credentials and wage discrimination the subject is wage discrimination among workers with differing privately known reservation wages and costs of obtaining credentials that can be observed by a monopsonist firm numerical examples are studied in which workers are equally productive and in the population their reservation wages and credentialing costs have a normal distribution with negative correlation according to these examples wage discrimination is unprofitable

using field experiments to address environmental externalities and resource scarcity major lessons learned and new directions for future research this article provides an overview of the use of field experiments in energy and resource economics i concentrate on two areas of study field experiments that i speak to the use of dynamic pricing plans to manage the use of electricity and water and ii explore the adoption of energy saving technologies viewed in its totality this work suggests that both neo classical factors such as prices or search costs and behavioural constructs such as salience or social norms influence the use of energy and water for academics the studies reviewed provide a deeper understanding of individual behaviour and the factors that drive the private provision of public goods for policy makers the studies reviewed provide a blueprint outlining ways to combine insights from neo classical and behavioural economics to manage energy water demand and mitigate externalities generated through their use

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

almost budget balanced vcg mechanisms to assign multiple objects subsidy free vcg mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents the efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus over all profiles of non negative valuations the smallest efficiency loss l n p satisfies l n p l n n2 43n if pn is bounded away from 12 l n p converges to zero exponentially in n participation is voluntary in the optimal mechanism achieving l n p if p 1 but not if p 2 among voluntary mechanisms the optimal efficiency loss is not significantly larger than l n p if pn 12 but it does not converge to zero in n if pn 12

stationary equilibrium in a market for durable assets this paper presents a dynamic model of consumer trading on the primary secondary and scrap markets for a stochastically deteriorating durable good in a stationary economy with perfect information and no transaction costs we explicitly model the trading process by tracking each durable from its birth in the primary market through its sequence of owners in the secondary market until its death in the scrap market we prove that a stationary equilibrium exists characterize the distribution of consumer holdings of durables and show that equilibrium asset prices are shadow prices to a particular regenerative optimal stopping problem we show that each heterogeneous agent equilibrium is observationally equivalent to a homogeneous agent equilibrium we derive a differential equation for equilibrium rental rates and a functional equation which links rental rates to asset prices these equations show precisely how the structure of durable prices and rental rates embody the functional form and population distribution of preferences and the technological characteristics of durable goods this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

the mispricing of u s treasury bonds a case study this article documents an apparent pricing anomaly involving 94 percent 30 year treasury bonds during the months of may and june 1986 during this period the price of the 94s rose sharply relative to the prices of other long term treasury bonds and created a potential arbitrage opportunity in addition owners of the 94 bonds were able to borrow at a zero interest rate bypledging their bonds detailed examination reveals that this relative pricing anomaly cannot be attributed to changes in the level or term structure of interest rates or to differences between the bonds with respect to liquidity taxation or duration

an analysis of the true notional bond system applied to the cbot t bond futures abstract the conversion factor system cfs is used in the determination of the invoice price of the chicago board of trade treasury bond futures as an alternative to the cfs oviedo oviedo r a 2006 improving the design of treasury bond futures contracts the journal of business 79 1293 1315 proposed the true notional bond system tnbs and showed that it outperforms the cfs when interest rates are deterministic the main purpose of this paper is to compare the effectiveness of the two systems in a stochastic environment in order to do so we price the cbot t bond futures as well as all its embedded delivery options under both the cfs and the tnbs our pricing procedure is an adaptation of the dynamic programming algorithm described in ben abdallah et al ben abdallah r ben ameur h breton m 2007 pricing cbot treasury bond futures les cahiers du gerad g 2006 77 numerical illustrations show that in a stochastic framework tnbs does not always outperform the cfs however as the long term mean moves away from the level of the notional rate the tnbs performs increasingly better than the cfs

worst case optimal redistribution of vcg payments in multi unit auctions abstract for allocation problems with one or more items the well known vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism aka clarke mechanism generalized vickrey auction is efficient strategy proof individually rational and does not incur a deficit however it is not strongly budget balanced generally the agents payments will sum to more than 0 we study mechanisms that redistribute some of the vcg payments back to the agents while maintaining the desirable properties of the vcg mechanism our objective is to come as close to budget balance as possible in the worst case for auctions with multiple indistinguishable units in which marginal values are nonincreasing we derive a mechanism that is optimal in this sense we also derive an optimal mechanism for the case where we drop the non deficit requirement finally we show that if marginal values are not required to be nonincreasing then the original vcg mechanism is worst case optimal

existence of stationary equilibrium in the markets for new and used durable goods abstract we prove the existence of stationary equilibrium in the primary and secondhand markets for an indivisible consumer durable in a general model with stochastic degradation and endogenous scrappage decisions unlike rust econometrica 53 1985 783 we introduce transaction costs in the model as a motivation for consumer holdings of durables across multiple quality levels our technique allows for both multiple types of durables e g porsche and bmw and relaxation of the single crossing condition on consumer tastes we provide a simple example showing how increasing transaction costs affect secondhand prices eventually for sufficiently costly transactions closing the secondhand market altogether

foundations of dominant strategy mechanisms wilson 1987 criticizes applied game theory s reliance on common knowledge as sumptions in reaction to wilson s critique the recent literature of mechanism design has adopted the goal of finding detail free mechanisms in order to eliminate this re liance in practice this has meant restricting attention to simple mechanisms such as dominant strategy mechanisms however there has been little theoretical foundation for this approach in particular it is not clear the search for an optimal mechanism that does not rely on common knowledge assumption would lead to simpler mechanisms rather than more complicated ones this paper tries to fill the void in the context of an expected revenue maximizing auctioneer we investigate some foundations for using simple dominant strategy auctions

implementation of reduced form auctions a geometric approach an auction is a mechanism for allocating a single indivisible object to one of several competing bidders the winner is the bidder who is awarded the object the rules of the auction specify two functions the first is the probability with which a bidder wins as a function of everyone s bids the second is the payment each bidder makes to the seller as a function of all the bids and whether or not he wins for instance a first price auction awards the object to the highest bidder with probability one providing there are no tie bids the winner pays his bid and the losers pay nothing the bidders in an auction differ significantly these differences are captured by the bidder s type a type may be the bidder s personal valuation of the object for sale his degree of risk aversion or perhaps his information about the object maskin and riley 1984 discuss a number of different economically meaningful examples of bidder types from the viewpoint of the seller and the other bidders each bidder s type is a random variable in this analysis we confine attention to auctions in which the types are independently and identically distributed according to a known probability distribution the revelation principle asserts that every auction is strategically equivalent to an auction in which bidders bid by announcing their type and no bidder has any incentive to lie such an auction is called an incentive compatible direct auction we will confine our attention to the probability functions for direct auctions and let the incentive compatibility conditions restrict the payment functions each bidder can compute the probability that he wins conditional on his own type by averaging over the types of the other bidders the function relating a bidder s type to his probability of winning is the reduced form of the auction the literature on optimal auctions usually addresses the problem of maximizing expected revenue for the seller for this purpose all the relevant information about the probability function of an auction is contained in its reduced form it is the reduced form that determines each bidder s behavior and hence the seller s expected revenue in a symmetric auction each bidder s reduced form is identical so that expected revenue is a functional defined on reduced forms which are functions of one variable namely types this makes the seller s problem somewhat tractable to design an auction a seller must be able to recognize a reduced form and recover the underlying auction reduced forms satisfy an intuitive feasibility condition given a set of types the

polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem we consider a revelation mechanism for the production of public goods a sample of consumers is drawn at random each member of the sample is asked to reveal her his preferences agents are subjected to transfers of the groves class and any surplus of taxes collected on sampled agents is redistributed to non sampled agents this polling mechanism is non parametric revealing in dominant strategies budget balanced and approximately efficient if the consumer population is large when applied to a public good with exclusion this mechanism in combination with consumer free mobility yields approximately optimal allocations

on cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good we study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation ecsmp mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good according to the maximal welfare loss criterion the ecsmp is optimal within the class of strategyproof individually rational and no deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents in general the ecsmp mechanism is not optimal we provide a class of mechanisms obtained by symmetric perturbations of ecsmp with strictly lower maximal welfare loss we show that if one of two possible fairness conditions is additionally imposed the ecsmp mechanism becomes optimal

optimal allocation of an indivisible good abstract in this paper we consider the problem of allocating an indivisible good efficiently between two agents with monetary transfers we focus on allocation mechanisms that are dominant strategy incentive compatible when agents types are private information inefficiency of an allocation mechanism may come from two sources misallocation of the indivisible good and an imbalanced budget unfortunately as green and laffont 1979 demonstrate no allocation mechanism can always overcome both kinds of inefficiency we identify allocation mechanisms that maximize the expected total utilities of agents and characterize optimal mechanisms for a large class of agents type distributions for strongly regular type distributions we show that the optimal mechanisms must be budget balanced they are either fixed price mechanisms or option mechanisms the result may not hold for other type distributions for certain type distributions we show that optimal mechanisms are hybrids of vickrey clarke groves mechanisms and budget balanced mechanisms

treasury auction bids and the salomon squeeze recent press accounts claim that collusion is common practice in treasury auctions and that as a result the auction profits are excessive but this paper finds that the auction prices are on average marginally higher than the secondary market bid prices the auction profits however are systematically related to the total fraction of winning bids tendered by banks and dealers the postauction prices of the two year notes in which salomon brothers had a 94 percent holding are also examined the secondary market prices of these notes were significantly higher than the estimated competitive prices in the four week postissue period

the flat rental puzzle 4cars and replace them after 2 years or when their odometer exceeds 34 000 km this is a very costly 5 strategy caused by rapid depreciation in used car prices we show how economic theory predicts that 6 in a competitive market cars are rented out covering their full economic lifespan and rental prices are 7 a declining function of their odometer value our solution to these puzzles is that actual rental markets 8 are not fully competitive and firms may be behaving suboptimally we provide a case study of a large 9 car rental company that provided us access to its operating data we develop a model of the company s 10 operations that predicts that the company can significantly increase its profits by keeping its rental cars 11 twice as long as it currently does and also by discounting the rental cost of older vehicles to induce 12 its customers to rent them the company undertook an experiment to test our model s predictions 13 we report initial findings from this experiment which involved over 4500 rentals of over 500 cars in 14 4 locations over a 5 month period the results are consistent with the predictions of our model and 15 suggest that a properly chosen declining rental price function can increase overall revenues profits 16 also increase significantly since doubling the holding period of rental cars cuts discounted replacement 17 costs by nearly 40 18

robustness and linear contracts abstract we consider a moral hazard problem where the principal is uncertain as to what the agent can and cannot do she knows some actions available to the agent but other unknown actions may also exist the principal demands robustness evaluating possible contracts by their worst case performance over unknown actions the agent might potentially take the model assumes risk neutrality and limited liability and no other functional form assumptions very generally the optimal contract is linear the model thus offers a new explanation for linear contracts in practice it also introduces a flexible modeling approach for moral hazard under nonquantifiable uncertainty jel d81 d82 d86

are lemons really hot potatoes abstract we model the hazard rate for car ownership spells our model allows us to distinguish among different types of adverse selection effects by observing the type of unobserved heterogeneity across owners of the same car our empirical results strongly suggest that there is a lemons effect because there is significant unobserved heterogeneity however they also suggest that the lemons effect is caused by the first owner rather than the manufacturer had the manufacturer created the lemon the unobserved heterogeneity would be positively correlated over all owners of a given car instead we observe a negative correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity term for the first owner and the unobserved heterogeneity term for subsequent owners

on the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation we consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent one dimensional private types we prove that for any bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus the short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to gutmann kemperman reeds and shepp 1991 we also show that the equivalence between bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations

on the generic nonoptimality of dominant strategy allocation mechanisms a general theorem that includes pure exchange economies it is shown that if an economy s participants cannot be separated into groups across which there are no potentially conflicting interests i e if the economy is indecomposable then every continuous truth dominant allocation mechanism will attain nonoptimal allocations on an open dense set of preference profiles classical edgeworth box exchange economies economies with no externalities and no production but with arbitrary numbers of consumers and goods as well as economies with public goods and economies with other kinds of externalities are all shown via simple arguments to be indecomposable the results are extended to cover nonrevelation mechanisms copyright 1990 by the econometric society

an empirical model of mainframe computer investment this paper introduces a dynamic model of investment decisions in mainframe computer systems i estimate and test the model using detailed micro data from a company in the telecommunications industry the model accounts for technological depreciation which distinguishes computers from other investment goods where physical depreciation is typically a key factor underlying replacement investment decisions the company increased its installed mainframe computer capacity by over 30 fold over the 10 year sample period part of this growth was undoubtedly due to the huge increase in performance and the corresponding drop in the per unit cost of processing capacity of mainframes a consequence of moore s law however there was also tremendous growth in the need for computers for billing account processing and other tasks due to the rapid growth in the telecommunications industry over this same time period i estimate the unknown parameters of the investment model using a nonlinear least squares nested fixed point algorithm nls nfxp which solves the bellman equation underlying the dynamic model of investment and replacement of mainframe computers by nonlinear least squares i demonstrate that it is feasible to estimate this model on an ordinary pc whereas standard discretization approaches to solving the firm s optimal investment policy might not even be feasible using supercomputers i show that the estimated model fits the data very well and accurately captures the large growth in installed mainframe capacity the timing and magnitude of replacement investment as well as periodic upgrades of existing mainframe units i use the model to decompose how much of the 30 fold increase in mainframe computer capacity is due to moore s law i e the huge drop in the unit cost of installed mainframe capacity and how much is due to the growth in demand for services of mainframes due to the rapid growth in demand for telecommunications services particularly cell phone accounts by the firm s customers copyright 2010 john wiley sons ltd

the market for used cars new evidence of the lemons phenomenon the lemons model assumes that owners of used cars have an information advantage over potential buyers with respect to the quality of their vehicles owners of bad cars try to sell them to ill informed buyers while owners of good cars hold on to theirs consequently the quality of traded automobiles tends to be sub average in contrast to previous empirical work the following article investigates the behaviour of both buyers and sellers testing for adverse selection by sellers and for quality uncertainty among buyers with a sample consisting of all 1985 cars registered in the swiss canton of basle city over the period 1985 to 1991 our data supports both adverse selection and buyer uncertainty suggesting that a lemons problem exists

strategic trading behavior and price distortion in a manipulated market anatomy of a squeeze abstract this paper investigates an attempted delivery squeeze in a bond futures contract traded in london using cash and futures trades of dealers and customers we analyze their strategic trading behavior price distortion and learning in a market manipulation setting we argue that marked differences in settlement failure penalties in the cash and futures markets create conditions that favor squeezes we recommend that regulators require special flagging of forward term repurchase agreements on the key deliverables that span futures contract maturity dates and that exchanges mark to market their contract specifications more frequently or consider a cash settled contract on a basket of bonds

the limits of inference with theory a review of wolpin 2013 this essay reviews kenneth i wolpin s 2013 monograph the limits of inference without theory which arose from lectures he presented at the cowles foundation in 2010 in honor of tjalling koopmans while i readily agree with wolpin s basic premise that empirical work that eschews the role of economic theory faces unnecessary self imposed limits relative to empirical work that embraces and tries to test and improve economic theory it is important to be aware that the use of economic theory is not a panacea i point out that there are also serious limits to inference with theory 1 there may be no truly structural policy invariant parameters a key assumption underpinning the structural econometric approach that wolpin and the cowles foundation have championed 2 there is a curse of dimensionality that makes it very difficult for us to elucidate the detailed implications of economic theo ries which is necessary to empirically implement and test these theories 3 there is an identification problem that makes it impossible to decide between competing theories without imposing ad hoc auxiliary assumptions such as parametric functional form assumptions and 4 there is a problem of multiplicity and indeterminacy of equilibria that limits the predictive empirical content of many economic theories i conclude that though these are very challenging problems i agree with wolpin and the cowles foundation that economists have far more to gain by trying to incorporate economic theory into empirical work and test and improve our theories than by rejecting theory and presuming that all interesting economic issues can be answered by well designed controlled randomized experiments and assuming that difficult questions of causality and evaluation of alternative hypothetical policies can be resolved by simply allowing the data to speak for itself jel b41 c18

dynamic demand for new and used durable goods without physical depreciation the case of japanese video games we develop a new dynamic demand model for new and used durable goods and quantify the impact of used goods markets on producers profits and consumer welfare

bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in the independent private values model we prove in the standard independent private values model that the outcome in terms of interim expected probabilities of trade and interim expected transfers of any bayesian mechanism can also be obtained with a dominant strategy mechanism

history is repeating itself get ready for a long dry spell the recent disappearance of a five year maturity gap from the set of bonds deliverable to the chicago board of trade treasury bond futures has resulted in a distinctive configuration whereby a single t bond will have the shortest remaining maturity in the delivery basket of bonds for a five year period this situation would be inconsequential were three other conditions not simultaneously present ensuring that this single bond will probably be the cheapest to deliver bond over the next five years we show that a similar alignment of conditions happened in 1994 1999 during the long dry spell of the 11 we recall the detrimental repercussions of that dry spell on the bond markets and suggest possible steps to remedy the current situation

optimal private good allocation the case for a balanced budget abstract in an independent private value auction environment we are interested in strategy proof mechanisms that maximize the agents residual surplus that is the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity we find that under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents that is it will be budget balanced specifically optimal mechanisms have a simple posted price or option form in the bilateral trade environment we obtain optimality of posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions

uniform pricing in us retail chains we show that most u s food drugstore and mass merchandise chains charge nearly uniform prices across stores despite wide variation in consumer demographics and competition demand estimates reveal substantial within chain variation in price elasticities and suggest that the median chain sacrifices 16 million of annual profit relative to a benchmark of optimal prices in contrast differences in average prices between chains are broadly consistent with the optimal benchmark we discuss a range of explanations for nearly uniform pricing highlighting managerial inertia and brand image concerns as mechanisms frequently mentioned by industry participants relative to our optimal benchmark uniform pricing may significantly increase the prices paid by poorer households relative to the rich dampen the response of prices to local economic shocks alter the analysis of mergers in antitrust and shift the incidence of intranational trade costs

a strategic analysis of corners and squeezes we develop a dynamic game theoretic model of a futures market in which prices can be manipulated by corner and squeeze we investigate equilibrium trading strategies and the price dynamics these strategies produce price paths produced by our model can mimic observed prices for potentially comerable commodities and explain the volatility of certain prices even when no manipulations occur our model also generates occasional apparent price bubbles and accounts for the existence of normal backwardation in futures markets even when players are risk neutral

balanced ranking mechanisms abstract in the private values single object auction model we construct a satisfactory mechanism a symmetric dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget balanced mechanism the mechanism converges to efficiency at an exponential rate it allocates the object to the highest valued agent with more than 99 probability provided there are at least 14 agents it is also ex post individually rational we show that our mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms since achieving efficiency through a dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget balanced mechanism is impossible in this model our results illustrate the limits of this impossibility