budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

the ellsberg paradox and risk aversion an anticipated utility approach the paper describes a decision process under which it is rational to prefer a lottery with known probabilities to a similar ambiguous lottery where the decision maker does not know the exact values of the probabilities the ellsberg paradox this is done by modeling ambiguous lotteries as two stage lotteries by assuming the independence axiom without the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and by using the anticipated utility functional this paper also gives conditions under which less ambiguity is preferred and presents some comparative statics analysis as well as some inter personal comparisons finally it proves that within the anticipated utility framework risk and ambiguity are almost identical copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

supermajority voting requirements for tax increases evidence from the states abstract this paper measures the effect of state level supermajority requirements for tax increases on tax rates unobserved attitudes towards taxation tend to influence both the adoption of supermajority requirements and tax policy consequently one cannot distinguish between the effect of these requirements and their correlation with these unobserved attitudes a model is presented in which legislatures controlled by a pro tax party adopt a supermajority requirement to reduce the majority party agenda control the propensity of pro tax states to adopt supermajority requirements results in an underestimate of the true effect of these requirements on taxes to correct this identification problem the paper first uses fixed effects to control for unobserved attitudes and then employs instruments that measure the difficulty of amending state constitutions the paper concludes that supermajority requirements have significantly reduced taxes

reduction of compound lotteries with objective probabilities theory and evidence abstract the reduction of compound lotteries axiom rocl has assumed a central role in the evaluation of behavior toward risk and uncertainty we present experimental evidence on its validity in the domain of objective probabilities our battery of lottery pairs includes simple one stage lotteries two stages compound lotteries and their actuarially equivalent one stage lotteries we find violations of rocl and that behavior is better characterized by a source dependent version of the rank dependent utility model rather than expected utility theory since we use the popular 1 in k random lottery incentive mechanism payment procedure in our main test our experiment explicitly recognizes the impact that this payment procedure may have on preferences thus we also collect data using the 1 in 1 payment procedure we do not infer any violations of rocl when subjects are only given one decision to make these results are supported by both structural estimation of latent preferences as well as non parametric analysis of choice patterns the random lottery incentive mechanism used as payment protocol itself induces an additional layer of compounding by design that might create confounds in tests of rocl therefore we provide a word of caution for experimenters interested in studying rocl for other purposes such as the relationship between ambiguity attitudes and attitudes toward compound lotteries to carefully think about the design to study rocl payment protocols and their interaction with the preferences being elicited

a caveat on the measurement of productive efficiency abstract the correspondence between used performance measures and enterprise objectives such as profit maximization and cost minimization is fundamental for manufacturing companies this paper identifies and critically examines a minimal set of relevant properties that a productivity index needs to satisfy to rightly assess performance development of a decision making unit commonly applied and suggested productivity measurement techniques such as partial efficiencies total factor productivity tfp index number approaches integrated partial efficiencies and operational competitiveness ratings are analyzed in order to assess the alignment with superior objectives there is a considerable spread in the results of this class of models and the interpretation may prove difficult or misleading as these apparently less complicated productivity measures increasingly are employed as a component in evaluation of manufacturing efficiency the question is of high managerial relevance in particular the paper points out inconsistencies with properties related to commensurability monotonicity and implications of maximizing behavior based on this viewpoint issues such as the consistency with profit maximization will be shown extra interest the paper also provides a critique of previous work in non parametric efficiency analysis where properties have been postulated or based on other arguments the findings suggest that there is no globally superior measurement technique to be found in this class and that care should be taken when evaluating managerial performance not to penalize rational behavior

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

budget windows sunsets and fiscal control abstract in recent years the united states has evaluated policy changes using a multi year budget window a budget window that is too short permits the shifting of costs beyond the window s endpoint while a window that is too long includes years for which current legislation is essentially meaningless and allows the shifting of fiscal burdens to those whom budget rules are supposed to protect this paper characterizes the optimal budget window an appropriately designed budget window eliminates the incentive to use sunsets to avoid budget restrictions the analysis also has implications for how to account for long term term budget commitments

the case for restricting fiscal policy discretion this paper studies the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on output volatility and economic growth using data for 91 countries we isolate three empirical regularities 1 governments that use fiscal policy aggressively induce significant macroeconomic instability 2 the volatility of output caused by discretionary fiscal policy lowers economic growth by more than 0 8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in volatility 3 prudent use of fiscal policy is explained to a large extent by the presence of political constraints and other political and institutional variables the evidence in the paper supports arguments for constraining discretion by imposing institutional restrictions on governments as a way to reduce output volatility and increase the rate of economic growth

peer effects in medical school abstract using data on the universe of students who graduated from us medical schools between 1996 and 1998 we examine whether the abilities and specialty preferences of a medical school class affect a student s academic achievement in medical school and his choice of specialty we mitigate the selection problem by including school specific fixed effects and show that this method yields an upper bound on peer effects for our data we estimate positive peer effects that disappear when school specific fixed effects are added to control for the endogeneity of a peer group we find no evidence that peer effects are stronger for blacks that peer groups are formed along racial lines or that students with relatively low ability benefit more from their peers than students with relatively high ability however we do find some evidence that peer groups form along gender lines

an endowment effect for risk experimental tests of stochastic reference points recent models of reference dependent preferences indicate that expectations may play a prominent role in the presence of behavioral anomalies a subset of such expectations based models predicts an endowment effect for risk that risk attitudes differ when reference points change from certain to stochastic in two purposefully simple risk preference experiments eliminating often discussed confounds i demonstrate both between and within subjects such an endowment effect for risk these results provide needed separation between expectations based reference dependent models allow for evaluation of recent theoretical extensions and may help to close a long standing debate in decision science on inconsistency between utility elicitation methodologies

fiscal restraints and voter welfare this paper explores the logic of fiscal restraints in a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection the role of the political process is both to discipline incumbents who may act against the public interest and to sort in those politicians who are most likely act in voters interests we use the model to examine the optimality of inefficient taxation limits on the size of government increasing transparency and yardstick competition some conclusions are surprising for example we show that some forms of fiscal restraint can only be desirable when incumbents are sufficiently likely to be benevolent

the macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in the us states abstract fiscal policy restrictions are often criticized for limiting the ability of governments to react to business cycle fluctuations and consequently the adoption of quantitative restrictions is viewed as inevitably leading to increased macroeconomic volatility in this paper we use data from 48 us states to investigate how budget rules affect fiscal policy outcomes our key findings are that 1 strict budgetary restrictions lead to lower policy volatility i e less aggressive use of discretion in conducting fiscal policy and 2 fiscal restrictions reduce the responsiveness of fiscal policy to output shocks these two results should have opposite effects on output volatility while less discretion should reduce volatility less responsiveness of fiscal policy might amplify business cycles we provide empirical support for the first effect restrictions by reducing discretion in fiscal policy can reduce macroeconomic volatility

comparative politics and public finance we propose a model with micropolitical foundations to contrast different political regimes compared to a parliamentary regime the institutions of a presidential congressional regime produce fewer incentives for legislative cohesion but more separation of powers these differences are reflected in the size and composition of government spending a parliamentary regime has redistribution toward a majority less underprovision of public goods and more rents to politicians a presidential congressional regime has redistribution toward powerful minorities more underprovision of public goods but less rents to politicians the size of government is smaller under a presidential regime this last prediction is consistent with cross country data

can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline the budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities we confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the european union finding that politics dominates the contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation long term structural forces triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures as others have also found however our most robust and hopeful finding is that budget institutions mechanisms and rules of the budget process that create checks and balances have significant value in curbing fiscal pressures even when the politics is representative but undisciplined and when long term structural forces are unfavourable stefania fabrizio and ashoka mody

the political economy of benefits and costs a neoclassical approach to distributive politics this essay offers a rational political explanation for the notorious inefficiency of pork barrel projects with an optimization model of legislative behavior and legislative institutions the model emphasizes the economically arbitrary from a welfare point of view importance of the geographic incidence of benefits and costs owing to the geographic basis for political representation we explore the implications of a legislator s objective function and derive conditions under which a representative legislature will select an omnibus of projects each of which exceeds the efficient scale

what is a peer the role of network definitions in estimation of endogenous peer effects we employ a standard identification strategy from the peer effects literature to investigate the importance of network definitions in estimation of endogenous peer effects we use detailed information on friends in the national longitudinal study of adolescent health survey add health to construct two network definitions that are less ad hoc than the school grade cohorts commonly used in the educational peer effects literature we demonstrate that accurate definitions of the network seriously impact estimation of peer effects in particular we show that peer effects estimates on educational achievement smoking and drinking are substantially larger with our more detailed measures than with the school grade cohorts these results highlight the need to further understand how friendships form in order to fully understand implications for policy that alters the peer group mix at the classroom or cohort level

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

an experimental test for risk aversion abstract this paper evaluates an experimental method to measure attitudes to risk in individual subjects the method is applied to study the degree of risk aversion of 46 subjects the results lead us to reject a working hypothesis of risk neutrality for such experimental subjects

constitutions politics and economics a review essay on persson and tabellini s the economic effects of constitutions in this essay i review the new book by torsten persson and guido tabellini the economic effects of constitutions which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules i also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy

executive control and legislative success the higher legislative success of parliamentary governments relative to presidential governments has been used to argue that legislative success is driven by parliamentary governments superior agenda power or their control of legislative majorities we show that this approach is at odds with some of the empirical regularities across and within political systems we then propose a legislative bargaining model to elucidate this puzzle in the model the policies of a confidence dependent parliamentary government enjoy more predictable support from governing coalition members because their short term policy goals are less important than the government s survival coalition support is stronger when the government has more agenda power and is weaker with a larger ruling coalition we explore the empirical implications of these findings and their consequences for the comparative study of legislative institutions

exchange asymmetries incorrectly interpreted as evidence of endowment effect theory and prospect theory systematic asymmetries in exchange behavior have been widely interpreted as support for endowment effect theory an application of prospect theory positing that loss aversion and utility function kinks set by entitlements explain observed asymmetries we experimentally test an alternative explanation namely that asymmetries are explained by classical preference theories finding influence through the experimental procedures typically used contrary to the predictions of endowment effect theory we observe no asymmetries when we modify procedures to remove the influence of classical preference theories when we return to traditional type procedures however the asymmetries reappear the results support explanations based in classical preference theories and reject endowment effect theory

fiscal discipline and the budget process the critical economic policy issue for many oecd countries developing countries and transition economies currently is fiscal consolidation and the maintenance of long run fiscal balance two related components underlie this general goal first several countries face the issue of deficit reduction particularly those countries with high debt gdp ratios second it is becoming increasingly apparent that major reforms of the welfare system and specifically of social security systems are critical ingredients of a long lasting fiscal consolidation see alesina and perotti 1995a in the case of monetary policy a constructive discussion has generated a widespread consensus about the benefits of different monetary institutions relatively few economists dispute the benefits of a certain amount of central bank independence even though different commentators and policymakers may disagree on the optimal degree of independence also a contracting approach has highlighted the benefit of inflation targeting and of certain institutional relationships contracts between the executive and the central bank a similar theoretical and empirical discussion on the role of budget procedures and budget institutions is just beginning in this paper we ask the following two questions i do budget procedures matter for the determination of the budget balance and its composition ii are there certain institutional reforms that one should feel comfortable in recommending based on the relatively scarce empirical evidence available we tentatively answer yes to the first question budget procedures matter on the second question we suggest that the two critical areas of reform are first more transparency second a strengthening of the roles of the executive branch vis a vis the legislature and of the treasury minister vis a vis the rest of the executive branch in order to achieve a centralized and top bottom approach to the budget process

intra experimental income effects and risk aversion abstract harrison s 1986 modification of the bekker degroot and marshak 1964 mechanism for eliciting risk preferences is employed to test the hypotheses of expected utility theory with respect to changes in income increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion subjects in the laboratory are shown to exhibit such behavior

multiyear budgets and fiscal performance panel data evidence abstract in the last two decades more than 120 countries have adopted a multiyear budget process medium term framework or mtf that enables the central government to set multiyear fiscal targets this paper analyzes a newly collected dataset of worldwide mtf adoptions during 1990 2008 it exploits within country variation in adoption in a dynamic panel framework to estimate mtfs impacts on aggregate as well as sectoral measures of fiscal performance we find that on average multiyear budgeting improves budget balance by about 2 percentage points with more advanced mtf phases having a larger impact higher phase mtfs also reduce health spending volatility while only the top phase mtf has a measurable impact on health sector technical efficiency

the endowment effect and the reference state evidence and manipulations abstract recent reports suggest that the endowment effect may be due to conditions under which it is observed and explained by incentives long recognized in standard theory evidence from new experiments reported here provides empirical support for the role of the economic environment on people s perceived reference state and consequently on their valuations as suggested by koszegi and rabin koszegi b rabin m 2006 a model of reference dependent preferences quarterly journal of economics 121 1133 1165 and indicates that the disappearance of the valuation disparity is more likely due instead to conditions that weaken the perception of reference states further these conditions appear to be poor approximations of those that prevail in most cases for which valuations are normally made

networks or neighborhoods correlations in the use of publicly funded maternity care in california abstract this study focuses on network effects in the utilization of publicly funded prenatal care using vital statistics data from california for 1989 2000 networks are defined using 5 digit zip codes and a woman s racial or ethnic group like others we find evidence that the use of public programs is highly correlated within groups defined using race ethnicity and neighborhoods these correlations persist even when we control for many unobserved characteristics by including zip code year fixed effects and when we focus on the interaction between own group behavior and measures of the potential for contacts with other members of the group contact availability however the richness of our data allows us to go further and to conduct several tests of one important hypothesis about networks that the estimated effects represent information sharing within groups the results cast doubt on the idea that the observed correlations can be interpreted as evidence of information sharing in particular we find estimated effects to be as large or larger among women who have previously used the program as among first time users

examining risk preferences under high monetary incentives experimental evidence from the people s republic of china several experimental sessions were conducted to elicit certainty equivalents for a sequence of lotteries involving real monetary outcomes the opportunity to conduct sessions in the people s republic of china afforded the ability to offer very large monetary incentives relative to subjects living costs in the highest payoff condition subjects earned three times their normal monthly revenue in the course of a two hour experiment results indicate a statistically significant impact of the level of monetary incentives on revealed risk preferences however even under extreme monetary incentives subjects demanded amounts well in excess of expected value for low probability gain prospects copyright 1992 by american economic association

voting on the budget deficit this paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending all voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal however if there is disagreement between current and future majorities a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters copyright 1990 by american economic association

financial development and openness evidence from panel data abstract this paper addresses the empirical question of whether trade and financial openness can help explain the recent pace in financial development as well as its variation across countries in recent years utilising annual data from developing and industrialised countries and dynamic panel estimation techniques we provide evidence which suggests that both types of openness are statistically significant determinants of banking sector development our findings reveal that the marginal effects of trade financial openness are negatively related to the degree of financial trade openness indicating that relatively closed economies stand to benefit most from opening up their trade and or capital accounts although these economies may be able to accomplish more by taking steps to open both their trade and capital accounts opening up one without the other could still generate gains in terms of banking sector development thus our findings provide only partial support to the well known rajan and zingales hypothesis which stipulates that both types of openness are necessary for financial development to take place

what do deficits tell us about debt empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the eu fiscal rules such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact sgp aim at constraining government behavior milesi ferretti 2003 develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting the amount of this depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule we provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the european union we find that the sgp rules have induced governments to use stock flow adjustments a form of creative accounting to hide deficits the tendency to substitute stock flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large

willingness to pay and compensation demanded experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value aside from possible income effects measures of the maximum amounts people will pay to avoid a loss and the minimum compensation necessary for them to accept it are generally assumed to be equivalent unexpectedly wide variations between these sums however have been noted in survey responses to hypothetical options this paper reports the results of a series of experiments that confronted people with actual money payments and cash compensations the results indicate that the compensation measure of value seems to exceed significantly the willingness to pay measure which would appear to call into some question various rules of entitlement damage assessments and interpretations of indifference curves

endowments and risky choice abstract we report evidence of an endowment effect for risk extending previous results to the popular paired choice lottery setting specifically we observe a distribution of revealed preferences consistent with risk aversion that diminishes in endowed variance although the effect is considerably weaker for compound relative to simple lotteries we also find that in the absence of an obvious endowment subjects behave as if the comparatively lower variance lottery is a cognitive reference point revealing a distribution of preferences indistinguishable from subjects who are explicitly endowed with the low variance lottery finally we report no significant difference in elicited preferences between two popular mechanisms the multiple price list and a variant on the becker degroot and marshak mechanism when no endowment is induced suggesting previously reported differences in behavior between the two mechanisms may be in part a consequence of relative responsiveness to endowment framing

social interactions in high school lessons from an earthquake after an earthquake hit southern italy in 1980 young men from certain towns were exempted from compulsory military service we show that the exemption raised high school graduation rates of boys by more than 2 percentage points we do this by comparing high school graduation rates of young exempt men and older nonexempt men from the least damaged areas and men of the same age groups from nearby towns that were not hit by the quake similar comparisons show that graduation rates of young women in the affected areas also increased since in italy women are not subject to the draft the findings suggest the presence of spillover effects jel i21 j13