getting big too fast strategic dynamics with increasing returns and bounded rationality neoclassical models of strategic behavior have yielded many insights into competitive behavior despite the fact that they often rely on a number of assumptions including instantaneous market clearing and perfect foresight that have been called into question by a broad range of research researchers generally argue that these assumptions are good enough to predict an industry s probable equilibria and that disequilibrium adjustments and bounded rationality have limited competitive implications here we focus on the case of strategy in the presence of increasing returns to highlight how relaxing these two assumptions can lead to outcomes quite different from those predicted by standard neoclassical models prior research suggests that in the presence of increasing returns tight appropriability and accommodating rivals in some circumstances early entrants can achieve sustained competitive advantage by pursuing get big fast gbf strategies rapidly expanding capacity and cutting prices to gain market share advantage and exploit positive feedbacks faster than their rivals using a simulation of the duopoly case we show that when the industry moves slowly compared to capacity adjustment delays boundedly rational firms find their way to the equilibria predicted by conventional models however when market dynamics are rapid relative to capacity adjustment forecasting errors lead to excess capacity overwhelming the advantage conferred by increasing returns our results highlight the risks of ignoring the role of disequilibrium dynamics and bounded rationality in shaping competitive outcomes and demonstrate how both can be incorporated into strategic analysis to form a dynamic behavioral game theory amenable to rigorous analysis

landlords tenants and technological innovations abstract there is a long standing belief that landlords and capitalists have used their control over the means of production to direct the development and adoption of technologies which have increased their welfare at the expense of workers there is also a wide spread belief that the interlinkage between credit and tenancy markets which seems so prevalent in ldcs provides further impetus to the resistance of innovations innovations which make tenants better off reduce their demand for loans and thus make landlords qua creditors worse off these contentions have typically been dismissed out of hand by standard welfare economics arguments the rural environment of most ldcs may not however be adequately described by the standard economic model on which this welfare analysis is based in particular in many ldcs sharecropping contracts are widely employed there is evidence of widespread unemployment and there is not the full set of risk and capital markets required by the competitive paradigm the objective of this paper is to show under quite general conditions that the institutional structure of the economy may indeed be an important determinant of whether a particular innovation will or will not be adopted we show that 1 i landlords may wish to and can resist innovations which unambiguously increase production whenever sharecropping contracts are employed 2 ii conversely landlords may adopt innovations which not only lower the welfare of workers but even lower net national product 3 iii the presence of interlinkage may indeed affect the adoption of a new technology however the reason for this is only partly related to the effect of innovations on tenants borrowing indeed we show that innovations may increase as well as decrease the tenants demand for borrowing

property rights externalities and resource degradation locating the tragedy abstract resource degradation in the third world is largely driven by the demands of farm households for fuelwood and land for agriculture since resources are often controlled through indigenous systems of property the tragedy of the commons has been used to explain resource degradation as a result private property is suggested as a solution to resource degradation a dynamic model capable of examining household incentives for resource use under private and common property is developed results of the model reject the conventional wisdom that gives rise to the presumed optimality of private individual property in natural resources and the correlated indictment of group management regimes

what determines female autonomy evidence from bangladesh abstract this paper examines the determinants of female autonomy within households in a developing country in particular we investigate the relative contributions of earned versus unearned income in enhancing women s autonomy and the role of employment outside of their husband s farm in a simple theoretical model it is demonstrated that earned income could be more important than unearned income in empowering women using data from rural bangladesh empirical estimations confirm this prediction and also reveal the surprising fact that it is not employment per se but employment outside their husbands farms that contributes to women s autonomy the data also point to the importance of choosing the correct threat point in theoretical analyses of female autonomy

interlinked contracts and moral hazard in investment abstract in agricultural tenancy arrangements the tenant is often required to undertake effort aimed at maintaining and improving the productive stocks this paper investigate the design of contracts which induce optimal investment of such effort it is found that a long term contract which interlinks tenancy with a credit agreement is optimal in equilibrium the tenant obtains credit from the landlord at a rate of interest below the market and is perpetually indebted to the landlord

introduction imperfect information and rural credit markets puzzles and policy perspectives rural credit markets have been at the center of policy intervention in developing countries over the past forty years many governments supported by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies have devoted considerable resources to supplying cheap credit to farmers in a myriad of institutional settings the results of many of these interventions have been disappointing and one explanation for this must be that they were based on an inadequate understanding of the workings of rural credit markets the articles in this symposium issue are devoted to empirical and theoretical investigations of rural credit markets in the framework of the imperfect information paradigm the authors show how this framework is useful not only in explaining puzzling features of these markets but also in providing a policy perspective to assess the successes and failures of specific interventions

the role of consumption credit in agricultural tenancy abstract in traditional agriculture it is common practice for landlords to give consumption loans to their own tenants if the tenant derives all his income from the landlord it is puzzling that the landlors needs another means of expropriating the surplus he could just raise the rent the paper suggests that consumption credit may be a side payment designed to enable the landlord to absorb the tenant s risk due to weather uncertainty without weakening his incentive to work tenancy is modelled as an agency contract designed in terms of information may be available to the landlord

seasonality differential access and interlinking of labour and credit this article explains the interlinking of rural labour and credit transactions in terms of differential access to credit markets and seasonality a model is developed which incorporates not only seasonality and differential access but also several other explanations for interlinking suggested in the literature moreover it allows one to test the sensitivity of the results to differing powers on the part of landowners relative to working households

wealth and health at the base of the pyramid modelling trade offs and complementarities for fast moving dairy product case abstract this paper models the localized base of the pyramid bop supply and demand chain of a fast moving dairy product within its social and business environment for identifying the effects of various pricing strategies on wealth and health of the poor population of bangladesh the joint venture of the grameen bank and danone gd in bangladesh is a showcase of integrative bop projects it produces fortified yoghurt in a micro plant and distributes it through micro entrepreneurs following a strictly localized approach the objective of this bop project is twofold 1 integrating as many people as possible into productive processes and paying decent prices wages and commissions wealth and 2 regularly serving as many people as possible with fortified yoghurt health by means of dynamic simulation we analyse how volatility in raw material prices affects the economic viability of the business model and hence both objectives the gd case provides the motivation as well as empirical data for the presented research and has been used for model validation additionally we use further literature sources our results show the outstanding importance of sales effectiveness for buffering against negative consumer reaction to sudden price increases sales effectiveness aggregates various performance factors regarding product distribution and perceived product quality and value in this respect awareness raising campaigns by governmental and civil society organizations as well as changes regarding distribution mode and selection of distributors may enhance sales effectiveness

cost sharing arrangements under sharecropping moral hazard incentive flexibility and risk this paper explains the rationale and describes the characteristics of cost sharing arrangements in rural developing economies focusing on the risk and incentive properties of alternative cost contracts and on their flexibility their ability to adapt to environmental changes it is shown that where labor inputs are difficult to monitor the rule that cost shares and output shares be equalized will not hold and is not constrained pareto efficient and that cost sharing contracts have a decided advantage over contracts which specify the level of inputs whenever there are asymmetries of information regarding production technology between the landlord and the tenant

production capacity planning for multiple products under uncertain demand conditions abstract this study chiefly deliberates issues regarding capacity allocation for multiple products when producing multiple products a manufacturer needs to allocate a favorable production quantity to each product under conditions of uncertain demand since the excess or shortage of a product will in turn cause the loss of profit the proposed model and the corresponding algorithm in this study are used to find out the optimal capacity allocation under the given probability density function of specific demands and to effectively allocate limited capacity to multiple products with an aim to maximize profit finally the numerical example suggests that the marginal profit the inventory holding cost the shortage cost the loss of excess production and market demands should be considered in an effort to discover an optimal capacity allocation with regard to multiple products

agriculture in recent development theory abstract this paper is a critical review of recent contributions to the literature on agriculture in development theory it considers and compares the main lines of advance made within neoclassical neo marxian and structuralist approaches recent neo marxian and structuralist studies of agrarian development reveal that traditional agriculture is neither stationary nor efficient that resource allocation cannot be separated from wealth distribution or production organization that forms of surplus appropriation do not necessarily follow the dictates of efficiency that the social relations of production may inhibit accumulation and determine the forms of technological change that the state s role in primitive accumulation is more economic than explicitly coercive political and that political and macroeconomic constraints preclude a simple get the prices right view of the intersectoral terms of trade the thrust of these developments is to challenge both neoclassical and some orthodox marxian formulations of agrarian development issues and add to the insights to be gleaned from a political economy of development

a theory of interlinked rural transactions this paper argues that the interlinking of labor output and credit contracts often observed in rural economies can be regarded as an attempt to improve allocative efficiency in the face of moral hazard it advances an economic explanation of the phenomenon which is rooted in the view that prevalent modes of transaction of which interlinked contracts are an example are shaped by technological considerations interlinking is shown to be an efficient economic response to unequally distributed information arising from the uncertainty which characterizes subsistence agriculture all pareto efficient allocations require a combination of wage cum output sharing with consumption credit contracts the analytical framework set up to demonstrate the results is used to examine the response of the contractual parameters to changes in i the returns to alternative occupations available to tenant laborers ii the cost of credit to the village economy and iii the riskiness of cultivation the analysis concludes that public policy to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the relationships between technological considerations and modes of transaction in the absence of a complete set of markets

unanticipated side effects of successful quality programs exploring a paradox of organizational improvement recent evidence suggests the connection between quality improvement and financial results may be weak consider the case of analog devices inc a leading manufacturer of integrated circuits analog s tqm program was a dramatic success yield doubled cycle time was cut in half and product defects fell by a factor of ten however financial performance worsened to explore the apparent paradox we develop a detailed simulation model of analog including operations financial and cost accounting product development human resources the competitive environment and the financial markets we used econometric estimation interviews observation and archival data to specify and estimate the model we find that improvement programs like tqm can present firms with a tradeoff between short and long run effects in the long run tqm can increase productivity raise quality and lower costs in the short run these improvements can interact with prevailing accounting systems and organizational routines to create excess capacity financial stress and pressure for layoffs that undercut commitment to continuous improvement we explore policies to promote sustained improvement in financial as well as nonfinancial measures of performance

trust interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial district an essential feature of the industrial district is trust among individuals and firms within it this paper focuses mainly on trust based on investments in building up a good reputation that is a personal capital that can even substitute for collateral in obtaining credit informal credit often linked to other transactions and especially subcontracting is therefore an important way of financing economic development in the industrial district moreover the importance of trust as personal capital gives rise to a double financial intermediation in the industrial district this double intermediation constitutes a device to reduce information problems that are usually responsible for credit rationing c 1994 academic press inc copyright 1994 by oxford university press

formal credit corruption and the informal credit market in agriculture a theoretical analysis the paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit the farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit the official and the moneylender play a non cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate respectively the informal sector interest rate and the effective formal sector interest rate incorporating the bribe are equal in equilibrium a reduction in the formal interest rate and or an increase in the price of the product may lead to an increase in the equilibrium bribing rate and the informal interest rate when the formal credit and the informal credit are complementary to each other

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

implications of agency theory for optimal land tenure contracts explores landowner tenant contracts in land tenure in agriculture inefficiency of share tenancy relative to owner cultivation introduction of principal agent models influence of monitoring in studying optimal landowner tenant risk sharing need to study adequate tenant incentives this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

pareto efficient taxation and expenditures pre and re distribution abstract this paper shows that there is a presumption that pareto efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital when tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset those effects need to be taken into account reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution the paper extends the 1976 atkinson stiglitz results to a dynamic overlapping generations model correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax that result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in fixed labor productivities in a general equilibrium model one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self selection constraints in a simple model with time separability but with non separability between consumption and leisure capital taxation depends on the complementarity substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption the final section constructs a simple two class model capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement whose productivity can be enhanced by publicly provided education it derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax which is positive so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high

effective control policies for stochastic inventory systems with a minimum order quantity and linear costs abstract we consider a model of single item periodic review inventory system with stochastic demand linear ordering cost where in each time period the system must order either none or at least as much as a minimum order quantity moq optimal inventory policies for such a system are typically too complicated to implement in practice in fact the s s type of policies are often utilized in the real world we study the performance of a simple heuristic policy that is easily implementable because it is specified by only two parameters s t we develop an algorithm to compute the optimal values for these parameters in the infinite time horizon under the average cost criterion through an extensive numerical study we demonstrate that the best s t heuristic policy has performance close to that of the optimal policies when the coefficient of variation of the demand distribution is not very small furthermore the best s t policy always outperforms the best feasible s s policies and on average the percentage differences are significant finally we study the impact of moq on system performance

a theory of sharecropping the role of price behavior and imperfect competition this paper proposes a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets we consider a contractual setting between one landlord and one tenant with seasonal variation of price where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage we consider two different classes of contracts i tenancy contracts and ii crop buying contracts it is shown that sharecropping is the optimal form within tenancy contracts and it also dominates crop buying contracts provided the price variation is not too large then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy and crop buying elements and show that there are multiple optimal interlinked contracts finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect competition in the rural product market it is shown that the unique contract that is robust to this refinement results in sharecropping

formal and informal sector credit institutions and interlinkage abstract nationalized banks in poor countries often ration rural credit this creates demand for loans from monopolistic landlord moneylenders who often interlink credit and product contracts allowing the latter to extract more of the tenant s consumer surplus in the presence of asymmetric information such arrangements can be inefficient we find that increasing the fixed credit allocation to the rural sector at a subsidized rate does not reduce that inefficiency the entire benefit of the subsidy is extracted by the moneylender an alternative policy of providing credit at subsidized rates but in a flexible manner is more effective in reducing the inefficiency

reducing the cost of demand uncertainty through accurate response to early sales traditionally fashion products have incurred high losses due to stockouts and inventory obsolence because long lead times coupled with a concentrated selling season force all or at least most production to be committed before demand information is available under a quick response system lead times are shortened sufficiently to allow a greater portion of production to be scheduled in response to initial demand we model and analyze the decisions required under quick response and give a method for estimating the demand probability distributions needed in our model we applied these procedures with a major fashion skiwear firm and found that cost relative to the current informal response system was reduced by enough to increase profits by 60 relative to the cost that would have been incurred if no response were used optimized response reduces cost by enough to roughly quadruple profits

where and how index insurance can boost the adoption of improved agricultural technologies abstract remote sensing and other advances have led to an outpouring of programs that offer index insurance to small scale farmers with the expectation that this insurance will enable adoption of improved technologies and boost living standards despite these expectations the evidence to date on the uptake and impacts of insurance is mixed this paper steps back and considers theoretically where index insurance might be most effective and whether it should be offered as a standalone contract or explicitly interlinked with credit contracts emerging from this analysis is a set of nuanced recommendations based on the structure of risk and the property rights collateral environment

joint liability versus individual liability in credit contracts abstract i offer an explanation for the coexistence of joint liability and individual liability microcredit contracts i show that both contracts maximize welfare when credit is rationed due to limited liability but for different borrowers borrowers monitor each other when liability is joint while the lender monitors individual loans joint liability offers poorer borrowers larger loans with less monitoring effort than would have to be exerted by the lender individual liability offers the wealthier among credit constrained borrowers larger loans even without monitoring the theory explains why individual loans serve the wealthier among poor borrowers and are larger and why businesses funded with individual loans grow more

interlocking transactions obstacles precursors or instruments of agrarian capitalism abstract rural labor arrangements often change rapidly and in ways that prevailing theories cannot explain explicit understanding of the exercise of power in rural society sheds considerable light on how and why rural labor arrangements change in the course of economic development this paper shows how different labor tying arrangements embody exclusionary mechanisms that can serve as instruments of both labor management and social control macro political and economic conditions shape the ways in which these mechanisms operate and are in turn influenced by them viewing labor arrangements in this way helps resolve problems confronted by the prevailing theories and allows for a broader understanding of dynamic processes

interlinked contracts and social power patronage and exploitation in india s waste recovery market abstract interlinked contracts have been examined almost exclusively in the context of the rural sphere this article describes the nature of exchange regimes between two sets of primary collectors of recyclable waste that is waste pickers and itinerant buyers and their dealers in the city of delhi far from the casualised labour transaction commonly described for the unorganised urban sector the findings portray a picture of personalised and surprisingly long term exchange between the parties while a new institutional economics approach might explain the underlying motivation and consequent general form of the implicit contracts it cannot explain the differential nature of each it is suggested that in order to do that a political economy approach must be taken this would understand interlinked transactions as being embedded within and consequently influenced by the particular social context in this case of an inequitable and impermeable caste hierarchy amongst those that engage in waste work

effective inventory control policies with a minimum order quantity and batch ordering abstract in this paper we consider a single item periodic review stochastic inventory system with both minimum order quantity moq and batch ordering requirements in each time period the firm can order either none or at least as much as the moq at the same time if an order is placed the order quantity is required to be an integral multiple of a given specific batch size we first adopt a heuristic policy which is specified by two parameters s t applying a discrete time markov chain approach we compute the system cost and optimize this s t policy under the long run average cost criterion we also consider a simpler one parameter policy the so called s policy which is a special case of the s t policy in an intensive numerical study we find that 1 both policies perform well in comparison with other policies and 2 the s policy also performs well and is compatible with the s t policy only in a few cases where demand variation is small the latter outperforms the former significantly we also evaluate the effects of some important parameters on system performance

multi task sharecropping contracts the italian mezzadria we use recent developments in the multi task principal agent methodology to study a sharecropping contract that was pervasive in central italy we distinguish between subsistence crops and cash crops we analyse the spillover effect from one crop to the other and we show that this reduces the ability of this sharecropping economy to adjust to a changed environment we trace the effects of the changes in agricultural prices in the second half of the nineteenth century finally we propose some explanation for the puzzling phenomenon of the reintroduction of many feudal clauses in the sharecropping contract when the rest of the italian economy was beginning to modernize copyright 1996 by the london school of economics and political science

endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics if i some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and ii there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading we address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early renaissance tuscany controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest and tenants risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice

permanent labour and land tenancy contracts in agrarian economies an integrated analysis extending the existing models of land and labour contracts this study attempts to build a general model of long term agrarian contracts the model implies that where tenancy is an available option the fixed wage permanent labour contract will not be chosen if it is chosen under institutional constraints on tenancy contracts resulting resource allocations will be inefficient empirical relevance of the model is tested on data from the philippines

moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation abstract this paper demonstrates that in an economy with moral hazard and more than one commodity competitive equilibrium is not constrained efficient to correct the market failure differential commodity taxation is necessary a general optimal tax formula is derived and special cases of is discussed

targeting child labor in debt bondage evidence theory and policy implications despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

supply and demand for livestock credit in sub saharan africa lessons for designing new credit schemes abstract based on analysis of credit supply in ethiopia kenya uganda and nigeria it is shown that public credit institutions do not have sufficient funds to meet the demand for livestock credit and cannot mobilize savings from their clients or other commercial sources for one reason or another in addition available credit does not reach those who need it the most and with whom it could have the greatest impact due to the application of inappropriate screening procedures and criteria to determine creditworthiness the analysis of demand based on borrowing and nonborrowing sample households using improved dairy technology it is shown that not all borrowers borrowed due to liquidity constraint while some borrowers and some nonborrowers had liquidity constraint but did not have access to adequate credit logistic regression analysis show that sex and education of the household head training in dairy prevalence of outstanding loan and the number of improved cattle on the farm had significant influence on both borrowing and liquidity status of a household though the degree and direction of influence were not always the same in each study country based on the findings it is suggested that combining public and commercial finance could solve the problem of inadequate credit supply while inventory finance to community level input suppliers and service providers might help in getting credit to worthy and needy smallholders at lower cost than providing credit to smallholders directly

monopoly power and distribution in fragmented markets the case of groundwater using data from pakistan s punjab the authors examine monopoly power in the market for groundwater irrigation water extracted using private tubewells a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation simple theory predicts that tubewell owners should price discriminate in favor of their own share tenants and this analysis of individual groundwater transactions over an 18 month period confirms such price discrimination and among those studied tubewell owners and their tenants use considerably more groundwater on their plots than do other farmers the authors also provide evidence that monopoly pricing of groundwater leads to compensating albeit small reallocations of canal water which farmers exchange in a separate informal market despite the substantial misallocation of groundwater a welfare analysis show that monopoly pricing has limited effects on equity and efficiency in the long run a policy aimed at eliminating monopoly pricing would do little to help the poorest farmers

land reform and agricultural productivity in india a review of the evidence in this paper we review as well as contribute to the empirical literature on the impact of land reform on agricultural productivity in india we find that overall for all states land reform legislation had a negative and significant effect on agricultural productivity however this hides considerable variation across types of land reform as well as variation across states decomposing by type of land reform the main driver for this negative effect seems to be land ceiling legislation in contrast the effect of tenancy reform averaged across all states is insignificant there seems to be a wide range of state specific effects which suggests that focusing on average treatment effects can hide a considerable amount of heterogeneity in particular allowing a separate slope for west bengal one of the few states that implemented tenancy laws rigorously we find that land reform had a marginal positive effect relative to the rest of india

delayed formal credit bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture a theoretical analysis abstract the paper presents a theory of interest rate determination in the informal credit market in backward agriculture the market for informal credit is created by the delay in disbursement of formal credit the delay is controlled by the official of the formal credit agency and he is bribed by the farmer to reduce the delay the official and the moneylender play a non cooperative game in choosing the bribing rate and the informal interest rate respectively the informal sector interest rate and the effective formal sector interest rate incorporating the bribe are equal in equilibrium agricultural price and credit subsidy policies may raise the interest rate in the informal credit market

testing between competing models of sharecropping the marshallian approach assumes a prohibitively high cost of monitoring the sharecropper s activities while the monitoring approach argues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers activities i present new evidence using detailed data collected from eight indian villages most tenants own some land of their own this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements the differences in input and output intensities on owned minus sharecropped land of the same household are found to be sizable and significant suggesting a rejection of the monitoring approach and supporting the notion of the marshallian productive inefficiency of sharecropping

the impact of connectivity on market interlinkages evidence from rural punjab up to the 1980s it was generally accepted that many key issues in agrarian development could not be studied without an understanding of market interlinkages recently however this theory has lost its importance in development literature based on a household level survey from rural pakistan this paper seeks to re introduce the importance of interlinkages by illustrating their exploitative potential particularly in unequal isolated villages where landlords are essentially monopolist monopsonist the solution proposed is to break isolation making use of an exogenous shock found in the construction of a motorway the study finds that while connectivity does not break interlinkages completely it does significantly reduce their exploitative nature

single item inventory control under periodic review and a minimum order quantity in this paper we study a periodic review single item single stage inventory system with stochastic demand in each time period the system must order none or at least as much as a minimum order quantity qmin since the optimal structure of an ordering policy with a minimum order quantity is complicated we propose an easy to use policy which we call r s qmin policy assuming linear holding and backorder costs we determine the optimal numerical value of the level s using a markov chain approach in addition we derive simple news vendor type inequalities for near optimal policy parameters which can easily be implemented within spreadsheet applications in a numerical study we compare our policy with others and test the performance of the approximation for three different demand distributions poisson negative binomial and a discretized version of the gamma distribution given the simplicity of the policy and its cost performance as well as the excellent performance of the approximation we advocate the application of the r s qmin policy in practice

price uncertainty and trader farmer linkage abstract we show that the pareto superiority of loan repayment in kind within a tied credit arrangement to a cash for cash scheme under uncertain output price depends crucially on the farmer loan demand elasticity and his risk aversion for the risk neutral trader the cash for cash scheme is shown to be pareto dominated by credit tying and the price premium he offers depends on farmer loan demand elasticity

on moral hazard and cost sharing under sharecropping in this article we show that when the tenant s input use is not observable by the landlord there will be cost sharing at the margin instead of a lump sum transfer if the standard model is extended to include cases of imperfection and interlinkage of transactions in rural markets thus making the opportunity cost of inputs different for the landlord and the tenant

credit markets and the control of capital traditional discussions of the role of capital markets have identified a number of distinct functions which they perforrn they allocate scarce capital among competing users and uses l and they provide signals to guide managers in making their investment decisions 2 in this lecture i wish to focus on a rather different function of the capital market what i shall refer to as the control of capital 3 conventional theory treats the typical firrn in an anthropomorphic manner it acts as a single rational individual doing what it is supposed to be doing maximizing stock market value that may have been well and good in those nostalgic bygone days of small firrns each run tightly by their owners who were single mindedly pursuing their lust for wealth but today a majority of production occurs in large corporations in which no shareholder owns more than a small fraction of the shares in which the separation of ownership and control that frank knight was so concerned with in his writings some sixty five years ago has become a reality those

optimal capital structure in agency relationships we analyze the optimal design of capital structure in agency relationships when a risk averse principal controls the agent s capital structure she awards a larger equity stake to outsiders the smaller the agent s productivity when she controls both the timing and the terms of the agent s financing the principal shifts to equityholders all risk associated with stochastic production and with the agent s unknown productivity when the principal dictates only the terms of financing only the former risk is borne by equityholders when the principal is sufficiently averse to risk she affords the agent no choice among incentive schemes

repeated moral hazard the role of memory commitment and the access to credit markets abstract the dynamic dimension introduces new questions in moral hazard models thus the roles of memory and commitment have recently raised a marked interest the goal of this paper is to discuss and clarify the issues at hand and to present some new results we show that two conditions are necessary for the optimal long term contract to be implementable via spot contracts first the long term optimum should be renegotiation proof second spot contracts should provide efficient consumption smoothing we discuss how the availability of credit to the agent affects these two prerequisites we also study the hitherto neglected case in which the repetition of the moral hazard problem generates hidden information at recontracting dates the optimal renegotiation proof contract then implements the minimum effort level unless it involves randomized savings

credit and sharecropping in agrarian societies this paper considers a model of linkage between land labor and credit transactions in the context of sharecropping the paper s objectives are a to derive and characterize the equilibrium in a model of a land scarce labour abundant economy under sharecropping given an infinitely elastic supply of identical sharecroppers at a reservation utility and b to demonstrate that in an imperfect market a landlord may offer credit to his tenant sometimes even at a subsidized rate of interest without necessarily insisting that the sharecropper borrow only from him precluding an involuntary linkage between credit and land transations it has been demonstrated that regardless of the presence or absence of linkage or any other control by the landlord as long as he can vary the size of the plot given to a tenant and there are enough potential tenants in equilibrium contracts a tenants utility under sharecropping will be the same as that which he could have obtained as a full time wage laborer this result implies that policies other than land reform will not affect the welfare of tenants

moral hazard and marshallian inefficiency evidence from tunisia abstract we formalize the link between optimal cost sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well known results from duality theory building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the i substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs as well as ii between these inputs and unobservable effort we endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments exploiting the fact that in our dataset landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa the approach is applied to an unbalanced plot level panel of cost sharing contracts in a tunisian village using a translog representation of the restricted profit function contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to marshallian inefficiency while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected

does organic command a premium when the food is already local the emergence of community supported agriculture csa farms has been recognized as a new way for small farms to remain competitive while engaging in their local community through direct marketing in this study we report on first revealed preference valuation of csa attributes using data on share prices and csa characteristics for the summer 2012 growing season using data covering 453 csa farms in michigan new york ohio and pennsylvania we develop a hedonic model based on firm level prices to reveal consumer valuations of csa attributes including various types of organic certification we also test for competition in the csa market using a model of firm entry to evaluate whether firms appear perfectly competitive which is a requirement when using firm level prices in our hedonic analysis our results reveal a price premium of approximately 7 for usda organic certification although this value is heterogeneous across states we find no premium associated with competing certified naturally grown programs finally we find that csa farms exhibit little market power and appear to act competitively even with few market entrants

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

double moral hazard and resale price maintenance incentives for resale price maintenance rpm are studied in a wholesaler retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard the best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers price if delegated to the retailer rpm controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well as a consequence either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive monopoly specification similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract such as the capital input of the retailer

microfinance and investment a comparison with bank and informal lending summary comparing the impact of different types of credit on households investment in bangladesh we find that loans from microfinance institutions are likely to be channeled toward non agricultural activities while both informal and bank lending are associated to a higher expenditure in agricultural inputs estimated effects are net of the differences in the amount borrowed interest rates and collateral results suggest that features which are specific to microfinance such as tight repayment schedules and land based eligibility rules may reduce the suitability of this source of funds for the farming sector

interlinked contracts an empirical study this study investigates the contractual relationship between farmers and sugar mills in colonial taiwan our investigation is based on a model of interlinked contracts which is adapted from gangopadhyay and sengupta 1987 the validity of our model s predictions is verified by analyzing a data set consisting of contracts between taiwan s cane farmers and sugar mills during the period of japanese occupation our data suggest that the contractual relationship is consistent with a second best scenario where the interest rates charged by sugar mills on cash loans to farmers are set in order to prevent diversion of funds to non production uses

effects of technology on incentive design of share contracts do observed contracts have the properties predicted by the principal agent model with moral hazard in contract theory this paper tests the predictions of such an agency model in the context of sharecropping in north india the most well known explanation for sharecropping is based on the principal agent model with a trade off between risk and incentives even though sharecropping contracts are quite prevalent in rural areas of developing countries there is very little evidence on factors determining the instruments used to provide incentives in such contracts using information in the data giving rise to exogenous variation in technology across regions this paper tests for the effect of cultivation technology on the incentive structure of share contracts as predicted by the agency model existing empirical evidence on sharecropping seems to indicate that yield on sharecropped plots is lower than on owner operated plots i e there is an incentive problem or moral hazard radwan a shaban 1987 jean jacques laffont and mohamed s matoussi 1995 there is some informal evidence that landowners use various mechanisms to improve efficiency in sharecropping by participating in cost sharing and by repeating contracts robert m townsend and rolf a mueller 1994 examine the nature of these mechanisms in detail but their data do not permit econometric tests more generally though the principal agent model has been widely studied there is little existing empirical evidence for it michael c jensen and kevin j murphy 1990 find that executive compensation is only weakly sensitive to firm performance in recent work rajesh k aggarwal and andrew a samwick 1999 find that executive s pay performance sensitivity is decreasing in the volatility of firm s performance however their results are sensitive to the inclusion of other characteristics of the firms in the regressions as pierre a chiappori and bernard salanie 2003 note in a recent survey empirical work on contract theory using nonexperimental data needs to be careful in adequately correcting for underlying heterogeneity across agents otherwise the parameters of interest would be hard to interpret if such heterogeneity affects contract choice for example douglas w allen and dean lueck 1995 find no role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contracts but they do not take the heterogeneity across agents into account in a recent paper addressing the issue of heterogeneity across agents ackerberg and botticini 2002 find a significant role for risk in the choice between share contract and fixed rent contract after correcting for endogenous matching between landowners and tenants they find that wealthier tenants are more likely to be in fixed rent contracts in this paper we are able to address such estimation issues and check for the robustness of our results regarding the relationship between technology and the design of share contracts department of economics pennsylvania state university university park pa 16801 e mail pxp22 psu edu this paper derives from related work done earlier in my dissertation i am grateful to two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions i thank james heckman lars stole robert townsend kala krishna and seminar participants for useful comments financial support from the andrew mellon foundation for both rounds of fieldwork is gratefully acknowledged any errors remain my own 1 see nirvikar singh 1991 for a survey of various theories of sharecropping including steven n cheung 1969 c h hanumantha rao 1971 joseph e stiglitz 1974 david newbery and stiglitz 1979 avishay braverman and stiglitz 1982 mukesh eswaran and ashok kotwal 1985 and sudhir shetty 1988 a common feature of the different theories is an emphasis on uncertainty and asymmetric information 2 an exception is daniel a ackerberg and maristella botticini 2002 ackerberg and botticini differ from our paper in that they examine the role of tenant s risk aversion in the choice between fixed rental contract and share contract they do not examine share contracts per se 3 see john e core and wayne guay 2000

the impact of the great migration on mortality of african americans evidence from the deep south the great migration the massive migration of african americans out of the rural south to largely urban locations in the north midwest and west was a landmark event in u s our paper shows that this migration increased mortality of african americans born in the early twentieth century south this inference comes from an analysis that uses proximity of birthplace to railroad lines as an instrument for migration

the market for wireless electricity the case of india a wireless revolution has transformed telecoms in india and in other emerging markets the electricity market on the other hand remains underdeveloped we define wireless electricity as renewable energy produced within a few hundred meters of the point of consumption a wireless revolution in electricity would solve the problem of electricity deficit empower people at the bottom of the pyramid and mitigate the environmental impact of bringing hundreds of millions out of poverty as the indian economy grows renewables are technically proven and economically viable in certain situations but their use remains peripheral the stark difference in the diffusion patterns in telecoms and electricity has been ignored by leaders in government business and academics we present common frameworks to explain the different directions of reform in telecoms and electricity we explain some of the dynamics which prevent the diffusion of wireless electricity we use a causal loop diagram to explain the status quo in the off grid electricity market and propose changes which will lead to the formation of a market for wireless electricity india has the entrepreneurial talent to develop this market and the largest number of potential customers the world will benefit as a result

dis advantages of informal loans theory and evidence abstract we study borrowers choice between formal and informal credit in a setting with imperfect debt enforcement in contrast to formal loans e g from banks informal loans e g from friends or relatives can be enforced by the threat of severing social ties if the underlying social capital is sufficiently large we show that informal loans carry lower interest rate and collateral than formal loans including the possibility of zero interest and collateral this makes informal credit a priori more attractive to borrowers at the same time since physical collateral is divisible unlike the social capital pledged in informal credit default on formal loans is less costly to both parties than default on informal loans because of this trade off formal and informal credit can co exist depending on the loan riskiness measured by the ratio of loan size to borrower s wealth ltw ratio borrowers choose formal credit for riskier larger loans while informal credit is preferred for smaller projects with low default risk empirical results using household data from rural thailand are consistent with the predicted choice pattern and terms of formal and informal credit

fragmented duopoly theory and applications to backward agriculture abstract the central aim of this paper is to provide a formal description of the idea of market fragmentation which is so widely used to describe markets in backward agriculture we begin by describing a fragmented duopoly in which each seller has a captive set of customers and there is a non captive set who may buy from either seller the nash cournot equilibria of the system are analyzed and then the model is generalized to allow for the endogenous determination of the captive sets the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model provides a useful background for studying familiar topics like fragmentation interlinkage and disguised unemployment from a new point of view

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

credit and share cropping comments on braverman and srinivasan abstract the monitoring cost is introduced in an otherwise braverman srinivasan model of share cropping it is shown that a possibility of excess applicants equilibrium arises and in such a case credit subsidization policy can improve the welfare of the tenant

are fair trade goods credence goods a new proposal with french illustrations in the literature fair trade ft goods are usually associated with other products differentiated by process attributes such as organic food genetically modified gm food or child labour free clothing all of these products are regarded as credence goods this classification refers to the simplified definition of credence goods which describes product attributes which consumers cannot evaluate even after having consumed the good focusing on the characteristics of ft goods this article proposes a reassessment of the link between ft goods and credence properties as defined by darby and karni we first demonstrate that 1 the usual classification masks important particularities of ft goods compared to other goods with process attributes and 2 the full definition of credence goods may even provide a better description of the quality of ft goods however and this is our second theoretical contribution the lack of consensus among experts concerning ft standards and their level of efficiency encourage us to consider ft goods as indeterminate goods as defined by lupton this result leads us to suggest a new typology of product attributes summarized in an innovative diagram it sheds light on how competition between the different ft approaches works and why the ft market is still confined to a niche if not threatened with collapse we mainly illustrate our theoretical analysis with observations relating to the french ft market and institutions

endogenous emergence of credit markets contracting in response to a new technology in ghana abstract access to credit is important for the productivity and overall welfare of farmers in developing countries we present a theoretical framework which shows that a change in the mode of shipping from air to sea in the ghanaian pineapple industry made it profitable for pineapple exporters to provide myopic farmers with both in kind loans to improve productivity and cash loans for consumption smoothing despite being unable to monitor farmers or enforce repayment the innovative theoretical result is that providing farmers with additional cash loans can enforce greater input use without compromising repayment we provide evidence in the form of a case study documenting the dramatic rise of informal credit through contract farming after the switch to sea freight between 1996 and 2001 using this anecdote we argue that credit arrangements can arise spontaneously absent non market interventions to meet market needs even in the absence of proper legal protections for creditors

demand for insurance and within kin group marriages evidence from a west african country abstract we ask whether parents have incentives to marry their children to a member of the kin group in order to better insure against adverse idiosyncratic income shocks exploiting original panel data from a household survey collected in senegal in 2006 2007 and 2011 2012 we find that daughters within kin group marriage helps their parents household to better smooth food consumption when a parent has fallen ill this better smoothing is notably driven by the fact that households having married a daughter within the kin group receive relatively more transfers our results indicate that parents demand for insurance can explain part of their demand for marrying within the kin group their daughter and extend the literature on inter linkages between marriage decisions and demand for insurance

institutions economics and the development quest institutions crucial for the analysis of how agents deal with uncertainty have been gaining increasing relevance on the economic research agenda in this paper we analyze the institutional literature aiming to explain why this perspective obtains better results than others in development economics in particular we stress the relevance of new institutional economics as an adequate framework for a broad understanding of development issues

an inquiry into quasi credit contracts the role of reciprocal credit and interlinked deals in small scale fishing communities in agrarian village societies beset with many hazards and uncertainties people evolve various means of coping with risk what is perhaps less known is that credit transactions can sometimes serve the function of reducing risk in such societies this article is concerned with examining several insurance motivated credit arrangements in small scale fishing communities a hunger insurance mechanism of reciprocal credit and a system of interlinked contracts aimed at insuring against risks in the spheres of labour and marketing relations will be extensively dealt with moreover the concept of triadic relationships will be shown to have special relevance in the case of traditional insurance arrangements aiming at controlling problems of moral hazard

technical change labor use and income distribution in the muda irrigation project factors influencing the performance of net farm income in families who adopted the double cropping regime in malaysia are analyzed in light of the muda irrigation project which supplies off season water to approximately 250 000 acres of padi land in n w malaysia from 1970 when water was first released to 1975 when the full feasible command area was served most of the project area s 50 000 farm families switched from single to double cropping this switch was accompanied by an extremely rapid adoption of short maturing improved varieties of rice and large increases in yield in both seasons the result of this technical change was an increase in padi production from 384 721 tons in 1969 to 795 830 tons in 1974 approximately 50 percent of the country s production there were also important changes in net farm income labor use and output and factor prices factors related and unrelated to the muda project are found to have caused these changes

targeting child labor in debt bondage despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture it is often argued that externally imposed contractual restrictions lead to inequitable credit rationing this paper argues that unrestricted laissez faire markets may also inequitably ration credit a formal model which grants borrowers autonomy in credit application and use demonstrates that adverse incentive and selection effects may cause banks to endogenously impose interest rate restrictions and ration small farms out of the credit market consequently liberalization of financial markets may be insufficient to guarantee small farms access to credit

reinventing strategies for emerging markets beyond the transnational model with established markets becoming saturated multinational corporations mncs have turned increasingly to emerging markets ems in the developing world such em strategies have been targeted almost exclusively at the wealthy elite at the top of the economic pyramid recently however a number of mncs have launched new initiatives that explore the untapped market potential at the base of the economic pyramid the largest and fastest growing segment of the world s population reaching the four billion people in these markets poses both tremendous opportunities and unique challenges to mncs as conventional wisdom about mnc global capabilities and subsidiary strategy in ems may not be appropriate how mncs can successfully enter these low income markets has not been effectively addressed in the literatures on global and em strategies an exploratory analysis involving interviews with mnc managers original case studies and archival material indicates that the transnational model of national responsiveness global efficiency and worldwide learning may not be sufficient results suggest that the success of initiatives targeting low income markets is enhanced by recognizing that western style patterns of economic development may not occur in these business environments business strategies that rely on leveraging the strengths of the existing market environment outperform those that focus on overcoming weaknesses these strategies include developing relationships with non traditional partners co inventing custom solutions and building local capacity together these successful strategies suggest the importance of mncs developing a global capability in social embeddedness

tenancy choice in a competitive framework with transactions costs the choice between wage labor and sharecrop contracts is analyzed in a model that avoids both the pitfalls of previous models inefficiency of sharecropping and indeterminacy by introducing transactions costs with appropriate nonlinearities plantation data from the american south provide empirical support for the hypothesized nonlinearity in transactions costs and simultaneous determination of direct supervision and contractual choice