exists an equilibrium in cut off strategies and there always exists an equilibrium exhibiting efficient long run patterns of learning these results extend to a three player game with common knowledge that exactly one risky arm is of the high pay off type

experimentation and learning in a differentiated products duopoly abstract this paper explores price setting behavior in the context of a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation firms learn from the difference in their realized demands in light of the price differential the informativeness of this market experiment is shown to be increasing in size of the price differential in markets with highly substitutable products price dispersion is enhanced as firms adjust their prices so as to generate more information in markets with highly differentiated products firms compress their prices as they prefer to reveal less about the extent of product differentiation journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 d83 l13

tax policy and capital allocation summary the purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of u s tax policy on the efficiency of capital allocation to achieve this objective we employ an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the u s economy implemented econometrically for annual data covering the period 1955 1980 we present a detailed model of the provisions of u s tax law applicable to income from capital we use intertemporal equilibrium paths corresponding to alternative tax policies to evaluate proposals for tax reform we find that dramatic gains in economic welfare would result from a shift from direct to indirect taxation

why do companies pay dividends this paper presents a simple model of market equilibrium to explain why firms that maximize the value of their shares pay dividends even though the funds could instead be retained and subsequently distributed to shareholders in a way that would allow them to be taxed more favorably as capital gains the two principal ingredients of our explanation are 1 the conflicting preferences of shareholders in different tax brackets and 2 the shareholders desire for portfolio diversification we show that companies will pay a positive fraction of earnings in dividends we also provide some comparative static analysis of dividend behavior with respect to tax parameters and to the conditions determining the riskiness of the securities this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

input price shocks and the slowdown in economic growth the case of u k manufacturing this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of input price shocks on economic growth with a focus on united kingdom manufacturing in the 1970s the theoretical model predicts a discrete decline in output and productivity after an input price rise and a longer run slowdown in productivity growth real wage growth and capital accumulation these features characterize the united kingdom and most other oecd economies after 1973 the empirical results confirm the important role of input prices in recent u k adjustment but also point to an important role for other supply and demand factors two types of explanations have been offered for the sharp deterioration in u k economic performance in the past decade focusing respectively on demand and supply factors a standard keynesian view holds that macroeconomic demand management has been either too expansionary or too contractionary and that rising unemployment and falling output reflect the burden of anti inflationary policies an alternative view holds that various supply shocks are the main source of the poor output performance in this interpretation higher raw material prices particularly oil competition from the newly industrializing countries nics and perhaps an independent decline in productivity growth all have lowered output growth and raised unemployment

taxes investment and q this paper attempts to provide a unified analysis of the effects of taxation on the equilibrium value of marginal q under alternative financial policies it is shown that the q approach does not avoid all the specification problems associated with analyses based on the cost of capital the theoretically and empirically crucial relationship between average and marginal q is also examined and it is shown that under uk and us tax rules the possibility of winding up precludes persistent undervaluation in equilibrium there have now been a considerable number of empirical studies of investment behaviour based on some variant of tobin s q defined as the ratio of the firm s market value to the value of its capital stock see for instance jenkinson 1981 oulton 1981 poterba and summers 1981 summers 1981 and von furstenberg 1977 the q approach is seen as having the empirical advantage compared in particular with the more traditional approach based on the cost of capital of allowing expectations to be brought directly into the study of investment behaviour by relying on asset prices to digest all relevant expectations and reflect them in observable data an immediate difficulty however is that whilst the incentive to invest is related to the effect on shareholder wealth at the margin and hence to marginal q only the value of average q is directly observable the consequent difficulty of implementation is not however considered here see bailey and scarth 1980 and hayashi 1982 for discussion of conditions under which marginal q can be inferred from average q rather this paper is concerned with the prior question of how personal and corporate taxation affects the equilibrium value of marginal q for there has as yet been no systematic analysis of the effects of taxation on the equilibrium value of marginal q comparable with the analysis of the relationship between taxation and the cost of capital in king 1974 thus auerbach 1979a b bradford 1981 and edwards and keen 1984 have all considered how taxes affect q when the marginal source of funds is either retained profit or the sale of new equity and the distinction between these two cases has also been recognized in the empirical work of poterba and summers 1983 but the important case in which debt is the marginal source has been ignored the effects on marginal q of the constraints that typically need to be imposed in modelling financial policy have also been neglected this paper attempts to fill these gaps in the literature by providing a general analysis of the relationships between taxation financial policy investment and q the paper also examines the implications of the special tax provisions that may apply in the event in the firm s ceasing operations winding up this bears upon one of the unresolved issues associated with the new view of equity finance auerbach 1983 namely the suggestion that if dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains

keeping your options open in standard models of experimentation the costs of project development consist of i the direct cost of running trials as well as ii the implicit opportunity cost of leaving alternative projects idle another natural type of experimentation cost the cost of holding on to the option of developing a currently inactive project has not been studied in a multi armed bandit model of experimentation in which inactive projects have explicit maintenance costs and can be irreversibly discarded i fully characterise the optimal experimentation policy and show that the decision maker s incentive to actively manage its options has important implications for the order of project development in the model an experimenter searches for a success among a number of projects by choosing both those to develop now and those to maintain for potential future development in the absence of maintenance costs the optimal experimentation policy has a stay with the winner property the projects that are more likely to succeed are developed rst maintenance costs provide incentives to bring the option value of less promising projects forward and under the optimal experimentation policy projects that are less likely to succeed are sometimes developed

taxes regulations and the corporate debt market outstanding credit market debt in the u s corporate sector increased dramatically over the second half of the 20th century during this period tax rates on dividend distributions and corporate income decreased this article argues that the observed decline in dividend and corporate income tax rates generated an improvement in the collateral value of corporate assets and led to an increase in u s corporate debt to analyze this conjecture we build a general equilibrium model with enforcement constraints that induce endogenous limits on debt financing we find that the model can account for the time series features of u s corporate debt data

rivals search for buried treasure competition and duplication in r d we model an r d race in which each fi rm decides in each period between two research projects only one of which has positive success probability and it is not known which there is symmetric information and hence scope for strategic search if the prize is shared when discovery is simultaneous there is too much duplication of projects if neither is rewarded in this event then equilibrium is efficient unless projects have asymmetric costs in which case there is a bias toward the high cost project or asymmetric success probabilities in which case too little duplication is possible if one firm is informed it may choose the wrong project to put the other off the scent

the marginal welfare cost of capital taxation discounting matters we interpret the marginal welfare cost of capital income taxes as the present discounted value of consumption distortions such an asset market interpretation emphasizes the importance of the interest rate used to value future distortions especially in the presence of uncertainty we find that the interest rate decreases as the tax rate increases thus increasing the welfare cost the variations in the interest rate are caused by amplified responses of consumption to exogenous shocks as a result of capital taxation the welfare cost may be underestimated if variations in interest rates are ignored especially when tax rates are high

learning and information aggregation in an exit game we analyze information aggregation in a stopping game with uncertain common payos players learn from their own private experiences as well as by observing the actions of other players we give a full characterization of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium and show that information aggregates in randomly occurring exit waves observational learning induces the players to stay in the game longer the equilibria display aggregate randomness even for large numbers of players

factor demands effective discount rates and liquidity constraints in the retail trade firm eunkyung kwon this is a firm level empirical study of the impact of credit market frictions on firm factor demands it extends previous work in two ways it studies the impact of liquidity constraints on both fixed investment and employment and examines data on retail firms using the euler equation approach it finds strong evidence for the impact of financial constraints on factor demands estimated relationships in turn induce striking countercyclical movements in effective discount rates of firms with limited access to credit the article concludes that the results found in previous work regarding excess sensitivities of investment to liquidity are indeed due to liquidity constraints jel e32 e44 e22 i introduction financing and investment decisions are not in general independent of one another when a firm has limited access to credit markets a number of empirical studies have provided evidence in support of this hypothesis 1 using the euler equation approach and firm level data these studies provide evidence for the role of imperfect financial markets in firms economic decisions they have two common features one is that they study the impact of liquidity constraints on only a single input typically investment the other is that they focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector this article extends the earlier work in two important ways first it examines the impact of liquidity constraints on multiple input choices in particular physical investment and employment second it incorporates data from nonmanufacturing sectors specifically retail trade studying the impact of liquidity constraints on multiple inputs is important for several reasons first it provides an additional testable restriction on the data by holding the impact of financial constraints constant over factor demands it is possible to identify the effects of financial constraints more strictly the idea is that if borrowing constraints truly affect firm factor demands then the impact of such constraints on a firm s discount rate should be the same across different input choices since previous studies considered investment only we cannot exclude the possibility that other factors e g fixed costs of adjustment capital irreversibility in capital etc may be responsible for data not conforming to the model s prediction hence finding the neoclassical model with the perfect capital market to have been misspecified second the analysis in this article considers a general model that allows for the possibility that demands for capital and labor are dynamically interrelated and so jointly determined as opposed to the previous model where optimal investment was determined solely by future investment and prices this generalization is important because the misspecification of the standard euler equation might be due to an assumption of no interactions between input demands rather than to capital market imperfections adding employment to the euler equation for investment is insightful regarding tests for the presence of financial constraints for several other reasons first it is quite straightforward to derive and analyze the euler equation for labor relative to other inputs such as inventories second firm employment decisions are more likely to be closely connected to a firm s physical investment decisions third it is commonly thought that firm labor decisions are rarely affected by liquidity constraints thus examining liquidity jointly on investment and employment is of particular interest for examining the empirical relevance of financial constraints 2 retail trade is an important cyclical sector that has received relatively little attention in the literature it is of particular interest to this study because one can make the case on a priori grounds that firms with imperfect access to credit have a substantial influence within this sector for example as described in a following section in retail trade firms that either do not issue publicly traded equity or do not have a rating to issue publicly traded bonds account for nearly 80 of economic activities in the retail sector

dividend and capital gains taxation under incomplete markets motivated by the jobs and growth tax relief reconciliation act jgtrra of 2003 the effects of capital income tax cuts are investigated in an economy with heterogeneous households and a representative mature firm dividend tax cuts contrary to capital gains tax cuts lead to a decrease in investment and capital this is because they increase the market value of existing capital and households require a higher return to hold this additional wealth in line with empirical evidence the model predicts substantial increases in dividends and stock prices overall the tax cuts lead to a welfare reduction equivalent to a consumption drop of 0 5

strategic learning in teams this paper analyzes a two player game of strategic experimentation with three armed exponential bandits in continuous time players face replica bandits with one arm that is safe in that it generates a known payoff whereas the likelihood of the risky arms yielding a positive payoff is initially unknown it is common knowledge that the types of the two risky arms are perfectly negatively correlated i show that the efficient policy is incentive compatible if and only if the stakes are high enough moreover learning will be complete in any markov perfect equilibrium with continuous value functions if and only if the stakes exceed a certain threshold

monopolistic competition and the q theory of investment abstract in this paper we analyse the implications for q models of investment of replacing the assumption of perfect competition in the output market with the assumption of monopolistic competition the structural investment equation that can be derived in this case has a richer dynamic structure than the conventional one and it contains in addition to present and future q output as an explanatory variable in the applied section we discuss the extent to which monopolistic competition helps in providing a remedy for the empirical weaknesses of q models the estimates are obtained using aggregate data for u k industrial and commercial companies for the period 1951 1979