should reference alternatives in pivot design sc surveys be treated differently analysts are increasingly making use of pivot style stated choice sc data in the estimation of choice models these datasets often contain a reference alternative whose attributes remain invariant across replications for the same respondent this paper presents evidence to suggest that respondents react differently to the attributes of these reference alternatives and those of purely hypothetical alternatives while some such evidence has been reported in the existing literature this paper goes further and details a number of different departures from a common treatment of the two types of alternatives relating both to the observed part of utility and the error term

second sourcing and the experience curve price competition in defense procurement we examine a dynamic model ofprice competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve asymmetric cost information and the availability of a higher cost alternative system we model acquisition as a two stage process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and the developer competition is then introduced by an auction in which a second source bids against the developer for remaining production we characterize the class of production contracts that are cost minimizing for the government and that induce the developer to reveal private cost information when high costs are revealed these contracts result in a credible cutoff of new system production in favor of the still higher cost alternative system

empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking abstract we examine whether executive stock options esos provide managers with incentives to invest in risky projects for a sample of oil and gas producers we examine whether the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from exploration activity our proxy for exploration risk increases with the sensitivity of the value of the ceo s options to stock return volatility eso risk incentives both eso risk incentives and exploration risk are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equations approach we find evidence that eso risk incentives has a positive relation with future exploration risk taking additional tests indicate that eso risk incentives exhibits a negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations where eso risk incentives and hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined overall our results are consistent with esos providing managers with incentives to mitigate risk related incentive problems

institutions and environmental governance a reconceptualization abstract this article presents the conceptual revisions needed to extend the new institutional approach to environmental governance from its current local and international domains of application to all governance solutions including national environmental and natural resource use policies and multi level governance solutions that are increasingly used to address global environmental change the article suggests that environmental governance is best understood as the establishment reaffirmation or change of institutions to resolve conflicts over environmental resources it also explains why the choice of these institutions is a matter of social justice rather than of efficiency the article suggests a way to understand formal and state centered governance solutions as forms of collective ownership not unlike common property the article demonstrates how institutional analysis can gain resolution by looking at the functional and structural tiers organization of governance functions and formulation of key institutional rules as key aspects of the design of governance institutions

consumer preference for a no choice option the traditional focus in the decision making literature has been on understanding how consumers choose among a given set of alternatives the notion that preference uncertainty may lead to choice deferral when no single alternative has a decisive advantage is tested in seven studies building on recent research the article shows that the decision to defer choice is influenced by the absolute difference in attractiveness among the alternatives provided and is not consistent with trade off difficulty or the theory of search these findings are then extended to show that choice deferral can also be modified for the same alternatives by manipulations that make them appear more similar in attractiveness or that decrease the need to differentiate among them the results are consistent with the notion that preference uncertainty results in a hesitation to commit to any single action since small differences in attractiveness among the alternatives are potentially reversible consistent with this premise the effect of attractiveness difference on choice deferral decreased significantly when subjects were first allowed to practice making monetary trade offs among the available alternatives

discrete choice survey experiments a comparison using flexible methods abstract this study investigates the convergent validity of discrete choice contingent valuation cv and contingent rating ranking cr methods using flexible econometric methods our results suggest that cv and cr can produce consistent data achieve convergent validity when respondent s preferred choices and the same changes in environmental quality are considered we also find that cr models that go beyond modeling the preferred choice and include additional ranks cannot be pooled with the cv models accounting for preference heterogeneity via random coefficient models and their flexible structure does not make rejection of the hypothesis of convergent validity less likely but instead rejects the hypothesis to about the same degree or perhaps more frequently than fixed parameter models commonly used in the literature

dealing with uncertainty in public preferences for rural development policies a contingent valuation survey dominguez torreiro m and solino m dealing with uncertainty in public preferences for rural development policies a contingent valuation survey regional studies rural development programmes are currently envisaged as a means to foster the provision of a broad range of non commodity outputs emanating from multifunctional rural environments this paper presents a contingent valuation survey that analyses individuals perceptions of and willingness to pay for the implementation of a rural development programme in cantabria spain uncertainty in individuals preferences is explicitly acknowledged and introduced into the analytical framework for that purpose a comparison is made between the open ended and the multiple bounded uncertainty elicitation formats the expectation of a positive welfare change constitutes a sound argument in favour of regional rural development policies

protecting the winner second price versus oral auctions abstract in oral auctions unlike sealed bid second price auctions the winner never reveals his reservation price we investigate bidders strategies in the two auctions when third parties can exploit information revealed by the auction when exploitation is likely oral auctions are more efficient than sealed bid second price auctions and preferred by all participants

demand for beef from cattle administered growth hormones or fed genetically modified corn a comparison of consumers in france germany the united kingdom and the united states we compare consumer valuations of beef ribeye steaks from cattle produced without growth hormones or genetically modified corn in france germany the united kingdom and the united states results suggest that french consumers place a higher value on beef from cattle that have not been administered added growth hormones than u s consumers however valuations of non hormone treated beef are statistically indistinguishable across germany the united kingdom and the united states results also suggest that european consumers place a much higher value on beef from cattle that have not been fed genetically modified corn than u s consumers copyright 2003 oxford university press

toward a model of risk in declining organizations an empirical examination of risk performance and decline scholars who study organizational decline have argued that declining organizations reduce or eliminate their riskier activities such as innovation further they cite reduced risk taking as a primary contributor to further decline scholars with an interest in risk per se come to the opposite conclusion low performing firms often take more risks than other firms and such risks reduce subsequent performance this study attempts to resolve these conflicting views by examining the risk of firms in decline our model based on cyert march s cyert r m j g march 1963 a behavioral theory of the firm prentice hall englewood cliffs nj behavioral theory of the firm includes six basic variables 1 performance 2 slack 3 aspirations 4 expectations 5 risk income stream uncertainty and 6 organization size as a measure of decline the estimated model includes prior levels of risk and performance in the risk and performance equations respectively as controls this study uses data on 34

implicit cost allocation and bidding for contracts the question of how or even whether indirect costs should be allocated for pricing decisions has been controversial and unresolved this paper takes a step toward answering this question by examining the special case of a firm that must incur incremental fixed costs to complete any or all of the several projects for which it is submitting simultaneous bids an independent private values bidding model is employed to endogenously determine an optimal cost allocation we term such a cost allocation implicit the optimal implicit fixed cost allocation is shown to fully allocate fixed costs ex ante although the fixed costs may be under over or exactly allocated ex post

alternative common value auction procedures revenue comparisons with free entry the logic of revenue comparisons for different types of common value auctions is substantially altered if the number of participants rather than being fixed responds endogenously to the expected profitability from participating in a thoroughly symmetric model a seller may prefer that competition be indirect an auction procedure in which fewer participants are needed to drive the expected profitability from participating down to the level obtainable in other auctions in the economy can attain higher expected revenue if a sale is sufficiently likely this insight allows a complete revenue ranking of standard auction procedures with endogenous entry

5 information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values a laboratory study in affiliated private value auctions each bidder has perfect information regarding his her own value for the object at auction but higher values of the item for one bidder make higher values for other bidders more likely we report on a series of experiments examining three key implications of these auctions i in a first price auction public information about rivals values increases expected revenue ii an english auction increases expected revenue compared to a first price auction and iii a second price auction is isomorphic to an english auction in examining these issues we compare predictions of some ad hoc bidding models with nash equilibrium predictions in the first price auction experiments nash equilibrium bidding theory organizes the data better than either of two ad hoc bidding models public information about others valuations does increase average revenue but the increase in revenue is smaller and less reliable than predicted under risk neutral nash equilibrium bidding lower average revenue might be attributed to risk aversion while the high variability is attributed to a sizable frequency of individual bidding errors relative to the theory bidding theory precisely organizes english auction outcomes after a brief initial learning period the dominant strategy equilibrium does not organize second price auctions nearly as well as market prices persistently exceed predicted prices the difference between english and second price outcomes is attributed to effects of different information flows inherent in the structure of the two institutions on eliminating bidding errors revenue impacts of these two institutions relative to a first price auction are examined in light of observed bidding patterns

numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions abstract we propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions the heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed journal of economic literature classification numbers d44 c63 c72 d82

do employers pay for consistent performance evidence from the nba i introduction there are many economic models of labor contracting that feature job performance monitoring by employers when there is asymmetric information about worker behavior these models focus on a variety of agency issues and generate implications about contract terms such as initial wages wage tenure profiles termination rates and involuntary unemployment 1 it is typically assumed in these models that a worker s marginal revenue product mrp is known at the time of hiring but that costly monitoring is necessary to enforce contractual terms this paper deals with another issue suppose there is no agency problem but both worker and firm are equally uninformed about mrp when contracts are signed and work begins how are initial wages and other contractual terms influenced by symmetric uncertainty about mrp contracts are often formulated on the basis of various provisional predictors of mrp such as grades in college letters of reference from teachers and former employers work experience and performance test scores typically employers expend resources to acquire such information at hiring and continue to engage in costly performance evaluation afterward under such conditions the purpose of monitoring is discovery not contract enforcement information acquired from on the job monitoring is used to make decisions about adjustment of contractual terms job assignment and retention for example tenure track college professors are often evaluated yearly and must submit information about various aspects of on the job performance such as student evaluations of teaching research papers completed committee assignments etc on the job monitoring of workers is costly and is likely to affect the worker s pay in fact a worker may agree to pay for his monitoring if the information revealed by monitoring has alternative uses elsewhere in the labor market in this paper we develop and test a model of a firm facing costly on the job monitoring when there is symmetric information and we develop a number of novel implications for initial salaries the central feature of our model is that monitoring can be costly when a worker s performance over time is variable notably the model predicts that there will be an unambiguous inverse relationship between variance of mrp and initial wages we obtain this and other predictions without resorting to assumptions about employers and employees utility functions that risk aversion models require we regard our explanation of the relationship between variance and wages to be theoretically more robust than what the risk aversion literature would predict because that literature predicts an ambiguous relationship for example stiglitz 1974 232 uses a risk aversion model to demonstrate that wages and risk are inversely related only under very restricted conditions specifically if the worker is more risk averse than the firm and if labor s elasticity of output does not exceed some threshold level in contrast our prediction is based on an information transactions costs model with no restricted conditions we build upon earlier work by bodvarsson 1987 1989 who created a salary determination model in which a worker s output is variable over time bodvarsson characterized on the job monitoring as a sequential sampling experiment where the employer periodically samples from the worker s mrp distribution and stops when she believes there is enough information to determine the true underlying mrp a key implication of bodvarsson s model is that expected monitoring costs are higher for workers with variable output and therefore if workers pay all or part of the cost of monitoring salaries of such workers will be lower in his earlier paper this proposition was tested using a share contracting model and data on commercial fishing in the later paper a fixed wage model with educational signaling was developed but never tested we extend bodvarsson s fixed wage model and test it on an occupation that has many characteristics described by our model professional basketball players in the national basketball association nba

are competitors forward looking in strategic interactions field evidence from multistage tournaments abstract this paper investigates whether decision makers are forward looking in dynamic strategic interactions and incorporate variations of continuation values in their choices using data from professional and semi professional basketball tournaments we find that the expected relative strength of a team in future interactions indeed affects behavior in the present the results also show that the response to changes in the continuation value is stronger if the structure of prizes is convex across stages if the players are in a decisive game and if the prevalence of free riding within a team is low

of tournaments and temptations an analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry we test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as losers will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be winners an empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid year winners furthermore we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time

a comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions a laboratory analysis laboratory economics experiments typically use financially motivated students as subjects an ongoing issue is whether this is an appropriate subject pool since the students are typically inexperienced in the types of decision making required of them in the lab this paper addresses this issue in the context of common value offer auctions as we compare the behaviour of experienced business executives in the construction contract industry experts with that of naive student subjects results of previous research of this sort have been equivocal in some cases experts make the same errors as novices in other cases they do not hogarth and reder i987 a series of sealed bid common value offer auctions in which bidders compete for the right to supply an item of unknown cost were conducted inherent to common value auctions cvas is an adverse selection problem which may result in below normal or negative profits the winner s curse experimental studies have documented the presence of the winner s curse with financially motivated student subjects in high price demand side auctions kagel et al i986 kagel and levin i986 the experiments reported here generalise these earlier studies from bid to offer auctions also in employing offer auctions we establish a setting with which our experts are familiar thus allowing their experience the best chance to manifest itself

losing to win tournament incentives in the national basketball association the focus of tournament models has been rank order compensation schemes whereby participants receive higher payments for higher relative performance either incrementally or winner takes all our research focuses on a unique tournament that offers rewards for both winning and losing specifically the national basketball association s regularly scheduled season of games we examine three nba seasons to determine whether team performance responded to changes in the underlying tournament incentives provided by the nba s introduction and restructuring of the lottery system to determine draft order our results yield strong evidence that nba teams are more likely to lose when incentives to lose are present

ex post information in auctions assumptions maskin and riley 1984 show that when the amount a buyer is willing to pay for the auctioned object is not independent of his wealth expected revenue tends to be lower under open bidding in contrast milgrom and weber 1982 relax the assumption that valuations are independent and assume instead that buyers private estimates of the item s value are affiliated a buyer with a high estimate then tends to believe that other buyers will have higher estimates as well maintaining the other assumptions milgrom and weber show that expected revenue is higher in the open ascending bid auction the intuition behind this result is that in sealed high bid auctions a buyer s bid is determined not only by his own beliefs but via their bids by the beliefs of those with lower estimates a buyer with a low estimate believes that others are more likely to have low estimates as well he therefore bids less aggressively it follows that a buyer can beat all opponents who have lower estimates with a bid which is lower than it would be if beliefs were independent 2 milgrom and weber also show that if the seller purchases and then publicly reveals information which is positively linked to buyers valuations this also raises expected gross revenue from an auction the intuition here is that this helps to reduce the difference in bidders willingness to pay 3 that such a reduction should raise expected revenue is easily understood for the limiting case in which the seller s information includes all the buyers private information for then all buyer asymmetry is eliminated and so expected buyer profit is bid away to zero the seller therefore reaps the entire surplus in the following pages the implications of correlated signals are further explored while milgrom and weber emphasized the potential gains to a seller who reveals information ex ante the focus here is on ex post information in section 2 it is shown that under weak assumptions the sealed high bid auction is dominated by any auction

negotiation analysis a characterization and review negotiation analysis seeks to develop prescriptive theory and useful advice for negotiators and third parties it generally emphasizes the parties underlying interests as distinct from the issues on the table and the positions taken alternatives to negotiated agreement approaches to productively manage the inherent tension between competitive actions to claim value individually and cooperative ones to create value jointly as well as efforts to change perceptions of the game itself since advice to one side does not necessarily presume the full game theoretic rationality of the other side s negotiation analysts often draw on the findings of behavioral decision analysts and economists further this approach does not generally assume that all the elements of the game are common knowledge thus the negotiation analytic approach tends to de emphasize the application of game theoretic solution concepts or efforts to find unique equilibrium outcomes instead to evaluate possible strategies and

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks i introduction when individuals compete for promotions bonuses or other rewards tied to their relative performance ranking vis a vis other contestants competition is likely to drive not just work effort but where imperfect monitoring permits other choices at the contestants discretion in this article we ask how rank dependent compensation influences attitudes toward risk or the choice of variance of output when contestants have opportunities to influence this aspect of their output distribution unlike previous literature we assume that it is costly for contestants to alter the variance of output and that identical contestants simultaneously choose both the mean of their output distribution i e work effort and its variance our analysis emphasizes the importance of the number of players and symmetry or lack thereof of payoffs on contestants incentives we find that contestants will engage in risk seeking increasing the variance of their output distribution in contests among three or more players when the payoff structure offers a greater prize for ranking first than the penalty for ranking last as happens in winner take all contests if the tournament organizer or sponsor values the aggregate output of the contestants as is typically assumed in labor market tournaments this risk seeking behavior is inefficient because it is costly but does not increase the expected output however we argue that many contests such as the research and development tournaments first modeled by taylor 1995 may be characterized by an organizer who cares only or primarily about the highest output achieved by a single contestant e g the best submission received in such cases the organizer may benefit from costly risk taking among contestants we show that three payoff levels a prize to the contestant ranked first a penalty to the contestant ranked last and a common intermediate payoff to all others are sufficient to achieve any combination of effort and variance of output that the organizer wishes to induce among contestants so long as the desired output variance does not exceed that which results from a winner take all prize structure therefore the sponsor s problem can be characterized as choosing the optimal mean and variance of the output distribution given the contestants costs of influencing the mean and variance of output in this way our model provides an explanation for the importance of both carrots prizes and sticks penalties in competitive settings only through the combined use of both can a contest organizer determine the effort and the variance of output chosen by contestants and doing so is necessary to achieve optimal performance from contests since the pioneering work of lazear and rosen 1981 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 o keeffe viscusi and zeckhauser 1984 and others rank order tournaments or contests have been used to model incentives in a variety of economic settings in particular executive compensation has frequently been modeled as a tournament in which low level executives are motivated by the prospect of climbing the corporate ladder and obtaining the large salaries attendant to top ranking executives as in rosen 1986 and bognanno 2001 similarly the behavior of investment fund managers who compete for top fund rankings has been modeled as a tournament by brown harlow and starks 1996 taylor 1995 developed a model of research tournaments in which contestants search for an innovation and the best innovation submitted to the sponsor wins a prize the distinguishing feature of a tournament or contest is that contestants are paid based on the rank of their output relative to others rather than the level of output prize levels are set in advance and competition to win generates the incentive to exert effort to increase output lazear and rosen 1981 showed that rank order tournaments can provide an efficient incentive framework in a labor market setting when workers are risk neutral

provided and perceived status quo in choice experiments implications for valuing the outputs of multifunctional rural areas this article presents a choice experiment analyzing multifunctional rural development policies targeting conservation and recovery of environmental social and cultural assets in choice experiments a base alternative is usually included in order to estimate the welfare change associated to policy proposals this study is concerned with the much neglected issue of the impact on policy analysis of the definition of a status quo alternative either as an objective assessment by experts or as a self reported perception by respondents convergent validity analysis and prospective policy scenarios show a significant impact of different status quo specifications on individuals preferences and related welfare measures when complex and unfamiliar biophysical systems are involved in policy analysis and evaluation

using choice experiments to value the environment this paper we outline the choice experiment approach to environmental valuation this approach has its roots in lancaster s characteristics theory of value in random utility theory and in experimental design we show how marginal values for the attributes of environmental assets such as forests and rivers can be estimated from pair wise choices as well as the value of the environmental asset as a whole these choice pairs are designed so as to allow efficient statistical estimation of the underlying utility function and to minimise required sample size choice experiments have important advantages over other environmental valuation methods such as contingent valuation and travel cost type models although many design issues remain unresolved applications to environmental issues have so far been relatively limited we illustrate the use of choice experiments with reference to a recent uk study on public preferences for alternative forest landscapes this study allows us to perform a convergent validity test on the choice experiment estimates of willingness to pay

choice modelling approaches a superior alternative for environmental valuation in this paper we examine some popular choice modelling approaches to environmental valuation which can be considered as alternatives to more familiar valuation techniques based on stated preferences such as the contingent valuation method a number of choice modelling methods are consistent with consumer theory and its focus on an attribute based theory of value permits a superior representation of many environmental management contexts however choice modelling surveys can place a severe cognitive burden upon respondents and induce satisficing rather than maximising behavioural patterns in this framework we seek to identify the best available choice modelling alternative and investigate its potential to solve some of the major biases associated with standard contingent valuation we then discuss its use in the light of policy appraisal needs within the eu an application to the demand for rock climbing in scotland is provided as an illustration

a model of auction contracts with liquidated damages abstract this paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller in the event of a default on the auction contract the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit when renegotiation is possible increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller s payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder under these conditions the seller s payoff is decreasing in the level of the deposit journal of economic literature classification number d44

environmental quality preference and benefit estimation in multinomial probit models a simulation approach simulated maximum likelihood is used to estimate a random parameter multinomial probit model of destination choice for recreational fishing trips formulated to accommodate varying tastes and varying perceptions of environmental quality across individuals the restricted likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the independent probit model which is similar to the independent logit model in both the parameter and benefit estimates furthermore both the krinsky robb and bootstrapping procedures suggest that the benefit standard deviation of an environmental policy is found to be markedly lower higher when heterogeneous preferences are taken into account

risk taking behavior in mutual fund tournaments abstract we develop a two period model of a brown et al j finance 51 1996 85 mutual fund tournament in which two fund managers with unequal midyear performances compete for new cash inflows when one of the managers is an exogenous benchmark winning managers index and losing managers gamble however when both managers are active the winning manager is more likely to gamble expecially when the midyear performance gap is high or when stocks offer high returns and low volatility empirical evidence that winning managers gamble has been documented by other researchers but it has been interpreted as evidence against the tournament model with a dataset of weekly returns from 1984 to 1996 for 660 mutual funds we text for other tournament effects predicted by the model our results suggest a role for the theory of tournaments in studies of mutual fund behavior

swinging for the fences the effects of ceo stock options on company risk taking and performance we unpack the concept of managerial risk taking distinguishing among three of its major elements the size of an outlay the variance of potential outcomes and the likelihood of extreme loss we

modeling disinterest and dislike a bounded bayesian mixed logit model of the uk market for gm food mixed logit models represent a powerful discrete choice analytical model but require assumptions about the functional form of the parameter distributions the use of unbounded distributions such as the normal distribution may be regarded as unsuitable where theory indicates that all are negatively affected by increases in an attribute such as price bounded distributions such as the triangular and log normal are unable to model the case where a section of the population is indifferent towards an attribute while the remainder are negatively disposed toward it train and sonnier s bounded mixed logit model accommodates these features and is employed in this paper a censored normal and johnson s s b distribution are used to model preferences in the uk for food attributes including price and gm technology bi modal distributions are identified regarding gm food some are unlikely to ever consume it some are close to indifference and willing to consume at relatively small discounts while the remainder are fairly unresponsive to further price reductions

modeling preference heterogeneity in stated choice data an analysis for public goods generated by agriculture stated choice models based on the random utility framework are becoming increasingly popular in the applied economics literature the need to account for respondents preference heterogeneity in such models has motivated researchers in agricultural environmental health and transport economics to apply random parameter logit and latent class models in most of the published literature these models incorporate heterogeneity in preferences through the systematic component of utility an alternative approach is to investigate heterogeneity through the random component of utility and covariance heterogeneity models are one means of doing this in this article we compare these alternative ways of incorporating preference heterogeneity in stated choice models and evaluate the sensitivity of estimated welfare measures to which approach is selected we find that a latent class approach fits our data best but all the models perform well in terms of out of sample predictions finally we discuss what criteria a researcher can use to decide which approach is most appropriate for a given data set

tournament rewards and risk taking this article considers a lazear rosen tournament model where agents can influence both the spread of their output distribution risk taking and its mean the unique equilibrium induces excessive risk taking and a low level of effort by modifying the tournament to give the highest prize to the agent with the most moderate output a low level of risk taking and high level of effort can be sustained as an equilibrium the first result can be useful to understand the relative performance evaluation puzzle of executive compensation and the second result can be useful to understand puzzling workplace norms promoting mediocrity

sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects abstract we show that in sequential auctions of a large enough number of stochastically equivalent objects with bounded values prices will on average have a downwards trend

collusion and the choice of auction auctions are used in many different markets including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the united states the procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy one of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders this article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending bid oral auctions but not if he uses sealed high bid auctions this may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high bid auctions

risk behavior in response to quotas and contests much of the salesforce compensation literature has focused on developing incentive schemes to maximize effort levels on the part of the salesforce the amount of effort to expend in the selling task is considered to be the sole decision variable for a sales representative in this paper we introduce another key decision variable for a sales representative which is how much risk to undertake in the selling task in other words we consider the fact that for a sales representative riskiness of performance e g the dispersion of the probability distribution for sales is often a choice and not a given fate for example a sales representative trying to increase sales may have the choice of allocating a given amount of effort on the low risk approach of pursuing a small set of existing customers or incur the same effort on the high risk option of getting new larger customers to switch from competitors this paper examines how decisions on risk behavior on the part of the sales representatives are influenced by compensation schemes we show that such decisions are sensitive to the payoff structure when a quota based or a rank order contest based compensation scheme is used more specifically we argue that a high quota level or a rank order contest where only the top few win induce sales representatives to opt for high risk prospects whereas a low quota level or a rank order contest where a high proportion win induce sales representatives to opt for low risk prospects this does not stem from any kind of violation of standard expected utility theory but arises from the specific structure of jumps in payoffs it is not that the inherent risk attitudes of the sales representatives are being altered rather under some quota and contest conditions a more risky prospect may yield higher expected utility for an inherently risk averse sales representative while under some other quota and contest conditions a less risky prospect may lead to a higher expected utility for an inherently risk seeking sales representative the theoretical propositions are tested in a series of five experiments the first two experiments test the theoretical results of quota based compensation the quota levels are manipulated subjects select between segment types where the mean expected sales are the same but the variance varies the next two experiments test the risk behavior of subjects in contest based incentive schemes when the proportion of winners in the contest is manipulated the results provide strong support for our models with only a few subjects departing from the theoretical predictions a fifth experiment shows some cognitive response data to explain the behavior that is inconsistent with the theoretical predictions this paper provides implications that are useful for managers who design compensation schemes a common assumption in most normative models on salesforce compensation is that all sales representatives are either risk averse or risk neutral this might often lead to the conclusion that sales representatives cannot be expected to engage in high risk activities in the absence of a risk premium over and above the compensation scheme while this may be true if sales representatives are facing only a piece rate compensation plan it need not be the case when quota based or contest based compensation schemes are used our results suggest that when the sales quotas are set high or if the proportion of winners in a sales contest is low sales representatives may engage in high risk behavior alternatively if the quotas are low or the proportion of winners in a sales contest is high sales representatives may engage in low risk prospects hence if a firm would like to dampen high risk behavior on the part of the salesforce lowering quota levels or increasing the proportion of winners in sales contests might do so similarly in order to reduce conservatism towards risk moving up the quota levels or reducing the proportion of winners in sales contests could be useful our results extend beyond just salesforce management to any situation where payoffs are based on reaching a certain threshold level in performance or are based on relative performance for example similar implications hold in tournaments for promotion to a limited number of top management positions in an organization influencing the portfolio of r d managers and so on

random coefficient models for stated preference surveys abstract this paper combines the use of random coefficient discrete choice models that allow for correlated errors in the form of unobserved preference heterogeneity with an investigation of the reliability and usefulness of rankings data for the data we examine we find significant unobserved preference heterogeneity in the rankings which violates the underlying assumptions of the rank ordered logit model further directly modeling unobserved preference heterogeneity results in significant improvement in the precision of the parameter estimates and in estimated willingness to pay wtp the reliability and usefulness of rankings data should be re examined with econometric models not subject to the independence of irrelevant alternatives iia

modeling competitive bidding a critical essay in analyzing bidding modeling matters this paper is a critical analysis of the models available to aid competitive bidding decision making bidding strategy and auction design in real transactions after an introductory overview this paper describes the contexts in which auctions arise reviews the mainstream theory of single isolated auctions and discusses the important work involved in enrichment of this theory in doing so it indicates results that have been obtained and the sort of changes in analytical approach that are needed to tackle other critical enrichments the paper summarizes briefly what is known about the direct use of models by bidders and auction designers a general theme of this paper is that enriched models are needed to bring bidding theory closer to direct applicability in decision making

incidence and consequences of risk taking behavior in tournaments evidence from the nba we empirically explore the relevance and efficiency of risk taking behavior in tournaments we use data from the national basketball association nba and measure risk taking by the fraction of three point shots in basketball games we examine how point differences between teams during games affect their subsequent risk taking behavior it is found that teams that are trailing are more likely to increase their use of three point shots we additionally analyze the consequences of this change in behavior enhanced risk taking is inefficient in the vast majority of cases and is only beneficial if a team is trailing by a rather large margin we discuss possible explanations for these decision errors jel m5 d81 j30

split awards procurement and innovation in many procurement settings it is possible for a buyer to split a production award between suppliers in this article we develop a model of split award procurement auctions in which the split choice is endogenous we characterize the set of equilibrium bids and allocations for optimizing agents in an environment in which suppliers are fully informed about each other s costs split award equilibria simultaneously exhibit strong collusive features and cost efficiency properties despite the former property of the equilibria upstream investment considerations may lead a buyer to prefer a split award auction format to a winner take all auction format

testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance the determinants of organizational risk taking and its impact on economic performance are critical issues in strategic management using a model that included risk performance performance expecta