duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

competition under consumer loss aversion we address the effect of expectation based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase however some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution whereas others are perfectly informed all the time we show that if firms have symmetric costs a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome the reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

a micro analysis of business travel demand this study tests two hypothesis 1 that tax deductibility and the dual benefit nature of goods on the business pleasure borderline increases the demand for business travel and 2 that this dual benefit decreases price elasticity the study uses expenditure microdata and contrasts the behaviour of business travellers and pleasure travellers both groups are assumed to have indentical tastes but the expenditure behaviour of business travellers is modified by the role of the business trip as a factor of production the linear expenditure system les allocation model is applied to expenditures on individual goods at a particular tourist destination business travellers are shown to have higher expenditures than pleasure travellers for food lodging and local transportation minimum quantities estimated by the les are also higher for business travellers uncompensated price elasticities of business travellers are significantly smaller than that of pleasure travellers for local transportation clothing a

long bond yields and inflation rates in oecd countries a cross section study 1987 long bond yields and inflation rates in oecd countries a cross section study applied economics vol 19 no 3 pp 407 415

competition and price variation when consumers are loss averse we modify the salop 1979 model of price competition with differentiated products by assuming that consumers are loss averse relative to a reference point given by their recent expectations about the purchase consumers sensitivity to losses in money increases the price responsiveness of demand and hence the intensity of competition at higher relative to lower market prices reducing or eliminating price variation both within and between products when firms face common stochastic costs in any symmetric equilibrium the markup is strictly decreasing in cost even when firms face different cost distributions we identify conditions under which a focal price equilibrium where firms always charge the same focal price exists and conditions under which any equilibrium is focal

how limiting deceptive practices harms consumers there are two competing sellers of an experience good one offers high quality one low the low quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer we show that he could be better off when the low quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not we characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt we show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare

modeling multiattribute utility risk and belief dynamics for new consumer durable brand choice this paper proposes a brand choice model to aid in the prelaunch management of a new consumer durable entry in an existing category the model contributes to theory by integrating the critical phenomena of multiattribute preference risk and dynamics in an individual level expected utility framework the integration is based on established theoretical constructs in utility bayesian decision analysis and discrete choice theory measurement and estimation procedures are presented an application is described and the managerial relevance of this work as a planning and forecasting tool is examined

demonstrations and price competition in new product release we incorporate product demonstrations into a game theoretic model of price competition demonstrations may include product samples trials return policies online review platforms or any other means by which a firm allows consumers to learn about their value for a new product in our model demonstrations help individual consumers to learn whether they prefer an innovative product over an established alternative the innovative firm controls demonstration informativeness when the innovative firm commits to demonstration policies and there is flexibility in prices the firm is best off offering fully informative demonstrations that divide the market and dampen price competition in contrast when a firm can adjust its demonstration strategy in response to prices the firm prefers only partially informative demonstrations designed to maximize its market share such a strategy can generate the monopoly profit for the innovative firm we contrast the strategic role of demonstrations in our framework with

a study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel this paper examines bidding in over 1 700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel or ring of stamp dealers in the 1990s the knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by daniel graham robert marshall and jean francois richard 1990 following a reduced form examination of these data damages induced inefficiency and the ring s benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of emmanuel guerre isabelle perrigne and quang vuong 2000 a notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers

managing consumer returns in a competitive environment this paper investigates the pricing and restocking fee decisions of two competing firms selling horizontally differentiated products we model a duopoly facing consumers who have heterogeneous tastes for the products and who must experience a product before knowing how well it matches with their preferences the analysis yields several key insights restocking fees not only can be sustained in a competitive environment but also are more severe when consumers are less informed about product fit and when consumers place a greater importance on how well products attributes fit with their preferences we compare the competitive equilibrium prices to a scenario in which consumers are certain about their preferences and find conditions defining when consumer uncertainty results in higher equilibrium prices comparison to a monopoly setting yields a surprising result equilibrium restocking fees in a competitive environment can be higher than those charged by a monopolist this paper was accepted by jagmohan s raju marketing

customer return policies for experience goods this paper studies the economic rationale for customer return policies by focusing on the experience goods aspect of many products return policies allow consumers to defer their purchasing decisions until after they gain some experience with goods in so doing they insure consumers against ex post loss which allows a monopoly seller to charge more than otherwise it is shown that the seller adopts the return policy when consumers are highly risk averse or retail costs are high consumers are strictly better off under the return policy but there is too little adoption of the policy in equilibrium copyright 1996 by blackwell publishing ltd

product differentiation and collusion sustainability when collusion is costly a widely debated question in recent years by both strategy theorists and antitrust practitioners is what role product differentiation between firms plays in their ability to sustain a collusive agreement in order to reduce the strength of competition and gain higher profits this paper addresses the following question what happens to the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship when setting up and maintaining an agreement is costly we show that introducing collusion costs into the discussion has relevant implications indeed sufficiently high collusion costs modify the underlying market structure thus altering the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship with respect to the case where collusion costs are absent or low in particular if the gains from collusion are increasing decreasing with the degree of product differentiation the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability is always positive negative whereas if the gains from collusion are inverted u shaped the relationship is inverted u shaped too these results stress the importance of considering those markets where the coordination between firms is sufficiently costly as structurally different from those markets where coordination has no costs for firms

deciding when to quit reference dependence over slot machine outcomes abstract we conduct tests for reference dependent loss aversion using slot machine gamblers decisions on when to quit playing for a visit to a casino evidence for a lagged status quo reference po

delivered pricing and the impact of spatial differentiation on cartel stability abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spatial differentiation on the sustainability of collusion on delivered prices it shows that the choice of the punishment mechanism that enforces collusion is crucial for determining whether differentiation facilitates cartel pricing or not if punishments are optimal then differentiation tends to facilitate collusion optimal punishments impose minmax profits on deviators independently of the degree of differentiation a high degree of differentiation then renders deviations less profitable since it makes business stealing more costly but does not affect the deviator s punishment profits depending on the transport cost technology excessive differentiation may have a countervailing effect however because it also implies high transport costs for the cartel if collusion is sustained by standard grim trigger punishments instead then collusion may be easiest for minimal differentiation the reason is that competitive and thus grim trigger punishment profits are higher the higher the degree of differentiation

learning and forgetting modeling optimal product sampling over time firms use samples to increase the sales of almost all consumable goods including food health and cleaning products despite its importance sampling remains one of the most under researched areas there are no theoretical quantitative models of sampling behavior other than the pioneering work of jain et al 1995 who modeled sampling as an important factor in the diffusion of new products in this paper we characterize sampling as having two effects the first is the change in the probability of a consumer purchasing a product immediately after having sampled the product the second is an increase in the consumer s cumulative goodwill formation which results from sampling the product this distinction differentiates our model from other models of goodwill in which firm sales are only a function of the existing goodwill level we determine the optimal dynamic sampling effort of a firm and examine the factors that affect the sampling decision we find that although the sampling effort will decline over a product s life cycle it may continue in mature products another finding is that when we have a positive change in the factors that increase sampling productivity steady state goodwill stock and sales will increase but equilibrium sampling can either increase or decrease the change in the sampling level is indeterminate because while increased sampling productivity means that firms have incentives to increase sampling the increase in the equilibrium goodwill level indirectly reduces the marginal productivity of sampling thus reducing the incentives to sample we discuss managerial implications and how the model can be used to address various circumstances

tacit collusion in differentiated cournot games abstract in a simple oligopoly with quantity setting firms we analyze the conditions under which more product differentiation makes tacit collusion easier it is found that the net effect can go either way

the deficit interest rate link empirical evidence for canada this paper explores whether a positive relationship exists between interest rates nominal or real and deficits as postulated by a conventional macroeconomic model mundell fleming using spectral and time series techniques annual and quarterly data for canada and a variety of definitions for the deficit and government spending variables no empirical link between deficits and interest rates could be detected it is suggested therefore that the evidence is inconsistent with themundell fleming model which predicts a positive association between interest rates and deficits a possible explantion for the observed empirical results may be found in the ricardian equivalence theorem

potential competition in the deregulated airlines using a new and unique data set this paper applies a systems approach to the study of potential competition prices and entry relations in airline city pair markets consistent with limit pricing models future entry is directly influenced by current prices current prices thus appear to provide an important signal to potential entrants about the probability of profitable entry while results indicate the existence of barriers to entry these barriers appear to have no independent effects on price beyond there effect on actual competition through increases in concentration copyright 1990 by mit press

tourism and economic development a survey this article surveys the literature on tourism and economic development identifying the contribution that tourism can make to development including foreign currency income and employment and the costs that it entails single equation and system of equations models for estimating tourism demand are provided indicating developing countries potential to benefit from increasing expenditure on tourism but their susceptibility to deterioration in price competitiveness the main sectors of tourism supply transportation tour operators travel agents and accommodation are examined and the importance of cross country integration between firms is highlighted the article argues that many of the problems associated with the use of environmental resources for tourism stem from market failure and it considers methods for increasing sustainably the returns from them

quality disclosure and competition we analyze costly quality disclosure with horizontally differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel and characterize the effect of competition on disclosure and welfare we show that expected disclosure is higher under a cartel than under duopoly and the welfare comparison depends on the level of disclosure cost when the disclosure cost is low welfare is higher under a cartel than duopoly but when the disclosure cost is high welfare is higher under duopoly in either market structure disclosure is excessive in terms of total surplus but insufficient in terms of consumer surplus

strategic leniency and cartel enforcement the cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the united states and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency i develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20 year span statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime jel d43 l12 l13 k21 in 1993 the department of justice doj introduced a new leniency program with the intent of destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels the program commits the doj to the lenient prosecution of early confessors in particular it guarantees complete amnesty from federal prosecution to the first confessor from each cartel provided that an investigation into the confes sor s cartel is not already underway it also offers discretionary penalty reductions to conspirators who confess when an investigation is already ongoing the new leniency program has become the cornerstone of cartel enforcement efforts in the united states e g scott d hammond 2004 and recently has inspired antitrust authorities in australia canada the european union japan south korea and elsewhere to introduce similar programs oecd 2002 2003 this paper tests the efficacy of the new leniency program the results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime a burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency a common finding is that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultane

consumer loss aversion product experimentation and tacit collusion abstract two firms compete to attract loss averse consumers that are uncertain about how well the goods on sale fit their needs to resolve valuation uncertainty firms can allow prospective customers to test experiment their products before purchase we investigate firms dynamic incentives to allow experimentation and analyze the resulting effects on the profitability and the stability of tacit collusion depending on the regulatory regime in place i e whether experimentation is forbidden mandated or simply allowed but not imposed laissez faire the degree of loss aversion has ambiguous effects both on the profits that firms can achieve through tacit collusion and on the stability of these agreements while in static environments consumer welfare is always maximized by a policy that forbids experimentation the opposite happens in a dynamic environment

when does a firm disclose product information a firm chooses a price and the product information it discloses to a consumer whose tastes are privately known we provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the match function for full disclosure to be the unique equilibrium outcome whatever the costs and prior beliefs about product and consumer types it allows for products with different qualities as well as some horizontal match heterogeneity with independently distributed product and consumer types full disclosure is always an equilibrium and a necessary and sufficient equilibrium condition is that all firm types earn at least the full disclosure profit

on the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies abstract we consider a rule designed to maintain collusion in a duopoly made up of firms producing differentiated products we analyse both price setting and quantity setting models and show that product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of this rule our results contrast with those obtained by earlier writers

comparative advertising disclosing horizontal match information improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices so consumer surplus can go up or down while profits rise with enough quality asymmetry though the higher quality and hence larger firm s price falls with more information so both effects benefit consumers this occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one comparative advertising as it imparts more information therefore helps consumers although it also improves the profitability of the small firm overall welfare goes down because of the large loss to the attacked firm

consumer choice between hedonic and utilitarian goods abstract in this article the authors examine how consumer choice between hedonic and utilitarian goods is influenced by the nature of the decision task building on research on elaboration the authors propose that the relative salience of hedonic dimensions is greater when consumers decide which of several items to give up forfeiture choices than when they decide which item to acquire acquisition choices the resulting hypothesis that a hedonic item is relatively preferred over the same utilitarian item in forfeiture choices than in acquisition choices was supported in two choice experiments in a subsequent experiment these findings were extended to hypothetical choices in which the acquisition and forfeiture conditions were created by manipulating initial attribute level reference states instead of ownership finally consistent with the experimental findings a field survey showed that relative to market prices owners of relatively hedonic cars value their vehicles more than do owners of relat

the effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing abstract using the spatial competition framework of hotelling 1929 this paper explores the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and the ability of firms to collude with respect to price we show that the minimum discount factor required to support the joint profit maximum as an equilibrium outcome monotonically increases as products become better substitutes when the joint profit maximum cannot be supported the optimal collusive price is shown to decline as products become more substitutable these findings suggest that firms producing stronger substitutes tend to find it tougher to collude in terms of their product price

reference dependent risk attitudes we use koszegi and rabin s 2006 model of reference dependent utility and an extension of it that applies to decisions with delayed consequences to study preferences over monetary risk because our theory equates the reference point with recent probabilistic beliefs about outcomes it predicts specific ways in which the environment influences attitudes toward modest scale risk it replicates classical prospect theory including the prediction of distaste for insuring losses when exposure to risk is a surprise but implies first order risk aversion when a risk and the possibility of insuring it are anticipated a prior expectation to take on risk decreases aversion to both the anticipated and additional risk for large scale risk the model allows for standard consumption utility to dominate reference dependent gain loss utility generating nearly identical risk aversion across situations

experience as a barrier to contestability in airline markets contrary to one of the predictions of the contestability hypothesis price in deregulated u s passenger airline markets is related to actual competition from diversifying former intrastates and newly established carriers more important former intrastates have a larger impact on price than do newly established firms a result consistent with these markets being imperfectly competitive because of an industry experience barrier to entry unlike actual competition a measure of potential competition has no effect in constraining price copyright 1989 by mit press

tourism as a factor in development cooperation abstract where there is little or no industrial or agricultural base and no exploitable resource tourism may make a significant contribution to the economy of a developing country the eec provides aid to developing countries in three areas the southern mediterranean asia and latin america and africa the caribbean and the pacific the commission has produced guidelines for drawing up proposals and a typical example is presented in this article the eec also supplies high quality expertise to help define policy options and strategic plans and carry out agreed programmes long term success is more likely for specialized high income projects

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability