investment and market dominance we analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment special cases include incremental investment patent races learning by doing and network externalities we investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments to this end we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes which applies to our investment game finally we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient

supply security and short run capacity markets for electricity the creation of electricity markets has raised the fundamental question as to whether markets create the right incentives for the provision of the reserves needed to maintain supply security in the short run or whether some form of regulation is required in some states in the us electricity distributors have been made responsible for providing such reserves by contracting capacity in excess of their forecasted peak demand the so called installed capacity markets provide one means of contracting reserves and are the subject of this paper under monopoly as well as under perfect competition we identify firms short run opportunity costs of committing resources in the capacity market and the costs of inducing full capacity commitment the long run investment problem is not considered from a welfare viewpoint we also compare the desirability of providing reserves either through capacity markets or through the demand side i e power curtailments at the optimum capacity obligations equal peak demand plus expected outages and the capacity deficiency rate which serves as a price cap is set at firms opportunity costs of providing full capacity commitment

exclusive contracts and protection of investments we consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship contrary to some informal claims in the literature we find that exclusivity has no effect when all investments are fully specific to the relationship i e are purely internal exclusivity does matter when investments affect the value of the buyer s trade with other sellers i e have external effects we examine the effects of exclusivity on investments and aggregate welfare and the private incentives of the buyer seller coalition to use it

an r d race with knowledge accumulation i develop a model of an r d race with knowledge accumulation my model does not inherit the memorylessness property of the exponential distribution that troubles existing models of r d races hence firms knowledge stocks are no longer irrelevant to their behavior during the r d race and knowledge accumulation has strategic implications in this more general setting i obtain results that stand in marked contrast to the previous literature in particular under some conditions the firm that is behind in the race engages in catch up behavior this pattern of strategic interactions action reaction is consistent with empirical research copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

symmetry breaking in two player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity a synthesis abstract this paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure strategy nash equilibria these classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game and relies on the theory of supermodular games the underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition to illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach we present some existing models dealing with r d capacity expansion and information provision which motivated this study

exploring income inequality in rural coastal viet nam income inequality has been rising in parallel with the economic liberalisation process in the former centrally planned economies the opportunities for non agricultural income associated with the market liberalisation process in former centrally planned economies would seem to be important in determining inequality within the rural sector this article reviews the trends in inequality in viet nam examining differential trends and hypothesised causes inequality is important because of its relationship to other factors in the evolution of the agricultural economy such as the incidence of poverty and the sustainability of emerging income sources this article analyses income inequality based on data collected by the author in two districts in coastal northern viet nam the results demonstrate that non agricultural income sources specifically aquaculture and wage and remittance contribute more to present inequality than any other income source simulation shows that the emergence of aquaculture since the l

racing with uncertainty and strategic interaction between competitors as the race unfolds most of the existing literature examines one or other of these features but not the two combined our aim is to see how the efforts of competitors in a race vary with the intensity of rivalry between them in our principal model whch is of a one dimensional race it is shown that the leader in the race makes greater efforts than the follower and efforts increase as the gap between competitors decreases under certain conditions the same results hold in our second related model which is of a two dimensional race

herd behavior the penguin effect and the suppression of informational diffusion an analysis of informational externalities and payoff interdependency this article analyzes a technology adoption process in which the effect of informational spillover interacts with network externalities the interplay of informational externalities and payoff interdependency induces risk averse and clustering behavior in the technology adoption process the analysis differs from the herd behavior literature in focusing on how the herd behavior of subsequent users influences the initial adoption decision moreover herd behavior in this article stems from each agent s desire to inhibit the revelation of new information that can be used in a way detrimental to her rather than from each agent s effort to free ride on information contained in the decisions made by predecessors

a model of the evolution of duopoly does the asymmetry between firms tend to increase or decrease this paper is an attempt to identify some of the factors that affect the evolution of market structure in a model of dynamic competition between two firms the stochastic evolution of the state of competition depends on the respective effort rates of the firms the question is whether the current leader works harder than the laggard does the gap between firms tend to increase or decrease we show that several effects are at work the state tends to evolve in the direction where joint payoffs are greater since joint payoffs are related to joint product market profits less joint effort costs there are two classes of effect the joint profit effect and various joint cost effects the latter result in part from the pattern of profits and in part from endpoint effects that give relief from efforts asymptotic expansions illuminate these influences moreover we show by numerical simulation that there is another kind of joint cost effect the pattern of joint effort costs can influence the pattern of evolution of market structure and the evolution of the pattern of market structure can influence the pattern of efforts in a mutually self reinforcing manner in particular there may be equilibria in which this last effect means that the laggard works harder than the leader even though all the other effects work in favour of the leader

an empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity who invests more into r d the incumbent or the challenger the theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the potential entrant invests more into r d has attracted considerable interest this paper reports the results of an empirical study on this question using data of about 3500 german firms over the years 1992 to 1995 the survey explicitly asks the firms for their motives to undertake innovative activity it is thus possible to take account of intended not just completed market entry it turns out that the challenger invests more into r d in order to enter a new market than the incumbent thus the patent racing model by reinganum and others seems to characterize innovative activity more accurately than the competing auction model of gilbert and newbery we use a heteroscedastic tobit as well as a tobit model with selectivity in order to deal with the econometric problems of double censoring

resource development and inequality in indigenous societies concern has been expressed both by indigenous people and by academic analysts that large scale resource development may sharpen inequality in what are relatively egalitarian indigenous societies much of the academic literature suggests that resource development does indeed have this effect but such claims are usually based on very limited empirical evidence in addition the literature is lacking in conceptual frameworks which allow the concept of inequality to be adequately specified take into account the quite different forms of income which resource development can generate explain rather than simply document specific changes in income distribution and on this basis provide grounds for policy prescription this article seeks to develop such a framework

a perpetual race to stay ahead this paper presents a model of dynamic competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative activity the state of competition measured by the difference between the number of innovations introduced by the firms evolves stochastically according to their effort level the structure of markov perfect equilibria is identified it is generally not true that competition is fiercest when firms are closest rather firms invest under two distinct circumstances while sufficiently ahead to outstrip their rival and secure a durable leadership while behind to regain leadership and prevent the situation from worsening to the point where their rival outstrips them industry such a market structure cannot be adequately modelled by a repeated game since history obviously affects market opportunities more precisely previous outcomes determine the range of available actions and pay offs economists have thus resorted to the study of races to gain insights into the strategic issues raised by such competition with the notable exceptions of aoki 1991 harris 1991 and budd harris and vickers 1993 most of the literature has analysed formal races displaying exogenous finishing lines or deadlines as well as final prizes and rewards and the corresponding results rely on backward induction however such assumptions do not seem to capture accurately the essential features of many markets often the rivalry only ends if at all when one of the competitors withdraws so that the deadline should be endogenized moreover benefits and losses are continuously collected additionally the emerging empirical literature on races stresses the inadequacy of standard models and the need to model r d as a race with multiple prizes in the words of cockburn and henderson 1994 our finding that the modern game theoretic literature is of only limited usefulness as an empirical guide points to the need to model r d as a race with multiple prizes the model analysed in this paper is an attempt to offer an adequate framework for this type of dynamic competition the stochastic evolution of the state of competition between two firms depends on their respective effort levels the state of competition is measured by the

the measurement of inequality and poverty a policy maker s guide to the literature abstract mathematical measures of poverty and inequality embody values that reflect the historical political social intellectual and ethical forces prevalent at the time of their formulation so that policy makers may select measures of poverty and inequality that are consistent with their values it is important to make explicit the value judgements implicit in the measures models designed to measure poverty and inequality fall into four categories absolute poverty measures absolute income measures relative poverty measures and relative inequality measures this article examines the principal models within each category and discusses the assumptions limitations and values implicit in the models

perpetual leapfrogging in bertrand duopoly we consider different patterns of infinite technological adoption choices by firms in a bertrand duopoly every period technological progress provides a sequence of cost reducing innovations the equilibrium concept is markov perfect equilibrium we analyze conditions for which equilibrium adoption leads to persistent leadership and those where firms alternate in adoption inducing leapfrogging only leapfrogging leads to technological improvement in the long run demand conditions play a crucial role in determining whether leapfrogging can be perpetual in bertrand duopoly

ranking income distributions a large variety of policy questions involve choices between social states and a consequent ordering of the feasible alternatives when these social states are related to the levels of welfare experienced by individuals or households two central issues stand out in determining the relative desirability of different social outcomes one of these is the essentially positive exercise of achieving comparability between households with different characteristics such as composition or preferences operating in different environments for example facing different price structures the other concerns the normative judgments implicit in the evaluation of alternative allocations of resourcesthe emphasis placed on inequality between households and the extent to which greater inequality can be compensated by higher average living standards this paper focuses on the second of these issues and in doing so we abstract from the problem of household comparability by considering a population of n households identical in all respects except for their incomes the question of ordering social states then becomes one of ranking income distributions over a group of anonymous households or individuals borrowing the usual assumptions imposed on consumer preferences we may suppose that a social ordering of income distributions can be represented by a welfare function 2

platform competition and seller investment incentives many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for profit platforms which charge buyers and sellers for access what is the effect of for profit intermediation on seller investment incentives since for profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for profit platforms however we show that for profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and thus access prices we characterize the effect of for profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes

bertrand edgeworth competition demand uncertainty and asymmetric outcomes abstract we analyze investment and pricing incentives in a symmetric bertrand edgeworth framework with uncertain demand firms choose production capacities before observing demand prices are chosen after demand is observed if the extent of demand variation exceeds a threshold level then a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies for capacities does not exist a smaller firm has no incentive ex ante to expand its capacity because capacity expansion would reduce its expected revenue in the event that demand is lower than expected output prices are predicted to have positive variance when demand is low and zero variance when demand is high journal of economic literature classification numbers d43 l13

competition and growth with step by step innovation an example this paper develops a simple example to analyse the relationship between product market competition and growth in a model with step by step innovations where laggards can never leapfrog the current industry leaders but instead must first catch up with the leaders before battling for technological leadership in the future unlike in existing schumpeterian models of growth more intense product market competition and or imitations may be growth enhancing

inequality and poverty in china institutional change and public policy 1978 to 1988 there is considerable uncertainty and debate about changes in poverty and living standards that are likely to occur in an economy in transition from centrally planned allocations to a more market oriented basis but a dearth of evidence and rigorous analysis remains there is a tradeoff between policies that provide a guaranteed living standard with low inequality albeit at a low income level and systems that provide much higher monetary incomes but create greater income variability and vulnerability particularly during periods of high inflation the chinese experience following the economic reforms of 1978 highlights this dilemma and our analysis strongly suggests the need for appropriate social safety nets if rapid growth is to be achieved without the poor and vulnerable bearing the costs of such growth

distribution of ecological entitlements implications for economic security and population movement abstract the concept of economic and environmental security is explored in a broad sense as a series of necessary entitlements to forest and other resources traditional measures of inequality such as the gini coefficient or the atkinson index of inequality which rely on measures of the distribution of formal cash income or wealth are regarded as flawed to the extent that they do not adequately reflect the value and distribution of access to non marketed goods and services an ecologically sensitive atkinson or gini index is proposed as a more relevant measure of inequality and of economic and environmental security to improve security policies must attempt to improve the value of these indices an empirical example is provided based on household survey data for 357 households in 24 villages in a rainforest zone of cameroon analyses of data relating to forest use incomes and demographics provides insights into the distribution of ecological entitlements across various income groups and into the impacts of these entitlements on economic and environmental security through measures related to population migration the empirical analysis demonstrates a number of important conclusions a use of ecologically adjusted indices provides a more complete picture of inequality inequality in the forest zone is less pervasive than traditional measures would have us believe b traditional forest entitlements contribute positively to reducing inequality and improving security and c income support programs targeted to conventional cash crops cocoa and coffee increase inequality and reduce security the analyses also demonstrate that when other economic factors have been taken into account population movement can be a useful indicator of environmental security an analysis of migration demographic and income patterns suggests that low population movement in this zone can be construed as an indicator of higher environmental security the analysis also provides direct evidence that a decline in ecological entitlements increases the probability of migration out of an area

industry effects and appropriability measures in the stock market s valuation of r d and patents this paper examines the stock market s valuation of a firm s innovative activity we estimate the market s relative valuation of firms tangible and intangible assets focusing on knowledge capital in the form of accumulated stocks of r d and patents we tried to improve upon our estimates of the stock market s valuation of knowledge capital embodied in such stocks by bringing in measures of the appropriability environment facing a firm from the yale survey on industrial research and development the responses to survey questions about the effectiveness of patents as a mechanism for protecting the returns from innovation turn out to be of some use there is evidence of an interaction between industry level measures of the effectiveness of patents and the market s valuation of a firm s past r d and patenting performance as well as its current r d moves we find no evidence however that other appropriability mechanisms differ enough across industries to leave measurable traces in our data the structure of the yale survey makes it possible to estimate the sampling error in the appropriability measures derived from it this information was used by us in an errors in variables context but with little success in the absence of r d variables our estimates imply that a two standard deviation increase in our index of patent effectiveness would raise the value of a patent held by our average firm from 0 4 million to 1 0 million when r d variables are introduced into the equations the patents variables become insignificant r d expenditures are a better measure of input to the innovative function of firms than patents are of its output but we estimate that the same experiment would induce changes in q of between 10 and 27 percent for the average firm approximately doubling the market s valuation of this kind of capital this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

dropout behavior in r d races with learning we examine a game theoretic model of a two firm r d race in which expenditures on r d and the concomitant increase in experience learning enable thefirms to increase their probability of discovering an invention the learning process is stochastic it generates a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for identicalfirms with the characteristic that the leader never drops out but the follower drops out if the leader gains a significant lead the leader can find it optimal to drop out if the firms value the invention differently or have different r d efficiencies thus our analysis generates results between vigorous competition and natural monopoly central to schumpeter s 1934 vision of entrepreneurship are the extraordinary profits associated with innovation the lure of these profits fuels the fires of creative destruction as innovators replace declining firms this article analyzes the competition for the profits obtained by bringing an innovation to fruition and receiving the associated patent we restrict attention to the subclass of innovations known as inventions innovations that are the product of a firm s research and development in particular we are concerned with the conditions that cause a firm after having invested in r d to drop out of the competitive race situations in which the leading firm drops out are of even greater interest competition in r d is often modelled as a race in which the winner receives a patent and reaps most or all of the benefits of the invention as exemplified by kamien and schwartz 1972 the early theoretical literature tended to be based on decision theoretic models the firm seeks an optimal rate of expenditure on r d determined in part by the expected value of the invention the extent of the first mover advantage the economies or diseconomies of scale in r d and the perceived intensity of rivalry it is not anticipated that the firm s decisions will affect the r d efforts of the perhaps unknown rivals kamien and schwartz 1982 p 124 show that the firm does no research if rivalry is sufficiently intense because their model is static however it is never the case that a firm enters the race and then drops out

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

a penny for your quotes patent citations and the value of innovations the use ofpatents in economic research has been seriously hindered by the fact that patents vary enormously in their importance or value and hence simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output the purpose of this article is to put forward patent counts weighted by citations as indicators of the value of innovations thereby overcoming the limitations of simple counts the empirical analysis of a particular innovation computed tomography scanners indeed shows a close association between citation based patent indices and independent measures of the social value of innovations in that field moreover the weighting scheme appears to be nonlinear increasing in the number of citations implying that the informational content of citations rises at the margin as in previous studies simple patent counts are found to be highly correlated with contemporaneous rd however here the association is within afield over time rather than cross sectional

a primer on capacity mechanisms abstract a simple model is built up to capture the key drivers of investment and pricing incentives in electricity markets the focus is put on the interaction between market power and investment incentives and the trade off it introduces when designing the optimal regulatory instruments in contrast to the energy only market paradigm that assumes perfect competition our model demonstrates that in the presence of market power scarcity prices do not promote efficient investments even among risk neutral investors combining price caps and capacity payments allows to disentangle the two fold objective of inducing the right investment incentives while mitigating market power bundling capacity payments with financial obligations further mitigates market power as long as strike prices are set sufficiently close to marginal costs

preemptive investment with resalable capacity we study an entry game under perfect information with the salient feature that capacity is resalable we show that an inability to precommit to final output can help rather than hurt in contrast to other analyses of limited commitment e g maskin tirole 1988 which do not specify the sources of or reasons for limits to commitment we assume that such limits arise from the resalable nature of capacity and are led naturally to a consideration of additional strategic variables that can improve the incumbent s position in our model resalability increases the complexity of the incumbent s precommitment problem but it also furnishes her with an additional source of power in our model the price at which to resell capacity while a capacity resale market enables capacity to be shared and can help anticompetitive behavior the very existence of a resale market can generate an incentive for a much larger initial level of investment to the point where the overall equilibrium outcome can be more competitive

income distribution and development some stylized facts in recent years the relationship between income distribution and the process of development has come under increasing scrutiny much of the debate has focused on the hypothesis originally advanced by simon kuznets that the secular behavior of inequality follows an inverted u shaped pattern with inequality first increasing and then decreasing with development this hypothesis has become so much a part of the conventional wisdom on this subject that it has generated considerable skepticism about the welfare implications of the development process indeed on some interpretations developing countries face the grim prospect not just of increasing relative inequality but also of declining absolute incomes for the lower income groups

dynamic competition in technological investments an empirical examination of the lcd panel industry abstract when are technological laggards more likely to try to catch up with leaders we offer empirical evidence on firm level data of plant investments in the tft lcd panel industry where technological competition has been intense and dynamic we find that the followers level of technology has a non monotonic effect on technology improving investments with intermediate followers the most apt to invest in catch ups this result is a puzzle given the existing theory on technology race we also find that followers catch up investments increase with the capacity of the leader that employs the state of the art technology these results are robust to variations in specification and alternative accounts of effects we discuss our findings and contributions in light of the technology race literature

does firm size matter evidence on the impact of liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in germany abstract this paper examines the link between liquidity constraints and investment behavior for german firms of different sizes from 1970 to 1986 results indicate that medium sized firms appear to be more liquidity constrained in their investment behavior than either the smallest or largest firms in the study suggesting that the unique german infrastructure designed to assist the small firm has indeed succeeded in alleviating to some degree such liquidity constraints findings also support the hypothesis that the emerging competition and internationalism which characterized the german financial markets in the 1980s have been improving access to capital for some groups of firms

market design and investment incentives the purpose of this study was to understand how market design affects market performance through its impact on investment incentives for this purpose we model capacity choices by two ex ante identical firms which compete in the product market we analyse a number of different market design elements including i two commonly used auction formats the uniform price and discriminatory auctions ii price caps and iii bid duration we find that although the discriminatory auction tends to lower prices this does not imply that investment incentives at the margin are poorer indeed aggregate capacity is the same under both auction formats

on the measurement of poverty official statistics in the united states and the united kingdom show a rise in poverty between the 1970 s and the 1980 s but scepticism has been expressed with regard to these findings in particular the methods employed in the measurement of poverty have been the subject of criticism this paper re examines three basic issues in measuring poverty the choice of the poverty line the index of poverty and the relation between poverty and inequality one general theme running through the paper is that there is a diversity of judgments which enter the measurement of poverty and that it is necessary to recognize these explicitly in the procedures adopted there is likely to be disagreement about the choice of poverty line affecting both its level and its structure in this situation we may only be able to make comparisons and not to measure differences and the comparisons may lead only to a partial rather than a complete ordering the first section of the paper discusses the stochastic dominance conditions which allow such comparisons illustrating their application by reference to data for the united states the choice of poverty measure has been the subject of an extensive literature and a variety of measures have been proposed in the second section of the paper a different approach is suggested considering a class of measures satisfying certain general properties and seeking conditions under which all members of the class which includes many of those proposed give the same ranking those sceptical about measures of poverty often assert that poverty and inequality are being confounded the third section of the paper distinguishes four different viewpoints and relates them to theories of justice and views of social welfare

dynamic r d competition the authors study a simple two stage stochastic patent race involving two firms they examine the behavior of the participants as they gain the lead or fall behind in the race the authors find that the leader engages in rd 2 a policy of issuing patents for intermediate research results and 3 the effects of research joint ventures whereby the firms coordinate their initial research efforts and share their results copyright 1987 by royal economic society

price cutting and business stealing in imperfect cartels although economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns important puzzles remain standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through the threat of punishment but they fail to explain two important factual observations first apparently deliberate cheating actually occurs second it frequently goes unpunished even when it is detected we propose a theory of equilibrium price cutting and business stealing in cartels to bridge this gap between theory and observation

household strategies and rural livelihood diversification this article reviews the recent literature on diversification as a livelihood strategy of rural households in developing countries with particular reference to sub saharan africa livelihood diversification is defined as the process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in order to survive and to improve their standards of living the determinants and effects of diversification in the areas of poverty income distribution farm output and gender are examined some policy inferences are summarised the conclusion is reached that removal of constraints to and expansion of opportunities for diversification are desirable policy objectives because they give individuals and households more capabilities to improve livelihood security and to raise living standards

on price caps under uncertainty this paper shows how standard arguments supporting the impo sition of price caps break down in the presence of demand uncertainty in particular though in the deterministic case the introduction or lowering of a price cap above marginal cost results in increased production increased total welfare decreased prices and increased consumer welfare we show that all of the above comparative statics predictions fail for generic uncertain demand functions for example for price caps su ciently close to marginal cost a decrease in the price cap always leads to a decrease in production and total welfare under certain mild conditions under stronger regularity assumptions all of the monotone comparative statics predictions from the deterministic case also do not hold for a generic uncertain demand if we restrict attention to price caps in an arbitrary flxed interval as long as the price caps are binding for some values in that interval