optimal leniency and the organization design of group crime abstract we study a simple law enforcement model where the organizational structure of a criminal group is endogenous and determined jointly with the amnesty granted to whistleblowers we allow criminals to choose between a horizontal partnership and a vertical hierarchical organization structure and we study how this choice affects the optimal leniency granted by a benevolent legislator whose aim is to minimize crime we show that the optimal amnesty with an endogenous organizational choice is less lenient than that granted when the policy targets vertical organizations only in the equilibrium partnerships coexist with vertical organizations

but who will monitor the monitor suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations what about the monitor s deviations to address this question i propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor s observations are not only private but costly too i also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform in doing so i emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games jel c78 d23 d82 d86

pre emptive corruption hold up and repeated interactions this paper analyses repeated interactions between a firm and an inspector who monitors regulatory compliance the firm may offer a bribe to pre empt the inspection corruption is unfeasible in the one shot game because of inspector hold up in an infinitely repeated game we characterize the set of bribes that can be sustained as equilibrium paths using the trigger strategy in this model the most likely bribe givers are not the firms that benefit the most from the illegal behaviour furthermore strengthening anti corruption policies has ambiguous welfare effects because it improves compliance only among a subset of firms and increases monitoring effort

the effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion abstract an antitrust authority grants leniency pre and post investigation it chooses the probability of an investigation firms pick the degree of collusion the more they collude the higher are profits but so is the probability of detection firms thus trade off higher profits against higher expected fines if firms are sufficiently patient leniency is ineffective it may even increase collusion increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion yet never completely with bare pre investigation leniency deterrence is better than without leniency if firms are sufficiently impatient granting leniency pre and post is better than merely pre investigation

combining cartel penalties and private damage actions the impact on cartel prices abstract in many countries antitrust enforcement by competition authorities through prosecution and the imposition of penalties is complemented in price fixing cases by private damage actions which should affect both cartel deterrence and the prices set by those cartels that do form we show that the impact of combining penalties and damages on cartel prices is not clearcut and depends on both the nature of the penalty regime and the way that damages are calculated we demonstrate this by focusing on two ways of calculating damages that have been advocated in practice and two different forms of the widely used revenue based penalty regime when the simple form of revenue based penalties is in force the standard method of calculating damages worsens its harmful pricing effects whereas the proposed alternative method of calculating damages can overturn them when a more sophisticated form of revenue based penalties is in operation imposing damages will improve its beneficial pricing effects under both methods of damage calculation but the alternative method is more effective in all cases combining penalties and damages improves deterrence

laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs the number of cartels detected in the united states and in europe has increased considerably since the introduction of corporate leniency programs in antitrust legislation it cannot however be ruled out that this apparent success results in part from increased cartel activity we explore the effects of corporate leniency programs on pricing and cartel activity by use of an experiment we find that in the lab i fewer cartels are established when a leniency program is in place and ii cartels that do exist are less successful in charging prices above the static nash equilibrium price and have lower survival rates

competition policy and cartel size this article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive in particular small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members regarding the least inclusive stable cartels competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and in the latter case the collusive price can rise

legal principles in antitrust enforcement we study antitrust enforcement to channel price fixing incentives of cartels through setting fine schedules and detection levels fines obey legal principles punishments fit the crime proportionality bankruptcy considerations and minimum fines bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines ensure abnormal cartel profits and impose a challenge for optimal antitrust enforcement we derive the fine schedule and detection level that are constrained optimal under legal principles and sustainability of cartel prices this fine schedule lies below the maximum fine makes collusion on lower prices more attractive than on higher prices and hence relates to marginal deterrence literature this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

less filling tastes great the realist neoliberal debate this essay examines and reformulates the realist neoliberal debate focusing initially on the issue of the attribution of goals to states we argue that not only are goals merely the epiphenomena of other things but also that their specification constitutes but a re description of strategic environments that is although an attribution of goals may contribute to our characterization of outcomes a discussion of them is not central to the development of a theory that explains and predicts the outbreak of conflict and the patterns of cooperation instead we argue that the realist neoliberal debate should be recast so that our central research agenda is the development of substantively specific models that allow us to ascertain how the equilibrium to a game in which states structure international affairs influences the types of issue specific subgames states play how countries coordinate to equilibria of different types how we can characterize the coordination problems associated with different equilibria how states can enhance the attractiveness of an equilibrium and how states can signal commitments to the strategies that are part of that equilibrium

the change of tide in political cooperation a limited information model of european integration european integration follows a puzzling stop and go pattern that traditional international reations theories cannot fully explain the predominating paradigms only account for either the achievements or the setbacks of the integration process an information based explanation makes it possible to move beyond structural accounts provided by realist and functionalist scholarship such an approach yields solid micro level foundations of international bargaining and focuses on leaders use of threats in negotiations about regional cooperation situations involving governments agreeing on the necessity of further integration but disagreeing about its level create room for strategic manipulation of information asymmetries this type of uncertainty stems from the manipulator s information and control advantages concerning domestic costs the analysis of different summit meetings demonstrates the empirical relevance of such maneuvers for the dynamics of european integration

on the design of leniency programs abstractleniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion but can also be abused and generate perverse effects this paper develops a simple model capturing this trade off which we use to relate the optimal leniency policy the carrot to the effectiveness of investigations the stick we show that it is always desirable to offer some leniency before an investigation is launched it is also optimal to offer some leniency once an investigation is underway when investigations are unlikely to succeed in uncovering cartels absent self reporting our analysis also confirms the usefulness of restricting leniency to the first informant only in contrast it does not support prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders

international antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact this article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities we are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship the interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration we compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination

fines leniency and rewards in antitrust this article reports results from an experiment studying how fines leniency and rewards for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices subjects use costly fines as punishments leniency improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports leniency with rewards prices fall at the competitive level overall our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well run leniency and reward schemes these findings may also be relevant for similar white collar organized crimes such as corruption and fraud

the effects of group composition in a strategic environment evidence from a field experiment abstract recent theoretical and empirical studies have explored the effect of group membership and identity on individual decision making this line of research highlights that economic models focusing on the individual as the sole entity in the decision making environment potentially miss critical features this study takes this literature in a new direction by overlaying a field experiment onto a setting where groups have arisen naturally our experimental laboratory is large open air markets where we are able to examine the effects of group membership on seller s collusive behavior as measured by prices and surplus allocations this permits us to explore strategic implications of group composition empirical results illustrate the importance of group composition on pricing decisions and show that deviations from nash equilibrium are crucially related to group membership

entrenching the yoshida defense doctrine three techniques for institutionalization japan s level of defense expenditure relative to tbe size of its economy bas long been uniquely low among the major industrialized countries as of 1995 japan s expenditures stood at 0 96 percent of gross domestic product gdp even adding to this tbe approximately 0 3 percent of gdp devoted to pensions for retired personnel the level of spending is considerably less than that of major westem states such as tbe united states united kingdom france and germany as well as industrialized asian states such as south korea taiwan malaysia and singapore furthermore these relative magnitudes have remained reasonably stable over tbe past few decades see table 1 defense expenditure as a percentage of gdp or gnp gross national product often referred to simply as defense burden has over tbe past few decades become the standard benchmark for measuring a state s relative contribution to international security because of this tbe appropriateness and consequences of japan s relatively low expenditure of national wealth on defense bave been hotly debated botb in japan and abroad critics accuse japan of unfairly exploiting a defense free ride to build its economic success and others worry that japan s lack of military capabilities prevents it from becoming a normal state whose political role is commensurate

discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates abstract ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in new keynesian models a stochastic forward looking model with an occasionally binding lower bound calibrated to the u s economy suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy the fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound the welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the phillips curve these results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment

uncertain policy promises abstract we develop a general method for analyzing the effects of macroeconomic policy promises about which the private sector is uncertain we illustrate the method in two applications to a central bank s forward guidance about the path for its policy rate we demonstrate that uncertainty about forward guidance resulting from its potential to be imperfectly credible makes it much less powerful than in textbook models in an application to the fomc s threshold based guidance we show that increasing the precision of the conditions under which the policy rate lifts off from the zero bound requires a lower unemployment threshold to deliver a given amount of stimulus

modeling the birth and death of cartels with an application to evaluating competition policy one of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust policy on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable we observe only the population of discovered cartels to address this challenge a model of cartel creation and dissolution is developed to endogenously derive the populations of cartels and discovered cartels it is then shown how one can infer the impact of antitrust policy on the population of cartels by measuring its impact on the population of discovered cartels in particular the change in the distribution on the duration of discovered cartels could be informative in assessing whether a new antitrust policy is reducing the latent rate of cartels

letting the briber go free an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes this paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes basu 2011 advocates legal immunity for bribe givers while retaining culpability for bribe takers results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices weak economic incentives for the bribe giver or retaliation by bribe takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation as a result asymmetric liability on its own may face challenges in the field

corporate leniency programs when firms have private information the push of prosecution and the pull of pre emption a corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities this study explores the incentives to apply for leniency when each cartel member has private information as to the likelihood that the competition authority will be able to convict them without a cooperating firm a firm may apply for leniency because it fears being convicted prosecution effect or because it fears another firm will apply pre emption effect policies by the competition authority to magnify concerns about pre emption and thereby induce greater use of the leniency program are also explored

endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market entry games an explorative experimental study this paper explores experimentally the effects of costly communication possibilities in market entry games it is shown that these effects depend on whether entry costs are symmetric or asymmetric in the former but not the latter case communication possibilities increase coordination success substantially and are likely to generate inferior outcomes for consumers furthermore cost asymmetries provide a tacit coordination cue that is robust to changes in the game and is used by experienced players as a substitute to communication it is also shown that although communication opens up for aggressive market domination strategies such strategies are not used often successful

do meetings in smoke filled rooms facilitate collusion the sherman act prohibits firms from discussing prices in meetings traditional thought suggests that this prohibition makes it harder for firms to collude and economists have concluded that the sherman act operates in the public interest i provide an alternative explanation for the act that also accounts for the small sanctions chosen by the legislature when firms interact in a dynamic environment in which the law helps them to prevent renegotiation the firms may benefit from the law that makes it costly but not very costly to meet to discuss prices the sherman act may help firms to collude

endogenous mergers and collusion in asymmetric market structures recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion including an indivisible cost of cartelization we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion since they balance the small firms incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders indivisible cartelization cost using an endogenous merger model we also show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion current antisymmetry merger policy can thus be counterproductive

optimal cartel pricing in the presence of an antitrust authority the dynamic behavior of a price fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed consistent with preceding static theories the cartel s steady state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection however contrary to those theories it is independent of the level of fixed fines it is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages

coordination and collaboration regimes in an anarchic world the study of regimes can contribute to our understanding of international politics only if regimes represent more than international organizations and less than all international relations the conceptualization of regimes developed here accepts the realist image of international politics in which autonomous self interested states interact in an anarchic environment yet there are situations in which rational actors have an incentive to eschew unconstrained independent decision making situations in which individualistic self interested calculation leads them to prefer joint decision making regimes because independent self interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes these situations are labeled dilemmas of common interests and dilemmas of common aversions to deal with these states must collaborate with one another or coordinate their behavior respectively thus there are different bases for regimes which give rise to regimes with different characteristics coordination is self enforcing and can be reached through the use of conventions collaboration is more formalized and requires mechanisms both to monitor potential cheating and to insure compliance with the regime the article elucidates the assumptions of such an interest based approach to regimes assimilates alternative explanations into this framework and develops the implications for regime maintenance and change

endogenous cartel formation experimental evidence in a bertrand oligopoly experiment firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel like communication and if so they may get fined by a cartel authority we find that the four firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption

global cartels leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation in this paper we analyze cartel formation and self reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions we are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies when international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated multi market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively we then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged we show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self reporting by cartel members

fines and reputational sanctions the case of cartels abstract in this article we revive an old debate in the law and economics literature the relative role of public and reputational sanctions in deterring misconduct we propose an empirical framework which accounts for public sanctions in our case cartel fines and a more direct measure of reputational sanctions harnessing recent developments in opinion mining we use the intensity and the sentiment of media exposure of misconduct as a measure of reputational effect and thus approximation of the reputational sanction as a demonstration we combine an event study approach sentiment analysis and econometric techniques on a sample of 339 listed cartel member firms prosecuted by the european commission between 1992 and 2015 our results offer evidence that in the context of cartels public and reputational sanctions act as substitutes where there is a reputational penalty increasing this penalty reduces the effect of the public sanction one the other hand in the absence of a reputational punishment the effect of the cartel fine steps in

design of yardstick competition and consumer prices experimental evidence abstract in this paper we analyze the effect of the design of yardstick competition on consumer prices by means of a theoretical analysis as well as an economic experiment we compare four different designs the uniform yardstick the unweighted uniform yardstick the discriminatory yardstick and the best practice yardstick the effect of a specific design on prices depends on two separate mechanisms one which affects the incentive power to increase productive efficiency and another which affects the risk of collusion we show theoretically that for the best practice yardstick which is widely applied in several industries in a number of countries these two mechanisms point in the same direction high prices which is confirmed by the experiment both the theoretical analysis as well as the economic experiment show that the discriminatory yardstick results in lower prices than the unweighted uniform yardstick the theory however does not give a clear answer on the relative performance of the discriminatory versus the weighted uniform yardstick in the experimental analysis we find that the advantage of the discriminatory yardstick in terms of giving incentives to improve productive efficiency exceeds the disadvantage of a relatively higher risk of collusion this conclusion appears to be robust for different degrees of heterogeneity of the industry hence the discriminatory yardstick yields the lowest prices for consumers

whistleblower protection theory and experimental evidence abstract whistleblowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud recent laws and global policy recommendations aim at facilitating whistleblower protection to enhance the willingness to report and to increase the detection and deterrence of misbehavior we study these issues in a theory guided laboratory experiment as expected protecting whistleblowers leads to more reporting of misbehavior however the predicted improvements in detection and deterrence do not materialize in the experiment this is mainly driven by prosecutors being less inclined to investigate upon a report when protection is in place

do antitrust laws facilitate collusion experimental evidence on costly communication in duopolies bertrand supergames with non binding communication are used to study price formation and stability of collusive agreements on experimental duopoly markets the experimental design consists of three treatments with different costs of communication zero cost low cost and high cost prices are found to be significantly higher when communication is costly moreover costly communication decreases the number of messages but more importantly it enhances the stability of collusive agreements mccutcheon 1997 presents an interesting application to antitrust policy by letting the cost of communication symbolize the presence of an antitrust law that prohibits firms from discussing prices although our experimental results do not support the mechanism of mccutcheon s 1997 argument the findings point in the direction of her prediction that antitrust laws might work in the interest of firms

denying leniency to cartel instigators costs and benefits abstract a large number of countries have introduced successful leniency programs into their competition law enforcement to encourage colluding firms to come forward with evidence that will help detect cartels and punish price fixers this paper studies a feature of some of these programs that has received relatively little attention in the literature the inclusion of no immunity for instigators clauses niics these provisions deny leniency benefits to parties that instigate cartel behavior or function as cartel ringleaders our results show that niics can lead to increased or decreased levels of cartel conduct by removing the instigator s benefit from cooperating with the authorities a niic undoes some of the destabilizing benefit the leniency program was intended to generate and thereby furthers cartel stability on the other hand the instigator faces an asymmetrically severe punishment under a niic and this can reduce the incentive to instigate in the first place

optimal monetary policy under commitment with a zero bound on nominal interest rates we determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking new keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero the lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear a calibration to the u s economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached while the empirical magnitude of u s mark up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound under optimal policy however this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium interestingly the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to non binding markup shocks

multi market collusion with demand linkages and antitrust enforcement this paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand related markets we show that cartel prosecution can have a knock on effect bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break up of the cartel in the adjacent market cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets we discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus explore antitrust spillovers the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms

antitrust and prices this study examines the effects of antitrust prosecution on prices charged by firms indicted for price fixing in a survey of 25 cases filed between 1973 and 1984 prices are found to gradually rise by about 7 percent over the 4 years following an indictment however the severity of penalties is negatively correlated with prices these two findings suggest either that penalties are too lenient or that prosecution is too broad penalizing economically efficient conspiracies along with those that are inefficient

leniency programs for multimarket firms the effect of amnesty plus on cartel formation we examine the effect of amnesty plus on dynamic cartel formation in a multimarket setting the amnesty plus program has been adopted as part of the us corporate leniency policy in 1999 and is now vigorously advertised as one of the most compelling tools in generating successful cartel investigations amnesty plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms convicted in one market to report their collusive agreements in other markets we show that amnesty plus has two opposite effects on firms ability and incentives to collude which are both increasing in the fine reduction granted first amnesty plus can reduce the deterrence of cartel activities by making it easier for firms to sustain multimarket collusion through strategies involving self reporting after a first cartel detection second it can reduce the expected duration of cartels or delay their formation by increasing firms incentives to self report after a first cartel detection

absolute and relative gains in international relations theory the problem of absolute and relative gains divides neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism the former assumes states focus primarily on their absolute gains and emphasizes the prospects for cooperation the latter supposes states are largely concerned with relative gains and emphasizes the prospects for conflict existing work in international relations theory generally traces the differences between these two theories to different assumptions about states preferences using a simple game theoretic model this essay offers a reformulation of the problem of absolute and relative gains that links changes in the states behavior the feasibility of cooperation and especially the states concern for relative versus absolute gains explicitly to changes in the constraints facing the states many of the differences between neoliberal institutionalism and structural realism appear as special cases of the model

the effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion the objective of a leniency program is to reduce sanctions against collusion if a participant voluntarily confesses his behavior or cooperates with the public authority s investigation constructing a model in which the detection probability varies over time harrington 2008 pointed out that there are three channels through which the leniency program can affect the collusion amount furthermore he presented a sufficient condition under which the maximum leniency is optimal after extending the model by endogenizing the degree of collusion as well as equilibrium selection in the self reporting stage we revealed that the race to the courthouse effect disappears and that the maximum reduction is always optimal

imperfect credibility and the zero lower bound as the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a new keynesian model during a large recession we characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect confronting monetary policy communication of the u s federal reserve and the swedish riksbank with such a framework the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis

the impact of the 2002 reform of the eu leniency program on cartel outcomes abstract the objective of this study is to empirically assess whether the 2002 reform of the eu leniency program which brought the eu leniency policy much closer to the us policy has increased the european commission s capability to destabilize cartels while making prosecution more efficient more specifically relying on a difference in difference approach we estimate the impact of the 2002 reform on cartel duration fines before and after applying leniency reductions and duration of investigation we find that the 2002 reform decreased cartel duration by about 87 percent but did not significantly affect the other outcome variables thus our findings seem to suggest that the 2002 reform has improved the cartel destabilizing effect of the eu leniency program without enhancing however its effectiveness in prosecuting cartels

strategic leniency and cartel enforcement the cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the united states and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency i develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20 year span statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime jel d43 l12 l13 k21 in 1993 the department of justice doj introduced a new leniency program with the intent of destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels the program commits the doj to the lenient prosecution of early confessors in particular it guarantees complete amnesty from federal prosecution to the first confessor from each cartel provided that an investigation into the confes sor s cartel is not already underway it also offers discretionary penalty reductions to conspirators who confess when an investigation is already ongoing the new leniency program has become the cornerstone of cartel enforcement efforts in the united states e g scott d hammond 2004 and recently has inspired antitrust authorities in australia canada the european union japan south korea and elsewhere to introduce similar programs oecd 2002 2003 this paper tests the efficacy of the new leniency program the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency a common finding is that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultane

effects of institutional history and leniency on collusive corruption and tax evasion we investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance we explore this through a formal leniency program in our experiment we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework we not only study the effect of the presence of such a mechanism on behavior but also the dynamic effect caused by the introduction and the removal of leniency we find that in the presence of a leniency mechanism subjects collude and accept bribes less often while paying more taxes but there is no increase in bribe offers our results show that the introduction of the opportunity to blow the whistle decreases the collusion and bribe acceptance rate and increases the collected tax yield it also does not encourage bribe offers in contrast the removal of the institutional mechanism does not induce negative effects suggesting a positive spillover effect of leniency that persists even after the mechanism has been removed

threshold based forward guidance abstract when the monetary policy rate is at the zero bound threshold based forward guidance tbfg is a state contingent promise to delay liftoff from the zero bound until macroeconomic variables breach particular thresholds we study tbfg within a stochastic version of the workhorse new keynesian model we show that tbfg can be used to provide temporary stimulus while also limiting the time inconsistency of policy promises existence of a unique equilibrium requires the policymaker to specify how the thresholds should be interpreted as well as their values with an appropriate choice of thresholds tbfg outperforms forward guidance based purely on calendar time and substantially reduces welfare losses compared to the optimal time consistent policy

leniency policies and illegal transactions abstract we study the consequences of leniency reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self report to law enforcers on sequential bilateral illegal transactions such as corruption manager auditor collusion or drug deals it is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction here we find that when not properly designed leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence

stability in anarchic international systems can stability emerge solely from the competition and self interest of sovereign powers existing in a state of anarchy or does stability depend on restraints from the complex nexus of interdependencies characterizing the contemporary world economy and its associated institutions we suppose some infinitely divisible resource that all nation states are endowed with and maximize and that enables them to overcome adversaries in the event of conflict we offer a noncooperative extensive form model of international conflict without exogenous mechanisms to enforce agreements in order to learn under what conditions balance of power and collective security ensure the sovereignty of all states in anarchic systems we conclude that there exists at least one world albeit an abstract one in which anarchy yields stability

cartel pricing dynamics in the presence of an antitrust authority cartel pricing is characterized when firms are concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed balancing concerns about maintaining the stability of the cartel with those of avoiding detection the cartel may either i gradually raise price to its steady state level or ii gradually raise price and then have it decline to its steady state level antitrust laws may have a perverse effect as they make cartel stability easier and thus allow for higher cartel prices

cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection this paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous we find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases during the transitional phase price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks during the stationary phase price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non collusion or simple monopoly the length of the transition phase is decreasing in the variance of cost shocks it is also shown that the cartel price path may overshoot its long run level so that price converges from above

the impact of leniency and whistle blowing programs on cartels antitrust authorities have set up leniency programs for cartel members that denounce their collusive agreements these programs help prosecute participants and can thereby deter collusion we compare the impact of reduced fines and positive rewards and argue that rewarding individuals including firm employees can deter collusion in a more effective way we discuss possible adverse effects of whistle blowing programs on firms behavior and particularly on turnover incentives to innovate and cooperation we also explore explanations for the puzzling fact that managers keep incriminating evidence and argue reward programs actually provide additional incentives for keeping such evidence

econometric policy evaluation note for successive values of the endogenous variables y with the x treated as deterministic forcing variables here 0 is a parameter vector and the et are random shocks lucas correctly observed that such a formulation is inconsistent with a view of agents as optimizers except in special cases in which the future is irrelevant to present decisions it makes no sense to think of agents as optimizing if they know that their budget constraints are liable to shift arbitrarily i e in a way which is not characterized probabilistically as government policy changes lucas was led to augment the foregoing equation by adding to the system a government policy function

coordination versus prisoners dilemma implications for international cooperation and regimes the study of political institutions in general and international cooperation in particular has been beneficially influenced by the prisoners dilemma pd game model but there is a mistaken tendency to treat pd as representing the singular problem of collective action and cooperation by relaxing the assumptions of 2 2 games and developing an alternate model of the coordination game i show how some cooperation problems have very different properties from those found in pd the analytical results of the two games are compared across several important dimensions number of strategies available number of iterations of the game numbers of players and the distribution of power among them the discussion is illustrated with specific problems of international cooperation and the implications of alternative cooperation problems for the formation and performance of international regimes are explored the basic solutions for pd and coordination have divergent ramifications for the institutionalization stability and adaptability of regimes and for the role of hegemony in the international system however the coordination model does not replace the pd model but complements and supplements it as a way to understand the diversity of political institutions these results are widely applicable to areas of politics beyond international relations

forward guidance with an escape clause when half a promise is better than a full one abstractusing a three equation new keynesian model we find that incorporating an escape clause ec into forward guidance fg is welfare improving as it allows the monetary authority to avoid cases in which the cost of reduced flexibility is too high the ec provides the central bank with another instrument additional to the promised policy rate the announced threshold the greater the size of the recessionary shock the lower the optimal promised rate and the higher the optimal threshold i e the higher the probability of delivering the promised rate while fg with an ec is better than discretion for facing any zero lower bound zlb situation unconditional fg performs better than discretion only in the most extreme 16 of zlb events furthermore even for very large recessionary shocks it is not optimal to make unconditional promises

accomplice witnesses and organized crime theory and evidence from italy we develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice witness program we characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest our predictions are tested by using data for italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice witness program as predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution moreover consistent with a novel prediction of our theory the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency

are leniency programs too generous i present a simple model of collusion in which the competition authority offers leniency rates contingent on the number of firms that report information the optimal leniency policy involves what i refer to as a single informant rule that is leniency should be given only when a single firm reports information the single informant rule allows to increase expected sanctions compared to the first informant rule which overall improves cartel deterrence

price leadership and unequal market sharing collusion in experimental markets abstract we consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price setting duopolies we investigate the effect on collusion of sequential versus simultaneous price setting we also examine the effect on collusion of changes in the size of each subject s market share in case both subjects set the same price our results show that sequential price setting compared with simultaneous price setting facilitates collusion if subjects have equal market shares or if the follower has the larger market share with sequential price setting we find more collusion if subjects have equal market shares rather than unequal market shares we observe more collusion if the follower has the larger market share than if the follower has the smaller market share

self reporting investigation and evidentiary standards abstractself reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement this paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort i show that this leads to a negative relationship between self reporting incentives and investigation effort three main conclusions arise first violators self report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered second self reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high finally authorities can increase the incentives to self report when they convict without hard evidence however a hard evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior

the rise of economics in competition policy a canadian perspective competition policy in canada and elsewhere has changed remarkably over the last 50 yearsin large measure due to advances in economics in this article we trace the impact of developments in industrial organization on the three central areas of competition policy cartels single firm conduct and mergers we focus on canadian competition policy but draw comparisons with developments in the united states and europe

how to organize crime in criminal organizations diffusing information widely throughout the organization might lead to greater internal efficiency in particular since these organizations are self sustaining through enhancing trust however this may come at the cost of leaving the organization more vulnerable to external threats such as law enforcement we consider the implications of this trade off and characterize the optimal information structure rationalizing both hierarchical structures and organization in cells then we focus on the role of the external authority characterize optimal detection strategies and discuss the implications of different forms of enforcement on the internal structure of the organization and policy finally we discuss a number of applications and extensions in this paper we study the interplay between trust within an illegal organization and its vulnerability to the authorities illegal organizations function more effectively when the people who constitute them trust each other we argue that information sharing is an important factor in building internal trust and cohesion but that can leave the organization vulnerable understanding how this trade off affects an organization s information structure and productivity can allow us to assess detection policies designed to destabilize such organizations since 9 11 the u s congress has passed a 400 billion annual budget for the war on terror new domestic institutions have been created or enhanced among many others the counterterrorism section at the u s department of justice s criminal division international intelligence cooperation has been strengthened and new protocols and controversial legal tools such as the patriot act have been developed however these new agencies and institutions face the same basic questions that have challenged the prosecutors fighting organized crime in italy south america and eastern asia as well as authorities fighting terrorism all over the world now and in the past how can we learn about the internal structure of criminal organizations how should we go about investigating a criminal organization in order to break its internal cohesion how does a criminal organization react to investigation policies we highlight the fact that simply understanding the information links within an organization gives us insight into addressing these questions the anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a wide heterogeneity across the information structures of different criminal organizations the most credited theory about the mafia developed in the early 1990 s has identified the so called cupola as the highest level of the organization supposedly consisting of agents who hold large amounts of information about the organization itself and carry out the enforcement needed for the organization to function 2 these crucial agents are shielded from the authorities since they are typically not directly involved in criminal activities this theory suggests a centralized information and enforcement structure 1 previous drafts have circulated under the titles power and organizational structure under an external threat

on optimal cartel deterrence policies abstract this paper studies audit policies designed to deter explicit cartels in the most effective way we first compare a standard random and stationary audit strategy with a simple deterministic but non stationary strategy we show that the certainty of an ulterior control may better deter collusion than the recurrent threat of a sword of damocles that would lead on average to same frequency of audit we then explore more complex non stationary strategies and show that it is theoretically possible to deter collusion in the whole economy even with a small audit budget

the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games experimental evidence 1 for example in infinitely repeated prisoner s dilemma games with patient agents both cooperate and defect may be played in equilibrium even though the theory of infinitely repeated games has been used to explain cooperation in a variety of environments no definitive solution has been provided to the problem of equilibrium selection when both cooperation and defection are possible equilibrium outcomes which one should we expect to prevail previous experimental evidence has shown that subjects often fail to coordinate on a specific equilibrium when they play a small number of infinitely repeated games some subjects attempt to establish cooperative agreements while others defect but how would behavior evolve as subjects learn from previous repeated games would cooperation prevail when it can be supported in equilibrium or will subjects learn

relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well in international politics this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy after discussing why states might seek relative gains i demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed relative gains do impede cooperation in the two actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner s dilemma problem but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner s dilemma relative gains seeking is much less consequential its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors

what price coordination the efficiency enhancing effect of auctioning the right to play a model is proposed to explain the results of recent experiments in which subjects repeatedly played a coordination game with the right to play auctioned each period in a larger group subjects bid the market clearing price to a level recoverable only in the efficient equilibrium and then converged to that equilibrium although subjects playing the game without auctions converged to inefficient equilibria the efficiency enhancing effect of auctions is reminiscent of forward induction but is not explained by equilibrium refinements the model explains it by showing how strategic uncertainty interacts with history dependent learning dynamics to determine equilibrium selection copyright 1998 by american economic association

legalizing bribe giving i introduction corruption remains an endemic problem in the developing world and has become a central political issue in many countries empirical work has considerably advanced our understanding of how widespread corruption is and how it can cause harm 1 governments and agencies such as the world bank have sponsored numerous anticorruption programs however regarding how to best fight corruption in practice research has lagged behind policy 2 recently kaushik basu chief economist then of the indian government and now of the world bank proposed a specific approach in basu s 2011 pamphlet why for a class of bribes the act of giving a bribe should be treated as legal he describes a society where bribery is rampant a scourge that deserves to be banished and proposes for the case of harassment bribes that people pay to get services they are legally entitled to 3 the following policy legalize bribe giving double the fine for bribe taking and make the bribe taker pay back the bribe if discovered when a citizen bribes a bureaucrat under traditional law the two become partners in crime they thus lack incentives to report the activity under basu s policy bp which he deems fairly radical incentives are provided for the bribe giver to report the bribe taker if this is foreseen the bureaucrat would not accept the bribe in the first place that is the key idea will it work a hot debate has raged in indian and international press the economist appeared sympathetic 4 however in some quarters the proposal stirred outrage and commentators discarded it mainly on moral grounds 5 more tempered thoughtful criticism has come from economists dreze 2011 in particular wrote a penetrating comment arguing that basu does not give adequate attention to some institutional and moral concerns which may change conclusions basu s intriguing presentation is informal as is the heated debate it inspired perhaps one should not expect the issues to be easily settled through such discourse the proposal is reminiscent of somewhat analogous tools used in other fields such as leniency policies in antitrust and whistleblower protection and reward schemes against fraud and organized crime scholars who studied those measures have suggested they may be effective if well designed and administered but counterproductive if details are not set right 6 deeper understanding of the pros and cons of subtle legal rules may require careful scrutiny within a formal model in section ii we develop a simple formal model to represent the scenarios basu and his commentators care about as explicit games by comparing equilibria we draw conclusions regarding the conditions under which bp is likely to be effective bp gets mixed context dependent grades and we highlight complementarities with other policies the proposal works best if coupled with measures that increase the costs for bureaucrats of denying citizens what they deserve and that reduce the costs for citizens of getting justice verifying whether a bribe was paid entails costs which may deter reporting hence bp works better against larger bribes inefficient or corrupt law enforcement increases these costs so bp will be more effective if it is part of a wider reform package that also fosters independence and accountability of the legal system in section iii we take into account also the legal and moral considerations brought up by dreze revealing other problems related to bp we propose a modified policy mbp that escapes many objections the idea is inspired by leniency rules in antitrust rather than legalize bribe giving only those who report having paid a bribe would be awarded legal immunity extortionary harassment bribes are distortive when they are not paid because a justified and presumably welfare enhancing licence is then not issued with other arguably often more serious forms of corruption distortions occur when bribes are paid not otherwise

asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism coordination failure game form auctions and tacit communication abstract in this paper we explore the possibility that asset markets provide a means of tacit communication which may allow subjects to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium in an underlying coordination game we find that the existence of a market price for the right to play does communicate information about the equilibrium selection problem specifically behavior never converged to the efficient outcome when subjects were endowed with the right to participate but always converged to the efficient outcome when subjects purchased the right to participate journal of economic literature classification numbers c720 g120

does auctioning of entry licences induce collusion an experimental study we use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost this argument is not uncontested though and this paper puts it to an experimental test our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly these results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits in oligopoly entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path in monopoly taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit maximizing price

the effect of international environmental institutions how we might learn more analysts of international politics can measure and explain the effect of international environmental institutions on the behavior of states and other actors and on the natural environment in three steps first we measure the outcome to be explained in terms of goal attainment defined as the difference over time or across cases between actor behavior or the state of the natural environment on dimensions identified by institutional goals and certain end points determined by institutional goals second we assess the effect of an institution in terms of the extent to which the existence or operation of the institution contributes ceteris paribus to variation in goal attainment we transform these two variables into a score of institutional effectiveness to indicate the degree to which institutions contribute to the resolution of the environmental problems that motivate their establishment third we analyze the relationship between institutional effectiveness and specific dimensions of institutional design such as decision making rules membership and access conditions and the compliance system

global communications and national power life on the pareto frontier regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building global communications regimes however have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power in those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms radio broadcasting and remote sensing no regime was formed in those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications regimes were created although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities

quantifying the deterrent effect of anticartel enforcement this paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anti cartel policy it develops a conceptual framework which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification this is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred our best estimate is two thirds and even on conservative assumptions at least half of all harms or seven times the detected harm is deterred

prosecution and leniency programs the role of bluffing in opening investigations this paper characterizes the optimal investigation and leniency policies when the competition authority is privately informed about the strength of a cartel case i show that the competition authority can then exploit firms uncertainty about the risk of conviction to obtain confessions even when the case is weak more generally i show that offering full leniency allows the competition authority to open more successful investigations what i refer to as the activism effect of leniency which overall raises both cartel desistance and cartel deterrence finally i discuss the policy implications of the model

optimal corporate leniency programs this study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward it is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony