contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

exclusive contracts and protection of investments we consider the effect of a renegotiable exclusive contract restricting a buyer to purchase from only one seller on the levels of noncontractible investments undertaken in their relationship contrary to some informal claims in the literature we find that exclusivity has no effect when all investments are fully specific to the relationship i e are purely internal exclusivity does matter when investments affect the value of the buyer s trade with other sellers i e have external effects we examine the effects of exclusivity on investments and aggregate welfare and the private incentives of the buyer seller coalition to use it

population pressures saving and investment in the third world some puzzles for over 25 years economists and population specialists have generally embraced the plausible notion that rapid rates of population growth exert a quantitatively significant adverse impact on the pace of economic growth through the effects of age dependency capital shallowing and investment diversion however empirical research has not sustained these hypotheses individually or collectively one general factor appears to account for this variance between theory and facts the tendency to develop analyses with simplifying assumptions that are not then subjected to adequate empirical tests at its most fundamental level economics is about making choices in the face of scarcity in the literature relating population growth savings and investment and modeling of choices has been amazingly narrow indeed almost a economic at the household level population pressures are usually modeled by engineering like fixed coefficient formulae in contrast trade offs between quantities or qualities of consumption are seldom admitted parents work force behavior is usually taken to be uninfluenced by family size and children are typically assumed to contribute nothing productively similarly at the government level population pressures are modeled to show population sensitive expenditures taking priority and crowding out more productive spending in reality governments respond with more flexibility than the models suggest and some of the population sensitive expenditures may be growth enhancing more elaborate analyses reveal 2nd order effects economizing on scarce resources and an expansion in supply

market structure and resource depletion a contribution to the theory of intertemporal monopolistic competition a the theory of resource extraction in the model we present there exists a produced substitute to the natural resource the primary question with which we are concerned is the interaction of the resource and its substitute the model we present can thus be thought as providing a link between rent and production based price theories one of the general results in the earlier literature on resource extraction is that deposits with lower extraction costs will be exploited first the analysis

population growth and savings in ldcs a survey article both population growth and savings have traditionally taken a certain place of pride among models of growth and development the purpose of this paper is to examine the literature concerning the hypothesis that the savings rate itself is a function of the population growth rate and this effect exacerbates the negative effect of population on economic growth the evidence is examined from three perspectives i macroeconomic effects of variations in the age structure of the population ii choice theoretic models of family decision making particularly the joint determination of fertility decisions and savings decisions and iii market level interactions of variables which determine individual decisions the paper concludes that both population growth and savings rates are inextricably tied up in the process of economic development there are many ways in which the two variables may interact but no generalizations can be safely made across countries

divide and rule the economic and legal implications of the proposed ownership unbundling of distribution and supply companies in the dutch electricity sector abstract in machiavelli s theory of power the concept of divide and rule forms the main theme the ruler has absolute power and to maintain and increase such power all means are justified when viewed against the background of this theory the current debate in the netherlands on the unbundling of energy electricity gas companies can be observed as an example of divide and rule in which the dutch minister of economic affairs plays a central role yet contrary to machiavelli in his time the dutch government does in fact aim principally at the greater welfare of the dutch people it is therefore noteworthy that while important steps in the decision to unbundled have been taken there is no evidence that the dutch people will indeed benefit from the envisaged unbundling

capital flows to the new world as an intergenerational transfer the late nineteenth century saw international mass migrations of capital and labor from the old world to the new factors chased each other and the abundant resources at the frontier demographic structure also contributed to the massive capital flows from britain to the new world the dependency hypothesis is confirmed by estimation of savings functions in three new world economies argentina australia and canada in which high dependency rates may have significantly depressed domestic savings rates and pulled in foreign investment in effect an intergenerational transfer from old savers in the old world to young savers in the new

a revisitation of the savings growth nexus in mexico by employing tests for long term causality contrary to sinha and sinha economic letters 1998 in mexico savings is shown to precede growth this paper further explores the complex dynamics of this inter relationship to lend clarity to this nexus

coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals abstract we propose a new solution concept for tu cooperative games in characteristic function form the scoop which builds on the symmetric nash bargaining solution nbs by adding a consistency requirement for negotiations inside every coalition the scoop specifies the probability of success and the payoffs to each coalition the players share the surplus of a coalition according to the nbs the disagreement payoffs are computed as the expectation of payoffs in other coalitions using a common probability distribution that is derived from the prior distribution the predicted outcome can be probabilistic or deterministic but only an efficient coalition can succeed with probability one we discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for an efficient solution in either case the scoop always exists is generically unique for superadditive games and is easy to compute moreover in the spirit of the nash program we propose a non cooperative protocol whose stationary equilibrium identifies the scoop as the limit equilibrium outcome

threatened species as public goods and public bads an application to wild predators in sweden this paper discusses pareto efficient allocations of an environmental commodity which is both a public good and a public bad with an application to the scandinavian problem of conserving wild predators that are killing semi domesticated reindeer the paper begins by briefly outlining this conflict this is followed by a theoretical analysis employing a diagrammatic tool called the kolm triangle which is an analogue of an edgeworth box in an economy with a public good bargaining pareto improving reallocations and the shape of the pareto set are discussed using a simple model where one of the agents is involountarily contributing to a public good the paper concludes with an analysis of income loss compensations and incentives for illegal hunting of predators

the interest elasticity of savings in developing countries the existing evidence abstract this paper presents a critical analysis of some of the most recent empirical work on the interest elasticity of savings in developing economies supported by a set of empirical results the paper argues that a the real interest elasticity of savings is not easily detected using the existing empirical models which generally yield insignificant interest rate parameters in the seventies b the existing models suffer from serious defects that make if very difficult to interpret the estimated parameters

the nature of the savings function in developing countries a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature the savings rate marginal or average is regarded as a key performance indicator by development economists and foreign aid practitioners admonish their clients to increase their savings ratio as a primary condition for achieving a satisfactory rate of economic growth however not only have questions been raised regarding the significance of the savings effort as an independent determinant of economic progress but the formulation of policies designed to increase the savings propensity has suffered from a dearth of knowledge regarding the nature of the savings function in developing countries a number of alternative savings hypotheses derived mainly from the literature relating to developed economies have been advanced but the paucity of reliable data has made it difficult to test these hypotheses and obtain results which warrant a reasonable degree of confidence the purpose of this article is a to review the theoretical and empirical literature on the savings function in developing countries b to assess critically the findings with respect to the major hypotheses and c to summarize the state of our knowledge on this important topic we shall begin with a brief review of the nature of the data on savings in developing countries with which economic analysts must work

coalition formation and bargaining protocols a review of the literature this paper offers a review of the vast literature regarding bargaining and coalition formation this topic has been generally described as the attempt to provide strategic foundations to cooperative solution concepts it can therefore be seen as the linking ring between the non cooperative and the cooperative game theoretic approach to coalition formation its central role in economic theory and its relatively long history that goes back to the nash program have fostered a large academic production including surveys nonetheless this paper will focus on an aspect that is often neglected in the dedicated surveys the specificities of the bargaining protocols leading to different outcomes although generally downgraded to the rank of details the differences in bargaining protocols even when minor can cause significant changes in fundamental aspects such as the possibility to reach full cooperation the distribution of final pay offs and the time taken to reach an agreement focused on externalities free games therefore on bargaining protocols sustaining solution concepts for cooperative games in characteristic function form the paper aims at providing a brief but exhaustive review of the topic that could result in a very useful tool for any researcher approaching the subject of coalitional bargaining

bidding for the surplus a non cooperative approach to the shapley value abstract we propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero monotonic environments with transferable utility the mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage we show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the shapley value payoffs we extend our results to implement the weighted shapley values finally we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments the modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure and implements the shapley values of the super additive cover of the environment journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72

altruism matching and nonmarket insurance incomplete market insurance gives rise to nonmarket arrangements for coinsurance we find that the effort altruistically linked individuals take to avoid an accident increases with the degree of altruism if the degree of altruism is sufficiently high an economy with nonmarket insurance yields higher social welfare than an economy without nonmarket insurance as altruism increases the equilibrium level of effort approaches the second best solution without the need for costly monitoring coinsurance is above below the socially optimal level if individuals place greater weight less weight on their own utility than on that of their partners

optimal procurement contracts under a binding budget constraint the traditional literature on agency models predicts that for zero liability contracts it is optimal for the principal to pay for the information he cannot observe however this principle is not valid for a set of contracts mostly used by government agencies whose distinguishing feature is represented by a stringent budget constraint for the principal this paper shows that in this environment the principal will either choose a structure exibiting pooling or a bargaining solution the bargaining solution represents the analytical proof to the intuition of the difficulty in implementing procurement contracts stated by laffont and tirole 1993

the effectiveness of policies to transform a gas exporting country into a gas transit country the case of the netherlands the netherlands has been a major european natural gas producer and exporter for many decades but now faces the challenge to deal with diminishing resources in response the dutch government initiated a gas hub strategy which is the policy to transform the gas industry from an export oriented business into a transit oriented business this policy included a number of investments in the gas infrastructure as well as institutional reforms to enhance the liquidity of the gas market we study the effects of this gas hub policy using hourly data on the dutch gas balance over the period 2006 2013 we find that gas storage and trading have become more important but that the level of gas in transit in the netherlands remained fairly constant consequently the dutch gas industry is still mainly oriented on domestic production and export of gas while the dutch gas hub ttf has become a key virtual trading place the policy lesson from the dutch experience is that implementing a gas hub strategy requires significant investments in the gas infrastructure while their effects do not necessarily become visible in the short run

renegotiation proof equilibria in a global emission game when players are impatient in a two country model in which countries differ with respect to the perception of environmental damages and abatement costs the stability of international environmental agreements is analyzed in a dynamic framework three types of agreements are considered a socially optimal solution a uniform emission tax a tax equally applied in both countries and a uniform emission reduction quota an equal percentage emission reduction from a base year stability is checked for these agreements according to the concept of renegotiation proofness it is shown that the stability requirements depend crucially on the parameters defining the interests of the two countries and the type of agreement moreover it is demonstrated that if punishment options are restricted for some reason the stability of an agreement may suffer one important result of the paper is that if countries exhibit asymmetric interests stability in the quota regime is higher than in the tax regime and in the social optimum this might explain why emission reduction quotas have been so popular in international politics despite recommendations of economists to use market based instruments

dependency rates and savings rates reply arthur goldberger s comment is a tempest in a teacup this is readily verified from the data presented in table 1 this table reproduces from my original paper the coefficients for paired equations estimated with three different samples in which in s n and ln si y were the dependent variables as the data of table 1 indicate in 7 of the 12 cases the coefficients are identical through the second decimal place furthermore all the discrepancies are quantitatively very small in 9 cases the paired parameter estimates are within 1 percent of each other in the remaining cases the differences are of the magnitude of 0825 0012 and 0011 these are well within the margins of accuracy within which anyone views data generated from the national income accounts of the less developed countries in light of these considerations it is difficult to understand the tone of goldberger s comment the reason for the slight discrepancies is straightforward my observations for s n and s y were computed separately from data supplied by the statistical office of the agency for international development with the rounding introduced by the series for n and y it is not surprising that the series for s n is not identically equal to the series which would be obtained by forming s n from the product of y n and s y similar slight discrepancies have also been reported in other econometric work in which equations for s n and s y have been estimated with separately computed data series in any case nowhere in my paper did i even refer to the precise numerical parameter estimates obtained in my equations the main conclusions of the paper were that the dependency variables were quantitatively an important determinant of international savings rates and further that introduction of these variables greatly reduced the importance of percapita income on which some previous discussions had focused neither of these conclusions is affected by goldberger s comment

population growth and economic growth long run evidence from latin america unit root tests the johansen maximal likelihood methodology and granger causality tests in the context of a one step error correction model are used to examine the long run relation between population and per capita gdp in seven latin american countries over most of the 20th century the results suggest that no long run relation has existed and hence population growth neither causes per capita gdp growth nor is caused by it

coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers abstract the paper analyzes a simple discrete time noncooperative coalitional bargaining game in which at each stage there is a contest for the right to make a proposal the pure stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoff set is equal to the core journal of economic literature classification numbers 026

the median and the competitive equilibrium in one dimension two alternative models of legislative outcomes are the minimum winning coalition and the competitive equilibrium koford 1982 in a unidimensional setting the outcome under the former is the median while the outcome under the latter is the highest net demand location this paper describes the competitive equilibrium in a unidimensional model and shows that under some common conditions it coincides with the median in particular for pure redistributive issues however for distributive issues the two equilibria will differ finally the comparative statics of the two models are examined while the winning coalition is sensitive only to changes in the location of the median for distributive issues the competitive equilibrium has the standard economic comparative statics that the outcome adjusts in the direction of the change in preferences

life cycles oil cycles or financial reforms the growth in private savings rates in indonesia what goes steady with private savings this paper investigates reasons for the sustained growth in private savings in indonesia since 1970 in a period characterized by economic growth demographic

towards a renaissance of economic theory in his penetrating essay theory and experiment vernon smith observes that subject behavior often diverges from game theoretic predictions and asserts that minor fudging with theory is unlikely to solve our problems because circumstances unknown to us are responsible for the explanatory failures of neoclassical economic theory i deal precisely with these issues in thebounds of reason 2009a my remarksheredrawupon several themes fromthis book relevant to specifying a refocused research agenda for the study of human strategic interaction the core of economic theory is the rational actor model which holds that individuals have preferences over outcomes beliefs called subjectivepriors linking choices to the relativeprobability of alternativeoutcomes and theymaximize their expected payoffs given these preferences and beliefs subject towhatevermaterial informational and other constraints they face many observers consider the experimental work of daniel kahneman and others kahneman et al 1982 gigerenzer and todd 1999 as destructive of the rational actormodel in fact however their research has considerably strengthened the rational actor model s explanatory power albeit at the expense of increasing its complexity gintis 2009a chs 1 and 12 most important these studies have shown the value of modeling using heuristics that conserve on information processing and of including the current state physiological temporal and ownership of the individual as an argument of the preference ordering in the 1980s the core of economic theory was extended to include game theory viewed as the theory of the strategic interaction of bayesian rational actors game theory has become a centerpiece of microeconomic theory alongside the traditional walrasian model of general market equilibrium it is important to note however that this exalted position is quite recent the textbooks that expound the received wisdom of today s practicing economists were written in the early years of the game theory revival between 1988 and 1995 these textbooks include misconceptions promulgated in the 1980s that have been transmitted to the current generation of economists as i shall show some of these misconceptions have been repaired in more recent contributions to game theory contemporary experimentalists however generally rely on the more traditional body of outdated theory i here rely on more recent theoretical contributions especially those of robert aumann and adam brandenburger and their coworkers to bring game theory up to date i then argue that despite their analytical power game theory and the rational actor model provide only part of the theoretical toolkit needed to explain human strategic interaction moreover because individuals bring much of the complexity of society into the controlled conditions of the laboratory game theory and the rational actor model are insufficient to explain experimental results concretely i suggest that a these analytical tools must be supplemented by what i term the psycho social theory of norms b the correlated equilibrium should replace

proposal rights and political power in a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players voting rights or their impatience for all monotonic voting rules and discount factors and for all divisions of the good among players there exists a stationary proposal making rule such that this division represents players expected payoffs in a stationary subgame perfect nash equilibrium in pure strategies the result highlights the significance of proposal rights in determining political power in collective deliberations t he purpose of this article is to further our understanding of political power in a committee environment we consider the problem of a group of two or more agents who must split a fixed divisible good agents cannot use physical force to divide this good our goal is to clarify the role and relative significance of other features of the political environment such as voting rights proposal rights agents patience etc in determining political power following shapley and shubik 1954 we gauge political power in terms of expected outcomes rather than a priori equate it with individual prerogatives 1 in that spirit political power is the share of the divisible good that agents can expect to obtain when their behavior conforms to an appropriately defined equilibrium notion 2 we model committee interaction using a canonical sequential bargaining game in each period a member of the committee is recognized with some probability that is fixed across periods and proposes a division of the good committee members then vote on the proposal if the proposal is approved in accordance with the underlying voting rule the proposed division is implemented and the

the coalitional nash bargaining solution the coalitional nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the product of players payoffs is maximal we consider a non cooperative model with discounting in which one team may form and every player is randomly selected to make a proposal in every period the grand team consisting of all players generates the largest surplus but a smaller team may form we show that as players get more patient if an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists it must deliver payoffs that correspond to the coalitional nash bargaining solution we also characterize when an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists which requires conditions that go beyond the nonemptiness of the core

household saving in developing countries first cross country evidence although most studies have relied on domestic or private sector saving data this article uses household data available from the u n system of national accounts for a sample of 10 countries household saving functions are estimated using combined time series and cross country observations in order to test households responses to income and growth rates of return monetary wealth foreign saving and demographic variables the results show that income and wealth variables affect saving strongly and in ways consistent with standard theories inflation and the interest rate do not show clear effects on saving which is also consistent with their theoretical ambiguity foreign saving and monetary assets have strong negative effects on household saving which suggests the importance of liquidity constraints and monetary wealth in developing countries

examining market power in the european natural gas market in this paper we develop a mixed complementarity equilibrium model for the european natural gas market this model has producers as cournot players with conjectured supply functions relative to their rivals as such these producers can withhold production to increase downstream prices for greater profits the other players are taken to be perfectly competitive and are combined with extensive pipeline seasonal and other data reflecting the current state of the market four market scenarios are run to analyze the extent of market power by these producers as well as the importance of pipeline and storage capacity

fertility and savings in the united states 1830 1900 a long tradition in the development literature has been to associate the aggregate savings rate with the dependency ratio the ratio of dependent children to adults in this paper i formalize the relationship by developing a life cycle model in which offspring are assets from the viewpoint of their parents the model is used to help explain the increase in nineteenth century u s savings rates i find that between 1830 and 1900 about one quarter of the 6 percentage point rise in the savings rate can be attributed to a decline in the dependency rate

beyond nash bargaining theory the nash set abstract we extend nash s bargaining theory to non convex and coalitional problems this paper investigates the implications of nash like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings the result is a characterization of the nash set of ntu games defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the nash product of their utilities subject to efficiency is critical the intersection of the nash set and the core is also characterized with the same axioms for the class of games where the core is non empty journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c71 c78

debt dependence and the demographic transition latin america in to the next century abstract in the decades ahead world demographic trends indicate that our planet s share of the population of working age will be gradually diminishing the regional incidence of the trends however shows a marked bias thus the general equilibrium of the world saving investment nexus may be fundamentally realigned in the years to come via dependency effects for example favorable demographic prospects in latin america and elsewhere in the developing world offer poorer countries the chance to use the potential of their own demographic transitions to propel financial transitions to domestically financed accumulation even capital export

multilateral bargaining problems abstract in many situations in economics and political science there are gains from forming coalitions but conflict over which coalition to form and how to distribute the gains this paper presents an approach to such multilateral bargaining problems a solution to a multilateral bargaining problem specifies an agreement for each coalition that is consistent with the bargaining process in every coalition we establish the existence of such solutions show that they are determined by reservation prices and characterize these reservation prices as the payoffs of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of a non cooperative bargaining model journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c72 c78

children and savings in less developed countries abstract a commonly cited motive for childbearing in ldcs is the support in old age provided by one s children alternative means of retirement support become available as a country develops this paper presents a simple two period model in which financial institutions are allowed to substitute for children in the provision of this service the quality of financial institutions is given an operational definition and the hypothesis of the model are tested on a cross section sample of countries

welfare distribution effect of a price reduction in the dutch gas transport market a scenario analysis of regulatory policy market form and rent allocation as part of the larger energy market deregulation program the dutch energy authority dte has developed the habit to force the dutch gas transport enterprise gas transport services or gts to lower its prices dte s key argument is that lower gas transport prices will benefit the end user indeed that might well be the case this policy in general is in line with european legislation on the liberalization of the gas market we model and simulate the domestic welfare effects of a 5 percent transport price reduction from this we conclude that at least three observations complicate matters substantially first gts is government owned and the dominant shipper gasunie trade supply or gasterra as it was recoined recently is partly so 50 second shippers enter into the competitive game to make profits third not only is the majority of gas transported in the netherlands exported to foreign end users but also foreign owners have a large stake in dutch shippers as a result part of the rents will always be distributed or will leak away to foreign consumers and shippers or their shareholders these three observations together have three important implications first state ownership implies that much rent allocation is simply a matter of circulating money from one government sub budget to the other second given that the industry is imperfectly competitive part of the rents will not be passed on to the end consumers third it is unavoidable that a substantial part of the rents are transferred abroad a general conclusion for policy makers is that market liberalization might not bring ex post what they expected ex ante

coalition theory and its applications a survey we survey some of the major advances in coalition theory in recent years we then look at the recent applications of the theory in the area of political economy and touch upon some important theoretical and applied open questions in the field

the role of intergenerational transfers in aggregate capital accumulation this paper uses historical u s data to directly estimate the contribution of intergenerational transfers to aggregate capital accumulation the evidence presented indicates that intergenerational transfers account for the vast majority of aggregate u s capital formation only a negligible fraction of actual capital accumulation can be traced to life cycle or hump savings a major difference between this study and previous investigations of this issue is the use of more accurate longitudinal age earnings and age consumption profiles these profiles are simply too flat to generate substantial life cycle savings this paper suggests the importance of and need for substantially greater research and data collection on intergenerational transfers life cycle models of savings that emphasize savings for retirement as the dominant form of capital accumulation should give way to models that illuminate the determinants of intergenerational transfers

old age pensions and fertility in rural areas of less developed countries some evidence from mexico this paper reviews the theoretical relationship between old age pensions and human fertility and offers preliminary evidence from mexico on the direction and magnitude of the effect on fertility of the introduction of a formal old age pension system the security motive is an untested but plausible hypothesis especially for rural areas where alternative methods for caring for the elderly if they exist are likely to be relatively risky and unprofitable a number of different effects can theoretically be expected following introduction of a system of old age pensions in such areas including a savings reduction effect and life cycle effects such as effects on the time phasing of labor force participation and of consumption and effects on family fragmentation and intergenerational transfers and on the sex composition of the labor force and the allocation of family resources between the sexes information costs uncertainties about various aspects of the social security system and the possibility of differences between desired and actual fertility must also be considered given the long list of possible effects and offsetting influences and uncertainties about the magnitudes of such effects the actual outcome can only be resolved empirically data on sugar cane workers who began to be covered by a social security system in 1963 in 34 contiguous rural municipalities in the papaloapan river basin in southeastern mexico were used to test the relationship a regression analysis of the determinants of change in the child woman ratios in the 34 municipalities from 1960 70 indicated among other findings that the proxy used for the influence of participation in an old age pension system had a significantly negative effect on fertility an increase in social security participation from 0 to 50 would appear to reduce the child woman ratio by more than 1 10 despite the simplicity of the testing procedure shortcomings in the available data and the possibility of specification bias the results indicate that the security motive may be important and requires further empirical and theoretical research

behind the market stage where real societies exist part i the role of public and private order institutions this two part article is an attempt to clarify the social conditions upon which the viability and efficiency of the market system rest it strives to show that the embeddedness thesis that is an explanation based upon the existence of long run personal ties involving the use of reputation mechanisms among transactors cannot fully elucidate the question as to how the problem of trust is solved in market societies as explained in part i there are difficulties of both theoretical and empirical historical kinds and these explain why the market order needs to be sustained by private and public order institutions in part ii the role of generalised morality in backing or supplementing such institutions is discussed in the light of game theory and particular emphasis is put on the ability of moral norms to sustain honest behaviour by generating the right kind of preferences and establishing trust the vexed problem of the dynamics of norm emergence and erosion is then addressed with a view to showing

a modified cournot model of the natural gas market in the european union mixed motives delegation in a politicized environment with gazprom gaining prominence as the major supplier of natural gas in the european union the european gas market becomes more politicized we assume that gazprom s interest as a state monopolist is not only to maximize profit but also to seek market power presumably because this contributes to the geopolitical power of russia at large we introduce a modeling tool so called strategic delegation games to analyze the implications of gazprom s operation in the eu by way of illustration we model the case where gazprom competes against two profit maximizing rivals algerian sonatrach and norwegian statoil we prove that if gazprom serves any of a comprehensive type of nonprofit objectives the outcome is beneficial for the eu s consumers as gazprom s behavior shifts volumes up and brings prices down

proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition this paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer in equilibrium agents effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects the endogenous prize is 9

a geographic relational perspective on the internationalization of emerging market firms the growth of outward foreign direct investment from emerging markets has led to increased scholarly attention on the internationalization of emerging market firms emfs we break from the recent strategic approach on internationalizing emfs to develop a problematization approach which permits us to introduce a geographic relational perspective we use this perspective to highlight process thinking complex social realities and relational practice as means by which to better develop theory on the internationalization of emfs our emergent approach emphasizes the need to view emf internationalization as deeply situated in multifaceted contextual influences as influenced by path dependence and as manifested in practice these three relational tenets contextuality path dependence and practice are central to our geographic relational approach s ability to generate new challenging research questions for understanding emf internationalization consequently we add novelty to the international business domain by bringing space and process to the forefront of the emf research agenda

a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining the authors explore a sequential offers model of n person coalitional bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting their focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount factor delta is sufficiently large it is shown that delay and the formation of inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium the latter for some or all orders of proposer however efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as delta approaches one strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently high delta

recognition for sale abstract i examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game in each period the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder and all players pay their bids if players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power then the first proposer captures the entire surplus if a full consensus is needed for an offer to be accepted then the first proposer shares the surplus with at most one other player and as the period length between offers vanishes one player may capture virtually the entire surplus in settings with a stochastic or an endogenous surplus players are unwilling to efficiently delay agreement or invest in the surplus