organizational membership and environmental ethics a comparison of managers in state owned firms collectives private firms and joint ventures in china abstract this study empirically examines the relationship between organizational type and the environmental ethical orientation of managers in the people s republic of china prc on three dimensions stewardship and long and short term utilitarianism it was found that chinese managers uniformly self report strong ethical commitments to environmental protection in addition organizational type was found to be a significant predictor for the different ethical dimensions overall managers in state owned firms uniformly reported the strongest values managers in private firms on the other hand self reported lower values and appeared relatively more skeptical of emergent utilitarian arguments that economic performance and environmental performance are compatible in the short term

whom can we trust to run the fed theoretical support for the founders views abstract the federal reserve has been called a bizarre policymaking structure this paper documents and formalizes a historical argument that the fed s structure was a response to public conflict over inflation s redistributive powers the paper shows that in the face of conflict over redistributive inflation policy by majority can lead to policy that is worse even for the majority than obvious alternatives in balancing the interests for and against surprise inflation the fed s structure can lead to a better outcome

regional house price dynamics and voting behavior in the fomc i introduction interest rate decisions by the federal open market committee fomc are not always made unanimously different individual views about the appropriate monetary policy stance may lead to the result that members cast dissenting interest rate votes in fomc meetings that is they opt for a higher or lower interest rate than proposed by the chairman of the fomc several studies find that fomc members have different views about the appropriate monetary policy when casting interest rate votes belden 1989 chappell and mcgregor 2000 chappell mcgregor and vermilyea 2005 2008 2012 gildea 1990 1992 havrilesky and gildea 1991 1995 havrilesky and schweitzer 1990 meade and sheets 2005 meade 2010 tootell 1991 1996 an important source of such dissenting votes may be the regional bias of the fomc member which is constituted by its regional affiliation several studies have examined the impact of the regional unemployment rate on the interest rate votes of fomc members while gildea 1992 meade and sheets 2005 and chappell mcgregor and vermilyea 2008 find that a higher regional unemployment rate relative to the national rate increases decreases fomc members preference for monetary easing tightening tootell 1991 finds no significant evidence 1 in this article we analyze whether fomc members align their interest rate voting behavior with house price developments of the federal reserve district they represent in addition to the regional unemployment rate studied so far in this way we can test whether regional house prices and or regional unemployment rates have a significant impact on the voting behavior of fomc members and we examine whether there are systematic differences between regional bank presidents and board members various studies have examined the link between monetary policy and asset price developments according to gilchrist and leahy 2002 there are some good reasons why central banks should align their monetary policies with asset prices first the consumer price index cpi or gross domestic product gdp deflator are incomplete measures since they only signal information on the prices of goods consumed today whereas a more complete measure would also signal future cost of living such as the information contained in asset prices alchian and klein 1973 second asset prices may be useful in forecasting inflation goodhart and hofmann 2000 third asset prices may directly affect real economic activity and inflation since for example wealthier consumers spend more which may affect price developments carroll otsuka and slacalek 2011 whether central banks should react to asset prices is however debated in the literature the traditional view is that central banks should only react to asset prices to the extent that they feed back into the conventional monetary policy goals inflation and output bernanke and gertler 1999 2001 on the contrary cecchetti et al 2000 conclude that it may be reasonable for central banks to react to asset prices in particular house prices in order to avoid the buildup of asset price bubbles as the burst of asset price bubbles may lead to financial crises reinhart and rogoff 2009 leaning against the buildup of extreme asset price changes may therefore be a reasonable choice for central banks as a part of their mission to manage systemic risk allen and carletti 2009 bordo and jeanne 2002 another rationale that central banks should take asset prices particularly house prices into account is that house prices have been shown to be suitable early warning indicators for the outbreak of the recent financial crisis kemme and roy 2012 several empirical papers analyze the impact of asset prices on interest rate setting rigobon and sack 2003 and dupor and conley 2004 find evidence that fomc interest rate decisions are influenced by equity prices on the contrary fuhrer and tootell 2008 find that fomc interest rate decisions are not a direct response to equity price movements and are an indirect response only to the extent that equity prices helped forecast the conventional monetary policy goals

innovations and issues in monetary policy panel discussion martin feldstein 1 chairman alan greenspan s remarks today give us an opportunity to understand his thinking about monetary policy and about the federal reserve s actions during the past 15 years it was a period of substantial accomplishment that no doubt reflects in considerable measure the views of the chairman himself the fed s primary goal price stability has been achieved with inflation down from 4 percent at the end of the 1980 s to about 1 5 percent now the 2 percentage point difference between the interest rate on conventional treasury bonds and on inflation indexed bonds tips shows that financial markets expect inflation will remain at about 2 percent for at least the next decade

forecast dispersion dissenting votes and monetary policy preferences of fomc members the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects using data from 1992 to 2001 we study the impact of members economic forecasts on the probability of casting dissenting votes in the federal open market committee fomc employing standard ordered probit techniques we find that higher individual inflation and real gdp growth forecasts relative to the committee s median significantly increase the probability of dissenting in favor of tighter monetary policy whereas higher individual unemployment rate forecasts significantly decrease it using interaction models we find that fomc members with longer careers in government industry academia non governmental organizations ngos or on the staff of the board of governors are more focused on output stabilization while fomc members with longer careers in the financial sector or on the staffs of regional federal reserve banks are more focused on inflation stabilization we also find evidence that politics matters with republican appointees being much more focused on inflation stabilization than democratic appointees moreover during the entire clinton administration natural monetary policy preferences of bank presidents and board members for inflation and output stabilization were more pronounced than under periods covering the administrations of both george h w bush and george w bush respectively

does a good central banker make a difference the personalities of central bankers moved center stage during the recent financial crisis indeed several central bankers even became superstars in this article we investigate whether superstar central bankers have an impact on economic performance we employ school grades given to central bankers by the financial press defining as superstars those central bankers receiving the top grade first we explain the grades in a probit estimation with measures of economic performance institutional features and personal characteristics second we employ a matching approach to account for the endogeneity of grading with respect to economic performance using entropy balancing we identify credible counterfactuals for top graded central bankers that is nonsuperstar central bankers who face similar situations comparing the economic performance of both groups we find that superstars do indeed matter a top graded central banker faces a significantly more favorable output inflation tradeoff than his peers this effect is driven by outstanding central bankers in both advanced and emerging economies and is especially prevalent in the precrisis subsample jel e52 e58

federal reserve independence abstract the federal reserve is always called an independent agency the term independent is rarely defined the only attempt in the literature and internal records is based on chairman martin s statement that the federal reserve is independent with the government not independent of the government martin explained several times that independence within government meant that the federal reserve helped to finance government budget because they were approved by congress and signed by the president financing budget deficits is the very opposite of the principle adopted when congress approved the federal reserve act in 1913 in fact the federal reserve has supported treasury operations many times i conclude that it is far more important to have an enforceable policy rule such as the taylor rule but any rule must have a provision that permits the rule to be set aside

money politics and the post war business cycle abstract the political economy literature has enshrined as stylized fact the view that lower inflation and temporarily lower growth follow the election of republican presidents and has emphasized political manipulation of monetary policy as an explanation support for the monetary explanation comes in econometric work that largely ignores identification issues that dominate the literature on measuring the effects of monetary policy we generalize a standard vector autoregression framework to accommodate discrete political party variables we find almost no support for the view that political effects on the macroeconomy operate through monetary policy and only weak evidence that political effects are significant at all

market structure and discrimination the case of small businesses this paper examines bank market structure to draw inferences concerning the role of discrimination in credit markets for small businesses the authors analyze credit application and denial rates loans outstanding and interest rates across demographic groups this set of variables in combination with information on local bank market structure helps them distinguish among borrower preferences lender tastes and inadequate lender information as likely causes of differences in credit market experiences of small business operators from distinct demographic groups the authors find that white men and women can expect similar treatment in credit markets with some benefits to female owned firms located in concentrated banking markets minorities by contrast fare worse than whites moreover by appealing to becker s 1957 classic theories we find some clear evidence to support the view that prejudicial discrimination is at least partly to blame

the biases of federal reserve bank presidents this paper develops statistical tests which show that in federal open market committee voting federal reserve bank presidents as a group prefer less expansionary monetary policy than federal reserve board members further tests show that a subset of federal reserve bank presidents vote in a manner which is consistent with the partisanship of the u s president during whose term they were appointed membership in this subset is highly correlated with a career as an economist these results have implications for reforms which would alter the voting power of bank presidents on the fomc

the objectives and priorities of monetary policy under different federal reserve chairmen this paper utilizes a monetary policy reaction function that relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives estimates of this reaction function over the post accord period suggest that the burns period was unique while the martin and volcker periods were extremely similar the burns period was structurally distinct from both the martin and volcker periods further model specifications that allow for an independent influence on monetary policy from different presidential administrations also imply that there are significant differences in monetary policy under different fed chairmen copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

a long history of fomc voting behavior we devise and apply a method for estimating monetary policy reaction functions for individual members of the federal open market committee fomc of the federal reserve our method uses members votes on the monetary policy directive in fomc meetings as the key source of data on individual preferences the analysis provides a ranking by preference for ease for 84 fomc members who served during the 1966 1996 period

monetary policy theory and practice in respect of the theory of monetary policy i am reminded of the comment that jacob viner made many years ago at a meeting of the american economic association about alfred marshall s economics what is new is highly unlikely at this late date also to be true and significant 1 consequently i shall restrict my remarks on theory to trying to summarize what i regard as the present intellectual position

the influence of fomc member characteristics on the monetary policy decision making process abstract this paper provides new empirical evidence on a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members whose decisions affect the efficacy of monetary policy it thereby provides a link between the literature on monetary policy committees and central bank monetary policy implementation through monetary rules using a novel dataset of the idiosyncratic characteristics of fomc members over the period from august 1979 to february 2014 the empirical findings show that characteristics such as education age and to a lesser extent work experience are not important in understanding the fomc decision making process instead the results point to the importance of time spent within the federal reserve system tenure on the fomc itself and the influence of the chair in shaping the decision making process the results are expected to have implications for the capacity of economic agents as well as various markets in the economy to more readily interpret public monetary policy information that reaches them this makes the monetary policy decision process less noisy and thus enhances the capability of agents and markets to attach the correct weight to this information

what s in a picture evidence of discrimination from prosper com abstract we find evidence of significant racial disparities in a new type of credit market known as peer to peer lending loan listings with blacks in the attached picture are 25 to 35 percent less likely to receive funding than those of whites with similar credit profiles despite the higher average interest rates charged to blacks lenders making such loans earn a lower net return compared to loans made to whites with similar credit profiles because blacks have higher relative default rates these results provide insight into whether the discrimination we find is taste based or statistical

the influence of the federal advisory council on monetary policy the federal advisory council consists of twelve bankers elected by federal reserve bank directorates who advise the federal open market committee every three months on their desired direction for monetary policy this paper tests the conjecture that the council s directives to the committee contain information that predicts subsequent changes in interest rates and committee directives regression equations and granger causality tests do not disprove the conjecture this is the first hard evidence of private interest group influence on monetary policy copyright 1990 by ohio state university press

taylor rules omitted variables and interest rate smoothing in the us abstract we test for the presence of interest rate smoothing in forward looking taylor rules in first differences we also consider financial and asymmetric preferences indicators we find that interest rate smoothing is not induced by an omitted variable bias

are emily and greg more employable than lakisha and jamal a field experiment on labor market discrimination we study race in the labor market by sending fictitious resumes to help wanted ads in boston and chicago newspapers to manipulate perceived race resumes are randomly assigned african american or white sounding names white names receive 50 percent more callbacks for interviews callbacks are also more responsive to resume quality for white names than for african american ones the racial gap is uniform across occupation industry and employer size we also find little evidence that employers are inferring social class from the names differential treatment by race still appears to still be prominent in the u s labor market jel j71 j64

entrepreneurial finance credit cards and race this paper examines the impact of financial deregulation on entrepreneurship we assess the impact of credit card deregulation on transitions into self employment using state level removal of credit card interest rate ceilings following the us supreme court s 1978 marquette decision as a quasi natural experiment we find that credit card deregulation increases the probability of entrepreneurial entry with a particularly strong effect for black entrepreneurs we demonstrate that these effects are magnified in states with a history of racial discrimination and link the results to discriminationbased barriers to entry 2012 elsevier b v all rights reserved

discrimination in the small business credit market we use data from the 1993 and 1998 national surveys of small business finances to examine the existence of racial discrimination in the small business credit market we conduct an econometric analysis of loan outcomes by race and find that black owned small businesses are about twice as likely to be denied credit even after controlling for differences in creditworthiness and other factors a series of specification checks indicates that this gap is unlikely to be explained by omitted variable bias these results indicate that the racial disparity in credit availability is likely caused by discrimination

policy regime changes judgment and taylor rules in the greenspan era this paper investigates policy deviations from linear taylor rules motivated by the risk management approach followed by the fed during the greenspan era we estimate a nonlinear monetary policy rule via a logistic smoothing transition regression model where policy makers judgment proxied by economically meaningful variables drives the transition across policy regimes we find that ignoring judgment induced nonlinearities while estimating taylor rules has remarkable costs in terms of fit above 250 bps in 10 quarters although linear taylor rules describe well the broad contours of monetary policy they fail to detect relevant policy decisions driven by policy makers judgment

business ethics and finance in greater china synthesis and future directions in sustainability csr and fraud following the financial crisis and recent recession the center of gravity of global economic growth and competitiveness is shifting toward emerging economies as a leading and increasingly influential emerging economy china is currently attracting the attention of academics practitioners and policy makers there has been an increase in research interest in and publications on issues relating to china within high quality international academic journals we therefore organized a special issue conference in conjunction with the journal of business ethics jbe in lhasa tibet on may 19 20 2014 on business ethics in greater china past present and future the papers for the special issue focused on the intersection of ethics and finance and fit within one of the three themes environment and sustainability corporate social responsibility and fraud within these themes issues of intellectual capital protection gender equality political connections regional development investor protection corporate stewardship trust and corruption and corporate transparency each play a significant role in this paper we survey these studies and the related literature to provide a comprehensive coverage of business ethics and finance issues that affect china

regional influences on fomc voting patterns this paper looks at the monetary policy decisions of the u s federal reserve and asks whether observed voting patterns have been driven entirely by national concerns or whether regional factors have also played a role we find that fed policymakers take into account developments in regional unemployment when casting votes on monetary policy these results are robust to different specifications of the voting equation this research is relevant for the fed and it may also be relevant for europe s fledgling central bank in frankfurt in light of regional differences within the euro area

the educational and professional background of central bankers and its effect on inflation an empirical analysis we assume that central banks can control inflation so that inflation rates reflect the preferences of the central bank council the hypothesis to be tested is that these preferences depend on the central bankers educational and or professional background in a panel data analysis for the euro area and eleven countries since 1973 we explain inflation either by the weights with which the educational and professional characteristics of the 391 council members were represented in the various central bank councils or by the education or profession of the median council members control variables are added using professional background weights we find that former members of the central bank staff and in some specifications former insurance executives commercial bankers other businessmen and public servants prefer significantly lower inflation rates than former union leaders and politicians do in the median voter analysis former central bankers commercial bankers businessmen and public servants are also significantly more inflation averse than economic scholars as for the education of the council members our results are less robust however if the median member of the central bank council has studied business the inflation rate is significantly lower than if she has studied economics taking educational and professional background together central banks seem to attract or produce primarily economists who are monetary conservatives whereas keynesian economists are more prominent in academia jel classification e42 e58

the policy preferences of fomc members as revealed by dissenting votes comment the purposes of this comment are to present evidence that casts doubt on several of the conclusions of susan belden s recent paper in this journal 1989 and to suggest directions for future research in this area to begin there is skepticism that dissenting votes at least as belden measures them can be unbiased indicators of policy preferences in addition belden partially recognizes but does not fully specify three influences on federal open market gommittee fomc member voting that are prominently featured in the literature these influences are 1 fomc member training background and career experience 2 state of the economy measures and 3 partisanship measures each of these factors alone may help to explain one of belden s three major findings first the training backgrounds and career experiences of bank presidents may help to explain belden s affirmation of their penchant to dissent from fomc directives on the side of monetary tightness second the state of the economy may help to explain belden s finding of a decline in dissent voting when arthur burns was chairman of the federal reserve third differences between the party of the president and the partisan composition of the board of governors may help to explain belden s discovery of shifts in ease and tightness dissent voting behavior under different chairmen since this comment will indicate how these influences qualify belden s elndings it will at the same time suggest fruitful directions for the research agenda in this area

reliable and unreliable partisan appointees to the board of governors every new appointment to the board of governors in recent years has triggered speculation as to how the new governor will vote in fomc meetings while several studies have hinted at partisan voting behavior by governors no study has yet attempted to identify reliable and unreliable partisan voting behavior and to pinpoint the background characteristics of governors that distinguish between the two this paper indicates that board members with a background in economics consistently voted in line with the economic ideology of the appointing president noneconomists on the board however displayed no such partisan voting behavior and were seen to be influenced by pressures emanating from the administration and by the monetary environment prior to their appointment over the 1951 to 1987 period most presidents have appointed reliable governors earlier in their presidential terms when the returns from being able to influence subsequent monetary policy are great and have chosen unreliable governors later in their terms when election support from the interest groups that these unreliables represent is important the results of the present paper suggest skepticism toward the recent spate of rational expectations game theoretic models which feature a dictatorial policy maker gaming atomistic market participants whose only political activity voting generates monetary surprises followed by convergence to an equilibrium because of their obsession with the ceremonial formalism of their genre these models ignore a vast complementary literature and as a consequence display conspicuously flimsy institutional and historical premises instead the present paper argues for the greater relevance of models of uncoordinated interaction between multiple political and private principals and federal reserve agents

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

monetary policy preferences of individual fomc members a content analysis of the memoranda of discussion the memoranda of discussion provide detailed records of federal open market committee fomc meeting deliberations procedures are developed for coding the textual data in the memoranda and assessing the reliability of those codings the codings are then used in the estimation of parameters of individual fomc members reaction functions data from the 1970 to 1976 period are employed in the estimation in the future similar methods could be used to analyze newly released transcripts of fomc meetings held after 1976

estimating central banks preferences from a time varying empirical reaction function abstract we estimate monetary policy reaction functions for the united states the united kingdom and germany using a markov switching model that allows for shifts in the coefficients of the central bank s reaction function as well as for independent shifts in the residual variance the results indicate that central bank policy can be characterized as falling into a low and a high inflation regime over time all central banks have assigned changing weights to inflation and the output gap switching in the residual variance turns out to be important for the fit of the model as a reaction function is a reduced form coefficients embody preference parameters as well as parameters characterizing the structure of the economy to recover the central banks preferences we estimate the preference parameters jointly with a small model of the economy the results show that the bundesbank has placed a relatively higher weight on inflation than the fed moreover for the bundesbank and the fed the differences between both regimes seem to originate mainly from a changing preference for interest rate smoothing

multiple regimes in u s monetary policy a nonparametric approach we use two different nonparametric methods to determine whether there were multiple regimes in u s monetary policy over the period 1955 2003 we model monetary policy using two different versions of taylor s rule for the nominal interest rate target by contrast with parametric tests for regime changes the nonparametric methods we use allow the data to determine the dimensions on which to split the sample for purposes of estimating the coefficients of the taylor rule we find evidence for a few structural breaks and consistent agreement between our two nonparametric methods on the dating of those breaks

monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve this chapter employs the index of monetary policy signaling from the administration to the federal reserve safer that was developed in chapter two the safer index is a simple weekly sum of articles that appeared in the wall street journal in which administration officials expressed a desire for easier 1 or tighter 1 monetary policy a key assumption is that systematically over time the financial media capture the essence of communication that is going on between the executive branch and federal reserve officials 1 the signaling index is employed in ordinary least squares regressions for the period from january 1964 to november 1991 cumulative values of the safer index over a three week period as an explanatory variable are found to have a statistically significant effect on the average federal funds rate during the third week as the dependent variable further evidence suggests that the safer index is granger causal with respect to the federal funds rate after classifying the signals by sources within the administration oval office council of economic advisers treasury and other and unidentified sources it is shown that for the overall 1964 1991 period signals from the treasury department and from other and unidentified sources have a statistically significant effect on the federal funds rate while signals from the oval office and the council do not when the data are segmented according to who was the chairman of the federal reserve board at the time ordinary least squares results indicate that the federal reserve did not systematically respond to executive branch signaling in a statistically significant way when william mcchesney martin g william miller and alan greenspan were chairmen but did respond statistically significantly to administration signaling during portions of the periods during which arthur burns and paul volcker were chairmen

the effect of fomc votes on financial markets this paper shows that since votes of members of the federal open market committee have been included in press statements stock prices increase after the announcement when votes are unanimous but f

a multinominal logit analysis of the influence of policy variables and board experience on fomc voting behavior previous studies have used probit or logit models to analyze two states of monetary policy tighter or looser in this paper we employ multinominal logit to permit federal reserve monetary policy to assume one of three alternative states tighter looser or no change as a function of three independent economic variables unemployment real growth and inflation and the amount of experience of the board of governors the results indicate that the federal reserve reacted differently under burns miller and volcker and between volcker s two operating procedures in the formulation of monetary policy

partisan monetary policies presidential influence through the power of appointment we investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a presidential administration could affect monetary policy making influence could be a result of direct presidential pressure exerted on members of the federal open market committee fomc or it could be a result of partisan considerations in presidential appointments to the board of governors to investigate these two channels of influence we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the fomc our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

regional banking instability and fomc voting abstract this study analyzes if regionally affiliated federal open market committee fomc members take their districts regional banking sector instability into account when they vote considering the period 1979 2010 we find that a deterioration in a district s bank health increases the probability that this district s representative in the fomc votes to ease interest rates according to member specific characteristics the effect of regional banking sector instability on fomc voting behavior is most pronounced for bank presidents as opposed to governors and fomc members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector

majority rule consensus building and the power of the chairman arthur burns and the fomc this paper investigates decision making within the federal open market committee of the federal reserve focusing on the competing pressures of majority rule consensus building and the power of the chairman to undertake this analysis we have constructed an original data set recording desired federal funds rates for each member of the committee over the 1970 78 period our results confirm a disproportionate influence of the chairman in the policy process they also confirm that other voting members of the committee have an impact on policy choices estimates indicate that the chairman exercises 40 to 50 of the voting weight in committee decisions

the fed s monetary policy rule and u s inflation the case of asymmetric preferences abstract this paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary policy analysis in which the decision makers are allowed but not required to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from the target values the estimates of the central bank s euler equation indicate that the preferences of the fed had been asymmetric only before 1979 with the interest rate response to output contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude we show that this asymmetry on output implied an average inflation bias around 1 5 while the implicit inflation target also declined the asymmetric preferences induced inflation bias appears to account for a sizable fraction of the historical decline in the inflation mean

risk management nonlinearity and aggressiveness in monetary policy the case of the us fed we contribute to the empirical literature on the risk management approach to monetary policy by estimating regime switching models where the strength of the response of monetary policy to macroeconomic conditions depends on the level of risk associated with the inflation outlook and risk in financial markets using quarterly data for the greenspan period we find that i risk in the inflation outlook and in financial markets are a more powerful driver of monetary policy regime changes than variables typically suggested in the literature such as the level of inflation and the output gap ii estimation of regime switching models shows that the response of the us fed to the inflation outlook is invariant across policy regimes iii however in periods of high economic risk monetary policy tends to respond more aggressively to the output gap and the degree of inertia tends to be lower than in normal circumstances and iv the us fed is estimated to have responded aggressively to the output gap in the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s and in the late 1990s and early 2000s these results are consistent with mishkin 2008 s view that in periods of high economic risk monetary authorities should respond aggressively to changes in macroeconomic conditions while the degree of inertia should be lower than in normal circumstances

evidence on discrimination in consumer markets economists have contributed to the measurement of racial and ethnic discrimination in consumption and to the identification of its causes especially in housing markets and car sales to test the hypothesis that discrimination exists economists have turned to regression analysis and to audits a matched pair survey technique economists also have developed audit based measures of the incidence and severity of discrimination audit studies find continuing high levels of discrimination against minorities in the marketing of available housing and in car prices audit studies also find that discrimination can be caused both by economic agents prejudice and by their search for profits

local governments as industrial firms an organizational analysis of china s transitional economy despite widespread skepticism about government ownership in transitional economies china s rapid industrial growth has been led by public enterprises kornai s theory of soft budbet constraints born of the failure of earlier hungarian reforms fosters such skepticism but it assumes as fixed organizational characteristics that in fact vary widely across government jurisdictions local governments with smaller industrial bases have clearer financial incentives and constraints fewer nonfinancial interests in enterprises and a greater capacity to monitor them in china s vast public sector the fastest growth in output and productivity has occurred where government ownership rights are clearest and most easily enforced which enables officials to manage public industry as a diversified market oriented firm

minority entrepreneurship in twenty first century america prior to the 1970s minority owned small businesses were small in size and scope and common in only a few industry niches business owners were severely capital constrained lacking in higher education and training in skilled occupations the median owner today in contrast is college educated access to financing has expanded and opportunities to serve corporate and public sector clients are commonplace nearly 40 of all new firms created nationwide in 2015 were minority owned changing attitudes in mainstream society reduced traditional barriers true equality of opportunity among small minority and white owned firms of similar size and scope has nonetheless not been achieved this issue of small business economics examines lingering barriers impeding the development of a more vibrant minority business community focusing on access to financing and government procurement markets articles in this issue offer explicit analyses of enduring barriers along with explanations of adoptive strategic firm behavior appropriate for reducing those barriers

policy preferences of fomc members as revealed by dissenting votes the composition of the federal open market committee the ability to predict the effect of policy decisions on economic and f1nancialvariables and political influence from the white house and the congress are all potentially significant determinants of monetary policy decisions this study uses the record of dissenting votes from federal open market committee meetings to consider the relevance of these influences tests for differences between voting patterns of bank presidents versus members of the board of governors and differences during various historical periods provide insight into four questions 1 are the policy preferences of bank presidents different from those of the members of the board 2 does uncertainty about the economic and financial results of policy actions influence the level of dissent 3 is there a difference in the pattern of dissent under different chairmen and 4 is there effective political influence on monetary policymakers the legitimacy of district bank presidents serving on the fomc has been challenged in the courts and the legislature challengers fear that district bank presidents who serve without executive or legislative approval prefer policy that produces lower inflation and higher unemployment relative to the policy preferred by members of the board who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate rogoff 1985 argues that in the presence of market distortions it is better for society to have central bankers who attach a larger weight than the society s

federal open market committee structure and decisions abstract this paper examines the dissents of federal open market committee members regarding the domestic monetary policy directive it shows that on balance governors appointed by democratic u s presidents dissented significantly on the easier side while governors appointed by republican u s presidents dissented significantly on the tighter side the pattern of dissents for the reserve bank presidents was like that of republican appointees to the board of governors the bank presidents voting did not reflect regional points of view furthermore the timing of the dissents by both the governors and presidents did not seem to be associated with the onset of congressional or presidential elections

does the ecb act as a lender of last resort during the subprime lending crisis evidence from monetary policy reaction models abstract we investigate whether the ecb aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in emu member countries we find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ecb has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable emu countries greece ireland italy portugal and spain increases while no significant effect is identified for the pre crisis period and relatively tranquil emu countries austria belgium france germany and the netherlands these findings suggest that the ecb acts as a lender of last resort for vulnerable emu countries

appointment procedures and fomc voting behavior an important issue for the conduct of monetary policy in the united states is whether the various appointment procedures of members of the federal open market committee help determine their voting behavior it is usually asserted that the method by which district bank presidents are appointed leads to more independence and or more conservative behavior increased independence is generally believed to reduce suboptimal short run manipulation of monetary policy but at the cost of reducing the central bank s accountability to the country s short run and longrun objectives the social desirability of any potential differences in monetary policy resulting from these appointment procedures and the optimality of discretionary policy in general are not addressed in this paper however instead the effect on monetary policy of the different appointment procedures currently in place within the federal reserve system is examined does the increased independence that the district bank presidents supposedly possess produce significantly different monetary policy from that of the politically appointed board governors many studies have examined the effects various appointment procedures may have on voting at the fomc and the results have been somewhat mixed belden 2 chappell havrilesky and mcgregor 3 havrilesky and gildea 6 and puckett 8 find that bank presidents tend to vote for tighter policy than board governors while tootell 10 finds no differences between the two groups most of the literature has concluded that in some unclearly defined way and for no clear theoretical reason the more independent district presidents are more conservative than the board governors in this paper conservative is defined over several clear dimensions in order to test whether district presidents vote more conservatively than board governors some slight variation in the voting behavior of bank presidents and board governors is found but the causes of any dissimilarities are shown to be much different from those asserted in the earlier literature

nobel lecture the economic way of looking at behavior an important step in extending the traditional theory of individual rational choice to analyze social issues beyond those usually considered by economists is to incorporate into the theory a much richer class of attitudes preferences and calculations while this approach to behavior builds on an expanded theory of individual choice it is not mainly concerned with individuals it uses theory at the micro level as a powerful tool to derive implications at the group or macro level the lecture describes the approach and illustrates it with examples drawn from my past and current work