the inflation tax in a real business cycle model money is incorporated into a real business cycle model using a cash in advance constraint the model economy is used to analyze whether the business cycle is different in high inflation and low inflation economies and to analyze the impact of variability in the growth rate of money in addition the welfare cost of the inflation tax is measured and the steady state properties of high and low inflation economies are compared

asymmetric price adjustment and economic fluctuations this paper considers a possible explanation for asymmetric adjustment of nominal prices the authors present a menu cost model in which positive trend inflation causes firms relative prices to decline automatically between price adjustments in this environment shocks that raise firms desired prices trigger larger price responses than shocks that lower desired prices the authors use this model of asymmetric adjustment to address three issues in macroeconomics the effects of aggregate demand the effects of sectoral shocks and the optimal rate of inflation copyright 1994 by royal economic society

boom and bust cycles external imbalances and the real exchange rate when the current account balance and net capital outflows do not exactly offset each other international payment flows arise payment flows into a country push the real exchange rate up payment outflows push it down this article uses a model of optimal consumption and portfolio choice to determine the factors that drive international payment flows during boom and bust cycles it shows that during such episodes capital inflows first exceed the deficit on current account strengthening the currency later on when the return on domestic capital reverts to its normal level the current account recovers yet the overall decline of the net foreign asset position provokes a fall of the real exchange rate even below its initial level case studies of countries experiencing rapid economic expansions followed by economic and financial meltdowns confirm the article s theoretical predictions

crises and exchange rate regimes time to break down the bipolar view we revisit the link between crises and exchange rate regimes err using a panel of 90 developed and developing countries over the period 1980 2009 we find that corner err are not more prone to crises compared to intermediate err this finding holds for different types of crises banking currency and debt and is robust to a wide set of alternative specifications consequently we clearly break down the traditional bipolar view countries that aim at preventing crisis episodes should focus less on the choice of the err and instead implement sound structural macroeconomic policies

collusion and overlending i introduction for a long time have korean companies been engaged in unbridled expansionism financed through loans inefficient octopus style management and over and duplicate investment thus expediting the structural failure of the economy this failure to concentrate on profits consolidation and efficiency provided the fuse to the bankruptcy bombs that triggered the foreign exchange and economic crises the collusion between the conglomerates financial sector and politicians made this financial monopoly possible chosun ilbo december 26 1997 collusion and overlending in the korean financial sector may be best illustrated by the above editorial highlight of chosun ilbo the most read newspaper in korea its 1997 financial crisis is primarily triggered by continual bankruptcies of chaebols conglomerates which with assistance from politicians had borrowed heavily from financial institutions in financing their investment projects 1 unlike some other asian countries experiencing problems in their financial sector due to shifts in investment projects toward real estates such as japan hong kong and thailand chaebols in korea concentrated mostly on manufacturing activities 2 in this study we establish a tractable model of overlending with three key players namely chaebols financial institutions and politicians as highlighted in chosun ilbo the model is designed to achieve two primary goals that are crucial for matching some key observations during the korean turmoil first we illustrate how overlending can be an equilibrium outcome with collusion between chaebols and politicians when the economic environment is favorable this occurs despite that such a collusion distorts normal borrowing lending operation by causing a discernible shift in loan composition from more to less productive investment projects second we show that as the economic environment gradually deteriorates there can be a shift from a collusion to a no collusion equilibrium the combination of deterioration in fundamentals and expectations of an equilibrium shift can trigger economy wide financial crisis more specifically we construct a simple principal supervisor agent model of corruption and overlending the principal is the formal authority of loan decision making of a financial institution or in short the financial institution the supervisor is a politician who serves as the informational intermediary in the borrowing lending arrangement via his her connections and networking 3 the agent is a chaebol of an unknown type which seeks for external financing of a set of risky projects a politician s favorable signal about the borrowing chaebol s overall performance would grant the approval of the loan to finance an array of risky projects whose returns depend on idiosyncratic shocks that cannot be washed out in aggregation within the chaebol as an outside alternative to making the loan the financial institution can invest in the world capital market where a fixed rate of return is guaranteed this portfolio decision depends on a comparison of the expected average returns on the given set of risky projects with the safe returns on investments in the world capital market while both the chaebol s type and the state of nature are unobservable to the financial institution we for simplicity assume that politician s connections and networking can fully uncover the true type of the chaebol this valuable information possessed by the politician is one that the financial institution has an incentive to purchase but a low type chaebol has an incentive to conceal whether the politician ends up revealing truthfully this information depends on how much to obtain from the lender in terms of general support versus how much to gain from the borrower in terms of bribes or side payments when a low type chaebol has the politician on its side information is distorted and a collusion equilibrium arises

ngos agricultural technology and the rural poor abstract a wide range of agencies outside the public and private commercial sectors is involved in generating introducing testing and promoting agricultural technology particularly for small farmers and landless labourers in marginal areas of less developed countries their experience is largely undocumented and tends to be overlooked for specific locations this paper discusses the significance of different types of voluntary agency vis a vis the public sector focusing on non government organizations it then examines in what roles they can be expected to perform well although still fragmentary the evidence from africa asia and latin america indicates substantial unexploited complementarities between agencies within and outside the public sector

the argentine stabilization plan of december 20th abstract in this paper an analytical model is developed to incorporate the essential characteristics of the stabilization plan implemented in argentina in january 1979 the model is based upon a set of simplifying assumptions that only approximate the complexity of the real world it is assumed that the expectations of inflation and the degree of excess demand or supply in the non traded goods market are the main intermediate determinants of the rate of inflation in that market the rate of change of prices of traded goods being determined by the external inflation together with the rate of devaluation treating thus the external rate of inflation as exogenous the only instrument available for influencing the rate of inflation in the long run is the rate of devaluation since the model assumes a fixed exchange rate regime the money supply is endogenous and hence unsuitable as an instrument of economic policy

the politics of speculative attacks in industrial democracies recent models of speculative currency crises contend that market expectations of policy behavior can trigger a speculative attack we argue that political processes and partisan objectives inform expectations about the government s commitment to the exchange rate first market actors anticipate periods when the partisan identity of a government may change through an election or a cabinet collapse second party labels provide information to currency traders about the policy objectives of a potential government consequently we contend that the probability of a speculative attack will be higher when markets expect the cabinet to end and when the cabinet dissolution is likely to produce a leftward shift in policy a discrete timesurvival model is used to estimate the probability that a cabinet will dissolve in any given month for sixteen parliamentary democracies from 1970 to 1995 the predicted values are then used as a proxy for market expectations in a model of speculative currency crises

balance of payments crises in a cash in advance economy the author shows that a flexible prices sidrauski type model with a cash in advance constraint is capable of depicting some of the phenomena associated with a balance of payments crisis like the onesrecently observed in argentina and mexico current accounts deficits and appreciation of the real exchange rat e it is also shown that these phenomena become exacerbated as the rate of devaluation before the crisis occurs becomes smaller copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

seigniorage revenue deficits and self fulfilling currency crises abstract this paper examines potential resolutions to the conflict between a fixed exchange rate and seigniorage revenue requirement of a stylized developing economy that gives rise to a currency crisis the government has an informational advantage and can decide when it is optimal to invoke an escape clause i e to drop the peg and float speculators must guess when the crisis will happen based on their assessment of the probability of collapse and this makes pegged exchange rate equilibria unstable

monopolistic competition credibility and the output costs of disinflation programs an analysis of price controls abstract brazil argentina and israel all used price controls as part of disinflation programs in 1985 1986 in each case they were intended to break an inertial component of inflation this paper focuses on the interaction between lack of credibility of government monetary policy announcements and the price setting behavior of forward looking firms we show that this interaction can lead to inertia extending well beyond the price setting period lack of credibility is then shown to lead to output losses during a disinflation program the paper analyses asset price behavior during disinflation programs with and without price controls and the influence of credibility problems finally we show that if past government policy has any information content about future government policy cheating on current announcements of tight policy buys current employment gains during the price control period at the cost of higher inflation afterwards sustaining low inflation after the price control period thus requires restrictive monetary policy during the price control period

macroeconomic regime switches and speculative attacks this paper explains a currency crisis as an outcome of a switch in how monetary policy and fiscal policy are coordinated the paper develops a model of an open economy in which monetary policy starts active fiscal policy starts passive and in a particular state of nature monetary policy switches to passive and fiscal policy switches to active the probability of the regime switch is endogenous and changes over time together with the state of the economy the regime switch is preceded by a sharp increase in interest rates and causes a jump in the exchange rate the model predicts that currency composition of public debt affects dynamics of macroeconomic variables furthermore the model is consistent with evidence from recent currency crises in particular small seigniorage revenues

discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises the flrst generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that in the absence of very large triggering shocks currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations this paper shows that these features of flrst generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information in particular this paper analyzes a generalization of the krugman flood garber kfg model which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals in this environment the kfg equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria in all the other equilibria the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations

mean gini analysis in r d portfolio selection abstract to date no single model has been published which fully satisfies the needs for a practical r d project selection technique some earlier models cannot handle risk well while others do not provide efficient portfolios this paper will present a model adapted from the literature of financial portfolio optimization which provides a practical means of developing preferred portfolios of risky r d projects the method is simple and highly intuitive requiring estimation of only two parameters the expected return and the gini coefficient the gini coefficient essentially replaces the variance in the two parameter mean variance model and results in a superior screening ability the model that we present requires estimates of only these two parameters and in turn allows for relatively simple determination of stochastic dominance sd among candidate r d portfolios we apply our model to a simple artificial five project set and then to a set of 30 actual candidate projects from an anonymous operating company we demonstrate that we can determine the stochastically non dominated portfolios for this real world set of projects our technique appropriate for all risk averse decision makers permits r d managers to screen large numbers of candidate portfolios to discover those which they would prefer under the criteria of sd

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

delaying the inevitable interest rate defense and balance of payments crises the classical model of balance of payments crises implicitly assumes that the central bank sits passively as international reserves dwindle in practice however central banks typically defend pegs aggressively by raising short term interest rates this paper analyzes the feasibility and optimality of raising interest rates to delay a potential bop crisis interest rate policy works through two distinct channels by raising demand for domestic interest bearing liquid assets higher interest rates tend to delay the crisis higher interest rates however increase public debt service and imply higher future inflation which tends to bring forward the crisis we show that under certain conditions it is feasible to delay the crisis but raising interest rates beyond a certain point may actually hasten the crisis a similar nonmonotonic relationship emerges between welfare and the increase in interest rates it is thus optimal to engage in some active interest rate defense but only up to a certain point i

temporary stabilization predetermined exchange rates the paper analyzes the impact of a stabilization policy based on a temporary reduction in the rate of devaluation against a background in which a constant rate of devaluation has no real effects it is shown that the temporary policy does and furthermore that the real effects tend to become bigger in absolute value as the horizon of the temporary policy is shortened the central discussion is carried out in terms of a one good cash in advance model with perfect capital mobility and ramsey type consumers results are extended to account for home goods and variable velocity the roles of capital mobility and banking liberalization are briefly discussed

the welfare costs of moderate inflations in the recent past the view that a little bit of inflation was good for the economy was widely held the phillips curve in its earlier incarnations implied that moderate inflation was worth tolerating because it would permit lower unemployment this justification for tolerating inflation has long since been abandoned by economists and policymakers because both theory and experience showed it to be false nevertheless one legacy of this era seems to be a fairly widespread tolerance for moderate inflation recently there has been much discussion of removing this inflationary bias by passing legislation that would require the federal reserve to target zero inflation in this paper we examine some of the consequences of achieving that goal we appraise the revenue and welfare costs of policies designed to reduce moderate inflation rates to zero much has been written about why government policies may have an inflationary bias in this paper we don t address the issue of what motivates governments to inflate implicit in our analysis however is the notion that one important motive for inflation is the revenue raising potential of the inflation tax it would be difficult to argue that the inflation tax constitutes an important revenue source for the united states one indirect and very imperfect measure of this would be contributions by the federal lleserve to the treasury in recent years those rebates have amounted to

macroeconomic effects of imf sponsored programs in latin america output costs program recidivism and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations we investigate the effects of imf stabilization programs and the reasons behind the unusually high imf activity and relatively low program completion rates in latin america we base our tests on a panel and distinguish between imf program approvals and completion we find that latin america has higher output costs of imf programs especially when completed no improvement in the current account and a much higher likelihood of program failure and recidivism than other regions the common finding that entering into an imf supported program incurs real short run costs on the economy is entirely driven by the experiences in latin america

determinants and costs of current account reversals under heterogeneity and serial correlation using large panel data sets for analysis of determinants and costs of reversals asks for controls of latent heterogeneity among countries this article performs a bayesian analysis which allows for a parsimonious yet flexible handling of country specific heterogeneity via random coefficients and serially correlated errors consideration of persistence within the employed macroeconomic data is important to gauge the impact of explaining variables suggested by theory correctly bayesian specification tests provide evidence in favour of models incorporating heterogeneity and serial correlation the results suggest that costs of reversals are overestimated when country specific heterogeneity is neglected and stress the importance of external variables in explaining current account reversals results are checked for robustness against the underlying reversal definition

governments ngos and agricultural development perspectives on changing inter organisational relationships there are divergent interests in involving ngos in public sector programmes of agricultural development some commentators seek to foster popular participation through such involvement while others view it largely within the logic of public sector cutbacks using material primarily from latin america and also from africa and asia the potential gains and risks inherent in a range of ngo government relationships are considered strengths and weaknesses in ngo development strategies and practice are reviewed and potential public sector contributions discussed while closer relationships between ngos and governments seem likely to emerge in the context of current public sector reform the form these relationships will assume is less clear and will probably be highly diverse

tight money and inflation abstract in a recent paper sargent and wallace present an example where tightening of monetary policy over a specified time interval in conjunction with a constant deficit leads to an increase in the rate of inflation not only beyond this interval but even from the outset in the present paper i show how the latter result can be derived from a standard monetary growth model of the sidrauski brock type this enables a relatively simple interpretation of the apparent paradox

learning large deviations and recurrent currency crises this article studies a version of obstfeld s journal of international economics 43 1997 61 77 escape clause model the model is calibrated to produce three rational expectations equilibria two of these equilibria are e stable and one is unstable dynamics are introduced by assuming that agents must learn about the government s decision rule it is assumed they do this using a stochastic approximation algorithm it turns out that as a certain parameter describing the sensitivity of beliefs to new information gets small the algorithm converges to a small noise diffusion process the dynamics of exchange rate changes are then characterized using large deviation techniques from freidlin and wentzell random perturbations of dynamical systems second edition berlin springer verlag 1998 these methods describe the sense in which the limiting distribution of exchange rate changes is approximated by a two state markov switching process where the two states correspond to the two e stable equilibria the model is calibrated to the exchange rate histories of argentina brazil and mexico currency crises in these countries resemble the predicted escape routes of the model a key feature of these escape routes is that expectations of a devaluation erupt suddenly without large contemporaneous shocks this is consistent with evidence showing that crises are often poorly anticipated by financial markets

when is it optimal to abandon a fixed exchange rate the influential krugman flood garber kfg model of balance of payment crises assumes that a fixed exchange rate is abandoned if and only if international reserves reach a critical threshold value from a positive standpoint the kfg rule is at odds with many episodes in which the central bank has plenty of international reserves at the time of abandonment we study the optimal exit policy and show that from a normative standpoint the kfg rule is generally suboptimal we consider a model in which the fixed exchange rate regime has become unsustainable due to an unexpected increase in government spending we show that when there are no exit costs it is optimal to abandon immediately when there are exit costs the optimal abandonment time is a decreasing function of the size of the fiscal shock for large fiscal shocks immediate abandonment is optimal our model is consistent with evidence suggesting that many countries exit fixed exchange rate regimes with still plenty of international reserves in the central bank s vault copyright 2008 wiley blackwell

disinflation and fiscal reform a neoclassical perspective abstract many latin american countries engaged in disinflation programs based on both exchange rate management and fiscal reforms in most of the cases part of the fiscal reform was not implemented and the program had to be abandoned the aftermath of these programs is not encouraging in this paper we show that if the reform process is uncertain and inflation has welfare costs the optimal exchange rate policy indeed implies the initiation of a disinflation program at the announcement of the fiscal reform even if it implies the possibility of a balance of payments crisis finally we show that it is optimal to engage in a sequence of stabilization programs until one of them is successful

mean gini portfolio theory and the pricing of risky assets this paper presents the mean gini mg approach to analyze risky prospects and construct optimum portfolios the proposed method has the simplicity of a mean variance model and the main features of stochastic dominance efficiency since mean gini is consistent with investor behavior under uncertainty for a wide class of probability distributions gini s mean difference is shown to be more adequate than the variance for evaluating the variability of a prospect the mg approach is then applied to capital markets and the security valuation theorem is derived as a general relationship between average return and risk this is further extended to include a degree of risk aversion that can be estimated from capital market data the analysis is concluded with the concentration ratio to allow for the classification of different securities with respect to their relative riskiness

a multiple source of innovation model of agricultural research and technology promotion abstract two models of agricultural research and technology diffusion are described and contrasted the central source of innovation model frequently underlies the theories and rhetoric of agricultural research and extension institutions the multiple source of innovation model places agricultural research and diffusion processes in the historical political economic agroclimatic and institutional context in which technological change takes place the paper discusses the evidence and reasons for the dominance of the central model and reviews the significance of the multiple source model for agricultural research policy

a real options perspective on r d portfolio diversification abstract this paper shows that the conditionality of investment decisions in r d has a critical impact on portfolio risk and implies that traditional diversification strategies should be reevaluated when a portfolio is constructed real option theory argues that research projects have conditional or option like risk and return properties and are different from unconditional projects although the risk of a portfolio always depends on the correlation between projects a portfolio of conditional r d projects with real option characteristics has a fundamentally different risk than a portfolio of unconditional projects when conditional r d projects are negatively correlated diversification only slightly reduces portfolio risk when projects are positively correlated however diversification proves more effective than conventional tools predict

international reserves and global interest rates abstract in this paper we study the relationship between foreign currency international reserve holdings and global interest rates to guide empirical work we solve a simple small open economy model with money where the central bank manages international reserves to smooth inflation over time this model shows that changes in interest rates are positively related to the target level of reserves as a consequence interest rate hikes increase reserve transfers defined as the change in international reserves net of the interest earned on reserves using quarterly data for 75 countries between 2000 and 2013 we document a positive relationship between interest rate changes and reserve transfers as a share of gdp that is consistent with the model

gold monetization and gold discipline gold and its price have emerged as frequent topics of both academic and government debate 2 public attention focused on the gold market since gold s price began fluctuating violently in 1980 and 1981 has turned to gold as a possible means of removing some discretion inherent in the current fiat money system since lack of adherence to monetary rules can lead to problems of dynamic policy inconsistency academic economists have begun seriously to reconsider monetary standards based either on gold or on some other commodity as politically feasible methods of establishing rules 3

explaining the duration of exchange rate pegs abstract this paper is an empirical investigation of the duration of exchange rate pegs in 16 latin american countries and jamaica we identify factors that influence peg duration using logit analysis the real exchange rate and the level of international liquidity are significant determinants of the monthly likelihood of devaluation structural variables such as the openness of an economy and its geographical trade concentration and political variables such as changes in the executive also significantly affect the likelihood of a devaluation there is some evidence that the likelihood of a devaluation first rises and subsequently declines during the first year of a peg

invisible hands indigenous knowledge and inevitable fads challenges to public sector agricultural research in ghana abstract support for public sector agricultural research in developing countries is declining at the same time many donors feel that alternative institutions will be able to perform the functions traditionally reserved for the public sector these alternatives include private sector initiatives nongovernment organizations and farmer organizations and highly publicized special projects in agricultural development the logic of these alternatives is examined using evidence on maize research in ghana although each of the alternatives offers contributions and public sector research undoubtedly requires an overhaul emphasis is placed on the necessity of continued suport to building strong public sector agricultural research capacity

reserve accumulation and financial crises from individual protection to systemic risk abstract this paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries international reserve holdings and financial crises while the local view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre which is transmitted globally according to this global view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system since the crisis affects all countries alike the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non accumulating countries we integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves moreover if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves a macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45

fiscal discipline and the choice of a nominal anchor in stabilization abstract the conventional wisdom is that exchange rate based stabilizations induce more fiscal discipline than money based programs the latin american experience does not support this view among the major stabilization programs implemented since 1960 the mean increase in the primary balance to gdp ratio was 3 2 percentage points under money based programs as opposed to only 0 2 percentage points under exchange rate based programs we present a model where fiscal policy is set by an optimizing but non benevolent government that replicates this stylized fact if the policy maker is impatient a money based stabilization provides more discipline and higher welfare for the representative agent than does an exchange rate based stabilization

the welfare cost of inflation under imperfect insurance abstract this paper examines the welfare cost of inflation in an economy where agents hold money in order to smooth consumption in the face of income variability for which there is no insurance the findings indicate that for the type of economies considered here the area under the empirical money demand curve is a poor measure of the welfare cost of inflation this area accounts for only one fourth of the true costs in the case of 5 inflation

currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence while virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers defend it this is seldom modelled explicitly we add the threat of an interest rate defence to the global game model of morris and shin american economic review 88 1998 with an endogenous defence actions of speculators may become strategic substitutes instead of the usual complements nevertheless our generalised model remains tractable and has a unique threshold equilibrium it provides additional insights for instance the threat of an interest rate defence makes speculation riskier and this may be sufficient to keep speculators out when fundamentals are still relatively strong

optimal maturity of nominal government debt an infinite horizon model the role of debt maturity is analyzed in a framework that blends tax smoothing with time inconsistency of optimal policy when policymakers have an incentive to use unanticipated inflation to reduce the real value of nominal government liabilities three conclusions emerge 1 nominal debt leads policymakers to resort to inflation even though in equilibrium inflation collects no revenue 2 when under full precommitment the optimal policy calls for complete tax smoothing and a constant debt level the equilibrium policy without precommitment calls for anticipating tax collection and early debt repayment and 3 management of debt maturity is an essential component of the equilibrium policy copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the international monetary system forty years after bretton woods review essay in may 1984 a distinguished group of central bankers and economists gathered for a conference at bretton woods to consider the evolution of the world monetary system that was born at that location forty years earlier this volume contains nine essays with accompanying discussion on issues of performance and reform of current international monetary arrangements these papers deal with problems facing the industrialized and the lessdeveloped countries and assess the institutions that have been set up to accommodate these problems the major accomplishments of the original bretton woods conference were of course the establishment of the system of payments based on fixed exchange rates and the organization of the world bank and the international monetary fund as the order developed in the late 40 s and early 50 s each central bank saw it as its duty to intervene in foreign exchange markets to ensure an essentially fixed parity of their currency with respect to the dollar the role of the u s was to guarantee the dollar price of gold at 35 an ounce the system has been called a dollar standard because the dollar played the role of a reserve currency one of the paradoxes of the system as robert triffin pointed out in the early 60 s is that in order to produce a continuing and rapid enough expansion of world reserves the u s had to run balance of payments deficits yet continued deficits by the u s threatened the convertibility of the dollar into gold as it happened the system of fixed parities broke down in the early 70 s not because of a lack of reserves but because a glut of dollars made the bretton woods dollar exchange rates untenable the system eventually evolved into one in which most of the industrialized countries currencies more or less are determined by the market while the currencies of most second and third world countries are pegged to a major currency the floating period has been

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

the lifetime of a unilateral target zone some extended results abstract in dumas and svensson journal of international economics 36 1994 467 the lifetime of a krugman quarterly journal of economics 106 1991 669 682 type target zone model is found to be extremely long this paper shows that the lifetime of the identical target zone regime can be much lower when real disturbances occur in particular the mean lifetime is found to be very low when real disturbances occur and the real exchange rate elasticity of the demand for domestic goods is very low it is also shown that allowing for monetary disturbances to have real effects has very little effect on the lifetime the results indicate the conditions under which real disturbances might trigger currency crises

bank firm relationships and contagious banking crises this paper argues that in an open economy a banking system with close bank firm relationships may be easily subject to contagious banking crises because it is difficult to distinguish between crony capitalism and good main bank relationships 1 show that if international investors cannot distinguish the bank type the distinction between crony capitalism and good main bank relationships becomes very fuzzy in particular the model can explain sequences of bank defaults within a country even if the insolvent banks are very few ex ante as well as sequences of banking crises among countries that are equally rated by international investors but indeed differ in the ex ante solvency of their banking system

monetary policy in economic transition lessons from the french post war experience abstract although tax and expenditure smoothing requires high deficits in transition periods this policy is difficult to implement because it leads to excess inflationary expectations and speculative attacks this forces the government to adopt a suboptimally restrictive fiscal policy it is argued that a potential explanation for this is that there is more incentive for weak governments to act as strong ones as compared to non transitional periods the model explains well the immediate post war inflation experience in france

fixed versus flexible exchange rates which provides more fiscal discipline abstract conventional wisdom holds that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates in this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority the claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg hence under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well the difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate hence bad behavior today leads to punishment today if fiscal authorities are impatient flexible rates by forcing the costs to be paid up front provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent the recent experience of sub saharan countries supplies evidence that matches the predictions of the model

seigniorage as a tax a quantitative evaluation in this paper we construct a computable general equilibrium model calibrate it to selected data for the american economy and use it to explore the efficacy of the seigniorage tax associated with various monetary arrangements we find that the key feature of any monetary tax arrangement is its equilibrium after tax real return schedule on liquid assets held by the households we also find that considerable seigniorage which we define to be the diserence between government expenditures other than interest paid on government debt and taxes collected can be large we find that the seigniorage tax is a poor one relative to a tax on labor income ln particular we find that if the after tax real return on saving deposits is 5 percent as it was on average in the 1974 1978 period welfare is one half percent of consumption lower than it would be if the after tax real return were zero as it approximately was in both the 1964 1968 and 19841988 periods the work builds on that of a imrohoroglu 1990 who finds that for worlds in which non interest bearing nominal assets are the only liquid assets the cost of constant inflation is far greater than the area under the empirical demand for money relation with such arrangements the after tax real return is the negative of the inflation rate the key feature of her model is that agents hold money in order to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic income variability for which there

the recent growth of international reserves in developing economies a monetary perspective abstract the massive accumulation of international reserves in developing economies is a puzzling recent development in the world economy this paper studies reserve accumulation as the outcome of a simple model in which the central bank smooths inflation i explore the view that central banks accumulate reserves to face large fiscal shocks that need monetary financing central bank revenues are obtained through inflation but inflation is distortionary as a result the central bank optimally accumulates international reserves in order to spread the costs associated with inflation over time a simple numerical exercise for an average developing economy using data between 1970 and 2009 yields fast growth of international reserves

marginal conditional stochastic dominance this paper introduces the concept of marginal conditional stochastic dominance mcsd which states the conditions under which all risk averse individuals when presented with a given portfolio prefer to increase the share of one risky asset over that of another mcsd rules also answer the question of whether all risk averse individuals include a new asset in their portfolio when assets returns are correlated mcsd criteria are expressed in terms of the probability distributions of the assets and of the underlying portfolio an empirical application of mcsd is provided using stocks traded on the new york stock exchange mcsd rules are used to show that in the long run one cannot assert that the market portfolio is inefficient

fiscal discipline and the choice of exchange rate regime conventional wisdom claims that fixed exchange rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates but the recent experiences in europe the record of sub saharan countries in the 1980s and the history of stabilization attempts in latin america cast empirical doubts on this wisdom to explore this puzzle we present a standard intertemporal model with perfect capital mobility and price flexibility in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority

the optimal inflation tax in the presence of currency substitution abstract an important result in the optimal inflation tax literature is that if money is modeled as reducing transactions costs the optimal nominal interest rate is zero this paper examines this issue in the context of a small open economy where both domestic and foreign currency circulate as media of exchange it is shown that the presence of foreign money enables the government to reduce the distortion introduced into the economy by a positive foreign nominal interest rate by setting a positive domestic nominal interest rate