policy equilibria in a federal system the effects of higher tax ceilings for unemployment insurance abstract in many federal systems a higher authority imposes changes that may alter lower level policies depending on the type of change and differences among lower level parties for example we model changes in the parameters of american states unemployment insurance ui systems when the federal government raises the ui tax ceiling bargaining among interested parties alters ui benefits and taxes we estimate a difference in differences model describing ui tax payments when federal increases in 1972 1978 and 1983 increased some states ceilings where the federal constraint was binding taxes rose nearly 20 percent the theory and empirical analysis suggest themselves as examples for future research on topics in public finance labor economics and international trade

politics and efficiency of separating capital and ordinary government budgets we analyze a golden rule that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and most u s states do today we study an overlapping generations economy where majorities choose durable and nondurable public goods in each period when demographics imply even moderate departures from ricardian equivalence the golden rule substantially improves efficiency examples calibrated to u s demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics

has work sharing worked in germany industry by industry basis in an attempt to raise employment whether this work sharing works is theoretically ambiguous i exploit the cross industry variation in standard hours reductions to examine their impact on actual hours worked wages and employment analysis of industry level data suggests that work sharing may have reduced employment in the period 1984 1994 using individual data from the german socio economic panel i substantiate the union claim of full wage compensation the hourly wage rose enough to offset the decline in actual hours worked

line item veto where is thy sting roponents of giving the president the authority to use a line item veto argue that the institutional change is needed to limit special interest legislation and restrain spending opponents respond that it would grant too much added power to the president thereby upsetting the delicate balance wisely crafted by the founding fathers this article focuses on the presumption evidently shared by both sides in the debate that adoption of item veto authority will have significant consequences in terms of budget outcomes and the distribution of power 1 curiously there presently exists little empirical support for the presumption that item veto authority is important most studies comparing states with various types of veto authority have failed to detect significant effects associated with item veto additional tests of our own are consistent with these results after reviewing the empirical evidence we reconsider the alleged effects of item veto authority by seating the popular depiction in an explicit model of the budgetary process formal modeling exposes logical inconsistencies contained in popular veto discourse further the model makes clear that the predicted consequences of item veto commonly projected as ubiquitous in fact arise only in select settings

capital budgets borrowing rules and state capital spending abstract this paper compares the level and composition of government spending in u s states that maintain separate budgets for capital and operating expenditures with that in states that employ unified budgets it also investigates the effects of pay as you go financing rules for capital projects the empirical findings suggest that states with separate capital budgets spend more on public capital projects than comparable states with unified budgets there is no evidence that the presence or absence of a capital budget affects the level of non capital spending pay as you go requirements for financing capital projects are associated with lower levels of both capital and non capital spending

taxation and political business cycles in eu economies this paper examines whether incumbent national governments of 11 member states of the european union manipulated the tax policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles opportunistic or partisan the empirical evidence based on data concerning the 1965 to 1997 period does not support this hypothesis rather it appears that governments have pursued stabilization policies

local government grants and income tax revenue redistributive politics in norway 1900 1990 an important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods primarily education and health care in norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector the development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes the important revenue sources of the local and county governments grants and income tax revenue have been controlled nationally and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900 1990 the approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength the decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome the analysis shows how politics matter and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30 more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run

state responses to fiscal crises the effects of budgetary institutions and politics this paper explores the dynamics of state taxes and spending during the late 1980s when regional economic downturns and increased expenditure demands led to substantial state budget deficits more restrictive state fiscal institutions such as no deficit carryover rules and tax and expenditure limitations are correlated with more rapid fiscal adjustment to unexpected deficits political factors are also important when a single party controls the state house and the governorship deficit adjustment is much faster than when party control is divided in gubernatorial election years tax increases and spending cuts are both significantly smaller than at other times

assessing empirical approaches for analyzing taxes and labor supply recent surveys on the labor supply responses of men document a divergence in the estimates of substitution and income effects obtained using various estimation approaches generally studies accounting for nonlinear tax schedules in a static setting via a piecewise linear approach produce estimates that typically imply higher substitution and lower income responses than are suggested by empirical work applying other approaches this paper demonstrates that maximum likelihood estimation of a consumer choice problem with nonlinear budget sets implicitly relies on the satisfaction of inequality constraints that translate into behaviorally meaningful restrictions these constraints arise not as a consequence of economic theory but instead as a requirement to create a properly defined statistical model in the analysis of piecewise linear budget sets the implicit constraints required by maximum likelihood in estimation amount to imposition of slutsky conditions at all wage income combinations associated with kink points in the analysis of differentiable budget sets the tacit constraints invoked by maximum likelihood also involve inequality restrictions on slutsky terms the empirical work presented in this study supports the contention that these implicit constraints play a major role in explaining the discrepancies in estimates found in the literature on men s labor supply

a note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints abstract an important agrument in the current debate over european monetary integration is that a monetary union requires formal fiscal restraints limiting individual member states budgetary powers to reduce the common monetary authority s risk of having to bail out insolvent member governments this note presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints on state budgets in the united states nonparametric tests reveal that fiscal restraints significantly affect the probability of fiscal choices and performance without however preventing extreme outcomes fiscal restraints induce substitution of nonrestricted for restricted debt instruments

political uncertainty and public financing costs evidence from u s gubernatorial elections and municipal bond markets this research investigates how political uncertainty around u s gubernatorial elections in uences the borrowing costs of public debt measured by yields of municipal bonds our evidence from both the new issuance market and the secondary market shows that yields of municipal bonds increase sharply by 6 to 8 basis points before elections and then reverse afterward elections have more pronounced impact during economic downturns when outcomes are less predictable and when states have more outstanding debt several state institutions such as gaap budgeting spending limits and tax increase limits help to mitigate the adverse impact of political uncertainty

who pays for public employee health costs abstract we analyze the incidence of public employee health benefits because these benefits are negotiated through the political process relevant labor market institutions deviate significantly from the competitive private sector benchmark empirically we find that roughly 15 percent of the cost of recent benefit growth was passed onto school district employees through reductions in wages and salaries strong teachers unions were associated with relatively strong linkages between benefit growth and growth in total compensation our analysis is consistent with the view that the costs of public workers benefits are difficult to monitor contributing to benefit oriented and often under funded compensation schemes

habit prisoner s dilemma and americans welfare cost of working much more than europeans europeans work much less than americans some studies claim this is due to high taxes in europe which would benefit by adopting us tax rates and work time others find that taxes have little or no impact on work time i examine the hypothesis that americans would benefit by reducing work time to europe s level empirical and experimental studies show utility falls as other people s income rises due to its historical experience europe is able to internalize this and other negative externalities by restricting work time through minimum vacation time and maximum weekly work hours while the us is not resulting in a prisoner s dilemma overworking trap equilibrium a simple model and work time data are used to derive the us welfare gain from reducing work time to europe s level findings are i parameter values are consistent with experimental results on the relative impact of own and other people s income ii the welfare gain s present value is about 120 percent of annual welfare and iii even if europe s policy reduces work time excessively it does remain beneficial as long as the reduction is less than twice the optimal one

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

the elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal constraints we study whether fiscal restrictions affect volatilities and correlations of macrovariables and the probability of excessive debt for a sample of 48 us states fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators and volatilities and correlations are computed in several ways the second moments of macroeconomic variables in states with different fiscal constraints are economically and statistically similar excessive debt and the mechanism linking budget deficit and excessive debts are independent of whether tight or loose fiscal constraints are in place creative budget accounting may account for the results

the cost of governing strategic behavior of the president and legislators in brazil s budgetary process several characteristics of a political system have been identified as increasing the cost of governing such as presidentialism federalism an open list with proportional representation a multiparty system and coalition governments although brazil suffers from all of these pathologies the authors argue that other characteristics of the brazilian system have the opposite effect and allow high levels of governability at low cost in particular the authors examine the role of legislators amendments to the budget which provide the executive a low cost means of obtaining support the authors provide evidence that the brazilian president routinely uses his or her powers to reward and punish legislators for supporting or opposing his or her interests in congress although legislators have a limited role in the budgetary process that role can have important electoral consequences for their political careers

do state balanced budget requirements matter testing two explanatory frameworks balanced budget requirements bbrs affect all aspects of financial operations previous studies relied on characterizations that highlight a constitutional statutory distinction hou and smith public budgeting finance 26 3 22 45 2006 instead propose a political technical construct this article uses probit estimation six measures of balance and long panels to test which framework offers more explanatory power the findings suggest that bbrs matter to varying degrees technical requirements exert bigger effects than political ones the effects are more obvious on narrower than broader measures of balance and in the later phases of the budget cycle and the political technical construct offers more explanatory power than the constitutional statutory distinction

government decision making and the incidence of federal mandates abstract this paper analyzes the effects of federally mandated program changes on state spending and revenues incorporating and evaluating the predictive value of several common theories of the state decision making process using several sources of exogenous increases in public medical spending i estimate that the entire state portion of the burden of mandated spending is borne by decreases in other public welfare spending while federal mandates may influence the composition of benefits at the state level it is much more difficult for them to change the total level of state transfers comparison of state reactions to different shocks suggests that these reductions are due in part to the substitutability of programs in the voter utility function but also in part to the stickiness of spending within budget categories states with greater racial differences between recipients and voters and states with less generous neighbors reduce other public welfare spending by even more alleviating the burden the medical expansions imposed on their taxpayers mandates may thus serve only to increase inequality across states

politics institutions and fiscal performance in a federal system an analysis of the argentine provinces abstract we posit that the fiscal behavior of argentine provinces is determined by a common pool game at two levels within each province and across political units in the latter game the national government has a greater incentive than the provincial governments to internalize the negative externality of fiscal imprudence given relatively strong party discipline the president is able to induce governors from his party to internalize a portion of the externality to a greater extent than opposition governors in argentina party matters for fiscal behavior but it does so for reasons different from those identified in studies of oecd countries

general revenue sharing and public sector unions abstract in this paper i find that in the context of a large intergovernmental general revenue sharing program implemented from 1972 to 1986 cities increased expenditures one for one with federal grants which is suggestive of a large flypaper effect furthermore i find that cities in states with pro union collective bargaining laws spent more than half of the transfers on increased wages while cities in states without such laws spent a greater fraction on increased government services these latter findings suggest that public sector unions play an important role in determining the usage and impact of intergovernmental grants

the line item veto and public sector budgets evidence from the states abstract the paper examines the claim that gubernatorial line item veto power reduces state spending analysis of a rich set of state budget data indicates that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto and that in the short run the item veto s potency is contingent upon the political setting in certain circumstances governors with political incentives to use an item veto alter spending and revenues in a statistically significant and quantitatively important fashion these results suggest that state budgets have not been importantly altered as a result of the existence of the line item veto and shed doubt on the use of the line item veto to reduce federal government spending

relative income effects on subjective well being in the cross section abstract recent work suggests that a person s subjective well being swb depends to a large degree on relative income focusing on the underlying identification this paper makes four contributions to this literature it describes the aggregation problem with past studies implements an estimation strategy to overcome this problem finds micro level evidence in support of the hypothesis that relative income does matter in individual assessments of swb and uses cross section estimates to replicate the aggregate time series the evidence further indicates that relative income effects may be smaller at low income levels the results are obtained from ordered probit techniques and the general social survey gss

why do europeans work so little market work per person is roughly 10 higher in the united states than in sweden however if we include the work carried out in home production the total amount of work only differs by 1 i set up a model and show that differences in policy mainly taxes can account for the discrepancy in both labor supply and home production between sweden and the united states these results are independent of the elasticity of labor supply

the fiscal stress arising from state and local retiree health obligations a major factor weighing down the long term finances of state and local governments is the obligation to fund retiree benefits while state and local government pension obligations have been analyzed in great detail much less attention has been paid to the costs of the other major retiree benefit provided by these governments retiree health insurance the first portion of the paper uses the information contained in the annual actuarial reports for public retiree health plans to reverse engineer the cash flows underlying the liabilities given in the report obtaining the cash flows allows us to construct liability estimates which are consistent across governments in terms of the discount rate actuarial method and assumptions concerning medical cost inflation and mortality we find that the total unfunded accrued liability of state and local governments for the provision of retiree health care exceeds 1 trillion or about of total state and local government revenue relative to pension obligations discounted at the same rate we find that unfunded retiree health care liabilities are the size of unfunded pension obligations we also find that using assumptions concerning the growth in health care costs that are arguably more realistic than those employed by most states actually reduces the size of the liability in most cases pushing in the opposite direction we find that using plausibly more realistic mortality assumptions increases the size of liability the second portion of the paper places retiree health care obligations into context by examining the budget pressures associated with retiree health on a continuing largely pay as you go basis we find that much of the projected increase in retiree health obligations as a share of revenue is the result of health care cost growth on average states could put their retiree health obligations into long run fiscal balance by contributing an additional percent of total revenue toward the benefit each year there is however wide variation across the states with the majority of states requiring little in the way of additional financing but some states requiring a significantly larger increase

is more always better a survey on positional concerns abstract we use survey data to provide some empirical information about concerns regarding relative standing respondents chose between a world where they have more of a good than others and one where everyone s endowment of the good is higher but the respondent has less than others questions asked about education attractiveness and intelligence for one s child and oneself income vacation time approval and disapproval from a supervisor and papers to write half of the respondents preferred to have 50 less real income but high relative income concerns about position were strongest for attractiveness and supervisor s praise and weakest for vacation time

time use during the great recession using data from the american time use survey between 2003 and 2010 we document that home production absorbs roughly 30 percent of foregone market work hours at business cycle frequencies leisure absorbs roughly 50 percent of foregone market work hours with sleeping and television watching accounting for most of this increase we document significant increases in time spent on shopping child care education and health job search absorbs between 2 and 6 percent of foregone market work hours we discuss the implications of our results for business cycle models with home production and non separable preferences jel codes d13 e32 j22

defining the government s debt and deficit although the budget deficit and the public debt feature prominently in political debate and economic research there is no agreement about how they should be measured they can b e defined for different sets of public institutions including the nested sets corresponding to central government general government and the public sector and for any definition of government there are many measures of the debt and deficit including those generated by four kinds of accounts cash financial full accrual and comprehensive which can be derived from four nested sets of assets and liabilities each debt and deficit measure says something about public finances but none tells the whol e story each is also vulnerable to manipulation and is likely to be manipulated if it is subject to a binding fiscal rule or target narrow definitions of government encourage the shifting of spending to entities outside the defined perimeter of governme nt narrow definitions of debt and deficit encourage operations involving off balance sheets assets and liabilities while broad measures are susceptible to the mismeasurement of on balance sheet assets and liabilities reviewing the literature on these is sues the paper concludes that governments should publish several measures of the debt and deficit in a form that clearly reveals their interrelationships

the political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of india an empirical investigation abstract using data from the 14 major states of india we investigate whether state governments fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations our principal findings are twofold first we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles state governments raise less commodity tax revenue spend less on the current account and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years second we show that coalition state governments raise less own non tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition in sum the dispersion of political power affects government size

testing the rationality of state revenue forecasts recent revenue shortfalls in several states focus attention on the question of whether states do a good job of forecasting revenues in modem economics forecasts are eval uated on the basis of whether or not they are rational do the forecasts optimally incorporate all available information this paper develops a method for testing the rationality of state revenue forecasts and applies it to the analysis of data from new jersey massachusetts and maryland one of our main findings is that in all three states the forecasts of own revenues are systematically biased downward tn 1985 the 50 states raised 349 billion in revenues from their own sources and received 84 billion in grants from the federal government u s bureau of the census 1987 p 266 state governments are clearly important players in the u s system of public finance and the efficiency with which they conduct their financial affairs has an important impact on consumer welfare one important determinant of a state s ability to con duct reasonable fiscal policies is the quality of its revenue forecasts sensible deliberations about ex penditures cannot be made in the absence of good forecasts indeed in the presence of con stitutional or statutory provisions for balanced budgets unanticipated changes in revenues can wreak havoc not only on proposals that are sched uled for funding but on plans that have already been put into effect as well in recent months two powerful governors michael dukakis of massachusetts and mario cuomo of new york have suffered major politi cal embarrassments because actual revenues fell substantially short of the predictions in their re spective states such episodes focus attention on the question of whether states do a good job of forecasting revenues in modem economics fore casts are evaluated on the basis of whether or not they are rational do the forecasts optimally incorporate all information that is available at the time they are made although there is a large literature on state revenue forecasting methods that literature focuses mostly on state budgetary institutions forecasts themselves are evaluated only in an informal fashion 1 although the theory and econometric methods of rational expectations have been used to evaluate forecasts made by households and businesses 2 these powerful tools have not been applied to state government fore casts this paper applies these methods to the problem of state revenue forecasting and as an example uses them to analyze data from new jersey massachusetts and maryland the results cast light not only on the question of rationality per se but on issues such as the impact of political factors on forecasts section ii presents the conceptual framework for testing rational expectations the relevant in stitutional issues and data are described in section iii the results are discussed in section iv we find that in all three states forecasts of own rev enues are systematically biased downward section v concludes with a summary

political parties and the business cycle in the united states 1948 1984 this paper tests the existence and the extent of a politically induced business cycle in the u s in the post world war ii period the cycle described in this paper is different from the traditional political business cycle of nordhaus it is based on a systematic difference between the monetary policies of the two parties in a model with labor contracts from an explicit optimization problem we derive a system of equations for output and money growth then we successfully test the non linear restriction imposed by the theory on the parameters of the system of equations we cannot reject the hypothesis that money growth has been systematically different under the two types of administration and that this difference contributes to explain output fluctuations

majority rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods abstract despite evidence that modern democracies systematically shortchange public investment goods relatively little theoretical work exists to explain this phenomenon we build on baron and ferejohn s american political science review 83 4 1989 1181 1206 bargaining model to describe public investments in a setting of budgetary politics specifically we show that underinvestment inherently arises from distributive politics within a majoritarian institution the inability of current majorities to contract with future ones drives a wedge between spending on consumption today and investing for future consumption extensions to the model demonstrate that earmarking future returns to specific players and or detaching consumption from investment decisions yields more efficient levels of public investment

legislative term limits and state spending supporters of legislative term limits often claim that they will lower state spending levels using fiscal data from 48 states from 1977 to 2001 this paper finds little support for this assertion instead this analysis finds that states with term limits have higher spending levels than states without term limits these results suggest that term limits give legislators greater incentives to deviate from socially optimal fiscal policy by altering the legislative environment in which such policy is formulated

property tax revaluation and tax levy growth abstract jurisdiction wide property revaluation like many administrative reforms may have unintended consequences this paper examines one such potential consequence by pooling 18 year time series for each of 39 massachusetts cities 17 of which revalued and 270 massachusetts towns 202 of which revalued we examine the hypothesis that politicians take advantage of the confusion generated by revaluation and raise property taxes by more than they otherwise would have we observe such a response in cities but not in towns and attribute this difference to differences in their governmental structures

testing for cojumps in high frequency financial data an approach based on first high low last prices this paper proposes a new test for simultaneous intraday jumps in a panel of high frequency financial data we utilize intraday first high lowlast values of asset prices to construct estimates for the cross variation of returns in a large panel of high frequency financial data and then employ these estimates to provide a first high low last price based test statistic to detect common large discrete movements co jumps we study the finite sample behavior of our first high low last price based test using monte carlo simulation and find that it is more powerful than the bollerslev et al 2008 return based co jump test when applied to a panel of high frequency data from the chinese mainland stock market our first high low last price based test identifies more common jumps than the return based test in this emerging market

the social multiplier aggregate data is often used to make inferences about individual level behavior if there are social interactions in which one person s actions influence his neighbor s incentives or information then these inferences are inappropriate the presence of positive social interactions or strategic complementarities implies the existence of a social multiplier where aggregate relationships will overstate individual elasticities we present a brief model and then estimate the size of the social multiplier in three areas the impact of education on wages the impact of demographics on crime and group membership among dartmouth roommates in these contexts there is a significant social multiplier jel ho jo co

the determinants of off budget activity of state and local governments the primary finding of this paper is that the off budget activity of the public sector is significantly and positively related to on budget activity by state and local governments we suggest the following policy implications one there appears to be evidence that the composition of total government activity is related to the relative costs of the alternative avenues of providing governmental activity future research into determining the nature of the relative cost differences may be one useful means of understanding both the composition of government activity as well as its total size two our ability to measure the true size of public sector participation in the economy must go well beyond our attempt here while we have presented information on one of the important hidden elements of public sector participation we are still a long way from effectively incorporating similar data on legislation regulations and so forth into our empirical tests further research into these issues is clearly warranted

are cash budgets a cure for excess fiscal deficits and at what cost abstract this paper investigates the effect of recent reforms of budgetary institutions in uganda and zambia we argue that cash budgeting has brought clear benefits in terms of improved expenditure control with regard to line ministries contrary to what is often suggested however adoption of a cash budget has not provided a means for top politicians in either country to tie their hands with respect to intervention in fiscal policy decisions in uganda improved fiscal policy outcomes have in fact been achieved as a result of and not in spite of discretionary interventions by top politicians in zambia a strict rule imposing a balanced budget on a monthly basis has proven partially effective due in no small part to international monetary fund imf enforcement but costly in terms of increased volatility of expenditures

the effect of income taxation on consumption and labor supply we estimate the incentive effects of income taxation in a life cycle model of consumption and labor supply without intratemporal strong separability we find that consumption and hours worked are direct complements in utility both increase with a compensated increase in the net wage the compensated net wage elasticity is about 0 3 nearly double estimates for u s men from a linear labor supply specification estimated intertemporal elasticities indicate significant intertemporal smoothing of utility the estimated marginal welfare cost of government revenue is 6 20 which is about half the estimated welfare cost when additivity between consumption and leisure is incorrectly imposed

bohn s test of fiscal sustainability of the american state governments the dramatic fall in state revenues during the great recession and the resultant large budget deficits accentuated concerns about state fiscal sustainability i employ a model based approach proposed by bohn 1998 to test for sustainability in this approach a positive and significant reaction of the ratio of primary surplus ratio s to lagged debt constitutes a sufficient condition for sustainability based on a panel of 48 contiguous states 1961 2008 and several model specifications i find robust evidence in favor of sustainability further analysis suggests that the adjustment of the components of s to debt is asymmetric with the revenue side bearing a heavier burden than the spending side the response of s is also found to be asymmetric with respect to the level of debt finally the magnitude of the response is larger in states with a higher degree of fiscal stringency in general and own revenue and no deficit carryover provisions in particular

the economic future of europe after three years of near stagnation the mood in europe is definitely gloomy many doubt that the european model has a future in this paper i argue that things are not so bad and there is room for optimism over the last thirty years productivity growth has been much faster in europe than in the united states productivity levels are roughly similar today in the european union and in the united states the main difference is that europe has used some of the increase in productivity to increase leisure rather than income while the united states has done the opposite still not everything is well unemployment is still high and europe suffers from inefficient regulation here also however there is more action than often perceived and a wide ranging reform process is taking place this process is driven by reforms in financial and product markets reforms in those markets are in turn putting pressure for reform in the labor market reform in the labor market is slowly taking place but not without political tensions these tensions dominate the news but they are a symptom of change not a reflection of immobility

political alternation and the fiscal deficits abstract this paper proposes the index of political alternation as a long run measure of political competition it expands the empirical literature on political determinants of fiscal performance and presents evidence for argentina that amplifications of governments planning horizon enhance fiscal performance

unemployment market work and household production time diary data from four countries suggest that differences in market time between the unemployed and employed represent additional leisure not increased household production in areas where unemployment is cyclically high however reduced market work is offset by additional home production

tax innovation in the states capitalizing on political opportunity this paper assesses the factors that prompt states to adopt taxes during the twentieth century we test five explanations of state tax innovation derived from the literature economic development fiscal health election cycle party control and regional diffusion using event history analysis a pooled cross sectional time series technique while little support is found for the economic development and party control explanations our empirical results are highly consistent with a political opportunity explanation of state tax adoptions 1 the presence of a long time until the next election 2 the existence of a fiscal crisis and 3 the presence of neighboring states that have previously adopted a tax all create opportunities for politicians to shield themselves from the political costs of supporting a tax increase and are all shown by empirical analysis to increase the probability of a tax adoption this empirical evidence is consistent across different tax instruments and different periods of analysis throughout the twentieth century

fiscal transfers and fiscal sustainability we examine whether the u s and german state governments pursue sustainable fiscal policies taking into account fiscal transfers using panel data techniques we investigate whether the debt to gdp ratio had a positive influence on the primary surplus bohn model we show that including excluding fiscal transfers changes the results if fiscal transfers are not included in the primary surplus the test results do not indicate that the u s and german state governments pursued sustainable fiscal policies our results also suggest that fiscal transfers were positively related to debt these findings indicate that intergovernmental transfers have implicitly subsidized debts

direct democracy and public employees in the public sector employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage and wages may be inefficiently high because of the strength of public employee interest groups this paper explores whether the initiative process a direct democracy institution of growing importance can control these political economy problems as proponents and some research suggests based on a sample of 650 cities in 2000 i find that when public employees are not allowed to bargain collectively and patronage may be a problem initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages when public employees are allowed to bargain collectively driving up wages the initiative appears to cut wages by about 4 percent but has no measurable effect on employment the employment cutting result is quite robust surviving a number of robustness tests the wage cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests

the subnational politics of economic adjustment provincial politics and fiscal performance in argentina existing research has failed to address the impact of subnational politics on economic adjustment this article attempts to fill this gap by outlining theoretical reasons for anticipating policy divergences across levels of government and by offering three hypotheses to account for variation at the subnational level the authors explore these ideas on the basis of the argentine experience the study traces the impact of subnational policy on argentine economic adjustment and tests hypotheses about subnational policy variation on the basis of provincial fiscal data the authors findings underline the importance of subnational policy choice for national performance and suggest a revised understanding of the role of political competition in the economic adjustment process the authors find considerable evidence that interactions between party competition and the structure of the public sector shape provincial fiscal performance and thereby condition the capacity for economic adjustment at the national level

defining the government s debt and deficit defining the government s debt and deficit although the budget deficit and the public debt feature prominently in political debate and economic research there is no agreement about how they should be measured they can be defined for different sets of public institutions including the nested sets corresponding to central government general government and the public sector and for any definition of government there are many measures of the debt and deficit including those generated by four kinds of accounts cash financial full accrual and comprehensive which can be derived from four nested sets of assets and liabilities each debt and deficit measure says something about public finances but none tells the whole story each is also vulnerable to manipulation and is likely to be manipulated if it is subject to a binding fiscal rule or target narrow definitions of government encourage the shifting of spending to entities outside the defined perimeter of government narrow definitions of debt and deficit encourage operations involving off balance sheets assets and liabilities while broad measures are susceptible to the mismeasurement of on balance sheet assets and liabilities reviewing the literature on these issues the paper concludes that governments should publish several measures of the debt and deficit in a form that clearly reveals their interrelationships

the political economy of fiscal deficits a survey this paper surveys recent literature both theoretical and empirical regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits 1 opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections even in conflict with general welfare 2 conflicts of interests between politicians partisan preferences create incentives for at least some incumbents to run deficits and 3 conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending this paper reviews these different strands of the literature it also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes promising avenues for future research are highlighted

economic and political determinants of fee income in norwegian local governments this paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of fee income in norweigan local governments the point of departure is a representative voter model emphasizing the effects of pure economic variables the benchmark model is extended by including two aspects of the political system ideology and strength it is evident that increased socialist influence increases the size of the local public sector while a strong political leadership has an advantage in opposing pressure to increase spending