war and natural resource exploitation abstract we build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour i e fighting efforts and for endogenous natural resource exploitation i e speed ownership and investments while depletion is spread in a balanced hotelling fashion during peace the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction as this lowers the stakes of future contest this voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government s weapon advantage is weak some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons the shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee furthermore the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation which leads to more government turnover without credible commitment to future fighting efforts private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government s non oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe

natural resources and sub national economic performance does sub national democracy matter abstract the differentiation in the impact of resources on economic growth is often explained by the specifics of institutional factors the aim of this paper is to investigate how sub national political differences influence the effect of natural resources on economic growth using a dataset of russian regions this paper demonstrates that sub national democratization influences the growth effects of resources and considers possible mechanisms for this influence the paper finds that in russia natural resources are only capable of promoting growth in the regions with non democratic political systems that at the same time have an efficient and non corrupt bureaucracy

the political economy of public income volatility with an application to the resource curse abstract in recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in greece or to unstable oil prices in venezuela we study the political consequences of such public income volatility as is standard in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re election probabilities but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power making policy more efficient yet at the same time it also reduces the re election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future this makes inefficient policy such as patronage public employment less costly our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth in the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices a characteristic of many developing countries we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction jointly interacting with increased patronage employment

natural resources democracy and corruption we study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our game theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor but not otherwise we use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions our main results hold when we control for the effects of income time varying common shocks regional fixed effects and various additional covariates they are also robust across different samples and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources democracy and corruption

the big push natural resource booms and growth a simple application of big push reasoning suggests that natural resource booms can be important catalysts for development in poorer countries in this paper we present evidence from seven latin american countries that natural resource booms are sometimes accompa nied by declining per capita gdp we present a model with natural resources increasing returns in the spirit of big push models and expectations to clarify some of the reasons this may happen q 1999 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

institutions capital and growth the international development community has encouraged investment in physical and human capital as a precursor to economic progress recent evidence shows however that increases in capital do not always lead to increases in output we develop a growth model where the allocation and productivity of capital depends on a country s institutions we find that increases in physical and human capital lead to output growth only in countries with good institutions in countries with bad institutions increases in capital lead to negative growth rates because additions to the capital stock tend to be employed in rent seeking and other socially unproductive activities

commodity windfalls democracy and external debt we examine the effects that windfalls from international commodity price booms have on external debt in a panel of 93 countries during the period 1970 2007 our main finding is that increases in the international prices of exported commodity goods lead to a significant reduction in the level of external debt in democracies but to no significant reduction in the level of external debt in autocracies to explain this finding we show that in autocracies commodity windfalls lead to a statistically significant and quantitatively large increase in government consumption expenditures in democracies government consumption expenditures did not increase significantl

the political economy of state failure rapid decolonization created many arbitrary countries in contrast to those states which had emerged through a quasi darwinian process of selection some of these new countries had structural characteristics which gravely impeded the provision of public goods their lack of a unifying sense of shared identity made cooperation difficult and their tiny economic size left them unable to reap scale economies two public goods security and accountability are particularly important for development and so where they could not be provided states failed the cause of a problem is not necessarily a guide to its solution darwinian struggle among failing states is not something to be encouraged solutions lie partly in a phase of international provision of the key public goods partly in enhanced regional pooling of sovereignty and partly in institutional innovation to make the domestic provision of public goods less demanding of the state copyright 2009 oxford university press

emission trading with fiscal externalities the case for a common carbon tax for the non ets emissions in the eu a government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first best level of public spending when involved in emission trading a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales this fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries our theory explains how and when fiscal externalities may be expected to arise moreover we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect 1 the price of emission permits 2 the global distribution of abatement effort and 3 total greenhouse gas mitigation costs this is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets our findings are especially relevant for the eu which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between eu member countries for all emissions outside the european emissions trading system

keeping the public purse an experiment in windfalls taxes and the incentives to restrain government it is widely believed that natural resource wealth foreign aid and other types of windfall revenue increase corruption and undermine accountability a predominant claim in political science is that windfalls free politicians from the need to tax resulting in a more politically quiescent population yet there is surprisingly little evidence to substantiate not only whether taxation has this eect but also why i use novel experiments to provide the rst micro level causal test of claims that 1 taxes motivate citizens more than windfalls to hold politicians accountable and 2 citizens care more about wasted revenue when they pay taxes the experiments were embedded in a public awareness campaign conducted with 1 863 citizens in a resource rich district in indonesia the results measured through a survey and a postcard campaign show that taxes made participants more willing to monitor government and hold politicians accountable than windfalls primarily because of a stronger sense of ownership over public funds yet when better information on government spending is made available the windfall group proved just as intolerant of misspent revenue these ndings have important implications for understanding not only how taxation motivates political action but also how revenue shapes the ways in which citizens acquire and process information on government spending

the resource curse and the decentralization of oil revenue the case of nigeria abstract nigeria is often portrayed as a poster child for countries experiencing the resource curse phenomenon the pertinent question that confronts policy makers in nigeria today is no longer whether or not nigeria is suffering from the resource curse rather it is what to do about it since the 1980s various policy initiatives have been adopted by the nigerian government to address different aspects of the resource curse but with limited success it is therefore not surprising that regional governments within the niger delta have in recent years turned to oil producing area development commissions as a means of reducing the poverty and conflict that is endemic in the region drawing on empirical data this paper argues that the oil producing area development commissions have been unable to improve the lives of the people in oil producing communities it is suggested that this is due largely to their inability to alter the opportunities and incentives for rent seekers and allow for active community and civil society participation the paper concludes by considering the implications for the resource curse and the way forward for these commissions

from curse to blessing institutional reform and resource booms in colombia abstract is it possible to reverse the resource curse through institutional reform evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between abundance of natural resources and economic growth political stability democracy and peace however evidence illustrating how institutional reform can reverse this situation is scarce in this paper we exploit a component of an institutional reform that modified the allocation rule of oil royalties in colombia and evaluate a set of effects of this reform on the living standards of colombian households using international variations in the price of oil for identification we find that the reform had important effects on several household welfare indicators we find positive impacts on important dimensions such as reductions in multidimensional poverty and improvements on income employment housing conditions health and education among others results are mixed or null in other outcomes such as formality or employment in the service sector importantly we find no effects on monetary poverty but larger income effects for rich and urban households we test for the different channels boosting these effects and provide tentative evidence that supports the role of fiscal and administrative capacity mechanisms

can vouchers reduce elite capture of local development projects experimental evidence from the solomon islands abstract external financing of local public goods can potentially create political resource curses by reducing citizen oversight exacerbating elite capture and producing policy outcomes that are sub optimal for the general population this paper experimentally tests a novel mechanism that seeks to mitigate elite capture of local development projects control communities are provided with block grants to fund local public goods while households in treatment communities are provided with vouchers that they may either contribute to a public good or redeem at a discount for a private capital good we find that the use of vouchers as a mechanism for aid delivery increases community participation in local public decision making changes the nature of allocation outcomes and improves community satisfaction with allocation outcomes

preference structures property rights and paired comparisons the method of paired comparisons was used to determine the structure of survey participants value expressions for australian native forests the same participants were also surveyed using the contingent valuation method cvm data from the paired comparisons were used to construct preference maps which enabled identification of participants whose value expressions were structurally incompatible with economic welfare theory in particular those participants who expressed their values according to lexicographic preferences for some of these participants cvm results did not provide appropriate measures of wtp the surveys also demonstrated the importance of allowing participants own views on property rights to dictate the valuation context offered

the curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries abstract this paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a blessing for some countries but a curse for others in this model natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights making productive activities even less attractive the aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large the model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous countries empirical evidence supporting this prediction is provided

resource curse or not a question of appropriability this thesis presents three self contained essays focusing on empirical questions in growth and development economics each article addresses specific questions on why countries perform differently in particular i analyse the effect of democracy on economic development the relationship between natural resources and growth and the efficiency of foreign development assistance in the first essay democracy consolidation and growth i analyse the effect of democracy on economic growth in this context i argue that an important aspect to consider is how consolidated political systems are put simply i find that it is not only a question of how democratic countries are but also how long they have been democratic in other words economic performance tends to improve with the duration of uninterrupted democracy the performance of autocracies on the other hand tends to deteriorate over time however for newly established political systems there seems to be a cost of being democratic this implies that democracies only bear their fruit after some time the analysis has important policy implications to overcome initial straits international assistance focused on democratic consolidation may be important and a very good investment in fostering long run development the second essay resource curse or not a question of appropriability together with anne boschini and jesper roine is concerned with the relation between natural resources and economic development for most laymen as well as for most economists it would seem reasonable that countries richly endowed in natural resources also benefit from this wealth however a large literature has found a systematic negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth we suggest that this so called resource curse is not determined by resource endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources a country possesses and the quality of institutions in the country this combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource the concept of appropriability captures the likelihood of natural resources leading to rentseeking corruption or conflicts which in turn will harm economic development our results suggest that if institutions are good enough the curse may be turned into a blessing this may explain why some countries such as norway and botswana tend to benefit from their resources while others such as angola and sierra leone do not the third and final essay of this thesis foreign sectoral aid fungibility growth and poverty reduction is a contribution to the aid efficiency literature which is concerned with the question of whether aid helps or hinders economic development foreign development assistance is often targeted on specific public expenditure sectors if this aid is not used in the sector for which it was granted e g health education it is said to be fungible and donors may end up financing something completely different from what they intended e g military expenditures the major concern about sectoral fungibility is that the alternative use of aid may be less productive or less socially useful however measuring fungibility is not sufficient to determine whether foreign sectoral aid fungibility is actually harmful what is important is how the funds treated as fungible are used the essay starts by obtaining estimates of fungibility for 57 countries the results suggest that sectoral aid is indeed largely treated as fungible by recipient countries next to assess the economic and health effects of fungibility these estimates are incorporated into an empirical model of aid and growth as well as into a model of aid and infant mortality altogether i find no evidence of more fungible sectoral aid leading to worse performance

political foundations of the resource curse a simplification and a comment in this note we show how a considerably simpler model than the one in our original jde 2006 paper generates all the same results we also acknowledge an error in the specification of a utility function in our previous paper

governance and timber harvests resource economics theory implies that risks associated with weak governance have an ambiguous impact on extraction with the net impact depending on the relative strengths of depletion and investment effects previous empirical studies have found that improved governance tends to reduce deforestation but to raise oil production here we present evidence that the marginal impact of improved governance on timber harvests in developing countries during 1984 2006 was nonmonotonic it tended to raise harvests in countries with weaker governance but to reduce harvests in countries with stronger governance this nonmonotonic impact occurred for both an index of governmental integrity corruption bureaucracy quality law and order and an index of governmental stability a simulation of hypothetical increases in these governance indices to the maximum 2006 values observed in the sample predicted that improved governance would reduce harvests in most countries but could raise harvests in some with large increases occurring in countries with the weakest governance

do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse evidence from china abstract by analyzing a panel on the political turnovers of 4390 county leaders in china during 1999 2008 we find that the revenue windfalls accrued to these officials from land sales have undermined the effectiveness of the promotion system for government officials instead of rewarding efforts made to boost gdp growth promotion is positively correlated with signaling efforts and with corruption the robust positive relationship between land revenue windfalls and political turnover or specifically promotion suggests that those who are politically connected to their superiors and those beyond the prime age for promotion are the primary beneficiaries the case for corruption is substantiated by the evidence inferred from anti corruption crackdowns which reveals that the additional effect of land revenue on political turnover and size of bureaucracy a proxy for corruption decreases significantly in crackdowns but that land revenue has no effect on city construction expenditure a proxy for signaling

optimal dutch disease growth models of the dutch disease such as those of krugman 1987 matsuyama 1992 sachs and warner 1995 and gylfason et al 1999 explain why resource abundance may reduce growth however the literature also raises a new question if the use of resource wealth hurts productivity growth how should such wealth be optimally managed this question forms the topic of the present paper in which we extend the growth literature on the dutch disease from a positive to a normative setting we show that the assumptions in the previous literature imply that the optimal share of national wealth consumed in each period needs to be adjusted down however some dutch disease is always optimal thus lower growth in resource abundant countries may not be a problem in itself but may be part of an optimal growth path the optimal spending path of the resource wealth may be increasing or decreasing over time and we discuss why this is the case

natural resource booms and inequality theory and evidence we develop a theory in the context of a two sector growth model in which learning by doing drives growth to explain the time path of income inequality following natural resource booms in resource rich countries under the condition of a relatively unskilled labor intensive non traded sector inequality falls immediately after a boom and then increases steadily over time until the initial impact of the boom disappears using data for 90 countries between 1965 and 1999 we find evidence in support of the theory especially for oil and mineral booms we also find that uncertainty about future commodity prices increases long run inequality

rent seeking and resource booms abstract this paper develops a model of rent seeking in which the opportunity cost of rent seeking is foregone entrepreneurship it provides conditions under which resource booms tend to lead to an increase in rent seeking activity and those in which they induce entrepreneurship we identify an important difference between the two activities which leads resource booms to bias gains in favour of rent seeking over entrepreneurship but we also show that this bias depends on the nature of the initial equilibrium

why do some resource abundant countries succeed while others do not on average resource abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource poor counterparts but the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources but its variation for every nigeria or venezuela there is a norway or a botswana why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others this paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource abundant winners and losers differ in light of this it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse with a particular emphasis on recent developments

do natural resource revenues hinder financial development the role of political institutions we hypothesize that natural resource revenues may deteriorate contract enforcement if political institutions are weak as poor contract enforcement leads to low financial development resource revenues may hinder financial development in countries with poor political institutions but not in countries with comparatively better political institutions we provide empirical support for this hypothesis based on within country variation in our sample covering the period 1970 2005 and 133 countries our results are robust to the use of additional control variables different samples and alternative measures of financial development and political institutions

natural resources and the quality of economic development abstract are natural resources a blessing or a curse for human development this article attempts to answer the question by distinguishing between a dependence on natural resources and an abundance of the same dependence is measured in terms of exports of metals and fuel while resource abundance is calculated on the basis of the subsoil assets per square kilometre and per capita results show the existence of a negative correlation between metals and ore exports and human development while subsoil assets measures are rather positively related these effects are particularly significant in countries with a comparatively lower institutional quality the cases of botswana the democratic republic of congo and equatorial guinea briefly examined suggest however that the effects of natural resources on human and economic development can be very different and strictly related to specific national political and institutional characteristics

the paradox of plenty a meta analysis since sachs and warner s seminal article in 1995 numerous studies have addressed the link between natural resources and economic growth although the resource curse effect was commonly accepted at first many articles have challenged its existence and the results found in the literature are ambiguous in this paper we aim to quantitatively review this literature in order to i identify the sources of heterogeneity and ii assess the impact of natural resources on economic growth a meta analysis is performed on 69 empirical studies on the resource curse totaling 1 419 estimates our findings show that i only developing countries suffer from the resource curse although it is soft ii the way natural resources are taken into account is crucial to understand the heterogeneity found in the literature iii the negative impact of the volatility of the terms of trade on growth should be qualified an additional mra performed on indirect effects size also indicate that when institutions are at their best level the resource curse disappears and may be turned into a blessing

nontax revenue social cleavages and authoritarian stability in mexico and kenya internationalization institutions and political change revisited what determines how authoritarian regimes use internationally attained revenues such as natural resource rents to stay in power the answer this article argues lies partly in the nature of the so

mission improbable does petroleum related aid address the resource curse petroleum related aid programmes and projects are a key part of donor activities in oil rich developing countries this paper critically assesses petroleum related aid activities using the norwegian oil for development programme as a main case recent research suggests that institutions or governance are essential in averting a resource curse while governance issues are beginning to receive more attention in these types of programmes they still form a minor part of programme activities the narrow sector focus that characterizes petroleum related aid makes it unlikely that it will produce the higher order institutional changes needed to lift the resource curse petroleum related aid activities address the issue of corruption only to a limited extent given the commercial and political interests of donor countries questions about the integrity and credibility of these types of programmes can be raised

resource curse an analysis of causes experiences and possible ways forward abstract higher prices for oil gas and mineral resources have again raised questions about how exporting countries can counter the challenges of resource curse international experience managing the risks of resource curse has varied summarising the continuing discussion on meeting the challenges of the resource curse this paper addresses four questions what are the positive and negative effects of high oil gas and mineral prices on exporters what have been the experiences with managing natural resource revenues can good institutions ensure that natural resource revenues have a positive impact on development and what is the direction for the way forward we argue that the current emphasis on institutions as a potential solution has largely ignored under what conditions institutions are formed and changed

the dutch disease and intergenerational welfare governments in resource abundant economies face a tradeoff between transferring wealth to present generations and saving for future generations employing an overlapping generations framework with endogenous growth this article analyses the intergenerational welfare effects of 1 a wealth transfer policy where the entire wealth is transferred to the generations alive at present 2 an income transfer policy where the wealth is saved and the permanent income of the wealth is transferred to all present and future generations forever not surprisingly present generations are unambiguously better off with the wealth transfer policy less trivially however the wealth transfer policy can be associated with higher welfare also for future generations the intuition for this result is that while a wealth transfer depresses growth only in the periods subsequent to the transfer income transfers constitute a permanent drag on growth perhaps counter to the naive intuition the policy of saving the wealth and

if diversification is good why don t countries diversify more the political economy of diversification in resource rich countries abstract for resource rich countries diversification is claimed to represent a strategy for reducing resource curse problems this however depends on whether diversification has a positive effect on the country s institutions while there is a lot of evidence that exports of oil have a negative impact on institutions we know much less about the extent to which diversification leads to better institutions this article applies recent political economy theory to the phenomenon of diversification theoretical arguments suggest that it is the pattern of industrial activity rather than diversification per se which affects institutions like democracy in other words not all forms of diversification lead to better institutions furthermore where diversification has a positive impact on institutions diversification may be difficult to attain when it threatens the power base of the ruling elite a possible implication of these arguments is that policies for diversification should focus on international regulation affecting elite incentives rather than domestic industrial policy

on the form of transfers to special interests an important question in political economy concerns the form of transfers to special interests the chicago view is that political competition leads politicians to make such transfers efficiently the virginia position is that lack of information on the part of voters leads politicians to favor inefficient sneaky methods of redistribution this paper analyzes the form of transfers in a model of political competition in which politicians have incentives to make transfers to special interests it shows that when voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of politicians inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed

the dutch disease a disease after all many third world oil producers are encountering serious problems in building up a diversified export base while west european oil and gas producers netherlands united kingdom are suffering a decline in their traded goods manufacturing sector induced by real wage pressures it is becoming increasingly clear that high but temporary oil revenues may be somewhat ora mixed blessing the quip of the economist notwithstanding the mechanism behind this unbalance is clear enough part of the oil revenues is spent on non traded goods which leads to a real appreciation i e a rise in the relative price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods this in turn draws resources out of the non oil traded sector into the non traded goods producing sector corden and neary 1982 van wijnbergen 1980 one may say that this is an efficient response to the increase in income from oil production the united kingdom mexico egypt simply should move into oil derived industries and non traded goods and forget about their manufacturing sector until oil reserves are exhausted however many developing countries are hesitant to take this advice after all the post world war ii success stories in economic development involve without exception countries that promoted their traded goods sector aggressively moreover it is a well established stylised fact that technological progress is faster in the traded non sheltered sectors of an economy than in the non traded sector balassa 1964 is an early reference considering the hypothesis that technological progress rather than taking place exogenously with the passage of time is a function of accumulated experience the concern of countries like egypt mexico or indonesia is much easier to understand since solow 1957 and denison 1962 it is known that capital accumulation explain only a small part of economic growth if most of economic growth is caused by learning by doing induced technologica

bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries abstract we argue that several easily identifiable structural features constitute the key ingredients of effective state bureaucracies and should help to predict ratings of bureaucratic performance competitive salaries internal promotion and career stability and meritocratic recruitment we collect a new dataset on these features for bureaucracies of 35 less developed countries controlling for country income level of education and ethnolinguistic diversity we find that our measure of meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant determinant of ratings supplied by two of three country risk agencies the importance of competitive salaries and internal promotion and career stability could not be clearly established

how economic growth renewable electricity and natural resources contribute to co2 emissions abstract this study explores the relationship between economic growth and co2 emissions in the so called european union 5 eu 5 countries germany france italy spain and the united kingdom for the 1985 2016 period in doing so we employ a carbon emission function to investigate the environmental kuznets curve phenomenon which describes a relationship between economic growth and environmental degradation the empirical results confirm the existence of an n shaped relationship between economic growth and co2 emissions in the eu 5 countries we incorporate additional variables such as renewable electricity consumption trade openness natural resource abundance and energy innovation to augment the carbon emission function renewable electricity consumption natural resources and energy innovation improve environmental quality while trade openness and the interaction between economic growth and renewable electricity consumption exert a positive impact on co2 emissions this study is novel in that it presents an interaction between economic growth and renewable electricity consumption we also confirm the need for renewable energy regulations related to increasing renewable sources and promoting energy innovation to reduce the negative effects of energy and fossil energy resources on environmental degradation

votes and violence evidence from a field experiment in nigeria following the wave of democratization during the 1990s elections are now common in low income societies however these elections are frequently flawed we investigate the nigerian general election of 2007 which is to date the largest election held in africa and one seriously marred by violence we designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti violence grassroots campaigning we find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject surveying and independent data sources crucially we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents we suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies vote buying and ballot fraud voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism

commodity prices and growth an empirical investigation whereas empirical evidence on the effect of higher commodity prices on the long run growth of commodity exporters is ambiguous time series analyses using vector autoregressive var models have found that commodity booms raise income in the short run in this paper we adopt panel error correction methodology to analyze global data for 1963 to 2008 to disentangle the short and long run effects of international commodity prices on output per capita our results show that commodity booms have unconditional positive short term effects on output but non agricultural booms in countries with poor governance have adverse long term effects which dominate the short run gains our findings have important implications for non agricultural commodity exporters with poor governance especially in light of the recent wave of resource discoveries in low income countries

the quality of political institutions and the curse of natural resources we propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians we extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections this gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions namely in countries with weak institutions it also suggests that for bad political institutions human capital depends negatively on natural resources while for high institutional quality the dependence is reversed this finding is corroborated in cross section regressions

the voracity effect abstract we analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock in equilibrium this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect by which a shock such as a terms of trade windfall perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth we also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks jel f43 o10 o23 o40

using natural resources for development why has it proven so difficult developing economies have found it hard to use natural resource wealth to improve their economic performance utilizing resource endowments is a multistage economic and political problem that requires private investment to discover and extract the resource fiscal regimes to capture revenue judicious spending and investment decisions and policies to manage volatility and mitigate adverse impacts on the rest of the economy experience is mixed with some successes such as botswana and malaysia and more failures this paper reviews the challenges that are faced in successfully managing resource wealth the evidence on country performance and the reasons for disappointing results

cursed by resources or institutions natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions with grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income such a theory finds strong support in data a key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions when that is the case countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources

re election incentives and deforestation cycles in the brazilian amazon abstract despite expansive research on amazonian deforestation and its drivers the role of local politics is not well understood using a panel data set that combines municipal level deforestation and election data from 2002 to 2012 i estimate the effect of an incumbent mayor running for re election on deforestation rates in election periods i find that deforestation rates increase 8 10 in election years when an incumbent mayor runs for re election an amount equivalent to four percent of the total forest lost since the 2004 elections electoral deforestation cycles do not appear to be driven by changes in agricultural policy implementation and activity but are linked to corruption and campaign finance suggesting that weak institutional constraints facilitate electoral manipulation of forest resources this phenomenon is not likely limited to amazonian forests re election incentives could very well lead to misallocation of other natural resources in alternate geographies

redistributive public employment abstract politicians may use disguised redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax transfer schemes first we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis next we provide evidence consistent with the prediction of the model namely that in u s cities politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device we find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher

oil price shocks income and democracy he effect of natural resource wealth and income on political institutions is a central issue at the intersection of economics and political sciences we contribute to this research by examining the effect of international oil price fluctuations on democratic institutions over the 1960 2007 period we also exploit the very persistent response of aggregate income to oil prices to study the effect of persistent oil price driven income shocks on democracy our results indicate that countries with greater net oil exports over gdp see improvements in democratic institutions following upturns in international oil prices for example positive oil price shocks lead to improvements in the polity democracy score as well as the subscores for executive constraints executive recruitment and political competition and a higher probability of a democratic transition we estimate that an oil price driven 1 percentage point increase in per capita gdp growth increases the polity democracy score by around 0 2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentage points in the long run the effect on the probability of a democratic transition is around 0 4 percentage points our work relates to the literature on the link between political institutions and natural resource wealth and income an influential early contribution is lipset 1959 who documents that high income countries tend to be more democratic he argues that this positive correlation arises because higher per capita income is a symptom of the modernization of society and that modernization also increases citizens demand for political participation the positive association between income and democracy has also been emphasized by huntington 1991 who holds that higher per capita income was one of the key factors behind the

a dynamic adjustment model for u s agriculture 1948 79 abstract a multioutput model is developed within the adjustment cost framework to analyze the structure of dynamic adjustments in u s agriculture during the post war period an important feature of this model is that the econometric model is consistent with dynamic economic theory fluctuations in capital stocks variable inputs and outputs are explained by changing opportunity costs empirical results indicated that durable equipment farm produced durables and family labor exhibited significant rigidity in adjustment as a response to exogenous shocks surprisingly the hypothesis that real estate was a variable input could not be rejected the univariate flexible accelerator hypothesis which is widely maintained in most agricultural adjustment studies is inconsistent with the data

a dynamic theory of resource wars we develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such wars can be prevented our focus is on the interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives for war in the presence of limited commitment we show that a key parameter determining the incentives for war is the elasticity of demand our first result identifies a novel externality that can precipitate war price taking firms fail to internalize the impact of their extraction on military action in the case of inelastic resource demand war incentives increase over time and war may become inevitable our second result shows that in some situations regulation of prices and quantities by the resource rich country can prevent war and when this is the case there will also be slower resource extraction than the hotelling benchmark with inelastic demand our third result is that because of limited commitment and its implications for armament incentives regulation of prices and quantities might actually precipitate war even in some circumstances where wars would not have arisen under competitive markets copyright 2012 oxford university press

natural resources education and economic development economic growth since 1965 has varied inversely with the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries four main channels of transmission from abundant natural resources to stunted economic development are discussed a the dutch disease b rent seeking c overconfidence and d neglect of education public expenditure on education relative to national income expected years of schooling for girls and gross secondary school enrolment are all shown to be inversely related to the share of natural capital in national wealth across countries natural capital appears to crowd out human capital thereby slowing down the pace of economic development

natural resources rent seeking and welfare abstract a new and very simple mechanism to explain why natural resource abundance may lower income and welfare is developed in a model with rent seeking a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs engaged in rent seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms with a demand externality it is shown that the drop in income as a result of this is higher than the increase in income from the natural resource more natural resources thus lead to lower welfare

institutions and the resource curse countries rich in natural resources constitute both growth losers and growth winners we claim that the main reason for these diverging experiences is differences in the quality of institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down when institutions are grabber friendly while more resources raise income when institutions are producer friendly we test this theory building on sachs and warner s influential works on the resource curse our main hypothesis that institutions are decisive for the resource curse is confirmed our results contrast the claims of sachs and warner that institutions do not play a role

it s the rents stupid the political economy of the resource curse a number of studies suggest that natural resources can have a negative impact on the developing prospects of countries empirical results suggest that political economy models of patronage and rent seeking are central to understanding why such a resource curse arises in other words the resource curse is created by certain resource rents leading to dysfunctional behaviour this article introduces the term impartiality enhancing institutions to structure policy debates by distinguishing conditions under which negative effects of resources can be mitigated moreover it is argued that viewing institutions as an equilibrium outcome has implications for the analysis of institutional change policy initiatives that do not promote the impartiality of institutions nor attend to the underlying interests and incentives keeping a bad institutional equilibrium in place will not help lift the resource curse

demographic transition in resource rich countries a blessing or a curse summary this study argues that resource wealth is a key factor for understanding income effects of demographic transition we develop a simple model highlighting how the income effect of increased labor supply may depend on resource rents and provide empirical evidence that support the theoretical predictions using panel data covering the period from 1982 to 2006 for more than 120 countries we find a negative interaction effect between resource wealth and demographic transition on national income moreover the negative interaction effect does not depend on institutional quality and is found also across different samples

corruption and reduced oil production an additional resource curse factor prominent contributions to the resource curse literature suggest weak governance and corruption are important factors behind the wide welfare variations observed among oil producing countries how weak governance and corruption influence revenue management and expenditure decisions as well as the possible welfare benefits derived from oil are broadly discussed how they impact upon volumes of oil produced has however attracted little attention this paper combines a review of the resource curse and oil production literatures with findings from qualitative interviews with oil sector experts to appreciate the feasibility of connections between corruption and oil production below its potential we make particular reference to environments where regulatory institutions or political accountability are weak and focus primarily on producer government and oil firm relations drawing on insights from geology political science and economics we suggest suboptimal production solutions can impact volumes of oil actually produced and create constraints on long term revenues for oil producing countries we argue greater disclosure of information on oil production efficiency on a field by field and country by country basis will assist further investigation of the relationships between corruption and volumes of oil produced

oil and regime type in latin america reversing the line of causality abstract in its first generation the literature on the resource curse typically posited that resource dependence shapes a country s economy and politics more recent work posits that the effects are mediated by institutions we take this newer approach further by arguing that economic and political institutions not just mediate but actually shape resource dependence our focus is on performance across national oil companies nocs in latin america we explain performance variation by invoking variations in regime and market features nocs that operate in contexts of greater independence from the executive branch stronger checks and balances within and outside the sector and greater market forces though not necessarily private actor dominance exhibit better performance institutions thus influence sector conditions rather than the other way around we advance this argument using original data from colombia and venezuela and supplementary data from mexico brazil and argentina our study focuses on the oil boom bust cycle of 2003 2016

import adjusted fatality rates for individual organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries caused by accidents in the oil energy chain abstract oil and its derivatives are crucial components of economic growth and prosperity globally the economic and social gains from producing trading and consuming oil are readily estimated and observed however during each of the phases of oil production and trade beginning with exploration and extraction physical damages injuries and fatalities and economic losses are frequently incurred from accidents such as pipeline explosions specifically organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries consume the majority of the oil produced annually yet most accidents occur in non oecd countries drawing from the input output analysis literature this paper uses a one dimensional accounting method based on trade data to determine the crude oil consumption fatality rates of the oecd countries annually between 1978 and 2008 this analysis results in meaningful changes to production based fatality calculations in particular oecd countries import the majority of their annual fatality rates from non oecd countries based on 5 patterns that emerge the authors postulate that historical trade relationships differential policies and regulations as well as levels of technology adoption may influence these outcomes this fundamental analysis applies the now popular consumption based accounting method taken from multi regional input output and life cycle assessment to a risk assessment setting the authors introduce the method in this setting such that as in the case of embodied emissions it can act as a basis for further econometric analyses develop more awareness and a greater sense of shared international responsibility as well as instruct policy changes for best practices in the field of energy

oil and entrepreneurship economic theory predicts that rents produced from natural resources especially oil and gas can increase opportunities for entrepreneurship but they may also reduce engagement in entrepreneurial activities as they change incentives towards rent seeking using global entrepreneurship monitor gem annual surveys this study provides empirical evidence that more per capita profit from oil and gas reduces entrepreneurship only in corrupt environments the more the corruption is the larger is the impact the results have important implications for policy makers especially in resource rich developing countries

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

carbon curse in developed countries among the ten countries with the highest carbon intensity six are natural resource rich countries this suggests the existence of a carbon curse resource rich countries would tend to follow more carbon intensive development paths than resource poor countries we investigate this assumption empirically using a panel data method covering 29 countries oecd and bric and seven sectors over the 1995 2009 period first at the macroeconomic level we find that the relationship between national co 2 emissions per unit of gdp and abundance in natural resources is u shaped the carbon curse appears only after the turning point second we measure the impact of resource abundance on sectoral emissions for two groups of countries based on their resource endowments we show that a country rich in natural resources pollutes relatively more in resource related sectors as well as all other sectors our results suggest that the debate on climate change mitigation should rather focus on a comparison of resource rich countries versus resource poor countries than the developed country versus developing country debate

trade and insecure resources we construct a model of conflict and trade to study the consequences of interstate disputes over contested resources land oil water or other resources for arming welfare and trade flows different trade regimes imply different costs of such disputes in terms of arming depending on world prices free trade can intensify arming to such an extent that the additional security costs it brings swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or all rival states free trade though is always an equilibrium and sometimes is a dominant one with features of a prisoner s dilemma outcome furthermore contestation of resources can reverse a country s apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict and where such conflict is present comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

sources of inefficiency in a representative democracy a dynamic analysis this paper studies the efficiency of policy choice in representative democracies it extends the citizen candidate model of democratic policy making to a dynamic environment equilibrium policy choices are shown to be efficient in the sense that in each period conditional on future policies being selected through the democratic process there exists no alternative current policy choices which can raise the expected utilities of all citizens however policies that would be declared efficient by standard economic criteria are not necessarily adopted in political equilibrium the paper argues that these divergencies are legitimately viewed as politicalfailures

public sector employment rent seeking and economic growth surplus labor in the public sector a characteristic of many developing countries is viewed in this paper as the consequence of rent seeking behavior a theory is presented of a segmented labor market with endogenous government hiring in response to unemployment a simple computable general equilibrium model is used to illustrate how this can give rise to dynamic social costs and to quantify them fiscal resources are diverted to support the unproductive sink the effect of surplus labor on economic growth is shown to be substantial while the government s attempt to reduce unemployment is shown to be futile copyright 1991 by royal economic society

kleptocracy and divide and rule a model of personal rule many developing countries have suffered under the personal rule of kleptocrats who implement highly inefe cient economic policies expropriate the wealth of their citizens and use the proceeds for their own glorie cation or consumption we argue that the success of kleptocrats rests in part on their ability to use a divide and rule strategy made possible by the weakness of institutions in these societies members of society need to cooperate in order to depose a kleptocrat yet such cooperation may be defused by imposing punitive rates of taxation on any citizen who proposes such a move and redistributing the benee ts to those who need to agree to it thus the collective action problem can be intensie ed by threats which remain off the equilibrium path in equilibrium all are exploited and no one challenges the kleptocrat kleptocratic policies are more likely when foreign aid and rents from natural resources provide rulers with substantial resources to buy off opponents when opposition groups are shortsighted when the average productivity in the economy is low and when there is greater inequality between producer groups because more productive groups are more dife cult to buy off jel o12 h00

vote motivated candidates abstract we study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs we find that if a strict nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large but finite electorates if the votes are independent random events then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates our results have implications for existing models of redistributive politics and spatial competition as the properties of pure strategy equilibria in such games carry over to equilibria in games with arbitrary candidate preferences on the other hand candidate utility functions will matter if the individual voting decisions are correlated in the presence of aggregate uncertainty such as changing economic conditions or political scandals the preferences of parties and candidates with respect to shares of votes will have an effect on political competition

constitutions and the resource curse abstract utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements we find that i the so called resource curse is present in democratic presidential countries but not in democratic parliamentary countries ii being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic and iii natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian the two first effects appear very robust the last effect less so

minerals institutions openness and growth an empirical analysis competing explanations of the resource curse are tested using panel data the data support the existence of a mineral resource curse for developing countries with weak institutions consistent with the hypothesis that owners of mineral resources use weak institutions and openness to trade to stifle the development of human capital to the detriment of growth in other sectors of the economy manufacturing imports substitute for the development of domestic production so openness to trade correlates with lower growth in mineral dependent economies the dutch disease and debt overhang explanations of the resource curse are not supported

cross scalar dynamics of the resource curse constraints on local participation in the bolivian gas sector abstractcontributing to debate on the contextual underpinnings and varieties of the resource curse this article points to how political and economic dynamics of resource endowments operate in interrelated but potentially contradictory ways across spatial scales resource endowments insert a complex set of incentives and interests into the political arena in ways that both enable and constrain actors at different scales using a case study of gas governance in bolivia the article illustrates the interrelation of these dynamics across local national and international scales and in particular how they circumscribe the space for local participation

how do mineral states learn path dependence networks and policy change in the development of economic institutions summary based on case study methods i draw lessons from the political economy of macroeconomic management in chile and peru to explain how mineral states learn to think long term and eventually escape the resource curse i give an institutionalist account of the rise of countercyclical funds showing how the long term development of elite networks qualifies the contemporary making of curse escapes policy networks compose one central avenue of institutional development for both the reproduction of path dependence and the making of institutional change the exposition challenges political economy of development frameworks which over emphasize structural initial conditions and assume steady rent seeking behavior of state agents

political foundations of the resource curse in this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse we show 1 politicians tend to over extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much and 2 resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path however 3 resource booms by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy 4 the overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse

natural resources a curse on education spending abstract in line with the rising interest in harnessing natural resource revenues for economic and human development through productive government investments this paper aims to address an important blind spot in our understanding of the resource curse by contributing innovative insights on how natural resource wealth impacts government priorities and expenditure practices using a large panel dataset of 140 countries covering the period from 1995 to 2009 we find an adverse effect of resource dependence on public education expenditures relative to gdp that is robust to controlling for a range of additional covariates furthermore our findings indicate that this resource curse effect on the government prioritization of education mainly stems from point source natural resources these results are of particular importance for the sustainable management of natural resource wealth in developing countries as they could achieve especially high returns by investing resource revenues in public goods such as education while this paper underlines the importance of institutions and government accountability our findings also raise questions on the role of the private sector as a partner in development as the extractives industry could consider increasing funding for education through corporate social responsibility csr initiatives

the political resource curse this paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians both with theory and data the theory is based on a political agency model with career concerns and endogenous entry of candidates the data refer to brazil where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously at given population thresholds allowing us to implement a regression discontinuity design the empirical evidence shows that larger transfers increase observed corruption and reduce the average education of candidates for mayor these and other more specific empirical results are in line with the predictions of the theory jel d72 d73 h77 o17 o18

revisiting the oil curse does ownership matter summary a large body of literature finds a negative relationship between oil abundance and economic growth the existing empirical evidence on the oil curse however does not account for variations in the ownership of oil this article investigates whether the effect of oil abundance on growth varies with ownership structures it also investigates whether pre existing institutional conditions influence the effect of oil abundance across different ownership structures using a novel database on ownership structures and employing a panel fixed effects estimation method it analyzes a sample of oil exporting developing countries during the period 1984 2005 the results show that the effect of oil abundance on growth varies with ownership structures and is also influenced by the quality of pre existing institutions under state ownership and control oil abundance reduces growth when the institutional quality is poor but increases growth when the institutional quality is good under private ownership on the other hand oil abundance increases growth when the institutional quality is poor but reduces growth when the institutional quality is good the results suggest that ownership matters and countries can avoid the oil curse by choosing an appropriate ownership structure given their pre existing institutional circumstances the policy advice in this article is adopt state ownership and control if the institutions are strong if the institutions are weak transfer ownership to foreign oil companies

funds from non renewable energy resources policy lessons from alaska and alberta abstract we document the use of energy natural resource funds in alaska and alberta and analyze theirs characteristics for further implementation in resource rich countries such funds allow dealing theoretically with intergenerational equity issues corruption and more general institutional problems the performance of both funds is very different depending on the management and composition choices but some policy lessons can be drawn from these two examples importantly the role of a public dividend policy is highlighted as a way to bypass corrupted institutions and to enhance quality of life for poorest people we also emphasize the need to deal with inflation to make the fund sustainable

oil windfalls and export diversification in oil producing countries evidence from oil booms abstract this paper examines the factors behind export diversification in oil countries specifically we investigate the impact of oil booms on export diversification through an empirical framework the paper finds that economy s export structure before the oil boom determines whether oil windfalls might affect the diversification process thus an oil boom negatively affects export diversification only if countries initially exhibit low levels of diversification in countries with a high level of diversification before the boom an oil boom has no impact on diversification these results are based on a large sample of 134 countries and are robust to various sensitivity analyses they are corroborated with data from the manufacturing sector which show that oil booms only reduce diversification in countries with a small manufacturing sector prior to the boom

natural resources and conflict a meta analysis of the empirical literature abstract the link between natural resources and conflict has been extensively analysed by the empirical literature yet there is disagreement on both the existence and the type of relationship connecting resources to conflict existing research has focused on demonstrating the impact of resource scarcity or abundance on the risk of conflict but no effort has explored the reasons behind the persisting disagreement among scholars this paper seeks to remedy this imbalance by conducting a meta analysis of the empirical literature that investigates the link between natural resources and conflict we adopt an econometric approach to analyse 900 estimates from 41 articles our results show that both resource scarcity and abundance are associated with a higher probability of conflict the direction and magnitude of the relationship depends on the type of resources and whether climate variables are controlled for specifically the impact of the scarcity of agriculturally related resources such as land and vegetation seems to be mediated by climate variables we also find that the way conflicts and resources are operationalized together with methodological choices and model specifications greatly influence the probability of finding a significant relationship between conflicts and resources

international business responses to institutional voids for nearly two decades scholars in international business and management have explored the implications of institutional voids for firm strategy and structure although institutional voids offer both opportunities and challenges they have largely been associated with firms efforts to avoid or mitigate institutional deficiencies and reduce the transaction costs associated with operating in settings subject to those institutional shortcomings the goal of this special issue is to advance scholarship on this topic by a exploring institutional voids that are new to the literature b providing a deeper assessment of the different ways in which firms respond to these voids and c utilizing diverse disciplines and theoretical approaches to do so in this introduction we first review and synthesize extant research on institutional voids tracking the evolution of institutional void scholarship since the inception of the concept khanna palepu journal of economic literature 45 2 331 372 1997 and providing our perspective on its contributions and limitations we then summarize the contributions of the articles included in this special issue in addition to identifying an array of institutional voids economic and social the articles highlight four different strategies for responding to them internalization substitution borrowing and signaling drawing on these we develop new insights on the implications of institutional voids for firm behavior we conclude with suggestions for future research