forward looking information in var models and the price puzzle abstract with a view to addressing the major disadvantage of the var model namely the inadequate description of the central bank reaction function we propose a var specification that proves successful in solving the price puzzle featuring in monetary vars for the us this specification consists in augmenting a standard var with two forward looking variables the federal funds futures rate or alternatively a money market forward rate reflecting monetary policy expectations and a composite leading indicator of economic activity these two variables appear to effectively control for the information set that the federal reserve may use in monetary policy decision making with this modification theory consistent responses to monetary policy shocks are obtained

resolving differences in willingness to pay and willingness to accept reply gwendolyn c morrison 1997 raises a logical point regarding our experimental test of the divergence between willingness to pay wtp and willingness to accept wta measures of economic value shogren et al 1994 she argues that our design does not provide a true test of the existence of a fundamental endowment effect since we did not control for the potential of a pivoting indifference map daniel kahneman et al 1990 she concludes that even though our ev idence shows that the mean wtp and wta bids for market goods with close substitutes e g candy bars and coffee mugs converge after market experience the endowment effect might still be alive and well albeit at statisti cally insignificant levels

not only what but also when a theory of dynamic voluntary disclosure we examine a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure of multiple pieces of private information in our model a manager of a firm who may learn multiple signals over time interacts with a competitive capital market and maximizes payoffs that increase in both period prices we show perhaps surprisingly that in equilibrium later disclosures are interpreted more favorably even though the time the manager obtains the signals is independent of the value of the firm we also provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to be in threshold strategies

recommender systems as mechanisms for social learning this article studies how a recommender system may incentivize users to learn about a product collaboratively to improve the incentives for early exploration the optimal design trades off fully transparent disclosure by selectively overrecommending the product or spamming to a fraction of users under the optimal scheme the designer spams very little on a product immediately after its release but gradually increases its frequency she stops it altogether when she becomes sufficiently pessimistic about the product the recommender s product research and intrinsic naive users seed incentives for user exploration and determine the speed and trajectory of social learning potential applications for various internet recommendation platforms and implications for review ratings inflation are discussed

endogenous information flows and the clustering of announcements we consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model because investors don t know whether or when the firm is informed the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately we show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms conversely good market news slows the release of information by firms thus our model generates clustering of negative announcements surprisingly this result holds only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external information these results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock returns jel d21 d83 g12 g14 l11

input demand under yield and revenue insurance previous studies disagree on the effects of insurance on fertilizer application rates the effect of increased fertilizer on the probability of low yields primarily determines whether fertilizer and insurance are substitutes or complements we estimate conditional distributions of corn yields to determine if the technical relationship between yields and fertilizer supports the hypothesis that insurance increases optimal application rates our results indicate no support for this hypothesis at all nitrogen fertilizer rates and reasonable levels of risk aversion nitrogen fertilizer and insurance are substitutes suggesting that those who purchase insurance are likely to decrease nitrogen fertilizer applications

the principal agent relationship with an informed principal ii common values in many circumstances a principal may have relevant private information when she proposes a contract to an agent we analyze such a principal agent relationship as a noncooperative game the principal proposes a contract which is accepted or rejected by the agent who for most of our analysis has no private information the contract is executed if accepted otherwise the reservation allocation takes effect this allocation may be determined by a pre existing contract which the principal by her proposal is attempting to renegotiate or it may simply be the no trade point in this paper we assume that the principal s information directly affects the agent s payoff before solving the game we discuss pareto efficiency with asymmetric information we define an incentive compatible allocation to be weakly interim efficient wie if there exists no alternative incentive compatible allocation that both parties prefer for all possible beliefs that the agent might have about the principal s private information type we show that any wie allocation is interim efficient ie for some beliefs the rothschild stiglitz wilson rsw allocation relative to the reservation allocation l is the allocation that maximizes the payoff of each type of principal within the class of incentive compatible allocations that guarantee the agent at least the utility he gets from a irrespective of his beliefs about the principal s type the equilibrium set of the contract proposal game consists of the allocations that weakly pareto dominate the rsw allocation thus there is a unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the latter is ie and the equilibrium outcome is the rsw allocation itself after characterizing the equilibrium allocations we study those that are renegotiation proof when either the principal or the agent leads the renegotiation we then compare our contract proposal game which is a signaling model with its screening counterpart we conclude by extending our results to the case in which the agent as well as the principal has private information under the assumption of quasi linear preferences

monetary policy rules macroeconomic stability and inflation a view from the trenches i estimate a forward looking monetary policy reaction function for the federal reserve for the periods before and after paul volcker s appointment as chairman in 1979 using information that was available to the fomc in real time from 1966 to 1995 the results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inflation forecasts during both periods this contradicts the hypothesis based on analysis with ex post constructed data that the instability of the great inflation was the result of weak fomc policy responses to expected inflation a difference is that prior to volcker s appointment policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious drawing on contemporaneous accounts of fomc policy i discuss the implications of the findings for alternative explanations of the great inflation and the improvement in macroeconomic stability since then

behavioral rationality in finance the case of dividends as the title suggests this paper attempts to get to the specifics of the behavioral rationality theme of this conference by focusing on an area in the main core of finance namely the demand and supply of dividends where by common consent the essentially rationalist paradigm of the field seems to be limping most noticeably important and pervasive behavior patterns on both the paying and the receiving ends have despairingly been written off as puzzles even by theorists as redoubtable as fischer black see esp his much cited 1976 article behaviorists have homed in on precisely these same dividendrelated soft spots in the current body of theory see esp shefrin and statman 1984 we seem to have in sum an ideal place to look for signs of an imminent paradigm shift in the behavioral direction of precisely the kind envisioned by some of the other contributors to this conference the dividend related difficulties and supposed anomalies at issue here are more than just the parochial concern of finance specialists the dividends seem a natural area in finance where the introduction of behavioral cognitive elements might help resolve long standing anomalies particularly the seeming failure of supply to adjust to taxinduced price penalties a closer look at the empirical record however particularly at evidence of responsiveness to major structural changes shows behavior of the aggregates to be less anomalous than conventional handwringing might suggest behavioral cognitive elements whatever they might contribute to the description of particular microdecisions do not appear to be essential adjuncts to the basic finance model in the major comparative static applications for which it was intended helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper have been received from nai fu chen jean marie gagnon gur huberman kose john james poterba and especially melvin reder

testing for the monotone likelihood ratio assumption although monotonicity of the likelihood ratio for conditioned densities is a common technical assumption in economic models empirical tests for its plausibility do not appear to have been conducted this article develops such a test based on the theory of order restricted inference that is robust with respect to the correlation structure of the distributions being compared the test is applied to study the technology revealed by agricultural production experiments for the data under scrutiny the results support the monotone likelihood ratio assumption in a second application we find some support for the assumption of affiliation among bids cast in a multiple round vickrey auction for a consumption good

expectations and the stability problem for optimal monetary policies eine auf den fundamentaldaten beruhende regelbindung der geldpolitik ohne selbstverpflichtung die bei vollkommen rationalen erwartungen der privaten akteure optimal ware ist instabil wenn diese akteure de facto den ublichen regeln des adaptiven lernens folgen dieses problem lasst sich dadurch beheben dass die erwartungen privater akteure berucksichtigt und in geeigneter weise in die optimale geldpolitik einbezogen werden diese eindeutige schlusfolgerung gilt auch dann wenn sich der geldpolitische entscheidungstrager und die privaten akteure in einem simultanen lernprozess befinden unsere ergebnisse zeigen wie wichtig es ist die geldpolitik angemessen zu gestalten und dabei nicht nur die fundamentaldaten sondern auch direkt die beobachteten erwartungen privater haushalte und unternehmen zu berucksichtigen

the role of ethics in finance the role of ethics in the financial community today seems to be limited to its role in financial economic theory contemporary financial economists view ethics in the context of objective wealth maximization in this context ethics functions primarily as a constraint on behavior this view is both illogical and ambiguous it is illogical because it may actually sanction unethical behavior if such behavior can be shown to lead to material gain it is ambiguous because throughout he 2000 year history of moral philosophy ethics has generally been viewed as a behavioral motivation not as a constraint if a conception of ethics as the fundamental objective in all human endeavor is disseminated in the financial community there is real hope that ethics will be accepted as both logically consistent and desirable

time scarcity and the market for news abstract we develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance time constrained consumers browse through news items across competing outlets they choose which outlets to access and which stories to read or skip thus indirectly deciding how much time to spend on a given outlet firms decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits we show that even when readers or television viewers and firms are rational and unbiased they spend more time on the news than they would like and not necessarily on the topics they prefer in particular relevant news items may be crowded out we then study how reader efficient standards can be restored and derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditional media these include tabloidization and polarization of the news and other aspects relevant for the political economy of the media including political knowledge gaps and voter turnout

is inflation sticky abstract new keynesian sticky price models predict that monetary policy can affect real variables however they also predict that inflation can be reduced without depressing output or employment in fact bringing down inflation is costly presenting a challenge to the new keynesian model two departures from the new keynesian model predict costly disinflation one assumes sticky inflation rather than sticky prices while the other assumes less than perfectly rational expectations taking into account information from surveys of inflation expectations i find the evidence suggests that inflation is not sticky and that inflation expectations are less than perfectly rational

news management and the value of firms the literature on asymmetric information has been concerned mainly with the problem of the informed party lying to the uninformed parties however in many cases the informed party will stop short of lying but will seek to gain from private information by managing the disclosure of news this article examines the pricing of a firm when there is such manipulation of news i model this situation as a variant of the persuasion game of milgrom and roberts 1986 in which i can parameterize the notion of the degree of credence placed by the market on the disclosures of the informed party an empirical hypothesis thrown up by the theory is that for otherwise identical firms a low price earnings ratio will be associated with a greater degree of positive skewness of the disclosure strategy

changes in uk monetary policy rules and discretion in practice abstract in october 1992 following sterling s departure from the exchange rate mechanism britain adopted a new framework for monetary policy that comprised two components first an explicit target for inflation and second institutional changes designed to give greater influence to the bank of england by increasing the transparency and openness of the process by which interest rates are set this paper analyses those changes from the perspective of the debate on rules versus discretion and argues that an appropriate design of institutional arrangements can provide incentives for central bankers to pursue the first best state contingent monetary policy

monetary policy rules based on real time data this paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules using taylor s rule as an example i demonstrate that real time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data further estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the federal reserve in real time these results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules

a spatial theory of media slant and voter choice we develop a theory of media slant as a systematic filtering of political news that reduces multidimensional politics to the one dimensional space perceived by voters economic and political choices are interdependent in our theory expected electoral results influence economic choices and economic choices in turn influence voting behaviour in a two candidate election we show that media favouring the front runner will focus on issues unlikely to deliver a surprise while media favouring the underdog will gamble for resurrection we characterize the socially optimal slant and show that it coincides with the one favoured by the underdog under a variety of circumstances balanced media giving each issue equal coverage may be worse for voters than partisan media

federal reserve information and the behavior of interest rates this paper tests for the existence of asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public by examining federal reserve and commercial inflation forecasts it demonstrates that the federal reserve has considerable information about inflation beyond what is known to commercial forecasters it also shows that monetary policy actions provide signals of the federal reserve s information and that commercial forecasters modify their forecasts in response to those signals these findings may explain why long term interest rates typically rise in response to shifts to tighter monetary policy jel e52 e43 d82 asymmetric information between the federal reserve and the public is a phenomenon that is often posited but rarely tested numerous models of central bank behavior for example show that the existence of asymmetric information has important implications for the effectiveness of policy and the consequences of dynamic inconsistency yet there

timing decisions in organizations communication and authority in a dynamic environment this paper develops a theory of how organizations make timing decisions we consider a problem where an uninformed principal decides when to exercise an option and interacts with an informed but biased agent this problem is common examples include headquarters deciding when to close a plant drill an oil well or launch a product because time is irreversible the direction of the agent s bias is crucial for communication and allocation of authority when the agent favors late exercise centralized decision making where the principal retains authority and communicates with the agent often features full information revelation but ine cient delay delegation is never optimal in this case in contrast when the agent favors early exercise communication under centralized decision making is partial while option exercise is unbiased or delayed delegation is optimal if the bias is small or delegation can be timed thus delegating decisions such as plant closures is never optimal while delegating decisions such as product launches may be optimal

a near rational model of the business cycle with wage and price inertia this paper presents a model in which insignificantly suboptimal behavior causes aggregate demand shocks to have significant real effects the individual loss to agents with inertial price wage behavior is second order in terms of the parameter describing the shock while the effect on real economic variables is first order thus significant changes in business activity can be generated by anticipated money supply changes provided that some agents are willing to engage in nonmaximizing behavior which results in small losses

a rehabilitation of monetary policy in the 1950 s monetary policy in the united states in the 1950s was remarkably modern analysis of federal reserve records shows that policymakers had an overarching aversion to inflation and were willing to accept significant costs to prevent it from rising to even moderate levels this aversion to inflation was the result of policymakers beliefs that higher inflation could not raise output in the long run that the level of output that would trigger increases in inflation was only moderate and that inflation had large real costs in the medium and long runs furthermore both narrative and empirical analysis indicates that policymakers were not wedded to free reserves or other faulty indicators in their implementation of policy empirical estimates of a forward looking taylor rule show that policymakers in the 1950s raised nominal interest rates more than one for one with increases in expected inflation and suggests that monetary policy in the 1950s was more similar to policy in the 1980s and 1990s than to that in the late 1960s and 1970s one implication of these findings is that the inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s must have been the result of a change in the conduct of policy this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

a new keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations abstract within a new keynesian model we incorporate bounded rationality at the individual agent level and we determine restrictions on expectations operators sufficient to imply aggregate is and as relations of the same functional form as those under rationality this result provides dual implications the strong nature of the restrictions required to achieve aggregation serve as a caution to researchers imposing heterogeneous expectations at an aggregate level may be ill advised on the other hand accepting the necessary restrictions provides for tractable analysis of expectations heterogeneity as an example we consider a case where a fraction of agents are rational and the remainder are adaptive and find specifications that are determinate under rationality may possess multiple equilibria in case of expectations heterogeneity

adaptive learning persistence and optimal monetary policy we show that when private sector expectations are determined in line with adaptive learning optimal policy responds persistently to cost push shocks the optimal response is stronger and more persistent the higher is the initial level of perceived inflation persistence by the private sector such a sophisticated policy reduces inflation persistence and inflation volatility at little cost in terms of output gap volatility persistent responses to cost push shocks and stability of inflation expectations resemble optimal policy under commitment and rational expectations nevertheless it is clear that the mechanism at play is very different in the case of commitment it relies on expectations of future policy actions affecting inflation expectations in the case of sophisticated central banking it relies on the reduction in the estimated inflation persistence parameter based on inflation data generated by shocks and policy responses jel e52

ethics in finance ii the best way to approach professional ethics whether in the finance profession or elsewhere is from the perspective of virtue ethics theory this theory places particular emphasis on the character and motivations of an individual professional and on the organizational community in which the individual acts this article extends and clarifies the central argument of an earlier article on financial ethics several real world examples illustrate the role of virtue ethics in professionalism

optimal interest rate smoothing this paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions it shows in the context of a simple model of optimizing private sector behaviour that assignment of an interest rate smoothing objective to the central bank may be desirable even when reduction of the magnitude of interest rate changes is not a social objective in itself this is because a response of policy to irrelevant lagged variables may be desirable owing to the way it steers private sector expectations of future policy

the market for news we investigate the market for news under two assumptions that readers hold beliefs which they like to see confirmed and that newspapers can slant stories toward these beliefs we show that on the topics where readers share common beliefs one should not expect accuracy even from competitive media competition results in lower prices but common slanting toward reader biases on topics where reader beliefs diverge such as politically divisive issues however newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions yet in the aggregate a reader with access to all news sources could get an unbiased perspective generally speaking reader heterogeneity is more important for accuracy in media than competition per se

macroeconomic expectations of households and professional forecasters economists have long emphasized the importance of expectations in determining macroeconomic outcomes yet there has been almost no recent effort to model actual empirical expectations data instead m acroeconomists usually simply assume that expectations are rational this paper shows that while empirical household expectations are not rational in the usual sense expectational dynamics are well captured by a model in which households views derive from news reports of the views of professional forecasters which in turn may be rational the model s estimates imply that people only occasionally pay attention to news reports this inattention generates stickyness in aggregate expectations with important macroeconomic consequences

term structure evidence on interest rate smoothing and monetary policy inertia abstract numerous studies have used quarterly data to estimate monetary policy rules or reaction functions that appear to exhibit a very slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate the conventional wisdom asserts that this gradual adjustment reflects a policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior by central banks however such quarterly monetary policy inertia would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest rates at horizons of more than 3 months which is contradicted by evidence from the term structure of interest rates the illusion of monetary policy inertia evident in the estimated policy rules likely reflects the persistent shocks that central banks face

optimal information disclosure a sender randomly draws a prospect characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver the receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his bayesian inference about the prospect s relevance exceeds his opportunity cost the sender s profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects switches by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones baits extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives

monetary policy in a data rich environment abstract most empirical analyses of monetary policy have been confined to frameworks in which the federal reserve is implicitly assumed to exploit only a limited amount of information despite the fact that the fed actively monitors literally thousands of economic time series this article explores the feasibility of incorporating richer information sets into the analysis both positive and normative of fed policymaking we employ a factor model approach developed by stock j h watson m w diffusion indices journal of business economic statistics 2002 20 2 147 forecasting inflation 1999 journal of monetary economics 44 2 293 that permits the systematic information in large data sets to be summarized by relatively few estimated factors with this framework we reconfirm stock and watson s result that the use of large data sets can improve forecast accuracy and we show that this result does not seem to depend on the use of finally revised as opposed to real time data we estimate policy reaction functions for the fed that take into account its data rich environment and provide a test of the hypothesis that fed actions are explained solely by its forecasts of inflation and real activity finally we explore the possibility of developing an expert system that could aggregate diverse information and provide benchmark policy settings

has u s monetary policy changed evidence from drifting coefficients and real time data despite the large amount of empirical research on monetary policy rules there is surprisingly little consensus on the nature or even the existence of changes in the conduct of u s monetary policy three issues appear central to this disagreement 1 the specific type of changes in the policy coefficients 2 the treatment of heteroskedasticity and 3 the real time nature of the data used this paper addresses these issues in the context of forwardlooking taylor rules with drifting coefficients the estimation is based on real time data and accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the policy shock the findings suggest important but gradual changes in the rule coefficients not adequately captured by the usual split sample estimation in contrast to orphanides 2002 2003 i find that the fed s response to the real time forecast of inflation was weak in the second half of the 1970s perhaps not satisfying taylor s principle as suggested by clarida gali and gertler 2000 however the response to inflation was strong before 1973 and gradually regained strength from the early 1980s onward moreover as in orphanides 2003 the fed s response to real activity fell substantially and lastingly during the 1970s

conflicts of interest in financial intermediation the last years have seen a surge of scandals in financial intermediation this article argues that the agency structure inherent to most forms of financial intermediation gives rise to conflicts of interest though this does not excuse scandalous behavior it points out market imperfections there are four types of conflicts of interest personal individual personal organizational impersonal individual and finally impersonal organizational conflicts analyzing recent scandals we find that all four types of conflicts of interest prevail in financial intermediation

experimental evidence on inflation expectation formation using laboratory experiments within a new keynesian sticky price framework we study the process of inflation expectation formation we focus on adaptive learning and rational expectations contrary to the previous literature that mostly studied simple heuristics using a test for rational expectations that allows heterogeneity of expectations we find that we cannot reject rationality for about 40 of subjects more than 20 of subjects are also best described by adaptive learning models where they behave like econometricians and update their model estimates every period however rather than using a single forecasting model switching between models describes their behavior better switching is more likely to occur when experimental economy is in a recession

is the fed s news perception different from the private sector s the recent literature on monetary policy has dedicated considerable attention to modelling agents processing of information about the future in real time this paper contributes to this growing st

wage rigidity and monetary union we compare monetary union to flexible exchange rates in an asymmetric threecountry model with active monetary policy unlike the traditional oca literature we find that countries with a high degree of nominal wage rigidity benefit from monetary union specially when they join other similarly rigid countries countries with relatively more flexible wages tend to be worse off in unions with countries that have more rigid wages we examine france germany and the uk and find that the welfare implications of alternative monetary arrangements depend more on the degree of wage asymmetry than on other types of asymmetries in shocks monetary policy etc and that higher degree of wage flexibility in the uk relative to france and germany would make its participation in emu costly

disclosures and asset returns public information in financial markets often arrives through the disclosures of interested parties who have a material interest in the reactions of the market to the new information when the strategic interaction between the sender and the receiver is formalized as a disclosure game with verifiable reports equilibrium prices can be given a simple characterization in terms of the concatenation of binomial pricing trees there are a number of empirical implications the theory predicts that the return variance following a poor disclosed outcome is higher than it would have been if the disclosed outcome were good also when investors are risk averse this leads to negative serial correlation of asset returns other points of contact with the empirical literature are discussed

when to drop a bombshell sender who is either good or bad wishes to look good at an exogenous deadline sender privately observes if and when she can release a public flow of information about her private type releasing information earlier exposes to greater scrutiny but signals credibility in equilibrium bad sender releases information later than good sender we find empirical support for the dynamic predictions of our model using data on the timing of u s presidential scandals and u s initial public offerings in the context of elections our results suggest that october surprises are driven by the strategic behaviour of bad sender

is shareholder wealth maximization immoral for those educated in modern business schools the justification for decisions made by financial professionals in business organizations has been supplied by financial economic theory broadly thi

monetary policy rules under heterogeneous inflation expectations this paper evaluates the role of inflation forecast heterogeneity in u s monetary policymaking the deviation between private and central bank inflation forecasts is identified as a significant explanatory factor behind the fed s monetary policy decisions a discretionary policy rule that includes the forecast deviation as an additional argument is estimated empirically for the period 1975 2009 covering the chairmanships of arthur burns george miller paul volcker alan greenspan and the beginning of ben bernanke s term by using inflation forecasts obtained from the federal open market committee s greenbook and the survey of professional forecasters and real time estimates of the output gap the estimated rule appears to provide a consistent description of the fed s policy during the sample period presenting an alternative perspective regarding the key drivers of the high inflation phase in the 1970s as well as of the successful volcker disinflation in the early 1980s and the gradual transition to a regime of lower inflation and high policy credibility that has increasingly characterized monetary policy over the past two decades jel e50 e52 e58