information and quality when motivation is intrinsic evidence from surgeon report cards abstract if profit maximization is the objective of a firm new information about quality should affect firm behavior only through its effects on market demand i consider an alternate model in which suppliers are motivated by a desire to perform well in addition to profit the introduction of quality report cards for cardiac surgery in pennsylvania provides an empirical setting to isolate the relative role of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives in determining surgeon response information on performance that was new to surgeons and unrelated to patient demand led to an intrinsic response four times larger than surgeon response to profit incentives jel d83 i11 l15

nonconvexities in the production of timber biodiversity and carbon sequestration abstract fixed logging costs and administrative constraints on logging regulations can create nonconvexities in forestry production sets that include timber and nontimber products managing forests to produce multiple values at a landscape level through the aggregation of stands that are completely or partially specialized in the production of timber or nontimber products can consequently be superior to management systems that treat all stands uniformly even when all stands are identical both fixed costs and administrative constraints are empirically important sources of nonconvexity in tropical rainforests the former is more important when the nontimber product is carbon sequestration while the latter is more important when the nontimber product is biodiversity protection uniform management appears to be superior for the joint production of timber and carbon sequestration while specialized management might often be superior for the joint production of timber and biodiversity at least at low discount rates

tradeoffs from integrating diagnosis and treatment in markets for health care anyone who has consulted a doctor plumber or auto mechanic has experienced the tradeoffs in consulting a single expert to both diagnose and treat a problem in the presence of asymmetric information on one hand integrated diagnosticians those who also sell treatments may have the incentive to give advice that is not in the buyer s best interests as the theoretical models in curtis r taylor 1995 and asher wolinsky 1993 point out because the buyer has imperfect information on the scope of the problem if he did not he would not have needed to consult a diagnostician in the first place the diagnostician inevitably has the incentive to recommend treatments that are more profitable even if they are more costly of lower quality or less appropriate on the other hand joint production of diagnosis and treatment may be more efficient the diagnostician may have better information about how to treat the problem than he could or would provide to an independent third party or the diagnostician may be able to treat the problem himself less expensively or more effectively half the cost is opening the engine block we examine an important special case of this problem the costs and quality of care of a random sample of medicare beneficiaries with coronary artery disease we compare patients who were diagnosed by an integrated cardiologist one who also provides surgical treatment to patients who were diagnosed by a nonintegrated cardiologist we decompose the total effect of diagnosis by an integrated cardiologist into the parts due to the change in the type of treatment and the parts due to the relative efficiency of each type of treatment with this information we quantify the potential upsides and downsides to diagnosis by an integrated expert we identify these effects based on differences across geographic areas in the number of integrated cardiologists per capita our estimates are consistent under the assumption that unobserved patient characteristics and other determinants of spending are similar across areas with many versus few integrated cardiologists we explore the validity of this assumption below the paper proceeds in four sections section i reviews the previous empirical literature on the problems of obtaining diagnosis and treatment from a single expert when that expert has better information than the buyer on the source of the buyer s problem section ii discusses the details of the problem that we study and presents our models section iii describes our data section iv presents our results and section v concludes with the implications of our results for economic theory and health policy

seller reputation from word of mouth to centralized feedback abstract reputation is one of the most important incentives for trade and cooperation using the complete selling history of 125 135 sellers on eachnet com an ebay equivalent in china we show that sellers with a longer successful selling record enjoyed more repeat business reached more buyer regions sold in more product categories and had a higher completion rate even before eachnet introduced a centralized feedback system since the centralized feedback system the difference between reputable and non reputable sellers has decreased in terms of repeat business but enlarged in terms of market expansion these findings suggest that while reputation can facilitate trade through buyer experience and word of mouth it is not as effective as centralized feedback our study also shows that although completion rate and transaction price are the two outcomes most often examined in the literature seller reputation is important for buyer clientele market reach business scope and market survival

reputation formation in economic transactions abstract we investigate patterns of information transmission and the evolution of behaviour in standard trust games where reputational information can be exchanged between individual agents within a population but does not become public we vary the nature of information that could be transmitted either a subjective rating or the objective details of a transaction as well as the cost of information transmission either zero or positive we find that information transmission is heavily used if it is costless but only moderately if it has positive cost objective information effectively increases the average amount sent in the trust game and thus efficiency and average profits as well as the return rate only if transmission is costless and therefore is heavily used subjective information a rating only increases transfer and return rates in a control treatment where it becomes publicly available but not for private communication a detailed analysis of the determinants of information transmission shows a positive influence of a the transfer made to a receiver b experience of exploitation and c points to reciprocity in information transmission

individual heterogeneity and cultural attitudes in credence goods provision abstract i study the heterogeneity of credence goods provision in taxi drivers taking detours in new york city first i document that there is significant detouring on average by drivers second there is significant heterogeneity in detouring across individuals yet each individual s propensity to take detours is stable drivers who detour almost always detour while those who do not detour almost never do drivers who take longer detours on each trip also take such trips more often third cultural attitudes plausibly explain some of this heterogeneity in behavior across individuals

why don t people trust experts abstractcredence goods such as health care legal and financial services and auto repair create a conflict of interest by requiring experts to diagnose and provide services to uninformed consumers mistreatment of consumers appears widespread empirically but a simple explanation for mistreatment under realistic assumptions has proved elusive i generalize uwe dulleck and rudolf kerschbamer s credence good model to incorporate the highly realistic assumption that consumers do not observe experts cost functions the model guarantees equilibrium mistreatment in a wide range of price setting and market environments the model also yields testable implications regarding the nature of mistreating firms and the direction of mistreatment

credence goods markets with conscientious and selfish experts i study credence goods markets when there are both selfish and conscientious experts the selfish expert is a profit maximizer the conscientious expert wants to maximize profit and repair the consumer s problem there are two classes of equilibria uniform price equilibria and nonuniform price equilibria a consumer cannot infer the expert s type from his price list in a uniform price equilibrium but can do that in a nonuniform price equilibrium when the fraction of the conscientious expert is small the selfish expert will be honest about the severity of the consumer s problem when the fraction of the conscientious expert is large the selfish expert will cheat the consumer overcharging the consumer whenever he offers to repair the problem finally more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss when the fraction of the conscientious expert is close to one of the two extremes 0 and 1 more conscientious experts will result in smaller social loss when the fraction of the conscientious expert is in a middle range more conscientious experts may result in a larger social loss

demand inducement and the physician patient relationship the physician patient relationship is a paradigm for any expert client relationship the physician both diagnoses the patient s illness and recommends a treatment this dual role gives the physician incentive to recommend treatments whose costs outweigh their medical benefits these socially inefficient treatments correspond to the notion of physician induced demand the level of inducement chosen by the physician is shown to depend on the price and potential medical benefits of treatment and the relative diagnostic skills of physician and patient this model offers several testable hypotheses some of which are confirmed by related studies

policy relevant nonconvexities in the production of multiple forest benefits abstract this paper challenges common assumptions about convexity in forest rotation models which optimize timber plus nontimber benefits if a local optimum occurs earlier than the globally optimal age policy based on marginal incentives may achieve suboptimal results policy relevant nonconvexities are more likely if i nontimber benefits dominate for young stands while the optimal age depends primarily on timber benefits or ii nontimber benefits dominate for mature stands and also determine the optimal age nonconvexities may create either temporary or persistent difficulties policymakers may improve efficiency by exploiting the relationship between the timber only optimum and the global optimum

politicians as experts electoral control and fiscal restraints we propose an argument for fiscal restraints that is based on the premise that the services of politicians are credence goods politicians are experts who specialize in observing the true state of the economy budget maximizing politicians are better informed than the electorate about the level of public spending necessary to manage public affairs voters who are able to observe the size of the budget but not the necessary level of spending affect the government s spending behavior via electoral control a fiscal restraint limits the maximum spending a government can choose we identify conditions under which such a fiscal restraint improves voter welfare and discuss the role of the political opposition as a second expert in situations in which the state of the economy requires a level of spending which exceeds the fiscal restraint

the economics of credence goods an experiment on the role of liability verifiability reputation and competition credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies such as under and overtreatment or market breakdown we study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets while theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency we find that liability has a crucial but verifiability at best a minor allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence as predicted seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated jel d12 d82

second opinions and price competition inefficiency in the market for expert advice we consider a market in which an expert must exert costly but unobservable effort to identify the service that meets the consumer s need in our model experts offer competing contracts and the consumer may gather multiple opinions we explore the incentives that a competitive sampling of prices and opinions provides for experts to exert effort and find that there is a tension between price competition and the equilibrium effort in particular the equilibrium fails to realize the second best welfare optimum an intervention that limits price competition via price control increases welfare

on doctors mechanics and computer specialists the economics of credence goods most of us need the services of an expert when our apartment s heating or our washing machine breaks down or when our car starts to make strange noises and for most of us commissioning an expert to solve the problem causes concern this concern does not disappear even after repair and payment of the bill on the contrary one worries about paying for a service that was not provided or receiving some unnecessary treatment this article studies the economics underlying these worries under which conditions do experts have an incentive to exploit the informational problems associated with markets for diagnosis and treatment what types of fraud exist what are the methods and institutions for dealing with these informational problems under which conditions does the market provide incentives to deter fraudulent behavior and what happens if all or some of those conditions are violated

a note on international trade and market structure as exports become an increasing part of industry sales the determinants of a firm s international position become increasingly important tests have supported single factors such as product life cycle lutz and green 1983 as well as multi factor models to explain the determinants of industry imports and exports stern and maskus 1981 harkness and kyle 1975 baldwin 1971 this study also presents a multi factor analysis of the determinants of u s trade patterns this study utilized the spi strategic planning institute data set which allows research at the business unit product line level results indicate that productivity and product development are the principal characteristics of high export percentage business units these findings are especially true for nonconsumer industries thus to the degree that business are concerned over the short term costs of product development direct or indirect for example insurance government aid may be required to promote u s export industries

the economics of breakdowns checkups and cures a market in which the owner of a durable good x contracts with an expert for diagnostic and treatment services is studied good x may be in one of three states health disease or failure only experts can determine whether x is healthy or diseased and perform treatment the owner cannot tell whether recommended treatment is really needed this creates an information based demand for health insurance by risk neutral consumers imperfections in the market for spot insurance may give rise to free diagnostic checks strategic procrastination and long term health maintenance agreements

on trust in honesty and volunteering among europeans cross country evidence on perceptions and behavior abstract we conduct an experimental study among european citizens regarding cross cultural perceptions related to trust in two dimensions volunteerism and honesty we use representative samples from five major economies of the euro area france germany italy the netherlands and spain we find that european citizens rely on nationality to infer behavior assessments of behavior show a north south pattern participants from northern countries are perceived to be more honest and to provide more effort in a volunteering game than participants from southern countries actual behavior is however not always in line with these assessments assessments of honesty show strong evidence of social projection participants expect other european citizens to be less honest if they are culturally closer to themselves assessments of volunteerism instead show that both northern and southern europeans expect higher performance in northern than in southern european countries

what drives taxi drivers a field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods credence goods are characterized by informational a symmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by seller s this paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in athens g reece set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers p resumed information and income on the extent of fraud results reveal that taxi drivers c heat passengers in systematic ways passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system l eads to manipulated bills higher income seems to lead to more fraud

signaling corporate social responsibility third party certification versus brands corporate social responsibility csr is a credence attribute of products which can be signaled either through a label certified by a third party or via unsubstantiated claims used as part of a brand building strategy we use an experimental posted offer market with sellers and buyers to compare the impact of these signaling strategies on market efficiency only third party certification gives rise to a separating equilibrium and an increase in csr investments unsubstantiated claims can generate a halo effect on consumers whereby the latter are nudged into paying more for the same level of csr investments by firms

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

consumer information in a market for expert services abstract we present a model of credence goods in which the consumers are heterogenous in terms of the valuation they place for getting a serious problem fixed we introduce consumer information into this framework by assuming that prior to visiting an expert some consumers receive an information signal about whether they have a serious or a minor problem we show that when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is sufficiently high the expert does not cheat any low valuation consumer regardless of their information status but cheats the high valuation consumers those high valuation consumers with bad signals are the most frequent victims of cheating whereas those with good signals are the least likely victims when the fraction of consumers with low willingness to pay is below a certain threshold however the unique equilibrium involves no cheating

credence goods costly diagnosis and subjective evaluation we study contracting between a consumer and an expert the expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low cost service is sufficient or whether a high cost treatment is required to solve the consumer s problem this involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and signals are not observable treatments are contractible but success or failure of the low cost treatment is observed only by the consumer payments can therefore not depend on the objective outcome but only the consumer s report or subjective evaluation a failure of the low cost treatment delays the solution of the consumer s problem by the high cost treatment to a second period we show that the first best solution can always be implemented if the parties discount rate is zero an increase in the discount rate reduces the range of parameter combinations for which the first best can be obtained in an extension we show that the first best is also always implementable if diagnosis and treatment can be separated by contracting with two different agents

on the role of verifiability and commitment in credence goods markets a client has a problem but does not know whether it is serious or minor she consults an expert who can correctly diagnose and fix her problem this paper characterizes the equilibrium pricing and recommendation strategies of an expert under the assumptions that i the type of treatment is verifiable by the client ii the client has the option of rejecting any treatment recommendation and iii the expert is not liable for the outcome of the treatment it is found for any parameter configuration that there exist equilibria in which the expert makes fraudulent recommendations resulting in inefficient treatment the market outcome is compared with that under an alternative market environment in which the expert is liable for treatment outcome but the type of treatment performed is non verifiable it is shown that for some parameter configurations the equilibrium is more efficient when liability is in place than when the treatment is verifiable these findings stand in sharp contrast to the received wisdom that the market outcome under verifiability of treatment is efficient while the market outcome under liability for outcome is not finally this paper shows that the existence of some honest experts may induce more fraudulent behavior by opportunistic experts

ecosystem services as substitute inputs basic results and important implications for conservation policy abstract in recent decades conservation advocates have often emphasized the contributions of ecosystem services to the production of other products a demonstration of the value of ecosystems as inputs into production would motivate their conservation such arguments often offer the observation that ecosystem services can substitute for purchased inputs and thus reduce costs if this is true however it has another important implication a producer who is preserving local ecosystems so as to maximize her own profit will produce less output if she further increases her reliance on ecosystem services this may induce leakage by which one producer s greater reliance on ecosystem services indirectly motivates others to preserve fewer natural ecosystems i demonstrate this result in a simple but canonical model and calibrate my findings to a celebrated example to show they could be quantitatively significant my results suggest another reason that appeals to ecosystem services as a motivation for conservation should be made with care at the most basic level they emphasize the importance of being clear about what we mean by conservation do we want to save some diversity in many places or nearly all indigenous diversity in a few places

efficient multiple use forestry may require land use specialization considered at the landscape scale economically efficient multiple use of forests may require land use specialization if managers attempt to satisfy legitimate multiple use demands from society by managing all lands for all outputs both commodity and amenity values of the forest may be inappropriately supplied and management inputs may be inefficiently deployed these results run counter to some of the prescriptions called new forestry

when do experts cheat and whom do they target a credence good is a product or service whose usefulness or necessity is better known to the seller than to the buyer this information asymmetry often persists even after the credence good is consumed i propose two new theories of expert cheating suggesting that identifiable heterogeneities among customers can cause expert sellers to defraud their customers according to these theories cheating arises as a substitute for price discrimination and experts cheat selectively for instance experts target high valuation and high cost customers finally selective cheating may damage the communication of useful information from customers to experts and result in inferior services

the production of eco labels eco labeling is a market based technique for conveying information about consumers demands for environmental protection most criticisms of eco labeling have concentrated on demand side issues the potential for firms or countries to use eco labels to manipulate market power and the difficulty of creating credible labels in this paper we argue that fundamental problems also arise on the production side specifically we argue that both increasing returns to scale and complexities in production imply that it will be possible to market only a small percentage of environmental attributes through the use of eco labels we present evidence for our hypotheses from a detailed survey of 100 randomly selected consumer products

gender effects in the credence goods market an experimental study abstract in this paper we offer further explanation for differences in earnings across genders we investigate difference in preferences in payment systems for credence goods we find that women were no less likely to select variable rate payment schemes as compensation for providing credence goods than men however overall earnings remained higher for men than for women disaggregating behavior by type of payment and gender reveals that women who chose fee for service provided significantly fewer units of services paid for than men who chose fee for service this difference accounts for the lower overall earnings for women in our experiments

information transmission in regulated markets the seminal papers of vincent p crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 study models in which a signal about the state of the world is transmitted from a perfectly informed sender to an uninformed receiver the authors study a model in which multiple signalers compete for consumers the authors ask how much information is revealed how consumers shopping around affects this information and how each is affected by incentives an implication of the model is that in a price regulated market for health care patients should not be prohibited from gathering more than one opinion

optimal design of forest taxation with multiple use characteristics of forest stands the paper studies optimal forest taxation under uncertainty about future timber price when private forest owners value amenity services of forest stands and forest stands have public goods characteristics it is assumed that preferences of forest owners can be described by a quasi linear intertemporal utility function which reflects risk aversion in terms of consumption and constant marginal utility in terms of amenity services the comparative statics of current and future harvesting in terms of timber price risk site productivity tax and yield tax are first developed it is shown that given the optimal site productivity tax which is independent of the timber harvested and thus non distortionary it is desirable to introduce the yield tax at the margin it both corrects externality due to the public goods characteristic of forest stands and serves as a social insurance device the optimal yield tax is less than 100 and depends on the social value of forest stands timber price risk and properties of compensated timber supply in the general case the inverse elasticity rule according to which the optimal yield tax is negatively related to the size of the substitution effects may not hold under certainty the desirability of the yield tax given the optimal site productivity tax depends only on the existence of public goods characteristic and is thus a pure pigouvian tax

credence goods efficient labelling policies and regulatory enforcement we analyse the optimality of information revelation of hidden attributes of credence goods via alternative labelling procedures when consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the hidden attribute producers can either self label their products or have them certified by a third party the government can impose self or third party labelling requirements on either the green or the brown producers our benchmark model develops a condition that links the optimal imposition of third party labelling to the relative market share of each type of the good under complete information we extend our analysis to incorporate asymmetric information and cheating by the producers when corrupt producers can affix spurious labels the government needs to supplement the labelling policy with costly monitoring activities we find that mandatory self labelling schemes generally dominate mandatory third party labelling unless the market share effect greatly exceeds the incentive to cheat effect

the product life cycle and the export position of the united states the present study analyzed trade in 4 digit level manufacturing categories over time for 4 nations including the united states to ascertain the relevance of the product life cycle theory of such trade the level of technological input was controlled for the result indicate that the theory has at least some explanatory relevance for 3 of the 4 countries including the united states

experts vs discounters consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods this paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis the unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures this makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters we explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free riding on experts advice and we discuss policy options to solve the free riding consumers cheating experts problem

credence goods experts and risk aversion abstract the existing literature on credence goods and expert services has overlooked the importance of risk aversion in this paper we extend a standard expert model of credence goods with verifiable service quality by considering risk averse consumers our results show that the presence of risk aversion reduces the expert s incentive to invest in diagnosis and may thus lead to consumers mistreatment

credence goods monopolists abstract with a credence good consumers never discover how much of the good they actually need therefore the seller acts as the expert determining the customers requirements this information asymmetry creates strong incentives for the seller to cheat on services we analyze whether the market mechanism may induce non fraudulent seller behavior we consider four scenarios differing in the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer the seller s incentives to be honest in three constellations the profit maximizing credence goods monopolist provides honest services only in one scenario there is no trade

timber harvest adjacency economies hunting species protection and old growth value seeking the dynamic optimum abstract forests have the potential to provide ecosystem services timber mature growth aesthetics and wildlife and endangered species protection forest managers are faced with complex ecosystem management decisions due to competing and complementary social values and differential interactions of these social values with timber production as a result management strategies can have dramatic aggregate and intertemporal welfare implications this paper portrays the trade offs and externalities in choosing or changing the forest management objective and the resulting rankings of management policies in addition the paper analyzes the role of economies of scale in harvest area where larger harvest areas generate average cost savings in harvesting and reseeding thereby promoting more intensive harvesting at the expense of environmental benefits

unobserved investment endogenous quality and trade a seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset s future returns the potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller s investment prior to trade nor does he receive any signal of it nor can he verify it in anyway after trade despite this severe moral hazard problem this paper shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability the outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining power between the parties with a holdup problem existing if the buyer has the bargaining power a consequence of the holdup problem is surplus reducing distortions in investment level perhaps counterintuitively in many situations this distortion involves an increase in the expected amount invested vis a vis the situation without holdup

search bargaining and signalling in the market for legal services over the last eight centuries lawyers in common law countries have generally been precluded from buying their clients cases recently a number of economists and lawyers have argued that sale should be allowed so as to eliminate moral hazard particularly when contingent fees are used this argument is based on full information reasoning however if the lawyer has private information about the case value then compensation demands potentially signal this value when the client can search over lawyers we provide a formal model and a family of computational examples that show that allowing possibly partial purchase can reduce expected social efficiency

car mechanics in the lab investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods credence goods such as car repairs or medical services are characterized by severe informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers leading to fraud in the form of provision of insufficient service undertreatment provision of unnecessary service overtreatment and charging too much for a given service overcharging recent experimental research involving a standard student subject pool has examined the influence of informational and market conditions on the type and level of fraud we investigate whether professional car mechanics as real sellers of credence goods react in the same way to changes in informational and institutional constraints while we find qualitatively similar effects in the fraud dimensions of undertreatment and overcharging for both subject pools car mechanics are significantly more prone to supplying unnecessary services in all conditions which could be a result of decision heuristics they learned in their professional training