do minority white unemployment differences really exist we develop a model of labor force status federal employment nonfederal employment unemployment and out of the labor force that depends on human capital variables local labor market conditions and personal characteristics according to the estimated model for white non hispanic males and females a substantial difference exists between blacks and white non hispanics even after correction for the control variables however the control variables explain almost all of the difference between hispanics and white non hispanics

glass ceilings or glass doors the role of firms in male female wage disparities i use canadian linked employer employee data to examine whether women face a glass ceiling in the labour market i also measure the extent to which the glass ceiling comes about because women are segregated into lower paying firms or because they are segregated into lower paying jobs within firms i find clear evidence that women experience a glass ceiling that is driven by their disproportionate sorting across firm types glass doors rather than within firms i find no evidence that these results are supply driven however my results are consistent with predictions of an efficiency wage model where high paying firms discriminate against females

screening ethics when honest agents care about fairness we analyze a principal s ability to discriminate between honest and dishonest agents who have private information about the circumstances of the exchange honest agents reveal circumstances truthfully as long as the mechanism is suciently fair the probability that an equilibrium allocation is chosen by an agent who is lying should not be too large without intolerance for lying the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest with even a small intolerance for lying the optimal mechanism is discontinuously altered it may still involve ethics screening whereby some allocation chosen by a dishonest agent is never chosen by an honest agent it happens either when the dishonest is overstating circumstances or when the principal is forced to allow for some suboptimal announcements due to an excessive intolerance for lying with limited intolerance for lying ethics screening allows for doing better than in the standard setup where the agent is dishonest with certainty even if honesty is unlikely however if intolerance for lying is too strong the principal cannot improve upon the standard setup

equilibrium incentive contracts and efficiency wages we analyze the optimal efficiency wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers effort nor their match specific productivity firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs as a result employed workers enjoy rents which in turn creates unemployment nonetheless the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits we also show that more high powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates jel e24 j30 j41

is the efficiency wage efficient the social norm and organizational corruption the effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption we model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem we find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect the snowball effect which intensifies the corruption effect this intensified effect due to the snowballing character of social norms may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm jel classification d82 j41

an economic analysis of acting white this paper formalizes a widely discussed peer eect entitled acting white acting white is modeled as a two audience signaling quandary signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection without peer eects equilibria involve all ability types choosing dierent levels of education acting white alters the equilibrium dramatically the possibly empty set of lowest ability individuals and the set of highest ability individuals continue to reveal their type through investments in education ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level only those in the lower intervals are accepted by the group the model s predictions t many stylized facts in the anthropology and sociology literatures regarding social interactions among minority group members

occupational choice and dynamic incentives we study an overlapping generations version of the principal agent problem where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium all individuals are workers when young but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital these rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints with a labour market that is subject to moral hazard the increased effort raises social welfare policies that reduce credit market imperfections or redistribute income may reduce welfare by dampening this effect

measurement error in human capital and the black white wage gap proxy variables are frequently used in economics to control for unavailable variables in a linear regression setting for example afqt scores have been used to control for human capital accumulati

the psychology of early institutional economics the instinctive approach of thorstein veblen s conspicuous consumer theory abstract thorstein veblen a founder of original or old institutional economics combined social and evolutionary thought in his institutionalist approach to dealing with psychological social and economic issues the psychological content of veblen s writings takes instinct and habits into consideration the economic literature on the psychological content of veblen s writings has focused on habits despite the importance of instincts in veblen s works this paper attempts to discuss veblen s notion of instincts in order to make its role clearer in his approach to conspicuous consumer decision making it discusses the role of instincts the instinct of workmanship the relationship between habits and instincts and their influence on the conspicuous consumer consequently this paper contributes to a better understanding of how inner forces and socialization culminate in behavior in veblen s conspicuous consumer approach

termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model i construct an equilibrium model of the labor market where workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever but are subject to optimal terminations upon a termination the firm hires a new worker and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts the model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble respectively the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice involuntary layos and voluntary retirements the model allows simultaneous determination of its equilibrium turnover unemployment and retirement as well as the expected utility of the new labor market entrants

catching the agent on the wrong foot ex post choice of monitoring abstract in a principal agent model with multiple performance measures we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored if it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type for cases of small asymmetry of information the principal can implement the first best contract for more serious asymmetries of information the first best is not implementable then the low type may be required to overproduce which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting we also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use

discrimination in an equilibrium search model i construct an equilibrium search model where some employers have a distaste for hiring minority workers and show that this bias results in economic discrimination against minority workers although only unprejudiced firms hire minority workers minority workers receive lower wages than workers not facing discrimination whenever any employers in the market have a distaste for minority workers one implication of the model is that gender or racial wage differentials understate the utility loss from discrimination in addition the wages of minority workers increase when their proportion increases in the labor market

efficiency wage models of unemployment one view h lorne carmichael persistent wage rigidity and involuntary unemployment appear to be recurrent problems in most economies what could be preventing the wage adjustment necessary to clear the labor market many recent papers claim to have found the answer in efficiency wage models this paper surveys this literature and attempts to evaluate its accomplishments it concludes that the efficiency wage models fail to explain wage rigidity or persistent involuntary unemployment persistent involuntary unemployment of workers is a recurrent problem in labor markets all over the world unemployed workers seem unable to find work even though they are willing to accept lower wages than those being paid employed workers with similar skills what could be preventing wages from adjusting to clear these markets many recent papers known collectively as the efficiency wage literature now claim to have the answer this paper will survey the efficiency wage literature and critically evaluate some of its accomplishments efficiency wage models have already been examined by yellen 1984 katz 1986 and stiglitz 1987 and have received generally favorable reviews this paper is more critical its overall conclusion is that efficiency wage models provide some useful insights into the workings of the labor market but they do not provide a satisfactory account of wage rigidity or involuntary unemployment there are at least five separate versions of the efficiency wage model they share a common structure however and this is outlined in the first section of the paper this section also attempts to relate efficiency wage models to other recent models of unemployment section ii examines and criticizes the different approaches in detail section iii evaluates the achievements of this approach and suggests some directions for future work i a general efficiency wage model efficiency wage models as the name suggests are first of all models of wages they generate unemployment by showing that firms will sometimes want to set wages at non market clearing levels it is useful to begin therefore by reviewing how wages and employment are determined in some related models in a perfectly competitive labor market the wage for each type of labor is adjusted constantly to maintain equality of supply and demand overall employment fluctuates in response to demand changes as workers move up and down their labor supply curves unemployment is voluntary in that anyone who is not working prefers that state to employment at the going wage for people of his skills as well the value of a worker s marginal product is equal to the marginal value of his leisure so there are no unexploited wage bargains between unemployed workers and firms this model is successful in predicting the long term response of wages to shifts in demand and supply but it is clear that in the short run its depiction of voluntary unemployment and flexible wages is unrealistic a natural way to generate more realism is to assume that wages are inflexible in the short run in this case a reduction in demand away from a long run equilibrium will lead to rationing of jobs by employers as they attempt to stay on their labor demand curves the unemployment here is involuntary in that the unemployed would prefer to be working at the going wage and is inefficient in that there are lost gains from trade between these workers and firms the weakness of this model is that it is silent about the mechanism that keeps wages rigid unemployed workers who offer to work for less than the fixed wage ought to find work the early implicit contract models of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 provide one explanation for wage rigidity these models introduced the idea that wages can do more than just clear the market for labor wages in an implicit contract model are used to shift the risk generated by uncertain output market conditions from risk averse workers to the risk neutral firm

the organization of work a historical dimension abstract an evaluation of the organizational efficiencies of various modes of production by o e williamson has led him to conclude that given identical technologies the factory was more efficient than the putting out system the superior organizational efficiency of the former he maintains was one reason for the transition to factory production during the nineteenth century this paper challenges that view it is argued that the way in which williamson evaluates efficiency is open to methodological and other objections and that there is limited empirical support for his hypothesis given an identical technology the evidence suggests that the putting out system was usually able to compete with the factory

chasing after good jobs do they exist and does it matter if they do most people believe that there are such things as good jobs jobs that a worker would consider herself lucky to get but for economists the existence of good jobs is debatable in this paper i provide a definition of a good job based on various theories of the labour market a job that involves a surplus captured partly by the worker i use that definition to guide an empirical investigation of the existence and importance of good jobs i conclude that good jobs do exist that the labour market does not just function according to a roy model with wage differentials reflecting only skill differentials compensating differentials or bond posting and that their impact on the overall wage structure is substantial finally i discuss the implications of the existence of good jobs for policy setting and for assessments of the justice of a society resume la chasse aux bons emplois est ce qu ils existent et est ce que cela importe qu ils existent la plupart des gens croient qu il y a telles choses que de bons emplois des emplois qu un travailleur se trouverait chanceux d avoir mais pour les economistes l existence de bons emplois est discutable dans ce texte l auteur propose une definition de bon emploi fondee sur diverses theories du marche du travail un emploi qui engendre un surplus capture en partie par le travailleur il utilise cette definition pour guider son enquete empirique sur l existence et l importance de bons emplois on conclut que les bons emplois existent que le marche du travail ne fonctionne pas seulement selon le modele de roy avec des differentiels de salaires qui refletent seulement les differentiels d habiletes les differentiels compensatoires ou le depot d une caution et que leur impact sur la structure globale des salaires est substantielle finalement l auteur discute les implications de l existence de bons emplois sur la definition de politiques et sur l evaluation du caractere juste d une societe

a critique of the perceived solid conceptual foundations of isew gpi irving fisher s cognisance of human health capital in net psychic income abstract this paper puts forward a political economy critique of the perceived solid conceptual foundations of sustainable well being indicators swbis such as isew and gpi a particular version of entropic net psychic income has been implanted as the main conceptual basis for these aggregated measures of sustainable economic welfare however a well known limitation of swbis is that they do not prudently factor in measures of investment and depreciation of human health capital yet this is a critical aspect of sustainable well being it is argued that under fisher s psychic income framework the heart of the indicator is a theory that specifies accounting for some sort of change in the human psyche i e the stock or fund of human health capital advocates of swbis cannot adequately account for the degree of human health or knowledge because this is not their reference point personal consumption expenditures is their reference point political economy seeks to avoid abstracting from the whole reality recognising that endogenous processes of human health capital formation are overdetermined this paper thus argues that there is a significant conceptual shortcoming in isew and gpi which if left unattended will undermine the measure of theoretical legitimacy and empirical efficacy

deductible contracts against fraudulent claims evidence from automobile insurance insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource allocation problem in many markets the object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance this type of contract is observed in many markets even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification a higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat particularly when the insured anticipates that the claim has a small probability of being audited to verify this proposition we estimate a loss equation for which one of the determinants is the amount of the deductible using a data set of claims filed for damages following an automobile accident with twenty insurance companies in quebec in 1992 because we have access only to reported losses a higher deductible also implies a lower probability of reporting small losses to isolate the fraud effect related to the presence of a deductible in the contract we jointly estimate a loss equation and a

search bargaining and employer discrimination this article analyzes becker s 1957 1971 theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage bargaining setting discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less and apply stricter hiring criteria to these workers the highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient moreover once ownership and management are separated both highest profits and highest utility can be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient thus market forces like entry or takeovers do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination disappear

tournaments as a worker discipline device c c yang i introduction in the absence of unemployment a worker caught shirking and subsequently fired could obtain a new job at the market wage without difficulty as a result of this and the imperfect monitoring of workers on the job effort shapiro and stiglitz 1984 argued that there must be involuntary unemployment in equilibrium to serve as a worker discipline device making job loss costly so as to discourage shirking 1 in response to shapiro and stiglitz s argument carmichael 1985 suggested that workers could pay employment fees to purchase their jobs and that the competition among workers for jobs would raise such fees until all involuntary unemployment disappeared alternatively there is the so called bonding scheme bonds are posted by workers when initially hired and forfeited if the workers are caught shirking the fear of losing the bonds then substitutes for the threat of becoming unemployed in creating work incentives the competition among workers for jobs would allow firms to charge an amount for bonds until there were no difference between employment and unemployment and so again there would be no involuntary unemployment in a nutshell the introduction of an employment fee or a bonding scheme can eliminate involuntary unemployment making obsolete unemployment as a worker discipline device in the real world however rarely are employment fees or bonding observed why do employment fees bonding or the like not then emerge to arbitrage the difference between employment and unemployment so as to eliminate involuntary unemployment this is a puzzle for shirking models romer 1996 461 2 it has been claimed that contracts with upward sloping age earning profiles the so called implicit bonding can act as perfect substitutes for contracts with explicit employment fees or bonds akerlof and katz 1989 negate this claim and show that the implicit bonding in general does not eliminate the need for involuntary unemployment as a worker discipline device to resolve the bonding issue katz 1986 suggests that future theoretical work is required to analyze the problem in an explicitly contractual setting this article offers an attempt in this direction we study a type of contract which is prevalent in the real world and most importantly can act as a perfect substitute for the employment fee or bonding scheme as far as the elimination of involuntary unemployment is concerned the contract in question is the so called tournament 3 a tournament contract compensates workers on the basis of their relative performance prizes arising from tournaments are fixed in advance and a worker receives the winner s prize not by being good in the absolute sense but by being better than the other workers contracts with the characteristics of tournaments are prevalent in labor markets the salesman who sells the most is given a large bonus the best worker gets promoted to become the company manager etc the incentive effects of tournaments have been analyzed in detail by lazear and rosen 1981 green and stokey 1983 nalebuff and stiglitz 1983 malcomson 1984 and others 4 in contrast to the extensive analysis of the microeconomic incentives of tournaments this article focuses on the macroeconomic implications of tournaments in the vein of shirking models it is shown that all involuntary unemployment will disappear if it is feasible for firms to exploit tournaments to full flexibility this finding pinpoints the power of tournament contracts in resolving involuntary unemployment as a consequence of this result the generation of equilibrium unemployment will require that there be certain impediments to the full exploitation of tournaments we suggest institutional constraints legal rules or social norms as possible candidates for the impediments the rest of this article is organized as follows

screening when some agents are nonstrategic does a monopoly need to exclude we characterize the optimal screening mechanism for a monopolist facing consumers with privately known demands some of whom have limited abilities to misrepresent their preferences we show that consumers with better abilities to misrepresent information benefit from the presence of consumers who lack such abilities whenever the fraction of the latter group is positive there is no exclusion the firm supplies a positive quantity of the good to all consumers whose valuations exceed marginal cost of production our analysis is motivated by the evidence indicating that some individuals have limited ability to misrepresent themselves and imitate others

self enforcing contracts shirking and life cycle incentives he labor market is a rich and complicated place when a worker takes a job he expects to earn a wage but will also care about rates of wage growth fringe benefits levels of risk retirement practices pensions promotion and layoff rules seniority rights and grievance procedures in return the worker must give up some time but he is also asked to upgrade his skills train other workers provide effort and ideas and defer to authority in questions of how his time is spent great changes are occurring in the way labor market institutions such as these are modelled central to the new approach is the concept of a self enforcing implicit contract this is the latest in a series of variations on the ideas of azariadis 1975 baily 1974 and gordon 1974 and is one of the more exciting new developments in the theory of labor markets this essay will outline this approach and evaluate some of its accomplishments the ideas will be presented in the context of an incentive model that is of some independent interest the model was introduced by becker and stigler 1974 and was extended by lazear 1979 to account for wage growth and mandatory retirement in these papers the workers retire at a fixed age lending the name life cycle incentives to the approach more recently shapiro and stiglitz 1984 have used a version without a fixed retirement date to account for unemployment this version is often called the shirking model these models have generated some controversy but much of it can be resolved when the models are presented in the framework of self enforcing contracts in fact this simple incentive model can do even more it can provide a rationale for competitive hierarchies where firms place their workers in competition with

cost padding in regulated monopolies abstract this paper considers the regulated monopoly that pads or falsifies its costs to increase the cost reimbursement it receives from the regulator contrary to the standard literature on cost regulation the firm engages in cost reducing investment before it enters into a regulatory contract this pre contractual investment in cost reduction determines the firm type at the contracting stage the paper derives both the optimum incentive compatible falsification contract and the equilibrium type distribution with the distribution of cost types determined endogenously by the pre contractual investment choice an increase in the cost of falsification has two effects first there is a direct effect that reduces cost padding because it becomes more expensive to do so second there is an indirect effect that increases cost padding because the firm responds by choosing lower investments and lower investments are associated with more cost padding it is demonstrated that the direct effect will dominate and both expected levels of cost padding and expected costs for falsification will be reduced however the indirect effect increases real costs and despite the reduction in cost padding the net effect can reduce welfare it is determined that these conclusions are significantly different from those obtained when the distribution of cost types is exogenously fixed

insurance fraud and optimal claims settlement strategies abstract we examine the optimal claims settlement strategy for a liability insurer when claimants can permanently misrepresent their losses by engaging in costly claims falsification in this environment claims auditing is not a possible deterrent to fraud and the settlement strategy consists of an indemnification profile that relates the insurance payment to the claimed amount of loss the optimal indemnification profile is shown to involve systematic underpayment of claims at the margin as a means to deter loss exaggeration with the extent of underpayment limited by expected litigation costs and potential bad faith claims the key testable implication of the theory is that the extent of underpayment should be greater for classes of claims for which loss exaggeration is easier empirical analysis of insurance settlements for bodily injury liability in automobile accidents confirms this prediction this suggests that liability insurers optimally choose claims payment strategies to lessen a claimant s i

superstars and mediocrities market failure in the discovery of talent a basic problem facing most labor markets is that workers can neither commit to long term wage contracts nor can they self nance the costs of production i study the eects of these imperfections when talent is industry speci c it can only be revealed on the job and once learned becomes public information i show that rms bid exces sively for the pool of incumbent workers at the expense of trying out new talent the workforce is then plagued with an unfavorable selection of individuals there are too many mediocre workers whose talent is not high enough to justify them crowding out novice workers with lower expected talent but with more upside potential the result is an ine ciently low level of output coupled with higher wages for known high talents this problem is most severe where information about talent is initially very imprecise and the complementary costs of production are high i argue that high incomes in pro fessions such as entertainment management and entrepreneurship may be explained by the nature of the talent revelation process rather than by an underlying scarcity of talent jel d30 j31 j6 m5

racial disparity in unemployment abstract in the united states black workers earn less than their white counterparts and have higher rates of unemployment empirical work indicates that most of this wage gap is accounted for by differences in cognitive skills that emerge at an early age in this paper we demonstrate that the same is not true for black white disparity in unemployment a large unexplained unemployment differential motivates the paper s second contribution a potential theoretical explanation this explanation is built around a model that embeds statistical discrimination into the subjective worker evaluation process that lies at the root of the efficiency wage theory of equilibrium unemployment

optimal insurance design under narrow framing abstract in this paper we study insurance decisions when the policyholder evaluates insurance with narrow framing we show that due to aversion to risk on the net insurance payoff i e insurance indemnity minus insurance premium narrow framing reduces insurance demand this helps explaining the observed low insurance demand in many insurance markets we also show that the optimal insurance contract involves a deductible and the coinsurance of losses above the deductible when transaction costs depend on the actuarial value of the policy moreover when the policyholder is loss averse over the net insurance payoff a fixed indemnity equal to insurance premium should be paid for a range of intermediate losses

profit sharing risk sharing and firm size implications of efficiency wages by taking account of output fluctuations this paper constructs a synthesis of profit sharing and efficiency wage models to highlight the role of the risk attitudes of the firm and its employees we show contrary to the traditional efficiency wage theory that in a profit sharing economy unemployment is no longer a necessary device to induce work effort and consequently the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by full employment such a result is more likely to be true when the economy is characterized by small sized firms in addition we also provide a preliminary sketch of the situations in which the firm chooses a profit sharing program or a fixed wage one and discuss how a firm determines its pay parameters and employment in response to output fluctuations

optimal auditing with scoring theory and application to insurance fraud this article makes a bridge between the theory of optimal auditing and the scoring methodology in an asymmetric information setting our application is meant for insurance claims fraud but it can be applied to many other activities that use the scoring approach fraud signals are classified based on the degree to which they reveal an increasing probability of fraud we show that the optimal auditing strategy takes the form of a red flags strategy which consists in referring claims to a special investigative unit siu when certain fraud indicators are observed the auditing policy acts as a deterrence device and we explain why it requires the commitment of the insurer and how it should affect the incentives of siu staffs the characterization of the optimal auditing strategy is robust to some degree of signal manipulation by defrauders as well as to the imperfect information of defrauders about the audit frequency the model is calibrated with data from a large european insurance company we show that it is possible to improve our results by separating different groups of insureds with different moral costs of fraud finally our results indicate how the deterrence effect of the audit scheme can be taken into account and how it affects the optimal auditing strategy

employment relations in dual labor markets it s nice work if you can get it jobs in big firms command higher wages i examine four theories that could explain this relation first large firms incur higher fixed employment costs including more specific training second monitoring costs are greater in big firms and can be spread by hiring more productive workers third large firms may choose to pay efficiency wages to deter shirking finally large employers organize production around teams and pay higher wages to get workers who comply with the discipline of team production the dispersion of wages and working conditions in the u s labor market reflect the heterogeneity of jobs employment relations and individuals

socio economic evolution and darwinism in thorstein veblen a critical appraisal the paper questions the idea that a biology based perspective and more speci callydarwinian population thinking constitutes a real alternative for the study of theevolution of social systems this is done through a critical appraisal of the work ofthorstein veblen even though veblen s account of the evolution of humankindmakes the notion of natural selection practically redundant his remainingattachment to darwinism created two other serious tensions for him first hisattachment to the darwinian scheme of descent with modi cation kept him fromdevisingasystematictheoryofthedifferentsocio economicsystemshestudied thisshortcoming is more evident in his analysis of capitalism which not only lacks anelaborated theory but also contradicts his initial evolutionary programme second by postulating that human history is a question of cultural change veblen wastempted to con ate social structures institutions and habits of thought key words evolution thorstein veblen darwinism institutions social structuresjel classi cations b52 b41 b15 p10

on reputation a microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity we study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterised by moral hazard problems social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially this effect is however associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities surprisingly reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences thus in markets characterised by moral hazard reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges reduce rents and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks

wage premiums and profit maximization in efficiency wage models abstract the standard shirking model of efficiency wages is essentially a continuous time repeated prisoners dilemma game thus to sustain an equilibrium with employment requires sufficient gains from future co operation each division of these gains corresponds to some equilibrium efficiency wages correspond to employees receiving the gains bonds allow firms to receive them in markets well informed about agents pasts employment is independent of the distribution of gains but in anonymous markets with more workers than jobs employment is highest in efficiency wage equilibria efficiency wages thus arise naturally as the unique efficient equilibrium without recourse to assumptions that limit bonding

did henry ford pay efficiency wages we examine henry ford s introduction of the five dollar day in 1914 in an effort to evaluate the relevance of efficiency wage theories of wage and employment determination we conclude that the ford experience strongly supports the relevance of these theories ford s decision to increase wages dramatically is most plausibly the consequence of labor problems of the kind efficiency wage theorists stress the structure of the five dollar day program is consistent with the predictions of efficiency wage theories there is vivid evidence that the introduction of the five dollar day resulted in substantial queues for ford jobs significant increases in ford productivity and profits accompanied the new regime

costly distortion of information in agency problems anecdotal evidence suggests that agents often spend resources distorting information transmitted to principals we present a model where costly information distortion emerges as equilibrium behavior the information structure we focus on is intermediate between and encompasses the cases of private information and public information the agent can falsify the privately observed state at some cost although the principal can design contracts that induce no falsification these may involve excessive iinformation rents falsification can be beneficial in spite of the waste of resources involved because it helps reduce information rents we examine how optimal contract and equilibrium payoffs change as the information structure ranges from private to public information

the economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation this article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm when realized these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report we characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits honestly as a result some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement

profit sharing unemployment and effort abstract efficiency wages above market clearing arising from unobservable individual effort are not compatible with profit sharing based on collective output if profit sharing is a feasible contract then full employment is the unique nash equilibrium of the economy

the provision of incentives in firms i ncentives are the essence of economics despite many wide ranging claims about their supposed importance there has been little empirical assessment of incentive provision for workers the purpose of this paper is to critically overview existing work on the provision of incentives since the interests of workers and their employers are not always aligned a large theoretical literature has emphasized how firms design compensation contracts to induce employees to operate in the firm s interest this literature has reached into many areas of compensation and has pointed to a multitude of different mechanisms that can be used to induce workers to act in the interests of their employers these include piece rates options discretionary bonuses promotions profit sharing efficiency wages deferred compensation and so on my objective here is to evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation where possible i will address the literature from two perspectives first an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance accordingly i consider whether agents behave in this way and whether these responses are always in the firm s interest second i address whether firms write contracts with these responses in mind in other words do contracts look like the predictions of the theory incentives are provided to workers

rural urban wage differentials unemployment and efficiency wages an open economy policy analysis this paper analyzes the desirability of various policies designed to counteract the distorting nature of an equilibrium rural urban wage differential in a small open two sector economy with urban unemployment a dual labor market model with an efficiency wage in the urban sector and urban unemployment is analyzed for the distributional and national output effects of an urban wage subsidy an urban production subsidy and a tariff on the urban good while a small subsidy or tariff raises the value of national output redistribution effects may limit the viability of intervention however subsidies can also be pareto improving policies

hardball and the soft touch the economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs abstract we examine an environment of costly state verification in which insureds possess private information about the magnitude of an insurable loss insurers can verify the actual loss suffered only by incurring a positive resource cost and insureds may verification and may lead to more generous settlements optimal insurance contracts are shown to mitigate the incentives to evade by a combination of incentives which include the overpayment of easily monitored losses and undercompensation for claims exhibiting higher verification costs

work incentives hierarchy and internal labor markets this paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest 1 hierarchical wage structures 2 internal promotion 3 wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity 4 the variance of earnings increasing with experience and 5 wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages

why do minority men earn less a study of wage differentials among the highly educated en in several minority groups in the united states have wages that are substantially lower than those of the benchmark majority group non hispanic white men several generations of labor economists have sought to understand the forces that drive these disparities this research program is potentially important for the purpose of determining whether minority wage gaps are likely to be narrowed more effectively by increasing enforcement of antidiscrimination laws or by implementing policies that reduce inequity in educational opportunity existing work shows large racial and ethnic differences in premarket factors especially formal schooling and suggests that these differences play a key role in shaping wage differences one example is trejo 1997 who finds that third and higher generation mexican american men earn 21 less than non hispanic white men approximately three quarters of the earnings gap is found to be attributable to the mexican americans relative youth and to differences in english language proficiency and years of schooling a second example is neal and johnson 1996 who find that black men earn 24 less than do non hispanic white men differences in schooling account for only about one fifth of this gap when the authors condition on performance on a basic verbal and math skills test the armed forces qualification test afqt though the differential between wages of blacks and whites declines to approximately onethird of its unadjusted level 1 trejo s 1997 study is a nice example of the traditional approach to studying race ethnicity wage gaps traditional in the sense that the explanatory variables in the study are conventional objective measures of human capital such as years of schooling and language ability neal and john

racial discrimination in labor markets with posted wage offers we analyze race discrimination in labor markets in which wage offers are posted if employers with job vacancies receive multiple applicants they choose the most qualified but may choose arbitrarily among equally qualified applicants in the model firms post wages workers choose where to apply and firms decide which workers to hire labor market frictions greatly amplify racial disparities so mild discriminatory tastes or small productivity differences can produce large wage differentials between the races compared with the nondiscriminatory equilibrium the discriminatory equilibrium features lower net output lower wages for both white and black workers and greater profits for firms this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly inexact verification abstract this paper integrates the often dichotomized models of costly state verification and costly claim falsification it is found that when verification is inexact it is possible for an optimal insurance contract to consist of both positive claim falsification and positive insurer verification provided that falsification cost and verification cost are sufficiently low and the insured is risk averse satisfying constant absolute risk aversion this result certainly contrasts with the common belief that falsification and verification are mutually exclusive in an optimal insurance contract some characteristics of the optimal falsification verification and indemnification profiles including implementability are analyzed

is work special justice and the distribution of employment i investigate from an egalitarian welfarist standpoint the issue of whether state guaranteed employment should be offered as a matter of right to able bodied poor citizens who suffer chronic or persistent unemployment an affirmative answer is defended one consideration supporting this right to work is that provision of transfer aid in the form of jobs rather than cash screens nonneedy bohemians from the class of beneficiaries the main conclusion of the essay is defended from one objection based on efficiency wage models of the labor market and from another based on the alleged impossibility of maintaining the self respect and self esteem of able bodied individuals who fail to earn their own keep independently in a market economy

why was there mandatory retirement abstract lazear argues that hours constraints and mandatory retirement form part of an efficient contract which inhibits worker shirking he argues that initially workers earn less than their vmp and must work more than they want while later they earn more than their vmp and must work less however if bonding is costly incentive compatibility requires that workers can never exceed the contracted hours in addition hours will be set so that vmp exceeds the disutility of employment consequently being paid more than their vmp is only sufficient not necessary for workers to be constrained to work less than they wish

on the merit of equal pay performance manipulation and incentive setting abstract work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly used metrics we created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities using two independent experiments we show that whenever pay for performance is used manipulation is pervasive leading to both a waste of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives by contrast paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

a theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy discrimination and keynesian unemployment this paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers need to motivate workers in order to elicit effort from their workers employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage this changes fundamentally the character of labor markets the model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena it provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates it also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces finally the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment

fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers insurance fraud is a major source of inefficiency in insurance markets a self justification of fraudulent behavior is that insurers are bad payers who start nitpicking if an opportunity arises even in circum stances where the good faith of policyholders is not in dispute we relate this nitpicking activity to the inability of insurers to commit to their auditing strategy reducing the indemnity payments acts as an incentive device for the insurer since auditing is profitable even if the claim is not fraudulent we show that optimal indemnity cuts are bounded above and that nitpicking remains optimal even if it induces adverse effects on policyholders moral standards

costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets abstract this paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type insurers can at some cost verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out however insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy the paper analyzes the relationship between second best pareto optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework it characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium the individuals contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists

reviving veblenian economic psychology thorstein veblen s seminal paper why is economics not an evolutionary science 1898 is well known for its critique of rational economic man however rather than just criticize this model veblen developed an alternative evolutionary informed approach to understanding human nature based partly on the ideas of charles sanders peirce william james and later william mcdougall the aim of this paper is to show how recent results from a number of cognitive disciplines are beginning to reaffirm many of veblen s core psychological assumptions the paper argues that an active multimodular and hierarchical approach to the mind can help provide a more integrative framework in which to examine economic behavior copyright 1998 by oxford university press

just cause employment policies in the presence of worker adverse selection the free market may not lead to the efficient level of just cause employment protection if workers are heterogeneous any firm that switches to just cause will attract a disproportionate share of workers that provide low effort yet are difficult to dismiss with cause thus there is an externality concerning each firm s just cause policy if all firms had just cause policies then the efficiency gains of just cause might outweigh the burden of the undesirable workers nevertheless no single firm may find it in its interest to switch to just cause it is possible for laws that require just cause to increase efficiency

ceo replacement under private information this article examines the optimal ceo compensation and replacement policy when the ceo is privately informed about the firm s continuation value under his leadership ex ante moral hazard implies that the ceo must receive ex post quasi rents which endogenously biases him toward continuation our model shows that to induce bad ceos to quit it may be best to make continuation costly through steep incentive pay rather than simply rewarding quitting through severance pay incentive pay makes continuation attractive for good ceos who can expect high future on the job pay but unattractive for bad ceos who may instead prefer to take their outside option payoff our model generates novel empirical implications that jointly relate ceo compensation and turnover to corporate governance firm size cash flow risk and the informativeness of performance measurement jel g34

workers compensation moral hazard and the composition of workplace injuries this paper provides evidence that workers compensation insurance wc affects not only the occurrence but also the composition of reported injuries in our theoretical approach wc is the source of two interrelated moral hazard problems underprovision of accident preventing efforts by the insured worker ex ante moral hazard and false reporting of injuries ex post moral hazard our model predicts that under certain assumptions the impact of wc benefits is stronger on the probability of reporting a difficult to diagnose injury than on the probability of reporting an injury that is easy to diagnose panel data on 9 800 workers in the quebec construction industry over each month of the period 1977 86 combining administrative data from the quebec construction board with data from the quebec workers compensation board are used for the estimates the parameters of the model are estimated using a threealternative logit kernel hybrid multinomial probit mnp framework with individual random effects our results confirm our theoretical pre

a language theory of discrimination any advanced industrial society is composed of a number of speech communities with different verbal and nonverbal languages in particular in the united states blacks and whites and men and women have sharply differing methods of speaking and listening this paper develops a model in which people can only work together if they speak the same language and in which it is costly to learn a second language the competitive market will tend to minimize communication through segregation but if interaction is required the cost will be borne by the minority a number of nontrivial predictions are derived from the model

workers trust funds and the logic of wage profiles this paper defines a concept a worker s trust fund which is useful in analyzing optimal age earnings profiles the trust fund represents what a worker loses if dismissed from a job for shirking in considering whether to work or shirk a worker weighs the potential loss due to forfeiture of the trust fund if caught shirking against the benefits from reduced effort this concept is used to show that the implicit bonding in upward sloping age earnings profiles is not a perfect substitute for an explicit up front performance bond or employment fee it is also shown that the second best optimal earnings profile in the absence of an up front employment fee pays total compensation in excess of market clearing in a variety of stylized cases

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

a test of dual labor market theory despite substantial differences in their views of the appropriate policy response to the existence of poverty neither the proponents of dual market theory nor its critics have proposed potentially conclusive tests of the dual market hypothesis this paper presents a test of the two central propositions of dual market theory 1 the existence of two distinct labor markets with different wage setting mechanisms and 2 the existence of barriers to mobility between the labor markets we find considerable support for both hypothesis estimation of a switching model of wage determination with unknown regimes yields two distinct wage equations the one which most workers are associated with closely resembles the standard human capital regression with significant returns to education and experience the other equation is flat with no returns to human capital these two equations resemble the predictions of dual market theory for the primary and secondary markets respectively further we present evidence that at least some non white workers are involuntarily confined to the secondary market this crowding of minority workers into the low wage labor market accounts for a substantial portion of white non white wage differences we interpret these results as providing empirical support for the dual market hypothesis and for recent theoretical work on efficiency wagemodels in addition combining the efficiency wage argument with the observation that much of the white non white wage difference is explained by the exclusion of non whites from the primary sector suggests an explanation for the persistance of wage differences this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

contracting productivity growth in this paper we analyze the interactions between growth and the contracting environment in the production sector allowing incompleteness in contracting implies that viable production relationships for firms and workers and therefore the profitability of industries depend on the rates of innovation and growth the speed at which new innovations arrive in turn depends on the profitability of production for the usual reasons examined in the endogenous growth literature we show that these interactions can have important implications which are consistent with observed phenomena in both the micro and macro environment in particular we demonstrate that a technological shock increasing productivity of research can through this interaction lead to a productivity slowdown and a shift in labor market contracts away from firms providing implicit guarantees of lifetime employment and towards shorter term contractor type arrangements we show the consistency of an increase in the proportion of the labor force under short term employment increased relative returns of workers in high productivity sectors and increased income inequality with a productivity slowdown of finite duration

are you a good employee or simply a good guy influence costs and contract design we develop a principal agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal the level of output and a soft behavioral signal the supervision signal about the agent s level of effort in our model the agent can initiate influence activities and manipulate the behavioral signal these activities are costly for the principal as they detract the agent from the productive task we show that the agent s ability to manipulate the behavioral signal leads to low powered incentives and increases the cost of implementing the efficient equilibrium as a result interestingly the fact that manipulation activities entail productivity losses may lead to the design of influence free contracts that deter manipulation and lead to high powered incentives this result implies that the optimal contract and whether manipulation is tolerated in equilibrium or not depends on the magnitude of the productivity based influence costs we show that it may be optimal for the principal not to supervise the agent even if the cost of supervision is arbitrarily low

optimal contracts under costly state falsification we examine an exchange economy with two agents one risk neutral with a certain endowment and a second risk averse with a random endowment the realization of the endowment is public but can be falsified by the second agent at a cost for a broad class of falsification cost functions the optimal no falsification contract is noncontingent on a left hand interval and strictly increasing with a slope strictly less than one on a right hand interval under a mild further restriction optimal no falsification contracts are in addition piece wise linear optimal contracts may in general require falsifying the state but for a set of the highest endowment realizations there is no falsification we find simple conditions under which the optimal contract is a no falsification contract the model has applications that include financial insurance and employment contracts and tax policy

learning by observation within the firm abstract this paper explores the implications of learning by observation on the production and wage decisions of a firm firms are viewed as collective arrangements that enable workers to share information this information takes the form of productivity enhancing innovations and is the product of research by workers some workers may choose to free ride on the research of others and the firm by its choice of wage profiles can affect the amount of research done the production function of a firm is then derived from the technology of learning as constrained by the incentives of workers the qualitative properties of the production function most importantly the nature of returns to scale and the incentives to limit firm size are shown to depend on the behaviour and objectives of the firm

the emergence persistence and recent widening of the racial unemployment gap census data show that the ratio of black to white unemployment rates currently in excess of 2 1 was small or nonexistent before 1940 widened dramatically during the 1940s and 1950s and widened again in the 1980s the authors decompose changes in the unemployment gap over the years 1880 1990 to identify the separate contributions of changes in observable worker characteristics and shifts in labor demand nearly all of the widening of the gap during the 1940s and 1950s can be attributed to regional shifts of workers and declining demand in markets where black workers were concentrated after 1970 improvements in the relative educational status of black workers would have narrowed the unemployment gap slightly but demand shifts adverse to black workers more than canceled out these gains

workers compensation and moral hazard two types of moral hazard have been determined the first type is related to self prevention activities affecting probabilities of accidents the second type relates to the agent s activities whenever the accident occurs the authors objective consists of presenting an empirical measure of the significance of this second type of moral hazard in the workers compensation market the main challenge in isolating moral hazard consists of dividing into two parts the total variation in recovery time with respect to changes in insurance coverage 1 the variation of consumption corresponding to a given level of information and 2 the variation of consumption due to greater asymmetrical information the methodology used in this study separates these two variations copyright 1991 by mit press

the role of human capital in earnings differences between black and white men d uring the past 50 years the earnings of black men have increased substantially both in absolute terms and relative to those of white men as shown in figure 1 in 1940 the black white weekly earnings ratio among men ages 25 34 was 49 percent by 1980 it had increased to 79 percent during the 1980s however the overall black white earnings gap did not narrow and at younger ages the gap actually widened although the 1980s is not the first decade since 1940 in which black men made little or no gains in relative earnings the 1950s was another the lack of progress in the 1980s is nevertheless puzzling and a source of concern this article examines the factors underlying the differential in earnings between black men and white men with a focus on the role of human capital since 1940 successive generations of black men entering the labor force have been increasingly more educated relative to white men both in terms of years of school completed and in the quality of schooling obtained as the education and income levels of black parents increased racial differences in the transmission of human capital in the home were also likely to have narrowed this convergence in educational differences combined with the migration of blacks out of the south contributed to the narrowing in the racial gap in earnings over the 1940 80 period particularly in the first half of the period but human capital factors education and migration were not the only source of convergence in black white differences in earnings the patterns of change in the earnings gap support the contention that declining labor market discrimination against blacks has also contributed to the rise in the black white earnings ratio moreover the acquisition of human capital itself has been strongly affected by societal and governmental discrimination since blacks were long provided with greatly inferior schooling resources

signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics abstract it is often argued that competitive and rent sharing models of wage determination should be distinguished by their long run properties in general rent sharing models predict the existence of a long run relationship between wages and firm specific ability to pay but the competitive model does not i present a two period counter example which demonstrates that rent sharing can be merely a short run phenomenon in the separating equilibria the firm signals ability to pay through first but not second period wage offers the model also has pooling equilibria in which the firm pays rents in the long run

the revenge of homo economicus contested exchange and the revival of political economy recent developments in microeconomic theory have shown that the self interested behavior underlying neoclassical theory is artificially truncated it depicts a charmingly victorian but utopian world in which conflicts abound but a handshake is a handshake but a handshake is not always a handshake studies of principal agent analysis the economics of information radical political economy mechanism design and transactions cost economics have all focused on the difficulties involved in policing and enforcing the actual process of market exchange abandoning the victorian world of neoclassical theory will redirect economists to an older conception of their profession what once was called political economy by taking optimizing more seriously post walrasian economics has inspired a revolution in economic thought fostering both new theoretical departures and alternative conceptions of the capitalist economy we will offer our own interpretation of this literature focusing on the widely recognized fact that the terms arising from exchange are not generally enforceable at zero cost to the exchanging parties where some aspect of the good or service supplied is both valuable to the buyer and costly to provide the absence of third party enforcement of claims gives rise to endogenous enforcement strategies we refer to this relationship as a contested exchange because unlike the transactions of walrasian economics the benefit the parties derive from the transaction depends on their own capacities to enforce competing claims

corporate tax evasion with agency costs this paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion using a costly state falsification framework we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and in particular how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority the optimal contract may adjust to offset at least partially the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion and we find a new and policy relevant non equivalence result penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders

unemployment dynamics and duration dependence a major issue in the analysis of unemployment durations concerns distinguishing genuine duration dependence of the exit rate out of unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity we present a method for the nonparametric estimation of both phenomena designed to be applicable to time series data on aggregate outflows from different duration classes the model explicitly takes into account that individual exit rates are affected by the business cycle and by seasonal effects the method is applied to u s data we find diverging duration effects among black and white individuals however except for white males duration dependence is dominated by unobserved heterogeneity

is honesty the best policy curtailing insurance fraud through optimal incentive contracts an incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims we demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones the differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss contingent insurance payments