re examination of uniform commodity taxes under a non linear income tax system and its implication for production efficiency abstract this paper shows that the result of uniform commodity tax under nonlinear income taxation by atkinson and stiglitz 1976 no longer holds if the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration in particular imposing a non uniform commodity tax can pareto improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation in addition the paper shows that if the government uses a nonlinear income tax system for income redistribution then the introduction of distortions in the public sector can pareto improve welfare contrary to the results in diamond and mirrlees 1971

a minimum wage can be welfare improving and employment enhancing abstract we examine whether minimum wages can fulfill a useful role as part of an optimal tax transfer scheme the government cannot observe household abilities only their incomes and is constrained to ensure that those working are at least as well off as those not working a minimum wage combined with the institutional features of typical welfare systems allows the incentive constraint to be severed at the ability level associated with the minimum wage if such a scheme can be enforced the government can increase the amount of redistribution from those working to those not working and possibly lower the number of unemployed

the ramsey problem for congestible facilities abstract in recent years a new set of models drawing on vickrey 1969 has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities these models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers time of use decisions and the congestion technology standard models in contrast simply assume the general form of the cost function we apply the new approach to analyze the ramsey problem for a congestible facility and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology

the consequences of minimum wage laws some new theoretical ideas economists generally agree that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers however this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of firms labor is not dependent on the wage in this paper we show that in a conventional efficiency wage model a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs the formal logic of our model is similar to the case of labor demand under monopsony but arises in a model with a large number of employers

optimal redistribution and monitoring of labor supply this paper extends the mirrlees 1971 model of optimal non linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that allows the government to verify labor supply at a positive but non infinite cost we analyze the joint determination of the non linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be implemented monitoring of labor supply reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates possibly above 100 the optimal intensity of monitoring increases with the marginal tax rate and the labor supply elasticity our simulations demonstrate that monitoring strongly alleviates the trade off between equity and efficiency welfare gains of monitoring are around 2 8 of total output the optimal intensity of monitoring follows a u shaped pattern similar to that of optimal marginal tax rates our paper can explain why large welfare states optimally rely on work dependent tax credits active labor market policies benefit sanctions and work bonuses in welfare programs

randomization of commodity taxes an expenditure minimization approach using an expenditure minimization approach necessary and sufficient conditions for local random taxation are obtained in terms of the curvature of the compensated demand function so that intuition from excess burden analysis can be applied major findings include 1 random taxation is locally optimal if the compensated demand function is sufficiently convex 2 horizontally equitable taxation is locally optimal if the compensated demand function is concave and 3 local randomization is not optimal if the tax revenue requirement is sufficiently close to zero or to any local maximum we also derive an inverse elasticity characterization of the optimal random tax structure

taxes redistribution and the minimum wage a theoretical analysis this paper considers a simple general equilibrium model that contains two types of workers with differing levels of ability and a social welfare maximizing government the paper shows that social welfare can sometimes be increased by supplementing an optimal linear income tax with a minimum wage but that social welfare can never be increased by supplementing an optimal nonlinear income tax with a minimum wage

the analytical derivation and empirical test of a tax adjusted fundamental value model in implementing the theory of current valuation for fixed assets accountants encounter a range of difficult estimation problems many of these problems arise because fixed assets yield their productive potential over many accounting periods theoreticians regulators users and preparers have sought to overcome difficulties in estimating values for owned used assets by estimating the historical cost or the current cost of a new asset and applying a depreciation factor that adjusts for diminished productive capacity the resulting depreciated cost estimate then serves as a proxy for the economic value of the owned used asset previous research has demonstrated that this depreciated cost estimate of economic value is sensitive to both the valuation model and the assumed depreciation schedule see for example greenball 1969 beaver and dukes 1973 beaver and landsman 1983 mohr and dilley 1984 swenson 1987 and kim and moore 1988 the purpose of our study is to extend prior research by examining the interactive

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

the minimum wage as a redistributive tool most analyses of the minimum wage focus on its unintended employment consequences the goal of a minimum wage is not of course to reduce employment but to redistribute earnings to low paid workers under what conditions can a minimum accomplish this are those conditions met in economies which otherwise rely extensively on markets to set wages such as the united states which in i994 rejected mandating health benefits that would have effectively raised the minimum or the united kingdom where in i995 the labour party promised a national minimum upon election who pays for the redistribution who benefits the redistributive effects of a minimum wage depend on the labour market and redistributive system in which it operates on the level of the minimum and on its enforcement at best an effective minimum wage will shift the earnings distribution in favour of the low paid and buttress the bottom tiers of the distribution from erosion at worst minimum wages reduce the share of earnings going to the low paid by displacing many from employment neither outcome is certain so that enacting a minimum is a risky but potentially profitable investment in redistribution it is the balancing of risk against gain that makes a minimum so controversial until the i980s i99os competitive labour markets in the united states and united kingdom produced rising real earnings for the low paid and falling earnings inequality so the risk of enacting a national minimum united kingdom or of raising substantially the national minimum united states seemed unnecessary why interfere with the competitive market when it produces socially desirable trends in earnings albeit a bit slower than one might accomplish with a legislated minimum two decades of falling real wages for lower decile workers in the united states and of rising earnings inequality in the united kingdom1 have however put the minimum back in play the job market is not doing much for lower paid workers in the united kingdom virtually all social groups accept the need for some redistribution though they differ on the best way to accomplish such in the united states pressures for tax cuts can be interpreted as a way for employees to gain real wage increases unavailable through the market the consensus favouring redistribution through the earned income tax credit disappeared in the midi 990s rush to reduce federal budget deficits this paper takes as its operating premise the goal of redistributing earnings

pareto improving minimum wage laws by increasing the expected wage in low skill jobs a minimum wage law can reduce the incentive for low skill workers to imitate high skill workers in the signalling process the gain from reduced investment in the signal can more than offset the loss from unemployment among low skill workers so that total output increases moreover with an appropriate poll tax on workers to compensate owners of capital the law can make all workers and owners of capital better off

income maintenance and labor force participation the paper studies the optimal tax subsidy schedules in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to work or not with an application to the case of france given an income guarantee provided by the welfare state the tax schedule that maximizes government revenue provides a benchmark the laffer bound above which it is inefficient to tax in fact under mild conditions a feasible allocation is second best optimal if and only if the associated taxes are lower than the laffer bound the only restriction that efficiency puts on the shape of the tax scheme is this upper laffer bound the laffer tax scheme itself can be computed from the joint distribution of the agents productivities and work opportunity costs depending on the economy it can take widely different forms and exhibit for instance negative marginal tax rates after estimating the joint distribution of productivities and work opportunity costs on french data i compute the laffer bound for two subpopulations single women and married women with two children or more quite surprisingly the actual incentives to work appear to be very close to the bound

incorporating affirmative action into the welfare state abstract in this paper we discuss a novel aspect of affirmative action policy we examine its redistributive role asking whether in an egalitarian society supplementing the tax transfer system with an affirmative action policy would enhance social welfare we demonstrate that affirmative action could be a desirable policy tool even if racial discrimination does not exist in the labor market

who pays for the minimum wage this paper analyzes the eects of a large 60 and persistent increase in the minimum wage instituted in hungary in 2001 we propose a new approach to estimating the employment eects of a minimum wage increase that exploits information on the distribution of wages before and after the policy change we infer the number of jobs destroyed by comparing the number of pre reform jobs below the new minimum wage to the excess number of jobs paying at and above the new minimum wage our estimates imply that the higher minimum wage had at most a small negative eect on employment and so the main eect was pushing up wages we then use data on a large panel of firms to evaluate the economic incidence of the minimum wage increase contrary to theoretical models that attribute the small employment eects of minimum wage changes to monopsonistic wage setting we find no evidence that the rise in the minimum wage led to lower profitability among low wage employers instead we find that the costs of the minimum wage were largely passed through to consumers

minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search matching and endogenous contact rates building upon a continuous time model of search with nash bargaining in a stationary environment we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model they can be welfare improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market we discuss identification of the model using current population survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters we show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

structural change and economic policy in a declining metropolitan region implications of the pittsburgh experience public private partnerships can play a valuable role in regional economic policy but the nature and effectiveness of such alliances depends on the type of problems faced by a region in the contex

optimal incentives for labor force participation abstract optimal taxation is analyzed under a rawlsian criterion in an economy where the only decision of the agents is to participate or not to the labor force the model allows for heterogeneity both in the agent s productivities and aversions to work at a first best optimal schedule the marginal agent who decides to work pockets all of her productivity while being just compensated for her work aversion when the planner does not observe work aversion financial compensation for work is lower than productivity theory puts little restrictions on the shape of the optimal tax schedules the usual first order conditions involving the elasticities of participation only apply for sufficiently regular economies we qualitatively show how the optimal incentive schemes depend on the underlying structure of the preferences 100 marginal tax rates or subsidies to work are related to specific features of the economies

technical change wage inequality and taxes this paper considers the normative implications of technical change for tax policy design a task to talent assignment model of the labor market is embedded into an optimal tax problem technical change modifies equilibrium wage growth across talents and the substitutability of talents across tasks the overall optimal policy response is to reduce marginal income taxes on low to middle incomes while raising those on middle to high incomes the reform favors those in the middle of the income distribution reducing their average taxes while lowering transfers to those at the bottom jel d31 h21 h23 h24 j31 o33

the distributional and efficiency effects of increasing the minimum wage a simulation the generally accepted goal of minimum wage laws is to alter the distribution of income in favor of low income households however since a minimum wage will also disrupt low wage labor markets causing inefficiencies and imposing costs on some of the same workers the law is intended to help an evaluation of the policy requires a weighing of the distributional benefits against the efficiency costs quantification of these benefits and costs is clearly important to this evaluation while much effort has been devoted to estimating the employment effects of minimum wage laws relatively little work has been done to estimate the distributional benefits our simulations focus on this efficiency equity tradeoff by developing estimates of the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the level and distribution of real income across households previous work has concluded that minimum wages are not as beneficial in their distributional impact as generally supposed

risk sharing on the labour market and second best wage rigidities the starting point of the analysis is that a significant proportion of the labour force is not covered by efficient labour contracts in particular the non existence of forward labour contracts limits the opportunity of efficient risk sharing through private arrangements among young labour suppliers and capital owners in such a context state dependent labour taxes and employment subsidies would be required to achieve ex ante pareto efficiency in the absence of employment subsidies a certain limited degree of downward wage rigidity is in general pareto superior to full wage flexibility at the second best optimum so defined productive efficiency is sacrificed in some states in order to achieve greater efficiency in risk sharing thus the unemployment associated with wage rigidity is inefficient though voluntary due to the levels of benefits and second best efficient a limited degree of wage discrimination by hiring date is typically part of the second best policy

equity and efficiency in rationed labor markets the social welfare implications of income tax policy are shown to critically depend on whether or not labor markets are rationed i e on the existence of involuntary unemployment with rationed labor markets raising taxes on the employed and transfers to the unemployed might improve both equity and efficiency it improves equity by redistributing income from the employed to the unemployed it improves efficiency as it encourages people with a small utility surplus of employment to exit the labor market leaving their jobs for people with a higher utility surplus i derive conditions under which this result continues to hold when only part of the labor market is rationed when there is both frictional and rationing unemployment and when rationing endogenously follows from trade unions monopoly power

minimum wage legislation and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistribution the use of minimum wages and unemployment insurance as instruments for redistributing income is analyzed the government is assumed to be able to implement an optimal income tax in an economy consisting of two types of individuals who differ in ability the effect of introducing a minimum wage which induces involuntary unemployment will be to improve social welfare under weak conditions circumstances under which combining unemployment insurance with the minimum wage will be welfare improving are also considered

minimum wages in an equilibrium search model with diminishing returns to labor in production this article analyzes a minimum wage in a market with imperfect information and job search it establishes that employment effects of a minimum wage do not generally indicate welfare effects it shows that researchers interested in welfare consequences should ask two questions first is the existing minimum wage binding second do some firms that would be bound by a new minimum wage presently experience labor shortages if the answers to these questions are no and yes respectively this article supports the conclusion that a higher minimum wage is welfare improving regardless of its effect on the unemployment rate

optimal linear income taxation with general equilibrium effects on wages abstract the paper argues that the endogeneity of wages may make a considerable difference to optimal linear tax rates in this case there is not only the usual direct redistribution via the fiscal system but also the general equilibrium redistribution due to the change in wages depending on the elasticity of substitution of the production function and the labour supply elasticities these may be reinforcing or opposing it is shown that the general equilibrium effect may plausibly outweigh the direct effect so that net redistribution to the lower paid involves a wage subsidy financed by a lump sum tax

on the optimality of a minimum wage new insights from optimal tax theory we build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage can be welfare improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax we consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment workers differ in productivity the government does not observe workers productivity but only their wages hence the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem we show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low however if the government controls the bargaining power then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power

is a minimum wage an appropriate instrument for redistribution textabstractwe analyze the redistributional dis advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets without imposing assumptions on the in efficiency of labor rationing compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change a minimum wage increase raises involuntary unemployment but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment a minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing we show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers a necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment we write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum wage increase is undesirable in nearly all oecd countries a reduction in the minimum wage along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant would yield a pareto improvement

privatization and the distribution of income in the commons abstract the explicit treatment of heterogeneity among the users of the commons leads to results that differ from those that are now generally accepted in the literature the owner of the fixed factor is not able to expropriate the rents of privatization rather the resulting distribution of income to the free factor after privatization depends on the technology and the institutional arrangements this result extends to more than two goods if the decline in the price of the good produced in the commons is sufficient to offset the decline in the marginal product of labor in the rest of the economy

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets this paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results first we show that a binding minimum wage while leading to unemployment is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first importantly this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers in that context a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low skilled workers as it prevents low skilled wages from falling through incidence effects second when labor supply re sponses are along the extensive margin only the co existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low skilled work is always second best pareto ineffcient a pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low skilled workers and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers overall our results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low skilled workers are complementary policies pa

welfare reform in european countries a microsimulation analysis this article compares the effects of increasing traditional welfare to introducing in work benefits in the 15 pre enlargement countries of the european union we use a labour supply model encompassing responses to taxes and transfers along both the intensive and extensive margins and the euromod microsimulation model to estimate current marginal and participation tax rates we quantify the equity efficiency trade off for a range of elasticity parameters in most countries because of large existing welfare programmes with high phase out rates increasing traditional welfare is undesirable unless the redistributive tastes of the government are extreme in contrast the in work benefit reform is desirable in a very wide set of cases

the elasticity of scale and the shape of average costs different concepts of returns to scale the first which is most widely used for defining returns to scale is the relative increase in output as all input quantities are increased proportionally along a ray through the origin the second which is the more relevant concept for micro economic analysis is the increase in output relative to costs for variations along the expansion path where input prices are constant and costs are minimized at every output 2 as it turns out these two concepts yield equal measures for the elasticity of scale3 e at every minimum cost point in the input space however the change in e with output is generally different for the two concepts 4 since expansion paths do not coincide with rays unless the production function is homothetic 5 but it is the change of e along the expansion path and not along the raywhich determines the shape of the average cost curve ac and which is therefore relevant for the analysis of firms and industry behavior under competition 6 these relations are stated and analyzed below it is shown that assumptions made in the literature7 which are related to the behavior of e along rays or to the slope of the technically optimal surface where returns to scale are locally constant are irrelevantbeing neither necessary nor sufficient for implying classical u shaped average cost curves the following definitions and results are used here

targeting transfers through restrictions on recipients our objective is to design transfer programs that maximize some social welfare function following the optimal income tax formulation we assume that a random process endows individuals with characteristics that influence welfare such as ability to earn income medical condition or unmonitorable income the goal is to maximize the utility of a randomly chosen individual other individualistic social welfare functions would lead to equivalent results if the random characteristics were observable a first best outcome could be achieved by making them the basis for lump sum transfers in practice however we can observe only indicators of these characteristics such as earnings medical expenditures or consumption patterns the challenge for policy is to design an efficient second best transfer program based on indicators in this paper we argue that 1 an optimal transfer program in general must sacrifice productive efficiency to target efficiency this is done by imposing restrictions on the choices made by intended beneficiaries 2 a program that incorporates restrictions such as means tested in kind transfers commodity specific taxes and subsidies and even ordeals i e the imposition of deadweight costs to qualify for a transfer will perform better than programs that rely solely on income taxes and cash transfers

modeling location and production an application to u s fully integrated steel plants i n weber s 1929 theory of the location of industry spatial firms produce under conditions of fixed proportions and constant returns to scale while their spatial consumers have priceinelastic demands weber s assumptions are relaxed separately in previous work moses 1958 and alonso 1967 allow either for flexible technologies but inelastic demands or for pricesensitive demands but fixed proportions technologies this paper presents a behavioral and econometric model of spatial firms which simultaneously relaxes restrictive assumptions on both technology and demand assumptions of earlier models become testable hypotheses the behavioral model is general to any spatial firm the econometric model can be estimated for any industry the paper reports an estimation of the model for a sample of fully integrated steel plants in the united states the steel industry is appropriate for illustrating the general model for two reasons first the important inputs in steel are localized weight losing materials while transportation charges are a nontrivial part of the delivered prices of both these inputs and of steel products second previous research lacks agreement about the principal determinants of steel plant locations disagreement also exists over the structure of production and the extent of scale economies in production and the existence of substitution possibilities among inputs each of these disagreements is treated as a hypothesis within this paper first a model which includes the influences of both consumers and materials on location can distinguish the comparative influence of each the literature lacks agreement on whether the steel industry is transport oriented in which case consumer demands are price inelastic and an optimal location minimizes transport costs or market oriented in which case consumer demands are price elastic and an optimal location reflects that sensitivity isard 1948 suggests the influences on location change over time due to changes in technology and relative prices isard and capron 1949 conclude the steel industry is transport oriented more recently hekman 1978 reports that the demand for steel is priceelastic he concludes that locations in the steel industry are sensitive to consumer demands the evidence in this paper portrays the steel industry as transport oriented second there are differing estimates of the extent of scale economies in steel production ranging from constant returns to scale hekman 1978 to a minimum efficient scale m e s of twelve million tons cockerill 1974 scherer 1973 and weiss 1976 estimate m e s of four million tons while tarr 1977 gives the mid1970s m e s at six million tons an estimate reported in this paper as well third the existence of substitution possibilities among inputs has implications for both location and production if substitution possibilities are limited weber models of location may be applied to the steel industry previous research has characterized steelnmaking technology as fixed proportions tsao and day 1971 cobb douglas hekman 1978 or having wide variation in substitution possibilities kopp and smith 1980 moroney and trapani 1981 this paper presents estimated elasticities of substitution suggestive of great substitution possibilities among inputs the behavioral model of location and production is presented and then transformed into an econometric model in section ii a brief discussion of regional markets for steel products and a description of the data appears in section iii received for publication july 31 1981 revision accepted for publication july 7 1982 wayne state university this research is based on my ph d dissertation at the university of wisconsin madison the advice of frank m gollop eugene smolensky and charles a wilson is gratefully acknowledged i have benefited from discussions with james hamilton and li way lee and comments by jan brueckner and several anonymous referees computing support has been provided by the graduate schools at the university of wisconsin madison and wayne state university the responsibility for any remaining errors is mine an earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1980 north american meetings of the econometric society

piercing the corporate veil the closure of wisconsin steel in south chicago clark g l 1990 piercing the corporate veil the closure of wisconsin steel in south chicago reg studies 24 405 420 restructuring is usually associated with technological change the transformation of the workplace and the communities affected by cross plant capacity rationalization however restructuring should also be understood as a corporate strategy specifically the actions of management to protect and foster their core economic interests while limiting the costs of adjustment by shifting those costs to others a case study of international harvester company s restructuring strategy which led to bankruptcy and closure of wisconsin steel in south chicago in the early 1980s is the basis of the paper the significance of plant closing pension liabilities in corporate restructuring is emphasized as is the regulation of restructuring with respect to those liabilities by the united states federal government s pension benefit guaranty corporation analytically the case is interpreted in part a

the optimal public employment policy abstract this paper studies optimal public employment in a model with two types of labor unskilled and skilled and a single consumption good a linear income tax is used to redistribute income it is shown that if the income tax and public employment levels are optimal then there is less unskilled labor and more skilled labor in public production than is necessary to minimize costs at the prevailing gross wage rates the robustness of this result is investigated by examining a second model

adoption of competing inventions by united states steel producers a hstract this research investigates innovative behavior in the u s steel industry under the assumption that basic oxygen and large electric furnaces are competing technologies the empirical model of innovation is based on recent theoretical research the coefficients are estimated by a seemingly unrelated tobit approach the research finds innovation is strongly influenced by a demonstration effect adoption is also influenced by potential cost savings and technical progress there is no evidence that large u s steel producers modernized more slowly than their smaller rivals the large electric furnace becomes sufficiently attractive by 1980 that firms choose not to adopt basic oxygen

q and the tax bias theory abstract a growing body of literature analyzes the variation in q the ratio of financial market value to asset current replacement cost and makes inferences about attributes such as monopoly power profitability managerial performance etc these studies ignore potential biases embedded in q that result from non neutral tax policies this study examines the association between q and tax biases and establishes that differences in accumulated depreciation tax shields explain significant variation in q the implication that q should be adjusted for tax biases before use in empirical research is examined further adjusting q for tax biases at least with the factors herein leads only to minor changes in econometric analyses

economic vs accounting depreciation abstract in this paper we present and estimate a model of economic depreciation consistent with producer s optimization the estimated economic depreciation which is a function of the rate of utilization and level of maintenance is about half of that used according to tax accounting depreciation the difference between the economic and tax rates of depreciation results in a subsidy and earlier capital replacement the implicit maximum net tax subsidy expressed as a proportion of the acquisition price of the asset is 13 3 for a sample of canadian trucking firms

income taxation endogenous factor prices and production efficiency in an analysis of a two type income tax model with endogenous wages this paper shows that production efficiency is violated in the optimum with i non linear and ii linear income taxation if and only if a distortionary tax schedule is implemented these findings complement earlier results of the literature in passing it is also shown that optima with non linear redistributive income taxation cannot be identified with the redistributive regime if the assumption of endogenous wages is taken seriously

a theory of urban decline economy demography and political elites during the past decades large cities in advanced industrialised countries have experienced different demographic and economic trajectories some are continuing to grow in population and jobs many have experienced decline to account for the process of decline and its consequences a general model of urban decline is proposed it specifies the relationship between employment population political elites and urban fiscal revenues constructs and propositions are drawn from economic and ecological theorems empirical evidence is based on literature predominantly from germany and the us

optimal minimum wage legislation in this paper we present a model in which minimum wage legislation may be pareto optimal this arises because a higher wage would be preferred to the market clearing wage by demanders for and suppliers of labour even though unemployment is induced and minimum wage legislation is needed to support the preferred equilibrium consider a labour market where the quality of labour depends positively on the wage offered if labour quality is highly sensitive to wage increases effective unit labour cost will fall as the wage rises this would lead the representative firm to prefer paying an above market clearing wage and to ration job slots such an effect has been studied when quality depends on an individual firm s wage offer see for example weiss i980 or stiglitz i974 suppose however that labour quality depended not on any individual firm s wage offer but on the average market wage if firms were atomistic each invidual firm would have an incentive to undercut the optimal above marketclearing wage trying to get the quality benefits of high average wages while paying lower wages itself the high wage solution would not be viable legislation fixing minimum wages might be required to support the preferred equilibrium quality might depend on average market wages when workers must decide whether or not to enter a labour market before they can sample and obtain specific job offers migration into labour markets for example rural to urban migration in less developed countries provides one example as the decision to migrate and therefore the quality of the labour pool will depend on some average of expected wage offers the decision over which profession to enter at the beginning of the educational process provides another example of course imperfect information plays a key role here it is assumed that both firms and workers have imperfect information about the suitability of individual workers for jobs both before and to a lesser extent after employment has begun this lack of information will rule out both profitable selfselection mechanisms and wages strictly proportional to output so that firms will care about the quality of the labour pool the non optimality of market clearing prices which will be demonstrated makes this paper similar to a number of papers on the implications of adverse selection in labour and product markets one may mention two excellent papers on screening in labour markets by guasch and weiss i980 i98i this paper builds on some of the results in those papers stiglitz and weiss i98i show how credit rationing may arise from a similar type of argument wilson

a case for maximum wage in this paper we demonstrate that supplementing the optimal non linear income tax system with a binding maximum wage rule attains a pareto improvement by serving to mitigate the mimicking incentives of the high skill individuals without entailing distortions

age differentiated minimum wages in developing countries abstract the fact that minimum wages seem especially binding for young workers has led some countries to adopt age differentiated minimum wages we develop a dynamic competitive two sector labor market model where workers with heterogeneous initial skills gain productivity through experience we compare two equally binding schemes of single and age differentiated minimum wages and find that although differentiated minimum wages result in a more equal distribution of income such a scheme creates a more unequal distribution of wealth by forcing less skilled workers to remain longer in the uncovered sector we also show that relaxing minimum wage solely for young workers reduces youth unemployment but harms the less skilled ones

minimum wage legislation as a second best policy mass unemployment is a striking phenomenon of the present economic situation of european market economies although the profession of economists has been criticized for not providing satisfactory cures it has produced a number of different explanations either complementary or contradictory for the occurrence of mass unemployment in this paper we examine the argument that unemployment is the consequence of minimum wage legislation which is socially desirable the observation of current wage legislations suggests that the above argument is broadly at least partly accepted by policy makers curiously enough a defence of this argument meeting the rigorous requirements of modern theory seems to be missing symmetrically attacks against minimum wage legislation often rely upon reasonings of dubious relevance i e the obvious remark that unemployment is a waste with first best efficiency criteria the present paper proposes a second best analysis where second best stems from informational asymmetries which prevent the implementation of lump sum transfers needed for a first best redistribution policy the question under scrutiny can be reformulated in a more precise way as follows does a second best optimal redistribution policy lead to minimum wage legislation and unemployment our elements of answer are gathered in 3 sections in section 2 the principles of the analysis of the desirability of quantity controls and existing results are recalled in section 3 the analysis of section 2 is specified to a simple prototype model for the study of linear income taxation in section 4

effects of the minimum wage on employment dynamics the voluminous literature on minimum wages offers little consensus on the extent to which a wage floor impacts employment we argue that the minimum wage will impact employment over time through changes in growth rather than an immediate drop in relative employment levels we show that commonly used specifications in this literature especially those that include state specific time trends will not accurately capture these effects using three separate state panels of administrative employment data we find that the minimum wage reduces job growth over a period of several years this finding is supported using several empirical specifications

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

neither ore nor coal nor markets a policy oriented view of steel sites in the usa markusen a 1986 neither ore nor coal nor markets a policy oriented view of steel sites in the usa reg studies 20 449 462 locational work on steel stresses the growing role of consuming markets over resources in shaping the evolution of mill sites here it is argued that four additional factors have governed steel siting in the usa agglomeration economies oligopolistic behaviour the role of the state and conflict between capital and labour the relative strength of each factor varies by era and region as a result the economic development prospects for places like pittsburgh and chicago are quite different

investment activity and the exit decision using level data from the u s steel industry this paper tests and finds support for the hypothesis that firms in a contracting industr y first disinvest from and then close their high cost plants an investment decision model is estimated using a panel data set composed of the major replacement investments made in forty three steel plants during the years 1960 81 the results indicate that the firms disinvested from those plants are least likely to remain profitable in an environment of strong competition from imports minimills and stagnating domestic demand copyright 1988 by mit press

the misallocation of housing under rent control the standard analysis of price controls assumes that goods are efficiently allocated even when there are shortages but if shortages mean that goods are randomly allocated across the consumers that want them the welfare costs from misallocation may be greater than the undersupply costs we develop a framework to empirically test for misallocation the methodology compares consumption patterns for demographic subgroups in rent controlled and free market places we find that in new york city which is rent controlled an economically and statistically significant fraction of apartments appears to be misallocated across demographic subgroups jel c25 d12 d61 r20

the promise of positive optimal taxation normative diversity and a role for equal sacrifice abstract a prominent assumption in modern optimal tax research is that the objective of taxation is utilitarian i present new survey evidence that most people reject this assumption s implications for several prominent features of tax policy instead preferring tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective the principle of equal sacrifice i generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective proposing a method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting pareto efficiency then i show that optimal policy in this generalized model calibrated to the survey evidence and u s microdata is capable of quantitatively matching several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional model but widely endorsed in the survey and reality including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited tagging together these findings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation

minimum wage unemployment and growth abstract this paper shows that in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth minimum wage legislation does not necessarily has negative consequences on economic performance such legislation can have positive effects on growth by inducing more human capital accumulation more precisely a low demand for unskilled labor induced by a minimum wage may create an incentive for workers to accumulate human capital moreover it is possible that a decrease in the minimum wage lowers the welfare of each agent in the economy

anti discrimination rules versus income taxation in the pursuit of horizontal equity abstract we consider a model of prejudice driven discrimination where the advantaged tall discriminate against the disadvantaged short we employ an egalitarian social welfare function to compare anti discrimination legal rules with a non discriminatory height blind income tax

public health insurance and optimal income taxation abstract if individuals differ not only in their inherent capacity to earn income but also in the probability that they will fall ill can subsidized public health insurance be justified on the grounds that it serves as an efficient tool to redistribute welfare this question is analyzed in a model where the social welfare function is a weighted average of individual expected utilities and where taxation is by a linear income tax the answer is yes except in certain special cases

horizontal equity income taxation and self selection with an application to income tax credits abstract this paper investigates the relationship between utilitarianism and horizontal equity in models of income taxation in particular and self selection in general an example involving well behaved individual preferences is constructed in which a maximization of a utilitarian social welfare function leads via income taxation to horizontal inequities sufficient conditions for utilitarianism to bring horizontal equity are derived the results are applied to the question of whether income tax credits are an appropriate way to treat differences in family size

regulating the restructuring of the us steel industry chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code and pension obligations clark g l 1991 regulating the restructuring of the us steel industry chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code and pension obligations reg studies 25 135 153 the past two decades have seen enormous changes in united states manufacturing industries restructuring of production has greatly affected levels of employment the volume of productive capacity and the location of work if these aspects of restructuring are now very well known less appreciated are the regulatory dilemmas posed by restructuring private corporations and public regulatory agencies have become enmeshed in litigation over the design and consequences of restructuring due in part to the fact that restructuring strategies have brought corporations into conflict with fundamental but competing public policy interests the apparent failure of the federal government to develop an explicit industrial policy has only exacerbated these conflicts based upon a case study of the chapter 11 bankruptcy of the ltv steel corporation and competi

the optimal linear income tax a diagrammatic analysis abstract this paper clarifies the role of the tax possibility frontier and the social indifference curve in the comparative statics analysis of the optimal linear income tax by a mostly diagrammatic derivation of the results we confirm the conventional conjecture that the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the government s inequality aversion on the other hand we cannot always confirm analytically the conventional conjecture that the optimal marginal tax rate increases with the government s budgetary needs

environmental regulation and the spatial structure of the u s dairy sector substantial public scrutiny about adverse environmental impacts of the dairy sector has resulted in increased environmental regulations a behavioral model of location and production is developed to examine the impacts of environmental regulations traditional location factors and agglomeration economies on the spatial structure and geographical location of dairy production the results show that counties in the states with more stringent environmental regulations tend to lose dairy inventories to those with less stringent policies there are substantially meaningful spatial patterns of dairy production current dairy production levels are positively correlated while changes in production levels are negatively correlated across counties

minimum wage policy with optimal taxes and unemployment abstract using a search model i derive a formula that links the welfare gains from the minimum wage to its effect on low skilled labor force participation and employment this formula shows that the minimum wage is welfare improving if pushing the low skilled labor market tightness downwards brings it closer to its efficient level i estimate the causal effect of the minimum wage on low skilled labor force participation and employment using federal and state minimum wage variation i discuss the policy implications of my estimates when viewed through the lens of the marginal welfare gain formula

aggregation bias in elasticities of substitution and the minimum wage paradox while the employment effects of minimum wages are usually reported to be small suggesting low substitutability between skill types direct estimates suggest a much larger degree of substitutability this article argues that this paradox is largely due to a bias induced by the aggregation of skill types into broad categories an assignment model is applied where skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs the implied pattern of substitutability reveals the sources of the bias estimation results for the united states show elasticities of complementarity to be underestimated by up to a factor 2 5 the methods laid out likewise can be applied to other markets where different quality types are close substitutes such as the housing market

optimal participation taxes addressing extensive labour supply responses the literature has established a case for larger transfers to the working poor than to even poorer non working people this paper casts new light on this result i argue that the result hinges crucially on the labour supply responses of people in income brackets above that of the working poor then distinguishing between more and less poor working people i show that if a single working type faces a negative tax it is the poorer one who does finally i endogenize wages and show that key conditions will be of the same form as before

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

a pareto improving minimum wage this paper shows that a graduated minimum wage in contrast to a constant minimum wage can provide a strict pareto improvement over what can be achieved with an optimal income tax the reason is that a graduated minimum wage requires high productivity workers to work more to earn the same income as low productivity workers which makes it more difficult for the former to mimic the latter in effect a graduated minimum wage allows the low productivity workers to benefit from second degree price discrimination which increases their income

decentralized fiscal federalism revisited optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership this paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension under plausible assumptions horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership

equivalence scales horizontal equity and optimal taxation under utilitarianism abstract this paper analyzes the question of how differences in family size should be treated by the income tax system in order to achieve horizontal equity family size is incorporated into the demand system by the procedure of demographic scaling horizontal equity is defined as equal treatment of equals it is shown that when lump sum taxes are not available and the government has to rely on income taxation then the only way to entail equal utilities for household of different size is to equate the labor supplies and the per standard adult consumptions of these households

estimation of complete demand systems from household budget data the linear and quadratic expenditure systems in this paper we explore two issues in empirical demand analysis the estimation of complete systems of demand equations using household budget data section i and the incorporation of demographic characteristics into such systems section ii although there are numerous studies which use time series data to estimate complete demand systems and many which estimate engel curves from household budget data there are virtually none which combine budget data from different periods to estimate complete systems since each budget study corresponds to a single price situation one might conjecture that estimation of complete systems would not be possible unless budget studies were available from a large number of periods this is incorrect in section i we argue that interesting complete demand systems can be estimated from a small number of budget studies despite the limited price variability represented in such data to demonstrate this we use budget study data for two periods to estimate a pair of related demand systems the familiar linear expenditure system les and a quadratic expenditure system qes a generalization of les in which the demand equations are quadratic in total expenditure the inclusion of demographic variables in the analysis of household consumption patterns is desirable because there are likely to be systematic differences in the consumption behavior of households with different demographic characteristics but the effects of demographic characteristics have seldom been studied within the framework of complete demand systems in section ii we propose translating as a general method for incorporating demographic variables into complete systems of demand equations this method has not previously been discussed as a general technique for bringing demographic variables into demand systems although it has been employed in several studies to improve the estimates of the les and the qes presented in section i we reestimate these two systems using translating to incorporate family size

the consequences of the minimum wage when other wages are bargained over abstract this paper examines the impact of a binding minimum wage in a situation where unions dominated by skilled workers set wages it is shown that the relationship between the minimum wage the bargained wage and employment of skilled and unskilled workers depends on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor cases where minimum wage hikes increase both overall and unskilled employment are exhibited

optimum taxation with errors in administration abstract the paper compares the welfare levels which can be achieved by two distinct tax regimes lump sum taxation where one attempts to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies on the basis of characteristics and income taxation where characteristics are not observed but personal incomes are measured and taxed where there are no errors in classifying individuals lump sum taxation is superior but where mistakes are made in the allocation of lump sum grants or subsidies income taxation may be more attractive the level of errors where the regimes are equally desirable in terms of social welfare is computed in simple models following that of feldstein 1973 where there is strong aversion to inequality then income taxation becomes preferable at quite small errors in analysing income taxation it is shown that in the feldstein model with endogenous wages the marginal tax rate in optimum income taxation on the more skilled is negative and that on the less skilled is positive in contrast to the standard results see seade 1977 with exogenous wages

self selection and pareto efficient taxation abstract this paper analyses the set of pareto efficient tax structures the formulation of the problem as one of self selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems such as the optimal pricing of a monopolist which have recently been the subject of extensive research but also allows the derivation of a number of new results we establish i under fairly weak conditions randomization of tax structures is desirable ii if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another in production then the general equilibrium effects until now largely ignored in the literature of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure in particular if the relative wage of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals the marnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution iii if individuals differ in their preferences pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes while iv if wage income is stochastic the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100 our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic