bidder preferences among auction institutions i introduction auctions have become a pervasive method of exchange in the online world as each day thousands of auctions take place online and this trade volume totals to billions of dollars worth of goods per year 1 this large volume of auction transactions implies the existence of a large number of sellers competing for buyers the obvious implication is that the competition among the sellers for the pool of potential buyers can be fierce and any competitive edge a seller can find could be important one such competitive edge a seller might exploit is using an auction design that attracts bidders away from their competitors when designing a real auction or modeling a theoretical one the entry decision of prospective bidders is rarely considered most auction analysis is performed assuming that a certain number of bidders will participate for certain or perhaps that the number of bidders is unknown and randomly determined it should be clear however that the most crucial part of a successful auction is encouraging as many bidders as possible to participate in general this should be expected to have a positive effect on revenue at least in noncommon value environments and in certain types of auctions it may help combat the possibility of bidder collusion because there are typically competing auctions available for similar goods or even outside options that bidders can pursue when auctions are for unique goods it is important to understand how the aspects of an auction format can effect the entry decision of a bidder consider a bidder who is faced with the choice of entering one of two auctions for similar or even identical objects how does this bidder make the decision of which auction to enter the obvious answer is that the bidder will enter into the auction that maximizes his or her expected utility so long as that expected utility is greater than some reservation value the real question then is how are these expected utilities constructed profit from participating in the auction is an obvious argument there are also a number of environmental considerations that might effect this decision that would be difficult to account for precisely such as the reputation and trustworthiness of the auctioneer quality of the advertisement for the auction and things of this nature it is also possible that the format of the auction itself can have an impact on the preferences of the bidder this latter point will be the issue of this study the particular focus will be looking at bidder preferences between the two most common standard auction formats used in the field the sealed bid first price will be abbreviated as just the sealed bid auction and the ascending or english auction the other reason we are interested in comparing these two auction formats rather than the ascending and second price or first price and descending is that it seems reasonable to expect bidders to have preferences between the two due to the strategic differences between them such differences lead to substantial differences in terms of the difficulty of deciding how to bid and also in the possibility that an outcome leads to a bidder experiencing some form of regret regret may occur in a first price auction when a bidder loses to a bid that is below his value as he may think that if only he had bid higher he could have won although such feelings of regret may be considered irrational that does not preclude their existence such a scenario should not reasonably occur in an ascending auction if one considers the situation of a bidder choosing between two auctions that differ only in regard to whether the auction is being conducted according to an ascending or sealed bid format it is not immediately obvious which would be the most preferred even assuming a standard symmetric independent private values environment were all bidders risk neutral then of course revenue equivalence would hold and the bidders would be indifferent

fat tails exponents extreme uncertainty simulating catastrophe in dice abstract the problem of low probability catastrophic risk is increasingly central to discussion of climate science and policy but the integrated assessment models iams of climate economics rarely incorporate this possibility what modifications are needed to analyze catastrophic economic risks in an iam we explore this question using dice a well known iam we examine the implications of a fat tailed probability distribution for the climate sensitivity parameter a focus of recent work by martin weitzman and the shape of the damage function one of the issues raised by the stern review forecasts of disastrous economic outcomes in dice can result from the interaction of these two innovations but not from either one alone

climate damages in the fund model a disaggregated analysis abstract we examine the treatment of climate damages in the fund model by inserting software switches to turn individual features on and off we obtain fund s estimates for 15 categories of damages and for components of the agricultural category fund as used by the u s government to estimate the social cost of carbon projects a net benefit of climate change in agriculture offset by a slightly larger estimate of all other damages within agriculture there is a large benefit from co 2 fertilization a moderate cost from the effect of temperature on yields and a much smaller impact of the rate of change in fund s agricultural modeling the temperature yield equation comes close to dividing by zero for high probability values of a monte carlo parameter the range of variation of the optimal temperature exceeds physically plausible limits with 95 confidence intervals extending to 17 c above and below current temperatures moreover fund s agricultural estimates are calibrated to research published in 1996 or earlier use of estimates from such models is arguably inappropriate for setting public policy but as long as such models are being used in the policymaking process an update to reflect newer research and correct modeling errors is needed before fund s damage estimates can be relied on

economic insights from internet auctions this paper surveys recent studies of internet auctions four main areas of research are summarized first we survey several studies that document and attempt to explain the frequently observed sniping or last second bidding behavior in these auctions second we summarize several methods proposed to quantify the distortions caused by asymmetric information in these markets most notably due to the winner s curse third we explore research about the role of reputation mechanisms installed to help combat these distortions finally we discuss what internet auctions have to teach us about auction design

frictions in internet auctions with many traders a counterexample abstract we show that when frictions are present the peters and severinov 2006 ps bidding rule is no longer efficient nor a pbe of the ps game researchers should be cautious when using the ps bidding rule in markets with frictions like ebay

search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auctions a leading explanation for price dispersion in posted price markets is search costs we incorporate this insight into a model of competing second price auctions similar to ebay by doing so we extend the narrow literature on competing auctions to capture price dispersion and grow the already large literature on price dispersion to include auctions we provide evidence on search costs and price dispersion using data collected from ebay identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to ebay s search tool 1 we thank aaron bodoh creed greg lewis steve tadelis and various seminar participants for helpful comments nate woody for programming assistance and the cornell university institute for social sciences for financial support the views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the u s department of justice 1

tail hedge discounting and the social cost of carbon the choice of an overall discount rate for climate change investments depends critically on how different components of investment payoffs are discounted at differing rates reflecting their underlying risk characteristics such underlying rates can vary enormously from 1 percent for idiosyncratic diversifiable risk to 7 percent for systematic nondiversifiable risk which risk adjusted rate is chosen can have a huge impact on cost benefit analysis in this expository paper i attempt to set forth in accessible language with a simple linear model what i think are some of the basic issues involved in discounting climate risks the paper introduces a new concept that may be relevant for climate change discounting the degree to which an investment hedges against the bad tail of catastrophic damages by insuring positive expected payoffs even under the worst circumstances the prototype application is calculating the social cost of carbon jel c51 q54 q58

the continued dumping and subsidy offset act an economic analysis under the continued dumping and subsidy offset act cdsoa of 2000 the u s government distributes the revenue from anti dumping and countervailing duties to domestic firms alleging harm in this article we develop a simple model to examine the economic effect of the cdsoa for the case in which the offset payments to domestic firms are linked to the volume of foreign imports the cdsoa may increase foreign imports when the domestic market is more competitive than in the cournot equilibrium this finding runs contrary to what the e u and some exporting countries have claimed but if the market is less competitive than in cournot the cdsoa becomes an instrument of trade protectionism

vertically differentiated simultaneous vickrey auctions theory and experimental evidence we study settings where a number of sellers simultaneously offer vertically differentiated vickrey auctions for imperfect substitute goods to unit demand buyers vertical differentiation can arise from differences in item quality item value certainty seller reliability or a combination of these factors we characterize the form of the bidding equilibria and derive expressions for the corresponding allocative efficiency and expected seller revenue when bidders are restricted to submit at most one bid our theory predicts the existence of a unique bayes nash equilibrium that resembles a form of probabilistic mating of likes allowing unit demand bidders to place an arbitrary number of bids induces complex strategy profiles where bidders place positive bids in all available auctions higher bidder types tend to follow more targeted strategies focusing their serious bids on fewer and generally higher quality auctions the nature of the bidding equilibria introduces allocative inefficiencies that arise from the lack of coordination in auction selection among bidders we test our theoretical propositions in a controlled laboratory experiment while also utilizing a domain specific risk score to help assess how the bidders risk type affects their bidding behavior in support of our theory we find evidence of a probabilistic assortative matching between bidder and auction types we also find that low risk type bidders tend to crowd on the highest auction and will pay a premium for the certainty it offers whereas high risk type bidders fail to appropriately adjust for risk associated with the lowest auction leading to overbidding these lead to an interesting focal anomaly whereby bids are concentrated on the highest and lowest auctions bypassing intermediate auctions

the impact of global warming on agriculture a ricardian analysis reply we measure the economic impact of climate on land prices using cross sectional data on climate farmland prices and other economic and geophysical data for almost 3 000 counties in the united states we find that higher temperatures in all seasons except autumn reduce average farm values while more precipitation outside of autumn increases farm values applying the model to a global warming scenario shows a significantly lower estimated impact of global warming on u s agriculture than the traditional production function approach and in one case suggests that even without co sub 2 fertilization global warming may have economic benefits for agriculture 16 refs 5 figs 5 tabs

do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices we investigate how auctioneers set reserve prices in auctions a well established theoretical result assuming risk neutrality of the seller is that the optimal reserve price should not depend on the number of participating bidders in a set of controlled laboratory experiments we find that seller behavior often deviates from the theoretical benchmarks we extend the existing theory to explore three alternative explanations for our results risk aversion anticipated regret and probability weighting after fitting our data to each of these models through parameter estimation techniques on both an aggregate and individual level we find that all three models are consistent with some of the characteristics of our data but that the regret model provides a slightly more favorable fit overall this paper was accepted by teck hua ho decision analysis

domino dumping i competitive exporters when exporting firms face the prospect of voluntary export restraints they have an incentive to export more than with no prospect of a voluntary export restraint since greater exports lead to larger license allocations in the event of a voluntary export restraint export country governments incentives differ leading either to export tax or subsidy depending on the circumstances the prospect of one departure from free trade thus leads to another a domino effect antidumping enforcement will ordinarily not eliminate and ironically may increase dumping copyright 1992 by american economic association

has the byrd amendment affected us imports the continued dumping and subsidy offset act cdsoa also known as the byrd amendment allows the u s government to distribute revenues from antidumping duties to domestic firms alleging harm prior to the amendment these revenues were not distributed to firms in this article we formally test the hypothesis that the byrd amendment effectively provides double protection to u s firms to the extent that it further restricts u s imports as argued by the e u and eleven other u s trading partners using a rich panel of 362 u s manufacturing industries for the period 1998 to 2003 we find that whether or not the byrd amendment restricted u s imports depends crucially on the level of competitiveness in the import competing industry specifically we find that the byrd amendment served to restrict imports only in industries where competition is relatively weak while the amendment is associated with an increase in imports in more competitive industries

mechanism design by competing sellers a dynamic model with many sellers and buyers is constructed agents failing to trade may trade in the next period an equilibrium is found where sellers hold identical auctions and buyers randomize over the sellers they visit the distribution of buyer valuations is endogenous an auction with efficient reserve is an optimal mechanism from each seller s point of view in spite of the ability of any seller to alter the distribution of buyer types participating in the seller s mechanism by altering the mechanism copyright 1993 by the econometric society

cross bidding impact throughout the product life cycle abstract two products at different points of the product life cycle have been chosen to analyse the effect of cross bidding in competing auctions the findings indicate that this strategy can have a different impact depending on the phase of the cycle

the structure of economic modeling of the potential impacts of climate change grafting gross underestimation of risk onto already narrow science models scientists describe the scale of the risks from unmanaged climate change as potentially immense however the scientific models because they omit key factors that are hard to capture precisely appear to substantially underestimate these risks many economic models add further gross underassessment of risk because the assumptions built into the economic modeling on growth damages and risks come close to assuming directly that the impacts and costs will be modest and close to excluding the possibility of catastrophic outcomes a new generation of models is needed in all three of climate science impact and economics with a still stronger focus on lives and livelihoods including the risks of large scale migration and conflicts

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

what do we learn from the weather the new climate economy literature a rapidly growing body of research applies panel methods to examine how temperature precipitation and windstorms influence economic outcomes these studies focus on changes in weather realizations over time within a given spatial area and demonstrate impacts on agricultural output industrial output labor productivity energy demand health conflict and economic growth among other outcomes by harnessing exogenous variation over time within a given spatial unit these studies help credibly identify i the breadth of channels linking weather and the economy ii heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of locations and iii nonlinear effects of weather variables this paper reviews the new literature with two purposes first we summarize recent work providing a guide to its methodologies datasets and findings second we consider applications of the new literature including insights for the damage function within models that seek to assess the potential economic effects of future climate change jel c51 d72 o13 q51 q54

the political economy of administered protection trade restrictions are hardly ever voted directly by congress though the threat of direct congressional action is frequently present pressure for protection is usually applied through the major instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the antidumping and countervailing duty procedures and the escape clause mechanism in this paper we will examine these instruments for the administrative regulation of imports the form of the paper is not novel a theory of how these mechanisms work is developed then operational implications of this theory are deduced and tested over the record of countervailing duty antidumping and escape clause cases decided from 1975 through 1979 this is the period over which the trade act of 1974 was in force because the nature of these mechanisms is relatively unfamiliar a relatively large amount of institutional information is provided

a sketch of the economics of the greenhouse effect over the last decade scientists have studied extensively the greenhouse effect which holds that the accumulation of carbon dioxide co2 and other greenhouse gases ghgs is expected to produce global warming and other significant climatic changes over the next century see stephen schneider 1989 the present study presents an economic approach for analyzing policies to slow climate change

addressing global environmental externalities transaction costs considerations is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively whereas others are not the transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis this approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so the demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments and determining who will pay and who will receive them four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights i scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs ii varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations iii asymmetric information and iv the extent of compliance and new entry these factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks implement the convention on the international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora execute the montreal protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer set limits on harvest of highly migratory ocean fish stocks and control greenhouse gas emissions jel d23 p14 q22 q51 q54 q58

prospect theory in a dynamic game theory and evidence from online pay per bid auctions abundant evidence exists that expected utility theory does not adequately describe decision making under risk although prospect theory is a popular alternative it is rarely applied in strategic situations in which risk arises through individual interactions this study fills this research gap by incorporating prospect theory preferences into a dynamic game theoretic model using a large field data set from multiple online pay per bid auction sites the authors empirically show that their proposed model with prospect theory preferences makes a better out of sample prediction than a corresponding expected utility model prospect theory also provides a unified explanation for two behavioral anomalies average auctioneer revenues above current retail prices and the sunk cost fallacy the empirical results indicate that bidders are loss averse and overweight small probabilities such that the expected revenue of the auction exceeds the current retail price by 25 46 the authors illustrate and empirically confirm a managerial implication for how an auctioneer can increase revenue by changing the details of the auction design

dumping on free trade the u s import trade laws the passage of the uruguay round trade agreement represents a natural opportunity for us to review the policy goals of the us import trade laws to assess how well current laws achieve those objectives and to explore possible reforms we argue that there are a variety of policy concerns that militate for a circumscribed set of import trade statutes the relevant us laws however have largely become divorced from such national welfare considerations and are now too often a mechanism for furtive protectionism the uruguay round effected some marginal improvements but left the fundamental structure of the laws unchanged we discuss possible reforms in the final selection of the paper

bidding behavior in competing auctions evidence from ebay much of the existing auction literature treats auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction however in many online auctions a number of substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid on several auctions at the same time recent theoretical research shows how bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions the current paper providing the first empirical evidence in support of competing auctions theory using online auctions data from ebay our results indicate that a significant proportion of bidders do bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids on auctions with the lowest standing bid as the theory predicts the paper also shows that winning bidders who cross bid pay lower prices on average than winning bidders who do not

competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices abstract in this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts two variants of the model are studied one extends a model first analyzed by wolinsky rev econ stud 55 1988 71 84 in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers the other variant extends the model of mcafee econometrica61 1993 1281 1312 in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions the equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed journal of economic literatureclassification numbers d41 d44 d82

an empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions abstract in undetermined this paper investigates hypotheses related to efficiency and price uniformity in online competing auctions based on two theoretical predictions from peters and severinov peters m severinov s 2006 internet auctions with many traders journal of economic theory 130 220 245 the investigation is conducted using a large and ideal data set for online competing train ticket auctions and the findings support the theoretical predictions in large parts

anti dumping and countervailing duties under oligopoly abstract this paper constructs a conjectural variations model of international oligopoly in which the home country s optimal policy responses to the foreign government s subsidies and foreign firms dumping can be calculated some theoretical support is found for tariffs that countervail part of the foreign export subsidy the optimal fraction depends on the size of own and cross effects in demand and on the extent of market competition however no normative case is found for anti dumping duties

search costs and equilibrium price dispersion in auction markets abstract a leading explanation for price dispersion in posted price markets is search costs we incorporate this insight into a model of competing second price auctions similar to ebay by doing so we extend the narrow literature on competing auctions to capture price dispersion and grow the already large literature on price dispersion to include auctions we provide evidence on search costs and price dispersion using data collected from ebay identifying search costs by exploiting a discontinuity in the visibility of auctions due to ebay s search tool

climate policy under sustainable discounted utilitarianism empirical evaluation of policies to mitigate climate change has been largely confined to the application of discounted utilitarianism du du is controversial both due to the conditions through which it is justified and due to its consequences for climate policies where the discounting of future utility gains from present abatement efforts makes it harder for such measures to justify their present costs in this paper we propose sustainable discounted utilitarianism sdu as an alternative principle for evaluation of climate policy unlike undiscounted utilitarianism which always assigns zero relative weight to present utility sdu is an axiomatically based criterion which departs from du by assigning zero weight to present utility if and only if the present is better off than the future using the dice integrated assessment model to run risk analysis we show that it is possible for the future to be worse off than the present along a business as usual development path consequently sdu and du differ and willingness to pay for emissions reductions is sometimes significantly higher under sdu than under du under sdu stringent schedules of emissions reductions increase social welfare even for a relatively high utility discount rate

export subsidies and countervailing tariffs this paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit shifting argument for export subsidies at the first stage the foreign country sets its export subsidy and then at the second stage the domestic country sets its tariff and or production subsidy it is shown that if the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always gain from a foreign export subsidy when the domestic country uses a tariff and a production subsidy the optimal foreign policy is an export subsidy but if the domestic country only uses a tariff then an export tax is usually the optimal policy

search and choice in online consumer auctions price dispersion in simultaneous online auctions is a puzzle in light of the relatively low search costs required to find the lower price much of this price dispersion appears to be due to a lack of switching by bidders between auctions which in turn could be due to inertia related to search costs we identify some of the influencing factors through a controlled field experiment involving pairs of simultaneous auctions keeping the sellers and the goods sold identical between two auctions we vary auction design features between and within pairs including shipping cost open reserve secret reserve price and duration and we provide bidders with incentives to search we use a choice model that examines individual choice between pairs of simultaneous auctions we find that within pair price dispersion is substantial and that prices and auction choice by bidders are indeed related to search costs we find strong inertia in auction choice and find that this effect significantly interacts with time left in the auction although individuals do not always choose a lower priced auction they are more likely to do so when search costs are low or search incentives are high

on modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change with climate change as prototype example this paper analyzes the implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low probability high impact catastrophes even when updated by bayesian learning uncertain structural parameters induce a critical tail fattening of posterior predictive distributions such fattened tails have strong im plications for situations like climate change where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages this paper shows that the economic consequences of fat tailed structural uncertainty along with unsureness about high temperature damages can readily outweigh the effects of discounting in climate change policy analysis

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices