guaranty funds and risk taking evidence from the insurance industry abstract this paper examines change in property liability insurers risk taking around enactments of state guaranty fund laws our evidence suggests that the risk of insurers asset portfolios increases following enactments but this increase in risk is significant only for stock insurers our evidence of increased risk taking following guaranty fund adoptions suggests that the way these funds are organized creates counterproductive investment incentives especially for stock companies because these laws were enacted by states over the period 1969 1981 our evidence on changes in risk taking helps resolve statistical problems that have been troublesome for studies of bank deposit insurance

a case study of organizational form and risk shifting in the savings and loan industry abstract i analyze the investment and funding strategies of two thrifts one stock owned and one mutually owned from 1983 to 1988 despite their similarities prior to 1983 the stock thrift implemented a riskier financial strategy and did so only after converting to stock ownership although this strategy ultimately led to its failure the stock thrift still made significant payouts to its controlling shareholders this case study illustrates in stark terms the relation between organizational form and risk shifting in the thrift industry

responding to financial crisis the case of jamaica abstract the adverse economic and social effects of the financial crises that have afflicted many developing countries in recent years have highlighted the need to develop a policy response which addresses the vulnerability of financial systems to systemic instability and crisis the article examines the experience of jamaica a country which managed a financial sector crisis during the 1990s without the assistance or involvement of the international monetary fund lessons are drawn from the jamaica case study for the domestic management of banking sector failures in lower income countries

institutional development and bank stability evidence from transition countries g21 p30 p34 p52 abstract this paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk using a difference in difference approach we show that banks financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal insti tutions liberalize banking and restructure corporate governance we also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms a further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk banks tend to have lower roa volatility and fewer nonper forming loans after reforming the institutional environment finally we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks

limitation of liability and the ownership structure of the firm this paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability if investors want managers to be monitored the monitors should be residual claimants shareholders and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm when liquidating wealth is costly contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device however if wealth is unobservable under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium this may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements

fdicia after five years at year end 1991 congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts the fdic improvement act this reform followed the failure of more than 2 000 depository institutions in the 1980s many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks this article reviews these changes and evaluates early results

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

the joint production of confidence endogenous regulation and nineteenth century commercial bank clearinghouses during the nineteenth century deposits increased relative to bank notes c ausing increased information asymmetry problems in banking this pape r describes how bank clearinghouses lowered these costs by monitoring bank activities and establishing mechanisms of managerial control i n effect regulating bank behavior such actions enforced the loca l one to one exchange rate between deposits and specie clearinghouse s increased regulation during financial panics creating and enforcin g a risk sharing device loan certificates for addressing panic rela ted information problems this paper concludes that the market s capacity to control bank managers depends on the banking product mix and more generally on information costs copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

tariff and quota reform with international capital mobility in a small open economy with a convex production set international capital mobility raises the cost of tariff protection on one subset of imports if there are irremovable quotas on another given irremovable quotas on one subset of imports free trade is the optimal policy toward all other imports with or without international capital mobility further in the scalar case international capital mobility reduces the optimal implicit excess tariff on the quota constrained import if an irremovable tariff is in place on the other import

the austrian search for realistic foundations self designated austrian economists have two different views of modem neoclassical economics some such as f a hayek take issue with certain aspects of neoclassical economics without disputing its fundamentals others most notably ludwig von mises and murray rothbard explicitly reject the foundations of neoclassical consumer and welfare theory and construct a systematic alternative this paper analyzes the most distinctive features of the mises rothbard alternative to the neoclassical paradigm it also considers related positions defended by israel kirzner i argue that their effort to rebuild economics on nonneoclassical foundations fails and that their critique of neoclassical foundations is wrong or strongly overstated

the liquidity trap and u s interest rates in the 1930s most current literature assumes that a central bank loses the ability to influence interest rates through variations in reserve supply as soon as overnight rates have been driven to zero i argue that reserve supply can be directly related to longer term rates when overnight rates are zero because banks reserve demand is then defined by the role of cash as an asset free of interest rate risk i present evidence that reserve supply affected longerterm interest rates in the u s from 1934 through 1939 while overnight rates were at the zero floor even when the changes in reserve supply reflected factors unlikely to have affected expectations of future overnight rates

does public insurance crowd out private insurance the cost of expanding public sector health programs depends critically on the extent to which public eligibility will cover just the uninsured or will crowd out existing private insurance coverage we estimate the extent of crowd out arising from the expansions of medicaid to pregnant women and children over the 1987 1992 period we estimate that approximately 50 percent of the increase in medicaid coverage was associated with a reduction in private insurance coverage this occurred largely because employees took up employer based insurance less frequently there is also some evidence that employers contributed less for insurance and that workers dropped coverage of dependents

protection and the harmful effects of endogenous capital flows abstract assume a country has in place a binding tariff and is a price taker on world markets in which capital is internationally mobile and unimpeded regardless of trade patterns possible specificity of capital or factor intensities an increase in the tariff harms the country if capital is frozen and harms the country even more when capital mobility brings rates of return into line among countries

insuring banks against liquidity shocks the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort it has long been recognized that banks simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure because a system failure is costly this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance di to insure banks against liquidity shocks these arrangements have proven themselves very successful but they have also been the source of problems researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed this paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks a lender of last resort and di and compares the design of these arrangements across countries the paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed copyright blackwell publishers ltd 2006

the valuation of sequential exchange opportunities sequential exchange opportunities are valued using the techniques of modern option pricing theory the vehicle for analysis is the concept of a compound exchange option this security is shown to exist implicitly in several contractual settings a valuation formula for this option is derived the formula is shown to generalize much previous work in option pricing several applications of the formula are presented

is the glass steagall act justified a study of the u s experience with universal banking before the glass steagall act of 1933 removed commercial banks from the securities underwriting business we evaluate the argument for the separation of commercial and investment banking that conflicts of interest induce commercial banks to fool the public into investing in securities which turn out to be of low quality a comparison of the performance of securities underwritten by commercial and investment banks prior to the act shows no evidence of this instead the public appears to have rationally accounted for the possibility of conflicts of interest and this appears to have constrained the banks to underwrite high quality securities jel g21 g24 n22

deposit insurance and moral hazard problem the case of turkish banking system we investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of turkish commercial banks we construct a model under reasonable assumptions with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk moral hazard risk empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system we relate this excessive risk taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks the research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk taking

the limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative abstract market value accounting mva might improve market and regulatory discipline on financial institutions unfortunately there are serious conceptual measurement and incentive problems with implementing mva that have not received significant attention these problems are suggested by the theory of asymmetric information and the role intermediaries play in solving information and monitoring problems after analyzing the problems with mva we develop an alternative approach that applies mva principles where they are most feasible and uses a statistical procedure where asymmetric information problems make mva particularly problematic an empirical analysis suggests that this procedure may substantially improve the distribution of regulatory discipline

organizational form and risk taking in the savings and loan industry abstract i hypothesize that risk taking is greater in stock thrifts than in mutual thrifts because the residual and fixed claims are separable i find that stock thrifts exhibit greater profit variability during the 1982 1988 period and that conversions from mutual to stock ownership are associated with increased investment in risky assets and increased profit variability these findings illustrate the relation between the structure of residual claims incentives and firm performance as well as the unintended consequences resulting from changes in thrift regulations

risk shifting incentives of depository institutions a new perspective on federal deposit insurance reform abstract we characterize the risk shifting incentives of a depository institution as arising fundamentally from the existence of limited liability and the associated convex payoff to equity holders this risk incentive feature is unchanged by deposits being insured and hence excessive risk taking by depository institutions is not solely attributable to the flat rate insurance premium consequently the incentive problem cannot be resolved through a risk based insurance premium contrary to the prevailing view we propose a solution that eliminates risk shifting through an optimal tax structure and specify a corresponding insurance premium that is revenue neutral from the social planner s regulator s standpoint the solution is derived in the context of a social objective function that trades off the benefits of liquidity services by banks and the unique informational role of bank loans with the costs of investment distortions engendered by risk shifting

appearance and reality in deposit insurance the case for reform abstract this paper argues that the staffs and explicit insurance reserves of u s deposit insurers have been overwhelmed by de facto financial disaster the full costs of financing federal deposit insurance have become enormous and increasingly inequitable in distribution to reduce voluntary risk taking authorities must reprice and redesign the system of de facto deposit insurance coverage six complementary reforms are discussed 1 accounting for institutional assets liabilities and net worth at market value 2 enhancing opportunities for deposit insurers to manage their risk exposure 3 recalibrating insurance coverages 4 imposing risk rated premiums 5 mixed private and governmental competition in deposit insurance and 6 constraining insurance agency and federal reserve authority to bail out insolvent institutions

the impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking abstract from 1863 1935 regulators imposed contingent liability on bank shareholders to discourage risk taking using data from 1900 to 1915 i find that banks subject to stricter liability rules have lower equity and asset volatility hold a lower proportion of risky assets and are less likely to increase their investment in risky assets when their net worth declines consistent with the hypothesis that stricter liability discourages commercial bank risk taking these findings provide lessons for current bank regulatory policy and show that the shape of the residual claimant s payoff function has a significant impact on managerial incentives and firm performance

a dynamic quantity adjustment process in a small open economy and welfare effects of tariff changes abstract considered an n good small open economy where the technology is strictly convex and ad valorem tariffs are imposed in this world it is known that the tariff utility relationship may be perverse the fact is known as the vanek bhagwati paradox the source of the perversity is found in aggregate income effects the present paper shows that d stability of our dynamic system implies non perverse aggregate income effects and hence the non perverse tariff utility relationship

specialization and human capital incentives for specialization trade and the production of comparative advantage through investment are shown to arise from increasing returns to utilization of human capital indivisibilities imply fixed cost elements of investment that are independent of subsequent utilization hence the rate of return is increasing in utilization and is maximized by utilizing specialized skills as intensively as possible identically endowed individuals have incentives to specialize their investments in skills and trade with each other for this reason even if production technology exhibits constant returns to scale

effective protection redux abstract this paper rehabilitates effective protection for use in political economy in general equilibrium the usual definition corresponds to no economically interesting magnitude the effective rate of protection for sector j is redefined here as the uniform tariff which is equivalent to the actual differentiated tariff structure in its effect on rents to residual claimants in sector j it permits political economic ranking of how much protection is given across sectors since higher uniform tariffs imply higher losses of welfare sacrificed to the interest groups demonstrating operationality the numerical results for the us economy for the old and new concepts are not significantly correlated

double liability and bank risk taking this paper examines double liability as it existed in the united states prior to the great depression and assesses its impact upon bank risk taking under double liability shareholders of failing banks could lose in addition to the initial purchase price of shares an amount equal to the par value of shares owned this paper assesses whether or not banks chartered in states with double liability laws undertook less risk than banks operating under conventional limited liability the results suggest that double liability did reduce bank risk taking but did not guarantee bank stability in times of widespread financial distress

did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in japan the principal agent problem between the regulator regulated banks and taxpayers is critical to the viability of the financial system s safety net there exists the danger that the regulator will collude with regulated banks to pursue their benefits at the expense of taxpayers thereby reducing effectiveness of financial supervision this paper proposes that the human relationship prevailing between the regulatory authorities and private banks referred to as amakudari is a form of collusion between the regulator and banks that endangers the safety net mechanism in japan statistical analysis of data on regional banks shows that those banks accepting post retirement officials from the ministry of finance have reduced capital adequacy levels and increased non performing loans thus the statistical result supports the hypothesis proposed in this paper

the s l debacle public policy lessons for bank and thrift regulation this book describes the period of failures of savings and loan associations and sets out a program of policies to prevent future debacles it explains the regulatory actions and inactions that created the incentives for large numbers of thrifts to make excessively risky and ill conceived and in some cases fraudulent and criminal investments it describes the failure of the accounting system to provide adequate information to regulators and in many cases even to the managers of the thrifts themselves concerning the health and riskiness of individual thrifts it also discusses how the regulatory system that had been conceived in an earlier and highly regulated era was overwhelmed in the deregulated environment of the early 1980s it shows how the reforms that were made in response to the growing crisis were too little and too late and finally it offers a set of policy reforms that could prevent future crises in the savings and loan industry this work should be of interest to political and financial economists

the mechanics of commercial banking liberalization and growth abstract this paper formalizes the effects of liberalization across the border of deposit taking and lending activities on the regime of competition in the banking market and on the rate of growth of the economy we extend two economy based deidda 2006 s banking model in which originally each economy hosts at least one operating bank we introduce two gats defined modes of commercial banking liberalization namely the commercial presence mode and the cross border mode additionally we introduce the possibility of strategic behavior by competing banks in equilibrium the extended model provides a causal link between the cost structure of the banking industry the regime of competition in the liberalized banking sector and the rate of growth of the economy under alternative modes of liberalization in particular we show a threshold effect in terms of economic development above certain economic development the banking sector operates competitively and supports an accelerating rate of growth generating a bidirectional self reinforcing link between commercial banking liberalization and growth the pace of growth is further increased with respect to a scenario where such behavior is not present by the presence of strategic behavior by competing banks in equilibrium

domestic distortions and international trade in this paper we develop techniques for measuring the trade policy equivalent of domestic distortions using a distance function approach our measure the trade restrictiveness index is shown to equal the uniform tariff which is welfare equivalent to a given pattern of domestic taxes and subsidies we extend the index to incorporate taxes in markets for nontraded goods and factors of production and illustrate its operationality with an application to liberalisation in mexican agriculture we conclude that our index has considerable potential in empirical work and as an aid to trade negotiators it is widely appreciated that government policies of a purely domestic nature can have major implications for a country s international trade to give just one example such implications were widely discussed in the context of the recent gatt round in which u s negotiators insisted that intra ec agricultural policy should be viewed as trade distorting however analysts and negotiators have not hitherto had access to a conceptual framework which would allow the trade effects of domestic policies to be measured in a consistent way in this paper we propose such a framework and show how it may be implemented empirically of course other attempts have been made to quantify the overall distortionary effects of domestic policies these have involved constructing empirically based indexes such as producer or consumer subsidy equivalents 2 however such measures have no theoretical foundation moreover since they use the shares of different sectors in production or consumption as weights they are likely to be systematically biased for example sectors whose output levels are reduced by high taxation are assigned low weights whereas their true weights should be higher by contrast we show below that our approach is based firmly on welfare economics and correctly uses marginal rather than average production and consumption shares as weights the approach we propose draws on recent work by two of the authors anderson and neary 1990 1992b which dealt with trade distortions only that work developed a scalar index the trade restrictiveness index or tri which equals the equiproportionate rate of trade restriction which is equivalent in welfare terms to

a contracting theory interpretation of the origins of federal deposit insurance conventional wisdom holds that the enactment of federal deposit insurance helped small rural banks at the expense of large urban institutions this paper uses asymmetricinformation agency cost paradigms from corporate finance theory and data on bank stock prices to show how deposit insurance could and did help stockholders of large banks the broadening stockholder distribution of large banks during the stock market bubble of the late 1920s undermined the efficiency of double liability provisions in controlling incentive conflict among large bank stakeholders federal deposit insurance restored depositor confidence by asking government officials to take over and bond the task of monitoring managerial performance and solvency at u s banks

international capital mobility shadow prices and the cost of protection this paper studies the welfare losses from tariff protection in a small open economy when some factors are internationally mobile our principal result is that international fictor mobility must raise the cost of protection more specifically the welfare loss resulting from a uniform increase in tariffs in a competitive small open economy is greater when tariff induced international factor movements take place than when factors are internationally immobile by contrast an exogen1ous inflow of factors in the presence of tariffs may increase or reduce the welfare loss associated with protection depending on whether or not the protected commodities use the foreign owned factors intensively relative to domestically owned factors these results are proven for a very general specification of the economy s technology in particular no restrictions are placed on the degree of vertical integration in production on the sectors into which factors are internationally mobile or on the number of goods and factors our main result holds whether or not an increase in tariff rates leads the economy to specialise in addition we show how our results relate to earlier work on immiserising capital inflows and on negative shadow prices for factors of production thus synthesizing a number of recent results within a common framework the paper is organised as follows in section 2 we explain our framework and derive expressions for the welfare effects of tariffs when all factors are domestically owned and when some factors are foreign owned but not internationally

can a small social pension promote labor force participation evidence from the colombia mayor program one of the primary motivations behind the establishment of noncontributory pension programs is to allow beneficiaries to retire from the labor force yet as with other unconditional cash transfer schemes their aggregate effects may be more complex using panel data and instrumental variable techniques this paper shows that the effect of one such program colombia mayor has been to raise the labor force participation of relatively younger male beneficiaries this increase occurred precisely in the occupations with characteristics that are likely to require some up front investment the paper concludes that the transfer effectively loosened the liquidity constraints to remaining in these occupations however no such effect is found among women or older beneficiaries

the impact of a social program on labor informality the case of auh in argentina abstract the recent universal child allowance program in argentina provides monthly cash transfers to unregistered workers with children as the program is accessible only to those who are not in formal employment it may discourage workers transitions to the formal sector in this paper we estimate this effect by comparing the transitions to registered jobs of eligible workers with children with a similar but not eligible group without children over time the results suggest a statistically significant and economically large disincentive to the labor market formalization of the program beneficiaries in contrast there is no sufficient evidence for the existence of a significant incentive for registered workers to become informal

worker sorting compensating differentials and health insurance evidence from displaced workers this article introduces an empirical strategy to the compensating differentials literature that i allows both individual observed and unobserved characteristics to be rewarded differently in firms based on health insurance provision and ii selection to jobs that provide benefits to operate on both sides of the labor market estimates of this model are used to directly test empirical assumptions that are made with popular econometric strategies in the health economics literature our estimates reject the assumptions underlying numerous cross sectional and longitudinal estimators we find that the provision of health insurance has influenced wage inequality finally our results suggest there have been substantial changes in how displaced workers sort to firms that offer health insurance benefits over the past two decades we discuss the implications of our findings for the compensating differentials literature

informality and the expansion of social protection programs evidence from mexico many countries are moving from employer based to universal health coverage which can generate crowd out in mexico seguro popular provides public health coverage to the uninsured using the gradual roll out of the system at the municipality level we estimate that seguro popular had no effect on informality in the overall population informality did increase by 1 7 for less educated workers but the wage gains for workers who switch between the formal and the informal sector were not significantly affected this suggests that marginal workers do not choose between formal and informal jobs on the basis of health insurance coverage

three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions standard models for deposit insurance strike analogies to more familiar financial contracts and conceive of risk as exogenous the oldest model of deposit insurance likens it to passively underwriting casualty insurance a more sophisticated but still bilateral model likens deposit insurance to writing a passive put option on the enterprise whose funding is insured delays in acknowledging the wreck of the s l industry and its federal insurer fslic discredit these models as guides to managing a deposit insurance fund deposit insurance is better interpreted as a trilateral performance bond that enhances the credit of an insured institution this interpretation endogenizes risk emphasizes incentive conflict and underscores the need to optimize loss control activity the bonding model clarifies that a subset of the monitoring and disciplinary activities traditionally undertaken by government officials can usefully be privatized

federal deposit insurance regulatory policy and optimal bank capital this paper seeks to explain the combination of explicit and implicit pricing for deposit insurance employed by the fdic essentially the fdic sells two products insurance and regulation to span the product space it must and does set two prices we argue that the need to establish regulatory disincentives to bank risk taking is the heart of the controversy over the adequacy of bank capital and that the ability to close risky banks before exhausting their charter value i e the value of their right to continue in business stands at the center of these disincentives and in front of the fdic s insurance reserves just as a book shouldn t be judged by its cover a government agency shouldn t be judged by the words behind its initials with the fdic federal deposit insurance corporation the agency s name describes only part of its formal operations the fdic is quasi governmental has a regional structure and sells deposit insurance however the initials fail to convey the fdic s critical place in the governmental regulatory structure as the sole federal overseer of the approximately 8900 state chartered commercial banks that have chosen not to belong the federal reserve system reflecting the federal reserve s membership problem the number of these banks is growing year by year besides selling deposit insurance at bargain explicit rates the fdic performs four regulatory functions 1 entry regulation it passes on new banks applications for deposit insurance and on branch and merger proposals as well thereby protecting the value of existing bank charters 2 examination two thirds of fdic employees are concerned with inspecting bank records and supervising managerial activity 3 regulation of deposit rates and conditions for withdrawal by tradition fdic policies on these matters conform entirely with regulations applicable to federal reserve member banks and 4 disposition of failed banks when an insured bank fails the fdic usually chooses not to liquidate it 2

austrian and neoclassical economics any gains from trade austrian economics has been important to the development of modern economics but its role in current practice is much diminished the neoclassical approach dominates today s thinking many austrians bemoan this state of affairs most neoclassical economists just ignore it but austrian and neoclassical economics aren t mutually exclusive each represents a distinctive point of view although with little meaningful intellectual exchange between them these days this is unfortunate many different concepts are associated with both austrian and neoclassical economics to concentrate on where the most exchange of ideas might occur i am concerned about those aspects of austrian economics primarily dealing with the process of competition and that portion of neoclassical economics primarily dealing with the determination of economic equilibrium this in a nutshell is the main intellectual difference between them some consequences of this difference are discussed in what follows i hope to show that mutually advantageous gains from trade exist austrian economics offers a valuable perspective of the economy as an evolutionary process akin to biological evolution with entrepreneurial activities representing the main instruments of change it is primarily a macroeconomic theory of the economy as a whole with keen insights on the nature of decentralization and the process of competition that deserve more attention neoclassical economics offers a microeconomic theory of economic behavior that is especially useful for analyzing specific economic problems and for orienting analysis around more sharply described empirical phenomena and data

fiscal policy and entrepreneurship abstract this paper reexamines the effect of expansionary fiscal policy on real gdp in the presence of entrepreneurship when government expenditure partially crowds out private consumption as government expenditure cannot reflect changes in consumers tastes expansionary fiscal policy weakens the social role of firms activities to predict and adapt to idiosyncratic changes in consumers taste i show that expansionary fiscal policy can lower real gdp when idiosyncratic risk and the substitutability of goods are large and when firms have a strong ability to predict changes in consumer tastes i also investigate how expansionary fiscal policy influences firms investments in prediction ability

retrospectives lange and von mises large scale enterprises and the economic case for socialism in the debates over economic calculation launched by ludwig von mises in 1920 and extending well into the 1940s the central issue concerned the ability of a socialist economy to achieve allocative efficiency von mises emphasized that a collectivist state would have great difficulty in gathering and acting on relevant information therefore under socialism even well intentioned bureaucrats would lack a meaningful system of values on which to calculate defenders of socialism such as oskar lange countered that a market socialism could match demand to supply just as well as capitalism and meet the range of static conditions required for pareto optimality that debate is a rich and interesting story that has been told many times before but in all that has been written an important aspect of the original debate has been lost somewhat oddly both the socialists like oskar lange and the advocates of private ownership like von mises and friedrich hayek maintained that they were defending the progressive tendencies of competitive capitalism against the deadening hand of monopoly power this historic paradox deserves consideration if only because it serves to focus attention on our still incomplete theories of large scale enterprises under socialism and capitalism

the role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements demandable debt finance by banks warrants explanation because it entails costs of bank suspension liquidation and idle reserve holdings an explanation is developed in which demandable debt provides incentive compatible intermediation where the banker has comparative advantage in allocating investment funds but may act against the interests of uninformed depositors demandable debt attracts funds by giving depositors an option to force liquidation its usefulness in transacting follows from information sharing between monitors and nonmonitors copyright 1991 by american economic association

the valuation of fdic deposit insurance using option pricing estimates when congress set the premium rate for fdic deposit insurance in the banking act of 1935 which authorized a permanent federal insurance system neither experience nor theory could offer much guidance regarding an appropriate fee structure although rates have since been periodically revised the fdic has yet to attempt to set the insurance rate at a ifair level that is a level equal to administrative costs plus the ex ante value of the insurance such a premium is the rate that would be charged by competitive private insurers however7 the garn st germain act of 1982 directed the fdic to consider the feasibility of a risk based premium structure in response the fdic has suggested a trial system in which each insured bank will be placed in one of three risk classes based on credit and interest rate risk relative to capital and a premium rate will be assigned to each group those rates will be determined in part by the loss experience of the entire banking system fdic 1983 another approach to the determination of the appropriate insurance premium has been offered by merton 1977 who suggested using the analogous relationship between deposit guarantees and put options to value fdic insurance in this paper we follow merton s suggestion and calculate bank specific estimates of the proper premium for deposit insurance for the banks in our sample we find that fdic rates greatly exceed estimates of the fair value of the insurance derived from the blackscholes 1972 option pricing model

the congressional bureaucratic system a principal agent perspective with applications to the sec this paper provides the theoretical perspective and empirical support for congressional dominance of agency decisions my thesis is twofold first because much of the previous evidence on this question is not evidence at all many scholars intuition and conclusions are based on a logically flawed foundation second i have provided here and in previous work a look at a variety of different agencies and in each case have shown how the events can plausibly be interpreted as involving congress agency problems within the congressional bureaucratic system are real and substantial just as they are within corporations however as in the latter institutional forms develop within the congressional system to partially if not wholly mitigate these problems the logical perspective together with the evidence provide a strong case against the agency dominance hypothesis as typified by the early sections of niskanen 1971 and wilson 1980

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

lessons from the asian crisis abstract this paper provides an asymmetric information analysis of the recent east asian crisis it then outlines several lessons from this crisis first there is a strong rationale for an international lender of last resort second without appropriate conditionality for this lending the moral hazard created by operation of an international lender of last resort can promote financial instability third although capital flows did contribute to the crisis they are a symptom rather than an underlying cause of the crisis suggesting exchange controls are unlikely to be a useful strategy to avoid future crises fourth pegged exchange rate regimes are a dangerous strategy for emerging market countries and make financial crises more likely

deregulation and bank financial policy the standard view that banks can value maximize by exploiting non risk rated deposit insurance ignores the potential loss of a valuable bank charter due to insolvency recognition of this effect changes the bank s optimal financial policy and can induce extreme risk averting as well as risk taking behavior however as the value of the bank charter falls the risk taking strategy is more apt to dominate therefore current deregulation of the banking industry by easing entry and devaluing charters holds the potential for increases in the incidence of insolvency unless offsetting policies are instituted

employment based health insurance and job mobility is there evidence of job lock the majority of privately insured americans obtain their health insurance through their own or a family member s employment the rationale for employers to provide health insurance is straightforward by pooling the risks of individuals employers can reduce adverse selection and lower administrative expenses in addition they benefit from tax laws allowing businesses to deduct their health insurance costs these advantages of employer provision however must be weighed against the distortions they may generate in individual labor market decisions in particular health insurance may distort job mobility if employees decide to keep jobs they would rather leave for fear of losing coverage for preexisting conditions a possibility that has been termed job lock this paper attempts to quantify the effect of employer provided health insurance on the labor market mobility of individuals the link between employer provided health insurance and

deeper integration in east asia regional institutions and the international economic system sea change in east asian perceptions of the international economic system is causing a determined thrust toward deeper east asian integration through regional financial and trade institutions the financial crisis of 1997 98 contributed to this change by revealing weaknesses in the international financial architecture at the same time that it bared weaknesses in domestic policies and institutions in east asia many east asians felt the existing international financial system failed to provide them with adequate prescriptions or aid at a time of great need in response governments are intensifying regional policy cooperation and have begun to develop regional institutional capacity to head off future financial crises and manage them if they occur this change in perceptions of the international economic system has been reinforced by paralysis in the world trade organisation wto the failure of governments to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations at the november 1999 wto ministerial meeting in seattle is helping to propel regional approaches to trade liberalisation deeper integration in east asia is a potentially substantial development which will influence the future shape of the international economic system in section 2 i review the primary factors contributing to the financial crisis and discuss the implications for policy makers in east asia in a context of diminished confidence in global institutions the emphasis is on macroeconomic policy management structural reforms changing incentive systems overhauling crisis

william j baumol an entrepreneurial economist on the economics of entrepreneurship william j baumol is the 2003 winner of the international award for entrepreneurship and small business research throughout his career baumol has urged the profession to pay attention to the instrumental role of entrepreneurship in economic renewal and growth at the same time he has insisted that economists continue to use their usual tool box when the purview of analysis is extended to entrepreneurship hence baumol can be characterized as a revolutionary from within in this article we present and discuss baumol s research contribution in the areas of entrepreneurship and small business economics notably from a growth perspective in addition to placing his work in these areas into the wider context of his full contribution we emphasize baumol s findings that growth cannot be explained by the accumulation of various factors of production per se human creativity and productive entrepreneurship are needed to combine the inputs in profitable ways as a result an institutional environment that encourages productive entrepreneurship and human experimentation becomes the ultimate determinant of economic growth

the fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises abstract in recent decades a majority of countries have experienced a systemic banking crisis requiring a major and expensive overhaul of their banking system budgetary outlays whether immediate or deferred have exceeded 50 of gdp in some cases this paper uses cross country econometric evidence to examine whether the design of crisis containment and resolution policies can systematically influence the overall magnitude of fiscal costs we find that accommodating policies such as blanket deposit guarantees open ended liquidity support repeated partial recapitalizations debtor bail outs and regulatory forbearance all tend to add significantly and sizably to fiscal costs

austrian economics neoclassicism and the market test professor sherwin rosen correctly suggests that the austrian and neoclassical schools can be complementary each accepting much from the other however his recognition of austrian strengths needs to be amplified and his criticisms need softening his appeal to the market test risks encouraging anti intellectual attitudes and practices

restoring banking stability beyond supervised capital requirements emerging economies have been particularly prone to financial sector crises reflecting marked information asymmetries and political interference as well as the substantial volatility in underlying economic conditions and the vulnerability of banking and finance when structural economic changes create a new and uncharted operating environment the standard regulatory paradigm relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy but it may not be enough other measures to improve the incentive structure for bankers regulators and other market participants could effectively increase the number of concerned skilled and watchful eyes intermittent application of supplementary blunt instruments could also be useful

international factor mobility minimum wage rates and factor price equalization a synthesis this paper examines the behavior of a small open economy facing perfectly elastic supply curves for some of its productive factors in particular the paper derives some comparative statics properties of such economies compares them with the properties of otherwise identical economies in which all factor prices are determined endogenously and investigates the relationship between factor price rigidities factor price equalization and the pattern of specialization among the new results which are proved it is shown that as more and more factor price rigidities are imposed on an economy it comes closer to a state of factor price equalization

is fairly priced deposit insurance possible we analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard without deposit linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive deregulated environment except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy we establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well this suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance this paper exposes a conflict between a deregulated competitive financial services industry on the one hand and fairly priced risk sensitive deposit insurance on the other we show that if depository institutions dis are perfectly competitive i e each makes zero profits on average then it is impossible to implement incentive compatible risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing recent distress among dis has fueled debate about reform of the existing deposit insurance system many believe that the prevailing risk insensitive premium structure encourages dis to choose excessively risky assets and that it should be replaced by deposit insurance premia linked to the dis choices of risk 2 risk sensitive deposit insurance pricing however imposes greater informational demands on the deposit insurer and runs afoul of both

optimal bank reorganization policies and the pricing of federal deposit insurance optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits and interest rate on deposits the economy s risk free interest rate and the regulators bank audit administration costs under competitive conditions the threshold assets to deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank s risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank s current assets to deposits ratio should regulatory agencies close reorganize an ailing federally insured financial institution if so when the recent record rate of failures of savings and loans associations s ls has renewed the urgency of this question the regulatory agencies are empowered but not required to reorganize financial institutions that are statutorily insolvent i e have zero or negative regulatory net worth recently regulators have in many instances permitted insolvent financial institutions to remain in operation 2 also while debating on the increase of the proposed funding of the federal deposit insurers the u s congress argued whether it would be desirable and if so when to close more s ls thus when regulators should close a troubled financial institution has become a major question of bank regulatory policy while the existing academic literature provides powerful insights into the structure and pricing of the insurers liability this literature offers very little guidance regarding the timing of bank reorganizations 3 indeed to the best of our knowledge the value of the federal

the effect of self employed health insurance subsidies on self employment abstract this paper estimates the effect of an increase in the deductibility of health insurance premiums for self employed individuals on the probability of being self employed using a panel of tax returns from 1999 to 2004 we estimate fixed effects instrumental variable regressions for the probability of being self employed entering into self employment and exiting from self employment our results suggest that this policy increased the probability of being self employed by 1 5 percentage points and increased the probability that a taxpayer would be primarily or exclusively self employed by 1 1 and 0 35 percentage points respectively these effects explain about a third to a half of the total increase in self employment by these definitions over the sample period we also find that the probability of entering self employment increased by 0 8 percentage points and find suggestive evidence that the probability of exit decreased by 2 8 percentage points

tariffs quotas and voluntary export restraints with and without internationally mobile capital this paper presents a general framework for comparing the effects of tariffs quotas and vers voluntary export restraints both with and without international capital mobility expressions for the shadow price of foreign exchange and the shadow price of capital under each type of trade restriction are derived and it is shown that although international capital mobility raises the welfare cost of tariff protection it lowers the welfare cost of quantitative restrictions in most cases the effects of exogenous shocks in the presence of quotas are intermediate between those in the presence of tariffs and those in the presence of vers tarifs douaniers contingentements et restrictions volontaires d l exportation quand le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur presente un cadre general d analyse qu il utilise pour comparer les effets de tarifs douaniers de contingentements et de restrictions volontaires a l exportation dans des contextes ofu le capital est ou n est pas mobile internationalement l auteur derive le prix fictif du change etranger et le prix fictif du capital sous l un et l autre types de restrictions au commerce et montre que meme si la mobilite internationale du capital augmente le cofut en terme de bien etre de la protection tarifaire elle reduit le cofut en terme de bien etre des restrictions sur les quantites echangees dans tous les cas les effets de chocs exogenes quand des contingentements existent sont toujours dans la fourchette entre ceux qu on observe quand des tarifs douaniers existent et ceux qui prevalent quand des restrictions volontaires i l exportation existent

determinants of thrift institution resolution costs this paper provides a detailed examination of the cost imposed by thrift institutions resolved during the period 1980 1988 a simple model is presented to explain the cost of resolution this model is tested empirically with a comprehensive data set that permits us to avoid some of the econometric problems present in earlier studies the empirical evidence suggests that the model that explains resolution costs in the late 1980s is significantly different from the model for either the middle or early 1980s this evidence is consistent with the changing nature of the thrift crisis and changes in the regulator s closure rule our econometric evidence moreover is consistent with the hypothesis that for troubled institutions tangible net worth systematically understates market value net worth in addition the importance of including time effects as well as institution effects as determinants of the cost of resolution is revealed the sharp increase in market interest rates in late 1979 and early 1980 and the deregulation of deposit rates led to record losses in the thrift industry in the early 1980s and to a major erosion of the industry s capital many institutions never fully recovered from these problems and most currently insolvent thrift

the resolution of claims in financial distress the case of massey ferguson when a firm s business deteriorates to the point where it cannot meet its financial obligations the firm is said to have entered the state of financial distress the first signals of distress are usually violations of debt covenants coupled with the omission or reduction of dividends some financially distressed firms eventually go bankrupt others recover or manage to settle the claims against them out of court 1 the behavior of firms in financial distress is interesting for two reasons first the costs of financial distress are an important element in capital structure theory in many models 2 these costs are hypothesized to counteract the tax benefits of leverage and lead to an internal optimum for the capital structure of the firm second financial distress has come to be recognized as a state in which contractual claims are incompletely specified standard terms of the debt equity contract are violated when the firm enters financial distress and claimants may then decide not to act according to previously agreed upon rules or legal formulas recent history has provided a number of examples of firms in financial distress including massey ferguson international harvester chrysler and braniff the resolution of claims in these situations often differs from what is predicted by legal rules or standard theoretical models this paper examines the actual resolution of claims in the reorganization of massey ferguson ltd in part i we use time series data on daily stock returns to test different specifications of priority rules for debt and equity claims in part ii we consider whether massey ferguson avoided deadweight costs of financial distress through the restructuring of claims negotiated among creditors during the winter of 1980 81

external increasing returns and the shadow price of foreign exchange abstract this paper shows that under external increasing returns to scale and a strictly concave production possibilities frontier the shadow price of foreign exchange in the presence of a tariff is the same as that in an economy with purely constant returns to scale however with a quota or a voluntary export restraint this shadow price is in general quite different from that in a purely constant returns to scale economy

a reexamination of the over or under pricing of deposit insurance this study shows how fair deposit insurance premia can be calculated using data on bank stock prices interest rate movements and income and balance sheet accounts fair insurance premia are estimat ed under the alternative assumptions that the fdic provides either a limited term variable rate or unlimited term insurance cont ract to banks the paper s results suggest that for nearly all of the large commerical banks in the sample the actual insurance premium c harged by the fdic falls between the bounds of fair limited term and unlimited term insurance premia copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

what did medicare do the initial impact of medicare on mortality and out of pocket medical spending abstract we study the impact of the introduction of one of the major pillars of the social insurance system in the united states the introduction of medicare in 1965 our results suggest that in its first 10 years the establishment of universal health insurance for the elderly had no discernible impact on elderly mortality however we find a substantial reduction in the elderly s exposure to out of pocket medical expenditure risk specifically we estimate that the introduction of medicare was associated with a 40 decline in out of pocket spending for the top quartile of the out of pocket spending distribution a stylized expected utility framework suggests that the welfare gains from such reductions in risk exposure alone may be sufficient to cover almost two fifths of the costs of medicare these findings underscore the importance of considering the direct insurance benefits from public health insurance programs in addition to any indirect benefits from an effect on health

benefits and costs of international financial integration theory and facts the author provides a selective review of the recent analytical and empirical literature on the benefits and costs of international financial integration he discusses the impact of financial openness on consumption investment and growth and the impact of foreign bank entry on the domestic financial system consistent with some recent studies the author argues that financial integration must be carefully prepared and managed to ensure that the benefits outweigh the short run risks prudent macroeconomic management adequate supervision and prudential regulation of the financial system greater transparency and improved capacity to manage risk in the private sector are important requirements for coping with potentially abrupt reversals in pro cyclical short term capital flows the author adopts a more skeptical view than some assessments in two areas however first only foreign direct investment appears to provide dynamic gains and improved prospects for growth the evidence on the benefits of other types of capital flows remains weak second empirical research on the net benefits associated with foreign bank penetration is far from conclusive in particular the possibility that such penetration may lead to adverse changes in the allocation of credit among domestic firms cannot be dismissed on the basis of the existing evidence

protection and the shadow price of foreign exchange with increasing returns and international capital mobility in an economy with an external increasing returns technology and a convex pro duction set international capital mobility reduces the shadow price of foreign exchange if quotas or vers are in force but leaves this shadow price unaltered if tariffs are in place protection et prix de reference des devises etrangeres quand il y rendements croissants et mobilite internationale du capital dans une economie dot6e d une technologie a rendements croissants et d un ensemble de production convexe la mobilit6 internationale du capital r6duit le prix de ref6rence des devises 6trangeres quand on a des contingentements ou des restrictions volontaires a 1 exportation mais laisse le prix de r6f6rence inchange quand on a des droits de douane

how big a problem is too big to fail a review of gary stern and ron feldman s too big to fail the hazards of bank bailouts this review essay examines whether too big to fail is as serious a problem as gary stern and ron feldman contend this essay argues that stern and feldman overstate the importance of the too big to fail problem and do not give enough credit to the fdicia legislation of 1991 for improving bank regulation and supervision however this criticism of the stern and feldman book does not detract from many of its messages the policy recommendations in their book have merit even if the too big to fail problem is currently not that serious because these policies make it less likely that a banking crisis will occur even if driven by other factors

deposit insurance and bank failures new evidence from the 1920s this paper examines the contribution of deposit insurance to bank failures during the 1920s using individual bank data from kansas where membership in the state insurance system was voluntary i find that the balance sheets of insured banks reflected greater risk taking and probit model estimates indicate that insured banks were more likely to fail than non insured banks insurance had an especially strong impact the closer a bank was to failure because regulation was comparatively strict in kansas the findings suggest that deposit insurance had an even greater impact in other states and in the recent u s experience

subordinated debt market discipline and bank risk this paper demonstrates that subordinated debt subdebt thereafter regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks by reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value destroying actions to benefit themselves subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk moreover subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks moral hazard problems to make subdebt regulation effective regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank s equity when the government provides assistance to the bank

investment incentives debt and warrants abstract this paper models and characterizes investment incentive problems associated with debt financing the decision problem of residual claimants is explicity formulated and their investment policies are characterized the paper also analyzes the use of conversion features and warrants to control distortionary incentives these claims reverse the convex shape of levered equity over the upper range of the firm s earnings and this mitigates the incentive to take risk it is shown that under certain conditions such claims can be constructed to restore net present value maximizing incentives and simultaneously meet the financing requirements of the firm

insurance markets with loss prevention activity profits market structure and consumer welfare this article considers the joint production of insurance protection and loss prevention by insurers we first examine the loss distribution of consumers that is potentially the most profitable for insurers unlike in the preponderance of the insurance literature which assumes cost based pricing of insurance policies we allow the insurer to charge whatever price the market will bear we then examine the expected profit maximizing strategy of assumes cost based pricing of insurance policies we allow the insurer to charge whatever price the market will bear we then examine the expected profit maximizing strategy of the insurer in several different market settings whether the insurance protection and loss prevention services can be perfectly bundled plays a key roll in the insurer s pricing decision we consider consumer welfare under various market settings and demonstrate that a consumer may be better off when the insurance market is monopolistic rather than competitive finally we consider whether monopoly power in the loss prevention market leads to monopoly power in an otherwise perfectly contestable insurance market we also show conditions under which a loss prevention monopolist would increase expected profit by integrating into the insurance market

does deposit insurance improve financial intermediation evidence from the russian experiment this study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects depositors and banks using the deposit insurance scheme introduced into the russian banking system as a natural experiment the fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit taking and decreased reliance upon state owned banks as custodians of retail deposits we find that banks entering the new deposit insurance system increase both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that do not enter the new deposit insurance system these results hold up in a multivariate panel data analysis that controls for bank and time random effects the longer a bank has been entered into the deposit insurance system the greater is its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets moreover this effect is stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks we also find that implementation of the new deposit insurance system has the effect of leveling the playing field between state owned banks and privately owned banks finally we find strong evidence of moral hazard following implementation of deposit insurance in the form of increased bank risk taking financial risk and to a lesser degree operating risk increase following implementation

financial liberalisation in emerging markets how does bank lending change financial liberalisation has often failed in the past due to underestimated problems of structural change we analyse such changes in lending behaviour of thai commercial banks during a liberalisation phase by way of unique micro data liberalisation has expected positive effects such as lowering the interest rate spread and collateral requirements liberalisation causes structural change such as a decline in collateral based and relationship banking however the liberal isation evidence is consistent with more risk taking such as lending to more risky projects and less protection against default the thai experience suggests obvious policy lessons

measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy this article provides an introduction to the trade restrictiveness index tri which equals the uniform tariff that is welfare equivalent to a given pattern of trade protection unlike standard measures of trade restrictiveness the tri has a solid theoretical basis can incorporate both tariffs and quantitative restrictions and can be adapted to construct the trade policy equivalent of domestic distortions the article compares a number of applications and describes procedures for operationalizing the tri on a personal computer the authors conclude that the tri has considerable potential in empirical work