the impact of state taxes on pass through businesses evidence from the 2012 kansas income tax reform abstract in 2012 kansas undertook a large scale tax reform that excluded pass through business income from individual taxation in theory these changes enhance the incentives to undertake more real economic activity such as new business formation or expansion of existing businesses the reform also increased the incentive to avoid taxation by recharacterizing income sources this paper provides evidence of these effects using federal administrative income tax data spanning 2010 2014 several findings suggest that on both the extensive and intensive margins the pass through exclusion led to increased tax avoidance in the form of income recharacterization and shifting of effort from activities compensated through wages to those compensated with business income we do not find much evidence however that the kansas reform led to increases in real economic activity

career concerns incentives and endogenous learning in labour markets models of career concerns provide a framework for analyzing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximize the financial return to a firm s owner this survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns hidden action and hidden information and discusses some extensions of these models applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behavior and the form of labor market institutions are emphasized copyright 1992 by blackwell publishers ltd

how robust are popular models of nominal frictions this paper analyzes three popular models of nominal price and wage frictions to determine which best ts post war u s data we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model and use maximum likelihood to estimate each model s parameters because previous research nds that the conduct of monetary policy and the behavior of in ation changed in the early 1980s we examine two distinct sample periods using a bayesian pseudo odds measure as a means for comparison a sticky price and wage model with dynamic indexation best ts the data in the early sample period whereas either a sticky price and wage model with static indexation or a sticky information model best ts the data in the late sample period our results suggest that price and wage setting behavior may be sensitive to changes in the monetary policy regime if true the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules may be even more complicated than previously believed

state investment tax incentives a zero sum game abstract over the past four decades state investment tax incentives have proliferated this emergence of state investment tax credits itc and other investment tax incentives raises two important questions 1 are these tax incentives effective in achieving their stated objective to increase investment within the state 2 to the extent these incentives raise investment within the state how much of this increase is due to investment drawn away from other states to begin to answer these questions we construct a detailed panel dataset for 48 states for 20 years the dataset contains series on output and capital their relative prices and establishment counts the effects of tax variables on capital formation and establishments are measured by the jorgensonian user cost of capital that depends in a nonlinear manner on federal and state tax variables cross jurisdictional differences in state investment tax credits and state corporate tax rates entering the user cost combined with a panel that is long in the time dimension are key to identifying the effectiveness of state investment incentives two models are estimated the capital demand model is motivated by the first order condition for a profit maximizing firm and relates at the state level the capital output ratio to the relative user cost of capital the twin counties model exploits both the spatial breaks discontinuities in tax policy at state borders and our panel dataset to relate at the county level the relative user cost to the location of manufacturing establishments using the capital demand model we find that own state capital formation is substantially increased by tax induced reductions in the own state price of capital and more interestingly substantially decreased by tax induced reductions in the price of capital in competitive states similarly using our twin counties model we find that county manufacturing establishment counts around state borders are higher on the side of the border with the lower price of capital but the difference is economically small suggesting that establishments are much less mobile than overall capital extensions of the capital demand model also reveal that state capital tax policy appears to be a zero sum game among the states in that an equiproportionate increase in own state and competitive states user costs tends to have no effect on own state capital formation

is there a winner s curse in the labor market abstract when a firm can make counteroffers to workers who have received outside wage offers a winner s curse effect may exist raided firms do not make counteroffers to those whose value is less than the raider s wage offer so the raider always earns negative profit when a raid is successful in this paper i demonstrate that when a raided firm makes reassignment decisions in anticipation of outside wage offers and there is at least an infinitesimal probability of exogenous turnover a winner s curse will not occur when there are counteroffers except possibly for workers at the lowest task assignment

standard promotion practices versus up or out contracts this article develops a theory concerning the choice between standard promotion practices and up or out contracts our theory is based on asymmetric learning and promotion incentives we find that firms employ up or out contracts when firm specific human capital is low and standard promotion practices when it is high we also find that if commitment to a wage floor is feasible and effort provision is important up or out is employed when low and high level jobs are similar these results are consistent with many of the settings in which up or out is typically observed such as law firms and academia

productivity growth in goods and services across the heterogeneous states of america i introduction the study of income and productivity convergence and structural transformation are central and recurring themes in economic growth research the u s states have been a fertile testing ground for many intellectual advances in these areas the closed economy assumptions of the underlying models notwithstanding the states offer compensating advantages such as being subject to the same macroeconomic policy while simultaneously exhibiting considerable heterogeneity along many dimensions of interest to growth researchers demographics composition of output quality of workforce tax policy natural resource endowments geography etc at the same time knowledge on multifactor productivity mfp growth which is central to many growth models remains sparse for u s states this is mainly due to lack of data on capital accumulation beyond the manufacturing sector this is unfortunate as an emerging body of work has begun to draw attention to the fact that the convergence of state level incomes has slowed down over the past two to three decades in the absence of adequate data at the state level it becomes difficult to further analyze this problem within a multisectoral framework in this study we seek to rectify this shortcoming by constructing and analyzing productivity growth for the broadly defined privately produced goods and service sectors at the state level and undertake both growth accounting and convergence analysis for the period 1980 2007 1 our primary innovation is the use of the dual growth accounting method which relies on factor prices rather than factor stocks to construct mfp growth to get a sense of the underlying heterogeneity in sectoral labor productivity growth consider the convergence plots displayed in figure 1 in figure 1 a we plot labor productivity growth in the nonfarm nonmining private sector between 1980 and 2007 against initial labor productivity there is some evidence of absolute convergence although weak in figures ib and 1c we repeat similar plots but now for the goods sector and for the private service sector separately here we see markedly different patterns while convergence in the goods sector is apparent for services it is quite the opposite moreover if one inspects the values on the vertical axes one can also infer large differences across states this is particularly true for goods where the difference between oregon or and montana mt was almost 7 annually as a result even though montana had slightly higher labor productivity in 1980 by 2007 oregon s productivity was at least five times higher even for the service sector where the range is much smaller the difference between connecticut ct and michigan mi was almost 2 annually as a result though both states began with almost similar values connecticut s labor productivity in services was 60 higher than michigan s by 2007 clearly these are large underlying regional differences these very different patterns motivate some of the questions that we try to answer in this study using our constructed series of mfp growth and its constituent variables we examine the sources of variations in labor productivity growth first we conduct an in depth growth accounting exercise to explore the relative importance of mfp growth versus factor accumulation for the two broad sectors across u s states this allows us to undertake traditional growth accounting exercises and also examine the sources of variations across states as the dual accounting approach relies on the construction of real wage growth and real user cost growth we also investigate the sectoral patterns for these two variables second we conduct convergence analysis at the sectoral level for labor productivity growth mfp growth as well as factor price growth we show that while the goods sector shows convergence both absolute and conditional on initial human capital we see no such evidence for the service sector

tax competition among u s states racing to the bottom or riding on a seesaw abstract dramatic declines in capital tax rates among u s states and european countries have been linked by many commentators to tax competition an inevitable race to the bottom and underprovision of local public goods this paper analyzes the reaction of capital tax policy in a given u s state to changes in capital tax policy by other states our study is undertaken with a novel panel data set covering the 48 contiguous u s states for the period 1965 to 2006 and is guided by the theory of strategic tax competition the latter suggests that capital tax policy is a function of foreign out of state tax policy preferences for government services and home state and foreign state economic and demographic conditions the slope of the reaction function the equilibrium response of home state to foreign state tax policy is negative contrary to casual evidence and many prior empirical studies of fiscal reaction functions this result which stands in contrast to most published findings is due to two critical elements that allow for delayed responses to foreign tax changes and responses to aggregate shocks omitting either of these elements leads to a misspecified model and a positively sloped reaction function our results suggest that the secular decline in capital tax rates at least among u s states reflects synchronous responses among states to common shocks rather than competitive responses to foreign state tax policy while striking given prior empirical findings these results are fully consistent with the implications of the theoretical model developed in this paper and presented elsewhere in the literature rather than racing to the bottom our findings suggest that states are riding on a seesaw consequently tax competition may lead to an increase in the provision of local public goods and policies aimed at restricting tax competition to stem the tide of declining capital taxation are likely to be ineffective

counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information this article considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker s productivity than potential employers previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers the latter use job assignment to infer an employed worker s qualifications as a result assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient i find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient i analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers and find these investment levels to be first best

state and local fiscal policy and growth at the border abstract the paper studies the connection between state and local fiscal policy as measured by the share of government spending and revenues in personal income and the economic activity of counties that share a state border i construct a panel of pairs of us counties that share a state border from the 1970s to 2012 economic activity is measured by county employment wages and business establishments the state and local government spending and revenue shares are aggregates for the states on the respective sides of the border i estimate distributed lag regressions of changes in economic activity on changes in state and local government budgets in two ways the first double difference utilizes change in the difference between border counties this suggests a quite modest relocation of economic activity away from states with fiscal expansion i then look at activity on each side of the border separately and find more substantial and consistently negative effects of fiscal expansion on both sides of the border a border county shares the negative consequences for its neighbor of growth in the size of that neighbor s state and local governments this negative fiscal externality is roughly half the size of the direct negative effects from similar own state spending increases and the sum of the two is substantial economically

regional state capacity and the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization abstract we study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation regional governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods administrative capacity and to raise tax revenues fiscal capacity two regimes are compared on efficiency grounds under partial decentralization regional governments rely on central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs under full decentralization marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes we show that the presence of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full decentralization dominance this condition may also be sufficient depending on the projects characteristics some extensions are presented

tiebout equilibria in local public good economies with spillovers abstract this paper analyzes the effects of spillovers on the equilibrium population distribution across jurisdictions in a local public good economy with free mobility spillovers are parametrized by a matrix ij where ij 0 1 when spillovers are symmetric and close to 0 or 1 pure local public goods and pure public goods all equilibrium jurisdiction structures are symmetric however any population distribution can be sustained in equilibrium for some value of the spillover parameter in the class of utility functions with additive externalities we identify the unique family of utility functions for which equilibria are symmetric except for an isolated value of this is a class of utility functions which are linear in the public good and a power function of the private good u c a 1 c with this specification of utility we show that an increase in results in a more fragmented equilibrium population distribution and that when spillovers are asymmetric and large a jurisdiction which is more centrally located i e benefits more from the public goods provided in other jurisdictions has a larger population in equilibrium

ex ante versus ex post optimal promotion rules the case of internal promotion i introduction the literature on promotion practices within the firm identifies two distinct roles for a firm s promotion policies promotions serve both as a way for the firm to efficiently assign workers to tasks and as a way for the firm to reward prior performance 1 in this article i explore the time inconsistency problem that arises as a result of the dual nature of the promotion decision in particular i show that the common practice of favoring internal candidates for promotion can be understood as a response by firms to the problem of time inconsistency 2 consider a firm in which promotions serve as a reward for prior expenditures of effort and or prior investments in human capital the optimal promotion policy for this firm depends on the time frame from which we view the problem the ex ante optimal promotion rule is the optimal rule when the problem is viewed from a date prior to young workers deciding to work at this firm this rule takes into account both the assignment aspects of the promotion decision and that promotions serve as a reward for prior performance there is a second relevant rule however because at the date of the promotion decision the effects of promotion serving as a reward for prior performance are in the past for example in a world where the possibility of future promotion serves to increase the effort levels of young workers by the time of the promotion decision those effort choices have already been made hence the ex post optimal rule only takes into account the assignment aspects of the promotion decision the time inconsistency problem that arises is now clear total profits are maximized when the firm follows the ex ante optimal promotion rule but in the absence of commitment this is not how the firm behaves at the time of the promotion decision the firm has an incentive to ignore the effects of promotion serving as a reward for prior performance and instead follow the ex post optimal rule in other words the profits of the firm are decreased because at the time of the promotion decision the firm maximizes current profits and the anticipation of this behavior by workers has deleterious effects on behavior in prior periods in this article i explore a specific example of this time inconsistency problem consider a firm s decision concerning whether to fill a managerial position by promotion from within or by hiring an outsider i show that when confronted with this decision the firm faces the exact situation described that is the ex post optimal rule shows no preference for promotion from within over hiring from the outside whereas the ex ante optimal rule exhibits a preference for promoting from within the logic here is that the possibility of receiving the higher managerial wage in the future reduces the wage required to attract young workers into the firm but only the ex ante optimal rule takes this into account the result is that in the absence of commitment the firm hires from the outside too often the conclusion is that the establishment of an internal labor market in which the firm favors promotion from within can be understood as a way that the firm avoids this time inconsistency problem this result extends a finding in malcomson 1984 that article also shows that an internal labor market in which hiring from the outside is restricted can arise in a world where promotion serves as a reward for prior performance in that work however there is no time inconsistency problem the reason is that malcomson assumes workers are homogeneous and thus at the time of the promotion decision it is weakly optimal for the firm to have all promotions be from within in contrast i assume that workers are heterogeneous and find that if the firm maximizes ex post profits it lowers total profits the result is an internal labor market that not only limits hiring from the outside but also constrains the firm to behave in a manner different from that which maximizes profits at the time the promotion decision is made

hierarchical rank and women s organizational mobility glass ceilings in corporate law firms this article revives the debate over whether women s upward mobility prospects decline as they climb organizational hierarchies although this proposition is a core element of the glass ceiling metaphor it has failed to gain strong support in previous research the article establishes a firm theoretical foundation for expecting an increasing female disadvantage with an eye toward defining the scope conditions and extending the model to upper level external hires the approach is illustrated in an empirical setting that meets the proposed scope conditions corporate law firms in the united states results confirm that in this setting the female mobility disadvantage is greater at higher organizational levels in the case of internal promotions but not in the case of external hires

firm specific human capital a skill weights approach the theory of human capital is agnostic on what constitutes firm specific skills the theory specifies that specific skills contribute to productivity only at the current firm a broader approach lets all skills be general but firms use them with different weights attached for example computer programming economics and accounting are general skills but there may be only one firm that wants workers trained in all three one implication is that wage profiles and the split of human capital costs depend on thickness of the market another is that firms pay for what appears to be general training

electoral cycles in government employment evidence from us gubernatorial elections abstract incumbents may opportunistically design policies increasing employment before elections or postpone cuts until afterwards i investigate electoral cycles in public sector employment around us gubernatorial elections exploiting staggered gubernatorial election cycles across states i use both county fixed effects models and a geographic discontinuity design that compares neighboring counties at state borders with a difference in gubernatorial election cycles consistent with manipulation state and local government employment per capita are higher leading up to elections afterwards employment abruptly returns to normal political and spatial heterogeneities are investigated including by election competitiveness term limits incumbent party affiliation and ideological alignment between the incumbent and the state legislature or local citizens differences across types of government employment and private sector employment are also explored

golden cages for showy birds optimal switching costs in labor contracts under what circumstances do workers sign contracts with high quitting penalties our answer points to market transparency when the worker s performance is privately observed by the incumbent 4rm alternative employers face an adverse selection problem as a result e7cient separations can only take place through involuntary layo8s and there is no role for quitting fees in contrast when performance is public quitting fees are useful devices to appropriate the surplus from workers reallocation separations are amicable and take the form of quitting after downwardly renegotiating the fees qualitative features of contracts are independent of the distribution of ex post bargaining power the impact of switching costs on total welfare and its distribution depends on the degree of market transparency and the ex ante distribution of market power c

how elastic are national corporate income tax bases in oecd countries the role of domestic and foreign tax rates abstract to what extent do reductions in corporate income tax cit rates attract foreign tax bases what are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally mobile these questions are explored using annual data from 17 oecd countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005 controlling for fixed country effects year effects and country time trends and subjecting our results to an extensive robustness analysis we find i a country s aggregate reported corporate profits are negatively and significantly affected by cit rate reductions in neighbouring countries ii a unilateral reduction in the domestic cit rate results in lower domestic cit revenues

promotion turnover and discretionary human capital acquisition this article explores human capital acquisition decisions when job placement helps determine competition for a worker with asymmetric information workers may invest in firm specific capital without long term contracts specific investment increases promotion chances and hence wage competition shifting competition back to a time when firms are symmetrically uninformed if general human capital is the efficient output maximizing investment then an equivalent firm specific investment maximizes expected career wages this is a general result for sellers in second price auctions sellers of labor invest to maximize the expected second highest bidder valuation wage not the winner s expected valuation

up or out contracts a signaling perspective a firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer i argue that this process can be important in environments characterized by up or out contracts in that the retention decision can serve as a signal of productivity the article investigates this argument in an environment where up or out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion

interim performance feedback in multistage tournaments the optimality of partial disclosure workers competing in a tournament for a prize e g a promotion often perform sequentially in multiple stages when the firm is privately informed about the workers performance it can sharpen incentives by strategically disclosing the intermediate results but the policies that enhance final stage effort may dampen incentives at the intermediate stage in our model the optimal disclosure policy has a simple form disclose only if all workers perform poorly this result offers a novel justification for partial disclosure in performance feedback also it contrasts with the existing literature that focuses on the extreme policies of full disclosure and no disclosure

the signaling role of promotions further theory and empirical evidence an extensive theoretical literature investigates the role of promotions as a signal of worker ability we extend the theory by focusing on how the signaling role of promotion varies with education and then investigate the resulting predictions using a longitudinal data set that contains detailed information concerning the internal labor market history of a medium sized firm in the financial services industry our results support signaling being important for understanding the differences between promotion practices concerning bachelor s and master s degree holders while the evidence concerning the importance of signaling for high school graduates and phds is mixed

investment in local public services nash equilibrium and social optimum within a two community setting we study the optimal provision of a local public good which is indivisible and generates interjurisdictional spillovers each community has to decide whether or not to invest in this public good the resulting nash equilibrium is compared with an optimal solution based on a benthamian welfare function we then analyze to what extent conditional grants are able to restore optimality when needed c 1997 elsevier science s a

the effects of location based tax policies on the distribution of household income evidence from the federal empowerment zone program abstract location based tax policies are redistributive as evidenced by their placement in distressed areas however the previous literature has focused on mean effects which can mask important effects that the program has on the distribution of households therefore we extend the literature by studying changes in the entire household income distribution in the context of the federal empowerment zone ez program we do not find evidence that the impoverished residents benefited from the program our findings are consistent with the areas becoming more attractive to high income households the improvements in the areas were concentrated in those portions of each zone that were relatively better off prior to ez designation the results confirm the prior literature findings that the areas on average became more attractive but also suggest that the benefits of the program likely did not accrue to the lower income residents of the ez areas

a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms we show that a framework that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning captures several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms including the following first real wage decreases are not rare but demotions are second wage increases are serially correlated third promotions are associated with large wage increases fourth wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference between average wages across levels of the job ladder fifth workers who receive large wage increases early in their stay at one level of the job ladder are promoted quickly to the next

a stochastic frontier analysis of financing constraints on investment is shown that investment under financing constraints can be modeled as a one sided deviation from a frictionless investment level and that effects of financing constraints can be identified and quantified by imposing a distributional assumption on the effects panel data on taiwanese manufacturing firms between 1989 and 1996 are used in the estimation it is found that 1 some of the sorting criteria used in the literature do not have significant and monotonic relationships with the degrees of financing constraint resulting in problematic sample separations and 2 the effects of financial liberalization in taiwan are such that the investment efficiency improved over time for a typical firm and the improvement was particularly large for smaller firms

communities competition spillovers and open space we explore the impact of the spatial distribution of developers on the private provision of open space our analysis yields three main findings first we demonstrate that the mixed public good nature of open space relative to private lot consumption can lead a single land rent maximizing developer to over supply open space relative to the utility maximizing level second by explicitly incorporating the spatial distribution of open space spillovers we show how competition can lead not only to inefficient levels of open space but also to inefficiencies in its spatial distribution finally we evaluate the impact of market based open space instruments

tax transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods abstract the purpose of this paper is twofold first it extends previous models of non cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods second it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump sum and distortionary policies the analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism

esteem and ignorance abstract we consider how the demand for esteem shapes behavior in the labor market when individuals care about what other people think of them especially fearing bad evaluations they may prefer jobs that hide information about their qualities we see how such a motive can contribute to explanations of wage stickiness high powered incentives search up or out contracts mandatory retirement and related issues

asymmetric information in residential rental markets implications for the energy efficiency gap abstract this paper explores whether energy cost information asymmetries exist between landlords and tenants by exploiting variation in which party pays for energy because tenants are always fully informed about their total housing costs in the landlord pay regime the effect of energy cost changes on tenant turnover rents and efficiency investment should differ between the two payment regimes under asymmetric information but not symmetric information using energy cost variation in the form of changes in relative heating fuel prices i find evidence that tenants are uninformed about energy costs this results in higher energy expenditures for tenants and implies that information campaigns or efficiency standards may improve market outcomes

imperfections in labor markets and the scope of the firm abstract results are derived showing how the interaction of adverse selection and worker uncertainty about job preferences creates incentives for firms to offer a wider array of jobs or integrate the equilibrium wage structure is characterized non integrated firms make retention wage offers increasing in ability while integrated firms do not a generalization in which costs to integration are relevant is then suggested results indicate that it is the interaction between adverse selection and uncertain preferences that leads to a second period allocation of workers across jobs that is not first best but is second best they also show why the presence of adverse selection and uncertain preferences create a tendency toward a scope of integration broader than the first best outcome

local fiscal competition an application to sales taxation with multiple federations abstract local sales tax rates influence the location of retail activity this paper develops a theory and empirical identification strategy for studying sales tax competition with multiple federations as exemplified by multiple counties each containing several cities in addition to strategic interactions with nearby cities and a city s own county city tax rates are influenced by the tax rates of neighboring counties cities react heterogeneously to own county sales tax rates depending on distance to the county border using data on the driving time to county borders and a comprehensive cross section of local sales tax rates i exploit variation in proximity to county borders to identify vertical fiscal competition cities located near county borders react more intensely to their county s tax rate in comparison to towns at the interior an increase in the neighboring county tax rate raises city tax rates in nearby counties

implementing high powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply we characterize the optimal contract between a principal and a risk neutral wealth constrained agent when an adverse selection problem follows a moral hazard problem the optimal contract in this setting often is more steeply sloped for the largest output levels than is the optimal contract in either the standard moral hazard setting or the standard adverse selection setting the large incremental rewards for exceptional performance motivate the agent to deliver substantial effort both before and after he acquires privileged information about the production environment

uncertainty in labor productivity and specific human capital investment uncertainty in labor productivity ulp is affected by many factors such as worker employer matching technology and macroeconomic conditions not surprisingly ulp varies across firms industries and economies how do variations in ulp affect specific human capital shc investment wage and labor turnover a fixed wage model is used to show that the answer depends critically on the initial level of ulp the model is also used to show that wage and shc are always positively correlated but shc investment and labor turnover do not have a monotonic relationship these results have implications for empirical studies and public policies affecting ulp

why do firms train theory and evidence this paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive the superior information of the current employer regarding its employees abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training even if these skills are general the model can lead to multiple equlibria in one equilibrium quits are endogenously high and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high using microdata on german apprentices we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data

involuntary layoffs in a model with asymmetric information concerning worker ability this paper examines the contract between a risk neutral firm and its risk averse employees assuming that worker ability is privately learned by the firm after a period of employment employers in an external spot labour market attempt to infer worker quality from the observable actions taken by the firm such as the number of workers it lays off the threat of spot market raids distorts the optimal contract layoffs may be involuntary and can exceed efficient levels a seniority layoff rule may be included in the contract to avoid the adverse selection problems that arise if layoffs are conducted on the basis of ability

classic promotion tournaments versus market based tournaments as initially formulated in the seminal analysis of lazear and rosen 1981 an important perspective for understanding the role of promotions in firms is the tournament perspective that is a promotion and in particular the wage increase associated with a promotion is a prize that serves as an incentive for workers to exert effort and take other actions beneficial to the firm such as the accumulation of human capital in this paper i consider whether the best way to model promotion tournaments is by having firms commit to prizes ex ante as in lazear and rosen s initial formulation or whether promotion prizes should be modeled as arising from the signaling role of promotions and the competition between firms for promoted workers

estimates of the economic returns to schooling from a new sample of twins this paper uses a new survey to contrast the wages of genetically identical twins with different schooling levels multiple measurements of schooling levels were also collected to assess the effect of reporting error on the estimated economic returns to schooling the data indicate that omitted ability variables do not bias the estimated return to schooling upward but that measurement error does bias it downward adjustment for measurement error indicates that an additional year of schooling increases wages by 12 to 16 percent a higher estimate of the economic returns to schooling than has been previously found copyright 1994 by american economic association

do new brooms sweep clean when and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates performance abstract if a manager stays in office for a long time he will have learned much about his subordinates thus competition among them will be weak as the manager has made up his mind who is suited best for which position with a new manager the race for favorable tasks is restarted leading subordinates to exert higher effort but for the firm owner the trade off arises that with a new manager effort is larger but the quality of task allocation is worse since information is lost the optimal dismissal policy will be nonmonotonic in the expected heterogeneity of the subordinates abilities

career concerns matching and optimal disclosure policy raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers quality when workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency long term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive the optimal short term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained these conditions are not only sufficient but also almost necessary for full disclosure partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed

the optimal disclosure policy when firms offer implicit contracts the observability of history is crucial for the sustenance of implicit or relational contracts when a firm hires a sequence of short lived workers turnover adversely affects the observability of history the old worker may leave the firm before communicating the history to the young however turnovercanalsoenhanceprofitsifmatchinggainscanbeextractedupfront disclosure of the workers productivity information affects turnover by mitigating adverse selection thus the optimal disclosure policy trades off matching efficiency with the sustainability of implicit contracts i show that i opaqueness can be optimal only for firms with moderate reputation concerns and ii an opaque firm s profit may decrease with its reputation concern

fiscal pressure tax competition and environmental pollution as one of the strategies local governments adopt in response to fiscal stress tax competition influences the social optimum level of public goods such as environment this paper aims to investigate the mechanism of regional tax competitions from the perspective of financial stress recently the effect of tax competition on environmental pollution rises gradually existing empirical researches mostly apply a fiscal decentralization based perspective and ignore the spatial correlation between pollution and tax competition under the perspective of financial stress this paper measures the impact of inter regional enterprise income tax competition and value added tax competition on environmental pollution of 30 provinces using empirical analysis and then estimates the direct effect indirect effect and total effect based on it from year 2004 2014 it s been found that inter regional tax competition not only brings negative influence to local environment but also makes the environmental quality become worse in spatial correlation regions these findings are of enlightening politic revelations to further standardize enterprise tax competition among local governments and to promote the sustainable development both in economy and environment

an opposing responses test of classic versus market based promotion tournaments we use a systems based econometric method to show that classic and market based tournament models are empirically distinguishable since the role of risk differs across these models implementing the method using a large finnish worker firm matched panel we find support for classic tournaments given that promotions depend on relative performance the firm s wage structure is convex promotion probabilities are decreasing in the number of competitors performance is increasing in the wage spread and workers and firms adjust their choice variables in opposite directions when the variance of the stochastic component of worker performance changes

optimal retention in agency problems this paper studies the interaction between a single long lived principal and a series of short lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection we assume that the principal can influence the agents behavior only through her choice of a retention rule this rule is further required to be sequentially rational i e no precommitment is allowed we provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where a the principal adopts a cut off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceeds a critical bound and b agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions we show that in equilibrium a retained agent s productivity is necessarily declining over time but that retained agents are also more productive on average than untried agents due to selection effects finally we show that for each given type agents of that type are more productive in the presence of adverse selection than when there is pure moral hazard i e when that type is the sole type of agent in the model nonetheless adding uncertainty about agent types cannot benefit the principal except in uninteresting cases

tax uncertainty and business activity abstract we investigate the extent to which uncertainties about tax policies affect business activities we develop a statewide tax uncertainty measure tu measure and show that it captures state corporate tax uncertainty by comparing adjacent counties across state borders we show that increasing tax uncertainty by one standard deviation a 30 increase in the tu measure leads to a 0 17 point per year decrease in the growth rate of establishments over two years the result holds after conducting a variety of robustness checks and is not likely to be driven by general state policy uncertainties

the insurance effect of groups many people belong to groups which partially identify their characteristics this paper argues that when agents are risk averse and where only group characteristics are visible rather than individual characteristics the pareto optimal construction of groups differs in systematic ways from standard notions of how groups should be formed two applications are considered the assignment of workers to jobs where it is shown the optimal contract does not involve maximizing output and accident insurance where the optimal contract does not involve complete insurance many people belong to groups which serve to partially identify otherwise hidden talents or characteristics for example it is possible to find out that certain authors have written an article but their individual contributions are much more difficult to ascertain similarly it may be easy to determine that a worker is a foreman but much more difficult to tell how much better he is than other foremen or that somebody is employed which tells us something about his talents but not whether he is more talented than the average employed person each of these examples illustrates cases where we can see the group to which an agent belongs author foreman employed rather than an individual s characteristics standard notions of efficiency tell us how these groups should be formed academics should write papers together only if their joint product is greater than if they operated separately a worker should be employer as a foreman only if his productivity is higher as a foreman than elsewhere in the organization and so on the principal result of this paper is that when agents are risk averse and where only groups of the type above are visible to some agents rather than individual characteristics these assignment rules may not be pareto optimal instead for example someone who is less competent as a foreman than as an operative may still be employed as a foreman and this yields higher welfare than employing that worker as an operative let me explain the intuition by a simple example assume that workers who join a firm are uncertain of their ability they are risk averse and seek insurance over that uncertainty untalented workers should be fired on standard efficiency grounds as they have higher productivity elsewhere assume that after a period of production information on ability becomes available to the employer and the employee but that other employers must infer this information from whether the

internal promotion and external recruitment a theoretical and empirical analysis we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment using a job assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two level job hierarchies with one managerial position the model predicts that controlling for the number of managers increasing the number of lower level workers is associated with 1 greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment 2 higher profit and 3 more general training empirical analysis of a large cross section of british employers is consistent with these predictions

the firm as the locus of social comparisons standard promotion practices versus up or out we suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns a firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker s status depends on past performance we investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies i standard promotion practices where agents have a job guarantee and ii up or out in which agents are fired when unsuccessful we show that up or out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve when success is less hard to achieve standard promotion practices are optimal provided the payoffs associated with success are moderate otherwise up or out is again optimal

the structure of state corporate taxation and its impact on state tax revenues and economic activity abstract this paper documents facts about the state corporate tax structure tax rates base rules and credits and investigates its consequences for state tax revenue and economic activity we present three main findings first tax base rules and credits explain more of the variation in state corporate tax revenues than tax rates do second although states typically do not offset tax rate changes with base and credit changes the effects of tax rate changes on tax revenue and economic activity depend on the breadth of the base third as states have narrowed their tax bases the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues has diminished overall changes in state tax bases have made the state corporate tax system more favorable for corporations and are reducing the extent to which tax rate increases raise corporate tax revenue

assessing the effects of local taxation using microgeographic data we study the impact of local taxation on the location and growth of firms our empirical methodology pairs establishments across jurisdictional boundaries to estimate the impact of taxation our approach improves on existing work as it corrects for unobserved establishment heterogeneity for unobserved time varying site specific effects and for the endogeneity of local taxation applied to data for english manufacturing establishments we find that local taxation has a negative impact on employment growth but no effect on entry

excessive labour raiding final version received 24 july 2006 labour raiding refers to rms recruiting and hiring employed workers the literature on labour raidingsupports the idea that raiding sorts workers into their most productive positions i present a model wherean outside rm decides whether or not to pay to learn the match quality of an employed worker and theemployer decides whether or not to pay its worker a high wage that pre empts the raiding i show that theemployer may pay a low wage and gamble that it will not be raided rather than use a pre emptive wage this leads to an excessive amount of raiding

the layoff rat race we investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs after investments are made firms may have to lay off workers and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates greater skill investments especially in specific human capital contribute more to a firm s bottom line so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last we show that as long as workers bargaining positions are not too weak workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities indeed workers over invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough even though they only receive a share of any investment more generally we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms the probability that a firm will downsize and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy

general training by firms apprentice contracts and public policy workers will not pay for general on the job training if contracts are not enforceable firms may if there are mobility frictions private information about worker productivities however prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere their new employers then receive external benefits from their training in this paper training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion at these high wages only good workers are retained this signals their productivity and reduces the external benefits if they subsequently quit regulation of apprenticeship length a historically important feature enhances efficiency appropriate subsidies enhance it further

promotion signaling gender and turnover new theory and evidence we extend promotion signaling theory to incorporate gender and across firm mobility within and across job levels evidence from worker firm linked finnish panel data supports our theory for some groups controlling for worker performance inferred from performance related pay within firm promotion probabilities are increasing and wage increases from promotion are decreasing in educational attainment for some educational groups with results stronger for first than for subsequent promotions women have lower promotion probabilities than men and a greater sensitivity of promotion probability to educational attainment across firm promotions are rare but bring wage increases exceeding those for internal promotions and across firm lateral moves

relational knowledge transfers an expert must train a novice the novice initially has no cash so he can only pay the expert with the accumulated surplus from his production at any time the novice can leave the relationship with his acquired knowledge and produce on his own the sole reason he does not is the prospect of learning in future periods the pro t maximizing relationship is structured as an apprenticeship in which all production generated during training is used to compensate the expert knowledge transfer takes a simple form in the rst period the expert gifts the novice a positive level of knowledge which is independent of the players discount rate after that the novice s total value of knowledge grows at the players discount rate until all knowledge has been transferred the ine ciencies that arise from this contract are caused by the expert s arti cially slowing down the rate of knowledge transfer rather than by her reducing the total amount of knowledge eventually transferred we show that these ine ciencies are larger the more patient the players are finally we study the impact of knowledge externalities across players

employer learning productivity and the earnings distribution evidence from performance measures two ubiquitous empirical regularities in pay distributions are that the variance of wages increases with experience and innovations in wage residuals have a large unpredictable component the leading explanations for these patterns are that over time either firms learn about worker productivity but productivity remains fixed or workers productivities themselves evolve heterogeneously in this paper we seek to disentangle these two models and place magnitudes on their relative importance we derive a dynamic model of learning and productivity that nests both models and allows them to coexist we estimate our model on a 20 year panel of pay and performance measures from a single large firm the baker gibbsholmstrom data incorporating performance measures yields two key innovations first the panel structure implies that we have repeat measures of correlates of productivity as opposed to the empirical evidence on employer learning which uses one fixed measure second we can separate productivity from pay whereas the previous literature on productivity evolution could not we find that both models are important in explaining the data however the predominant effect is that worker productivity evolves idiosyncratically over time implying firms must continuously learn about a moving target therefore while the majority of pay dispersion is driven by variation in individual productivity wages differ significantly from individual productivity at all experience levels due to imperfect information we believe this represents a significant reinterpretation of the empirical literature on employer learning

as certain as debt and taxes estimating the tax sensitivity of leverage from state tax changes abstract using staggered corporate income tax changes across u s states we show that taxes have a first order effect on capital structure firms increase leverage by around 40 basis points for every percentage point tax increase consistent with dynamic tradeoff theory the effect is asymmetric leverage does not respond to tax cuts this is true even within firm tax increases that are later reversed nonetheless lead to permanent leverage increases the treatment effects are heterogeneous and confirm the tax channel tax sensitivity is greater among profitable and investment grade firms which respectively have a greater marginal tax benefit and lower marginal cost of issuing debt

asymmetric learning and the wage productivity relationship abstract a worker s current employer will typically acquire information concerning that worker s productivity that is not directly available to other potential employers a number of papers have considered this idea and argued that in such a setting these other firms will utilize the actions of the current employer as signals of productivity in this paper i argue that this perspective can explain the existence of puzzling results concerning the relationship between wage and productivity growth found in the classic studies of medoff and abraham 1980 1981

performance promotion and the peter principle this paper considers why organizations use promotions rather than just monetary bonuses to motivate employees even though this may conflict with efficient assignment of employees to jobs when performance is unverifiable use of promotion reduces the incentive for managers to be affected by influence activities that would blunt the effectiveness of monetary bonuses when employees are risk neutral use of promotion for incentives need not distort assignments when they are risk averse it may sufficient conditions for this are given the distortion may be either to promote more employees than is efficient the peter principle effect or fewer

corporate tournaments human capital acquisition and the firm size wage relation this paper provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed size wage effect and inter industry wage differences it develops a model in which incentives for workers to accumulate general human capital are provided by corporate tournaments where workers with the highest level of general human capital win promotions given that the prizes in such tournaments are determined by outside market conditions the investment and the equilibrium wages depend on firm and industry characteristics the model implies that workers in bigger firms and in more technology intensive and profitable firms and industries acquire more human capital and receive higher wages and benefits

turnover and promotion of lawyers an inquiry into gender differences this paper analyzes the turnover and promotion of male and female lawyers using data on two cohorts of lawyers one which entered law firms between 1969 and 1973 and the other entering between 1980 and 1983 this study considers whether law firm promotion decisions have differed for women and if so whether these differences have declined over time a competing risks duration model is employed to capture the link between the lawyer s decision to stay or leave and the firm s decision to grant or deny promotion we find that over the entire sample period women are considerably less likely to be promoted and slightly more likely to leave the firm without being promoted however we also find that the parametric differential between men and women in partnership hazards has been reduced substantially and in the most general of our specifications eliminated across the two cohorts in contrast the gap between male and female job turnover rates does not appear to change over time we find that the gap between males and females in the cumulative partnership rate at seven years of experience falls from 32 to 14 percent the turnover gap increases about 0 2 percent with females slightly more likely to exit from the firm in the later period

employment wage and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers this article offers an explanation of the postinjury employment wage and accommodation patterns of permanently impaired workers in particular it argues that the observed tendency of time ofaccident employers to rehire at the preinjury wage accommodate and then perhaps quickly terminate the impaired worker is a manifestation of the worker s preferred contract that contract is characterized by wage inflexibility by removing the opportunity for the postinjury employer to underreport productivity this contract creates an incentive for the worker to attempt to functionally adapt to the impairment thereby increasing expected lifetime utility

identifying the local economic development effects of million dollar facilities presented on february 22 2013 from 12 35 pm 2 00 pm in the architecture east building room 217 on the georgia tech campus

tax avoidance and business location in a state border model abstract previous studies have struggled to demonstrate that higher taxes deter business activity we revisit this issue by estimating the effect of changes over time in cross border differences in state tax conditions on the tendency for new establishments to favor one side of a state border over the other identification is enhanced by taking account of previously overlooked reciprocal agreements that require workers to pay income tax to their state of residence as opposed to their state of employment when reciprocal agreements are in force higher personal income tax rates lure companies from across the border while corporate income tax and sales tax rates have the opposite effect where reciprocal agreements are not in place the results are largely reversed these patterns are amplified in heavily developed locations and differ in anticipated ways by industry and corporate non corporate status of the establishment overall results strengthen the view that state level tax policies do affect the location decisions of entrepreneurs and new business activity but not in a way that lends itself to a one size fits all summary

enriching a theory of wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment human capital acquisition and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms in this article we extend that model in two ways first we incorporate schooling and derive further testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence second and more important we show that introducing task specific human capital allows us to produce cohort effects we further argue that task specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications we also discuss limitations of our extended approach

do economists swing for the fences after tenure using a sample of all academics who pass through top 50 economics and finance departments from 1996 through 2014 we study whether the granting of tenure leads faculty to pursue riskier ideas we use the extreme tails of ex post citations as our measure of risk and find that both the number of publications and the portion consisting of home runs peak at tenure and fall steadily for a decade thereafter similar patterns hold for faculty at elite top 10 institutions and for faculty who take differing time to tenure we find the opposite pattern among poorly cited publications their numbers rise post tenure

strategic promotion and compensation within a hierarchical firm structure this paper details how the composition of a worker s skills and the non observability of a worker s ability affect wage and promotion paths promotionbased compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker s asymmetrically observed ability promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker s ability conversely employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able but uneducated counterparts explanations for fast track promotions plans and other empirical regularities are provided

teaching new markets old tricks the effects of subsidized investment on low income neighborhoods abstract this paper examines the effects of investment subsidized by the federal government s new markets tax credit nmtc program which provides tax incentives to encourage private investment in low income neighborhoods i identify the impacts of the program by taking advantage of a discontinuity in the rule determining the eligibility of census tracts for nmtc subsidized investment using this discontinuity as a source of quasi experimental variation in commercial development across tracts i find that subsidized investment has modest positive effects on neighborhood conditions in low income communities though spillovers appear to be small and crowd out incomplete the results suggest that some of the observed impacts on neighborhoods are attributable to changes in the composition of residents as opposed to improvements in the welfare of existing residents

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

specific training sometimes cuts wages and always cuts turnover turnover falls with tenure but wages do not always rise and sometimes fall with tenure we reconcile these findings by revisiting an old issue how gains from firm specific training are split between workers and firms the division is determined by a stationary distribution of outside offers the lower the wage a firm pays to a specifically trained worker the more profit it makes but the more likely the employee is to leave the optimal time paths of wages and turnover show that if marginal product is increasing wages need not be increasing but it always implies a falling turnover rate

provision of a pure local public good in a spatial model with many jurisdictions abstract this paper examines the provision of a pure local public good in jurisdictions that are spaced evenly along an infinite line each jurisdiction either supplies the local public good or else its residents travel to another jurisdiction to consume the local public good the equilibrium spacing between jurisdictions which supply the local public good which can be uneven varying between a minimum spacing and a maximum spacing for given exogenous parameters can be greater than equal to or less than the socially optimal spacing