the cost of pollution on longevity welfare and economic stability this paper presents an overlapping generations model where pollution private and public health expenditures are all determinants of longevity public expenditures financed through labour taxation provide both public health and abatement we study the role of these three components of longevity on welfare and economic stability at the steady state we show that an appropriate fiscal policy may enhance welfare however when pollution is heavily harmful for longevity the economy might experience aggregate instability or endogenous cycles nonetheless a fiscal policy which raises the share of public spending devoted to health may display stabilizing virtues and rule out cycles this allows us to recommend the design of the public policy that may comply with the dynamic and welfare objectives

public health spending old age productivity and economic growth chaotic cycles under perfect foresight abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of a double cobb douglas economy with overlapping generations and public health investments that affect the supply of efficient labour of the old aged it is shown that the positive steady state of the economy is unique moreover we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of endogenous deterministic complex cycles when individuals are perfectly foresighted interestingly i the equilibrium dynamics shows rather complicated phenomena such as a multiplicity of bubblings depending on the size of the public health system and ii the higher the degree of thriftiness the likelier an economy is exposed to endogenous fluctuations because the need to save when young to support consumption when old is reduced

a simplified jump process for common stock returns the specification of a statistical distribution which accurately models the behavior of stock returns continues to be a salient issue in financial economics with the introduction of arithmetic and geometric brownian motion models much attention has recently focused on a poisson mixture of distributions as an appropriate specification of stock returns for example see 12 3 8 10 5 and 1 consistent with empirical evidence these models yield leptokurtic security return distributions and furthermore the specification has much economic intuition in particular one may always decompose the total change in stock price into normal and abnormal components the normal change may be due to variation in capitalization rates a temporary imbalance between supply and demand or the receipt of any other information which causes marginal price changes this component is modelled as a lognormal diffusion process the abnormal change is due to the receipt of any information which causes a more than marginal change in the price of the stock and is usually modeled as a poisson process

bilateral trading with naive traders we introduce naive traders in bilateral trading these traders report their true types in direct mechanisms and bid ask their values costs in auctions we show that by expropriating naive traders in direct mechanisms the mechanism designer can subsidize additional trades by strategic traders and improve efficiency in fact complete expropriation of naive traders is a necessary condition for constrained efficiency a significant implication is that in the presence of naive traders ex post individually rational mechanisms are not constrained efficient in contrast if the traders must use a given mechanism then the introduction of naive traders has an ambiguous effect on efficiency

envy in mission oriented organizations according to the labor donation theory workers adhering to their firms mission are willing to donate a portion of their paid labor in this paper we study how workers fairness concerns limit the firm s ability to extract labor donation from its employees we find that in sectors where the firm s mission is important optimal contracts are such that high ability employees perceive their wage as less fair than low ability employees and they must be rewarded with an envy rent the opposite is true in sectors where the firm s mission does not play a relevant role we empirically test the predictions of the model using the german socio economic panel finding support for our theoretical results

endogenous lifetime and economic growth abstract endogenous mortality is introduced in a two period overlapping generations model probability of surviving from the first period to the next depends upon health capital that is augmented through public investment high mortality societies do not grow fast since shorter lifespans discourage savings development traps are possible productivity differences across nations result in persistent differences in capital output ratios and relatively larger gaps in income and mortality high mortality also reduces returns on education where risks are undiversifiable when human capital drives economic growth countries differing in health capital do not converge to similar living standards threshold effects may also result

simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty we consider full implementation in complete information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty we offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies

day of the week effects and asset returns the number of empirical studies using daily stock returns is rapidly increasing researchers generally assume that the distribution of stock returns is identical for all days of the week a convenient statistical assumption but not a necessary condition of market equilibrium nevertheless there are reasons to suspect that the distribution of returns may vary according to the day of the week the most obvious is the impact of weekends on monday s return since monday s return is calculated over three instead of one calender day the mean and variance may well be higher on monday compared with any other daily return perhaps three times as large previous research has examined the daily distribution of stock returns for a monday effect while fama 1965 does not compare daily mean returns he does report that monday s variance is about 20o greater than other daily returns with a traditional distributional assumption regarding the returns on a financial asset specifies that the expected returns are identical for all days of the week contrary to this plausible assumption this paper discovers that the expected returns on common stocks and treasury bills are not constant across days of the week the most notable evidence is for monday s returns where the mean is unusually low or even negative several explanations of the results are investigated but none proves satisfactory aside from documenting significant day of the week effects the implications of the results for tests of market efficiency are examined while market adjusted returns continue to exhibit day of the week effects these effects are no longer concentrated on monday during the last year we have had many conversations with our colleagues throughout the professions we are particularly thankful to the participants at sessions of the western and american finance associations where preliminary versions of this paper were presented special thanks are due to gene fama gailen hite jon ingersoll robert jarrow merton miller clifford smith and rex thompson the expert research assistance of frank rabinovitch and youngsup yun is gratefully acknowledged 1 the list of papers using daily stock returns is too long to name recent examples include charest 1978 dodd 1980 banz 1981 and reinganum 1981

oil prices brownian motion or mean reversion a study using a one year ahead density forecast criterion abstract for oil related investment appraisal an accurate description of the evolving uncertainty in the oil price is essential for example when using real option theory to value an investment a density function for the future price of oil is central to the option valuation the literature on oil pricing offers two views the arbitrage pricing theory literature for oil suggests geometric brownian motion and mean reversion models empirically driven literature suggests arma garch models in addition to reflecting the volatility of the market the density function of future prices should also incorporate the uncertainty due to price jumps a common occurrence in the oil market in this study the accuracy of density forecasts for up to a year ahead is the major criterion for a comparison of a range of models of oil price behaviour both those proposed in the literature and following from data analysis the kullbach leibler information criterion is used to measure the accuracy of density forecasts using two crude oil price series brent and west texas intermediate wti representing the us market we demonstrate that accurate density forecasts are achievable for up to nearly two years ahead using a mixture of two gaussians innovation processes with garch and no mean reversion

individual risk attitudes measurement determinants and behavioral consequences this paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects homes using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general we find that gender age height and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks the experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure using paid lottery choices turning to other questions about risk attitudes in specific contexts we find similar results on the determinants of risk attitudes and also shed light on the deeper question of stability of risk attitudes across contexts we conduct a horse race of the ability of different measures to explain risky behaviors such as holdings stocks occupational choice and smoking the question about risk taking in general generates the best all round predictor of risky behavior

hedge funds the good the bad and the lucky we develop an estimation approach based on a modified expectation maximization em algorithm and a mixture of normal distributions associated with skill groups to assess performance in hedge funds by allowing luck to affect both skilled and unskilled funds we estimate the number of skill groups the fraction of funds from each group and the mean and variability of skill within each group for each individual fund we propose a performance measure combining the fund s estimated alpha with the cross sectional distribution of fund skill in out of sample tests an investment strategy using our performance measure outperforms those using estimated alpha and t statistic

on optimal public good provision with tax evasion it is proved that for public goods with zero income effects also called ziff public goods tax evasion does not affect the optimal level of public expenditure further examples show that in general tax evasion may lead to less but also to more public expenditure

models of stock returns a comparison in this paper a discrete mixture of normal distributions is proposed to explain the observed significant kurtosis fat tails and significant positive skewness in the distribution of daily rates of returns for a sample of common stocks and indexes stationarity tests on the parameter estimates of this discrete mixture of normal distributions model revealed significant differences in the mean estimates that can explain the observed skewness and significant differences in the variance estimates that can explain the observed kurtosis an alternative explanation for the observed fat tails is the symmetric student model the result of a comparison between the models is that the discrete mixture of normal distributions model has substantially more descriptive validity than the student model for many years both financial economists and statisticians have been concerned with the description of stock market returns the form of the distribution of stock returns is a crucial assumption for mean variance portfolio theory theoretical models of capital asset prices and the prices of contingent claims for example understanding the behavior of the variance is essential to option pricing models empirical tests of asset pricing models and the efficient markets hypothesis draw statistical inferences that are also conditional on distributional assumptions the most convenient assumption for financial theory and empirical methods is that the distribution of security rates of return be multivariate normal with parameters that are stationary over time since the normal distribution is stable under addition any arbitrary portfolio of stocks will also be normally distributed with the additional assumption of risk aversion mean variance theory follows furthermore the assumptions of normality and parameter stationarity are required for most of the econometric techniques typically used in empirical research tests of the normality hypothesis on the daily returns of the dow jones industrial stocks by fama 121 revealed more kurtosis fatter tails than that predicted from a sample of independent and identically distributed normal variates fama concluded from this evidence that the distribution of price changes conforms better to the stable paretian distribution with characteristic exponent

public and private expenditures on health in a growth model abstract this paper introduces endogenous longevity into an otherwise standard overlapping generations model with capital in the model a young agent may increase the length of her old age by incurring investments in health such private health investments are assumed to be more productive if accompanied by complementary tax financed public health programs the presence of the public input in private longevity is shown to expose the economy to aggregate endogenous fluctuations and even chaos and such volatility is impossible in its absence the model is capable of generating dramatic reversals in life expectancy as has been observed in many countries

representative evidence on lying costs abstract a central assumption in economics is that people misreport their private information if this is to their material benefit several recent models depart from this assumption and posit that some people do not lie or at least do not lie maximally these models invoke many different underlying motives including intrinsic lying costs altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation to provide an empirically validated microfoundation for these models it is crucial to understand the relevance of the different potential motives we measure the extent of lying costs among a representative sample of the german population by calling them at home in our setup participants have a clear monetary incentive to misreport misreporting cannot be detected reputational concerns are negligible and altruism efficiency concerns or conditional cooperation cannot play a role yet we find that aggregate reporting behavior is close to the expected truthful distribution suggesting that lying costs are large and widespread further lab experiments show that this result is not driven by the mode of communication

mean var portfolio optimization a nonparametric approach portfolio optimization involves the optimal assignment of limited capital to different available financial assets to achieve a reasonable trade off between profit and risk we consider an alternative markowitz s mean variance model in which the variance is replaced with an industry standard risk measure value at risk var in order to better assess market risk exposure associated with financial and commodity asset price fluctuations realistic portfolio optimization in the mean var framework is a challenging problem since optimizing var leads to a non convex np hard problem which is computationally intractable in this work an efficient learning guided hybrid multi objective evolutionary algorithm mode gl is proposed to solve mean var portfolio optimization problems with real world constraints such as cardinality quantity pre assignment round lot and class constraints a learning guided solution generation strategy is incorporated into the multi objective optimization process to promote efficient convergence by guiding the evolutionary search towards promising regions of the search space the proposed algorithm is compared against the non dominated sorting genetic algorithm nsga ii and the strength pareto evolutionary algorithm spea2 experimental results using historical daily financial market data from s p 100 and s p 500 indices are presented experimental results shows that mode gl outperforms two existing techniques for this important class of portfolio investment problems in terms of solution quality and computational time the results highlight that the proposed algorithm is able to solve the complex portfolio optimization without simplifications while obtaining good solutions in reasonable time and has significant potential for use in practice

the risk in hedge fund strategies theory and evidence from trend followers hedge fund strategies typically generate option like returns linear factor models using benchmark asset indices have difficulty explaining them following the suggestions in glosten and jagannathan 1994 this article shows how to model hedge fund returns by focusing on the popular trend following strategy we use lookback straddles to model trend following strategies and show that they can explain trend following funds returns better than standard asset indices though standard straddles lead to similar empirical results lookback straddles are theoretically closer to the concept of trend following our model should be useful in the design of performance benchmarks for trend following funds

the wages of dishonesty the supply of cheating under high powered incentives we use a novel design to identify how dishonesty changes through a broad reward range that at the high end exceeds participants average daily wages using a sample of online indian workers who earn bonuses based on six simultaneous coin flips we show that the relationship between dishonesty and financial rewards depends on the incentive range we find two novel effects as incentives exceed those used in most prior research first dishonesty increases and reaches its maximum as rewards increase from 0 50 to 3 per reported head and as earnings reach 15 indicating that rewards can indeed motivate more cheating when large enough more importantly we show that dishonesty declines at the highest reward levels up to 5 per head as individuals appear to engage in lower magnitudes of dishonesty we detail how our results could be explained by a reference dependent utility with internal costs of dishonesty that are convex in the magnitude of the lie and show survey and simulation based evidence that support this explanation

skewness in financial returns abstract in this paper the symmetry of daily returns is addressed in eight international stock markets and three spot exchange rates tests of symmetry with the sample skewness seem of little value due to the non normality of the returns under alternative non normal distributions the symmetry of the returns cannot be rejected for most markets distribution free procedures do not detect strong asymmetries in most of the series either however some differences between returns below the mean and returns over the mean are observed in several markets

costly search and mutual fund flows this paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information but do so asymmetrically investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows high performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort as measured by higher fees flows are directly related to the size of the fund s complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund which lower consumers search costs

a model of longevity fertility and growth abstract economic and demographic outcomes are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of longevity fertility and growth reproductive agents in overlapping generations mature safely through two periods of life and face an endogenous probability of surviving for a third period given this probability each agent maximises her expected lifetime utility by choosing consumption and the number of children child bearing is costly in the sense that time must be spent on child rearing activities rather than on production or education the model produces multiple development regimes which yield different predictions about life expectancy fertility timing of births and educational investment depending on initial conditions these predictions accord strongly with the empirical evidence on demography and development

sizing the government is there such a thing as an optimal government size we investigate the so called armey curve which claims an inverted u shaped relationship between government size and economic performance using non parametric data envelopment analysis dea the dea scores are linked to control variables such as initial per capita income openness population density urbanization country size and family size for 23 oecd countries we estimate the country specific efficiency scores which reveal the extent to which a country uses excess public resources to achieve the observed growth rate of gdp

on trust in honesty and volunteering among europeans cross country evidence on perceptions and behavior abstract we conduct an experimental study among european citizens regarding cross cultural perceptions related to trust in two dimensions volunteerism and honesty we use representative samples from five major economies of the euro area france germany italy the netherlands and spain we find that european citizens rely on nationality to infer behavior assessments of behavior show a north south pattern participants from northern countries are perceived to be more honest and to provide more effort in a volunteering game than participants from southern countries actual behavior is however not always in line with these assessments assessments of honesty show strong evidence of social projection participants expect other european citizens to be less honest if they are culturally closer to themselves assessments of volunteerism instead show that both northern and southern europeans expect higher performance in northern than in southern european countries

an econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns the returns to hedge funds and other alternative investments are often highly serially correlated in sharp contrast to the returns of more traditional investment vehicles such as long only equity portfolios and mutual funds in this paper we explore several sources of such serial correlation and show that the most likely explanation is illiquidity exposure i e investments in securities that are not actively traded and for which market prices are not always readily available for portfolios of illiquid securities reported returns will tend to be smoother than true economic returns which will understate volatility and increase risk adjusted performance measures such as the sharpe ratio we propose an econometric model of illiquidity exposure and develop estimators for the smoothing prole as well as a smoothing adjusted sharpe ratio for a sample of 908 hedge funds drawn from the tass database we show that our estimated smoothing coecien ts vary considerably across hedge fund style categories and may be a useful proxy for quantifying illiquidity exposure

crime fertility and economic growth theory and evidence abstract this paper studies the link between crime and fertility and the way by which they jointly impact on economic growth in a three period overlapping generations model where health status in adulthood depends on health in childhood adult agents allocate their time to work leisure child rearing and criminal activities an autonomous increase in the probability offenders face in escaping apprehension increases both crime and fertility non monotonically giving rise to an ambiguous effect on growth a cross country empirical examination based on data that span four decades supports the non linear effects on both crime and fertility at the same time it reveals a negative effect on output growth

selection tournaments and dishonesty we conduct a real effort experiment in which performance is not monitored and participants are paid according to their reported performance participants are paid according to a piece rate and a winner take all tournament and then select between the two schemes before performing the task one more time competition increases dishonesty and lowers output when the payment scheme is exogenously determined participants with a higher propensity to be dishonest are more likely to select into competition however after selection we find no output difference between piece rate and tournament this is attributable to a handful of honest individuals who select competition

contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality this paper analyses contracts to keep down costs while maintaining quality of health services when patient demand does not reflect quality there is then a natural role for forms of contract that have emerged during the reforms of the nhs in britain that differ from pure fixed price or cost reimbursement contracts the optimal form depends on whether the provider is entirely self interested or benevolent in having genuine concern for patient welfare with fully benevolent providers there are roles for block and cost and volume contracts with partially benevolent providers some degree of cost sharing is typically optimal

honesty in a model of strategic information transmission we consider the following simple model of consumer fraud consumers need one of two possible repairs an expensive repair denoted e or an inexpensive repair denoted i the exogenous probability that a consumer needs the more costly remedy is r each consumer is assumed to know r an expert can observe with certainty which of the two repairs is needed and can offer to sell either to the consumer in a simple extension we allow for uncertainty with respect to the expert s observation we assume that selling the expensive remedy to a consumer who needs only the inexpensive one is more profitable than selling the inexpensive one thus h eii h1 iji where h denotes profit and i denotes conditional on needing the profit functions are increasing in the price of the respective repairs for convenience we suppress the dependence of h on prices in our notation we also assume that a consumer prefers to obtain the appropriate repair to the inappropriate one thus u eie u ije and u iii u eii where u is the consumer s payoff lastly we assume that the functions u eje and u e i are decreasing in the price of the expensive repair and that u iie and u iii are decreasing in the price of the inexpensive repair we also assume that u iie is decreasing in the price of the expensive repair since the consumer ultimately buys the expensive repair in this case see below for further assumptions regarding the repairs we are interested in the equilibrium levels of honesty in this model how honest is the expert at the equilibrium do consumers always follow the expert s advice does the level of honesty increase as the interests of the agents become more similar in a sense to be defined below our assumptions are similar to those in the abstract strategic information transmission models of vincent crawford and joel sobel 1982 and jerry green and nancy stokey 1980 we follow the former paper which asks whether the signals sent become less noisy as the agents preferences become more similar despite the similarity of our model to crawford sobel s we arrive at some different conclusions with respect to the expert s honesty vis a vis the agents closeness of interests we explain this in detail in section iii in addition we allow that the expert may be uncertain about the true state of the world we also explicitly model the level of expert honesty which extends crawford sobel the outline of the paper is as follows in section i we provide the details of the model and show that a unique equilibrium exists comparative static results and a simple extension incorporating the assumption of the incompetent expert are given in section ii we draw comparisons with crawfordsobel in section iii in section iv we conclude with a brief summary

the ex ante and ex post price effects of quarterly earnings announcements reflected in option and stock prices the subject of this study is the effect of investors anticipations of impending informative disclosures on the behavior of option and stock prices our approach introduced in a previous paper patell and wolfson 1979 and substantially extended here represents the following significant departure from traditional information content studies instead of analyzing security price reactions to announcements we analyze preannouncement option prices in order to discern investors beliefs about the range of possible stock price reactions expected to accompany a forthcoming disclosure whose actual content is not yet known in the tests reported here we focus on quarterly earnings announcements as disclosure events whose timing is predictable and we attempt to detect their systematic influence on the relationship between stock and option prices our operational definition of information content emphasizes changes in the variability of common stock returns in response to earnings disclosures while market efficiency precludes investors from predicting the direction of the stock price change which will accompany a future earnings announcement it is likely that investors will anticipate increased price variability at the time of disclosure and indeed several studies have documented announcement date increases in stock price volatility

the competitive advantage of honesty abstract we study competitive markets where firms may lie to their workers to reduce costs consumers may benefit from firms dishonesty through lower market prices does firms dis honesty affect consumers purchasing decisions our experiment shows that when honesty is fully transparent it can provide a competitive advantage honest firms sell more and despite higher costs achieve higher profits this finding is in line with our equilibrium predictions when allowing for dishonesty averse consumers by identifying circumstances in which consumers although not the addressee of dishonesty punish firms for their within firm dishonesty we contribute both to behavioral ethics and behavioral industrial organization

aging growth and the allocation of public expenditures on health and education in this paper i develop an overlapping generations endogenous growth model in which both public education and health are sources of growth by affecting the accumulation rate of the human capital stock and the savings rate over life expectancy i first find that dynamic complementarities of public expenditures lead to minimum threshold levels of public education and health expenditures that ensure sustainable growth i then show how governments can use the allocation of public expenditures as an alternative policy instrument to maximize growth without increasing the tax rate or the retirement age as usually happens in aging economies resume vieillissement croissance et l allocation des depenses publiques en sante et en education dans ce texte l auteur developpe un modele de croissance endogene avec des generations qui se chevauchent dans lequel les services publics en sante et en education sont des sources de croissance en raison du fait qu ils affectent le taux d accumulation du stock de capital humain et le taux d epargne au cours du cycle de vie on decouvre que les complementarites dynamiques des depenses publiques determinent des seuils minimaux de depenses publiques en sante et en education qui assurent une croissance durable on montre comment les gouvernements peuvent utiliser l allocation des depenses publiques comme un instrument de politique publique de rechange pour maximiser la croissance sans accroitre le taux d imposition ou l ge de la retraite comme cela se fait d habitude dans les economies vieillissantes

multi period performance persistence analysis of hedge funds since hedge funds specify significant lock up periods we investigate persistence in the performance of hedge funds using a multi period framework in which the likelihood of observing persistence by chance is lower than in the traditional two period framework under the null hypothesis of no manager skill no persistence the theoretical distribution of observing wins or losses follows a binormial distribution we test this hypothesis using the traditional two period framework and compare the findings with the results obtained using our multi period framework we examine whether persistence is sensitive to the length of return measurement intervals by using quarterly half yearly and yearly returns we find maximum persistence at the quarterly horizon indicating that presistence among hedge fund managers is short term in nature

public private mix of health expenditure a political economy and quantitative analysis this paper constructs a simple model to examine decisions on public and private health spending under majority voting in the model agents with heterogeneous incomes choose how much to consume and spend on health care and vote for public health expenditure the health status of an agent is determined by a ces composite of public and private health expenditure the existence and uniqueness of the voting equilibrium are established a quantitative exercise reveals the importance of the relative effectiveness of public and private health expenditure and their substitutability in determining the public private mix of health expenditure and in accounting for the observed differences across a sample of 22 advanced democratic countries

securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents abstract we study a social choice model with partially honest agents and we show that strategy proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition to achieve secure implementation this result provides a behavioral foundation for the rectangularity property and it offers as a by product a revelation principle for secure implementation with partial honesty we apply the implementation concept to a single crossing voting environment and we prove that it characterizes in combination with unanimity the family of augmented representative voter schemes

honesty beliefs about honesty and economic growth in 15 countries the honesty of people in an online panel from 15 countries was measured in two experiments reporting a coin flip with a reward for heads and an online quiz with the possibility of cheating there are large differences in honesty across countries average honesty is positively correlated with per capita gdp this is driven mostly by gdp differences arising before 1950 rather than by gdp growth since 1950 a country s average honesty correlates with the proportion of its population that is protestant these facts suggest a long run relationship between honesty and economic development the experiment also elicited participants expectations about different countries levels of honesty expectations were not correlated with reality instead they appear to be driven by cognitive biases including self projection

skills signals and employability an experimental investigation abstract because most skills of labor market entrants are not directly observed by employers individuals acquire skill signals to study which signals are valued by employers we randomize several skill signals on resumes of fictitious applicants among which we ask a large representative sample of german human resource managers to choose we find that signals in both studied domains cognitive and social skills have significant effects on being invited for a job interview consistent with their relevance expectedness and credibility different signals are effective for apprenticeship applicants and college graduates while gpas and social skills are significant for both genders females are particularly rewarded for it and language skills older hr managers value school grades less and other signals more hr managers in larger firms value college grades more

endogenous private health investment and the willingness to pay for public health projects the effects of income abstract a distinction is made between the wtp for health improvement and the wtp for health improving projects through endogenizing private health investment while the former always increases in income income s effect on the latter depends on whether private and public health inputs are substitutes or complements

loss aversion and lying behavior abstract we theoretically show that loss averse agents are more likely to lie to avoid receiving a low payoff after a random draw the lower the ex ante probability of this bad outcome the ex ante expected payoff increases as the bad outcome becomes less likely and hence the greater is the loss avoided by lying we demonstrate robust support for this theory by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature and with a new experiment that varies the outcome probabilities and is run double anonymous

the road less traveled strategy distinctiveness and hedge fund performance we investigate whether skilled hedge fund managers are more likely to pursue unique investment strategies that result in superior performance we propose a measure of the distinctiveness of a fund s investment strategy based on historical fund return data we call the measure the strategy distinctiveness index sdi we document substantial cross sectional variations as well as strong persistence in sdi our main result indicates that on average a higher sdi is associated with better subsequent performance after adjusting for risk funds in the highest sdi quintile outperform funds in the lowest quintile by 3 5 in the subsequent year the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game conventional models of tax compliance emphasize that taxpayers make strategic tax reports underreporting income to the extent that this behavior is functionally rewarded in contrast to this view considerable empirical evidence suggests that many taxpayers are inherently honest reporting truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat in this article we build a game theoretic model of tax compliance that includes both honest and potentially dishonest taxpayers we show that including honest taxpayers significantly alters the model leading to much improved empirical predictions and somewhat different and novel policy implications

student t distribution based var mgarch an application of the dcc model on international portfolio risk management significant second moment transmission effects and obvious time varying patterns of correlation coefficients among major equity and currency markets in the us japan and the uk are found to exist such observations inspire the time varying setting of dynamic conditional correlation coefficients in mgarch models on the other hand the multivariate student t distribution is suitable for analysing the visible leptokurtosis that is common in financial markets both are important for international portfolio risk management thus a comparison on the hedging efficiency of hypothetical portfolios consisting of stock and currency future positions is conducted in order to justify the multivariate student t distribution based on the dcc mgarch model

do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field in this paper we study the correlation between cheating in the lab and cheating in the field we conduct a laboratory experiment using a variant of the mind game jiang 2013 payoffs above a certain threshold are indicative of cheating behavior subjects are paid their earnings by bank transfer a fraction of the subjects is deliberately paid more than their earnings we send subjects a reminder e mail stating their earnings and asking them if they have received their payment we find a significant correlation of 0 31 between cheating in the lab and in the field subjects with higher payoffs in the mind game are also less likely to report the overpayment our results speak to the lab field generalizability of cheating behavior

healthcare investment and income inequality abstract this paper examines how the relative shares of public and private health expenditures impact income inequality we study a two period overlapping generation s growth model in which longevity is determined by both private and public health expenditure and human capital is the engine of growth increased investment in health reduces mortality raises return to education and affects income inequality in such a framework we show that the cross section earnings inequality is non decreasing in the private share of health expenditure we test this prediction empirically using a variable that proxies for the relative intensity of investments private versus public using vaccination data from the national sample survey organization for 76 regions in india in the year 1986 87 we link this with region specific expenditure inequality data for the period 1987 2012 our empirical findings though focused on a specific health investment vaccines suggest that an increase in the share of the privately provided health care results in higher inequality

economics and identity this paper considers how identity a person s sense of self affects economic outcomes we incorporate the psychology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior in the utility function we propose identity is associated with different social categories and how people in these categories should behave we then construct a simple game theoretic model showing how identity can affect individual interactions the paper adapts these models to gender discrimination in the workplace the economics of poverty and social exclusion and the household division of labor in each case the inclusion of identity substantively changes conclusions of previous economic analysis

cheat or perish a theory of scientific customs abstract performance incentives have become increasingly important in academia evidence suggest that they increase not only researchers effort but also their cheating we develop a principal agent framework in which a research institution principal aims to reward scientific productivity considering the social benefit of research and the remuneration costs researchers agents take into account what others are doing as a consequence the introduction of performance incentives not only leads to fraudulent behavior in the short run but may also deteriorate the scientific norm in the long run in the face of these dynamics the principal pursues two goals to increase productivity effort incentive policy and to deal with fraud anti fraud policy several factors determine the optimal mix of policies economic factors researchers cost of providing high or low effort the societal value of scientific knowledge and the societal costs of scientific misbehavior and psychological factors the evolution of norms over time an important insight of our theory is that when research institutions seek to encourage the production of high quality research they should also raise the salary for normal research to avoid misconduct

do hedge funds deliver alpha a bayesian and bootstrap analysis abstract using a robust bootstrap procedure we find that top hedge fund performance cannot be explained by luck and hedge fund performance persists at annual horizons moreover we show that bayesian measures which help overcome the short sample problem inherent in hedge fund returns lead to superior performance predictability sorting on bayesian alphas relative to ols alphas yields a 5 5 per year increase in the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom hedge fund deciles our results are robust and relevant to investors as they are neither confined to small funds nor driven by incubation bias backfill bias or serial correlation

health spending savings and fertility in a lifecycle dynastic model with longevity externalities we investigate health spending savings fertility and policy implications in a lifecycle dynastic model with longevity externalities in annuity returns we show that such externalities engender not only excessive health spending but also under saving and excessive fertility social security and health subsidization increase health spending and savings but reduce fertility from laissez faire levels a publicly funded universal health system under labour income taxation raises fertility taxing health spending or using social security and public health together can obtain socially optimal health spending savings longevity and fertility numerical results based on us observations suggest substantial variations among these cases especially in old age health spending

cheating ourselves the economics of tax evasion no government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers sense of duty to remit what is owed some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe but many others will not over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others thus paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens with penalties attendant on noncompliance but even in the face of those penalties substantial tax evasion exists and always has the history of taxation is replete with episodes of evasion often notable for their inventiveness during the third century many wealthy romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to evade the luxury tax and homeowners in eighteenth century england temporarily bricked up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector webber and wildavsky 1986 p 141 this essay reviews what is known about the magnitude nature and determinants of tax evasion with an emphasis on the u s income tax alm 1999 andreoni erard and feinstein 1998 and slemrod and yitzhaki 2002 offer more comprehensive recent reviews of the literature it then places this information into a conceptual and policy context

tax me if you can an artifactual field experiment on dishonesty in this paper we test whether increased salience of a tax charge increases dishonesty using a version of the die under cup paradigm participants earn money in proportion to the outcome reported and thus have an incentive to over report we find a significant increase in high outcomes in the presence of a tax frame suggesting that participants use the tax as an excuse to rationalize their dishonest act in addition we tested whether adding an explanation for the adoption of the tax would increase honesty we find evidence for reversed dishonesty with participants reporting significantly more low outcomes these results warn policy makers about the non trivial relationship between taxation charges and dishonesty

incentives for dishonesty an experimental study with internal auditors we conduct an experiment with professional internal auditors and evaluate their performance and objectivity measured as the extent to which they truthfully report the performance of other participants in a real effort task in line with our hypotheses we find that incentive based compensation increases dishonest behavior competitive incentives lead to under reporting of other participants performance while collective incentives lead to over reporting of performance we replicate these results with a student sample in addition we find that moving from an environment with objective performance evaluation toward a peer evaluation scheme reduces performance among internal auditors but not among students jel c93 m42 m52

performance characteristics of hedge funds and commodity funds natural vs spurious biases it is well known that the pro forma performance of a sample of investment funds contains biases these biases are documented in brown goetzmann ibbotson and ross 1992 using mutual funds as subjects the organization structure of hedge funds as private and often offshore vehicles makes data collection a much more onerous task amplifying the impact of performance measurement biases theis paper reviews these biases in hedge funds we also propose using funds of hedge funds to measure aggregate hedge fund performance based on the idea that the investment experience of hedge fund investors can be used to estimate the performance of hedge funds

aspirations health and the cost of inequality how does inequality motivate people and at what cost in a model of perpetual youth people have heterogeneous upward looking aspirations they value their consumption relative to the conditional mean of those above them in the distribution their survival depends on health capital produced from time investment and health goods higher fundamental inequality working through the aspirations gap motivates people to work and save more economic outcomes improve but income and consumption inequality worsen because the poor have less capacity to respond on the labor market by diverting resources from health production aspirations also worsen mortality especially for the poor though relative income has a strong negative effect on personal health inequality has a weak effect on population health explaining an empirical puzzle on the relative income and health gradient

context dependent cheating experimental evidence from 16 countries policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions however no effort has been made to study how the honesty of citizens varies across countries this paper explores the honesty among citizens across 16 countries with 1440 participants we employ a very simple task where participants face a trade off between the joy of eating a fine chocolate and the disutility of having a threatened self concept because of lying despite the incentives to cheat we find that individuals are mostly honest further international indices that are indicative of institutional honesty are completely uncorrelated with citizens honesty for our sample countries

evidence on price stabilization and underpricing in early ipo returns using data on 560 firm commitment initial public offerings of common stock for the 1982 1983 period we find that the cross sectional distribution of one day returns is modeled better as a mixture of two distributions with the parameter estimates of one distribution being consistent with underpricing and the other with price stabilization further the evidence that early ipo returns are drawn from a mixture distribution persists for at least four weeks the implications of these results for the analysis of ipo returns are illustrated by examining the influence of a measure of ex ante price uncertainty on ipo pricing

the value of life and the rise in health spending over the past half century americans spent a rising share of total economic resources on health and enjoyed substantially longer lives as a result debate on health policy often focuses on limiting the growth of health spending we investigate an issue central to this debate is the growth of health spending a rational response to changing economic conditions notably the growth of income per person we develop a model based on standard economic assumptions and argue that this is indeed the case standard preferences of the kind used widely in economics to study consumption asset pricing and labor supply imply that health spending is a superior good with an income elasticity well above one as people get richer and consumption rises the marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly spending on health to extend life allows individuals to purchase additional periods of utility the marginal utility of life extension does not decline as a result the optimal composition of total spending shifts toward health and the health share grows along with income in projections based on the quantitative analysis of our model the optimal health share of spending seems likely to exceed 30 percent by the middle of the century

longevity complementarities under competing risks many of the high expenditure health programs established by international organizations or national and subnational governments involve disease specific interventions such as measles vaccinations hiv education programs mammogram screening malaria prevention and lung cancer research typically these programs are evaluated solely upon the success or failure of their impact on the targeted disease this paper argues that such an exclusive evaluation may significantly underestimate the overall effect of disease specific interventions when multiple risks act as competing forces on life we suggest that programs that target one disease may have important spillover effects on the mortality and morbidity of other causes of death in order to better understand and evaluate the overall effects of disease specific programs it is necessary to understand and measure these spillover effects this paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the incentives introduced by disease specific mortality interventions more precisely we discuss predictions about health investment incentives as implied by the competing risk model which is the empirical framework almost exclusively used to study multiple cause mortality we show that important complementary effects between niultiple causes of death operate to equalize the occurrence of the causes we argue that this complementarity should alter the evaluation of cause specific interventions by discrediting the argument that interventions are wasted because competing mortality risks are just around the corner in support of the existence of such complementarities we present substantive evidence from one of the most important public health programs ever introduced in developing countries the expanded programme on immunization epi of the united nations the paper is organized as follows section i provides a theoretical analysis arguing that the competing risk model of multiple causes of mortality corresponds to the leontief production function of survival this implies that there are inherent complementarities between investments in the prevention of cause specific mortality risks both on the individual level and on the aggregate level for competing risks the marginal benefit of investing to avoid one cause of death increases as a function of the survival rates of other causes the implications of this complementarity are important and have not received sufficient attention in theoretical or practical evaluations of causespecific interventions when mortality is treated as exogenous a disease specific intervention may seem wasteful if members of the targeted group are likely to die from a second cause as soon as the first has been eliminated then reducing the mortality from one cause of death would not appear to substantially increase life expectancy indeed this argument is repeatedly made by economists and demographers about medical care interventions in old age however it is sguided to use the preintervention background mortality when assessing the effectiveness of an interventionbehavior under one policy should not be assumed to prevail under a new policy as the leontief nature of competing risks predicts health investments will be focused upon he most immediate cause of death so that there are dow department of health policy and administration cb 7400 university of north carolina chapel hill nc 27599 philipson irving b harris graduate school of public policy studies department of economics and the law school university of chicago 1155 east 60th street chicago il 60637 sala i martin department of econornics columbia university 420 west 118th street 1005 new york ny 10027 and universitat pompeu fabra we are thankful to three anonymous referees for comments that substantially improved the paper and we especially acknowledge the contributions of jessica holmes who was a research assistant and co author on early drafts of this work we also thank gary becker kate howe steen jorgenson casey mulligan sherwin rosen paul schultz and participants at numerous workshops for discussions dow acknowledges financial support from national institute on aging grant no t32 ag00244 philipson from the national science foundation and the rockefeller foundation this research was begun while all authors were at yale university during 1994

survival versus consumption we develop an indirect method to estimate utility and willingness to pay wtp for reductions in the risk of death at various ages using a life cycle model of consumption we assume that an individual sets his consumption level each year so as to maximize his expected lifetime utility alternative assumptions about opportunities for borrowing and annuities characterize two polar types of societies in our robinson crusoe case an individual must be entirely self sufficient and annuities are not available in our perfect markets case an individual can borrow against future earnings and purchase actuarially fair annuities we show that under these assumptions wtp is the sum of livelihood discounted expected future earnings and consumer surplus to illustrate our methods we derive wtp for an average financially independent american man under plausible assumptions the model is calibrated to 1978 earnings e g 18 000 per year for men aged 45 54 with at least some income in the robinson crusoe case wtp increases from 500 000 at age 20 to a peak of 1 250 000 at age 40 and declines to 630 000 at age 60 in the perfect markets case age variations are less pronounced wtp is 1 050 000 at age 20 peaks at 1 070 000 at age 25 and declines to 600 000 at age 60 these results suggest that individuals value risks to their lives at several times the pro rata share of their future earnings

incentives and cheating abstract we study how cheating behavior is affected by incentives after replicating the finding in the cheating game literature that lying does not increase with incentives we show that this insensitivity is not a characteristic of the intrinsic lying cost but rather a result of concern about being exposed as a liar in a modified mind game in which this concern is eliminated we find that people lie more and in particular lie more when the incentives to do so increase thus our results show that for many participants the decision to lie follows a simple cost benefit analysis they compare the intrinsic cost of lying with the incentives to lie once the incentives are higher than the cost they switch from telling the truth to lying

humanitarian aid fertility and economic growth this paper examines the effect of humanitarian aid on fertility and economic growth in an overlapping generations model where health status in adulthood depends on health in childhood adult agents allocate their time to work leisure and childrearing activities humanitarian aid influences the probability of survival to adulthood health in childhood and the time that adults allocate to childrearing giving rise to an ambiguous effect on both fertility and growth an empirical investigation for the period 1973 2007 suggests that humanitarian aid has on average a zero effect on the rates of fertility and of per capita output growth

why do we lie a practical guide to the dishonesty literature over the last decade a massive body of research has been devoted to uncovering human dishonesty in the present paper we review more than a hundred papers from this literature and provide a comprehensive overview by first listing the existing theoretical frameworks and then covering the common empirical approaches synthesizing the demographic and personal characteristics of those who cheat identifying the behavioural mechanisms found that affect dishonesty and finally we finish by discussing how the empirical evidence fit theory overall the review concludes that many people behave dishonestly but also that it is a highly malleable behavior sensitive to elements such as decision contexts behaviour of others state of mind and depletion the review can be used as an overview of the dishonesty literature or as a guide or work of reference for selected topics of interest

why does child labor persist with declining poverty we develop a dynamic overlapping generations model to highlight the role of income inequality in explaining the persistence of child labor under declining poverty differential investment in two forms of human capital schooling and health in the presence of inequality gives rise to a nonconvergent income distribution in the steady state characterized by multiple steady states of relative income with varying levels of education health and child labor the child labor trap thus generated is shown to preserve itself despite rising per capita income policy recommendations include public provision of education targeted toward reducing schooling costs for the poor or raising the efficacy of public health infrastructure jel i1 j2 o1 o2

strategic communication with lying costs i study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed receiver and an informed but upwardly biased sender the sender bears a cost of lying or more broadly of misrepresenting his private information the main results show that inflated language naturally arises in this environment where the sender almost always claims to be of a higher type than he would with complete information regardless of the intensity of lying cost there is incomplete separation with some pooling on the highest messages the degree of language inflation and how much information is revealed depend upon the intensity of lying cost the analysis delivers a framework to span a class of cheap talk and verifiable disclosure games unifying the polar predictions they make under large conflicts of interest i use the model to discuss how the degree of manipulability of information can affect the trade off between delegation and communication copyright 2009 wiley blackwell

identifying voter preferences the trade off between honesty and competence abstract we set up two experiments to measure how voters trade off the competence and honesty of candidates in elections we measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work in the first stage the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant in the second stage subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the first stage s competence and honesty of the alternative candidates we find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs

nash equilibrium and welfare optimality if is a set of social alternatives a social choice rule scr assigns a subset of a to each potential profile of individuals preferences over a where the subset is interpreted as the set of welfare optima a game form or mechanism implements the social choice rule if for any potential profile of preferences 1 any welfare optimum can arise as a nash equilibrium of the game form implying in particular that a nash equilibrium exists and 2 all nash equilibria are welfare optimal the main result of this paper establishes that any scr that satisfies two properties monotonicity and no veto power can be implemented by a game form if there are three or more individuals the proof is constructive

a fairness approach to income tax evasion abstract the tax that a taxpayer wishes to evade is determined on the basis of his perception of the fairness of his fiscal treatment with respect to both governmental supply of public goods and the perceived behaviour of other taxpayers the coercive powers of the state and the taxpayer s attitude toward risk determine the extent to which this desired level is undertaken in practice this approach is able to produce implications for the relationship between public expenditure tax rates and tax evasion which are more consistent with empirical evidence than the results of the conventional portfolio choice approach