efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search abstract this paper studies finite versions of competitive matching models in which sellers announce prices and buyers understand the relationship between price and probability of trade two equilibrium concepts are studied for finite games subgame perfect equilibrium and rational expectations equilibrium it is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers under both equilibrium concepts converges weakly to the same competitive equilibrium distribution of prices furthermore the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d41 d45

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

optimality versus practicality in market design a comparison of two double auctions we consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers traders privately know their values costs which are statistically dependent two mechanisms are considered the buyer s bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market clearing price it fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding the designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved this optimality however comes at the expense of plausibility i the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders beliefs about each other s value cost ii a trader may suffer a loss ex post iii the mechanism may run a surplus deficit ex post we compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer s bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism

devaluation and the trade balance in india stationarity and cointegration a study of devaluation and the trade balance in india corrects the data for nonstationarity previous empirical tests have used non stationary data the trade balance in india is not cointegrated with a number of variables including the exchange rate absorption elasticity and monetary models are compared and the monetary model performs better there has been no j curve in india and devaluations have had no significant long run effect on the trade balance

demand for india s manufactured exports abstract surprisingly few estimates exist of disaggregated world demand functions for ldc exports despite the obvious policy importance of the inherent price elasticities time series simultaneous equation estimates are herein presented of world demand for 23 categories of manufactured exports from india tests for homotheticity separability whether price elasticity of demand differs during world recession and for effects of foreign learning about india s exports are reported estimated price elasticities range from below unity to infinity revealing important variations masked by aggregate studies these results raise considerable doubts about policy design from a uniform small country assumption

a walrasian rubinstein and wolinsky model we provide a full dynamic analysis of a continuous time variant of rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 matching and bargaining model with unbalanced flows of buyers and sellers the focus is on the price limit as the frictions of search are removed it is found that a necessary and sufficient condition for the limit price to be walrasian at all times is the alignment of the initial buyer and seller stocks with the flows

are stocks a good hedge against inflation evidence from emerging markets theory suggests that equities are a good hedge against inflation however most of the empirical evidence for industrialized economies suggests that the relationship between stock returns and inflation is negative one explanation is the negative correlation between inflation and real output growth this paper examines the relationship between inflation and stock returns for ten important emerging stock market esm markets namely chile mexico brazil argentina thailand s korea malaysia hong kong philippines and turkey during the 1990s to anticipate the results the relationship between stock returns and inflation for the whole sample period is positive and statistically significant for three of the sample esms while it is positive but statistically insignificant for a further three only for one esm is the relationship negative and statistically significant this result may be due to the role of money and the positive relationship between consumer prices and output

crisis and policymaking in latin america the case of chile s 1998 99 electricity crisis summary this article studies the effect of sectoral crises on policy reform by emphasizing the conflictive incentives generated by public demands for a solution on the one hand the crisis provides the opportunity for bypassing veto points for technical innovation on the other hand if simultaneous with increasing electoral competition it reduces the time horizons of policymakers and their propensity to adopt reforms of uncertain effects for them our research traces these on the chilean 1998 99 electricity crisis and assesses their impact on policy change through a comparative analysis of reform contents this article shows how electoral effects prevailed in the context of upcoming competitive elections suggesting the importance of introducing electoral competition in the study of crises effects on policymaking in the region our research strategy for tracing incentives and opportunities generated by crises can travel to other cases to further our understanding of crises effects on policymaking

a dynamic macroeconometric model for short run stabilization in india this paper presents a small macroeconometric model examining the determinants of indian trade and inflation to address the effects of a reform policy package similar to those implemented in 1991 this is different from previous studies along one important dimension that we explicitly incorporate the non stationarity of the data into our model and estimation procedures which suggest that the stationarity assumption may be a source of misspecification in previous work so the model has been estimated using the data from 1950 to 1995 employing fully modified phillips hansen method of estimation to obtain the cointegrating relations and short run dynamic model policy simulations using dynamic simulations method compare the dynamic responses to devaluation with the responses to tight credit policy it is shown that the trade balance effects of tight credit policy are more enduring than those of devaluation the simulations demonstrate that the devaluation has actually worsened the trade balance and hence devaluation is not an option in response to a negative trade shock whereas the reduction in domestic credit produces a desirable improvement in the trade balance

an examination of the relationship between australian industry equity returns and expected inflation this paper analyses the relationship between inflation and equity returns in australia over the period january 1974 to march 1996 analysis is based on monthly and quarterly data using value weighted equity indices at both the aggregate market and industry level three price indices the consumer price index cpi quarterly and the manufactured materials used index mmu and the manufacturing articles produced index map both monthly and quarterly are used to measure inflation results provide little evidence of the statistically significant negative relationship observed in the us for the full study period analysis is also conducted on three subperiods monetary targeting july 1976 january 1985 checklist approach february 1985 december 1989 and anti inflation january 1990 march 1996 at the market level the anti inflation subperiod does provide some evidence of a negative relationship between inflation and equity returns though statistical significance is not apparent with quarterly tim

robust estimation and inflation forecasting this paper considers various models emerging from the fisher effect and or the term structure of interest rates for inflation forecasting this paper it is believed makes a contribution to the literature on estimation of the models by using a procedure that is robust for non normal errors improving the efficiency of the estimates considerably the consumer price index series 90 days and 180 days australian bank accepted bill rates covering the sample period 1968q1 to 1998q4 were used in this study contrary to earlier findings strong evidence was documented supporting the fisher effect in the presence of a structural break with the break point being at 1980q1 the overall results suggest that the error correction model of the fisher effect the term structure of interest rates and short run dynamics produce superior forecasts in particular when the models were estimated using the robust method these findings have important implications for economic policy analysis

asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets an inversion result abstract i consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations the seller makes a take it or leave it price offer if the seller observes the buyer s valuation symmetric information bilateral trade is trivially efficient if the seller cannot observe the valuation asymmetric information bilateral trade is inefficient this bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market in the steady state equilibrium of the market game the relation between the informational regime and efficiency is inverted with small frictions efficiency obtains if information is asymmetric if information is symmetric however the trading outcome can be very inefficient even if frictions vanish

decentralized trading strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome for a market with a finite number of agents pairwise matching and bargaining it is shown that even when the market is frictionless the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive it depends on the amount of information agents use if their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events

the philippine electricity sector reform and the urban question how metro manila s utility is tackling urban poverty in the early 2000s the philippine government reformed its electricity sector following neoliberal principles unbundling of the power industry privatisation of assets and commodification of electricity this paper shows that the reform was primarily driven by the need to secure electricity supply and cut down tariffs these national objectives ousted other issues and notably those that find their expression at the urban level among which the question of access to electricity in metro manila s urban poor communities the central state withdrew its attention from the issue of electrification and local actors had to react as they were confronted to social tensions and practices of pilferage as a consequence city governments and local administrations are getting involved in this issue which opens the way to participation of civil society this paper shows how the rolling back of the central state led to new partnerships and arrangements between the distribution utility local governments and community organisations this movement points to an urbanisation of energy issues which could bring positive results for end users provided that it is accompanied by a clearer regulatory framework

the laspeyres bias in the spanish consumer price index the cpi compares the cost of acquiring a reference quantity vector at current and base prices such reference vector is the vector of mean quantities actually bought by a reference population whose consumption patterns are investigated during a period prior to the index base period 0 this paper shows that unless the price change between these two dates is taken into account the cpi ceases to be a proper statistical price index of the laspeyres type among several negative consequences the most important is that this omission produces a bias in the measurement of inflation the laspeyres bias using spanish data the size of the laspeyres bias is estimated at 0 061 per year during 1992 1998 the laspeyres bias in shorter time periods reached 0 122 per year in 1992 and 0 108 in 1997

existence and convergence of equilibria in the buyer s bid double auction this paper concerns a bayesian game model of the buyer s bid double auction which is a procedure for organizing trade that selects a market clearing price from a list of offers bids strategic misrepresentation by traders may make the outcome of trade inefficient satterthwaite and williams 1989 showed that misrepresentation and inefficiency quickly converge to zero as the number of traders on each side of the market increases this is extended here to cases in which the number of buyers may differ from the number of sellers the existence of equilibria in a generic instance of the model is also proven this paper concerns a market in which each trader privately knows his own preferences such a trader may have an incentive to misrepresent his preferences in order to influence the market price in his favour a buyer for instance may bid less than his true evaluation of the good for sale in an attempt to drive the price down similarly a seller may ask for more than he is willing to accept with behaviour of this kind a seller s offer could exceed a buyer s bid even though a mutually profitable trade between them exists in the market as a whole a price may be determined at which all potential gains from trade are not achieved strategic misrepresentation may therefore cause inefficiency our confidence in markets rests upon the belief that this inefficiency is insignificant when there are a large number of small traders a small trader in a large market is unlikely to have much influence on the market price as a consequence he has little incentive to misrepresent and the market is therefore almost fully efficient this argument however is vague about a very important point when is a trader relatively small and how many traders constitute a large market the meaning of small and large in this context is critical to understanding when this intuitive argument applies this argument is investigated here by thoroughly analyzing a particular model of trade a market is considered in which money may be exchanged for indivisible units of a good for n m 1 there are n sellers each of whom has a unit to sell and m buyers each of whom wishes to buy a unit each trader is therefore small in that he trades at most one unit we shall consider arbitrary values of n and m however trade is organized with the following rules each seller submits an offer while each buyer submits a bid the n m offers bids are ordered in a list sl s2 sn m any

the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer s bid double auction as the market becomes large a trader who privately knows his preferences may misrepresent them in order to influence the market price this strategic behaviour may prevent realization of all gains from trade in this paper trade in a simple market with an explicit rule for price formation is modelled as a bayesian game we show that the difference between a trader s bid and his reservation value is maximally 0 1 m where m is the number of traders on each side of the market competitive pressure as m increases thus quickly overcomes the inefficiency private information causes and f ces the market towards an efficient allocation

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

dynamic matching two sided incomplete information and participation costs existence and convergence to perfect competition consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched we characterize the steady state equilibria that are perfect bayesian we show that as converges to zero equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation we also show the existence of equilibria for sufficiently small provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation

post neoliberal electricity market re reforms in argentina diverging from market prescriptions this paper focuses upon the policy and institutional change that has taken place within the argentine electricity market since the country s economic and social crisis of 2001 2 as one of the first less developed countries ldcs to liberalise and privatise its electricity industry argentina has since moved away from the orthodox market model after consumer prices were frozen by the government in early 2002 when the national currency was devalued by 70 although its reforms were widely praised during the 1990s the electricity market has undergone a number of interventions ostensibly to keep consumer prices low and to avert the much discussed energy crisis caused by a dearth of new investment combined with rising demand levels this paper explores how the economic crisis and its consequences have both enabled and legitimised these policy and institutional amendments while drawing upon the specifics of the post neoliberal market re reforms to consider the extent to which the government appears to be moving away from market based prescriptions in addition this paper contributes to sector specific understandings of how despite these changes neoliberal ideas and assumptions continue to dominate argentine public policy well beyond the postcrisis era

for profit search platforms we consider optimal pricing by a profit maximizing platform running a dynamic search and matching market buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time meet and bargain under private information the optimal centralized mechanism which involves posting a bid ask spread can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary to both sides the sum of buyers and sellers fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates of the marginal types and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers and sellers bargaining weights we also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare enhancing

cycles in deregulated electricity markets empirical evidence from two decades abstract in this article we discuss the cycle hypothesis in electricity generation which states that the introduction of deregulation in an electricity system might lead to sustained fluctuations of over and under capacity the occurrence of cycles is one of the major threats for electricity markets as it affects the security of supply and creates uncertainty in both the profitability of electricity companies and in consumer prices we discuss the background for these cycles using analogies with other capital intensive industries along with evidence from the analysis of behavioral simulation models as well as from experimental electricity markets using data from the oldest deregulated markets we find support for the hypothesis in the case of the english and chilean markets based on an autocorrelation analysis evidence from the nordpool market is more ambiguous although we might be observing the first half of a cycle in generation capacity comparing a simulation of the english market performed in 1992 with the actual performance we can observe that the qualitative behavior of the model is consistent with the actual evolution finally we discuss possible mechanisms for damping cycles in electricity generation such as mothballing capacity payments and reliability markets

prices delay and the dynamics of trade we characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral finding a trading partner is costly prices are determined by bargaining and preferences are private information we show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values as frictions vanish transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists journal of economic literature classification numbers d40 d50

learning and price discovery in a search market we introduce learning into an otherwise standard two sided search and bargaining market there is uncertainty about the price distribution due to uncertainty about an underlying exogenous state of relative demand in the high state buyers are on the long side otherwise they are on the short side in equilibrium prices are on average higher in the high state individual agents learn about the distribution while searching agents typically start out by experimenting with a tough bargaining position buyers may initially insist on a low price and sellers on a high price after successive failures to trade agents become increasingly pessimistic about the market conditions and soften their bargaining stance when frictions are small equilibrium transaction prices are approximately market clearing despite aggregate demand being unknown thus the search and bargaining procedure enables price discovery in a decentralized market

the behaviour of the us consumer price index 1913 2003 a study of seasonality in the monthly us cpi this article analyses the seasonality in the monthly consumer price index cpi over the period january 1913 to december 2003 we examine three types of month effects if the mean of monthly cpi changes of the entire data set and of a given month were significantly different from zero if the mean of monthly cpi changes of a given month was different from the mean of the other months and if the variance of the monthly cpi changes for a given month was different from the variance of the other months the mean of monthly cpi changes for the entire data set 0 27 was found to be significantly greater than zero the means of monthly changes show a downward trend from september to december when the data are sliced into three sub periods we find an increasing trend in the means and medians of monthly changes but a decreasing trend in the sds of the monthly changes the mean of monthly cpi changes during the republican presidencies 0 15 was significantly lower than during the democratic presidencies 0

spot price modeling and the valuation of electricity forward contracts the role of demand and capacity we propose a model where wholesale electricity prices are explained by two state variables demand and capacity we derive analytical expressions to price forward contracts and to calculate the forward premium we apply our model to the pjm england and wales and nord pool markets our empirical findings indicate that volatility of demand is seasonal and that the market price of demand risk is also seasonal and positive both of which exert an upward seasonal pressure on the price of forward contracts we assume that both volatility of capacity and the market price of capacity risk are constant and find that depending on the market and period under study it could either exert an upward or downward pressure on forward prices in all markets we find that the forward premium exhibits a seasonal pattern during the months of high volatility of demand forward contracts trade at a premium during months of low volatility of demand forwards can either trade at a relatively small premium or even in some cases at a discount i e they exhibit a negative forward premium

efficiency of large double auctions we consider large double auctions with private values values need be neither symmetric nor independent multiple units may be owned or desired participation may be stochastic we introduce a very mild notion of a little independence we prove that all nontrivial equilibria of auctions that satisfy this notion are asymptotically efficient for any alpha 0 inefficiency disappears at rate 1 n 2 alpha

limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining this paper models trade as a non coopertative strategic game played at an inlinite sequence of dates a single indivisible commodity is traded buyers and sellers have transferable utility and are characterized by their reservation utilities they meet at random and bargain over the price at which a single unit of the good will be exchanged under a variety of circumstances it is shown that as the costs of search and bargaining become negligible the outcome of the game converges to the competitve flow equilibrium even when there is complete information journal of economic literature classification numbers 022 19x7

models of currency crises with self fulfilling features the discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency market equilibria after describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange rate crisis with self fulfilling features the paper reviews some other self reinforcing mechanisms recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms

money prices and stabilization policies in some developing countries in this paper we examine the general reasons for price and balance of payments instability in less developed countries ldcs and critically evaluate the adjustment policies usually prescribed by the international monetary fund imf for these countries the scope for stabilization policies is then examined in the framework of the keynesfan monetarist controversy the causality between money and prices is examined by using a transfer function time series approach a simple model for inflation generation is set up to analyse the price and output effects of the growth of money supply some unfavourable effects of a restrictive monetary stabilization policy in ldcs are indicated the impact of a rise in interest rate on savings in some ldcs are found to be positive but not always significant

the rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms abstract we study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information a friction parameter is the length of the time period until the next meeting we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms the condition requires that buyers and sellers always retain some bargaining power the bargaining mechanisms that satisfy this condition are called nonvanishing bargaining power nbp mechanisms simple random proposer take it or leave it protocols are nbp while k double auctions k da are not we find that k das have equilibria that converge to perfect competition at a linear rate converge at a slower rate or even do not converge at all

energy policy and energy market performance the argentinean case in the early 1990s argentina liberalized and privatized the energy system trending to a total market oriented system and abandoning the use of energy policy since 2004 as a result of a boom in energy demand and constrains in energy supply argentina has gone through an energy problem mainly related to natural gas and electricity which derived in energy shutdowns in this frame this study explores the role of energy policy and institutions in argentina with the aim of discussing whether it has been properly used to contrast the observed lack of coordination between fossil energy reserves management and the demand of fuels in power generation the results of the analysis enhance the relevance of regulatory and control authorities as well as the active use of long run energy policy for the energy system performance in order to avoid coordination failures between subsectors of the system the relevance of energy consumption for the development process and the particular characteristics of energy systems require a wide planning perspective

evaluating electricity sector reforms in argentina lessons for developing countries abstract in argentina prior to the macroeconomic crisis of early 2002 power sector reforms had proven successful in delivering low electricity tariffs and increasing private investments this had been achieved through the unbundling of electricity supply businesses and the introduction of competition paying due attention to the lessons learned by forerunners in power sector reform including neighbouring chile the reforms that had been implemented in argentina were therefore deemed to have been a success however in the wake of the macroeconomic crisis and the devaluation of the peso generators and gas suppliers found themselves in critical financial straights which caused a halt to additional investment the current challenge facing reforms in the argentine power sector is to rebound from the financial ramifications of peso devaluation and to promote private investment given these basic facts this paper traces the history of reforms in the argentine electricity sector assessing the progress that has been achieved and suggesting lessons for developing countries it is often the case in developing countries that the unbundling of vertically integrated state owned industries into privatised enterprises requires efforts to improve infrastructure as a prerequisite for the introduction of competitive practices bearing this in mind this paper lays out measures that would be useful to consider for electricity sector reforms in developing countries from the following three perspectives 1 transition from a state owned power companies to private enterprises 2 development of conditions required to promote infrastructure projects and 3 development of conditions for the establishment of a healthy and fair competitive environment assuming that liberalisation is achieved once the conditions in 1 and 2 are met

winners and losers from the privatization and regulation of utilities lessons from a general equilibrium model of argentina a computable general equilibrium cqe model is used to estimate the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the privatization and regulation of utilities in argentina begun in 1989 based on data available after the privatization that indicate different kinds of efficiency gains in electricity gas water and telecommunications both the privatization and effective regulation are estimated to yield significant macroeconomic benefits gains from the privatization accrue mainly to high income classes while gains from the effective regulation of newly privatized utilities accrue mainly to low income classes computable general equilibrium cge estimates of overall employment effects suggest that privatization was not a major contributor to the dramatic rise in unemployment in argentina between 1993 and 1995 this rise was more likely due to the tequila effect of an interest rate shock

the macroeconomics of the great depression a comparative approach recently research on the causes of the great depression has shifted from a heavy emphasis on events in the united states to a broader more comparative approach that examines the interwar experiences of many countries simultaneously in this lecture i survey the current state of our knowledge about the depression from a comparative perspective on the aggregate demand side of the economy comparative analysis has greatly strengthened the empirical case for monetary shocks as a major driving force of the depression an interesting possibility suggested by this analysis is that the worldwide monetary collapse that began in 1931 may be interpreted as a jump from one nash equilibrium to another on the aggregate supply side comparative empirical studies provide support for both induced financial crisis and sticky nominal wages as mechanisms by which nominal shocks had real effects still unresolved is why nominal wages did not adjust more quickly in the face of mass unemployment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

power sector reform in developing countries mismatched agendas power sector reform is rapidly spreading across all corners of the developing world at an alarmingly rapid pace while the rationales for reform seem to have gained acceptance among the stakeholders the reform model and process are contested this paper examines the impacts of reform using the promised outcomes as a basis for analysis the ability of reform to meet the developmental challenges facing the reformers is explored it concludes that reform has had some achievements if conventional performance indicators are used but also questions the validity of some of these indicators reform has however not fulfilled many of its goals and the prevailing recipes are likely to leave developing countries socially and economically worse off than in the pre reform period progressive government intervention is needed to shift reform process towards a more responsible development path

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

gaining and losing erm credibility the case of the united kingdom the model of this paper highlights two aspects of credibility signaling the type of government which is assumed not to be known and for any type the likelihood that if circumstances are sufficiently unfavorable a devaluation will be impossible to avoid since not to do so would go against the government s interests these two factors have opposite implications for the link between unemployment and interest differentials high unemployment signals a tough government but also makes it less likely that even a tough government will maintain an existing parity copyright 1995 by royal economic society

toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium a step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information if there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices then generically there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents in particular the large double auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents information

a search model of rental markets who should pay the commission abstract we develop a dynamic search equilibrium model of rental markets with brokerage fees an endogenous mass of landlords and tenants is active in the search market while the mass of entering tenants is exogenous the mass of entering landlords is endogenously determined by the rate at which apartments become vacant brokerage fees paid by tenants are used as a device to screen short term and long term tenants we analyze a policy that requires fees to be paid by landlords such a policy decreases efficiency by preventing efficient screening but also increases turnover and hence efficiency in the search market we further provide empirically testable implications of our theory

the role of policymakers reputation in the ems disinflations abstract it is frequently argued that the ems itself in connection with the high anti inflation reputation of the german bundesbank is responsible for the inflation reduction and convergence which member countries have experienced based on the game theoretical model of backus and driffill 1985 american economic review 75 530 538 an empirical measure of the government s reputation for fighting inflation is derived by using a bayesian learning approach time varying estimates of these counterinflation reputation measures are computed for the original ems member countries and for a control group of major non ems countries the paper finds that only the smaller ems participants have gained anti inflation reputation during the ems period

convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate abstract consider a decentralized dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers values for the traded good are private and independently drawn time is discrete each period has length and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero one or more buyers every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and if trade occurs the seller and winning buyer exit with their realized utility traders who fail to trade either continue in the market to be rematched or exit at an exogenous rate we show that in all steady state perfect bayesian equilibria as approaches zero equilibrium prices converge to the walrasian price and realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation

responses to electricity liberalization the regional strategy of a chilean generator abstract chilean reformers joined the new trend toward liberalization of the electricity markets around 1980 12 years before any other latin american country this paper summarizes the main characteristics of the electricity reforms in chile and other latin american countries it then analyzes the strategic response by the electricity generating company endesa de chile to these reforms endesa completely reformulated its competitive strategy its most significant commitments were its investments across latin america in privatized power plants in argentina peru colombia and brazil endesa based its internationalization on its chilean experience in transforming an inefficient state owned firm and operating it in the new electrical regulatory framework favorable to market competition the company s competitive advantage originated to a great extent in that chile was the first country in latin america to reform its electrical sector

do equity index industry groups improve forecasts of inflation and production a us analysis this study develops a new financial market indicator which may be a useful addition to analysing real activity in the us by taking the ratio of the price return of equity industry groups of the s p 500 over a benchmark industry group in this case taken to be the utilities industry group an indicator is created which represents the price return performance specific to each individual industry we then perform recursive pseudo out of sample bivariate forecasts of future changes in the industrial production index ipi and the consumer price index cpi at 3 month 6 month and 12 month horizons using each of the indicators and compare results against an ar forecast the results of the bivariate forecasts using a number of the indicators produce better forecasts of changes in the ipi and are also significant for causality both for the full sample period and when tested recursively bivariate forecasts of changes to the cpi however do not improve upon the ar forecasts

competitive pricing and efficiency in search equilibrium we consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and efficiency in search equilibrium extending models by rubinstein and wolinsky and by gale heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition when the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0 we show that prices in all exchanges are the same and equal the competitive market clearing price given positive search costs efficiency obtains iff bargaining satisfies hosios condition and r 0 when prices are set by third party market makers however we show that search equilibrium is necessarily efficient

dynamic markets with competitive bidding the model features a dynamic market in steady state in which prices are determined in first price auctions it combines competition over time familiar from the pairwise meeting models with instantaneous bidding competition it inquires how different properties of the model determine the relative importance of these two aspects of the competition and in particular how the non market clearing price result of the matching and bargaining models is affected by the

equilibria of the sealed bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information we study the nash equilibria of the sealed bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information a nonzero sum game for the case of uniform priors we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria the first has differentiable strategies in the second the strategies are step functions the efficiencies of these equilibria range from second best to zero for independent nonuniform priors we show that a similar situation obtains these results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed bid mechanism in practice the mechanism might be salvaged however if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear strategy equilibria

exchange rate versus credit policy analysis with a monetary model of trade and inflation in india abstract a general equilibrium model of the trade balance and inflation in india is specified and empirically analyzed the model takes into account many important institutional features of india such as foreign exchange rationing and emphasizes the effects of monetary disequilibrium on the trade balance policy simulations compare the dynamic responses to devaluation with the responses to tight credit policy it is shown that the relative price effects of policies are often significantly offset by perverse liquidity effects which serve to raise absorption however the trade balance effects of devaluation are found to be more enduring than those of tight credit policy

a critical assessment of transaction cost theory and governance of public services with special reference to water and sanitation this is a pre copyedited author produced version of an article accepted for publication in cambridge journal of economics following peer review the version of record hulya dagdeviren and simon a robertson a critical assessment of transaction cost theory and governance of public services with special reference to water and sanitation cambridge journal of economics vol 40 6 1707 1724 january 2016 is available online at https doi org 10 1093 cje bev079

inflation minimum wage and other wages an econometric study on french macroeconomic data this study examines the set of interdependences between the formation of wages prices and the minimum wage smic through a vectorial error correction model estimated on french quarterly macroeconomic data covering the 1970 1 1999 4 period two periods are distinguished the period of inflation rise from 1970 to 1981 which coincides with an important squeeze of the wage range measured by the ratio of the minimum wage to the hourly wage rate the period of disinflation since 1981 that has been concomitant with a stability of wage inequalities disinflation has hardly benefited the evolution of the smic which has always profited by price rises in real and relative terms which have become less strong this evolution does not benefit any more on wage rises when the interdependences between variables are taken into account the smic seems however to have gained in efficiency as an instrument on wage disparity reduction it rises are finally more persistent in real terms and relatively to the other salar

a decentralized market with common values uncertainty non steady states we analyse a market where i trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining ii agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good and iii no new entrants are allowed once the market is open we show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium even as discounting is removed this holds whether the asymmetry is two sided or one sided in some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded this contrasts with the earlier literature which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period

currency boards more than a quick fix currency boards more than a quick fix once a popular colonial monetary arrangement currency boards fell into disuse as countries gained political independence but recently currency boards have made a remarkable come back this essay takes a critical look at their performance are currency boards really a panacea for achieving low inflation and high growth or do they merely provide a quick fix allowing authorities to neglect fundamental reforms and thus fail to yield lasting benefits we have three major findings first the historical track record of currency boards is sterling with few instances of speculative attacks and virtually no involuntary exits countries that did exit from currency boards did so mainly for political rather than economic reasons and such exits were usually uneventful second modern currency boards have often been instituted to gain credibility following a period of high or hyperinflation and in this regard have been remarkably successful countries with currency boards experienced lower inflation and higher if more volatile gdp growth compared to both floating regimes and simple pegs the inflation difference reflects both a lower growth rate of money supply a discipline effect and a faster growth of money demand a credibility effect the gdp growth effect is significant but may simply reflect a rebound from depressed levels third case studies reveal the successful introduction of a currency board to be far from trivial requiring lengthy legal and institutional changes as well as a broad economic and social consensus for the implied commitment moreover there are thorny issues as yet untested regarding possible exits from a currency board thus currency boards do not provide easy solutions but if introduced in the right circumstances with some built in flexibility they can be an important tool for gaining credibility and achieving macroeconomic stabilization atish r ghosh anne marie and holger c wolf

exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks exchange market mayhem the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks this paper evaluates the causes and consequences of episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets using data from 1959 through 1993 for twenty oecd countries we consider the antecedents and aftermath of devaluations and revaluations flotations fixings and speculative attacks which may not be successful we find that realignments of fixed exchange rates are alike devaluations are preceded by political instability budget and current account deficits and fast growth of money and prices revaluations are mirror images of devaluations speculative attacks resemble devaluations but money growth and inflation are more endemic and there is no last minute attempt to tighten monetary policy in contrast few consistent correlations link regime transitions like flotations or fixings to macroeconomic or political variables transitions between exchange rate regimes are largely idiosyncratic and are neither consistently provoked ex ante by systematic imbalances nor typically justified ex post by subsequent changes in policy we conclude that there are no clear early warning signals of many speculative attacks and no easy solutions for policy makers barry eichengreen andrew k rose and charles wyplosz

information revelation in a market with pairwise meetings the paper presents a simple pairwise meetings model of trade the new feature is that agents have asymmetric information about the true state of the world the focus is on the transmission of the information through the process of trade the qualitative question is to what extent is the information revealed to uninformed agents through the trading process when the market is in some sense frictionless in particular does the decentralized process give rise to full revelation results as derived by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and competitive environments in the context of the model of this paper it turns out that the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents even when the market is in some sense approximately frictionless

on the trade off between deficit and inefficiency and the double auction with a fixed transaction fee in many trading environments any incentive compatible and individually rational market mechanism will be either inefficient or will run a deficit we prove that as the market size m gets large for any fixed surplus or deficit x m times the minimal absolute inefficiency converges to c x where c is essentially a quadratic function of textitx we introduce a new mechanism the double auction with a fixed transaction fee by choosing the size of the fee appropriately any level of deficit or surplus can be implemented and the resulting mechanisms achieve the above bound corollaries include an asymptotic version of the myerson satterthwaite impossibility theorem a description of the minimal subsidy required to implement the efficient trading rule a characterization of the minimal inefficiency obtainable with budget balanced market mechanisms recommendations on the optimal organization of trade and insights on the effects of taxation

getting prices right what should be done much of the profession accepts that the cpi likely overstates the rate of increase of the cost of living it is less clear that there are sound and feasible steps that the bls can adopt to improve matters in the short run there are unresolved conceptual and identification problems in the measurement of quality superlative price indexes are not feasible and feasible approximations are not superlative and may not even be better the need for a single index that aggregates over heterogeneous consumers with different incomes tastes and needs casts serious doubt on the cost of living approach

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

money and prices some evidence from india the objective of this paper is to examine the long run relationship between supply of money and prices the prices considered are wholesale price and consumer price indices for industrial workers urban non manual workers and agricultural labourers using the null hypothesis of cointegration it is shown that the supply of money and consumer price indices for urban non manual workers and agricultural labourers are cointegrated in the long run both the prices namely urban non manual workers and agricultural labourers form a stable relationship with money supply in the long run

the optimality of a simple market mechanism strategic behavior in a finite market can cause inefficiency in the allocation and market mechanisms differ in how successfully they limit this inefficiency a method for ranking algorithms in computer science is adapted here to rank market mechanisms according to how quickly inefficiency diminishes as the size of the market increases it is shown that trade at a single market clearing price in the k double auction is worst case asymptotic optimal among all plausible mechanisms evaluating mechanisms in their least favorable trading environments for each possible size of the market the k double auction is shown to force the worst case inefficiency to zero at the fastest possible rate

dynamic matching and bargaining games a general approach this paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies this result is informed by the analysis of non cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions a central objective of this literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions in particular does the trading outcome become walrasian when frictions become small existing specifications of such games provide divergent answers the characterization result is used to investigate what causes these differences and to generalize insights from the analysis of specific search and bargaining games

equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining this paper considers a market where pairs of agents who are interested in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process and upon meeting initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction the basic bargaining problem is treated with the strategic approach the paper derives the steady state equilibrium agreements analyzes their dependence on market conditions such as the relative numbers of agents of different types and discusses their relations with the competitive equilibrium outcome and other results in the search equilibrium literature this paper considers a market that operates in the following way pairs of agents who have mutual interest in carrying out a transaction are brought together by a stochastic process when two agents meet they initiate a bargaining process over the terms of the transaction if two agents reach an agreement a transaction takes place and they leave the market of course the bargaining positions and hence the agreement reached in any particular meeting will be affected by the conditions prevailing in the market these will include the chances that each of the negotiating parties have of meeting other partners in the event that the agreement in the current negotiations is delayed also the expected length of time required to achieve an alternative transaction and the expected behavior of alternative partners the study of such a market mechanism is of interest for two reasons firstly it captures some realistic aspects of the trade in certain specific markets e g asset markets such as housing and some labor markets secondly it contributes to an understanding of the micro mechanisms of price formation and their role in shaping market outcomes in both cases the features studied are largely neglected in the traditional market equilibrium analyses the related literature includes the articles by diamond 4 5 diamond and maskin 6 mortensen 8 9 and zusman and bell 13 these articles consider markets of the type described above in which transactions are concluded at pairwise meetings of agents the major difference between our work and these articles is in the approach to the basic bargaining problem in the cited articles it is assumed that a meeting is concluded with an instantaneous agreement which divides the associated surplus in an arbitrary predetermined way when the surplus is assumed to be divided equally the division rule is in fact nash s axiomatic bargaining solution in contrast the present paper treats the basic bargaining problem with the strategic approach see rubinstein 19 which constitutes an attempt to look into the bargaining black box this approach explicitly models the time dimension of the bargaining process describes in detail the bargaining procedure and justifies the agreement as a perfect equilibrium in

bargaining under incomplete information this paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty under the bargaining rule proposed the buyer and the seller each submit sealed offers that determine whether the good in question is sold and the transfer price the nash equilibrium solution of this bargaining game implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent s reservation price issues of relative bargaining advantage and efficiency are examined for a number of special cases finally we discuss the appropriateness of the nash solution concept

price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty abstract we introduce aggregate uncertainty into a rubinstein and wolinsky 1985 type dynamic matching and bilateral bargaining model the market can be either in a high state where there are more buyers than sellers or in a low state where there are more sellers than buyers traders do not know the state they randomly meet each other and bargain by making take it or leave it offers the only information transmitted in a meeting is the time a trader spent on the market there are two kinds of search frictions time discounting and exogenous exit we find that as the search frictions vanish the market discovers the competitive price quickly the prices offered in equilibrium converge in expectation to the true state walrasian price at the rate linear in the total search friction this rate is the same as it would be if the state were commonly known

crisis sustainability of electricity prices and state interventions in argentina this article examines the sustainability of wholesale power prices following the 2001 economic crisis in argentina we depart from the contractual disputes between the multinational power generating companies and the state of argentina arising from price and investment interventions after the economic crisis then we move on to argue that these sector specific measures were inevitable once some of the key macroeconomic policies such as the currency board system were discarded using an error correction method and estimating a counterfactual price series we demonstrate that in the absence of changes in the price determination method and direct public investment the level and the volatility of power prices would have been much higher with further knock on effects on the rest of the economy copyright 2012 the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining can it be good for efficiency abstract we consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of mortensen and wright 2002 we find that private information typically deters entry but the welfare can actually be higher under private information

walras retrouve decentralized trading mechanisms and the competitive price we extend the standard analysis of decentralized markets to allow for the possibility that traders interact simultaneously with more than one trader on the opposite side of the market in contrast with the literature we reconcile the walrasian equilibrium with the outcome of decentralized strategic trade we show that there exist generic matching technologies that determine local market conditions such that as market frictions vanish the equilibrium price is the one that would result in the static walrasian market our analysis highlights the importance of local market conditions for the determination of equilibrium prices

the grin of the cheshire cat abstract throughout the 1990s privatisation liberalisation de regulation in short the british model dominated the policy agenda for electric utilities at the heart of these reforms was a desire to transform the electricity industry from a monopoly into a competitive market so that electricity could be bought and sold like other commodities and products however from 2001 onwards cracks in this policy became visible rather than admit the policy s failings its advocates have tried to fix the model by re introducing planning as planning replaces competition increasingly all that is left of the competitive element of the model is the free market rhetoric the grin of the cheshire cat but when supply security can no longer be guaranteed politicians will be forced to act for developed countries the problems will be significant but they willingly opted for liberalisation and have the financial resources to deal with these problems so sympathy must be limited by contrast developing countries often had little choice but to comply with the wishes of the international financial institutions ifis their industries have often suffered serious under investment in the privatised market it is these countries that the developed world has a duty to help and the ifis must urgently re assess their policies and widely acknowledge their mistakes

rational expectations econometric analysis of changes in regime an investigation of the term structure of interest rates abstract this paper is of interest both for its methodological contribution of new tools for analyzing rational expectations models and for its substantive conclusions concerning the term structure of interest rates during the monetary experiment of october 1979 the paper studies systems subject to changes in regime interpreted here as occasional discrete shifts in the parameters governing the time series behavior of exogenous economic variables the specification is shown to be quite tractable both theoretically and empirically the technique is used to analyze yields on three month treasury bills and ten year treasury bonds during 1962 to 1987 a constant parameter linear model for short term rates is shown to be inconsistent both with the univariate time series properties of short rates and with the observed bivariate relation between long and short rates under the expectations hypothesis of the term structure an alternative nonlinear model that admits the possibility of changes in regime affords a much better description of the univariate process for short rates moreover the cross equation restrictions implied by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure are consistent with the nonlinear specification indeed the residuals of the restricted relation have a standard error of only 0 8 basis points this is a third less than that of a completely unrestricted linear regression of long rates on short rates and compares with an unconditional standard deviation of long rates of 142 basis points i conclude that once the recognition by bond traders of changes in regime is taken into account the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates holds up fairly well for these data

international prices wages and inflation in the open economy a chilean model this paper presents a macroeconomic model to explain the dynamics of chilean inflation during 1976 82 the model extends the australian and scandinavian open economy models by making a finer distinction between tradables and nontradables and by introducing more elaborate expectations formation results of the model supplied to quarterly chilean data over the period reject the homogeneity of the system indicating that a devaluation does indeed affect the relative price between tradables and nontradables in the chilean context the results cast doubt on the stabilization policies pursued during the period 1979 82 which implicitly relied upon a model in which full homogeneity obtains

stabilization and its discontents argentina s economic restructuring in the 1990s abstract this paper assesses the argentine stabilization and market reform strategies since 1989 we argue that argentina may be penned in by its own success exchange rate targeting quelled inflation but the resulting real appreciation has limited export and employment growth microeconomic reforms raised efficiency but have threatened income distribution and hence political stability exclusive styles of policy making helped enact reform but have led to corruption and policy insensitivity and contributed to rising social discontent we close by suggesting how a second generation of reforms could tackle these issues and spread the proceeds of reform to a wider segment of the argentine public

bilateral matching and bargaining with private information we study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game dmbg with two sided private information bilateral bargaining the model is a private information replica of mortensen and wright 2002 there are two kinds of frictions time

rational expectations and price behavior abstract this paper evaluates the role of rational expectations in price setting behavior in india india has a large informal sector where prices are generally flexible since most economic transactions do not take place under formal and fixed contracts empirical tests suggest that prices respond fully to anticipated changes in demand while unanticipated changes affect output furthermore the price equation was found to be consistent with the money demand and output equation in the past the monetary authority in india have not systematically responded to negative output shocks such as those arising from droughts or famines by introducing unanticipated reductions in money growth this policy has been helpful in minimizing output losses and thereby stabilizing prices

electricity sector reform in cameroon is privatization the solution abstract the economic difficulties of cameroon and of its government owned companies led the international monetary fund imf and the world bank to set up a vast privatization program with the government s collaboration in the electricity sector the state had a complete control over the industry through the societe national d electricite sonel an integrated monopoly utility under the imf world bank program sonel has been sold to foreign interests this article presents cameroon s electricity sector the proposed reform and the importance of electricity in economic development an evaluation of the reform is presented from two different perspectives first we consider the reform from a theoretical and market design point of view second we challenge the reform from a more fundamental level by questioning the relevance of privatization at this stage of the electricity sector development this brings us to review the strategic place of electricity in economic growth how different countries have dealt with their electricity industry in early development stage and how the objective of multinational corporations could be in conflict with specific electricity sector goals from these two different perspectives we conclude that the imf and the world bank have set up a reform process that is against good public policy we conclude with some suggestions for improving the reform process

money prices and causality monetarist versus structuralist explanations using pooled country evidence the direction of causality between changes in money supply and aggregate prices has long been a matter of controversy between structuralists and monetarists this paper addresses deficiencies in this literature in three ways first a large sample of countries with alternate measures of money and price variables is used to evaluate the evidence on money inflation and causality second combined data are tested for causality with the combinations based on variables suggested by the literature level of per capita income magnitude of inflation degree of financial market development and independence of the central bank finally because the choice of lag length is often arbitrary results are generated with varying lags and consistency across different lag periods looked for two presentation methods are developed categorical and graphical evidence of structural inflation was found only in chile and sri lanka evidence of money supply exogeneity on the other hand was found to be strongest in kuwait

bilateral trade with the sealed bid k double auction existence and efficiency for k in the unit interval the k double auction determines the terms of trade when a buyer and a seller negotiate transfer of an item the buyer submits a bid b and the seller submits an offer s trade occurs if b exceeds s at price kb 1 k s we model trade as a bayesian game in which each trader privately knows his reservation value but only has beliefs about the other trader s value existence of a multiplicity of equilibria is proven for a class of trader s beliefs for generic beliefs however these equilibria are shown to be ex ante inefficient

working to improve the consumer price index he recent report of the advisory commission appointed by the u s senatefinance committee begins with one overarching recommendation thebls should establish a cost of living index coli as its objective in mea suring consumer prices u s senate 1996 p 2 this seems basically right to us indeed the bls has long said that the cost of living framework guides operationaldecisions about the construction of the index gillingham 1974 u s bureau oflabor statistics 1984 1988 1992 1997a putting things slightly differently if thebls staff or other technical experts knew how to produce a true cost of living indexon a monthly production schedule that would be what we would produce althoughwe have no fundamental disagreement with the commission about what the objec tive of the cpi program ought to be we may disagree to some extent about theapproaches and methods that are appropriate and feasible in working toward thatobjective this is a point to which we will return below our rst purpose in the present paper is to comment on the advisory com mission s report and the recommendations it contains