on the fixed nature of sharecropping contracts newbery and stiglitz i979 suggest four stylised facts of sharecropping which theories should attempt to explain the first is the persistence of sharecropping and its coexistence with fixed rental and wage markets under a variety of conditions over centuries of time the second is that in modern developed economies there appears to be a decline in share tenancy thirdly share tenancy is often but not alwavs associated with lower productivity than fixed rental land finally in many economies contracts involve shares of around one half for landlord and tenant this does not vary from contract to contract and does not seem to be the object of negotiation smith i776 and many subsequent authors have likened sharecropping to a tax they argue that under this type of contract tenants choose their labour supply to equate their marginal disutility of labour with their proportionate share of the marginal product instead of the full marginal product they therefore regard sharecropping as an inefficient form of land tenure however this view is difficult to reconcile with the first observation given the coexistence of fixed rent and share contracts it is reasonable to expect that if share contracts were relatively inefficient they would quickly die out this does not appear to have happened more recently it has been argued most notably by cheung i969 that if there is certainty and transactions costs are the same for all contracts then provided a share contract specifies the labour supply of the tenant it leads to the same efficient allocation of resources as a fixed rent or wage contract cheung has used this result as the basis of an explanation for coexistence he suggests that the transaction costs for share contracts are higher than for wage and fixed rent contracts however share contracts have the advantage that they allow the risk to be shared between the landlord and tenant whereas with fixed rent contracts the tenant bears all the risk and with wage contracts the landlord does given varying degrees of risk aversion among landlords and tenants it is possible that for some parties the risk sharing advantages outweigh the transaction cost disadvantages so that they will prefer share contracts whereas with others the reverse is true one problem with this argument raised by stiglitz i974 and newbery i977 is that given constant returns to scale the risk sharing properties of share contracts can be attained with mixtures of fixed rent and wage contracts if these do indeed have lower transaction costs share contracts would not then be observed

landlords tenants and technological innovations abstract there is a long standing belief that landlords and capitalists have used their control over the means of production to direct the development and adoption of technologies which have increased their welfare at the expense of workers there is also a wide spread belief that the interlinkage between credit and tenancy markets which seems so prevalent in ldcs provides further impetus to the resistance of innovations innovations which make tenants better off reduce their demand for loans and thus make landlords qua creditors worse off these contentions have typically been dismissed out of hand by standard welfare economics arguments the rural environment of most ldcs may not however be adequately described by the standard economic model on which this welfare analysis is based in particular in many ldcs sharecropping contracts are widely employed there is evidence of widespread unemployment and there is not the full set of risk and capital markets required by the competitive paradigm the objective of this paper is to show under quite general conditions that the institutional structure of the economy may indeed be an important determinant of whether a particular innovation will or will not be adopted we show that 1 i landlords may wish to and can resist innovations which unambiguously increase production whenever sharecropping contracts are employed 2 ii conversely landlords may adopt innovations which not only lower the welfare of workers but even lower net national product 3 iii the presence of interlinkage may indeed affect the adoption of a new technology however the reason for this is only partly related to the effect of innovations on tenants borrowing indeed we show that innovations may increase as well as decrease the tenants demand for borrowing

chaos in oil prices evidence from futures markets abstract we test for the presence of low dimensional chaotic structure in crude oil heating oil and unleaded gasoline futures prices from the early 1980s evidence on chaos will have important implications for regulators and short term trading strategies while we find strong evidence of non linear dependencies the evidence is not consistent with chaos our test results indicate that arch type processes with controls for seasonal variation in prices generally explain the non linearities in the data we also demonstrate that employing seasonally adjusted price series contributes to obtaining robust results via the existing tests for chaotic structure maximum likelihood methodologies that are robust to the non linear dynamics lend support for samuelson s hypothesis on contract maturity effects in futures price changes however the tests for chaos are not found to be sensitive to the maturity effects in the futures contracts the results are robust to controls for the oil shocks of 1986 and 1991

a characterization of erratic dynamics in the overlapping generations model abstract in this paper we characterize and give examples o wide classes of utility functions which generate erratic dynamics in the standard deterministic overlapping generations model erratic dynamics refers to feasible trajectories which are bounded but which do not converge to stationary points or periodic orbits we show that such trajectories are pareto efficient we introduce credit into the model and show how a constant credit expansion rate can result in erratic trajectories in prices and the real value of credit finally we briefly discuss certain technical aspects of the mathematics used and the statistical nature of the dynamics that can arise from deterministic dynamical systems

complex dynamics in a cobweb model with adaptive production adjustment abstract chaos occurs in a nonlinear cobweb model with normal demand and supply naive expectations and adaptive production adjustment the model differs from existing ones in that it includes adaptive production adjustment instead of adaptive expectations the model exhibits observable chaos strange attractors as well as topological chaos horseshoes associated with homoclinic points as numerical simulations show the faster suppliers adjust their production and the more inelastic demand is the more likely the market behaves chaotically

cost sharing arrangements under sharecropping moral hazard incentive flexibility and risk this paper explains the rationale and describes the characteristics of cost sharing arrangements in rural developing economies focusing on the risk and incentive properties of alternative cost contracts and on their flexibility their ability to adapt to environmental changes it is shown that where labor inputs are difficult to monitor the rule that cost shares and output shares be equalized will not hold and is not constrained pareto efficient and that cost sharing contracts have a decided advantage over contracts which specify the level of inputs whenever there are asymmetries of information regarding production technology between the landlord and the tenant

dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations and nonlinear supply and demand the price quantity dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations and nonlinear supply and demand curves is analysed we prove that chaotic dynamical behaviour can occur even if both the supply and demand curves are monotonic the introduction of adaptive expectations into the cobweb model leads to price quantity fluctuations with a smaller amplitude however at the same time the price quantity cycles may become unstable and chaotic oscillations may arise we present a geometric explanation why chaos can occur for a large class of nonlinear monotonic supply and demand curves

application of nonlinear mapping theory to commodity price fluctuatuions abstract the cobweb model of price stability with lagged price elasticities is extended to include nonlinear terms the result falls within nonlinear mapping models such as the logistics map nonlinearities prevent the unbounded oscillation predicted from the unstable linear cobweb but the price time series may exhibit chaotic unpredictable endogenous fluctuations the theory is applied to the u s crude oil market regressing consumption against price gives lagged elasticities greater than current elasticities indicating linear instability this instability is seen in a mapping model of the price time series predictions of the model are given both with and without nonlinear terms indicating large continuing endogenous price fluctuations

a theory of interlinked rural transactions this paper argues that the interlinking of labor output and credit contracts often observed in rural economies can be regarded as an attempt to improve allocative efficiency in the face of moral hazard it advances an economic explanation of the phenomenon which is rooted in the view that prevalent modes of transaction of which interlinked contracts are an example are shaped by technological considerations interlinking is shown to be an efficient economic response to unequally distributed information arising from the uncertainty which characterizes subsistence agriculture all pareto efficient allocations require a combination of wage cum output sharing with consumption credit contracts the analytical framework set up to demonstrate the results is used to examine the response of the contractual parameters to changes in i the returns to alternative occupations available to tenant laborers ii the cost of credit to the village economy and iii the riskiness of cultivation the analysis concludes that public policy to alleviate rural poverty must recognize the relationships between technological considerations and modes of transaction in the absence of a complete set of markets

theories of share tenancy a critical survey for the past 2 decades the problems of agricultural tenancy have attracted a great deal of attention not only from agricultural economists but also from economists in general as a typical example of agencyprincipal contract relations despite the prolific growth of literature both theoretical and empirical there has been little convergence in opinions on tenancy contracts the divergence has been especially great on the understanding of the causes and the effects of sharecropping tenancy much confusion underlying the widely divergent perspectives has stemmed from partial treatments of contractual choice which unduly limit the optimizing behavior of contracting parties and the options of contract forms this essay aims at clarifying the sources of the confusion by reviewing the past literature in light of the more general theory of agency principal relations the agency theory in order to examine the problems of various theoretical models in a unified framework in section ii we first develop the basic framework of a general model of tenancy contract in section iii we clarify in terms of the general model contradictions latent in the traditional marshallian theory which asserts that share tenancy is inefficient because of the disincentive effect of cropsharing on the tenant s work effort in section iv we attempt to show that recent efforts to reconstruct the theory based on the traditional assumption have not yet been quite successful section v draws implications and testable hypotheses from more general theories incorporating the aspects of risk and uncertainty section vi tests allocational and distributional implications of those alternative hypotheses based on the summary of evidence col

variable elasticity models for electricity demand abstract it is demonstrated analytically that the demand models as specified by betancourt do not yield unitless measures of elasticity a simple transformation is suggested and the results are compared with other variable price elasticity demand models

pareto efficient taxation and expenditures pre and re distribution abstract this paper shows that there is a presumption that pareto efficient taxation entails a positive tax on capital when tax and expenditure policies can affect the market distribution of income in ways that cannot be directly offset those effects need to be taken into account reducing the burden imposed on distortionary redistribution the paper extends the 1976 atkinson stiglitz results to a dynamic overlapping generations model correcting a misreading of the result on the desirability of a zero capital tax that result required separability of consumption from labor and that the only unobservable differences among individuals were in fixed labor productivities in a general equilibrium model one needs to take into account the effects of policy changes on binding self selection constraints in a simple model with time separability but with non separability between consumption and leisure capital taxation depends on the complementarity substitutability of leisure during work with retirement consumption the final section constructs a simple two class model capitalists who maximize dynastic welfare and workers who save for retirement whose productivity can be enhanced by publicly provided education it derives a simple expression for the optimal capital tax which is positive so long as the social welfare function is sufficiently equalitarian and the productivity of educational expenditures is sufficiently high

adaptive signal processing hierarchy and budgetary control in federal regulation control over agency budgets is a critical tool of political influence in regulatory decision making yet the causal mechanism of budgetary control is unclear do budgetary manipulations influence agencies by imposing resource constraints or by transmitting powerful signals to the agency i advance and test a stochastic process model of adaptive signal processing by a hierarchical agency to address this question the principal findings of the paper are two first presidents and congressional committees achieve budgetary control over agencies not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts second bureaucratic hierarchy increases the agency s response time in processing budgetary signals limiting the efficacy of the budget as a device of political control i also show that the magnitude of agency response to budgetary signals increased for executive branch agencies after 1970 due to executive oversight reforms i conclude by discussing the limits of budgetary manipulations as a device of political control and the response of elected authorities to adaptive signal processing by agencies

capital requirements screening and interlinked sharecropping and credit contracts this paper provides one more rationale for interlinking credit and tenancy contracts in the context of production loans in an environment characterized by a heterogeneous labor pool and imperfect information landlords will have an incentive to avail themselves of screening devices by linking tenancy and credit contracts a screening device can be implemented the equilibrium set of contracts is characterized by a variety of interest rates some of which might be below the market interest rate the interest rate principal schedule is downward sloping with higher ability tenants choosing larger principals at lower interest rates

rational expectations may lead to complex dynamics in a muthian cobweb model with heterogeneous agents abstract starting from a muthian cobweb model we extend the profit based evolutionary setting in hommes and wagener 2010 by assuming that in addition to pessimistic optimistic and unbiased fundamentalists the market is populated by rational producers which correctly anticipate the next period price thanks to their introduction we find that differently from the framework in hommes and wagener 2010 the map governing the dynamics is no more monotonically decreasing hence if on the one hand adding rational agents enlarges the local stability region of the steady state on the other hand their consideration opens the door to complex dynamic outcomes characterized by chaotic attractors and rich multistability phenomena that we investigate along the paper

price stabilization using buffer stocks abstract the price stabilization problem is stated and solved for a nonlinear cobweb model with government stocks it is shown that if the storage capacity for the commodity is sufficiently large then there exists a simple stabilization policy called the keep supply at equilibrium kse policy such that the equilibrium price is a global attractor for the corresponding closed loop system in addition it is shown that if the government approximates the equilibrium supply with the average supply stabilization is guaranteed we refer to this policy as keep supply at average ksa

agency costs and the agricultural firm in the last decade there has been a major rekindling of interest among economists in the form of institutions used to organize resources for production and distribution jensen 1983 distinguishes two agency literatures that share the comparative institutions perspective introduced by coase 1937 1960 principal agency theory e g stiglitz 1975 harris and raviv 1978 shavell 1979 h61mstrom 1979 lewis 1980 provides a mathematical formulation of contractual choice and has been primarily directed to the trade off between risksharing and incentives against labor shirking positive agency theory pioneered by coase 1937 resurrected by alchian and demsetz 1972 and currently represented for example by fama and jensen 1983a is nonmathematical and places relatively more emphasis on explaining actual patterns that characterize industrial organization in agriculture the theory of organizational form has centered largely around tenure choice the theory of tenure choice has an illustrious history in the economics literature e g smith 1922 marshall 1920 heady 1955 day 1967 cheung 1969 rao 1971 stiglitz 1974 reid 1976 newbery and stiglitz 1979 binswanger and rosenzweig 1984 in recent years alternative tenancy arrangements are commonly viewed as types of employment contracts e g newbery and stiglitz 1979 braverman and stiglitz 1975 harris and raviv 1978 shavell 1979 hw1mstrom 1979 lewis 1980 in an innovative departure from the view of tenancy as an employment contract eswaran and kotwal 1985 have modelled share tenancy as a partnership between a landowner who specializes in decision making and a tenant who specializes in labor supervision more generally questions of tenure choice employment contracts manag ment systems and farm size can all be usefully viewed as aspects of agricultural organization the purpose of the present paper i to elucidate this view and to investigate tenure choice as a part of the general study of the nature and causes of the agricultural firm the paper is organized to highlight the inductive approach employed section 2 classiies agricultural firms according to the degree of specialization and who gets the residual payment the classification is combined with previously documented patterns of tenure choice in order to posit a preliminary hypothesi about the relationship between the econo ic environment and the nature of the agricultural firm section 3 uses a principalagency framework to construct a theory of the hypothesized relationship between the degree of separation between labor and management nd l nd quality section 4 provides an illustrative statistical verification of the hypothesis based on a sample of philippine sugarcane f rms section 5 summarizes the paper and discusses two implications of the transaction cost approach for institutional design

fiscal policy and class income inequality the distributional consequences of governmental revenues and expenditures in the united states 1949 1976 despite the vast expansion in governmental spending during the post second world war era few researchers have sought to analyze the income distributional consequences of state fiscal policies the present research initially elaborates three abstract perspectives on the state and on united states budgetary practices then using factor share income as a proxy for broad class groupings this research provides a time series regression analysis of the impact of state expenditures and revenue extraction on the distribution of income in the united states for the years 1949 1976 results suggest that governmental revenue policies have had a procapital bias while state expenditures have tended to favor labor relative to capital the net impact of these contradictory tendencies has left the market based income distribution relatively unchanged despite the sizeable growth of the public sector during the period under study

hierarchy and ecological control in federal budgetary decision making a central issue for fiscal sociology is the articulation between state and society operationally what is required is the embedding of bureaucratic decision making in history this article proposes the concepts of hierarcy and ecological control as one possible bridge between organization theorists and macro sociologists a stochastic process model of federal budgetary decision making within the executive branch is developed and tested using hud program allocation data from the johnson administration the model emphasizes that budgets emerge from the interaction of three levels of organizational decision making each of which is embedded in a distinct cultural context historical application focuses on the impact of the vietnam war on domestic antipoverty and housing programs

influences on executive and congressional budgetary priorities 1955 1981 a reduced form equation system is used to analyze the influence of economic political and institutional influences on the budgetary priorities of the executive branch and congress during fiscal 1955 81 three related issues are considered the extent to which political and macroeconomic factors affect priorities the degree of interdependence among the components of the federal budget and between spending and revenues and differences between the executive branch and congress with respect to these issues both types of interdependence are present within both executive branch and congressional budgeting although this interdependence is stronger within the executive branch the influence of economic conditions on budgetary outcomes is strong but varies considerably across spending categories there is no evidence of apolitical business cycle political variables exert a modest influence on the budgetary outcomes examined differences between democratic and republican budgetary policies as well as differences in the budgetary priorities of different presidential administrations are small by comparison with the differences between executive and congressional policies

transaction costs and the design of cropshare contracts modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth it is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output the incentives of altering the cropshare percentage are examined and are used to derive implications about the portion of the crop that will be owned by the farmer the model is tested and supported using data from a 1986 survey offarmers and landowners in nebraska and south dakota

the nature of the agricultural firm abstract models explaining the choice between rent wage and share contracts in agriculture abstract from the large variations within the classes of rent share and owner managed forms of organization regarding the extent to which a specific form accommodates specialization between labor and management as a result modern explanations of agricultural organizations are misleadingly dependent on risk aversion or the assumption that landowners have an absolute advantage in production decisions viewing the agricultural firm as a constitution instead of as a nexus of contracts facilitates an agency explanation of alternative organizational forms and their amenability to specialization

the institutional dynamics of policy administration bureaucratic influence over securities regulation theory a dynamic systems model of administrative politics that 1 relaxes restrictive causal assumptions among the president congress and an administrative agency 2 emphasizes aggregate institutional behavior and 3 analyzes both anticipated and unanticipated policy behavior is set forth as a more general means to investigate agency political relationships hypotheses the main set of hypotheses focus on the aggregate institutional relationships among the president congress and administrative agency these four possible hypotheses include bureaucratic influence bureaucratic autonomy mutual influence and political influence the purpose here is to assess the relative merits of competing explanations for bureaucratic behavior securities regulation is a perfect area of inquiry to investigate these competing perspectives since the findings of existing research on this topic are disparate methods vector autoregressive time series statistical methods are used to empirically test the dynamic systems model of administrative politics by examining three empirical models of sec enforcement behavior in relation to presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals for the 1949 92 annual period results the sec sends potent signals of their own via their changes in regulatory outputs that will affect the budgetary preferences of its political principles however the sec s administrative outputs are shown to be somewhat less sensitive to political budgetary preference signals than what one would expect presidential and congressional budgetary preference signals with respect to the sec are interdependent to a sizeable extent thus raising doubts about the separate independent effect democratic institutions have over the bureaucracy the implications of this study suggest that conventional theories of agency political relations serve as an oversimplified way to study administrative behavior future research on this topic

contractual structure in agriculture abstract this paper develops a generalized double sided moral hazard model of contract choice in agricultural production with mutual monitoring of each other by the landlord and the tiller who generally have different levels of farming efficiency and are risk averse using this model we formally prove that the optimal contract maximizes the output net of the risk bearing and agency costs of both the parties and carry out a simulation exercise which helps explain many of the tenancy related issues the difference in the farming efficiency of the two sides often ignored in previous analysis turns out to be the principal determinant of the contract offered to a tiller

on moral hazard and cost sharing under sharecropping in this article we show that when the tenant s input use is not observable by the landlord there will be cost sharing at the margin instead of a lump sum transfer if the standard model is extended to include cases of imperfection and interlinkage of transactions in rural markets thus making the opportunity cost of inputs different for the landlord and the tenant

moral hazard and marshallian inefficiency evidence from tunisia abstract we formalize the link between optimal cost sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well known results from duality theory building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the i substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs as well as ii between these inputs and unobservable effort we endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments exploiting the fact that in our dataset landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa the approach is applied to an unbalanced plot level panel of cost sharing contracts in a tunisian village using a translog representation of the restricted profit function contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to marshallian inefficiency while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected

credit and sharecropping in agrarian societies this paper considers a model of linkage between land labor and credit transactions in the context of sharecropping the paper s objectives are a to derive and characterize the equilibrium in a model of a land scarce labour abundant economy under sharecropping given an infinitely elastic supply of identical sharecroppers at a reservation utility and b to demonstrate that in an imperfect market a landlord may offer credit to his tenant sometimes even at a subsidized rate of interest without necessarily insisting that the sharecropper borrow only from him precluding an involuntary linkage between credit and land transations it has been demonstrated that regardless of the presence or absence of linkage or any other control by the landlord as long as he can vary the size of the plot given to a tenant and there are enough potential tenants in equilibrium contracts a tenants utility under sharecropping will be the same as that which he could have obtained as a full time wage laborer this result implies that policies other than land reform will not affect the welfare of tenants

tenancy and interlocking markets issues and some evidence abstract it is frequently asserted that the land lease markets in agrarian economies tend to be interlocked with other markets in recent years a number of theoretical models have been constructed to explain and analyze interlinkages of various markets under cropshare tenancy however the empirical basis for such assertions remains very weak this paper reviews the issues discussed in the literature and attempts empirical verification in the specific context of agriculture of bangladesh the evidence presented does not reveal any significant interlinkages of rural markets in bangladesh

electricity consumption and economic growth across australian states and territories this study investigates the long run and short run dynamics between electricity consumption along with traditional inputs such as labour and capital on economic output for a panel of seven austra

are commodity prices chaotic we conduct tests for the presence of low dimensional chaotic structure in the futures prices of four important agricultural commodities though there is strong evidence of non linear dependence the evidence suggests that there is no long lasting chaotic structure the dimension estimates for the commodity futures series are generally much higher than would be for low dimension chaotic series our test results indicate that autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity arch type processes with controls for seasonality and contract maturity effects explain much of the non linearity in the data we make a case that employing seasonally adjusted price series is important in obtaining robust results via some of the existing tests for chaotic structure finally maximum likelihood methodologies that are robust to the non linear dynamics lend strong support to the samuelson hypothesis of maturity effects in futures price changes 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

residential energy demand additional empirical evidence by minority household type abstract in a number of recent studies household level data for specific urban areas or national household level micro data have been used to estimate price and income elasticities of energy demand none of this literature however provides us with elasticity estimates by minority majority household type the main focus of this paper is to measure the responsiveness of the quantity of electricity and total energy demanded for black hispanis and majority households to price and income price and income elasticities are compared among these groups over the short and long term a variable elasticity demand model is estimated the elasticities are allowed to vary with respect to non price and income variables the price elasticities of demand vary with heating and cooling degree days and the income elasticities with the number of household members mean estimates were calculated over the respective samples findings indicate that demand for electricity is relatively price inelastic irrespective of household group however blacks are more sensitive to variations in the short run to price than hispanic and majority households in the long run blacks are also more sensitive to price changes but the magnitude of the response to price changes in the long run relative to the short run is larger for hispanics and majority households respectively than for blacks

an econometric analysis of peak electricity demand in the short run abstract different functional forms for the analysis of electricity demand are developed and compared to the popular double log demand model these functional forms are characterized by an increased sensitivity of electricity demand to price changes as prices increase and decreased sensitivity as the weather becomes more extreme these two features capture popular notions in industry about electricity demand behaviour on the basis of 12 different samples corresponding to 12 different utilities of monthly data over the 1972 76 period these functional forms are found to provide useful alternatives to the double log demand model nevertheless the most important characteristic of the empirical results is their variability across utilities the analysis is equally applicable to average and peak demand but the discussion stresses peak demand

moral hazard land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the philippines abstract introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a principal agent model of sharecropping with moral hazard we show that the optimal contract under limited commitment reflects a trade off between production and land quality maintenance using data from the philippines a model where the leasing out and contract choices are simultaneous is estimated and avoids the selectivity bias of observed contracts landlords prefer to use more incentive contracts for more fertile plots and less incentive ones when crop choices induce land overuse empirical tests reject the model of pure risk sharing in production and show the interest of taking land quality maintenance into account

carl s nonlinear cobweb abstract this essay surveys some of my work on expectations learning and bounded rationality within the classical cobweb model following early inspiring ideas from carl chiarella in particular i focus on the role of nonlinear dynamics learning and heterogeneity within the cobweb framework and how price fluctuations in the cobweb theory fit with observations of individual and aggregate behaviour from laboratory experiments with human subjects

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

the new development economics abstract the theory of rural organization based on rational peasants in environments where information is imperfect and costly provides a simple explanation for a wide variety of phenomena in ldcs it provides insights into both why sharecropping is so widespread and why it takes on the particular forms that it does it provides an explanation of the interlinkage of credit and land markets and of cost sharing the paper argues that this theory provides a better explanation of these phenomena than do the competing theories this theory can be viewed as an important application of a more general paradigm the imperfect information paradigm which has been useful in explaining economic phenomena under a wide variety of settings under competition oligopoly and monopoly in labor markets capital markets in insurance markets and product markets and in developed and less developed countries

adaptive learning and roads to chaos the case of the cobweb abstract we investigate the dynamics of the cobweb model with adaptive expectations a linear demand curve and a nonlinear s shaped increasing supply curve both stable periodic and chaotic price behaviour can occur we investigate how the dynamics of the model depend on the parameters both infinitely many period doubling and period halving bifurcations can occur when the demand curve is shifted upwards the same result holds with respect to the expectations weight factor

rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory this article presents evidence of the failure of government intervention in rural credit markets of ldcs in the past three decades it then shows how lessons for policy analysis can be drawn from modern theory particularly those theories focussing on credit rationing in competitive markets and interlinking of credit contracts with labor and land contracts the article outlines the policy implications of these theories and finds them insufficient to account for the empirical evidence it contends that a more systematic and rigorous analysis of institutions and institutional environments is essential for understanding and implementing effective policy reforms of rural credit markets it presents suggestions for undertaking such an analysis

an integrated theory of budgetary politics and some empirical tests the u s national budget 1791 2010 we develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on u s government expenditures from 1791 to 2010 we draw on three major approaches to budgeting decision making theories primarily incrementalism and serial processing policy process models and path dependency we show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form the equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures associated with wars or economic collapse we assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods we offer three takeaways 1 exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting 2 disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments 3 temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path longer returns to the path within budgetary eras and annual punctuations in budget changes

a general empirical law of public budgets a comparative analysis weexamineregularitiesand differencesinpublicbudgetingincomparativeperspective budgetsquantifycollectivepolitical decisions made in response to incoming information the preferences of decision makers and the institutions that structure how decisions are made we first establish that the distribution of budget changes in many western democracies follows a non gaussian distribution the power function this implies that budget changes are highly incremental yet occasionally are punctuated by large budget changes this pattern holds regardless of the type of political system parliamentary or presidential and for level of government by studying the power function s exponents we find systematic differences for

institutions economics and the development quest institutions crucial for the analysis of how agents deal with uncertainty have been gaining increasing relevance on the economic research agenda in this paper we analyze the institutional literature aiming to explain why this perspective obtains better results than others in development economics in particular we stress the relevance of new institutional economics as an adequate framework for a broad understanding of development issues

on the consistency of backward looking expectations the case of the cobweb in dynamic models of economic fluctuations backward looking expectations with systematic forecasting errors are inconsistent with rational behaviour in non linear dynamic models exhibiting seemingly unpredictable chaotic fluctuations however simple habitual rule of thumb backward looking expectation rules may yield non zero but nevertheless non systematic forecasting errors in a chaotic model expectational forecasting errors may have zero autocorrelations at all lags even for rational agents patterns in these forecasting errors may be very difficult to detect especially in the presence of small noise backward looking expectations are then not necessarily inconsistent with rational behaviour we investigate whether simple expectation schemes such as naive or adaptive expectations can be consistent with rational behaviour in the simplest of all non linear dynamic economic models the non linear cobweb model

the residential demand for electricity in australia an application of the bounds testing approach to cointegration this paper reports estimates of the long and short run elasticities of residential demand for electricity in australia using the bounds testing procedure to cointegration within an autoregressive distributive lag framework in the long run we find that income and own price are the most important determinants of residential electricity demand while temperature is significant some of the time and gas prices are insignificant our estimates of long run income elasticity and price elasticity of demand are consistent with previous studies although they are towards the lower end of existing estimates as expected the short run elasticities are much smaller than the long run elasticities and the coefficients on the error correction coefficients are small consistent with the fact that in the short run energy appliances are fixed