labor market returns to two and four year college the paper examines labor market returns to a two and four year college education analysis of the 1972 national longitudinal survey of youth observation that the average person who attended a two year college earned about 10 percent more than those without any college education comparison with the wages of those who attended a four year college education

credible public policy abstract credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame perfect nash equilibrium behavior for the government it is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of abreu 1988 for repeated games the results are then extended to systems with state variables simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example

optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model with public capital in this paper a real business cycle model with optimal tax rates government borrowing and productive public capital is analysed a specification that allows for multiple stochastic shocks to technology and preferences can reproduce some key features describing the cyclical behaviour of postwar u s fiscal policy the optimally chosen policy variables fluctuate substantially over the business cycle but they do not operate like automatic stabilizers jel classification e62 e32 politiquefiscale optimale dans un modee de cycle d affaires avec capital public ce m6moire analyse un modele de cycle d affaires r6el avec taux d imposition optimaux emprunts gouvernementaux et capital public productif une sp6cification de ce modele qui enregiste plusieurs chocs stochastiques affectant technologie et pr6f6rences peut reproduire quelquesunes des caract6ristiques d6crivant le comportement cyclique de la politique fiscale d apres guerre des etats unis les variables correspondant a la politique optimale choisie fluctuent substantiellement au cours du cycle mais n operent pas comme des stabilisateurs automatiques

social discounting and incentive compatible fiscal policy abstract this paper considers a representative agent model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which the government cannot commit ex ante to a sequence of policies for the future in this setup if the government is more impatient than the households the capital income tax will be positive in steady state thus impatience and lack of commitment are able to generate positive capital taxes in the long run although each of these characteristics individually was not furthermore the steady state to which the economy converges is independent of initial conditions

optimal taxation in models of endogenous growth we study the problem of optimal taxation in three infinite horizon representative agent endogenous growth models the first model is a convex model in which physical and human capital are perfectly symmetric our second model incorporates elastic labor supply through a lucas style technology analysis of these two models points out the danger of assuming that government expenditures are exogenous in our third model we include government expenditures as a productive input in capital formation showing that the limiting tax rate on capital is no longer zero in numerical simulations we find similar effects on growth and welfare in all three models

optimal taxes without commitment abstract in the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital the optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital tends to zero in the limit with all the tax burden on labor it is well known however that this solution is time inconsistent so if the commitment power is not perfect this second best tax plan will not be sustainable we model explicitly the trade off between the cost of revising the tax plan and the benefit of the revision as a result when commitment is not possible both the limit tax rate and the steady state capital are different from their levels in the second best solution limit taxes on capital may be strictly positive but it may also be the case that the only sustainable plan has subsidies to capital the subsidies induce an overaccumulation of capital which becomes a commitment device against revisions of the tax plan journal of economic literature classification numbers h21 c73

time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals abstract in a dynamic economy whose government is interested in both equity and efficiency time consistency problems arise even if the government has access to nondistortionary tax instruments moral hazard in production leads to a nondegenerate distribution of income which the government would like to flatten ex post self enforcing social agreements can mitigate the tendency toward excessive redistribution we investigate the nature of the distortions caused by the time consistency problem and show that in the constrained optimal equilibrium usually a linear tax schedule is imposed this remains true if renegotiation of the social agreement is possible journal of economic literature classification numbers c7 c73 e6 h21

optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model this paper develops the quantitative implications of optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model in a stationary equilibrium the ex ante tax rate on capital income is approximately zero there is an equivalence class of ex post capital income tax rates and bond policies that support a given allocation within this class the optimal ex post capital tax rates can range from close to independently and identically distributed to close to a random walk the tax rate on labor income fluctuates very little and inherits the persistence properties of the exogenous shocks thus there is no presumption that optimal labor tax rates follow a random walk most of the welfare gains realized by switching from a tax system like that of the united states to the ramsey system come from an initial period of high taxation on capital income

time consistent optimal fiscal policy this article studies the properties of optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot commit itself beyond the next period s capital income tax rate we find that the results contrast markedly with those under full commitment first capital income tax rates are very high 65 on average versus close to zero on average under full commitment second labor income taxes are rather low on average about 12 versus a value of around 31 under full commitment finally labor income taxes are quite volatile whereas under full commitment their standard deviation is essentially zero

redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model abstract we investigate the redistributive potential of capital taxation in an intertemporal maximizing model of capital formation first even unanticipated redistributive capital taxation is severely limited in its effectiveness since it depresses wages second under any convergent redistributive tax policy which maximizes a paretian social objective the capital income tax will converge to zero independent of the factor supply elasticities these results are independent of workers holdings of capital

optimal taxation without state contingent debt in an economy studied by lucas and stokey tax rates inherit the serial correlation structure of government expenditures belying barro s earlier result that taxes should be a random walk for any stochastic process of government expenditures to recover a version of barro s random walk tax smoothing outcome we modify lucas and stokey s economy to permit only risk free debt having only risk free debt confronts the ramsey planner with additional constraints on equilibrium allocations beyond one imposed by lucas and stokey s assumption of complete markets the ramsey outcome blends features of barro s model with lucas and stokey s in our model the contemporaneous effects of exogenous government expenditures on the government deficit and taxes resemble those in lucas and stokey s model but incomplete markets put a near unit root component into government debt and taxes an outcome like barro s however we show that without ad hoc limits on the government s asset holdings outcomes can diverge in importa

learning by doing and learning from others human capital and technical change in agriculture household level panel data from a nationally representative sample of rural indian households describing the adoption and profitability of high yielding seed varieties hyvs associated with the green revolution are used to test the implications of a model incorporating learning by doing and learning spillovers the estimates indicate that i imperfect knowledge about the management of the new seeds was a significant barrier to adoption ii this barrier diminished as farmer experience with the new technologies increased iii own experience and neighbors experience with hyvs significantly increased hyv profitability and iv farmers do not fully incorporate the village returns to learning in making adoption decisions

optimal sustainable monetary policy in recent monetary policy literature optimal commitment policy or its variant from a timeless perspective has been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment regardless of its time consistency problem called a stabilization bias with an optimizing model used in the literature we examine sustainable equilibrium of chari and kehoe 1990 and study optimal sustainable policy the policymaker s strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium in the absence of commitment technologies calibrated versions of the model show that the ramsey equilibrium generated by optimal commitment policy is not achievable suggesting that optimal sustainable policy is the desirable policy benchmark from the viewpoint of policy operationality the latter policy involves some issues due to its dependence on the entire history of lagrange multipliers on a sustainability constraint as a guidepost for actual policy conduct that contains no such issues and attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does we propose a sustainable policy conducted by following a policy rule that achieves the best markov equilibrium

sex wages and productivity an empirical analysis of israeli firm level data sex discrimination in labor markets may generate a wage gap between men and women that exceeds any gap in marginal productivity we test for this type of discrimination using unique firm level data on manufacturing firms in israel there is a statistically significant negative association between wages and the proportion of a firm s workforce that is female however there is also a statistically significant negative association between marginal productivity and the proportion of females the difference beween the wage and productivity gaps is small relative to wage regression estimates of wage discrimination and is not statistically significant which is most consistent with no discrimination

policy commitment and the welfare gains from capital market liberalization this paper evaluates the quantitative impact of capital liberalization on the taxation structure and welfare of the liberalizing countries when governments conduct fiscal policy optimally but without commitment time consistent policies the transition from a regime of capital autarky to a regime of free mobility leads to a decrease in the long term tax rate on capital of 13 percent and an increase in the tax rate on labor of 2 percent as a consequence of this taxation shift welfare increases by about 1 percent the reduction in capital taxation induced by capital market liberalization is welfare improving because in the absence of capital mobility the time consistent policies over tax capital

time consistent control in non linear models abstract the paper shows how to use optimal control to compute optimal time consistent markovian government policies in nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium models it extends cohen and michel s 1988 results for the linear quadratic case the method involves replacing private agents costate variables with flexible functions of current state variables in the government s maximization problem the functions hold in equilibrium to an arbitrarily close approximation they can be found numerically by perturbation or projection methods a stochastic model of optimal public spending illustrates the technique

are educated workers really more productive abstract this paper presents a new method for examining the productive nature of education it outlines an econometric model which simultaneously estimates an earnings function and a production function for workers and the firms where they are employed this approach permits a direct comparison to be made between the relative wage and relative productivity of workers with different levels of education using a unique data set from ghana two primary questions are addressed 1 are educated workers more productive than workers with no formal education and 2 do earnings differentials between workers with different levels of education reflect genuine productivity differentials the results suggest that education is positively correlated with productivity in ghanaian manufacturing and that firms pay workers according to their productivity

are earnings profiles steeper than productivity profiles we test competing explanations of rising age earnings profiles by obtaining direct estimates of marginal productivity differentials between workers in different age groups and comparing these to associated earnings differentials using contemporary data from israeli manufacturing firms the results indicate that controlling for other productive inputs and firm characteristics for the unskilled or less skilled workers who represent most of the workers in our sample both earnings and productivity profiles are upward sloping moreover these profiles mirror each other closely and are statistically indistinguishable however the estimates of the profiles are sufficiently imprecise that even sizable deviations between point estimates of earnings growth and productivity growth would not be statistically significant while we view the results as most consistent with a general human capital model of rising earnings profiles over the life cycle there is not strong evidence with which to reject alternative models

does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings we establish that season of birth is related to educational attainment because of school start age policy and compulsory school attendance laws individuals born in the beginning of the year start school at an older age and can therefore drop out after completing less schooling than individuals born near the end of the year roughly 25 percent of potential dropouts remain in school because of compulsory schooling laws we estimate the impact of compulsory schooling on earnings by using quarter of birth as an instrument for education the instrumental variables estimate of the return to education is close to the ordinary least squares estimate suggesting that there is little bias in conventional estimates every developed country in the world has a compulsory schooling requirement yet little is known about the effect these laws have on educational attainment and earnings 1 this paper exploits an unusual natural experiment to estimate the impact of compulsory schooling laws in the united states the experiment stems from the fact that children born in different months of the year start school at different ages while compulsory schooling laws generally require students to remain in school until their sixteenth or seventeenth birthday in effect the interaction of school entry requirements and compulsory schooling laws compel students born

growth in the shadow of expropriation we propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes political economy and contracting frictions the political economy frictions involve a preference for immediate spending while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt and expropriation we show that the political economy frictions slow an economy s convergence to the steady state due to the endogenous evolution of capital taxation the model rationalizes why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment why institutions such as the treatment of capital income evolve over time why governments in countries that grow rapidly accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities and why foreign aid may not affect growth

the strategic impact of references in business markets we investigate a business to business context and ask when and why a firm should announce a reference program that commits the firm to facilitating the flow of information about the efficacy of its products from early adopters to potential late adopters we model a monopolist manufacturer with a new innovation that can be sold to two potential customers we demonstrate here two benefits of a reference program that relate not to an increase in later adopters willingness to pay but to an increase in the willingness to pay of the early adopters themselves the impact on the early adopters willingness to pay arises in two ways as a result of their observation of the firm s commitment to information transmission first in a model of symmetric uncertainty we show that the announcement of a reference program facilitates dynamic pricing by the manufacturer in the sense that it allows the firm to provide temporary exclusive use of the technology to one of the customers this creates more value which the manufacturer can extract via a higher price in this way a reference program can serve as a partial substitute for an exclusive use contract in a model with asymmetric information we demonstrate that under certain conditions the firm is able to use the reference program as a signal again to the early adopting customer that its technology is of high quality however such a signal requires significant discounts to early adopters to ensure separation as a result a pooling equilibrium dominates in which the manufacturer fosters references regardless of its quality finally by allowing the firms private information to be stochastic we show that separation may be a dominant outcome

fiscal policy in debt constrained economies abstract we study optimal fiscal policy in a small open economy soe with sovereign and private default risk and limited commitment to tax plans the soe s government uses linear taxation to fund exogenous expenditures and uses public debt to inter temporally allocate tax distortions we characterize a class of environments in which the tax on labor goes to zero in the long run while the tax on capital income may be non zero reversing the standard prediction of the ramsey tax literature the zero labor tax is an optimal long run outcome if the economy is subject to sovereign debt constraints and the domestic households are impatient relative to the international interest rate the front loading of tax distortions allows the economy to build a large aggregate debt position in the presence of limited commitment we show that a similar result holds in a closed economy with imperfect inter generational altruism providing a link with the closed economy literature that has explored disagreement between the government and its citizens regarding inter temporal tradeoffs

on the optimal taxation of capital income abstract we show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital the chamley and judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale moreover for a class of widely used preferences consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well however we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there are profits generated journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e62 h21

public debt and optimal taxes without commitment abstract benhabib and rustichini optimal taxes without commitment j econ theory 77 1997 231 259 study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt they find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state this note shows that once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero

markov perfect capital and labor taxes abstract this paper analyzes the markov perfect equilibrium of an economy were a benevolent government that lacks the ability to commit to future policy choices uses taxes on capital and labor income to finance the provision of a public good the main finding is that the government taxes capital and subsidizes labor so that only the dynamic inefficiency of future capital taxes remains if agents preference for the public good is sufficiently high then capital is confiscated setting bounds on taxes alleviates the dynamic inefficiency inherent in capital taxation but some implementations carry a high welfare cost allowing for endogenous capital utilization makes the current capital tax distortionary and implies capital and labor tax rates that are relatively close to those measured for the u s economy

optimal taxation and spending in general competitive growth models abstract we find that the optimal long run tax on capital income is zero even if the capital stock does not converge to a steady state nor to a steady state growth rate the optimal tax on human capital is also zero if human capital is not a final good but the long run wage tax is not generally zero we argue that consumption tax proposals such as the flat tax are not consumption taxes and are biased against human capital

be careful what you calibrate for social discounting in general equilibrium abstract concerns about intergenerational equity have led to an influential practice of setting social utility discount rates based on ethical considerations rather than to match household behavior particularly in climate change economics e g stern 2006 this paper formalizes the broader policy implications of this approach in general equilibrium by characterizing jointly optimal environmental and fiscal policies in a climate economy model with differential planner household discounting first i show that decentralizing the optimal allocation requires not only high carbon prices but also fundamental changes to tax policy if the government discounts the future less than households implementing the optimal allocation requires an effective capital income subsidy a negative intertemporal wedge and in a setting with distortionary taxation an effective labor consumption tax wedge that is decreasing over time second if the government cannot subsidize capital income the constrained optimal carbon tax may be up to 50 below the present value of marginal damages the social cost of carbon due to the general equilibrium effects of climate policy on household savings third given the choice to optimize either carbon capital or labor income taxes the socially discounting planner s welfare ranking is ambiguous over a standard range of parameters overall in general equilibrium a policy maker s choice to adopt differential social discounting may thus overturn conventional recommendations for both environmental and fiscal policy

communication commitment and growth abstract we study the effect on the growth of an economy of alternative financing opportunities in a stochastic growth model with incentive constraints efficient accumulation mechanisms are designed and computed for economies that differ in their incentive structure we show that when borrowing is subject to information constraints there is a computable efficient transfer mechanism that does not affect capital accumulation and investment patterns even though consumption patterns and the distribution of wealth are affected in contrast enforcement constraints can severely reduce the outside financing opportunities and affect investment patters and economic growth we adapt numerical algorithms for obtaining numerical solutions of these models

the relevance of standard estimates of rates of return to schooling for education policy a critical assessment abstract this paper examines the accuracy and usefulness of estimated rates of return to schooling based on the standard human capital model of becker and mincer regarding accuracy it investigates whether failure to account for differences in ability and school quality lead to significant biases estimates using ghanaian data confirm this possibility even when accurate estimated rates of return to additional years of schooling may have limited policy implications more useful for governments are rates of return to investments in school quality the paper uses data on cognitive skills to estimate rates of return to three types of school quality improvements

schooling information and nonmarket productivity contraceptive use and its effectiveness information from two u s fertility surveys on couples knowledge about and use of specific contraceptives are used to estimate the technology of human reproduction in order to examine the association between schooling and productivity in the household sector the results indicate that more schooled couples have a wider knowledge of contraceptive methods use more efficiently those contraceptive methods for which there is little information and large scope for misuse and are better able to mitigate the effects of their biological constraints fecundity on their fertility compared to less schooled couples excerpt

is partial tax harmonization desirable we consider a setting in which capital taxation is characterized by two distortions working in opposite directions on one hand governments engage in tax competition and are tempted to lower capital tax rates on the other hand they are unable to commit to future policies and once capital has been installed have incentives to increase taxes in this setting there exists a tax that optimally trades off the two distortions we compare three possible tax harmonization scenarios no tax harmonization all countries set taxes unilaterally global tax harmonization all countries coordinate their capital taxes and partial tax harmonization only a subset of all countries coordinate capital taxes we show that if capital is sufficiently mobile partial tax harmonization benefits all countries compared to both global and no harmonization

zakat islam s missed opportunity to limit predatory taxation one of islam s five canonical pillars is a predictable fixed and mildly progressive tax system called zakat it was meant to finance various causes typical of a pre modern government implicit in the entire transfer system was personal property rights as well as constraints on government two key elements of a liberal order those features could have provided the starting point for broadening political liberties under a state with explicitly restricted functions instead just a few decades after the rise of islam zakat opened the door to arbitrary political rule and material insecurity a major reason is that the quran does not make explicit the underlying principles of governance it simply outlines the specifics of zakat as they related to conditions in seventh century arabia

governance and contract choice theory and evidence from groundwater irrigation markets abstract this paper examines the role governance institutions play in the adoption of contracts we develop a simple model of the contracting relationship in a setting where unverifiable outcomes exist and use it to interpret data on groundwater irrigation contracts in bangladesh a distinguishing feature of this market is the variety of village level institutions which impose different degrees of punishment for contract violation consistent with the model we find households adopt contracts that rely on unverifiable outcomes which are not formally contractible when punishment for contract violation is weak conversely households adopt contracts that rely on formally contractible and verifiable outcomes when punishment is severe this evidence is consistent with contract terms being chosen optimally given what is or is not formally contractible

capital taxation under political constraints this paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform a policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform thus sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or u shaped so that savings are subsidized for the poor and or the middle class but are taxed for the rich u shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals political behavior is purely determined by economic motives

sequential equilibria in a ramsey tax model this paper presents a full characterization of the equilibrium value set of a ramsey tax model more generally it develops a dynamic programming method for a class of policy games between the government and a continuum of households by selectively incorporating euler conditions into a strategic dynamic programming framework we wed two technologies that are usually considered competing alternatives resulting in a substantial simplification of the problem

optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives this paper analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in general equilibrium models of the second best agents have infinite lives and utility functions which are extensions from the koopmans form the population is heterogeneous the important property of the models is the equality between the social and the private discount rates in the long run i find that the optimal tax rate is zero in the long run for a special case of additively separable utility functions i then determine the tax rates along the dynamic path and conditions that are sufficient for the local stability of the steady state

indeterminacy and fiscal policies in a growing economy this paper studies the dynamic properties of a standard one sector model of endogenous growth with inelastic labor supply in which capital taxes are used to nance public production and consumption services the government is benevolent and chooses its tax policy by taking into account the decentralized competitive equilibrium within this second best setup we establish conditions for multiple balanced growth paths in conjunction with indeterminacy of transitional dynamics the mechanism for global and local indeterminacy is a simple combination of public production services that provide production externalities to private rms and hence cause a wedge between private and social returns public consumption services that provide direct utility to households and endogenously chosen distorting taxes

optimal taxation of capital income with imperfectly competitive product markets abstract we show that the steady state optimal tax on capital income can be negative positive or zero in a neoclassical growth model that allows for imperfectly competitive product markets the sign of the optimal tax rate depends crucially on 1 the degree of monopoly power 2 the extent to which monopoly profits can be taxed 3 the size of the depreciation allowance and 4 the magnitude of government expenditures for an empirically plausible set of parameters we find that the steady state optimal capital tax can range between 10 and 22

cyclical and noncyclical redistributive taxation consider the optimal time path of a tax on capital income the proceeds of which are transferred to labor in a lump sum it is known from earlier open loop formulations that if the optimal rate of tax converges to a point it converges to zero implying that in the long run a tax on capital income can do nothing for social welfare it is now shown that the optimal rate of tax need not converge to zero and in the case of feedback formulations that it may converge to a positive or negative number or to a limit cycle copyright 1993 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the quality of schooling quantity alone is misleading although much research discusses the quantity of schooling as an effective impact on productivity and earnings most such research leaves out the idea of the quality of schooling which may cause biases in the estimated returns to schooling this paper consequently attempts to extend the standard mincerian approach to incorporate school quality as well as quantity it demonstrates how exclusion of quality in the standard procedure may cause biases in the estimated returns to years of schooling probably in the upward direction the paper explores the implications of this extension of the standard model for the case of young brazilian males it shows that the estimate of the private return to years of schooling using the preferred quality inclusive specification is only one half the estimate using the standard procedure indicating substantial upward bias in the standard estimates it further outlines a method for estimating a social return to quality and finds that it exceeds substantially the social return to quantity the paper then shows why this in turn suggests there may be an equity productivity trade off in schooling investments

political economy of ramsey taxation abstract we study the dynamic taxation of capital and labor in the ramsey model under the assumption that taxes and public good provision are decided by a self interested politician who cannot commit to policies we show that as long as the politician is as patient as the citizens the chamley judd result of zero long run taxes holds in contrast if the politician is less patient than the citizens the best subgame perfect equilibrium from the viewpoint of the citizens involves long run capital taxation

optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclassical growth model abstract this paper provides a counterexample to the simplest version of the redistribution models considered by judd 1985 in which the government chooses an optimal distortionary tax on capitalists to finance a lump sum payment to workers i show that the steady state optimal tax on capital income is generally non zero when the capitalists utility is logarithmic and the government faces a balanced budget constraint with log utility agents optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return not any future rates of return or tax rates this feature of the economy effectively deprives the government of a useful policy instrument because promises about future tax rates can no longer influence current allocations when combined with a lack of other suitable policy instruments such as government bonds the result is an inability to decentralize the allocations that are consistent with a zero limiting capital tax i show that the standard approach to solving the dynamic optimal tax problem yields the wrong answer in this knife edge case because it fails to properly enforce the constraints associated with the competitive equilibrium specifically the standard approach lets in an additional policy instrument through the back door