social capital and political institutions evidence that democracy fosters trust this paper finds evidence that more democratic political institutions increase trust second generation immigrants with ancestries from 115 countries are studied within 30 european countries comparing individuals born and residing in the same country those whose father was born in a more democratic country express higher trust than those whose father was born in a less democratic country the results are robust to individual parental and ancestral country controls

does social trust determine the size of the welfare state evidence using historical identification most modern welfare states offer an extensive array of services and benefits that are wholly or partly financed by tax revenue one missing link in explaining the long run sustainability of such comprehensive welfare states could be the already existing stock of trust indeed our cross country results suggest that trust determines the size of welfare states as well as three features that are arguably necessary for their preservation high levels of political confidence strong legal institutions protecting private property rights and low levels of bureaucratic corruption

inherited trust and growth this paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation we show that inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants is sig nificantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears we thus use the inherited trust of descendants of us immigrants as a time varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin this strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects jel n11 n12 n31 n32 o47 z13

better reply dynamics and global convergence to nash equilibrium in aggregative games we consider n person games with quasi concave payoffs that depend on a player s own action and the sum of all players actions we show that a discrete time stochastic process in which players move towards better replies the better reply dynamics converges globally to a nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic adjusted best reply dynamics we present an example of a 2 person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best reply functions have different signs and the better reply dynamics does not converge

does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention the paper considers trust as an empirical determinant of individual support for government intervention the central notion is that the influence of generalized trust on policy attitudes is conditional on confidence in both state actors and major companies the starting point is the idea that individuals who generally distrust other persons have a stronger taste for the regulation of economic activities while people with high interpersonal trust are in favor of less stringent regulatory control yet people who do not trust unknown others also tend to mistrust government and private companies if mistrust in state actors dominates we should not necessarily expect stronger interventionist preferences estimating the determinants of interventionist attitudes using data from the world values survey european values study for approximately 130 000 individuals in forty oecd and eu countries we find evidence that the impact of social trust on government intervention attitudes is conditional on institutional trust confidence in major companies appears to have a stronger effect on preference formation than trust in state actors

economic freedom culture and growth how do economic freedom and culture impact economic growth this paper argues that culture as measured by the world values surveys and economic institutions associated with economic freedom are both independently important for economic prosperity but the strength of their impact can be better understood only when both are included in the growth regression our results indicate that economic freedom is more important than culture for growth outcomes suggesting substitutability between the two we posit that culture is important for growth when economic freedom is absent diminishing in significance once economic freedom is established

the role of social capital in financial development to identify the effect of social capital on financial development we exploit social capital differences within italy in high social capital areas households are more likely to use checks invest less in cash and more in stock have higher access to institutional credit and make less use of informal credit the effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people these results are not driven by omitted environmental variables since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born

determination of price and warranty length for a normal lifetime distributed product abstract in this paper a decision model is presented for manufacturing firms to determine the optimal price and warranty length to maximize profits based on the pre determined life cycle we consider the free renewal warranty policy under which failed items are renewed free of charge until a specified total operating time has been achieved the expected number of renewals based on the warranty length is derived for a normal lifetime distributed product and the total cost of production and providing warranty is evaluated a solution approach using the maximum principle is described and is applied to two specific types of markets the first type of market considers the case of static sales rate function with a positive discount rate and the second type of market considers the case of separable sales rate function with a zero discount rate a sensitivity analysis is conducted to evaluate the effect of model parameters on the optimal solution some conclusions are drawn based on the sensitivity analysis

a reason for quantity regulation in a variety of situations governments regulate undesirable activities by controlling quantities rather than charging taxes blue laws prohibit all liquor sales on sundays rather than impose higher taxes on that day zoning restrictions limit commercial construction in residential areas rather than charge for nuisance to neighbors anti smoking and anti trust laws restrict rather than tax particular conduct fishing and hunting rules allow hunting during particular time periods rather than tax the catch pollution controls impose limits rather than tax emissions quantity regulations are common in the financial sphere as well in the united states banking regulations for many years prohibited interstate banking as well as ownership of investment banks by commercial banks in many countries commercial banks are limited in the amount of various activities they can pursue such as real estate investments or borrowing in foreign currency in some countries banking laws prohibit all lending to the parties related to the owners of the bank the so called related lending rather than impose liability rules on loans to related parties that are found to be fraudulent or unsafe rafael la porta et al 2000 despite this common practice economists generally prefer taxes and liability rules to quantity controls and property rights rules robert ellickson 1973 louis kaplow and steven shavell 1996 1997 nathaniel keohane et al 1998 as the instrument for reducing undesirable conduct when explaining why quantity regulations are so pervasive they first make the political economy argument that quantity restrictions are favored by incumbent firms that wish to deter entry james buchanan and gordon tullock 1975 but this argument is not general it does not explain such quantity restrictions as blue laws and hunting and fishing regulations which affect all market participants equally some academics also argue that because certain activities such as smoking are seen as morally wrong by the community their level is regulated at zero in other instances however such as pollution and hunting positive but limited levels of activity are allowed inconsistent with the moral argument that the reason for quantity regulation is the special attraction of zero in this paper we present an alternative reason for quantity regulations one from the perspective of a benevolent government we begin with the observation of gary becker and george stigler 1974 that law enforcement is not free but is fundamentally an economic problem throughout human history and throughout the world today there are chronic problems of under enforcement witness the low level of tax compliance in much of the developing world and over enforcement by politically motivated prosecutors or regulators an analysis of pigouvian taxes versus quantity restrictions must recognize that in reality neither policy is free and automatic to enforce in general the choice of policies itself can facilitate or discourage enforcement in two ways first policies can shape the incentives for enforcement second policies can influence the costs of enforcement in our earlier work glaeser and sheifer 2000 glaeser et al 2001 we have focused on incentives and shown that quantity regulations can be used as an optimal instrument to raise the rewards to law enforcers for identifying violations here we focus not on the incentives for the enforcers but on the costs of finding violations these costs are often lower in the case of quantity restrictions we show that even when quantity regulations unlike taxes restrict some socially efficient conduct the reduced costs of identifying violations can enhance enforcement and overall efficiency such reliance of quantity regulation is especially important when private enforcement is crucial as in the case of enforcing department of economics harvard university cambridge ma 02138 we thank the national science foundation for financial support and louis kaplow for extremely helpful comments

regulation and distrust in a cross section of countries government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital we document this correlation and present a model explaining it in the model distrust creates public demand for regulation while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation leading to multiple equilibria a key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt we test this and other implications of the model using country and individual level data on social capital and beliefs about government s role as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism

shadows of the past the effect of communist heritage on employee consultation following research on transition economies in central and eastern europe cee and having been motivated by arguments pertaining to the business systems approach the authors propose that the existence of a communist heritage decreases the likelihood that employees will be consulted during organizational change processes results based on 23 876 firms across 27 of the european union eu 27 countries support this proposition moreover the likelihood of direct consultation decreases with the existence of formal employee representation and an increasing share of foreign ownership in firms located in cee countries the authors discuss these findings in the context of organizational democracy research and the recent literature on transition economies and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of participative decision making processes in organizations

optimal procurement policies under price dependent demand abstract we study a periodic review inventory model where in addition to the procurement quantity price is also a decision variable we develop a model where demand in each period is a random variable having a price and possibly period dependent probability distribution with the expected demand decreasing in price the model includes price limits and fixed ordering costs in addition to unit procurement holding and shortage costs we study the optimal policies which jointly maximize the discounted expected profit over a finite planning horizon we characterize the form of the optimal procurement policy under a general price demand relationship and give a sufficient condition for it to be s n s n type we also discuss some special cases and extensions to the basic model including the infinite horizon problem

experimentation imitation and stochastic stability abstract do boundedly rational agents repeatedly playing a symmetric game with a unique symmetric equilibrium learn over time to play it in this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of such agents experimenters and imitators whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb we find that the stochastic process describing their play isstable in the large it converges globally and with probability one to a compact neighborhood of the equilibrium however its local behavior near the equilibrium depends in interesting ways on the details of the model journal of economic literatureclassification number d83

investigating capitalism aversion capitalism aversion there are two non mutually exclusive theories of individual variations in pro capitalism opinions the first theory views pro capitalism opinions as self serving individuals are opposed to market forces when they threaten their economic rents the second theory views differences in such opinions as reflecting genuine disagreement on the efficiency of various economic systems using individual data we investigate the validity of both theories focusing on attitudes toward private ownership private profit and competition we find evidence that the first theory explains some of the variations in attitudes however consistent with the second theory we also find evidence of individual learning about the comparative virtues of economic systems the learning is slow home biased and path dependent long run cultural and historical determinants of pro market attitudes such as religion and legal origins explain more than 40 of the cross country variations in capitalism aversion last we provide tentative evidence that at the country level pro market opinions affect the nature of economic institutions our results suggest that the feasibility of economic reform does not depend solely on its impact on the distribution of rents ideological a prioris are likely to be important as well

endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in cournot competition abstract an evolutionary game theoretic model of cournot competition is investigated individuals choose from a finite set of different behavioral rules each rule specifies the quantity to be produced in the current period as a function of past quantities using more sophisticated rules may require extra information costs based upon realized payoffs the fractions of the population choosing a certain behavioral rule are updated according to the replicator equation with noise the long run behavior of the evolutionary system consisting of the population dynamics coupled with the quantity dynamics of the cournot game may be complicated and endogenous fluctuations may arise we consider a typical example where firms can choose between two rules the nash rule and the best reply rule we show that a homoclinic tangency between the stable and unstable manifold of the equilibrium occurs as evolutionary pressure increases implying bifurcation routes to complicated dynamics and strange attractors

imitators and optimizers in a changing environment abstract we analyze the repeated interaction between an imitating and a myopically optimizing player in an otherwise symmetric environment of changing marginal payoff focusing on finite irreducible environments and the case of strategic substitutes we unfold a trade off between the degree of interaction and the size of environmental shocks the optimizer outperforms the imitator if interaction is weak or shocks are large as to the case of duopoly this translates into small cross price elasticities or large shocks in marginal cost and or the maximum willingness to pay in these cases a changing environment creates selection pressure against imitative behavior

modelling cognitively bounded rationality an evaluative taxonomy abstract since its origins in the 1950s the notion of bounded rationality has been incorporated into economic theory using an array of methodological approaches this paper presents a taxonomy by which these approaches can be categorized and understood evaluating each approach against a range of important criteria at a time when the foundations of economic theory are being re examined this paper should be viewed as a first step towards an assessment of the appropriate role that this more realistic view of cognition should take in different areas of economic theory and also of the desirable characteristics of models that incorporate it

unemployment insurance and cultural transmission theory and application to european unemployment this paper emphasizes the two way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural transmission of work ethic values affect the size of the moral hazard problem and hence the policy to be implemented conversely when parents rationally choose how much effort to exert to raise their children to work hard they form expectations on the policy that will be implemented by the next generation in this context we show that the different cultural traits are complementary and that there is some cultural heterogeneity in all steady state equilibria the model could generate a lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and a deterioration of the work ethic relying on a calibration we argue that it can account for a substantial fraction of the history of european unemployment since world war ii as our explanation is compatible with the co existence of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s it could be seen as an alternative to the dominant story that relies on the occurrence of large shocks since the 1970s supportive empirical evidence is provided

optimal strategies for general price quality decision models of new products with learning production costs abstract the question of product quality permeates every level of business and is becoming crucial for the survival of modern manufacturing firms in automotive and high tech industries in this paper we deal with the optimal price and quality policies for the introduction of a new product on the supply side the firm wants to determine the unit price and quality level over time given that unit cost declines along a learning curve and increases if quality is made greater on the demand side dynamic demand is related to price and quality as well as to cumulative sales which represent diffusion and saturation effects we will model this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases by applying the maximum principle we will derive the optimal price and quality policies and discover the interactions between these two major strategic marketing instruments and the diffusion process several fundamental theoretical results will be established for the model under certain specified conditions higher prices do imply higher quality and under other conditions the optimal price declines over time while the product quality improves to illustrate these results the theoretical results are applied to two specific cases the first one is a simple nonseparable demand growth function in price and quality the other is a separable demand function of price and quality

law and social capital evidence from the code napoleon in germany abstract i test whether legal institutions crowd in social cooperation in the long run using the introduction of the code napoleon in parts of 19th century germany as a historical experiment i find that the application of the code napoleon is associated with higher levels of trust and cooperation today this finding is robust to an identification strategy that uses only individuals located around a discontinuity in the number of years the code civil was used results from a falsification test that moves this discontinuity artificially as well as the comparison of pre treatment characteristics support the interpretation of a causal effect in addition regions around the discontinuity are similar in post treatment economic development and inequality on the contrary the positive social consequences of the code civil manifest themselves in less political fraud in elections from 1871 to 1900 and in more bridging social capital in the 1920s

good bye lenin or not the effect of communism on people s preferences preferences for redistribution as well as the generosities of welfare states differ significantly across countries in this paper we test whether there exists a feedback process of the economic regime on individual preferences we exploit the experiment of german separation and reunification to establish exogeneity of the economic system from 1945 to 1990 east germans lived under a communist regime with heavy state intervention and extensive redistribution we find that after german reunification east germans are more in favor of redistribution and state intervention than west germans even after controlling for economic incentives this effect is especially strong for older cohorts who lived under communism for a longer time period we further find that east germans preferences converge towards those of west germans we calculate that it will take one to two generations for preferences to converge completely

people s opium religion and economic attitudes since max weber there has been an active debate on the impact of religion on people s economic attitudes much of the existing evidence however is based on cross country studies in which this impact is confounded by differences in other institutional factors we use the worldvalues surveys to id entify the relationship between intensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes controlling for country fixed effects we study several economic attitudes towardcooperation the government working women legal rules thriftiness andthe market economy we also distinguish across religious denominations differentiating on whether a religion is dominant in a country we find that on average religious beliefs are associated with good economic attitudes where good is defined as conducive to higher per capita income andgrowth yet religious people tendto be more racist andless favorable with respect to working women these effects differ across religious denominations overall we find that christian religions are more positively associatedwith attitudes conducive to economic growth r 2003 elsevier science b v all rights reserved jel classification a1 e0 n4 z1

imitators and optimizers in cournot oligopoly we analyze a symmetric n firm cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous popu lation of optimizers and imitators imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la vega redondo 1997 optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents previous output firms are allowed to make mistakes and deviate from the decision rules with a small probability apply ing stochastic stability analysis we find that the long run distribution converges to a recurrent set of states in which imitators are better o than are optimizers this finding appears to be robust even when optimizers are more sophisticated it suggests that imitators drive optimizers out of the market contradicting a funda mental conjecture by friedman 1953

does environmental degradation shackle economic growth a panel data investigation on 11 asian countries sustainable economic growth needs to be the primary objective of every government including developing asian countries to improve the social welfare of the people therefore to achieve the desirable level of sustainable economic growth environmental degradation must be controlled without lowering real growth and the well being of the society this study empirically investigates the impact of environmental degradation by co2 emissions on the economic growth of 11 asian countries between 1990 and 2011 based on the nature of the data traditional panel estimation techniques encompassing fixed effects and random effects are employed in which the results of hausman s test and other tests show that the use of fixed effects is preferable over the random effect estimator empirical results exhibit that environmental degradation has a significantly negative impact on economic growth empirical findings also suggest that environmental degradation should be regulated therefore environmentally enlightened management policies for the decrease of co2 emissions and fuel consumption by transportation and industries need to be pursued by asian countries the adoption of safe carbon emission cut back policies is a promising path to sustainable economic growth

voter heterogeneity and political corruption abstract we show that policies that eliminate corruption can depart from socially desirable policies and this inefficiency can be large enough to allow corruption to live on political competition between an honest welfare maximiser and corrupt politicians is studied in our model the corrupt politician is at a distinct disadvantage there is no asymmetric information no voter bias and voters are fully rational yet corruption cannot be eliminated when voters have heterogeneous preferences

corruption inequality and fairness bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption we formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model a positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population this feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality multiple steady states exist in some cases

a new perspective on planned obsolescence automobile manufacturers have long had a policy of introducing annual style changes into their new model cars textbook publishers have a policy of periodically bringing out revised editions of their popular books recently ibm changed the operating system used in its personal computers causing a reduction in the compatibility between its old and new machines if one were to ask the typical man in the street to explain what is happening in these markets he would not hesitate before giving the following answer in economists terminology he would say that for the above firms the incentive to introduce new products that make old units obsolete is too high i e the firms have an incentive to practice planned obsolescence of course just as is true for the man in the street economists have also long observed and commented on the speed with which new products are introduced for example galbraith 1958 suggests that the annual model changes of automobile manufacturers are socially wasteful while fisher griliches and kaysen 1962 provide empirical estimates of the costs of these changes there have also been numerous theoretical attempts to model the idea of planned obsolescence or the related idea of killing off the market for secondhand goods but most of these models have in fact considered the choice a monopolist faces concerning how much durability to build initially into his product rather than the monopolist s incentive to introduce new versions of his product over time 1 in this paper i consider planned obsolescence from the standpoint of a firm that can change the nature of what it sells and show that the man in the street is in fact correct in many settings the incentive for a durable goods monopolist to introduce new products that make old units obsolete will be above that which is socially optimal

the empire is dead long live the empire long run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy we hypothesise that the habsburg empire with its well respected administration increased citizens trust in local public services in several eastern european countries communities on both sides of the long gone habsburg border have shared common formal institutions for a century now we use a border specification and a two dimensional geographic regression discontinuity design to identify from individuals living within a restricted band around the former border we find that historical habsburg affiliation increases current trust and reduces corruption in courts and police falsification tests of spuriously moved borders geographic and pre existing differences and interpersonal trust corroborate a genuine habsburg effect

trust in large organizations several authors suggest that trust is an important determinant of cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social institutions we argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations in a cross section of countries evidence on government performance participation in civic and professional societies importance of large firms and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis moreover trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross section of countries this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

legitimacy and the cost of government while previous research documents a negative relationship between government size and economic growth suggesting an economic cost of big government a given government size generally affects growth differently in different countries as a possible explanation of this differential effect we explore whether government legitimacy measured by satisfaction with the way democracy works influences how a certain government size affects growth on the positive side a government perceived as legitimate may get away with being big since legitimacy can affect behavioral response to and therefore the economic growth cost of taxation and government expenditures on the negative side perceived legitimacy may make voters less prone to acquire information which in turn facilitates interest group oriented or populist policies that harm growth a panel data analysis of up to 30 developed countries in which two different measures of the size of government are interacted with government legitimacy reveals that perceived legitimacy exacerbates a negative growth effect of government size in the long run this could be interpreted as governments taking advantage of being regarded as legitimate in order to secure short term support at a long term cost to the economy

determining the optimal warranty price based on the producer s and customers risk preferences we propose a warranty model for the free replacement fixed period warranty policy that determines the optimal warranty price for a given warranty period we assume a constant failure rate for the product constant repair costs throughout the warranty period and a producer s and customers risk aversion for future repair costs using the exponential utility function and the gamma failure rate distribution we derive the decision model that maximizes the producer s certainty profit equivalent furthermore the sensitivity of the optimal warranty price is analyzed with a numerical example with respect to such factors as 1 the producer s and customers risk preferences 2 their perceptions about the product failure rate 3 the customers loyalty to the original producer in repairing failed products and 4 the customers repair price

culture openness and finance abstract differences in culture proxied by differences in religion and language cannot be ignored when examining why investor protection differs across countries we show that a country s principal religion predicts the cross sectional variation in creditor rights better than a country s natural openness to international trade its language its income per capita or the origin of its legal system catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less well than protestant countries a country s natural openness to international trade mitigates the influence of religion on creditor rights culture proxies are also helpful in understanding how investor rights are enforced across countries

cournot versus walras in dynamic oligopolies with memory abstract this paper explores the impact of memory in cournot oligopolies where firms learn through imitation of success as suggested in alchian j polit econ 57 1950 211 and modeled in vega redondo econometrica 65 1997 375 as long as memory includes at least one period the long run outcome corresponds to any quantity between the cournot one and the walras one the evolutionary stability of the walrasian outcome relies on interfirm comparisons of simultaneously observed profits i e whether a firm earns more than others in a given period whereas the stability of the cournot nash equilibrium is derived from intertemporal comparisons of profits for each given firm i e whether a deviation pays off for that firm

are there civic returns to education abstract the hypothesized effects of educational attainment on adult civic engagement and attitudes provide some of the most important justifications for government intervention in the market for education in this study i present evidence on whether these externalities exist i assess and implement two strategies for identifying the effects of educational attainment one is based on the availability of junior and community colleges the other on changes in teen exposure to child labor laws the results suggest that educational attainment has large and statistically significant effects on subsequent voter participation and support for free speech i also find that additional schooling appears to increase the quality of civic knowledge as measured by the frequency of newspaper readership

a tale of an unwanted outcome transfers and local endowments of trust and cooperation abstract transfers can do good however they can also result in massive failures this paper presents a model that highlights the ambiguous nature of the impact of transfers on local endowments of social capital it then describes an empirical investigation that illustrates that the receipt of eu structural funds causes a deterioration of the endowments of trust and cooperation in the subsidized regions

an evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection abstract the equilibrium nonexistence problem in rothschild and stiglitz s insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised profitable competitors contracts are imitated and loss making contracts are withdrawn occasionally a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts we show that rothschild and stiglitz s candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently similar to those currently on the market

optimal production run length and warranty period for an imperfect production system under selling price dependent on warranty period abstract this paper extends the extant literature to consider that the selling price of the product sold with warranty policy is a function of the length of the warranty period for an imperfect production system a product under a free replacement repair warranty policy is considered and the lifetime distribution of the product is assumed to be exponentially distributed we seek to maximize the total profit per item through optimal determinations of the production run length and the warranty period based on the proposed mathematical model we will derive some lemmas and the propositions to carry out an efficient solution procedure to determine the optimal warranty period and production run length the numerical examples are given to illustrate the features of the proposed maximizing profit model and to show all of the possible cases of the solution procedure

three problems in learning mixed strategy nash equilibria this paper discusses three problems that can prevent the convergence of learning mechanisms to mixed strategy nash equilibria first while players expectations may converge to a mixed equilibrium the strategies played typically fail to converge second even in 2 2 games fictitious play can produce a sequence of frequency distributions in which the marginal frequencies converge to equilibrium mixed strategies but the joint frequencies violate independence third in a three player matching pennies game with a unique equilibrium it is shown that if players learn as bayesian statisticians then the equilibrium is locally unstable journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 c73 d83

law enforcement and political participation italy 1861 65 abstract does tougher law enforcement positively affect political participation this paper addresses this question which hinges upon the causal impact of formal institutions on informal ones by using a historical event from 19th century italy this event was the pica law which was introduced in 1863 to fight a surge of criminal violence in southern italy and to ensure a safer environment for wealthy people the only ones allowed to vote at that time our main finding obtained using a spatial regression discontinuity technique in a diff in diffs framework is that voter turnout greatly increased in those areas where the pica law was applied compared with bordering and otherwise similar areas this result is confirmed by a number of robustness checks and placebo exercises and turns out to be persistent over time

economists models of learning abstract economic theorists have intensively studied learning in games and decisions over the last decade this essay puts some of the work in perspective and offers opinions about what still needs to be learned journal of economic literature classification numbers c73 d83

a theory of misgovernance this paper tries to explain why government bureaucracies are often associated with red tape corruption and lack of incentives the paper identifies two specific ingredients that together can provide an explanation the fact that governments often act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government we show that these problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people we also argue that we need to posit the existence of a welfare oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption

the dark side of sunshine regulatory oversight and status quo bias abstract as the mortgage foreclosure crisis accelerated in the u s in the late 2000s state level policymakers implemented measures designed to protect consumers and stem the tide of foreclosures one form of policy was simply to require lenders to report on foreclosure prevention activities such policies represented a shift from the status quo for mortgage loan servicing firms operating under incomplete information doing nothing with non paying loans while waiting for more information to be revealed to either foreclosing on the borrower or offering the borrower a modification of loan terms using a difference in difference in differences empirical strategy we exploit one policy implemented in maryland for a subset of mortgage servicers and find evidence that firms perform more loan modifications as well as file more foreclosures increasing foreclosure filings was contrary to the intent of the policy suggesting that policymakers should be aware of how firms exhibit systematic biases much like individuals

product based cultural change is the village global we provide a model of product based cultural change where trade integration leads to cultural convergence a standard trade model of dixit stiglitz monopolistic competition is coupled with a micro founded model of cultural dynamics we show that access to varieties that are attached to a global cultural type changes the incentives of parents to socialize their children and transmit their type the resulting increase in agents of the global cultural type leads to a magnification of the initial shock a striking feature of the model is that even temporary shocks to openness may have permanent effects through the changing distribution of preferences in the economy

stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations we analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n player games played by heterogeneous populations containing best repliers better repliers and imitators individuals select strategies by applying a

information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment we model investment as an n player game with a pure informational externality each player s payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature however because a player s action reveals his private information players wait to see what other players will do equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed we characterize the unique symmetric perfect bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players we establish the following results i when the period length is very short the game ends very quickly and there is a form of herding or informational cascade which results in a collapse of investment ii as the period length increases the possibility of herding disappears iii as the number of players increases the rate of investment and the information flow are eventually independent of the number of players adding more players simply increases the number who delay iv in the limit the time profile of investment is extreme a period of low investment followed either by an investment surge or a collapse

gender bias and credit access we extract an exogenous measure of gender bias from survey responses by descendants of u s immigrants on questions about the role of women in society we then use data on around 6 000 small business firms from 17 countries and find that in high gender bias countries female entrepreneurs are more likely to opt out of the loan application process and to resort to informal finance even though banks do not appear to actively discriminate against them these results are not driven by credit risk differences between female and male owned firms or by any idiosyncrasies in the set of countries in our sample

dynamic pricing and warranty policies for products with fixed lifetime abstract we consider a repairable product with known market entry and departure times a warranty policy is offered with product purchase under which a customer can have a failed item repaired free of charge in the warranty period it is assumed that customers are heterogeneous in their risk attitudes toward uncertain repair costs incurred after the warranty expires the objective is to determine a joint dynamic pricing and warranty policy for the lifetime of the product which maximizes the manufacturer s expected profit in the first part of the analysis we consider a linearly decreasing price function and a constant warranty length we first study customers purchase patterns under several different pricing strategies by the manufacturer and then discuss the optimal pricing and warranty strategy in the second part we assume that the warranty length can be altered once during the product lifetime in developing a joint pricing and warranty policy numerical studies show that a dynamic warranty policy can significantly outperform a fixed length warranty policy

public trust the law and financial investment abstract how does trust evolve in markets what is the optimal level of regulation and how does this affect trust formation and economic growth in a theoretical model we analyze these questions given the value of social capital and the potential for growth in the market when social capital is valuable regulation and trustfulness are substitutes in this case regulation may cause lower aggregate investment and decreased economic growth when the social capital is less valuable regulation and trustfulness may be complements in the paper we analyze the optimal level of regulation and highlight the novel predictions of the model

optimal dynamic pricing for perishable assets with nonhomogeneous demand we consider a dynamic pricing model for selling a given stock of a perishable product over a finite time horizon customers whose reservation price distribution changes over time arrive according to a nonhomogeneous poisson process we show that at any given time the optimal price decreases with inventory we also identify a sufficient condition under which the optimal price decreases over time for a given inventory level this sufficient condition requires that the willingness of a customer to pay a premium for the product does not increase over time in addition to shedding managerial insight these structural properties enable efficient computation of the optimal policy numerical studies are conducted to show the revenue impact of dynamic price policies price changes are set to compensate for statistical fluctuations of demand and to respond to shifts of the reservation price for the former our examples show that using optimal dynamic optimal policies achieves 2 4 7 3 revenue improvement over the optimal single price policy for the latter the revenue increase can be as high as 100 these results explain why yield management has become so essential to fashion retailing and travel service industries

optimal monopolist pricing under demand uncertainty in dynamic markets we examine pricing policy for a monopolist facing uncertain demand in a market characterized by dynamics on the demand side such as diffusion or saturation effects and or on the cost side experience curve effects our model explicitly incorporates the impact of demand uncertainty and thus allows us to analyze the implications of uncertainty on the optimal price path by contrasting the stochastic policy with the corresponding deterministic policy we begin with an analysis of the general model and then focus on several special cases based on well known demand specifications to gain more specific insights and to suggest directional guidelines for dynamic pricing decisions in an uncertain environment in general the interaction among uncertainty demand and or cost dynamics and firm s discount rate thus farsighted firms operating under dynamic market conditions with high demand uncertainty such as high tech companies with innovative products for consumer or industrial markets should attach partic

dynamic pricing with real time demand learning in many service industries the firm adjusts the product price dynamically by taking into account the current product inventory and the future demand distribution because the firm can easily monitor the product inventory the success of dynamic pricing relies on an accurate demand forecast in this paper we consider a situation where the firm does not have an accurate demand forecast but can only roughly estimate the customer arrival rate before the sale begins as the sale moves forward the firm uses real time sales data to fine tune this arrival rate estimation we show how the firm can first use this modified arrival rate estimation to forecast the future demand distribution with better precision and then use the new information to dynamically adjust the product price in order to maximize the expected total revenue numerical study shows that this strategy not only is nearly optimal but also is robust when the true customer arrival rate is much different from the original forecast finally we extend the results to four situations commonly encountered in practice unobservable lost customers time dependent arrival rate batch demand and discrete set of allowable prices

optimal warranties reliabilities and prices for durable goods in an oligopoly this paper addresses the problem of durable goods manufacturers in an oligopoly seeking optimal values for three decision variables product warranty reliability and price each firm seeks a warranty reliability price combination that maximizes expected profit subject to quite general constraints on the firm s decision variables warranty serves as a signal of product reliability which is not observable by consumers we present a game theoretic model of warranty reliability price competition in such a market and examine nash equilibria for this game we show that under fairly general assumptions each firm can optimally set its warranty and reliability independently of price and competitors actions in addition we show that optimal warranties and reliabilities are complementary and we explore the impact of different market factors on the optimal warranty and reliability finally we show that optimal warranties are longer and products more reliable when consumers are risk averse

the slave trade and the origins of mistrust in africa in a recent study nunn 2008 examines the long term impacts of africa s slave trade he finds that the slave trade which occurred over a period of more than 400 years had a significant negative effect on long term economic development although the article arguably identifies a negative causal relationship between the slave trade and income today the analysis is unable to establish the exact causal mechanisms underlying this reduced form relationship in this article we examine one of the channels through which the slave trade may affect economic development today combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we ask whether the slave trade caused a culture of mistrust to develop within africa initially slaves were captured primarily through state organized raids and warfare but as the trade progressed the environment of ubiquitous insecurity caused individuals to turn on others including friends and family members and to kidnap trick and sell each other into slavery sigismund wilhelm koelle 1854 p e h hair 1965 charles piot 1996 we hypothesize that in this environment a culture of mistrust may have evolved which may persist to this day we show that current differences in trust levels within africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and indian ocean slave trades combining contemporary individual level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal examining causal mechanisms we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual such as cultural norms beliefs and values jel j15 n57 z13

who trusts others community and individual determinants of social capital in a low income country this study presents new evidence on individual and community specific determinants of social trust using data from 96 villages in bangladesh we find perceived institutional trust to be positively correlated with stated inter personal trust at the same time there is significant social distance among various faith groups in our data both hindus and muslims trust their coreligionists more than they trust those from other religions moreover hindus trust christians buddhists and ngo workers more than muslims and are not distrustful of the wider society trust towards non muslims is negatively correlated with islamic school attendance among muslim respondents while religiosity tends not to play any role compared to religion the effects of institutional trust and local economic development are modest these findings are robust to control for a range of individual and community level correlates and enumerator fixed effects

attitudes policies and work we study whether cultural attitudes towards gender the young and leisure are signi cant determinants of the evolution over time of the employment rates of women and of the young and of hours worked in oecd countries beyond controlling for a larger menu of policies institutions and structural characteristics of the economy than has been done so far our analysis improves upon existing studies of the role of culture for labor market outcomes by dealing explicitly with the endogeneity of attitudes policies and institutions and by allowing for the persistent nature of labor market outcomes when we do all this we nd that culture still matters for women employment rates and for hours worked however policies and other institutional or structural characteristics are also important attitudes towards youth independence however do not appear to be important in explaining the employment rate of the young in the case of women employment rates the policy variable that is signi cant along with attitudes is the oecd index of employment protection legislation for hours worked the policy variables that play a role along with attitudes are the tax wedge and unemployment bene ts the quantitative impact of these policy variables is such that changes in policies have at least the

dynamic pricing and ordering decisions by a monopolist this paper considers the relationship between pricing and ordering decisions for a monopolistic retailer facing a known demand function where over the inventory cycle the product may exhibit i physical decay or deterioration of inventory called wastage and ii decrease in market value called value drop associated with each unit of inventory on hand the retailer is allowed to continuously vary the selling price of the product over the cycle we introduce a notion of instantaneous margin and use it to derive profit maximizing conditions for the retailer the model explains the markdown of retail goods subject to decay it also provides guidance in determining when price changes during the cycle are worthwhile due to product aging how often such changes should be made and how such changes affect ordering intervals and quantities

rules of thumb for social learning this paper studies agents who consider the experiences of their neighbors in deciding which of two technologies to use we analyze two learning environments one in which the same technology is optimal for all players and another in which each technology is better for some of them in both environments players use exogenously specified rules of thumb that ignore historical data but may incorporate a tendency to use the more popular technology in some cases these naive rules can lead to fairly efficient decisions in the long run but adjustment can be slow when a superior technology is first introduced

social mobility and redistributive politics just like economists voters have conflicting views about redistributive taxation because they estimate its incentive costs differently we model rational agents as trying to learn from their dynastic income mobility experience the relative importance of effort and predetermined factors in the generation of income inequality and therefore the magnitude of these incentive costs in the long run left wing dynasties believing less in individual effort and voting for more redistribution coexist with right wing dynasties this allows us to explain why individual mobility experience and not only current income matters for political attiitudes and how persistent differences in perceptions about social mobility can generate persistent differences in redistribution across countries

constitutional verbosity and social trust a common argument in the trust literature is that high trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter covering fewer contingencies we take this idea to the topic of social contracts specifically we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions cross country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries constitutions

word of mouth communication and social learning this paper studies the way that word of mouth communication aggregates the information of individual agents we find that the structure of the communication process determines whether all agents end up making identical choices with less communication making this conformity more likely despite the players naive decision rules and the stochastic decision environment word of mouth communication may lead all players to adopt the action that is on average superior these socially efficient outcomes tend to occur when each agent samples only a few others i introduction economic agents must often make decisions without knowing the costs and benefits of the possible choices given the frequency with which such situations arise it is understandable that agents often choose not to perform studies or experiments but instead rely on whatever information they have obtained via casual word of mouth communication reliance on this sort of easily obtained information appears to be common in circumstances ranging from consumers choosing restaurants or auto mechanics to business managers evaluating alternative organizational structures this paper studies two related environments in arguing that individuals reliance on word of mouth communication has interesting implications for their aggregate behavior first motivated by the diffusion of new technologies we consider a choice between two competing products with unequal qualities or payoffs and show that the structure of communication is important in determining whether the population as a whole is likely to learn to use the superior product second we consider a choice between two products or practices that are equally good and ask whether consumers are likely to herd onto a single choice or whether diversity will obtain even in the long run we explore the implications of word of mouth communication in a simple nonstrategic environment there is a large population of identical players each of whom repeatedly chooses between two possible actions each player s payoff is determined by his own

co evolution of firms and consumers and the implications for market dominance consider a setting in which rms randomly discover new ideas that a ect their products or services and implement favorable ones at the same time that rms are adapting their o erings consumers are searching among rms for the best match it is shown that implicit in these dual dynamics is an increasing returns mechanism which can result in one rm dominating the market in the long run the conditions under which there is sustained market dominance are characterized

the role of regulation on entry evidence from the italian provinces this paper studies the effects of differences in local administrative burdens in italy in the years 2005 2007 preceding a major reform that sped up firm registration procedures combining regulatory data from a survey on italian provinces before the reform costs and time to start a business with industry level entry rates of limited liability firms it explores the effects of regulatory barriers on the average of the annual entry rates across industries with different natural propensities to enter the market the estimates of the cross sectional analysis show that lengthier and to some extent more costly procedures reduced entry in sectors with naturally high entry a one day delay in registration procedures reduces the entry rate in highly dynamic sectors by more than 1 percent these results hold when i include measures of local financial development and of efficiency of bankruptcy procedures are included

the extent of the market and the supply of regulation we present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost as a consequence the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market we test three implications of this model first jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it second jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more this implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely consistent with the model we find that higher population u s states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states we also find that the regulation of entry the regulation of labor and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations as well as in civil law countries where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower

the right amount of trust we investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance we find that individual income is hump shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs heterogeneity of trust beliefs in the population coupled with the tendency of individuals to extrapolate beliefs about others from their own levels of trustworthiness could generate this non monotonic relationship highly trustworthy individuals tend to form overly optimistic beliefs to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population on the other hand less trustworthy individuals form overly pessimistic beliefs and avoid being cheated but give up profitable opportunities therefore underperforming the cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by foregoing college our findings in large scale survey data are supported and extended with experimental findings we show that in the trust game own trustworthiness and beliefs about others trustworthiness are strongly correlated and persistent and that patterns in earnings lost due to incorrect beliefs are comparable to those in the survey data

political movement and trust formation evidence from the cultural revolution 1966 76 abstract this paper examines the effect of political movement on trust formation in the context of china s cultural revolution 1966 76 an episode that involved conflicts and non cooperative behavior under moral dilemmas combining both county level variation in revolutionary intensity and cohort level variation in trust formation ages we construct individual exposure to the revolution using a difference in differences strategy our findings indicate that individuals in counties with higher revolutionary intensity and of trust formation cohorts report significantly lower levels of trust more than three decades later this effect is more pronounced for those more likely to have been targeted during the revolution as well as those with greater exposure to its early years 1966 71 the results are robust after accounting for the dynamic effects of pre revolution socio economic characteristics an extensive set of region specific cohort trends placebo tests and potential reporting bias

value diversity and regional economic development we investigate the link between culture and regional economic development within european countries considering a variety of cultural values we provide evidence that it is the degree of diversity in these values at the regional level that strongly correlates with economic performance rather than the prevalence of specific values in particular we show that greater value diversity is negatively associated with regional economic performance within countries which also relates to lower institutional quality and poorer public goods provision these patterns are robust even when diversity is measured based on values expressed by emigrants residing outside of their region of origin this article is protected by copyright all rights reserved

family values and the regulation of labor flexible labor markets requires geographically mobile workers to be e cient otherwise rms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents in cultures with strong family ties moving away from home is costly thus individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of rms even though regulation generates lower employment and income empirically we do nd that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile have lower wages are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations there are also positive cross country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities finally we nd positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty rst century and family values prevailing before world war ii which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

trust firm organization and the pattern of comparative advantage interpersonal trust favors the delegation of decisions and tasks within firms allowing the expansion of more productive units we show that this interaction between trust and firm organization contributes to shaping the pattern of comparative advantage high trust regions and countries exhibit larger value added and export shares in delegation intensive industries relative to other industries consistent with the idea that trust allows firms to expand beyond a narrow circle of family members and friends such effects are driven by an increase in average firm size reflecting in turn a shift of the size distribution away from the smallest firms and toward the small to medium ones according to our estimates trust is no less relevant than human or physical capital or institutions in shaping the pattern of comparative advantage

war signals a theory of trade trust and conflict we construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter ethnic trust and trade the model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups inter ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group since conflict disrupts trade the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time transmitting them to the next generation the theory bears a set of testable predictions first war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs second the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode third accidental conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts a war trap the incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers fostering inter ethnic trade and human capital and shifting beliefs coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects

the effect of weather induced internal migration on local labor markets evidence from uganda relying on census data collected in 2002 and historical weather data for uganda this paper estimates the impact of weather induced internal migration on the probability for non migrants living in the destination regions to be employed consistent with the prediction of a simple theoretical model the results reveal a larger negative impact than the one documented for developed countries they further show that this negative impact is significantly stronger in ugandan regions with lower road density and therefore less conducive to capital mobility a 10 percentage points increase in the net in migration rate in these areas decreases the probability of being employed of non migrants by more than 10 percentage points

trust regulation and market failures abstract government regulation of firms is associated with more negative externalities and unofficial activity across countries i argue that this correlation mainly reflects causality going from concerns about market failures to demand for government intervention using trust in others as a proxy for such concerns i show that differences in trust explain a great deal of variation in entry regulations then controlling for trust in the regression of market failures on regulation the latter is no longer associated with worse economic outcomes the same result is confirmed when i exploit country population as an alternative source of variation in regulation

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

trust us to repay social trust long term interest rates and sovereign credit ratings this paper asks whether the sensitivity of market long term interest rates and credit ratings is associated with cross country differences in informal institutions measured by social trust we note a number of theoretical mechanisms that could imply that similar objective problems are more likely to be effectively dealt with in higher trust societies a set of panel estimates across middle and high income countries reveal that interest rates and ratings are substantially more sensitive to inflation and growth problems in low trust countries this finding sheds light on the differential market reactions to economic problems in seemingly comparable countries jel codes g12 a13

government size and growth a survey and interpretation of the evidence the literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings this conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied an alternative approach of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to gdp and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time reveals a more consistent picture the most recent studies find a significant negative correlation an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0 5 to 1 percent lower annual growth rate we discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation against this background we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth one hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market friendly policies in other areas both explanations are supported by ongoing research

learning mixed equilibria we study learning processes for finite strategic form games in which players use the history of past play to forecast play in the current period in a generalization of fictitious play we assume only that players asymptotically choose best responses to the historical frequencies of opponents past play this implies that if the stage game strategies converge the limit is a nash equilibrium in the basic model plays seems unlikely to converge to a mixed strategy equilibrium but such convergence is natural when the stage game is perturbed in the manner of harsanyi s purification theorem journal of economic literature classification number c72

government in transition abstract the speed of economic reforms is not the only important determinant of the success of the transition to a market economy the transition of government from a communist state to an institution supporting a market economy is as critical survey evidence shows that russia lags significantly behind poland in the transition of its government which may account for its inferior economic performance despite adopting similar economic reforms i argue that the lack of turnover of old communist politicians and the creation of inappropriate electoral and fiscal incentives for these politicians may account for the poor performance of the russian government and suggest some strategies for improving the situation

monopolist pricing with dynamic demand and production cost this paper deals with pricing of a new product over time by a monopolist who maximizes the discounted profit stream the interdependency of cost and demand on cumulative production makes the problem inherently dynamic cost is assumed to be declining with cumulative production learning curve effect while demand is a function of price and cumulative sales representing word of mouth and saturation effects the paper addresses this problem in a general framework that includes several previous results as special cases and provides new insights in other situations while the learning curve and word of mouth effect cause prices to be lower than the price that maximizes immediate revenues the saturation factor has the opposite effect the price path over time is affected by these factors and the interest rate we characterize the price path under several different situations and interpret the results for policy guidelines