multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities abstract in an auction with externalities a buyer s type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the n 1 possible outcomes the seller keeps the object or buyer i i 1 n gets the object we provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one dimensional mechanisms although reservation utilities are endogenous and type dependent the participation constraint is binding for only one critical type a main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the integrability condition we present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields in auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure a second price auction maximizes revenue with two buyers this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c72

scale and scope economies at large banks including off balance sheet products and regulatory effects 1984 1991 this paper examines the impact of the risk based capital rbc requirements on bank cost efficiencies we take into consideration both on and off balance sheet obs products and allow product mixes to differ across banks and to vary over time our empirical results suggest that the cost structures of large banks are significantly different during the pre rbc and post rbc periods that is the rbc change seemed to reduce the optimal bank size that achieves maximum scale and scope economies so that some of the large banks that previously were efficient became too large and inefficient the results suggest that regulations that encourage large banks to expand their production and product mixes any further will likely result in a less efficient banking industry

standard essential patents a major policy issue in standard setting is that patents that are ex ante not that important by being included into a standard may become standard essential patents in an attempt to curb the monopoly power that they create most standard setting organizations require the owners of patents covered by the standard to make a loose commitment to grant licenses on reasonable terms such commitments unsurprisingly are conducive to litigation this paper builds a framework for the analysis of these patents identifies several types of inefficiencies attached to the lack of price commitments and shows how structured price commitments restore competition and why such commitments may not arise spontaneously in the marketplace

reward structures in a planned economy some difficulties there is an extensive literature on the socially optimal pricing policy for public firms but much less attention has been paid to the vital question of how managers of public firms can be induced to follow such policies the politicians or planners who seek to control a public enterprise will be less well informed about cost and demand functions than the manager and there is no reason to suppose that managers are altruists thus with asymmetrical information and selfish managers there is a significant control problem recently tam 1981 has suggested an ingenious iterative incentive mechanism designed to surmount this problem this note a argues that her negative price incentive scheme npis will not achieve its objective of guiding managers to price at marginal cost2 and b compares npis with variants of the performance index pi proposed by scott 1952 1978 and finsinger and vogelsang 1980a 1981 tam s proposal is that the manager of a public firm be paid a bonus b each period

can megamergers improve bank efficiency abstract this paper uses a fitted multiproduct translog cost function to simulate mergers between pairs of us commercial banks with assets exceeding 1 billion and studies the predicted impact of such mergers on total costs thick frontier analysis reveals that variations in x efficiency dominate scale product mix and branching efficiencies ex ante financial data imply that costs could potentially be reduced in nearly half of the possible mergers except those between banks each larger than 10 billion most cost efficient mergers are across state lines apparently a result of variations in product mix

an empirical investigation of changes in scale economies for the commercial banking firm 1979 1986 the period of the 1980s represents a particularly turbulent time for the banking industry a number of technological and regulatory changes have occurred including the elimination of regulation q which had limited the explicit interest payments that banks could pay on some types of deposits it would be expected that these changes would affect the structure of costs for banks the behavior of the cost function is studied over the 1979 1986 time period and in contrast to previous studies using earlier data increasing economies of scale are found in the later years for banks in both unit and branch banking states these results indicate that there may be increased cost pressure for smaller banks to become larger either through mergers and acquisitions or through internal growth this may lead to further consolidation pressures within the industry and reductions in the overall number of banking firms copyright 1991 by ohio state university press

optimal taxation and firm formation abstract this paper analyzes non linear optimal taxation under asymmetric information in a general equilibrium model with endogenous firm formation it first shows under a weak separability assumption on technologies that output and input taxes are not necessary if profits are optimally taxed it then examines the progressivity or lack of it of the optimal profit tax and describes the corresponding effects on the structure of the production sector relative to the first best solution finally the paper investigates conditions under which the provision of public goods can be decentralized

socially optimal pricing with rivalry and economies of scale this article examines the nature of economically efficient tariffs when there exists rivalry among firms that produce imperfectly substitutable outputs with economies of scale and that operate under a viability constraint pricing principles are derived and related to the rules developed in the literature for the regulated monopolist for some firms excess profits may prevail at efficient prices and the form of the inverse elasticity rule is altered in markets with rivalry however the standard efficient pricing rules and increased welfare results if regulators are empowered to implement lump sum interfirm payments a numerical example is provided

structural transformation and the deterioration of european labor market outcomes this paper examines hours worked in continental europe and the united states from 1956 to 2003 the empirical work establishes two results first hours worked in europe decline by almost 45 percent compared to the united states over this period second this decline is almost entirely accounted for by the fact that europe develops a much smaller market service sector than the united states a simple model of time allocation is used to understand these patterns i find that relative increases in taxes and technological catch up can account for most of the differences between the european and american time allocations over this period

multitask agency problems focus and task clustering abstract this short paper discusses recent insights of multitask agency theory it considers in turn the issues of effort substitution conflicts between tasks and implicit incentives and mission it concludes by addressing the problem of optimal task clustering

an empirical analysis of scale and scope economies and technical change in an irish multiproduct banking firm abstract in contrast to most empirical investigations of the efficiency of multiproduct financial institutions which either estimate scale and scope economies with a given state of technology or only analyse technical change in the presence of overall scale economies this study estimates overall scale economies product specific scale economies and scope economies in the presence of both neutral and non neutral technical change also in contrast to most other empirical studies in this area standard errors are computed for all relevant statistics the findings indicate diseconomies of scope overall diseconomies of scale product specific economies are decreasing for investments and increasing for loans in addition to substantial neutral technical change biased technical change is labour and capital saving and deposits using in character

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

incentives for monitoring quality we analyze a procurement problem in which the quality of the delivered product can be observed perfectly by the buyer and supplier but may not be verifiable i e may not be observable to any third party we present a set of plausible conditions under which the equilibrium welfare of both the buyer and supplier is higher when quality is verifiable than when it is unverifiable the welfare gain for the privately informed supplier arises even when the buyer has all the bargaining power thus the interests of the buyer and supplier coincide with regard to whether delivered quality should be made verifiable

price caps and output floors a comparison of simple regulatory rules we study in this paper a simple alternative to price cap regulation the mechanism which we label output floor regulation requires the regulated firm to supply a given level of output this rule is as simple as price cap regulation and performs identically when the regulated firm is a natural monopoly however we show that in the presence of a competitive fringe output floor regulation yields lower prices and stronger incentives for cost reduction its introduction however is likely to be resisted by the industry since it lowers managerial utility and shareholders profits

two part tariffs as regulatory constraints abstract this paper introduces a regulatory two part monopoly pricing mechanism with desirable properties assuming that firm managers are informed about cost and demand functions no detailed prior information of the regulator about the regulated firm and its environment is required also subsequent observations of the regulator are restricted to verifiable bookkeeping data nevertheless the pricing formula is simple and easily interpreted the firm may freely choose the variable price of the two part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint the firm will then in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing the current approach requires no government subsidies

incentive mechanisms for environmental protection under asymmetric information a case study the purpose of this paper is to compare the performance of some instruments of environmental policy using data for a coal fired power plant each decentralized scheme coverages towards the social optimum chosen by a regulator we look at the performance of a changing tax rate on emission of an announcement of the tax formula of an announcement of the tax formula with a tax refund possibility and of a tax cum subsidy scheme our emphasis is on full information concerning the tax and subsidy formulas and on the opportunity for the firm to optimize intertemporally we also test two performance schemes which combine social optimal pricing with optimal abatement decisions our interest is to compare the speed of convergence of the schemes the monetary side payments subsidy bonus required and to look for self financing schemes

x efficiency in banking looking beyond the balance sheet the distribution free and stochastic frontier estimation methods are used to derive bank specific measures of cost and profit xefficiency this is done to investigate the importance of including aggregate measures of off balance sheet obs activities the results indicate that economic cost and production cost x efficiency estimates increase with the inclusion of the obs measure profit xefficiency estimates are largely unaffected further the composition of bankso obs activities appears to help explain interbank differences in cost and profit x efficiency estimates whereas bank size and the mix between on and off balance sheet banking activities are largely uncorrelated with the x efficiency estimates

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

scale economies and cost complementarities in commercial banks on and off balance sheet activities abstract bank off balance sheet obs activities have grown dramatically and have become significantly important especially at large banks we investigate whether failure to incorporate obs products may lead to a misspecification problem models that exclude deposits from the output specification suggest economies of scale which vanish when deposits are included we find that inclusion of obs products has little effect on the scale economies measures with only a few exceptions the results provide no evidence of cost complementarities in joint production the tremendous growth of bank obs activities in the 1980s may be explained by the very small approximately zero pecuniary cost of these activities

intertemporal price cap regulation under uncertainty this paper examines the intertemporal price cap regulation of a firm that has market power under uncertainty the unconstrained firm waits longer before investing or adding to capacity and as a corollary enjoys higher prices over time than would be observed in an equivalent competitive industry in the certainty case the imposition of an inter temporal price cap can be used to realise the competitive market solution by contrast under uncertainty it cannot even if the price cap is optimally chosen under uncertainty the monopoly firm will generally a under invest and b impose quantity rationing on its customers

technological change in large u s commercial banks this article examines technological change its relationship to firm size and its impact on the efficient scale of output and product mix for large u s commercial banks the results suggest that technological change lowered real costs by about one percent per year increased the cost minimizing scale of outputs and affected product mix the authors do not find support for the galbraith schumpeter hypothesis this suggests that the largest banks cannot use innovation alone to outpace smaller banks the major implications are that public policies allowing freer banking combinations do not necessarily run counter to the public interest copyright 1991 by university of chicago press

noisy observation in adverse selection models we consider a principal agent contracting problem under incomplete information where some of the agent s actions are imperfectly observable contracts take the form of reward schedules based on the noisy observation of the agent s action we first review situations where the principal can reach the same utility as in the absence of noise then we focus on the use of linear reward schedules which allow universal implementation i e implementation of a given mechanism for any unbiased noise of observation and on quadratic reward schedules which only require the knowledge of the variance of the noise we exhibit sufficient conditions under which linear reward schedules implement a given mechanism finally we characterize necessary conditions for a mechanism to be implementable under noisy observation by a linear schedule and by quadratic schedules we give the geometric intuition behind all results

the regulation of multiproduct firms part i theory abstract this paper develops a normative model of the regulation of a multiproduct firm with private information about its technology and cost reducing activity it first characterizes the optimal regulatory scheme and illustrates it through examples it then derives necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing incentive dichotomy to hold i e conditions under which the cost reimbursement rule but not pricing is used to provide incentives last the paper studies the regulation of the multiproduct firm in a general equilibrium framework both to assess the validity of the partial equilibrium approach and to formalize the notion of taxation by regulation

procurement policy and contracting efficiency the contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments such as multiple cost observations full commitment self selection and competition a two period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment self selection and multiple cost observations are small while the benefits of competition are larger to obtain some evidence on contracting costs defense contracting is reviewed it indicates that using these instruments is very costly thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

access pricing and competition abstract in many industries electricity telecommunications railways the network can be described as a natural monopoly a central issue is how to combine the necessary regulation of the network with the organization of competition in activities which use the network as an input and are potentially competitive generation of electricity value added services road transportation in this paper we derive access pricing formulas in the framework of an optimal regulation under incomplete information first we study how access pricing formulas take into account the fixed costs of the network and the incentive constraints of the natural monopoly over the network second we examine the difficulties coming from the accounting impossibility to disentangle costs of the network and costs of the monopoly s competitive goods third the analysis is extended to the cases where governmental transfers are prohibited where the competitors have market power and where competitors are not regulated fourth the possibility some consumers bypass the network is taken into account finally the role of access pricing for inducing the best market structure is assessed the conclusion summarizes our results and suggests avenues of further research

threshold effects of financial status on the cost frontiers of financial institutions in nondynamic panels this article applies hansen s 1999 2000 threshold regression model to estimate translog cost frontiers in the hope of shedding light on the banking industry s production processes and the extent of its technical efficiency te the threshold technique allows for the existence of multiple technologies of production distinguished by an exogenous threshold variable strong evidence of multiple technologies is found in the industry irrespective of which financial indicator as constructed by factor analysis defines the threshold variable cost savings and scale economies among the various underlying technologies are compared herein we also highlight the differences between the threshold results and the conventional cost frontier

a reduced form optimal nonlinear income tax problem abstract for a finite population with quasilinear preferences it is shown how mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem can be simplified to a reduced form problem involving only the allocation of the consumption good this result is a finite version of a proposition established in the continuum by s lollivier and j c rochet

reward structures in a planned economy the problem of incentives and efficient allocation of resources this paper considers a reward mechanism for inducing the choice of a socially optimal level of output by a socialist price setting manager under this mechanism the planner is assumed to have no information other than the observed output and price level it thus has informational advantages over other schemes thus far discussed in the literature the other schemes require the additional knowledge of demand elasticities of all the products produced in the economy besides this informational advantage the reward structure suggested here also eliminates other basic weaknesses of those schemes suggested previously

regulation with non price discrimination abstract this paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges and the effect such regulation has on incentives for non price discrimination i show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non price measures optimal access charges must be set higher than in the case when no discrimination is possible since the level of the access charge affects incentives to practice foreclosure furthermore i show that whether the access charge should be used to level or tilt the playing field in favour of the more efficient firm depends on the cost associated with non price discrimination

optimal border policies for invasive species under asymmetric information this paper analyzes the problem faced by a border protection agency if endogenous exporter abatement activities affect invasive species risk allowing for unobservable differences in abatement cost we show how the optimal inspection penalty regime differs from the symmetric information case departing from previous literature we allow for technical assistance a policy instrument specifically permitted and commonly employed under article 9 of the world trade organization sanitary and phytosanitary agreement we find the information asymmetry can make it optimal for the importing country to provide technical assistance grants for exporter risk abatement even if it would otherwise be inefficient further we show that fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy affects the qualitative nature of optimal policy if technical assistance has no outside value in the exporter s country optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts balancing higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive if technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter s economy it can introduce countervailing incentives making a uniform tariff penalty combination optimal

the regulation of multiproduct firms part ii applications to competitive environments and policy analysis abstract this paper extends our companion paper part i laffont and tirole 1990 on the regulation of the rate of return and prices of a multiproduct firm in two directions first it studies optimal pricing by a regulated firm competing with regulated or unregulated rivals with or without market power or other distorted pricing it then focuses on the access pricing problem and its potential foreclosure effects second it shows how optimal pricing can be decentralized to the regulated firm in the absence of cost and demand information

the performance of universal banks evidence from switzerland abstract this paper examines the performance of swiss banks from 1996 to 1999 using a broad definition of bank output we find evidence of large relative cost and profit inefficiencies in swiss banks a more narrow definition that focuses on only traditional activities leads to efficiency estimates that are even lower we also find evidence of economies of scale for small and mid size banks but little evidence that significant scale economies remain for the very largest banks finally evidence on scope economies is weak for the largest banks that are involved in a wide variety of financial activities taken together these results suggest few obvious benefits from the trend toward larger universal banks in switzerland

evaluation of credit risk based on firm performance abstract this paper investigates whether productive inefficiency measured as the distance from the industry s best practice frontier is an important ex ante predictor of business failure we use samples of french textiles wood and paper products computers and r d companies to obtain efficiency estimates for individual firms in each industry these efficiency measures are derived from a directional technology distance function constructed empirically using non parametric data envelopment analysis dea methods estimating binary and ordered logit regression models we find that productive efficiency has significant explanatory power in predicting the likelihood of default over and above the effect of standard financial indicators

regulation vertical integration and sabotage we consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a bertrand competitive differentiated products downstream industry to 1 vertically integrate forward and 2 raise its downstream rivals costs through non price activities which we characterize generally as sabotage we examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price we find that while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation welfare effects are also explored

on the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility abstract implementability conditions in rochet 1987 are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer or linear in the type for the case where agents information is one dimensional but actions become multidimensional the results obtained are relevant for the characterization of optimal mechanisms in adverse selection and moral hazard problems

structural change in a multisector model of growth we study a multi sector model of growth with differences in tfp growth rates across sectors and derive sufficient conditions for the coexistence of structural change characterized by sectoral labour reallocation and constant aggregate growth path the conditions are weak restrictions on the utility and production functions commonly applied by macroeconomists we present evidence from us two digit industries that is consistent with our predictions about structural change and successfully calibrate the historical shift from agriculture to manufacturing and services we show quantitatively that reasonable deviations from our conditions do not have a big impact on the properties of the model

the economics of career concerns part ii application to missions and accountability of government agencies the paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies officials incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions a lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy the paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives last the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on government bureaucracies 1999 the review of economic studies limited

a multiproduct cost study of savings and loans this paper investigates the cost structure of savings and loans most studies of financial institutions have failed to take into account the multiproduct nature of these institutions using the multiproduct approach the existence of subadditivity multiproduct global and product specific economies of scale and scope and substitutability between inputs is investigated a translogarithmic cost function is estimated using 1982 data on california savings and loans restrictive functional forms also estimated are rejected standard errors for the statistics calculated are estimated and various statistical tests are conducted previous authors have not calculated standard errors for these statistics no evidence of subadditivity in the industry is found in order to investigate the impact of deregulation on the financial services industry it is necessary to know the cost structure of the industry optimal firm size and product mix can be determined once the structure is known the presence of scale economies would imply that smaller firms or entering firms that operate at a small scale would be at a cost disadvantage compared with larger established firms a finding of economies of scope i e economies of joint production would imply that firms that were specialized would be at a cost disadvantage and that regulations that restrict the outputs a firm is allowed to produce may lead to inefficient production

competition long run contracts and internal inefficiencies in firms abstract internal reward structures in firms are often integral parts of their culture and are changed infrequently in comparison to decisions about e g prices this paper investigates how this feature of firm organization provides a mechanism through which product market competition affects firms internal efficiency the design of firms internal organization is modeled as a choice of an incentive structure between a principal and an agent with strategic implications for firm s competitive positions on the product market it is shown that contrary to popular beliefs there may be a negative relation between the competitiveness of the product market and effort incentives

tirole s industrial regulation and organization legacy in economics jean tirole was awarded the 2014 sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in memory of alfred nobel for his analysis of market power and regulation this paper provides an overview of some of that work and of his related contributions to game theory

an examination of cost subadditivity and multiproduct production in large u s banks this paper examines the subadditivity of costs for a sample of the largest commercial banks in the u s we introduce into the bank production literature the grid approach developed by evans and heckman 1984 we estimate two models of the bank cost function one where deposits are treated as outputs while in the other deposits are treated as inputs the models are estimated using the commonly used translog and the more flexible miniflex laurent viewed narrowly the findings imply that cost complementarities are not the raison d etre for multiproduct production in the largest commercial banks subadditive costs however are sufficient but not necessary for multiproduct production it is quite possible for multiproduct production to be optimal when output are produced independently levy and haber 1986 and teece 1980 1982 it is only required that inputs be shareable as opposed to joint copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

bank capitalization and cost evidence of scale economies in risk management and signaling we amend the standard cost model to account for the role of financial capital in banking the cost function is conditioned on the level of capital but we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of capitalization that minimizes cost we find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk

a reexamination of the optimal nonlinear income tax abstract this paper investigates mirrlees model of optimal income taxation it provides a concrete example of utility and density functions for which the solution to the usual first order model is not implementable i e and example where the first order approach does not work adding second order conditions leads to an extended model and to implementable solutions if these conditions are binding one gets a kink in the optimal net income schedule and bunching of individuals occurs the properties of an optimal nonlinear income tax are reexamined within the extended model

departmentalization and stochastic dissimilarity abstract when activities within the organization are confronted with different types of stochastic environments the owner of the firm has to evaluate the benefits and the costs involved in establishing multiple specialized divisions the benefit from departmentalization is the ability to better match incentives to the extent of uncertainty confronting different activities the cost of departmentalization is the increase in the number of required managerial positions which implies that the owner has to deal with a bigger number of individuals that can assume only limited risk only when the extent of stochastic dissimilarity among activities is significant can the benefit more than outweigh the cost

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

changes in the cost of intermediation the case of savings and loans the minimum cost output configuration for a firm may change as the result of a variety of factors including changes in market structure in this paper we test this structural change hypothesis with savings and loan data we find support for the hypothesis that separable constant returns to scale production functions characterize the average savings and loan in our sample in 1983 this is in contrast to the cost complementarities found in 1978 we argue that this result may be the result of regulatory changes that allowed savings and loans to alter their production mix to fully capture the benefits of joint production it seems reasonable to assume that the cost minimizing configuration of a multiproduct firm is potentially subject to nonstationarity during periods of structural change in input and or output markets the late 1970s and early 1980s represent such a period of turbulence for many markets in the financial services industry volatile interest rates combined with technological and regulatory changes may have caused firms in this industry to alter their output mixes in an effort to capture cost complementarities from joint production the purpose of this paper is to test this hypothesis of structural change in the savings and loan industry using both a translog and minflex laurent translog mlt specification of the production function we have chosen to investigate savings and loans s ls during the late 1970s and early 1980s for two reasons first s ls provide an ideal vehicle for testing our hypothesis because they were restricted almost exclusively to mortgages and securities as outputs before the passage of the depository institutions deregulation and monetary control act of 1980 and the garn st germain act of 1982 moreover there were also market changes with respect to both the pricing and mix of inputs i e deposits our second rationale involves the fact that there is a large and growing body of literature in the area of what is now called the

deregulation and quality abstract this paper analyses within a static model the effect of quality concern on optimal market structure it focuses on cases where industry quality has public good like features and is not contractible it is shown that the introduction of competition raises a free rider problem which depresses quality the smaller producer free rides on its competitor investment which as a result underinvests to encourage the efficient producer to provide quality the regulator diminishes the market share of the opportunistic producer and chooses more often a monopoly however when quality is verifiable the introduction of competition entails no welfare loss whether the regulator observes total quality outcome or individual contributions

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

an incentive scheme of a non linear price schedule for regulating a monopolist with unknown cost abstract we construct a non linear price schedule that serves as an incentive tool under doubly asymmetric information where the regulator has incomplete information about a monopolist s cost parameter while the monopolist cannot identify consumer types

determinants of management compensation with risk averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm abstract the salaries of top managers consist of two parts one part depending on profits the other being constant in a model of management compensation schemes with risk averse agents holmstrom and milgrom 1987 predict that an increasing variance in profits should reduce the profit relatedness of salaries using data from germany we show that indeed a larger variance of profits reduces the pay performance sensitivity moreover we analyze the relative influence of profits as compared to firm size on managerial compensation in general as well as the relationship between pay performance sensitivity and ownership structure

unemployment and hours of work the north atlantic divide revisited i examine the dynamic evolutions of unemployment hours of work and the service share since the war in the united states and europe the theoretical model brings together all three and emphasizes technological growth computations show that the very low unemployment in europe in the 1960s was due to the high productivity growth associated with technological catch up productivity also played a role in the dynamics of hours but a full explanation for the fast rise of service employment and the big fall in aggregate hours needs further research taxation has played a role but results are mixed

how did bank holding companies prosper in the 1990s abstract this paper examines the improved performance of us bank holding companies bhcs from 1991 to 1997 analysis of cost and profit functions using several alternative output specifications suggests that the gains were primarily due to productivity growth and changes in scale economies various econometric methodologies yield productivity growth of about 0 4 per year and the optimal size seems to have increased in the 1990s era of deregulation technological change and financial innovation estimates of both productivity growth and economies of scale are robust across traditional and non traditional output specifications despite the overall success however substantial cost and profit inefficiency existed for bhcs of all sizes in the 1990s these efficiency estimates are particularly sensitive to the output specification and failure to account for non traditional activities like off balance sheet obs items leads profit efficiency but not cost efficiency to be understated for the largest bhcs

the structure of firms abstract this paper studies different organizational forms within a single framework the u form is modelled as a two round communication game between a principal and agents with unobservable efforts and adverse selection problems the m form is modelled by considering a one round communication game with pure adverse selection feasible and optimal mechanisms are characterized the profit functions are derived and an extension of hotelling s lemma proved in the absence of the control loss problems flowing form the unobservability of agent effort levels the u form will be superior to the m form both forms will be superior to the corrupted m form

contributions of neoclassical economics to public utili iy analysis neoclassical economics the dominant economics paradigm has influenced and been influenced by developments in regulated industries we identify major theoretical and empirical accomplishments discuss the impactofthese accomplishmentsonpolicydevelopment andlist the channelsthrough which the impacts are madepossible we then discuss regulatorypolitics lack ofresearchperspective an overly narrow focus on economic efficiency and the academic profession as factors limiting the impact of neoclassical economics on public policy

price and access charge discrimination in electricity distribution an application to the chilean case this paper presents and analyzes a model of electricity distribution in chile with three alternative regulatory pricing contract schemes for assigning a common capacity cost to final customers and competitive energy sellers the first scheme involves ramsey pricing while under the second and third schemes the monopoly chooses final prices and access charges subject either to a peak load physical cap or a total revenue price cap constraint in addition we consider circumstances in which the regulator does not know consumer demand the monopoly cannot price discriminate beyond a range defined by the marginal cost as a floor and the stand alone cost as a ceiling and access charges are set at the fully distributed cost allocation level currently in force the model is calibrated with chilean data and demonstrates that in terms of social welfare the fully distributed cost contract scheme currently in effect can be improved by discriminatory pricing complemented by certain of the analyzed constraints

structural change in advanced nations a new set of stylised facts we provide new evidence on patterns of structural change in advanced economies reconsidering the stylised facts put forward by kaldor 1963 kuznets 1971 and maddison 1980 since 1980 the services sector has overwhelmingly predominated in the economic activity of the european union japan and the us but there is substantial heterogeneity among services personal finance and business services have low productivity growth and increasing shares in employment and gdp by contrast shares of distribution services are constant and productivity growth is rapid we find that the labour share in value added is declining while the use of ict capital and skilled labour is increasing in all sectors and regions

market failures and public policy industrial organization studies the exercise and control of market power to this purpose it builds models that capture the essence of the situation the predictions of the model can then be tested econometrically and possibly in the lab or the field in the end the reasonableness of and robustness to modeling assumptions and the quality of empirical fit determine how confident economists are in making recommendations to public decision makers for intervention and to companies for the design of their business model industrial organization has a long tradition first theoretical with the work of french engineer economists antoine augustin cournot 1838 and jules dupuit 1844 then policy oriented with the enactment of the sherman act 1890 and subsequent legislation then descriptive with the studies of the harvard school structure conduct performance comforting and refining the antitrust drive and finally skeptical with the chicago school the chicago school correctly pointed out the lack of underlying theoretical doctrine and went on to cast doubt on the whole edifice it however did not develop an alternative antitrust doctrine perhaps because

contract design and bargaining power abstract it is a common assumption in contract theory that the uninformed side makes a take it or leave it proposal in contrast this paper explores a model which allows a shift in bargaining power continuously between the two parties endowing the informed side with more bargaining power gradually reduces distortions

the access pricing problem a synthesis the baumol willig efficient component pricing rule states that it is efficient to set the price of access to an essential facility equal to the direct cost of access plus the opportunity cost to the integrated access provider the authors analyze the relevant notion of opportunity cost under various assumptions about demand and supply conditions including product differentiation bypass and substitution possibilities which all reduce opportunity cost compared to the benchmark case they show that the ramsey approach to access pricing developed by j j laffont and j tirole 1994 is closely related to the efficient component pricing rule provided opportunity cost is correctly interpreted

diversification incentives under price based and cost based regulation this article considers two schemes of regulationforfirms that serve both monopoly markets and markets subjected to substantial competition the first form cost based regulation combines elements of rate of return regulation on monopoly markets with filly distributed cost pricing much like the form of regulation currently in place in the domestic telephone industry the secondform price based regulation would establish rate caps on noncompetitive services and allow the firm to enter into competitive markets and charge whatever prices it might like in those markets models of both forms of regulation are developed and analyzed with respect to incentives for cost misreporting choice of technology cost reducing innovation choices of prices and output levels and diversification into competitive markets

optimal departures from marginal cost pricing focuses on departures from marginal cost pricing optimal allocation or resources level of tax revenue that will be collected by the government theorems developed for resource allocation ebsco

incentives for conservation and quality improvement by public utilities the author examines the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service e g electricity supply local telephone service and service enhancements e g energy conservation services improved clarity and speed of voice communication the optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly depending upon the information available to the regulator the price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation 35 refs 2 figs