on the origin of monetary exchange there are good reasons to think that the nature of money is not yet rightly understood john law 1705 i introduction if it were possible to plan and execute trades in goods services and financial assets at zero cost in time and other resources we might still know fluctuating prices unemployment poverty and sin but we would neither know nor care about shoe shops used car lots wholesale bread distributors brokerage houses or other intermediaries because we would not willingly pay others to perform trade facilitating services that we could perform for ourselves at no expense neither would we know money because we would never choose to execute two transactions first selling an object for money then buying another with money simmons 1947 308 when the same result could be achieved at no extra cost by barter in real life of course things are more complicated we are awash in trading intermediaries because we cannot easily discover and exploit potential gains from trade without them 1 we who live in private ownership economies are so accustomed to intermediaries especially myriad local retailers that we take their operations for granted similar familiarity with retail traders must have been almost as common in ancient cities since the beginning of recorded history we find references to trade specialists of various kinds butchers grocers silversmiths prostitutes spice merchants house builders marriage brokers bankers pawn brokers etc heidel 1963 15 27 32 polanyi 1957 64 94 monroe 1924 14 27 8 it seems likely indeed that urban dwellers always have been accustomed to deal with marketors who in exchange for fees of one kind or another perform services that give substance and direction to the invisible hand 2 the phrase substance and direction merits emphasis because the function of every marketor is to make a ready market where other individuals can execute desired trades more easily and inexpensively than by acting alone evidently this function would not be performed with such alacrity and diligence by so many persons in such similar ways in so many diverse societies over such long stretches of history were it not otherwise extremely costly for individuals to exploit more than a trivial fraction of potential gains from trade but a market is one thing money another we know of no society historically in which money and markets did not coexist in common parlance the term money has always meant objects that are routinely treated as acceptable means of payment by marketors in the last century money was often described by economists as a veil because it was thought to mask the true nature of trade which was thought really to consist in the exchange of commodities for commodities but that view obscures a more important truth in every civilized community for more than three centuries specialized media of exchange have served to enable private marketors efficiently to coordinate individual economic activities over an ever wider diversity of areas of economic and geographical experience to be sure the coordination process never is perfect and sometimes is perfectly terrible as during the great depression of the 1930s but consider the issue posed by leijonhufvud 1981 how is it possible how is it even conceivable that decentralized economic activities can ever be reasonably coordinated when nobody really is trying to ensure that outcome perhaps the wonder is not that coordination is often imperfect but rather that it ever occurs at all arrow and hahn 1971 1 2 it is argued elsewhere clower and leijonhufvud 1975 that a world of cost less exchange might be imagined in which households could efficiently execute trades directly by barter cf debreu 1959 28 veendorp 1970 history even records instances that lend qualified support to this view jevons 1875 21 to explain privately organized markets we must of course introduce transaction costs friedman and hahn 1990 xii clower 1977 235

interest rates and money in the measurement of monetary policy over the last 25 years a set of influential studies has placed interest rates at the heart of analyses that interpret and evaluate monetary policies in light of this work the federal reserve s recent policy of quantitative easing with its goal of affecting the supply of liquid assets appears to be a radical break from standard practice alternatively one could posit that the monetary aggregates when measured properly never lost their ability to explain aggregate fluctuations and for this reason represent an important omission from standard models and policy discussions in this context the new policy initiatives can be characterized simply as conventional attempts to increase money growth this view is supported by evidence that superlative divisia measures of money often help in forecasting movements in key macroeconomic variables moreover the statistical fit of a structural vector autoregression deteriorates significantly if such measures of money are excluded when identifying monetary

structural factors in the economic reforms of china eastern europe and the former soviet union reform in china and russia jeffrey sachs and wing thye woo china s experience does not show that gradual reform is superior to the shock therapy undertaken in eastern europe and the former soviet union eefsu differing performance primarily reflects different economic structures prior to reform china was a peasant agricultural society eefsu was urban and overindustrialized in both jobs in state enterprises were so heavily subsidized that workers refused to move to new industries elsewhere even when productivity in the latter was much higher in eefsu the large state sector impeded structural adjustment curtailing subsidies would have produced many losers who used their power to resist this outcome failure to curtail subsidies then cut off the potential supply of labour and other factors to new emerging firms china s state enterprises have not performed as well as the rest of the chinese economy and do not explain its success rapid growth was possible because the large agricultural sector contained vast surplus labour and did not enjoy subsidies and soft budget constraints once constraints on migration across regions and jobs were removed this labour was available to fuel expansion in new industries unlike the distributional conflict in eefsu in china reallocation of labour allowed all groups to gain in both partial liberalization also unleashed macroeconomic pressures manageable in china because of rapid growth and adequate monetary policy but explosive in much of eefsu because of deeper structural problems and gross monetary mismanagement

on the competitiveness of grid tied residential photovoltaic generation systems in pakistan panacea or paradox abstract pakistan is experiencing a slow uptake of grid tied residential pv generation systems gtrpvgs despite of steep fall in pv module price higher solar irradiation and enactment of net metering by the government this slow uptake is attributed to the lack of awareness of four major stakeholders namely the house hold utility financier and the policy maker this paper presents a coherent framework that addresses the concerns of the stakeholders using four country specific parameters i e the local solar irradiation pv system costs borrowing and discount rates and electricity tariffs to compute npv irr payback period and levelized cost of electricity lcoe assuming net metering we model the economic payoffs on self consumption and sale of pv electricity at varying net metering rates system sizes load to generation profiles borrowing and discount rates findings suggest economic competitiveness of pv electricity with an irr and payback averaging around 28 and 5 years respectively moreover the lcoe is also found to be significantly lower than the retail rates the findings inform the household and financier on the economic yield utility on efficient tariff setting and government on sustainable policy design finally we argue that gtrpvgs bears huge potential for pakistan suffering from energy deficit unsustainable cost transmission losses and environmental hazards

innovation and bureaucracy under soft and hard budget constraints because of the inherent uncertainty promotion of innovation critically depends on screening mechanisms to select projects this paper studies the relationship between bureaucracy and financial constraints as two such mechanisms the lack of commitment to hard financial constraints interferes with its ex post screening capability ex ante bureaucratic screening is optimally chosen as a substitute however bureaucracy makes mistakes by rejecting promising projects and delays innovation and the efficiency loss due to soft financial constraints increases as prior knowledge becomes worse and as research stage investment requirements become lower in a centralized economy bureaucracy may reduce the number of parallel projects particularly for projects with higher uncertainties and less research stage requirements this theory fits much of the evidence and in particular it explains why the computer industry but not the nuclear or aerospace industries has fared so poorly in centralized economies the fundamental importance of innovation to the survival and evolution of economic systems and organizations has long been recognized marx 1978 schumpeter 1950 innovation is characterized by its inherent uncertainty because it is a process whose every element takes considerable time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects schumpeter 1950 p 83 and people are unable to anticipate the future impact of successful innovations even after their technical feasibility has been established rosenberg 1994 an understanding of how different systems and organizations deal with the uncertainties associated with innovation and the resultant consequences is crucial for understanding alternative economic systems and organizations in this paper we provide a theory to analyse how different systems screen uncertain innovative projects and the impact of the various screening mechanisms on those systems we distinguish two alternative screening mechanisms the bureaucratic screening mechanism vs the market screening mechanism the latter is directly linked to financial constraints with this perspective our theory explains why centralized economies did well in certain areas of innovation but fared poorly in others for instance in the early 1960s the west was frightened by the ussr s great success in launching the first unmanned satellite and the first manned space capsule while in the 1980s in contrast the centralized system

energy production system optimization evidence from pakistan abstract the ongoing energy crisis in pakistan and the dependency on thermal electricity generation has contributed to the necessity to optimize energy production system the expensive thermal electricity and inability to recover its cost gives unprecedented rise to the electricity tariffs in this study optimization of the energy production system has been performed using linear programing model as the high cost of electricity generation has been found as the root cause of energy crises the objective function of the proposed model is cost minimization that will also reduce the circular debt specifically it has examined the optimum proportion of energy production from each available source under two different scenarios the first scenario considers that the existing system should be used at its maximum capacity in the second scenario seventy percent utilization of power plants has been examined the second scenario summarizes the optimum mix of energy production which minimizes the cost of electricity production the differential cost that is payable by the government as a subsidy is also compensated similarly it reduces circular debt that is a bottleneck between power generation companies and oil supply companies thus the proposed model has a tendency to minimize the cost of energy production and further reduce circular debt as well as the burden of a subsidy on the government the study specifies the problems confronting pakistan s energy sector and identifies the key elements of a potential policy response to address the country s severe power crisis

gradual versus rapid liberalization in socialist economies the problem of macroeconomic control from 1978 to 1992 china experienced gradual liberalization with a fairly stable price level the more rapid liberalization attempted after 1989 in eastern europe and the former ussr generated much higher inflation yet both regions fiscal policies were similar as in formerly socialist europe in china the share of government revenue in gross national product gnp has fallen sharply nevertheless china avoided resorting to the inflation tax the resulting enormous growth in saving and in stock of financial assets allowed the liberalized sector to finance itself the chinese government and the deficits of the slowly reforming state enterprises important aspects of china s dualistic banking and pricing policies could well be adopted in other transitional socialist economies but such incredibly high real financial growth is not feasible in russia or in formerly socialist europe thus to prevent inflation fiscal reforms should come much earlier in their transitions than they did in china s

the breakdown of hierarchies in the soviet union and china a neoinstitutional perspective why did modest attempts to decentralize the centrally administered soviet system lead to its collapse while more far reaching decentralization in china left central political and administrative hierarchies intact this article analyzes the disintegration of centrally planned organizations in the context of a neoinstitutional model of the breakdown of authority within hierarchies an agency model of hierarchy is presented that incorporates the ambiguous property rights authority relations and risk sharing conditions that prevailed under central planning and then persist during postcommunist transitions this model suggests that decentralizing reforms could trigger an organizational bank run prompting local agents to seize organizational assets under their control the article also considers reputation preserving strategies that central authorities might use to avert disintegration as an application of this model the collapse of soviet political industrial and state fiscal hierarchies are considered and compared with the experience of analogous sectors in china reforms in both states transferred significant autonomy from the center to local field agents in the soviet case these agents appropriated organizational assets with little interference from the center in china by contrast the center preserved both its capacity for monitoring and its reputation for disciplining transgressions and the rise of hybrid ownership forms made expropriation of state and party assets far less attractive

competition and the ratchet effect in labor markets the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or by cutting pay we model this effect as a multiperiod principal agent problem with hidden information and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally consistent with our theoretical model we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition which are nearly eliminated when competition is introduced this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

notes on the microfoundations of monetary economics it is important to keep two closely related distinctions in mind when discussing the microeconomics of money that between the social arrangement known as monetary exchange and those assets known as money and that between what patinkin 1957 called the market experiment and individual experiment this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

which road leads to stable money demand this paper denies that the demand for money function is any more unstable than other demand functions and maintains that the controversies regarding unstable money demand are produce by poor methodology that is not shared by other areas of the field of economics when investigating demand function properties this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

managing r d in vertical relationships we study the optimal strategy for research and development r d in a buyer supplier relationship the buyer chooses whether to 1 insource a cost reducing r d to its own research subunit or to 2 outsource it to its manufacturing supplier the buyer cannot observe the r d effort in either case but can better observe the r d result when the r d is conducted internally according to our analysis the buyer prefers insourcing r d to mitigate information asymmetry when the r d cost is either small or large when the r d cost is intermediate however the buyer prefers outsourcing r d and can achieve the full information outcome first best outcome despite the information asymmetry associated with outsourcing r d moreover the buyer s preference for outsourcing high cost r d increases when the r d is more likely to succeed or to generate significant cost reductions or the r d result is more difficult to predict our analysis provides a theoretical explanation for the increasing trend of outsourcing innovation to manufacturing suppliers jel d82 l22 l23

search bargaining money and prices the goal of this paper is to extend existing search theoretic models of fiat money which until now have assumed that the price level is exogenous by explicitly incorporating bilateral bargaining this allows us to determine the price level endogenously and leads to additional insights concerning the role of money for example we find that monetary equilibria are generally inefficient in the sense that output and prices differ from the solution to a social planner s problem although the difference can become small as the discount rate or search friction vanishes we also find that there exist nonstationary inflationary equilibria

chaos in power pakistan s electricity crisis abstract pakistan is facing a severe electricity crisis due to a persistent and widening gap between demand and available system generating capacity the worsening of power shortages has become a major political issue reflecting the hardships for individuals and businesses it threatens to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of government and to further stress the social fabric of the country the power crisis did not emerge suddenly it is the direct result of imprudent and reckless energy policies over the last three decades these policies have impeded the development of cheap and abundant domestic energy sources they have also resulted in very inefficient fuel mix choices compromising energy and economic security pakistan s energy bankruptcy is ultimately due to massive institutional and governance failure this paper analyzes the problems confronting pakistan s electricity sector and identifies the key elements of a potential policy response to address the country s severe power crisis

the multicontract organization this paper starts by discussing some nonstandard issues in organization theory bou nded rationality incomplete contracting and collusive behavior on which the rest of the paper focuses it then contrasts the comprehens ive contracting and game theoretic approaches to collusion and it li sts tentative conclusions and some unresolved issues

energy security and renewable energy policy analysis of pakistan abstract sustainable energy supply is an important factor for continued economic growth of any society pakistan is among those developing countries which are facing severe shortages of energy now a days the current and past governments in the country have designed various energy policies to fulfill energy demands but could not fill the demand supply gap there has been a shortage of about 5000 mw of electrical supply during summer 2016 a policy for development of renewable energy was framed in 2006 which was aimed to supply sustainable energy to all consumers including those households which have not been supplied electricity and natural gas in rural and far flung areas the policy was extended for implementation in 2011 and is still in use the basis of this policy rests on energy security and self sufficiency social equity and economic benefits this study aims at analyzing renewable energy policy of pakistan and examining and finding the ways to secure energy supplies in future using leap four scenarios business as usual green pakistan nuclear and optimization have been developed to assess the validity of the energy plans the study concludes that green pakistan scenario employing renewable energy technologies having minimum operation and externality costs is the most suitable option in future

an institutional framework for the development of sustainable and competitive power market in pakistan abstract pakistan is continuously striving for sustainable and competitive power market under the comprehensive power sector reform program pakistan shifted its power market from monopoly model to single buyer model by unbundling water and power development authority wapda and establishing national transmission and dispatch company ntdc current severe power situation in the country is triggering the government of pakistan gop to accelerate the implementation of intended reform program and to readily undertake next planned transformation i e from single buyer model to wholesale market model this research endeavors the future dynamics of power market after the structural spin off by pre assessment of upcoming wholesale power market market power of both public and private electricity generators has been computed using 8 largest firm concentration ratio herfindahl hirschman index hhi and residual supply index rsi the findings suggest that future power market will function with non existence of market power except in the periods of peak electricity demand and maximum hydro generation furthermore insufficient installed capacities and underutilization of public thermal units may enable some players to exercise market power for sustainable and competitive power market an empirically supported framework has been proposed based on the analysis the framework proposes utilization of huge available renewable energy potential for future which will protect the whole infrastructure from market power it recommends respective roles and responsibilities for the smooth transition among market models the framework will be supportive in terms of successful and smooth transition from single buyer model to wholesale market model and potential of wind solar biogas to be properly explored and utilized to reduce energy gap

the organizational cost of protection abstract this paper offers another explanation for the proposition that protection induces slack it employs a model of a hierarchic firm in which the firm s owner cannot observe the cost type or the effort level of his manager a production subsidy by stimulating output may increase the marginal information rents that have to be paid to the manager for higher effort the resulting increase in the firm s marginal cost of effort leads to reduced managerial effort amplifying the intra firm effort distortion if effort is initially below the optimal level and yielding an organizational cost of protection additional to the standard deadweight cost

to innovate or not to innovate incentives and innovation in hierarchies hierarchical organizations often perform poorly in inducing the adoption of innovations the authors examine a principal offering contracts to agents who make unobservable effort and adoption of innovation choices yielding moral hazard who occupy jobs of differing unobserved productivities yielding adverse selection and who engage in a repeated relationship with the principal causing a ratchet effect to arise increasing the rate of adoption of an innovation in such an organization causes the incentive costs of adoption to increase at an increasing rate relatively low rates of adoption may then be a response to the prohibitive incentive costs of higher adoption rates copyright 1990 by american economic association

might makes rights a theory of the formation and initial distribution of property rights this paper is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the formation and initial distribution of property rights violence is singled out as a major constraint on this formation process its role is explicitly modeled in a choice theoretic framework and some of the implications are tested using data collected from contracts written during the california gold rush of 1848

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

money and asset prices in a cash in advance economy an asset pricing model with money introduced via a cash in advance constraint is presented the monetary velocity is variable hence money demand does not obey the trivial quantity equation the effects of disturbances in output and money growth on real balances the price level and interest rates are examined monetary policy has effects on real asset prices the fisher relation and the premium on nominal bonds are discussed the precise role of the timing of information and transactions for properties of price levels and interest rates are clarified

retrospectives lange and von mises large scale enterprises and the economic case for socialism in the debates over economic calculation launched by ludwig von mises in 1920 and extending well into the 1940s the central issue concerned the ability of a socialist economy to achieve allocative efficiency von mises emphasized that a collectivist state would have great difficulty in gathering and acting on relevant information therefore under socialism even well intentioned bureaucrats would lack a meaningful system of values on which to calculate defenders of socialism such as oskar lange countered that a market socialism could match demand to supply just as well as capitalism and meet the range of static conditions required for pareto optimality that debate is a rich and interesting story that has been told many times before but in all that has been written an important aspect of the original debate has been lost somewhat oddly both the socialists like oskar lange and the advocates of private ownership like von mises and friedrich hayek maintained that they were defending the progressive tendencies of competitive capitalism against the deadening hand of monopoly power this historic paradox deserves consideration if only because it serves to focus attention on our still incomplete theories of large scale enterprises under socialism and capitalism

microfoundations for a stable demand for money function scientific revolutions seldom occur when the prevailing theories appear to be performing well it is only when the accepted theory fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of events that new and more robust theories are proposed of these new theories the one which can explain the successful performance of the previous theory and also the events which led to its demise becomes the replacement so it is in the history of modern monetary economics the failure of the partial adjustment model in the mid s is well documented in the united kingdom and the united states and the search for a replacement has been the main point on the agenda since that time there are many contending theories some of which are advocated by the other contributors to this controversy but the mark of a truly better theory which can be claimed to supersede the partial adjustment model is one that can explain the success and the breakdown of the previous theory as well as the events subsequently central to the argument of this paper is the importance of individual behaviour in the context of a market for monetary assets only by means of careful investigation of the microeconomic behaviour underpinning monetary economics at the individual and the market level can the stability of the money demand function be restored it is the purpose of this paper to suggest that the buffer stock approach has gone further than other approaches in dealing with the fundamental micro foundations of the demand for money it does not suggest that other approaches have no microfoundations but they tend to concentrate exclusively on specific aspects of the micro structure such as separability and ignore others relating to the behaviour of individual optimisers in a monetary market the buffer stock model has firm micro foundations which can explain the events both before and after the breakdown of the partial adjustment model section i provides an historical background to the debate and section ii gives a brief overview of buffer stock models which shows that unlike other approaches they have been able to reconcile the past success of the partial adjustment model with its present failure the nature of the microfoundations of buffer stock models are the source of the success and are discussed in more detail in section iii the final section evaluates the buffer stock approach in the light of the other alternatives

on money as a medium of exchange we analyze economies in which individuals specialize in consumption and production and meet randomly over time in a way that implies that trade must be bilateral and quid pro quo nash equilibria in trading strategies are characterized certain goods emerge endogenously as media of exchange or commodity money depending both on their intrinsic properties and on extrinsic beliefs there are also equilibria with genuine fiat currency circulating as the general medium of exchange we find that equilibria are not generally pareto optimal and that introducing fiat currency into a commodity money economy may unambiguously improve welfare velocity acceptability and liquidity are discussed

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

microfoundations and the demand for money the reader should note that i write this piece in a style that aims to be accessible to that much neglected representative agent the woman on the eurostar train hence unlike the man on the clapham omnibus i assume my intrepid traveller has reasonable knowledge of monetary economics and econometrics but not of the details of the demand for money space constraints force me to indulge in a certain amount of poetic licence but i hope this results in poetic justice there have been many wars fought on this particular battlefield some with almost religious zeal on the theoretical side of the debate we sometimes have the equivalent of religious fundamentalists be they muslims jews christians etc who would dismiss almost any evidence unless it were associated with a strong microtheoretic basis as laid down in the koran talmud or bible the empirical side encompasses agnostics atheists as well as born again econometricians pure theorists inhabit the sunlit uplands while applied economists and policymakers flounder in the muddy plain below occasionally gaining solace from their copy of zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance in general in economics we do not have the luxury of controlled experiments as is the case in the natural sciences what distinguishes good microfoundations from bad and how to weight priors and statistical evidence is subject to much dispute leamer i983 hendry et al i990 as in religion sometimes there is the occasional miracle proclaimed after a suitable interval a new saint may be declared and disciples flock to the new shrine later doubts may arise as to whether a miracle really did occur human behaviour is difficult to explain let alone predict so the search for the equivalent of the holy grail ark of the covenant etc is bound to be arduous in scholarly journals we generally read of the success of the demand for money like diplomats who are sent abroad to lie for the good of their country publication may require applied economists to be somewhat economical with the actualite lovell i983 leamer i983 in this article i want to be as honest as possible about our success and failures in this area the prior information an armchair economist would consider when thinking about the demand for money over the past 40 years in western industrialised countries which have experienced moderate inflation might

gaming against managers in incentive systems experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers we examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in china comparing behavior between i students and managers with field experience with this situation ii standard versus increased monetary incentives and iii sessions conducted in context making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers and those without any such references the dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually and incompletely converging on a pooling equilibrium a fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers with minimal impact on students

an empirical examination of the inventory theoretic model of precautionary money demand abstract this study examines the empirical contents of precautionary demand for transactions money balances panel data are utilized to construct estimates of income variance regression results indicate that income uncertainty has a positive effect on precautionary money demand but the magnitude of the elasticity of income variance falls far short of those suggested by economic theories

energy crisis and potential of solar energy in pakistan abstract energy is the basic need of modern life pakistan is an energy deficient country energy crisis is making bad impacts and destroying the economy the current study investigates the relationship between the energy and demand supply in pakistan the purpose of this research is to evaluate the real reasons behind the current energy crisis we want to find supplementary and alternate energy sources to cut down the load on the national energy mix we select different areas and conduct our research and find the best possible renewable energy sources in this paper we proposed the solution and best available indigenous resource in energy demanding areas

on ensuring the acceptability of a new fiat money currency reforms of the type now being contemplated by some former soviet republics aimed at establishing new fiat monies linked to established currencies through fixed exchange rates carry an inherent danger such reforms may by neglecting certain requirements crucial for ensuring the acceptability of a new currency cause it to be treated by the public as so many bits of paper analyzing this problem serves to highlight some shortcomings of patinkin style walrasian monetary ananlysis which ignores money s character as a social institution and downplays the role of expectations in determining a would be money s acceptability thereby giving support to misguided reform efforts in this respect at least some early non walrasian monetary theories are more enlightening copyright 1994 by ohio state university press

hicks on monetary theory and history money as endogenous money hicks was never tired of saying that monetary theory is in history what he meant was that monetary theory is intrinsically related to real events and more importantly that monetary issues need to be analysed in a dynamic sequential context in which time plays an essential part he went on developing a particular sequential analysis the study of what happens within a single period single period theory and the study of the linkages between a succession of those periods continuation theory it is suggested that this distinction provides a useful lesson for modern endogenous money theorists

a theory of conservatism a free rider problem arises when a group choice between two alternatives has to be made on the basis of privately collected evidence leading to insufficient effort in gathering evidence and an ex ante welfare loss for the group to alleviate the free rider problem the group can commit to a conservative rule whereby the decision is made against the alternative favored by the group s preference or prior when evidence supports it but is not preponderant optimal conservatism increases private incentives to gather evidence and improves the quality of the group decision my result explains why sometimes groups appear overly cautious toward favored alternatives

perspectives on positive political economy this volume serves as an introduction to the field of positive political economy and the economic and political processes with which it is concerned this new research tradition is distinct from both normative and historical approaches to political economy grounded in the rational actor methodology of microeconomics positive political economy is the study of rational decisions in a context of political and economic institutions more analytical than traditional approaches it is concerned with the derivation of principles and propositions against which real world experience may be compared its focus is on empirical regularities and its goal is theoretical explanation the field has focused on three main areas of research models of collective action constraints on competitive market processes and the analysis of transaction costs developments in all of these areas are covered in the book the first part of the volume surveys the field while the second part displays positive political economy at work examining a variety of subjects the final part contains essays by leading political economists on the theoretical foundations of the field

information bureaucracy and economic reforms in china and the soviet union the argument in this essay can be reduced to the following form the better a planning system is in terms of central planning techniques the less likely it is to depart from central planning the author proposes an information approach to explain why china launched economic reforms at a relatively earlier stage of development than did the soviet union the claim is twofold regarding the connections between initiation of reform and information flows in china and in the soviet union first all else being equal a bureaucracy better informed about economic conditions is more likely to pursue realistic economic objectives and its policies are less likely to induce macroeconomic instability to the extent that macroeconomic instability activates a search for alternatives to the status quo including reforms a bureaucracy with better information collection capabilities is less likely to initiate such a search and therefore less likely to initiate reforms second policymakers choose between reforms and the strengthening of central planning as alternative solutions to the status quo the choice of one solution over another depends on their relative costs again all else being equal the higher the costs of strengthening central planning or reform the more likely is reform or strengthening of central planning to be chosen this essay focuses on one aspect of these costs the costs of information provision

making reform work institutions dispositions and the improving health of bangladesh we examine whether local governance can improve social development empirically using good and bad cases of public health outcomes in bangladesh we explore the institutional underpinnings of service provision digging down beneath the rules of the game to analyze the beliefs understandings and dispositions that drive social behavior changes in deep social attitudes led to improvements in social indicators regional variation in health outcomes is explained by the presence or absence of a dense web of relationships that enmeshed reformers in local systems of authority and legitimacy strengthening their actions and making local society more susceptible to change

reputation and hegemonic stability a game theoretic analysis we develop and explicate a game theoretic model in which repeated play incomplete information and reputation are major elements a significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes the model is used to formalize certain aspects of the theory of hegemonic stability it shows that the dilemma or limits of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved unifying both benevolent and coercive strands of hegemony theory an example drawn from recent developments in the organization of petroleum exporting countries shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction we conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information

maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observed this paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long run player whose choice of stage game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents we obtain lower and upper bounds on the long run player s payoff in any nash equilibrium of the game if the long run player s stage game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge as the discount factor tends to 1 to the long run player s stackelberg payoff which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy

pakistan s overall energy potential assessment comparison of lng tapi and ipi gas projects abstract pakistan is facing severe energy crisis in spite of the fact that nature has blessed her with huge energy potential short fall of electricity supply in the country is increasing and has been recorded up to 4522 mw in 2010 this deficit reached to 7000 mw in may 2011 a comprehensive review of pakistan s energy sector is presented in this paper energy potential major issues of energy sector and energy import options are discussed issues like poor management combined cycle capacity low hydro power share circular debt and energy security have been covered energy potential assessment includes hydro solar wind coal nuclear hydrogen cells geo thermal ocean resources and bio mass future prediction calculations are based upon country s current and world s average per capita energy consumption current oil and gas reserves of the country contribute to only 5 percent and 48 8 percent of the energy mix and at the current rate will be exhausted by 13 and 16 years respectively the overwhelming dependence of the energy sector on imported fossil fuels may create a situation of energy security threat however dependence upon the energy import options cannot be avoided in order to lessen the severity of energy crisis in near future some of the energy import options are turkmanistan afghanistan pakistan and india tapi iran pakistan and india ipi gas pipelines liquefied natural gas lng from qatar etc on the other hand exploitation of vast renewable potential like hydro solar and wind requires serious attention exploitation of indigenous coal resources would also be a key for solving energy crisis in the long run in summary this paper presents energy potential assessment in context of major issues future predictions and impact of energy import options this in turn provides a big clear and brighter picture of the country s energy sector

renewable energy sources in power generation in pakistan abstract pakistan as an underdeveloped and populous country requires an uninterrupted source of energy to keep its development on track and provide its citizens with a reasonable standard of living conversely the country is unable to fulfil its domestic energy requirements and is undergoing an acute energy crisis electricity is a sector that has suffered the most from the energy shortages the gap between demand and supply is met through blackouts and at times the country plunges into darkness for more than 10 12 h a day this crisis that the country is currently facing did not occur overnight the root cause of this debacle goes back in history and can be attributed to decades of mismanagement poor planning and negligence this article provides a comprehensive overview of the electricity sector in pakistan and the issues it is beset with in addition an analysis of the energy policies that the country has announced over the years as well as the impact that they have had on the electricity sector is presented it is concluded that pakistan s existing energy mix is not sustainable due to the excessive reliance on imported fossil fuels rising electricity generation cost and increase in power generation related emissions this paper develops a roadmap and proposes the energy sources that can fulfil the country s rising energy requirements whilst being sustainable at the same time the roadmap identifies and highlights the primary tasks that the country must undertake to reach its vision of meeting its energy needs and integrating renewable energy sources in the power generation the recommendations of this paper will provide guidelines to the decision makers and policymakers with an insight on how the energy technology and resource development should be carried out which sources should be given priority and how the issues should be resolved both in the short and long term

how to reform a planned economy lessons from china the countries of eastern europe and the former soviet union have been flooded with advice from the west on how to liberalize their planned econo mies this advice is unfortunately offered in an empirical vacuum no one knows how these econo mies will react to the proposed liberalization meas ures there exists however a neglected source of information china offers a long time series of data over a decade s worth on the effects of reforms on a planned economy china s reforms were gradual but their cumulative effect has been large and they have been remarkably successful china s experiments provide some practical les sons on what kinds of reforms can work elsewhere the dominant school of thought among economists favours the big bang policy of reforming quickly and according to a comprehensive plan partial reforms in this view are useless they will be negated by the remnants of the planning system the proponents of big bang reform have been influential with poland czechoslovakia and rus sia announcing plans for a rapid transition to capi talism