a farm firm model of machinery investment decisions this article presents a multiperiod mixed integer programming mmip model of optimal machinery decisions infinite horizon valuation models of replacement and other investment situations are conceptualized in the context of a finite programming model dual properties of the mmip model are used to identify and value opportunity costs involved in investment decisions of farm machinery the interdependent nature of investment and production relationships necessary for solving these values emphasizes the importance of a holistic firm perspective in analyzing farm machinery investment strategies an empirical situation is used to demonstrate model application

the relative economic performance of foreign subsidiaries in uk manufacturing there is now considerable evidence to show that domestically owned firms does have lower levels of labour productivity than foreign owned subsidiaries foss in uk manufacturing industry in explaining these productivity differences most studies refer to the firm specific advantages which multinationals possess allowing them to succeed in foreign environments in fact as barrell and pain 1997 point out if foreign owned assets are no more productive than those that are locally owned the rational for fdi particularly among developed countries disappears superior foreign owned assets are also important from a policy viewpoint in that there is a perception that host countries can benefit from the potential for spillover effects to domestic firms given the importance of firm specific advantages to fdi theory it is surprising that there has been little attempt to directly measure these assets in studies of relative productivity performance

managerial leverage is limited by the extent of the market hierarchies specialization and the utilization of lawyers human capital abstract this paper examines the role of hierarchies in the organization of human capital intensive production we develop an equilibrium model of hierarchical organization and provide empirical evidence based on confidential data on thousands of law offices the equilibrium assignment of individuals to hierarchical positions varies with the degree of field specialization which increases as the extent of the market increases as individuals knowledge becomes narrower but deeper managerial leverage the number of workers per manager optimally increases to exploit this depth consistent with our model the share of lawyers who work in hierarchies and the ratio of associates to partners increase as market size increases and lawyers field specialize other results provide evidence against alternative interpretations that emphasize unobserved differences in the distribution of demand or firm size effects and lend additional support to the view that in legal services hierarchies help exploit increasing re

reaching for the stars who pays for talent in innovative industries innovative firms need to hire and motivate highly talented workers this article connects the potential returns to innovation to the structure of compensation for skilled employees we show that the software firms that operate in software sectors with high potential upside gains to innovation pay more to star workers than do other firms that operate in stable markets firms operating in product domains with highly skewed positive returns pay employees more in up front starting salaries and offer higher compensation growth the large estimated effects on earnings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls for worker and firm characteristics

a nonlinear mixed integer multiperiod firm model abstract we formulate and test an advanced multiperiod model for strategic firm planning this has not been previously considered as a mixed integer nonlinear problem minlp our approach is to show the differences between a linear and a nonlinear mixed integer approach the key property of our model is the simplicity and efficiency of generating optimal firm strategies a cornerstone for managerial acceptance our purpose is to maximize the discounted value of net income and return on investment roi our model has been tested on some major finnish firms and it seems to give reliable results with the data of our sample firm for this paper optimal roi and optimal net income presuppose different strategies when optimizing roi the model balances between cash and fixed assets while optimizing net income results in an intensive investment program even if our sample firm is but one case the results are indicative of some fundamental principles governing managerial decision making

production and investment decisions under sunk cost and temporal uncertainty building on glenn johnson s asset fixity theory this article introduces sunk cost and temporal uncertainty in jorgenson s neoclassical theory of investment under the assumption of risk neutrality we show sunk cost and temporal risk affect the implicit rental value of capital and investment and entry exit decisions results suggest there are important interactions between sunk cost and the effects of temporal uncertainty on production behavior

comparative advantage learning and sectoral wage determination we develop a model in which a worker s skills determine the worker s current wage and sector the market and the worker are initially uncertain about some of the worker s skills endogenous wage changes and sector mobility occur as labor market participants learn about these unobserved skills we show how the model can be estimated using nonlinear instrumental variables techniques we apply our methodology to study wages and allocation of workers across occupations and industries using individual level panel data from the national longitudinal survey of youth we find that high wage sectors employ high skill workers and offer high returns to workers skills

incentives learning and compensation a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts this article analyzes properties and implications of multiperiod managerial labor contracts under two alternative hypotheses incentives in which productivity depends on unobservable effort and learning in which ability is unknown and is revealed over time shared and conflicting implications of these competing models are developed in terms of experienceearnings profiles and the relation between compensation and performance i empirically examine these theoretical results by using a longitudinal sample of 1 488 chief executive officers followed from 1974 1985 the data yield mixed evidence that generally supports the learning hypothesis over the incentive hypothesis

changes in the u s wage structure 1963 1987 application of quantile regression the 1980 s witnessed rapid changes in the structure of wages in the united states in this study recently developed techniques for quantile regression are applied to every march current population survey since 1964 and changes in the return to schooling and experience at different points of the wage distribution are examined the quantile regression technique parsimoniously describes the entire conditional wage distribution this conditional distribution is used to examine changes in within group wage inequality as measured by the difference between conditional quantiles two linear models are considered a simple one group model and a 16 group model the results suggest that the returns to schooling and experience differ across quantiles of the wage distribution but their patterns of change are similar significant differences in wage inequality are also found across the various skill groups the paper also presents a new imputation method for cps data

the creation and capture of rents wages and innovation in a panel of u k companies this paper examines the impact of technological innovation on wages using a panel of british firms a head count measure of major innovations between 1945 and 1983 is combined with share price and accounting information innovating firms are found to have higher average wages but rival innovation tends to depress own wages this appears consistent with a model where wages are partly determined by a sharing in the rents generated by innovation in other words innovation may be a good instrument for proxies for rents such as profitability quasi rents or tobin s average q instrumental variable estimates of the elasticity between wages and quasi rents are about 0 29

cultural influences on managerial choice an empirical study of employee benefit plans in the united states the objective of this study is to determine the effect of culture on the provision of employee benefits cultural influences have been investigated from a variety of perspectives but not in the context of pension and welfare benefits using unique data this study analyzes the level of coverage of employee benefits in the united states results indicate that culture does have an effect on the provision of these benefits

valuation of the operating flexibility of multinational corporations the returns to multinationality are estimated as the value of operating flexibility empirical measures of the return of multinationality require a precise specification of the extensiveness of the mnc s transnational network to measure the degree of multinationality this precise empirically grounded definition of multinationality has been absent from the academic literature to date we address this omission and we find that two characteristics of the transnational network its breadth number of foreign countries in which the mnc has operations and depth the concentration of foreign subsidiaries in a few countries are significant in explaining the value of operating flexibility in particular we find that the returns to multinationality are maximized for firms with networks that have breadth but not depth the role of market intangibles such as r d and advertising on mnc market valuation is shown to depend on the flexibility regime

managing innovation optimal incentive contracts for delegated r d with double moral hazard abstract managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates r d to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions the analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated r d is an option delegated r d with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated r d with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome the analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated r d attains the first best the discussion also considers delegated r d with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions

incentives in organizations n 1975 steven kerr published on the folly of rewarding a while hoping for b the argument was simple you get what you pay for kerr distilled this unifying theme from a disparate set of examples involving politicians soldiers doctors orphanage directors professors and students as well as manufacturing and clerical employees and even human resource managers from these examples kerr pp 77980 concluded that two main causes of distorted incentives are fascination with an objective criterion where individuals seek to establish simple quantifiable standards against which to measure and reward performance and overemphasis on highly visible behaviors when some parts of the task are highly visible while others are not it took agency theory 15 years to express kerr s title not to mention to evaluate or extend his conclusions during this period agency theory was obsessed with the tradeoff between incentives and insurance even though clear eyed observations like kerr s about the design and performance of real incentive contracts suggested that several other issues are at least as important fortunately recent work has brought agency theory not only to kerr s position but beyond in this paper i summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations as a point of departure i begin with a quick sketch of the classic agency model i then discuss static models of objective performance measurement that sharpen kerr s argument repeated game models of subjective performance assessments incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort and incentive contracts between versus within organizations i con

investment and disinvestment principles with nonconstant prices and varying firm size applied to beef breeding herds variable beef breeding herd sizes are found to be optimal given cyclical beef prices traditional replacement theory does not allow variable firm size because unequal investment replacement and disinvestment culling rates are not possible if firm size changes cost of production per unit endogenously changes given a u shaped cost curve optimal investment and disinvestment rules for variable firm size are developed based upon the firm s cost curve and discounted net revenue flows for a finite rolling planning horizon current and future investment and disinvestment decisions are linked by their mutual effect on firm size and hence production cost per unit

the polarization of the u s labor market this paper analyzes a marked change in the evolution of the u s wage structure over the past fifteen years divergent trends in upper tail 90 50 and lower tail 50 10 wage inequality we document that wage inequality in the top half of distribution has displayed an unchecked and rather smooth secular rise for the last 25 years since 1980 wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution also grew rapidly from 1979 to 1987 but it has ceased growing and for some measures actually narrowed since the late 1980s furthermore we find that occupational employment growth shifted from monotonically increasing in wages education in the 1980s to a pattern of more rapid growth in jobs at the top and bottom relative to the middles of the wage education distribution in the 1990s we characterize these patterns as the u201cpolarization u201d of the u s labor market with employment polarizing into high wage and low wage jobs at the expense of middle wage work we show how a model of computerization in which computers most strongly complement the non routine abstract cognitive tasks of high wage jobs directly substitute for the routine tasks found in many traditional middle wage jobs and may have little direct impact on non routine manual tasks in relatively low wage jobs can help explain the observed polarization of the u s labor market this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

fdi theories and the performance of foreign multinationals operating in the u s based on firm specific financial data performance of foreign multinationals operating in the u s is evaluated to determine if they enjoy advantages over u s firms results of this study indicate that foreign firms operating in the u s are less profitable than randomly selected u s firms that they spend more in research and development but less in advertising and that they have higher debt levels combined with higher liquidity in addition the findings also demonstrate that the determinants of excess market value as measured by tobin s q differ between foreign owned firms and american owned firms and that the performance of foreign multinationals differ by country of origin this suggests that foreign owned firms may have different reasons for investing in the u s and that foreign multinationals present investment opportunities to the u s investors distinct from american firms

optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns theory and evidence this paper studies optimal incentive contracts when workers have career concerns concerns about the effects of current performance on future compensation we show that the optimal compensation contract optimizes total incentives the combination of the implicit incentives from career concerns and the explicit incentives from the compensation contract thus the explicit incentives from the optimal compensation contract should be strongest for workers close to retirement because career concerns are weakest for these workers we find empirical support for this prediction in the relation between chief executive compensation and stock market performance

an adjustment cost rationalization of asset fixity theory this article integrates a classic concept in production economics g l johnson s asset fixity theory with the dynamic adjustment cost model until now the literature has considered these two to be incompatible by relaxing the smoothness assumption of the adjustment cost function at the origin the theory of costs of adjustment can provide a rigorous endogenization of asset fixity g l johnson and edwards results are then obtained when the linearity assumption of the adjustment cost function is imposed the work reported here also indicates that both smoothness at the origin and symmetry of adjustment cost function should be subject to empirical tests

misspecification of capital asset pricing this study documents empirical anomalies which suggest that either the simple one period capital asset pricing model capm is misspecified or that capital markets are inefficient in particular portfolios based on firm size or earnings price e p ratios experience average returns systematically different from those predicted by the capm furthermore the abnormal returns persist for at least two years this persistence reduces the likelihood that these results are being generated by a market inefficiency rather the evidence seems to indicate that the equilibrium pricing model is misspecified however the data also reveals that an e p effect does not emerge after returns are controlled for the firm size effect the firm size effect largely subsumes the e p effect thus while the e p anomaly and value anomaly exist when each variable is considered separately the two anomalies seem to be related to the same set of missing factors and these factors appear to be more closely associated with firm size than e p ratios

motives of non american firms investing in the united states non american firms have recently begun investing larger sums of money in the u s such increased activity has created a great deal of interest and concern the growth in foreign direct investment and findings of a mailed questionnaire will be reviewed in this article factor analysis was utilized to help isolate the salient motives for these investment activities although the size of the u s market and the attractiveness of a new market or the desire to preserve the existing u s market were the most frequently cited reasons for new investment in the u s factor analysis reveals that these reasons merely reinforce the primary motive namely the desire to benefit from a higher level of u s technology and innovation

on the misuse of the profits sales ratio to infer monopoly power the common use of the profits sales ratio as a measure of the lerner index of monopoly power is flawed even with the assumption of constant returns because of problems connected with the valuation of capital the size of the error is related to the cost of capital the growth rate of the firm the depreciation method used and most important the shape of the stream of benefits resulting from an investment examples show that the error can be quite large further the error is likely to be systematically related to the variables used in regression studies

an opportunity cost view of fixed asset theory and the overproduction trap comment in a 1981 ajae article johnson and pasour criticize the works of edwards and glenn johnson 1972 and earlier publications for attributing persistent excess production in agriculture to an asset fixity theory which at its crux relies on divergences between asset acquisition costs and asset salvage values johnson and pasour mjp pinpoint their critique of edwards and johnson ej when they state p 3 the conclusion of fixed asset theory that excess resources are trapped in production can be traced directly to selection of acquisition prices of resources as a benchmark for equilibrium production but there is no reason to expect the opportunity cost of a resource once acquired to equal its historical acquisition price in his 1982 ajae reply to mjp glenn johnson contends that the ej formulation does contrary to the mjp assertion allocate resources on the basis of opportunity costs including the cases where opportunity cost is equal to current not historical acquisition cost or ourrent not historical salvage value the primary purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly how mjp s article is lacking in a key respect it ignores intertemporal opportunity costs of durable resources to achieve brevity and expositional clarity other aspects of differences between mjp and ej are avoided insofar as the specifics of this paper allows conventional resource adjustment theory is reviewed by mjp their equations 1 4 pp 1 2 stress is placed on the usual hypothesis that the equilibrium use of durable resources similar to nondurables occurs when each durable s value of marginal product just equals its marginal factor cost this equilibrium relation is hypothesized for a profit maximization firm to hold for each durable resource or asset in each production or planning period t but this engine of analysis while acceptable for nondurable resources lacks crucial detail for dealing with the multiperiodicity of durable resources essentially it is a monoperiodic engine or at best it is a sequential monoperiodic engine it avoids defining the time horizon the finite or infinite span of t hence it avoids a precise definition of the relevant set of investment disinvestment and production activities to be considered by the decision maker more specifically even if t can be limited to a finite number of periods s intertemporal opportunity costs associated with each durable resource are ignored assumed by implication to not exist or assumed to equal zero to paraphrase perrin who mjp acknowledge as having reviewed their paper these are the costs of postponing the earnings which will be forthcoming from the series of replacement or new investment durable assets for the currently owned or currently considered asset moreover if the appropriate span of t is infinite it becomes even more important not to ignore intertemporal opportunity costs this point was illustrated conceptually by perrin in his figure 1 p 61 when considering optimal investment disinvestment in and use of durables multiperiod models which explicitly account for time money relationships are judged by most economic analysts to be preferable to conventional static monoperiodic models wealth maximization becomes the norm as opposed to one period profit maximization present value equations which model flows of acquisition prices ensuing quasi rents and salvage values of durables or their derived first order marginal optimizing inequalities take over the role of simple static vmp mfc equalities in what follows the resource adjustment rule hypothesized by mjp is compared with the marginal rules derived by perrin rules and logic which are presented in various earlier and subsequent texts and other publications on capital investment equation 3 in mjp p 2 summarizes their durable resource adjustment rule as follows

the economics of real superstars the market for rock concerts in the material world beginning in 1997 the price of concert tickets took off and ticket sales declined from 1996 to 2003 for example the average concert price increased by 82 while the cpi increased by 17 explanations for price growth include 1 the possible crowding out of the secondary ticket market 2 rising superstar effects 3 baumols and bowen s disease 4 increased concentraion of promoters and 5 the erosion of complementarities between concerts and album sales because of file sharing and cd copying the article tentatively concludes that the decline in complementarities is the main cause of the recent surge in concert prices

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

international corporate diversification market valuation and size adjusted evidence errunza and senbet es 7 analyze the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm both at theoretical and empirical levels the theoretical model which is largely heuristic exploits the costly supply adjustment of multinational firms mncs in providing international portfolio diversification services to investors who face differential cost barriers to direct holdings of assets across national boundaries mncs compete as financial intermediaries to undo the barriers so that in equilibrium profits are driven out mncs and pure domestic firms sell at an equivalent risk adjusted return however costly financial intermediation and the associated relative efficiency leads to a positive valuation effect for mncs relative to purely domestic firms further the equilibrium analysis implies that demand side investor barriers to international capital flows alone are inconsequential to the valuation of mncs in their pure financial role but that the interaction with the supply side costs are necessary to produce a valuation effect at the corporate level es subject the theory to an empirical analysis in a value based approach by employing a variant of tobin s 17 qratio the analysis controlling for industrial market power suggests that the relationship between the excess valuation and the degree of international involvement doi has magnified over periods characterized by severe u s government controls vis a vis the more recent periods in this paper we formalize the theoretical argument by viewing indirect portfolio diversification by mncs as a means of completing the international capital market we employ a paradigm in the unanimity literature and formally characterize the equilibrium in which there is a rationale for mnc financial intermediation we then perform an expanded empirical study by employing generalized least squares and maximum likelihood procedures since the positive relationship between excess valuation and doi as suggested in es 7 might be attributed to the so called small firm or size and the p e effects the test methodology controls for such effects also the traditional literature has relied upon foreign sales percentage as a proxy for doi in view of the well recognized limitations of this proxy we employ four different measures of international

the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm theory and evidence this paper investigates the existence of monopoly rents associated with international operations in a market value theoretic framework the benefits of international operations evolve from such factors as 1 imperfections in the product and factor markets 2 differential international taxation and 3 imperfections in the financial markets in this paper these factors are subject to an equilibrium analysis in the context of recent advances in financial theory in particular imperfections in the financial sector arising from corporate international diversification are examined in a framework which allows a supply adjustments by multinational firms and b the interaction of barriers to international capital flows faced by both firms and investors taking the u s capital market and investors as a base we then specify the conditions under which the foregoing imperfections get priced out in an equilibrium these pricing effects cannot be detected empirically through the methodologies employed by the existing studies which examine the effects of corporate international diversification indeed it was an attempt to rescue the limitations of these studies which initially motivated our paper the existing empirical inquiries into this area rely on traditional risk adjusted performance measures e g 7 or international analogs of return generating processes e g 1 8 instead at the empirical level we employ a value based method which is in the same vein of the thomadakis 17 approach developed to identify the monopoly benefits of industrial market structure we conduct the tests over subperiods characterized by differential government controls in an attempt a to separate the pure financial motives for multinationality from other motives and b to detect if the benefits of international operations carry through recent periods

the tenuous trade off between risk and incentives empirical work testing for a negative trade off between risk and incentives has not had much success the data suggest a positive relationship between measures of uncertainty and incentives rather than the posited negative trade off i argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees when workers operate in certain settings firms are content to assign tasks to workers and monitor their inputs by contrast when the situation is more uncertain they delegate responsibility to workers but to constrain their discretion base compensation on observed output

investment and disinvestment principles with nonconstant prices and varying firm size applied to beef breeding herds comment optimal investment and disinvestment principles have received considerable attention in both general and agricultural economics for over two centuries notable are the works of faustmann samuelson 1937 hirschleifer burt and perrin which establish the basic replacement principle recently trapp presented a reformulation of this basic replacement principle by relaxing the assumptions of constant prices and firm size the purpose of this comment is to discuss a possible misinterpretation of the replacement principle underlying trapp s model specifically the link between trapp s article and previous literature is established with the hope of clarifying any misunderstandings of optimal investment principles trapp states that his equations 3 and 4 which are derived from the discrete time form of the net present value formula for a single asset constitute the appropriate addition and culling investment and disinvestment decision rules for a firm with nonconstant size trapp p 694 this formulation is analogous to perrin s equation 2 which maximizes the returns from an asset over a single rotation in contrast chavas kliebenstein and crenshaw present the asset replacement decision as an optimal control problem with an infinite planning horizon transversality conditions for optimal asset rotation as given in chavas kliebenstein and crenshaw s equation 12 correspond to perrin s equation 4 2 which maximizes the returns from an asset over an infinite horizon reid and bradford in an investigation of investment and disinvestment in farm machinery also derive optimal rotation criteria analogous to perrin s formulation thus it appears that an inconsistency exists in the journal associated with the appropriate replacement rule when expansion and contraction of an operation is endogenously determined should replacement rules be derived from an infinite horizon specification or from a single asset specification the merits of an investment decision must be based not only on earnings from the next production period but also on the rents which can be extracted from the firm s fixed factors failure to consider future assets in a replacement decision implies that changes in replacement costs have absolutely no effect on the optimal life of assets up to the point where it is no longer profitable to operate specifically maximizing over a single asset rotation corresponds to maximizing the internal rate of return of an investment decision with a discount rate quivalent to the internal rate of return samuelson 1976 the quantitative effects of considering only a single asset specification are minimal depending on the length of the asset rotation and the discount rate employed as the rotation length increases or a larger discount rate is employed representation of the optimal replacement rule will converge to perrin s equation 2 samuelson 1976 the turnpike theorem states that if the asset rotation is of sufficient length where the end of the horizon has o influence on period decisions the system then converges towards the von neumann path boussard too short a length may result in the system never converging toward the von neumann path alternatively if the salvage and acquisition values are equal at any point in time then the von neumann path will be reached at the beginning of the last period however in general asset replacement is costly and thus access to the von neumann path is not instantaneous the apparent inconsistent use of a single asset specification in contrast to basic replacement principles associated with an infinite horizon may be resolved by investigating the theoretical results in chavas and klemme employing an optimal control methodology with a finite planning horizon t a distinction among rules derived from alternative specifications is evident using perrin s terminology chavas and klemme generalize the replacement criteria for a system with multiple constraints

why are researchers paid bonuses on technology spillovers and market rivalry abstract a temporary change in pay to employed inventors around the time of patent application has been documented a theoretical model is here developed to provide an explanation to said findings based on the idea that inventors may be able to use the knowledge previously generated while working in a firm in a rival company the model features firms who hire workers in r d functions to make product innovations the innovation process consists of distinct phases each with different access to information about the innovation value for firms firms compete to attract workers and workers can transfer part of the generated new knowledge to a new employer results suggest that the capital intensity of r d investments and the type and size of knowledge spillovers may affect the probability to observe bonus pay at the time of a patent application different tax incentives and subsidies are then studied as a means to correct for possible under investment of capital we study the effect of a patent box a subsidy to r d capital investments and a subsidy to bonus pay when market rivalry prevails over positive knowledge externalities a bonus pay incentive was found to obtain the social first best while a patent box or a subsidy to capital investment would cause overinvestment when positive knowledge externalities prevail either a patent box or a subsidy to capital investment obtain the social optimal level of capital investments

are ceos really paid like bureaucrats a common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and ceo pay using a new fifteen year panel data set of ceos in the largest publicly traded u s companies we document a strong relationship between firm performance and ceo compensation this relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of ceo holdings of stock and stock options in addition we show that both the level of ceo compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980 largely because of increases in stock option grants

internal capital markets and firm level compensation incentives for division managers do multidivisional firms structure compensation contracts for division managers to mitigate incentive problems in their internal capital markets i find evidence that compensation and investment incentives are substitutes firms providing a stronger link to firm performance in incentive compensation for division managers also provide weaker investment incentives through the capital budgeting process specifically as the proportion of incentive pay for division managers that is based on firm performance increases division investment is less responsive to division profitability these findings are generally consistent with a model of influence activities by division managers in interdivisional capital allocation decisions

foreign direct investment by japanese electronics firms in the united states and canada modelling the timing of entry this paper examines the relationship between attributes of japanese electronics firms and the sequence of their investments in the u s and canada it is argued that a useful way to model foreign direct investment fdi decisions is to recognize explicitly the uncertainties involved in them a probabilistic model of fdi is specified the following hypotheses are incorporated in the model 1 the higher the risk adjusted expected net benefits from foreign direct investment ceteris paribus the higher the probability of making an investment at any particular moment and thus the probability of investing earlier 2 risk adjusted expected net benefits from fdi by a firm are a function of its possession of certain types of intangible transportable assets 3 the uncertainties involved with fdi may be reduced with the passage of time and with increased experience with foreign operations 4 parent company attributes that facilitate market intelligence capabilities permit early recognition of investment opportunities and 5 timing of entry may reflect strategic considerations such as responding to growing foreign market opportunities the need to ensure market access and the presence of opportunities to obtain abnormal profits due to market concentration the models are estimated using cox s proportional hazards regression model results generally confirm the hypotheses that size and financial capabilities as well as possession of some knowledge based firm specific strategic assets are significantly related to early fdi they also confirm that timing of entry is affected by market opportunities and in some cases by the need to ensure market access we did not find evidence in this sector that differences in market concentration significantly affected the timing of fdi analyses are also provided of inter period changes in the importance of different types of intangible assets in explaining earlier fdi as well as changes that reflect differences in host country environments

career concerns of mutual fund managers we examine the labor market for mutual fund managers using data from 1992 1994 we find that termination is more performance sensitive for younger managers we identify possible implicit incentives created by the termination performance relationship the shape of the termination performance relationship may give younger managers an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk direct effects of portfolio composition may also give younger managers an incentive to herd into popular sectors consistent with these incentives we find that younger managers hold less unsystematic risk and have more conventional portfolios promotion incentives and market responses to managerial turnover are also studied

comparative advantage relative wages and the accumulation of human capital i apply ricardo s principle of comparative advantage to a theory of factor substitutability in a model with a continuum of worker and job types highly skilled workers have a comparative advantage in complex jobs the model satisfies the distance dependent elasticity of substitution dides characteristic substitutability between types declines with their skill distance i analyze changes in relative wages due to human capital accumulation the concept of a complexity dispersion parameter or compression elasticity is introduced empirical studies suggest its value to be equal to two a 1 percent increase in the stock of human capital reduces the mincerian return by 2 percent

individual preferences organization and competition in a model of r d incentive provision abstract understanding the organization of rd 2 knowledge is not perfectly appropriable 3 scientists are responsive to both monetary and non monetary incentives and 4 firms compete on the product market we show that both knowledge spillovers and market competition affect the incentives given to scientists and these effects interact first high knowledge spillovers lead firms to soften incentives when product market competition is high and to strengthen incentives when competition is low second the relationship between the intensity of competition and the power of incentives is u shaped with the exact shape depending on the degree of knowledge spillovers we also show that the performance contingent pay for both applied and basic research increases with the non pecuniary benefits that scientists obtain from research while the fixed component decreases we relate our findings to the existing empirical evidence and also discuss their implications for management and public policy

the dependence of pay performance sensitivity on the size of the firm i analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm s shareholders i use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship estimating this model on chief executive officer ceo compensation data using nonlinear least squares i determine that pay performance sensitivity as defined by jensen and murphy 1990b appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size however measured i also analyze the properties of pay performance sensitivity for teams of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as ceo pay performance sensitivity

multinational enterprise internal governance and industrial organization abstractthe following sections are included monopoly vs efficiency interpretations of the multinational enterprisehost country controlsdynamic considerationsconclusionreferences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

mobility barriers and tobin s q the cross sectional relation of tobin s q to structural features of firms depends on market conditions features such as industry concentration advertising and research and development intensity firm specialization and proxies for the use of specialized resources can operate as barriers to entry or to exit depending on the direction of expectations regressions of q on structural features over periods when the state of the economy was clearly different strongly confirm this view for example concentration was positively related to q in the mid 1960s but negatively related in the mid 1970s coefficients for all structural variables also changed significantly this implies that structural features must be interpreted as indexes of resources flexibility rather than as sources of stable positive rents copyright 1987 by the university of chicago

excess market value the multinational corporation and tobin s q ratio the results of this study show that there is a positive and significant relationship between excess market value of multinational corporations and the degree of international involvement as measured by foreign sales percentage however the excess market value is not determined by the number of foreign subsidiaries nor the interaction between foreign sales and the number of foreign subsidiaries the relationship between excess market value and the two frequently used measures of monopoly power concentration ratio and the lerner index was also examined this study found that the lerner index contributes significantly in explaining excess market value but concentration ratio does not furthermore the positive and significant coefficients of advertising and r d intensity serve as evidence that product market imperfections appear to play a bigger role in explaining the excess market value experienced by mncs during our sample period

ceo incentives and firm size we develop a model that clarifies how to measure ceo incentive strength and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms the crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of ceo productivity with respect to firm size we find that ceo marginal products rise significantly with firm size confirming rosen s conjecture that ceos of large firms have a chain letter effect on firm performance and overall ceo incentives are roughly constant or decline slightly with firm size we employ a multitask model to discuss implications for the design of control systems

an opportunity cost view of fixed asset theory and the overproduction trap in fixed asset and exit barrier theories durable asset valuation is based upon acquisition prices yielding downwardly biased rate of return estimates and erroneous implications that excess resources become trapped in production when product price expectations fall conventional asset valuation based on opportunity cost shows that excess resource applications are incompatible with rational producer behavior market failure conclusions of overproduction trap models are shown to be unfounded a review of recently published agricultural economics texts illustrates how use of fixed asset theory in the college classroom obscures the concept of choice influencing cost and the rule of resource allocative efficiency