inequality and the dynamics of public opinion the self reinforcing link between economic inequality and mass preferences this article assesses the influence of income inequality on the public s policy mood recent work has produced divergent perspectives on the relationship between inequality public opinion and government redistribution one group of scholars suggests that unequal representation of different income groups reproduces inequality as politicians respond to the preferences of the rich another group of scholars pays relatively little attention to distributional outcomes but shows that government is generally just as responsive to the poor as to the rich utilizing theoretical insights from comparative political economy and time series data from 1952 to 2006 supplemented with cross sectional analysis where appropriate we show that economic inequality is in fact self reinforcing but that this is fully consistent with the idea that government tends to respond equally to rich and poor in its policy enactments

insecure alliances risk inequality and support for the welfare state popular support for the welfare state varies greatly across nations and policy domains we argue that these variations vital to understanding the politics of the welfare state reflect in part the degree to which economic disadvantage low income and economic insecurity high risk are correlated when the disadvantaged and insecure are mostly one and the same the base of popular support for the welfare state is narrow when the disadvantaged and insecure represent two distinct groups popular support is broader and opinion less polarized we test these predictions both across nations within a single policy area unemployment insurance and across policy domains within a single polity the united states using a new survey results are consistent with our predictions and are robust to myriad controls and specifications when disadvantage and insecurity are more correlated the welfare state is more contested hy do citizens support the welfare state the answer remains as elusive as the question is fundamental we know that patterns of public support vary greatly across nations and domains of social policy we also know that these differences are associated with variations in levels of spending and program generosity brooks and manza 2006a 2006b 2007 kang and powell 2010 svallfors 1997 2004 yet there has only been limited effort to explain why patternsofpublicsupportvary thatis whyaggregatepublic support polarization of opinion and the breadth of opposition to the welfare state differ across societies and social policy areas in this article we develop such a proposition distinguish it from other leading claims and show that it finds strong confirmation not only in cross national analysis but also when examining popular support for different social policies within the united states the proposition is that the structure of support for the welfare state varies with the joint distribution of economic disadvantage low income and economic in

stock flow consistent accounting a macroeconomic perspective the quotations at the head of this article indicate the widespread perception of the importance of asset revaluations to those who directly and indirectly through life assurance and pension funds own corporate equity although it is clear to economic commentators that such a decline in stock prices effects a revaluation to the stock of wealth and hence to the associated stream of income conventional national income accounting frameworks are poorly suited to capturing such changes primarily because they are not constructed on the principle of stock flow consistency the concern of this article is with the implications of stock flow consistency for the organisation and analysis of data at a macroeconomic level the concept of stock flow consistency is not new but to our knowledge no systematic presentation of the macroeconomic accounting implications in a relatively unconsolidated model exists although useful references are buiter i983 and coutts et al i988 it is important to fill this gap since much empirical work including for example that embodied in macroeconomic models of the united kingdom and united states implies broad acceptance of the conceptual basis of the national income and flow of funds accounts various studies have considered particular aspects of enforcing stock flow consistency on national income accounting practice see for example siegel i979 and miller i985 recent work on the personal sector has made use of a stock flow concept of income due to hicks i 939 see jump ig80 and in particular on the consumption function see hendry and vonungern sternberg i 98i and patterson i 986 and pesaran and evans i984 found a significant role for capital gains and losses on personal sector share holdings in determining aggregate consumption expenditures the question of how to define income is fundamental to our approach to stock flow consistency this concern can be traced back to haig i 92i and hicks i939 both of whom recognised the difficulties which arise in defining income in a dynamic world which involves stocks and flows the definitions of income offered by hicks i939 especially chapter i4 are by now well known

government versus opposition at the polls how governing status affects the impact of policy positions we argue that governing status affects how voters react to extreme versus moderate policy positions being in government forces parties to compromise and to accept ideologically unappealing choices as the best among available alternatives steady exposure to government parties in this role and frequent policy compromise by governing parties lead voters to discount the positions of parties when they are in government hence government parties do better in elections when they offset this discounting by taking relatively extreme positions the relative absence of this discounting dynamic for opposition parties on the other hand means that they perform better by taking more moderate positions as the standard downsian model would predict we present evidence from national elections in germany the netherlands norway sweden and the united kingdom 1971 2005 to support this claim

what moves policy sentiment in spite of the fact that political eras in the united states are widely and often ambiguously defined in terms of a general policy sentiment or mood political scientists have done little in the way of rigorous analysis regarding this subject i argue that shifts in domestic policy sentiment along a liberal conservative continuum may be understood in part as responses to changing economic expectations specifically expectations of a strong economy result in greater support for liberal domestic policies whereas anticipation of declining economic conditions pushes the national policy mood to the right using quarterly data for the period 1968 88 i present a multiple time series error correction model that lends considerable support to the hypothesis

endogenous credible commitment and party competition over redistribution under alternative electoral institutions political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters i argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution the model i develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules parties efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment thus left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation the model also generates new insights about the anti left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device i find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies

global markets and national politics collision course or virtuous circle increasing exposure to trade foreign direct investment and liquid capital mobility have not prompted a pervasive policy race to the neoliberal bottom among the oecd countries one reason is that there are strong political incentives for governments to cushion the dislocations and risk generated by openness moreover countries with large and expanding public economies when balanced with increased revenues even from capital taxes have not suffered from capital flight or higher interest rates this is because the modern welfare state comprising income transfer programs and publicly provided social services generates economically important collective goods that are undersupplied by markets and that actors are interested in productivity value these range from the accumulation of human and physical capital to social stability under conditions of high market uncertainty to popular support for the market economy itself as a result arguments about the demise of national autonomy in the global economy are considerably overdrawn

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

a model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy abstract this paper studies political equilibrium in a two party representative democracy in which the political parties are policy motivated and voters trade off their policy preferences against their party identity it is shown that the parties will in general adopt differing policy positions in equilibrium and that under certain qualifications the winning policy will lie between the more popular party s preferred policy and a certain utilitarian optimum the winning policy will be closer to this utilitarian optimum the less biased the electorate is in terms of party identification

the public as thermostat dynamics of preferences for spending theory democratic accountability requires that the public be reasonably well informed about what policymakers actually do such a public would adjust its preferences for more or less policy in response to policy outputs themselves in effect the public would behave like a thermostat when the actual policy temperature differs from the preferred policy temperature the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly and once sufficiently adjusted the signal would stop hypotheses in domains where policy is clearly defined and salient to the public changes in the public s preferences for more policy activity are negatively related to changes in policy methods a thermostatic model of american public preferences for spending on defense and a set of five social programs is developed and then tested using time series regression analysis results changes in public preferences for more spending reflect changes in both the preferred levels of spending and spending decisions themselves most importantly changes in preferences are negatively related to spending decisions whereby the public adjusts its preferences for more spending downward upward when appropriations increase decrease thus consistent with the eastonian model policy outputs do feed back on public inputs at least in the defense spending domain and across a set of social spending domains

the politics of inequality voter mobilization and left parties in advanced industrial states why is it that some countries have witnessed significant increases in inequality since the 1960s while at the same time experiencing very little change in the way politics is conducted and why is it that in other countries where inequality has increased much less the left has become substantially more redistributive the answer the authors argue has to do with the interaction between inequality and political mobilization of low income voters the authors make two points in this article first high levels of inequality move left parties to the left second although increasing inequality pushes the core constituencies of left parties to the left it also makes some individuals less likely to be involved in politics the authors argue that left parties will respond to an increase in inequality only when low income voters are politically mobilized they explore these claims through a comparative analysis of left party programs in 10 organisation for economic cooperation and development countries over the period 1966 to 2002

the costs of related diversification the impact of the core business on the productivity of related segments i develop the thesis that in related diversified firms the core business in my analysis the largest business may provide benefits such as scope economies to a related segment but it may also exert power and constrain the segment to act in its interests in various internal and external transactions this enables the core business to shift productivity gains toward itself from the segment which could lead to various inefficiencies within the related diversified firm using input output flow data and a multilevel model with the segment as the unit of analysis i first show that a segment s productivity is lower compared with a single business firm when it shares backward and forward complementarity i e when it shares transactions with common suppliers and customers with the core business correspondingly i show that as a mirror image the core business s productivity is enhanced when the business shares backward and forward complementarity with segments and when segments are backward integrated with it i e when the core business provides outputs to segments these shifts in productivity and the attendant inefficiencies do not seem to be destroying the entire value from related diversification overall the findings support the argument that the power and influence exerted by the core business and concomitantly the subsidization of the core business by related segments is an important source of costs borne by segments in a related diversified firm

social democracy christian democracy constitutional structure and the welfare state the literature on the determinants of welfare state effort displays many inconsistencies and contradictins this article takes imoprtant stepts toward resolving these issues with the use of pooled

economic and social class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns we investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals preferences for redistribution in our model agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions productivity and social class and an individual s social status is de ned as his relative standing in terms of a weighted average of these two components the weight on each component depends positively on its standard deviation redistribution thus simultaneously affects labor supply and the weights that determine social status as such taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor but also becomes a way of preserving or modifying social status thus individuals who have the same productivity but belong to different social classes support different tax rates we characterize the equilibrium of the political game as the solution of a system of non linear equations and identify the interclass coalition of voters who support the equilibrium tax rate

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

wage setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies the distribution of pay differs significantly across countries and over time among advanced industrial societies in this paper institutional and political determinants of pay inequality are studied in sixteen countries from 1980 to 1992 the most important factor in explaining pay dispersion is the level of wage setting i e whether wages are set at the level of the individual the plant the industry or the entire private sector the impact of centralization is the same whether centralization occurs via collective bargaining or via government involvement in private sector wage setting the concentration of unions and the share of the labor force covered by collective bargaining agreements also matter after controlling for wage setting institutions other variables such as the governing coalition the size of government international openness and the supply of highly educated workers have little impact economic political and norm based explanations for the association of centralization with egalitarian outcomes are discussed

economic globalization domestic politics and income inequality in the developed countries a cross national study this article assesses the impact of economic globalization and domestic political factors on income inequality and state redistribution in the developed countries over the past two decades using household level data from the luxembourg income study that are more detailed accurate and cross nationally comparable than those used in previous empirical work it examines three major modes of international integration trade direct foreign investment and international financial flows as well as four domestic political variables the partisan balance of national cabinets electoral turnout union density and the centralization of wage setting institutions the study finds only scattered relationships between global integration and income distribution or redistribution but reasonably strong positive relationships between several domestic political variables and an egalitarian distribution of income and or extensive state redistribution these findings are consistent with a growing number of studies that emphasize the resilience of domestic political factors in the face of economic globalization

earnings inequality and welfare spending a disaggregated analysis the welfare state is generally viewed as either providing redistribution from rich to poor or as providing publicly financed insurance both views are incomplete welfare policies provide both insurance and redistribution in varying amounts depending on the design of the policy the authors explore the political consequences of the mix of redistribution and insurance in the context of studying the impact of income inequality on expenditures in different categories of welfare spending in advanced industrial societies from 1980 to 1995 they find that spending on pensions health care family benefits poverty alleviation and housing subsidies is largely uncorrelated with income inequality but that spending on income replacement programs such as unemployment insurance sickness pay occupational illness and disability are significantly higher in countries with more egalitarian income distributions they show that this pattern is exactly what a theory of political support for redistributive social insurance programs would predict

political reinforcement how rising inequality curbs manifested welfare generosity we propose a political reinforcement hypothesis suggesting that rising inequality moves party politics on welfare state issues to the right strengthening rather than modifying the impact of inequality we model policy platforms by incorporating ideology and opportunism of party members and interests and sympathies of voters if welfare spending is a normal good within income classes a majority of voters moves rightward when inequality increases as a response the left in particular shift their welfare policy platform toward less generosity we find support for our arguments using data on the welfare policy platforms of political parties in 22 oecd countries

the generosity of social insurance 1971 2002 international comparisons of national social policy rely overwhelmingly on programme spending ratios however there are widespread problems with this type of data as an indicator of trends in societies commitments to social protection this paper suggests an alternative approach to understanding social commitments and introduces a new international data set of social insurance programmes that is comprised of important characteristics of three types of public insurance unemployment sick pay and public pensions the data are available annually from the 1970s for 18 oecd countries looking more closely at trends in two programme characteristics income replacement rates and programme coverage we develop an indicator of expected benefits according to this indicator there is considerably more evidence of welfare state retrenchment in recent years than most analyses of public spending have suggested copyright 2006 oxford university press