movements towards free trade and domestic market performance with imperfect competition this paper studies the response of a dominant domestic oligopoly to the reduction in the rate of a protective tariff the issue here is whether domestic market performance is improved through a movement toward free trade alone put another way is free trade always a substitute for competition policy we find that the lower tariff may lead to inferior domestic market performance the direction of the change and its magnitude are functions of the shape of the import supply function the degree of competition between oligopolists and whether or not entry is possible thus there is reason to believe that a strong competition policy may in some markets be complementary to freer trade

evaluating welfare reform in the united states this paper reviews the economic literature on welfare reform over the 1990s a brief summary of the policy changes is followed by a discussion of the methodological techniques that analyze the effects of these changes on outcomes the paper then critically reviews the econometric and experimental literature on caseload changes labor force changes poverty and income changes and family formation changes a growing body of evidence suggests that recent policy changes have influenced economic behavior and well being one particular set of new style welfare programs seems to show especially promising results with significantly increased work and earnings and reduced poverty

the pitfalls of work requirements in welfare to work policies experimental evidence on human capital accumulation in the self sufficiency project abstract this paper investigates whether policies that encourage recipients to exit welfare for full time employment influence participation in educational activity the self sufficiency project ssp was a demonstration project where long term welfare recipients randomly assigned to the treatment group were offered a generous earnings supplement if they exited welfare for full time employment we find that treatment group members were less likely to upgrade their education along all dimensions high school completion enrolling in a community college or trade school and enrolling in university thus work first policies that encourage full time employment may reduce educational activity and may have adverse consequences on the long run earnings capacity of welfare recipients we also find that there was a substantial amount of educational upgrading in this population for instance among high school dropouts at the baseline 19 completed their diploma by the end of the demonstration finally we simulate the consequences of the earnings supplement in the absence of adverse effects on educational upgrading doing so alters the interpretation of the lessons from the ssp demonstration

corporate unity in american trade policy a network analysis of corporate dyad political action this essay examines factors that produce political unity among large u s corporations advocating free trade expanding on old debates these data and analyses validate the importance of organizational and class cohesion approaches to corporate political action methodologically the political unity of pairs dyads of firms in trade policy activism is analyzed with quadratic assignment procedure regression shared membership in prominent policy networks and board interlocks positively predict corporate political unity across three areas of trade policy influence from the executive branch to the legislature non network organizational indicators also significantly predicted corporate trade policy activism the findings support business unity accounts of corporate political action and suggest that higher levels of firm embeddedness within intercorporate networks facilitate collective corporate political action

estimating the effects of a time limited earnings subsidy for welfare leavers in the self sufficiency project ssp welfare demonstration members of a randomly assigned treatment group could receive a subsidy for full time work the subsidy was available for 3 years but only to people who began working full time within 12 months of random assignment a simple optimizing model suggests that the eligibility rules created an establishment incentive to find a job and leave welfare within a year of random assignment and an entitlement incentive to choose work over welfare once eligibility was established building on this insight we develop an econometric model of welfare participation that allows us to separate the two effects and estimate the impact of the earnings subsidy on welfare entry and exit rates among those who achieved eligibility the combination of the two incentives explains the time profile of the experimental impacts which peaked 15 months after random assignment and faded relatively quickly our findings suggest that about half of the peak impact of ssp was attributable to the establishment incentive despite the extra work effort generated by ssp the program had no lasting impact on wages and little or no long run effect on welfare participation

corporate economic power and the state a longitudinal assessment of two explanations much has been written about the relationship between the economic resources of corporations and their ability to control politics in advanced capitalist democracies the resource that has received the most attention is economic concentration but there is little agreement about the precise form of concentration that matters in an attempt to find the most useful image of the state this study looks at the connection between the aggregate concentration of assets among the leading manufacturing firms as well as the rate of business investment and taxes on business time series regressions computed on u s national level data show that theories of the state that emphasize the independet activities of private investors are not supported instead the aggrgate concentration of assets as measured by the share of assets held by the leading 100 firms has a strong negative influence on effective corporate tax rates these results are consistent with the theory that heightened aggregate concentration helps corpor

education and crime over the life cycle we compare two large scale policy interventions aimed at reducing crime subsidizing high school completion and increasing the length of prison sentences to this purpose we use a life cycle model with endogenous education and crime choices we apply the model to property crime and calibrate it to u s data we find that targeting crime reductions through increases in high school graduation rates entails large efficiency and welfare gains these gains are absent if the same crime reduction is achieved by increasing the length of sentences we also find that general equilibrium effects explain roughly one half of the reduction in crime from subsidizing high school

viewpoint estimating the causal effects of policies and programs estimation inference and interpretation of the causal effects of programs and policies have all advanced dramatically over the past 25 years we highlight three particularly important intellectual trends an improved appreciation of the substantive importance of heterogeneous responses and of their methodological implications a stronger focus on internal validity brought about by the credibility revolution and the scientific value that follows from grounding estimation and interpretation in economic theory we discuss a menu of commonly employed partial equilibrium approaches to the identification of causal effects emphasizing that the researcher s central intellectual contribution always consists of making an explicit case for a specific causal interpretation given the relevant economic theory the data the institutional context and the economic question of interest we also touch on the importance of general equilibrium effects and full cost benefit analyses

employers and the welfare state the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies the authors argue that the organization of employers shapes social policy support among firms and in turn affects social policy outcomes specifically the authors argue that the centralization and cohesion of employer groups and economic cooperation across enterprises positively affects social welfare provision empirically the authors assess the impacts of business organization on social welfare effort in 15 developed democracies between the 1970s and 1990s the authors also provide analysis of the impact of employer organization on active labor market policy the authors find that the organization of employers is one of the most important determinants of overall social welfare effort the authors also find that employer organization affects the development of active labor market policies and it influences the degree to which social democratic parties pursue active labor market programs the authors conclude with a discussion of the findings implications for theories of social corporatism and the w

trade and trade policy with imperfect competition the case of identical products and free entry abstract this paper analyses intra industry trade between economies containing an imperfectly competitive industry in which firms produce a homogeneous output production is subject to increasing returns to scale and there is free entry and exit of firms trade is shown to unambiguously increase welfare by reducing the degree of monopoly in each market and increasing firm size the effects of differences in technology and endowments on the pattern of trade and welfare are examined import tariffs are shown to raise welfare in the country employing the tariff and the welfare implications of various types of industry subsidy are examined

trade liberalisation in developing economies modest benefits but problems with productivity growth macro prices and income distribution microeconomically the case for liberalisation is dubious under increasing returns to scale and when firms can invest directly in productivity enhancement distributional effects of commercial policy changes can be regressive and large but the rents they generate can serve as a basis for effective policy intervention contingent on firms performance macroeconomically the case of liberalisation rests on say s law which is not always enforced recent combined current and capital market liberalisations have been associated with strong exchange rates and high interest rates and output and productivity growth have positive mutual feedbacks which liberalisation may well suppress

price discrimination by u s and german exporters the insensitivity of the u s trade balance to the sharp depreciation of the dollar in the past three years has revived interest in the relationship between exchange rates and the trade balance a central issue in most analyses of the relation between the current account and the exchange rate concerns the price adjustment process the simple integrated competitive market model predicts that local currency prices should change in proportion to the nominal exchange rate for a country too small to influence world prices the relationship between local currency import prices and exchange rates has been referred to as the pass through relationship in the empirical literature in international economics if the proportional relationship between import prices and exchange rates holds pass through is said to be complete accounts of recent u s experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in proportion to exchange rates i e incomplete pass through as an important factor in explaining the persistence of the trade deficit unfortunately observations on pass through alone provide limited insight into the behavior of markets since incomplete pass through is consistent with at least two fundamentally different paradigms one is the standard competitive model of trade in which the law of one price holds but exchange rate fluctuations are associated with large changes in import demand due to other factors for example if dollar appreciation is correlated with increases in world demand and industry marginal cost is increasing then pass through will be less than complete the other is an imperfectly competitive model in which exporters are capable of price discriminating across destination markets a phenomenon paul krugman 1987 has labeled pricing to market in this model incomplete pass through is typically associated with fluctuations in the markup of price over marginal cost on exports 2 these fluctuations in markups are believed to be countryspecific they do not reflect the behavior of prices to other export destinations both models are plausible explanations of recent u s experience unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish between these competing models using only information on import prices and exchange rates for a single country in order to distinguish between the competing models an empirical analysis of goods prices and exchange rates must be capable of measuring either marginal cost or the markup over marginal cost either of these tasks poses formidable empirical problems much of the empirical literature in industrial organization has been concerned with precisely these issues since markups are an important measure of the competitiveness of industries

bringing capital back in or social democracy reconsidered employer power cross class alliances and centralization of industrial relations in denmark and sweden the political domination of social democrats in denmark and sweden beginning in the 1930s was stabilized by the absence of intense opposition by capital to reformist programs aggressively opposed by business and the right elsewhere in the world this quiescence was not a symptom of weakness or dependency rather it was a product of a class intersecting cross class alliance behind institutions of centralized industrial relations that served mutual interests of sectoral groupings dominating both union and employer confederations well organized and militant and backed by social democrats employers in the two countries used offensive multi industry lockouts to force centralization on reluctant unions analysis of these cross class alliances and their pay distributional objectives is used to challenge a widely held view that centralization and social democratic electoral strength are sources of power against capital it also occasions a reassessment of conventional understandings of farmer labor coalitions and the decline of industrial conflict in scandinavia in the 1930s according to the alternative view presented here capital was included rather than excluded from these cross class alliances and industrial conflict subsided dramatically in part because employers achieved politically what they had previously tried to achieve with the lockout

eliminating race differences in school attainment and labor market success in this article we provide quantitative evidence on the effects of monetary incentive schemes designed to reduce racial differences in school attainment and earnings our analysis is based on the structural estimation of a dynamic model of schooling work and occupational choice decisions over the life cycle we consider two recent proposals that although not specifically targeted to blacks can be expected to have differential racial impacts one proposal suggested by robert reich provides a high school graduation bonus to youths from lower income families the other suggested by edmund phelps provides wage subsidies to low wage workers

does the organization of capital matter employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm levels does the organization of business matter for social policy development in the advanced capitalist democracies conventional welfare state analysis has given this significant question scant attention we argue however that the representational power of business coordination across business interest units and integration of associations in corporatist policy making forums or what we call the social corporatist organization of business should result in greater support and participation by employers in social policy formation and implementation we test our arguments with models both of 1980 98 pooled time series data on withinand across country variation in spending on active labor market programs and of extensive firm level survey data from denmark and the united kingdom we find that the centralization and coordination of employers as well as the integration of employer organizations in corporatist policy making forums are strongly associated with shares of national income devoted to active labor market policy we find moreover that the degree of employer organization conditions active labor market policy responses to de industrialization and increases in general unemployment at the firm level membership in an employer association has a significant positive effect on employer participation in active labor market programs in corporatist denmark but not in the pluralist united kingdom

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

organizational determinants of wage moderation this article contributes to the political economic literature regarding the effects of industrial relations institutions on national economic outcomes based on an econometric analysis of the determinants of wage moderation in sixteen industrialized countries between 1974 and 2000 it argues that the organizational characteristics of trade unions have a significant impact on wage dynamics controlling for a number of institutional and economic factors the countries in which trade union confederations directly involve workers in the process of collective bargaining ratification have on average lower wage growth relative to productivity than others the authors also find that collective bargaining coordination and contract ratification magnify each other s wage dampening effect through case studies of ireland and italy the article examines the causal mechanisms underlying the uncovered statistical regularities and concludes that particularly at a time in which classic political exchange is waning worker involvement in contract ratification allows confederation leaders to resolve conflicting claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than are achieved by a less participatory governance process

gonna party like it s 1899 party systems and the origins of varieties of coordination this article explores the origins of peak employers associations to understand why countries produce highly centralized macrocorporatist groups weaker national associations but stronger industry level groups or highly fragmented pluralist associations the authors suggest that the structure of partisan competition played a vital causal role in the development and evolution of these peak associations the leadership for peak employers association development came from business oriented party activists and bureaucrats who sought both to advance industrial development policy and to solve specific problems of political control business oriented party leaders and bureaucrats in both predemocratic and democratic regimes feared the rising tide of democracy and labor activism and viewed employer organization as a useful tool for political control to secure parliamentary advantage and to serve as a societal counterweight to workingclass activism because leadership for association building came from the state the political rules of the game were crucial to outcomes the structure of party competition and state centralization shaped incentives for strategic coordination for both political actors and employers dedicated business parties were more likely to develop in countries with multiparty systems and limited federal power sharing than in countries with two party systems and federalism in a multiparty context where no single party was likely to gain power each party had an incentive to cooperate with other social groups moreover business oriented party leaders and bureaucrats in multiparty systems were motivated to delegate policy making authority to coordinated societal channels for industrial relations because they anticipated that employers would win more in these channels than in parliamentary settings where the center and left could form a coalition against the right again centralized party systems were more likely than federal ones to develop a dedicated national business party that transcended regional cleavages and to retain a strong role for the state in the governance of industrial relations

the causes of welfare state expansion deindustrialization or globalization an influential line of argument holds that globalization causes economic uncertainty and spurs popular demands for compensatory welfare state spending this article argues that the relationship between globalization and welfare state expansion is spurious and that the engine of welfare state expansion since the 1960s has been deindustrialization based on cross sectional time series data for fifteen oecd countries the authors show that there is no relationship between globalization and the level of labor market risks in terms of employment and wages whereas the uncertainty and dislocations caused by deindustrialization have spurred electoral demands for welfare state compensation and risk sharing yet while differential rates of deindustri alization explain differences in the overall size of the welfare state its particular character in terms of the share of direct government provision and the equality of transfer payments is shaped by government partisanship the argument has implications for the study and the future of the welfare state that are very different from those suggested in the globalization literature

estimates of the economic returns to schooling from a new sample of twins this paper uses a new survey to contrast the wages of genetically identical twins with different schooling levels multiple measurements of schooling levels were also collected to assess the effect of reporting error on the estimated economic returns to schooling the data indicate that omitted ability variables do not bias the estimated return to schooling upward but that measurement error does bias it downward adjustment for measurement error indicates that an additional year of schooling increases wages by 12 to 16 percent a higher estimate of the economic returns to schooling than has been previously found copyright 1994 by american economic association

tariff limit pricing relative plant scale and the eastman stykolt hypothesis this paper provides a formal basis for the widely held proposition sometimes called the eastman stykolt effect that the interaction of tariff protection and small domestic market size prevents canadian firms from achieving scale efficiency it considers a free entry cournot nash equilibrium in a homogeneous goods industry protected by tariffs the model demonstrates that the tariff limit pricing effect can arise without appeal to collusion or product differentiation moreover it is not appropriate to test for the eastman stykolt effect by simply including the interaction of market size and tariffs in a regression explaining relative plant scale

estimating welfare effects consistent with forward looking behavior part i lessons from a simulation exercise an extensive literature in economics seeks to determine the quantitative impact of welfare benefits on economic and demographic behaviors most studies adopt a static choice framework to motivate their empirical specifications the behaviors that are studied however have both immediate and long term consequences if potential welfare recipients are forward looking they will consider these long term consequences when making current decisions in this paper we investigate the implications of the existence of forward looking behavior for estimation methodology in the companion paper that follows we estimate the effect of welfare on those decisions adopting an empirical specification that is consistent with forward looking behavior and interpretable within that framework

social policy by popular demand why are unemployment benefits more generous in some countries this article argues that citizens trade off the redistributive and insuring effect of social insurance as a result the distribution of risk in a society has important consequences via popular demand for social policy making at the microlevel the article shows that in addition to income the risk of unemployment is a key predictor of individual level preferences for unemployment benefits based on the microlevel findings the article argues that at the macrolevel the homogeneity of the risk pool is an important determinant of benefit generosity the more equally unemployment risk is distributed the higher unemployment replacement rates are empirical testing at both levels finds support for this account of social policy by popular demand

up the average cost curve inefficient entry and the new protectionism abstract a two country model is developed in which each country produces one good with increasing returns the goods being perfect or imperfect substitutes with cournot nash behavior and free entry certain restrictive trade policies have effects opposite to their favorable effect under noentry assumptions import tariffs and export subsidies lead to inefficient entry that raises rather than decreases the average production cost of and price charge by the domestic industry with negative welfare consequences we argue that these predictions of our model are closely consistent with extensive canadian data on entry exit and firms responses to trade liberalization

the eastman stykolt hypothesis reconsidered in their frequently cited book eastman and stykolt 1967 advanced two major propositions concerning the effect of small market sizes on canadian industry specifically they predicted that in tariff protected markets in which domestic consumption is small relative to the minimum efficient scale of plant one would discover both an abnormally high fraction of output produced in plants of suboptimal scale and an abnormally high percentage of foreign ownership these hypotheses have become deeply ingrained in the discussion of canadian industrial economics 1 in most cases they are accepted as a basis for policy discussion without further investigation this paper assesses the theoretical and empirical support for the first eastmansykolt proposition that small market size induces suboptimal capacity on the basis of an extensive literature search2 it concludes that there is considerable empirical support for some aspects of the theory but that the theory itself has not been satisfactorily formulated

effects of permanent and transitory tax changes in a life cycle labor supply model with human capital i examine effects of labor income taxation in life cycle models with human capital accumulation in this case the opportunity cost of time equals the wage plus returns to work experience this has several interesting consequences first the data appear consistent with larger labor supply elasticities than prior work suggests second contrary to conventional wisdom permanent tax changes can have larger effects on current labor supply than temporary changes third human capital dampens responses of young workers to transitory tax changes fourth labor supply elasticities increase with age fifth human capital amplifies the effect of permanent tax changes in the long run

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

capitalist systems deindustrialization and the politics of public education recent years have seen a number of studies on the determinants of educational spending almost all of the existing work emphasizes the importance of left wing governments as a motor of expansion because such expansion allegedly ensures both redistribution and the facilitation of a supply side economy the existing literature thereby corroborates the power resource theory against this common wisdom the article presents an argument building on the varieties of capitalism approach it is argued that education is a poor instrument for redistribution because access is universal and high income groups have a tendency to use education even more than low income groups instead we argue that deindustrialization is the main driver of educational spending because deindustrialization constitutes one of the most salient threats to workers in modern societies as deindustrialization rises workers risk ending up with redundant skills especially in countries where the average skills specificity is high that is coord

the origins of private social insurance public policy and fringe benefits in america 1920 1950 how did the american system of private employment related pension and health insurance arise data on corporate fringe benefit programs during the second quarter of the 20th century contradict the received wisdom that benefits rose in response to wartime federal policy changes and industrial factors instead it appears that public policies such as the wagner act and social security led to union and business support for private insurance which in turn spurred to growth of fringe benefits the historical record suggests that neoinstitutional and conflict approaches must be synthesized to explain the expansion of fringe benefits institutional factors influenced organizational outcomes by affecting interest group goals

from comparative public policy to political economy putting political institutions in their place and taking interests seriously the historical institutionalist tradition in comparative politics commonly assigns analytical primacy to political institutions whereas this polity centeredness may be quite justifiable for purposes of comparative public policy students of comparative political economy should pay systematic attention not only to economic institutions but also to a range of economic structural variables that lie beyond the conventional confines of institutional analysis providing the basis for an analysis of collective actors and their interests such an approach is needed to account for institutional change and policy realignments within stable institutions

international competitiveness and industry pricing in canadian manufacturing this paper examines the effect of the international competitiveness of home producers on their pricing evidence based on the 1970 75 period supports the claim that in the canadian manufacturing sector domestic prices are set in accordance with a mixture of two pricing hypotheses the eastman stykolt pricing hypothesis esph and the monopolistic pricing hypothesis mph however in the 1975 80 period when their competitiveness increased prices were set solely according to the mph for the purposes of assessing the impact of free trade this paper shows the circumstances under which each or a mixture of these pricing hypotheses employed in the harris cox model on the gains from freer trade would be appropriate

exchange rate pass through when market share matters the authors investigate the pass through from exchange rates to import prices when firms future demands depend on their current market shares they show that profit maximizing foreign firms may either raise or lower their dollar export prices when the dollar appreciates temporarily i e the pass through may be perverse and that current import prices may be more sensitive to expected future exchange rates than to current exchange rates they present evidence that suggests the behavior of expected future exchange rates may provide a clue to the puzzling recent behavior of u s import prices copyright 1989 by american economic association

geographically discriminatory trade arrangements a bstract an eight region numerical general equilibrium model of global trade is used to investigate the impacts of various geographically discriminatory trade policy arrangements gdas on regional trade and welfare results suggest that the important factors determining gains and losses in any gda are such issues as whether initial levels of protection are asymmetric the relative sizes of participating regions and the pattern of trade between participating and non participating countries results also appear to confirm the implication of wonnacott and wonnacott 1981 that the gain from reducing a partner s tariff is typically a more important consideration in evaluating potential benefits from a customs union than the traditional concerns of trade creation and trade diversion

welfare states and social trust this article tests the linkage between institutional configuration and social trust highlighting the role of the welfare states in coordinating interests among different labor market actors this study initially builds a theoretical framework distinguishing training supplemented welfare regimes from transfer based welfare regimes evidence from descriptive and multivariate analyses of world values survey based on 17 advanced industrial democracies supports my argument that public investment in skill provision prevalent in training supplemented welfare states leads to higher accumulation of social trust whereas passive social transfers result in lower social trust especially high investment in public skill provision leads to a decreased gap in social trust between employers and low skilled workers as well as among different occupational groups in addition the negative effect of passive social transfers on trust is greatly ameliorated when it is jointly configured with high active labor market polici

politics and the structural dependence of the state in democratic capitalist nations i explore empirically a central claim of the structural dependence thesis namely that capitalists ability to disinvest fundamentally conditions policy choices in democratic capitalist systems utilizing time series data for 16 affluent democracies from 1965 to 1984 i find that indeed low rates of business investment are associated with reductions in corporate tax burdens and that these reductions are more pronounced in periods of economic crisis moreover low rates of capital formation engender cuts in personal income taxes during periods of economic stress however i also find that the magnitude of responsiveness of taxation to low rates of investment is relatively small and that analyses of the political context of investment and taxation indicate that governments have choices the responsiveness of corporate tax burdens to capital formation may under some governments be part of a policy mix designed to maintain adequate investment and to address the demands of core constituencies

structural dependence of the state on capital a central claim of both marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society this is the theory of structural dependence of the state on capital using a formal model the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined we conclude that in a static sense the theory is false virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense policies that once in place redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented

the determinants of industry political activity 1978 1986 c ampaign contributions made by corporate political action committees pacs are increasingly important and controversial in u s elections influence purchasing is often alleged by pundits and campaign finance reform is continually debated in congress in the academy social scientists have analyzed the allocation of interest group monies and have looked for possible impacts on legislation few however have tried to explain the total contributions of economic interest groups we shall analyze variations in contributions across industries and over time with an empirical model based on organizationally constrained profit maximizing behavior we assume that corporate pac contributions in an industry are raised to enhance industry profits subject to the constraints of organization costs and freeriding incentives our empirical work covers 124 industries over five election cycles from 1978 through 1986 both the costs and benefits of political activity vary across industries we argue that the benefits of political action are determined by direct contact with the government as a regulator or purchaser of industry output by government s ability to ameliorate adverse market conditions and by the industry s ability to solve collective action problems without government assistance the costs of industry political action arise mainly from collective action problems because effective political activity often requires concerted action by the constituent firms in each industry we also make a methodological contribution previous studies use statistical techniques that suffer from sample selectivity bias or else force the probability of acting politically to be explained by the same set of coefficients as is the amount of action taken we explain and employ a technique that accounts for both problems the results are consistent with the theses that industries follow investment oriented goals in deciding the amount of political action to undertake and that collective action problems are important constraints on industry political activity we can explain between 60 and 80 of the variation in contributions in our sample first we review existing work on corporate political activity particularly papers examining patterns of aggregate pac spending by industry then we present an organization cost constrained industryprofit maximizing model based on a comparison between an idealized zero organization cost industry and the more realistic case where organizing collective action is difficult the independent variables used in the analysis are also discussed and defined next we discuss the dependent variable and total industry contributions and explain our statistical method then the results are presented followed by a discussion of industry structure and political activity to make clear how our results can explain different contribution patterns we give examples using five actual industries

unions employers associations and wage setting institutions in northern and central europe 1950 1992 the eight countries examined in this study austria belgium denmark finland germany the netherlands norway and sweden have long been viewed as exemplifying corporatist industrial relations

why do the free trade gain numbers differ so much the role of industrial organization in general equilibrium a small general equilibrium model calibrated approximately to match the canadian tradeable goods sector is used to examine the implications of a range of assumptions about pricing behaviour and entry barriers for the impact of free trade with the united states it turns out that only a model with an extreme combination of non competitive product market and free entry as well as unexploited scale economies can generate substantial gains from free trade other assumptions modelled include monopolistic competition market share pricing an economist s model and a mainstream industrial organization approach the predicted welfare gains range from zero to more than 7 per cent of gnp pourquoi est ce que les evaluations numeriques des gains derives de l accord de libre echange different tellement le role de l organisation industrielle dans l analyse d equilibre g6neral l auteur utilise un petit modele d equilibre general calibre pour approximer le secteur canadien des biens echangeables avec l exterieur dans son analyse des implications d un ensemble de postulats quant a la tarification et aux barrieres a l entree sur l impact du libre echange avec les etats unis il appert que seul un modele impliquant une combinaison extreme de marches de produit non concurrentiels et d entree libre ainsi que d economies d echelle non exploitees peut engendrer des gains substantiels comme resultat du libre echange on examine aussi d autres postulats concurrence monopolistique tarification pour maintenir une part du marche un modele a saveur economiste et 1 approche standard d organisation industrielle les gains de bien etre qu on predit selon les postulats de base couvrent un eventail de zero a 7 pour cent du pnb

exchange rates and prices the adjustment of relative prices to exchange rate movements is explained in an industrial organization approach given labor costs in the respective currencies exchange rate movements change costs for firms selling in the home market and thus disturb the industry equilibrium the extent of absolute and relative price adjustment is shown to depend on market integration product substitutability the relative number of domestic and foreign firms and the market structure the impact of exchange rates on prices is illustrated in a variety of approaches including the cournot a dixit and j stiglitz 1977 and s salop 1979 models some empirical evidence is offered in support of the theory copyright 1987 by american economic association