a model of product line design and introduction sequence with reservation utility abstract cannibalization is a major concern for a firm when designing a product line in addition external options from outside the firm s product line may also play a significant role in this paper we investigate the impact of external options represented by reservation utility on product line design and introduction sequence we find that a heterogeneous reservation utility defines the relative attractiveness of segments and corresponding product line b reservation utility makes it more favorable to introduce products sequentially rather than simultaneously c aggregating segments is an effective way to mitigate cannibalization when it becomes too difficult to manage with different values of reservation utility across multiple segments and d introducing products in a non monotone order of quality can improve profit from simultaneous introduction when the value of reservation utility of a middle segment is particularly high

managing supply uncertainty under supply chain cournot competition abstract we study the cournot competition between two supply chains that are subject to supply uncertainty each supply chain consists of a retailer and an exclusive supplier which has random yield we examine how the levels of supply uncertainty and competition intensity affect the equilibrium decisions of ordering quantity contract offering and centralization choice we show that a retailer should order more if its competing retailer s supply becomes less reliable or if its own supply becomes more reliable a supply chain with reliable supply can take great advantage of the high supply risk of its competing chain furthermore for decentralized chains we characterize the optimal wholesale price contracts with linear penalty under different supply risks and competition scenarios finally we show that supply chain centralization is a dominant strategy and it always makes the customers better off nevertheless if the supply risk is low and the chain competition is intensive centralization could actually decrease the supply chain profit compared with the case where both chains do not choose centralization this results in a prisoner s dilemma on the other hand if the supply risk is high and or the competition level is low centralization always increases the supply chain profit the desirability of supply chain centralization is enhanced by high supply uncertainty or low chain competition

evaluating renewable energy based rural electrification program in western china emerging problems and possible scenarios renewable energy technologies offer an economically viable and environmentally suitable scenario towards addressing energy requirements for rural livelihoods china s renewable energy rural electrification program initiated in 2001 is an effort to employ renewable energy technologies on a large scale for rural electrification the program has been designed with several stages this paper firstly offers an analysis of the problems encountered during the progress of this rural electrification program using data obtained from field survey of representative areas in western china where the first stage of the program was implemented the paper then explores feasible solutions in order to address existing rural energy issues and provide long term reliable energy service for remote communities in support of future course of development of renewable energy application for rural energy demands policy recommendations are provided

vertical governance change and product differentiation under decreasing component costs in deciding on whether and when to outsource component production firms should consider the trade off between total production costs and the ability to horizontally differentiate products we study the outsourcing decision in a duopoly under decreasing but uncertain market rates for components given that outsourcing increases the substitutability of the final products we find that there is at least one firm that eventually outsources component production because it cannot differentiate its product enough by in house production to justify the eventually higher costs the follower outsources at a lower market rate or may even remain vertically integrated the follower thus incurs the eventually much higher in house component costs longer while the low substitutability is enjoyed by both firms under endogenous roles firms thus engage in a preemption game to be the first to outsource we also find that firms generally outsource at lower market rates if uncertainty is higher but seek to preempt at remarkably higher market rates if substitutability remains low

scope economies market information and make or buy decision under asymmetric information abstract this paper presents a make or buy m b model in which a firm say firm 1 may produce in house or outsource a product to the unique vendor the monopolist in the outsourcing market demand for the finished product is stochastic and price sensitive and firm 1 s information forecast about the base market demand and corresponding precision are known when the m b decision is faced firm 1 is risk neutral and owns a constant return to scale technology while the vendor is risk averse and enjoys the advantage of scope economies a traditional solution is provided under perfect information under asymmetric information we demonstrate that when outsourcing is realized both parties expected profits increase with firm 1 s forecast accuracy only if the forecasted market demand is higher than the base demand i e good news outsourcing strictly dominates in house production if the yield of the vendor s production input is sufficiently low or its economies of scope are remarkably attractive furthermore it is optimal for firm 1 to hide information at first and decide whether or not to share information only after the vendor s supply price is announced however the vendor s profit is constrained by the trade off between the coordination effort for impelling firm 1 to share information and the advantages of its monopoly on outsourcing market low production costs as well as scope economies

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

full line or specialization strategy the negative effect of product variety on product line strategy abstract this paper studies the product line decisions of firms under two consumer segments differing in their quality sensitivity we focus on a negative impact of the product variety on the consumers motivation to purchase while each product is horizontally differentiated in the presence of this impact and high fixed costs relative to variable costs it is shown that when a highly quality sensitive segment exists it is always advantageous for the monopoly to specialize in only one product serving this segment however the appearance of a competitor can drastically change the product line in the market under the duopolistic setting where two firms sequentially determine their product lines we show that the leader gains a better financial result by offering its product to the low segment for many cases including the case where no product is offered to the high segment by either of the firms who are in equilibrium furthermore we obtain another interesting result that indicates that the follower s profit can exceed the leader s profit when the quality sensitivities between the two consumer segments are sufficiently different even though the two firms are symmetric except for the order of their product offerings

vertical mergers and product differentiation this paper presents an equilibrium theory of vertical mergers that incorporates strategic behaviors in the hotelling type location model this enables one to consider the relationship between downstream firms strategies for product differentiation and vertical integration i show that vertical integration enhances the degree of product differentiation of the integrated firm under some conditions partial integration arises in equilibrium which may increase the profit of the nonintegrated downstream firm the paper also discusses the welfare implications of vertical integration

on the irrelevance of input prices for make or buy decisions this paper demonstrates that input prices need not reflect the costs of an efficient incumbent supplier in order to induce entrants to implement efficient make or buy decisions because of strategic downstream considerations entrants may always undertake efficient make or buy decisions regardless of the prices at which they are authorized to buy key inputs from incumbent suppliers

equilibrium prices in the bertrand and cournot oligopolies abstract the equilibrium prices for the bertrand and cournot oligopolies with product differentiation are compared if all firms have linear demand and cost functions and if in addition the jacobian matrix of the demand functions has a dominant negative diagonal the cournot equilibrium prices are not lower than the bertrand ones the general condition for the comparison of the bertrand and cournot equilibrium prices can be derived even if the nonlinearity is involved in the cost and or demand functions

pricing and product line strategy in a supply chain with risk averse players abstract we study the pricing and product line strategy of a risk averse manufacturer who sells her products through a risk averse retailer we identify the conditions under which the manufacturer extends her product line or replaces the old product with a new product and find that i a higher retailer s risk aversion decreases the retail price but increases the unit wholesale price ii the manufacturer extends the product line if the price caps for both products are sufficiently high both her risk aversion and product substitutability are sufficiently low iii the manufacturer discontinues the old product if the relative price cap of the new product to the old product is sufficiently high her risk aversion is medium and product substitutability are sufficiently high further we find that i the decentralization of supply chain may increase product line length if the retailer s risk aversion and product substitutability are sufficiently high otherwise it may decrease product line length ii the endogenization of quality design increases the motivation to introduce a new product and iii the manufacturer extends or replaces the product line if quality cost is not too high

valuing investment decisions of renewable energy projects considering changing volatility abstract volatility is an important parameter when evaluating investments using the real options method for renewable energy investments the volatility of cash flow continuously changes because as new information and knowledge are gathered there is less foreseen variation this paper proposes an extended recombining trinomial tree model where the changing volatility is used to generate transition probabilities the changing volatility is generated using a consolidation process where multiple random variables including the market price of electricity carbon price and lending rate are integrated into a low dimension stochastic process a two factor learning curve is used to model the changes of investment cost we apply the proposed model to analyze solar photovoltaic pv power generation investment in china the results show volatility with changing feature compared with constant volatility changing volatility may advance investment decisions and change the project value complete grid parity policy in the solar pv industry is infeasible because the opportunity cost brought by the option of delaying cannot be offset the changing volatility may produce a lower and equally effective subsidy level compared with constant volatility a carbon emission trading scheme is helpful in advancing investments in renewable energy which is reflected in improvements in project value advancements in investment decisions and reductions in the required subsidy level

vertical mergers and market foreclosure ythe model in this paper illustrates three effects of vertical mergers when both stages are oligopolistic and vertically integrated and unintegrated producers coexist first the merging firm increases its final good output second the resulting backward shift in the residual demand curve facing unintegrated final good producers ylowers their demand for the intermediate good third the merged firm withdraws from the intermediate good market the increased concentration pushes the intermediate good price upward which effect dominates depends on market structure under some conditions a vertical merger causes the price of the final good to increase

preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology we study the adoption of a new technology to illustrate the effects of preemption in games of timing we show that the threat of preemption equalizes rents in a duopoly but that this result does not extend to the general oligopoly game if the gain to preemption is sufficiently small then the optimal symmetric outcome which involves late adoption is an equilibrium this contrasts with reinganum s result that in precommitment equilibria there must be diffusion we develop a new and richer formalism for modeling games of timing which permits a continuoustime representation of the limit of discrete time mixed strategy equilibria

outsourcing in a global economy we study the determinants of the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade we model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts the extent of international outsourcing depends inter alia on the thickness of the domestic and foreign market for input suppliers the relative cost of searching in each market the relative cost of customizing inputs and the nature of the contracting environment in each country

price vs quantity competition in a vertically related market this paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of cournot and bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two part tariffs in such a market downstream cournot competition yields higher output lower wholesale prices lower final prices higher consumers surplus and higher total welfare than bertrand competition

regulating platform competition in two sided markets under the o2o era abstract online to offline o2o services permeate our daily life and consumption along with the advanced technology in e commerce in this study motivated by taxi hailing market case we analyze the effect of government regulations on competition in two sided markets featured network externality under the o2o era first a model with hotelling specification is formulated to describe the competition in taxi hailing markets using subsidies as decision variables in the model platforms subsidize two sides agents labeled drivers and passengers and the subsidies are given based on whether a state of membership or every transaction second government regulations are introduced into the model by adding corresponding modification into agents utility and new consequent market equilibriums are compared with the benchmark status major findings of this work include i the effects of price adjustments regulation depend largely on relative size of mutual network externalities which causes a negative impact on social welfare except for extreme size level ii butt joint with official platforms brings down platforms cost in both sides so that companies make more profits where social welfare including consumer surplus and profits increases iii forbiddance setting in time limited usage scarifies a little economic effectiveness to ensure better safety

production costs scope economies and multi client outsourcing under quantity competition abstract two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi client outsourcing mco phenomenon analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers high in house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor under certain conditions if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria if both firms make decisions sequentially collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium furthermore the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of mco with regard to diverse market parameters finally it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when mco occurs this research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls supply chain cities and the china price

discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels a prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it fearing it will attract new rivals in this paper we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers can notably alter disclosure incentives as under prevailing views a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors however entry shifts the incumbent supplier retailer relationship the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner translating into lower wholesale prices this in turn can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products

manufacturers channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products abstract manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision namely whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary to address this issue extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing equally substitutable products however in reality many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity in this paper we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products following some recent studies we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function based on this model we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains cournot quantity competition bertrand price competition and bertrand cournot competition we find that brand equity substitutability as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures specifically in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity moreover when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability manufacturers tend to sell directly our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and bertrand competition

assessment of instruments in facilitating investment in off grid renewable energy projects abstract renewable off grid solution plays a critical role in supporting rural electrification however off grid renewable energy ogre project financing faces significant challenges due to limited financing access low affordability of consumers high transactions costs and etc various supporting instruments have been implemented to facilitate ogre investment this study assesses the effectiveness of those instruments with a framework consists of three dimensions feasibility sustainability and replicability the weights of each dimension in the framework and the scores of each instrument are assessed by expert surveys based on the delphi method it is suggested that all the three dimensions should be taken into consideration while assessing the instruments among which feasibility and sustainability are considered as the most important dimensions in the assessment framework furthermore the top 5 most effective instruments in facilitating ogre investment are local engagement in operation and maintenance loan guarantee start up grant end user financing and concessional finance developing countries that need to increase electrification such as most of the asean member states could use these top scored instruments despite of their limited amount of public finance

product differentiation in successive vertical oligopolies this is a successive oligopoly model with two varieties of a final product downstream firms choose one variety to sell on a final market upstream firms specialize in the production of one input specifically designed for one variety but they also produce the input for the other variety at an extra cost we show that as more downstream firms choose one particular variety more upstream firms specialize in the input specific to that variety and vice versa multiple equilibria may result and the softening effect of product differentiation on competition might not be strong enough to induce maximal differentiation jel classification l11 l13 l23

the cournot bertrand model and the degree of product differentiation abstract we consider a duopoly model with a cournot type firm and a bertrand type firm both survive and the equilibrium is stable when there is sufficient product differentiation with no differentiation only the cournot type firm survives and the outcome is perfectly competitive

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

bertrand vs cournot competition in distribution channels with upstream collusion abstract this paper applies repeated game theory to tacit collusion in dynamic distribution channels based on the grim trigger strategy we examine competitors choice of the strategic instruments in distribution channels comprised of two manufacturers distributing through two independent retailers respectively first the paper discusses the upstream manufacturers collusion incentives under different competition modes for downstream retailers and shows that the manufacturers collusion incentives critically depend on the retailers competition modes and the discount factor we then identify the endogenous competition modes in equilibrium we find that upstream collusion is easier to sustain under cournot competition than bertrand competition and it is least likely to be sustained under mixed bertrand cournot competition furthermore in equilibrium retailers can engage in bertrand cournot or mixed bertrand cournot competition depending on the discount factor and the degree of product differentiation this study provides the rationale behind the emergence of various modes of competition in practical dynamic distribution channels especially the recent mixed bertrand cournot competition mode finally the manufacturers collusion incentives and retailers competition modes jointly affect the manufacturers profitability and social welfare we also discuss how the manufacturers profitability and social welfare vary under different competition modes taking upstream collusion into consideration we find that upstream collusion increases decreases social welfare for complements substitutes

can vertical integration by a monopsonist harm consumer welfare abstract vertical integration by a monopsonist is generally believed not to harm consumers this paper demonstrates in a natural economic setting that this conventional wisdom may not hold we model one on one bargaining between a monopsonist and independent suppliers when the set of suppliers cannot be expanded easily ex post and show that a vertically separated monopolist is vulnerable to holdup without integration we demonstrate that a bottleneck monopsonist has an incentive to encourage more upstream entry than would arise in a pure neoclassical monopoly having more suppliers mitigates the holdup power of any one this however distorts the cost structure of the industry toward greater industry output and hence lowers final good prices vertical integration mitigates the hold up problem faced by the monopsonist it allows it to generate and appropriate a greater level of industry profits at the expense of consumers

bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty abstract substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination the majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains moreover a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain this paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty we consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies vertical integration vi manufacturer s stackelberg ms and bargaining on the wholesale price bw is the bargaining parameter over a single or infinitely many periods we show that in contrast to earlier literature using vivi vi in both chains is the unique nash equilibrium over one period decision while using msms or bw bw may be nash equilibrium over infinitely many periods

games with strategic complementarities new applications to industrial organization this paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization oligopoly pricing comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two stage games

coordinating investment production and subcontracting we value the option of subcontracting to improve financial performance and system coordination by analyzing a competitive stochastic investment game with recourse the manufacturer and subcontractor decide separately on their capacity investment levels then demand uncertainty is resolved and both parties have the option to subcontract when deciding on their production and sales we analyze and present outsourcing conditions for three contract types 1 price only contracts where an ex ante transfer price is set for each unit supplied by the subcontractor 2 incomplete contracts where both parties negotiate over the subcontracting transfer and 3 state dependent price only and incomplete contracts for which we show an equivalence result while subcontracting with these three contract types can coordinate production decisions in the supply system only state dependent contracts can eliminate all decentralization costs and coordinate capacity investment decisions the minimally sufficient price only contract that coordinates our supply chain specifies transfer prices for a small number 6 in our model of contingent scenarios our game theoretic model allows the analysis of the role of transfer prices and of the bargaining power of buyer and supplier we find that sometimes firms may be better off leaving some contract parameters unspecified ex ante and agreeing to negotiate ex post also a price focused strategy for managing subcontractors can backfire because a lower transfer price may decrease the manufacturer s profit finally as with financial options the option value of subcontracting increases as markets are more volatile or more negatively correlated

network competition ii price discrimination our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing this article relaxes this assumption and allows networks to charge different prices for calls terminating on the subscriber s network and those terminating on a rivals network this creates a price differential between services that are identical for the consumer and generates network externalities despite network interconnection we show that in both the mature and entry phases of the industry the nature of competition is substantially affected by such price discrimination

socio economic development and electricity access in developing economies a long run model averaging approach abstract access to electricity continues to be a popular subject in empirical studies however the choice of key factors related to electricity access in the literature to date has been ad hoc due to the lack of a theoretical framework this paper adopts a bayesian model averaging bma approach to selects important factors related to electricity access from 26 socioeconomic indicators using a sample of 48 developing countries and reveal their long term relationship with electricity access the bma approach allows us to identify the optimal empirical model when a theoretical foundation is not available moreover it allows us to address the relative importance of variables using posterior inclusion probabilities and thus has clear policy relevance our results show that access to finance education economic development infrastructure and industrialisation are positively related to electricity access in the long run although the long run relationship does not indicate causality it shows that to maintain this relationship policy adjustments against any deviations from the relationship are needed our study suggests that electrification needs not only economic educational and infrastructural development but also private sector participation governments commitment and political will and integration with poverty reduction and other development schemes

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

equilibrium vertical foreclosure the authors formulate a complete but analytically simple equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic of standard vertical foreclosure claims and the criticisms made of those claims the model includes incentives of the integrated firm and unintegrated input suppliers to exclude rivals and the potential holdout problem in this fully specified model vertical foreclosure can emerge in equilibrium copyright 1990 by american economic association

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

chain to chain competition on product sustainability this paper studies the game model of two sustainable supply chains under competition in product sustainability derives the equilibrium structures of the two chain system and generates the managerial insights when the supplier and manufacturer within the reverse supply chain are competitive the sustainability degrees demands and profits under three structures of this two chain system are analyzed it is found that although vertical integration is always a nash equilibrium it is pareto optimal only when the competition degree is low on the other hand a more generalized case for the former model is investigated when the supplier and manufacturer are cooperative in bargaining the wholesale price and the effects of bargaining power to the sustainability degrees demands and chain member profits are studied it is further shown that the structure of vertical integration channels is not an equilibrium unless the two sustainable supply chains are independent

reply to do returns policies intensify retail competition returns policies are common in many sectors of retail distribution padmanabhan and png 1997 showed that with demand uncertainty a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions wang 2004 showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive we show that returns policies do increase manufacturer profitability by attenuating retailer price competition when demand is low and intensifying competition when demand is high importantly this effect holds only in the presence of demand uncertainty further the conditions under which a returns policy raises the manufacturer s profit are weaker when retailing is a duopoly than when retailing is a monopoly this suggests that returns policies serve both to manage competition and mitigate demand uncertainty

durable goods leasing in the presence of exporting used products to an international secondary market abstract with the rapid growth of global trade used durable goods from wealthy countries increasingly find their way into the secondary market of less wealthy countries exporting used products to a physically separate market not only removes cannibalization for new products at home but also fetches additional revenue in this paper we investigate the implications of exporting used products to international secondary markets in the durable goods industry we find that such a practice may significantly stimulate new product lease on the home market an effect in which the market attractiveness and product quality are mutually reinforcing we discover that removing cannibalization pressure is more of a priority than generating additional revenue while exporting used products if the export is carried out by an agent who exports used products bought from oem original equipment manufacturer we observe the disadvantage of double marginalization in a channel structure which slows down export and causes quantity distortion and also reduces the effectiveness of government stimulus however if the agent and oem set export price based supply and demand equilibrium this reduces the quantity distortion one special characteristic of used products trade across borders is the involvement of governments on both sides of the border the government measures include penalties imposed on aging durable goods and trade barriers we find that legislation of penalizing used products on the domestic market can stimulate export but it does not have an intended effect of stimulating new products produced at home the channel structure worsens the problem

price negotiation between supplier and buyer under uncertainty with fixed demand and elastic demand abstract negotiation between a supplier and a buyer is complicated when they face uncertainty in addition the timing problem for them to reach agreement becomes more difficult when the buyer faces elastic demand this paper proposes a negotiation model representing a supplier and a buyer under uncertainty about the supplier s cost and the buyer s revenue when the buyer faces fixed and elastic demand the agreement thresholds the critical point for them to reach an agreement and trade zones the possible contract price scope between them are determined using real options approach comparisons of agreement thresholds and trade zones under uncertainty with fixed demand and elastic demand are made when the reliability of the supplier and the market risk are varied the results indicate that the agreement threshold is lower and the trade zone is wider when the buyer faces elastic demand the results also indicate that the agreement threshold becomes lower and the trade zone becomes wider when the reliability of the supplier is improved independent of the buyer facing fixed or elastic demand moreover with the market risk increasing the agreement threshold becomes lower and the trade zone becomes wider when the buyer faces elastic demand while the agreement threshold becomes higher and the trade zone becomes narrower when the buyer faces fixed demand the results of this paper could help a supplier and a buyer to make better negotiation decisions when facing uncertainty under different demand conditions

on the diffusion of new technology a game theoretic approach this paper is an attempt at a rigorous albeit not exceedingly general analysis of the diffusion of new technology in particular consider an industry composed of two firms each using the current best practice technology the firms are assumed to be operating at nash equilibrium output levels generating a market price given demand and profit allocations when a cost reducing innovation is announced each firm must determine when if ever to adopt it based in part upon the discounted cost of implementing the new technology and in part upon the behavior of the rival firm if either firm adopts before the other it can expect to make substantial profits at the expense of the other firm on the other hand the discounted sum of purchase price and adjustment costs may decline with the lengthening of the adjustment period as various quasi fixed factors become more easily variable therefore although waiting costs the firm more in terms of foregone profits it may save money on the cost of purchasing the new technology thus the firm must weigh the costs and benefits of delaying adoption as well as take account of its rival s strategic behavior

strategic investments with spillovers vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market abstract we analyse competition between two retailers of broadband access when they differ in their ability to offer value added services one retailer is vertically integrated and controls the input market for local access this firm invests to increase the input quality upgrading to broadband before an access price regulation is set we first show that access price regulation may lower consumer surplus and welfare if retailers do not differ too much second if the integrated firm s ability to offer value added services is much higher than that of the rival the integrated firm uses overinvestment as an alternative foreclosure tool

on the welfare impact of mergers of complements raising rivals costs versus elimination of double marginalization abstract a common view in antitrust analysis is that mergers of complements can have raising rivals costs and elimination of double marginalization effects with the net effect on consumer welfare thus unclear we revise this view in the context of a merger between a monopolist in one market and a duopoly producer of a complement good with linear demand and imperfect substitutability while such a merger increases the price of the monopolized component elimination of double marginalization dominates any raising rivals costs effects increasing consumer welfare we discuss a variety of extensions

a two echelon sustainable supply chain coordination under cap and trade regulation this paper analyses the decision behaviour and coordination mechanisms for a two echelon sustainable supply chain under a cap and trade regulation in a make to order setting carbon emissions are generated primarily by the downstream manufacturing process and the market demand of the supply chain is affected by two decision variables the sustainability level and the selling price the impact of the unit emissions trading price on the optimal decision variables in both centralized and decentralized systems is revealed the comparison of decentralized and centralized systems shows that the increase in total profit in centralized system is at most 1 3 that in decentralized system to achieve the same profit as the centralized system we consider two contracts to coordinate the sustainable supply chain revenue sharing and two part tariff contracts by analysing the conditions for a win win outcome we prove that only the two part tariff contract can lead to perfect coordination finally sensitivity analysis of the key parameters is undertaken as part of a numerical example illustrating the theoretical results

collaborate or consolidate assessing the competitive effects of production joint ventures we analyze collaborations in which two firms facing external competition reorganize to form an input joint venture as an alternative to horizontal merger under standard regularity conditions the collaboration can lead to higher profits than a horizontal merger though the effect on prices quantities and welfare depends on the form of downstream competition in light of our results regarding profits we provide reasons why firms might still wish to merge imperfect information cost synergies and organizational asymmetries we further consider how our comparisons change with the managerial structure of the joint venture i e by delegation of input pricing jel l13 l23 l42

downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose regulated wholesale prices are above costs we examine the consequences of allowing a bottleneck input supplier to vertically integrate downstream and compete with users of the input when the input has a regulated price above cost if the supplier maximizes the sum of short run profits from the downstream market and input market then allowing the vertical integration will increase social surplus even if it causes sellers of competing differentiated products to exit the market if the bottleneck supplier wishes to engage in predatory pricing increasing the regulated price of the input above cost reduces the incentive to engage in predation these questions are motivated primarily by assertions made in the public record that allowing bell operating companies into long distance can be harmful if access rates are above cost copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

contracting for software development software contracting is a multi faceted issue that involves legal economic managerial and technological considerations to better understand the economic aspect of software contracting this paper provides a summary review of software development contracts followed by a gametheoretic model developed to incorporate incentive and information issues associated with software contracting in the model an outside contractor is hired to develop a software system over multiple periods due to the uncertainties about costs or technology the developer faces the risk of having to abandon the project at an intermediate phase the user is better informed of the benefit of the system while the developer privately discovers the development costs as the project advances given the limited information the contracting parties make decisions in their own interest leaving each party vulnerable to the other s opportunistic behavior in this setting we construct a viable contract that aligns the incentives of the contracting parties and produces the same equilibrium outcome as in in house development we also relate the implications of the model to the actual contract cases

quality and competition in recent years the practitioner literature in operations management has seen a dramatic surge in articles on quality management it reflects the increased emphasis on quality by u s firms which has been attributed largely to increased competition faced by them the question of how quality is influenced by competitive intensity however has not received much attention either in the practitioner or the academic research literatures the notion of competitive intensity itself has not been defined precisely in this paper we develop formal models of oligopolistic competition to investigate whether equilibrium levels of quality increase as competition intensifies we consider three different competitive settings i asymmetric duopolistic competition where the dominant firm s intrinsic demand potential decreases ii a symmetric duopoly where the firms are precluded from cooperating in setting quality levels and iii symmetric oligopolistic competition where the number of firms increases we find that the relation between equilibrium quality and competitive intensity depends on what is understood by increased competition and in addition the relation is contingent on the values of parameters describing the cost and demand structure for the industry

leaders followers and equity risk premiums in booms and busts abstract we study an investment problem in which two asymmetric firms face competition and the regime characterizing the economic condition follows a markov switching process we derive the value functions and investment thresholds of the leader and follower the option value of regime uncertainty is found to be quite important for the investment decision of firms we also show the relationship between the equity risk premium and the economic cycle that has not been done in previous studies which proxy economic conditions by the level of demand or other state variables

competition and outsourcing with scale economies scale economies are commonplace in operations yet because of analytical challenges relatively little is known about how firms should compete in their presence this paper presents a model of competition between two firms that face scale economies i e each firm s cost per unit of demand is decreasing in demand a general framework is used which incorporates competition between two service providers with price and time sensitive demand a queuing game and competition between two retailers with fixed ordering costs and pricesensitive consumers an economic order quantity game reasonably general conditions are provided under which there exists at most one equilibrium with both firms participating in the market we demonstrate in the context of the queuing game that the lower cost firm in equilibrium may have a higher market share and a higher price an enviable situation we also allow each firm to outsource their production process to a supplier even if the supplier s technology is no better than the firms technology and the supplier is required to establish dedicated capacity so the supplier s scale can be no greater than either firm s scale we show that the firms strictly prefer to outsource we conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing that has not previously been identified in the literature

bertrand competition with subcontracting we investigate how the possibility of subsequently subcontracting production to each other influences rivals initial competition for a contract or a market as a two stage game in its first stage the two firms engage in price competition to supply a contract or a market in the second stage the firms may subcontract production to each other it is supposed that the firms produce the identical product with the same strictly convex cost function the incentive for subcontracting comesfrom the strictly convex production costs a firm is obliged to supply the entire quantity demanded at its quoted price our analysis discloses that if the winner of the game s first stage determines the terms of the subcontract in its second stage there exists a unique subgame perfect nash equilibrium spne in pure strategies in which the firms bid the same price in the first stage and both receive zero profits on the other hand if the loser of the game s first stage sets the terms of the subcontract in the second stage there exists a unique spne in pure strategies in which the firms bid the same price in the first stage and both receive positive profits the presence of the possibility of subcontracting supports a unique spne in pure strategies even though no actual subcontracting may occur the spne price is below the socially optimal price in the first case and is above it in the second case we also consider other modes of sharing the gains from subcontracting between the two firms such as the nash bargaining solution

outsourcing vertical integration and price vs quantity competition abstract we show that standard conclusions about duopoly competition can be reversed when the production of key inputs is outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power under such outsourcing bertrand competition can produce higher prices higher industry profit lower consumer surplus and lower total surplus than cournot competition in addition to limiting the intensity of retail competition bertrand competition can limit the extent of wholesale competition by reducing the incentive of retail providers to produce key inputs themselves

the economic effects of social security toward a reconciliation of theory and measurement abstract in this paper we argue that actuarial valuation of social security benefit streams is theoretically inconsistent with the assumption of pure life cycle motives instead we show that the simple discounted value of future benefits ignoring the possibility of death is often a good approximation to the relevant concept of value this observation motivates a re examination of existing empirical evidence concerning the economic effects of social security we focus our attention on studies of distributional equity and personal saving behavior in both cases we argue that the use of simple rather than actuarial discounting of survival contingent income streams produces results that differ dramatically from previous findings specifically estimates based on actuarial valuation may overstate the importance of redistribution between and within generations and may understate the depressive effect of social security on personal wealth accumulation by a factor of three or more

strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure abstract we consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival with linear input pricing at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship for either cournot or bertrand competition with a two part tariff for the input the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements but is reversed for cournot with strategic substitutes we analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival customer

a note on price and quality competition between asymmetric firms abstract this paper analyzes the impact of asymmetry between firms on the outcome of price and quality competition from a microeconomic viewpoint consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level therefore two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits the asymmetry arises from the difference in consumers loyalty to each firm that asymmetry then determines a character of differentiation between firms our purpose is to show how asymmetry influences competition under varying consumers price and quality sensitivity in doing so we extend earlier work in the area of price and quality competition we show that in both the moderately quality sensitive and price sensitive markets higher consumers sensitivity as well as lower consumers loyalty to any firm leads to intense competition resulting in a decrease of both firms equilibrium profits on the other hand in highly quality sensitive market asymmetry compels the smaller firm to change its competitive strategy in general this is more beneficial to the larger firm as the smaller firm s profit tends to decline in the worst case the smaller firm is driven out of business under equilibrium

incomplete contracts vertical integration and supply assurance this paper extends the analysis of transactions cost models of vertical integration to multilateral settings its main focus is on supply assurance concerns which arise when several downstream firms are competing for inputs in limited supply integration reduces supply assurance concerns for an integrating firm but it may increase them for others therefore to explain the scope of any firm one must consider the overall network of production and distribution relations three fundamental questions are addressed 1 what are the effects of different integration structures 2 what are the determinants of the socially efficient integration structures 3 in what way do equilibrium integration structures differ from socially efficient structures

the contractual nature of the firm for their helpful comments i am grateful to armen a alchian yoram barzel keith leffler john s mcgee and dean worcester 1 ronald h coase the nature of the firm 4 economica 386 1937 the paper however was written several years earlier see note 3 infra 2 the social sciences citation index provides the following information breaking down the period of 1966 80 into three five year periods the total citations of coase s firm paper for each subperiod are 1966 70 17 citations 1971 75 47 citations and 1976 80 105 citations

the interaction of public and private insurance medicaid and the long term care insurance market a long tradition in public finance examines how public programs can crowd out private activ ity in areas as diverse as education savings and insurance among others these studies typi cally focus on aggregate economic implications particularly for government expenditures and national savings in this paper we demonstrate that crowd out can also have an important effect on individual welfare specifically we show that the provision of even very incomplete public insurance can crowd out more comprehensive private policies by imposing a large implicit tax on private insurance benefits thus potentially increasing overall risk exposure for individuals we examine the interaction of public and private insurance for one of the largest uninsured financial risks facing the elderly in the united states long term care expenditures at 135 bil lion in 2004 long term care expenditures represented over 8 5 percent of total health expendi tures or all ages or roughly 1 2 percent of gdp moreover real long term care expenditures are projected to triple over the next 35 years due to rising medical costs and the aging of the baby boomers only 10 percent of the elderly however have any private long term care insurance and one third of expenditures are paid for out of pocket congressional budget office cbo 1999 cbo 2004 brown and finkelstein 2007 one potential explanation for the small size of the private market is that the public insurance provided by medicaid may crowd out demand for private insurance medicaid was designed to provide long term care insurance for the poor elderly mark v pauly 1989 1990 has established the qualitative result that as an incomplete but publicly funded source of long term care insur ance medicaid has the potential to reduce substantially demand for private long term care insur ance even among the nonpoor our work builds on this insight by quantifying the magnitude of medicaid s crowd out effect and the incomplete nature of medicaid coverage we also illustrate the mechanism behind medicaid s crowd out effect and are therefore able to assess the likely impact of alternative policies on private insurance demand we develop a utility based model of a 65 year old risk averse individual who chooses an opti mal intertemporal consumption path in the presence of uncertainty about long term care expen ditures we calibrate the model using data on the distribution of long term care expenditure risk common state medicaid rules and the prices and coverage of typical private long term care insurance policies

network interconnection in telecommunications this paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service two scenarios are considered i the case of a symmetric unregulated industry and ii the case of an industry with a dominant regulated incumbent in the first provided there is sufficient product differentiation it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit maximising outcome in the second a formula for the welfare maximizing interconnection charge is derived relations with the efficient component pricing rule are discussed

the quantity flexibility contract and supplier customer incentives consider a supply chain consisting of two independent agents a supplier e g a manufacturer and its customer e g a retailer the latter in turn serving an uncertain market demand to reconcile manufacturing procurement time lags with a need for timely response to the market such supply chains often must commit resources to production quantities based on forecasted rather than realized demand the customer typically provides a planning forecast of its intended purchase which does not entail commitment benefiting from overproduction while not bearing the immediate costs the customer has incentive to initially overforecast before eventually purchasing a lesser quantity the supplier must in turn anticipate such behavior in its production quantity decision this individually rational behavior results in an inefficient supply chain this paper models the incentives of the two parties identifying causes of inefficiency and suggesting remedies particular attention is given to the quantity flexibility qf contract which couples the customer s commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage below the forecast with the supplier s guarantee to deliver up to a certain percentage above under certain conditions this method can allocate the costs of market demand uncertainty so as to lead the individually motivated supplier and customer to the systemwide optimal outcome we characterize the implications of qf contracts for the behavior and performance of both parties and the supply chain as a whole

competition and cooperation in marketing channel choice theory and application this paper discusses the problem of choosing a vertical marketing channel in a product differentiated duopolistic market firms choose product price and the form of the marketing channel to maximize profits it is shown that integration of the marketing function results in greater price competition and lower prices than does the use of independent marketing middlemen the profitability of reducing price competition by using such middlemen is investigated two hypotheses that integration is negatively associated with the products substitutability and that symmetric channel structures are stable are tested in a preliminary way and supported with survey data from the international semiconductor industry

competition strategy and efficiency evaluation for decision making units with fixed sum outputs this paper develops a dea data envelopment analysis model to accommodate competition over outputs in the proposed model the total output of all decision making units dmus is fixed and dmus compete with each other to maximize their self rated dea efficiency score in the presence of competition over outputs the best practice frontier deviates from the classical dea frontier we also compute the efficiency scores using the proposed fixed sum output dea fsodea models and discuss the competition strategy selection rule the model is illustrated using a hypothetical data set under the constant returns to scale assumption and medal data from the 2000 sydney olympics under the variable returns to scale assumption

quality choice and vertical integration abstract we show that despite coordination in the quality level of the components that they provide independent vertically related disintegrated monopolists will provide products of lower quality level than a sole integrated monopolist further the integrated monopolist achieves higher market coverage higher consumer surplus and higher profits we establish these results for any distribution of preferences in the standard model of quality differentiation despite the lower quality we also show that for a wide class of cost functions price will be higher in a market of independent vertically related monopolists all results are the effects of the interaction of double marginalization occurring in the market of independent monopolists with the choice of quality

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

life cycle modeling of bequests and their impact on annuity valuation in this paper we introduce a linear bequest motive into a standard life cycle model both allowing for credit and annuity market imperfections first we characterize the consumption and wealth processes we find that consumption is non increasing in the linear bequest parameter for the simplest certainty case but that the same is not true for life span uncertainty second we study the issue of annuity valuation for a sufficiently strong bequest motive the true value of an annuity is equal to the actuarial value this invalidates a previous claim that for imperfect annuity markets it is close to the simple financial value c 2001 elsevier science bn all rights reserved

strategy research governance and competence perspectives business strategy is a complex subject and is usefully examined from several perspectives this paper applies the lenses of governance and competence to the study of strategy both the governance and the competence perspectives have had the benefit of distinguished antecedents they have also had to deal with tautological reputations i begin with the governance perspective with emphasis on the six key moves through which it has been operationalized i then examine the competence perspective in these same six respects governance challenges the competence perspective to apply itself more assiduously to operationalization including the need to choose and give definition to one or more units of analysis of which the routine is a promising candidate the research challenges posed by competence to which governance can and should respond include dynamic transaction costs learning and the need to push beyond generic governance to address strategy issues faced by particular firms with their distinctive strengths and disabilities a lively research future for these two perspectives individually and in combination is projected copyright 1999 john wiley sons ltd business strategy is an expansive enterprise not only do all of the functional areas in the business school relate but strategy is by nature interdisciplinary all of the social sciences especially economics and organization theory plus contract law are implicated indeed in the high technology arena where some of the most difficult strategy issues reside engineering and the law on intellectual property rights also have a bearing of the various approaches to the study of strategy this paper focuses on the governance and competence perspectives both perspectives combine economic reasoning with organization theory as between these two the governance

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

price and quality competition the effect of differentiation and vertical integration abstract this paper studies an instance of price and quality competition between firms as seen in the recent internet market consumers purchase a product based on not only its price but also its quality level therefore two firms compete in determining their prices and quality levels to maximize their profits characterizing this competition from a microeconomic viewpoint we consider two possible business strategies that firms can utilize to overcome the competition the differentiation and the vertical integration with another complementary firm we show an interesting result not seen in the well known bertrand price competition not only does the differentiation always increase the firms profits but also it can increase the consumer s welfare in a quality sensitive market we further derive that under some mild conditions the monopolistic vertical integration that excludes the combination purchase with a competitor s product is beneficial for both the integrated firm and its consumers

complementarities in organizational design and the diffusion of information technologies an empirical analysis we use a specially designed survey on french firms located in haute savoie to provide empirical evidence suggesting that information and communication technologies adoption is not only influenced by the traditional factors of technology diffusion but also by complementarity effects between strategies organization and information technologies the data collected permitted several advances firstly we could study authentic ict while the recent literature has mainly focused on computer capital stocks or automation tools secondly we constructed measures of the determinants put forward by the models of technology diffusion thirdly we studied three kinds of practices organizational and strategic practices technological choices

work health and income among the elderly contents include introduction and summary public policy implications of declining old age mortality aging the ability to work policy issues and recent trends occupational effects on the health and work capacity of older men involuntary early retirement and consumption life cycle labor supply and social security a time series analysis life insurance of the elderly its adequacy and determinant

preferences in the future environmental economics has been much occupied with the discount rate which is the value of future costs and benefits relative to present costsor benefits but at least as important is the question of whatshould be discounted that is what the value of those future environmentalbenefits is to future generations this paper analyzes the role for futurepreferences and discusses the state of knowledge i argue that theappropriate discount rate is the market one and that the real problemis determining future willingness to pay this approach makes clearerthe connection between discounting and the valuation debate this paper focuses on two features that have been prominent in that debate existence value and reference dependence i argue that thereis a vital connection between the two constructs and that this link yieldsimportant implications for future willingness to pay

capital as a commitment strategic investment to deter mobility abstract this paper analyzes how an early entrant in a market can exploit its head start by strategic investment the analysis is based on spence s paper investment strategy and growth in a new market bell j econ 10 1979 1 19 we frist study the investment game in the no discounting case which embodies the key features of mobility deterrence we establish the existence of a set of perfect equilibria and suggest that one particular equilibrium is most reasonable this equilibrium also valid with discounting involves the follower firm being forever deterred from investing to its steady state reaction curve in contrast to spence s proposed solution

manufacturer s return policies and retail competition manufacturers returns policies are a common feature in the distribution of many products the obvious rationale for returns policies is insurance practitioners not surprisingly have a different perspective and view returns as a cost of doing business in this paper we study the strategic effect of returns policies on retail competition and highlight its profitability implications for a manufacturer the setting for our research is the distribution of products with uncertain demand limited shelf lives and retail competition our objective is to provide a better understanding of when manufacturers should adopt returns policies the insights are obtained with a model based on the economics of strategy and decision making under uncertainty we show that when retailing is competitive and there is no uncertainty in demand a returns policy subtly induces retailers to compete more intensely the provision of a returns policy reduces retail prices without affecting wholesale prices thereby reducing retailer margins and improving manufacturer profitability the intuition is that with a returns policy cournot like levels of retail stocks cannot be sustained each retailer will order stocks so that it will not be constrained by stocks and so intensifying retail competition when however demand is uncertain and there is a single retailer a returns policy encourages the retailer to over stock and so decreases upstream manufacturer profits while the provision of a returns policy leads to lower retail margins the optimality of returns policy depends on the overall uncertainty and marginal cost a returns policy reduces the dispersion in retail prices between the high and low states of demand and the range of retail prices in the returns case is contained within the range of retail prices for the no returns case in the general setting when there are competing retailers and demand is uncertain there is a trade off for the manufacturer between the benefits more intense retail competition and the costs excessive stocking of a returns policy we find that a manufacturer should accept returns when the marginal production cost is sufficiently low and demand uncertainty is not too great to validate the results of our theory we conduct an empirical test with data from a major u s retailer the tests confirm our prediction that a returns policy intensifies retail competition and reduces retailer margins our theory and empirical test should interest practitioners and researchers in distribution especially those concerned with managing retail competition

industrial clusters knowledge integration and performance abstract scholars examining the phenomenon of industrial clusters have begun to regard them as social communities specializing in efficient knowledge creation and transfer in addition to neo classical arguments focusing on the advantages of localization we seek to contribute to this body of work by developing the argument that both the degree of knowledge integration between an industrial cluster s agents and the scope of their economic activities are key dimensions behind their economic performance we present a model that incorporates a hypothesized relationship between these three dimensions and argue that a formal test of this hypothesis constitutes a promising area of future empirical research in this field

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

on the efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria with product differentation in a differentiated products setting with n varieties it is shown under certain regularity conditions that if the demand structure is symmetric and bertrand and cournot equilibria are unique then prices and profits are larger and quantities smaller in cournot than in bertrand competition and as n grows both equilibria converge to the efficient outcome at a rate of at least 1n if bertrand reaction functions slope upwards and are continuous then even with an asymmetric demand structure given any cournot equilibrium price vector one can find a bertrand equilibrium with lower prices in particular if the bertrand equilibrium is unique then it has lower prices than any cournot equilibrium

competition and cooperation between supply chains in multi objective petroleum green supply chain a game theoretic approach petroleum supply chain is one of the most important and sophisticated managing missions in both developing and developed countries nowadays environmental pollution is another critical factor in designing the petroleum supply chain this importance encourages the governments to minimize the amount of environmental pollution and maximize their obtained profit simultaneously by enacting required legislations on the transportation modes and the refineries considering maximizing the job creation and each stakeholder s profit and minimizing the emission of co2 and other greenhouse gases at the same time is called sustainable petroleum supply chain which has been paid little attention despite its significance therefore the modelling of petroleum supply chain considering sustainability and pricing issues is investigated for the first time in this work and a sustainable competitive petroleum supply chain scpsc model is developed to minimize pollution while maximizing the profits and job creation this problem is a two level model the first level in scpsc is the competition between the supply chains of the government and the private sectors which is modelled by the game theory approach including nash and stackelberg equilibria the optimal price and demand for each supply chain determined in the first level are considered as the second level parameters in the second level the optimal values of the decisions in designing the petroleum supply chain will be obtained by solving mixed integer linear programming milp under the mentioned three objective functions finally the proposed model is applied to a real world case in the national iranian oil company nioc based on the results of the stackelberg equilibrium the government profits increase by 11 12 while that of the private sector decreases by 25 4 and 28 11 increasing in the government profit is due to increased demand provided by government the results show that the whole profit of the petroleum supply chain in nash equilibrium is 9 8 more than that in the stackelberg equilibrium

performance measures and metrics in outsourcing decisions a review for research and applications outsourcing an operations strategy that influences the performance of a supply chain has become an important component of global operations management an effective global sourcing strategy helps companies to manage the flow of parts and finished products in meeting the needs of overseas and domestic markets outsourcing reduces the cost of assets facilitates core competencies to reduce production costs leads to strategic flexibility and reduces administrative and overhead costs some of the reasons why companies are against outsourcing include integration challenges sacrificing their competitive base opportunistic behaviour rising transaction and coordination costs limited innovation and higher procurement costs despite these shortcomings outsourcing will continue to play an important role in enhancing organizational competitiveness therefore an attempt has been made to review the literature on outsourcing with particular reference to performance measures and metrics pmms used in arriving at outsourcing decisions the main objective of this paper is to present a taxonomy classification of pmms in outsourcing decisions at the pre outsourcing during outsourcing and post outsourcing stages also based on the literature review and analysis an attempt is made to determine a list of specific tools and techniques for pmms in outsourcing finally the limitations of the paper and future research directions are presented

how to compete cournot versus bertrand in a vertical structure with an integrated input supplier we study whether a quantity or a price contract is chosen at equilibrium by one integrated firm and its retail competitor in a differentiated duopoly using a similar vertical structure arya et al 2008 show that bertrand competition is more profitable than cournot competition which contrasts with conventional wisdom in this article we first demonstrate that such a result is robust to the endogenous determination of the type of contract second by introducing managerial incentives in the model we find that delegation to managers may lead each firm to choose a quantity contract and as long as products are sufficiently differentiated entails conflicting choices causing nonexistence of equilibrium in pure strategies significantly high product substitutability reconciles firms objectives under delegation leading unique or multiple equilibria with symmetric types of contracts to arise

wind electricity in denmark a survey of policies their effectiveness and factors motivating their introduction this paper surveys the development of the policies supporting the introduction of wind electricity in denmark in the last 15 years with special attention to the new policy introduced after a 2 year long debate the aim of this paper is to explore the roles of financial support policy certainty and planning constraints in the diffusion of wind electricity in denmark and the reasons prompting the change of the system in the current decade it is discovered that political uncertainty has badly affected the effectiveness of the feed in law in the years immediately after its introduction with regard to the new system it is concluded that the change has been prompted by generous conditions under the feed in law and by the desire to facilitate the modernisation of old turbines it is also concluded that incentive based systems can be more effective than tradable quotas in promoting the modernisation of renewable plants this finding is relevant to the development of energy policy in countries such as germany and spain where the average age of wind turbines is much younger than those existing in denmark

network competition i overview and nondiscriminatory pricing we develop a model of unregulated competition between interconnected networks and analyze the mature and transition phases of the industry in this deregulated environ ment networks pay negotiated or regulated access charges to each other and com pete in prices for customers we show that a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for large access charges or for large network substitutability and that freely negotiated access charges may prevent effective competition in the mature phase of the industry and erect barriers to entry in the transition toward competition last we examine the meaning and impact of policies such as the efficient component pricing rule

capabilities transaction costs and firm boundaries although the literature on firm boundaries has been greatly influenced by transaction cost economics strategy scholars often emphasize the importance of capabilities considerations in these decisions this has led to a debate that we suggest has generated more heat than light we argue that the two sets of considerations are in fact so intertwined dynamically that treating them as independent competitive explanations is fundamentally misleading we offer a theoretical synthesis of transaction cost and capabilities approaches to firm boundaries that seeks to overcome each approach s limitations and provides a unified and logically consistent understanding of boundary decisions