a dynamic theory of collective goods programs a collective goods program such as an entitlement program distributes benefits and costs according to constituents characteristics this paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal making and voting in a majority rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted a stationary markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time but they ultimately converge to the median on the path to that point legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make

modeling global spillover of new product takeoff abstract this article examines the global spillover of foreign product introductions and takeoffs on a focal country s time to takeoff using a novel data set of penetration data for eight high tech products across 55 countries it shows how foreign clout the susceptibility to foreign influences and intercountry distances affect global spillover patterns the authors find that foreign takeoffs but not foreign introductions accelerate a focal country s time to takeoff the larger the country the higher its economic wealth and the more it exports the more clout it has in the global spillover process in contrast the poorer the country the more tourists it receives and the higher its population density the more susceptible it is to global spillover effects cross country spillover effects are stronger the closer the countries are to one another both geographically and economically but not necessarily in terms of culture the model the authors develop also quantifies the spillover between each co

structural interpretation of vector autoregressions with incomplete identification revisiting the role of oil supply and demand shocks traditional approaches to structural vector autoregressions vars can be viewed as special cases of bayesian inference arising from very strong prior beliefs these methods can be generalized with a less restrictive formulation that incorporates uncertainty about the identifying assumptions themselves we use this approach to revisit the importance of shocks to oil supply and demand supply disruptions turn out to be a bigger factor in historical oil price movements and inventory accumulation a smaller factor than implied by earlier estimates supply shocks lead to a reduction in global economic activity after a significant lag whereas shocks to oil demand do not

the market evolution and sales takeoff of product innovations in contrast to the prevailing supply side explanation that price decreases are the key driver of a sales takeoff we argue that outward shifting supplyand demand curves lead to market takeoff our fundamental idea is that sales in new markets are initially low because the first commercialized forms of new innovations are primitive then as new firms enter actual and perceived product quality improves and prices possibly drop which leads to a takeoff in sales to provide empirical evidence for this explanation we explore the relationship between takeoff times price decreases and firm entry for a sample of consumer and industrial product innovations commercialized in the united states over the past 150 years based on a proportional hazards analysis of takeoff times we find that new firm entry dominates other factors in explaining observed sales takeoff times we interpret these results as supporting the idea that demand shifts during the early evolution of a new market due to nonprice factors is the key driver of a sales takeoff

existence of stationary bargaining equilibria abstract this paper addresses the question of existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in a class of dynamic games that includes many known bargaining models and models of coalition formation general sufficient conditions for existence of equilibria are currently lacking in a number of interesting environments e g models with non convexities consumption lower bounds or an evolving state variable the main result establishes existence of equilibrium under compactness and continuity conditions without the structure of convexity or strict comprehensiveness used in the extant literature the proof requires a precise selection of voting equilibria following different proposals using a generalization of fatou s lemma

a percolation based model explaining delayed takeoff in new product diffusion a model of new product diffusion is proposed in which a site percolation dynamics represents socially driven diffusion of knowledge about the product s characteristics in a population of consumers a consumer buys the new product if her valuation of it formed after her witnessing the product in use among her friends or neighbors is not below the price of the product announced in a given period our model attributes the empirical finding of a delayed takeoff of a new product to a drift of the percolation dynamics from a nonpercolating regime to a percolating regime this drift is caused by learning effects lowering the price of the product or by network effects increasing its individual valuations by consumers both with an increasing number of buyers

forty years of oil price fluctuations why the price of oil may still surprise us it has been forty years since the oil crisis of 1973 74 this crisis has been one of the defining economic events of the 1970s and has shaped how many economists think about oil price shocks in recent years a large literature on the economic determinants of oil price fluctuations has emerged drawing on this literature we first provide an overview of the causes of all major oil price fluctuations between 1973 and 2014 we then discuss why oil price fluctuations remain difficult to predict despite economists improved understanding of oil markets unexpected oil price fluctuations are commonly referred to as oil price shocks we document that in practice consumers policymakers financial market participants and economists may have different oil price expectations and that what may be surprising to some need not be equally surprising to others

dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players this note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of anesi 2010 the main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von neumann morgestern solutions assuming that players are patient that the voting rule is oligarchical and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von neumann morgenstern solution we also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment of diermeier and fong 2012 we show that all equilibria are essentially pure and we extend their characterization of absorbing sets to allow an arbitrary voting rule and by removing the restriction to pure strategy equilibira

bargaining in legislatures bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures in our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting the model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard institution free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium

bargaining in standing committees with an endogenous default committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard baron ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement in standing committees however existing agreements can be amended this article studies an extension of the baron ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees in each of an infinite number of periods the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy which is in turn the default for the next period the model provides a number of quite different predictions i from a positive perspective the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity in that case patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy markov perfect equilibria in contrast the unique markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding baron ferejohn framework ii if players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria including all markov perfect equilibria are inefficient

demand heterogeneity and technology evolution implications for product and process innovation the evolution of technology has been a central issue in the strategy and organizations literature however the focus of much of this work has been on what is essentially the supply side of technical change the evolution of firm capabilities we present a demand based view of technology evolution that is focused on the interaction between technology development and the demand environment in which the technology is ultimately evaluated we develop a formal computer simulation model that explicitly considers the influence of heterogeneity in market demand the presence of consumers with different needs and requirements on firms innovation choices the model is used to examine the dynamics of product and process innovation utterback and abernathy 1975 the analysis reveals that demand heterogeneity offers an alternative to supply side explanations of the technology life cycle further by considering the implications of decreasing marginal utility from performance improvements the model highlights the role of technologically satisfied consumers in shaping innovation incentives and suggests a rationale for a new stage in the technology life cycle characterized by increasing performance at a stable price the stage has not yet been treated formally in the literature but is widely observed most prominently in digital and information based technologies

oil and the macroeconomy since world war ii all but one of the u s recessions since world war ii have been preceded typically with a lag of around three fourths of a year by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum this does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions evidence is presented however that even over the period 1948 72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the u s recessions prior to 1972 by extension energy price increases may account for much of post opec macroeconomic performance

does drawing down the us strategic petroleum reserve help stabilize oil prices we study the effects of releases from the us strategic petroleum reserve spr within the context of fully specified models of the global oil market that explicitly allow for storage demand as well as unanticipated changes in the spr we show that historically spr policy interventions defined as sequences of exogenous spr shocks during selected periods have helped stabilize the price of oil their effect on the price of oil however has been modest for example the cumulative effect of the spr releases after the invasion of kuwait in 1990 was a reduction of 2 per barrel in the real price of oil after 7 months whereas emergency drawdowns tend to lower the real price of oil we find that exchanges tend to raise the real price of oil in the long run we also provide a detailed analysis of the benefits of the 2018 white house proposal to sell off half of the spr within the next decade we show that the expected fiscal benefits of this plan are somewhat higher than the revenue of 16 6 billion dollars projected by the white house

characterization of the von neumann morgenstern stable set in a non cooperative model of dynamic policy making with a persistent agenda setter abstract we generalize the dynamic bargaining game of diermeier and fong 2011 to arbitrary quota rules to provide a non cooperative characterization of the von neumann morgenstern stable set assuming that players are sufficiently patient and have strict preferences a pure strategy stationary equilibrium exists and in any such equilibrium a policy is a steady state if and only if it is in the stable set the result provides a non cooperative foundation of stable sets in settings with dynamic policy making and a persistent agenda setter

oil prices and the terms of trade abstract the combination of substantial terms of trade variability and unstable correlation patterns of trade prices with output and trade volumes has led some to suggest a break in the link between trade volumes and prices we find that oil accounts for much of the variation in the terms of trade over the last twenty five years and its quantitative role varies significantly over time and since our dynamic general equilibrium model predicts that the economy responds differently to oil supply shocks than to other shocks changes in their relative importance helps to account for the unstable correlations in the data

inefficiency in legislative policymaking a dynamic analysis this paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining the policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation the productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens e g national defense and the distributive spending is district specific transfers e g pork barrel spending investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods the analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of

the effect of oil supply shocks on us economic activity what have we learned estimated responses of real oil prices and us gross domestic product gdp to oil supply disruptions vary widely we show that most variation is attributable to differences in identification assumptions and in the model specification models that allow for a large short run price elasticity of oil supply imply a larger response of oil prices and a larger longer lived contraction in us real gdp we find that if we condition on a range of supply elasticity values supported by microeconomic estimates the differences in the oil price responses diminishes we also examine the role of lag length of using pre 1973 data alternative measures of real economic activity and using the median response function instead of the modal structural model

technological extinctions of industrial firms an inquiry into their nature and causes after a buildup in the number of firms new industries commonly experience a shakeout in which the number of firms declines sharply three theoretical perspectives on how technological change contributes to industry shakeouts are analyzed the theories are used to synthesize predictions concerning technological change and industry evolution the predictions inform an analysis of four us industries that experienced sharp shakeouts automobiles tires televisions and penicillin using data on firm participation and innovation from the commercial inception of the four products through their formative eras we uncover regularities in how the products evolved the regularities suggest that shakeouts are not triggered by particular technological innovations nor by dominant designs but by an evolutionary process in which technological innovation contributes to a mounting dominance by some early entering firms copyright 1997 by oxford university press

will it ever fly modeling the takeoff of really new consumer durables a consistent pattern observed for really new household consumer durables is a takeoff or dramatic increase in sales early in their history the takeoff tends to appear as an elbow shaped discontinuity in the sales curve showing an average sales increase of over 400 in contrast most marketing textbooks as well as diffusion models generally depict the growth of new consumer durables as a smooth sales curve our discussions with managers indicate that they have little idea about the takeoff and its associated characteristics many managers did not even know that most successful new consumer durables had a distinct takeoff their sales forecasts tend to show linear growth yet knowledge about the takeoff is crucial for managers to decide whether to maintain increase or withdraw support of new products it is equally important for industry analysts who advise investors and manufacturers of complementary and substitute products although previous studies have urged researchers to examine the takeoff no research has addressed this critical event while diffusion models are commonly used to study new product sales growth they do not explicitly consider a new product s takeoff in sales indeed diffusion researchers frequently use data only from the point of takeoff therefore nothing is known about the takeoff or models appropriate for this event our study provides the first analysis of the takeoff in particular we address three key questions i how much time does a newly introduced product need to takeoff ii does the takeoff have any systematic patterns iii can we predict the takeoff we begin our study by developing an operational measure to determine when the takeoff occurs we found that when the base level of sales is small a relatively large percentage increase could occur without signaling the takeoff conversely when the base level of sales is large the takeoff sometimes occurs with a relatively small percentage increase in sales therefore we developed a threshold for takeoff this is a plot of percentage sales growth relative to a base level of sales common across all categories we define the takeoff as the first year in which an individual category s growth rate relative to base sales crosses this threshold the threshold measure correctly identifies the takeoff in over 90 of our categories we model the takeoff with a hazard model because of its advantages for analyzing time based events we consider three primary independent variables price year of introduction and market penetration as well as several control variables the hazard model fits the pattern of takeoffs very well with price and market penetration being strong correlates of takeoff our results provide potential generalizations about the time to takeoff and the price reduction nominal price and penetration at takeoff in particular we found that on average for 16 post world war ii categories the price at takeoff is 63 of the introductory price the time to takeoff from introduction is six years the penetration at takeoff is 1 7 the time to takeoff is decreasing for more recent categories for example the time to takeoff is 18 years for categories introduced before world war ii but only six years for those introduced after world war ii many of the products in our sample had a takeoff near three specific price points in nominal dollars 1000 500 and 100 in addition we show how the hazard model can be used to predict the takeoff the model predicts takeoff one year ahead with an expected average error of 1 2 years it predicts takeoff at a product s introduction with an expected average error of 1 9 years even against the simple mean time to takeoff of six years for recent categories the model s performance represents a tremendous improvement in prediction it represents an immeasurable improvement in prediction for managers who currently have no idea about how long it takes for a new product to takeoff the threshold rule for determining takeoff can be used to distinguish between a large increase in sales and a real takeoff some limitations of this study could provide fruitful areas for future research our independent variables suffer from endogeneity bias so alternative variables or methods could address this limitation also the takeoff may be related to additional variables such as relative advantage over substitutes and the presence of complementary products finally examination of sales from takeoff to their leveling off could be done with an integrated model of takeoff and sales growth or with the hazard model we propose generalizations about this period of sales growth could also be of tremendous importance to managers of new products

persistence of power repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority abstract we extend a simple repeated multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members theoretically and experimentally we compare this endogenous power environment with a standard random power environment in which agenda setters are appointed randomly each period although the theoretical analysis predicts that the two environments are outcome equivalent the experimental analysis shows substantial differences in behavior and outcomes across the games the endogenous power environment results in the formation of more stable coalitions less equitable budget allocations the persistence of power across periods and higher long run inequality than the random power environment we present evidence that the stationary equilibrium refinements traditionally used in the literature fail to predict behavior in either game

a diffusion model incorporating product benefits price income and information we start by assuming that a major benefit of many new durable products such as dishwashers and microwave ovens is time savings others such as vcrs also enhance the value of our leisure time using a household production framework we demonstrate that a utility maximizing individual will have a reservation price for the product which is a function of the product benefits and his wage rate by assuming that the wage rate has an extreme value distribution across the population we are able to derive for the aggregate process an income price dependent logistic adoption equation we then allow for the possibility that certain eligible consumers may delay their purchase of the product because they are unaware that it exists are suspicious of its quality or expect its price to fall unawareness uncertainty and hope for further price declines are assumed to decrease with the increase in the number of previous adopters the resulting diffusion model has the property that the product life cycle phenomenon can be explained jointly or separately by the income price process and the awareness uncertainty expectations process using data on household income on durable penetration within different income classes and on first purchase sales the aggregate diffusion model and its premises are tested and supported it is found that both the income price and awareness uncertainty expectations processes are at work however the dependence of the awareness uncertainty expectations delay process on the number of previous adopters e g word of mouth type effect exists only in certain product categories and is usually relatively weak it is demonstrated that if the word of mouth type effects are weak a price skimming strategy is optimal for a monopolist and also is likely to be implemented by oligopolists the sales forecasting implications of the model also are pursued

a three player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game this file contains two sets of calculations first we report the calculations of demands and continuation values of proposition 1 second the mixing probabilities of proposition 1 are shown to be well defined

innovation diffusion in the presence of supply restrictions innovation diffusion models are developed to represent the spread of a new product from its manufacturers to its ultimate users in the marketplace however the growth of a new product can be retarded by supply restrictions such as the unavailability of the product due to limitations on the production capacity or difficulties encountered in setting up distribution systems in the presence of supply restrictions diffusion models must be developed to capture the dynamics of supply restrictions and to allow management to evaluate the impact of such supply restrictions on the growth of a new product in the market place based on the bass innovation diffusion model the objective of this paper is to suggest a parsimonious diffusion model that integrates the demand side dynamics with the supply side restrictions the sensitivity of innovation diffusion patterns in the presence of supply restrictions is examined an application examining the diffusion of new telephones in israel is documented to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed model

a dynamic theory of public spending taxation and debt this paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending taxation and debt policy choices are made by a legislature consisting of representatives elected by geographically defined districts the legislature can raise revenues via a distortionary income tax and by borrowing these revenues can be used tofinance a national public good and district specific transfers interpreted as pork barrel spending the value of the public good is stochastic reflecting shocks such as wars or natural disasters in equilibrium policy making cycles between two distinct regimes business as usual in which legislators bargain over the allocation of pork and responsible policy making in which policies maximize the collective good transitions between the two regimes are brought about by shocks in the value of the public good in the long run equilibrium tax rates are too high and too volatile public good provision is too low and debt levels are too high in some environments a balanced budget requirement can improve citizen welfare

oil and the macroeconomy since the 1970s economists have long been intrigued by empirical evidence that suggests that oil price shocks may be closely related to macroeconomic performance this interest dates back to the 1970s the 1970s were a period of growing dependence on imported oil unprecedented disruptions in the global oil market and poor macroeconomic performance in the united states thus it was natural to suspect a causal relationship from oil prices to u s macroeconomic aggregates since then a large body of work has accumulated that purports to establish this link on theoretical grounds and to provide empirical evidence in its support we do not attempt a comprehensive survey of this literature but rather provide an idiosyncratic synthesis of what we view as the key issues in this debate and the insights gained over the last 30 years the timing seems right for such an account although the experience of the 1970s continues to play an important role in discussions of the link between oil and the macroeconomy there have been a number of new oil price shocks since the 1970s notably the 1986 collapse of oil prices and the 2000 boom in oil prices as well as the oil price increases associated with the 1990 1991 gulf war and the 2003 iraq war given this richer case history we are arguably in a better position than two decades ago to distinguish the idiosyncratic features of each oil crisis from the systematic effects increases in oil prices have been held responsible for recessions periods of excessive inflation reduced productivity and lower economic growth in this paper we review the arguments supporting such views first we highlight some of the conceptual difficulties in assigning a central role to oil price shocks in explaining

social contagion and income heterogeneity in new product diffusion a meta analytic test standard diffusion models capture social contagion only coarsely and do not allow one to operationalize different contagion mechanisms moreover there is increasing skepticism about the importance of contagion and as has long been known s shaped diffusion curves can also result from heterogeneity in the propensity to adopt we present hypotheses about conditions under which specific contagion mechanisms and income heterogeneity are more pronounced and test these hypotheses using a meta analysis of the q p ratio in applications of the bass diffusion model the ratio is positively associated with the gini index of income inequality in a country supporting the heterogeneity in thresholds interpretation the ratio also varies as predicted by the gamma shifted gompertz diffusion model but the evidence vanishes after controlling for national culture as to contagion the q p ratio varies with the four hofstede dimensions of national culture for three of them in a direction consistent with the social contagion interpretation furthermore products with competing standards have a higher q p ratio which is again consistent with the social contagion interpretation finally we find effects of national culture only for products without competing standards suggesting that technological effects and culturally moderated social contagion effects might not operate independently from each other

evolutionary trends of industry variables abstract the paper offers empirical evidence on the evolutionary trends of industry variables it investigates the time path of patents product price and quantity and number of firms from the first introduction of a product to maturity of the market the paper extends earlier work by gort and klepper by expanding the data on products through 1991 and augmenting it with new products and new data sources the reexamination of the aging patterns reveal the gort and klepper results to be robust the time trends follow the expected patterns with remarkable consistency and are strongly significant for most products new evidence on patenting activity reveal an eventual decline in technological activity over the later years of the product market life cycle

noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games abstract this paper studies coalition formation payoff division and expected payoffs in a divide the dollar by majority rule game with random proposers a power index is called self confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector unlike the shapley value and other commonly used power indices the nucleolus has this property the proof uses a weak version of kohlberg s siam j appl math 20 1971 62 balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium

the making of an oligopoly firm survival and technological change in the evolution of the u s tire industry the number of producers in the u s tire industry grew for 25 years and then declined sharply and the industry evolved to be an oligopoly the role of technological change in shaping the industry s market structure is explored a model of industry evolution featuring technological change is used to derive predictions that are tested using a novel data set on firm entry exit size location distribution networks and technological choices prior to the shakeout of producers consistent with the model earlier entering and larger firms survived longer principally because of the influence of age and size on technological change

noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games abstract this short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von neumann morgenstern stable sets in voting games to do so we study stationary markov equilibria smes of a noncooperative legislative bargaining game based on underlying simple games the following result emerges from such an exercise every stable set of the underlying simple game is the limit set of pure strategy stage undominated smes of the bargaining game when voters are sufficiently farsighted

oil price shocks and u s economic activity abstract our understanding of the sources of oil price fluctuations and their effects on the u s economy has undergone important transformations in the last decades first several studies have demonstrated the importance of identifying the causes of oil price fluctuations whether they are driven by demand or supply shocks instead of assuming that oil price changes are exogenous to the evolution of the world s economic activity second new methodologies have allowed researchers to re evaluate the functional form of the relationship between oil prices and u s gdp its components and job flows third significant advances have been made in understanding the relationship between oil price uncertainty news economic policy uncertainty and aggregate economic activity finally investigations into the time varying nature of oil price macroeconomy relationship have provided important insights into the reasons why unexpected increases in oil prices appear to shock less now than in the 1970s this paper reviews the studies that have contributed to these different aspects of the literature

a note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy the citizen candidate approach proposed to study the performance of representative democracies builds on a multi stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and successively to vote consistently the solution concept adopted in besley and coate 1997 conforms to backward induction rationality in this note we remark that it does not conform to forward induction rationality

demand heterogeneity and technology evolution the evolution of technology has been a central issue in the strategy and organizations literature however the focus of much of this work has been on what is essentially the supply side of techn

refining the workhorse oil market model the kilian and murphy journal of applied econometrics 2014 29 454 478 structural vector autoregressive model has become the workhorse model for the analysis of oil markets i explore various refinements and extensions of this model including the effects of 1 correcting an error in the measure of global real economic activity 2 explicitly incorporating narrative sign restrictions into the estimation 3 relaxing the upper bound on the impact price elasticity of oil supply 4 evaluating the implied posterior distribution of the structural models and 5 extending the sample i demonstrate that the substantive conclusions of kilian and murphy 2014 are largely unaffected by these changes

the economic effects of energy price shocks large fluctuations in energy prices have been a distinguishing characteristic of the u s economy since the 1970s turmoil in the middle east rising energy prices in the u s and evidence of global warming recently have reignited interest in the link between energy prices and economic performance this paper addresses a number of the key issues in this debate what are energy price shocks and where do they come from how responsive is energy demand to changes in energy prices how do consumers expenditure patterns evolve in response to energy price shocks how do energy price shocks affect u s real output inflation and stock prices why do energy price increases seem to cause recessions but energy price decreases do not seem to cause expansions why has there been a surge in the price of oil in recent years why has this new energy price shock not caused a recession so far have the effects of energy price shocks waned since the 1980s and if so why as the paper demonstrates it is critical to account for the endogeneity of energy prices and to differentiate between the effects of demand and supply shocks in energy markets when answering these questions

the evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure several empirical regularities concerning firm growth rates and industry firm size distributions have been developed by studying primarily mature industries the primary purpose of this article is to bring together and extend empirical regularities on the evolution of new industries and to use these regularities to gain further insight into the forces governing industry evolution to explain these regularities a model is constructed which emphasizes how factors governing the early evolution of industries may shape their market structure at maturity it stresses how chance events and exogenous factors that influence the number of potential entrants to the industry the growth rate of incumbents and the ease of imitation of industry leaders will influence the ultimate number and size distribution of firms in the industry

modeling fluctuations in the global demand for commodities it is widely understood that the real price of globally traded commodities is determined by the forces of demand and supply one of the main determinants of the real price of commodities is shifts in the demand for commodities associated with unexpected fluctuations in global real economic activity

empirical generalizations and marketing science a personal view marketing has matured to the point where it seems desirable to take stock of where we are what we have learned and fruitful directions for extending the knowledge base that has developed science is a process involving the interaction between empirical generalizations and theory an empirical generalization is a pattern or regularity that repeats over different circumstances and that can be described simply by mathematical graphic or symbolic methods one of the purposes of the empirical generalizations conference held at wharton on february 16 18 1994 was to develop a list of examples of such empirical generalizations in marketing empirical generalization can precede a theory to explain it or it can be predicted by a theory science is the process of interaction between theory and data that leads to higher level theories examples are provided here of empirical generalizations in marketing and their theoretical counterparts one example is provided of a higher level theory

what are the macroeconomic effects of high frequency uncertainty shocks this paper evaluates the effects of high frequency uncertainty shocks on a set of low frequency macroeconomic variables that are representative of the u s economy rather than estimating models at the same common low frequency we use recently developed econometric models which allows us to deal with data of different sampling frequencies

legislative bargaining with reconsideration we present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter policy making proceeds until the agenda setter can no longer pass a new policy to replace an approved bill we prove existence and necessary conditions of pure strategy stationary equilibria for any finite policy space any number of players and any preference profile in equilibrium the value of proposal power is limited compared to the case that disallows reconsideration as voters are induced to protect each other s benefits to maintain their future bargaining positions the agenda setter in turn would prefer to limit his ability to reconsider the lack of commitment due to the possibility of reconsideration however enhances policy efficiency

the life cycle of a competitive industry firm numbers first rise then later fall as an industry evolves this nonmonotonicity is explained using a competitive model in which innovation opportunities fuel entry and relative failure to innovate prompts exit equilibrium time paths for price and quantity also share features of the data the model is estimated using data from the u s automobile tire industry a particularly dramatic example of the nonmonotonicity in firm numbers

mandatory versus discretionary spending the status quo eect do mandatory spending programs such as medicare improve eciency we analyze a model with two parties allocating a xed budget to a public good and private transfers each period over an innite horizon we compare two institutions that dier in whether public good spending is discretionary or mandatory we model mandatory spending as an endogenous status quo since it is enacted by law and remains in eect until changed mandatory programs result in higher public good spending furthermore they ex ante pareto dominate discretionary programs when parties are patient persistence of power is low and polarization is low

hotelling under pressure we show that oil production from existing wells in texas does not respond to oil prices while drilling activity and costs respond strongly to explain these facts we reformulate hotelling s class

nonparametric estimation of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss we apply nonparametric regression models to estimation of demand curves of the type most often used in applied research from the demand curve estimators we derive estimates of exact consumers surplus and deadweight loss which are the most widely used welfare and economic efficiency measures in areas of economics such as public finance we also develop tests of the symmetry and downward sloping properties of compensated demand we work out asymptotic normal sampling theory for kernel and series nonparametric estimators as well as for the parametric case the paper includes an application to gasoline demand empirical questions of interest here are the shape of the demand curve and the average magnitude of welfare loss from a tax on gasoline in this application we compare parametric and nonparametric estimates of the demand curve calculate exact and approximate measures of consumers surplus and deadweight loss and give standard error estimates we also analyze the sensitivity of the welfare measures to components of nonparametric regression estimators such as the number of terms in a series approximation

dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo we analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players conflict of interest players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo this leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia under certain conditions the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock players never reach an agreement gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences provided they are sufficiently patient in legislative settings our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines