vertical control of price and inventory this paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain we consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts the price mechanism in which each outlet pays a two part price and chooses price and inventory virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently contracts that can elicit first best decisions include resale price floors or buy back policies retailer held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers

resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand abstract this paper considers a model where oligopolistic manufacturers sell to consumers through competitive retailers who face demand uncertainty the setup is a symmetric duopoly with product differentiation and a perfectly competitive retail market in the game with unconstrained price competition there is price dispersion in the retail market in the game with resale price maintenance rpm manufacturers profits are higher retail inventories are at least as high and total surplus is at least as high the effect of rpm on consumer surplus is ambiguous rpm also precludes possible coordination failure between the manufacturers

raising retailers profits on vertical practices and the exclusion of rivals resale price maintenance rpm slotting fees loyalty rebates and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers if these retailers were to accommodate entry upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers thus in equilibrium retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent s profits consequently if entry requires downstream accommodation entry can be deterred we discuss policy implications of this aspect of vertical contracting practices jel l14 l22 l25 l42 l81 this paper considers the upstream exclusionary effect of vertical practices that create rents for downstream retailers without carrying a contractual obligation for exclusivity 1 examples of interest include allowing the manufacturer to set the price at which a retailer sells to consumers resale price maintenance or rpm periodic lump sum payments to retailers through slotting fees or loyalty rebates and mar ket division schemes such as the allocation of clients to specific retailers or the use of exclusive territories we explore equilibria that can arise when an upstream incumbent uses a vertical practice of the sort outlined above to share industry profits with retailers we show that if entry by another upstream manufacturer leads to competition that reduces industry profits sufficiently and entry requires accommodation by retailers then equilibria exist in which retailers do not accommodate the entrant this results in exclusion in essence the vertical practice creates a quasi rent that retailers in equilibrium have an incentive to protect

parallel imports price controls and innovation the impact of parallel trade on innovation in r d intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals is a hotly debated question in antitrust and ip policy the well known argument that parallel trade dampens innovation by undermining firms ability to price discriminate has been challenged by recent literature the argument is that with endogenous price controls parallel trade increases innovation by reducing governments incentives to set particularly low price caps in this paper we show that this result crucially depends on the degree of homogeneity of the trading countries the result only holds if consumers in poorer countries have a relatively similar demand for medication as consumers in richer countries instead when countries are relatively heterogeneous parallel trade dampens innovation and lowers welfare by exporting price cap regulation from poorer to richer countries these findings are in line with recent case evidence we also show that when patent length is endogenous richer countries will tend to choose longer patent protection with parallel trade whereas equilibrium price caps tend to be tighter in that case

private value of european patents abstract i examine the joint patent designation renewal behavior of the european patent office epo patent applicants during 1978 1996 using both nonparametric techniques and a parametric model the european patents granted through the epo are substantially more valuable than those through the national route value distribution of patents is highly skewed and even more so for the epo patent families the value of patent rights increases with the economic size of the country and exhibits modestly increasing returns to scale model estimation also reveals significant institutional differences across epo member countries in patent protection

equilibrium parallel import policies and international market structure in a north south vertically differentiated duopoly the analysis in this paper derives equilibrium government policies towards parallel imports by incorporating strategic interaction at the policy setting stage and the product market the model sheds new light on i the effects of parallel import policies on pricing behavior of firms and ii the interdependence of national parallel import policies if demand asymmetry across countries is sufficiently large the north forbids parallel imports to ensure its firm sells in the south thereby generating international price discrimination the south s most preferred market outcome as the equilibrium when demand structures are relatively similar across countries the north permits parallel imports and uniform pricing its most preferred market outcome obtains

retailers as agents and the limits of parallel trade abstract the volume of retail level parallel trade is surprisingly small despite persistent international price differences we offer an agency based explanation by considering competition between an original home manufacturer and a foreign retailer the model endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent with private information on the perceived quality of the good in its own market the manufacturer cannot control the retailer once the latter has ordered its sales quantity but it can limit the initial offer if parallel trade is permitted this offer will fall if there is incomplete information resulting in a small or zero volume of parallel trade this outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off while offering little benefit to home consumers compared to the case where such trade is banned

the role of fees in patent systems theory and evidence this paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems two main research questions are usually addressed the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application or pre grant fees and renewal or post grant fees depending on the structural context and policy objectives the paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of 30 patent offices worldwide it is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age 2012 john wiley sons ltd

capacity investment under postponement strategies market competition and demand uncertainty we consider duopoly models where firms make decisions on capacity production and price under demand uncertainty capacity and price decisions are made respectively ex ante and ex post demand realizations the interplay between the timings of demand realization and production decision endows firms with different capabilities flexible firms can postpone production decisions until the actual demand curve is observed but inflexible firms cannot under general demand structures and cost functions we characterize the equilibrium for a symmetric duopoly and establish the strategic equivalence of price and quantity competitions when firms are flexible we investigate the stochastic order properties of capacity and profit and show that they both increase for a flexible firm when the market is more volatile we find that flexibility allows a firm to increase investment in capacity and earn a higher profit while benefiting customers by keeping the price in a narrower range strategic equivalence implies that

returns system with rebates we consider a variant of the newsvendor problem atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand after the orders are filled the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not we show that in this setting a returns system with rebates with previously set buy back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold implements the optimal production and sales strategy attaining maximum expected profit in the channel

consumer skepticism of advertising claims testing hypotheses from economics of information propositions regarding consumers differential skepticism for search experience and credence claims are tested in an experiment using adult consumers the results provide clear support for nelson s 1970 hypotheses that consumers are more skeptical of experience than search attribute claims and more skeptical of subjective than of objective claims no support is found however for the darby and kami 1973 hypothesis that consumers will be more skeptical of credence than of experience attribute claims or for the hypothesis that consumers will not be less skeptical of experience claims for low priced goods

an elementary proposition concerning parallel imports abstract this paper demonstrates that when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports a global nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i e global uniform pricing this result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government s objective function i e political economy considerations we also show that when countries can prevent parallel exports then any nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination

manufacturers and retailers in the global economy we develop a general equilibrium model to capture key features of the retailing and of the manufacturing industry in order to understand how these two industries interact and how labor is allocated between them we show that the observed shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing the rise in retailer product assortment and the emergence of slotting allowances in many retail markets are consistent with the global integration of product markets while higher retail market concentration is best explained by technological change in retailing we also identify a novel benefit from market integration consisting of efficiency gains in the vertical distribution chain

distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty abstract when suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer this paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts each of which consists of a mixture of constant per unit wholesale prices buy back arrangements and post sale payments contingent on sales made such as revenue sharing or buybacks we show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly thereby generating the supplier s preferred inventory configuration and price distribution we extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution given the choices of its rival distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers standpoint even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty and given the perfect competition among distributors all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers thus suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand and without the need to control dealer actions in detail in particular suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion

how valuable is patent protection estimates by technology field i present evidence on the private value of patent rights in france for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal i find that the distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed that patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to r d and that these characteristics vary across technology fields i compute the r d cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights measure the variations in value of time technology fields and nationalities and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates

multi period modeling of two way price commitment under price dependent demand abstract this paper examines the use of price commitment policies in dynamic contracting in multiple period finite time horizons two specific forms of price commitment are considered one on the part of the retailer through a retail fixed markup contract and one on the part of the manufacturer through a price protection contract optimal policies for each form of price commitment are analytically derived as are optimal policies for the traditional price only and centralized supply chain scenarios that we use as comparisons we prove that optimal retail price and order size solutions exist in each period under the assumption of non increasing price dependent demand we show that the existence of retailer inventory between periods causes the optimal policies to differ from a static single period model further we show that a supplier offers a price protection policy as a signal to the retailer to resolve the gaming that naturally occurs under price only this effectively decouples the multi period dynamic contracting setting into repeated single period scenarios however the resulting behavior can actually inhibit supply chain performance on the retail commitment side we find that retail fixed markup policies are quite effective in improving supply chain efficiency we show that such policies can lead to pareto improvement over price only contracts and can even coordinate the supply chain in some situations

innovation in israel 1968 1997 a comparative analysis using patent data abstract the israeli high tech sector is widely regarded as a hotbed of cutting edge technologies and as the growth engine of the israeli economy in the 1990s and beyond in this paper we present a close up portrait of innovation in israel for the past 30 years with the aid of highly detailed patent data we use for that purpose all israeli patents taken in the us over 7000 as well as us patents and patents from other countries for comparative purposes the time path of israeli patenting reveals big jumps in the mid 1980s and then again in the early 1990s reflecting underlying shocks in policy and in the availability of relevant inputs israeli ranks high in terms of patents per capita compared to the g7 the asian tigers and a group of countries with similar gdp per capita finland is strikingly similar taiwan s patenting has grown extremely fast and is now on par with israel south korea is rapidly closing the gap the technological composition of israeli innovations reflects quite well worldwide technological trends except that computers and communications the fastest growing field in the us has grown even faster in israel the weak side resides in the composition of israeli assignees the actual owners of the intellectual property rights just 35 of israeli patents were assigned to israeli corporations a much lower percentage than in most other countries relatively large shares went to foreign assignees to universities and the government and to private inventors on the other hand israeli patents are of good quality in terms of citations received and getting better over time us patents command on average more citations but not in computers and communications or in biotechnology and israeli patents are significantly better than those of the reference group of countries

surplus maximization and optimality i identify assumptions under which policies that maximize expected surplus are pareto optimal even when expected consumer surplus does not even locally represent preferences over price income lotteries besides the oft made partial equilibrium assumptions that only one price varies and that income changes do not aect demand the two other assumptions are that every consumer s indirect utility function is supermodular in price and income and policies order prices by a single crossing property supermodularity holds precisely if relative risk aversion exceeds the income elasticity of demand a mild condition the single crossing property appears strong but holds in many applications that use expected surplus

revenue sharing and vertical control in the video rental industry revenue sharing contracts in which retailers pay a royalty on sales to their suppliers are now widely used in the video rental industry we show that revenue sharing is valuable in vertically separated industries in which demand is either stochastic unpredictable or variable e g systematically declining downstream inventory is chosen before demand is realized and downstream firms engage in intrabrand competition unlike two part tariffs revenue sharing achieves the first best outcome by softening retail price competition without distorting retailers inventory decisions our theories are also consistent with trends in prices and availability following retailers adoption of revenue sharing contracts

patent protection in the shadow of infringement simulation estimations of patent value empirical estimates of the private value of patent protection are derived for four technology areas computers textiles combustion engines and pharmaceuticals using new patent data for west germany 1953 1988 patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force as well as legal expenses in order to enforce them a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of optimal renewal decisions is developed incorporating both learning and depreciation as well as the potential need to prosecute infringement the evolution of the distribution of returns over the life of a group of patents is calculated for each technology using a minimum distance simulation estimator results indicate that the aggregate value of protection generated per year is on the order of 10 of related r d expenditure

resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of rpm we analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers we show that rpm indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry wide monopoly pricing the impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties influence in determining the terms of the contracts our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies

the effects of advertising on resale price maintenance this research combines the market power and market competition perspectives on advertising under the framework of a generalized theoretical model in minimum resale price maintenance rpm in order to investigate the effects of advertising on rpm using the real options approach the effects of advertising on retail price will impact the value of rpm further influence the incentive of manufacturers to impose rpm through brand penetration and promotional pricing effects advertising is likely to influence rpm under the condition of retail price competition when the brand penetration effect is dominant advertising will discourage manufacturers from imposing rpm advertising will encourage manufacturers to impose rpm when the promotional pricing effect is dominant rpm not only substitutes advertising but also complements advertising

strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy this paper shows that parallel import policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy we demonstrate this result in two country international duopoly where a domestic monopolist competes with a rival rm in the foreign market if it chooses to incur the xed investment cost of exporting the two rms sell horizontally dierentiated goods and compete in prices when the foreign market is signi cantly larger than the domestic one the home rm gains if it is unable to price discriminate its desire to not deviate too far from its optimal monopoly price in the domestic market makes it credibly less aggressive in price competition abroad which softens price competition and raises pro ts on the other hand when the foreign market is not signi cantly larger it is optimal for the home country to forbid parallel imports since international price discrimination yields higher pro ts to the home rm we draw out the implications of the two types of parallel import policies for global welfare

demand uncertainty inventories and resale price maintenance we show that a manufacturer facing uncertain demand and selling through a competitive retail market may wish to support adequate retail inventories by preventing the emergence of discount retailers in our model discounters offer low prices made possible by low probability of being saddled with unsold inventories in the event of slack demand full price retailers are compensated for a higher probability of unsold inventories by a higher retail price when they sell we show that preventing discounting increases the manufacturer s wholesale demand and profits and we delineate demand conditions under which equilibrium inventory holding and consumer welfare increase

resale price maintenance and spatial price discrimination abstract in this article we examine resale price maintenance rpm in a classic model of downstream retailers engaging in spatial price discrimination we show that a resale price floor increases the total profit of the upstream monopoly when transport cost product differentiation is relatively low importantly this profitable rpm floor can also enhance social welfare and even consumer surplus a resale price ceiling can also be profitable and always improves consumer surplus and social welfare we argue that such findings support a rule of reason approach to rpm

organizational structure of a global supply chain in the presence of a gray market information asymmetry and valuation difference we consider a global supply chain of a multinational firm mnf with domestic and foreign markets in the presence of a gray marketer in particular we investigate the organizational structure of the mnf for pricing centralization vs decentralization when the foreign division of the mnf competes with the gray marketer the foreign division has a private information on the market potential and customers have a valuation difference between the products sold by the foreign division and the gray marketer in this situation while centralized pricing may control the gray marketer s activities decentralized pricing may take advantage of a local manager s private information especially when a significant valuation difference of customers exists due to product or service differentiation we analyze the trade offs in the choice of organizational structure for pricing and the impact of information asymmetry and valuation difference on this choice also we show that decentralization can be further improved by an incentive adjustment of profits between divisions which has a potential to increase all divisions and mnf s total profits over centralization

an investigation of individual responses to tensile price claims this article describes the results of two studies investigating the effects of tensile price claims e g save up to 50 on consumers perceptions of offer value information value and price reduction the findings suggest that the use of tensile claims in conjunction with large advertised price reductions may result in decreased perceived offer value and substantial discounting of expected price reductions by the consumer

controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales in a make to stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts when retailers do not observe each other s stocks before choosing their prices an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market wide resale price maintenance rpm can restore monopoly power however other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts such as buyback contracts also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power we conclude that a more lenient policy toward rpm is unlikely to affect the producer s ability to control opportunism

parallel imports challenges from unauthorized distribution channels we examine the problem of parallel imports unauthorized flows of products across countries which compete with authorized distribution channels the traditional economics model of a discriminating monopolist that has different prices for the same good in different markets requires the markets to be separated in some way usually geographically the profits from price discrimination can be threatened by parallel imports that allow consumers in the high priced region some access to the low priced marketplace however as this article shows there is a very real possibility that parallel imports may actually increase profits the basic intuition is that parallel importation becomes another channel for the authentic goods and creates a new product version that allows the manufacturer to price discriminate we propose a two country three stage model to quantitatively study the effects and strategies in the third stage and in the higher priced country where parallel imports have entered we characterize the resulting market segmentation one segment of consumers stays with the authorized version as they place more value on the warranty and services that come with the authorized version another segment switches to parallel imports because a lower price is offered due to lack of country specific features or warranties parallel imports also generate a third and new segment that would not have bought this product before unlike counterfeits that are fabricated by imitators all parallel imports are genuine and sourced from the manufacturer in the lower priced country through authorized dealers therefore the manufacturer s global sales quantity should increase but profit may rise or fall depending on the relative sizes and profitability of the segments a profit maximizing parallel importer should set price and quantity in the second stage after observing the manufacturer s prices in both countries there will be a threshold of across country price gap above which parallel imports would occur in the first stage the manufacturer can anticipate the possible occurrence of a parallel import its price and quantity and its effect on authorized sales in each country to make a coordinated pricing decision to maximize the global supply chain profit under some circumstances the manufacturer should allow parallel imports and under others should prevent them through a stackelberg game we solve for the optimal pricing strategy in each scenario we then find in one extension that when the number of parallel importers increases the optimal authorized price gap should narrow but the prices and quantities of parallel imports may rise or fall in another extension we nd that when the manufacturer has other means such as monitoring dealers differentiating designs and unbundling warranties to contain parallel imports the authorized price gap can widen as a function of the effectiveness of nonpricing controls in summary parallel imports may help the manufacturer to extend the global reach of its product and even boost its global profit if the manufacturer offers a discount version through its authorized dealers it is running a high risk of confusing customers and tarnishing brand images parallel imports may cause similar concerns for the manufacturer but unauthorized dealers are perceived as further removed from the manufacturer therefore there is less risk of confusing consumers when parallel imports are channeled through unauthorized dealers furthermore they are more nimble in diverting the product whenever their transshipment and marketing costs are small enough not to offset the authorized price gap and the valuation discount this may explain why some manufacturers fiercely fight parallel imports while others knowingly use this alternative channel

equilibrium returns policies in the presence of supplier competition the pioneering pasternack returns policy model analyzed channel coordination with a single supplier catering to a retailer facing stochastic demand for a perishable product with a fixed price and the model showed that giving partial returns of unsold stock to the retailer is the optimal policy for the entire supply chain the result thus begs the question as to why manufacturers of perishable commodities widely accept full returns of unsold stock as the norm we model the environment as one where two capacity constrained manufacturers compete for shelf space with the same retailer and we show that a complete credit returns policy is in fact the only possible equilibrium of the game our results obviate the need for knowing the exact functional form of the demand distribution in order to compute the returns credit as pasternack s results would require from a retailer s standpoint we establish a simple procurement strategy and show that it is optimal the same game with price only contracting has a pure strategy equilibrium when the supplier capacities are below a threshold value and a mixed strategy equilibrium when the supplier capacities cross this threshold but are still so limited that no single supplier can with certainty supply all the quantity demanded

the strategic perils of delayed differentiation the value of delayed differentiation also known as postponement for a monopolist has been extensively studied in the operations literature we analyze the case of imperfectly competitive markets with demand uncertainty wherein the choice of supply chain configuration i e early or delayed differentiation is endogenous to the competing firms we characterize firms choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices on quantities sold profits consumer surplus and welfare we demonstrate that purely strategic considerations not previously identified in the literature play a pivotal role in determining the value of delayed differentiation in the face of either entry threats or competition these strategic effects can significantly diminish the value of delayed differentiation in fact under plausible conditions these effects dominate the traditional risk pooling benefits associated with delayed differentiation in which case early differentiation is the dominant strategy for firms even under cost parity with delayed differentiation we extend the main model to study the effects of alternate market structures asymmetric markets and inventory holdback our results in particular that for a broad range of parameter values early differentiation is a dominant strategy even under cost parity with delayed differentiation are robust to these relaxations

demand uncertainty and price maintenance markdowns as destructive competition this paper offers a new theory of destructive competition the authors compare minimum resale price maintenance to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers in both the resale price maintenance and flexible price games retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty the authors find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under resale price maintenance than under market clearing surprisingly consumer surplus can also be higher in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive copyright 1997 by american economic association

parallel imports demand dispersion and international price discrimination parallel imports goods imported by unauthorized resellers are advocated worldwide for undermining international price discrimination for a continuum of markets we find that uniform pricing by a monopolist yields lower global welfare than third degree discrimination if demand dispersion across markets is large though uniform pricing avoids output misallocation too many markets go unserved mixed systems permitting discrimination across but not within designated groups of markets yield significantly higher welfare than uniform pricing or unrestricted multimarket discrimination and can pareto dominate uniform pricing thus while parallel imports might benefit some countries our results weaken the multilateral case for allowing them

inventory dynamics and supply chain coordination this paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting a manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates we show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions when the product is highly perishable retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories vertical price floors or inventory buybacks subsidies for unsold inventory can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions when the product is less perishable the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives

resale price maintenance and forward integration into a monopolistically competitive industry in this paper we adopt the ces model of product differentiation for the downstream stage of the industry with an upstream monopolist we first show that resale price maintenance is equivalent to forward integration and that both increase profits then we demonstrate that forward integration by an upstream monopolist will reduce welfare for the industry prices fall with forward integration but the integrating firm contracts the number of downstream subsidiaries so drastically that the reduced diversity more than offsets the gains from lower prices

why parallel trade may raise producers profits abstract this paper shows that a manufacturer may benefit from parallel trade in addition to an intuitive condition about the effect of demand shocks this occurs when competitive retailers must order inventories before they know the realization of demand and for products whose sale value drops at the end of the demand period for these types of products letting retailers trade unsold inventories generally results in larger orders placed with the manufacturer and higher manufacturer profit the model provides a simple explanation as to why the volume of parallel trade is now very large and accepted by manufacturers for some products such as automobiles clothes toys consumer electronics musical recordings cosmetics and perfumes

parallel imports and repair services abstract this study explores the welfare effects of parallel imports when the producer may refuse to provide repair services for parallel imported units which reduces the degree of price convergence between countries if the probability of the product s breakdown is endogenously determined by the producer permitting parallel imports could increase the probability because a higher probability leads to a larger price gap as a result it is possible that prices increase and welfare deteriorates in both countries this negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as the liberalization of trade in goods proceeds the prohibition of service discrimination recovers the positive welfare effect

the effect of semantic cues on consumer perceptions of reference price ads this article examines the differential effects of two types of semantic cues 1 cues connoting that an advertised price discount exhibits low consistency over time and 2 cues connoting that an advertised discount is highly distinctive vis a vis competitors results suggest that for manipulations of external reference prices with offering price held constant semantic cues that connote high distinctiveness are more effective in influencing consumers price related evaluations when the external reference price is otherwise implausibly high than are semantic cues that connote low consistency for manipulations of offering prices with external reference price held constant however semantic cues connoting high distinctiveness exert more relative influence on price related cognitions when offering prices are high

a stochastic and asymmetric information framework for a dominant manufacturer supply chain abstract consider a dominant manufacturer wholesaling a product to a retailer who in turn retails it to the consumers at p unit the retail market demand volume varies with p according to a given demand curve this basic system is commonly modeled as a manufacturer stackelberg ms game under a deterministic and symmetric information det sym i framework we first explain the logical flaws of this framework which are i the dominant manufacturer leader will have a lower profit than the retailer under an iso elastic demand curve ii in some situations the system s correct solution can be hyper sensitive to minute changes in the demand curve iii applying volume discounting while keeping the original ms profit maximizing objective leads to an implausible degenerate solution in which the manufacturer has dictatorial power over the channel we then present an extension of the stochastic and asymmetric information sto asy i framework proposed in lau and lau lau a lau h s 2005 some two echelon supply chain games improving from deterministic symmetric information to stochastic asymmetric information models european journal of operational research 161 1 203 223 coupled with the notion that a profit maximizing dominant manufacturer may implement not only ms but also pm i e using a manufacturer imposed maximum retail price we show that this new framework resolves all the logical flaws stated above along the way we also present a procedure for the dominant manufacturer to design a profit maximizing volume discount scheme using stochastic and asymmetric demand information using our sto asy i framework to resolve the logical flaws of the det sym i framework also reveals two noteworthy points i the attractiveness of the perfectly legal but overlooked channel coordination mechanism pm and ii volume discounting as a means for the dominant manufacturer to benefit from information known only to the retailer

a dynamic stochastic analysis of international patent application and renewal processes abstract this paper formulates a dynamic stochastic model to examine the joint patent application and renewal behaviors under an international patent protection regime the framework makes it possible to utilize both the cross sectional multi country application and the time series patent renewal dimensions of available international patenting data to estimate the private value of patent protection and allows us to distinguish more aspects of patent returns the evolution dynamics of the value of european patents in pharmaceutical and electronics industries are examined estimation results indicate that pharmaceutical patents are endowed with higher initial returns thus their owners tend to seek patent protection in more countries than electronics patent holders however pharmaceutical patents become obsolete at a much faster pace than electronics patents and consequently they have lower renewal rates and shorter lives

consumer perceptions of comparative price advertisements the authors analyze the issue of comparative price advertising from a behavioral perspective because public policy recognizes that comparative pricing may lead to consumer misperceptions the auth

strategic technology choice and capacity investment under demand uncertainty this paper studies the impact of competition on a firm s choice of technology product flexible or product dedicated and capacity investment decisions specifically we model two firms competing with each other in two markets characterized by price dependent and uncertain demand the firms make three decisions in the following sequence choice of technology technology game capacity investment capacity game and production quantities production game the technology and capacity games occur while the demand curve is still uncertain and the production game is postponed until after the demand curve is revealed we develop best response functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and a duopolist respond to a given flexibility premium we show that the firms may respond to competition by adopting a technology which is the same as or different from what the competitor adopts we conclude that contrary to popular belief flexibility is not always the best response to competition flexible and dedicated technologies may coexist in equilibrium we demonstrate that as the difference between the two market sizes increases a duopolist is willing to pay less for flexible technology whereas the decision of a monopolist is not affected further we find that a firm that invests in flexibility benefits from a low correlation between demands for two products but the extent of this benefit differs depending on the competitor s technology choice our results indicate that higher demand substitution may or may not promote the adoption of flexibility under competition whereas it always facilitates the adoption of flexibility without competition finally we show that contrary to intuition as the competitor s cost of capacity increases the premium a flexible firm is willing to pay for flexibility decreases

dedicated vs product flexible production technology strategic capacity investment choice this paper studies the optimal investment strategies of an incumbent and a potential entrant that can both choose between a product flexible and dedicated technology in a two product market characterized by uncertain demand the product flexible production technology has certain advantages especially when the economic environment is uncertain on the other hand the dedicated production technology allows a firm to commit to production quantities this gives strategic advantages which can outweigh the value of flexibility it turns out that both firms prefer for some scenarios the dedicated production technology however we find that in a game with sequential technology choices both firms investing dedicated will not be an equilibrium especially when the economic environment is more uncertain the incumbent overinvests in product flexible capacity to force the entrant to choose the dedicated technology then the incumbent is the only firm with the product flexible production technology which results in a high payoff

the patent paradox revisited an empirical study of patenting in the u s semiconductor industry 1979 1995 we examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to r d yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s we explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 u s semiconductor firms during 1979 1995 the results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of u s patent rights spawned patent portfolio races among capital intensive firms but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms

reply to do returns policies intensify retail competition returns policies are common in many sectors of retail distribution padmanabhan and png 1997 showed that with demand uncertainty a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions wang 2004 showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive we show that returns policies do increase manufacturer profitability by attenuating retailer price competition when demand is low and intensifying competition when demand is high importantly this effect holds only in the presence of demand uncertainty further the conditions under which a returns policy raises the manufacturer s profit are weaker when retailing is a duopoly than when retailing is a monopoly this suggests that returns policies serve both to manage competition and mitigate demand uncertainty

commodity taxation and parallel imports we examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a two country model with imperfect competition while governments determine non cooperatively their commodity tax rate the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector we compare the positive and normative implications of having commodity taxes based on destination or origin principle we show that as the volume of parallel imports increases non cooperative origin taxes converge while destination taxes diverge moreover origin taxes are more similar and lead to higher aggregate welfare levels than destination taxes

how to escape a declining market capacity investment or exit this paper considers a firm that faces a declining profit stream for its established product the firm has the option to invest in a new technology with which it can produce an innovative product while having the option to exit at any point in time in the presence of an exit option earlier work determined the optimal timing to invest where it was shown that higher uncertainty might accelerate investment timing in the present paper the firm also decides on capacity this extension leads to monotonicity i e higher uncertainty delays investment timing we also find that higher potential profitability of the innovative product market increases the incentive to invest earlier where however we get the counterintuitive result that the firm invests in smaller capacity finally if quantity has a smaller negative effect on price the firm wants to acquire a larger capacity at a lower investment threshold

a penny for your quotes patent citations and the value of innovations the use ofpatents in economic research has been seriously hindered by the fact that patents vary enormously in their importance or value and hence simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output the purpose of this article is to put forward patent counts weighted by citations as indicators of the value of innovations thereby overcoming the limitations of simple counts the empirical analysis of a particular innovation computed tomography scanners indeed shows a close association between citation based patent indices and independent measures of the social value of innovations in that field moreover the weighting scheme appears to be nonlinear increasing in the number of citations implying that the informational content of citations rises at the margin as in previous studies simple patent counts are found to be highly correlated with contemporaneous rd however here the association is within afield over time rather than cross sectional

estimates of the value of patent rights in european countries during the post 1950 period this paper examines the distribution of the values of patent rights in the united kingdom france and germany during the post 1950 period these values are inferred from the behavior of patentees with respect to payment of renewal fees on their patents a simple economic model of renewal decisions is combined with data on the proportion of patents renewed at alternative ages and the renewal fee schedules to produce estimates of the distribution and the total value of patent rights in these countries moreover the data indicate that there have been changes in the value distribution and we follow these changes over the period the empirical results of particular interest concern the total value of patent rights and the relationship between changes in it and changes in the quantity of patents the skew in the distribution of patent values and the rate of obsolescence on the returns to patents

patents as options some estimates of the value of holding european patent stocks in many countries holders of patents must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force this paper uses data on the proportion of patents renewed and the renewal fees faced by post world war ii cohorts of patents in france the united kingdom and germany in conjunction with a model of patent holders renewal decisions to estimate the returns earned from holding patents in these countries since patents are often applied for at a nearly stage in the innovation process the model allows agents to be uncertain about the sequence of returns that will be earned if the patent is kept inforce formally then the paper presents and solves a discrete choice optimal stochastic control model derives the implications of the model on aggregate behaviour and then estimates the parameters of the model from aggregate data the estimates enable a detailed description of the evolution of the distribution of returns earned from holding patents over their life spans and calculations of both the annual returns earned from holding the patents still in force or the patent stocks in the alternative countries and the distribution of the discounted value of returns earned from holding the patents in a cohort this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework this paper examines a dynamic incumbent entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the inverse demand in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly considered we find that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry deterrence is achieved through timing rather than through overinvestment this is because the incumbent invests earlier and in a smaller amount compared to a scenario without potential entry if on the other hand the size of the investment is exogenously given the investment order changes and the entrant invests before the incumbent does

using return policies to elicit retailer information we show that a manufacturer may prefer to offer a return policy when dealing with a retailer who holds advance knowledge about market conditions roughly stated the manufacturer offers a liberal return allowance in lieu of a lower price to satisfy a retailer facing unfavorable market conditions a retailer facing favorable conditions finds this tradeoff unattractive because he is likely to sell the merchandise anyway and thus not make as much use of the generous return terms as a consequence a retailer is less inclined to misstate market conditions by serving as an additional control instrument a returns policy reduces the manufacturer s need to ration cut production

effects of sourcing structure on performance in a multiple product assemble to order supply chain abstract this paper addresses the strategic pricing decisions of a decentralized assemble to order system and the effects of sourcing structure on system performance we consider an assemble to order system consisting of two substitute products and three components manufactured by different suppliers demand for the products is price sensitive the selling prices for the products are jointly determined by firms in the system we study the system under both centralized and decentralized decision making situations for the centralized system we demonstrate that there exists a unique optimal pricing solution for the decentralized system we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium in the players pricing game we further analyze the effects of different sourcing structures on the system performance and the assembler s performance we find that reduction of suppliers in the system does not guarantee improvement of system performance different sourcing structures have different impacts on performance when the two dedicated components are sourced from a single supplier and the common component is sourced from another independent supplier the system and the assembler s performance become worse we show that the decentralized system can be effectively coordinated and the system performance can be improved with a simple profit sharing contract finally we provide comprehensive numerical examples to demonstrate some important managerial insights

capacity optimization under uncertainty the impact of operational time lags time lags in switching operational modes are typical in the manufacturing and power sectors but are not treated in most real options models in this paper we consider a firm that has the opportunity to suspend and to resume production infinitely many times subject to a time lag after each startup decision we contribute to the literature by allowing the firm to determine its level of installed capacity in conjunction with its optimal investment timing we find that an increase in the length of the time lag results in an increase in the optimal capacity level capacity optimization also interacts with the length of the time lag to affect investment timing and the triggers to suspend and resume production thereby weakening the result about hysteresis from a standard real options model under the assumption of a fixed level of capacity a longer lag speeds up the decision to resume operations due to a positive upside to the revenue but delays the suspension of operations by contrast with capacity optimization a longer time lag results in a larger capacity choice which can indirectly delay the investment decision and the timing to resume operations this indirect effect dominates when the level of market uncertainty is low and the time lag is initially small

the value of flexibility in make to order systems the effect of demand correlation we consider a manufacturer of mass customized modular products who orders components under demand uncertainty and sets prices produces to order and trades excess components in a secondary market after this uncertainty is resolved the sequence of events reflects in a parsimonious fashion the considerable reduction in demand uncertainty between the procurement stage and the selling season typical of industries with long supply lead times and short product life cycles we prove that in contrast to conventional wisdom the value of production flexibility and expected profit increase with demand correlation if and only if commonality between the corresponding products does not exceed a threshold we also prove that the value of flexibility and expected profit may each increase or decrease with demand variability depending on demand correlations and component commonalities across the entire product line finally we prove that when demand shocks are independent the optimal product prices are positively correlated if and only if the degree of commonality between the corresponding products exceeds a threshold

demand uncertainty and returns policies manufacturers facing uncertain demand may induce distributors to carry ample stocks of their products by agreeing to accept returns of unsold goods for credit the authors model the manufacturer s decision to accept returns showing that this decision depends crucially on the nature of the demand uncertainty uncertainty over customer arrivals favors returns while uncertainty over consumers valuation of the manufacturer s product leads distributors to set retail prices too high from the manufacturer s standpoint when returns are allowed the authors show that returns can be expected to raise retail prices while maintaining shrinking distributor margins copyright 1995 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the effect of plausible and exaggerated reference prices on consumer perceptions and price search this article examines whether advertisers regular price claims affect consumer perceptions and price search behavior experiments involving simulated shopping via personal computers indicate that compared to an ad with no reference price an ad with a plausible reference price raised subjects estimates of the advertiser s regular price and the perceived offer value an exaggerated reference price had generally the same positive effects on perception as a plausible reference price even for the more skeptical subjects further when subjects were presented with an advertised sale price above the lowest expected price the exaggerated reference price increased the percentage of subjects who purchased the product from the advertiser without checking other stores prices

patent quality and research productivity measuring innovation with multiple indicators we analyse the determinants of the decline in research productivity using panel data on manufacturing firms in the us for the period 1980 93 we focus on three factors the level of demand the quality of patents and technological exhaustion we develop an index of patent quality using detailed patent information and show that using multiple indicators substantially reduces the measured variance in quality research productivity at the firm level is inversely related to patent quality and the level of demand as predicted by theory and patent quality is positively associated with the stock market value of firms