a formal model of firm boundaries and haggling this study provides a formal model of williamson s haggling theory in which transacting parties engage in ex post contract renegotiation we show that integration can economize bargaining costs but suffers from too much third party arbitration i e fails in selective intervention

residual wage disparity and coordination unemployment how much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms to answer we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high or low productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers calibrated to the u s economy workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms and can conduct on the job search the stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump shaped skewed significantly to the right and with baseline parameters generates residual dispersion statistics 75 90 of those found empirically however the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment

the distribution of earnings in an equilibrium search model with state dependent offers and counteroffers we construct an equilibrium job search model with on the job search in which firms implement optimal wage strategies under full information in the sense that they leave no rent to their employees and counter the offers received by their employees from competing firms productivity dispersion across firms results in wage mobility both within and across firms workers may accept wage cuts to move to firms offering higher future wage prospects equilibrium productivity dispersion across ex ante homogeneous firms can be endogenously generated productivity dispersion then generates a nontrivial wage distribution which is generically thin tailed as typically observed in the data

equivalence of auctions and posted prices abstract we determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms auctions and posted prices agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices we show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 d44

wage and technology dispersion this paper explains why firms with identical opportunities may use different technologies and offer different wages our key assumption is that workers must engage in costly search in order to gather information about jobs stigler 1961 in equilibrium some firms adopt high fixed cost high productivity technologies offer high wages and fill job openings quickly other firms adopt less capital intensive technologies and offer low wages hiring mostly uninformed workers in equilibrium the amount of wage dispersion leaves workers indifferent about whether to gather information and the fraction of informed workers leaves firms indifferent about their wage and technology choice we show that worker search which would appear to be a rent seeking activity in partial equilibrium may be efficiency enhancing in general equilibrium

competitive search equilibrium in this paper i construct an equilibrium for markets with frictions which is competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and maximize utility subject to a set of market parameters i show that the equilibrium allocation is socially optimal i also show how the competitive search equilibrium can be achieved if employers with vacancies can advertise publicly the wages they pay

outside options and the failure of the coase conjecture a buyer wishes to purchase a good from a seller who chooses a sequence of prices over time each period the buyer can also exercise an outside option abandoning their search or moving on to another seller we show there is a unique equilibrium in which the seller charges a constant price in every period equal to the monopoly price contravening the coase conjecture we then embed the singleseller model into a search framework and show the result provides a foundation for the usual no haggling assumption jel c78 d42 d43 l12 l13 the coase conjecture is a cornerstone of modern microeconomic theory informing monopoly theory and providing a canonical example of the problem of commitment the idea is that for any given price high value buyers are more likely to purchase than low value buyers leading to negative selection in the demand pool accordingly the seller cuts its price over time causing high value buyers to delay their purchases the seller s inability to commit thus leads its later selves to exert a negative externality on its former selves reducing its overall profit gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 this idea of negative selection is robust versions of it hold when costs are nonlinear kahn 1986 when goods depreciate over time bond and samuelson 1984 when there is entry of new buyers sobel 1991 and when the buyers face future competition fuchs and skrzypacz 2010 in this article we show that the coase conjecture fails in a natural environment where buyers have an outside option they can choose to exercise we consider a seller who faces a buyer or a continuum of buyers with unknown value for the good and unknown outside option each period the seller chooses price p t the buyer then chooses to buy wait or exercise his option and terminate the game the outside option may come from the possibility of buying another product for example when waiting for the price of the iphone to fall a customer could instead buy a comparable phone from a competitor similarly when bargaining over the price of a car a buyer may abandon negotiations and move on to the next dealer the outside option may also come from pursuing other objectives once the negotiation has terminated for example after he finishes bargaining at a bazaar a tourist could start seeing local attractions

a theory of firm scope the formal literature on firm boundaries has assumed that ex post conflicts are resolved through bargaining in reality parties often simply exercise their decision rights we develop a model based on shading in which the use of authority has a central role we consider two firms deciding whether to adopt a common standard nonintegrated firms may fail to coordinate if one firm loses an integrated firm can internalize the externality but puts insufficient weight on employee benefits we use our approach to understand why cisco acquired stratacom a provider of new transmission technology we also analyze delegation

commitment and costly signaling in decentralized markets i propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers search private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segmenting the market to alleviate information frictions seemingly irrelevant but incentive compatible listing fees are implementable provided that the market is not already sufficiently active abstract from author

estimating the general equilibrium benefits of large changes in spatially delineated public goods the purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the general equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality we estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios characterizing the availability of public goods within a system of communities welfare measures take into consideration the adjustments of households in equilibrium to nonmarginal changes in public goods the framework is used to analyze willingness to pay for reductions in ozone concentrations in southern california between 1990 and 1995

information gathering transaction costs and the property rights approach the property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives while bargaining is ex post efficient in contrast transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies in the present paper a party may invest and acquire private information about the default payoff that it can realize on its own inefficient rent seeking can overturn prominent implications of the property rights theory in particular ownership by party b may be optimal even though only the indispensable party a makes an investment decision

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

underemployment on the job search and the beveridge curve abstract this paper derives the implications of on the job search for unemployment dynamics and shows how the initial jump in market tightness is influenced by the search behaviour of employed workers the model predicts that the vacancy unemployment ratio can either overshoot or undershoot its steady state value in response to a change in the productivity of jobs

search direction and wage dispersion in a directed search model we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers this determines the market structure there are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of offers and the equilibrium strategies involve mixing this results in wage dispersion we show that if the unemployment vacancy ratio is close to unity the stable equilibrium consists of two submarkets with opposite search directions otherwise the long side of the market sends offers the stable equilibrium is efficient given the frictions

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit abstract in a seminal paper ariel rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the two person bargaining problem in this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum if the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways for example because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small we also show that for a fixed discount rate all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the discrete game converge to the solution obtained by rubinstein if the smallest money unit tends to zero

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

directed search for equilibrium wage tenure contracts i analyze the equilibrium in a labor market where firms offer wage tenure contracts to direct the search of employed and unemployed workers each applicant observes all offers and there is no coordination among individuals workers applications as well as firms recruiting decisions are optimal this optimality requires the equilibrium to be formulated differently from the that in the literature of undirected search i provide such a formulation and show that the equilibrium exists in the equilibrium individuals explicitly tradeoff between an offer and the matching rate at that offer this tradeoff yields a unique offer which is optimal for each worker to apply and applicants are separated endogenously according to their current values despite such uniqueness and separation there is a non degenerate and continuous wage distribution of employed workers in the stationary equilibrium the density of this distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages in all equilibrium contracts wages increase with tenure which results in quit rates to decrease with tenure moreover the model makes novel predictions about individuals job to job transition and comparative statics

the evolutionary stability of auctions over bargaining this paper considers equilibrium in transaction mechanisms in an environment with homogeneous buyers and sellers which eliminates the advantage auctions possess of matching buyers and sellers both auctions and bargaining are equilibria however only auctions are evolutionarily stable this identifies a new advantage of auctions over bargaining arising from the division of the gains from trade journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c73 d44

auctions versus posted price selling two popular selling methods posted price selling and auctions are compared here in an independent private values model without auctioning costs auctioning is always optimal when auctioning is costly auctions are still preferable if the marginal revenue curve is sufficiently steep the global steepness of the marginal revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions finally the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared copyright 1993 by american economic association

non price equilibria for non marketed goods abstract as part of the resources for the future frontiers of environmental economics collection of papers we consider the problem of general equilibrium feedback effects in non price space as they relate to non market valuation our overall objective is to examine the extent to which non price equilibria arising from both simple and complex sorting behavior can be empirically modeled and the resulting differences in partial and general equilibrium welfare measures quantified after motivating the problem in general we consider the specific context of congestion in recreation demand applications which we classify as the outcome of a simple sorting equilibrium using both econometric and computable general equilibrium cge models we examine the conceptual and computational challenges associated with this class of problems and present findings on promising solution avenues we demonstrate the relevance of accounting for congestion effects in recreation demand with an application to lake visits in iowa our econometric and cge results confirm that for some plausible counterfactual scenarios substantial differences exist between partial and general equilibrium welfare estimates we conclude the paper by describing tasks that are needed to move forward research in this area

applied welfare economics with discrete choice models economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare but very little has been said in general regarding the tools of applied welfare economics indiscrete choice situations this paper shows how the conventional methods of applied welfare economics can be modified to handle such cases it focuses on the computation of the excess burden of taxation and the evaluation of quality change the results are applied to stochastic utility models including the popular cases of probit and logit analysis throughout the emphasis is on providing rigorous guidelines for carrying out applied work this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

bargaining with imperfect commitment abstract we study the effect of imperfect commitment in noncooperative two person bargaining games by establishing the reputation for being stubborn a player sometimes commits to her initial demand becoming unable to change her demands or to accept an inferior offer from her opponent when the probability of being stubborn is small the set of equilibria is shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the possibility of stubbornness a player has greater bargaining power when she is more patient and or is more likely to be stubborn journal of economic literature classification number c78

equilibrium wage dispersion and interindustry wage differentials this paper develops a search theoretic explanation of interindustry wage differentials given coordination problems in the labor market the probability of filling a vacancy is an increasing function of the wage offered in equilibrium firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages the model thus explains the persistence of interindustry wage differentials and their correlation with industry average capital labor ratio and profitability additionally the model predicts that high wage firms will receive more applications per job opening and that wages in the labor market will behave as strategic complements

bertrand equilibrium with capacity constraints and restricted mobility this paper considers price competition among firms when there are capacity constraints and buyers have limited ability to visit firms a natural method of allocating buyers among firms arises in the equilibrium of the buyers search game sufficient conditions are given under which the buyers equilibrium varies continuously with the prices charged by firms capacity constraints are used to guarantee that this ensures existence of mixed strategy equilibria for the pricing game played by sellers we show that natural pure strategy equilibria arise when the game is made large in appropriate ways since bertrand s criticism of cournot it has been known that models where sellers compete with prices may have undesirable properties when the commodities traded are homogenous in the simplest models with constant marginal costs price may be driven down to the competitive level even when there are only two firms more problematic if sellers are subject to capacity constraints nash in prices equilibrium may not exist at all these problems all arise because of a discontinuity in firms profit functions that arises when the prices of two or more firms are equal there have been many attempts to resolve this problem the simplest is to constrain sellers prices to be equal and to force them to compete in quantities this is the basis of most of the literature on monopolistic competi

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

directed search unemployment and public policy we examine the effects of public policy parameters in a simple directed search model of the labour market and contrast them with those in standard random matching models with nash bargaining both finite and limit versions of the directed search model are considered and the value of the limit model as an approximation of the finite one is assessed as with the random matching model job creation is the key channel through which the policy parameters affect the equilibrium of the directed search model both comparative static effects of the policy parameters and optimal configurations are identified on examine les effets des parametres de la politique publique dans un modele simple de recherche dirigee d emploi sur le marche du travail et on les contraste avec ceux qu on obtient par des modeles d appariements aleatoires avec marchandage a la nash a la fois les versions finie et limite du modele de recherche dirigee sont examinees et la valeur du modele limite en tant qu approximation de la version finie est evaluee comme dans le modele d appariement aleatoire la creation d emploi est le canal principal a travers lequel les parametres de la politique affectent l equilibre du marche du travail on identifie les effets de statique comparative des parametres de la politique ainsi que les configurations optimales

moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm abstract in the grossman hart moore property rights theory there are no frictions ex post i e after non contractible investments have been sunk in contrast in transaction cost economics ex post frictions play a central role we bring the property rights theory closer to transaction cost economics by allowing for ex post moral hazard as a consequence central conclusions of the grossman hart moore theory may be overturned in particular even though only party a has to make an investment decision b ownership can yield higher investment incentives moreover ownership matters even when investments are fully relationship specific i e when they have no impact on the parties disagreement payoffs

gambling reputation repeated bargaining with outside options we study the role of incomplete information and outside options in determining bargaining postures and surplus division in repeated bargaining between a long run player and a sequence of short run players the outside option is not only a disagreement point but reveals information privately held by the long run player in equilibrium the uninformed short run players offers do not always respond to changes in reputation and the informed long run player s payoffs are discontinuous the long run player invokes inefficient random outside options repeatedly to build reputation to a level where the subsequent short run players succumb to his extraction of a larger payoff but he also runs the risk of losing reputation and relinquishing bargaining power we investigate equilibrium properties when the discount factor goes to 1 and when the informativeness of outside options diffuses in both cases bargaining outcomes become more inefficient and the limit reputation building probabilities are interior publication abstract

coordination matching and wages we analyse the coordination problem in the labour market by endogenizing the matching function and the wage share each firm posts a wage to maximize the expected profit anticipating how the wage affects the expected number of applicants in equilibrium workers apply to firms with mixed strategies which generate coordination failure and persistent unemployment we show how the wage share unemployment and the welfare loss from the coordination failure depend on the market tightness and the market size the welfare loss from the coordination failure is as high as 7 5 per cent of potential output jel classification c78 j64 les auteurs analysent le probleme de la coordination dans le marche du travail en endogeneisant la fonction arrimage et la part des revenus qui va aux salaires chaque entreprise definit le niveau de salaire qui maximise ses profits anticipes en tenant compte de l effet de ce niveau de salaire sur le nombre des applications qu elle peut anticiper de meme les travailleurs font application aupres d une entreprise a un salaire donne en tenant compte d une certaine relation d equivalence entre niveau de salaire et probabilite d obtenir l emploi voila qui engendre incoordination et chomage persistant on montre que la part des revenus qui revient aux salaires le niveau de chomage et les pertes de bien etre attribuables au manque de coordination dependent de la taille du marche et du degre de rarete de la main d oeuvre les pertes de bien etre attribuables au manque de coordination correspondent a quelques 7 5 pour cent de la production potentielle

directed search on the job and the wage ladder we model a labor market where employed workers search on the job and firms direct workers search using wage offers and employment probabilities applicants observe all offers and face a trade off between wage and employment probability there is wage dispersion among workers even though all workers and jobs are homogeneous equilibrium wages form a ladder as workers optimally choose to climb the ladder one rung at a time this is because low wage applicants are relatively more sensitive to employment probability than to wage and thus forgo the opportunity to apply for a high wage with a lower chance of success

worker heterogeneity the job finding rate and technical change we examine the implications of changes in the skill distribution on the equilibrium matching process and the job finding rate using a directed search approach worker abilities are selected from a distribution while firms face heterogeneous entry costs and direct their job offers to workers we identify conditions under which technical progress increases or decreases the job finding rate allowing for entry and the effects of technical changes on heterogeneity we find that the effects of skill neutral technical progress on job finding rates are unambiguously non negative but the effects of skill biased changes depend on the elasticity of vacancy costs however both skill neutral and skill biased technical changes are pareto improving ex ante if all agents are risk neutral c 2014 elsevier b v all rights reserved

bilateral trading and incomplete information price convergence in a small market abstract we study a model of decentralised bilateral interactions in a small market where one of the sellers has private information about her value in addition to this seller with private information there are two identical buyers and another seller whose valuation is commonly known to be in between the two possible valuations of the seller with private information we consider an infinite horizon game with simultaneous one sided offers and simultaneous responses we construct one particular pbe of the game and show that as the discount factor goes to 1 prices in all transactions converge to the same value we then show that this is the case with any stationary equilibrium of the game that is the asymptotic outcome is unique across all stationary equilibria

commitment and conflict in bilateral bargaining building on crawford 1982 we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c our primary solution concept is iterated strict dominance if commitment attempts never fail there are three solutions in two solutions all the surplus goes to one player in the third solution there is a high probility of con ict if commitment attempts succeed with probability q 1 the unique solution entails con ict with probability q 2 when c 0 analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance

densities rather than shares improving the measurement of congestion in recreation demand models while economists have successfully addressed the endogeneity of congestion in revealed preference approaches little attention has been devoted to measuring congestion in fact most applications measure congestion as a simple count of users or at best consider the shares of users defined as the proportion of people visiting a site during the course of the season however only when all sites have a similar size or length and the total number of visitors is constant over time can these measures be used as a proxy for congestion in general these assumptions are unrealistic in this paper we examine site density measures rather than participation shares as a measure of congestion we show that endogeneity problems can be addressed using a control function approach and demonstrate that the density of users leads to more statistically significant coefficients of congestion

a theory of bargaining deadlock abstract i study a dynamic one sided offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under incomplete information the seller knows the quality of his product while the buyer does not during bargaining the seller may receive an outside option the value of which depends on the quality of the product if the outside option is sufficiently important there is an equilibrium in which the buyer s belief about the product s quality stays constant and she continues to make the same randomized offer throughout the bargaining process as a result the equilibrium behavior produces an outcome path that resembles a bargaining deadlock and its resolution the equilibrium outcome exhibits bargaining delay that does not vanish even with frequent offers and the limiting delay may exist even without a static adverse selection problem under stronger parametric assumptions the equilibrium with deadlock is the only one in which behavior is monotonic in the buyer s belief

asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm abstract in the grossman hart mooreproperty rights approach to the theory of the firm it is usually assumed that information is symmetric ownership matters for investment incentives provided that investments are partly relationship specific we study the case of completely relationship specific investments i e the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments it turns out that if there is asymmetric information then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus specifically giving ownership to party b can be optimal even when only party a has to make an investment decision and even when the owner s expected disagreement payoff is larger under a ownership

lost in transition the costs and consequences of sectoral labour adjustment this paper uses an equilibrium search and matching model to study canada s sectoral labour adjustment in 2002 2006 during an increase in global commodity prices and exchange rate appreciation i estimate economically significant adjustment costs for the aggregate economy in this episode and demonstrate that difficulty in transferring skills between jobs for individual workers can be an important contributor to these aggregate costs the analysis also demonstrates that the level of unemployment benefits impacts the economy s sectoral composition its aggregate productivity and the speed of its adjustment to shocks ce texte utilise un modele d equilibre de la recherche et de l arrimage pour etudier les ajustements sectoriels du travail au canada dans la periode 2002 2006 une periode d appreciation des prix globaux des produits de base et du taux de change j estime que les couts d ajustement sont economiquement significatifs pour l economie agregee au cours de cet episode et que la difficultea transferer les competences entre emplois pour les travailleurs individuels peut etre une source importante de ces couts agreges les analyses montrent aussi que le niveau des prestations d assurance emploi a un impact sur la composition sectorielle de l economie sur la productivite et sur la vitesse des ajustements aux chocs

bargaining reputation and equilibrium selection in repeated games with contracts consider a two person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period and collect payoffs as a function of that period s actions while bargaining proceeds this can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split because a folk theorem applies perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided as the perturbation probabilities approach zero behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent s play in equilibrium rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues how much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining in both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the nash bargaining with threats nbwt theory developed for two stage games in any perfect bayesian equilibrium she can guarantee herself virtually her nbwt payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy in every period ask for and accept nothing less than that player s nbwt share and while waiting for the other side to concede take the action nash recommends as a threat in his two stage game the results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others this is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two sided reputational perturbations and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go

on the role of outside options in bargaining with obstinate parties the presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes this paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining when parties have access to stationary outside options we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party there is a unique perfect bayesian equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible a similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option

pricing and matching with frictions suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good sellers post prices and then buyers choose sellers in symmetric equilibrium similar sellers all post one price and buyers randomize hence more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate we call this frictions we solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow the matching function displays decreasing returns but converges to constant returns we argue that the standard matching function in the literature is misspecified and discuss implications for the beveridge curve

product market and the size wage differential using directed search to model the product market and the labor market i show that large plants can pay higher wages to homogeneous workers and earn higher expected profit per worker than small plants although plants are identical except size a large plant charges a higher price for its product and compensates buyers with a higher service probability to capture this sizerelated benefit large plants try to become larger by recruiting at high wages this size wage differential survives labor market competition because a high wage is harder to get than a low wage moreover the size wage differential increases with the product demand when demand is initially low and falls when demand is already high

a control function approach to endogeneity in consumer choice models abstract endogeneity arises for numerous reasons in models of consumer choice it leads to inconsistency with standard estimation methods that maintain independence between the model s error and the included variables the authors describe a control function approach for handling endogeneity in choice models observed variables and economic theory are used to derive controls for the dependence between the endogenous variable and the demand error the theory points to the relationships that contain information on the unobserved demand factor such as the pricing equation and the advertising equation the authors approach is an alternative to berry levinsohn and pakes s 1995 product market controls for unobserved quality the authors apply both methods to examine households choices among television options including basic and premium cable packages in which unobserved attributes such as quality of programming are expected to be correlated with price without correcting for endogeneity aggregate d

reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player a single long run player plays a simultaneous move stage game against a sequence of opponents who play only once but observe all previous play let the stackelberg strategy be the pure strategy to which the long run player would most like to commit himself if there is positive prior probability that the long run player will always play the stackelberg strategy then his payoff in any nash equilibrium exceeds a bound that converges to the stackelberg payoff as his discount factor approaches one when the stage game is not simultaneous move this result must be modified to account for the possibility that distinct strategies of the long run player are observationally equivalent

estimating equilibrium models of sorting across locations while there is growing interest in measuring the size and scope of local spillovers it is well understood that such spillovers cannot be distinguished from unobservable local attributes using solely the observed location decisions of individuals or firms we propose an empirical strategy for recovering estimates of spillovers in the presence of unobserved local attributes for a broadly applicable class of equilibrium sorting models our approach relies on an iv strategy derived from the internal logic of the sorting model itself we show practically how the strategy is implemented provide intuition for our instruments discuss the role of effective choice set variation in identifying the model and carry out a series of monte carlo simulations to demonstrate performance in small samples

ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment we study the implementation of constrained efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction we argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding this holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching process has decreasing returns to scale where the hosios rule does not apply both with and without heterogeneity

a revealed preference approach to the measurement of congestion in travel cost models abstract travel cost models are regularly used to determine the value of recreational sites or particular site characteristics yet congestion a key site attribute is often excluded from such analyses one reason for this omission is that congestion is determined in equilibrium by the process of individuals sorting across sites and thus presents significant endogeneity problems this paper illustrates this source of endogeneity describes how previous research has dealt with it using stated preference techniques and describes an instrumental variables approach to address it in a revealed preference context we demonstrate that failing to address the endogeneity of congestion leads one to dramatically understate its costs we apply our technique to the valuation of a large recreational fishing site in wisconsin lake winnebago which if eliminated would induce significant re sorting of anglers amongst remaining sites ignoring congestion leads to an understatement of the lake s value by more than 50

the mortensen rule and efficient coordination unemployment we study the implementation of constrained efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function we argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding this holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching function has decreasing returns to scale where the hosios rule does not apply both with and without heterogeneity this wage determination mechanism is similar to the one proposed by mortensen 1982 in a different setting

wage differentials employer size and unemployment the unique equilibrium solution to a game in which a continuum of individual employers choose permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers is characterized wage dispersion is a robust outcome provided that workers search while employed as well as when unemployed the unique nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of wage offers is constructed for three cases 1 identical workers and employers 2 identical employers and an atomless distribution of worker supply prices and 3 identical workers and an atomless distribution of job productivities copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

it s about time implications of the period length in an equilibrium search model empirical evidence suggests that transitions between employment states are highly clustered around the first day of each workweek or month i analyze the effect of this phenomenon by presenting an equilibrium search model in which the period length is a parameter determining the degree of clustering infinitesimally short periods result in a continuous time model with bilateral meetings whereas longer time periods introduce the possibility of recall or simultaneity of job offers in this environment i show that the period length has a profound effect on equilibrium outcomes including the unemployment rate unemployment duration and the cross sectional wage distribution