the thrill of victory measuring the incentive to win there is ample evidence that incentive pay structures such as tournaments result in increased performance is this due to selection or increased individual effort and is any increased individual effort caused by pecuniary incentives or merely thirst for the thrill of victory tov prior literature has not separated the different effects we look at performance in horse and dog racing and find that only horses controlled by jockeys during the race exhibit performance corresponding to pecuniary incentives while both respond to selection and tov the results show that pay structures do matter

presidential address collateral and commitment optimal dynamic capital structure choice is fundamentally a problem of commitment in a standard trade off setting with shareholder debtholder agency conflicts full commitment counterfactually predicts the firm would rely almost exclusively on debt financing conversely absent commitment a modigliani miller like value irrelevance and policy indeterminacy result holds thus the content of dynamic trade off theory must depend on the commitment technology in this context collateral is valuable as a low cost commitment device because ex ante optimal commitments are likely to be suboptimal ex post observed capital structure dynamics will exhibit hysteresis and depart significantly from standard predictions

testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets the first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context we also argue that insurance data are particularly well suited to such empirical investigations to illustrate this claim we use data on contracts and accidents to investigate the extent of asymmetric information in the french market for automobile insurance using various parametric and nonparametric methods we find no evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in this market

north south trade export led growth with abundant labour abstract a north south model is developed in which the south is represented as a neo classical dual economy conditions are imposed which make temporary equilibrium unique and walrasian stable and long run balanced growth paths globally asymptotically stable in the short run an expansion of northern demand for southern products always improves the terms of trade in the long run however an increase in the growth rate of northern demand can turn the terms of trade against the south reduce real wages and lower living standards

claim timing and ex post adverse selection many health care treatments are not urgent and may be delayed if patients so choose because insurance coverage is typically determined by the treatment date individuals may have incentives to strategically delay treatments to minimize out of pocket costs the strategic delay of treatment a particular form of moral hazard can be an important source of subsequent adverse selection in which ex ante identical individuals select insurance coverage based on their differing accumulation of previously delayed treatments this article investigates these forces empirically in the context of the missing market for dental insurance using rich claim level data my analysis reveals that approximately 40 of individuals strategically delay dental treatments when incentivized to do so and this flexibility in delaying treatment can explain why the market for dental insurance has largely unraveled more generally the counterfactual analysis suggests features such as open enrolment periods and contracting on pre existing conditions may be helpful tools in overcoming adverse selection in insurance contexts where the timing of uncertainty is not contractible

choose to lose health plan choices from a menu with dominated option we examine the health plan choices that 23 894 employees at a u s firm made from a large menu of options that differed only in financial cost sharing and premium these decisions provide a clear test of the predictions of the standard economic model of insurance choice in the absence of choice frictions because plans were priced so that nearly every plan with a lower deductible was financially dominated by an otherwise identical plan with a high deductible we document that the majority of employees chose dominated plans which resulted in excess spending equivalent to 24 of chosen plan premiums low income employees were significantly more likely to choose dominated plans and most employees did not switch into more financially efficient plans in the subsequent year we show that the choice of dominated plans cannot be rationalized by standard risk preference or any expectations about health risk testing alternative explanations with a series of hypothetical choice experiments we find that the popularity of dominated plans was not primarily driven by the size and complexity of the plan menu nor informed preferences for avoiding high deductibles but by employees lack of understanding of health insurance our findings challenge the standard practice of inferring risk preferences from insurance choices and raise doubts about the welfare benefits of health reforms that expand consumer choice

the role of games in security design we contend that security design should be approached as a problem of game design that is contracts should specify the procedures that govern the behavior of contract participants in determining outcomes as well as the allocations resulting from those outcomes we characterize optimal contracts in two nested classes all contracts including those that depend on the state and state independent contracts we demonstrate that in situations in which the dependence of contracts on the state is limited contracts designed as games can improve the allocation of resources relative to nonstrategic allocation rules article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

preference heterogeneity and insurance markets explaining a puzzle of insurance the textbook approach to insurance markets emphasizes the role of private information about risk in determining who purchases insurance in the classic adverse selection model of michael rothschild and joseph stiglitz 1976 individu als with higher expected claims buy more insur ance than those with lower expected claims who may be out of the market entirely this basic prediction of asymmetric information models of a positive correlation between insurance cov erage and accident occurrence has been shown to be robust to a variety of extensions to the stan

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

estimating the effects of global patent protection in pharmaceuticals a case study of quinolones in india under the trips agreement wto members are required to enforce product patents for pharmaceuticals the debate about the merits of this requirement has been extremely contentious many low income economies claim that patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines with adverse consequences for the health and well being of their citizens on the other hand research based global pharmaceutical companies argue that prices are unlikely to rise significantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes in this paper we empirically investigate the basis of these claims central to the ongoing debate is the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where because health insurance coverage is so rare almost all medical expense are met out of pocket using a detailed product level data set from india we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply side parameters for the fluoroquinolones sub segment of the systemic anti bacterials i e antibiotics segment of the indian pharmaceuticals market we then use these estimates to carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices profits and consumer welfare would have been had the fluoroquinolone molecules we study been under patent in india as they were in the u s at the time our results suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare effects of trips may have some basis we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory licensing the total annual welfare losses to the indian economy from the withdrawal of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub segment would be on the order of u s 450 million or about 73 of the sales of the entire systemic anti bacterials segment in 2000 of this amount foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly 50 million or 11 the overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare in contrast the profit gains to foreign producers in the absence of any price regulation are estimated to be only around 53 million per year

control rights and capital structure an empirical investigation we show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit the effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower s alternative sources of finance are costly in addition despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation a fundamental question in financial economics is how do firms choose their financial policies extant empirical research on this question has focused primarily on the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs e g scott 1976 information asymmetry e g myers and majluf 1984 and more recently market timing behavior e g baker and wurgler 2002 however beginning with jensen and meckling 1976 a large body of theoretical research examines how incentive conflicts between managers and external investors affect corporate financial policies in particular theoretical research on financial contracting shows that in the presence of incentive conflicts optimal debt contracts will allocate certain rights to creditors after negative performance in order to help firms secure financing ex ante e g aghion and bolton 1992 and dewatripont and tirole

anchoring in financial decision making evidence from jeopardy abstract this paper analyzes 12 596 daily double wagering decisions of 6064 contestants in the us game show jeopardy we exploit a situation in which a player has to unexpectedly wager on responding correctly to an unknown clue known as a daily double clue we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis of contestants anchoring heavily on the initial dollar value of a clue in wagering this positive relationship remains statistically significant at the one percent level after controlling for other characteristics that may independently affect wagering decisions such as scores clue categories time trends individual jeopardy experience and player fixed effects exploiting within player variation only raising the anchoring amount by 100 translates to an increase of 29 in the wager an alternative explanation of underlying strategic considerations appears unlikely and results are consistent throughout a number of robustness checks overall these findings suggest that anchoring can play a substantial role in financial decision making under pressure

pricing and welfare in health plan choice premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs either because consumers have private information or because prices are not risk rated this creates inefficiencies when consumers self select into plans we develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers we find a welfare loss of 2 11 percent of coverage costs compared to what is feasible with risk rating only about one quarter of this is due to inefficiently chosen uniform contribution levels we also investigate the reclassification risk created by risk rating individual incremental premiums finding only a modest welfare cost

an empirical analysis of competitive nonlinear pricing abstract we estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional preference heterogeneity using individual level data on advertisements bought by local businesses e g doctors electricians from two yellow page directories in one u s city market variation in individual choices and payments allows us to identify the joint density of preferences marginal costs of publishing and common utility parameters our estimates suggest substantial welfare loss due to asymmetric information comparing duopoly outcomes with counterfactual monopoly outcomes we find that with less competition i producer surplus increases substantially ii more low type consumers are excluded iii product variety increases but benefits accrue only to the high type consumers iv total consumer surplus decreases v but its distribution across consumers does not change

did community rating induce an adverse selection death spiral evidence from new york pennsylvania and connecticut using data from the 1987 to 1996 march current population surveys we find no evidence for the dire predictions of some that the imposition of pure community rating leads to a market wide reduction in insurance coverage by setting off an adverse selection death spiral specifically the percentage of individuals in small groups covered by health insurance did not fall in new york which enacted community rating legislation in 1993 relative to either pennsylvania which enacted no insurance reform or connecticut which enacted moderate insurance reforms without imposing community rating consistent with the predictions of the simple rothschild and stiglitz 1976 framework however we find that the new yorkreforms appear to have had a significant impact on the structure of the new yorkinsurance mark et specifically new yorkexperienced a dramatic shift away from indemnity insurance toward hmos while this shift tookplace during a period of nationwide increases in the percentage with managed care the increase in hmo penetration in new york s small group and individual markets was significantly greater than in pennsylvania or connecticut

terms of trade and domestic distribution export led growth with abundant labour abstract a general equilibrium macro model is constructed to explore effects of export led growth policies on the terms of trade and the domestic distribution of a developing region with abundant labour this region the south trades with another the north they have different technologies and supplies of factors it is shown that under certain conditions of dualism in the production of goods and of abundant labour supply in the south an increase in the volume of exports from the south may bring about a sustained worsening of the south s terms of trade with the north even if this increase in exports is due to a positive shift in demand from the north this change in the terms of trade is accompanied by a sustained loss of purchasing power of wages within the south these results take place in a walrasian stable market when technologies are more homogenous and labour less abundant the results are reversed increased exports will take place together with improvements in terms of trade and a tendency to equalise factor prices between the regions the results argue for coordination of domestic and international policies with special attention to technologies and labour markets

multiple dimensions of private information evidence from the long term care insurance market we demonstrate the existence of multiple dimensions of private information in the long term care insurance market two types of people purchase insurance individuals with private information that they are high risk and individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance ex post the former are higher risk than insurance companies expect while the latter are lower risk in aggregate those with more insurance are not higher risk our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information even absent a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence the results also suggest a general test for asymmetric information

health and mortality delta assessing the welfare cost of household insurance choice we develop a pair of risk measures health and mortality delta for the universe of life and health insurance products a life cycle model of insurance choice simplifies to replicating the optimal health and mortality delta through a portfolio of insurance products we estimate the model to explain the observed variation in health and mortality delta implied by the ownership of life insurance annuities including private pensions and long term care insurance in the health and retirement study for the median household aged 51 to 57 the lifetime welfare cost of market incompleteness and suboptimal choice is 3 2 of total wealth

covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender s incentives to do this thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender s incentives to monitor covenants make a loan s effective maturity and the ability to collateralize makes a loan s effective priority contingent on monitoring by the lender thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender s incentive to monitor these results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending modern finance theory suggests that financial intermediaries such as commercial banks insurance companies and finance companies monitor and control their borrowers on behalf of other investors 1 this article investigates how the loans made by these institutions can be structured so as to best enhance the institutions role as delegated monitors covenants and collateral are common features of loans made by financial institutions but these features are somewhat difficult to justify consider loan covenants clauses in a loan contract that require the borrower to take or refrain from various actions berlin and mester 1992 magee and sridhar 1994 and park 1994 show that by giving institutions the right to renegotiate or call loans when covenants are violated covenants serve as tripwires that enhance the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting also as documented in smith and warner 1979 control rights from covenants reduce borrower adverse selection or moral hazard nevertheless by allowing institutions to demand repayment based on any information contractible or not

international capital transfers and the choice of production technique a simple two country model abstract a two country two factor two good world with incomplete specialization is explored in the context of international capital transfers where the techniques of production of the same good differ across sectors of the world economy it is shown that the terms of trade for the south will worsen with a capital transfer to the south under a wide range of assumptions about the nature of the technology used in the north owned sector of the south the implied redistribution of world income as well as the implications of a change in the production technique of the foreign owned sector of the south are then examined

advantageous selection in insurance markets this article reverses the standard conclusion that asymmetric information plus competition results in insufficient insurance provision risk tolerant individuals take few precautions and are disinclined to insure but they are drawn into a pooling equilibrium by the low premiums created by the presence of safer more risk averse types taxing insurance drives out the reckless clients allowing a strict pareto gain this result depends on administrative costs in processing claims and issuing policies as does the novel finding of a pure strategy partial pooling subgame perfect nash equilibrium in the insurance market copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

the industrial organization of health care markets the u s health care sector is large and growing health care spending in 2011 amounted to 2 7 trillion and 18 percent of gdp approximately half of health care output is allocated via markets in this paper we analyze the industrial organization literature on health care markets focusing on the impact of competition on price quality and treatment decisions for health care providers and health insurers we conclude with a discussion of research opportunities for industrial organization economists including opportunities created by the u s patient protection and affordable care act

the design of bank loan contracts the unique characteristics of bank loans emerge endogenously to enhance efficiency in a model of renegotiation between a borrower and a lender in which there is the potential for moral hazard on each side of the relationship firm risk is endogenous and renegotiated interest rates on the debt need not be monotone in firm risk the initial terms of the debt are not set to price default risk but rather are set to efficiently balance bargaining power in later renegotiation loan pricing may be nonlinear involving initial transfers either from the borrower to the bank or front the bank to the borrower article published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies in its journal the review of financial studies

estimating the benefits of contractual completeness i provide a revealed preference based framework that uses covenant prices and choices to quantitatively study how covenants generate firm benefits by completing debt contracts i use a rational expectations based panel estimator of covenant prices which does not require quasi experimental variation to circumvent the problem of endogenous covenant choices i find that firms surpluses exceed the spread paid on a loan leverage and interest rate covenants produce the largest benefits lending quantitative credence to several standard theories of covenants once covenants are chosen the benefits from fine tuning them are small thus rationalizing boilerplate covenants i conclude by discussing the extensions and limitations of my method the author 2013 published by oxford university press on behalf of the society for financial studies all rights reserved for permissions please e mail journals permissions oup com oxford university press

mispriced equity regulated rates for auto insurance in massachusetts from the santa monica freeway to the new jersey turnpike drivers are unhappy about the cost of automobile insurance and are asking government to do something about it california voters approved proposition 103 in 1988 it requires that all rates be approved by the state insurance commissioner attempts to reduce rates by 20 percent and dramatically limits the criteria that can be used to rate drivers for premium purposes new jersey enacted an insurance reform law that seeks to charge insurers for a deficit burdened state underwriting pool and prohibits the use of age sex and marital status in rating drivers for premiums other states enacting or considering significant rate rollbacks or reform since 1988 include arizona florida michigan nevada and pennsylvania this article describes the current consequences of similar policies adopted in massachusetts more than a decade ago the experience suggests that recent moves by other states in the same direction will ultimately prove quite expensive as the proportion of high cost drivers increases and as insurers lose the incentive to write policies and control costs the trend away from insurance premiums based on expected cost also reduces incentive effects for drivers since insurance premiums provide a link between tort judgments and consumer decisions

health insurance and the demand for medical care evidence from a randomized experiment we estimate how cost sharing the portion of the bill the patient pays affects the demand for medical services the data come from a randomized experiment a catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out of pocket price the price elasticity is approximately 0 2 we reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure for example by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization

accounting information in financial contracting the incomplete contract theory perspective this paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research we argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved by discussing its rich theoretical implications we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency

observing unobservables identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice we estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology we randomized 58 000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major south african lender along three dimensions i an initial offer interest rate featured on a direct mail solicitation ii a contract interest rate that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate and ii a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing these three randomizations combined with complete knowledge of the lender s information set permit identification of specific types of private information problems our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate via unobservable risk and anticipated effort from hidden action effects via moral hazard in effort induced by actual contract terms we find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems a rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13 to 21 of default is due to moral hazard asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high risk borrowers

moral hazard vs liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance this paper presents new evidence on why unemployment insurance ui benefits affect search behavior and develops a simple method of calculating the welfare gains from ui using this evidence i show that 60 percent of the increase in unemployment durations caused by ui benefits is due to a liquidity effect rather than distortions on marginal incentives to search moral hazard by combining two empirical strategies first i find that increases in benefits have much larger effects on durations for liquidity constrained households second lump sum severance payments increase durations substantially among constrained households i derive a formula for the optimal benefit level that depends only on the reduced form liquidity and moral hazard elasticities the formula implies that the optimal ui benefit level exceeds 50 percent of the wage the exact identification approach to welfare analysis proposed here yields robust optimal policy results because it does not require structural estimation of primitives

field experiments on the anchoring of economic valuations i introduction take the last three digits of your social security number ssn turn those numbers into a dollar value i e if your numbers are 462 then they provide a value of 462 consider whether you would be willing to pay that dollar amount for a first edition of j r r tolkien s the hobbit now how much would you actually pay for a first edition original copy a stylized result from laboratory experiments in economics and psychology is that the answer to the latter valuation question can be strongly influenced by the dollar amount computed at the start 1 critics of neoclassical theory have argued that the influence of uninformative anchors such as the transformed ssn refutes the notion that decision makers preferences are predefined consistent and stable instead they are constructed during the process of choice bettman luce and payne 1998 hoeffler and ariely 1999 slovic 1995 a natural conclusion one might draw from studies of anchoring is that decisions may be influenced by irrelevant circumstances and optimization principles do not apply the laboratory evidence consonant with anchoring effects is considerable tversky and kahneman 1974 make a seminal contribution implementing a protocol similar to the one described above to examine general knowledge questions 2 furnham and boo 2011 provide a recent review of the literature and identify more than 25 studies that report significant anchoring effects substantive areas investigated include general knowledge questions epley and gilovich 2006 tversky and kahneman 1974 probability estimates wright and anderson 1989 legal judgments englich and mussweiler 2001 forecasting switzer and sniezek 1991 and valuation and purchasing decisions ariely loewenstein and prelec 2003 taken together the results suggest strong effects from anchoring protocols even in areas where subjects have significant experience yet the importance of anchoring for economic outcomes remains an open question one reason is that research goals and methods differ across the disciplines of psychology and economics croson 2005 hertwig and ortmann 2001 plott 1996 3 fumham and boo 2011 note that drawing generalizable conclusions from the existing anchoring studies is difficult as many involve undergraduate students engaged with topics they are unlikely to encounter in field settings their observation is consistent with the criticism of the ecological validity of many studies made by gerd gigerenzer and colleauges gigerenzer et al 2008 discussed in our footnote 2 while the results of these studies may help distinguish among competing causal claims about the anchoring process they are less relevant for understanding the potential for anchors to affect market equilibria further many of the studies lack meaningful incentives and we believe that economists are justifiably circumspect about results that may merely reflect mistakes made by unmotivated subjects consistent with this view is the idea that with appropriate incentives and feedback anchoring effects should diminish and behavior more closely match predictions from neoclassical models 4 recent attempts to examine the relevance of anchoring for economic outcomes closely follow ariely loewenstein and prelec 2003 alp hereafter who find statistically and economically significant effects of anchors on willingness to pay wtp for common consumer goods and on willingness to accept wta for unpleasant sounds and tastes bergman et al 2010 and fudenberg levine and maniadis 2012 flm hereafter replicate the consumer goods portion of the alp study with mixed results bergman et al 2010 find significant anchoring results consistent with the earlier work although the magnitude of the effect is smaller implementing an auxiliary protocol they find also that anchoring effects diminish with cognitive ability flm 2012 attempt to anchor both wtp and wta and find no evidence of anchoring in the wtp treatment

simulation of a health insurance market with adverse selection a health insurance market is examined in which individuals with a history of high utilization of health care services tend to select fee for service ffs insurance when offered a choice between ffs and health maintenance organizations hmos in addition hmos are assumed to practice community rating of employee groups based on these observations and health plan enrollment and premium data from minneapolis st paul a deterministic simulation model is constructed to predict equilibrium market shares and premiums for hmo and ffs insurers within a firm despite the fact that favorable selection enhances their ability to compete with ffs insurers the model predicts that hmos maximize profits at less than 100 market share and at a lower share than they could conceivably capture that is hmos would not find it to their advantage to drive ffs insurers from the market even if they could in all cases however the profit maximizing hmo premium is greater than the experience rated premium and thus the ave

health insurance for humans information frictions plan choice and consumer welfare traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk in practice choosing an insurance plan is a complicated decision often made without full information in this paper we combine new administrative data on health plan choices and claims with unique survey data on consumer information to identify risk preferences information frictions and hassle costs our additional friction measures are important predictors of choices and meaningfully impact risk preference estimates we study the implications of counterfactual insurance allocations to illustrate the importance of distinguishing between these micro foundations for welfare analysis

the incidence of mandated maternity benefits i consider the labor market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group the efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group specific wages i study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age i find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group correspondingly i find little effect on total labor input for that group jel 118 j32 h51 in an era of tight fiscal budget constraints mandating employer provision of workplace benefits to employees is an attractive means for a government to finance its policy agenda consequently in recent years there has been a growth of interest in mandated benefits as a tool of social policy for example the centerpiece of president bill clinton s health care proposal is mandated employer provision of health insurance and more than 20 states have man

externalities in economies with imperfect information and incomplete markets this paper presents a simple general framework for analyzing externalities in economies with incomplete markets and imperfect infonnation by identifying the pecuniary effects of these externalities that net out the paper simplifies the problem of determining when tax interventions are pareto improving the approach indicates that such tax interventions almost always exist and that equilibria in situations of imperfect information are rarely constrained pareto optima it can also lead to simple tests based on readily observable indicators of the efficacy of particular tax policies in situations involving adverse selection signaling moral hazard incomplete contingent claims markets and queue rationing equilibria traditional discussions of externalities have emphasized the distinction between technological externalities in which the action of one individual or firm directly affects the utility or profit ofanother and pecuniary externalities in which one individual s or firm s actions affect another only through effects on prices while the presence of technological externalities imply in general that a competitive equilibrium may not be pareto efficient pecuniary externalities hy themselves are not a source of inefficiency the fact that prices change has of course important consequences there are both distributional and allocational effects but the distribution effects net out gains for example hy firms whose prices increase are precisely offset by losses e g to individuals who must pay higher prices and there are no welfare losses from the allocation effects as long as the price changes involved are small if firms are maximizing profits and individuals are maximizing utility both facing prices that correctly refiect opportunity costs then standard envelope theorem arguments imply that changes in profits or utility induced by changes in allocations resulting from any small change in prices are negligible

estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices we provide a graphical illustration of how standard consumer and producer theory can be used to quantify the welfare loss associated with inefficient pricing in insurance markets with selection we then show how this welfare loss can be estimated empirically using identifying variation in the price of insurance such variation together with quantity data allows us to estimate the demand for insurance the same variation together with cost data allows us to estimate how insurers costs vary as market participants endogenously respond to price the slope of this estimated cost curve provides a direct test for both the existence and the nature of selection and the combination of demand and cost curves can be used to estimate welfare we illustrate our approach by applying it to data on employerprovided health insurance from one specific company we detect adverse selection but estimate that the quantitative welfare implications associated with inefficient pricing in our particular application are small in both absolute and relative terms

elasticity of substitution and the perverse export supply response abstract this paper re examines the possibility of perverse export supply response in the south in a 2 2 2 trade model we find that such perverse response is impossible if the elasticity of substitution in the production of the basic good in the south is greater than or equal to unity

the use of regression statistics to analyze imperfect pricing policies corrective taxes can solve many market failures but actual policies frequently deviate from the theoretical ideal because of administrative or political constraints we present a method to quantif

anchoring effects evidence from art auctions in order to separate anchoring where an irrelevant message has an effect on the outcome from rational learning where past prices are not irrelevant because they may be used to estimate unobservable quality we use the following strategy we first develop a hedonic prediction of price for both the current sale e g the 2006 sale and the previous sale these hedonic predic tions are based on observable characteristics of each painting and an index of overall prices we then regress actual sale price on our hedonic prediction on the difference between the actual price in the previous sale and our hedonic prediction this expression tests for anchoring and on the difference between the actual price in the previous sale and our hedonic prediction of price in the previous sale this expression controls for unobservable characteristics the test for anchor ing is the extent to which the actual price in the previous sale affects the current sale price we can identify anchoring from other effects because the demand for art which is captured by the average overall price index changes over time whereas the unobservable component of qual ity is assumed to remain constant between auctions this allows us to control for unobserved quality characteristics as long as something drastic has not happened between sales such as a painting has been deemed a fake which is a very rare occurrence the assumption of constant quality is a realistic one

social insurance private health insurance and individual welfare abstract this paper studies the impact of social insurance on individual choices and welfare in a dynamic general equilibrium model with uncertain medical expenses and individual health insurance choices i find that social insurance modeled as the combination of a minimum consumption floor and the medicaid program does not only distort saving and labor supply decisions but also has a large crowding out effect on the demand for private health insurance however despite the distorting effects the net welfare consequence of eliminating social insurance is still negative in most cases in addition the large crowding out effect on private health insurance suggests that the existence of social insurance programs may be one reason why some americans do not buy any health insurance

graciela chichilnisky s model of north south trade abstract the model of the effects of north south trade set out by chichilnisky in the april 1981 issue of the journal of development economics is shown to contain a number of errors the model is presented anew in this note after corrections are made one can still obtain results similar in spirit to some of those chichilnisky tried to derive although the interpretation of the cause of the results must be substantially altered in particular it is shown that for appropriate parameter values in this model one will find that it is possible for an increase in the demand for the good the north exports to lead to 1 a worsening of the terms of trade for the south 2 a worsening of the distribution of factor incomes in the north and in the south 3 a reduction in the total export revenues of the south and 4 at the same time an increase in the physical volume of the south s exports the cause is in essence a shift in world demand from the good the south exports to the good the north exports which leads to a terms of trade loss for the south income effects following from the terms of trade loss then lead to a situation where the south s own demand for its export good falls by more than its supply thus leading to the preverse effect of an increase in the volume of its exports the paper also considers the model of chichilnisky and cole 1978 this model is similar to that of chichilnisky 1981 and is used to examine the same issues but is closed in a different way it is shown that this second model may give similar results as the first but that also a quite different set of results is now possible closure is therefore shown to play a key role

liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending ditions for precisely the population that is most likely to have a difficult time obtaining credit those with low incomes and poor credit histories these consumers who typically cannot qualify for regular bank loans comprise the so called subprime market because the company we study originates subprime loans its loan applications and transaction records provide an unusual win dow into the consumption and borrowing behavior of households that are rationed in primary credit markets moreover we track loan repayments allowing us to analyze the difficulties in lending to the subprime population we begin by documenting the importance of short term liquidity constraints for individuals in our sample we present two pieces of evidence both are based on purchasing behavior and indicate a high sensitivity to cash on hand first we document a dramatic degree of demand seasonality associated with tax rebates overall demand is almost 50 percent higher during tax rebate season than during other parts of the year this seasonal effect varies with household

an empirical examination of information barriers to trade in insurance this paper uses direct evidence to evaluate whether asymmetric information is a barrier to trade in the largest market for private insurance in the world life insurance we report several findings that seem difficult to reconcile with the conventional theory of insurance under asymmetric information we conjecture that sellers may know their costs of production better than consumers in this market as in those for most other products

perfect competition in markets with adverse selection this paper proposes a perfectly competitive model of a market with adverse selection prices are determined by zero profit conditions and the set of traded contracts is determined by free entry crucially for applications contract characteristics are endogenously determined consumers may have multiple dimensions of private information and an equilibrium always exists equilibrium corresponds to the limit of a differentiated products bertrand game we apply the model to establish theoretical results on the equilibrium effects of mandates mandates can increase efficiency but have unintended consequences with adverse selection an insurance mandate reduces the price of low coverage policies which necessarily has indirect effects such as increasing adverse selection on the intensive margin and causing some consumers to purchase less coverage

the effects of rate regulation on demand for supplemental health insurance many developed countries have a market for private health insurance that supplements publicly funded universal coverage government regulation of the supplemental market including the extent to which insurers are permitted to adjust premiums based on individual characteristics such as age sex and health status varies across countries oecd 2004 proponents of rate regulation argue that the resulting crosssubsidization from low to high risks is necessary to maintain the affordability of coverage for high risks economic theory however raises the concern that the inability to adjust premiums to reflect individual risk could create adverse selection by driving low risks from the market michael rothschild and joseph stiglitz 1976 little empirical evidence exists to determine the optimal role of rate regulation in private supplemental insurance markets existing studies of the consequences of rating restrictions focus on markets for primary health insurance and find that these laws have had surprisingly little effect on overall rates of coverage simon 2004 in this paper we study the effects of rate regulation in supplemental health insurance markets by examining the market for individually purchased coverage that supplements medicare among the elderly in the united states while the publicly financed medicare program provides nearly universal coverage of a standard set of benefits for those 65 and over beneficiaries are exposed to significant financial risk due to the cost sharing associated with covered services and a lack of coverage for some important services the vast majority of medicare beneficiaries obtain supplemental coverage through a complex system of publicly and privately funded sources state medicaid programs provide publicly financed supplemental coverage for low income and disabled beneficiaries and employers provide highly subsidized retiree supplemental health insurance for other beneficiaries but the remainder rely on highly regulated private insurance markets medicare s part c managed care plans are a voluntary private replacement for traditional medicare while medigap coverage is a private policy bought by about 30 percent of medicare beneficiaries that provides only supplemental benefits franklin j eppig and george s chulis 1997 our study examines the effects of regulations limiting the information on individual characteristics insurers can use in setting premiums for medigap coverage

optimal mandates and the welfare cost of asymmetric information evidence from the u k annuity market much of the extensive empirical literature on insurance markets has focused on whether adverse selection can be detected once detected however there has been little attempt to quantify its welfare cost or to assess whether and what potential government interventions may reduce these costs to do so we develop a model of annuity contract choice and estimate it using data from the u k annuity market the model allows for private information about mortality risk as well as heterogeneity in preferences over different contract options we focus on the choice of length of guarantee among individuals who are required to buy annuities the results suggest that asymmetric information along the guarantee margin reduces welfare relative to a first best symmetric information benchmark by about 127 million per year or about 2 percent of annuitized wealth we also find that by requiring that individuals choose the longest guarantee period allowed mandates could achieve the first best allocation however we estimate that other mandated guarantee lengths would have detrimental effects on welfare since determining the optimal mandate is empirically difficult our findings suggest that achieving welfare gains through mandatory social insurance may be harder in practice than simple theory may suggest

terms of trade and domestic distribution a comment abstract this note comments on a paper by chichilnisky in the april 1981 issue of this journal it is shown that within the context of her model a rightward shift in the demand curve of the north for exports from the south can never result in a worsening of the terms of trade for the south it is however possible that the quantity of exports from the south may decline in the new equilibrium due to the income effect of the improved terms of trade

contract pricing in consumer credit markets we analyze subprime consumer lending and the role played by down payment requirements in screening high risk borrowers and limiting defaults to do this we develop an empirical model of the demand for financed purchases that incorporates both adverse selection and repayment incentives we estimate the model using detailed transaction level data on subprime auto loans we show how different elements of loan contracts affect the quality of the borrower pool and subsequent loan performance we also evaluate the returns to credit scoring that allows sellers to customize financing terms to individual applicants our approach shows how standard econometric tools for analyzing demand and supply under imperfect competition extend to settings in which firms care about the identity of their customers and their postpurchase behavior

are risk preferences stable across contexts evidence from insurance data using a unique dataset we test whether households deductible choices in auto and home insurance reflect stable risk preferences our test relies on a structural model that assumes households are objective expected utility maximizers and claims are generated by household coverage specific poisson processes we find that the hypothesis of stable risk preferences is rejected by the data our analysis suggests that many households exhibit greater risk aversion in their home deductible choices than their auto deductible choices our results are robust to several alternative modeling assumptions jel d11 d83

the house doesn t always win evidence of anchoring among australian bookies abstract we examine australian horseracing bookmakers responses to late scratches instances in which a horse is abruptly withdrawn after betting has commenced our observed bookies exhibit anchoring on the original odds and fail to re adjust odds fully on the remaining horses after a scratch thereby earning lower profit margins and occasionally creating nominal arbitrage opportunities for bettors we also examine which horses odds bookies adjust after a scratch and demonstrate diminished profit margins even after controlling for these endogenous adjustments our results indicate that bookies adjustments recover approximately 80 of lost profit margin but that bookies forgo the remaining 20 due to systematic under adjustments

paying for health insurance the trade off between competition and adverse selection we use data on health plan choices by employees of harvard university to compare the benefits of insurance competition with the costs of adverse selection moving to a voucher type system induced significant adverse selection with a welfare loss of 2 to 4 percent of baseline spending but increased competition reduced harvard s premiums by 5 to 8 percent the premium reductions came from insurer profits so while harvard was better off the net effect for society was only the adverse selection loss adverse selection can be minimized by adjusting voucher amounts for individual risk we discuss how such a system would work governments are increasingly turning to market forces as a way to limit the cost of social insurance traditionally social insurance programs were operated as nonmarket goods governments mandated participation in a central program collected revenues to finance the program and ran the insurance system there was no role for competition among suppliers in providing the basic benefit as the costs of social insurance have increased however the centralized model of social insurance is coming under increasing strain in the united states for example recent proposals have called for replacing the medicare program with a health care voucher for the elderly aaron and reischauer 1995 cutler 1996 the voucher would guarantee people a basic insurance plan but the plans would be privately run competition among plans would generate plan premiums and enrollments similarly longstanding proposals for social security reform have called for replacing the current system with a system of individual accounts where people would make saving investment and annuitization decisions on their own advisory council on social security 1996 feldstein 1996 the trend is not just domestic in the united kingdom the national health service has moved to encourage more competition in recent years with the establishment of hospital trusts that bid for patients and partially fixed payments to physicians

does legal enforcement affect financial transactions the contractual channel in private equity analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments we find that transactions vary with nations legal enforcement whether measured directly or through legal origin investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants in low enforcement and civil law nations private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt and rely on equity and board control transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns while relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy

selection in health insurance markets and its policy remedies selection adverse or advantageous is the central problem that inhibits the smooth efficient functioning of competitive health insurance markets even and perhaps especially when consumers are well informed decision makers and insurance markets are highly competitive and offer choice such markets may function inefficiently due to risk selection selection can cause markets to unravel with skyrocketing premiums and can cause consumers to be under or overinsured in its simplest form adverse selection arises due to the tendency of those who expect to incur high health care costs in the future to be the most motivated purchasers the costlier enrollees are more likely to become insured rather than to remain uninsured and conditional on having health insurance the costlier enrollees sort themselves to the more generous plans in the choice set these dual problems represent the primary concerns for policymakers designing regulations for health insurance markets in this essay we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates we emphasize the two markets that seem especially likely to be targets of reform in the short and medium term medicare advantage the private plan option available under medicare and the state level individual insurance markets

estimating risk preferences from deductible choice we develop a structural econometric model to estimate risk preferences from data on deductible choices in auto insurance contracts we account for adverse selection by modeling unobserved heterogeneity in both risk claim rate and risk aversion we find large and skewed heterogeneity in risk attitudes in addition women are more risk averse than men risk aversion exhibits a u shape with respect to age and proxies for income and wealth are positively associated with absolute risk aversion finally unobserved heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater than that of risk and as we illustrate has important implications for insurance pricing

using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions this article studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions for risk averse borrowers who use unsecured contracts but have the possibility of defaulting in a large class of economies knowledge of four variables is sufficient to determine whether a bankruptcy exemption level is optimal or should be increased or decreased these variables are 1 the composition of households liabilities 2 the sensitivity of the credit supply schedule to exemption changes 3 the probability of filing for bankruptcy with non exempt assets and 4 the value given by households to a marginal dollar in different states which can be mapped to changes in households consumption i recover empirical estimates of the sufficient statistics using u s data over the period 2008 16 and find that increasing exemption levels improves overall welfare although there is substantial variation in estimated welfare gains across u s states and income quintiles

anchored in the past persistent price effects of obsolete vineyard ratings in france abstract although abundant evidence for anchoring in economic valuations has been produced in experimental settings there have been relatively few studies testing for anchoring in actual markets we analyze data on grape and vineyard prices in the champagne region of france to determine whether current prices are anchored on past prices set under a discontinued price setting system the key feature of this system is a vineyard quality rating called the echelle des crus edc the econometric challenge is to separately identify anchoring effects from the effects of relevant information edc era prices may convey about grape and vineyard quality our empirical approach controls for observable attributes of vineyards and time invariant unobserved determinants of vineyard quality that may be revealed to market participants through edc era prices in addition we use an instrumental variables strategy to mitigate confounding influences of time varying unobservables we find strong evidence that anchoring has large effects on prices for grapes and vineyards we also examine whether the anchoring effect is diminishing over time as market participants come to rely more on objective information to determine prices we find instead a persistent effect of the edc many years after it became obsolete

coherent arbitrariness stable demand curves without stable preferences economic theories of valuation generally assume that prices of commodities and assets are derived from underlying fundamental values for example in finance theory asset prices are believed to reflect the market estimate of the discounted present value of the asset s payoff stream in labor theory the supply of labor is established by the tradeoff between the desire for consumption and the displeasure of work finally and most importantly for this chapter consumer microeconomics assumes that the demand curves for consumer products chocolates cds movies vacations drugs and so forth can be ultimately traced to the valuation of pleasures that consumers anticipate receiving from these products because it is difficult as a rule to measure fundamental values directly empirical tests of economic theory typically examine whether the effects of changes in circumstances on valuations are consistent with theoretical prediction for example whether labor supply responds appropriately to a change in the wage rate whether compensated demand curves for commodities are downward sloping or whether stock prices respond in the predicted way to share repurchases however such comparative static relationships are a necessary but not sufficient condition for fundamental valuation e g summers 1986 becker 1962 was perhaps the first to make this point explicitly when he observed that consumers choosing commodity bundles randomly from their budget set would nevertheless produce downward sloping demand curves

north south trade and exported led policies abstract an earlier paper in this journal chichilnisky 1981 formulated a model of north south trade where the south exports a labor intensive commodity in exchange for industrial goods the paper studied moves to new equilibria with higher levels of exports of the south and of industrial demand in the north it was established that with abundant labor and technological dualism such moves lead to more exports but no lower terms of trade consumption and real wages in the south this occurs within walrasian stable and perfectly competitive markets sufficient conditions were also given for the south to improve its terms of trade real wages and consumption through an export expansion this paper comments on several other papers written on these results generalizes the earlier propositions and extends them to a larger class of economies which export labor intensive products but need not have abundant labor it gives a generalization of the earlier results on uniqueness and stability of the equilibria and reports also on recent econometric tests for sri lanka and the u k and numerical simulations of the model

mistake 37 the effect of previously encountered prices on current housing demand based on contrast effects studies from psychology we predicted that movers arriving from more expensive cities would rent pricier apartments than those arriving from cheaper cities we also predicted that as people stayed in their new city they would get used to the new prices and would readjust their housing expenditures countering the initial impact of previous prices we found support for both predictions in a sample of 928 movers from the psid alternative explanations based on unobserved wealth and taste and on imperfect information are ruled out

coase versus the coasians who should enforce laws or contracts judges or regulators many coasians though not coase himself advocate judicial enforcement we show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice we then compare the regulation of e nancial markets in poland and the czech republic in the 1990s in poland strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market in the czech republic hands off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market i introduction at the heart of economists traditional skepticism about government regulation is the coase theorem coase 1960 the theorem states that when property rights are well dee ned and transaction costs are zero market participants will organize their transactions in ways that achieve efe cient outcomes when they can do so it is not necessary for the government to engage in corrective actions through taxes regulations or even legal rules financial markets are often used to demonstrate the coase theorem s case against regulation advocates of the regulation of these markets point to a variety of potential failures such as the ability of security issuers to expropriate both potential and existing investors through misrepresentation or proe t diversion investors fear of such expropriation prevents e rms from raising external funds and keeps efe cient projects from being undertaken not so reply the coasians they point out that most securities transactions take place between sophisticated adults and that both the buyers and the issuers of securities have available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efe ciency including contracts such as corporate charters certie cation by intermediaries and various forms of bonding such contracts render most laws and regulations unnecessary stigler 1964 easterbrook and fischel 1991