pareto improving campaign finance policy this paper argues that campaign finance policy in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing can be pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters the optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen the argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions

the performance of pivotal voter models in small scale elections evidence from texas liquor referenda abstract this paper explores the ability of pivotal voter models to explain voter behavior in small scale elections using data from texas liquor referenda the findings provide little support for the view that pivotal voter models are a reasonable theory for understanding small scale elections interestingly this is not because they cannot explain the levels of turnout in the data but rather because they cannot explain the size of the winning margins the logic of pivotal voter models implies that elections must be expected to be close even if there is a significant difference between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences with even a relatively small number of eligible voters elections that are expected to be close ex ante must end up being close ex post however in the data winning margins are often significant

the impact of campaign expenditures on political competition in the french legislative elections of 1993 we use regression analysis to estimate the effect that campaign money had on the votes of challengers and incumbents in the 1993 elections to the french legislative assembly incumbent candidates can at best expect to win 1 01 of the popular vote for each extra franc they spend per registered voter in their district challengers can expect to win at least twice as much as this simulations show that if campaign spending ceilings were halved incumbents would have gained an extra ten percent of the popular vote over their closest challenging rivals the regression analysis also suggests that voters react negatively to candidates who rely heavily on their own money for their outlays and reward candidates who rely on contributions from private individuals these results suggest that campaign spending ceilings may inhibit political competition and that voters may resist a candidate who relies on narrow sources of funding

renewable resource management with environmental prediction variations in environmental conditions affect renewable resource growth the ability to predict such variations is improving providing scope for improved management we generalize a common stochastic stock recruitment model to explore how optimal management changes with environmental prediction we obtain three main results first while it might seem that a prediction of adverse future conditions should lead to more conservative management the opposite may be true second optimal management requires only a one period ahead forecast suggesting forecast accuracy is more important than forecast lead time finally we derive conditions on environmental fluctuations guaranteeing positive optimal harvest in every period gestion d une ressource renouvelable quand on predit les conditions futures de l environnement les variations dans les conditions de l environnement affectent la croissance de la ressource renouvelable la capacitea prevoir ces variations s ameliore et ouvre la possibilite d ameliorer la gestion de la ressource les auteurs utilisent un modele de ressource renouvelable avec croissance stochastique et obtiennent trois resultats d abord alors qu il peut sembler que des previsions pessimistes de conditions difficiles dans l avenir peuvent conduire a une gestion plus conservatrice le contraire peut etre vrai ensuite la gestion optimale requiert seulement une prediction pour la prochaine periode voila qui suggere qu il est plus important d avoir une prevision exacte que d avoir des previsions a plus long terme enfin on developpe les conditions pour les fluctuations de l environnement qui garantissent une recolte positive optimale a chaque periode

the role of firm size in bilateral bargaining a study of the cable television industry we examine the effect of buyer merger on bilateral negotiations between a supplier and n buyers merger may have bargaining effects in addition to the usual efficiency effects the effect of merger on the buyers bargaining position depends on the curvature of the supplier s gross surplus function merger enhances worsens the buyers bargaining position if the function is concave convex based on a panel of advertising revenue in the cable television industry our estimates indicate that the gross surplus function for suppliers of program services is convex this result suggests that cable operators integrate horizontally to realize efficiency gains rather than to enhance their bargaining position vis a vis program suppliers

patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the united states house of representatives our most robust findings can be summarized as follows u the spatial location of candidates is important in determining the pattern of campaign contributions many pacs and all pac types except agricultural cooperatives contribute in a manner highly consistent with a simple spatial model there is little giving by an individual pac to candidates at opposite ends of the dimension there is no instance of a pac contributing to incumbents located at each end of the dimension and only to challengers of incumbents in the middle or vice versa contributions against incumbents i e to challengers of incumbents are often spatial mirror images of a pac s giving in favor of incumbents though this statement must be tempered by the fact that the large majority of pacs give relatively little money to challengers few pacs give money to both challenger and incumbent in the same race giving in open seat races is if anything even more spatially consistent than in races where an incumbent is running while many individual pacs exhibit patterns of contributions consistent with the ideological dimension the data for 1980 suggest that there was no particular bias toward one end of the spectrum or the other taking all pacs together essentially eliminates the effect of the location variable in the regressions giving in races with an incumbent on the ballot was overall balanced across the dimension there are however ideological distinctions even among groups as broadly defined as the fec categories for the corporate labor and trade membership health groups the incumbent s location on the ideological dimension is an important explanatory variable even when other factors specific to the incumbent are considered of course ideology matters to nonconnected groups too they just tend to balance each other off in positive money though not in negative on average corporate and trade groups favor conservative incumbents and opponents of liberal incumbents labor pacs do the opposite except for labor pacs party is not an important variable in explaining positive contributions once the incumbent s voting record is taken into account for contributions to challengers however party is significant corporate nonconnected and trade pacs gave to opponents of democrats labor pacs did the opposite the expected closeness of the election is always an important variable both positive money and contributions to challengers increase as the probability of a strong challenge increases this suggests that pacs are sensitive to the potential impact of contributions on electoral outcomes although committee assignments have some importance in explaining campaign contributions by pac categories their net effect is never strong except in the case of cooperatives this is almost certainly because of the diversity of interests represented by pacs in every category except coops which are essentially one giant pac of milk producers we would surmise that competitive forces in the house result in most members having a portfolio of committee assignments that provides maximum advantage vis a vis each member s constituency it would therefore be surprising if overall committee assignments by themselves pointed to significant differences in generating campaign resources being chairman or ranking minority member of a committee has no impact on campaign contributions other things equal seniority as measured by number of consecutive years in office has a complicated role for positive contributions seniority has a nonmonotonic effect with contributions being higher for the most junior and most senior members ceteris paribus than for incumbents with average seniority negative contributions however are not significantly related to seniority

academic earmarks and the returns to lobbying abstract in this paper we estimate the returns to lobbying by universities to motivate our empirical work we develop a simple theoretical model of university lobbying for academic earmarks our statistical analysis shows that universities represented by a house appropriations committee hac or senate appropriations committee sac member spend less money on lobbying than those that are not represented in addition using instrumental variables estimations we show that universities without hac or sac representation may receive some benefit to lobbying for earmarks although in many estimations this benefit is not statistically different from zero however for universities with hac or sac representation a 10 percent increase in lobbying yields an additional 2 8 percent or 3 5 percent increase in earmarks respectively this suggests that there are large returns to lobbying for academic earmarks if a university is represented by a member of one the hac or sac but little or no return if not

u s multinationals and preferential market access this paper examines the relationship between oshoring activity by u s multinational rms and the structure of u s trade preferences we combine rm level panel data on u s foreign aliate activity from the u s bureau of economic analysis bea with detailed measures of u s trade preferences from the u s international trade commission usitc to create a three way panel that spans 80 industries 184 countries and ten years 1997 2006 consistent with existing theory we nd that o shoring and preferential market access are positively and consistently correlated both in the pooled sample and within countries industries and years using both instru mental variables and simultaneous equations approaches to address the endogeneity of export oriented foreign investment we nd that a 10 increase in u s foreign aliate exports to the u s from a particular industry and country is associated with a 4 per centage point increase in the rate of preferential duty free access restricting attention to the generalized system of preferences gsp among potentially eligible develop ing countries we nd that the inuence of multinational aliate sales on preferential market access more than triples

a bargaining theory of inefficient redistribution policies when two policies are available to achieve the same goal why is the relatively inefficient one often observed we address this question in the context of policies used to redistribute income towards special interest groups sigs in a two stage model in the first stage the set of constraints on policy instruments is chosen in the second stage the government and sigs bargain over the level of the available transfer policies restrictions on the use of efficient policies and the use of inefficient ones reduce the surplus over which sigs and governments can bargain there is however an offsetting effect not generally recognized in models of inefficient redistribution an improvement in the government s bargaining position which allows it to capture a larger share of the surplus we show that this positive effect for the government dominates under plausible conditions inefficient policies are the equilibrium outcome under alternative first stage mechanisms for policy selection such as the election of policymakers or in some cases bargaining between sigs and the government jel classification d7 f13 c70 h23

optimal harvesting of an age structured schooling fishery biologists have criticized traditional biomass models in fishery economics for being oversimplified biological stock assessment models are more sophisticated with regard to biological content but rarely account for economic objectives this study includes a full age structured population model for studying schooling fisheries and extends the delayed difference approach used in earlier studies we take the total harvest as the choice variable resulting in a simple analytical structure the model produces optimal steady states that may be higher or lower compared to the delayed difference formulation the model is applied to the baltic sprat fishery both ecological and harvesting cost data support specifying baltic sprat as a schooling fishery given nonlinear harvesting costs the optimal solution is a path toward a steady state with smooth annual harvest and population age structure sensitivity analysis shows that the optimal solution is highly dependent on the population level of the sprat s main predator baltic cod a linear cost function and an interest rate below 9 imply pulse fishing instead of smooth continuous harvesting given nonlinear harvesting cost the optimal steady state yield is rather insensitive to changes in the interest rate however under a high cod scenario interest rates of 10 or higher implies that no optimal steady state exists

renewable resource management with stochastic recharge and environmental threats abstract exploitation diminishes the capacity of renewable resources to withstand environmental stress increasing their vulnerability to extreme conditions that may trigger abrupt changes the onset of such events depends on the coincidence of extreme environmental conditions and on the resource state determining its resilience when the former is uncertain and the latter evolves stochastically the uncertainty regarding the event occurrence is the result of the combined effect of these two uncertain components we study optimal management in this setting the environmental threat renders the single period discount factor policy dependent and as a result the compound discount factor becomes history dependent existence of an optimal markovian deterministic stationary policy is established and the optimal state process is shown to converge to a steady state distribution

minimum information management in fisheries this paper deals with problems of optimal management of common property fisheries it advances the proposition that many fisheries management schemes which are theoretically capable of generating efficiency are actually not practicable owing to their huge informational requirements this applies for instance to management by means of corrective taxes subsidies the paper proceeds to show that there exists under fairly unrestrictive conditions market based management systems that require minimal information for their operation but lead nevertheless to efficiency in common property fisheries one such system is the individual transferable share quota system

committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign contributions committee assignments constituent preferences and campaign constributions the familiar economic model of regulation as developed by stigler 1971 peltzman 1976 and becker 1983 posits an essentially frictionless market process for regulatory policy formation in which a single regulator legislator chooses policy to maximize net support from competing groups in this paper we extend the supply side of this model by considering the effect of legislative institutions and unorganized constituent preferences on the ability of incumbents in the house of representatives to serve specific interest groups we then test this formulation by examining the recent history of interest group campaign contributions to these legislators our theoretical model concentrates on how a legislator allocates time between serving specific interest groups outside his district and serving his constituency we do not model interest group decisions directly assuming simply that they purchase their desired amount of service from the lowest cost suppliers our model sorts legislators by the supply price at which they can serve a particular group this price depends on the preferences of the voters in the legislators district and the productivity of the legislator in producing policy service for each group 1 the empirical section tests the model by examining the pattern of interest group campaign contributions to house incumbents from 1978 through 1984 our regression analysis tends to confirm both implications of the theory first the pattern of campaign contributions from specific interest groups to legislators is shaped by the division of substantive legislative and regulatory jurisdictions represented by the system of house standing committees second voter preferences influence the pattern of contributions by affecting the supply price at which a legislator can offer policy to interest groups legislators with sympathetic or indifferent constituencies are able to offer a lower price and are therefore able to attract larger sums than those with hostile constituencies these results are important for two reasons first the influence of congressional institutions such as committees on policy is not widely accepted while several studies faith levins and tollison 1982 weingast and moran 1983 weingast 1984 grier 1989 and robert 1990 have documented the effects of changes in a particular committee on policies under its jurisdiction this work considers the jurisdiction of only a single committee in each case 2 by examining the linkages between congressional committees and political action committees pacs we investigate whether interest groups act as if committees have power second while the chicago model of regulation emphasizes correctly in our view that policy is the result of vote maximizing calculations and the incremental balancing nature of any equilibrium the model is imprecise about which sets of preferences are most important in determining the levels of policy or the size of changes in policies focusing on committees promotes a parsimonious specification of both the political players members of the relevant committee rather than the entire congress and the pivotal voters committee members constituencies more than the nation determining specific policy outcomes the paper is organized as follows section i reviews some issues on the nature and sources of committee influence in the u s congress the second section incorporates committee assignments into a theory of decision making by interest group investors sections iii and iv describe our data and estimation technique and present the empirical results the fifth and final section discusses some implications and conclusions of this research i committee power in congress legislators differ substantively by virtue of their committee assignments committees in congress and particularly in the house of representatives possess disproportionate power over the policy areas in their respective jurisdictions have the right to hold hearings and recommend budget allocations for the bureaus in their jurisdiction goodwin 1970

gaining access by doing good the effect of sociopolitical reputation on firm participation in public policy making this paper examines the role of firms sociopolitical reputations as proxied by their perceived engagement in socially responsible practices in public policy makers decisions to grant access in the policy making process i argue that policy makers dependencies motivations and decision making processes lead them to evaluate firms by using sociopolitical reputation as a differentiating heuristic i hypothesize that firms that construct stronger sociopolitical reputations will be granted greater access and that firms existing political activity and policy makers partisanship will moderate this relationship i test these hypotheses using an 11 year panel on congressional testimony reputation and political and financial characteristics for the s p 500 and find support for all three these findings support the existence of a sociopolitical dimension to firms reputations that affects how public policy makers evaluate firms demonstrating that corporate social responsibility pays political benefits this paper was accepted by jesper sorensen organizations

dynamic analysis of discontinuous best response with innovation abstract starting from the static analysis in eckert et al 2017 we study a cournot duopoly where firms can decide to incur fixed costs in activities that improve their competitiveness i e product development or process innovation innovation costs generate discontinuities in the firms quantity best response functions and in turn a variety of equilibrium configurations including multiple equilibria we provide a dynamic global analysis of the equilibria and show the way in which firms initial expectations regarding the rivals level of output are crucial in defining the configuration of the long run equilibrium

a structural model of government formation in this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies we use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process the type of coalitions that form and their relative stability

harvest reporting timely information and incentives for technology adoption natural resource managers typically adopt precautionary quota buffers to account for scientific and management uncertainty such buffers ensure compliance with harvest targets up to a confidence level set by the manager but represent foregone profits and create incentives for firms voluntary investment in the provision of information that lessens the regulator s uncertainty this paper characterizes conditions under which the fishing industry would willingly upgrade its reporting technology to provide accurate and timely catch data wireless technologies currently available to harvesters make the provision of real time information feasible and affordable industry s incentives critically depend on the manager s expected choice of effort restrictions under the alternative technologies upgrading is attractive if the new distribution of reporting error shifts probability mass away from large errors so that the quantile at the confidence level is reduced first order stochastic dominance by the distribution under the baseline technology is a sufficient condition evidence from the maryland blue crab accountability pilot program an industry led initiative that tested the feasibility of adopting e logbooks illustrates the results real time availability of accurate catch information under electronic reporting would translate into in season adjustments of the manager s controls that could increase the industry s total harvest

renewable resource harvesting under correlated biological and economic uncertainties implications for optimal and second best management biologists have long recognized environmental disturbances impact both the growth of renewable resources and the efficiency of harvest effort however models of renewable resource management under uncertainty have commonly assumed economic and biological uncertainties to be uncorrelated we present examples of valuable fish species that experience correlated variation in biological growth and catchability in response to a common environmental disturbance building correlation into a model of renewable resource management under uncertainty we find correlation to alter the optimal response by managers to cost disturbances and impact the value of retaining intra period flexibility over harvest targets examining the performance of three harvest control mechanisms harvest quotas effort quotas and taxes reveals that positive correlation between costs and growth favors harvest quotas over effort quotas and effort quotas over taxes and vice versa the model is then applied numerically to the pacific bigeye tuna fishery which experiences positively correlated shocks driven by the el nino southern oscillation correlation qualitatively changes the optimal response to a cost shock and harvest quotas are found to be strongly favored over both effort quotas and taxes

electoral contributions and the cost of unpopularity when considering electoral campaigns candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding to offset this unpopularity effect politicians may either demand more money for campaign advertising from these industries in order to persuade less informed voters or shy away from unpopular contributors to avoid losing the support of the informed electorate our model predicts that the first effect dominates and electoral contributions are increasing in industry unpopularity by using u s house elections data and different identification strategies we provide robust evidence in favor of our predictions jel d72 p16

some inconvenient truths about climate change policy the distributional impacts of transportation policies abstract climate policy has favored costly measures that implicitly or explicitly subsidize lowcarbon fuels we simulate four transportation sector policies cap and trade cat ethanol subsidies a renewable fuel standard rfs and a lowcarbon fuel standard our simulations confirm that alternatives to cat are 2 5 to 4 times more costly but are amenable to adoption due to right skewed distributions of gains we analyze voting on the waxman markey wm cat bill conditional on a district s cat gains a district s rfs gains are negatively correlated with the likelihood of voting for wm our analysis supports campaign contributions as a partial mechanism

interjurisdictional sorting and majority rule an empirical analysis the goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions the idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice the estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households observed and unobserved characteristics of communities and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures as well as the self selection of households into communities of their choice we estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the boston metropolitan area the empirical findings reject myopic voting models more sophisticated voting models based on utility taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities

does the optimal size of a fish stock increase with environmental uncertainties we analyze the effect of environmental uncertainties on optimal fishery management in a bio economic fishery model unlike most of the literature on resource economics but in line with ecological models we allow the different biological processes of survival and recruitment to be affected differently by environmental uncertainties we show that the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal size of a fish stock is ambiguous depending on the prudence of the value function for the case of a risk neutral fishery manager the overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of two opposing effects the convex cost effect and the gambling effect we apply the analysis to the baltic cod and the north sea herring fisheries concluding that for risk neutral agents the net effect of environmental uncertainties on the optimal size of these fish stocks is negative albeit small in absolute value under risk aversion the effect on optimal stock size is positive for sufficiently high coefficients of constant relative risk aversion

optimal harvesting of stochastic spatial resources abstract we characterize the optimal harvest of a renewable resource in a generalized stochastic spatially explicit model despite the complexity of the model we are able to obtain sharp analytical results we find that the optimal harvest rule in general depends upon dispersal patterns of the resource across space and only in special circumstances do we find a modified golden rule of growth that is independent of dispersal patterns we also find that the optimal harvest rule may include closure of some areas to harvest either on a temporary or permanent basis biological reserves reserves alone cannot correct open access but may under sufficient spatial heterogeneity and connectivity increase profits if appropriate harvest controls are in place outside of reserves

boom bust dynamics in a stock market participation model with heterogeneous traders abstract the boundedly rational heterogeneous agent literature can be considered to have properly started with a number of contributions in the early 90s with the impressive contribution by carl chiarella who amongst his huge field of research developed several milestone models of heterogeneous interacting agents that are able to generate a number of dynamic outcomes compatible with the empirical evidence in this paper we propose a stock market model in which participation depends upon an attractiveness measure related to the market activity and the fundamental value of the market a market maker adjusts the stock price with respect to the current endogenous excess market demand which in turn depends on the demands of the different types of agents populating the economy market participants are also allowed to switch between different strategies analytical and numerical results confirm how the participation mechanism amplifies the occurrence of endogenous booms and busts in line with empirical and experimental evidence

what do campaign contributions buy deciphering causal effects of money and votes in the 1987 1988 election cycle political action committees pacs spent 176 6 million on candidates who competed for a seat in the house of representatives what do pacs buy when contributing this money if campaign contributions are rational allocations of a contributor s income campaign expenditures could increase both the probability that the contributor s preferred candidate is elected and the likelihood that if elected the candidate will vote in the interest of the contributor most studies do not find that incumbents expenditures have a significant positive effect on the number of votes incumbents receive 11 14 15 17 29 the evidence that contributions influence congressional votes is mixed most studies find weak or no support for this hypothesis for example kau rubin and keenan 17 find that contributions from businesses mattered in only two of the eight votes they analyzed others argue that campaign expenditures play no important role in the voting decision of congressmen 5 9 12 31 the lack of finding of significant effects of money on votes has been explained with the need for better models to explain campaign contributions 5 however the theoretical developments of for example ben zion and eyton 4 bental and ben zion 3 and baron 2 have not been incorporated in the empirical analysis of the effect of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of legislators empirical models that test this relationship must allow for the endogeneity of campaign contributions for the dichotomous nature of the dependent vote variable and the nonnegativity constraint of campaign contributions most empirical work in this area utilize models that do not incorporate these restrictions in this study i plan to incorporate these aspects of the data generating process into a more detailed model of the effects of campaign contributions on congressional votes of all the reported empirical studies on this issue only chappell 5 uses a model which can properly assess the impact of money on votes chappell finds that campaign contributions do not affect votes in congress when his more detailed econometric technique is used the best test of the theory results if votes have a clear economic payoff to contributors benefits of the votes are concentrated and costs are

on uncertain renewable resource stocks optimal harvest policies and the value of stock surveys abstract annual harvest quotas are commonly employed in the management of renewable resource stocks commercial fisheries being a prime example such resource stocks often undergo quite significant natural fluctuations to which quotas must be adapted a further complication arises from the fact that estimates of stock abundance are often highly uncertain in this paper a bayesian approach is used to model optimal quota decisions for an uncertain fluctuating renewable resource stock

renewable resource management with environmental prediction the importance of structural specification environmental variability can substantially influence renewable resource growth and as the ability to forecast environmental conditions improves opportunities for adaptive management emerge using a stochastic stock recruitment model costello et al 2001 show the optimal management response to a prediction of favourable growth conditions is to reduce current harvests we find this result may be reversed when environmental variability and stock are substitutes in growth a possibility that has been ignored by resource economists as an example we analyze the south carolina white shrimp fishery finding the optimal response to a prediction of favourable overwinter conditions is to increase fall harvests gestion d une ressource renouvelable quand il y prevision environnementale importance des specifications structurelles la variabilite de l environnement peut affecter de maniere significative la croissance d une ressource renouvelable et a proportion que l habilete a prevoir les conditions environnementales des occasions de gestion qui s y adaptent emergent utilisant un modele stochastique du type stock recrutement costello et al 2001 montrent que la gestion optimale face a une prediction de conditions de croissance favourables serait de reduire les recoltes presentes on montre que ce resultat peut etre inverse quand la variabilite de l environnement et les stocks sont des substituts dans la croissance une possibilite que les economistes specialises en ressources ont ignore on examine en tant qu exemple les peches de crevettes blanches de la caroline du sud et on montre que la reponse optimale a une prevision de conditions favourables au cours de l hiver qui vient est d accroitre les recoltes d automne

campaign contributions and access an important and pervasive view of campaign contributions is that they are given to promote access to successful candidates under circumstances when such access would not ordinarily be given in this story access is valuable as it offers groups the opportunity to influence legislative decisions through the provision of policy relevant information under complete information regarding donors policy preferences i argue that this model predicts a negative relationship between contributions and the extent to which the groups and the recipient legislators preferences are similar however one of the more robust empirical findings in the literature is that this relationship is positive relaxing the informational assumption on donors preferences i reexamine the access story with a model in which campaign contributions can act as signals of policy preference and the informational value of access to any agent is endogenous

consumption pollution tradeoffs in an environment vulnerable to pollution related catastrophic collapse abstract this paper considers the consequences of an avoidable risk of irreversible environmental catastrophe for society s optimal long run consumption pollution tradeoffs the risk is assumed to be a nondecreasing function of pollution concentration which evolves as a dynamic environmental renewal process the main objective of the paper is to derive qualitative insights regarding the effects of such risk on optimal management

fishery management under multiple uncertainty abstract among others who point to environmental variability and managerial uncertainty as causes of fishery collapse roughgarden and smith proc natl acad sci 93 1996 5078 argue that three sources of uncertainty are important for fisheries management variability in fish dynamics inaccurate stock size estimates and inaccurate implementation of harvest quotas we develop a bioeconomic model with these three sources of uncertainty and solve for optimal escapement based on measurements of fish stock in a discrete time model among other results we find 1 when uncertainties are high we generally reject the constant escapement rule advocated in much of the existing literature 2 inaccurate stock estimation affects policy in a fundamentally different way than the other sources of uncertainty and 3 the optimal policy leads to significantly higher commercial profits and lower extinction risk than the optimal constant escapement policy by 42 and 56 respectively

fisheries management under cyclical population dynamics cycles in environmental conditions e g sea surface temperature directly impact fish growth this paper extends the classical gordon schaefer fishery model by replacing the constant growth rate with a cyclical growth rate the optimal harvest rate is shown to fluctuate but the cycle of the harvest rate lags the cycle of the biological growth function with the highest harvest rate occurring after biological conditions start to decline simulations contrast various fishing policies and illustrate the proclivity to crash a fishery if it is wrongfully managed as if there is a constant growth rate with i i d environmental shocks finally we show that small cyclical fluctuations in one species can result in large fluctuations in the optimal harvest rate of another species if the fish species are interlinked through predator prey relationships

optimal management with reversible regime shifts abstract in this paper we examine the management of a natural resource a fishery subject to regime shifting dynamics a regime shift is defined as an episode in which the dynamics of the resource can switch between two alternative regimes at random times specifically we study the impact of reversible regime switching both observed and unobserved on optimal harvesting policy the case in which the regime is not directly observed i e observational uncertainty is addressed by using the extended pomdp approach developed in fackler and pacifici 2014 we illustrate the performance of the model under different assumptions on the underlying stochastic growth variability the biological structure of the stock in different regimes and the resilience of the regimes when the regime is known optimal policies depend on the population level and which regime is currently active when the regime is unobserved on the other hand the optimal policy depends on the population level and a belief distribution about the current regime in general when the probability of regime change is fixed and hence is not affected by harvesting policy the optimal policy is of the constant escapement variety when the probability of switching regime is endogenous the optimal policy is no longer of the constant escapement type optimal policies when the regime is uncertain are approximately equal to a weighted average of the policies when the regime is certain with the weights equal to the beliefs in the associated regimes but there are differences

fisheries management with stock growth uncertainty and costly capital adjustment we develop a dynamic model of a fishery which simultaneously incorporates random stock growth and costly capital adjustment numerical techniques are used to solve for the resource rent maximizing harvest and capital investment policies capital rigidities bring diminishing marginal returns to the current period harvest and introduce an incentive to smooth the catch over time with density dependent stock growth however catch smoothing increases stock variability resulting in reduced average yields the optimal management policy balances the catch smoothing benefits against yield loss we calibrate the model to the alaskan pacific halibut fishery to demonstrate the main insights

spatial renewable resource extraction under possible regime shift how will countries harvesting mobile natural resources react to the possibility of regime shift we address the non cooperative exploitation of a migratory renewable resource in the presence of possible regime shift that affects its movement motivated by the anticipated effects of climate change we model a regime shift that will alter the spatial movement patterns of the resource at some point in the future we develop a stochastic spatial bioeconomic model to address the effects of this class of regime shift on non cooperative harvest decisions made by decentralized owners such as countries exploiting a migratory fish or other natural resource stock we find that the threat of a future shift modies the standard golden rule and may induce more aggressive harvest everywhere irrespective of whether the owner will be advantaged or disadvantaged by the shift we also identify conditions under which the threat of regime shift induces owners to reduce harvest rates in advance of the shift our analysis suggests that different property rights structures single ownership vs common property or heterogeneous growth can give rise to previously unexplored incentives and can even reverse conventional wisdom about how countries will react to the prospect of future environmental change

why is there so little money in u s politics in this paper we argue that campaign contributions are not a form of policy buying but are rather a form of political participation and consumption we summarize the data on campaign spending and show through our descriptive statistics and our econometric analysis that individuals not special interests are the main source of campaign contributions moreover we demonstrate that campaign giving is a normal good dependent upon income and campaign contributions as a percent of gdp have not risen appreciably in over 100 years if anything they have probably fallen we then show that only one in four studies from the previous literature support the popular notion that contributions buy legislators votes finally we illustrate that when one controls for unobserved constituent and legislator effects there is little relationship between money and legislator votes thus the question is not why there is so little money politics but rather why organized interests give at all we conclude by offering potential answers to this question this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

campaign spending limits incumbent spending and election outcomes abstract we study the impact of campaign spending limits for candidates in canadian federal elections we first demonstrate that spending limits are binding mostly for incumbent candidates we then use this information to produce endogeneity corrected estimates for the impact of incumbent spending on electoral vote shares furthermore we examine the impact of spending limits on broader measures of electoral outcomes finding that larger limits lead to less close elections fewer candidates and lower voter turnout

socially optimal districting a theoretical and empirical exploration this paper investigates the problem of optimal districting in the context of a simple model of legislative elections in the model districting matters because it determines the seat vote curve which describes the relationship between seats and votes the paperrst characterizes the optimal seat vote curve and shows that under a weak condition there exist districtings that generate this ideal relationship the paper then develops an empirical methodology for computing seat vote curves and measuring the welfare gains from implementing optimal districting this is applied to analyze the districting plans used to elect u s state legislators during the 1990s

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the u s house previous studies of congressional spending have typically found a large positive effect of challenger spending but little evidence for effects of incumbent spending those studies however do not adequately control for inherent differences in vote getting ability across candidates high quality challengers are likely to receive a high fraction of the vote and have high campaign expenditures even if campaign spending has no impact on election outcomes to avoid that bias this paper examines elections in which the same two candidates face one another on more than one occasion differencing eliminates the influence of any fixed candidate or district attributes estimates of the effects of challenger spending are an order of magnitude below those of previous studies campaign spending has an extremely small impact on election outcomes regardless of who does the spending campaign spending limits appear socially desirable but public financing of campaigns does not

votes or money theory and evidence from the us congress abstract this paper investigates the relationship between the size of interest groups in terms of voter representation and the interest group s campaign contributions to politicians we uncover a robust hump shaped relationship between the voting share of an interest group and its contributions to a legislator this pattern is rationalized in a simultaneous bilateral bargaining model where the larger size of an interest group affects the amount of surplus to be split with the politician thereby increasing contributions but is also correlated with the strength of direct voter support the group can offer instead of monetary funds thereby decreasing contributions the model yields simple structural equations that we estimate at the district level employing data on individual and pac donations and local employment by sector this procedure yields estimates of electoral uncertainty and politicians effectiveness as perceived by the interest groups our approach also implicitly delivers a novel method for estimating the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes we find that an additional vote costs a politician on average 145

inducing political action by workers a firm aiming to influence a governmental policy may benefit from political action by its stakeholders such as workers this article studies the behavior of such a firm showing that workers will have a greater incentive to engage in costly political activity against the governmental policy the greater their number and the higher the wage the firm may therefore profit from paying above market wages and from hiring what might appear to be an inefficiently large number of workers and because unions may overcome free rider problems of uncoordinated political effort a firm may favor unionization or be less opposed to unionization than it would otherwise be the results of this article can also explain why firms may little reduce wages in a recession and why the higher wages paid by unionized firms do not reduce survival rates of these firms

uncertain measurements of renewable resources approximations harvesting policies and value of accuracy abstract this paper deals with the management of renewable resources subject to measurement error the method stochastic optimization in policy space sops allows for more general solutions to problems that are not lq than earlier attempts measurement errors are found to be more important for quota policies than natural stochastic variation with little error filtering in time or in policy space is important with considerable error caution becomes important various approximations are compared policies based simply on historical measurements are found to give higher expected values than policies based on advanced kalman filter estimates values of measurement accuracy are estimated

is trade policy for sale congressional voting on recent trade bills this paper examines voting by u s representatives onthe north american free trade agreement the uruguayround agreement and most favored nation status forchina using recent political economy models of tradepolicy to formulate an empirical specification ofcongressional voting behavior we find evidence thatcampaign contributions influenced legislators voteson the nafta and uruguay round bills labor groupcontributions were associated with votes against freertrade while business contributions were associatedwith votes in favor of freer trade economicconditions in each member s district as well as thebroad policy views of the legislators also affectedrepresentatives voting decisions

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

production technology costs and multiproduct industry structure an application of the long run profit function to the new england fishing industry the long run multiproduct profit function is developed to provide a more general procedure than the static minimum cost function to examine the technological and cost determinants of multiproduct industry structure and the likely form of any market equilibrium in this approach outputs are endogenous and the long run equilibrium levels of quasi fixed factors are endogenously determined the multiproduct structure of the multispecies new england fishing industry and the likely multi

a keynesian macroeconometric framework for the analysis of monetary policy rules abstract in the framework of a keynesian based monetary macro model we study the implications of targeting monetary aggregates or targeting the interest rate as two alternative monetary policy rules whereas the former targets the inflation rate indirectly through the control of the money supply the latter also called the taylor rule implies direct inflation targeting our monetary macro model exhibits asset market clearing disequilibrium in the product and labor markets sluggish price and quantity adjustments two phillips curves for the wage and price dynamics and expectations formation which represents a combination of adaptive and forward looking behavior the parameters of different model variants are estimated partly through single equation and partly through subsystem estimations for us quarterly time series data 1960 1 1995 1 with the estimated parameters system simulations for the two monetary policy rules are performed although the two rules have slightly different stability properties we show that discretionary monetary policy i e policy that responds to the state of macro variables has stabilizing effects we also show that our model with either of the two rules generate in terms of impulse response functions roughly the same responses to shocks as one obtains from standard var studies

is it whom you know or what you know an empirical assessment of the lobbying process abstract do lobbyists provide issue specific information to members of congress or do they provide special interests access to politicians we present evidence to assess the role of issue expertis

estimating the value of proposal power this paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across u s congressional districts in 1991 and 1998 the evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models members with proposal power those sitting on the transportation authorization committee secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed i then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior including partisan models informational roles for committees models with appropriations committees and theories of committees as preference outliers

the political economy of the us mortgage default crisis we examine the effects of constituents special interests and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in us economic history representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the foreclosure prevention act especially in competitive districts interestingly representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own party constituents special interests in the form ofhigher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the emergency economic stabilization act however ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests jel d72 g21 g28

are contributors rational untangling strategies of political action committees empirical public choice literature and casual observation suggest that the behavior of political action committees is remarkably unsophisticated meaning that pacs give to those legislators who would support their interests anyway thus it is suggested that contributor behavior deviates from rational behavior which is a cornerstone of economic analysis in this paper a switching regression model is estimated that allows for strategies of pacs to vary for different contribution recipients i analyze the behavior of farm pacs over three election cycles in contrast to previous findings i find that contributor behavior is not inconsistent with rational behavior contributors who attempt to influence the voting behavior of members of congress give the most money to legislators whose constituency interest suggests that they are likely to be undecided on how to vote and pacs give less money to legislators who represent districts with larger farm populations because those legislators are likely to vote in con

legislators and interest groups how unorganized interests get represented this paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model in the model three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection a given legislator s supply price for policy is shown to depend on the productivity of his effort as determined by committee assignments priority and ability and by the preferences of his unorganized constituency in the home district two extreme assumptions about the effectiveness of campaign spending in eliciting votes are used to illustrate the comparative statics properties of the model the prediction of the model is that interest groups will in general seek out legislators whose voters are indifferent to the policy the interest group seeks thus voters who do have preferences over policy are in effect represented even though they are not organized

landing fees vs harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks a revised version of this paper was published in the journal of environmental economics and management volume 43 issue 2 march 2002 pages 325 338

landing fees versus fish quotas the relative efficiency of landing fees versus quota controls to achieve given escapement levels is examined the criterion is profit per year over a given time horizon the model employed is a discrete version of the logistic model where growth is influenced by a random variable simulations are used to compare landing fees and quota controls under imprecise stock estimates variable availability of fish and random fish prices while ecological uncertainty combined with imprecise stock estimates favors fee control as shown byweitzman the opposite can be the case under uncertainty about the availability of fish or fish price

revolving door lobbyists we study how ex government ocials benet from the personal connections acquired during public service lobbyists with experience in the oce of a us senator suer a 24 drop in generated revenue when that senator leaves oce the eect is immediate discontinuous around the exit period and long lasting consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians the drop in revenue is increasing in the committee assignments power held by the exiting politician

a re evaluation of adaptive expectations in light of global nonlinear dynamic analysis we undertake an analysis of the dynamic behaviour of a discrete time nonlinear monetary dynamics model with adaptive expectation that is a basic mechanism in a broad class of descriptive macrodynamic models we consider in particular a variety of ways in which the adaptive expectations mechanism may be formulated these differ in the degree of rationality of the economic agents that inhabit the model we study in detail the local and global properties of the maps determining the price dynamics

electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters i present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies informed voters however vote based on those policies so candidates face a trade off between choosing a policy to generate funds to attract the uninformed vote and choosing a policy to attract the informed vote electoral equilibria are characterized for two categories of policies particularistic and collective in the case of particularistic policies the equilibrium policies of the candidates are separated if the proportion of uninformed voters is sufficiently high and the degree of separation is an increasing function of that proportion the model is extended to include the public financing of elections and incumbency advantages for the case of collective policies the candidates locate at the median of the ideal points of the informed voters and contributions are zero

optimal fishery management with regime shifts an assessment of harvesting strategies this paper compares outcomes from informed and uninformed harvesting strategies for a fish stock with switching dynamics where the probability of switching is influenced by climate using data on sea surface temperature anomalies the impacts of climate on the conservation and the welfare that can be extracted from the stock are investigated results indicate that an informed management policy leads to stock biomass and resource rents that are up to 2 7 and 2 times higher respectively than under an uninformed policy also the fishery is open 54 longer under the informed policy the magnitude of these effects depends on the choice of the discount rate indicating that when the future is highly discounted gains from the informed policy dissipate