rethinking the effects of financial globalization during the last few decades many emerging markets lifted restrictions on cross border nan cial transactions in this paper we present a simple model that can account for the observed eects of nancial globalization the model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and the interactions between domestic and foreign debts financial globaliza tion can lead to a variety of outcomes i domestic capital ight and ambiguous eects on net capital ows investment and growth ii capital in ows and higher investment and growth or iii volatile capital ows and unstable domestic nancial markets the model shows how the eects of nancial globalization depend on the level of development productivity domestic

submarkets and the evolution of market structure we construct a model of industry evolution in which the central force for change is the creation and destruction of submarkets firms expand when they are able to exploit new opportunities that arrive in the form of submarkets they contract and ultimately exit when the submarkets in which they operate are destroyed this simple framework can transparently explain a wide range of well known regularities about industry dynamics most notably the subtle relationships between size age growth and survival data on the laser industry where submarkets are prominent further illustrate the ability of the model to explain distinctive patterns in the evolution of industries and firms

globalization and emerging markets with or without crash we analyze the effects of financial and trade globalization on the likelihood of financial crashes in emerging markets while trade globalization always makes crashes less likely financial globalization may make them more likely especially when trade costs are high pessimistic expectations can be self fulfilling and lead to a collapse in demand for goods and assets such a crash comes with a current account reversal and drops in income and investment lower income countries are more prone to such demand based financial crises a quantitative evaluation shows our model is consistent with the main stylized facts of financial crashes in emerging markets

investor protection and equity markets we present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders the model incorporates elements of becker s j political econ 106 1968 172 crime and punishment framework into a corporate finance environment of jensen and meckling j financial econ 3 1976 305 we examine the entrepreneur s decision and the market equilibrium the model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance it also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection r 2002 elsevier science b v all rights reserved

trying to explain home bias in equities and consumption investors hold a substantially larger proportion of their wealth portfolios in domestic assets than standard portfolio theory would suggest a phenomenon called equity home bias in the absence of this bias investors would optimally diversify domestic output risk using foreign equities therefore consumption growth rates would tend to co move across countries even when output growth rates do not empirically however consumption growth rates tend to have a lower correlation across countries than do output growth rates a phenomenon i call consumption home bias in this paper i discuss these two biases and their potential relationship as suggested by the literature

what drives international financial flows politics institutions and other determinants abstract this paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending first employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed effects framework the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance second cross sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending third instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows the results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of lucas lucas robert e 1990 why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries american economic review papers and proceedings 80 2 92 96 1990 paradox of why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries the analysis also does a first step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking

north south lending and endogenous domestic capital market inefficiencies abstract we develop an open economy model of intertemporal trade under asymmetric information capital market imperfections are endogenous and depend on a country s stage of economic development relative to the perfect information benchmark north south capital flows are dampened and possibly reversed and world interest rates are lower whereas riskless rates are equalized across borders the domestic loan rate is higher in poorer countries the model can be applied to a number of policy issues including the debt overhang problem the indexation of foreign public debts and the effect of income distribution on growth

sudden stops and phoenix miracles in emerging markets a decade has passed since the salvos from mexico s tequila crisis of 1994 1995 echoed around the financial world since then many more crises have taken place in emerging market economies ems furthermore crises have tended to bunch together bringing to the forefront the systemic nature of these events true every new crisis has its own idiosyncratic features but useful policy lessons must be derived from robust empirical regularities this is the research strategy we have pursued in the last few years we will report on two types of regularities that strike us as highly robust across em crises a sudden stops of capital inflows and b phoenix miracles a sudden stop is a sharp fall in capital inflows relative to their past trajectory sudden stops are not a common feature in developed economies and display a large degree of temporal bunching suggesting that global capital market turmoil acts as a coordinating factor external to ems as shown in section i however balance sheet effects namely the interaction of large changes in the real exchange rate during sudden stops and liability dollarization i e foreign exchange denominated debts are key in influencing the likelihood of a sudden stop thus even though the initial shock is in principle exogenous to the economy whether or not it materializes into a sudden stop depends on domestic financial vulnerabilities on the other hand a phoenix miracle is defined as a case in which output recovers relatively quickly from a sharp collapse with virtually no recovery in credit or capital inflows and a very weak recovery in investment hence the reference to the mythical bird rising from the ashes the existence of phoenix like recoveries suggests that financial frictions play a key role in pushing economies to the abyss from which in some way or another they can crawl back to safe ground by means less than apparent to the conventional observer looking for standard fundamentals and thus may appear miraculous interestingly the great depression of the 1930s shares some of the key features of phoenix miracles in ems but shows salient differences as well that suggest nominal labor market rigidities are not crucial in explaining output collapse in ems understanding these regularities could and we believe does shed light on policies aimed at preventing crises and attenuating their effects

solving the feldstein horioka puzzle with financial frictions unlike the prediction of a frictionless open economy model long term average savings and investment rates are highly correlated across countries a puzzle first identified by feldstein and horioka 1980 we quantitatively investigate the impact of two types of financial frictions on this correlation one is limited enforcement w here contracts are enforced by the threat of default penalties the other is limited spanning where the only asset available is noncontingent bonds we find that the calibrated model with both frictions produces a savings investment correlation and a volume of capital flows close to the data to solve the puzzle the limited enforcement friction needs low default penalties under which capital flows are much lower than those in the data and the limited spanning friction needs to exogenously restrict capital flows to the observed level when combined the two frictions interact to endogenously restrict capital flows and thereby solve the feldstein horioka puzzle

globalization and risk sharing we study the effects of globalization on risk sharing and welfare like the previous literature we assume that governments cannot commit to enforce the repayment of debts owed by their citizens unlike the previous literature we assume that governments cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors when enforcing debt payments this creates novel interactions between domestic and international trade in assets i increases in domestic trade raise the benefits of enforcement and facilitate international trade in fact in our set up countries can obtain international risk sharing even in the absence of default penalties ii increases in foreign trade raise the costs of enforcement and hamper domestic trade as a result globalization may worsen domestic risk sharing and lower welfare we show how these effects depend on various characteristics of tradable goods and explore the roles of borrowing limits debt renegotiations and trade policy

sovereign defaults and liquidity crises abstract sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises the conventional view is that the domestic turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation although there is no clear empirical evidence on classic default penalties this paper emphasizes instead a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises building on two natural assumptions i government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector and ii the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default in this context external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties and government default is countercyclical triggers a liquidity crunch and amplifies output volatility in addition a reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting governments access to foreign credit

capital market imperfections international credit markets and nonconvergence abstract we consider a two country growth model with international capital markets these markets fund capital investment in both countries and operate subject to a costly state verification csv problem investors in each country require some external finance but also provide internal finance which mitigates the csv problem when two identical except for their initial capital stocks economies are closed they necessarily convergemonotonicallyto the same steady state output level unrestricted international financial tradeprecludesotherwise identical economies from converging and poor countries are necessarily net lenders to rich countries oscillation in real activity and international capital flows can occur journal of economic literatureclassification numbers e00 f00 f34 g14

inefficient foreign borrowing a dual and common agency perspective studying the implications of uncoordinated borrowing the paper first looks at whether and when countries borrow too much in the aggregate it then revisits the original sin debate analyzing whether and when equity portfolio investment international portfolio diversification domestic currency denomination and longer maturities enhance borrowing countries access to international lending the paper thereby relates a country s level and quality of access to international capital markets to a variety of institutional features such as the level of domestic savings their location the extent of control rights held by political authorities and the interests of dominant domestic political forces

growth volatility and financial liberalization we examine the effects of both equity market liberalization and capital account openness on real consumption growth variability we show that financial liberalization is mostly associated with lower consumption growth volatility our results are robust surviving controls for business cycle effects economic and financial development the quality of institutions and other variables countries that have more open capital accounts experience a greater reduction in consumption growth volatility after equity market openings we also find that financial liberalizations are associated with declines in the ratio of consumption growth volatility to gdp growth volatility suggesting improved risk sharing our results are weaker for liberalizing emerging markets but we never observe a significant increase in real volatility moreover we demonstrate significant differences in the volatility response depending on the size of the banking and government sectors and certain institutional factors

growth in the shadow of expropriation we propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes political economy and contracting frictions the political economy frictions involve a preference for immediate spending while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt and expropriation we show that the political economy frictions slow an economy s convergence to the steady state due to the endogenous evolution of capital taxation the model rationalizes why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment why institutions such as the treatment of capital income evolve over time why governments in countries that grow rapidly accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities and why foreign aid may not affect growth

elections capital flows and politico economic equilibria we study an open economy where a pro labor and a pro business candidate compete in an election the winner chooses taxes which affect investment returns electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election the resulting interaction is novel and has several implications elections are associated with increased volatility politico economic crises can occur inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy but such commitments have predictable effects on the election empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed jel d72 f34 o17 o19

strategic pricing consumer search and the number of firms discover prices there are three distinct price dispersed equilibria characterized by low moderate and high search intensity the effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour expected prices price dispersion and welfare are sensitive i to the equilibrium consumers search intensity and ii to the status quo number of firms for instance when consumers search with low intensity an increase in the number of firms reduces search does not affect expected price leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare in contrast when consumers search with high intensity increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms a question that has received much attention in economic theory is how the number of competitors and market outcomes are related despite the existence of work showing the contrary see e g satterthwaite 1979 rosenthal 1980 the prediction that emerges from a market where firms interact in a cournot fashion has come to dominate economic thought namely that an increase in the number of competitors leads to larger aggregate production lower market price and improved market performance measured in terms of some social welfare criterion ruffin 1971 this paper challenges the generality of this belief by presenting an oligopoly model with consumer search where the equilibrium expected price may be constant increasing or nonmonotonic in the number of firms we present an economy with two types of consumers consumers who search for prices at no cost fully informed and consumers who must pay a fixed search cost for each price quotation they observe less informed 1 all buyers have the same willingness to pay for the good and buy either a single unit or nothing at all on the supply side of the market there are n firms producing a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost we analyse a one shot simultaneous move game firms set prices and consumers decide how many prices to search for at the same moment in time our model is essentially an oligopolistic version of burdett and judd 1983 where some consumers search costlessly in this model consumers search using a fixed sample size search strategy i e they choose the number of prices to observe before receiving any offer nonsequential search is appealing when consumers find it more advantageous to gather price information quickly morgan and manning 1985 this occurs when the search outcome is observed with delay and delay is costly for instance an mba graduate looking for a job 1 the presence in the model of consumers who search costlessly captures the fact that some people have a

international capital flows and credit market imperfections a tale of two frictions the nancial crisis of 2007 08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in nancial markets this friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of nancial imperfections however which have focused almost exclusively on the eects of limited pledgeability in this paper we ll this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverse selection our main results are that by fostering unproductive investment adverse selection i leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate and ii it generates a negative wedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate under nancial integration we show how this translates into excessive capital inows and endogenous cycles we also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limited pledgeability coexist we conclude that both frictions complement one another and show that limited pledgeability exacerbates the eects of adverse selection

trade and capital flows a financial frictions perspective the classical heckscher ohlin mundell paradigm states that trade and capital mobility are substitutes in the sense that trade integration reduces the incentives for capital to ow to capital scarce countries in this paper we show that in a world with heterogeneous nancial development the classic conclusion does not hold in particular in less nancially developed economies south trade and capital mobility are complements within a dynamic framework the complementarity carries over to nancial capital ows this interaction implies that deepening trade integration in south raises net capital in ows or reduces net capital out ows it also implies that at the global level protectionism may back re if the goal is to rebalance capital ows when these are already heading from south to north our perspective also has

financial market globalization symmetry breaking and endogenous inequality of nations this paper investigates the effects of financial market globalization on the inequality of nations the world economy consists of inherently identical countries which differ only in their levels of capital stock each country is represented by the standard overlapping generations model modified only to incorporate credit market imperfection an integration of financial markets affects the set of stable steady states as it changes the balance between the equalizing force of the diminishing returns technology and the unequalizing force of the wealth dependent borrowing constraint the model is tractable enough to allow for a complete characterization of the stable steady states in the absence of the international financial market the world economy has a unique steady state which is symmetric and stable in the presence of the international financial market symmetry breaking occurs under some conditions that is the symmetric steady state loses its stability and stable asymmetric steady states come to exist in the stable asymmetric steady states the world economy is endogenously divided into the rich and poor countries the borrowing constraints are binding in the poor but not in the rich the world output is smaller the rich are richer and the poor are poorer in any of the stable asymmetric steady states than in the unstable symmetric steady state

sovereign debt as intertemporal barter author s kletzer kenneth m wright brian d abstract borrowing and lending between sovereign parties is modeled as intertemporal barter that smoothes the consumption of a risk averse party subject to endowment shocks the surplus anticipated in the relationship offers sufficient incentive for cooperation by all parties including any other competitive agents who are potential lenders to the sovereign the sole punishments consist of renegotiation proof changes in the path of future payments we show that intertemporal trade can be sustained in the absence of any exogenous enforcement of lending relationships whatsoever that is borrowing and lending are possible under anarchy and are supported by punishments that consist of cheating any cheater long term implicit relationships may be fulfilled as the continual renegotiation of simple incomplete short term loans the analysis suggests that the crucial role of the explicit loan contract is the identification of the relationship and the parties involved

why doesn t capital flow from rich to poor countries an empirical investigation we examine the empirical role of difierent explanations for the lack of ows of capital from rich to poor countries the lucas paradox the theoretical explanations include difierences in fundamentals across countries and capital market imperfections we show that during 1970i2000 low institutional quality is the leading explanation for example improving peru s institutional quality to australia s level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the speciflc mechanisms our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions afiect long run development

financial integration productivity and capital accumulation understanding the mechanism through which nancial globalization aects eco nomic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and bene ts of opening nancial markets this paper is a rst attempt at disentangling the eects of nancial inte gration on the two main determinants of economic performance productivity tfp and investment i provide empirical evidence from a sample of 70 countries observed between 1975 and 1999 the results for both de jure and de facto indicators suggest that nancial integration has a positive direct eect on productivity while it does not directly aect capital accumulation i also control for indirect eects of nancial globalization through nancial development and banking and currency crises while nancial integration does not systematically increase domestic nancial depth it may raise the likelyhood of banking crises though only to a minor extent yet the overall eect of nancial liberalization remains positive for productivity and negligible for investment

international lending with moral hazard and risk of repudiation in this paper i examine the constrained optimal pattern of capital flows between a lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming contracts the first impediment to contracting arises from the assumption that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds this assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment the second impediment arises from the assumption that the borrower as a sovereign nation may choose to repudiate his debts the optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital outflow when the worst realizations of national output occur this seemingly perverse capital outflow forms a necessary part of the optimal solution to the moral hazard problem in investment

prospective deficits and the asian currency crisis this paper argues that a principal cause of the 1997 asian currency crisis was large prospective deficits associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems the expectation that these future deficits would be at least partially financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax on outstanding nominal debt led to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes in asia we articulate this view using a simple model whose key feature is that a speculative attack is inevitable once the present value of future government deficits rises we present empirical evidence in support of the key assumptions underlying our interpretation of the crisis