anticipating regret why fewer options may be better we study preferences over menus which can be represented as if the agent selects an alternative from a menu and experiences regret if her choice is ex post inferior since regret arises from comparisons between the alternative selected and the other available alternatives our axioms reflect the agent s desire to limit her options we prove that our representation is essentially unique we also introduce two measures of comparative regret attitudes and relate them to our representation finally we explore the formal connection between the present work and the literature on temptation

choice by sequential procedures article history we propose a rule of decision making the sequential procedure guided by routes and show that three influential boundedly rational choice models can be equivalently understood as special cases of this rule in addition the sequential procedure guided by routes is instrumental in showing that the three models are intimately related we show that choice with a status quo bias is a refinement of rationalizability by game trees which in turn is also a refinement of sequential rationalizability thus we provide a sharp taxonomy of these choice models and show that they all can be understood as choice by sequential procedures

randomization vs selection how to choose in the absence of preference decision makers sometimes have to choose between alternative options about which they have no preference either they judge the options equally valuable indifference or they have no judgment about their relative value noncomparability choosing randomly is generally considered a natural way to deal with such situations this paper shows however that systematic randomization between noncomparable options may lead to a chain of decisions resulting in monetary losses a money pump furthermore these losses can be avoided by deliberately selecting one of the noncomparable options instead of randomizing thus randomization among noncomparable options is costly relative to deliberate selection on the other hand randomization among indifferent options is costless relative to deliberate selection

robust social decisions we propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs in addition to conflicting tastes or interests to do so we adapt the standard pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle we also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle the former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied when it cannot the latter always provides minimal guidance

consumer preference for a no choice option the traditional focus in the decision making literature has been on understanding how consumers choose among a given set of alternatives the notion that preference uncertainty may lead to choice deferral when no single alternative has a decisive advantage is tested in seven studies building on recent research the article shows that the decision to defer choice is influenced by the absolute difference in attractiveness among the alternatives provided and is not consistent with trade off difficulty or the theory of search these findings are then extended to show that choice deferral can also be modified for the same alternatives by manipulations that make them appear more similar in attractiveness or that decrease the need to differentiate among them the results are consistent with the notion that preference uncertainty results in a hesitation to commit to any single action since small differences in attractiveness among the alternatives are potentially reversible consistent with this premise the effect of attractiveness difference on choice deferral decreased significantly when subjects were first allowed to practice making monetary trade offs among the available alternatives

status quo maintenance reconsidered changing or incomplete preferences after reviewing the evidence for status quo maintenance sqm i consider how to reconcile sqm with traditional consumer theory behavioural economists usually let agents preferences change as a function of their endowments treating the same person with different endowments as a set of distinct agents many properties of preferences then become immune to empirical test and it becomes impossible to judge whether an agent s decisions make the agent better or worse off this impedes prediction of when decision rules are likely to change sqm can alternatively be explained with unchanging preferences if preferences are incomplete sqm is then consistent with self interest and there is no reason why it should not persist

indecisiveness undesirability and overload revealed through rational choice deferral three reasons why decision makers may defer choice are indecisiveness between various feasible options unattractiveness of these options and choice overload this paper provides a choice theoretic explanation for each of these phenomena by means of three deferral permitting models of decision making that are driven by preference incompleteness undesirability and complexity constraints respectively these models feature rational choice deferral in the sense that whenever the individual does not defer he chooses a most preferred feasible option as a result choices are always consistent with the weak axiom of revealed preference the three models suggest novel ways in which observable data can be used to recover preferences as well as their indecisiveness desirability and complexity components or thresholds several examples illustrate the relevance of these models in empirical and theoretical applications

predisclosure information firm capitalization and security price behavior around earnings announcements several studies on the relationship between earnings reports and security price behavior provide evidence suggesting that a significant portion of the information revealed through earnings reports is reflected in security prices prior to the report month e g ball and brown 1968 and brown and kennelly 1972 this has been attributed at least partly to the existence of other more timely sources of information which allow market agents to forecast earnings prior to their release the evidence above reflects an average finding across all firms one question of interest is whether there are significant systematic crosssectional differences in the security price reactions to earnings announcements of firms which are associated with specific firm characteristics that lead to differential amounts of predisclosure information this study focuses on firm size capitalization as one such characteristic a firm

ballot position choice fatigue and voter behaviour in this paper we examine the eect of choice fatigue on decision making we exploit a natural experiment in which voters face the same contest at dierent ballot positions due to dierences in the number of local issues on their ballot facing more decisions before a given contest signi cantly increases the tendency to abstain or rely on decision shortcuts such as voting for the status quo or the rst listed candidate we estimate that without choice fatigue abstentions would decrease by 8 and 6 of the propositions in our dataset would have passed rather than failed

single option aversion this article documents single option aversion an increase in consumers desire to search when faced with a single option this effect can lead to a product being chosen more often when competing alternatives are included in the choice set contrary to various rational models of search as well as to recent research on choice conflict showing that additional options can lead to higher deferral rates a series of lab studies document this effect differentiate it from other context effects and test some of its boundary conditions the results suggest that single option aversion is not driven by the information provided by the additional options that the desire to search is critical for this effect to occur and that the effects of single option aversion are not limited to the immediate choice set these results have both practical and theoretical implications for the understanding of consumer search and choice deferral

who is more rational we report on the results of a large scale field experiment that enables us to test for consistency with utility maximizing behavior and to investigate the correlation between individual behavior and demographic and economic characteristics we conducted the experiment with the centerpanel a representative sample of over 2 000 dutch households using procedures similar to those used by choi et al 2007b in a setting with risk we find a high level of consistency in the individual level decisions there is also considerable heterogeneity in subjects consistency scores high income and high education subjects display greater levels of consistency men are more consistent than women and young subjects are more consistent than those who

duopolistic competition with choice overloaded consumers a large body of experimental work has suggested the existence of a choice overload effect in consumer decision making faced with large menus of choice options decision makers often defer or avoid choice a suggested reason for the occurrence of this effect is that the agents attempt to avoid the cognitive effort that is associated with choosing from larger menus building on this explanation we propose and analyse a model of duopolistic competition where firms compete in menu design in the presence of a consumer population with heterogeneous preferences and overload menu size thresholds the firms strategic trade off is between offering a large menu in order to match the preferences of as many consumers as possible and offering a small menu in order to avoid losing choice overloaded consumers to their rival assuming uniformly distributed preferences we focus on symmetric pure strategy equilibria under various assumptions on the overload distribution and product markups we also propose and analyse a measure of consumer welfare that applies to this environment among other things we provide conditions for maximum and minimum variety equilibria to be possible whereby both firms either offer the entire set of available products or the same one product respectively

the effect of forced choice on choice abstract whereas most academic and industry studies of consumer preferences and decision making involve forced choice i e participants are told to choose one of the presented product or service alternatives buyers usually also have the option not to select any alternative an implicit assumption in the experimental practice of forcing choice is that the no choice option draws proportionately from the various available alternatives such that the qualitative conclusions are unaffected however the authors propose that the no choice option competes most directly with alternatives that buyers tend to select when they are uncertain about their preferences building on this general proposition the authors show that the introduction of the no choice option strengthens the attraction effect weakens the compromise effect and decreases the relative share of an option that is average on all dimensions they also examine the mechanisms underlying the impact of having the option not to choose and the condi

beyond revealed preference choice theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics we propose a broad generalization of standard choice theoretic welfare economics that encompasses a wide variety of nonstandard behavioral models our approach exploits the coherent aspects of choice that those positive models typically attempt to capture it replaces the standard revealed preference relation with an unambiguous choice relation roughly x is strictly unambiguously chosen over y written xp y iff y is never chosen when x is available under weak assumptions p is acyclic and therefore suitable for welfare analysis it is also the most discerning welfare criterion that never overrules choice the resulting framework generates natural counterparts for the standard tools of applied welfare economics and is easily applied in the context of specific behavioral theories with novel implications though not universally discerning it lends itself to principled refinements

rational choice with status quo bias abstract motivated by the empirical findings concerning the importance of one s current situation on her choice behavior the main objective of this paper is to propose a rational choice theory that allows for the presence of a status quo bias and that incorporates the standard choice theory as a special case we follow a revealed preference approach and obtain two nested models of rational choice that allow phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect and that are applicable in any choice situation to which the standard static choice model applies

status quo bias multiple priors and uncertainty aversion motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets we study this phenomenon from a decision theoretic prospective focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty we develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of an agent for each possible status quo option and provide a characterization according to which the agent considers a full dimensional set of possible priors and abandons her status quo option only if she finds an alternative that returns a higher expected utility for each of these priors we then show that in this framework the very presence of a status quo induces the agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option

indifference or indecisiveness choice theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences abstract a commonly held belief in economics is that an individual s preferences that are revealed by her choices must be complete this paper takes issue with this position by showing that one may be able to distinguish between indifference and indecisiveness of an agent upon observing her choice behavior we relax the standard weak axiom of revealed preferences warp and show that a potent theory of individual choice with and without risk can be founded on this weaker axiom when it is coupled with some other standard postulates the most notable features here are that an agent is allowed to be indifferent between certain alternatives and indecisive about others moreover an outside observer can identify which of these actually occur upon examining the observable choice behavior of the decision maker as an application we also show how our theory may be able to cope with the classical preference reversal phenomenon

contextual inference in markets on the informational content of product lines context can influence decisions this malleability of choice is usually invoked as evidence that people do not maximize stable preference orderings in a market equilibrium however context conveys payoff relevant information to consumers consequently these consumers rationally violate naive formulations of standard choice theoretic principles i identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors namely the compromise effect and choice overload arise as market equilibria firms respond to consumers contextual inference in case of the compromise effect a firm may introduce premium loss leaders expensive goods of overly high quality that increase the demand for other goods

dynamic logit with choice aversion we characterize a generalization of discounted logistic choice that incorporates a parameter to capture different views the agent might have about the costs and benefits of larger choice sets the discounted logit model used in the empirical literature is the special case that displays a preference for flexibility in the sense that the agent always prefers to add additional items to a menu other cases display varying levels of choice aversion where the agent prefers to remove items from a menu if their ex ante value is below a threshold we show that higher choice aversion as measured by dislike of bigger menus also corresponds to an increased preference for putting off decisions as late as possible

a measure of rationality and welfare evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates from the classical principle of preference maximization has raised at least two important questions 1 how serious are the deviations 2 what is the best way to analyze choice behavior in order to extract information for the purpose of welfare analysis this paper addresses these questions by proposing a new way to identify the preference relation that is closest in terms of welfare loss to the revealed choice

on the theory of reference dependent preferences a theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points it is related to tversky and kahneman s reference dependent preference theory but is simpler and deviates less from conventional consumer theory preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy conventional assumptions apart from a continuity condition the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice the theory is consistent with observations of status quo bias and related effects reference points are treated as subject to change during the course of trade the implications of endogeneity of reference points for behaviour in markets are investigated

indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade abstract we use an agent s strict preferences to define indifference and incompleteness relations that identify the sequences of trades that are rational to undertake if an agent makes sequences of trades of options labeled indifferent the agent will never be led to an inferior outcome but trades of options where no preference judgments obtain can lead to diminished welfare for one shot choices in contrast there can be no behavioral distinction between indifference and incompleteness applications include an isomorphism for incomplete preferences that indicates when weak and strict preferences contain interchangeable information a characterization of the possibly incomplete preference relations consistent with a one shot choice function and an equivalent definition of incompleteness that relies on the philosophical theory of incommensurability

consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty by using graphical representations of simple portfolio choice problems we generate a very rich dataset to study behavior under uncertainty at the level of the individual subject we test the data for consistency with the maximization hypothesis and we estimate preferences using a two parameter utility function based on faruk gul 1991 this specification provides a good interpretation of the data at the individual level and can account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the laboratory the parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the population

when more alternatives lead to less choice this paper shows that when the alternatives offered to consumers span the preference space as it would be chosen by a firm search or evaluation costs may lead consumers not to search and not to choose if too many or too few alternatives are offered if too many alternatives are offered then the consumer may have to engage in many searches or evaluations to find a satisfactory fit this may be too costly and result in the consumer avoiding making a choice altogether if too few alternatives are offered then the consumer may not search or choose fearing that an acceptable choice is unlikely these two forces result in the existence of a finite optimal number of alternatives that maximizes the probability of choice

choice deferral indecisiveness and preference for flexibility abstract in a standard model of menu choice we examine the behavior of an agent who applies the following cautious deferral rule whenever in doubt don t commit just leave options open our primitive is a complete preference relation that represents the agent s choice behavior the agent s indecisiveness is captured by means of a possibly incomplete but otherwise rational preference relation we ask when can be viewed as a cautious deferral completion of some incomplete under the independence and continuity assumptions commonly used in the menu choice literature we find that even the smallest amount of indecisiveness is enough to force through the above deferral rule to exhibit preference for flexibility on its entire domain thus we highlight a fundamental tension between non monotonic preferences such as preferences for self control and tendency to defer choice due to indecisiveness

a theory of informational autocracy abstract we develop an informational theory of autocracy dictators survive not by means of force or ideology but because they convince the public rightly or wrongly that they are competent citizens do not observe the leader s type but infer it from signals in their living standards state propaganda and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media if citizens conclude that the leader is incompetent they overthrow him the dictator can invest in making convincing state propaganda censoring independent media co opting the elite or equipping police to repress attempted uprisings but he must finance such spending at the expense of the public s consumption we show that informational autocracies prevail over old style overtly violent dictatorships when the informed elite is sufficiently large but are replaced by democracies when elites are too numerous to be bribed or censored the theory provides insight into various soft authoritarian regimes around the world and suggests a logic of modernization behind recent global political trends

a canonical model of choice with initial endowments we use the revealed preference method to derive a model of individual decision making when the endowment of an agent provides a reference point that may influence her choices this model generalizes the classical rational choice model which views choice as a consequence of utility maximization instead our model sees choice as arising from psychologically constrained utility maximization where the constraints are induced by one s initial endowment in particular this model produces status quo bias as a natural consequence but not necessarily the endowment effect a range of economic applications identify the predictive and explanatory strength of the model in particular we demonstrate that the status quo bias phenomenon reduces the size of the substitution effect in problems of consumption choice