partisan competition growth and the franchise we present an argument for changes in the franchise in which an elite split along economic interests uses the suffrage to influence implemented policies through the influence of these policies on the character of industrialization we analyze the effects of franchise changes on economic growth we identify in the social structure of society an explanation for the connection between enfranchisement and growth when 1 there exists an economic conflict among the elite 2 landed classes are not politically strong and 3 there exists a critical mass of industrial workers we observe both growth and democratization the lack of conditions 1 or 2 resolves in stagnant autocracies while the absence of condition 3 drives growth deterring democratic expansions we provide historical support for our argument by analyzing the experience of eleven countries

a new index of housing sentiment we propose a new measure for housing sentiment and show that it accurately tracks expectations of future house price growth rates we construct the housing sentiment index using partial least squar

income and democracy existing studies establish a strong cross country correlation between income and democracy but do not control for factors that simultaneously affect both variables we show that controlling for such factors by including country fixed effects removes the statistical association between income per capita and vari ous measures of democracy we present instrumental variables estimates that also show no causal effect of income on democracy the cross country corre lation between income and democracy reflects a positive correlation between changes in income and democracy over the past 500 years this pattern is con sistent with the idea that societies embarked on divergent political economic development paths at certain critical junctures jel d7 e 1

growth in post soviet russia a tale of two transitions abstract in the early stages of post soviet russia s economic transition small scale entrepreneurial activity appeared to be a strong engine of growth moreover striking regional variations in initial conditions and adopted policy reforms appeared useful in accounting statistically for observed regional variations in entrepreneurial activity here we investigate whether these relationships have persisted as russia s transition has continued to evolve and find that they have not we then document that the emergence of bank issued credit virtually non existent outside of moscow prior to 2000 has been an important engine of growth since 2000 thus to date russia s post soviet development appears as a tale of two distinct transition paths

reevaluating the modernization hypothesis we revisit and critically reevaluate the widely accepted modernization hypothesis which claims that per capita income causes the creation and the consolidation of democracy existing studies find support for this hypothesis because they fail to control for the presence of omitted variables controlling for these factors either by including country fixed effects in a linear model or by including parameterized random effects in a nonlinear double hazard model removes the correlation between income and the likelihood of transitions to and from democratic regimes in addition the estimated fixed effects from the linear model are related to historical factors that affect both the level of income per capita and the likelihood of democracy in a country this evidence is consistent with the idea that events during critical historical junctures can lead to divergent political economic development paths some leading to prosperity and democracy others to relative poverty and non democracy

spatial spillovers in the development of institutions abstract we examine spatial spillovers in institutional development dependent variables are institutional measures reflecting politics law and governmental administration the explanatory variable of interest is the level of institutions in bordering countries a spatial lag of the dependent variable our spatial model directly leads to the identification strategy for the endogenous spatial lag we implement new results in spatial econometrics to counter missing data problems usually rife in spatial empirics spatial institutional spillovers are statistically significant and economically important a counter factual exercise the non existence of the ussr reveals large direct and indirect spillovers numerous robustness exercises bolster conclusions including yearly cross section regressions fixed effects estimates and adding many extra explanatory variables moreover we provide a new theoretical result showing the robustness of estimates in the presence of omitted variables we extend the core model allowing different effects for better and worse neighbors using inverse distance weights estimating the spatial durbin model and using polity s institutional measure

the coevolution of economic and political development from monarchy to democracy this article establishes a unified political economy model to analyze the democratization process from monarchy to oligarchy and to democracy in the context of dynamic economic development as the predominant source of wealth evolves from land to physical capital and finally to human capital the relative economic and hence coercive power of land owners capitalists and workers shifts accordingly inducing the transition of the political system where political power is expanded from landlords to capitalists and finally to workers a smooth transition through political compromise facilitates efficient allocation of savings in physical capital followed by efficient investment in human capital

international commodity prices growth and the outbreak of civil war in sub saharan africa to learn more about the effect of economic conditions on civil war we examine whether sub saharan civil wars are more likely to start following downturns in the international price of countries main export commodities the data show a robust effect of commodity price downturns on the outbreak of civil wars we also find that sub saharan countries are more likely to see civil wars following economic downturns in their main oecd export destinations

the rise of europe atlantic trade institutional change and economic growth the rise of western europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the atlantic ocean and with substantial trade with the new world africa and asia via the atlantic this trade and the associatedcolonialism affected europe not only directly but also indirectly by inducing institutional change where initial political institutions those established before 1500 placed significant checks on the monarchy the growth of atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights these changes were central to subsequent economic growth

workers of the world unite franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in europe 1820 1938 abstract we test the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise in europe was related to the threat of revolution we contend that international diffusion of regime contention and information about revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries generate the necessary variation in the perceived threat of revolution using two samples of european countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938 we find robust evidence which is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis we also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform

institutional traps and economic growth this article s point of departure is that low quality institutions concentration of political power and material wealth and underdevelopment are persistent over time its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality thereby promoting growth the politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails the possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited with concentration of political and economic power low quality institutions and slow growth and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources high quality institutions and faster growth

do natural resources fuel authoritarianism a reappraisal of the resource curse a large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy extant cross country regressions however assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships numerous sources of bias may be driving the results the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country specific and time invariant heterogeneity to address these problems we develop unique historical datasets employ time series centric techniques and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals we test to see if there is a long run relationship between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time both on a country by country basis and across several different panels we find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism in fact in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

poverty and civil war revisiting the evidence abstract previous research has interpreted the correlation between per capita income and civil war as evidence that poverty is a main determinant of conflict in this paper we find that the relationship between poverty and civil war is spurious and is accounted for by historical phenomena that jointly determine income evolution and conflict in particular the statistical association between poverty and civil wars disappears once we include country fixed effects also using cross section data for 1960 to 2000 we find that once historical variables like european settler mortality rates and the population density in 1500 are included in civil war regressions poverty does not have an effect on civil wars these results are confirmed using longer time series from 1825 to 2000

oligarchic versus democratic societies this paper develops a model to analyze economic performance under different political regimes an oligarchic society where political power is in the hands of major producers protects their property rights but also tends to erect significant entry barriers against new entrepreneurs democracy where political power is more widely diffused imposes redistributive taxes on producers but tends to avoid entry barriers when taxes in democracy are high and the distortions caused by entry barriers are low an oligarchic society achieves greater efficiency because comparative advantage in entrepreneurship shifts away from the incumbents the inefficiency created by entry barriers in oligarchy deteriorates over time the typical pattern is one of rise and decline of oligarchic societies an oligarchic society may first become richer but later fall behind a similar democratic society i also discuss how democracies may be better able to take advantage of new technologies how within elite conflict in oligarchies might cause a transition to democracy and how the unequal distribution of income may keep inefficient oligarchic institutions in place jel p16 o10

does high income promote democracy the authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors such as the historical context various features of the institutional setting and simultaneity with the process of leadership change even after correcting for these many other influences the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions the authors go on to find that leaders risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries the authors confirm the finding by burkhart and lewis beck that the democracy promoting effect of income is stronger among the european countries they suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the southern european countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize this suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade

effects of international food price shocks on political institutions in low income countries evidence from an international food net export price index we examine the effects of variations in the international food prices on political institutions in low income countries our empirical analysis exploits that the economic impact of changes in the international food prices differs across countries depending on whether countries are net food importers or exporters we construct an international food net export price index that captures this heterogeneity our panel fixed effects analysis yields that in low income countries within country variations in the international food net export price index are significantly negatively related to democratic institutions we further explore the mechanisms driving this relationship along the economic and the conflict dimensions

international house price cycles monetary policy and credit abstract we evaluate three alternative predictors of house price corrections anticipated tightenings of monetary policy deviations of house prices from fundamentals and rapid credit growth a new cross country measure of monetary policy expectations based on an international term structure model with time varying risk premiums is constructed house price overvaluation is estimated via an asset pricing model the variables are incorporated into a panel logit regression model that estimates the likelihood of a large house price correction in 18 oecd countries the results show that corrections are predicted by increases in the market s forecast of higher policy rates the estimated degree of house price overvaluation also contains significant information about subsequent price reversals in contrast to the financial crisis literature credit growth is less important all of these variables help forecast recessions

determinants of democracy a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995 finds that improvements in the standard of living predict increase in democracy as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights the propensity for democracy rises with per capita gdp primary schooling and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment for a given standard of living democaracy tends to fall with urbnization and with a greater reliance on natrual resources democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle class share of income the apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant similarly the allowance for these economic variables weakens the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation however negative effects from muslim and non religious affiliations remain intact

from education to democracy the conventional wisdom views high levels of education as a prerequisite for democracy this paper shows that existing evidence for this view is based on crosssectional correlations which disappear once we look at within country variation in other words there is no evidence that countries that increase their education are more likely to become democratic

why did the west extend the franchise democracy inequality and growth in historical perspective during the nineteenth century most western societies extended voting rights a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs we argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution political transition rather than redistribution under existing political institutions occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution our theory also offers a novel explanation for the kuznets curve in many western economies during this period with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization i introduction the nineteenth century was a period of fundamental political reform and unprecedented changes in taxation and redistribution britain for example was transformed from an oligarchy run by an elite to a democracy the franchise was extended in 1832 and then again in 1867 and 1884 transferring voting rights to portions of the society with no previous political representation the decades after the political reforms witnessed radical social reforms increased taxation and the extension of education to the masses moreover as noted by kuznets inequality which was previously increasing started to decline during this period the gini coefficient for income inequality in england and wales had risen from 0 400 in 1823 to 0 627 in 1871 but fell to 0 443 in 1901 two key factors in the reduction in inequality were the increase in the proportion of skilled workers williamson 1985 and the redistribution of income toward the poorer segments of the society for example taxes rose from 8 12 percent of national product in 1867 to 18 8 percent by 1927 and the progressivity of the tax system increased substantially see lindert 1989

world welfare is rising estimation using nonparametric bounds on welfare measures abstract i take a new approach to measuring world inequality and welfare over time by constructing robust bounds for these series instead of imposing parametric assumptions to compute point estimates i derive sharp bounds on the atkinson inequality index that are valid for any underlying distribution of income conditional on given fractile shares and gini coefficients while the bounds are too wide to reject the hypothesis that world inequality may have risen i show that world welfare rose unambiguously between 1970 and 2006 this conclusion is valid for alternative methods of dealing with countries and years with missing surveys alternative survey harmonization procedures alternative gdp series or if the inequality surveys used systematically underreport the income of the very rich or suffer from nonresponse bias

how to get the snowball rolling and extend the franchise voting on the great reform act of 1832 this paper suggests a new approach to analyzing the causes of franchise extension based on a new dataset it provides a detailed econometric study of the great reform act of 1832 in the united kingdom the analysis yields four main results first modernization theory receives limited support second the reform enjoyed some measure of popular support third the threat of revolution had an asymmetric impact on the voting behavior of the pro reform whigs and the anti reform tories while the threat might have convinced reluctant reformers among the whig politicians and among their patrons to support the bill it seems to have hardened the resistance to reform among the tories fourth ideology played a critical role nevertheless it also appears that self interest and political expedience explained the votes of many members of parliament

self enforcing democracy author s fearon james abstract if democracy is to have any of the good effects said to justify it it must be self enforcing those who control the government must want to hold regular competitive elections for the highest offices and all parties must be willing to comply with the results i consider a model in which citizens can always protest or rebel against the current ruler but can unseat the ruler only if enough people rebel when individuals privately observe a signal of the government s performance e g their own welfare they face a difficult problem of how to coordinate to pose a credible threat of rebellion necessary to keep the ruler from stealing further if the signals are noisy inefficient rebellions must occur in equilibrium to keep the ruler honest allowing for the possibility of elections makes for equilibria that eliminate both problems the convention of holding elections at particular times provides a public signal for coordinating rebellion in the event that elections are suspended of blatantly rigged the electoral results themselves aggregate private information about the ruler s performance providing the ruler an incentive to stick to the terms int he case of noisy signals of government performance the electoral results act as a cheap talk signal that allows the public to commit to rebel if a losing ruler does not step down avoiding the need for costly rebellions these arguments pose an explanation for self enforcing democracy whereas the several models in the literature do not because they do not explain why anyone would want to use elections to allocate power

democracy foreign direct investment and natural resources abstract empirical studies that examine the impact of democracy on foreign direct investment fdi assume that the relationship between democracy and fdi is the same for resource exporting and non resource exporting countries this paper examines whether natural resources in host countries alter this relationship we estimate a linear dynamic panel data model using data from 112 developing countries over the period 1982 2007 we find that democracy promotes fdi if and only if the value of the share of minerals and oil in total exports is less than some critical value we identify 90 countries where an expansion of democracy may enhance fdi and 22 countries where an increase in democratization may reduce fdi we also find that the effect of democracy on fdi depends on the size and not the type of natural resources

revisiting the modernization hypothesis longevity and democracy summary modernization theory claims that changes in economic fundamentals like e g income per capita and education levels affect the political structure of a country in a causal way as an important marker of development life expectancy can also be conjectured to have a direct effect on political structures in this paper we estimate the impact of improvements in life expectancy on democracy for the purpose of identification we use data from the international epidemiological transition to construct an instrument for life expectancy we find a statistically and economically significant positive causal effect of improvements in life expectancy on democracy

the impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior recent work by rotemberg and saloner 1986 investigates the effect of the business cycle on optimal collusive pricing by specifying that demand is subject to i i d shocks an implication of the i i d assumption is that firms expectations on future demand are unrelated to the current level of demand we put forth a model that allows for both the level of current demand and firms expectations on future demand to change over time thus it captures two important properties of the business cycle our analysis reveals that while the gain to deviating from a collusive agreement is greatest during booms firms find it most difficult to collude during recessions as the forgone profits from inducing a price war are relatively low an implication of this effect for pricing behavior is that at the same level of demand price is lower when demand is declining than when demand is rising consistent with previous theoretical work we find that firms price countercyclically for a range of values for the discount factor however numerical simulations reveal a greater tendency for firms to price countercyclically during recessions than during booms

natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development abstract why do african and middle eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet usa australia and norway seem blessed a growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions this paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system the model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies it also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes i test the model s predictions using fixed effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support

money and monetary stability in europe 1300 1914 abstract this paper investigates the determinants of monetary stability in europe from the late medieval era until world war i through this period the anchor for monetary policy was the silver or gold value of the monetary unit states however frequently abandoned this anchor some depreciating their monetary units against silver and gold less than 10 fold and others more than 10 000 fold between 1500 and 1914 to understand the determinants of these differences we compile a new and comprehensive monetary history dataset for all major states in europe and test alternative theories we find strong evidence that political factors and in particular fiscal capacity political regime and warfare explain patterns of monetary stability this finding is robust to addressing endogeneity controlling for the instability induced by the mechanics of the monetary system and accounting for the impacts of new monetary technologies and the advent of fiat standard

time varying impact of uncertainty shocks on the us housing market abstract this paper investigates the impact of uncertainty shocks on the housing market of the united states using the time varying parameter factor augmented vector autoregression tvp favar we use a comprehensive quarterly time series dataset on real economic activity price and financial variables besides housing market variables covering the period 1963 q1 to 2014 q3 in addition to housing prices we also consider variables related to home sales permits and starts in general the results of the cumulative response of housing variables to a one standard deviation positive uncertainty shock at the one four eight and twelve quarter horizon tends to change over time both in terms of sign and magnitude with the uncertainty shock primarily negatively affecting the housing variables in particular prices permits and starts in longer runs i e two and three years ahead horizons