state versus federal environmental regulation in a non cooperative monopoly screening model abstract a multiple principal monopoly screening model is presented in which two regulators act as rivals when setting a menu of contracts composed of a two part pricing scheme and design standard state and federal environmental regulation are modeled we show that the firm prefers federal environmental regulation because the design standards are more stringent this preference for stricter control occurs because higher standards generate higher information rents for the firm

environmental negotiation its potential and its economic efficiency negotiation is increasingly viewed as a desirable alternative to courtroom conflict between industrialists and environmentalists the court battle is often costly time consuming uncertain and all or nothing negotiation promises a cheaper quicker mutually acceptable outcome this paper examines the conditions under which there is scope for a negotiated compromise and it examines the conditions under which a negotiated compromise is economically efficient its principal result is a warning there is no reason to expect that environmental negotiation conducted under threat of court battle will produce a socially desirable outcome

tax adjusted discount rates this paper develops models for discount rates that are adjusted for the interest tax shields of an infra marginal firm in a general tax equilibrium where there is cross sectional variation in corporate tax rates under the assumption that the firm optimally maintains a predetermined debt ratio a tax adjusted riskless discount rate model is given for valuing certainty equivalents and a tax and risk adjusted discount rate model is given for valuing expected cash flows for the latter case the asset equity debt and tax shield betas are derived and a weighted average cost of capital interpretation is given the tax adjusted capm apt security market lines for expected returns in stock and bond markets both have the same slope but different intercepts a formula is also provided for the present value of the interest tax shield when the firm optimally maintains a predetermined debt level the analysis here also differs from the existing literature in the following respects it allows for cross sectional variation in corporate tax rates and personal tax rates it shows that the market values of risky and riskless interest tax shields differ only to the extent that tax laws provide for nonlinear taxation of gains and losses it also shows that interest tax shields should be discounted at a tax adjusted discount rate that reflects the fact that they accrue to equity investors rather than debt investors continuous time simplifications of the formulas in this paper and the previous literature are also given

inflation and reputation in many macroeconomic models with rational expectations optimal policy is time inconsistent and therefore announced policy may not be credible this paper models the government s credibility explicitly using kreps and wilson s analysis time consistent optimal government policy emerges as a sequential equilibrium in a repeated game this policy is at least as good as the inconsistent optimal policy and dominates the consistent policy when reputational effects are ignored thus the analysis resolves the problem of specifying a credible optimal policy in such models the results show why attempts to disinflate may lead to recession even with perfectly flexible prices this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

interest rate uncertainty and the optimal debt maturity structure as demonstrated by boyce and kalotay 1979 and brick and ravid 1985 the use of long term debt may be preferred because of tax related advantages brick and ravid show that if there exists a tax advantage to debt and nonstochastic interest rates long term debt will increase the present value of the tax benefits of debt if the term structure of interest rates adjusted for risk of default is increasing a decreasing term structure on the other hand calls for short term debt the present paper extends the tax induced argument of brick and ravid to allow for the presence of stochastic interest rates once interest rates are uncertain pricing even under risk neutrality becomes a complex issue we analyze the debt maturity decision under two competing pricing equations the return to maturity expectations hypothesis and the local expectations hypothesis this terminology is used in cox ingersoll and ross 1981 and campbell 1986 under uncertainty a debt capacity factor will create an additional incentive to issue long term debt our other results may be interpreted to indicate that if the term premium the difference between the implied forward interest rate and the future expected spot rate is positive sufficiently negative then long term short term debt maturity strategy is optimal

the irrelevance of capital structure for the impact of inflation on investment studies concerning the effect of inflation on firms investment decisions suggest that the form of financing is relevant in assessing the effect of inflation on investment this paper demonstrates that when the equilibrium relationship between market rates of return on bonds and stocks is considered the effect of inflation on investment is independent of the capital structure the paper also shows that when the fisher effect is assumed to hold the cut off rate of return on investment declines with anticipated inflation independently of the financing however if the real interest rate rises with inflation inflation may increase the cut off rate corporate investment decisions are affected by inflation because the tax code does not provide perfect adjustments for inflation real tax payments may vary with the inflation rate even if fully anticipated inflation does not affect other pre tax real flows three such effects have been commonly discussed in the literature first the real tax shield on depreciation decreases with inflation because depreciation allowances for tax purposes are based on historical costs rather than on current nominal values this depreciation effect causes the pretax required real rate of return on investments to rise with the rate of inflation second the real tax subsidy on interest deductions increases with inflation because firms are allowed to deduct interest expenses at nominal rates rather than at real rates if the interest rate does not rise with inflation sufficiently to offset the increased tax shelter the cut off rate of return tends to decrease with inflation this effect is termed in this paper the interest effect the third effect the capital gains effect may occur when inflation induced nominal capital gains on assets are subject to capital gains tax however since firms do not pay capital gains tax unless the asset is sold these tax payments are deferred the present value of these payments is presumed to be small and therefore the

corporate control and the choice of investment financing the case of corporate acquisitions we test the proposition that corporate control considerations motivate the means of investment financing cash and debt or stock corporate insiders who value control will prefer financing investments by cash or debt rather than by issuing new stock which dilutes their holdings and increases the risk of losing control our empirical results support this hypothesis in corporate acquisitions the larger the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm the more likely the use of cash financing also the previously observed negative bidders abnormal returns associated with stock financing are mainly in acquisitions made by firms with low managerial ownership do firms have systematic preferences for the means of financing investments in modigliani and miller s 1958 m m s perfect market no tax world the means by which investments are financed are irrelevant for the total value of the firm miller 1977 extended this irrelevance proposition to a case where taxes exist however casual observation suggests that firms are not indifferent to the means of financing for example many firms prefer to finance investments from internal sources or by debt rather than by issuing new equity an explanation for such systematic financing preferences and the consequent capital structure of firms is therefore called for indeed a number of such explanations have been advanced for example deangelo and masulis 1980 showed that in miller s 1977 framework the means of financing is not irrelevant if firms have different expected marginal effective tax rates due to differences in fixed charges it has also been argued that financing preferences may result from agency costs associated with debt e g barnea haugen and senbet 1981 or from asymmetry of information between managers and outside investors myers and majluf 1984 recently harris and raviv 1988 and stulz 1988 advanced a new argument for the existence of financing preferences that centers around managers incentive to maintain control over the corporation specifically by increasing debt and using the proceeds to retire equity held by the public owners managers increase the probability of maintaining control and reaping the benefits associated with it since the substitution of debt for outsiders equity decreases the fraction of

toward a theoretical model of voluntary overcompliance abstract we explain why some firms voluntarily overcomply with environmental regulation in our model all consumers value environmental quality but differ in their willingness to pay which depends on their income levels publicly available information on environmental performance of firms enables consumers to identify clean firms firms participate in a two stage duopoly game where they first choose their levels of cleaning technology and next engage in price competition the market gets segmented by income levels a minimum standard binding on the dirty firm has the effect of improving the performance of the cleaner firm a subsidy obtains the same competitive outcome

the social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government abstract regulatory agencies charged with public health and safety typically promulgate uniform regulatory standards which suggests the agencies are concerned mainly to reduce harmful externalities with little concern for firms costs a focus on benefits to the exclusion of costs in standard setting and enforcement leads to inefficiencies we show that even when the legislature cannot peg the budget to a specific enforcement policy it can reduce the distortions by limiting the enforcement agency s budget and by permitting the agency to partially self finance from rebates of noncompliance fines

implications of corporate capital structure theory for banking institutions the determination of an optimal capital structure for commercial banks has stimulated discussion and controversy among scholars bankers and regulators for many years while numerous studies e g 5 16 18 19 21 24 have explored this issue the underlying question remains unresolved at the same time the issue of optimal capital structure has seen a resurgence of interest in the corporate finance literature in recent years the effects on corporate capital structure of the tax system 15 agency costs 10 23 and bankruptcy costs 9 as well as the combined effects of these factors 2 6 have all come under scrutiny although several previous papers e g 3 5 8 24 have argued that banks are susceptible to corporate capital structure theory to our knowledge the full range of recent developments in this theory has not been brought to bear on the bank capital decision the purpose of this paper then is to draw implications from this theory for the determinants of bank capital structure over time and across banks of different size in section 1 below we briefly review recent work in corporate finance theory on the capital structure effects of taxes and agency costs in section 2 we discuss the effects of the interaction between the tax system and the production function for financial services on commercial bank capital structures in section 3 we analyze the nature of bankruptcy and agency costs in banking and their potential influence on bank capital finally in section 4 we summarize and draw conclusions from our analysis

international pollution control cooperative versus noncooperative strategies abstract international pollution control involving two neighboring countries is modeled as a simple two player dynamic game each country produces a good that is consumed by domestic households production of each consumption good results in emissions of pollutants households in each country derive utility from the consumption of the domestically produced good but incur costs through the total stock of pollution stock externality in this setting we characterize cooperative as well as noncooperative pollution control strategies of the governments of the two countries that maximize the discounted stream of net benefits of a representative consumer it turns out that when the governments are restricted to use linear strategies noncooperative behavior results in overall losses for both countries if on the contrary governments use nonlinear markov perfect strategies and the discount rate is small enough a pareto efficient steady state pollution stock can be supported as a differentiable subgame perfect equilibrium thus the emergence of first best solutions cooperative outcomes does not require any institutional arrangements threats retaliation etc but can be brought about through the use of nonlinear markov perfect equilibrium strategies

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice abstract this paper extends the economic literature on the incomplete enforcement of social regulation by incorporating regulatory choice in an institutional environment of limited regulatory resources and powers we show how regulatory decisions determine the structure of incentives faced by regulated firms our results indicate that the expense of monitoring relative to the regulator s power to levy penalties helps to explain the differences between compliance and deterrence enforcement styles we find that in most circumstances firms with higher abatement costs will receive a larger share of regulatory resources and thus face higher penalties than firms with lower costs

evidence on the impact of the agency costs of debt on corporate debt policy in the last several years there has been increased theoretical emphasis on the agent principal problem as it applies to corporate finance this paper is an attempt to empirically test for the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy of corporations we find that firms with higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower insider ownership which may be explained by the agency costs of debt and or the agency costs of equity other regression results tend to confirm the theoretically optimal relationships put forth by myers we find that high growth firms use less debt rather than more debt high operating risk firms use more debt rather than less debt and firm size appears to be uncorrelated to the level of debt

optimal environmental regulation under asymmetric information abstract a market model of environmental regulation with interdependent production and pollution abatement costs and heterogeneous firms is developed firms have private information about costs which have a quadratic form firms pursue bayes nash strategies in communication with the regulator the full information optimum cannot be attained unless gains from trade in the product market net of external damages exceed the information rents earned by firms aggregate output and externality levels are lower at the regulated equilibrium than at the full information social optimum

separating the wheat from the chaff a disaggregate analysis of the effects of public spending in the us in this paper we undertake a systematic disaggregate analysis of the effects of government spending on economic activity in the us the level of disaggregation we consider is the highest available and is unprecedented in the empirical literature more specifically public consumption and public investment are decomposed into various subcategories which are measured at the levels of the federal defence and non defence and state and local governments for each subcategory we estimate a structural vector autoregression that identifies public spending shocks through the conditional heteroskedasticity of the structural disturbances thus relaxing the identifying restrictions commonly used in the literature our analysis reveals significant heterogeneity in the effects of public spending shocks on output both across subcategories and government levels shocks to spending on durables and structures are found to have the largest and most persistent effect on aggregate output with a peak multiplier that exceeds 1 our results also suggest that there is little association between the size of a given category of public expenditures and the magnitude of its effect on output resume separer le bon grain de l ivraie une analyse desagregee des effets des depenses publiques aux etats unis dans ce texte on entreprend une analyse desagregee des effets des depenses gouvernementales sur l activite economique aux etats unis le niveau de desagregation considere est le plus grand possible et est sans precedent dans la litterature empirique plus specifiquement la consommation et l investissement publics sont decomposes en diverses sous categories qui sont mesurees pour le gouvernement federal defense et non defense ainsi que pour les gouvernements des etats et locaux pour chaque sous categorie on estime un vecteur autoregressif structurel qui identifie les chocs de depenses publiques a travers l heteroscedastictite conditionnelle des perturbations structurelles pour ainsi rel cher les restrictions d identification communement utilisees dans la litterature l analyse revele une heterogeneite significative dans les effets des chocs de depenses publiques sur la production agregee selon les sous categories et les niveaux de gouvernement les chocs dans les depenses sur les biens durables et les structures tendent a avoir les effets les plus grands et les plus persistants sur la production agregee avec un effet multiplicateur qui excede 1 les resultats suggerent qu il y a peu de rapport entre la taille d une categorie donnee dans les depenses publiques et l ampleur de l effet sur la production agregee

cooperative solution of local externality problems a case of mechanism design applied to irrigation abstract cooperative solutions to ameliorate externalities may be pareto superior compared to noncooperative abatement strategies but such solutions may not be adopted without appropriate institutional mechanisms to achieve cooperative outcomes voluntarily there must be methods of determining cost shares and identifying preferred solutions here the design of a process and a related algorithm are proposed based on concepts of welfare economics and game theory for public goods and externalities simulation of the process for an irrigation externality problem in the central valley of california demonstrates existence of a unanimously preferred solution with improved water quality

an empirical reconciliation of the miller model and the generalized capital structure models abstract this paper uses time series techniques to demonstrate the compatibility of miller s capital structure model miller m h 1977 journal of finance 32 261 276 with generalized capital structure models from 1970 through 1985 the miller model represents a long run equilibrium because deviations from the miller equilibrium revert toward a mean close to zero while transitory shocks to the leverage related costs of debt and bank borrowing costs explain short run deviations from the miller equilibrium the typical levels of leverage related costs of debt and bank borrowing costs over the sample period do not cause deviations from the miller equilibrium

government intervention in production and incentives theory a review of recent contributions national science foundation the commissariat general du plan and the center for energy policy research at m i t

a general equilibrium theory of banks capital structure abstract we develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms the liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a cheaper source of funding than equity in equilibrium banks pass on part of this funding advantage in the form of lower interest rates to firms that borrow from them firms and banks choose their capital structures to balance the benefits of debt financing against the risk of costly default an increase in the equity of a firm makes its debt less risky and that in turn reduces the risk of the banks who lend to the firm hence there is some substitutability between firm and bank equity we find that firms have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against systemic shocks whereas banks have a comparative advantage in providing a buffer against idiosyncratic shocks

overcompliance and voluntary agreements voluntary agreements with industry offer many examplesof overcompliance with respect to environmentalstandards such phenomena seem to be irrational butappear less surprising considering firms strategiesare aimed to internalise environmental quality wemodel the choice of the environmental quality ofproducts in a one shot game between a monopolist andconsumers to show the existence of inefficientequilibria where quality is low because of moralhazard the firm can however change its equilibriumstrategy in a repeated but finite game in order tobuild an environmental reputation if we suppose thatconsumers information is not only imperfect withregard to quality but also incomplete with respect toany environmental constraint that may affect thebehaviour of firms like the threat either of astricter regulation or of potential entry in atwo period model we show the existence of a perfectbayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies where thefirm can revert to the production of green products inorder to influence consumers beliefs and acquire anenvironmentally friendly reputation due to thepeculiarity of environmental information greenproducts are credence goods we claim that anexplicit agreement is also necessary in order toestablish monitoring and controlling procedures toverify the performance of firms these procedures canexplain per se the diffusion of voluntary agreementsthat are nevertheless self enforcing because of thereputation effect

enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted in the united states empirical studies of the enforcement of continuous compliance with environmental regulations especially air and water pollution regulations have repeatedly demonstrated the following i for most sources the frequency of surveillance is quite low ii even when violations are discovered fines or other penalties are rarely assessed in most states iii sources are nonetheless thought to be in compliance a large part of the time the evidence for the apparently low level of enforcement activity is found in a number of case studies of state and local enforcement of air and water quality regulations conducted jointly by the environmental protection agency epa and council on environmental quality ceg together with periodic surveys of implementation of air and water quality legislation conducted by the general accounting office gao these surveys show

a solution to the problem of externalities when agents are well informed the author describes a class of simple two stage mechanisms that implement efficient allocations as subgame perfect equilibria for economic environments involving externalities these mechanisms known as compensation mechanisms solve a wide variety of externalities problems including implementation of lindahl allocations regulation of monopoly and efficient solutions to the prisoner s dilemma copyright 1994 by american economic association

reputation and the control of pollution this paper investigates the effectiveness of reputation in inducing a polluting firm to self regulate its emissions when consumers have imperfect information in particular we ask to what extent must consumers reward and punish the firm before it chooses self regulation as its dominant strategy we find that if payoffs in the stage game are such that both the consumer and the polluting firm have beliefs that are consistent with each others behaviors then the firm has a positive probability of playing clean in each period of a finite game further we find that a weak reward punishment scheme may have an adverse effect on the environment and that there are both environmental and welfare gains associated with strengthening the scheme

information as regulation the effect of community right to know laws on toxic emissions abstract there is growing academic and policy level interest in the use of information as quasi regulatory mechanisms such as toxic release inventory tri and green labels mandatory disclosure requirements have been touted as market based incentives that may affect firm behavior we provide new evidence on the effectiveness of disclosure requirements by examining firm behavior in response to disclosures of tri emissions we find that firms with the largest stock price decline on the day this information became public subsequently reduced emissions more than their industry peers this is consistent with the view that financial markets may provide strong incentives for firms to change their environmental behavior

on the asset substitution problem in their seminal paper modigliani and miller 11 12 demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions furthermore if capital markets are perfect stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm see 6 motivated by this assumption the firm has been viewed as a black box namely as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value however in a growing body of recent literature see 1 2 7 9 13 and 14 researchers recognize that the firm in an imperfect capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can and do conflict jensen and meckling 9 study the roles of three important groups the owner manager the stockholders and the bondholders focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them they provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts

measuring the effects of fiscal policy measuring the effects of discretionary fiscal policy is both difficult and controversial as some explicit or implicit identifying assumptions need to be made to isolate exogenous and unanticipated changes in taxes and government spending studies based on structural vector autoregressions typically achieve identification by restricting the contemporaneous interaction of fiscal and non fiscal variables in a rather arbitrary way in this paper we relax those restrictions and identify fiscal policy shocks by exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity of the structural disturbances we use this methodology to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks in the u s before and after 1979 our results show substantive differences in the economy s response to government spending and tax shocks across the two periods importantly we find that increases in public spending are in general more effective than tax cuts in stimulating economic activity a key contribution of this study is to provide a formal test of the identifying restrictions commonly used in the literature

using stock returns to identify government spending shocks this article explores a new approach to identifying government spending shocks which avoids many of the shortcomings of existing approaches the new approach is to identify government spending shocks with statistical innovations to the accumulated excess returns of large us military contractors this strategy is used to estimate the dynamic responses of output hours consumption and real wages to a government spending shock we find that positive government spending shocks are associated with increases in output hours and consumption real wages initially decline after a government spending shock and then rise after a year we estimate the government spending multiplier associated with increases in military spending to be about 1 5 over a horizon of 5 years

international capital structure equilibrium this paper develops a theory of capital structure in an international setting with corporate and personal taxes we generalize the miller analysis to an international equilibrium characterized by differential international taxation and inflation in otherwise perfect international capital markets our analysis highlights the key role that corporate tax arbitrage plays in generating an international capital structure equilibrium and we set forth a number of mechanisms for tax arbitrage transactions we close the paper by outlining some implications of our analysis for national differences in capital structure the international fisher effect and international tax effects on yield differentials among major questions regarding corporate capital structure which arise in an international setting are how or whether multiple tax jurisdictions and multiple currencies affect firm financing decisions and the international bond market equilibrium we examine some of these questions by way of generalizing miller s 1977 debt and taxes model into an international setting this setting allows for different tax regimes across countries as well as the possibility of differential inflation across currencies with consequent exchange rate movements in the first part of this paper we find that an international miller type equilibrium obtains under differential international taxation with capital market conditions which are otherwise analogous to those required for a domestic miller equilibrium our analysis particularly highlights the role that corporations play in miller s analysis as vehicles for tax arbitrage we show that if corporations engage in international tax arbitrage transactions on an equal footing no optimal capital structure exists for individual firms consequently without further restrictions differences in international tax rates alone are incapable of dictating a particular capital structure for an individual firm in the second part of the paper we extend the analysis to consider differential inflation rates with a consequent exchange rate movement and draw additional implications for the international analog of the miller equilibrium with differential inflation and taxation we begin by showing the existence of the international fisher effect for both equity and bonds although inflation and or exchange rate movements may affect real corporate tax subsidy rates and real

a reexamination of the empirical relationship between investment and financing decisions several studies see 7 15 9 and 16 have attempted to ascertain the empirical relationships that exist between the financing and investment decisions of firms the primary impetus for these efforts was provided by modigliani and miller mm 20 21 when they demonstrated that under the assumption of perfect capital markets the optimal investment decisions of a firm are separable from its financing decisions in the presence of market imperfections interdependencies between these decisions that violate the basic mm propositions may exist therefore the studies referred to above have essentially focused upon determining whether market imperfections have been of sufficient magnitude to lead to joint determination of investment and financing decisions though the original mm propositions were introduced more than two decades ago the nature of the empirical relationship between investment and financing decisions remains a controversial issue the fact that this matter is still unresolved is not attributable to a lack of attention for the original propositions have been examined in the presence of taxes bankruptcy costs and agency costs with no clear consensus emerging

the relative tax benefits of alternative call features in corporate debt this paper examines the differential tax treatment of the borrower and lender at the time debt is called as a potential explanation for the widespread existence of call provisions in corporate debt this tax effect alone cannot explain the standard call feature because greater tax benefits may be derived for bonds callable at market prices the equilibrium implications of the model allowing for tax arbitrage opportunities both at the corporate level and the individual level also are considered

the effects of fiscal shocks on employment and the real wage we study the transmission of fiscal shocks in the labor market we employ a structural var and base identification on the restrictions that shocks to government consumption investment and employment must raise output and deficits these restrictions hold in both prototype real business cycle rbc and new keynesian models shocks to government consumption and investment increase real wages and employment contemporaneously both at state level and in the aggregate the dynamics in response to employment shocks are mixed increases in government employment raise the real wage and total employment in the aggregate however in one third of the states they reduce total employment

the effects of public spending shocks on trade balances and budget deficits in the european union we investigate the consequences of an increase in public spending for trade balances and budget deficits in the european union using a panel var approach whereas the literature tends to treat the trade balance gdp ratio as a single variable we include exports and imports as separate variables this allows us to track in more detail the sources of trade balance movements further we use annual rather than quarterly data this facilitates the interpretation of the shocks and reduces potential anticipation effects of fiscal policy changes however the identification assumptions become stronger and we extensively check their validity according to our baseline estimate a 1 gdp increase in public spending produces a 1 2 on impact with a 1 6 peak rise in gdp rising imports and falling exports are responsible for a fall of the trade balance by 0 5 of gdp on impact and a peak fall of 0 8 in addition the spending increase produces a 0 7 impact and peak budget deficit thereby pointing to the potential relevance of the twin deficits hypothesis for the european union jel e62 h60

the effects of international operations on the market value of the firm theory and evidence this paper investigates the existence of monopoly rents associated with international operations in a market value theoretic framework the benefits of international operations evolve from such factors as 1 imperfections in the product and factor markets 2 differential international taxation and 3 imperfections in the financial markets in this paper these factors are subject to an equilibrium analysis in the context of recent advances in financial theory in particular imperfections in the financial sector arising from corporate international diversification are examined in a framework which allows a supply adjustments by multinational firms and b the interaction of barriers to international capital flows faced by both firms and investors taking the u s capital market and investors as a base we then specify the conditions under which the foregoing imperfections get priced out in an equilibrium these pricing effects cannot be detected empirically through the methodologies employed by the existing studies which examine the effects of corporate international diversification indeed it was an attempt to rescue the limitations of these studies which initially motivated our paper the existing empirical inquiries into this area rely on traditional risk adjusted performance measures e g 7 or international analogs of return generating processes e g 1 8 instead at the empirical level we employ a value based method which is in the same vein of the thomadakis 17 approach developed to identify the monopoly benefits of industrial market structure we conduct the tests over subperiods characterized by differential government controls in an attempt a to separate the pure financial motives for multinationality from other motives and b to detect if the benefits of international operations carry through recent periods

the leasing puzzle prevailing theories in finance and economics suggest that leases and debt are substitutes an increase in one should led to a compensating decrease in the other in particular there are three views on the magnitude of the substitution coefficient standard finance theory treats cash flows from lease obligations as equivalent to debt cash flows thus describing the tradeoff between debt and leases as one to one others are willing to use a tradeoff of leases for debt which is less than but close to one the rationale for a dollar of leases using less of debt capacity than a dollar of debt obligation is based upon the differences in the terms and nature of lease and debt contracts finally there are some who argue that since leased assets may be firm specific the risk of moral hazard may be great resulting in a tradeoff of greater than one to one that is a dollar of a lease obligation uses more of debt capacity than a dollar of a debt obligation a series of empirical tests are performed in this study on samples of approximately 600 firms covering the years 1976 through 1981 with none of the three views supported by the results instead the results indicate that leases and debt are complements greater use of debt is associated with a greater use of leasing this finding reappears consistently for each year each definition of leverage ratios and each approach to analysis this complementary relationship persists even after refinements are made to the estimation technique

asset substitution and the agencycosts of debt financing agency costs of debt have been advanced in the literature as an important consideration foroptimal corporate debt policies recently there have been some doubts concerning the theoretical foundations of the notion that these costs increase as the firm employs more debt in this paper we examine explicitly the incentive for asset substitution by solving endogenously for the optimal risk policy the results support the notion that more debt aggravates shareholders incentives to take risk we also investigate the marginal agency cost function and discuss conditions for interior optimal capital structure

environmental policy under imperfect information incentives and moral hazard abstract when net emissions of individual polluters cannot be efficiently monitored then emissions charges controls on emissions levels or subsidies for emissions reduction are not effective as environmental policy instruments this paper proposes instruments that can be applied in such limited information situations these instruments take the form of contracts between a pollution control agency and individual polluters the contracts include a combination of fines and subsidies that induces dischargers to follow optimal environmental policies in the absence of individual monitoring

efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists abstract we show that there exists a time independent tax rule that guides polluting oligopolists to achieve the socially optimum production path the optimal tax is dependent on the current pollution stock and it may be negative when the pollution stock is low a surprising result is that the optimal tax rule may give firms a subsidy for an initial time interval even though under laissez faire their output always exceeds the socially optimal output this subsidy however induces firms to produce less than they would under laissez faire

tobin s q and financial policy abstract recent research in macroeconomics has emphasized the importance of linking the financial and real sectors and working with optimizing models tobin s q model of investment would appear to provide a framework satisfying these two criteria in contrast to the original presentation of the q model the formal development has not recognized that the firm actively participates in a number of financial markets in this broader context q may be an uninformative and possibly misleading signal for investment expenditures we then endeavor to turn this negative theoretical result to positive advantage in resolving a number of empirical problems with q models

an equilibrium analysis of debt financing under costly tax arbitrage and agency problems in his recent paper merton miller 12 extends the notion of tax induced differential returns on securities into a general equilibrium framework in which firms make adjustments in the supply of corporate debt in an environment of progressive personal taxation the interest rates on taxable corporate bonds are greater than rates on tax exempt securities so as to compensate investors for the associated tax burden on the supply side value maximizing firms have an incentive to issue additional debt so long as the personal tax induced compensation is less than the tax savings from interest payment deductions at the corporate level miller argues that in the final equilibrium the interest rate differential between taxable and tax exempt bonds exactly reflects the tax advantage of debt financing at the corporate level thus the tax subsidy disappears in its entirety and we are back to an environment in which corporate leverage is inconsequential to the value of any particular firm what emerges in equilibrium is merely an optimal debt equity ratio for the corporate sector as a whole 1 miller derives this invariance proposition under the following assumptions 1 progressive personal tax rates reach a maximum at a level beyond the corporate tax rate 2 no tax arbitrage by individuals and firms is allowed 3 there is a personal tax rate differential in favor of income from stocks and 4 the opportunity for riskless borrowing and lending exists 2 indeed miller s equilibrium analysis is based on a zero effective personal tax rate on income from stocks but

loan sales and the cost of bank capital this paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers bank regulation together with competitive deposit and equity financing can give banks an incentive to sell loans but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral hazard problem a solution is given for the optimal design of the bank loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral hazard problem an explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased banks practice of making loans and then selling them to other institutions and individuals has grown in popularity an important example in the development of loan selling has been the increase in banks mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority of the government national mortgage association gnma and then sold to secondary market investors recently however there has been a dramatic rise in the volume of other types of loans being sold especially by money center banks portions of commercial loans originated by these larger banks are being sold to smaller banks foreign banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in addition banks car loans and credit card receivables have also been pooled and sold to institutions and individuals selling loans that were once considered nonmarketable assets a process that has been termed asset securitization may be signalling the start of a fundamental change in the commercial banking business the leading banks in loan selling operations now view themselves more as originators and distributors of loans rather than as institutions holding loans as assets the potentially large impact of loan sales on the future of commercial banking naturally evokes the question of what incentives exist for banks to sell loans in this paper we show that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and

the importance of composition of fiscal policy evidence from different exchange rate regimes abstract we study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies in an open economy we emphasize two transmission mechanisms the cost channel by which wage government spending and labor taxes raise the real wage firms must pay and the exchange rate channel by which the nominal exchange rate shifts induced by fiscal policy have real effects if some prices and wages are sticky the latter channel implies that changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation should have different effects under flexible than under fixed exchange rates in a 1964 93 panel of oecd countries we find significant evidence for both channels moreover we find that the real product wage and profitability are more responsive than quantities employment and output to fiscal policy innovations

what are the effects of fiscal policy shocks we propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions specifically we use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue shock as well as a government spending shock while controlling for a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock we explicitly allow for the possibility of announcement effects i e that a current fiscal policy shock changes fiscal policy variables in the future but not at present we construct the impulse responses to three linear combinations of these fiscal shocks corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit spending deficit financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion we apply the method to us quarterly data from 1955 to 2000 we find that deficit financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve gdp with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total additional gdp per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

trade spill overs of fiscal policy in the european union a panel analysis we explore the international spillovers from fiscal policy shocks via trade in europe a fiscal expansion stimulates domestic activity which leads to more foreign exports and hence higher foreign output to quantify this we combine a panel var model in government spending net taxes and gdp with a panel trade model on average a public spending increase equal to 1 of gdp implies 2 3 more foreign exports over the first two years the corresponding figure for an equal size net tax reduction is 0 6 both estimates are statistically significant as far as the effect on foreign activity is concerned a 1 of gdp spending increase net tax reduction in germany on average raises gdp of trading partners by 0 23 0 06 over the first two years these figures are likely to form lower bounds for the actual effects and suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the benefits from coordinated fiscal expansions contractions in response to european wide cyclical downturns upswings

taxes and capital structure evidence from firms response to the tax reform act of 1986 while the theoretical relation between taxes and capital structure has been extensively analyzed the empirical evidence on this issue has thus far been inconclusive one of the main difficulties confronting previous empirical studies of the cross sectional relationship between taxes and leverage was the control of intervening variables the tax reform act of 1986 tra which drastically changed the tax regime provides a unique opportunity to assess the interaction between taxes and leverage decisions in a controlled environment the authors test the relationship between leverage and certain tax related variables for a large sample of companies in the years surrounding the enactment of tra the results support the tax based theories of capital structure the findings indicate that there exists a substitution effect between debt and nondebt tax shields and that both corporate and personal tax rates affect leverage decisions coauthors are dan givoly aharon r ofer and oded sarig article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

the effect of taxes and depreciation on corporate investment and financial leverage this paper provides an analysis of the effect of corporate and personal taxes on the firm s optimal investment and financing decisions under uncertainty it extends the deangelo aad masulis capital structure model by endogenizing the firm s investment decision the authors results indicate that when investment is allowed to adjust optimally the existing predictions about the relationship between investment related and debt related tax shields must be modified in particular the authors show that increases in investment related tax shields due to changes in the corporate tax code are not necessarily associated with reductions in leverage at the individual firm level in cross sectional analysis firms with higher investment related tax shields normalized by expected earnings need not have lower debt related tax shields normalized by expected earnings unless all firms utilize the same production technology differences in production technologies across firms may thus explain why the empirical results of recent cross sectional studies have not conformed to the predictions of deangelo and masulis

capital tax reform corporate finance and economic growth and welfare abstract recent empirical studies have revealed a strong impact of tax changes on corporate finance yet models of economic growth usually neglect financial structure of the representative firm in order to investigate whether the consideration of firm finance modifies the estimated outcome of capital tax reforms a corporate sector is introduced in three popular models of economic growth the paper explores analytically the impact of taxation on structures of finance and production and gives a quantitative reassessment of growth and welfare effects of tax reforms in the u s economy a general result is that standard models of exogenous and endogenous growth overestimate the growth effect and underestimate the welfare gain from tax reform

the critical implicit tax rate and capital structure in a miller world firms are indifferent between debt and equity when the tax rate that isimplicitly used to price a bond is equal to the statutory corporate tax rate in this paper we derive the implicit tax rate that makes a firm marginally indifferent between debt and equity when debt related tax savings are uncertain we analyze the functional relationship between this critical tax rate and the amount of debt issued by a firm and discuss the implications for a firm s optimal capital structure

on the relevance of debt maturity structure in this paper we present a tax induced framework to analyze debt maturity problems we show that under some modifications of the existing u s tax code debt maturity is irrelevant even in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs that yield an optimal capital structure if this restrictive structure is relaxed and assuming the miller 15 equilibrium does not prevail tax reasons would usually imply the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure if there exists a gain from leverage then an increasing term structure of interest rates adjusted for default risk results in long term debt being optimal a decreasing term structure under similar circumstances renders short term debt optimal in the absence of agency costs a miller 15 type result emerges at equilibrium and irrelevance prevails we also argue that agency costs could again reverse the irrelevance and imply a firm specific optimal debt maturity structure there has been extensive discussion in the literature concerning the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure kraus 13 states without proof that efficient capital markets preclude the existence of an optimal debt maturity stiglitz 20 demonstrates the irrelevance of debt maturity but in an economic environment in which the entire financing decision is irrelevant due to the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs in contrast morris 16 argues that the issuance of short term debt can reduce the risk to stockholders and thereby increase equity value if the covariance between the net operating income and future interest rates is positive this result by morris is obtained even in the absence of taxes and when there is no probability of default the discrepancy between morris and stiglitz arises because morris uses the bogue and roll 31 multiperiod capital asset pricing model to incorporate uncertain future interest rates which implicitly assumes that investors cannot diversify away intertem

explaining differences in corporate capital structure theory and new evidence abstract this paper tests a theory of optimal capital structure based on three simple imperfections i personal and corporate taxes ii bankruptcy related costs and iii transfer of wealth from unprotected creditors in contrast to other empirical tests most of which rely on comparative statics to devise a linear regression we derive a testable equation explicitly from the firm s value maximizing first order condition our cross sectional tests confirm earlier findings by warner 1977 and ang et al 1982 that the fixed explicit costs of bankruptcy are not statistically significant however we find strong explanatory power in the marginal implicit costs of bankruptcy these costs have two components first the data suggest that firms with high fixed asset intensity carry heavier debt loads because of the floor that these assets create for potential bankruptcy costs to be borne by security holders this result explains inter industry differences in debt ratios found by schwartz and aronson 1967 and scott 1972 it also explains some anomalies in recent tests by bradley et al 1984 who find a positive relationship between debt ratios and depreciation when their model predicted a negative relation in our view depreciation acts more asa proxy for fixed asset and less as a proxy for non debt tax shield which bradley et al were analyzing secondly our tests suggest that an unprotected creditor or wealth transfereffect provides additional stimulus to issuance of debt and that this stimulus is stronger than the net tax effect schwartz 1981 finds such distributional explanations to be both economically meaningful and worthy of further empirical research because of its potential for initiating legal reform we modestly claim that our finding in this regard is an important first step in this research and is similar to the wealth transfer effect from bondholders to stockholders studied by masulis 1980 1983

community pressure and clean technology in the informal sector an econometric analysis of the adoption of propane by traditional mexican brickmakers abstract in many developing countries the informal sector comprised of low technology unlicensed micro enterprises is a major source of pollution environmental management in this sector is exceptionally challenging though clean technologies offer a means of mitigating the problem to our knowledge there has been no rigorous empirical research on why informal or even small scale firms do and do not adopt them as a first step toward filling this gap this paper presents the results of an econometric analysis of the diffusion of propane among informal traditional brickmakers in cd juarez mexico a leading source of air pollution owing to their reliance on cheap highly polluting fuels such as used tires and scrap wood the two key policy implications of our analysis are that 1 it is possible to successfully promote the adoption of a clean technology by intensely competitive informal firms even when the new technology significantly raises variable costs and 2 community pressure applied by competing firms and private sector local organizations can generate incentives for adoption

capital structure investment and fire sales we study a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms choose their investment level and capital structure trading off the tax advantages of debt against the risk of costly default bankruptcy costs are endogenous as bankrupt firms are forced to liquidate their assets resulting in a fire sale if the market is illiquid when the corporate income tax rate is positive firms have a unique optimal capital structure in equilibrium firms default with positive probability and their assets are liquidated at fire sale prices the equilibrium features underinvestment and is constrained inefficient in particular there is too little debt and default

incentives for conservation and quality improvement by public utilities the author examines the design of incentive programs to motivate regulated utilities to supply both basic service e g electricity supply local telephone service and service enhancements e g energy conservation services improved clarity and speed of voice communication the optimal regulatory programs are shown to vary greatly depending upon the information available to the regulator the price of the basic service may optimally be distorted above or below marginal cost to better motivate the supply of the service enhancement policy prescriptions are compared with current programs and proposals to promote energy conservation 35 refs 2 figs

the interaction of corporate and government financing in general equilibrium this article develops a general equilibrium model for analyzing the in teraction of corporate financial and production decisions consumers behavior and government financing the authors use the model to inv estigate how changes in income tax rates and government debt policy a ffect production interest rates and consumer welfare they also sho w how changes in the different tax rates affect other tax rates in ge neral equilibrium copyright 1988 by the university of chicago