the effects of hospitals governance on optimal contracts bargaining vs contracting we propose a two stage model to study the impact of different hospitals governance frameworks on the optimal contracts designed by third party payers when patients disease severity is the private information of the hospital in the second stage doctors and managers interact within either a bargaining or a contracting scenario in the contracting scenario managers offer a contract that determines the payment to doctors and doctors decide how many patients to treat in the bargaining scenario doctors and managers strategically negotiate on both the payment to doctors and the number of patients to treat we derive the equilibrium doctors payments and number of treated patients under both scenarios we then derive the optimal contract offered by the government to the hospital in the first stage results show that when the cost of capital is sufficiently low the informational rent is lower and the social welfare is higher in the contracting scenario

a target group specific approach to green power retailing students as consumers of renewable energy an extensive body of literature exists on the obstacles that have to be overcome in green power retailing in this article target group specific marketing is evaluated as a strategy to increase the share of residential customers of green power a sample of students in the city of freiburg germany was interviewed in order to assess their awareness of environmental issues their willingness to change to green power products and to better understand individual hindrances in changing the power supplier the analysis shows that students are highly positive towards green power products but for several reasons difficult to reach in marketing campaigns aspects to be considered in addressing this consumer group include the students particular expectations towards green products their living conditions price sensitivity and their perception of the relative effort involved in changing the power provider

collusion under asymmetric information when applied to groups the revelation principle postulates a bayesian nash behavior between agents their binding agreements are unenforceable or the principal can prevent them at no cost we analyze instead a mechanism design problem in which the agents can communicate between themselves and collude under asymmetric information we characterize the set of implementable collusion proof contracts both when the principal offers anonymous and nonanonymous contracts after having isolated the nexi and the stakes of collusion we proceed to a normative analysis perform some comparative statics discuss our concept of collusion proofness and provide some insights about transaction costs in side contracting

network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers abstract this paper analyses two way access pricing in a telecommunications market where consumers are heterogeneous in their demand for calls and firms are allowed to use non linear tariffs we first investigate how the presence of access charges affects the tariffs offered by firms in symmetric equilibrium next we show that under certain conditions each firm s profit is independent of the level of reciprocal access charge and therefore collusion using access charges is not sustainable this result suggests that efficient call allocations can be achieved under a minimal regulatory intervention i e recommending firms set access charges equal to call termination cost

multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design abstract incentive compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents types are multidimensional two questions of monopoly pricing under multidimensional uncertainty are then analyzed first we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves and second we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist

competitive price discrimination we model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers the equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship u between profit and average utility per consumer public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on u f rom this perspective we examine the profit utility and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework we also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two part tariffs

an empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing abstract we estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional preference heterogeneity using individual level data on advertisements bought by local businesses e g doctors electricians from two yellow page directories in one u s city market variation in individual choices and payments allows us to identify the joint density of preferences marginal costs of publishing and common utility parameters our estimates suggest substantial welfare loss due to asymmetric information comparing duopoly outcomes with counterfactual monopoly outcomes we find that with less competition i producer surplus increases substantially ii more low type consumers are excluded iii product variety increases but benefits accrue only to the high type consumers iv total consumer surplus decreases v but its distribution across consumers does not change

the welfare performance of sequential pricing mechanisms consumers are commonly required to subscribe to particular tariff options before uncertainty regarding their future purchases gets resolved since the general comparison of welfare performance of different pricing mechanisms is ambiguous this article empirically evaluates the expected welfare associated with standard nonlinear pricing and optional tariffs by using information directly linked to the type of individual consumers results show that tariffs composed of nonlinear options do not necessarily outperform simpler pricing strategies in terms of expected profits furthermore evidence suggests that a menu of optional two part tariffs dominates any other pricing strategy from an expected welfare perspective

optimal multi unit mechanisms with private demands abstract a seller can produce multiple units of a single good the buyer has constant marginal value for each unit she receives up to a demand and zero marginal value for units beyond the demand the marginal value and the demand are drawn from a distribution and are privately known to the buyer we show that under natural regularity conditions on the distribution the optimal revenue maximizing selling mechanism is deterministic it is a price schedule that specifies the payment based on the number of units purchased further under the same conditions the revenue as a function of the price schedule is concave which in turn implies that the optimal price schedule can be found in polynomial time we give a more detailed characterization of the optimal prices when there are only two possible demands

is commodity taxation unfair abstract in a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences about consumption goods and leisure this paper studies how to combine commodity taxes and non linear income tax it proposes a particular social welfare function on the basis of fairness principles it then derives a simple criterion for evaluating the social welfare consequences of various tax schedules under the proposed approach the optimal tax should have no commodity tax for some range of consumptions and income redistribution would feature high subsidies to the working poor it is also shown that even when the income tax fails to be optimal commodity taxes may not improve social welfare

bundling information goods of decreasing value consumers average value for information goods websites weather forecasts music and news declines with the number consumed this paper provides simple guidelines to optimal bundling marketing strategies in this case if consumers values do not decrease too quickly we show that bundling is approximately optimal if consumers values to subsequent goods decrease quickly we show by example that one should expect bundling to be suboptimal

on the failure of the linkage principle in multi unit auctions it is shown that the linkage principle milgrom and weber 1982 does not extend to the multi unit auction setting an analysis of the equilibium bidding strategies is carried out for the general two agent two unit vickrey auction in order to provide economic insight into the nature of the failure in addition an explicit counterexample is provided both authors acknowledge support from the binational science foudation grant 9500023 1 reny also acknowledges support from the national science foundation grant sbr 970932 and the university of pittsburgh s faculty of arts and sciences

procurement when price and quality matter a buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure xed cost and marginal cost of providing quality we characterize the buyer s optimal buying mechanism we then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining scoring auctions can extract a signifi cant proportion of the buyer s strategic surplus the difference between the expected utility from the optimal mechanism and the e cient auction bargaining does less well and often does worse than the e cient auction

bargaining over a menu of wage contracts we investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions quality and wage the worker has private information about his type only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality wage contracts instead of single one we show that for all discount factors the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period our result shows that in multi dimensional bargaining the coase conjecture holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period but it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power

gaussian demand and commodity bundling in an important and widely cited essay adams and yellen 1976 examine the use of package selling as a price discrimination device they consider a monopolist producing two goods with constant unit costs and facing buyers with diverse tastes the marginal utility of a second unit of either good is assumed to be zero for all buyers the two goods are independent in demand for all buyers so that any buyer s reservation price for the first unit of either good is independent of the market price of the other thus the maximum amount any buyer would pay for a bundle consisting of one unit of each good is the sum of the two reservation prices and buyers are completely described by the values of those two prices 2 resale markets are assumed away in order to obtain comparative results for alternative pricing strategies the distribution of reservation prices in the adams yellen framework is assumed to be bivariate normal implications of gaussian demand are explored pure bundling is shown to operate by reducing buyer diversity thus facilitating the capture of consumers surplus it generally makes buyers worse off than unbundled sales it is more profitable if average reservation prices are high enough mixed bundling combines advantages of both pure bundling and unbundled sales and it is generally strictly more profitable than either bundling which treats goods symmetrically seems most attractive under symmetric reservation price distributions i am indebted to severin borenstein for superb research assistance to the ford motor company for research support through a grant to m i t and to the harvard economics department for housing me as a visiting scholar while most of this research was performed of course only i can be held responsible for this essay s shortcomings 1 the first clear recognition of this possibility seems to have been by stigler 1968 but also see burstein 1960 2 paroush and peles 1981 relax the assumption that consumers purchase at most one unit of each good but they consider only two types of buyers both with linear demand functions they retain the assumption that demands are independent for all buyers telser 1979 and phillips 1981 use different frameworks to analyze bundling policies spence 1980 explores the relation between bundling across commodities as here and bundling multiple units of the same

an optimal auction for complements abstract this paper considers the optimal selling mechanism for complementary items when buyers are perfectly symmetric the optimal procedure is to bundle the items and run a standard auction in general however bundling the items is not necessarily desirable and the standard auctions do not maximize revenue moreover the optimal auction allocation may not be socially efficient since the auction must discriminate against bidders who have strong incentives to misrepresent their true preferences journal of economic literature classification number d44

mobility housing and labour markets in times of economic crises this special issue addresses the effects of the most recent financial and economic crisis starting in 2007 on mobility housing and labour markets in order to learn some lessons for the future t

multiproduct price discrimination with quantity limits an application to zero rating abstract zero rating is a recent practice that allows internet providers to discriminate among contents focusing on the consumer side we show that a monopolist provider may implement zero rating in order to extract more surplus from consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for content this is akin to the practice of quantity discounts with one difference the monopolist screens consumer types by distorting not only the total consumption but also the composition of consumption zero rating may lead to an increase in network capacity and improve welfare

agglomeration effects on regional economic disparities a comparison between the uk and japan in this study the reason and cause of regional economic disparities in terms of per capita value added are investigated by comparing the uk and japanese regions special attention is paid to agglomeration effects on the differences of regional productivities the gini coefficients of per capita values added exhibit relatively higher levels for the uk regions than for japanese regions over the period 1995 2003 the cause of this difference is found to be in labour productivities rather than employment rates or labour per population furthermore a decomposition of labour productivity into main industries clarifies agglomeration effects on manufacturing and service related industry between both countries based on these findings the production functions are estimated by main industries and differences in agglomeration effects on industries between the two countries are examined taking a dynamic view of the changing disparities across regions an increase in regional disparities is associated with the cum

estimating demand for local telephone service with asymmetric information and optional calling plans in this paper i study the theoretical and econometric implications of agents uncertainty concerning their future consumption when a monopolist offers them either a unique mandatory nonlinear tariff or a choice in advance from a menu of optional two part tariffs agents uncertainty is resolved through individual and privately known shocks to their types in such a situation the principal may screen agents according to their ex ante or ex post type by offering either a menu of optional tariffs or a standard nonlinear schedule the theoretical implications of the model are used to evaluate a tariff experiment run by south central bell in two cities in kentucky in 1986 the empirical approach explicitly accounts for the existence of informational asymmetries between local telephone users and the monopolist leading to different nested econometric specifications under symmetric and asymmetric information the empirical evidence suggests that there exists a significant asymmetry of information between consumers and the monopolist under both tariff regimes all expected welfare components failed to increase with the introduction of optional tariffs for the estimated value of the parameters copyright 2002 wiley blackwell

dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation abstract we study the effects of renegotiation in an infinitely repeated screening model with long term contracts we propose a simple and tractable recursive formulation to study equilibria in which the monopolist s profit is maximized after every history we show that the monopolist sequentially screens high type consumers and characterize second degree price discrimination policies the monopolist s ability to extract rent from high type consumers by distorting the allocation of low type consumers vanishes as all parties become more patient as a result all distortions disappear and the allocation becomes efficient

young citizens knowledge and perceptions of bioenergy and future policy implications abstract in the past few years extensive discussions on bioenergy has been both positive and negative in europe the image of bioenergy appears to be low with lack of broad public support previous studies show that younger people are unsure about many issues surrounding renewable energy the aim of this study was to investigate the knowledge and perceptions of bioenergy among pupils in north karelia finland data drawn from 495 ninth grade students indicate that the majority of them lack in depth knowledge about different renewable energy sources including bioenergy only a small percentage has a high level of knowledge about bioenergy and the majority indicates critical perceptions of it statistically significant gender differences are not apparent girls appear to be more knowledgeable than boys results also show a clear urban and rural difference in perceptions of bioenergy perceptions of urban respondents being more positive than that of their rural counterparts developing collaboration between future bioenergy policies and bioenergy education for younger citizens is necessary for their engagement in critical debates on bioenergy

price and quality competition under adverse selection market organization and efficiency firms compete with prices and qualities in markets where consumers have heterogeneous preferences and cost characteristics consumers demand two goods which can be supplied jointly or separately by firms we consider two strategy regimes for firms uniform price quality pairs and screening price quality menus for each regime we compare the equilibria under integration each firm supplying both goods and separation each firm supplying one good integrating and separating markets change quality efficiency and welfare the theory illustrates phenomena such as the carveout of mental health and substance abuse coverage from general health insurance and creaming for low cost students in locales with school choices copyright 2003 by the rand corporation

earmarked taxation welfare versus political support abstract compared with the traditional public finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal agent setting is considered where taxing and spending are performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament we assume that the parliament either maximizes welfare or expected votes vote maximizers are more inclined to choose earmarking but at the price of inefficiently high costs

bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple good monopolist abstract multiple objects may be sold by posting a schedule consisting of one price for each possible bundle and permitting the buyer to select the price bundle pair of his choice we identify conditions that must be satisfied by any price schedule that maximizes revenue within the class of all such schedules we then provide conditions under which a price schedule maximizes expected revenue within the class of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms in the n object case we use these results to characterize environments mainly distributions of valuations where bundling is the optimal mechanism in the two and three good cases

incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non marketable good this good is valued by a single principal and there is a verifiable measure of the agent s performance crucially the agent is intrinsically motivated due to warm glow altruism in addition the agent s budget which is controlled by the principal must not be less than the monetary performance cost faced by the agent this gives rise to a limited liability constraint it also restricts the agent s ability to under report costs in such environment we determine the link between the agent s budget and performance our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal agent problem and to most in the literature on mission motivated organisations and public services provision

adverse selection without single crossing monotone solutions abstract the single crossing assumption simplifies the analysis of screening models as local incentive compatibility becomes sufficient for global incentive compatibility if single crossing is violated global incentive compatibility constraints have to be taken into account this paper studies monotone solutions in a screening model that allows a one time violation of single crossing the results show that local and non local incentive constraints distort the solution in opposite directions therefore the optimal decision might involve distortions above as well as below the first best decision furthermore the well known no distortion at the top property does not necessarily hold the results show that the decision can even be distorted above first best for all types sufficient conditions for existence strict monotonicity and continuity of the solution are presented a new necessary condition satisfied by such solutions is found an algorithm based on this condition can calculate continuous and strictly monotone solutions

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

optimal delegation with multi dimensional decisions this paper investigates optimal communication mechanisms in a framework with a twodimensional policy space and no monetary transfers contrary to the one dimensional setting if the conflicts of interests between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension the optimal mechanism never exhibits any pooling and the agent s ideal policies are never chosen simple delegation sets that trade off inflexible rules and full discretion are no longer optimal but take more complex shapes

the role of the agent s outside options in principal agent relationships abstract we consider a principal agent model of adverse selection where in order to trade with the principal the agent must undertake a relationship specific investment which affects his outside option to trade i e the payoff that he can obtain by trading with an alternative principal this creates a distinction between the agent s ex ante before investment and ex post after investment outside options to trade we investigate the consequences of this distinction and show that whenever an agent s ex ante and ex post outside options differ this may equip the principal with an additional tool for screening among different agent types by randomizing over the probability with which trade occurs once the agent has undertaken the investment in turn this may enhance the efficiency of the optimal second best contract

public goods with costly access abstract we examine the optimal allocation of excludable public goods with a private access cost that some consumers may not be able to afford the full information benchmark is presented first then individuals access costs and income levels are private information when high income consumers have low access cost asymmetric information increases the cost of subsidizing the poor for accessing the public good and inequality increases when the low access cost consumers have the lower income subsidizing the poor may involve countervailing incentives but inequality decreases finally monopoly provision exacerbates underprovision of the poor particularly of those with low access cost

political authority expertise and government bureaucracies by applying the revelation principle we focus on how a sponsor who possesses political authority could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts that is when they control information about the true costs of public services production our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement in a two types setting and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms we find that the agency is productively efficient under certain conditions the agency is also allocatively efficient while under others the low cost bureau oversupplies and the high cost agency undersupplies its output

mixed bundling auctions we study multi object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects we focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects the weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism this class contains efficient auctions pure bundling auctions mixed bundling auctions auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre packaged bundles for any number of objects and bidders both the pure bundling auction and separate efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling

dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller abstract this paper considers dynamic bilateral trade with short term commitment we show that when the seller is more patient than the buyer there exist systematic differences between the optimal selling and renting mechanisms while the former consists of simple price posting the latter induces the buyer to choose between a secure and a random delivery contract allowing for mechanisms more general than price posting reduces the seller s cost of learning the buyer s valuation in the renting case renting leads to more learning than selling but unless the horizon is sufficiently long only when general mechanisms are available our results contrast with the common view that the restriction to price posting is innocuous and that informational asymmetries are more persistent under renting than under selling

price discrimination and majority voting the theory of second degree price discrimination for group behavior mixes the difficulties of incentive theory with those of social choice theory we present a special environment where all these difficulties can be solved easily

bundling and competition for slots we consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots under independent pricing a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient when bundling is allowed each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient technology renting equilibrium always exists furthermore in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned all equilibria are efficient comparing the mixed strategy equilibrium with the technology renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer s surplus finally we derive clear cut policy

internal and external labor markets and the scope of the firm abstract the scope of integration is characterized in the context of worker learning about job preferences and adverse selection integration mitigates inefficiencies arising from incomplete information on both the demand and supply sides of the labor market worker learning about job preferences comes at a productivity cost which is important in how firms determine the scope of integration

approximation in mechanism design this paper considers three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them challenge 1 optimal mechanisms are finely tuned to precise details of the distribution on agent preferences challenge 2 in environments with multi dimensional agent preferences economic analysis has failed to provide general characterizations optimal mechanisms challenge 3 optimal mechanisms are parameterized by unrealistic knowledge of the distribution of agents private preferences this paper surveys positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques and their relevance to theory and practice

sellers with misspecified models principals often operate on misspecified models of their agents preferences when preferences are such that non local incentive constraints may bind in the optimum even slight misspecification of the preferences can lead to large and non vanishing losses instead we propose a two step scheme whereby the principal 1 identifies the model optimal menu and 2 modifies prices by offering to share with the agent a fixed proportion of the profit she would receive if an item were sold at the model optimal price we show that her loss is bounded and vanishes smoothly as the model converges to the truth finally two step mechanisms without a sharing rule like 2 will not yield a valid approximation

price and quality discrimination in durable goods monopoly with resale trading abstract we examine a durable goods monopolist s optimal dynamic price and product quality strategy when buyers are rational and can trade used durables among themselves in contrast to the usual credibility problem of the durable goods monopolist intertemporal quality discrimination introduces a time inconsistency problem of not raising prices against high valuation consumers who delay purchase for quality upgrades resale trading ameliorates this time inconsistency problem and allows the monopolist to effectively price discriminate especially when the buyers are patient the monopolist s optimal price and quality offers in the new good market exhibit complex dynamic patterns and new good prices can fall as product quality improves even in the absence of entry threats or learning economies initial quality distortions are followed by steady state quality allocations that are always efficient for the high valuation buyers but sometimes also for the marginal consumer types both the resale trading frequency and the price discount for secondhand goods are driven by the pace of strategic quality obsolescence in the new good market

multiproduct monopoly commodity bundling and correlation of values through what selling strategy can a multiproduct monopolist maximize his profits when his knowledge about individual consumers preferences is limited one possibility extensively studied in the context of a single good monopoly is to use quantity dependent pricing as a means of discriminating among customers with differing tastes see for example oi 1971 and maskin and riley 1984 an alternative technique for price discrimination first suggested by stigler 1968 and analyzed further by adams and yellen 1976 is for the monopolist to package two or more products in bundles rather than selling them separately through a series of examples adams and yellen illustrate that bundling can serve as a useful price discrimination device even when all consumers willingnesses to pay for each of the goods individually are unaffected by whether they are also consuming the other product a typical example is illustrated in figure i adapted from figure iv in adams and yellen where there are two goods three consumers ab c who consume at most one unit of each good with reservation values for each good that are independent of whether the other good is consumed and zero costs of production there a bundle offered at a price of 100 fully extracts all potential surplus which would be impossible pricing the goods independently unfortunately though these authors do not provide any general characterization of the circumstances in which bundling is actually a multiproduct monopolist s optimal strategy their examples however such as figure i create the impression that the profitable use of bundling

extracting consumer information rent by delaying the delivery of goods services abstract a firm can relax the incentive constraint and extract extra consumer information rent by delaying the delivery of goods services to the low type of consumers we provide a condition for profit increasing delays and comment on the related literature

the role of optimal threats in auction design abstract this paper studies revenue maximizing auctions when buyers outside options depend on their private information and are endogenously chosen by the seller we show that the revenue maximizing assignment of the object can depend crucially on the outside options that the seller can choose as threats depending on the shape of outside options sometimes an optimal mechanism allocates the object in an ex post efficient way and other times buyers obtain the object more often than is efficient

biofuels and economic development a computable general equilibrium analysis for tanzania abstract biofuels could offer new economic opportunities for low income countries we use a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model of tanzania to evaluate different biofuels production options and estimate their impacts on growth and poverty our results indicate that maximizing the poverty reducing effects of biofuels production in countries like tanzania will require engaging and improving the productivity of smallholder farmers evidence shows that cassava based ethanol production is more profitable than other feedstock options cassava also generates more pro poor growth than sugarcane based systems however if smallholder yields can be improved rather than expanding cultivated land then both sugarcane and cassava out grower schemes generate similar pro poor outcomes we conclude that in so far as the public investments needed to establish a biofuels industry are consistent with other development needs then producing biofuels will enhance economic development in countries like tanzania

damaged durable goods i analyze a durable goods monopolist s incentives to introduce a damaged good a stripped down version of the original good in an infinite horizon framework the damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the coasian time inconsistency problem however it may lead to a welfare reduction low valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low quality damaged good early rather than buy the high quality original good later and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions this welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework

intertemporal price discrimination with two products we study the two product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy we show that if consumers valuations are not strongly ordered then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date for general valuations we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling so we show that the established no discrimination across time result does not extend to two product sellers under standard taste distributions

durable goods with quality differentiation abstract we study the optimal strategy of a durable goods monopolist who can offer goods in different qualities the key finding is that the presence of the additional sorting variable further undermines the firm s commitment problem leading to results that contrast sharply with those of standard durable goods models or those of models where the firm can commit

multiproduct pricing made simple we study pricing by multiproduct firms in the context of unregulated monopoly regulated monopoly and cournot oligopoly using the concept of consumer surplus as a function of quantities rather than prices we present simple formulas for optimal prices and show that cournot equilibrium exists and corresponds to a ramsey optimum we then present a tractable class of demand systems that involve a generalized form of homothetic preferences as well as standard homothetic preferences this class includes linear and logit demand within the class profit maximizing quantities are proportional to efficient quantities we discuss cost passthrough including cases where optimal prices do not depend on other products costs finally we discuss optimal monopoly regulation when the firm has private information about its vector of marginal costs and show that if the probability distribution over costs satisfies an independence property then optimal regulation leaves relative price decisions to the firm

information exchange and distributional implications of price discrimination with internet marketing in agriculture a price discrimination model is proposed to explain why firms provide extraneous information on internet sites selling agricultural inputs whether an informative site is offered depends on price discrimination potential which depends on how much farmers reveal heterogeneity by internet behavior price discrimination is greater if information benefits are negatively correlated with farm size or other characteristics explaining why extraneous not product related information is offered on internet sales sites price discrimination adversely affects some farmers but may be beneficial on average because it generates free information outcomes depend on whether internet users are aware of price differentials on the basis of clickstream information

an empirical analysis of digital music bundling strategies we use panel data on digital song and album sales coupled with a quasi random price experiment to determine own and cross price elasticities for songs and albums we then develop a structural model of consumer demand to estimate welfare under various policy relevant counterfactual scenarios this approach represents an early application of the big data management paradigm within the media industries and provides managers with detailed guidance on optimal pricing and marketing strategies for digital music our results show that tiered pricing coupled with reduced album pricing increases revenue to the labels by 18 relative to uniform pricing policies traditionally preferred by digital marketplaces while also increasing consumer surplus by 23 thus optimal tiered pricing can yield a pareto improvement over the prior status quo additionally our results indicate that even without tiered pricing unbundling albums outperforms album only pricing policies that dominated the era of physical cd cassette sales this paper was accepted by alok gupta special issue on business analytics

dynamic bargaining in a supply chain with asymmetric demand information we analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product both firms are impatient and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached the buyer is privately informed about his type which can be high or low the high type s demand is stochastically larger than the low type s in the dynamic negotiation process the seller can screen whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers and the buyer has an endogenous and type dependent reservation profit with rational assumptions on the seller s belief structure we characterize the perfect bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game interestingly we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms relative patience and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first or with both simultaneously furthermore we explore our model to characterize the effect of demand forecasting accuracy on firm profitability we find that improved demand forecast benefits the buyer but hurts the seller when the buyer s forecasting accuracy is low however once the buyer s forecasting accuracy exceeds a threshold both firms will benefit from further improvement of the forecast this observation makes an interesting contrast to previous findings based on the one shot principal agent model in which improvement of forecasting accuracy mostly leads to a win lose outcome for the two firms and the buyer has an incentive to improve his forecasting accuracy only when it is extremely low this paper was accepted by yossi aviv operations management

increasing regional disparities in the 1990s the finnish experience kangasharju a and pekkala s 2004 increasing regional disparities in the 1990s the finnish experience reg studies38 255 267 this paper investigates why regional disparities in finland started to grow in the early 1990s after a decades long period of convergence the analysis focuses on per capita gdp and its subcomponents particularly labour productivity jobs and population the results show first that the evolution of labour productivity and the number of jobs account for the regional divergence of per capita gdp second even though interregional migration and fertility tend to have a convergent effect on regional per capita gdp its effect was not strong enough the divergence of productivity and jobs dominated third among divergent factors productivity and jobs primary production contributed the most to the divergence of per capita gdp during the recession of the 1990s and private services during the subsequent recovery one reason for divergence of the primary production sector may

collusion in organizations the principal agent theory developed in the 1980s has produced a large set of insights for understanding how contracts can be established within organizations this theory explains how a principal who offers a contract to an agent should structure this contract to overcome at least partially the asymmetries of information he faces by now optimal contracts with adverse selection or hidden knowledge with moral hazard or hidden action or with nonverifiability by a third party of some variables known ex post by both the principal and the agent are relatively well understood despite insightful extensions to multiagent or multiprincipal organizations this body of knowledge falls short of a comprehensive theory of organizations one major reason beyond the restrictive nature of the organizations studied lies in the noncooperative approach generally followed to model multiagent settings indeed in this standard paradigm the cooperation of agents desired by the principal can be induced by the contracts he offers to the agents each of them maximizing his own welfare given the behavior of the other agents what remains is that the principal has complete control of the game played by the agents unwanted communication or side contracting between agents can be prevented this is a rather unrealistic assumption contract theory teaches us that the principal structures the contracts so as to minimize the informational rents given up to the agents because of their informational advantages it is quite natural to expect a collective reaction on the part of the agents to protect their rents we need to understand how agents can react to the rules of an organization and beyond to understand how a principal who is aware of the incentives for collusion should design the organization modeling coalitional or collusive behavior and characterizing the regulatory responses to such behavior is a major task of organization theory the empirical relevance of this line of work is easy to establish a clear example is that of auctions for which the occurrence of cooperative behavior between bidders is a general and well documented phenomenon see porter and zona 1993

multiproduct nonlinear pricing typically work on mechanism design has assumed that all private information can be captured in a single scalar variable this paper explores one way in which this assumption can be relaxed in the context of the multiproduct nonlinear pricing problem it is shown that the firm will choose to exclude some low value consumers from all markets a class of cases that allow explicit solution is derived by making use of a multivariate form of integration by parts in such cases the optimal tariff is cost based

pricing on the internet it is often claimed that e commerce has created a more competitive environment by encouraging the entry of new online firms and by enabling buyers to search easily for the lowest prices the limited evidence that exists paints a mixed picture many online markets are advertising and technology intensive creating a tendency towards growing concentration price search is imperfect and firms can dampen price competition by increasing product heterogeneity and switching costs in many sectors online firms may come to acquire some market power we look at the forms of pricing that are likely to emerge in such markets including the greater use of price discrimination and auction like trading arrangements copyright 2001 oxford university press

unemployment volatility and regional specialization in the european union ezcurra r unemployment volatility and regional specialization in the european union regional studies this paper examines the link between unemployment volatility and the sectoral composition of economic activity in the regions of the european union over the period 1980 2004 to that end different spatial econometric techniques are used that allow the investigation of the role played in this context by spatial effects and geographical spillovers the results show that unemployment volatility is positively related to regional specialization in the european union this finding does not depend on the use in the analysis of absolute or relative specialization measures ezcurra r l instabilite du chomage et la specialisaiton regionale dans l union europeenne regional studies cet article cherche a examiner le lien entre l instabilite du chomage et la structure sectorielle de l activite economique dans les regions de l union europeenne entre 1980 et 2004 dans ce but on emploie diverses techniques econome

the power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design abstract we investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental bayesian optimal mechanism design problem a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to unit demand agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution when the agents preferences are single dimensional myerson s seminal work 1981 shows that randomness offers no benefit the optimal mechanism is always deterministic in the multi dimensional case when agents preferences are arbitrarily correlated briest et al 2010 showed that the gap between the expected revenue obtained by an optimal randomized mechanism and an optimal deterministic mechanism can be unbounded even when a single agent is offered only 4 services we show that when the agents values involve no correlation or a specific kind of positive correlation the benefit of randomness is only a small constant factor

multi attribute procurement contracts abstract we consider the design of multi attribute procurement contracts when the supplier possesses multi dimensional private information specifically we consider a buyer who must design a contract to procure a single product whose value is a function of two attributes the potential supplier s cost structure is two dimensional including one component for each attribute and is unknown to the buyer in contrast to the existing one dimensional models we find that in some cases the buyer can extract all of the channel profits without distorting the specifications of the final product and we identify conditions under which that will be the case in other words with more dimensions to leverage the buyer may be able to discern the supplier s type without paying any information rents thus reducing her procurement costs it is also possible that the buyer can extract all the channel profits by distorting the product specifications downward finally we demonstrate how our results can be extended to a setting with multiple customer classes where the valuation for the product attributes varies across the classes we find that greater differentiation in customer valuation leads to a setting in which the buyer is less likely to extract all of the channel profit without distortion

labor and capital income taxation fiscal competition and the distribution of wealth this paper studies optimum income taxation in a small open economy where households differ with respect to their endowments with wealth the government raises taxes on income from labor and wealth and a source tax on capital used in domestic production to avoid taxes households may at some cost shift capital to labor income and vice versa the government can only observe income after shifting has taken place it turns out that the optimal source tax on capital is negative the optimal income tax is characterized by a positive marginal tax rate for the wealthy households which is equal for labor income and income from wealth for the poor households the marginal tax rate on capital income is higher than that on labor income we also study international tax coordination and show that a reduction in the source subsidy on capital raises welfare

multidimensional bargaining under asymmetric information a buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade depending on parameter values a high valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value in the first case equilibrium trades are efficient in the second case the low valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity and there can be a one period delay in trade the quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero there exist equilibria that are independent of the seller s prior beliefs

haggling over substitutes abstract using a model of substitutable goods i determine generic conditions on tastes which guarantee that fixed prices are not optimal the fully optimal tariff includes lotteries that is a profit maximising seller would employ a haggling strategy we show that the fully optimal selling strategy in a class of cases requires a seller to not allow themselves to focus on one good but to remain haggling over more than one good this throws new light on the selling strategies used in diverse industries these insights are used to provide a counter example to the no lotteries result of mcafee and mcmillan j econ theory 46 1988 335

intention of agricultural professionals toward biofuels in iran implications for energy security society and policy abstract this research applies the health beliefs model hbm as a framework for understanding the intentions of agricultural professionals with respect to biofuels we argue that it is essential to understand these intensions as agricultural professionals play critical role as educators gatekeepers and stakeholders in the agricultural domain a face to face survey was undertaken in south western iran using a multi stage stratified random sample of agriculture professionals n 288 the reliability and validity of the instruments were examined and approved structural equation modeling showed that general beliefs regarding fuels and biofuels perceived benefits perceived severity self efficacy and cue to action are significant predictors of professionals willingness to support biofuels these variables can predict nearly 43 variance in professionals willingness the findings yield public policy implications for biofuel use and development support among professionals and provide preliminary support for the hbm as an effective framework for examining intention toward biofuels among agriculture professionals in iran

an analysis of dynamic price discrimination in airlines prices for the same flight change substantially depending on the time of purchase this article uses a unique data set with round the clock posted fares to document significant within day price variation labeling time variation as discriminatory is difficult because the cost of an unsold airline seat changes with inventory days before departure and aggregate demand expectations after controlling for these factors and aggregating hourly fares to have a framework with two consumer types we are able to identify a component that is largely consistent with dynamic price discrimination we find higher prices during office hours when business travelers are likely to buy and lower prices in the evening when leisure travelers are more likely to purchase as the proportion of business travelers increases closer to departure both price dispersion and price discrimination become larger we provide an alternative explanation for the observed within day price differentials which is related to edgeworth price cycles

revenue and efficiency in multi unit uniform price auctions abstract this paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform price multi unit auction with a positive reservation price i demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency or welfare in multi unit uniform price auctions i show that the higher the reservation price is the higher is the seller s revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi unit uniform price auction the reservation price increases the bidder s equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform price auction thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats e g the reservation price decreases efficiency in the vickrey auction and single unit auctions with symmetric bidders therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single unit single dimensional context to the multi unit multi dimensional one

robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition in robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition t roughgarden i talgam cohen and q yan revisit the classic bulow klemperer result this result compares the revenues of two well know

separating between unobserved consumer types evidence from airlines we propose an alternative approach to identify unobserved consumer types and assess whether firms price discriminate unlike other screening schemes that rely on quantity discounts or product differentiation in our finite mixture structure individuals have unit demands and the product is homogeneous we implement the model using an original u s airlines data set the results support the existence of two demand types the high type business traveler is less price sensitive has a higher valuation and pays a higher price than the low type tourist the proportion of high types also increases as the departure date nears jel c23 l93 r41

nonlinear pricing of information goods this paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information when both unlimited usage fixed fee pricing and usage based pricing are feasible and administering usage based pricing may involve transaction costs it is shown that offering fixed fee pricing in addition to a nonlinear usage based pricing scheme is always profit improving in the presence of nonzero transaction costs and there may be markets in which a pure fixed fee is optimal this implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing moreover it is proved that the optimal usage based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed fee a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed fee and nonlinear usage based pricing the introduction of fixed fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus the differential effects of setup costs fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described these results suggest a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules for instance in nascent information markets firms may profit from low fixed fee penetration pricing but as these markets mature the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage based pricing options minimum fees quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described and the implications of the paper s results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed

competition in the presence of individual demand uncertainty this article offers a tractable model of oligopolistic competition in differentiated product markets characterized by individual demand uncertainty the main result shows that in equilibrium firms offer advance purchase discounts and that these discounts are larger than in the monopolistic benchmark competition reduces welfare by increasing the fraction of consumers who purchase in advance that is without full knowledge of their preferences

contract negotiation and the coase conjecture a strategic foundation for renegotiation proof contracts what does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible this paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation proof contracts in this environment the model extends the framework of the coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods as frictions become negligible all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating efficient and straightforward to characterize

fair income tax fairness is a key concept in redistribution issues in this paper we study how particular requirements of fairness can shed light on the design of the optimal income tax schedule we consider a population of heterogeneous individuals or households who differ in two respects first they have unequal skills and therefore unequal earning abilities second they differ in terms of their preferences about consumption and leisure and as a consequence typically make different labour time choices both kinds of differences generate income inequalities we study how to justify and compute a redistribution income tax in this context redistribution through an income tax usually entails distortions of incentives but the resulting efficiency loss has to be weighed against potential improvements in the fairness of the distribution of resources we address this efficiency equity trade off here by constructing social preferences which obey the standard pareto principle in addition to fairness conditions

mixed bundling of two independently valued goods this paper develops analytical results and insights for the mixed bundling problem of pricing a product line consisting of two component goods with valuations distributed uniformly and independently in 0 a1 and 0 a2 respectively with a1 a2 and a bundle of the two goods this setting has previously been considered analytically intractable by deriving component good prices as exact algebraic functions of the optimal bundle price i reduce the multiproduct pricing problem to a univariate nonlinear optimization problem in the bundle price when the two component goods are sufficiently asymmetric in valuations the optimal solution is partial mixed bundling one component good is not sold separately for which i derive exact conditions and optimal prices an exact analytical solution is also given for mixed bundling of two information goods component goods with zero marginal costs for the general case i derive a closed form approximation of the optimal bundle price pb 0 5724w1 0 5695w2

the value of information and optimal organization the paper addresses the issue of optimal organization of production i compare three organizational forms centralization one agent produces difierent inputs decentralization each of the two agents produces a difierent input and contracts directly with the principal and delegation two agents produce difierent inputs the principal contracts with one of them only the optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity substitutability between the inputs in the flnal use the degree of complementarity substitutability also determines whether delegation is payofi equivalent to the two agent mechanism from the point of view of the principal in the context of delegation i consider which of the two agents should serve as the primary contractor i also address the issue of collusion between the agents in a decentralized organization and characterize the conditions under which a stake of collusion exists jel fields d2 d82 l23

biofuel policies and the environment do climate benefits warrant increased production from biofuel feedstocks abstract we examine whether climate benefits warrant policies promoting biofuel production from agricultural crops when other environmental impacts are accounted for we develop a general economic ecological modelling framework for integrated analysis of biofuel policies an economic model of farmers decision making is combined with a biophysical model predicting the effects of farming practices on crop yields and relevant environmental impacts they include ghg emissions over the life cycle nitrogen and phosphorus runoff and the quality of wildlife habitats we apply our model to crop production in finland we find that under current biofuel production technology the case for promotion of biofuels is not as evident as has been generally thought only reed canary grass for biodiesel is unambiguously desirable whereas biodiesel from rape seed and ethanol production from wheat and barley cause in most cases negative net impacts on the environment suggested policies in the us and the eu tend to improve slightly the environmental performance of biofuel production

the optimal income taxation of couples this paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples a multidimensional screening problem each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market but makes an hours of work choice and a secondary earner who chooses whether or not to work if second earner participation is a signal of the couple being better worse off we prove that optimal tax schemes display a positive tax subsidy on secondary earnings and that the tax subsidy on secondary earnings decreases with primary earnings and converges to zero asymptotically we present calibrated microsimulations for the united kingdom showing that decreasing tax rates on secondary earnings is quantitatively significant and consistent with actual income tax and transfer programs

bundling and optimal auctions of multiple products we study the optimal i e revenue maximizing auction of multiple products we make three major points first we extend the relationship between price discrimination and optimal auctions from the single product case to the multiple product case a monopolist setting prices for multiple products may offer discounts on purchases of bundles of products similarly the optimal auction of multiple products facilitates price discrimination by allocating products inefficiently to customers who are willing to purchase both products second we demonstrate that optimal auctions are qualitatively distinct from monopoly sales of multiple products because of uncertainty about the values of other consumers two products are bundled probabilistically in an optimal auction for a customer who is willing to buy both of them a customer may then receive a discount on a lower valued product without receiving a higher valued product third we show that in an optimal auction of two products the allocation of one product may vary with the amount of competition for the other product

posted pricing vs bargaining in sequential selling process we study the role of bargaining in a firm s sequential selling process the seller firm under consideration sequentially sells a fixed amount of stock to a random arrival stream of potential buyers who are heterogeneous in product valuation based on the stock level and the time to the end of the selling season the seller may dynamically choose either to post a take it or leave it price or to engage in bargaining with an arriving buyer we introduce a stochastic order called the scaled pricing order for the buyer s valuation distribution the scaled pricing order measures the average portion of trade surplus that the seller can obtain by posting a price for distributions with increasing length biased hazard rate checking the property of increasing decreasing scaled pricing order boils down to verifying the concavity convexity of the mills ratio we fully characterize the family of distributions that are invariant in the scaled pricing order which includes uniform and exponential distributions

optimal multi object auctions this paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects in the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object in which case the optimal auction is efficient the optimal auction takes one of two formats either objects are sold in independent auctions or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other the format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders in the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed and the optimal auction is then inefficient

optimal bundle pricing under correlated valuations abstract we study optimal pricing issues for a monopolist selling two indivisible goods to a continuum of consumers with correlated private valuations over the goods where the positive or negative correlation is modeled using copulas in the frechet family we derive explicit optimal pricing schemes and comparative statics results for various environments in our setting the optimal pricing schemes can take several forms including pure bundling partial mixed bundling and mixed bundling depending jointly on the degrees of asymmetry and correlation of the consumers valuations the explicit optimal pricing schemes also enable us to investigate whether and how the monopolist s profit can be further improved via random assignments