can education subsidy reverse falling fertility the case of taiwan abstract the education subsidy in taiwan is available for government employees only in 1996 the government ceased to index the education subsidy for inflation which created a natural experiment ideal for studying the effect of the education subsidy on fertility using the difference in differences approach we find that the reform reduced the fertility probability for public sector households by 17 per cent and this negative response appears to be permanent the estimated probability elasticity of fertility is 0 05 which is smaller than that of personal tax exemption 0 8 the results also suggest that the education subsidy has a heterogeneous effect on fertility across income groups

do stronger intellectual property rights increase innovation summary do stronger intellectual property rights ipr increase innovation recent decades have seen a global transformation in ipr standards underpinned by the theory that stronger iprs spur increased incentives to innovate this study tests the impact of ever more rigorous ipr systems on innovation through an index of economic complexity of 94 countries from 1965 to 2005 our results confirm that stronger intellectual property systems engender higher levels of economic complexity nevertheless only countries with an initial above average level of development and complexity enjoy this effect

games with espionage abstract we consider normal form games in which two players decide on their strategies before the start of play and player 1 can purchase noisy information about his opponent s decisions concerning future response policies i e spy on his opponent we give a full characterization of the set of distributions over the players payoffs that can be induced by such equilibria as well as describe their welfare and pareto properties in 2 2 games we find three equilibrium phenomena i when the game is non degenerate the information purchased is independent of its cost the cost determines only whether information is purchased or not ii the player who spies treats his information as if it were deterministic even though it is correct only probabilistically and iii in chain store models espionage is used if and only if the perfect equilibrium payoff differs from the stackelberg equilibrium payoff with player 2 being the stackelberg leader

economic development and income inequality further evidence on the u curve hypothesis abstract internationally comparable data on inequality and income are utilized to reassess the empirical status of kusnets u curve hypothesis the hypothesis seems well supported when both developed countries dcs and less developed countries lcds are included in the sample however the position changes rather dramatically if the sample is restricted to lcds and very small support for the hypothesis is then observed also a simple comparison indicates that some of the support reported in earlier studies may have been due to the use of conventional gross domestic product per capita in general results based on gini coefficient seem less favorable to the hypothesis than those derived from household income shares

human capital and inequality dynamics the role of education technology the paper offers a unified way to examine several puzzles on inequality dynamics it focuses on differences in the education technology and their effects on income distributions our overlapping generations economy has the following features 1 consumers are heterogenous with respect to ability and parental human capital and 2 intergenerational transfers take place via parental direct investment in education and public education financed by taxes possibly with a level determined by majority voting we explore several variations in the production of human capital some attributed to home education and others related to public education and indicate how various changes in education technologies affect the intragenerational income inequality along the equilibrium path

second mover disadvantages in a three player stackelberg game with private information abstract i consider a three player stackelberg game where each player has its private signal concerning stochastic demand i show that at a perfectly revealing equilibrium the second mover earns the lowest and the third mover the highest expected profit of the three i characterize this result by the strategic substitutes or complements relationships among three firms at the equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82 and l13

taxation in a two sided search model abstract this paper analyzes the effects of wage and profit taxation in a simple search and bargaining model wage tax effects depend upon the level of unemployment benefits if unemployment benefits are less than search costs or if benefits are taxed as income then a wage tax decreases unemployment it also decreases the wage thereby overshifting the tax burden profit tax effects depend upon job entry in the short run with a fixed number of jobs filled jobs plus vacancies a profit tax decreases unemployment it also raises the wage again overshifting the tax in the long run the converse holds

trade policy and income inequality new evidence abstract this paper uses recently available data to investigate the link between income inequality and trade protection it finds that among less developed countries more open economies experienced increased income inequality during the late 1980s trade policy has had no effect on income inequality in developed countries

an expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty abstract in economies where agents bear some risk the analysis would often be facilitated by the assumption that the risks are i i d and disappear in the aggregate a formal appeal to the law of large numbers requires the consideration of a sequence of finite economies in an economy with a continuum of agents there are countable families of sets for which it is impossible for a law of large numbers to be valid with countably many agents and a finitely additive measure independence is compatible with the law of large numbers

openness external risk and volatility implications for the compensation hypothesis a central assumption in the globalization literature is that economic openness generates economic insecurity and volatility based on this assumption schol ars of international political economy have proposed the compensation hypothesis which claims that globalization bolsters rather than undermines the welfare state by increasing public demand for social protection against externally generated eco nomic instability the openness volatility link is dubious however on both theoret ical and empirical grounds in this study i revisit the volatility assumption focusing on a crucial difference between openness and external risk in their effect on volatil ity my statistical analysis of a panel data set from 175 countries 1950 2002 finds a consistent effect of external risk on volatility of the major economic aggregates but a largely insignificant effect of openness these findings suggest that economic volatility may be a mistaken link in explaining the openness spending nexus calling for further research on the causal mechanisms linking the two the general growth of government in the post world war ii era is one of the most important empirical regularities in political science measured by general govern ment consumption or sectoral expenditures government size grew dramatically during most of the postwar period intrigued by this phenomenal government growth political scientists offered numerous accounts some viewing this growth as a corollary of economic phenomena such as modernization industrialization income distribution or fiscal illusion and others attributing government growth to political causes such as bureaucratization interest group politics and electoral competition 1

on the endogeneity of cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria games of accumulation abstract we characterize equilibria of games with two properties i agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur but ii they can only add to their initial amounts the equilibrium set consists of just the cournot nash outcome one or both stackelberg outcomes or a continuum of points including the cournot nash outcome and one or both stackelberg outcomes a simple theorem that uses agents standard one period reaction functions and the one period cournot nash and stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set applications include contribution oligopoly and rent seeking games

changes in income inequality and the black market premium is a high black market premium for us dollars associated with rising or falling income inequality within a nation this paper empirically examines this issue within a cross section of countries and finds that the black market premium is strongly associated with rising income inequality as measured by changes in the gini coefficient others have used the black market premium as a proxy to measure protectionist policies so a possible implication is that protectionist policies further skew the distribution of income within a country however other measures of protectionist policies are not associated with changes in income inequality instead other factors which might drive the black market premium such as interest rate differentials appear to be more relevant in explaining why the black market premium is positively related with increases in income inequality

changes in the world distribution of income between 1950 and 1977 trends in the world distribution of income are much discussed and philosophised about the issue of increasing economic inequality among nonsocialist countries in the post war period is central to the debate about the international economic order in i969 the pearson commission report was already pointing to the widening gap between the developed and developing countries as a central issue of our time and was proposing the reduction of that gap as the main objective of international co operation according to that report gnp per capita had increased between i960 and i967 at annual rates of 2 5 and 3 6 in developing and developed countries respectively morawetz i978 found that the gap between the two sets of countries rose from i 2 6 fold in i950 to i3 2 fold in i975 other authors see a more complicated picture atkinson i975 for instance has argued that although the share of poor countries in world income probably declined between i950 and i970 that of the countries at the middle of the world distribution probably increased 2 what may be a mere assessment of relative growth performances among nonsocialist countries becomes a basic theoretical element in the radical stream of economic literature for authors like amin i974 emmanuel i972 and frank i978 the capitalist mode of development necessarily leads to the rich countries of the centre becoming richer and poor countries of the periphery becoming poorer in a degree depending on their involvement in international trade for them a widening gap between developed and developing countries is simply the statistical confirmation of an unavoidable consequence of the national and international capitalist system in the latter perspective the issue at stake is of such importance that the contrast between the abundance of theoretical literature and the lack of empirical work is striking the few existing studies of changes in world distribution provide an inadequate picture intra country income distributions are not taken into account observation periods do not exceed i5 years 8 for andic and peacock i96i and for beckerman and bacon i970 i5 for kirman and tomasini i969 socialist as well as some non socialist countries are excluded and national incomes are converted to u s dollars at official exchange rates 3 finally none of these studies covers the i970s although several shocks which might have affected world distribution occurred during that decade for the non socialist countries to which they refer the andic peacock and beckerman bacon studies found the gini coefficient almost constant over

commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing abstract this paper investigates which equilibria of a game are still viable when players have the opportunity to commit themselves to that end we study a model of endogenous timing in which players face the trade off between committing early and moving late it is shown that mixed resp pure equilibria of the original game are subgame perfect resp persistent in the timing game only when no player has an incentive to move first consequently mixed equilibria are viable only if no player has an incentive to move first one needs strong evolutionary solution concepts to draw that conclusion for pure equilibria journal of economic literature classification number c72

opening the pandora s box trade openness and informal sector growth this article constructs a labour transition model combining the features of job loss and job creation in the formal sector of an economy the theoretical model examines the impact of trade liberalization on net job transition from formal to informal sector in the light of our model we establish certain pre conditions based on simulations under which trade liberalization is accompanied by rising informal sector the model outcome conforms to the empirical evidence of rising informality with openness which we find in 18 central eastern european and former soviet union countries

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange abstract search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via nash bargaining which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions in this paper we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of lagos and wright 2005 we show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential if lump sum monetary transfers are available a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria the friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set but higher inflation rates are also possible when lump sum monetary transfers are not available equilibrium allocations are generally not first best nevertheless fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities and the friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power

second mover advantage and price leadership in bertrand duopoly we consider the issue of first versus second mover advantage in differentiated product bertrand duopoly with general demand and asymmetric linear costs we generalize existing results for all possible combinations where prices are either strategic substitutes and or complements dispensing with common extraneous and restrictive assumptions we show that a firm with a sufficiently large cost lead over its rival has a first mover advantage for the linear version of the model we invoke a natural endogenous timing scheme coupled with equilibrium selection according to risk dominance the analysis yields as the unique equilibrium outcome sequential play with the low cost firm as leader

inequality growth and democracy the analysis of the relationship between inequality and economic growth in distinct politi coeconomic environments has been one of the central preoccupations of the extensive theoretical and empirical work on growth in the last decade the authors argue that the empirical evidence available to date strongly indicates the relevance of this work for understanding the elusive causal connection between economic development and democracy the state of the literature suggests considerable sophistication in conceptualizing the direct economic effects of inequality and contains critical insights into politically unconstrained policy making aimed at the alleviation of their negative economic impact however the political feasibility of the recommended policy measures and the politically mediated effects of inequality and redistributive policy on growth and on the strength and stability of democratic regimes are understood less well the authors discuss the critical factors influencing these effects and sketch several approaches to creating a comprehensive politicoeconomic account of the interaction between inequality redistributive policy making and political regimes

endogenizing leadership in tax competition abstract in this paper we extend the standard approach of horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the timing of decisions made by the competing jurisdictions following the literature on the endogenous timing in duopoly games we consider a pre play stage where jurisdictions commit themselves to move early or late i e to fix their tax rate at a first or second stage we highlight that at least one jurisdiction experiments a second mover advantage we show that the subgame perfect equilibria spes correspond to the two stackelberg situations yielding to a coordination problem in order to solve this issue we consider a quadratic specification of the production function and we use two criteria of selection pareto dominance and risk dominance we emphasize that at the risk dominant equilibrium the less productive or smaller jurisdiction leads and hence loses the second mover advantage if asymmetry among jurisdictions is sufficient pareto dominance reinforces risk dominance in selecting the same spe three results may be deduced from our analysis i the downward pressure on tax rates is less severe than predicted ii the smaller jurisdiction leads iii the big country higher tax rate rule does not always hold

looking beyond averages in the trade and poverty debate there has been much debate about how much poor people in developing countries gain from trade openness as one aspect of globalization the paper views the issue through both macro and micro empirical lenses the macro lens uses cross country comparisons and aggregate time series data the micro lens uses household level data combined with structural modeling of the impacts of specific trade reforms case studies are presented for china and morocco both the macro and micro approaches cast doubt on some widely heard generalizations from both sides of the globalization debate additionally the micro lens indicates considerable heterogeneity in the welfare impacts of trade openness with both gainers and losers among the poor a number of covariates of the individual gains are identified the results point to the importance of combining trade reforms with well designed social protection policies

abertura comercial dotacao de fatores produtivos e a desigualdade de rendimentos no brasil 1990 1998 this work studies the empirical relations between the endowment of production factors commercial opening and personal income in the brazilian states in the period between and 1998 using given in panel it tests the hypothesis of that regions or states with bigger per

income distribution factor endowments and trade openness abstract this paper studies the empirical links among factor endowments trade and personal income distribution by using panel data we show that land and capital intensive countries have a less equal income distribution while skill intensive countries have a more equal income distribution we also show that the effects of trade openness on inequality depend on factor endowments in a way consistent with several recent case studies but not with the simple hecksher ohlin framework our results are robust to the division of the sample according to level of income the inclusion of different regressors the use of different measures of trade openness and of relative factor abundance and tests for possible problems of endogeneity

development and distribution a critique of the cross country u hypothesis abstract this paper questions the validity of a modern paradigm viz the u hypothesis it argues that notwithstanding contrary claims the recent cross country econometric studies by ahluwalia and others have little in common from a methodological point of view with kuznets earlier intertemporal national studies ahluwalia s cross country u curve is found to be based on defective statistics and questionable methodological premises in specific the estimation of one u curve from observations on both ldcs and dcs is criticised a sample restricted to the ldc group considerably weakens support for the u hypothesis further even marginal variations in the data set lead to the virtual disappearance of ahluwalia s empirical relationship the paper concludes that the cross country u hypothesis is more of a hindrance than an aid to our comprehension of the relationship between economic growth and income distribution

when should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual channel supply chains abstract applying an observable delay game framework developed in noncooperative game theory we investigate the timing problem concerning when a manufacturer managing dual channel supply chains consisting of a retail channel and a direct channel should post its wholesale price and direct price conventionally operational research models describing dual channel supply chains examine price competition where the retailer and the manufacturer simultaneously determine the retail and direct prices respectively in contrast to this conventional setting our model demonstrates that such simultaneous price competition never arises if the manufacturer and retailer can choose not only the level of the price but also the timing of pricing if the manufacturer sets the direct price after setting the wholesale price to the retailer the retailer accelerates the timing of retail pricing prior to the direct price setting by the manufacturer our findings suggest that the manufacturer should post the direct price before or upon but not after setting the wholesale price for the retailer this upfront posting of the direct price not only constitutes the subgame perfect nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game between channel members but also maximizes the profits for a manufacturer employing multichannel sales strategies

is there a social kuznets curve the influence of labour standards on inequality abstract this study empirically investigates the impact of core labour standards on income inequality for a range of 90 countries from 1990 2000 a synthetic index of labour standards is computed by means of a multiple correspondence analysis and no significant correlation is found with the gini index one of the reasons pointed out is that the effective implementation of core labour standards depends on the quality of the country s political and legal systems using instrumental variables in a tsls model we found an inverse u shaped curve between the new endogenous index of core labour standards and income inequality

dynamic commitment games efficiency and coordination abstract an important form of commitment is the ability to restrict the set of future actions from which choices can be made we study a simple two player dynamic game of complete information which incorporates this type of commitment for a given initial game the players engage in an endogenously determined number of commitment periods before choosing from the remaining actions we show the existence of equilibria with pure strategies in the commitment periods partial characterization results for general games capture the tradeoff between commitment and deterrence the equilibrium outcome is unique and efficient for two classes of games including pure coordination and stag hunt games

the evolution of inequality after trade liberalization abstract the paper presents a general framework for the analysis of the evolution of personal income distribution following trade liberalization the model allows many factors of production and the possibility of capital gains in this framework the short run evolution of inequality depends on the wage to wealth ratio while changes in the interest rate determine the changes in long run inequality the general framework is applied to the dynamic specific factors model of eaton rev econ stud vliv 1987 in this model the land labor ratio determines whether a country exports the land using or the capital using good in the long run the type of the export good determines the effects of liberalization on inequality in land labor abundant countries inequalities increase decrease along the dynamic path the model provides an explanation for the differences between latin american and asian countries in their response to trade liberalization econometric analysis provides mixed results for these predictions with the correct signs but non significant coefficients for the coefficient on the interaction between openness and the land labor ratio

does natural resource abundance increase latin american income inequality abstract why is income inequality higher in latin america than in east asia is this phenomenon related to the region s natural resource abundance is it a contributor to latin america s slow and narrowly focused human capital accumulation if so can anything be done to reverse the latin american trends or should we think of the region s fate as unalterable to help answer these questions this paper draws upon standard trade theory and cross sectional empirical analysis to demonstrate that natural resource intensive sectors particularly permanent agriculture absorb capital that might otherwise flow to manufacturing this depresses workers incentive to accumulate skill and delays industrialization

unemployment insurance and disability insurance in the great recession social security disability insurance ssdi awards rise during recessions if marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs countercyclical unemployment insurance ui benefit extensions may reduce ssdi uptake exploiting ui extensions in the great recession as a source of variation we find no indication that expiration of ui benefits causes ssdi applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude a supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs recipient populations only 28 of ssdi awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year and of those only 4 received ui

international factor mobility minimum wage rates and factor price equalization a synthesis this paper examines the behavior of a small open economy facing perfectly elastic supply curves for some of its productive factors in particular the paper derives some comparative statics properties of such economies compares them with the properties of otherwise identical economies in which all factor prices are determined endogenously and investigates the relationship between factor price rigidities factor price equalization and the pattern of specialization among the new results which are proved it is shown that as more and more factor price rigidities are imposed on an economy it comes closer to a state of factor price equalization

social divisions and institutions assessing institutional parameter variation this paper investigates the hypothesis that the association between property rights institutions and income is weaker in countries with high social divisions it argues that social divisions should have a negative effect on perceived institutional inclusiveness which in turn should depress institutional payoffs absent a property rights indicator that captures the perceived inclusiveness of institutions social divisions should then weaken the observed association between property rights institutions and income the empirical results support this hypothesis and highlight the importance of evaluating whether the institutions measure used captures the institutional framework applying to the population at large

a dynamic specific factors model of international trade in a dynamic economy land and capital serve not only as factors of production but as assets which individuals use to transfer income from working periods to retirement changes in the terms of trade and in the endowments of fixed factors do not necessarily have the same effects on factor prices and on the composition of output as they do in a static framework changes in these variables affect both total savings and the amount of savings that is diverted toward investment in capital results derived from the traditional specific factors model are more likely to emerge when the sector using land as a factor of production has a higher labor share than the sector using capital in this case the land using sector dominates factor markets more than asset markets once the roles for land and capital as assets are recognized the possibility of natural resource booms that reduce steady state welfare arises at the same time an increase in population can raise steady state welfare

endogenous timing in the presence of non monotonicities the aim of this paper is to generalize the endogenous timing game proposed by hamilton and slutsky games and economic behavior 1990 2 pp 29 46 by allowing the payoff or the marginal payoff of a player to become non monotonic with respect to the strategy of the opponent we propose a taxonomy of the subgame perfect nash equilibria based on the characteristics of the payoff functions proposed by eaton canadian journal of economics 2004 37 pp 805 29 we determine under which conditions of the initial payoff functions commitment has a social value and when the simultaneous move nash equilibrium is commitment robust and discuss its pareto efficiency

smallholder livelihood adaptation in the context of neoliberal policy reforms a case of maize farmers in southern veracruz mexico governments around the world have embraced trade liberalisation as a means of enhancing efficiency to realise economic growth and alleviate poverty likewise the mexican government implemented neoliberal policy reforms the nafta in particular to stimulate sustainable development using the mexican maize sector as illustration this article describes the adaptation process of smallholders to market changes shaped by these reforms going beyond the aggregated level we have investigated smallholders livelihood strategies contrary to what economic models estimated our data suggests that farmers intensified the cultivation of maize rather than switch to sectors in which mexico has a comparative advantage

income distribution development and foreign trade a cross sectional analysis abstract this paper analyses cross sectional evidence on income inequality in developing countries within a consistent theoretical framework where the major explanatory variables are factor endowments their ownership structure and foreign trade distortions the resulting explanation of cross country differences in income distribution is considerably better than what is found in the existing literature endowments in mineral resources land concentration in agricultural exports trade protection and secondary schooling are shown to be major determinants of differences in income inequality across developing countries

do patent rights matter 40 years of innovation complexity and productivity abstract does the rigorous protection of patents advance or retard economic development two decades ago a new global standard of intellectual property swept across developing and industrialized nations through the implementation of the wto s trips agreement many years later the issue of patent rights remains contentious in this paper we focus on the effects of patent rights systems on total factor productivity growth using dynamic panel regression analysis for 70 countries from 1965 to 2009 we show that the effects of stronger or more rigorous patent systems are insignificant for productivity growth in both developing and industrialized countries why does the strength of patents appear to have no impact on productivity classic economic theory suggests that stronger patent systems incentive innovative output with important spill over effects for productivity and growth we offer an alternative explanation using data from the economic complexity index we find that while patents rights are increasingly irrelevant to productivity the relationship between economic complexity and productivity is highly positive and significant our results are consistent with the contributions of the absorptive capacity theory in that they suggest it is not the discovery and ownership of novel products and processes at the innovative frontier that induces productive growth but the ability to adapt replicate and diffuse along the international productive chain

tariff rates tariff revenue and tariff reform some new facts this article compares the statutory and valorem tariff rates official rates with the ratio of tariff revenues to import values collected rates for jamaica kenya and pakistan it identifies four general features of the tariff codes considers whether these features apply to all developing countries and discusses four implications of these features for tariff reform first the collected rate for any given item in the tariff code is only weakly related to the official rate for the item second the variation of collected rates on average increase much less than the official rates fourth the relation between official rates and collected rates is nonlinear because the slope is lower at higher levels of the official rate

income distribution in the dynamic two factor trade model the issue of the effects of trade on personal income distribution has remained largely unexamined this paper describes an overlapping generations 2 x 2 model with a bequest motive and heterogeneous agents in order to examine the problem in this dynamic setting trade leads to both short run and long run reductions increases in inequality in labor capital abundant countries if the investment good is capital intensive if the consumption good is capital intensive the short run effects continue to hold but the long run effects are ambiguous copyright 1992 by the london school of economics and political science

a theory of endogenous commitment commitment is typically modelled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial binding action the weakness of this approach is that the fundamental question of who has the opportunity to commit cannot be addressed as it is assumed this paper presents a framework in which commitment power arises endogenously from the fundamentals of the model we construct a finite dynamic game in which players are given the option to change their minds as often as they wish but pay a switching cost if they do so we show that for games with two players and two actions there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple structure this equilibrium is independent of the order and timing of moves and is robust to other protocol specifications moreover despite the perfect information nature of the model and the costly switches strategic delays may arise in equilibrium the flexibility of the model allows us to apply it to various environments in particular we study an entry deterrence situation its equilibrium is intuitive and illustrative of how commitment power is endogenously determined copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

household inequality social welfare and trade abstract working with sen social welfare functions meaning explicit separability between mean income and income dispersion we develop a generalized dual approach to tracking household inequality aspects of social welfare in general equilibrium we highlight how household equity can be examined analytically alongside production efficiency in duality based models using our dual framework to explore potential trade offs between efficiency and equity effects of trade policy our results complement the set of standard inequality results in trade theory focused on functional rather than household inequality we also find that the relative distributional impact of tariffs on welfare is conditional on the initial level of inequality

tax incidence with bargaining abstract the paper investigates tax incidence in a two person bargaining model where one party is taxed the condition under which the non taxed party shares the burden of taxes or benefit of subsidies is characterized sufficient conditions for the tax burden to fall entirely on the taxed party are given also a sufficient condition for the non taxed party actually to benefit from taxation is given

wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the united kingdom abstract this paper analyses the effects of a non linear tax system on wage bargaining the main conclusions are an increase in the marginal income or payroll tax rate reduces the pre tax wage in the isoelastic case an increase in the average tax rate increases the pre tax wage by more than the tax increase and a measure of the progressivity of the tax system residual income progression is a sufficient measure of the effect of the tax system on wage pressure empirical evidence is presented to support these propositions and the predictions of the model regarding the effect of recent changes to the u k tax system on the distribution of earnings discussed

the simultaneous evolution of growth and inequality research on inequality and growth can be divided into two strands one deriving from kuznets and lewis has tried to identify a mechanistic relationship between growth or level of income and inequality the other has tried to find causal explanations of growth and inequality treating each independently in this paper we draw from both strands to test whether growth and inequality are the joint outcomes of other variables and processes we find that simultaneous examination of growth and inequality yields significantly different results and has different consequences for policy from previous independent studies the empirical literature on growth and inequality can be divided into two broad strands one following the pioneering work of kuznets and lewis is motivated by the pessimistic conjecture that the process of growth and development somehow requires increasing inequality at least in the early stages this has led to many efforts to identify a mechanical relationship between the level of development and inequality anand and kanbur 1993 or to determine whether faster growth requires higher or lower inequality the second strand has sought to identify the causal factors influencing the evolution of growth and inequality independently this research has looked either at growth for example barro and sala i martin 1995 or at inequality li et al 1997 but has not tried to identify those factors that might simultaneously influence both growth and inequality 2 thus the literature that looks simultaneously at growth and inequality descending most notably from kuznets 1955 relates them in a mechanistic manner that ignores or minimises the role of other causal factors including policy while the literature that incorporates other causal factors including policies looks independently at growth and inequality neither approach is particularly convincing from a theoretical standpoint the evolution of growth and inequality must surely be the outcome of similar processes in addition neither approach is particularly useful for the policy maker who needs to balance the impact of policies on both growth and distribution in this paper we investigate whether growth and inequality are simultaneously determined and if so whether or not they are subject to

welfare impacts of china s accession to the world trade organization data from china s national rural and urban household surveys are used to measure and explain the welfare impacts of changes in goods and factor prices attributable to accession to the world trade organization wto the price changes are estimated separately using a general equilibrium model to capture both direct and indirect effects of the initial tariff changes the welfare impacts are first order approximations based on a household model incorporating own production activities calibrated to household level data and imposing minimum aggregation the results show negligible impacts on inequality and poverty in the aggregate however diverse impacts emerge across household types and regions associated with heterogeneity in consumption behavior and income sources with possible implications for compensatory policy responses

financial development financial structure and income inequality in china using panel data of 23 provinces during the period 1996 2012 this paper investigates the impacts of financial development and structure on income inequality in different administrative districts urban rural and overall in china the results produced by the dynamic generalised method of moments estimator provide some evidence for a linear and inverse u shape relationship between financial development and income inequality and increasing the relative importance of financial markets to banks helps to reduce income inequality furthermore the results of panel threshold regressions show that the benefits of financial development only occur if the stock market activity has reached a threshold level and disappear if the stock market capitalisation has reached a certain scale meanwhile the impact of the financial structure weakens as the financial development expands and the proportion of financial markets increases we also find that the impacts of financial development and structure on rural income inequality are stronger than those on urban income inequality

list pricing and discounting in a bertrand edgeworth duopoly list or retail pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice we modify the standard bertrand edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount or not in a subsequent stage we show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome this is true for a general class of rationing rules further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader

risk bearing and the theory of income distribution this paper develops the stochastic theory of distribution with a dynamic model which focuses on the role of incomplete insurance in generating inequality unlike previous work our approach takes explicit account of the reason for market incompleteness in modeling agents behaviour in particular the amount of risk borne is endogenous using a model of growth with altruism in which agents are risk averse and there is moral hazard we show that lineage wealth follows a markov process which converges globally to an ergodic distribution this also represents the long run population distribution of wealth we discuss the role of particular assumptions such as availability of production loans and unboundedness of utility in yielding the qualitative properties of the distribution of wealth the choice of occupation and the prevention of poverty traps