mechanism design in large games incentives and privacy abstract we study the design of mechanisms satisfying a novel desideratum privacy this requires the mechanism not reveal much about any agent s type to other agents we propose the notion of jo

global liquidity through the lens of monetary aggregates this paper examines how the financial activities of non financial corporations nfcs in international markets potentially affects domestic monetary aggregates and financial conditions monetary aggregates reflect in part the activities of nfcs who channel capital market financing into the domestic banking system thereby influencing funding conditions and credit availability periods of capital inflows are also those when the domestic currency is appreciating and such periods of rapid exchange rate appreciation coincide with increases in the central bank s foreign exchange reserves increasing the stock of narrow money the paper examines economic significance of cross country panel data on monetary aggregates and other measures of non core bank liabilities non core liabilities that reflect the activities of nfcs reflect broad credit conditions and predict global trade and growth

relative price determination in the medium run the influence of wages productivity and international prices this work explores three critical assumptions of the balassa samuelson productivity differential model for the short and medium run wage equalization competitive labor markets and purchasing power parity the data reveal violations in these assumptions for france germany japan the u k and the u s significant wage and unit labor cost differentials exist across industries and traded and nontraded sectors and these differentials do not diminish over time the findings are consistent with the presence of industry and or sectoral specific human capital

walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities many institutions allocate resources by non market mechanisms based on priorities in this paper we introduce a model of resource allocation on the basis of priorities and address the following questions is it possible to allocate resources on the basis of any priority structure if yes when can we do this pareto efficiently without creating incentives for manipulation and consistently across different groups of agents and resource levels we adopt a basic indivisible objects model with a finite number of object types and a finite quota of goods of each type some interesting examples are the determination of access to education allocation of graduate houses offices or tasks agents are assumed to have strict preferences over object types and remaining unassigned an assignment is an allocation of the objects to the agents such that every agent receives at most one object a rule associates an assignment to each preference profile we formalize a priority structure to be a collection of strict priority rankings of individuals indexed by the object types where i a j would be read as i has higher priority for object a than j we assume that the priority structure is exogenously fixed and allow the preferences of the agents to vary a rule is said to violate a priority of i for a if there is a preference profile under which i envies j who is assigned a and publication information econometrica 70 6 november 2002 2489 2497 the copyright to this article is held by the econometric society http www econometricsociety org it may be downloaded printed and reproduced only for personal or classroom use absolutely no downloading or copying may be done for or on behalf of any for profit commercial firm or other commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the econometric society for this purpose contact julie p gordon executive director of the society at jpg northwestern edu i would like to thank faruk gul wolfgang pesendorfer the co editor the four anonymous referees and the participants of the micro theory lunch seminar in princeton university for their comments and suggestions

convergence to efficiency in a simple market with incomplete information a model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which price is set to equate revealed demand and supply in a bayesian nash equilibrium each trader acts not as a price taker but instead misrepresents his true demand supply to influence price in his favor this causes inefficiency we show that in any equilibrium the amount by which a trader misreports is o 1 m and the corresponding inefficiency is o 1 m2 the indeterminacy and the inefficiency that is caused by the traders bargaining behavior in small markets thus rapidly vanishes as the market increases in size

on two competing mechanisms for priority based allocation problems we consider the priority based allocation problem there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies e g schools with seats and a set of agents e g students with priorities over objects e g proximity of residence area we study two well known and competing mechanisms the agentoptimal stable mechanism aosm allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm the top trading cycles mechanism ttcm allots objects via gale s top trading cycles algorithm we show that the two mechanisms are equivalent or ttcm is fair i e respects agents priorities or resource monotonic o rpopulation monotonic if and only if the priority structure is acyclic furthermore if aosm fails to be efficient consistent for a problem ttcm also fails to be fair consistent for it however the converse is not necessarily true

near feasible stable matchings with couples the national resident matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals with couples stable matchings need not exist nevertheless for any student preferences we show that each instance of a matching problem has a nearby instance with a stable matching the nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals in this perturbation aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four the capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two

approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies abstract we consider exchange economies where each consumer may report or act according to any demand function provided that there exist situations that the consumer finds plausible in which the reported demand performs at least as well as the true demand we identify conditions under which as the size of the economy increases all the market clearing prices and allocations of the reported economy approximate the competitive equilibria of the true economy journal of economic literature classification numbers d51 d82

zero interest rate policy and unintended consequences in emerging markets since 2009 central banks in the major advanced economies have held interest rates at very low levels to stabilise financial markets and support the recovery of their economies this paper outlines the unintended consequences of the prolonged period of very low world funding interest rates in emerging markets the paper is informed by a mises hayek bis view on credit booms and mises law of unintended consequences consistent with the presented credit boom view i provide evidence that the very low world funding interest rates are associated with a rise in volatile capital flows and asset market bubbles in fast growing emerging markets in line with mises law i further show that these unintended consequences give rise to a new wave of interventionism as policymakers in emerging markets increasingly reintroduce financially repressive measures to isolate the economies from foreign capital inflows

substitutes and stability for matching with contracts we consider the matching problem with contracts of hatfield and milgrom 2005 and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes we show that bilateral substitutes is a sucient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework however the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition and there does not necessarily exist a doctor optimal stable allocation under a slightly stronger condition unilateral substitutes the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors preferences but there does exist a doctor optimal stable allocation and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered

stability in large matching markets with complementarities labor markets can often be viewed as many to one matching markets it is well known that if complementarities are present in such markets a stable matching may not exist we study large random matching markets with couples we introduce a new matching algorithm and show that if the number of couples grows slower than the size of the market a stable matching will be found with high probability if however the number of couples grows at a linear rate with constant probability not depending on the market size no stable matching exists our results explain data from the market for psychology interns

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

real and nominal exchange rates in the long run an empirical investigation abstract this paper reports on econometric tests of the hypothesis that purchasing power parity holds as a long run relationship using data on eight industrialized countries during the flexible exchange rate period the empirical work proceeds by i testing whether nominal exchange rates and relative price levels are co integrated and ii conducting impulse response analysis of long run exchange rate and relative price level changes to explain the data keynesian models suggest that shocks during the estimation period were due principally to exogenous shifts in aggregate demand while equilibrium models suggest that monetary factors have been relatively more important

a double track adjustment process for discrete markets with substitutes and complements we propose a new walrasian tatonnement process called a double track procedure for efficiently allocating multiple heterogeneous indivisible items in two distinct sets to many buyers who view items in the same set as substitutes but items across the two sets as complements in each round of the process a walrasian auctioneer first announces the current prices for all items buyers respond by reporting their demands at these prices and then the auctioneer adjusts simultaneously the prices of items in one set upward but those of items in the other set downward it is shown that this procedure converges globally to a walrasian equilibrium in finitely many rounds

matching with contracts comment the theory of two sided matching markets has interested researchers for its theoretical appeal and its relevance to the design of real world institutions the medical residency matching mecha nism in the united states the national resident matching program nrmp and student assign ment systems in new york city and boston are important mechanisms designed by economists using the theory 1 hatfield and paul r milgrom 2005 present a unified framework of matching with contracts which includes the two sided matching and package auction models as well as a simplified version of a labor market model of alexander kelso and vincent p crawford 1982 as special cases they introduce the substitutes condition of contracts which is an adaptation of the substitutability condition in the matching literature roth and marilda a oliveira sotomayor 1990 to matching with contracts they show that there exists a stable allocation if contracts are substitutes for hospitals and that a number of other results in matching generalize to problems with contracts they further claim that the substitutes condition on individual hospitals prefer ences is necessary to guarantee the existence of a stable allocation for all possible singleton preferences of others that is if contracts are not substitutes for a hospital then there exists a preference profile of other hospitals with single job openings and doctors such that there exists no stable allocation we show that this last claim of hatfield and milgrom 2005 does not hold in general the counterexample we present involves a hospital which has two different kinds of positions and the preferences of the hospital are a combination of preferences of these two positions while the substitutes condition does not hold for that hospital we adopt a technique developed by bettina klaus and flip klijn 2005 and show that there exists a stable allocation we then present the weak substitutes condition which we show is necessary to guarantee existence of stable allocations the modified result we present as well as the original contribu tion of hatfield and milgrom 2005 suggest a connection between the substitutes condition and stability 2

productivity differentials the relative price of non tradables and real exchange rates abstract this paper reconciles the apparent contradiction between recent panel unit root tests of real exchange rates and the productivity differential model proposing an alternative view that explains the coexistence of such findings real exchange rates and the relative price of non tradables reflect the gradual adjustment of mean reverting and endogenously competing factors supply and demand shocks as well as traded goods arbitrage granger causality and variance decomposition results indicate substantial simultaneity and feedback effects between real exchange rates the relative price of non tradables and productivity differentials

the industrial mobility of displaced workers this article uses a two industry model of unemployment duration and job search to estimate rates of transition of displaced workers from unemployment to employment distinguishing between employment in a worker s previous industry and in other industries the competing risks model allows inferences about search strategies to be drawn from data concerning employment outcomes and allows tests of some fundamental implications of search theory there is evidence that improvements in the prospects for employment in their previous industry induce displaced workers to reduce search intensity or increase reservation wages in other industries

the package assignment model we study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several rather than single objects although buyers reservations values are non additive efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non linear in the objects constituting the packages the interconnections among the linear programming formulation walrasian equilibrium and the core are established in the single seller auction version a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 d44 d51

stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues in the standard two sided matching models agents on one side of the market the institutions can each be matched to a set of agents the individuals on the other side of the market and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched we explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one s coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution

power couples changes in the locational choice of the college educated 1940 1990 college educated couples are increasingly located in large metropolitan areas these areas were home to 32 percent of all college educated couples in 1940 39 percent in 1970 and 50 percent in 1990 we investigate whether this trend can be explained by increasing urbanization of the college educated or the growth of dual career households and the resulting severity of the colocation problem we argue that the latter explanation is the primary one smaller cities may therefore experience reduced inflows of human capital relative to the past and thus become poorer

the english auction with differentiated commodities abstract we study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes gs condition we define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in excess demand eventually leads to the smallest walrasian prices this procedure is a generalization of the auction studied by g demange d gale and m j sotomayor polit econ 94 1986 863 872 in our auction truthful revelation of demand is a perfect bayesian equilibrium if the smallest walrasian prices correspond to the vickrey clarke groves payments however no dynamic auction can reveal sufficient information to implement the vickrey mechanism if all gs preferences are allowed journal of economic literature classification numbers d4 d44 d5 d51

implementation in the many to many matching market abstract this paper deals with a discrete many to many matching market of firms and workers we analyze the following mechanism firms announce the set of workers they want to hire then workers select the set of firms with which they want to work the first phase of the game determines the potential partners while the second phase determines the actual matching we prove that subgame perfect nash equilibria spne always exist while strong equilibria se may not exist we characterize the spne outcomes as the pairwise stable matchings and show that there may be no spne outcome in the core when the preferences of the agents are not maximin however when the preferences of the firms respectively workers are maximin the core always contains the equilibrium outcomes

in search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred acceptance algorithm many centralized entry level labor markets use the firm proposing deferred acceptance da algorithm to compute the matching that is implemented among workers and firms we propose a definition of the strategic options a worker faces in the da algorithm then we develop a theory to advise workers who distinguish between the firms from which they believe not to receive a proposal the firms from which they might receive a proposal and the firms from which they certainly receive a proposal if a worker is not able to deduce which new proposals she receives after having rejected others then it is not profitable for her to submit a list that reverses the true ranking of any two acceptable firms furthermore it is not beneficial for her to include a firm in her submitted list that is unacceptable to her

leveling the playing field sincere and sophisticated players in the boston mechanism empirical and experimental evidence suggests different levels of sophistication among families in the boston public school student assignment plan we analyze the preference revelation game induced by the boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response we characterize the set of nash equilibrium outcomes as the set of stable matchings of a modified economy where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the pareto dominant nash equilibrium of the boston mechanism to her assignment under the recently adopted student optimal stable mechanism jel d82 i21

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

the combinatorial assignment problem approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes this paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment for example assigning schedules of courses to students based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes ceei in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together the main technical result is an existence theorem for approximate ceei the mechanism is approximately efficient satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness and is strategyproof in large markets its performance is explored on real data and it is compared to alternatives from theory and practice all other known mechanisms are either unfair ex post or manipulable even in large markets and most are both manipulable and unfair

matching and price competition we develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much implying little inefficiency furthermore the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed in light of our results we discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the national resident matching program

incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism abstract the probabilistic serial mechanism bogomolnaia and moulin 2001 9 is ordinally efficient but not strategy proof we study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism for large assignment problems we establish that for a fixed set of object types and an agent with a given expected utility function if there are sufficiently many copies of each object type then reporting ordinal preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent regardless of the number of other agents and their preferences the non manipulability and the ordinal efficiency of the probabilistic serial mechanism support its implementation instead of random serial dictatorship in large assignment problems

monetary policy and financial spillovers losing traction abstract has financial globalisation compromised central banks effectiveness in managing domestic financial conditions this paper tackles this question by studying the dynamics of bond yields encompassing 31 advanced and emerging market economies to gauge the extent to which external financial conditions complicate the conduct of monetary policy we isolate a contagion component by focusing on comovements in measures of bond return risk premia that are unrelated to domestic economic fundamentals our contagion measure is designed to more accurately capture relative to simple yield correlation spillovers driven by exogenous global shifts in risk preference or appetite in contrast to what simple comovements in bond yields suggest emerging market economies appear to be much less susceptible to global contagion than advanced economies and the overall sensitivities to contagion have not increased after the global financial crisis the extent to which financial spillovers have compromised policy traction thus appears to be lower relative to studies based on common variation in bond yields

credible group stability in many to many matching problems abstract it is known that in two sided many to many matching problems pairwise stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations unlike in many to one matching problems blair 1988 in this paper we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise responsive preferences a credibly group stable matching is immune to any executable group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability under the same preference restriction we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition proof nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic form game

the role of nontraded and traded wages in the productivity differential model purchasing power parity ppp remains the benchmark model for long run nominal exchange rate determination since cassel s pioneering work 3 despite weak empirical support 6 7 12 14 seminal work by balassa 1 and samuelson 15 explains that movements in real exchange rates are due to changing real factors in the economy balassa and samuelson show that differing productivity rates between traded and nontraded sectors can explain deviations in ppp hsieh 10 has empirically supported the importance of productivity differentials in explaining real exchange rate movements although the balassa samuelson productivity differential model is commonly cited by international textbooks as an explanation of ppp failure 4 11 several assumptions have not been explicitly tested this paper examines four critical assumptions of the balassa model for fourteen oecd economies and demonstrates that some are weak and deserve additional study real exchange rate movements affect the competitiveness of a nation s tradable goods sector and represent deviations from purchasing power parity seminal work by balassa on real exchange rates and ppp violations relies on several underlying premises 1 the traded sector possesses higher productivity growth and larger intercountry differences than the nontraded sector 2 intracountry wage rates are equalized between traded and nontraded sectors due to labor mobility 3 wages in the traded good sector are linked to productivity in that sector 4 innovations in unit labor cost wage compensation adjusted for productivity cause corresponding movements in the relative price of nontraded goods this paper examines general patterns and interrelationships among traded and nontraded productivity real wages and relative prices for 14 oecd economies and extends the work of strauss and ferris 16 we construct gdp price indices productivity measures and real wage compensation rates for the traded and nontraded sectors for the years 1970 1990 the key finding is that differences in intersectoral wage growth appear to influence the relative price of nontradables more than differences in productivity growth the results support the proposition that produc

the relationships between permanent and transitory movements in u s output and the unemployment rate this paper estimates the permanent and transitory movements in u s output and the unemployment rate and the relationships between them the results suggest that permanent movements in u s output and the unemployment rate are important for explaining overall fluctuations further the correlation between changes in these series arises in large part due to the relationship between their permanent components

the rise of dollar credit in emerging market economies and us monetary policy this paper examines the hypothesis that the boom in dollar credit in the emerging market economies is associated with excessively low interest rate in the us for this purpose we use a multivariate correlated unobserved component model that allows for correlation between shocks to dollar credit interest rates and dollar index both in the short run and in the long run in addition it also provides us a quantitative estimate of the permanent and transitory movements in dollar credit in emerging markets us interest rate and the dollar index the results from this model do suggest that a temporary decline in interest rate and dollar index below their long run levels are associated with an increase in dollar credit with a very high degree of negative correlation the estimate of the cyclical component of the dollar credit in emerging market from our model captures the recent boom and bust in this market and compares favorably to a univariate trend cycle decomposition benchmark

equilibria and indivisibilities gross substitutes and complements this paper examines an exchange economy with heterogeneous indivisible objects that can be substitutable or complementary we show that a competitive equilibrium exists in such economies provided that all the objects can be partitioned into two groups and from the viewpoint of each agent objects in the same group are substitutes and objects across the two groups are complements this condition generalizes the well known kelso crawford gross substitutes condition and is called gross substitutes and complements we also provide practical and typical examples from which substitutes and complements are both jointly observed

an empirical model of the medical match abstract this paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many to one matching market using only observed matches i use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression due to residents willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain on average at least 23 000 below the marginal product of labor therefore the match is not the likely cause of low salaries jel c78 i11 j31 j44 k21 l44

the rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases an asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms private information in an independent private values market provides incentives to traders to manipulate equilibrium prices strategically this strategic behavior precludes ex post efficient market performance increasing the number of traders improves the efficiency of some trading mechanisms by enabling them to better utilize the private information traders bids and offers reveal this paper shows that the expected inefficiency of optimally designed mechanisms relative to ex post efficient allocations decreases almost quadratically as the number of traders increases

financial globalisation and emerging markets volatility the volatility of capital flows to emerging market em countries and frequency of financial crises have imposed high welfare costs on the countries involved the empirical literature provides at best a mixed picture on the relationship between long run em country growth and financial integration meanwhile the prevailing policy discourse regarding reform of the international financial system remains incomplete the focus has largely been on either institutional and policy measures required of em countries or international crisis resolution procedures the role played by private financial markets and institutions in the developed world has not received adequate attention this paper describes some of the structural features inherent in today s financial markets that directly contribute to the instability in em capital flows

sectoral shifts and interindustry wage differentials the observed differences in wages across industries may arise from a lack of worker mobility particularly among experienced workers allowing the effects of industry shocks to persist for some time although young workers arbitrage wage shocks they will have little effect on the dispersion of experienced workers wages if young and old workers are poor substitutes in production this explanation is investigated using the five censuses of population between 1940 and 1980 the evidence strongly suggests that differences in pay are not temporary phenomena the data provide some support for the role of human capital and ability