long live the doge death as a term limit on venetian chief executives can an electorate use the projected life expectancy of a lifetime appointed chief executive to enforce binding informal term limits informal term limits based on the life expectancy of a chief executive candidate at election would enable an electorate to exercise discretion in adjusting tenure lengths to minimize expected turnover and tenure length costs while also providing a strictly binding term limit death we provide a detailed historical case study of venice from 1172 to 1797 when the ruling patricians utilized informal term limits on their chief executive the doge relying on the projected life expectancy of ducal candidates

campaign contributions and congressional voting a simultaneous probit tobit model m any citizens and scholars have been troubled by the influence that special interest groups appear to exert over policymaking as a result of their roles in the financing of political campaigns these concerns inspired the enactment of a number of election law reforms in the 1970s and have led to increasing popular support for public financing of electoral campaigns despite the public attention these issues have attracted few social scientists have attempted to analyze the financial relationships between interest groups and policymakers empirically 1 one such study was reported by durden and silberman 1976 who included contributions from the afl cio political action committee as an independent variable in an equation explaining congressional voting on minimum wage legislation their results indicated that campaign contributions significantly affected voting on that issue the work i have done differs substantially from that of durden and silberman in two ways first i have chosen to examine issues which were of considerably narrower concern than the minimum wage issue in the interest of simplicity i examine issues of concern to just one or a few groups i have also used a different econometric technique if campaign contributions are actually endogenous as seems plausible the single equation estimation technique employed by durden and silberman is subject to a possible simultaneous equations bias for each issue studied i have therefore jointly estimated a two equation system explaining both votes on the bill and contributions from an associated interest group the simultaneous probit tobit model which i use takes into account the dichotomous nature of the variable indicating a congressman s vote the non negativity constraint imposed on the contribution variable and the possibility of correlation between the error terms for the equations explaining these two variables 2 full information maximum likelihood fiml estimates for the model are consistent and asymptotically efficient

economics and the family match or mismatch a review of beckers a treatise on the family the author reviews and evaluates beckers a treatise on the family which concerns a the allocation of roles and resources and distribution of income within families b the formation dissolution growth and structure of families and c the implications of these analyses for inequality and social mobility in the present paper beckers approach and substantive conclusions regarding the role of theory and empirical evidence in the study of economics and the family are critically examined it is suggested that while beckers discussion is a source of many useful insights the theory does not attempt a systematic treatment of the transition from traditional to modern types of family excerpt

reputational capital opportunism and self policing in legislatures this paper examines the question of whether reputational capital can deter opportunistic behavior among legislators preparing to exit the house of representatives i create a measure of reputational trustworthiness based upon pooled samples of constituency opinion derived from the national election studies surveys i then examine the extent to which such reputational good will among constituents deters lame duck foreign travel by exiting house incumbents within the context of a quasi experimental research design the analysis suggests that legislators may be self policed by their reputations for honesty and trustworthiness to the point of discouraging unethical activity urveys i then examine the extent to which such s derived from the national election studies

campaign spending and senate elections 1978 84 this paper uses a sample of recent senate election results and estimates vote equations that show challenger spending hurts and incumbent spending helps incumbent re election while both types of spending have diminishing returns the effects are asymmetrical challenger spending is more productive at lower levels of spending but incumbents can spend greater amounts more profitably than can challengers these results can explain why senate incumbents spend money why they typically outspend their challenger and why incumbents who can outspend their challenger would tend to be against spending limits or public financing

does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents the theoretical importance of past investments in political brand name the existing literature ignores the fact that the marginal return to current campaign expenditures depends on the candidate s stock of brand name this simple observation is then used to provide a possible explanation for the negative empirical relationship observed between an incumbent s campaign spending and how well he does

entry barriers in politics and uncontested elections abstract lott 1986 1987a argues that brand names can be barriers to entry in political markets because political brand names cannot be sold our empirical model examines the effect of inalienability of political capital on entry into nineteenth century british political markets we test the hypothesis that since county races were more expensive than borough races owing to greater costs of information the level of non transferable investment produced by a given number of past campaigns was greater in the rural districts and produced more significant entry barriers

why democracies produce efficient results by applying the standard tools of microeconomic analysis i argue that democratic markets work as well as economic markets in particular i show that previous work has greatly exaggerated the existence of principal agent and informational problems in electoral markets and has drawn incorrect conclusions

shirking and political support in the u s senate 1964 1984 several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on the job consumption or ideological behavior these findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support this paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse the results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support a corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly

agent compensation and the limits of bonding agents in positions of trust may engage in malfeasance which is difficult to detect this paper develops a model in which employers seek to control malfeasance by paying wages contingent on imperfect monitoring and agents may be required to pay entry fees or post bonds we conclude that entry fees which exceed agents assets are ineffective in controlling malfeasance as a result conditions exist in which it is optimal to pay agents more than their opportunity cost such conditions lead to an excess supply of applicants and allow employers to engage in discrimination at zero cost to themselves

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

brand names and barriers to entry in political markets the most obvious implication of this discussion is that barriers to entry in politics will raise the costs of governments transferring wealth more generally it will raise the cost of public provision of goods and services in the case of transfers the inefficiency created by barriers depends on whether one values government transfers the total transfer the transfer to the beneficiaries plus the politician s commission is maximized by the politician who can create support the most efficiently for other governmental services which are viewed as efficiency creating e g national defense these barriers reduce the amount of a valuable output we desire to purchase this result also supplies a possible efficiency explanation for the limitation on the number of terms imposed on the presidency and many governorships brand names are not really the barriers information costs are what cause brand name to be used and are the more fundamental barrier to entry what we are arguing is that private and not public organizations can in certain respects better overcome these information costs

shirking and sorting in a political market with finite lived politicians this paper analyzes principal agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters challengers and incumbents the introduction of a last period via finite livedness in combination with voters imperfect information about politicians preferences causes time varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments in the extreme sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office a systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist and depends on how quickly sorting takes place we show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences in addition if sorting is a significant feature of political markets cross sectional studies will tend to oversample little and non shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed

the changing technology of technological change general and abstract knowledge and the division of innovative labour abstract in the past most innovations have resulted from empiricist procedures the outcome of each trial yielding knowledge that could not be readily extended to other contexts while trial and error may remain the primary engine of innovation developments in many scientific disciplines along with progress in computational capabilities and instrumentation are encouraging a new approach to industrial research instead of relying purely on trial and error the attempt is also to understand the principles governing the behaviour of objects and structures the result is that relevant information whatever its source can now be cast in frameworks and categories that are more universal the greater universality makes it possible for the innovation process to be organised in new ways firms can specialise and focus upon producing new knowledge and the locus of innovation may be spread across both users and producers more generally the use of general and abstract knowledge in innovation opens up the possibility for a division of labour in inventive activity the division of innovative labour the implications for public policy especially that on intellectual property rights are discussed

campaign finance reform and electoral competition using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002 this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races this is reflected in several dimensions conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins the regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office and they increase the probability that incumbents win re election campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent

capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics the economic theory of regulation long ago put public interest theories of politics to rest these theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishings rather than explanations of real world phenomena they have been replaced by models of political behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics anthony downs 1957 james buchanan and gordon tullock 1965 george stigler 1971 sam peltzman 1976 recently however debate has arisen over whether some version of a public interest theory of regulation will have to be readmitted to our thinking about actions and results in the political arena what is at issue is the empirical importance of the altruistic publicly interested goals of rational actors in determining legislative and regulatory outcomes james kau and paul rubin 1979 kalt 1981 peltzman 1982 this study assesses the nature and significance of publicly interested objectives in a particular instance of economic policymaking u s senate voting on coal strip mining regulations the existence of such objectives is of course no contradiction of the economic view of human behavior kenneth arrow 1972 gary becker 1974 and may well be rooted in genetic biological history becker 1976 jack hirshleifer 1978 generally however individuals altruistic publicly interested goals have been given little attention this reflects the judgment that such goals are so empirically unimportant as to allow the use of occam s razor in positive models or well founded apprehensions that these goals are unusually difficult to identify measure and analyze notwithstanding the latter problem we find that approaches which confine themselves to a view of political actors as narrowly egocentric maximizers explain and predict legislative outcomes poorly the tracking and dissecting of the determinants of voting on coal strip mining policy suggest that the economic theory of politics has been prematurely closed to a broader conception of political behavior

an explanation for why senators from the same state vote differently so frequently abstract this paper explains why rational well informed voters elect politicians with divergent platforms given well defined constituencies and the costliness of any individual politician creating transfers across all interest groups we show that different politicians from the same district can successfully represent vastly different constituencies and still have each politician producing the support maximizing level of transfers our explanation focuses on how obtaining wealth transfers reduces successful constituencies returns to obtaining additional transfers the evidence strongly rejects alternative explanations based upon the median voter and polarized policy preference approaches

televising legislatures some thoughts on whether politicians are search goods the evidence that televising legislative sessions helps politicians from homogeneous districts where everyone agrees with his positions but hurts politicians from heterogeneous districts does not differentiate between whether politicians are search or experience goods while evidence does exist that politicians are search goods e g lott 1987b it relies on the presence of the last period problem if the conclusion that politicians are search goods is correct it has important implications because it contradicts the commonly held belief that it is the threat of re election that prevents politicians from behaving opportunistically it also indicates that there are fundamental differences between firm and political brand names

competition policy for elections do campaign contribution limits matter this paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes states are a natural laboratory to examine this issue we analyze elections to assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions we find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation we also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race

dynastic political privilege and electoral accountability the case of u s governors 1950 2005 i introduction political dynasties which pass on public offices and other political privileges from family member to family member have been important in the united states throughout its history this paper investigates whether dynastic political privilege enhances incumbent accountability to voters as incumbents with family political capital work to maintain favorable reputations even in the incumbents last period this would mitigate last period problems in contrast with earlier empirical results in which incumbents in their last period in office deliver inferior economic results we test the hypothesis that dynastic political privilege increases accountability using data for 1950 2005 on u s governors including a new data set on the family relationships of politicians the constitution of the united states embodies the political ideals of the founders whose goal was to establish a republican national government that was responsible to the nation s people that specified the powers of the federal government that recognized the rights of the states and that incorporated checks and balances which would limit governmental power this new government was to be a direct contrast to and repudiation of monarchy in one of the most explicit repudiations of monarchy the constitution forbids the grant of titles of nobility by both the federal government and the states constitution of the united states article i sections 9 and 10 see the federalist papers number 39 for james madison s statements on the most decisive importance of the ban on titles of nobility library of congress 1961 242 interestingly however the constitution does not directly forbid hereditary office provided that the inheritor of the office is elected to it or appointed to it by constitutional means for example early in the nineteenth century the nation elected john quincy adams son of the second president as its sixth president dal bo dal bo and snyder 2009 carefully examine u s congressional dynasties from 1789 to 1996 and find that political power in the united states is self perpetuating this seems not only contrary to our nation s fundamental political principles but it also seems to hand over opportunities for rent seeking to relatives of successful politicians furthermore it is inefficiently anticompetitive because under such a system many highly qualified candidates are frozen out of office for reasons other than qualifications and anticipated productivity in office thus at first glance this process of family privilege in politics appears repugnant and contrary to the republican principles of our national political system there are however at least two other views of inherited political privilege which see it as socially useful first it is possible that political skills are actually inheritable so that dynastic political privilege may be socially productive that is relatives of office holders may gain special access to knowledge and skills that is only available to other potential office holders at much higher cost if at all the second and perhaps more important way in which inherited political privilege could be socially productive is that it may mitigate public sector principal agent problems the political system of the united states presents substantial principal agent problems as the voters cannot directly control the behavior of incumbent officials this gives office holders opportunities to act against the voters interests through corruption shirking on the job consumption at public expense promoting narrow ideology and others dynastic political privilege may make these behaviors more costly the possibility that opportunistic behavior in office may damage other family members political prospects disciplines current office holders making them more likely to exercise care in serving their constituents interests the main mechanism for voters to discipline incumbents is through elections

who chooses to inflation target abstract in this article we seek what are the factors behind a country s decision to move to inflation targeting we find that high past inflation low debt levels and the absence of a nominal exchange rate anchor increase the probability that a country will end up opting for it

unique equilibrium in a model of self fulfilling currency attacks even though self fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals this unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals but also on financial variables such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading in contrast to multiple equilibrium models our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks

balance of payments crises under inflation targeting abstract this paper analyzes a small open economy model under inflation targeting it shows why such a monetary regime is vulnerable to speculative attacks that take place over a short period rather than instantaneously the speed at which the regime collapses and the extent of reserve losses are increasing in the central bank s explicit or implicit commitment to intervene in the foreign exchange market attacks are therefore ranked from most to least severe as follows exchange rate targeting cpi inflation targeting domestic nontradables inflation targeting and money targeting under inflation targeting the size of the attack is increasing in the tradables consumption share

entrepreneurial success and occupational inheritance among proprietors roughly 50 percent of self employed proprietors are second generation proprietors these individuals acquire informal business experience while growing up in the context of a family business since some of this informal experience substitutes for more formally acquired schooling measured rates of return to the latter will not be as high as for wage salary workers early acquisition of managerial human capital that can be acquired only through experience implies differentially greater proprietary success for second generation proprietors compared with first generation proprietors the authors present evidence in favor of both hypotheses

money and votes reconsidered congressional elections 1972 1982 the evolution of congressional campaign finance over the past decade is characterized by steady growth in campaign spending and other notable changes in campaign finance practices the main purpose of the research reported here was to determine whether these changes have altered the effects of campaign spending on election outcomes this required reexamination of auxiliary questions concerning how sending effects operate and can be measured it also required facing the limits of what analysis of aggregate campaign spending data can tell us about money in elections replication of ols and 2sls analyses of campaign spending effects produced solidly consistent results over the six congressional elections held between 1972 and 1982 taken at face value the evidence is overwhelming that the challenger s level of spending has a strong impact on the vote whereas that of the incumbent has virtually no impact at all but the evidence remains open to doubt on two grounds one is the probable inadequacy of the 2sls model or perhaps any possible model leaving the issue of simultaneity bias unsettled if bias remains the estimates exaggerate the electoral effects of the challenger s campaign expenditures the issue cannot be resolved with more of the same data but rather requires data of a different sort surveys taken over the course of a sample of campaigns would do the trick meanwhile i think it would be foolish to make policy on the assumption that bias is in fact substantial the greatest likelihood remains that restrictions on campaign money will have the general effect of hurting challengers jacobson 1979 the other doubtful albeit equally stable finding is that incumbents do not gain votes by spending in campaigns no incumbent seems to believe it and there is at least circumstantial evidence from for example the 1982 elections that their skepticism is quite justified if so the problem lies in the limits of what aggregate data of the kind analyzed here can tell us few incumbents do not spend heavily when they are strongly challenged if both candidates spend beyond the point needed to become thoroughly familiar to voters then the substance of the campaigns the contents of campaign messages become the dominant factors incumbents may need to spend money in order to change the message as new circumstances arise to frame new issues that would help them most or damage them least to win the battle of establishing the real issues like nonincumbents sitting members may sometimes need to spend beyond a certain threshold to remain competitive but nearly all of them do so when the necessity arises so aggregate spending data are largely uninformative how the money is spent rather than how much is what matters the two most notable developments in congressional campaign finance have opposing implications national party organizations particularly the republican have assumed an increasingly important role in financing campaigns greater central control leads to a more efficient distribution of the party s collective campaign resources which among other things promises to raise the overall level of electoral competition it also leads to more coordinated campaigning with greater emphasis on national themes and programs thus it should foster more cooperation and loyalty among fellow partisans in congress but pacs have also grown in numbers and in financial importance because most concentrate on gaining access to incumbents they do little to make elections more competitive because they usually pursue narrowly defined interests their influence fragments the congress and weakens party coalitions in this and other ways parties and pacs are natural rivals the most consequential decisions taken in the next round in campaign finance policy will be those which affect the relative importance of parties and pacs see u s congress 1984 for comments on this and other current campaign finance issues

brand names ignorance and quality guaranteeing premiums recent literature contains several theories of how self enforcing agreements rely on repeat purchase mechanisms to ensure product quality some have suggested the use of advertising as a signal of future actions in such games this article extends these recent studies for the case where firms face temporary changes in cost or demand curves and offers an initial attempt at providing a statistical test of the klein leffler model it is found that the deviations in the advertising sales ratio from the levels that can be explained by industry specific characteristics are consistently contrary to what their model predicts these results hold over a very wide range of depreciation rates for advertising and for the many individual industries examined the results are only weakly affected when the presence of measurement error is explicitly recognized

two part pricing for experience goods in the presence of adverse selection abstract because customers learn something when they purchase an experience good for the first time a firm selling experience goods may face different demand curves from new and repeat customers the firm can exploit these differences by using a two part pricing strategy to price discriminate between new and repeat customers the firm may also use a two part pricing strategy to mitigate the information problems of adverse selection when its quality is uncertain the analysis is particularly applicable to service markets where customers and firms seek long term relationships and firms maintain customer records which facilitate price discrimination

self imposed term limits in reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits dick and lott argue that since more senior representatives are better at rent seeking there is an inefficient tendency to re elect incumbents in their model term limits are preferred collectively by constituencies even though no constituency would independently oust its incumbent representative however many term limits are unilaterally self imposed in particular the 22nd amendment limiting presidents terms to two and their model cannot explain these limits in this comment i suggest that term limits may be self imposed by risk averse voters who prefer cycling between left and right wing candidates to a once and for all election that imposes a candidate of a single ideology on the entre electorate the market failure that makes term limits helpful is that out of power minorities cannot bribe the median voter

the credit channel transmission mechanism and the nonlinear growth and welfare effects of inflation and taxes with the credit channel effect driven by the central bank s open market operations this paper s model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation growth nexus which is evidenced by a number of cross country empirical studies the threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher the presence of the credit channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive and smaller than 1 tax rates on consumption labor income and capital income the optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet the credit channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing this provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets jel e58 e62 o42

a critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature after substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal changes in budgetary and employment levels it is clear that the size and scope of the federal leviathon had not been reduced over 1982 83 it is also clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were of minor importance in terms of the total u s budget future research on why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better understanding of the budgetary process

term limits causes and consequences this paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation particularly on congress i first consider theories that aroseto explain among related issues why individual states mightunilaterally self impose term limits on their own delegationsto congress next i consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure first supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government highspending second higher tenure creates inefficient anti competitive conditions in the legislative election market term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure these claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature based on theliterature reviewed this paper finds that while term limitswill reduce average tenure there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies further research on a more general reform which would strike deeper at these underlying causes isimplied

does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy evidence from indian state elections the effect of legislative turnover on the size and composition of government expenditures in indian states over the 1980 2000 period is examined the paper finds that excessive turnover in indian state elections results in inefficient government expenditure policy first the higher the turnover the larger the government size second excessive turnover affects the allocative efficiency of government expenditures by skewing the composition of government spending toward pure consumption and away from more productive investment expenditures third the effect of turnover on fiscal policy is not linear public consumption expenditure is convex in turnover while public investment expenditure is concave in turnover

price quality and reputation evidence from an online field experiment we examine the link between price quality seller claims and seller reputation in internet auctions after purchasing actual baseball cards and having them professionally graded we find that some buyers in the online graded market are misled by incredible claims of quality they pay higher prices but do not receive better quality and in fact are defrauded more often online seller reputation is effective for identifying good faith sellers but conditional on completed auctions reputable sellers do not provide better quality evidence also suggests that high claim sellers target less experienced buyers we attribute these patterns to two loopholes in the ebay rating system we benefited from the comments of austan goolsbee raphael thomadsen john shea dan vincent david reiley larry ausubel peter cramton v joseph hotz jeff smith jimmy chan vincent crawford mark duggan and attendees at numerous seminars and conferences we are particularly grateful to seth sanders and john list for their constructive advice at the early stage of the research to timothy bresnahan rachel kranton and thomas hubbard for their detailed suggestions in reshaping earlier versions and to editor ariel pakes and two anonymous referees for their careful readings special thanks to eight friends who acted as our agents in purchasing baseball cards in retail markets and to numerous sports card store owners who shared their insights on the sportscard industry excellent research assistance from randy alexander moore and krzysztof fizyta is gratefully acknowledged any remaining errors are ours

attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment attendance rates political shirking and the effect of post elective office employment i introduction political shirking the degree to which a politican s actions deviate from the wishes of his constituents can take many different dimensions economists e g amacher and boyes 1978 davis and porter 1989 dougan and munger 1989 kalt and zupan 1984 lott 1987d nelson and siberberg 1987 and peltzman 1984 have debated whether shirking exists in how a politician votes when he does vote this divergence is measured through some particular special interest voting ratings e g american conservative union americans for democratic action etc however shirking can obviously take as many forms as there are outputs that a politician produces besides how he votes he also produces services for his constituents involving everything from being personally available to listen to the constituents grievances to ensuring effective handling of case work by his staff see for example fiorina 1977 fenno 1978 and cain et al 1987 1 one dimension that has not been sufficiently examined is the extent to which politicians shirk by failing to vote on pending legislation 2 no attention has been given to which mechanisms will make this particular type of shirking relatively more costly most economists agree that opportunitic behavior by politicians is limited by the threat of reelection e g amacher and boyes 1978 barro 1973 kalt and zupan 1984 nelson 1976 and telser 1976 3 by implication the level of shirking should be the greatest when a politician decides to leave office however this opportunistic behavior might be reduced to the extent that political parties or constituencies impose costs for shirking through affecting politicisns post elective office career or the careers of their children thus a politicians last term in elective office may not represent his last period in any meaningful sense the next section outlines the differing views on how politicians act when they no longer face the threat of reelection section iii describes some empirical evidence on what mechanisms may prevent this last period problem the final section discusses the impliactions of these results ii the last period whether economists view politicians as ideologues e g kau and rubin 1979 and kalt and zupan 1984 or as simply attempting to maximize political support e g barro 1973 ferejohn 1986 nelson 1976 and peltzman 1984 the threat of reelection is seen as preventing shirking as kalt and zupan 1984 298 phrase it it appears that the proximity of the next election inhibits ideological shirking even those who do not view the last period as affecting how a politician votes argue that it will affect how often he votes lott 1987a 1987b has argued that if voters can determine and elect politicians that have ideological preferences corresponding exactly to the wishes of constituents politicians voting patterns should continue to reflect those values even when the cost of shirking in terms of forgone future votes is low the penalty to ideologues of not votingfor their constituency in the last period when they no longer face reelection is the forgone utility from not doing what they personally value assuming that politicians also desire leisure politicians should continue to vote for what they believe in but they should vote less frequently since they no longer receive the additional return of larger future support mechanisms to overcome this last period problem have been suggested by becker and stigler 1974 9 10 they argue that opportunistic behavior can be controlled if officeholders face the loss of a pension or equivalently a posted bond in the event of opportunistic behavior in their last term however the actual pension system does not effectively eliminate the last period for politicians since retirement payments are not based on cheating in the last period

independent candidates and political representation in india we estimate the causal effect of independent candidates on voter turnout and election outcomes in india to do this we exploit exogenous changes in the entry deposit candidates pay for their participation in the political process changes that disproportionately excluded candidates with no affiliation to established political parties a one standard deviation increase in the number of independent candidates increases voter turnout by more than 6 percentage points as some voters choose to vote rather than stay home the vote share of independent candidates increases by more than 10 percentage points as some existing voters switch who they vote for thus independents allow winning candidates to win with less vote share decrease the probability of electing a candidate from the governing coalition by about 31 percentage points and ultimately increase the probability of electing an ethnic party candidate altogether the results imply that the price of participation by independents is constituency representation in government

reconciling voters behavior with legislative term limits a puzzle exists over why voters continually re elect their congressional and state representatives although these same voters often support initiatives to limit the number of terms that their legislators may serve residents of california colorado and oklahoma voted in 1990 to limit the terms of their state legislators to tenures ranging from six to twelve years 1 in california these same voters however re elected 87 of 91 or 96 percent of all incumbent state representatives and senators whose terms they sought to limit 2 among re elected incumbents 67 or 77 percent had served as long as or longer than the maximum term prescribed under their state s term limit initiative voters defeated only two incumbents who would have been removed under the terms of california s tenure restrictions had they been in effect similar voter behavior characterized recent state elections in colorado and oklahoma 3 more generally these seemingly contradictory voter preferences also are apparent in public opinion polls at the federal level while 62 percent of voters immediately prior to the 1990 general elections indicated their intentions to reelect their congressman that same poll showed that only 24 percent said they approve of the way congress is handling its job gallup and newport 1990 pp 36 37 support for term limit initiatives and the low public esteem of legislators as a group both appear to be inconsistent with voters strong preferences for their own representative and the regular reelection of incumbents

incumbent performance and electoral control in the pure theory of electoral competition citizens compare the platforms of the candidates and vote for the one whose platform is preferred candidate strategies are identified with promises about future performance in office models of this sort have been developed in both static mckelvey 1975 and dynamic kramer 1977 i settings and all appear to have the property that if the set of alternatives is large enough in some sense equilibrium platforms rarely exist but these models have another feature that is quite as disturbing as their instability in the static setting discussed by mckelvey little attention is paid to the possibility that once in office the politician s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents and that he may therefore choose policies at variance from his platform instead it is simply assumed that promises will be kept whether or not such behavior is congruent with the interest of the officeholder it is sometimes argued that an enforcement mechanism may exist to discipline politicians for failing to keep promises but without a specification of the mechanism it is not obvious that it would be in the interests of the

shirking representation and congressional behavior voting on the 1983 amendments to the social security act our central goals at the outset of the paper were three 1 to report on the relative significance of a sophisticated measure of constituent economic interest and a commonly used variable ada score that purports to measure the personal ideology of the candidate 2 demonstrate that the constituent economic interest variable should be adjusted to account for the fact thatvoters not citizens are the only effective principals in influencing a legislator s voting activities and 3 call into question on both theoretical and empirical grounds the claim that legislators shirk their responsibilities to voters by voting their own ideological preferences in order to evaluate our efforts consider table 5 for a large majority 15 of the 18 relevant runs the ideological variable is significant our measure of constituent economic interests does not eliminate the explanatory power of the ideological voting variable but this does not indicate shirking as opposed to shirking we may observe ideological voting because 1 it provides brand name capital 2 it represents the ideological preferences of the constituents or 3 it acts as a measure of median voter economic preferences further ada scores do not allow us to differentiate between these competing explanations for 11 of the 18 models one of the economic variables accounts for a significant portion of the variance in the dependent variables the results derived from our measure of constituent economic interests contradict most findings of the lasi school and raise questions about the validity of the empirical characterization of constituent interests in that research a breakdown of the results by chamber indicates that significant differences in the degree of ideological voting between the house and senate may exist this is important in that most research has focused only on the senate where ideological voting is more prevalent for the house table 5 reveals the constituent economic interest variable isalways significant and in fully one half of the relevant regressions it is theonly significant variable knocking ada out of the race as noted earlier the insignificance of ada is some indication of the absence of ideological shirking though its significance may indicate only measurement error voter ideology or reputational capital in the senate the results are more evenly split though it is clear that the adjusted for reelection constituency economic interest variable is an improvement ada is significant in all 12 senate regressions and the respective economic variables are significant in 5 or just under half this side by side comparison is provocative though it remains to be tested in detail but our preliminary conclusions can be stated as follows first as peltzman 1984 suggested a better specification of economic interest and constituency representation reduces though it does not eliminate the role of the ada variable in the senate second we find evidence that ideological shirking if it exists is much smaller in the house in fact from an institutional perspective it can be argued that economic interests are dominant since house districts are smaller and more homogeneous further the shorter terms for house members may make them more directly accountable to voters and smaller groups of voters may force a lesser reliance on pure ideological campaigning and require a more personal presentation of self

prices as signals of product quality this paper is concerned with the provision of quality in markets in which consumers have only imperfect information the analysis focuses on a market for a product that can be produced at different quality levels all consumers prefer higher to lower quality but they may differ in their willingness to pay for quality producers can produce any quality they like but higher qualities are more costly to produce the information in this market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known only to the firm itself some information about the quality of a firm s product will however reach its potential customers even if they do not make any special effort to acquire it within the framework suggested here two conclusions are drawn first prices may serve as signals which exactly differentiate the available quality levels that is there exists a fulfilledexpectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level second the pricesignals are not arbitrary each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it signals such a mark up depends on the nature of the product specific information received by consumers the poorer the information the higher the mark up

term limits time horizons and electoral accountability term limits have been known to reduce electoral accountability by removing the possibility of reelection thus affecting economic policy choices i e the lame duck effect we show that the magnitude and statistical significance of this effect is influenced by the expected length of a future career by using incumbent age as a proxy for expected career length we find that the lame duck effect is statistically observable only among those politicians with long careers ahead using data on us governors from 1950 to 2005 we find evidence that the influence of term limits is heterogeneous primarily influencing young incumbents who hope to have long careers and thus have stronger incentives to remain accountable to voters indeed we find little evidence of a lame duck effect among older incumbents suggesting that their already shortened time horizons may offset the term limit effect

campaign spending in congressional elections campaign spending in congressional elections i introduction empirical studies of the effects of campaign spending on the outcome of congressional elections have found that campaign spending by incumbents is not as effective as that of their challengers indeed kau and rubin 1982 and jacobson 1985 1987 find that incumbent spending reduces the number of votes they receive and netter 1983 that it increases the challenger s votes incumbents seeking reelection however are very successful winning nine times out of ten in the postwar era if their campaign spending is so inefficient why do incumbents continue to outspend their challengers in a majority of elections we argue that these researchers counterintuitive findings are the result of using models which do not adequately correct for the simultaneous determination of the election outcome and campaign contributions and which do not include an electoral check on incumbent behavior 1 in their studies jacobson and netter as well as lott 1986 and laband and lentz 1985 assume the incumbent s ability to repel challengers is independent of his or her behavior while in office few would agree that the electoral check is so ineffective we develop a simultaneous model to correct these deficiencies it captures the effects of campaign expenditures tenure the consistency of the incumbent s votes with his constituents preferences and the size of the voter turnout on the votes received by incumbents and challengers in four congressional elections between 1978 and 1984 the model is very robust over these four elections the use of primary election data insures model identification ii model and empirical measures we assume that the platforms of any two candidates for a political office can be measured along a single left right spectrum voters know their preferred position on the dimension but cannot observe the positions of the two candidates with certainty because of rational ignorance a theory accepted since downs 1957 following congleton 1986 we assume voters are risk averse and receive more utility from candidates with positions closer to the voters preferred position but lose utility as the candidate s position becomes more uncertain voters compare the candidates and vote for the one that provides them greater expected utility voters can observe the incumbent s performance and are thus less uncertain of his views and credibility uncertainty should decrease with an incumbent s tenure in office tenure provides voters with knowledge of the incumbent s position and the incumbent with political capital this accumulation of political capital may make it more difficult for challengers to mount a successful campaign in this sense tenure acts as a barrier to entry 2 if all incumbents were at the same point on the spectrum as the median voter of their districts all incumbents would win reelection if all potential challengers were aware of this fact they would not challenge since campaigns are costly but one observes many challengers and some defeated incumbents so we proceed from the hypothesis that challengers enter the race when they perceive a gap between the position of the incumbent and that of the median voter and assume this position as their platform a large difference between the incumbent s position and the median voter s position increases the likelihood of a successful challenge if voters were certain of the positions of both candidates and the challenger s assessment was correct the challenger would win but challengers are usually less well known than incumbents and this additional uncertainty gives incumbents an advantage thus the challenger must convince the voters that his or her position is closest to the median voter s position and advertising is the primary means to that end 3 repetition of the message reduces the voters uncertainty over a challenger s position

optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information abstract this paper examines the optimal behavior of a policymaker who is able to precommit labelled strong when the public entertains the possibility that he is either strong or weak unable to precommit the main result is that in the presence of doubts about their type it is optimal even for strong policymakers to partially accommodate inflationary expectations this contrasts with vickers 1986 who finds that when strength is conceived in terms of the relative concern for employment the strong policymaker inflates less under incomplete than under full information the paper also provides a theory of endogenous announcements

forest biorefineries a business opportunity for the finnish forest cluster abstract bioenergy and biomass based products offer the greatest new opportunities for diversifying business in the forest cluster in particular biorefineries which can be integrated into the pulp and paper industry seem to have immense future potential this article aims to explore the biorefinery concept and related new products and business operations as well as new business strategies and company models which are part of the biorefinery value chain these factors which contribute to the establishment and success of forest biorefineries were examined using internet survey responses and compared between scandinavia north america and south america this article looks at the results of the survey primarily from the finnish perspective to help identify competitive advantages upon which successful business operations in the finnish forest cluster can be built according to the survey the outlooks for technical and raw material choices as well as barriers to biorefinery diffusion are very similar in all the studied areas biorefineries and related energy products are considered the way to sustainably guarantee the forest cluster s success an increase in the price of oil motivates the development of forest biorefineries and wood based biofuels however it is obvious that there is a need to revaluate from a fresh perspective the utilisation of wood and the wood refining chain in the forest cluster the survey respondents consider wood based biofuel and chemical production a serious business opportunity for the forest cluster in finland there is a strong confidence in the production of biofuels however all the countries included in the study trust in their own national strengths and in their chance to be a leading actor in the forest biorefinery business worldwide the forest biorefinery business seems to have market potential and global competition can thus be expected

inflation targeting with imperfect information in a global games setup with imperfect commitment technology we show that low targets the ones close to the optimal inflation under perfect commitment are unattainable leading to a trade off between low and credible targets moreover since noisy public information helps to coordinate expectations around the announced target our article supports unconventional policy prescriptions first weaker countries need to impose higher targets second less transparency helps to make the announced target credible and then reduces the optimally announced target results are based on a general central bank loss function encompassing models traditionally used to discuss central bank decisions

marital division of labor with risk of divorce the role of voice enforcement of contracts it is assumed that emotional ties can be relied on to enforce implicit marital contracts by voice therefore in the present model divorce has economic consequences not only because the economies of scale from living together are destroyed but also because the scope for such voice enforcement is weakened moreover perhaps surprisingly i find that it is ambiguous how an increase in the probability of divorce influences predivorce allocation of time even when preferences are assumed to be homothetic

favorite sons intergenerational wealth transfers among politicians in this paper we investigate the degree of occupational following in politics and its impact upon the career success and behavior while in office of both sons and fathers we find that sons follow into their politician fathers footsteps to a degree surpassed in the general population only among farmers and self employed proprietors there is substantial indirect evidence which suggests that following is motivated to a large extent by the transfer of valuable name recognition and voter loyalty

an explanation for public provision of schooling the importance of indoctrination this article was completed while i was a national fellow at the hoover institution and represents the unpublished theory and cross country empirical sections from my 1984 university of california los angeles dissertation armen alchian harold demsetz gertrud fremling david friedman robert hansen ben klein ed lazear russell roberts finis welch e g west an unusually helpful anonymous referee from this journal and the participants in seminars at auburn university the university of california at los angeles and at davis california state university at hayward and northridge the hoover institution george mason university the university of houston southern methodist university the u s department of education texas a m university and the 1987 public choice meetings in tucson arizona provided valuable discussions i would like to thank maury pearl for very helpful research assistance any remaining errors are of course my responsibility

legislator voting and shirking a critical review of the literature we set out to critically review the progress in answering two related questions what determines how legislators vote and how can shirking by legislators be measured in the first category the hypothesis that legislators shirk in order to indulge their personal ideological preferences has led researchers astray the theoretical underpinning is shaky on two counts first legislators who indulge their preferences at the expense of their constituents preferences put themselves at a competitive electoral disadvantage second the original two stage procedure used to measure ideological shirking is severely flawed among many other problems the residual measure of shirking implicitly assumes that the median voter is the relevant constituent principal for the legislator agent

influences on sponsorship deals in nascar indirect evidence from time on camera when corporate sponsors want to maximize their exposure they often focus sponsorship dollars on events teams and athletes that will prove to be reliable respectable and most important repetitive advertising outlets analysing the factors that increase a broadcaster s propensity to display a sponsor during television broadcasts is often hard to measure using a unique data set describing nascar broadcasts we indirectly analyse what influences the value of a sponsorship contract through a proxy for driver sponsorship value the value of time on camera vtoc we find that the vtoc is influenced by driver performance and their celebrity status as measured by driver experience and inherited brand name capital although the values of individual sponsorship contracts are generally not reported the evidence herein suggests that driver performance and status likely influence the value of nascar sponsorship contracts

the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms our study investigates the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms we argue that in early relationships the level of expected cooperative norms in an exchange is the result of a calculative process facilitated by transaction attributes joint transaction specific investments and observability the greater the level of these two exchange attributes the greater the level of cooperative exchange norms all else being equal we further argue that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms can deviate from the expected level because the development of such norms is the result of social processes that management cannot directly and fully control this gap between realized and expected norms affects exchange performance performance suffers when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms falls below the expected level but overshooting expectations lays a critical groundwork for repeat transactions the analysis of a survey of 182 collaborative r d alliances provides initial support for our theory

informative and persuasive campaigning in this paper we use a simple downsian spatial model to analyze the properties of campaign contributions we first consider campaign contributions that are intended to inform voters of candidate positions we show that it is difficult to construct arguments in a downsian spatial model for why some voters would choose to contribute to a candidateand the candidate would want to spend the money contributed to inform voters of his position we then define persuasive campaign expenditures as those that are intended to convince an individual to vote for a candidate regardless of the candidate s position on issues in the presence of persuasive campaign expenditures some voters have an incentive to contribute to one or both candidates and the candidates have an incentive to spend the money we show why the nature of persuasive campaign expenditures may explain both their growth in recent years and the increasing advantage of incumbency

occupational inheritance in agriculture it used to be common if not expected that a son would grow up and take over the family business or follow in his father s footsteps today we still observe varying degrees of occupational inheritance in business politics the arts and other occupations however blau and duncan find that farmers inherit their occupation at a rate five times greater than the next highest category of occupational inheritors despite a growing concern about the future of the family farm there seem to be no successful attempts to explain why occupational mobility studies consistently find higher rates of intergenerational occupational mobility among farmers than among other groups in this paper we attempt to explain the tendency of farmers to be sons of farmers by itself the preponderance of family farms is not particularly surprising it is interesting that ownership of these farms tends to remain within families across generations moreover sons of farmers tend to become farmers rather than rent or

the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes a data envelopment analysis data envelopment analysis is used to analyze the efficiency of candidate campaign spending analysis of the measured efficiency scores of the incumbents and challengers shows that there are significant systematic effects of both district and candidate characteristics the incumbent s residuals from the efficiency score regressions indicate those candidates who do well because of the nature of their district and those who do well because of their own abilities incumbents are ranked according to their observed efficiency their unobserved efficiency and their vote share correlations among the rankings are significant and of the expected signs more efficient candidates receive higher vote shares

a simple explanation for why campaign expenditures are increasing the government is getting bigger abstract this paper shows that most of the large recent increases in campaign spending for federal and state offices can be explained by higher government spending this result holds for both federal and state legislative campaigns and gubernatorial races and across many different specifications the irony is that those who seem most concerned about the level of campaign expenditures are also frequently the ones who most strongly support increasing the size of government evidence is also examined on whether it is the composition and not just the level of expenditures that determines campaign expenditures and whether higher government expenditures similarly results in more candidates competing for office finally by focusing on the symptoms and not the root causes of ever higher campaign expenditures this paper argues that the current public policy debate risks changing the form in which payments are made rather than actually restricting the level of competition

firm organization industrial structure and technological innovation abstract the formal and informal structures of firms and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation this paper explores the properties of different types of firms with respect to the generation of new technology various archetypes are recognized and an effort is made to match organization structure to the type of innovation the framework is relevant to technology and competition policy as it broadens the framework economists use to identify environments that assist innovation

term limits and electoral competitiveness evidence from california s state legislative races california s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures real expenditures during the three general elections after the term limits initiative passed in 1990 were lower than in even 1976 this drop has occurred at the same time that races have become closer contests and more candidates are running for office by any measure term limits have coincided with large changes in the level of political competition even before term limits have forcibly removed a single politician from office the changes are so large that more incumbents are being defeated races are closer more candidates are running and fewer single candidate races than occur at any other time during our sample period from 1976 to 1994

legislative turnover fiscal policy and economic growth evidence from u s state legislatures an examination of how increased turnover among legislators in the fifty u s states affects fiscal policy and economic growth finds that it makes legislators short sighted turnover increases the size of government by increasing the shares of both total spending and taxes in income in particular turnover increases capital expenditure and income taxes both of which may cause long run distortions in the economy further increased turnover by resulting in inefficient fiscal policy reduces long term economic growth

commercial development of energy environmentally sound technologies for the auto industry the case of fuel cells abstract the economic importance of energy and environmental issues is continuously increasing affecting both process and product design in business the energy crisis in california in 2001 made this basic issue universal new technologies are expected to reduce pollution derived both from production processes and products with costs that are still unknown and in competition with more mature technologies high nevertheless until now there is still little but growing knowledge concerning the process of technological innovation in the fields of energy and environment in this paper we analyze the development of zinc air fuel cell zafc and its transfer from a research laboratory to potential mass production zafc are a new environmentally sound technology proven to have commercial value that can be used for substituting internal combustion engines ices and meeting zero emission vehicles zev regulations although zafc performances are higher than traditional electric batteries ones commercial costs are still high hence the pathway to mass production may come from stationary application of fuel cells for power in contrast to the conventional paradigmatic approach we argue that the existing economic and organizational literature concerning technological innovation is not able to fully explain steps followed in commercializing energy environmentally sound technologies existing models mainly consider adopting problems which are due to market uncertainty weak application lack of a dominant design and problems in reconfiguring existing organizational routines above all market power exists in terms of control over technological innovation and its commercial application barriers are erected that prevent new technologies such as fuel cells from becoming adapted through pro active government intervention such as the case in california new advanced technologies can move rapidly into the marketplace from this discussion we draw some conclusions and issues for further research concerning policy making for sustaining the process of technological transfer and firms strategies in technological innovation

social value of public information comment morris and shin 2002 is actually pro transparency not con the main result of morris and shin 2002 restated in papers by amato morris and shin 2002 and amato and shin 2003 and commented upon by the economist 2004 has been presented and interpreted as an anti transparency result more public information can be bad however some scrutiny of the result shows that it is actually pro transparency except in very special circumstances more public information is good furthermore for a conservative benchmark of equal precision in public and privateinformation social welfare is higher than in as ituation without public information

an analysis of legislative inefficiency and ideological behavior this paper explores the theory of legislative inefficiency and the role of ideological preferences of legislators it is shown that inefficiency can be caused by many factors other than legislative ideological behavior three major sources are emphasized cost of voting and policy position information asymmetries across groups of voters and barriers to entry in political competition ideological preferences of legislators is not a cause of inefficiency independently legislators who care about both policy and winning will give inefficient representation to their constituents only when groups of voters are prevented from participating equally in the legislative process

toward prospective voluntary agreements reflections from a hydrogen foresight project abstract there is substantial interest in promoting the emergence of a hydrogen based energy economy if successful this would represent a policy led discontinuous transition away from existing fossil fuel based systems such a move has few precedents and few policy tools exist to manage such a complex and uncertain endeavour furthermore existing hydrocarbon energy systems can be considered techno institutional complexes tic which have developed through the path dependent co evolution of physical technologies and social institutions these complexes have numerous structures that ensure their perpetuation and create important barriers to the implementation of alternatives like hydrogen based systems the authors explore the application of prospective voluntary agreements pva as a policy tool process that can help facilitate a move towards a hydrogen based economy through foresight and negotiation from this perspective we look at the recent case of the nordic hydrogen energy foresight project for evidence

campaign war chests as a barrier to entry in congressional races i introduction issues surrounding the nature and degree of competition in political races have been examined extensively in both the economic and political science literature with most attention focused on the interplay between incumbent and challenger expenditures and electoral success this study extends our understanding of political competition by investigating the impact of an incumbent s war chest on a challenger s decision to mount a campaign 1 for this purpose a war chest is defined as a pool of unencumbered funds accumulated prior to the start of a campaign for elective office 2 sorauf 1988 182 has observed that early receipts even without early spending discourage competition in the primary and attractive challengers in the general election jacobson 1985 26 has argued the most effective strategy for keeping a seat in congress is to avoid serious opposition contemporary critics and reformers of campaign financing practices use such words as frighten intimidate and overpower to describe the role of an incumbent s war chest 3 despite this kind of attention little is actually known about the degree to which war chests diminish entry or reduce the quality of a challenge we present three alternative mechanisms to explain how an incumbent s war chest might deter entry each is based upon a war chest serving as a credible commitment to spend heavily if challenged specifically war chests may either represent excess capacity in financing a campaign or serve as a signal of non observable incumbent characteristics that define a formidable opponent aside from determining whether an incumbent is challenged a war chest might also affect the quality of the challenger for example potential candidates with prior political experience may be unwilling to risk their political capital on a long shot proposition to test for these effects on entry into house races a trichotomous logit model is estimated the choices are uncontested race contested by an ordinary challenger and contested by an experienced challenger although the empirical model is not sufficiently rich to fully distinguish among competing mechanisms the regression results are robust incumbent war chests negatively affect the likelihood of a contested race and the quality of the challenger ii war chests as a barrier to entry becker 1958 106 in comparing economic and political competition observed i n an ideal political democracy competition is free in the sense that no appreciable costs or artificial barriers prevent an individual from running for office in the theory of the firm entry occurs when the expected postentry stream of profits minus the cost of entry is positive analogously an individual will enter a political race when the expected gain from holding office is positive expected gain as defined by baron 1989 is a function of campaign costs the probability of winning and the personal valuation placed by the candidate on the office the first two determinants are partly endogenous depending upon the strategic interplay of the candidates the third aside from its direct effects indirectly affects the first two for example persons hungry for office may be committed to expending greater effort and funds on their campaigns thus increasing their probability of winning similarly as lott has emphasized nontransferable brand name capital would be another factor creating a commitment to aggressively pursue office thereby affecting campaign costs and the probability of winning 4 that some challengers are deterred however need not imply the existence of a political market failure in a contestability sense the lack of a viable challenger on the ballot does not imply a lack of competition good representation will discourage entry similarly the fact that some incumbents will aggressively seek re election frightening away potential challengers is not a sign that competition is lacking

crises and prices information aggregation multiplicity and volatility crises are volatile times when endogenous sources of information are closely monitored we study the role of information in crises by introducing a financial market in a coordination game with imperfect information the asset price aggregates dispersed private information acting as a public noisy signal in contrast to the case with exogenous information our main result is that uniqueness may not obtain as a perturbation from perfect information multiplicity is ensured with small noise in addition we show that a multiplicity may emerge in the financial price itself b less noise may contribute toward nonfundamental volatility even when the equilibrium is unique and c similar results obtain for a model where individuals observe one another s actions highlighting the importance of endogenous information more generally

time series evidence on shirking in the u s house of representatives this paper presents time series evidence on the voting behavior of members of the u s house of representatives from 1975 to 1990 the empirical results indicate that voting behavior of individual congressmen is remarkably stable over time we find no evidence of economically significant last term effects on voting behavior nor are there important effects of legislative tenure on voting patterns the most significant deviations in voting behavior occur for congressmen who failed to win their reelection bid suggesting that sizable deviations from previous policy positions may result in swift retribution by constituents in the district

licensing and nontransferable rents traditionally restrictive licensing is assumed to create monopoly profits by restricting output and therefore to produce two kinds of social costs the deadweight loss due to reduced output and the resources devoted to rent seeking however the fact that nonsalvagable resources spent on rent seeking create their own barriers to entry has not been recognized by increasing nontransferable rents licensing prevents the least costly producers from entering and thus produces a third kind of social cost while harold demsetz 1982 dismissal of the traditional notion of entry barriers is correct when assets are transferable the idea of entry barriers is still useful when assets are nontransferable as this note shows in the case of professional licensing