median voters or budget maximizers evidence from school expenditure referenda some readers may have found these results of greater interest were we able to confirm the directional hypotheses of the certainty setter model in addition to finding that spending is related to the reversion the much weaker prediction of the uncertainty model yet the failure of the certainty when base elections were optional their infrequent occurrence might be expected under either a median voter or a setter model for those districts that did hold base elections the observations appear consistent with a setter model but are either inexplicable by or inconsistent with a median voter model finally both a the relationship between the number of budget elections and the presence of base elections and b the outcome of mandatory base elections in 1978 provide a set of observations that are challenging to either model a similar challenge was posed by our investigation of budget elections when we called attention to the inadequacy of static full information models rather than resolving the question of the simple setter model against the simple median voter model our results indicate that both may be inappropriate and that endeavors dealing with complexities omitted here are warranted

governmental behavior in representative democracy a synthesis of the theoretical literature what is the impact of bureaucratic behaviors on tax rates what is preferable a bureaucrat or a partisan politician does a flypaper effect occur when lobby groups influence public policies this article tries to answer these questions by analyzing and comparing six different models of public choice 1 the median voter model 2 the leviathan model 3 the slack maximizing model 4 a general model of bureaucracy 5 the partisan politicians model and 6 a general model of lobbying among several results it is shown that the median voter s income and tax share almost always play a significant role in the design of the public good tax package even if the government does not explicitly try to maximize the median voter s utility the article also provides a synthesis of the positive analysis of the flypaper effect

legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in american states in accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy if the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter this paper seeks to identify the median district and therein the preferences driving the median legislator in american state legislatures using economic characteristics of constituents we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median as the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity government expenditures increase in addition the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs finally we find that direct democracy procedures which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians

secular cost changes and the size of government towards a generalized theory abstract baumol s cost disease account of government growth is contrasted with that of kau and rubin who focus on decreasing costs of tax collection over time the apparent paradox wherein the first theory explains government growth by cost increases and the second by way of cost decreases is technically resolved why both theories seem to be able to stand up to empirical tests even though they use similar data is then explained finally public choice analysis is employed to reveal further potential for the ultimate construction of one all embracing secular cost change theory of government growth

rent seeking and rent dissipation a neutrality result abstract we consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently we capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties the main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker s win probability with respect to her effort we show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs in this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds our results imply a partial robustness result for the all pay auction

effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players a contest is a situation in which players compete with one another by expending effort to win a prize examples abound firms compete by spending rd 26 krueger 14 posner 20 rogerson 23 appelbaum and katz 1 hillman and riley 12 hirshleifer 13 ellingsen 8 nitzan 18 and baik 2 3 have studied rent seeking contests lazear and rosen 15 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 19 and rosen 24 have examined performance incentives associated with reward schemes riley 22 has analyzed the war of attrition and auctions dixit 7 has considered strategic commitments in contests with different applications these are only a part of the literature on the theory of contests despite the vast literature however the effects of asymmetries between players have not been clarified except by harris and vickers 11 who analyze in a patent race model the strategic consequences of asymmetries the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of asymmetries between two players on individual and total effort levels in a model with a logit form probability of winning function effort levels expended by the players deserve attention effort in a rent seeking contest is interpreted as social costs and thus total effort level is a measure of economic efficiency effort in an r d contest is interpreted as r d expenditures and thus effort levels determine the expected date of invention we focus on asymmetries between the players resulting from their different valuations of the prize their different abilities to convert effort into probability of winning or both such asymmetries are common in contests for example people in different locations may receive different

empirical evaluation of bureaucratic models of inefficiency two separate but related strands of literature exist regarding the efficiency of public sector service provision the theoretical base developed in the bureaucratic models of supply and the methodological base developed in the operations research and economic literatures most analyses focus exclusively on either the measurement or causes of inefficiency this paper seeks to empirically test bureaucratic models of supply by drawing on the measurement literature in anticipation of the results it is found that there does exist empirical evidence supporting some of the implications of these models

revolution evolution and local government structure an empirical analysis of london conventional analyses of local government structure focus on the revolutionary changes that result from deliberate reorganisations we propose a new perspective on structural change that emphasises the importance of evolutionary processes as well as radical reforms evolutionary changes in structure are caused for example by population growth or decline and reallocations of service responsibilities between tiers the argument is illustrated by an empirical analysis of fragmentation and concentration in the structure of local government in london the evidence reveals that structural change is the norm rather than the exception it occurs even when the absolute number of local government tiers and units is constant

rent seeking and the provision of public goods in this short paper i adopt the public choice school paradigm of modeling a government in order to compare its performance with that of the market in the standard model of the provision of public goods private provision is represented by the cournot nash equilibrium in individual contributions public provision incorporates rent seeking whereby some of the aspects of the allocation are determined indirectly by influence activities of the interested parties thus both allocation procedures yield inefficiency and the question is which procedure results in a greater amount of inefficiency private provision with its free riding incentives or public provision with its rent seeking incentives the results indicate that public provision may well be preferred to private provision of public goods thus superiority of private provision is not guaranteed even in the case of a non benevolent government copyright 1993 by royal economic society

how to win the political contest a monopolist vs environmentalists this paper sheds light on the political economy of local energypolitics both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective first a case study of a small town in southern germany schonau is presented where environmentalists have won thepolitical contest against the regional energy monopolist and havefounded an energy supply firm themselves the different stagesof the political process are explained and analysed second apolitical economy model is developed where environmentalists anda monopolistic utility firm confront each other both on thepolitical and on the energy market in the lobbying equilibriumthe probability of the environmentalists winning the gamedepends on the monopoly rent and the perceived social costs ofenergy production it is shown that it is optimal for themonopolist to reduce his output below the monopolistic output finally the winning strategy in the schonau case is discussedin the light of the theoretical results of the paper

endogenizing the median voter public choice goes to school this paper investigates implications of the relationship between voter self selection and the behavior of politicians voter self selection arises in elections because only a portion of eligible voters actually vote it is likely to be more pronounced whenever the implied net benefits from a given electoral choice are disproportionately distributed across voters public choice theory predicts that incumbent officials will manipulate this self election pursuant to the maximization of their personal objective functions this paper provides evidence from school bond elections that politicians influence voter self selection via manipulation of election parameters

micro estimates of public spending demand functions and tests of the tiebout and median voter hypotheses responses to questions given to a random sample of michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions while income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner a relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the tiebout mechanism works this interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice

sent seeking with private values we study a rent seeking contest in which the players valuations of the prize are private information we determinea bayesian equilibrium and give conditions under which theequilibrium exists although players are ex ante symmetric increased possibilities for ex post lopsidedness lead toless aggressive bidding lopsidedness increases as players values become less positively correlated or as the variationin possible values increases we also compare theprivate information contest to a related public informationcontest in which the realizations of values are commonknowledge the contests are equally efficient and players areindifferent between the two but risk averse sellers of theprize are not

bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output further econometric evidence based on the theory of bureaucracy in contrast to the median voter model expenditure functions are estimated for various municipal services provided by some smsa cities various econometric measures and diagnostics are applied to the sample data to test for the incidence of multicollinearity heteroscedasticity and influential observations the test results indicate the absence of any econometric problems and the empirical results can be taken as statistically meaningful and to a large extent precise over the range of smsa cities included in the estimated model the presented econometric evidence points out that in these communities the municipal services are private in nature and there exist no economies of scale in the provision of these services although these services reveal no pure publicness or quasi publicness they are provided by local governments through a collective choice mechanism perhaps due to the inherent problems associated with their provision such as the cities lack of knowledge of individuals preferences and tastes and the anticipated potential free rider problem

the implications of competition among jurisdictions does tiebout need politics the paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is by itself sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods jurisdictions have fixed boundaries and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions it is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency though residents can vote with their feet land is immobile hence governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power

the municipal wage and employment effects of public infrastructure we empirically examine the relationship between public capital and municipal employment levels and changes using a sample of 48 large us cities during the 1970 80 period we find greater stocks of public capital are associated with a higher demand for and supply of municipal workers holding all other factors constant the effect of a 10 per cent greater level of per capita public capital stock is a 0 6 and 12 9 per cent higher demand for and supply of municipal workers in the short run reduced form estimates indicate a net positive effect on municipal employment but no net effect on municipal wages these findings are supported by a fixed effect model estimation

the expenditure effects of restricting competition in local public service industries the case of special districts the purpose of this paper has been to extend the type of positive economic analysis of the urban public economy that has been initiated by wagner and martin 1978 wagner and weber 1975 ostrom et al 1976 and others the hypothesis was tested that restricting the growth of single purpose special districts renders local service industries more monopolistic and should therefore increase local public expenditure levels evidence brought forth indicates that the effect of such restrictions imposed in two states california and oregon was to increase general per capita expenditures ceteris paribus per capita expenditures on water supply and fire protection two services frequently provided by special districts were also seen to increase dramatically after controlling for other supply and demand determinants of local public expenditures thus the empirical test of the last section supports the monopoly enhancing view of special district growth restrictions and leads us to reject the alternative reformist hypothesis that consolidating or annexing special districts will lead to improved hierarchical organization of local government and diminish the cost of providing local public services

political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy abstract this paper derives the characteristics of endogenous environmental policy in a common agency model of politics and proceeds to show that competition between lobby groups is an important source of internalization of economic externalities our analysis generalizes bhagwati s principle of targeting to the case of distorted political markets moreover we show that the politically optimal structure of environmental taxes incorporates a pigouvian adjustment however since lobby groups care about the distribution of income as well as about efficiency the equilibrium structure of taxes differs considerably from the pigouvian rule

a disequilibrium model of public spending abstract this paper proposes a disequilibrium model of public spending empirical results show that public spending is constrained by the supply side for low per capita income countries and the demand side forhigh income countries

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

a politico economic approach to intergovernmental lump sum grants this paper develops a positive approach to grant design when the central government and a lobby of local governments are the main agents it develops the hypothesis that the regressivity or progressivity of per capita grants regarding community size is ceteris paribus related to the structure of the lobbying activities of local governments and is independent of hypothetical economies or diseconomies of scale in the production of local public goods an encompassing lobby organisation using a one mayor one vote system of representation supports the regressivity of per capita grants while under proportional representation the lobby will support a design of per capita grants which is progressive towards community size an empirical analysis of lump sum grants in portugal supports the politico economic hypothesis and rejects the hypothesis that economies of scale is the main explanatory cause for the observed regressivity of per capita grants

discrimination in matchmaking evidence from the price policy of a french marriage bureau this article shows how a matchmaking agency may improve the quality of serious meetings between individuals seeking long term relationship thanks to a price discrimination policy its filtering is based on objective and official characteristics sex age and contract s environment and on implicit criteria the few asked characteristics by its clients

a theory of allocation of time in markets for labour and marriage this paper analyzes the interdependence between labor and marriage markets it is argued that market conditions concerning marriage influence the value of time in the home according to this economic view marriage involves an exchange of household labor between individual men and women wages in labor markets affect marital behavior and conditions in the markets for household labor influence labor supply single persons must decide whether to marry and if so how much work to invest and employ in the framework of marriage in monogamous societies marriage tends to occur when a man demands the amount of household labor a woman wants to supply and a woman demands the amount of labor supplied by the man however changing outside factors can disrupt this equilibrium and produce changes in income redistribution between the spouse new marital labor relations or divorce this approach diverges from the traditional theory of labor supply in the way the value of time in the home is determined awareness that the supply of labor can shift following changes in a market determined wage for household labor opens new avenues for research in labor economics and studies of female labor supply a change in sex ratio is likely to increase the proportion of women who marry and decrease the number of hours women work outside the home group differences in patterns of division of household labor further influence the elasticity of female labor supply a positive correlation between achievements in markets for labor and household labor can provide an additional explanation for the backward bending supply of labor finally the relative position of husbands and wives in their respective marriage markets has implications for their consumption patterns and fertility this theory could provide a useful framework for analyzing the consequences of public policy for production reproduction and the distribution of wealth

off budget activities of local government comment bennett and dilorenzo have provided evidence that limitations on taxes and spending induce a proliferation of special purpose local government they conclude that the effects on spending were less than originally supposed whatever the effects on total spending a very important effect on the limitations is an induced change in the fiscal constitution of local government using a public choice approach this institutional change was found to have certain desirable features

bureaucrats voters and public investment abstract this paper explores the provision of a durable public good in romer and rosenthal s agenda setter model it identifies a type of equilibrium called a romer rosenthal equilibrium in which in every period the bureaucrat proposes the maximum level of public investment the voter will support the paper establishes that such an equilibrium exists for a variety of public good benefit functions equilibrium public good levels converge or almost converge to a steady state these steady states can involve a unique public good level being provided each period or may exhibit a two period cycle steady state public good levels exceed the voter s optimal level more surprisingly steady state equilibrium reversion levels can exceed the voter s optimal steady state level meaning that reversion levels cannot be used to bound the optimal level reflecting the inability of the agents to commit to their future proposing and voting behavior equilibrium paths are pareto inefficient

collective rent dissipation the theory of rent seeking was initiated by tullock 1967 1980 followed by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 and more recently extended in various directions by allard 1988 appelbaum and katz 1986a b c gradstein and nitzan 1989 hillman and katz 1984 1987 hillman and samet 1987 hillman and riley 1989 katz et al 1990 long and vousden 1987 ursprung 1990 and varian 1989 the purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent seeking efforts

municipal utilities and local public finance a simultaneous model our results confirm the existence of a positive direct effect of cross subsidies from municipally owned water utilities on city spending while the results are consistent with the hypothesis that internal subsidization creates a fiscal illusion they are also consistent with vote maximizing behavior that is the demand for cross subsidies is found to depend on factors that reflect the city s fiscal position including its spending level in the absence of a contribution the results of the logit estimation suggest that annual contributions are discretionary and explained primarily by a city s fiscal health our results also confirm the existence of a simultaneous relationship between municipal spending and utility contributions and the need for a simultaneous estimation technique this bias affects all prior studies of the interaction between utility revenue contributions and local public finance variables and future studies must be aware of the simultaneous nature of the underlying relationship

running against the status quo institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time stylized institutions for direct democracy referenda are examined in a dynamic full information environment with myopic voters competitive agenda median voter processes are contrasted with monopolistic controlled agenda processes by extending existing static analyses to a class of dynamic institutions not previously characterized the status quo reversion rule this highlights the dependence of the progression of real equilibrium allocations over time on institutional structure by delineating the restrictions implied by each institutional form the model explains some persistent empirical regularities in particular a strict ceteris paribus ordering of the magnitudes of budgets by institutional form is derived for a wide portion of the parameter space

the flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods in this paper we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods specifically we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo classical economic theory in this research the flypaper effect is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences we empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect the implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed

an empirical assessment of the factor supplier pressure group hypothesis the main purpose of this paper has been to empirically assess tullock s factor supplier pressure group hypothesis theory predicted that public employees would be most able to use their political power to expand public spending levels at the local level of government therefore in contrast to the two previous attempts to test this hypothesis the empirical tests focused on the growth oflocal public spending the test results lead to the conclusion that the political power of public employee groups is an important determinant of the growth of local public spending although the extent of their influence is as yet unknown general control personnel and sanitation workers were found to be exceptionally successful at influencing budgetary growth in terms of the former group these results lead me to suspect that the results of bennett and johnson s 1980 research on federal government growth apply to the local public sector as well that is while there may be debate over how much local public spending has increased as a percentage of net national product its composition has changed in that proportionally more resources are being used for the purposes of administrative rule making as is the case with federal governmental regulation increased regulation of the local public economy is sure to have substantial allocative and distributive effects which form an agenda for future research

the median voter setters and non repeated construction bond issues the median voter model pervades the literature concerning the estimation of demands for collective expenditures but with some unanswered criticism the general issue addressed in this paper is whether observed collective expenditure levels and the characteristics of observed majorities are more adequately described by the median voter model or the romer and rosenthal setter model on a sample of non repeated hospital construction referenda bond issues the median voter model and the romer and rosenthal setter model are compared in both full information and uncertainty contexts little empirical support of the setter model is found indeed the evidence supports the absence of expenditure maximizing behavior the specific conclusions are 1 the standard median voter model explains quite well for this sample of non repeated bond issues 2 the explanatory power of the median voter model appears to vary across both voting arrangements and types of reversion threats 3 the explanation of hospital expenditures which have been judged too large may be due to how benefits and costs are distributed among voters and 4 the preponderance of large majorities for hospital construction in the face of evidence that such facilities typically become a burden on the general tax fund is consistent with setters offering the median ideal in the presence of a reversion below the ideal

marriage and class here we consider a matching model where agents are heterogeneous and utilities nontransferable we utilize this framework to study how equilibrium sorting takes place in marriage markets we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of a steady state equilibrium and then characterize it several examples are developed to illustrate the richness of equilibria the model reveals an interesting sorting externality that can support multiple steady state equilibria even with constant returns to matching excerpt

the market for laws an economic analysis of legislation considerable insight into the workings of government has been gained in recent years by analyzing political behavior in the same way that economists analyze market behavior such analysis has led to at least two actually several distinguishable but often overlapping developments one might be labeled the interest group theory of government 1 4 10 11 12 16 while the second could be referred to as the economic theory of legislatures 4 5 10 15 18 the purpose of the following presentation is to combine these two theoretical developments and treat the legislative process as a market for laws then by simultaneously considering interest group characteristics and legislative production costs hypotheses concerning both the level of interest group pressure and the magnitude of legislative output are examined in particular the primary issues to be addressed are 1 what determines the number of interest groups formed in a state and 2 what impact does the number of interest groups have on the level of legislative output in the process the developing economic approach to government is extended in two directions first this study contains what appears to be the first direct empirical examination of the question of what factors lead to or limit aggregate interest group demands for legislation and second the level of interest group pressure and the constraints on or costs of legislative decision making are considered to simultaneously determine the aggregate output of the legislative process virtually all previous studies of interest group legislation examine the impact of specific interests on specific legislation 2 the following presentation is divided into five sections in addition to this introduction in order to explore the issues suggested above section ii characterizes the political process as a market in order to justify the theoretical hypotheses to be tested section iii details the theoretical

the demand for military expenditures an international comparison earlier studies have explained inter country variations in the share of gnp devoted to military expenditures by international spillovers and by differences in the threat of attack related to relative incomes in this paper we use the theory of public choice to explain these differences we attempt to measure the importance of both international spillovers and relative incomes along with two other factors the tax price elasticity of demand and economies of scale in the consumption of security we find that international spillovers are significant and positive that the income elasticity of demand is greater than unity that the tax price elasticity of demand explains part of observed inter country differences and that there are considerable economies of scale in the consumption of military spending finally between 1960 and 1975 there was apparently a substantial increase in the value which each country derived from a dollar of military spending by its allies this phenomenon which seems related to the increased importance of deterrent weapons has tended to induce individual alliance members to reduce the share of their national income devoted to defense

economic competition and political competition an empirical note this paper has examined the proposition that more concentrated or consolidated metropolitan areas will produce public goods less efficiently than if there were a greater degree of interjurisdictional competition the empirical evidence garnered in section 3 suggests that interjurisdictional competition does tend to reduce the cost of providing local public services and consequently local government expenditure levels

information in conflicts abstract we consider two player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value for settings where one player knows the value of the prize while the other only knows its prior distribution we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent in the special case of a lottery contest equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed

fragmentation and the growth of local government an assumption of the post world war ii metropolitan reform movement was that fragmentation of metropolitan regions into multiple local governments was wasteful and inefficient increasing the cost and size of government more recently polycentrists have argued that the competition between multiple governments in metropolitan regions can in factreduce the growth in government by providing a competitive check on the excessive demands of local bureaucrats for more resources in this article i explore the effects of fragmentation on growth in the size of suburban municipal government budgets and in the number of services offered competition inherent in more fragmented metropolitan regions is shown to slow the expansion in local government expenditures and service levels

the convergence of fiscal regimes and the decline of the tiebout effect i have argued that the spatial convergence of per capita incomes and income distributions lead to the spatial convergence of fiscal regimes and that convergence diminishes opportunities for tiebout type moves in the economy considerable empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis states with relatively low initial levels of taxation have had relatively higher growth rates of taxation low per capita income states have had higher growth rates of real per capita incomes than have had high per capita income states the high economic growth rate states have had lower growth rates of taxation than the low income growth rate states spatial convergence of per capita incomes is associated with spatial convergence of fiscal regimes furthermore there has been a spatial convergence in income distributions increased equality of income empirically is associated with increased size of the fiscal regime confirming the public choice insight the spatial convergence of fiscal regimes has diminished the gains from tiebout type moves as such fiscal convergence diminishes the opportunity for citizen voters to reveal their preference for collective goods through migration of course at the limit where per capita incomes and the income distribution are invariant spatially the spatial convergence of fiscal regimes makes the musgrave samuelson problem of revealed preference for collective goods as intractable at the state and local levels as at the national level tiebout type moves no longer allow escape from leviathan

the power to tax analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution preface 1 taxation in constitutional perspective 2 natural government a model of leviathan 3 constraints on base and rate structure 4 the taxation of commodities 5 taxation through time income taxes capital taxes and public debt 6 money creation and taxation 7 the disposition of public revenues 8 the domain of politics 9 open economy federalism and taxing authority 10 toward authentic tax reform prospects and prescriptions epilogue notes selected bibliography index

the market for used cars new evidence of the lemons phenomenon the lemons model assumes that owners of used cars have an information advantage over potential buyers with respect to the quality of their vehicles owners of bad cars try to sell them to ill informed buyers while owners of good cars hold on to theirs consequently the quality of traded automobiles tends to be sub average in contrast to previous empirical work the following article investigates the behaviour of both buyers and sellers testing for adverse selection by sellers and for quality uncertainty among buyers with a sample consisting of all 1985 cars registered in the swiss canton of basle city over the period 1985 to 1991 our data supports both adverse selection and buyer uncertainty suggesting that a lemons problem exists

would you trust lobbies we consider the regulatory problem to approve or to ban a new product technology in the context of scientific controversy about its detrimental environmental and or health effects we formalize the regulator s decision making process as a tullock contest towards a theory of the rent seeking society texas a m university press texas 1980 the contestants being an industrial lobby representing the economic agents who have developed the new product technology and an environmental lobby representing the economic agents who will be harmed by the product or technology assuming that the industrial lobby has private information about the unfavorable environmental and or health effects but can be held liable for damage ex post we derive the equilibrium properties of the contest in particular we derive conditions under which it is socially preferable for the regulator to decide according to the contest s outcome rather than according to an ex ante cost benefit analysis using his prior beliefs we find that the contest outperforms the ex ante cost benefit analysis only if the risk of judgment proofness is not too high

the use of expert opinion quality and reputation indicators by consumers evidence from the french vaulting stallion semen market we build a model inspired by the standard hedonic approach developed by rosen 1974 and completed by landon and smith 1997 1998 to analyse the price of french vaulting stallion semen in 2004 we show that reputation modelled as an endogenous factor plays a less important role than information on true quality for the explanation of price dispersion this result is explained by the fact that information on studhorses is not only available but also reliable insofar as the quality of a stallion is stable over time contrary to nondurable products like wine or cigars this explains also why consumers on this market do not use expert opinions to make their choices

are governmental expenditures also sticky evidence from the operating expenditures of public schools abstractexisting research on cost stickiness focuses primarily on for profit companies this study investigates cost behaviour in the public sector a new setting that deserves more research attent

the effects of non clearing labor markets on the demand for public spending the median voter model suggests the causal sequence distribution spending bureaucracy whereas the bureaucratic model proposes the chain bureaucracy spending distribution in the presence of labor market distortions and underemployment labor contracts we argue that an initial link must be added to each causal chain namely the excess supply of labor in the private sector empirical estimates of both the median voter and bureaucratic models indicate that inter country differences in per capita public spinding are an increasing function of differences in wage rates

bureaucracy publicness and local government expenditures revisited comment the empirical literature on the publicness of local government services has observed no significant degree of publicness it is difficult to reconcile these findings with wyckoff s conclusion that bureaucrats prefer pure public goods wyckoff s solution is to suggest that bureaucracy has little effect on operating non capital expenditure decisions this solution however conflicts with the empirical findings of numerous local expenditure and wage studies based on bureau supply models but there is no need to consider this evidence because we have shown that wyckoff s cost assumptions imply that a median voter regime will also operate at a maximum attainable degree of publicness hence we must either reject wyckoff s assumptions or conclude that the nature of the services demanded from local government is such that the maximum attainable degree of publicness is close to no publicness at all in any case wyckoff s conclusions are not supported within the context of his own assumptions

asymmetric information and agenda control the bases of monopoly power in public spending abstract a pervasive empirical finding widely known as the flypaper effect is that lump sum intergovernmental grants generate considerably greater public spending by the recipient jurisdiction than would be predicted by equivalent shifts in personal income in that jurisdiction moreover such observations are inconsistent with standard median voter models of the political process we posit a model in which it is in the interest of suppliers of a collectively provided good not to generate full information to voters about outside aid the empirical results are consistent with flypaper and suggest that voters are very poorly informed about outside grants

bureaucracy and the publicness of local public goods a reply to gonzalez folsom and mehay readers of the literature on bureaucracy will recall that three years ago gonzalez and mehay 1985 published an empirical piece utilizing a slack maximizing model of bureaucratic behavior which concluded that local public goods are really private goods my own article wyckoff 1988a reached the same conclusion using theoretical means the effect of bureaucracy i argued is to bias our results toward the conclusion that local public goods are public in nature so the empirical results showing the opposite cannot be blamed on bureaucracy now in a surprising comment on my paper gonzalez folsom and mehay 1988 gfm assert that i made methodological errors in the process of establishing my result not content with my agreement with their conclusions gfm demand that i reach these results using their methodology gfm insist that i ignore four special cases in my paper each one of these special cases is discussed below in general i find little merit in their arguments each special case is either obviously unrealistic or relates to a question completely different from those discussed in my paper first of all gfm argue that i fail to note that the voter s tax share t is likely to vary with city population n when this correlation is incorporated into my model they say the reverse of my results could occur but there is a fundamental error in allowing t to vary with n the issue in this paper is not whether large cities spend more than small cities nobody disputes this but whether local public goods are public goods or not what we want to know is whether two people can enjoy a public service just as easily as one by including tax considerations in the calculations as they have done gfm confuse crowding effects with changes in spending caused by changes in tax burdens when t is allowed to vary with n we no longer have a measure of the crowding parameter but a composite which cannot answer the question we originally asked an analogy may help clarify gfm s error gfm s approach is equivalent to suggesting that since wealthy people have larger homes and hence larger tax

burden sharing in the nato alliance an empirical test of alternative views this paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances the first view associated with olson and zeckhauser argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members a second view argues that nato defense activities produce a mix of outputs some of which are not purely public and some of which may be complementary across nations furthermore the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies the test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of nato members and their population and relative wealth shares a simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data the empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the olson zeckhauser non cooperative model

municipal residency laws and local public budgets prior research has shown that residency laws increase the productivity of municipal employees which tends to reduce per unit operating cost however this gain in efficiency appears to have been lost when one considers that public employee groups tend to be high demanders who have a greater tendency to vote in local elections and to support expenditure increases bennett and orzechowski 1983 our results tend to provide additional evidence to support the findings of previous studies that public employee groups tend to exert a disproportionate impact on local budgetary decisions

rent seeking for pure public goods in this paper we present a formal analysis of rent seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals we begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality a case which constitutes our basic model several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case the problem is then extended to deal with a groups with different wealth levels and b risk aversion this last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results

centralization and government competition this paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal centralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmentation on the size of public sector in the united states the empirical findings at the national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller government the findings at the state and local levels however show no empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization

economic incentives under contract supply of local government services it has been argued that organizations which are unable to directly appropriate any of the firm s residual earnings tend to experience various forms of wealth taking by managers alchian and kessel 1962 this wealth taking has been observed in privately owned regulated firms nelson 1980 as well as in government operated bureaus the results in this paper suggest that the x inefficiency associated with various forms of wealth taking may be constrained when external competitive pressures exist niskanen argued that one strategy for reducing the inefficiency associated with monopoly bureaus would be to set up two bureaus to compete for the sponsor s budget in order to generate better information on cost and production functions at the local level the lakewood plan by generating information on actual production cost to purchasing cities and to unincorporated area residents appears to create the desired effect by generating this flow of information on cost the lakewood plan eases the task of monitoring the performance of county departments second the threat of entry posed by the city bureau which can always produce services in house appears to effectively constrain the x inefficiency of the county supplier bureaus

legal constraints and the choice of educational grant structures recent empirical work suggests that legalconstraints are significant in choosingstate educational grant structures unfortunately the literature has not takensuch constraints into account thus callinginto question particular grant structurerecommendations this paper studies theconditions under which a legislature underorder to reform its educational grantstructure prefers foundation grants overdistrict power equalization grants atheoretical model is presented in which thechoice is shown to depend on the legalbasis of the court s decision and theempirical validity of this conclusion isdemonstrated using connecticut data and aseparate model of school districtexpenditure choice

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

the publicness of local public goods evidence from ontario municipalities recent studies of local public good provision report publicness parameter estimates of about one indicating private good characteristics this empirical investigation of a wider range of communities obtains parameter estimates of significantly less than one indicating a high degree of publicness exists in smaller municipalities and within the service areas of individual public facilities comprising the supply network in larger centres it is argued that the observed values of the publicness parameters have no normative significance as to the merits of public versus private provision la materialite publique d usage des biens publics locaux resultats d une etude de municipalites ontariennes les etudes recentes sur l approvisionnement de biens publics locaux indiquent des coefficients de materialite publique d usage autour de l unite c est a dire que les biens publics locaux ont de fortes caracteristiques semblables aux biens prives ce memoire presente les resultats d un enquete empirique d un large eventail de communaut6s locales et en arrive a des valeurs pour le coefficient de materialite publique d usage qui sont bien moins que l unite et qui donc indiquent un haut degre de materialite publique d usage dans les petites municipalites mais aussi dans les zones de service d infrastructures particulieres parc bibliotheque poste de pompier etc qui forment le reseau d approvisionnement de biens publics dans les grands centres les auteurs suggerent que les valeurs observees de ces coefficients de materialite publique d usage n ont aucune portee normative et donc ne sauraient arbitrer les merites relatifs d un approvisionnement prive ou public de certains biens

municipal annexation and local monopoly power we have found that the fiscal power of a city can be increased by extension of its borders within a land area that is homogeneous with respect to earning opportunities even when numerous rival jurisdictions exist in the area we hypothesized that extending municipal boundaries will have a positive effect on discretionary outlays and on expenditures per capita the evidence presented supports these hypotheses furthermore municipal wages appear to be significantly increased in cities experiencing annexation growth therefore we would expect to find that municipal employees are more inclined to favor annexation than the rest of the electorate from a policy standpoint this study suggests that significant perverse effects on fiscal efficiency may follow adoption of legal reforms that facilitate the ability of municipalities to extend their borders or that restrict the formation of new municipalities

bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output the empirical results of this paper are derived from a monopoly view of local government decisionmaking in contrast to the competitive view offered by earlier researchers that our results are similar to earlier findings lends additional support to the conclusion that local output is largely private in nature other than park and recreation services there appear to be no economies in consumption for local services nor any economies of density larger cities do not appear to be more efficient than smaller cities 10 of course this result holds only for the sample of cities used here and does not rule out scale economies for communities smaller than those in our sample i e below 25 000 population

establishing the micro foundations of a macro theory information movers and the competitive local market for public goods e tiebout model of competition in the local market for public goods is an important and controversial theory the current debate revolves around the apparent disparity between macro 5 x empirical studies that show greater efficiency in the supply of public goods in polycentric regions compared to consolidated ones and micro evidence of widespread citizen consumer ignorance which has been used to argue that individual actions cannot plausibly lead to efficiency enhancing competition between local governments we argue that competitive markets can be driven by a subset of informed consumers who shop around between alternate suppliers and produce pressure for competitive outcomes from which all consumers benefit using data from a survey of overfive hundred households we analyze the role of these marginal citizen consumers and incorporate the costs of information gathering and the strategic interests of local governments into the competitive market model

estimating the publicness of local government services alternative congestion function specifications the standard approach to estimating median voter expenditure equations has incorporated the specification of a congestion function a n to convert the total output q of a government provided good into individual consumption qi in their classic papers borcherding and deacon 2 and bergstrom and goodman 1 adopted a simple form a n n y using this form estimated values of y 0 imply that the service in question is classified as a pure public good while y 1 implies a private good this approach is attractive from an empirical standpoint because it allows the data to determine the degree of publicness of the local government output the empirical findings of borcherding and deacon bergstrom and goodman and numerous later studies that used the median voter approach indicate that most local government services do not exhibit a significant degree of publicness 2 recent studies have questioned whether estimates of publicness are sensitive to the particular specification of the congestion relationship 6 9 researchers also have objected to the standard form because it holds the degree of publicness fixed which implies a decreasing marginal rate of congestion 3 6 15 moreover holding the degree of publicness fixed implies a single estimated value of y is sufficient to classify the publicness of the good critics of the standard approach argue that the degree of publicness should vary with population size for instance a local park may exhibit no congestion for small population sizes but eventually become congested as population increases unfortunately no clear guidelines for specifying the congestion function are available edwards suggested that flexible functional forms are to be preferred because they let the data speak for themselves 6 92 he also argued that the preferred form is one that fits the data best based on these criteria he concluded that a flexible form such as an exponential form is su

median voters political systems and public policies an empirical test this paper tests the median voter hypothesis that variations in policies across political systems are caused by variations in median voter preferences the context of the empirical analysis is the tax policies of three groups of sub national governments in england in three time periods the results of a median voter model of tax policy variation are compared to the results of a mean voter model in different party systems and different electoral systems the evidence provides little support for the median voter hypothesis

to ban or not to ban foreign lobbying and cross national externalities this paper studies the costs and benefits of foreign lobbying we show how and when foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities we argue that this is an often overlooked benefit of foreign lobbying we also study under what conditions a constitutional rule banning foreign lobbying is in the national interest of a country a key factor in this calculus is whether the interests of foreign lobby groups and domestic unorganized groups coincide or not we illustrate the logic with examples from trade policy and environmental regulation bannir ou ne pas bannir lobbying etranger et effets externes transnationaux ce texte etudie les couts et avantages du lobbying etranger on montre quand et comment que le lobbying etranger peut aider a internaliser des effets externes transnationaux on suggere que c est souvent un avantage qu on est porte a negliger du lobbying etranger on etudie sous quelles conditions une regle constitutionnelle bannissant le lobbying etranger peut etre dans l interet national d un pays un facteur cle dans ce calcul est le fait que les interets des groupes etrangers coincident ou non avec ceux des groupes nationaux non organises on illustre la logique sous jacente a l aide d exemples portant sur la politique commerciale et la reglementation environnementale

the median voter hypothesis evidence from general purpose local governments the median voter hypothesis mvh represents a much used as well as much criticized tool in the hands of public finance economists to evaluate the mvh this paper applies the cox specification test using data from general purpose municipal governments the cox test allows for possible simultaneous rejection of the mvh and all tested models thus providing stricter criteria than applied to date in empirical mvh analyses the test results reveal that the mvh is appropriate for explaining the aggregate behavior of municipal governments but not specific services further the single service and single tax base assumptions are not critical to the empirical mvh performance

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

institutions efficiency and the strategic behaviour of sponsors and bureaus abstract the over production associated with bureaucratic production is examined in a general equilibrium environment in which the bureau and its sponsor behave strategically seemingly minor modifications in institutional settings give major differences in nash equilibrium outcomes the non equivalence of institutional settings suggests that over production or under production by bureaus can be a result of the institutions governing the decision process as well as the preferences of the bureau for the size of the bureau

gmo standards endogenous policy and the market for information the paper develops a composite index of gmo standards restrictiveness for 60 countries assigning objective scores to six different regulatory dimensions using this index and its components we empirically investigate the political and economic determinants of gmo regulations for 55 countries controlling for spatial autocorrelation results show that many of the determinants highlighted in the theoretical literature such as the structure of the agricultural sector and the institutional environment are important determinants of the restrictiveness of the gmo regulation as a key result there emerges a prominent role of the market for information showing that the structure of domestic mass media public vs private is an important driver of gmo standards

rent seeking with asymmetric valuations this paper analyzes tullock s rent seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy nash equilibrium is established equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected to comparative statics analysis increasing the underdog s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts increasing the favorite s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog expected profits increase with a player s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor the impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed