global warming technological change and trade in carbon energy challenge or threat is it possible to combat global climate change through north to south technology transfer even without a global climate treaty or do carbon leakage and the rebound effect imply that it is possible to take advantage of technological improvements under the umbrella of a global arrangement only for answering these questions two possible states of the world are discussed one where more energy efficient technologies are transferred unconditionally from the north to the south and where regions do not cooperate in the solution of the global climate problem but unilaterally decide on climate policies and technology transfers one where the north to south technology transfer is tied to the requirement that the south in some way contributes to the solution of the global climate problem rebound and leakage effects hinder a sustainable and welfare improving solution of the climate problem

transfers and the generalized theory of distortions and welfare recent theoretical attention devoted to the transfer paradox has included attempts to incorporate it into the body of commercial policy in this paper the existence of a family of always feasible corrective tax policies is proved which guarantees normal welfare response the set of pol icies is shown to contain the external trade fixing tariff and the op timal tariff the set of policies is then extended to include a capit al flow fixing profits tax to deal with the problems of foreign inves tment the results are then interpreted in terms of a general proposi tion in the theory of distortions and welfare copyright 1987 by the review of economic studies limited

transfer problem dynamics macroeconomics of the franco prussian war indemnity we study the classic transfer problem of predicting the effects of an international transfer on the terms of trade and the current account a two country model with debt and capital allows for realistic features of historical transfers they follow wartime increases in government spending and are financed partly by borrowing the model is applied to the largest historical transfer the franco prussian war indemnity of 1871 1873 in these three years france transferred to germany an amount equal to 22 percent of a year s gdp when the transfer is combined with measured shocks to fiscal policy and productivity over the period the model provides a very close fit to the historical sample paths of french gdp terms of trade net exports and aggregate consumption this makes a strong case for the dynamic general equilibrium approach to studying the transfer problem more generally our results provide striking evidence of the importance of international capital markets in the nineteenth century

advantageous reallocations a constructive example this note shows how to construct smooth examples of a phenomenon noted by gale in which a pair of agents make themselves better off at the expense of a third agent by reallocating their own endowments walrasian stability prevails

foreign investment and economic growth characterization of a second best policy for welfare gains abstract this paper prescribes corrective taxes for immiserizing growth and customs union formation growth through removal of trade barriers when the home country and the rest of the world are financially linked through foreign investment and ownership of assets an always feasible policy which generates pareto welfare gains for home country residents and union countries residents is found with foreign ownership the policy generally requires a specific profits tax in addition to the usual taxes on traded goods and factors the policy does not harm residents in the rest of the world growth is pareto non inferior from the world point of view

do employees sickness absences react to a change in costs for firms evidence from a natural experiment we analyse the impact of a social security reform that changed the costs incurred by firms due to sickness absences the reform abolished a compulsory insurance for firms which insured them against the wages paid to sick blue collar workers during the first year after its introduction we estimate that the reform resulted in about 6 3 percent fewer sickness absences and in about 8 6 percent fewer absence days we do not find evidence for changes in hiring or firing and we find only limited workforce composition changes we do not find spillover effects on the absences of white collar workers robustness checks confirm these results

price and quantity adjustments in the austrian labour market austria is among the very few countries in the european union which have managed to maintain comparatively low unemployment rates and high employment rates this study looks at the price and quantity adjustment mechanisms in the austrian labour market which may have contributed to this favourable outcome after reviewing briefly the basic theoretical reasoning an empirical investigation is began into gross flow dynamics in the labour market and the cyclical volatility of employment and unemployment in austria in international comparison austrian unemployment is very stable over the business cycle this is due mainly to the high sensitivity of the labour force on cyclical conditions and partly also on the relatively weak responsiveness of employment to cyclical fluctuations in output the latter being possibly attributable to the high degree of real wage flexibility in austria the study proceeds to show that the long run elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment is indeed quite high in austria

foreign ownership and the theory of trade and welfare some standard topics in the theory of international trade are reconsidered in this paper by distinguishing between national and aggregate income when fixed supplies of foreign inputs are present within the home country under conditions that would ensure a national welfare gain if foreign ownership were absent international transfer economic growth or tariff policy might cause a national welfare loss in the presence of foreign ownership the techniques developed could be applied to other domestic distinctions such as those based on race sex age or ethnicity and to the theory of customs unions in a three country world

sense and surprise in competitive trade theory 2010 weai presidential address i introduction the competitive theory of international trade is well known for its abundance of paradoxes perhaps the most widely known is the leontief paradox associated with the rather startling results presented by leontief 1953 that the trade pattern of the united states suggested that its export sectors were more labor intensive than factor proportions found in its import competing sectors this result stimulated decades of research but is not the focus of the present paper other so called paradoxes include the metzler 1949 result wherein a country levying a tariff on an imported item may end up with a lowering of its domestic price that is a tariff may not be protective 1 lerner 1936 who earlier hinted at the metzler outcome emphasized the possibility that a tariff might instead worsen a country s terms of trade which is at the opposite extreme to the metzler result both of these paradoxes are attributed to possible income effects in demand more recently income effects stemming from asymmetry in demand patterns among countries were shown to open the door to paradoxical results if one country makes a transfer to another in a world in which other countries are also engaged in trade in the same commodities the surprising results the giver in the transfer might end up better off i e it may pay to give rather than to receive and or the recipient of the transfer may end up worse off 2 finally a classic result that does not depend on asymmetries in taste patterns but rather upon the degree of elasticity in demand and the nature of growth is the question of whether a country that unequivocally grows transformation schedule shifts out can be made worse off as a consequence of growth the so called immiserizing growth paradox 3 this is an issue familiar to particular sectors of the economy for example agriculture can a good harvest yield lower returns because of the subsequent price fall instead of revisiting these familiar paradoxes here i wish to concentrate on the production side of competitive models used in international trade and to focus on the question involving ways of judging economic models clearly the question of realism often comes up whether it is in terms of assumptions made or of outcomes expected here i suggest a different criterion does the model conform in many ways to common sense that is would one be tempted to suggest that the model is not necessary because common sense would lead to the same results and if it does do the outcomes in certain scenarios seem to be paradoxical or surprising if so can the model reveal in simple terms why these somewhat surprising results make sense 4 i shall restrict myself to a pair of basic models of production used in competitive trade theory the specific factors model on the one hand and the heckscher ohlin model on the other i shall argue that in many ways both conform to common sense but in addition provide the very tools that expose the underlying rationale for surprise ii a preliminary question consider any economy that is characterized by competitive markets and constant returns to scale technology suppose for such an economy there is an increase in the factor endowment bundle to fix on an example suppose there is an increase in the economy s labor force the very general question i wish to ask is how does such an economy absorb this increased endowment to maintain full employment of all factors note that if this economy is not engaged in international trade there will likely result a change in commodity prices as they adjust in order to equilibrate local supply and demand given the points i wish to make later let me assume that the country is engaged in free trade with the rest of the world if this economy were particularly small world prices could be taken as given even if world prices are disturbed it is legitimate to ask how the economy absorbs the extra supplies before any change in commodity prices takes place

taming capital flows abstract the argument of this paper is that growing capital mobility is unavoidable domestic financial liberalization and the revolution in information and communications technologies make it much more difficult to stop capital flows at the border effective controls will therefore have to become increasingly comprehensive onerous and distortionary the issue is therefore how to cope with the reality of high capital mobility and to manage the transition this means not freeing capital flows before substantial progress has been made in liberalizing domestic financial markets and strengthening financial supervision it means liberalizing foreign direct investment first access to stock and bond markets second and offshore bank funding last it means putting in place exchange rate monetary and fiscal policies that do not destabilize the capital account it means reforming monetary and fiscal institutions to assure the markets of the capacity to deliver desirable monetary and fiscal outcomes

poverty and public policy the problem of poverty is particularly acute in india with 14 of the world s population we have the misfortune of having almost twice as large a share of the world s poor indeed as i shall presently underline the question of poverty and its amelioration has been at the center of our concerns from the beginning of our planning efforts almost four decades ago little therefore can be said on it that some distinguished indian economist has not already said in some ways therefore to talk on the design of public policy for poverty to an indian audience is to carry coal to newcastle or as the old saying goes to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs nonetheless i hope to provide a fresh perspective by putting the problem into an explicit analytical framework that permits alternative policy designs to be sharply defined and contrasted i also intend to draw on international experience to put our efforts and problems into both historical and comparative perspectives

distortions true trade price and quantity indices and welfare trade expenditure functions are used to develop true trade price and quantity indices for multihousehold open economies with domestic distortions such as commodity or production taxes subsidies factor unemployment or exogenous factor price differentials these indices are then used to analyse the welfare effects of changes in world market prices and or the distortions in contrast to earlier literature we derive a set of novel globally valid necessary and sufficient conditions for gains from trade in the presence of the listed distortions novel sufficient conditions for welfare improvement which are readily measurable are also proven

a result on the transfer problem in international trade theory abstract the purpose of this paper is to provide a result on the welfare effect of a transfer in a general equilibrium exchange model with no arbitrary restrictions on either the number of commodities traded or the number of countries our result can be stated as follows the donor country is worse off after a transfer if a all goods are net substitutes for the donor b all goods are gross substitutes for the other countries and c all goods are normal for all countries

the transfer paradox in a one sector overlapping generations model abstract this paper examines the effects of international income transfers on capital accumulation and welfare in a one sector overlapping generations model it is shown that a strong form of the transfer paradox in which the donor country experiences a welfare gain while the recipient country experiences a welfare loss may occur both in and out of steady state in addition it is shown that a weak form of the transfer paradox where either the donor or recipient but not both experiences a paradoxical welfare effect may characterize all segments of the transition path not already characterized by the strong transfer paradox

compensating differentials for cyclical and noncyclical unemployment the interaction between investors and employees risk aversion this paper integrates the labor and assets markets equilibria to determine and evaluate the wage differentials generated for cyclical and noncyclical risks of unemployment the relative wage differential is a linear function of unemployment risk measured by the covariance of an index of employment with the rate of change in aggregate output seniority and the hoarding of skilled labor are characteristics of minimum cost contracts because employees with more human capital prefer safer jobs empirical results suggest that a 14 41 wage differential can be explained by interindustry differences in unemployment risks

international investment and immiserizing growth abstract a country with significant foreign investment can be immiserized by growth of its labor force because this increases the payments that have to be made to foreign investors we show that this occurs when the elasticity of supply of foreign capital and the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the host country are low we relate this phenomenon to bhagwati s general analysis of immiserizing growth and identify several new sources of immiserization that can arise from the interaction of the bhagwati johnson mechanisms and international investment

international migration non traded goods and economic welfare in the source country abstract this paper examines the economic effects of emigration in a source country producing both traded and non traded commodities it is shown that even if the economy faces fixed terms of trade emigration can still affect the welfare of the non migrants and the direction of the effect in this context will always be negative

the economics of country specific tariffs a three country model of the world economy is used to show that when effective a country specific tariff will have an impact on the world economy that is equivalent to the imposition of a uniform tariff plus a subsidy to the production of home importables in the favored country financed by a transfer from the home country lerner s symmetry theorem and the optimum tariff problem are discussed country specific tariffs were a prominent feature of the congressional debate surrounding the recent u s trade bill a preliminary version of the bill which passed the house contained the well known gephardt amendment that would have required increased tariffs or quotas on imports from countries running unacceptably large bilateral trade surpluses with the u s in addition since 1976 the u s has allowed most goods produced in less developed countries to enter duty free under its version of the generalized system of preferences the country specific nature of these preferences runs contrary to all previous u s trade policy and sparked controversy in the u s congress when the original legislation was passed in 1974 and again when it was extended in 1984 while country specific tariffs are a relatively new feature of u s trade policy they have an established history in other countries prior to joining the european economic community great britain granted preferential tariff rates on imports from the commonwealth countries moreover these countries granted tariff preferences to less developed countries nearly five years before the u s initiated its general system of preferences program a proper theoretical analysis of country specific tariffs and preferential tariff reductions requires a multi country model however most work on tariff policy uses the standard two country framework almost all of the multi country models found in the literature consider only uniform tariffs or as in the customs union literature consider preferential tariffs as part of a multilateral effort to coordinate trade policies rather than as a unilateral policy instrument an exception is the partial equilibrium analysis of mcculloch and pinera 1977 they consider a three country world economy and examine the impact of a preferential tariff reduction

the global correspondence principle a generalization this paper generalizes the global correspondence principle by extending in two major ways samuelson s 1971 analysis of the exchange rate response to an international purchasing power transfer first the authors analyze the price effect of a shift in anyparameter not necessarily a transfer second the authors explore the resulting adjustments in any nonprice variable such as welfare as the analysis shows the direction of these adjustments depends neither on whether they are small or large nor on whether equilibrium is locally stable or unstable thus the authors generalize the conventional algebra of comparative statics which typically assumes small shifts from a stable equilibrium copyright 1987 by american economic association

the welfare effects of trade and capital market liberalization treatise on the welfare effects of trade and capital market liberalization consquenses of the capital account liberalization in the presence of trade restrictions specifies on the liberalization of trade in the presence of foreign borrowing constraints proves superiority of gradual liberalization of trade to an abrupt liberalization

the possibility of recipient harming donor benefiting transfers with more than two countries the possibility of a commodity transfer among nations which simultaneously benefits the donor and harms the recipient is examined an example of a three country exchange economy is presented where a transfer may be made which gives the counter intuitive result the result is then explained

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare bilateral transfers in a multilateral world paul samuelson s 1952 1954 classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues the positive effect of a transfer on the terms of trade and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient since then a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis while samuelson 1954 himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model for example to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in samuelson 1971 or general nontraded goods in john chipman 1974 and ronald jones 1970 1975 remarkably however the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments since wassily leontief 1936 produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and samuelson 1947 argued that the example required market instability the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable in the walras sense interestingly samuelson 1954 who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two country model could now arise consistent with market stability recently the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions both apparently unconnected and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing and that the donor may improve its welfare despite market stability one route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent or country that is outside of the transfer process in the appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution harry johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor income classes capital and labor in an open economy thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor an independent analysis of the three agent transfer problem using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption was also undertaken in an important paper by david gale 1974 2 brecher and bhagwati bhagwati department of economics columbia university new york ny 10027 brecher department of economics carleton university ottawa on kis 5b6 hatta department of political economy the johns hopkins university baltimore md 21218 we thank the national science foundation grant no 524718 for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper the paper was written when brecher and hatta were visiting columbia university 1981 82 gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from john chipman avinash dixit jacques dreze robert feenstra jacob frenkel ronald jones murray kemp andreu mas colell michael mussa john riley lars svensson and robert willig from anonymous referees and from seminar participants at berkeley harvard minnesota rochester chicago and the university of california los angeles after the present paper was submitted for publication and following its presentation at rochester our attention was drawn to this appendix which was noticed by a student of ronald jones subsequently we learned from makoto yano that motoshige itoh had pointed out an important related paper by ryuotaro komiya and t shizuki 1967 whose condition 11 for the johnson case anticipated our equation 12 below we are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention 2 gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient furthermore this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis

competition for aid and trade policy this paper considers the optimal allocation of a given amount of foreign aid between two recipient countries it is shown that given consumer preferences a country following a more restrictive trade policy would receive a smaller share of the aid if the donor country maximises its own welfare in allocating aid if on the other hand the donor country allocates aid in order to maximize the sum of the welfare of the two recipient countries the result is just the opposite finally we analyze the situation where the recipient countries compete with each other for the given amount of aid it is shown that this competition tends to lower the level of optimal tariffs in the recipient countries

foreign aid domestic investment and welfare this paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two period two country model of trade domestic investment is endogenous providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two transfer induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient in the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending such redistribution gives rise to the possibility of temporary aid being both potentially and strictly pareto improving

strategic transfers and private provision of public goods abstract this paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good if the agents differ in their contribution productivity then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game the less productive agent becomes a stackelberg leader furthermore the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization

give and take how the funding of adaptation to climate change can improve the donor s terms of trade this paper discusses the interplay between international trade regional adaptation to climate change and financial transfers for funding adaptation it combines insights from a theoretical model of north to south transfers with the findings of a calibrated dynamic multi region multi sector computable general equilibrium model that takes into account the impacts of climate change and the adaptation to it assessing the effects of adaptation funding indicates that funding of adaptation in developing regions can be pareto improving not only will developing regions which do not own sufficient resources for adapting optimally profit from receiving adaptation funding terms of trade improvements in the high and middle income donor countries can dominate transfer costs and hence lead to a net welfare gain in almost any developed region except north america as such our consideration adds a new argument for financially supporting adaptation in the developing world besides the well known ones such as fairness and incentives for participation in a global climate treaty

optimal tariffs and income taxes under imperfect and uncertain foreign investment international investment as well as international trade is now a wide phenomenon and optimal policies to be selected in the presence of both international trade and investment have been a great concern jones 7 and kemp 9 have done pioneering works in this area of study previous studies however have mostly postulated that international capital movements are perfect while perfect capital mobility is expected in the long run bhagwati and brecher 2 and brecher and bhagwati 3 emphasized short run sluggishness of foreign investment that is even in the presence of international differentials in rates of return to capital the amount of foreign capital existing in the host country is fixed in the short run a realistic case however will be between complete fixity and perfect mobility of foreign capital this is especially true in the medium run in such a case the amount of foreign capital existing in a country at a particular future point in time may be reasonably conceived as uncertain to that country uncertainty may arise for various reasons the case includes uncertainty about the level of the rate of return to capital in the world market and also uncertainty about production technology employed by foreign investors these cause amounts of foreign capital to be received by the host country uncertain to it even under perfect international capital mobility uncertainties in such a case are relevant when the host country government has a long run perspective and is concerned with the long run consequences of its policies this paper addresses the open question of levels of optimal policies to be chosen when foreign capital movements are uncertain as well as imperfect and examines whether they modify or make intact the optimal policies established traditionally policies considered here are import tariff and income tax by the host country since these are prevalent and have attracted much attention in the literature of international trade and investment

trade theory distribution of income and immigration this paper examines the impact of mass immigration utilizing the analytical framework of so called trade theory as such its emphasis is on general equilibrium effects and on the constraints imposed by the openness of the economy on such effects the analysis will center on the distributional impact of unskilled labor immigration excerpt

international capital mobility shadow prices and the cost of protection this paper studies the welfare losses from tariff protection in a small open economy when some factors are internationally mobile our principal result is that international fictor mobility must raise the cost of protection more specifically the welfare loss resulting from a uniform increase in tariffs in a competitive small open economy is greater when tariff induced international factor movements take place than when factors are internationally immobile by contrast an exogen1ous inflow of factors in the presence of tariffs may increase or reduce the welfare loss associated with protection depending on whether or not the protected commodities use the foreign owned factors intensively relative to domestically owned factors these results are proven for a very general specification of the economy s technology in particular no restrictions are placed on the degree of vertical integration in production on the sectors into which factors are internationally mobile or on the number of goods and factors our main result holds whether or not an increase in tariff rates leads the economy to specialise in addition we show how our results relate to earlier work on immiserising capital inflows and on negative shadow prices for factors of production thus synthesizing a number of recent results within a common framework the paper is organised as follows in section 2 we explain our framework and derive expressions for the welfare effects of tariffs when all factors are domestically owned and when some factors are foreign owned but not internationally

the measurement of waste in a public goods economy abstract a small open economy model is developed to measure the waste of the whole economy when levels of public goods are determined by the government the allais debreu diewert measure of waste is defined and its second order approximation is calculated this measure utilizes the second order substitution matrices of the restricted profit function and the restricted expenditure function evaluated at an equilibrium finally simple examples and diagrams are utilized to clarify the economic implications of our approach

the measurement of the benefits of public inputs with distortionary taxation this paper derives formulae that show the marginal benefits of public inputs in second best economies with tax distortions the values of the change in the aggregate net output vector and in some cases the change of profit income evaluated at appropriate shadow prices show their marginal benefits these shadow prices depend on which taxation scheme you can perturb when the amount of a public input is increased the author considers the three cases where he can change 1 all indirect tax rates and all corporate income tax rates 2 all lump sum transfers and 3 some part of indirect tax rates

compensating wage differentials and the duration of wage loss a formal model of occupational choice is developed that shows the extent to which the compensation for increased duration exceeds that for increased risk using the panel study of income dynamics linked to industry data on injuries and unemployment we find nearly all the compensating wage differential for losses due to workplace injuries is for increases in the duration of loss and similarly for losses due to cyclical unemployment the compensating differentials for risk of injury are larger for union than for nonunion workers while those for cyclical unemployment are smaller for union workers

optimal foreign aid and tariffs this paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non cooperative fashion three alternative scenarios depending on the timing of the actions and on whether aid is tied are analyzed it is shown that in the case where aid is decided before tariffs untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient s optimal trade tax when the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient s tariff the optimal aid level is always positive and the world can always achieve a pareto efficient equilibrium

optimal policy in the presence of licensed technology from abroad this paper extends the theory of international trade to analyze optimal commercial policy of a country importing technology for which royalties must be paid to foreigners as the analysis shows the country can maximize national welfare by combining a tax on international trade in commodities and a domestic commodity market tax or subsidy depending respectively on whether foreigners are net exporters or importers of the commodity whose technology is licensed internationally the analysis also demonstrates that the maximum level of national welfare might be lower with than without technological imports if the country s exportable commodity uses the foreign technology

the distributional impact of a resource boom abstract sizeable export growth led by a booming natural resource extraction sector has recently been experienced in a number of countries this form of growth holds potentially important implications for the distribution of income and in this paper a simple general equilibrium trade model is presented which is aimed at exposing the effects of a resource boom on factor owners real incomes the analysis highlights the critical role played by the real exchange rate and also explores the consequences of a resource boom in the presence of real international capital flows and endogenous protection wherein one group of factor owners uses commercial policy to maintain the group members real incomes

gender stock market participation and financial literacy abstract women participate less than men in the stock market and score lower on financial literacy we explore the link between this gender gap in stock market participation and financial literacy using survey data on a random sample of 1300 individuals that is representative of the swedish population we show that the estimated gender gap in stock market participation diminishes when we control for basic financial literacy essentially a measure of numeracy a gender gap in risk taking remains significant also when controlling for financial literacy

flexible contracts and subjective well being theory suggests that when workers choose between permanent and flexible contracts their utility should tend to equalize across contract types new estimates of job satisfaction show the critical role played by unmeasured worker heterogeneity they reveal that flexible contracts are a strong negative determinant of satisfaction with job security but are often a positive determinant of other dimensions of job satisfaction as a consequence flexible contracts have either a weak negative influence or no influence on overall job satisfaction moreover flexible contracts generally have no impact on overall life satisfaction of the employed these results appear broadly consistent with the presence of equalizing differences jel j28 j41

welfare aspects of the transfer problem using the standard trade model with three countries and allowing for substitutability in both production and consumption this paper demonstrates that a country may gain by giving a transfer that the receiver may lose and that these two phenomena may appear at the same time this result is an extension of gale s example in a fixed coefficient model where he shows both transferer and transferee may become better off harming the third country and it is contrasted with the traditional welfare proposition whereby a giver is immiserized and a recipient is enriched

multilateral transfers export taxation and asymmetry abstract it has been established that under free trade transfers that are proportional to the trade volumes of recipient nations cannot immiserize them we investigate this result in the context of a three country model of export taxation by recipient nations proportional transfers can be immiserizing in the presence of fixed export taxes under nash welfare maximizing export taxes proportional transfers cannot immiserize the recipients consequences of asymmetry in size and in nash equilibrium tax rates are also explored the findings are relevant for developing nations who use export taxes and also receive foreign aid

participation constraints in the stock market evidence from unexpected inheritance due to sudden death we use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals decisions to invest in the stock market unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non participation we have three key findings first windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation second the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market but hold on to substantial safe assets even over longer horizons third the majority of households inheriting stock holdings actively sell the entire portfolio overall these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is unlikely to be constrained by financial participation costs

the possibility of an immiserizing transfer under uncertainty in a two country two commodity trade model with production uncertainty an international transfer can harm the recipient and benefit the donor this result holds even when equilibrium prices are stable moreover the form in which the transfer is paid can matter for the welfare consequences of the transfer

temporary layoff unemployment in austria empirical evidence from administrative data temporary layoffs rehires recalls have been widely recognized as an important feature of north america s labour markets for europe however several observers have suggested that tighter regulatory impediments to the recruitment and dismissal of employees are responsible for temporary layoff unemployment being virtually non existent against this background this paper uses administrative data to evaluate the quantitative importance of temporary separations among the unemployed in austria and to track its composition by industries the main finding of our empirical analysis is that about one third of all unemployment spells in austria in 1985 ended with the individual returning to the former employer since temporary layoff unemployment was found to be on average of shoter duration it comprised a somewhat lower fraction of total weeks of unemployment however temporary layoff unemployment thus accounts for the same proportion of unemployment in austria as in the us or canada

strategic trade policy and welfare foreign equity ownership is shown empirically to weaken significantly and occasionally reverse common strategic trade policy results existing levels of u s cross ownership for example reduce the average optimal export subsidy by 47 relative to the brander and spencer journal of international economics 1985 18 83 100 value in industries with particularly high cross ownership and relatively small imputed labor rents optimal subsidies fall to less than one seventh of their former level previous studies which overlook high rates of cross ownership overstate the effectiveness of strategic policies most sharply in sectors with above average expected profitability scope for strategic investments and barriers to rent dissipation

on the tying of aid to tariff reform this paper considers the welfare effects of foreign aid that is tied to changes in the recipient s tariff by constructing a three country model with tariffs and by allowing for changes both in the amount of aid and in the tariff rates we are able to consider the welfare implications of two different rules of aid conditionality i a rule which leaves the donor s welfare unchanged and ii a rule which leaves the recipient government s total revenue unchanged it is shown that the tying of aid to a tariff reform can inter alia be used to ensure pareto improvement

reevaluating the role of trade agreements does investment globalization make the wto obsolete abstract international ownership alters the role of multilateral trade institutions by redefining pecuniary externalities among countries regardless of the underlying cause whether foreign direct investment international portfolio diversification cross country mergers or multinational firms international ownership can mitigate incentives that lead large countries to set inefficiently high tariffs at the same time however foreign ownership introduces the potential for expropriation by investment host countries which can extract rent from foreign owners by manipulating local prices the basic principle of reciprocity continues to serve as an important guide to efficiency though its application must account for the pattern of international ownership in addition to traditional measures of market access

from a customs union to a common market the need for factor tax harmonization abstract wooton 1988 demonstrates that a movement of a small customs union towardsa common market may result in a welfare loss if the common external tariff rates are not zero the present paper building on wooton s model demonstrates that even if the common external tariff rates are zero the movement towards a common market may still result in a welfare loss if the tax rates on factor s rates of return are not equal among partners within two special models the analysis also demonstrates that when the tax rates on factors rates of return are equal among member countries then the movement towards a common market is optimal regardless of whether or not the common external tariff rates are zero

paradoxes associated with the administration of foreign aid abstract this paper shows that if because of administration costs or other wastes only a proportion of an aid reaches the recipient then it is possible that the donor is enriched by its act of charity the extent of the enrichment increasing with the extent of the leakage and or that the recipient is impoverished by aid the extent of the impoverishment increasing with the extent of the leakage these outcomes are possible even when trade is optimally restricted by donor or recipient

aid nontraded goods and the transfer paradox in small countries this paper constructs a model of the transfer paradox for a small open economy with nontraded goods it demonstrates that increased production of nontraded goods can change their domestic price so as to offset the otherwise beneficial effect of aid and under certain conditions to create a transfer paradox even in a small country the model is estimated with time series data for 44 aid dependent countries for the period 1970 90 the results support the model and show that the nontraded goods expansion effect is more likely to cause immiserization than harry g johnson s 1967 tariff distorting export displacement effect

tied aid and the paradoxes of donor enrichment and recipient impoverishment it is part of received doctrine that in a two country world without hindrance of commodity taxes or other distortions and with market stability assured international transfers necessarily harm the donor and benefit the recipient 2 however in the case of most non private international aid those conditions fail donors often require that aid be spent in a manner not closely related to private preferences in the recipient countries indeed not closely related to any well behaved preferences and they normally finance the aid by means of distorting taxation hence one cannot rule out by appeal to standard theorems the possibility that aid perversely leaves the donor better off and or the recipient worse off let us say that aid is tied in the recipient if it is spent inefficiently in terms of individual preferences and that aid is tied in the donor if it is financed inefficiently thus whether aid is tied is a question of how it is spent or financed it is not a question of the numeraire in terms of which aid is accounted nor of the form in which it is offered 3 evidently the definition of tying is uncommonly broad for example aid may be tied in the recipient not because the donor attaches strings but because the government of the recipient is incompetent or unrepresentative moreover the definition is relevant however the aid is applied whether to private or public goods whether to consumption or investment goods we follow the literature on the transfer problem in assuming that aid is spent on private consumption goods like hospital services and powdered milk this is a matter of convenience and continuity only 4 in the present note we seek to rework the economics of foreign aid under novel assumptions in particular allowance will be made for the possibility that aid is tied in whole or in part in the donor or in the recipient it will be verified that the donor may benefit and the recipient suffer and that these outcomes are com

aid and trade this paper surveys the recent theoretical and empirical literature that explores the relations between aid and trade and asks about the complementarity or substitution effects at work we distinguish between the effects of aid on trade flows and on trade policies of the donor as well as the recipient countries special focus is given on trade facilitation or aid for trade

equilibrium and optimality some imprints of david gale abstract the paper is a review of some of the themes to which david gale made lasting contributions it touches upon a number of the fundamental issues in the walrasian equilibrium theory existence uniqueness and stability the overlapping generations model non optimality and indeterminacy of competitive equilibria the von neumann equilibrium as a turnpike and in the theory of decentralized intertemporal allocation through competitive prices efficiency and golden rules duality and existence of optimal programs

the generalized theory of transfers and welfare exogenous policy imposed and endogenous transfer induced distortion this paper reconsiders the welfare effects of a transfer payment in a two commodity world with two agents countries by taking the presence of exogenous and endogenous distortions into account when there is an exogenous tax cumsubsidy on production consumption or trade the analysis demonstrates that a transfer may paradoxically enrich the donor and immiserize the recipient under certain specific conditions these welfare paradoxes are also shown to be possible if the transfer endogenously induces directly unproductive profit seeking activity of lobbyists concluding remarks emphasize the paper s relevance for policymakers

the welfare effects of targeted export subsidies a general equilibrium approach a three country model of export subsidies is developed with an exporter an importer and a neutral country which can act on either side of the market when the neutral country is an exporter the country offering a targeted export subsidy always suffers a welfare loss however when the neutral country is an importer the possibility of a paradoxical result that the subsidizing country can gain and the subsidized country can lose is shown to exist and the conditions under which this result occurs are derived the model fails to provide justification on national welfare grounds for widespread use of targeted export subsidies such as the export enhancement program

targeted export subsidies as an exercise of monopoly power a country with monopoly power in its export good normally benefits from an export tax however if it exports to two countries and the tax on exports to one is suboptimal then it may be best to subsidize exports to the other this is more likely the smaller is the import demand elasticity in the country being taxed suboptimally and the larger the elasticity in the other it is also more likely the larger are exports to the first and the smaller are exports to the other finally it is more likely the less elastic is home export supply

welfare effects of aid under quantitative trade restrictions the paper examines the effects of tied aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries we depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions to mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of both countries are derived and interpreted under the stability of the system furthermore we show that whereas untied aid cannot increase global welfare tied aid unambiguously does so

foreign aid and public goods abstract most less developed countries ldcs use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods or public intermediate inputs this paper constructs a two country general equilibrium trade model where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good within this framework the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor country s terms of trade and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country the paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise reduce world welfare in which case a welfare increase decrease in both the donor and the recipient country is possible

transfers returns to scale tied aid and monopolistic competition we examine transfers and tied aid in a model with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition transfers give rise to an additional love of variety welfare effect and affect the utility possibility locus generic tied aid may exacerbate or reverse these results the popularity of aid tied to specific manufactured goods can be explained through rent seeking behavior since such aid gives rise to profits in the donor country these profits in turn largely repatriate the transfer such that donors can appear to be more generous than they really are

impure public goods and transfers in a three agent model abstract this paper extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing for impure public goods the analysis is developed in the context of international public goods under certain conditions the consequences of transfers on utility are paradoxical if the preferences are divergent a country may gain by giving a transfer the receiver may lose and these two phenomena may appear at the same time

tariffs foreign capital and immiserizing growth with urban unemployment and specific factors of production abstract in this note we show that a recent observation of brecher alejandro as regards tariff induced capital inflows essentially extends to a setting with urban unemployment three factors of production and a variety of labor market conditions in the urban sector

international trade and labor migration a theory of the relationship between international trade and labor mobility is developed that takes into account five characteristics of such migration including its temporary nature differences between migrant and native labor the acceptance of unpredictable conditions of employment by migrant labor the ready availability of further labor resources and international capital mobility particular attention is paid to the role of international labor migration in helping to insulate native populations from the rigors of industrial fluctuations and in helping to preserve import competing industries that would have succumbed without the availability of cheap imported labor

bilateral war in a multilateral world carrots and sticks for conflict resolution this paper constructs a three country many good and many factor trade theoretic model in which two of the countries are in conflict and where war eort is determined endogenously

recall expectations and duration dependence using novel administrative data from austria we investigate the nature of temporary layoffs and recalls we find that on average jobs ending in temporary layoffs lasted shorter but paid higher wages the majority of temporarily laid off workers return to their previous employer but also one fifth of those permanently laid off are recalled compared to job switchers recalls have shorter unemployment spells and do not experience wage losses negative duration dependence of unemployment only appears once recall exits are excluded for temporary and permanent layoffs however for temporary layoffs the aggregate pattern masks significant heterogeneity by pre unemployment tenure additional survey evidence suggests a lower average search level for temporary layoffs

a theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma a theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid social humiliation in a general equilibrium framework it is shown that as long as migration can reduce humiliation sufficiently migration will occur even between two identical economies migration increases the number of individuals who choose to perform degrading jobs and consequently migration lowers the price of the good produced in the sector that is associated with low social status moreover the greater an individual s aversion to performing degrading jobs the more likely it is that he will experience a welfare gain when the economy opens up

who supports global economic engagement the sources of preferences in american foreign economic policy in this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand u s foreign policy in particular foreign trade and aid using votes in the u s house of representatives from 1979 2004 we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy we assess the impact of domestic factors namely political economy and ideological preferences versus foreign policy pressures our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas first aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences second trade preferences but not economic aid ones are shaped by the president s foreign policy concerns for economic aid domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones third aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones but ideology plays a different substantive role in each different constituencies support aid and trade this finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability the internationalist coalition in u s foreign policy statist theories of foreign policy and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting

do multinationals deteriorate developing countries export prices the impact of fdi on net barter terms of trade this paper explores the economic relationship between foreign direct investment fdi to developing countries and the export prices of the latter measured by terms of trade it is rst shown that economic theory suggests such a relationship for various reasons but is inconclusive about the direction of the eect to address this open issue empirically i analyze data on more than 50 developing countries throughout the period 1980 2008 using robust dynamic panel data methods the results show that fdi had an economically relevant and statistically signicant positive impact on developing countries net barter terms of trade a higher level of education in the developing country fosters this eect

immiserizing transfer under variable returns to scale this paper examines the welfare consequences of a unilateral transfer for both the transfer paying and the transfer receiving country in which the production functions are subject to variable returns to scale we obtain the conditions for the strong paradox that is the welfare of the transfer paying country improves and that of the transfer receiving country declines in the standard two country framework the conditions for the weak paradox that is both the transferor and transferee gain or lose simultaneously and the normal results that is the transferor loses and the transferee gains are also derived transferts appauvrissants quand les rendements a l echelle sont variables ce memoire examine les effets de bien etre d un transfert unilateral a la fois pour le pays donateur et le pays recipiendaire quand les fonctions de production ont des rendements variables a l echelle les auteurs d6veloppent les conditions qui sous tendent le paradoxe fort i e le cas oii le bien r ils d6rivent aussi les conditions qui sous tendent le paradoxe faible i e le cas oui les deux pays gagnent ou

international redistribution of income summary how do international policies on aid trade and factor movements affect the international distribution of income we calculate the impact by world decile of the actual level of aid flows and the effect on income of merchandise trade restrictions by high income countries we find that aid s distributional impact is equality enhancing extremely small in terms of changes in inequality measures but of some importance for the lowest decile of the distribution we also find that some of this impact is counteracted by lost potential income in the lower deciles from merchandise trade barriers imposed by high income countries

birth order and portfolio choice abstractthis paper examines the impact of birth order on financial decision making in lieu of explanations such as dissimilar parental style across children with different birth orders due to lea

on the provision of official and private foreign aid abstract the provision of official relative to private foreign aid varies considerably between donor countries we explain the variations in terms of country size household composition income distribution and the government s ability to commit to aid and derive inter alia the results 1 official aid crowds out private aid 2 total aid and official aid collected from each household are lower in more populous countries 3 total aid is lower if i the distribution of income favors the more altruistic households and ii the government can credibly commit to a certain level of aid evidences suggest that the theoretical results can explain stylized facts

do wages compensate for anticipated working time restrictions evidence from seasonal employment in austria this article investigates the existence of compensating wage differentials across seasonal and long term jobs that arise due to anticipated working time restrictions using longitudinal information from the austrian administrative records we derive a definition of seasonality based on observed regularities in employment patterns as wages change across seasonal and long term jobs for the same individual over time we can control for individual specific effects and use variation in the starting month of seasonal jobs as an exogenous predictor of anticipated unemployment we find that employers pay on average a positive wage differential of about 11 for seasonal jobs

transfers the terms of trade and capital accumulation in the context of a two sector overlapping generations model it is demonstrated that a steady state transfer paradox may arise under commodity trade with stability and without distortions or bystanders the existence of the paradox is due to the effect of the transfer on world capital accumulation which is shown to always i e for any ranking of factor intensities and savings rates improve the donor s terms of trade transfers may also improve steady state welfare for both donor and recipient and produce paradoxical welfare results along the transition path la litterature en statique du commerce international a conclu que en l absence de distorsions ou de tierces parties les mouvements des termes d echange induits par les transferts ne peuvent pas etre suffisamment importants quand il y a stabilite walrasienne pour engendrer le paradoxe du transfert on a tire la conclusion de modeles dynamiques a un secteur que le paradoxe du transfert est possible mais en comptant sur la mobilite internationale du capital et sur les mouvements dans le niveau mondial du taux d interet plutot que sur les prix et les marches des biens dans un modele dynamique a deux secteurs ou les generations se chevauchent ce qui permet des effets a la fois statiques et intertemporels dans les termes d echange le commerce des biens peut engendrer un paradoxe du transfert en regime permanent quand il y a stabilite walrasienne sans distorsions et tierces parties l existence du paradoxe est attribuable a l effet du transfert sur l accumulation du capital qui toujours pour tout ordre des intensites de facteur et des taux d epargne ameliore les termes d echange du donneur les transferts peuvent aussi ameliorer le bien etre du donneur et du recipiendaire en regime permanent et produire des resultats paradoxaux de bien etre dans le sentier de transition

international capital mobility and commercial policy in an economic region abstract if two small countries are linked by capital movements then at low tariff levels any increase in capital flows induced by the commercial policy of either country will harm that country and benefit the other country while at low levels of international investment a tariff increase always harms the country levying the tariff nevertheless an increase in one country s tariff could benefit both countries by alleviating regional distortions in factor allocation if the countries liberalize factor movements within a customs union then conflicts must arise in choosing the level of the common external tariff

global imbalances revisited the transfer problem and transport costs in monopolistic competition we study the welfare eects of trade imbalances in a two sector model of monop olistic competition as in perfect competition a trade surplus involves an income transfer to the de cit country and possibly a terms of trade deterioration unlike the conventional wisdom however trade imbalances do not impose any double burden on surplus countries this is because of a production delocation eect which leads to a reduction in the local price index in the presence of intermediate goods new results arise a trade surplus may lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate to a terms of trade improvement and to a welfare increase under standard parameter con gurations in addition policies that stabilize the exchange rate can make the balanced trade equilibrium unstable these results can explain why the manufac turing sector may agglomerate in countries that resist the real appreciation of their currency and suggest that a xed exchange rate and nominal rigidities may generate short run instability

immiserizing transfers from abroad abstract this paper shows that an international transfer payment may paradoxically immiserize the recipient country or increase the donor country s welfare even when world markets are stable despite the traditional view that such a paradox theoretically requires market instability to demonstrate this paradoxical possibility the paper extends the conventional trade theoretic analysis to admit exogenous distortions created by tax cum subsidies in domestic production or endogenous distortions due to additionality requirements imposed by the donor on the recipient this analysis of immiserizing transfers from abroad immediately suggests significant implications for important policy issues including the evaluation of real benefits from foreign aid

negotiating free trade we develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at once we show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining and we identify circumstances in which the grand coalition is the equilibrium outcome leading to worldwide free trade a model of international trade is then used to illustrate equilibrium outcomes and how they depend on the structure of trade and protection global free trade is not achieved when the political economy motive for protection is sufficiently large furthermore the model generates both building bloc and stumbling bloc effects of preferential trade agreements in particular we describe an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are permitted to form a building bloc effect and an equilibrium in which global free trade is attained only when preferential trade agreements are forbidden a stumbling bloc effect the analysis identifies conditions under which each of these outcomes emerges