price wars caused by switching costs in many markets consumers have switching costs for example learning costs or transaction costs of changing between functionally equivalent brands of a product or of using any brand for the first time we analyse a four period complete information model of a market with switching costs in which new entry occurs after the second period the new entry results in equilibrium in a price war that is the new entrants prices are higher in the post entry period than in the entry period and the incumbent s price falls in either the pre entry period or the entry period and subsequently rises we can interpret the incumbent s lowering its price in the pre entry period as limit pricing behaviour we distinguish between two types of price war that can occur and show how the type or mixture of types that arises depends on the size of switching costs

indirect taxation and undesirable competition abstract this paper studies undesirable competition in an asymmetric oligopoly under ad valorem taxation we show that when the cost advantage of efficient firms is large both the entry of and the cost reduction in efficient firms raise social welfare but unexpectedly hurt consumers moreover we find that unit taxation yields higher consumer surplus in equilibrium and it could also be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation under certain conditions

interfirm rivalry in a repeated game an empirical test of tacit collusion rivalry in the vancouver retail gasoline market is modeled as a repeated game service station demand cost and intertemporal reaction functions are estimated from daily data on individual station prices costs and sales these functions are then used to calculate noncooperative and cooperative solutions to the constitutent game and the actual outcome of the repeated game the actual outcome is found to be substantially less lucrative than the monopoly solution nevertheless all stations are better off than if they played their noncooperative strategies in every period copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

price wars and price collusion in china s airline markets in the absence of an effective antitrust law both fare wars and price collusion have been pervasive in china s airline markets causing concern for both airlines and consumers a study of monthly airfare data from 2002 to 2004 confirms that fare wars occur periodically as well as price collusion both tend to be short lived the fact that collusion is more likely to occur in january and april when demand is high as revealed by china eastern s and china southern s price war and collusion models has been confirmed by interview information obtained from the airlines sales managers however there is also evidence in these models suggesting that collusion can be more easily formed when demand is low high airport concentration measured by the hhi may facilitate collusion in certain circumstances but it may also lead to more price wars under other conditions concentration in both airports and routes does not appear to systematically affect the occurrence of fare wars and collusion in all the models estimated we also reject the possibility that mutual forbearance due to multimarket contact plays any important anti competitive role in china s airline markets

trade ins and introductory offers in a monopoly we model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers trade ins or new buyers introductory offers of a quasi durable good we analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third degree price discrimination in our two period model the monopolist sets a first period price that segments the second period market optimally into holders and nonholders of the good in the second period different prices are quoted to the two market segments we present three versions of the model with varying assumptions on consumers rationality

do tax incentives for saving in pension accounts cause debt accumulation evidence from danish register data abstract this paper applies a quasi experimental research design on a danish 2010 policy that reduced tax incentives for saving in annuity pension schemes to show significant substitution of savings from retirement accounts to gross debt repayments we find that for every 1 danish currency unit reduction in retirement savings 31 cents goes to debt repayments taking into account all types of savings we find full crowding out consistent with previous findings we document that the effect is driven by a minority about 23 percent who actively rebalance their savings

bureaucratic capacity delegation and political reform thecentraltensionmotivatingcontemporarytheories of delegation from politicians to bureaucrats lies in the potential conflict between the value of bureaucratic expertise on one hand and the desire for political control on the other this tension is well known and has been debated at least since weber s classic work on bureaucracy modern bureaucracies are staffed with individuals who by virtue of rational bureaucratic organization are highly skilled policy experts who in principle should be able to help less knowledgeable politicians achieve their goals however the very skills and expertise that bureaucrats enjoy create the possibility that bureaucrats will usurp the rightful role of politicians in policymaking processes because the way this tension is resolved determines the ultimate compatibility of democracy and bureaucracy existing theories of delegation typically focus on understanding how and to what extent politicians can resolve it 1 in many contexts particularly developing democracies bureaucracy does not fit the weberian characteristics that are assumed in the existing delegation literature the bureaucracies may be staffed with individuals who lack the personal capacity to execute orders effectively the organizational structure may lead to breakdowns within bureaucratic hierarchies making it difficult for senior administrators to control their subordinates departments and ministries may lack basic budgets and resources to undertake implementation actions they may suffer from incentives for

the illusory effects of saving incentives on saving the authors evaluate research on how tax based saving incentives iras and 401 k s affect saving previous research overstates the impact of the incentives on saving by failing to account for several issues households with saving incentives have stronger tastes for saving than others saving incentives have interacted with debt nonfinancial assets financial markets and pensions and saving incentives represent pretax balances whereas taxable accounts represent posttax balances accounting for these issues essentially eliminates the impact of saving incentives on saving the authors conclude that little if any of the contributions to existing saving incentives have raised saving

pension plan characteristics and framing effects in employee savings behavior abstract defined contribution pensions in many postsecondary institutions are funded by a combination of an employer premium and a mandatory employee premium individuals can also contribute to a supplemental savings account holding constant total compensation standard reasoning suggests that supplemental savings should depend negatively on the sum of the employer and employee pension contributions contrarily we find that the supplementary savings of professors are significantly more sensitive to employee contributions than to employer contributions this asymmetry is consistent with different marginal propensities to save out of the salary and pension components of compensation nevertheless impacts on lifetime utility are relatively modest

disentangling retirement and savings responses in january 2006 the dutch government implemented a pension reform that substantially reduced the public pension wealth of workers born in 1950 or later at the same time a tax facilitated savings plan was introduced that implied a large savings subsidy for all workers irrespective of birth year this paper uses linked administrative and survey data to assess the effect of the reform on the savings and retirement expectations and realizations of two virtually identical male cohorts that differ only in treatment status the treated having been born in 1950 and the controls having been born in 1949 we show that retirement expectations are in line with realizations and that the reform increased the labor supply for the larger part of the workers namely those without sufficient means to substantially increase private savings to counter the effect of the reform these workers have zero substitution rates between private and public wealth on the other hand there is a group of mostly high wage workers who participate in the tax facilitated savings plan and increase their private savings to fully counter the impact of the drop in public wealth an unintended side effect of the introduction of the tax facilitated savings plan is that high wage earners who are not affected by the drop in pension wealth retire even sooner than initially planned

taxpayers responses to tax based incentives for retirement savings evidence from the saver s credit notch abstract this paper uses the saver s credit to analyze taxpayers understanding of and responses to tax incentives the saver s credit is a tax credit designed to encourage retirement savings among low and middle income households however the credit s structure creates notches or discontinuous jumps within a household s budget constraint these notches provide an incentive to manipulate adjusted gross income to fall just below the level where the credit decreases i use public use tax files from the internal revenue service to test whether taxpayers bunch their income at the notch created by the saver s credit i find strong evidence that bunching occurred in response to the credit which implies that taxpayers claiming the credit understood the incentives for bunching and indeed manipulated their incomes accordingly i then exploit the discontinuity in credit rates to analyze the credit s impact on retirement contribution behavior using a regression discontinuity approach and find that the credit failed to generate a statistically significant effect on the level of retirement contributions these results imply that the saver s credit is more effective at providing transfers to low and middle income taxpayers than at increasing retirement contributions

how retirement saving programs increase saving this paper summarizes the authors work on the effect of ira and 401 k contributions on net personal saving they consider many different nonparametric approaches to controlling for heterogeneity in individual saving behavior and conclude that the weight of the available evidence suggests that contributions to both iras and 401 k s largely represent new saving the authors devote particular attention to reconciling their results with the findings in other studies that reach different conclusions sometimes using the same databases that the authors analyze methodological limitations that undermine the reliability of results in other studies explain many of these disparities

public participation and poverty alleviation the experience of reform communists in india s west bengal abstract public participation is essential to making poverty alleviation programs responsive to the needs of the poor but it requires a political process that adequately represents their interests yet as long as the poor remain poor they are disadvantaged in securing equitable representation this article highlights the problems stemming from this paradox of participation it shows how implementing poverty alleviation programs through elected governing councils has simultaneously made policy more responsive to the poor while permitting the organizational interests of the ruling communist party to distort implementation the article highlights the importance of political competition among parties and nongovernment organizations for maximizing responsiveness to the poor

testing for liquidity constraints in euler equations with complementary data sources previous tests for liquidity constraints using consumption euler equations have frequently split the sample on the basis of wealth arguing that low wealth consumers are more likely to be constrained we propose alternative tests using different and more direct information on borrowing constraints obtained from the 1983 survey of consumer finances in a first stage we estimate probabilities of being constrained which are then utilized in a second sample the panel study of income dynamics to estimate switching regression models of the euler equation our estimates indicate stronger excess sensitivity associated with the possibility of liquidity constraints than the sample splitting approach

buffer stock saving in retirement accounts abstract we use a dynamic programming model to explore the possibility and extent of precautionary saving in tax sheltered accounts such as the 401 k the main policy experiment examines the behavior of saving for different levels of unemployment insurance ui which is a perfect substitute for precautionary saving against job loss our results indicate that increasing the generosity of ui crowds out 401 k contributions made by younger workers who save primarily for precautionary reasons at the aggregate level we find that 401 k s increase national saving and that the magnitude of the effect depends on the generosity of ui

profit raising entry common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms on the contrary we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like stackelberg followers then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones and the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry

the budgetary and welfare effects of tax deferred retirement saving accounts abstract the present paper analyzes the budgetary macroeconomic and welfare effects of tax deferred retirement saving accounts similar to u s 401 k plans in a dynamic general equilibrium overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous households because of the initial deferral of tax payments the short run budgetary cost of tax deferred accounts is significantly higher than the long run cost therefore the budget neutral introduction of tax deferred accounts would make current and near future households worse off although it would increase national wealth and total output in the long run if the government spread the short run cost to future households by increasing debt the policy change could make all age cohorts on average as well off as the economy without tax deferred accounts due to increased government debt and debt service costs however national wealth and total output would decrease in the long run thus introducing tax deferred accounts would not increase national wealth and improve social welfare at the same time this is partly because the policy change is regressive and reduces the risk sharing effect of the current income tax system

how do contribution limits affect contributions to tax preferred savings accounts abstract contributions to tax preferred savings accounts are typically constrained by a contribution limit these limits influence contributions not only for taxpayers currently constrained by the limit but also for those contributing less than the limit i develop a simple life cycle model in which taxpayers exhibit use it or lose it contribution behavior this connects current contributions to future contribution limits and implies that an increase in contribution limits can decrease contributions empirical evidence from microdata provides support for the model using variation from canadian limit reforms i find that larger future contribution room is associated with smaller contributions

price wars triggered by entry abstract to attract customers who incur set up or switching costs new firms offer below market prices when entering a market the incumbent responds with discounts resulting in a price war once new entrants have locked in their customers the price warfare stops and all firms raise their prices during the price war the incumbent s price is not as low as the entrants after the price war the market price is lower and output is greater than the pre entry price and output entrants attract new buyers to the market and depending on the size distribution of set up costs we show that some of the incumbent s customers switch to entrants the model is shown to square with the price and output sequences observed in a price war that was the subject of a recent and prominent antitrust case in the cigarette market

do 401 k contributions crowd out other personal saving during the late 1980s contributions to 401 k plans eclipsed contributions to individual retirement accounts iras as the leading form of tax deferred individual retirement saving in the united states in this paper we describe patterns of participation in 401 k plans contrast these patterns with ira participation and evaluate the net impact of 401 k contributions on personal saving we find that 401 k participation conditional on eligibility exceeds 60 at all income levels in contrast ira participation at the height of that program rose sharply with income we use two methods to evaluate the net saving effect of 401 k contributions on personal saving we compare the financial assets of families who are eligible for 401 k saving with the assets of those who are not eligible and we consider the change over time in the assets of like groups of savers we find little evidence that 401 k contributions substitute for other forms of personal saving including ira contributions

a game theoretic model of reform in latin american democracies in this article the a develops a simple game theoretic model of administrative reform in latin american democracies the model which is based on the incentives facing the politicians who must initiate reforms if any are to occurt yields two predictions 1 reforms are more likely to pass the legislative hurdle when patronage is evenly distributed among the strongest parties and 2 initial reforms are more likely to be followed by further extensions of reform where the electoral weight of the top parties remains relatively even and stable attention to the incentives facing legislators and party leaders also results in the expectation that certain political institutions such as open list proportional representation and electoral rules that minimize party control over candidate lists reduce the probability of reform the a tests predictions and expectations on a set of latin american democracies and finds them consistent with historical events

pension design with a large informal labor market evidence from chile this article investigates the fiscal and welfare trade offs involved in designing a pension system when workers can avoid contributing by working informally using a life cycle model of labor supply and saving decisions i structurally estimate preferences and earnings opportunities in the formal and informal sectors using data on chilean households i find limited support for formal jobs rationing instead mandatory pension contributions significantly encourage informality policy experiments show that chile could lower minimum pension spending by 23 while guaranteeing the same income to retirees if the minimum pension s implicit tax rate was increased to 60

tax deferred saving accounts heterogeneity and policy reforms abstract tax deferred saving accounts tda are systematically used in many countries in the united states households access to tda exhibits substantial heterogeneity 401 k has a higher contribution limit than ira but only 50 of workers are eligibility for it i developed an overlapping generations model that captures the tax benefits of tda and the heterogeneity in 401 k eligibility to investigate the quantitative impacts of tda on the aggregate economy and their implications on policy reforms experiment results show that ira already provides sufficient tax benefits for most households the effects of providing universal 401 k are relatively insignificant because households who can benefit from 401 k already have access to it on the other hand raising the tda contribution limit allows high income households to increase their use of tda and results in stronger effects on the economy when households use of tda is considered the u s income tax system is less distortionary and the welfare gain from a consumption tax reform is reduced by more than half

tax reform and retirement saving incentives take up of stakeholder pensions in the uk in april 2001 the uk government introduced stakeholder pensions a new private pension arrangement the reform also changed the structure of tax relieved pension contribution ceilings increasing their generosity for lower earners we examine the impact of these changes on private pension coverage using individual level data we use a difference in differences strategy with an estimator that is modified to allow for dichotomous outcomes contrary to the conventional wisdom that the stakeholder pension reforms had little or no impact on saving behaviour our results indicate that the change to the contribution ceilings affected private pension coverage rates among lower earners especially among women

the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition abstract this paper compares ad valorem and specific taxation in two models of oligopoly with and without free entry predominantly ad valorem taxation implies a relatively low consumer price high tax revenue and when entry is precluded low profits ad valorem taxation dominates specific taxation from the welfare perspective the set of circumstances under which with free entry specific taxation raises welfare is a strict subset of that in which ad valorem taxation is welfare improving and in both models the maximisation of consumer welfare subject to a binding revenue constraint requires maximum reliance on ad valorem taxation

psychology and savings policies many observers of the current economic scene are concerned about the low rate of personal saving in the united states one well known researcher laurence kotlikoff 1992 calls the situation a crisis he proposes that each american worker receive an annual statement from the social security administration with projected benefits upon retirement arguing that if each of us got this statement our attention would be caught and perhaps our psychology of saving which is in such urgent need of redress would really change p 107 i agree with the thrust of kotlikoff s recommendations and join him in applauding steps that will alter the general public s psychology of saving however as economists we need to recognize that the economic theory of saving is similarly in urgent need of redress if we are to understand why people are saving so little and are to make helpful recommendations as to how to get people to save more we have to incorporate more of the psychology of saving into our economic theories kotlikoff s policy proposal while a sensible one highlights the growing gap between theory and policy prescription in this domain if households are acting in accordance with the life cycle theory of saving then undersaving is impossible so why do they need to have their psychology redressed and how does this psychology fit into the model this example reflects an increasing frustration in the economics community about personal saving many observers have come to the conclusion that the low saving rate represents an important problem on two fronts macroeconomists worry that the low saving rate will produce too little investment and microeconomists worry that individuals particularly the baby boomers are not putting enough away to finance a satisfactory lifestyle in retirement these are serious concerns however the frustration comes from the realization that even if there was agreement that the saving rate needs to go up economic theory offers little help in constructing a solution in the standard life cycle framework the only policy variable is the after tax rate of return to saving yet it is well known that the theory does not specify the sign of the relationship between the saving rate and the interest rate raising the interest rate increases the returns to saving but decreases the amount of saving necessary to yield any given future consumption level furthermore empirical estimates offer little help most studies are unable to reject the hypothesis that the elasticity of personal saving with respect to the interest rate is zero clearly this is frustrating the theory only gives us one lever to use and we don t know whether to push or pull with this background i wish to supply what should be considered good news the theory is misspecified life cycle models of saving fail to describe actual household saving in three important ways this failure of the theory is good news because by incorporating some basic psychology we can enrich the theory and generate specific policy recommendations in this paper i will begin by characterizing the problems with the theory and then go on to discussing the implications of modifying the theory

fiscal policies capital formation and capitalism abstract this lecture examines the effect of tax policy and social security retirement benefits on capital accumulation and economic welfare the paper begins by examining how capital income taxes reduce the real return to savers and then discusses the welfare loss of capital income taxation relative to the alternatives of taxing consumption and labor income the analysis shows that capital income taxes impose a very substantial deadweight loss even if they do not alter private saving the first section of the paper also discusses the theory and empirical literature on the effect of capital income taxes on national saving the second part of the lecture deals with social security retirement benefits in 1994 the aged members of the u s population will receive cash and medical benefits that cost the government 530 billion or 16 000 per person over age 65 the likely impact of these benefits on private saving and the empirical evidence on this subject are then reviewed the second part of the paper concludes by discussing the welfare loss of unfunded social security benefits and the possibilities for alternative arrangements a final section discusses the implications of international capital flows for this analysis as capital flows become more important particularly in europe the response of government policy may be to compete for foreign capital inflows and to tax domestic savers more heavily this would lead to a smaller total volume of capital the sharp decline in the net national saving rate from more than 8 percent of gdp in the united states in the 1970s to only 4 5 percent in the 1980s and from more than 14 percent of gdp in europe in the 1970s to 9 9 percent in the 1980s may not only create lower real incomes and slower growth but may weaken capitalism itself in the united states a decade of slow growth has increased protectionist tendencies in international trade and led to a new interest in industrial policies that expand the role of government in guiding the direction of technology and of private investment in these ways the government policies that discourage saving might make the schumpeterian vision of a shift from private capitalism to a government dominated economy more likely

the impact of pension schemes on saving in israel israeli micro and macro data indicate that consumption smoothing is limited and thus pension savings increase private and national savings since private savings rates are to a great extent unequal across different income groups saving is almost exclusively concentrated in the upper two quintiles

savings the policy debate in europe thre issues dominate the public policy debate over savings in continental europe first can private savings substitute for public pensions in the provision of retirement income given that the current generosity of pay as you go financed pensions is hardly sustainable in the light of population ageing and if so which policy steps have to be taken to alleviate this transition second does the evolution of a new financial landscape in europe necessitate policy response in terms of taxation and regulation specifically considering the increase in pension funds and third closely related to the other two issues is there too much or too little saving in an ageing europe do we need to subsidise saving more or less than we currently do the paper reviews economic theory and empirical evidence on these intertwinded issues most importantly it identifies many gaps in our theoretical and empirical knowledge that caution us against overly strong policy recommendations

south korean and taiwanese development and the new institutional economics the publication of books by both alice amsden and robert wade provide an opportune moment to reflect on the study of east asian development after an initial surge of interest beginning in the 1970s the field has reached a plateau and scholars recently have cast a wide net in searching for ways to extend the field in assessing the state of the art regarding the economic development of the east asian newly industrialized countries nics this review will treat three themes first i will argue that the focus on states versus markets is becoming stale and that much of the scholarly interest lies in the politics behind the economics second i argue that political scientists have underexplored the historical origins of korean and taiwanese capitalism and that such attention promises to strengthen both theories and explanations of development third i argue that the international system has been more important in promoting development in east asia than accounts in the first wave have recognized the purpose of this review is to assess the field reveal

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

price competition with reduced consumer switching costs the case of wireless number portability in the cellular phone industry wireless number portability wnp is a telecommunication regulatory policy that requires cellular phone service providers to allow customers who switch service subscriptions to retain their original phone numbers the right to retain the number lowers the switching cost for a consumer thus the purpose of the policy is to induce more competition and facilitate the growth of new or small service providers in this paper we show that wnp drives market price downward as expected but with a surprising twistrather than helping the smaller firms grow the policy may accelerate the process of market concentration we find that the main contributing factor to this peculiarity is the discriminatory pricing scheme prevalent in the industrythat is a service provider charges a lower per minute fee for the calls initiated and received within the same network than for the calls connected across two networks under this pricing scheme a consumer who subscribes to a larger network would benefit more than if subscribing to a smaller network despite the relatively higher fixed access fee that the former may charge by lowering the barrier of switching wnp creates a market condition conducive for a larger network to gain market share we support our analysis with the empirical evidence gathered from hong kong where wnp was adopted in march 1999

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

the market selects the wrong firms in the long run we consider the effects of free entry on the market structure and social welfare of an asymmetric cournot oligopoly even if we allow for the existence of different types of firms initially only one type in almost all cases can survive in the long run free entry leads an economy to a symmetric equilibrium in which the excess entry theorem holds further we consider the socially optimal policy for this economy in cases of either i a concave demand which implies strategic substitutability or ii strategic complementarity which implies a convex demand the type of firms that should remain in the market to achieve social optimality does not necessarily coincide with the type of firms that will survive in the long run the market may select not only the wrong number of firms but also the wrong type of firms in the long run

risk return preferences in the pension domain are people able to choose this paper presents new evidence for the netherlands on pension preferences and investor autonomy in the pension domain using a representative survey of about 1000 dutch citizens our main conclusions are the following risk aversion is domain dependent and highest in the pension domain the vast majority of respondents favours the currently dominant defined benefit pension system if offered a combined defined benefit defined contribution system the majority would like to have a guaranteed pension income of at least 70 of their net labour income self assessed risk tolerance and financial expertise are important individual explanatory variables of pension attitudes the average respondent considers himself financially unsophisticated and is reluctant to take control of retirement savings investment even when offered the possibility to increase expertise respondents who have chosen a relatively safe portfolio tend to switch to the riskier median portfolio when they are shown future income streams this again suggests that many respondents currently lack the skills to have investor autonomy over investment for retirement

a characterization for the negative welfare effects of cost reduction in cournot oligopoly abstract this paper characterizes the welfare effects of cost reductions in a cournot model with linear costs under linear demand a small reduction in a firm s marginal cost reduces welfare if and only if its market share is less than 1 2n 2 or equivalently its marginal cost exceeds a critical level determined by the market a large cost reduction by the firm increases welfare if and only if its magnitude is at least twice the difference between the current marginal cost and its critical value the paper also extends the results to non linear demand but the characterizations become less tractable

welfare effects of entry into markets with switching costs in many markets consumers have costs of switching between products that are functionally identical this note shows that entry of efficient low cost competitors into these markets may be socially detrimental in a linear model entry reduces social welfare as conventionally defined in more than half of the relevant parameter space in a more general model there is always a range of values of switching costs for which entry reduces welfare even if the entrant s production costs are lower than the incumbent s copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

the timing of sales this paper presents a model of intertemporal price discrimination a fixed number of sellers produce a homogeneous good consumers with different preferences enter the market in each period and leave when they make a purchase the sellers typically vary their prices over time charging a high price in most periods but occasionally cutting the price to sell to a large group of customers with a low reservation price in some equilibria all stores lower their price at the same time and to the same level

the role of buying consortia among smes in the electricity market in italy we model the electricity market in italy focusing on the impact of buying consortia among smes on the behaviour of the large electricity producers and sellers we show that consortia may in certain circumstances produce a pro competitive result i e they may induce a reduction of prices not only for consortia members but also for firms not in the consortia

a signal jamming theory of predation we propose a new theory ofpredation based on signal jamming in our model the predator s characteristics are common knowledge while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability the entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market and the predator preys to jam or interfere with this inference problem thus our model differs from those based on reputation effects in which the predator preys to signal information about himself

the effects of pensions on household wealth a reevaluation of theory and evidence this paper examines the extent to which households offset pension wealth with reductions in other wealth systematic econometric biases imply that the estimated offsets in previous empirical studies are smaller than the true offset and may even have the wrong sign new empirical estimates that do not correct for the biases generate little offset between pensions and other wealth estimates that correct for the biases show substantially more offset a smaller impact of pensions on overall saving than in most previous studies the estimates also indicate that the effects of pensions on wealth vary significantly across households

iras and household saving this paper examines the effects of individual retirement accounts iras on private and national saving the authors construct a formal model of dynamic utility maximization that generates closed form equations for ira and other saving their empirical estimates indicate that raising the annual ira contribution limit between 1983 and 1986 would have resulted in little if any increase in national saving results from sensitivity analysis imply substantially smaller effects on national saving than most previous researchers have estimated the authors results are consistent with new evidence they present indicating considerable potential among ira holders to shift taxable forms of saving into iras copyright 1994 by american economic association

a quick and easy method for estimating switching costs abstract i develop and test a method for a quick and easy calculation of consumer switching costs among brands in a given industry the theory developed and tested here maps observed brands prices and market shares onto the switching costs which deter a consumer of a specific brand from switching to any other competing brand then i demonstrate how users switching costs can be directly calculated in two different industries a the israeli cellular phone market and b the finnish market for bank deposits this calculation method can be used to calculate switching costs in a wide variety of other industries such as airlines health services computers software telecommunications and more

emergence and persistence of inefficient states we present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics the society consists of rich and poor the rich are initially in power but expect to transition to democracy which will choose redistributive policies taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats by choosing an inefficient state structure the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy moreover the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time intuitively an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one when the poor come to power in democracy they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats anticipating this when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state bureaucrats support the rich who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats we obtain that the rich bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support the model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values and when individuals are sufficiently forward looking jel p16 h11 h26 h41

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

helping minor firms reduces welfare the effect on national welfare of uneven technical progress and eli mination of a firm is analyzed under the existence of a cournot oligopolistic sector an increase in the share of an inefficient firm owing to its innovations results in a shift of production from more efficient firms to the inefficient firm causing a less efficie nt allocation of production it may decrease welfare even though the innovation itself is beneficial conversely policies keeping ineffic ient firms from innovations or eliminating them may increase welfare though they make the market structure more oligopolistic copyright 1988 by royal economic society

switching costs in the wholesale distribution of cigarettes recent theories of price wars triggered by entry assign a critical role to switching costs in explaining price and output changes earlier elzinga and mills 1998 showed that actual switching patterns following an episode of new entry in an industry are driven by the fact that buyers have different switching costs the current paper draws on transaction specific price and shipments data surrounding the 1984 1985 price war in generic cigarettes to explore the size and determinants of switching costs among wholesale cigarette distributors results show that switching costs vary across firms and are nontrivial in magnitude several implications of the findings are discussed

the effect of individual retirement accounts on household consumption and national saving a major debate exists on whether expanding tax favoured savings accounts such as individual retirement accounts iras will increase national savings much of the empirical debate has centred on whether ira contributions before the tax reform act of 1986 represented new savings or merely reshuffled assets we find no evidence that households financed their ira contributions from reductions in consumption at least initially we find evidence that households financed their ira contributions from existing savings or from saving that would have been done anyway our results indicate that at most 9 of ira contributions represented net additions to national saving

assessing the effectiveness of saving incentives concluding that iras and 401 k s do increase saving this text provides a fresh cost benefit approach for analyzing the success of savings incentives it compares the new savings to the government tax revenue lost through contributions to iras and 401 k s

active vs passive decisions and crowd out in retirement savings accounts evidence from denmark using 41 million observations on savings for the population of denmark we show that the effects of retirement savings policies on wealth accumulation depend on whether they change savings rates by active or passive choice subsidies for retirement accounts which rely on individuals to take an action to raise savings primarily induce individuals to shift assets from taxable accounts to retirement accounts we estimate that each 1 of government expenditure on subsidies increases total saving by only 1 cent in contrast policies that raise retirement contributions if individuals take no action such as automatic employer contributions to retirement accounts increase wealth accumulation substantially we estimate that approximately 15 of individuals are active savers who respond to tax subsidies primarily by shifting assets across accounts 85 of individuals are passive savers who are unresponsive to subsidies but are instead heavily influenced by automatic contributions made on their behalf active savers tend to be wealthier and more financially sophisticated we conclude that automatic contributions are more effective at increasing savings rates than subsidies for three reasons i subsidies induce relatively few individuals to respond ii they generate substantial crowd out conditional on response and iii they do not increase the savings of passive individuals who are least prepared for retirement jel codes h2 h3

the effects of pension funds on markets performance a review the worldwide reforming process of pension systems triggered by the demographic transition and globalization has led several countries to implement multi pillar pension systems and enhance pension funds for this reason the studies on the effects that pension funds exert on markets performance have been flourishing in the last decades in this paper we provide an updated review of the empirical advances in this field of study with particular focus on the effects that pension funds produce on labour markets financial markets and economic growth