common agency with rational expectations theory and application to a monetary union we extend the theory of common agency to the situation where the principals payoffs are affected by their ex ante expectations of the agent s ex post choice we show how the usual truthful schedules must be modified to account for the rational expectations constraint we apply the model to a monetary union where member governments influence the policy of the common central bank using incentive contracts we examine how the outcomes depend on different delegated objectives of the bank and find that some often advocated rules create an excessive deflationary bias

the labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality abstract unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies this paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality we build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction on the job search and intersectoral flows where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs we calibrate the model for mexico and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs even if they obtain informal jobs can lead to an increase in formality in the economy while also producing small increases in unemployment the exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits we also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market in particular combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality such as lower employment taxes and firing costs can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation

does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation abstract if discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inflation bias monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt the additional debt accumulation harms welfare if governments are sufficiently myopic in the presence of myopic governments debt ceilings play a useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allowing a conservative independent central bank to focus on price stability with supply shocks monetary unification results in excessive variability of public debt a debt target that constrains stabilization policy helps to prevent this

why is corruption less harmful to income inequality in latin america summary conventional wisdom says corruption is bad for income inequality but recent research on latin america finds a trade off between corruption and inequality and suggests this is due to the large informal sector in the region using data on a large sample of countries we find that the informal sector impacts the link between corruption and inequality in particular the marginal impact of corruption becomes negative once the informal sector becomes large this is true in latin america and more generally corruption reducing policies should be accompanied by measures that help displaced informal sector workers

political uncertainty and macroeconomic performance abstract it is often claimed that politically induced economic flucturations are harmful for the society in this paper we show that this conjecture is not necessarily correct and such fluctuations can actually improve society s macroeconomic performance

optimal central banker contracts and common agency a comment we explore a setting where the central bank is offered an incentive scheme by an interest group in addition to the contract designed by the government we prove that the inflation bias can be eliminated when principals do not cooperate and have different output or inflation objectives these conclusions contrast with those of chortareas and miller public choice 121 131 155 2004 the reason is that our analysis takes into account the participation constraints of the central bank we also show that if principals cooperate the inflation bias is eliminated when their output target is different but not when they disagree over the inflation objective

independent central banks low inflation at no costs a widely held view suggests that politically independent central banks bring about relatively low and stable inflation rates a more debated question is whether one has to pay for this good outcome with more real instability in his seminal contribution kenneth rogoff 1985 suggests that an independent and inflation averse central bank reduces average inflation but as a result increases output variability the conservative central banker reduces the inflation bias due to the time inconsistency problem but stabilizes less however alesina and summers 1993 do not find that at least within the oecd countries more independent central banks are associated with more variability of growth or unemployment thus they conclude that independent central banks bring about low inflation at no apparent real costs the point of this paper is to provide theoretical underpinnings to this finding which is in contrast to rogoff 1985 2 the basic idea is that one can isolate two sources of output variability one is the economic variability induced by standard exogenous shocks that monetary policy is supposed to stabilize for instance money demand shocks or supply shocks the second source of variability is political or more generally policy induced this is the variability introduced in the system by the uncertainty about the future course of policy for instance alesina 1987 studies the effect of uncertain electoral outcomes in a model where the two contending parties have different preferences over inflation and unemployment an inflation averse independent central banker does not stabilize as much the economic variability in order to keep inflation low and stable this is rogoff s point however by insulating monetary policy from political pressures an independent central bank can reduce the political variability the overall effect of independence on output variability is thus ambiguous this result is consistent at least prima facie with the evidence in alesina and summers 1993 on the lack of correlation between centralbank independence and output variability in fact it is possible that when the politically induced output variability is predominant a more independent central bank reduces average inflation and the variance of output

lurking in the shadows the informal sector and government policy abstract this paper develops a dynamic model that sheds light on the evolution of the informal sector we show how tax rates and enforcement policies influence the size of this sector and how the sector naturally declines as an economy transitions towards steady state we find small changes in the tax rate cause measurable changes in the size of informal employment but modest changes in enforcement have negligible effects these results suggest that while reductions in the tax rate combined with increased enforcement reduce the size of the informal sector tax rate reductions and penalties for evasion are the most effective

the response of the informal sector to trade liberalization this paper studies the relationship between trade liberalization and informality it is often claimed that increased foreign competition in developing countries leads to an expansion of the informal sector defined as the sector that does not comply with labor market legislation using data from two countries that experienced large trade barrier reductions in the 1980 s and 1990 s brazil and colombia we examine the response of the informal sector to liberalization in brazil we find no evidence of a relationship between trade policy and informality in colombia we do find evidence of such a relationship but only for the period preceding a major labor market reform that increased the flexibility of the colombian labor market these results point to the significance of labor market institutions in assessing the effects of trade policy on the labor market

central bank independence economic behavior and optimal term lengths the authors parameterize central bank independence in terms of partisanship and term length focusing on the implications of alternative policy structures for real economic activity while long terms of office for the central banker can reduce the role of electoral surprises term lengths that are too long are costly if societal preferences are subject to permanent shifts the appointment of a conservative central banker increases the optimal term length and leads to lower average inflation but need not increase the volatility of output copyright 1996 by american economic association

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

inflation contracts and inflation targets under uncertainty why we might need conservative central bankers this paper compares the relative effectiveness of inflation contracts and inflation targets in the presence of uncertainty regarding the central bank s preferences and the underlying output target the model explains why discretion may be superior to a delegation solution we also show that there might be the need to combine inflation targets and contracts with the appointment of a rogoff type conservative central banker if contracts and targets cannot be made state contingent and that less flexible inflation targets may be appropriate with uncertain central bank preferences

monetary politics in a monetary union a note on common agency with rational expectations abstract is the politicisation of monetary policy in a currency union desirable this paper shows that in a setting where political influence by national governments is modeled as a common agency game with rational expectations the answer to this question crucially depends on whether the common central bank can commit to follow its policy

aggregate demand shocks central bank preferences and macroeconomic outcomes with imperfect information abstract assuming imperfect information regarding aggregate demand shocks the paper shows first the distribution of the impact of such shocks between employment and prices depends crucially on central bank preferences second optimal stabilization is achieved by a conservative central banker

accountability transparency and inflation targeting inflation targeting regimes define a performance measure for the central bank a regime that places a large small weight on achieving the target is analogous to a high low powered incentive scheme high powered incentive structures promote accountability but may distort stabilization policy the optimal power under inflation targeting is derived under perfect and imperfect information the fundamental trade off between accountability and stabilization depends on the degree of transparency defined as the ability to monitor the central bank s performance multiplicative uncertainty increases the optimal weight to place on achieving an inflation target

why money talks and wealth whispers monetary uncertainty and mystique this paper analyzes the effect of monetary uncertainty on the inflationary bias and the variance of output and inflation monetary policy uncertainty is modeled as a shock to the central banker s preference for inflation stabilization relative to output stabilization that cannot be observed by the public we find that the mean and variance of inflation increase with the variance of this preference shock however unlike other studies we find that monetary uncertainty may very well have a positive effect on output stabilization and therefore also on society s welfare

supply shocks private sector information and monetary policy is there inevitably a stabilization trade off we assume that while the central bank has an information advantage in respect of aggregate productivity shocks the private sector has superior knowledge of local disturbances it is shown that there is no policy trade off between inflation and employment stability moreover macroeconomic outcomes are independent of the weight assigned to inflation by the central bank

central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy abstract a shared feature of models used to investigate the welfare enhancing potential of a central bank inflation contract is their stochastic nature central to the benefits conferred by such a contract is the presence of supply shocks in constructing a framework where wages are set strategically by a number of nonatomistic inflation averse unions this note identifies circumstances in which an inflation contract improves macroeconomic outcomes even in the absence of supply shocks

job search and mobility in developing countries theory and policy implications abstract a labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive we show that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium in this dual economy we then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms profits we find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages we also find that an employment wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications in particular the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it

good jobs versus bad jobs this article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high wage good and low wage bad jobs coexist minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high wage jobs because the composition of jobs in the laissez faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low wage jobs these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare

a theory of ambiguity credibility and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information this paper develops a positive theory of credibility ambiguity and inflation under discretion and asymmetric information the monetary policymaker maximizes his own politically motivated objective function that is positively related to economic stimulation through monetary surprises and negatively related to monetary growth the relative importance he assigns to each target shifts stochastically through time his current preference trade off is known to him but not to the public when choosing the state contingent path of money growth for the present and the future the policymaker compares the benefits from current stimulation with the costs associated with higher future inflation expectations current monetary growth conveys information to the public about future money growth because there is persistence in the policymaker s objectives although expectations are rational information is imperfect because monetary control procedures are imprecise as a result the public cannot correctly distinguish persistent changes of emphasis on different policy objectives from transitory monetary control errors the public becomes aware of changes gradually by observing past monetary growth credibility is defined in terms of the speed with which the public recognizes changes in the objectives of the policymaker credibility is lower the noisier monetary control and the more stable the objectives of the policymaker looser monetary control and a higher degree of time preference on the part of the policymaker induce him to produce higher and more variable monetary growth when the policymaker is free to determine the accuracy of monetary control he does not always choose the most effective control available in spite of the fact that monetary surprises always have an expected value of zero the reason is that ambiguous control procedures enable the policymaker to generate positive surprises when he cares more than on average about economic stimulation he leaves the inevitable negative surprises for periods in which he cares more about inflation prevention this result provides an explanation for the fed s preference for ambiguity recently documented by goodfriend 1986 the policymaker is more likely to pick more ambiguous control procedures the more uncertain his objectives and the higher his time preference the paper also provides a theoretical underpinning for the well documented crosscountry positive correlation between the level and the variability of inflation

inflation targeting under asymmetric preferences this paper develops and estimates a game theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker s preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate specifically positive deviations from the target can be weighted more or less severely than negative ones in the central banker s loss function it is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to this generalization of preferences estimates of the central banker s preference parameters for canada sweden and the uk are statistically different from the one implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function

announcements inflation targeting and central bank incentives this paper studies the incentives a central bank faces in announcing inflation targets when the central bank has private information about the economy and the public is uncertain about the central bank s preferences targeting rules in the absence of announcements reduce the inflationary bias of discretionary policy but they distort the central bank s response to private information about the economy this distortion is eliminated when the central bank is allowed to announce the inflation target announcements also affect credibility although the way they do so depends on the exact definition of credibility that is employed in standard models of monetary policy in which dynamic inconsistency plays a prominent role announcements from the central bank about its policy inten tions are not believable the central bank has an incentive to lie yet central banks often do make announcements and they are legally required to do so in some cases the bank of england for example must issue periodic inflation reports the chairman of the federal reserve is required by the humphrey hawkins act to testify before congress twice each year to explain the fed s policy actions and to detail the fed s outlook for future economic develop ments similarly the reserve bank of new zealand is required under the reserve bank act of 1989 to publish policy statements that spell out its plans the january 1994 legislation governing the banque de france requires its gov ernor to appear before parliament and the european central bank must under the maastricht treaty report at least annually to the european parlia ment if public statements about policy intentions are not credible the question naturally arises as to why central banks are frequently required to make them the answer of course is that announcements do provide the public with some information given the growing interest in policy transparency particu larly among those central banks that have adopted some form of inflation targeting it is perhaps surprising that there has been relatively little explicit analysis of how inflation targeting requirements might combine with reporting requirements to influence the informational content of announcements the conduct of stabilization policies and the central bank s credibility the purpose of this paper is to analyse the way inflation targeting affects the incentives the central bank faces in announcing targets when the central bank has private information about the economy and the public is uncertain about the central bank s preferences inflation targeting has seen increased popularity in recent years but a fixed target for inflation is generally suboptimal in the face of supply shocks while state contingent targets are viewed as not feasible an important result of this paper is that allowing the central bank to announce its own inflation target

optimal inflation contracts and inflation targets with uncertain central bank preferences accountability through independence this paper examines some problems which arise when monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank and where the central bank s preferences are unknown two key conclusions emerge from the paper first even with optimal targets or contracts central bank independence may not always be desirable because central banks may have distorted preferences relative to society second if the delegation solution is preferable and the independent central bank responds to information about supply shocks the central bank may be made more accountable by allowing it to set its own inflation targets i e by making it goal independent

can informal firms hurt registered smes access to credit using firm level survey responses from 2009 to 2012 we examine whether competitors from the informal sector affect the credit constraints of registered smes in 86 countries worldwide we also investigate the role played by the quality of institutional environment in exacerbating or in alleviating such effect a weak quality of institutional environment strengthens inter linkages between the formal and the informal sectors increases the costs and decreases the benefits assumed by formal firms and reduces the costs attributed to informality moreover it also results in a large informal economy which influences perceptions about the substitutability between formal and informal goods and law evasion our findings indicate that registered smes facing competition from informal firms are more likely to be credit constrained than other formal smes that are not confronted with such competition this result is consistent with the parasite view and the entrepreneurial perspective of informality which assert that informal firms are capable of competing against registered smes and hurting the latter s profits further we find that such adverse impact manifests only in countries with weak rule of law and high degree of corruption and bureaucracy our results also show that registered micro and small firms are more likely to be affected by the presence of informal firm competitors than medium sized firms this is because the benefits of formality that include access to credit from financial institutions increase with firm size on the whole our findings suggest that governments must enhance their role in increasing access to credit to smaller firms and in providing incentives for informal firms to be integrated in the formal economy moreover in order to achieve inclusive growth our results highlight the importance of improving the business environment which affects all entrepreneurs

house allocation with existing tenants an equivalence abstract we analyze two mechanisms designed to eliminate inefficiencies in house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers the first mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a sister exchange economy constructed by endowing each existing tenant with her current house and each newcomer with a random vacant house the second mechanism chooses an ordering from a given distribution and determines the final outcome as follows assign the agents the best available house one at a time following their ordering in the queue and whenever an agent demands the house of an existing tenant who is still in the line modify the queue by inserting the existing tenant at the top whenever a loop of existing tenants forms assign each of them the house she demands and proceed we show that the first mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the second which favors the newcomers

inequality corruption and the informal sector abstract the marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is shown to be a linear function of the size of the informal sector this implies that anti corruption policies alone are unlikely to reduce inequality in countries with a large informal sector

have increases in federal reserve transparency improved private sector interest rate forecasts yes this paper shows that since the late 1980s u s financial markets and private sector forecasters have become 1 better able to forecast the federal funds rate at horizons out to several months 2 less surprised by federal reserve announcements 3 more certain of their interest rate forecasts ex ante as measured by interest rate options and 4 less diverse in the cross sectional variety of their interest rate forecasts we also present evidence that strongly suggests increases in federal reserve transparency played a role for example private sector forecasts of gdp and inflation have not experienced similar improvements over the same period indicating that the improvement in interest rate forecasts has been special

inflation targets and contracts with uncertain central banker preferences within a standard model of monetary delegation the authors show that the optimal linear inflation contract performs strictly better than the optimal inflation target when there is uncertainty about the central banker s preferences the optimal combination of a contract and a target performs best and eliminates the inflation bias and any variability not associated with supply shocks however variability due to shocks is enhanced by uncertain central banker preferences quadratic contracts are shown to overcome this problem partly but the advantages of delegation may still be dominated by the excess variability due to shocks hence the credibility stabilization tradeoff is restored

designing monetary policy committees we integrate monetary policy making by committee into a new keynesian model to assess the consequences of the committee s institutional characteristics for inflation output and welfare our analysis delivers the following results first we demonstrate that transparency about the committee s future composition is typically harmful second we show that short terms for central bankers lead to effective inflation stabilization at the expense of comparably high output variability third larger committees generally allow for more efficient stabilization of inflation but possibly for less efficient output stabilization fourth large committees and short terms are therefore socially desirable if the weight on output stabilization in the social loss function is low fifth we show that a central banker with random preferences may be preferable to a central banker who shares the preferences of society

informality over the life cycle abstract in developing countries informality is mainly concentrated among younger and older workers and low skilled workers in this study we propose a dual labor market theory that highlights how frictions and taxation in the formal sector and educational choices interact to shape the informality rate over the life cycle we develop a life cycle model with search frictions skill heterogeneities and endogenous educational choices we carry out a numerical analysis and show that our model reproduces remarkably well the life cycle patterns of informality non employment and formal employment in argentina we analyze several public policies and show that an educational grant reduces both informality and non employment and may be fully financed by the extra tax revenues generated by the increase in formal employment and wages lowering taxes may achieve similar results but is detrimental to the government budget despite increasing the base on which they are levied

is the mpc s voting record informative about future uk monetary policy it is shown that the voting record of the monetary policy committee of the bank of england helps predict future policy rate changes this result is robust to the inclusion of market participants expectations as measured by the slope of the term structure of money market rates and interest rate futures moreover expectations seem to adjust to the information contained in the voting record which suggests that publishing the minutes of mpc meetings increases the transparency of monetary policy

the benefits of formalization evidence from vietnamese manufacturing smes summary based on unique panel data consisting of both formal and informal firms this paper uses a matched double difference approach to examine the relationship between legal status and firm level outcomes in micro small and medium manufacturing enterprises smes in vietnam controlling for determining factors and observable time variant factors that may simultaneously influence the decision to formalize and subsequent firm performance we find evidence that becoming officially registered leads to an increase in profits and investments and a decrease in the use of casual labor improved contract conditions for workers thus we conclude that formalizing is beneficial both to firms and the workers in these firms

central bank communication and monetary policy a survey of theory and evidence over the last two decades communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy these real world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication mostly empirical and almost all of it written in this decade we survey this ever growing literature the evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank s toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions and potentially to help achieve central banks macroeconomic objectives however the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy

shadow economies size causes and consequences using various methods the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing transition and oecd countries is estimated average size varies from 12 percent of gdp for oecd countries to 23 percent for transition countries and 39 percent for developing countries increasing taxation and social security contributions combined with rising state regulations are driving forces for the increase of the shadow economy especially in oecd countries according to some findings corruption has a positive impact on the size of the shadow economy and a growing shadow economy has a negative effect on official gdp growth

monetary policy delegation and polarisation there is by now a comprehensive literature beginning with rogoff 1985 arguing that a government should delegate monetary policy to a central banker who is independent and more conservative than the government itself this will reduce the inflationary bias typically at the cost of stabilisation for a democratic society this result would suggest that the median voter should prefer that monetary policy is delegated to an independent central banker who is more conservative than herself typically the central banker is chosen by the government and the government is chosen by the electorate thus there is some albeit perhaps a weak link between the preferences of the electorate and the central banker although the central banker presumably should be chosen for a long period of time waller and walsh 1996 he has to be chosen at some point in time this paper contains a political economy model where the central issue in politics is the choice of central banker and

wages and informality in developing countries we develop an equilibrium wage posting model with heterogeneous firms that decide to locate in the formal or the informal sector and workers who search randomly on and off the job we estimate the model on brazilian labor force survey data in equilibrium firms of equal productivity locate in different sectors a fact observed in the data wages are characterized by compensating differentials we show that tightening enforcement does not increase unemployment and increases wages total output and welfare by enabling better allocation of workers to higher productivity jobs and improving competition in the formal labor market jel e26 j24 j31 j46 o15 o17

central banking as a political principal agent problem i introduction conventional wisdom holds that during election periods political leaders have incentives to misuse policy instruments to enhance their chances of reelection rogoff and sibert 1988 construct a rational political economy model of monetary policy based on this theme 1 the results of their model can be interpreted in the following way 2 society elects a leader every other period whose competence affects the level of output in the economy and private agents will tend to vote for the incumbent if the level of output is expected to be higher than that which can be provided by an unknown challenger voters have imperfect information regarding the politician s true impact on output and exogenous shocks to output and consequently cannot disentangle the effects of one from the other in an election period this asymmetry of information gives the incumbent an incentive to expand output through the use of inflationary monetary policy in order to appear more competent than he really is however rational voters are aware of this incentive to inflate and adjust their expectations such that in equilibrium no gain in output occurs and the economy suffers from excessive inflation an implication of the rogoff sibert model is that unless a society does away with elections as a way to choose policymakers excessive inflation and a political inflation cycle will be an unavoidable cost of democracy however societies can try and have tried to avoid these ill effects by taking the power of money creation away from the elected officials and giving it to an appointed independent central banker who will presumably pursue the public good but can this approach actually work the problem with this proposal is that the central bankers well being in many respects reappointment post central bank employment opportunities avoidance of public criticism etc often hinges on pleasing their political benefactors giving the central bankers incentives to act in the interest of elected officials 3 as a result the central banker could pursue objectives different from society s and may actually function as a veil for the elected policymaker in the real world this veil is not complete but partial and hence we can characterize the relationship between the monetary authority and society as a principal agent problem the advantage of delegating power to an appointed central banker and then erecting appropriate institutions is that the inflation problems may be resolved without abandoning the electoral process in this paper we develop a rational political business cycle model that starts from the foundations laid down by rogoff and sibert we depart from their model by having monetary policy delegated to a central banker who is appointed by the elected leaden the concern about reappointment is what motivates the agency problem the central banker would like to be reappointed and this desire leads her to partially accommodate the wishes of the current administration which in turn may not coincide with the desires of the electorate we then analyze the problem faced by a central banker who is concerned about her own selfinterest as well as social well being it is this feature that turns the setting of monetary policy into a political principal agent problem the contributions of our approach to modelling the agency problem of central banking are 1 it explicitly incorporates reappointment concerns into the decision process of the central banker which heretofore has not been done in the literature and 2 we explicitly model the source of the agency problem unlike previous research that simply assumes an agency problem exists our key results are as follows in equilibrium the pursuit of her own self interest leads the central banker to create a socially inefficient inflation bias while rogoff and sibert also obtain this result our explicit functionalform model allows us to analyze this bias in more detail and tie it directly to the strength of the relationship between the central banker and the current administration

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

labor market institutions taxation and the underground economy abstract the paper aims at qualifying the links between labor market institutions taxation tax monitoring and underground economic activity the proposed model is a continuous time matching model with one commodity roduced either overground or underground underground economic activity arises because of partial compliance with regulations and tax contributions imposed by the government vacancies and workers search are directed at a specific labor market workers are heterogenous in the subjective cost they face when operating in the irregular sector analytical and numerical investigations suggest that interactions between regular and irregular activities can affect standard results of policy interventions in that respect the paper supports the view that policies aiming at increasing individuals benefits of participating in the regular sector are more desirable than a deterrence policy

informal sector the credit market channel abstract we build a model of firms choice between formality and informality complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods enforcement of property rights and contracts that make the participation in the formal credit market possible in a moral hazard framework with credit rationing their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements the model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality

union bargaining power subcontracting and innovation we show that if a firm can subcontract production to an informal sector an increase in union power may either increase or decrease innovation an increase in union power makes the firm worse off irrespective of its effect on innovation however in contrast to the usual belief an increase in union power may increase consumer surplus and decrease union utility by affecting innovation thus suggesting that a union may not want to be too powerful an increase in union power may create an ambiguous effect on social welfare our analysis provides new insights to the relation between union power and innovation

optimal monetary policy cooperation through state independent contracts with targets abstract simple state independent monetary institutions are shown to secure optimal cooperative policies in a stochastic linear quadratic two country world with international policy spill overs and national credibility problems institutions characterize delegation to independent central bankers facing quadratic performance related contracts punishing or rewarding deviations from primary and intermediate policy targets

political macroeconomics a survey of recent developments the paper surveys political macroeconomics covering its development from rogoff s conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design topics include the inflation stabilization trade off central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs inflation targets performance contracts for monetary authorities and the consequences of output persistence for these issues further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy the government spending bias and the game theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy all work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework

informality and the labor market effects of financial crises abstract we provide evidence based on a large sample of countries on the effects of financial crises on key labor market indicators including official and unofficial employment unemployment and the participation rate crises are followed by a drop in the official market participation rate and by an increase in informal employment these responses are strongly persistent empirical results are then interpreted with a dsge model which accounts for informality and for financial and labor market frictions in this framework the informal sector acts as a buffer which absorbs workers in bad times and vice versa our simulations suggest the informal sector also is a crisis amplifier for the official economy for a given financial shock the ensuing contraction in the official economy is deeper and more persistent the larger the initial size of the unofficial sector this implies that in less developed economies financial crises cause a relatively stronger reallocation of inputs towards less efficient sectors expose a larger fraction of the population to the adverse effects of informality cause a sharper deterioration of public finances limiting governments ability to supply public goods and to engage in countercyclical fiscal policies

a repeated game model of monetary union given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank s operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation this is modelled as a repeated game and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries incentive compatibility constraints is found the optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level so as to maintain the worse hit country s incentive to abide by the rule

optimal central banker contracts and common agency this paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model we suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency we develop amodel with two principals society government and ageneric interest group whose objective conflicts withsociety s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias we determine when the government offered orinterest group offered contract dominates the central banker sdecision the results largely depend on whether theinterest group offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation

inflation government transfers and optimal central bank independence abstract the problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two stage non cooperative game between the government and the central bank the solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence the results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism the results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker

the political economy of inflation labour market distortions and central bank independence using the citizen candidate model we study the government s choice of institutions for the labour market and the central bank and derive the implications for inflation and employment we derive conditions for the existence of equilibria in which the labour market is distorted and the central bank is dependent or independent under a range of conditions affecting central bank dependence the post election cycle in inflation and employment and inflation bias our results imply that average inflation and inflation variability are lower under an independent central bank whereas employment variability can be lower or higher consistent with evidence for oecd countries many democratic societies delegate key tasks to non elected and independent institutions a prominent example being independent central banks the belief in the advantage of central bank independence is nursed by the cross country evi

the optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union the paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit with international risk sharing fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard an inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline in a monetary union however this adverse effect on fiscal discipline is weaker this advantage of monetary unification may outweigh the disadvantage of not being able to employ monetary policy to stabilise country specific shocks while monetary unification may thus be optimal international risk sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline

why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments we consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents recent research introduced a promising mechanism the probabilistic serial that has superior e ciency properties than the most common real life mechanism random priority on the other hand mechanisms based on gale s celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature with the exception of the present context thanks to their outstanding e ciency features we present an equivalence

why money talks and wealth whispers monetary uncertainty and mystique we demonstrate that in important cases propositions 3 and 4 in eijffinger hoeberichts and schaling journal of money credit and banking may 2000 may fail moreover their monetary policy delegation arrangement which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable is dominated by other arrangements without any such uncertainty finally their way of modelling preference uncertainty leads to arbitrary effects on average monetary policy without these preference uncertainty is never desirable

the regulation of labor author s botero juan djankov simeon la porta rafael lopez de silanes florencio shleifer andrei abstract we investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment collective relations and social security laws in 85 countries we find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems and that socialist french and scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries however the effects of legal origins are larger and explain more of the variation in regulations than those of politics heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment especially of the young these results are most naturally consistent with legal theories according to which countries have pervasive regulaory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

the probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments abstract a random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects when there are no private endowments the set of ordinally efficient random assignments is characterized by the eating algorithm bogomolnaia and moulin 2001 when there are private endowments the main requirement is individual rationality however the eating algorithm fails to deliver this property our contribution is the natural generalization of the eating algorithm for this general class of problems the family of this generalized eating algorithm characterizes the set of individually rational and ordinally efficient random assignments a special solution in this family the individually rational probabilistic serial ps ir also achieves a new fairness axiom no justified envy however it is not immune to strategic manipulation we show that individual rationality no justified envy and strategy proofness are incompatible

is the walsh contract really optimal the purpose of this paper is to show thatthe linear penalization to inflation foundin walsh 1995 is not the government soptimal choice when the fixed part of thetransfer scheme is any given constant and thepayment to the central bank represents acost for the government

taxation base in developing countries abstract informal sectors are larger in developing countries than in rich countries this is a result of higher fixed costs of entry into the formal economy in developing countries we show that raising barriers to entry is consistent with a deliberate government policy for raising tax revenue by generating market power and hence rents for the permitted entrants market entry fees foster the emergence of large taxpayers the rents can be readily confiscated by the government through entry fees and taxes on profits at a low administrative cost the relevance of the theory is assessed with a sample of 64 countries empirical analysis supports the results of the paper

multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias abstract this paper shows that an increase in the degree of multiplicative uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy will reduce social loss when policymaker s preferences are highly uncertain this result is still valid even when there is no distortion in the market

optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking den meisten akademikern und politischen entscheidungstragern zufolge ist transparenz in der geldpolitik wunschenswert ich untersuche diese behauptung anhand eines kleinen theoretischen models das das vorausschauende verhalten des privaten sektors hervorhebt transparenz erleichtert es denjenigen die preise festsetzen auf die kunftigen geldpolitischen absichten der zentralbank zu schliesen wodurch die laufende inflation starker auf stabilitatspolitische masnahmen reagiert dies fuhrt dazu dass die zentralbank sich eher auf die inflation als auf die stabilisierung der produktionslucke konzentriert in diesem fall kann transparenz negative folgen haben sie kann sich sogar als eine die geldpolitik verzerrende zwangsjacke herausstellen wenn die zentralbank sich stabilitatspolitischer glaubwurdigkeit erfreut und eine aktive monetare stabilisierungspolitik benotigt wird

debt contingent inflation contracts and targets abstract this paper analyzes fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a simple policy game with debt and output shocks seigniorage provides revenue for the government but results in an inflation bias we analyze three mechanisms designed to eliminate some or all of the biases in monetary policy an inflation performance contract inflation target both contingent on the stock of debt and a zero inflation rule the performance contract and inflation target result in higher interest rate remove all biases in monetary policy and achieve the pre commitment policy hence they are equivalent the first two solutions also yield a higher expected welfare than a zero inflation policy

revisiting the role of multiplicative uncertainty in a model without inflationary bias kobayashi 2003 aims to show that in a model without inflationary bias an increase in the degree of multiplicative uncertainty on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy improves social welfare when central bank s preferences are highly uncertain we demonstrate that this result applies only to the case in which society is strictly conservative i e when the weight attached to output in the social welfare function is lower than one

labor market effects of payroll taxes in developing countries evidence from colombia abstract we use a panel of manufacturing plants from colombia to analyze how the rise in payroll tax rates over the 1980s and 1990s affected the labor market our estimates indicate that formal wages fall by between 1 4 and 2 3 as a result of a 10 rise in payroll taxes this less than full shifting is likely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and the presence of downward wage rigidities in colombia because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted from employers to employees employment also falls our results indicate that a 10 increase in payroll taxes lowered formal employment by between 4 and 5 in addition we find some evidence of less shifting and larger disemployment effects for production than for nonproduction workers these results suggest that policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of less skilled workers by reducing social security taxes may be effective in latin american countries where minimum wages bind and benefits are often not directly lin

the effects of labour market policies in an economy with an informal sector in this article we build an equilibrium search and matching model of an economy with an informal sector our model extends mortensen and pissarides 1994 by allowing for ex ante worker heterogeneity with respect to formal sector productivity we use the model to analyse the effects of labour market policy on informal sector and formal sector output on the division of the workforce into unemployment informal sector employment and formal sector employment and on wages finally we examine the distributional implications of labour market policy specifically we analyse how labour market policy affects the distributions of wages and productivities across formal sector matches in this article we construct a search and matching model that we use to analyse the effects of labour market policies in an economy with a significant informal sector what we mean by an informal sector is a sector that is unregulated and hence not directly affected by labour market policies such as severance or payroll taxes we find that labour market policies that apply only to the formal sector nonetheless affect the size and the composition of employment in the informal sector this is important since there is substantial economic activity in the informal sector in many economies particularly in developing countries estimates for some latin american countries put the informal sector at more than 50 of the urban work force 1 the informal sector is also important in many transition countries as well as in some developed economies 2 although much of the literature treats the informal sector as a disadvantaged sector in a segmented labour market framework this interpretation is not consistent with recent empirical evidence from latin america under a segmented or dual labour market interpretation one would expect jobs to be rationed in the primary sector and workers to be in the secondary or informal sector involuntarily and to be queuing for formal sector jobs maloney 2004 presents evidence for several latin american countries that challenges this view and instead interprets the informal sector as an unregulated micro entrepreneurial sector similarly using data from the argentinian household survey pratap and quintin 2006 reject the notion that labour markets are segmented in the greater buenos aires area concluding that there is no evidence of a formal sector wage premium after controlling for individual and establishment we thank mauricio santamaria for stimulating conversations that inspired our interest in this topic we also thank bob hussey and fabien postel vinay as well as our editor steve pischke and two anonymous

regulation of entry labor market institutions and the informal sector abstract this paper develops a two sector matching model that incorporates the main features of latin american labor markets it has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries the model is numerically solved using brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed reducing formal sector s entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare thus the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal

inflation forecast contracts we introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers inflation forecast contracts which make central bankers remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts we show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more eectively thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts but have adverse consequences for output on balance paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare

central banker contracts incomplete information and monetary policy surprises in search of a selfish central banker approaching monetary policy as a principal agent problemprovides a useful framework for interpreting alternativedelegation schemes in this paper we consider theeffectiveness of central banker incentive schemes when theprincipal delegates monetary policy through contracts butremains uncertain about the central banker s responsiveness tosuch schemes we adopt a simple principal agent model andassume that the central banker s trade off between socialwelfare and the incentive scheme is private information weconsider two types of central bankers one who responds to theincentive scheme selfish and one who does not and onlycares about social welfare benevolent we demonstratethat when a benevolent central banker accepts a contractdesigned for a selfish central banker positive inflationsurprises occur and output exceeds its natural rate wefurther show that a benevolent central banker with aninflation bias has an incentive to masquerade as selfish mechanisms exist that solve that problem by achievingpreference revelation we consider a simple mechanism indominant strategies that induces the benevolent type eithernot to breach or not to accept the appointment contract inthe first place this multi period mechanism works with eitherinflation targets or the appointment of a conservativecentral banker our results suggest that more complicatedincentive schemes embedded within broader constitutionalarrangements are required in the presence of privateinformation for them to work effectively

institutions informal labor markets and business cycle volatility i build a business cycle labor search and matching model with informal labor markets which shows that different dimensions of institutional quality have similar effects on the size of the informal sector but different effects on the relationship between informality and long run macroeconomic outcomes and between informality and labor market volatility for the same change in informal sector size changes in different proxies for institutional quality have contrasting quantitative implications for the steady state and the volatility of the labor market despite having similar consequences on other macroeconomic variables these results highlight the importance of identifying the source behind changes in the size of the informal sector to characterize the link between informality and business cycle dynamics

informality in developing economies regulation and fiscal policies abstract this paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections they have monopoly power in the goods market they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers through either individual or collective bargaining our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis in this framework we study the impact on informality wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality we consider changes in product market regulation pmr and in two types of fiscal policies labor taxes and formality enforcement we find that lessening pmr decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment the tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used though moreover the impacts of pmr on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining with respect to wage inequality lessening pmr reduces it while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium

is new zealand s reserve bank act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract this paper evaluates the reserve bank of new zealand act of 1989 from a principal agent perspective arguing that the act represents a dismissal rule the optimal dismissal rule requires that the central banker be dismissed whenever inflation exceeds a critical level that depends on aggregate supply disturbances and measurement error in the inflation index this is essentially the structure established by the act the scope for renegotiating the target rate however creates an incentive for the government to set the critical rate too high consequently the inflation bias of discretion is reduced but not completely eliminated copyright 1995 by ohio state university press

the walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all a recent paper argues that the walsh linear inflation contract does not prove optimal when the government concerns itself about the cost of the central bank contract candel sanchez campoy minarro 2004 this result relies on assuming that the participation constraint does not represent an effective constraint on the central banker s decision we show that the walsh linear inflation contract does produce the optimal outcome even when the government cares about the cost of the contract assuming that the participation constraint holds

incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods abstract in a market in which each trader s initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good there exists an incentive compatible procedure for reaching a competitive allocation this contrasts with some recent results for similar problems

optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences we analyze the effects of imperfectly known central banker s preferences on optimal linear contracts offered by the government and an interest group these effects depend on the type of uncertainty faced by the principals when the central bank s output target is uncertain the results by campoy and negrete public choice 137 197 206 2008 under perfectly known preferences obtain uncertainty about the central banker s degree of conservatism or about its degree of selfishness has a multiplicative impact on the principals instruments in the agent s best response function this may generate an inflation bias independently of the type of contract offered by the interest group

what should central banks do what should be their macroeconomic objectives and operations before turning to the normative question of what central banks hereafter cbs should do we need to deal with the contentious issue of what cbs actually can do in the field of monetary control one might think that this should be a relatively straightforward matter of fact instead there is a yawning chasm of mutual misunderstanding which has persisted for decades between economists and those working in cbs which has bedevilled the subject virtually every monetary economist believes that the cb can control the monetary base hereafter mo and subject to errors in predicting the monetary multiplier the broader monetary aggregates as well after all mo apart from some relatively unimportant qualifications about coins from the mint represents the liabilities of the cb and the cb should be able to control its own liabilities by open market operations hence the normal assumption is that mo is controllable within a narrow margin if the central bank should fail to do so it must be because it has chosen some alternative operational guide for its open market operations e g holding interest rates constant at some level which operational rule is frequently decried as sub optimal assuming that cbs can almost perfectly control mo economists have constructed several simulated schemes of how an optimal rule for so doing might be set up mccallum i993a b provides good recent examples almost all those who have worked in a cb believe that this view is totally mistaken in particular it ignores the implications of several of the crucial institutional features of a modern commercial banking system notably the need for unchallengeable convertibility at par between currency and deposits and secondly that commercial bank reserves at the cb receive a zero or belowmarket rate of interest the first means that fluctuations in the public s demand for cash which are both strongly seasonal and somewhat unpredictable must be accommodated the second means that commercial banks will not willingly hold free reserves at the end of each day assuming for this purpose that a stated reserve ratio has to be held on each day rather than averaged over say a couple of weeks beyond that needed to meet late fluctuations in the demand for cash after the money market has closed or become thin only if interest rates fall to the very low levels of the i930s and or risks of interest rate variability or late in the day cash runs increase would commercial banks increase their desired free reserves thus given the

labor turnover and labor legislation in brazil one of the main characteristics of the brazilian labor market is its impressively high job and worker turnover rates although labor legislation in brazil is very restrictive dismissal costs are not high when compared with other latin american countries moreover many authors argue that the design of some job security programs creates perverse incentives that generate labor turnover the objective of this paper is twofold first we describe brazilian labor legislation with emphasis on job security provisions and their incentives on workers reallocation then after reviewing the most recent evidence on labor turnover in brazil we investigate the effects of changes in job termination costs implemented in the 1988 constitution and in a labor law of september 2001 on employment duration both legislation changes increased firing costs and should have therefore reduced turnover for formal workers affected by them a simple differences in differences methodology is applied to monthly individual data from pesquisa mensal de emprego pme ibge which has information on previous employment spells for those currently unemployed the results establish that both changes reduced turnover for formal workers affected by the legislation a significant increase in average employment duration of affected workers relative to not affected workers was observed after both legislation changes we also provided evidence that the 1988 constitutional change reduced the probability of fake layoffs although there are still a high number of such agreements being made between workers and their employers