preferences of citizens for agricultural policies evidence from a national survey the increasing costs of agricultural programs is raising concern about the future direction of agricultural policies data from a nationwide survey on public attitudes toward agriculture are used to examine the structure of citizens preferences for government involvement in agriculture and especially for policies to protect family farms estimates of the influence of economic and sociodemographic variables on policy preferences are computed using a multiple indicator model signs and magnitudes of estimated coefficients lend support to the self interest theory of voter behavior results question economic arguments suggesting altruistic motives as a cause of redistributionary agricultural policies

corporate social responsibility of the most highly reputed european and north american firms the objective of this article is double first to analyze using a descriptive analysis the main differences in the level and components of social behaviour between european and north american firms and second to contrast empirically using a multiple linear regression model whether the motives behind corporate social behaviour are different depending on the region or country of the firm with this aim an indicator of social behaviour termed effort in sustainability has been constructed by aggregating the firm s social effort with customers employees community and environment for a sample of the 40 european and north american companies most highly reputed in the years 2003 and 2004 the results obtained indicate that the region or country of the firm influences the level components and motivation of its social behaviour

informational constraints and the overlapping generations model folk and anti folk theorems this paper analyses the sustainability of inter generational transfers in samuelson s consumption loan model when agents are imperfectly informed about past events we find that with mild informational constraints transfers cannot be supported by pure strategy equilibria mixed strategies allow transfers to be sustained even if agents have little information so that a version of the folk theorem holds however these equilibria are not robust if each agent s utility function is subjected to a small random perturbation as in harsanyi 1973 these mixed strategy equilibria unravel and only the zero transfer allocation survives as the unique rationalizable outcome this result is an example of mixed strategy equilibrium of an extensive form game which cannot be purified

collusion with costly consumer search i use standard consumer search models to study how an increase in market transparency lower search costs or higher share of fully informed consumers affects cartel stability when firms sell horizontally differentiated products cartels become more stable as the search cost increases with homogeneous products by contrast the opposite holds a higher share of fully informed consumers makes collusion less stable when the market is initially sufficiently transparent whereas it happens otherwise if the market is originally little transparent

moral hazard and private monitoring we clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization sunspots in sustaining near efficient outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring we study a finitely repeated game where the stage game has multiple equilibria and show that mixed strategies can support partial cooperation but cannot approximate full cooperation even if monitoring is almost perfect efficiency requires extensive form correlation where strategies can condition upon a sunspot at the end of each period for any finite number of repetitions we approximate the best equilibrium payoff under perfect monitoring assuming that monitoring is sufficiently accurate and sunspots are available journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d82

optimal collusion with internal contracting abstract in this paper two firms play an infinitely repeated bertrand game and each firm has an agent who produces the firm s output and holds private information about production costs the colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents information we develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information we show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric

enforcing international trade agreements with imperfect private monitoring to analyse the role that the world trade organization wto plays in enforcing international trade agreements this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies pts under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country s concealed trade barriers it identifies the condition under which countries can restrain the use of concealed barriers based on pts and establishes that countries will not reduce the cooperative protection level to its minimum attainable level under the optimal pts this paper then considers third party trigger strategies tts under which the wto allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on the wto s judgement about potential violations by comparing the optimal pts and optimal tts it demonstrates that the wto facilitates a better cooperative equilibrium by changing the nature of punishment triggering signals from private to public which in turn enables countries to use a more efficient punishment such as an asymmetric and a minimum punishment

optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner s dilemma this paper studies informational partnerships in a repeated prisoner s dilemma with random matching assuming that players observe the play within but not across partnerships we find the surprising result that the relation between the observability of actions and the sustainability of cooperation is non monotonic increasing partnerships beyond a certain optimal size hardens cooperation although it improves observability d 2005 elsevier b v all rights reserved

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

communication in repeated games with private monitoring abstract the paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed we address the following question what is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes the main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs when the discount factor tends to one contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at leasttwoother players journal of economic literatureclassification number c73

money is privacy an extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record keeping device money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit based transactions continues to fall in this paper we investigate another use for money the provision of privacy that is a money purchase does not identify the purchaser while a credit purchase does in a simple trading economy with moral hazard the efficiency of money is compared with that of credit and we find that money may be useful even when information is free

repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting in a partnership game each player s utility depends on the other players actions through a commonly observed consequence e g output profit price which is itself a function of the players actions and an exogenous stochastic environment if a partnership game is repeated infinitely and each player s payoff in the infinite game supergame is the long run average of his expected one period utilities then efficient combinations of one period actions can be sustained as nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players actions or information but can only observe the resulting consequences

information can wreck cooperation a counterpoint to kandori 1992 we propose a simple model of repeated games with private monitoring and time varying information structures we then obtain an example demonstrating that the set of achievable equilibrium payos may shrink when play

efficiency results in n player games with imperfect private monitoring abstract we demonstrate that efficiency is achievable in a certain class of n player repeated games with private almost perfect monitoring our equilibrium requires only one period memory and can be implemented by two state automata furthermore we show that this efficiency result holds with any degree of accuracy of monitoring if private signals are hemiindependent whereas most existing research focuses on two player cases or only a special example of n player games our results are applicable to a wide range of n player games of economic relevance such as trading goods games and price setting oligopolies

existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring abstract we consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition of nash equilibria of the stage game surprisingly the conditions are consistent with uniqueness of the stage game equilibrium a class of repeated chicken is shown to satisfy the condition

the effects of firm size and industry on corporate giving recent downward trends in corporate giving have renewed interest in the factors that shape corporate philanthropy this paper examines the relationships between charitable contributions firm size and industry improvements over previous studies include an irs data base that covers a much broader range of firm sizes and industries as compared to previous studies and estimation using an instrumental variable technique that explicitly addresses potential simultaneity between charitable contributions and profitability important findings provide evidence of a cubic relationship between charitable giving and firm size and evidence of strong industry effects the plus minus plus regression coefficient sign pattern for the cubic firm size model suggests that small and large firms give more relative to total receipts with lower giving ratios among medium size firms one interpretation for this finding is that small firms are close to the communities they serve while high visibility creates a need for large firm philanthropy strong industry effects provide evidence of inter industry differences in giving culture and or different public relations requirements across industries

collusion with almost no information we analyze noncooperative collusion in an infinitely repeated bertrand game where each of the n firms receives a privately observed i i d cost shock in each period and firms only and privately observe whether they have won the unit mass of consumers no other information is available and no communication is allowed we prove that there exist equilibria in private strategies approximating first best profits when firms are sufficiently patient in particular productive efficiency obtains in the limit

beliefs and private monitoring this paper develops new recursive set based methods for studying repeated games with private monitoring for any nite state strategy prole we nd necessary and sucient conditions for whether there exists a distribution over initial states such that the strategy together with this distribution form a correlated sequential equilibrium also for any given correlation device for determining initial states including degenerate cases where players initial states are common knowledge we provide necessary and sucient conditions for the correlation device and strategy to be a correlated sequential equilibrium or in the case of a degenerate correlation device for the strategy to be a sequential equilibrium we also consider several applications in these we show that the methods are computationally feasible show how to construct and verify equilibria in a secret price setting game

contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations a repeated moral hazard setting in which the principal privately observes the agent s output is studied the optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized and shown to require burning of resources these are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor for the infinite horizon it is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the agent receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired furthermore optimal contracts cannot be replicated by short term contracts a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized longer review intervals are preferable but harder to implement comparative statics on the review length are carried out finally these contracts are shown approximate first best if players are very patient jel d82 d86

corporate social performance and innovation with high social benefits a quantitative analysis this article analyses the link between innovation with high social benefits and corporate social performance csp and the role that family firms play in this this theme is particularly relevant given the large number of firms that are family owned also the implicit potential of innovation to reconcile corporate sustainability aspects with profitability justifies an extended analysis of this link governments often support socially beneficial innovation with various policy instruments with the intention of increasing international competitiveness and simultaneously supporting sustainable development in parallel firms pursue corporate social responsibility csr and environmental management activities partly in the hope that this will foster such innovation in their organisation alongside their main aim of improving csp hence the main research question of this article is about the association of csp with innovation with high social benefits and the determinants of the potential moderation of this association based on panel data the article analyses the link between csp and innovation and the effect of being a family firm using panel estimation techniques the results point to a moderating role of family firms on the link between innovation with high social benefits and csp the article concludes by assessing the policy implications of this insight

asymmetry of customer loss and recovery under endogenous partnerships theory and evidence this article is inspired by real world phenomena that firms lose customers based on imprecise information and take a long time to recover if consumers are playing an ordinary repeated game with fixed partners there is no clear reason why recovery happens slowly however if consumers are playing an endogenously repeated game a class of simple efficient equilibria exhibits the asymmetry of fast loss and slow recovery of customers after a bad signal exit is systematic but formation of a new partnership is random we also give empirical evidence of our equilibria at an individual firm level

a foundation for markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory we study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an arbitrary number of players we assume that social memory is finite every player except possibly one is finitely lived and cannot observe events that are sufficiently far back in the past this class of games includes games between a long run player and a sequence of short run players and games with overlapping generations of players an equilibrium is purifiable if some close by behaviour is consistent with equilibrium when agents payoffs in each period are perturbed additively and independently we show that only markov equilibria are purifiable when social memory is finite thus if a game has at most one long run player all purifiable equilibria are markov

a belief based approach to the repeated prisoners dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring abstract this paper extends the belief based approach to the repeated prisoners dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring we first find that the previous belief based techniques t sekiguchi efficiency in repeated prisoners dilemma with private monitoring j econ theory 76 1997 345 361 v bhaskar i obara belief based equilibria in the repeated prisoners dilemma with private monitoring j econ theory 102 2002 40 69 cannot succeed when players private monitoring technologies are sufficiently different we then modify the previous belief based approach by letting the player with smaller observation errors always randomize between cooperate and defect along the cooperative path of the play we show that with vanishing observation errors efficiency and a folk theorem can be approximated using our modified belief based strategies

individual learning and cooperation in noisy repeated games we investigate whether two players in a long run relationship can maintain cooperation when the details of the underlying game are unknown specifically we consider a new class of repeated games with private monitoring where an unobservable state of the world influences the payoff functions and or the monitoring structure each player privately learns the state over time but cannot observe what the opponent learned we show that there are robust equilibria in which players eventually obtain payoffs as if the true state were common knowledge and players played a belief free equilibrium we also provide explicit equilibrium constructions in various economic examples copyright 2014 oxford university press

strategic buyers and privately observed prices a model of finitely repeated price competition between two sellers with differentiated goods and a large buyer is analyzed the set of pure strategy sequential equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring with private monitoring i e when prices are not observable to the competing sellers all sales are made by the better seller and the set of repeated game equilibrium payoffs coincides with the stage game subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs this is in sharp contrast to the game with perfect monitoring where the folk theorem obtains journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

on failing to cooperate when monitoring is private abstract i consider a repeated prisoners dilemma where in each period each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent s current action i show that when players are patient enough any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies i e do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax i also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game journal of economic literature classification numbers c72

robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring a repeated game with private monitoring is close to a repeated game with public monitoring or perfect monitoring when i the expected payoff structures are close and ii the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be aggregated by some public coordination device to generate a public signal whose distribution is close to the distribution of the public signal in the public monitoring game we provide a sufficient condition for the set of uniformly strict perfect public equilibria for a public monitoring game to be robust in nearby private monitoring games in the sense that they remain equilibria with respect to the public signal that is generated by such public coordination devices with truthful reporting our sufficient condition requires that every player is informationally small in a well defined sense

corporate social and financial performance an investigation in the u k supermarket industry the comparison of corporate social performance with corporate financial performance has been a popular field of study over the past 25 years the results while broadly conclusive of a positive relationship are not entirely consistent in addition most of the previous studies have concentrated on large scale cross industry studies and often with a single variable for corporate social performance in order to produce statistically significant results this weakens the richness of understanding that might be obtained from a single industry study with multiple social variables which would also allow investigation of inter relationships between individual and sub sets of social performance measures and between individual and sub sets of social performance and financial performance measures there have also been criticisms that the results lack a rigorous theoretical basis and the paper demonstrates clearly how stakeholder theory must form the basis for this area of research following a review of the literature this paper presents the initial findings from a study of the u k supermarket industry which suggest that contemporaneous social and financial performance are negatively related while prior period financial performance is positively related with subsequent social performance positive relationships between both age and size of the company with social performance are also found

imperfectly observable commitments in n player games abstract in a two stage game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise pure subgame perfect nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise still for almost all games there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise this however depends crucially on generic payoffs and does not necessarily hold for all subgame perfect equilibria of the game without noise journal of economic literature classification number c72

cooperation but no reciprocity individual strategies in the repeated prisoner s dilemma a recent advance in our understanding of repeated pds is the detection of a threshold d at which laboratory subjects start to cooperate predictively this threshold is substantially above the classic threshold existence of grim equilibrium and has been characterized axiomatically by blonski ockenfels and spagnolo 2011 bos in this paper i derive its behavioral foundations first i show that the threshold is equivalent to existence of a semi grim equilibrium s cc s cd s dc s dd it is cooperative s cc 0 5 non reciprocal s cd s dc and robust to imperfect monitoring belief free next i show that the no reciprocity condition s cd s dc also follows from robustness to random utility perturbations logit equilibrium finally i re analyze strategies in four recent experiments and find that the majority of subjects indeed plays semi grim when it is an equilibrium strategy which explains d s predictive success

on the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games abstract we show that any feasible individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available

communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this paper examines repeated games in which each player observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played and in which players are allowed to communicate using public messages providing incentives for players to reveal their observations generates revelation constraints that combined with signal imperfections may be a source of inefficiencies however by delaying the revelation of their observations players may economize on the cost of deterring deviations and thereby avoid these inefficiencies because a player would not want to trigger a sanction that would penalize him too revelation constraints also tend to make sanctions difficult to enforce however with at least three players detecting deviations may not require that all the players reveal their observations in that case we obtain a nash threat version of the folk theorem with two players we do not obtain a similar result nevertheless we show that an efficient outcome can almost always be approximated

private monitoring in auctions abstract we study infinitely repeated first price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object while repetition of the stage game equilibrium is the unique nash equilibrium in public strategies with patient bidders there are simple nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect bayesian equilibrium epbe which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories our main result is the construction of epbea that improve upon bid rotation assuming symmetry the exclusionary schemes of skrzypacz and hopenhayn tacit collusion in repeated auctions j econ theory 114 2004 153 169 including asymptotically efficient ones are supported as epbea

the allocation of future business dynamic relational contracts with multiple agents we consider how a firm dynamically allocates business among several suppliers to motivate them in a relational contract the firm chooses one supplier who exerts private effort output is non contractible and each supplier observes only his own relationship with the principal in this setting allocation decisions constrain the transfers that can be promised to suppliers in equilibrium consequently optimal allocation decisions condition on payoff irrelevant past performance to make strong incentives credible we construct a dynamic allocation rule that attains first best whenever any allocation rule does this allocation rule performs strictly better than any rule that depends only on payoff relevant information

a robust folk theorem for the prisoner s dilemma we prove the folk theorem for the prisoner s dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring from this follows a limit folk theorem when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate but private and possibly independent any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium the strategies used can be implemented by finite randomizing automata journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d82

comments on money is privacy by charles kahn james mcandrews and william roberds monetary theory and game theory three classes of models on money closely related to game theoretic models are i search theoretic models ii repeated games in a narrow sense and iii trading post games this note tries to point out the sense of affinity between the theory of microfoundations of money and the theory of repeated games in a broad sense of the term

community enforcement of trust with bounded memory we examine how trust is sustained in large societies with random matching when records of past transgressions are retained for a finite length of time to incentivize trustworthiness defaulters should be punished by temporary exclusion however it is profitable to trust defaulters who are on the verge of rehabilitation with perfect bounded information defaulter exclusion unravels and trust cannot be sustained in any purifiable equilibrium a coarse information structure that pools recent defaulters with those nearing rehabilitation endogenously generates adverse selection sustaining punishments equilibria where defaulters are trusted with positive probability improve efficiency by raising the proportion of likely re offenders in the pool of defaulters

a limit characterization of belief free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games abstract the present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring and characterizes the set of belief free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes contrary to the conjecture by ely et al j c ely j horner w olszewski belief free equilibria in repeated games econometrica 73 2005 377 415 the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula no matter how many players there are as an application of this result a version of the folk theorem is established for n player prisoner s dilemma games

perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring this paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring this concept is a refinement of myerson s myerson r b 1982 optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems j math econ 10 67 81 communication equilibrium a communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game after every history of messages of the mediator we provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a folk theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

hiding information in electoral competition abstract we model a two candidate electoral competition in which there is uncertainty about a policy relevant state of the world the candidates receive private signals about the true state which are imperfectly correlated we study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their information to voters through their choice of policy platforms our results show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the candidates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward the electorate s prior information transmission becomes more difficult the less correlated are the candidates signals the lower is the signals quality and the stronger is the electorate s prior indeed for weak priors welfare decreases as the prior becomes stronger and welfare always decreases as the signals become less correlated

optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring abstract there exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the green porter model 4 8 having an elementary intertemporal structure such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities the only production levels used by firms in any contingency the central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games

introduction to repeated games with private monitoring abstract we present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring the literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long term relationship where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents actions although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price cutting exchange of goods with uncertain quality and observation errors it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players this is in sharp contrast to the well explored case of repeated games under public information with the celebrated folk theorems and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case however rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d43 d82 l13 l41

the electronic mail game strategic behavior under almost common knowledge the paper addresses a paradoxical game theoretic example which is closely related to the coordinated attack problem two players have to play one of two possible coordination games only one of them receives information about the coordination game to be played it is shown that the situation with almost common knowledge is very different from when the coordination game played is common knowledge

distributional impact of farm programs and the adjustment dilemma farm program benefits in the united states that it could be regarded as folly to raise the issue again from the earlier work of bonnen schultze and gardner and hoover to more recent analyses by lin johnson and calvin and u s congress the distributional effects of farm programs have been widely discussed by agricultural economists given the history of farm policy legislation it could be argued that the distributional question has not been a major item on the political agenda in the united states

repeated games with private monitoring two players we investigate two player infinitely repeated games where the discount factor is less than but close to unity monitoring is private and players cannot communicate we require no condition concerning the accuracy of players monitoring technology we show the folk theorem for the prisoners dilemma with conditional independence we also investigate more general games where players private signals are correlated only through an unobservable macro shock we show that efficiency is sustainable for generic private signal structures when the size of the set of private signals is sufficiently large finally we show that cartel collusion is sustainable in price setting duopoly

an example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria in this note we present an example of a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring in which all supergame equilibria with positive discount rates are bounded away from full efficiency uniformly in the discount rate provided the latter is strictly positive on the other hand if the players do not discount the future then every efficient one period payoff vector that dominates the one period equilibrium payoff vector can be attained by an equilibrium of the repeated game thus the correspondence that maps the players discount rate into the corresponding set of repeated game equilibrium payoff vectors is discontinuous at the point at which the discount rate is zero

microeconomic uncertainties facilitate cooperative alliances and social welfare abstract we show that microeconomic chaotic variations of payoffs in the prisoner s dilemma game maintain cooperation over a broad range of defection temptation values where otherwise economic stalemate reigns thus unpredictability at micro scales impedes mutual defection that inflicts social poverty

collusion in dynamic bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication abstract this paper studies collusion in repeated bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated it derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim trigger strategy this analysis is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations in this model it is shown that the above sufficient conditions hold if idiosyncratic noise terms are sufficiently small journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d82

the repeated prisoner s dilemma with imperfect private monitoring abstract in this paper i study a repeated prisoner s dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect a partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring

belief based equilibria in the repeated prisoners dilemma with private monitoring abstract we analyze repeated prisoners dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring and construct mixed trigger strategy equilibria such strategies have a simple representation where a player s action only depends upon her belief that her opponent s are continuing to cooperate when monitoring is almost perfect the symmetric efficient outcome can be approximated in any prisoners dilemma game while every individually rational feasible payoff can be approximated in a class of such games the efficiency result extends when there are more than two players it requires that monitoring be sufficiently accurate but does not require very low discounting when a public randomization device is available journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d82

commitment and observability in a contracting environment this paper examines leader follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price setting supplier in order to take an action we show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders actions i e they are not accessible accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium a supplier makes positive profits however in an equilibrium where a leader randomizes supplier profits must be zero our result follows from a generalized indifference principle that mixed strategies must satisfy in economic environments while supplier profits cannot be approximated player action profiles are accessible our results also apply to games with costly observation

corporate social responsibility in europe and the u s insights from businesses self presentations the paper compares the extent and content of businesses communications about corporate social responsibility csr in france the netherlands the u k and the u s in particular the study investigates the nature of csr principles processes and stakeholder issues discussed in web pages the results show that businesses in the four countries do not display the same eagerness to appear as socially responsible and employ diverse means to convey social responsibility images

flights towards defection in economic transactions we show that levy distributed variations of payoffs in the prisoner s dilemma game impede cooperation as the frequency of rare events increases levy flights thus facilitate defection but also uphold the evolutionary process arguably maintaining a healthy level of competitiveness amongst the agents

why do corporations give to charity this paper explores whether corporate contributions should be tax dedu ctible within the more general context of an examination of the profi t and utility maximization motives driving contributions the theoret ical section develops a formal structural model of the contributions process illustrates comparative statics and derives a set of empiri cally testable hypotheses using a new source of firm data the empir ical results indicate that profit maximization is an important motive driving contributions this finding supports the current tax deducti ble status of contributions up to a seldom encoun tered ceiling and favors a reform that allows firms to treat contributions as ordinary business expenses copyright 1988 by the university of chicago

on sustaining cooperation without public observations abstract this paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played our main result is that in a repeated prisoner s dilemma where defections are irreversible at least for a long enough period of time patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because i continuation games are games of incomplete information hence they do not have the same structure as the original game in particular continuation equilibria are correlated equilibria ii players are typically uncertain about their opponents past observations and actions and they use their entire own private history to learn about these actions as a result equilibrium strategies are in general nontrivial and increasingly complex functions of past observations we bypass these difficulties by looking at correlated equilibria of the original game and find correlated equilibria in which the decision problem faced by each player remains the same over time journal of economic literature classification numbers c72

intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations this paper studies the role of a proposed seniority system in an organization the organization consists of at least three overlapping generations of short lived members and chooses either a shortsighted or a farsighted action in each period this results in intergenerational conflicts of interest the old generation desires to obtain an immediate profit while the middle and young generations have incentives to invest for future profits we use a model of infinitely repeated games and demonstrate that the seniority system solves these conflicts in the sense that the farsighted action profile is sustainable in equilibrium

the efficiency of bonus or terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations abstract we study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations we construct simple bonus or terminate incentive schemes in these schemes the principal evaluates the agent every t periods the principal pays a bonus and asks the agent to work for t more periods if the evaluation is positive the relationship is terminated if the evaluation is negative the inefficiencies in these schemes vanish as the agent can be more frequently evaluated this result holds generally under objective or subjective evaluations

an empirical analysis of participation in us government farm programmes factors affecting the participation of individual kansas farms in government programmes are considered a sample drawn from over 1600 kansas farms for nine years is used in the context of a simultaneous equation tobit regression to investigate the effects of various factors on the probability and expected level of participation in farm programmes the results suggest that differences in farm sizes incomes types and farming practices influence participation in government programmes small sole proprietor livestock operations with low debt levels receive the lowest levels of support conversely large corporate crop farms receive the highest levels of government support

the folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs abstract the folk theorem literature has been relaxing the assumption on how much players know about each other s past action here we consider a general model where players can buy precise information every period each player decides whether to pay a cost to accurately observe the actions chosen by other players in the previous period when a player does not pay the cost he obtains only imperfect private signals observational decisions are unobservable to others known strategies such as trigger strategies do not work since they fail to motivate players to pay for information this paper shows that the folk theorem holds for any level of observation costs unlike existing folk theorems with private monitoring ours imposes virtually no restriction on the nature of costless imperfect signals the theorem does not use explicit or costless communication thereby having implications on antitrust laws that rely on evidence of explicit communication the main message is that accurate observation alone however costly enables efficient cooperation in general repeated games

efficiency in repeated prisoner s dilemma with private monitoring abstract this paper analyzes repeated games with private monitoring where in each period each player receives a signal of the other player s action in the previous period and that signal is private information previous literature on discounted repeated games with private monitoring has not shown whether or not nearly efficient equilibria exist for a repeated prisoner s dilemma satisfying a certain assumption regarding stage game payoffs we show that there exists a nearly efficient sequential equilibrium provided that imperfectness of signals is small and players are patient journal of economic literature classification number c73

the corporate social performance financial performance link strategic managers are consistently faced with the decision of how to allocate scarce corporate resources in an environment that is placing more and more pressures on them recent scholarship in strategic management suggests that many of these pressures come directly from sources associated with social issues in management rather than traditional arenas of strategic management using a greatly improved source of data on corporate social performance this paper reports the results of a rigorous study of the empirical linkages between financial and social performance corporate social performance csp is found to be positively associated with prior financial performance supporting the theory that slack resource availability and csp are positively related csp is also found to be positively associated with future financial performance supporting the theory that good management and csp are positively related 1997 by john wiley sons ltd