simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems abstract this paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing subselections of the core correspondence of matching markets we provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many to one real life matching markets we show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism we also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

south korea s economic future industrial policy or economic democracy abstract many south koreans believe that the country s remarkable economic successes over the past half century are the product of an industrial policy that made korean industry competitive in world markets while there is widespread sentiment in favor of maintaining the emphasis on industrial policy others believe industrial policy has generated benefits for some koreans at the expense of the welfare of working class koreans this has resulted in a push toward economic democracy to more equitably distribute the gains from increased productivity neither industrial policy nor economic democracy are in the best interest of koreans rather a laissez faire policy of minimal government interference will provide the best environment to foster south korea s continued economic progress

the economic consequences of hugo chavez a synthetic control analysis abstract we use the synthetic control method to perform a case study of the impact of hugo chavez on the venezuelan economy we compare outcomes under chavez s leadership and polices against a counterfactual of business as usual in similar countries we find that relative to our control per capita income fell dramatically while poverty health and inequality outcomes all improved during the chavez administration these outcomes also improved in each of the corresponding control cases and thus we cannot attribute the improvements to chavismo we conclude that the overall economic consequences of the chavez administration were bleak

the big push natural resource booms and growth a simple application of big push reasoning suggests that natural resource booms can be important catalysts for development in poorer countries in this paper we present evidence from seven latin american countries that natural resource booms are sometimes accompa nied by declining per capita gdp we present a model with natural resources increasing returns in the spirit of big push models and expectations to clarify some of the reasons this may happen q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

rationing by waiting and the value of time results from a natural experiment the authors analyze data from a natural experiment with rationing by waiting in the situation motorists were confronted with a choice between waiting in line for low priced gasoline or purchasing at a higher price without waiting they view this as a revealed preference experiment and use their choices to estimate the value of time spent waiting as a function of individual characteristics in most cases the estimates of the value of time are quite similar to individuals after tax wages 13 references 7 tables

the welfare effects of balance of payments reform a macro micro simulation of the cost of rent seeking this article proposes a methodology for analysing the effect of balance of payments liberalisation on measures of poverty and distribution and applies it to the case of jamaica in the 1990s the methodology consists of a macro micro simulation in which a cge model provides labour market outcomes which in turn are used to manipulate the sectoral allocation of employment to generate the income distribution consistent with the new labour market outcome in the application to jamaica we find that the reallocation of resources away from rent seeking activities in the presence of exchange controls is significant and has large macroeconomic effects opening up of the current account has little effect on poverty but liberalisation of the capital account reduces poverty especially amongst the very poor neither policy change taken separately nor the combination of the two has more than a negligible effect on the distribution of income

a finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search abstract i study a model in which a finite number of men and women look for future spouses via random pairwise meetings the central question is whether equilibrium marriage outcomes are stable matchings when search frictions are small the answer is they can but need not be for any stable matching there is an equilibrium leading to it almost surely however there may also be equilibria leading to an unstable matching almost surely a restriction to simpler strategies or to markets with aligned preferences rules out such equilibria however unstable even pareto dominated matchings may still arise with positive probability under those two restrictions combined in addition inefficiency due to delay may remain significant despite vanishing search frictions finally a condition is identified under which all equilibria are outcome equivalent stable and efficient

revisiting the effects of imf programs on poverty and inequality investigating how lending programs of the international monetary fund imf affect poverty and inequality we explicitly address model uncertainty we control for endogenous selection into imf programs using data on 86 low and middle income countries for the 1982 2009 period and analyze program effects on various poverty and inequality measures the results rely on averaging over 90 specifications of treatment effect models and indicate adverse short run effects of imf agreements on poverty and inequality for the whole sample while for a 2000 2009 subsample the results are reversed there is evidence that significant short run effects might disappear in the long run author s abstract

a positive theory of environmental quality regulation this paper demonstrates that environmental quality regulation may enhance producer wealth while simultaneously reducing an externality problem by restricting access to common property regulation not only corrects a resource misallocation but it creates a scarcity rent as well in the recent history of environmental quality the common access problem has been addressed by federal and state agencies through a standards based approach rather than through the enforcement of tradable property rights as a consequence rents from the right to use these assets have accrued to producers the data are convincing that there is a strong interplay between producers consumers and the victims of pollution each party has some influence on the outcome and one sided analysis neglects many important aspects of regulation environmental quality regulation is complicated but many of the observed perplexities are consistent with a rent seeking self interest theory of government 46 references 1 figure 7 tables

misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem it has been shown previously that for two sided discrete markets of the kind exemplified by the marriage problem no strategy proof procedure for aggregating preferences into stable outcomes exists here it is shown that nash equilibrium misrepresentation of preferences nevertheless results in a stable outcome in terms of the true preferences when the aggregation procedure yields the optimal stable outcome in terms of the stated preferences for one side of the market journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 025 026 0 1984 academic

does balance among areas of institutional quality matter for economic growth countries with better institutions as measured by the economic freedom of the world index have greater prosperity growth and well being however the previous literature has ignored interrelationships among the subareas instead implicitly assuming substitutability and independence we hypothesize that when some areas are weak better scores in other areas are not a simple substitute we find that including a simple measure of the within country standard deviation among coexisting area scores results in a meaningfully significant improvement in the empirical growth specifications based on our findings this should become routine practice in future empirical work we also explore interactions among areas and find ones with legal system and property rights most important to include these findings suggest a need to reconsider the implicit assumption of independence among area scores as well as a balanced approach to institutional reform in practice improving the worst areas is more beneficial to growth

measuring chronic poverty without a panel abstract a new method of decomposing cross sectional poverty estimates into chronic and transient components is demonstrated using data from a recent household survey in papua new guinea this method is simpler than previously used panel methods because it does not require data on every household in every period the only requirement is that a subset of the surveyed households have a repeat observation made on their welfare indicator some time after the initial observation in the setting considered the chronic and transient components of headcount poverty are roughly equal while three quarters of the mean poverty gap is transient in the sense of being due to within year fluctuations in expenditures

divided we vote divided government is known to correlate with limited government but less is understood about the empirical conditions that lead to divided government this paper estimates the determinants of continuous and categorical measures of divided government in an empirical macro political economy model using 30 years of data from the american states voters support more divided government after increased government spending per dollar of tax revenues but more unified government after worsening incomes and unemployment rates only conditional support is found for the strategic moderating theory alesina and rosenthal in econometrica 64 6 1311 1341 1996 that focuses purely on midterm cycles and split ticket voting absent economic conditions

empirical regularities in black markets for currency abstract this paper develops a model of the black or parallel market foreign exchange rate this rate is seen to depend upon the level of the official rate the unobserved equilibrium rate the premium offered for exchange sold through the black market and government reserve level policies the model is then empirically estimated for 10 countries over a period from 1957 through 1983 the results generally support the model specified by theory additionally the paper provides weak form tests concerning the efficiency of the black market the results cannot reject the hypothesis that the current black market rate incorporates all relevant historical price information

a macro micro analysis of the effects of electricity reform in senegal on poverty and distribution abstract this paper uses a computable general equilibrium cge macro micro model to explore the distributional effects of price reform in the electricity sector of senegal in the first part of the paper we analyse the distribution of electricity in senegal by income quintiles between 1995 and 2001 the analysis demonstrates that poor and rural households are not the main beneficiaries of the expanded network the results of the cge model show that direct price effects are weaker than general equilibrium effects on poverty and inequality moreover compensatory policies tested can help attenuate some adverse effects

smuggling and the black market for foreign exchange this paper develops a model of the black market for foreign exchange in which black market currency is demanded and supplied by firms engaged in smuggling it is demonstrated that quotas or foreign exchange rationing are not necessary to induce the coexistence of legal and black foreign exchange markets variants of the model analyze the implications of capital flight unbalanced trade quotas foreign exchange licensing and economies with more than two goods

non revelation mechanisms for many to many matching equilibria versus stability we study many to many matching markets in which agents from a set a are matched to agents from a disjoint set b through a two stage non revelation mechanism in the rst stage a agents who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to simultaneously make proposals to the b agents in the second stage b agents sequentially and respecting the quota choose and match to available a proposers we study the subgame perfect nash equilibria of the induced game we prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all a agents preferences are substitutable we also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the a agents in particular implementation holds when a agents preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non binding

intradaily price volume adjustments of nyse stocks to unexpected earnings the speed and path of adjustment in stocks to the degree of earnings surprise in their quarterly announcements are studied using price volume transactions data a differential price adjustment process was observed with stocks having large positive earnings surprises experiencing a faster adjustment compared with those stocks with negative earnings surprises volume transaction frequency and size were found to be directly related to the absolute degree of surprise but very favorable earnings surprise stocks experienced initially a large number of smaller trades while stocks with large unfavorable earnings surprises had relatively fewer transactions but higher volume per trade the stock market s microstructure has received increasing attention from researchers especially from an empirical perspective as transaction data on prices and volume have become more readily available 1 an important subset of this research has been the study of stock price adjustments to significant news events specifically publicly announced information with economic content should be quickly reflected in prices in an unbiased manner this paper contains a study of the intradaily adjustment in stocks to the informational content of earnings reports using price changes trading volume and transaction frequency and size we examine the transaction to transaction and time series stock behavior associated with different degrees of earnings surprise embedded in earnings announcements the degree of surprise is measured by a comparison of actual with forecasted earnings for 325 new york stock exchange nyse firms these firms are subdivided into five earnings surprise categories in order to determine whether the speed and path of their price volume adjustment processes are different one question of interest is whether the adjustment process for favorable versus unfavorable earnings surprises is similar or different another is whether any adjustment is distinguished by a few large trades or a large number of smaller

commodity price stabilization in imperfect or cartelized markets most studies of commodity price stabilization assume that all agents behave competitively however many commodities suitable for stockpiling are produced by countries with a significant share of the world market and commodity agreements themselves often result in cartelization of the market the paper explores the consequences of market power for the choice of storage rule and the degree of price stabilization it finds that with linear demand dominant producers choose more stable prices than under perfect competition and price stability increases with their market share with constant elastic demand the competitive degree of price stabilization is achieved

hiring procedures to implement stable allocations abstract we implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in subgame perfect equilibrium we use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker first stage and then each worker accepts at most one proposal second stage moreover if agents preferences are additive this mechanism implements in subgame perfect equilibrium the firms optimal corre spondence when firms use undominated strategies finally we construct another simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and which implements the workers optimal correspondence when agents preferences are additive journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

workers remittances and the real exchange rate a paradox of gifts abstract we test the impact of workers remittances on the real exchange rate using a panel of 13 latin american and caribbean countries the analysis reveals that workers remittances have the potential to inflict economic costs on the export sector of receiving countries by reducing its international competitiveness our findings raise concerns parallel to those raised by dutch disease or resource boom models where resource discoveries result in real exchange rate appreciation and shifting of resources from the traded to the nontraded sectors of the economy

black markets and optimal evadable taxation in a simple model of evadable indirect taxation some surprises emerge because of a market thinning effect of high prices high taxes induce multiple equilibria low price black markets and high price legal markets further evadability introduces a bifurcation to optimal taxation for less effective tax administrations the optimal tax system follows a cash cow pattern with one sector bearing all of the tax but for relatively effective administrations the optimum follows a slightly modified ramsey rule this discontinuity results from the mathematics of evasion incentives and may help explain tax reforms commonly seen over the course of economic development

allocation of goods through non price mechanisms evidence on distribution by willingness to wait abstract this paper discusses a model of market clearing when prices are rigid the estimated model is one in which the waiting time necessary to obtain the scarce goods brings the excess demand in line with current supply in a manner of a flexible price the mechanism of such a market has been discussed by barzel and by nichols smolensky and tideman but little empirical evidence has been reported estimation of consumer demand in such a market is presented here heckman s approach to truncated sample estimation has been employed the approach allows modelling of time costs as a two part tariff the results confirm that consumer s response to waiting time is measurable and in the same order of magnitude as expected from response to changes in prices the study also indicates that rationing by willingness to wait does not necessarily distribute goods to the poor

price controls in liberia abstractin 2009 the liberian government removed a wide reaching set of price controls compared with goods never subject to price ceilings goods whose prices were liberalized showed increased pri

a fractional cointegration analysis of the long run relationship between black and official foreign exchange rates the case of the brazilian cruzeiro this paper applies a relatively new but generalized concept of fractional cointegration to shed some light on the validity of a long run relationship between monthly black and official us dollar rates of the brazilian cruzeiro an investigation of the stochastic properties of these rates reveals that while the relationship is not cointegrated in their logs they appear to be fractionally cointegrated if we allow for mean reverting processes that are ci 1 d with 0 d 1 the paper demonstrates that relaxing the condition that the residual from the cointegration equation must be a i 0 process captures a much wider class of mean reversion behaviour furthermore an analysis of the short run dynamics propelling the long run relationship tends to imply that although the official rate influences the changes in the black rate this is purely over the short run in the longer term the black rate is found to be the initial receptor of any exogenous shock to the equilibrium and it is the official exchange

two to tangle financial development political instability and economic growth in argentina abstract this paper studies the impact of financial liberalization on economic growth it contributes to this literature by using an innovative econometric methodology and a unique data set of historical series it presents power arch estimates for argentina for the period from 1896 to 2000 the main results show that the long run effect of financial liberalization on economic growth is positive while the short run effect is negative albeit substantially smaller interestingly we find that financial development affects growth only directly that is not through growth volatility

poverty and basic needs fulfilment in africa during structural change evidence from cote d ivoire abstract much attention is given in the literature to the evolution of social indicators during periods of structural adjustment and economic reform this paper argues that these processes are not distribution neutral from the point of view of basic needs fulfilment and that hence the focus should not be on aggregate indicators but on the distribution of beneficiaries of social services and changes in this distribution evidence is presented for cote d ivoire during the second half of the 1980s a period of intense structural change which shows that the poorest absorbed the bulk of the decline in basic needs fulfilment as a result of structural change this was the case for almost all aspects of basic needs and occurred regardless of the overall trend in the social indicators

adjustment with a human face evidence from jamaica summary in september 1991 jamaica liberalized its exchange rate as part of its structural adjustment program sap the sudden and steep devaluation associated with this policy move had serious repercussions for real purchasing power poverty general inflation and food prices especially staple foods such as rice and flour which are imported this study evaluates the social cost of the liberalization policy by examining the behavior of preschool childrens weight for height or wasting an indicator of nutritional status that is sensitive to short term fluctuations in living conditions using 8 years of national microsurvey data for 1989 96 we apply synthetic cohort analysis to disentangle the separate impacts of childs age date of birth and measurement date on weight for height estimates based on an exhaustive set of controls indicate that children weighed in the aftermath of the policy november and december 1991 are significantly lighter by 0 178 z scores than children weighed just a few months later and children in urban areas were especially affected when food price inflation is explicitly entered into the model it is highly statistically significant and reduces but only slightly the effect of being measured at the end of 1991 the calculated elasticity of weight for height z score with respect to food price inflation is a very high 0 86 during the rapid economic reform in 1991 this elasticity rose to 1 24 indicating a large response of weight for height to food price inflation as is to be expected in a small open economy 2003 elsevier science ltd all rights reserved

a simple selling and buying procedure abstract for the assignment game we analyze the following mechanism sellers simultaneously fix their prices first then buyers sequentially decide which object to buy also each buyer may report his or her indifferences along with the previous buyers indifferences to the following buyer the first phase determines the potential prices while the second phase determines the actual matching reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers moreover when buyers state their true indifferences the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d78

queues rations and market comparisons of outcomes for the poor and the rich this paper presents a positive comparison of the outcomes of several alternative allocation systems the queue system convertible and nonconvertible rations and the unhindered market to distribute the limited quantity of a deficit good among heterogeneous individuals the authors show that for the poor the ranking of systems from better to worse is convertible rations nonconvertible rations the queue system and nonintervention the rich are found to be better off under nonintervention than under other systems these and other results are notably robust not only to many parameters of the economy but also to certain types of commodity taxes and administrative costs copyright 1987 by american economic association

the rationality of u s regulation of the broadcast spectrum in his classic 1983 technologies of freedom ithiel de sola pool so elucidated the prevailing wisdom concerning broadcast licensure in the united states while the key legal questions surrounding this institution involve important first amendment questions hence pool s scarcity analogy to paper ink and presses economists and other policy analysts have often remarked on the more general incongruity in federal licensing while spectrum is regulated on the physical scarcity premise it is awarded to private users on a no fee basis thus conferring significant economic rents on private parties at substantial opportunity cost to the fisc moreover federal communications commission fcc 2 policies have openly sought virtually throughout the agency s entire life span to restrict broadcast licenses and competition for broadcasters particularly cable television to far below the quantity technically available 3 the

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

implementation in the many to many matching market abstract this paper deals with a discrete many to many matching market of firms and workers we analyze the following mechanism firms announce the set of workers they want to hire then workers select the set of firms with which they want to work the first phase of the game determines the potential partners while the second phase determines the actual matching we prove that subgame perfect nash equilibria spne always exist while strong equilibria se may not exist we characterize the spne outcomes as the pairwise stable matchings and show that there may be no spne outcome in the core when the preferences of the agents are not maximin however when the preferences of the firms respectively workers are maximin the core always contains the equilibrium outcomes

on perfect rent dissipation if economists are united on anything it is the proposition that monopoly prices reduce economic welfare by preventing the realization of the maximum gains from trade in any market the extent of such distortions to efficiency are often called harberger costs after arnold harberger s 1954 provocative attempt to measure the extent of these losses in the u s economy more recent analysis has revealed that when monopoly power is achieved via regulation at least part of the monopoly rents so gained will not be simple transfers from consumers to producers but will be dissipated by producers rent seeking activity since such activity employs real resources there are additional costs to monopolization beyond the harberger costs as emphasized by gordon tullock 1967 and richard posner 1975 indeed posner and others have argued that if competition for the monopoly rents is perfect all of the expected rents from regulation will be converted to welfare losses while franklin fisher s 1985 comment has qualified this conclusion somewhat the upshot of the debate is that the rent seeking or tullock costs may greatly exceed the harberger costs 1 another recent strand of the analysis concerns the time pattern over which monopoly returns are dissipated by competition to gain and hold the monopoly right robert mccormick et al 1984 emphasize that to the extent such expenditures are sunk they are forever lost and not recoverable by deregulation while conceding the point martin cherkes et al 1986 argue that most rentseeking expenditures are recurring not sunk and therefore large gains from deregulation remain the purpose of this essay is to point out that recurring or sunk even the largest specification of the harberger and tullock costs of regulatory monopolization may fall far short of the actual welfare costs this is because the analysis concentrates on the rent seeking tullock costs and largely ignores the parallel rent defending2 tullock costs a proper assessment of such rent defending tullock costs might more than double the maximum welfare costs of regulation suggested by posner

in search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred acceptance algorithm many centralized entry level labor markets use the firm proposing deferred acceptance da algorithm to compute the matching that is implemented among workers and firms we propose a definition of the strategic options a worker faces in the da algorithm then we develop a theory to advise workers who distinguish between the firms from which they believe not to receive a proposal the firms from which they might receive a proposal and the firms from which they certainly receive a proposal if a worker is not able to deduce which new proposals she receives after having rejected others then it is not profitable for her to submit a list that reverses the true ranking of any two acceptable firms furthermore it is not beneficial for her to include a firm in her submitted list that is unacceptable to her

some empirical evidence on rent seeking we tested for the capture of net gains by winners in rent seeking competitions using the most prominent announcements of government favors in the canadian economy over a twelve year period stockholders returns were not significantly different from zero one possible explanation is that government assists firms only when assistance creates political gains refusing to transfer economic rents to firms maximmizes the resources available to serve political purposes this kind of behavior by government officials would imply that government has market power which is consistent with several well known theories of government

comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy abstract we apply leeson and dean s 2009 method for studying democratic dominoes to capitalist spillovers to compare the rates at which capitalism and democracy spread between countries we find that capitalism and democracy spread at approximately the same modest rate

the kennedy round evidence on the regulation of international trade in the united states the purpose of this paper is to analyze and provide empirical evidence regarding the regulation of international trade flows our goal is to provide an explanation of the changes in the interindustry pattern of trade restrictions which emerged from the kennedy round of tariff negotiations the principal conclusion of the analysis is that the pattern of protection which resulted from the kennedy round was shaped to minimize the domestic political disruption resulting from liberalization industries which faced significant import threats and whose characteristics enhanced their potential political influence were able to maintain tariff protection in the face of overall liberalization the potential impact of the agreed upon tariff reductions was partially undermined by the introduction of offsetting nontariff trade barriers ntbs in addition ntbs were introduced systematically in industries that were becom

the economics of rotating savings and credit associations evidence from the jamaican partner abstract using a unique sample of rotating savings and credit association rosca members from jamaica we provide the first econometric tests of the recent theoretical advances in the literature on roscas and find considerable support for an economic theory of roscas we find for example that payments to the rosca leader significantly enhance the sustainability of the rosca and that the contractual relationship between the leader and other rosca members is transaction cost minimizing when the degree of asset specificity is higher the contract is more flexible other theoretical predictions we validate are the inverse relationship between size of rosca and size of contribution and the use of rosca funds for durable goods purchase

implementation in undominated strategies a look at bounded mechanisms this paper examines the impact of placing natural restrictions on the mechanisms considered for implementation problems it is shown that if all mechanisms are considered and preferences satisfy a basic condition then any social choice correspondence can be implemented in undominated strategies an example points out that the strength of this result derives from the use of mechanisms with questionable features in part of the message space the agent who announces the highest integer is rewarded this sort of tail chasing construction common in the constructive proofs of the literature is used to assure that undesired strategy combinations do not form an equilibrium if such mechanisms are ruled out then the social choice correspondences which can be implemented in undominated strategies satisfy an incentive compatibility type condition called strategy resistence for social choice functions this is equivalent to strategy proofness this contrast suggests that this issue should be examined as it applies to other solution concepts used in implementation theory the last portion of the paper begins to explore the issue as it relates to nash implementation and undominated nash implementation

easing countries transitions from price controls and subsidies abstract in transitional economies initial popular support of market reforms is often followed by disillusionment and repudiation of the reform program to facilitate economic transition this paper proposes a marketable discount coupon system dcs that reassures the public even as an economy moves from nonmarket to market prices unlike price controls subsidies or ration coupons dcs involves no queuing or allocative distortions unlike vouchers dcs would not be negated by inflation to avoid distortions discount coupons would be marketable and redeemable even without purchase of specific products this procedure permits efficient adjustment of domestic prices to international levels

implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems abstract this note analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisms and the hypothesis of agents behavior considered in the nash equilibrium concept we analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations by employing two types of mechanisms the first mechanism is a now or never choice process that permits us to implement in undominated nash equilibria the set of all the stable allocations the second choice process is the classic algorithm in matching theory the gale shapley mechanism a reversal property is observed in such a mechanism when agents act strategically the use of a mechanism which selects the best solution for one side of the market in the absence of strategic behavior yields the best stable solution for the agents on the other side under dominance solvability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d78 j41

the welfare costs of price controls for cars and color televisions in poland contrasting estimates of rent seeking from recent experience the welfare costs of price controls can vary enormously depending on the method of allocating the goods in shortage and the possible rent seeking costs that may result with full rent dissipation the welfare loss from price controls on polish color televisions in 1989 was about ten times the standard estimates of distortion costs which ignore rent seeking and was more than 100 percent of the value of domestic producers sales the methods of allocating cars however did not result in rent seeking costs the domestic price controls were an unintended implicit subsidy to imports subsidies for cars were estimated at 43 percent and for color televisions at 22 percent

colombia s black market in foreign exchange abstract decree law 444 in 1967 heavily restricted access to foreign exchange by colombian residents this policy spurred the development of a large black market which had grown to about us 2 5 billion of transaction value per year by 1988 soon after the restrictive policies were imposed marijuana and then cocaine smuggling became large industries in colombia this narcotics boom has apparently driven down the black market exchange rate and largely eliminated the exchange rate premium that is usual for such markets while colombia s government has opened up the official foreign exchange market in the early 1990s the black market is expected to continue to thrive due to the smugglers need to resort to underground means for transacting their business

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

the international monetary fund in a time of crisis a review of stanley fischer s imf essays from a time of crisis the international financial system stabilization and development stanley fischer was deputy managing director of the imf from 1994 to 2001 and perhaps more than any other individual he personifies the international rapid response to financial crises in the 1990s this book is a collection of essays written during his tenure at the imf taken together the essays represent the strongest and most logical defense of imf initiatives in the 1990s in print my review essay comprises six parts in parts 2 through 4 i provide an overview of fischer s arguments in three central areas of contention stabilization policy the impact of imf programs on poverty and the imf s anticipation of and response to international financial crisis i then compare fischer s arguments to those raised by the imf s critics during that period the controversial issues of these parts can be resolved only through empirical investigation but on the issues of greatest importance from the financial crises of the 1990s both fischer and the imf s critics make logically consistent arguments with little empirical support in part 5 i review the recent empirical literature to illuminate what evidence has been found in support of or counter to the assertions of fischer and the imf s critics part 6 provides conclusions and suggestions for follow on empirical research

the textile bill of 1985 the determinants of congressional voting patterns the following tables show the results of the probit analysis for the senate and the house a table including results for different combinations of the independent variables is included in an unpublished appendix available from the authors upon request the results of the probit analysis for the senate are shown in table 1 all the variables except exp had the expected signs however the results indicate that the two other employment variables and party affiliation are the only factors which we can say with confidence influenced a senator s decision to vote for or against this bill the coefficients reported and labeled der of prob measure the derivative of the probability of a yes vote evaluated at the means of the independent variables in question thus for example the coefficient for unemp in the top line of table 1 should be interpreted as indicating that a one percentage point increase in a state s unemployment rate will cause a 5 89 increase in the probability that the senator will vote for the bill the result for dr the party of the senator shows that in general democrats are more apt to vote for protectionist policies than are republicans this is consistant with president reagan s negative stand on the bill and his threat to veto it should it pass the amendment in question passed the senate on 24 october 1985 by a vote of 54 for to 42 against but the bill it was attached to has been postponed indefinitely the house bill which was passed on 10 october 1985 by a vote of 262 for to 159 against was vetoed by reagan on 17 december 1985 the results of the probit analysis for the house of representatives are shown in table 2 state employment data was used for the house as opposed to data for each voting district this was done for three reasons first employment data is usually reported by state or by county since counties are often divided by congressional district boundaries much personal judgement would be necessary to assign employment figures second the most recent county industry employment data is from 1981 while the data used in this analysis is from 1984 third we feel that in general logrolling is prevalent among a state s representatives for this bill the representatives from twenty six states voted as a block and in all but six states one third or less of that state s representatives voted contrary to the majority all of the probabilities are significant at the 05 confidence level representative s voting patterns are influenced by all of the included factors when unionization is added to the equation its coefficient is very small and negative although it is significant at the 05 confidence level one would expect more significance here since there are more degrees of freedom for the house analysis than for that of the senate when the data from the house and senate are pooled the results are similar to those of the house alone the null hypothesis that the data cannot be pooled was tested using a statistic with eight degrees of freedom 9 721 meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected as in the senate the state unemployment rate and the percent employed in textiles are important influences on the representative s vote and democrats in the house are more likely to vote for protectionist bills than republicans however unlike the senate the percent of a representative s campaign contributions that are donated by industry special interest groups has a significant effect on voting patterns although the point estimates for the magnitudes of the influence are very similar in both cases seventy four percent of the house received campaign contributions from these special interest groups while only 54 of the senate received contributions from these same sources this is probably because only one third of the senate was up for reelection during the time period considered while the entire house was in the process of campaigning for reelection exports also play a role in influencing the probability of a yes vote reducing this probability as employment in export industries increases but the magnitude of the coefficient is only 11 of that for textile employment the significance of this variable in the house is probably due to fear of retaliation expressed by both democrats and republicans this variable was not significant in the senate model most likely because the senate version excluded from the 1 import quota growth rate many countries who might have retaliated representatives appear to respond to a wider variety of constituent interests than do senators while senators voting patterns are only significantly influenced by their political affiliation their state s unemployment rate and the importance of textiles to their state the voting behavior of representatives is influenced by these factors as well as the importance of exports to their state and campaign contributions by textile special interest groups these results affirm the validity of the approach used by baldwin and coughlin they differ from baldwin who finds exports are not a significant influence on the house and from coughlin who does not include export employment as an explanitory variable or analyze the differences in voting patterns between the house and the senate

structural adjustment policies income distribution and poverty a review of the jamaican experience abstract although jamaica has had structural adjustment and standby loans from the world bank and the international monetary fund imf since 1977 the implementation of typical structural adjustment policies such as trade and financial liberalization privatization and labor market reform has for the most part occurred only since 1989 during 1989 1993 when the jamaican economy underwent the most drastic liberalization policies inequality and poverty declined although there were sharp jumps in both inequality and poverty in 1991 when financial liberalization occurred the overall decline in poverty is attributed to the strong performance of domestic agriculture and the increased inflow of remittances and seems unlikely to be sustained

rentless rent seeking and abnormal returns the assumption that seekers of a monopoly privilege from government will dissipate the expected value of future related rents by costly pursuit of the privilege is frequently used though subject to a growing debate tullock has described a set of plausible circumstances where strategic bidding for a single prize leads to net gains for the rent seeking participants 2 that is even with competition for rents less than full dissipation of future gains may obtain tullock also identifies other circumstances where the process is a zeroor negative sum game if the theory of rentless rent seeking holds under any set of circumstances empirical work designed to identify wealth effects associated with a regulatory event is destined to fail indeed such empirical analysis may find no effect when in fact a regulatory restriction has occurred yet reports of empirical research on regulatory effects have supported the hypothesis that rents have been generated 3 do such empirical results implicitly support tullock s theory of efficient rent seeking are such results purely random observations of one of many discrete regulatory processes involving the same firms where the overall expected value is zero 4 or is there an explanation of such results that is consistent with full dissipation of rents and systematic observation of abnormal positive returns for shareholders of directly affected firms this article offers another explanation for observing profitable rent seeking that is compatible with tullock s observations and rent dissipation theory the next section gives the explanation that section is followed by a brief summary

domestic content legislation house voting and the economic theory of regulation house voting on domestic content legislation provides a rare opportunity to examine the political economy of protectionism with respect to a particular issue rather than by using the traditional interindustry approach the results indicate that a representative s vote in favor of the content legislation and the intensity of the legislator s preferences are positively related to the importance of the auto and steel industries in the representative s district an increasing unemployment rate campaign contributions from labor groups affiliation with democratic party and a liberal ideology despite ideology s statistical significance the results suggest this variable can be disregarded because neither the predictive accuracy nor the explanatory power of the model is improved by its inclusion the estimates also provide insights concerning the impact of changes in the independent variables upon voting patterns

economic freedom and growth decomposing the effects most studies of the relation between economic freedom andgrowth of gdp have found a positive relation one problem inthis area is the choice of economic freedom measure a singlemeasure does not reflect the complex economic environment anda highly aggregated index makes it difficult to draw policyconclusions in this paper we investigate what specific typesof economic freedom measures that are important for growth the robustness of the results is carefully analysed since thepotential problem with multicollinearity is one of thenegative effects of decomposing an index the results showthat economic freedom does matter for growth this does notmean that increasing economic freedom defined in generalterms is good for economic growth since some of thecategories in the index are insignificant and some of thesignificant variables have negative effects

price controls and rent seeking behavior in developing countries abstract when the price of a good is controlled a nonprice allocation rule must necessarily be substituted for allocation by price examples are first come first served allocation which gives rise to rationing by waiting and allocation by an explicit system of ration coupons with rationing by waiting consumers are induced to pursue activities that economize on waiting costs such as buying a larger quantity per purchase although such responses are individually rational they are socially self defeating in the sense that they lower equilibrium consumer welfare rationing by coupons can avoid some but typically not all of these losses these ideas are developed with examples of model economies and their practical relevance is illustrated with evidence from developing countries

jamaica s foreign exchange black market as in many other less developed nations the imposition of foreign exchange controls promoted the growth of a foreign exchange black market in jamaica this article explains the structure and functioning of the market in recent years under controls initially imposed in 1954 this market grew to about us 1 7 billion of transaction value per year by 1990 during the 1980s the main participants in the market seeking to buy foreign exchange were jamaican importers and savers who either were restricted from obtaining foreign exchange in the official market or chose to evade taxes and other rules by using the black market on the supply side were jamaican expatriates living abroad foreign tourists ganja exporters and traders using false invoices thousands of black market exchangers provided the market making service sometimes adding the service of funds transfer overseas a black market exchange rate model supported this interview based institutional description of the market the foreign exchange black

the welfare costs of rationing by waiting with price controls and rationing by waiting rational consumers increase the quantity boughtperpurchase this individually rational response is socially wasteful and the cost of making it is a deadweight loss this cost plus the value of time spent in queues may exceed the total rent transferred from suppliers to consumers by price controls i e the value of resources spent competing for the rent may exceed the rent itself this point is illustrated by an empirical application to gasoline price controls rent seeking exhausts an estimated 116 percent of the rent trangerred the efficiency of the price system is often illustrated lby pointing to the obvious wastes associated with alternative allocation mechanisms for example the queues that accompany price controls and first come first served allocations although rationing by waiting wastes resources in a dramatically visible fashion the magnitude of the waste and the factors that determine it seldom have been examined empirically moreover existing theory on the subject is incomplete unless the first come first served rule is precisely specified consumers will compete for available supplies in ways other than waiting in the model developed below queues cause consumers to compete by increasing amounts bought per trip to the market the analysis demonstrates that such individually rational adjustments only increase the welfare cost of rationing by waiting and thus are socially self defeating the theoretical model is illustrated empirically by estimating the welfare costs of a market wide ceiling on gasoline prices this application was motivated by the availability of two key pieces of information the value of time spent in gasoline queues and the effect of waiting lines on amounts bought per purchase this information was obtained from a survey of motorists conducted during the era of federal gasoline price regulations to focus on competition among consumers one of the inefficiencies that results from price controls is ignored the supply reduction leading to the

the effect of imf programs on labor abstract previous studies find that imf programs have negative effects on income distribution the international monetary fund and latin america economic stabilization and class conflict westview press boulder 1987a world dev 15 1987b 365 world dev 28 2000 1031 no study however has used parametric methods to control for nonrandom selection using a dynamic version of the heckman selection model i study the effect of imf programs on the labor share of income from manufacturing my conclusions are supported by 2 095 observations of 110 countries during 1961 93

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed