duopoly supergames with product differentiation abstract when goods are complements or very close substitutes more tacit collusion is supported by trigger strategies in price setting supergames than in quantity setting supergames for moderate or poor substitutes the situation is reversed this contrasts with the static situation where price setting strategies always lead to higher welfare

implications of market structure for elasticity structure though considerable attention has been given to market structure little research has been done on the relationship between market structure and elasticity structure the authors develop and partia

optimal symmetric punishments in a bertrand differentiated products duopoly abstract this paper studies how product differentiation affects collusive pricing in a duopoly when products are horizontally differentiated and firms compete in prices in contrast to earlier work the punishment mechanism supporting collusion is assumed to be the optimal symmetric punishment proposed by abreu 1986 journal of economic theory 39 191 225 such punishments have previously been characterized only for cournot oligopolies and for bertrand oligopolies with capacity constraints the optimal symmetric punishment turns out to have a simple two phase structure after one period of an intense price war firms return to the collusive outcome if prices are restricted to be non negative and the discount factor is large the price war will be extended to more than one period the best collusive price is shown to be lower the more substitutable are products

modeling inertia and variety seeking tendencies in brand choice behavior theories of exploratory behavior suggest that inertia and variety seeking tendencies may coexist within the individual implying that the same individual may exhibit inertia and variety seeking at different times depending on his her choice history past research has not allowed for such within consumer variability in these tendencies the purpose of this study is to present a choice model that allows us to identify such hybrid behavior i e a mixture of inertia and variety seeking and to distinguish hybrid behavior from simpler types of behavior such as pure inertia pure variety seeking and zero order behavior the model is estimated at the household level using panel data for three product classes covering a total of 1069 households the empirical analysis shows that more than half the households analyzed exhibited hybrid behavior rather than simpler types of behavior

cost based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly abstract this paper revisits the conventional doctrine that it is easier to collude among equals applied in the context of vertically related markets in a differentiated duopoly model we study how cost based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion

standardization and the stability of collusion we characterize the interplay between firms decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour we prove the existence of a nonmonotone relationship between firms decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences c 1998 elsevier science s a

on the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products abstract this paper provides a thorough exploration of the microeconomic foundations for the multi variate linear demand function for differentiated products which is widely used in industrial organization the setting is the standard representative consumer with a quasi linear utility function a key finding is that strict concavity of the quadratic utility function is critical for the demand system to be well defined otherwise the true demand function may be quite complex multi valued non linear and income dependent we uncover failures of duality relationships between substitute products and complementary products as well as the incompatibility between high levels of complementarity and concavity the two good case emerges as a special case with strong but non robust properties a key implication is that all conclusions derived in applied economic models via the use of linear demand that does not satisfy the law of demand ought to be regarded with some suspicion

variety seeking through brand switching a concept of variety seeking behavior is modeled as a stochastic brand choice model the model yields a measure of variety seeking for each individual consumer panel data for 28 products are analyzed for each household and the possibility of market segmentation by variety seeking behavior is explored

opec s oil exporting strategy and macroeconomic in stability aguiar conraria and wen 2008 argued that dependence on foreign oil raises the like lihood of equilibrium indeterminacy economic instability for oil importing countries we argue that this relation is more subtle the endogenous choices of prices and quantities by a cartel of oil exporters such as the opec can aect the directions of the changes in the likelihood of equilibrium indeterminacy we show that uctuations driven by self ful lling expectations under oil shocks are easier to occur if the cartel sets the price of oil but the re sult is reversed if the cartel sets the quantity of production these results oer a potentially interesting explanation for the decline in economic volatility i e the great moderation in oil importing countries since the mid 1980s when the opec cartel changed its market strategies from setting prices to setting quantities despite the fact that oil prices are far more volatile today than they were 30 years ago

intertemporal aggregation of heterogeneous consumers abstract this paper deals with a relatively unexamined facet of stochastic brand switching models their connection to market share models we derive a composite market share model based on aggregation of heterogeneous markovian type individuals each purchasing a brand from the product class several times during the period of analysis the characteristics of this composite model are examined and interestingly suggest a markov type market share model moreover this examination sheds some light on a phenomenon uncovered in econometric studies of market share response to advertising the slow decay of the lagged market share term as the length of the measurement period is increased

intertemporal product choice and its effects on collusive firm behavior this study analyzes the collusive behavior of firms in markets characterized by horizontal product differentiation the special features are that product choice is endogenized and that firms may redesign their products intertemporally at a fixed cost the main objective is to examine the relationships between the extent of product differentiation the product redesigning cost and the degree of collusion supportable the findings indicate that flexible product design makes collusion more difficult to sustain since in the event collusion breaks down firms have an incentive to mitigate the severity of punishment by redesigning their products and thus reducing price competition copyright 1992 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

vertical integration raising rivals costs and upstream collusion abstract this paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear as a first step the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated it turns out this is the joint profit maximum of the colluding firms the discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry while the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising rivals costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here

cartel stability with multiproduct firms abstract i examine the implications of the presence of multiproduct firms for cartel stability in a horizontally differentiated market under quantity competition an increase in the number of varieties produced by each firm for any given number of firms increases the critical discount factor above which collusion is sustainable by trigger strategies and thus makes collusion less likely this is also the case under price competition except for a special case where the number of firms is small and the products are close substitutes these results may help explain apparent inconsistencies between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence on the effect of market structure and product differentiation on the likelihood of collusion

a multivariate polya model of brand choice and purchase incidence in this paper we develop an integrated stochastic model of purchase timing and brand selection which incorporates the influence of marketing mix variables seasonality and trend and also allows for various individual choice mechanisms our approach rests on the assumptions of a zero order choice process a poisson timing process and purchase rates following a multivariate gamma distribution over the population the scale parameters of which vary according to marketing activities and time the resulting model is a multivariate polya process and the distribution of brand choice probabilities turns out to be a generalized dirichlet distribution thus most currently used zero order models can be considered to be special cases of this approach furthermore we derive a number of market diagnostics which provide insights into market structure and demonstrate the model s use for marketing strategy simulation based on extensive testing of the underlying hypotheses we finally validate the model using empirical data and show that it fits the market in question

try it you will like it does consumer learning lead to competitive price promotions there is strong evidence that consumers learn from their brand consumption experiences and continuously update their brand purchase probabilities however in explaining why established competitive brands continuously compete through periodic price promotions most of the existing theories do not attribute this phenomenon to underlying consumer learning yet try it you will like it is often the stated rationale of the practicing marketing manager in offering consumers a price promotion on a brand this paper examines the connection between consumer learning and the offering of price promotions the consumer model specified is markovian in nature and encompasses in addition to consumer learning other empirical findings such as the increase in product class consumption in response to price reductions the consumer models used in the existing game theoretic approaches to this problem are shown to be mostly special cases of the proposed model it is demonstrated that for the commonly used price response functions the existence of consumer learning at a level of intensity consistent with that identified in empirical works makes it optimal for competing brands to periodically offer price promotions moreover it is shown that the competing brands should promote in different periods as opposed to head to head

competitive response and equilibria this paper investigates the relationship between market share and promotional expenditures the long run using data that span a decade and 91 product categories we find that market shares are stationary for a majority of the products in the data base we find that relative promotional expenditures for the products are offsetting in the long run finally for products whose market shares show a trend it is difficult to discern the impact of relative promotional expenditure on the evolution of market share this result generalizes the empirical finding of bass et al bass f m m m givon m u kalwani d reibstein g p wright 1984 an investigation into the order of the brand choice process marketing sci 3 4 267 287 that offsetting competitive activity plays a role in the maintenance of what appears to be stationary and zero order behavior

the long term effects of price promotions on category incidence brand choice and purchase quantity abstract to what extent do price promotions have a long term effect on the components of brand sales namely category incidence brand choice and purchase quantity the authors answer this question by using persistence modeling on weekly sales data of a perishable and a storable product derived from a scanner panel their analysis reveals first that permanent promotion effects are virtually absent for each sales component next the authors develop and apply an impulse response approach to estimate the promotional adjustment period and the total dynamic effects of a price promotion specifically they calculate the long term equivalent of gupta s 1988 14 84 2 breakdown of promotional effects because of positive adjustment effects for incidence but negative adjustment effects for choice the authors find a reversal of the importance of category incidence and brand choice 66 11 23 for the storable product and 58 39 3 for the perishable product the authors discuss the implications of the findings an

consumer loss in czech photovoltaic power plants in 2010 2011 this paper provides a financial survey of a small sample of czech photovoltaic pv plants to evaluate the extent of market losses we calculate the shadow market price of solar electricity from the profit and loss accounts of the pv plants and the shadow market price we estimate the total economic loss generated by pv electricity sector in the czech republic the presented microeconomic approach has two main advantages firstly we work with real observed data which offsets the drawback of a limited sample secondly the profit accounting calculation enables sensitivity analysis with respect to key variables of the plants we show that money invested in pv plants would generate an annual loss of 8 given the estimated solar assets of czk 165 6 billion eur 6 6 billion as of december 2011 this translates in at least czk 12 6 billion lost in the czech solar sector in 2012 about 43 of this loss is due to high technology costs and corresponds to pure dead weight loss while the remaining 57 constitute the redistributive profit component of subsidies finally we calculate that unless electricity prices increase or technology costs decrease approximately sevenfold pv plants will remain loss making

performance regimes and marketing policy shifts even in mature markets managers are expected to improve their brands performance year after year when successful they can expect to continue executing on an established marketing strategy however when the results are disappointing a change or turnaround strategy may be called for to help performance get back on track in such cases performance diagnostics are needed to identify turnarounds and to quantify the role of marketing policy shifts in this process this paper proposes a framework for such a diagnosis and applies several methods to provide converging evidence for two main findings first contrary to prevailing beliefs the performance of brands in mature markets is not always stable instead brands systematically improve or deteriorate their performance outlook in clearly identifiable time windows that are relatively short compared to windows of stability second these shifts in performance regimes are associated with the brand s marketing actions and policy shifts as opposed to competitive marketing promotion oriented marketing policy shifts are particularly potent in improving a brand s performance outlook

tacit collusion with price matching punishments abstract tacit collusion is explored under a strategy in which loosely speaking firms match the lowest price set by any firm in the previous period conditions are provided under which this strategy supports collusive outcomes in a subgame perfect equilibrium in contrast to traditional results the highest collusive price is always lower than the monopoly price it corresponds to the unique nash equilibrium price when upward and downward price deviations are matched our paper provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart from standard timing assumptions to do so

endogenous quality choice price vs quantity competition two versions of a vertical product differentiation model one with fixed and the other with variable costs of quality are analyzed to study how the hypotheses of price versus quantity competition affect equilibrium solutions product differentiation arises under all the scenarios considered contrasting previous findings of symmetric quality choices under cournot behavior however to relax harsher market competition firms differentiate more under bertrand than under cournot a simple welfare measure also indicates that the economy is better off when firms compete on prices with fixed costs of quality not only consumer but also producer surplus is higher under price competition copyright 1993 by blackwell publishing ltd

cartel stability and product differentiation abstract this paper employs a supergame theoretic model of collusion to analyze the effects of different levels of product differentiation on cartel stability in contrast to earlier work the ability of the parties to reach an agreement is assumed here the focus is on how greater product homogeneity increases both the gain to cheating on a collusive agreement and the magnitude of the punishments that follow a defection the total effect on the likelihood a cartel is stable is therefore unclear two particular differentiated products models are then used to demonstrate that contrary to the conventional view greater homogeneity can reduce cartel stability

cartel sustainability in retail markets evidence from a health service sector abstract this paper studies the role of cost asymmetries and product differentiation on cartel sustainability by drawing data from a failed retail cartel unlike the extensive theoretical literature little empirical evidence exists on these relationships first we analyze cartel compliance and find that players are more likely to comply when cost is symmetric and own cost is high next based on a structural model and counterfactual experiments we show that a cartel price that satisfies all cartel members does not exist this result indicates an inherent difficulty of sustaining collusion in retail markets with heterogeneous players we also show that firm heterogeneities especially product differentiation rather than cost asymmetries hinder collusion more finally we derive the level of patience or the discount factor required for cartel sustainability when firms split profits based on the shapley value

a micromodeling approach to investigate the advertising sales relationship the purpose of this paper is to derive a model of advertising effects on the firm s sales a micromodel is postulated and aggregated across individuals and over time to produce a macromodel of the aggregate sales advertising relationship for a single product the micromodel postulated is very simple it incorporates two factors reach of the ads and rate of decay of their effectiveness over time this approach to modeling advertising effects is shown to be fruitful in several respects 1 the coefficients of the aggregate equation are easily interpretable in terms of the reach and decay parameters 2 the model derived is nonlinear yet estimable 3 a special case of the model is very similar to lag models that have been in use 4 the model can be used whatever the unit of time is 5 the carryover effect of advertising as commonly defined is not constant but depends upon the previous spending levels and 6 the model helps illustrate that the duration of advertising may be greatly overstated if aggregate lagged dependent variable models are simplistically interpreted

research joint ventures product differentiation and price collusion abstract we investigate the interplay between firms decisions in product development either joint or independent and their ensuing repeated pricing either collusive or bertrand nash a joint venture develops a single product whereas independent ventures develop their respective products which can be differentiated we prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion whilst firms r d decisions have no bearings on collusive sustainability if differentiation is vertical we also discover the non monotone dependence of firms venture decisions at the development stage upon their time preferences as well as upon consumers willingness to pay

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

bertrand vs cournot competition in distribution channels with upstream collusion abstract this paper applies repeated game theory to tacit collusion in dynamic distribution channels based on the grim trigger strategy we examine competitors choice of the strategic instruments in distribution channels comprised of two manufacturers distributing through two independent retailers respectively first the paper discusses the upstream manufacturers collusion incentives under different competition modes for downstream retailers and shows that the manufacturers collusion incentives critically depend on the retailers competition modes and the discount factor we then identify the endogenous competition modes in equilibrium we find that upstream collusion is easier to sustain under cournot competition than bertrand competition and it is least likely to be sustained under mixed bertrand cournot competition furthermore in equilibrium retailers can engage in bertrand cournot or mixed bertrand cournot competition depending on the discount factor and the degree of product differentiation this study provides the rationale behind the emergence of various modes of competition in practical dynamic distribution channels especially the recent mixed bertrand cournot competition mode finally the manufacturers collusion incentives and retailers competition modes jointly affect the manufacturers profitability and social welfare we also discuss how the manufacturers profitability and social welfare vary under different competition modes taking upstream collusion into consideration we find that upstream collusion increases decreases social welfare for complements substitutes

the effects of cross ruff coupons on sales and profits cross ruff coupons are obtained at the time of purchase of a carrier brand and may be redeemed at a later date on a target brand these coupons therefore have the ability to link consumer purchases across different brands as well as shopping trips we model the effects of cross ruff coupons on consumer choice behavior and derive the conditions under which cross ruff coupons can lead to higher sales and profits than other types of package coupons the model also provides insights into the selection of appropriate carrier and target brands and on how the choice of an appropriate carrier or a target brand is affected when the categories that these brands belong to are demand complements or substitutes we conduct an empirical analysis using data from 195 different cross ruff coupon campaigns observed in grocery stores in a major u s city over a three month period the data are consistent with the key insights provided by the model

delivered pricing and the impact of spatial differentiation on cartel stability abstract this paper analyzes the impact of spatial differentiation on the sustainability of collusion on delivered prices it shows that the choice of the punishment mechanism that enforces collusion is crucial for determining whether differentiation facilitates cartel pricing or not if punishments are optimal then differentiation tends to facilitate collusion optimal punishments impose minmax profits on deviators independently of the degree of differentiation a high degree of differentiation then renders deviations less profitable since it makes business stealing more costly but does not affect the deviator s punishment profits depending on the transport cost technology excessive differentiation may have a countervailing effect however because it also implies high transport costs for the cartel if collusion is sustained by standard grim trigger punishments instead then collusion may be easiest for minimal differentiation the reason is that competitive and thus grim trigger punishment profits are higher the higher the degree of differentiation

competitive market structures a subset selection analysis market structure models are used to identify submarkets or to test for the presence of submarkets where within group competition is much stronger than across group competition the implicit assumption in such models is that the brands in a submarket compete on the basis of their shared product features however if significant variety seeking effect exist in the market such an assumption may not be valid we present a model based on a subset selection procedure for analyzing competitive market structures and develop tests of significance for variety seeking effects present in the market for each brand in the market the subset selection procedure identifies sets submarkets of brands that are in close competition the competitive market structure is defined by the possibly overlapping submarkets that are identified for each brand and the model provides insights on whether the brands in a submarket are of a reinforcing or a variety seeking kind the application of our model to two different consumer packaged goods markets highlights its contribution relative to extant methods

tacit collusion in differentiated cournot games abstract in a simple oligopoly with quantity setting firms we analyze the conditions under which more product differentiation makes tacit collusion easier it is found that the net effect can go either way

technical note why does the nbd model work robustness in representing product purchases brand purchases and imperfectly recorded purchases one of the most managerially useful constructs that emerge from the stochastic modelling of brand choice is that of conditional expectations in this paper the conditional expectations are derived for a generalization of the nbd model called the beta binomial negative binomial distribution bb nbd model first described by jeuland bass and wright the model developed to jointly represent the product class purchase and brand selection processes is also particularly appropriate for analyzing panel data when not every purchase occasion is recorded the conditional expectations for the nbd model increase linearly with the number of previous purchases made by an individual therefore the degree of nonlinearity of the conditional expectations in our more complicated model allows us to assess the robustness of nbd results when in fact the basic assumptions are not true this paper gives the simple conditions when the nbd will exactly or approximately represent the bb nbd and describes the qualitative deviations between these two models when they are not identical

collusion between two sided platforms abstract we study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market and whether users single home or multi home our most striking result is that one sided collusion leads to lower resp higher prices on the collusive resp competitive side if the cross group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong one sided collusion may therefore benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions

an anatomy of cartel contracts we study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal finnish manufacturing cartels one third of the clauses relate to raising profits the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility cartel organization or external threats cartels use three main approaches to raise profits price market allocation and specialization these appear to be substitutes choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability simplifying we find that large cartels agree on prices cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets and small cartels avoid competition through specialization

czech republic and indicative targets of the european union for electricity generation from renewable sources abstract in 2010 the czech republic was one of the states of the european union which met the indicative target for the share of renewable energy sources in gross electricity consumption that year gross electricity generation from renewable sources amounted to a total volume of 5851 gwh which corresponds to 8 24 of gross electricity consumption in the czech republic in the given time period the largest share of the total came from hydroelectric power plants 47 7 and biomass power plants 25 8 and a smaller share from photovoltaic power plants 10 5 biogas power plants 8 7 and wind farms 5 7 compared with 2009 the highest year on year growth came from photovoltaic power plants 527 gwh 44 2 and as far as other renewable sources are concerned electricity generation at hydroelectric power plants 360 gwh 30 2 and biogas power plants 184 gwh 15 4 rose more sharply as well

counting your customers compounding customer s in store decisions interpurchase time and repurchasing behavior abstract consumer buying decision is an important element of any company s efforts to count its customers stochastic models have been used extensively in previous studies of marketing and are usually constructed so as to easily fit the data and make predictions however the regularity of customer interpurchase time in store decisions and repeat buying behavior are not considered simultaneously in the literature since the empirical evidence suggests that all the above factors do indeed influence the firm s sales we here present a methodology which takes all these elements into account the methodology employed is illustrated by taking the customer purchase data for tea as an example by not eliminating light buyers the integrated model we developed achieves precise results and addresses the relative importance of each element while predicting firm sales

the effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing abstract using the spatial competition framework of hotelling 1929 this paper explores the relationship between the degree of product differentiation and the ability of firms to collude with respect to price we show that the minimum discount factor required to support the joint profit maximum as an equilibrium outcome monotonically increases as products become better substitutes when the joint profit maximum cannot be supported the optimal collusive price is shown to decline as products become more substitutable these findings suggest that firms producing stronger substitutes tend to find it tougher to collude in terms of their product price

price or quantity in tacit collusion abstract we investigate the choice of market variable price or quantity of an optimal implicit cartel if the discount factor is high the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases otherwise it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes and prices if goods are complements the reason is that this minimizes the gains from deviations from collusive play

localized competition multimarket operation and collusive behavior this paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition also reinterpreted as a model of multimarket operation private information about the rivals past actions naturally arises from these product market structures the resulting communication problems imply that firms should not adopt strategies with too severe punishments infinite grim punishments may be too severe for large discount factors the standard stick and carrot punishments from the perfect public information model are always too severe for all discount factors modified stick and carrot punishments can still be used though for a smaller range of discount factors than the standard stick and carrot punishments

delegation and firms ability to collude abstract in a model of repeated cournot competition under complete information we show that delegation has no effect on cartel stability if managers collude while it may hinder cartel stability when owners collude in setting the incentive schemes if owners can choose whether to delegate or keep control of their respective firms and both groups of individuals collude or play non cooperatively in their respective variables according to the level of intertemporal discount factor then if managers are not able to collude in output levels owners delegation decision is non monotone in the discount factor

collusion with costly consumer search i use standard consumer search models to study how an increase in market transparency lower search costs or higher share of fully informed consumers affects cartel stability when firms sell horizontally differentiated products cartels become more stable as the search cost increases with homogeneous products by contrast the opposite holds a higher share of fully informed consumers makes collusion less stable when the market is initially sufficiently transparent whereas it happens otherwise if the market is originally little transparent

economic analysis of different supporting policies for the production of electrical energy by solar photovoltaics in western european union countries abstract within various renewable energy technologies photovoltaics pv today attracts considerable attention due to its potential to contribute a major share of renewable energy in the future however pv market development is undoubtedly dependent on the political support of any given country in this paper after a brief analysis of national support policies in pv technology in western european union eu countries the authors perform an economic analysis of the main support mechanisms as implemented in the same countries based on the calculation of the cash flow the net present value npv and the internal rate of return irr indices the analysis shows that in some situations support policies can be inconvenient for the owner of the pv based generation system and that in many cases the differences between the implementation of the same support policy in different countries can give rise to significantly different results the analysis carried out in this work could help to assess the impact of pv energy policies in different western european member states renewable energy companies to identify potential pv markets and investigate the policy landscape across western eu countries

relative energy price and investment by european firms abstract a dynamic model of investment is estimated with data on non financial firms in 15 european countries across 25 industries over 1991 2006 a rise in real energy price reduces the degree of persistence in the investment adjustment cost function panel results suggest that in manufacturing a 1 rise in real energy price reduces investment by a country s firms by 1 9 relative to that by firms in other countries with a smaller effect for non manufacturing firms the negative effect of a higher relative price of energy on firm level investment is significantly less marked the larger the firm results imply that stabilizing the relative price of energy would steady firm investment with greater gains in stability at smaller and medium sized firms results are robust to consideration of country business cycle effect and firm leverage estimation of investment is based on the euler equation approach with over 21 000 observations individual country regressions imply that a rise in the relative price of energy price has a statistically significant negative effect on firm level investment in 14 out of 15 countries to avoid dynamic panel bias estimation is by generalized method of moments with instrumental variables

sustaining collusion when the choice of strategic variable is endogenous abstract this paper addresses the problem of maintaining collusion in a differentiated duopoly when both the prospective deviant and punisher are free to choose between price and output as their strategic variables we show that the traditional formulation of the supergame in which firms commit for the duration to either price or output as their single common strategic variable overlooks the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium in the punishment phase the results obtained here have obvious parallels with those found in the comparative statics literature

price versus quantity rules in dynamic competition the case of nonrenewable natural resources price and quantity competition are compared in the dynamic game framework of a nonrenewable natural resource duopoly it is shown that a price decision rule quantity decision rule strategy dominates in terms of a higher present value of the initial resource stocks if the resources are complements substitutes this result is shown to hold for subgame perfect equilibria it holds although equilibrium price paths resulting from those two types of strategies will cross it is shown however that even though the price trajectories cross initial equilibrium prices resulting from the price rule strategy will be lower than the initial equilibrium prices resulting from the quantity rule strategy copyright 1990 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

the arm s length principle and tacit collusion the arm s length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances by unrelated parties dealing at arm s length with each other this paper examines the effect of the arm s length principle on dynamic competition in two alternative models of vertical market structure it is shown that the arm s length principle renders tacit collusion more stable and can reduce welfare when collusion targets the maximum collusive profit achievable in each environment

an investigation into the order of the brand choice process this paper investigates the order of the brand choice process at the individual family level using a variety of tests t likelihood ratio binomial runs and multinomial runs tests the test of stationarity developed permits separate analyses for stationary and nonstationary purchase sequences our analyses indicate that the purchase sequences of a majority of stationary consumers are consistent with the zero order assumption this result is observed for all the nine frequently bought packaged goods studied with the use of panel data and for a product category soft drinks using experimental data

quality differentiation and conditional spatial price competition among hotels abstract it is generally accepted that location is the dominant product attribute for hotels accordingly studies on price competition have often utilized fixed geographic boundaries when defining competitive sets when travelers are willing to substitute location and quality however the spatial extent of competition can depend on the hotels quality therefore it can be hypothesized that geographic boundary of price competition among hotels is conditional on quality differentiation through an empirical analysis based on two stage least squares modified to test for spatial price competition the present study finds that hotels compete with more distant neighbors of similar quality than those who are quality differentiated in addition the results also suggest possibility of cooperation among neighboring hotels similar in quality implications and suggestions are presented along with the findings of the study which is expected to contribute to the literature by suggesting a new perspective on the relationship between quality differentiation and price competition among hotels

testing for choice dynamics in panel data this article applies different approaches to distinguish state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity and serial correlation and hence test for state dependence in consumer brand choices first we apply a simple method proposed by chamberlain which involves lagged exogenous variables only second we also estimate a lagged dependent variable specification proposed by wooldridge third we use the estimation approach suggested by wooldridge to estimate a model with both lagged dependent and exogenous variables to distinguish between the two different sources of choice dynamics state dependence and lagged effects of the exogenous variables our analysis reveals that the best approach is to use models with both lagged dependent and exogenous variables our findings include strong evidence for state dependence in five out of the six product categories studied in this article

price vs quantity competition in oligopoly supergames abstract in a repeated oligopoly with differentiated products and firms following trigger strategies quantity competition leads to a less efficient outcome than price competition this result contrasts with the repeated duopoly result where price competition is less efficient under certain conditions

inferring the order of the choice process using consumer purchase histories the small sample properties of the multinomial runs mr test which is often used to test for effects of previous brand choices on current brand choice probabilities are explored in this article through a monte carlo study of different buyer level brand choice probability models the power and the actual size of this test under a null hypothesis of no previous brand choice effects are shown to depend on the nature of the true underlying model length of purchase history and skewness in baseline choice probabilities we provide some guidelines for when the mr test is more useful in empirical research

formal choice models in marketing the paper gives an overview and evaluates the theoretical traditions underlying choice models that are used in marketing in particular the emphasis of this essay is on the underlying assumptions limitations and empirical demands of these choice models four fundamental choice models are used as a basis to analyze this complex field the neoclassical economic theory as extended by lancaster the risk preference theory of choices under uncertainty the strict utility theory and the random utility theory these four choice models and their extensions are compared and contrasted along the three critical steps in the model building process theory generation parameterization and estimation

endogenous product design in an infinitely repeated game abstract this paper examines the incentives to differentiate products horizontally in a repeated game when redesigning costs are negligible the main findings are the following if firms are patient with respect to future profits i e the discount factor is high they will choose an intermediate degree of differentiation the lower the discount factor the more firms are forced to increase differentiation in order to keep collusion from breaking down unless the discount factor is extremely low prices will be unconstrained monopoly prices

reply on comment to small firms and the merger mania research on performance differences between small and large firms is booming it emerges relatively separated from the mainstream industrial organization literature inspired by levy s comment on an earlier paper we try to bridge the gap between the two areas especially we screen non cooperative game theoretical models for predictions on performance differences most of them forecast higher profits for larger firms but there exist also some models which predict the opposite for very specific circumstances

transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion abstract this paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated hotelling duopoly increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price it also decreases the punishment profit the net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain in the limiting homogeneous market the effect vanishes here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion

the merit order effect of czech photovoltaic plants abstract we assess the impact of photovoltaic power plants on the electricity supply curve in the czech republic the merit order effect is estimated as the elasticity of electricity spot price with respect to change in supply of electricity from renewable sources data for the czech electricity spot market from 2010 to 2015 are analyzed as this is the period with the steepest increase in a renewable generation capacity the effect is estimated separately for solar and other renewable sources we find a significant difference between these two groups our results show that based on hourly daily and weekly data energy produced by czech solar power plants does not decrease electricity spot price creating double cost to the end consumer however the merit order effect based on averaged daily and weekly data is shown to exist for other renewable sources excluding solar mainly water and wind this contributes to the conclusion that the czech renewables policy that prefers solar to other renewable sources may be considered as suboptimal

collusion among asymmetric firms the case of different discount factors abstract this study investigates collusive behavior among asymmetric firms for this purpose we develop a selection criterion for deriving a unique collusive outcome and apply it to the case when firms have different discount factors our analysis reveals that for collusion to be self enforcing it is unnecessary that all firms have sufficiently high discount factors but rather only that firms on average have a sufficiently long run view the optimal collusive outcome entails a strict ordering of output quotas in which firms with relatively low discount factors receive a disproportionate share of market demand as found in the case of a common discount factor a fall in a firm s discount factor reduces the likelihood of successful collusion this effect reduces firm profits on the other hand in the event that firms can collude a lowering of a firm s discount factor increases its output quota so that its profits rise

product differentiation in spatial cournot markets abstract we introduce to the spatial cournot markets model the inverse demand function of deneckere economics letters 11 1983 37 that allows product differentiation the circular model s outcome alters depending on if goods are complements or substitutes while the linear model results in central agglomeration

reassessing brand loyalty price sensitivity and merchandising effects on consumer brand choice this article reports the results of an empirical study of household brand choices over four scanner panel data sets the study uses a random effects autocorrelated logistic regression model the analysis presents evidence that the brand choice process is not zero order in addition the influence of in store displays and feature advertisements on switching is shown to be about two to three times more effective than estimates obtained from previous studies finally the analysis indicates systematic differences between frequent and infrequent buyers of products in terms of their sensitivity to price displays and feature advertising

in which industries is collusion more likely evidence from the uk i examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price fixing across uk manufacturing industries in the 1950s the econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising intensive than in low advertising industries there is also some evidence of a non monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion there is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion

a model of balanced choice behavior in some product categories consumers appear to alternate among items in a consistent and purposeful though not entirely deterministic fashion such alternation occurs even in the absence of any apparent external influences on choice to explain such balanced choice behavior we present a model based upon the premise that past consumption influences the utility of items on subsequent choice occasions individuals may seek variety on certain product attributes and exhibit loyalty toward others the model specification yields a logit choice model which may be calibrated using consumption diary panel data at the individual or cross sectional level

combining cartel penalties and private damage actions the impact on cartel prices abstract in many countries antitrust enforcement by competition authorities through prosecution and the imposition of penalties is complemented in price fixing cases by private damage actions which should affect both cartel deterrence and the prices set by those cartels that do form we show that the impact of combining penalties and damages on cartel prices is not clearcut and depends on both the nature of the penalty regime and the way that damages are calculated we demonstrate this by focusing on two ways of calculating damages that have been advocated in practice and two different forms of the widely used revenue based penalty regime when the simple form of revenue based penalties is in force the standard method of calculating damages worsens its harmful pricing effects whereas the proposed alternative method of calculating damages can overturn them when a more sophisticated form of revenue based penalties is in operation imposing damages will improve its beneficial pricing effects under both methods of damage calculation but the alternative method is more effective in all cases combining penalties and damages improves deterrence

cartel stability under quality differentiation abstract this note considers cartel stability when the cartelized products are vertically differentiated if market shares are maintained at pre collusive levels then the firm with the lowest competitive price cost margin has the strongest incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement the lowest quality supplier has the tightest incentive constraint when the difference in unit production costs is sufficiently small

collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited abstract in a letter previously published in this journal rothschild 1992 rothschild r 1992 on the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies economics letters 40 33 37 claims to obtain results in contrast with those obtained by deneckere 1983 deneckere r 1983 duopoly supergames with product differentiation economics letters 11 37 42 we show however that taking correctly into account non negativity constraints on output rothschild s formulation yields the same conclusions as deneckere s

sales growth of spanish tourist firms some implications of gibrat s law on marketing management abstract the research presented in this paper is targeted towards empirical validation of three hypotheses deduced from gibrat s law and concerning sales growth in the spanish tourism industry the research refers to the years 1997 2000 and uses a sample of 1131 surviving firms all of which are devoted to tourism activities regression correlation and automatic interaction detection techniques were used throughout the sample the results show the existence of two firm growth segments set apart by a threshold size reached only when initial size is measured in sales terms firms above the threshold size grow at a significantly lower accumulated rate than firms below it thus contradicting gibrat s law however no relationship was observed for successive inter annual growth rates this in turn suggests that marketing actions and programmes have rather a medium and long term effect than a short term effect over sales growth sound implications about the firms degree of market opportunity management strategic interdependence and market orientation were deduced from these results

a model of stochastic variety seeking in this paper we propose and test a stochastic model of consumer choice that incorporates attribute based variety seeking our stochastic variety seeking model svs has nested within it a fixed variety seeking model a zero order model of choice and a first order pure variety model we compare the svs model to alternative models under stochastic variety seeking we examine the nature of the variety sought and provide a test of the satiation hypothesis unlike fixed variety seeking models our model allows variety seeking to vary in intensity and consistency over individuals as well as over purchase occasions we show that the model is equivalent to a random utility model with the features that the attributes of brands relative to those of the brand previously bought influence choice and the extent of variety seeking is random over choice occasions for a given individual the model permits a closed form solution to the conditional switching probabilities parameterized by variety seeking parameters and dependent on brand attributes we apply our model to individual choice data obtained from a field study specifically designed for the purpose at hand

empirical generalizations about market evolution and stationarity we present empirical generalizations about conditions under which marketing variables evolve or remain stationary we first define evolution statistically and make the case why it is an important concept for increasing our understanding of long run marketing effectiveness we then briefly review ways in which evolution can be tested empirically from readily available data we present a database of over 400 prior analyses and catalog the relative incidence of stationarity versus evolution in market performance and marketing spending we find that evolution is the dominant characteristic for sales and marketing mix spending but that stationarity is the dominant characteristic for market share thus we find strong support for the conjecture that many markets are in a long run equilibrium where the relative position of the players is only temporarily disturbed by their respective marketing activities we assess the impact of a number of covariates on the likelihood of finding stationarity evolution in sales

on the incidence and duration of price wars the purpose of this paper is to test some theoretical predictions about the incidence and duration of price wars when these price wars are viewed as an enforcement device to maintain a cooperative or tacitly collusive agreement in an uncertain environment the theoretical model of green and porter i984 and porter i983a predicts that price wars should be triggered by unanticipated demand fluctuations and that they will be more frequent the greater the number of firms in the industry or the greater the degree of market concentration correspondingly the optimal duration of price wars is also affected by the number of firms the tests employ weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel henceforth referred to as the jec from i88o to i886 porter i 983b and lee and porter i 984 previously used this data in order to identify periods in which price wars occurred and to test whether pricing behavior in cooperative periods was consistent with predictions of the theoretical model the present paper will look more closely at the price wars themselves in order to test another set of predictions about their incidence and duration section 2 summarizes the theoretical model in more detail with emphasis on markets with price setting firms the models in green and porter i984 and porter i 983a consider quantity setting firms but the railroads in the jec chose prices not quantities the distinction has some bearing on the econometric work but the basic ideas from the theory still apply there is a brief description of thejec and the data set in section 3 empirical results are covered in section 4 and section 5 contains some concluding comments

choice map inferring a product market map from panel data this paper describes choice map a model that infers a product market map from panel data choice map is a stochastic brand choice model a random utility quantal choice model and a multidimensional scaling procedure choice map combines the parsimony of stochastic choice models the rationale of random utility models and the ability of multidimensional scaling procedures to simultaneously infer both brand positions and consumer preferences from preference choice data choice map assumes that consumers have stationary purchase probabilities for the observational period which makes the model best suited to frequently bought mature product categories neither experimental nor survey data are required traditional mapping methods that scale such data may not yield the same structure for low involvement products as will a procedure like choice map that scales behavioral data choice map s descriptive and predictive validity exceeds that of an alternative stochastic brand choice model the dirichlet multinomial for a test data set

estimation of latent class models with heterogeneous choice probabilities an application to market structuring recently grover and srinivasan developed a latent class based approach to analyze market structure by using brand switching data the authors provide an iterative maximum likelihood procedure for

on the stability of multimarket collusion in price setting supergames abstract in this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions the model we consider is a segmented markets duopoly with differentiated goods in which price setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their most collusive outcome we find that when goods are very close substitutes and trade costs are sufficiently high a marginal reduction in trade costs facilitates collusion exactly the opposite is true if for any given degree of product substitutability trade costs are sufficiently low we also study the dependence of multimarket collusion on product differentiation

the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry abstract this paper investigates how the incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry depend upon the degree of product substitutability when goods are imperfect substitutes both cournot and bertrand competition result in underinvestment in the sense that a social planner would be willing to pay more for a given cost reduction than a profit maximizing firm overinvestment may occur when the goods are sufficiently close substitutes similarly cournot competition provides a stronger incentive to innovate than bertrand competition if the degree of substitutability is low and a weaker incentive if this degree is high

confronting the implications of the cournot model with industry and firm data this paper derives testable implications of the standard cournot models and confronts these implications with real world data though we cannot expect that real world may be characterized by a simple static homogeneous model it is surprising that little empirical work exists on testing the implications of this most popular model of oligopoly and non cooperative game theory

consumer loss aversion product experimentation and tacit collusion abstract two firms compete to attract loss averse consumers that are uncertain about how well the goods on sale fit their needs to resolve valuation uncertainty firms can allow prospective customers to test experiment their products before purchase we investigate firms dynamic incentives to allow experimentation and analyze the resulting effects on the profitability and the stability of tacit collusion depending on the regulatory regime in place i e whether experimentation is forbidden mandated or simply allowed but not imposed laissez faire the degree of loss aversion has ambiguous effects both on the profits that firms can achieve through tacit collusion and on the stability of these agreements while in static environments consumer welfare is always maximized by a policy that forbids experimentation the opposite happens in a dynamic environment

collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities abstract conventional wisdom is that collusion between firms will be destabilized when they produce closer substitutes of products we show that in the presence of strong network externalities this result no longer holds and collusion becomes more sustainable for closer substitutes of products under relatively strong network externalities

on the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies abstract we consider a rule designed to maintain collusion in a duopoly made up of firms producing differentiated products we analyse both price setting and quantity setting models and show that product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of this rule our results contrast with those obtained by earlier writers

prisoners dilemma in duopoly super games abstract the choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here it is shown that this relocates the prisoners dilemma backward from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion and where discount rates appear as the payoffs likewise a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior cooperative or non cooperative are simultaneously chosen journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l13

collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products abstract this paper examines the relationship between product differentiation and the sustainability of collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products the main finding is that collusion is more easily sustained the more similar the products are exactly the opposite result may be obtained in models of horizontal differentiation consequently when products are differentiated both horizontally and vertically theory provides no clearcut prediction

chapter 6 market share models publisher summary this chapter describes that three basic principles motivate the specification of the market share models market share models should be competitive descriptive as well as predictive and profit oriented being fundamentally competitive implies that one cannot know the effect or effectiveness of a marketing action without accounting for the actions of competitors market share models are models for understanding how the marketing efforts of every brand impact the results in a competitive marketplace only by describing the influence of each marketing instrument can one gain a basis for marketing planning prediction alone is not enough time series models that forecast the future from the past sales provide no insight into how sales are generated the emphasis on being descriptive also embraces the need to understand the areas in which consumer choice probabilities are synonymous with market shares as well part of the goal of description transcends what can be done by market share models alone managers need to understand that their efforts have potentially competitive effects and potentially market expansive effects in sales response models these effects are comingled but by combining descriptive market share models for the competitive effects with descriptive category volume models for the market expansive effects managers obtain a much richer understanding of the market the profit oriented goal of market share analysis urges us to ask how the firm s allocations of resources to aspects of the marketing mix produce bottom line results

cheating in a duopoly supergame this paper examines an approach to oligopoly theory first proposed in a relatively neglected paper by georgej stigler i 964 suppose that the firms in an oligopoly have achieved tacitly or explicitly a collusive agreement and that open defection in a sense to be made more precise below does not pay given that the other firms observe the agreenient it pays any one of them to cheat that is to make secret price cuts to selected buyers in order to secure sales it may not otherwise have made stigler then sets out to define the likely extent of the gain a cheat can make without detection and to relate this to observable market parameters this would allow prediction of the probable incidence of cheating in a market and hence of the effectiveness of the collusive agreement stigler first argues that in a purely deterministic world there could be no scope for cheating each firm s sales could be fully anticipated and any deviation from the expected level would be immediate evidence of cheating which becomes in effect open defection implicit in this of course is the assumption that firms can observe each others outputs at negligible cost a reasonable assumption which will be maintained throughout the rest of this paper if the world is not in fact deterministic then scope for cheating may arise suppose that in each period any one buyer buys from any one seller with a probability between zero and one then each seller s sales in each period are a random variable and it is possible that a seller may attribute to chance a well above average sales level which in fact was due to cheating in deciding whether to accept this the other sellers are involved in hypothesis testing and the critical level of this test will determine how far a cheat dare go stigler s development of this idea in a formal model is open to a number of specific criticisms mckinnon i 966 criticized the excessively simplistic decision theoretic basis of stigler s model in deciding whether a rival has gained above average sales by cheating or simply by chance a firm is assumed to use a standard significance test with conventional critical levels the choice of which is entirely unexplained in the model there is also an unnecessary separation of tests according to the precise source of the buyers won by cheating previous customers of the cheat other firms customers or newly