fighting with one hand tied behind the back political budget cycles in the west german states theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre election period only if fiscal transparency is low i argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering governments may increase spending on highly visible policies the composition of the budget serves as a second best strategy it increases political support without straining the budget balance an empirical analysis of the west german states reveals alternative electoral budget strategies and ultimately point to the importance of analyzing how governments choose between alternative fiscal instruments

an initial investigation into the impact of tourism on local budgets a comparative analysis of spanish municipalities abstract the spanish federation of municipalities has particularly since 2008 been vocal about a chronic deficit situation caused by high public expenditures in tourist areas within this context new strategies to increase revenues have been proposed including the introduction of tourist taxes this paper contributes to this debate by determining if tourism activity actually has a negative impact on local finances in spain to that end a comparative analysis of budget structures between tourism intensive and non tourism intensive municipalities is undertaken using data from more than 3200 local corporations for the years 2001 2010 the determinants of expenditures revenues and deficit per capita are identified using a linear regression the results indicate a direct relationship between tourism intensity and local deficits only in the smallest and largest municipalities while a beneficial effect is actually seen in the remainder of the sample in view of this evidence we recommend revising the existing regulations to allow for municipalities below 20 000 residents to be officially recognized as tourist municipalities so that they can benefit from that status in addition the option of introducing new tourist taxes should be more restricted in scope and depend upon further evidence of possible cost inefficiency in the affected municipalities

political cycles in oecd economies this paper studies whether the dynamic behaviour of gnp growth unemployment and inflation is systematically affected by the timing of elections and of changes of governments the sample include the last three decades in 18 oecd economies we explicitly test the implication of several models of political cycles both of the opportunistic and of the partisan type also we confront the implication of recent rational models with more traditional approaches our results can be summarized as follows a the political business cycle hypothesis as formulated in nordhaus 1975 on output and unemployment is generally rejected by the data b inflation tends to increase immediately after elections perhaps as a result of pre electoral expansionary monetary and fiscal policies c we find evidence of temporary partisan differences in output and unemployment and of long run partisan differences in the inflation rate as implied by the rational partisan theory by alesina 1987 d we find virtually no evidence of permanent partisan differences in output growth and unemployment

consensus consumer and intertemporal asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs le fichier attache est egalement edite dans les cahier de la chaire les particuliers face aux risques de l institut de finance de dauphine cahier n 7 mars 2007

asymmetric information and rational expectations when is it right to be wrong abstract in this paper we examine the effects of private agents being less than fully rational in their expectations we examine this in the context of monetary policy where the central bank may have uncertain preferences either by choice or by necessity the new feature is that we allow the public to react in two different ways they either form rational expectations and internalize the uncertainty about the central bank s preferences in full or alternatively and if this process of internalization is costly it forms a best guess regarding those preferences this implies a certainty equivalence strategy applied to the preference parameters as those parameters enter the decisions non linearly a systematic error emerges we examine the magnitude of the resulting error in inflation and output following the assumption of certainty equivalence under all reasonable levels of uncertainty this error turns out to be small but involves trading a deflation bias against the cost of gathering the information needed for the full information rational expectations solution

optimal investment under ambiguous technology shocks abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of a firm facing an ambiguous technology shock and the effects of the attitude toward ambiguity on optimal capital investment using the smooth ambiguity model of klibanoff et al 2005 although it seems intuitive that an increase in ambiguity aversion always reduces the optimal capital investment this is not necessarily true because the shape of the production function plays a key role in determining the effect under some conditions we show that the optimal amount of capital investment increases decreases in ambiguity aversion if the production function is substitute complement and that this result is counterintuitive when the production function is substitute furthermore our main results hold if we assume the maxmin preferences in ghirardato et al 2004

are those paid more really more productive the case of experience this study uses computerized personnel microdata on the white male managerial and professional employees at a major u s corporation to address the following question can the additional earnings which are associated with more labor market experience at a point in time really be explained by higher productivity at the same point in time our answer to this question based on both cross sectional and longitudinal information is that performance plays a substantially smaller role in explaining cross sectional experience earnings differentials and earnings growth than is claimed by those who have adopted the human capital explanation of the experience earnings profile this response depends critically on our assumption that the performance ratings which supervisors give to their white male managerial and professional subordinates adequately reflect the subordinates relative productivity in the year of assessment we present a great deal of evidence which strongly supports this assumption

a test of lazear s theory of delayed payment contracts according to lazear workers and firms enter into long term implicit contracts that discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract such delayed payment contracts are less likely to occur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker effort this paper uses data from the national longitudinal survey and the dictionary of occupational titles to test that hypothesis in particular it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions mandatory retirement long job tenures and high wages for older workers

political business cycles 40 years after nordhaus the aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following nordhaus s rev econ stud 42 2 169 190 1975 publication on political business cycles pbcs i first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground breaking contribution saw the light of the day i also present a simplified version of nordhaus s model to highlight his key results i detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth i then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on pbcs the actual research agenda finally i derive some paths for future research

a dynamic structural model for stock return volatility and trading volume an examination is made of an adaptive beliefs model that is able to roughly reproduce the following features seen in the data 1 the autocorrelation functions of the volatility of returns and trading volume are positive with slowly decaying tails 2 the cross correlation function of volatility is approximately zero for squared returns with past and future volumes and is positive for squared returns with current volumes 3 abrupt changes in prices and returns occur that are hard to attach to news the last feature is obtained because the law of large numbers can fail in the large economy limit

fiscal policy deficits and politics of subnational governments the case of the german laender the first part of the paper briefly describesinstitutional aspects of the german federal system andexamines the economic and fiscal performance of thegerman laender since 1970 taking into account theinstitutional settings especially the fact that thegerman laender cannot set tax rates individually wedevelop a highly stylized model of subnationalgovernments that do not have access to the tax rateinstrument and thus have to use expenditures as apolicy variable the model implies an expendituresmoothing policy of subnational governments andcomplements the famous tax smoothing model theempirical section examines whether governments ofvarious ideology show significant differences infiscal stabilization policy our results indicatethat regional differences in public debt accumulationand public expenditure policy in general is largelydetermined by interregional differences in economicperformance whereas we do not find any significantimpact on the ideological composition of the laendergovernments

uncertainty and risk in financial markets this paper considers a general equilibrium model in which the distinction between uncertainty and risk is formalized by assuming agents have incomplete preferences over statecontingent consumption bundles as in bewley 1986 without completeness individual decision making depends on a set of probability distributions over the state space a bundle is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all probabilities in this set when preferences are complete this set is a singleton and the model reduces to standard expected utility in this setting we characterize pareto optima and equilibria and show that the presence of uncertainty generates robust indeterminacies in equilibrium prices and allocations for any specification of initial endowments we derive comparative statics results linking the degree of uncertainty with changes in equilibria despite the presence of robust indeterminacies we show that equilibrium prices and allocations vary continuously with underlying fundamentals equilibria in a standard risk economy are thus robust to adding small degrees of uncertainty finally we give conditions under which some assets are not traded due to uncertainty aversion

equity premium and consumption sensitivity when the consumer investor allows for unfavorable circumstances abstract introducing one additional element due to possible misfortune to the return of each of two assets in the basic model of samuelson rev econom statist 51 1969 239 on optimum portfolio and consumption decisions this paper resolves both the excess equity premium and the excess consumption sensitivity puzzles this unified treatment provides a framework to study how important state variables will affect the change in aggregate consumption which is considered unpredictable in one formulation of the permanent income hypothesis the implications of the theory agree with empirical results reported here and elsewhere the theoretical framework appears to be simple and powerful as compared with alternative theories to explain the two puzzles

educational business cycles the political economy of teacher hiring across german states 1992 2004 strong institutional constraints and better informed voters may lead re election seeking incumbents to shift the use of political business cycle mechanisms away from monetary and fiscal policy towards other policy domains that are more easily manipulable targetable and timeable we investigate teacher employment patterns at the state level in germany and find strong evidence of cycling mechanisms in the form of electioneering and honeymooning against a backdrop of a continuously shrinking total teachers pool german state level incumbents accelerate the hiring of new teachers during election periods and partly reverse this during politically safer points in the electoral cycle cycles are mediated by issue salience heightened attention to german public schooling after the notorious pisa 2000 tests further strengthens the manipulation of new teacher hiring for electoral purposes

doubts or variability reinterpreting most of the market price of risk as a price of model uncertainty eradicates a link between asset prices and measures of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations that was proposed by hansen et al 1999 tallarini 2000 and alvarez and jermann 2004 prices of model uncertainty contain information about the benefits of removing model uncertainty not the consumption fluctuations that lucas 1987 2003 studied a max min expected utility theory lets us reinterpret tallarini s riskaversion parameter as measuring a representative consumer s doubts about the model specification we use model detection instead of risk aversion experiments to calibrate that parameter plausible values of detection error probabilities give prices of model uncertainty that approach the hansen and jagannathan 1991 bounds fixed detection error probabilities give rise to virtually identical asset prices as well as virtually identical costs of model uncertainty for tallarini s two models of consumption growth

a closed form solution for a model of precautionary saving this paper analyses life cycle consumption plans and distinguishes between temporal risk aversion and intertemporal substitution the results assume that felicity functions are quadratic and that income follows a linear model with normally distributed errors stochastic dynamic programming then yields closed loop linear decision rules certainty equivalence no longer holds but instead households play a min max strategy against nature one finds a rationale for precautionary saving and a larger sensitivity of changes in consumption to income innovations

the electoral budget cycle on municipal waste collection expenditure abstractthis article analyses the determinants of municipal waste collection expenditure specifically the effects of electoral cycles on municipal waste collection expenditure we use a database with information on spanish municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants for the period 2002 2011 our results reveal that incumbents adopt an opportunistic behaviour increasing spending on waste in the preelection year and reducing it in the election and post election years therefore we confirm an electoral budget cycle on waste collection expenditures in spain additionally we find that the levels of income unemployment and upper level governments transfers have a positive impact on waste collection spending finally population density level of urbanization average age of the population of the municipality and less fragmented governments negatively influence waste collection spending

discussion of robustness and pricing with uncertain growth hansen and sargent and a number of coauthors have recently initiated a research agenda that introduces the notion of robustness to model uncertainty or a concern with model misspecification into macroeconomics and finance methodologically they modify key techniques from the robust control literature in applied mathematics in order to allow for recursivity discounting and stochastic dynamics which are obvious ingredients of the conventional modeling paradigm in financial economics the fundamental idea behind robustness is that economic models are at best viewed as stylized approximations of reality rather than perfectly accurate descriptions thereof it is then natural to entertain the possibility that economic agents making decisions in these models share the concern for model misspecification that economists and econometricians routinely express when agents use a particular model as guidance in a dynamic decision problem and worry that this model might be misspecified one would expect them to insist on considering alternative models in order to obtain decision rules that not only work well when the particular baseline model is correct but that also perform reasonably well when the model is somewhat misspecified this is the sense in which the decision rule is designed to be robust the question of course is how agents go about considering alternative models and obtaining a robust decision rule given these alternative models in this article as in other work introducing robustness the agents are assumed to achieve robustness by considering a least favorable or worst case model that is similar to and statistically hard to distinguish from the baseline model worrying about a worst case distortion of the baseline model seems quite drastic first it should be emphasized that the least favorable model is endogenously selected from a set of models that are close to the baseline model where distance between models is measured by an entropy or likelihoodtype criterion and in accordance with a preference parameter that measures the strength of the preference for robustness 0 effectively the preference parameter 0 dictates how much confidence the decision maker has in the baseline model so that i indicates to what extent she is willing to consider 0

searching for political business cycles in germany one reslt of the revitalised literature on political business cycles is that there are signs in german data that elections and ideology have an impact however using monthly data for the period 1950 1989 and standard methods of time series analysis we reject both the nordhaus hypothesis of opportunistic cycles and the partisan approaches by hibbs ans alesina we show that some results are sensitive to the assumption of stationarity there are signs of policy cycles in m1 it is hard though to bring this in line with the rogoff hypothesis of rational opportunistic cycles because of the german institutional setting

running for office again evidence from portuguese municipal elections using a data set that covers all portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979 2005 this study performs an empirical analysis of the economic determinants of mayors decisions to run for another term in office the literature on the subject is mainly centered on the united states and as far as we know there are no papers addressing the economic factors influencing those choices

risk ambiguity and the exercise of employee stock options abstract we investigate the importance of ambiguity or knightian uncertainty in executives stock option exercise decisions we develop an empirical estimate of ambiguity and include it in regression models alongside the traditional measure of risk equity volatility we show that each variable has a significant effect on the timing of option exercises with volatility causing executives to hold options longer to preserve option value and ambiguity increasing the tendency for executives to exercise early

stochastic control for economic models past present and the paths ahead abstract on the 30th anniversary of a meeting between engineers and economists at princeton university to discuss the potential application of stochastic control methods to economics this paper provides a review of past present and paths ahead the events surrounding some of the key developments of the past are described along with a discussion of the present state of the research and of paths for future research the paper is structured around the primary methods for solving quadratic linear economic stochastic control models namely open loop classical control handcrafted feedback rules optimal feedback min max control optimal feedback rules with parameter uncertainty and dual control the paper also includes a discussion of software developments in economic stochastic control modeling

robust control of forward looking models abstract this paper shows how to formulate and compute robust ramsey aka stackelberg plans for linear models with forward looking private agents the leader and the followers share a common approximating model and both have preferences for robust decision rules because both doubt the model since their preferences differ the leader s and followers decision rules are fragile to different misspecifications of the approximating model we define a stackelberg equilibrium with robust decision makers in which the leader and follower have different worst case models despite sharing a common approximating model to compute a stackelberg equilibrium we formulate a bellman equation that is associated with an artificial single agent robust control problem the artificial bellman equation contains a description of implementability constraints that include euler equations that describe the worst case analysis of the followers as an example the paper analyzes a model of a monopoly facing a competitive fringe

saving and liquidity constraints this paper is concerned with the theory of saving when consumers are not permitted to borrow and with the ability of such a theory to account for some of the stylized facts of saving behavior the models presented in the paper seem to account for important aspects of reality that are not explained by traditional life cycle models copyright 1991 by the econometric society

equilibrium political budget cycles political business cycle theories generally rely on nominal rigidities and voter myopia this paper offers an equilibrium theory that preserves some basic insights from earlier models though with significant refinements the political budget cycle emphasized here is in fiscal policy rather than output and inflation it arises via a multidimensional signal process one can consider the welfare implications of proposals to mitigate the cycle and the effects of altering the electoral structure copyright 1990 by american economic association

political budget cycles the case of the western german lander this paper focuses on the issue of the electoral andideological cycles in state government budget for the elevenwestern german lander we verify this hypothesis over theperiod 1974 1994 for the following budgetary variables totalexpenditures surplus deficit administration health care education roads and social security benefits while overallour results seem to show that generally the party variabledoes not play a systematic role in spending decisions theyprovide some support to the opportunistic cycle theory showingthat the only relevant phenomenon is the effect of theupcoming election on the government spending inclinations

a theory of rational addiction we develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable they are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention our theory also implies that cold turkey is used to end strong addictions that addicts often go on binges that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction

continuous time smooth ambiguity preferences abstract this study extends the smooth ambiguity preferences model proposed by klibanoff et al 2005 to a continuous time dynamic setting it is known that the original smooth ambiguity preferences converge to the subjective expected utility as the time interval shortens so that decision makers do not exhibit any ambiguity sensitive behavior in the continuous time limit accordingly this study proposes an alternative model of these preferences that interchanges the role of the second order utility function with that of the second order probability to prevent the smooth ambiguity attitude of decision maker from evaporating in the continuous time limit by utilizing the utility convergence results established by kraft and seifried 2014 our model is eventually represented by the stochastic differential utility with distorted beliefs so that most existing techniques in economics and financial studies can be made applicable together with these distorted beliefs we give an asset pricing example to demonstrate the applicability of our model

model misspecification and underdiversification in this paper we study intertemporal portfolio choice when an investor accounts explicitly for model misspecification we develop a framework that allows for ambiguity about not just the joint distribution of returns for all stocks in the portfolio but also for different levels of ambiguity for the marginal distribution of returns for any subset of these stocks we find that when the overall ambiguity about the joint distribution of returns is high then small differences in ambiguity for the marginal return distribution will result in a portfolio that is significantly underdiversified relative to the standard mean variance portfolio

electoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities abstractelectoral cycles in public administration decisions evidence from german municipalities regional studies this paper provides evidence that there is an electoral cycle in public administration decisions using data from german local governments in the period 2001 10 specifically it finds that the number of building licences issued by the public administration significantly increases in election years this result is robust to various specification tests and to dealing with the potential endogeneity of the election timing

voting suffrage and the political budget cycle evidence from the london metropolitan boroughs 1902 1937 we study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the london metropolitan boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes taxpayer suffrage 1902 1914 and universal suffrage 1921 1937 we argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage taxpayer suffrage where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings on administration costs universal suffrage where all adult residents can vote irrespective of their taxpayer status creates demands for productive public services and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current spending

rationality and the political business cycle the case of local government the empirical results which have been reported support the hypotheses implied by the model of rational political behavior set out in section 2 in pre election periods local government development expenditures deviate significantly from their normal levels the extent of deviation is approximately 20

the economic crisis from a neoclassical perspective abstract this paper assesses the 2007 2009 recession using neoclassical business cycle theory i find that the 2007 2009 u s recession differs substantially from other postwar u s recessions and also from the 2008 recession in other countries in that lower labor input accounts for virtually all of the decline in income and output in the united states while lower productivity accounts for much of other u s recessions and the 2007 2009 recession in other countries i also find that existing classes of models including financial market imperfections models do not explain the u s recession this is because the 2007 2009 recession is almost exclusively related to what appear to be labor market distortions that drive a wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure a topic about which current classes of financial imperfection models are largely silent i discuss future avenues for developing this class of models and i consider alterna

recovery rates uncertainty certainly matters abstract previous studies identify default rate as the main systematic determinant of bond recovery rates we revisit this paradigm by investigating the impact of another factor economic uncertainty based on a wide sample of american default issues and relying on beta regression models well suited for the bounded heteroskedastic and skewed sample of recovery rates we analyze the determinants of recovery rate distributions we find economic uncertainty to be of paramount importance as it proves to be the most important systematic determinant of recovery rate distributions significant for both their mean and dispersion by contrast default rate remains a key determinant of the dispersion of these distributions but not for their means considering this evidence is critical to the sound implementation of stochastic recovery rate models used by financial institutions for the computation of regulatory capital

has japan s long term employment practice survived developments since the 1990s japan s traditional long term employment practice loosely termed lifetime employment once attracted much attention but its fortunes have not been tracked since the 1990s the authors use micro data from the japanese government s basic survey on wage structure to estimate permanent full time workers tenure patterns in the years during and following japan s decade long recession mean tenure they find grew for both genders between 1990 and 2003 the main explanation for this trend was a changing relationship between tenure and the attributes of workers and firms rather than changes in the attributes themselves although the importance of the latter increased for some women beyond the tendency at the mean the authors find substantial variation notably workers who had gained employment protection under the traditional system mostly in large firms saw larger gains in mean tenure than did other workers this divergence the authors suggest could eventually exacerbate lifetime income inequality in

precautionary savings and the permanent income hypothesis this paper derives the explicit solution of a dynamic stochastic optimal consumption problem for infinitely lived agents whose preferences exhibit in the presence of non diversifiable labour income uncertainty a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution and constant absolute risk aversion the constancy of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution which implies that marginal utility at zero consumption is infinite guarantees that the non negativity constraint on consumption is never binding along the optimal path the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion allows an explicit computation of human wealth and provides a simple representation of the precautionary savings motive

the electoral budget cycle this article begins with a review of the now substantial literature on the thesis that polticians manipulate governmental outputs so as to favor their chances of reelection it concludes that while this electoral cycle thesis was initially overstated by its proponents it retains more plausibility than recent critics have allowed this conclusion is then demonstrated through an analysis of expenditures by the ten provincial governments in canada between 1951 and 1984

robustly strategic consumption portfolio rules with informational frictions this paper provides a tractable continuous time constant absolute risk aversion gaussian framework to explore how the interactions of fundamental uncertainty model uncertainty due to a preference for robustness and state uncertainty due to information processing constraints rational inattention affect strategic consumption portfolio rules and precautionary savings in the presence of uninsurable labor income specifically after solving the model explicitly i compute and compare the elasticities of strategic asset allocation and precautionary savings to risk aversion robustness and inattention furthermore for plausibly estimated and calibrated model parameters i quantitatively analyze how the interactions of model uncertainty and state uncertainty affect the optimal share invested in the risky asset and show that they can provide a potential explanation for the observed stockholding behavior of households with different education and income levels this paper was accepted by neng wang finance

seniority wages and productivity a turbulent decade why does a worker s wage tend to grow with seniority in the firm and what does this have to do with productivity two decades ago neoclassical labor economists thought that the theory of human capital provided a good answer to this question the last decade has however been one of puzzles and doubt at this point few would give an unambiguous answer and much hinges on the answer an attractive feature of human capital theory is that it yields a consistent and coherent explanation for several aspects of the employer employee relationship for example seniority systems layoff policies that vary with skill and the relationship between tenure and turnover can be explained in terms of human capital the fact that these explanations are connected leads however to something like a domino effect doubts about one cast doubt on the others if the human capital explanation for the wage seniority relationship is flawed then human capital explanations for other phenomena may require reevaluation in addition an important body of empirical research is built around the assumption that at any point in time a person s wage indicates the person s productivity included here is the extensive literature on the human capital earnings function as well as work on labor demand market discrimination and compensating differentials that assumption has become controversial in recent years in part because implicit contract theories predict that compensation will be redistributed over the period of the contract if a person s spot wage has little to do with spot productivity but rather is an instrument of a complex insurance or deferred compensation scheme then a reassessment of the empirical research may be necessary

employment tenure and earnings profiles in japan and the united states comments the relationship between job tenure and annual earnings in japan has received considerable attention from social scientists examining employment contracts and the japanese compensation system in their widely cited article masanori hashimoto and john raisian 1985 using data for 1980 showed that japanese men have greater job tenure than comparable workers in the united states and that the earnings of japanese men rise more rapidly with increased tenure they found that an additional year of tenure increases earnings in both small and large firms in japan more than does an additional year of general market experience their results for the united states indicate that general market experience increases earnings more than an additional year of job tenure the 1970 s and 1980 s were a period of substantial change in japanese labor markets due to the rapid aging of the population and the restructuring of the economy following the oil crisis the present analysis extends the work of hashimoto and raisian by estimating earnings equations for japanese men for the years 1971 1976 1981 and 1986 specifically we wish to investigate whether hashimoto and raisian s findings have been stable over time or whether changes in the labor market have altered the importance of tenure relative to total labor market experience in the japanese labor market i changes in the labor market

is german domestic social policy politically controversial this paper investigates empirically the influence of government ideology on social policy using german data examining the funding and the benefits of social security and public healthcare policy my results suggest that policies implemented by governments dominated by left and rightwing parties were similar over the 1951 2007 period leftwing governments however spent more in the 1970s and rightwing governments did so after german reunification in 1990 since policy convergence encourages new parties to enter the political arena and party platforms on social policy matters are likely to undergo further changes in light of demographic change the observed pattern may thus be a transitory phenomenon

public spending interactions and local politics empirical evidence from french municipalities this paper aims at testing whether there exist spending interactions between french municipalities by estimating a dynamic panel data model our results suggest that there are some interactions between neighbouring municipalities as regards primary and investment expenditures a positive relationship between municipalities wage bill and un employment rates is likely to stress a rise of temporary employment in those municipalities that suffer from social troubles further the estimation results show that these interdepen dences also exist between cities whose mayors have the same partisan affiliation finally our results confirm the opportunistic behaviour of local governments which increase all categories of public spending in pre electoral periods

delayed payment contracts and a firm s propensity to hire older workers there are jobs for which firms employ older workers but tend not to hire new older workers this may be attributable in part to implicit contracts that discourage worker shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract such delayed payment contracts can introduce a form of fixed costs into the employment relationship much as with hiring and training costs these fixed costs lead firms to hire primarily young long term workers while firms employ older workers workers who are serving out the last years of their contract they tend not to hire them this paper presents empirical evidence that is consistent with this argument

election results and opportunistic policies a new test of the rational political business cycle model the literature on the rational pbc suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of reelection most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre election distortions in fiscal policy we propose a new test that explores the two way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory the test is implemented using a large panel of portuguese municipalities the results show that opportunism leads to a larger win margin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win margin is small these results are consistent with the theoretical model

how robustness can lower the cost of discretion model uncertainty has the potential to change importantly how monetary policy is conducted making it an issue that central banks cannot ignore using a standard new keynesian business cycle model this paper analyzes the behavior of a central bank that conducts policy under discretion while fearing that its model is misspecified the main results are as follows first policy performance can be improved if the discretionary central bank implements a robust policy this important result is obtained because the central bank s desire for robustness directs it to assertively stabilize inflation thereby mitigating the stabilization bias associated with discretionary policymaking second the central bank s fear of model misspecification leads it to forecast future outcomes under the belief that inflation in particular will be persistent and have large unconditional variance raising the probability of extreme outcomes private agents however anticipating the policy response make decisions under the belief that inflation will be more closely stabilized that is more tightly distributed than under rational expectations finally as a technical contribution the paper shows how to solve with robustness an important class of linear quadratic decision problems

seeing the forest through the trees a meta analysis of political budget cycles despite a vast number of articles the political budget cycle literature contains many conflicting theories and empirical results i conduct the first ever meta analysis of this literature in order to establish whether a link between elections and government budgets exists using data on 1198 estimates across 88 studies published between 2000 and 2015 i find evidence of a statistically significant yet substantively small increase in government expenditures and public debt around elections and reductions in revenues and fiscal balance using meta regression analysis combined with bayesian model averaging i find support for some of the context conditional theories in the literature although the findings of political budget cycles are robust to publication bias as well as some of the methodological and study specific choices authors are forced to make they also shed light on how certain decisions may affect a study s findings this has implications for current and future research on political budget cycles

the political economy of the german lander deficits weak governments meet strong finance ministers we analyse the deficits of the german lander regional states for the period 1960 to 2005 and test a number of hypotheses derived from the literature on the political economy of public deficits we find evidence for the weak government hypothesis that is coalition governments issue significantly more debt than single party governments a result that is typically explained by the common pool problem as our data suggest this result crucially hinges on the position or strength of the finance minister within coalition governments we find that coalition governments with a strong finance minister are in terms of borrowing not significantly different from single party governments in addition we find weak evidence for an opportunistic political business cycle as borrowing is significantly lower in pre election years it appears that german voters favour fiscal discipline there is no evidence for partisan behaviour so party ideology seems to play a negligible role

leaning against the wind during financial disruptions market makers provide liquidity by absorbing external selling pressure they buy when the pressure is large accumulate inventories and sell when the pressure alleviates this paper studies optimal dynamic liquidity provision in a theoretical market setting with large and temporary selling pressure and order execution delays i show that competitive market makers offer the socially optimal amount of liquidity provided they have access to sufficient capital if raising capital is costly this suggests a policy role for lenient central bank lending during financial disruptions

politics and business cycles in industrial democracies politics alberto alesina influences from political competition on macroeconomic policy are often thought to be a source of economic fluctuations politicians are described as being driven by two not mutually exclusive main motivations they want to be reelected and they harbour political or ideological biases when such theories are confronted with actual cycles in a number of industrial countries the pattern of inflation unemployment output and budget deficits indicates that partisan policy making is a fairly widespread phenomenon with more limited evidence that electoral preoccupations result in major fluctuations the combination of partisanship and electoral cycles may easily result in socially undesirable outcomes in particular the degree of politico institutional stability and the independence of the central bank have a bearing on macroeconomic outcomes these observations raise a number of important questions about the design of political institutions

robust permanent income and pricing i suppose there exists an extremely powerful and if i may so speak malignant being whose whole endeavours are directed toward deceiving me rene descartes meditations ii 1

the effect of mandatory retirement on earnings profiles in japan using data from the japanese basic survey on wage structure for 1981 and 1986 the authors estimate the effect of the age of mandatory retirement on the rate of growth of earnings with job tenure i

overlapping political budget cycles we advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing for cycles in expenditures for elections to the legislative and the executive branches using municipal data we identify cycles independently for the two branches evaluate the effects of overlaps and account for general year effects we find sizable effects on expenditures before legislative elections and even larger effects before joint elections to the legislature and the office of mayor in the case of coincident elections we show that it is important whether the incumbent chief executive seeks reelection to account for the potential endogeneity of that decision we apply an iv approach using age and pension eligibility rules

cagan s model of hyperinflation under rational expectations this paper studies p cagan s model of the german hyperinflation under the hypothesis that adaptive expectations are rational it shows that inference about the key money demand elasticity parameter a is very senstitive to the specification of the dynamic interaction of the unobserved money demand shock with prices and money in particular if t j sargent s 1977 specification is modified then his basic conclusions are overturned identification of a does not require prior knowledge about the covariance of unobserved shock terms and d ata on the german hyperinflation imply a sharp not loose estimate of a which is of plausible magnitude finally informal tests indicate that modifying sargent s specification gives rise to improved model fit copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the sensitivity of tests of the intertemporal allocation of consumption to near rational alternatives suppose a consumer sets consumption equal to income each period rather than following the optimal permanent income decision rule how much utility does he lose this paper finds that the answer is typically less than 10 cents 1 per quarter in environments specified by popular tests on aggregate data it includes calculations of the costs of excess sensitivity and excess smoothness to income and interest rate changes and the costs of ignoring information it concludes that the theory does not make predictions for aggregate tests that are robust to small costs such as information or transactions copyright 1989 by american economic association

portfolio choices and asset prices the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion we investigate the comparative statics of more ambiguity aversion as defined by klibanoff marinacci and mukerji 2005 in the context of the static two asset portfolio problem it is not true in general that more ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the uncertain asset we exhibit some sufficient conditions to guarantee that ceteris paribus an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset and raises the equity premium for example this is the case when the set of plausible distributions of returns can be ranked according to the monotone likelihood ratio order we also show how ambiguity aversion distorts the price kernel in the alternative portfolio problem with complete markets for contingent claims

disasterization a simple way to fix the asset pricing properties of macroeconomic models a central difficulty in economics is to create a model with both good business cycle properties and asset pricing properties i show how to solve this difficulty by a simple portable modeling device the disasterization of models take an economy with good business cycle properties and create a new disasterized economy which is essentially identical to the original one except that disasters can destroy part of the capital stock and productivity in such a disasterized economy asset prices exhibit high and volatile risk premia but macro variables remain unchanged perturbations of this benchmark allow for feedback from finance to macro

aggregation over time and the inverse optimal predictor problem for adaptive expectations in continuous time this paper describes the continuous time stochastic process for money and inflation under which cagan s adaptive expectations model is optimal it then analyzes how data formed by sampling money and prices at discrete points in time would behave this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

induced uncertainty market price of risk and the dynamics of consumption and wealth abstract in this paper we examine the implications of model uncertainty or robustness rb for consumption and saving and the market price of uncertainty under limited information processing capacity rational inattention or ri first we show that ri by itself creates an additional demand for robustness that leads to higher induced uncertainty facing consumers second if we allow capacity to be elastic rb increases the optimal level of attention third we explore how the induced uncertainty composed of i model uncertainty due to rb and ii state uncertainty due to ri affects consumption and wealth dynamics the market price of uncertainty and the welfare losses due to incomplete information we find that induced uncertainty can better explain the observed consumption income volatility and market price of uncertainty low attention increases the effect of model misspecification

public expenditures in canadian provinces an empirical study of politico economic interactions it is widely believed that government ideology and electoral constraints are two major factors that influence the level of public expenditures however frey and schneider argue that the effects of the two phenomena are not simultaneous only when a government is popular can it pursue ideological goals and when popularity is low energies must be redirected toward gaining support from voters to win the next election data draw from the canadian provincial case are used to test empirically this hypothesis the findings support the frey and schneider explanation