targeting target shareholders we integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers investors have dispersed valuations holding shares in firms they value more highly and a successful offer must win approval from the median target shareholder we derive the consequences for an acquiring firm s takeover offer its size and cash equity structure and implications for takeover premia firm returns share price dynamics the probability that a takeover succeeds and shareholder welfare we characterize when the acquirer prefers cash offers and when equity offers are best our model collectively reconciles various empirical regularities that have proven elusive to explain in one unified framework and we derive new testable predictions this paper was accepted by neng wang finance

speculative investor behavior and learning as traders learn about the true distribution of some asset s dividends a speculative premium occurs as each trader anticipates the possibility of reselling the asset to another trader before complete learning has occurred small differences in prior beliefs lead to large speculative premiums during the learning process this phenomenon helps explain a paradox concerning the pricing of initial public offerings the result casts light on the significance of the common prior assumption in economic models

credit supply and the housing boom an increase in credit supply driven by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market is the key force behind four empirical features of the housing boom before the great recession the unpreced

employer stock and 401 k plans the sharp decline in the stock prices of several firms at which employees held a large fraction of their 401 k plan assets in company stock including enron global crossing lucent and polaroid has sparked a public policy debate about investment options in 401 k plans at many large firms particularly those with retirement saving plans that combine elements of an employee stock ownership plan esop with a traditional 401 k a substantial fraction of defined contribution retirement plan assets are held in company stock such undiversified holdings are a source of concern because they raise the volatility of the retirement wealth for employees and expose some workers to the prospect of very small retirement values holding an undiversified position in employer stock may be particularly costly because of the potential correlation between company stock returns and the value of the worker s human capital which may depend on the company s prospects this paper reviews the extent of undiversified company stock investments in 401 k plans evaluates the cost of such investments from an employee s perspective and discusses a range of policy actions that could address the excessive concentration of retirement plan assets

securitized markets international capital flows and global welfare we study the effect of collateralized lending and securitization on the global supply of securitized assets welfare and international net and gross capital flows in a two country general equilibrium model with idiosyncratic investment risk the financial sectors in the two countries home and foreign differ by the collateral requirement for investment loans with home requiring lower margins in autarky home endogenously supplies more assets and enables more risk sharing upon financial integration capital flows from foreign to home leading to lower interest rates and an increase in the global supply of assets foreign enjoys substantial welfare gains through better risk sharing and portfolio reallocation while the welfare experience for home is ambiguous gross capital flows arise when agents face aggregate shocks to the expected payoff to investment projects but can collapse when shocks concern the variance of returns

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

spatial equilibrium with entry this paper examines spatial equilibrium in political competition when established parties choose their platforms competitively while rationally anticipating entry of a vote maximizing third party the resulting equilibrium is substantially different from the hotelling median equilibrium established parties are spatially separated and third parties will generally lose the election this provides one theoretical explanation for the stability of two party systems namely that non cooperative behavior between established parties can effectively prevent third parties from winning

ex ante and ex post welfare optimality under uncertainty it is widely believed by economic theorists that if there were no transactions costs and if all information about the economy were perfectly shared by all then arrow debreu contingent commodity markets should bring about an ideal allocation the basis for this belief seems clear we have the two efficiency theorems of welfare economics which assure us that in the absence of external effects any competitive allocation is pareto efficient and that any pareto efficient allocation is competitive provided that appropriate lump sum transfers are made of course there are some reservations that need to be made local satiation and non convexities are well known to cause problems but these are not the problems i wish to discuss here to return to the usual argument the next step involves noticing how with contingent commodity markets the efficiency theorems of welfare economics carry over to an economy with uncertainty as explained for instance in chapter 7 of debreu s theorpj of value the fundamental value judgment that gives these efficiency theorems their normative interest is what may be called consumer sovereignty it is an assumption that the social welfare ordering should respect the preferences that govern consumers market behaviour it is a serious value judgment more serious than most economists have been prepared to concede but its seriousness increases when there is uncertainty we know full well that individuals misperceive the probabilities of certain events assuming that they even perceive any probabilities at all see for example kahneman and tversky 1979 nor are we always willing to accept as appropriate the attitudes to risk of individuals who seem either extremely reckless or extremely cautious societies are often willing to make some gestures towards property owners who have not insured themselves adequately against damage from fire flood or tempest and not just because of imperfect insurance markets or even misperceptions of probabilities in addition the inequalities of income that arise when some individuals take more risks than others are not necessarily seen to be desirable particularly if an individual has undertaken a useful but risky activity and has a very low income as a result of failure such gestures are examples of contingent lump sum transfers it seems clear that if such transfers occur to a sufficient extent they could supplant completely the securities markets which are usually sufficient to bring about pareto efficiency they may even be able to go further and correct the imperfections of an arrow debreu market allocation when individuals do misperceive probabilities or else have wrong attitudes to risk this is the main question i wish to consider here the idea that consumer sovereignty should not always extend to economies with uncertainty is not new it can be found in work by diamond 1967 dr6ze

a theory of disclosure in speculative markets this paper presents a theory of disclosure in a market where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and face short sale constraints assets trade above fundamentals reflecting the value of the option to sell to more optimistic investors in the future the initial seller has an incentive to commit to an imprecise disclosure policy despite the negative effect this has on the fundamental value of the asset in order to increase the potential for disagreement and hence the magnitude of the speculative premium i show that there is a strategic complementarity between sellers in their disclosure decisions this explains why financial misreporting and episodes of speculation occur together in waves and demonstrates that the endogenous choice of imprecise disclosure amplifies the extent to which assets are overpriced this paper was accepted by amit seru finance

effects of financial innovations on market volatility when beliefs are heterogeneous abstract consider a model with two logarithmic utility maximizer agents that observe aggregate consumption but disagree about its expected rate of change markets are incomplete we first show that volatility of the interest rate in an economy with additional information is higher in a complete markets economy with no additional information there are two differences in volatility with the previous the first one due to the increase in volatility of the wealth share of the individuals is always positive the second difference is the change in covariance between the components of the interest rate volatility and can be positive or negative

bubbles crashes and endogenous expectations in experimental spot asset markets1 spot asset trading is studied in an environment in which all investors receive the same dividend from a known probability distribution at the end of each of t 15 or 30 trading periods fourteen of twenty two experiments exhibit price bubbles followed by crashes relative to intrinsic dividend value when traders are experienced this reduces but does not eliminate the probability of a bubble the regression of changes in mean price on lagged excess bids number of bids minus the number of offers in the previous period p pt a f b 1 o l supports the hypothesis that a e d the one period expected value of the dividend and that f 0 where excess bids is a surrogate measure of excess demand arising from homegrown capital gains losses expectations thus when bt 1 o goes to zero we have convergence to rational expectations in the sense of fama 1970 that arbitrage becomes unprofitable the observed bubble phenomenon can also be interpreted as a form of temporary myopia tirole 1982 from which agents learn that capital gains expectations are only temporarily sustainable ultimately inducing common expectations or priors tirole 1982 four of twenty six experiments all using experienced subjects yield outcomes that appear to the chart s eye to converge early to rational expectations although even in these cases we get 0 and small price fluctuations of a few cents that invite scalping

expressive voting and electoral equilibrium there are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition the mainstream instrumental account that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes essentially analogous to a market choice and the expressive account that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options rather like cheering at a football match this paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account we also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics

belief disagreements and collateral constraints belief disagreements have been suggested as a major contributing factor to the recent subprime mortgage crisis this paper theoretically evaluates this hypothesis i assume that optimists have limited wealth and take on leverage so as to take positions in line with their beliefs to have a significant effect on asset prices they need to borrow from traders with pessimistic beliefs using loans collateralized by the asset itself since pessimists do not value the collateral as much as optimists do they are reluctant to lend which provides an endogenous constraint on optimists ability to borrow and to influence asset prices i demonstrate that the tightness of this constraint depends on the nature of belief disagreements optimism concerning the probability of downside states has no or little effect on asset prices because these types of optimism are disciplined by this constraint instead optimism concerning the relative probability of upside states could have significant effects on asset prices this asymmetric disciplining effect is robust to allowing for short selling because pessimists that borrow the asset face a similar endogenous constraint these results emphasize that what investors disagree about matters for asset prices to a greater extent than the level of disagreements when richer contracts are available relatively complex contracts that resemble some of the recent financial innovations in the mortgage market endogenously emerge to facilitate betting

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

extrapolation and bubbles abstract we present an extrapolative model of bubbles in the model many investors form their demand for a risky asset by weighing two signals an average of the asset s past price changes and the asset s degree of overvaluation and waver over time in the relative weight they put on them the model predicts that good news about fundamentals can trigger large price bubbles that bubbles will be accompanied by high trading volume and that volume increases with past asset returns we present empirical evidence that bears on some of the model s distinctive predictions

leverage cycles and the anxious economy ing opportunities for emerging economies their access to international markets has turned out to be very volatile with frequent periods of market closures even worse as we will show emerging economies with sound fundamentals are the ones that issue less debt during these closures the goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed light on the problems of emerging assets like emerging markets that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public their marginal buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the whole economy who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets we will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses

a welfare criterion for models with distorted beliefs this paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct our criterion asserts an allocation to be belief neutral ine cient if it is ine cient under any convex combination of agents beliefs while this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations it can identify negative sum speculation in a broad range of prominent models with distorted beliefs

optimal security design how should new securities be designed traditional theories have little to say on this the literature on capital structure and general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets take the securities firms issue as exogenous this paper explicitly incorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities and develops a model where the instruments that are traded are chosen optimally and the economy s market structure is endogenous among other things it is shown that the firm s income stream should be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocated to the security held by the group that values them most this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

neglected risks financial innovation and financial fragility abstract we present a standard model of financial innovation in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek but modify two assumptions first investors and possibly intermediaries neglect certain unlikely risks second investors demand securities with safe cash flows financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks because the risks are neglected security issuance is excessive as investors eventually recognize these risks they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile even without leverage precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive

a dynamic duverger s law electoral systems promote strategic voting and affect party systems duverger les partis politiques 1951 proposed that plurality rule leads to bi partyism and proportional representation leads to multi partyism we show that in a dynamic setting these static effects also lead to a higher option value for existing minor parties under plurality rule so their incentive to exit the party system is mitigated by their future benefits from continued participation the predictions of our model are consistent with multiple cross sectional predictions on the comparative number of parties under plurality rule and proportional representation in particular there could be more parties under plurality rule than under proportional representation at any point in time however our model makes a unique time series prediction the number of parties under plurality rule should be less variable than under proportional representation we provide extensive empirical evidence in support of these results

arrested development theory and evidence of supply side speculation in the housing market this paper incorporates speculation into the standard supply and demand framework used to analyze housing booms and busts speculation reverses the common intuition that elastic housing supply attenuates housing booms housing market frictions make land a more attractive speculative investment than housing as a result undeveloped land both facilitates construction and intensies

credibility and policy convergence in a two party system with rational voters the traditional approach to modeling political parties behavior based upon the contribution of anthony downs 1957 assumes that the parties unique objective is to win elections thus they maximize their popularity the crucial implication of this assumption for a two party system is that if the two parties have the same information about voters preferences full convergence of policies results from electoral competition this is the crucial implication of the median voter theorem more generally it may be argued that different parties are motivated differently because they represent different constituencies parties may not care only about winning elections per se but also about the quality of the policies resulting from an election in this case the candidates of the two parties view winning an election not only as a goal per se but also as a means of implementing a better policy for their respective constituencies this paper shows that electoral competitions imply dynamic inconsistency if the voters are modeled as rational and forwardlooking agents and parties do not care exclusively about being elected but also about which policy to implement once elected the dynamic inconsistency arises as follows the parties have an incentive to announce convergent platforms to increase their chances of election however if the elected party is not committed to its electoral platform it has an incentive to follow its most preferred policy rather than the policy announced in its platform if voters are rational they account for this incentive thus in general in a one shot electoral game the only timeconsistent equilibrium is one in which no convergence is possible the two parties follow their most preferred policies and the voters rationally expect this outcome full convergence of parties platforms results only as a limiting case when the parties are completely indifferent with respect to the quality of the policies resulting from the election thus these results differ from the existing literature on ideologically motivated politicians for instance donald wittman 1977 1983 randall calvert 1985 which implicitly assumes the possibility of binding commitments to electoral platforms complete or partial policy convergence can be the outcome of political competition if the interaction between the parties and the voters is modeled as an infinitely repeated game in fact if the candidates have concave objective functions the welfare maximizing policy rule implies a complete convergence of parties policies however this cooperative and agreed upon policy may or may not be sustainable as a subgame perfect equilibrium depending on parameter values in particular it depends on the discount rates of the two parties the degree of polarization of their preferences and the relative popu graduate school of industrial administration carnegie mellon university pittsburgh pa 15213 and national bureau of economic research cambridge ma 02138 this paper is based upon a chapter of my unpublished doctoral dissertation at harvard university i am greatly indebted to jeffrey sachs for directing my attention toward these issues and for many conversations i also wish to thank andrew abel dilip abreu olivier blanchard ramon caminal andrew caplin alex cukierman morris fiorina benjamin friedman herschel grossman howard rosenthal and the referees for very useful comments the responsibilitv af anv n mtnkieis af calrirp nfnlv mine the result of policy convergence in a two party system is more general than the median voter theorem for discussions of convergence results not at the median see john ledyard 1984 peter coughlin 1984 coughlin and shmuel nitzan 1981 melvin hinich 1977 for earlier work on spatial competition see richard mckelvey 1975 hinich ledyard and peter ordeshook 1972 1973 and the references quoted therein the present paper focuses on the result of convergence rather than on the median voter theorem per se

asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles abstract we develop a simple model of defaultable debt and rational bubbles in the price of an asset which can be pledged as collateral in a competitive credit pool when the asset pledgeability is low the down payment is high and bubble investment is unleveraged as in a standard rational bubble model when the pledgeability is high the down payment is low making it easier for leveraged borrowers to invest in the bubbly asset as loans are packaged together into a competitive pool the pricing of individual default risk may facilitate risk taking in equilibrium credit constrained borrowers may optimally choose a risky leveraged investment strategy borrow to invest in the bubbly asset and default if the bubble bursts the model predicts joint boom bust cycles in asset prices and securitized credit

rational choice and turnout turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any democracy voting is also less well understood and explained empirically than other political acts engaged in regularly by citizens turnout however presents a special problem for rational choice theories of politics for it is taken to be the paradigmatic example of the problem of collective action in which although all may benefit from voting it is rarely in the individual s self interest to vote this paper begins by examining the problem of explaining turnout a basic form of rational choice models of turnout is developed basic in the sense that it is common to all such models this basic model is shown to be incomplete and the two most important models the calculus of voting and the minimax regret model are illustrated as alternative ways to complete this basic model along with mention of game theoretic models their strengths and weaknesses are then assessed the remainder of the paper argues that rational choice accounts of turnout are possible the first step is to argue that turnout is not an especially problematic version of the collective action problem because it is for many a low cost low expected benefit decision a strategic politicians account of turnout and campaigns is examined next a reinterpretation of the intrinsic benefits of voting is then considered and is used to examine the most important substantive problem in the turnout literature its decline these steps i argue make theories of ordinary political decisions at once both more political and more integrated into the politics of the larger system

campaign spending limits and political advertising traditionally research on political campaigns has focused on the positioning of parties and not on how parties communicate with the electorate we construct a model where two parties fund both the creative and media elements of political advertising and examine how campaign budgets affect advertising strategies in the context of a political campaign our key finding is that tight campaign limits stimulate aggressive advertising on the part of competing parties while generous budgets often lead to parties acting defensively the analysis also provides an explanation for the increasingly partisan campaigns that the republicans and democrats have taken in recent elections when there is significant polarization amongst noncommitted voters and campaign spending limits are higher we find that parties retrench toward traditional constituencies

a risk centric model of demand recessions and speculation we provide a continuous time risk centric representation of the new keynesian model which we use to analyze the interactions between asset prices financial speculation and macro economic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand in principle interest rate policy is highly effective in dealing with shocks to asset valuations however in practice monetary policy faces a wide range of constraints if these constraints are severe a decline in risky asset valuations generates a demand recession this reduces earnings and generates a negative feedback loop between asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession phase average beliefs matter not only because they affect asset valuations but also because they determine the strength of the amplification mechanism in the ex ante boom phase belief disagreements or heterogeneous asset valuations matter because they induce investors to speculate this speculation exacerbates the crash by reducing high valuation investors wealth when the economy transitions to recession which depresses wealth weighted average beliefs macroprudential policy that restricts speculation in the boom can pareto improve welfare by increasing asset prices and aggregate demand in the recession

trade with heterogeneous prior beliefs and asymmetric information no trade theorems have shown that new information will not lead to trade when agents share the same prior beliefs this paper explores the structure of no trade theorems with heterogeneous prior beliefs it is shown how different notions of efficiency under asymmetric information ex ante interim ex post are related to agents prior beliefs as well as incentive compatible and public versions of those efficiency concepts these efficiency results are used to characterize necessary and sufficient conditions on agents beliefs for no trade theorems in different trading environments

animal spirits heterogeneous expectations and the amplification and duration of crises we introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans households lend to firms and form expectations about their loan default probability under heterogeneous expectations with switching between forecasting strategies driven by reinforcement learning even a small fraction of pessimistic traders has a large aggregate effect causing a heterogeneous expectations risk premium i e significantly higher contract rates for loans and significantly lower output our stylized model illustrates how animal spirits and heterogeneous expectations may lead to aconfidence loss and to financial instability amplifying the magnitude of economic crises and slowing down recovery

collateral requirements and asset prices many assets derive their value not only from future cash flows but also from their ability to serve as collateral in this article we investigate this collateral premium and its impact on asset returns in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents we document that borrowing against collateral substantially increases the return volatility of long lived assets moreover otherwise identical assets with different degrees of collateralizability exhibit substantially different return dynamics because their prices contain a sizable collateral premium that varies over time this premium can be positive even for assets that never pay dividends

synthetic or real the equilibrium effects of credit default swaps on bond markets we provide a model of nonredundant credit default swaps cdss building on the observation that cdss have lower trading costs than bonds cds introduction involves a trade off it crowds out existing demand for the bond but improves the bond allocation by allowing long term investors to become levered basis traders and absorb more of the bond supply we characterize conditions under which cds introduction raises bond prices the model predicts a negative cds bond basis as well as turnover and price impact patterns that are consistent with empirical evidence we also show that a ban on naked cdss can raise borrowing costs

proportional representation with citizen candidates we construct a simple model incorporating bothcitizen candidates and proportional representation andinvestigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and purepolicy motivations and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences the idea of citizen candidates developedby osborne and slivinski 1996 besley and coate 1997 endogenises the decision to stand as acandidate and allows explicit study of the number andtype of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon theidea of proportional representation allows a moreflexible relationship between the pattern of votescast and the final policy outcome and also providesa richer model of political representation ourdiscussion points to the widespread possibility ofequilibria involving non median policy outcomes provides insights into the relationship betweenproportional representation and the equilibrium numberof candidates and also provides an explicit accountof the trade off between candidate benefitsdistributed on a winner take all basis and those thatare mediated through proportional representation

adverse effects of leverage and short selling constraints in a financial market model with heterogeneous agents this paper investigates the impact of leverage and short selling constraints on financial market stability investors demand is modelled in a well known asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs in particular i generalise the heterogeneous agents model of brock and hommes 1998 and anufriev and tuinstra 2013 to allow for leverage constraints as well as a short selling tax i consider two examples of adaptive belief systems describing the coevolution of prices and investors beliefs first if the market is inhabited by fundamentalist and chartist traders demand constraints have potential adverse effects and may restrict the stabilising fundamentalist strategy such that mispricing and price volatility increase second if the market is inhabited by fundamentalists optimists and pessimists with fixed beliefs demand constraints drive down price volatility but mispricing remains the results suggest the stabilising effects of demand constraints in financial markets are limited only if asset prices are too high compared to fundamentals policy makers should consider constraining leverage ratios in order to deflate financial bubbles

a macroeconomic model with a financial sector this paper studies a macroeconomic model in which financial experts borrow from less productive agents we pursue four sets of results i the economy is prone to instability and occasionally enters volatile episodes as volatility spikes agents precautionary motive increases depressing prices even further log linear approximations fail to capture these non linear effects that can cause economies to be significantly depressed for long periods of time ii endogenous risk during volatile episodes increases asset price correlations iii financial experts impose a negative externality on each other and on the labor sector by not maintaining adequate capital cushion and funding structure iv while risk sharing within the financial sector through securitization and derivatives contracts reduces many inefficiencies it can also amlify systemic risks

securitization bubbles structured finance with disagreement about default risk abstract an additional reason for the structured finance boom of the 2000s may have been disagreement about default risk of collateral assets when risk neutral investors disagree about average default probabilities structuring collateral cash flow raises prices by concentrating optimists demand on risky tranches with disagreement about default correlation low correlation investors believe in diversification and pay high prices for senior tranches they deem riskless high correlation investors value junior tranches they expect to pay whenever aggregate conditions are good risk aversion and short selling through credit default swaps reduce the prices of both pass through and structured securitizations but may increase the return to tranching

a theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of porto alegre participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation the aim of this paper is to understand how participatory democracy operates and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes to this end we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of participatory budgeting implemented in the brazilian city of porto alegre that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by osborne et al 2000 meetings with costly participation american economic review 90 927 943

trading in derivatives when the underlying is scarce abstract regulatory restrictions and market frictions can constrain the aggregate quantity of long and short positions in a security when these constraints bind we refer to the security as scarce and its price becomes distorted relative to its value in a frictionless market we show that an otherwise redundant derivative can reduce the price distortion of the underlying security by relaxing its scarcity we also show that it is especially important to analyze the underlying and derivative markets jointly when evaluating the impact of regulation such as short sales bans and position limits in derivatives that restricts trade

did credit rating agencies make unbiased assumptions on cdos article appears in papers and proceedings of the 123rd annual meeting of the amerian economic association denver co usa 6 9 january 2011

cdos and the financial crisis credit ratings and fair premia abstract we study risk and return characteristics of cdos using the market standard models we find that fair spreads on cdo tranches are much higher than fair spreads on similarly rated corporate bonds our results imply that credit ratings are not sufficient for pricing which is surprising given their central role in structured finance markets this illustrates limitations of the rating methodologies that are solely based on real world default probabilities or expected losses and do not capture risk premia we also demonstrate that cdo tranches have large exposure to systematic risk and thus their ratings and prices are likely to decline substantially when credit conditions deteriorate

referendum design quorum rules and turnout in this article we focus on the consequences of quorum requirements for turnout in referendums we use a rational choice decision theoretic voting model to demonstrate that participation quorums change the incentives some electors face inducing those who oppose changes in the status quo and expect to be in the minority to abstain as a result paradoxically participation quorums decrease electoral participation we test our model s predictions using data for all referendums held in current european union countries from 1970 until 2007 and show that the existence of a participation quorums increases abstention by more than ten percentage points

would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation abstract we investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation we do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account namely strategic voting endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates we consider two classes of voting rules one class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally weighed votes for the different candidates the other class consists of the voting rules where each voter rank orders the candidates we identify conditions under which these voting rules yield policy moderation we also show that these voting rules may yield policy extremism instead of policy moderation if one or several of the conditions is not satisfied finally we find that amongst these voting rules the extent of policy moderation is maximal under the borda count if we consider only equilibria where all candidates are serious contenders however this result does not carry over to spoiler equilibria where approval voting can yield more moderate policy outcomes than the borda count

the dynamics of financially constrained arbitrage we develop a model of financially constrained arbitrage and use it to study the dynamics of arbitrage capital liquidity and asset prices arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assets traded in segmented markets and in doing so provide liquidity to investors a collateral constraint limits their positions as a function of capital we show that the dynamics of arbitrage activity are self correcting following a shock that depletes arbitrage capital profitability increases and this allows capital to be gradually replenished spreads increase more and recover faster for more volatile trades although arbitrageurs cut their positions in these trades the least when arbitrage capital is more mobile across markets liquidity in each market generally becomes less volatile but the reverse may hold for aggregate liquidity because of mobility induced contagion

the real effects of sustainable responsible investing abstract sustainable and responsible investing sri may have a mixed effect on firms incentives to remove negative externalities whereas sri screening incentivizes the removal of externalities sri trading can disincentivize it when traders disagree on the externality removal s cash flow effects

participation quorums in costly meetings meetings of shareholders societies and clubs often require a minimal participation quorum in the absence of a quorum no valid decisions can be made thus decisions are postponed to a later meeting this paper examines the effect of such quorum constraints on both individual behavior and collective outcomes in a model of costly meetings we show that when a binding quorum constraint delivers an immediate decision it also induces a welfare loss with respect to the outcome that prevails when no quorum applies potentially including policy distortions when the quorum requirement is high and causes the decision to be postponed the number of participants in the second meeting may decrease with respect to the zero quorum rule

collateral constraints and the law of one price an experiment we test the asset pricing implications of collateralized borrowing that is of using assets as collateral to borrow money in the laboratory to this purpose we develop a general equilibrium model with collateral constraints amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data in the laboratory assets that can be leveraged fetch higher prices than assets that cannot even though assets payoffs are identical in all states of the world collateral value therefore creates deviations from the law of one price the spread between collateralizeable and noncollateralizeable assets is significant and quantitatively close to theoretical predictions

truth telling by third party auditors and the response of polluting firms experimental evidence from india in many regulated markets private third party auditors are chosen and paid by the firms that they audit potentially creating a conflict of interest this article reports on a two year field experiment in the indian state of gujarat that sought to curb such a conflict by altering the market structure for environmental audits of industrial plants to incentivize accurate reporting there are three main results first the status quo system was largely corrupted with auditors systematically reporting plant emissions just below the standard although true emissions were typically higher second the treatment caused auditors to report more truthfully and very significantly lowered the fraction of plants that were falsely reported as compliant with pollution standards third treatment plants in turn reduced their pollution emissions the results suggest reformed incentives for third party auditors can improve their reporting and make regulation more effective jel codes q56 m42 d22 copyright 2013 oxford university press

speculation and risk sharing with new financial assets while the traditional view of nancial innovation emphasizes the risk sharing role of new nancial assets belief disagreements about these assets naturally lead to speculation which represents a powerful economic force in the opposite direction this paper investigates the eect of nancial innovation on portfolio risks in an economy when both the risk sharing and the speculation forces are present financial assets provide hedging services but they are also subject to speculation because traders do not necessarily agree about their payos i de ne the average variance of traders net worths as a measure of portfolio risks for this economy and i decompose it into two components the uninsurable variance de ned as the average variance that would obtain if there were no belief disagreements and the speculative variance de ned as the residual variance that results from speculative trades based on belief disagreements financial innovation always decreases the uninsurable variance because new assets increase the possibilities for risk sharing my main result shows that nancial innovation also always increases the speculative variance this is true even if traders completely agree about the payos of new assets the intuition behind this result is the hedge more bet more eect traders use new assets to hedge their bets on existing assets which in turn enables them to place larger bets and take on greater risks my second set of results concern endogenous nancial innovation when belief disagreements are su ciently large a pro t seeking market maker introduces assets that maximize the average variance among all possible choices completely disregarding the risk sharing motive for nancial innovation my third set of results concern a calibration of the model in the context of the gdp indexed assets proposed by athanasoulis and shiller 2001 when traders have reasonable amounts of belief disagreements these assets would have the unintended consequence of increasing their consumption risks

leadership and conflict we model the choice of leaders of groups within society where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups either peaceful compromise or costly conflict and the outcome of these interactions group members may choose leaders strategically instrumentally or they may choose leaders expressively we characterize the equilibria of the instrumental choice model and also argue that leadership elections may overemphasise the role of expressive considerations in the choice of leader and that this may result in increased conflict between groups

intertemporal asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs abstract we examine the behaviour of the interest rate asset prices and asset holdings in an economy with heterogeneous rationally updated beliefs about the expected rate of production growth the equilibrium interest rate is a weighted average of the interest rates that would prevail in economies populated by homogeneous agents with the beliefs of the respective agents in the heterogeneous model the weights are given by the fractions of total wealth held financial innovation affects the dynamics of allocations and prices but preserves the aggregate output process and the structure of equilibrium asset prices also display the wealth weighted average characterization journal of economic literature classification numbers c60 d52 d91 g12

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

electoral rules strategic entry and polarization abstract how does electoral rule disproportionality affect the structure of the party system i e the number and the policy platforms of the competing parties by studying a model where both party entry and platform choice are endogenous we are able to provide a unified theory an increasing electoral rule disproportionality exhibits a a first order negative effect on platform polarization b a second order negative effect on the number of parties as polarization decreases centrist parties are squeezed between other contenders and prefer not to enter and c an additional third order negative effect on polarization via the reduction of the number of parties we then conduct a laboratory experiment and strongly confirm the theoretical predictions of the model

voter participation and strategic uncertainty the paradox of not voting is examined in a model where voters have uncertainty about the preferences and costs of other voters in game theoretic models of voter participation under complete information equilibrium outcomes can have substantial turnout even when voting costs are relatively high in contrast when uncertainty about preferences and costs is present only voters with negligible or negative net voting costs participate when the electorate is large

quorum and turnout in referenda we analyze the effect of turnout requirements in referenda in the context of a group turnout model we show that a participation quorum requirement may reduce the turnout so severely that it generates a quorum paradox in equilibrium the expected turnout exceeds the participation quorum only if this requirement is not imposed furthermore a participation quorum does not necessarily imply a bias for the status quo we also show that in order to induce a given expected turnout and avoid the quorum paradox the quorum should be set at a level that is lower than half the target finally we argue that a super majority requirement to overturn the status quo is never equivalent to a participation quorum jel d72

collateral constraints and asset prices abstract we study the effects of collateral constraints in an economy populated by investors with nonpledgeable labor incomes and heterogeneous preferences and beliefs we show that these constraints inflate stock prices and generate spikes and crashes in price dividend ratios and volatilities clustering of volatilities and leverage cycles they also lead to substantial decreases in interest rates and increases in sharpe ratios when investors are anxious about hitting constraints due to production crises in the economy furthermore stock prices have large collateral premiums over nonpledgeable incomes we derive asset prices and stationary distributions of the investors consumption shares in closed form

leverage and beliefs personal experience and risk taking in margin lending what determines risk bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets using unique archival data on collateralized lending we show that personal experience can affect individual risk taking and aggregate leverage when an investor syndicate speculating in amsterdam in 1772 went bankrupt many lenders were exposed in the end none of them actually lost money nonetheless only those at risk of losing money changed their behavior markedly they lent with much higher haircuts the rest continued as before the differential change is remarkable since the distress was public knowledge overall leverage in the amsterdam stock market declined as a result

the valuation of complex derivatives by major investment firms empirical evidence this article examines the auction of a portfolio of collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major broker dealers and institutional investors the unique data set allows us to analyze a number of important empirical questions related to the valuation of cmos by the bidders and the elasticity of demand for the securities the results reveal that the valuations differ substantially implying a significant elasticity of demand this article is designed to shed light on two related questions first it extends the work of bagwell 1991 1992 brown and ryngaert 1990 and bradley desai and kim 1988 among others on shareholder heterogeneity and the elasticity of the demand for financial assets to date the empirical research on investor heterogeneity has focused on common stock this article supplements previous work by examining an auction of another class of securities complex collateralized mortgage obligations cmos to major securities dealers and institutional investors second it provides perspective on fixed income valuation models in the spirit of cox ingersoll and ross 1985 and black derman and toy 1990 virtually all of these models even those that specify relatively complex interest rate processes assume homogeneous beliefs this implies that within the constraints imposed by estimation error sophisticated investors should place equal values on fixed income securities bagwell observes that investors can be heterogeneous along several dimensions first heterogeneity can be induced by tax rules to the extent that different investors are taxed in different ways their demand for securities will be affected second transaction costs can cause heterogeneity by driving a wedge between buyers sellers and owners of a security third investors can differ in their assessments of the value of a security either because they possess different information or because they analyze that information in different ways fourth investors can face different nontradeable risks and thus can have different assessments of the value of a security depending on how it interacts with these risks finally it has been suggested by lee shleifer and thaler 1991 among others that investors may differ for idio

leverage and default in binomial economies a complete characterization our paper provides a complete characterization of leverage and default in binomial economies with financial assets serving as collateral our binomial no default theorem states that any equilibrium is equivalent in real allocations and prices to another equilibrium in which there is no default thus actual default is irrelevant though the potential for default drives the equilibrium and limits borrowing this result is valid with arbitrary preferences and endowments contingent or noncontingent promises many assets and consumption goods production and multiple periods we also show that only no default equilibria would be selected if there were the slightest cost of using collateral or handling default our binomial leverage theorem shows that equilibrium loan to value ltv for noncontingent debt contracts is the ratio of the worst case return of the asset to the riskless gross rate of interest in binomial economies leverage is determined by down risk and not by volatility

imperfect information transmission from banks to investors macroeconomic implications abstract our goal is to elucidate the interaction of banks screening effort and strategic information production in loan backed asset markets using a general equilibrium framework asset quality is unobserved by investors but banks may purchase error prone ratings the premium paid on highly rated assets emerges as the main determinant of banks screening effort the fact that rating strategies reflect banks private information about asset quality helps keep this premium high conventional regulatory policies interfere with this decision margin thereby reducing signaling value of high ratings and exacerbating the credit misallocation problem we propose a tax subsidy scheme that induces efficiency

can institutional investors bias real estate portfolio appraisals evidence from the market downturn this paper investigates the extent to which institutional investors may have influenced independent real estate appraisals during the financial crisis a conceptual model of the determinants of client influence on real estate appraisals is proposed it is suggested that the extent of clients ability and willingness to bias appraisal outputs is contingent upon market and regulatory environments ethical norms and legal and institutional frameworks the salience of the appraisal s to the client financial incentives for the appraiser to respond to client pressure organisational culture the level of moral reasoning of both individual clients and appraisers client knowledge and the degree of appraisal uncertainty the potential of client influence to bias ostensibly independent real estate appraisals is examined using the opportunity afforded by the market downturn commencing in 2007 in the uk during the market turbulence at the end of 2007 the motivations of different types of owners to bias appraisals diverged clearly and temporarily provided a unique opportunity to assess potential appraisal bias we use appraisal based performance data for individual real estate assets to test whether there were significant ownership effects on performance during this period the results support the hypothesis that real estate appraisals in this period reflected the differing needs of clients

candidate entry and political polarization an antimedian voter theorem we study a citizen candidate entry model with private information about ideal points we fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively extreme citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates whereas more moderate types never enter it generally leads to substantial political polarization even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates we show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office moreover when the number of citizens goes to infinity only the very most extreme citizens with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space become candidates finally our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates types that is revealed via parties

ratings shopping and asset complexity a theory of ratings inflation abstract many identify inflated credit ratings as one contributor to the recent financial market turmoil we develop an equilibrium model of the market for ratings and use it to examine possible origins of and cures for ratings inflation in the model asset issuers can shop for ratings observe multiple ratings and disclose only the most favorable before auctioning their assets when assets are simple agencies ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low when assets are sufficiently complex ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges thus an increase in the complexity of recently issued securities could create a systematic bias in disclosed ratings despite the fact that each ratings agency produces an unbiased estimate of the asset s true quality increasing competition among agencies would only worsen this problem switching to an investor initiated ratings system alleviates the bias but could collapse the market for information

how do we know that real wages are too high it is common belief that the wages that we observe are above the level that would prevail in a competitive labour market and also it is common to believe that wage moderation should be encouraged as a way to keep unemployment down this paper considers whether we can have confidence in these beliefs it presents a number of models designed to cast doubt on the conventional wisdom first we show that in an efficiency wage model in which there is involuntary unemployment a binding minimum wage may increase employment we then present a general equilibrium matching model in which there is involuntary unemployment but wages are below market clearing levels and raising wages can reduce unemployment we then consider the empirical evidence on employment and wage determination to argue that it is just as consistent with this model as with models in which wages are at or above market clearing levels

the citizen candidate model with imperfect policy control strategic delegation and polarization we present a modified citizen candidate model where the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power we show that the two candidate equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original however small the cost of candidacy the distance between the candidates policies both ideal and implemented remains strictly above a threshold moreover there may be one candidate equilibria in which the only candidate is not the one most preferred by the median voter both results point out that even with negligible cost of entry there are limits to strategic delegation

discretionary ratings and the pricing of subprime mortgage backed securities using a dataset of home equity loan securities issued up to june 2007 and rated by moody s and or sp however these alternative thresholds do not appear to play a role as relevant as that of the ig sg boundary rating bias is also found to have an asymmetric impact on spreads the relevance of actual over expected ratings is greater for tranches receiving evaluations that are higher rather than lower than expected taken together these pieces of empirical evidence point toward ratings based regulation as an important explanation for the observed mispricing of structured finance products

credit rating industry a helicopter tour of stylized facts and recent theories the recent subprime crisis and the ongoing euro zone crisis have generated an enormous interest in the credit rating industry not only among economists but also among average citizens as a consequence we have seen an explosion of the economic literature on the industry the objective of this survey is to introduce readers to the key stylized facts of the credit rating industry and to the recent theoretical economic literature on this industry

polarization and inefficient policies of the economy in this case the costs of producing a public good the parties each propose a policy an election is held and the policy of the winning party is implemented voters and parties care about the level of the public good and costs two kinds of sequential equilibria exist revealing where voters learn the true costs and the implemented policy adjusts to costs and non revealing if parties preferences are polarized only non revealing equilibria fulfill a refinement criterion like the intuitive criterion if they are alike only revealing equilibria fulfill this criterion thus less political polarization improves information revelation in electoral democracies policy motivated parties are likely to be better informed about the functioning of the economy than are voters this paper presents a model where two parties but not voters are informed about the cost of producing a public good we study whether an electoral democracy leads to efficient production of the public good given this asymmetry of information in particular under which circumstances will the implemented policy the level of the public good reflect actual costs the main result is that the policy will reflect costs if and only if at least one of the parties has preferences which are sufficiently similar to the median voter s in this sense polarization leads to inefficiency the public good can be for instance infrastructure medicare or military services both a continuum of voters and the parties have preferences over the amount of the good that is provided by the government the preferences of the two parties are situated on each side of those of the median voter the costs of providing the good are not precisely known to the voters who only know the distribution of costs and that they will pay for these costs as taxpayers on the other hand the parties know the costs

finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information abstract we present a finite period general equilibrium model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information we say that a rational expectations equilibrium exhibits a strong bubble if the price is higher than the dividend with probability one we show that necessary conditions for a strong bubble to occur are that 1 each agent must have private information in the period and state in which the bubble occurs 2 each agent must be short sale constrained at some period in the future with positive probability and 3 agents trades are not common knowledge we present examples of bubbles when the necessary conditions are satisfied journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d52 d82 d84 g12 g14

collateral motivated financial innovation collateral frictions have a profound effect on our economic landscape ranging from the design of financial securities laws and institutions to various rules and regulations we analyze a model with disagreement where securities and collateral requirements are endogenous it shows that the security that isolates the variable with disagreement is optimal in the sense that alternative securities cannot generate any trading in an economy with n states investors may introduce more than n securities and markets are still incomplete the model has several novel predictions on the behavior of basis the spread between the prices of an asset and its replicating portfolio

using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions this article studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions for risk averse borrowers who use unsecured contracts but have the possibility of defaulting in a large class of economies knowledge of four variables is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal or should be increased or decreased these variables are 1 the composition of households liabilities 2 the sensitivity of the credit supply schedule to exemption changes 3 the probability of filing for bankruptcy with non exempt assets and 4 the value given by households to a marginal dollar in different states which can be mapped to changes in households consumption i recover empirical estimates of the sufficient statistics using u s data over the period 2008 16 and find that increasing exemption levels improves overall welfare although there is substantial variation in estimated welfare gains across u s states and income quintiles

the macroeconomics of shadow banking we propose a dynamic macroeconomic model of nancial intermediation in an environment where households demand liquid assets in contrast to the literature intermediaries can issue equity without any friction in normal times intermediaries maximize liquidity creation by levering up the collateral value of their assets a process we call shadow banking a rise in uncertainty causes investors to demand liquidity in bad states intermediaries respond by simultaneously deleveraging and substituting toward safe liabilities shadow banking eectively shuts down prices fall and investment plummets the model generates amplication via endogenous collateral runs as well as ight to quality eects the model s macroeconomic eects are consistent with a slow economic recovery even when and especially when intermediary capital is high we analyze the impact of several policy interventions in the areas of unconventional monetary policy and regulatory reform

bank ratings what determines their quality this paper examines the quality of credit ratings assigned to banks by the three largest rating agencies we interpret credit ratings as relative assessments of creditworthiness and define a new ordinal metric of rating error based on banks expected default frequencies our results suggest that on average large banks receive more positive bank ratings particularly from the agency to which the bank provides substantial securitization business these competitive distortions are economically significant and contribute to perpetuate the existence of too big to fail banks we also show that overall differential risk weights recommended by the basel accords for investment grade banks bear no significant relationship to empirical default probabilities harald hau sam langfield and david marques ibanez

on hierarchical spatial competition in this paper we consider a hierarchical model of spatial electoral competition with two dominant players incumbents and one entrant the incumbents engage in a non cooperative game against each other and act as stackelberg leaders with respect to a vote maximizing entrant we prove that the equilibrium of this game called a hierarchical equilibrium exists and is unique for an arbitrary single peaked distribution of voters ideal points moreover we fully characterize the set of equilibrium strategies and show its equivalence to the set of strategies generated by a perfect foresight equilibrium most of the recently developed models of entry in oligopolistic markets and the theory of political competition deal with the case of dominant firms or parties which face a threat of potential entry these models possess a number of features on which they may be compared and contrasted the most important of these features are the ways in which the existing parties or firms compete against each other for votes or profits and types of expectations the incumbents have about the responses of potential entrants to changes in their decisions in most of the cases an electoral or oligopolistic competition is represented by some type of a non cooperative game played by parties or firms in this paper we also consider a non cooperative model of electoral race where the established parties incumbents compete against each other by offering positions ideologies to the population of voters given the profile of voters preferences over the space of ideologies or issue space each of the established parties attempts to maximize its vote share in making their choices the incumbents however anticipate that a new party an entrant will join the electoral race consistent with the other parties objectives the entrant is assumed to maximize its share of voters while taking the incumbents choices as given the resulting non cooperative game possesses therefore a structural hierarchy the established parties behave as nash players with respect to each other whereas acting as stackelberg leaders with respect to the entrant and correctly anticipating its vote maximizing response to their choices in the issue space the main purpose of this paper is to study the properties of the game we described and in particular to characterize its equilibrium which we will call hierarchical equilibrium naturally some assumptions are needed in order to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium we assume that there are two established parties the issue space i is the uni dimensional interval all voters have symmetric single peaked peaked preferences over i and the distribution of the voters ideal points is represented by a quasi concave continuous density function under these rather mild assumptions we are able to prove the existence and uniqueness of the hierarchical equilibrium and to completely

house price beliefs and mortgage leverage choice we study the relationship between homebuyers beliefs about future house price changes and their mortgage leverage choices whether more pessimistic homebuyers choose higher or lower leverage depends on their willingness and ability to reduce the size of their housing market investments when households primarily maximize the levered return of their property investments more pessimistic homebuyers reduce their leverage to purchase smaller houses on the other hand when considerations such as family size pin down the desired property size pessimistic homebuyers reduce their financial exposure to the housing market by making smaller downpayments to buy similarly sized homes to determine which scenario better describes the data we investigate the cross sectional relationship between house price beliefs and mortgage leverage choices in the u s housing market we use plausibly exogenous variation in house price beliefs to show that more pessimistic homebuyers make smaller downpayments and choose higher leverage in particular in states where default costs are relatively low as well as during periods when house prices are expected to fall on average our results highlight the important role of heterogeneous beliefs in explaining households financial decisions

meetings with costly participation we study a collective decision making process in which people interested in an issue may participate at a cost in a meeting and the resulting decision is a compromise among the participants preferences we show that the equilibrium number of participants is small and their positions are extreme and when the compromise is the median the outcome is likely to be random the model and its equilibria are consistent with evidence on the procedures and outcomes of us regulatory hearings jel d7 h0 l5

debt financing in asset markets short term debt such as overnight repurchase agreements and commercial paper was heavily used by financial institutions to fund their investment positions during the asset market boom preceding the financial crisis of 2007 2008 and later played a major role in leading to the distress of these institutions during the crisis what explains the popularity of short term debt in financing asset market investments geanakoplos 2010 presents a dynamic model of the joint equilibrium of asset markets and credit markets in which optimistic buyers of a risky asset use the asset as collateral to raise debt financing from less optimistic creditors the asset s collateral value depends on the marginal creditor s asset valuation and determines the buyers purchasing capacity to bid up the asset price geanakoplos posits that short term debt allows the asset buyers to maximize riskless leverage 1 short term debt however exposes the asset buyers to rollover risk e g acharya gale and yorulmaker 2011 and he and xiong 2012 forthcoming which is reflected in the fact that the asset buyers in geanakoplos model may not be able to obtain refinancing after a negative fundamental shock as a result they are forced to transfer their asset holdings to the