the economics of a blend mandate for biofuels a biofuel blend mandate may increase or decrease consumer fuel prices with endogenous oil prices depending on relative supply elasticities biofuel tax credits always reduce fuel prices tax credits result in lower fuel prices than under a mandate for the same level of biofuel production if tax credits are implemented alongside mandates then tax credits subsidize fuel consumption instead of biofuels this contradicts energy policy goals by increasing oil dependency co 2 emissions and traffic congestion while providing little benefit to either corn or ethanol producers these social costs will be substantial with tax credits costing taxpayers 28 7 billion annually by 2022 copyright 2008 oxford university press

property rights externalities and resource degradation locating the tragedy abstract resource degradation in the third world is largely driven by the demands of farm households for fuelwood and land for agriculture since resources are often controlled through indigenous systems of property the tragedy of the commons has been used to explain resource degradation as a result private property is suggested as a solution to resource degradation a dynamic model capable of examining household incentives for resource use under private and common property is developed results of the model reject the conventional wisdom that gives rise to the presumed optimality of private individual property in natural resources and the correlated indictment of group management regimes

cores of inventory centralization games abstract consider a set of n stores with single item and single period demands assume an option of centralized ordering and inventory with holding and penalty costs only in this case a cooperative inventory centralization game defines allocations of the cost we examine the conditions under which such an inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we prove the existence of nonempty core for demands with symmetric distributions and the existence of nonempty core for joint multivariate normal demand distribution we establish the equivalency of four different nonempty core conditions for the newsboy problem and demonstrate their efficacy for discrete independent and identically distributed iid demands journal of economic literature classification numbers c44 c62 c71

collaborative replenishment in the presence of intermediaries in complex supply chains downstream buyers would often replenish individually from intermediaries instead of directly dealing with original manufacturers although collaborative replenishment from intermediaries might generate benefits significant cost reductions could be achieved when direct replenishments from manufacturers are considered this paper constructs a general model to study collaborative replenishment in multi product chains with alternative sources of supply i e manufacturers and intermediaries a collaborative organization determines the optimal choices of replenishment sources on behalf of its members to minimize collective costs we introduce a class of cooperative games associated with these situations and give sufficient conditions for their concavity we investigate the choice of allocation rule and its effect on supply chain efficiency when buyers strategically participate in the collaborative organization we prove that the shapley value coordinates the supply chain i e it makes complete participation the best strategy for buyers even under asymmetric information this setting is compared with an alternative structure where buyers can only collaborate in source specific replenishment organizations that purchase all requested products either from intermediaries or manufacturers although there are always participation strategies that result in minimum collective cost it is impossible to find allocation rules for source specific replenishment organizations that always motivate the buyers to choose such strategies

coalitional game theory approach to modeling suppliers collaboration in supply networks abstract suppliers collaboration is a new paradigm to improve the utilization of collective intelligence in supply networks although existing literature advocates the notion of cooperation in supply networks there is a dearth of studies quantitatively analyzing cost and benefit of cooperation in this study we first develop a model for suppliers dynamic coalition formation using coalitional game theory the proposed cost structure influences the utility of each possible coalition and restricts the coalition size and search space for finding possible coalitions to distribute the profit earned by cooperation in a fair manner a criterion named shared capacity index is developed according to suppliers capacity share in the corresponding coalition a suppliers cooperation algorithm is then proposed to resolve possible conflicts among network members whereby each supplier is able to explore coalitional structures autonomously the efficiency of the proposed approach is evaluated through simulation studies and compared to other solution methods including shapley value and proportional fairness results demonstrate that long term cooperation among suppliers leads to enhanced average individual profit in the network

examining crop price effects on production decision and resource allocation an ex ante approach this article examines the output price effects on the us crop production employing an ex ante approach to the differential systems of input demand and output supply the estimation results of the

the effects of selling packaged goods on inventory decisions in this paper we study within a newsboy type modeling framework the common business practice of retail firms to sell products not only as independent items but also as part of multiproduct packets packaged goods our emphasis is on understanding the effects of such practices on the inventory decisions of the firm we provide insights on the resulting level of suboptimality when inventory decisions are made with demand information only on the independent items and without accounting for the demand substitution structure induced between independent items and packaged goods our stylized model studies an environment with two products that are not direct substitutes for each other sold either independently or as part of a packet that contains one unit of each we provide necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for this model and suggest an efficient numerical search for obtaining the optimal stocking levels an extensive computational study allowed us to provide insights on the nature of the optimal stocking policies the suboptimality of independent newsboy policies the effects of demand correlation among individual products and multiproduct packets and the determining role of induced substitution structure among products during stockout occasions on the profitability of the inventory system

the cost allocation issue in joint replenishment abstract joint replenishment for several products to achieve a lower inventory logistics cost has been a topic of extensive studies less attention has been paid to the issue of deciding how the joint replenishment costs should be allocated across the individual products ideally when items are ordered together one would require a stable cost allocation such that no subset of products subsidizes another subset when part of each product s ordering cost is product specific and part can be shared with other products like in a 3pl setting of anily and haviv it has been shown that even when a stable allocation exists such an allocation might be difficult to compute in addition usually the components of ordering costs are partially determined using estimates and accounting discretion this paper provides two main insights for determining an appropriate cost allocation it provides the means to test how sensitive a stable cost allocation is to a range of cost parameter values then in a computational study it is shown how to obtain a stable cost allocation without excessive computation

the global supply and demand for agricultural land in 2050 a perfect storm in the making the number of people which the world must feed is expected to increase by another 2 billion people by 2050 when coupled with significant nutritional improvements for the 2 1 billion people currently living on less than 2 day this translates into a very substantial rise in the demand for agricultural production most past growth in the demand for food has been met by improvements in productivity but there is evidence of declining growth rates for agricultural yields climate change is likely to have important impacts on productivity through changes in temperature and precipitation land based climate mitigation policies are also projected to lead to increasing pressure on agricultural lands meanwhile supplies of water for irrigation are under pressure urban land use is on the rise and demands for setting aside land for environmental purposes continue to increase clearly an enormous amount of additional research on ways to deal with this potential perfect storm is needed this paper highlights the explores the roles of biophysical and economic uncertainty in these projections of long run land use change using this to suggest a future research agenda

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

the newsvendor game has a nonempty core we settle an open conjecture regarding the newsvendor game we prove that its core is always non empty for all possible joint distributions of the random demands we give sufficient conditions under which the core is a singleton or it contains non negative elements

the competitive newsboy we consider a competitive version of the classical newsboy problem in which a firm must choose an inventory or production level for a perishable good with random demand and the optimal solution is a fractile of the demand distribution and investigate the impact of competition upon industry inventory a splitting rule specifies how initial industry demand is allocated among competing firms and how any excess demand is allocated among firms with remaining inventory we examine the relation between equilibrium inventory levels and the splitting rule and provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium our most general result is that if all excess demand is reallocated i e there is perfect substitutability then competition never leads to a decrease in industry inventory

an optimal path to extinction poverty and resource degradation in the open agrarian economy this paper constructs a model of the open agrarian economy in order to explore the tendency of many such economies to evolve along paths characterised by severe environmental degradation it pays special attention to the importance of commodity prices and the transfer system in determining agricultural activity levels in ecologically delicate systems

prices and productivity in agriculture developing countries often tax agriculture heavily a practice that might affect the productivity as well as the quantity of resources allocated to agriculture a variable coefficient cross country agricultural production function is estimated with past price expectations among the determinants of the production coefficients productivity s responsiveness to those expectations implies that had these developing economies eliminated price interventions agricultural productivity would have increased on average by about a fourth copyright 1993 by mit press

stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences abstract we study stochastic linear programming games a class of stochastic cooperative games whose payoffs under any realization of uncertainty are determined by a specially structured linear program these games can model a variety of settings including inventory centralization and cooperative network fortification we focus on the core of these games under an allocation scheme that determines how payoffs are distributed before the uncertainty is realized and allows for arbitrarily different distributions for each realization of the uncertainty assuming that each player s preferences over random payoffs are represented by a concave monetary utility functional we prove that these games have a nonempty core furthermore by establishing a connection between stochastic linear programming games linear programming games and linear semi infinite programming games we show that an allocation in the core can be computed efficiently under some circumstances

the estimation of product supply and input demand by the differential approach this paper makes use of the differential approach to the theory of the multiproduct firm in order to empirically analyze input demand and product supply in italian agriculture estimation of the parameters of the model with annual 1961 80 data for a sector model of fourteen products and three factors of production suggests possibilities for farmers to change their output mix in response to changes in the expected prices of products on the input demand side the derived demand functions seem to satisfy the integrability conditions but turn out to be quite inelastic

how fast should we graze the global commons unlike the vast preponderance of planets earth has been bequeathed a hospitable environment in which to thrive up to now man s activities have affected this environment negligibly scientists are becoming convinced however that release of carbon dioxide co2 from combustion of fossil fuels will lead to a significant modification of the global climate see woodwell how should we think about such a destruction of our heritage should it be treated as anathema like bondage or should the pace and extent of use of our global commons be subject to the same reasoned balancing of costs and benefits as other economic activities the present paper takes the second approach asking how fast the global economy should allow a buildup of atmospheric co2 the first section reviews the current scientific knowledge on this subject while the second puts this into an optimal growth framework the third section then presents a numerical example while the last presents some realistic policy views on the subject this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

business cycle comovement in the g 7 common shocks or common transmission mechanisms what are the sources of macroeconomic comovement among g 7 countries two main candidate explanations may be singled out common shocks and common transmission mechanisms in the article it is shown that they are complementary rather than alternative explanations by means of a large scale factor vector autoregressive fvar model allowing for full economic and statistical identification of all global and idiosyncratic shocks it is found that both common disturbances and common transmission mechanisms of global and country specific shocks account for business cycle comovement in the g 7 countries moreover spillover effects of foreign idiosyncratic disturbances seem to be a less important factor than the common transmission of global or domestic shocks in the determination of international macro economic comovements

distributed consensus in noncooperative inventory games this paper deals with repeated nonsymmetric congestion games in which the players cannot observe their payoffs at each stage examples of applications come from sharing facilities by multiple users we show that these games present a unique pareto optimal nash equilibrium that dominates all other nash equilibria and consequently it is also the social optimum among all equilibria as it minimizes the sum of all the players costs we assume that the players adopt a best response strategy at each stage they construct their belief concerning others probable behavior and then simultaneously make a decision by optimizing their payoff based on their beliefs within this context we provide a consensus protocol that allows the convergence of the players strategies to the pareto optimal nash equilibrium the protocol allows each player to construct its belief by exchanging only some aggregate but sufficient information with a restricted number of neighbor players such a networked information structure has the advantages of being scalable to systems with a large number of players and of reducing each player s data exposure to the competitors

cooperation in service systems we consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers this economies of scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady state mean total number of customers in the system the question we pose is how the servers should split among themselves the cost of the pooled system when the individual incoming streams of customers form poisson processes and individual service times are exponential we define a transferable utility cooperative game in which the cost of a coalition is the mean number of customers or jobs in the pooled system we show that despite the characteristic function is neither monotone nor concave the game and its subgames possess nonempty cores in other words for any subset of servers there exist cost sharing allocations under which no partial subset can take advantage by breaking away and forming a separate coalition we give an explicit expression for all infinitely many nonnegative core cost allocations of this game finally we show that except for the case where all individual servers have the same cost there exist infinitely many core allocations with negative entries and we show how to construct a convex subset of the core where at least one server is being paid to join the grand coalition

coalitional aggregation of wind power this paper explores scenarios in which independent wind power producers form willing coalitions to exploit the reduction in aggregate power output variability obtainable through geographic diversity in the setting of a two settlement electricity market we examine the advantage gained through optimal coalitional contract offering strategies for quantity risk reduction we show that a group of independent wind power producers can always improve their expected profit by cooperatively offering their aggregated power using coalitional game theory we identify sharing mechanisms to fairly allocate the profits to coalition members we show that the resulting coalitional game is balanced guaranteeing that the core of the game is necessarily nonempty in addition we propose a profit sharing mechanism that minimizes the worst case dissatisfaction to recover an imputation in the core finally we illustrate our theoretical results with empirical studies using data from five representative wind farms in upstate new york

a capacitated single item lot size model abstract wagner and whitin s inventory model is generalized to incorporate a limited production rate the model is conspicuous amongst related models in the literature as wagner and whitin s original algorithm may be applied the result requires restrictions on the cost coefficients that make conventional material requirements planning the model s natural field of application

inventory centralization games with price dependent demand and quantity discount consider a distribution system consisting of a set of retailers facing a single period price dependent demand of a single product by taking advantage of the risk pooling effect and the quantity volume discount provided by suppliers or third party carriers the retailers may place joint orders and keep inventory at central warehouses before demand realization and allocate inventory among themselves after demand realization to reduce their operating costs under rather general assumptions we prove that there is a stable allocation of profits among the retailers in the sense that the resulting inventory centralization game has a nonempty core we also show how to compute an allocation in the core

cooperative solution of local externality problems a case of mechanism design applied to irrigation abstract cooperative solutions to ameliorate externalities may be pareto superior compared to noncooperative abatement strategies but such solutions may not be adopted without appropriate institutional mechanisms to achieve cooperative outcomes voluntarily there must be methods of determining cost shares and identifying preferred solutions here the design of a process and a related algorithm are proposed based on concepts of welfare economics and game theory for public goods and externalities simulation of the process for an irrigation externality problem in the central valley of california demonstrates existence of a unanimously preferred solution with improved water quality

the cost allocation problem for the first order interaction joint replenishment model we consider an infinite horizon deterministic joint replenishment problem with first order interaction under this model the setup transportation reorder cost associated with a group of retailers placing an order at the same time equals some group independent major setup cost plus retailer dependent minor setup costs in addition each retailer is associated with a retailer dependent holding cost rate the structure of optimal replenishment policies is not known thus research has focused on optimal power of two pot policies following this convention we consider the cost allocation problem of an optimal pot policy among the various retailers for this sake we define a characteristic function that assigns to any subset of retailers the average time total cost of an optimal pot policy for replenishing the retailers in the subset under the assumption that these are the only existing retailers we show that the resulting transferable utility cooperative game with this characteristic function is concave in particular it is a totally balanced game namely this game and any of its subgames have nonempty core sets finally we give an example for a core allocation and prove that there are infinitely many core allocations

stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations this study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers each of them facing a newsvendor problem and a supplier groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by joint ordering and inventory centralization however we assume that the retailers impose some level of stock that should be dedicated to them in this situation we show that the associated cooperative game has a non empty core afterwards we concentrate on a dynamic situation where several model cost parameters and the retailers dedicated stock levels can change we investigate how the profit division might be affected by these changes we focus on four monotonicity properties we identify several classes of games with retailers where some of the monotonicity properties hold moreover we show that pairs of cooperative games associated with newsvendor situations do not necessarily satisfy these properties in general when changes in dedicated stock levels are in concern

pooling of spare parts between multiple users how to share the benefits companies that maintain capital goods e g airplanes or power plants often face high costs both for holding spare parts and due to downtime of their technical systems these costs can be reduced by pooling common spare parts between multiple companies in the same region but managers may be unsure about how to share the resulting costs or benefits in a fair way that avoids free riders to tackle this problem we study several players each facing a poisson demand process for an expensive low usage item they share a stock point that is controlled by a continuous review base stock policy with full backordering under an optimal base stock level costs consist of penalty costs for backorders and holding costs for on hand stock we propose to allocate the total costs proportional to players demand rates our key result is that this cost allocation rule satisfies many appealing properties it makes all separate participants and subgroups of participants better off it stimulates growth of the pool it can be easily implemented in practice and it induces players to reveal their private information truthfully to obtain these game theoretical results we exploit novel structural properties of the cost function in our s 1 s inventory model

capacity allocation and scheduling in supply chains we consider a multiple product supply chain where a manufacturer receives orders from several distributors if the orders cannot all be met from available production capacity then the manufacturer allocates that capacity and a set of resubmittable orders among the distributors the distributors may share their allocated capacity among themselves before submitting revised orders finally the manufacturer schedules the revised orders to minimize its cost we consider three practical coordination issues first we estimate the benefit to the manufacturer from considering scheduling costs and constraints in making capacity and order allocation decisions second we estimate the additional profit that the distributors achieve when they share their allocated capacity third we estimate the value of coordination between the manufacturer and the distributors our work is among the first to consider all three issues simultaneously we model scheduling costs and constraints within the manufacturer s capacity allocation problem we model the distributors capacity sharing problem as a cooperative game that has properties that are unique within cooperative game theory finally we develop optimal algorithms for all the models defined by the three coordination issues our exact evaluation of decisions about the appropriate coordination level improves managers ability to make those decisions

removing distortions in the u s ethanol market what does it imply for the united states and brazil we analyze the impact of trade liberalization and removal of the federal tax credit in the united states on ethanol markets using a multimarket international ethanol model we find that u s trade barriers have been effective in protecting the ethanol industry under current policy there is separability of the u s ethanol market from world markets with trade liberalization the ethanol market deepens making it less susceptible to price volatility the effect of trade liberalization extends beyond ethanol markets affecting agricultural markets the results show that the impact of removal of the tax credit overrides the impact of the tariff removal copyright 2008 oxford university press

the new competition for land food energy and climate change abstract the paper addresses the new competition for land arising from growing and changing demand for food when combined with increasing global demand for transport energy under conditions of declining petro chemical resources and the urgent need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions the paper starts from the premise of a food energy and environment trilemma tilman et al 2009 where all demands to expand the area of cultivated land present high risks of increasing the carbon footprint of agriculture having reviewed the main drivers of demand for food and for liquid transport fuels the paper weighs the controversies surrounding biofuels arising from food price spikes the demand for land and consequent direct and indirect land use change it suggests that we need a more complex and geographically differentiated analysis of the interactions between direct and indirect land use change the paper then reviews evidence of land availability and suggests that in addition to technical availability in terms of soil water and climate political social and technological factors have significantly shaped the competition for land in different global regions particularly the three major biofuel producing ones of the usa brazil and europe this point is further developed by reviewing the different innovation pathways for biofuels in these three regions the main conclusion of this review is firstly that any analysis requires an integrated approach to the food energy environment trilemma and secondly that strategic political direction of innovation and sustainability regulation are required to bring about major shifts in agriculture leading to sustainable intensification of cultivation royal society 2009 rather than the continued expansion of cultivated area the consequent perspective is one of considerable global variety in technologies agricultural productive systems and use of natural resources this contrasts sharply with the world of a dominant global and integrated technology platform based on petro chemicals to which we have become accustomed

the euro changeover and its effects on price transparency and inflation despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have no effect on prices european consumers perceived the opposite to shed some light on this puzzle we develop a model of imperfect information in which cheaper goods experience higher price growth after the changeover retailers aware of consumers difficulties in adopting the new currency use currency changeovers to increase profits by increasing prices the lower the price transparency after the changeover the higher the euro related inflation using data on inflation eurostat and price levels economist intelligence unit we show that although the euro changeover did not significantly increase inflation it nevertheless had a distortionary effect on prices after the changeover cheaper goods had higher inflation and this effect was stronger in countries in which people found dealing with the new currency problematic

large newsvendor games we consider a game called newsvendor game where several retailers who face a random demand can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers a game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit we consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors we prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game and we show that in a game with a continuum of players under a nonatomic condition on the demand the core is a singleton for a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases

benefit sharing in holding situations a situation is studied where one agent has available an amount of storage facility and the other agents have some goods part of which can be stored generating benefits the problem of sharing the benefits produced by full cooperation between agents is tackled in this paper by introducing a related cooperative game this game turns out to be a big boss game with interesting theoretical properties a solution concept relying on optimal storage plans and associated holding prices is also introduced and its relationship with the core of the above holding game is explored in detail the family of monotonic decreasing bijective mappings defined on the set of non negative real numbers plays an important role in our approach

a three person game theory model arising in stochastic inventory control theory abstract in this paper we build a game theory model for a single period inventory problem where each of three retailers tries to determine his optimal order quantity their products are substitutable and have random demands therefore multiple direction demand transfers occur when one or more retailers are sold out it is shown that by using nash equilibrium optimal decision exists for each retailer when they work independently the optimal order quantity in this case is larger than that under the newsboy problem model this is because substitution can be a source of sales and hence a justification for inventory in situations where some retailer may act irrationally to inflict a damage on the others the defensive strategy for the latter is to totally ignore the existence of the irrational player we also study the cooperation of retailers by switching excess inventory to those who have excess demand both when side payments are and are not allowed if side payments are not allowed secure nash strategies always exist for each retailer and cooperation will reduce inventory the latter is especially true when the depreciation of value of the item and or inventory carrying cost are large we give conditions for cooperation in both cases and show that although all player cooperation is often feasible it may not always be obtainable even if side payments are allowed

biofuels and the poor global impact pathways of biofuels on agricultural markets this study seeks to assess the future impacts of biofuel production on regional agricultural and related sectors over the next decade with a specific focus on the vulnerable regions of developing nations using a modification of the gtap modeling platform to account for the global interactions of regional biofuel and food markets the analysis shows that biofuel production levels depend on the assumption about the future price of energy and the nature of the substitutability between biofuels and petroleum based transport fuels low energy prices reduce the demand for biofuels and thus require greater government support to meet the desired production targets at the other extreme when prices are high and there is scope for substituting biofuels for petroleum based fuels the volume of biofuels produced will exceed the mandates even when biofuels are being mainly produced in developed countries our results indicate that there are impact pathways that extend far beyond the borders of the us brazil and the eu prices of feedstock and non feedstock commodities rise in developing countries there is also a rise in value added from the agricultural sector a gain that is enjoyed by the owners of land and labor including unskilled hence to the extent that agriculture is a key sector in getting growth started and addressing poverty needs the emergence of biofuels can in this way at least be a positive force

nitrogen land substitution in corn production a reconciliation of aggregate and firm level evidence in this paper we seek to reconcile low farm level substitution elasticity between nitrogen fertilizer and land with larger industry level values for the corn sector this is accomplished with a micro simulation model which identifies twenty three heterogeneous groups of corn farmers based on survey data for indiana after controlling for soil quality slope crop rotation and natural nitrogen sources considerable variation in fertilizer application rates remains model simulations indicate that the estimated substitution elasticity at the state level 1 15 is consistent with very low farm level substitutability the difference is attributable to compositional changes in the wake of relative price shocks these compositional effects are potentially very important but they are ignored in most policy analyses

modeling cooperation on a class of distribution problems in this paper we study models of cooperation between the nodes of a network that represents a distribution problem the distribution problem we propose arises when over a graph a group of nodes offers certain commodity some other nodes require it and a third group of nodes neither need this material nor offer it but they are strategically relevant to the distribution plan the delivery of one unit of material to a demand node generates a fixed profit and the shipping of the material through the arcs has an associated cost we show that in such a framework cooperation is beneficial for the different parties we prove that the cooperative situation arising from this distribution problem is totally balanced by finding a set of stable allocations in the core of an associated cooperative game in order to overcome certain fairness problems of these solutions we introduce two new solution concepts and study their properties

investment under uncertainty and dynamic adjustment in the finnish pork industry bykyosti s pietola and robert j myersmay 1998paper prepared for a selected paper session at the annual meeting of the american agriculturaleconomics association salt lake city utah august 1998 this research was financed jointly byagricultural economics research institute in finland the academy of finland and the finnishcultural foundation we also knowledge the michigan agricultural experiment station for itssupport of this research authors are agricultural economist agricultural economics research institute helsinki finland and associate professor department of agricultural economics michigan state university eastlansing copyright 1998 by kyosti s pietola and robert j myers all rights reserved readers may makeverbatim copies of this document for non commercial purposes by any means provided that thiscopyright notice appears on all such copies

on the cooperation of recycling operations abstract this paper addresses two important issues that may affect the operations efficiency in the recycling industry first the industry contains many small scale and inefficient recycling firms especially in developing countries second the output from recycling a waste product often yields multiple recycled products that cannot all be sold efficiently by a single firm to address these two issues this paper examines how different firms can cooperate in their recycling and pricing decisions using cooperative game theory recycling operations under both joint and individual productions with different cost structures are considered decisions include the quantity of waste product to recycle and the price at which to sell each recycled product on each firm s market these decisions can be made jointly by multiple cooperating firms to maximize total profit we design allocation schemes for maximized total profit to encourage cooperation among all firms managerial insights are provided from both environmental and economic perspectives

impact of increasing liquid biofuel usage on eu and uk agriculture the biofuels industry in both the uk and the eu as a whole has expanded significantly in recent years in response to various eu biofuel policy initiatives further expansion of biofuel demand will increase the impact of the biofuels sector on agricultural markets this paper examines the impact that increasing levels of first generation biofuel demand to 10 of total transport fuel use in the uk and other eu member states would have on agricultural markets within the eu and specifically the uk using a partial equilibrium modelling system increasing overall biodiesel demand raises demand for vegetable oil and oilseed and in turn their prices the increased grain demand in response to the increased bioethanol demand is mostly sourced from changes in eu net trade

the indirect land use impacts of united states biofuel policies the importance of acreage yield and bilateral trade responses recent work has highlighted agricultural land conversion as a significant debit in the greenhouse gas accounting of ethanol as an alternative fuel this work has at the same time sparked considerable debate on the role of crop yield growth as a means of avoiding rapid land conversion we examine the agricultural land use impacts of mandate driven ethanol demand increases in the united states in a formal economic equilibrium framework which allows us to examine the importance of yield price relationships we find that the standard assumption of trend yield growth is likely restrictive for analysis of equilibrium response to significant demand increases for fuel feedstocks furthermore we identify both the acreage response and bilateral trade specification of a multi country model as important sources of variability in terms of parametric uncertainty in predicting global land use change from the biofuels boom

population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility abstract an allocation scheme for a cooperative game specifies how to allocate the worth of every coalition it is population monotonic if each player s payoff increases as the coalition to which he belongs grows larger we show that essentially a game has a population monotonic allocation scheme pmas if and only if it is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto control a dual characterization is also provided sufficient conditions for the existence of a pmas include convexity and increasing average marginal contributions if the game is convex its extended shapley value is a pmas classification number 026

oligarchic versus democratic societies this paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes an oligarchic society where political power is in the hands of major producers protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs democracy where political power is more widely diffused imposes redistributive taxes on producers but tends to avoid entry barriers when taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time the typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies an oligarchic society may first become richer but later fall behind a similar democratic society i also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies how within elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place jel p16 o10

handbook of game theory with economic applications volume 3 this is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in game theory and its applications to many and varied fields in particular to economics the chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area the applications include empirical evidence the following topics are covered communication and correlated equilibria coalitional games and coalition structures utility and subjective probability common knowledge bargaining zero sum games differential games and applications of game theory to signalling moral hazard search evolutionary biology international relations voting procedures social choice public economics politics and cost allocation this handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics political science psychology mathematics and biology handbook of game theory with economic applications vol i

sell the plant the impact of contract manufacturing on innovation capacity and profitability in the electronics industry and others original equipment manufacturers oems are selling their production facilities to contract manufacturers cms the cms achieve high capacity utilization through pooling supplying many different oems meanwhile the oems focus on innovation research and development product design and marketing we examine how this change in industry structure affects investment in innovation and capacity and thus profitability in particular innovation is noncontractible so oems will invest less in innovation than is ideal for the industry as a whole hence although contract manufacturing improves capacity utilization it may reduce the profitability of the industry as a whole by weakening the incentives for innovation contract manufacturing is not the only means to achieve capacity pooling alternatively the oems can pool capacity with one another through supply contracts or a joint venture this may result in underinvestment or overinvestment in innovation and capacity but always increases profitability we find that the sale of production facilities to a cm improves profitability for the industry as a whole if and only if oems are subsequently in a strong bargaining position vis a vis the cm if the oems are indeed very strong the gain from pooling capacity via contract manufacturing is maximized in industries with moderate cost of capacity

cooperation between multiple news vendors with transshipments we study a situation with n retailers each of them facing a news vendor problem i e selling to customers over a finite period of time product with a short life cycle such as fashion groups of retailers might improve their expected joint profit by coordinating their orders followed by transshipments after demand realization is known we analyze these situations by defining a cooperative game called a general news vendor game for such a situation with n retailers we concentrate on whether it makes sense to cooperate by studying properties of general news vendor games our main result states that general news vendor games have non empty cores

productivity growth in world agriculture sources and constraints during the last half century advances in crop production came from expansion in areas irrigated from more intensive application of fertilizers and crop protection chemicals and from crop varieties that were more responsive to technical inputs and management advances in animal production came from genetic improvements and advances in animal nutrition differences among developed and developing countries in output per hectare and per worker have widened if these gaps are to be narrowed agricultural research capacity in developing countries will have to be substantially strengthened

land use change impacts of biofuels near var evidence from the us abstract the present paper studies the land use change impacts of fuels and biofuels we test the theoretical hypothesis which says that changes in fuel prices cause changes in land use both directly and indirectly and that because of price inter dependencies biofuels reinforce the land use change impacts we apply time series analytical mechanisms to five major traded agricultural commodities the cultivated area of agricultural land and crude oil price our data consists of yearly observations extending from 1950 to 2007 for the us the empirical findings confirm that markets for crude oil and cultivated agricultural land are interdependent an increase in oil price by 1 dollar barrel increases land use between 54 000 and 68 000 ha we also find that the increase of bioenergy sector accelerates land use change in the us i e food commodities are being substituted for bioenergy crops

controlling stock externalities flexible versus inflexible pigovian corrections abstract this paper examines the use of inflexible pigovian taxes subsidies to correct a stock externality an optimal control framework is first used to characterize the first best path for a pigovian correction that varies continuously this first best path is then contrasted with inflexible second best paths in which the level of the correction can be set only once or twice the optimal timing of a fixed one time correction is also studied a deferment of this correction is desirable when the initial state of the environmental stock is less deteriorated than the first best steady state or the adjustment costs are sufficiently great

production inventory games a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games in this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production inventory problems several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed each agent has its own unit production inventory holding and backlogging cost cooperation among agents is given by sharing production processes and warehouse facilities agents in a coalition produce with the cheapest production cost and store with the cheapest inventory cost we prove that the resulting cooperative game is totally balanced and the owen set reduces to a singleton the owen point based on this type of allocation we find a population monotonic allocation scheme for this class of games finally we point out the relationship of the owen point with other well known allocation rules such as the nucleolus and the shapley value

stock externalities pigovian taxation and dynamic stability abstract stock externalities represent a type of consumption externality in which individual consumption of a particular good leads to production of a public bad such as in the arms race and in the greenhouse effect certain of these stock externalities can be regulated by pigovian taxation of the good that produces the externality for others however depending on an ordinal property of preferences the equilibrium becomes dynamically unstable so it is necessary to use direct regulation to support an optimal equilibrium

adverse selection and entrepreneurship in a model of development this paper presents a theory in which talented entrepreneurs are identified as the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation entrepreneurial skills are private information which prevents full risk sharing development into a modern industrial economy might fail to take place since potentially talented entrepreneurs may refrain from taking on the entrepreneurial risks as a way to avoid income shocks an interesting feature of the model is the fact that the informational asymmetries are endogenous to the process of development as they are related to the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills required in the manufacturing activities

shipment consolidation who pays for it and how much this paper examines the subject of cost allocation in a multiple product inventory system allowing for consolidation of shipments if we order multiple items using an economic order quantity eoq policy and consolidate shipments part of the ordering cost is shared and part is specific to each item we want to find the consolidation choice with optimal total cost and divide the cost fairly among the individual items such a fair division is central to a costing system in which no group of items subsidizes the others there are no free riders we use a cooperative inventory game to determine when this can be done this game is usually not concave so we want to know what consolidation combinations determine when this cost can be fairly divided using the core of the game we prove that consolidation of all the items is cheaper exactly if there are fair cost allocations core of the game is not empty which happens when the portion of the ordering cost common to all items is not too small we further show how sensitive the nonempty core result is to adjustments in the cost parameters and show how to determine a threshold value for the shared ordering cost which assures the existence of a fair cost allocation

implications of breach remedy and renegotiation design for innovation and capacity amanufacturer writes supply contracts with n buyers then the buyers invest in innovation and the manufacturer builds capacity finally demand is realized and the firms renegotiate the supply contracts to achieve an efficient allocation of capacity among the buyers the court remedy for breach of contract specific performance versus expectation damages affects how the firms share the gain from renegotiation and hence how the firms make investments ex ante the firms may also engage in renegotiation design inserting simple clauses into the supply contract to shape the outcome of renegotiation for example when a buyer grants a financial hostage to the manufacturer or is charged a per diem penalty for delay in bargaining the manufacturer captures the gain from renegotiation tradable options which grant buyers the right to trade capacity without intervention from the manufacturer return the gain from renegotiation to the buyers this paper proves that under surprisingly general conditions the firms can coordinate their investments with the simplest of supply contracts fixed quantity contracts this may require renegotiation design and certainly requires that the firms understand the breach remedy and set their contract parameters accordingly

land allocation effects of the global ethanol surge predictions from the international fapri model we quantify the emergence of biofuel markets and its impact on world agriculture using the multimarket multicommodity international fapri model the model incorporates trade offs between biofuel feed and food production and consumption and international feedback effects of the emergence through world prices and trade we shock the model with exogenous changes in ethanol demand first in the united states then in brazil and other countries and compute shock multipliers for land allocation decisions for important crops and countries the brazilian ethanol expansion using sugarcane has fewer consequences on existing arable land allocation than the u s ethanol expansion does using corn feedstock

a cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts quantity discounts offered by a monopolist are considered in the context of a bargaining problem in which the buyer and the seller negotiate over the order quantity and the average unit price all units and incremental quantity discounts that permit transaction at a negotiated outcome are described the effects of risk sensitivity and bargaining power on quantity discounts are discussed for alternative bargaining models

the welfare economics of a biofuel tax credit and the interaction effects with price contingent farm subsidies a framework is developed to analyze the effects of a biofuel consumer tax exemption and the interaction effects with a price contingent farm subsidy ethanol prices rise above the gasoline price by the amount of the tax credit corn farmers gain directly while gasoline consumers only gain from any reduction in world oil prices due to the extra ethanol production domestic oil producers lose historically the intercept of the ethanol supply curve is above the gasoline price hence part of the tax credit is redundant and represents rectangular deadweight costs that dwarf triangular deadweight cost measures of traditional farm subsidies copyright 2007 oxford university press

motives behind purchasing consortia abstract although purchasing cooperation between independent companies has been practiced for a long time the phenomenon is not extensively researched especially purchasing consortiums formed by industrial companies have received relatively little attention in literature of the discipline in this paper the key results of the larger study concerning industrial consortium purchasing are presented the study was recently conducted and tested in finnish machine manufacturing industry the objective of this paper is to find out the motives behind purchasing consortia as foundations for the empirical study three theories explaining why companies form purchasing consortia are presented the results of the study indicate that two main reasons for the companies to cooperate on purchasing are the expected cost savings and the collection of information on supply markets

inventory games with permissible delay in payments abstract meca et al 2004 studied a class of inventory games which arise when a group of retailers who observe demand for a common item decide to cooperate and make joint orders with the eoq policy in this paper we extend their model to the situation where retailer s delay in payments is permitted by the supplier we introduce the corresponding inventory game with permissible delay in payments and prove that its core is nonempty then a core allocation rule is proposed which can be reached through population monotonic allocation scheme under this allocation rule the grand coalition is shown to be stable from a farsighted point of view

supply chain coordination perspectives empirical studies and research directions supply chains sc are generally complex and are characterized by numerous activities spread over multiple functions and organizations which pose interesting challenges for effective sc coordination to meet these challenges sc members must work towards a unified system and coordinate with each other a systematic literature review is presented in this paper to throw light on the importance of sc coordination the objectives of this paper are to report and review various perspectives on sc coordination issues understand and appreciate various mechanisms available for coordination and identify the gaps existing in the literature a framework is suggested indicating scope for further research

computing core allocations in cooperative games with an application to cooperative procurement abstract cooperative game theory defines several concepts for distributing outcome shares in a cooperative game with transferable utilities one of the most famous solution concepts is the core which defines a set of outcome allocations that are stable such that no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition in this paper we propose a general procedure to compute a core element or to detect that no core allocation exists which is based on mathematical programming techniques the procedure proposed in this paper can be applied to a wide class of cooperative games where the characteristic function is given by the optimum objective function value of a complex optimization problem for cooperative procurement which is an example from the field of supply chain management where some literature on the core concept already exists we prove the applicability and provide computational results to demonstrate that games with 150 players can be handled

dynamic version of the economic lot size model this article originally appeared in management science october 1958 volume 5 number 1 pp 89 96 published by the institute of management sciences a forward algorithm for a solution to the following dynamic version of the economic lot size model is given allowing the possibility of demands for a single item inventory holding charges and setup costs to vary over n periods we desire a minimum total cost inventory management scheme which satisfies known demand in every period disjoint planning horizons are shown to be possible which eliminate the necessity of having data for the full n periods

alleviating soil erosion pollution stock externalities alternative roles for government abstract this paper addresses two temporal externalities due to agriculture soil erosion and related pollution the possibility of decentralization of decisions the appropriate role of a resource manager and the efficiency of alternative policies are examined using traditional welfare economics concepts for a two sector model of rural urban linkage three alternative types of policies can be socially efficient but imply different involvement by government and have different knowledge requirements a pigouvian policy requires full information a bargaining solution involves government only in setting an entitlement but it may require too much knowledge by rural households in terms of understanding dynamic environmental relationships a third way is that government and rural households be co producers of environmental goods this concept assigns government the responsibility for maintaining knowledge about environmental relationships and government is a participant in a market system that determines prices for environmental related goods

setting the right incentives for global planning and operations we study incentive issues seen in a firm performing global planning and manufacturing and local demand management the stochastic demands in local markets are best observed by the regional business units and the firm relies on the business units forecasts for planning of global manufacturing operations we propose a class of performance evaluation schemes that induce the business units to reveal their private demand information truthfully by turning the business units demand revelation game into a potential game with truth telling being a potential maximizer an appealing refinement of nash equilibrium moreover these cooperative performance evaluation schemes satisfy several essential fairness notions after analyzing the characteristics of several performance evaluation schemes in this class we extend our analysis to include the impact of effort on demand

food vs fuel the effect of biofuel policies the rise in food commodity prices since 2004 which reached record highs in 2008 has coincided with the tripling of corn ethanol production from 15 billion liters bl to 50 bl over the 2004 2010 period this has spurred the food vs fuel debate and raised questions about the extent to which biofuels have contributed to the increase in food crop prices estimates of the impact of observed levels of biofuel production differ widely across studies and lie between 20 and 60 hochman et al 2011 biofuel production in the united states us has surged as a result of government policies like the renewable fuel standard rfs volumetric ethanol excise tax credit veetc for blenders of ethanol and tariffs that restrict the imports of sugarcane ethanol the rfs authorized by the energy independence and security act eisa of 2007 has set ambitious targets of increasing biofuel production sixfold to 136 bl by 2022 with over 60 of it to be met by advanced biofuels produced using non corn starch based feedstocks a 0 12 liter veetc is provided to blenders of ethanol to reduce their costs of meeting the rfs while a tariff of 0 14 liter and an ad valorem tariff of 2 5 were enacted to prevent transfer of the tax credit to ethanol producers in brazil the current veetc and import tariff expired in 2011 with increasing federal debt and concerns about the impact of these policies on food and feed prices political support for the

transshipment of inventories among retailers myopic vs farsighted stability the author considers a model of a decentralized distribution system consisting of n retailers selling an identical product retailers face a stochastic demand and must order their initial inventory before this demand is realized after demand realization retailers decide how much of their unsold inventory or unsatisfied demand they want to share with other retailers this is followed by a transshipment of leftover inventories and distribution of the additional profit generated through inventory sharing the author addresses the following issue suppose that the retailers distribute the profit from inventory sharing according to an allocation rule that induces retailers to share their residuals in a way that maximizes the additional profit such as the shapley value but may not belong to the core is it likely that in this framework all retailers will jointly share their residuals and not form subcoalitions previous research has looked at this problem from a myopic viewpoint and concluded that the grand coalition is not stable unlike the prior work the author looks at stability in a farsighted sense that is retailers do not consider only their immediate payoffs but are also concerned with reactions of other retailers to their actions in a symmetric setting with identical additional unit revenues from transshipments generated by all retailers farsighted retailers always maximize their allocations by not defecting from the grand coalition the author also provides conditions when the same is true for nonidentical additional unit revenues