a dynamic analysis of licensing the boomerang effect and grant back clauses this article develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on r d competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant back clauses of particular concern are how the consideration of future competition distorts the licensing relationship and how the grant back clause can mitigate this distortion i also evaluate the validity of the casual antitrust argument that grant back clauses may adversely affect competition because they reduce the licensee s incentive to engage in r d and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets

the structure of licensing contracts industrial organization theory has explored several issues related to licensing but empirical analyses are extremely rare we amass a new and detailed dataset on licensing contracts and use it to present some simple facts concerning licensing behavior our analysis reveals robust cross industries differences in several contractual features such as exclusivity cross licensing ex ante versus ex post technology transfers and licensing to related versus unrelated parties we offer an interpretation of these facts based on cross industry variation in the strength of intellectual property rights

when is foreign aid policy credible aid dependence and conditionality the author studies foreign aid policy within a principal agent framework he shows that one reason for foreign aid s poor overall record may be a moral hazard problem that shapes the aid recipient s incentive to undertake structural reform the model s basic prediction is a two way relationship disbursements of foreign aid are guided in part by the needs of the poor anticipating this recipients have little incentive to improve the welfare of the poor preliminary econometric work shows that the data support this hypothesis in principle conditionality could partly solve this problem but only if the donor can make a binding commitment to increase disbursements in good relative to bad states without such a commitment technology aid disbursements remain guided by the needs of the poor and recipient countries maintain a low effort to reduce poverty contrary to the conventional wisdom found in the aid literature the author shows that the welfare of all parties might be improved by using tied project aid or by delegating part of the aid budget to an international agency with less aversion to poverty

royalties vs fees how do firms pay for foreign technology abstract the theoretical determinants of technology licensing contracts have been extensively studied but empirical evidence is scarce we assemble a data set of all the foreign technology licensing agreements entered into by manufacturing firms in india between 1989 and 1993 industry firm and contract characteristics are used to explain differences between the forms of payment in licensing contracts our findings support theoretical arguments licensing contracts are more likely to use royalties when sales are relatively high while increased volatility of sales and greater profitability favor fixed fee contracts we also find that firms are more likely to use output based payments to control the sale and diffusion of r d or brand intensive know how to unaffiliated firms

intertemporal equilibrium and the transfer paradox the transfer paradox may occur in a world with only two countries at a dynamically stable intertemporal competitive equilibrium in a framework of overlapping generations with production and investment a transfer of income may immiserize the recipient while enriching the donor away from the golden rule a transfer may result in a pareto improvement

durable goods monopolists durable goods monopolists face special problems because the sale of their products creates a secondhand market not controlled by the monopolist to the extent the monopolist is able to rent his product rather than sell it or to make binding promises about his future production such problems are ameliorated given the inability to do the above the monopolist is led to producing goods less durable than those produced by either competitive firms or monopolist returns a reverse averch johnson result that monopolist sellers may invest less in fixed costs including plant modernization and research and development than would the renters is shown it is also shown that even though sellers have less monopoly power than renters and nondurable goods monopolists it is possible that the seller will cause a greater deadweight loss than the other types of monopolies

the licensing of patents under asymmetric information abstract this paper seeks to explain the use of royalty payments rather than fixed fees in the licensing of patents by the presence of asymmetric information the licensee is assumed to know the value of the patent and makes a single offer of a contract to the licensor it is shown that there is a unique equillibrium satisfying cho and kreps intuitive criterion qualitative properties of the equilibrium contract are derived by considering a continuum of types

on the empirics of foreign aid and growth the present paper re examines the effectiveness of foreign aid theoretically and empirically using a standard olg model we show that aid inflows will in general affect long run productivity the size and direction of the impact may depend on policies deep structural characteristics and the size of the inflow the empirical analysis investigates these possibilities overall we find that aid has been effective in spurring growth but the magnitude of the effect depends on climate related circumstances finally we argue that the collier dollar allocation rule should be seriously reconsidered by donor agencies if aid effectiveness is related to climate the usefulness of foreign aid in promoting growth in developing countries has been an area of controversy ever since rosenstein rodan in 1943 advocated for aid to eastern and south eastern europe browsing through successive editions of a leading textbook in development economics provides a telling illustration of how the confidence in aid effectiveness dwindled over the years in the first edition of leading issues in economic development meier 1964 dedicated a full 18 page section to the issue of foreign aid he started out asking how much aid by the time of the sixth edition meier 1995 the treatment of foreign aid had been cut into half and the questions in focus were why official assistance and does aid work in the 2000 edition meier and rauch 2000 foreign aid is not even listed in the index

industrial policy and politics abstract recognizing the uncontrollable nature of the political system in a fine tuning way we derive simple constitutional rules for industrial policies which take into account simultaneously the inefficiencies of the political system and informational asymmetries of regulators we apply this methodology to the regulation of natural monopolies we consider a two type political system with the majority rule we study how the chosen cost reimbursement rules and pricing rules which characterize regulation are affected by constitutional choices such as public ownership or privatization creation of incentives for regulators or not price discrimination or not

risk sharing in licensing abstract this paper studies the design of linear license contracts under demand or cost uncertainty the optimal contract consists in general of a mix of a fixed fee and royalties the source of uncertainty has a crucial impact on the type of royalties that must be used in particular under demand uncertainty at most two of the instruments are used the contract generally combines a fixed fee with an ad valorem royalty when cost is uncertain a wider variety of cases can arise the contract may involve a combination of either type of royalties coupled with a fixed fee alternatively it may be optimal to use all three available instruments

concessions of infrastructure in latin america government led renegotiation this paper analyzes government led renegotiations in infrastructure concession contracts in latin america based on the same sample used in guasch laffont and straub 2003 to examine firm led renegotiations after extending the theoretical framework to a multiple period context in which both pareto improving and rent shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur we develop an original instrumental variable strategy to address the issue of contract endogeneity and derive empirical results while some of the main insights concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes are unchanged significant differences arise with respect to the effect of investment and financing as well as the corruption variables we provide evidence that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism copyright 2007 john wiley sons ltd

aid allocation rules abstract this paper studies an aid allocation rule used by major development agencies and investigates optimal allocations when recipients are neoclassical economies undergoing transition dynamics when recipients face aid absorption constraints allocations that favor poorer recipients are not always optimal contrary to what is assumed in assessments of donor performance the most quantitatively significant factors that determine the optimal sensitivity to recipient characteristics are the generosity of the aid budget and the extent of absorption constraints in neoclassical recipients aid can only accelerate growth where there is already growth so the optimal rule places little weight on growth and optimality is largely a matter of balancing recipient need against absorption constraints

a panel data analysis of the fungibility of foreign aid the donor community has been increasingly concerned that development assistance intended for crucial social and economic sectors might be used directly or indirectly to fund unproductive military and other expenditures the link between foreign aid and public spending is not straightforward because some aid may be fungible this article empirically examines the impact of foreign aid on the recipient s public expenditures using cross country samples of annual observations for 1971 90 for the base sample of 14 developing countries it finds that aid is not fungible at the aggregate level and there is no associated tax relief increasing the number of countries however makes aid fungible moreover results based on the main sample indicate that aid is fungible in three out of five sectors examined developing country governments receiving earmarked concessionary loans for agriculture education and energy reduce their own resources going to these sectors and use them elsewhere only loans to the transport and communication sector are fully spent on the purposes intended by donors because most aid appears to be fungible the rate of return on a specific donor funded project tells little about the impact of that assistance a better approach may be to tie foreign aid to an overall public expenditure program that provides adequate resources to crucial sectors

estimating aid allocation criteria with panel data in 1990 the net amount of economic aid or official development assistance to all recipients from all multilateral and bilateral sources was about 62 billion an amount that exceeded the gdps of greece and portugal despite the size of this yearly transfer there has been no rigors modeling and estimation of the criteria by which it occurs as a result there is little agreement about the extent to which oda is allocated according to the needs of the recipient countries the purpose of this paper is to develop a rigorous theoretical model of oda allocation that can be used to provide consistent estimates of the importance of recipient needs copyright 1994 by royal economic society

licence contracts future exchange clauses and technological competition abstract in an incumbent challenger innovation model this paper examines to what extent licence contracts can internalize the business stealing and common pool externalities occurring in technological competition due to these negative externalities private r d investments are higher than the socially optimal ones licensing of current technology creates a replacement effect for the challenger and thus induces lower research rates special exchange clauses concerning future improvements which are often used in licensing practice partially take care of the common pool externality although the externalities are not internalized completely a grant back clause requiring the licensee to license back improvements to the original licensor can achieve a welfare improvement by reducing the r d investments in some cases below optimal levels if there are no restrictions in setting the ex post licence fee for the improvement socially optimal r d investments can be induced a mutual exchange clause stating that the original licensor must license an improvement to the licensee and vice versa induces social underinvestment in r d

accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials political agency models suggest that elected public officials choose different policies than appointed officials do this paper is the first a to apply a clean empirical design to study whether t

choosing the competition and patent licensing this article examines licensing as a means of choosing the competitors which a patentee monopolist will face in the period after the patent expires the queue of entrants consists of two firms which differ in their relative strengths as competitors for example by size or level of marginal cost by structuring the industry to be composed of weak competitors the incumbent is able to prolong its dominant position in the industry after the patent expires examples are presented in which the evidence suggests that choosing the competition was an important motivation of the licensor s behavior

productive government expenditures and long run growth the purpose of this paper is to review some of the recent developments in endogenous growth models specifically our focus is on the growth effects of productive government spending in dynamic general equilibrium models we use a simple overlapping generations model as our basic framework and illustrate the role of taxes and spending we then examine several related issues nonrivalry in publicly provided goods existence and uniqueness of competitive equilibrium endogenous public policy ways of financing public expenditures composition of publicly provided goods and services and private alternatives finally we review some empirical results related to output elasticity of public capital and educational expenditures

are there negative returns to aid the world bank report assessing aid assumes that an inflow of aid above a certain level starts to have negative effects in this analysis we empirically test this assumption we find evidence for negative returns to aid at high levels of aid inflows however the results are sensitive to both the countries included in the sample and model specification moreover the turning point above which aid starts to have a negative effect on growth seems to be much higher than assumed in the background calculations for assessing aid

incomplete written contracts undescribable states of nature this paper extends the classic two armed bandit problem to a many agent setting in which n players each face the same experimentation problem the difference with the single agent problem is that agents can now learn from the experiments of others thus experiementation produces a public good and a free rider problem in experimentation naturally arises more interestingly future experimentation by others encourages current individual experimentation the paper provides an analysis of the set of markov equilibria in terms of the free rider effect and the encouragement effect

technology transfer under asymmetric information licensing contracts for newly patented innovations are observed to vary along several dimensions including the form and size of the payment to the inventor fixedfee versus some output based royalty the degree of exclusivity and the division of rents in this article we show that theform of the contract can be explained by two problems in technology exchange the superiority of a licensor s precontractual information about the economic value of the innovation and thefact that sharing this information with the licensee mayfacilitate imitation we show that a licensor signals her technology type with an output based payment or royalty and may leave some of the rents with the licensee conditions under which exclusive license contracts linear and nonlinear and nonexclusive linear contracts are used to transfer technology are identified

licensing information goods abstract a significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis patent holders however may face a dynamic problem namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem there are situations however where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent the case of information goods or due to compulsory patenting laws we study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations relative to the existing literature we obtain the following main results i all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation ii royalty licensing may be superior to fixed fee or auction licensing from the licensor s point of view iii social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales iv even for non drastic innovations the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation before the innovation was discovered

aid policies and growth the authors of this paper use a new database on foreign aid to examine the relationships among foreign aid economic policies and growth of per capita gdp in panel growth regressions for 56 developing countries and 6 four year periods 1970 93 they find that the policies that have a great effect on growth are those related to fiscal surplus inflation and trade openness they construct an index for those three policies and have that index interact with foreign aid they have instruments for both aid and aid interacting with policies they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies in the presence of poor policies aid has no positive effect on growth this result is robust in a variety of specifications which include or exclude middle income countries include or exclude outliers and treat policies as exogenous or endogenous they examine the determinants of policy and find no evidence that aid has systematically affected policies either for good or for ill they estimate an aid allocation equation and show that any tendency for aid to reward good policies has been overwhelmed by donors pursuit of their own strategic interests in a counterfactual they reallocate aid reduce the role of donor interests and increasing the importance of policy such a reallocation would have a large positive effect on developing countries growth rates

fee versus royalty licensing in a cournot duopoly model abstract this paper finds that royalty licensing can be superior to fixed fee licensing for the patent holding firm when the cost reducing innovation is non drastic the reason for this result is that the patent holding firm enjoys a cost advantage over the licensee under royalty licensing while the two firms compete on equal footing under fixed fee licensing

planned obsolescence and the r d decision by investing in rd i e the r d choice that maximizes current profitability does not maximize overall profitability the result is that if output is sold rather than rented then in its r d decision the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned obsolescence that lowers its own profitability

can foreign aid accelerate stabilization this paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization following alesina and drazen 1991 we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies since the delay is used to signal each faction s strength the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in the release of information we show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer foreign aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization but aid decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms

determinants of canadian bilateral aid allocations humanitarian commercial or political in this paper we examine the determinants of the allocation of canadian bilateral aid over the period 1984 2000 we draw on models of donor behaviour that allow us to incorporate humanitarian commercial and political considerations the trinity of mixed motives that affect canadian aid we find that allocations are moderately altruistic recipient country human rights and membership in the commonwealth and la francophonie also affect aid flows most strikingly our results suggest that canadian aid flows became less altruistic over this period and commercial motives became increasingly important jel classification h50 o10 les determinants des allocations de l aide humanitaire canadienne humanitaires commerciaux ou politiques ce memoire etudie les determinants de l allocation de l aide bilaterale canadienne dans la periode 1984 2000 on utilise des modeles de comportement de donateur qui permettent de prendre en considerations les motivations humanitaires commerciales et politiques la trinite de motifs mixtes qui affectent l aide canadienne on decouvre que les allocations sont moderement altruistes le fait pour un pays de defendre bien les droits de la personne et d etre membre du commonwealth et de la francophonie affecte les flux d aide plus important peut etre les resultats suggerent qu au cours de cette periode les flux d aide canadienne deviennent moins altruistes et les motifs commerciaux de plus en plus importants

transaction costs institutional design and the separation of powers abstract the internal organization of the government can be used as a constraint on the capture of political decision makers in a setting where multiple interest groups try to influence policy outcomes centralization i e the choice of a single agency dealing with all interest groups is costly because it induces a better coordination of their influences the choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture making agencies more immune to capture by interest groups more generally we discuss how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes

the politics of government decision making a theory of regulatory capture the paper develops an agency theoretic approach to interest group politics and shows the following 1 the organizational response to the possibility of regulatory agency politics is to reduce the stakes interest groups have in regulation 2 the threat of producer protection leads to low powered incentive schemes for regulated firms 3 consumer politics may induce uniform pricing by a multiproduct firm 4 an interest group has more power when its interest lies in inefficient rather than efficient regulation where inefficiency is measured by the degree of informational asymmetry between the regulated industry and the political principal congress

licensing a sequence of innovations it is common for a firm which receives a license for a technology also to obtain as part of the contract a license for future improvements on that technology we derive market structure reasons why such a provision might be used in a two period setting

altruism the samaritan s dilemma and government transfer policy this paper shows that altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor the framework is one in which there are rich altruists and risk averse poor who face some possibility of loss the government represents the rich and makes transfers on their behalf with unconditional transfers the poor may forgo insurance and rely on private charity to bail them out in the event of loss this reliance on private charity has adverse efficiency effects these may be avoided if the government makes in kind transfers of insurance copyright 1995 by american economic association

how strong are weak patents economists usually conceive of patents as property rights that prevent others from practicing the patenting technology unless they first obtain a license from the patent holder even for ironclad patents i e for patents that are certain to be valid the existing literature has shown that the analysis of equilibrium licensing contracts is surprising subtle and complex 1 for example the analysis is quite different depending upon whether one firm s licensing contract is observable to the other firms likewise equilibrium outcomes are quite different if royalties must be linear than in the case where two part tariffs and other non linear royalties are permitted in that literature a downstream firm that refuses to sign a contract with the upstream supplier either exits the industry in the case that the upstream supplier controls an essential input or must rely on more costly inputs in the case of a non essential input in other words the downstream firm s threat point is to use some backstop technology in practice however patents are issued after a brief examination by the patent office to see if they meet the statutory requirements for novelty and non obviousness mounting evidence indicates that many weak patents i e patents unlikely to be found valid if challenged in court are issued by the u s patent and trademark office uspto 2 some observers view this with great alarm arguing that uspto is handing out undeserved monopolies others by contrast have suggested that these weak patents are of little concern because they will have little commercial impact because they will be licensed at commensurately low royalty rates or not enforced at all we study the commercial impact of weak patents more precisely we define a patent s strength as the probability that it will be found valid if challenged in court and we examine the relationship between a patent s strength and the royalties that it can command the distinctive

learning by doing and the dutch disease this paper develops a model of learning by doing and the dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways first it is assumed that both the traded and the non traded sector can contribute to learning second it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors it is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run due to a shift in the steady state relative productivity between the traded and the non traded sector in contrast to standard models of the dutch disease production and productivity in both sectors may go up or down the conditions for the different cases are worked out

donor policy rules and aid effectiveness abstract the present paper examines the macroeconomic impact of aid by introducing endogenous aid allocations into a neoclassical growth framework on this basis it is shown that donor policies can have important implications for the trajectory of recipients gdp per capita depending on specific donor policy choices aid disbursements may lead to faster transitional growth stagnation or cyclical growth moreover the analysis also suggests that donor policies may be part of the reason why foreign aid is not found to be uniformly effective in raising long run productivity across recipients

technology transfer with moral hazard abstract this paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship that is susceptible to the moral hazard problem the optimal contractual form of licensing derived in the model generates predictions that seem to be consistent with actual practice for instance the introduction of inputs that are not contractible and costly explains the prevalence of royalty contracts in the licensing relationship moreover the model is able to relate the size of the royalty rate to the parameters that represent the environments under which the concerned parties operate finally the model can be naturally extended to analyze the choice of a technology holder between direct investment and licensing in an attempt to serve a foreign market

the importance of bequests and life cycle saving in capital accumulation a new answer as the workhorse of consumption and saving research for the past four decades the life cycle model has proved flexible and useful for examining a variety of questions in a classic paper albert ando and franco modigliani 1963 p 56 stated a key assumption of the basic model t he individual neither expects to receive nor desires to leave any inheritance although the authors contended that the absence of a bequest motive was not critical to the heart of their results the assumption set off a long standing battle over the relative importance of different motives for saving in an influential study laurence kotlikoff and laurence summers 1981 estimated that a large fraction of the u s capital stock was attributable to intergenerational transfers modigliani and his collaborators vigorously disagreed and based on their own empirical work claimed that life cycle saving was the primary source of capital accumulation modigliani 1988 subsequent work has failed to reach a consensus since this debate began an important advance in the consumption literature has been the incorporation of uncertainty in life cycle models see e g r glenn hubbard et al 1995 we argue that allowing for uncertainty resolves the controversy over the importance of life cycle and bequest saving by showing that these motives for saving are overlapping and cannot generally be distinguished a dollar saved today simultaneously serves both a precautionary life cycle function guarding against future contingencies such as health shocks or other emergencies and a bequest function because in the likely event that the dollar is not absorbed by these contingencies it will be available to bequeath to children or other worthy causes under this view households have a bequest motive but bequests are given i e the motive is operative in only some states of the world wealth is something like traveler s checks you take them along on vacation just in case but odds are they will remain uncashed and available for sundry goods after the journey is complete we first demonstrate the result using a simple model and then argue that this approach reconciles the apparent importance of bequests with households declared focus on life cycle saving finally we consider implications of our analysis

on aid growth and good policies this study provides a critical analysis of the growth regressions in burnside and dollar 2000 first we analyse the relationship between aid and government expenditure in a modified neo classical growth model one of the main results of the analysis is that while good policies spur growths they may at the same time reduce the effectiveness of foreign aid second we show that the econometric results in burnside and dollar emphasising the crucial role of interaction between aid and good policies in the growth process are fragile as they are extremely data dependent finally we demonstrate that the burnside and dollar data lend support to the idea that the association between aid and growth can be approximated by decreasing returns to aid this finding conforms well to regression results in other recent studies

welfare reducing licensing abstract in this paper we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two part tariff contracts a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty reduces social welfare we show that it occurs if i the firms compete in prices ii the innovation is large enough but not drastic and iii the goods are close enough substitutes moreover we show that regardless of the type of competition first the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and second even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous

fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent we compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n 1 players the inventor and the n firms in this game the inventor acts as a stackelberg leader and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies it is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers only a drastic innovation is licensed to a single producer

on licensing policies in bertrand competition abstract three licensing policies the auction the fee and the royalty are studied in a bertrand type duopoly with differentiated goods the analysis is conducted in terms of a multistage noncooperative game involving an external patentee and two firms each producing a differentiated good in bertrand price competition a principal finding is that for a patentee the royalty may be superior to the other two policies journal of economic literature classification numbers 026 611 621

how to license intangible property we examine the optimal licensing strategy of a research lab selling to firms who are product market competitors we consider an independent lab as well as a research joint venture we show that 1 demands are interdependent and hence the standard price mechanism is not the profit maximizing licensing strategy 2 the seller s incentives to develop the innovation may be excessive 3 the seller s incentives to disseminate the innovation typically are too low 4 larger ventures are less likely to develop the innovation and more likely to restrict its dissemination in those cases where development occurs and 5 a downstream firm that is not a member of the research venture is worse off as a result of the innovation

aid policies and growth comment in an extraordinarily influential paper craig burnside and david dollar 2000 p 847 find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies this finding has enormous policy implications the burnside and dollar 2000 henceforth bd result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid if aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies this suggests that 1 aid can promote economic growth and 2 it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies international aid agencies public policy makers and the press quickly recognized the importance of the bd findings this paper reassesses the links between aid policy and growth using more data the bd data end in 1993 we reconstruct the bd database from original sources and thus 1 add additional countries and observations to the bd data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses and 2 extend the data through 1997 thus using the bd methodology we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies given our focus on retesting bd we do not summarize the vast pre bd literature on aid and growth we just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth and disagreements over econometric specification see gustav f papanek 1972 robert cassen 1986 paul mosley et al 1987 peter boone 1994 1996 and henrik hansen and finn tarp s 2000 review since bd found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results including paul collier and jan dehn 2001 carljohan dalgaard and hansen 2001 patrick guillaumont and lisa chauvet 2001 hansen and tarp 2001 robert lensink and howard white 2001 and collier and dollar 2002 these papers conduct useful variations and extensions some of which had already figured in the pre bd literature such as introducing additional control variables using nonlinear specifications etc some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables this literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample we differentiate our paper from these others by not deviating from the bd specification thus we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations but instead maintain the bd methodology this paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to bd thus we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997 easterly department of economics new york university 269 mercer street new york ny 10003 center for global development and national bureau of economic research e mail william easterly nyu edu levine department of finance carlson school of management university of minnesota 321 19th avenue south minneapolis mn 55455 and national bureau of economic research e mail rlevine csom umn edu roodman center for global development 1776 massachusetts avenue nw washington dc 20036 e mail droodman cgdev org we are grateful to craig burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper thanks also to francis ng and prarthna dayal for generous assistance with updating the sachs warner openness variable and to three anonymous referees craig burnside and henrik hansen for helpful comments 1 see for instance the world bank 1994 2001 2002 the u k department for international development 2000 president george w bush s speech march 16 2002 the announcement by the white house on creating the millennium challenge corporation white house 2002 as well as a washington post editorial february 9 2002 a financial times column by alan beattie march 11 2002 and the economist march 16 2002

contracting for tacit knowledge the provision of technical services in technology licensing contracts abstract recent research on the economic payoff from new technology has emphasized the importance of tacit knowledge or know how this paper shows that arm s length contract can overcome the problems in contracting for know how by bundling complementary inputs with know how in a technology package and leveraging the superior enforceability of contracts over the latter in the empirical part of this paper the relationship between bundling and transfer of know how is analyzed using indian data the results imply that tied sales of inputs may increase the efficiency of contracts involving the transfer of know how a striking result in the context of the current north south debates on intellectual property rights is the packaging of patents with know how

general licensing schemes for a cost reducing innovation optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost reducing innovation in a cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators it is shown that for any nondrastic innovation a the license is practically sold to all firms ensuring full diffusion of the innovation b consumers are better off firms are worse off and the social welfare is improved c the optimal licensing policy involves positive royalty for relatively significant innovations d compared to an incumbent firm an outsider invests more in r d and has higher incentive to innovate and e as a function of the magnitude of the innovation the industry size that provides the highest incentive to innovate is u shaped

on the duration of technology licensing abstract we model an innovator s choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi period licensing game with potential future innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer we find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more profitable than fixed fee licensing even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion moreover licensing contracts based on royalty have a longer duration than fixed fee licenses and are more likely to be used in industries where innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is weak our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing and the theory of durable goods

politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid abstract critics of foreign aid programs have long argued that poverty reflects government failure in this paper i test predictions for aid effectiveness based on an analytical framework that relates aid effectiveness to political regimes i find that aid does not significantly increase investment nor benefit the poor as measured by improvements in human development indicators but it does increase the size of government the impact of aid does not vary according to whether recipient governments are liberal democratic or highly repressive but liberal political regimes and democracies ceteris paribus have on average 30 lower infant mortality than the least free regimes this may be due to greater empowerment of the poor under liberal regimes even though the political elite continues to receive the benefits of aid programs an implication is that short term aid targeted to support new liberal regimes may be a more successful means of reducing poverty than current programs

foreign aid and economic growth the role of flexible labor supply this paper examines the link between foreign aid economic growth and welfare in a small open economy external transfers impinge on the recipient s macroeconomic performance by affecting resource allocation decisions and relative prices the endogeneity of the labor leisure choice plays a crucial role in the propagation of foreign aid shocks the efficacy of foreign aid also depends on externalities associated with the public good that it helps finance the impact of tied and untied aid on the recipient government s intertemporal fiscal balance is examined finally the transitional adjustment to a foreign aid shock is shown to be sensitive to the elasticity of substitution in production and the relative importance of the labor leisure choice in utility

aid and growth what does the cross country evidence really show abstract we examine the effects of aid on growth in cross sectional and panel data after correcting for the possible bias that poorer or stronger growth may draw aid contributions to recipient co

aid and growth regressions this paper examines the relationship between foreign aid and growth in real gdp per capita as it emerges from simple augmentations of popular cross country growth specifications it is shown that aid in all likelihood increases the growth rate and this result is not conditional on good policy there are however decreasing returns to aid and the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of estimator and the set of control variables when investment and human capital are controlled for no positive effect of aid is found yet aid continues to impact on growth via investment we conclude by stressing the need for more theoretical work before this kind of cross country regressions are used for policy purposes

do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds often support corrupt governments and inefficient bureaucracies supporters argue that foreign aid can be used to reward good governments this paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments receive more foreign aid on the contrary according to some measures of corruption more corrupt governments receive more aid also we could not find any evidence that an increase in foreign aid reduces corruption in summary the answer to the question posed in the title is no

patents vs trade secrets knowledge licensing and spillover we develop a model of two stage cumulative research and development rd yet the contracting parties choose the closed sale whenever the interim knowledge is more valuable and leakage is sufficiently high if the extent of leakage is lower more rus choose open sales generating a nonmonotonic relationship between the strength of intellectual property rights and aggregate r d expenditures and the overall likelihood of development by either du jel d23 o32 o34

cross country evidence on the link between volatility and growth this paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations in a sample of ninety two countries as well as a sample of oecd countries the authors find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth the addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship the authors also find that government spending induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time and country fixed effects copyright 1995 by american economic association

public policies pressure groups and dead weight costs abstract this paper presents a model of competition among special interest groups for political influence each active group exerts pressure to affect its taxes and subsidies where activities of different groups are related by the equality between total tax collections and total tax subsidies the dead weight costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies play a major role in our model an increase in the dead weight cost of taxation encourages pressure by taxpayers while an increase in the dead weight costs of subsidies discourages pressure by recipients various applications of the analysis are discussed