the allocation of inventory risk in a supply chain push pull and advance purchase discount contracts while every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk the cost of insufficient supply some firms may even with wholesale price contracts completely avoid inventory risk the cost of unsold inventory with a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer by ordering his entire supply before the selling season bears all of the supply chain s inventory risk a pull contract also has a single wholesale price but the supplier bears the supply chain s inventory risk because only the supplier holds inventory while the retailer replenishes as needed during the season examples include vendor managed inventory with consignment and drop shipping an advance purchase discount has two wholesale prices a discounted price for inventory purchased before the season and a regular price for replenishments during the selling season advance purchase discounts allow for intermediate allocations of inventory risk the retailer bears the risk on inventory ordered before the season while the supplier bears the risk on any production in excess of that amount this research studies how the allocation of inventory risk via these three types of wholesale price contracts impacts supply chain efficiency the ratio of the supply chain s profit to its maximum profit it is found that the efficiency of a single wholesale price contract is considerably higher than previously thought as long as firms consider both push and pull contracts in other words the literature has exaggerated the value of implementing coordinating contracts i e contracts that achieve 100 efficiency such as buy backs or revenue sharing because coordinating contracts are compared against an inappropriate benchmark often just a push contract furthermore if firms also consider advance purchase discounts which are also simple to administer then the coordination of the supply chain and the arbitrary allocation of its profit is possible several limitations of advance purchase discounts are discussed

trust trustworthiness and information sharing in supply chains bridging china and the united states whether and how trust and trustworthiness differ between a collectivist society e g china and an individualistic one e g the united states generates much ongoing scientific debate and bears significant practical values for managing cross country transactions we experimentally investigate how supply chain members countries of origin china versus the united states affect trust trustworthiness and strategic information sharing behavior in a cross country supply chain we consider a two tier supply chain in which the upstream supplier solicits demand forecast information from the retailer to plan production but the retailer has an incentive to manipulate her forecast to ensure abundant supply the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the supply chain and supplier s capability to determine the optimal production quantity affect the efficacy of forecast sharing and the resulting profits we develop an experimental design to disentangle these three aspects and to allow for real time interactions b

optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities this paper considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity with a short shelf or demand life a hierarchical model is developed and the results of the single period inventory model are used to examine possible pricing and return policies the paper shows that several such policies currently in effect are suboptimal these include those where the manufacturer offers retailers full credit for all unsold goods or where no returns of unsold goods are permitted the paper also demonstrates that a policy whereby a manufacturer offers retailers full credit for a partial return of goods may achieve channel coordination but that the optimal return allowance will be a function of retailer demand therefore such a policy cannot be optimal in a multi retailer environment it is proven however that a pricing and return policy in which a manufacturer offers retailers a partial credit for all unsold goods can achieve channel coordination in a multi retailer environment this article was originally published in marketing science volume 4 issue 2 pages 166 176 in 1985

option pricing with downward sloping demand curves the case of supply chain options this article investigates the role of option contracts in a supply chain when the demand curve is downward sloping we consider call put options that provide the retailer with the right to reorder return goods at a fixed price we show that the introduction of option contracts causes the wholesale price to increase and the volatility of the retail price to decrease in general options are not zero sum games conditions are derived under which the manufacturer prefers to use options when this happens the retailer is also better off if the uncertainty in the demand curve is low however if the uncertainty is sufficiently high then the introduction of option contracts alters the equilibrium prices in a way that hurts the retailer

behavioral causes of the bullwhip effect and the observed value of inventory information the tendency of orders to increase in variability as one moves up a supply chain is commonly known as the bullwhip effect we study this phenomenon from a behavioral perspective in the context of a simple serial supply chain subject to information lags and stochastic demand we conduct two experiments on two different sets of participants in the first we find the bullwhip effect still exists when normal operational causes e g batching price fluctuations demand estimation etc are removed the persistence of the bullwhip effect is explained to some extent by evidence that decision makers consistently underweight the supply line when making order decisions in the second experiment we find that the bullwhip and the underlying tendency of underweighting remains when information on inventory levels is shared however we observe that inventory information helps somewhat to alleviate the bullwhip effect by helping upstream chain members better anticipate and prepare for fluctuations in inventory needs downstream these experimental results support the theoretically suggested notion that upstream chain members stand to gain the most from information sharing initiatives

the dynamics of the uk chemical plant investment cycle abstract orders for new chemical plant sanctions and investment in chemical plant both show marked business cycle like variations amongst the effects of the uk cycle on the chemical industry are variations in new plant additions requirements for capital expenditure finance and capital utilization as far as the uk process plant contractors and process plant manufacturers are concerned the cycle is reflected in a varying work load arising from the uk chemical industry together with varying manpower requirements and profitability the project described in this paper involved the construction of both system dynamics and control systems models of the investment cycle as a guide to strategic planning for the industries affected by it the implications of the results from both types of model for corporate and strategic planning in the industries concerned are discussed

designing supply contracts contract type and information asymmetry this paper studies the value to a supplier of obtaining better information about a buyer s cost structure and of being able to offer more general contracts we use the bilateral monopoly setting to analyze six scenarios three increasingly general contracts wholesale pricing schemes two part linear schemes and twopart nonlinear schemes each under full and incomplete information about the buyer s cost structure we allow both sides to refuse to trade by explicitly including reservation profit levels for both for the supplier this is implemented through a cutoff policy we derive the supplier s optimal contracts and profits for all six scenarios and examine the value of information and of more general contracts our key findings are as follows first the value of information is higher under two part contracts second the value of offering two part contracts is higher under full information and third the proportion of buyers the supplier will choose to exclude can be substantial

supply contracts profit sharing switching and reaction options a common theme in the studies of flexible supply contracts has been the producer s profit maximization problem without regard to the suppliers reactions however suppliers do react and protect their downside against producer s operating policies by revising their strategies in a manner consistent with their profitmaximization objectives this fact motivates our work using a real options contingent claims approach we analyze and value supply contracts in a setting characterized by exchange rate uncertainty supplier switching options order quantity flexibility profit sharing and supplier reaction options we also use basic diversification concepts from portfolio theory to analyze risk reduction in a unique framework given this setup we explicitly model how flexibility can be mutually beneficial to both the producer and the suppliers using this model we concurrently solve and examine the dual optimization problem for the suppliers and the producer our approach also endogenizes the extent and degree of profit sharing through the resulting optimal policies we also analyze what induces the producer and the suppliers to accept flexibility in their contracts

interfirm relationships and informal credit in vietnam trading relations in vietnam s emerging private sector are shaped by two market frictions the difficulty of locating trading partners and the absence of legal enforcement of contracts examining relational contracting we find that a firm trusts its customer enough to offer credit when the customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier a longer duration of trading relationship is associated with larger credit as is prior information gathering customers identified through business networks receive more credit these network effects are enduring suggesting that networks are used to sanction defaulting customers

pricing and the news vendor problem a review with extensions in the newsvendor problem a decision maker facing random demand for a perishable product decides how much of it to stock for a single selling period this simple problem with its intuitively appealing solution is a crucial building block of stochastic inventory theory which comprises a vast literature focusing on operational efficiency typically in this literature market parameters such as demand and selling price are exogenous however incorporating these factors into the mode l can provide an excellent vehicle for examining how operational problems interact with marketing issues to influence decision making at the firm level in this paper we examine an extension of the newsvendor problem in which stocking quantity and selling price are set simultaneously we provide a comprehensive review that synthesizes existing results for the single period problem and develop additional results to enrich the existing knowledge base we also review and develop insight into a dynamic inventory extension of this problem and motivate the applicability of such models

reference points in revenue sharing contracts how to design optimal supply chain contracts abstract coordinating supply chains is an important goal for contract designers because it enables the channel members to increase their profits recently many experimental studies have shown that behavioral aspects have to be taken into account when choosing the type of contract and specifying the contract parameters in this paper we analyze behavioral aspects of revenue sharing contracts we extend the classical normative decision model by incorporating reference dependent valuation into the decision model and show how this affects inventory decisions we conduct different lab experiments to test our model as a result human inventory decisions deviate from classical normative predictions and we find evidence for reference dependent valuation of human decision makers we also show how contract designers can use the insights we gained to design better contracts

contract complexity and performance under asymmetric demand information an experimental evaluation exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant the goal of this paper is to understand why simpler contracts may commonly be preferred in practice despite being theoretically suboptimal we study a two tier supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer to characterize the impact of contract complexity and asymmetric information on performance and to compare theoretical predictions to actual behavior in human subject experiments in the experiments the computerized buyer faces a newsvendor setting and has better information on end consumer demand than the human supplier the supplier offers either a quantity discount contract with two or three price blocks or a price only contract contracts that are commonplace in practice yet different in complexity results show that contrary to theoretical predictions quantity discounts do not necessarily increase the supplier s profits we also observe a more equitable distribution of profits between the supplier and the buyer than what theory predicts these observations can be described with three decision biases the probabilistic choice bias the reinforcement bias and the memory bias and can be modeled using the experience weighted attraction learning model our results demonstrate that simpler contracts such as a price only contract or a quantity discount contract with a low number of price blocks are sufficient for a supplier designing contracts under asymmetric demand information this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations and supply chain management

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

modeling long term dynamics of electricity markets in the last decade many countries have restructured their electricity industries by introducing competition in their power generation sectors although some restructuring has been regarded as successful the short experience accumulated with liberalized power markets does not allow making any founded assertion about their long term behavior long term prices and long term supply reliability are now center of interest this concerns firms considering investments in generation capacity and regulatory authorities interested in assuring the long term supply adequacy and the stability of power markets in order to gain significant insight into the long term behavior of liberalized power markets in this paper a simulation model based on system dynamics is proposed and the underlying mathematical formulations extensively discussed unlike classical market models based on the assumption that market outcomes replicate the results of a centrally made optimization the approach presented here focuses on replicating the system structure of power markets and the logic of relationships among system components in order to derive its dynamical response the simulations suggest that there might be serious problems to adjust early enough the generation capacity necessary to maintain stable reserve margins and consequently stable long term price levels because of feedback loops embedded in the structure of power markets and the existence of some time lags the long term market development might exhibit a quite volatile behavior by varying some exogenous inputs a sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the influence of these factors on the long run market dynamics

no taxation without information deterrence and self enforcement in the value added tax abstract claims that the vat facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms contributed to widespread vat adoption worldwide but there is surprisingly little evidence this paper analyzes the role of third party information for vat enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400 000 chilean firms announcing additional monitoring has less impact on transactions that are subject to a paper trail indicating the paper trail s preventive deterrence effect this leads to strong enforcement spillovers up the vat chain these findings confirm that when taking evasion into account significant differences emerge between otherwise equivalent forms of taxation jel d83 h25 h26 k34 o17

the impact of repeated interactions on supply chain contracts a laboratory study abstract in this laboratory study we investigate the interactive behaviors that develop over a perceived long term contractual relationship specifically three types of contracts are examined under a two echelon supply chain setting with stochastic demand wholesale price contracts buyback contracts and revenue sharing contracts the supply chain contracting theory has demonstrated that the simple linear price contract is inefficient whereas the latter two contracts can coordinate the channel through risk sharing and they are mathematically equivalent we propose an experimental design that controls for individual decision biases to isolate the behavioral impact of repeated negotiations our experimental results indicate that participants systematically deviate from predictions by the normative model that assumes a one shot interaction between self interested players we find that when future opportunities to punish are available social preferences for fairness and reciprocity are reinforced and reputation building behaviors are motivated to achieve long term economic benefits as a result the performance of the overall supply chain is enhanced moreover we observe that buyback contracts behave differently from revenue sharing contracts by inducing higher order quantities over time

strategic commitments for an optimal capacity decision under asymmetric forecast information we study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer the supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product we address how different contracts affect the supplier s capacity decision and hence the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer we fully develop two contracts and provide explicit formulae to enable credible forecast information sharing the first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity the second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product these contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing the capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer s private forecast information while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information we show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt

the effect of payment schemes on inventory decisions the role of mental accounting does the payment scheme have an effect on inventory decisions in the newsvendor problem keeping the net profit structure constant we examine three payment schemes that can be interpreted as the newsvendor s order being financed by the newsvendor herself scheme o by the supplier through delayed order payment scheme s and by the customer through advanced revenue scheme c in a laboratory study we find that inventory quantities exhibit a consistent decreasing pattern in the order of schemes o s and c with the order quantities of scheme s being close to the expected profit maximizing solution these observations are inconsistent with the expected profit maximizing model contradict what a regular or hyperbolic time discounting model would predict and cannot be explained by the loss aversion model instead they are consistent with a model that underweights the order time payments which can be explained by the prospective accounting theory in the mental accounting literature a second study shows that the results hold even if all physical payments are conducted at the same time suggesting that the framing of the payment scheme is sufficient to induce the prospective accounting behavior we further validate the robustness of our model under different profit conditions our findings contribute to the understanding of the psychological processes involved in newsvendor decisions and have implications for supply chain financing and contract design this paper was accepted by christian terwiesch operations management

opportunity cost neglect to properly consider the opportunity costs of a purchase consumers must actively generate the alternatives that it would displace the current research suggests that consumers often fail to do so even under conditions promoting cognitive effort various cues to consider opportunity costs reduce purchase rates and increase the choice share of more affordable options sensitivity to such cues varies with chronic dispositional differences in spending attitudes we discuss the implications of these results for the marketing strategies of economy and premium brands

efficient supply contracts for fashion goods with forecast updating and two production modes we examine the problem of developing supply contracts that encourage proper coordination of forecast information and production decisions between a manufacturer and distributor of high fashion seasonal products operating in a two mode production environment the first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead time while the second is expensive but offers quick turnaround we focus on contracts of the form w1 w2 b wherewi is the wholesale price offered for production modei andb is a return price offered for items left over at the end of the season we find that such a contract can coordinate the manufacturer and distributor to act in the best interest of the channel the pricing conditions needed to ensure an efficient solution vary depending on the degree of demand forecast improvement between periods and the manufacturer s access to forecast information we also examine whether these conditions ensure a pareto optimal solution with respect to two traditional production settings

push pull or both a behavioral study of how the allocation of inventory risk affects channel efficiency in this paper we experimentally investigate how the allocation of inventory risk in a two stage supply chain affects channel efficiency and profit distribution we first evaluate two common wholesale price contracts that differ in which party incurs the risk associated with unsold inventory a push contract in which the retailer incurs the risk and a pull contract in which the supplier incurs the risk our experimental results show that a pull contract achieves higher channel efficiency than that of a push contract and that behavior systematically deviates from the standard theory in three ways 1 stocking quantities are set too low 2 wholesale prices are more favorable to the party stocking the inventory and 3 some contracts are erroneously accepted or rejected to account for these systematic regularities we extend the existing theory and structurally estimate a number of behavioral models the estimates suggest that a combination of loss aversion with errors organizes our data remarkably well we apply our behavioral model to the advance purchase discount apd contract which combines features of push and pull by allowing both parties to share the inventory risk in a separate experiment as an out of sample test and we find that it accurately predicts channel efficiency and qualitatively matches decisions two practical implications of our work are that 1 the push contract performs close to standard theoretical benchmarks which implies that it is robust to behavioral biases and 2 the apd contract weakly pareto dominates the push contract retailers are better off and suppliers are no worse off under the apd contract data as supplemental material are available at http dx doi org 10 1287 mnsc 2014 1940 this paper was accepted by serguei netessine operations management

contract preferences and performance for the loss averse supplier buyback vs revenue sharing prior theory claims that buyback and revenue sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier retailer setting this suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts however the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues i e losses and gains vary significantly between the contracts suggesting the supplier s preference of contract type and associated contract parameter values may vary with the level of loss aversion we investigate this phenomenon through two studies the first is a preliminary study investigating whether human suppliers are indeed indifferent between these two contracts using a controlled laboratory experiment with human subjects taking on the role of the supplier having to choose between contracts we find that contract preferences change with the ratio of overage and underage costs for the channel i e the newsvendor critical ratio in particular a buyback contract is preferred for products wit

financial development and international trade is there a link the author explores a possible link between financial development and trade in manufactures his theoretical model focuses on the role of financial intermediaries in facilitating large scale high return projects results show that economies with better developed financial sectors have a comparative advantage in manufacturing industries he provides evidence for this hypothesis first proposed by kletzer and bardhan 1987 using a 30 year panel of data for 65 countries controlling for country specific effects and possible reverse causality he shows that financial development exerts a large causal impact on the level of both exports and the trade balance of manufactured goods

supply chain performance anomalies fairness concerns under private cost information abstract this work investigates how fairness concerns influence supply chain decision making while examining the effect of private production cost information and touching on issues related to bounded rationality we conduct laboratory work utilizing a supply chain dyad with an upstream supplier feeding a downstream retailer under a simple wholesale price contract we perform human computer h c experiments where human subjects play the role of the supplier paired with the computerized retailer as well as human human h h experiments where human subjects play the role of both supplier and retailer these experiments allow us to isolate other effects like bounded rationality from the effects of fairness concerns on supply chain decision making we find that compared to standard analytical model the bounded rationality slightly reduces overall supply chain profit without changing its distribution between the supplier and the retailer while fairness concerns lead to greater supply chain profits and a more balanced supply chain profit distribution we further illustrate that under private cost information the retailer s fairness concern is suppressed by the lack of reciprocity from not being able to observe her rival s profit information but that the supplier s fairness concern from altruism persists based on our experimental results we modify classical supply chain models to include utility functions that incorporate both bounded rationality and fairness concerns the estimated other regarding coefficients are significantly lower under private information than under public information for the h h experiments and we find no evidence of inequity aversion for the h c experiments

the bright side of loss aversion in dynamic and competitive markets a well established phenomenon of consumer buying behavior is that consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference point and exhibit loss aversion i e their propensity to buy is more negatively affected by prices above the reference point than it is positively affected by prices below the reference point the objective of this paper is to analytically examine how the competitive strategy and profitability of firms are affected by the presence of consumer loss aversion in the price dimension although we assume that consumer loss aversion increases consumer propensity to search for lower prices we find that it does not necessarily lead to lower prices or profits when firms compete over multiple periods and when the consumer reference price in subsequent periods is affected by current prices specifically consumer loss aversion could lead to higher prices and profits when consumer valuation is sufficiently high relative to search costs and the proportion of consumers with positive search costs is in an intermediate range we also show that when forward looking firms incorporate the negative effect of price promotions on future profits the equilibrium range of price promotions may actually increase

cycles in deregulated electricity markets empirical evidence from two decades abstract in this article we discuss the cycle hypothesis in electricity generation which states that the introduction of deregulation in an electricity system might lead to sustained fluctuations of over and under capacity the occurrence of cycles is one of the major threats for electricity markets as it affects the security of supply and creates uncertainty in both the profitability of electricity companies and in consumer prices we discuss the background for these cycles using analogies with other capital intensive industries along with evidence from the analysis of behavioral simulation models as well as from experimental electricity markets using data from the oldest deregulated markets we find support for the hypothesis in the case of the english and chilean markets based on an autocorrelation analysis evidence from the nordpool market is more ambiguous although we might be observing the first half of a cycle in generation capacity comparing a simulation of the english market performed in 1992 with the actual performance we can observe that the qualitative behavior of the model is consistent with the actual evolution finally we discuss possible mechanisms for damping cycles in electricity generation such as mothballing capacity payments and reliability markets

technical note optimal long term supply contracts with asymmetric demand information we consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon under a backlogging model we show that the manufacturer s optimal dynamic long term contract takes a simple form in the first period based on her private demand forecast the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee and from then on the two parties stick to a simple wholesale price contract with the retailer s chosen price under a lost sales model we show that the structure of the optimal long term contract combines a menu of wholesale pricing contracts with an option that if exercised by the retailer reduces future wholesale prices in exchange for an immediate payment to the manufacturer the online appendix is available at https doi org 10 1287 opre 2017 1626

designing incentive systems for truthful forecast information sharing within a firm we consider a firm where the sales division sales is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division operations is responsible for ordering sales has better information about the demand than operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to operations to incentivize truthful information sharing we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of sales besides monetary payoffs we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of sales we model the setting as a signaling game and derive the pareto dominant separating equilibria of the game in laboratory experiments we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected payoff maximizing behavior we use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out of sample treatments and out of sample subjects we conduct additional experiments to provide further robus

trade promotion decisions under demand uncertainty a market experiment approach in this paper we examine trade promotion decisions in manufacturer retailer channels where retailers face consumer demand uncertainty we first present the theoretical analysis for two types of markets where trade promotion discounts are offered either as off invoices or as scan backs we derive propositions by comparing wholesale and retail prices retailer order quantities and profits given the same trade promotion discount next we extend the basic model so that the amount of trade promotion discount influences market expansion and solve for the optimal discount level to test our theory we then employ market experiments where we manipulate demand uncertainty and market expansion consistent with our theoretical predictions we find that wholesale and retail prices are higher and retailer order quantities lower when the same amount of trade promotion discount is allocated to scan backs versus off invoices in the market expansion condition we find that manufacturers offer deeper discounts when tra

research note vertical information sharing in a volatile market when demand is uncertain manufacturers and retailers often have private information on future demand and such information asymmetry impacts strategic interaction in distribution channels in this paper we investigate a channel consisting of a manufacturer and a downstream retailer facing a product market characterized by short product life uncertain demand and price rigidity assuming the firms have asymmetric information about the demand volatility we examine the potential benefits of sharing information and contracts that facilitate such cooperation we conclude that under a wholesale price regime information sharing might not improve channel profits when the retailer underestimates the demand volatility but the manufacturer does not although information sharing is always beneficial under a two part tariff regime it is in general not sufficient to achieve sharing and additional contractual arrangements are necessary the contract types we consider to facilitate sharing are profit sharing and buyback contracts

designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers does the framing of the fixed fee matter the format of pricing contracts varies substantially across business contexts a major variable being whether a contract imposes a fixed fee payment this paper examines how the use of the fixed fee in pricing contracts affects market outcomes of a manufacturer retailer channel standard economic theories predict that channel efficiency increases with the introduction of the fixed fee and is invariant to its framing we conduct a laboratory experiment to test these predictions surprisingly the introduction of the fixed fee fails to increase channel efficiency moreover the framing of the fixed fee does make a difference an opaque frame as quantity discounts achieves higher channel efficiency than a salient frame as a two part tariff although these two contractual formats are theoretically equivalent to account for these anomalies we generalize the standard economic model by allowing the retailer s utilities to be reference dependent so that the up front fixed fee payment is perceived as a loss and the subsequent retail profits as a gain we embed this reference dependent utility function in a quantal response equilibrium framework where the retailer is allowed to make decision mistakes due to computational complexity the key prediction of this behavioral model is that channel efficiency decreases with loss aversion for sufficiently nash rational retailers consistent with this prediction the estimated loss aversion coefficient is 1 37 in the two part tariff condition significantly higher than 1 27 in the quantity discount condition at the same time loss aversion dominates contract complexity in explaining the data lastly we conduct a follow up experiment to confirm the central role of loss aversion as a behavioral driver in one condition the retailer becomes less loss averse when we temporally compress the fixed fee payment and the realization of retail profits which supports the loss aversion theory in the other condition the retailer s contract acceptance rate does not decline when we reward the manufacturer a higher cash payment for each experimental point earned which rules out the competing hypothesis that the retailer rejects contract offers due to fairness concerns

trade law and product complexity abstract how does the quality of national institutions that enforce the rule of law influence international trade anderson and marcouiller argue that bad institutions located in the importer s country deter international trade because they enable economic predators to steal and extort rents at the importer s border we complement this research and show how good institutions located in the exporter s country enhance international trade in particular trade in complex products whose characteristics are difficult to fully specify in a contract we argue that both exporter and importer institutions affect international as well as domestic transaction costs in complex and simple product markets international transaction costs are a part of the costs of trade domestic transaction costs affect complex and simple products differently thereby changing a country s comparative advantage in producing such goods we find ample empirical evidence for these predictions countries that have good institutions tend to

unwilling or unable to cheat evidence from a tax audit experiment in denmark this paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in denmark in the base year a stratified and representative sample of over 40 000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited while the rest were deliberately not audited the following year threat of audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups we present three main empirical findings first using baseline audit data we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third party reporting but substantial for self reported income since most income is subject to third party reporting the overall evasion rate is modest second using quasi experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self reported income but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses third using the randomization of enforcement we find that prior audits and threat of audit letters have significant effects on self reported income but no effect on third party reported income all these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of rational tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self reported and third party reported income

can trustworthiness in a supply chain be signaled the relationship between a buyer and its suppliers often relies on factors beyond the terms of a contractual agreement buyers can therefore benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers we argue that precontractual actions by a supplier for example making costly buyer specific investments without a long term contract can signal a supplier s trustworthiness we develop a theoretical model to reflect supplier trustworthiness and determine when a buyer can benefit from identifying trustworthy suppliers we show that costly relationship specific investments can serve as a signal of trustworthiness and that supply chain profits increase when trustworthy suppliers are able to identify themselves in this fashion we demonstrate the importance of the signaling mechanism using laboratory experiments the experimental results show that relationship specific investments lead to more collaborative transactions with buyers offering higher prices and suppliers returning higher quality products this results in

institutional quality and international trade institutions quality of contract enforcement property rights shareholder protection and the like have received a great deal of attention in recent years yet trade theory has not considered the implications of institutional differences beyond treating them simply as different technologies or taxes the purpose of this paper is twofold first we propose a simple model of international trade in which institutional differences are modeled within the framework of incomplete contracts we show that doing so reverses many of the conclusions obtained by equating institutions with productivity institutional differences as a source of comparative advantage imply among other things that the less developed country may not gain from trade and factor prices may actually diverge as a result of trade second we test empirically whether institutions act as a source of trade using data on us imports disaggregated by country and industry the empirical results provide evidence of institutional content of trade institutional differences are an important determinant of trade flows

contracting in supply chains a laboratory investigation the coordination of supply chains by means of contracting mechanisms has been extensively explored theoretically but not tested empirically we investigate the performance of three commonly studied supply chain contracting mechanisms the wholesale price contract the buyback contract and the revenue sharing contract the simplified setting we consider utilizes a two echelon supply chain in which the retailer faces the newsvendor problem the supplier has no capacity constraints and delivery occurs instantaneously we compare the three mechanisms in a laboratory setting using a novel design that fully controls for strategic interactions between the retailer and the supplier results indicate that although the buyback and revenue sharing contracts improve supply chain efficiency relative to the wholesale price contract the improvement is smaller than the theory predicts we also find that although the buyback and revenue sharing contracts are mathematically equivalent they do not generally result in equivalent supply chain performance

selling to the newsvendor with a forecast update analysis of a dual purchase contract we consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure to stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update under a wholesale price contract the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update we show that the retailer s wait and decide strategy induced by the wholesale price contract hinders the manufacturer s ability to 1 set the wholesale price and maximize his profit 2 hedge against excess inventory risk and 3 reduce his profit uncertainty to mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract we propose the dual purchase contract through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update we characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract to do so we establish the retailer s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer s optimal pricing and production policies we show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer through a numerical study we provide additional managerial insights and show for example that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract

modeling the psychology of consumer and firm behavior with behavioral economics abstract marketing is an applied science that tries to explain and influence how firms and consumers behave in markets marketing models are usually applications of standard economic theories which rely on strong assumptions of rationality of consumers and firms behavioral economics explores the implications of the limits of rationality with the goal of making economic theories more plausible by explaining and predicting behavior more accurately while maintaining formal power this article reviews six behavioral economics models that are useful to marketing three models generalize standard preference structures to allow for sensitivity to reference points and loss aversion social preferences toward outcomes of others and preference for instant gratification the other three models generalize the concept of game theoretic equilibrium allowing decision makers to make mistakes encounter limits on the depth of strategic thinking and equilibrate by learning from feedback the authors also discuss a sp

on the origins of comparative advantage this paper proposes a simple theory of international trade with en dogenous technological dierences across countries the core of our analysis lies in the determinants of the division of labor we consider a world economy comprising two large countries with a continuum of goods and one factor of production labor each good is characterized by its complexity de ned as the number of tasks that must be per formed to produce one unit there are increasing returns to scale in the performance of each task which creates gains from specialization and uncertainty in the enforcement of each contract which create transac tion costs the trade obetween these two forces pins down the size of productive teams across sectors in each country under free trade the country where teams are larger specializes in the more complex goods in our model it is the country where the product of institutional qual ity and human per worker capital is larger hence better institutions and more educated workers are complementary sources of comparative advantage in the more complex industries

buyback contracts with price dependent demands effects of demand uncertainty chapter 2 examines buyback contracts in a supplier retailer supply chain where the retailer faces a price dependent downward sloping demand curve subject to uncertainty compared with classical research a fundamental difference of this research lies in its analytical examination of the effects of demand uncertainty on the applicability of buyback contracts to this end the research seeks to characterize the buyback contract model in terms of only demand uncertainty level with such a new research perspective some new and interesting findings are obtained for such issues as how demand uncertainty level affects the applicability of buyback practice and how to apply this practice to improve supply chain members own interests or the supply chain system s efficiency the research in this chapter demonstrates that the uncertainty level inherent in market demand can be a critical factor influencing the applicability of supply chain contracts as well as the contract s administrative cost cachon 2003 and the uncertainty type marvel and peck 1995

reference dependence in multilocation newsvendor models a structural analysis we propose a behavioral theory to predict actual ordering behavior in multilocation inventory systems the theory rests on a well known stylized fact of human behavior people s preferences are reference dependent we incorporate reference dependence into the newsvendor framework by assuming that there are psychological costs of leftovers and stockouts we also hypothesize that the psychological aversion to leftovers is greater than the disutility for stockouts we then experimentally test the proposed theory in both the centralized and decentralized inventory structures using subjects motivated by substantial financial incentives consistent with the proposed theory actual orders exhibit the so called pull to center bias and the degree of bias is greater in the high profit margin than in the low profit margin condition these systematic biases are shown to eliminate the risk pooling benefit when the demands across store locations are strongly correlated because the proposed model nests the standard inventory and ex post inventory error minimization theories as special cases one can systematically evaluate the predictive power of each alternative using the generalized likelihood principle we structurally estimate all three theories using the experimental data and the estimation results strongly suggest that the proposed behavioral theory captures actual orders and profits better we also conduct two experiments to validate the behavioral model by manipulating the relative salience of the psychological costs of leftovers versus that of stockouts to alleviate the pull to center bias

export to elude abstract how does domestic value added tax vat reform affect firms export we address this question via a model in which firms choose their sales for the domestic and foreign markets optimally the model predicts that strengthening domestic tax enforcement has a negative effect on domestic sales but a positive effect on exports when firms face a convex production cost function we test the model predictions using detailed firm and product level data from chinese industrial surveys and customs records our empirical analyses rely on china s golden tax project which is an information technology introduced in 2001 2002 that dramatically reduces the cost of vat enforcement we find that after the adoption of the technology by the government firms located far from local tax offices face a larger increase in their effective vat rates than those located nearby the enforcement effect and the former increase their export more than the latter the elusion effect we also find that the elusion effect is stronger for firms subject to higher export rebates or more severe financial constraints

building state capacity evidence from biometric smartcards in india anti poverty programs in developing countries are often dicult to implement in particular many governments lack the capacity to deliver payments securely to targeted beneciaries we evaluate the impact of biometrically authenticated payments infrastructure smartcards on beneciaries of employment nregs and pension ssp programs in the indian state of andhra pradesh using a large scale experiment that randomized the rollout of smartcards over 158 subdistricts and 19 million people we nd that while incompletely implemented the new system delivered a faster more predictable and less corrupt nregs payments process without adversely aecting program access for each of these outcomes treatment group distributions rst order stochastically dominated those of the control group the investment was cost eective as time savings to nregs beneciaries alone were equal to the cost of the intervention and there was also a signicant reduction in the leakage of funds between the government and beneciaries in both nregs and ssp programs beneciaries overwhelmingly preferred the new system for both programs overall our results suggest that investing in secure payments infrastructure can signicantly enhance state capacity to implement welfare programs in developing countries

decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution experimental evidence in the newsvendor problem a decision maker orders inventory before a one period selling season with stochastic demand if too much is ordered stock is left over at the end of the period whereas if too little is ordered sales are lost the expected profit maximizing order quantity is well known but little is known about how managers actually make these decisions we describe two experiments that investigate newsvendor decisions across different profit conditions results from these studies demonstrate that choices systematically deviate from those that maximize expected profit subjects order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit products these results are not consistent with risk aversion risk seeking preferences prospect theory preferences waste aversion stockout aversion or the consequences of underestimating opportunity costs two explanations are consistent with the data one subjects behave as if their utility function incorporates a preference to reduce ex post inventory error the absolute difference between the chosen quantity and realized demand two subjects suffer from the anchoring and insufficient adjustment bias feedback and training did not mitigate inventory order errors we suggest techniques to improve decision making

supply chain choice on the internet internet companies extensively use the practice of drop shipping where the wholesaler stocks and owns the inventory and ships products directly to customers at retailers request under the drop shipping arrangement the supply chain benefits from risk pooling because the inventory for multiple retailers is stocked at the same location the wholesalers another more traditional channel alternative on the internet is one in which retailers stock and own the inventory these two supply chain structures which predominate on the internet result in different inventory risk allocation stocking decisions and profits for channel members moreover the two channel alternatives can be combined into a dual strategy whereby the retailer uses local inventory as a primary source and relies on drop shipping as a backup we model the dual strategy as a noncooperative game among the retailers and the wholesaler analyze it and obtain insights into the structural properties of the equilibrium solution to facilitate development of recommendations for practicing managers finally we characterize situations in which each of three channels is preferable by specifying appropriate ranges of critical parameters including demand variability the number of retailers in the channel wholesale prices and transportation costs

labor supply of new york city cabdrivers one day at a time life cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages because such changes have virtually no effect on life cycle wealth previous attempts to test this hypothesis empirically with time series data have not been supportive estimated elasticities are typically negative or nonsignificant such analyses however are vulnerable to measurement error and other estimation problems we use data on daily observations of wages and hours for new york city cab drivers to estimate the supply response to transitory fluctuations in wages cab drivers decide daily how many hours to supply and face wages that are positively correlated within days but largely uncorrelated between days using these data our central finding is that wage elasticities are persistently negative from 5 to 1 in three different samples even after correcting for measurement error using instrumental variables these negative wage elasticities challenge the notion that cab drivers trade off labor and leisure at different points in time and question the empirical adequacy of life cycle formulations of labor supply

how psychological should economic and marketing models be abstract the authors discuss the potential of making the recently developed behavioral economics models even more psychological by 1 increasing their context specificity 2 allowing different people to have different model parameters and 3 capturing the underlying psychological processes more explicitly they show that some of these models already make room for understanding context specificity and heterogeneity and they discuss new ways to enrich the models along those two dimensions the task of adding process details is more challenging in simple mathematical forms because these models must serve as building blocks for aggregate market models

social loss aversion and optimal contest design when managers are designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople service employees franchisees or product development teams a key question is what should the optimal proportion of winne