in search of insights into the generation of techno economic trends micro and macro constituencies in the microprocessor industry abstract in the field of technology policy few challenges are more intriguing than understanding the nature of technical and market trends this paper deals with this problem by using the sociotechnical constituencies approach in order to integrate the treatment of micro macro issues from product to industry the case study is that of the microprocessor industry where at present a risc reduced instruction set computer technology is emerging in a field where a powerful and far from exhausted cisc complex instruction set computer technology tends to occupy almost every segment of the market the analysis reveals how emerging product constituencies do implement pro active trend creating strategies in order to establish themselves as industrial trends and by so doing they simultaneously re define the existing content of the macro industrial level the study also reveals the important role of the nature and maturity of microprocessor technology in conditioning the constituency building strategies implemented by different players microprocessor technology is specifically characterised as an architectural codified knowledge component with indirect network externalities and weak appropriability regime finally the paper also highlights the potential risks of both fragmentation and complete proprietary control of technology in technological processes involving strongly competitive situations

market price behavior of wholesale electricity products texas abstract applying a regression based approach to a newly developed sample of over 60 000 hourly observations for 01 01 2011 12 30 2017 we answer the question what moves the day ahead market dam prices for energy and ancillary services as and the real time market rtm price for energy in the electric reliability council of texas ercot our answer comprises the following findings that capture the interdependence of ercot s energy and as products 1 the dam energy price increases with the day ahead forecasts of natural gas price system load and as requirements but declines with nuclear and wind generation s forecasts 2 the as prices increase with the dam energy price and the as procurement forecasts but decline with the as offer forecasts and 3 the rtm energy price increases with the dam energy price but diverges from the dam energy price due to forecasting errors related to the dam energy price s fundamental drivers these findings imply that texas can reduce the prices for day ahead energy day ahead as and real time energy via wind generation development and demand side management further texas can improve its electricity trading efficiency by improving ercot s forecast accuracy to narrow the rtm energy price s divergence from the dam energy price

structure cooperation and the flow of market information this article explores the potential impact of individual consumer decisions to transmit or withhold word of mouth information on the flow of information in a market information flow is examined in networks composed of graphs and nodes where graphs represent channels that foster information flow and nodes represent sentient decision makers who can potentially impede or foster information flow we assert that actors in embedded markets first judge the moral hazards imposed by the information they consider for transmission and the social context of transmission and then moderate their decisions to transmit the information in light of these judgements we analyze this process using a modified version of marshall sahlins s social exchange theory examine the plausibility of this analysis using two laboratory experiments and explore the consequences of this behavior at the aggregate level using a computer simulation our view highlights the importance of the interplay of individuals and their social context for understanding word of mouth processes

on the electrical two part tariff the brazilian perspective this paper discusses in terms of brazil s situation the use of a nonlinear pricing approach in the application of a two part tariff to electricity distribution networks the principles that uphold charging access and usage are to optimize energy systems that are based on a generation technology mix such a pricing approach is used in brazil where the generation mix is mainly hydro generation this study shows that in a case like brazil s a two part tariff may be used as a tool for network optimization the paper presents a design for a two part tariff for a distribution system with varying consumer behavior to validate the discussion we offer a numerical example finally remarks are given concerning pricing access and usage for low voltage level consumers

electricity portfolio management optimal peak off peak allocations electricity purchasers manage a portfolio of contracts in order to purchase the expected future electricity consumption profile of a company or a pool of clients this paper proposes a mean variance framework to address the concept of structuring the portfolio and focuses on how to optimally allocate positions in peak and off peak forward contracts it is shown that the optimal allocations are based on the difference in risk premiums per unit of day ahead risk as a measure of relative costs of hedging risk in the day ahead markets the outcomes of the model are then applied to show i that it is typically not optimal to hedge a baseload consumption profile with a baseload forward contract and ii that under reasonable assumptions risk taking by the purchaser is rewarded by lower expected costs

a note on switching costs and technology choice it is a commonplace claim that the ibm pc owes its success not to technical superiority but to the belief that it would be successful this note presents a simple model where switching costs between brands say because of incompatible software can lead to an inferior technology being adopted switching costs arise when buyers find it costly to switch to a competitor once they have bought from one manufacturer even if ex ante their products were identical 1 if consumers care about which firms survive perhaps because they need to buy spare parts then their belief that particular firms will succeed may ensure that these firms do indeed succeed since possibly more efficient rivals may be unable o overcome consumers reluctance to buy one may therefore find inferior technologies being adopted this model can be seen as an example of the analysis of katz and shapiro 1986 in which expectations can also lead to poorer products winning out in their model this is because of network externalities that is to say consumers value a product more highly the more other consumers buy it here there are no direct network externalities but the presence of switching costs and increasing returns together generates an indirect externality since the more consumers who buy a product the more likely it is to survive and the more attractive it is to other consumers

portfolio optimization using mixture design of experiments scheduling trades within electricity markets abstract deregulation of the electricity sector has given rise to several approaches to defining optimal portfolios of energy contracts financial tools requiring substantial adjustments are usually used to determine risk and return this article presents a novel approach to adjusting the conditional value at risk cvar metric to the mix of contracts on the energy markets the approach uses mixture design of experiments mde in this kind of experimental strategy the design factors are treated as proportions in a mixture system considered quite adequate for treating portfolios in general instead of using traditional linear programming the concept of desirability function is here used to combine the multi response nonlinear objective functions for mean with the variance of a specific portfolio obtained through mde the maximization of the desirability function is implied in the portfolio optimization generating an efficient recruitment frontier this approach offers three main contributions it includes risk aversion in the optimization routine it assesses interaction between contracts and it lessens the computational effort required to solve the constrained nonlinear optimization problem a case study based on the brazilian energy market is used to illustrate the proposal the numerical results verify the proposal s adequacy

the regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs this paper addresses the following question to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost effectively should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target the total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs monitoring costs and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms under common assumptions i show that allowing noncompliance is cost effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty however one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs this last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty in fact the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty and can actually be lower finally tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms abatement costs

predicting price spikes in electricity markets using a regime switching model with time varying parameters this paper shows that a stochastic regime switching model can represent the volatile behavior of wholesale electricity prices associated with price spikes effectively the structure of the model is very flexible because the mean prices in the two regimes and the two transition probabilities are functions of the load and or the implicit reserve margin using price data from the single settlement market in pjm may 1999 to may 2000 the results show that the estimated switching probability from the low to the high regime predicts price spikes well if the reserve margin is measured accurately

hourly electricity prices in day ahead markets this paper focuses on the characteristics of hourly electricity prices in day ahead markets in these markets quotes for day ahead delivery of electricity are submitted simultaneously for all hours in the next day the same information set is used for quoting all hours of the day the dynamics of hourly electricity prices does not behave as a time series process instead these prices should be treated as a panel in which the prices of 24 cross sectional hours vary from day to day this paper introduces a panel model for hourly electricity prices in day ahead markets and examines their characteristics the results show that hourly electricity prices exhibit hourly specific mean reversion and that they oscillate around an hourly specific mean price level furthermore a block structured cross sectional correlation pattern between the hours is apparent

competing technologies the learning curve and rational expectations abstract the problem of choice between several variants of a technology subject to dynamic learning economies is examined in a rational expectations model with overlapping adopters it is shown that even with rational expectations the long term market outcome depends sensitively on the pattern of early chance events and that only one variant of the technology will come to dominate the market in the long run this variant need not be the one which is socially optimal or most promising technically

monopoly pricing with network externalities abstract how should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities in particular should the monopolist set a low introductory price to attract a critical mass of adopters in this paper we provide intuition as to when and why introductory pricing might occur in the presence of network externalities incomplete information about demand or asymmetric information about costs is necessary for introductory pricing to occur in equilibrium when consumers are small

bertrand supertraps we study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms firms whose products interact in the profit function specifically we focus on the impact of intrafirm product interactions on the level of equilibrium profits this impact may be decomposed in two different ways a a direct effect keeping the competitors actions fixed plus a strategic effect i e through the competitors actions or alternatively b a competitive advantage effect change in firmi only plus an imitation effect change in all other firms we derive conditions such that a the strategic effect more than outweighs the direct effect and conditions such that b the imitation effect more than outweighs the competitive advantage effect bertrand supertraps for example an increase in the degree of economies of scope would increase profits if prices were fixed or if the change were limited to firmi s cost function however if all firms increase the degree of economies of scope then all firms receive lower profits a variety of other applications is considered including learning curves core competencies demand synergies systems competition compatibility bundling network effects switching costs durable goods long term contracts

strategic complements and substitutes and potential games abstract we show that games of strategic complements or substitutes with aggregation are pseudo potential games the upshot is that they possess nash equilibria in pure strategies ne even if the strategy sets are not convex and that various dynamic processes converge to ne in particular ne exist in cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models

over confidence may reduce negotiation delay abstract when a seller negotiates with multiple buyers how does over confidence affect the timing of trade in this paper we distinguish between over confidence about trade opportunities and over confidence about the terms of trade in bargaining environments without externalities both types of over confidence can cause delays in agreement if externalities are present the two forms of subjective bias have very different impacts on delay in particular over confidence about trade opportunities may reduce bargaining delay

globalizing carbon lock in this paper extends the arguments surrounding carbon lock in elaborated in unruh energy policy 28 2000 817 30 2002 317 to countries currently undergoing industrialization it argues that for numerous reasons industrializing countries are unlikely to leapfrog carbon intensive energy development on the contrary carbon lock in may be globalizing and could further constrain climate change mitigation options it is then argued that many policy recommendations ignore carbon lock in possibly limiting their potential for successful implementation the paper then discusses four policy approaches that appear to have advantages given lock in conditions it is recognized however that relative ease of implementation does not necessarily equate with superiority instead it is merely a path dependent outcome of past development decisions pursuing policies on the basis of relative implementation ease may help address the issue of climate change but could also result in sub optimal outcomes along other dimensions of sustainable development

investment planning in electricity production under co2 price uncertainty the electricity markets have undergone significant changes during the last years on the one hand the market deregulation has increased significantly the uncertainty on future electricity prices on the other hand the kyoto protocol and the establishment of emission restrictions as well as the development of emission trading systems has added another expense stream for conventional fuel electricity producers and a potential income stream for renewable electricity producers the emission allowance prices are another source of uncertainty for electricity producers the scope of this work is to investigate the effect that various scenarios for emission allowance price evolution may have on the orders for new electricity generation technologies and therefore on the future electricity generation mix of greece the renewable energy generation targets are taken into consideration as a constraint of the system and the learning rates of the various technologies are included in the calculations the national electricity generation system is modelled for long term analysis and an optimisation method is applied in order to come up with the optimal generating mix that minimises electricity generation cost while satisfying the national emissions reduction targets and incorporating the uncertainty of emission allowance prices in addition an investigation is made to identify if a point should be expected when renewable energy will be more profitable than conventional fuel electricity generation the work is interesting for investment planning in the electricity market as it may provide directions on which technologies are most probable to dominate the market in the future and therefore are of interest to be included in the future power portfolios of related investors

boom and bust patterns in the adoption of financial innovations we develop a dynamic model of the adoption of financial innovations each period firms decide whether or not to adopt an innovation of uncertain value and the profitability of each period s adoptions reveals information about the innovation s value we show that characteristics of financial innovation waves cited by critics as evidence of irrational excess are in fact consistent with fully rational behavior we also show that social welfare is enhanced when more firms adopt innovations of questionable value and that financial intermediaries base an incentive to encourage such adoption article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

portfolio applications in electricity markets review private investor and manager perspective trends abstract the private sector plays a major role in the expansion and operation of power systems in most countries especially those running liberalized electricity markets policymakers have the task of inducing private agents through their regulatory designs to make decisions that point toward social welfare maximization conversely it is a task of private agents to protect themselves against the risks of the sector including regulatory risks international fuel price uncertainty climate change policies natural resource availability electricity demand uncertainty co2 clearance prices etc instead of hiding all of these risks within the total project costs and losing competitiveness private agents can use diversification as a strategy to deal with them this paper presents a review of the main applications voids and challenges of portfolio optimization for two key agents of the private sector investors and managers the problem of the investor is to design a technology portfolio to invest in that maximizes its expected returns and limits risks while the manager has to design a portfolio of financial physical instruments long term contracts futures etc to sell buy electricity and hedge against price risks we have found two fundamental issues in the literature the first and most important is excessive confidence in historical data and statistical analysis for predicting future price behavior for a changing future in detriment of more structural analysis structural analysis can include particularities of modern power systems such as future transmission changes congestion operational constraints ramps new entrants new technologies and new demand grow patterns that cannot be taken into account by simply analyzing price historical values the second is the omission of renewable complementarities which is a proven characteristic of dispersed renewable plants that may have important risk mitigation effects although it has largely been ignored in portfolio analysis due to insufficient data modeling limitations and computational complexity

setting up standard power options to hedge price quantity risk in a competitive electricity market the colombian case this paper applies the conceptual framework applied in the work of oum et al to hedge retailers against price quantity fluctuations in spot electricity markets and extends it to power generators in order to design suitable power options with optimal strike prices from a market maker s perspective these options are then used to hedge agents against price and quantity fluctuations by maximizing a static expected utility problem an infinite collection of derivatives exotic option emerges as the solution of both price and quantity hedging this exotic option is approximated with a portfolio composed by bonds forward futures contracts and a fixed number of put and call options employing a plausible replicating strategy the theoretical framework is tested within the context of the colombian power market and is applied to month ahead and quarterly ahead hedging during on peak hours the proposal addresses major problems such as lack of liquidity and anonymity of the current bilateral electricity trading scheme in colombia

technology adoption in the presence of network externalities we analyze technology adoption in industries where network externalities are significant the pattern of adoption depends on whether technologies are sponsored a sponsor is an entity that has property rights to the technology and hence is willing to make investments to promote it key findings include the following 1 compatibility tends to be undersupplied by the market but excessive standardization can occur 2 in the absence of sponsors the technology superior today has a strategic advantage and is likely to dominate the market 3 when one of two rival technologies is sponsored that technology has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior 4 when two competing technologies both are sponsored the technology that will be superior tomorrow has a strategic advantage

coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information abstract a monopolist sells a good whose value depends on the number of buyers who adopt it as well as on their private types the seller coordinates the buyers adoption decisions based on their reported types and charges them the price based on the number of adoptions we study ex post implementable sales schemes that are collusion proof and show that under the revenue maximizing scheme more buyer types are willing to adopt when there are more adoptions and the number of adoptions is maximized subject to the participation constraints

enforcement and price controls in emissions trading this paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms abatement costs the analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits when this occurs accommodating the effect of abatement cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second best optimal values however it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices this enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs and the policy produces the second best optimal outcome

a markov regime switching approach for hedging energy commodities abstract this paper estimates constant and dynamic hedge ratios in the new york mercantile exchange oil futures markets and examines their hedging performance we also introduce a markov regime switching vector error correction model with garch error structure this specification links the concept of disequilibrium with that of uncertainty as measured by the conditional second moments across high and low volatility regimes overall in and out of sample tests indicate that state dependent hedge ratios are able to provide significant reduction in portfolio risk

merit order effects of renewable energy and price divergence in california s day ahead and real time electricity markets abstract we answer two policy questions 1 what are the estimated merit order effects of renewable energy in the california independent system operator s caiso s day ahead market dam and real time market rtm and 2 what causes the hourly dam and rtm prices to systematically diverge the first question is timely and relevant because if the merit order effect estimates are small california s renewable energy development is of limited help in cutting electricity consumers bills but also has a lesser adverse impact on the state s investment incentive for natural gas fired generation the second question is related to the efficient market hypothesis under which the hourly rtm and dam prices tend to converge using a sample of about 21 000 hourly observations of caiso market prices and their fundamental drivers during 12 12 2012 04 30 2015 we document statistically significant estimates p value 0 01 for the dam and rtm merit order effects this finding lends support to california s adopted procurement process to provide sufficient investment incentives for natural gas fired generation we document that the rtm dam price divergence partly depends on the casio s day ahead forecast errors for system loads and renewable energy this finding suggests that improving the performance of the caiso s day ahead forecasts can enhance trading efficiency in california s dam and rtm electricity markets

a gravity based multidimensional scaling model for deriving spatial structures underlying consumer preference choice judgments in multidimensional unfolding multidimensional scaling mds procedures the predicted utility of a brand for a consumer is inversely related to the distance between that consumer s ideal point and the brand position in the derived space most mds models treat all brands the same regardless of their respective market share in many product categories however consumer preferences are heavily influenced by the size of the existing market share i e the brand mass this article presents two versions of a new spatial methodology that incorporates the effects of brand as well as consumer mass via a spatial gravity model of consumer utility that is the attraction of a brand for a consumer depends not only on the distance of the brand from a consumer s ideal point but also on the current market size of the brand as well as the consumer purchase pattern and volume one version of the proposed model estimates brand positions and individual ideal points with two way or three way pick any n binary choice data the second version we develop provides the same spatial decomposition for two way or three way metric preference dominance data we also develop a series of nested mds models to estimate test and compare four different model structures with respect to any common data set we illustrate the proposed methodology using an actual commercial application involving physician prescription behavior and examine competing model fits

local network externalities and market segmentation this paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction it departs from the standard katz shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents it shows that even if rival firms engage in bertrand competition this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits the analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation while for others there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

insuring unit failures in electricity markets an electric energy producer participates in futures markets in the hope of hedging the risk of trading in the pool however this producer is required to supply the energy associated with all its signed forward contracts even if some of its units are forced out due to unexpected failures in this case the producer must purchase some of the energy needed to meet its futures market commitments in the pool which may result in high losses if the pool prices happen to be higher than the forward contract prices to mitigate these losses the producer can take out insurance against the forced outages of its units using a stochastic programming model this paper analyzes the convenience of signing an insurance against unit failure by an electric energy producer and its impact on forward contracting decisions results from a realistic case study are provided and analyzed

enforcement costs and the choice of policy instruments for controlling pollution i introduction when evaluating policy instruments for controlling pollution analysts generally agree that economic incentives are superior to direct controls in terms of minimizing abatement costs however when it comes to minimizing enforcement costs there is no such agreement some analysts such as freeman et al 1973 and anderson et al 1977 argue that economic incentives would be much easier to enforce than direct controls while others such as drayton 1978 argue that they would be virtually unenforceable the debate typically centers on technical difficulties in continuously monitoring emissions and to a lesser extent on political and legal issues related to the assessment of penalties 1 an issue that has not been examined is whether there are economic reasons for enforcement costs to vary across policy instruments although there is now a sizable economic literature on the problem of noncompliance with pollution control policies there have been no attempts to formally compare enforcement costs across policy instruments 2 accordingly the purpose of this note is to examine whether there are economic grounds for arguing that enforcement costs would be lower for economic incentives than direct controls 3 the policy instruments compared are marketable permits or emissions taxes and uniform standards the instruments are compared in a setting where the penalty schedule is previously specified by some judicial or legislative body and the regulator s enforcement policy is limited to the choice of audit frequency the analysis is based on the premise that for any policy instrument that targets emissions the regulator will have to periodically monitor emissions and assess penalties for noncompliance the relevant question then is whether less frequent monitoring would be required to ensure compliance with economic incentives casual analysis suggests this should be the case economic incentives minimize aggregate abatement costs and lower abatement costs imply lower costs to firms of complying this should imply in turn that less stringent enforcement is needed to achieve compliance this argument although intuitively appealing is flawed using a simple model of pollution control with costly enforcement i show that enforcement costs narrowly defined may be higher for economic incentives for purposes of exposition the result is established in a setting where the regulator ensures each firm is fully compliant however as shown in the appendix the result generalizes to the more realistic setting where firms are partially compliant ii the model consider a group of n risk neutral firms emitting a single pollutant for simplicity the damages from the pollutant are assumed to depend only on total emissions each firm s abatement costs are given by a strictly convex function c sub i x sub i that is decreasing in emissions x sub i the firm s maximum emissions level is denoted mathematical expression omitted and is defined by mathematical expression omitted with probability p sub i a regulator audits each firm and measures its emissions if the regulator finds the firm s actual emissions x sub i exceed its allowed emissions s sub i the firm is assessed a fine of f x sub i s sub i as is common in the literature on enforcement i assume the fine schedule is previously specified e g by a legislative body 4 thus the regulator can choose the probability with which it audits firms but not the fine it assesses for noncompliance i assume the fine schedule is such that both the total fine and marginal fine are increasing in the violation size x sub i s sub i f prime is greater than 0 and f prime prime is grater than 0 because the regulator is assumed to ensure full compliance no violations occur and no fines are collected therefore enforcement costs consist solely of auditing or monitoring costs to simplify the analysis the cost of conducting an audit a is assumed to be the same across firms

something to talk about social spillovers in movie consumption we exploit the randomness of weather and the relationship between weather and moviegoing to quantify social spillovers in movie consumption instrumenting for early viewership with plausibly exogenous weather shocks captured in lasso chosen instruments we find that shocks to opening weekend viewership are doubled over the following five weekends our estimated momentum arises almost exclusively at the local level and we find no evidence that it varies with either ex post movie quality or the precision of ex ante information about movie quality suggesting that the observed momentum is driven in part by a preference for shared experience and not only by social learning

inefficient standard adoption inertia and momentum revisited i introduction since the establishment of the theory of network effects economists have been concerned with the question of whether a market with network effects will tend to settle on the socially optimal standard it has been postulated that markets may exhibit excess inertia once a technological standard is in place a new superior standard may not displace it because of installed base effects alternatively markets may exhibit excess momentum consumers may adopt a new standard too quickly ignoring the stranding effect they are having on previous users similar issues arise in the adoption of language and social norms the literature has investigated various conditions under which one of these inefficiencies arises such inefficiencies are of particular concern for open technologies such as the qwerty and dvorak keyboards 1 the situation is somewhat different when individual firms own standards in that case a simple argument seems to indicate that there is no possibility that an inefficient standard will persist if a new standard is superior in any objective sense there are gains to be made from switching to it once the standard has been adopted the firm can appropriate these gains therefore the firm has incentive to lower the initial price enough to induce adoption of the standard the preceding argument is made in liebowitz and margolis 1999 and repeated in spulber 2002 spulber expresses a general skepticism about the likelihood of inefficiencies when property rights are defined and markets exist critics might claim that previous models that imply inefficient standard adoption are unrealistic in some way and that if such models were modified slightly the inefficiency would disappear i reconsider the issue of inefficient standard adoption using a parsimonious yet compelling model assuming only that there are successive generations of finitely lived consumers that preferences are heterogeneous and that there are network effects among users adoption decisions can be inefficient this is true even if consumers can coordinate efficiently within a generation and a firm can act as a coordinating device across generations the model presented here generates some of the same results found in other papers collectively but in a more general setting and with more robust results if there is an established standard and a superior alternative emerges no single generation of consumers will be willing to switch to the new standard if the switching cost the loss of network benefit from breaking with past users is too high it may be that the benefits to future generations of consumers are large enough that from a social standpoint it would be efficient for one generation to adopt the new standard even if it is privately optimal for that generation to retain the old standard on the other hand the current generation considers only its own switching cost and not the cost it imposes on the previous generation leading to potential overadoption of new technology even for proprietary standards it is not clear that the incentive of the firm to induce adoption matches the social incentive in particular if consumer preferences are heterogeneous the firm will not be able to price in such a way to extract all of the additional surplus gained from the new standard on the other hand the firm will be able to appropriate some of the surplus generated by the network effect itself which is present for any standard and thus does not affect the social incentive to change standards it is not possible to address this issue with a two period model as in some of the previous literature see for example choi 1994 choi and thum 1998 katz and shapiro 1986 if a new technology is introduced in the second period but then the game ends the welfare of future generations of consumers is neglected 2 this article also differs from previous infinite horizon models of technology adoption

network effects and environmental externalities do clean technologies suffer from excess inertia abstract we study the diffusion of a clean substitute to a dirty durable in a dynamic model consumer utility of both durables increases in their respective market shares due to network effects first we characterize the optimal dirty good tax the tax should achieve a long run optimal division of the market between the two goods along the transition path to this steady state the optimal tax depends on the current and future market shares of the clean durable thus even if the marginal environmental damage from an additional dirty durable is constant the optimal tax should not be constant second we study whether excess inertia can occur if the emission tax is not optimally set we then find that a constant tax that only accounts for the environmental damage caused by the dirty good may lead to excess inertia excess inertia could happen even if the clean technology is proprietary and the technology owner has incentives to sponsor the initial market diffusion of the technology

regime jumps in electricity prices many countries are liberalizing their energy markets participants in these markets are exposed to market risk due to the characteristics of electricity price dynamics electricity prices are known to be mean reverting very volatile and subject to frequent spikes models that describe the dynamics of electricity prices should incorporate these characteristics in order to capture the price spikes many researchers have introduced stochastic jump processes but we argue and show that this specification might lead to potential problems with specifying the true amount of mean reversion within the process in this paper we propose a regime switching model that models price spikes separated from normal mean reverting prices

the cost effective choice of policy instruments to cap aggregate emissions with costly enforcement we study the cost effectiveness of inducing compliance in a program that caps aggregate emissions of a given pollutant from a set of heterogeneous firms based on emissions standards and the relative cost effectiveness of such a program with respect to an optimally designed program based on tradable discharge permits our analysis considers abatement monitoring and sanctioning costs as well as perfect and imperfect information on the part of the regulator with regard to the polluters abatement costs under perfect information we find that a the total cost effective design of a program based on standards is one in which the standards are firm specific and perfectly enforced and b the total cost of an optimally designed program based on standards is lower than the total cost of an optimally designed transferable emission permits system except under special conditions this is true when it is optimum to induce perfect compliance and when it is not under imperfect information nevertheless it is only by implementing a system of tradable permits and perfectly enforcing it with a constant marginal penalty tied to the price of the permits that the regulator can surmount the informational problem and at the same time minimize the total cost of the program with certainty

time of use based electricity cost of manufacturing systems modeling and monotonicity analysis traditionally manufacturing enterprises pay flat rates for each kilowatt hour kwh of electricity consumed newly available electric tariffs that charge both energy consumption in kwh and peak demand in kilowatts i e kw with varying time of use tou rates have started to gain popularity in this paper the per product electricity cost as a function of manufacturing system parameters and the tou rates is modeled the contributions of both electricity energy consumption and peak demand are combined to formulate the electricity cost of manufacturing systems with multiple machines and buffers new knowledge of the effects of various modeling parameters on the electricity cost is acquired through monotonicity analysis the formulated model is utilized to answer the following two questions facing manufacturers with the availability of tou rates in mind is switching from the flat rates to the tou rates economically sound what changes can be made on electric use routines to take advantage of the tou rates the findings based on case studies show that with appropriate adjustment of production routines a significant saving of up to 24 8 of the per product electricity cost can be achieved by adopting the tou rates

using taxes to deter illegal fishing in itq systems we study the effects of different tax schemes used in fisheries management in combination with an individual transferable quota system we focus on the effects of taxes on equilibrium quota prices and on violations under the assumption that enforcement to induce compliance is imperfect and costly the use of taxes is motivated by the regulator s need to recover costs for enforcement activities we propose the use of a tax on the price of the processed products based on its impact on violations and the information that is required to implement it we also show that this tax has a double pay off for enforcement because it reduces the demand for illegal fishing and increases revenue for enforcement activities without producing a deadweight loss in the quota market we present an application of our model to the case of the red shrimp fishery in chile in our simulation example a tax of 7 on the price of fish exports could sufficiently reduce harvest demand and generate enough funding to completely eliminate quota violations which in the absence of taxes can be more than 100 of the total allowable catch at the same time this tax could increase the equilibrium quota price by 19

a positive theory of flexibility in accounting standards abstract we develop a positive theory of accounting standards when standards generate network externalities and differ in the amount of reporting discretion or flexibility they provide firms we evaluate expected value maximizing firms preferences between two standards regimes rigid and flexible as the number of firms subject to each standard varies as the organization of the securities market varies and as the mapping from the underlying economics of the firms transactions to the accounting reports produced under the two standards vary we also compare firms preferences between the two regimes to the preferences of profit maximizing traders in the firms securities

the economics of convention c onventions regulate much of economic and social life yet they have received surprisingly little attention from economists by a convention we mean a pattern of behavior that is customary expected and self enforcing everyone conforms everyone expects others to conform and everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person s best interest when everyone else plans to conform lewis 1969 familiar examples include following rules of the road adhering to conventional codes of dress and using words with their conventional meanings conventions with direct economic implications include species of money and credit industrial and technological standards accounting rules and forms of economic contracts indeed it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that almost all economic and social institutions are governed to some extent by convention the main feature of a convention is that out of a host of conceivable choices only one is actually used this fact also explains why conventions are needed they resolve problems of indeterminacy in interactions that have multiple equilibria indeed from a formal point of view we may define a convention as an equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have more than one equilibrium the economic significance of conventions is that they reduce transaction costs imagine the inconvenience if whenever two vehicles approached one another the important exceptions are sugden 1986 and ullman margalit 1977 the interested reader might also refer to the symposium on social norms that appeared in the fall 1989 issue of this journal with articles by sugden 1989 and elster 1989

hedging size risk theory and application to the us gas market abstract many corporate commitments exhibit a combined financial exposure to both market prices and idiosyncratic size components e g volume load or business turnover we design a customized contract to optimally mitigate the risk of joint fluctuations in price and size terms the hedge is sought out among contingent claims written on price and any quoted index that is statistically dependent on commitment size closed form solutions are derived for the optimal custom hedge pay off and for the asset holdings of two market strategies one based on price linked forwards the other based on price linked and index linked forwards analytical hedges are obtained using a stylized lognormal market model detailed comparative statics provide a thorough analysis of optimal hedging pay off functions performance assessment is conducted in the context of the us gas market and a prototypical urban region results suggest that hedging through suitable custom claims written on price and an additional index significantly outperforms standard price based as well as mixed price index forward hedging alternatives our optimal custom hedge could be adopted as a benchmark for the relative assessment of any risk management solution

to comply or not to comply pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning in this paper we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of a pollution standard a probability of inspection and a fine for non compliance in a context where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly and the penalty may include gravity and non gravity components at the regulator s discretion under given penalties the optimal policy entails compliance with the standard as long as a quite intuitive condition is met non compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages interestingly the appropriate structure of the penalty under non compliance is highly progressive while the best possible shape of the fine under compliance is linear if the regulator is entitled to choose the structure of the fine linear penalties are socially preferred and the optimal policy induces compliance

preying for monopoly the case of southern bell telephone company 1894 1912 focusing on the southern bell telephone company we propose a modified version of the predation hypothesis to explain bell s natural monopoly over local telephone service southern bell effectively eliminated competition through a strategy of pricing below cost in response to entry which deprived competitors of the cash flow required for expansion even if it failed to induce exit investing in toll lines ahead of demand isolating independent companies in smaller towns and rural areas and forcing them to consolidate on favorable terms and influencing local regulatory policy in large cities to weaken rivals and ultimately to institutionalize the bell monopoly

environmental enforcement when inspectability is endogenous a model with overshooting properties if a firm can influence its monitorability vis a vis an environmental regulator it is shown that increasing the thoroughness of inspections induces the firm to substitute towards more transparent technologies whilst increasing their frequency may cause substitution the other way perversely when the effect of such substitution is taken into account an increase in the frequency of inspections or equally the stringency of penalties may worsen the firm s environmental performance the agency should favour more thorough inspections than existing theory suggests particularly in sectors where the scope for such substitution is great moreover when monitorability adjusts only sluggishly to policy shocks because it is an embodied characteristic of capital for example the environmental impacts of increased frequency and increased thoroughness well over and under shoot their respective long run impacts in assessing regulatory reform therefore it is important to leave sufficient time for the class of adjustments identified to occur the possibility of overshooting can be used as an alternative to existing regulatory capture theories to explain why the efficacy of some classes of regulatory reform may fade through time

energy planning and modern portfolio theory a review abstract modern portfolio theory mpt stands as a widely accepted methodology to meet the challenges associated with the definition of energy planning for a particular territory or region energy planning is thus framed as an investment selection problem mpt is characterized by having a wider capacity and conceptual richness than the other previously used methodologies such as the individual least cost alternative the portfolio approach is based on solving for an objective function that seeks to minimize either the cost or the risk of the portfolio subject to different constraints considering that real electricity generation assets can be defined in terms of cost or return and economic risk for each alternative technology the relevant portfolios are the result of solving the optimization model to determine the efficient cost risk frontier the work presented here consists of an exhaustive review of the literature in relation to the application of mpt methodology to the field of energy planning and electricity production a new classification is proposed from a financial perspective of the selection of investments from the preceding studies it delves deeper into the explanation of the limits to the methodology and into the concept of risk which is key from both a financial and an energy perspective the main methodological contributions found in the literature are examined that are aimed at improving the capacity of the model and adjusting it to the reality of the electricity market finally conclusions are provided from the works analyzed in terms of renewable technologies and the policy implications derived from them in most studies a preference has been shown for the inclusion of renewable technologies in the efficient portfolios however in order to implement the decision to increase the share of renewable technologies greater flexibility in the interconnection capacity between states and in storage capacity is needed

gravity models a reformulation and an application to discriminatory trade arrangements gravity models are used to estimate trade flows from 162 countries into 11 major importing countries for 1976 counting the ec as one the main theories underlying gravity models are reviewed and a new gravity model is derived from a linear expenditure system a major innovation of this model is that both tariffs and dummy variables for discriminatory arrangements are incorporated price variables are also explicitly included in the model the tariff and the dummy variables are found to be statistically significant and this indicates that previous gravity model studies which used dummies to estimate the trade benefits of preferential tariffs may not have accurately estimated the effects of the preferences the price variables generally are also found to be statistically significant which casts doubt on the homogeneous goods assumption underlying the purchasing power parity hypothesis some significant differences in the estimates were found when separate equations were regressed for the eec and the us