the effect of imf lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises abstract this paper explores empirically how the adoption of imf programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term we find that imf programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1 5 2 percentage points these results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously furthermore imf programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of imf triggered debt runs however are also possible

does one soros make a difference a theory of currency crises with large and small traders do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets to address this issue we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals even abstracting from signaling the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling relative to the case in which there is no large investors small investors attach the currency when fundamentals are stronger yet the difference can be small or null depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors adding signaling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders behaviour much stronger

adoption of an imf programme and debt rescheduling an empirical analysis the existence of an empirical relationship between the adoption of an imf programme and the concession of a debt rescheduling by commercial and official creditors is tested using a bivariate probit model if countries who have arrangements with the imf are more likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their external debt we could conclude that the adoption of an imf programme could work as a sort of signal of a country s good willingness which is thus rewarded with the debt relief the results confirm the existence of a significant effect of the adoption of an imf programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling by creditors

the imf a bird s eye view of its role and operations the international monetary fund imf is the world s premier international financial institution with 184 member countries and active programmes in a significant number of them at any one time the fund attracts a great deal of attention much of it critical but the discussion is often polemic in style strongly held but frequently opposing views are expressed this survey attempts to examine in an objective way the theory and evidence relating to the fund s operations many aspects of the empirical research are relatively recent and a universal consensus is yet to emerge as a consequence there is scope for disagreement to persist however the research is also gradually clarifying many important issues the format for the survey is to examine the life cycle of imf arrangements what makes a country turn to the fund for assistance should the imf be lending what influences the outcome of negotiations and the design of programmes are imf programmes effective and why do some countries make prolonged use of imf resources for completeness there is also some discussion of the history of the imf the extent to which fund policies have been influenced by advances in economic theory and the fund s systemic role important organisational and governance issues are also covered briefly although primarily adopting an economist s perspective the survey reflects the growing recognition that in order to understand the imf s operations economics has to be combined with politics examining the imf is an exercise in applied political economy copyright 2007 the author journal compilation 2007 blackwell publishing ltd

equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games abstract we experimentally assess the predictive power of two equilibrium selection principles for binary n player entry games with strategic complementarities in static entry games we test the theory of global games which posits that players play games of complete information as if they were playing a related global game of incomplete information by contrast in dynamic n period entry games the efficient subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is for all to enter whenever the payoff relevant state variable exceeds a certain threshold the subgame perfect entry threshold of the dynamic game will generally differ from the global game threshold of the static version of the same game nevertheless our experimental findings suggest that entry thresholds are similar between static and dynamic versions of the same game an implication is that the modeling of entry games with strategic complementarities as static one shot games ignoring the dynamic element of such interactions may not be unreasonable

credit rating and debt crises we develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk by influencing rational creditors ratings affect sovereigns probability of default which in turn affects ratings our analysis reveals a pro cyclical impact of credit rating in equilibrium the presence of a rating agency increases default risk when it is high and decreases default risk when it is low

do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks new evidence kraay kraay a 2003 do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks journal of international economics 59 297 321 documents the lack of any systematic association between monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack this paper revisits kraay s work and modifies it by introducing an improved measure of monetary policy and an additional country specific fundamental short term corporate debt to capture balance sheet vulnerabilities emphasized by the recent currency crises literature the results show that for low levels of short term corporate debt raising interest rates lowers the probability of a successful attack this effect decreases and eventually reverses for higher levels of debt these findings contrast earlier empirical evidence and imply a fundamental reconsideration of the role of monetary policy during currency crises

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

the imf and the mobilisation of foreign aid abstract particularly in the context of the millennium development goals there has been much discussion of the association between the international monetary fund and bilateral aid flows what role should the fund be playing in helping to achieve the mdgs some observers have suggested that the fund should seek to reduce its role in poor countries and should be minimising its own lending they see aid donors taking on a larger role and present the imf and aid donors as substitutes others envisage a much bigger lending role for the fund this may hint at complementarities although this discussion raises important policy issues there are very few studies that examine the relationship empirically this paper attempts to help fill this gap it explores the extent to which the imf has had a catalytic effect on official development assistance and the potential channels through which catalysis might work it finds strong evidence of a positive association and suggests that this may have more to do with condit

who matters in coordination problems we consider a common investment project that is vulnerable to a self fullling coordination failure and hence is strategically risky based on their private information agents who have heterogeneous investment incentives form expectations or sentiments about the project s outcome we nd that the sum of these sentiments is constant across dierent strategy proles and it is independent of the distribution of incentives as a result we can think of sentiment as a scarce resource divided up among the dierent payo types applying this nding we show that agents who benet little from the project s success have a large impact on the coordination process the agents with small benets invest only if their sentiment towards the project is large per unit investment cost as the average sentiment is constant a subsidy decreasing the investment costs of these agents will free up a large amount of sentiment provoking a large impact on the whole economy intuitively these agents insensitive to the project s outcome and hence to the actions of others are inuential because they modify their

delphic and odyssean monetary policy shocks evidence from the euro area abstract what drives the reaction of financial markets to central bank communication on the days of policy decisions we highlight the role of two factors that we identify from high frequency monetary surprises news on future macroeconomic conditions delphic shocks and news on future monetary policy shocks odyssean shocks these two shocks move the yield curve in the same direction but have opposite effects on financial conditions and macroeconomic expectations they also have a different impact on macroeconomic outcomes so that central bankers cannot infer the degree of stimulus they provide by looking at the mere reaction of the yield curve

mexico s balance of payments crisis a chronicle of a death foretold this paper claims that the roots of mexico s balance of payments crisis are found in the prevailing high degree of capital mobility and financial globalization under these circumstances shifts in foreign capital flows and anticipation of a banking system bailout may produce large imbalances between stocks of financial assets and foreign reserves threatening the sustainability of currency pegs econometric analysis suggests that half of mexico s reserve losses could be accounted for by these phenomena large financial imbalances are also fertile ground for self fulfilling prophesy crises which lead devaluations to produce deep recessions these difficulties can be partly remedied by appropriate policies

policy language and information effects in the early days of federal reserve forward guidance i show that the nature of the federal open market committee s fomc s forward guidance language shapes the private sector s responses to monetary policy statements from february 2000 to june 2003 the fomc only gave forward guidance about economic outlook risks and a decrease in the expected federal funds rate path caused stock prices to fall gdp growth forecasts to fall and the unemployment rate to rise from august 2003 to may 2006 the fomc added forward guidance about policy inclinations and a decrease in the expected federal funds rate path had the opposite effects these results suggest that forward guidance that emphasizes economic outlook risks causes stronger information effects than forward guidance that emphasizes policy inclinations

sovereign debt migration pressure and government survival as soon as the sovereign debt crisis began it was widely understood that germany s response would dictate its ultimate resolution whereas the initial round of bailouts stabilized markets and pres

how central banks prepare for financial crises an empirical analysis of the effects of crises and globalisation on international reserves central banks international reserve holdings have increased significantly in the recent past while traditional models fail to explain this accumulation of reserves the more recent literature argues that reserves are used as a lifejacket against currency crises however research so far has neglected the question whether and how central banks change their precautionary reserve holdings after the country was affected by a currency crisis this paper tests the hypothesis that central banks revise their reserve policy in the aftermath of currency crises a dynamic panel data model is estimated for developing and industrial countries covering the period from 1975 to 2003 the evidence suggests that currency crises induce a permanent increase of reserves this effect is particularly strong for recent currency crises since the asian financial crisis

catalysing private capital flows do imf programmes work as commitment devices in this article we examine whether imf programmes influence the ability of developing country issuers to tap international bond markets and if they improve spreads paid on the bonds issued we find that fund programmes do not provide a uniformly favourable signalling effect instead the evidence is most consistent with a positive effect of imf programmes when they are viewed as likely to lead to policy reform and when undertaken before economic fundamentals have deteriorated significantly the size of the fund s programme matters but the credibility of a joint commitment by the country and the imf appears to be critical enhancing its members access to international capital markets is widely regarded as an important objective of the international monetary fund imf or fund though the objective is not an explicitly stated purpose in the fund s articles of agreements the flow of international capital is essential to such stated purposes as the stability of the international monetary system efficient trade and productive resource use and to providing confidence when a member country experiences difficulties with its balance of payments 1 the fund s interest in private international capital flows has moreover increased over the last decade reflecting this evolution the fund s former managing

sovereign default private sector creditors and the ifis abstract the data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from international financial institutions ifis is small intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors the ifi loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them taking these contractual differences as given this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of ifi loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the ifis

a primer on global games applied to macroeconomics and finance this paper shows how to solve global games applied to macroeconomics and finance we ascertain the roles of public and private information for the determination of a unique equilibrium and discuss the informative role of market prices we examine the impact of public information on social welfare comparing models with and without complementarities at the aggregate level

central bank communication and monetary policy a survey of theory and evidence over the last two decades communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy these real world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication mostly empirical and almost all of it written in this decade we survey this ever growing literature the evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve central banks macroeconomic objectives however the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy

fundamentals news global liquidity and macroprudential policy we study optimal macroprudential policy in a model in which unconventional shocks in the form of news about future fundamentals and regime changes in world interest rates interact with collateral constraints in driving the dynamics of financial crises these shocks strengthen incentives to borrow in good times i e when good news about future fundamentals coincide with a low world interest rate regime thereby increasing vulnerability to crises and enlarging the pecuniary externality due to the collateral constraints quantitatively an optimal schedule of macroprudential debt taxes can lower the frequency and magnitude of financial crises but the policy is complex because it features significant variation across interest rate regimes and news realizations

what does monetary policy do to long term interest rates at the zero lower bound this article uses a structural var with daily data to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks on various longer term interest rates since the federal funds rate has been stuck at the zero lower bound the var is identified using the assumption that monetary policy shocks are heteroskedastic monetary policy shocks have especially high variance on days of fomc meetings and certain speeches while there is otherwise nothing unusual about these days a complementary high frequency event study approach is also used i find that stimulative monetary policy shocks lower treasury and corporate bond yields but the effects die off fairly fast

the budget deficit and the arbitrage pricing theory abstract non linear sur techniques are used to demonstrate that the budget deficit is a priced factor in the arbitrage pricing theory the results also indicate that unexpected increases in the deficit lower stock prices

interest rates and expected future budget deficits in the united states several recent empirical studies have found no evidence of a positive association between interest rates and current and past budget deficits one possible explanation for this finding is that interest rates are related much more to the expectation of future budget deficits than to current and past budget deficits in this paper i investigate whether this explanation is valid finding no evidence that it is section ii briefly formulates and discusses the hypothesis under consideration stating some of its implications section iii presents the results of regressing the commercial paper rate moody s aaa bond rate and the ex post real commercial paper rate on current and past government spending budget deficits and real money supplies the regressions have been fitted to the entire sample of monthly data spanning the period between june 1908 and march 1984 and to 11

the mystery of the printing press monetary policy and self fulfilling debt crises we study the mechanism by which unconventional balance sheet monetary policy can rule out self fulfilling sovereign default in a model with optimizing but discretionary fiscal and monetary policymakers by purchasing sovereign debt the central bank e ectively swaps risky government paper for monetary liabilities only exposed to inflation risk thus yielding a lower interest rate we characterize a critical threshold for central bank purchases beyond which absent fundamental fiscal stress the government strictly prefers primary surplus adjustment to default since default may still occur for fundamental reasons however the central bank faces the risk of losses on sovereign debt holdings which may generate ine cient inflation this risk does not undermine the credibility of a backstop nor the ability of a central bank to pursue its inflation objectives when the latter enjoys fiscal backing or fiscal authorities are su ciently averse to inflation

the ecb s omts a tale of governments investors and the central bank this paper analyses official financial assistance via esm programmes with and without the ecb s omts as long as macroeconomic imbalances are small esm stand alone programmes galvanize creditors into rolling over their loans alleviate the liquidity crisis and help the country to implement adjustment policies yet the impact of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms is likely to be recessionary in the short run since these reforms take a long time to pay off recessionary effects raise strategic uncertainty in the roll over decisions of creditors thus reducing the effectiveness of esm liquidity assistance with large imbalances liquidity problems can only be overcome with credible and sizable official assistance adding omts to an esm programme mitigates the policy dilemma but does not fully restore investor confidence when macroeconomic imbalances are too large

government financing decisions and asset returns abstract this paper presents an empirical investigation of the relation between government financing decisions and asset returns in particular the focus is on whether a substitution of debt financing for tax financing of a given level of expenditures is associated with an increase in interest rates the paper brings a different perspective to empirical investigations of government fiscal policies by examining the response of asset prices in an efficient capital market to such policies rather than focusing on aggregate consumption behavior the results are consistent with the idea that asset prices are unrelated to how the government finances its expenditures the results however also indicate that the capital market is not indifferent with respect to the level of government expenditures as higher interest rates are associated with increases in government purchases

optimal time consistent macroprudential policy collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions made in good times affect collateral prices during a crisis we show that under commitment the optimal financial regulator s plans are time inconsistent and study time consistent policy quantitatively this policy reduces sharply the frequency and magnitude of crises removes fat tails from the distribution of asset returns and increases social welfare in contrast constant debt taxes are ineffective and can be welfare reducing while an optimized macroprudential taylor rule is effective but less so than the optimal time consistent policy

cooperative monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area this article discusses the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in the euro area though many observers suggest a fiscal union as the next step of euro area constitutional reform a federal fiscal union does not appear politically feasible in the short run we suggest moving forward with cooperative monetary and fiscal institutions and policies that allow for decentralized fiscal decisions while taking federal stabilization policies into account this approach will increase the probability of survival of the euro area compared with the current fiscal arrangements using a dynamic macro model counterfactual simulation paths of our cooperative solution are contrasted with time series data for the euro area

sovereign debt with heterogeneous creditors we develop a sovereign debt model with heterogeneous creditors private and official where the probability of default depends on both the level and the composition of debt higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives to repay due to more severe sanctions but it is also costly because it lowers the value of the sovereign s default option the model can account for the co existence of private and official lending the time variation in their shares in total debt as well as the low rates charged on both it also produces intertwined default and debt composition choices

monetary policy surprises and interest rates evidence from the fed funds futures market abstract this paper estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on bill note and bond yields using data from the futures market for federal funds to separate changes in the target funds rate into anticipated and unanticipated components interest rates response to anticipated target rate changes is small while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant these responses are generally consistent with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure surprise target rate changes have little effect on expectations of future actions however which helps to explain the lack of empirical support for the expectations hypothesis at the short end of the yield curve

is the pragmatic response to international monetary fund quotas and credit limits favourable under the international monetary fund imf s recently developed pragmatic response the amount a member can borrow is not determined by its quota we consider two pragmatic responses that produce a pareto improvement compared with the imf rule one mandated by the imf and the other related to the trade of the additional credit limit in the market both these responses indicate that the additional credit limit on top of the imf rule should be positive negative for a country whose investment return is larger smaller than the average investment return across all imf member developing countries the rule for the imf credit limit does not reflect the demand for credit which induces inefficiency the first pragmatic response which has an appropriately small negotiation and distribution cost per unit incurred by the imf may dominate the second one

revisiting imf expenditure conditionality we study the long run relationship between expenditure conditionality in imf programmes and the composition of public spending we compile a granular dataset on government expenditure conditions in

sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment abstract this paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default a time inconsistency problem arises since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments an international organization capable of designing a contract that coaxes debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap senior lending in times of crisis can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare

reserve accumulation and financial crises from individual protection to systemic risk abstract this paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries international reserve holdings and financial crises while the local view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre which is transmitted globally according to this global view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system since the crisis affects all countries alike the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non accumulating countries we integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves moreover if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves a macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45

how can imf policy eliminate country moral hazard and account for externalities abstract costly crisis prevention has positive external effects which leads to free riding of governments on each other s efforts ordinary imf loans aggravate existing externalities reinforcing the under investment problem we consider the reform proposals of the meltzer commission in both loan and insurance models and show how the imf can eliminate country moral the efficiency ensuring loan policy accounts for given externalities and involves effort contingent discounts on interests or the extension of credit volume similar results hold for the insurance framework ex ante participation requires that smaller countries be subsidized by large ones or that imf policy consider distributional aspects in addition to efficiency

signalling effects of monetary policy we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the policy rate signals the central bank s view about macroeconomic developments to price setters the model is estimated with likelihood methods on a u s data set that includes the survey of professional forecasters as a measure of price setters inflation expectations this model improves upon existing perfect information models in explaining why in the data inflation expectations respond with delays to monetary impulses and remain disanchored for years in the 1970s u s monetary policy is found to signal persistent inflationary shocks explaining why inflation and inflation expectations were so persistently heightened the signalling effects of monetary policy also explain why inflation expectations adjusted more sluggishly than inflation after the robust monetary tightening of the 1980s

an experimental investigation of moral hazard in costly investments frequently parties make sequential decisions regarding investments for which the probability of success or failure is dependent on the amount of total investment this paper reports a series of experiments involving a costly investment game that is derived from the catalytic finance model of morris and shin global games theory and applications in advances in economics and econometrics proceedings of the eighth world congress of the econometric society edited by m dewatripont l hansen and s turnovsky cambridge ma cambridge university press pp 56 114 the sequential nature of investments is such that the second investment could function as a complement to the initial investment or simply serve as a substitute to it thereby creating moral hazard the features of this game are similar to those of the ultimatum game however there are several key differences between the games that may account for the high frequency of materially self interested behavior that we observe particularly among second movers

the dynamics of exchange rate regimes fixes floats and flips the impermanence of fixed exchange rates has become a stylized fact in international finance the combination of the mirage view that pegs do not really peg with the fear of floating view that floats do not really float generates the conclusion that exchange rate regimes are in practice unimportant for the behavior of the exchange rate this is consistent with evidence on the irrelevance of exchange rate regimes for general macroeconomic performance recent studies however show that the exchange rate regime matters this can be understood by considering the dynamics of exchange rate regimes we demonstrate that the mirage view is somewhat misleading and incomplete pegs frequently break but many do last also there is a high degree of flipping that is the re formation of pegs that have broken thus a fixed exchange rate today is a good predictor that one will exist in the future we also investigate the quantitative effect of fixed exchange rates while the fear of floating view suggests little actual difference in fixed and floating rates with respect to exchange rate volatility we show that fixed exchange rates exhibit considerably greater bilateral exchange rate stability than flexible rates both today and in the future 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved

banking crises and the lender of last resort how crucial is the role of information this article develops a model of bank runs and crises and analyses how the presence of a lender of last resort lolr affects the solvency of the banking system we obtain a one to one mapping from the depositors equilibrium strategy to an optimal contract prevailing in the economy the study finds that the difference between a perfectly informed and an imperfectly informed lolr can be crucial our results indicate that a perfectly informed lolr is a pareto improvement however if the supervisory process of the lolr is subject to noise then the gains from ex post efficiency may be outweighed by ex ante inefficiency induced by moral hazard which is conducive to lower lending rates in the economy

shocking language understanding the macroeconomic effects of central bank communication we explore how the multi dimensional aspects of information released by the fomc has effects on both market and real economic variables using tools from computational linguistics we measure the information released by the fomc on the state of economic conditions as well as the guidance the fomc provides about future monetary policy decisions employing these measures within a favar framework we find that shocks to forward guidance are more important than the fomc communication of current economic conditions in terms of their effects on market and real variables nonetheless neither communication has particularly strong effects on real economic variables

decomposing the effects of monetary policy using an external instruments svar we study the effects of monetary policy on economic activity separately identifying the effects of a conventional change in the fed funds rate from the policy of forward guidance we use a structural var identified using external instruments from futures market data the response of output to a fed funds rate shock is found to be consistent with typical monetary var analyses however the effect of a forward guidance shock that increases long term interest rates has an expansionary effect on output this counterintuitive response is shown to be tied to the asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public

a quantitative model of international lending of last resort abstract we analyze banking crises and lending of last resort lolr in a quantitative model of financial frictions with bank defaults lolr policies generate a tradeoff between financial fragility due to more highly leveraged banks and milder crises since the policies are effective once in a crisis in the calibrated model the crisis mitigation effect dominates the moral hazard problem and the economy is better off having access to a lender of last resort we characterize the conditions under which pools of small economies can be sustainable lolrs in addition we assess the ability of china a country with ample reserves to be a sustainable international lolr

coordination failures and the lender of last resort was bagehot right after all the classical doctrine of the lender of last resort lolr elaborated by bagehot 1873 asserts that the central bank should lend to illiquid but solvent banks under certain conditions several authors have argued that this view is now obsolete in modern interbank markets a solvent bank cannot be illiquid this paper provides a possible theoretical foundation for rescuing bagehot s view our theory does not rely on the multiplicity of equilibria that arises in classical models of bank runs we built a model of banks liquidity crises that possesses a unique bayesian equilibrium in this equilibrium there is a positive probability that a solvent bank cannot find liquidity assistance in the market we derive policy implications about banking regulation solvency and liquidity ratios and interventions of the lender of last resort furthermore we find that public bailout and private bail in involvement are complementary in implementing the incentive efficient solution and that bagehot s lender of last resort facility must work together with institutions providing prompt corrective action and orderly failure resolution finally we derive similar implications for an international lender of last resort ilolr jel g21 g28

new evidence on deficits and interest rates it is generally assumed on theoretical grounds that increases in government borrowing cause interest rates to rise 1 but empirical support for this proposition has been weak at best several recent papers have uncovered no strong relationship between deficits and short terrn interest rates however the research reported here indicates that although the relationship between deficits and short terrn interest rates may be tenuous there is strong evidence that larger deficits are associated with higher long terrn interest rates much of the debate about whether there is a strong relationship between federal borrowing and interest rates concerns the crowding out question this controversy centers on the direct and indirect eilffects of government fiscal actions on private spending these effects have been well documented in the theoretical literature e g buiter 1977 carlson and spencer 1975 blinder and solow 1973 many of the crowding out effects studied in this literature depend on the connection between government borrowing and high interest rates friedman 1978 meyer 1975 silber 1970 this is called short run indirect crowding out and may occur when increases in government spending and borrowing cause interest rates to rise which then may cause private spending to be reduced buiter 1977 pp 310 13

optimal bank transparency increasing transparency is recurrently offered as a centerpiece of bank regulation we study a competitive banking sector whose illiquid assets are funded by short term debt that must be refinanced we show that welfare is a nonmonotonic function of the level of transparency increasing transparency fosters efficient liquidation but has an adverse effect on rollover risk given the level of risk banks may compensate this adverse effect by taking more risk these offsetting effects render an intermediate level of transparency optimal moreover the existence of negative social externalities of bank failures calls for making banks more opaque rather than more transparent

tenure issues in higher education the system of tenure that dominates american higher education has long been a source of controversy the institution of tenure has been attacked for entrenching a lazy professoriate more interested in attending faraway conferences and producing unreadable research than in teaching or developing practical insights while on the other hand it has long been defended as an absolute necessity for the defense of open intellectual inquiry the tenure controversy has been sharpened in recent years by several events the end of mandatory retirement which was abolished by federal law effective january 1 1994 has heightened concerns about the productivity and commitment of professors who received tenure long ago and who no longer have the same incentives to invest in long term reputation there is also ongoing concern over the steadily rising cost of higher education which raises the question of what students as well as the taxpayers who support public institutions of higher education are getting for their money 1 the idea that tenure is a wasteful institution for universities runs up against the puzzling fact that the commitment to tenure is one that academic institutions impose on themselves although the american association of university professors aaup provides a powerful lobby in favor of tenure generally colleges and universities most notably private ones are under no legal requirement to observe tenure constraints although as administrators we certainly feel the weight of those constraints our view is that a tenure system in fact provides important benefits to society and to colleges and universities we argue here that the role of tenure is

financial instability reserves and central bank swap lines in the panic of 2008 in this paper we connect the events of the last twelve months the panic of 2008 as it has been called to the demand for international reserves in previous work we have shown that international reserve demand can be rationalized by a central bank s desire to backstop the broad money supply to avert the possibility of an internal external double drain a bank run combined with capital flight thus simply looking at trade or short term debt as motivations for reserve holdings is insufficient one must also consider the size of the banking system m2 here we show that a country s reserve holdings just before the current crisis relative to their predicted holdings based on these financial motives can significantly predict exchange rate movements of both emerging and advanced countries in 2008 countries with large war chests did not depreciate and some appreciated meanwhile those who held insufficient reserves based on our metric were likely to depreciate current account balances and short term debt levels are not statistically significant predictors of depreciation once reserve levels are taken into account our model s typically high predicted reserve levels provide important context for the unprecedented u s dollar swap lines recently provided to many countries by the federal reserve this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

catalytic finance when does it work in a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort this model helps us understand a debate about the role of the imf in catalyzing lending to developing countries

coordination risk and the price of debt abstract creditors of a distressed borrower face a coordination problem even if the fundamentals are sound fear of premature foreclosure by others may lead to pre emptive action undermining the project recognition of this problem lies behind corporate bankruptcy provisions across the world and it has been identified as a culprit in international financial crises but has received scant attention from the literature on debt pricing without common knowledge of fundamentals the incidence of failure is uniquely determined provided that private information is precise enough this affords a way to price the coordination failure comparative statics on the unique equilibrium provides several insights on the role of information and the incidence of inefficient liquidation

who borrows from the lender of last resort understanding why banks borrow from the lender of last resort lolr during a nancial crisis is crucial to understanding the macroeconomic impact of such largescale interventions we document a strong divergence among banks take up of lolr assistance during the nancial crisis in the euro area as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral we propose four explanations for this divergence

sufficient information in structural vars abstract necessary and sufficient conditions under which a var contains sufficient information to estimate the structural shocks are derived on the basis of this theoretical result we propose two simple tests to detect informational deficiency and a procedure to amend a deficient var a simulation based on a dsge model with fiscal foresight suggests that our method correctly identifies and fixes the informational problem in an empirical application we show that a bivariate var including unemployment and labor productivity is informationally deficient once the relevant information is included into the model technology shocks appear to be contractionary

deficit announcements and interest rates despite the fact that the most theoretical analyses with the notable exception of the ricardian equivalence approach indicate that increased deficits cause interest rates to rise the empirical evidence is at best inconclusive 1 in this note the relationship between interest rates and deficits is examined with the announcement effect methodology which has not previously been used in this context we find evidence of a positive relationship between unanticipated announcements of the projected federal government deficit and interest rates in an efficient market information about any determinant of interest rates should be quickly incorporated into observed rates thus when information about the size of the deficits is released a relatively quick impact on interest rates can be anticipated more specifically if an increase in the deficit is in fact associated with higher interest rates then an unanticipated announcement of a larger deficit should lead to a response in financial markets which increases interest rates this paper provides evidence on the announcement effects of information on the deficit the advantage of the announcement effect approach is that it precludes the necessity of specifying a structural model for interest rates 2 projections of current and future federal government deficits are made on a regular basis by both the office of managementand budget omb and the congressional budget office cbo and receive wide attention in the financial press these projections provide data that are related to the change in interest rate on government securities from the day before the announcement to the end of the announcement day the macroeconomic hypothesis underlying this investigation is simply that an increase in the current or future deficit leads to an increase in yields on government securities in anticipation of higher levels of debt financing in a rational expectations framework an announcement of higher future deficits will lead to a current increase in interest rates in anticipation of future financing thus the examination of announcement effects enables us to substantiate a relationship between interest rates and deficits without encountering the econometric problems of reduced form modeling section i begins with a description of the data this is followed by a discussion of the methodology in section ii section iii presents the empirical results this is followed by our conclusions in section iv