efficient diversification according to stochastic dominance criteria this paper develops the first operational tests of portfolio efficiency based on the general stochastic dominance sd criteria that account for an infinite set of diversification strategies the main insight is to preserve the cross sectional dependence of asset returns when forming portfolios by reexpressing the sd criteria int dimensional euclidean space with elements representing rates of return int different states of nature we characterize subsets of this state space that dominate a given evaluated return vector by first and second order sd this allows us to derive simple sd efficiency measures and test statistics computable by standard mathematical programming algorithms the sd tests and efficiency measures are illustrated by an empirical application that analyzes industrial diversification of the market portfolio

the influence of information technology on the use of loosely coupled organizational forms an industry level analysis information technology it enhances coordination both within the firm and between the firm and its external partners consequently it investment can promote both loosely and tightly coupled organizational forms indeed in some industries widespread investment in it is associated with high levels of disaggregation in other industries this is not the case we argue that the specific influence of it on firm boundaries depends on the broader industrial context we investigate conditions whereby it investments enable industries to be more loosely coupled through alliance formation and the use of contingent workers we use transaction cost and modular systems theory to ground our theoretical development the extent to which industrywide it investment is associated with loosely coupled organizational forms depends on 1 limited asset specificity because of industry standards 2 the level of industry uncertainty resulting from technological change and 3 the overall complexity of the industry in terms of diverse inputs specifically when industry standards exist it investment leads to greater use of both alliances and contingent workers it investment has a stronger positive relationship with the use of contingent workers when levels of technological change are low as compared to when levels of technological change are high when there are high levels of input diversity and industry standards exist it investment led to an increased use of contingent workers our analyses provides a more refined view of it influence on firm boundaries

energy price shocks and medium term business cycles abstract energy price shocks pose sudden challenges to economies this paper examines how oil price shocks have influenced the u s economy over the last decades and especially focuses on the productivity slowdown in the years following an oil price shock we extend the existing literature by considering medium term business cycles which consist of high frequency components conventional business cycles up to 8 years and medium frequency components 8 50 years we find that the medium frequency consequences of energy price shocks are considerable and explain a significant part of the productivity slowdown

is there an inflation productivity trade off some evidence from the manufacturing sector in greece this paper examines the effect of inflation on total factor productivity growth tfp using time series data for every two digit greek manufacturing industries in order to do the above a translog flexible cost function is estimated and used to decompose tfp growth into scale economies inflation and technical change the advantage of estimating a very general and flexible cost function is that it allows us for the first time to examine empirically a large number of significant relationships between tfp growth and economies of scale inflation and technical change the main conclusion drawn from this analysis is that inflation reduces tfp growth in a way which is sizeable furthermore using standard causality test the direction of causality between inflation and tfp growth was tested at the manufacturing level

the role of energy in productivity growth the objective of this paper is to analyze the role of energy in the growth of productivity the special significance of energy in economic growth was first established in the classic study energy and the american economy 1850 1975 by sam schurr and his associates 1960 at resources for the future for the period from 1920 to 1955 schurr noted that energy intensity of production had fallen while both labor and total factor productivity were rising the simultaneous decline in energy intensity and labor intensity of production ruled out the possibility of explaining the growth of productivity solely on the basis of substitution of less expensive energy for more expensive labor since the quantity of both energy and labor inputs required for a given level of output had been reduced technical change is also a critical explanatory factor an alternative explanation for growth of output with declining energy and labor intensity required an examination of the character of technical change this examination was motivated by the fact that from 1920 to 1955 the utilization of electricity had expanded by a factor of more than ten while consumption of all other forms of energy only doubled the two key features of technical change during this period were that the thermal efficiency of conversion of fuels into electricity increased by a factor of three and that the unusual characteristics of electricity had made it possible to perform tasks in altogether different ways than if the fuels had to be used directly schurr 1983 p 3 schurr 1982 has recently extended the analysis of energy and the american economy through 1981 for the period through 1969 his conclusions are as follows although the inverse relationship between total factor productivity and energy intensity virtually disappeared during the 1953 1969 period it is still noteworthy that high rates of improvement in total factor productivity were essentially not associated with increases in energy intensity 1982 p 6 schurr 1982 has analyzed the experience of the u s economy in the aftermath of the oil embargo of 1973 he points out that energy intensity of production has fallen steadily since 1973 and that the rate of decline accelerated sharply after the second oil price shock in 1979 following the iranian revolution he goes on to point out that

energy demand and the composition of output growth abstract using the theory of the firm the effects of unbalanced rates of output growth on aggregate energy demand are examined theoretical results show that failure to consider unbalanced growth leads to bias in aggregate price elasticity estimates empirically differential output growth rates are important contributors to the overall growth of energy and other inputs they can be as important as net price effects in explaining input growth unbalanced growth effects help to explain changes in labor s productivity growth and have increased in importance since the arab oil embargo they are quite significant relative to other sources of change during business cycle downturns

on the effects of downstream entry we study the effects of entry in a downstream market where firms e g compaq and ibm cvs and safeway buy an input e g microprocessor grocery items from an upstream supplier e g intel procter gamble and sell their output to consumers we show demand conditions where contrary to conventional wisdom entry of a new downstream firm lowers the downstream market output and increases the consumer price thus consumers may be better off with fewer sellers in such markets we also show that this entry may cause the profit of each incumbent downstream firm to i remain unchanged ii decrease or iii even increase also for a class of widely used demand conditions the supplier s optimal price is shown invariant to the entry exit of its downstream buyer firms we classify all possible effects of downstream entry in terms of fundamental market demand conditions

research note quantity discounts in differentiated consumer product markets in this paper we extend the standard hotelling model of product differentiation to incorporate a second dimension of consumer heterogeneity that relates to the quantity of the product consumers wish to buy this extension allows us to derive optimal nonlinear pricing rules chosen by competing sellers when offering differentiated products in the marketplace it also permits us to assess whether sellers find it optimal to offer quantity discounts in such a setting and the implications of such discounts on their profitability we find that offering quantity discounts corresponds indeed to equilibrium behavior the extent of discounting declines the less differentiated the products surprisingly when sellers offer to consumers a choice between two different sized packages their profits are at most as high as when such a choice is unavailable moreover when utilizing nonlinear pricing rules is not feasible the profits of the sellers actually decline when they offer consumers a choice between different sized packages a limited empirical investigation supports the comparative statics we derive in our theoretical model

outsourcing retail pricing to a category captain the role of information firewalls it has been argued that retailers lack both the resources and capabilities to maximize category performance retailers may seek category management cm advice from a manufacturer referred to as a category captain cc a cc s recommendations affect all brands in the category not just her own despite an increase in the number of cc collaborations retailers are still concerned about manufacturer opportunism and militant behavior by manufacturers not selected as ccs whereas government agencies are worried about anticompetitive behavior that could harm consumers the federal trade commission recommends strictly enforced information firewalls within a cc s organization as a best practice guideline in this study we develop an empirical model and use policy simulations to quantify the impact of cc arrangements with information firewalls on retailers manufacturers and consumers we show how these effects could be influenced by the deactivation of vertical and horizontal information firewalls within the cc s organization

the marketing channel as an equilibrium set of contracts nash bargaining theory and recent developments in economic contract theory are employed in the analysis of the marketing channels individual dyadic contracts involving payment schedules between members of a simple 3 level channel are investigated with particular reference to monitoring problems and intrachannel power relations the interrelations between individual contracts are examined and the equilibrium set of contracts constituting the channel derived the performance of the channel in terms of risk sharing allocative efficiency and the distribution of gains is then evaluated it is found that the risk aversion of channel members and the cost of monitoring and enforcement affect channel efficiency and that under certain types of interdependencies and externalities the nature of the power structure is crucial to channel efficiency

the implications of the historical decline in us energy intensity for long run co2 emission projections this paper analyzes the influence of the long run decline in us energy intensity on projections of energy use and carbon emissions to the year 2050 we build on our own recent work which decomposes changes in the aggregate us energy gdp ratio into shifts in sectoral composition structural change and adjustments in the energy demand of individual industries intensity change and identifies the impact on the latter of price induced substitution of variable inputs shifts in the composition of capital and embodied and disembodied technical progress we employ a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium cge model of the us economy to analyze the implications of these findings for future energy use and carbon emissions comparison of the simulation results against projections of historical trends in gdp energy use and emissions reveals that the range of values for the rate of autonomous energy efficiency improvement aeei conventionally used in cge models is consistent with the effects of structural changes at the sub sector level rather than disembodied technological change even so our results suggest that us emissions may well grow faster in the future than in the recent past

can wage increases pay for themselves tests with a production function efficiency wage theories predict that companies that pay high wages will have higher productivity from high work effort low turnover and other efficiency enhancing effects this paper uses the pims line of business data set to test whether high wage businesses are more productive relative wages were measured by managers assessments of their relative compensation holding worker quality constant a positive relation was found between changes in relative wages and changes in total factor productivity the elasticity of output with respect to wages was of the magnitude predicted by efficiency wage theories also consistent with efficiency wage theories the relationship between changes in wages and changes in productivity was weaker at businesses with high unionization results from two additional data sets imply that high wages are not merely measuring high human capital copyright 1992 by royal economic society

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

efficient algorithms for stochastic dominance tests based on financial market data it is known that when the random variables being compared have a uniform probability measure as is the case when using financial market data the computation of efficient sets for first and second degree dominance can be greatly simplified if majorization conditions are used instead of the dominance definitions this paper presents an equally efficient technique for third degree dominance

the impact of electric power on productivity according to the historical record the increased use of energy in general and electric power in particular stands as one of the key factors in productivity growth growth accountants however find little support for this view rejecting claims that the productivity slowdown can be attributed to the lower rate of growth of the energy input in us manufacturing in this study an attempt at reconciling the historical record with the empirical facts is made specifically the commonly used factor income shares in the relevant divisia input growth index are replaced by the estimated output input elasticities the latter attribute a considerably larger role to electric power than previous studies indicated these are then used to reevaluate the sources of growth in us manufacturing

unemployment equilibria and input prices theory and evidence from the united states the paper develops an efficiency wage model where input prices affect the equlibrium rate of unemployment we show that a simple framework based on only two prices the real price of oil and the real rate of interest is able to explain the main post war movements in the rate of u s joblessnss the equations do well in forecasting unemployment many out of sample and provide evidence that the oil price spike associated with iraq s invasion of kuweit appears to be a component of the mystery recession which followed

aggregation and the role of energy in the economy methods for investigating the role of energy in the economy involve aggregating different energy flows a variety of methods have been proposed but none has received universal acceptance this paper shows that the method of aggregation has crucial effects on the results of the analysis we review the principal assumptions and methods for aggregating energy flows the basic heat equivalents approach economic approaches using prices or marginal product for aggregation emergy analysis and thermodynamic approaches such as exergy we argue that economic approaches such as the index or marginal product method are superior because they account for differences in quality among fuels we apply various economic approaches in three case studies in the us economy in the first we account for energy quality to assess changes in the energy surplus delivered by the extraction of fossil fuels from 1954 to 1992 the second and third case studies examine the importance of energy quality in evaluating the relation between energy use and gdp first a quality adjusted index of energy consumption is used in an econometric analysis of the causal relation between energy use and gdp from 1947 to 1996 second we account for energy quality in an econometric analysis of the factors that determine changes in the energy gdp ratio from 1947 to 1996 without adjusting for energy quality the results imply that the energy surplus from petroleum extraction is increasing that changes in gdp drive changes in energy use and that gdp has been decoupled from between aggregate energy use all of these conclusions are reversed when we account for changes in energy quality 2000 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

oil consumption and economic efficiency a comparative analysis of advanced developing and emerging economies abstract this paper investigates the economic efficiency oil consumption relationship in 42 countries during the period 1986 2006 in a first stage by using dea window analysis countries economic efficiencies are obtained in a second stage an econometric analysis based on robust gmm estimators reveals an inverted u shape relationship between oil consumption and economic efficiency in order to capture heterogeneities among countries development stages the analysis has been separated into two groups advanced economies and developing emerging economies the results show that advanced economies have much higher turning points compared to emerging and developing economies it appears that oil consumption increases countries economic efficiency in addition the consumption patterns of oil products and its derivatives have changed through years and among countries the different turning points from the econometric analysis indicate the dependence of oil consumption in advanced economies higher turning points is driven mainly by household purchasing activities and their standards of living transport housing and water food etc finally it appears that oil consumption is the main driver behind the progress of industrialization and urbanization regardless of the country s development stage

energy prices and productivity growth the sharp decline in economic growth since 1973 presents a problem comparable in scientific interest and social importance to the problem of unemployment in the great depression of the 1930s conventional methods of economic analysis have been tried and have been found to be inadequate this paper outlines a new framework for understanding the slowdown in economic growth we find that the fall in u s economic growth since 1973 has been due to the dramatic decline in productivity growth within the new framework we identify higher energy prices as an important determinant of the productivity slowdown

bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty abstract substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination the majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains moreover a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain this paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty we consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies vertical integration vi manufacturer s stackelberg ms and bargaining on the wholesale price bw is the bargaining parameter over a single or infinitely many periods we show that in contrast to earlier literature using vivi vi in both chains is the unique nash equilibrium over one period decision while using msms or bw bw may be nash equilibrium over infinitely many periods

the economic power of energy and the need to integrate it with energy policy abstract drastic oil price changes the associated economic perturbations the coupling of energy conversion to entropy production in the form of emissions and the problems of climate change call for a reappraisal of energy in economic theory we review econometric growth analyses that do not weigh the production factors capital labor and energy by their cost shares their reproduction of economic growth in germany japan and the usa during the second half of 20th century is good according to these analyses energy s output elasticity which measures its economic power is much larger than energy s share in total factor cost while for labor s output elasticity and cost share the opposite is true this is consistent with profit and welfare optimization if hitherto ignored technological constraints are taken into account computing the motion of the german industrial sector in its cost mountain employing empirical data on factor quantities and prices supports these results the pivotal role of energy in economic growth provides leverage to energy policies that care about social well being and climate stability

energy efficiency and economic growth a retrospective cge analysis for canada from 2002 to 2012 abstract the efficiency with which energy is used by firms and households has widespread impacts on economic activity which in turn has implications for environmental quality and energy security using a novel method that could be used for other jurisdictions we estimate the impact of energy efficiency improvements on canadian gdp employment economic structure and welfare from 2002 to 2012 we use a counterfactual back casting method with a sectorally and regionally disaggregated dynamic recursive computable general equilibrium model in effect reverse calibrating the model from observed data to isolate the effects of energy efficiency we estimate that total energy efficiency improvements in canada during this period increased gdp by 2 0 0 19 yr employment by 2 5 0 24 yr and household welfare by about 1 5 0 15 yr additionally energy efficiency improvements reoriented economic structure from capital intense energy supply sectors to relatively labour intense manufacturing and services we find evidence of widespread rebound on an energy expenditure basis across most sectors and backfire where energy efficiency leads to absolute energy use increases in oil sands in situ extraction bitumen upgrading shale gas extraction lime production pulp paper and metal smelting but overall energy use is reduced by energy efficiency improvements over this period

using game theory to model competition the article is an exposition of the basic concepts of noncooperative game theory and their application to advertising product and price competition

manufacturer retailer channel interactions and implications for channel power an empirical investigation of pricing in a local market the issue of power in the marketing channels for consumer products has received considerable attention in both academic and practitioner journals as well as in the popular press our objective in this paper is to provide an empirical method to measure the power of channel members and to understand the reasons demand factors cost factors nature of channel interactions for this power we confine our analysis to pricing power in channels we use methods from the game theory literature in marketing on channel interactions to obtain the theoretical framework for our empirical model this literature provides us a definition of power one that is based on the proportion or percentage of channel profits that accrue to each of the channel members there can be a variety of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and retailers in channels the theoretical literature has examined some of these games for example choi 1991 examines how channel profits for manufacturers and retailer vary if channel interactions are either vertical nash or if they are stackelberg leaderfollower with either the manufacturer or the retailer being the price leader each of these three channel interaction games has different implications for profits made by manufacturers and retailers and consequently for the relative power of the channel members in contrast to the previous literature that has focused largely on the above three channel interaction games our model extends the game theoretic literature by allowing for a continuum of possible channel interactions between manufacturers and a retailer furthermore for a given product market we empirically estimate from the data where the channel interactions lie in this continuum more critically we obtain measures of how channel profits are divided between manufacturers and the retailer in the product market where a higher share of channel profit is associated with higher channel power we then examine how channel power is related to demand conditions facing various brands and cost parameters of various manufacturers in going from game theory based theoretical models of channel interactions to empirical estimation we use the new empirical industrial organization framework bresnahan 1988 as part of this structural modeling framework we build retail level demand functions for the various brands manufacturer and private label in a given product category given these demand functions we obtain optimal pricing rules for manufacturers and the retailer in determining their optimal prices manufacturers and the retailer account for how all the players in the channel choose their optimal prices that is we account for dependencies in decision making across channel members these dependencies are characterized by a set of conduct parameters which are estimated from market data the conduct parameters enable us to identify the nature of channel interactions between manufacturers and the retailer along the continuum mentioned previously in addition to the demand and conduct parameters manufacturers marginal costs are also estimated in the model these marginal cost estimates along with the manufacturer prices and retail prices available in our dataset enable us to compute the division of channel profits among the channel members hence we are able to obtain insights into who has pricing power in the channel in the empirical application of the model we analyze a local market for two product categories refrigerated juice and tuna in both categories there are three major brands the difference between them is that the private label has an insignificant market share in the tuna category our main empirical results show that the usual games examined in the marketing literature do not hold for the given data we also nd that the retailer s market power is very significant in both these product categories and that the estimated demand and cost parameters are consistent with the estimated pattern of conduct between the manufacturers and the retailer given the evidence from the trade press of intense manufacturer competition in these categories as well as the commodity nature of these products the result of retailer power appears intuitive

mitigating factors assessing the costs of reducing ghg emissions abstract the debate over the costs of ghg emission reduction has become more complex recently as disagreements over the existence of economic and environmental double dividends have been added to discussions over the existence of a negative cost potential we argue that basic assumptions about economic efficiency the sub optimality of the baseline and the rate of technical change are more important than model structure and we underline the importance of the timing of decisions for determining the costs moreover the use of a single baseline no policy scenario and several policy intervention scenarios may be fundamentally misleading in the longer term simply because the very idea of a business as usual scenario is deeply problematic ultimately the debate turns on political judgments about the desirability of alternative development paths

third degree stochastic dominance here f x and g x are less than cumulative probability distributionis where x is a continuous or discrete random variable representing the outcome of a prospect the closed interval a b is the sample space of both prospects the integral shown in rule 2 and those shown throughout the paper are stieltjes integrals recall that the stieltjes integral fb f x dg x exists if one of the functions f and g is continuous and the other has finite variation in a b let d1 d2 and d3 be three sets of utility functions x d1 is the set containing all utility functions with 4 x and 1 x continuous and 41 x 0 for all xe a b d2 is the set with x 1 x 2 x continuous and q j x 0 02 x o for all xc a b d3 is the set with x 1 x 2 x 3 x continuous and 1 x 04 2 x o o for all xc a b here 1 x denotes the ith derivative of x hadar and russell proved that rule 1 is valid for all cd1 and rutle 2 is valid for all ed2 the authors point out that the set of probability distributions that can be ordered by means of second degree stochastic dominance is in general larger than that which can be ordered by means of first degree stochastic dominance note that in rule 2 they assume that x is not only an increasing function of x but also exhibits weak global risk aversion a condition guaranteed by requiring the second derivative of x to be nonpositive in this paper a condition which will be called third degree stochastic dominance is considered it is based on the following assumption about the form of the utility function x from a normative point of view one expects the risk premium associated with an uncertain prospect to become smaller the greater is the individual s wealth the plausibility and implications of this assumption h ave been explored by john pratt as well as others the risk premium of an uncertain prospect is that amount by which the certainty equivalent of the prospect differs from its expected value in mathematical terms given the prospect f x with expected value a the corresponding risk premium t is obtained by solving the following equation rb

total factor productivity growth and characteristics of the production technology in the uk chemicals and allied industries an insight to the structure of technology in the uk chemicals and allied industries is provided employing both the conventional index number and the cost function methods to measure productivity growth the amount of information lost in the former approach is emphasized moreover some of the crucial assumptions underlying the conventional approach have been found to be invalid for the industries in question

delegating pricing decisions an outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not this paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and in turn the impact of delegation on prices and incentives the theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions prices and sales agents effort specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 does competition affect the price delegation decision and if yes why 2 how do prices vary under price delegation and no price delegation scenarios 3 do the incentives to the sales representatives vary under the delegation and no delegation scenarios to address these issues we build a game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling through their sales representatives these representatives are company employees sales are a function of prices and selling efforts the risk neutral firms decide whether or not to delegate the pricing decision to risk averse sales representatives the wages to the sales representatives consist of salary plus a commission on gross margins the commission on gross margins can be adjusted either through communicated marginal cost of production which we call virtual marginal cost or directly the firm and the sales representative are assumed to have the same information about the market that is there is no information asymmetry with competition in two dimensions the strategic nature of decision variableprice depends on the relative intensity of competition with unobservable contracts and risk averse sales representatives firms delegate the pricing decision when price competition is intense part of the uncertainty in demand is absorbed by the firm by keeping virtual marginal cost greater than the marginal cost of production the competing firm infers this through the risk aversion of the sales representatives under price delegation the sales representatives wages are higher and they set a price that is higher than what the firms would have set themselves this leads to softening of price competition that is to the advantage of both firms when the effort competition is dominant however the firms prefer to make the pricing decision themselves because this reduces the intensity of effort competition among agents a single instrument commission structure in which the firms adjust the virtual marginal cost is compared to a two instrument commission structure in which the firms can adjust the commission rate as well the virtual marginal cost under no price delegation the two incentive schemes are the same however under price delegation the risk premium with the two instrument scheme is lower however the prices and efforts are higher with the single instrument scheme when price competition is intense the increase in risk premium with the single instrument scheme is more than compensated for by the increase in profits this is the benefit of softening price competition through higher prices

stochastic dominance and expected utility survey and analysis while stochastic dominance has been employed in various forms as early as 1932 it has only been since 1969 1970 that the notion has been developed and extensively employed in the area of economics finance agriculture statistics marketing and operations research in this survey the first second and third order stochastic dominance rules are discussed with an emphasis on the development in the area since the 1980s

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

does renewable and or non renewable energy consumption matter for total factor productivity tfp growth evidence from the brics abstract studies proved that output growth is mainly associated with the total factor productivity tfp growth and variables that affect the tfp have an important explanatory power on output in this regards the aim of this study is to examine the causal relationship between different types of energy consumption and tfp growth in the brics from 1992 to 2012 a panel bootstrap granger causality test by konya 2006 68 was employed to investigate the direction of possible connection between energy consumption and tfp growth results show that no remarkable causal link exists between renewable energy consumption and tfp growth in the brics however in the case of non renewables energy consumption creates a positive externality that contributes economic development in brazil and south africa by the growth of tfp as well as energy use itself in this respect policies that promote coal and non renewable electricity consumption in south africa and natural gas consumption in brazil may be beneficial for their economic development

product diversion to a direct competitor a manufacturer will often limit competition among downstream partners by authorizing only a select group of retailers to carry its product however it is not uncommon for authorized retailers to create an additional competitor by diverting units to an unauthorized seller this paper presents an analytical model that demonstrates how diversion from authorized retailers to an unauthorized direct competitor can occur under circumstances not considered by the prior literature in fact diversion can represent a prisoner s dilemma whereby retailers diminish their own profit by selling to the unauthorized direct seller the authorized retailer s profit loss actually increases as the per unit diversion costs incurred by the authorized retailer decrease the model also shows that the unauthorized direct seller earns greater profit by strategically procuring a unilaterally constraining quantity even though this procurement strategy results in an equivalent increase in the quantity sold by the retailers combined the results identify a new reason for diversion and its consequences for retailers and the unauthorized direct seller

pricing information goods a strategic analysis of the selling and pay per use mechanisms we analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods these mechanisms are selling where up front payment allows unrestricted use and pay per use where payments are tailored to use we analytically model a market where consumers differ in use frequency and where use on a pay per use basis invokes a psychological cost associated with the well known ticking meter effect we demonstrate that pay per use yields higher profits in a monopoly provided the associated psychological cost is low in a duopoly one firm uses selling and the other uses pay per use here in contrast to the monopoly selling yields higher profits than pay per use we demonstrate that surprisingly the profits of both duopolists can increase as the psychological cost associated with pay per use increases next we show that uncertainty in consumer use frequency does not affect pay per use in a monopoly but lowers profits from selling in a duopoly both the seller and the pay per use provider obtain lower profits when use frequency is uncertain we also analyze how pricing mechanism performance is affected if the firms cannot commit to prices if the pay per use provider offers a two part tariff and if consumers are risk averse

a marginal measure of energy efficiency the shadow value abstract economists are well aware of the importance of marginal versus average measures of energy efficiency yet in the energy literature there is no consensus on the appropriate method for defining and measuring energy efficiency this paper sets out the shadow value of energy as a proper and meaningful marginal energy efficiency index a restricted profit function is used to model the shadow value we explore four scenarios to characterize and evaluate the shadow value of energy a within country comparison of different production processes with different energy requirements a comparison of different countries with different resource endowment a government policy to impose a tax to alter the shadow value to address environmental issues and a within country comparison of externalities arising from two sources of energy a comparative static analysis is carried out to sign the functional arguments defined for the shadow value

the cost of regulation osha epa and the productivity slowdown the slowdown in productivity growth in the u s economy during the 1970 s has been a matter of great concern to policymakers associated as it is with inflation unemployment and declining real wage growth this paper examines the impact on productivity growth of government regulation specifically worker health and safety regulation by the occupational safety and health administration osha and environmental regulation by the environmental protection agency epa looking at data for 450 manufacturing industries between 1958 and 1978 the study finds a large negative relationship between such regulation and productivity growth using these results about 30 percent of the decline in productivity growth in manufacturing during the 1970 s may be attributed to such regulation several previous studies have looked at the contribution of regulation to the productivity slowdown many of these have inferred that the contribution must be small on the basis of the relatively small amount spent on complying with such regulations edward denison 1979 estimates that only about 16 percent of the productivity slowdown in the 1972 75 period was due to regulation 35 percentage points out of a slowdown of 2 17 percentage points paul portney 1981 notes that little of gnp is spent on pollution control under 2 percent concluding that therefore pollution regulations could have little effect on productivity growth norsworthy et al 1979 also find a small impact of pollution abatement capital expenditures on productivity growth studies based on econometric estimation of the regulation productivity relationship have found a wide range of results gregory christainsen and robert haveman 1981 find regulation reduced labor productivity growth by 27 percentage points using time series data and measures of total federal regulation robert crandall 1981 finds a strong relationship between pollution abatement capital and productivity growth but this relationship disappears when a measure of energy intensity is included robin siegel 1979 observes a significant contribution 5 percentage points from pollution control expenditures to the productivity slowdown for 1965 73 but not for later years finally frank gollop and mark roberts 1983 examine data for a set of electric utilities and find that regulation of emissions had a large impact on total factor productivity growth lowering it for regulated firms by 59 percentage points many other factors might help to explain the productivity slowdown including the rise in energy prices the long and severe recession and declines in research and development expenditures there have been a variety of studies examining the contributions of each factor to the slowdown they generally conclude that many factors contributed to the slowdown but that a sizable fraction of the slowdown remains unexplained by the estimated contributions of all the factors considered

vertical strategic interaction implications for channel pricing strategy this paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels using foresight i e price leadership and considering category implications i e product line pricing are price leadership and product line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member if not when does this occur and why by investigating these questions we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues in addition this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions as such this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the right demand specification at the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member s reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure specifically if a channel member s best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability vss if the best reaction is to increase the margin the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity vsc if the best reaction is no margin change it is referred to as vertical strategic independence vsi using a game theoretic approach we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products both carried by two competing retailers as such the model allows for retailer product line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition in addition this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature i e a bilateral monopoly jeuland and shugan jeuland abel steven m shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2summer 239 72 two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers mcguire and staelin mcguire timothy w richard staelin 1983 an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 92 and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing choi choi s chan 1991 price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer marketing sci 10fall 271 96 unlike many other channel studies most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves thus this paper provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions the paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set the manufacturer uses foresight the retailer uses foresight and neither channel member uses foresight we then show a one to one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership specifically a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for vss but prefers to be a follower for vsc for vsi channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue as it has no effect on channel member profits we also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non product line pricing to product line pricing such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by vss or vsc at a more general level this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge i e foresight and or product line pricing in making strategic marketing decisions in this way ignorance can be bliss we also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction we show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price interestingly we find that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function consequently in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear finally our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer s precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations

strategic commitment versus postponement in a two tier supply chain abstract in this paper the trade off between strategic commitment and operational flexibility is examined as it arises in a supply chain when a supplier offers competing buyers opportunities to make early purchase commitments for a product with a short life cycle traditionally the use of incentives for early purchase commitments for short life cycle products has been justified on the basis of a supplier s production lead times or capacity constraints an alternative explanation has been proposed by offering early purchasing opportunities a supplier can influence the form of competition in the downstream market using a single period model it has been shown that below a threshold level of demand uncertainty the supplier can benefit from providing adequate pricing incentives to entice downstream buyers to commit to purchase quantities before demand information is revealed moreover such early purchasing opportunities can benefit the supplier as well as the buyers even in the absence of production lead times or capacity constraints

distribution channels an extension of exclusive retailership the underlying channel structure in most studies to date has consisted either of exclusive dealers that sell only one manufacturer s brand or of a single retailer selling multiple brands little attention has been given to the larger segment of most consumer goods markets in which retailers compete to sell multiple brands at the same location this research seeks to add to the growing literature of channel competition by analyzing three channel structures the least constrained of which deals with two competing manufacturers and two retailers each of whom distributes both products in a noncooperative game with two nash s and one stackleberg equilibrium using differentiated products and a linear demand function we introduce the concept of store substitutability a measure corresponding to product substitutability representing competitiveness at the retail level between the two retailers we are able to obtain closed form solutions for all cases we show that the presence of competitive effects at both retail and manufacturer levels of distribution has a significant impact on profits and prices we also study the effects of various power relationships in the channel furthermore we compare these results to those obtained by previous research finally we propose some testable implications and suggest avenues for future research

introduction of a second channel implications for pricing and profits in this paper we study the optimal pricing strategies when a product is sold on two channels such as the internet and a traditional channel we assume a stylized deterministic demand model where the demand on a channel depends on prices degree of substitution across channels and the overall market potential we first study four prevalent pricing strategies which differ in the degree of autonomy for the internet channel for a monopoly we provide theoretical bounds for these pricing strategies we also analyze the duopoly case where an incumbent mixed retailer faces competition with a pure retailer and characterize price equilibria finally through a computational study we explore the behavior price and profits under different parameters and consumer preferences for the alternative channels

comparing energy use structures an input output decomposition analysis of large economies abstract in this paper we aim to assess how the changes in aspects of demand impact the use of energy in the developing economies of brazil china and india and the developed economies of germany the united kingdom and the united states to achieve this objective we use input output matrices for the years 1995 and 2005 by applying a structural decomposition analysis we find the following brazil is the only country where technology has a positive impact on energy germany and the united kingdom decrease their use of energy over the sample period china and the united kingdom are the only countries where the use of renewable inputs decreases and in brazil china and the united states the use of coal increases when we change the focus of our analysis from aggregated to disaggregated results these countries can be lined up differently in terms of development in relation to their wealth and energy use

interactions between members of a marketing production channel under seasonal demand abstract key decisions in a marketing production channel faced with a seasonal demand include production and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and processing and pricing decisions for the retailer in such situations a variety of contracts are possible including contracts under which the manufacturer charges a constant price throughout the season or the retailer processes at a constant rate throughout the season also possible are channel structures in which the manufacturer and retailer cooperate to make decisions jointly the main objective of the present paper is to compare optimal policies under all the situations described above we show that having a constant manufacturer s price or a constant processing rate does not have a significant impact upon the retailer s price or inventory decisions however if the demand is not highly seasonal a constant processing rate contract will result in higher production and processing rates and a lower manufacturer s price compared to a constant manufacturer s price contract also a centralized channel involving joint decision making will lead to a lower price at the retail level and higher production and processing rates hence issues such as channel coordination and contracts between manufacturers and retailers which have received significant attention in the marketing literature have implications for the production area as well

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

transaction cost theory inferences from clinical field research on downstream vertical integration a bulk of the marketing research on distribution channel design attempts to resolve the question of when a direct company owned sales operation would be preferred to an indirect independent distributor operation the widely accepted theoretical rationale is provided by transaction cost theory which indicates that the total costs of going to market inclusive of distribution as well as its administration is likely to be lower for the direct option when the sales transactions require investments in unique assets for effectively serving the end customer examples of unique assets are account specific sales teams and account dedicated repair and maintenance facilities conversely transaction cost theory indicates that an indirect option would be the more efficient one for sales transactions that require investments only in nonunique assets such as an inventory of standard parts since its formulation in 1975 the transaction cost framework has been empirically confirmed in a variety of marketing channel se

when is servitization a profitable competitive strategy abstract although servitization has emerged as a new competitive strategy for manufacturers there has been little research about product level servitization we investigate the competition between two channels one separately providing both goods and services and the other providing inseparable servitized goods through a game theoretic approach two critical parameters to understand competition between the two channels will be proposed 1 service dependency a degree of dependency of physical goods upon services and 2 channel substitutability a degree of substitution between conventional channels and servitized one the study reveals that the servitization strategy is a better choice for a manufacturer selling physical goods only when the goods require a higher level of service i e high service dependency and when the competition between the two channels is more severe i e high channel substitutability in addition obtaining cost efficiency is found to be an important factor to achieve higher competitive advantage over the other channel