analysts weighting of private and public information using both a linear regression method and a probability based method we find that on average analysts place larger than efficient weights on i e they overweight their private information when they forecast corporate earnings we also find that analysts overweight more when issuing forecasts more favorable than the consensus and overweight less and may even underweight private information when issuing forecasts less favorable than the consensus further the deviation from efficient weighting increases when the benefits from doing so are high or when the costs of doing so are low these results suggest that analysts incentives play a larger role in misweighting than their behavioral biases copyright 2006 oxford university press

bias rationality and asymmetric loss functions abstract in the literature it is a common empirical finding that survey based expectations are biased at the individual level this has sparked a large debate if forecasters have asymmetric loss functions or the rationality assumption is violated in this paper i will show that the bias can in large part be explained by the pattern of missing observations in the survey thus the assumption of asymmetric loss functions is not required to satisfy the rationality assumption

rational bias in yield curve forecasts empirical studies of forecasts often fail to reconcile the rational expectations hypothesis with a minimum mean square error objective function recent studies however have argued that observed b

impact of food safety information on us poultry demand the impact of poultry product recall events on consumer demand in the us was empirically tested for four major categories of poultry broiler young chicken eggs turkey and other chicken mature or nonbroiler chicken from 2000 to 2004 poultry food safety inspection service fsis recall events had a consistent positive impact on demand for turkey but no significant impact on other types of poultry products united states department of agriculture usda fsis recall as a complement to food labelling did not undermine poultry consumption but promoted turkey demands on the contrary media recall undermined poultry demands moreover it demonstrated that turkey consumers were a special behaviour group of poultry consumers

macroeconomic forecasts and microeconomic forecasters in the presence of principal agent problems published macroeconomic forecasts by professional economists may not measure expectations forecasters may use their forecasts in order to manipulate beliefs about their ability i test a cross sectional implication of models of reputation and information revelation i find that as forecasters become older and more established they produce more radical forecasts since these more radical forecasts are in general less accurate ex post forecast accuracy grows significantly worse as forecasters become older and more established these findings are consistent with reputational factors at work in professional macroeconomic forecasts

strategic behavior of federal open market committee board members evidence from members forecasts abstract in this paper we use panel data to test whether federal open market committee fomc board members forecasts are rational rationality is rejected in the sense that forecasts by members are heavily dependent on previous own forecasts and last consensus made in fomc furthermore we reveal the strategic behavior of fomc board members forecasts by governors who always have voting rights agree much with the previous consensus of fomc members forecasts in contrast non governors who rotate voting rights exaggerate their forecasts they aggressively deviate their forecasts from previous consensus the former is herding behavior and the latter is anti herding behavior our results imply that individual members behave strategically governors want to present policy consistent forecasts to the congress and non governors utilize their forecasts to influence decision making in fomc

changing one s mind when the facts change incentives of experts and the design of reporting protocols experts often collect and report information over time what reporting protocol elicits the most information here a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability who observes two signals about the state of the world the signals differ in initial quality and unlike previous work differ in quality improvement the paper finds that mind changes inconsistent reports can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster also sequential reports dominate when the principal s decision is very sensitive to information a single report dominates if the mediocre agent s signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre

explanations of the inconsistencies in survey respondents forecasts a comparison of the point forecasts and the probability distributions of inflation and output growth made by individual respondents to the us survey of professional forecasters indicates that the two sets of forecasts are sometimes inconsistent we evaluate a number of possible explanations and find that not all forecasters update their histogram forecasts as new information arrives this is supported by the finding that the point forecasts are more accurate than the histograms in terms of first moment prediction c 2009 elsevier b v all rights reserved

differential interpretation in the survey of professional forecasters in this paper i estimate a simple bayesian learning model to expectations data from the survey of professional forecasters i reformulate the model in terms of forecast revisions which allows one to abstract from differences in priors and to focus the analysis on the relationship between news and revisions the empirical analysis shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the interpretation of news among forecasters in particular at longer horizons while it decreases closer to the forecast target date the results also indicate a positive relationship between prior sentiment and interpretation of the signal in the sense that relatively optimistic pessimistic forecasters are likely to believe that the signal under over estimates the future realization and assign it a low high weight in the forecast revision

exchange rate puzzles and distorted beliefs abstract we propose a new explanation for the foreign exchange forward premium and delayed overshooting puzzles we show that both puzzles arise from a systematic distortion in investors beliefs about the interest rate process accordingly the forward premium is always a biased predictor of future depreciation the bias can be so severe as to lead to negative coefficients in the fama regression delayed overshooting may or may not occur depending upon the persistence of interest rate innovations and the degree of misperception we document empirically the extent of this distortion using survey data for g 7 countries against the u s and find that it is strong enough to account for these irregularities

one signal two opinions strategic heterogeneity of analysts forecasts we present a model of investors acquiring forecasts from a group of investment analysts investors may pick an analyst based on his past performance in the literature it is typically assumed that agents rewards depend solely on the type they are perceived to be which leads to typical herding results in contrast here analysts rewards not only depend on their own reputation but also on the number of analysts with a similar reputation there exist two interesting types of equilibria in the first type it is optimal for investors to ignore analysts past performance even though analysts make predictions according to their best knowledge in a second type investors do use past performance to select analysts however this induces analysts to predict strategically i e some analysts knowingly make wrong predictions

survey measures of expected u s inflation of real interest rates and cash flows for decisions concerning investment expenditures international capital flows and exchange rate movements hinge in large part on expected real yield differentials across countries the federal reserve needs reliable measures of expected inflation to formulate and gauge the thrust of monetary policy in fact inflation expectations have become more important to the fed given the diminished stability of the link between the monetary aggregates and gdp expenditures since the early 1980s and the greater role which has been thrust upon expected real short term interest rates in the implementation of federal reserve policy the issue of rationality of inflation expectations that is the extent to which agents form expectations without making systematic mistakes in their beliefs about what inflation will be is important if inflation expectations are formed rationally labor and financial markets will strongly tend to neutralize the potential redistributive effects of inflation over time financial capital will flow efficiently within and across national borders moreover some of the stronger claims of new classical macroeconomics like the claim that only unexpected monetary policy actions will

mitigating contagion risk by investing in the safety of rivals abstract firms often benefit when an unfavorable event befalls a rival usually through a shift in demand but sometimes negative especially catastrophic events adversely affect an entire industry we refer to such phenomena as contagion and note that each firm faces not only its own direct risks but also the contagion risks imposed by rivals who for example avoid strong safety measures because investment cost exceeds expected loss the conclusion of this paper is that in the extreme case low risk firms may benefit from investing in safety improvements for their higher risk rivals for example a firm that over complies with safety requirements may benefit from investing in safety improvements in a rival that complies with regulations at a minimal level this research explores conditions under which such a contagion risk mitigation strategy is profitable our findings indicate that for a low risk firm there is a threshold above which such an investment would be profitable in a market where price sensitivity to a rival s safety is close to zero a low risk firm can decrease this threshold by extending the investment horizon the investment is less likely to pay off when firms compete on quantity as opposed to price we also show that below a threshold market price a third firm that is neutral neither needs investment nor invests may be put at a cost disadvantage when this contagion risk mitigation strategy is implemented

bias in federal reserve inflation forecasts is the federal reserve irrational or just cautious abstract inflation forecasts of the federal reserve seem to have systematically under predicted inflation from the fourth quarter of 1968 until volcker s appointment as chairman and to systematically over predict it afterwards until the second quarter of 1998 furthermore under quadratic loss commercial forecasts seem to have information not contained in those forecasts to investigate the cause of this apparent irrationality this paper recovers the loss function implied by federal reserve s inflation forecasts the results suggest that the cost of having inflation above an implicit time varying target was larger than the cost of having inflation below it for the period since volcker and that the opposite was true for the pre volcker era once these asymmetries are taken into account the federal reserve s inflation forecasts are found to be rational

rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts do professional forecasters provide their true unbiased estimates or do they behave strategically in our model forecasters have common information confer actively and thus know the true pdf of future outcomes intensive users of economic forecasts monitor forecasters performance closely occasional users are drawn to the forecaster who fared best in the previous period in the resulting nash equilibrium even though economists have identical expectations they make a range of projections that mimics the true probability distribution of the forecast variable those whose wages depend most on publicity produce forecasts that differ most from the consensus empirical evidence supports the model

financial markets forecasts revisited are they rational stubborn or jumpy this paper evaluates professional forecasters behavior using a panel data of individual forecasts we find that i professional forecasts are behavioral and ii there exists a stock bond dissonance the forecasting behavior seems to be stubborn in the stock market but jumpy in the bond market even in the same country forecasting behavior is quite different by market

using survey data to correct the bias in policy expectations extracted from fed funds futures many studies estimate risk premiums on federal funds futures to extract monetary policy expectations by assuming that average forecast errors of the expectations are zero or that survey forecasts are good proxies for the expectations these assumptions however may fail due to an unanticipated declining trend in the federal funds rate and to survey respondents strategic behavior consequently the premiums estimated under these assumptions may be biased we propose a new method to estimate the premiums and find that the premiums have been often negative since 2000 which is generally consistent with the negative betas observed in the 2000s

disagreement and biases in inflation expectations empirical work documents substantial disagreement in inflation expectations obtained from survey data furthermore the extent of such disagreement varies systematically over time in a way that reflects the level and variance of current inflation this paper oers a simple explanation for these facts based on asymmetries in the forecasters costs of over and under predicting inflation our model implies biased forecasts with positive serial correlation in forecast errors and a cross sectional dispersion that rises with the level and the variance of the inflation rate it also implies that forecast errors at dierent horizons can be predicted through the spread between the short and long term variance of inflation we find empirically that these patterns are present in inflation forecasts from the survey of professional forecasters a constant bias component not explained by asymmetric loss and rational expectations is required to explain the shift in the sign of the bias observed for a substantial portion of forecasters around 1982

inflation expectations and behavior do survey respondents act on their beliefs we compare the inflation expectations reported by consumers in a survey with their behavior in a financially incentivized investment experiment the survey is found to be informative in the sense that the beliefs reported by the respondents are correlated with their choices in the experiment more importantly we find evidence that most respondents act on their inflation expectations showing patterns consistent with economic theory respondents whose behavior cannot be rationalized tend to have lower education and lower numeracy and financial literacy these findings help confirm the relevance of inflation expectations surveys and provide support to the microfoundations of modern macroeconomic models

a theory of noise trading in securities markets in a recent article black 1 introduces a type of trading that he terms noise trading he asserts that noise trading which he defines as trading on noise as if it were information must be a significant factor in securities markets however he does not provide an explanation of why any investors would rationally want to engage in noise trading the goal of this paper is to provide such an explanation for one type of investor managers of investment funds as shown here the incentive for a manager to engage in noise trading arises because of the positive signal that the level of the manager s trading provides about his or her ability to collect private information concerning current and potential investments if the manager s compensation is directly related to investors perceptions of his or her ability the manager will then trade more frequently than is justified on the basis of his or her private information in addition to providing this explanation for noise trading the results of this analysis may also be useful for further empirical exploration of the relation between investment fund portfolio turnover and subsequent performance

an analysis of a panel of spanish gdp forecasts this article undertakes an analysis of the forecasts included in the panel of spanish forecasts in order to highlight the fact that the predictions made and the errors committed by the entities participating on this panel contain information that is particularly useful in analysing the evolution of the spanish economy here a study is undertaken of the gdp growth forecasts for the spanish economy for the period 2000 to 2002 made in distinct forecast time horizons specifically it analyses whether the forecasts are optimistic or pessimistic and whether new information concerning the variable being predicted is used efficiently in revising earlier forecasts

why are professional forecasters biased agency versus behavioral explanations professional forecasters may not simply aim to minimize expected squared forecast errors in models with repeated forecasts the pattern of forecasts reveals valuable information about the forecasters even before the outcome is realized rational forecasters will compromise between minimizing errors and mimicking prediction patterns typical of able forecasters simple models based on this argument imply that forecasts are biased in the direction of forecasts typical of able forecasters our models of strategic bias are rejected empirically as forecasts are biased in directions typical of forecasters with large mean squared forecast errors this observation is consistent with behavioral explanations of forecast bias

do analysts herd an analysis of recommendations and market reactions this article develops and implements a new test to investigate whether sell side analysts herd around the consensus when they make stock recommendations our empirical results support the herding hypothesis stock price reactions following recommendation revisions are stronger when the new recommendation is away from the consensus than when it is closer to it indicating that the market recognizes analysts tendency to herd we find that analysts from larger brokerages analysts following stocks with smaller dispersion across recommendations and analysts who make less frequent revisions are more likely to herd the author 2009 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oxfordjournals org oxford university press

testing for forecast consensus a panel of forecasts may be defined to be in consensus when individual forecasters place identical weights on a common latent variable we suggest this definition and formulate a dynamic latent variable model to test for consensus this method also tests whether it is valid to use the mean forecast as the consensus forecast in applications to surveys of u s macroeconomic forecasters there is greater consensus in forecasts for output growth than for inflation or unemployment but idiosyncratic forecast autocorrelation from year to year is present for most forecasters

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

harnessing the wisdom of crowds when will a large group provide an accurate answer to a question involving quantity estimation we empirically examine this question on a crowd based corporate earnings forecast platform estimize

how beliefs influence the willingness to contribute to prevention expenditure we study how beliefs affect individuals willingness to contribute to prevention expenditure through a two type n person public good game and test several results empirically we show analytically that pessimistic agents will invest more in prevention expenditure than optimists we also demonstrate how small differences in beliefs may induce substantial differences in type related prevention expenditure the more atomistic agents are the less they will contribute to the public good pessimistic beliefs then lead to a double deprivation and we discuss potential issues and remedies the more optimistic a society is the lower will be its total green expenditure we then use a large international survey to study how beliefs and additional controls determine prevention expenditure we rely on several proxies for beliefs and the willingness to contribute to prevention expenditure which we combine through principal component analysis in addition we investigate the role of environmental education for the relationship between beliefs and the willingness to contribute because of potential endogeneity bias due to unobserved variables that are likely to affect both beliefs and the willingness to contribute we follow the theoretical analysis and resort to a recursive bivariate model our main findings are very much in line with the theoretical predictions we find across all specifications that more optimistic beliefs lead to a lower willingness to contribute environmental education affects the willingness to contribute only indirectly through its impact on beliefs

explaining bureaucratic optimism theory and evidence from u s executive agency macroeconomic forecasts we offer a theory of intertemporal bureaucratic decision making which proposes that an agency s forecast optimism is related to the extent to which it discounts future reputation costs associated with bureaucratic incompetence agency forecasts of the distant future are more likely to be optimistic than short term forecasts we claim that unstable organizations will discount reputation costs at a steeper rate than stable organizations and therefore will produce more optimistic forecasts we test our theory using macroeconomic forecasts produced by the office of management and budget omb and the social security administration ssa across six forecast horizons from 1979 to 2003 the statistical results are generally consistent with our theory omb generates more optimistic long term forecasts than ssa further differences in forecast optimism between these executive branch agencies widen as the forecast horizon increases our evidence suggests that more stable agencies place a premium on minimizing reputation costs conversely less stable agencies are more likely to accommodate political pressures for forecast optimism these findings underscore the importance of institutional design for understanding how executive agencies balance the conflicting goals of political responsiveness and bureaucratic competence within the administrative state

lies damn lies and pre election polling in this paper we ask the question how well do pre election polls forecast the actual results of elections in the united states 1 the question is interesting for a number of reasons first even polling data suggest about one third of polling respondents do not believe that polls work in the best interests of the general public 2 the situa tion is such that even many national governments have undertaken to restrict some aspect of pre election polling a 1997 international survey of governments found 30 of 78 surveyed nations had some kind of ban on publication of poll results second there is a strong presumption in the lit erature on professional forecasting in other con texts such as interest rate forecasting which do not rely on sampling per se that forecasts will be biased there is a variety of explanations for why forecasts will be biased one honest motivation is that pollsters may avoid reporting results from the unavoidable atypical polls third in the literature in economics it is sometimes assumed

biases in macroeconomic forecasts irrationality or asymmetric loss empirical studies using survey data on expectations have frequently observed that forecasts are biased and have concluded that agents are not rational we establish that existing rationality tests are not robust to even small deviations from symmetric loss and hence have little ability to tell whether the forecaster is irrational or the loss function is asymmetric we quantify the exact trade off between forecast inefficiency and asymmetric loss leading to identical outcomes of standard rationality tests and explore new and more general methods for testing forecast rationality jointly with flexible families of loss functions that embed quadratic loss as a special case an empirical application to survey data on forecasts of nominal output growth demonstrates the empirical significance of our results and finds that rejections of rationality may largely have been driven by the assumption of symmetric loss

the strategy of professional forecasting we develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters strategic behavior the first theory reputational cheap talk posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed the market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state if the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean with correct market expectations equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded the second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre specified rules in a winner take all contest equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated

testing the rationality of price forecasts new evidence from panel data this paper tests the rationality of individual price forecasts in a panel of professional forecasters here unlike in most previous studies rationality is not rejected the results here differ because 1 using individual forecasts avoids aggregation bias 2 comparison of forecasts to initial data avoids bias due to data revision 3 the professional forecasters have economic incentives to state their expectations accurately and 4 a new covariance matrix estimator consistent when forecast errors are correlated across individuals is used copyright 1990 by american economic association

do sell side stock analysts exhibit escalation of commitment this paper presents evidence that when an analyst makes an out of consensus forecast of a company s quarterly earnings that turns out to be incorrect she escalates her commitment to maintaining an out of consensus view on the company relative to an analyst who was close to the consensus the out of consensus analyst adjusts her forecasts for the current fiscal year s earnings less in the direction of the quarterly earnings surprise on average this type of updating behavior reduces forecasting accuracy so it does not seem to reflect superior private information further empirical results suggest that analysts do not have financial incentives to stand by extreme stock calls in the face of contradictory evidence managerial and financial market implications are discussed

foreign exchange rate expectations micro survey data this paper analyzes the panel data of biweekly surveys on the yen dollar exchange rate expectations of forty four institutions for two years and contains four major findings first market participants are heterogeneous that is significant individual effects exist in their expectation formation second the individual effects have a characteristic of wishful expectations exporters expect yen depreciation and importers expect yen appreciation relative to others third many violate the rational expectations hypothesis fourth forecasts with long horizons show less yen appreciation than those with short horizons cross equation constraints implied by the consistency of the forecast term structure are strongly rejected in the data copyright 1990 by american economic association

exchange rate expectations the role of person specific forward looking variables abstract we analyze how individual forecasters build their foreign exchange rate expectations the wall street journal poll allows us to incorporate explanatory variables such as expected inflation rates and expected gdp growth rates that are both forward looking and person specific

can rational stubbornness explain forecast biases this paper examines whether the rational jumpiness stubbornness hypothesis can explain forecast biases using a dataset of professional gdp forecasts for the g7 countries over the period 1989 2010 we find evidence supporting the rational stubbornness hypothesis specifically forecasters underreact more when large forecast revisions are highly indicative of low forecast ability underreaction is less likely when the size of forecast revisions is unrelated to ability these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that forecasters choose to smooth gdp forecasts to maximize their perceived ability

evaluating the efficiency of the fomc s new economic projections since 2007 fomc policymakers have been publishing detailed numerical projections of macroeconomic series over the next three years by testing whether the revisions to these projections are unpredictable i find that fomc s efficiency is generally accepted for inflation but often rejected for real economic variables notably for the unemployment rate the rejection is due to the strong autocorrelation of revisions which may reflect information rigidity of fomc s unemployment projections the joint efficiency of the entire projection is accepted in most cases

security analysts career concerns and herding of earnings forecasts several theories of reputation and herding see e g scharfstein and stein 1990 suggest that herding among agents should vary with career concerns our goal in this paper is to document whether such a link exists in the labor market for security analysts specifically we look at the relationship between an analyst s job tenure a proxy for career concerns and various measures of stock earnings forecast performance we establish the following key results 1 older analysts are more likely to produce earnings forecasts of firms before younger ones 2 their forecasts also deviate more from the consensus forecast than their younger counterparts we argue that these results are consistent with some reputational models of herding we also establish a number of auxiliary findings regarding the relationship between forecast accuracy and frequency of forecast revisions with job tenure

testing the rationality of japanese gdp forecasts the sign of forecast revision matters abstract this paper analyzes the rationality of japanese gdp forecasts of individual economists it finds that japanese forecasters are pessimistic optimistic when their forecast revisions frs are positive negative and that they always over react to new information across forecasters the magnitude of average fr is not correlated with the magnitude of average forecast errors fe these results together are consistent with neither the rational expectations hypothesis nor reputation models with rational and strategic forecasters

the liability of good reputation a study of product recalls in the u s automobile industry in this paper we explore opposing theoretical claims about how organizational reputation affects market reactions to product defects on the one hand good reputation could be a disadvantage because expectations about product quality are more likely to be violated by defects in highly reputed products on the other hand a good reputation could be an advantage because of strong inertial effects on reputation orderings we empirically test these competing hypotheses using data on product recalls in the u s automobile industry from 1975 to 1999 our results support for the idea that reputation can be an organizational liability in that highly reputed firms suffer more market penalty as a result of their product recalls we also propose that the reputational effects are moderated by two important factors substitutability and generalism specialism our results show that having few substitutes with an equivalent level of reputation or a focused product identity stemming from specialism buffers the negative market reactions to product recalls we conclude with a discussion on the implications of these results for institutional reputation and status theories

evolution of banking efficiency within an unstable macroeconomic environment the case of turkish commercial banks this paper analyses the efficiency performance of the turkish banking sector between 1988 and 1999 a period characterized by increasing macroeconomic instability the technical and scale efficiencies of turkish commercial banks are measured with the use of nonparametric data envelopment analysis the empirical results suggest that over the sample period both pure technical and scale efficiency measures show a great variation and the sector did not achieve sustained efficiency gains it is also reported that the sector suffers mainly from scale inefficiency and scale inefficiency in turn is due to decreasing returns to scale there are also reported differences in the efficiency performance of commercial banks with different ownership status in addition the relationships between profitability asset quality size and the two definitions of efficiency are considered efficient banks are more profitable and pure technical efficiency and scale inefficiency are positively related to size the trend in th