climate change uncertainty irreversibility and the precautionary principle this paper begins with a critique of the option value argument used by economists to explain and justify the precautionary principle the argument is shown to misrepresent both uncertainty and irreversibility an alternative justification of the precautionary principle is discussed under conditions of keynesian uncertainty and irreversibility interpreted in terms of incommensurability recent formal decision theories under keynesian uncertainty are reviewed and their limitations explored with particular reference to the insights that decision theory can bring to understanding the precautionary principle throughout the decision problems under consideration are those faced by climate change policy makers copyright oxford university press

the carbon footprint of european households and income distribution abstract this paper calculates the carbon footprint of private consumption in the eu27 by five groups of household income using a fully fledged macroeconomic input output model covering 59 industries and five groups of household income for the eu27 due to macroeconomic feedback mechanisms this methodology besides induced intermediate demand also quantifies i private consumption induced in the other household groups ii impacts on other endogenous final demand components and iii negative feedback effects due to output price effects of household demand the carbon footprint is calculated separately for the consumption vector of each of the five income groups the simulation results yield a non linear income elasticity of direct and indirect emissions at each income level the value of the direct footprint income elasticity decreases from 1 32 first quintile to 0 69 fourth quintile the value of the indirect footprint income elasticity is always below unity and decreases from 0 89 to 0 62 the results in general reveal a relative decoupling effect the share of the top income group in income 45 is much larger than its share in the carbon footprint 37 and vice versa for the bottom income group 6 in income and 8 in footprint

is probability theory relevant for uncertainty a post keynesian perspective stable url http links jstor org sici sici 0895 3309 28199124 295 3a1 3c129 3aiptrfu 3e2 0 co 3b2 gthe journal of economic perspectives is currently published by american economic association your use of the jstor archive indicates your acceptance of jstor s terms and conditions of use available athttp www jstor org about terms html jstor s terms and conditions of use provides in part that unless you have obtainedprior permission you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles and you may use content inthe jstor archive only for your personal non commercial use please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work publisher contact information may be obtained athttp www jstor org journals aea html each copy of any part of a jstor transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission the jstor archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long term preservation and access to leading academicjournals and scholarly literature from around the world the archive is supported by libraries scholarly societies publishers and foundations it is an initiative of jstor a not for profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community takeadvantage of advances in technology for more information regarding jstor please contact support jstor org http www jstor orgsun feb 17 13 40 22 2008

regulation of a spatial externality refuges versus tax for managing pest resistance we examine regulations for managing pest resistance to pesticide varieties in a temporally and spatially explicit framework we compare the performance of the epa s mandatory refuges and a tax or subsidy on the pesticide variety under several biological assumptions on pest mobility and the heterogeneity of farmers pest vulnerability we find that only the tax or subsidy restores efficiency if pest mobility is perfect within the area if pest mobility is imperfect and when farmers face identical pest vulnerability only the refuge might restore efficiency with simulations we illustrate that complex outcomes may arise for intermediate levels of pest mobility and farmers heterogeneity our results shed light on the choice of regulatory instruments for common pool resource regulations where spatial localization matters

investing in a green transition abstract at the rio 20 conference the world s governments affirmed a need to transition toward green economies and background reports in preparation for the event emphasized the role of investment subsequent authors noted that private investment flows overwhelm public ones arguing that private investment must be mobilized for a transition however the role of private investment in a major economic transition is poorly understood particularly when the investment is not inherently attractive to investors and must be made attractive through policy we present a model representing investment macroeconomic interactions with classical features among its novel features is a distinction between affected sectors which are sensitive to the amount of green capital in the economy because of network effects and forward backward linkages and unaffected sectors which are relatively insensitive we argue that affected sectors are both harder to change and nearer to the base of the economy in model runs we observe that in a green transition the affected sector lags the unaffected sector with possible implications for a transition strategy thus in the model firm and investor behavior postpones deeper and more systemic changes until late in the transition

signalling in a dynamic labour market this paper analyzes a multiperiod version of the spence job market signalling model in which workers cannot commit to an education choice and firms make wage offers at any point in time the dynamic competition combined with the incomplete information yield a multiplicity of sequential equilibria including ones that sustain implicit collusion even though the length of the game is finite emphasis is placed on equilibria that satisfy the independence of never weak best response criterion of kohlberg and mertens 1986 it is shown that in the limit as the time between offers tends to zero any such equilibrium results in expectation in the unique stable outcome of the static spence model

dynamic signaling and market breakdown we consider the effects a public revelation of information e g rating grade has on trading in a dynamic signaling model competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration the external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium more interestingly we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices if signals are noisy no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information if signals are fully revealing then trade occurs even close to revelation however transaction prices are discontinuous

legal standards enforcement and corruption stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement because enforcement activity depends both on available tax revenue and the honesty of officials the optimal legal standard of a benevolent government is increasing in per capita income and decreasing in officials corruption in contrast to the tollbooth view of regulation the standard chosen by a self interested government is a non monotonic function of officials corruption and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a benevolent regulator international evidence on environmental regulation shows that standards correlate positively with per capita income and negatively with corruption consistent with the model s predictions for benevolent governments jel d73 k42 l51

bargaining with arrival of new traders we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events which represent arrival of traders or information we char acterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers the possi bility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics there is delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations the seller pay off equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival in applications when buyer valuations fall average prices drop and delay increases surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate

misselling through agents this paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents prospecting for customers and advis ing on the product s suitability for the specific needs of customers when structuring salesforce compensation firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing market ing incentives we characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling and thus the scope of policy intervention depends on features of the agency problem including the internal organization of a firm s sales process the transparency of its commission structure and the steepness of its agents sales incentives jel m31 m37 m52 when purchasing unfamiliar products consumers often rely on information and advice pro vided by representatives of the seller this creates the possibility of misselling the question able practice of a salesperson selling a product that may not match a customer s specific needs 1 this problem is particularly severe in markets for technically complex products such as con sumer electronics auto repairs medical care and retail financial services including securities pensions insurance policies and mortgages an important feature of these markets is that the seller often deals with the customer through an agent rather than directly for example financial brokers typically recommend purchase of a specific product after inquiring about their customers particular circumstances and needs the possibility of abuse has led to regulation in some of these markets most notably for securities transactions the financial industry regulatory authority finra the major self regulatory organization for securities firms operating in the united states mandates that broker dealers make a reasonable effort to obtain information about the individual characteristics of their noninstitutional cus tomers and to ensure that their recommendations are suitable to customers financial situations

government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection we study government interventions in a dynamic market with asymmetric information we show that if the government can only carry out budget neutral policies introducing a short tax exempt trading window followed by short lived positive taxes creates a pareto improvement in the market under a su cient condition on the shape of the gains from trade and the distribution of asset values we show that even when not requiring budget neutrality it is optimal to subsidize trades only at time zero while imposing prohibitively high taxes afterwards subsidies can greatly enhance welfare but they can also be detrimental if they are provided with delay

information spillovers in asset markets with correlated values we study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with privately informed traders and correlated asset values a trade of one asset or lack thereof can provide information about the value of other assets the information content of trading behavior is endogenously determined in equilibrium we show that this endogeneity leads to multiple equilibria when the correlation between asset values is suciently high the

education signalling with preemptive offers offers before workers complete their education workers cannot commit to turning down such offers offers are private so that workers are unable to use one firm s offer in an attempt to elicit better offers from other firms in the unique sequential equilibrium outcome of the model with unproductive education there is no wasteful education when education is productive the standard model predicts that more able individuals become overeducated to separate themselves from less able workers in our model less able workers become overeducated to partially pool with more able workers the pooling mutes the incentives of high ability workers who in consequence actually choose to become undereducated we examine the robustness of our result to modifications to the basic model

no compromise uncertain costs in reputational bargaining abstract i show how uncertainty about agents future costs of delay can lead to substantial bargaining delays when agents have reputational concerns reputational concerns arise because with positive probability agents are behavioral types committed to demanding a fixed share of the surplus in equilibrium rational agents may demand almost the entire surplus and then wait with the deadlock only broken by the arrival of news about future costs even as the probability of behavioral types vanishes although both agents would benefit from a compromise reached immediately they do not propose such agreements because doing so would increase an opponent s option value of waiting

equity issues with time varying asymmetric information this paper develops a formal model of the effect of time varying asymmetric information on the timing and pricing of equity issues when managers are better informed than outside investors we assume that as time passes the adverse selection problem becomes more severe as more managers receive a private signal under this assumption the model predicts temporal variation in the quantity of issues with a bunching of issues after information releases it also predicts that the price drop at issue announcement increases with the time since the last information release these predictions are consistent with several recent empirical studies relating equity issues to earnings and dividend announcements

hierarchical design and enforcement of income tax policies abstract a hierarchical model of tax compliance is studied in which the government selects a tax policy and then delegates the responsibility to collect taxes to the irs there is a fixed distribution of income in the economy individuals differ by their income which is known niether to the government nor to the irs we completely characterize the solution to the irs s revenue maximizing problem when taxpayers are risk neutral the optimal auditing policy divides the reported incomes into at most three groups we show that the government provides a smaller budget to the irs than the irs would wish

stagnation income distribution and monopoly power the deceleration in the rate of industrial growth in the indian economy since the middlesixties initially interpreted by some as a temporary downward deviation from trend hasnow come to be generally accepted as reflecting long run tendencies towards stagnation several explanations for these tendencies have been offered bhagwati and desai 1970 and bhagwati and srinivasan 1975 have focused on inefficiencies and the misallocationof resources arising from industrial policies pursued by the government others chakravarty 1974 raj 1976 and vaidyanathan 1974 among them have emphasisedthe sluggishness of agricultural growth which is alleged to have retarded industrial growthby limiting markets and the supply of wage goods and raw materials a third view reflectedin srinivasan and narayana 1977 for example has put the blame on a slackening of invest ment demand due to lower public investment but does not explain why public investmentfell or why its fall restrained industrial growth finally there is the explanation put forthin bagchi 1970 1975 1982 in nayyar 1978 and in parts of mitra 1977 that inequali ties in income distribution have resulted in a limited demand for industrial goods reducedincentives for investment and therefore reduced growth this view seems to suggest apositive relation between growth and income equality which is opposed to the generallyaccepted idea derived from cambridge growth models that higher growth requires greaterinequality the purpose of this paper is to examine the last explanation by considering the inter action between growth and income distribution in an underdeveloped economy with thehelp of a simple macroeconomic model the model is a stylisation of the indian economy so that we will be able to use the model to assess the argument that a deceleration in therate of growth of the indian industrial economy could have been caused by an unequaldistribution of income the argument will not be made that this income distributional con straint is the binding constraint on industrial growth the model will merely examine theinternal consistency of the argument that a bad income distribution could explain stagnation in the sense of reduced growth and show that in the indian context as in other similarcontexts this argument can be put forward in explaining stagnation our argument is first presented with a highly simplified schematisation of the indianeconomy which we shall call the basic model the economy modelled produces only one

towards post keynesian ecological macroeconomics the paper starts with a brief criticism of macroeconomic analyses of different schools of thought for their focus on economic growth and maximisation of output this applies to the traditional keynesian approach which has focused on the achievement of sufficient aggregate demand to underpin full employment and full capacity utilisation down playing aggregate supply constraints this also applies to the neoclassical approach including the current new consensus macroeconomics approach which asserts the dominant role of aggregate supply in the long run and where growth is set by the so called natural rate of growth with no concerns over environmental and ecological issues the paper then proposes a different approach to macroeconomic analysis it explicitly acknowledges that economic growth is a double edged sword growth can help to alleviate persistent levels of high unemployment but it can also lead to potentially catastrophic environmental problems building on the monetary circuit theory and the demand led growth theory the paper offers an analysis of the interconnections and interdependence of the economic biophysical and social worlds and by doing it hopes to provide the building blocks for the establishment of post keynesian ecological macroeconomics

does self regulation work experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self regulatory organizations self regulation sr is a common way of enforcing quality in markets such as banking financial services and several professions and in a variety of public and private organizations we provide experimental evidence of the reputational incentives of self regulatory organizations sros to publicly disclose versus cover up fraud in an incomplete information environment we find that observed behaviour is generally consistent with bayesian equilibrium when subjects are informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by a vigilant versus a lax sro type in particular a fraud disclosure equilibrium is supported when subjects are informed that the vigilant sro is more likely to detect fraud otherwise a cover up equilibrium is supported however when subjects are not informed about the relative likelihood of fraud detection by the sro types as expected in real sr situations no equilibrium is strongly supported our results suggest that in practice the reputation based incentives for ef

the effectiveness of energy service demand reduction a scenario analysis of global climate change mitigation abstract a reduction of energy service demand is a climate mitigation option but its effectiveness has never been quantified we quantify the effectiveness of energy service demand reduction in the building transport and industry sectors using the asia pacific integrated assessment computable general equilibrium aim cge model for the period 2015 2050 under various scenarios there were two major findings first a 25 energy service demand reduction in the building transport and basic material industry sectors would reduce the gdp loss induced by climate mitigation from 4 0 to 3 0 and from 1 2 to 0 7 in 2050 under the 450 ppm and 550 ppm co 2 equivalent concentration stabilization scenarios respectively second the effectiveness of a reduction in the building sector s energy service demand would be higher than those of the other sectors at the same rate of the energy service demand reduction furthermore we also conducted a sensitivity analysis of different socioeconomic conditions and the climate mitigation target was found to be a key determinant of the effectiveness of energy service demand reduction measures therefore more certain climate mitigation targets would be useful for the decision makers who design energy service demand reduction measures

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis

evading auditing and taxing the equity compliance tradeoff tax evasion and auditing are analyzed in a model of linear income taxation taxpayers minimize expected tax payments including penalty for underreporting while the tax administration sets its audit policy to maximize expected net revenue under the restriction of only two audit rates per class of taxpayers given the reaction of taxpayers and tax administration we derive the optimal income tax that the government should adopt to maximize social welfare there are several classes of taxpayers each characterized by a given distribution of pretax income and specific audit policy parameters

competition leverage how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment we study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low risk consumers insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences to achieve first best risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high risk agents second we identify a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low risk market to the less elastic high risk market third mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further at the cost of efficiency

the complementarity between risk adjustment and community rating distorting market outcomes to facilitate redistribution abstract we analyze optimal risk adjustment in competitive health insurance markets when insurers have better information on their customers risk profiles than the sponsor of health insurance in the optimal scheme the sponsor uses reinsurance to screen insurers with bad and good risks in order to lower premiums for enrollees with high expected healthcare costs we then explore the effects of adding a community rating requirement to complement this risk adjustment scheme with community rating insurers have incentives to distort contract generosities to cherry pick low cost consumers however the reduced generosity for low cost types makes screening through reinsurance easier allowing the sponsor to redistribute more when costs for reinsurance are low or the sponsor s bias towards high cost consumers is high community rating dominates risk rating

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

the effects on competitiveness of coordinated versus unilateral fiscal policies reducing ghg emissions in the eu an assessment of a 10 reduction by 2010 using the e3me model abstract international competitiveness effects from coordinated and uncoordinated multilateral policies to reduce co 2 emissions from 11 member states of the eu by 2010 are compared with those from unilateral policies to achieve a 10 cut in each member state alone the paper presents the results from four projections using a large scale integrated regionalised e3 model of the eu estimated on time series cross section data 1968 93 with international trade treated as between each member state and a european transport and distribution network the 10 reduction is achieved by additional excise duties incremented every year 1999 to 2010 according to the carbon contents of fuels with special with special treatment of electricity taxed on outputs not inputs with revenues recycled via reductions in employers social security contributions multilateral coordinated policies require a common tax rate of 156 ecu per tonne carbon 1999 prices which rises to an average of 165 ecu per tonne with a wide range between regions when policies are uncoordinated all the tax shift projections show double dividends for emission reduction and employment gain for all member states unilateral policies do not show much carbon leakage but they show smaller gains for output and employment effects for price competitiveness appear to be small and mixed with serious losses appearing only for the netherlands and for metals and chemicals especially for unilateral action

the approach of ecological economics this paper discusses the major tenets of ecological economics including value pluralism methodological pluralism and multi criteria policy assessment ecological economics offers viable alternatives to the theoretical foundations and policy recommendations of neoclassical welfare economics a revolution in neoclassical economics is currently taking place and the core assumptions of welfare economics are being replaced with more realistic models of consumer and firm behaviour this paper argues that these new theoretical and empirical findings are largely ignored in applied work and policy applications in environmental economics as the only heterodox school of economics focusing on the human economy both as a social system and as one imbedded in the biophysical universe and thus both holistic and scientifically based ecological economics is poised to play a leading role in recasting the scope and method of economic science

the endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing abstract this paper analyzes the deadweight loss of delegated auditing in a three tier hierarchy in a costly state verification model this cost depends on the endogenous information structure the auditor s degree of risk aversion and the size of the punishment we identify the optimal contractual outcome of this delegation model with the solution obtained in a standard three tier hierarchical model of collusive auditor we then derive from this identification the set of parameters of the physical environment which may affect the efficiency of side contracting within the firm

self regulation and government oversight self regulation is a feature of a number of professions for example in the u s the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self regulatory organizations sros like the new york stock exchange and the national association of securities dealers we analyse one regulatory task of an sro enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers specifically we model contracting enforcement as a two tier problem an sro chooses its enforcement policy the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule given an enforcement policy agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers expected utility we assume that the sro s objective is to maximize the welfare of its members the agents we show that the sro chooses a more lax enforcement policy meaning less frequent investigations than what customers would choose a general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents we also investigate government oversight of the self regulatory process the threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the sro just enough to pre empt any government enforcement copyright 2005 wiley blackwell

macroeconomic impacts of climate change mitigation in latin america a cross model comparison abstract in this paper we analyse macroeconomic consequences of greenhouse gas emission mitigation in latin america up to 2050 through a multi model comparison approach undertaken in the context of the climacap lamp research project we compare two carbon tax scenarios with a business as usual scenario of anticipated future energy demand in the short term with carbon prices reaching around 15 tco 2 by 2030 most models agree that the reduction in consumer spending as a proxy for welfare is limited to about 0 3 by 2050 at carbon prices of 165 tco 2 there is much more divergence in the estimated impact on consumer spending as well as gdp across models and regions which reflects uncertainties about technology costs and substitution opportunities between technologies we observe that the consequences of increasingly higher carbon prices in terms of reduced consumer spending and gdp tend to be fairly linear with the carbon price in our cge models however the consequences are divergent and nonlinear in our econometric model that is linked to an energy system model that simulates step changes in technology substitution the results of one model show that climate policy measures can have positive effects on consumer spending and gdp which results from an investment stimulus and the redistribution of carbon price revenues to consumers

switching to carbon free production processes implications for carbon leakage and border carbon adjustment climate policy under partial global compliance raises concerns regarding carbon leakage while border carbon adjustment bca measures are a potential remedy they have also been criticised on various grounds this paper therefore investigates whether a policy fostering the switch to carbon free technologies can substitute for bcas a reason for the effectiveness of a targeted technology policy is that major leakage prone sectors such as iron and steel have two main sources of carbon emissions combustion of fossil fuels and industrial processes while combustion emissions can be reduced relatively easy by increasing energy efficiency reducing process emissions requires a switch to low carbon production processes e g in steel production by deploying electrolysis based on large scale solar electricity we show by means of a multi regional computable general equilibrium analysis that such a switch in steel production technology can eliminate a significant fraction of carbon leakage and also increase sectoral output and welfare since the necessary technologies are not available at large scale yet however are likely to be by 2020 a transitional bca scheme may be a crucial supportive instrument to foster such technology switches yet in the long run bca should be phased out to preserve the incentive for carbon free innovation

search with adverse selection this paper analyzes a sequential search model with adverse selection we study information aggregation by the price how close the equilibrium prices are to the full information prices when search frictions are small we identify circumstances under which prices fail to aggregate information well even when search frictions are small we trace this to a strong form of the winner s curse that is present in the sequential search model the failure of information aggregation may result in inefficient allocations

waiting for news in the market for lemons econometrica vol 80 no 4 july 2012 1433 1504 waiting for news in the market for lemons b y b rendan d aley and b rett g reen 1 we study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information news about the value of a privately informed seller s asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers we con struct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure the no trade period ends in one of two ways either enough good news arrives restoring confidence and markets reopen or bad news arrives making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is a partial sell off of low value assets conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided we analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure k eywords dynamic games adverse selection information economics signaling 1 introduction c onsider an entrepreneur who is interested in selling her company due to liquidity constraints naturally she is better informed than the market about her company s fundamentals she would like to sell yet there is no reason she is forced to do so on any given day nor can she commit to delaying trade with every passing day that she retains ownership she gains or loses the day s profit and maintains the option to sell the next day if trade is in fact delayed then the market may learn about the value of the firm by observing cash flows investments customer base and so forth herein lies the key innovation of this paper we introduce an exogenous public information process news into a model of such settings we then study the implications for trading behavior efficiency and welfare we model the environment as a game played in continuous time where a risk neutral seller faces a competitive market there is common knowledge of gains from trade but the seller is privately informed about the asset s value i e her type which may be either high or low at each point in time prior to trade the seller receives offers from the market if an offer is accepted then the trade is consummated and the game ends if all offers are rejected then the seller consumes the type dependent flow payoff endowed by the asset contemporaneously information about the seller s type is publicly revealed we are grateful to a co editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and sug gestions we are greatly indebted to jeremy bulow michael harrison and andrzej skrzypacz for useful conversations comments and encouragement special thanks also to peter demarzo johannes horner ilan kremer jon levin paul milgrom yuliy sannikov bob wilson and sem inar participants at chicago chicago gsb duke mit kellogg nyu penn stanford olin wharton unc yale and the 7th annual duke northwestern texas io theory conference 2012 the econometric society doi 10 3982 ecta9278

samurai accountant a theory of auditing and plunder a risk neutral principal wishes to exact a payment from a risk neutral agent whose wealth he does not know but may verify through a costly auditing procedure we characterize efficient schemes for the principal when he is allowed to choose schedules for preaudit and postaudit payments and audit probabilities subject to the constraint that only monetary incentives can be used and that the principal may never make a net payment to the agent the main results are that efficient schemes involve preaudit payments which are increasing in the agent s wealth audit probabilities are decreasing in the agent s wealth and also satisfy certain constraints as equalities in general such schemes involve stochastic auditing and rebates after an audit in this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns we assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent s

imperfect markets and the properties of macro economic environmental models as tools for policy evaluation abstract economic environmental models are deeply disaggregated macro economic systems which are used in economic environmental studies to explain the emissions of pollutions and the extraction of resources concerning the economic base two approaches can be differentiated the neoclassical and the keynesian paradigm models based on the neoclassical paradigm are depicting equilibrium of perfectly competitive markets whereas the models based on the keynesian paradigm have been developed from a critical position vis a vis neoclassical theory stressing the importance of market imperfections the paper at hand shows in its theoretical part that this fundamental difference to a large extent is responsible for differences in modeling results concerning the impact of policy instruments on the economy and the environment furthermore the two paradigms prefer different ways of parameterization which has consequences for the empirical validation of the models the construction of the references and the effects of environmental policy the paper at hand further shows that the theoretical arguments allow explaining the totally different and partly opposite results of concrete policy simulations in the polfree project where the large scale economic environmental models exiomod neoclassical and ginfors keynesian have been used

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

the self regulation of commodity exchanges the case of market manipulation influential economists argue that government regulation of manipulative practices in financial markets is unnecessary because exchanges have incentives to take nearly first best precautions against the exercise of market power this article shows that the theoretical arguments underlying this proposition are weak because exchange members are likely to ignore the effects of manipulation on inframarginal traders and price informativeness competition between exchanges may be limited and collective action problems preclude efficient exchange intervention for these reasons exchanges will likely take few precautions against market power an examination of the history of self regulation at 10 exchanges prior to the passage of laws proscribing manipulation shows that they took few if any measures to curb manipulation since the characteristics of manipulation imply that it can be deterred efficiently through the use of harm based sanctions this theory and evidence strongly suggest that self regulation is a

basic versus supplementary health insurance moral hazard and adverse selection this paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection we show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market surprisingly the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance

non bayesian decision theory ahead of its time the case of g l s shackle this article deals with the reception of george l s shackle s volume expectation in economics introducing a unique attempt to discard the probability framework in the investigation of behaviour under uncertainty through a fresh reading of the textual evidence including correspondence held at cambridge university library the article assesses why decision theorists interest in shackle s theory substantial during the 1950s faded away in the early 1960s the article argues that apart from shackle s refusal to comprehend that his critics were under the influence of a new subjective probability perspective a major explanation of the dismissal of his work stays in shackle s stance not to establish a collaborative link with those critics who showed a positive attitude towards his theory the article shows though that the discussion between shackle and his critics hinged on a number of topics that are still crucial to the current developments of decision theory

economic impacts of the 1997 eu energy tax simulations with three eu wide models in march 1997 the european commission adopted aproposal that increases existing minimum levels oftaxation on mineral oils by around 10 to 25 andintroduces excises for other energy products thispaper analyses the macroeconomic impacts of theproposal it employs three models hermes gem e3 ande3me all models confirm that the proposal will havepositive macroeconomic impacts when the tax revenuesare used to reduce social security contributions paidby employers for the eu as a whole both gdp andemployment are expected to be higher and co2emissions are 0 9 to 1 6 percent lower the positiveeu wide effects can be observed in practically allmember states the sector impacts are modest with theenergy sector expected to face the most negativeimpacts differences between model results are due tothe model type general equilibrium ormacro econometric the eu countries covered and theway tax exemptions were handled crucial assumptionsto obtain the double dividend are the modelling ofthe labour market and the impacts on eu externaltrade the sensitivity of the results for the use oftax revenues tax exemptions and tax rate increases isassessed

revenue raising vs other approaches to environmental protection the critical significance of pre existing tax distortions using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a tax interaction effect that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates this effect is partially offset by a revenue recycling effect grandfathered pollution quotas such as those used under the 1990 clean air act amendments to regulate electric utilities so2 emissions do not benefit from this offset preexisting taxes raise this regulation s cost by over 70 more than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue recycling effect

uncertainties in macroeconomic assessments of low carbon transition pathways the case of the european iron and steel industry abstract the climate targets agreed in paris 2015 render deep decarbonization of energy and emission intensive industries crucial policy makers are interested in the macroeconomic consequences of such decarbonization pathways and often rely on integrated modelling studies however the underlying modelling assumptions and uncertainties often remain unquestioned or invisible although they may govern the models results for the case of a zero process emission pathway of the european iron and steel industry we demonstrate how different assumptions on different layers of uncertainty influence results we show that effects strongly depend on technology choice prevailing macroeconomic states as well as regional characteristics the underlying socio economic development and the climate policy trajectory seem to play a less important role particularly we find that the choice of model i e which macroeconomic theory strand it arises from influences the sign and magnitude of macroeconomic effects and thus should be well understood in terms of appropriate interpretations by both modelers and policy makers we emphasize that model assumptions should be transparent results sought as to be robust across a range of possible contexts and presented together with the conditions under which they are valid to that end co design and co production in research would support its relevance and applicability

the self regulating profession slayton and treblicock 1978 the formal analysis of the economics of the self regulating profession has received little attention from theorists if a profession is self regulating in the sense that its current members being the sole suppliers of a certain type of service are free to determine in one way or another whether or not to admit a potential recruit then it might seem prima facie that such a profession could simply be regarded as a monopolistic seller of the service in question so that the effects of self regulation would appear to involve an unambiguous welfare loss the whole rationale for self regulation however rests on the notion that it provides a vehicle through which the quality of the service may be maintained in markets where the consumer cannot readily measure this quality himself it is the analysis of the interplay of these two elements the enhanced price of such services associated with the monopolistic power of the profession and the improved quality of the service which may accompany a reduction in supply which forms the focus of the present paper it is tempting to begin the analysis of such a profession by first positing some particular

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small