a dynamic tiebout theory of voluntary vs involuntary provision of public goods this paper considers a dynamic model of tiebout like migration between communities that utilize distinct allocation procedures for public goods at issue is whether voluntary or compulsory procedures are more likely to prevail over time we model infinitely lived individuals who make repeated sequential location decisions over one of two communities each community uses a distinct mechanism for allocating public goods the first is one in which contributions are given voluntarily by the citizenry of the community the second is a compulsory scheme by which individuals are taxed proportionately to wealth with the tax determined by a majority vote opportunities to accumulate wealth exist via accumulation of public capital the markov perfect equilibria of the dynamic game are studied our main result shows that when accumulated wealth converges to a steady state individuals locational choices eventually select the involuntary provision mechanism this holds despite the fact that unanimous location in the voluntary provision community may in many cases remain as a nash equilibrium of the static game each period we also describe conditions under which voluntary provision survives these conditions require that accumulation of capital fails to decrease wealth dispersion over time the results are shown to be consistent with findings relating inequality to school choice

edgeworth price cycles cost based pricing and sticky pricing in retail gasoline markets abstract this paper examines dynamic pricing behavior in canadian retail gasoline markets i find three distinct pricing patterns cost based pricing sticky pricing and sharp asymmetric retail price cycles that resemble the edgeworth cycles of maskin and tirole 1988 i use a markov switching regression to estimate the prevalence of the regimes and the structural characteristics of the cycles themselves i find cycles are more prevalent when there are more small firms and are accelerated and amplified with very many small firms in markets with few small firms sticky pricing dominates the findings are consistent with the theory of edgeworth cycles

contestability in real time experimental flow markets this article reports the results from laboratory markets using a new trading institution in which sellers post offers to sell flows of output in real time we use the new institution to examine the outcomes in natural monopoly experimental markets no stable price outcomes were observed in markets contestable by two firms a finding that is consistent with the contestable markets hypothesis but in conflict with assertions commonly made by those advancing the theory s role in policy formation the average efficiency of markets contestable by two firms while greater than that of monopoly markets protected from entry was significantly less than that associated with the sustainable equilibrium

price search and periodic price discounts this paper empirically investigates the interplay between buyer search behavior and firm pricing strategy in a commodity market where many firms compete in price to sell homogeneous products we use the heterogeneity in buyer search cost to rationalize why a firm offers periodic price discounts and enjoys a high profit in such a market an estimation method is proposed to recover the nonparametric distribution of buyer search cost from the price and transaction volume data with both data we show that the search cost distribution can be estimated nonparametrically in a sequential search model and estimation results from a nonsequential search model are robust to the assumption on the maximum number of searches we also show that the commonly observed high low pricing strategy can be an optimal strategy for firms when buyers search for price information sequentially as an empirical application we use the proposed method to estimate the two search models using data on a commodity product sold by a firm

price wars in price setting supergames this paper presents a method of generating price wars in price setting supergames the market is one where symmetric oligopolists produce a differentiated product and use price as a strategic variable prices are posted and can be observed by all there is thus little uncertainty or scope for secret price cutting nevertheless price wars occur they are precipitated by periodic but infrequent demand shocks firms use the wars to learn about changed conditions in the market so that they can calculate the new stationary nash equilibrium learning is modeled in a bayesian fashion via the kalman filter copyright 1989 by the london school of economics and political science

temporary wholesale gasoline price spikes have long lasting retail effects the aftermath of hurricane rita abstract i study u s gasoline prices following hurricane rita to show that short lived geographical differences in the severity of wholesale gasoline price spikes are associated with long lasting geographical differences in retail prices in most u s cities wholesale prices spiked significantly for roughly 2 weeks following the hurricane however in cities where this spike was particularly large retail margins remained higher than in other cities for nearly 2 months high retail margins dissipated more quickly after the hurricane in cities where competition between stations tends to generate cyclical retail price fluctuations independent of wholesale cost movements i discuss why prices may have fallen faster in cities exhibiting retail price cycles and present additional results identifying differences in market characteristics between cities with and without price cycles i find that cycling cities tend to have higher population density and have independent nonrefinery brand stations that are mor

legal principles in antitrust enforcement we study antitrust enforcement to channel price fixing incentives of cartels through setting fine schedules and detection levels fines obey legal principles punishments fit the crime proportionality bankruptcy considerations and minimum fines bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines ensure abnormal cartel profits and impose a challenge for optimal antitrust enforcement we derive the fine schedule and detection level that are constrained optimal under legal principles and sustainability of cartel prices this fine schedule lies below the maximum fine makes collusion on lower prices more attractive than on higher prices and hence relates to marginal deterrence literature this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

an analysis of dynamic price discrimination in airlines prices for the same flight change substantially depending on the time of purchase this article uses a unique data set with round the clock posted fares to document significant within day price variation labeling time variation as discriminatory is difficult because the cost of an unsold airline seat changes with inventory days before departure and aggregate demand expectations after controlling for these factors and aggregating hourly fares to have a framework with two consumer types we are able to identify a component that is largely consistent with dynamic price discrimination we find higher prices during office hours when business travelers are likely to buy and lower prices in the evening when leisure travelers are more likely to purchase as the proportion of business travelers increases closer to departure both price dispersion and price discrimination become larger we provide an alternative explanation for the observed within day price differentials which is related to edgeworth price cycles

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

retail price cycles and the presence of small firms abstract in many canadian cities retail gasoline prices remain unchanged for weeks at a time while in other cities retail prices cycle increasing sharply and declining slowly in maskin and tirole econometrica 56 1988 571 both price cycles and rigid prices can exist in equilibrium in this article i demonstrate that the existence of these equilibria is dependent on the number of retail outlets operated by the firms constant price equilibria are found to exist only when firms are of similar size however cycle equilibria can be constructed for a wide range of relative sizes

bargaining and value we present and analyze a model of noncooperative bargaining among n participants applied to situations describable as games in coalitional form this leads to a unified solution theory for such games that has as special cases the shapley value in the transferable utility tu case the nash bargaining solution in the pure bargaining case and the recently introduced maschler owen consistent value in the general nontransferable utility ntu case moreover we show that any variation in a certain class of our bargaining procedure which generates the shapley value in the tu setup must yield the consistent value in the general ntu setup

edgeworth cycles with partial price commitment abstract the price commitment model of maskin and tirole 1988 provides an extensively cited foundation for edgeworth cycles we examine the viability of edgeworth cycles when price commitment is partial in the sense that a subset of firms are committed to price in each period if multiple firms are not committed in each period then the existence of edgeworth cycle equilibria requires a demanding convexity condition on the profit function

asymmetric adjustment in symmetric duopoly abstract adjustments to unanticipated demand shocks in a symmetric differentiated bertrand duopoly are analysed asymmetric adjustment may arise even when adjustment costs are negligible or absent in some equilibria only one firm adjusts to negative shocks while both firms adjust to positive shocks

empirical studies of gasoline retailing a guide to the literature abstract this paper surveys the empirical literature on gasoline retailing which has been growing rapidly over the last three decades possibly in response to antitrust and regulatory concerns and increased availability of pricing data studies of both pricing and non price decision variables are considered in general it is found that crude oil prices are the primary driver of national price movements over time however market structure has been identified as playing a role in price dynamics equilibrium selection and price differentials across markets and stations the economic literature emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity across stations and coordination problems faced by retailers several directions for future work are suggested including the development of theory and demand estimation using high frequency station level data

imperfect information and dynamic conjectural variations this article analyzes oligopoly interaction in an environment where firms are imperfectly informed about the evolution of the market demand curve the analysis develops a two period cournot framework under the assumptions that demand shifts are positively serially correlated that firms never directly observe the demand curve and that firms never observe the previous quantity decisions of rivals firms do draw inferences about the position of the demand curve from past observations on prices consequently the current output of a firm will influence the current market price which will then influence rivals inferences about future demand the future output decisions of rivals will respond accordingly the theory predicts negative dynamic conjectural variations essentially a firm perceives that an increase in its output will lower the current market clearing price which will cause rival firms to think that the demand curve has shifted down and hence induce them to lower their outputs in the future

alfred chandler and capabilities theories of strategy and management alfred d chandler s scholarship on the large industrial enterprise has deepened understanding of economic development and helped establish the field of strategic management research chandler s monumental work emphasized the importance of organizational innovation managerial acumen and business performance a particular contribution was the support provided for a capabilities theory of the business enterprise this article also looks at recent developments in industrial organization that are less well explained and appreciated in the chandler framework copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

lowering consumer search costs can lead to higher prices we demonstrate that regulations that lower consumer search costs and make them less heterogeneous across consumers can lead to higher prices charged by firms we estimate the distribution of consumer search costs for 366 isolated retail gasoline markets and find that reducing the mean and standard deviation by 20 and 48 respectively leads to price increases in 32 of markets and an average price increase of 5 2 cents per gallon across all markets thus price transparency regulation that results in higher prices may not stem from collusion but from an equilibrium with less consumer search

stationary markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games abstract the existence of stationary markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games is shown under a general condition called decomposable coarser transition kernels this result covers various earlier existence results on correlated equilibria noisy stochastic games stochastic games with finite actions and state independent transitions and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition kernels as special cases a remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of correspondences new applications of stochastic games are presented as illustrative examples including stochastic games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model

intertemporal price discrimination dynamic arrivals and changing values we study the profit maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically the setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon contrary to the case with constant values optimal prices fluctuate with time we argue that consumers randomly changing values offer an explanation for temporary price reductions that are often observed in practice

retail price cycles and response asymmetry weekly retail gasoline prices in windsor ontario from 1989 to 1994 appear to respond faster to wholesale price increases than to decreases but exhibit a cyclic pattern inconsistent with a common explanation of response asymmetry i reconcile these observations through a model of price cycles prices on the downward portion of the cycle appear insensitive to costs compared with price increases supporting the theory that price decreases result from battles over market share this pattern resembles a faster response to cost increases than to decreases and the conclusion that asymmetry indicates a role for competition policy may be inappropriate jel classification l13 l71 cycles des prix de detail et reponse asymetrique les prix de detail hebdomadaires de la gazoline a windsor ont entre 1989 et 1994 semblent reagir plus vite aux accroissements qu aux chutes des prix de gros mais suivent un pattern cyclique qui ne semble pas consistant avec l explication traditionnelle en termes de reponse asymetrique l auteur reconcilie ces observations a l aide d un modele de cycle de prix les prix dans la portion descendante du cycle semblent insensibles aux variations de couts par comparaison avec les accroissements de prix ce qui supporte la theorie que les chutes de prix resultent de luttes pour les parts de marche le pattern ressemble a celui declenche par une reponse plus rapide aux augmentations qu aux chutes de couts et la conclusion qui voudrait qu on puisse attribuer le tout a l asymetrie des reponses et que donc une intervention de la politique de la concurrence s impose peut etre inappropriee

what enables rapid economic progress what are the needed institutions abstract in recent years institutions have again become a central focus of economists and other scholars studying the processes of economic growth and the reasons why nations have differed so greatly in their achievements on this front however with few exceptions the exploration of the role of institutions has not been connected with a coherent analysis of the relationships between institutions and institutional change and technological advance this paper proposes a way of analyzing these relationships the concept of social technologies which support physical technologies plays a key role in the analysis

coordination need not be a problem abstract in a game of common interest there is one action vector that all players prefer to every other yet there may be multiple pareto ranked nash equilibria in the game and the coordination problem refers to the fact that rational equilibrium play cannot rule out pareto dominated equilibria in this paper i prove that two elements asynchronicity and a finite horizon are sufficient to uniquely select the pareto dominant action vector in subgame perfect equilibrium play asynchronicity may be exogenously specified by the rules of the game alternatively in a game where players choose when to move asynchronicity may emerge as an equilibrium move outcome

shell shocked the impact of foreign entry on the gasoline retail market in china abstract since joining the wto in 2001 restrictions on foreign entry into china s energy sector have been steadily reduced we investigate the impact of royal dutch shell s entry on the pricing behavior of three varieties of gasoline in the retail market of china using a difference in difference pairwise estimator we show that a year after entry the average absolute price differential of gasoline between two cities increased by around 1 4 before falling the following year in other words shell s entry caused prices to diverge but only for a short period of time the largest price effect was found for highly refined fuels in western cities similar results are found when we examine the effect of entry of the top four foreign retailers policy implications are discussed

the distribution of price changes in oligopoly econometric analysis of the skew of price change distributions for an eighty industry sample over an eleven year period indicates that the distributions are less skewed in times of rapidly changing prices in concentrated oligopolies and in markets with little product heterogeneity the results provide evidence of less price staggering and greater pricing coordination by firms in times of high inflation and in oligopolistic markets respectively tight oligopolies also appear to have more symmetric distributions when prices are falling than when they are rising suggesting that price decreases are more readily followed than increases copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

determinants of health care expenditure in africa a cross sectional study the paper presents some quantitative evidence on the relationship between certain socioeconomic and demographic factors and per capita health care expenditure in africa first gnp per capita percentage of births attended by health staff and foreign aid received per capita together explained 78 3 of the variance in health care expenditure second per capita gnp is the most significant factor explaining differences in health care expenditure contrary to what has been found in comparisons of health care expenditure in the organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries we found that the income elasticity is close to unity furthermore aid was consistently significant and positive in the three models estimated third variables such as crude birth rate and the population under 15 years of age as percentage of total population were not significant

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

naked exclusion efficient breach and downstream competition previous papers by eric b rasmusen j mark ramseyer and john s wiley jr 1991 and ilya r segal and michael d whinston 2000 argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers we first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages we then show however that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors even in the absence of scale economies and even if breach is possible

dynamic competition and price adjustments the link between price rigidity and market structure has long been a topic of interest to researchers in both macroeconomics and industrial organization research on this subject with its antecedents in the widely debated topic of administered inflation has gone through several stages in recent years the focus of research has been on explaining the speed of price adjustment 8 7 11 4 2 3 a parallel line of research has been on the role of entry in disciplining the price behavior of incumbent firms 15 14 5 the current study extends previous work on price adjustment in several important ways most importantly we introduce dynamic elements of competition as measured by several disaggregated measures of domestic and import entry we are able to evaluate the extent to which price effects of entry into u s manufacturing are due to changes in desired prices or to changes in the speed of adjustment to desired prices we depart from previous studies in that we use pooled data to estimate by nonlinear regression methods both the desired target price change and the speed of adjustment across industries

manufacturing margins differences between small and large firms the influence of labour costs concentration capacity utilization exports and firm size on manufacturing profit margin is studied with a discrimination between small and large firms

a theory of dynamic oligopoly ii price competition kinked demand curves and edgeworth cycles we provide game theoretic foundations for the classic kinked demand curve equilibrium and edgeworth cycle we analyze a model in which firms take turns choosing prices the model is intended to capture the idea of reactions based on short run commitment in a markov perfect equilibrium mpe a firm s move in any period depends only on the other firm s current price there are multiple mpe s consisting of both kinked demand curve equilibria and edgeworth cycles in any mpe profit is bounded away from the bertrand equilibrium level we show that a kinked demand curve at the monopoly price is the unique symmetric renegotiation proof equilibrium when there is little discounting we then endogenize the timing by allowing firms to move at any time subject to short run commitments we find that firms end up alternating thus vindicating the ad hoc timing assumption of our simpler model we also discuss how the model can be enriched to provide explanations for excess capacity and market sharing keiiwords tacit collusion markov perfect equilibrium kinked demand curve edgeworth cycle excess capacity market sharing endogenous timing

dynamic pricing in the spanish gasoline market a tacit collusion equilibrium abstract during the last twenty years the spanish petrol market has undergone an intensive restructuration process it has changed from being a state owned monopoly to total liberalization and privatization this liberalization process was accompanied by measures that facilitated the creation of a national champion the repsol group which is a huge vertically integrated company with a high market share in all the industry s segments using a dynamic model this paper analyses whether the prices established by companies in the spanish gasoline market after the restructuration process fits with a tacit collusion equilibrium the empirical results show that a strategic behaviour of companies occurs and is compatible with a tacit collusion price strategy so the restructuration process does not seem to have introduced effective competition into the spanish gasoline market

persistency in sticky price models abstract nominal rigidities imply that nominal shocks have an impact effect which may be propagated by standard mechanisms however the nominal adjustment process may in itself be a propagation mechanism causing persistent effects of nominal shocks this may be caused by inertia in nominal wage and price adjustment arising due to input output networks or multiperiod nominal contracting as captured in models with staggered price wage decisions it has recently been contested whether staggering can account for persistency of any quantitative importance this paper reviews the theory and empirical evidence on this issue and it is concluded that staggering may be a quantitative important propagation mechanism

alfred chandler and knowledge management within the firm this essay examines the role of knowledge management defined as the management of processes affecting the creation communication distribution and exploitation of knowledge concerning corporate strategy markets product and process technologies and management practices within the corporation in alfred d chandler s work on the modern corporation along with efforts to avoid transaction cost problems the management of firm specific information and knowledge was central to the 19th century transformation of us corporate structure that chandler examined in the visible hand knowledge management also played a key role in the creation of intrafirm organizations for managing the creation of knowledge management of innovation and acquisition of technologies from external sources industrial r d and the product diversification that emerged from the in house r d facilities of many of these firms contributed to the development of the so called m form corporation examined by chandler in strategy and structure in which corporate management and strategy formulation were organizationally differentiated and separated from functional management finally chandler s last work on the success and failure of united states japanese and western european firms in the modern electronics pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries emphasized the role of the integrated learning base within these firms and the varying degrees of success with which established firms were able to sustain these learning bases and or apply them to new markets and technologies copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

gasoline price dispersion and consumer search evidence from a natural experiment the vast majority of empirical studies examining the link between consumer search and price dispersion focus on how changes in consumer search impact price dispersion this article does the reverse it examines how a shock to price dispersion impacts consumer search a direct measure of search is used and an exogenous shock to price dispersion is found in a refinery fire that caused decades old retail gasoline price cycles and the nonlinear high frequency price dispersion pattern generated by them to stop identifying effects from this shock the results show a substantial response of consumer search to changes in price dispersion

a dynamic analysis of the market for wide bodied commercial aircraft this paper uses an empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial aircraft industry to analyse industry pricing industry performance and optimal industry policy a novel feature of the model with respect to the previous literature is that entry exit prices and quantities are endogenously determined in markov perfect equilibrium mpe we find that many unusual aspects of the aircraft data such as high concentration and persistent pricing below static marginal cost are explained by this model we also find that the unconstrained mpe is quite efficient from a social perspective providing only 10 less welfare on average than a social planner would obtain finally we provide simulation evidence that an anti trust policy in the form of a concentration restriction would be welfare reducing

consumer and competitor reactions evidence from a field experiment abstract in response to a price change by a single seller it is common for the density of sellers in the market to influence both the quantity response of consumers and the price response of other sellers using field experiment data collected around a series of exogenously imposed price changes we find that an individual retailer with a larger number of competitors faces a more responsive demand this finding is fundamental to a predicted inverse relationship between market prices and the number of competitors we also examine the reaction of rival stations to exogenous price changes and find that the magnitude of a competitor s response is inversely related to the density of stations in the market

markov puppy dogs and related animals abstract it is shown that steady state markov perfect equilibria of discrete time infinite horizon quadratic adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state in contrast to continuous time games the limit of these equilibria as adjustment costs approach zero is the same as the equilibria of their static counterpart games a classification scheme is presented and it is shown that the taxonomy is identical to that of analogous two stage games such as those analyzed by fudenberg and tirole american economic review papers and proceedings 1984 74 361 366 this classification is useful in that it implies that steady state equilibria need not be explicitly calculated to analyze qualitatively the effects of adjustment costs in strategic environments it is also argued that estimated conjectural variations parameters may capture a well defined property of strategic interaction in a dynamic game

firm market share price flexibility and imperfect information this paper argues that firms with larger market shares will be relatively better informed about demand conditions the main implications are 1 more rapid price adjustments in concentrated industries 2 price leadership in industries with dominant firms and 3 price setting behavior by the concentrated side of the market

transaction cost influences on the adjustment of industries prices and outputs short run adjustments of prices and outputs in producer goods industries should reflect suppliers continuing quasi contractual relationships with their industrial customers the authors test hypotheses about these relationships by analyzing cross section determinants of time series coefficients showing the rates of adjustment of industries prices and outputs to movements of demand inferred from customers outputs they confirm that price adjustments decrease with the bases for sticky relations with customers the sensitivity of quantity adjustments increases with those bases and decreases with suppliers own adjustment costs they also confirm the standard hypothesis that price flexibility decreases with producer concentration copyright 1987 by mit press

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules i a game theoretic analysis of staggered versus synchronised wage setting this paper studies the benefits of staggered wage setting in reducing strategic conflicts it is shown that when wage setters interact strategically and dynamically they prefer moving alternatingly because by doing so they are able to commit temporarily not to offset the effects of each other s action it is also shown that synchronization represents a better arrangement when agents are able to coordinate these results are consistent with the presence of nonsynchronous and decentralized wage decisions in the united states and the united kingdom and the presence of synchronous bargaining in shunto and coordination in wage determination in japan copyright 1996 by royal economic society

aggregate pattern of time dependent adjustment rules ii strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization abstract this paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models it identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game theoretic framework the paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions by pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric stackelberg leadership it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization the results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization two important macroeconomic features journal of economic literature classification numbers e30 l16

bargaining with durable offers and endogenous timing abstract the timing structure of a bargaining game is crucial in the static bargaining model of j nash 1953 econometrica 21 128 140 any division of the surplus is a possible equilibrium in the alternating offer model of a rubinstein 1982 econometrica 50 97 109 there is a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne this paper takes a step toward endogenizing the timing of offers by expanding the strategy space to include the duration of the offer and permitting but not imposing simultaneous moves we find that virtually any division is a possible spne whenever simultaneous accept reject decisions are permitted

increasing returns and the genesis of american resource abundance the usa became the world s leading mineral producing nation between 1870 and 1910 a development paralleled by the rising resource intensity of american manufacturing this paper challenges the premise that resource abundance simply reflected the country s geological endowment of mineral deposits instead in the century following 1850 the usa exploited its natural resource potentials to a far greater extent than other countries and did so across virtually the entire range of industrial minerals the paper argues that natural resource abundance was an endogenous socially constructed condition that was not geologically preordained it examines the complex legal institutional technological and organizational adaptations that shaped the us supply responses to the expanding domestic and international industrial demands for minerals and mineral products it suggests that strong positive feedbacks even in the exploitation of depletable resources were responsible for the explosive growth of the american minerals economy

judo economics reconsidered capacity limitation entry and collusion abstract the capacity investment by a new firm into an established market is explored in a repeated price game if the entrant expects collusion to prevail upon entry it may not practice judo economics but instead choose to install enough capacity to serve the entire market this occurs when collusion involves optimal punishment paths if instead collusion is based upon the static nash equilibrium punishment and the incumbent has excess capacity and the entrant is at a cost disadvantage the entrant will strategically limit its capacity so as to restrain the incumbent s price response to entry

do edgeworth price cycles lead to higher or lower prices abstract a recent literature seeks to understand the causes of the high frequency asymmetric retail price cycles observed in many retail gasoline markets however much less attention has been given to the effects of the cycles in particular whether the cycles lead to higher or lower prices and margins the leading theory for the underlying cause of the price cycles edgeworth price cycles is silent on the issue the challenge in addressing this most important question has been the difficulty in isolating cycle effects from other confounding factors especially market structure in this article i exploit a unique natural experiment to isolate the effect of cycles a refinery fire that in a matter of days halted cycles that had previously persisted for decades i find that edgeworth price cycles lead to lower prices and lower margins i conclude with implications for competition policy

staggered vs synchronised wage setting in oligopoly abstract this paper analyses the dynamic equilibrium which emerges when wages are bargained upon at different times in the various firms operating in an oligopolistic industry unions set wages the management of the firms the output level and the outcome of this interaction is captured by the game theoretic concept of markov perfect equilibrium the steady state equilibrium is compared with that which would emerge if all wage negotiations occurred simultaneously it is shown that staggered wage setting leads to higher steady state levels of wage and unemployment than synchronised wage setting it is also shown that a longer duration for wage contracts leads other things equal to lower wages and higher employment the final part of the paper shows that allowing for nash bargaining between union and management and for risk averse unions does not alter the conclusions of the paper

collusion with intertemporal price dispersion we develop a theory of optimal collusive intertemporal price dispersion dispersion clouds consumer price awareness encouraging firms to coordinate on dispersed prices our theory generates a collusive rationale for price cycles and sales patient firms can support optimal collusion at the monopoly price for less patient firms monopoly prices must be punctuated with fleeting sales the most robust structure involves price cycles that resemble edgeworth cycles low consumer attentiveness enhances the effectiveness of price dispersion by reducing the payoff to deviations involving price reductions however for sufficiently low attentiveness price rises are also a concern

determinants of price adjustment this paper reports results of an empirical study investigating the adjustment speed of prices to change in costs and demand particular emphasis is laid on the impact of concentration on the adjustment speed in addition the effects of the business cycle and capital intensity are considered it shows that concentrated industries tend to adjust prices faster while capital intensity has a negative impact prices are more flexible during an upswing than in times of a recession

time to build and fluctuations in bulk shipping abstract this paper explores the nature of fluctuations in world bulk shipping by quantifying the impact of time to build and demand uncertainty on investment and prices we examine the impact of both construction lags and their lengthening in periods of high investment activity by constructing a dynamic model of ship entry and exit a rich dataset of secondhand ship sales allows for a new estimation strategy resale prices provide direct information on value functions and allow their nonparametric estimation we find that moving from time varying to constant to no time to build reduces prices while significantly increasing both the level and volatility of investment jel g31 l11 l62 l92

kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation this paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand we show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games

convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of r d the undiscounted case abstract will r d increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time we examine this issue in the context of a dynamic alternate move duopoly model of non cooperative r d the asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market utilizing a value loss process constructed from the optimality equation of dynamic programming we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time we obtain this convergence to symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to r d through the notion that r d investment cannot be changed instantaneously by allowing research externalities complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated r d and either increasing decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival r d

instability of endogenous price dispersion equilibria a simulation models of price posting by firms and search by consumers such as burdett and judd 1983 often feature equilibria with endogenous price dispersion however such equilibria are strategically fragile in order to investigate how robust they are in the absence of an external coordination mechanism i simulate various protocols firms may use to update their prices despite firms being myopic some protocols yield results close to the benchmark model if firms rush to update before observing competitors actions profits are higher on average but volatile and cyclical with cost dispersion prices become more stable as they are more closely tied to costs all results are robust to moderate menu costs

asynchronized multiperiod commitments and cycles abstract we consider a game where agents can synchronize or stagger their decisions we compare the outcomes of both timing patterns and show that spillovers and strategic interactions are crucial for such a comparison a typology used in industrial organization distinguishing four cases fat cat top dog lean and hungry puppy dog allows us to compare the actions taken in the staggered variant and in the synchronized one the staggered variant exhibits cycles and players are both better off when there are strategic complementarities between them a timing game is then set up so as to endogenize the choice between the two variants we study two examples are developed i bertrand competition and ii a wage setting game when there are two monopoly unions in two interrelated firms we show that the staggering of price decisions generates counter cyclical mark ups in the first example and the staggering of wage decisions generates cycling output in the industry in the second example

retail gasoline price cycles across spatially dispersed gasoline stations abstract studies of volatility in retail gasoline prices have used either weekly averages of the prices at a small subset of stations in a city or daily observations on prices at a small number of stations this paper uses daily observations on station specific prices within a large canadian metropolitan area to address whether weekly average prices or prices for a small number of stations provide an accurate description of pricing in a market with volatility this paper considers whether researchers using restricted data can draw meaningful conclusions about the appropriate theoretical model and the policy response to allegations of anticompetitive behavior

conjectural variations strategies in accelerated cournot games abstract a family of constant conjectural variations strategies is defined and examined in the natural context of infinitely repeated cournot duopoly games with discounting it is shown that any pair of linear reaction functions in the family gives rise to a unique pair of quantities in stationary equilibrium as the conjectures and discount parameter vary the sum of the stationary quantities will vary anywhere between the competitive and the monopoly outcomes equilibrium is strongly stable and credible in the sense of exhibiting a variation of selten s subgame perfection provided that firms can react quickly enough to one another s actions

capitalism as an engine of progress economists from marx to schumpeter have touted capitalism as an engine of technical progress but what kind of an engine is it what are its key components how does it work

the cyclical behaviour of manufacturing prices in a small open economy this paper presents a disaggregated regression study of the cyclicality of the mark up over costs in belgian manufacturing industry this is found to be low reflecting a great reluctance on the part of price setters to adjust prices to uncertain market signals this appears to be especially the case for exporters when compared with firms active on the domestic market exporters face greater uncertainty because their competitors are less well known and their market shares tend to be smaller implying a higher variance of industry sales estimates

does the european natural gas market pass the competitive benchmark of the theory of storage indirect tests for three major trading points this paper presents the first comparative analysis of the relationship between natural gas storage utilization and price patterns at three major european trading points using two indirect tests developed by fama and french 1987 1988 that are applied in other commodity markets we impose the no arbitrage condition to model the efficiency of the natural gas market the results reveal that while operators of european storage facilities realize seasonal arbitrage profits substantial arbitrage potentials remain we suggest that the indirect approach is well suited to provide market insights for periods with limited data we find that overall market performance differs substantially from the competitive benchmark of the theory of storage

natural resources national accounting and economic depreciation abstract the current value hamiltonian in an aggregate optimal growth problem with heterogeneous capital stocks including exhaustible renewable and environmental stocks is the nnp function routine substitutions reveal that the using up of natural resource stocks is representable as easy to interpret economic depreciation magnitudes we obtain true nnp inclusive of natural resource stock diminution implications for actual national accounting practices are also discussed

defending against rival innovation we analyze how an incumbent defends its competitive advantage with a focus on the under examined methods of actively defending against the threats posed by rival innovation we describe delineate and analyze the set of such defenses and their likely effects the set of such defenses differs substantially from many standard defenses such as those aimed at defeating the threat of imitation the further study of these pre emptive innovation defenses is important because these defenses are different and because they can substantially affect the sustainability of firm profits and the pace of different of types of innovation

alternative time patterns of decisions and dynamic strategic interactions this paper offers a simple approach to study steady state markov perfect equilibria arising in dynamic games when players are obliged to commit their actions for several periods it highlights the importance of spillovers and dynamic strategic interactions when assessing the various time patterns conceivable in such games the obtained results are then applied to various either micro or macroeconomic issues where time patterns of decisions matter

cournot and the oligopoly problem cournot s recherches sw les principes mathpmatiques de la thiorie des richesses 1838 contribution to economic theory ranges from the formulation of the concept of demand function to the analysis of price determination in different market structures from monopoly to perfect competition he is credited for being the pioneer in the use of mathematics in economic analysis nevertheless cournot is most known for his theory of oligopoly cournot claimed that prices would also be determined under oligopolistic rivalry he envisioned firms the celebrated mineral water producers competing independently deciding about their production levels and bringing to the market the output where a price emerges from the interaction of supply and demand an equilibrium is reached when the output of any firm is a best response to the other firms outputs that is when each firm chooses an output level that maximizes profits given the outputs chosen by the rivals the equilibrium involves a price above the marginal cost of production cournot thought furthermore that this equilibrium would be stable in the sense that a departure from it would be self correcting through a series of reactions of the firms the disequilibrium dynamics would be governed by the best response functions of the firms that is by the functions that give the optimal output of a firm in terms of the outputs of the rivals cournot also evoked the question of why is it that firms do not come to an understanding and agree on sharing the market at the monopoly price the answer is that from the point of view of a firm if the rivals follow the agreement it is in the interest of the firm to depart from it since this way it can increase its profits in other words there is an incentive to cheat cournot thought that monopoly or cartel type agreements could only be maintained by means of a formal engagement p 83 our author also considered competition of

market structure and endogenous productivity growth how do r d subsidies affect market structure abstract conclusions about optimal rd 2 distribution of firm sizes and 3 more complex market structures that vary across industries and over time this paper presents the partial equilibrium for a single industry demonstrating how growth promoting r d subsidies alter the endogenously determined market structure subsidies to r d stretch the distribution of market shares with an increased number of firms in the market but a higher variance in the market shares across firms

collusive price rigidity under price matching punishments by analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price matching punishment strategy we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close this provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve in contrast to the kinked demand curve it also generates predictions regarding the level and the determinants of the best collusive price which in turn has implications for the corresponding collusive profits the relationships between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a high cost phase the degree of product differentiation and the number of firms in the market are also investigated

managing beliefs about monetary policy under discretion in models of monetary policy discretionary policymaking is typically constrained in its ability to manage public beliefs however when a policymaker possesses private information policy actions serve as signals to the public about unobserved economic conditions and belief management becomes an integral part of optimal discretion policies this article derives the optimal time consistent policy for a general linear quadratic setting the optimal policy is illustrated in a simple new keynesian model where analytical solutions can be derived as well in this model imperfect information about the policymaker s output target leads to lower policy losses

endogenous price commitment sticky and leadership pricing evidence from the italian petrol market this article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky pricing policy using daily italian firm level prices and weekly average eu prices we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold first it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes after the policy change the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost based to sticky leadership pricing second using a dif in dif estimation and a synthetic control group we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky leadership pricing our paper highlights the importance of price commitment by a large firm in order to sustain tacit collusion

markov perfect equilibrium in multi period games between sponsor and bureau we formulate a simple model of the interaction between a sponsor and a bureau the sponsor sets the bureau s budget while the bureau decides on how much to spend on slack we compute numerically markov perfect equilibria of multi period games where the agents move alternately and apply markov strategies both agents are worse off compared to the one period game with simultaneous moves as the discount factors increase the equilibrium outcome becomes less cooperative in nature

bertrand edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms abstract we examine a model of price competition with strictly convex costs where the firms simultaneously decide on both price and quantity are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and there is discrete pricing if firms are symmetric then for a large class of residual demand functions there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies whenever for a fixed grid size the number of firms is sufficiently large moreover this equilibrium price is within a grid unit of the competitive price the results go through to a large extent when the firms are asymmetric or they are symmetric but play a two stage game and the tie breaking rule is weakly manipulable

the vanishing hand the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism alfred chandler s portrayal of the managerial revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries does not extend well into the late twentieth century when widespread vertical disintegration began replacing the classical multi unit managerial enterprise this paper attempts to explain the new economy in a manner consistent with chandler by providing an enlarged theoretical account of industrial evolution in this account clusters of chandlerian firms appeared as a temporary episode within a larger smithian process of the division of labor

a dynamic model of entry and exit in a growing industry the potential demand in a new industry evolves over time demand is initially low but advertising by the industry s early entrants can speed up demand growth however there is intrinsic uncertainty of the demand level in each period and uncertainty of the demand evolution path which can be affected by the underlying economic environment we construct a dynamic model that features the stochastically and endogenously expanding demand of a new industry and we investigate the optimal entry and exit behavior of firms as the industry evolves we find that firms incentive to enter early depends critically on the cost that early entrants have to pay in developing the market when the cost is high and the benefit spills over to potential entrants firms have an incentive to wait and the probability of entry can increase with the number of incumbents under certain circumstances firms entry strategy is also influenced by the transition of economic states firms are more likely to enter under a state that shows the prospect of demand taking off soon we also find that in the early stage of an industry higher demand uncertainty can induce faster entry

sequential moves and tacit collusion reaction function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly abstract this paper analyzes a finite horizon sequential move pricing duopoly restricting attention to markov strategies the solution yields stationary patterns independent of initial conditions where the reaction functions follow cycles of three periods the market price never settles down and is at all times strictly above marginal cost long run average industry profits are approximately 5 6 of the monopoly level these results demonstrate that neither a long horizon nor non markovian strategies are required for persistent profits in dynamic price competition games journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d43 l13

behavioral heuristics and market patterns in a bertrand edgeworth game abstract this paper studies bertrand price setting behavior when firms face capacity constraints bertrand edgeworth game this game is known to lack equilibria in pure strategies while the mixed strategy equilibria are hard to characterize we explore families of heuristic rules for individual price setting behavior and the resulting market patterns through simulations of agent based models and laboratory experiments overall the individual pricing strategies observed experimentally can be represented approximately by a sales based simple rule in the experiments average market prices tend to converge from above and approach a state resembling a steady state with slow aggregate price variations and low price dispersion around an average near the competitive level however that configuration can be disturbed occasionally by excursions triggered by discrete price raises of some agents salient features of experimental results can be described by simulations where agents use sales based heuristics with parameters calibrated from the experiments the results obtained here suggest the existence of useful complementarities between analytical experimental and agent based simulation approaches