spillovers investment incentives and the property rights theory of the firm this paper examines the property rights theory of the firm when a manager s relationship specific investment can be partially appropriated by the owner of an asset even if cooperation breaks down the investments of non owners may then be devalued but are seldom wholly lost to the owner with such spillovers the outside option principle can be incorporated into the grossman hart moore framework without implying that ownership demotivates enriched predictions on the determinants of integration emerge

left parties poor voters and electoral participation in advanced industrial societies although income inequality is an important normative issue for students of democratic politics little is known about its effects on citizens electoral participation the authors develop a formal

wage bargaining central bank independence and the real effects of money the effects of financial capital mobility on monetary policy autonomy are relatively well understood but the importance of particular monetary regimes in distinct national institutional settings is not this article is a theoretical and empirical exploration of the effects of monetary policy regimes on unemployment in different national wage bargaining settings based on a rational expectations two stage game of the interaction between the wage behavior of labor unions and the monetary policies of governments i argue that monetary policies have real employment effects in all but the most decentralized bargaining systems specifically in intermediately centralized bargaining systems a credible government commitment to a nonaccommodating monetary policy rule will deter militant wage behavior with salutary effects on unemployment in highly centralized systems by contrast restrictive monetary policies will clash with unions pursuit of wage distributive goals and produce inferior employment performance only in highly fragmented bargaining systems is money neutral in the sense that employment performance is unaffected by monetary regimes the model has clear consequences for the optimal design of central banks and collective bargaining arrangements and suggests new ways to study institutional change hereunder the causal effect of increasingly globalized capital markets the argument is supported by pooled time series data for fifteen oecd countries over a twenty one year period

expanding the solution set organizational economics and agri environmental policy abstract the market failure paradigm dominates agri environmental research and policy organizational economics provides an alternative framework for analyzing agri environmental problems and points to alternative solutions in this paper the traditional approach of creating markets for environmental goods and services is critiqued and set aside to provide space for an organizational analysis from an organizational perspective the relationship between the state and agricultural agents is viewed as grounded in an over arching exchange relationship including elements of cooperation and trust such a collaborative exchange relationship may prove useful in supporting exchange between agricultural agents and the state leading to the provision of ecological goods and services highlighting the potential of organizational economics the analysis suggests that agri environmental research and policy go further in accounting for and investigating the unique organizational modes of exchange governing the production of food fiber and ecological goods and services

the elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns stable democratic regimes depend heavily on the consensual unity of national elites so long as elites remain disunified political regimes are unstable a condition which makes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary oscillations in the forms unstable regimes take disunity appears to be the generic condition of national elites and disunity strongly tends to persist regardless of socioeconomic development and other changes in mass populations the consensually unified elites that are necessary to stable democracies are created in only a few ways two of the most important of which involve distinctive elite transformations after elaborating this argument we examine the relationship between elites and regimes in western nation states since they began to consolidate after 1500 we show that our approach makes good sense of the western political record that it does much to clarify prospects for stable democracies in developing societies today and that it makes the increasingly elite centered analysis of democratic transitions and breakdowns more systematic

party systems and electoral volatility in latin america a test of economic institutional and structural explanations three different theoretical explanations are tested for the exceptionally high level of electoral volatility found in contemporary latin america economic voting institutional characteristics of political regimes and party systems and the structure and organization of class cleavages a pooled cross sectional time series regression analysis is conducted on 58 congressional elections and 43 presidential elections in 16 latin american countries during the 1980s and 1990s institutional variables have the most consistent effect on volatility while the influence of economic performance is heavily contingent upon the type of election and whether the dependent variable is operationalized as incumbent vote change or aggregate electoral volatility the results demonstrate that electoral volatility is a function of short term economic perturbations the institutional fragilities of both democratic regimes and party systems and relatively fluid cleavage structures

institutions and legacies electoral volatility in the postcommunist world the postcommunist states of eastern europe and the former soviet union have witnessed levels of electoral volatility higher than both western europe and latin america levels that have deleterious

low intensity democracy revisited the effects of economic liberalization on political activity in latin america existing literature emphasizes the disorganizing or weakening effects of economic liberalization on civil society whereby free market policies are said to demobilize and depoliticize collective actors the article evaluates the effects of economic liberalization on large scale societal mobilizations across seventeen latin american countries for the period 1970 2000 the article further tests the effects of economic liberalization on individual political participation across sixteen latin american countries for the period 1980 2000 in contrast to the atomization literature this article provides strong evidence that economic liberalization leads to greater levels of societal mobilization in the context of free market democratization the article also demonstrates that economic liberalization does not induce a decline in political participation collectively these results cast doubt on the theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings presented in kurtz 2004

contractual solutions to the hold up problem this paper considers a general version of the hold up problem where n agents first make relation specific investments and then must agree on some collective action it is shown that first best solutions exist under a variety of different assumptions about the nature of information asymmetries

corporate contracting for health care this paper examines the process used by fortune 500 companies to contract with health care carriers for complex and hard to observe services we confirm in part the conventional view that large companies partner with health care insurers however we show that the picture is more complex and that most of these companies do not engage in several aspects of partnering the complete nature of our data allows us to describe the distribution of company practices from tough bargaining without continuing relationships to partnering we also show that contract length can be a poor proxy for length of relationship

a classical model of the class struggle a game theoretic approach the class struggle is formalized as a differential game in a strictly supply side model an approach that synthesizes the models of lancaster and goodwin four different steady state equilibria are derived each corresponding to different assumptions about the degree to which each class is organized to promote its own interests in particular the goodwin growth cycle is shown to emerge from a world characterized by unorganized capitalists and workers in which individuals ignore the effects of their own actions on economywide variables more relevant for discussion of modern capitalism are the hierarchical equilibria especially the codetermination equilibrium in which the existence of a full employment equilibrium turns out to be problematic finally comparative statics results suggest that the incentives for technological change differ widely among the four regimes

distributional coalitions and other sources of economic stagnation on olson s rise and decline of nations one of the most important recent contributions to the field of comparative political economy is mancur olson s the rise and decline of nations in that work olson deduces from his logic of collective action a series of implications regarding the impact of social organizations in particular distributional coalitions on economic growth that can explain variations in national growth rates across a wide range of time and space this article considers the assumptions upon which that logic is founded the plausibility of the several implications drawn from that logic and the application of the theory to account for differences among five nations in rates of economic growth in the post world war ii era the analysis suggests that the characteristics of group activity emphasized by olson represent at best only a small perhaps negligible part of the explanation of cross national differences in growth instead it suggests that an important source of the variation among nations in growth rates is the international political and economic system in particular the discussion of the german japanese and british cases suggests that stagnation or growth is to a considerable extent the product of a nation s position in the world economy the policy responses through which governments seek to perpetuate or improve that position and the constraints upon or opportunities for growth oriented domestic economic policy posed by that position

the impact of alternative forms of state regulation of at t on direct dial long distance telephone rates federal and state regulatory agencies have traditionally used rate of return regulation to set profit and rate levels for utilities a price cap framework in which the regulatory agency sets a maximum rate below which the regulated utility has pricing flexibility is possibly a more efficient alternative to rate of return regulation this article presents an econometric analysis that compares at t s prices of intrastate long distance telephone service in states that allow at t pricing flexibility with those in states that do not the results of this analysis suggest that at t s daytime evening nighttime and weekend rates are significantly lower in states that allow pricing flexibility than in states that use rate of return regulation

diffusion and the international context of democratization democracy does not evolve sui generis the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions suggests that international factors play a prominent role in forg ing democracies as well as influencing their durability we argue that democracy often comes about as a result of changes in the relative power of important actors and groups as well as their evaluations of particular institutions both of which are often influenced by forces outside the country in question the scope and extent of con nections with other democratic countries in a region can strengthen support for dem ocratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies results from a transition model demonstrate that international factors can exert a strong influence on the prospects for transitions to democracy and the spatial clustering in democ racy and transitions cannot adequately be explained by the hypothesized domestic social requisites of individual countries

renegotiation design with unverifiable information this paper considers a buyer seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and or random utility parameters in such situations it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first best outcomes in this paper we show however that efficient investments and optimal risk sharing can typically be achieved provided the initial contract is able to monitor the ex post renegotiation process specifically we focus on the following two features of renegotiation design first default options in case renegotiation breaks down second the allocation of all bargaining power to either contracting party moreover we show that these two features can be obtained in standard rubinstein bargaining games through contractual provisions such as specific performance clauses and penalties for delay or equivalently financial hostages refundable without interest

the political impact of economic crisis in latin america in the 1980s research on the political implications of economic conditions is separated into two relatively distinct bodies of literature i bridge the theoretical gap between them by examining the effects of economic crisis on electoral outcomes in latin america from 1982 to 1990 an analysis of 21 competitive elections indicates that crisis conditions undermine support for incumbents and provoke high levels of electoral volatility but without necessarily fostering the growth of political extremism or the exhaustion of elite consensus associated with the breakdown of democracy the results also suggest that the relationship between economic conditions and electoral instability is mediated by party system structure rather than democratic age paradoxically the findings buttress prior research on electoral outcomes in the comparatively stable and homogeneous organization for economic cooperation and development oecd nations while undercutting theoretical frameworks elaborated with specific reference to the breakdown and consolidation of third world democracy

community and class antagonism abstract we investigate how vertical unity within a community interacts with horizontal class divisions of an unequal income distribution community is conceptualized in terms of a public good to which all those in the community have equal access but from which outsiders are excluded we formulate the idea of redistributive tension or class antagonism in terms of the costs that poorer individuals would be willing to impose on the rich to achieve a given gain in personal income our conclusion is that the nominal distribution of income could give a misleading picture of tensions in society both within and across communities ideologies of community solidarity may well trump those of class solidarity because of the implicit sharing of community resources brought about by community specific public goods greater economic mobility of particular types may actually exacerbate class tensions instead of attenuating them we illustrate our theoretical results with a discussion of a number of historical episodes of shifting class tensions and alliances

toward an economic model of the japanese firm i owe a great deal to professor moses abramovitz who suggested that i write this article i appreciate his constant encouragement and guidance which aided me throughout its preparation i am also indebted to three anonymous referees of the journal and to professors ryutaro komiya and michael riordan for their critical comments and helpful suggestions needless to say i am solely responsible for the views expressed in this paper

swallowing the bitter pill sources of popular support for neoliberal reform in latin america what accounts for the surprisingly widespread popular approval that painful neoliberal reforms elicited in several latin american countries this article compares the explanatory power of two rival hypotheses which draw on conventional rational choice and psychological decision theory the compensation hypothesis claims that governments can engineer support for costly reforms by compensating the losers through targeted social benefits the rescue hypothesis questions this claim and maintains that draconian adjustment only finds support if it promises to revert a deep crisis and avert further losses data from argentina bolivia brazil mexico peru and venezuela suggest that the rescue hypothesis accounts much better for the initial endorsement of neoliberal shock programs immediately after their enactment when these shock programs bring about economic stabilization and recovery targeted social benefits help consolidate support for neoliberalism which a statistical analysis of the impact of social s

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

cooperative investments and the value of contracting recent articles have shown that contracts can support the efficient outcome for bilateral trade even in the face of specific investments and incomplete contracting these studies typically considered selfish investments that benefit the investor e g the seller s investment reduces her production costs the authors find very different results for cooperative investments that directly benefit the investor s partner e g the seller s investment improves the buyer s value of the good most importantly if committing not to renegotiate the contract is impossible then contracting has no value i e the parties cannot do better than to abandon contracting altogether in favor of ex post negotiation

multidivisional vs metanational governance of the multinational enterprise the effective and efficient management of diversified business firms that supply multiple products and operate in multiple dynamic markets especially large multinational enterprises mnes builds upon a number of specific governance principles these governance principles allow the alignment of environmental characteristics strategy and organization given the rising need to learn from the world doz et al in their influential harvard business school press book entitled from global to metanational have proposed a new set of governance principles described under the metanational umbrella concept this paper revisits the metanational using a comparative institutional perspective here we contrast multidivisional and metanational governance principles a comparative institutional analysis suggests that the metanational s application potential in terms of actually improving the effectiveness and efficiency of mne governance may be subject to more qualification than suggested by doz et al senior mne management must therefore reflect carefully before substituting metanational governance principles for the more conventional multidivisional ones with established contributions to managerial effectiveness and efficiency

cooperation and political economic performance in affluent democratic capitalism research on comparative political economic performance has traditionally followed two separate tracks one concerned with collective economic gain growth and efficiency and the other focused on distribution and redistribution cooperative institutions offer a key to understanding cross national variation among the affluent capitalist democracies in both facets of political economic performance these institutions cluster along two dimensions neocorporatism and firm level cooperation pooled time series analysis for 18 nations over 1960 89 suggests that 1 neocorporatism is a major source of distributive redistributive policies and outcomes and of several sources of collective gain 2 firm level cooperation is a key contributor to economic growth

organizational determinants of wage moderation this article contributes to the political economic literature regarding the effects of industrial relations institutions on national economic outcomes based on an econometric analysis of the determinants of wage moderation in sixteen industrialized countries between 1974 and 2000 it argues that the organizational characteristics of trade unions have a significant impact on wage dynamics controlling for a number of institutional and economic factors the countries in which trade union confederations directly involve workers in the process of collective bargaining ratification have on average lower wage growth relative to productivity than others the authors also find that collective bargaining coordination and contract ratification magnify each other s wage dampening effect through case studies of ireland and italy the article examines the causal mechanisms underlying the uncovered statistical regularities and concludes that particularly at a time in which classic political exchange is waning worker involvement in contract ratification allows confederation leaders to resolve conflicting claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than are achieved by a less participatory governance process

leaning right and learning from the left diffusion of corporate tax policy across borders there is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments the authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear in this article the authors build a model of social learning with a specific application to the diffusion of corporate tax reductions the model yields predictions that are differentiable from existing models of tax competition specifically the authors argue that social learning is most likely in the wake of tax policy cuts by left governments they test the model using an existing data set of corporate tax rate changes and an author created data set of changes in tax legislation covering 20 organisation for economic co operation and development countries the authors empirical findings show that social learning is an important determinant of corporate tax policy making

the perception and measurement of transaction costs the chapter discusses various explanations of how transaction cost minimising corporate configurations come about it contrasts darwinian with rational explanations finding both unsatisfactory what matters rather than computation of fully recognised transaction costs are managerial perceptions of transaction costs these perceptions are not expressed in numbers but in language this is related to arguments derived from bounded rationality and from transaction cost economics the chapter argues that issues of managerial perception must become central to analysis existing academic traditions which accord primacy to perception and to language are drawn upon and argued to be of great relevance to future work

state formation and international aid the emergence of the palestinian authority abstract thirty years ago samuel huntington criticized western aid policy toward new states that assumed that economic improvement in the standard of living coupled with democratic institutions would yield a more stable and democratic state building process an extensive political economic literature on the developmental state has since emerged that explores the complex relationship between state capacity economic development and democracy much of it critical of both the economist assumption and the importance of democracy in achieving sustainable growth at least in the initial stages of statehood this literature however does not specifically relate to the impact of international aid affects state consolidation despite its critical role in the initial stages of new states the paper explores how international aid affects on new state formation in the 1990s as reflected by the palestinian experience and more specifically whether huntington s criticism is valid today regarding the international aid regime toward the palestinian authority established in may 1994 it shows that international aid was initially based on economist assumptions changed course to reflect the importance of the state and now must seek a better balance between the centralization of power developing state capacity and promoting civil society

divestiture and its implications for innovation and productivity growth in u s telecommunications this study has sought to determine the impact of policy changes that led to the breakup of the monopoly structure of u s telecommunications on productivity and research activities of at t a simultaneous equations model is used to examine the relationship between research intensity market share firm size and total factor productivity tfp before and after divestiture the results show that the effect of divestiture on productivity is negative but that competition has a significantly positive effect contrary to popular argument competition led to significant increases in r d investment by at t the study also finds a strong and positive relationship between r d and productivity in the postdivestiture period marked by its absence in the predivestiture years scale economies remain important indicating the industry continues to favor large firms

business to business electronic commerce just as the industrial revolution mechanized the manufacturing functions of firms the information revolution is automating their merchant functions four types of potential productivity gains are expected from business to business b2b electronic commerce cost efficiencies from automation of transactions potential advantages of new market intermediaries consolidation of demand and supply through organized exchanges and changes in the extent of vertical integration of firms the article examines the characteristics of b2b online intermediaries including categories of goods traded market mechanisms employed and ownership arrangements and considers the market structure of b2b e commerce

agglomeration opportunism and the organization of production abstract recent economic analysis of outsourcing has emphasized its international dimension in contrast this paper focuses on local outsourcing the paper specifies and solves a model where the organization of production vertically integrated or not and the location of production agglomerated or not are jointly determined the paper shows that agglomeration reduces opportunism a thick market effect and so serves as a substitute for integration this force will lead firms to agglomerate the paper also shows that the normative properties of equilibrium with local outsourcing are not as clear cut as for international outsourcing since local agglomeration is achieved at the cost of congestion local markets may be too thick which would not be the case for an increase in the thickness of a world market finally the many changes in economic and social circumstance that have been labeled globalization do not impact only vertically integrated firms they also impact cities and industry clusters to the extent that agglomeration is a substitute for vertical integration

bayesian inference for comparative research rv egression analysis in comparative research suffers from two distinct problems of statistical inference first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of a repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second the small and collinear data sets of comparative research yield imprecise estimates of the effects of explanatory variables we describe a bayesian approach to statistical inference that provides a unified solution to these two problems this approach is illustrated in a comparative analysis of unionization a widely used tool in quantitative comparative politics is the linear regression model estimating relationships between institutional and economic variables observed for a set of countries constituting some population of interest a brief survey of recent comparative research finds no shortage of work of this type for instance remmer 1991 identifies economic crisis as a source of electoral volatility in latin american countries in the 1980s robertson 1990 presents evidence that institutions moderating the transaction costs of negotiations between capital and labor reduce industrial conflict and golden 1993 finds that union wage moderation in industrialized democracies results from coordinated collective bargaining although the methodological advantages are well documented jackman 1985 we identify two distinct problems of statistical inference endemic to this type of quantitative comparative research first because the data constitute all the available observations from a population conventional inference based on the long run behavior of some repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate second because data sets tend to be small and collinear the effects of explanatory variables are estimated imprecisely in most applications the first problem is generally ignored and the second is solved by imposing restrictions on the regression model to obtain sensible results the bayesian model of statistical inference provides a unified solution to these two distinct problems of quantitative comparative research two features of bayesian inference are important in this context first probability is conceived subjectively as characterizing a researcher s uncertainty about the parameters of a statistical model this subjective probability concept seems particularly useful in comparative settings where the data are typically convenience samples not generated by a known probability mechanism such as random sampling second bayesian inference allows the inclusion of other information in addition to the quantitative sample information again this seems useful in the comparative context where rich historical material is commonly available sparking ideas for researchers but formally discarded in the final analysis in the bayesian approach this historical material can be formally incorporated into the analysis we begin by detailing why the nonstochastic and weak data typical of comparative research are problematic for conventional linear regression analysis we next introduce some ideas about bayesian inference and describe bayesian regression analysis these ideas are applied to a comparative analysis of unionization the subject of a recent exchange in the american political science review between michael wallerstein and john stephens stephens and wallerstein 1991 wallerstein 1989 the bayesian regressions we present are supplemented with a sensitivity analysis that investigates how our conclusions depend upon the sample data and our prior beliefs although we survey some ideas in bayesian statistics a full introduction to the bayesian approach to statistical inference is beyond our scope here good book length treatments are pollard 1986 lee 1989 and at a slightly higher level press 1989 our intention here is to spotlight problematic but ignored issues of statistical inference in a common area of application the bayesian alternative that we present represents just one way forward to address these inferential problems

holdups standard breach remedies and optimal investment in bilateral trading problems the parties may be hesitant to make relationship specific investments without adequate contractual protection we postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed we find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages moreover specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds expectation damages on the other hand is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems forthcoming the american economic review please contact the program in law and economics at boalt hall school of law uc berkeley berkeley ca 94720 for a copy of this paper

commitment through renegotiation proof contracts with third parties the paper analyzes contracts as means of strategic commitment that is commitment against outside parties to the agreement it considers the example of an incumbent firm which enters a contractual relationship with its workers in order to deter entry it assumes away the possibility for the parties to precommit not to make pareto improving renegotiations of the agreement once entry has taken place under symmetric information the contract is thus found to be useless for entry deterrence if the incumbent firm or workers possess some private information excessive post entry production levels can however be sustained ex post since output reductions may not be incentive compatible while information asymmetries are usually welfare decreasing when the goal is optimal risk sharing they can thus be welfare improving for the contracting parties when commitment against outsiders is the goal of the contract the role of the renegotiation process as a constraint on sustainable agreements is stressed in the paper and the general relevance of strategic contractual commitment is discussed

social pacts and inflation control in new democracies the impact of wildcat cooperation in argentina and uruguay this article examines both the advocacy of social pacts in new democracies and the common assumption that labor presents the chief obstacle to social pacts game theory is used heuristically to demonstrate that in slack labor markets business will be more opposed to pacts than labor because individual workers will make more concessions at the plant level than labor confederation leaders will offer in peak level negotiations an examination of wage bargaining in the first 3 years of the new argentine and uruguayan democracies supports this hypothesis the article closes with a reexamination of the wage centered debate on inflation in contemporary new democracies

public opinion and market reforms the limits of economic voting the broadly held view that promarket reforms are good for most people is in conflict with the equally broadly held view that in democracies reforms will generate widespread resistance resistance is expected because reforms typically produce economic downturns at least over the short term under normal circumstances we expect citizens to withdraw support from governments during periods of economic decline if citizens withdraw support then governments worried about the next election may abandon reforms but our expectations should be different of new democracies pursuing promarket reforms citizens may believe governments when they claim that things have to get worse before they get better or that economic stagnation is the fault of the past model research in poland peru and mexico reported in this special issue supports these expectations hence under democracy there is more scope for support of painful reforms than frequently acknowledged

reversal of fortunes democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries does increased democracy promote or jeopardize foreign direct investment fdi inflows to less developed countries we argue that democratic institutions have conflicting effects on fdi inflows on the one hand democratic institutions hinder fdi inflows by limiting the oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviors of multinational enterprises facilitating indigenous businesses pursuit of protection from foreign capital and constraining host governments ability to offer generous financial and fiscal incentives to foreign investors on the other hand democratic institutions promote fdi inflows because they tend to ensure more credible property rights protection reducing risks and transaction costs for foreign investors hence the net effect of democracy on fdi inflows is contingent on the relative strength of these two competing forces our argument reconciles conflicting theoretical expectations in the existing literature empirical analyses of fifty three developing countries from 1982 to 1995 substantiate our claims we find that both property rights protection and democracy related property rights protection encourage fdi inflows after controlling for their positive effect through property rights protection democratic institutions reduce fdi inflows these results are robust against alternative model specifications statistical estimators and variable measurements

endogenous verifiability and relational contracting for contracting parties it will often be uncertain whether a legal court is able to enforce the real intents of their contract the strict requirements of verifiability make it costly if not impos sible for parties to arrange their transactions and design their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court a way out is then to rely on self enforcing relational con tracts through repeated transactions the parties can make it costly for each other to breach the contract by letting breach ruin future trade but the self enforcing range of contracts is limited so the court s ability to enforce a contract is not without consequence for the contracting parties if possible the parties may thus have incentives to take costly actions that affect the ability of the court both ex ante preparations in terms of detailed contracting and ex post revelation of informa tion can increase the probability of fair court enforcement in this paper we focus on the former assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted actions by care ful ex ante contract specifications we assume that careful contracting can improve the court s ability to verify whether an action conforms to the one described in the contract then we ask what happens to the self enforcing contract equilibrium if a party takes actions ex ante that affect the probability of verification in order to provide some answers we analyze a simple repeated principal agent game where the verifiability of the agent s actions is endogenously determined by the principal s investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent s output the model makes it possible to identify some subtle effects of two key enforcement devices legal courts and repeated interaction note that by endogenizing verifiability we also endog enize the degree of contractual incompleteness and the equilibrium level of incompleteness will depend on the verification technology i e the resource costs that are necessary to achieve various verifiability levels this verification technology will be influenced in an essential way by the quality of courts in fact we can use the model to study relationships between two distinct aspects of courts namely their ability which influences the verification technology and their predictability which manifests itself in the equilibrium level of verifiability i e the probability with which the court in fact will verify the relevant action the repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness since a party honors trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing it the discount factor is then a proxy for the trust level in the relationship by studying the effect of variations in verification technology and the discount factor we can gain insight into the rela tionship between court ability explicit contracting trust and relational contracting below we summarize the results

comparative democratization big and bounded generalizations comparative studies of democratization have produced two types of generalizations those having nearly universal application and those applying to a range of countries within a region in the first category are such arguments as the role of high levels of economic development in guaranteeing democratic sustainability the centrality of political elites in establishing and terminating democracy and deficits in rule of law and state capacity as the primary challenge to the quality and survival of new democracies in the second category are contrasts between recent democratization in post socialist europe versus latin america and southern europe for example in the relationship between democratization and economic reform and in the costs and benefits for democratic consolidation of breaking quickly versus slowly with the authoritarian past the two sets of conclusions have important methodological implications for how comparativists understand generalizability and the emphasis placed on historical versus pr

asset specificity and vertical integration asset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration the main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behavior and that vertical integration reduces the cost of preventing opportunism in this paper i show that asset specificity can be an argument for non integration in a repeated game model of self enforcing relational contracts it is shown that when parties are non integrated increasing degrees of asset specificity make it possible to design relational contracts with higher powered incentives

the fable of the bees an economic investigation ever since a c pigou wrote his books on welfare a divergence between private and social costs has provided the main argument for instituting government action to correct allegedly inefficient market activities the analysis in such cases has been designed less to aid our understanding of how the economic system operates than to find flaws in it to justify policy recommendations both to illustrate the argument and to demonstrate the nature of the actual situation the quest has been for real world examples of such defects

dissatisfied democrats or retrospective voters economic hardship political institutions and voting behavior in latin america this article examines recent trends in latin american voting behavior and casts them in terms of sincere economic and strategic electoral concerns it argues that thanks to years of economic adversity latin americans have developed long sophisticated economic memories although this has resulted in rising frustration with democratic government according to recent opinion polls it has not always led voters to punish all parties responsible for hardship at election time a panel study of the region s presidential systems demonstrates that citizens punish incumbents by voting for established nonincumbents when electoral laws reduce opportunities available to small parties in the systems even if nonincumbents have also been blamed for hard economic times more permissive electoral systems in contrast encourage citizens to reject all parties responsible for economic decline the analysis demonstrates how economic and electoral concerns interact to affect voting behavior political accountability an

four formal izable theories of the firm in this essay i define and compare elemental versions of four theories of the firm these elemental theories are distilled from important contributions by hart holmstrom klein williamson and others although these contributions have been widely cited and much discussed i have found it difficult to understand the commonalities distinctions and potential combinations of these seemingly familiar contributions in this essay therefore i attempt to clarify these issues in three steps i begin with informal summaries of the theories then turn to simple but formal statements of each elemental theory and finally nest the four elemental theories in an integrative framework

the fable of fisher body abstract general motors s gm s acquisition of fisher body is the classic example of market failure in the literature on contracts and the theory of the firm according to the standard account in 1926 gm merged vertically with fisher body a maker of auto bodies because of concerns over transaction specific investment and contractual holdup that account exhibits errors of historical fact and interpretation general motors acquired a 60 percent interest in fisher body in 1919 moreover the contractual arrangements and working relationship prior to the 1926 merger exhibited trust rather than opportunism fisher body s production technology did not exhibit asset specificity the merger reflected economic considerations specific to that time not some immutable market failure we demonstrate that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of production and inventories assuring gm of adequate supplies of auto bodies and providing gm with access to the executive talents of the fisher bro

transaction cost economics and cross national patterns of industrial conflict a comparative institutional analysis at the core of a capitalist system is an implied coalition between labor and capital built upon a system of exchange and compromise without capital the material condition upon which labor s interests are realized would be impossible likewise without labor s consent to exchange wages for future investment capital could not procure the profits and savings necessary for its reproduction and transformation organizing stable and cost efficient class coalitions has long been recognized as not merely an economic priority but a political challenge yet some democracies have met this challenge more successfully than others for the student of comparative political economy an enduring question remains why the present study is an attempt to provide an answer that complements and integrates the more common macroand microanalytic studies of industrial conflict it is argued here that a useful approach is to explicate some of the major microeconomic dynamics that condition exchanges between labor and capital and to demonstrate how institutional devices designed to accommodate political representation and conflict resolution facilitate or impede the process of class compromise by employing the logic of transaction cost economics the analysis highlights the comparative institutional elements fundamental to economizing on the costs of exchange shaping consensus within a political economy s industrial relations system the resulting transaction cost efficiency model of industrial conflict specifies the ex ante cost factors price margin of transaction and the institutional control of bounded rationality and the ex post cost factors legislative polarized pluralism executive hegemony and the frequency of general elections central to the process of building and sustaining class coalitions the model is tested on data drawn from 19 democracies covering the years 1965 83 use of simulation models reveals the relative trade offs associated with different patterns of ex ante and ex post cost structures

the boundaries of the firm revisited why do firms exist what is their function and what determines their scope these remain the central questions in the economics of organization they are also central questions for business executives and corporate strategists the worldwide volume of corporate mergers and acquisitions exceeded 1 6 trillion in 1997 it is hard to imagine that so much time effort and investment bankers fees would be spent on adjusting firm boundaries unless there was some underlying economic gain indeed the exceptional levels of merger and acquisition activity over the past two decades are a strong indication that economically significant forces do determine organizational boundaries the study of firm boundaries originated with the famous essay by coase 1937 who raised the question of why we observe so much economic activity inside formal organizations if as economists commonly argue markets are such powerful and effective mechanisms for allocating scarce resources coase s answer was in terms of the costs of transacting in a world of imperfect information when the transaction costs of market exchange are high it may be less costly to coordinate production through a formal organization than through a market in large part thanks to the work of williamson 1975 1985 recent decades have seen a resurgence of interest in coase s fundamental insight that firm boundaries can be explained by efficiency considerations our understanding of firm boundaries has been sharpened by identifying more precisely the nature and sources of transaction costs in different circumstances in the process the focus of

campaign contributions as a commitment device we explore the idea that the influence of interest groups in elections may have positive economic effects since the investment decisions of firms determine economic growth and employment voters have a common interest in making their governments commit to policies that encourage private investments however governments may renege on promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist policies campaign contributions by firms tend to restrain the scope for such opportunism and provide a commitment device this is achieved if firms after the policy is chosen contribute to the governing party or to its rivals

institutions and economic performance evidence from the labour market the institutional determinants of economic performance is analyzed taking european labor market institutions as a case in point european economic growth after the second world war was based on fordist technologies a setting to which the continent s institutions of solidaristic wage bargaining were ideally suited they eased distributive conflicts and delivered wage moderation which in turn supported high investment the wage compression that was a corollary of their operation was of little consequence so long as the dominant technologies were such that firms could rely on a relatively homogeneous labor force but as fordism gave way to diversified quality production which relied more on highly skilled workers the centralization of bargaining and the compression of wages became impediments rather than aids to growth assuming that growth will rely even more in the future on rapidly changing science based skilled labor intensive technologies countries with centralized labor market institutions will have to move still further in the direction of decentralization whether europe in particular can accommodate these demands will help to determine whether it is able to re establish a full employment economy in the twenty first century

the structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies the article presents a theory of class conflict between workers and capitalists who pursue their material interests under a form of societal organization that combines private ownership of instruments of production with representative political institutions there exist economic and political conditions under which both classes would simultaneously choose courses of action that constitute a class compromise workers consent to the institution of profit and capitalists to democratic institutions through which workers can effectively press claims for material gains when these conditions hold and a compromise is in force the role of the state consists in institutionalizing coordinating and enforcing the terms of a compromise that represents the preferences of workers as well as capitalists the combination of private ownership of the instruments of production with representative political institutions based on widespread suffrage constitutes a compromise between workers who consent to the private appropriation of profit by owners of capital and capitalists who accept the democratic institutions through which workers can make effective claims for an improvement of their material conditions this form of societal organization was con

the politics of financial booms and crises evidence from latin america the persistence of policy switches whereby presidents renege on campaign promises shortly after winning elections 30 years after latin america s redemocratization defies established notions of democratic representation and poses a puzzle to analysts and voters alike in this article i advance current explanations for switches by arguing they can only be understood in the context of currency booms and crises typical of latin american economies after their reintegration into world finance in the 1970s to test my propositions empirically i examine elections held in the region between 1978 and 2006 and find evidence consistent with the claim that switches are more likely to occur in periods of dollar scarcity when the need to attract financial capital to the economy pushes leftist presidents into adopting policies opposed to the programs they announced during campaign

oil nontax revenue and the redistributional foundations of regime stability nontax revenues make up a substantial amount of government revenue around the world though scholars usually focus on individual sources of such revenue for example foreign aid and state owned oil companies using a theory of regime change that builds on recent models of the redistributional foundations of dictatorships and democracies i generate hypotheses regarding all nontax revenue and regime stability i argue that an increase in nontax revenue should be associated with less taxation of elites in democracies more social spending in dictatorships and more stability for both regime types i find support for all three of these hypotheses in a cross sectional time series analysis covering all countries and years for which the necessary data are available significantly i show that the particular source of nontax revenue does not make a difference they all act similarly with regard to regime stability and the causal mechanisms

regulatory restructuring and incumbent price dynamics the case of u s local telephone markets prior to the telecommunications act of 1996 many u s states restructured their regulatory framework by replacing rate of return regulation with competition in both the local exchange service and local long distance markets and adopting price regulation price caps and price freezes using a panel data set of incumbent firm prices for three services i investigate whether price regulation and differences in entry conditions affect incumbent operators rate structures i find that competition has prompted a significant amount of rate rebalancing by reducing the amount of cross subsidization present in local telephone markets in addition the added flexibility of price cap regulation speeds the rate rebalance effects of competition

structural dependence of the state on capital a central claim of both marxist and neoclassical political theory is that under capitalism all governments must respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of society this is the theory of structural dependence of the state on capital using a formal model the internal logic and the robustness of the theory is examined we conclude that in a static sense the theory is false virtually any distribution of consumption between wage earners and owners of capital is compatible with continual private investment once an appropriate set of taxes and transfers is in place yet the state may be structurally dependent in a dynamic sense policies that once in place redistribute income without reducing investment do reduce investment during the period in which they are anticipated but not yet implemented

information and competitive advantage the rise of general motors during the mid 1920s alfred p sloan instituted a number of innovations designed to provide the operating divisions at general motors with more accurate and more timely information regarding final consumer demand these innovations have not received much attention in attempts to explain general motors remarkable rise to dominance of the u s domestic automobile industry the present article reviews these events and provides statistical tests affirming the success of these innovations at the same time as general motors increases in profitability and market share

unstable politics fiscal space and electoral volatility in the indian states what explains variations in electoral volatility the authors argue that fiscal space availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs possessed by govern

incomplete contracts specific investments and risk sharing an optimal contract design problem is considered contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness an optimal contract is characterized in two cases first when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk neutral parties who must make relationship specific investments it is possible to implement the first best by a simple contract second when a contract is being used to share risk it is generally not possible to implement the first best when one party is risk neutral however it is possible to implement the first best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party

political responses to interdependence what s left for the left heightened economic interdependence in recent years is commonly argued to have generated great pressures for convergence in economic policies across the advanced industrial democracies interdependence has clearly had a great impact on the types of economic policies that governments can pursue they have been unable to pursue independent fiscal and monetary policies since the mid 1970s furthermore all governments have been forced to attempt to promote the competitiveness of national goods and services in world markets and to increase the speed and efficiency with which national producers adjust to changes in global markets there are however different policies consistent with these goals statistical analyses of economic policies since the mid 1970s show that governments of the left and the right continue to be able to enact distinctive supply side policies that promote competitiveness and flexible adjustment and simultaneously further their partisan objectives

lawyers asleep at the wheel the gm fisher body contract in the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership one event has dominated the discussion general motors gm merger with fisher body in 1926 the debates have all been premised on the assumption that the 10 year contract between the parties signed in 1919 was a legally enforceable agreement however it was not because fisher s promise was illusory the contract lacked consideration this note suggests that gm s counsel must have known this it raises a significant question in transactional engineering what is the function of an agreement that is not legally enforceable

inside the coasean firm why variations in competence and taste matter abstractronald coase s signal achievement relates to the role of transactions costs in two contexts the formation and maintenance of the firm and the systematic analysis of social costs these transaction cost explanations however do not offer a complete explanation of the variations observed in the internal structures of firms which are elucidated by noting the irreducible role of variations in individual competence temperament and taste in explaining both why firms are formed and how they are structured thus some firms are organized as partnerships and others as straight employment arrangements with many permutations in between sometimes these differences are driven by tax and regulatory considerations that coase well understood but these differences remain prominent even in wholly unregulated markets understanding the internal construction helps explain the difficulties faced by regulation in areas as diverse as employment discrimination law capital markets and tort liability

district magnitude economic performance and party system fragmentation in five latin american countries this article makes a fresh start in the attempt to explain the number of parties in party systems it develops a simultaneous equations model to differentiate between the psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude on party system fragmentation both effects are statistically significant and approximately equal however neither effect is very large in comparison to underlying patterns of politicization which are argued to be reflections of the number of political cleavages in society these cleavages predispose each party system to converge toward a country specific effective number of parties within 5 elections regardless of the initial level of fragmentation barring outside disturbances major devaluations may act as such disturbances but the evidence so far is inconclusive the analysis is based on new data from 62 elections in argentina bolivia colombia peru and venezuela supplemented by 30 additional elections in brazil chile costa rica ecuador mexico and uruguay for th

embeddedness and price formation in the corporate law market the determination of prices is a key function of markets yet sociologists are just beginning to study it most theorists view prices as a consequence of economic processes by contrast we consider how social structure shapes prices building on embeddedness arguments and original fieldwork at large law firms we propose that a firm s embedded relationships influence prices by prompting private information flows and informal governance arrangements that add unique value to goods and services we test our arguments with a separate longitudinal dataset on the pricing of legal services by law firms that represent corporate america we find that embeddedness can significantly increase and decrease prices net of standard variables and in markets for both complex and routine legal services moreover results show that three forms of embeddedness embedded ties board memberships and status affect prices in different directions and have different magnitudes of effects that depend on the complexity of the legal

good times bad times postwar labor s share of national income in capitalist democracies this article returns to a classic question of political economy the zero sum conflict between capital and labor over the division of the national income pie a detailed description of labor s shar