control of accumulating stock pollution by heterogeneous producers abstract this paper presents a framework to determine optimal resource allocation over time for the production of a good by heterogeneous producers who generate a stock externality we analyze the optimal intertemporal and quality specific combination of abatement strategies at the source source abatement given by a change in the intensity intensive margin of production and in the chosen technology extensive margin and or removal of existing pollution stock stock abatement the results show how the specifications of the production and the emission functions affect technology adoption and the design of the optimal intertemporal combination of source and stock abatement strategies moreover the paper shows that regulation at the intensive margin cannot be considered as a substitute for a regulation at the extensive margin the paper employs the so called two stage solution approach for solving the resulting quality distributed intertemporal optimal control problem

preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning abstract we analyze a three country model of trade negotiations in which countries can form bilateral free trade areas bilateral customs unions or a trilateral preferential trading arrangement and can continue negotiating after reaching an agreement in contrast to the literature on multilateral bargaining the set of agreements can form a nonpartitional network while in contrast to the network literature players can reach multilateral agreements patient enough countries only reach bilateral agreements if insiders gain more than outsiders which allows them to manipulate the status quo in subsequent negotiations however a hub and spoke pattern may then emerge and insiders then dissipate the advantages of strategic positioning we also use variants on the model to explain why a us commitment not to bargain bilaterally sustained progress at gatt negotiations and the rarity of open access preferential trading arrangements

standard risk aversion this paper introduces the concept of standard risk aversion a von neumann morgenstern utility function has standard risk aversion if any risk makes a small reduction in wealth more painful in the sense of an increased reduction in expected utility also makes any undesirable independent risk more painful it is shown that given monotonicity and concavity the combination of decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing absolute prudence is necessary and sufficient for standard risk aversion standard risk aversion is shown to imply not only pratt and zeckhauser s proper risk aversion individually undesirable independent risks always being jointly undesirable but also that being forced to face an undesirable risk reduces the optimal investment in a risky security with and independent return similar results are established for the effect of broad class of increases in one risk on the desirability of or optimal investment in a second independent risk

the silent success of customs unions an earlier version of this paper is part of arevik gnutzmann mkrtchyan s thesis essays on the economics of trade agreements 2014 http hdl handle net 1814 34561

asymmetric fdi and tax treaty bargaining theory and evidence abstract tax treaties are often viewed as a mechanism for eliminating tax competition however this approach ignores the need for bargaining over the treaty s terms this paper focuses on how bargaining can affect the withholding taxes set under the treaty in a simple framework we develop hypotheses about patterns in treaty tax rates a key determinant for these patterns is the relative size of bilateral foreign direct investment fdi activity in plausible situations more asymmetric countries will negotiate treaties with higher tax rates this theory is then tested using 1992 data from us and organization for economic cooperation and development oecd bilateral tax treaties overall the data supports the prediction that greater asymmetric fdi activity increases the negotiated tax rates

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements the authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the world trade organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members they show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium however fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country if fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of retaliatory tariffs they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the current system the authors also consider the use of bonds as a means of settling disputes if bonds can be posted with a third party they do not have to be supported by retaliatory tariffs and can improve the negotiating position of countries that are too small to threaten tariff retaliation

enforcing international trade agreements with imperfect private monitoring to analyse the role that the world trade organization wto plays in enforcing international trade agreements this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies pts under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country s concealed trade barriers it identifies the condition under which countries can restrain the use of concealed barriers based on pts and establishes that countries will not reduce the cooperative protection level to its minimum attainable level under the optimal pts this paper then considers third party trigger strategies tts under which the wto allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on the wto s judgement about potential violations by comparing the optimal pts and optimal tts it demonstrates that the wto facilitates a better cooperative equilibrium by changing the nature of punishment triggering signals from private to public which in turn enables countries to use a more efficient punishment such as an asymmetric and a minimum punishment

do big countries win tariff wars yes it is widely believed that tariffs invite retaliation and that the postretaliation equilibrium l eaves all countries worse off than they would be at free trade the a uthors present a simple pure exchange model with two countries and t wo goods and show which endowment patterns are consistent with this belief they find that if one country is substantially bigger than th e other it can expect to gain from a tariff war despite retaliation the model can be extended to show that the advantage obtained by bei ng part of a large trading unit can help explain the formation of cus toms unions copyright 1988 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

the formation of networks with transfers among players we examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links we vary three aspects of the game i whether players can only make transfers to and receive transfers from players to whom they are directly linked or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in ii whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself and iii whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links we characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs

optimal tariff equilibria with customs unions the authors construct a model of customs unions in which countries charge optimal tariffs customs unions internalize the externality that exists whenever two countries import the same good also customs unions make several countries into one large unit with more market power big customs unions can improve their members welfare relative to the free trade the authors model of customs unions separates the effects of tariff reduction from the effects of policy coordination the movement from nash equilibrium to a free trade association improves global resource allocations moving from a free trade association to a full customs union has ambiguous resource allocation effects

the economic impact of the trans pacific partnership what have we learned from cge simulation the trans pacific partnership tpp trade agreement if were it to be successfully implemented would be one of the largest regional agreements ever seen it is the only exemplar to date of a mega regional fta for which negotiations have been successfully concluded and a landmark in evolving approaches to asia pacific integration as such quantitative assessments of its potential effects are of considerable interest one of the most widely used techniques for evaluating the economic impact of regional trading agreements is numerical simulation with computable general equilibrium or cge models there have now been a large number of papers written that use cge methods to analyse the potential economic impact of the tpp agreement under varying theoretical and policy assumptions in this paper we provide a synthesis of the key results that have emerged from the literature and introduce some new simulation results of our own to anchor the discussion

bilateralism and free trade we study a setting with many countries in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets countries can sign bilateral free trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade we allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free trade agreements a profile of free trade agreements defines the trading regime our principal finding is that in symmetric settings bilateralism is consistent with global free trade we also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements

is the wto passe the wto has delivered policy outcomes that are very different from those likely to emerge out of the recent wave of preferential trade agreements ptas should economists see this as an efficient institutional hand off where the wto has carried trade liberalization as far as it can manage and is now passing the baton to ptas to finish the job this paper surveys a growing economics literature on international trade agreements and argues on this basis that the wto is not passe rather and subject to some caveats this survey of research to date suggests that the wto warrants strong support while a more cautious view of ptas seems appropriate

networks of collaboration in oligopoly abstract in an oligopoly prior to competing in the market firms have an opportunity to form pair wise collaborative links with other firms these pair wise links involve a commitment of resources and lead to lower costs of production of the collaborating firms we study the incentives of firms to form links and the architecture of the resulting collaboration network we find that incentives to form links are intimately related to the nature of market competition our analysis also suggests that collaborations are used by firms to generate competitive advantage and that strategically stable networks are often asymmetric with some firms having many links while others have few links or are isolated specifically we show that networks with the dominant group architecture stars and inter linked stars are stable we also present some results on the architecture of socially efficient networks

bilateralism multilateralism and the quest for global free trade abstract we develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature bilateral or multilateral of trade liberalization are endogenously determined to determine whether and how bilateralism matters we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis we find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements by contrast under symmetry both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade

free trade agreements as dynamic farsighted networks in the presence of multilateral negotiations are free trade agreements ftas necessary for or will they prevent global free trade i answer this question using a dynamic farsighted model of network formation among asymmetric countries ultimately ftas prevent global free trade when there are two larger countries and one smaller country but ftas can be necessary for global free trade when there are two smaller countries and one larger country the model provides insights into the dynamics of recent real world negotiations and recent results in the literature on the empirical determinants of trade agreements jel c71 f12 f13

the control of invasive species on private property with neighbor to neighbor spillovers invasive pests cross property boundaries property managers may have private incentives to control invasive species despite not having sufficient incentive to fully internalize the external costs of their role in spreading the invasion each property manager has a right to future use of his own property but his property may abut others properties enabling spread of an invasive species the incentives for a foresighted property manager to control invasive species have received little attention we consider the efforts of a foresighted property manager who has rights to future use of a property and has the ability to engage in repeated discrete control activities we find that higher rates of dispersal associated with proximity to neighboring properties reduce the private incentives for control controlling species at one location provides incentives to control at a neighboring location control at neighboring locations are strategic complements and coupled with spatial heterogeneity lead to a weaker link public good problem in which each property owner is unable to fully appropriate the benefits of his own control activity future use rights and private costs suggest that there is scope for a series of coase like exchanges to internalize much of the costs associated with species invasion pigouvian taxes on invasive species potentially have qualitatively perverse behavioral effects a tax with a strong income effect e g failure of effective revenue recycling can reduce the value of property assets and diminish the incentive to manage insects on one s own property

hub and spoke free trade areas theory and evidence from israel we study how the sequential formation of free trade areas affects trade flows between member countries in a three country three good model of comparative advantage if two countries have an fta and both sign a similar agreement with the third trade between the two decreases however if only one of them signs an additional fta a hub and spoke pattern arises and trade between the initial members increases israel s experience lends strong support to our model trade between israel and the eu subject to an fta since 1975 increased by an additional 29 after the introduction of the us israel fta in 1985 on etudie comment la formation sequentielle de zones de libre echange affecte les flux commerciaux entre les pays membres dans un modele d avantage comparatif avec trois pays et trois biens si deux pays ont un accord de libre echange et qu ils signent tous deux un accord similaire avec un tiers pays le commerce entre les deux pays originaux decroit cependant si seulement un des deux pays originaux signe un accord avec le troisieme un reseau en etoile emerge et le commerce entre les deux payx d origine s accroit l experience d israel donne un fort support au modele le commerce entre israel et l union europeenne sujet a un accord de libre echange depuis 1975 s est accru de 29 apres l introduction de l accord de libre echange entre israel et les etats unis en 1985

pattern formation spatial externalities and regulation in coupled economic ecological systems abstract we study the management of ecosystems in which interacting state variables that are affected by management decisions diffuse in space we study pattern formation first in a setting where economic agents maximize myopic profits and ignore spillovers onto agents at other sites and second in the context of a social planner who internalizes these spillovers we compare patterns under these two institutions and study how the differences in the patterns generated by these two institutions impact the design of regulatory schemes to internalize the externalities at the same time we introduce new methods based on fourier series type decompositions that enable us to turn an intractable infinite dimensional optimal control problem into a countable number of finite dimensional optimal control problems as far as we know these methods are new to the economics literature our theory is applied to the management and regulation of a semi arid system

china and the trans pacific partnership a numerical simulation assessment of the effects involved the trans pacific partnership tpp is a new negotiation on cross border liberalisation of goods and service flows going beyond wto disciplines and focused on issues such as regulation and border controls this paper uses numerical simulation methods to assess the potential effects of a tpp agreement on china and also china s inclusion or exclusion on other countries we use a numerical 11 country global general equilibrium model with trade costs and inside money trade costs are calculated using a method based on gravity equations tpp barriers potentially removable are trade costs less tariffs simulation results reveal that china will be slightly hurt by tpp initiatives in welfare when china is out but the total production and export will be increased other non tpp countries will be mostly hurt in welfare but member countries will mostly gain if china takes part in tpp she will significantly gain and increase other tpp countries gain as well the comparison of tpp effects and global free trade effects show that the positive effects of global free trade are stronger than tpp effects japan s joining tpp would be beneficial to both herself and most of other tpp countries but which negative effects on china s welfare when out of tpp will increase further

preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization and the role of political economy abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the freedom to pursue preferential trade liberalization permitted by article xxiv of the gatt on country s incentives to participate in multilateral negotiations and on feasibility of global free trade we present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferential or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special interest groups we show that heterogeneity in political preferences across countries plays an important role in determining the relative merits of preferential and multilateral approaches to trade liberalization on one hand the opportunity to liberalize preferentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations on the other hand when countries share similar political preferences multilateral free trade that would have been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue preferential liberalization

rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions abstract this paper is about the determination of common external tariffs cets in customs unions cus we first examine how the relationship between preferences over cet levels technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a cu is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues we then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium cet among other things we find that when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members imports tariff preferences may be polarized the trade patterns of some cu members may be endogenous and as a result their payoff functions may not be single peaked this leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules e g the population and consumption rules and raises the possibility of a condorcet paradox

the effects of shifts in a return distribution on optimal portfolios when the distribution of the returns of a risky asset undergoes a stochastically dominating shift a risk averse investor may not necessarily increase the investment in that asset this paper provides restrictions on the investor s utility function that are necessary and sufficient for a dominating shift to bring about no decrease in the investment in the respective asset if there are two risky assets in the portfolio these conditions are also necessary if there are n 2 assets and are necessary and sufficient if the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

winners and losers from the gradual formation of trading blocs although global free trade is efficient each country s benefit from free trade depends on the path that leads to the global free trade agreement using a dynamic model of trading bloc formation we show that when global free trade is reached gradually the countries that are initially excluded gain less than the rest and may be even made worse off by the final free trade agreement than they were in the initial state of no trading blocs

on the role of retaliation in trade agreements this paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements it shows that in the presence of private information retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments in particular it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium we argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms of trade externalities within the current world trading system though in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal the model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies

monotonicity of asset price toward higher changes in risk abstract this note gives the conditions on preferences to guarantee the monotonicity of asset prices when the payoffs of the risky asset change in the sense of the n th stochastic dominance and with an n th degree increase in risk those conditions are expressed in terms of the sign of the successive derivatives of the utility function coupled with the relative risk aversion of higher orders less than their benchmark values

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries we consider a small open economy that faces a commitment problem in trade liberalization we examine how the relationship with a large trading partner affects the ability of the small countrys government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism if the small country s government is patient enough it can overcome its domestic commitment without the help of the large country unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country s dynamic incentives liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country however if capacity in the import competing sector can only be reduced gradually a conditional reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions with the large country liberalizing before the small country

the economics of dead zones linking externalities from the land to their consequences in the sea the purpose of this review and analysis is to provide a basic understanding of the issues related to worldwide hypoxic zones and the range of economic questions sorely in need of answers we begin by describing the causes and extent of hypoxic zones worldwide followed by a review of the evidence concerning ecological effects of the condition and impacts on ecosystem services we describe what is known about abatement options and cost effective policy design before turning to an analysis of the large seasonally recurring hypoxic zone in the gulf of mexico we advance the understanding of this major ecological issue by estimating the relationship between pollutants nutrients and the areal extent of the hypoxic zone this production function relationship suggests that both instantaneous and legacy contributions of nutrients contribute to annual predictions of the size of the zone highlighting concerns that ecologists have raised about lags in the recovery of the system and affirms the importance of multiple nutrients as target pollutants we conclude with a discussion of critical research needs to provide input to policy formation

vertical mergers and product differentiation this paper presents an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers that incorporates strategic behaviors in the hotelling type location model this enables one to consider the relationship between downstream firms strategies for product differentiation and vertical integration i show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation of the integrated firm under some conditions partial integration arises in equilibrium which may increase the profit of the nonintegrated downstream firm the paper also discusses the welfare implications of vertical integration

point nonpoint effluent trading with spatial heterogeneity potential earnings from permits sales may provide an incentive for farmers to accept water quality regulation we derive optimal adjustments of point nonpoint effluent trading ratios for heterogeneity in marginal environmental damage and degradation retention of the pollutant across locations in a watershed a simulation based on data from the kymi river valley finland indicates that farmers are the greatest suppliers of permits as expected but that gains from trading vary substantially some farmers may become net buyers of permits and thus net losers from regulation the benefits of effluent trading are distributed unevenly among point sources as well copyright 2008 oxford university press

the theory of preferential trade agreements historical evolution and current trends the theory of preferential trade agreements pta s or what might be described in policy terms as the general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt article xxiv sanctioned freetrade areas fta s and customs unions cu s has undergone two phases of evolution in two very different modes largely reflecting the contrasting policy concerns of the time in this paper we trace this evolution offering both a historical context and an intellectual coherence to diverse analytical approaches

domestic policies in self enforcing trade agreements abstract if all cross country externalities travel through the terms of trade efficient trade agreements may simply target the terms of trade and ignore domestic policies this argument has been advanced by several prominent studies simply put it reads terms of trade agreements are efficient i show that this result breaks down if the following two standard conditions are met first a self enforcement requirement constrains the agreement and second production possibilities are intertemporally linked these conditions imply that a country s current policy mix affects future production possibilities and thus impacts payoffs under potential defection since a terms of trade agreement does not specify a country s policy mix it effectively invites countries to manipulate their own defection temptation to be self enforcing terms of trade agreement must ensure that no country while optimizing its policies on the iso terms of trade schedule will abandon its zone of voluntary cooperation this requirement implies that terms of trade agreements are inefficient and can be improved upon by agreements that target policies directly

do south south preferential trade agreements undermine the prospects for multilateral free trade due to trade diversion there has been concerns expressed over the proliferation of preferential trade agreements ptas between south countries in this paper we compare welfare across the various forms of bilateral free trade agreements ftas and customs unions cus and examine their implications for the stability of multilateral free trade while north north ptas tend to yield higher welfare we fi nd certain cases where south south agreements are more likely to lead to global free trade than north north or north south agreements but other cases where multilateral cooperation over free trade is the least likely under south south agreements we also examine how the expansion of existing agreements or the combination of separate agreements affects the potential for free trade

the dynamics of spatial pollution the case of phosphorus runoff from agricultural land abstract the paper analyzes based on a land classification system the optimal management of negative production externalities while taking into account the intertemporal and spatial aspects of the problem to incorporate both aspects simultaneously a two stage modeling approach is proposed where the solution of the spatial problem first stage is optimized over time second stage as a result it is possible to relate long run and short run supply and input demand functions attention is given to runoffs from agricultural land leading to the contamination of a water body in particular the one of phosphorus and the eutrophication of lakes the employment of a land classification system supports a full information approach and allows to address the optimal management of mineral fertilizer and manure based on zonal taxes zonal permits and zonal standards which all vary over time

international trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size abstract this paper analyzes how changes in the structure and environment of trade agreements between a small and a large country affect the efficient frontier of those self enforcing agreements and hence negotiation outcomes using the autarky punishment instead of the interior nash punishment may provide the small country with greater bargaining power negotiating direct transfers under free trade instead of reciprocal tariff reductions improves the worst possible negotiation outcome for the small country the existence of irreversible investment may strengthen weaken the small country s bargaining power under the interior nash autarky punishment scheme

should the wto require free trade agreements to eliminate internal tariffs abstract in a three country model of endogenous free trade agreements ftas we study the effects of requiring fta members to eliminate tariffs on one another as is essentially stipulated under current wto rules we explain why in the absence of such a requirement ftas members impose positive tariffs on each other even when maximizing their joint welfare we show that requiring fta members to eliminate internal tariffs induces them to lower their external tariffs such external trade liberalization by fta members undermines the prospects of global free trade since it reduces the non member s incentive to enter into trade agreements with them

research needs and challenges in the few system coupling economic models with agronomic hydrologic and bioenergy models for sustainable food energy and water systems on october 12 13 a workshop funded by the national science foundation was held at iowa state university in ames iowa with a goal of identifying research needs related to coupled economic and biophysical models within the few system approximately 80 people attended the workshop with about half representing the social sciences primarily economics and the rest from the physical and natural sciences the focus and attendees were chosen so that findings would be particularly relevant to sbe research needs while taking into account the critical connectivity needed between social sciences and other disciplines we have identified several major gaps in existing scientific knowledge that present substantial impediments to understanding the few system we especially recommend research in these areas as a priority for future funding 1 economic models of decision making in coupled systems deliberate human activity has been the dominant factor driving environmental and land use changes for hundreds of years while economists have made great strides in modeling and understanding these choices the coupled systems modeling literature with some important exceptions has not reflected these contributions several paths forward seem fruitful first baseline economic models that assume rationality can be used much more widely than they are currently moreover the current generation of iams that include rational agents have emphasized partial equilibrium studies appropriate for smaller systems to allow this approach to be used to study larger systems the potential for and consequences of general equilibrium effects should be studied as well second it is important to address shortcomings in these models of economic decision making valuable improvements could be gained from developing coupled models that draw insights from behavioral economics many decision makers deviate systematically from actions that would be predicted by strict rationality but very few iams incorporate this behavior potentially leading to inaccurate predictions about the effects of policies and regulations improved models of human adaptation and induced technological change can also be incorporated into coupled models particularly for medium to long run models decisions about adaptation and technological change will have substantial effects on the conclusions and policy implications but more compelling methods for incorporating these changes into modeling are sorely needed in addition some economic decisions are intrinsically dynamic yet few coupled models explicitly incorporate dynamic models economic models that address uncertainty in decision making are also underutilized in coupled models of the few system 2 coupling models across disciplines despite much recent progress established models for one component of the few system often cannot currently produce outcomes that can be used as inputs for models of other components this misalignment makes integrated modeling difficult and is especially apparent in linking models of natural phenomena with models of economic decision making economic agents typically act to maximize a form of utility or welfare that is not directly linked to physical processes and they typically require probabilistic forecasts as an input to their decision making that many models in the natural sciences cannot directly produce we believe that an especially promising approach is the development of bridge models that convert outputs from one model into inputs for another such models can be viewed as application specific reduced form distillations of a richer and more realistic underlying model ideally these bridge models would be developed in collaborative research projects involving economists statisticians and disciplinary specialists and would contribute to improved understanding in the scientific discipline as well 3 model validation and comparison there is little clarity on how models should be evaluated and compared to each other both within individual disciplines and as components of larger iams this challenge makes larger integrated modeling exercises extremely difficult some potential ways to advance are by developing statistical criteria that measure model performance along the dimensions suitable for inclusion in an iam as well as infrastructure and procedures to facilitate model comparisons focusing on the models out of sample distributional forecasting performance as well as that of the iam overall is especially promising and of particular importance moreover applications of iams tend to estimate the effect of hypothetical future policy actions but there have been very few studies that have used these models to estimate the effect of past policy actions these exercises should be encouraged they offer a well understood test bed for the iams and also contribute to fundamental scientific knowledge through better understanding of the episode in question the retrospective nature of this form of analysis also presents the opportunity to combine reduced form estimation strategies with the iams as an additional method of validation

are trade blocs conducive to free trade is integration conducive to free trade equilibria in the context of an infinitely repeated tariff setting game with intraindustry trade integration of numerous very small provinces promotes free trade by deterring the exercise of market power by a large dominant province if the dominant province is smaller than the rest of the world combined integration promotes free trade if it results in multiple equal sized blocs free trade is less likely the higher the degree of integration in such a world but it is always more likely than in a world with one very dominant trading partner

is there a case for non discrimination in the international protection of intellectual property abstract we evaluate the case for non discrimination in international patent protection when trade is not subject to any frictions barriers requiring national treatment nt does not affect the rate of innovation and welfare since unfavorable discrimination suffered abroad by innovators in the absence of nt is fully offset by favorable discrimination enjoyed by them at home when trade barriers exist however such international offsetting in patent protection is incomplete and innovation incentives are actually lower under nt by lumping domestic and foreign patent protection together nt blunts the overall effectiveness of patent protection in incentivizing innovation in the presence of trade barriers

the evolution of free trade networks abstract this paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement fta network formation game among n countries we first explore the static model introduced by goyal and joshi 2006 and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable fta networks then we develop a dynamic model under random perturbations and identify long run outcomes to remove prediction uncertainty inherited from static analysis the results show that both partial free trade and global free trade will result when there are only three countries however when more countries are involved only the complete fta network emerges

the size of trading blocs market power and world welfare effects abstract we construct an n country n commodity trade model to analyze the implications of bloc size for nash equilibrium tariffs and welfare the relationship between the absolute size of symmetric trading blocs and their market power is ambiguous and we illustrate how this relationship varies with model parameters in contrast sufficiently large increases in the relative size of a bloc enhance its relative market power and cause the welfare of its country members to rise above the free trade level we establish the existence of an optimal bloc size and study the dependence of optimal size on the parameters of the model

water quantity management in a heterogeneous landscape with farsighted farmers agricultural production contributes to many environmental problems in semi arid areas agricultural irrigation causes the so called waterlogging phenomenon this phenomenon is both spatial and dynamic since percolation depends on soil quality summed up in landscape heterogeneity and evolves along time furthermore farmers can be farsighted with respect to their contribution to percolation we study regulation schemes to be implemented to restore the socially optimal spatial and temporal production plan of farmers in such a context we show that both a temporal tax on percolation and a spatio temporal tax on inputs both at the extensive and at the intensive margin are efficient for the restoration of the socially optimal solution furthermore a numerical example demonstrates that the consequences of implementing a fiscal scheme designed for myopic farmers whereas they are farsighted depends on the distribution of soil quality

size inequality coordination externalities and international trade agreements abstract developing countries now account for a significant fraction of world trade and two thirds of the membership of the world trade organization wto however many are still individually small and thus have a limited ability to bilaterally extract and enforce trade concessions from larger developed economies even though as a group they would be able to do so we show that this coordination externality generates asymmetric outcomes under agreements that rely on bilateral threats of trade retaliation such as the wto but not under agreements extended to include certain financial instruments in particular we find that an extended agreement generates improvements in global efficiency and equity if it includes the exchange of bonds prior to trading but not if it relies solely on ex post fines moreover a combination of bonds and fines generates similar improvements even if small countries are subject to financial constraints that prevent them from posting bonds

strategic competition in the asian mega regionalism and optimal choices the strategic interactions of mega regional blocs such as the trans pacific partnership tpp the regional comprehensive economic partnership and even the one belt and one road obor in the asia pacific reflects the dual purposes of large countries as they seek not only the welfare gains from trade liberalisation but also the leadership in a trading bloc or the right to set the rules this paper designs two sequential network formation games a leadership game and a trade liberalisation game to model this phenomenon and predict the equilibrium result in the first game we show how the incorporation of leadership affects the choices among different trading structures specifically we show that the parallel trading blocs emerge as the equilibrium outcome only when there exists large loss from giving up leadership in the second game we describe how the globalisation is arrived and conduct numerical simulations to test our theoretical results the predictions of the game are supported by the real world data based on simulation results

multi lateral trade negotiations and the most favored nation clause abstract this paper considers the interaction between private information and the most favored nation clause in trade negotiations it demonstrates that by aggregating uncertainty over a number of trading partners the most favored nation clause may offer a welfare improvement over a set of bilateral trade negotiations this improvement is shown to be most pronounced when a large number of countries are involved in negotiations

the comparative statics of changes in risk revisited abstract in this paper we consider the problem of determining the conditions under which a change in risk increases the optimal value of a decision variable for all risk averse agents for a large class of payoff functions we obtain the least constraining necessary and sufficient condition on the change in risk for signing its effect without any additional restriction on the utility function than risk aversion it entails all existing sufficient conditions as particular cases our results are applied to the linear model which describes the standard portfolio problem the necessary and sufficient condition for unambiguous comparative statics in this class of problems is termed greater central riskiness cr it is shown that cr dominance is neither stronger nor weaker than second degree stochastic dominance journal of economic literature classification number d81

a strategic model of social and economic networks we study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks when self interested individuals can form or sever links first for two stylized models we characterize the stable and efficient networks there does not always exist a stable network that is efficient next we show that this tension persists generally to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production we characterize one such allocation rule the equal split rule and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players

tariff bindings and the dynamic formation of preferential trade agreements abstract we show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of preferential trade agreement pta formation first it shapes the nature of forces constraining expansion of free trade agreements ftas the constraining force is a free riding incentive of fta non members under relatively high bindings but an exclusion incentive of fta members under relatively low bindings second multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role played by ptas in the attainment of global free trade initially tariff binding liberalization leads to custom union cu formation in equilibrium but in a way that undermines the pursuit of global free trade however further tariff binding liberalization leads to fta formation in equilibrium and in a way that facilitates the attainment of global free trade our theoretical analysis also has implications regarding recent empirical discussions over the relative merits of ftas versus cus

sanctions in networks abstract in this paper we contribute to the sender target models of sanctions by explicitly incorporating the linkages social political or economic that bind the sender and target to other agents given any network model and architecture we draw attention to two factors that play a key role in determining the efficacy of sanctions in reducing the frequency of violations these are respectively strategic complementaritiesbetween the sanctioning action deleting link with target and number of direct links of the sender and the externalities imposed on the sender by third parties we examine the role played by these factors both in the short run when links can only be deleted and the long run when links can also be added as well as when sanctions are unilateral the sender can only delete own links or multilateral the sender can impose on common allies to sever links to the target our analysis allows an active role to the target to build an opposing coalition to deflect sanctions and to third parties to engage in sanction busting it also extends to multiple senders and targets existence of interest groups within sender and target with dissimilar objectives and signed networks allowing both antagonistic and cordial bilateral relationships

regionalism in a multilateral world recent regional initiatives have been addressed from a vinerian perspective of trade creation and trade diversion this is true of both policy oriented economists who tend to be critical of the initiatives and theorists who have added dynamic and gametheoretic elements to the vinerian structure this paper describes the stylized facts of much recent regional integration and develops an alternative model the analysis suggests that regional integration far from threatening multilateral liberalism may in fact be a direct consequence of the success of past multilateralism and an added guarantee for its survival

a theory of gradual coalition formation we study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games based on underlying tu games in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements we distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements reversible actions and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game irreversible actions we show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions on the other hand we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty irrespective of the reversibility of actions agreements between players form the basis of much that game theory seeks to explain there are obviously many useful ways to categorize such agreements in multilateral negotiations that is with more than two participants it seems natural to distinguish between cases in which the coalition forms in one step and those in which the coalition grows to its eventual size by attracting new members thus recipients of marshall aid collectively agreed to american terms at the ceec in 1947 whereas a strict subset of these countries agreed to the schuman plan in 1950 with the other current members joining the eu over time similarly negotiations on climate change culminated in universal agreement at rio in 1992 whereas india and china only agreed to reduce cfc emissions in london in 1990 after other countries had signed up to the montreal protocol finally un security council resolution 242 urged that a multilateral conference be set up to establish a comprehensive settlement in the middle east whereas the process initiated by the oslo agreements and arguably camp david has consisted of a sequence of agreements between israel and its neighbours we will refer to cases in which the grand coalition forms in one step as involving immediate coalition formation or icf for short and cases in which a coalition grows as involving gradual coalition formation

third country effects on the formation of free trade agreements the recent proliferation of free trade agreements ftas has resulted in an increasingly complex network of preferential trading relationships the economics literature has generally examined the formation of ftas as a function of the participating countries economic characteristics alone in this paper we show both theoretically and empirically that the decision to enter into an fta is also crucially dependent on the participating countries existing fta relationships with third countries accounting for the interdependence of ftas helps to explain a significant fraction of fta formations that would not otherwise be predicted by countries economic characteristics

a strategic and welfare theoretic analysis of free trade areas abstract we construct a three country model to determine how the formation of free trade areas ftas affects optimal tariffs and welfare we find that at constant rest of the world row tariffs the adoption of internal free trade induces union members to reduce their external tariffs below the kemp wan j int econom 6 1976 95 97 level and causes row s terms of trade to improve and its welfare to rise when row also behaves optimally its policy response to the formation of the fta is to raise tariffs generally fta members prefer to liberalize internal trade partially and find regional integration appealing only if their collective size is sufficiently large we also demonstrate how ftas may undermine the attainment of global free trade

china and trans pacific partnership agreement countries estimation of the virtual water trade of agricultural products abstract the trans pacific partnership agreement tppa is one of the most important multilateral free trade and investment agreements in recent years although as a major economic power in the asia pacific region china has yet to join the tppa existing research on china and tppa countries has mainly been conducted from political and economic perspectives this paper first reports the relationship between china and tppa countries from the perspective of virtual water trade of agricultural products and completes a diachronic analysis from 2001 to 2014 the results indicate that china was in virtual water trade surplus with tppa countries for agricultural products and that the surplus had an expansion trend the exported virtual water totalled 7 47 billion m 3 y whereas 63 45 billion m 3 y was embedded in imported products malaysia was the biggest virtual water surplus partner of china and japan was the biggest virtual water deficit partner additionally the proportion of the grey water footprint of agricultural products that china exported to tppa countries was about five times higher than that imported from tppa countries it reflected the difference of agricultural science and technology moreover the products structure of china s virtual water trade was not reasonable and was excessively focused on several products finally with respect to environmental and water allocation ethics tppa countries were classified into four types in terms of net import and water abundance mutual benefit countries australia canada new zealand the united states malaysia and chile unilateral benefit countries peru and brunei supported countries japan and singapore and double pressure countries mexico and vietnam with respect to the virtual water trade of agricultural products there is a close relationship between china and tppa countries the virtual water trade promotes the sustainability of water resources and the findings are conducive to the adjustment of trade structure to achieve optimal state of ecology economy and politics

multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements a network formation approach we study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability we consider multi country settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a cournot oligopolist in each market under endogenous tariffs we find that the existence of a multilateral trade agreement is always necessary for the stability of the trading system and that the formation of preferential trade agreements is always necessary for achieving global free trade we also find that global free trade is efficient but not necessarily the only multilaterally stable trade equilibrium when countries are symmetric heterogeneous in terms of market size we derive conditions under which such a conflict between overall welfare efficiency and stability occurs

free trade networks abstract the paper examines the formation of free trade agreements ftas as a network formation game we consider an n country model in which possibly asymmetric countries trade differentiated industrial commodities we show that if all countries are symmetric the complete fta network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable we also compare ftas and customs unions cus as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization noticing that unlike cus each signatory of an fta can have another fta without consent of other member countries

dynamic formation of preferential trade agreements the role of flexibility in practice free trade agreements ftas vastly outnumber customs unions cus nevertheless the literature traditionally views cus as optimal for members because cu members coordinate external tariffs i show that a dynamic fta flexibility benefit can help explain the prevalence of ftas individual fta members have the flexibility to form their own future ftas whereas cu members must jointly engage in future cu formation i show how the relative prevalence of ftas versus cus depends on the structure of market size asymmetry across countries and use these predictions to shed some light on fta versus cu formation in europe and south america formation dynamique d accords commerciaux preferentiels le role de la flexibilite en pratique les accords de libre echange ale sont plus nombreux que les unions douanieres ud neanmoins la litterature specialisee percoit traditionnellement que les ud sont optimales pour les membres parce qu ils peuvent coordonner leurs tarifs externes on montre qu une flexibilite dynamique de l ale peut aider a expliquer la prevalence des ale les membres des ale ont la flexibilite de former leurs propres ale dans l avenir alors que les membres des ud s engagent conjointement pour la formation des ud futures on montre comment la prevalence des ale versus les ud depend de la structure de l asymetrie de la taille entre les pays et on utilise ces previsions pour eclairer les choix entre la formation de ale et de ud en europe et en amerique du sud

how do the trans pacific economies affect the usa an industrial sector approach this paper studies how the trans pacific region affects the us economy in terms of business cycle transmission we use a large data set consisting of disaggregated sectoral industrial production indexes from selected countries in the region and employ a factor augmented vector autoregression favar approach to analyse the transmission of shocks in different industries we find that a positive output shock in the entire trans pacific region has positive effects on the majority of us manufacturing sectors we also find that sectoral shocks in five sectors of the trans pacific region have a large impact on the overall us economy three of the five sectors displayed strong same sector responses relative to the overall response suggesting that vertical production linkages might play a key role in the transmission of shocks our results highlight the importance of examining industrial sectors in studying the transmission of shocks in the trans pacific region

negotiating free trade we develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once we show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome leading to worldwide free trade a model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection global free trade is not achieved when the political economy motive for protection is sufficiently large furthermore the model generates both building bloc and stumbling bloc effects of preferential trade agreements in particular we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form a building bloc effect and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden a stumbling bloc effect the analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society

tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks this paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements ftas on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level we demonstrate that a country s unilateral incentive to form an fta depends on the relative magnitudes of the negative market concession effect and the positive market expansion effect both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two fta partner countries global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form ftas two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an fta when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low this finding is robust to several extensions of the model our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding

the customs union issue why do we observe so few of them the number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully edged customs unions this paper develops a political economy model of trade policy under imperfect competition to provide a positive explanation for the prevalence of free trade areas in a three country setting a representative from each prospective member is elected to determine the tarifis to be applied on imported goods under a customs union the necessity to coordinate tarifis leads voters to strategically delegate power to more protectionist representatives contrary to most of the existing literature we show that strategic delegation may imply that free trade areas increase welfare compared to customs unions moreover the model also indicates that free trade areas are more likely to be politically viable than customs unions