international coordination of trade and domestic policies the past half century has seen a dramatic multilateral reduction in tariff barriers under general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt negotiations however as tariff barriers have fallen attention has shifted to the use of domestic policies as secondary trade barriers a primary concern is that as countries sign trade agreements that constrain their ability to pursue trade goals through trade policy there will be unilateral incentives for governments to distort their domestic policies as a secondary means of protection 1 increasingly international trade disputes revolve around a country s use of internal regulations as a means of restricting trade the united states has successfully challenged the system of liquor taxes in both japan and korea as discriminating against imported liquor while venezuela and brazil have challenged american standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline as trade protection masquerading as environmentalism gatt contains several articles concerning the international regulation of domestic policies but the question of how to fully incorporate domestic policies within gatt negotiations and other international trade agreements remains contentious indeed at both the ministerial meeting in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round and the recent unsuccessful ministerial conference in seattle many gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies e g environmental policy labor standards or competition policy to be examined despite the importance that has recently been placed on international cooperation over domestic policies no theoretical basis exists for considering how to cooperate over both trade and domestic policies within an international agreement previous papers on negotiation over two instruments of protection e g copeland 1989 1990 thomas l hungerford 1991 have assumed asymmetric limitations on cooperation i e they assume that one of the two instruments is either nonobservable or nonnegotiable this paper extends such work by investigating cooperation over two negotiable instruments of protection under symmetric limitations on cooperation and provides insight into the design of international trade agreements that incorporate cooperation over domestic policies i adopt the view that enforcement issues are central to the understanding of international cooperation one of the challenges of international cooperation is the absence of a central authority to enforce the terms of an agreement without access to an external enforcement mechanism international agreements are viable only as long as member countries view continued cooperation to be in their own self interest i e the benefits from cooperating outweigh the potential gains from cheating 2 while the gatt department of economics university of miami p o box 248126 coral gables fl 33124 e mail ederington miami edu i would like to thank bob staiger bob baldwin wolfgang keller phillip mccalman jenny minier seminar participants at the nber conference on trade the environment and natural resources and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper any remaining errors are of course my own for example brian r copeland 1990 examined negotiation over one trade barrier leaving a secondary trade barrier e g nontariff barriers domestic legislation etc to be set noncooperatively he shows that trade liberalization will induce substitution toward the less efficient nonnegotiable instrument of protection due to the unilateral incentives to maintain trade protection facing countries thus within a cooperative framework the two types of barriers serve as imperfect substitutes for each other 2 as stated by kenneth w dam in his review of the gatt institution the best guarantee that a commitment of any kind will be kept particularly in an international setting where courts are of limited importance and even more important marshals and jails are nonexistent is that the parties continue to view adherence to their agreement in their mutual interest thus the gatt system unlike most legal systems is not designed to exclude self help in the form of retaliation rather retaliation subjected to established procedures and kept within prescribed bounds is made the heart of the gatt system dam 1970 pp 80 81

nonlinear pricing to produce information we investigate the firm s dynamic nonlinear pricing problem when facing consumers whose tastes vary according to a scalar index we relax the standard assumption that the firm knows the distribution of this index in general the firm should determine its marginal price schedule as if it were myopic and produce information by lowering the price schedule bunching consumers at positive purchase levels should be avoided as a special case we also consider a market characterized by homogeneous consumers with a static but unknown demand curve we show that when there are repeat purchases the forward looking firm should tend towards penetration pricing otherwise its strategy should tend towards skimming we extend our insights to more general settings and discuss implications for pricing product lines

evaluating jointly constrained order quantity complexities for incremental discounts abstract in this paper we consider the purchasing decisions facing a buying firm which receives incrementally discounted price schedules for a group of items in the presence of constraints such as budgets and space limitations the constraints take the form of upper bounds on positively weighted linear combinations of order size dollar volume unit price and order frequency we adapt the solution procedures from an earlier paper naval res logis 40 2 1993 255 to treat this case the results show that simultaneous order quantities for multiple items offered with separate incremental discounts and subject to joint resource constraints can be calculated efficiently using a combination of lagrangean relaxation and as needed partial enumeration this problem proved to be no more and no less tractable than its counterpart with all units discounts

the role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation the world trade organization wfo lacks the power to directly enforce agreements it is therefore important to understand what role the wto can play to facilitate international cooperation and whether a multilateral institution can offer distinct advantages over a web of bilateral agreements this paper examines two potential benefits of a multilateral trade institution first verifying violations of the agreements and informing third parties thus facilitating multilateral reputation mechanisms second promoting multilateral trade negotiations rather than a web of bilateral negotiations the model suggests that a multilateral approach is particularly important when there are strong imbalances in bilateral trading relationships

self enforcing trade agreements and lobbying abstract in an environment where international trade agreements must be enforced via promises of future cooperation the presence of an import competing lobby has important implications for optimal punishments when lobbies work to disrupt trade agreements a nash reversion punishment scheme must balance two conflicting objectives longer punishments help to enforce cooperation by increasing the government s costs of defecting but because the lobby prefers the punishment outcome this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it political pressure to break the agreement thus the model generates an optimal length for nash reversion punishments and it depends directly on the political influence of the lobbies trade agreement tariffs are shown to be increasing in the political influence of the lobbies as well as their patience levels

enforcing international trade agreements with imperfect private monitoring to analyse the role that the world trade organization wto plays in enforcing international trade agreements this paper first explores what countries can achieve alone by characterizing optimal private trigger strategies pts under which each country triggers a punishment phase by imposing an explicit tariff based on privately observed imperfect signals of the other country s concealed trade barriers it identifies the condition under which countries can restrain the use of concealed barriers based on pts and establishes that countries will not reduce the cooperative protection level to its minimum attainable level under the optimal pts this paper then considers third party trigger strategies tts under which the wto allows each country to initiate a punishment phase based on the wto s judgement about potential violations by comparing the optimal pts and optimal tts it demonstrates that the wto facilitates a better cooperative equilibrium by changing the nature of punishment triggering signals from private to public which in turn enables countries to use a more efficient punishment such as an asymmetric and a minimum punishment

competitive nonlinear tariffs abstract this paper generalizes the study of nonlinear tariffs i e those depending nonlinearly on the quantity purchased to the case of a symmetric oligopoly competitive equilibria and the corresponding tariffs are analyzed in a cournot framework various equilibria are obtained which depend both upon the number of competing suppliers and the choice of market parameters used to characterize the competitors strategies buyers are classified by type each selecting an optimal consumption level in response to the prevailing tariff the phenomena of buyer self selection found in monopoly nonlinear pricing and the scaling of equilibrium demand elasticity found in cournot models both appear in the results

discriminatory tariffs and international negotiations abstract recent research has highlighted the efficiency of the mfn principle within the gatt wto structure this paper analyzes the exception made to mfn within article xxiii that allows discriminatory punishment for deviations from the agreement we argue that in the absence of collusion the mfn exception reduces the severity of punishment and thus lowers the level of cooperation that can be achieved by the agreement however discriminatory punishment may still be beneficial as we show that it reduces the problems associated with the potential for renegotiation during the punishment phase finally we argue that our results are also applicable to the question of whether to use trade policy sanctions as a means of enforcing agreements covering domestic policies

please or squeeze brand performance implications of constrained and unconstrained multi item promotions existing research on price promotions typically investigates the effects of single product promotions however brand managers often promote multiple items simultaneously to bolster the performance of a complete brand line this paper investigates the brand performance implications of such multi item promotions we distinguish between two types of multi item promotions traditional unconstrained multi item promotions that grant a discount irrespective of the size or composition of the purchase set and constrained multi item promotions that require consumers to purchase specific quantities self bundling or even predetermined combinations fixed bundling of promoted items using a normative consumer decision model the authors analyze the relative effectiveness of these promotions in terms of unit sales and revenue impact and show that promotion performance is moderated by consumers preference for variety the authors find that unconstrained multi item promotions outperform single item promotions especially in markets without variety seeking in markets with variety seeking unconstrained multi item promotions are not as effective in stealing extra sales from competition because consumers prefer to spread their purchases across all items including competitive ones however in those markets self bundling promotions are particularly effective because they force consumers to adopt larger amounts of the promoted items at the expense of competitors finally in neither type of market does fixed bundling substantially improve promotion performance

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

a classification of literature on determining the lot size under quantity discounts abstract determining a lot size in the presence of either all units or incremental discounts has represented one of major interests of materials managers it is a common practice that the suppliers offer quantity discount to entice the buyers to purchase more and to achieve economies of scale for transportation and processing costs this paper will classify the literature on lot sizing determination under several types of discount schemes and discuss some of the significant literature in this area over two decades also some future research areas have been identified

nonlinear pricing in markets with interdependent demand this paper provides a mathematical framework for modeling demand and determining optimal price schedules in markets which have demand externalities and can sustain nonlinear pricing these fundamental economic concepts appear in the marketplace in the form of mutual buyers benefits and quantity discounts the theory addressing these aspects is relevant to a wide variety of goods and services examples include tariffs for electronic communications services pricing of franchises and royalty fees for copyrighted material and patents this paper builds on several previous results from microeconomics and extends nonlinear pricing to markets with demand externalities the implications of this price structure are compared to results obtained for flat rates and two part tariffs in a similar context a case study is described in which the results were applied to planning the startup of a new electronic communications service

consumption self control by rationing purchase quantities of virtue and vice consumers attempts to control their unwanted consumption impulses influence many everyday purchases with broad implications for marketers pricing policies addressing theoreticians and practitioners alike this paper uses multiple empirical methods to show that consumers voluntarily and strategically ration their purchase quantities of goods that are likely to be consumed on impulse and that therefore may pose self control problems for example many regular smokers buy their cigarettes by the pack although they could easily afford to buy 10 pack cartons these smokers knowingly forgo sizable per unit savings from quantity discounts which they could realize if they bought cartons by rationing their purchase quantities they also self impose additional transactions costs on marginal consumption which makes excessive smoking overly difficult and costly such strategic self imposition of constraints is intuitively appealing yet theoretically problematic the marketing literature lacks operationalizations and empirical tests of such consumption self control strategies and of their managerial implications this paper provides experimental evidence of the operation of consumer self control and empirically illustrates its direct implications for the pricing of consumer goods moreover the paper develops a conceptual framework for the design of empirical tests of such self imposed constraints on consumption in consumer goods markets within matched pairs of products we distinguish relative virtue and vice goods whose preference ordering changes with whet her consumers evaluate immediate or delayed consumption consequences for example ignoring long term health effects many smokers prefer regular relative vice to light relative virtue cigarettes because they prefer the taste of the former however ignoring these short term taste differences the same smokers prefer light to regular cigarettes when they consider the long term health effects of smoking these preference orders can lead to dynamically inconsistent consumption choices by consumers whose tradeoffs between the immediate and delayed consequences of consumption depend on the time lag between purchase and consumption this creates a potential self control problem because these consumers will be tempted to over consume the vices they have in stock at home purchase quantity rationing helps them solve the self control problem by limiting their stock and hence their consumption opportunities such rationing implies that per purchase occasion vice consumers will be less likely than virtue consumers to buy larger quantities in response to unit price reductions such as quantity discounts we first test this prediction in two laboratory experiments we then examine the external validity of the results at the retail level with a field survey of quantity discounts and with a scanner data analysis of chain wide store level demand across a variety of different pairs of matched vice regular and virtue reduced fat calorie or caffeine etc product categories the analyses of these experimental field and scanner data provide strong convergent evidence of a characteristic crossover in demand schedules for relative vices and virtues for categories as diverse as among others potato chips chocolate chip cookies cream cheese beer soft drinks ice cream and frozen yogurt chewing gum coffee and beef andturkey bologna vice consumers demand increases less in response to price reductions than virtue consumers demand although their preferences are not generally weaker for vices than for virtues constraints on vice purchases are self imposed and strategic rather than driven by simple preferences we suggest that rationing their vice inventories at the point of purchase allows consumers to limit subsequent consumption as a result of purchase quantity rationing however vice buyers forgo savings from price reductions through quantity discounts effectively paying price premiums for the opportunity to engage in self control thus purchase quantity rationing vice consumers are relatively price in sensitive from a managerial and public policy perspective our findings should offer marketing practitioners in many consumer goods industries new opportunities to increase profits through segmentation and price discrimination based on consumer self control they can charge premium prices for small sizes of vices relative to the corresponding quantity discounts for virtues virtue consumers on the other hand will buy larger amounts even when quantity discounts are relatively shallow a key conceptual contribution of this paper lies in showing how marketing researchers can investigate a whole class of strategic self constraining consumer behaviors empirically moreover this research is the first to extend previous theoretical work on impulse control by empirically demonstrating its broader implications for marketing decision making

quantity discounts under demand uncertainty to motivate buyers to increase their order quantity suppliers often rely on a well established and widely used approach they offer quantity discounts this practice is in large part driven to obtain improved economies in transportation through higher truckload utilization recently transportation rates which are increasing faster than other costs have become a larger portion of total net landed cost placing the traditional quantity discount practices under scrutiny many suppliers are left perplexed as to why their approach is not effective anymore and some are even concerned that their overall profits may have actually decreased due to their discount parameters in this paper we study a multiperiod model with a buyer facing stochastic end item demand and a supplier offering an all units quantity discount to him to understand better the dynamics of such systems we provide guidelines and insights on how to set effective discount parameters and when not to expect much from them we derive the opt

an approach for developing an optimal discount pricing policy this paper addresses the problem of why and how a seller should develop a discount pricing structure even if such a pricing structure does not alter ultimate demand the situation modeled is most appropriate where the seller s product does not represent a major component of the buyer s final product where the demand for the product is derived or where the price is only one of many factors considered in making a purchase decision a model of buyer reaction to any given pricing scheme is developed to show that there exists a unified pricing policy which motivates the buyer to increase its ordering quantity per order thereby reducing the joint buyer and seller ordering and holding costs as a result the seller is able to reduce its costs while leaving the buyer no worse off and often better off the model is extended to handle variable ordering and shipping costs and situations where the seller faces numerous groups of buyers each having different ordering policies finally a case study is presented explicitly showing how the proposed pricing policy can be applied to the situation of a large seller selling to a number of different buyer groups

coalition formation problem for sourcing contract design in supply networks abstract this article studies a coalition formation problem for cooperative replenishment with a single supplier and multiple firms we consider that a vertical cooperation between the supplier and the set of firms is already set using periodic individual contracts and we investigate the profitability of a horizontal cooperation between firms when designing collaborative contracts given the significant savings that can be realized thanks to horizontal collaboration the main interest of the potential collaborating firms is to figure out how the collaborating group should be formed and how stable alliances and coalitions should be generated in this article the two questions are studied in two business situations focusing either on the collaboration opportunities in the ordering or the transportation process in each collaborative situation a decision making approach is applied to assess the expected profitability of each firm and to determine if firms should form coalitions to maximize their profits an exact solution method based on a game theoretic approach is developed called cooperative replenishment algorithm cra which generates core stable coalitions for cost savings regarding all partner standpoints an analytical study of stability conditions regarding the ordering and transportation cost structures were performed to enhance the cra resolution procedure extensive experiments based on realistic instances are provided to validate the performance of the cra proposed in terms of solution stability and convergence the computational results also confirm the potential benefit of horizontal collaboration between firms in terms of profit maximization compared to the stand alone situation

heuristics for sourcing from multiple suppliers with alternative quantity discounts in this paper we analyze the impact of supplier pricing schemes and supplier capacity limitations on the optimal sourcing policy for a single firm we consider the situation where the total quantity to be procured for a single period is known by the firm and communicated to the supplier set in response to this communication each supplier quotes a price and a capacity limit in terms of a maximum quantity that can be supplied to the buyer based on this information the buyer makes a quantity allocation decision among the suppliers and corresponding to this decision is the choice of a subset of suppliers who will receive an order based on industry observations a variety of supplier pricing schemes from the constituent group of suppliers are analyzed including linear discounts incremental units discounts and all units discounts given the complexity of the optimization problem for certain types of pricing schemes heuristic solution methodologies are developed to identify a quantity allocation decision for the firm through an extensive computational comparison we find that these heuristics generate near optimal solutions very quickly data from a major office products retailer is used to illustrate the resulting sourcing strategies given different pricing schemes and capacity limitations of suppliers in this industry we find for the case of capacity constrained suppliers the optimal quantity allocations for two complex pricing schemes linear discount and incremental units discount are such that at most one selected supplier will receive an order quantity that is less than its capacity

on the role of retaliation in trade agreements this paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements it shows that in the presence of private information retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments in particular it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium we argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms of trade externalities within the current world trading system though in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal the model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies

gradualism in free trade agreements a theoretical justification a notable feature of many recent trade agreements is the gradual rather than immediate reduction of trade barriers in this paper we model trade liberalization as a cooperative relationship that evolves gradually in a non cooperative environment we show that specialization capacity irreversibility and the development of trade partner specific capital increase the benefit of continuing the liberalizing relationship and decrease over time the lowest obtainable self enforcing tariff by increasing the penalty of future defection sunk costs ensure that the self enforcing trading relationship starts slowly but once in progress the level of cooperation continues to improve

does hidden information make trade liberalization more fragile this paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements in the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeoff between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges it is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring in that case cooperation will break down in finite time and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied indefinitely ce memoire etudie l impact de l information cachee sur l interaction strategique dans le contexte des accords de commerce quand il y a asymetrie de l information il est possible qu emerge une relation d equivalence entre la liberalisation et la viabilite de la cooperation on montre qu il peut etre optimal de s entendre sur un degre de liberalisation associea une probabilite ex ante strictement positive qu une deviation va se produire dans ce cas la cooperation va s effriter dans une periode finie et le degre optimal de liberalisation ne tient pas indefiniment

optimal nonuniform prices we consider optimal nonuniform pricing schedules where the price depends upon the amount purchased such schedules are regularly used by public utilities and other services welfare optimal nonuniform prices are related to the theory of optimal uniform prices developed by ramsey we characterize situations in which upward or downward discontinuities in pricing schedules are optimal our results are applicable to a number of related problems including optimal taxation insurance and incentives economic theory has confined most of its attention to markets with uniform prices in which the price per unit charged is invariant to the level of a customer s purchases this focus is warranted when goods are resellable since any attempt to charge nonuniform prices could be circumvented by reselling amongst customers but when goods are not resellable nonuniform prices are not only possible but common public utilities have declining block pricing with lower unit charges for large levels of consumption many agencies providing services including communications transportation even education use two part pricing with a fixed entry or retainer charge and a further charge per unit consumption nonuniform price schedules can be expected to be ever more common as services become a larger fraction of total output the increasing prevalence of nonuniform pricing policies have made them the focus of recent public and economic attention oi 1971 feldstein 1972 and ng and weisser 1974 have examined optimal two part pricing policies leland and meyer 1976 examine block pricing and show by example that optimal welfare policies may require nonuniform prices if zero profit constraints are binding in this paper we consider arbitrary nonuniform pricing policies using variational techniques two part and block pricing schedules are of course special cases of the environment we consider the work most closely related to our examination is the seminal paper by spence 1978 and subsequent analysis by roberts 1979 spence however does not pay explicit attention to the key role played by constraints on optimal pricing schedules roberts considers upward price discontinuities which lead to bunching of consumers at a given level of consumption but not downward price discontinuities which lead to regions in which no consumer chooses to consume gaps bunching or gaps may appear in the optimal price schedule even when underlying demand and cost functions are smooth and well behaved the prevalence of discontinuous pricing schedules e g the block pricing structures of public utilities argues that these questions are of practical as well as theoretical interest

discount pricing decisions in distribution channels with price sensitive demand abstract in this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of quantity discounts and volume discounts as coordination mechanisms in distribution channels with demand that is price sensitive we consider a single vendor single retailer distribution channel demand for the product arises only at the retailer the demand faced by the retailer is assumed to be deterministic but price elastic the retailer in turn buys the product from the vendor the vendor and the retailer act independently and rationally each maximizing their own respective profit the equilibrium point that specifies the vendor s and buyer s inventory and pricing policy is determined by the solution to a stackelberg game we consider the cases when quantity discount and volume discount respectively are offered we develop methods to determine the optimal discount policy for these cases we then consider the case where both volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously and develop a method to determine the optimal simultaneous discount offer the relative performance of the alternative discount schemes is then evaluated through a numerical study the results of the study demonstrate that the effectiveness of volume discount as a coordination mechanism is higher when the sensitivity of demand to price changes is higher the effectiveness of quantity discount on the other hand is higher with lower price sensitivity of demand finally the results also demonstrate that perfect coordination is achieved when volume and quantity discounts are offered simultaneously

policy linkage and uncertainty in international agreements i introduction negotiations over the north american free trade agreement nafta brought issues concerning the environment and a country s environmental policies to the forefront of international trade negotiations as a result nafta includes several environmental provisions as well as an environmental side agreement the side agreement established a commission to review each country s environmental standards and environmental enforcement record in addition the side agreement includes an enforcement mechanism to ensure that each country upholds its standards by threatening the withdrawal of trade benefits for noncompliance thus nalfta ties the benefits of the trade policy portion of the agreement to compliance in a side agreement concerning domestic policies in this sense nafta appears to reflect a belief in the benefits of linking issues e g trade and domestic policy obligations within an integrated agreement the question of when issues should be linked will only grow in importance in coming years as issues of trade and the environment or other domestic policy issues like labor standards move to the forefront indeed at the ministerial meetings in 1994 at the close of the uruguay round many general agreement on tariffs and trade gatt delegates renewed demands for the relationship between trade and various domestic policies including environmental policy labor standards and competition policy to be examined the question of how to integrate environmental issues into the world trade organization wto will no doubt be accompanied by questions of whether to enforce environmental obligations with the threat of the suspension of trade concessions many free trade advocates have argued that environmental issues and other domestic concerns should be negotiated in separate international agreements that are divorced from the gatt wto framework in effect calling for two separate nonlinked agreements thei r primary concern is that disputes with respect to environmental policy will undermine the previous gains made in liberalizing trade barriers in contrast many environmentalists argue that environmental concerns should be more fully integrated into existing international agreements a linked agreement their main concern is that any environmental agreement that is separate from the gatt wto framework will be unenforceable without the threat of trade policy retaliation this article addresses these concerns with a theoretical analysis of the benefits and costs of linking issues like trade and domestic policy within a unified agreement under conditions of uncertainty the theory of self enforcing trade agreements has been well established by dixit 1987 bagwell and staiger 1990 and riezman 1991 who showed how countries can support low tariffs within a repeated relationship by configuring the tariff agreement so that each country fears that a decision to cheat on the agreement would trigger a costly retaliatory episode in the future ederington 2002 extended this repeated tariff game to include two policy instruments trade and domestic policy and showed that under conditions of perfect information cross retaliation e g enforcing cooperative domestic policies with the threat of trade policy retaliation does not help support a more efficient agreement intuitively even though trade policy sanctions are a stronger punishment to cheating they are not necessary because countries have less incentive to deviate from the agreement with their domestic policy thus with perfect information linked and nonlinked agreements are functionally equivalent however this leaves unanswered the question of whether or not cross retaliation may be beneficial or detrimental under conditions of imperfect monitoring it seems natural to relax the assumption of perfect information especially with respect to domestic policies and other nontariff trade barriers

optimal pricing and inventory control policy with quantity based price differentiation a firm facing price dependent stochastic demand aims to maximize its total expected profit over a planning horizon in addition to the regular unit selling price the firm can utilize quantity discounts to increase sales we refer to this dual pricing strategy as quantity based price differentiation at the beginning of each period the firm needs to make three decisions replenish the inventory set the unit selling price if the unit sales mode is deployed and set the quantity discount price if the quantity sales mode is deployed or the combination of the two modes of sales we identify conditions under which the optimal inventory control policy and selling pricing strategy is well structured remarkably under a utility based demand framework these conditions can be unified by a simple regularity assumption that has long been used in the auction and mechanism design literature moreover sharper structural results are yielded for the optimal selling strategy we also examine the comparative advantag

wto tariff commitments and temporary protection complements or substitutes abstract there is a long held notion in the trade policy literature that traditional tariff instruments and temporary protection tp measures are substitutes despite this prediction there is only mixed empirical evidence for a link between tariff reductions and the usage pattern of antidumping safeguard and countervailing duties based on recent theoretical advances i argue in this paper that the relevant trade policy margin for implementing tp measures is instead tariff overhangs the difference between wto bound and applied tariffs lower tariff overhangs constrain countries to raise their mfn applied rates without legal repercussions independent of past tariff changes using detailed sectoral data for a sample of 30 wto member countries during the period 1996 2014 i find strong evidence for an inverse link between tariff overhangs and tp activity this result implies that tariff overhangs and tp measures are substitutes vindicating the importance of existing tariff commitments as a key determinant of alternative protection instruments

when does tit for tat diplomacy in trade policy pay off in international relations short run incentives for non cooperation often dominate yet external institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms this paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit for tat in trade policy by highlighting various strategies in a linear partial equilibrium framework we show that retaliation of non cooperative behavior by limiting market access works as a disciplining device independently of supply and demand parameters our theoretical results are backed by empirical evidence that countries more frequently involved in wto mediated disputes entailing tit for tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes

gatt a cooperative equilibrium in a noncooperative trading regime abstract as global tariff rates have fallen the use of nontariff barriers to trade have become more prevalent one incentive for a country to depart from free trade is to levy the optimal tariff in order to maximize domestic welfare the gatt was designed to maintain free trade through a system of managed retaliation as is well known in a game theoretic trade model of tariffs with no uncertainty free trade is an equilibrium outcome however with the introduction of uncertainty and asymmetric information it is shown that the equilibrium outcome s has each country imposing nontariff barriers to trade

trade agreements with domestic policies as disguised protection abstract wto rules prohibit disguised protection in the form of domestic policies how then do governments cooperate over trade and domestic policies when none can verify whether a nation s domestic tax reduction is a protective measure or a reaction to a production externality in this paper each government privately observes whether a production externality associated with its import competing good is high or low this paper finds that in an optimal agreement disguised protection with domestic policies is never used by governments with a high externality and is never commonly realized moreover in an optimal agreement tariffs may be conditional on domestic policies

market segmentation self selection and product line design the purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of market segmentation based on consumer self selection the extant theory is based on the third degree price discrimination model of pigou central assumptions of which are that the firm can directly address individual segments and isolate them by using consumer self selection i am relaxing these assumptions in the context of a monopolist designing a product line i show that this relaxation has significant implications for how the products and prices are chosen and what they look like in particular segments may be aggregated even though there are no economies of scale furthermore consumer self selection enables us to model cannibalization and competition among firms

modeling quantity discounts under general price sensitive demand functions optimal policies and relationships this paper presents models for determining optimal all unit and incremental quantity discount policies and investigates the effect of quantity discounts on increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions under general price sensitive demand functions the paper develops optimal quantity discount policies investigates their interrelationships and their benefits to both the supplier and the buyer and gains managerial insights for the scenarios of maximizing the supplier s profit and the joint profit we develop simple and efficient solution approaches for determining the all unit and the incremental optimal decision policies for general price sensitive demand functions we have three main findings first with price sensitive demand there are two incentives in offering quantity discounts increasing demand and ensuring pareto efficient transactions in most cases increasing demand dominates in justifying the offering of quantity discounts second using a single lot size associated with all efficient transactions as with the constant demand case does not hold with the price sensitive demand case third the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in benefiting both the supplier and the buyer

recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement abstract this paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions such as the wto play a central role in supporting credible enforcement in our model countries engage in ongoing negotiations and as a consequence cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions by using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation despite the lack of coercive power the occurrence of costly trade disputes and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify and condition on events that may lead to trade disputes

group buying on the web a comparison of price discovery mechanisms web based group buying mechanisms are being widely used for both business to business b2b and business to consumer b2c transactions we survey currently operational online group buying markets and then study this phenomenon using analytical models we build on the literatures in information economics and operations management in our analytical model of a monopolist offering web based group buying under different kinds of demand uncertainty we derive the monopolist s optimal group buying schedule under varying conditions of heterogeneity in the demand regimes and compare its profits with those that obtain under the more conventional posted price mechanism we further study the impact ofproduction postponement by endogenizing the timing of the pricing and production decisions in a two stage game between the monopolist and buyers our results have implications for firms choice of price discovery mechanisms in e markets and for the scheduling of production and pricing decisions in the presence and absence of scale economies of production

quantity discounts managerial issues and research opportunities marketing managers frequently administer pricing policies involving substantial quantity discounts however our understanding of the precise role of these discounts and their design is quite limited this paper reviews and integrates the economics and marketing literature and presents a detailed analysis of the policies of four firms in order to i specify the variety of motivations for quantity discounts ii provide guidelines to managers in designing quantity discount schedules and iii set out the most fruitful directions for future research

reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations abstract it is well known in international trade that a unique nash equilibrium of a static quota game is no trade and the rodriguez tower alternating retaliation process yields the same outcome yet they fail to capture the notion of retaliation appropriately using the framework of the theory of social situation we construct a model of the quota retaliation as an individual contingent threats situation in a static non cooperative setting we show that every solution called a stable standard of behavior supports at least one pareto efficient combination of quotas and vice versa free trade can be rationalized by a solution journal of economic literature classification numbers c79 f13

strategic interaction among nations negotiable and non negotiable trade barriers trade policy is modelled as a two stage game between governments governments choose a negotiable trade barrier in the first stage of the game which is co operative the level of this barrier is treated as a binding commitment in the second stage of the game where the non negotiable trade barrier is chosen non co operatively hence governments choose trade barriers during negotiations with a view to influencing the equilibrium of the non co operative game to follow this proves to be a convenient framework in which to analyse the idea that trade agreements contain loopholes which can be exploited by protectionist governments trade negotiations induce substitution toward less efficient instruments of protection but are nevertheless welfare improving as long as the negotiations are relevant i e the negotiable barrier is actually in use and the two instruments are not perfect substitutes

in or out standards discretion compliance and the wto self enforcement in international agreements in the presence of uncertainty in the form of shocks and imperfect information regarding the extent of compliance by other members is enhanced by the use of standards in performance of commitments standards are less precise than rules they must be sufficiently demanding that undercompliance is distinguishable from non compliance discretion permits undercompliance as an alternative to renegotiation of commitments safeguards and the filing of disputes undercompliance particularly when restrained is a lower cost and less confrontational resolution to addressing adverse shocks signatories are restrained in undercomplying so that the effects of their actions are imperfectly distinguishable from the effects of shocks compliance and evidentiary standards for formal disputes define the accomplishments of the agreement evidentiary standards serve as an important discipline to undercompliance even in the absence of formal disputes

u s trade policies in a changing world economy this collection of original essays focuses on issues of international trade and trade policy in a world that is undergoing structural adaptation and in the face of a serious increase in the us trade deficit they bring a new consolidation of analytical perspective to a wide variety of current trade policy issues in their overview chapter alan v deardorff and robert m stern discuss developments in trade and protectionism review the case for free trade and address the arguments in favor of trade intervention rudiger dornbusch and jeffrey frankel analyze the macroeconomic setting in which changes have been made in us tariffs and ntbs stephen p magee and leslie young develop a model of endogenous protection and use it to search for microeconomic and macroeconomic variables that may help to explain changes in tariff and nontariff protection in the us since 1900 paul krugman takes up the question of identifying strategic sectors and the extent to which international competition and national government policies may affect the returns to such sectors under conditions of imperfect competition or when externalities are present avinash dixit analyzes the responses that the us might make to other countries trade policies in terms of how these policies affect us real national income and national security he concludes that the us could use strategic advance responses to alter other countries trade policies in a mutually beneficial way richard n cooper evaluates trade policy as foreign policy by looking at changes through three periods of us history t n srinivasan scrutinizes the national defense argument for government intervention in foreign trade john h jackson in discussing alternative negotiation approaches for the conduct of us trade policies observes that the pursuit of multilateralism may be frustrating and that what may be needed instead is a minilateral approach to trade liberalization in conclusion w max corden offers a package of rules that he believes may be both desirable and possible for the international trading system to attain robert m stern is professor of economics at the university of michigan and director of the institute of public policy studies he is coauthor with allan v deardorff of the michigan model of world production and trade mit press 1985

supplier manufacturer coordination in capacitated two stage supply chains abstract manufacture to order is an increasingly popular strategy in commodity electronics and other similar markets where many different product configurations can be produced from common components to succeed in this environment manufacturers need to keep both cost and order fulfillment time low in this article we compare three different mechanisms that a manufacturer whose revenues depend on order delays may use to affect its component supplier s inventory decisions these mechanisms are specifying components inventory level offering a share of the earned revenues to the supplier called simple revenue sharing and offering a two part revenue sharing scheme we show that whereas the first two approaches do not lead to supply chain coordination the two part scheme does we demonstrate with numerical experiments that up to a point the component supplier benefits from having a high utilization of its production facility whereas the manufacturer benefits from having excess production capacity

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

on supply chain coordination for false failure returns a quantity discount contract approach abstract a large proportion of consumer returns fall into the category of false failure returns which refer to returns without functional defects in this paper we consider profits resulting from exerting costly effort to reduce false failure returns in a reverse supply chain the supply chain as a whole has a strong incentive to reduce such returns for cost saving however retailers typically enjoy a full credit provided by suppliers for returns so they may not have sufficient incentives to exert enough effort for supply chain profit maximization in some scenarios retailers may even have the motivation to encourage such returns we suggest using a coordination contract to resolve this profit conflict we introduce a quantity discount contract which specifies a payment to the retailer with an amount exponentially decreasing in the number of returns we present explicit forms of such contracts given different assumptions about the distribution of the number of returns we also prove that the contract is pareto improving besides it is shown that when the contract is applied in a closed loop supply chain it can deter retailer s potential incentive to encourage returns moreover some modifications of the contract can lead to easy allocation of supply chain profit

eoq jit and fixed costs in the ready mixed concrete industry the successful implementation of just in time jit purchasing policy in many industries has prompted many companies that still use the economic order quantity eoq purchasing policy to ponder if they should switch to the jit purchasing policy despite existing studies that directly compare the costs between the eoq and jit purchasing systems this decision is however still difficult to be made especially when price discount has to be considered jit purchasing may not always be successful even though plants that adopted jit operations have experienced or can take advantage of physical space reduction hence the objective of this study is to expand on a classical eoq with a price discount model to derive the eoq jit cost indifference point the objective was tested and achieved through a survey and case study conducted in the ready mixed concrete industry in singapore

a cooperative game theory model of quantity discounts quantity discounts offered by a monopolist are considered in the context of a bargaining problem in which the buyer and the seller negotiate over the order quantity and the average unit price all units and incremental quantity discounts that permit transaction at a negotiated outcome are described the effects of risk sensitivity and bargaining power on quantity discounts are discussed for alternative bargaining models

tariffs and quotas retaliation and negotiation with two instruments of protection abstract this paper examines the equilibrium level of trade barriers in a two country world when both tariffs and quotas are available as instruments of protection it is shown that the set of efficient equilibria is the same when either tariffs or quotas but not both may be negotiated furthermore it is shown that a trade eliminating quota war will not occur unless bargaining over tariffs is inefficient

a taxonomy and research overview of perishable asset revenue management yield management overbooking and pricing this paper proposes the term perishable asset revenue management to denote the field that combines the areas of yield management overbooking and pricing for perishable assets after summarizing the characteristics common to problems in this field the paper discusses the objectives and constraints faced by decision makers then it offers a comprehensive taxonomy with 14 different elements and reviews the research that has been done related to each element finally it suggests some important areas of future research that can help bridge the gap between theory and application

chapter 11 pricing models in marketing publisher summary this chapter brings together a set of diverse efforts in the recent literature on the modeling of price decisions and related questions in marketing there has been an impressive growth in the array of topics investigated in the literature various trends in the development of pricing models are evident from the foregoing review first one trend has been to develop theoretical models to describe observed pricing strategies in the marketplace and to derive conditions under which certain strategies are optimal this trend is clearly evident when one considers the area of dynamic pricing models another trend is an attempt to develop pricing models in which certain aspects of consumer behavior e g asymmetric response to price increases versus price decreases are incorporated this development is quite recent and does offer a large potential a third dominant direction is the use of game theoretic models for developing equilibrium pricing strategies

the extent of nontariff barriers to industrial countries imports this paper examines the extent of non tariff barriers to sixteen industrial countries visible imports using three alternative measures it shows that governmental commodity specific border measures affect over 27 of all imports and over 34 of imports from developing countries it also shows that during the period 1981 83 ntbs became significantly more extensive detailed statistics reveal considerable variations in ntb coverage by commodity type of barrier importer and exporter the data on which these conclusions are based are compiled from official information at the finest level of disaggregation they are described in the paper

dynamic input demand an application to agriculture a theoretically consistent analytical framework for examining dynamic agricultural input demand is developed and applied results from duality theory on restricted variable profit functions are incorporated into a long run dynamic optimization framework input use is affected by external adjustment costs which permits sluggish factor adjustment

strategic effects of three part tariffs under oligopoly the distinct element of a three part tariff 3pt compared with linear pricing lp or a two part tariff is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero this quantity target instrument enriches the firm s strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level even in the absence of a usual price discrimination motive with general differentiated linear demands the competitive effect of a 3pt in contrast to lp depends on the degree of substitutability between products competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated yet softened when two products are more substitutable

all units quantity freight discounts with disposals abstract this paper examines the effect of various freight rate structures and quantity discounts on the inventory policies of roi and profit maximizing firms with downward sloping price elastic demand lot sizing policies and price set at a markup on unit cost units not sold at the regular price are disposed of at a reduced price both the markup and the order quantity are decision variables numerical examples are used throughout to illustrate the properties of the model and the sensitivity of the optimal solutions to fluctuations in the parameters

supplier pricing and lot sizing when demand is price sensitive abstract the problem of co ordination between a vendor and a buyer is formulated as a two person fixed threat bargaining game the vendor decides on his lot size and the price schedule he is to offer to the buyer the buyer decides upon his lot size and the selling price in the market we have characterized pareto efficient solutions and the nash bargaining solution for the problem we have also proposed two pricing schedules for the vendor who is supplying to a large population of buyers the first one is based upon profit sharing the second one resembles the classical all unit quantity discount schedule we have thus provided for the supplier a procedure for setting all unit quantity discount schedule

stable multilateral trade agreements we analyse multilateral tariff negotiations as a game in coalition form in a model with three identical countries that produce and trade an homogeneous commodity and where countries aggregated welfare can weight differently their different components we analyse how changes in the countries objective affects the stability of coalitions in other words we characterize what tariff agreements if any are stable i e lie in the core

unfair allocation of gains under the equal price allocation method in purchasing groups certain purchasing groups do not flourish a supposed reason for this is a creeping dissatisfaction among various members of a group with the allocation of the cooperative gains in this paper we analyze unfairness resulting from using the commonly used equal price ep method for allocating gains under the assumption of continuous quantity discounts we demonstrate that this unfairness is caused by neglecting a particular component of the added value of individual group members next we develop two fairness ratios and tie these to fairness properties from cooperative game theory the ratios show among other things that being too big a player in a purchasing group can lead to decreasing gains they can be used to assess if ep is an unfair method in specific situations finally we discuss measures a purchasing group could consider in order to attenuate perceived unfairness thereby the group may improve its stability and prosperity

channel coordination and quantity discounts this paper presents a model for analyzing the impact of joint decision policies on channel coordination in a system consisting of a supplier and a group of homogeneous buyers the joint decision policy characterized by the unit selling price and the order quantity is coordinated through quantity discounts and franchise fees both the annual demand rate and the operating cost including the purchase ordering and inventory holding costs depend on the joint decision policy employed this paper contributes by integrating work addressing quantity discounts on inventory and ordering policies and work focusing on the control mechanism provided by quantity discounts in channel coordination it is shown that the optimal all unit quantity discount policy is equivalent to the optimal incremental quantity discount policy in achieving channel coordination furthermore it is shown that quantity discounts alone are not sufficient to guarantee joint profit maximization the analyses of the general models are illustrated by specific analytical results obtained for a given demand function