growth and inequality in the dual model of development the role of demand factors this paper relates growth and income distribution in the development of a dual economy its originality lies in the fact that the analysis of income inequality uses the whole lorenz curve instead of some summary measures and that the dual economy is represented through a fully specified general equilibrium model conditions for particular shifts in the lorenz curve are derived they mostly involve the income and price elasticities of demand faced by the traditional sector of the economy and suggest that an unambiguous drop in income inequality is somewhat unlikely at the dual stage of development

does right or left matter cabinets credibility and fiscal adjustments abstract this paper tests the widely held assumption that left wing cabinets favor higher public spending and examines whether cabinet ideology affects the persistence of major fiscal adjustments in a panel of large fiscal adjustments in oecd countries during the last 40 years we find evidence that left wing and right wing cabinets are partisan the left tends to reduce the deficit by raising tax revenues while the right relies mostly on spending cuts our testable hypothesis is that cabinets can signal commitment by undertaking fiscal adjustments in ways that are not favored by their constituencies in other words the left gains credibility when it cuts spending while the right becomes more credible when it increases tax revenues probit estimates of the determinants of persistence in fiscal adjustments confirm that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments the effect is significant for cuts in public spending public consumption wage or nonwage increases in total revenues direct taxes on businesses and other taxes we test for the role of several other determinants of persistence confirming that coalition and majority cabinets are associated with less persistence while periods of high or rising levels of indebtedness favor persistence the estimates of the impact of ideology and other variables on gdp and its components show that it is the size of the spending cut rather than cabinet ideology that is most important

human capital inequality and economic growth some new evidence this paper provides new measures of human capital inequality for a broad panel of countries taking attainment levels from barro and lee 2001 we compute gini coefficients and the distribution of education by quintiles for 108 countries over five year intervals from 1960 to 2000 using this new cross country data on human capital inequality two main conclusions are obtained first most countries in the world have tended to reduce the inequality in human capital distribution second human capital inequality measures provide more robust results than income inequality measures in the estimation of standard growth and investment equations

understanding long run african growth colonial institutions or colonial education abstract long term growth in developing countries has been explained in four frameworks extractive colonial institutions acemoglu et al 2001 colonial legal origin la porta et al 2004 geography gallup et al 1998 and colonial human capital glaeser et al 2004 in this paper we test the colonial human capital explanation for sub saharan africa controlling for legal origin and geography utilising data on colonial era education we find that instrumented human capital explains long term growth better and shows greater stability over time than instrumented measures for extractive institutions we suggest that the impact of the disease environment on african long term growth runs through a human capital channel rather than an extractive institutions channel the effect of education is robust to including variables capturing legal origin and geography which have additional explanatory power

a distributional theory of government growth this article presents a closed form solution for time consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter extending meltzer and richard s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government at low stages of economic development the median voter identified as a relatively poor worker prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage at higher stages of development however when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises yet in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times hence government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state

dynamic procurement under uncertainty optimal design and implications for incomplete contracts we characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long term basic service when an uncertain add on is required later on introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelation for this service an income effect which reduces output distortions the firm must also bear some risk to induce information revelation for the add on this risk effect reduces the level of the add on but hardens information revelation for the basic service the interaction between these effects has important implications for the dynamics of distortions contract renegotiation and the value of incomplete contracts

public versus private investment in human capital endogenous growth and income inequality in this paper we present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth we use simple functional forms for preferences technologies and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education we find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education on the other hand private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high we also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average

explaining fashion cycles imitators chasing innovators in product space abstract this paper considers the problem of a fashion trend setter confronting an imitator who can produce the same product at lower cost a one dimensional product space is considered which is an abstraction of the key attribute of some consumer good three broad strategies can be optimal for the fashion leader 1 never innovate which milk profits from the initially advantageous position but ultimately concede the market without a fight 2 innovate once but only once which just temporarily defers conceding the market 3 cycle infinitely around product space never letting the imitator catch up and capture the market sometimes the cycles start immediately sometimes the innovator should wait for a time before beginning the cycles the optimal solution exhibits strong state dependency with so called skiba curves separating regions in state space where various of these strategies are optimal there are even instances of intersecting skiba curves in most cases analytical expressions can be stated that characterize these skiba curves

on the simple economics of advertising marketing and product design we propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers valuations which lead to rotations of the demand curve in many settings profits are a u shaped function of dispersion high dispersion is complemented by niche production and low dispersion is complemented by mass market supply we investigate numerous applications including product design advertising marketing and sales advice and the construction of quality differentiated product lines we also suggest a new taxonomy of advertising distinguishing between hype which shifts demand and real information which rotates demand

oligarchy democracy inequality and growth abstract this paper analyses the dynamics of inequality democratization and economic development in a political economy model of growth where education is both the engine of growth and a determinant of political participation in a context with imperfect capital markets we investigate the incentives for an educated oligarchy to subsidize the poor s education and to initiate a democratic transition we characterize the equilibrium patterns of political institutions income distribution and growth as a function of the initial income and inequalities in particular we identify circumstances under which the elite promotes the endogenous emergence of a middle class for purely political economy reasons a simple linear infinite horizon framework is then presented in this setting we discuss the importance of historical dependence for long run social stratification and redistribution

earthquake fatalities the interaction of nature and political economy to say that the level of fatalities resulting from an earthquake is inversely related to a country s per capita level of income is hardly novel what makes our approach novel is that we relate fatalities to both per capita income and the level of inequality that exists within a country through their joint impact on the likelihood of collective action being taken to mitigate the destructive potential of quakes we first develop a theoretical model which offers an explanation as to why in some environments different segments of society prove incapable of arriving at what all parties perceive to be an agreeable distribution of the burden of the necessary collective action causing the relatively wealthy simply to self insure against the disaster while leaving the relatively poor to its mercy following this we test our theoretical model by evaluating 269 large earthquakes occurring worldwide between 1960 and 2002 taking into account other factors that influence a quake s destructiveness such as its magnitude depth and proximity to population centers using a negative binomial estimation strategy with both random and fixed estimators we find strong evidence of the theoretical model s predictions that is while earthquakes themselves are natural phenomena beyond the reach of humankind our collective inaction with respect to items like the creation and enforcement of building codes failure to retrofit structures and to enact quake sensitive zoning clearly plays a part in determining the actual toll that a given quake takes and it is through these and other examples of collective inaction that limited per capita income and inequality couple together with a given quake s natural destructive power in determining the actual fatalities resulting from a quake

on the informational superiority of quantities over prices in the presence of an externality in this study we investigate the convexity of the profit function of a regulated firm with respect to the random shocks in the marginal costs and the demand intercept and its implications regarding information disclosure when these shocks are revealed to the firm at a future stage we illustrate that information disclosure is attained when the firm is regulated through the use of a quantity rather than a price instrument to do so we argue that increased convexity obtained under complete information is a sufficient condition as a policy implication we suggest a new argument which favors the use of quantities over prices these implications are more pronounced once we allow for multiple firms

legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen consider legal uncertainty as uncertainty about the legality of a specific action in particular suppose that the threshold of legality is uncertain i show that this legal uncertainty raises welfare legal uncertainty changes deterrence in opposite directions the probability of conviction increases for firms below the threshold while the probability of conviction decreases for firms above the threshold hence legal uncertainty acts as a welfare enhancing screen and increases welfare legal uncertainty discourages some actions with low private benefits while it encourages other actions with high private benefits

regulatory risk vertical integration and upstream investment abstract we investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator s commitment to a regulatory policy that promotes the regulated firm s noncontractible investment we show that when the regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial regulatory risk makes vertical integration profitable and stimulates high upstream investment at a lower social cost this occurs for moderate costs of high investment and firms small risk aversion our analysis sheds new light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets

structural analysis of optimal investment for firms with non concave revenue abstract qualitative properties of optimal investment strategies for a firm with quadratic costs that faces network externalities in its revenues are analysed organising the qualitative information in a bifurcation diagram it is found that the structure of the bifurcation manifolds is determined by a so called swallow tail singularity this implies the existence of up to three saddle equilibria of the state costate system whose local optimal stability for positive discount rates is determined by a three dimensional bifurcation diagram taking a particular two dimensional section of this diagram it is shown that the bifurcation curves divide this into 19 different parameter regions within each region the corresponding phase systems and also the optimal solutions derived from them are structurally stable in particular stable configurations with threshold skiba points are found in this way

the aging population and the size of the welfare state is there a puzzle abstract razin sadka and swagel razin asaf efraim sadka and phillip swagel 2002 the aging population and the size of the welfare state the journal of political economy vol 110 no 4 pp 900 918 unveil a puzzling fact the welfare state appears to be shrinking even as the dependency ratio rises while they formulate an elegant political economy model to explain the coexistence of an aging population and declining transfers the resolution of the puzzle turns out to be much simpler labor tax rates and per capita transfers are negatively correlated with the dependency ratio in advanced economies only because this measure includes children as well as retirees both labor tax rates and per capita transfers in advanced economies are in fact historically positively correlated with the ratio of retirees to the working age population and negatively correlated with the ratio of children to the working age population increasing the number of retirees shifts preferences toward higher taxes and transfers by increasing the fraction of the population that receives transfers in contrast workers with more children prefer to spend more of their lifetime income while raising dependents so they prefer smaller public pension systems these results suggest that fiscal leakage from workers to retirees is not required to explain the broad trends in the transfer policies of advanced economies

on the faustian dynamics of policy and political power this paper examines the faustian dynamics of policy and power we posit a general class of dy namic games in which current policies affect the future distribution of political power resulting in the following faustian trade off if the current ruler chooses his preferred policy he then sacrifices future political power yet if he wants to preserve his future power he must sacrifice his present policy objec tives the trade off comes from the fact that the current political ruler pivotal voter cannot uncouple the direct effect of his policy from its indirect effect on future power a policy endogenous pe equilibrium describes this endogenous transfer of power and the resulting evolution of policy and political power over time we show that the faustian trade off in a pe equilibrium is decomposed into two basic rationales the political preservation effect induces more tempered policy choices than if one s policy choice did not affect one s political fortunes however the reformation effect induces more aggressive policies in order to exploit the productivity gains from policies chosen by even more aggressive successors we distinguish between political systems that give rise to monotone faustian dynamics political power that progressively evolves towards more fiscally liberal types of leaders and cyclical faustian dynamics political power that oscillates between liberal and conservative types of leaders in each case we show that the faustian trade off moderates the choices of each type of leader

unequal societies income distribution and the social contract this paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political fundamentals can sustain such different systems of social insurance fiscal redistribution and education finance as those of the united states and western europe with imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality conversely with credit constraints lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality hence the potential for multiple steady states with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution or vice versa

a complete characterization of optimal growth paths in an aggregated model with a non concave production function the convexity of technology has played a crucial role in economic analyses of optimal one sector growth problems for example two of the key results on the traditional model of ramsey 1928 that have relied on the convexity of the technology are that optimal intertemporal growth involves moving monotonically towards a unique steady state as in cass 1965 koopmans 1965 and that the value function is a concave differentiable function of the initial capital stock as in benveniste and scheinkman 1979

income distribution and macroeconomics this paper analyzes the role of wealth distribution in macroeconomics through investment in human capital it is shown that in the presence of credit markets imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital the initial distribution of wealth affects aggregate output and investment both in the short and in the long run as there are multiple steady states this paper therefore provides an additional explanation for the persistent differences in per capita output across countries furthermore the paper shows that cross country differences in macroeconomic adjustment to aggregate shocks can be attributed among other factors to differences in wealth and income distribution across countries

new ways of looking at old issues inequality and growth abstract the paper uses new cross country data on income and asset land distribution to show that i there is a strong negative relationship between initial inequality in the asset distribution and long term growth ii inequality reduces income growth for the poor but not for the rich and iii available longitudinal data provide little support for the kuznets hypothesis policies that increase aggregate investment and facilitate acquisition of assets by the poor might thus be doubly beneficial for growth and poverty reduction

factor income distribution and endogenous economic growth piketty meets romer what is the relationship between the economy s long run growth rate its capital income ratio and its factor income distribution a satisfactory answer requires an endogenous growth and savings rate we scrutinize piketty s 2014 theory in a richly parameterized variant of romer s 1990 seminal model with and without population growth the economy s growth and savings rate are exogenous in piketty s theory and endogenous in romer s in contrast to piketty s second fundamental law of capitalism a smaller growth rate may be associated with a smaller capital income ratio moreover it may go together with a greater or a smaller capital share jel e10 e21 e25 o33 o41

compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms we propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible in our model a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups the organization of interest groups is endogenous compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms

pecuniary emulation inequality and growth abstract we study a two class growth model in which agents care about both consumption and the social perception of their wealth rank the latter determines the social status enjoyed by agents social perceptions are based upon noisy signals of wealth and in equilibrium there is incomplete separation of classes the steady growth rate of the economy increases with the full information status differential between classes and contrary to the growth model without status it is affected by the initial level of wealth inequality both too much equality and too much inequality are detrimental to economic growth

regulating a monopolist with unknown costs we consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator the regulator s objective is to maximize a linear social welfare function of the consumers surplus and the firm s profit in the optimal regulatory policy prices and subsidies are designed as functions of the firm s cost report so that expected social welfare is maximized subject to the constraints that the firm has nonnegative profit and has no incentive to misrepresent its costs we explicitly derive the optimal policy and analyze its properties in their classic papers dupuit 2 and hotelling 5 considered pricing policies for a bridge that had a fixed cost of construction and zero marginal cost they demonstrated that the pricing policy that maximizes consumer well being is to set price equal to marginal cost and to provide a subsidy to the supplier equal to the fixed cost so that a firm would be willing to provide the bridge this first best solution is based on a number of informational assumptions first the demand function is assumed to be known to both the regulator and to the firm while the assumption of complete information may be too strong the assumption that information about demand is as available to the regulator as it is to the firm does not seem unnatural a second informational assumption is that the regulator has complete information about the cost of the firm or at least has the same information about cost as does the firm this assumption is unlikely to be met in reality since the firm would be expected to have better information about costs than would the regulator as weitzman has stated an essential feature of the regulatory environment i am trying to describe is uncertainty about the exact specification of each firm s cost function in most cases even the managers and engineers most closely associated with production will be unable to precisely specify beforehand the cheapest way to generate various hypothetical output levels because they are yet removed from the production process the regulators are likely to be vaguer still about a firm s cost function 12 p 684 as this observation suggests it is natural to expect that a firm would have better information regarding its costs than would a regulator the purpose of this paper is to develop an optimal regulatory policy for the case in which the regulator does not know the costs of the firm one strategy that a regulator could use in the absence of full information about costs is to give the firm the title to the total social surplus and to delegate the pricing decision to the firm in pursuing its own interests which would then be to maximize the total social surplus the firm would adopt the same marginal cost pricing strategy that the regulator would have imposed if the regulator had

fiscal policy over the real business cycle a positive theory this paper presents a political economy theory of the behavior of fiscal policy over the business cycle the theory predicts that in both booms and recessions fiscal policies are set so that the marginal cost of public funds obeys a submartingale in the short run fiscal policy can be pro cyclical with government debt spiking up upon entering a boom however in the long run fiscal policy is counter cyclical with debt increasing in recessions and decreasing in booms government spending increases in booms and decreases during recessions while tax rates decrease during booms and increase in recessions data on tax rates from the g7 countries supports the submartingale prediction and the correlations between fiscal policy variables and national income implied by the theory are consistent with much of the existing evidence from the u s and other countries

regulatory risk under optimal monopoly regulation i develop a tractable framework to study regulatory risk under optimal monopoly regulation it captures increasing regulatory risk as mean preserving spreads of two regulatory variables weights attached to profits and costs of public funds the regulator s reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of demand for convex concave demand it yields a positive negative information rent effect that benefits hurts the firm consumers dislike a positive information rent effect but their risk preferences also depend on their tendency to dislike fluctuations in consumption risk preference of benevolent regulators may contradict both those of the firm and consumers

political equilibrium income distribution and growth this paper analyzes the impact of income distribution on growth when investment in human capital is the source of growth and individuals vote over the degree of redistribution in the economy the model has three main features first very different patterns of income distribution are conducive to high growth at different levels of per capita income second growth is associated with an externality whereby investment in human capital by one group increases the productivity of other groups thus potentially enabling them to invest in human capital third the initial pattern of income distribution and the resulting political equilibrium are crucial in determining whether the transmission of this externality is promoted in which case growth is enhanced or prevented in which case growth is stopped using a non overlapping generations model with voting i derive several empirical implications in particular the model implies an inverted u relation between levels of inequality and levels of income in cross sections but not necessarily in time series a result that seems consistent with a number of empirical studies

education economic growth and measured income inequality in this paper education simultaneously affects growth and income inequality more education does not necessarily decrease inequality when the latter is assessed by the lorenz dominance criterion increases in education first increase and then decrease growth as well as income inequality when measured by the gini coefficient there is no clear functional relationship between growth and measured income inequality the model identifies regimes of this relationship which depend crucially on the production and schooling technology conventional growth regressions with human capital and inequality as regressors may miss the richness of the underlying nonlinearities but viewed as approximations may still provide important information on the nonlinear relationship between growth and education

is there a double bonus from reducing inequality i introduction in the 1990s a number of empirical studies found an economically and statistically significant negative relationship between inequality and long run growth a huge literature that has investigated the effect of inequality on growth much of it emphasizes the negative effect can be broadly classified into three branches 1 the first branch of the literature regards an endogenously determined redistributive policy as a catalyst bertola 1993 persson and tabellini 1994 it asserts that in more unequal economies greater distortion because of higher redistributive tax which is determined endogenously by vote is likely to impede more investment the second branch of the literature argues that more inequality will lead to more sociopolitical instability which in turn will discourage investment alesina and rodrik 1994 benhabib and rustichini 1996 grossman and kim 1996 the third branch of the literature focuses on investment in human capital 2 these papers show that when credit markets are imperfect more inequality implies less people being able to invest in human capital which in turn implies slower growth the idea that low income inequality and high long run growth are consistent objectives appeared to be a common agreement until the late 1990s when it started being challenged by the empirical literature for instance forbes 2000 and li and zou 1998 although their focus is the effect in the short run 5 10 years showed the positive effect of initial inequality on growth burro 2000 and deininger and squire 1998 separate their samples into two according to some criteria such as an income level or a degree of democracy suggest the nonmonotonic effects of inequality on subsequent growth banerjee and duflo 2003 also cast a doubt on the validity of a linear structure that is assumed in the empirical literature assessing the relationship between inequality and growth in the meantime the third branch of the literature mentioned earlier has been extended by incorporating endogenous fertility this new strand of the literature postulates that fertility and investment in human capital are jointly determined by the individuals optimizing behavior 3 and emphasizes the fertility difference between the rich and poor it claims that more unequal economies have higher fertility differentials accumulate less human capital and hence have lower economic growth 4 the endogenous fertility literature appears to reemphasize the negative effect of initial inequality on subsequent growth in this paper we hope to further extend the literature by arguing that the effect of inequality on growth can be non monotonic even when the fertility differential is taken into account to this end we employ an overlapping generations olg model that follows a model by ehrlich and lui 1991 hereafter e l a representative agent in their model maximizes her his utility by choosing how much to invest in quality and quantity of human capital caring about current and future consumption as well as companionship by her his children in the future in contrast to e l who focus only on the representative agent we look at heterogeneous dynasties that comprise an economy by allowing education to have external effects we define an economy as a set of dynasties that can affect one another through externality in education it turns out that a dynasty s behavior differs according to the human capital stock it inherits as well as the economy s average level of human capital hence the initial distribution of human capital in an economy has strong implications for subsequent growth of that economy our main interest is to assess from our theoretical model how inequality affects long run growth of an economy say over 25 years however this is a somewhat tricky exercise because 25 years correspond to only one generation in our three period olg model

a dns curve in a two state capital accumulation model a numerical analysis abstract in this paper we study a capital accumulation model in an optimal control theoretic framework where the capital stock and the investment rate are modelled as state variables and the change in the investment rate as control adjustment costs are introduced for investment rate and its change moreover we model network externalities by a convex segment in the revenue function which implies the existence of two long run optimal steady states one with a low level and the other with a high level capital stock it depends on the initial capital endowment and initial investment rate to which steady state it is optimal to converge we numerically compute a curve in the state plane for which it holds that when starting from a point on this curve the decision maker is indifferent between going to either one of these steady states and identify this curve as the dns curve the negative slope of the dns curve indicates that there is a trade off between the initial capital endowment and initial investment rate

income inequality education expenditures and growth abstract recent studies have reported a negative association between income inequality and economic growth if true what accounts for this finding what are possible transition mechanisms that might link the two this paper explores one such mechanism income inequality raises expenditures for public education as a fraction of gross domestic product gdp although public education expenditures are positively associated with future economic growth the contemporaneous effect upon growth is negative given this cost upon current growth these findings may help to explain the lack of a large positive effect from the growth of human capital upon economic growth as reported in the literature

a new data set measuring income inequality this article presents a new data set on inequality in the distribution of income the authors explain the criteria they applied in selecting data on gini coefficients and on individual quintile groups income shares comparison of the new data set with existing compilations reveals that the data assembled here represent an improvement in quality and a significant expansion in coverage although differences in the definition of the underlying data might still affect inter temporal and international comparability based on this new data set the authors do not find a systematic link between growth and changes in aggregate inequality they do find a strong positive relationship between growth and reduction of poverty

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

income inequality government expenditures and growth this paper investigates the relationship between income inequality and growth by utilizing the recently published deininger squire data set most of the recent empirical growth literature suggests a negative relationship between inequality and growth on the basis of reduced form growth equations this is also found in the author s study some effort is made to discuss the argument behind the perceived negative relationship between inequality and growth according to the fiscal policy approach a high level of income inequality leads to a higher demand for redistribution which in turn affects growth through resource allocation out of investment or through incentive distorting taxes needed to fund the redistribution it is suggested that the last mentioned relationship between government expenditure and growth is more likely to be non linear positive with small amounts and negative with large amounts such a relationship however is only found for public goods thus government expenditure on law and ord

extremism in revolutionary movements abstract a revolutionary entrepreneur strategically chooses the revolutionary agenda to maximize the likelihood of revolution citizens have different preferences and can contribute varying degrees of support we show 1 extremists exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda 2 depending on the structure of repression more severe repression can moderate or radicalize the revolutionary agenda specifically increases in the minimum punishment marginal cost of revolutionary effort at its minimum radicalize the revolutionary agenda this presents the elite with a tradeoff between extreme but unlikely revolutions and moderate but likely ones 3 competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda

regulatory decision errors legal uncertainty and welfare a general treatment abstract we provide a general treatment of the implications for welfare of various sources of legal uncertainty facing agents about the decisions made by a regulatory authority we distinguish the legal uncertainty from the decision errors made by the authority while an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare for any given level of decision errors information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare this holds always when sanctions are set at their optimal level this transforms radically one s perception about the costs of legal uncertainty we also provide general proofs for two results previously established under restrictive assumptions

equity and efficiency in human capital investment the local connection a general model of community formation and human capital accumulation with social spillovers and decentralized school funding is used to analyse the causes of economic segregation and its consequences for equity and efficiency significant polarization arises from minor differences in endowments preferences or access to capital markets this makes income inequality more persistent across generations but the same need not be true for wealth equilibrium stratification tends to be excessive resulting in low aggregate surplus whether state equalization of school resources can remedy these problems hinges on how purchased social and family inputs interact in education and in mobility decisions

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

social norms savings behavior and growth we argue that many goods and decisions are not allocated or made through markets we interpret an agent s status as a ranking device that determines how well he or she fares in the nonmarket sector the existence of a nonmarket sector can endogenously generate a concern for relative position in for example the income distribution so that higher income implies higher status moreover it can naturally yield multiple equilibria it is thus possible to explain differences in growth rates across countries without recourse to differences in underlying preferences technologies or endowments different social organizations lead to different reduced form preferences which lead to different growth rates

the survival of the welfare state this paper provides an analytical characterization of markov perfect equilibria in a model with repeated voting where agents vote over distortionary income redistribution a key result is that the future constituency for redistributive policies depends positively on current redistribution since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters the model features multiple equilibria in some equilibria positive redistribution persists forever in other equilibria even a majority of beneficiaries of redistribution vote strategically so as to induce the end of the welfare state next period skill biased technical change makes the survival of the welfare state less likely

investment and screening under asymmetric endogenous information this article provides an analysis of screening contracts in a complete but imperfect information environment as opposed to the usual incomplete information bayesian environment an agent faces a hold up situation while making a cost reducing specific investment that is not observed by the principal to prevent the hold up the agent randomizes his investment strategy and the principal offers a screening contract the informational rents provided by the equilibrium contract finance the investment for a large class of cost functions the randomization is such that the marginal surplus follows a power distribution

financing higher education and majority voting abstract this paper examines the state funding of higher education treated as an investment good generating an externality under majority voting the model considers a single cohort over two periods individuals maximise net lifetime income subject to the government s budget constraint with a proportional tax cyclical voting does not occur despite double peaked preferences comparative static results are obtained a fall in non education expenditure leads to a fall in the choice of grant and a positive externality is a necessary though not sufficient condition for ensuring majority support for some positive level of the grant

income inequality human capital accumulation and economic performance we show that greater income equality implies higher human capital accumulation and economic performance in an overlapping generations model with heterogeneity in income and talent given liquidity constraints and declining marginal utility individuals with a given level of talent receive education if their initial income is higher than a threshold level and the threshold is lower for more talented individuals assuming the more talented create more human capital when educated greater initial income equality for one generation then imply not only higher aggregate human capital accumulated by that generation but an improvement in all subsequent generations initial income distributions

measuring inequality change in an economy with income growth abstract this paper analyzes how to measure changes in inequality in an economy with income growth the discussion distinguishes three stylized kinds of economic growth 1 1 high income sector enrichment 2 2 low income sector enrichment 3 3 high income sector enlargement in which the high income sector expands and absorbs persons from the low income sector th e two enrichment types pose no problem for assessing inequality change in the course of economic growth for high income sector enrichment growth inequality might reasonably be said to increase whereas for low income sector enrichment inequality might be said to decrease these adjustments are non controversial and non problematical where problems arise is in the case of high income sector enlargement growth in that case the two alternative approaches have been shown in this paper to yield markedly results 1 1 the traditional inequality indices generate an inverted u pattern of inequality that is inequality rises in the early stages of high income sector enlargement growth and falls thereafter 2 2 the new approach suggested here based on axioms of gap inequality and numerical inequality generates a u pattern of inequality that is inequality falls in the early stages of high income sector enlargement growth and rises thereafter the discrepancy between the familiar indices and the alternative approach based on axioms of gap inequality and numerical inequality bears further scrutiny two courses of action are possible one might try to axiomatize inequality in ways that generate an inverted u pattern in high income sector enlargement growth thereby rationalizing the continued use of the usual inequality indices with the inverted u property alternatively one might retain the axioms proposed here embed them into a more formal structure and construct a family of inequality indices consistent with them others might wish to pursue the first course i am at work on the second

subsidies for higher education who should pay the resource costs of higher education this paper investigates a simple model of the general equilibrium of the labor market with three skill levels those in the population with the lower level of intelligence and or sophistication can only become low skilled workers but the brighter segment of the population can become either high or medium skilled workers given the tax structure the welfare of each group is maximized by a unique subsidy rate on the cost of training high skilled workers under several circumstances the lower iq group wants a higher subsidy rate than will the group that benefits directly from the training

the size and composition of government expenditure abstract this paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure the purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude using government financial statistics data from the imf covering over 100 countries from 1970 2000 i look at cross sectional and inter temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure such as defense education health care and different levels of government central and local among other results i find a new explanation for wagner s law widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance

channels and policy debate in the globalization inequality poverty nexus the process of globalization has led to a much greater integration of the world economy the flows of trade capital labour technology and information across national borders have accelerated since the 1980s and created an environment conducive to faster economic growth and transmission of knowledge it is evident that the forces of globalization provide a strong potential for a major reduction in poverty in the developing world however for a number of reasons brought out in this chapter the positive impact of globalization on poverty alleviation worldwide has not been as substantial as one might have expected in this chapter we explore structural factors and policies within the world economy and national economies that impede the full transmission of the benefits of the various channels of globalization to poverty reduction

capital taxation under political constraints this paper studies optimal dynamic tax policy under the threat of political reform a policy will be reformed ex post if a large enough coalition of citizens supports reform thus sustainable policies are those that will continue to attract enough political support in the future we find that optimal marginal capital taxes are either progressive or u shaped so that savings are subsidized for the poor and or the middle class but are taxed for the rich u shaped capital taxes always emerge when individuals political behavior is purely determined by economic motives

vested interests in a positive theory of stagnation and growth we study a positive theory of stagnation and growth aimed at understanding the large variations in growth outcomes across actual economies the theory points to the fundamental role played by vested interests in determining policies which are key to the growth process some agents seek to prevent the adoption of new technologies we develop a model of technology adoption and show how technological innovation may sow the seeds of its own destruction in particular we find that the equilibrium is characterized by a long cycle of stagnation and growth over this cycle incumbents are phased out of the economy will new innovation occur in formalizing our theory we make a methodological contribution by characterizing dynamic voting equilibria when voters must forecast the effects of different current policies on future prices and policy outcomes

factor shares and savings in endogenous growth in models of steady investment driven growth an individual s propensity to save depends on how much of his income is drawn from accumulated factors of production capital rather than from nonaccumulated factors when agents are heterogeneous in this respect growth oriented policies have distributional consequences and in the absence of lump sum redistribution their implementation faces political constraints if the median voter is capital poor relative to the economy s representative agent political interactions tend to slow down growth when policy acts on capital s income share and tend to accelerate it when investment subsidies are the policy instrument of choice copyright 1993 by american economic association

distributive politics and economic growth a crude distinction between economics and politics would be that economics is concerned with expanding the pie while politics is about distributing it in this paper we analyze the relationship between the two we focus on how an economy s initial configuration of resources shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution and how that in turn affects long run growth our main conclusion is that inequality is conducive to the adoption of growth retarding policies we derive this result from a simple political economy model of growth and present cross country evidence consistent with it the key feature of our model is that individuals differ in their relative factor endowments we distinguish between two types of factors an accumulated factor called capital and a nonaccumulated factor called labor growth is driven by the expansion of the capital stock which is in turn determined by individual saving decisions long run growth is endogenous as the aggregate production function is taken to be linearly homogeneous in capital and productive government services taken together the provision of government services is financed by a tax on capital because government services are productive a small tax on

intergenerational mobility and the process of development this paper offers an explanation for some evidence that intergenerational earnings mobility is higher in more developed economies and that mobility is positively correlated with wage equality in the model mobility promotes economic growth via its effect on the accumulation and allocation of human capital growth influences mobility via its effect on incentives to acquire education and its effect on liquidity constraints upon such acquisition in the process of development mobility increases and the distribution of education becomes better correlated with ability redistributive policy has a negative effect on growth in developed economies and a positive effect in developing economies

explaining international and intertemporal variations in income inequality this paper explores the propositions that income inequality is relatively stable within countries and that it varies significantly among countries a new and expanded data set provides broad support for both propositions drawing on a political economy and capital market imperfection arguments to explain the intertemporal and international variation in inequality the empirical analysis shows that the predicted variables associated with the first argument a measure of civil liberties and the initial level of secondary schooling and the second argument a measure of financial depth and the initial distribution of land are indeed important determinants of inequality this paper explores two propositions regarding income inequality they are first income inequality is relatively stable within countries and second it varies significantly across countries to illustrate note that the gini coefficient in india remained almost constant for forty years 1951 92 with mean 32 6 and standard deviation 2 0 2 in contrast the variation in gini coefficients across countries is large 61 9 in honduras in 1968 compared with 17 8 in bulgaria in 1976 if substantiated these propositions have potentially significant implications for poverty the significance of the first is obvious barring any fundamental socio political change poverty reduction will depend crucially on the rate of economic growth given this the significance of the second is that in inegalitarian economies the poor will enjoy a smaller share of any national increment in income than in more egalitarian ones drawing on a new and expanded data set on inequality deininger and squire 1996a the first of the paper s three sections conducts standard statistical tests of the two propositions the sample comprises 573 observations on the most common measure of inequality the gini coefficient for 49 developed and developing countries covering the period 1947 94 the results broadly confirm our two propositions specifically analysis of variance anova shows that about 90 of the total variance in the gini coefficients

dynamics of income distribution in this paper we have obtained closed form solutions in cass koopmans growth models with heterogeneous agents the relationship between the form of the production function and the dynamics of income distribution is made explicit we then use this relationship to determine what production structure is simultaneously consistent with facts on growth and income inequality our empirical findings give support to models with decreasing returns in the reproducible factor jel classification d3 o1 o4 dans ce memoire les auteurs obtiennent des solutions pour des modeles de croissance a la cass koopmans dans le cas ou les agents sont heterogenes on explicite la relation entre la forme de la fonction de production et la dynamique de la repartition des revenus on utilise alors cette relation pour determiner quelle structure de production est arrimee aux faits connus a la fois quant a la croissance economique et a la repartition des revenus les resultats empiriques supportent les modeles ou les rendements sur les acteurs de production reproductibles sont decroissants

distributional effects of growth and public expenditures in africa estimates for tanzania and rwanda summary in this paper we explore the effects of fiscal policies and growth on measures of household welfare across the distribution of expenditures for two african countries rwanda and tanzania we explore the effect of government expenditures on expenditure growth in each quintile of the expenditure distribution and the effect of growth for each group we find that the benefits of growth are concentrated among the better off sectors of the population in these two countries perhaps to the detriment of the poorer sectors by looking at the effects within a country and across different groups of households and administrative entities we exploit variation in expenditures and growth across and within regions of each country to estimate the elasticities of expenditure with respect to fiscal expenditure and mean expenditure growth at different points of the expenditure distribution using household survey data and government expenditure data at the district level we find that overall mean expenditure growth benefits the top expenditure groups the welfare spillovers are mostly present for top 20 of the expenditure distribution with the middle of the distribution in tanzania responding slightly to these spillovers public social expenditures do not appear to affect inequality considerably but do tend to work toward decreasing inequality however mean expenditure growth is related to increases in inequality in the sense that the richest sectors of the population benefit the most from growth we find that the growth elasticity of expenditure is only above one for the top quintile in both countries in tanzania a 1 increase in average household expenditure is related to a 1 96 expenditure growth in the top quintile and 0 43 in the third quintile in rwanda a 1 increase in average household expenditure is related to a 1 93 increase in household expenditure in the top 20 of the distribution

growth learning and redistributive policies abstract this paper develops an endogenous growth model with redistributive taxation in which the growth rate of the economy affects the agents preferences over redistributive policies and therefore the equilibrium level of taxation the main mechanism through which the growth rate affects policy preferences is by changing the ability of the agents to learn their positions in the future distribution of incomes the main result of the paper is that during periods of growth the society opts for less taxation and less redistribution the model also predicts that growing economies are characterized by higher inequality in the distribution of income and by greater mobility of agents within income classes over time

precautionary saving in the small and in the large the theory of precautionary saving is shown to be isomorphic to the arrow pratt theory of risk aversion making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving and more generally to the theory of optimal choice under risk in particular a measure of the strength of the precautionary saving motive analogous to the arrow pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving and to give a new interpretation of the dreze modigliani substitution effect copyright 1990 by the econometric society