selecting suitable compensation plans of executive stock options theoretical and empirical works have emphasized that executive stock option plans play an important role in compensation management and corporate governance owing to the incentives to increase firm stock price and volatility levels this study not only proposes models of executive stock options and constructs value matched financial variables for comparing the incentive effects towards these options but also develops an empirical study exploring the characteristics of executive stock options and suitable compensation management for companies this investigation examines the daily value and compares incentive effects of six kinds of executive stock options with the empirical data of tsmc the world s largest dedicated semiconductor foundry which is listed on the tse and nyse empirical results indicate that purchased options would be the best choice for companies that are unsuitable to undertake risky investments while the relative indexed options are appropriate for bear markets and good for companies

ironing out the kinks in executive compensation linking incentive pay to average stock prices abstract traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation applying a principal agent analysis we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices among other benefits averaging reduces volatility by about 42 making the incentive pay more attractive to risk averse executives holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price more importantly the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant s risk incentives after adjusting for option cost finally averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options

effects of wildlife resources on community welfare in southern africa abstract this paper demonstrates the importance of wildlife in the portfolio of environmental income in the livelihoods of poor rural communities living adjacent to a national park the results show that wealthier households use more wildlife resources in total than do relatively poor households however poorer households derive greater proportional benefit than wealthier households from the use of wildlife resources excluding wildlife understates the relative contribution of environmental resources while at the same time overstating the relative contribution of farm and wage income wildlife income alone accounts for about a 5 5 reduction in the proportion of people living below the poverty line furthermore wildlife income has an equalizing effect bringing about a 5 4 reduction in measured inequality regression analysis suggests that the likelihood of belonging to a wealthier category of income increases with an increase in environmental income as expected household wealth significantly and positively affects environmental income generated by households this seems to suggest that wildlife based land reform also needs to empower poor households in the area of capital accumulation while imposing restraints on the use of capital investments by well off households to harvest wildlife

links between the local trade in natural products livelihoods and poverty alleviation in a semi arid region of south africa can the local commercialization of natural products contribute to reduced poverty and vulnerability commentary on this issue is mixed with some observers being quite optimistic while others hold a counterview this paper explores the poverty alleviation potential of four products traded in bushbuckridge south africa traditional brooms reed mats woodcraft and marula beer while key in enhancing the livelihood security of the poorest households these products were unlikely to provide a route out of poverty for most although there were exceptions incomes often surpassed local wage rates and some producers obtained returns equivalent to the minimum wage non financial benefits such as the opportunity to work from home were highly rated and the trade was found to represent a range of livelihood strategies both within and across products

managerial incentives risk aversion and debt we investigate the risk choices of risk averse ceos following recent theoretical work we expect ceo risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability we find that the ceos of these firms reduce firm risk even in the presence of strong risk taking incentives our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of ceo wealth to stock price changes firm risk determinants the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on ceo incentives unobserved firm and market effects and debt governance the impact of ceo risk aversion is economically significant

the loss averse newsvendor model with backordering abstract in this paper we study the optimal order quantity in the loss averse newsvendor model with backordering we first obtain the optimal order quantity to maximize the expected utility to hedge against the risk arising from the uncertainty of market demand we introduce the conditional value at risk cvar measure and derive the optimal order quantity to maximize the cvar objective about utility it is found that the optimal order quantity with the cvar objective is decreasing in the confidence level and thus is smaller than the optimal order quantity to maximize the expected utility it is proved that under the optimal order quantity with the cvar objective the loss averse newsvendor s expected utility is decreasing in the confidence level it further confirms that high risk implies high return and low risk comes with low return

the other side of the trade off the impact of risk on executive compensation the principal agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance yet the exiting empirical evidence supporting it is quite wea

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

does stock return predictability affect eso fair value abstract executive stock options esos are modified american options that cannot be valued using standard methods with a few exceptions the literature has discussed the eso fair value by assuming unpredictable stock returns which are not supported by the available empirical evidence in this paper we obtain the fair value of american esos when stock returns are predictable and specifically driven by the trending ornstein uhlenbeck process of lo and wang 1995 we solve the executive s portfolio allocation problem for a simple buy and hold strategy when his wealth can be distributed between a risk free asset and a market portfolio this problem is jointly solved with the executive s optimal exercise policy we find that executives tend to wait longer the higher the predictability independently of the composition of executive s asset menu we have also analyzed the implications under the fas123r proposals for the eso fair value and found that even for low autocorrelations there is a meaningful mispricing when unpredictable returns are erroneously assumed

optimal exercise prices for executive stock options although exercise prices for executive stock options can be set either below or above the grant date market price in practice virtually all options are granted at the money we offer an economic rationale for this apparent puzzle by showing that pay to performance incentives for risk averse undiversified executives are typically maximized by setting exercise prices at or near the grant date market price we provide an operationally useful alternative to black scholes 1973 for the purpose of both valuing executive stock options and measuring the incentives created by options our framework has implications not only for exercise price policies but also for indexed options option repricings exchanges of cash for stock based compensation and the design of bonus plans

pricing executive stock options under employment shocks abstract we obtain explicit expressions for the subjective objective and market value of perpetual executive stock options esos under exogenous employment shocks driven by an independent poisson process previously we obtain the executive s optimal exercise policy from the subjective valuation that is necessary for the objective one or fair value the perpetual eso is compared with the true finite maturity eso finding that the approximation is reasonably good to illustrate the usefulness of the objective valuation for accounting purposes we analyze the statistical distribution of the fair value when there is uncertainty about the employment shock intensity finally the role of esos in the design of executives incentives is also discussed

household wealth status and natural resource use in the kat river valley south africa abstract much work has demonstrated the significant role and value of non timber forest products ntfps in the livelihoods of rural people in southern africa and elsewhere the findings provide a mean or composite picture averaged across the sample households within each community yet within any given community there is significant socio economic differentiation it is important to acknowledge such differentiation when considering policy and management interventions to support rural livelihoods and promote sustainable resource use this paper reports on a study in south africa the objective of which was to explore wealth related differences and similarities in the use and value of ntfps data on ntfp consumption purchase and sale were collected from households in three rural villages households were divided into three wealth classes and patterns of ntfps use between the classes examined there was no difference in the proportions of households in each wealth class using ntfps nor the total number of ntfps used per household yet there was some supporting evidence that poorer households derive greater benefits from ntfps than do wealthy or intermediate households one clear difference was that with increasing wealth households purchased significantly more ntfps and a greater proportion of wealthy households did so conversely a greater proportion of poor households were involved in the sale of one or more ntfps and they sold a greater number per household compared to wealthy and intermediate households detailed examination of use and value of four ntfps fuelwood wild fruits edible herbs and grass hand brushes revealed that in all instances the poorest households used more of the resource per capita than the other wealth classes this was not the case for comparisons based on the total household as the unit of analysis gross annual direct use value did not differ between the wealth classes for any of the four ntfps examined at the household level but on a per capita basis a significantly higher gross annual direct use value was evident within poorer households for fuelwood and edible herbs the significance of these differences is discussed

american garch employee stock option valuation abstract we implement a flexible simulation based approach for the fair value of employee stock option eso that accounts for the vesting period departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise we introduce garch effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case we also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several eso characteristics we compare this valuation with fas 123 method revealing a fas overvaluation finally we value a real eso plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated eso prices

private information in executive stock option trades evidence of insider trading in the uk uk executives stock option exercises and associated sell decisions are motivated by private inside information executives use their inside information to lock in short term gains and to sell stock acquired prior to negative abnormal stock returns this informed trading is robust to the alternative factors that might motivate the exercise of executive stock options including option moneyness and value of exercise we suggest that the disparity in informed trading between us and uk executives option trades is related to important differences in the proportion of executive remuneration linked to options the regulation of options and the taxation of option gains

wealth differentiation in household use and trade in non timber forest products in south africa findings from southern africa and internationally indicate the local use and trade of ntfps to be significant however most present a composite picture failing to account for intra community socio economic differences these differences may have implications for policy and practice related to poverty alleviation and sustainable use this paper reports on a study in south africa which explored the relationship between household wealth and the use procurement and sale of ntfps in two villages there was no influence of wealth on the proportion of households using or purchasing most of the ntfps or the number used however wealthier households bought significantly more resources per household and poor households at one village sold significantly more these results are discussed within the context of local conditions and poverty alleviation debates

aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives we consider the problem of providing incentives over time for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion the optimal compensation scheme is found to be a linear function of a vector of n accounts which count the number of times that each of the n kinds of observable events occurs the number n is independent of the number of time periods so the accounts may entail substantial aggregation in a continuous time version of the problem the agent controls the drift rate of a vector of accounts that is subject to frequent small random fluctuations the solution is as if the problem were the static one in which the agent controls only the mean of a multivariate normal distribution and the principal is constrained to use a linear compensation rule if the principal can observe only coarser linear aggregates such as revenues costs or profits the optimal compensation scheme is then a linear function of those aggregates the combination of exponential utility normal distributions and linear compensation schemes makes computations and comparative statics easy to do as we illustrate we interpret our linearity results as deriving in part from the richness of the agent s strategy space which makes it possible for the agent to undermine and exploit complicated nonlinear functions of the accounting aggregates

too much of a good incentive the case of executive stock options abstract using a utility maximization framework i show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does not exceed a certain fraction of total wealth beyond this critical level granting more options actually reduces incentive effects and becomes counterproductive in addition stock options also create incentive to reduce increase idiosyncratic systematic risk these incentive effects are sensitive to the choice of exercise price

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite this paper solves the dynamic investment problem of a risk averse manager compensated with a call option on the assets he controls under the manager s optimal policy the option ends up either deep in or deep out of the money as the asset value goes to zero volatility goes to infinity however the option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking sometimes the manager s optimal volatility is less with the option than it would be if he were trading his own account furthermore giving the manager more options causes him to reduce volatility managers with convex compensation schemes play an important role in financial markets this paper solves for the optimal dynamic investment policy for a risk averse manager paid with a call option on the assets he controls the paper focuses on how the option compensation impacts the manager s appetite for risk when he cannot hedge the option position on one hand the convexity of the option makes the manager shun payoffs that are likely to be near the money under the optimal policy the manager either significantly outperforms his benchmark or else incurs severe losses furthermore in examples of optimal trading strategies asset volatility goes to infinity as asset value goes to zero yet option compensation does not strictly lead to greater risk seeking as asset value grows large or if the evaluation date is far away the manager moderates asset risk for example if the manager has constant relative risk aversion crra asset volatility converges to the merton constant as asset value goes to infinity in some situations the manager actually chooses a lower asset volatility than he would if he were investing on his own because the leverage inherent in his option magnifies his exposure to the asset volatility in addition with all constant or decreasing absolute risk averse utility functions from the hyperbolic absolute risk averse hara class giving the manager more options causes him to reduce asset volatility in the crra case for example the manager targets a fixed volatility for his personal