a theory of the cross sectional fertility differential job heterogeneity approach this article presents a theory of the cross sectional fertility differential which produces the negative wage fertility relationship based on job heterogeneity although evidence suggests the importance of job heterogeneity in the labor market it has largely been ignored in theories of fertility choice i show that a theory incorporating job heterogeneity requires only standard conditions on preferences to generate the negative wage fertility relationship and the negative relationship derived from the model is robust to changes in economic environments e g public policy and technology furthermore the theory reconciles the negative cross sectional wage fertility relationship with various time series variations in aggregate fertility

inter industry wage differentials evidence from sweden and a comparison with the united states inter industry wage differentials evidence from sweden and a comparison with the united states

evidence from an experiment on charity to welfare recipients reciprocity altruism and the empathic responsiveness hypothesis this article investigates the determinants of generosity in an experiment on charity to real life welfare recipients it tests the effects of various measures of unconditional altruism and conditional or reciprocal altruism the results show strong support for conditional or reciprocal altruism however people who are self reported unconditional altruists make offers that are highly elastic with respect to the apparent worthiness of the recipient one interpretation of this is that self reported unconditional altruists have combined desires to help others and to reciprocate unconditional altruism and reciprocal altruism may not be independent motives i refer to this combination as empathic responsiveness

an empirical analysis of wage dispersion and efficiency wages the main purpose of this study is to examine inter industry wage differentials in sweden after controlling for individual and job characteristics the results indicate that these differentials are substantial the ranking of the differentials was stable over time while the dispersion of wage premiums fell by 50 per cent during the period 1968 81 a period of strong efforts to reduce wage dispersion in sweden the relation between industry wage premiums and a number of industry characteristics is also examined along with new evidence which is in line with the shirking model hypothesis on the relation between wages and worker control

effort and wages evidence from the payroll tax this is a pre copy editing author produced pdf file of an article accepted for publication canadian journal of economics following peer review this accepted manuscript is being archived under the conditions specified in the bu open access policy

the effects of oil price shocks in a new keynesian framework with capital accumulation the economic implications of oil price shocks have been extensively studied since the 1970s despite this huge literature no dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model was available that captures two well known stylized facts 1 the stagflationary impact of an oil price shock together with 2 the influence of the energy productivity of capital on the depth and length of this impact we build estimate and simulate a new keynesian model with capital accumulation which takes the case of an economy where oil is imported from abroad and where these stylized facts can be accounted for moreover the bayesian estimation of the model on the us economy 1984 2007 suggests that the output elasticity of oil might have been above 10 stressing the role of oil use in us growth at this time finally our simulations confirm that an increase in energy efficiency significantly attenuates the effects of an oil shock a possible explanation of why the third oil shock 1999 2008 did not have the same macro economic impact as the first two ones

joseph schumpeter lecture ideology i develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained yet individually rational distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets in processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education health insurance pensions etc individuals optimally trade off the value of remaining hopeful about their future prospects or their children s versus the costs of misinformed decisions because these future outcomes also depend on whether other citizens respond to unpleasant facts with realism or denial endogenous social cognitions emerge thus an equilibrium in which people acknowledge the limitations of interventionism coexists with one in which they remain obstinately blind to them embracing a statist ideology and voting for an excessively large government conversely an equilibrium associated with appropriate public responses to market failures coexists with one dominated by a laissez faire ideology and blind faith in the invisible hand with public sector capital this interplay of beliefs and institutions leads to history dependent dynamics the model also explains why societies find it desirable to set up constitutional protections for dissenting views even when ex post everyone would prefer to ignore unwelcome news jel h11 d72 d83 p16 z1

europe vs america institutional hysteresis in a simple normative model we show how the differences in us and european institutions can arise in a normative model the paper focuses on the labor market and the government s decision to set unemployment benefits in response to an unemployment shock the government balances insurance considerations with the tax burden of benefits and the possibility that they introduce adverse incentive effects whereby benefits increase unemployment it is found that when an adverse shock occurs benefits should be increased most when the adverse incentive effects of benefits are largest adjustment costs of changing benefits introduce hysteresis and can help explain why post oil shock benefits remained high in europe but not in the us desirable features of the model are that we obtain an asymmetry out of a symmetric environment and that the mechanism yielding hysteresis is both simple requires the third derivative of the utility function to be non negative and self correcting empirical evidence concerning the role of corporatism is discussed

equilibrium incentive contracts and efficiency wages we analyze the optimal efficiency wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers effort nor their match specific productivity firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs as a result employed workers enjoy rents which in turn creates unemployment nonetheless the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits we also show that more high powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates jel e24 j30 j41

sources of intra industry wage dispersion how much do employers matter observed human capital explains less than half of wage variation in bls industry wage surveys establishment based wage differentials controlling for occupation account for 20 70 percent of intra industry wage variation this corresponds to a standard deviation in wages of 14 percent of the mean almost as large as interindustry wage variation investigation suggests that establishment wage differentials are not random variations or returns to usual measures of human capital

an extension of the second welfare theorem to economies with nonconvexities and public goods in this paper we report a generalization of the results of foley and guesnerie on the second welfare theorem to economies with arbitrary nonconvex production sets the nature of marginal cost prices in such economies is clarified through the use of the clarke tangent cones

efficiency wages and local wage bargaining in the literature on wage drift it is often argued that strikes or work to rule practices are used to force employers to pay a wage rate that exceeds the contract wage here we introduce the efficiency wage argument as a foundation for bargaining about wage drift contrary to the view in most bargaining models where firms and unions struggle to divide a fixed pie given employment we take the relation between wages and revenues explicitly into account the implications for wages and employment appear to differ not only with respect to the order of magnitude but also in a qualitative sense

methods of pay and earnings a longitudinal analysis using data from the national longitudinal survey of youth 1988 90 the author investigates the relationship between methods of pay including piece rates and bonuses and the level and variance of wages among men piece rate workers earned a premium compared to other workers but the evidence on bonuses is mixed the author finds evidence that female piece rate workers earned more than other female workers once a control variable for the presence of dependents is interacted with the piece rate variable with controls for the wage effects of schooling and experience unobserved worker productivity is found to have accounted for most of the wage variance among both male and female piece rate workers wage variance among workers not having explicit pay for performance schemes in contrast was predominantly due to other factors

positive and normative judgments implicit in u s tax policy and the costs of unequal growth and recessions calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion one approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real world policy choices converting a normative decision into a positive inference as in the recent surge of inverse optimum research we find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope we perform the inverse optimum inference on u s tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations

ideology and the growth of government abstract we analyze the impact of ideology on the size of government in a simple model the government sets redistribution and provision of public services according to the preferences of the median voter ideology is defined in terms of preferences for public services and the impact of ideology on the size of government is shown to increase with mean income this idea is tested using measures of ideology based on party manifestos we show that the interaction of ideology and mean income has a major role in explaining the increase and divergence in government size observed across oecd countries

group loyalty and the taste for redistribution interpersonal preferences preferences that depend on the characteristics of others are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior as an alternative approach this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences i show that self reported attitudes toward welfare spending are determined not only by financial self interest but also by interpersonal preferences these interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises and racial group loyalty individuals increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from their own racial group rises these findings help to explain why levels of welfare benefits are relatively low in racially heterogeneous states

existence of marginal cost pricing equilibria in economies with several nonconvex firms this paper considers a general equilibrium model of an economy where some firms may exhibit increasing returns to scale or more general types of nonconvexities the firms are instructed to follow the standard marginal cost pricing rule or to fulfill the first order necessary conditions for profit maximization a general existence theorem of equilibria is proved in the case of an arbitrary number of firms no assumption is made to imply the aggregate productive efficiency of equilibria a condition that must be excluded in the nonconvex case the failure of the competitive mechanism in the presence of increasing returns to scale has been recognized since marshall 1920 and the search for alternative mechanisms has resulted in the so called theory of marginal cost pricing this theory was developed by allais 1953 hotelling 1938 lange 1936 lerner 1936 pigou 1932 to remain in the thirties and forties but has a long history dating back to the discussion on public utility pricing by dupuit 1844 it states that an optimum of welfare corresponds to the sale of everything at marginal cost hotelling 1938 this statement of the second welfare theorem has since been formulated at a high level of generality starting with the work by guesnerie 1975 and more recently by bonnisseau and cornet 1988b cornet 1986 1988a b c khan and vohra 1987 1988 quinzii 1986 none of these papers however is concerned with the existence of equilibria this has been considered in the past ten years by beato 1979 1982 beato and mas colell 1985 brown and heal 1982 brown et al 1986 cornet 1982 dierker guesnerie and neuefeind 1985 mantel 1979 and more recently by bonnisseau bonnisseau cornet kamiya and vohra in the special issue of the journal of mathematical economics 1988 on general equilibrium theory and increasing returns the purpose of this paper is to provide a general existence theorem for an economy with an arbitrary number of convex and nonconvex producers which may exhibit increasing returns to scale or even more general types of nonconvexities in our model a the consumers maximize their preferences subject to their budget constraints b the convex producers maximize their profits while the nonconvex producers are instructed to follow the marginal pricing rule i e they

measuring attitudes towards inequality individuals attitudes to inequality aversion are measured using survey data based on the leaky bucket experiment for several groups of students in australia and israel three forms of social welfare function are estimated it is found that measures of inequality aversion can be obtained with some precision and that these estimates are substantially lower than the values typically used by those measuring inequality and examining optimal tax structures furthermore a welfare function based on the gini inequality measure is generally found to give a better fit than forms based on constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion jel classification c91 d63

efficiency wages and industry wage differentials a comparison across methods of pay efficiency wage considerations should be less important for piece rate pay than for time wages therefore if industry wage differentials reflect efficiency wage factors then these pay differences should be less sizable and have less explanatory power for piecework than for timework we test this proposition using wage data for male production workers employed in the swedish metalworking industries in 1985 the data are partitioned into two groups of workers in our preferred sub sample of workers who received pay under both piece rates and time wages our results are uniformly consistent with efficiency wage implications for industry wage differentials for the subsample of workers who received pay under either piece rates or time wages industry wage differentials are of equal importance under either pay scheme these latter results however may also be influenced by unaccounted for sorting of workers and employers across methods of pay overall our examination of industry wage differentials across m

biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution evidence from a survey experiment abstract individual perceptions of income distribution play a vital role in political economy and public finance models yet there is little evidence regarding their origins or accuracy this study examines how individuals form these perceptions and explores their potential impact on preferences for redistribution a tailored household survey provides original evidence on systematic biases in individuals evaluations of their own relative position in the income distribution the study discusses one of the mechanisms that may generate such biases based on the extrapolation of information from endogenous reference groups and presents some suggestive evidence that this mechanism has significant explanatory power the impact of these biased perceptions on attitudes toward redistributive policies is studied by means of an experimental design that was incorporated into the survey which provided consistent information on the own ranking within the income distribution to a randomly selected group of respondents the evidence suggests that those who had overestimated their relative position and thought that they were relatively richer than they were tend to demand higher levels of redistribution when informed of their true ranking

low inflation targeting and long run unemployment the model of akerlof dickens and perry 2000 adp predicts that low inflation may cause unemployment to persist at high levels when applied to u s data their results strongly rejected the conventional nairu model we apply the adp model to swedish data the fact that our swedish data also reject the nairu model has a number of interesting implications for the swedish economy and potentially for other european countries as well the results indicate that raising the swedish inflation target from 2 to 4 percent would bring longrun unemployment down by several percentage points the possibility of adp type long run phillips curves also across the euro countries may raise some concern about the emu project while detailed studies on other countries are needed there is nothing to suggest that these non vertical phillips curves would not differ considerably across the euro countries any single inflation level targeted by the ecb would then generate excess unemployment in individual member states

inequality social sanctions and cooperation within south african fishing communities abstract we explore the effect of income inequality and social attitudes on cooperation and sanctioning in nine south african fishing communities where allocation of fishing rights via quota and permits have been unequal and controversial we use a linear public goods experiment design with heterogeneous endowments and peer sanctioning in the punishment treatment aggregate contributions towards the public good are significantly higher amongst unequal groups with low endowment players contributing the greatest endowment share sanctioning is significantly lower in unequal groups but demand for punishment is similar irrespective of differences in relative costs free riding drives punishment but retaliation is another important motivator specifically in unequal groups in equal groups antisocial punishment of cooperators is more common the effect of real wealth and inequality on contributions and punishment is less salient possibly due to real wealth not being discernible in the experimental context interestingly social attitudes are important in explaining sanctioning behavior indicating that distrust in formal institutions and specifically in the top down quota allocation process may have a significant impact on behavioral outcomes and the effectiveness of community sanctioning mechanisms

resistance to reform status quo bias in the presence of individual specific uncertainty comment why do governments so often fail to adopt policies which economists consider to be efficiency enhancing our answer to this question relies on uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses from reform we show that there is a bias towards the status quo and hence against efficiency enhancing reforms whenever some of the individual gainers and losers from reform cannot be identified beforehand there are reforms which once adopted will receive adequate political support but would have failed to carry the day ex ante the argument does not rely on risk aversion irrationality or hysteresis due to sunk costs jel d72 f13 why do governments so often fail to adopt policies that economists consider to be efficiency enhancing this is one of the fundamental questions of political economy the answer usually relies on what may be

unobserved ability efficiency wages and interindustry wage differentials interindustry wage differentials in wage regressions estimated for individuals have been interpreted as evidence consistent with efficiency wage models a principal competing explanation is that these differentials are generated by differences across workers in unobserved ability this paper tests the unobserved ability hypothesis by incorporating test scores into standard wage regressions as error ridden indicators of unobserved ability the results indicate that differences in unobserved ability explain relatively little of interindustry or interoccupation wage differentials this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

would you like to shrink the welfare state a survey of european citizens welfare state reform a survey of what europeans want the fundamental problems facing european welfare states high unemployment and unsustainable public pensions plans in particular have been in the political debate for years so why have we seen so little reform to find out we surveyed the opinions of citizens in france germany italy and spain on their welfare states and on various reform options this is what we found first most workers underestimate the costs of public pensions though they are aware of their unsustainability second the status quo is a majoritarian outcome a majority of citizens opposes cuts to social security and welfare spending but also opposes further increases since population ageing without reform implies an automatic expansion our results suggest that most citizens would favour reforms that stabilize but do not shrink the current welfare states third many would welcome changes in the allocation of benefits a large number of workers in italy and germany would be willing to opt out of public pensions and replace them with private pensions though the details of how this scheme is formulated matter for its popularity and many italians and spaniards would welcome an extension of the coverage of unemployment insurance fourth conflicts over the welfare state are mainly shaped by the economic situation of the respondent while political ideology plays a limited role disagreements are found along three dimensions young versus old rich versus poor and outsider versus insider in terms of labour market status from a practical point of view this suggests that there is scope to bundle reforms strategically in order to build a large and mixed coalition of supporters tito boeri axel borsch supan and guido tabellini

dual income taxation a promising path to tax reform for developing countries summary the dual income tax combines a progressive tax on labor income and a lower flat tax on income from capital unlike flat tax systems a dual income tax provides developing countries greater flexibility in addressing tax competition while retaining progressivity countries could use the move to a dual income tax system not just as an opportunity to rationalize the taxation of income from business operations and investment but also as a vehicle for broader reform of their tax systems

new estimates of the elasticity of marginal utility for the uk this paper provides novel empirical evidence on the value of the elasticity of marginal utility eta for the united kingdom eta is a crucial component of the social discount rate sdr which determines the inter temporal trade offs that are acceptable to society using contemporaneous and historical data new estimates are obtained using four revealed preference techniques the equal sacrifice income tax approach the euler equation approach the frisch additive preferences approach and risk aversion in insurance markets a meta analysis indicates parameter homogeneity across approaches and a central estimate of 1 5 for eta the confidence interval excludes unity the value used in official guidance by the uk government the term structure of the sdr is then estimated the result is a short run sdr of 4 5 declining to 4 2 in the very long run this is higher and flatter than the uk official guidance the difference stems from incorrect calibration of social welfare and estimation of the diffusion of growth other things equal the results suggest that current uk guidance might need to be updated

inequality aversion versus risk aversion inequality aversion and risk aversion are widely assumed in economic models however existing economic literature fails to distinguish between the two this paper presents methodology and a laboratory experiment which separates inequality aversion from risk aversion in a set of laboratory experiments subjects had to choose between two risky alternatives which pay meaningful prizes with the same individual risk but different levels of egalitarianism thus the choice of the more egalitarian alternative implies a higher level of inequality aversion the experiment was conducted among children some of whom live on a communal system kibbutz and some in the city

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

earnings productivity and performance related pay jobs with performance related pay prp attract workers of higher ability and induce workers to provide greater effort we construct an integrated model of effort and sorting that clarifies the distinction between observable and unobservable ability and the relationship between earnings and productivity predictions are tested against data from the british household panel survey bhps the prp raises wages by 9 for men and 6 for women theoretical calculations show that these estimated earnings differentials represent average productivity differentials net of monitoring costs at the marginal firm using prp but not of the disutility of additional effort expended by workers

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

individual preferences for political redistribution what drives people s support of governmental reduction of income inequality we employ data from a large international survey in order to evaluate the explanatory power of three competing forces referred to as the homo oeconomicus effect the public values effect and the social rivalry effect the empirical analysis reveals that at the aggregate level all three effects play a significant role in shaping individual preferences for political redistribution attitudes of citizens in formerly socialist countries turn out to differ from those of western citizens in a systematic way 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european unemployment the aggregate evidence two key facts about european unemployment must be explained the rise in unemployment since the 1960s and the heterogeneity of individual country experiences while adverse shocks can potentially explain much of the rise in unemployment there is insufficient heterogeneity in these shocks to explain cross country differences alternatively while explanations focusing on labour market institutions explain current heterogeneity well many of these institutions pre date the rise in unemployment based on a panel of institutions and shocks for 20 oecd nations since 1960 we find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial to explaining both stylised facts

the macroeconomics of specificity specific quasi rents arise in a variety of economic relationships and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract rent appropriation has important macroeconomic consequences resources are underutilized factor markets are segmented production suffers from technological sclerosis job creation and destruction are unbalanced recessions are excessively sharp and expansions run into bottlenecks while depending on the shock expansions may require reinforcement or stabilization recessions should typically be softened in the long run institutions may evolve to alleviate the problem by balancing appropriation technology choice will also be affected with the appropriated factor partially excluding the other from production to reduce appropriation

supply side hysteresis the case of the canadian unemployment insurance system abstract this paper presents results from a 1971 natural experiment carried out by the canadian government on the unemployment insurance system at that time the generosity of the ui system was increased dramatically we find some evidence that the propensity to collect ui increases with a first time exposure to the new ui system hence as more individuals experience unemployment their lifetime use of the system increases this supply side hysteresis effect may explain why unemployment has steadily increased over the 1972 1992 period even though the generosity of unemployment insurance did not

supervision and wages across industries this paper uses supervision data from a supplement to the 1977 wave of the panel survey of income dynamics to examine differences in supervision and wages across industries and to evaluate relationships between supervision practices and interindustry wage differentials the results demonstrate that workers in high wage industries are supervised with equal or greater stringency than secondary sector workers further the results offer no evidence that interindustry differences in monitoring contribute to interindustry wage differentials such findings appear to contradict explanations for industry wage premiums that are motivated by efficiency wage models of shirking copyright 1993 by mit press

on marginal cost pricing with given tax subsidy rules we provide an existence proof for generalized marginal cost pricing with given tax subsidy rules the novelty is that our approach allows for economic environments where all the generalized marginal cost pricing equilibria are inefficient in the aggregate an example is recalled in order to suggest how non pathological these environments are

are people inequality averse or just risk averse individuals preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries the median relative risk aversion which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion is between 2 and 3 most people are also found to be individually inequality averse reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society left wing voters and women are both more risk and inequality averse than others the model allows for non monotonic swfs implying that welfare may decrease with an individual s income at high income levels which is illustrated in simulations based on the empirical results

belief in a just world and redistributive politics international surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate at the same time social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain and pass on to their children a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts this paper offers a model that helps explain i why most people feel such a need to believe in a just world ii why this need and therefore the prevalence of the belief varies considerably across countries iii the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology levels of redistribution labor supply aggregate income and popular perceptions of the poor the model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals desired beliefs or ideological choices resulting in two equilibria a first american equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez faire policies the other european equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state more generally the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions including those concerning money consumption and happiness as well as religion

experienced inequality and preferences for redistribution abstract we examine whether individuals experienced levels of income inequality affect their preferences for redistribution we use several large nationally representative datasets to show that people who have experienced higher inequality during their lives are less in favor of redistribution after controlling for income demographics unemployment experiences and current macroeconomic conditions they are also less likely to support left wing parties and to consider the prevailing distribution of incomes to be unfair we provide evidence that these findings do not operate through extrapolation from own circumstances perceived relative income or trust in the political system but seem to operate through the respondents fairness views

the determination of unemployment benefits while much empirical research exists on labor market consequences of unemployment benefits there is remarkably little evidence on the forces determining benefits we present a simple model where workers desire insurance against unemployment risk and benefits increase the unemployment rate we then conduct one of the first empirical analyses of the determinants of the parameters of the benefit system using data for developed countries for 1971 89 controlling for year and country fixed effects and the government s political color we find evidence that the level of benefits falls when the unemployment rate is high this is consistent with wright s tax effect

costs of taxation and the size of government existing theory on the form of government suggests that a parliamentary system promotes a larger size of government than does a presidential system this paper extends the existing theory by allowing for distortionary taxation a main result is that if taxation is sufficiently distortionary the parliamentary system may promote a smaller size of government than the presidential system the proposed mechanism appears consistent with several empirical patterns in the data that cannot be explained by other theories

the equality multiplier how wage compression and welfare empowerment interact we explore how more wage equality fuels the generosity of the welfare state via political competition in elections and how a more generous welfare state fuels wage equality via empowerment of weak groups in the labor market together the two mechanisms may generate a cumulative process that explains how equality multiplies and why countries with more equal distributions of market outcomes also have stronger welfare states the complementarity between wage setting and welfare spending can explain why almost equally rich countries differ so much in economic and social equality among their citizens jel h53 i31 j31

the role of unemployment insurance in an economy with liquidity constraints and moral hazard the potential welfare benefits of unemployment insurance along with the optimal replacement ratio are studied using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model to provide a role for unemployment insurance agents in our economy face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks and are unable to borrow or insure themselves through private markets in the absence of moral hazard replacement ratios as high as 65 are optimal and the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance are quite large however if there is moral hazard and the replacement ratio is not set optimally but is instead set to an empirically plausible value the economy can be much worse off than it would be without unemployment insurance

the theory of reform and indian indirect taxes abstract given a set of value judgements an initial state and a model of the economy one can ask whether some feasible tax change would increase welfare we do this by defining the marginal cost in terms of welfare of raising an extra rupee from the i th good the inverse optimum problem is the calculation of non negative welfare weights on households which imply that the initial state is optimum if no such welfare weights exist then a pareto improvement is possible we illustrate the concepts and results using data from the indian economy for 1979 1980 directions of tax reform for a number of specific social welfare functions and for pareto improvements are presented

salaries and piece rates compensation can take many forms remuneration can come as pecuniary payments as fringes such as health and pension benefits or as a nonpecuniary reward such as plush office furniture that costs the firm less than it benefits the worker a significant literature has examined the trade offs between pecuniary and nonpecuniary compensation the modern work having been pioneered by rosen 1974 more recently another body of literature has examined the selection of method of total compensation ignoring the distinction between pecuniary and nonpecuniary payment this work has focused on risk and incentive factors it has resulted in comparisons of compensation based on absolute output levels to that based on relative performance it has also led to explorations of the relation of compensation to experience over the work life 2 little attention has been paid to what may be among the most important and obvious distinction in methods of compensation namely the choice between a fixed salary for some period of time that is paying on the basis of input and some workers receive compensation that is specified in advance and not directly contingent on performance instead it depends on an input measure such as hours worked for others compensation is directly related to output this essay is an attempt to predict a firm s choice of compensation method piece rates are defined more rigorously among the more important factors discussed are worker heterogeneity incentives sorting considerations monitoring costs and asymmetric information one result is that salary workers tend to be of lower quality and more homogeneous than are their piece rate counterparts numerous additional results are provided helpful comments by victoria lazear and yoram weiss are gratefully acknowledged support was provided by the department of labor and the national science foundation 1 see lazear and rosen 1981 stiglitz 1981 holmstrom 1982 green and stokey 1983 2 see lazear 1979 1981 and harris and holmstrom in press

piece rates fixed wages and incentive effects statistical evidence from payroll records we develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages the model implies optimal decision rules for the firm s choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages that can be estimated using regression methods using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a british columbia tree planting firm we estimate these bounds to be an 8 8 and a 60 4 percent increase in productivity structural estimation which accounts for the firm s optimal choice of a compensation system suggests that incentives caused a 22 6 percent increase in productivity however only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives in part by reducing quality

hysteresis in unemployment unemployment has risen sharply in a number of countries and it appears to be becoming more persistent the experience of the 1970s and 1980s showed that adverse unemployment shocks could have long lasting effects with very serious economic and social consequences a key mechanism producing these adverse consequences was hysteresis in unemployment whereby temporary rises in unemployment generated by supply and or demand shocks had permanent or at least very persistent effects clearly it is important to understand how hysteresis mechanisms might operate in order to avoid such adverse outcomes on the other hand experience during the subsequent two decades showed that under more favourable macroeconomic conditions it is possible to observe good hysteresis effects now is a very appropriate time to re visit the issue of hysteresis in unemployment in order to avoid the errors of the 1970s and 1980s and if possible to get hysteresis effects working in a positive direction copyright 2011 oxford university press

growing up in a recession does the historical macroeconomic environment affect preferences for redistribution we find that individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort support more government redistribution and tend to vote for left wing parties the effect of recessions on beliefs is long lasting we support our findings with evidence from three different datasets first we identify the effect of recessions on beliefs exploiting time and regional variation in macroeconomic conditions using data from the 1972 2010 general social survey our specifications control for nonlinear time period life cycle and cohort effects as well as a host of background variables second we rely on data from the national longitudinal survey of the high school class of 1972 to corroborate the age period cohort specification and look at heterogeneous effects of experiencing a recession during early adulthood third using data from the world value survey we confirm our findings with a sample of 37 countries whose citizens experienced macroeconomic disasters at different points in history

implementation in economies with non convex production technologies unknown to the designer this paper deals with the problem of incentive mechanism design in non convex production economies when production sets and preferences both are unknown to the designer we consider nash implementation of loss free average cost marginal cost voluntary trading and quantity taking pricing equilibrium allocations in economies involving increasing returns to scale or more general types of non convexities the mechanisms presented in the paper are well behaved they are feasible continuous and use finite dimensional message spaces moreover the mechanisms work not only for three or more agents but also for two agent economies

existence of lindahl equilibria in economies with nonconvex production sets abstract in this article we establish the existence of lindahl equilibria in an economy with public goods which may exhibit increasing returns to scale or more general types of nonconvexities in the production sector this result generalizes several previous results in the literature we give a simple proof by using an auxiliary economy with an enlarged space of goods

social mobility and the demand for redistribution the poum hypothesis this paper examines the often stated idea that the poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they or their offspring may make it up the income ladder this prospect of upward mobility poum hypothesis is shown to be fully compatible with rational expectations and fundamentally linked to concavity in the mobility process a steady state majority could even be simultaneously poorer than average in terms of current income and richer than average in terms of expected future incomes a e rst empirical assessment suggests on the other hand that in recent u s data the poum effect is probably dominated by the demand for social insurance in the future everyone will be world famous for e fteen minutes andy warhol 1968

on the evolution of market institutions the platform design paradox we study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them we ask whether walrasian platforms leading to market clearing trading outcomes will dominate the market in the long run if several market designers compete we find that traders learn to select non market clearing platforms with prices systematically above the market clearing level provided at least one such platform is introduced by a market designer this in turn leads market designers to introduce non market clearing platforms hence platform competition induces non competitive market outcomes

inequality social insurance and redistribution is the political support for welfare policy higher or lower in less egalitarian societies we answer the question using a model of welfare policy as publicly financed insurance that pays benefits in a redistributive manner when voters have both redistributive and insurance motives for supporting welfare spending the effect of inequality depends on how benefits are targeted greater inequality increases support for welfare expenditures when benefits are targeted to the employed but decreases support when benefits are targeted to those without earnings with endogenous targeting support for benefits to those without earnings declines as inequality increases whereas support for aggregate spending is a v shaped function of inequality statistical analysis of welfare expenditures in advanced industrial societies provides support for key empirical implications of the model

cooperation harassment and involuntary unemployment an insider outsider approach the authors present a theory of involuntary unemployment which explains why the unemployed workers outsiders are unable or unwilling to find jobs even though they are prepared to work for less than the prevailing wages of incumbent workers in siders the outsiders do not underbid the insiders since were the y to do so the insiders would withdraw cooperation from them making their work unpleasant with harassment and thereby reducing the prod uctivity and increasing the reservation wages of the underbidders th e resulting labor turnover costs create economic rent which the insid ers tap in wage setting and as a result involuntary unemployment ma y arise copyright 1988 by american economic association

exploring the political economy of labour market institutions labour markets how reforms took place many economists argue that the european unemployment problem relates to large labour market rigidities this paper argues that many of those inflexibilities and the underlying institutional regulations can be understood as the outcome of political influence by incumbent employees this is because many policies that increase unemployment actually benefit these insiders an empirical investigation of the determinants of labour market institutions demonstrates that the observations are consistent with this view the findings imply 1 higher exposure of the employed to unemployment facilitates a reduction in the level of employment protection 2 unemployment benefits are lower the more employment reacts to wages 3 a higher level of unemployment and the existence of a right wing government slow down the growth rate of the minimum wage giles saint paul

income maximization and the selection and sorting of international migrants abstract two prominent features of international labor movements are that the more educated are more likely to emigrate positive selection and more educated migrants are more likely to settle in destination countries with high rewards to skill positive sorting using data on emigrant stocks by schooling level and source country in oecd destinations we find that a simple model of income maximization can account for both phenomena results on selection show that migrants for a source destination pair are more educated relative to non migrants the larger is the absolute skill related difference in earnings between the destination country and the source results on sorting indicate that the relative stock of more educated migrants in a destination is increasing in the absolute earnings difference between high and low skilled workers we use our framework to compare alternative specifications of international migration estimate the magnitude of migration costs by source destination pair and assess the contribution of wage differences to how migrants sort themselves across destination countries

endogenous adverse selection and unemployment insurance in this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance in particular we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance we also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public sector in providing unemployment insurance

optimal income transfer programs intensive versus extensive labor supply responses this paper analyzes optimal income transfers for low incomes labor supply responses are modeled along the intensive margin intensity of work on the job and along the extensive margin participation into the labor force when behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin the optimal transfer program is a classical negative income tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support and a large phasing out tax rate however when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin the optimal transfer program is similar to the earned income tax credit with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income carefully calibrated numerical simulations are provided

growth inequality and social welfare cross country evidence social welfare functions that assign weights to individuals based on their income levels can be used to document the relative importance of growth and inequality changes for changes in social welfare in a large panel of industrial and developing countries over the past 40 years most of the cross country and over time variation in changes in social welfare is due to changes in average incomes in contrast the changes in inequality observed during this period are on average much smaller than changes in average incomes are uncorrelated with changes in average incomes and have contributed relatively little to changes in social welfare

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

does unmeasured ability explain inter industry wage differentials this paper provides empirical assessments of the two leading explanations of measured inter industry wage differentials 1 true wage differentials exist across industries and 2 the measured differentials simply reflect unmeasured differences in workers productive abilities first we summarize the existing evidence on the unmeasured ability explanation second we construct a simple model which shows that if matching is important then endogenous job change decisions can create important self selection biases even in first differenced estimates of industry wage differentials third we analyze a sample that approximates the experiment of exogenous job loss we find that i the wage change experienced by a typical industry switcher closely resembles the difference in the relevant industry differentials estimated in a cross section and ii pre displacement industry affiliation plays an important role in post displacement wage determination

information learning and wage rates in low income rural areas in this essay we present evidence that employers in rural areas of developing countries have imperfect information with regard to the productivity of heterogeneous workers in addition to obtaining direct measures of the completeness of employer information we consider the implications of information asymmetries for the structure of casual labor markets we then evaluate the extent to which casual labor markets do in fact exhibit these attributes we find that 1 there is adverse selection out of the time rate labor market 2 employers discriminate statistically given two workers with different observed characteristics but the same actual productivity the worker from the group with the higher average productivity will have a higher wage 3 employers exhibit learning over time the extent of employer ignorance is negatively related to labor market exposure on the part of the workers and 4 calorie consumption affects productivity but is not rewarded in the time rate labor market in concluding we argue that an analysis of wage and employment patterns and the implications of these patterns for human capital investment in rural areas of developing countries that ignored the role of information problems could yield misleading conclusions

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

some properties of egalitarian economies abstract it is argued that in strictly egalitarian economies there is an equilibrium in which social well being is maximized and that this is so whatever the nature of returns to scale and whether or not the economy is characterized by elements of monopoly externalities of consumption or production commodity taxes or subsidies or the private provision of public goods as a corollary the implications of distortions and increasing returns can be effectively studied only in a context of inequality

ideology and the size of us state government this paper theorizes that the impact of ideology on the size of us state governments increases with state income this idea is tested using state level ideology data derived from the voting behavior of state congressional representatives empirically the interaction of ideology and mean income is a key determinant of state government size at 1960s levels of income the impact of ideology is negligible at 1997 levels of income a one standard deviation move towards the left of the ideology spectrum increases state government size by about half a standard deviation estimated income elasticities differentiated by state and time are found to be increasing with ideology and diminishing with income as predicted by the theory

inequality aversion in income health and income related health abstract based on a survey of a sample of the general public we estimate inequality aversion across income health and bivariate income health inequality aversion is domain specific mean inequality aversion is greater for income than for health but the underlying distributions of aversion attitudes differ with a highly bi modal distribution of inequality aversion values for health in which nearly half the participants display very low aversion and nearly half display very high aversion aversion to income related health inequality is greater than that to income or health alone consistent with previous literature we find only weak associations between aversion attitudes and individual characteristics the magnitude of the estimates implies potentially large gains in welfare from reducing inequality in these domains

general equilibrium when some firms follow special pricing rules in this paper we study the existence of a general equilibrium in an economy in which some of the firms behave competitively whereas others follow special pricing rules an even casual observation of economic reality confirms the need for the inclusion of price setting firms in the study of general equilibrium models and in fact this has been emphasized in the economic literature for some time we consider this a sufficient justification to present a general equilibrium model which allows for both types of behavior price setting as well as price taking behavior the model to be presented will account for a wide range of price setting rules we however find it appropriate to point out at the start that not all economically relevant price setting rules are covered although our model permits the drawing of useful conclusions for the general equilibrium theory of oligopolistic competition through prices it is not especially designed for that purpose in particular our results are not applicable to the general equilibrium analysis with price making monopolistic firms a subject on which there exists some literature 2 our motivation as well as our modelling options and assumptions are directed to two fields where an increased interest in the theoretical foundations recently could be noticed

the redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting abstract public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy abstracting from incentive effects we focus on redistribution some results are because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist and because of the dynamics even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous the equilibrium benefit level or duration benefit schedule deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature the effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated with some unanticipated results

electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters how do voters allocate costly attention to alternative political issues and how does selective ignorance of voters interact with policy design by politicians we address these questions by developing a model of electoral competition with rationally inattentive voters rational inattention amplies the eects of preference intensity because voters pay more attention where stakes are higher the model has many potential applications and those that we discuss in more detail imply that extremist voters are more attentive and inuential public goods are under provided divisive issues receive more attention and less transparent candidates choose more extreme policies endogenous attention can also lead to multiple equilibria explaining how poor voters in developing countries can be politically empowered by welfare programs

a leaky bucket in the real world estimating inequality aversion using survey data existing evidence of inequality aversion relies on data from class room experiments where subjects face hypothetical questions this paper estimates the magnitude of inequality aversion using representative survey data with questions related to the real economy situations the respondents face the results reveal that inequality aversion can be measured in a meaningful way using survey data but the magnitudes of the estimates depend dramatically on how inequality aversion is measured no matter how measured the revealed inequality aversion predicts opinions on a wide range of questions related to the welfare state such as the level of taxation tax progressivity and the structure of unemployment benefits

on a general existence theorem for marginal cost pricing equilibria abstract we report a generalization of recent results on the existence of marginal cost pricing equilibria mcpe in economies with an increasing returns to scale industry our result makes no ad hoc assumptions which force the equilibrium to be on the efficiency frontier of the aggregate production possibility set we also present an additional condition under which our mcpe are productively efficient in the aggregate