the influence of private contractual failure on regulation the case of oil field unitization an analysis of the interdependence between regulation and private contractual failure reveals that the feasible range of regulation is restricted by the same forces that block private agreement the focus of the study is oil field unitization regulation in oklahoma texas and wyoming federal lands from 1948 through 1975 despite large potential gains from unitization private negotiations fail because of lease heterogeneities and information problems regarding lease value estimates in response the federal and state governments have adopted strikingly different policies to encourage unitization with different results only the federal government s regulations are effective because they surmount information problems texas has the least successful regulation the paper argues that the policy differences are due to the political influence of small firms that benefit from nonunitized production 25 references 2 tables

contractual responses to the common pool prorationing of crude oil production this paper examines bargaining among firms to mitigate rent dissipation following the major oil discoveries of 1926 35 because of high bargaining costs firms chose prorationing instead of consolidation and unitization and success varied the analysis also shows that prorationing took the form it did because concession such as per well quotas were required to draw in small operations and the quotas led to predictable responses regarding rent dissipation prorationing despite its costs controlled total field production and costs conserved natural reservoir energies and lengthened field life when private agreements failed the parties successfully appealed for state enforcement since similar heterogeneities influnce regulations elsewhere in the economy detailed analysis of bargaining among firms is essential for insight into the emergence of various institutional forms 33 references 3 tables

matching users rights to available groundwater abstract the amount of available groundwater in a catchment changes quickly and the amount of water that users can take sustainably depends on where and when it is taken however rights to water tend to be fixed and obtaining rights to water incurs high transaction costs as a result water catchments are over allocated worldwide in this paper i show how a catchment manager could match users rights to the available water in near real time despite uncertain future inflows while making effective use of all available hydrological data the solution uses the framework of a smart market a smart market is a periodic auction cleared with the help of an optimization model in addition to market clearing this model allows a convenient means to adjust initial rights and the auction revenue reflects the available water relative to users rights when the auction is revenue neutral the catchment may be viewed as allocated perfectly i suggest several ways in which a catchment manager can find this revenue neutral allocation assuming the manager has authority to adjust initial rights

does the optimal size of a fish stock increase with environmental uncertainties we analyze the effect of environmental uncertainties on optimal fishery management in a bio economic fishery model unlike most of the literature on resource economics but in line with ecological models we allow the different biological processes of survival and recruitment to be affected differently by environmental uncertainties we show that the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal size of a fish stock is ambiguous depending on the prudence of the value function for the case of a risk neutral fishery manager the overall effect depends on the relative magnitude of two opposing effects the convex cost effect and the gambling effect we apply the analysis to the baltic cod and the north sea herring fisheries concluding that for risk neutral agents the net effect of environmental uncertainties on the optimal size of these fish stocks is negative albeit small in absolute value under risk aversion the effect on optimal stock size is positive for sufficiently high coefficients of constant relative risk aversion

optimal harvesting of stochastic spatial resources abstract we characterize the optimal harvest of a renewable resource in a generalized stochastic spatially explicit model despite the complexity of the model we are able to obtain sharp analytical results we find that the optimal harvest rule in general depends upon dispersal patterns of the resource across space and only in special circumstances do we find a modified golden rule of growth that is independent of dispersal patterns we also find that the optimal harvest rule may include closure of some areas to harvest either on a temporary or permanent basis biological reserves reserves alone cannot correct open access but may under sufficient spatial heterogeneity and connectivity increase profits if appropriate harvest controls are in place outside of reserves

managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries abstract this paper addresses the management of multispecies fisheries and suggests the use of restricted fishing policies as an interesting option for unassessed fisheries as is the case within developing countries specifically we consider a predator prey system under two potential management policies an unrestricted regime where agents can compete to harvest from both species and a second one where they are allowed to harvest only predators the performance of both policies is compared from an ecological and an economic point of view for a sufficiently large number of agents or for strong biological interaction parameters the assumed restricted fishing policy yields both higher long run stock levels and profits thus this contribution suggests that such a policy while requiring weaker monitoring governance than instruments based on outputs such as quotas or taxes would meet environmental and economic objectives finally several features of the analysis are discussed including targeting prey instead of predator and the issue of compliance

privatization and the distribution of income in the commons abstract the explicit treatment of heterogeneity among the users of the commons leads to results that differ from those that are now generally accepted in the literature the owner of the fixed factor is not able to expropriate the rents of privatization rather the resulting distribution of income to the free factor after privatization depends on the technology and the institutional arrangements this result extends to more than two goods if the decline in the price of the good produced in the commons is sufficient to offset the decline in the marginal product of labor in the rest of the economy

unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly abstract this paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly a closed loop nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction surprisingly such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long run asset s stock we also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset s stock and the long run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction moreover a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production

managing partially protected resources under uncertainty it is common wisdom that open access leads to the inefficient use of resources and private ownership of resources improves efficiency however the impact of enclosure and efficient management of some resource pools on other open access resource pools is poorly recognized the problem is common to many congestion prone facilities including roads parks fisheries antibiotics grazing lands and wilderness areas in this paper we analyze the optimality of price and quantity instruments in regulating resource use when there is uncertainty about congestion costs price instruments are found to be preferable to quantity instruments and strictly so when demand is less than perfectly elastic we also explore the effect of market power by resource owners on the relative efficiency of the two instruments

on uncertain renewable resource stocks optimal harvest policies and the value of stock surveys abstract annual harvest quotas are commonly employed in the management of renewable resource stocks commercial fisheries being a prime example such resource stocks often undergo quite significant natural fluctuations to which quotas must be adapted a further complication arises from the fact that estimates of stock abundance are often highly uncertain in this paper a bayesian approach is used to model optimal quota decisions for an uncertain fluctuating renewable resource stock

fishery management under multiple uncertainty abstract among others who point to environmental variability and managerial uncertainty as causes of fishery collapse roughgarden and smith proc natl acad sci 93 1996 5078 argue that three sources of uncertainty are important for fisheries management variability in fish dynamics inaccurate stock size estimates and inaccurate implementation of harvest quotas we develop a bioeconomic model with these three sources of uncertainty and solve for optimal escapement based on measurements of fish stock in a discrete time model among other results we find 1 when uncertainties are high we generally reject the constant escapement rule advocated in much of the existing literature 2 inaccurate stock estimation affects policy in a fundamentally different way than the other sources of uncertainty and 3 the optimal policy leads to significantly higher commercial profits and lower extinction risk than the optimal constant escapement policy by 42 and 56 respectively

partial enclosure of the commons abstract we examine the efficiency distributional and environmental consequences of assigning spatial property rights to part of a spatially connected natural resource while the remainder is competed for by an open access fringe we refer to this as partial enclosure of the commons we obtain sharp analytical results regarding partial enclosure of the commons including 1 while second best it typically improves welfare relative to no property rights 2 all resource users can be made better off 3 positive rents arise in the open access area and 4 the resource maintains higher stocks under spatial heterogeneity we also characterize spatial regions that are ideal candidates for partial enclosure typically society should seek to enclose those patches with high environmental productivity and high self retention but whether high economic productivity promotes or relegates a patch may depend on one s objective

oil field unitization contractual failure in the presence of imperfect information an empirical analysis of the impact of transaction costs on contracting shows that imperfect in formation can seriously limit the effectiveness of private contracting the case under study is the widespread failure of private crude oil producing firms to use us oil fields to reduce rent dissipation rent dissipation follows as multiple firms compete for migratory oil in common oil pools unitization is the obvious private contractual solution to rent dissipation the authors argue that despite large net gains from unitization imperfect information and information asymmetries among the negotiating parties regarding lease values prevents consensus on unit shares as a result contracts are often not completed or only fragmented units are completed 9 references 1 figure 4 tables

a major environmental tax reform for the uk results for the economy employment and the environment this paper reports the results of a major modelling exercise to gain insights into the possible economic and environmental effects of a large scale environmental tax reform etr in the uk etr involves a shift in the target of taxation away from labour or firms towards pollution or the use of natural resources in such a way that overall tax revenues are unchanged it is hoped that such a tax shift will deliver environmental improvements while having a neutral or positive effect on the economy the modelling was set up to explore the extent to which this would be the case the paper starts with a brief literature review identifying the theoretical hypotheses relating to etr and summarising the results of some of the evaluations of etrs that have been implemented it then briefly describes the model used for the analysis in this paper the main body of the paper then describes the scenarios set up to explore the main impacts and the results of modelling these scenarios these results suggest that substantial reductions in greenhouse gas ghg emissions can be achieved with minimal impacts on output and an overall increase in employment such that etr emerges as a very attractive policy for ghg emission reduction

contracting problems and regulation the case of the fishery the inefficiencies of common property fisheries are of continuing concern to economists the early work by scott gordon 1954 and anthony scott 1955 outlined the problem and later studies by james crutchfield and giulio pontecorvo 1969 and frederick bell 1972 provided empirical estimates of the losses that result those studies were followed by the dynamic models of colin clark 1976 and james quirk and vernon smith 1970 of optimal harvest rates and the use of corrective taxes or quotas to achieve them but in spite of a large and growing literature and the persuasiveness of the outlined efficiency criteria most fisheries retain common property aspects with overcapitalization and excessive labor input why those conditions persist and the failure of the regulatory response to them are the issues addressed in this paper we examine a number of fisheries but focus on the texas shrimp industry which is one of the nation s most valuable fisheries for a single species and which shares the common property characteristics observed elsewhere it is considered overcapitalized and catch per unit of effort is falling 2 examination of the fishery reveals the many margins along which rent dissipation occurs and the nature of the regulations necessary for controlling fishing effort to avoid those losses the regulatory environment in texas is complicated by conflict within the fishery between inshore and offshore fishermen the latter assert that bay shrimping reduces the number of shrimp that successfully migrate to the gulf the inshore fishery is highlighted by another issue the recent resettlement of some 30 45 000 vietnamese refugees including many fishermen along the texas coast marine advisory service paul starr their entry has been met by hostility and violence from existing shrimpers who recognize that they are in an environment characterized by the absence of property rights bay shrimpers have lobbied the texas legislature for broad limits on new entrants yet ironically the sale of additional boats by individual shrimpers to the vietnamese has facilitated entry of the refugees into the fishery regulations in the texas shrimp and other fisheries are incomplete leaving many options for rent dissipation uncontrolled because of high contracting costs among fishermen and political factors that mold government actions contracting costs are high among heterogeneous fishermen who vary principally with regard to fishing skill 3 montana state university and texas a m university respectively we benefitted from comments by terry anderson raymond c battalio gardner brown oscar burt micha gisser wade griffin john r moroney anthony d scott peter temin and participants in workshops at texas a m university and the university of washington research assistance was provided by scott barnhart and phil mizzi funding was provided by sea grant texas a m university throughout this paper we use the terms common property and open access interchangeably here the terms describe a situation where no property rights group or individual exist s for the resource 2catch per unit of effort in the inshore texas gulf and federal gulf waters is presented for 1963 77 by w l griffin c g tydlacka and w e grant they show catch per unit of effort generally falling in inshore and offshore waters while catch per unit of effort fluctuates from year to year it falls from approximately 360 kg shrimp per unit of effort to 220 kg from 1963 to 1977 the common property nature of the fishery is reflected in the following statistics since 1975 the number of vessels has grown by 23 percent nelson swartz for fish houses the record of entry is similar between 1970 a d 1977 the number of firms grew from 259 to 287 though during that period many left the industry as others entered the number of fish houses was calculated from license data supplied by the texas parks and wildlife department the record of entry by fish houses suggests that monopsony as discussed by colin clark and gordon munro is absent in the fishery 3there may be minor differences in labor leisure choices and capital but our statistical evidence and discussions with fishermen indicate that catch variations are largely due to skill government regulations in the texas bays restrict capital and our empirical evidence shows boats to be relatively homogeneous

landing fees vs harvest quotas with uncertain fish stocks a revised version of this paper was published in the journal of environmental economics and management volume 43 issue 2 march 2002 pages 325 338

unreasonable rationality this paper explores how fractional demands the optimal fraction of wealth invested in a security change upon exogenous changes in security returns and wealth in the first part of the paper the analysis is conducted in an arrow debreu framework here we demonstrate the counterintuitive but completely rational result that fractional demands can remain unchanged or in fact decrease upon an exogenous increase in return furthermore we show that this can occur without any offsetting wealth effect in the second part of the paper we apply these results to ordinary securities those composed of fixed portfolios of arrow debreu securities here we derive a complete analytical solution and show that portfolio managers should beware even correct information that the return from holding an underlying pure security will improve is not sufficient to conclude that one should increase or decrease one s holdings of any particular stock

international environmental problems a simple taxonomy of international environmental problems is developed based on economic considerations the unidirectional externalities are illustrated by the case of one upstream and one downstream country the main problem in this case is an informational one the analysis of regional reciprocal externalities is illustrated by the acid rains in europe it is shown that an efficient solution could be achieved by transferable export rights finally global external problems are discussed with reference to greenhouse effects and extinction of species copyright 1990 by oxford university press

stability and success of regional fisheries management organizations according to international law straddling fish stocks should be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations rfmos this paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical gordon schaefer bioeconomic model results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher are the relative gains from full cooperation but the lower is the likelihood of large rfmos being stable it is also shown that new entrants increase the incentives of rfmo members to leave and decrease the incentives of non members to join it moreover the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency

oligopoly exploitation of a private property productive asset abstract in this paper we build a closed loop nash equilibrium of a private property productive asset oligopoly we compare and contrast private with common property in terms of exploitation rates and social welfare and provide a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the number of firms in the industry contrary to previous studies on oligopolistic exploitation of productive assets before exploitation begins the resource is parcelled out each firm privately owns and manages the assigned parcel over the entire planning horizon compared with the common property regime we find a new set of results both in the short and in the long run as for social welfare we provide conditions on the implicit growth rate and the initial asset stock under which the socially optimal allocation of the resource implies a natural monopoly

the optimal tax for maximum economic yield fishery regulation under rational expectations abstract this paper examines the optimal tax to achieve maximum economic yield mey exploitation in a rational expectations model of a competitive open access fishery to analyze the dynamic evolution of resource use a structural model which explains the relationship between the firm and the industry is presented the unregulated equilibrium is contrasted with the potential mey conditions under which the unregulated equilibrium will be mey are explored in addition a tax is devised which will cause non mey competitive exploitation to become mey when the tax is implemented