excise taxes with multiproduct transactions i examine excise taxes levied on multiproduct retailers excise taxes reduce equilibrium output and decrease equilibrium product variety in the short run but taxes can raise output per product in the long run and induce entry excise taxes are overshifted into prices in a wide range of cases including under linear and concave demand conditions and excise taxes shift less than one for one into prices only when demand is highly convex multiproduct transactions substantively alter the efficiency of ad valorem and specific forms of excise taxes and affect the comparison of relative tax performance over short run and long run time horizons jel h25 h32 l11 l13 l81

stock returns before and after calls of convertible bonds ofer and natarajan 1987 report negative statistically significant cumulative average abnormal returns over five years following convertible bond calls we show that these results are obtained only if returns preceding the call dates are used for market model parameter estimation returns preceding calls tend to be positive and unusually large this means that predicted post call returns based on pre call parameter estimates are biased upward consequently the corresponding abnormal returns are biased downward we also discuss a corrected test statistic we conclude that the evidence does not indicate market inefficiency in the stock price reaction to convertible calls

convertible debt corporate call policy and voluntary conversion this paper examines why in contrast to the predictions of finance theory firms do not call convertible debt when the conversion price exceeds the call price the empirical results suggest that the principal reason is because some firms enjoy an advantage of paying less in after tax interest than they would pay in dividends were the bond converted this cash flow incentive is the inverse of an investor s incentive to convert voluntarily if the converted dividends are greater than the bond s coupon because of taxation however the decisions by investors and firms are not symmetric and there exist bonds which the firm may not call and an investor will not convert the results also find that voluntary conversion is significantly related to both the conversion price and the differential between the coupon and the dividends on the converted stock

market performance with multiproduct firms we revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with chamberlin spence and dixit stiglitz when firms sell multiple products both products and firms are horizontally differentiated we propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much the nested ces is a special case we use it to determine the market s biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices the market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition but this exacerbates over entry

a representative consumer theorem for discrete choice models in networked markets we provide an alternative way to model sequential decision processes which is consistent with the random utility maximization hypothesis and the existence of a representative agent our result is stated on terms of a direct utility representation and it does not depend on parametric assumptions

estimating markups and market conduct with multidimensional product attributes we demonstrate how to estimate a model of oligopoly pricing when products are multi dimensionally differentiated we provide an empirical counterpart to recent theoretical work on product differentiation using specifications informed by economic theory we estimate price cost margins for products differentiated in many dimensions

product diversity in asymmetric oligopoly is the quality of consumer goods too low we analyse an oligopoly model incorporating horizontal differentiation and quality differences high quality goods are overpriced and underproduced when the market is fairly well covered low quality products may be profitable when their net social contribution is negative implying excessive entry in a relatively uncovered market even low quality goods are underproduced and there may be underentry when fixed costs are independent of quality the market tends to select the right firms otherwise the market may produce low quality products when it should produce high quality ones the model is calibrated using market data for yoghurt

assessing the impact of renewable energy deployment on local sustainability towards a theoretical framework renewable energy sources res have a large potential to contribute to the sustainable development sd of specific territories by providing them with a wide variety of socioeconomic and environmental benefits however the existing literature has put much emphasis on the environmental benefits including the reduction of global and local pollutants while socioeconomic impacts have not received a comparable attention these include diversification of energy supply enhanced regional and rural development opportunities creation of a domestic industry and employment opportunities with the exception of the diversification and security of energy supply these benefits have usually been mentioned but their analysis has been too general i e mostly at the national level and a focus on the regional and even more so the local level has been lacking at most studies provide scattered evidence of some of those regional and local benefits but without an integrated conceptual framework to analyse them this paper tries to make a contribution in this regard by developing an integrated theoretical framework which allows a comprehensive analysis of the impact of renewable energy on local sustainability and which can be empirically applied to identify these benefits in different territories

analysing future trends of renewable electricity in the eu in a low carbon context the aim of this paper is to analyse the situation and trends of electricity from renewable energy sources res e in the eu up to 2030 taking into account several drivers and barriers and different maturity levels for the renewable energy technologies the methodology is based on the results of simulation models providing insights on future outlooks complemented with an analysis of regulations and other drivers and barriers regarding the most mature renewable electricity technologies the main drivers will be public policies carbon prices and support schemes and the expected up ward trend in fossil fuel prices and the main barriers are related to grid access administrative procedures and the exhaustion of places with the best wind resource for those already commercial but expensive technologies the main driver is support schemes but not carbon prices allowing the exploitation of the large potential for investment cost reductions barriers are mostly related to their high investment costs finally for those technologies which are emerging and immature further technical improvements as a result of r d efforts will be needed and they cannot be expected to significantly penetrate the european electricity market until 2030

convertible bonds are not called late starting with ingersoll 1977b the academic literature has repeatedly sought to explain why convertible bonds are called late the findings here demonstrate there is no call delay to explain this paper finds that most convertible bonds given their call protection are called as soon as possible for those that are not there are significant cash flow advantages to delaying the median call delay for all convertible bonds is less than four months if a safety premium is desired to assure the conversion value will exceed the call price at the end of call notice period the median call period is less than a month the question of what is the optimal call policy for convertible bonds has attracted considerable attention since brennan and schwartz 1977 and ingersoll s 1977a seminal work that work suggests that the optimal call policy is to call the bond when the conversion value first exceeds the call price since forcing conversion eliminates the bondholders premium or option value however empirical studies e g ingersoll 1977b and constantinides and grundy 1987 claim that firms consistently deviate from this call policy and delay calls this claim is based on ingersoll s finding that firms wait on average until the conversion value exceeds the call price by 43 9 a result confirmed in mikkelson 1985 trying to explain this call delay phenomenon has generated an impressive literature to date however no one has actually documented whether there is a delay or measured how long the delay is in addition the existing empirical work has focused either on a subsample of called bonds or on a subsample of bonds remaining uncalled at a given point in time these partial samples are not adequate to empirically determine average call delays for convertible bonds or to distinguish between the various hypotheses proposed for call

optimal policy and network effects for the deployment of zero emission vehicles abstract we analyze the impact of indirect network effects in the deployment of zero emission vehicles in a static partial equilibrium model in most theoretical analyses direct and indirect effects are conflated and relatively few authors have explicitly considered indirect network effects we also introduce the market power of vehicle producers and scale effects in the production function the model exhibits a multiplicity of local social critical points and market equilibria suggesting a possibility of lock in the optimal two subsidies for vehicles and stations are derived so that the pareto dominating market equilibrium would coincide with the social optimum configurations associated with different values of the parameters are explored to revisit the policy issues at various stages of deployment of hydrogen and battery electric vehicles

liquidity costs and stock price response to convertible security calls firms announcements to call in the money convertible securities for redemption essentially force their conversion into common stock and such announcements are generally met with significant reductions in the calling firms equity values an explanation based on liquidity costs is advanced and tested the explanation implies that investors who choose to sell their shares early in the conversion period bear liquidity costs by selling at reduced prices consistent with the explanation the average share price decline is short lived lasting most of the conversion period thus a component of the call announcement effect appears to be due to liquidity costs copyright 1992 by university of chicago press

stock reaction to dividend savings of convertible preferred calls free cash flow or price pressure effects abstract calls of in the money convertible preferred stock typically induce dividend savings for the firm since preferred dividends exceed common stock dividends prior research finds that these savings are negatively related to stock returns at call announcement and argues that the market expects managers to abuse the increased free cash flow this paper finds that dividend savings are closely related to call size suggesting other explanations larger calls experience a more negative announcement reaction consistent with temporary liquidity effects there is a price reversal during the conversion period which is greater for larger calls

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

tax shields sample selection bias and the information content of conversion forcing bond calls the information content of conversion forcing bond calls depends on the after tax cash flow to bondholders if the dividend after conversion exceeds the after tax coupon but is less than the before tax coupon the call reveals unanticipated decreases in dividends and or earnings that reduce the tax shield from interest payments in contrast a call when the dividend is less than the after tax coupon reveals the timing of an anticipated shift from exceptional firm specific positive growth to the industry norm efforts to document properties of convertible calls are subject to sample selection bias because calls are disproportionately associated with positive pre call firm specific growth brennan and schwartz 1977 1980 and ingersoll 1977a show that if capital markets are perfect the optimal policy is to call and force conversion the first time the bond s conversion value exceeds its cash redemption value however ingersoll 1977b 1 and constantinides and grundy 1987 provide evidence that firms delay calling convertible debt and mikkelson 1980 1981 ofer and natarajan 1987 and singh cowan and nayar 1990 document a statistically significant negative return to equity at the call announcement to explain these results which are inconsistent with the optimal call policy and its predicted effect on equity value in a perfect capital market several asymmetric information hypotheses have been put forth mikkelson 1981 1985 hypothesizes that the negative market reaction results from the market inferring that management expects a decline in the present value of the debt s tax shield possibly due to a decline in future earnings this suggests that managers refrain from calling due to the tax shields provided by the debt harris and raviv 1985 present a signaling model in which a

product and price competition in a two dimensional vertical differentiation model in this paper the one dimensional vertical differentiation model shaked and sutton shaked a j sutton 1982 relaxing price competition through product differentiation rev econom stud 49 3 13 moorthy moorthy k s 1988 product and price competition in a duopoly marketing sci 7spring 141 168 is extended to two dimensions and an analysis of product and price competition is presented a two stage game theoretic analysis in which two firms compete first on product positions and then on price is conducted closed form equilibrium solutions are obtained for each stage in which competitors are unrestricted in their choices of price or product positions a significant finding of this research is that unlike the one dimensional vertical differentiation model firms do not tend towards maximum differentiation although this solution is possible under certain conditions when the range of positioning options on each of the dimensions is equal maxmin product differentiation occurs that is in equilibrium the two firms tend to choose positions which will represent maximum differentiation on one dimension and minimum differentiation on the other dimension

new evidence on the valuation effects of convertible bond calls this study examines the wealth effects of convertible bond call announcements on stock holders straight bondholders and called and non called convertible debtholders we docu ment that forced conversions are associated with a significant loss in firm value the results suggest that convertible call announcements can trigger both negative signal and wealth transfer effects we show that at least part ofthe negative effect on stock prices results from wealth transfer to straight bondholders our analysis also lends empirical validity to the common contention that called convertible bondholders suffer wealth expropriation due to the elimination ofthe premium the wealth effect on non called convertible debtholders is insignificant cross sectional analysis reveals that the negative signal effect is important in explaining bond stock and firm excess returns finally we present evidence that refutes the notion that bonds are called to relieve the firm from restrictive debt covenants

is a convertible bond call really bad news we test and reject the hypothesis that managers call in the money convertibles when they view a decline in the value of the firm as likely inconsistent with this view we find that insiders generally buy equity before conversion forcing calls also analysts tend to raise their earnings forecasts following a call thus our evidence supports the alternative hypothesis that the price decline immediately following conversion forcing calls is a purely transitory decline caused by the anticipated increase in the supply of equity indeed our evidence confirms that the initial price decline is reversed in the weeks following the announcement

variety pass through an examination of the ready to eat breakfast cereal market abstract we examine variety pass through effects that occur when multiproduct retailers adjust the length of their product lines in response to changes in wholesale prices studying variety pass through is essential to understanding how wholesale price changes transmit into retail prices when variety is endogenous using data from the ready to eat breakfast cereal category we find that retailers jointly adjust retail prices and the length of their product lines in response to changes in wholesale prices we show the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of retailers product line decisions when calculating price pass through rates

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

revisiting optimal call policy for convertibles when a company calls its convertible bonds it typically must give the bondholders a notice period of approximately 30 days to decide whether to convert the bonds this important institutional detail substantially affects the optimal call policy for convertible bonds when the company calls the bonds it fixes the price at which bondholders can redeem them effectively giving bondholders a 30 day put option the optimal time to call the convertibles minimizes the value of the conversion option net of the put option this optimization problem is solved here and a simple decision rule for the company results this solution contains those of previous researchers as a special case

adverse selection and convertible bonds informational asymmetries between a firm and investors may lead to adverse selection in capital markets this paper demonstrates that when the market obtains noisy information about a firm over time this adverse selection problem can be costlessly solved by issuing callable convertible bonds with restrictive call provisions such securities can be designed to make the payoff to new claimholders independent of the private information of the manager this eliminates the possibility of any dilution of equity or underinvestment and implements the symmetric information outcome in either a pooling or a separating equilibrium the same first best efficient outcome can also be implemented by issuing floating price and mandatory convertibles

oligopolistic competition and the optimal provision of products this paper considers the theory of market versus optimal product diversity in the light of two recent advances in oligopoly theory the first is the development of discrete choice models to describe heterogeneous consumer tastes and the application of such models to oligopolistic competition the second advance is the proof that logconcavity of the consumer taste density guarantees the existence of a price equilibrium we analyze an oligopoly model with price competition and free entry taking explicit account of the integer constraint under the chamberlinian symmetry assumption that tastes are i i d we first show that logconcavity of the taste density implies there is excessive market provision of variety when each consumer buys one unit of the product from one of the firms we then show that this result extends to price sensitive individual demands by proving that the equilibrium number of firms is at least as great as that which would be provided at the second best social optimum subject to a zero profit constraint for firms our results call into question previous findings for representative consumer models that left open the possibility of insufficient product diversity

the role of time value in convertible bond call policy abstract since the seminal work of ingersoll 1977b the optimal time in which a firm should redeem its outstanding convertible bonds has received large attention by the financial literature several studies have put forward a number of possible costs and benefits for a firm if it interrupts the life of its convertible bonds prior to their contractual maturity however in this paper we argue that the managerial decision to call back a convertible bond is mainly driven by a fundamental variable almost neglected up until now the time value extraction from bondholders conversion option accordingly we propose a measure for the effective convenience of calling which we define as net time value advantage and we show using a survival analysis that it is more effective than previously proposed measures in explaining the firms observed call policy

convertible call policies an empirical analysis of an information signaling hypothesis abstract this paper tests an information signaling hypothesis as a potential explanation for corporate convertible bond call policies and for the negative share price reaction to the announcement of the calls we test this hypothesis by trying to ascertain whether the information signaled is realized our results show an unexpected decline in the firm s performance subsequent to the call we also find significant negative cumulative returns during a sixty month period following the calls

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

multiple product firms a nested logit approach this paper proves the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with multiproduct firms using a nested logit model of demand the demand model is parameterized by two variables that characterize different dimensions of preference for variety these reflect intragroup heterogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity a group or nest being the set of products produced by a firm there are then two dimensions to market performance the total number of firms and the range of products produced per firm it is shown that the market equilibrium involves an excessive number of firms but each firm provides too few products copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets the case of the u s automobile industry this paper develops and estimates a model of the u s automobile industry on the demand side a discrete choice model is adopted that is estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey the estimation results are used in conjunction with population weights to derive aggregate demand on the supply side the automobile industry is modelled as an oligopoly with product differentiation equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the profit maximizing firms the estimation results are used in counterfactual simulations to investigate two trade policy issues the effects of the ver and exchange rate pass through

calls of warrants timing and market reaction this paper examines the timing of and reaction to calls of callable warrants three main findings emerge first unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible second there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced finally at the completion of a call the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent the total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent since 1980 several hundred firms have issued callable warrants typically these warrants become callable only after a predetermined date and only when the price of the underlying stock exceeds a minimum price for a prespecified number of days if the company then calls warrantholders are allotted a notice period usually 30 days to decide whether to exercise their warrants or accept a nominal call price this paper is the first to study market reaction to calls of warrants and to see if firms delay calls the results indicate that warrants are called almost as soon as exercise can be forced at the announcement of a call stock prices fall about 3 percent however they rebound by about 7 percent around the last day that warrants can be exercised because this date is known in advance this result is not expected in an efficient market the investigation of calls of warrants may provide insights into calls of convertible bonds and preferred stock both calls of warrants and calls of convertibles transfer wealth to stockholders by reducing the life of the other securityholder s options so if management tries to maximize shareholder wealth management s incentive to call warrants may resemble their incentive to call convertible securities 1 however in contrast to the results pre