global energy use decoupling or convergence we examine the key factors driving change in energy use globally over the past four decades we test for both strong decoupling where economic growth has less effect on energy use as income increases and weak decoupling where energy use declines overtime in richer countries ceteris paribus our econometric approach is robust to the presence of unit roots unobserved time effects and spatial effects our key findings are that the growth of per capita energy use has been primarily driven by economic growth convergence in energy intensity and weak decoupling there is no sign of strong decoupling

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

income resources and electricity mix this paper presents evidence on a national level electricity ladder which sees countries transition toward coal and natural gas and finally nuclear power and modern renewables such as wind power for their electricity needs as they develop the extent to which countries climb the electricity ladder is dependent on energy endowments the results imply that the environmental implications of economic development differ in countries with different energy resource endowments an effective global carbon mitigation strategy will require developing countries to leapfrog the middle rungs of the electricity ladder

a two person game of information transmission we consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities one player is specialized in gathering information and transmitting it to the other who takes the decision this process is modeled as a game qualitative properties of the equilibria are analyzed the impact of improving the quality of available information on the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is studied better information generally may not improve welfare we give conditions under which it will

natural resources and sub national economic performance does sub national democracy matter abstract the differentiation in the impact of resources on economic growth is often explained by the specifics of institutional factors the aim of this paper is to investigate how sub national political differences influence the effect of natural resources on economic growth using a dataset of russian regions this paper demonstrates that sub national democratization influences the growth effects of resources and considers possible mechanisms for this influence the paper finds that in russia natural resources are only capable of promoting growth in the regions with non democratic political systems that at the same time have an efficient and non corrupt bureaucracy

who ll stop lying under oath empirical evidence from tax evasion games using two earned income tax declaration experimental designs we show that only partial liars are affected by a truth telling oath a non price commitment device under oath we see no change in the number of chronic liars and fewer partial liars rather than smoothly increasing their compliance we also observe that partial liars who respond to the oath respond by becoming fully honest under oath based on both response times data and the consistency of subjects when several compliance decisions are made in a row we show that partial lying arises as the result of weak preferences towards profitable honesty the oath only transforms people with weak preferences for lying into being committed to the truth

the new institutional economics this outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world s leading economists including ronald coase douglass c north masahiko aoki oliver e williamson and harold demsetz it demonstrates the extent and depth of the new institutional economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession

the big push natural resource booms and growth a simple application of big push reasoning suggests that natural resource booms can be important catalysts for development in poorer countries in this paper we present evidence from seven latin american countries that natural resource booms are sometimes accompa nied by declining per capita gdp we present a model with natural resources increasing returns in the spirit of big push models and expectations to clarify some of the reasons this may happen q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

can there be a market for cheap talk information an experimental investigation abstract this paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information we find that the level of trade in these markets is very small and eventually vanishes sellers provide low quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff this contributes to the low demand in the market for information moreover we observe the same very low level of activity in the market for information when sellers face no conflict of interest and the noise in the quality of the transmitted information is much lower hence we argue that the collapse of the market for information is a demand phenomenon and even small uncertainty over the quality of information seems to have a large impact

cursing the blessings natural resource abundance institutions and economic growth summary since sachs and warner s sachs j d warner a m 1995a natural resource abundance and economic growth nber working paper no 5398 contribution there has been a lively debate on the so called natural resource curse this paper re examines the effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth using new measures of resource endowment and considering the role of institutional quality we find a positive direct empirical relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth in both ols and 2sls regressions the positive resource effects are particularly strong for subsoil wealth our results also show no evidence of negative indirect effects of natural resources through the institutional channel

international environmental agreements the role of foresight the present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the cooperative and the non cooperative approach employed to examine the size of stable coalitions formed to address global environmental problems we do so by endowing countries with foresightedness that is by endogenizing the reaction of the coalition s members to a deviation by one member we assume that when a country contemplates withdrawing or joining an agreement it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own actions we identify conditions under which there always exists a unique set of farsighted stable ieas the new farsighted ieas can be much larger than those some of the previous models supported but are not always pareto efficient

the resource curse analysis of the applicability to the large scale export of electricity from renewable resources abstract the resource curse has been analyzed extensively in the context of non renewable resources such as oil and gas more recently commentators have expressed concerns that also renewable electricity exports can have adverse economic impacts on exporting countries my paper analyzes to what extent the resource curse applies in the case of large scale renewable electricity exports i develop a comprehensive model that integrates previous works and provides a consolidated view of how non renewable resource abundance impacts economic growth deploying this model i analyze through case studies on laos mongolia and the mena region to what extent exporters of renewable electricity run into the danger of the resource curse i find that renewable electricity exports avoid some disadvantages of non renewable resource exports including i shocks after resource depletion ii macroeconomic fluctuations and iii competition for a fixed amount of resources nevertheless renewable electricity exports bear some of the same risks as conventional resource exports including i crowding out of the manufacturing sector ii incentives for corruption and iii reduced government accountability i conclude with recommendations for managing such risks

from the lab to the field a review of tax experiments tax experiments have been gaining momentum in recent years although this literature dates back several decades with new developments in methods and data availability tax experiments have gradually moved away from lab settings and towards the field this movement from the lab to the field has happened against the background of the credibility revolution in applied economics which has seen more rigorous methods applied to policy relevant questions and of the availability to researchers of administrative data from tax returns these developments have allowed significant advances in the experimental literature on tax compliance this paper reviews this literature giving particular attention to field experiments using administrative data but putting them in the broader context of the compliance literature a particular effort is made to take a global perspective in a literature that is only recently seeing the emergence of evidence from africa latin america and asia

farsighted coalitional stability abstract i define the largest consistent set a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts act publicly and are fully farsighted in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts another coalition might react a third coalition might in turn react and so on without limit i establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting i argue that it improves on the von neumann morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c71

natural resources and economic development new panel evidence the question as to whether natural resources are a curse on economic growth and development is subject to considerable debates and remains controversial using heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques this paper provides a fresh re examination of the resource curse while allowing for cross section heterogeneity and commonalities in the nexus between natural resource abundance and economic development it finds in a sample of developing countries that economies endowed with abundant natural resources tend to develop more slowly than countries with scarce resources natural resources are on average a curse however there is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of resource abundance on economic development across countries perhaps because of differences in the extent of government intervention access to sound money legal structures and the security of property rights the degree of globalization and or corruption

social programs as positive inducements for tax participation a significant amount of non compliance with the personal income tax is due to individuals who have not filed a tax return and so who are not in the system we use experimental laboratory methods to examine the effect of positive inducements for filing a tax return our design captures the essential features of a voluntary income reporting and tax assessment system human participants earn income they must decide whether to file a tax return and conditional upon filing they must choose how much income to report taxes are paid on reported income only unreported income of filers may be discovered via a random audit and the participant then pays owed taxes plus a fine inducements for filing are introduced as treatments a social safety net e g unemployment replacement income that is conditional upon past filing behavior and a tax credit that is available only to those who file our results suggest that an untargeted tax credit can encourage participation but that targeting the credit to low income earners offers a stronger inducement to file also the provision of a social safety net via unemployment benefits has a positive albeit an indirect impact on participation

a theory of political transitions we develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of western europe and latin america nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite the initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution especially when the opportunity cost is low for example during recessions the threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

money talks an experimental investigation of cheap talk and burned money we experimentally study the strategic transmission of information in a setting where both cheap talk and money can be used for communication purposes theoretically a large number of equilibria exist side by side in which senders either use costless messages money or a combination of the two we find that senders prefer to communicate through costless messages only when the interest disalignment between sender and receiver increases cheap talk tends to break down and high sender types start burning money to enhance the credibility of their costless messages a behavioral model due to kartik 2009 assuming that sellers bear a cost of lying fits the data best

persuasive communication when the sender s incentives are uncertain abstract we study persuasion in a modified crawford sobel sender receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender the good s quality and the sender s type neutral or biased are not observable to the receiver these alterations yield a simple model and a unique truth telling equilibrium in which neutral senders who observe different qualities fully separate but can only communicate low quality levels accurately biased senders adopt a mixed strategy that can successfully persuade the receiver to accept the good most of the time when the sender s degree of bias is continuously distributed a truth telling equilibrium does not exist nonetheless a partition equilibrium exists for any given number of partitions on the message space

do natural resources attract nonresource fdi abstract a new and extensive panel of outward nonresource and resource fdi is used to investigate the effect of natural resources on the different components of fdi our main findings are as follows first for countries which were not a resource producer before a resource discovery causes nonresource fdi to fall 16 in the short run and by 68 in the long run second for countries that were already a resource producer a doubling of resource rents induces a 12 4 fall in nonresource fdi third on average the contraction in nonresource fdi outweighs the boom in resource fdi aggregate fdi falls by 4 if the resource bonanza is doubled finally these negative effects on nonresource fdi are amplified through the positive spatial lags in nonresource fdi we also find that resource fdi is vertical whereas nonresource fdi is of the export fragmentation variety our main findings are robust to different measures of resource reserves and the oil price and to allowing sample selection bias

long run trends in 26 primary commodity prices abstract this paper uses time series techniques to re examine the prebisch singer hypothesis that there has been a secular deterioration in primary commodity prices in terms of manufactured goods instead of using price indices it considers 26 individual commodity prices over the period 1900 1983 this avoids possible aggregation and interpretation problems associated with the use of aggregate indices the study finds that 16 of the 26 prices are trendless five have statistically significant negative trends the remaining five have positive trends it concludes that the prebisch singer hypothesis should certainly not be considered a universal phenomenon or stylized fact

the paradox of plenty a meta analysis since sachs and warner s seminal article in 1995 numerous studies have addressed the link between natural resources and economic growth although the resource curse effect was commonly accepted at first many articles have challenged its existence and the results found in the literature are ambiguous in this paper we aim to quantitatively review this literature in order to i identify the sources of heterogeneity and ii assess the impact of natural resources on economic growth a meta analysis is performed on 69 empirical studies on the resource curse totaling 1 419 estimates our findings show that i only developing countries suffer from the resource curse although it is soft ii the way natural resources are taken into account is crucial to understand the heterogeneity found in the literature iii the negative impact of the volatility of the terms of trade on growth should be qualified an additional mra performed on indirect effects size also indicate that when institutions are at their best level the resource curse disappears and may be turned into a blessing

the allocation of time in decision making we study the allocation of time across decision problems if a decision maker 1 has noisy estimates of value 2 improves those estimates the longer he or she analyzes a choice problem and 3 allocates time optimally then the decision maker should spend less time choosing when the difference in value between two options is relatively large to test this prediction we ask subjects to make 27 binary incentive compatible intertemporal choices and measure response time for each decision our time allocation model explains 54 of the variance in average decision time these results support the view that decision making is a cognitively costly activity that uses time as an input allocated according to cost benefit principles

blessing and curse the gold boom and local development in colombia abstract i provide a microeconomic channel for the resource curse using the boom in colombian gold mining as a case study identification strategies exploit trend changes in international gold prices after 2002 and regional gold production capabilities as measured by water supply the majority of gold mining in colombia is placer mining and water is important for industrial gold production i find that the gold boom decreases local unemployment in the short term by 3 5 however given the lack of capacity to effectively ban child labor these economic opportunities are also available for children my results indicate that because of the gold boom the probability that a child works increases by 9 3 and school attendance decreases by 23 9 capital accumulation seems to be permanently hurt since the probability that a child is lagging three or more grades behind increases by 9 these effects are only discernible after 2002 the human capital results can be retrieved from different databases furthermore results are robust to a series of robustness checks restricting the sample to gold producers and their neighbors using alternative sets of controls and restricting the sample to non migrants resources are a blessing in the short term but a curse for long term economic growth if human capital is productive

a note on cheap talk and burned money abstract austen smith and banks cheap talk and burned money j econ theory 91 1 2000 1 16 study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of crawford and sobel strategic information transmission econometrica 50 6 1982 1431 1451 i identify an error in the main theorem of austen smith and banks and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications i also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning this strengthens a result of austen smith and banks but uncovers other errors in their analysis finally an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct

bribing and signaling in second price auctions abstract we examine whether a two bidder second price auction for a single good with private independent values is immune to a simple form of collusion where one bidder may bribe the other to commit to stay away from the auction i e submit a bid of zero in either of two cases where the potential bribe is fixed or allowed to vary the only robust equilibria involve bribing in the fixed bribe case there is a unique such equilibrium in the variable bribes case all robust equilibria involve low briber types revealing themselves through the amount they offer while all high types offer the same bribe only one such equilibrium is continuous bribing in all cases causes inefficiency

property rights and the political organization of agriculture we propose a general equilibrium model where the economic organization of agriculture and the political equilibrium determining the security of property rights are jointly determined in particular because the form of organization may affect the probability and distribution of benefits from future property challenges it may be shaped in anticipation of this impact property rights security may then be secured at the expense of economic efficiency the model provides a framework for understanding why in some contexts land is redistributed primarily via land sales and tenancy markets but via politics and conflict in others we test some implications of the theory using a five decade panel dataset that traces changes in the extent of tenancy and tenancy reform across 15 indian states

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

a model of agreements in strategic form games abstract because in a strategic form game all the possibilities of communication available to the players must be explicitly listed in the strategy spaces coalitions and coalitional behaviour are not very often taken into account in noncooperative games however it may be desirable especially in applications to separate the basic strategic features of a situation from those strategic features added as a consequence of the possibility of coalitional behaviour we define an equilibrium for the bargaining procedure called by greenberg the theory of solid situations an alternative game theoretic approach cambridge university press cambridge uk 1990 coalitional contingent threat situation we argue that the crucial problem of expectations on the counterdeviations following a deviation can be addressed by defining coalitional strategies and studying the equilibrium of the extended game journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c70 c71

a consistent bargaining set abstract both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency in excluding imputations to which there exist objections the core does not assess the credibility of such objections the bargaining set goes a step further only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified however the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed we formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a chain of objections is tested in precisely the same way as its predecessor various properties of the consistent bargaining set are also analyzed

corruption and the extractive industries transparency initiative the extractive industries transparency initiative eiti has received much attention as a scheme that can help reduce corruption in mineral rich developing economies to our knowledge this paper provides the first empirical attempt using panel data to explore how eiti membership links to changes in corruption levels we also examine whether the different stages in eiti implementation initial commitment candidature full compliance influence the pace of changes in corruption we find that eiti membership offers on the whole a shielding mechanism against the general tendency of mineral rich countries to experience increases in corruption over time

resource intensity institutions and development summary we examine the relationship between resource abundance and several indicators of human welfare consistent with the existing literature on the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth we find that given an initial income level resource intensive countries tend to suffer lower levels of human development while we find only weak support for a direct link between resources and welfare there is an indirect link that operates through institutional quality there are also significant differences in the effects that resources have on different measures of institutional quality these results imply that the resource curse is a more encompassing phenomenon than previously considered and that key differences exist between the effects of different resource types on various aspects of governance and human welfare 2005 elsevier ltd all rights reserved

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

the hidden cost of raising voters expectations reference dependence and politicians credibility abstract two politicians compete to get elected each politician is characterized by a valence which is unobservable to the electorate and can take one of two values high or low the representative voter prefers politicians with high valence but random shocks may lead him to appoint a low valence politician politicians make statements concerning their valence if the voter is a standard expected utility maximizer politicians statements lack any credibility and no information transmission takes place by introducing reference dependence and loss aversion we show that truthful communication is possible in equilibrium and we characterize the conditions under which it can arise intuitively these behavioral biases introduce a cost of overstating one s valence as overstatements may shift the electorate s preferences toward better skilled opponents

cheap talk and burned money we augment the standard crawford sobel 1982 econometrica 50 1431 1451 model of cheap talk communication by allowing the informed party to use both costless and costly messages the issues on which we focus are the consequences for cheap talk signaling of the option to burn money and the circumstances under which both cheap talk and burned money are used to signal information

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

investment in energy efficiency do the characteristics of firms matter the literature on energy efficiency provides numerous examples of apparently profitable technologies that are not universally adopted yet according to the standard neoclassical theory of investment profit maximizing firms should undertake all investments with a positive net present value the standard theory also holds that the discount rate for computing the present value of a project should be the return available on other projects in the same risk class and therefore should not depend on characteristics of the firm this model as applied to energy saving investments is tested by examining whether firms characteristics influence their decision to join the environmental protection agency s voluntary green lights program a discrete choice regression is estimated over a large sample of participating and nonparticipating firms missing values in the data matrix are replaced with multiple imputations from a distribution estimated using the expectation maximization algorithm the results show that 1 sub

coalition formation in international environmental agreements and the role of institutions abstract the aim of this paper is to discuss the role played by international institutions in achieving effective international environmental agreements we emphasise the strategic nature of environmental negotiations and use a game theoretic model of coalitional bargaining to illustrate the main issues we argue that international institutions can intervene in the framing of the strategic interactions between countries i e setting the rules of the negotiation game and can influence the actual agreement reached when different outcomes of the negotiation game can be equilibria

rule of law and the resource curse abundance versus intensity we examine the resource curse using new data on historic resource stocks and an improved econometric methodology the paper distinguishes between resource abundance stocks and extractive intensity flows focusing on relationships between resources and rule of law previously unavailable information on past resource stocks is estimated we find that economically large initial natural resource stocks are associated with subsequent lower levels of rule of law and do not directly affect growth while raw resource exports do not have a significant effect on rule of law when stocks are included in the analysis but do affect average growth rates sample size is maximized through the use of an emis expectation maximization with importance sampling algorithm to replace missing data minimizing the bias and inefficiency associated with listwise deletion which commonly eliminates half or more of the available data in this setting

commitment to pay taxes results from field and laboratory experiments abstract a tax authority s ability to successfully collect taxes depends on its relationship with the taxpayers as well as their commitment to contribute to the common good in this paper we examine the effect of promises on tax compliance aimed at fostering taxpayer commitment first in a field experiment we investigate whether tax compliance changes when taxpayers make a formal promise to pay their taxes on time with compliance rewarded by entry into a lottery for either a financial or nonfinancial in kind reward we then complement this analysis with a laboratory experiment in which we measure the effect of promises in the different compliance domain of tax honesty and contrast the effect of a pure promise to pay with schemes that pair the promise with a reward offer we find that taxpayers with a history of compliance or high scores on tax morale are more likely to make the promise but solely offering the possibility to make a promise does not lead to a change in compliance behavior whether or not compliance improves depends on the type of reward to which the promise is linked in our experimental analyses for example compliance only increases if the reward for promise fulfillment is nonfinancial

coalition formation as a dynamic process abstract we study coalition formation as an ongoing dynamic process with payoffs generated as coalitions form disintegrate or regroup a process of coalition formation pcf is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value compared to inaction this future value in turn is endogenous it depends on coalitional movements at each node we study existence of equilibrium pcfs we connect deterministic equilibrium pcfs with unique absorbing state to the core and equilibrium pcfs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set in addition we study cyclical as well as stochastic equilibrium pcfs

natural resources education and economic development economic growth since 1965 has varied inversely with the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries four main channels of transmission from abundant natural resources to stunted economic development are discussed a the dutch disease b rent seeking c overconfidence and d neglect of education public expenditure on education relative to national income expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrolment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries natural capital appears to crowd out human capital thereby slowing down the pace of economic development

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

language meaning and games a model of communication coordination and evolution language is a powerful coordination device we generalize the cheap talk approach to pre play communication by way of introducing a meaning cor respondence between messages and actions and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages players have a lexicographic preference second to material payoffs against deviating from the meaning correspondence under two sided communication in generic and symmetric n 3 n coordination games a nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique pareto efficient out come of the underlying game we extend the analysis to one sided communica tion in arbitrary finite two player games jel c72 c73 z 3

bequests as signals an explanation for the equal division puzzle in the united states more than two thirds of decedents with multichild families divide their estates exactly equally among their children in contrast gifts given before death are usually unequal these findings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the determination of intergenerational transfers in this paper we develop a theory that accounts for this puzzle based on the notion that the division of bequests provides a signal about a parent s altruistic preferences the theory can also explain the norm of unigeniture which prevails in other societies

the varieties of resource experience natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic growth many oil mineral and plantation crop based economies experienced a substantial deceleration in growth following the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and early 1980s this article illustrates how countries dependent on point source natural resources those extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base such as oil and minerals and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened economic and social divisions and weakened institutional capacity this in turn impedes their ability to respond effectively to shocks which previous studies have shown to be essential for sustaining rising levels of prosperity analysis of data on classifications of export structure controlling for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance shows that point source and coffee and cocoa exporting countries do relatively poorly across an array of governance indicators these governance effects are not associated simply with being a natural resource exporter countries with natural resource exports that are diffuse relying primarily on livestock and agricultural produce from small family farms do not show the same strong effects and have had more robust growth recoveries

coalition formation in non democracies we study the formation of a ruling coalition in non democratic societies where institutions do not enable political commitments each individual is endowed with a level of political power the ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources a ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it and it needs to be self enforcing in the sense that none of its subcoalitions should be able to secede and become the new ruling coalition we present both an axiomatic approach that captures these notions and determines a generically unique ruling coalition and the analysis of a dynamic game of coalition formation that encompasses these ideas we establish that the subgame perfect equilibria of the coalition formation game coincide with the set of ruling coalitions resulting from the axiomatic approach a key insight of our analysis is that a coalition is made self enforcing by the failure of its winning subcoalitions to be self enforcing this is most simply illustrated by the following example with majority rule two person coalitions are generically not self enforcing and consequently three person coalitions are self enforcing unless one player is disproportionately powerful we also characterize the structure of ruling coalitions for example we determine the conditions under which ruling coalitions are robust to small changes in the distribution of power and when they are fragile we also show that when the distribution of power across individuals is relatively equal and there is majoritarian voting only certain sizes of coalitions e g with majority rule coalitions of size 1 3 7 15 etc can be the ruling coalition copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

experience and gender effects in an acquiring a company experiment allowing for value messages this paper focuses on a bargaining experiment in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for acquiring the company participants are constantly in the role of either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with randomly changing partners in the other role we test how overstating the value of the company underpricing the received value message and acceptance of price offers are affected by experience and gender constellation like in our companion paper on single play di cagno et al 2015 we control via treatments for awareness of gender constellation one main hypothesis is that gender constellation matters but that the effects become weaker with more experience and that the main experience effects apply across gender constellations

price and advertising signals of product quality we present a signaling model based on ideas of phillip nelson in which both the introductory price and the level of directly uninformative advertising or other dissipative marketing expenditures are choice variables and may be used as signals for the initially unobservable quality of a newly introduced experience good repeat purchases play a crucial role in our model a second focus of the paper is on illustrating an approach to refining the set of equilibria in signalling games with multiple potential signals

natural resources institutional quality and economic growth in china the resource curse has been mainly studied using cross country samples in this paper we analyze a cross province sample from one country china we focus on the interplay between resource abundance institutional quality and economic growth using two different measures of resource abundance a stock resource reserves and a flow resource revenues and employing various econometric approaches including varying coefficient models we find that resource abundance has a positive effect on economic growth at the provincial level in china between 1990 and 2008 an effect that depends nonlinearly on institutional quality 1995 confidence in courts the west china development drive policy initiated in 2000 caused substantial changes which we investigate through a comparative panel data analysis

property rights corruption and the allocation of talent a general equilibrium approach we consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes we find that 1 it may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully 2 less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption 3 there may exist a free lunch such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption increase investment and achieve a better allocation of talent bureaucratic corruption is widespread in many societies casual empiricism and case studies suggest that corruption distorts the allocation of resources and discourages investment and the creation of new firms e g mydral 1968 desoto 1989 cross country studies also find that countries with high corruption or long bureaucratic delays suffer lower growth e g mauro 1996 sartre 1997 it is therefore tempting to conclude that government policies and bureaucratic corruption are at least partly responsible for the lack of development or slow growth of many economies e g shleifer and vishny 1993 nevertheless governments and bureaucracies do not exist only to seek rents they perform a number of useful functions including provision of public goods correction of market failures and redistribution without understanding why the state exists it is difficult to assess why corruption arises what its consequences are and whether and how it should be prevented in this paper we analyse how the employees of the state bureaucrats can misuse their power to enforce property rights the protection of property rights is commonly viewed as one of the most important roles of the state by political philosophers as diverse as david hume karl marx and robert nozick while a number of social scientists including north and thomas 1973 and rosenberg and bridzell 1989 emphasise the importance of secure property rights in the development of western societies for the state to have a role in enforcing property rights some contractual problems must exist between private parties in our economy these contractual problems are between entrepreneurs in particular production requires two agents and one of the entrepreneurs needs to undertake an investment but the returns accrue to the other one this can be thought as a partnership with the first agent as an upstream supplier providing an input of variable

partially verifiable information and mechanism design in a principal agent model with adverse selection we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent s message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic we characterize such correspondence for which the revelation principle is valid returns must not contradict easily observable elements of the taxpayer s lifestyle in this paper we present a model of two person organizations in which these considerations are important we ask whether the restrictions on fallacious statements inherent in the system are sufficient to achieve the goals of the organization we show that the optimal way of eliciting the agent s response may not be to establish incentives for truthtelling in all instances in our model there is one player the agent who observes the state of the economic system another player the principal takes an action based on the information presented to him by the agent this class of models is often referred to as the principal agent problem in the extensive and growing literature on this problem it has always been assumed that the agent could lie to the principal and therefore that he had to be properly motivated to act at least partially in the principal s interest our formal way of modelling the partial verifiability of information is to introduce the restriction that the agent s responses must lie in a set m o that varies with the true state 0 it is assumed that this set always admits the possibility of responding with the true state the way in which the allowable response set varies with the true state is known to the principal in other respects we retain the usual principal agent formalization in particular the principal is the stackelberg leader in this game he can commit himself to choose a collective action as a function of the message transmitted by the agent whether the variation of the message space with the true observation is purely technological or whether it is induced by the severity of potential actions of the principal

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

conflict of interest and the credibility of underwriter analyst recommendations brokerage analysts frequently comment on and sometimes recommend companies that their firms have recently taken public we show that stocks that underwriter analysts recommend perform more poorly than buy recommendations by unaffiliated brokers prior to at the time of and subsequent to the recommendation date we conclude that the recommendations by underwriter analysts show significant evidence of bias we show also that the market does not recognize the full extent of this bias the results suggest a potential conflict of interest inherent in the different functions that investment bankers perform

why do we lie a practical guide to the dishonesty literature over the last decade a massive body of research has been devoted to uncovering human dishonesty in the present paper we review more than a hundred papers from this literature and provide a comprehensive overview by first listing the existing theoretical frameworks and then covering the common empirical approaches synthesizing the demographic and personal characteristics of those who cheat identifying the behavioural mechanisms found that affect dishonesty and finally we finish by discussing how the empirical evidence fit theory overall the review concludes that many people behave dishonestly but also that it is a highly malleable behavior sensitive to elements such as decision contexts behaviour of others state of mind and depletion the review can be used as an overview of the dishonesty literature or as a guide or work of reference for selected topics of interest

the resource curse what have we learned from two decades of intensive research introduction to the special issue there has been increasing interest in the so called resource curse that is the tendency of resource rich countries to underperform in several development outcomes this has generated a mountain of often contradictory evidence leaving many floundering in the flood of information this special issue compiles eight papers from some of the most prominent contributors to this literature combining original research with critical reflection on the current stock of knowledge the studies collectively emphasise the complexities and conditionalities of the curse its presence intensity is largely context specific depending on the type of resources socio political institutions and linkages with the rest of the economy

preference elicitation under oath eliciting sincere preferences for non market goods remain a challenge due to the discrepency between hypothetical and real behavior and false zeros the gap arises because people either overstate hypothetical values or understate real commitments or a combination of both herein we examine whether the traditional real world institution of the solemn oath can improve preference elicitation applying the social psychology theory on the oath as a truth telling commitment device we ask our bidders to swear on their honour to give honest answers prior to participating in an incentive compatible second price auction the oath is an ancillary mechanism to commit bidders to bid sincerely in a second price auction results from our induced valuation testbed treatments suggest that the oath only auctions outperform all our other auctions real and hypothetical in our homegrown valuation treatments eliciting preferences for dolphin protection the oath only design induced people to treat as binding both their experimental budget constraint i e lower values on the high end of the value distribution and participation constraint i e positive values in place of the zero bids used to opt out of auction based on companion treatments we show the oath works through an increase in the willingness to tell the truth due to a strengthening of the intrinsic motivation to do so

dynamics and stability of constitutions coalitions and clubs a central feature of dynamic collective decision making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions for example current constitutional change must take into account how the new constitution may pave the way for further changes in laws and regulations we develop a general framework for the analysis of this class of dynamic problems under relatively natural acyclicity assumptions we provide a complete characterization of dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and determine conditions for their uniqueness we show how this framework can be applied in political economy coalition formation and the analysis of the dynamics of clubs the explicit characterization we provide highlights two intuitive features of dynamic collective decision making 1 a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently many members of the society 2 efficiency enhancing changes are often resisted because of further social changes that they will engender

corruption and the political economy of resource based development a comparison of asia and sub saharan africa we model how the supply and demand for bribes affects resource use by an economy and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets this requires adjusting the world bank s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption the impacts of corruption on long run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across african and asian economies from 1970 to 2003 corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of african countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term but for asian countries corruption is less important than point resources corruption influences long run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries and is also the pathway through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use trade and abundance

how sharing information can garble experts advice we model the strategic provision of advice in environments where a principal s optimal action depends on an unobserved binary state of interest experts receive signals about the state and each recommends an action the principal and all experts dislike making errors in their decision and recommendations respectively but may have different costs of different errors is it in the principal s interest to let experts share information although sharing improves experts ability to avoid errors we identify a simple environment in which any principal regardless of how he trades off the different errors is worse off if he permits information sharing

drivers of industrial and non industrial greenhouse gas emissions abstract though there has been extensive analysis of the drivers of aggregate carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production there has been much less analysis of the drivers of greenhouse gases in general and especially of aggregate emissions of greenhouse gases from agriculture forestry and other land uses which we call non industrial emissions in this paper we statistically analyze the relationship between both industrial and non industrial greenhouse gas emissions and economic growth and other potential drivers for 129 countries over the period from 1971 to 2010 our analysis combines the three main approaches in the literature into a single framework for investigating the evolution of emissions and income we find that economic growth is a driver of both industrial and non industrial emissions though economic growth has twice the effect on industrial emissions the time effect is negative for both sources of emissions though this effect is larger for non industrial emissions there is also convergence in emissions intensity for both types of emissions but given these other effects there is no evidence for an environmental kuznets curve

selection vs accountability an experimental investigation of campaign promises in a moral hazard environment abstract we examine retrospective and prospective voting considerations in an experiment implementing a simple voting model in each period the official chooses how much rent to appropriate from a social endowment announcement of this choice is followed by an election between the official and a randomly selected challenger with the winner becoming the official in the next period we vary two features of the setting a the discount factor and b whether candidates can make costless non binding campaign promises about their behaviour if elected consistent with the model s predictions both raising the discount factor and introducing campaign promises lead to lower rent appropriation by officials and worse electoral outcomes other things equal for incumbents campaign promises despite being cheap talk have real effects promising less appropriation is rewarded by voters but breaking such promises is punished finally we find a weak positive association between campaign promises and officials subsequent behaviour

persuasive puffery sellers often make claims about product strengths without providing evidence even though such claims are mere puffery we show that they can be credible because talking up any one strength comes at the implicit trade off of not talking up another potential strength puffery pulls in some buyers who value product attributes that are talked up or emphasized while pushing away other buyers who infer that the attributes they value are relative weaknesses when the initial probability of making a sale is low there are more potential buyers to pull in than to push away so puffery is persuasive overall this persuasiveness requires that buyers have some privacy about their preferences so that the seller does not completely pander to them more generally the results show how comparative cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker can be credible and persuasive in standard discrete choice models used throughout marketing economics and other disciplines

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

industry structure with sequential technology choice abstract noncooperative entry deterrence arises in a market where firms enter sequentially and irreversibly choose a technology in the case of delegated entry deterrence the earliest firms enter with a normal technology and pass on entry deterrence responsibilities to subsequent entrants in the case of partial entry deterrence the earlliest firms choose an inferior technology that allows some but not full entry of later firms with a normal technology in both cases entry is deterred in that the equilibrium number of firms is smaller than would prevail if all firms were to choose a normal technology

relying on the information of interested parties we investigate the conventional wisdom that competition among interested parties attempting to influence a decisionmaker by providing verifiable information elicits all relevant information we find that if the decisionmaker is strategically sophisticated and well informed about the relevant variables and about the preferences of the interested party or parties competition may be unnecessary to achieve this result if the decisionmaker is unsophisticated or not well informed competition is not generally sufficient if the interested parties interests are sufficiently opposed however or if the decisionmaker is seeking to advance the parties welfare then competition can reduce or even eliminate the decisionmaker s need for prior knowledge about the relevant variables and for strategic sophistication in other settings only the combination of competition among information providers and a sophisticated skepticism is sufficient to allow effective decisionmaking

natural resource abundance and economic growth this paper explores whether natural resource abundance leads other things equal to slower growth rates we distinguish between natural resource dependence rd and the natural resource endowment re we estimate three models using world bank data on national capital stocks in a one equation model we show that rd has a negative effect on growth rates apparently confirming the main results of the resource curse literature re however has a positive impact on growth we then estimate a twoequation model in which the impacts of re are much weaker finally we estimate a three equation model in which the impacts of natural resources on growth disappears

mining away the preston curve summary i estimate the long term national health and education impacts of having a larger mining share in the economy by instrumenting the relative size of the mining sector with the natural geological variation in countries fossil fuel endowments i provide evidence suggestive of a causal relationship the findings suggest that countries with larger mining shares tend to have poorer health and education outcomes than countries with similar per capita incomes geographic characteristics and institutional quality doubling the mining share of an economy corresponds to on average the infant death rate being 20 higher life expectancy being 5 lower total years of education being 20 lower and 70 more people having no formal education divergences from the preston curve the concave relationship between cross country income and life expectancy that has long been of interest to economists demographers and epidemiologists are thus partly explained by the size of the mining sector within country evidence from indonesia paints a similar picture my results provide support for a growing body of evidence linking mining to poorer average living standards particularly vis a vis other types of income i also estimate the effects of national mining dependence on non mining income health and education investment and institutions

lying for strategic advantage rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of intentions starting from hendricks and mcafee s 2000 example of the allies decision to feint at calais and attack at normandy on d day this paper models misrepresentation of intentions to competitors or enemies allowing for the possibility of bounded strategic rationality and rational players responses to it yields a sensible account of lying via costless noiseless messages in many cases the model has generically unique pure strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players exploit boundedly rational players but are not themselves fooled in others the model has generically essentially unique mixed strategy sequential equilibria in which rational players strategies protect all players from exploitation

the aversion to lying abstract we experimentally investigate the effect of cheap talk in a bargaining game with one sided asymmetric information a seller has private information about her skill and is provided an opportunity to communicate this information to a buyer through a written message four different treatments are compared one without communication one with free form communication and two treatments with pre specified communication in the form of promises of varying strength our results suggest that individuals have an aversion towards lying about private information and that the aversion to lying increases with the size of the lie and the strength of the promise freely formulated messages lead to the fewest lies and the most efficient outcomes