combining cartel penalties and private damage actions the impact on cartel prices abstract in many countries antitrust enforcement by competition authorities through prosecution and the imposition of penalties is complemented in price fixing cases by private damage actions which should affect both cartel deterrence and the prices set by those cartels that do form we show that the impact of combining penalties and damages on cartel prices is not clearcut and depends on both the nature of the penalty regime and the way that damages are calculated we demonstrate this by focusing on two ways of calculating damages that have been advocated in practice and two different forms of the widely used revenue based penalty regime when the simple form of revenue based penalties is in force the standard method of calculating damages worsens its harmful pricing effects whereas the proposed alternative method of calculating damages can overturn them when a more sophisticated form of revenue based penalties is in operation imposing damages will improve its beneficial pricing effects under both methods of damage calculation but the alternative method is more effective in all cases combining penalties and damages improves deterrence

competition policy and cartel size this article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive in particular small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members regarding the least inclusive stable cartels competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and in the latter case the collusive price can rise

capacity constraints mergers and collusion abstract the objective of this paper is two fold to contribute to the analysis of tacit collusion in bertrand supergames with asymmetric capacity constraints and from a more applied perspective to bring a new light on merger analysis and provide useful guidelines for competition policy taking into account dynamic aspects of competition it is well known that capacity constraints affect tacit collusion as they limit both incentives to deviate e g to undercut rivals and retaliation possibilities however most studies have so far focused on symmetric situations where all firms have the same capacity which leads to ambiguous and unintuitive results and also considerably limits the scope of application studying asymmetric situations makes it possible to analyse the impact of changes in the distribution of these capacities expansions but also mergers split offs transfers etc and to provide guidelines for competition policy and particularly for merger policy these guidelines which differ substantially from those inspired by more static analyses such as the herfindahl or other standard concentration tests are applied to a famous merger that took place in the french bottled water market the nestle perrier merger case

price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper examines the role of industry capacity in enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games for a fixed capacity per firm it is shown that changes in the number of firms have a non monotone effect on the best enforceable cartel price this is due to the fact that while an additional firm lowers the share that each of the other firms enjoys at the collusive price it also increases the losses to each firm should the cartel fail

long run competition in capacity short run competition in price and the cournot model in this article we investigate the nature of equilibrium in markets in which firms choose the scale of operation before they make pricing decisions we analyze a duopoly model in which firms choose their capacities before engaging in bertrand like price competition we demonstrate that the cournot outcome is unlikely to emerge in such markets and that the equilibrium tends to be more competitive than the cournot model would predict in addition our results indicate a tendency toward asymmetric firm sizes and price dispersion that results from the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium

endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms in the context of an infinitely repeated capacity constrained price game we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities when firms are sufficiently patient there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms a firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel when a cartel is not all inclusive colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity contrary to previous work our results suggest that the most severe coordinated effects may come from mergers involving moderate sized firms rather than the largest or smallest firms

excess capacity and collusion in this paper the authors analyze a restricted class of equilibria in the dynamic model of j p benoit and v krishna 1987 in which firms choose their scale of operation before engaging in a repeated game of price competition benoit and krishna established that all firms carry excess capacity in all collusive equilibria as the authors are interested in the relationship between excess capacity and collusion in price they examine equilibria in which firms tacitly collude in price but not in investment decisions copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

horizontal mergers and collusive behavior abstract in the industrial organization literature it is generally felt that mergers hurt consumers not only because of the increased industrial concentration they effect but also because collusion becomes more likely in this paper we show that at least in one important case this intuition is misguided if a tacitly collusive agreement enforced by trigger strategies is not initially sustainable mergers will tend to reduce the chance that it becomes sustainable in the future this is so because the threat point implicit in the agreement becomes more favorable for outsiders

endogenous mergers and collusion in asymmetric market structures recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric while cartel theory suggests that firm symmetry is conducive to collusion including an indivisible cost of cartelization we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion since they balance the small firms incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel leaders indivisible cartelization cost using an endogenous merger model we also show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with a higher risk of collusion current antisymmetry merger policy can thus be counterproductive

the discontent cartel member and cartel collapse the case of the german cement cartel we hypothesize a particular source of cartel instability and explore its relevance to understanding cartel dynamics the cartel instability is rooted in the observation that upon cartel formation the relative positions of firms are often fixed which may lead some growthconscious members to be discontent this incongruity between a cartel member s allocated market share and its desired market share may result in systematic deviations and the eventual collapse of the cartel this hypothesis is then taken to the german cement cartel of 1991 2002 we argue that readymix was such a discontent cartel member and using a rich pricing data set are able to characterize how readymix deviated how other firms responded and how it led to the collapse of the cartel

market structure and schumpeterian growth abstract we present a discrete time version of a schumpeterian growth model a natural r d analogue to constant returns to scale implies a poisson production function with diminishing marginal product surprisingly the industry demand for r d inputs does not depend on the number of firms in the r d sector if bertrand competition ensues following ties in contrast demand is higher if ties result in collusion in general equilibrium bertrand competition leads to random switching between monopoly and competitive production under collusion production is always at the monopoly level but there is faster growth numerical simulations suggest that this leads to higher welfare

partial coordination and mergers among quantity setting firms we analyze horizontal mergers in a collusive environment by using an infinitely repeated game where i a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given and ii partially collusive arrangements are allowed for we show that in our model there is no clear relation between the existence of mergers and full collusion at equilibrium however we demonstrate that the presence of mergers generally leads to a price increase also we show that cartel firms have less incentives to merge than firms in a cournot oligopoly and that collusion increases fringe firms incentives to merge 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved jel classification l13 l40 l41

ringleaders in larger number asymmetric cartels the concept of a cartel ringleader has specific legal meaning but has received relatively little attention in the economic literature of cartels this article draws on a sample of 89 european cartels to identify how often ringleaders exist who they are and what they do it argues that ringleaders are more likely where the traditional cartel problems are likely to be most acute i e with larger numbers of members exhibiting substantial size asymmetries this is confirmed for price fixing and bid rigging cartels and is especially pronounced where the ringleader displays aggressive as opposed to merely organisational behaviour

on the workings of a cartel evidence from the norwegian cement industry using the institutional set up of the norwegian cement industry in particular its sharing rule we are able to identify the workings of a cartel in some detail given data on prices production and exports we are able to identify marginal costs as well as the effectiveness of the cartel we compare our marginal cost estimates which are derived from an equilibrium condition to detailed cost accounting data and find that our estimate of marginal cost is very much in line with the data we then show that the cement cartel has been ineffective in the sense that the sharing rule induces overproduction and exporting below marginal costs in this sense it is consumers not firms that benefi tf rom the sharing rule we find that the ineffectiveness of the cartel is becoming so large that domestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would in fact be positive at around 1968 which is exactly when the merger actually took place however we also show that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire sample

a tip of the iceberg the probability of catching cartels summary reliable estimates of crime detection probabilities could help in designing better sanctions and improve our understanding of the efficiency of law enforcement for cartels we only have limited knowledge on the rate at which these illegal practices are discovered in comparison to previous works this paper offers a more parsimonious and simple to use method to estimate time dependent cartel discovery rates while allowing for heterogeneity across firms it draws on capture recapture methods that are frequently used in ecology to make inferences on various wildlife population characteristics an application of this method provides evidence that less than a fifth of cartelising firms are discovered copyright 2013 john wiley sons ltd

denying leniency to cartel instigators costs and benefits abstract a large number of countries have introduced successful leniency programs into their competition law enforcement to encourage colluding firms to come forward with evidence that will help detect cartels and punish price fixers this paper studies a feature of some of these programs that has received relatively little attention in the literature the inclusion of no immunity for instigators clauses niics these provisions deny leniency benefits to parties that instigate cartel behavior or function as cartel ringleaders our results show that niics can lead to increased or decreased levels of cartel conduct by removing the instigator s benefit from cooperating with the authorities a niic undoes some of the destabilizing benefit the leniency program was intended to generate and thereby furthers cartel stability on the other hand the instigator faces an asymmetrically severe punishment under a niic and this can reduce the incentive to instigate in the first place

food aid domestic policy and food security contrasting experiences from south asia and sub saharan africa abstract food aid both for short term emergency relief and as program food aid that helps address medium term food deficits is often a major component of food security strategies in developing countries this study reviews the experience with food aid of four major recipients of food aid india bangladesh ethiopia and zambia regarding food production trade markets consumption and safety nets as well as the policy responses to food emergencies the widely varying experiences of the study countries suggest that food aid that supports building of production and market enhancing infrastructure is timed to avoid adverse price effects on producers and is targeted to food insecure households can play a positive role in enhancing food security however food aid is not the only or in many cases the most efficient means of addressing food insecurity in many cases private markets can more effectively address shortfalls in food availability and cash transfers may be a viable alternative to food transfers in kind

multimarket contact and collusive behavior traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the exercise of market power in an industry to internalfeatures such as demand conditions concentration and barriers to entry nevertheless some economists have remained concerned that external factors such as contact across markets may also play a significant role in determining the level of competitiveness in any particular industry in this article we examine the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in settings of repeated competition we isolate conditions under which multimarket contact facilitates collusion and show that these collusive gains are achieved through modes of behavior that have been identified in previous empirical studies of multimarketfirms

quantifying the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions abstract recent years have witnessed an increased interest by competition agencies in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions we propose an empirical structural methodology which can deal with settings involving all types of owners and ownership rights to quantify the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions on differentiated products industries by evaluating the impact of such acquisitions on the minimum discount factors for which coordination can be sustained we also provide an empirical application of the methodology to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry that give rise to cross and common ownership structures the results are as follows i the incentives to coordinate of the firms that the acquiring party is pre acquisition able to influence are non decreasing with any acquisition ii the incentives to coordinate of the acquired firm are non decreasing with acquisitions involving full or partial both financial and corporate control rights but non increasing with acquisitions involving full or partial solely financial rights and iii the incentives to coordinate of the remaining firms in the industry are non increasing with any acquisition this implies that the coordinated effects of partial horizontal acquisitions are in general ambiguous which illustrates the importance of an empirical structural methodology

public policy markets and household coping strategies in bangladesh avoiding a food security crisis following the 1998 floods abstract at their peak the 1998 floods covered two thirds of bangladesh causing severe damage to the major rice crop and threatening the food security of tens of millions of households in this paper we first highlight the contribution of government policy interventions including trade liberalization in the early 1990s to stabilization of rice markets during and after the flood then using a panel data set covering 750 households in three rounds over a 13 month period we analyze impacts of the flood on household assets consumption and nutritional outcomes finally we present empirical estimates of the contribution of rice market stabilization and government transfers to household food consumption

lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics capacity addition and withdrawal decisions are among the most important strategic decisions made by firms in oligopolistic industries in this paper we develop and analyze a fully dynamic model of an oligopolistic industry with lumpy capacity and lumpy investment disinvestment we use our model to suggest answers to two questions first what economic factors facilitate preemption races second what economic factors facilitate capacity coordination with a series of examples we show that low product differentiation low investment sunkness and high depreciation tend to promote preemption races the same examples also show that low product differentiation and low investment sunkness tend to promote capacity coordination although depreciation removes capacity it might impede capacity coordination finally our examples show that multiple equilibria arise over at least some range of parameter values the distinct structures of these equilibria suggest that firms expectations play a key role in determining whether or not industry dynamics are characterized by preemption races and capacity coordination taken together our results suggest that preemption races and excess capacity in the short run often go hand in hand with capacity coordination in the long run

averting a food crisis private imports and public targeted distribution in bangladesh after the 1998 flood abstract the 1998 flood in bangladesh caused a shortfall of 2 2 million tonnes mill t in the rice production and threatened the food security of tens of millions of households despite the best efforts of donors and the government the public distribution of rice and wheat was only 188 000 t more than originally planned for july 1998 to april 1999 however a major food crisis was averted as private imports made possible by trade liberalisation in the early 1990s stabilised market prices and supplies the government s direct distribution programs though small compared to private imports nonetheless increased access to food by poor households household survey data indicate that immediate relief efforts were well targeted to flood affected households as were transfers from ngos vulnerable group feeding vgf a medium term program was not targeted well to households directly exposed to the flood though the program was relatively well targeted to poor households more broadly the bangladesh experience with the 1998 flood shows that in a liberalised trade regime where private imports respond to price signals food aid s contribution to the total availability of food may be minimal however foreign assistance in kind or in cash can provide resources for subsidised targeted distribution to food insecure households assistance not possible otherwise under tight government budget constraints

collusion in a price quantity oligopoly abstract in the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities we compare a price cartel with a price quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic if market demand is sufficiently inelastic then the cartel faces a trade off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction we find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production in this case a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price from a policy perspective our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable

is schumpeterian creative destruction a plausible source of endogenous real business cycle shocks abstract this paper examines the link between growth and business cycles by incorporating schumpeterian growth into an otherwise standard real business cycle rbc model we ask whether schumpeter s creative destruction process can generate realistic business cycles we solve the model generate artificial time series and compare statistical properties of these series with their historical counterparts in our approach the trend component is included in our artificial series just as it is in the data hence we are not tied to any particular filtering method for our comparisons we find that schumpeterian fluctuations alone can generate time series that match key moments from u s data we also find however that a model with both schumpeterian and standard rbc shocks performs better

some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric bertrand supergames abstract optimal penal codes in asymmetric bertrand supergames exhibit security level punishments for the largest firm if no firm has sufficient capacity to service the market then collusion that is barely sustainable by optimal penal codes entails higher capacity utilization by the largest firm than by the other firms collusion supported by optimal penal codes in models with a large firm facing a competitive fringe can result in the large firm having low capacity utilization and thus providing a price umbrella for the fringe firms which have high capacity utilization journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 l11 l13

dynamic duopoly prices and quantities we study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities if quantity capacity choices are relatively inflexible firms generally carry excess idle capacity in equilibrium because of this enforcement cost firms are unable to achieve monopoly levels this contrasts with models in which which firms compete in either prices or quantities alone on the other hand if capacities are flexible firms may be able to sustain monopoly behaviour

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

colluding on excluding abstract in an oligopoly characterized by barriers to re entry a finite horizon complete information convex costs and the presence of three identical firms i show that in subgame perfect equilibrium two of them the predators can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third the prey decides to exit immediately in this predatory pricing equilibrium the predators can enjoy higher profits than in the best collusive equilibrium with three firms thus a coalition of two firms can benefit from colluding on excluding

a simple model of schumpeterian growth with complex dynamics abstract in this paper we develop a schumpeterian discrete time model of endogenous growth with an explicit market for the resource used for innovation creating investment and study its global dynamics we show among others that the level of investment may fluctuate chaotically for a compact range of model parameters as a consequence of the explicit intermediation and market imperfections temporary monopoly power following an innovation underlying the growth process

participation games and international environmental agreements a non parametric model abstract we examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements cartel formation rd based on these examples a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game the equilibrium coalition size is small except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small in this paper we develop a non parametric approach to the problem and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust in a general setting we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large contrary to previously examined leading special cases we show that reductions in marginal abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium membership and we provide a measure of the smallest reduction in costs needed to support a coalition of arbitrary size

time cost substitutability earlycutting threat and innovation timing with time cost substitutability a potential imitator could threat to earlycut the innovator by increasing experimental intensity the earlycutting threat or uncertainty about the potential imitator s experimental cost advantage usually drives down the new product s quality but advances its launching date

a dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars we provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among jirms investment entry and exit it is a symmetric information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an activejim that is likely to exit in the near future numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment only the collusive industry generates price wars also the collusive industry offers both more and higherquality products to consumers albeit often at a higher price the positive effect of collusion on variety and quality more than compensates consumers for the negative effect of collusive prices so that consumer surplus is larger with collusion

trade liberalization and national food security rice trade between bangladesh and india abstract following a poor harvest in late 1997 and a massive flood in 1998 private sector traders in bangladesh imported several million metric tons of rice from india this paper presents evidence that this trade made possible by separate trade liberalizations in india and bangladesh in the early 1990s augmented domestic supplies and stabilized prices in bangladesh at import parity levels letters of credit data indicating the participation of hundreds of importers and a close correlation of price movements across the two countries suggest that the trade was competitive a risk of co incident crop shortfalls in the two countries remains though these have occurred rarely in the past two decades bangladesh imports from alternative sources would also enhance food availability if another production shortfall occurs but these imports face higher transport costs and would involve far fewer importing firms given the economies of scale of shipments by sea the positive contribution of trade liberalization to short run food security in bangladesh in recent years does not minimize the importance of increased agricultural productivity and rural economic growth to provide rural poor households with sufficient incomes to acquire food nonetheless the bangladesh experience shows that trade liberalization offers potential benefits for national food security by enabling a rapid increase of food supplies following domestic production shortfalls

coalition proof nash equilibria ii applications abstract in bernheim peleg and whinston coalition proof equilibria i concepts j econ theory 42 1987 1 12 we proposed the notion of coalition proof nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition proof nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make binding commitments this paper undertakes applications to several economic problems including the behavior of cournot oligopolists oligopolistic entry deterrence cooperation in finite horizon games and social choice rule implementation

optimal penal codes in price setting supergames with capacity constraints this paper constructs optimal pure strategy penal codes for a broad class of symmetric bertrand supergames with capacity constraints the results should simplify the analysis of bertrand supergames because the punishments comprising the penal codes constructed below have a very simple form and the associated payoffs are often easy to calculate it is also shown that for a commonly employed subclass of the games considered the admission of mixed strategies does not allow severer punishments the analysis draws heavily on the pathbreaking work of abreu 1984 he demonstrated that in the search for optimal penal codes attention can be restricted to simple penal codes simple penal codes are characterized by a vector of outcome paths one for each player the ith outcome path is interpreted as the punishment to be imposed on the ith player if he deviates from the equilibrium path or from any punishment path section 2 explains the basic framework of analysis the class of bertrand games studied is very general no particular rationing rule is imposed some mild restrictions are placed on the firms sales functions instead the commonly used models of levitan and shubik 1972 and beckman 1965 are special cases of the games analysed below it is assumed throughout that there is a price firms can be induced to charge if the punishment for charging a different price gives the offending firm a payoff equal to its security level for the supergame thus either there must exist a static nash equilibrium in pure strategies or else the discount factor must not be too close to zero in section 3 optimal penal codes are constructed and it is established that the punishments comprising them always drive punished firms to their security levels the arguments employed make clear that optimal penal codes are not generally unique this issue is addressed in section 4 where it is also shown that the levitan shubik rationing rule exhibits more types of optimal penal codes than do other rules in particular if the levitan shubik rule is employed then punishments that are analogous to abreu s 1986 symmetric two phase punishments for cournot games can be used to construct optimal penal codes in bertrand games this property does not hold generally however