modeling aggregate manufactured exports for some asian newly industrialized economies a central question in studies of the asian newly industrialised economies has been whether the extremely rapid export growth of these countries can be viewed as primarily a phenomenon of income elastic export demand or of fast expanding export supply in the face of highly price elastic demand this paper provides evidence to show that while high income elasticities of export demand are detected using a conventional simultaneous model this may conceal the presence of important product differentiation and product innovation effects on export demand these are then captured using a measure of the total resource base copyright 1995 by mit press

natural resources curse or blessing are natural resources a curse or a blessing the empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible this paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources these include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate deindustrialization and bad growth prospects and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law corruption presidential democracies and underdeveloped financial systems another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries and keeps in place bad policies finally resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets the survey also offers some welfare based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies

a note on national income in a dynamic economy abstract we review the properties of the static measure of changes in economic welfare national income in a dynamic economy it is possible to establish attractive welfare properties by rather simple arguments and this can be estimated from current data its welfare properties are preferable to those of net national product and comparable to those of the state valuation function

peer pressure and partnerships partnerships and profit sharing are often claimed to motivate workers by giving them a share of the pie but in organizations of any significant size the free rider effects would seem to choke off

the introduction of formal insurance and its effect on redistribution abstract transfers motivated by altruism guilt and norms of giving play an important role in supporting individuals who suffer losses due to risk we present empirical evidence from an artefactual field experiment in ethiopia in which we introduce formal insurance in a setting where donors make redistributive transfers to recipients who experience losses we find that donors tend to reduce their transfers to recipients who are offered insurance whether or not they take it up when insurance is rejected by a recipient transfer reductions are larger for donors who firmly expect that the recipient would take up insurance the results are consistent with a framework in which the introduction of insurance erodes norms of giving by revealing differences in the extent to which individuals value precautionary behavior with respect to risk taking welfare calculations show that when formal insurance is introduced the welfare of those who fail to take it up may be reduced

the political obstacles to greater exchange rate flexibility in china summary an undervalued currency has arguably helped china pursue an east asian style export led model of development spurring economic growth and job creation recently however the undervalued exchange rate has exposed china to a raft of growing major financial and economic vulnerabilities including an overheating of the domestic economy and renewed financial sector difficulties despite these risks chinese leaders have refused to significantly revalue the renminbi suggesting that political objectives are taking precedence over economic optimality i aim to glean insight into such political explanations by building upon present theories in political economy

voracious transformation of a common natural resource into productive capital i analyze a power struggle where competing factions have private financial assets and deplete a common stock of natural resources with no private property rights i obtain a feedback nash equilibrium to the dynamic common pool problem and obtain political variants of the hotelling depletion rule and the hartwick saving rule resource prices and depletion occur too fast so substitution away from resources to capital occurs too fast and the saving rate is too high the power struggle boosts output but depresses sustainable consumption genuine saving is nevertheless zero in a fractionalized society world bank estimates may be too optimistic

trust interlinking transactions and credit in the industrial district an essential feature of the industrial district is trust among individuals and firms within it this paper focuses mainly on trust based on investments in building up a good reputation that is a personal capital that can even substitute for collateral in obtaining credit informal credit often linked to other transactions and especially subcontracting is therefore an important way of financing economic development in the industrial district moreover the importance of trust as personal capital gives rise to a double financial intermediation in the industrial district this double intermediation constitutes a device to reduce information problems that are usually responsible for credit rationing c 1994 academic press inc copyright 1994 by oxford university press

social norms and moral hazard the probability of income loss depends on talent and effort effort has positive externalities and therefore individuals are awarded status in proportion to their perceived diligence the social no

symbiosis vs crowding out the interaction of formal and informal credit markets in developing countries abstract it is a common observation in many developing countries that enterprises are active borrowers in both formal and informal credit markets we propose a model in which the formal sector s superior ability in deposit mobilization is traded off against the informational advantage that lenders in the informal sector enjoy the formal sector can screen borrowers by providing only partial financing for projects thereby forcing borrowers to resort to the informal sector for the remainder of the loan we use the model to predict how the market structure responds to changes in the environment and we consider the policy implications of various forms of government intervention

decoupling co2 emissions and industrial growth in china over 1993 2013 the role of investment abstract since industrial sector is a leading energy consumer and co 2 emitter in china the degree of the decoupling of co 2 emissions and industrial growth plays a critical role in realizing the energy conservation and emission reduction goals of china this is the first study to present a specific investigation on the decoupling of co 2 emissions and industrial growth in china from 1993 to 2013 using an extended logarithmic mean divisia index lmdi model focusing on both energy related and process related co 2 emissions and introducing three novel investment factors i e investment scale investment share and investment efficiency we highlight and explore the remarkable role of investment in the mitigation and decoupling of co 2 emissions with industrial growth the results show that china s industrial sector experienced the weak decoupling during 1993 2013 the investment scale is the most important factor responsible for the increase in co 2 emissions and the inhibition of the decoupling the investment efficiency effect has a volatile trend and overall it plays the most significant role in reducing co 2 emissions followed by the energy intensity effect and process carbon intensity effect whereas the energy mix carbon coefficient and investment share have marginal effects among 36 industrial sub sectors the seven factors of rcmcp raw chemical materials and chemical products nmp nonmetal mineral products and spfm smelting and pressing of ferrous metals have significant effects on the decoupling thus the three sub sectors should be among the top concerns for abating co 2 emissions finally we provide policy recommendations considering both conventional and investment factors for china s industrial sector to realize emission reduction targets

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

credit markets in northern nigeria credit as insurance in a rural economy this article addresses the issues of imcomplete markets and imperfect information in the context of credit markets in rural northern nigeria in much recent theoretical literature the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of agrarian institutions in contrast it is found that in the four villages surveyed credit transactions take advantage of the free flow of information within rural communities information asymmetries between borrower and lender are unimportant and their institutional consequences the use of collateral and interlinked contracts are absent credit transactions play a direct role in pooling risk between households through the use of contracts in which the repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random production shocks by both the borrower and the lender

wealth enterprise and credit policy empirical evidence suggests that capital market constraints prevent low wealth individuals from setting up in business this paper shows this finding to be consistent with socially excessive lending and an interest rate tax being welfare improving one feature of the model banks inability to identify entrepreneurial quality leads to excessive bank lending and investment in low return projects the reduction in the probability of bankruptcy lowers the cost of borrowing and eliminates deadweight costs and hence promotes entry if the incentive effects are sufficiently large wealth and the volume of entrepreneurial activity move together a key result of the paper is to show that a market equilibrium in which there is a positive relationship between entry and the level of wealth is consistent with either subsidies to inactivity or taxes on interest raising welfare

releasing constraints to growth or pushing on a string policies and performance of mexican micro firms abstract using firm level data from mexico this paper investigates the firm characteristics associated with participation in credit markets access to training tax payments and membership in business associations we find that firms which participate in these institutions exhibit significantly higher profits moreover firms that borrow from formal or informal sources and those that pay taxes are significantly more likely to stay in business but firms that received credit exhibit lower rates of income growth these results persist when firm characteristics that are arguably correlated with unobserved entrepreneurial ability are controlled for our findings suggest that the significant within country differences in firm productivity observed in developing economies are due in part to market and government failures that limit the ability of micro firms to reach their optimal sizes

the net national product and exhaustible resources the effects of foreign trade abstract it is the widely held view that estimates of national income should be corrected for the value of the extracted exhaustible resource stock this correction implies the counter intuitive result that the national income of an oil producer is unaffected by its vast oil reserves in this paper we review the definition of national income and discuss its relation to national welfare we show that an extra income should be imputed to the resource owning country based on the exportable resource stock part of the net adjustment for resource use is made to the income of the resource using and not the resource producing country

beyond gdp an overview of measurement issues in redefining wealth in the last decades a growing quantity of literature has been written about concepts such as quality of life and well being as a proxy for evaluating societal prosperity and progress this paper analyses the theoretical foundations and the empirical validity of multi dimensional technical tools that can be used for well being measurement there is no doubt that there is a lot of complexity and fuzziness inherent in multi dimensional concepts such as well being a possible reduction of this complexity a pre condition for policy making introduces the problem of the descriptors used indicators and indexes in a multi dimensional framework multi criteria evaluation is a consistent approach for the construction of so called composite indicators often some individual indicators improve while others deteriorate this is the classical conflictual situation dealt with in multi criteria evaluation in particular non compensatory methods are quite relevant since compensability implies complete substitutability between different types of capital uncertainty and sensitivity analysis can estimate the robustness of the results obtained and help the framing of the debate around the conceptual framework used that is which representation of reality and thus which societal values and interests has been considered

moral hazard and nonmarket institutions dysfunctional crowding out or peer monitoring the authors examine a situation in which insurance is characterized by moral hazard when market insurance is provided supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends unobservable to market insurers will occur when nonmarket insurers have no better information than market insurers the mutual assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore dysfunctional alternatively when nonmarket insurers can observe each other s effort perfectly mutual assistance is beneficial these results point to the potential importance of peer monitoring mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard copyright 1991 by american economic association

global welfare comparisons to provide a normative foundation for transfers between dierent economies one needs information on their per capita welfare this paper considers various methods for doing this and reaches the following main conclusions i such global welfare comparisons are more demanding than usually thought ii the ranking of methods diers from that of local e g over time comparisons with real comprehensive per capita nnp being the least impractical method the lesson is that global welfare comparisons should be performed with great care the comparisons must be made in local real prices calculated according to purchasingpower parity where non traded environmental amenities play an important role

the nature of credit market failure abstract hidden knowledge gives rise to over lending if as evidence suggests the returns distributions preferred by borrowers are also favoured by lenders even the stiglitz weiss model yields over lending when entrepreneurs are sufficiently risk averse

the multicontract organization this paper starts by discussing some nonstandard issues in organization theory bou nded rationality incomplete contracting and collusive behavior on which the rest of the paper focuses it then contrasts the comprehens ive contracting and game theoretic approaches to collusion and it li sts tentative conclusions and some unresolved issues

the political economy of monetary institutions in recent decades countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions including alternative exchange rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions emphasizing their role in resolving both the time inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy this first generation work however suffers from a central limitation it studies exchange rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other by contrast the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange rate regime and central bank independence together and in so doing present a second generation of research on the determinants of monetary institutions the articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions investigating how political institutions democratic processes political party competition and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives

tax competition and leviathan abstract attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government this paper synthesises the two extremes which as in other areas of public finance have dominated the debate typically being presented as stark alternatives the view of government as a leviathan from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy makers and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens welfare from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency conditions are derived under which when policy makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self serving tax coordination benefits the representative citizen

the welfare economic theory of green national accounts this paper takes a critical look at the literature on green national accounts the problem studied is to find a linear index of economic variables that responds to perturbations in the same direction as social well being the thesis of a large literature that net national product which is a flow is that index in closed economies is shown in some interpretations to be simply false and in others to suffer from deep estimation problems it is argued that capital depreciation using shadow prices should certainly be included in national accounts but that the right welfare index is a comprehensive measure of wealth defined as the shadow value of an economy s stock of all capital assets it is shown that comprehensive wealth is usable as a criterion for policy evaluation as well as for determining sustainable economic development

is informal risk sharing less effective for the poor risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance abstract poor farm households are less keen to adopt high risk high return technologies than rich households yet the poor are more vulnerable to income shocks we develop a model of endogenous risk taking to explain these facts in autarky poor households adopt less risky production plans and obtain lower expected returns but face higher relative risk than the rich the introduction of risk sharing generates negative risk externalities between agents at the first best the social planner imposes a homogeneous level of risk taking in the group at the second best risk taking is not enforceable and increases with insurance generating moral hazard interestingly the poor s risk taking behavior is more sensitive to insurance the social planner thus mitigates risk taking by applying a lower insurance coverage in poor groups the introduction of risk sharing therefore reinforces the gap between rich and poor in terms of expected income and absolute risk while the effect on relative risk is ambiguous

too much investment a problem of asymmetric information this paper shows that under plausible assumptions the inability of lenders to discover all of the relevant characteristics of borrowers results in investment in excess of the socially efficient level raising the rate of interest above the free market level will restore optimality this conflicts with generally held views and is contrasted with the stiglitz weiss model it is shown that the assumptions which yield overinvestment support debt as the equilibrium method of finance however under the stiglitz weiss assumptions used to derive an underinvestment result equity is shown to be the equilibrium method of finance

comparing augmented sustainability measures for scotland is there a mismatch we estimate and compare two empirical measures of the weak sustainability of an economy for the first time the change in augmented green net national product gnnp and the interest on augmented genuine savings gs yearly calculations are given for each measure for scotland during 1992 1999 augmentation means including using projections to 2020 changed production possibilities enabled by exogenous technical progress or changing oil prices the change in augmented gnnp and the interest on augmented gs are both always positive showing no sustainability problem for scotland then according to the assumptions underlying our weak sustainability calculations however the former greatly exceeds the latter even when macroeconomic fluctuations are taken into account this is a mismatch which poses an unresolved problem with the theory resolving it may require respecifying the utility functions used in mainstream growth theory

a general approach to welfare measurement through national income accounting a framework is developed for analyzing national income accounting using a revealed welfare approach that is sufficiently general to cover both the standard discounted utilitarian and maximin criteria as special cases we show that the basic welfare properties of comprehensive national income accounting previously ascribed only to the discounted utilitarian case extend to this more general framework in particular under a wider range of circumstances it holds that real nnp growth or equivalently a positive value of net investments indicates welfare improvement we illustrate the applicability of our approach in the dasgupta heal solow model of capital accumulation and resource depletion

controlling preferences for lotteries on units of experimental exchange in an experimental setting when outcomes are stochastically related to actions predictions of equilibrium behavior depend not only on the participants preference orderings of outcomes but also on their orderings of lotteries on outcomes as well we introduce and test a reward structure that can be utilized in any experimental setting to allow the experimenter to decree beforehand the subjects preferences for lotteries on experimental outcomes we show analytically that the proposed reward structure can induce subjects to behave as if they have the decreed preference function defined on experimental outcomes empirical tests using two different choice settings provide evidence to support this ability to control preferences

public goods and political institutions trade and monetary policy processes in the united states basic analytic premises are an issue in contemporary debates about the u s foreign economic policy process in dispute are the power structures alleged to govern the formation of american trade and international monetary policy thus the literature supports both of these assumptions the distribution of power is skewed towards private actors in the issue area generally the distribution of power varies according to issue area within the camp of issue specific power structures as i shall discuss in more detail support can be found for almost any assumption about the distribution of power prevailing in the language of current debate between state and society

costly monitoring loan contracts and equilibrium credit rationing this paper develops a model with asymmetrically informed agents and costly monitoring of loan contracts where an equilibrium can exhibit credit rationing borrowers are identical ex ante but some receive loans and others do not in contrast to existing credit rationing theories rationing does not occur here due to inflexible prices adverse selection or moral hazard optimizing behaviour produces a standard debt contract in equilibrium the aggregate quantity of loans and equilibrium interest rates respond differently depending on whether there is rationing in equilibrium

government relief for risk associated with government action a significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government policy government action tax reform deregulation judicial decisions budgetary shifts produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules the effects of government relief compensation grandfathering phase ins on ex ante incentives and risk bearing are examined using a model in which private insurance is available it is demonstrated that government relief is inefficient even when private insurance is subject to moral hazard because relief shields individuals from some of the effects of their actions i introduction a significant source of risk arises from uncertainty concerning future government action government action produces gains and losses for those who invested under preexisting rules government policy with regard to these effects transition policy varies widely full compensation for takings of real property in many jurisdictions partial relief through grandfathering and phase ins for tax reform and deregulation in some instances but not others and no relief for most budgetary shifts and

evaluating projects and assessing sustainable development in imperfect economies we are interested in three related questions 1 how should accounting prices be estimated 2 how should we evaluate policy change in an imperfect economy 3 how can we check whether intergenerational well being will be sustained along a projected economic programme we do not presume that the economy is convex nor do we assume that the government optimizes on behalf of its citizens we show that the same set of accounting prices should be used both for policy evaluation and for assessing whether or not intergenerational welfare along a given economic path will be sustained we also show that a comprehensive measure of wealth computed in terms of the accounting prices can be used as an index for problems 2 and 3 above the remainder of the paper is concerned with rules for estimating the accounting prices of several specific environmental natural resources transacted in a few well known economic institutions

risk adverse selection and capital market failure this paper investigates the implications of adverse selection for capital market equilibrium when borrowers are risk averse k j arrow and r c lind 1970 argue that when capital markets fail to spread risk properly interest rates are too high the market adds a risk premium that the social planner would not this paper shows that when projects differ in quality in a pooling equilibrium the private market sets interest rates too low even accounting for the risk premium hence there is overinvestment the result is shown to be robust to the introduction of moral hazard copyright 1990 by royal economic society

financial contracting under risk neutrality limited liability and ex ante asymmetric information this paper derives equilibrium financial contract forms in a risk neutral capital market with asymmetrically informed borrowers entrepeneurs and investors in doing so the analysis generalizes the work of demeza and webb 1987 by allowing for arbitrary profit distributions arbitrary contract forms and variable investment choices the main result of this inquiry is as follows when higher quality entrepreneurs have better ex post profit distributions in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property equilibrium contracts take a standard debt form so long as admissible investor payoff functions are monotone non decreasing in firm profit without the monotonicity constraint contracts often take a different live or die form

kinship incentives and evolution we analyze how family ties affect incentives with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings the siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty and they may transfer output to each other with equally altruistic siblings their equilibrium effort is non monotonic in the common degree of altruism and it depends on the harshness of the environment we define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship relatedness factor numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment and how this a ects economic outcomes

sustainability in uncertain economies a stochastic growth model with a list of capital assets i e reproducible capital non renewable resources the knowledge base and institutions is studied to evaluate the effects of different sources of uncertainty on sustainability it is also discussed which measure can serve as an index of intergenerational welfare to evaluate sustainable development under uncertainty the aim is to consider a more comprehensive setting than is usually explored in the literature and to generalize arrow dasgupta and maler results to the case of uncertainty

reform and openness why china s economic reforms have delayed democracy most theories that seek to explain democratization look to changes in the economy as the precursor to significant political liberalization locating the main causal factor in either severe economic crisis or rapid economic growth in the chinese context by contrast the communist party has extricated itself from the socialist social contract with the urban working class without losing its grip on political power moreover china has maintained a rapid pace of economic growth for over twenty five years without significant political liberalization comparative analysis of china s post 1978 reform policies yields insights both across types of socialist transition comparing china with eastern europe and russia and across time comparing china with other high growth east asian economies a key factor in china s ability to reform the economy without sacrificing political control is the timing and sequencing of its foreign direct investment fdi liberalization there are two key variables that are important to this comparative analysis china s pattern of ownership diversification and china s mode of integration into the global economy the article relates these two variables to the success of economic change without political liberalization in particular how fdi liberalization has affected relations between workers and the ruling communist party reform and openness in this context resulted in a strengthened chinese state a weakened civil society especially labor and a delay in political liberalization

some evidence on the empirical significance of credit rationing this paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988 while commercial loan rates are sticky consistent with rationing this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory in addition the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing overall the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon

symposium on organizations and economics m t r ost production in modern economies occurs within organizations and this production is regulated only to a limited extent by prices the size of some of the largest organizations like general motors or ibm or att if managers didn t they would be replaced and firms that didn t maximize value wouldn t survive accordingly what went on inside the black box was mere detail the behavior of the firm could be described completely without knowledge of those details

invested interests the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance capital moves more rapidly across national borders now than it has in at least fifty years and perhaps in history this article examines the effects of capital mobility on different groups in national societies and on the politics of economic policymaking it begins by emphasizing that while financial markets are highly integrated within the developed world many investments are still quite specific with respect to firm sector or location it then argues that contemporary levels of international capital mobility have a differential impact on socioeconomic groups over the long run increased capital mobility tends to favor owners of capital over other groups in the shorter run owners and workers in specific sectors in capital exporting countries bear much of the burden of adjusting to increased capital mobility these patterns can be expected to lead to political divisions about whether or not to encourage or increase international capital market integration the article then demonstrates that capital mobility also affects the politics of other economic policies most centrally it shifts debate toward the exchange rate as an intermediate or ultimate policy instrument in this context it tends to pit groups that favor exchange rate stability against groups that are more concerned about national monetary policy autonomy and therefore less concerned about exchange rate stability similarly it tends to drive a wedge between groups that favor an appreciated exchange rate and groups that favor a depreciated one these divisions have important implications for such economic policies as european monetary and currency union the dollar yen exchange rate and international macroeconomic policy coordination