credentials and wage discrimination the subject is wage discrimination among workers with differing privately known reservation wages and costs of obtaining credentials that can be observed by a monopsonist firm numerical examples are studied in which workers are equally productive and in the population their reservation wages and credentialing costs have a normal distribution with negative correlation according to these examples wage discrimination is unprofitable

efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

co firing coal with wood pellets for u s electricity generation a real options analysis abstract in contrast to eu u s electric utilities are not employing the bioenergy technology of co firing wood pellets with coal this difference in employment patterns is explored within a real options analysis roa for possible u s utilization of wood pellets considering fuel price series from 2009 to 2014 for analysis these series are divided into two sub periods based on different market conditions infancy 2009 2011 and substitution 2012 2014 roa indicates co firing wood pellets with coal is feasible considering adoption during wood pellets infancy under low discount rates and long power plant lifespans a portfolio effect of employing multiple fuels underlies this result however co firing is not currently economically feasible the different adoption decisions are likely a consequence of recent cheap and abundant u s natural gas for co fired wood pellets to be feasible government incentives and or a market increase in natural gas prices appear necessary

strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining theory and data we develop a private information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm s willingness to pay previous models have assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike yet a prominent feature of u s collective bargaining is the holdout negotiations often continue without a strike after the contract has expired production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract we analyze the union s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to strike activity strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real wage or a decline in unemployment

a direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one sided incomplete information we characterize the sequential equilibria of a class of infinite horizon bargaining games with one sided incomplete information when the seller the uninformed party makes all the offers we prove a folk theorem every incentive compatible individually rational direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria introducing buyer counteroffers eliminates outcomes which are unfavorable to that party as the proportion of buyer offers increases the set of implementable mechanisms shrinks continuously when the proportion reaches one only the single outcome most favorable to the buyer remains thus depending on the offer structure sequentiality may or may not impose restrictions beyond static incentive compatibility

factors affecting drivers willingness to pay for biofuels the case of italy biofuels represent a promising alternative to substitute fossil fuels and given the relevance of environmental impacts of the transport sector policy initiatives worldwide aim at supporting the shift towards such cleaner energy source acknowledging the crucial role that biofuels will play in years to come in the energetic paradigm the study aims at investigating key determinants of drivers willingness to pay for biofuels focusing on a sample of 260 individuals from northern italy n 260 in line with recent research on consumer behavior socio demographics are not good predictors of drivers willingness to pay surprisingly on the other hand knowledge of the topic is negatively correlated to willingness to pay so that the more people know about biofuels the less they are willing to pay a premium price moreover certification is not an effective tool to convince drivers of the eco friendliness of biofuels hence spurring willingness to pay possible explanations of the research findings as well as policy implications are discussed in detail along with suggestions for future research on the topic

public policy supports and export performance of bioenergy technologies a dynamic panel approach abstract this study investigates the effects of public policy supports on the export performance of bioenergy technologies it uses panel data from 18 countries from the 1992 to 2008 period panel unit root and cointegration tests are applied taking into account the results of structural break tests for each time series and testing for the presence in the panel of cross sectional dependence time series data on public supports and exports are integrated and cointegrated the results of dynamic ordinary least squares indicate that in the long term public r d expenditures have a positive effect on the exports the contribution of bioenergy to the total energy supply has a negative effect on the exports and gdp has a positive effect on the exports the contribution of bioenergy to total energy supply responds to deviations in the previous period from the long term equilibrium additionally blundell bond system generalized methods of moments estimations are made to determine dynamic causality in a panel vector error correction mechanism setting evidence of a positive strong and short term relationship from exports to r d expenditures and of a positive short term causality from exports to the contribution of bioenergy to total energy supply is found a positive strong bidirectional relationship between gdp and exports is also uncovered there is a positive strong bidirectional and short term relationship between gdp and the contribution of bioenergy to total energy supply finally some policy implications based on the results of this study are offered

unions and strikes with asymmetric information strikes seem to be a pareto inefficient outcome of bargaining between a union and a firm however this paper shows that strikes can be the outcome of rational behavior by both agents if the firm has more information than the union concerning the state of nature the union can use strikes as a way of gaining information the paper uses an asymmetric information model where the firm has information about the state i e profitability that the union does not know the schedule of wage offers by the union then depends on the probability that a given state will occur

capital flows and gdp in emerging economies and the role of global spillovers abstract this paper provides a global analysis of capital flow impacts on gdp for selected emerging economies as additional control variables we also include currency reserves and effective exchange rates in our analysis we distinguish between gross and net capital flows and also assess the impact of both fdi and portfolio flows accounting for the fact that common factors have been the main drivers of capital flows while country specific determinants pull factors drive the response to such shocks we analyze shocks to country groups but consider country specific responses based on a bayesian time varying panel var framework in the spirit of canova and ciccarelli 2009 based on a sample of 24 economies our results show a robust positive effect of capital flows on gdp except for korea both gross and net capital flows display a positive impact for around two quarters the impact of effective exchange rates on gdp hardly offers an explanation for a possible transmission of capital flow effects with effective depreciations both positively and negatively linked to gdp we also find that the effect of net portfolio flows is even more positive compared to net fdi flows for emerging economies finally we provide evidence that the importance of global factors increases in times of crises

determinants of technical efficiency in the bioenergy industry in the eu28 region most previous bioenergy industry research has concentrated on how to implement a certain level of yield however few articles have paid attention to rational resource allocation to increase efficiency to enhance bioenergy production through proper use of available resources this study identified the effects of internal country specific and external macroeconomic determinants of technical efficiency level in the bioenergy industry for the eu28 region the study was established based on a conceptual framework suggesting a correlation between input use and level of technical efficiency a panel data analysis method was employed for the analysis and a panel regression analysis framework based on the fixed effect fe model and random effect re model was used to examine the potential determinants of technical efficiency level in the bioenergy industry for the eu28 region for the period between 1990 and 2013 the results indicate that the technical efficiency level of the bioenergy industry in developing countries is higher than in developed countries the empirical findings also suggest that technical efficiency has greater influence on pure technical efficiency levels capital input labor input gross domestic product inflation and interest rate significantly affected the technical efficiency of the bioenergy industry in the developing and developed countries in the eu28 region during the period of this study the findings clearly call for regulators and decision makers to review the technical efficiency level of the bioenergy industry within the eu28 region this study also provides better information and guidance to the boards of the bioenergy industry as they need to have a clear understanding of the influence technical efficiency has on bioenergy production performance moreover the results of this study have implications for investors who focus mainly on profits from their investments

the effects of public policy on strike duration hazard function estimates are utilized to analyze the effect of numerous public policy variables on strike duration based on 7 546 strikes in canada between 1967 and 1985 we find that only the mandatory strike vote substantially reduced conditional duration however the policy variables generally had a more favorable effect on reducing strike incidence so that on net they tended to reduce unconditional duration incidence times conditional duration specifically reduced unconditional duration was associated with the existence of conciliation and the requirement of a mandatory strike vote but the prohibition on replacement workers had a perverse effect

bargaining and strikes strikes are generally regarded as an important economic phenomenon and yet good theoretical explanations of them are hard to come by the difficulty is to understand why rational parties should resort to a wasteful mechanism as a way of distributing the gains from trade why could not both parties be made better off by moving to the final distribution of surplus immediately or if it is uncertain to its certainty equivalent and sharing the benefits from increased production

interdependent international relations and the expansion of ethanol production and consumption the brazilian perspective abstract the global production and consumption of ethanol are expected to increase the growing interdependence of markets and nations producers and consumers of biofuels has led actors to seek and devise mechanisms intended to develop the sector this paper aims to analyze the interdependent international relations between brazil and other ethanol biofuel producer and consumer countries to do so the paper explores the theory of complex interdependence and the game theory a quali quantitative study was conducted involving the application of two questionnaires to experts on biofuels and documentary analysis aided by qda miner software the results show that brazil shares highly interdependent relations with the united states an intermediate degree of interdependence with europe and a low degree of interdependence with china the dimensions of those interdependent relations can be ranked according to importance in the following order first the political then the economic technical and finally the social environmental dimensions a number of actions can be envisaged that could lead ethanol to achieve an increasingly strategic position in the diversification of the energy matrix in different countries technological efforts to improve production efficiency the creation of globally integrated policies designed to provide security and develop the production and consumption infrastructure the reduction of international tariffs on the product and the transformation of ethanol into a global commodity with a large number of countries buying and selling the product this paper faced the challenge of integrating approaches and concepts from two complex theoretical areas complex interdependence theory and game theory the research methodology and the insights gained from the ethanol case contribute to the literature on the applicability of these two theoretical approaches

is strike behavior cyclical we examine cyclicality of strike frequency and incidence using canadian data on strikes and contracts total strike frequency exhibits significant procyclicality to which within contract strikes contribute appreciably evidence is weaker for procyclical behavior of contract expiry strikes both in total and disaggregated by issue strike incidence is also procyclical particularly in manufacturing though the procyclicality here is confined to strikes over nonwage issues these results mirror those obtained by analyzing the frequency of strikes in the contract data industry specific cyclical variables positively affect strike incidence in manufacturing but region specific variables have no effect

wage bargaining with time varying threats we study wage bargaining in which the union is uncertain about the firm s willingness to pay and threat payoffs vary over time strike payoffs change as replacement workers are hired as strikers find temporary jobs and as inventories or strike funds run out we find that bargaining outcomes are substantially altered if threat payoffs vary if dispute costs increase in the long run then dispute durations are longer settlement rates are lower and wages decline more slowly during the short run and may even increase the settlement wage is largely determined from the long run threat rather than the short run threat

an empirical study of the adverse selection model of strikes problems with existing empirical studies of the asymmetric information theory of strikes are 1 industry level data are used as proxies for firm level variables 2 studies using firm level data potentially suffer from simultaneity bias and 3 one of the key predictions of the theory is not tested the present paper addresses these issues while estimating a probit model of strike incidence using data comprising 2 459 contracts from canadian industry for 1964 85 that are merged with firm specific data under a number of alternative specifications results support the main predictions of the asymmetric information theory of strikes

the empirical relations between employers striker replacement strategies and strike duration this analysis of general accounting office survey data on strikes in 1985 and 1989 shows that employers permanent replacement of striking workers was associated with longer strikes than would otherwise have occurred furthermore the authors find that simply announcing the intent to replace strikers was also associated with longer strikes finally when employers permanently replaced strikers the probability of settlement fell approximately 30 these findings are consistent with models focusing on the joint costs of a strike and on private information in the bargaining process t o the firm that seeks to operate during a strike a major obstacle is securing a work force to do the work normally performed by members of the striking bargaining unit of the four possible strategies for securing such a work force reassigning struck work to non bargaining unit employees utilizing members of the bargaining unit who return to work during the strike hiring temporary replacement employees and hiring permanent replacement employees the strategy of hiring permanent replacements for strikers has become the most controversial before the passage of new deal labor legislation u s employers regularly exercised their common law right to replace striking workers the wagner act of 1935 protected employees right to strike but did not explicitly grant employers the right to replace strikers the supreme court however upheld the legality of permanently replacing strikers in its 1938 decision nlrb v mackay radio

foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture subgame perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period assume zero costs positive interest rate continuum of buyers and some technical conditions if buyers valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique buyers strategies are stationary and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist but at most one with analytic strategies coase s conjecture is verified for stationary strategies reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation connections to bargaining models are described journal qf economic literature classification

strikes wages and private information private information models of strikes suggest that the strike is used as an information revealing device by the union in the presence of asymmetrical information a testable prediction of these models is that there is a negative relationship between strikes and the unpredicted component of the wage this paper finds evidence of such a relationship in a large sample of u s labor contracts the real wage falls by about 3 percent after a strike lasting one hundred days copyright 1989 by american economic association

an empirical and forecasting analysis of the bioenergy market in the eu28 region evidence from a panel data simultaneous equation model this study improves upon and applies a comprehensive panel data simultaneous equation model to the european union eu28 region s bioenergy market the goals are to estimate bioenergy quantities in domestic and international markets for the period from 1990 to 2013 and to apply a forecasting analysis for the eu28 s domestic and international bioenergy markets for the period of 2014 2020 the results demonstrate that biomass harvest and the domestic price in a domestic market have a significant influence on the supply function additionally domestic price has a negative relationship with the bioenergy market domestic demand in international markets competitive import prices play a primary role in the development of the bioenergy market import demand export prices and gdp also have primary influences on the export demand for bioenergy moreover the exchange rate has a positive and significant effect on export demand the results of a forecasting analysis for the future period of 2014 2020 has predicted slight increases in domestic supply domestic demand and import trends on the other hand it also predicted a sharp decline in the export demand trend between those same years this study contributes to the literature by providing policymakers and other energy policy stakeholders a reliable forward looking analysis of the potential condition of the domestic and international bioenergy markets in the eu28 region through the end of 2020

wage bargaining inventories and union legislation this paper analyses a strategic bargaining game where the firm may or may not be able to sell out of its inventory of finished goods during a strike firms and the union are both risk neutral and have the same discount rate it is shown that the wage equilibrium corresponds to the axiomatic nash bargaining solution where the threatpoints are the agents payoffs should bargaining continue indefinitely we use the 1980 and 1982 employment acts to test this theory interpreting that legislation change as changing the firm s threatpoint but not its bargaining power this allows us to identify the value of the firm s threatpoint post 1982 formal tests support the theory also consistent with the theory it is found that union wages decrease with inventories after 1982 but not before and that the union wage gap is smaller after 1982 wage bargaining as described in the strategic bargaining literature is a peaceful affair if there is no agreement workers simply withdraw their labour for one period and there is a consequent one period loss of production for the firm but strikes tend to generate a lot of conflict in the u k in the 1970s striking unions would form picket lines across the factory gates their aim was not only to prevent strikebreakers going to work but also to stop lorries delivering goods conversely firms often with the help of the police would try to get the lorries across those lines the employment acts of 1980 and 1982 stopped this struggle stopping lorries crossing picket lines had always been illegal but this new legislation gave firms power to have picket lines immediately lifted should striking workers act illegally the courts would immediately sequester the union s assets if its members refused to comply with the law using the strategic bargaining approach this paper considers the equilibrium effect of this change in legislation on union wage formation using wage and inventory data from a panel of firms across this time period this paper also formally tests that theory there have been two main approaches to bargaining theory the strategic bargaining

estimating strike effects in a general model of prices and quantities estimates of the effect of strikes on the production price and purchases of north american automobiles are provided over the period 1966 79 the estimates are based on a model that reflects the decisions of both consumers and producers and that captures important intertemporal adjustments before during and after the strike to allow for inventory buildup in anticipation of the strike as well as inventory depletion during the strike and replacement afterward the results generally indicated that both consumers and producers rationally responded to the expected and the actual event of the strike through a variety of related intertemporal adjustments and while the initial effects are in some instances quite pronounced the long run effects are usually minimal

logit estimates of strike incidence from canadian contract data logit estimates of strike incidence are made based on a unique and comprehensive data set of 2 437 collective agreements the appropriate level of aggregation since that is where bargaining occurs the results are interpreted through a theoretical framework emphasizing that strikes are more likely when the joint costs of using the strike mechanism are low relative to the cost of alternative mechanisms for achieving the same purposes such functions of strikes are to generate information elicit truth telling establish reputations provide catharsis and solve intraorganizational conflict

bargaining with incomplete information an infinite horizon model with two sided uncertainty the resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others preferences this paper explores within the context of an infinite horizon bargaining model with two sided uncertainty how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached this need for learning due to incomplete information about preferences results in bargaining inefficiencies trade often occurs after costly delay thus the model provides an explanation for the inefficient bargaining behaviour that appears to occur often in practice

dynamic bargaining with transaction costs a buyer and seller alternate making offers until an offer is accepted or someone terminates negotiations the seller s valuation is common knowledge but the buyer s valuation is known only by the buyer impatience to reach an agreement comes from two sources the traders discount future payoffs and there are transaction costs of bargaining equilibrium behavior involves either immediate trade delayed trade or immediate termination depending on the size of the gains from trade and the relative bargaining costs this contrasts with the pure discounting model where termination never occurs and the pure transaction cost model where delayed trade never occurs

cyclical fluctuations in strike durations canadian data on strikes between 1946 and 1983 are used to estimate linear regression models for the logarithm of completed duration a thorough investigation of the influence of the business cycle reveals strong support for the hypothesis that strike durations are countercyclical the cyclical effect is shown to be robust to both the choice of cyclical variable and the econometric specification and the magnitude of the effect is quite substantial experimentation with different representations of the cycle reveals that it is difficult to improve on a simple formulation involving a single continuous variable

bargaining enforcement and international cooperation neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains by contrast i argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third distinct obstacle plays a crucial role almost regardless of the issue area states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement furthermore the bargaining and enforcement problems interact using a game model i show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced the shadow of the future cuts two ways a high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories

equilibria with communication in a job market example we study costless information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and if so which position to give him we construct equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps or even that no deadline be imposed on the plain conversation the set of communication equilibrium payoffs achieved with the help of a communication device is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs

a theory of exit in duopoly we develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs each firm enters the market knowing its own cost but not that of its opponent as times goes on each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival the time of exit is the only strategic variable so that our model is a war of attrition in contrast to the classic war of attrition however we assume that with positive probability each firm s costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy thus our model unlike the classic one has a unique equilibrium

facilitating the financing of bioenergy projects in sub saharan africa abstract the purpose of this paper is to identify and develop potential solutions on how to facilitate the financing of bioenergy projects in sub saharan africa we focus on four main areas that have been identified from empirical research in achieving this objective these are i financing ii markets iii trade and iv policy the sources utilised consist of primary and secondary data compilation and analysis of particular relevance are the results of a market survey undertaken on funding opportunities where the perspectives of both project developers as well as project financiers are taken into account results indicate that the four areas cannot be treated autonomously as they not only overlap but impact each other there are a number of difficulties for biofuel ventures not least the nature of the projects themselves but also around the financing and political landscape of these enterprises common solutions which cross cut the four areas are the need to raise awareness and the skillsets in areas including financing opportunities markets policy technical aspects among a range of stakeholders involved in biofuel ventures there is also a necessity to create a supporting framework for the emerging carbon trading related activities in africa

wage contract settlements in u s manufacturing a bstruactusing a large scale longitudinal micro data base this paper tests for the determinants of union wage settlements in manufacturing alternative specifications of wage change relationships were tested in data covering the years 1957 to 1980 among the most important determinants of union wage changes were the expected inflation rate inflationary surprises in indexed agreements incomes policy dummy variables and spillovers from key national agreements catch up effects from lagged inflationary surprises were not important in determining the size of new settlements

the sunk cost fallacy in penny auctions this article theoretically and empirically analyses behaviour in penny auctions a relatively new auction mechanism as in the us dollars or war of attrition players in penny auctions commit higher non refundable costs as the auction continues and only win if all other players stop bidding i first show that in any equilibria that does not end immediately players bid probabilistically such that the expected profit from every bid is zero then using two large data sets covering 166 000 auctions i calculate that average profit margins actually exceed 50 to explain this deviation i incorporate a sunk cost fallacy into the theoretical model to generate a set of predictions about hazard rates and player behaviour which i confirm empirically while players do slowly learn to correct this bias and there are few obvious barriers to competition activity in the market is rising and concentration remains relatively high

work stoppages and the theory of the offset factor evidence from the british columbian lumber industry one method of estimating losses resulting from work stoppages is to multiply the total number of man days lost during disputes by the average product of workers this statistic can be easily calculated using information typically available from government agencies but has obvious flaws for example the behavior of other firms not involved in disputes is ignored moreover when output is durable the impact on consumption is unknown since inventories can be used as buffers to assess the importance of these and other considerations i develop an alternative empirical framework and implement it using data from the british columbian lumber industry

multidimensional separating equilibria and moral hazard an empirical study of national football league contract negotiations this paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts using contract and performance data on players drafted into the national football league from 1986 through 1991 we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations in addition our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player s effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract

reputation in repeated second price auctions abstract a model in which two bidders take part in a series of second price comon value auctions is examined the question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer s standpoint in a repeated auction setting is partially addressed it is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively second price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer

the impact of energy prices on the volatility of ethanol prices and the role of gasoline emissions abstract the contribution of renewable energy resources is vital for a country s economic growth by providing high efficiency in energy as well as an effective tool for the confrontation of climate change in particular concerning the eu an increase in the consumption of renewable energy resources as a proportion of the total energy consumption by its member states was set as an objective until 2020 ethanol has been widely used as a substitute to conventional energy like gasoline and oil the present paper surveys the role of alternative energy prices and gas emissions in the formation of the ethanol prices the results of the empirical survey confirmed the existence of a sole relationship among the variables employed according to the results obtained an increase in the volume of emissions or in gasoline prices results in an increase in ethanol prices while the opposite is confirmed in the case of crude oil he elasticity of ethanol prices to the increase of the emissions is another result worth mentioning indicative of the significant role of the emissions in the formation of ethanol prices

dynamic bargaining with action dependent valuations abstract an infinite horizon dynamic bargaining model is presented in which actions affect the expected future value of the buyer seller match because actions directly affect the future surplus to be bargained over the model is unlike other models that tie the dynamic process to nature alone focusing on a subset of weak markov equilibria several results come about that are not found in static bargaining models using similar bargaining protocols in particular optimal price demands can be lower higher than the buyer s lowest highest possible valuation and several empirical features concerning wage settlements and strike incidence from labor union contract negotiations can be explained

repeated bargaining with persistent private information the paper analyses repeated contract negotiations involving the same buyer and seller where the contracts are linked because the buyer has persistent but not fully permanent private information the size of the surplus being divided is specified as a two state markov chain with transitions that are synchronized with contract negotiation dates equilibrium involves information cycles triggered by the success or failure of aggressive demands made by the seller because there is persistence in the markov chain generating the surplus a successful demand induces the seller to make another aggressive demand in the next negotiation since the buyer s acceptance reveals that the current surplus is large rejection of an aggressive demand on the other hand leads the seller to be pessimistic about the size of the surplus in the next contract so the seller makes a soft offer that is sure to be accepted then after several such offers have been accepted the seller is optimistic enough to again make an aggressive demand creating an information cycle an interesting feature of this cycle is that the soft price is not constant but declines as the cycle continues so as to offset the buyer s option value of re starting the cycle when the current state is bad an explicit mapping is given for the relationship between the basic parameters and the equilibrium prices and quantities in particular there is a closed form solution for the threshold belief that makes the seller indifferent between hard and soft offers

optimal reserve composition in the presence of sudden stops abstract we analytically derive optimal central bank portfolios in a minimum variance framework with two assets and transaction demands caused by sudden stops in capital inflows in this model transaction demands become less important relative to traditional portfolio objectives as debt to reserve ratios decrease we empirically estimate optimal dollar and euro shares for 23 emerging market countries and find that optimal reserve portfolios are dominated by anchor currencies and at current debt to reserve ratios introducing transaction demand has a relatively modest effect for most countries we find that in general the dollar acts as a safe haven currency during sudden stops for country specific and global sudden stops increasing the optimal share of dollar bonds in central bank portfolios correspondingly our model predicts that dollar shares should decline as debt to reserve ratios fall as observed in recent data we also find that the denomination of foreign currency debt has little importance for optimal reserve portfolios

reserve accumulation and financial crises from individual protection to systemic risk abstract this paper provides a new perspective on the relationship between countries international reserve holdings and financial crises while the local view holds that reserves may prevent domestic crises it overlooks that the accumulation of reserves relaxes the financing constraint of the reserve currency country and may cause a financial crisis in the centre which is transmitted globally according to this global view reserve accumulation might destabilize the international financial system since the crisis affects all countries alike the accumulation of reserves imposes a negative externality on non accumulating countries we integrate this idea in a theoretical model of the optimal amount of reserves and illustrate the gap between local and global optimality the consideration of systemic risk lowers the demand for reserves moreover if a supranational authority determines the optimal level of reserves it internalizes the negative externality and accumulates fewer reserves a macroprudential tax on reserve hoardings might implement the socially optimal solution our calibration analysis shows that these considerations are economically significant they lower the optimal amount of reserves in the benchmark case by 45

a bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences etude d un jeu de negociation strategique sequentiel avec information incomplete caracterisation d une classe d equilibres sequentiels appeles equilibres sequentiels de negociation et demonstration de l unicite de cet equilibre

bargaining power strike durations and wage outcomes an analysis of strikes in the 1880s strike outcomes in the 1880s had a winner take all character successful strikes ended with a discrete wage gain failed strikes ended with a return to work at the prestrike wage we present a theoretical interpretation of these outcomes based on a war of attrition model we fit an empirical model specifying the capitulation times of the two parties and the size of the wage gain in the event of a strike success the results show a systematic relation between the determinants of strike success and the determinants of the wage gain for a successful strike

difficult choices crossing the picket line during the 1987 national football league strike this study examines the difficult choice faced by members of a striking bargaining unit between withholding labor or crossing the picket line in violation of the prevailing behavioral norm using duration analysis we test a model of crossing behavior using data on individual football players during the 1987 national football league strike a notable finding is that nonwhite players are less willing to cross the picket line if their team union representative is also nonwhite willingness to cross the line is also influenced by teammate crossing and proxies for expected career length demand for current income and expected benefits from union demands

bargaining with common values this paper examines a bargaining model with asymmetric information in which the private valuations of the two bargaining agents are correlated it shows that equilibria in such models typically exhibit a significant probability of a significant delay to agreement the paper characterizes the unique perfect bayesian equilibrium to the game in which an uninformed buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller it also shows by example that in this framework bargainers may rationally break off negotiations even in the presence of commonly known gains from trade

the macroeconomic role of currency reserve accumulation in emerging markets the asian experience the impact of currency reserve accumulation is controversially discussed since reserve accumulation potentially destabilises the international financial system and causes crises due to higher systemic risk the main aim of this paper is to put the macroeconomic role of currency reserve accumulation for four asian economies under closer scrutiny the key question is whether accumulating currency reserves is beneficial from a long run perspective based on a vector error correction approach we start by analysing long run steady state relationships between currency reserves exchange rates against the us dollar real gdp and interest rates our findings show that cumulated currency reserve shocks significantly affect real gdp a likely explanation for our finding is that accumulation of reserves has supported growth through providing liquidity and supporting the development of the financial sector for the economies under observation

strategic bargaining models and interpretation of strike data attrition screening and signalling models of strategic bargaining are characterized in terms of their predictions about the incidence mean duration and settlement rates of strikes and the terms of wage settlements these predictions are compared with the general features observed in empirical studies of strikes in canada and the united states conclusions are drawn about the types of models capable of generating these features and about the conformity of the models to the evidence methods are described for computing the numerical examples used to illustrate the models

an empirical test of an asymmetric information model of strikes recent developments in the theory of strategic bargaining demonstrate how informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining these models can be applied to contract negotiations yielding an economic theory of strikes to date however few empirical tests of these models have been carried out in this paper a set of predictions concerning the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple bargaining model in which the union is uncertain about the firm s future profitability these predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major u s contract negotiations that took place from 1973 to 1977

uncertainty and delay in bargaining this paper investigates the relationship between uncertainty and delay of agreement in the one sided offer bargaining model with two sided uncertainty where the seller makes offers we construct a weak stationary equilibrium in which different types of the seller charge different prices in every period we completely characterize the separating equilibrium by three regularity conditions and show that the time interval between offers converges to zero the seller s initial price offer in a separating equilibrium converges with probability 1 to the lowest valuation of the buyer if and only if the gain from trading is common knowledge we have witnessed a proliferation of sequential bargaining models that with a few remarkable exceptions fudenberg and tirole 1983 cramton 1984 and chatterjee and samuelson 1987 are based on models with one sided uncertainty the importance of studying bargaining models with one sided uncertainty is that despite their highly special informational structure we can derive valuable insights into the role of uncertainty in the delay in reaching an agreement while keeping the computational exercise tractable however the assumption of one sided uncertainty essentially excludes the situation where the buyer s actual reservation value is lower than the seller s actual reservation value though they are still engaged in the bargaining process the primary objective of this paper is to investigate the role of uncertainty about the gain from trading in a sequential bargaining model with two sided incomplete information in the models with one sided incomplete information important studies fudenberg levine and tirole 1985 and gul sonnenschein and wilson 1986 are often based on weak stationary equilibria where the equilibrium strategy of each player only depends upon the posterior conjecture about the other player and the previous period s offer although the importance of two sided uncertainty and the weak stationary equilibrium is well recognized previous research on sequential bargaining models has not combined the two features within the same framework studies on the models under two sided uncertainty have not focused on weak stationary equilibria for example cramton 1984 computes a specific sequential equilibrium with interesting properties in which the equilibrium strategies of both players depend upon histories in a rather complex fashion on the other hand it is only in models under one sided uncertainty that the weak stationary equilibrium has been extensively studied this paper computes and analyzes the weak stationary equilibria in a model under two sided uncertainty in order to investigate the effect of uncertainty on the delay in agreement we will extend the results from previous studies of one sided uncertainty models the computation of the equilibrium in models with two sided uncertainty is generally very complicated furthermore we must identify a sensible outcome if more than one equilibrium exists in the model to simplify the analysis we choose a standard bargaining

inventories and strikes this paper analyses a dynamic model of bargaining and strikes in which the reservation wage of union members in each period is private information the model endogenizes the firm s decision to accumulate inventories of finished goods in order to enhance its bargaining position with higher inventories the firm makes a lower wage offer thereby accepting an increased probability of a strike the model can help explain empirical results that have found a positive correlation between wages and inventory accumulation it also shows that unless inventories are controlled for strike incidence will exhibit a spurious negative state dependence

can strategic bargaining models explain collective bargaining data much effort has recently been devoted to the development of strategic models of bargaining with private information at the same time empirical analyses of data on collective bargaining in the labor market have generated an interesting list of facts to be explained in this paper we assess the prospective interactions between these theoretical and empirical developments the style here is expository detailed arguments have been ruthlessly suppressed a more complete treatment can be found in our 1989 article the theoretical models deal with conflicts between rational bargainers in situations where at least one of the bargainers has private information as in the case where an employer knows more about the value of labor s product than the workers do we start by explaining why private information is important in building models of strikes in a naive model of collective bargaining the union starts with a tough demand and

collapsing exchange rate regimes some linear examples abstract we construct a pair of linear examples to study the collapse time of a fixed exchange rate regime the first example is a perfect foresight continuous time model which allows calculation of the exact collapse time and the tracking of reserves the second example is a discrete time stochastic model which yields an endogenous probability distribution over the collapse time and produces a forward discount of the exchange rate

market competition and strike activity we develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly we investigate how product differentiation and market competition bertrand vs cournot competition affect wages and strikes if bargaining takes place at the industry level then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product differentiation whatever the type of market competition however if bargaining takes place at the firm level then wages and strikes are increasing with the degree of product differentiation and the strike activity is smaller under bertrand than under cournot competition

european union leadership in biofuels regulation europe as a normative power the rapid emergence of the european union eu as a leader in global environmental politics has led many scholars to argue in favour of the eu being a normative power in international relations this paper critically examines the eu s biofuels policy and evaluates whether its attempts to lead by example and shape international practice in this field could support such arguments europe s biofuel policies are evaluated through a sustainable development lens so as to determine the extent to which it has embraced a holistic approach to sustainability while not dismissing that the identity of the eu is indeed an explanatory factor and that normative intentions may well be regarded as a motivating force this study argues that an interest based perspective on international environmental regulation offers a supplementary view of how an actor s preferences for an international regime are shaped by erecting barriers aimed at shielding its own inefficient domestic biofuels production the eu is in essence placing trade competitiveness and economic growth above environmental protection thus permitting sustainability concerns to be addressed only in part

international bioenergy trade a review of past developments in the liquid biofuel market policies aimed to promote biofuels locally had tremendous effects on global market developments across the past decade this article develops insights into the interaction of these policies and market forces via a comprehensive collection and analysis of international production and trade data it shows that world biofuel production and trade has grown exponentially from below 30 pj in 2000 to 572 pj in 2009 for biodiesel from 340 pj in 2000 to over 1540 pj in 2009 for fuel ethanol the eu has dominated world biodiesel whereas the us and brazil have led fuel ethanol production world net biofuel trade reached 120 130 pj in 2009 and was directed towards the most lucrative markets for biodiesel this has been the eu whose imports rose to 92 pj in 2008 and remained at 70 pj in 2009 regarding fuel ethanol both the us and the eu have been prime destinations for competitively priced exports the vast majority of which originated in brazil international biofuel trade is both supply and demand driven the demand side was shaped by support policies which generally increased the domestic market value of biofuels trade developed wherever these policies prices were not accompanied by respective measures it is found that import duties largely influenced trade volumes whereas trade routes were mainly driven by tariff preferences trade regimes appear to have been designed and adapted unilaterally along national interests causing market disruptions trade inefficiencies and disputes to avoid these it is important to explicitly consider international trade implications of national trade policies a prerequisite is to improve the understanding of the underlying complex and interwoven links within the market the current lack of adequate homogeneous international reporting of biofuel production and trade statistics could be bridged via internationally standardized custom clarifications trade factor interrelations also need to be investigated further

an investigation into the determinants of u s strike activity this paper outlines the steps involved in constructing a new panel dataset of u s contract negotiations and strike activity this data set has a much broader coverage of firms and unions than micro data sets analyzed to date key findings include the discovery that the variability and not the level of firm profitability affects the probability of a strike personal characteristics of the union workforce also emerge as key determinants of strike activity finally strikes are found to be more likely when the local labor market is tight but less likely when the industry labor market is tight copyright 1986 by american economic association

a multistage model of bargaining this paper presents a simple multistage model of bargaining wherein a seller makes an offer that can be either accepted or refused if rejected the process continues how the seller s ability to make commitments affects bargaining outcomes is analysed by comparing the commitment equilibria to those arising when commitment is impossible the effects of increasing uncertainty about preferences and varying the length of the bargaining horizon are analysed the ways in which the bargaining environment can be changed to improve outcomes are discussed

sequential bargaining with incomplete information this paper describes a simple two person two period bargaining game and solves it using the concept of perfect bayesian equilibrium in which the actions of each player convey information which is used by his opponent the paper examines the effects of changes in bargaining costs the size of the contract zone and the length of the bargaining process on such aspects of the solution as the probability of impasse and the likelihood of concessions the combination of information transfer and the lack of pre commitment embodied in perfectness yields many surprising results common perceptions about the effects of parameter changes on bargaining processes are suspect and should be checked in the particular game being discussed

on delay in bargaining with one sided uncertainty recently attention has been given to a model of two person bargaining in which the parties alternate making offers and there is uncertainty about the valuation of one party the purpose of the analysis has been to identify delay to agreement with a screening process where agents with relatively lower valuations distinguish themselves by waiting longer to settle we point out a fundamental difficulty with this program by demonstrating that the assumptions used in the literature allow for delay only in so far as the time between offers is significant

wage bargaining labor turnover and the business cycle a model with asymmetric information this paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the other s reservation wage under specified circumstances the model s equilibrium is shown to involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover in addition aggregate demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs these results are obtained without resorting to assumptions of nominal wage rigidity long term contracting or aggregate price misperceptions

strategic delay in bargaining this paper analyses a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous strategic variable we find equilibria involving a delay to agreement that is due to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers to signal their relative strength under some specifications of the parameters delay is present in the unique sequential equilibrium whose beliefs satisfy one intuitive restriction this delay does not vanish as the minimal time between offers becomes small

opportunities and barriers for international bioenergy trade recently the international trade of various bioenergy commodities has grown rapidly yet this growth is also hampered by some barriers the aim of this paper is to obtain an overview of what market actors currently perceive as major opportunities and barriers for the development of international bioenergy trade the work focuses on three bioenergy commodities bioethanol biodiesel and wood pellets data were collected through an internet based questionnaire the majority of the 141 respondents had an industrial background geographically two thirds were from mainly western europe with other minor contributions from all other continents results show that import tariffs and the implementation of sustainability certification systems are perceived as potentially major barriers for the trade of bioethanol and biodiesel while logistics are seen mainly as an obstacle for wood pellets development of technical standards was deemed more as an opportunity than a barrier for all commodities most important drivers were high fossil fuel prices and climate change mitigation policies concluding to overcome some of the barriers specific actions will be required by market parties and policy makers import tariffs for biofuels could be reduced or abolished linked to multinational trade agreements and harmonization including provisions on technical standards and sustainability requirements