estimating the tax advantage of corporate debt this paper presents estimates of the effective tax value of incremental interest deductions for corporations taking into account that they may not be able to utilize all their interest deductions fully because of either insufficient taxable income or the availability of nondebt tax shields after describing particular features of the tax code which may drive a wedge between statutory and effective tax rates for debt finance we present estimates using the treasury corporate tax model of effective tax rates for a variety of industry groupings our estimates suggest that the after tax cost of debt varies widely across industries the magnitude of the effective tax advantage to debt finance has important implications for corporate financial behavior one issue which has been examined extensively in the corporate finance literature is whether the value of the firm is affected by the firm s leverage ratio in a recent contribution deangelo and masulis 3 have shown that financing decisions can affect the value of the firm if the effective tax advantage to debt finance varies among firms or is reduced by the presence of nondebt tax shields such as investment tax credits and depreciation deductions the effective tax advantage to debt is also an important determinant of leverage related costs gordon and malkiel 5 have recently used the statutory tax rate to estimate expected bankruptcy costs induced by the corporate tax when the firm is assumed to balance the marginal tax advantage to debt with marginal expected bankruptcy costs if however the effective tax rate for interest deductions falls short of the statutory rate the magnitude of these costs may be overstated this paper presents detailed estimates of the marginal effective tax advantage to debt finance our estimates based on data in the treasury 1978 corporate master statistical file and on simulations done with the treasury corporate tax model quantify the impact of increasing interest deductions without changing other items on the corporation s income statement 1 we simulate the impact of a change in a firm s capital structure holding its investment and production decisions constant this is an appropriate procedure for estimating the marginal

renegotiations in the greenhouse international climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing negotiations this paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations we analyse how the incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related to renegotiations for this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate economy impacts of greenhouse gas emissions for a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a coalition of china and the united states is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium in a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game consequently several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of china and usa in terms of abatement levels and global payoff the grand coalition however is unstable

some nonlinear tax effects on asset values and investment decisions under uncertainty abstract tax system nonlinearities are often ignored but with uncertainty may have important implications for the magnitude and direction of tax effects this paper studies a particular nonlinear tax rule the policy subsidizes asset values but may discourage some investments and encourage earlier shutdown of some projects the marginal effective tax rate varies with project risk furthermore a corporate cash flow tax can encourage investment due to interactions with the nonlinear policy the paper also presents a general statement of the stochastic equilibrium valuation method which can be used to analyze other nonlinear taxes numerical examples demonstrate computational feasibility

transfers to sustain dynamic core theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control international environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of countries may attempt to do better for themselves outside of any proposed agreement in a static context it has already been shown that it is possible to achieve stability in the sense of the core of a co operative game by means of appropriately defined transfers between the countries involved however the transboundary pollution problems that are most important are caused by accumulated pollutants so that a dynamic analysis is required this paper provides a transfer scheme that yields a core property in a dynamic context the possibility of computing such transfers numerically is discussed

buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game abstract we consider a two player asymmetric differential game of pollution control one player is non vulnerable to pollution or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non cooperative game we characterize the feedback nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution we establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non vulnerable player to control her emissions we further use the nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff

the effects of tax convexity on default and investment decisions the objective of this article is to examine how default and investment triggers change under different levels of tax asymmetry when firms face nonlinear tax schedules under a convex tax schedule profits are taxed at a higher rate while losses are taxed or rebated at a lower rate thus reducing the risk shared by the government this article presents a dynamic model based on the contingent claims framework to explore the impacts of tax convexity on the triggers and we find that the impacts vary significantly depending on several countervailing forces tax convexity has a nonmonotonic relationship with both the default and investment triggers because of the government s risk sharing role the default trigger is higher when tax convexity increases while the growth option exerts a counteracting effect that lowers this trigger creating an ambiguity in the investment trigger when changing the level of tax asymmetry

trade s dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution abstract this study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the u s mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs public health damages and trade benefits noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages results show trade liberalization leads mexico to curtail pollution in both games cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the united states from mexico s pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game

the biodiversity supergame this paper considers the ability of developed countries to sustain a cooperative agreement to compensate developing countries for the incremental costs of biodiversity conservation it is shown that depending on certain parameter values and the model specification such an agreement could only codify the non cooperative outcome or achieve the full cooperative outcome where global net benefits are maximized however where the agreement can sustain the full cooperative outcome net benefits will be only slightly larger than in the noncooperative outcome

real options agency conflicts and optimal capital structure abstract we examine the impact of a stockholder bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy we find that an equity maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value maximizing strategy and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects equityholders incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics

the kyoto protocol a review and perspectives international concern about climate change has led to the kyoto protocol negotiated in 1997 which contains legally binding emission targets for industrialized countries to be achieved during the commitment period 2008 2012 while proponents of the protocol celebrate it as a breakthrough in international climate policy opponents criticize that its approach namely setting targets and timetables for emission reductions is seriously flawed this paper provides a critical assessment of the protocols potential performance and discusses amendments to foster its effectiveness and efficiency it concludes that even without any effective emission reductions in the initial commitment period the ratification of kyoto is important for the further policy process of climate protection the kyoto protocol has established a flexible broad based international mechanism that provides a valuable starting point for shaping efficient climate policies in the future

renegotiation proof climate agreements with full participation conditions for pareto efficiency recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating i e abate emissions or defecting no abatement here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices indeed a pareto efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium for a sufficiently high discount factor this means that one need not trade off a narrow but deep treaty with a broad but shallow treaty

the role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements abstract transnational externalities e g transboundary pollution trade contagious diseases and terrorism warrant coordination and cooperation between governments but this proves often difficult one reason for the meager success is the public good character of many of these economic problems encouraging free riding another reason one might suspect is uncertainty surrounding most environmental problems and in particular climate change this provides often an excuse for remaining inactive paradoxically some recent papers have concluded just the opposite the veil of uncertainty can be conducive to the success of international environmental cooperation in this paper we explain why and under which conditions this can be true however we argue that those conditions are the exception rather than the rule most important we suggest a mechanism for those conditions where learning has a negative effect on the success of cooperation which removes this effect or even turns it into a positive effect our results apply beyond the specifics of climate change to similar problems where cooperation generates positive externalities

olson s exploitation hypothesis in a public good economy a reconsideration since the publication of olson s 1965 the logic of collective action the exploitation hypothesis in which the rich shoulder the provision burden of public goods for the poor has held sway despite empirical exceptions to address such exceptions we establish two alternative exploitation hypotheses based on contributors asymmetric preferences or on their productivity differences regarding the public good the classic hypothesis and its two variants are proven in a novel fashion for asymmetric preferences we also establish the exploitation hypothesis for the joint products model with private and public co benefits our theoretical insights are then illustrated by some empirical examples from the field of international public goods such as military defense and cross border pollution

the acid rain differential game this paper considers an acid rain differential game countries emit sulphur which is partly transferred to other countries depositions above critical loads ultimately destroy the soil countries face a trade off between the costs of emission reductions and the damage to the soil due to the depletion of the acid buffers because of the transboundary externalities the outcome will depend on whether the countries cooperate or not this paper presents the cooperative outcome and the open loop and markov perfect nash equilibria of the acid rain differential game it will be shown that the depositions always converge to the critical loads but the steady state levels of the buffer stocks differ the theory is used to analyse the acid rain differential game for sulphur between great britain and ireland finally some results are given for the whole of europe

market failure in incentive based regulation the case of emissions trading abstract among the existing evaluations of the us epa s emissions trading program a consensus has emerged while the program has resulted in significant cost savings it has not even approximately achieved a cost effective allocation of the control responsibility the cost savings have been smaller and the trades fewer than might have been expected at the outset of the program in this article we explore one hypothesis which purports to explain the divergence between the cost minimizing and the observed pattern of trades for nonuniformly mixed pollutants the trading process hypothesis attributes some significant proportion of this divergence to the nature of the process by which emission reduction credits are traded under the bubble policy an examination of actual bubble trades reveals that the actual trading process is sequential and bilateral and hence differs considerably from the implicit process modeled in the existing empirical studies simulations of this more realistic trading process suggest that the resulting equilibria deviate considerably from cost effective allocations of the control responsibility

the voluntary provision of a pure public good the case of reduced cfc emissions and the montreal protocol abstract this paper applies the theory of the voluntary provision of a pure public good to the behavior of nations to curb chlorofluorocarbon cfc emissions during the late 1980s by devising an empirical test we determine that these cutbacks in emissions are consistent with nash behavior when taste parameters are controlled the relationship between emission cutbacks and national income is nearly linear as implied by the theory if the sample is purged of potential outliers then the linear relationship results a significant taste parameter is the extent of political and civil freedoms while a marginally significant parameter is geophysical position in terms of latitude

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

transboundary pollution in the black sea comparison of institutional arrangements this paper analyses the transboundary pollution between romania and ukraine coastal states along the black sea and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem to achieve this goal we use a dynamic and strategic framework we compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first best case with three different institutional arrangements the non cooperative game of countries the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the black sea commission our findings indicate that the non cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules

the interaction of debt financing cash grants and the optimal investment policy under uncertainty abstract significant progress has been made toward understanding a levered firm s optimal investment policy under uncertainty to date however not much work has concentrated on the time scale trade off and collectively held real options we employ a game theoretic real option model between a firm and a government to analyze the effect of uncertainty and investment stimulus in the form of cash grants on optimal investment timing financing and investment scaling we find that the jointly held real option between the firm and the government leads to underinvestment regardless of whether the firm has the possibility to issue debt subsidies however reduce the level of underinvestment notably the results indicate that even though levered firms receive less support they invest more than unlevered firms this challenges recent findings that a firm s optimal investment level is not affected by the way it finances a project similarly we find that for realistic parameter constellations the levered firm s optimal investment threshold can be higher than that of its unlevered counterpart this indicates that the availability of tax shield benefits does not necessarily serve as an incentive to invest earlier finally we show that the effect of cash flow uncertainty on the equilibrium level of grants is ambiguous and triggers the switch from a subsidy to non subsidy regime

subgame perfect cooperative agreements in a dynamic game of climate change abstract we model climate change as a dynamic game and prove existence of a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne that is also markov perfect we interpret this unique spne as the business as usual bau equilibrium and show that if the countries are not sufficiently symmetric then the familiar trigger strategy equilibria may not be pareto improvements over the bau equilibrium and may even lack efficiency properties we then motivate and introduce a subgame perfect cooperative agreement as an improvement over the bau equilibrium in the sense that every country or coalition of countries is better off in every subgame irrespective of the extent of heterogeneity of the countries we characterize subgame perfect cooperative agreements and identify sufficient conditions for their existence we show that direct or indirect transfers between countries to balance the costs and benefits of controlling climate change are a necessity and not a matter of approach

the fuelwood market in greece an empirical approach abstract wood has been since ancient times the basic household heating medium nowadays wood remains the primary energy source in rural areas of developing countries mainly in africa in greece the domestic demand of fuelwood is relied mainly on the fuelwood domestic supply especially during the post war period the domestic supply satisfies adequately the domestic demand eliminating the role of imports the present study surveys the long run relationship between the fuelwood prices of different forest species in order to determine the role of the special market conditions in their price formation in addition the error correction model is estimated in order to survey the direction of the granger causality among the prices of the fuelwood forest species the implementation of the impulse response analysis and the variance decomposition confirmed that coniferous and beech fuelwood producer price may account for the volatility of the oak fuelwood producer price this result may contribute greatly to the conservation of oak forest an important carbon storage forest ecosystem

nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices abstract we discuss nonlinear strategies in an infinite horizon duopoly game with sticky prices where firms maximize their discounted sum of profit we construct a stationary feedback equilibrium without guessing value functions and feedback strategies that solve the hamilton jacobi equation for this purpose we study the auxiliary equation that is derived from the hamilton jacobi equation we show that the domain of the state space plays an crucial role in characterizing feedback equilibria and discuss several implications of this observation in particular we find that when the upper bound of the state space is not very high previously unknown feedback equilibria emerge

trade transboundary pollution and foreign lobbying in this paper we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution we show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream polluted country but if the upstream polluting country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country s social welfare and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country thus the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments susceptibility to foreign political influence

identifying the free riders a simple algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good abstract when a heterogeneous group of people provide themselves with a pure public good the resulting nash equilibrium outcome will divide the group into contributors and free riders this paper proposes a general algorithm for discovering which individuals in the group fall into which of these two classes the algorithm is based on identifying for each individual how much of the public good must be provided by others to drive that individual s contribution to zero

renegotiation proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient in a two country model in which countries differ with respect to the perception of environmental damages and abatement costs the stability of international environmental agreements is analyzed in a dynamic framework three types of agreements are considered a socially optimal solution a uniform emission tax a tax equally applied in both countries and a uniform emission reduction quota an equal percentage emission reduction from a base year stability is checked for these agreements according to the concept of renegotiation proofness it is shown that the stability requirements depend crucially on the parameters defining the interests of the two countries and the type of agreement moreover it is demonstrated that if punishment options are restricted for some reason the stability of an agreement may suffer one important result of the paper is that if countries exhibit asymmetric interests stability in the quota regime is higher than in the tax regime and in the social optimum this might explain why emission reduction quotas have been so popular in international politics despite recommendations of economists to use market based instruments

can tax convexity be ignored in corporate financing decisions abstract the standard modeling practice in corporate finance has been to assume a linear tax schedule this paper extends the structural contingent claim model of corporate finance to incorporate a more realistic convex tax schedule it is shown that tax convexity raises the optimal default boundary and thus increases the likelihood of default and also reduces the optimal leverage ratio while the former effect seems insignificant in general the effect of tax convexity on the optimal leverage ratio can be quantitatively significant we conclude that tax convexity should not be ignored in corporate financing decisions and theoretical models should use a convex tax schedule instead of a linear one thus the short answer to the question in the title is no

valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics 1 valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics relevance and scope h folmer e van ierland part i the valuation of public goods 2 non market asset prices a comparison of three valuation approaches r c d arge j f shogren 3 valuing public goods in a risky world an experiment p o johansson 4 recreational values pareto optimality and timber supply p o johansson k g lofgren k g maler 5 estimating social benefits of environmental improvements from reduced acid rain deposition a contingent valuation survey s navrud part ii the valuation of health and life 6 benefits of reduced morbidity from air pollution control a survey m dickie s gerking 7 valuing a public good direct and indirect valuation approaches to the measurement of the benefits from air pollution abatement m shechter m kim l golan 8 environmental regulation and the valuation of life interindustry mobility and the market price of safety h w herzog jr a m schlottmann part iii cost benefit analysis 9 disequilibrium cost benefit rules an exposition and extension p o johansson k g lofgren 10 macroeconomic cost benefit analysis of environmental programmes a nentjes part iv aspects of policy making 11 benefit estimation for complex policies a randall j hoehn 12 the acid rain game k g maler index

do voluntary international environmental agreements work abstract we consider the effects of international environmental agreements using the 1988 sofia protocol on the reduction of nitrogen oxides panel data on 23 european countries for the period 1985 96 is used to evaluate the impact on emissions by dividing countries into participants and non participants that is those that did and those that did not ratify the sofia protocol using a difference in difference estimator and controlling for country specific variables we find that signing the treaty had a significant positive impact on emission reduction the estimated yearly reduction in emissions is approximately 2 1 greater than it would have been without the sofia protocol

on the debt capacity of growth options we relate the value of growth options in the firm s investment opportunity set to the level of debt in the firm s capital structure underinestment costs of debt increase and free cash flow benefits fall with additional growth options thus if debt capacity is defined as the amount of debt the firm optimally adds for an incremental project then the debt capacity of growth options is negative this result implies that book leverage should fall with the addition of growth options our tests using a large sample of industrial firms confirm this prediction

on the existence of an optimal capital structure theory and evidence one of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century has been the theory of capital structure the geneses of this controversy were the seminal contributions by modigliani and miller 18 19 the general academic view by the mid 1970s although not a consensus was that the optimal capital structure involves balancing the tax advantage of debt against the present value of bankruptcy costs no sooner did this general view become prevalent in the profession than miller 16 presented a new challenge by showing that under certain conditions the tax advantage of debt financing at the firm level is exactly offset by the tax disadvantage of debt at the personal level since then there has developed a burgeoning theoretical literature attempting to reconcile miller s model with the balancing theory of optimal capital structure e g deangelo and masulis 5 kim 12 and modigliani 17 the general result of this work is that if there are significant leverage related costs such as bankruptcy costs agency costs of debt and loss of non debt tax shields and if the income from equity is untaxed then the marginal bondholder s tax rate will be less than the corporate rate and there will be a positive net tax advantage to corporate debt financing the firm s optimal capital structure will involve the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and various leverage related costs the upshot of these extensions of miller s model is the recognition that the existence of an optimal capital structure is essentially an empirical issue as to whether or not the various leverage related costs are economically significant enough to influence the costs of corporate borrowing the miller model and its theoretical extensions have inspired several timeseries studies which provide evidence on the existence of leverage related costs trczinka 28 reports that from examining differences in average yields between taxable corporate bonds and tax exempt municipal bonds one cannot reject the miller hypothesis that the marginal bondholder s tax rate is not different from the corporate tax rate however trczinka is careful to point out that this finding does not necessarily imply that there is no tax advantage of corporate debt if the personal tax rate on equity is positive indeed buser and hess 1 using a longer time series of data and more sophisticated econometric techniques estimate that the average effective personal tax rate on equity is statistically positive and is not of a trivial magnitude more importantly they document evidence that is consistent with the existence of significant leverage related costs in the economy

strategic interaction among governments in the provision of a global public good abstract how do governments respond to other governments when providing a global public good using data from 2007 to 2014 on medical research funding for infectious and parasitic diseases we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries respond to funding changes by the us government which accounts for half of funding for these diseases because funding across governments might be positively correlated due to unobserved drivers they have in common we use variation in the representation of research intensive universities on us congressional appropriations committees as an instrument for us funding we find that a 10 increase in us government funding for a disease is associated with a 2 to 3 reduction in funding for that disease by another government in the following year

renegotiation proof equilibria in repeated prisoners dilemma abstract in this note it is shown that the requirement of weak renegatiation proofness does not eliminate any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the repeated prisoner s dilemma specifically it is demonstrated that when players are sufficiently patient any feasible and individually rational outcome can be sustained by means of an equilibrium in which the punishing player always profits by carrying out the punishment

regional versus global cooperation for climate control abstract this paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision such as mitigation of climate change is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global treaty previous research suggests that at best a global environmental treaty will achieve very little at worst it will fail to enter into force using a simple dynamic game theoretic model with weakly renegotiation proof equilibrium as solution concept we demonstrate that two agreements can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a single global treaty the model provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under each type of regime it is shown that a regime with two agreements can pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty we conclude that regional cooperation might be a good alternative or supplement to global environmental agreements

political institutions and pollution control this paper models the selection of environmental policies under authoritarian and democratic regimes and tests the hypothesis that political institutions systematically affect the enactment of environmental regulations the results support the contention that political institutional arrangements rather than resource endowments largely determine policies concerning environmental regulation copyright 1992 by mit press

a trading ratio system for trading water pollution discharge permits abstract the fact that water flows to the lowest level uni directionally is a very specific and useful property of water by utilizing this property we design a trading ratio system trs of tradable discharge permits for water pollution control such a trading ratio system has three main characteristics 1 the zonal effluent cap is set by taking into account the water pollutant loads transferred from the upstream zones 2 the trading ratios are set equal to the exogenous transfer coefficients among zones and 3 permits are freely tradable among dischargers according to the trading ratios this paper shows that the trs can take care of the location effect of a discharge and can achieve the predetermined standards of environmental quality at minimum aggregate abatement costs problems with hot spots and free riding can be avoided and the burdens on both dischargers and the environmental authority should be relatively light

private eradication of mobile public bads we consider analytically the non cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad such as an invasive weed species infectious disease fire or agricultural pest the stock of the public bad can grow and disperse across a spatial domain of arbitrary size in this setting we characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate and determine how this decision depends on property specific environmental features and on the behavior of other landowners we show that high mobility or lower control by others result in lower private control but when the marginal dynamic cost of the bad is sufficiently large we find that complete eradication may be privately optimal despite the lack of consideration of others welfare in these cases eradication arises in the non cooperative game and is also socially optimal so there is in effect no externality finally when property harboring the bad is not owned or is owned in common we derive the side payments required to efficiently control the mobile public bad

asset sale debt restructuring and liquidation this paper considers a dynamic model in which shareholders of a firm in distress have a choice of whether the firm proceeds to debt restructuring or direct liquidation at an arbitrary time in the model we show the following results fewer asset sales lower financing debt renegotiation and running costs a lower premium to the debt holders a lower cash flow volatility and a higher initial coupon increase the shareholders incentive to choose debt restructuring to avoid full liquidation in the debt renegotiation process the shareholders arrange the coupon reduction and use equity financing to retire a part of the debt value to the debt holders the timing of debt restructuring always coincides with that of liquidation without debt renegotiation most notably the shareholders do not prefer asset sale in debt restructuring even if they face high financing costs the possibility of debt renegotiation in the future increases the initial leverage ratio in the optimal capital structure

impacts of trade and the environment on clustered multilateral environmental agreements many countries align their environmental policy and environmental regulation by way of multilateral environmental agreements meas previous work in economics provided insights in the economic and political determinants of meas at large this paper distinguishes meas by the main issues covered and classifies them in five clusters biodiversity atmosphere land chemicals and hazardous wastes and seas then the role of environmental economic and political factors and of dynamic and cross cluster effects is studied at the level of mea clusters two findings stand out from this empirical analysis first economic size and multilateral trade liberalisation of countries are found to be the most important drivers of mea participation across all clusters second adjustment costs turn out to deter and in particular cross cluster spillovers turn out to stimulate mea participation across countries and clusters

incorporating data and theory in roundwood supply and demand estimation this paper examines the aggregate pulpwood market in finland using the econometric approach advocated by hendry neale and joba and spanos who propose a statistically consistent way to estimate simultaneous equations models private nonindustrial timber supply is estimated along with a three input demand function capital labor and wood results indicate that short term supply reacts positively to an increase in stumpage price while the long term total elasticity is negative and small in absolute terms capital is a complement while labor is a substitute for roundwood input dynamic adjustment process substitution and cross price effects and capital market imperfections implied by the present study differ from those obtained in previous research

economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions abstract recent empirical research has examined the relationship between certain indicators of environmental degradation and income concluding that in some cases an inverted u shaped relationship which has been called an environmental kuznets curve ekc exists between these variables unfortunately this inverted u shaped relationship does not hold for greenhouse gas emissions one explanation of the absence of ekc like behavior in greenhouse gas emissions is that greenhouse gases are special pollutants that create global not local disutility but the international nature of global warming is not the only reason that prevents de linking greenhouse gas emissions from economic growth the intergenerational nature of the negative impact of greenhouse gas emissions may have also been an important factor preventing the implementation of greenhouse gas abatement measures in the past in this paper we explore the effect that the presence of intergenerational spillovers has on the emissions income relationship we use a numerically calibrated overlapping generations model of climate economy interactions we conclude that 1 the intertemporal responsibility of the regulatory agency 2 the institutional capacity to make intergenerational transfers and 3 the presence of intergenerationally lagged impact of emissions constitute important determinants of the relationship between economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions

the optimal size of a permit market regulating the emissions of non uniformly mixed pollutants with a permit market carries the risk of hot spot formation which can be reduced by dividing the regulation area into trading zones the trading zone approach has been extensively discussed for the full information case we consider incomplete information concerning the emitters abatement costs their locations and pollution dispersion we derive the optimal number of trading zones and the optimal number of permits per zone and analyze under which conditions a system of independent trading zones is superior to other policy measures our results show that appropriately sized permit markets are well suited to regulating non uniformly mixed pollutants under informational constraints if firms are not too heterogeneous only for substantial heterogeneity and a highly non linear damage function can it be optimal to use command and control strategies

potentially harmful international cooperation on global public good provision recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize instead partial cooperation between like minded countries appears a more likely outcome in this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like minded countries in doing so we link the literature on partial cooperation with so called matching approaches matching schemes are regarded as providing a promising approach to overcome undersupply of public goods like climate protection the functioning of matching mechanisms in a setting with an incomplete agreement i e a contract where only a subset of the players participates has however not been investigated yet this paper fills this research gap by analyzing incomplete matching agreements in the context of international climate protection we analyse their effect on both welfare and the global climate protection level we show that matching coalitions may bring about a decline in global public good provision and a reduction in the welfare of outsiders

the impact of equity preferences on the stability of international environmental agreements this paper uses a coalition formation model to explore how equity considerations affect countries cooperation on global environmental issues e g on climate change when developing countries are exempted from obligations to reduce their emissions i find that opening them for abatement projects financed by industrialized countries changes the incentives to cooperate in a way which can increase emissions and decrease welfare equity concerns in industrialized countries regarding the difference between their per capita emission levels and those of developing countries lead to increased abatement but do not qualitatively change the incentives to cooperate inequality aversion with respect to differences to abatement targets across industrialized countries generally induces larger coalition sizes and stricter abatement here the inclusion of developing countries improves upon the prospects of cooperation

biosecurity incentives network effects and entry of a rapidly spreading pest abstract protection against pest invasion is a public good yet the nature of private incentives to avoid entry is poorly understood this work shows that due to increasing returns or network effects private actions to avoid entry are strategic complements this means that compulsory action at least by a subset of parties can be an effective policy both heterogeneity in biosecurity costs and the effect of private actions on the extent of the invasion threat are shown to have ambiguous effects on the magnitude of welfare loss due to strategic behavior communicated leadership by some party is preferred to simultaneous moves and it may be best if the party with highest biosecurity costs assumes a leadership role

a two level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between russia china and annex b countries this paper proposes a computable dynamic game model of the strategic competition between russia and developing countries dcs mainly represented by china on the international market of emission permits created by the kyoto protocol the model uses a formulation of i a demand function for permits from annex b countries and ii marginal abatement costs mac in russia and china provided by two detailed models gemini e3 is a computable general equilibrium model that provides the data to estimate annex b demand for permits and macs in russia poles is a partial equilibrium model that is used to obtain mac curves for china the competitive scenario is compared with a monopoly situation where only russia is allowed to play strategically the impact of allowing dcs to intervene on the international emission trading market is thus assessed

growth pollution policy abstract we investigate long run patterns in pollution flows in an optimally regulated growing economy in which consumption and environmental quality are imperfectly substitutable and pollution is a by product of production we show that by production implies that a scale effect will always drive increasing pollution when productivity is sufficiently low on the other hand if a clean technology exists it will always be chosen in the long run hence emissions will approach zero because for any strictly positive flow of pollution willingness to pay to reduce that flow grows without bound as consumption grows without bound whereas the cost of switching is bounded we clarify the intuition using a specified model in which pollution arises as a by product of the use of natural resource inputs

the consequences of a one sided externality in a dynamic two agent framework abstract we develop a dynamic model where all agents contribute to a global externality but only those in a specific region suffer from it we model this in a dynamic setting via a two agent non cooperative overlapping generations model and analyze the consequences for economic growth and intertemporal choices we find that multiple steady states may result from this asymmetry in particular if the agent who is affected by the externality has to spend a large share of his income to offset it then he may be stuck in an environmental poverty trap we provide conditions for the existence of and local convergence to the equilibria as well as a condition for the global convergence to the poverty trap while in addition to maintenance expenditures externalities tend to be addressed via studying taxes investment in r d or alike we focus on capital market integration specifically agents in the affected region can open up their capital market to enable capital inflows we investigate whether an open capital market improves or worsens their welfare while we do find that capital market integration eliminates the environmental poverty trap we show that capital market integration is not always in both agents interest in particular we provide conditions under which the agents prefer autarkic or integrated capital markets

the oslo protocol on sulfur reduction the great leap forward the increasing number of international environmental agreements ieas and the fact that under some agreements emissions have been reduced beyond agreed targets are frequently viewed as success stories of international cooperation we argue that success can only be measured if abatement targets under an iea are compared with estimated abatement levels in the absence of a treaty and are evaluated in terms of costs and benefits we analyze the oslo protocol on sulfur reduction showing that this iea is not the great leap forward when compared with the calculated nash equilibrium and the social optimum however we also demonstrate that under the oslo protocol more ambitious targets could not have been realized due to strong free rider incentives

taxes and capital structure evidence from firms response to the tax reform act of 1986 while the theoretical relation between taxes and capital structure has been extensively analyzed the empirical evidence on this issue has thus far been inconclusive one of the main difficulties confronting previous empirical studies of the cross sectional relationship between taxes and leverage was the control of intervening variables the tax reform act of 1986 tra which drastically changed the tax regime provides a unique opportunity to assess the interaction between taxes and leverage decisions in a controlled environment the authors test the relationship between leverage and certain tax related variables for a large sample of companies in the years surrounding the enactment of tra the results support the tax based theories of capital structure the findings indicate that there exists a substitution effect between debt and nondebt tax shields and that both corporate and personal tax rates affect leverage decisions coauthors are dan givoly aharon r ofer and oded sarig article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

estimating strategic models of international treaty formation this article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties a treaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period the net benefit of treaty membership increases over time spillovers among members and non members accelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute respectively the predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters based on a cross section of treaty ratification dates with this approach i estimate the sign and magnitude of strategic interaction in the ratification of the montreal protocol in the formation of europe s preferential trade agreements and in the growth of germany s network of bilateral investment treaties through a series of counterfactual experiments i explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in the formation of these treaties

pigouvian taxation in tourism the paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists accommodations first a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered in each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit linear perfect markov strategies are derived for both the non cooperative and the public monopoly case in equilibrium a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly furthermore the more the monopolist discounts the future the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced second the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure the tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use however its combined effect with another policy instrument such as a quota induces the optimal level of resource use

tax incentives to hedge for corporations facing tax function convexity hedging lowers expected tax liabilities thereby providing an incentive to hedge we use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax code provisions on average the tax function is convex although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge other tax code provisions have minor impacts among firms facing convex tax functions average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5 4 percent of expected tax liabilities in extreme cases these savings exceed 40 percent if a firm faces a convex tax function then hedging that reduces the volatility of taxable income reduces the firm s expected tax liability for a firm facing some form of tax progressivity when taxable income is low its effective marginal tax rate will be low but when income is high its tax rate will be high if such a firm hedges the tax increase in circumstances where income would have been low is smaller than the tax reduction in circumstances where income would have been high thus lowering expected taxes in examining the importance of various motives to hedge researchers have employed two general methods survey and regression analysis there are potential problems with each for example some managers might view the information requested in a survey as proprietary or might hesitate to admit that they employ derivatives to speculate rather than hedge to employ regression methods researchers must generate proxies for tax status in addition to other firm characteristics to the extent that a tax variable e g whether the firm has a net operating loss carryforward proxies for factors such as financial distress as well as tax circumstances analysts face an identification problem in interpreting the results

transitional restricted linkage between emissions trading schemes linkages between emissions trading systems are deemed an important element of the future climate policy landscape they are however difficult to agree and remain few and far between temporary restrictions on permit trading have potential to facilitate and gradually approach unrestricted full linkage we compare the relative merits of several link restrictions in this respect namely quantitative transfer limits border taxes on transfers exchange and discount rates and unilateral linkage to this end we develop a simple model to have a unifying framework which in conjunction with lessons we draw from real world experiences serves as a basis for a broader policy oriented discussion while quantitative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage they can lead to uncertain distributional effects and weaken price signals these aspects are mitigated under a border permit tax but this policy seems harder to implement exchange rates have potential to adjust for programmes stringencies and raise ambition over time but can be challenging to select as experience corroborates unilateral linkage can be a convenient approach

the capital structure puzzle revisited corporate finance researchers have long been puzzled by low corporate debt ratios given debt s corporate tax advantage this article recognizes that firm value typically reflects a growing stream of earnings while current debt reflects a nongrowing stream of interest payments debt to value is therefore a distorted measure of corporate tax shielding even with very small debt related costs this may explain the observed magnitude and cross sectional variation of debt ratios since this variation may be independent of tax shielding debt ratios provide an inappropriate framework for empirically examining the trade off theory of capital structure article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty a spatial probit analysis abstract this paper represents treaty participation as a two stage game for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation the resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages this spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages when the procedure is applied to the helsinki protocol we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized

corruption and air pollution in europe this paper examines how the effectiveness of regulatory framework influences levels of sulphur emissions in a scenario where to reduce its emission tax payments a polluting firm may under report emissions level at the risk of being audited and fined first a model to explain how changes in regulatory framework e g audit effectiveness and transboundary spillovers affect both actual and reported emissions is developed then the theoretical predictions using data for 39 european countries from 1999 to 2003 are tested and inferences about true emission levels are made the empirical analysis supports the theoretical predictions with significant implications for the interpretation of pollution data reported to international monitoring agencies countries with effective regulation are likely to have relatively high reported emissions of sulphur but this should not automatically be interpreted as weak environmental performance because their actual pollution levels are likely to be lower than in nations with less effective regulation

efficiency gains under exchange rate emission trading in the case of emission of non uniformly dispersed pollutants such as so2 the negative effects depend on the location of the sources a unit increase at one source must be compensated by either a larger or smaller reduction at another source to keep the negative effects at the same level emission trading between countries is possible under the second sulphur protocol exchange rate trading and third party problems are studied within a simultaneous model facilitating impositions of various environmental constraints simulations based on the negotiated emission quotas are offered results indicate potential cost savings of 19

emission trading in europe with an exchange rate this paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate the exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition it is shown that generally this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated although total abatement costs are always reduced a routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral sequential process subject to an exchange rate in the example used results for so2 emissions in europe show that starting from a uniform reduction exchange rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one to one trading without achieving the cost minimum sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places the results are sensitive to pre trade emission levels the transaction costs the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners

growth and pollution convergence theory and evidence stabilizing pollution levels in the long run is a pre requisite for sustainable growth we develop a neoclassical growth model with endogenous emission reduction predicting that along optimal sustainable paths pollution growth rates are i positively related to output growth scale effect and ii negatively related to emission levels defensive effect this dynamic law reduces to a convergence equation that is empirically tested for two major and regulated air pollutants sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides with a panel of 25 european countries spanning the years 1980 2005 traditional parametric models are rejected by the data more flexible regression techniques confirm the existence of both the scale and the defensive effect supporting the model predictions

regulation via the polluter pays principle we consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution we examine the distributional impact of the polluter pays pp principle which requires that any agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her pollution emissions with constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the pp principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that induces non negative individual welfare change and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact we extend both the pp principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due to pollution we also compare the pp principle with the vickrey clark groves scheme

reassessing forest products demand functions in europe using a panel cointegration approach abstractin a panel of european countries we analyse paper products sawnwood and wood panels consumption data with this object we use a classical demand model where national consumption depends

stochastic carbon sinks for combating carbon dioxide emissions in the eu abstract this paper carries out numerical calculations on the potential of carbon sinks in the eu emissions trading scheme ets and national commitments under conditions of stochastic carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and carbon sequestration by forests chance constraint programming is used to analyze the role of stochastic carbon sinks for national and eu wide compliance costs the analytical results show that the inclusion of the carbon sink option can reduce costs for low enough marginal cost and risk discount but also that costless carbon sinks as by products from forestry are not part of a cost effective solution under a high reliability concern cost savings are reduced due to risk discounting under a reliability concern in particular when assigning chebyshev s inequality as compared with a normal probability distribution it is also shown that the supply of forest sinks on the market depends on the differences in marginal abatement cost between the trading and the non trading sectors and in risk discounting between achievements of the ets cap and the national commitment relatively low marginal abatement cost in the non trading sector and high risk discounting of national commitment achievements increase the supply of sinks in the market and hence reduces the equilibrium price the empirical application illustrates the importance of risk discounting for the magnitude of cost savings obtained from introducing forest carbon sinks in the eu ets and national commitments

sunk capital and negotiated resolutions of environmental conflicts two nations seek a cooperative agreement to control bilateral flows of an industrial pollutant from previous noncooperative production choices the nations hold a certain amount of sunk capital if production requires relatively large investments in sunk capital the nations may find that they cannot negotiate production quotas that improve on their noncooperative choices when the nations find cooperation worthwhile negotiated levels of production will be higher than in the absence of sunk capital furthermore both nations are motivated to attempt to manipulate the terms of the agreement by making strategic investments in sunk capital prior to its completion

coalition proof nash equilibria ii applications abstract in bernheim peleg and whinston coalition proof equilibria i concepts j econ theory 42 1987 1 12 we proposed the notion of coalition proof nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition proof nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make binding commitments this paper undertakes applications to several economic problems including the behavior of cournot oligopolists oligopolistic entry deterrence cooperation in finite horizon games and social choice rule implementation

optimal control for transboundary pollution under ecological compensation a stochastic differential game approach abstract to account for previously ignored yet widely observed uncertainty in nature s capability to replenish the natural environment in ways that should inform ideal design of ecological compensation ec regimes this study constructs a stochastic differential game sdg model to analyze transboundary pollution control options between a compensating and compensated region equilibrium strategies in the stochastic two player game inform optimal control theory and reveal a welfare distribution mechanism to form the basis of an improved cooperative game contract a case based numerical example serves to verify the theoretical results and supports three key insights first accounting for various random disturbance factors the probabilistic pollutant stock in stackelberg non cooperative game exceeds that of a cooperative game situation second the ec mechanism provides long term effective incentives only when the marginal losses of environmental damage in the compensating region are more than twice that of the compensated region achieving a pareto optimal equilibrium relies upon the attainment of a dynamic allocation ratio derived from the analysis of a robust welfare allocation mechanism third cross region cooperation reliably outperforms stackelberg non cooperation due to either overwhelming incumbent economic interests or high abatement costs this study illuminates the importance of balancing both parties interests within an ec agreement while reducing uncertainty around unobserved environmental factors during ex ante negotiations

international aspects of pollution control pollution is a by product of production is only gradually dissolved by the environment and crosses national borders the market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution in practice governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra national social planning absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges less cleaning up activities and more pollution appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis attention is also paid to investment in clean technology the debate between optimists who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy and pessimists can be analysed in this way