democracy and human capital formation education spending in latin america 1980 to 1997 this article examines the relationship between democratic representation and spending on education in latin america the authors assess the impact that democracy has on the distribution of resources between different levels of schooling and on total spending on education specifically they test whether democratic governments allocate a greater share of resources to primary education the level that benefits the largest segment of the electorate and that is most critical for human capital formation in developing countries using time series cross sectional analysis the authors find that democracies devote a higher percentage of their educational resources to primary education and that they maintain higher absolute spending levels on education in the aggregate thereby enhancing the prospects of human capital formation

the effect of land scarcity on farm structure empirical evidence from mali abstractwe analyze the individualization of farm units in mali in the sense of a transformation of purely collective farms into mixed units in which private plots coexist with collective fields since a moral hazard in team problem plagues production on the latter and the household head extracts his income from it he faces a trade off between efficiency and capture we show within the framework of a patriarchal farm household model that private plots become profitable for the head once land becomes sufficiently scarce specifically greater land scarcity raises both the probability to find private plots in afarm and the share of farmland allocated to these plots on the basis of firsthand data collected in southern mali we test and confirm the two predictions yielded by the above theory moreover we show that a higher number of married men within the household has the same effect as land scarcity thus suggesting an interesting refinement of the moral hazard in team argument

institutional solutions to the asymmetric information problem in health and development services for the poor summary the world s poorest pay for professional services and thus are in a market whether the services are provided in the public or private sectors the associated problems of unequal information are particularly acute in undergoverned countries where state regulation is weak we systematically review the evidence on solutions to these problems in a variety of professions payments by clients are more likely to have a positive effect on quality if they are made through locally managed organizations rather than directly to individual practitioners particularly if those organizations have an institutionalized history of other regarding values and incorporate client participation

the demand for and impact of learning hiv status this paper evaluates an experiment in which individuals in rural malawi were randomly assigned monetary incentives to learn their hiv results after being tested distance to the hiv results centers was also randomly assigned without any incentive 34 percent of the participants learned their hiv results however even the smallest incentive doubled that share using the randomly assigned incentives and distance from results centers as instruments for the knowledge of hiv status sexually active hiv positive individuals who learned their results are three times more likely to purchase condoms two months later than sexually active hiv positive individuals who did not learn their results however hiv positive individuals who learned their results purchase only two additional condoms than those who did not there is no significant effect of learning hiv negative status on the purchase of condoms

optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences with the standard non linear income taxation framework with heterogeneity of preferences in this paper the optimality of workfare as a screening tool is examined it is assumed that workfare does not serve as a human capital investment participation is mandatory and administrative costs are negligible imposing alternative cardinalizations on individuals utilities allows for the possibility that the government optimally redistributes income to or from high disutility of labour individuals under either case it is never optimal to impose workfare on these individuals it is also shown that non productive workfare can be an e cient policy tool in contrast to the results found in besley and coate 1995 brett 1998 and beaudry and blackorby 1997 jel classification h21 h23 optimalite du workfare en presence de preferences heterogenes l auteur examine l timalite du workfare en tant qu instrument de tamisage a l aide du cadre conceptuel traditionnel d imposition non lineaire des revenus en presence de preferences heterogenes on postule que le workfare n est pas un processus d investissement en capital humain que la participatioun est obligatoire et que les couts d administration sont negligeables quand on postule aussi des utilites cardinales differentes pour les individus il devient possible pour le gouvernement de redistribuer optimalement les revenus en faveur ou au detriment des individus pour qui le travail a une tres grande desutilite dans l un et l autre cas on montre que le workfare n est jamais une politique optimale on montre aussi que le workfare dans des activites non productives peut etre un instrument de politique publique e cient contrairement a ce qu a rment besley et coate 1995 brett 1998 et beaudry et blackorby 1997

a framework for the analysis of evolving patron client ties in agrarian economies abstract this paper looks systematically at the various factors that can account for the disappearance or the transformation of the institution of patronage that used to structure labor and other relationships in many agrarian societies of the past it is an attempt to offer a unifying framework capable of guiding one s attention to the relevant variables and to the way they interact in this process the rather simplistic view according to which there is a unique linear path through which patronage evolves is called into question and a number of different scenarios are instead presented these alternatives are illustrated with reference to asia

methods of household consumption measurement through surveys experimental results from tanzania consumption expenditure has long been the preferred measure of household living standards however accurate measurement is a challenge and household expenditure surveys vary widely across many dimensions including the level of reporting the length of the reference period and the degree of commodity detail these variations occur both across countries and also over time within countries there is little current understanding of the implications of such changes for spatially and temporally consistent measurement of household consumption and poverty a field experiment in tanzania tests eight alternative methods to measure household consumption on a sample of 4 000 households there are significant differences between consumption reported by the benchmark personal diary and other diary and recall formats under reporting is particularly relevant in illiterate households and for urban respondents completing household diaries recall modules measure lower consumption than a personal diary with larger gaps among poorer households and households with more adult members variations in reporting accuracy by household characteristics are also discussed and differences in measured poverty as a result of survey design are explored the study concludes with recommendations for methods of survey based consumption measurement in low income countries

health and democracy in spite of the inexorable march of democracy around the globe just how democratic institutions a ect human well being is open to debate the evidence that democracy promotes prosperity is neither strong nor robust moreover which aspects of policy making and human well being are promoted by democracies is still a subject of debate 1 even if correlations between democracy and outcome measures can be found there is an overriding di culty of interpreting them as causal e ects whether democracy matters per se or simply serves as a proxy for societal and political development presents a di cult problem for research in this area thinkers such as lipset 1959 have argued that democracy can thrive only when conditions are right if this is correct then becoming democratic may only serve as a proxy for these hard to measure cultural and societal preconditions this paper explores these issues further by reconsidering the link between democracy and health using panel data from a cross section of countries the

on the sign of the optimum marginal income tax this paper studies a central aspect of optimal income taxation as modelled in mirrlees original paper on the topic identical leisure consumption preferences qualitatively homogeneous skills in production namely whether given concave utilitarianism alone the optimal marginal income tax will be non negative a well known positive answer to this question in weak inequality form was given in the said paper which however we show requires additive separability of individual utility in the ordinal and cardinal senses our main result here is to derive the required strict positivity of the marginal tax under weak conditions slightly wider than noninferiority of consumption and leisure with preferences otherwise arbitrary

a contribution to the theory of optimal utilitarian income taxation abstract the paper provides a new formulation of the mirrlees seade theorem on the positivity of the optimal marginal income tax under weaker assumptions and in a more general model the formulation of the theorem is independent of whether the model involves finitely many types or a continuous type distribution the formal argument makes the underlying logic transparent relating the mathematics to the economics and showing precisely how each assumption enters the analysis

democracy and development the devil in the details does democracy promote economic development this paper reviews recent attempts to address this question that exploited within country variation it shows that the answer is largely positive but also depends on the details of democratic reforms first the sequence of economic vs political reforms matters countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better second different forms of democratic government lead to different economic policies and this might explain why presidential democracy leads to faster growth than parliamentary democracy third it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms taking expectations of regime change into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy

labor tying in a poor agrarian economy a theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper we show how tied labor contrary to its common characterization as a feudal relic and as a symptom of economic stagnation may actually be strengthened by capitalist agricultural development we construct a simple two period theoretical model of a two tiered labor market to show how the proportional importance of voluntary labor tying contracts may increase with yield increasing improvements and with a tightening of the labor market we then provide in support of these hypotheses some general historical as well as more detailed econometric evidence from a variety of cross sectional data in rural india

interlinkage limited liability and strategic interaction abstract the literature on interlinkage is inconclusive regarding the strict superiority of this arrangement we analyze a landlord and a moneylender as two players making non cooperative decisions regarding the terms of their respective contracts with a tenant in the sequential game where the landlord moves first and the tenant has limited liability we demonstrate that there exist circumstances in which interlinkage is superior even with nonlinear loan contracts a result that carries over when there is moral hazard the incorporation of risk aversion yields strict superiority in general the main result is unaffected by changes in the seniority of claims but is sensitive to changes in the order of moves limited liability ceases to ensure the strict superiority of interlinked contracts if the principal who provides the variable factor of production moves first even if he has junior claims to the output

political regimes and the extractive capacity of governments taxation in democracies and dictatorships recent political and economic transformations in latin america africa asia and eastern europe have brought about a renewed interest in the incentives and capabilities of different types of political regimes to implement policies that are deemed necessary for economic development in particular policies aimed at increasing tax revenue one central question is whether democracies can collect as much in taxes as dictatorships this article addresses this question by examining whether regime type classified as democracy or dictatorship has a causal impact on a government s capacity to mobilize resources through taxation on the basis of data gathered for 108 countries for the period between 1970 and 1990 the article concludes that observed differences across countries regarding the level of taxes collected by the government are not due to the fact that some are under a democracy and others under a dictatorship concerns about the inability of democratic regimes to collect taxes are therefore unfounded

how optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes abstract the impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated in one version preferences are quasilinear in leisure for this version it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone s optimal consumptions and optimal marginal tax rates in the other version preferences are quasilinear in consumption for this version it is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone s optimal before tax incomes and optimal marginal tax rates moreover the directions of change in the optimal marginal tax rates are the same for the two specifications of preferences

the economics of child labor if child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents concern for the household s survival the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force however this assumption about parental decision making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work the paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications copyright 1998 by american economic association

democracy and economic growth a historical perspective recent studies appear to show that democracy has no robust association with economic growth yet all such work assumes that the causal effect of democracy can be measured by a country s regime status in a particular year t which is correlated with its growth performance in a subsequent period t 1 the authors argue that democracy must be understood as a stock rather than a level measure that is a country s growth performance is affected by the number of years it has been democratic in addition to the degree of democracy experienced during that period in this fashion democracy is reconceptualized as a historical rather than a contemporary variable with the assumption that long run historical patterns may help scholars to understand present trends the authors speculate that these secular historical infiuences operate through four causal pathways each of which may be understood as a type of capital physical capital human capital social capital and political capital this argument is tested in a cross country analysis and is shown to be robust in a wide variety of specifications and formats

screening with convex menus and optimal flow taxation abstract this paper considers a family of screening problems in which the principal is constrained to offer only convex menus applications include i optimal flow taxation when individuals can substitute consumption and leisure inter temporally ii optimal product design for a linear pricing monopolist iii non exclusive cum linearly priced annuity markets a modified version of a myerson 1979 mirrlees 1971 direct mechanism in which standard incentive compatibility constraints are replaced by no convexification constraints can be used to compute optimal allocations in this family of problems in the flow taxation application the optimal tax schedule necessarily features progressive marginal tax rates typically features distortions at the top and can be analyzed by adapting standard ironing techniques

inequality in landownership the emergence of human capital promoting institutions and the great divergence this paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human capital promoting institutions e g public schooling and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries the prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the u s

has democratization reduced infant mortality in sub saharan africa evidence from micro data does democracy help babies survive in sub saharan africa by using retrospective fertility surveys conducted in 28 african countries i compare the survival of infants born to the same mother before and after democratization to disentangle the effect of democracy from that of changes in population characteristics which is infeasible with country level statistics on infant mortality i find that infant mortality falls by 1 2 percentage points 12 of the sample mean after democratization in the post cold war period relevant aspects of democracy appear to be the combination of multiparty elections and leadership change

formal and informal sector credit institutions and interlinkage abstract nationalized banks in poor countries often ration rural credit this creates demand for loans from monopolistic landlord moneylenders who often interlink credit and product contracts allowing the latter to extract more of the tenant s consumer surplus in the presence of asymmetric information such arrangements can be inefficient we find that increasing the fixed credit allocation to the rural sector at a subsidized rate does not reduce that inefficiency the entire benefit of the subsidy is extracted by the moneylender an alternative policy of providing credit at subsidized rates but in a flexible manner is more effective in reducing the inefficiency

interlocking transactions obstacles precursors or instruments of agrarian capitalism abstract rural labor arrangements often change rapidly and in ways that prevailing theories cannot explain explicit understanding of the exercise of power in rural society sheds considerable light on how and why rural labor arrangements change in the course of economic development this paper shows how different labor tying arrangements embody exclusionary mechanisms that can serve as instruments of both labor management and social control macro political and economic conditions shape the ways in which these mechanisms operate and are in turn influenced by them viewing labor arrangements in this way helps resolve problems confronted by the prevailing theories and allows for a broader understanding of dynamic processes

how big is the crowding out effect of user fees in the rural areas of ethiopia implications for equity and resources mobilization summary using a nested multinomial logit model this study investigates the demand reduction and diversion effects of user fees in rural areas of ethiopia the results reveal that an increase in user fees of public clinics which are the most widely used alternative can have a significant demand reduction effect on the poorest of the poor this implies that despite cost recovery has been advocated as an alternative means of health care financing in most of the developing world increasing user fees may drive the poorest segment of the population out of the health care market unless some protective measures are taken

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

a note on the optimum income tax abstract this paper analyzes the optimum utilitarian income tax with special attention given to the characterization of the lower end of the optimum tax function in the case when the least qualified individuals do not work moreover the positivity of the marginal tax rate throughout is shown to be a consequence of the desirability of redistribution of income or leisure given the self selection constraints and preferences fulfilling agent monotonicity and non inferiority of leisure

oligopsonistic landlords segmented labor markets and the persistence of tied labor contracts this article examines contractual labor arrangements in agrarian economies that persist as a consequence of market power on the part of landlords faced with output uncertainty we show that a segmented labor market characterized by tied labor contracts and involuntary unemployment in the lean season are optimal as compared to a labor hiring arrangement that guarantees full employment of labor in both seasons government intervention in the form of a specific subsidy targeted toward the hiring of permanent laborers may raise the welfare of all laborers while a specific subsidy directed toward the hiring of casual laborers or the institution of relief programs that absorb the rural unemployed in the lean season leads to the casual laborers in the economy being worse off copyright 2002 oxford university press

is child labor inefficient we build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare we assume that there is a trade off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects this occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect we also study the effects of a simple ban on child labor and derive conditions under which it may be pareto improving in general equilibrium we show that the implications of child labor for fertility are ambiguous

how much income redistribution an explanation based on vote buying and corruption this paper studies how income tax rates are determined and how they are related to government corruption in the form of fund capture a model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters in equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption when rich voters can bribe the government an additional equilibrium with zero taxation is possible the link between corruption and tax rates is tested using cross country data the empirical evidence is fully consistent with the predictions of the model

the political economy of growth democracy and human capital democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy we argue that there are significant indirect effects of democracy on growth through public health and education where economists use life expectancy and education as proxies for human capital we expect democracy will be an important determinant of the level of public services manifested in these indicators in addition to whatever direct effect democracy may have on growth we predict an important indirect effect through public policies that condition the level of human capital in different societies we conduct statistical investigations into the direct and indirect effects of democracy on growth using a data set consisting of a 30 year panel of 128 countries we find that democracy has no statistically significant direct effect on growth rather we discover that the effect of democracy is largely indirect through increased life expectancy in poor countries and increased secondary education in nonpoor countries t he relationship between democracy and economic growth has received considerable attention in recent years as yet however there is no consensus among analysts on the relationship between these two widely studied variables sound theoretical positions have been advanced suggesting that democracy is both an impediment and facilitator of growth careful quantitative tests of the relationship have produced contradictory results in our view existing studies fail to develop an adequate political theory of growth and as a result their empirical models are typically misspecified with competing arguments on both sides of the question many analysts merely add a variable for democracy to existing economic models and then look at the sign of the coefficient and its significance this is inadequate democracy is more than just another brake or booster for the economy we argue that there are important indirect effects of democracy on growth that are manifested through public health and education where economists typically use life expectancy and secondary school enrollment as proxies for human capital we expect that democracy will itself be an important determinant of the level of public services captured in these indicators thus in

targeting child labor in debt bondage evidence theory and policy implications despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

the political economy of bad data evidence from african survey and administrative statistics abstractacross multiple african countries discrepancies between administrative data and independent household surveys suggest official statistics systematically exaggerate development progress we provide evidence for two distinct explanations of these discrepancies first governments misreport to foreign donors as in the case of a results based aid programme rewarding reported vaccination rates second national governments are themselves misled by frontline service providers as in the case of primary education where official enrolment numbers diverged from survey estimates after funding shifted from user fees to per pupil government grants both syndromes highlight the need for incentive compatibility between data systems and funding rules

history institutions and economic performance the legacy of colonial land tenure systems in india we analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the british in india and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators these areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education these differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices

political regimes and economic growth arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights pressures for immediate consumption and the autonomy of dictators while everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights the main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption which reduces investment only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them and democratic states are not the main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output these views are summarized in turn

the illusion of sustainability this brief summarizes the results of a gender impact evaluation study entitled the illusion of sustainability conducted during the time period 1998 to 2001 in kenya the study observed that deworming is a public good since much of its social benefit comes through reduced disease transmission people were less likely to take deworming if their direct first order or indirect second order social contacts were exposed to deworming the introduction of a small fee for deworming drugs led to an 80 percent reduction in treatment rates take up was not sensitive to the exact price level suggesting that it is particularly counter productive to charge small positive prices for the treatment of infectious diseases an intensive school health education had no impact on worm prevention funding for the study derived from world bank nih fogarty international center berkeley center for health research

a note on the marginal tax rate in a finite economy abstract the marginal tax rate is shown to be non negative in guesnerie and seade s model of nonlinear pricing in a finite economy under assumptions that are as mild as those customarily adopted in nonlinear tax models with a one dimensional continuum population

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

price uncertainty and trader farmer linkage abstract we show that the pareto superiority of loan repayment in kind within a tied credit arrangement to a cash for cash scheme under uncertain output price depends crucially on the farmer loan demand elasticity and his risk aversion for the risk neutral trader the cash for cash scheme is shown to be pareto dominated by credit tying and the price premium he offers depends on farmer loan demand elasticity

disneyland monopoly interlinkage and usurious interest rates abstract interlinkage between labour and credit markets is interpreted as a consequence of a monopolistic moneylender s attempt to extract consumer s surplus from the borrower by levying a two part tariff this analogy enables us to draw on the literature on non linear pricing to high light issues in agrarian structure the consequence of policy interventions like taxes and minimum wage legislation is studied it is shown that the moneylender will charge usurious interest rates if wages are rigid downwards or there is a tax on agricultural income or borrowers have heterogeneous preferences some geometry for analysing interlinkage is developed and used for deriving some of the results

a new database on the structure and development of the financial sector this article introduces a new database of indicators of financial structure and financial development across countries and over time the database is unique in that it combines a wide variety of indicators that measure the size activity and efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets it improves on previous efforts by presenting data on the public share of commercial banks introducing indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial institutions and constructing measures of the size of bond and primary equity markets this article introduces a new database the first to provide comprehensive measures of the development structure and performance of the financial sector this database is the first to define and construct indicators of the size and activity of nonbank financial intermediaries such as insurance companies pension funds and non deposit money banks it is also the first to include indicators of the size of primary equity markets and primary and secondary bond markets in constructing the database authors carefully deflate measures and match stock and flow variables

theory general equilibrium and political economy in development economics i discuss the role of economic theory in empirical work in development economics with special emphasis on general equilibrium and political economy considerations i argue that economic theory plays should play a central role in formulating models estimates of which can be used for counterfactual and policy analysis i discuss why counterfactual analysis based on microdata that ignores general equilibrium and political economy issues may lead to misleading conclusions i illustrate the main arguments using examples from recent work in development economics and political economy

the heart kuznets curve understanding the relations between economic development and cardiac conditions abstract as countries turn wealthier some health indicators such as child mortality seem to have well defined trends however others including cardiovascular conditions do not follow clear linear patterns of change with economic development abnormal blood pressure is a serious health risk factor with consequences for population growth and longevity as well as public and private expenditure in health care and labor productivity this also increases the risk of the population in certain pandemics such as covid 19 to determine the correlation of income and blood pressure we analyzed time series for the mean systolic blood pressure sbp of men s population mmhg and nominal gross domestic product per capita gdppc for 136 countries from 1980 to 2008 using regression and statistical analysis by pearson s correlation r our study finds a trend similar to an inverted u shaped curve or a heart kuznets curve there is a positive correlation increase gdppc increase sbp in low income countries and a negative correlation in high income countries increase gdppc decrease sbp as country income rises people tend to change their diets and habits and have better access to health services and education which affects blood pressure however the latter two may not offset the rise in blood pressure until countries reach a certain income investing early in health education and preventive health care could avoid the sharp increase in blood pressure as countries develop and therefore avoiding the heart kuznets curve and its economic and human impacts

vote buying general elections we examine the consequences of vote buying assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up front binding payments and or campaign promises platforms that are contingent on the outcome of the election we analyze the role of the parties and voters preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters

the monopoly of violence evidence from colombia many states in latin america africa and asia lack the monopoly of violence even though this was identified by max weber as the foundation of the state and thus the capacity to govern effectively in this paper we develop a new perspective on the establishment of the monopoly of violence we build a model to explain the incentive of central states to eliminate nonstate armed actors paramilitaries in a democracy the model is premised on the idea that paramilitaries may choose to and can influence elections since paramilitaries have preferences over policies this reduces the incentives of the politicians they favor to eliminate them we then investigate these ideas using data from colombia between 1991 and 2006 we first present regression and case study evidence supporting our postulate that paramilitary groups can have significant effects on elections for the legislature and the executive next we show that the evidence is also broadly consistent with the implication of the model that paramilitaries tend to persist to the extent that they deliver votes to candidates for the executive whose preferences are close to theirs and that this effect is larger in areas where the presidential candidate would have otherwise not done as well finally we use roll call votes to illustrate a possible quid pro quo between the executive and paramilitaries in colombia language en

coercive contract enforcement law and the labor market in 19th century industrial britain british master and servant law made employee contract breach a criminal offense until 1875 we develop a contracting model generating equilibrium contract breach and prosecutions then exploit exogenous changes in output prices to examine the effects of labor demand shocks on prosecutions positive shocks in the textile iron and coal industries increased prosecutions following the abolition of criminal sanctions wages differentially rose in counties that had experienced more prosecutions and wages responded more to labor demand shocks coercive contract enforcement was applied in industrial britain restricted mobility allowed workers to commit to risk sharing contracts with lower but less volatile wages

interlinked contracts an empirical study this study investigates the contractual relationship between farmers and sugar mills in colonial taiwan our investigation is based on a model of interlinked contracts which is adapted from gangopadhyay and sengupta 1987 the validity of our model s predictions is verified by analyzing a data set consisting of contracts between taiwan s cane farmers and sugar mills during the period of japanese occupation our data suggest that the contractual relationship is consistent with a second best scenario where the interest rates charged by sugar mills on cash loans to farmers are set in order to prevent diversion of funds to non production uses

implicit interest rates usury and isolation in backward agriculture the unusually high interest rates in many backward agricultural regions have been a source of some puzzlement to economists adding to this puzzle is the fact that these rates can take on a wide range of values often within the same region one important question is why arbitrage between sectors does not lead to more homogeneous and lower interest rates the traditional answer to this is in terms of lender s risk it is argued that moneylenders in backward regions face a great risk of default and once this is taken into account the effective interest rate turns out to be no higher than its counterpart in the organised sector consequently there is no real room for arbitrage and the high interest rates are equilibrium prices while this explanation may be of use in some situations it is in general inadequate and can even be misleading the reason which novelists describing rural india have repeatedly written about is that in these financial transactions the lender s risk frequently ranges from minimal to non existent because the personalised relation between the borrower and the lender enables the latter to extract the defaulted loan in the form of asset transfers from the borrower in a somewhat stylised manner these deals could be thought of as follows a peasant takes a loan from his employer keeping some of his assets like land a standing crop or even the promise of labour services as security or collateral a collateral price is then fixed this is the conversion price used to calculate the amount of collateral that has to be relinquished to the lender given a certain amount of default clearly the lower the collateral price the larger the quantity of collateral that the peasant has to forfeit hence the underpricing of collateral amounts to the charging of an implicit interest a widespread feature of rural credit markets reported in many diverse studies bardhan and rudra 1978 myint 1964 raj 1981 roth 1979 and sivakumar 1978 to mention just a few is the underpricing of collateral an interesting attempt to bring collateral explicitly into a model of usury was made by bhaduri 1977 see also 1983 who argued that one of the reasons why landlords raise interest rates is in fact to encourage default and to claim ownership of the asset kept as collateral a sharp contrast to the lender s risk model this hypothesis has deservedly received much attention 1

free distribution or cost sharing evidence from a randomized malaria prevention experiment author s cohen jessica dupas pascaline abstract it is often argued that cost sharing charging a subsidized positive price for a health product is necessary to avoid wasting resources on those who will not use or do not need the product we explore this argument through a field experiment in kenya in which we randomized the price at which prenatal clinics could sell long lasting anti malarial insecticide treated nets itns to pregnant women we find no evidence that costsharing reduces wastage on those that will not use the product women who received free itns are not less likely to use them than those who paid subsidized positive prices we also find no evidence that costsharing induces selection of women who need the net more those who pay higher prices appear no sicker than the average prenatal client in the area in terms of measured anemia an important indicator of malaria cost sharing does however considerably dampen demand we find that uptake drops by 75 percent when the price of itns increases from zero to 0 75 i e from 100 to 87 5 percent subsidy the price at which itns are currently sold to pregnant women in kenya we combine our estimates in a cost effectiveness analysis of itn prices on child mortality that incorporates both private and social returns to itn usage overall our results suggest that free distribution of itns could save many more lives than cost sharing programs have achieved so far and given the large positive externality associated with widespread usage of itns it would likely do so at a lesser cost per life saved

does free public health care increase utilization and reduce spending heterogeneity and long term effects zambia removed user fees in publicly supported government and faith based health facilities in 54 out of 72 districts in 2006 this was extended to rural areas of previously unaffected districts in 2007 the natural experiment provided by the step wise implementation of the removal policy and five waves of nationally representative household survey data enables us to study the impact of the removal policy on utilization and household health expenditure we find that the policy increased overall use of health services in the short term and the effects were sustained in the long term the increases were higher for individuals whose household heads were unemployed or had no or less education the policy also led to a small shift in care seeking from private to publicly supported facilities an effect driven primarily by individuals whose household heads were either formally employed or engaged in farming the likelihood of incurring any spending reduced although this weakened slightly in the long term at the same time there was an upward pressure on conditional health expenditure i e expenditure was higher after removal of fees for those who incurred any spending hence total unconditional household health expenditure was not significantly affected

sharecropping and the interlinking of agrarian markets one of the often noted features of less developed agrarian economies is the existence of interlinkages among the land labor credit and product markets the landlord is often the supplier of credit he frequently purchases and markets the output of the tenant farmers and often sells raw materials and even consumption goods to his tenant farmers how can this phenomenon be explained what are the welfare consequences of attempts to restrict these practices which often seem to constitute restraints on free trade these are the questions to which this paper is addressed a general set of arguments applicable to both competitive and noncompetitive environments are presented to situations where all the terms of the contract are determined in an optimal way as well as to situations where many of the terms are specified institutionally section i examines interlinked credit and tenancy contracts section ii examines interlinked marketing and tenancy contracts section iii points out the possible interlinking between labor contracts and consumption goods markets and section iv presents the different equilibrium frameworks discussed in the paper such as monopoly monopsony competition and equilibria with surplus labor

the effects of capital mobility trade openness and democracy on social spending in latin america 1980 1999 empirical studies measuring the impact of globalization on social spending have appeared recently in leading journals this study seeks to improve upon previous work by 1 employing a more sophisticated and comprehensive measure of financial openness 2 using a more accurate measure of trade openness based on purchasing power parities and 3 relying on social spending data that are more complete than those used by previous studies on latin america our estimates suggest that several empirical patterns reported in previous work deserve a second look we find that trade openness has a positive association with education and social security expenditures that financial openness does not constrain government outlays for social programs and that democracy has a strong positive association with social spending particularly on items that bolster human capital formation t he international integration of markets for goods and services over the past two decades is unprecedented amidst a broader context of international integration latin america has experienced the most dramatic change in its economic policy orientation since world war ii few regions have undergone as rapid and thorough an economic transformation how has economic integration affected the social welfare policies of latin american governments has it forced them to reduce spending on social programs in order to compete in the world economy or has it induced them to provide social safety nets for those hurt by economic competition has democratization in latin america compelled governments to spend more on social programs in relatively open economies

empowerment and efficiency tenancy reform in west bengal the paper analyzes the effect of agricultural tenancy laws offering security of tenure to tenants and regulating the share of output that is paid as rent on farm productivity theoretically the net impact of tenancy reform is shown to be a combination of two effects a bargaining power effect and a security of tenure effect analysis of evidence on how contracts and productivity changed after a tenancy reform program was implemented in the indian state of west bengal in the late 1970s suggests that tenancy reform had a positive effect on agricultural productivity there

concentrated objective functions for nonlinear taxation models abstract weymark s reduction of the optimal tax problem is robust to changes in the assumptions about the social welfare function and individual preferences concentrations of the objective function exist for additively separable preferences and a social welfare assumption satisfying guesnerie and seade s strong redistributive assumption the ability to concentrate the objective function is symmetric in income and consumption

targeting child labor in debt bondage despite recent multilateral efforts to single out child labor in debt bondage as one of the worst forms of child labor several important questions have yet to be addressed how pervasive is the phenomenon are there systematic correlations between the incidence of children in debt bondage and the economic legislative and financial development indicators of the economy how does an understanding of these correlates affect the way national and international policy measures aimed at targeting this form of child labor are perceived this article addresses each of these questions the empirical findings suggest strong correlation between the likelihood of the incidence of child labor in debt bondage with the stage of development of an economy the stage of financial development and enforcement of core labor rights building on this evidence the article presents a theoretical model that highlights the drawbacks and merits of a number of policies aimed at putting checks on child labor in debt bondage

the political value of land political reform and land prices in chile in this article we argue that when patron client relations are grounded in economic relationships such as between landlord and worker we should expect clientelism to influence not just how public policy the state and the political system work but also how the economy works we develop a simple model of the economic consequences of electoral clientelism when voting behavior can be observed landlords patrons provide economic rents to workers and in exchange workers vote for parties favored by landlords as votes are used by the landlords to accumulate political rents vote control increases the demand for labor and for land the model implies that the introduction of the australian ballot which destroys this form of clientelism should lead to a fall in the price of land in those areas where patron client relationships are strongest we test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the evolution of land prices in chile around may 31 1958 for which we collected original data a characteristic of rural chile at this time were patron client relations based on the inquilinaje system by which a worker the inquilino entered into a long term often hereditary employment relationship with a landlord and lived on his landlord s estate we show that the introduction of the australian ballot in 1958 led to a fall of about 26 in land prices in the areas where these patron client relationships were predominant

public good provision and the comparative statics of optimal nonlinear income taxation comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally there are two types of individuals distinguished by their skill levels who have the same quasilinear preferences for labor supply and the consumption of a private and a public good comparative statics are obtained for the weights in a weighted utilitarian social welfare function the prices of the two goods a taste parameter that measures the onerousness of working and the skill levels

optimum taxation with errors in administration abstract the paper compares the welfare levels which can be achieved by two distinct tax regimes lump sum taxation where one attempts to identify individuals and allocate transfers or subsidies on the basis of characteristics and income taxation where characteristics are not observed but personal incomes are measured and taxed where there are no errors in classifying individuals lump sum taxation is superior but where mistakes are made in the allocation of lump sum grants or subsidies income taxation may be more attractive the level of errors where the regimes are equally desirable in terms of social welfare is computed in simple models following that of feldstein 1973 where there is strong aversion to inequality then income taxation becomes preferable at quite small errors in analysing income taxation it is shown that in the feldstein model with endogenous wages the marginal tax rate in optimum income taxation on the more skilled is negative and that on the less skilled is positive in contrast to the standard results see seade 1977 with exogenous wages