a dynamic analysis of licensing the boomerang effect and grant back clauses this article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on r d competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant back clauses of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant back clause can mitigate this distortion i also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee s incentive to engage in r d and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets

towards an attention based view of the firm the central argument is that firm behavior is the result of how firms channel and distribute the attention of their decision makers what decision makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on what issues and answers they focus on depends on the specific situation and on how the firm s rules resources and relationships distribute various issues answers and decision makers into specific communications and procedures the paper develops these theoretical principles into a model of firm behavior and presents its implications for explaining firm behavior and adaptation 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

the dark side of board political capital enabling blockholder rent appropriation resource dependence theorists argue that boards of directors with political capital can benefit focal firms by reducing uncertainty and providing preferential resources here we develop theory reg

patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the united states house of representatives our most robust findings can be summarized as follows u the spatial location of candidates is important in determining the pattern of campaign contributions many pacs and all pac types except agricultural cooperatives contribute in a manner highly consistent with a simple spatial model there is little giving by an individual pac to candidates at opposite ends of the dimension there is no instance of a pac contributing to incumbents located at each end of the dimension and only to challengers of incumbents in the middle or vice versa contributions against incumbents i e to challengers of incumbents are often spatial mirror images of a pac s giving in favor of incumbents though this statement must be tempered by the fact that the large majority of pacs give relatively little money to challengers few pacs give money to both challenger and incumbent in the same race giving in open seat races is if anything even more spatially consistent than in races where an incumbent is running while many individual pacs exhibit patterns of contributions consistent with the ideological dimension the data for 1980 suggest that there was no particular bias toward one end of the spectrum or the other taking all pacs together essentially eliminates the effect of the location variable in the regressions giving in races with an incumbent on the ballot was overall balanced across the dimension there are however ideological distinctions even among groups as broadly defined as the fec categories for the corporate labor and trade membership health groups the incumbent s location on the ideological dimension is an important explanatory variable even when other factors specific to the incumbent are considered of course ideology matters to nonconnected groups too they just tend to balance each other off in positive money though not in negative on average corporate and trade groups favor conservative incumbents and opponents of liberal incumbents labor pacs do the opposite except for labor pacs party is not an important variable in explaining positive contributions once the incumbent s voting record is taken into account for contributions to challengers however party is significant corporate nonconnected and trade pacs gave to opponents of democrats labor pacs did the opposite the expected closeness of the election is always an important variable both positive money and contributions to challengers increase as the probability of a strong challenge increases this suggests that pacs are sensitive to the potential impact of contributions on electoral outcomes although committee assignments have some importance in explaining campaign contributions by pac categories their net effect is never strong except in the case of cooperatives this is almost certainly because of the diversity of interests represented by pacs in every category except coops which are essentially one giant pac of milk producers we would surmise that competitive forces in the house result in most members having a portfolio of committee assignments that provides maximum advantage vis a vis each member s constituency it would therefore be surprising if overall committee assignments by themselves pointed to significant differences in generating campaign resources being chairman or ranking minority member of a committee has no impact on campaign contributions other things equal seniority as measured by number of consecutive years in office has a complicated role for positive contributions seniority has a nonmonotonic effect with contributions being higher for the most junior and most senior members ceteris paribus than for incumbents with average seniority negative contributions however are not significantly related to seniority

political pluralism public policies and organizational choices banking branch expansion in india 1948 2003 data on the expansion of 94 commercial banks in india from 1948 to 2003 were analyzed to test the proposition that political pluralism wherein competing parties control the state and national governments of a nation can promote business expansion the results confirm that such political pluralism reduces the power of either government to constrain business decision making but that pluralism might at times lead to unhealthy competition between parties harming local expansion opportunities the data show that in india banks selectively exploit political pluralism to guide their expansion decisions

licensing and innovation a comment according to chang et al 2013 social welfare under licensing is lower than under no licensing if the r d efficiency is high we show that this result is not correct as when r d efficiency is high social welfare is higher under licensing than under no licensing

flexing muscle corporate political expenditures as signals to the bureaucracy when corporations and their employees spend money in the political arena to what extent are they purchasing special treatment complaints about the deleterious effects of corporate money in politics are ubiquitous in american political discourse however in order to pinpoint the place of these expenditures in american democracy and to appreciate fully the consequences of various reform proposals itiscriticaltoidentifytheprecisemechanism through which any preferential treatment might occur in this spirit scholars have suggested that corporations make political expenditures because they hope to influence government behavior through either explicit quid pro quos with legislators for constituency service or favorable votes baron 1989 grossman and helpman 1994 2001 improved access to legislators hall and wayman 1990 langbein 1986 or enhancement of the electoral prospects of sympathetic incumbents pooleandromer1985 empiricalevidenceverifying a definitive relationship between expenditures and specific policy change unfortunately has proven elusive in a recent review essay ansolabehere de figueiredo and snyder 2003 116 conclude contributions explain a miniscule fraction of the variation in voting behavior in the u s congress they suggest thatcontributionsarebetterthoughtofasconsumption goods that fulfill a desire to participate in politics than as investment in a political marketplace

a behavioral theory of r d expenditures and innovations evidence from shipbuilding i base an integrated model of innovation development and launch on the behavioral theory of the firm this model specifies that research and development expenses are increased when low performance causes problemistic search and when excess resources cause slack search innovations generated by search are launched if low performance gives managers high risk tolerance using data from shipbuilding firms i show that high performance reduces r d intensity and innovation launches and high slack increases r d intensity as predicted

duty fear and tax compliance the heuristic basis of citizenship behavior theory the costs imposed by income tax and other citizenship duties provide powerful incentives to free ride yet the likelihood of getting caught the primary self interested deterrent to free riding is unlikely to be known with much accuracy by most citizens thus the duty heuristic provides not only a direct motivation to comply but also influences behavior through cognitive processes that bias self interested beliefs about the advantages of free riding hypothesis citizens beliefs about their duty to obey laws of the state bias their information processing and judgements about the fear of getting caught and punished for disobedience so citizens reporting greater commitment to obey tax laws systematically overestimate the expected penalty for noncompliance methods regression analysis of survey and tax return data for 445 taxpayers results subjective risk of getting caught is more closely related to duty than to objective risk factors objective audit probabilities affect only taxpayers with greater temptation to cheat but duty influences tempted taxpayers as much as ordinary taxpayers

how do competitive pressures affect incentives to innovate when there is a market for inventions competition and intellectual property ip protections are complements in stimulating innovation when ip is appropriable a market for inventions forms and competitive pressures increase incentives to innovate competition among producers the demand side of the market for inventions and competition among inventors the supply side of the market for inventions create incentives to innovate when ip is not fully appropriable markets for inventions are limited and competitive pressures can decrease incentives to innovate firms vertically integrate r d and production and share technology to appropriate the returns to ip this implies that antitrust policy and ip protections are complements

motive opportunity choice and corporate illegality research on corporate illegality spans several distinct literatures and defies ready integration this article helps to overcome those problems analysis of data from 80 u s industrial organizations indicates that lower industry profitability is associated with higher frequencies of detected serious violations of federal environmental laws organizational profitability industry concentration organization size structural complexity organizational decentralization and ethical climate join this variable in statistical interactions also associated with detected instances of serious environmental violations however none of those variables are found to be associated with the incidence of detected nonserious violations these results provide qualified support for a model of corporate illegality in which illegal behaviors are attributable to the interactive effects of motive opportunity and choice they suggest that illegal corporate activities resist simple explanation and that future research on corporate illegality should concentrate on further development of multivariable models

an empirical test of the asymmetric models on innovative activity who invests more into r d the incumbent or the challenger the theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the potential entrant invests more into r d has attracted considerable interest this paper reports the results of an empirical study on this question using data of about 3500 german firms over the years 1992 to 1995 the survey explicitly asks the firms for their motives to undertake innovative activity it is thus possible to take account of intended not just completed market entry it turns out that the challenger invests more into r d in order to enter a new market than the incumbent thus the patent racing model by reinganum and others seems to characterize innovative activity more accurately than the competing auction model of gilbert and newbery we use a heteroscedastic tobit as well as a tobit model with selectivity in order to deal with the econometric problems of double censoring

the power of the purse and its implications for bureaucratic policy making a dilemma of the power of the purse is thatcutting an agency s budget may make a desired policyinfeasible i examine the implications of thisdilemma with a repeated game in which a bureau choosesunobservable policies after a legislature sets itsbudget the bureau is work averse and has its ownpolicy preferences and therefore may cheat but thelegislature may perform an audit to recover slack funds a main result is that if the legislaturedesires a higher policy level than the agency then itfaces a trade off between good but wasteful policiesand bad but efficient ones

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly reply stephen salant takes issue with a single paragraph of our 1982 paper section iic p 518 and then claims that our conclusions result either from faulty logic or from our implicit assumption that a market fails to operate we respond by showing that our conclusions are logically consistent and that salant s argument is flawed by its incompleteness the preemptive patenting results hold whenever equally efficient firms compete with nonzero transaction costs a point which is not contested by salant and whenever any cost disadvantage experienced by the incumbent is less than the transaction costs incurred in the process of bargaining for production rights furthermore we will show that if the incumbent s cost disadvantage exceeds transaction costs then the preemption result hinges on the relative transaction costs in the markets for r d outputs and inputs the conditions derived by salant are erroneous and indeed irrelevant to the incentives for preemption salant mounts his main argument on the assumption that transaction costs are zero but fails to realize the full implications of this counterfactual assumption ronald coase told us many years ago that bargaining in the absence of transaction costs broadly interpreted will eliminate cost inefficiencies and yield a pareto optimal allocation by selecting excerpts from two different papers and then providing his own emphasis salant constructs the impression that our results contradict the coase argument we feel this creative journalism is an inaccurate representation of our conclusions the implications for preemptive patenting depend on transaction costs as salant shows for any finite transaction cost an equally efficient monopolist can preempt competitors subject to the technological and strategic assumptions in our model salant argues that if a monopolist is less efficient than a rival and if the cost penalty exceeds transaction costs then the rival firm will preempt the monopolist as it stands this conclusion is false it is arbitrary to restrict bargaining as salant does to a single market or group of markets if firms can negotiate in the patent market they can also negotiate in markets for inputs to the r d process assuming as we had explicitly done no diseconomies that are solely due to management technological inefficiency must be the result of inferior r d inputs these inputs can be bargained for as well

information access and contributions a signaling model of lobbying interest groups pay monetary contributions to gain access and provide information to a policymaker if their interests are aligned with those of the policymaker s constituency they have costless access and report their private information truthfully if their interests conflict they are forced to pay a strictly positive contribution in order to enhance the credibility of their reports the policymaker bases her policy decision on the competing reports and the size of the contributions accompanying these reports the interest groups contribution decisions are plagued by a free rider problem i derive the implications of this problem for the size and pattern of contributions and for the degree of information aggregation

strategic reference point theory how can executives achieve a match between expected external environmental conditions and internal organizational capabilities that facilitates improved performance this paper argues that a firm s choice of reference points can help achieve strategic alignment capable of yielding improved performance and potentially even a sustainable competitive advantage building upon prospect theory and other relevant theoretical perspectives the strategic reference point srp matrix is developed a firm s srp consists of three dimensions internal capability external conditions and time a theory is developed which posits an optimal srp structure and propositions are offered which articulate the expected relationships between the srp strategic choice behavior and firm performance the paper closes with some suggestions for using strategic reference points in both research and practice

pre emptive patenting joint ventures and the persistence of oligopoly abstract gilbert and newbery 1982 have examined pre emptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly the present paper considers pre emptive patenting when there are several incumbent firms rather than just one it is shown why the incumbent oligopolists behaving non cooperatively might fail to deter entry this suggests that a joint venture in r and d might be a useful entry deterring device insofar as it pools the incumbents incentives to prevent entry this is indeed the case for small innovations but for large innovations the formation of a joint venture weakens the incumbents incentive to innovate by removing the competitive stimulus between them

incentive compatibility in signaling games with a continuum of types on donne deux resultats utiles pour demontrer l existence et pour caracteriser des equilibres de separation dans des jeux de signalement

licensing in the theory of innovation this article analyzes licensing in a noncooperative r d game we ask two questions what are the incentives for licensing a production technology and what is the impact of licensing on the pattern of innovation and the consequent evolution of industry costs and market structure the gainsfrom trading information through licensing contracts are achieved through the replacement of inefficient production techniques the ex post incentive and the elimination of inefficient research expenditures the ex ante incentive in a duopoly the availability of licensing encourages research when the firms initial production technologies are close in costs and discourages research when initial costs are asymmetric

strategic innovation and technology adoption in an evolving industry abstract we introduce a racing model with multiple product generations product innovation spin outs and licensing industry conditions and innovation characteristics affect who wins the race and who markets the resulting product small firms market their innovations when they pioneer a new generation or improve quality in a young generation and license their innovations in mature generations if old generation leaders ever market improvements in young generation goods they do so early on leadership in mature generations persists tests on the rigid disk drive industry 1977 1997 provide empirical support the results have implications for antitrust policies and policies governing employee non compete agreements

business ethics and finance in greater china synthesis and future directions in sustainability csr and fraud following the financial crisis and recent recession the center of gravity of global economic growth and competitiveness is shifting toward emerging economies as a leading and increasingly influential emerging economy china is currently attracting the attention of academics practitioners and policy makers there has been an increase in research interest in and publications on issues relating to china within high quality international academic journals we therefore organized a special issue conference in conjunction with the journal of business ethics jbe in lhasa tibet on may 19 20 2014 on business ethics in greater china past present and future the papers for the special issue focused on the intersection of ethics and finance and fit within one of the three themes environment and sustainability corporate social responsibility and fraud within these themes issues of intellectual capital protection gender equality political connections regional development investor protection corporate stewardship trust and corruption and corporate transparency each play a significant role in this paper we survey these studies and the related literature to provide a comprehensive coverage of business ethics and finance issues that affect china

fundamentals of efficient factor investing corrected may 2017 combining long only constrained factor subportfolios is generally not a mean variance efficient way to capture expected factor returns for example a combination of four fully invested factor subportfolios low beta small size value and momentum captures less than half e g 40 of the potential improvement over the market portfolio s sharpe ratio in contrast a long only portfolio of individual securities using the same risk model and return forecasts captures most e g 80 of the potential improvement we adapt traditional portfolio theory to more recently popularized factor based investing and simulate optimal combinations of factor and security portfolios using the largest 1 000 common stocks in the us equity market from 1968 to 2015

deterrence by market sharing a strategic incentive for licensing the potential of an incumbent firm to retain its dominant position in a market is a focal point of the modem theory of industrial organization a recent literature examines this issue for markets in which challengers threaten an incumbent s position by engaging in research for a new technology richard gilbert and david newbery 1982 show that an incumbent firm with a firstmover advantage will preempt potential entrants by inventing a new technology slightly earlier than would its rivals in a stochastic r d therefore its introduction does not alter the decision to research when the pre innovation market is characterized by an incumbent and potential entrants stephen salant 1984 shows that licensing ex post to innovation can alter the research decision as anticipation of the returns from future licensing encourages research by the entrant as a counterpoint to the salant result i find that licensing ex ante to research may discourage further research by the entrant indeed this strategic incentive for licensing may be so strong as to persuade the incumbent as well as the entrant to terminate research activity to isolate this incentive for licensing from the one discussed by salant a simple model is constructed in which licensing of future technologies is not desirable anecdotal evidence suggests that the strategic incentive does lead innovators in some markets to license their technologies examples of this information sharing are prevalent in markets where technological change is rapid in the 1940 s standard oil of new jersey discovered a process for synthetic rubber it traded patent rights on this process for a synthetic oil production process discovered by farben a german rubber company in both the synthetic oil and synthetic rubber markets rival companies were department of economics scarsborough college university of toronto toronto ontario canada m5s lal i thank jon cohen and ron saunders for discussions that inspired this paper i am also grateful to yehuda kotowitz andy mclennan jennifer reinganum ralph winter myma wooders two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the university of toronto for helpful comments on earlier drafts

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

complementarity status similarity and social capital as drivers of alliance formation using data on u s investment banking firms syndication in underwriting corporate stock offerings during the 1980s this study explores the factors that drive alliance formation between two specific firms we compare resource complementarity status similarity and social capital as a basis of alliance formation the findings indicate that the likelihood of investment banks alliance formation is positively related to the complementarity of their capabilities as well as their status similarity social capital arising from banks direct and indirect collaborative experiences also plays a very important role in alliance formation the number of deals given by a lead bank to a potential partner over the past three years has an inverted u shaped relationship to the probability that the lead bank will invite the potential partner to form an alliance our findings indicate that status similarity and social capital have a stronger effect on alliance formation in initial public offering deals than in secondary offering deals as the former are more uncertain than the latter using these findings we discuss the role of complementarity status similarity and social capital in alliance formation copyright 2000 john wiley sons ltd

which firms buy licenses market positions and license expenditures this paper presents the empirical results of a comparison of technology licensing expenditures of german companies in order to test implications of the gilbert and newbery 1982 model aside from standard control variables the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account we differentiate between firms intending to secure their present position in the market incumbents and those intending to enter a new market challengers in line with the prediction of the gilbert and newbery model we find that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants

investor protection and corporate governance recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms in the breadth and depth of capital markets in dividend policies and in the access of firms to external finance a common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors both shareholders and creditors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms we describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries discuss the possible origins of these differences summarize their consequences and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform we argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank centered and market centered financial systems

getting to know you a theory of strategic group identity this paper develops a theory of strategic group identity that explains how strategic groups emerge in an industry and how they can affect firm behaviors and outcomes in so doing it provides a theoretical basis for the existence of strategic groups we argue that managers cognitively partition their industry environment to reduce uncertainty and to cope with bounded rationality social learning theory and social identification theory are used to describe how cognitive groups coalesce into meaningful substructures and how a group level identity emerges we describe the ways in which macro level factors condition the development of groups and their identities we introduce the notion of a strong identity which characterizes any group sufficiently recognized and attended to by members to affect individual action groups with weak identities are no more than transient agglomerations of firms and do not exist in any meaningful sense these ideas are developed into propositions that describe the conditions under which groups with strong identities are likely to emerge a second set of propositions describes their transformation over time identity strength is linked to both positive and negative outcomes in a final set of propositions we show how strategic groups with strong identities can affect firm performance resolving a longstanding problem which has plagued strategic groups research and conclude by suggesting some approaches for measurement and future research 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

the arithmetic of all in investment expenses this article represents a rare if not unique attempt to estimate the drag on mutual fund returns engendered by all in investment expenses including not only expense ratios until now the conventional measure of fund costs but also fund transaction costs sales loads and cash drag compared with costly actively managed funds over time low cost index funds create extra wealth of 65 for retirement plan investors

performance following changes of international presence in domestic and transition industries we examine relationships between firm performance and changes in international presence in five medical sector industries between 1978 and 1989 conditioned on the international status of the industries and the market position of the firms international expansion was necessary for survival when foreign firms began to enter a domestic market but only firms with substantial market share and international experience gained prior to the industry transition could expand successfully operating only in the home market may permit a firm to survive in a primarily domestic industry but moderate international expansion often brings current benefits and provides a base for future success should the industry become more global however expansion carries the risk of failure firms that retrench after expanding internationally disappear

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

preemptive patenting and the persistence of monopoly this article takes a different tack and inquires whether institutions such as the patent system create opportunities for firms with monopoly power to maintain their monopoly power the results apply to other situations such as brand identification spatial location and capacity expansion which share the characteristic that early or preemptive actions may lower the returns to potential competitors

law endowments and property rights while scholars have hypothesized about the sources of variation in property rights for over 2500 years it is only very recently that researchers have begun to test these theories empirically this paper reviews both the theory and empirical evidence supporting and refuting the law and endowment views of property rights the law view holds that historically determined differences in national legal traditions continue to shape cross country differences in property rights the endowment view argues that during european colonization differences in climate crops the indigenous population and the disease environment influenced long run property rights

the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud this study extends the research on corporate financial fraud by developing a new perspective on the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments premised on social learning theory we posit that firms vicariously learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues environmental cues and social cues in the inhibitive learning process thus being deterred from committing future fraudulence using a matched sample of 604 observations of chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2008 our findings show that an observing firm is deterred from committing fraud if the peers in its industry are caught and punished we further find that such deterrence effects are subject to how the observing firm evaluates the possibility of being caught and the likelihood it will be punished the same way if it violates similar prohibitions in particular inhibitive learning effects are positively moderated by punishments of prominent firms and model observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development of the legal system our study sheds light on the corporate fraud literature by illuminating the indirect inhibitive learning process from vicarious punishments and identifying the conditions for differential learning deterrence outcomes of the observing firms

why good firms do bad things the effects of high aspirations high expectations and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality recent high profile corporate scandals involving prominent high performing firms cast doubt on assertions that the costs of getting caught decrease the likelihood such high performers will act illegally we explain this paradox by using theories of loss aversion and hubris to examine a sample of s p 500 manufacturers results demonstrate that both performance above internal aspirations and performance above external expectations increase the likelihood of illegal activities the sample firms prominence enhanced the effects of performance above expectations on the likelihood of illegal actions prominent and less prominent firms displayed different patterns of behavior when their performance failed to meet aspirations

portfolio constraints and the fundamental law of active management active portfolio management is typically conducted within constraints that do not allow managers to fully exploit their ability to forecast returns constraints on short positions and turnover for example are fairly common and materially restrictive other constraints such as market capitalization and value growth neutrality with respect to the benchmark or economic sector constraints can further restrict an active portfolio s composition we derive ex ante and ex post correlation relationships that facilitate the performance analysis of constrained portfolios the ex ante relationship is a generalized version of a previously developed fundamental law of active management and provides an important strategic perspective on the potential for active management to add value the ex post correlation relationship represents a practical decomposition of performance into the success of the return prediction process and the noise associated with portfolio constraints we verify the accuracy of these relati

partnering with leviathan the politics of innovation in foreign host state joint ventures forming international joint ventures ijvs with political institutions in emerging economies involves both benefits and risks for multinational enterprises mnes while political partners can provide ijvs with various resources their political status equips them with a strong position to appropriate rents in ijvs we address this tension by examining how host state ownership affects both innovation inputs and outputs in china based ijvs over 2008 2013 despite the potential government opportunism we find more r d investment innovation inputs made in ijvs with state partners than in those with private ones thus r d investment can be politically motivated and symbolically managed to ensure continued resource exchanges with the host state this political pressure is mitigated when foreign parents directly transfer home country based technology to ijvs when the host market dependence of ijv is weak and when ijvs are located in a deregulated region moreover we find foreign host state jvs deliver fewer innovation outputs measured by patent data than foreign private jvs which implies the failure of state partners to adequately absorb foreign technologies these findings highlight both the state partners powerfulness to boost ijv innovation investment and their limits in shaping ijv innovation outcomes and bear rich implications for the management of mne host government relationships

technology licensing r d and welfare this paper sets up a three stage r d technology licensing and output oligopoly game in which only one of the firms undertakes a cost reducing r d and may license the developed technology to the others by means of a two part tariff i e a per unit royalty and an upfront fee contract it is found with surprise that if the licensor firm s r d efficiency is high the availability of licensing subdues the firm s r d incentive leading to a lower social welfare level this result implies that a government has to be cautious when encouraging technology licensing among firms

practical implications of game theoretic models of r and d the purpose of this paper is to survey recent game theoretic models of research and development and to ask whether they yield practical implications or testable hypotheses the papers i will be discussing have been written or published within the past five years they have a good deal in common relying upon similar assumptions and building upon each other because of this the literature surveyed here may seem narrow and some relevant work has probably been inadvertently omitted i apologize for these omissions for want of space i will not discuss the normative conclusions of this literature

licensing to enhance demand for new technologies this article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and therefore may be a profit maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost in the model buyers care about price and quality sellers can contract on price but not on quality and a single supplier has monopoly power licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm as a result licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry

opportunity and constraint organizations learning from the operating and competitive experience of industries organizational learning is central to a number of strategic theories recent arguments however identify risks associated with learning from own experience in the form of overattention to the short term and local conditions the experience of the industry may offer opportunities for organizational learning that the experience of the organization does not because industry experience is more varied and not tied to the path dependent history of any one organization we investigate the influence of own experience and of two types of industry experience on the failure rates of u s hotel chains the two types of industry experience are operating experience which is a discounted sum of the units operated by u s hotel chains in the history of the industry and competitive experience which is a discounted sum of the number of failures of u s hotel chains in the history of the industry we find that a organizations initially benefit from their own experience but are harmed in the long run b generalist organizations are more weakly affected by their own experience than specialists c organizations benefit from their industry s operating experience accumulated both before and after the organization s entry and d organizations benefit from their industry s competitive experience but only after the organization s entry 1997 by john wiley sons ltd

the liability of good reputation a study of product recalls in the u s automobile industry in this paper we explore opposing theoretical claims about how organizational reputation affects market reactions to product defects on the one hand good reputation could be a disadvantage because expectations about product quality are more likely to be violated by defects in highly reputed products on the other hand a good reputation could be an advantage because of strong inertial effects on reputation orderings we empirically test these competing hypotheses using data on product recalls in the u s automobile industry from 1975 to 1999 our results support for the idea that reputation can be an organizational liability in that highly reputed firms suffer more market penalty as a result of their product recalls we also propose that the reputational effects are moderated by two important factors substitutability and generalism specialism our results show that having few substitutes with an equivalent level of reputation or a focused product identity stemming from specialism buffers the negative market reactions to product recalls we conclude with a discussion on the implications of these results for institutional reputation and status theories

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes