sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division this paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure gains from cooperation are represented by a valuation which maps coalition structures into payoff vectors i show that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game if stationary perfect equilibria may fail to exist in general games a simple condition is provided under which they exist in symmetric games furthermore symmetric stationary perfect equilibria of symmetric games generate a coalition structure which is generically unique up to a permutation of the players a general method for the characterization of equilibria in symmetric games is proposed and applied to the formation of cartels in oligopolies and coalitions in symmetric majority games journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c78 c71 1996 academic press inc

an examination of the antecedents and implications of patent scope this paper focuses on the concept of patent scope and contributes to existing research in three ways first it offers a re examination of the construct and identifies two dimensions of patent scope 1 the number of variations of the core inventive idea identified in the patent reflected in the number of claims in the patent e g merges and nelson 1994 and 2 the positioning of those variations in the inventive space which is reflected in the number of technological classes in which patent examiners classify those claims second it investigates the implications of patent scope for the firm s subsequent inventive performance and finds that when the scope of a patents spans across a higher number of technological classes the extent to which the inventing firm itself succeeds in building on the knowledge underlying its own patent is lower third it investigates the antecedents of scope and suggests that prior investment in scientific knowledge and in related inventive experience are two factors that affect the scope of the patents that firms develop the theoretical predictions elaborated in this paper are supported by an empirical examination of a longitudinal sample of firms in the photonics industry

hybrid r d we develop a model of r d collaboration in which individual firms carry out in house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non core activities with other firms we develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which r d investments in different projects of a firm are complementary we show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models we then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits in this context we identify a second aspect of complementarity equilibrium investments in in house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects however we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research

renewable energy drivers a panel cointegration approach the expected gains from res deployment to the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions co2 and the cut off of external dependence of electricity sources could be important however it is crucial to

endogenous formation of coalitions with composite goods abstract we construct a model of endogenous formation of coalitions when three goods are necessary for a composite good and composite goods are substitutes for each other this analysis extends economides and salop s journal of industrial economics xl 1992 105 model of composite goods where two goods are necessary we analyze the welfare implications of coalition structure and investigate which coalition structure leads to the highest social welfare the paper investigates whether the most desirable coalition structure represents an equilibrium and provides a sufficient condition for the socially efficient coalition structure to be a stable nash coalition structure

information gathering through alliances abstract the effect of a firm s uncertainty regarding technological development on the formation of alliances is examined and it is shown that this uncertainty is positively related to the number of alliances however higher uncertainty also makes the firm less likely to ally with others if the collected information is redundant the higher the similarity between the technological regimes of potential alliance partners the lower the incentive to ally also direct ties are preferred to indirect ones if uncertainty is high since direct ties yield more accurate information than indirect ties

an experiment on risky choice amongst households a host of experiments have examined theories of risky choice using individuals however many important economic decisions are taken within multi adult households this paper reports on the first economic experiment designed to test theories of household choice we use established couples and face them individually and jointly with decisions involving monetary payoffs we find that joint choices typically are more risk averse than those made by individuals meanwhile choices made by couples exhibit the same kinds of departures from expected utility theory e g the common ratio and common consequence effects as are regularly recorded with individuals

endogenous structures of association in oligopolies the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two stage noncooperative game in the first stage firms form associations in order to decrease their costs and in the second stage they compete on the market examples of associations include r d joint ventures and groups of firms adopting common standards in equilibrium the associations formed exhibit two general features they are asymmetric and inefficient

complementarity and external linkages the strategies of the large firms in biotechnology in biotechnology large firms enter into different kinds of linkages with universities and small medium sized research intensive firms we test the hypothesis that the strategies of external linkage of the large firms with other parties are complementary to one another we show that if any two strategies are complementary i e undertaking more of one strategy raises the marginal value of the other then they are positively correlated using data for a sample large us european and japanese chemical and pharmaceutical producers we find that the strategies above are positively correlated even after controlling for firm specific characteristics

endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard abstract we analyze the formation of competing partnerships as a sequential game with moral hazard within coalitions in a linear cournot model we show that when moral hazard is very severe no partnerships will form however when moral hazard is not too severe the coalition structure may be more concentrated than it is in the absence of moral hazard concerning industry profits in the absence of moral hazard too many coalitions are formed in equilibrium as compared to the efficient outcome but moral hazard may be responsible for an inefficiency of opposite sign

the role of institution building in us industrial modernization programs abstract an important issue for evaluating industrial modernization programs is how well alternative intervention strategies address the underlying problems that contribute to uneven patterns of technology adoption the one on one industrial extension service model where the state agency provides technical assistance directly to individual firms constitutes one approach by contrast institution building approaches emphasize inter firm learning in which government serves as the catalyst for bringing technology developers together with potential users and for providing closer linkages between organizations that are the technology leaders and those that tend to be followers programs that support such inter firm learning opportunities stand a better chance of contending with the underlying problems retarding technology transfer are more likely to gain acceptability by both technology leaders and followers and are more likely to garner funds from the private sector

pure strategy nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities abstract this paper identifies a domain of payoff functions in no spillover noncooperative games with positive externality which admit a pure strategy nash equilibrium since in general a nash equilibrium may fail to exist in order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium we impose two additional assumptions anonymity and order preservation the proof of our main result is carried out by constructing for a given game g a potential function over the set of strategy profiles in such a way that the maximum of yields a nash equilibrium in pure strategies of g journal of economics literature classification numbers c72 d62 h73

do binding agreements solve the social dilemma we investigate whether binding agreements can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods by signing a binding agreement players can prevent free riding by the contributors to a public good however a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient in our setting the individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global coalition is always the socially optimal structure agreements form sequentially and the equilibrium outcome is an asymmetric structure which consists of two coalitions our experiment therefore lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient in fact we observe an outcome which is even less efficient than that predicted by the equilibrium agreement structure however it seems that when subjects reach agreements they do so with the intention of cooperating rather than free riding furthermore it seems that they learn to cooperate over time and reach the global agreement more often towards the end of sessions keywords

strategizing by firms in the presence of markets for resources strategizing by firms from the resource based view is concerned with the process through which firms acquire a distinctive bundle of resources that is costly and time consuming for competitors to duplicate or imitate a central question facing any firm therefore is its strategy for accumulating the resources that underpin its production activities in this article the process of resource accumulation is discussed as one involving potentially both internal resource development and external resource acquisition from the perspective of the strategic issues involved in making a choice between these options emerging markets for technologies and know how through licensing and other forms of resource exchange have opened up new avenues through which firms may jostle for advantage the article is concerned with three major aspects of this process illustrating the discussion with cases from biotechnology and pharmaceuticals first the strategizing by firms around the internal development vs external sourcing issue is discussed as informed by the practices of leading firms and how these lend greater variety of strategic options for firms second the potential competitive advantages as well as disadvantages to be secured by firms through the process of external sourcing as compared with the well known potential advantages accruing to incumbents through internal development such as time compression diseconomies and causal ambiguity and third the criteria to be used by firms to strategically evaluate resources individually as contrasted with the strategic evaluation of the resource bundle or totality these criteria it is argued turn on the issues of marginal value contribution resource complementarities and synergies resource variety and transferability involving intellectual property issues successful firms it is argued expand their options through blending internal resource accumulation with external resource leverage thereby deepening their distinctive dynamic capabilities this approach extends the framework of the rbv enabling it to encompass resource driven schumpeterian competition and such aspects of industrial dynamics as specialization modularization and imitative challenge copyright 2003 oxford university press

complementarities of innovation activities an empirical analysis of the german manufacturing sector abstract innovation strategies in manufacturing often involve internal rd it is based on data from the german part of the community innovation survey cis 3 the results provide evidence for significant complementarities between internal r d and r d cooperation but cast doubt on the complementarity of internal and contracted r d since a productivity effect on firms patenting probability or sales with new products cannot be found

the individual travel cost method with consumer specific values of travel time savings the treatment of the opportunity cost of travel time in travel cost models has been an area of research interest for many decades our analysis develops a methodology to combine the travel distance and travel time data with respondent specific estimates of the value of travel time savings vtts the individual vtts are elicited with the use of discrete choice stated preference methods the travel time valuation procedure is integrated into the travel cost valuation exercise to create a two equation structural model of site valuation since the travel time equation of the structural model incorporates individual preference heterogeneity the full structure model provides a travel cost site demand model based upon individualized values of time the methodology is illustrated in a study of recreational birdwatching more specifically visits to a stork village in poland we show that the usual practice of basing respondents vtts on 1 3 of their wage rate is largely unfounded and propose alternatives including a separate component of the travel cost survey aimed at valuation of respondents vtts or as a second best asking if they wish if their journey was shorter and for those who do use full hourly wage as an indicator of their vtts

the causes of order effects in contingent valuation surveys an experimental investigation contingent valuation researchers have found that the hypothetical values respondents place on a nested sequence of environmental goods are sensitive to the order in which the goods are presented typically the smallest bundle of goods is valued more highly if presented first than if following more comprehensive bundles such effects appear even when each bundle is valued from an exclusive list or as an alternative to any other so that income and substitution effects are controlled we conduct lab experiments where participants are asked to value sequences of nested goods for purchase from an exclusive list using an incentive compatible becker degroot marschak mechanism we test whether order effects occur in valuation for a induced value goods b actual private goods and c identical private goods that are to be donated to charities we find significant order effects when the goods are valued for own use but not when they are valued for donation

valuation of natural resource improvements in the adirondacks for 20 years acid rain in the adirondack park has been a central issue in the debate about clean air regulation based on a contingent valuation survey of new york residents our study quantifies the total economic value of expected ecological improvements in the park from forthcoming policies our preferred estimates of the mean household willingness to pay range from 48 to 107 annually which imply total statewide benefits ranging from 336 million to 749 million annually alternative assumptions about ecological changes yield benefits up to 1 1 billion the instrument passes external scope sensitivity to bid and sample selection tests

present at the biotechnological revolution transformation of technological identity for a large incumbent pharmaceutical firm abstract management of successful incumbent firms experience difficulty in recognizing the need for and effecting change in the firm s technological identity after an externally generated shift in the industry s technological trajectory nonetheless some large pharmaceutical firms have transformed their technological identity in drug discovery from a chemical random screening to biological drug design model we report how one of the world s most successful incumbents transformed technically sophisticated senior management championed the transformation it was achieved primarily through hiring many new scientists embodying biotechnology existing personnel acquired the expertise or left continual self transformation is part of the corporate ethos some differences in incumbent and entrant technology remain incumbents use a wider range of techniques consistent with their complementary assets publication and incentive compensation policies are driven by the need to attract and retain the best scientists professor firm collaborations are ubiquitous often non public and best identified in quantitative analyses by co publishing collaborations with new biotechnology firms are used primarily to substitute for developing internal expertise judged of marginal value no drug discovery collaborations exist with other major incumbents we identify another seven or eight incumbents similarly transforming as indicated by top scientific talent and patenting success

is there complementarity or substitutability between internal and external r d strategies abstract the various strands of extant empirical research are inconclusive about the complementarity or substitutability between different innovation mechanisms such as internal and external r d using a panel sample of 83 incumbent pharmaceutical firms covering the period 1986 2000 our empirical analysis suggests that instead of a clear cut answer to the question of whether internal and external r d are complementary or substitutive innovation activities there appears to be a contingent relationship between internal and external r d strategies in shaping a firm s innovative output the results from our study indicate that the level of in house r d investments which is characterized by decreasing marginal returns is a contingency variable that critically influences the association between internal and external r d strategies in particular internal r d and external r d through either r d alliances or r d acquisitions are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of in house r d investments whereas at lower levels of in house r d efforts internal and external r d turn out to be substitutive strategic options

exchange rate fluctuations and labour market adjustments in canadian manufacturing industries we estimate the link between exchange rate fluctuations and the labour input of canadian manufacturing industries the analysis is based on a dynamic model of labour demand and the econometric strategy employs a panel two step approach for cointegrating regressions

recovering individual preferences for non market goods a collective travel cost model traditional recreation demand models do not make a distinction between a household and an individual as the reference decision making unit thus assuming that a family maximizes a single utility function even if the family consists of different individuals such models ignore the possibility of family members divergent preferences for non market goods this study proposes a novel approach the collective travel cost model ctcm to eliciting individual preferences for a non market good such as a recreation site by using revealed preference data this approach accounts for the intra household resource allocation and the role of each household member s preferences we show that the collective travel cost model can be applied to estimating a recreation demand model that yields individual welfare estimates appropriate for policy analysis of non market goods such as the willingness to pay to access a recreation site we find that how resources are distributed within the household reflects significant differences in welfare measures

does public scientific research complement private investment in research and development in the pharmaceutical industry abstract this paper analyzes how pharmaceutical research and development r d investment responds to publicly supported biomedical research performed mainly at universities and nonprofit institutions new microlevel data on investment by the u s national institutes of health allow measures of public basic and clinical research in seven medical classes to be included in a distributed lag model explaining pharmaceutical r d investment using a panel of medical classes observed over 18 years the analysis found strong evidence that public basic and clinical research are complementary to pharmaceutical r d investment and thereby stimulate private industry investment however differences in the relevance and degree of scientific and market uncertainty between basic and clinical research lead to differences in the magnitude and timing of the pharmaceutical investment response

an analytical framework for joint vs separate decisions by couples in choice experiments the case of coastal water quality in tobago this paper offers an analytical framework for analyzing joint and separate decisions by couples in the context of choice experiments for nonmarket valuation it reports results from an attribute based stated preference study in which members of couples are asked to conduct a choice experiment first individually and then jointly the choice context was the selection of which beach to visit while on vacation in tobago available alternatives differed in attributes related to coastal water and beach quality such as level of coastal development and fish abundance tests of preference equality are reported and structured so as to identify the intra couple decision making patterns under taste heterogeneity with both finite and continuous mixed logit results from the latter suggest that women s preferences are found to be predominant in the joint choice experiment results suggest caution in using individual choice rather than joint couple choice when valuing quality changes impacting on couple activities such as water and beach quality in tobago and call for further research on the topic

dynamic complementarities in innovation strategies using a panel of irish manufacturing plants over the period 1991 2008 we test for dynamic complementarities in the joint use of internal r d and external knowledge sources we find little evidence either from considering successive cross sectional waves of comparable surveys or in terms of the strategy switch choices of specific plants that there has been a systematic move towards the joint use of internal and external knowledge in innovation we then test formally for the presence of complementarities in the joint use of internal r d and external innovation linkages in static terms we find no evidence of complementarity but in dynamic terms find evidence that strategy switches by individual plants towards a more open strategy are accompanied by increased innovation outputs

do husbands and wives pool their resources evidence from the united kingdom child benefit common preference models of family behavior imply income pooling a restriction on family demand functions such that only the sum of husband s income and wife s income affects the allocation of goods and time testing the pooling hypothesis is difficult because most family income sources are not exogenous to the allocations being analyzed in this paper we present an alternative test based on a natural experiment a policy change in the united kingdom that transferred a substantial child allowance to wives in the late 1970s using family expenditure survey data we find strong evidence that a shift toward greater expenditures on women s clothing and children s clothing relative to men s clothing coincided with this income redistribution

the role of knowledge in r d efficiency past research has recognized that both demand and capability influence the allocation of r d resources scholars have had an easier time getting a grip on demand than on capability while it has been recognized that knowledge is an important part of capability to date formalization of knowledge and its role in r d activity has been unsatisfactory this paper models the role of knowledge in r d various sources of such knowledge are considered the model throws a different light on analyses that employ a knowledge capital stock and also illuminates the dual private and public nature of technological knowledge

strategic information revelation we analyze the problem in which agents have non public information and are to play an asymmetric information game the agents may reveal some or all of their information to other agents prior to playing this game revelation is via exogenously specified certifiable statements the equilibria resulting from various revelation strategies are used to determine equilibrium revelation of information sufficient conditions are provided for complete revelation of all private information a number of examples are provided illustrating when revelation will or will not occur in commonly analyzed games many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behaviour on the part of individuals and by asymmetric information models encompassing both of these characteristics have been used successfully to examine questions in many fields usually using the concept of bayesian nash equilibrium as the solution concept typically the agents information is given exogenously and is fixed throughout the analysis modelling the information structure as static is appropriate for some problems but not for all in particular situations that are inherently dynamic most economic encounters allow for some interchange between the agents before the outcome is settled irrevocably in such circumstances it is possible that at least one or more of the agents possessing non public information may be able to reveal part or all of his information to one or all of the other agents in the economy during the course of their contact to the extent that such a communication is believed by the other agents the priors of the other agents will change and we will have what is in essence a new asymmetric information game new in

endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers abstract we examine the endogenous formation of research coalitions with high spillovers among symmetric firms members of a research coalition set their r and d investments in order to maximize the aggregate profits of members of their coalition the exclusive membership rule supports a more concentrated coalition structure and thus leads to higher industry r and d investments for high spillovers than the open membership rule does however due to free riding problems the grand research coalition which is the socially efficient outcome is rarely an equilibrium outcome under either rule our results suggest that government subsidies to research consortia for basic research with high spillovers can improve social welfare by encouraging wider participation to a research consortium that is by alleviating free rider problems in coalition formation from a more theoretical viewpoint our results on stable coalition structures are applicable to a wide variety of economic coalitions with positive externalities

partial coordination and mergers among quantity setting firms we analyze horizontal mergers in a collusive environment by using an infinitely repeated game where i a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given and ii partially collusive arrangements are allowed for we show that in our model there is no clear relation between the existence of mergers and full collusion at equilibrium however we demonstrate that the presence of mergers generally leads to a price increase also we show that cartel firms have less incentives to merge than firms in a cournot oligopoly and that collusion increases fringe firms incentives to merge 2007 elsevier b v all rights reserved jel classification l13 l40 l41

ideas for rent an overview of markets for technology this article surveys some of the recent literature on technology markets and summarizes its main issues and insights we structure our analysis in three parts the supply and demand of technology the factors that condition the formation and growth of technology markets industry structure and dynamic issues in addition we summarize some of the studies that have tried to document the size and growth of these markets we find that the literature has focused mainly on the supply of technology but several other aspects of these markets remain under studied including the demand for external technology the role of uncertainty in technology markets and the dynamic interaction between industry structure and the market for technology understanding these will illuminate whether markets for technology will continue to grow or remained confined to pockets of the economy copyright 2010 the author 2010 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved oxford university press

the strategic alliance of the biotechnology firm this article applies the relevant theories of firm organization and inter firm relationships in the high tech environment to explain the institutional reasons that firms choose between internal or external approaches particularly this study tries to understand to what extent and in what way strategic alliances have impacts on individual firms organizational structure financial structure and firms activities also it tries to find out what type of firms tend to benefit most from alliances and thus use more inter firm agreements the theoretical findings are that due to liquidity constraint and asymmetric information reasons young research intensive firms need to use more alliances to survive in the fast changing high technology industry the empirical analysis employs 3 year panel data and finds that the results are consistent with the theoretical predictions

stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms i study games of coalition formation with open membership where firms form associations in order to decrease their costs before competing on the market according to previous analyses only the grand coalition forms at the nash equilibrium of such games i show that this result hinges on the assumption of symmetric firms i therefore introduce asymmetric firms in a game where only two associations can form i demonstrate that there exists a coalition proof nash equilibrium coalition structure in this game and that when the equilibrium involves two associations all the members of an association have a higher taste for this association than all nonmembers do journal of economic literature classification numbers c70 c72 l13

patents as indicators of corporate technological strength abstract quantitative indicators of the technological strengths of individual companies would be an important addition to the financial and economic data used in competitor assessments merger acquisition analyses investment decisions and corporate planning and management this paper examines the links between corporate patent and patent citation data and several other indicators of corporate performance changes in sales and profits research and development budgets scientific productivity and expert opinions of company technological strength the study covers 17 us pharmaceutical companies for which financial r d and expert opinion data were readily available for these pharmaceutical companies it was found that the patent data are an excellent indicator of overall corporate technological strength with 1 an overall correlation of 0 82 between expert opinion of pharmaceutical company technical strength and the number of us patents granted to the companies and 2 correlations in the general range of 0 6 to 0 9 between increases in company profits and sales and both patent citation frequency and concentration of company patents within a few patent classes

network centrality and organizational aspirations a behavioral interaction in the context of international strategic alliances the authors wish to acknowledge the financial support provided by the spanish ministry of science and education under projects eco2013 48496 c4 2 r eco2013 48496 c4 4 r and eco2017 48496 c4 4 r

stable coalition structures with externalities this paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions in many interesting economic games coalition formation creates either negatie externalities or posi tie externalities for nonmembers examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions i characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation the open

the open eco innovation mode an empirical investigation of eleven european countries this paper deals with the open innovation mode in the environmental realm and investigates the effects that knowledge sourcing has on the environmental innovations eis of firms using the community innovation survey cis 2006 2008 we refer to the firm s probability of both introducing an ei and extending the number of ei typologies adopted we estimate the impact of the depth and breadth of knowledge sourcing in addition we test for the moderating role of the firm s absorptive capacity knowledge sourcing has a positive impact on both types of ei performance however a broad sourcing strategy reveals a threshold above which the propensity to introduce an ei diminishes cognitive constraints in processing knowledge inputs that are too diverse may explain this result absorptive capacity generally helps firms to turn broadly sourced external knowledge into ei however internal innovation capabilities and knowledge socialization mechanisms seem to diminish the ei impact of knowledge sourced through deep external interactions the possibility of mismatches between the management of internal and external knowledge and of problems in distributing the decision makers attention between the two may explain this result

recovering hicksian consumer surplus within a collective model hausman s method for the household the purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non marketed environmental resources after demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover hicksian consumer surplus an algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources

equilibria in a model with partial rivalry abstract in this paper we show that a non cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals preferences satisfy independence of irrelevant choices anonymity and partial rivalry moreover if any of these assumptions is violated then even a pure strategy nash equilibrium may fail to exist further more we demonstrate that even with a continuum of players the same three assumptions yield the existence of a pure strategy strong nash equilibrium and in addition the equivalence of the sets of nash and strong nash equilibria in pure strategies journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d62

why do firms do basic research with their own money abstractthe question to be addressed is why do private firms perform basic research with their own money interest in this question derives from both analytical and utilitarian considerations there is empirical evidence in the united states which provides the main context for this paper supporting the view that basic research makes a significant contribution to the productivity growth of the economy 4 7 it is widely held that social returns from basic research are significant and higher than private returns and it is for this reason that most such activities continue to be financed by the taxpayer this also implies that measures aimed at increasing basic research by the private sector will be welfare improving in the united states the federal government in the years since the second world war has provided the vast majority of all funds devoted to basic research although the federal share has been declining in recent years and although that share is at its lowest level in about 20 years it still constitutes about two thirds of the total 10 this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

intra household experiments a survey experiments with family groups are rare but since many decisions are taken at the household level or occur within the household it is an important area to investigate this paper provides a survey of the recent experimental work on intra household decision making i discuss some of the challenges involved in doing experiments with couples and families and consider major areas that remain yet to be explored while general themes from the research are still emerging four results repeatedly occur 1 the absence of efficiency in intra household decisions 2 joint decisions that are not a convex combination of individual decisions 3 individual behaviour is affected by opportunities for hiding actions from spouses and 4 deviations from standard models of microeconomics in line with those seen in the anomalies literature of individual decision making

asking for individual or household willingness to pay for environmental goods implication for aggregate welfare measures the aggregate welfare measure for a change in the provision of a public good derived from a contingent valuation cv survey will be higher if the same elicited mean willingness to pay wtp is added up over individuals rather than households a trivial fact however once respondents are part of multi person households it becomes almost impossible to elicit an uncontaminated wtp measure that with some degree of confidence can be aggregated over one or the other response unit the literature is mostly silent about which response unit to use in wtp questions and in some cv studies it is even unclear which type has actually been applied we test for differences between individual and household wtp in a novel web administered split sample cv survey asking wtp for preserving biodiversity in old growth forests in norway two samples are asked both types of questions but in reverse order followed by a question with an item battery trying to reveal why wtp may differ we find in a test between samples that the wtp respondents state on behalf of their households is not significantly different from their individual wtp however within the same sample household wtp is significantly higher than individual wtp in particular if respondents are asked to state individual before household wtp our results suggest that using individual wtp as the response unit may overestimate aggregate wtp thus the choice of response format needs to be explicitly and carefully addressed in cv questionnaire design and further research in order to avoid the risk of unprofitable projects passing the benefit cost test

collective household models principles and main results in the traditional approach to consumer behaviour it is assumed that households behave as if they were single decision making units this approach has methodological empirical and welfare economic deficiencies a valuable alternative to the traditional model is the collective approach to household behaviour the collective approach explicitly takes account of the fact that multi person households consist of several members which may have different preferences among these household members an intrahousehold bargaining process is assumed to take place in addition to providing an introduction to the collective approach this survey intends to show how different collective household models each with their own aims and assumptions are connected

public financing of cooperative r d projects in spain the concerted projects under the national r d plan abstract this work will analyse the factors which influence decision making within the spanish public sector on the financing of precompetitive research projects developed by firms in collaboration with universities and public research organisms with this objective in mind an econometric model is proposed that explains simultaneously the concession of aid on behalf of the public sector and the amount of such aid the estimates carried out indicate among other results that the destination of the budgeted funds explains a large part of the public financing received however all the evidence would seem to indicate that the funding has not been awarded either in order to significantly favour those firms which most need it nor to give incentive to high levels of cooperation

contingent valuation controversies and evidence contingent valuation cv has become one of the most widely used non market valuation techniques cv s prominence is due to its flexibility and ability to estimate total value including passive use value its use and the inclusion of passive use value in benefit cost analyses and environ mental litigation are the subject of a contentious debate this paper discusses key areas of the debate over cv and the validity of passive use value we conclude that many of the alleged problems with cv can be resolved by careful study design and implementation we further conclude that claims that empirical cv findings are theoretically inconsistent are not generally supported by the literature the debate over cv however has clarified several key issues related to nonmarket valuation and can provide useful guidance both to cv practitioners and the users of cv results

introduction to the special issue things we do and don t understand about the household and the environment environmental economics has been slow to incorporate the full and complex nature of the household into its analytical structures and to reflect empirical evidence on household decision making this paper provides an overview of some of the main unanswered questions

on visible choice sets and scope sensitivity abstract in this paper we argue that the burgeoning empirical debate over scope sensitivity within contingent valuation studies is fundamentally incomplete in that it has neglected a systematic examination of certain effects of study design upon observed scope sensitivity in particular we highlight the fact that in certain study designs the choice set initially offered or visible to respondents is changed in a stepwise manner as they progress through a valuation exercise while other designs involve advance disclosure regarding the full extent of the final visible choice set prior to any choices or values being elicited the issue of changes in the visible choice set is alluded to by smith j environ econom manage 22 1 71 who identifies this as a primary challenge to kahneman and knetsch s j environ econom manage 22 1 57 well known experimental results kahneman and knetsch contend that it seems highly implausible that this minor procedural change would significantly alter results p 61 but do not test this assertion we present experimental and field tests of the impact upon contingent values of varying the visible choice set through stepwise and advance disclosure these dimensions of design are interacted with changes in the order in which nested goods are presented bottom up versus top down when a stepwise disclosure procedure is adopted the observed scope sensitivity is substantially and significantly affected by the order in which goods are presented but such procedural variance is not observed within advance disclosure designs conjectures regarding the origin and implications of such findings are presented

coalition formation in standard setting alliances we present a theory for predicting how business firms form alliances to develop and sponsor technical standards our basic assumptions are that the utility of a firm for joining a particular standard setting alliance increases with the size of the alliance and decreases with the presence of rivals in the alliance especially close rivals the predicted alliance configurations are simply the nash equilibria i e those sets of alliances for which no single firm has an incentive to switch to another alliance we illustrate our theory by estimating the choices of nine computer companies to join one of two alliances sponsoring competing unix operating system standards in 1988

household willingness to pay equals individual willingness to pay if and only if the household income pools abstract i show household and individual willingness to pay are equal if and only if household choices satisfy income pooling providing a test of whether the individual respondent speaks for the household an assumption implicit in much stated preference practice

evidence on macroeconomic complementarities this paper provides empirical evidence on macroeconomic complementarities a restriction on the nature of interaction between individuals in a multiagent setting these models imply that activities across agents will be positively correlated that discrete decisions will be synchronized and that disturbances will be magnified and propagated the paper shows that these implications are consistent with aggregate observations as well as some microeconomic evidence further looking at certain historical episodes such as the national industrial recovery act as well as seasonal fluctuations provides additional support for models with macroeconomic complementarities copyright 1996 by mit press

individual and household willingness to pay for public goods the issue of whether willingness to pay wtp for the benefits generated by a public good should be elicited on an individual or on a household basis is addressed differences between individual and household wtp may arise when members of the household are mutually altruistic it is shown that for general specifications of altruism household wtp is less than the sum of household members individual wtp implications for the choice between household and individual measures of wtp are considered and issues in the elicitation of household wtp are addressed

stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets in this paper we study dynamic alliance formation among agents in competitive markets we look at n agents selling substitutable products competing in a market in this setting we examine models with deterministic and stochastic demand and we use a two stage approach in stage 1 agents form alliances coalitions and in stage 2 coalitions make decisions price and inventory and compete against one another to analyze the stability of coalition structures in stage 1 we use two notions from cooperative games the largest consistent set lcs and the equilibrium process of coalition formation epcf which allow players to be farsighted thus in forming alliances players consider two key phenomena first players trade off the size of the total profit of the system versus their allocation of this total pie and second they weigh the possibility that an immediate beneficial defection can trigger further counter defections that in the end may prove to be worse than the status quo in particular one such example is that of the grand coalition which we show to be stable in the farsighted sense even though players benefit myopically by defecting from it we also provide conditions under which a situation of a few lone players competing against a large coalition is stable we examine the impact of the size of the market n the degree of competition the effect of cost parameters and the variability of the demand process on the prices inventory levels and structure of the market we discuss the possible strategic implications of our results to firms in a competitive market and for new entrants

governance and uncertainty the trade off between administrative control and commitment this study elaborates upon the motives for initiating equity based collaborations vs acquisition of another firm already having a desired technology we characterize both minority direct investments and joint ventures as options to defer either internal development or acquisition of a target firm in domains where learning about growth opportunities dominates investment activity this incremental mode of governance economizes on the cost of committing resources to a technology with an uncertain value using a sample of 402 transactions in the biotechnology industry we find strong support for the theoretical model the findings suggest that the cost of commitment in the face of technological uncertainty may offset the administrative benefits of hierarchical governance 1998 john wiley sons ltd

formation of a coalition proof stable cartel formation of coalitions in oligopolies is modeled as a noncooperative game in which firms strategies have a binary form to cooperate or not the author demonstrates a one to one correspondence between stable cartels defined by c d aspremont et al 1983 and the nash equilibria of this game using a coalition proof nash equilibrium they define the concept of a coalition proof stable cartel and prove that there is a unique equilibrium

in search of complementarity in innovation strategy internal r d and external knowledge acquisition empirical research on complementarity between organizational design decisions has traditionally focused on the question of existence of complementarity in this paper we take a broader approach to the issue combining a productivity and an adoption approach while including a search for contextual variables in the firms strategy that affects complementarity analysis of contextual variables is not only interesting per se but also improves the productivity test for the existence of complementarity we use our empirical methodology to analyze complementarity between innovation activities internal research and development r d and external knowledge acquisition our results suggest that internal r d and external knowledge acquisition are complementary innovation activities but that the degree of complementarity is sensitive to other elements of the firms strategic environment we identify reliance on basic r dthe importance of universities and research centers as an information source for the innovation processas an important contextual variable affecting complementarity between internal and external innovation activities

effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market distant r d collaboration abstract r d outsourcing is often conducted during the early market distant stages of the innovation process however the main obstacle to this potentially efficient interfirm specialization is the high danger of moral hazard most organizational mechanisms fail to control that type of opportunism because of information asymmetries even ex post in the theory of incomplete contracts this problem is mitigated by assigning the control rights to the supplier to date empirical studies have mainly investigated the interfirm distribution of the control rights however we do not know yet which concrete control right is crucial with regard to supplier opportunism which is the decisive dependent variable our study addresses this research gap for the first time we extend the empirical focus from biotechnology and pharmaceutical firm alliances to a cross industry sample of 113 collaboration cases the results show the effectiveness of contracts that ex ante assign patent ownership rights to the supplier the findings are also relevant for management practice because the majority of practitioners do not use this contract type yet although there is no sign of an effective alternative

ordering effects in nested top down and bottom up contingent valuation designs abstract within a contingent valuation cv survey ordering effects are defined where responses to a given question vary in a theoretically unanticipated manner according to the positioning of that question relative to others in the survey instrument this paper employs a split sample cv design to investigate the potential for such ordering effects upon stated willingness to pay for nested goods in one top down design values are first elicited for protecting the whole of an endangered area after which values for a part sub area are elicited a second bottom up treatment reverses the order of valuation tasks with the part scheme valued prior to the whole results show that whole and part valuation responses are logically ordered and determined by a consistent set of factors irrespective of question order however variance to question order was observed in both the part and whole valuations the correspondence of these results to standard and non standard preference theories is explored and the difficulties and practical issues concerning valuing nested goods are highlighted

capitalism as an engine of progress economists from marx to schumpeter have touted capitalism as an engine of technical progress but what kind of an engine is it what are its key components how does it work

a review and comparison of tests of cross section independence in panels abstract in this paper we review and compare diagnostic tests of cross section independence in the disturbances of panel regression models we examine tests based on the sample pairwise correlation coefficient or on its transformations and tests based on the theory of spacings the ultimate goal is to shed some light on the appropriate use of existing diagnostic tests for cross equation error correlation our discussion is supported by means of a set of monte carlo experiments and a small empirical study on health results show that tests based on the average of pairwise correlation coefficients work well when the alternative hypothesis is a factor model with non zero mean loadings tests based on spacings are powerful in identifying various forms of strong cross section dependence but have low power when they are used to capture spatial correlation

coalition proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities abstract the ability of the members of a coalition to communicate secretly determines whether the coalition can coordinate to deviate from a proposed strategy and thus affects which strategies are coalition proof we show that the existence of a pareto best element in the set of strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies implies the existence of a coalition proof correlated equilibrium for any specification of coalitional communication possibilities that always permits individual deviations such an element exists in games with strategic complementarities if either 1 there is a unique nash equilibrium or 2 each player s payoff is nondecreasing in the others strategies journal of economic literature classification number c72

sequencing and the adding up property in contingent valuation of endangered species are contingent non use values economic values this paper presents tests of the theoretical validity of the contingent valuation cv method the validity of cv is especially a concern when involving environmental goods with a predominant non use value one test of theoretical validity is the adding up property that implies that a specific good should be equally valued irrespectively of it is being valued directly or built up sequentially in this cv study four independent sub samples stated willingness to pay for the same composite good or package using different sequences one sub sample valued the composite good directly while two sub samples faced built up sequences valuing first subsets of this composite good a fourth sub sample valued the composite good from a dividing out approach facing first the valuation of a larger multi package theoretically expected sequencing effects were observed the subset goods obtained higher values earlier in a sequence and the dividing out approach decreased the stated value for the composite good most importantly these cv data did pass the tests of the adding up property

adjusting for cultural differences in international benefit transfer values for non market goods can be expected to be sensitive to variations in the cultural contexts of beneficiaries however little progress has been made to date in adapting benefit transfer bt procedures for cultural variations using information from a study that ranked 62 societies with respect to nine attributes of their cultures we develop an index that is then used to re weight multiple coastal ecosystem service value estimates we examine whether these culturally adjusted bt estimates are statistically different than simply transferring the income adjusted mean transfer estimates for each coastal ecosystem service from international study sites to the policy site we find that once differences in income levels have been accounted for the differences in cultural dimensions between study and policy sites actually have little impact on the magnitude of our transfer estimates this is not a surprising result given that the majority of the study site estimates are derived from countries that share many ethnic linguistic and other cultural similarities to the policy site however benefit adjustments based on cultural factors could have a much higher impacts in settings different to that investigated here

households willingness to pay for water service attributes water consumption and disposal are often taken for granted as essential services with required levels of service quality yet little is known about how much consumers are willing to pay for specific service levels as customers in many countries face changing levels of water availability especially shortages linked possibly to climate change and limited catchment capacity the need to assess the value and hence benefit to society of varying service levels and prices in an effort to secure the provision of and disposal of water has risen on public agendas in an attempt to establish how much customers are willing to pay for specific levels of service we use a series of stated choice experiments and mixed logit models to establish the willingness to pay to avoid interruptions in water service and overflows of wastewater differentiated by the frequency timing and duration of these events the empirical evidence is an important input into the regulatory process for establishing service levels and tariffs as well as useful planning information for agencies charged with finding cost effective ways of delivering services at prices that customers deem to be value for money

firms motivations for cooperative r d an empirical analysis of spanish firms abstract the aim of this paper is to analyze the motives that have caused industrial firms to cooperate in r d there are many theoretical works devoted to the theme but few empirical studies have been carried out with large samples to analyze the factors which determine why firms cooperate in r d we first review the reasons offered by the literature to explain technological cooperation with this allowing us to determine the conceptual framework and to propose some hypotheses we test these hypotheses with a sample of 1652 spanish firms that have carried out r d activities the results obtained suggest that firms motivations for cooperative r d are the complexity of technology and the fact that innovation is costly and uncertain we find that in order to undertake cooperative r d it is necessary to have certain internal capacities in this area with our results being supported by the theory of absorptive capacity however and by contrast with the results presented in other works questions related to market access and search for opportunities do not appear to exert an influence over cooperative r d besides the large sized firms resort more to cooperation and the reasons for cooperative r d differ as between large and small sized firms

colluding on excluding abstract in an oligopoly characterized by barriers to re entry a finite horizon complete information convex costs and the presence of three identical firms i show that in subgame perfect equilibrium two of them the predators can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third the prey decides to exit immediately in this predatory pricing equilibrium the predators can enjoy higher profits than in the best collusive equilibrium with three firms thus a coalition of two firms can benefit from colluding on excluding

participation games and international environmental agreements a non parametric model abstract we examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements cartel formation rd based on these examples a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game the equilibrium coalition size is small except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small in this paper we develop a non parametric approach to the problem and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust in a general setting we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large contrary to previously examined leading special cases we show that reductions in marginal abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium membership and we provide a measure of the smallest reduction in costs needed to support a coalition of arbitrary size

public good valuation and intra family allocation i derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two person households measured alternatively by household member i s willingness to pay wtp for the good on behalf of the household wtp i h or by the sum of individual wtp values across family members wtp c households are assumed to allocate their resources in efficient nash bargains over private and common household goods wtp i h is then defined by trade offs between the public good and the household good and wtp c by trade offs of between the public good and private goods wtp i h is found to be higher lower than wtp c when member i has a relatively high low marginal valuation of the public good but tends on average to equal wtp c as a consequence individuals tend to represent households correctly on average when questioned about the household s wtp for a public good even when they are purely selfish and answer truthfully adding all members wtp answers on behalf of the household then leads to double counting pure and paternalistic altruism the latter attached to consumption of the public good move each member s wtp on behalf of the household closer to the true sum of individual wtp but only paternalistic altruism raises this sum

structural change and cross country growth empirics one of the most striking features of economic growth is the process of structural change whereby the share of agriculture in gdp decreases as countries develop the cross country growth literature typically estimates an aggregate homogeneous production function or convergence regression model that abstracts from this process of structural change this paper investigates the extent to which assumptions about aggregation and homogeneity matter for inferences regarding the nature of technology differences across countries using a unique world bank dataset it estimates production functions for agriculture and manufacturing in a panel of 40 developing and developed countries for the period from 1963 to 1992 it empirically models dimensions of heterogeneity across countries allowing for different choices of technology within both sectors the paper argues that heterogeneity is important within sectors across countries implying that an analysis of aggregate data will not produce useful measures of the nature of the technology or productivity it shows that many of the puzzling elements in aggregate cross country empirics can be explained by inappropriate aggregation across heterogeneous sectors

technological cooperative agreements and firm s r d intensity a note on causality relations abstract in this paper we apply a recently proposed model of vector autoregression for panel data to analyse the granger causality relationship between a firm s intramural r d intensity and technological cooperative agreements the analysis relies on a sample composed of 95 major us european and japanese firms in the semiconductor data processing and telecommunications industries observed during the period 1980 1986 decisions on interfirm technological collaborations are shown to cause a la granger decisions on internal r d investments and vice versa we thus suggest that in contrast with the methodological approaches followed by previous empirical works firms decisions concerning both intramural innovative effort and technological cooperation are endogenous and have to be jointly studied through a simultaneous two equation structural model

do children matter an examination of gender differences in environmental valuation abstract this paper is concerned with the role played by children in a household on choice behaviour related to willingness to pay wtp for environmental goods improvements data from a contingent valuation cvm survey dealing with three environmental improvements are used to examine three hypotheses the first is that after controlling for income individuals with children have higher wtp than childless individuals the second hypothesis is that women with children are willing to pay more for environmental improvements than men with children particularly in the case where there is concern for environmental health risks the third is that childless men and women exhibit significant differences in wtp that arise from greater time constraints faced by women estimated wtp functions are shown to be statistically different for four groups of individuals women with children men with children women without children and men without children parents of either gender are willing to pay more than their childless counterparts valuations of mothers and fathers are statistically different for only one of the three goods being evaluated interestingly it is the fathers mean valuations that are higher this may arise from the fact that these environmental improvements lead to better recreational opportunities and as indicated earlier men are less time constrained further support for this view comes from results that show that valuations of childless men are significantly greater than those for childless women for two goods the paper concludes with some directions for future research in the area

strategic groups and rent dissipation we consider a rent seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays we examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation we show the following when just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking however when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium group formation is never profitable to any players and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking jel