a micro analytic threshold model for the timing of first purchases of durable goods a micro analytic threshold model to describe the timing of household purchases of consumer durable goods is developed and tested the model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity via a generalized gamma distribution and accounts for time varying covariates further we employ estimation methods applicable or purchase data observed at periodic intervals of time the model outperforms other competing models for predicting the timing of purchase of durable goods in terms of fit and predictive ability in particular this model outperforms the logit model and the diffusion model the generalized gamma timing model predicts well the time to purchase the durable good we show how it can be employed for micro segmentation of households several research directions and applications are described

empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking abstract we examine whether executive stock options esos provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects for a sample of oil and gas producers we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity our proxy for exploration risk increases with the sensitivity of the value of the ceo s options to stock return volatility eso risk incentives both eso risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach we find evidence that eso risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk taking additional tests indicate that eso risk incentives exhibits a negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where eso risk incentives and hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined overall our results are consistent with esos providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk related incentive problems

exercise behavior valuation and the incentive effects of employee stock options abstract we use a large database on eso exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of eso values and incentives and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of eso holders

dynamic analysis of consumer response to marketing strategies this paper develops a methodology for modeling consumer response that integrates previous research in stochastic brand selection diffusion of innovation test market analysis and new product design the methodology makes it practical to extend brand selection models to include diffusion phenomena such as awareness trial and information flow purchase timing and brand selection are interdependent and both phenomena depend jointly on managerial controls such as advertising coupons price off promotion product positioning and consumer characteristics within this general structure we provide practical estimation procedures a least squares approximation to the maximum likelihood estimates to determine the parameters which link managerial controls to consumer response closed form solutions are derived for cumulative awareness cumulative trial penetration expected sales and purchases due to promotion all as a function of time we also provide simplified expressions for equilibrium t market share tradeoffs among complexity of the diffusion process number of managerial variables nonstationarity complexity of purchase timing consumer segmentation and sample size are made explicit so that the marketing scientist can customize his analyses to the managerial problems that he faces the effects of sample size data interval frequency and collinearity in the explanatory variables are investigated with simulations based on a five state consumer response process which depends on 8 10 marketing variables the paper closes with a brief description of the application and predictive test of a consumer response model based on the methodology

too much pay performance sensitivity abstract we examine the relation between pay performance sensitivity pps the convexity of managerial compensation vega and future stock risk and returns for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004 higher pps and vega are both associated with lower future stock returns part of this negative relation can be explained by risk averse managers decreasing equity risk in response to increases in pps and vega however even after correcting for lower future risk future stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of option sensitivity this finding is consistent with previous studies that link high option compensation to manager owner agency problems

the sensitivity of ceo wealth to equity risk an analysis of the magnitude and determinants abstract to control risk related incentive problems equity holders are expected to manage both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance and managers wealth i find stock options but not common stockholdings significantly increase the sensitivity of ceos wealth to equity risk cross sectionally this sensitivity is positively related to firms investment opportunities this result is consistent with managers receiving incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from underinvestment in valuable risk increasing projects is greatest firms stock return volatility is positively related to the convexity provided to managers suggesting convex incentive schemes influence investing and financing decisions

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

executive compensation and principal agent theory the empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants in contrast this paper analy

the exercise and valuation of executive stock options abstract in theory hedging restrictions faced by managers make executive stock options more difficult to value than ordinary options because they imply that exercise policies of managers depend on their preferences and endowments using data on option exercises from 40 firms this paper shows that a simple extension of the ordinary american option model which introduces random exogenous exercise and forfeiture predicts actual exercise times and payoffs just as well as an elaborate utility maximizing model that explicitly accounts for the nontransferability of options the simpler model could therefore be more useful than the preference based model for valuing executive options in practice

the job search behavior of employed youth an employed worker s search strategies include 1 employed not searching 2 employed searching and 3 unemployed searching the last requires that the worker quit to search under plausible assumptions on search costs the optimal algorithm involves a dual reservation wage strategy burdett 1978 the probability of on the job search increases as the current wage decreases relative to the distribution of alternative wages if the wage is sufficiently low the searcher quits to search substituting time for financial outlays estimates based on the national longitudinal survey of youth indicate that these calculations characterize the search strategies of young workers copyright 1991 by mit press

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

do contracts make them care the impact of ceo compensation design on corporate social performance using the behavioral agency model we analyze how two compensation design characteristics pay performance sensitivity and duration of ceo compensation taking into account multiple vesting periods affect corporate social performance we find that the performance sensitivity of ceo pay is negatively associated with poor social performance but also negatively affects strong social performance these results suggest that pay performance sensitivity increases the relevance of potential negative consequences of poor social performance however the insurance benefits of strong social performance may also become less relevant with respect to the duration of ceo compensation we find that it reduces poor social performance this finding confirms arguments that a long term compensation time horizon increases the perceived threat that the negative effects of poor social performance will become visible with our findings we integrate behavioral agency theory with the traditional stakeholder views

employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis this paper describes the exercise behavior of over 50 000 employees who hold longterm options on employer stock at eight corporations employees typically exercise options years before expiration commonly sacrificing half of the black scholes value exercise is strongly associated with recent stock price movements the market to strike ratio proximity to vesting dates time to maturity volatility and the employee s level within the company these findings have implications for compensation planners the fasb as it develops a new accounting standard for options and financial statement users and preparers who apply and interpret the new fasb standard

estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility the costs associated with compiling data on employee stock option portfolios is a substantial obstacle in investigating the impact of stock options on managerial incentives accounting choice financing decisions and the valuation of equity we present an accurate method of estimating option portfolio value and the sensitivities of option portfolio value to stock price and stock return volatility that is easily implemented using data from only the current year s proxy statement or annual report this method can be applied to either executive stock option portfolios or to firm wide option plans in broad samples of actual and simulated ceo option portfolios we show that these proxies capture more than 99 of the variation in option portfolio value and sensitivities sensitivity analysis indicates that the degree of bias in these proxies varies with option portfolio characteristics and is most severe in samples of ceos with a large proportion of out of the money options however the proxies explanatory power remains above 95 in all subsamples

an empirical two stage choice model with varying decision rules applied to internet clickstream data abstract in this article the author proposes and applies an empirical two stage choice model to internet clickstream data that captures observed choices for two choice stages products viewed and products purchased the model allows for interdependences between choices within a stage as well as the use of varying decision rules in each stage the author accommodates heterogeneity in preferences and in decision rules the proposed model uses observed choices to infer both attribute preference ratings and criterion attributes the results show empirically in a field setting that the product attributes evaluated in stage 1 differ from those evaluated in stage 2 consistent with existing theory consumers tend to use simpler decision rules based on a subset of attribute information in earlier stages the author also finds some preliminary evidence that attributes such as price and size tend to be considered in only one of the two stages whereas ingredient attributes tend to be considered in both stages f

lower salaries and no options on the optimal structure of executive pay we estimate a standard principal agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices for a sample of 598 us ceos the model is widely used in the compensation literature but it predicts that almost all of the ceos in our sample should hold no stock options instead ceos should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies for a typical value of relative risk aversion almost half of the ceos in our sample would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies from their private savings the model predicts contracts that would reduce average compensation costs by 20 while providing the same incentives and the same utility to ceos we investigate a number of extensions and modi cations of the standard model but nd none of them to be satisfactory we conclude that the standard principal agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts one reason may be that executive pay contracts are suboptimal

compensation incentives and the duality of risk aversion and riskiness the common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false in fact no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse this paper finds simple intuitive necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse the paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse and gambles that increase or decrease risk with the growing interest in executive compensation and agency problems

analysing incomplete individual employment histories using indirect inference in this paper we apply the indirect inference method to estimate the parameters of a semi markov transition model when the data are subject to a complex form of censoring there is no explicit expression for the likelihood function and therefore maximum likelihood estimation is computationally burdensome the econometric methodology of indirect inference is first tested on simulated data under various assumptions about the distribution of spell durations and transitions then it is applied to labour market transitions between self employment wage work and unemployment using the 1986 1988 french labour force survey although the analysis is basically a reduced form analysis we motivate our transition model in terms of a structural search model

optimal strike prices of stock options for effort averse executives abstract this paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at the money hall and murphy hall brian murphy kevin j 2000 optimal exercise prices for executive stock options american economic review 90 2 209 214 claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance however they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort averse into their model we revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages options and stock grants we simulate the manager s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders equity under alternative compensation schemes and identify schemes that are optimal our simulations indicate that when abstracting from tax considerations it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable i e substantially in the money on their expiration date prior to 2006 the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006

introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts abstract we study when it is appropriate to add a convex component such as stock options to an optimal managerial compensation contract we show that convexity is introduced when managers have moderate levels of relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion in addition we study how convexity is affected as the distribution of outcomes becomes more skewed toward low outcomes here we show that while convexity increases when skewness is increased without regard to the effect on mean stock price the opposite effect results when increases in skewness leave the mean stock price unchanged

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal