cooperative and noncooperative r d in duopoly with spillovers contrary to the usual assumption made in most oligopoly models relations among firms are seldom of a wholly cooperative or noncooperative type in many situations they compete in some fields while they cooperate in others an important example is the case of cooperative research efforts bringing fierce competitors together two types of agreement are observed first r d cooperation can take place at the so called precompetitive stage companies share basic information and efforts in the r d stage but remain rivals in the market place 1 a second type of agreement involves an extended collusion between partners creating common policies at the product level the usual justifications of this extension are the difficulties of protecting intellectual property the idea is then to allow partners who have achieved inventions together to also control together the processes and products which embody the results of their collaboration in order to recuperate jointly their r d investments 2 what could be expected from these types of agreement is a reduction in r d expenditures because of less wasteful duplication and a reduction of total production because of more reprinted from the american economic review 78 5 1133 1137 1988 center for operations research econometrics 1348 louvain la neuve belgium we are grateful to jean

how efficient is the voting market it is by now well established that good macroeconomic conditions benefit the incumbent president and his congressional party confreres at the polls this result is not unanimous see for example stigler or arcelus and meltzer2 and may not be universal 3 however the basic results in kramer 4 the progenitor of the modern literature on the effect of economic conditions on elections seem to have stood the test of time the broad consensus of this literature is that voters in presidential and congressional elections 1 reward income growth and punish unemployment and inflation 2 probably give greater weight to income growth than to unemployment and inflation and 3 myopically ignore any information beyond the recent past say prior to the election year 5 so far however the data have outrun interpretation while economic conditions seem to matter we do not know why they matter or how plausibly to characterize the process by which voters translate information about economic conditions into voting decisions this article tries to fill that gap though it extends the empirical literature to gubernatorial elections its main con

moral hazard with several agents abstract we consider a situation in which a principal hires two agents whose cooperation is technically profitable and study three models that incorporate different assumptions about the agents cooperative behavior we find a close relationship between the agents commitment capacity and the characteristics of the optimal contract a greater capacity to cooperate leads to more efficient outcomes we also show that unless agents form a team the efficient level of mutual help is not achieved in equilibrium

economic and political determinants of budget deficits in developing countries abstract the evidence from a large sample of developing countries tends to reject the empirical implications of optimizing models of the process of determination of fiscal deficits tax rates seigniorage and inflation the paper also presents some preliminary evidence that an important reason for the failure of the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy is that fiscal deficits are partly determined by political factors and that cross country differentials in budget deficits may depend on measures of political instability in particular as suggested by a number of recent theoretical approaches an increase in the degree of political instability appears to lead to greater budget deficits

personal traits and individual choices taking action in economic and non economic decisions abstract in a large number of decisions the option that does not require a specific action such as filling in a form is chosen frequently it is a stylized fact that opt in or opt out designs for otherwise identical choices lead to vastly different outcomes choice options are chosen more frequently simply because they are the no action alternative or default option however direct empirical evidence on the reasons for the popularity of defaults is scarce we devised a special survey module for the dutch dnb household survey to study potential explanations for default choices we find that the popularity of the default option is related to different personal traits in economic and non economic decisions financially literate individuals are more likely to take action and opt out the default option in economic decision making in non economic decisions procrastination increases the popularity of the default while individuals who care much about the opinion of others are more inclined to deviate from the default

how do crises lead to change liberalizing capital controls in the early years of new order indonesia how do crises lead to change rationalist approaches to the question that emphasize inexorable structural responses and the pursuit of distributive preferences by newly dominant coalitions are inadequate because they obscure the social mediation of material events and the pervasive uncertainty that follows destabilization of the precrisis status quo the latter constrains actors from fully grasping their distributive preferences until uncertainty is reduced persuasion emerges as a key mechanism of change although constructivist approaches emphasize persuasive practices they have yet to adequately specify the scope conditions underpinning the selection of new ideas this article goes beyond much of the constructivist focus on domestic legitimacy and static notions of resonance by emphasizing external credibility and dynamic processes of resonance building by norm entrepreneurs the author specifies four features what he calls the four cs of crisis resolution that shape the process of idea selection carriers composition crossover appeal and credibility developing these arguments in the case of the early years of new order indonesia the article suggests that whenever a prominent and cohesive group of advocates promotes an idea that has sufficient ideational and distributive appeal and the endorsement of external actors whose seal of approval is perceived as important intersubjective belief change and thus institutional and policy change is more likely

bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge we consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an r d race for an ultimate patentable invention licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed by the leading to the laggingagent are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure in hersequential offers bargaining games the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee

the impact of inequality on the transmission of monetary policy abstract we consider a model to detect the relation between household debt and the transmission of monetary policy in an eu member state with independent monetary policy and high income inequality romania we find that households response to changes in monetary conditions depends on their income and indebtedness profile the transmission of monetary policy is more effective for middle income households which are more indebted and have adjustable rates as lower policy rates ease the consumption constraints on these households low income households respond mainly to budgetary policies as the increase in disposable income matters most for the bottom quintile top income quintile reacts more to monetary policy than bottom quintile but less than middle income quintiles lower inequality is associated with stronger effectiveness and higher homogeneity of monetary policy transmission in turn higher inequality is associated with less effectiveness and higher heterogeneity of the impact of the monetary policy

overview of the special issue on policy implications of and lessons from the global financial crisis this paper reviews the special issue policy implications of and lessons from the global financial crisis and its themes global liquidity and the use of international reserves real and financial economic patterns before and during the global financial crisis

cooperation between rivals informal know how trading it has long been recognized that it is difficult for an innovating firm to fully appropriate the benefits arising from its innovations and that desired research might therefore not be performed nelson 1959 pp 297 306 one sometimes possible solution to this dilemma is cooperative r d conducted by firms who share the costs and benefits of particular r d projects johnson 1973

an analysis of cooperative research and development i analyze the effects of cooperative research whereby member firms agree to share the costs andfruits of a research project before they undertake it in this model industrywide agreements tend to have socially beneficial effects when the degree ofproduct market competition is low when there are r d spillovers in the absence of cooperation when a high degree of sharing is technologically feasible and when the agreement concerns basic research rather than development activities i show that a royalty free cross licensing agreement among any number offirms lowers the equilibrium level of innovation even though it increases the efficiency of r d through sharing

lifecycle consumption plans social learning and external habits experimental evidence abstract we report results from a laboratory experiment exploring the extent to which individuals can solve a deterministic intertemporal lifecycle consumption optimization problem and the effect of revealing social information on past average consumption amounts as all individuals have identical induced preferences and lifetime incomes such social information could be useful in solving for the optimal consumption path instead we find that the provision of social information on past average levels of consumption results in a greater deviation of consumption from both the unconditional and the conditionally optimal paths we find some improvement in consumption planning relative to the conditional optimum when social concerns external habits are explicitly incorporated into subject s period utility functions as in external habit formation preference specifications our results on the effects of social information on consumption behavior may help to explain the phenomenon of over consumption and under saving that has been observed in many developed countries in recent decades as social information on the behavior of others has become more readily available

strategic trade policy design with asymmetric information and public contracts this paper examines strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with publicly observable contracts we analyse both the cases of unilateral and bilateral intervention we find that the requirement of incentive compatibility undermines the strategic precommitment effect when public funds are costly even with no restrictions on the form of the policies second when firms sell substitute goods the introduction of a rival interventionist government may reduce the cost of informational rents to each government third it turns out that under bilateral intervention there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria with levels of output and corresponding levels of welfare in the exporting countries which can be ranked the requirement of ex post participation constraints for the firm limits the set of subsidies which can be offered to the firm in particular under bilateral intervention the equilibrium levels of output which are implemented under adverse selection are below their values under ex ante uncertainty i e below the equilibrium levels of output which are achieved when firms sign their contracts before the realization of their costs ever since the inception of research on strategic trade policy with the seminal paper by brander and spencer 1985 economists have been warning that the informational requirements of rent shifting policies are enormous and unlikely to be met in practice because the policy recommendations are highly sensitive to the particularities of the market in response a number of recent papers have begun to address the specific ways that informational failures affect policy and to modify policy recommendations to take such failures into account this paper analyses the implications of asymmetric information for strategic trade policy under both unilateral and bilateral intervention our complete information benchmark is a simple trade policy designed to shift rents similar to brander spencer two firms are competing in a third country and receive export subsidies from their respective governments however we place no restrictions on the form of these export policies previous literature has shown that under complete information a large number of outcomes may be sustained as equilibria of delegation games such as this moreover the introduction of uncertainty about the state of nature on the part of both

nonlinear pricing in vertically related duopolies a vertically separated duopolistic market is analyzed in which manufacturers compete in wholesale price schedules and retailers in quantity under certainty there exists a continuum of equilibria the introduction of an uncertain demand parameter observed only by retailers dramatically reduces the set of equilibria quantity discounts emerge in markets with only moderately decreasing returns to scale in manufacturing and quantity competition downstream with additive shocks to demand the equilibria coincide with those of markets in which vertically integrated firms compete in supply functions before market uncertainty is resolved however generically equilibria in my model are not supply function equilibria

baby boomer retirement security the roles of planning financial literacy and housing wealth abstract we compare wealth holdings across two cohorts of the health and retirement study the early baby boomers in 2004 and individuals in the same age group in 1992 levels and patterns of total net worth have changed relatively little over time though boomers rely more on housing equity than their predecessors most important planners in both cohorts arrive close to retirement with much higher wealth levels and display higher financial literacy than non planners instrumental variables estimates show that planning behavior can explain the differences in savings and why some people arrive close to retirement with very little or no wealth

trade balance news and exchange rates is there a policy signal abstract contrary to earlier studies surprisingly large us trade deficits are shown to have a significant effect on exchange rates throughout the 1980s three possible reasons for the time varying effect are considered the evidence presented yields the following inference deficit news is likely to have changed expectations of fed intervention that moved exchange rates deficit news probably has an effect on revisions of future deficit expectations and exchange rates change as a result and deficit news may change expectations regarding us trade policy that is reflected in exchange rates

social policy through labor markets understanding national differences in the provision of economic security to wage earners recent work in comparative political economy has emphasized the existence of functional equivalents to the welfare state in the area of labor market policy in many european countries in australia and in new zealand labor laws minimum wages and collective agreements have traditionally played an important role in guaranteeing a certain level of economic security for workers and their families this article tries to explain why different countries have developed different instruments for providing economic security to wage earners it compares labor legislation and practices across several european countries and focuses on the detailed trajectory of france germany and the united kingdom it finds that state society relationships and ideological influences at key historical moments can help understand the original divergence which is perpetuated through a typical path dependent development

on information sharing and incentives in r d i investigate the issue of endogenous spillover of r d information across firms through information exchange between their employees although the firms typically cannot observe and restrict communication between their employees in a direct way they can regulate information flows through the incentive schemes offered to the employees the article focuses on two issues characterization of the optimal incentive schemes and the link between the nature of the firms interaction in the product market and the intensity of information exchange between the employees copyright 2001 by the rand corporation

household financial planning and savings behavior greater personal responsibility toward financial decision making is being advocated on a global basis individuals and households are encouraged to take a more active approach to personal finance in this paper we examine behavioral factors which lead households toward savings and financial planning across a panel of 1253 dutch households in line with the available literature we find that an individual s propensity to save decreases with age and is higher among the financial literate moreover we find that saving behavior varies across generations and is significantly dominant among baby boomers this generation effect however weakens once we account for more individual specifics our results offer evidence for parental influence and for the effects of the psychological and behavioral metrics of numeracy self efficacy locus of control and future orientation a good understanding of these personality variables helps to explain why some take financial responsibility while others do not

r d rivalry with licensing or imitation the authors study the rivalry between two firms to develop an innovation in a dynamic setting that allows for post development dissemination of the innovation such as licensing or imitation this dissemination may cause the noninnovating firm to benefit from the discovery when this occurs conventional results in the economics of r d no longer need apply they find that industry leaders will tend to develop minor innovations but will develop major innovations only if imitation is difficult copyright 1987 by american economic association

the life cycle model of consumption and saving a central implication of life cycle models is that agents smooth consumption we review the empirical evidence on smoothing at frequencies from within the year up to across a lifetime we find that life cycle models particular those which incorporate realistic features of markets and goods have more empirical successes than failures we also show that some apparent deviations from theoretical predictions imply very small welfare losses for agents finally we emphasize that the coherence of life cycle models imposes an important discipline when incorporating new features into models

understanding the heterogeneity of savings and asset allocation a behavioral economics perspective why do saving rates and the proportion of savings invested in stocks substantially increase with income this paper sheds light on this question from the perspective of a new bounded rationality life cycle model it has been shown elsewhere that this model is better than existing ones at predicting how savings and asset allocation choices vary over the life cycle in this paper it is shown that a very simple version of the same model also allows for a better understanding of the variation in savings and asset allocation choices across income groups

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

political factors in international economics an overview abstract the intellectual interaction between politics and economics is not new theolder term to describe what economists do political economy which until recently survived only in french translation and on the masthead of one of the premier professional journals is a case in point a more pertinent example is provided by developments over the past two decades in the field of industrial organization the shift from an exclusively public interest view of economic regulation to one in which regulation is seen as the result of interaction between utility maximizing politicians and various interest groups 1 the extension of such ideas to international economics is i believe both necessary and desirable and as these papers indicate with the right experimental design it can also prove highly illuminating

an analysis of the principal agent problem most analyses of the principal agent problem assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to maximize expected utility subject to the agent s utility being at a stationary point an important paper of mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally invalid we present an alternative procedure if the agent s preferences over income lotteries are independent of action we show that the optimal way of implementing an action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem we use this to characterize the optimal incentive scheme and to analyze the determinants of the seriousness of an incentive problem

the ideological determinants of liberal economic reform the case of privatization ollowing the collapse of the communist regimes in eastern europe one of the first priorities of the reform governments was to transform the system of ownership the new governments overwhelm ingly chose to pursue a broad program of sweeping privatization trans ferring the bulk of state property to the private sector given that most property was controlled and owned by the state and that there was no historical precedent for privatization on an economy wide scale policy makers had to design from scratch a program to transfer the wealth of the state to private hands with few exceptions east european priva tization officials appointed to this task concluded that it would be too slow and unwieldy to rely on the piecemeal sale of enterprises to pri vate investors as was typical in west european privatization more commonly they developed programs to transfer the ownership of state enterprises to private individuals and groups through mass distribution programs to be followed by or supplemented with piecemeal sales as one can imagine these policymakers and technocrats could de sign the mass privatization program in ways that held different distri butional consequences for society such that some groups would benefit more than others for example citizens over foreigners one former elite group over another managers over labor and so on in the czech re public the government designed a mass privatization program in which there were no special privileges for any particular groups in society the author wishes to express her gratitude for the helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts from andrew barnes thomas callaghy margaret hanson meredith el nems steven fish denise powers and peter rutland in addition the author wishes to acknowledge the woodrow wil son center and the kennan institute for advanced russian studies for their generous support the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the institutions or individuals acknowledged above responsibility for any errors is assumed entirely by the author