heterogeneity in the adoption of photovoltaic systems in flanders abstract we study the determinants of pv adoption in the region of flanders belgium where pv adoption reached high levels during 2006 2012 because of active government intervention based on a unique dataset at a very detailed spatial level we estimate a poisson model to explain the heterogeneity in adoption rates we obtain the following findings first local policies have a robust and significant impact on pv adoption second there is a strong unconditional income effect implying a matthew effect in the subsidization of pvs our third finding is however that this income effect is largely driven by the fact that wealthier households are more likely to adopt because they tend to be higher users are more frequent house owners or own houses that are better suited for pv in several extensions we consider the determinants of the average size of installed pvs and the differential impact of certain variables over time

time preferences and mortgage choice abstractmortgage decisions have important consequences for consumers lenders and the state of the economy more generally mortgage decisions are also prototypical of consumer financial choices that involve a stream of expenditures and consumption occurring across time the authors use heterogeneity in time preferences for both immediate present bias and long term outcomes to explain a sequence of mortgage decisions including mortgage choice and the decision to abandon a mortgage the authors employ an analytic model and a survey of mortgaged households augmented by zip code level house price and foreclosure data the model suggests and data confirm that consumers with greater present bias and long term discounting tend to choose mortgages that minimize up front costs however greater present bias decreases homeowners willingness to abandon a mortgage locking them into the contract long term patience increases mortgage abandonment this reversal across mortgage decisions is difficult for alternati

learning by bidding we analyze a dynamic second price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who upon seeing a posted price learns whether his valuation is above that price in the essentially unique equilibrium an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise an uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder this model also provides a rationale behind the use of a secret reserve price in private value settings

time inconsistent preferences and the annuitization decision good news can involve difficult decisions for example winning a lottery jackpot can go along with the decision whether to have the jackpot paid out immediately as a lump sum or as periodic annual payments also when entering retirement most people face the decision whether they want their defined contribution account balance paid as a lump sum or to annuitize that amount the fact that people tend to choose the lump sum even if economic reasons suggest that they should choose the annuity is called the annuity paradox in a large online survey we find that people behave time inconsistent older people have a stronger tendency to choose the lump sum than younger people when they are asked to predict today what to choose when they retire this effect is considerably stronger for participants that answer simple time preference questions inconsistently our findings suggest to think about precommitment devices for the annuitization decision in the retirement case already at the time when the defined benefit plan is started

discount rates and credit markets theory and evidence from rural india three models of credit markets 1 the permanent income model 2 upward sloping credit supply to individual borrowers and 3 constrained credit due to imperfect enforcement are tested using credit market data and an experimental study of individuals discount rates in south india the permanent income model is rejected by both the discount rate and the credit market data the discount rate data are consistent with either of the other two models while the credit market data are consistent with a combination of these two models other explanations are found to be insufficient to explain the results of this study

internal pricing and cost allocation in a model of multiproduct competition with finite capacity increments internal prices are used in practice to allocate central resources to a firms profit centers the fixed costs of capacity acquisitions are often included in these prices we examine the interaction between capacity acquisition and competition when capacity is available in fixed increments we find predictably that if the increments are small unit capacity cost is a good approximation for the internal price and if the increments are large the internal price is zero however the relationship between the internal price and the capacity increment for intermediate cases is quite irregular to the extent that it is not possible to approximate the internal price with accounting data the analysis also suggests that full cost allocation overcharges for the opportunity cost of capacity furthermore the right internal price does not act either as a way of recovering fixed costs or as a proxy for externalities such as congestion costs the conclusions are not materially altered in the case where variable costs increase at the margin and where these costs rather than hard capacity constraints are the reason to restrict output

outcome signs question frames and discount rates this study explains why gain loss discount rate differences reported in previous studies cannot be attributed to outcome sign alone but rather must be associated with particular outcome sign question frame combinations to do so it extends loewenstein s 1988 framing model of intertemporal choice to negative outcomes and uses the resulting predictions to interpret and integrate the results of three previous studies comparing subjective discount rates thaler 1981 loewenstein 1988 benzion et al 1989 the new framework reveals previously unidentified linkages among outcome signs question frames and discount rates to investigate whether losses and gains are in fact discounted differently an experiment is conducted that includes a neutral frame intertemporal choice scenario no proposed change in outcome timing for each outcome sign the results show that subjective discount rates vary in a predictable way according to the outcome sign and question frame combination examined

energy efficiency and financial literacy abstract financial literacy explains anomalies in a wide range of consumers financial decisions we extend the literature on financial literacy by examining its role in the purchase of energy consumer durables a setting purported to suffer from sub optimal levels of investment due to consumer mistakes we augment a standard choice experiment for purchasing a hot water system with data on financial literacy financial literacy is an economically important and statistically significant determinant of investment in energy efficiency this result is robust to incorporating individual discount rates and risk aversion as well as standard controls such as income and education indicating that financial literacy is not merely a proxy for standard demographic characteristics financial literacy also makes choices more consistent with standard consumer preferences and increases the probability that respondents select investments with the lowest lifetime discounted costs the results establish low financial literacy as a mechanism driving low investment in energy efficiency

an experimental test on retirement decisions i introduction the reform of social security systems is now one of the main issues on the economic policy agenda of most industrialized countries it is widely considered that unless serious changes take place the aging of the population implying a rise in the number of retirees relative to that of workers will threaten the viability of pay as you go public pension systems in the long run this threat is being reinforced by the progressive reduction in the retirement age of the working population the central reforms that are being proposed to neutralize these future financing problems are the raising of the contribution rate the decreasing of pension benefits or and the delay of the retirement age with reference to this latter reform as blondal and scarpetta 1998 state a direct way to encourage people to work longer would be to raise the pensionable age but delaying the retirement age may not be very popular according to recent surveys most workers claim that they are happy with the current retirement age see cremer and pestieau 2003 this may help to explain why reforms on the legal retirement age have currently become a very delicate matter for governments 1 on the other hand pension systems in virtually all organization for economic cooperation and development oecd countries in the mid 1990s made it financially unattractive to work after the age of 55 see gruber and wise 1997 or blondal and scarpetta 1998 indeed the general consensus in the theoretical literature related to social security and retirement decisions is that pension systems create enormous incentives to leave the labor force early 2 therefore increasing the retirement age as a tool to improve the financial problems of public pensions systems faces two sensitive problems the opposition of workers to a delay in the standard retirement age and the disincentives to continuous work being embedded in the pension system the large decline in labor force participation is attributed to the specific fact that to keep on working implies a reduction in the present value of total pension benefits the terms old age pension wealth and implicit tax on postponing retirement have been frequently used to illustrate these disincentives in the pension system the old age pension wealth is the discounted value of expected pension benefits minus the discounted cost of obtaining such benefits after the earliest age at which pensions can be accessed working for an extra year may imply changes in this pension wealth by foregoing 1 yr of pensions paying contributions for an additional year and maybe increasing the pension benefits per year therefore if the costs of postponing retirement are higher than the gains then it is considered that the pension system is implicitly taxing to prolong the working period that is the drop in pension wealth acts as an implicit tax on income from continued work and as such is a clear incentive to retire early actually reforms aiming to increase the effective retirement age to improve the financial problems of public pensions systems have mainly focused on the reduction of this implicit tax on prolonging the working period it is also considered that when the increase in pension benefits is exactly offset by the higher cost in terms of contributions and forgone pensions the pension system is not distorting the retirement decision that is the pension systems that are marginally actuarially fair will not distort individual decisions concerning retirement age and consequently they are defined as neutral systems for this reason the main economic policy measures move in the direction of strengthening the link between lifetime contributions and pension benefits 3 indeed this reform is one of the policy conclusions of maintaining prosperity in an ageing society oecd 2000 the most appropriate reform would be to allow people to retire at the age of their own choice and to adjust pension level so that the pension system is neutral on average

on representative social capital abstract this paper analyzes the behavior of subjects randomly drawn from the dutch population who reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest and reward investments in an economic experiment we find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries men the young and elderly and low educated individuals invest relatively less but reward significantly more investments the age effects are found to corroborate existing findings whereas those of gender and education do not higher expected levels of investments by others are found to have a positive and significant effect on own investments finally a laboratory experiment with student subjects is found to provide a lower bound of the population level of social capital

possession and discounting behavior abstract subjects chose when they could first use financial rewards between choices 2 months apart we manipulated the early reward date and whether participants took immediate possession quasi hyperbolic discounting is rejected in favor of hyperbolic discounting without but not with possession

discounting behaviour and the magnitude effect evidence from a field experiment in denmark we evaluate the claim that individuals exhibit a magnitude effect in their discounting behaviour where higher discount rates are inferred from choices made with lower principals all else being equal if the magnitude effect is quantitatively significant it is not appropriate to use one discount rate that is independent of the scale of the project for cost benefit analysis and capital budgeting using data from a field experiment in denmark we find statistically significant evidence of a magnitude effect that is much smaller than is claimed this evidence surfaces only if one controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the population

sunk costs and strategic commitment a proposed three stage equilibrium dixit s i980 paper in this journal the role of investment in entry deterrence has attracted considerable interest from economists concerned with constructing a modern theory of strategic behaviour towards entry in fact the paper has spawned quite an industry of commitment models in which the equilibrium payoffs in some final period game can be influenced by strategic commitments made by the players in an earlier period for similar models with important insights into strategic entry deterrence see eaton and lipsey i980 i98i schmalensee i98i the purpose of this note is to argue that when the instrument of stragetic commitment takes the form of sunk costs which both entrant and incumbent have to bear as it does in dixit s paper and in many other examples a three stage model rather than the two stage model presented by dixit is required although the proposed equilibrium differs from dixit s its qualitative features are the same it may or may not be profitable to deter entry and if it is the first mover may still prefer to play an accommodation strategy and allow entry to take place following dixit we restrict our attention to the asymmetric case in which one firm the incumbent makes the first move the two stage game involves the first mover sinking part of its costs in advance so that in the second stage equilibrium it will have a current cost advantage over the entrant which must incur the full cost of producing any desired output level the second period cost asymmetry ensures the incumbent a lar ger share of the post entry market which may be sufficient to deter entry altogether the problem with the two stage game lies in the nature of sunk costs sunk costs by definition are committed before the production period takes place if they were expended as a flow simultaneously with production they would not be sunk the installation of capacity is the natural example employed by dixit and well illustrates the point if installed capacity is a sunk cost which it must be for the incumbent to acquire any strategic advantage at all then the entrant s installed capacity is equally sunk and must also be committed before the production period takes place given this observation the post entry final period equilibrium should not be modelled as if the entrant were simultaneously incurring both variable and sunk costs but the incumbent only incurs variable costs this implies too great an asymmetry in favour of the incumbent the final period equilibrium should involve both firms incurring only variable

non hyperbolic time inconsistency the commonly used hyperbolic and quasi hyperbolic discount functions have been developed to accommodate decreasing impatience which is the prevailing empirical finding in intertemporal choice in particular for aggregate behavior however these discount functions do not have the flexibility to accommodate increasing impatience or strongly decreasing impatience this lack of flexibility is particularly disconcerting for fitting data at the individual level where various patterns of increasing impatience and strongly decreasing impatience will occur for a significant fraction of subjects this paper presents discount functions with constant absolute cadi or constant relative crdi decreasing impatience that can accommodate any degree of decreasing or increasing impatience in particular they are sufficiently flexible for analyses at the individual level the cadi and crdi discount functions are the analogs of the well known cara and crra utility functions for decision under risk

the intrinsic comparative dynamics of infinite horizon optimal control problems with a time varying discount rate and time distance discounting abstract the intrinsic comparative dynamics of a ubiquitous class of optimal control problems with a time varying discount rate and time distance discounting are derived and shown to be characterized by a positive semidefinite matrix it is also shown that the said comparative dynamics are invariant to the functional form of the discount rate function and the type of agent consequently if one limits econometric testing to the basic comparative dynamics of the given class of control problems one cannot determine i the functional form of the discount rate function used by an agent and thus if an agent is a time consistent or time inconsistent decision maker or ii if an agent commits to a plan of action or takes into account the changing nature of his preferences when choosing a plan

reputation and imperfect information abstract a common observation in the informal literature of economics and elsewhere is that is multistage games players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else but this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game theoretic analyses of finite games such as selten s finitely repeated chain store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma we reexamine selten s model adding to it a small amount of imperfect or incomplete information about players payoffs and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects

wind power externalities a meta analysis this study presents the first quantitative meta analysis of the non market valuation literature on the external effects associated with wind power production a data set of 60 observations drawn from 32 studies is constructed the relative economic values of different types of externalities as well as the impact of various methodological and sample characteristics on welfare estimates are examined the results indicate a significant effect of visual externalities on welfare estimates in both directions i e a positive effect of visual improvements and a negative effect of deteriorations this finding corresponds to predictions of the importance of visual impacts in the social science literature external effects of wind power on biodiversity mainly birds do not affect welfare estimates indirect externalities caused by conventional sources of electricity that can be avoided by wind power such as a the reduction of air pollution do neither have a significant impact on welfare measures methodologically we find substantial but inelastic income effects and for choice experiments clear evidence of sensitivity to scope from a policy point of view our results suggest that a policy mix combining a promotion of wind turbines with another green policy facilitates expansion of wind energy

a simultaneous approach to the estimation of risk aversion and the subjective time discount rate in this paper we analyze a sample of 1832 individuals who responded to six randomly generated lottery questions that differ with respect to chance prize and the timing of the draw using a model that explicitly allows for consumption smoothing we obtain an estimate of relative risk aversion of 82 instead assuming consumption to be immediate gives an estimate of 2 close to what is traditionally reported while a model of full asset integration gives estimates higher by several orders of magnitude our results show that estimated risk aversion is sensitive to the assumptions made with respect to the consumption profile and that it is possible to determine the level of asset integration endogenously the average subjective time discount rate which includes a preference for the present equals 6 percent per month it is found that both parameters vary strongly over individuals and that the variation can be explained by income age gender and entrepreneurship consistent with the majority of previous evidence

cost based transfer pricing under r d risk aversion in an integrated supply chain abstract this paper examines the economic role of transfer pricing for a vertically integrated supply chain when a risk averse production division manager faces uncertainty on the outcomes from r d investment in particular we compare two representative cost based transfer pricing methods full cost and variable cost pricing we construct an economic model based on the assumption that r d investment reduces the expected fixed costs of a production factor as well as the variable production costs we show that a firm s profit under full cost transfer pricing is greater than that under variable cost transfer pricing under certainty contrary to this benchmark result variable cost pricing becomes more profitable than full cost pricing when the risk averse manager bears relatively high risk

masters of our time impatience and self control in high level chess games this paper presents empirical findings on gender differences in time preference and inconsistency based on international high level chess panel data with a large number of observations including a control for ability due to the time constraint in chess it is possible to study performance and choices related to time preferences the results suggest that men play shorter games on average and pay a higher price to end the game sooner they also perform worse in shorter game compared to women but better in longer games furthermore women perform worse in time pressure the 40th move time control the results are consistent with the interpretation that men are more impatient with a lower discount factor but also more inconsistent in the sense that they tend to be too impatient women on the other hand are more inconsistent as they tend to over consume reflection time in the beginning leading to time pressure later

on the rationality of buying from a price predator abstract by means of a simple example i demonstrate that it may be rational for consumers to purchase at predatory prices even though the exit of the intended victim and the consequent price increase are correctly anticipated

heterogeneity in risky choice behaviour in a broad population we analyse risk preferences using an experiment with real incentives in a representative sample of 1 422 dutch respondents our econometric model incorporates four structural parameters that vary with observed and unobserved characteristics utility curvature loss aversion preferences towards the timing of uncertainty resolution and the propensity to choose randomly rather than on the basis of preferences we find that all four parameters contribute to explaining choice behaviour the structural parameters are significantly associated with socio economic variables but it is essential to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in each of them to match the rich variety of choice patterns in the data

risk attitudes randomization to treatment and self selection into experiments randomization to treatment is fundamental to statistical control in the design of experiments however randomization implies some uncertainty about treatment condition and individuals differ in their preferences towards taking on risk since human subjects often volunteer for experiments or are allowed to drop out of the experiment at any time if they want to it is possible that the sample observed in an experiment might be biased because of the risk of randomization on the other hand the widespread use of a guaranteed show up fee that is non stochastic may generate sample selection biases of the opposite direction encouraging more risk averse samples into experiments we directly test these hypotheses that risk attitudes play a role in sample selection our results suggest that randomization bias does affect the overall level of risk aversion in the sample we observe but that it does not affect the demographic mix of risk attitudes in the sample we show that the common use of non stochastic show up fees can generate samples that are more risk averse than would otherwise have been observed

modernization and time preferences in tanzania evidence from a large scale elicitation exercise abstract assumptions about individual time preferences are important for explanations of poverty and development data from a large scale elicitation exercise in tanzania show significantly higher levels of impatience in urban areas than in rural areas this result remains robust to adding controls for socio economic differences between rural and urban areas which possibly correlate with time preferences we attribute this to differences in modernisation between urban and rural areas with modernisation leading to increased impatience this is corroborated by the observed positive correlation between impatience and education the latter being an important vehicle of modernisation for traditional societies in tanzania

the personal discount rate evidence from military downsizing programs the military drawdown program of the early 1990s provides an opportunity to obtain estimates of personal discount rates based on large numbers of people making real choices involving large sums the program offered over 65 000 separatees the choice between an annuity and a lump sum payment despite break even discount rates exceeding 17 percent most of the separatees selected the lump sum saving taxpayers 1 7 billion in separation costs estimates of discount rates range from 0 to over 30 percent and vary with education age race sex number of dependents ability test score and the size of payment

competition as a savings incentive a field experiment at a homeless shelter abstract this paper describes a randomized field experiment testing the impact of a savings competition on the behavior of homeless individuals staying at a transitional shelter when monetary prizes were offered for achieving the highest saving rates within a particular month average savings increased by 80 a 30 increase in savings rate while income and attendance at case management meetings remained unchanged however repeating the competition in the following month had no effect because responsive savers selected out of the shelter after the first month in summary while a savings competition can increase savings in the short run its effect may be limited to the intensive margin and may diminish with repetition

intertemporal choice with liquidity constraints theory and experiment since thaler 1981 we have lived with the uncomfortable stylized fact that many humans choose strictly dominated actions in intertemporal choice experiments we designed an experiment to probe the reasons for the apparently suboptimal behavior and we find that the classic fisher 1930 intertemporal choice theory with perceived transaction costs and liquidity constraints is perfectly consistent with our experimental data whereas hyperbolic discounting is not

the impact of education on subjective discount rate in ugandan villages abstract heterogeneity in time discounting may reinforce the existing barriers to save and invest faced by rural populations in developing countries we elicit a subjective discount rate for a varied sample of ugandan villagers in accordance with other studies we have found the discount rate to decrease with education we examine this correlation further by testing the causal effect of education and exploit two different sources of its variation school frequency across villages and the number of the respondents school going years that overlap with the era of the dictator idi amin s rule for men we find that education has a significant impact on their discount rate similar in magnitude for both types of instruments and robust to observable characteristics this finding highlights the importance of education in development

a theory of market structure with sequential entry this article sets out a theory of market structure with sequential entry we characterize the perfect nash equilibrium to the entry game in several propositions first equilibria never involve excess capacity second a sufficient statistic for the entry of any firm is that its profits are positive when computed myopically i e with no further entry third the equilibrium number of firms is the smallest number that can deter entry fourth aggregate output in equilibrium is no smaller than the limit output we calculate some explicit solutions to the model and examine comparative static properties

environmental choices and hyperbolic discounting an experimental analysis environmental goods such as carbon abatement or green space development often generate benefit streams that may not occur until far into the future how individual consumers value such amenities therefore depends critically on the discount rate the usual assumption is that agents discount future values using constant exponential rate but there is some evidence from the lab suggesting that discount functions are more likely quasi hyperbolic we compare estimates of subjects rate of intertemporal time preference for financial rewards and environmental goods using multiple price list and a new matrix multiple price list approaches our objective is to determine if discount functions for environmental and monetary goods differ and to estimate the structure of discounting in both contexts we find that financial discount functions are not hyperbolic but those for environmental goods are discount rates for environmental goods are generally lower than for financial rewards but are still above zero consumers therefore value long lived environmental goods differently than financial goods

optimal sin taxes abstract we investigate sin taxes on unhealthy items such as fatty foods that people may by their own reckoning consume too much of we employ a standard optimal taxation framework but replace the standard assumption that all consumers have 100 self control with an assumption that some consumers may have some degree of self control problems we show that imposing taxes on unhealthy items and returning the proceeds to consumers can generally improve total social surplus because such taxes counteract over consumption by consumers with self control problems while at the same time they naturally redistribute income to consumers with no self control problems who consume less such taxes can even create pareto improvements finally we demonstrate with some simple numerical examples that even if the population exhibits relatively few self control problems optimal taxes can still be large

individual preferences and the exponential growth bias abstract the exponential growth bias egb refers to individuals underestimation of the effects of exponential growth and has been shown to affect important financial decisions such as retirement savings we develop and test a novel experimental design to evaluate the magnitude of the egb based on multiple price lists our design simultaneously elicits the egb as well as subjects utility curvatures and time preferences allowing for non linear utility we structurally estimate the magnitude of the egb as about half as large as when linear utility is assumed these results shed light on the relationship between individual preferences and the egb

laboratory testbeds and non market valuation the case of bidding behavior in a second price auction with an outside option researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field application which some argue has less experimental control but lab valuation work raises its own set of concerns when it uses private goods to explore non market valuation behavior because private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab therefore the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work may be limited herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a second price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity theory predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding strategies and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option our results suggest that bidders account for outside options when formulating bids with behavior following comparative static predictions in addition we provide evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior with induced values the data suggesting a hypothetical bias in the level of bids but not in bid shaving

discounting the distant future an experimental investigation we use a laboratory experiment to elicit discount rates over a 20 year time horizon using government savings bonds as a payment vehicle when using a constant exponential discount rate function we find an implied average discount rate of 4 9 which is much lower than has been found in previous experimental studies that used time horizons of days or months however we also find strong support for non constant declining discount rates for longer time horizons with an extrapolated implied annual discount rate approaching 0 5 in 100 years there is heterogeneity in discount rates and risk preferences in that people with more optimistic beliefs about technological progress have higher discount rates these findings contribute to the debate over the appropriate discount rate to use in comparing the long term benefits of climate change mitigation to the more immediate costs

endogenous time preferences of forest goods and community based forest management abstract in the economic analysis of cbfm people s discount rates are assumed exogenous and same for all goods we examined the validity of this assumption by eliciting the discount rates of households for grass timber fuelwood and money and analyzed the impacts of various personal and economic factors on households discount rates we found that time preferences are endogenous and good specific a good proportion of households have infinite discount rates for forest goods the mean values of monthly discount rates for households that indicated finite discount rates are 0 67 for timber 6 83 for fuelwood 55 49 for grass and 3 47 for money the availability of alternative sources and current consumption of the forest goods are two main determinants of a household s discount rates the study provides many useful insights for the design and implementation of cbfm programs the concept of mental accounting should be used for economic analyses of cbfm programs different management strategies should be adopted for different forest goods and alternative sources should be provided to meet the current needs of the households

risk aversion time preferences and out migration experimental evidence from ghana and indonesia abstract it has long been hypothesized that migrants and non migrants differ in their individual risk and time preferences due to a lack of reliable data on migrants preferences empirical evidence however is scarce therefore this paper has sought to advance research on preferences and migration decisions by using original household survey data from two developing countries that are both characterized by a longstanding tradition in regional migration in coastal communities in ghana and indonesia individual risk and time preferences have not only been elicited through survey questions but also through experimental tasks with real and relatively large monetary payoffs there is evidence that out migrants from both study regions are significantly less risk averse and have a lower time preference than non migrants overall the results indicate that the considered individual preferences are as important as employment status education or networks which have mainly been the focus of migration theories

elderly care and intrafamily resource allocation when children migrate this paper considers the intrafamily allocation of elderly care in the context of international migration where migrant children may be able to provide financial assistance to their parents but are unable to offer physical care to investigate sibling interaction i estimate best response functions for individual physical and financial contributions as a function of siblings contributions after addressing the endogeneity of siblings contributions and selection into migration i find evidence that siblings financial contributions function as strategic complements while time contributions operate as strategic substitutes this suggests that contributions may be based on both strategic bequest and public good motivations

product line selection production decisions and allocation of common fixed costs abstract product costs are determined in practice for the purpose of pricing make buy and product line decisions while many costs are directly assignable to individual products common costs have historically presented a difficult conundrum a variety of cost allocation methods are used in practice or have been suggested in the literature to attach these costs to individual products while such procedures are theoretically unsupported they may be able to mimic the correct decisions adequately in this paper we investigate the efficacy of certain cost allocation schemes in a competitive environment the schemes are evaluated with reference to a scenario in which there is a single fixed cost incurred in manufacturing any subset of a set of products under idealized conditions a cournot nash model is developed that describes the number of entering firms and the equilibrium price and production levels using this as a point of reference it is shown that by using gross contribution as an allocation basis optimal product line decisions are achieved without distorting the selection of production levels moreover competitive pressure sufficient to drive total net profits close to zero is sufficient to require that any allocation rule supporting optimal product line decisions yields allocations nearly proportional to gross contributions an analogy is drawn with the allocation of joint costs to coproducts in a competitive environment and the corresponding allocation in proportion to net realizable value

game theory and cost allocation problems problems of allocating joint costs in a reasonable way arise in many practical situations where people decide to work together to save costs cost allocation methods based on game theoretical concepts take into account the strategic aspects of cost allocation situations we give a survey of cost allocation methods based on the nucleolus and the shapley value and introduce also a new one the so called cost gap allocation method which is based on the i value it is shown that for some large subclasses of cost allocation problems this new cost allocation method coincides with old separable cost methods proposed in the thirties by the tennessee valley authority and also with the separable costs remaining benefits scrb method properties of this cost gap allocation method are also treated

empirical determinants of intertemporal choice abstract we provide new evidence on the empirical determinants of intertemporal financial decisions we use an exogenously imposed choice affecting nearly all croatian retirees to study characteristics associated with choosing a larger deferred stream of payments over a smaller more immediate payment individuals are more willing to defer if they have higher incomes and are not liquidity constrained have a longer time horizon because of better health and longer life expectancy and have stronger bequest motives individuals who expect currency devaluation or political risk to reduce the value of future income are more likely to take the earlier income stream

predation reputation and entry deterrence abstract economists often argue that predatory practices are irrational since there exist cheaper or more certain means to gain or maintain a monopoly our gametheoretic equilibrium analysis suggests that if a firm is threatened by several potential entrants then predation may be rational against early entrants even if it is costly when viewed in isolation because it yields a reputation which deters other entrants asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis since it provides the rationale for entrants to base their expectations of the firm s future behavior on its past actions the analysis also suggests methods to treat general reputational phenomena

anatomy of the credit score abstract this paper addresses the question of what determines a poor credit score we compare estimated credit scores with measures of impulsivity time preference risk attitude and trustworthiness in an effort to determine the preferences that underlie credit behavior data is collected using an incentivized decision making lab experiment together with financial and psychological surveys credit scores are estimated using an online fico credit score estimator based on survey data supplied by the participants preferences are assessed using a survey measure of impulsivity with experimental measures of time and risk preferences as well as trustworthiness controlling for income differences we find that the credit score is correlated with measures of impulsivity time preference and trustworthiness

discounting behavior a reconsideration we re evaluate the theory experimental design and econometrics behind claims that individuals exhibit non constant discounting behavior theory points to the importance of controlling for the non linearity of the utility function of individuals since the discount rate is defined over time dated utility flows and not flows of money it also points to a menagerie of functional forms to characterize different types of non constant discounting behavior the implied experimental design calls for individuals to undertake several tasks to allow us to identify these models and to several treatments such as multiple horizons and the effect of allowing for a front end delay on earlier payments the implied econometrics calls for structural estimation of the theoretical models allowing for joint estimation of utility functions and discounting functions using data collected from a representative sample of 413 adult danes in 2009 we draw striking conclusions assuming an exponential discounting model we estimate discount rates to be 5 6 on average this is significantly lower than all previous estimates using controlled experiments we also find no evidence to support quasi hyperbolic discounting or fixed cost discounting and only modest evidence to support other specifications of non constant discounting furthermore the evidence for non constant discounting while statistically significant is not economically significant in terms of the size of the estimated discount rates we undertake extensive robustness checks on these findings including a detailed review of the previous comparable literature

social preferences in the lab a comparison of students and a representative population we report from a lab experiment conducted with a sample of participants that is nationally representative for the adult population in norway and two student samples economics students and non economics students the participants make choices both in a dictator game a non strategic environment and in a generalized trust game a strategic environment we find that the representative sample differs fundamentally from the student samples both in the relative importance assigned to different moral motives efficiency equity and reciprocity and in the level of selfish behavior it is also interesting to note that the gender effects observed in the student samples do not correspond to the gender effects observed in representative sample finally whereas economics students behave less pro socially than non economics students the two student groups are similar in the relative importance they assign to different moral motives

the rich domain of uncertainty source functions and their experimental implementation we often deal with uncertain events for which no probabilities are known several normative models have been proposed descriptive studies have usually been qualitative or they estimated ambiguity aversion through one single number this paper introduces the source method a tractable method for quantitatively analyzing uncertainty empirically the theoretical key is the distinction between different sources of uncertainty within which subjective choice based probabilities can still be defined source functions convert those subjective probabilities into willingness to bet we apply our method in an experiment where we do not commit to particular ambiguity attitudes but let the data speak

cost allocation and opportunity costs one explanation for the widespread use of allocated fixed costs is that they can serve as a proxy for difficult to calculate opportunity costs this explanation is pursued by modeling a service department as an m m s s queueing system two main results are that the expected value of opportunity costs equals both the incremental productivity of capacity and the optimal transfer price when the cost of capacity is of the form cs as and is close to one we show that allocated fixed costs are a good proxy for average opportunity costs however if there are great economies of scale is close to zero then a method which charges users only for the variable costs of the service department is recommended finally the economic efficiency of transfer prices based on either variable cost or full cost is compared with optimal transfer pricing policies

aggregate production planning for process industries under oligopolistic competition abstract we consider a competitive version of the traditional aggregate production planning model with capacity constraints in the general case multiple products are produced by a few competing producers oligopoly with limited capacities production quantities prices and consequently profits depend on production and allocation decisions of each producer in addition there is competition for the raw material whose supplies are limited and where prices reflect these limitations such situations have recently occurred in several process industry settings including petro refining petrochemicals basic chemicals cement fertilizers pharmaceuticals rubber paper food processing and metals we use a successive bertrand cournot framework to address this problem and to determine optimal production quantities prices and profits at the producers and at the raw material supplier our analysis allows a new way to understand and evaluate the marginal value of additional capacity when there is competition for the market and raw materials

discount rates inferred from decisions an experimental study two hundred and four students of economics and finance participated in an intertemporal choice experiment which manipulated three dimensions in a 4 4 4 factorial design scenario postponing a receipt postponing a payment expediting a receipt expediting a payment time delay 0 5 1 2 and 4 years and size of cashflow 40 200 1000 and 5000 individual discount rates were inferred from the responses and then used to test competitively four hypotheses regarding the behavior of discount rates the classical hypothesis asserting that the discount rate is uniform across scenarios time delays and sums of cashflow was flatly rejected a market segmentation approach was found lacking the results support an implicit risk hypothesis according to which delayed consequences are associated with an implicit risk value and an added compensation hypothesis which asserts that individuals require compensation for a change in their financial position

simpson s reversal paradox and cost allocation allocation of indirect costs among products sometimes yields a paradoxical result that unit cost for each product may increase under one method of allocation and may decrease for each product under another method the stalcup paper company case illustrate such behaviour of costs at the same time provides an accounting example of simpon s reversal paradox simpson 1951 which blyth 1972 discussed in the statistics literature as with other paradoxes this cost allocation paradox disappears upon closer scrutiny this paper examines the properties of allocated costs in order to arrive at an intuitive understanding of the results the relationship of the cost allocation problem to simpson s paradox and the implications of the analysis for cost control are briefly discussed necessary and sufficient condition for occurrence of the paradox is also given this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

judging experimental evidence on dynamic inconsistency abstract this article briefly summarizes and judges recent experimental developments exploring the predictions of dynamically inconsistent models an opinion is provided as to how the literature ma

the endowment effect and intertemporal choice a laboratory investigation we present a laboratory investigation of intertemporal choice i e elicited discount rates allowing for the influence of the endowment effect consistent with the previous literature we hypothesize that the endowment effect in an intertemporal choice setting results in substantially higher discount rates relative to when individuals treat the resources in question as found money our results support this hypothesis and our experimental design provides a new protocol for conducting choice experiments wherein the endowment effect is an important determinant of behaviour l effet de dotation et le choix inter temporel une analyse en laboratoire on presente une analyse en laboratoire de choix inter temporels i e de taux d escompte permettant a l effet de dotation de jouer selon les conventions dans la litterature specialisee on fait l hypothese que l effet de dotation dans un contexte de choix inter temporel resulte en des taux d escompte substantiellement plus eleves que quand les individus traitent les ressources comme de la monnaie trouvee les resultats supportent l hypothese et le design de l experience fournit un protocole pour mener des experiences de choix ou l effet de dotation est un determinant important du comportement

the today and tomorrow of kids time preferences and educational outcomes of children abstract we experimentally investigate the distribution of children s time preferences along gender and racial lines we find that boys are more impatient than girls and black children are more impatient than white children black boys have the highest discount rates of all groups most importantly we show that impatience has a direct correlation with behavior that is predictive of economic success an increase of one standard deviation in the discount rate is associated with an increase in the number of disciplinary referrals that a child has the following school year by 14 our results suggest that impatience might play an important role in determining the success of performance incentive programs for school children

putting it off for later procrastination and end of fiscal year spending spikes many governments around the world exhibit heightened spending at the end of the fiscal year these end of fiscal year spending spikes often concern policy makers due to their tendency to result in lower quality spending this paper uses uk data to offer evidence against the precautionary savings explanation for spending spikes an alternative explanation is offered with procrastination driving heightened end of fiscal year spending a new technique of time variant budgetary taxes is calibrated to the model and it is shown to be effective for smoothing spending and improving spending efficiency throughout the fiscal year

short run subsidies and long run adoption of new health products evidence from a field experiment short run subsidies for health products are common in poor countries how do they affect long run adoption a common fear among development practitioners is that one off subsidies may negatively affect long run adoption through reference dependence people might anchor around the subsidized price and be unwilling to pay more for the product later but for experience goods one off subsidies could also boost long run adoption through learning this paper uses data from a two stage randomized pricing experiment in kenya to estimate the relative importance of these effects for a new improved antimalarial bed net reduced form estimates show that a one time subsidy has a positive impact on willingness to pay a year later inherit to separately identify the learning and anchoring effects we estimate a parsimonious experience good model estimation results show a large positive learning effect but no anchoring we black then discuss the types of products and the contexts inherit for which these results may apply

competitive location production and market selection abstract this paper investigates how firms should select their production sites capacities and quantities under rivalry there are assumed to be a finite number of discrete potential location sites and a finite number of discrete markets which may or may not coincide firms first decide either simultaneously or sequentially whether and where to establish a production site the fixed cost of opening a facility and the marginal cost of production both depend on where the facility is located firms then choose capacity and a production quantity for each market prices in each market are determined by the total quantity available at that location via the cournot mechanism this formulation thus addresses multi market oligopolistic spatial competition with heterogeneity in production and logistics costs we then analyze the nash equilibria of the entry game and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in the simultaneous entry game at equilibrium firms may not produce for all markets and may have limited market areas however these areas may overlap so that there are multiple suppliers in any market in general there may not be a first mover advantage and early entrants may earn lower profits than later entrants

decreasing impatience a criterion for non stationary time preference and hyperbolic discounting despite recent interest in hyperbolic discounting there has been little discussion of exactly what property of time preferences is instantiated by hyperbolic or quasi hyperbolic functional forms the paper revives an earlier proposal in prelec 1989 that the key property is prattarrow convexity of the log of the discount function which corresponds to decreasing impatience di at the level of preferences di provides a natural criterion for assessing the severity of departure from stationarity in that greater di is equivalent to more choices of dominated options in two stage decision problems as well as greater convexity of the log of the discount function inefficient choices may arise as intentional precommitments or as unintended reversals of preference by naive agents

tempus fugit time pressure in risky decisions we study the effects of time pressure on risky decisions for pure gain prospects pure loss prospects and mixed prospects involving both gains and losses in two experiments we find that time pressure has no effect on risk attitudes for gains but increases risk aversion for losses for mixed prospects subjects become simultaneously more loss averse and more gain seeking under time pressure depending on the framing of the prospects the results suggest the importance of aspiration levels and thus the overall probability to break even under time pressure we discuss the implications of our findings for decision making situations that involve time pressure

cultural constraints on innovation based growth to what extent does the cultural composition of a society impose a constraint on its long run growth potential we study this question in the context of an innovation based model of growth where cultural attitudes are endogenously transmitted from one generation to the next focusing on attitudes regarding patience we analyze the two way interaction between economic growth and the intergenerational transmission of patience exploiting this interaction we compare the long run growth performance of a culturally heterogeneous society where patience is initially underrepresented in the population with a culturally homogeneous society where all agents are perfectly patient our main result is that in the absence of any intrinsic preferences of patient parents to transmit their attitudes to their children the development paths of the two societies are bound to diverge with the culturally heterogeneous society experiencing lower growth rates yet if patient parents ceteris paribus prefer their children to be patient like them we show that the two societies can in the long run grow at the same rate jel d91 e24 o30 o40 z10

anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption this paper presents a model of intertemporal choice that incorporates savoring and dread i e utility from anticipat ion of delayed consumption the model explains why an individual with positive time preference may delay desirable outcomes or get unpleas ant outcomes over with quickly contrary to the prediction of convent ional formulations of intertemporal choice implications of savoring and dread for savings behavior empirical estimation of discount rate s and public policy efforts to combat myopic behavior are explored the model provides an explanation for common violations of the indepe ndence axiom as applied to intertemporal choice copyright 1987 by royal economic society

poverty and the political economy of public education spending evidence from brazil a large body of literature has emphasized the elite capture of democratic institutions as the explanation for the low levels of spending on public education in many low income democracies this paper provides an alternative to that longstanding hypothesis motivated by new cross country facts and evidence from brazilian municipalities we hypothesize that many democratic developing countries might invest less in public education spending because poor decisive voters prefer the government to allocate resources elsewhere one possible explanation is that low income voters could instead favor redistributive programs that increase their incomes in the short run such as cash transfers to test for this possibility we design and implement an experimental survey and an incentivized choice experiment in brazil the findings from both interventions support our hypothesis

the lack of loan aversion among canadian high school students evidence is presented on the factors that influence take up for postsecondary education financing loans or grants for high school students results show several factors influence the students decisions about taking loans or grants but the most prominent influence was the price of educational subsidy a total of 1 248 high school students across canada participated prices for the grants and loans overlapped substantially in order to more clearly distinguish the impact of loan aversion on the decision to take up financial assistance to pursue pse the study featured paid experimental decisions ranging from 25 to 700 in cash and from 500 to 4 000 in education financing a numeracy assessment a student survey and a parental telephone survey the targeted sample included at risk high school students low ses levels first nations and first generation students participants were marginally sensitive to the form of financing grant or loan with no evidence of systematic loan aversion being detected resume notre etude experimentale montre que plusieurs facteurs influencent les decisions des etudiants au sujet de prendre des prets et ou d accepter des bourses pour financer leurs etudes par ailleurs l influence la plus importante est le prix en dollars des subventions a l education 1 248 eleves canadiens du secondaire ont participe a l etude l etude a comporte des decisions experimentales payees de 25 a 700 en especes et de 500 a 4 000 en financement de leur education une evaluation de leur niveau de numeratie une enquete aupres des etudiants et un sondage telephonique parental l echantillon cible inclus les eleves a risque du secondaire du milieu socioeconomique faible les premieres nations et les etudiants de premiere generation les decisions binaires remunerees impliquant un arbitrage entre des dollars et divers types d aide financiere nous ont permis de generer un cout par dollar du financement de l education bourses prets melanges de prets et de bourses les couts pour les bourses et pour les prets se chevauchent suffisamment pour permettre de distinguer l existence d une aversion au pret d etudes les participants ont ete legerement influences par la forme de financement subvention ou pret mais aucune preuve d aversion pour les prets n a ete decelee

estimating the effect of individual time preferences on the use of disease screening economists have long been interested in evaluating the role that time preferences play in a wide range of economic decisions in the health care arena time preferences may be an especially important determinant of many decisions particularly the use of preventative health care one potential barrier to patient adoption of preventative screening regimens is that they impose current costs on consumers with the hope of lower costs in the future using data from a national survey we jointly estimate latent discount rate and preventative service demand models using a limited information maximum likelihood estimator iterated m estimator the results suggest that discount rates are generally inversely related to the likelihood of most screening tests

the failure of competition in the credit card market the bank credit card market containing 4 000 firms and lacking regulatory barriers casually appears to be a hospitable environment for the model of perfect competition nevertheless this article reports that credit card interest rates have been exceptionally sticky relative to the cost of funds moreover major credit card issuers have persistently earned from three to five times the ordinary rate of return in banking during the periods 1983 88 the failure of the competitive model appears to be partly attributable to consumers making credit card choices without taking account of the very high probability that they will pay interest on their outstanding balances copyright 1991 by american economic association

preference reversals for ambiguity aversion this paper finds preference reversals in measurements of ambiguity aversion even if psychological and informational circumstances are kept constant the reversals are of a fundamentally different nature than the reversals found before because they cannot be explained by context dependent weightings of attributes we offer an explanation based on sugden s random reference theory with different elicitation methods generating different random reference points then measurements of ambiguity aversion that use willingness to pay are confounded by loss aversion and hence overestimate ambiguity aversion this paper was accepted by teck ho decision analysis

determining consumers discount rates with field studies abstract because utility profits state transitions and discount rates are confounded in dynamic models discount rates are typically fixed for the purpose of identification the authors propose a strategy of identifying discount rates the identification rests on imputing the utility profits using decisions made in a context in which the future is inconsequential the objective function is concave and the decision space is continuous they then use these utilities profits to identify discount rates in contexts in which dynamics become material the authors exemplify this strategy using a field study in which cell phone users transitioned from a linear to a three part tariff pricing plan they find that the estimated discount rate corresponds to a weekly discount factor 90 lower than the value typically assumed in empirical research 995 when using a standard 995 discount factor they find that the price coefficient is underestimated by 16 moreover the predicted intertemporal substitution pat

estimating individual discount rates in denmark a field experiment we estimate individual discount rates with respect to time streams of money using controlled laboratory experiments these discount rates are elicited by means of field experiments involving real monetary rewards the experiments were carried out across denmark using a representative sample of 268 people between 19 and 75 years of age individual discount rates are estimated for various households differentiated by socio demographic characteristics such as income and age our conclusions are that discount rates are constant over the 12 month to 3 year horizons used in these experiments and that discount rates vary substantially with respect to several socio demographic variables hence we conclude that it would be reasonable to assume constant discount rates for specific household types but not the same rates across all households

the public finance of healthy behavior lifestyle can often affect the likelihood an individual will have a future illness subsidies often mitigate the consequences of poor lifestyle choices in this paper we explore tax subsidy policies that lower the consequences of incurring ill health we find that a funding mechanism consistent with current us policy lowers the investment in healthy lifestyles by both the wealthy who pay taxes and the poor who receive subsidies we also explore alternative policy interventions such as investing in research to lessen the impact or probability of the disease

estimating time preferences from convex budgets experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what seems reasonable for economic decision making such high rates are often attributed to present biased discounting a well known bias of standard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption utility attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversion to identify concavity researchers find reasonable discounting but at the cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature we present a new methodology for identifying time preferences both discounting and curvature from simple allocation decisions we find reasonable levels of both discounting and curvature and surprisingly dynamically consistent time preferences jel c91 d12 d81 understanding and estimating time preferences is obviously of great importance to economists marketers and policy makers consumers decide how much to invest in savings education real estate and life insurance how much to diet exercise and smoke whether to marry when to have children and what to leave in their wills while there has been substantial research estimating time preferences using aggregate consumption data 1 the bulk of the effort has occurred in laboratory environments 2 among the many laboratory techniques employed recent studies have favored multiple price lists mpl with monetary payments 3 with mpls individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller payment amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future the interest rate increases monotonically in a price list such that the point where an individual switches from preferring sooner payments to later payments carries interval

consume now or later time inconsistency collective choice and revealed preference this paper develops a revealed preference methodology for exploring whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of nonstationarities at the individual level or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit an empirical application to household level microdata highlights that an explicit recognition of the collective nature of choice allows the vast majority of household behaviour to be rationalised by theory that assumes preference stationarity at the individual level for our particular short panel data set simply permitting limited intrahousehold heterogeneity in time preferences allows the choices of 98 4 of the sample to be rationalised by a model that assumes exponential discounting at the individual level we also find that couples characterized by lower divergence in spousal discount rates are older more likely to have children and wealthier which we take as indications of experiencing higher match quality

risk preferences are not time preferences risk and time are intertwined the present is known while the future is inherently risky this is problematic when studying time prefer ences since uncontrolled risk can generate apparently present biased behavior we systematically manipulate risk in an intertemporal choice experiment discounted expected utility performs well with risk but when certainty is added common ratio predictions fail sharply the data cannot be explained by prospect theory hyperbolic discounting or preferences for resolution of uncertainty but seem consistent with a direct preference for certainty the data suggest strongly a difference between risk and time preferences jel c91 d81 d91 understanding individual decision making under risk and over time are two foundations of economic analysis 1 in both areas there has been research to suggest that standard models of expected utility eu and exponential discounting are flawed or incomplete regarding time experimental research has uncovered evidence of a present bias or hyperbolic discounting frederick loewenstein and o donoghue 2002 regarding risk there are number of well documented departures from eu such as the allais 1953 common consequence and common ratio paradoxes an organizing principle behind expected utility violations is that they seem to arise as so called boundary effects where certainty and uncertainty are combined camerer 1992 harless and camerer 1994 and starmer 2000 indicate that violations of expected utility are notably less prevalent when all choices are uncertain this observation is especially interesting when considering decisions about risk taking over time in particular certainty and uncertainty are combined in intertemporal decisions the present is known and certain while the future is inherently risky this observation is problematic if one intends to study time preference in isolation from

the less you discount the more it shows you really care interpersonal discounting in households abstract household members make monetary tradeoffs across time classical economics treats these decisions as if one rational individual makes them this assumption masks important other regarding concerns between spouses we designed an artefactual field experiment and collected data from 94 pairs of cohabiting couples to capture the complex nature of intra household time preferences estimation results show that 1 the interpersonal discount rate the rate used to tradeoff intertemporal payoffs between one s own payoff and the spouse s payoff is significantly different from the individual discount rate and 2 the interpersonal discount rate may provide an alternative way for people to express their other regarding preferences towards their spouses

theory and misbehavior of first price auctions recent experimental evidence appears to reject simple nash equilibrium models of bidding behavior in first price auctions the author presents a methodological critique of this evidence existing tests have concentrated on deviations of subjects from predictions in the message space of the action bid deviations the author suggests that it is more natural to evaluate subject behavior in expected payoff space he concludes that the evidence against the simple models is not significant enough to warrant their rejection copyright 1989 by american economic association

subjective discount rates in the general population and their predictive power for energy saving behavior why do people sometimes refrain from saving energy even if it would pay off in monetary terms subjective discount rates present one possible explanation for this lack of foresight but little is known about their level and reliability in the general population with regard to behavior persons with lower discount rates are expected to accept additional costs upfront more readily than those with higher discount rates based on a representative nation wide study the swiss environmental survey 2007 and a follow up survey our analyses reveal that on average subjective discount rates are well above market interest rates and moderately stable over a time interval of four years income and education are negatively correlated with discount rates contrary to expectations we did not find convincing support for an impact of discount rates on energy saving behavior

patience among children abstract recent policy initiatives offer cash payments to children and often their families to induce better health and educational choices these policies implicitly assume that children are especially impatient i e have high discount rates however little is known about the nature of children s patience how it varies across children and whether children can even make rational inter temporal choices this paper examines the inter temporal choices of 5 to 16 year old children in an artefactual field experiment we examine their choices between varying levels of compensation received in 2 or 4 months in the future and in 0 or 2 months in the future we find that children s choices are consistent with hyperbolic discounting boys are less patient than girls older children are more patient and that mathematical achievement test scores private schooling and parent s patience are not correlated with children s patience we also find that although more than 25 of children do not make rational inter temporal choices within a single two period time frame we cannot find variables that explain this behavior other than age and standardized mathematical achievement test scores