female labour supply and marital status decisions a life cycle model this paper studies the interdependence between and the determinants of life cycle marital status and labour force participation decisions of women a dynamic utility maximization model is presented and estimated using longitudinal data on women from the panel study of income dynamics the mle method employed involves solving a dynamic programming problem further a minimum distance estimator is proposed which allows for the incorporation of wage data in a computationally simple way the estimates are used to predict changes in the life cycle patterns of employment marriage and divorce due to differences in education race the female s earnings and her potential husband s earnings the estimation results indicate that the utility gains to marriage are decreasing in the female s wage rate and increasing in her potential husband s earnings while the opposite is found for gains to working ignoring the endogeneity of marital status decisions is shown to lead to an underestimation of own and husband s wage effects on female labour supply

the effect of salaries and opportunity costs on duration in teaching evidence from michigan this paper demonstrates that salaries and opportunity costs have important influences on how long teachers stay in teaching the empirical work is based on a new longitudinal dataset providing information on the careers of 7800 michigan public school teachers the generalized least squares estimation technique accommodates censored observations time varying covariates and fixed effects one implication of the result is that predictions from the current generation of teacher supply and demand models are likely to be misleading copyright 1989 by mit press

implementing just and efficient decision making in an economy with one public good one private good and quasi linear utilities we explore decision making mechanisms to non cooperatively implement an efficient outcome by auctioning the leadership role among agents one implements egalitarianism namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo a refinement of this mechanism so called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome it achieves egalitarianism above the vickrey clarke groves decision

learning dynamics for mechanism design an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms in a repeated interaction public goods economy incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information oneshot game an experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations this provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations these predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice the simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested

welfare reform when recipients are forward looking in 1996 the aid to families with dependent children program was replaced with the temporary assistance for needy families tanf program this paper considers the effects of two specific components of tanf time limits and work requirements on employment marriage and welfare participation a discrete choice dynamic programming model is used and parameter estimates are obtained using data from the panel study of income dynamics policy simulations show that a five year lifetime time limit results in a 60 percent reduction in welfare use and that a substantial part of this reduction occurs because recipients are forward looking

a dynamic theory of conjectural variations this paper explores the relationship between dynamic oligopolistic competition and static conjectural variations equilibria using an infinite horizon adjustment cost model the author demonstrates that any steady state closed loop subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with a conjectural variations equilibrium in the case of linear demand and quadratic costs the dynamic conjectures consistent with closed loop steady state equilibria are negative constant symmetric and vary continuously with the discount rate and the adjustment cost parameter in an interval between the static consistent conjectures and zero cournot copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

are rational conjectures rational the concepts of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures are critically reviewed it is shown that their operation depends crucially on an invisible non optimizing deus ex machina hence these concepts are not really suitable for understanding competition among optimizing firms in addition the widely claimed fact that bertrand conjectures are locally rational conjectural variations is shown to be erroneous the message of this paper should be plain from the title it reflects a disillusionment with the concepts of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures for helping us understand economic interactions under imperfect competition on the face of it these concepts seem to offer the economic modeller some useful tools hence this paper is in some sense intended as a friendly warning to other economic modellers there are inherent conceptual weaknesses in these concepts that do not become apparent until one begins to penetrate their inner logic to make plain the weaknesses of rational conjectures and reasonable conjectures we shall concentrate on the simplest application of the ideas to duopoly and we shall illustrate our points using the classical cournot example of duopolists facing a common linear demand curve and having the same constant marginal cost the reader may know that this example figures prominently in the rational conjectures literature it being shown that bertrand conjectures are locally rational conjectural variations we shall see in section vi that this claim is not really valid although widely asserted but our real message is on a different plane and pertains to the usefulness of the concepts in general

a dynamic analysis of educational attainment occupational choices and job search this article examines career choices using a dynamic structural model that nests a job search model within a human capital model of occupational and educational choices wage growth occurs in the model because workers move between firms and occupations as they search for suitable job matches and because workers endogenously accumulate firm and occupation specific human capital simulations performed using the estimated model reveal that both self selection in occupational choices and mobility between firms account for a much larger share of total earnings and utility than the combined effects of firm and occupation specific human capital

optimal vcg mechanisms to assign multiple bads for the problem of assigning economic bads for example costly tasks or undesirable objects vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanisms achieve efficient allocations via money transfers however they can produce arbitrarily large budget surpluses or deficits we construct a performance index for a vcg mechanism to measure its budget surplus and deficit in the worst case using this index we develop mechanisms whose surpluses or deficits vanish as the number of participants increases for both cases of bads and goods we find that individual rationality creates an asymmetry between surplus and deficit particularly in the case of bads when the number of agents is large enough a minute amount of deficit can replace unit surplus to achieve a budget balance for the case of economic goods unit surplus can only be replaced with unit deficit regardless of individual rationality this result shows that the model with bads differs fundamentally from the model with goods

characterizations of the pivotal mechanism the pivotal mechanism is strategyproof demand revealing in public decision problems where preferences are quasi linear moreover no agent has an incentive to free ride by withdrawing from the committee and consuming whatever decision is taken by the remaining agents strategyproofness plus no free ride characterize the pivotal mechanism this mechanism is anonymous and neutral yet together strategyproofness anonymity and neutrality do not characterize it they will however if reasonable lower or upper bounds on final utilities are imposed our last characterization of the pivotal mechanism uses the no free ride axiom and two mild monotonicity properties but not strategyproofness

a theory of dynamic oligopoly iii cournot competition abstract we study the markov perfect equilibrium mpe of an alternating move infinite horizon duopoly model where the strategic variable is quantity we exhibit a pair of difference differential equations that when they exist differentiable mpe strategies satisfy for quadratic payoff functions we solve these equations in closed form and demonstrate that the mpe corresponding to the solution is the limit of the finite horizon equilibrium as the horizon tends to infinity we conclude with a discussion of adjustment costs and endogenization of the timing

dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs a differential game approach abstract this paper develops a differential game model of duopoly in which firms incur costs associated with how fast they change their level of output the analysis solves for a subgame perfect equilibrium to the model in which the steady state level of output lies strictly between the static cournot and perfect competition solutions furthermore we demonstrate that the limit game in which the speed of adjustment parameter approaches zero does not tend toward the static cournot equilibrium

the inconsistency of consistent conjectures abstract conjectural variation models have been criticized because firms are right for the wrong reasons and because possible equilibria are abundant lately several papers have attempted to meet these difficulties by some condition of consistency or rationality on the conjectural variation this paper shows that stronger versions of such conditions lead into paradoxes while the weaker forms are of little use in solving the conceived problems the original cournot assumption actually satisfies consistency enterions the problems with consistent conjectures illuminates fundmental problems with too demanding information assumptions like perfect foresight such assumptions may create non trivial structures of self reference

dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices the authors study duopolistic competition in a homogeneous good through time under the assumption that its current desirability is an exponentially weighted function of accumulated past consumption this implies that the current price of the good does not decline by as much to accommodate any given level of current consumption our an alysis is conducted in terms of a differential game it is found that the equilibrium price corresponding to the open loop nash equilibriu m strategies approaches the static cournot equilibrium price while th e equilibrium price corresponding to the closed loop nash equilibrium strategies which are subgame perfect approaches a price below it copyright 1987 by the econometric society

an estimable dynamic stochastic model of fertility and child mortality this paper develops a finite horizon dynamic stochastic model of discrete choice with respect to life cycle fertility within an environment where infant survival is uncertain the model yields implications for the number timing and spacing of children a tractable estimation method is developed for the linear constraint quadratic utility case that is intimately tied to the dynamic optimization problem and the method is applied to malaysian household data estimation is based on integrating the numerical solution of the dynamic programming model of behavior with a maximum likelihood procedure

teacher quality in public and private schools under a voucher system the case of chile chile is unusual in having long term experience with nationwide school vouchers a key criticism of school voucher systems is that they make it easier for private schools to attract better teachers to the detriment of public schools this paper uses longitudinal data from chile to estimate a discrete choice dynamic programming dcdp model of teacher and nonteacher labor supply decisions and to explore how wage policies affect the composition of the teacher labor force in public and private schools in the model individuals first decide whether to get a teaching degree and then choose annually from among five work home sector alternatives empirical results show that private voucher schools attract better teachers than public schools however the existence of the private voucher sector also draws higher productivity individuals into the teaching profession

incentives work getting teachers to come to school we use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in india in treatment schools teachers attendance was monitored daily using cameras and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group and the children s test scores increased by 0 17 standard deviations we estimate a structural dynamic labor supply model and find that teachers respond strongly to financial incentives our model is used to compute cost minimizing compensation policies jel i21 j31 j45 o15

rational conjectures in the theory of oligopoly abstract the paper employs the notion of rational conjectural equilibrium to remove the arbitrary nature of conjectures about rivals reactions which characterises the traditional non cooperative theory of oligopoly a general definition of these equilibria is given and the concept is then applied to a simple duopoly model the standard models of perfect competition monopoly limit price dominant firms are shown to emerge as special cases of rational conjectural equilibria

conjectural variations as a reduced form abstract the conjectural variations solution is usually seen as the reduced form of the equilibrium of an unmodeled dynamic game we show that in linear oligopolies and for an open set of values of the discount factor this correspondence holds exactly for a quantity setting repeated game with minimax punishments during t periods

the evolution of consistent conjectures in this paper we model the evolution of conjectures in an economy consisting of a large number of firms which meet in duopolies the duopoly game is modelled by the conjectural variation cv model an evolutionary process leads to more profitable conjectures becoming more common payoff monotonic dynamics under this class of selection dynamics convergence occurs to a small set of serially undominated strategies containing the consistent conjecture this set can be made arbitrarily small by appropriate choice of the strategy set if the game is dominance solvable then the dynamics converge globally to the unique attractor

the separability axiom and equal sharing methods a quasi linear social choice problem is defined as selecting one among finitely many indivisible public decision and a vector of monetary transfers among agents to cover the cost of this decision this decision is based upon individual preferences which are assumed to be additively separable and linear in money the separability axiom is a consistency property for choice methods on societies with variable size the decision is not affected if we remove an arbitrary agent under the condition that he be guaranteed his original utility level and the cost to the remaining agents is modified accordingly thus the utility level assigned by the social choice function to agent i is the price at which the other agents are unanimously willing to buy agent is share of the decision power a general characterization of choice methods satisfying this axiom is provided three subclasses of particular interest are characterized by additional milder axioms those are i equal sharing of the surplus left over some reference utility e g the utility at a status quo decision ii utilitarian methods that merely select the efficient public decision and perform no monetary transfers and iii equal allocation of nonseparable costs which divides equally the surplus left over from the utility derived from the pivotal mechanism also known as the vickrey clarke groves mechanism

capacity investment preemption and commitment in an infinite horizon model the commitment value of capacity is analyzed in an infinite horizon duopoly model the paper focuses on the role of alternative behavioral assumptions about the ability of firms to commit to investment paths each firm s investment strategy in a feedback nash equilibrium is shown to be a decreasing function of its rival s current capacity this creates an incentive for a firm to expand its capacity to preempt subsequent rival investment in a precommitment equilibrium there are no incentives to invest preemptively as a consequence steady state capacity levels are greater in a feedback nash equilibrium than in a precommitment equilibrium copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

a dynamic model of teacher labor supply the labor supply decisions of certified elementary and high school teachers are examined using data from a general longitudinal survey a significant decrease in the teaching participation rate tak

all sorry to disagree a general principle for the provision of non rival goods a group of agents with identical rights but different preferences share the cost of a public good in a situation where each agent is held responsible for his own preferences the principle says that nobody can benefit from the difference between his and other agents preferences all are sorry to disagree this axiom is incompatible with the pay according to benefits approach and in particular with lindahl pricing methods however it is compatible with foley s stand alone core constraints the author s axiom unlike the stand alone properties applies to any number of public goods or bads and to arbitrary public decisions copyright 1992 by the editors of the scandinavian journal of economics

the influence of classroom characteristics on high school teacher turnover i introduction a number of authors have suggested that the u s will face a shortage of qualified teachers in the near future especially in the areas of math and science 1 school districts facing such a shortage could respond in a variety of ways for instance hiring standards could be lowered teachers could be asked to teach outside their areas of certification or funds permitting starting salaries could be increased in an effort to attract the most promising candidates still another option would be to raise teaching loads i e average class size or the number of classes taught thus making do with fewer teachers this option is particularly alluring in light of the fact that average class size has been falling rapidly in the u s over the last twenty years and yet no strong connection between smaller classes and increased student learning has been established 2 there is however a possible hidden cost that needs to be investigated before recommending such a course of action if teachers respond to larger or more frequent classes by quitting then a district that tries to solve its hiring problems in this fashion could simply be increasing its demand for new teachers this paper uses data from the new york state education department s personnel master file for the years 1979 to 1989 in order to investigate whether an increased teaching load affects the likelihood that a teacher will leave his or her district in order to obtain an unbiased sample of job lengths the sample is restricted to full time high school teachers who were newly hired in 1979 3 we estimate a discrete time hazard model in which teaching load is measured as the average class size taught by an individual the number of classes taught and the proportion of classes taught in the teacher s certified area in interpreting our results we pay special attention to whether the behavior of math and science teachers differs from that of other teachers this is an important issue because shortages of qualified teachers in these two areas are predicted to be especially acute ii background the market for teachers differs from a well functioning neoclassical labor market in that salaries are determined through a political process involving various levels of government the public and often teachers unions 4 if the demand for teachers increases as retirements and student enrollment increase then starting salaries cannot be counted on to quickly move to the market clearing level and thus a shortage of teachers becomes a possibility 5 few observers however believe that there will be an actual shortage of warm bodies the more likely scenario is that there will be a lack of teachers trained in specific areas and of high quality teachers in general see murnane et al 1991 1 2 given a limited budget what are the options available to a school district facing this type of shortage the district could settle for hiring lower quality teachers but this might be seen as an unnecessary measure with long term implications taken in response to what could be a temporary situation another option that has been suggested is to increase teacher workloads 6 whether this option is workable depends in part on the exit decisions of teachers a large number of empirical studies have investigated the determinants of teacher turnover however no work specifically directed toward capturing the effect of increased teaching responsibilities on turnover has been done 7 without knowing whether such an effect exists and what the magnitude of it might be informed policy decisions at the district level in response to a shortage of qualified teachers becomes impossible past studies have shown that the probability of a teacher leaving his or her job is high in the first few years after entering the profession falls after the third year 8 and again increases as the teacher nears retirement age murnane et al

demand for coffee in sweden the role of prices preferences and market power there is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from third world countries this issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices preferences and market power influence coffee demand in sweden a demand function is estimated for the period 1968 2002 and used together with information on import prices of coffee beans to simulate an oligopoly model this approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level the maximum level of market power is found to be low but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values moreover the impact of a price decrease would be small because long run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups hence a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports

compensation policies and teacher decisions a dynamic discrete choice framework with a flexible structure for unobserved heterogeneity is used to model the occupational decisions of individuals who are certified to teach in elementary and secondary schools the model is estimated using data from the national longitudinal study of the high school class of 1972 and is used to examine the effects of possible changes in the compensation policy for teachers

career paths and quit decisions evidence from teaching conventional models predict that workers consider employment opportunities and monetary rewards expected over their lifetimes when making current period decisions such as whether to quit a job this article tests the hypothesis that later career opportunities affect quit decisions by examining the relationship between teaching and school administration evidence on the extent to which administrative positions are available to teachers and the salary premia associated with them is presented discrete time logit hazard models of teacher quits estimated using data from new york state provide some support for the hypothesis though the magnitudes of the estimated effects are small

do public schools hire the best applicants despite a surplus of candidates for most teaching jobs a strong academic record does little for an applicants job prospects this does not appear to result from lukewarm interest on the part of such applicants or choosiness about the positions they accept administrators lack of interest in these candidates may reflect the weakness of competitive pressures in public education policies intended to improve teacher quality need to consider incentives on both the demand and supply sides of the market

leaving teaching in the uk a duration analysis in this paper the authors analyze the decision by teachers to leave the profession their results affirm the importance of relative earnings in the tenure and turnover decisions of teachers the econometric modeling approach used yields important insights into the appropriateness of adopting a flexible semiparametric specification of the duration dependence structure and of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution in duration models copyright 1995 by royal economic society

the escape from conjectural variations the consistency condition in duopoly theory from bowley to fellner the paper covers the 1924 1949 debate on the conjectural variations approach to duopoly theory and focuses on the evolution of economists views about the imposition of a consistency condition on the firms conjectures the main point is that although the consistency condition entailed a notion of interactive equilibrium that resembled the modern correct conjectures equilibrium most neoclassical economists of the time refused to apply it because of the excessive requirements it imposed upon the firms forecasting abilities and because of its failure to encompass an explanation of the equilibrating process