frontiers of climate change economics the economics of climate change is an active field of research the contributions to a special issue are put in context of the literature and it is suggested that second best issues such as carbon leakage and the green paradox need to be complemented with a political economy analysis of why certain instruments are politically infeasible and with intra and intergenerational analyses of the impact of climate policy a case is also made for more empirical work on the gradual and catastrophic damages of global warming

decentralization and intra country transfers in the great recession the case of the european union empirical evidence is found supporting the assignment of the redistribution function to the central government viewing the great recession or recessions in general as a shock it is found that a

environmental tax policy and intergenerational distribution abstract we study the effects of environmental taxation within the context of an overlapping generations model the quality of the environment is modelled as a durable consumption good introduction of the environmental tax harms old existing generations and benefits young existing generations as well as all future generations increasing the tax in a pareto improving manner is easier the higher the pre existing tax the reverse holds if tax policy is decided by majority rule a suitably designed bond policy can be used to redistribute the efficiency gains due to the internalisation of environmental externalities across the generations

optimal health and environmental policies in a pollution growth nexus abstract this paper shows how policies aimed at insuring health risks and those intended to improve the environment are and should be deeply intertwined in the model economy inspired by recent chinese experience pollution raises the likelihood of future poor health prompting households to save more so as to self insure against anticipated medical expenses increased household saving generates more capital while capital use by firms generates more pollution along the transition such a pollution growth nexus may be attractive from a capital accumulation perspective however rising pollution via the health channel hurts welfare both insurance and environmental policies affect capital accumulation and can have additional dynamic benefits the availability of private health insurance to top up pay as you go coverage of medical bills along with a pigouvian tax on emissions and a profit tax can replicate the first best

environmental quality public debt and economic development this article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt a public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt we show that if the initial capital stock is high enough the economy monotonically converges to a long run steady state on the contrary when the initial capital stock is low the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap we also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long run stable steady state in particular we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long run steady state finally a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal

sustainability and the intergenerational distribution of natural resource entitlements abstract the paper describes an olg economy with a single exhaustible resource that has amenity value the steady states of this economy form a continuum implying path dependency we compare three policy scenarios first a zero extraction policy of enforced conservation that avoids environmental degradation possibly at the expense of intertemporal efficiency second a grandfathering policy that endows the present generations with all resources and that ensures efficiency but cannot prevent a persistent decline in lifetime utility from one generation to the next third a trust fund policy where future generations receive claims for the natural resource of the three only the trust fund ensures efficiency and protects welfare of all generations

self enforcing intergenerational transfers and the provision of education this paper considers intra family financing of human capital under the assumptions that individuals are selfish and binding contracts are not feasible cooperation among family members is possible through a family norm a family social capital which prescribes the obligations to be met at each stage in life and sanctions for those who deviate we characterize the set of self enforcing transfers and show that there is a downward bias in the family provision of education this gives a rationale for public action as a remedy to the lack of commitment between selfish family members

property tax and fiscal discipline in oecd countries this paper investigates the effects of property taxation on fiscal discipline for a sample of oecd countries over the period 1973 2011 we find that aggregate property taxation in total tax revenues is not statistically correlated with the primary surplus to gdp ratio in contrast a greater reliance on property taxes pertaining to sub national governments contributes to fiscal discipline suggesting that fiscal decentralization should favor responsive tax base instruments

social contracts as assets a possible solution to the time consistency problem this paper presents a new solution to the time consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work the solution involves formulating a social contract institution or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy the social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract for the old generation breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it for the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

the political economy of environmental policy with overlapping generations a two sector overlapping generations model illuminates the intergenerational effects of a tax that protects an environmental stock a traded asset capitalizes the economic returns to future tax induced environmental improvements benefiting the current asset owners the old generation absent a transfer the tax harms the young generation by decreasing their real wage future generations benefit from the tax induced improvement in environmental stock the principal intergenerational conflict arising from the tax is between generations alive at the time society imposes the policy not between generations alive at different times a pareto improving tax can be implemented under various political economy settings

the dynamics of foreign direct investments in land and pollution accumulation following the recent increase of foreign direct investments in land this paper studies their possible effects on the development of a local economy to this aim we use a two sector model external and local with heterogeneous agents external investors and local land owners we assume that both sectors are negatively affected by pollution but only the external sector is polluting the local government can tax the external sector s production activities to finance environmental defensive expenditures we first examine the equilibria that emerge in the model from the dynamics of pollution and physical capital and then investigate the conditions for the coexistence of the two sectors and the impact of the external sector on the revenues of the local population using numerical simulations we show that a revenue increasing path may occur only if the pollution tax is high enough and the impact of the external sector on pollution is low enough otherwise foreign direct investments may end up impoverishing the local population

fiscal policy debt management and exchange rate credibility lessons from the recent italian experience abstract this paper explores some potential determinants of exchange rate credibility with reference to the italian experience of the 1990s the analysis relies on a nonlinear framework emphasizing shifts between credible and non credible states and assuming a significant degree of persistence in the above regimes almost all fiscal and debt management indicators display significant effects on devaluation expectations the main policy implications of the paper are that a restrictive fiscal stance a lengthening of average debt maturity and an increase in the share of foreign denominated debt are crucial to stabilize the lira exchange rate and to qualify italy in the former group of countries which will join emu

regime switching and interest rates in the european monetary system this paper examines the impact that a currency target zone has on short term interest rates for a number of countries in the european monetary system we characterize the short rate using a regime switching model that allows fbr a differently parameterized mean reverting square root process in each regime we find that the volatility the level and the speed of adjustment are all higher in the regime that is operative during speculative attacks and currency crises moreover we allow the conditional probability of being in each regime to be state dependent so the model can be used to examine questions relating to the likelihood of realignments and the stability of the target zone system c 1999 elsevier science bn all rights reserved jel classification e43 g12

distributional impacts of carbon pricing a general equilibrium approach with micro data for households article i nfo many policies to limit greenhouse gas emissions have at their core efforts to put a price on carbon emissions carbon pricing impacts households both by raising the cost of carbon intensive products and by changing factor prices a complete analysis requires taking both effects into account the impact of carbon pricing is determined by heterogeneity in household spending patterns across income groups as well as heterogeneity in factor income patterns across income groups it is also affected by precise formulation of the policy how is the revenue from carbon pricing distributed as well as the treatment of other government policies e g the treatment of transfer payments what is often neglected in analyses of policy is the heterogeneity of impacts across households even within income or regional groups in this paper we incorporate 15 588 households from the u s consumer and expenditure survey data as individual agents in a comparative static general equilibrium framework these households are represented within the mit usrep model a detailed general equilibrium model of the u s economy in particular we categorize households by full household income factor income as well as transfer income and apply various measures of lifetime income to distinguish households that are temporarily low income e g retired households drawing down their financial assets from permanently low income households we also provide detailed within group distributional measures of burden impacts from various policy scenarios

election goals and income redistribution recent evidence from albania this paper examines the impact of political competition on block grants from federal to sub federal levels of government we model the extent and direction of income redistribution as determined proximately by the political agendas of central decision makers and at a deeper level by the institutions within which they nd themselves operating we contrast two political objective functions that yield di erent empirical predictions of the ways in which politics should a ect scal policy lessons learned here may prove important in understanding limits on the types of redistribution possible via block grants given the institutional framework in both developing and developed countries 2001 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classixcation h1 h7 o1

decentralization and electoral swings this paper explores how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization it relies on aggregate data fro

segregation and the quality of government in a cross section of countries we provide a new compilation of data on ethnic linguistic and religious composition at the subnational level for a large number of countries using these data we measure segregation of groups within the country to overcome the endogeneity problem that arises because of mobility and endogenous in ternal borders we construct an instrument for segregation we find that more ethnically and lin guistically segregated countries i e those where groups live more spatially separately have a lower quality of government there is no relationship between religious segregation and governance trust is an important channel of influence it is lower in more segregated countries jel hi 1 h77 j15 017 z12 z13 racial and religious conflicts are often associated with poor politicoeconomic performance especially in developing countries economists have recently turned their attention to ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an explanation of differences in the pace of development starting with an influential paper by william easterly and ross levine 1997 since then many others have shown that fractionalization is negatively correlated with a host of policy outcomes and the quality of government 1 however many ethnically diverse countries the united states for instance are quite successful what makes different countries more or less capable of handling

optimal tax schemes and the environmental externality abstract this paper analyzes optimal tax schemes in an overlapping generations model with the environment which deteriorated by the consumption to achieve the optimal allocation two sorts of consumption tax schemes are analyzed in addition we examine another tax scheme with the maintenance subsidy

self enforcing intergenerational social contracts for pareto improving pollution mitigation we consider in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations under each contract agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives the transfer is financed in a pay as you go manner by the next young generation different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum we show that the existence of a contract which is pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income in a steady state with social contracts in each period the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions also steady state income and welfare are higher delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare in the second part of the paper we study a game theoretic setup taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible we show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy social contracts coexist with private savings

economic voting and multilevel governance a comparative individual level analysis an important component of incumbent support is the reward punishment calculus of economic voting previous work has shown that clarity of responsibility within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice where clarity is high low economic effects are greater less this article advances the clarity of responsibility argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting in institutional contexts of multilevel governance the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult this article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government individual level data from the comparative study of electoral systems module 1 are used to test this proposition results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance

forward and backward intergenerational goods why is social security good for the environment this paper studies the ability of nonmarket institutions to invest optimally in forward intergenerational goods figs such as education and the environment when agents are selfish or exhibit paternalistic altruism we show that backward intergenerational goods bigs such as social security play a crucial role in sustaining investment in figs without them investment is inefficiently low but with them optimal investment is possible we also show that making the provision of bigs mandatory crowds out the voluntary provision of figs and that population aging can increase investment in figs

environmental abatement and intergenerational distribution this paper employs an overlapping generations model to explore the impact of public abatement on private investment and the intergenerational distribution of welfare whereas public abatement benefits old generations in terms of non environmental welfare future generations gain most in terms of environmental welfare the overall benefits tend to be smallest for generations born at the time of the unanticipated policy shock public debt policy however can be employed to ensure that welfare gains are distributed more equally across the various generations such a policy implies that natural capital crowds out man made capital

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

inequality and party support positional economic voting or a new dimension of valence economic growth helps governments get re elected but does growth as a valence issue exhaust the possibilities for the economic vote this paper shows via an examination of 318 elections in esta

intergenerational altruism and the environment we construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in barro 1974 it is shown that steady state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism despite individuals altruism the competitive equilibrium is not optimal we thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized

the global crisis and intergovernmental relations centralization versus decentralization 10 years on there is a growing empirical literature on the effects of the global financial and economic crisis on intergovernmental relations this paper contributes to this literature by focusing on conventio

an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment this article analyzes the potential conflict between economic growth and the maintenance of environmental quality in an overlapping generations model short lived individuals make decisions which have long lasting effects on both factor productivity and the environment the model provides a theoretical explanation of observed correlations between environmental quality and income whereby economic growth is associated first with declines then improvements in environmental quality it suggests circumstances in which multiple pareto ranked steady state equilibria may arise and in which sustained growth of both capital and environmental quality may occur overmaintenance of the environment analogous to dynamically inefficient overaccumulation of capital may emerge copyright 1994 by royal economic society

fiscal stability during the great recession putting decentralization design to the test this paper provides an empirical analysis aimed at disentangling the roles played by decentralization level and design as well as the extended decentralized framework provided by subnational borrow

calculating the equity cost of capital using the apt the impact of the erm abstract one of the expected benefits of membership of the exchange rate mechanism erm was a reduction in risk which should lead to a lower cost of capital and foster investment and growth using the apt we investigate the behavior of the equity market risk premium for the london stock exchange prior to and during sterling s membership of the erm we find that prior to and during the first year of membership the equity market risk premium fell quite dramatically however when conflict between domestic and erm policy requirements arose at the turn of 1991 the equity risk premium increased and continued to do so until sterling s exit partially wiping out the benefits of membership of the erm

decentralization after the great recession fine tuning or paradigm change the general question addressed in this special issue of regional studies is whether the great recession of 2008 affected the political consensus about decentralization and the conventional wisdom a