the efficiency of electric power pools evidence from firing unit data 1986 the efficiency of electric power pools evidence from firing unit data applied economics vol 18 no 12 pp 1323 1334

an analysis of interfirm cooperation theory and evidence from electric power pools this paper develops and tests a model for analyzing the extent to which an individual utility participates in a power pool it incorporates the benefits and costs of pool membership in a profit maximization model of an individual utility the study finds that coordination reflects the benefits and costs the degree to which other utilities are committed to the pool and the utility s behavior toward other utilities the results show that large firms are reluctant to pool with small firms and the us pools tend to be loosely coordinated policy implications are that regulatory commissions can be instrumental in coordination efforts and that interstate cooperation among regulatory authorities is needed to encourage pooling and obtain regional solutions to regional problems it is also important to reduce the transactional costs of pooling wherever possible 37 references 3 figures 1 table

walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes in this paper we study the problem of efficient production and allocation of indivisible objects among a set of consumers we assume that the agents preferences depend on the bundle of objects and the quantity of money they consume furthermore we assume that preferences are quasilinear in money and that agents have a large endowment of money with indivisibilities it is well known that many familiar properties of the utility functions fail to ensure existence in their striking analysis of the matching problem kelso and crawford 5 introduce the gross substitutes gs condition which ensures the non emptiness of the core we propose two new conditions and show that with quasilinearity they are equivalent article id jeth 1999 2531 available online at http www idealibrary com on

constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages a number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers while having to abide by the law of minimum wages firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what salary in such situations fair envy free allocations usually fail to exist to cope with this situation this paper proposes a new concept of fairness called constrained fairness among the set of constrainedly fair allocations the so called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular interest the reason for this is that the salaries are not only compatible with the minimum wages they are also optimal from the standpoint of cost minimizing firms and the assignment of jobs is efficient from the viewpoint of workers a convergent dynamic procedure that identifies constrainedly fair and minimal allocations is proposed furthermore strategic properties of the mechanism are derived and two notions of efficiency are evaluated

how do sex ratios affect marriage and labor markets evidence from america s second generation sex ratios i e relative numbers of men and women can affect marriage prospects labor force participation and other social and economic variables but the observed association between sex ratios and social and economic conditions may be confounded by omitted variables and reverse causality this paper uses variation in immigrant flows as a natural experiment to study the effect of sex ratios on the children and grandchildren of immigrants the flow of immigrants affected the second generation marriage market because second generation marriages were mostly endogamous i e to members of the same ethnic group the empirical results suggest that high sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and a large negative effect on female labor force participation perhaps surprisingly the marriage rates of second generation men appear to be a slightly increasing function of immigrant sex ratios higher sex ratios also appear to have raised male earnings and the incomes of parents with young children the empirical results are broadly consistent with theories where higher sex ratios increase female bargaining power in the marriage market

using first price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses abstract this paper considers three alternative ways to sell heterogeneous licenses via a first price format when there is single unit demand it has been suggested that incorporating a first price element may bolster competition in this case klemperer paul d 2002 what really matters in auction design journal of economic perspectives 16 169 189 in a controlled laboratory setting we compare the performance of the simultaneous first price auction the sequential first price auction and the simultaneous descending auction with that of the simultaneous ascending auction the experiments involve several bidding environments of varying complexity we find that the simultaneous ascending auction achieves the highest levels of efficiency but also has drawbacks i its revenues are low and variable ii per license profits vary and iii the incidence of winner s curse outcomes is high seller s revenues are highest when the licenses are sold in a sequential first price auction in decreasing order of quality

missing women age and disease relative to developed countries and some parts of the developing world most notably sub saharan africa there are far fewer women than men in india and china it has been argued that as many as a 100 million women could be missing the possibility of gender bias at birth and the mistreatment of young girls are widely regarded as key explanations we provide a decomposition of these missing women by age and cause of death while we do not dispute the existence of severe gender bias at young ages our computations yield some striking new findings 1 the vast majority of missing women in india and a significant proportion of those in china are of adult age 2 as a proportion of the total female population the number of missing women is largest in sub saharan africa and the absolute numbers are comparable to those for india and china 3 almost all the missing women stem from disease by disease comparisons and not from the changing composition of disease as described by the epidemiological transition finally using historical data we argue that a comparable proportion of women was missing at the start of the 20th century in the united states just as they are in india china and sub saharan africa today

internet advertising and the generalized second price auction selling billions of dollars worth of keywords we investigate the generalized second price gsp auction a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising although gsp looks similar to the vickrey clarke groves vcg mechanism its properties are very different unlike the vcg mechanism gsp generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies and truth telling is not an equilibrium of gsp to analyze the properties of gsp we describe the generalized english auction that corresponds to gsp and show that it has a unique equilibrium this is an ex post equilibrium with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of vcg

the strategy structure of some coalition formation games in coalitional games with side payments the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared the predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully these difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form as the collection of pairs of buyer seller in an assignment game the incentive properties of the core and of its selections are investigated in function of the collection furthermore the relationships with vickrey clarke groves mechanisms are drawn

double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint i consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant the objective is to select an assignment price pair that is envy free with respect to the agents true preferences i propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences i prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in nash and strong nash equilibrium the set of true envy free allocations

are incentives against economic justice abstract we consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains but is not restricted to quasi linear preferences we analyze the manipulability of the generalized money rawlsian fair gmrf solutions i we show that the nash and strong nash equilibrium correspondences of the preference revelation game form associated with each gmrf solution coincide with the no envy solution in equilibrium efficiency is preserved according to agents true preferences ii a corollary is that the gmrf solutions naturally implement the no envy solution in nash and strong nash equilibria

elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions the problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned a set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested it is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited the procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well it results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and consumer surplus is maximized its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria

competitive fair division several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players whose bids for the goods determine their prices an equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair division procedure called the gap procedure that ensures 1 nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the good 2 pareto optimality though coupled with possible envy 3 monotonicity such that higher bids never hurt in obtaining a good 4 sincere bids that preclude negative utility and 5 prices that are partially independent of the amounts bid as in a vickrey auction a variety of applications are discussed

an algorithm for identifying fair and optimal allocations the concept of a fair and optimal allocation was recently introduced by sun and yang sun n yang z 2003 a general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism economics letters 81 73 79 this note states some basic properties of fair and optimal allocations and provides a simple algorithm for identifying them c 2007 elsevier b v all fights reserved

scale economies and capacity utilization the importance of relative fuel prices abstract several authors have directed attention to the importance of capacity utilization as an explanation for technical scale economies in the production of electricity we analyse 1981 us firing unit data for electric generating companies to determine the relationship between capacity utilization and scale economies we show that capacity utilization rates are functions of relative fuel prices and the mix of technology available to the company this suggests that the results of capacity utilization studies will be dependent on the relative fuel prices in the year s from which the data come even if the capital stock is exactly the same as a result ex ante companies do not have much flexibility in choosing an expected utilization rate associated with scale

ascending price vickrey auctions abstract we show that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by ausubel i raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products and ii the auction is a primal dual algorithm applied to an appropriate linear programming formulation in which the dual solution yields those same market clearing prices we emphasize the similarities with efficient incentive compatible ascending price auctions to implement vickrey payments when there is a single object or when objects are heterogeneous but each buyer does not desire more than one unit a potential benefit of these common threads is that it helps to establish the principles upon which vickrey payments may be implemented through decentralized incentive compatible procedures

a theory of buyer seller networks this paper introduces a new model of exchange networks rather than markets of buyers and sellers it begins with the empirically motivated premise that a buyer and seller must have a relationship a link to exchange goods networks buyers sellers and the pattern of links connecting them are common exchange environments this paper develops a methodology to study network structures and explains why agents may form networks in a model that captures characteristics of a variety of industries the paper shows that buyers and sellers acting strategically in their own self interests can form the network structures that maximize overall welfare

no toilet no bride intrahousehold bargaining in male skewed marriage markets in india abstract haryana state in india is characterized by widespread discrimination against women including a severe population level sex imbalance in this context an innovative social marketing campaign which targeted pro sanitation messages to households active in local marriage markets was implemented with the goal of increasing toilet ownership this paper estimates the impact of this program known colloquially as no toilet no bride on household level latrine ownership private sanitation coverage in haryana increased by 21 specifically among households with boys active on the marriage market this effect is larger and concentrated in marriage markets where women are relatively scarce and absent when women are relatively abundant which together suggest the program operated by successfully linking sanitation outcomes with marriage market competition induced by local scarcities of women due to male biased sex ratios

the package assignment model we study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several rather than single objects although buyers reservations values are non additive efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non linear in the objects constituting the packages the interconnections among the linear programming formulation walrasian equilibrium and the core are established in the single seller auction version a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 d44 d51

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

auction protocols for decentralized scheduling decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules we investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems the quality of equilibrium solutions and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol to remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarities in preference we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods finally we consider direct revelation mechanisms and compare to the market based approach journal of economic literature classification numbers c62 c70 d44

empirical analysis of the efficiency of job assignment auctions for some hard to fill jobs the navy awards assignment incentive pay using an auction like format with respect to the optimal job assignment auction format however there is only a very limited academic literature furthermore the extant literature assumes all bidders are equally qualified in the navy assignment context this is not a tenable assumption as other considerations such as relocation and en route training costs must be considered when making an assignment the lower the weight on the bid the greater the weight that can be attached to the qualification component in the objective function the lower the weight however the weaker the incentive to bid near one s reservation wage the consideration of such other criteria precludes the implementation of the incentive compatible vickery leonard assignment auction we relax the assumption that bid amounts alone determine the assignment set and experimentally estimate the efficiency reductions associated with decreased bid weights the estima

investment in schooling and the marriage market we present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns the labor market return resulting from higher wages and a marriagemarket return defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles this asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses when the labor market returns to schooling rises home production demands less time and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken more women may invest in schooling than men

allocation of track capacity experimental evidence on the use of priority auctioning in the railway industry allocation of track capacity concerns multiple users facing demand indivisibilities running trains over an inelastic supply of railway tracks the paper suggests a vickrey type mechanism to handle incentive aspects of this technically complex optimisation task here the price for operating a train will correspond to the bids foregone by other operators who are pushed off their preferred routes the paper reports the results of 11 experimental markets using variations of this mechanism where each market includes up to 10 trading periods and subjects bid for routes over a highly stylised railway network the experiments generated solutions that capture 90 100 of potential benefits

the english auction with differentiated commodities abstract we study economies with indivisibilities that satisfy the gross substitutes gs condition we define an excess demand set with the property that increasing the prices of all goods in excess demand eventually leads to the smallest walrasian prices this procedure is a generalization of the auction studied by g demange d gale and m j sotomayor polit econ 94 1986 863 872 in our auction truthful revelation of demand is a perfect bayesian equilibrium if the smallest walrasian prices correspond to the vickrey clarke groves payments however no dynamic auction can reveal sufficient information to implement the vickrey mechanism if all gs preferences are allowed journal of economic literature classification numbers d4 d44 d5 d51

status caste and the time allocation of women in rural india abstractwe argue that women may be disinclined to participate in market work in the rural areas of india because of family status concerns in a culture that stigmatizes market work by married women we set out a theoretical framework that offers predictions regarding the effects of caste based status concerns on the time allocation of women we then use the all india national sample survey data for the year 2004 5 and the time use survey for six states of india for the year 1998 99 to empirically test these hypotheses after controlling for a host of correlates we find that the ratio of women s market work to men s declines as we move up the caste hierarchy this ratio falls as family wealth rises and the decline is steeper for the higher castes finally the effect on women s market work of higher education is weaker for the higher castes these findings lend support to our theory and to the view that through its emphasis on family status caste plays a pivotal role in undermining the autonomy of wome

the market for evaluations recent developments in computer networks have driven the cost of distributing information virtually to zero creating extraordinary opportunities for sharing product evaluations the authors present pricing and subsidy mechanisms that operate through a computerized market and induce the efficient provision of evaluations the mechanisms overcome three major challenges first evaluations which are public goods are likely to be underprovided second an inefficient ordering of evaluators may arise and third the optimal quantity of evaluations depends on what is learned from the initial evaluations

protective behavior in matching models this paper analyzes the use of a version of lexical maximim strategies called protective behavior in two sided matching models it restricts attention to mechanisms which produce stable matchings that is matchings which are individually rational and pairwise optimal the main results of the paper show that truth telling is the unique form of protective behavior in two such mechanisms the first is the one which selects the student optimal stable matching in the college admissions model while the second is the mechanism which selects the buyer optimal matching in the shapley shubik assignment model journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d81

competitive equilibria in two sided matching markets with general utility functions we present an exact characterization of utilities in competitive equilibria of two sided matching markets in which the utility of each agent depends on the choice of partner and the terms of the partnership potentially including monetary transfer examples of such markets include sellers and buyers or jobs and workers demange and gale showed that the set of competitive equilibria in this type of market forms a complete lattice with each extreme point of the lattice representing an equilibrium with the highest utilities for the agents on one side and the lowest utilities for the agents on the opposite side our characterization is based on establishing a connection between the competitive equilibria of a market and the competitive equilibria of certain strict subsets of that market each obtained by removing exactly one agent this characterization captures the effect of competition when agents are added to the market or removed from the market it gives a precise procedure for constructing competitive eq

power pooling an exercise in industrial coordination interconnected public utilities can achieve cost savings more reliable service lower capacity requirements and optimum siting by closely coordinating generation and transmission transactions within a common pool they can also achieve seasonal diversity and economy of energy in their exchanges despite the advantages the costs of pooling arrangements inefficient allocations of benefits and government regulations have been serious disincentives the relative tightness of agreements in 17 power pools demonstrates that tightly coordinated pools generally experience the most benefits 20 references dck

optimal allocation without transfer payments abstract often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return this may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs in this paper we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent while the designer cannot charge agents he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them we find conditions for cases in which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible is optimal in other cases those that send the highest signal should receive the goods however we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior also we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated

the economies of massed reserves the economy of massed reserves first mentioned by e a g robinson 1958 pp 26 27 is now firmly established in the industrial organization literature as an example of a potential plant level scale economy the massing of reserves results in a savings in the proportion of required reserves to expected output as the scale of a facility increases examples of such reserves are bank tellers specialized tools and equipment repairmen inventories spare parts and checkout lines the potential economies from massing reserves are dependent on the underlying stochastic processes governing the supply and or demand of the service provided theoretical justification for the economies of massed reserves has usually been based on an appeal to the law of large numbers for example donald hay and derek morris wrote the law of large numbers makes the number of breakdowns more predictable in a plant using a large number of machines so that the number of stand by maintenance staff need not be increased in proportion to size 1979 p 44 this paper demonstrates that the law of large numbers does not provide a theoretical explanation of massed reserves scale economies instead it is shown that the expected economies of massed reserves can be calculated from the steady state properties of well known queuing models queuing models apply to any case where a servicing input is held in reserve to cope with the stochastic nature of the market or production process in addition a method for quantifying the expected economies of queuing processes is developed the magnitude of these expected economies is shown to be significant and calculable for example the expected economies inherent in a widely applied queuing model are shown to exceed 23 percent in some cases section i establishes the irrelevance of the law of large numbers as a theory of scale economies section ii provides a formal method for determining the scale economies inherent in the most often mentioned massed reserves example machine repair section iii shows that the same method can be used to calculate scale economies for the remaining massed reserves examples specialized repair tools and equipment checkout counter clerks bank tellers and other service personnel capacity and inventories and spare parts in addition it is demonstrated that the same method can be used to calculate scale economies for some multiproduct operations

common and conflicting interests in two sided matching markets abstract this paper reviews and synthesizes some of what is now known about what i will call two sided matching markets a number of such models which arise naturally in the study of certain labor markets have been shown to have surprising implications about the common and conflicting interests of the agents and about the incentives they face

a general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism abstract this paper studies a general problem of efficiently and fairly allocating n indivisible objects like jobs or houses with a certain amount of money to n persons with a requirement that each person be assigned with one object the precise preferences of individuals over both the objects and money are unknown and manipulable but assumed to follow some general patterns to ensure the existence of a fair allocation a mechanism is developed that elicits honest preferences over both the objects and money and that assigns the objects with some money to individuals efficiently and fairly

multi item vickrey english dutch auctions abstract assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item this paper defines a polynomial time multi item auction that locates the vcg prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices this auction is called the vickrey english dutch auction and it contains the vickrey english auction sankaran j k 1994 on a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem math soc sci 28 143 150 and the vickrey dutch auction mishra d parkes d 2009 multi item vickrey dutch auctions games econ behav 66 326 347 as special cases by means of numerical experiments it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the bidders value distributions the vickrey english dutch auction is weakly faster than the vickrey english auction and the vickrey dutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent respectively of the investigated problems a greedy version of the vickrey english dutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies

income and outcomes a structural model of intrahousehold allocation there is evidence from several sources that one cannot treat many person households as a single decision maker if this is the case then factors such as the relative incomes of the household members may affect the final allocation decisions made by the household we develop a method of identifying how incomes affect outcomes given conventional family expenditure data the basic assumption we make is that household decision processes lead to efficient outcomes we apply our method to a sample of canadian couples with no children we find that the final allocations of expenditures on each partner depend significantly on their relative incomes and ages and on the level of lifetime wealth

consumption smoothing migration and marriage evidence from rural india a significant proportion of migration in low income countries particularly in rural areas is composed of moves by women for the purpose of marriage we seek to explain these mobility patterns by examining marital arrangements among indian households in particular we hypothesize that the marriage of daughters to locationally distant dispersed yet kinship related households is a manifestation of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements aimed at mitigating income risks and facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks analysis of longitudinal south indian village data lends support to the hypothesis marriage cum migration contributes significantly to a reduction in the variability of household food consumption farm households afflicted with more variable profits tend to engage in longer distance marriage cum migration the hypothesized and observed marriage cum migration patterns are in dissonance with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned primarily with search costs and static income gains

non manipulable house allocation with rent control in many real life house allocation problems rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration this is known as rent control because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept called rationing price equilibrium tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control an allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and group non manipulable for almost all preference profiles in its bounding cases the rule reduces to a number of well known mechanisms from the matching literature in this sense the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework

connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple partners assignment game multiple partners assignment game is the name used by sotomayor the multiple partners game in m majumdar ed equilibrium and dynamics essays in honor of david gale the macmillan press ltd new york 1992 the lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game int j game theory 28 1999 567 583 to describe the cooperative structure of the many to many matching market with additively separable utilities stability concept is proved to be different from the core concept an economic structure is proposed where the concept of competitive equilibrium payoff is introduced in connection to the equilibrium concept from standard microeconomic theory the paper examines how this equilibrium concept compares with the cooperative equilibrium concept properties of interest to the cooperative and competitive markets are derived

missing women and the price of tea in china the effect of sex specific earnings on sex imbalance economists have long argued that the sex imbalance in developing countries is caused by underlying economic conditions this paper uses exogenous increases in sex specific agricultural income caused by post mao reforms in china to estimate the effects of total income and sex specific income on sex differential survival of children increasing female income holding male income constant improves survival rates for girls whereas increasing male income holding female income constant worsens survival rates for girls increasing female income increases educational attainment of all children whereas increasing male income decreases educational attainment for girls and has no effect on boys educational attainment