a comparison of bribery and bidding in thin markets abstract this paper compares bribery to competitive bidding in a government purchasing context while competitive bidding is one method of procurement bribery is a common alternative in many third world countries although bribery is often considered to be the ethical antithesis of competitive bidding the analysis shows there is a fundamental isomorphism between bribery and competitive bidding on the supply side of the transaction

open for innovation or bribery to secure bank finance in an emerging economy a model and some evidence abstract in an emerging economy like china characterized by scarce financial resources excessive red tape and rampant corruption firms are advised to bribe bank officials to grease the wheels of bank lending in order to secure the fund they need for innovation business venturing and growth drawing on the literature on corruption and open innovation we develop a model to illustrate that bribery fails to ease bank lending when red tape is endogenous whereas openness for innovation smooths bank lending no matter whether red tape is exogenous or endogenous openness for innovation is more effective than bribery in helping a firm reduce red tape to secure bank finance based on a dataset of chinese firms provided by the world bank our findings strongly support the argument we find that openness for innovation has a positive relationship with both the access to bank finance and the size of bank finance whereas bribery is related to neither supplementary tests further suggest that the positive relationship is mainly driven by private firms and manufacturing firms our findings help firms make decisions to select an effective and yet socially responsible approach to securing bank finance

bribery inefficiency and bureaucratic delay abstract we examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy the presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants consequently efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses or may never receive licenses as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them an increase in the proportion of honest officials while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions can also induce greater inefficiencies misallocation and delay from corrupt officials as a result social welfare may be non monotonic in the proportion of honest officials and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption competition between officials can hurt efficiency its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants ability to pay bribes

a note on competitive bribery games abstract within a competitive bribery game in which each player has incomplete information we show that there exists a unique nash equilibrium which is symmetric similar results hold for another bribery game form that prevails in the literature implications for corrupt practices in relation to economic development are also discussed

corruption and allocation efficiency abstract in this paper we investigate the possibility of allocation inefficiencies associated with corrupt practices specifically we consider the case in which two firms compete via bribery of a corrupt government official for a to be awarded project the economy may suffer allocation inefficiencies whenever there is some degree of discrimination given additional assumptions it is shown that the possibility of inefficient allocations increases as the degree of discrimination increases although empirical verification of discrimination is difficult due to the observational equivalence of an alternative imperfect knowledge model two possible explanations for the determination of discrimination coefficients indicate that it is a general phenomenon in competitive bribery games

understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance comment abstract himmelberg et al j financial econom 53 1999 353 384 argue that fixed effects estimators should be used in examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance i show that managerial ownership while substantially different across firms typically changes slowly from year to year within a company with rational managers maximising long term utility small one year changes in ownership are not likely to reflect notable changes in incentives that would lead to substantive within year changes in performance by relying on within variation fixed effects estimators may not detect an effect of ownership on performance even if one exists

is corruption an efficient grease this paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework it analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency corruption and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries both developed and developing using two measures of corruption and two other aspects of governance we observe that corruption is less detrimental to efficiency in countries where institutions are less effective it may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective we thus find evidence for the grease the wheels hypothesis in its weak and strong forms

board openness during an economic crisis does a board with greater gender diversity make better investment decisions drawing on austrian economic cycle theory and work groups theory we argue that such board openness will help male board members to overcome gender biases discrimination and conflicts integrate different perspectives under the economic cycle and crisis and foster an environment in which better decisions are made the results of an empirical study of 14 609 firm quarter observations from 1 555 listed firms in china between 2007 and 2009 strongly support our arguments we find that a chinese board is more likely to accept female directorship during an economic crisis than during an economic prosperity stage boards with greater gender diversity are more likely to make tough counter cyclical investments to improve firm performance during a crisis our study enriches the board decision making literature by exploring the impacts of board gender diversity on firm performance within the context of an economic crisis the results of our study also carry significant managerial implications for overcoming gender stereotypes biases and prejudices on a board

corruption and development a review of issues in this paper we start with a discussion of some of the different denotations of the problem of corruption we then consider the ways in which the damaging consequences of corruption operate in a developing economy while not ignoring its possible redeeming features in some cases we pursue the question of why corruption is perceptibly so different in different societies and also persistent finally we examine the feasible policy issues that arise in this context

corruption in tax administration abstract we extend the game theoretic model of graetz reinganum and wilde 1986 to allow for corruption in tax administration in the presence of corruption audit rates are generally higher than in its absence in fact in the presence of corruption it is possible to sustain equilibria in which all returns are audited moreover when some auditors accept bribes it is possible for increases in the fine rate or the tax rate to reduce expected government revenue

corruption institutions and economic development many scholarly articles on corruption give the impression that the world is populated by two types of people the sanders and the greasers the sanders believe that corruption is an obstacle to de velopment while the greasers believe that corruption can in some cases foster development this paper takes a critical look at these positions it concludes that the evidence supporting the greasing the wheels hypothesis is very weak and shows that there is no cor relation between a new measure of managers actual experience with corruption and gdp growth instead the paper uncovers a strong negative correlation between growth in genuine wealth per capita a direct measure of sustainable development and corruption while corruption may have little average eect on the growth rate of gdp per capita it is a likely source of unsustainable development

allocation efficiency in a competitive bribery game abstract we consider the selection properties of a competitive bribery model in the presence of two types of asymmetry unevenness between the competitors and unfairness in the contest rules only under very special conditions does the benchmark model yield allocation efficiency in other cases the effect on allocation efficiency of making the contest more unfair is ambiguous and parameter specific we present conditions under which each result obtains our results indicate that it is socially optimal to run an unfair contest in order to redress the allocation inefficiency introduced when contestants are asymmetric we show however that a selfish income maximizing bribee will discriminate in the opposite direction to that which society would prefer

corruption and market competition evidence from post communist countries summary this paper empirically examines whether market competition is associated with greater bribe payments we use firm level data from the business environment and enterprise performance surveys since market competition could be endogenous and some firms report zero bribes we employ a tobit estimation methodology instrumenting for market competition we find that greater market competition increases the amount of bribes paid results are robust across several measures of market competition however market competition is less strongly associated with bribes in the presence of other obstacles of doing business that could also lead to more bribes

gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial performance the monitoring role performed by the board of directors is an important corporate governance control mechanism especially in countries where external mechanisms are less well developed the gender composition of the board can affect the quality of this monitoring role and thus the financial performance of the firm this is part of the business case for female participation on boards though arguments may also be framed in terms of ethical considerations while the issue of board gender diversity has attracted growing research interest in recent years most empirical results are based on u s data this article adds to a growing number of non u s studies by investigating the link between the gender diversity of the board and firm financial performance in spain a country which historically has had minimal female participation in the workforce but which has now introduced legislation to improve equality of opportunities we investigate the topic using panel data analysis and find that gender diversity as measured by the percentage of women on the board and by the blau and shannon indices has a positive effect on firm value and that the opposite causal relationship is not significant our study suggests that investors in spain do not penalise firms which increase their female board membership and that greater gender diversity may generate economic gains

corruption and competition in procurement abstract we consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality potential bidders have private information about their production costs since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality in exchange for a bribe he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than that announced we compute equilibrium corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment and in particular of i an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured and ii an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents we identify the effects that influence equilibrium corruption and show that contrary to conventional wisdom corruption may well be increasing in competition

household borrowing after personal bankruptcy a large body of literature has examined factors leading to filing for personal bankruptcy but little is known about household borrowing after bankruptcy this paper augments the existing literature with a comprehensive analysis of postbankruptcy borrowing using data from the survey of consumer finances we find that filers generally have more limited access to unsecured credit but borrow more secured debt after bankruptcy than comparable households that have never filed for bankruptcy filers also pay higher interest rates on all types of debt in addition as more time passes after filing credit access and borrowing costs improve however filers remain more prone than comparable nonfilers to experience financial distress accumulate less wealth and use expensive credit sources like payday loans even more than 10 years after filing

the household bankruptcy decision personal bankruptcy filings have risen from 0 3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1 35 percent in 1998 and 1999 transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event lenders lost about 39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy filings but economists have little understanding of why households file for bankruptcy or why filings have increased so rapidly until very recently studying the household bankruptcy decision was very difficult because no household level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy filings in this paper we use new data from the panel study of income dynamics which includes information on bankruptcy filings to estimate a model of households bankruptcy decisions we find support for the strategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households are more likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher our model predicts that an increase of 1 000 in households financial benefit from bankruptcy would result in a 7 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings our model also predicts that if the 1997 national bankruptcy review commission s proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented there would be a 16 percent increase in the number of bankruptcy filings each year but if the 100 000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the u s senate were adopted our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of filings we find little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households file when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay finally controlling for state and time fixed effects our model shows that households are more likely to file for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate filing rates

bribery and public procurement an experimental study a procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat the auctioneer who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider procurement is thus a multi dimensional bidding contest with one dimensional type space the privately known cost the optimal price and bribe bid is derived based on an iid private cost assumption in the experiment bribes are negatively framed to capture that society is better off if bribes are rare or low although bid prices are lower than predicted behavior is qualitatively in line with the linear equilibrium prediction when bribes generate a negative externality there is a significant increase in the variability of the data

efficiency and the role of default when security markets are incomplete this paper argues that default plays an important positive role in the economy if markets are incomplete and traders are only able to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute regardless of future events contingent contracting may be severely restricted moreover opening new markets may not relieve these restrictions default promotes efficiency in a way that opening new markets does not by making it possible for traders to enter into contracts that they will be able to execute with high probability but not with certainty copyright 1993 by american economic association

are they efficient in the middle using propensity score estimation for modeling middlemen in indian corporate corruption corrupt regulatory environment encourages firms to deploy middlemen for speedy and assured acquisition of different services from regulatory agencies using a world bank dataset of 2210 indian manufacturing firms this article examines how firms with middlemen deal with corrupt governmental agencies for its operational efficiency our results demonstrate that deployment of middlemen by the firms is often accompanied by a substantial increase in operational delay relatively trigger more consumption of senior management s time on regulatory disentanglement enhance the likelihood tendency to pay bribe and likely to face more court cases as a means of restitution of legal rights as firm specific attributes may contaminate our preliminary results we utilized the propensity score framework to examine relationships among variables of interests our study contributes to the inconspicuous part of the corruption literature by attempting to present a comprehensive but indirect assessment of the functions of middlemen that predominantly remained unattended except some scattered descriptive case based anecdotal presentations

institutional framework and economic development international evidence this paper examines the effect of quality of the institutional framework on economic development our empirical results support the hypothesis that good institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth the positive effect of institutional quality is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom our results also indicate that good institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence we infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation but also freedom to choose and institutional support

asymmetric information in competitive bribery games abstract in this paper competitive bribery games with incomplete information about the nature of the potential bribee are considered given a common uniform cost distribution function we characterize the closed form nash equilibrium some properties of the equilibrium are derived therein

gender differences in risk aversion and expected retirement benefits women are generally considered more risk averse than men controlling for age income and education this study examined the impact of gender on the superannuation retirement fund risk preferences of staff in the australian university sector the findings suggest that women choose more conservative investment strategies than men and that lower income which affects the amount members contribute to their superannuation funds is the primary contributor to the lower projected retirement benefits of women providing members with a choice among risk levels in their retirement investments should significantly benefit male and female retirees

greasing the wheels of bank lending evidence from private firms in china abstract bribery rather than firm performance largely determines the extent to which private firms access bank credit in china bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans these firms also pay more in terms of bribes although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans it does so only for loans originated by the big four banks for loans originated by smaller banks performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

strategic or nonstrategic the role of financial benefit in bankruptcy i introduction personal bankruptcy rates have increased at an annual rate of 3 9 since 1990 from about 718 thousand non business bankruptcies in 1990 to about 1 5 million in 2010 partly as a response to this increase the congress passed the bankruptcy abuse prevention and consumer protection act bapcpa of 2005 the largest overhaul of bankruptcy laws since 1980 although recent data are too sparse to determine the longer term effectiveness of the law we know that there was a spike in bankruptcy filings in 2005 just before the law took effect on october 17 2005 and a corresponding decline in 2006 since then bankruptcies have continued to rise reaching a level of about 1 5 million in 2010 the same level as in 2004 the bankruptcy rate has also begun to creep up to the earlier levels one of the major purposes of the new bankruptcy law was to cut down on abusive or fraudulent uses of the bankruptcy system or in other words strategic use of the law therefore it is important to understand the motivations of consumers who file for bankruptcy what constitutes strategic use of bankruptcy law and how widespread is its incidence in the literature there is no clear definition of what constitutes a strategic bankruptcy filing we shall consider strategic behavior to be a conscious decision to benefit from bankruptcy law to make this tractable consider a simple two period model of decision making in the first period consumers receive a noisy signal of experiencing a financial shock in the second period based on this signal consumers may update their probability of an adverse shock and choose their debt level in the second period the shock is realized and consumers decide whether to file for bankruptcy or not a strategic consumer is one who in the first period chooses her debt level after conditioning on the signal that is a strategic consumer takes on debt after accounting for the chance of filing for bankruptcy in other words a strategic consumer is one who is fully rational and takes decisions to maximize her benefit a nonstrategic consumer is one who chooses debt level without conditioning on the signal he plans to repay his debt in the absence of adverse events such a consumer is myopic and may be exhibiting rational inattention as described below consistent with this view we may distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic behavior by testing whether consumers make their debt and filing decision jointly or not strategic behavior is consistent with a joint decision whereas nonstrategic behavior is not in terms of empirical strategy this is implemented by testing whether financial benefit is endogenous to the filing decision or not our test is different from the one in the study by fay hurst and white 2002 henceforth fhw in that approach a positive relationship between filing for bankruptcy and financial benefit from filing ceteris paribus is taken as evidence of strategic behavior and a positive relationship between filing for bankruptcy and adverse events such as divorce health shocks employment shocks etc is taken as evidence of nonstrategic behavior using data from the panel study of income dynamics psid fhw show that financial benefit is positively and significantly related to the filing decision and after controlling for financial benefit adverse event variables do not affect the bankruptcy decision except for a marginally significant positive effect of divorce 1 this simple empirical relationship between bankruptcy filing and financial benefit does not consider more realistic relationships among financial benefit adverse events and strategic behavior for example financial benefit from filing may go up due to adverse events regardless of whether a consumer is trying to abuse bankruptcy law or not that is financial benefit goes up when a consumer consciously increases unsecured debts before filing consistent with strategic behavior and it also goes up when she uses unsecured debt e

corruption and local democratization in indonesia the role of islamic parties indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms this paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies democratization occurred in 1999 and decentralization in 2001 we have firm level data for 2001 and 2004 the 2001 data benchmark corruption at the time of decentralization we find that corruption declines between 2001 and 2004 overall but much less so in districts with more secular party as opposed to islamic party representatives in district assemblies for a larger sample of districts correspondingly we find that corruption in 2004 is more in districts which voted more in favor of secular party representatives in the first elections in 1999 we argue that the effects seem to be causal over above any effects of changing religiosity and economic circumstances across districts

deals and delays firm level evidence on corruption and policy implementation times whether demands for bribes for particular government services are associated with expedited or delayed policy implementation underlies debates around the role of corruption in private sector development the grease the wheels hypothesis which contends that bribes act as speed money implies three testable predictions first on average bribe requests should be negatively correlated with wait times second this relationship should vary across firms with those with the highest opportunity cost of waiting being more likely to pay and facing shorter delays third the role of grease should vary across countries with benefits larger where regulatory burdens are greatest the data are inconsistent with all three predictions according to the preferred specifications ceteris paribus firms confronted with demands for bribes take approximately 1 5 times longer to get a construction permit operating license or electrical connection than firms that did not have to pay bribes and respectively 1 2 and 1 4