share contracts and their rationale lessons from marine fishing most of the existing literature on share contracts is based explicitly or implicitly on agriculture a sector in which share contracts are seldom dominant and apparently on the decline moreover since agricultural activities have some rather special characteristics the purpose of the present article is to analyse contractual choice and especially the choice of share contracts in a sector in which share contracts are dominant namely fishing in the process of explaining the dominance of share contracts in fishing the article also explains a some heretofore neglected features of these share contracts such as the way in which shares are calculated and the treatment of repair and maintenance expenditures b the nature and extent of interlinked transactions c the exceptional cases where share contracts are not used and d the relevance of varying environmental conditions and especially those of poor developing countries to the nature of contracts in fishing and to the differences therein between

seasonality differential access and interlinking of labour and credit this article explains the interlinking of rural labour and credit transactions in terms of differential access to credit markets and seasonality a model is developed which incorporates not only seasonality and differential access but also several other explanations for interlinking suggested in the literature moreover it allows one to test the sensitivity of the results to differing powers on the part of landowners relative to working households

the tale of the tails canadian income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s we present new evidence on levels and trends in after tax income inequality in canada between 1980 and 2000 we argue that existing data sources may miss changes in the tails of the income distribution and that many of the changes in the income distribution have been in the tails for this reason we turn to an alternative source in particular we construct data on after tax and transfer income using census files augmented with predicted taxes based on information available from administrative tax data using these data we find that canadian after tax inequality levels are substantially higher than has been previously recognized primarily because income levels are lower at the bottom of the distribution than in commonly used survey data we also find larger long term increases in after tax income inequality and far more variability over the economic cycle this raises interesting questions about the role of the tax and transfer system in mitigating both trends and fluctuations in market income inequality les auteurs presentent de nouveaux resultats sur les niveaux et tendances de l inegalite des revenus apres impots au canada entre 1980 et 2000 on suggere que les donnees existantes peuvent avoir ignore des changements dans les extremites de cette distribution alors que le gros des changements y etait concentre pour cette raison les auteurs se sont tournes vers une autre source de donnees ils ont construit une base de donnees sur les revenus apres impots et les paiements de transfert en utilisant les donnees du recensement ainsi que des donnees additionnelles sur les impots prevus a partir de renseignements disponibles dans les dossiers administratifs on decouvre que les niveaux d inegalite des revenus apres impots sont beaucoup plus eleves que ce qu on a suggere jusqu ici d abord parce que les niveaux de revenus sont plus bas au pied de la distribution que ne le suggerent les donnees d enquetes on decouvre aussi un accroissement plus grand a long terme de l inegalite des revenus apres impots et une plus grande variabilite au cours du cycle economique voila qui souleve des questions interessantes a propos du role de la fiscalite et du systeme de paiements de transfert dans la modulation de la tendance et des fluctuations dans l inegalite des revenus du marche

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

implementing results oriented trade policies the case of the us japanese auto parts dispute abstract why would the us threaten punitive tariffs on luxury autos to implement a market share target in auto parts we show that by making threats to a linked market a market share target may be implemented with fairly weak informational and administrative requirements moreover such policies can be both pro competitive and advantageous to us firms

a theory of interlinked rural transactions this paper argues that the interlinking of labor output and credit contracts often observed in rural economies can be regarded as an attempt to improve allocative efficiency in the face of moral hazard it advances an economic explanation of the phenomenon which is rooted in the view that prevalent modes of transaction of which interlinked contracts are an example are shaped by technological considerations interlinking is shown to be an efficient economic response to unequally distributed information arising from the uncertainty which characterizes subsistence agriculture all pareto efficient allocations require a combination of wage cum output sharing with consumption credit contracts the analytical framework set up to demonstrate the results is used to examine the response of the contractual parameters to changes in i the returns to alternative occupations available to tenant laborers ii the cost of credit to the village economy and iii the riskiness of cultivation the analysis concludes that public policy to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the relationships between technological considerations and modes of transaction in the absence of a complete set of markets

a limited dependent analysis of the choice of regular labour contract in seasonal agriculture the paper examines both theoretically and empirically the factors determining the demand for regular labour in seasonal agriculture in an implicit contract framework it is argued that there are hoarding costs of regular labour in the slack period when there is not much work to be done consequently the number of regular labour employed is constrained by the hoarding cost where larger employment intensive farms tend to hire more regular labour evidence from the icrisat villages in india too show that though the marginal costs of regular labour are zero there are significant hoarding costs of regular labour among small farms so that larger farmers are the major demanders of regular labour estimates of the double hurdle model jointly determining the probability of hiring regular labour and demand for regular labour hours if a regular labour is hired are shown to be an improvement over univariate tobit estimates of the demand for regular labour hours only

market share quotas abstract anecdotal evidence reveals that an import quota is not always filled when the quota is specified in terms of a market share limit instead of a quantity limit in a simple cournot duopoly we show that imposing a market share quota eliminates pure strategy equilibria instead a mixed strategy equilibrium occurs where the quota is not binding under one of the two equilibrium domestic strategies compared with a tariff that restrains the foreign market share to an equivalent level domestic output and social welfare may be higher under a market share quota

labor tying in a poor agrarian economy a theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper we show how tied labor contrary to its common characterization as a feudal relic and as a symptom of economic stagnation may actually be strengthened by capitalist agricultural development we construct a simple two period theoretical model of a two tiered labor market to show how the proportional importance of voluntary labor tying contracts may increase with yield increasing improvements and with a tightening of the labor market we then provide in support of these hypotheses some general historical as well as more detailed econometric evidence from a variety of cross sectional data in rural india

efficiency and equity tradeoffs incentive compatible contracts revisited abstract while the efficiency of certain contractual choices has been well established less attention has been given to the distributional outcomes of contracting in natural resource based industries data from a case study of seed gatherers in honduras demonstrates that workers paid under a relative payment system receive an earnings premium of about 25 of which 40 cannot be explained by observed differences in worker productivity a theoretical agency model is outlined in the appendix to explain why workers under tournaments necessarily enjoy a higher return than those under piece rates implying a more skewed income distribution as suggested in the efficiency wage literature

consumption efficiency and surplus labour abstract if 1 there is a long term relationship between consumption and labour efficiency 2 long employment contracts are possible and 3 production is seasonal a trade off emerges between positive effects of permanent contracts on productivity and the costly seasonal idleness of permanent labour possible outcomes include 1 co existence of casual and permanent contracts with number of workers affecting proportion of permanent to temporary employees but not output classical disguised unemployment 2 exclusively casual employment with output negatively related to workforce leibenstein mazumdar surplus labour and 3 permanent contracts only with open unemployment and a positive relationship between number employed and output the mirrlees bliss stern stiglitz solution conditions are derived for each solution

east west joint ventures and buyback contracts abstract contractual joint ventures cjvs and the buyback form of countertrade are popular methods that socialist countries use to attract foreign investment in this paper we explore some reasons why this is so and also explain two predominant characteristics of these contracts the existence of sharing rules and minimum standard requirements on inputs the model stresses the incentive problems involved when a socialist host country which does not allow foreign direct investment uses a cjv to obtain the fruits of some knowledge based production process from a multinational enterprise

shirking and the choice of technology a theory of production inefficiency with an empirical application abstract we develop a model of shirking and technology choice and show that organizations exercising less effective direct control over shirking adopt technologies that underutilize the workforce to a greater degree relative to neoclassical counterparts in order to control shirking indirectly thus technical inefficiency arises endogenously as a rational response to allocative inefficiency caused by shirking an empirical analysis of data from a sample of collective and private farms operating in jewish palestine reveals the presence of shirking and supports the prediction that farms with less effective direct control over shirking exhibit greater labor hoarding as a manifestation of technical inefficiency

welfare and market access effects of piecemeal tariff reform abstract we study the link between import volume and welfare due to liberalization we confine our attention to the small country case and to unilateral tariff reductions our results indicate that increased import volume associated with tariff reductions is neither necessary nor sufficient for welfare improvement to occur we show that in general both import value and welfare cannot fall moreover if the excess demand for exported goods does not respond to changes in the prices of imported goods the value of imports and welfare must move in opposite directions

capital requirements screening and interlinked sharecropping and credit contracts this paper provides one more rationale for interlinking credit and tenancy contracts in the context of production loans in an environment characterized by a heterogeneous labor pool and imperfect information landlords will have an incentive to avail themselves of screening devices by linking tenancy and credit contracts a screening device can be implemented the equilibrium set of contracts is characterized by a variety of interest rates some of which might be below the market interest rate the interest rate principal schedule is downward sloping with higher ability tenants choosing larger principals at lower interest rates

permanent labour and land tenancy contracts in agrarian economies an integrated analysis extending the existing models of land and labour contracts this study attempts to build a general model of long term agrarian contracts the model implies that where tenancy is an available option the fixed wage permanent labour contract will not be chosen if it is chosen under institutional constraints on tenancy contracts resulting resource allocations will be inefficient empirical relevance of the model is tested on data from the philippines

results oriented versus rules oriented trade policies a theoretical survey this paper surveys the recent literature on results oriented versus rules oriented trade policies after presenting a simple setting capturing the basics of results oriented markets access schemes we discuss extensions which have been or might be developed in this line of research in particular we investigate how the use of simple costly verification of information models might be fruitfully applied to analyze the incentives for countries to choose between results oriented and rules oriented trade policies

targeting child labor in debt bondage evidence theory and policy implications despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

rural labor legislation and permanent agricultural employment in northeastern brazil abstract permanent annual or longer term agricultural employment declined relative to temporary daily weekly or seasonal employment during the 1960s in a sugar cane producing region in northeastern brazil but increased rapidly during the 1970s predictions from economic theory are combined with observations about the economic forces at work during the period to argue that in the absence of government intervention permanent employment would likely have risen during both decades the argument renders the introduction of the brazilian rural labor statute rls of 1963 a strong candidate explanation for the decline of permanent employment in the 1960s the rls s employment stability provision which required employers to make severance payments to workers with at least one year tenure dismissed without just cause not only increased the expected cost of permanent contracts but also changed the very nature of permanent employment prior to the legislation employers induced permanent workers to be subject to them by giving them premium wage and benefits packages and threatening to dismiss them if caught shirking in subjection severance pay provisions made such threats incredible the elimination of farmers ability to derive subjection benefits from permanent employees reduced even further the incentive to hire workers under permanent contracts

does supervision matter some hypothesis tests using indian farm level data abstract a model is developed and estimated to test for heterogeneity of family and hired labor in agricultural production and to estimate the impact of employer supervision on the productivity of hired labor plot level data are used from a rice growing village in semi arid tropical india the hypothesis that family and hired labor are homogeneous inputs was rejected results indicate that family member supervision is required to increase hired labor productivity output loss attributable to operating at reduced supervision intensity was greater than 10 on over 40 of the plots

why have poorer neighbourhoods stagnated economically while the richer have flourished neighbourhood income inequality in canadian cities higher income neighbourhoods in canada s eight largest cities flourished economically during the past quarter century while lower income communities stagnated this paper identifies some of the underlying processes that led to this outcome increasing family income inequality drove much of the rise in neighbourhood inequality increased spatial economic segregation the increasing tendency of like to live nearby like also played a role it is shown that these changes originated in the labour market changes in investment pension income and government transfers played a very minor role yet it was not unemployment that differentiated the richer from poorer neighbourhoods rather it was the type of job found particularly the annual earnings generated the end result has been little improvement in economic resources in poor neighbourhoods during a period of substantial economic growth and a rise in neighbourhood income inequality

trade liberalization and strategic outsourcing this paper develops a model of strategic outsourcing with trade liberalization in the intermediate product market a domestic firm may choose to purchase a key intermediate good from a more efficient foreign producer who also competes with the domestic firm for a final good this has a strategic effect on competition unlike the outsourcing motivated by cost saving the strategic outsourcing has a collusive effect that could raise the prices of both intermediate and final goods trade liberalization in the intermediate good market has a very different effect compared with trade liberalization in the final good market d 2003 elsevier b v all rights reserved

drink what you can pay for financing infrastructure in a fragmented water system the article investigates the relationship between environmental violations and water utility infrastructure investment in the houston metropolitan area through a lens of institutional fragmentation

can subsidies for mars be procompetitive in contrast to recent literature we show that market access requirements mars can be implemented in a procompetitive manner even in the absence of threats in related markets by focusing on subsidies that are paid only when the requirement is met we show that a mar can increase aggregate output relative to free trade provided that the right set of firms is targeted in the context of a model with multiple japanese and u s firms we show that a mar on u s imports is procompetitive as long as the u s firms are the ones targeted to receive the subsidy jel classification f13 est ce que les subventions pour promouvoir la penetration du marcheetranger peuvent promouvoir la concurrence contrairement a ce qui ressort de la litterature specialisee recente les auteurs montrent que l on peut mettre en place des mesures pour promouvoir la penetration du marcheetranger de telle maniere que cela promeuve la concurrence et ce meme en l absence de menaces dans des marches relies en mettant l accent sur les subventions payees quand les objectifs de penetration sont remplis on montre que de telles pratiques peuvent accroire le niveau de production par rapport a ce qu il serait dans un monde de libre echange pourvu que le bon ensemble de firmes soit cible dans un modele ou coexistent plusieurs firmes americaines et japonaises on montre que de tels efforts quand ils portent sur les importations en provenance des etats unis promeuvent la concurrence tant que ce sont les firmes americaines qui recoivent la subvention

income inequality and income segregation this article investigates how the growth in income inequality from 1970 to 2000 affected patterns of income segregation along three dimensions the spatial segregation of poverty and affluence race specific patterns of income segregation and the geographic scale of income segregation the evidence reveals a robust relationship between income inequality and income segregation an effect that is larger for black families than for white families in addition income inequality affects income segregation primarily through its effect on the large scale spatial segregation of affluence rather than by affecting the spatial segregation of poverty or by altering small scale patterns of income segregation

is profit sharing a cure for unemployment in less developed countries abstract the effects of introducing profit sharing in modern sectors in ldcs are discussed within a dual model with endogenous wages and internal migration profit sharing does not have a direct job creation effect as long as firms set the pay parameters yet the new system may have long run effects on employment allocation under some circumstances profit sharing may in fact destabilize short run employment such that jobs last for a shorter duration modern sector wages are then raised to discipline workers and urban unemployment goes up arguments are also given for the hypothesis that profit sharing stabilizes short run employment with the opposite results

vertical foreclosure and international trade policy international differences in the cost of production of a key intermediate product can mean that a domestic firm is dependent on supplies from a foreign vertically integrated firm this paper considers the incentives for the foreign firm and foreign country to supply the domestic firm when the firms compete in a cournot or bertrand market for the final product the vertical supply decision is significantly affected by domestic supply conditions for the input and a domestic tariff on final product imports optimal policy by the exporting country may require a tax on both exports or a subsidy on both exports countries that are dependent on imports of a key intermediate product or raw material from a dominant world supplier are often concerned about the price and the availability of imports a notable current example involves the computer industry japanese suppliers with the help of the japanese government recently restricted the exports of dram semiconductors substantially raising their price these suppliers control about 80 of the market for semiconductors and the higher prices and shortage in supply have forced u s producers of computers to curtail production and increase prices vertically integrated japanese firms such as toshiba and n e c have benefitted both from increased profits in the export market for semiconductors and from the improvement in their competitive position in the market for final computers as this example indicates the price and availability of imported supplies can depend on both public and private incentives in the exporting country in this paper we first examine the private incentives for a vertically integrated firm to export an intermediate product to a higher cost rival lowering its rival s costs the exporting firm may choose vertical foreclosure thus fully cutting off supplies we then consider the public interest of the exporting country does the exporting country gain by encouraging the export of the intermediate product or alternatively might government foreclosure occur the government is in a position to affect the quantity of exports of both the input and the final product by an appropriate choice of export tax and subsidy policies

keiretsu and relationship specific investment implications for market opening trade policy abstract this paper considers the implications of relationship specific investment within keiretsu for policies aimed at opening the japanese market for intermediate goods such as auto parts both vies applied to parts and vers restricting japanese exports of autos cause the keiretsu to import a wider range of parts but of a relatively unimportant type such as seat covers since keiretsu investment and output fall the total value of us parts exports may actually fall for a given value of these exports a vie is less costly for us consumers and japanese producers but a ver is preferred by us automakers

the control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences a two stage bertrand duopoly model demonstrates how the sequence of firm and government actions can explain the origins of export credit subsidies and can affect the welfare consequences of international agreements to adopt subsidy rate ceilings firms act first by stating prices in applications for export credit and can induce positive subsidies by inflating the prices the subsidies transfer rents from governments to firms without changing welfare defined as profits less subsidy expenditures governments become the first to act by adopting subsidy rate ceilings that bind ceilings cause firms to lower prices such that if a positive ceiling binds welfare falls

the impact of income inequality on economic residential segregation the case of malmo 1991 2010 as in other western countries in sweden there is a widespread conviction that residential segregation influences the opportunities for residents social mobility and therefore is a cause of income

attached farm labor limited horizons and servility abstract two facets of attached farm labor arrangements the servility often required of attached laborers and employers interest in maintaining such workers limited horizons are described and incorporated into an otherwise standard model of attached and temporary agricultural employment substantially modifying the model s predictions the dependence of workers preferences on reference group behavior which underlies employers interest in limiting horizons may enable employers to drive even freely mobile workers wellbeing below competitive levels may imply that abolishing servility arrangements would benefit all workers gives rise to multiple equilibria in community layout and culture and sheds light on some characteristics of agrarian revolts

export subsidies for differentiated products abstract export subsidies in differentiated product markets are examined in a framework where the decision to establish subsidy programs occurs first but firms set prices before governments set subsidy levels in contrast to earlier results that governments should tax the exports of bertrand firms when subsidy levels are set before prices positive subsidies can be optimal adoption of a subsidy program by one producer s government does not necessarily hurt the unsubsidized competitor the subsidy itself hurts but the program facilitates collusion the results highlight the importance of timing and the distinction between the effects of policy regimes and policy instruments

the economy of high wages an agency problem latitude with respect to the effort they supply and monitoring of effort and output is costly in this paper we examine the agency problem that arises in these circumstances the agent employee is assumed to maximize expected utility which depends on wages and effort a bad we assume that output is a deterministic function of effort that either effort or output can be accurately monitored and that monitoring is costly the firm s problem is to select a level of monitoring and a compensation package that will minimize the cost of obtaining a desired level of effort given the cost of monitoring the agent s preferences and the agent s opportunity cost of accepting employment with the firm his labour supply constraint the firm chooses a compensation scheme from the set in which compensation is contingent on effort if the agent is monitored and is equal to a standard

agricultural workers credit rationing and family networks in rural mexico abstractwe use mixed methods and first hand household data in mexico to investigate credit practices by households engaged in agricultural wage employment quantitative analysis shows evidence of rationing in the formal sector but also suggests the existence of mitigating mechanisms qualitative analysis provides additional insights first income patterns associated with agricultural wage generate income smoothing needs that are sometimes better met by the informal sector second family networks can perform key functions as gateways to the formal sector through specific informal arrangements that inject flexibility into formal rules and procedures

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

productivity and distribution under cropsharing tenancy abstract this paper develops a model of sharecropping assuming tenant autonomy competitive behavior of landlords and laborers and endogenously determined wage and share rental rates the coexistence of wage labor and sharecropping is explained in terms of their incentive labor process and risk sharing characteristics sharecropping serves as a surrogate for the direct supervision of the labor process its incidence is shown to rise in the presence of unemployment at a subsistence wage the model implies that the abolition of tenancy will raise output raise labor income and reduce land income

minimum wage legislation in a dual labor market the paper studies the equilibrium effects of minimum wage legislation in an economy with coexisting primary and secondary labor markets owing to difficulties in monitoring relative wages and the threat of job loss play a functional role in eliciting effort from primary sector workers minimum wage laws hence affect the primary wage and employment level even if the law only binds in the secondary labor market furthermore interaction between the two sectors can also alter the secondary outcome relative to the standard analysis and has implications for participation decisions and for the level of unemployment

factor markets and resource allocation in colonial punjab it is often argued that agricultural factor markets in colonial india were underdeveloped leading to inefficient resource use and slow agricultural development however there is little econometric evidence on these issues this article outlines a model which incorporates the factor market imperfections discussed in the literature and tests the model against data from the punjab there is in the statistical sense evidence of resource misallocation however these effects are too small to be of much economic significance