stabilization policy a reconsideration i introduction in 1936 keynes s general theory explained how fiscal and monetary policy could be used to end depressions since that time no developed country has ever seen a downturn on the scale of the 1930s the general theory was not just a how to book on the avoidance of depressions it was an argument for stabilization policy itself the years since the general theory have seen a revolt against keynesian economics in a revisionist mode milton friedman argued that countercyclical policy cannot affect the average level of unemployment and output robert lucas and thomas sargent 1979 went further contending that it is not only impossible to increase average output it is also impossible to stabilize it more recently lucas 1987 2003 has argued that policies to stabilize output even if effective would yield negligible welfare gains thus stabilization policy should not be a macroeconomic priority lucas s conclusion notwithstanding stabilization policy has long been an explicit or implicit objective of monetary policy in most industrial countries even including those countries with inflation targets the volatility of output has in fact declined in most major industrial countries since the mid 1980s and monetary policy arguably deserves at least partial credit see bernanke 2004 mirroring practice monetary policy research commonly takes it as given that along with price stability stabilization policy the minimization of squared deviations of output around potential is an appropriate policy objective see for example clarida et al 1999 in this article we explore the economic rationale for stabilization as a policy goal concluding that it does in fact deserve high policy priority we survey a large body of literature that critiques the validity of key assumptions in lucas s argument we also offer suggestive evidence that stabilization policy can significantly reduce average levels of unemployment by providing stimulus to demand in circumstances where unemployment is high but underutilization of labor and capital does little to lower inflation a monetary policy that vigorously fights high unemployment should however also be complemented by a policy that equally vigorously fights inflation when it rises above a modest target level the federal reserve act thus wisely enunciated price stability and maximum employment as twin goals for monetary policy ii the case against stabilization policy macroeconomic analysis typically assumes that social welfare depends negatively on both inflation above a modest target level here assumed zero and unemployment above some minimum socially efficient level for example a standard social welfare function is the discounted sum of period losses l sub t of the form see among others barro and gordon 1983 pp 592 93 1 l sub t a u sub t 1 k u sup 2 b pi sup 2 sub t where u sub t and pi sub t are the unemployment and inflation rates in period t and u sup is the natural rate of unemployment the coefficient k is positive reflecting the desirability of unemployment below the natural rate because real economies deviate in many respects from perfect competition the natural rate of unemployment is likely to exceed the socially optimal unemployment rate for example with monopolistic competition goods are underproduced because they are priced above marginal cost so potential output is inefficiently low and equilibrium unemployment is too high standard macroeconomic analysis additionally assumes that inflation is determined by an expectations augmented accelerationist phillips curve of the form 2 pi sub t pi sup e sub t f u sub t u sup epsilon sub t where pi sup e sub t is the expected inflation rate at time t with expectations formed at t 1 and epsilon sub t captures supply shocks to the phillips curve at t

money still makes the world go round the zonal view many leading monetary economists have come to regard the monetary aggregates as obsolete measures of the monetary policy stance this critique has led some to view money as having lost its central role in the conduct of monetary policy we say to those advocating excising money from monetary policy not so fast to better understand the potential role for money we develop a zonal view of monetary policy which reflects the historical regularity for the relative informativeness of the quantitative measures of monetary policy such as the monetary aggregates and real interest rates to depend on the inflation zone in which a central bank finds itself the zones range from high inflation zone 1 to deep deflation zone 5 with intermediate zones of moderate inflation zone 2 low inflation zone 3 and low deflation zone 4 we find considerable support for this view in the historical data which stretches back to the 19 th century seen from this perspective the past experience of central banks casts doubt on the singular importance often attributed to the short term real interest rate as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy this applies especially in the current low inflation environment in which many central banks find themselves the zonal view has far reaching implications for monetary policy frameworks for the analytical efforts to understand the monetary policy transmission mechanism and for central bank communication strategies this paper was prepared for the 21 st congress of the european economic association held in vienna on august 27 2006 the views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors

great powers hierarchy and endogenous regimes rethinking the domestic causes of peace this paper blends recent research on hierarchy and democratization to examine the theoretical and empirical costs of treating regime type exogenously in the literature most identified with studying its impact on international politics it argues that the apparent peace among democratic states that emerges in the aftermath of world war i is not caused by domestic institutional attributes normally associated with democracy instead this peace is an artifact of historically specific great power settlements these settlements shape subsequent aggregate patterns of military conflict by altering the organizational configuration of the system in three critical ways by creating new states by altering hierarchical orders and by influencing regime type in states these claims are defended with a series of tests that show first how the statistical relationship between democracy and peace has exhibited substantial variation across great power orders second that this statistical relationship breaks down with theoretically motivated research design changes and third that great powers foster peace and similar regime types within their hierarchical orders in short the relationship between democracy and peace is spurious the international political order is still built and managed by great powers

a comparison of var and cvar constraints on portfolio selection with the mean variance model in this paper we analyze the portfolio selection implications arising from imposing a value at risk var constraint on the mean variance model and compare them with those arising from the imposition of a conditional value at risk cvar constraint we show that for a given confidence level a cvar constraint is tighter than a var constraint if the cvar and var bounds coincide consequently a cvar constraint is more effective than a var constraint as a tool to control slightly risk averse agents but in the absence of a risk free security has a perverse effect in that it is more likely to force highly risk averse agents to select portfolios with larger standard deviations however when the cvar bound is appropriately larger than the var bound or when a risk free security is present a cvar constraint dominates a var constraint as a risk management tool

currencies and the allocation of risk the welfare effects of a monetary union in a general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets nominal securities and mean variance preferences a monetary union is desirable when the gain from eliminating excess volatility of nominal variables exceeds the cost of reducing the number of currencies with which to hedge risks copyright 1998 by american economic association

financial factors in the great depression eginning with irving fisher 1933 and john maynard keynes 1931 b 1963 macroeconomists have argued that financial markets were important sources and propagators of decline during the great depression turning points during the depression often coincided with or were preceded by dramatic events in financial markets stock market collapse waves of bankruptcy and bank failure and contractions in the money stock but the mechanism through which financial factors contributed to the depression has been a source of controversy as has been the relative importance of financial factors in explaining the origins and persistence of the depression this essay reviews the literature on the role of financial factors in the depression and draws some lessons that have more general relevance for the study of the depression and for macroeconomics i argue that much of the recent progress that has been made in understanding some of the most important and puzzling aspects of financial real links in the depression followed a paradigm shift in economics a central neglected theoretical piece of the story for financial factors was the allocative effects of imperfections in capital markets which can imply links between disruptions in financial markets and subsequent economic activity also the increasing emphasis on learning and path dependence in economics has helped to explain why financial shocks during the 1930s were so severe and why policy makers failed to prevent the depression

the political economy of the euro crisis this article introduces the special issue on the political economy of the euro crisis which aims to improve our understanding of the causes consequences and implications of the highly unusual nature of this crisis a financial crisis among developed countries within a supranational monetary union the article provides a brief chronology of the crisis discusses its underlying causes and reviews the ways in which comparative and international political economy can help us understand the crisis the article then discusses the individual and collective contributions of the articles in the special issue and discusses possible future research paths on the political economy of the euro crisis we conclude with a brief discussion of how a political economy perspective informs our understanding of the long term prospects for the eurozone and european integration

the ups and downs of capitalism ben bernanke is a leading macroeconomist who has contributed extensively to the literature on business cycles monetary policy the role of financial markets in economic fluctuations inflation targeting and the economics of the great depression he is one of the six economists who form the nber business cycle dating committee a group that determines the dates of recessions in the us in this article interview professor bernanke discusses issues relating to the great depression of the 1930s and problems relating to inflation in the latter half of the twentieth century

could stable money have averted the great contraction i introduction although over fifty years have elapsed since the onset of the great contraction controversy still swirls about the factors responsible for its depth and long duration a basic issue is the hypothesis due to friedman and schwartz 1963 that the great contraction would have been attenuated had the federal reserve not allowed the money stock to decline although the validity of the hypothesis has been a subject of much debate there is little empirical evidence directly addressing it a direct test of the friedman and schwartz hypothesis requires simulating the behavior of output under a counterfactual policy of stable money that approach was adopted by warburton 1966 friedman 1960 and modigliani 1969 none of whom constructed a model of the economy on the basis of which to conduct his test recently mccallum 1990 has used simulations from a macro model to show that his base rule with feedback would have avoided the severe decline in nominal income that occurred between 1929 and 1933 1 the extent to which his rule would have improved the behavior of nominal income depends on the value of the feedback coefficient mccallum s simulations however do not address the issue considered here of how a stable money rule would have performed in this paper we present simulations that focus on the stable money counterfactual our model is based on mccallum s but we use a more general framework than his that a estimates separate relations for output and the price level and b places no prior restrictions on the feedback from output and the price level to money our stable money counterfactual does not change the long term rate of money growth from that actually experienced and thus involves only short run changes in the behavior of the money supply we assume that dynamics embedded in the output and price relation are not especially sensitive to this type of policy change we simulate two variants of milton friedman s 1960 constant money growth rule the first a strong form of the rule assumes that the fed could quickly offset changes in the money multiplier by changes in high powered money and thus keep the money stock on the constant growth rate path in each quarter the second a weaker form of the rule assumes that the money multiplier is observed with a one quarter lag and the fed can only set the expected rate of growth of money conditional on last period information equal to the constant rate our basic simulation is derived from a model estimated for the 1921 1 1941 4 interwar period the results of this simulation buttress the views of friedman and schwartz had a constant money growth rule with an annual rate equal to the average 1921 41 rate of 2 95 percent been followed throughout the interwar period the great contraction would have been avoided real output would have declined from 1929 3 to 1933 1 but the order of magnitude of the cumulative change 11 1 to 21 6 percent and the annual rate of change 3 3 to 6 6 percent when the actual cumulative change was 36 2 percent and the annual rate of change was 12 1 percent would have been comparable to other recessions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the basic simulation we assume that the output and price relations remained stable over the entire interwar period the extraordinary economic conditions of the great contraction could have arguably shifted the output and price relations thus we also present an alternative simulation that uses estimates of these relations based on the 1920s data this simulation shows that a constant money growth rule with an annual rate equal to the 1921 29 average of 3 29 percent would have prevented even a mild recession during the great contraction period section ii contains a brief survey of the continuing debate over the cause and propagation mechanism of the great contraction and its implications for the stable money hypothesis

trade barriers and the collapse of world trade during the great depression 1 introduction the contraction in world trade during the first phase of the great depression stands out as the strongest adverse shock to international trade in modern history from 1929 to 1932 world import and export volume in the industrialized nations decreased about 30 however it is not well understood which factors were responsible for the collapse the factors that have been highlighted in the literature are declining demand escalating tariff and nontariff trade barriers increasing bilateral trade agreements and international exchange rate policies the importance attributed to each of these factors has often been controversial pollard 1962 p 200 for instance argues that for britain the fall in total foreign trade as a proportion of home production was a part of a secular trend and may well not have been caused by the tariff as such by contrast khan 1946 p 246 claims that within 12 to 18 months uk nominal imports of manufactures from most of europe and the united states were reduced by something like 60 as a result of the tariff similarly saint etienne 1984 p 29 argues that by the mid 1930 s international trade had become in large proportion barter trade as a result of the tariffs and nontariff barriers empirical studies have examined the effects of trade restrictions on incomes to explain the declining trade for individual countries the studies of crucini and kahn 1996 and irwin 1998 find that the tariffs were influential for the u s imports and exports in his study of nominal imports to the european countries friedman 1974 quantified the effects of trade barriers on nominal imports and ultimately income by means of dummies in periods of significant tariffs and nontariff barriers he found that trade restrictions had a significant impact on trade in a few countries however as friedman himself acknowledges the weakness of this approach is that strong and weak forms of trade barriers are restricted to impact equally on imports in the estimates coupled with the small sample problems that plagued his estimates the trade barrier dummies were unlikely to effectively have captured the effects of trade barriers on imports which explains substantial variations of the estimated effects of the tariffs and the nontariff barriers across countries the study of eichengreen and irwin 1995 is probably the most extensive analysis of trade flows in the interwar period using 561 cross sectional bilateral trade flows over three periods 1928 1935 and 1938 they estimate a gravity model of trade patterns they relate the value of bilateral flows to national income population distance contiguity trade and currency block indicators and exchange rate variability to examine the effects on trade of trade and currency blocks and exchange rate variability they observe a declining marginal propensity to import and export during the depression which they attribute to quotas and other binding trade restrictions but do not formally test their importance this paper seeks to estimate the contribution of income tariffs and nontariff barriers on world trade during the depression using panel data for 17 countries over the period from 1920 to 1938 the panel data approach enables the assessment of the influence on trade of nontariff barriers from estimates of import and export functions by using as an identifying assumption that the nontariff barriers were to some degree simultaneously imposed and relaxed across the industrialized nations during the interwar period the estimates and extensive evidence from the literature suggest that this identifying assumption is valid section 3 in section 4 the changes in world trade in the interwar period are decomposed into income effects tariff effects and nontariff barrier effects the trade effects of the tariff changes are furthermore decomposed into deflation inflation induced tariff changes and discretionary tariff induced changes

the analytics of seasonal migration a framework that yields different possible patterns of migration as optimal solutions to a simple utility maximization problem is presented and explored it is shown that seasonal migration arises as an optimal endogenous response to a comparison of costs of living and of separation and returns to work over a set of three alternative options even if a year long migration is feasible

meltzer s history of the federal reserve this review argues that allan meltzer s account of the fed between 1913 1951 complements friedman and schwartz s in their monetary history meltzer emphasises policy making within the system rather than the evolution of the money supply and its effects on the economy he stresses the uncertainty of the fed s independence before the 1951 accord and the effects of economic ideas notably the real bills and riefler burgess doctrines on policy many virtues in the book are noted and one weakness a failure to explain why inadequate ideas became dominant within the fed when sounder alternatives were available in contemporary monetary thought

democratic institutions and exchange rate commitments since the collapse of the bretton woods system countries have been able to choose from a variety of exchange rate arrangements we argue that politicians incentives condition the choice of an exchange rate arrangement these incentives reflect the configuration of domestic political institutions particularly electoral and legislative institutions in systems where the cost of electoral defeat is high and electoral timing is exogenous politicians will be less willing to forgo their discretion over monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate in systems where the costs of electoral defeat are low and electoral timing is endogenous politicians are more likely to adopt a fixed exchange rate regime consequently differences in domestic political systems can help account for variations in the choice of exchange rate arrangements we test this argument using constrained multinomial logit and binomial logit on a sample of twenty democracies over the period 1974 95 domestic political institutions have a significant effect on exchange rate regime choice even after controlling for systemic macroeconomic and other political variables

international liquidity in a multipolar world today s global monetary and financial system to a remarkable extent continues to rely on the u s dollar for international liquidity this reflects the currency s historic role the liquidity of american financial markets and the absence of alternatives but with the emergence of emerging markets the capacity of the united states to provide safe assets will be outstripped by the growth of international transactions it is thus likely that other large economies presumably europe and china will eventually join the united states as sources of international liquidity and that other currencies will come to share the dollar s reserve currency status

investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes under inflation targeting estimates of the indexation parameter in hybrid new keynesian phillips curves are either equal to zero or very low in the united kingdom canada sweden and new zealand analogous results hold for the euro area under the european monetary union and for switzerland under the new monetary regime under stable regimes with clearly defined nominal anchors inflation appears to be purely forward looking these results question the notion that the intrinsic inflation persistence found in post wwii u s data is structural in the sense of lucas carnegie rochester conference series on public policy 1 1976 19 46 and suggest that hardwiring inflation persistence in macroeconomic models is potentially misleading

international aspects of the great depression and the crisis of 2007 similarities differences and lessons we focus on two international aspects of the great depression financial crises and international trade and try to discern lessons for the current economic crisis both downturns featured global banking crises which were generated by boom slump macroeconomic cycles during both crises world trade collapsed faster than world incomes and the trade decline was highly synchronized across countries during the depression income losses and rises in trade barriers explain trade s collapse owing to vertical specialization and more intense trade in durables today s trade collapse is due to uncertainty and small shocks to trade costs hitting international supply chains so far the global economy has avoided the global trade wars and banking collapses of the depression perhaps owing to improved policy even so the global economy remains susceptible to large shocks owing to financial innovation and technological

politics institutions and trade lessons of the interwar era recent studies cast doubt on the value added of international trade agreements and institutions using a new data set that consists of about 35 000 observations on the trade of fifty four nations between 1919 and 1938 we examine whether this skepticism also applies to the infamous interwar trade blocs traditional historical accounts attribute to them a large drop in international trade and a rise in the political tensions that would later erupt in world war ii in this study we show that no bloc raised trade among its members as a whole or decreased trade between members and nonmembers however our findings are not wholly consistent with the skepticism recent studies express we argue that conflicts of interest among the great powers encouraged the emergence of the bloc system and also gave rise to intrabloc trade shifts consistent with the political interests of their great power hubs the political military alliances these conflicts created also reduced trade between their signatories and we argue more generally that the causal chain runs from politics to trade as a result measuring only the effect of agreements and institutions on aggregate trade between their members can generate inaccurate estimates of their value added

trade blocs currency blocs and the reorientation of world trade in the 1930s we analyze the impact of commercial and financial policies on the reorientation of trade in the 1930s we report evidence that commercial policies attenuated prior connections between income growth and trade and that exchange rate instability marginally discouraged international trade in contrast the tendency toward regionalization commonly ascribed to the formation of trade and currency blocs was already evident to a considerable extent prior to the regional policy initiatives of the 1930s this reorientation is more properly attributed to ongoing historical forces such as commercial and financial links between countries forged over many years

viewpoint understanding the great depression bernanke 2000 and james 2001 it is now commonplace to view the depression from an international perspective and to test causal hypotheses by comparing the experiences of countries that endured more and less severe cyclical downturns this is in contrast with the earlier generation of scholarship notably the influential work of friedman and schwartz 1963 and temin 1976 which viewed the depression as centred in the united states and focused on shocks and policies in that country specific hypotheses associated with the global perspective continue to be disputed but there seems little question that the international view serves as a point of departure for a growing portion of recent scholarship whether this new research has produced a scholarly consensus is another matter in this paper i ask whether it is possible to arrive at such a consensus by synthesizing the old and new literatures i describe a perspective that views the great depression as a global phenomenon emphasizing linkages among countries and the destabilizing influence of the international monetary and financial system but that at the same time acknowledges the uniquely important character of events and policies in the united states i thereby suggest that the opposition between the old and new or u s centric and global views of the great depression may ultimately prove artificial the task for macroeconomic and historical scholarship

fuzzy multi period portfolio selection with different investment horizons abstract this paper considers a fuzzy multi period portfolio selection problem with v shaped transaction cost compared with the traditional studies assuming that assets have the same investment horizon we handle the practical but complicated situation in which assets have different investment horizons within the framework of credibility theory a mean variance model is formulated with the objective of maximizing the terminal return under the total risk constraint over the whole investment alternatively a variation is given by minimizing the total risk under the terminal return constraint a fuzzy simulation based genetic algorithm fsga is designed and three numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach

the labour market performance of recent migrants migrant workers constitute a vital component of many western labour markets although migrants can benefit greatly by moving to higher wage economies it is important to compare their labour market outcomes with those of native born workers in this paper we discuss factors that have been found to influence labour market success in the receiving country and examine the actual performance of recent migrants to the uk the uk provides a good case study for conducting such an exercise because of the very large increases in immigration that have been seen over the past decade we find that labour market performance varies greatly between migrant groups and that outcomes have changed noticeably following the uk government s decision to allow migrants from poland and other central and eastern european countries more or less free access to the labour market after eu enlargement in 2004

business cycles in international historical perspective business cycle models seek to answer the question of why economies go through cycles of recession and recovery or boom and bust any theory of the business cycle makes two sorts of claims what shocks are most important in disturbing the economy and what economic structure is necessary for propagating these shocks for example one common explanation of business cycles begins with monetary shocks and then seeks to explain why monetary shocks are not purely neutral as neoclassical theory would have it and instead have real effects at least in the short term early models in this vein were often implicitly or explicitly based on the proposition that markets do not clear continuously early equilibrium real business cycle theories instead emphasized the importance of real shocks especially to technology which may cause socially efficient fluctuations even when markets are always in equilibrium more recent models have attempted to marry the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics with the substantive keynesian ideas that money is not neutral and that economic fluctuations are costly new keynesian theories of the business cycle admit the possibility of a number of economic shocks including monetary and technology shocks but then focus on explaining how nominal price rigidities within the economy can turn these shocks into recessions or booms other models show that business cycles driven by keynesian animal spirits are consistent with rigorous microfoundations and rational expectations seeking empirical evidence for and against these various approaches we turn business cycle theories loose on perhaps the greatest macroeconomic laboratory

golden fetters the gold standard and the great depression barry eichengreen oxford university press new york 1992 pp xix 448 39 95

the new deal and modern memory summary economists and other social scientists may never be able to explain fully why the greatdepression happened when it did or why it initially was so severe numerous hypotheses havebeen advanced as we have seen and each of them contributes important insights into thecauses of the macroeconomic calamity in which most of the world was mired in 1929 1933 if however one is forced to adopt a monocausal theory it must center on the actions of america scentral bank which presided over an extraordinary expansion in bank credit in the mid to late1920s and then took the punch bowl off the table for the purposes of this article though the key question is why did the great depressionlast longer in the united states than it did in any other nation the answer as laid out in thenext section is presidential politics 23 there will come seven years of great plenty throughout all the land of egypt but after them will arise seven years offamine and all the plenty will be forgotten in the land of egypt the famine will consume the land genesis 41 29 30 nkjv

short term labour migration from the republic of armenia to the russian federation we explore the determinants of short term labour migration from armenia to russia based on a unique panel dataset a dynamic switching regression model with endogenous switching is applied our evidence pinpoints migration experience the expected individual income gap from migration low job opportunities in armenia and the possibility of diversifying income risks as the most important determinants family ties turn out to be insignificant the hypothetical income gap is about 280 per cent several explanations are provided for the fact that some individuals do not migrate in spite of a large income gap

the nation in depression t he economic cataclysm of the 1930s was an international phenomenon experienced by countries in all parts of the globe countries as diverse as the united states germany chile and japan all experienced significant depressions in the 1930s thus the title of charles kindleberger s classic book the world in depression 1973 captures an important feature of the great depression these international aspects especially the importance of the gold standard in causing the downturn and transmitting depression from one country to another have been emphasized in recent years in excellent books by peter temin 1989 and barry eichengreen 1992 these books have rightly received widespread attention and have successfully changed the focus of much analysis of the great depression from the united states to the world economy while such a change from american provincialism is surely healthy and warranted adopting an international perspective on the great depression risks losing sight of the many ways in which the u s depression differed in timing and severity from depressions elsewhere more important it may obscure the many uniquely american causes of america s great depression this paper examines the ways in which the u s experience during the 1930s resembled that of other countries in some regards and fundamentally differed in other aspects i also evaluate the evidence on the causes of the great depression in the united states and the sources of the eventual recovery i suggest that the path of american output and unemployment before 1931 can be explained quite well with only domestic factors even after 1931

blood and treasure exiting the great depression and lessons for today although avoiding the policy mistakes of the 1930s helped define how policy makers responded to the 2007 8 financial crisis and ensuing recession policy applications to the recovery phase are less well understood we draw on the experience of the us in the 1930s to shed light on exit strategies movements back to institutional conditions associated with steady state growth including stable inflation and broadly non interventionist credit and capital market policies we describe how policy responses to the deflation and banking crises of the 1930s coloured the exit policy debate after the great depression we show that a full exit from the great depression defined as the point at which interventionist credit and capital market policies and institutions were wound down did not occur in the 1930s it took until the 1950s for this to occur and for the federal reserve to regain its independence and return unfettered to its longer run

lessons from the political economy of the new deal the new deal produced a fundamental change in the structure of american government the national government came to play a much larger role in the financing of social welfare programmes while administration of the programmes was largely located at the states both the purely national and the shared federal parts of the welfare system were characterized by impersonal rules the political economy of how the rules came about and how the new deal experience may have contributed to americans changing their views on the danger of dealing with the national government is the primary focus the paper closes with speculations about the possible effect of changing views on american participation in the second world war after 1939

british monetary and fiscal policy in the 1930s current economic turbulence has revived interest in interwar macroeconomic instability and policy this paper provides a guide to the current state of knowledge on british macroeconomic policy between 1929 and the eve of the second world war for today s economists and policy makers mindful that some will seek lessons from this earlier age it makes clear the very particular economic and policy context of the time including the marked difference between british and american economic performance and policies and the challenge posed by the massive rise in debt brought about by the first world war knowledge transfer is possible here for policy learning but what transpires is that lessons are typically stronger as negatives than as positives namely what should not be done in general as against what might be done this largely situation specific the focus is the role and effectiveness of the monetary and fiscal policies pursued together with an assessment of the principal policy not adopted namely the keynesian solution of significant loan financed public works to remedy mass unemployment the analysis is comparative with respect to us macroeconomic economic performance and policy it explores the different macroeconomic shocks of the contraction phase the term great depression is not really appropriate to the british experience in the two countries comparative policy regimes and then in turn analyses the policy mix and policy effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy including for britain the counterfactual keynesian solution a business cycle periodization is adopted with the key role for the abandonment of the gold standard in terms of regaining freedom of choice in macroeconomic policy itself experiencing significant developments after 1931 the traditional role of the cheap money induced housing boom in britain s post 1932 economic recovery is reaffirmed the impact of the fiscal policies actually pursued are then discussed as are assessments of the likely effectiveness of the keynesian solution had the 1929 liberal party s we can conquer unemployment spending package been implemented

deflation and monetary policy in a historical perspective remembering the past or being condemned to repeat it inflation is currently low and stable in industrialized countries but might deflation replace inflation as a major policy concern we present a broad cross country historical study of deflation over the past two centuries in order to shed light on current policy challenges in the light of the relevant theoretical approaches we empirically characterize good bad and ugly deflations assess similarities between the current low inflation environment and that of the gold standard period and discuss lessons from the historical record as to policies to escape undesirable deflation and the relative merits of interest rate and monetary instruments michael bordo and andrew filardo

rulers of the game central bank independence during the interwar years central bank independence is associated with restrictive monetary choices that can be deflationary within fixed exchange rate regimes because central banks act to counteract domestic inflation they put a premium on domestic price stability at the expense of international monetary stability evidence from fifteen countries between 1925 and 1938 shows that the more independent central banks took more deflationary policies than were necessary for external adjustment central banks in general were more restrictive under left wing governments than they were under more conservative regimes and often were more restrictive than required for external equilibration this suggests that policies of independent central banks designed to enhance domestic price stability may force deflationary pressures onto other states in the system and potentially destabilize a fixed exchange rate regime

prospect theory and mean variance analysis the experimental results of prospect theory pt reveal suggest that investors make decisions based on change of wealth rather than total wealth that preferences are s shaped with a risk seeking segment and that probabilities are subjectively distorted this article shows that while pt s findings are in sharp contradiction to the foundations of mean variance mv analysis counterintuitively when diversification between assets is allowed the mv and pt efficient sets almost coincide thus one can employ the mv optimization algorithm to construct ptefficient portfolios the markowitz 1952a tobin 1958 mean variance mv rule is probably the most popular investment decision rule under uncertainty in economics and in finance and it is widely employed by both academics and practitioners the strength of the mv analysis is that in the case of normal return distributions the choice of any expected utility maximizing risk averse individual will be according to the mv rule 1 the mv framework is the foundation of the sharpe 1964 lintner 1965 capital asset pricing model capm which is a cornerstone of modern finance moreover the mv framework provides a very important practical procedure for the construction of efficient portfolios while standard economic theory and in particular mv analysis assume expected utility maximization and risk aversion in a breakthrough article kahneman and tversky 1979 show that the actual behavior of individuals systematically and consistently violates these

coping with risk management and fill rate in the loss averse newsvendor model abstract in this paper we introduce the cvar conditional value at risk measure to hedge against the risks for the loss averse newsvendor we derive the optimal order quantities for the loss averse newsvendor to maximize the cvar objective of utility with and without the shortage cost respectively it is shown that when shortage cost is not considered an increase in the degree of loss aversion leads to a decrease in the fill rate therefore the newsvendor should strike a balance between the two conflicting targets in selecting the optimal order quantity when the shortage cost is taken into account and sufficiently large it is proved that an increase in the degree of loss aversion leads to an increase in the fill rate to manage both of the two targets the newsvendor should order more items in this case our sensitivity analysis further verifies that high risk implies high return and low risk comes with low return based on the analysis some management insights for the risk management of the loss averse newsvendor are presented

a century of us central banking goals frameworks accountability several key episodes in the 100 year history of the federal reserve have everal key episodes in the 100 year history of the federal reserve have been referred to in various contexts with the adjective great attached to been referred to in various contexts with the adjective great attached to them the great experiment of the federal reserve s founding the great them the great experiment of the federal reserve s founding the great depression the great infl ation and subsequent disinfl ation the great moderation depression the great infl ation and subsequent disinfl ation the great moderation and the recent great recession here i ll use this sequence of great episodes and the recent great recession here i ll use this sequence of great episodes to discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of federal to discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of federal reserve policymaking the goals of policy the policy framework and accountability reserve policymaking the goals of policy the policy framework and accountability and communication the changes over time in these three areas provide a useful and communication the changes over time in these three areas provide a useful perspective i believe on how the role and functioning of the federal reserve have perspective i believe on how the role and functioning of the federal reserve have changed since its founding in 1913 as well as some lessons for the present and for changed since its founding in 1913 as well as some lessons for the present and for the future the future

restarting globalization after world war ii structure coalitions and the cold war the present period of economic globalization originated following world war ii given the strongly protectionist tendencies prevailing at the time how did this happen structural economic and military causes along with intervening coalitional and institutional factors are considered trade policy change is examined in the five largest trading economies britain france the federal republic of germany japan and the united states structural economic causes best explain why protectionist tendencies were so strong and why they were weakest in the united states and the federal republic the liberalizing trend inaugurated in the united states and the federal republic was also facilitated by coalitional side payments to agriculture cold war related military interests appear to have been the strongest impetus behind the unilateral form of the liberalization

macroprudential policy what can it achieve this paper examines both the objectives and the available instruments for new macroprudential policy making bodies it argues that the objective financial stability is best understood as avoiding widespread disruption of financial flows achieving this objective requires that policy makers carry out two different but related tasks first they must ensure the resilience of the financial system to external shocks second they must respond in a timely fashion to future unsustainable expansions of credit and growth of asset prices these are old policy challenges what has changed is the emergence of new vulnerabilities in our innovative and relatively lightly controlled financial system exposed by the recent global financial crisis macroprudential policy can be effective in addressing these vulnerabilities but will not remove the major political and institutional obstacles to the effective control of unsustainable credit expansions 136 words

capital controls and recovery from the financial crisis of the 1930s abstract we examine the first widespread use of capital controls in response to a global or regional financial crisis in particular we analyze whether capital controls mitigated capital flight in the 1930s and assess their causal effects on macroeconomic recovery from the great depression we find evidence that they stemmed gold outflows in the year following their imposition however time shifted difference in differences dd estimates of industrial production prices and exports suggest that capital controls did not accelerate macroeconomic recovery relative to countries that went off gold and floated countries imposing capital controls also appear to perform similar to the gold bloc countries once the latter group of countries finally abandoned gold time series analysis suggests that countries imposing capital controls refrained from fully utilizing their newly acquired monetary policy autonomy

kicking the habit moving from pegged rates to greater exchange rate flexibility why do governments find it so difficult to move from pegged exchange rates to greater exchange rate flexibility i first establish that there is a problem to be solved that there are powerful incentives for greater flexibility deriving from changes in the international economic and financial environment but that policymakers find it difficult to engineer a smooth transition i offer practical suggestions and a framework under which the probability of a smooth transition can be maximised drawing examples from recent economic history i then attempt to understand the experience of selected countries which have undertaken this transition

a theory of migration as a response to occupational stigma a theory is developed of labor migration that is prompted by a desire to avoid social humiliation in a general equilibrium framework it is shown that as long as migration can reduce humiliation sufficiently migration will occur even between two identical economies migration increases the number of individuals who choose to perform degrading jobs and consequently migration lowers the price of the good produced in the sector that is associated with low social status moreover the greater an individual s aversion to performing degrading jobs the more likely it is that he will experience a welfare gain when the economy opens up

sovereign risk credibility and the gold standard 1870 1913 versus 1925 31 author s obstfeld maurice taylor alan m abstract what determines sovereign risk we study the london bond market from the 1870s to the 1930s our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the interwar gold standard before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled credibility and shaved up to 30 basis points from country borrowing spreads in the 1920s however simply resuming prewar gold parities was insufficient to secure benefits countries that devalued before resumption were treated more favorably and markets scrutinized other signals public debt and british empire membership were important determinants of spreads after world war one but not before

portfolio optimization with disutility based risk measure abstract in this paper we propose a quantile based risk measure which is defined using the modified loss distribution according to the decision maker s risk and loss aversion the properties related to different classes of disutility functions are established a portfolio selection model in the mean risk framework is proposed and equivalent formulations of the model generating the same efficient frontier are given the advantages of this approach are investigated using real world data from nyse the differences between the efficient frontier of the proposed model and the classical mean variance and mean cvar are quantified and interpreted extensive experiments show that the efficient portfolios obtained by using the proposed model exhibit lower risk levels and an increased satisfaction compared to the other two mean risk models

optimal asset allocation under linear loss aversion abstract we study the asset allocation of a linear loss averse la investor and compare it to the more traditional mean variance mv and conditional value at risk cvar investors first we derive conditions under which the la problem is equivalent to the mv and cvar problems and solve analytically the two asset problem of the la investor for a risk free and a risky asset then we run simulation experiments to study properties of the optimal la and mv portfolios under more realistic assumptions we find that under asymmetric dependence la portfolios outperform mv portfolios provided investors are sufficiently loss averse and dependence is large finally using 13 eu and us assets we implement the trading strategy of a linear la investor who reallocates his her portfolio on a monthly basis we find that la portfolios clearly outperform mv and cvar portfolios and that incorporating a dynamic update of the la parameters significantly improves the performance of la portfolios

portfolio selection in stochastic markets with hara utility functions in this paper we consider the optimal portfolio selection problem where the investor maximizes the expected utility of the terminal wealth the utility function belongs to the hara family which includes exponential logarithmic and power utility functions the main feature of the model is that returns of the risky assets and the utility function all depend on an external process that represents the stochastic market the states of the market describe the prevailing economic financial social political and other conditions that affect the deterministic and probabilistic parameters of the model we suppose that the random changes in the market states are depicted by a markov chain dynamic programming is used to obtain an explicit characterization of the optimal policy in particular it is shown that optimal portfolios satisfy the separation property and the composition of the risky portfolio does not depend on the wealth of the investor we also provide an explicit construction of the optimal wealth process and use it to determine various quantities of interest the return risk frontiers of the terminal wealth are shown to have linear forms special cases are discussed together with numerical illustrations

mean risk analysis with enhanced behavioral content abstract we study a mean risk model derived from a behavioral theory of disappointment with multiple reference points one distinguishing feature of the risk measure is that it is based on mutual deviations of outcomes not deviations from a specific target we prove necessary and sufficient conditions for strict first and second order stochastic dominance and show that the model is in addition a convex risk measure the model allows for richer and behaviorally more plausible risk preference patterns than competing models with equal degrees of freedom including expected utility eu mean variance m v mean gini m g and models based on non additive probability weighting such as dual theory dt in asset allocation the model allows a decision maker to abstain from diversifying in a positive expected value risky asset if its performance does not meet a certain threshold and gradually invest beyond this threshold which appears more acceptable than the extreme solutions provided by either eu and m v always diversify or dt and m g always plunge in asset trading the model provides no trade intervals like dt and m g in some but not all situations an illustrative application to portfolio selection is presented the model can provide an improved criterion for mean risk analysis by injecting a new level of behavioral realism and flexibility while maintaining key normative properties