the role of the media in fiscal consolidation programmes the case of ireland a number of european countries have implemented austerity programmes since the onset of the current economic crisis this paper focuses on fiscal consolidation a central aspect of such programmes using the case of ireland it investigates the significant role of the mass media in presenting such policies to the public a role which has so far remained unexamined conceiving of the irish experience over the past few decades as a case of neoliberalisation it uses a critical political economic conceptualisation of news organisations to consider 431 editorials and opinion articles discussing fiscal consolidation in three leading irish newspapers between 2008 and 2012 it finds that the majority of articles present viewpoints in favour of fiscal consolidation and display a preference for spending cuts over tax hikes which substantiates the claim that ireland has adopted neoliberal policies to address the crisis only a minority of articles oppose fiscal consolidation these mostly contest specific spending cuts but usually fail to criticise fiscal consolidation itself by calling for economic alternatives such as keynesian stimulus differences between newspapers are also discussed highlighting their ideological cleavages

budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline abstract we present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion empirical evidence supports that proposition the choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process

persistent government spending and fiscal multipliers the investment channel this paper inspects the mechanism shaping government spending multipliers in various smallscale dsge setups with endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation we analytically characterize the short run investment multiplier which in equilibrium can be either positive or negative the investment multiplier increases with the persistence of the exogenous government spending process the response of investment to government spending shocks strongly affects short run multipliers on output and consumption

pricing risk adjusted deposit insurance an option based model this paper presents a methodology for arriving at empirical estimates of deposit insurance premiums from market data by using isomorphic relationships betweeen equity and a call option and insurance and a put option the data utilizes the market value of equity to solve for the asset value and its volatility market perceptions of fdic bailout policies are explicitly modeled so as to eliminate the bias in inverted values of assets and their volatility sensitivity analyses are performed to show that rank orderings based on premiums are robust to changes in specification thus facilitating allocation of aggregate premium across banks while economists have long argued in favor of risk adjusted deposit insurance as both more equitable and more efficient than the current system of flatrate premiums various recent developments have further contributed to an increasing dissatisfaction with the current system first both the banking industry and the government seem to be tending to the view that deregulation of the banking industry would be necessary in order to meet more sophisticated future demands on the industry as well as desirable as a policy means of stimulating greater competition among banks moreover a sudden rise in the incidence of bank failures 1 and the vulnerability of the u s banks to the socalled international debt crisis have served to bring to the fore concern about the health of the banking industry in the absence of deposit insurance riskier banks will be able to attract deposits only at higher rates and these higher costs of funding serve as built in market regulated incentives to limit excessive risk taking by banks as introduction of deposit insurance makes deposits equally risk free across banks these incentives disappear and regulation and close supervision of the banking industry must necessarily replace them as deterrents to excessive risk taking thus when insurance is offered at a flat premium regulation is designed to ensure that the risk posed to the insurer both asset and financial risk is appropriately uniform

macroeconomic policy in a two party system as a repeated game this paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward looking wage setters if discretionary policies are followed an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium this cycle is significantly different from the traditional political business cycle reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations

the stability pact more than a minor nuisance stability pact more than a minor nuisance the stability and growth pact will lead member countries to aim for cyclically balanced budgets until this steady state is reached europe will continue its efforts at de cit cutting while so doing politicians are less likely to undertake the dif cult labour market reforms that are really needed is further scal retrenchment wise the paper reviews the reasons that have been advanced in favour of a stability pact and nds them wanting the most serious justi cations such as the systemic risk of bank crisis following a government s failure to service its debt can be better dealt with in other ways for example by prudential limits on banks exposure to public debts moreover our analysis reveals that the macroeconomic costs of the stability pact while sizeable are not as dangerous as often believed the costs will be barely visible once the steady state is reached the true macroeconomic costs are front loaded they concern the next few years after a decade already dominated by convergence efforts barry eichengreen and charles wyplosz

separation of powers and political accountability political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power in democracies elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials but they are not sufficient separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power but only with appropriate checks and balances checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy in this way the two bodies discipline each other to the voters advantage under appropriate checks and balances separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information

ten commandments for a fiscal rule in the e m u abstract fiscal rules in a monetary union should 1 be simple 2 ensure the solvency of the state 3 relate to the consolidated general government and central bank 4 be neutral as regards the size of the public sector 5 avoid pro cyclical behaviour of the fiscal policy instruments 6 make sense also in the long run 7 allow for important differences in economic structure and initial conditions 8 aggregate into behaviour that makes sense at the level of the union as a whole 9 be credible and 10 be enforced impartially and consistently the paper reviews the rules of the stability and growth pact the uk s golden rule and sustainable investment rule and buiter and grafe s permanent balance rule and enhanced permanent balance rule from the perspective of how well they meet these 10 criteria key words fiscal rules stability and growth pact golden rule financial sustainability journal of economic literature classification system e61 e62 e63 f33 f42 h62 h87 e32 e42 willem h buiter european bank for reconstruction and development one exchange square london ec2a 2jn united kingdom tel 44 0 20 7336 6805 fax 44 0 20 7338 6110 1 e mail buiterw ebrd com office e mail willembuiter whsmithnet co uk home www http www nber org wbuiter

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

policy coordination conflicting national interests and the european debt crisis this paper tries to identify the causes of and solutions to the debt crisis by moving from the content of a previous debate on policy coordination in the euro area and from the available evidence on the existence of conflicting national interests within the governing bodies of the european central bank ecb it argues that before 2007 the flaws in the institutional organisation of the process of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy affected the cyclical and growth operation of the economies after then they have contributed to intensifying the conflicts among national and european authorities the conflicts have curbed policy reactions held back the interventions of the ecb as occurred to the federal reserve during the crisis of 1929 and favoured the speculative attacks the conclusion is that the organisation of the area must be reformed to allow its institutions to effectively pursue the objectives for which they were created i e to protect the citizens from the instability of the international financial markets as has been done in monetary policy the reforms must reduce the uncertainty on the actual conduct of national policies and transform the defensive attitudes of the different actors of the process into a positive search for the most effective policy for the whole area copyright oxford university press

government spending and budget deficits in the industrial economies fiscal policy nouriel roubini and jeffrey sachs this paper examines the evolution of the size of government and of budget deficits in oecd economies we highlight the rapid increase in government spending in the 1970s the sharp rise in budget deficits and public debt after 1973 and the reversal in these trends in the 1980s the increase in the size of government was associated in part with the slowdown in growth after 1973 but also reflected gradual adjustment of the ratio of spending to output towards a long run target which depends on political and institutional characteristics of the economy the political orientation of the government the degree of wage indexation and the degree of stability of the political system such factors also explain the size of budget deficits when faced with an adverse shock subsequent deficit reduction requires a measure of political consensus we note that such consensus is hard to achieve in multi party coalitions in consequence countries with such a political structure tended in consequence countries with such a political structure tended toin consequence countries with such a political structure tended to experience much more rapid increases in their debt gnp ratios

nontraditional activities and the efficiency of us commercial banks abstract in recent years an increasing portion of bank income has been generated through nontraditional activities most studies of bank efficiency do not include any measure of nontraditional activities when measuring outputs in this paper cost revenue and profit efficiency are estimated by using models with and without nontraditional output the results suggest that the standard model which omits nontraditional output understates bank efficiency evidence also surfaces that based on efficiency the relative ranking of individual banks changes when nontraditional activities are included as a type of output

the case for restricting fiscal policy discretion this paper studies the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on output volatility and economic growth using data for 91 countries we isolate three empirical regularities 1 governments that use fiscal policy aggressively induce significant macroeconomic instability 2 the volatility of output caused by discretionary fiscal policy lowers economic growth by more than 0 8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in volatility 3 prudent use of fiscal policy is explained to a large extent by the presence of political constraints and other political and institutional variables the evidence in the paper supports arguments for constraining discretion by imposing institutional restrictions on governments as a way to reduce output volatility and increase the rate of economic growth

current real business cycle theories and aggregate labor market fluctuations hours worked and the return to working are weakly correlated traditionally the ability to account for this fact has been a litmus test for macroeconomic models existing real business cycle models fail this test dramatically we modify prototypical real business cycle models by allowing government consumption shocks to influence labor market dynamics this modification can in principle bring the models into closer conformity with the data our empirical results indicate that it does

output effects of government purchases the theoretical analysis focuses on the distinction between temporary and permanent movements in government purchases under plausible conditions the temporary case involves an output response that is positive less than one to one with the change in government purchases and larger than that generated by an equal sized but permanent shift in purchase the equilibrium real rate of return rise in the temporary case but changes little in the permanent one defense purchases are divided empirically into permanent and temporary components by considering the role of temporary wars no temporary shifts in nondefense purchases were isolated empirical results verify an expansionary output effect for temporary purchases that exceeds that of permanent purchases the results for some other expectational hypotheses are found to be generally supportive of the theory

from great depression to great credit crisis similarities differences and lessons the great depression of the 1930s and the great credit crisis of the 2000s had similar causes but elicited strikingly different policy responses while it remains too early to assess the effectiveness of current policy it is possible to analyse monetary and fiscal responses in the 1930s as a natural experiment or counterfactual capable of shedding light on the impact of current policies we employ vector autoregressions instrumental variables and qualitative evidence for 27 countries in the period 1925 39 the results suggest that monetary and fiscal stimulus was effective that where it did not make a difference it was not tried they shed light on the debate over fiscal multipliers in episodes of financial crisis they are consistent with multipliers at the higher end of those estimated in the recent literature and with the argument that the impact of fiscal stimulus will be greater when banking systems are dysfunctional and monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound miguel almunia agustin benetrix barry eichengreen kevin h o rourke and gisela rua

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

new keynesian versus old keynesian government spending multipliers renewed interest in fiscal policy has increased the use of quantitative models to evaluate policy because of modelling uncertainty it is essential that policy evaluations be robust to alternative assumptions we find that models currently being used in practice to evaluate fiscal policy stimulus proposals are not robust government spending multipliers in an alternative empirically estimated and widely cited new keynesian model are much smaller than in these old keynesian models the estimated stimulus is extremely small with gdp and employment effects only one sixth as large and with private sector employment impacts likely to be even smaller we investigate the sensitivity of our findings with regard to the response of monetary policy the zero bound on nominal interest rates and the inclusion of an empirically relevant degree of rule of thumb behaviour in the new keynesian model in addition we relate our findings using estimated structural macroeconomic models to the recent literature using reduced form regression techniques

global implications of self oriented national monetary rules author s obstfeld maurice rogoff kenneth abstract it is well known that if international linkages are relatively small the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited but what if goods and financial markets are tightly linked is it then problematic if countries unilaterally design their institutions for monetary stabilization are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination we argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no unless risk aversion is very high lack of coordination in rule setting is a second order problem compared to the overall gains from monetary policy stabilization

electoral systems and public spending we study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in oecd and latin american countries we emphasize the distinction between purchases of goods and services which are easier to target geographically and transfers which are easier to target across social groups we present a theoretical model in which voters anticipating government policymaking under different electoral systems have an incentive to elect representatives more prone to transfer public good spending in proportional majoritarian systems the model also predicts higher total primary spending in proportional majoritarian systems when the share of transfer spending is high low after dee ning rigorous measures of proportionality to be used in the empirical investigation we e nd considerable support for our predictions

business cycle convergence in emu a first look at the second moment we analyse the dynamics of the standard deviation of demand and supply shocks as well as of the demand component of gdp across countries in the european monetary union emu this analysis allows us to evaluate the patterns of cyclical comovement in emu and compare them the cyclical performance of the new members of the eu and other oecd countries we make use of sigma convergence methods to identify synchronization patterns in business cycles the eurozone has converged to a stable lower level of dispersion across business cycles during the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s the new eu members have also experienced a strong pattern of convergence from 1998 to 2005 when a strong divergence trend appears an enlargement of the emu to 22 members would not significantly decrease its optimality as a currency area there is evidence for some europe specific characteristics as compared to global comovements in business cycles authors abstract

fiscal rules discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability an empirical assessment for oecd countries does aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy induce macroeconomic instability in terms of higher output and inflation volatility three main conclusions arise from our cross section and panel analysis for a sample of 20 oecd countries first discretionary fiscal policy has a significant and sizeable effect on volatility of gdp per capita and all of its components second there is no direct effect on inflation volatility since output volatility is an important determinant of inflation volatility discretionary fiscal policy indirectly exacerbates inflation volatility these results turn out robust with respect to alternative fiscal policy measures and endogeneity concerns finally many of the fiscal rules introduced since 1990 appear to have reduced the use of discretionary fiscal policy

indivisible labor lotteries and equilibrium abstract this paper considers an economy where labor is indivisible and agents are identical although the discontinuity in labor supply at the individual level disappears as a result of aggregation it is shown that indivisible labor has strong consequences for the aggregate bahavior of the economy it is also shown that optimal allocations involve lotteries over employment and consumption

fiscal stimulus and the role of wage rigidity abstract in this paper we study the impact of an expansion in public spending in an economy characterized by limited asset market participation and sticky wages the flexible wage version of the model implies strong expansionary effects on output and consumption but also a counterfactual increase in real wages the introduction of sticky wages besides being a realistic addition solves this problem and preserves the expansionary effects on output and consumption moreover once we introduce segmentation in the labor market sticky wages are even essential to obtain expansionary effects

indivisible labor and the business cycle abstract a growth model with shocks to technology is studied labor is indivisible so all variability in hours worked is due to fluctuations in the number employed we find that unlike previous equilibrium models of the business cycle this economy displays large fluctuations in hours worked and relatively small fluctuations in productivity this finding is independent of individuals willingness to substitute leisure across time this and other findings are the result of studying and comparing summary statistics describing this economy an economy with divisible labor and post war u s time series

some fiscal calculus what is the impact of fiscal policy on the econ omy how large are the multipliers of govern ment spending and tax cuts this old question has recently received considerable attention in par ticular in the context of the american recovery and reinvestment act arra of 2009 i contribute to answering that question by calculating fiscal multipliers in a baseline neo classical growth model with endogenous labor supply and fiscal policy allowing for govern ment spending transfers government debt and distortionary taxes on labor and capital income the policy experiments are conducted holding transfers consumption taxes and capital income taxes fixed i e changes in taxation require changes in the distortionary labor tax the model is simple and fairly standard as an additional contribution i provide the model in an elegant and tractable form starting from a fairly general formulation and pointing out the key functional form properties for characterizing the dynamics the formulation of the model here or versions

the confidence effects of fiscal consolidations we explore how fiscal consolidations affect private sector confidence a possible channel for the transmission of fiscal policy that has received particular attention recently as a result of governments embarking on austerity trajectories in the aftermath of the crisis panel regressions based on the annual action based datasets of devries et al 2011 and alesina et al 2014a show that consolidations and in particular their unanticipated components affect confidence negatively to obtain a more accurate picture of how consolidations affect confidence we construct a monthly dataset of consolidation announcements so that we can investigate the confidence effects in real time using an event study the results suggest that consumer confidence falls around announcements of consolidation measures an effect likely driven by revenue based measures moreover these effects are highly relevant for european countries with weak institutional arrangements as measured by the tightness of fiscal rules or budgetary transparency the effects on producer confidence are generally similar but weaker than for consumer confidence long term interest rates as a measure of confidence in the sovereign tend to fall around spending based consolidation announcements we have no evidence that the confidence effects of consolidation announcements are worse in slumps than in booms generally strengthening institutional arrangements may help in mitigating adverse confidence effects of consolidations

when international policy coordination matters an empirical analysis the interdependence of national economies implies externalities in policy making and these externalities lead to inefficient outcomes when policy makers are decentralized and independent these externalities have been well documented from a theoretical point of view this paper reports our attempts to discover when and if policy coordination matters using the liverpool world model which exhibits strong spillover effects for monetary policy and would therefore we thought yield very different results from those of earlier researchers however strong spillover effects do not guarantee that cooperative policies will differ much from the uncooperative other aspects of the game s structure can be equally important indeed we found many plausible game situations in which the uncooperative and cooperative solutions are so close together as to be operationally indistinguishable given the precision with which central banks seem to be able to control their money supplies we also found situations in which c

the use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial banks abstract this paper examines the incentives banks have to engage in off balance sheet activities such as commercial loan sales and the issuance of standby letters of credit slcs i show that loan sales and loans backed by slcs have payoff characteristics similar to secured debt like secured debt off balance sheet activities permit banks to sell a portion of the cash flows associated with new investment oppurtunities this ability permits banks to invest in loans with positive net present values that they would pass up if restricted to deposit financing an examination of the risk premium on large certificates of deposit provides evidence consistent with the model

fiscal foresight and information flows news or foresight about future economic fundamentals can create rational expectations equilibria with non fundamental representations that pose substantial challenges to econometric efforts to recover the structural shocks to which economic agents react using tax policies as a leading example of foresight simple theory makes transparent the economic behavior and information structures that generate non fundamental equilibria econometric analyses that fail to model foresight will obtain biased estimates of output multipliers for taxes biases are quantitatively important when two canonical theoretical models are taken as data generating processes both the nature of equilibria and the inferences about the effects of anticipated tax changes hinge critically on hypothesized information flows different methods for extracting or hypothesizing the information flows are discussed and shown to be alternative techniques for resolving a non uniqueness problem endemic to moving average representations

the output employment and interest rate effects of government consumption abstract we study the impact on aggregate variables of changes in government consumption using the neoclassical stochastic growth model we show theoretically that the impact on output and employment of a persistent change in government consumption exceeds that of a temporary change we also show that in principle there can be an analog to the keynesian multiplier in the neoclassical growth model finally in an empirically plausible version of the model we show that the interest rate impact of a persistent government consumption shock exceeds that of a temporary one our results provide counterexamples to existing claims in the literature

interest rate swaps in an agency theoretic model with uncertain interest rates abstract this paper reconciles market participants claims that interest rate swap financing may reduce financing costs through comparative advantage with academic arguments questioning the existence of comparative advantage the findings suggest that the combination of short term debt and interest rate swap may reduce financing costs by allowing high risk firms to reduce agency costs without incurring interest rate risk

can government purchases stimulate the economy this essay briefly reviews the state of knowledge about the government spending multiplier drawing on theoretical work aggregate empirical estimates from the united states as well as cross locality estimates i assess the likely range of multiplier values for the experiment most relevant to the stimulus package debate a temporary deficit financed increase in government purchases i conclude that the multiplier for this type of spending is probably between 0 8 and 1 5 jel e23 e62 h50

the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy evidence from the oecd this paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in scal policy in particular we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across oecd countries in line with leading theories of scal cyclicality we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical scal policies wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect scal cyclicality

fragmented fiscal policy abstract this paper explores on a panel of 19 oecd countries the role of fragmentation in determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970 95 period we first define the notion of fragmentation of fiscal policy making as the degree to which the costs of a dollar of aggregate expenditure are internalized by individual decision makers empirically this notion has two key logical components the number of decision makers and the rules of the game or the budget process in turn the number of decision makers can refer to the number of parties in a coalition or the number of ministers in the cabinet we test all these determinants against each other and against perhaps the oldest explanation of all ideology we show that cabinet size and to a lesser degree coalition size and ideology are significant and robust determinants of fiscal outcomes in particular transfers are the budget items most affected by these factors

strategic interactions of fiscal policies in europe a global var perspective abstract the paper analyses the strategic interactions of fiscal policies in the european union context by modelling the interdependencies arising between public and private sectors saving investment balances in a global vector autoregressive framework we use two empirical specifications to reflect some important differences in the sequencing of the policy decision making process in this setting we draw policy implications with respect to fiscal policy coordination and fiscal policy discretion we highlight the importance of several factors such as global capital flows uncertainty with respect to policy actions and nature of the shocks as key elements defining the dimension of the prevailing policy tradeoffs

the need for international policy coordination what s old what s new what s yet to come the first generation of policy coordination models was introduced some 25 years ago it provided a rationale for policy coordination but the gains from coordination were generally thought to be small now a new generation of policy coordination models is emerging incorporating monopolistic competition and nominal inertia here we examine macroeconomic interdependence and the scope for policy coordination in a tractable second generation model with two countries and multiple sectors initial calibration of the model suggests that second generation models may have more scope for policy coordination than did the first d 2004 elsevier b v all rights reserved

an analytical characterization of noisy fiscal policy this paper provides an analytical characterization of the effects of noisy news shocks on fiscal policy we consider a small scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium dsge model with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply and show that noise dampens the propagation of anticipated fiscal policy over the business cycle thus reducing the fiscal multiplier

loan sales and the cost of bank capital this paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers bank regulation together with competitive deposit and equity financing can give banks an incentive to sell loans but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral hazard problem a solution is given for the optimal design of the bank loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral hazard problem an explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased banks practice of making loans and then selling them to other institutions and individuals has grown in popularity an important example in the development of loan selling has been the increase in banks mortgage loans that are insured and pooled under the authority of the government national mortgage association gnma and then sold to secondary market investors recently however there has been a dramatic rise in the volume of other types of loans being sold especially by money center banks portions of commercial loans originated by these larger banks are being sold to smaller banks foreign banks and other financial and nonfinancial institutions in addition banks car loans and credit card receivables have also been pooled and sold to institutions and individuals selling loans that were once considered nonmarketable assets a process that has been termed asset securitization may be signalling the start of a fundamental change in the commercial banking business the leading banks in loan selling operations now view themselves more as originators and distributors of loans rather than as institutions holding loans as assets the potentially large impact of loan sales on the future of commercial banking naturally evokes the question of what incentives exist for banks to sell loans in this paper we show that loan sales allow some banks to finance loans less expensively than by traditional deposit or equity issue because bank funds received via loan sales can avoid costs associated with required reserves and

what are the effects of fiscal policy shocks we propose and apply a new approach for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy using vector autoregressions specifically we use sign restrictions to identify a government revenue shock as well as a government spending shock while controlling for a generic business cycle shock and a monetary policy shock we explicitly allow for the possibility of announcement effects i e that a current fiscal policy shock changes fiscal policy variables in the future but not at present we construct the impulse responses to three linear combinations of these fiscal shocks corresponding to the three scenarios of deficit spending deficit financed tax cuts and a balanced budget spending expansion we apply the method to us quarterly data from 1955 to 2000 we find that deficit financed tax cuts work best among these three scenarios to improve gdp with a maximal present value multiplier of five dollars of total additional gdp per each dollar of the total cut in government revenue 5 years after the shock copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

standby letters of credit and large bank capital an empirical analysis abstract a recent trend in commercial banking has been the rapid growth in the issuance of off balance sheet guarantees revised capital standards presume that banks are increasing the issuance of off balance sheet guarantees to generate fee income and conserve primary capital while shifting out of low risk assets the relationship between standby letters of credit an off balance sheet guarantee and large bank capital is tested using granger causality and then estimated in a structural model to accurately estimate the relationship a simultaneous equation model is required to capture the positive effect of bank capital on standby letter of credit issuance

market discipline and bank subordinated debt note a lengthy literature in banking has addressed the question of whether the market prices of liabilities respond to individual bank risk taking activity that is whether any market disciplines exists however despite the obvious importance of this question the current record has led to no consensus on the issue results have been contradictory in this journal alone hannan and hanweck 1988 conclude that the market does extract at least some price for risk taking while avery belton and goldberg 1988 find no such evidence in this study we argue that this line of inquiry has a serious f law in that it fails to use theoretical models of bank instrument valuation to determine the appropriate testing of market discipline therefore the empirical models have lacked the necessary exactness to isolate the appropriate null hypotheses to redress this shortcoming and advance the methodology of this area of the literature we use a pricing model which comes to the banking area from the options pricing literature to look at the yield spread on bank liabilities using this model it is clear that the value of large uninsured bank liabilities cannot be described as a linear monotonic function of risk moreover current bank regulation affects the assumed role risk measures play in the pricing of such debt instruments both of these complications mean that simple regressions are not likely to adequately address the relationship between the value of debt and underlying risk in the final section we empirically investigate the presence of market discipline using contingent claims pricing we find that accounting measures of bank risk still have little predictive value in explaining yield spreads and therefore offer little evidence of meaningful market discipline

variation in the fiscal multiplier with the method of financing evidence across industrial countries government spending has often varied with the business cycle to stimulate the economy and to revive economic conditions however the state of public finances has often necessitated higher borrowing to finance widening fiscal deficits indeed recent austerity packages around the globe have crystalized the importance of fiscal consolidation against the backdrop of rising public debt to shed light on recent debates regarding fiscal multipliers the article estimates variation in these multipliers with the method of financing using annual data for a sample of industrial countries there is a large variation in the effects of expansionary and contractinary government spending shocks on economic variables within and across countries the significant effects of negative government spending shocks fiscal contraction appear more prevalent than those of expansionary shocks on real output growth price inflation and nominal wage inflation consistent with theory s predictions the fiscal multiplier is more lik

deposit insurance market discipline and off balance sheet banking risk of large u s commercial banks abstract the market discipline of off balance sheet banking activities obsas is examined by employing contingent claims valuation techniques to derive implied asset variances from bank equity and from risk premia for bank subordinated debt specifically implied asset variances have been calculated from market and on and off balance sheet information using options pricing techniques theoretically these implied asset variances are better than equity variance or risk premia in proxying bank risk because they capture portfolio effects as well as the non linear nature of contingent claims model and the impact of closure rules empirical results suggest the existence of market discipline of obsas market participants price these obsas as risk reducing

fiscal policy in general equilibrium this paper studies four classic fiscal policy experiments within a quantitatively restricted neoclassical model the authors main findings are as follows 1 permanent changes in government purchases can lead to short run and long run output multipliers that exceed one 2 permanent changes in government purchases induce larger effects than temporary changes 3 the financing decision is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in government purchases and 4 public investment has dramatic effects on private output and investment these findings stem from important dynamic interactions of capital and labor absent in earlier equilibrium analyses of fiscal policy copyright 1993 by american economic association

fiscal stimulus with spending reversals abstract the short run effects of fiscal policy depend not only on current tax and spending choices but also on expectations about future policy adjustment while general equilibrium models typically restrict medium term adjustment to taxation we highlight the importance of government spending dynamics first we provide time series evidence for the united states suggesting that an exogenous increase in government spending prompts a rise in public debt followed over time by a reduction in spending below trend second we show how expected spending reversals alter the short run impact of fiscal policy in a new keynesian model bringing it closer in line with the evidence

noisy fiscal policy abstract this paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in a setting in which private agents receive noisy signals about future shocks to government expenditures we show how to empirically identify the relative weight of news and noise shocks to government spending and compute the level of noise for canada the uk and the us we then investigate the quantitative implications of imperfect fiscal policy information using a medium scale dsge model we find that when the government seeks to implement a persistent change in expected public spending the existence of noise as estimated using actual data implies a sizable difference in fiscal multipliers compared to the perfect fiscal foresight case

do the ecb and the fed really need to cooperate optimal monetary policy in a two country world abstract a two country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements a cooperative b non cooperative and c monetary union i characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non cooperation and monetary union the non cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of terms of trade spillover effects while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy independently of the calibration scenario adopted the ecb has little to gain by coordinating with the fed

is there a fiscal free lunch in a liquidity trap this paper uses a dsge model to examine the eects of an expansion in government spending in a liquidity trap the spending multiplier can be much larger than in the normal situation if the liquidity trap is very persistent and scal stimulus can be rapidly implemented moreover the budgetary costs may be minimal as the large response of output boosts tax revenues allowing for something close to a scal free lunch however we caution that the multiplier may be much smaller under plausible implementation lags for many types of public spending and or if the liquidity trap lasts less than two years in addition because the marginal impact of scal expansion decreases in the scale of the outlay it is crucial to distinguish between average and marginal multipliers

uncertain fiscal consolidations the paper explores the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations whose timing and composition are uncertain drawing on the evidence in alesina and ardagna 2010 we emphasize whether or not the fiscal consolidation is driven by tax rises or expenditure cuts we find that the composition of the fiscal consolidation its duration the monetary policy stance the level of government debt and expectations over the likelihood and composition of fiscal consolidations all matter in determining the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary and or successful in stabilizing government debt

common currencies vs monetary independence we study the optimal monetary policy in a two country open economy model under two monetary arrangements a multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers b common currencies with a centralized policy maker our findings suggest that i monetary policy competition leads to higher long term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses ii the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies iii the welfare losses from higher long term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks

the time for austerity estimating the average treatment effect of fiscal policy after the global financial crisis a controversial rush to fiscal austerity followed in many countries yet research on the effects of austerity on macroeconomic aggregates was and still is unsettled mired by the difficulty of identifying multipliers from observational data this article reconciles seemingly disparate estimates of multipliers within a unified and state contingent framework we achieve identification of causal effects with new propensity score based methods for time series data using this novel approach we show that austerity is always a drag on growth and especially so in depressed economies a 1 of gdp fiscal consolidation translates into a loss of 3 5 of real gdp over five years when implemented in a slump rather than just 1 8 in a boom

on constraining fiscal policy discretion in emu we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the benefits and costs of imposing restrictions on fiscal policy we emphasize that the arguments in favour of restricting discretion of fiscal policy go beyond the notion of avoiding unsustainable budgetary plans that can lead to pressure on the central bank restrictions on fiscal policy can also be justified on the grounds that discretionary changes in spending or taxes can lead to unnecessary volatility in output and lower economic growth empirically there is evidence that implicit constraints on governments can be as effective as explicit constraints i e rules from the analysis in emu countries in the last 10 years we conclude that there has been a significant change in the conduct of fiscal policy in terms of increased discipline and less use of discretion however since 1999 there are clear signs of fatigue in this process as previous trends have either stopped or even reversed copyright 2003 oxford university press

securitization with recourse an instrument that offers uninsured bank depositors sequential claims abstract this paper expands on the observation that securitization with recourse offers a lender the protections of an uninsured bank deposit with an additional senior claim if the bank fails the senior claim derives from the commitment of the revenues from a group of securitized assets that pay off the securitized lender first thus securitization with recourse provides sequential claims for bank liability holders which improves the allocation of risk sharing among them securitization with recourse may also improve the selection of loans granted by partially offsetting the moral hazard incentives toward risk taking created by fixed rate deposit insurance empirical results are given which are consistent with the theoretical model

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted

the government spending multiplier in a mis managed liquidity trap i study the impact of a government spending shock in a new keynesian model when monetary policy is set optimally in this framework the economy is at the zero lower bound but expectations are well managed by the central bank as such the multiplier effect of government spending increases on expected inflation is small while the one on output can be larger than one this is consistent with recent empirical evidence on the effects of the 2009 arra