fixing exchange rates a virtual quest for fundamentals abstract fixed exchange rates are less volatile than floating rates but the volatility of macroeconomic variables such as money and output does not change very much across exchange rate regimes this suggests that exchange rate models based only on macroeconomic fundamentals are unlikely to be very successful it also suggests that there is no clear tradeoff between reduced exchange rate volatility and macroeconomic stability

on the existence of a strictly strong nash equilibrium under the student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm abstract this study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem we assume that each college s true preferences are known publicly and analyze the strategic behavior of students we demonstrate the existence of a strictly strong nash equilibrium in the preference revelation game through a simple algorithm that finds it specifically i the equilibrium outcome from our algorithm is the same matching as in the efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm and ii in a one to one matching market it coincides with the student optimal von neumann morgenstern vnm stable matching we also show that i when a strict core allocation in a housing market derived from a college admission market exists it can be supported by a strictly strong nash equilibrium and ii there exists a strictly strong nash equilibrium under the college optimal deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the student optimal stable matching is pareto efficient for students

walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

research design meets market design using centralized assignment for impact evaluation a growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed the resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness yet the question of how best to separate the lottery generated randomization integral to such designs from non random preferences and priorities remains open this paper develops easily implemented empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in a wide class of mechanisms while also revealing why seats are randomized at one school but not another we use these methods to evaluate charter schools in denver one of a growing number of districts that combine charter and traditional public schools in a unified assignment system the resulting estimates show large achievement gains from charter school attendance our approach generates efficiency gains over ad hoc methods such as those that focus on schools ranked first while also identifying a more representative average causal effect we also show how to use centralized assignment mechanisms to identify causal effects in models with multiple school sectors

boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting an experimental investigation abstract while much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness recent research has aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non truthtelling equilibria we address two issues that arise from this approach we first show that even in simple environments with ample feedback and repetition agents fail to reach non truthtelling equilibria we offer another way forward implementing truth telling as an ordinal bayes nash equilibrium rather than as a dominant strategy equilibrium we show that this weaker solution concept can allow for more efficient mechanisms in theory and provide experimental evidence that this is also the case in practice in fact truth telling rates are basically the same whether truthtelling is implemented as an ordinal bayes nash equilibrium or a dominant strategy equilibrium this provides a proof of concept that ordinal bayes nash design might provide a middle path achieving efficiency gains over strategy proof mechanisms without relying on real life agents playing a non truth telling equilibrium

near feasible stable matchings with couples the national resident matching program seeks a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals with couples stable matchings need not exist nevertheless for any student preferences we show that each instance of a matching problem has a nearby instance with a stable matching the nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals in this perturbation aggregate capacity is never reduced and can increase by at most four the capacity of each hospital never changes by more than two

evaluating interval forecasts a complete theory for evaluating interval forecasts has not been worked out to date most of the literature implicitly assumes homoskedastic errors even when this is clearly violated and proceed by merely testing for correct unconditional coverage consequently i set out to build a consistent framework for conditional interval forecast evaluation which is crucial when higher order moment dynamics are present the new methodology is demonstrated in an application to the exchange rate forecasting procedures advocated in risk management

constrained school choice an experimental study 31 pages 18 tables jel classification c72 c78 d78 i20 trabajo publicado como articulo en american economic review 100 4 1860 1874 2010 http dx doi org 10 1257 aer 100 4 1860

internet advertising and the generalized second price auction selling billions of dollars worth of keywords we investigate the generalized second price gsp auction a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising although gsp looks similar to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism its properties are very different unlike the vcg mechanism gsp generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth telling is not an equilibrium of gsp to analyze the properties of gsp we describe the generalized english auction that corresponds to gsp and show that it has a unique equilibrium this is an ex post equilibrium with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of vcg

the collapse of purchasing power parities during the 1970 s one of the striking facts concerning the relationship beiveen prices and exchange rates during the 1970 s has been the dismal performance of the predictions of the simple versions of the purchasing power parity doctrine ppp that doctrine in its absolute version states that the equilibrium exchange rate between domestic and foreign currencies equals the ratio of domestic to foreign price levels the relative version of the doctrine relates equilibrium changes in exchange rates to changes in the ratio of domestic to foreign prices during the 1970 s short run changes in exchange rates bore little relationship to short run differentials in national inflation rates and frequently divergences from purchasing power parities have been cumulative this paper reviews and analyzes the empirical record of exchange rates and prices during the 1970 s and the analysis is based on the experience of the dollar pound the dollar frecch franc and the dollar dm exchange rates section 2 presents the evidence on ppp during the 1970 s and contrasts it with the evidence from the 1920 s a period during which the doctrine held up reasonably well this analysis is relevant for assessing whether the flexible exchange rate system was successful in providing national economies with an added degree of insulation from foreign shocks and whether it provided policymakers with an added instrument for the conduct of macroeconomic policy the evidence regarding devia tions from purchasing power parities is also relevant for determining whether there is a case for managed float section 3 attempts to explain what went wrong with

substitutes and stability for matching with contracts we consider the matching problem with contracts of hatfield and milgrom 2005 and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes we show that bilateral substitutes is a sucient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework however the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition and there does not necessarily exist a doctor optimal stable allocation under a slightly stronger condition unilateral substitutes the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors preferences but there does exist a doctor optimal stable allocation and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered

broadening the market design approach to school choice school choice refers to policies that allow parents preferences to be an input to the decision of which school a student will attend a rich body of research has developed over the past 10 15 years to study mechanisms that implement school choice this literature has mostly taken the inputs of school choice preferences priorities and capacities as exogenous more recently researchers have sought to embed the school choice problem into its wider context thereby broadening the scope of market design questions and enriching the analysis this article discusses current school choice policy issues in light of this recent literature and outlines remaining open questions

marketplaces markets and market design marketplaces are often small parts of large markets and both markets and marketplaces come in many varieties market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must accomplish to enable different kinds of markets marketplaces can have varying degrees of success and there can be marketplace failures i ll discuss labor markets like the market for new economists and also markets for new lawyers and doctors that have suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates to well before employment begins markets work best if they enjoy social support but some markets are repugnant in the sense that some people think they should be banned even though others want to participate in them laws banning such markets often contribute to the design of illegal black markets and this raises new issues for market designers i ll briefly discuss markets and black markets for narcotics marijuana sex and surrogacy and the design of markets for kidney transplants in the face of widespread laws against and broader repugnance for compensating organ donors i conclude with open questions and engineering challenges

matching with couples stability and incentives in large markets accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists because couples view pairs of jobs as complements a stable matching may not exist when couples are present this paper s main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are suciently short relative to market size we also discuss incentives in markets with couples we relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data despite the presence of couples

a binary conflict ascending price bicap mechanism for the decentralized allocation of the right to use railroad tracks the questions posed for study are motivated by controversies over how sweden might change from a centralized system of railroad management to a decentralized system the central rail administration banverket will retain ownership and maintenance responsibility of the tracks but will sell access to the tracks to private firms the questions are about the mechanism that might accomplish this task parties to the controversy have claimed that the technical aspects of networks will as a matter of principle preclude the operation of any decentralized method this paper explores the properties of a mechanism developed as a challenge to that claim the mechanism is examined in the context of a testbed experimental environment that contains many potential problem causing elements in the tests performed the mechanism operated to efficiently allocate access to the network and it did so for behavioral reasons that are understandable in terms of theory the paper closes with suggestions for further study of environments that might present additional challenges to a mechanism

the mechanism is truthful why aren t you abstract honesty is the best policy in the face of a strategy proof mechanism irrespective of others behavior the best course of action is to report one s preferences truthfully we review evide

stable and strategy proof matching with flexible allotments we introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross division hiring restrictions our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints building upon our recent work on observable substitutability we show that multi division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy proof matching these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy proof matching is possible

the welfare effects of coordinated assignment evidence from the new york city high school match abstract coordinated single offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform we show that uncoordinated offers in nyc s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches one third of

untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm abstract we examine all dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm under substitutable and quota filling choice functions we show how untruthful dominant strategies look like our finding leads to the uniqueness of equilibrium outcome despite the possibility of multiple equilibria

market capitalization and value at risk abstract the potential of economic variables for financial risk measurement is an open field for research this article studies the role of market capitalization in the estimation of value at risk var we test the performance of different var methodologies for portfolios with different market capitalization we perform the analysis considering separately financial crisis periods and non crisis periods we find that var methods perform differently for portfolios with different market capitalization for portfolios with stocks of different sizes we obtain better var estimates when taking market capitalization into account we also find that it is important to consider crisis and non crisis periods separately when estimating var across different sizes this study provides evidence that market fundamentals are relevant for risk measurement

contributions to financial crisis research an assessment of the literature in social science citation index journals from 1990 to 2008 research in the field of financial crisis has generated a considerable amount of literature in the past yet there has neither been any study to assess the contributions to the literature made by individuals or institutions nor any to measure the impact of the articles and researchers this study represents an attempt to 1 investigate the major journals in publishing financial crisis research 2 assess the contributions of individual researchers and institutions using the credited contribution approach and 3 measure the impact of individual publications and individual researchers on the financial crisis literature through citation analysis based on the publications in social science citation index ssci journals from 1990 to 2008 the findings provide a useful benchmark for assessing individual and institutional research productivity and trends for future research and venues for publications are identified

time horizons lattice structures and welfare in multi period matching markets abstract we analyze a t period two sided one to one matching market without monetary transfers under natural restrictions on agents preferences which accommodate switching costs status quo bias and other forms of inter temporal complementarity dynamically stable matchings exist we propose a new ordering of the stable set ensuring that it forms a lattice we investigate the robustness of dynamically stable matchings with respect to the market s time horizon and frequency of rematching opportunities

survey measures of family decision processes for econometric analysis of schooling decisions in this article we consider the collection of novel subjective data on family processes of schooling decisions in particular we review recent progress on survey measurement of expectations information and locus of decision of american families within the context of secondary schooling and we discuss possible future developments by providing concrete examples from recent exploratory efforts we argue that collection of data on adolescents and parents perceptions of the available school options and the application and admission rules their subjective expectations about short and long term consequences of alternative choices and their assessments of the locus of decision making within families could greatly enhance economic modeling and contribute to effective econometric analysis of schooling decisions jel c83 d19 d79 d83 d84 i21 i26 j24

the impact of liquidity on portfolio value at risk forecasts abstracthistorical crisis events have highlighted the insufficiency of value at risk var as a measure of market risk because such metric does not take liquidity into account unlike previous stud

the real exchange rate and macroeconomic performance in sub saharan africa abstract pooled time series and cross section data for 33 countries in sub saharan africa ssa confirm the negative relationship between the real exchange rate rer misalignment and economic performance economic growth imports exports saving and investment macroeconomic instability also slows growth and other indicators of performance higher levels of misalignment are accompanied by higher levels of macroeconomic instability both lower levels of rer misalignment and instability lead to better economic performance the edwards model of rer determination performs well for the region black market premia tend to show a greater degree of misalignment in rer than alternative measures

has european customs union agreement really affected turkey s trade the numerous discussions regarding the advantages and disadvantages of turkey s becoming a member of the customs union has been inconclusive the empirical analysis that mostly focus on the changes in the volume of trade without much regard to the conjectural changes have also been insufficient this study attempts to shed light on this issue in a formal analysis of turkey s international trade by empirically accounting for the changes before and after the customs union agreement cua in doing so we explicitly account for the concurrent changes in the macroeconomic environment that may have affected turkey s trade with the rest of the world our empirical findings indicate that cua has not only positively impacted on turkey s trade but also led to changes in the behaviour of both exports and imports with regards to their responsiveness to underlying variables

reserve design unintended consequences and the demise of boston s walk zones we show that in the presence of admissions reserves the effect of the precedence order i e the order in which different types of seats are filled is comparable to the effect of adjusting reser

real exchange rate behavior and economic performance in ldcs in recent years policy discussions have included increasing references to real exchange rate rer stability and correct exchange rate alignment as crucial conditions to improve economic performance in less developed countries ldcs 1 evidence from latin american asian and african countries is often quoted to support the view that the link between rer behavior and economic performance is strong it is argued that while unstable rers inhibited export growth in some of latin america their stability was fundamental in promoting east asian expansion in many african countries on the other hand persistently misaligned local currencies harmed the development of agriculture reducing domestic food supply 2 but in spite of its importance no empirical work has been attempted either to test the relationship between rer behavior and performance indicators at a broad multicountry level or to investigate the sources of rer variability and misalignment in ldcs the theoretical literature on rer determinants has been recently surveyed by sebastian edwards 3 he distinguishes between equilibrium and disequilibrium rers and between external and domestic rer determinants although domestic policies are often said to account for significant rer variations empirical work has only concentrated on the effect of nominal devaluations4 or speculative crises arising from expansionary monetary policies in a system of fixed ex

distinguished lecture on economics in government exchange rate regimes is the bipolar view correct the choice of appropriate exchange rate regime which for economies with access to international capital markets increasingly means a move away from the middle ground of pegged but adjustable fixed exchange rates towards the two corner regimes of either flexible exchange rates or a fixed exchange rate supported if necessary by a commitment to give up altogether an independent monetary policy lawrence h summers 2000 p 8

exchange rate versus monetary aggregate targeting the turkish case this article compares and contrasts the macroeconomic effects of exchange rate targeting and money supply targeting by using quarterly data from turkey for the period february 1986 march 2000 the results of the var analysis show that the exchange rate does not have the traditional hump shaped effect that money supply has on output in addition we observe that an exchange rate depreciation leads to a temporary improvement in the trade balance for only a year while monetary innovations have longer lasting effects those results suggest that money based targeting is more appropriate than exchange rate targeting for turkey

obviously strategy proof mechanisms what makes some strategy proof mechanisms easier to understand than others to address this question i propose a new solution concept a mechanism is obviously strategy proof osp if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies this has a behavioral interpretation a strategy is obviously dominant if and only if a cognitively limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant it also has a classical interpretation a choice rule is osp implementable if and only if it can be carried out by a social planner under a particular regime of partial commitment i fully characterize the set of osp mechanisms in a canonical setting with one dimensional types and transfers a laboratory experiment tests and corroborates the theory

il legal assignments in school choice in public school choice students with strict preferences are assigned to schools schools are endowed with priorities over students incorporating constraints from different applications priorities are often modelled as choice functions over sets of students it has been argued that the most desirable criterion for an assignment is stability there should not exist any blocking pair no student shall prefer some school to her assigned school and have higher priority than some student who got into that school or the school has an empty seat we propose a blocking notion where in addition it must be possible to assign the student to her preferred school we then define the following stability criterion for a set of assignments a set of assignments is legal if and only if any assignment outside the set is blocked with some assignment in the set and no two assignments inside the set block each other we show that under very basic conditions on priorities there always exists a unique legal set of assignments and that this set has a structure common to the set of stable assignments i it is a lattice and ii it satisfies the rural hospitals theorem the student optimal legal assignment is efficient and provides a solution for the conflict between stability and efficiency

designing random allocation mechanisms theory and applications randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation we generalize the theory of randomized assignment to accommodate multi unit allocations and various real world constraints such as group specific quotas controlled choice in school choice and house allocation and scheduling and curriculum constraints in course allocation we develop new mechanisms that are ex ante efficient and fair in these environments and that incorporate certain non additive substitutable preferences we also develop a utility guarantee technique that limits ex post unfairness in random allocations supplementing the ex ante fairness promoted by randomization this can be applied to multi unit assignment problems and certain two sided matching problems jel c78 d82

leveling the playing field sincere and sophisticated players in the boston mechanism empirical and experimental evidence suggests different levels of sophistication among families in the boston public school student assignment plan we analyze the preference revelation game induced by the boston mechanism with sincere players who report their true preferences and sophisticated players who play a best response we characterize the set of nash equilibrium outcomes as the set of stable matchings of a modified economy where sincere students lose priority to sophisticated students any sophisticated student weakly prefers her assignment under the pareto dominant nash equilibrium of the boston mechanism to her assignment under the recently adopted student optimal stable mechanism jel d82 i21

optimal allocation without money an engineering approach we study the allocation of heterogeneous services to agents with incomplete information and without monetary transfers agents have private multidimensional utilities over services drawn from commonly known priors the social planner s goal is to maximize a potentially complex public objective for tractability we take an engineering approach in which we solve a large market approximation and convert the solution into a feasible finite market mechanism that still yields good results we apply this framework to real data from boston to design a mechanism that assigns students to public schools in order to maximize a linear combination of utilitarian and max min welfare subject to capacity and transportation constraints we show how to optimally solve a large market formulation with more than 868 types of students and 77 schools and we translate the solution into a finite market mechanism that significantly outperforms the baseline plan chosen by the city in terms of efficiency equity and predic

estimation of value at risk for energy commodities via fat tailed garch models the choice of an appropriate distribution for return innovations is important in var applications owing to its ability to directly affect the estimation quality of the required quantiles this study investigates the influence of fat tailed innovation process on the performance of one day ahead var estimates using three garch models garch n garch t and garch ht daily spot prices of five energy commodities wti crude oil brent crude oil heating oil 2 propane and new york harbor conventional gasoline regular are used to compare the accuracy and efficiency of the var models empirical results suggest that for asset returns that exhibit leptokurtic and fat tailed features the var estimates generated by the garch ht models have good accuracy at both low and high confidence levels additionally mrsb indicates that the garch ht model is more efficient than alternatives for most cases at high confidence levels these findings suggest that the heavy tailed distribution is more suitable for energy commodities particularly var calculation

matching with contracts we develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates as special cases the college admissions problem the kelso crawford labor market matching model and ascending package auctions we introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that when workers are substitutes this law is satisfied by profit maximizing firms when workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker offering auction matching algorithm we also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions

matching and price competition we develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much implying little inefficiency furthermore the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed in light of our results we discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case against the national resident matching program

what parents want school preferences and school choice we investigate parents preferences for school attributes in a unique data set of survey administrative census and spatial data using a conditional logit incorporating characteristics of households schools and home school distance we show that most families have strong preferences for schools academic performance parents also value schools socio economic composition and distance which may limit the potential of school choice to improve academic standards most of the variation in preferences for school quality across socio economic groups arises from differences in the quality of accessible schools rather than differences in parents preferences although more advantaged parents have stronger preferences for academic performance

the strategy structure of two sided matching markets we study two sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women the agents are to form partnerships which provide them with satisfaction and at the same time make monetary transfers e g salaries or dowries the core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability the idea of using walrasian equilibrium as a mechanism for making allocations with desirable properties of fairness and efficiency has been studied extensively the scheme involves having agents specify their supply and demand functions the competitive equilibria are then calculated and allocations are made accordingly in general this procedure may run into two difficulties first nonuniqueness if there are several equilibria there may be no fair way to decide which one should be implemented and second manipulability if there is only one equilibrium an informed agent may be able to influence it by suitably falsifying his demand data however as we will show here using the walrasian mechanism does work remarkably well for a certain class of important markets these are the matching markets of our title and they include markets for single items like houses where it is assumed that traders do not wish to acquire more than one item they also include labor markets in which it is desired to match workers with jobs at suitable salaries academic markets in which students are to be assigned to educational institutions marriage markets where men and women are matched through negotiating of dowries it turns out that in these markets both the problems of nonuniqueness and manipulability can be resolved in a

sincere and sophisticated players in an equal income market abstract we study the simultaneous direct revelation mechanism associated with each equal income competitive social choice function in the allocation of objects and money among sincere and strategic agents strategic agents take advantage of sincere agents they non cooperatively coordinate on the equal income competitive allocations for the true preferences that are pareto undominated for them within the set of equal income competitive allocations sincere agents are protected to some extent however their welfare is usually above their maximin payoff

recent developments in matching with constraints in an earlier work kamada and kojima 2015 we introduced matching with constraints a two sided matching problem in which the market is subject to feasibility constraints that paper proposed and analyzed a possible solution to this problem and discussed various real market applications of our results the present paper reorganizes some of the findings from our more recent effort based on kamada and kojima 2016a b

demand analysis using strategic reports an application to a school choice mechanism several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to misrepresent their preferences we find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in cambridge such strategizing can complicate preference analysis this paper develops empirical methods for studying random utility models in a new and large class of school choice mechanisms we show that preferences are non parametrically identified under either sufficient variation in choice environments or a preference shifter we then develop a tractable estimation procedure and apply it to cambridge estimates suggest that while 82 of students are assigned to their stated first choice only 72 are assigned to their true first choice because students avoid ranking competitive schools assuming that students behave optimally the immediate acceptance mechanism is preferred by the average student to the deferred acceptance mechanism by an equivalent of 0 08 miles the estimated difference is smaller if beliefs are biased and reversed if students report truthfully

on responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority based affirmative action abstract in school choice priority based affirmative action favors minority students by means of promoting their priority ranking at schools this paper investigates the responsiveness of the top trading cycles mechanism to priority based affirmative action when schools priority structure satisfies a certain acyclicity condition when schools priority under the problem without affirmative action satisfies virtual homogeneity condition a weak responsiveness result is obtained

structural estimation of a model of school choices the boston mechanism vs its alternatives we model household choice of schools under the boston mechanism bm and develop a new method applicable to a broad class of mechanisms to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible

currency crises and the stock market empirical evidence for another type of twin crisis we explore the dependency between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies our focus is two fold first the risk of a currency crisis rises as the foreign stake in the domestic stock market increases successful economies with high capital flows into their booming stock markets especially are prone to stock market induced currency crises second we apply the dividend growth model to show that stock markets crash in the run up to a currency crisis this new type of twin crisis is empirically tested by employing a logit framework using quarterly data for 33 emerging economies for 1994q1 2007q4

how to control controlled school choice we characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body the stable or fair assignment of students to schools requires the latter to regard the former as substitutes such a requirement is in conflict with the reality of schools preferences for diversity we show that the conflict can be useful in the sense that certain unique rules emerge from imposing both considerations we also provide welfare comparisons for students when different choice rules are employed

measuring exchange rate misalignment in turkey we propose a new methodology to measure exchange rate misalignment for turkey which has already undergone a severe economic crisis we estimate the real exchange rate within a time varying parameter model where a return to normality assumption about the parameters are assumed contrary to common belief it is found that except the initial four months of the stabilization program the turkish lira remained structurally undervalued for most of 2000 also we observe a pattern where lira has been structurally overvalued after the crisis in 1994 until 1998 and has displayed structural undervaluation after then

priorities in school choice the case of the boston mechanism in barcelona abstract the boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the world and has been criticized for its incentive problems in order to resolve overdemands for a given school most often priority is given to families living in the neighborhood of the school using a very rich data set on school applications for the case of the boston mechanism in barcelona we exploit an unexpected change in the definition of neighborhood this change allows us to identify that a large fraction of families systematically ranks first high priority schools neighborhood schools in this case additional data on school enrollment decisions and census data shows that some seemingly unsophisticated parents are high income families that can rank hard to get schools because they can afford the outside option of a private school in case they do not get in this sheds light on important inequalities beyond parents lack of sophistication found in the literature

resolving conflicting preferences in school choice the boston mechanism reconsidered the boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice pro cedures in use yet the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances which led the boston public schools to recently replace it with gale and shapley s deferred acceptance algorithm henceforth da the da elicits truthful revelation of ordinal preferences whereas the boston mechanism does not but the latter induces participants to reveal their cardinal preferences i e their relative preference intensities whereas the former does not we show that cardinal preferences matter more when families have similar ordinal preferences and schools have coarse priorities two common features of many school choice environ ments speci cally when students have the same ordinal preferences and schools have no priorities the boston mechanism pareto dominates the da in ex ante wel fare the boston mechanism may not harm but rather bene t participants who may not strategize well in the presence of school priorities the boston mechanism also tends to facilitate a greater access than the da to good schools by those lack ing priorities at those schools these results contrast with the standard view and cautions against a hasty rejection of the boston mechanism in favor of mechanisms such as the da

welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the liter ature boston and deferred acceptance da the question arises on the ex ante welfare implications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategic sophistication abdulkadiroglu che and yasuda 2011 have shown that the chances of naive participants getting into a good school are higher under the boston mechanism than under da and some naive participants are actually better o in this note we show that these results can be extended to show that under the veil of ignorance i e students not yet knowing their utility values all naive students may prefer to adopt the boston mechanism

equilibria and indivisibilities gross substitutes and complements this paper examines an exchange economy with heterogeneous indivisible objects that can be substitutable or complementary we show that a competitive equilibrium exists in such economies provided that all the objects can be partitioned into two groups and from the viewpoint of each agent objects in the same group are substitutes and objects across the two groups are complements this condition generalizes the well known kelso crawford gross substitutes condition and is called gross substitutes and complements we also provide practical and typical examples from which substitutes and complements are both jointly observed

a leaky bucket in the real world estimating inequality aversion using survey data existing evidence of inequality aversion relies on data from class room experiments where subjects face hypothetical questions this paper estimates the magnitude of inequality aversion using representative survey data with questions related to the real economy situations the respondents face the results reveal that inequality aversion can be measured in a meaningful way using survey data but the magnitudes of the estimates depend dramatically on how inequality aversion is measured no matter how measured the revealed inequality aversion predicts opinions on a wide range of questions related to the welfare state such as the level of taxation tax progressivity and the structure of unemployment benefits

caviar conditional autoregressive value at risk by regression quantiles value at risk var has become the standard measure of market risk employed by financial institutions for both internal and regulatory purposes var is defined as the value that a portfolio will lose with a given probability over a certain time horizon usually one or ten days despite its conceptual simplicity its measurement is a very challenging statistical problem and none of the methodologies developed so far give satisfactory solutions interpreting the var as the quantile of future portfolio values conditional on current information we propose a new approach to quantile estimation which does not require any of the extreme assumptions invoked by existing methodologies such as normality or i i d returns the conditional autoregressive value at risk or caviar model moves the focus of attention from the distribution of returns directly to the behavior of the quantile we specify the evolution of the quantile over time using a special type of autoregressive process and use the regression quantile framework introduced by koenker and bassett to determine the unknown parameters since the objective function is not differentiable we use a differential evolutionary genetic algorithm for the numerical optimization utilizing the criterion that each period the probability of exceeding the var must be independent of all the past information we introduce a new test of model adequacy the dynamic quantile test applications to simulated and real data provide empirical support to this methodology and illustrate the ability of these algorithms to adapt to new risk environments

bidding for army career specialties improving the rotc branching mechanism motivated by the low retention rates of us military academy and reserve officer training corps graduates the army recently introduced incentives programs in which cadets could bid 3 years of additional service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired branches the full potential of this incentives program is not utilized because of the rotc s deficient matching mechanism i propose a design that eliminates these shortcomings and mitigates several policy problems the army has identified in contrast to the rotc mechanism my design utilizes market principles more extensively and it is a hybrid between a market mechanism and a priority based allocation mechanism