efficient and durable decision rules with incomplete information we compare six concepts of efficiency for economies with incomplete information depending on the stage at which individuals welfare is evaluated and on whether incentive constraints are recognized an example is shown in which an incentive efficient decision rule may be unanimously rejected by the individuals in the economy we define durable decision rules which can resist such unanimous rejection and show that efficient durable decision rules exist

contracting for software development software contracting is a multi faceted issue that involves legal economic managerial and technological considerations to better understand the economic aspect of software contracting this paper provides a summary review of software development contracts followed by a gametheoretic model developed to incorporate incentive and information issues associated with software contracting in the model an outside contractor is hired to develop a software system over multiple periods due to the uncertainties about costs or technology the developer faces the risk of having to abandon the project at an intermediate phase the user is better informed of the benefit of the system while the developer privately discovers the development costs as the project advances given the limited information the contracting parties make decisions in their own interest leaving each party vulnerable to the other s opportunistic behavior in this setting we construct a viable contract that aligns the incentives of the contracting parties and produces the same equilibrium outcome as in in house development we also relate the implications of the model to the actual contract cases

risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public private partnerships we study the agency costs of delegated public service provision focusing on the link between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation we consider a dynamic multitask moral hazard environment where the mapping between efiort and performance is ex ante uncertain but new information may come along during operations our analysis points out at the e ciency gains that bundling planning and implementation as under public private partnerships can bring in terms of better project design and lower operational costs bundling also results in increasingly better performance as uncertainty is reduced by growing experience in the sector bundling should instead be viewed with caution when the private sector seeks to radically innovate on public service provision or to introduce new services but lacks the knowledge and expertise to anticipate the impact of the innovative design procedure technology on the cost of operations the compounding of asymmetric information ex post plus moral hazard and renegotiation may generate diseconomies of scope in agency costs which for high operational risk can make unbundling optimal in this context the use of private flnance can help re establishing the beneflt of bundling only if lenders have su cient expertise to help assessing project risks

does a procurement service provider generate value for the buyer through information about supply risks we consider a supply chain with one buyer and two suppliers who are subject to disruptions and whose likelihoods of disruption are their private information in such a setting does the buyer benefit from engaging the services of a better informed procurement service provider psp compared to procuring directly from the suppliers intuition might suggest that hiring a psp is always the right choice because the psp s knowledge of the supply base improves supplier selection and management on the other hand earlier studies prove that using a psp purely for its superior knowledge about supply costs is always worse for a buyer than contracting with the suppliers directly our answer to this research question is more nuanced contrary to the findings of earlier studies we find that the buyer may benefit from using a psp we identify quantify and explain all of the benefits and the costs of using a psp and describe conditions under which the benefits exceed the costs the benefits of using a psp are deriv

simple contracts renegotiation under asymmetric information and the hold up problem abstract in this article it is demonstrated that voluntary bargaining over a collective decision under asymmetric information may well lead to ex post efficiency if the default decision is non trivial it is argued that the default decision may be interpreted as a simple contract that the parties have written ex ante this result is used in order to show that simple unconditional contracts which are renegotiated may allow the hold up problem to be solved even if the parties valuations are private information

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

second sourcing and the experience curve price competition in defense procurement we examine a dynamic model ofprice competition in defense procurement that incorporates the experience curve asymmetric cost information and the availability of a higher cost alternative system we model acquisition as a two stage process in which initial production is governed by a contract between the government and the developer competition is then introduced by an auction in which a second source bids against the developer for remaining production we characterize the class of production contracts that are cost minimizing for the government and that induce the developer to reveal private cost information when high costs are revealed these contracts result in a credible cutoff of new system production in favor of the still higher cost alternative system

two sided uncertainty and up or out contracts a bilateral moral hazard problem provides a rationale for up or out employment contracts the employer sets a wage higher than opportunity cost to induce the worker to invest in firm specific capital if the individual does not make the grade it is in the firm s interest ex post to fire him had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals the firm would underreport the value of the employee wrecking the incentive scheme the basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral therefore it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension which we also investigate

a theory of contracts with limited enforcement we present a theory of contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset public enforcement relies on remedies for breach private enforcement comes from severing relationships we first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly whether a long term contract is enforceable does not depend on the distribution of penalties for breach between the buyer and the seller while under complete information the optimal contract would remain stationary non stationarity might arise under asymmetric information enforcement constraints are time dependent and easier to satisfy as time passes indeed a high cost seller may be tempted to trade high volumes at high prices at the beginning of the relationship before breaching the contract later on yet such take the money and run strategy becomes less attractive as time passes and can be prevented with backloaded payments the optimal contract thus goes through two different phases first quantities and prices increase at the inception of the relationship later on the contract looks more stationary the public and private sides of enforcement plays different roles in determining the length of the earlier phase of contracting long run screening distortions encapsulate the quality of enforcement offering de facto a link between the quality of the legal system and contractual performances

coordination of internal supply chains in vertically integrated high tech manufacturing organizations htmos abstract this paper uses economic mechanisms to coordinate supply chains within high tech manufacturing organizations htmos it models the one shot initial production and allocation decisions involved in the production and marketing of new technologies these decisions are driven by the economic objectives of the firm and of the employees with private information the experts it analyzes and compares the efficiency of three coordination policies centralized command and control centralized revelation and decentralized revelation it shows that decentralized policies introduce an additional cost and it proposes rules of thumb for coordinating supply chains within firms that use many experts

balanced bayesian mechanisms in the transferable utility case a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers we present a new easy to interpret condition and we show that it is strictly more general than all the other conditions found in the literature we also study conditions guaranteeing the bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms

optimal contracts with public ex post information abstract we are concerned with the value of public ex post information about a seller s costs to an initially uninformed buyer we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a public ex post signal s s that is correlated with the risk neutral seller s costs to render the initial information asymmetry inconsequential to the buyer the first best outcome for the buyer is shown to be feasible if 1 the dimension of s is at least that of or 2 the conditional likelihood function of s given is for one of its realizations sj a strictly increasing function of and more concave in than is the seller s cost function

contracting theory and accounting abstract this paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues i discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection problems i review theoretical research on the role of performance measures in compensation contracts and i compare how information is aggregated for compensation purposes versus valuation purposes i also review the literature on communication including models where the revelation principle does not apply so that nontruthful reporting and earnings management can take place the paper also discusses capital allocation within firms including transfer pricing and cost allocation problems

auctioning incentive contracts this paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory it considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms the firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion the authors show that 1 the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid and the second bid 2 the winner faces a linear incenti ve contract 3 the fixed transfer to the winner decreases with his announced expected cost and increases with the second lowest announce d expected cost and 4 the share of cost overruns borne by the winn er decreases with the winner s announced expected cost copyright 1987 by university of chicago press

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

regulating risk averse producers the case of complementary products abstract this paper studies the impacts of producers risk aversion on the relative virtues of integrated production and component production in the case of complementary products with independent cost realization

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

bilateral monopoly with imperfect information abstract the problem at stake in this paper is the determination of the price and the quantity transacted in a bilateral monopoly with imperfect information a simple characterization of incentive compatible contracts is given that significantly generalizes a previous one due to green and honkapohja this allows an easy study of two interesting families of such contracts and their institutional counterpart namely cost plus contracts and contracts with quantity rationing

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

group cultural values and political skills a situationist perspective on interpersonal citizenship behaviors drawing on mischel s 1968 situationist perspective we theorized that in a weak situation one created by a group culture of low power distance pd or low uncertainty avoidance ua political skills increase the display of interpersonal citizenship behaviors in a strong situation one created by a high group pd or high group ua the application of political skills is constrained in a sample comprising of supervisor employee groups from canada and india we highlight group culture as an important boundary condition on interpersonal citizenship behaviors and recommend that leaders carefully consider the cultures that they create in their groups

the changing architecture of advertising agencies in contrast to other marketing activities advertising is usually outsourced historically to an integrated full service advertising agency that provides both creative and media services recently major changes have occurred specialized media shops have appeared and large holding companies with several agencies and a separate media shop have emerged this paper describes how firms in the current industry structure choose their agents a theoretical section specifies the firm s decision process in obtaining the creative and media components conditions under which one or both could be effectively produced internally are identified in the prevalent case when these components are outsourced we evaluate whether they can be more efficiently produced by a bundled full service agency or by unbundling to separate agents an empirical section tests the theory implications with cross sectional data on u s firm choices of advertising agents the bundled full service agency is still widely used firms with large advertising budgets unbundle to take advantage of media discounts obtained by market making media shops internal agencies are used when firms have internal creative abilities or have low level requirements in both creative and media the creative and media agencies within holding companies are found to act independently

decentralization hierarchies and incentives a mechanism design perspective separation of ownership from management multidivisional firm organizations delegation of production decisions to worker teams delegation of pricing and advertising decisions to retail franchisers reliance on intermediaries in trade or finance and distribution of regulatory authority across different agencies represent examples of organizations that delegate and distribute decision making authority instead of centralizing it this paper reviews literature on costs and benefits of delegated decision making in hierarchical organizations or contracting networks with regard to problems of incentives and coordination it starts by describing incentive and coordination costs of delegation in simple canonical examples of hierarchies where both information and incentives of different decisionmakers differ one class of models pertain to contexts where the classical revelation principle applies i e where costs of contractual complexity information processing or communication are absent agents do not collude and the mechanism designer can commit to the mechanism delegation may conceivably entail a loss of control and coordination arising from the divergence of information and incentives sufficient and necessary conditions for this loss to be mitigated entirely include risk neutrality top down contracting and monitoring of transfers or production assignments between subordinates the next class of models introduces communication costs that restrict the performance of centralized arrangements relative to delegation owing to a resulting loss of flexibility which has to be traded off against possible control losses of delegation finally consequences of collusion among agents is discussed which typically enlarge the range of circumstances under which delegation can attain optimal second best outcomes the paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this theoretical literature to recently emerging empirical studies of industrial organizations where delegated decision making plays an important role adoption of innovative human resource management practices new information technologies and retail franchising

marketing information a competitive analysis selling information that is later used in decision making constitutes an increasingly important business in modern economies jensen jensen fred o 1991 information services congram friedman eds the ama handbook of marketing for the service industries chapter 22 ama com new york 423 443 information is sold under a large variety of forms industry reports consulting services database access and or professional opinions given by medical engineering accounting financial and legal professionals among others this paper is the first attempt in marketing to study competition in the rapidly emerging information sector specifically we are interested in answering the following questions 1 is competition fundamentally different when competing firms sell information rather than traditional goods and services and if yes why 2 what are the implications of such differences for decision makers marketers and regulators 3 can we explain some of the observed marketing strategies in the information industry as such the audience of the paper includes academics as well as professionals who are interested in understanding what is specific about competition in information markets familiarity with the practical implications of such differences and understanding of the mechanisms that drive them is essential for those who are faced with the problem of marketing information to answer the above research questions we build a simple game theoretic model that consists of two firms selling information to a population of consumers who are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the quality of information the most important features of the model are the following information products sold by the two firms are modeled as random draws from two normal distributions having equal mean the variances of these distributions and their correlatedness constitute the product attribute space which is assumed to be common knowledge consumers are interested in assessing the mean of the distributions and to do so they can buy the sample from any of the firms or they can buy both samples and combine them to obtain a more accurate estimate quality of information is linked to the accuracy of consumers estimate of the mean which in turn is influenced by the accuracy of each sample as well as by their correlatedness consumers utility depends on the quality of information they purchased on their inherent utility for quality taste and on the total price they paid to acquire information knowing consumer preferences firms simultaneously price their information products the main finding of the paper is that information markets face unique competitive structures in particular the qualitative nature of competition changes depending on basic product characteristics while traditional products and services compete either as substitutes or as complements in the relevant product attribute space information may be one or the other depending on its position within the same product attribute space said differently the nature of competition changes qualitatively with a continuous change in basic product attribute levels the intuition behind this finding is the following when purchasing information consumers facing important decisions may find it beneficial to purchase from several information sellers this is more likely to happen when the reliability of information is low and the sources of information are independent under such conditions information products tend to be complements and as a result competition between sellers is relatively mild in the opposite case when information is reliable and or sellers sources are highly correlated consumers are satisfied after consulting a single source in this case information products are substitutes and sellers tend to undercut one another s prices to induce consumers to choose their brand understanding this discontinuity in competitive structures has important implications for decision makers as very different strategies are optimal under different product characteristics under substitution traditional strategies to avoid competition e g differentiation are recommended when the competing products reliability is generally low they are complements firms are better off accommodating competition in fact we find that a firm may benefit from inviting a competitor finally our findings are also important for regulators of information markets as the literature on complementarity suggests price fixing agreements between firms offering complementary products may benefit firms as well as consumers

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions we consider the design of regulatory policy when the regulator is imperfectly informed about both the firm s cost function and the demand function it faces to some extent the optimal policy here is the natural combination of the optimal policies when there is uncertainty only about either demand or cost important qualitative differences also exist however for example it may be optimal to set prices below marginal cost and the pricing authority delegated to the firm may be more limited when there is uncertainty about both cost and demand

separation of regulators against collusive behavior we show that the separation of powers in regulation may act as a commitment against the threat of regulatory capture splitting regulatory tasks and monitoring technologies among several nonbenevolent regulators may reduce their discretion in engaging in socially wasteful activities when regulators make collusive offers that are accepted by the agent whatever his characteristics competition between regulators relaxes collusion proofness constraints and improves social welfare this result is robust to different specifications of the agent s preferences and to the timing of the game as long as one insists on safe side contracting offers we also discuss how separation affects both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in the economy

bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply abstract rate regulation is studied as a bargaining process in which consumers and the firm negotiate output and payments under asymmetric information the feasible set of transactions given incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints is characterized the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms for the direct revelation game is also characterized sufficient conditions are given for efficient mechanisms to be full information efficient efficient mechanisms are identified which correspond to nonlinear monopoly pricing monosony compensation schedules and the baron myerson regulation model

awarding monopoly franchises the authors analyze how to award a monopoly franchise when the objective is to maximize expected consumers surplus net of transfer payments to the producer potential producers initially possess independent private information about uncertain production costs only the chosen producer subsequently observes realized production costs after awarding the franchise to the producer with the lowest expected costs prices are optimally set above realized marginal cost these ex post distortions foster more competitive bidding ex ante the distortions for any bid cost pair are invariant to the number of bidders n though expected distortions and profits decline with n copyright 1987 by american economic association

competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment a two period model is considered in which ex ante identical firms invest in period one and in period two after they learn their costs the lowest cost firm is chosen as the winner of the contract it is found that even though firms are racing against one another they end up underinvesting relative to the ex ante socially optimal levels when the buyer is unable to credibly precommit to the second period contract

the incentive value of inventory and cross training in modern manufacturing this paper shows that major components of modern manufacturing processes such as inventory management and cross training play a significant control role in our model workers possess information that is critical to efficient ongoing operations an organizational design that motivates workers to optimally apply this information leverages both the production schedule and worker management communication management s use of these controls results in work in process wip inventory that appears excessive from a pure job scheduling perspective but is optimal when control issues are considered empirical work testing pure job scheduling theories of modern manufacturing practices has yielded mixed results we provide control related interpretations for these empirical findings and also provide novel predictions regarding the link between inventory levels and the nature of operational information asymmetries overall our model highlights the importance of recognizing both control and scheduling issues when analyzing production processes

to build or not to build normative and positive theories of public private partnerships abstract this paper analyzes whether the two tasks of building infrastructures which are socially useful in providing public services and managing these assets should be bundled or not when performance contracts can be written both tasks should be performed altogether by the same firm if a better design of the infrastructure helps also to save on operating costs otherwise tasks should be kept apart and undertaken by different units in incomplete contracting environments we isolate conditions under which either the traditional form of public provision of services or the more fashionable public private partnership emerges optimally the latter dominates when there is a positive externality and the private benefits from owning assets are small enough finally we take a political economy perspective and study how incentive schemes are modified under the threat of capture of the decision makers much of the gains from bundling may be lost in this case

information sharing in union firm relationships large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions when they do an ex ante agreement to share information should make it more likely that they will reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade however if the firm refuses to share information the union may shade down its wage demand to increase the probability of acceptance this reduction in the wage can increase the joint surplus of the agents and increase social welfare as a result there are some circumstances in which bargaining with incomplete information can be better for the agents and society than bargaining with complete information many firms and their input suppliers form long term relationships in which they periodically negotiate their terms of trade as has long been recognized the presence of private information can cause negotiations to break down on occasion resulting in an inefficient disruption of production for example the united auto workers with superior knowledge of its strike fund and or its member s outside options may call for a strike against general motors if the firm is unwilling to meet its wage demands and the firm s unwillingness to concede may be due to its superior knowledge of demand productivity and or its stock of inventories theoretically such disruptions could be avoided if the agents would simply agree to reveal their private information before the negotiations begin 2 whether or not this will occur is unclear however since some agents may be unwilling to enter into such an agreement if it sufficiently weakened their bargaining position the literatures on noncooperative bargaining and mechanism design have already dealt with many of the issues that arise in this environment in the bargaining literature it is generally assumed that the agents already possess the private information and then the implications of different bargaining processes are examined see ausubel et al 2002 for a survey in the mechanism design literature one of the questions addressed is whether the agents can find a way to commit to ex

credible commitments contract enforcement problems and banks intermediation as credibility assurance abstract we consider contract enforceability problems in credit transactions and justify a bank as an organizational solution to market breakdown due to unenforceable contracts specifically we explain i why loan commitments exist and ii why banks exist to sell such commitments a loan commitment resolves moral hazard more efficiently than any combination of inside equity and spot credit however the market breaks down if commitment sellers are individuals because their promises to honor contracts are not credible with a large bank a perfect sequential equilibrium is obtained in which credibility is restored

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

information management in incentive problems we extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he choose an unobservable level of cost reducing effort concer

the positive role of global leaders in enhancing multicultural team innovation this study contributes to the empirical research on leadership of multicultural teams from the positive organizational scholarship perspective pos following the information decision making processes perspective on team cultural diversity we examined the positive effect of leaders global identity on multicultural team innovation we proposed that r d multicultural team leaders with high global identity foster team shared innovation goals and motivate team members to adopt communication inclusion behavior making sure that they all understand each other furthermore we propose that the effect of fostering team shared innovation goals on communication inclusion will be stronger for teams with perceived high rather than low cultural diversity and that team communication inclusion will positively affect team innovation participants were 574 r d multicultural team members their leaders and their leaders managers in 82 co located teams in a chinese branch of a large german global organization using sem analysis our findings supported our research model demonstrating that multicultural team leaders with high global identity leveraged cultural diversity to promote innovative goals which further enhanced team communication inclusion and its positive impact on team innovation we discuss the theoretical and practical implications to the pos perspective on cultural diversity

the informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics we use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors optimal policies result from a trade off between imposing rules which are non responsive to the groups preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better within a strong coalition interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups joint interests an informativeness effect competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences a screening effect the socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature with more congruence a strong coalition is preferred finally within a weak coalition interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information such weak coalitions are always inefficient

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

justifying the first order approach to principal agent problems it is of interest to know when the incentive compatibility conditio n in principal agent problems can be replaced by the condition that the agent s expected utility be stationary in effort the mirrlees rogerson conditions do not work if the principal can observe more than one observable statistic also the mirrlees rogerson assumption that the distribution function of output is convex in the agent s action is unsatisfactory even in the context of the basi c model it is too restrictive the paper presents a suite of conditio ns that are applicable to the multistatistic case and replaces the objectionable convex distribution function assumption copyright 1988 by the econometric society

does organizational formalization facilitate voice and helping organizational citizenship behaviors it depends on national uncertainty norms prosocial work behaviors in a globalized environment do not operate in a cultural vacuum we assess to what extent voice and helping organizational citizenship behaviors ocbs vary across cultures depending on employees perceived level of organizational formalization and national uncertainty we predict that in contexts of uncertainty cognitive resources are engaged in coping with this uncertainty organizational formalization can provide structure that frees up cognitive resources to engage in ocb in contrast in contexts of low uncertainty organizational formalization is not necessary for providing structure and may increase constraints on discretionary behavior a three level hierarchical linear modeling analysis of data from 7 537 employees in 267 organizations across 17 countries provides broad support for our hypothesis perceived organizational formalization is weakly related to ocb but where uncertainty is high formalization facilitates voice significantly helping ocb to a lesser extent our findings contribute to clarifying the dynamics between perceptions of norms at organizational and national levels for understanding when employees may engage in helping and voice behaviors the key implication is that managers can foster ocb through organizational formalization interventions in uncertain environments that are cognitively demanding

correlated information and mechanism design in models of asymmetric information possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors this induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency the authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided additionally the two person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition similar conditions allow full rent extraction in milgrom weber auctions

the design of contracts and remedies for breach in the first part of this article hypothetical contracts providing for all possible uncertain contingencies are considered in the next part contracts providing for only some contingencies are examined and are shown to be advantageous due both to difficulties that could arise in making and enforcing contingent terms and to the presence of implicit substitutes for them in the following major part of the article two of these substitutes for contingent terms are analyzed remedies for breach and the opportunity for renegotiation the existence of both is demonstrated to induce parties to behave approximately as they would under detailed contracts

the value of information and optimal organization the paper addresses the issue of optimal organization of production i compare three organizational forms centralization one agent produces difierent inputs decentralization each of the two agents produces a difierent input and contracts directly with the principal and delegation two agents produce difierent inputs the principal contracts with one of them only the optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity substitutability between the inputs in the flnal use the degree of complementarity substitutability also determines whether delegation is payofi equivalent to the two agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal in the context of delegation i consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor i also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists jel fields d2 d82 l23

optimal incentive schemes in bottleneck constrained production environments this paper analyzes the design of incentives and control measures in a manufacturing setting in the environment we consider the output of one operation serves as the input for a second operation where there is a bottleneck inputs must be processed at both workstations to produce the final output thus high production volume at the first operation does not translate into high benefits to the owner unless the output is subsequently processed at the second workstation this is a familiar context in manufacturing management lawrence and buss 1992 critics such as goldratt 1990 argue that in these situations typical cost accounting efficiency measurements motivate the nonbottleneck operation to produce output beyond the available capacity of the bottleneck resource leading to waste and excess work in process inventories however workers at the nonbottleneck operation can be induced not to overproduce if restricting production is desired by the owner we characterize management accounting practices and incentive arrangements that balance output production at nonbottleneck operations with the input demands of the bottleneck facility

risk information and incentives in telecom supply chains supply chain management involves the selection coordination and motivation of independently operated suppliers the central planner s perspective in operations management translates poorly to vertically separated chains where suppliers recurrently seem to object to benevolent information sharing and centralized decision rights seen from the supplier s perspective such resistance may very well be rational a downstream assembly line disclosing reliable information on actual and forecasted sales puts itself at a disadvantage when bargaining on share of chain profits in this paper we use a minimal agency model to contrast known optimal mechanisms with the actual practice in the telecommunications industry a three stage supply chain under stochastic demand and varying coordination and information asymmetry is modeled a two period investment production game addresses the information sharing and specific investment problem in the telecom industry the observed price quantity contracts under limited commitment are shown to be inadequate under realistic asymmetric information assumptions more a result of gradually evolving changes in bargaining power than coordination efforts the upstream urge to coordinate may further deteriorate performance in terms of our model c 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

the organization of regulated production complementarities correlation and collusion we analyze the choice between vertical separation vs and vertical integration vi when two regulated firms produce complementary inputs with correlated costs and are protected by ex post break even constraints first in the absence of collusion the regulator prefers vi vs for negative and weak positive respectively strong positive correlation second if the firms can collude under vs and know all costs then vs is equivalent to vi however if firms collude under asymmetric information then collusion does not affect the choice between vs and vi since the regulator takes advantage of the transaction costs created by asymmetric information

anniversary article a perspective on asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation the paper asymmetric information incentives and intrafirm resource allocation by harris kriebel and raviv was published in the june 1982 issue ofmanagement science in this article written as part of this journal s 50 year anniversary celebration we highlight the significance of the harris et al paper for research in managerial accounting we first formulate and solve a continuous version of the harris et al model to illustrate the key assumptions and findings of their paper we then review several strands of the resource allocation literature in managerial accounting that have taken their inspiration either directly or indirectly from the work of harris et al

convergence and divergence of paternalistic leadership a cross cultural investigation of prototypes paternalistic leaders provide care nurturance and guidance to employees in their professional and personal lives in a parental manner and in exchange expect loyalty and deference from employees this study aims at investigating how the paternalistic leadership pl prototype converges and diverges with prototypes of transformational authoritarian participative and nurturant task leadership ntl in six countries representing high power distance and collectivism china turkey and pakistan and low power distance and individualism the united states germany and the netherlands a total of 1272 employees from six countries participated in this study findings revealed that the pl prototype converged more strongly with authoritarian leadership and ntl in hierarchical and collectivistic cultures than in egalitarian and individualistic ones the relationship of the pl prototype with that of transformational and participative leadership was similar across cultures theoretical and managerial implications of these findings for international business are discussed

efficient reliance and damage measures for breach of contract this article considers a situation where the buyer or the seller of a good must engage in expenditures on specific capital before the exchange either to prepare to use the product or to prepare to sell it it is assumed that postbreach bargaining is possible and carried out in a cooperative fashion and that buyers and sellers form expectations about the outcome of such bargaining in a specific way without enforceable contracts the potential appropriability of specific rents results in inefficiently low levels of investment three damage measures commonly used to enforce contracts are shown to produce inefficiently high levels of investment and to be pareto ranked from best to worst as follows specific performance expectation damages and reliance damages

efficient contracting with reliance and a damage measure this article reexamines the problem of breach of contract studied by shavell 1980 1984 and rogerson 1984 by considering explicitly the incentive problems that arise from asymmetric information and transaction specific investment we derive the optimal contract which consists of variable price and damage payment schedules each of which is set before any private information is observed we show that the optimal contract attains full classical efficiency

asia s materialists reconciling collectivism and materialism materialism has an ugly face the dominant view of materialism regards materialists as self prioritizing individuals who oppose collective and prosocial goals in favor of a lifestyle led by money possessions and status the present research argues that there is a side of materialism that is concerned with collective oriented interests we examine the nature and consequences of collective oriented materialism the belief system that ascribes importance to possessions for their symbolic and signaling capacities to construct desirable social attributes drawing from cultural and consumer theories we find considerable support that materialists espouse a collective oriented quality to an otherwise self oriented interest towards possessions

information incentives and organizational mode we examine the choice of organizational mode for a two stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party when these costs are positively correlated the principal prefers to undertake second stage production herself when the correlation is negative and sufficiently small she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second for large negative correlation either mode might be preferred when costs are uncorrelated the principal is indifferent between modes

side payment contracts in two person nonzero sum supply chain games review discussion and applications this paper investigates supply chain coordination with side payment contracts we first summarize specific side payment contracts and present our review on the literature that developed general side payment schemes to coordinate supply chains following our review we discuss two criteria that a proper side payment contract must satisfy and accordingly introduce a decision dependent transfer payment function and a constant transfer term we present the condition that the transfer function must satisfy and use nash arbitration scheme and shapley value to compute the constant transfer term and derive its closed form solution next we provide a five step procedure for the development of side payment contract and apply it to four supply chain games cournot and bertrand games a two retailer supply chain game with substitutable products and a one supplier one retailer supply chain more specifically for the cournot game we construct a linear transfer function and a constant side payment to coordinate two producers for the bertrand game we build a nonlinear transfer function which is equivalent to a revenue sharing contract and show that the constant term is zero and two firms in the game equally share the system wide profit for a supply chain with substitutable products we present a side payment contract to coordinate two retailers for a two echelon supply chain we develop a proper side payment scheme that can coordinate the supply chain and also help reduce the impact of forward buying on supply chain performance

the organization of supplier networks effects of delegation and intermediation in a one principal two agent model with adverse selection and collusion among agents we show that delegating to one agent the right to subcontract with the other agent always earns lower profit for the principal compared with centralized contracting delegation to an intermediary is also not in the principal s interest if the agents supply substitutes it can be beneficial if the agents produce complements and the intermediary is well informed

delegated monitoring versus arm s length contracting abstract this paper analyzes the optimal organization of input suppliers in a procurement context we discuss when a top firm chooses to induce information sharing and active coordination between its suppliers consolidation rather than having them contract at arm s length delegation in designing the organization the firm anticipates that different supplier networks have different costs of inducing information revelation from suppliers when the cost of information sharing varies the optimal organization exhibits various discrete degrees of consolidation there is excessive arm s length contracting compared to the case where the top firm controls this organizational choice itself the paper offers also a methodology to study in a unified framework various organizational forms separately analyzed in the literature

regulating complementary products a comparative institutional analysis optimal regulation subject to informational constraints is analyzed for industries for which production requires complementary inputs an issue for regulatory policy is whether supply in these industries should be bundled or unbundled bundled supply calls for regulation of an integrated industry unbundled supply has each component regulated separately a main result is that unbundling introduces into regulation an additional component of information cost that is similar to double marginalization in the monopoly pricing of complementary products unbundling may be advantageous if it allows sufficient competition in nonmonopoly services but the information cost can exceed the benefits of competition

dominant strategy implementation of bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules abstract a large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a bayesian equilibrium this paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies we identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of an optimal bayesian mechanism so as to create dominant strategies and yet leave every participant s expected utility unchanged we also address the issue of multiple equilibria and unique implementation contexts where these results apply include auctions bilateral bargaining procurement contracting and intrafirm resource allocation

team personal life inclusion in socially versus task oriented countries a cross cultural study of chinese versus german teams team personal life inclusion team pli refers to socialization with fellow team members in the private domain while pli is an expected behavior in the socially oriented chinese work context it is generally seen as unfavorable in task oriented contexts like germany we investigate the relative impact of team pli on the performance of chinese and german teams based on data from 130 chinese and 124 german teams we show that team pli has opposing consequences in china and germany while it increases german teams performance the reverse relationship was observed for chinese teams

minimum bill contracts theory and policy this paper examines the efficiency implications of minimum bill cont racts and concludes that minimum bill provisions promote rather than impede efficient adaptation to changing circumstances in particular minimum bills provide a simple mechanism by which parties faced wit h uncertain demand and rising marginal cost can approximate joint pro fit maximizing payment schedules in transaction specific relationship s governed by long term contracts the paper also questions the merit of proposals for legislative or regulatory intervention to reduce mi nimum bill obligations in natural gas contracts and considers the ap propriate legal status of these provisions in the event of contractua l failure copyright 1988 by blackwell publishing ltd

job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered a principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth constrained agents suppose that there is an outcome externality i e a first stage success can make second stage effort more or less effective if the tasks are conflicting the principal s profit maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks so that the prospect to get a larger second stage rent after a first stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage in contrast when there is an effort externality i e first stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second stage success then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting

a note on the optimal structure of production abstract we analyze the advantages of centralization and decentralization in industries in which production takes place in several stages and the costs are privately observed by the agents in charge of production we demonstrate that informational diseconomies arise when uncorrelated information is concentrated in the hands of a single agent these diseconomies arise when the stages of production are different activities with different cost supports journal of economic literature classification numbers d82 l22 l51

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

uncertainty asymmetric information and bilateral contracts on considere un monopole bilateral avec incertitude et information asymetrique on donne les conditions necessaires et suffisantes a l existence de contrats qui soient efficaces et a la fois stimulants