an econometric investigation of the monetary neutrality and rationality propositions from an international perspective t he combination of the natural rate of unemployment and the rational expectations hypotheses in macroeconomic models results in the now well known conclusion that anticipated short run monetary stabilization policies do not influence real economic variables this policy ineffectiveness proposition has been named the macro rational expectations mre hypothesis by modigliani 1977 as a result the implicit policy prescription is that a price level stabilization policy should be pursued the empirical validity of this conclusion is perhaps the central issue in modern stabilization theory barro 1977 1978 1981 barro and rush 1980 and leiderman 1980 have presented empirical evidence for the united states supporting this proposition however a number of recent studies have claimed that previous empirical results which support the finding that anticipated policy is neutral are flawed corrections of these problems often result in conflicting conclusions see small 1979 gordon 1979 and mishkin 1982 given the important implications of the mre hypothesis it is curious that almost all formal testing has been focused upon the united states while barro has suggested that a cross country study would be useful as far as we know only darby 1980 attempts to test whether anticipated changes in monetary policy are neutral across countries unfortunately his results suffer from problems caused by using generated regressors in addition he makes no attempt to test the individual implications of the mre hypothesis which encompasses the propositions that expectations are rational lad anticipated monetary policy does not matter in this paper we employ the methodology developed by mishkin to test the mre hypothesis in six countries canada germany italy japan the united kingdom and the united states the paper is divided into three major sections and a conclusion section ii briefly reviews mishkin s testing method in section iii the procedure employed to specify the money growth equation is discussed and these equations specified section iv presents and discusses the results of applying the method introduced in section ii in the conclusion the major findings are restated possible limitations discussed and extensions suggested

delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies this paper studies a simultaneous move infinite horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort the delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance we show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium the paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives we also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear quadratic payoffs

the role and growth of new car leasing theory and evidence abstractthere has been substantial growth in rates of new car leasing over the last few decades building on recent theoretical research we construct a model of the leasing decision in which leasing mitigates adverse selection and reduces transaction costs but moral hazard limits its use in our model the prevalence of leasing is related to new car reliability which suggests that the recent growth in leasing is at least partly due to improvements in new car reliability we use this model to derive testable implications and then conduct an empirical analysis to investigate whether the operation of the new and used car markets is consistent with the predictions of this theoretical approach our empirical results support the theoretical predictions of our model in particular we provide direct evidence that leasing mitigates adverse selection and that an important factor in the growth in new car leasing rates has indeed been the growth of new car reliability

trade ins and introductory offers in a monopoly we model the commonly used marketing practices of offering discounts to either repeat buyers trade ins or new buyers introductory offers of a quasi durable good we analyze these practices in terms of their potential for intertemporal and third degree price discrimination in our two period model the monopolist sets a first period price that segments the second period market optimally into holders and nonholders of the good in the second period different prices are quoted to the two market segments we present three versions of the model with varying assumptions on consumers rationality

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

commitment and monopoly pricing in durable goods models this article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist two models of the interaction between durability recycling and market power are compared the two differ according to the ability f the seller to credibly commit to a given salec qtrn egy this article takes the standard durable goods monopoly model extends it to allow for depreciation and compares the monopoly markup with swan s predicted markup for a recycled good the difference between the two models is shown to reduce to a single parameter in the markup equation

durable goods theory for real world markets the early 1970s witnessed three major advances in durable goods theory swan 1970 1971 and sieper and swan 1973 on optimal durability coase 1972 on time inconsistency and akerlof 1970 on adverse selection this paper surveys durable goods theory starting with these three contributions where much of the focus is on recent literature and on models that explain real world phenomena in addition to the ideas found in the contributions of swan coase and akerlof topics covered include why producers sometimes practice planned obsolescence the role of adverse selection in new car leasing and reasons for aftermarket monopolization

innovation and the durable goods monopolist the optimality of frequent new version releases when an improvable durable good such as packaged software saturates the market the seller could be tempted to release new versions too frequently hurting her profit a novel contractual device which i term as a free new version rights warranty free nvr warranty can help the seller overcome this temptation in a two period game theoretic model involving a monopolist firm facing heterogeneous consumers i derive conditions under which a rational monopolist can act suboptimally she could face a commitment problem and offer the new version even if doing so lowers her overall profit profit is hurt because when consumers expect a new version a fewer consumers buy the initial version and b the monopolist is forced to charge a lower price for the initial version i show how the free nvr warranty which requires the monopolist to offer consumers the right to receive the new version for free for a limited period can solve her commitment problem this is a new surprising finding by bundling new version rights with the initial version the monopolist at first appears to be denying herself future revenue i derive conditions under which this apparently unprofitable action is optimal which is my main contribution when free nvr is offered consumer surplus decreases and social surplus increases this work extends prior literature on durable goods and the coase conjecture to innovative durable goods with network externalities the findings have important practical implications for firms selling new versions of innovative durable goods subject to network effects as well as for their consumers

more labour market flexibility for more innovation evidence from employer employee linked micro data this paper examines labour market flexibility in various definitions and its impact on innovation the results demonstrate that the relationship strongly depends on the type of innovation as well as the predominant innovation regime in which a company operates thereby labour market flexibility does not influence innovation in an entrepreneurial innovation regime characterised by high competition low market entry barriers and generally available knowledge that might explain why the silicon valley has been successful despite of having a labour market with a strong strong hire and fire mentality in contrast labour market flexibility significantly reduces the likelihood of innovation in a routinised innovation regime with leading innovators and high entry barriers similar to the us automobile industry and steel districts that did not succeed these findings emphasise that the currently discussed structural labour market reforms might hamper innovation as technological change still requires a level of security and stability

law finance and innovation the dark side of shareholder protection proponents of minority shareholder protection state that national legal institutions protecting small investors boost stock markets and in turn the long term performance of countries in this paper we empirically challenge this argument we perform three stage least squares estimation on a sample of 48 countries during 1993 2006 and find that countries with stronger shareholder protection tend to have larger market capitalisation but also lower innovative activity we cope with stock market endogeneity and industry heterogeneity and circumvent omitted variables bias so that this finding is unlikely to be driven by misspecification problems the estimation results are interpreted arguing that stronger shareholder protection may depress rather than encourage the most valuable corporate productions because it enables small and diversified shareholders to play opportunistic actions against undiversified stockholders after specific investments are undertaken by the company innovative activity largely based on specific investing is particularly exposed to this problem copyright oxford university press

outside options and the failure of the coase conjecture a buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option abandoning their search or moving on to another seller we show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price contravening the coase conjecture we then embed the singleseller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual no haggling assumption jel c78 d42 d43 l12 l13 the coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment the idea is that for any given price high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers leading to negative selection in the demand pool accordingly the seller cuts its price over time causing high value buyers to delay their purchases the seller s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves reducing its overall profit gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 this idea of negative selection is robust versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear kahn 1986 when goods depreciate over time bond and samuelson 1984 when there is entry of new buyers sobel 1991 and when the buyers face future competition fuchs and skrzypacz 2010 in this article we show that the coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise we consider a seller who faces a buyer or a continuum of buyers with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option each period the seller chooses price p t the buyer then chooses to buy wait or exercise his option and terminate the game the outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product for example when waiting for the price of the iphone to fall a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor similarly when bargaining over the price of a car a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer the outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated for example after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar a tourist could start seeing local attractions

the coase conjecture need not hold for durable good monopolies with depreciation abstract we consider the optimal sales policy for a monopoly seller of a durable good in a non stationary rational expectations equilibruim with replacement sales we show that coase s conjecture that the monopolist will sell the competitive stock as period length approaches zero may not hold under these assumptions

why would a durable good monopolist also produce a cost inefficient nondurable good abstract we develop both commitment and time consistent stationary policies for a monopolist who produces a mixture of goods distinguished by production costs and degree of durability under commitment only the cost efficient durable good is produced and the monopoly output is realized each period for the time consistent stationary case there is an interval for the degree of durability where only the durable good is produced and a higher non overlapping interval where both the cost efficient durable and the cost inefficient nondurable good are produced for any period length when the degree of durability is such that both durable and nondurable goods are provided combined output is less than the competitive output and decreases in the degree of durability approaching the single period monopoly output when both goods are produced the coase conjecture does not hold

durable goods oligopoly abstract this paper models a durable goods oligopoly as a differential game two cases are treated sales where firms cannot lease but must sell the good in question and leasing where firms do not sell but only rent in the sales case firms face increasing marginal cost of production and the good in question depreciates for this case a rational expectations feedback nash equilibrium is constructed for which monopoly or oligopoly output is less than the efficient level this gap between oligopoly and competitive output diminishes as the number of firms increases when firms can only lease the good the good is assumed not to depreciate and the monopoly level of steady state output is compared with the level of steady state output for a feedback equilibrium duopoly for this case the duopoly equilibrium has steady state output that is less than the corresponding efficient level but greater than the monopoly level the leasing model is shown to be isomorphic to the adjustment cost duopoly model of driskill and mccafferty journal of economic theory 49 1989 324 338

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

on real and sticky price theories of the business cycle after presenting some facts about the growth of government in western industrialized countries possible causes of this development are analyzed from a public choice perspective next some empirically tested theories which seek to explain this growth are discussed finally possible consequences for efficiency and individual liberty are examined it is shown that both the number and size of interest groups age of democracy as stated by mancur olson 1982 and the increasing share of government expenditure in gdp seem to exert a negative influence on the growth rate of gdp copyright 1986 by ohio state university press

bargaining with arrival of new traders we study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events which represent arrival of traders or information we char acterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers the possi bility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics there is delay in equilibrium and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations the seller pay off equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival in applications when buyer valuations fall average prices drop and delay increases surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate

competition in durable goods markets the strategic consequences of leasing and selling in marketing durable goods manufacturers use varying degrees of leasing and selling to consumers e g cars photo copiers personal computers airplanes etc the question that this raises is whether the distinction between leases and sales is simply one of price or whether the proportion of leases and sales effects a firm s ability to compete in the market in this paper we use two approaches to argue that leasing and selling create strategic consequences that extend beyond prices first we develop a stylized theoretical model that shows that the optimal proportion of leases and sales depends on the competitiveness of the market and on the inherent reliability of the firm s product and second we find support for the implications of our theoretical model with data from the automobile industry the u s automobile industry has seen a large increase in leasing over the last five years however the extent to which leasing has been embraced varies widely across manufacturers for example in 1993 the sport utility segment had the following lease percentages ford explorer 29 jeep grand cherokee 24 toyota 4 runner 11 and chevrolet blazer 9 in addition manufacturers often vary lease percentages across models for example in 1993 ford leased 22 of its crown victoria model 35 of its taurus model and 42 of its probe model a popular argument for why we see these differences is that higher priced cars are leased more often because leasing makes them more affordable however this rationale is not compelling in the face of our data for example the ford probe was priced significantly lower than the crown victoria and yet it was leased almost twice as often to develop a better understanding of why we observe differences in the proportion of leasing we develop a two period model of a duopoly in which each manufacturer chooses its optimal quantity and the fraction of units it wants to lease we find that in equilibrium neither firm leases all its units either they use a mix of leasing and selling or they use only selling our analysis suggests that the fraction of leased cars decreases as the manufacturers products become more similar and the competition between them increases the intuition for this result is that a higher fraction of leases puts the firm at a competitive disadvantage in the future this occurs because unlike firms that sell their product firms that lease are at a price disadvantage another important finding in this paper is that the extent of leasing chosen by a manufacturer depends on the reliability of its product in particular all else being equal the lower a product s reliability the lower its proportion of leases within the context of the automobile industry this suggests that more expensive cars may be leased more often because they are of higher quality and not necessarily because they are more expensive finally we test the implications of our theoretical model with data from the u s automobile market in particular for 1993 model year cars we develop a measure of reliability using data from consumer reports in addition we develop a measure of the extent of competition in each segment of the automobile market we support our hypotheses by finding that the extent to which a car model is leased depends strongly on its predicted reliability and on the competitive intensity within the segment

sequentially optimal auctions abstract in auctions where a seller can post a reserve price but if the object fails to sell cannot commit never to attempt to resell it revenue equivalence between repeated first price and second price auctions without commitment results when the time between auctions goes to zero seller expected revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price with many bidders the seller equilibrium reserve price approaches the reserve price in an optimal static auction an auction in which the simple equilibrium reserve price policy of the seller mirrors a policy commonly used by many auctioneers is computed journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d44 d82

why monopolists prefer to make their goods less durable this paper considers goods that depreciate in terms of quality over time and permits consumers to differ in their attitude concerning the usability of a durable good after it has depreciated given this it is shown that even if a monopoly can costlessly increase the durability of its product it may choose not to do so this does not happen in competition copyright 1988 by the london school of economics and political science

friends acquaintances or strangers partner selection in r d alliances like governance structure and alliance scope partner selection may serve to safeguard firms intellectual assets in r d alliances we categorize potential alliance partners into friends acquainta

evaluating innovation and labour market relationships the case of italy in this paper the link between labour market flexibility and innovation is analysed paying particular attention to the different technological regimes of economic activities and the different geographical areas of the italian economy a dynamic panel data specification is used to assess the endogenous relationship between patents included as a proxy of the innovation and job turnover and wages which represent labour market indicators the results show that higher job turnover only has a significant and negative impact on patent activities in regional sectors of northern italy while a positive and significant impact of blue and white collar wages has been generally found

optimal best price policy abstract a best price policy bp is a promise by a seller to give her customer a refund if she reduces her price after the customer has already purchased the product we characterize the optimal bp policy as when the seller can control both the policy length when the promise expires and the refund scale what portion of the price difference is refunded we explain why the policy length is finite and varies across industries in a setting where consumers valuations decline over time we show that a finite length bp allows the seller to commit to not lowering her price too soon while at the same time letting her capture some of the benefits of intertemporal price discrimination however because the decline in consumers valuations is uncertain a bp does not allow the monopolist to achieve the profit she could earn with a full commitment

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

the effects on output of money growth and interest rate volatility in the united states in october 1979 the federal reserve began a policy of disinflation and also stopped stabilizing interest rates subsequently interest rates became much more volatile using a methodology advanced by barro this paper estimates what this change in policy did to output in the united states the paper finds that the stagnation of the u s economy since 1979 stemmed almost as much from increased interest rate volatility as from reduced money growth the paper also assesses the extent to which increased volatility of money growth has contributed to stagnation it finds no evidence of any appreciable contribution the paper concludes that stabilizing interest rates is probably sensible monetary policy

quality and price personalization under customer recognition a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria abstract we present a model of market hyper segmentation where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products the firm offers a new price quality schedule after each commitment period lower consumer types may have an incentive to delay their purchases until next period to obtain a better introductory offer the monopolist counters this incentive by offering higher informational rents considering the dynamic game played by the monopolist and its customers we find that there is always a markov perfect equilibrium mpe in which the firm immediately sells the good to all customers offering the mussa rosen static equilibrium schedule to first time customers and getting full commitment profits however if the commitment period between two offers is long enough there is another mpe with gradual market expansion contrary to the coasian result for a durable good monopoly we find that in both equilibria the profit of the monopolist increases and the aggregate consumers surplus decreases as the interval of commitment shrinks the model yields policy implications for regulations on collection and storage of customers information

reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly this paper analyzes durable goods monopoly in an infinite horizon discrete time game we prove that as the time interval between successive offers approaches zero all seller payoffs between zero and static monopoly profits are supported by subgame perfect equilibria this reverses a well known conjecture of coase alternatively one can interpret the model as a sequential bargaining game with one sided incomplete information in which an uninformed seller makes all the offers our folk theorem for seller payoffs equally applies to the set of sequential equilibria of this bargaining game

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

trust and efficiency abstract agency problems within the firm are a significant hindrance to efficiency we propose trust between coworkers as a superior alternative to the standard tools used to mitigate agency problems increased monitoring and incentive based pay we model trust as mutual reciprocal altruism between pairs of coworkers and show how it induces employees to work harder relative to those at firms that use the standard tools in addition we show that employees at trusting firms have higher job satisfaction and that these firms enjoy lower labor cost and higher profits we conclude by discussing how trust may also be easier to use within the firm than the standard agency mitigation tools

monopoly with endogenous durability abstract a multi period formulation for a durable good monopoly is developed where production and durability are decision variables when commitment to production is possible neither the level nor the depreciation rate of initial stock has an effect on the selected efficient degree of durability with time consistent production policy the optimal degree of durability is less than the efficient rate and typically increasing in the initial stock and initial degree of durability when a monopolist can switch at any time from an inefficient non durable to an efficient durable there exists a cutoff durability above which only the non durable will be produced otherwise the efficient durable will be produced

incomplete information bargaining with outside opportunities we consider two kinds of outside opportunity that a seller of an indivisible good might have selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself in both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer s valuation and becomes more pessimistic over time when the seller becomes sufficiently pessimistic she prefers the outside opportunity so she will not bargain indefinitely with the current buyer despite the resulting finite horizon nature of negotiations the link between the buyer s willingness to accept an offer and the seller s eagerness to go outside generates multiple equilibria

tests of rationality neutrality and market efficiency a monte carlo analysis of alternative test statistics abstract this paper examines the small sample properties of three testing strategies used to analyze the rationality monetary neutrality and market efficiency hypotheses we focus on the original two step barro test of the mre hypothesis formed entirely from ols results a test that employs the correct variance covariance formulae for these two step estimates and mishkin s fimle testing framework each test is examined under likely model respecifications the findings highlight the extensive bias incurred by drawing inferences from simple unadjusted two step estimates and reveal the relative power of all tests in identifying alternatives to the null hypotheses

urban congestion and developer precommitments unilateral solutions to dynamic inconsistency the sale of housing creates a dynamic inconsistency problem for residential developers who find it profit maximising to overdevelop an area once ownership of the existing housing stock has been transferred to local residents rational buyers lower the prices they are willing to pay in expectation of this future congestion it is therefore in the developers interest to attract higher prices by credibly precommitting themselves unilaterally to construction plans that are optimal for each housing tract if the externalities associated with congestion affect quality of life in neighbouring tracts however development will still exceed the efficient level the introduction of master planned communities where a single development company commits future developer builders to a plan for the construction of multiple contiguous housing tracts can create the expectation of future population densities that will be optimal on a city wide level

leasing lemons and moral hazard abstract a number of recent papers have analyzed leasing in the new car market as a response to the adverse selection problem in the used car market originally explored in the seminal 1970 paper by george akerlof in this paper we consider a model characterized by both adverse selection as in these earlier papers and moral hazard concerning the maintenance choices of new car drivers we show that this approach provides explanations for a number of empirical findings concerning real world new and used car markets including that leasing has become more popular over time very high income new car drivers lease more and used cars that were leased when new sell for more than used cars that were purchased when new we also compare and contrast our approach to new car leasing with alternative approaches

trends random walks and tests of the permanent income hypothesis abstract recent studies find that consumption is excessively sensitive to income these studies assume that income is stationary around a deterministic trend the data however do not reject the hypothesis that disposable personal income is a random walk with drift if income is indeed a random walk then the standard testing procedure is greatly biased toward finding excess sensitivity moreover if income follows either a more general non stationary process or a borderline stationary process this procedure is also seriously biased

strategic urban projects in amsterdam and new york incomplete contracts and good faith in different legal systems contracts between local government and private investment agencies play an important role in strategic urban projects real estate cycles provide only a narrow window of opportunity within which to draft such contracts a legal system should therefore not impede the possibility of reaching an agreement quickly instead it should facilitate efficient ways of reaching an agreement lengthy contracting may contribute to the persistence of real estate market cycles this paper explores the question of whether the civil law principle of good faith facilitates the drafting of incomplete contracts which may be efficient in situations of high uncertainty and complexity as was the case with two strategic inner city projects the south axis in amsterdam and battery park city in new york city the paper further establishes that good faith does play a considerable role in the differences in contracting practice

rational expectations supply shocks and the stability of the inflation output tradeoff some time series evidence for the united kingdom 1957 1977 abstract the lucas 1973 supply curve is modified to incorporate both specific and aggregate supply shocks in addition to demand shocks a time series test of the rational expectation natural rate renr hypothesis is derived monthly data for the united kingdom 1957 1977 are split into periods based on a moving variance procedure utilizing zellner palm transfer functions it is shown that a significant reduction in the short run inflation output tradeoff is associated with an increase in the variance of the unanticipated price level this provides evidence in favor of the renr hypothesis moreover the worsened tradeoff is shown to have been caused by higher supply side rather than demand side volatility

trust contract and economic cooperation after providing a brief overview of the standard economic analysis of incomplete contracts in terms of property rights transaction costs and self enforcing implicit contracts the author shows why in the orthodox view trust is not a pertinent category to their negotiation or effectiveness drawing on various empirical studies which he has undertaken in the area of industrial relations the author develops an alternative approach to the study of incomplete contracts in which the concept of trust is central in this alternative vision boundedly rational agents with limited foresight form provisional judgements about the trustworthiness of their trading partners based on the success of their past encounters a consequence of this alterna tive understanding of incomplete contracts is that there is no guarantee that coopera tion will succeed even when the circumstances appear to promise mutual gain the author argues however that by establishing an appropriate set of procedural rules to guide their response to the unanticipated agents can promote the kinds of mutual learning that contribute to the build up of trust and that increase the likelihood of successful cooperation

monopoly extraction of a durable non renewable resource failure of the coase conjecture the author studies a perfect information rational expectations markov equilibrium for the situation where a monopolist extracts a nonrenewable resource that is converted to a durable good even if short run extraction costs are constant the coase conjectur e fails provided that the depreciation rate of the durable good is positive copyright 1993 by the london school of economics and political science

durable goods monopoly with limited choice of commitment strategy when should the monopolist precommit consider a firm a monopolist offering a unique product to a fixed number of potential customers suppose that no consumer desires more than one unit of the good within a given period or across periods that is there is no value to repeat purchases in addition suppose that customers vary with respect to their initial reservation prices which decline over time a natural interpretation is that the monopolist is selling a good that is durable alternatively the firm is providing an entertainment or fashion good consumers may place a premium on obtaining the product quickly before it becomes less useful less stylish or less novel coase 7 conjectured that this firm s ability to extract surplus is limited because the firm has to compete with itself across time periods high valuation customers would be unwilling to pay a high initial price because they would anticipate that over time the firm will be reducing the price in order to sell to lower valuation customers subsequent literature formalizes this as a time inconsistency problem faced by a monopolist unable to make intertemporal commitments a separate strand of the literature proceeds from the polar assumption that the monopolist can precommit to any multiperiod pricing strategy comparison to coase s monopolist is simple higher profits are obtainable under precommitment because more surplus is extracted from high valuation customers an important proposition due to stokey 22 is that it will be optimal for the monopolist to precommit to a declining intertemporal price schedule if consumers with higher initial valuations have a higher rate of time preference 2 otherwise the optimal strategy is to hold price constant at the static monopoly level and to sell no more than the static monopoly quantity 3

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

durable goods price cycles theory and evidence from the textbook market i introduction one of the features of the market for new textbooks is that the price of new textbooks is relatively inflexible over the life of an edition in the sense that it fails to decline as the end of an edition approaches this inflexibility seems surprising because the availability of used textbooks which are a close substitute for new textbooks rises as the textbook ages furthermore the willingness to pay of a purchaser of a new textbook who plans to resell the book should decline at the end of the edition as the introduction of a new edition will destroy the resale value of the previous edition both of these factors would be expected to put downward pressure on the price of the good as the edition ages our goal of this article is to develop a model of textbook pricing that is capable of explaining this price inflexibility over the life of an edition we model the textbook pricing decision as that of a monopoly seller of a durable good over the life of an edition of the good where the life of the edition is exogenously given at two periods and the introduction of a new edition kills off the used market for the previous edition we assume that the market for the good is made up of two types of consumers high valuation buyers who will keep the good and low valuation buyers who value the option of being able to resell the good in the used market after using the services of the good in the current period the willingness to pay of high valuation buyers will thus be constant over the life of an edition while that of the low valuation buyers will decline in the second period due to the elimination of the used market we show that this model may lead to an optimal price for the durable good that may either rise or fall over the life of an edition and identify two effects that influence the monopolist s pricing decision the first we refer to as the used goods supply effect which is the impact of the quantity of goods available in the used market on the optimal price of new goods in the second period we show that if the quantity of high valuation buyers is sufficiently low the price of new goods may be increasing in the quantity of used goods in the second period this results from the fact that the increased supply of used goods may reduce the elasticity of demand for new goods making it optimal for the monopolist to sell only to high valuation buyers in the second period the second effect is the potential for resale effect which is due to the fact that the ability to sell goods in the used market will raise the willingness to pay of low valuation buyers relative to that of high valuation buyers in the first period the combination of these two effects leads to the possibility that the monopolist will choose to sell to both types of buyers in the first period of the edition but to sell only to high valuation buyers in the second period our empirical analysis tests for the presence of used goods supply and potential for resale effects on the prices of new textbooks we utilize a panel dataset from college bookshops that contains price and quantity information for economics textbooks for each semester between 1997 and 2003 we estimate simple pricing equations with textbook fixed effects instrumental variables are also used to account for the potential endogeneity of a regressor we find that textbook prices increase as the share of used textbooks increases which is consistent with the presence of a used good supply effect in which the increased presence of used goods makes the demand curve for new goods less elastic we also find evidence that prices of the goods are higher in the last period of an edition controlling for the stock of used goods in the market this is consistent with the potential for resale effect our theoretical model can be distinguished from other work that has analyzed the optimal pricing problem for a monopoly seller of a durable good

little innovation many jobs an econometric analysis of the italian labour productivity crisis during the past twenty years italy has realized changes in labour legislation leading to a decentralization of wage bargaining and increased flexibility in labour relations both these factors have helped to curb wage growth and to enhance employment growth but have also led to a crisis in italian labour productivity growth our estimates among 3 000 firms show that firms with high shares of flexible workers a high labour turnover and lower costs of labour relative to capital experienced significantly lower rates of labour productivity growth our findings raise doubts about the mainstream call for flexibilisation of european labour markets we argue hat the italian shift towards a low productive and labour intensive growth path is problematic gainst the background of an ageing population

one is almost enough for monopoly it has been argued that two factors product durability and potential entry may force a monopolist to price at marginal cost this article shows that when these two forces coexist the tendency toward competition may be negated first we prove that durable goods oligopolists without commitment powers may attain joint profits arbitrarily close to those of a monopolist with perfect commitment power second we demonstrate that the presence of a potential entrant may enable a durable goods monopolist to act as if he had commitment power thus potential as well as actual entry may restore monopoly power

a theory of bargaining deadlock abstract i study a dynamic one sided offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information the seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not during bargaining the seller may receive an outside option the value of which depends on the quality of the product if the outside option is sufficiently important there is an equilibrium in which the buyer s belief about the product s quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process as a result the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution the equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem under stronger parametric assumptions the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer s belief

quality upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market abstract we examine an infinite horizon model of quality growth for a durable goods monopoly the seller may offer any bundle s of current and previous quality improvements upgrades subgame perfect equilibrium seller payoffs range from capturing the full social surplus down to only the initial flow value of each good as long as the value of all future quality growth exceeds the value of a single unit each of these payoffs is realized in a markov perfect equilibrium that follows the socially efficient path however inefficient delay equilibria with bundling exist for innovation rates above a threshold

pricing product diversity and search costs a bertrand chamberlin diamond model we study price competition in the presence of search costs and product differentiation the limit cases of the model are the bertrand paradox the diamond paradox and chamberlinian monopolistic competition market prices rise with search costs and decrease with the number of firms prices may initially fall with the degree of product differentiation because more diversity leads to more search and more competition equilibrium diversity rises with search costs while the optimum level falls so entry is excessive the market failure is most pronounced for low preference for variety and high search costs

a note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in economic growth this paper takes issue with the trend to attribute differences in economic growth rates to differences in interpersonal trust i discuss the world values survey wvs measure that is used to operationalise trust at the macro level i hypothesise that there is a mismatch between the theoretical argument and the empirical operationalisation of trust instead of measuring trust the wvs measure may instead proxy the well functioning of institutions i provide circumstantial evidence for this thesis by a principal components analysis of trust and institutions and a robustness test of zak and knack s 2001 trust and growth economic journal vol 111 295 321 seminal study on trust and economic growth

learning to contract evidence from the personal computer industry organizational forms involving more detailed contracts than are found in traditional spot market exchanges appear to be increasingly prevalent there has been relatively little analysis however of the extent to which firms learn how to use contracts to manage their interfirm relationships over time in this paper we conduct a detailed case study of a time series of 11 contracts concluded during 1989 1997 between the same two partners both of whom participate in the personal computer industry to explore whether and how firms learn to contract we find many changes to the structure of the contracts that cannot be fully explained by changes in the assets at risk in the relationship and evidence that these changes are largely the result of processes in which the firms were learning how to work together including learning how to contract with each other the nature of this learning appears to have been quite incremental and local that is not very far sighted we suggest how and when contracts might serve as repositories for knowledge about how to govern collaborations and suggest some boundary conditions for this phenomenon our findings also provide implications for the debate about whether contracts have a positive or negative effect on interorganizational trust we conclude with suggestions for future research

on the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties the presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes this paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining when parties have access to stationary outside options we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible a similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option

durability and strategic trade are there rents to be captured abstract this paper analyzes strategic trade policy when home and foreign duopolists produce a durable good that is either sold or leased in a third country durability is important for two reasons it characterizes most of the products discussed in the strategic trade literature and it also calls for explicit dynamic modeling for duopolists who sell their product in a third country market this paper finds the optimal policy to be a tax on domestic output for duopolists who lease the good in a third country market though the optimal policy is a subsidy

forecasting rational expectations and the phillips curve an empirical investigation abstract the rational expectations version of the phillips curve is empirically evaluated for switzerland using a wide variety of specifications it turns out that the results are highly sensitive to measurement of both the natural rate and expectations of nominal variables no reliable phillips curve seems to exist in addition information on the relative quality of different forecasting schemes is obtained for a number of important macroeconomic variables

durable goods monopoly with entry of new consumers this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who produces at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market each entering cohort is identical consumers within a cohort have different tastes for the good my main results are if players are sufficiently patient any positive average profit less than the maximum feasible level can be attained in a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subset of subgame perfect equilibria in which players use stationary strategies the seller cannot make sales at prices significantly greater than the lowest willingness to pay when period length goes to zero and the seller attains the maximum profit when commitment is feasible by charging the same static monopoly price in every period this paper analyzes a model of a dynamic monopolist who operates in a market in which there is a regular flow of new consumers the seller produces a durable good at constant unit cost each period a new cohort of consumers enters the market consumers wish to buy exactly one unit of the item but are willing to wait resales are not allowed each entering cohort is identical

durable goods monopoly increasing marginal cost and depreciation this paper combines increasing marginal cost and depreciation in a continuous time model of a durable goods monopolist in contrast to the case of increasing marginal cost but no depreciation analysed by kahn and the case of depreciation with constant marginal cost analysed by bond and samuelson steady state output in this model is less than in the competitive case a turnpike result shows that choice of a long enough time horizon can make the equilibrium path of output in a finite horizon game arbitrarily close to the path of the infinite horizon game

trends random walks and the expectations augmented phillips curve evidence from six countries two major empirical results are reported first it is shown that time series measuring real activity in major industrialized countries contain nonstationarities of the random walk type second it turns out that the estimated influence of unexpected changes in inflation and monetary growth strongly depends on the chosen approach concerning nonstationarity the popular assumption of a deterministic time trend proxying for growth generally yields the hypothesized positive coefficients the influence of nominal surprises however becomes indistinguishable from zero if the respective equations are estimated in stationary differences of real activity variables copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

is flexible labour good for innovation evidence from firm level data whether the use of flexible workers is damaging to innovation or not depends on the dominant innovation regime in a sector in sectors with a routinised innovation regime high shares of low paid temporary workers have a negative impact on the probability that firms invest in r d in sectors that tend towards a garage business regime however flexibility has no impact the two innovation regimes differ in the nature of their knowledge base reliance on generally available knowledge or dependence on a firm s historically accumulated knowledge base innovation in the latter regime benefits from longer job durations our results are consistent with findings in macro level studies that coordinated market economies with rigid labour markets have higher labour productivity gains than liberalised market economies

durable good monopolies with rational expectations and replacement sales a monopoly producer of a durable good is examined under the previously uninvoked assumption that the good depreciates and hence that replacement sales must occur if a fixed stock of the good is to be maintained we find two ways in which the no depreciation result that the monopoly will always at least eventually produce a stock equal to that produced by a competitive market may not hold if the length of the trading period is nonzero the limiting stock produced by the firm will be lower than the competitive stock to ensure the profitability of future replacement sales if the firm is able to constrain its production capacity it may choose a constraint that always binds in the sense that it will be impossible for the firm to achieve a stock equal to the competitive stock

sequentially optimal mechanisms this paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment a risk neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line the seller has all the bargaining power she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t 1 we show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism a methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent s type 2006 the review of economic studies limited

tests of a rational expectations structural neutrality model with persistent effects of monetary disturbances abstract this paper describes tests of a rational expectations structural neutrality resn model capable of accounting for the persistent effects of aggregate demand shocks the model imposes the identifying restriction that only contemporaneous shocks to aggregate demand affect a vector stochastic process of highly cyclic real variables tests are performed using a well known measure of unanticipated monetary change as the demand disturbance the results suggest that resn models observationally inequivalent from keynesian models can be constructed in such a way as to account for observable relationships between monetary and real variables

a bargaining model with incomplete information multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player this paper re examines the bargaining model in rubinstein 1985a b monotonicity restrictions are placed on off the equilibrium path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized

noncooperative collusion in durable goods oligopoly coase conjectured that a durable goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits this result which has now been proved can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future for the case of durable goods oligopoly we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment one shot monopoly profit

interest rates and exchange rates under money supply targets the swiss evidence abstract short term effects of monetary policy on interest rates and exchange rates are evaluated with monthly and daily data for switzerland from 1974 to 1991 during this period the swiss national bank generally pursued a policy of targeting the money supply some evidence in favor of liquidity effects on interest rates is found the influence of changes in monetary aggregates is however not very strong both in terms of magnitude and explanatory power and depends on the time period investigated exchange rates do not react systematically to monetary policy actions

when labour market rigidities are useful for innovation evidence from german iab firm level data abstract supply side economists made numerous pleas for removing labour market rigidities through structural reforms from a schumpeterian viewpoint however one can argue that labour market rigidities create useful incentives for innovation our estimates on german panel data 2007 2015 support the schumpeterian view using the taxonomy of industries by peneder 2010 we find that evidence of the schumpeterian view is particularly strong in r d intensive manufacturing industries as well as in service industries with high degrees of cumulativeness of knowledge evidence of the schumpeterian view is weaker in low technology industries and in start ups when firms rely more on generally available knowledge rather than on firm specific and tacit knowledge accumulated in the past

imperfect durability and the coase conjecture this article considers a market served by a monopolist who sells a durable good that depreciates stochastically over time we show that there exist three types of stationary equilibria a coase conjecture equilibrium a monopoly equilibrium and a reputational equilibrium when the depreciation rate is low the coase conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for intermediate values of the depreciation rate all three equilibrium types coexist when the depreciation rate is high the monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium consequently when selling a good of sufficiently low durability the monopolist does not lose any of her monopoly power furthermore the steady state output in the reputational equilibrium falls below the monopoly quantity hence in durable goods markets welfare losses due to monopoly power may be larger than in markets for perishables

price inertia and policy ineffectiveness in the united states 1890 1980 this paper introduces a new approach to the empirical testing of the lucas sargent wallace lsw policy ineffectiveness proposition which compares the lsw hypothesis with an alternative that states that prices respond fully in the long run but only gradually in the short run to nominal aggregate demand disturbances the empirical equations estimated for a new set of quarterly data extending back to 1890 exhibit uniformly high responses of real output and low responses of price changes to anticipated changes in nominal gnp the paper compares and tests three alternative methods of introducing persistence effects into the lsw framework

coase and hotelling a meeting of the minds in this paper we tie together the two literatures of durable goods monopoly and exhaustible resource pricing we show that the intertemporal no arbitrage condition that arises if the durable good monopolist seller can commit to a price path mirrors the intertemporal no arbitrage condition if the monopsonist buyer of an exhaustible resource can commit to a price path the intuition is that the durable good monopolist initially announces high future prices to get high valuation buyers to buy early and subsequently lowers the price to attract additional buyers on the other hand the monopsonist buyer of the exhaustible resource initially announces low future prices to encourage sellers to supply their units early and subsequently as the stock of the resource declines raises the price to call forth additional supply as the period of commitment shrinks to zero the durable good s price drops to its marginal cost and the exhaustible resource s price jumps to its choke level all in a twinkling of the eye a

true monopolistic competition as a result of imperfect information the paper restates hart s 1985a 1985b definition of large group monopolistic competition distinguishes it from oligopolistic competition and raises the question of whether there are reasonable circumstances that give rise to true monopolistic competition as defined the purpose is to show that consumers imperfect information may create conditions that will turn an otherwise oligopolistic market into a truly monopolistically competitive one