aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame abstract two agents recurrently play a 2 2 version of the ultimatum game each player sticks to his past action if it was satisfactory relative to an endogenous aspiration level and otherwise abandons it with positive probability this type of satisficing behavior is shown to yield efficiency in the limit it does not favor a specific distribution of surplus and can give an explanation for the incidence of equitable offers in practice numerical investigations link a player s character as captured by the model parameters to his average bargaining success results indicate that it is beneficial to be persistent and stubborn i e slow in adapting aspirations and switching actions in response to major dissatisfaction also it is an advantage to be capricious i e to experience large and frequent perturbations of aspiration level and to discriminate only little between minor and major dissatisfaction

stochastic stability in a double auction abstract in a k double auction a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with probability 1 k we show that the stable equilibria of a complete information k double approximate an asymmetric nash bargaining solution with the seller s bargaining power decreasing in k note that ceteris paribus the payoffs of the seller of the one shot game increase in k nevertheless as the stochastically stable equilibrium price decreases in k choosing the seller s favorite price with a relatively higher probability in individual encounters makes him worse off in the long run

the economics of small business finance the roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle abstract this article examines the economics of financing small business in private equity and debt markets firms are viewed through a financial growth cycle paradigm in which different capital structures are optimal at different points in the cycle we show the sources of small business finance and how capital structure varies with firm size and age the interconnectedness of small firm finance is discussed along with the impact of the macroeconomic environment we also analyze a number of research and policy issues review the literature and suggest topics for future research

a theory of international new ventures a decade of research oviatt and mcdougall s jibs article identified and defined international new ventures invs and their prominent role in the global marketplace the article spurred worldwide interest in invs by raising questions about the validity and efficacy of existing theory especially about the uppsala process model of internationalization the article also laid an important theoretical foundation for research into international entrepreneurship ie where younger and wellestablished companies use their entrepreneurial activities to create value as they internationalize their operations this paper reviews oviatt and mcdougall s original propositions highlighting their important contributions to the field the paper also highlights the progress made in research using oviatt and mcdougall s framework the major debates that persist about the nature and role of invs the source of their competitive advantages and the key issues to be explored in future research

why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes an evolutionary approach abstract two bargaining parties play the nash demand game to share a pie whose size is determined by one party s investment decision various investment levels are subgame perfect adding the investment decision to young s evolutionary bargaining model yields the following long run outcome efficient investment prevails and the investor s share of the pie approximates die maximum of i the smallest share that induces efficient investment even if the investor expects to appropriate the available pie from every inefficient investment and ii half of the pie the result favors forward induction to subgame consistency and equity theory to hold ups journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 l14

the human capital effect of general education development certificates on low income women this study examines the impacts of the general equivalency diploma ged certificate and other secondary and post secondary credentials on labor market outcomes for women it uses data from the nlsy mother and children file and the washington state family income study fis correcting for sample selection and endogeneity bias of welfare recipiency we find that one cannot distinguish between secondary dropouts ged recipients and secondary graduates in hours of work results on hourly wage rates are mixed for the fis sample ged recipients secondary graduates and secondary dropouts earn the same wage for the nlsy ged recipients fare better than dropouts but worse than secondary graduates job experience explains the wage gap between ged recipients and graduates but its explanatory power is dominated by controlling for years of education or afqt differences in years of education and afqt scores are responsible for the observed wage differences among ged recipients secondary graduates and secondary dropouts

competitive behavior in market games evidence and theory we explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game introduced by shubik 1972 market games obtain pareto inferior strict nash equilibria in which some markets are closed we find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic nash equilibria but favor more efficient nash equilibria in which all markets are open as the number of subjects participating in the market game increases the nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy motivated by these findings we investigate theoretically whether evolutionary forces lead to walrasian outcomes in market games we introduce a strong version of evolutionary stable strategies sess f orfinite populations our concept requires stability against deviations by coalitions of agents a small coalition of trading agents is sufficient for pareto improving trade to be generated in addition provided that agents lack market power nash equilibria corresponding to approximate competitive outcomes constitute the only approximate sess

conventional contracts intentional behavior and logit choice equality without symmetry abstract when coordination games are played under the logit choice rule and there is intentional bias in agents non best response behavior we show that the egalitarian bargaining solution emerges as the long run social norm without intentional bias a new solution the logit bargaining solution emerges as the long run norm these results contrast with results under non payoff dependent deviations from best response behavior where it has previously been shown that the kalai smorodinsky and nash bargaining solutions emerge as long run norms we complement the theory with experiments on human subjects results of which suggest that non best response play is payoff dependent and displays intentional bias this suggests the egalitarian solution as the most likely candidate for a long run bargaining norm

the internationalization of small and medium sized firms this paper contributes to the existing research by integrating the notions of organizational learning and entrepreneurial orientation into the body of international entrepreneurship our primary framework combines learning theory and the new venture theory of internationalization to study the extent to which small and medium sized companies engage in international activities we found that the firms international learning effort and entrepreneurial orientation are positively associated with internationalization intent whereas domestic learning effort is negatively related with internationalization intent overall our results suggest 1 that intensive knowledge renewal and exploitation regarding foreign markets and the internationalization process itself may increase internationalization by affecting the perceptions of opportunities offered by further international expansion and 2 that firms with an entrepreneurial mindset may be more likely to develop a long term substantial presence in the international arena compared to firms that are more reactive or conservative

the evolutionary stability of cooperation is cooperation without central authority stable if so how robust is it despite what might be the conventional wisdom the evolution of cooperation did not solve this problem deductively in fact results obtained later by others seem to have contradicted the book s main message reexamining this exceptionally influential work yields a new picture part of axelrod s evolutionary story turns out to be false but the main intuition that retaliatory strategies of conditional cooperation are somehow advantaged proves correct in one specific and significant sense under a standard evolutionary dynamic these strategies require the minimal frequency to stabilize hence they support the most robust evolutionary equilibrium the easiest to reach and retain moreover the less efficient a strategy the larger is its minimal stabilizing frequency hobbesian strategies of pure defection are the least robust our main theorems hold for a large class of games that pose diverse cooperation problems prisoner s dilemma chicken stag hunt and many others

evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play abstract we study equilibrium selection in stochastic evolutionary bargaining games in which idiosyncratic play is intentional instead of random in contract games the stochastically stable state selected by intentional idiosyncratic play is the nash bargain rather than the usual kalai smorodinsky solution

adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations consider a population of agents who play a game through repeated interactions and adapt their behavior based on information about other agents previous behavior the standard way of modeling such a process is to assume that everyone in the population is governed by the same adaptive rule e g best response imitation or the replicator dynamic this paper studies heterogeneous populations of agents in which some agents are best responders others are conformists they do what the majority does and still others are nonconformists they do the opposite of what the majority does unlike deterministic best reply processes which in 2 2 games converge to nash equilibrium these heterogeneous processes may have limit cycles moreover limit cycles may exist even when the proportion of non best responders is arbitrarily small we show how to analyze the asymptotic behavior of such processes through a suitable generalization of bendixson stability theory combined with stochastic approximation theory journal of economic literature classification numbers c44 c73 d83

an evolutionary model of bargaining abstract individuals from two populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the nash demand game they make their demands by choosing best replies based on an incomplete knowledge of the precedents and occasionally they choose randomly there is no common knowledge over the long run typically one division will be observed almost all of the time this stochastically stable division is close to the nash solution when all agents in the same population are alike when the populations are heterogeneous a generalization of the nash solution results if there is some mixing between the two populations the stable division is fifty fifty journal of economic literature classification number c78

collateral loan quality and bank risk abstract most commercial loans are made on a secured basis yet little is known about the relationship between collateral and credit risk several theoretical studies find that when borrowers have private information about risk the lowest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral in contrast conventional wisdom holds that when risk is observable the highest risk borrowers tend to pledge collateral an additional issue is whether secured loans as opposed to secured borrowers tend to be safer or riskier than unsecured loans empirical evidence presented here strongly suggests that collateral is most often associated with riskier borrowers riskier loans and riskier banks

a stage contingent model of design and growth for technology based new ventures abstract stage of growth developmental models have traditionally been used to enhance our understanding of the organizational creation and growth process until recently most of this literature has been primarily conceptual and descriptive this paper presents a stage of growth model theorized to hold for technology based new ventures the model consists of four stages conception and development commercialization growth and stability and views each stage of growth as a reflection of the dominant problems faced over the course of growth by the venture the model predicts that the organization of a venture will be a function ofthe dominant problems that define a stage of growth more specifically it is argued that a technology based venture s rate of growth depends in part on the consistency or fit between its stage of growth and certain structural features of its organization including decision making centralization and formalization and functional specialization in the areas of marketing and sales manufacturing and engineering technology data were collected from 105 technology based ventures in the electronics computer and peripherals industries to test the model the results were generally consistent with the theory and showed that centralization of decision making decreased as the firms moved to higher stages while formalization of decision making increased in higher stages specialization of roles in the functional areas of manufacturing and marketing also increased by stage however specialization in the engineering and technology functions remained high across all stages the contingency hypothesis was also supported indicating that technology based ventures growth is partially attributable to the fit between a venture s stage of growth and aspects of its structure these findings indicate that different patterns of decision making and functional specialization are required at each stage if growth is to be achieved as such this research validates a long standing but untested belief in the venture management field that performance of new ventures depends upon

the evolution of exchange abstract stochastic stability is applied to the problem of exchange we analyze the stochastic stability of two dynamic trading processes in a simple housing market in both models traders meet in pairs at random and exchange their houses when trade is mutually beneficial but occasionally they make mistakes the models differ in the probability of mistakes when all mistakes are equally likely the set of stochastically stable allocations contains the set of efficient allocations when more serious mistakes are less likely the stochastically stable states are those allocations always efficient with the lowest envy level

a prospect theory nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability abstract we consider the long run outcomes of bargaining games when players obey prospect theory we extend the evolutionary bargaining model of young 1993 to a two stage nash demand game two players simultaneously choose whether to exercise an outside option in the first stage and play the nash demand game in the second stage which will be reached only if neither player exercises the outside option we address the influence on the stochastically stable division of reference dependent preferences where the reference point is the value of the outside option we show that the division consistently differs from the nash bargaining solution under expected utility theory inspired by this we propose a prospect theory nash bargaining solution which coincides with the stochastically stable division

labor market returns to the ged using regression discontinuity analysis we evaluate returns to general educational development ged certification for high school dropouts using state administrative data we apply a fuzzy regression discontinuity method to account for test takers retaking the test for women we find that ged certification has no statistically significant effect on either employment or earnings for men we find a significant increase in earnings in the second year after taking the test but no impact in subsequent years ged certification increases postsecondary school enrollment by 4 8 percentage points our results differ from regression discontinuity approaches that fail to account for test retaking

estimating the labor market signaling value of the ged this paper tests the labor market signaling hypothesis for the general educational development ged equivalency credential using a unique data set containing ged test scores and social security administration ssa earnings data we exploit variation in ged status generated by differential state ged passing standards to identify the signaling value of the ged net of human capital effects our results indicate that the ged signal increases the earnings of young white dropouts by 10 to 19 percent we find no statistically significant effects for minority dropouts

financing new venture exporters this paper investigates the demand for and access to financing for young small and medium sized enterprises smes the work compares theoretically and empirically two sets of new firms those that export and those that do not export as to the frequency with which they seek and obtain external financing the work hypothesizes that new growth firms and new exporter firms are especially likely to seek external financing yet less likely to obtain financing empirical findings confirm these expectations demonstrating that young growth firms were more likely than non growth firms to seek all forms of capital and exporters were particularly likely to apply for equity and trade credit commercial lenders were less likely to approve loan applications from early stage growth firms and especially so for applications from young growth oriented sme exporters the implications of these results for research and public policy are discussed

does evolution solve the hold up problem abstract the paper examines the theoretical foundations of the hold up problem at the first stage one agent decides on the level of a relationship specific investment there is no contract so at the second stage the agent must bargain with a trading partner over the surplus that the investment has generated we show that the conventional underinvestment result hinges crucially both on the assumed bargaining game and on the choice of equilibrium concept in particular we prove the following two results i if bargaining proceeds according to the nash demand game any investment level is subgame perfect but only a particular efficient outcome is stochastically stable ii if bargaining proceeds according to the ultimatum game with the trading partner as proposer only the minimal investment level is subgame perfect but any investment level is stochastically stable journal of economic literature classification numbers l14 c78

international versus domestic entrepreneurship new venture strategic behavior and industry structure abstract international entrepreneurship is defined in this study as the development of international new ventures or start ups that from their inception engage in international business thus viewing their operating domain as international from the initial stages of the firm s operation one hundred and eighty eight new venture firms in the computer and communications equipment manufacturing industries are classified according to the percentage of their sales in the international market ventures with no sales derived from international activities are considered domestic new ventures and ventures with sales from international activities comprising greater than 5 of total sales are considered international new ventures the strategy and industry structure profiles of international new ventures are significantly different from domestic new ventures the internationals pursue much broader market based strategies seeking a strategy of broad market coverage through developing and controlling numerous distribution channels serving numerous customers in diverse market segments and developing high market or product visibility the internationals also emphasize a more aggressive entry strategy building on outside financial and production resources to enter numerous geographical markets on a large scale securing patent technology is also an important component of their strategy this suggests that the internationals compete by entering the industry on a large scale seeking to penetrate multiple markets with the recognition that external resources are necessary to support such an entry whereas both the domestics and the internationals characterize domestic competition as being relatively intense the international new ventures compete in industries with higher levels of international competition it is not clear from this research whether the new venture selects an industry with a high degree of international competition and therefore responds with an international orientation or because the new venture has an international orientation it perceives or recognizes a higher degree of international competition another industry structure difference is the internationals perceived higher degree of restrictiveness due to government regulation it is unclear whether this restrictiveness motivates new ventures to seek less regulated international environments or if it indicates that when competing internationally the new venture is confronted with increased regulatory requirements domestic new ventures are distinguished by their emphasis on a production expansion strategy and customer specialization strategy the production specialization strategy consists of focusing on limited geographical markets maintaining excess capacity and pursuing forward integration the customer specialization strategy incorporates the production of a specialty product that is purchased infrequently thus for both of the domestic strategies a consistent closeness between the producer and consumer is implied this may be an important basis underlining the new venture s decision to compete in an exclusive domestic context this study offers initial support for the notion of international entrepreneurship by its findings that there are significant differences between new venture firms competing domestically and new ventures choosing to also enter international markets

international new ventures revisiting the influences behind the born global firm there is a small but theoretically important literature on born globals or international new venture firms that positions itself in contrast to the more established sequential international entry literature in this paper we examine the pattern of entry into international markets for a set of international new ventures and show that they need not be a distinct breed of firms as previous research has portrayed absent a specific technological advantage the decision for a new venture to internationalize at inception is influenced by the size of its home market and by its production capacity as well as by cultural and economic forces that also influence other more traditional firms that stage their entry into international markets most importantly we demonstrate that the decision to internationalize or not should be considered jointly with the capacity allocation decision to specific international markets as analysing these separately may lead to biased results

persistence of power repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority abstract we extend a simple repeated multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members theoretically and experimentally we compare this endogenous power environment with a standard random power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games the endogenous power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions less equitable budget allocations the persistence of power across periods and higher long run inequality than the random power environment we present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game

the value of school facility investments evidence from a dynamic regression discontinuity design author s cellini stephanie riegg ferreira fernando rothstein jesse abstract despite extensive public infrastructure spending surprisingly little is known about its economic return in this paper we estimate the value of school facility investments using housing markets standard models of local public goods imply that school districts should spend up to the point where marginal increases would have zero effect on local housing prices our research design isolates exogenous variation in investments by comparing school districts where referenda on bond issues targeted to fund capital expenditures passed and failed by narrow margins we extend this traditional regression discontinuity approach to identify the dynamic treatment effects of bond authorization on local housing prices student achievement and district composition our results indicate that california school districts underinvest in school facilities passing a referendum causes immediate sizable increases in home prices implying a willingness to pay on the part of marginal homebuyers of 1 50 or more for each 1 of capital spending these effects do not appear to be driven by changes in the income or racial composition of homeowners and the impact on test scores appears to explain only a small portion of the total housing price effect c 2010 by the president and fellows of harvard college and the massachusetts institute of technology

perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games abstract players adaptively learn how to bargain a characteristic function describes the available surplus the underlying bargaining game extends the nash demand game by allowing subcoalitions to reach an agreement players demands must be multiples of a money unit we show that stochastically stable allocations ssa i e allocations that are most stable to unlikely errors are a subset of the core uniqueness does not obtain even when the money unit becomes arbitrarily small nonetheless every ssa is related to the allocation that maximizes the product of players utilities over the core i e constrained egalitarian solution for tu games journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78

adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations we study the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning for a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function we first show that all self perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf following this we provide a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide the surplus according to some core allocation regardless of the initial history

bias corrected estimates of ged returns using three sources of data this article examines the direct economic return to general educational development ged certification for both native and immigrant high school dropouts one data source the current population survey cps is plagued by nonresponse and allocation bias from the hot deck procedure that biases the estimated return to the ged upward correcting for allocation bias and ability bias there is no direct economic return to ged certification an apparent return to ged certification with age found in the raw cps data is due to dropouts becoming more skilled over time these results apply to both native born and immigrant populations

does the g e d improve earnings estimates from a sample of both successful and unsuccessful g e d candidates the author uses a unique data set constructed from florida general education development certificate ged and unemployment insurance ui administrative records to estimate the relative earnings of two groups of male high school dropouts who took the ged exams in 1995 those who passed the exams obtaining the credential and those who failed the exams estimates from several different specifications all show greater mean quarterly earnings growth among those who obtained a ged than among unsuccessful candidates the advantage was small in dollar terms only about 1 400 annually six years after the exams but given the very low initial earnings of these school dropouts it was large in relative terms growing from zero immediately after the 1995 exams to 13 20 six years later most of these gains appear to reflect not differential wage growth between the two groups but a differential rate of movement from non employment to employment

fictitious play property of the nash demand game we show that the nash demand game has the fictitious play property we also show that almost every fictitious play process and its associated belief path converge to a pure strategy nash equilibrium in the nash demand game

succession financing in family firms business succession is one of the primary management challenges for family firms however many family firms fail at this task because of financial issues although a vast number of studies have investigated the succession process research thus far has failed to determine how and why family firms select particular forms of financing for succession related expenditures accordingly this study conceptually and empirically investigates succession financing we introduce a conceptual framework that investigates the reasons behind an owner manager s intent to use debt for succession financing specifically our model accounts for general and succession related personal factors however we also include a set of firm specific financing behavioral controls in our research the empirical results are derived from a sample of 187 german family firms and the results highlight financial knowledge attitudes succession experience and succession planning as significant determinants of the owner managers debt usage intentions the implications and avenues for future research are discussed

commitment and conflict in bilateral bargaining building on crawford 1982 we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c our primary solution concept is iterated strict dominance if commitment attempts never fail there are three solutions in two solutions all the surplus goes to one player in the third solution there is a high probility of con ict if commitment attempts succeed with probability q 1 the unique solution entails con ict with probability q 2 when c 0 analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance

capital structure decision making a model for family business abstract most theoretical and empirical studies of capital structure focus on public corporations only a limited number of studies on capital structure have been conducted on small to medium size enterprises smes and this deficiency is particularly evident in investigations into factors that influence funding decisions of family business owners theory indicates that there is a complex array of factors that influence sme owner managers financing decisions recent family business literature suggests that these processes are influenced by firm owners attitudes toward the utility of debt as a form of funding as moderated by external environmental conditions e g financial and market considerations a number of other factors have been shown to influence financing decisions including culture entrepreneurial characteristics entrepreneurs prior experiences in capital structure business goals business life cycle issues preferred ownership structures views regarding control debt equity ratios and short vs long term debt age and size of the firm sources of funding for growth attitudes toward debt financing issues relating to independence and control and perceived risk and attitudes toward personal risk although these factors have been identified until now there does not appear to have been any attempts to develop empirically based models that show relationships between these factors and family business owners financing decisions utilizing theories derived from divergent disciplines this study develops an empirically tested structural equation model of financing antecedents of family businesses participants of our study involved a random sample of 5000 business owners who were mailed a 250 item australian family and private business questionnaire developed specifically for this investigation notably our findings reveal that firm size family control business planning and business objectives are significantly associated with debt small family businesses and owners who do not have formal planning processes in place tend to rely on family loans as a source of finance however family businesses in the service industry e g retailers and wholesalers are less likely to use family loans as are those owners who are planning to achieve growth through new products or process development use of capital and retained profits is likely for family businesses planning to achieve growth through an increase in sales but less is likely for family businesses in the manufacturing sector and lifestyle firms in addition debt and family loans are negatively related to capital and retained profits equity is a consideration for owners of large businesses young firms and owners who plan to achieve growth through increasing profit margins however equity is less likely to be a consideration for older family business owners and owners who have a preference for retaining family control our findings suggest that the interplay between multiple social family and financial factors is complex in addition our findings indicate the importance of utilizing theories that also help to explain behavioral factors e g owners needs to be in control that affect financial structure decision making processes practitioners and researchers should consider the dynamic interplay among business characteristics e g size or industry behavioral aspects of business financing e g business objectives and financial factors e g gearing levels when working with and researching family enterprises

evolutionary game theory game theory has been developed as a theory of rational behavior in interpersonal conflict situations with economics and the other social sciences being the intended fields of application since the theory is based on an idealized picture of human rationality it is by no means obvious that it can be applied to situations in which the players cannot be attributed any intellectual capabilities however in their seminal paper the logic of animal conflict maynard smith and price showed that animal contests can be modeled as games and that game theory can be applied successfully in biology the objective of this chapter is to review some of the developments in this biological branch of game theory and to point out the distinctions and similarities with the classical branch also see parker and hammerstein 1985 the main emphasis will be on the mathematics involved lack of space prevents an extensive discussion of the underlying biological assumptions as well as an analysis of specific examples for these the reader is referred to the very stimulating book evolution and the theory of games by john maynard smith

conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining abstract we consider a multilateral nash demand game in which short sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource we prove that the resulting process converges with probability one to a state in which all players agree on a strictly self enforcing division of resources i e a strict core allocation highlighting group dynamics we show how the myopic actions of players may lead to the break up of groups in the short run but can ultimately bring about a situation from which a strictly self enforcing allocation can be reached

learning to play limited forecast equilibria abstract this paper provides a learning justification for limited forecast equilibria i e strategy profiles such that 1 players choose their actions in order to maximize the discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts and 2 forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path the limited forecast equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable outcomes of a simple learning process involving vanishing trembles journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c72 d83

hold up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms abstract the purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple production problem with two sided relationship specific investments and competition the puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist efficient sequential equilibria conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized and it is shown that there is a hierarchy of norms with a stochastically stable division rule that is independent of the long run investment strategy due to this independence efficient sequential equilibria are not in general stochastically stable this result may help us understand why institutions such as firms may be needed to ensure efficient relationship specific investments

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

commentary john nash and evolutionary game theory abstract john nash s work laid the foundations for evolutionary game theory as well as the theory of games with rational agents the nash bargaining solution emerges as a natural solution concept in both of these settings

clever agents in adaptive learning abstract saez marti and weibull j econom theory 86 1999 268 investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in young s j econom theory 59 1993 145 bargaining model which is how they introduce cleverness of players i analyze such clever agents in general finite two player games and show young s individual strategy and social structure princeton university press princeton nj 1998 prediction to be robust adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents if their population share is less than one however the long run strategy distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents

learning to be fair abstract we study the process of equilibrium selection in games when players have social preferences of the type discussed among others by rabin 1993 and segal and sobel 2007 to this end we employ a standard noisy version of the best response dynamics we obtain several results concerning some popular games such as the prisoner s dilemma and the battle of the sexes we show that reciprocity may have a negative effect on the equilibrium selection process when players are sufficiently concerned with reciprocity the stochastically stable equilibrium in the battle of the sexes is inefficient at the same time the cooperative equilibrium in the prisoner s dilemma is never stochastically stable

the cost of growth small firms and the pricing of bank loans drawing upon data from the 2007 uk survey of sme finance the current analysis is concerned with the extent to which growth firms are discriminated on price in loan markets or more simply the extent to which growth firms pay more for credit given relatively small turndown rates historically vos et al in j bank finance 31 9 2648 2672 2007 higher credit prices may be a more substantial growth constraint than the access to finance issues that have dominated the academic literature to date to this end we observe inter alia that firms who have recorded recent high growth are more likely to pay higher interest rates for the loan they obtained moreover small sized firms who intend to grow through the introduction of new products exhibit a higher probability of paying more for credit than their peers finally acknowledging that banks are not risk funders we discuss the potential policy implications of these findings

evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining a large and growing literature on reputation in games builds on the insight that the possibility of one or more players being boundedly rational can have significant effects on equilibrium behavior this literature leaves unexplained the presence of behavioral players in the first place as well as the particular forms of irrationality assumed and the population shares of the various types in this paper we endogenize departures from rationality on the basis of an evolutionary stability criterion under the assumption that rational players incur a cost which reflects the greater sophistication of their behavior this cost may be arbitrarily small within the context of a reputational model of bargaining we show that evolutionary stability necessitates the presence of behavioral players it also places significant joint restrictions on the set of behavioral types that can coexist their respective population shares and the long run population share of rational players

a dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets in his work on signaling spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers with private information about their types choose utility maximizing signals given these prices we follow spence s suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process in a broad class of markets our model selects a separating equilibrium outcome if and only if the equilibrium outcome satisfies a version of the undefeated equilibrium concept whereas a pooling equilibrium outcome is selected if and only if the equilibrium outcome is both undefeated and satisfiesd1

stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations we analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n player games played by heterogeneous populations containing best repliers better repliers and imitators individuals select strategies by applying a

learning to like what you have explaining the endowment effect the endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it the existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments we attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect the reason is that an endowment effect improves one s bargaining position in bilateral trades we show that for a general class of evolutionary processes strictly positive endowment effects will survive in the long run

explaining the formation of international new ventures the limits of theories from international business research abstract international new ventures invs represent a growing and important type of start up an inv is defined as a business organization that from inception seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries oviatt and mcdougall 1994 their increasing prevalence and important role in international competition indicates a need for greater understanding of these new ventures oviatt and mcdougall 1994 logitech as described in a case study by alahuhta 1990 is a vivid example of an inv its founders were from two different countries and had a global vision for the company from its inception the venture which produces peripheral devices for personal computers established headquarters in both switzerland and the u s manufacturing and r d were split between the u s and switzerland and then quickly spread to taiwan and ireland the venture s first commercial contract was with a japanese company using 24 case studies of invs we found that their formation process is not explained by existing theories from the field of international business specifically neither monopolistic advantage theory product cycle theory stage theory of internationalization oligopolistic reaction theory nor internalization theory can explain the formation process of invs these theories fail because they assume that firms become international long after they have been formed and they therefore highlight large mature firms they also focus too much on the firm level and largely ignore the individual and small group level of analysis i e the entrepreneur and his or her network of business alliances we propose that an explanation for the formation process of invs must answer three questions 1 who are the founders of invs 2 why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries and 3 what form do their international business activities take who are the founders of invs we argue that founders of invs are individuals who see opportunities from establishing ventures that operate across national borders they are alert to the possibilities of combining resources from different national markets because of the competencies networks knowledge and background that they have developed from their earlier activities following the logic of the resource based view of the firm we argue that the possession of these competencies is not matched by other entrepreneurs only the entrepreneur possessing these competencies is able to combine a particular set of resources across national borders and form a given inv why do these entrepreneurs choose to compete internationally rather than just in their home countries the founders of invs recognize they must create international business competencies from the time of venture formation otherwise the venture may become path dependent on the development of domestic competencies and the entrepreneur will find it difficult to change strategic direction when international expansion eventually becomes necessary as the founder of one inv explained the advantage of starting internationally is that you establish an international spirit from the very beginning mamis 1989 38 what form do their international business activities take founders of invs prefer to use hybrid structures i e strategic alliances and networks for their international activities as a way to overcome the usual poverty of resources at the time of start up this study has important implications for the practice of management in financing decisions relating to invs venture capitalists and other venture financiers should look for entrepreneurs who have a global vision international business competence and an established international network when entrepreneurs start invs they should create hybrid structures to preserve scarce resources finally given the path dependence of competence development founders of new ventures should consider whether establishing a domestic new venture with plans to later internationalize will be as successful a strategy as establishing a new venture that is international from inception

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

rule evolution and equilibrium selection abstract this paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria two rules are investigated the myopic best response and naive imitation if agents cannot change rules equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents using the two rules when agents can only change rules through mutation the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk dominant one if agents can change rules by updating then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the risk dominant one journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d81

growing firms and the credit constraint restricted access to finance either debt or equity or both is potentially a significant constraint on the growth of small businesses financing problems arise primarily as a consequence of information asymmetries the adverse effects of these may in part be counteracted by the use of collateral as a signalling and bonding mechanism and or by the development of a good working relationship between lender and borrower if the form of information asymmetry differs for growth firms or if the effects of information asymmetries are less easily ameliorated then growing firms may be more adversely affected by credit constraints if growth is contingent upon access to credit then the generalised implications for the economy may be significant and detrimental using evidence from a survery of over 6 000 firms conducted in 1992 this paper addresses the extent to which growth firms are adversely affected by a credit constraint the results suggest that the credit constraint for growing firms per se is no greater but growth firms may still experience a credit constraint as a consequence of their relative youth however there is evidence to suggest that firms expecting to grow in the future do perceive a rather tighter credit constraint but this may be partly or wholly offset by a generally better relationship with their bank

creative tension the significance of ben oviatt s and patricia mcdougall s article toward a theory of international new ventures the article by oviatt and mcdougall threw the spotlight on international entrepreneurs on international new ventures and on their importance in the globalising world economy recognising the rich theoretical implications of this phenomenon they mounted a challenge to received internationalisation process theories and established a new and exciting research theme that of international entrepreneurship this article reviews the impact of their contribution and discusses new research themes raised by their challenge to the process theories of internationalisation

the influence of the management team s international experience on the internationalization behaviors of smes why are some small and medium sized enterprises smes more successful in selling outside their domestic markets than are other smes in the same industry although the traditional explanation is that firms can gain valuable knowledge and resources as they become older and larger small and young firms are not necessarily disadvantaged if they develop other mechanisms to acquire the requisite knowledge and resources we examine the role of the management team s international experience as such a mechanism for the internationalization of canadian software product firms we show that internationally experienced management teams have a greater propensity to develop foreign strategic partners and to delay less in obtaining foreign sales after start up and that these behaviors are associated with a higher degree of internationalization

a theory of discouraged borrowers this paper examines the implications for the sme financing market of application costs that vary between firms and of imperfect screening of applicants by banks under these conditions discouraged borrowers can exist these are good borrowers who do not apply for a bank loan because they feel they will be rejected the paper shows that under a range of assumptions the scale of discouragement in an economy depends upon the screening error of the banks the scale of application costs and the extent to which the bank interest rate differs from that charged by the moneylender discouragement is shown to be at a maximum where there is some but not perfect information

small and medium size enterprises access to finance as a growth constraint abstract this paper presents recent research on access to finance by small and medium size enterprises smes smes form a large part of private sector in many developed and developing countries while cross country research sheds doubt on a causal link between smes and economic development there is substantial evidence that small firms face larger growth constraints and have less access to formal sources of external finance potentially explaining the lack of smes contribution to growth financial and institutional development helps alleviate smes growth constraints and increase their access to external finance and thus levels the playing field between firms of different sizes specific financing tools such as leasing and factoring can be useful in facilitating greater access to finance even in the absence of well developed institutions as can systems of credit information sharing and a more competitive banking structure

recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games abstract an evolutionary style model of recontracting is given which guarantees convergence to core allocations of an underlying cooperative game unlike its predecessors in the evolution learning literature this is achieved without assumptions of convexity of the characteristic function or a reliance on random errors the stochastic stability properties of the model are then examined and it is shown that stochastically stable states solve a simple and intuitive minimization problem which reduces to maximizing a rawlsian swf for a common class of utility functions in contrast to previous analyses the stochastically stable state is unique for a broad class of utility functions