not all rivals look alike estimating an equilibrium model of the release date timing game a very serious game of strategy is at work a cross between chess and chicken which studio distribution chiefs play year round but with increasing intensity during the summer and holiday release period new york times december 6 1999 hubris hubris if you only think about your own business you think i ve got a good story department i ve got a good marketing department we re going to go out and do this and you don t think that everybody else is thinking the same way in a given weekend in a year you ll have five movies open and there s certainly not enough people to go around joe roth chairman of walt disney studios answering a question about the large number of major movies opening within days of each other los angeles times december 31 1996 i introduction the number of americans who go to the movies varies dramatically over the course of the year and sometimes more than doubles within a period of two weeks at the same time the first week accounts for almost 40 of the box office revenues of the average movie the combination of these two facts makes the timing of launching a new movie a major focus of attention for distributors of movies with virtually no subsequent price competition the movie s release date is one of the main short run vehicles by which studios compete with each other in this paper i develop and estimate a model of discrete games which allows me to analyze this release date timing game most empirical industry studies focus on price and quantity competition taking other product characteristics as given in many industries however prices play a very small role and competition is channeled through other product attributes the entertainment industry is a prime example competition among movies television programs or broadway shows is on nonmonetary product attributes such as content advertising and time therefore understanding competition in such industries requires a model that endogenizes some of these product attributes especially those that can be changed in the short run this paper provides a framework in which release decisions can be endogenized and nonprice competition can be analyzed the absence of price competition is useful because it allows the focus of the analysis to be on the timing dimension without relying on assumptions about the nature of the postrelease price competition 1 together with the frequent timing decisions associated with different movies this makes the motion picture industry quite attractive for empirical analysis of the timing game this industry however is not the only example in which timing decisions play a central role similar timing considerations are also important in the release decisions of books compact disks and other new products as well as in the scheduling decisions of major events television programs flight schedules and promotional sales 2 when taking on a new project distributors of movies typically plan for a friday release which falls within a relatively short window of time carefully chosen to match the type of the movie this makes the choice of the release date a very discrete one the exact friday within the season is generally determined by a strategic timing game played among distributors before each release season distributors scramble to release their movies on big holiday weekends when demand is high when doing so each distributor tries to release on the attractive holiday weekend and at the same time to deter competitors from doing the same the extent to which distributors are successful in doing so largely depends on the quality of the movies at their disposal and on the way they can compete with movies released by other studios thus modeling this timing game must account for the asymmetries among movies and for the variation in these asymmetries across release seasons specifically i develop and estimate a sequential move game with private information i assume that the observed release date decisions are the equilibrium outcome of such a game

competition between exchanges a research agenda this paper describes open research questions related to the competition and market structure of financial exchanges and argues that only a combination of industrial organization and finance can satisfactorily attack these questions two examples are discussed to illustrate how the combination of these two approaches can significantly enrich the analysis the network externality puzzle which refers to the question of why trading for the same security is often split across trading venues and the impact of the multi sided character of financial exchanges on pricing and profitability

nonparametric estimation of sample selection models sample selection models provide an important way of accounting for economic decisions that combine discrete and continuous choices and of correcting for nonrandom sampling nonparametric estimators for these models are developed in this paper these can be used for estimating shapes and important economic quantities as in standard nonparametnc regression endogeneity of regressors of interest is allowed for series estimators for these models are developed which are useful for imposing additivity restnctions that arise from selection corrections convergence rates and asymptotic normality results are derived an application to returns to schooling among australian young females is given

on the equilibrium properties of locational sorting models abstract important to many models of location choice is the role of local interactions or spillovers whereby the payoffs from choosing a location depend in part on the number or attributes of other individuals or firms that choose the same or nearby locations in equilibrium this paper develops the equilibrium properties of a broadly applicable and readily estimable class of sorting models that allow location decisions to depend on both fixed local attributes including unobserved attributes and local interactions describes the conditions under which equilibria exist and are unique and provides a test for uniqueness in empirical analyses of sorting equilibrium

platform pricing in mixed two sided markets when a consumer can appear on both sides of a two sided market such as a user who both buys and sells on ebay the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides i develop a general model for such mixed two sided markets and show that a monopolist platform s incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand which embody the bundling effect and price cost margins adjusted for network externalities which incorporate two sidedness the optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar lerner formula

ownership consolidation and product characteristics a study of the us daily newspaper market this paper develops a structural model of newspaper markets to analyze the effects of ownership consolidation taking into account not only firms price adjustments but also the adjustments in newspaper characteristics a new dataset on newspaper prices and characteristics is used to estimate the model the paper then simulates the effect of a merger in the minneapolis newspaper market and studies how welfare effects of mergers vary with market characteristics it finds that ignoring adjustments of product characteristics causes substantial differences in estimated effects of mergers jel g32 l13 l82 m37 do mergers affect product characteristics standard merger analyses typically study price effects only and ignore changes in product characteristics this paper endogenizes both it is likely that firms would adjust the features of their products after a merger ignoring this aspect of firm decisions in a merger analysis can lead to a bias in estimated welfare effects specifically i study how ownership consolidation affects product characteristics and welfare in the us daily newspaper market the newspaper market provides an ideal environment for analyzing the effect of mergers on product features for both econometric and economic reasons first of all individual newspapers often circulate in local markets there is substantial variation in demographics and ownership structure across these markets this variation is crucial for this study secondly the characteristics of newspapers are obviously important for welfare for example after an ownership consolidation do newspaper publishers improve or diminish the content quality do they enlarge or shrink the local news ratio do they increase or decrease content variety to address these questions i set up a structural model of the us daily newspaper

returning to new orleans after hurricane katrina hurricane katrina displaced approximately 650 000 people and destroyed or severely damaged 217 000 homes along the gulf coast damage was especially severe in new orleans and the return of displaced residents to this city has been slow the fraction of households receiving mail which in the absence of reliable population estimates is a good indicator for returns was 49 5 percent in august 2006 and 66 0 percent in june 2007 greater new orleans community data center 2007 low income minority families appear to have been slower than others to return william h frey and audrey singer 2006 in this paper we examine the determinants of returning to new orleans in the 18 months after the hurricane the data come from a study of low income parents mainly african american women who were enrolled in a community college intervention prior to the hurricane although the sample is not representative of the pre katrina population of the city it nonetheless is of great interest the relatively slow return of low income primarily african american residents is a politically charged issue one extreme view is that the redevelopment plans are designed to discourage low income minority residents from returning a quite different view is that members of this group have found better opportunities outside of new orleans and do not want to return because few data sets trace individuals from before to after the hurricane this debate has taken place largely without the benefit of evidence

the economics of two sided markets at a local best buy a child places a new sony playstation 3 on the cashier s counter while the parents dig out their visa card the gaming system and the payment card may appear to have little connection other than this purchase however these two items share an important characteristic that is generating a series of economic insights and has important implications for strategic decision making and economic policymaking both video game systems and payment cards are examples of two sided markets broadly speaking a two sided market is one in which 1 two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform and 2 the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents typically through an externality in the case of a video game system the intermediary is the console producer sony in the scenario above while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the playstation if the other party is not similarly a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance where both consumers and merchants value each others participation many more products fit into this paradigm such as search engines newspapers and almost any advertisersupported media examples in which consumers often negatively value rather than positively value the participation of the other side as well as most software or title based operating systems and consumer electronics malls which seek retailers and consumers convention organizers which seek buyers and sellers dating services which seek men and women and the journal of economic perspectives which seeks content and readership all experience the economics of two sided markets the multi sided nature of many internet and high technology markets as well as

a unified presentation of competition analysis in two sided markets the goal of this paper is to present quantitative tools to manage competition policy analysis in two sided platforms based on a common framework for transaction and non transaction platforms we explore tools for relevant market definition critical loss analysis and a small but significant non transitory increase in price ssnip test unilateral effects indicators upward pricing pressure upp and gross upward pricing pressure index guppi and tests for exclusionary practices we review dispersed results in the literature and fill the gaps where appropriate we highlight the required changes from the usual one sided market framework and tools while discussions of antitrust tools can be found in specialized forums devoted to advances in competition policy analysis we organize the material in an integrated framework

do media consumers really dislike advertising an empirical assessment of the role of advertising in print media markets this paper uses data on german consumer magazines observed between 1992 and 2004 to analyze the extent to which consumers dis like advertising we estimate logit demand models separately for the six most important magazine segments in terms of circulation we find little evidence for readers disliking advertising on the contrary we show that readers in many magazine segments appreciate advertising readers of women s magazines business and politics magazines as well as car magazines market segments where advertisements are relatively more informative appreciate advertising while advertising is nuisance to readers of adult magazines a segment where advertisements are particularly uninformative demand for interior design magazines is not well identified our logit demand estimates are confirmed by logit demand models with random coefficients and by magazine specific monopoly demand models

why do payment card networks charge proportional fees credit and debit cards have become an important part of our payment system and they affect a large portion of the consumer and merchant populations recent federal reserve studies found that 80 2 percent of us consumers have debit cards and 78 3 percent have credit cards in a typical month 31 0 percent of consumer payments are paid for with debit cards and 21 3 percent with credit cards kevin foster et al 2010 in 2006 debit cards were used in 25 3 billion transactions for a total value of 1 0 trillion and credit cards were used in 21 7 billion transactions for a total value of 2 1 trillion geoffrey r gerdes 2008 along with this development some controversy has emerged because merchants are critical of the card fees challenging both the fee structure and the level 1 this has generated heated debates among researchers practitioners and policymakers in recent years on the research side a large body of literature called two sided mar ket theory has been developed to evaluate payment card market competition and pricing issues 2 on the policy side several bills are currently under consideration in the united states congress if passed the new legislation could open the possibility of regulating card fees in the united states 3 similar trends are taking place in many other countries more than 20 countries and areas around the world have started

evaluation of salesforce size and productivity through efficient frontier benchmarking the efficient operation of a salesforce is a critical element in the profitability of many firms three factors play key roles the salesforce s size its allocation and its productivity this gives rise to the following questions can salesforce performance be improved by 1 hiring more salespeople 2 allocating them more effectively to the various sales districts and or 3 improving salesperson productivity through better calling patterns in terms of consumers and product line items the practice of most firms and the methodology used in most of the academic literature to address salesforce design and productivity questions is a bottom up approach this approach starts with assessments by each salesperson of the sales and effort corresponding to each customer and prospect in their territory these assessments are then aggregated to the territory district and national levels this paper takes an alternative top down approach it is based on an estimated relationship between district level sales and salesforce size effort and other variables this more macro level decision tool can be used by management in parallel to and as an objective check of the more conventional and more subjective bottom up approach we develop an efficient frontier methodology which allows us to estimate how total district sales respond to salesforce size district potential and competitive activity in the firm s best performing districts the methodology utilized is based on data envelopment analysis dea and yields a benchmark measure of each district s efficient frontier sales sales assuming the district s salesforce allocates its effort as done in the best performing districts based on the estimated response function we discuss the three potential sources of increased profitability closing the inefficiency gap of each of the lower performing districts optimally reallocating the current salesforce to the various districts and changing the current size of the salesforce to its optimal level the inefficiency gap issue is addressed through comparison of the parameter estimates for the best districts obtained through our methodology with those of an average district sales response function obtained using regression analysis this comparison points to an important methodological finding the use of multiple estimation results may lead to an improved understanding of the phenomenon being studied in our case the identification of the likely causes of district productivity inefficiencies the latter two sources of increased profitability salesforce reallocation and changes in the current salesforce size are addressed analytically given the district level efficient frontier sales response function the proposed top down procedure using the efficient frontier methodology and the insights it provides are examined by evaluating the operations of two different salesforces one selling manufacturing equipment and the other business equipment in both cases regression based analysis would have resulted in a declaration that the status quo was close to optimal while the frontier based analysis pointed out that strong gains were possible in certain districts in particular for both firms the greatest increases in profit are obtained through improved salesforce efficiency in the lower performing districts not through salesforce size or district allocation adjustments at the more micro level a comparison of the frontier and regression parameters made it possible to identify which specific changes in the daily operations of the salesforces would allow the realization of these potential productivity gains in our two cases this could be obtained through more emphasis on pursuing prospective accounts

tying in two sided markets with multi homing this paper analyzes the effects of tying on market competition and social welfare in two sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi homing by participating in multiple platforms to reap maximal network benefits the model shows that tying induces more consumers to multi home and makes platform specific exclusive content available to more consumers which is beneficial to content providers as a result tying can be welfare enhancing if multi homing is allowed even in cases where its welfare impacts are negative in the absence of multi homing the analysis thus can have important implications for recent antitrust cases in industries where multi homing is prevalent

platform competition in two sided markets many if not most markets with network externalities are two sided to succeed platforms in industries such as software portals and media payment systems and the internet must get both sides of the market on board accordingly platforms devote much attention to their business model that is to how they court each side while making money overall this paper builds a model of platform competition with two sided markets it unveils the determinants of price allocation and end user surplus for different governance structures profit maximizing platforms and not for profit joint undertakings and compares the outcomes with those under an integrated monopolist and a ramsey planner jel l5 l82 l86 l96

the unequal geographic burden of federal taxation in the united states workers in cities offering above average wages cities with high productivity low quality of life or inefficient housing sectors pay 27 percent more in federal taxes than otherwise identical workers in cities offering below average wages according to simulation results taxes lower long run employment levels in high wage areas by 13 percent and land and housing prices by 21 and 5 percent causing locational inefficiencies costing 0 23 percent of income or 28 billion in 2008 employment is shifted from north to south and from urban to rural areas tax deductions index taxes partially to local cost of living improving locational efficiency

quantifying the effects from horizontal mergers in european competition policy this paper starts from a recent case to study how merger analysis in europe may be potentially improved starting from the geographic market definition in the merger decision we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products based on the estimates we compare several alternative market power tests a hypothetical market power test an actual market power test and a comparative market power test our comparison of these alternative tests illustrates that the recently introduced empirical techniques need not be in conflict with traditional policy practices in europe but should be seen as a natural extension of commonly accepted principles furthermore we emphasize the importance of our dynamic comparative market power test in the european context according to this test the relevant point of comparison when assessing a merger is not the status quo but rather a relevant alternative merger scenario that is likely to happen in the event the merger is rejected in a european context the choice is often to accept a sequence of regionally based mergers or rather a sequence of pan european mergers finally we also emphasize the importance of constructing confidence intervals when computing the predicted merger effects especially if one is interested in testing the hypothesis that a merger has no effects

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

cross sided liquidity externalities we study the empirical relevance of the participation externality between liquidity suppliers makers and demanders takers i e whether liquidity demand attracts or reduces liquidity supply and vice versa we use exogenous shocks to exchange fees and technology as experiments to identify cross sided complementarities between liquidity suppliers and demanders in the u s equity market we find that the externality is large and positive on average however the externality is negative in periods of high adverse selection we quantify the economic significance of the externality by evaluating an exchange s revenue after a fee change the internet appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2016 2658 this paper was accepted by lauren cohen finance

network effects software provision and standardization in this paper we examine the software provision decision of software firms the provision decision by software firms determines the value and hence the market share of competing hardware technologies we show how the provision decision by software firms determines whether multiple hardware technologies are supported in equilibrium or whether there is de facto standardization with only one hardware technology supplied with software in equilibrium we show that when consumers place a high value on software variety there is a suboptimal amount of standardization by the market

a dynamic oligopoly structural model for the prescription drug market after patent expiration this article incorporates consumer learning and heterogeneity into a dynamic oligopoly model for the prescription drug market in the model both firms and patients need to learn the generic qualities via patients experiences generic firms entry decisions are endogenous but their entry timings depend on a random approval process i apply the model to examine the impact of shortening the expected generic approval time although this policy experiment brings generics to the market sooner it increases a potential entrant s likelihood of entering a crowded market and hence could reduce the total number of generic entrants and consumer welfare

mobile computing the next platform rivalry all modern information and communications technology ict industries use the platform organization a platform is a reconfigurable base of compatible components on which firms and users build applications applications share the general purpose components thereby exploiting increasing returns at an industrywide level bresnahan and trajtenberg 1995 platforms sometimes compete for developers who create applications which make the platform valuable for users we consider such competition in mobile computing different mobile platforms are supplied by firms such as microsoft google apple nokia and research in motion who employ different approaches the approaches vary in the use of hierarchy which frames a seemingly simple question why doesn t one form of platform governance emerge as superior dominating most markets in which platforms play an essential role this essay will stress the reasons for differ entiation and proposes a new argument a platform s hierarchy can help at one moment but then get in the way at a later time hierarchical organization helps coordinate supply and the invention of complements avoids postinvention holdup through contracting and other forms of

platform based mobile payments adoption in emerging and developed countries role of country level heterogeneity and network effects platform based payment services such as mobile wallets mwallet provide a unique value proposition to both customers and firms over other digital payment methods interestingly the story of platform based mobile payments adoption is unfolding differently across countries with some emerging countries china and india outperforming developed countries using extant literature in international business international marketing industry reports and qualitative interviews we present a conceptual framework for mobile payments adoption at an aggregate level for customers and retailers we present a set of hypotheses and derive the explanations using the literature on network effects and institutional theory we test our framework on a diverse set of 30 countries and confirm the presence of network effects and the differential impact of perceived value inertia and culture on the adoption level of innovators and imitators importantly we find a significant level of within and between country heterogeneity for mobile payment adoption which provides further evidence for leapfrogging by emerging countries in the context of the mass adoption of mobile payments these findings have significant implications for theory and practice in multinational organizations

estimating network effects in two sided markets without data on prices and quantities abstract i develop a semi structural approach to identify network effects on two sided monopoly platforms without data on prices and quantities when total revenue data is available the test is sufficient when separate revenue data is available on the two sides the test is both necessary and sufficient

interactions neighborhood selection and housing demand abstract this paper contributes to the growing literature that aims at identifying and measuring the impact of social context on individual economic behavior we develop a model of housing structure demand with neighborhood effects and neighborhood choice modeling neighborhood choice is of fundamental importance in estimating and understanding endogenous and contextual neighborhood effects controlling for non random sorting into neighborhoods allows for unbiased estimates and provides a means for identifying endogenous neighborhood effects estimation of the model exploits a household level data set that has been augmented with contextual information at two different levels scales of aggregation one is at the neighborhood level consisting of about ten neighbors with the data coming from the neighborhood clusters sub sample of the american housing survey a second level is the census tract to which these dwelling units belong these data were geocoded by means of privileged access to confidential us census data our results for the neighborhood choice model indicate that individuals prefer to live near others like themselves our estimates of the housing structure demand equation confirm that neighborhood effects are important in particular one s demand for housing depends on the mean of neighbors demand for housing

chicken and egg competition among intermediation service providers we analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers we insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the internet the presence of indirect network externalities the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users identity and on usage efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium as well as some specific form of inefficient structures intermediaries have incentives to propose non exclusive services as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power we analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

dividing online and offline a case study every new method of trade offers an opportunity for economic agents to compare its costs and benefits relative to the status quo such comparison motivates sorting across market segments and reshapes the whole marketplace the internet provides an excellent example it introduces substantial search cost savings over brick and mortar retail stores but imposes new obstacles for sellers to convey quality using sports card trading as a case study we provide empirical evidence on 1 the sorting of product quality between the online and offline segments 2 the changes for retail outlets after the internet came into place and 3 how supporting industries such as professional grading and card manufacturing adapted to take advantage of the new market copyright 2007 wiley blackwell

mergers with differentiated products the case of the ready to eat cereal industry traditional merger analysis is difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with differentiated products i discuss an alternative which consists of demand estimation and the use of a model of postmerger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a merger i estimate a brand level demand system for ready to eat cereal using supermarket scanner data and use the estimates to 1 recover marginal costs 2 simulate postmerger price equilibria and 3 compute welfare effects under a variety of assumptions the methodology is applied to five mergers two of which occurred and for which i compare predicted to actual outcomes

mergers coordinated effects and efficiency in the portuguese non life insurance industry we evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three portuguese non life insurance markets we specify and estimate with a panel of firm level data a structural model which includes preferences technology and a market equilibrium condition firms demand curves are not very elastic firms technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores we find that for the period following the mergers there is no evidence of i an increase in market power through coordinated behavior or ii changes in cost efficiency levels in addition social welfare increased

switching costs in two sided markets in many markets there are switching costs and network effects yet the literature gen erally deals with these two concepts separately this paper bridges the gap by analyzing their interaction effects or indirect bargain in a dynamic two sided market i show that in a symmetric equilibrium the classic result that the first period price is u shape in switching costs does not emerge but instead switching costs always intensify first period price competition moreover an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first period price on the other side thus policies that ignore these effects may underestimate the welfare enhancing effects of switching costs

price theory and the role of marketing science professor rao provides a comprehensive review of pricing research in marketing science i will not repeat the details here save to say that the review indicates a diversity of pricing research within the developing field of marketing science professor rao s review and the other papers in this issue from the second rochester conference on the interface of economics and marketing science provide us with the opportunity to reflect on the continuing joint evolution of our two disciplines as a marketing scientist who has found economic models and concepts useful in addressing marketing issues let me comment on these evolutions from a marketing science perspective however as i portray these evolutions in the extreme i note that the boundaries are fluid with much overlap and merging of ideas and issues differences are in degree not in fundamental philosophy in the extreme price theory in economics deals with how markets behave while price theory in marketing science deals with how managers should act it is true that one must understand how managers behave in order to model market behavior and that one must understand how markets behave in order to advise managers the difference is not in the comprehensiveness of the analyses but in the emphasis a typical economic analysis will simplify the model of the manager s task in order to study the essential forces of the market in contrast the typical marketing science analysis will simplify the model of the market mechanism in order to study the essential profit impacts of the actions by the marketing manager i will comment more on these simplifications later economics is a mature science with roots in the eighteenth century when adam smith 1776 observed the english marketplace and formulated his famous invisible hand theory since then the field has evolved in many rich and varied ways a myriad of researchers has

global platforms and ecosystems implications for international business theories the emergence of digital platforms and ecosystems dpe as a venue for value creation and capture for multinational enterprises holds considerable implications for the theory and practice of international business in this paper we articulate these implications by considering the dual perspectives of cross border platforms and ecosystems as a venue for multifaceted innovation and as multisided marketplace and focusing on three overarching themes at the intersection of dpes and international business that is dpes as affording new ways of internationalization as facilitating new ways of building knowledge and relationships and as enabling new ways of creating and delivering value to global customers we explain specific dpe related concepts and constructs that underlie these themes and discuss how they could be incorporated into existing ib theories in ways that would enhance their richness and continued relevance as well as their ability to better predict a multitude of emerging ib phenomena

complementary network externalities and technological adoption abstract we address the adoption of technology when there are network externalities and networks are characterized by complementary products produced by different firms we show that when the software firms are bertrand competitors a hardware technology with lower software development costs is adopted for many parameter values for which it is socially optimal to adopt the other technology the over adoption is due to a discrepancy between the private and social benefit of having a larger network

measuring market power in the ready to eat cereal industry the ready to eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration high price cost margins large advertising to sales ratios and numerous introductions of new products previous researchers have concluded that the ready to eat cereal industry is a classic example of an industry with nearly collusive pricing behavior and intense nonprice competition this paper empirically examines this conclusion in particular i estimate price cost margins but more importantly i am able empirically to separate these margins into three sources i that which is due to product differentiation ii that which is due to multi product firm pricing and iii that due to potential price collusion the results suggest that given the demand for different brands of cereal the first two effects explain most of the observed price cost margins i conclude that prices in the industry are consistent with noncollusive pricing behavior despite the high price cost margins leading firms are able to maintain a portfolio of differentiated products and influence the perceived product quality it is these two factors that lead to high price cost margins

estimating market power in a two sided market the case of newspapers the newspaper industry is a two sided market the readers market and the advertising market are closely linked by inter market network externalities we estimate market power in the italian newspaper industry by building a structural model which encompasses a demand estimation

an investigation of the equal commission rate policy for a multi product salesforce for a multi product sales force the policy of paying commissions as an equal percentage of realized gross margins is shown to be in general nonoptimal from the firm s profit maximization point of view for a homogeneous salesforce the nonoptimality results from the fact that earlier research while taking into account the effect of commission rates on a salesperson s allocations of total time to the multiple products has not incorporated the effect of commission rates on salesperson s total selling time resulting from his her trading off income vs total time to maximize utility the equal commission rate policy is however optimal for the cases of i salesperson with a fixed total selling time and a minimum income requirement and ii fair income salesperson whose total selling time is merely a function of income and not based on rate of change of income as in the utility maximization case if the salesforce is heterogeneous e g different salespersons have differing sales responses to selling time this makes the equal commission rate policy to be in general nonoptimal even for the restrictive cases i and ii it is suggested that the commission rates be set higher for products with greater elasticities relating quantities sold to selling times the common practice of paying commissions as a percentage of total dollar sales rather than gross margins is shown to be optimal under certain assumptions

competition between networks a study of the market for yellow pages this paper estimates the importance of network effects in the market for yellow pages i estimate three simultaneous equations consumer demand for usage of a directory advertiser demand for advertising and a publisher s first order condition derived from profit maximizing behaviour estimation shows that advertisers value consumer usage and that consumers value advertising implying a network effect i find that internalizing network effects would significantly increase surplus as an application i consider whether the market benefits from monopoly which takes advantage of network effects or oligopoly which reduces market power i find that a more competitive market is preferable copyright 2004 wiley blackwell

to surcharge or not to surcharge an empirical investigation of atm pricing this paper investigates depository institutions decisions whether or not to impose surcharges direct usage fees on nondepositors who use their atms in addition to documenting patterns of surcharging we examine motives for surcharging including both direct generation of fee revenue and the potential to attract deposit customers who wish to avoid incurring surcharges at an institution s atms consistent with expectations we find that the probability of surcharging increases with both the institution s share of market atms and the time since surcharging was first allowed in the state and decreases with increasing local atm density further we find evidence consistent with the use of surcharges to attract deposit customers who are new to the local banking market but we find no evidence that larger banks use surcharges as a means to attract existing customers away from smaller local competitors

the role of online platforms for media markets two dimensional spatial competition in a two sided market abstract we analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions for integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner s dilemma specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions this is in contrast to the maximum minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition we show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets

wages rents and the quality of life this study focuses on the role of wages and rents in allocating workers to locations with various quantities of amenities the theory demonstrates that if the amenity is also productive then the sign of the wage gradient is unclear while the rent gradient is positive the theory is extended to include the housing market and nontraded goods these extensions require little modification of the conclusion the empirical work on wages shows that the regional wage differences can be explained largely by these local attributes with the use of site price data implicit prices are estimated and quality of life rankings for the cities are computed

discrete choice with social interactions this paper provides an analysis of aggregate behavioural outcomes when individual utility exhibits social interaction effects we study generalized logistic models of individual choice which incorporate terms reflecting the desire of individuals to conform to the behaviour of others in an environment of noncooperative decisionmaking laws of large numbers are generated in such environments multiplicity of equilibria in these models which are equivalent to the existence of multiple self consistent means for average choice behaviour will exist when the social interactions exceed a particular threshold local stability of these multiple equilibria is also studied the properties of the noncooperative economy are contrasted with the properties of an economy in which a social planner determines the set of individual choices finally a likelihood function based on the theoretical model is given and conditions for the econometric identifiability of the model are established

price cap regulation in a two sided market intended and unintended consequences abstract this paper studies intended and unintended consequences of price cap regulation in the two sided payment card market the recent u s debit card regulation was intended to lower merchants card acceptance costs by capping interchange fees at the issuer cost but for small ticket transactions the interchange fee instead rose post regulation to address the puzzle i construct a two sided market model and show that card demand externalities between large ticket and small ticket transactions rationalize card networks pricing response based on the model i provide a welfare assessment of the issuer cost based interchange regulation and discuss alternative regulatory approaches

economic effects of media concentration estimates from a model of the newspaper firm by specifying and estimating a 5 equation model of newspaper operations this paper provides evidence useful for addressing several issues concerning media concentration on the cost side the results indicate that there exist significant scale economies in the production of circulation and space on the other hand the evidence suggests that chain newspapers can not produce output more efficiently than independents all things equal on the demand side rival newspapers located in contiguous geographic markets appear to have an important competitive effect on the demand for circulation however broadcast stations do not seem to affect demand for newspaper advertising and circulation

optimization models for salesforce compensation abstract this paper reviews models which address the design of optimal salesforce compensation schemes the discussion starts with agency theoretic models that are able to derive the optimal form for a compensation scheme under assumptions regarding the degree of information asymmetry and heterogeneity within the salesforce for the four resulting extreme cases models are presented that allow for the determination of optimal parameter values for specific compensation schemes such as fixed salary plus commission bonus for quota achievement and menus of plans finally there follows an examination of approaches through which commission rates or bonuses can be optimally differentiated such that the salespersons allocate their selling time in their own and at the same time in the firm s best interest all of these models are reviewed in particular with respect to their applicability in practice

cooperation among competitors some economics of payment card associations we analyze platforms in two sided markets with network externalities using the specific context of a payment card association we study the cooperative determination of the interchange fee by member banks the interchange fee is the access charge paid by the merchants banks the acquirers to cardholders banks the issuers we develop a framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card after drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative determination of the interchange fee we describe in detail the factors affecting merchant resistance compare cooperative and for profit business models and make a first cut in the analysis of system competition

platform pricing at sports card conventions we study a new data set of u s sports card conventions from the perspective of the pricing theory of two sided markets conventions are two sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers we present several findings first consumer pricing decreases with competition but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition second when consumer price is zero and thus constrained dealer price decreases more strongly with competition these results are compatible with existing models of two sided markets but are difficult to explain without such models

explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by u s consumers this paper develops and estimates a structural model of adoption and usage of payment instruments by u s consumers we utilize a cross section from the survey of consumer payment choice a new survey of consumer behavior our empirical model combines the elements of a discrete continuous model where rst a consumer picks a product and then chooses how much to use it with a bundled choice model in which consumers can choose multiple products that may aect the utility derived from each other we consider how changes in the costs of adoption and usage may dierentially aect substitution patterns these results are particularly relevant for bank pricing of debit card services in response to the regulation of interchange fees on debit cards enacted by the durbin amendment to the dodd frank act which became eective on

discrete pricing and market fragmentation a tale of two sided markets security trading now fragments into more than ten almost identical stock exchanges in the united states we show that discrete pricing is one economic force that prevents the consolidation of trading volume the uniform one cent tick size minimum price variation imposed by the sec s rule 612 leads to more dispersed trading for lower priced securities when a security reverse splits its price increases and relative tick size one cent divided by the price decreases we find that reverse splits consolidate trading of securities using securities with identical underlying fundamentals that do not reverse split as the control group

on the equivalence of general and specific control in organizations most principal agent relationships in firms are multidimensional in the presence of multiple tasks and multiple performance signals the contract between principal and agent not only has to motivate the agent but also has to direct the agent to allocate effort among different tasks the value of efforts for a specific task accrues not only through the principal s expected returns but also through its contribution to overall risk and therefore to the risk diversification of the task portfolio hence if the agent is risk averse multitask relationships can be considered as a portfolio problem coupled with incentive constraints we examine the relationship between specific control sc and general control gc for multitask principal agent problems under sc the principal observes the outcome of each individual task and uses this set of information for compensation under gc contracts are based only on the aggregate signal such as cumulative profits of all tasks we describe two sets of multitask problems for which gc and sc are equivalent that is contracts based only on aggregate performance signals impose the same incentives for the agent as a contract that is based on the outcome of each task the first multitask problem is characterized by homogeneous tasks in the second multitask problem all activities are perfect substitutes in the cost function of the agent the equivalence of sc and gc arises since gc provides insurance to the agent and yields the same overall risk premium as specific control moreover gc allows the principal to set the same incentives as sc since the marginal returns from gc are equal to the sum of the marginal returns for each task under sc the results described in this paper can serve as benchmarks where gc and sc are equivalent we show how the equivalence can be relevant for a variety of business situations such as the compensation of sales persons or managers at all hierarchy levels we also discuss the reasons when gc and sc differ suppose for instance that tasks are technologically separable and the precision of the performance of one task is low then the principal is forced under gc to adopt an incentive scheme that implements only a low effort across all tasks since the average precision matters under sc however the principal can tailor the optimal efforts to each task

on manufacturing marketing incentives stereotypically marketing is mainly concerned about satisfying customers and manufacturing is mainly interested in factory efficiency using the principal agent agency paradigm which assumes that the marketing and manufacturing managers of the firm will act in their self interest we seek incentive plans that will induce those managers to act so that the owner of the firm can attain as much as possible of the residual returns one optimal incentive plan can be interpreted as follows the owner subcontracts to pay the manufacturing manager a fixed rate for all capacity he delivers each marketing manager receives all of the returns from his product in turn all managers pay a fixed fee to the owner under this plan the marketing managers will often complain about the stock level decisions even though these levels are announced in advance under a revised plan the owner can eliminate such complaints by delegating the stocking decisions to the respective marketing managers without any loss this plan is interpreted as requiring the owner to make a futures market for manufacturing capacity paying the manufacturing manager the expected marginal value for each unit of capacity delivered receiving the realized marginal value from the marketing managers and losing money on average in the process

submission demand in core economics journals a panel study i introduction academic economics journals have proliferated to around 1 500 providing economists a large number of outlets for publishing manuscripts econlit n d ideas n d although researchers have examined how the demand for submission for academic economics journals responded to nonprice variables such as an editorial policy change on page limit card and dellavigna 2012 surprisingly the price elasticity of demand for submission remains unknown and becomes the focus of this study the objective of this study was to examine empirically what factors influence authors decisions on which economics journal to submit to focusing on three sets of demand factors manuscript submission fee observed journal quality such as impact factor and ranking and journal usage such as abstract views and library subscriptions similar to most of the literature on economics journals we focused on the economics journals indexed in journal citation reports jcr compiled by the institute for scientific information because jcr journals tend to be viewed as the core or leading academic journals two challenges arose in estimating the demand for journal submission first submission fee may be endogenous if supply and demand are simultaneously determined or if economics journals set the fee based on demand variations that the econometrician does not observe and hence cannot explicitly specify in the demand model to reduce the potential endogeneity bias we surveyed journal editors to obtain and use as an instrument the fee paid to a journal referee for reviewing the reviewer fee might serve as a good instrument in this case because the reviewer fee which is a supply side variable generally is paid by the submission fee there is little evidence to support that paying referees is correlated with unobserved journal quality such as journal reputation indeed a recent study by chetty saez and sandor 2014 found that reviewer fees have little or no effects on quality of the reviewer reports based on an experiment with referees at the journal of public economics casting doubt on the relationship between reviewer fee and referee report the second challenge is that journal quality such as journal reputation or editor reputation is not observed by the econometrician our strategy to address this issue was to use panel data to control for unobserved individual journal effect by supplementing the jcr citation data with other publicly available data and our two rounds of surveys of journal editors we constructed a unique panel dataset that contains various journal characteristics such as submission fee fee paid to a journal referee for reviewing and the number of new submissions for the years of 2008 and 2013 thompson scientific institute for scientific information 2008 and 2013 many researchers have analyzed theoretically the role of submission fee and or response times in academic publishing e g azar 2006 cotton 2013 heintzelman and nocetti 2009 leslie 2005 for a recent example cotton 2013 showed that journal quality could be maximized through a combination of both moderate fees and moderate delays when authors have heterogeneous preferences such a result is obviously based on the assumption that authors respond negatively to a submission fee from an empirical perspective submission fees raise the cost of submitting an article and therefore discourage the submission of papers especially those of marginal quality i e a self selection process regarding the quality of authors own manuscripts however several factors can alleviate the negative impact of submission fees on submissions first azar 2005 pointed out that the rewards for publications in good economics journals are very high compared with the relatively low submission fees second submission fees are sometimes paid by department funds and faculty s grants research contracts

collusion between two sided platforms abstract we study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market and whether users single home or multi home our most striking result is that one sided collusion leads to lower resp higher prices on the collusive resp competitive side if the cross group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong one sided collusion may therefore benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions

two sided markets a progress report the paper provides a road map to the burgeoning literature on two sided markets and presents new results it identifies two sided markets with markets in which the structure and not only the level of prices charged by platforms matters the failure of the coase theorem is necessary but not sufficient for two sidedness the paper builds a model integrating usage and membership externalities that unifies two hitherto disparate strands of the literature emphasizing either form of externality and obtains new results on the mix of membership and usage charges when price setting or bargaining determine payments between end users

network effects without network externalities abstract the network externalities hypothesis postulates that consumers prefer to purchase brands which are bought by more consumers compared with brands with a low market share in this paper we show that increasing returns to scale in the production of complementary products can substitute for the network externalities assumption we develop a model for the computer industry in which the production of complementary software requires a large fixed cost of development relative to the cost of duplicating and marketing the software the increasing returns to scale in the production of software yields consumers behavior which is very similar to consumers who have preferences exhibiting network externalities

marketplace or reseller intermediaries can choose between functioning as a marketplace in which suppliers sell their products directly to buyers or as a reseller by purchasing products from suppliers and selling them to buyers we model this as a decision between whether control rights over a noncontractible decision variable the choice of some marketing activity are better held by suppliers the marketplace mode or by the intermediary the reseller mode whether the marketplace or the reseller mode is preferred depends on whether independent suppliers or the intermediary have more important information relevant to the optimal tailoring of marketing activities for each specific product we show that this trade off is shifted toward the reseller mode when marketing activities create spillovers across products and when network effects lead to unfavorable expectations about supplier participation if the reseller has a variable cost advantage respectively disadvantage relative to the marketplace then the trade off is shifted toward the marketplace for long tail respectively short tail products we thus provide a theory of which products an intermediary should offer in each mode we also provide some empirical evidence that supports our main results data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 2042 this paper was accepted by bruno cassiman business strategy

optimal auction design in two sided markets a key feature of online markets for advertising e g sponsored links is that clicking rates depend on the searchers expectations that the platform selects relevant advertisers this article studies auction design by a platform that maximizes profits in the long run where clicking rates are mechanism dependent in line with the practice of the major search engines the revenue maximizing mechanism is a scoring auction that combines the willingness to pay and the relevance to searchers of advertisers by trading off rent extraction and clicking volume this mechanism works as a cross subsidization device between searchers and advertisers

interactive property valuations this paper estimates models of social interactions within residential neighborhoods using data on neighborhood clusters for standard metropolitan areas in the united states from the american housing survey for 1985 and 1989 it examines eects of social interactions in the form of reaction functions for homeowners valuation of their properties at the level of the immediate residential neighborhood with neighborhoods consisting of a randomly chosen dwelling unit and about ten nearest neighbors the paper identifies the eect of endogenous social interactions to be significant and large ranging from 0 587 to 0 770 and much more important then the dynamic autoregressive structure of the model when both variables are present and both are significant the interactive regressions that it reports improve upon commonly used hedonic regressions as well the paper provides empirical support for the notion common in the real estate world of the importance of neighboring properties in property valuations

two sided network effects a theory of information product design how can firms profitably give away free products this paper provides a novel answer and articulates trade offs in a space of information product design we introduce a formal model of two sided network externalities based in textbook economics a mix of katz and shapiro network effects price discrimination and product differentiation externality based complements however exploit a different mechanism than either tying or lock in even as they help to explain many recent strategies such as those of firms selling operating systems internet browsers games music and video the model presented here argues for three simple but useful results first even in the absence of competition a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity second we identify distinct markets for content providers and end consumers and show that either can be a candidate for a free good third product coupling across markets can increase consumer welfare even as it increases firm profits the model also generates testable hypotheses on the size and direction of network effects while offering insights to regulators seeking to apply antitrust law to network markets

optimal quality threshold of admission in a two sided farmers market we develop a two sided model for a farmers market where farmers value the number of consumers and consumers value the number of farmers and the average product quality in the market consumer preference over product quality provides an incentive for the farmers market to exclude farmers of the lowest product quality using the model we identify what factors the farmers market has to consider in determining the optimal quality threshold of admission an issue that has not received any formal study those factors include the network effects between farmers and consumers consumer preference over product quality and variety and the quality spread among farmers we also outline an empirical estimation strategy in order to make use of the model developed in this study

liberalizing a distribution system the european car market we quantify the competitive effects of liberalizing the selective and exclusive distribution system in the european car market based on a model of oligopoly pricing with differentiated products we consider two possible competitive effects from liberalization i the creation of international intrabrand competition cross border trade which will result in a reduction of international price discrimination and ii a possible cumulative effect arising from a strengthening of national intrabrand competition which would result in reduced double marginalization we find that the reduction in international price discrimination mainly redistributes consumer gains across countries it has a positive but modest effect on total welfare if liberalization also has the cumulative effect of reducing double marginalization the welfare effects are much higher finally we find that the effects of liberalization on the manufacturers profits are either small or positive this finding implies that international price discrimination and softening competition through a double marginalization mechanism should not be interpreted as main profit motives for the previous distribution system but only as unintended side effects hence the industry rationale for maintaining the previous distribution system should be sought in other areas jel f15 l42

platform pricing at sports card conventions platform pricing at sports card conventions we study a new data set of us sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two sided markets conventions are two sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers we have detailed information on consumer price dealer price and since most conventions are local the market structure for conventions we present several findings first consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition second when consumer price is zero and thus constrained dealer price decreases more strongly with competition these results are compatible with existing models of two sided markets but are difficult to explain without such models

games of survival in the us newspaper industry 1989 games of survival in the us newspaper industry applied economics vol 21 no 5 pp 631 649

a semi parametric analysis of two sided markets an application to the local daily newspapers in the usa summary this paper considers an empirical semiparametric model for two sided markets contrary to existing empirical literature on two sided markets we specify network effects and probability distribution functions of net benefits of the two sides nonparametrically we then estimate the model by nonparametric instrumental variables regression for local daily newspapers from the usa we show that semiparametric specification is supported by the data and the network effects are neither linear nor monotonic with a numerical illustration we demonstrate that the mark up of the newspaper on each side changes drastically with the nonlinearly specified network effects from the case with linear network effects copyright 2015 john wiley sons ltd

estimation of an equilibrium model with externalities post disaster neighborhood rebuilding we study the optimal design of subsidies in an equilibrium setting where the decisions of individual recipients impose externalities on one another we apply the model to the case of post katrina rebuilding in new orleans under the louisiana road home rebuilding grant program rh we estimate the structural model via indirect inference exploiting a discontinuity in the formula for determining the size of grants which helps isolate the causal effect of neighbors rebuilding on one s own rebuilding choices we find that the additional rebuilding induced by rh generated positive externalities equivalent to 4950 to each inframarginal household whose rebuilding choice was not affected by the program counterfactual policy experiments find that optimal subsidy policies bias grant offers against relocation with an inverse u shaped relationship between the degree of bias and the severity of damages from the disaster

estimating equilibrium models of sorting across locations while there is growing interest in measuring the size and scope of local spillovers it is well understood that such spillovers cannot be distinguished from unobservable local attributes using solely the observed location decisions of individuals or firms we propose an empirical strategy for recovering estimates of spillovers in the presence of unobserved local attributes for a broadly applicable class of equilibrium sorting models our approach relies on an iv strategy derived from the internal logic of the sorting model itself we show practically how the strategy is implemented provide intuition for our instruments discuss the role of effective choice set variation in identifying the model and carry out a series of monte carlo simulations to demonstrate performance in small samples

salesforce compensation theory and managerial implications this paper discusses recent advances in the study of salesforce motivation and compensation special emphasis is given to quantitative approaches from the economics finance and marketing literatures the paper summarizes the findings in this analytical work in the context of some examples of compensation practice in order to illustrate the usefulness of the paradigm for the evaluation and setting of compensation systems we consider some major issues in setting compensation such as the firm s own objective the salesperson s objective and the nature of the sales response function variations in these factors imply significant variation in optimal compensation policy where optimal takes into account the components in the plan the parameter levels of the components and whether or not a menu of such plans should be made available to the salesforce by highlighting the results in the literature in light of some relevant compensation examples we show the applicability of theory to the practical concerns of salesforce management we close with a summary of these insights and directions for future research in the area

quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ach banking industry we seek to estimate the causes and magnitudes of network externalities for the automated clearinghouse ach electronic payments system using a panel data set on individual bank usage of ach we construct an equilibrium model of consumer and bank adoption of ach in the presence of a network the model identifies network externalities from correlations of changes in usage levels for banks within a network from changes in usage following changes in market concentration or sizes of competitors and from adoption decisions of banks outside the network with small branches in the network and can separately identify consumer and bank network effects we structurally estimate the parameters of the model by matching equilibrium behavior to the data using simulated maximum likelihood and a data set of localized networks and use a bootstrap to recover confidence intervals the parameters are estimated with high precision and fit various moments of the data reasonably well we find that most of the impediment to ach adoption is due to large consumer fixed costs of adoption the deadweight loss from the network externality is moderate the optimal number of ach transactions is about 16 higher than the equilibrium level

pricing decisions of the newspaper monopolist in nearly every city in the united states there is only one daily newspaper of general interest given the prevalence of monopoly it seems anomalous that newspapers are typically sold well below cost compaine 5 19 for example reports that sales revenue is only 28 7 percent of total cost moreover it appears that price is below marginal cost since the sales revenue does not cover the cost of the ink and paper used in producing the newspaper 2 if the newspaper publisher were selling only newspapers he or she would be in dire straits but in reality the publisher has two products to sell the newspaper itself and advertising space within the newspaper although very few newspaper customers are also purchasers of advertising space there is an important interaction between the circulation of the newspaper and the sale of advertising space the higher the circulation of the newspaper the greater the demand for advertising and the more advertising there is in the newspaper the greater the circulation of the newspaper 3 as a consequence the publisher has a more complicated pricing problem since the prices of advertising space and of the newspaper have feedback effects upon one another in the next section of this paper we shall derive the publisher s optimal prices for advertising space and for the newspaper under fairly general conditions one purpose of this analysis is to show that there are two meaningful measures of demand elasticity in section iv we discuss some of the associated empirical problems that this poses and relate this to two existing newspaper demand studies

price structure in two sided markets evidence from the magazine industry we present and estimate a model of competition in a two sided market the market for magazine readership and advertising using data on magazines in germany we find evidence that magazines have properties of two sided markets the results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are subsidized and that magazines make all their money from advertisers consistent with advertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements our results imply that higher demand on the reader side increases ad rates but that higher demand on the advertising side decreases cover prices

compensation plans for single and multi product salesforces an application of the holmstrom milgrom model the agency theory approach to understanding salesforce compensation plans is modified to incorporate the intratemporal nature of the salesperson s effort rate decision i e the decision about the effort rate at any given point in time potentially depends upon the sales performance up to that point in time in the accounting period under the assumptions considered in this paper holmstrom and milgrom 1987 have shown that the optimal compensation plan is linear in total sales over the accounting period the comparative statics results obtained here corroborate most of the corresponding results in the salesforce compensation literature moreover we derive many additional results not available in the literature it is demonstrated that the commission income as a fraction of total compensation goes up with an increase in the effectiveness of the sales effort or an increase in base sales on the other hand the salary component of the total compensation goes up with increases in uncertainty absolute risk