a political economy model of congressional careers our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the united states congress we specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset given estimates of the structural model we assess reelection probabilities estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages and quantify the value of congressional seat moreover we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in congress

operating flexibility global manufacturing and the option value of a multinational network the multinational corporation is a network of activities located in different countries the value of this network derives from the opportunity to benefit from uncertainty through the coordination of subsidiaries which are geographically dispersed we model this coordination as the operating flexibility to shift production between two manufacturing plants located in different countries a stochastic dynamic programming model treats explicitly this flexibility as equivalent to owning an option the value of which is dependent upon the real exchange rate the model is extended to analyze hysteresis effects and within country growth options we show that the management of across border coordination has led to changes in the heuristic rules used for performance evaluation and transfer pricing

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

on the identity of social capital and the social capital of identity in contemporary economics social capital is identified by some with norms and networks that enhance trust reciprocity and cooperation for the production of public goods but critics claim that social capital is principally of individualist origin and provides solid ground for the subordination of labour by capital we argue that despite neoclassical mis treatments more socialised conceptions of social capital address individuals capacities to share a sense of social obligation and common identity and pursue joint strategies for public welfare we attempt to reinstate the social in social capital via the concept of social embeddedness where individuals freely engage in processes of reflection social mobilisation and political debate to assess different and often conflicting values and objectives across multiple collective agencies choices thus depend not only on personal utility but also on personal identity i e what kind of person one wants to be and what kind of society one wishes to have copyright oxford university press

an economic model of representative democracy this paper develops an approach to the study of democratic policy making where politicians are selected by the people from those citizens who present themselves as candidates for public office the approach has a number of attractive features first it is a conceptualization of a pure form of representative democracy in which government is by as well as of the people second the model is analytically tractable being able to handle multidimensional issue and policy spaces very naturally third it provides a vehicle for answering normative questions about the performance of representative democracy

favoritism and reverse discrimination abstract we analyze the inefficiency that may arise in the form of reverse discrimination in the presence of favoritism or nepotism favoritism is typically associated with inefficient transfers to the core support of the incumbent government but inefficiency that is opposite in nature may also arise through the electoral process in a political environment where favoritism is pervasive we show that if the policy maker is sufficiently office seeking a socially efficient action may never be taken if it yields benefits to his core support due to reputational concerns hence the core support of the incumbent may fare worse than other groups we also consider the implications of policies such as anti nepotism laws or term limits in the presence of favoritism

when does it take a nixon to go to china substantial policy changes like market oriented reforms by populist parties and steps towards peace by hawks are sometimes implemented by unlikely parties to account for such episodes this paper develops a framework in which incumbent politicians have better information about the state of the world than voters the incumbent is unable to credibly transmit all this information since voters are also imperfectly informed about his ideology the paper identifies conditions under which an incumbent party s electoral prospects increase the more atypical the policy it proposes popular support for a policy or its credibility depends on the policymaker policy pair copyright 1998 by american economic association

linear and nonlinear foreign exchange rate exposures of german nonfinancial corporations this paper investigates whether the low significance of the impact of foreign exchange rate risk on firm value reported in previous studies can be explained by the fact that only the linear exposure component has been estimated or that exchange rate indices were used for a comprehensive sample of german firms empirical evidence is presented for the existence of significant linear and nonlinear exposures which can be identified for bilateral as well as multilateral foreign exchange rates the percentage of foreign sales measures of firm liquidity and industry sectors are significant determinants of the exposure

the nature of heterodox economics heterodoxy serves as an umbrella term to cover the coming together of separate projects or traditions in answering the question what distinguishes heterodoxy from the orthodoxy the author argues that matters of ontology are central in answering the question how are the various traditions that make up the modern heterodoxy to be distinguished from each other the author defends criteria other than varying commitments to specific substantive theories policy measures or techniques or basic units of analysis

symmetric pass through of tariffs and exchange rates under imperfect competition an empirical test abstract this paper examines the effect of tariffs and exchange rates on u s prices of japanese cars trucks and motorcycles in particular we test whether the long run pass through of tariffs and exchange rates are identical the symmetry hypothesis we find that this hypothesis is easily accepted in our sample we also find that the pass through relation varies across products ranging from about 0 6 for trucks to unity for motorcycles these coefficients have very different implications for trade policy we explain the results based on demand cost and institutional conditions in each industry

international competition and exchange rate shocks a cross country industry analysis of stock returns this article systematically examines the importance of exchange rate movements and industry competition for stock returns common shocks to industries across countries are more important than competitive shocks due to changes in exchange rates weekly exchange rate shocks explain almost nothing of the relative performance of industries using returns measured over longer horizons the importance of exchange rate shocks increases slightly and the importance of industry common shocks increases more substantially both industry and exchange rate shocks are more important for industries that produce internationally traded goods but the importance of these shocks is economically small for these industries as well economists journalists and politicians around the world argue that some of the industries in their country compete vigorously with the same industries in other countries and that exchange rate shocks affect their competitiveness in the united states it is routinely stated that some u s industries compete with japanese industries and that a depreciation of the yen is bad for these u s industries and good for the rival japanese industries if the yen falls trade tensions could intensify between the u s and japan as autos and machinery from japan gain a competitive edge 1 further the exchange rate literature shows that exchange rate shocks lead to persistent deviations from purchasing power parity 2 froot and klemperer 1989 and knetter 1989 1993 among others demonstrate that deviations from purchasing power parity lead to sharp changes in price markups and profit margins for exporters

electoral competition and politician turnover abstract in this paper we analyze the selection by opportunistic parties of the candidates who run for election we consider a setting with incomplete but symmetric information about the candidates abilities in which electoral campaigns provide voters with additional information about candidates parties care only about selecting an appropriate candidate to win the election while voters elect the best candidate conditional on their information we first argue that in order to defeat an established very good candidate of its rival a party may favor a new candidate with highly uncertain ability rather than an established good candidate next we establish that the discrepancy between the objective of parties and the objective of the electorate leads to inefficient conservatism in the selection of candidates i e each party keeps its incumbents too often from the voters viewpoint

price discrimination by u s and german exporters the insensitivity of the u s trade balance to the sharp depreciation of the dollar in the past three years has revived interest in the relationship between exchange rates and the trade balance a central issue in most analyses of the relation between the current account and the exchange rate concerns the price adjustment process the simple integrated competitive market model predicts that local currency prices should change in proportion to the nominal exchange rate for a country too small to influence world prices the relationship between local currency import prices and exchange rates has been referred to as the pass through relationship in the empirical literature in international economics if the proportional relationship between import prices and exchange rates holds pass through is said to be complete accounts of recent u s experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in proportion to exchange rates i e incomplete pass through as an important factor in explaining the persistence of the trade deficit unfortunately observations on pass through alone provide limited insight into the behavior of markets since incomplete pass through is consistent with at least two fundamentally different paradigms one is the standard competitive model of trade in which the law of one price holds but exchange rate fluctuations are associated with large changes in import demand due to other factors for example if dollar appreciation is correlated with increases in world demand and industry marginal cost is increasing then pass through will be less than complete the other is an imperfectly competitive model in which exporters are capable of price discriminating across destination markets a phenomenon paul krugman 1987 has labeled pricing to market in this model incomplete pass through is typically associated with fluctuations in the markup of price over marginal cost on exports 2 these fluctuations in markups are believed to be countryspecific they do not reflect the behavior of prices to other export destinations both models are plausible explanations of recent u s experience unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish between these competing models using only information on import prices and exchange rates for a single country in order to distinguish between the competing models an empirical analysis of goods prices and exchange rates must be capable of measuring either marginal cost or the markup over marginal cost either of these tasks poses formidable empirical problems much of the empirical literature in industrial organization has been concerned with precisely these issues since markups are an important measure of the competitiveness of industries

on the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent governments a couple of months before the swedish election in 1998 the incumbent government distributed 2 3 billion sek to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities this was the first wave of a four year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development this temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government in this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants we find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes in particular we find strong support for the lindbeck weibull dixit londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters this result is statistically as well as economically significant we do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters

persistent trade effects of large exchange rate shocks this paper presents a theoretical basis for the argument that large exchange rate shocks such as the 1980s dollar cycle may have persistent effects on trade flows and the equilibrium exchange rate itself we begin with a partial equilibrium model in which large exchange rate fluctuations lead to entry or exit decisions that are not reversed when the currency returns to its previous level then we develop a simple model of the feedback from hysteresis in trade to the exchange rate itself here we see that a large capital inflow which leads to an initial appreciation can result in a persistent reduction in the exchange rate consistent with trade balance

identity and the economics of organizations on plebes first day at west point called r day they strip down to their underwear their hair is cut off they are put in uniform they then must address an older cadet with the proper salute and with the statement sir new cadet doe reports to the cadet in the red sash for the first time as ordered plebes must stand and salute and repeat and stand and salute and repeat until they get it exactly right all the while being reprimanded for every tiny mistake in the summary of david lipsky 2003 pp 145 154 who spent four years tracking a company of cadets at west point on r day you surrender your old self in stages but r day is just the beginning of the training and personal re engineering that is to come so that west point graduates emerge four years later as loyal officers in the u s army lipsky shows that despite some failure this tough program is remarkably successful in creating officers with the will to lead in battle economists current picture of organizations and work incentives has no place for the west point program and the motivations it seeks to inculcate in recruits in a standard economic model an individual s preferences are fixed and utility depends only on pecuniary variables the army s aim at west point is to change cadets preferences they wish to inculcate non economic motives in the cadets so that they have the same goals as the u s army alternatively stated the goal of west point is to change the identity of the cadets so they will think of themselves above all else as officers in the u s army they will feel bad about themselves they will lose utility if they fall short of the ideals of such an officer this change in identity

does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices evidence from gubernatorial term limits this paper analyzes the behavior of u s governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation building model of political behavior we argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model we find evidence that taxes spending and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a democrat is in office the result is a fiscal cycle in term limit states which lowers state income when the term limit binds

exchange rate exposure and industry characteristics evidence from canada japan and the usa abstract this paper examines industry level exchange rate exposures for canada japan and the usa measuring exposure by adding the change in the exchange rate to the domestic market model of industry portfolio returns some industries in all three countries display significant exposures moreover for each country the exchange rate is important for explaining industry returns at the economy wide level to explore whether exchange rate exposures are systematically linked to the activities of the industries we model exposure as a function of industry characteristics for all three countries the relation between exposure and industry characteristics is broadly consistent with economic theory jel f3

contribution to productivity or pork barrel the two faces of infrastructure investment abstract this paper proposes a simultaneous equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth we model explicitly the political economy process driving infrastructure investments in doing so we eliminate a potential source of bias in production function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy our empirical findings on a panel of france s regions over 1985 92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were indeed significant determinants of the cross regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments by contrast we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending even after controlling for pork barrel

a dynamic analysis of exchange rate exposure the impact of china s renminbi this study examines the impacts of unexpected exchange rate movements of chinese renminbi cny usd on stock returns of standard poor s 500 corporations to gain better insight into the long standing exposure puzzle concerning the divergence between theoretical and empirical investigation and the critical issue regarding the determinants of exposure the time variation and asymmetry property associated with foreign exchange exposure are further taking into account we also broaden the scope of analysis to investigate unexpected risk exposure at 10 economic sectors in compliance with global industry classification standard unlike those from the static analysis or dynamic ones with the ordinary least squares model the empirical findings provide additional concrete evidence that unexpected exchange rate exposure varies substantially across time and market circumstances when using the quantile regression with a rolling method furthermore our dynamic analysis not only supports the existence of industrial effects across different economic sectors but also provides strong evidence that financial factors such as size debt ratio and book to market ratio have a significant impact on exposure

managerial incentive problems a dynamic perspective the paper studies how a person s concern for a future career may influence his or her incentives to put in effort or make decisions on the job in the model the person s productive abilities are revealed over time through observations of performance there are no explicit output contingent contracts but since the wage in each period is based on expected output and expected output depends on assessed ability an implicit contract links today s performance to future wages an incentive problem arises from the person s ability and desire to influence the learning process and therefore the wage process by taking unobserved actions that affect today s performance the fundamental incongruity in preferences is between the individual s concern for human capital returns and the firm s concern for financial returns the two need be only weakly related it is shown that career motives can be beneficial as well as detrimental depending on how well the two kinds of capital returns are aligned it is well understood by now that informational externalities may place special demands on the organization of economic exchange simple price mediated markets will frequently fail in the presence of asymmetric information in that case more elaborate contractual arrangements have to be used as substitutes for the price system lately considerable effort has been devoted to the analysis of contracting under incomplete information with the objective to understand the range of economic institutions that emerge in response to the failure of the price system the analysis of moral hazard has played a prominent role in this development moral hazard problems arise when for some reason or another transacting parties cannot contract contingent on the delivery of the good for instance in buying labour services it may be that the amount of labour supplied is not directly observable precluding a simple exchange of wage for labour as a partial remedy to this problem an imperfect mutually observed signal about the supply of labour can be used as a proxy in the contract frequently output is taken as such a proxy the drawback is that output is often influenced by other factors than labour input which induce undesirable risk into the contract one is therefore faced with a tradeoff between allocating risk associated with incomplete observability and providing incentives for a proper supply of labour gaining insight into this tradeoff is important not only for understanding contracting in the small e g managerial incentive schemes but also because it is closely related to the fundamental tension between equity and efficiency in the society as a whole while our understanding of moral hazard has advanced a lot in past years it is clear that much work remains an important question that has received little attention until

the effects of industry structure on economic exposure abstract a firm is subject to economic exposure if changes in exchange rates affect the firm s value as measured by the present value of its future cash flows this paper shows that in many forms of competition including the most commonly studied case of monopoly the economic exposure of an exporting firm is simply proportional to the firm s net revenues based in foreign currency this simple result breaks down under some but not all forms of competition between the exporting firm and foreign firms in that case the exporting firm needs to know about the price elasticity of its product demand and its marginal cost in order to assess its exposure to exchange rates the key determinant of economic exposure therefore is the competitive structure of the industry in which a firm operates

balanced budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition this paper models balanced budget redistribution between socio economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties equilibrium is unique in the present model and a sufficient condition for existence is given requiring that there be enough stochastic heterogeneity with respect to party preferences in the electorate the validity of hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation and of director s law are examined under alternative hypotheses concerning administrative costs of redistributions and voter s possibilities both of abstaining from voting and of becoming campaign activists for one of the parties the policy strategy of expected plurality maximization is contrasted with the strategy of maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality incomes are fixed and known so lump sum taxation is feasible however constraints on tax transfer differentiation between individuals are permitted in the analysis

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

is price adjustment asymmetric evaluating the market share and marketing bottlenecks hypothesis abstract export price adjustment is asymmetric with respect to currency fluctuations in at least two circumstances if firms face capacity constraints in distribution networks or quantitative trade restrictions then pricing to market may be greater during depreciations of the exporter s currency if firms attempt to build market share subject to the threat of trade restrictions then pricing to market may be greater during appreciations of the exporter s currency this paper tests for asymmetries using panel data on german and japanese 7 digit industry exports the data seldom reject the hypothesis of a symmetric response of prices to exchange rates

paying politicians theory and evidence this paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance the paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two period term limits this model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems we also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous the main ideas in the model are confronted with data on u s governors jel d72 j33

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

identity economics meets financialisation gender race and occupational stratification in the us labour market throughout his career geoff harcourt has constantly and consistently highlighted the role of social norms and collective decisions in his study of modern economies in doing so he has put a great deal of emphasis on the distribution of income between different social groups especially so when concerned with the labour market this article attempts to celebrate this particular aspect of his numerous contributions to economics by highlighting the role of social norms in influencing earnings across occupations and demographic groups in the usa social norms generate hierarchy economic and non economic inequalities amongst ascriptively distinguished groups drawing on the stratification and identity economics literatures this article proposes a novel theoretical and empirical framework for analysing the effects of financialisation on the earnings dynamics of gender and race groups a framework that is consistent with discrimination as a source of racial and gender inequality the empirical methodology used in the form of long run cointegrating relationships of groups earnings across occupations assesses whether a pattern of social norms on wage distribution emerges over time the results of this study show that over the past 30 years social norms have exacerbated the stratification of the us labour market

hyteresis in import prices the beachhead effect this paper shows that temporary real exchange rate fluctuations can have persistent hysteretic effects on trade specifically when market entry costs are sunk sufficiently large exchange rate shocks alter domestic market structure and thereby induce hysteresis this simple result has strong implications for exchange rate theory t rade policy and estimation of trade equations empirical evidence su ggests that the recent dollar overvaluation induced hysteresis in u s import prices namely the aggregate pass through equation of exchange rates to import prices shifted in the 1980s the shift s nature and timing is broadly consistent with the hysteresis hypothesis copyright 1988 by american economic association

foreign exchange exposure of us tourism related firms abstract to date literature on foreign exchange risk has paid a particular attention to multinationals in trade related industries the tourism sector is also sensitive to the exchange rates between travelers home countries and their destinations suspecting that the exposure of domestic tourism related firms to foreign exchange risk results from price elasticity of demand the current study tested the cash flow exposure of sample firms accounting for nonlinearity asymmetry and lagged effects as a result a significant percentage 78 of domestic tourism related firms was found to have significant foreign exchange exposure this study also found that exchange rate exposure for tourism related firms was nonlinear asymmetric and lagged the evidence implied that several tourism related firms are passive regarding their exposure and may face financial burdens caused by demand fluctuations implications and suggestions are presented along with the findings of the study

presidential pork executive veto power and distributive politics mitigated to the extent that the president prefers spending in some districts over others the model also generates new insights and predictions about fiscal policy under the separation of powers including the effects of divided government electoral rules and term limitations for the executive

redistributive public employment abstract politicians may use disguised redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax transfer schemes first we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis next we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model namely that in u s cities politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device we find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

investment pass through and exchange rates a cross country comparison using detailed data from the united states canada the united kingdom and japan we examine the implications of exchange rates for time series of sectoral investment both theoretically and empirically we show that investment responsiveness to exchange rates varies over time positively in relation to sectoral reliance on export share and negatively with respect to the share of imported inputs in production important differences exist in investment endogeneity across high and low price over cost markup sectors with investment in low markup sectors often significantly more responsive to exchange rates cross country differences in investment response are only partially explained by industrial organization arguments

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

exchange rate pass through when market share matters the authors investigate the pass through from exchange rates to import prices when firms future demands depend on their current market shares they show that profit maximizing foreign firms may either raise or lower their dollar export prices when the dollar appreciates temporarily i e the pass through may be perverse and that current import prices may be more sensitive to expected future exchange rates than to current exchange rates they present evidence that suggests the behavior of expected future exchange rates may provide a clue to the puzzling recent behavior of u s import prices copyright 1989 by american economic association

executive veto legislative override and structure induced equilibrium in this study the structure induced equilibrium approach for modeling democratic institutions is extended to allow for the added structural features of executive veto and legislative override a multidimensional model is presented for a budgetary process involving three actors a legislature an appropriations committee and an executive in order to focus attention on the role of the veto and override possibilities simplifying assumptions are made with regard to other aspects of the agenda formation process in particular the committee has monopoly agenda power a closed amendment control rule is operative and perfect foresight expectations are held by the committee and the executive given these assumptions utility maximization by the several actors generates a budget outcome characterized as a structure induced equilibrium the general model is illustrated geometrically with a two dimensional example permitting budget outcomes to be analyzed for various combinations of veto rules and override provisions the analysis demonstrates that budget outcomes are sensitive to alternative specifications of veto rules and override provisions in the illustration executive veto power is shown to vary directly with both the permissiveness of the veto rule and the stringency of the override provision similar relationships however are not found to exist for total budget expenditures

the exchange rate exposure of u s multinationals this article examines the exposure of u s multinationals to foreign currency risk evidence is presented that the relationship between stock returns and exchange rates differs systematically across multinationals given these results the study focuses on the determinants of exchange rate exposure the comovements between stock returns and the value of the dollar is found to be positively related to the percentage of foreign operations of u s multinationals copyright 1990 by the university of chicago

competition and incentives with motivated agents a unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission as opposed to profit as an organizational goal such mission oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission this paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organizational efficiency matching economizes on the need for high powered incentives it can also however entrench bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovations the framework developed in this paper is applied to school competition incentives in the public sector and in private nonprofits and the interdependence of incentives and productivity between the private for profit sector and the mission oriented sector through occupational choice jel d23 d73 h41 l31 the late twentieth century witnessed a historic high in the march of market capitalism with unbridled optimism in the role of the profit motive in promoting welfare in the production of private goods moreover this generated a broad consensus on the optimal organization of private good production through privately owned competitive firms when it comes to the provision of collective goods no such consensus has emerged debates about the relative merits of public and private provision still dominate this paper suggests a contracting approach to the provision of collective goods it focuses on two key issues how to structure incentives and the role of competition between providers at its heart is the idea that organizations that provide collective goods cohere around a mission 2 thus production of collective goods can be viewed as mission oriented

goods prices and exchange rates what have we learned import prices typically change by a smaller proportion than the exchange rate between the exporting and importing country recent research indicates that common currency relative prices for similar goods exported to different markets are highly correlated with exchange rates between those markets this evidence suggests that incomplete pass through is a consequence of third degree price discrimination while distance matters for market segmentation borders have independent effects the source of the border effect has not been clearly identified furthermore there is little evidence yet to suggest substantial market power is implied by the observed price discrimination

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

divided government and u s trade policy theory and evidence if different parties control the u s congress and white house the united states may maintain higher import protection than otherwise this proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the president when the congressional majority party faces a president of the other party the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the president by requiring congressional approval of trade proposals by up or down vote this constraint forces the president to provide higher protection in order to assemble a congressional majority evidence confirms that 1 the institutional constraints placed on the president s trade policymaking authority are strengthened in times of divided government and loosened under unified government and 2 u s trade policy was significantly more protectionist under divided than under unified government during the period 1949 90

does the currency regime shape unhedged currency exposure abstract this paper examines how unhedged currency exposure of firms varies with changes in currency flexibility a sequence of four time periods with alternating high and low currency volatility in india provides a natural experiment in which changes in currency exposure of a panel of firms is measured and the moral hazard versus incomplete markets hypotheses tested we find that firms carried higher currency exposure in periods when the currency was less flexible our results support the moral hazard hypothesis that low currency flexibility encourages firms to hold unhedged exposure in response to implicit government guarantees

identity and schooling some lessons for the economics of education abstract this review culls noneconomic literature on education by sociologists anthropologists and practitioners to present a new economic theory of students and schools this theory elaborates two themes that have eluded economic analysis first is the student as decision maker whose primary motivation is her identity second is a conception of the school as a social institution this framework suggests a new perspective on questions such as resource allocation and school reform it explains why some educational policies succeed and others fail we show how sociological variables may affect outcomes and suggest ways economists can incorporate them into theoretical and empirical research

the making of economic policy a transaction cost politics perspective economic policymaking as a political process the normative approach to policy analysis the positive view of political economy a synthesis the policy process in real time a theme transaction costs the transaction cost politics framework political outcomes and economic efficiency transaction cost analysis in politics mechanisms to cope with transaction costs in politics national differences two case studies to illustrate transaction cost politics tax and expenditure reform in the united states the gatt and national trade politics some reflections and suggestions some lessons for the policy process the role of the economist concluding comments appendix multiprincipal multitask agencies

linear and nonlinear exchange rate exposure abstract this paper presents a new methodological approach to examine exchange rate exposure which takes account of the role of the market portfolio and macroeconomic variables in exposure regressions exchange rate regimes based on periods of depreciation and appreciation and nonlinear exposure within each regime we show that the stock market s own exposure to exchange rates should be taken into account before considering industry exposure in addition we adjust the exchange rate and the stock market for common economy wide factors that are unrelated to exchange rates within this framework we show that exposure to bilateral exchange rates is statistically and economically important and that industries with extensive international trade are more often exposed than industries with low levels of international trade the signs of exposure coefficients in each regime are consistent with the extent to which an industry exports we also show that nonlinear exposure is often statistically and economically significant interestingly there is little evidence that industries are exposed to a currency basket

exposure and markups this article examines how to properly specify and test for factors that affect exchange rate exposure starting from theoretical underpinnings and a sample of u s manufacturing industries between 1979 and 1995 we find that 4 of 18 industry groups are significantly exposed to exchange rate movements through the effect of industry competitive structure export share and imported input share on average a 1 appreciation of the dollar decreases the return of the average industry by 0 13 consistent with our model s predictions as an industry s markups fall rise its exchange rate exposure increases decreases exchange rate movements are an important source of risk for a firm they affect a firm s expected cash flows and or change the terms of competition for exporters importers and multinationals hung 1992 estimates that during the 1980s u s manufacturing industries lost approximately 23 billion year or 10 of total profits due to the dollar s movements surprisingly early studies which assume exchange rate exposure to be constant e g jorion 1990 bodnar and gentry 1993 and amihud 1994 find that exchange rates have no effect on the stock returns of u s multinationals exporters or manufacturing industries recently however allayannis 1997 and bodnar dumas and marston 1998 examine time varying exposure of industry returns 1 in particular the former article focuses on the effect the variation of u s industries import and export shares have on exposure while the latter focuses on pass through and exposure in a sample of japanese export oriented industries besides trade shares and pass through exchange rate exposure also depends on the markup of an industry specifically in industries with

pass through and exposure firms differ in the extent to which they pass through changes in exchange rates into foreign currency prices and in their exposure to exchange rates the responsiveness of their profits to changes in exchange rates because pricing affects profitability a firm s pass through and exposure should be related this paper develops models of exporting firms under imperfect competition to study these related phenomena from these models we derive the optimal pass through decisions and the resulting exchange rate exposure the models are estimated on eight japanese export industries using both the price data pass through and financial data for exposure exchange rates can have a major inf luence on the pricing behavior and profitability of exporting and importing firms firms differ in the extent to which they pass through the change in exchange rates into the prices they charge in foreign markets they also differ in their exposure to exchange rates the responsiveness of their profits to changes in exchange rates previous papers have studied either pass through or exposure but none has studied these two phenomena together yet because pricing directly affects profitability the exposure of a firm s profits to exchange rates should be governed by many of the same firm and industry characteristics that determine pricing behavior this paper develops models of firm and industry behavior that are used to study these closely related phenomena together it also provides estimates of pass through and exposure behavior using data from japanese export industries to examine pass through behavior and exchange rate exposure we model a firm with sales to a foreign export market this exporting firm competes with a foreign firm in that export market the costs of the exporting firm are based primarily in the local domestic currency while the foreign firm

taxes and bribery the role of wage incentives this paper presents a simple model to evaluate alternative payment schemes for tax inspectors in the presence of corruption we consider problems of both moral hazard which arises because taking bribes cannot be observed without costly monitoring and adverse selection since not all potential tax inspectors can be identified as being honest or dishonest we identify three wage regimes first one could pay the same wage that a tax inspector could earn elsewhere his reservation wage second one could pay a wage which solves the moral hazard problem i e deters bribery this we call an efficiency wage by analogy with recent models examined i n macro economics third the government could pay a wage below the reservation wage at which only the dishonest become tax inspectors the capitulation wage we make precise the conditions under which each yields the greatest amount o f tax revenues net o f administrative costs many countries in the developing world are undergoing structural adjustment programmes which require fundamental fiscal changes outside agencies advise restoration of budget balance a task which involves expenditure cuts and tax increases the treatment of public employee pay scales often poses a particular dilemma i n this process wages and salaries are a significant component of government expenditures and one important question concerns the extent to which wages rather than employment cuts should be used to save money there is sometimes a reluctance to advocate wage cuts stemming in part from a feeling that this might impair the performance of the public sector hence tanzi 1990 argues that a policy of wage cutting is likely to increase the inefficiency of public sector employees especially at a time when the public sector is expected to play a larger role in restructuring the economy p 16 in the context of tax collection the issue is particularly pressing given the need to raise more tax revenues a reduction in efficiency in this branch of the government i s likely t o mean that fewer returns are processed and when individuals living standards are squeezed their incentive to accept bribes in lieu o f collecting taxes i s increased o n this count i t i s even sometimes suggested that wages of tax inspectors should be increased to aid the effort to the comments of henry bienen john hey and two anonymous referees have been helpful in revising this paper the authors are also grateful t o the john m olin program for the study o f economic organization and public policy at princeton university and the pew charitable trusts for financial support mclaren also acknowledges support from the international finance section of princeton university none of the above should be implicated in any way see for example goode 1984 chapter 1 3 and gould and amaro reyes 1983

the economics of identity and the identity of economics drawing upon individual and social choice theory the economic approach to identity associated with akerlof and kranton is critically assessed in terms of its own definitional and technical conundrums this leads on to an external critique in terms of the limited extent to which identity can be addressed by mainstream economic methods indeed the latter essentially sets aside the insights into the nature of identity that emerged with modernism let alone postmodernism as a result the enterprise of constructing an economics of identity is set in the context of recent changes in and disagreement over interpretation of the identity of contemporary economics

a model of political competition with citizen candidates the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates a winner implements her favorite policy the equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning for some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates whose positions are distinct two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system the candidates positions are less differentiated under a runoff system there exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning

executive budget proposal executive veto legislative override and uncertainty a comparative analysis of the budgetary process this study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal the executive veto the legislative override and legislative uncertainty about the executive s preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process a sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents a legislature an appropriations committee and an executive is presented to focus attention on the executive proposal the veto the override provision and uncertainty simplifying assumptions are made 1 the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power and 2 there is a closed amendment control rule in order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions we examine a particular arrangement of agents preferences and a two item budget the results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal the executive veto rule the override provision and the uncertainty we achieve three striking results first the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto second for a given override provision a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases third with the same change in institutions the government budget may increase

international comparisons of pricing to market behavior this paper measures the degree of price discrimination across export destinations that is associated with exchange rate changes using u s u k german and japanese industry level data given the industries sampled more price discrimination across destinations is observed in the u k german and japanese data for industries that match across source countries however behavior is very similar across source countries furthermore destination specific price adjustment on exports to the united states from germany and japan is similar to price adjustment observed on shipments to other destinations most variation in the data appears to be related to industry copyright 1993 by american economic association