angel investors around the world we document that the choice between disintermediated individual angel investments and intermediated private equity and venture capital investments depends on legal economic and cultural differences we find evidence of this using pitchbook s comprehensive data on more than 5000 angel and 80 000 private equity and venture capital investments in 96 countries from 1977 to 2012 the data further indicate that investee firms funded by angels are less likely to successfully exit through either an ipo or an acquisition these findings are robust to propensity score matching methods as well as to clustering standard errors and excluding u s observations among other approaches

the interplay of national distances and regional networks private equity investments in emerging markets integrating social network theory with the literature on national distance we examine how the investment strategy followed by a private equity pe firm in an emerging market is affected by the interplay between two important types of national distances institutional and geographic and the firm s centrality in the regional syndication network covering over 5 000 investment transactions we use a dataset of more than 500 pe firms based in both developed and emerging markets targeting three emerging market regions latin america southeast asia and eastern europe from 1996 to 2011 the results show that depending on the level of centrality of pe firms in regional syndication networks institutional and geographic distances can have differing effects both in magnitude and direction on their investment strategies in emerging markets moreover these effects are contingent on whether the pe firm is from a developed market or an emerging market we conclude that different types of national distances can operate in dissimilar ways depending on 1 firm level factors defined at the regional level such as centrality in the regional syndication network and 2 the developed market or emerging market nature of the pe firm

an institution based view of international business strategy a focus on emerging economies leveraging the recent research interest in emerging economies this perspective paper argues that an institution based view of international business ib strategy has emerged it is positioned as one leg that helps sustain the strategy tripod the other two legs consisting of the industry and resource based views we then review four diverse areas of substantive research 1 antidumping as entry barriers 2 competing in and out of india 3 growing the firm in china and 4 governing the corporation in emerging economies overall we argue that an institution based view of ib strategy in combination with industry and resource based views will not only help sustain a strategy tripod but also shed significant light on the most fundamental questions confronting ib such as what drives firm strategy and performance in ib

the competitive effects of vertical agreements for many years there were few distinctions drawn between horizontal and vertical agreements both were considered anticompetitive and subject to per se condemnation under the antitrust laws recently however this approach has come under attack and what was once the conventional wisdom is no longer so indeed there is growing acceptance of the view that vertical agreements can rarely have anticompetitive consequences per se legality would then be the appropriate standard in this paper we investigate the competitive implications of a particular vertical agreement the imposition of exclusive dealing requirements by a manufacturer on his distributors however to maintain the focus of the analysis we do not consider ultimate welfare gains or losses in an early application of economic analysis to this practice aaron director and edward levi 1956 suggest that exclusive dealing would be anticompetitive if it raised entry costs for rivals our object following this conjecture see their p 293 is to examine the market conditions under which exclusive dealing impedes entry howard marvel 1982 dealt with the practice of exclusive dealing he provides an efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing ignores the prospect that anticompetitive effects may follow and concludes that exclusive dealing ought therefore to be treated as legal per se p 25 this paper examines the possible anticompetitive effects neglected by marvel i market conditions for exclusive dealing

bilateral bargaining with externalities this paper provides an analysis of a non cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network we establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents that is we provide a non cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non cooperative surplus the resulting division is related to the myerson shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications we demonstrate this by examining buyer seller networks and vertical foreclosure

contracts as a barrier to entry it is shown that an incumbent seller who faces a threat of entry into his or her market will sign long term contracts that prevent the entry of some lower cost producers even though they do not preclude entry completely moreover when a seller possesses superior information about the likelihood of entry it is shown that the length of the contract may act as a signal of the true probability of entry

eco labelling by a for profit certifier countervailing power and its consequences for profit certifier s eco labelling is common in industries where firms have some countervailing power on sharing gains from labelling we show that the certification standard for an environmental quality is lowered when firms have strong power a certifier with too low bargaining power will prefer to sell to the best offer rather than bargain this switch in the selling mechanism also thwarts his incentives in setting the standard this is consequential for evaluating policies the dimensions and even signs of welfare changes induced by taxes and subsidies depend upon the mechanism used and ultimately upon firms countervailing power

regional competitive advantage based on pioneering economic reforms the case of chilean fdi foreign affiliates of chilean companies operating in latin america were more profitable than similar local firms but this difference in profitability has been decreasing over time two case studies of chilean multinationals illustrate our hypothesis that one source of competitive advantage for chilean firms was their know how of business strategy during economic liberalization using empirical and theoretical considerations we analyze whether this hypothesis is valid for other firms and industries

transfer behavior in the health and retirement study measurement and the redistribution of resources within the family recent work by a number of economists has opened a debate about the role played by intergenerational transfers using the new health and retirement study hrs we are better able to address the issues involved contrary to the current literature on bequests we do not find that parents give transfers equally to all children rather we find that in the case of inter vivos transfers respondents give greaterfinancial assistance to their less well off children than to their children with higher incomes financial transfers to elderly parents are also found to be negatively related to the potential recipient s income these results hold both for the incidence of transfers and for the amounts in addition we allow for unobserved differences across families by estimating fixed effect models and find our results to be robust to these specifications a comparison of the hrs transfer data to other survey data demonstrates that the hrs is potentially quite useful for research on transfer behavior

the connection between public transfers and private interfamily transfers abstract this paper investigates the anti poverty effectiveness of public transfers taking private transfer responses into account widespread altruistically motivated private transfers would neutralize the distributional impact of public transfers but exchange motivated transfers can reinforce the effects of public transfers on the distribution of economic well being the common technique for gauging anti poverty effectiveness subtracting public transfers from other income and measuring the poverty rate counterfactual yields results that are close to a more complex procedure that takes private transfer responses into account and some of the empirical findings suggest an exchange rather than altruistic motive for private transfers indicating that the effects of public transfers can be magnified by private behavior this is an exact reversal of the prediction that public transfers merely supplant private ones

home country networks and foreign expansion evidence from the venture capital industry we propose that home country network advantages shape firms foreign expansion we argue that a social status advantage is transferable from one market to another as a signal of quality but that a

intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints a growing body of evidence indicates that liquidity constraints could affect a substantial proportion of u s consumers but little is known about why these constraints might exist an important but little explored issue is the relationship between inter vivos intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints these transfers can ease borrowing constraints empirical transfer patterns match those predicted from a model in which transfers are allocated to liquidity constrained consumers in particular the distinction between current and permanent incomes of potential recipients is a key aspect of private transfer behavior the findings have important implications for our understanding of consumer behavior

do venture capital firms benefit from international syndicates this paper examines the benefits of syndicating with foreign venture capital vc firms for domestic vc firms in emerging markets we find that the vc firms that are domestic to their invested companies and previously syndicated with foreign partners invest proportionately more frequently in riskier ventures after gaining syndication experience with foreign vc firms a larger number of their portfolio companies are successfully exited thereby suggesting improved performance we hypothesize that this outcome is due to the organizational learning effects while the previous research has shown benefits for foreign vc firms our results show that domestic vc firms also benefit from international syndication through improved investments

compensatory inter vivos gifts parents transfer motives are important for understanding e g macroeconomics income re distribution savings and public finance using data from six biennial waves of the health and retirement study 1992 2002 we estimate censored regression models with nested multilevel error components first we interpret our findings that inter vivos transfers from parents to children are gifts rather than temporary help to overcome liquidity constraints second inter vivos gifts are compensatory in the sense that lifetime poorer children will receive higher transfers than their lifetime richer siblings third inter vivos gifts do not however make up the entire difference in lifetime incomes copyright 2009 john wiley sons ltd

inter vivos transfers and intergenerational exchange the surge of interest in intergenerational transfers in the past decade has sparked a debate over the motivation for them are transfers given out of altruism or part of an exchange while each motive is probably at work to some extent we know little about whether one motive predominates the question is relevant for issues concerning public income redistribution and inequality in the family but despite its importance empirical evidence about motives is scarce because of limited data we investigate a new data set the national survey of families and households which remedies many of the shortcomings of other data sets containing private transfer information we find that empirical patterns for inter vivos transfers i e transfers between living persons are more consistent with exchange than altruism

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

liability of country foreignness and liability of regional foreignness their effects on geographic diversification and firm performance the costs of inter and intra regional diversification have been widely discussed in the existing international business literature but the findings are mixed explanations for the mixed findings have important managerial implications because business managers have to estimate accurately the costs of doing business within and across regions before they make their internationalization decisions to explain the existing mixed findings this study differentiates between liabilities of foreignness at the country and regional levels and explores the joint effects of liability of country foreignness lcf and liability of regional foreignness lrf on the performance of internationalizing firms using data from 167 canadian firms we find that lcf may not necessarily be negatively correlated with intra regional diversification but lrf is positively correlated with inter regional diversification lcf moderates the relationship between lrf and inter regional diversification and also mediates the relationship between intra regional diversification and firm performance lrf mediates the relationship between inter regional diversification and firm performance missing one or more of these variables may result in different cost estimates identification of the relationships between these variables helps to improve the accuracy of estimating the costs of doing business aboard

common marketing agency as a device for facilitating collusion in a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents in this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperatively select agents name output prices and choose compensation schemes we exhibit an equilibrium in which all strategic variables not merely the marketing choices delegated to agents but prices as well are selected perfectly cooperatively this cooperative equilibrium is very simple and attractive each firm sets the collusive output price and employs a commission scheme to compensate the agent although each

optional fixed fees in multilateral vertical relations abstract we examine vertical contracting in a perfect information environment in contrast to mcafee and schwartz mcafee r p schwartz m 1994 opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity american economic review vol 84 pp 210 230 we demonstrate that outcomes are efficient if an upstream monopolist has the choice of requiring upfront fixed fee payments or making them optional

cross border venture capital investments the impact of foreignness on returns against the background of the growing internationalization of venture capital vc investing this is the first global comparison of the returns generated by individual domestic and cross border deals we examine investments worldwide during 1971 2009 and find that cross border investments significantly underperform compared with equivalent domestic investments returns are negatively affected by geographic distances cultural disparities and institutional differences between the home and host countries returns on cross border and domestic deals also decline after the late 1990s international portfolio diversification and the saturation of domestic markets may explain why vc investors make cross border investments despite poor expected returns

travel time and the liability of distance in foreign direct investment location choice and entry mode measures of geographic distance are often used to proxy for the impact of spatial separation on firm decisions and performance we develop a construct dyad travel time to measure the friction of interacting and costs of uncertainty from ex post behavioral monitoring across non collocated sites we measure the actual time required to travel between 1171 parent subsidiary dyads and show that dyad travel time but not geographic distance has significant predictive power in firm governance and location decisions while prior literature has independently modeled these we specify a simultaneous model offering stronger support for the interrelation of these decisions

how does regional institutional complexity affect mne internationalization international business research is only beginning to develop theory and evidence highlighting the importance of supranational regional institutions to explain firm internationalization in this context we offer new theory and evidence regarding the effect of a region s institutional complexity on foreign direct investment decisions by multinational enterprises mnes we define a region s institutional complexity using two components regional institutional diversity and number of countries we explore the unique relationships of both components with mnes decisions to internationalize into countries within the region drawing on semiglobalization and regionalization research and institutional theory we posit an inverted u shaped relationship between a region s institutional diversity and mne internationalization extremely low or high regional institutional diversity has negative effects on internationalization but moderate diversity has a positive effect on internationalization larger numbers of countries within the region reduces mne internationalization in a linear fashion we find support for these predicted relationships in multilevel analyses of 698 japanese mnes operating in 49 countries within 9 regions regional institutional complexity is both a challenge and an opportunity for mnes seeking advantages through the aggregation and arbitrage of individual country factors

the competitive effects of vertical agreements comment recent economic analyses of vertical restraints and integration emphasize the circumstances under which these arrangements are socially efficient efficiency claims have proven contentious however for exclusive dealing a vertical restraint that prohibits any outlet carrying a manufacturer s product from stocking substitute brands this paper analyzes the impact of exclusive dealing on competition and allocative efficiency opinions expressed on the impact of exclusive dealing range from the extreme view that it is invariably anticompetitive to the view that it is always procompetitive the u s supreme court has concluded that in hundreds if not thousands of communities where there is a single retailer for a product

the non existence of pairwise proof equilibrium abstract private bilateral contracting between a supplier and competing customers admits multiple equilibria we show that requiring equilibrium to be pairwise proof immune to bilateral deviations by the supplier and any customer can imply non existence of equilibrium in normal environments

learning across geographic space pro market reforms multinationalization strategy and profitability building on economic geography and knowledge based theory i argue that pro market reforms augment the profitability of firms by increasing their competitiveness and market knowledge however i propose that this effect is greater for firms that operate internationally firms that operate in more advanced markets and firms that become multinationals before reforms are implemented this is because such firms acquire market knowledge abroad that they can use when responding to reforms at home giving them a head start advantage over other local firms the analyses of a panel of the largest 500 latin american companies from 1989 to 2008 provide support for these arguments

do country level institutional frameworks and interfirm governance arrangements substitute or complement in international business relationships interfirm relationships among partners from institutionally distant environments are subject to governance difficulties owing to the paucity of shared cognitive and regulatory frameworks we examine the potential of formal contracting and relational governance developed at the partnership level to overcome the formal and informal institutional gap at the country level empirical results from a sample of 184 international partnerships of large us firms support an overall substitutive relationship between informal institutional frameworks and interorganizational relational arrangements whereby the performance benefits of relational governance are reinforced at higher degrees of informal institutional distance contrastingly formal institutional frameworks and contractual governance are found to have a complementary relationship with performance gains from formal contracting undermined at higher degrees of formal distance

cultural differences and cross border venture capital syndication we examine cross border syndication in investments led by foreign venture capitalists vcs focusing on the potential correlation between cultural differences and the formation of vc syndicates contrary to the risk sharing motive we find that a greater cultural disparity between the countries of investors and their companies is actually associated with smaller vc syndicates this is driven largely by lesser local investor representation in foreign vc led syndicates however certain cultural disparity related syndication strategies such as the involvement of locally experienced foreign vcs or syndicate members from culturally similar countries are associated with greater presence of local vcs who provide valuable monitoring services we further show that these culture linked syndication approaches are significantly correlated with vc financing and monitoring strategies in cross border investments and their eventual success

resale price maintenance and interlocking relationships dampening of interbrand as well intrabrand competition is often advanced to justify per se illegality of rpm we analyze this argument in a context where rival manufacturers distribute their products through the same competing retailers we show that rpm indeed limits the exercise of competition at both levels and can generate industry wide monopoly pricing the impact on prices depends on the extent of potential competition at either level as well as on the parties influence in determining the terms of the contracts our analysis sheds a new light on ongoing legal developments and is supported by recent empirical studies

upstream market power and wasteful retailers we provide a novel explanation for the wasteful product disposal by retailers in our model after purchasing a quantity of a product from the manufacturer the retailer exerts a costly effort to sell the product to the final users the manufacturer s production cost and the outside opportunity associated with it is private information we show that when the manufacturer has the upstream market power the retailer sells all units purchased from the manufacturer however when the retailer has the market power it might deliberately purchase more than it sells to the final users thus wasting the unsold amount

opportunism and menus of two part tariffs we show that a menu of two part tariffs can solve the opportunism problem identified by mcafee and schwartz 1994 in vertical games with sequential contracting provided the sunk costs incurred by the first firm to invest are not too large if the seller were to engage in opportunism with a second firm in an attempt to shift rents from the first firm the first firm could mitigate the dissipation of its rents by choosing from its menu of contract options the tariff with the higher marginal price and lower fixed fee the prospect of the first firm s choosing the wrong two part tariff in the event of opportunism is in some environments sufficient to make opportunism unprofi table for the seller

do private transfers displace the benefits of public transfers evidence from south africa abstract this paper investigates whether government transfer programs displace or crowd out private support focusing on a large increase in state old age pensions in south africa using data spanning the period of the expansion we find that each rand of public pension income to the elderly leads to a 0 25 0 30 rand reduction in private transfers from children living away from home however despite the large increase in income there were no significant changes in migration labor supply or household composition we also show that evaluations of the distributional effects of the pension are overstated when crowding out is ignored

exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure a firm may induce some customers to sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size exclude it from the market and enjoy increased market power this strategy may result in socially inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage and can make counteroffers in addition allowing for breach penalty clauses decreases firms incentives to exclude rivals because such clauses allow a firm to use customers as a conduit for the transfer of another firm s profits

the economics of organization the transaction cost approach the transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization regards the transaction as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of organizations applications of this approach require that transactions be dimensionalized and that alternative governance structures be described economizing is accomplished by assigning transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way the approach applies both to the determination of efficient boundaries as between firms and markets and to the organization of internal transactions including the design of employment relations the approach is compared and contrasted with selected parts of the organization theory literature

the hassle factor an explanation for managerial location shunning this study investigates the widely overlooked phenomenon of multinational enterprise mne location avoidance utilizing a multi method research design and data on 131 foreign investment locations it complements economic choice based location research by adding contextual dimensions at the country level that matter to managers personally and affect decisions at the firm level we provide a connection between international business research the behavioral stream in economic geography and the microfoundations stream in the strategic management literature the results suggest that in addition to traditional location choice criteria including investment potential internationalization strategy and various geographic and psychic distances foreign location decisions in mnes are influenced by how troublesome it is for managers to travel to or live in certain places an 11 item measure composed of travel inconveniences shows a significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between foreign direct investment potential and investment intensity the effect is stronger for non resource seeking industries we call this phenomenon the hassle factor

social security and private transfers in developing countries the case of peru do social security systems crowd out private transfers from younger to older generations this question has generated much theoretical discussion but little empirical work exists to confirm or refute this crowding out hypothesis we investigate the connection between social security and private transfers in peru using the peruvian living standards survey and find that private transfers from young to old would have been nearly 20 percent higher without social security benefits this indicates that the peruvian social security system is less effective at delivering benefits to the elderly than a simple assignment of government expenditures would suggest social security s displacement of private transfers while significant is less than that predicted by models with widespread altruistic transfers

cross border acquisition abandonment and completion the effect of institutional differences and organizational learning in the international business service industry 1981 2001 based on the concepts of north s 1990 political economy of national institutions and economic behavior we investigate how formal and informal institutional features influence the likelihood that a cross border acquisition deal will be completed as well as the time taken for its completion after announcement additionally we study how past experience with completed acquisition deals moderates the effects of institutional differences we focus on a relatively new context the pre completion stage of acquisition processes we test our hypotheses using data from 2389 announced cross border acquisition deals in the international business service industry 1981 2001 we find that differences in national formal and informal institutions explain part of the variation in the likelihood that an announced cross border acquisition deal will be completed as well as the duration of the deal making in addition organizational learning moderates the effects of institutional distance past experience with completed cross border acquisition deals increases the likelihood of a subsequent deal completion in institutionally closer environments but shortens the deal duration in institutionally distant environments

buyer power and exclusion in vertically related markets suppliers and consumer organizations have become increasingly concerned by the build up of buyer power of retailers in many markets a major concern is that strong retailers will abuse their power to exclude products and rival retailers from the market to be able to increase prices to consumers as a consequence remedies to limit buyer power are discussed and implemented in many countries in this paper we compare the incentives for exclusion and the effect on consumers prices under both buyer and seller power we study a model with a dominant upstream manufacturer and a competitive fringe of producers offering their products to two differentiated downstream retailers we compare the equilibrium outcome of this model when i the dominant supplier holds all the bargaining power and ii the retailers have all the bargaining power we show that full or partial exclusion of either the competitive product or downstream retailers occurs when inter and intrabrand competition are strong this is true both under seller and buyer power however in contrast to the received literature we find that buyer power weakly enhances welfare compared to seller power because buyer power will lead to both more product variety less exclusion and lower retail prices

interlocking relationships and quantity rationing as shown by rey and verge 2010 resale price maintenance can be used to maximize industry profit when competing manufacturers sell their brands through the same competing retailers the present article shows how quantity rationing non linear tariffs can be used to achieve the same outcome

parental and public transfers to young women and their children this paper presents estimates of how an increase in welfare benefits for the welfare eligible affects the provision of parental support in the form of both financial transfers and shared residence based on an overlapping generations framework incorporating game theoretic interactions among parents their adult children and the government the empirical results obtained from two longitudinal data sets indicate that the parents view a dollar of income earned by their daughters as equivalent to a dollar increase in welfare benefits however there exists only a small trade off between the generosity of government aid and the incidence of parental aid data are for the united states and are from the national longitudinal survey of young women for 1968 1984 and the national longitudinal survey of youth for 1979 1984 excerpt

robust predictions for bilateral contracting with externalities the paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and n agents when each agent s utility depends on the principal s unobservable contracts with other agents we show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents beliefs this bound yields for example competitive convergence as n in environments in which an appropriately defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists we also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games the offer game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents and the bidding game in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal

mnes as border crossing multi location enterprises the role of discontinuities in geographic space spurred by the classic work of dunning mne location has become the focus of a growing body of research in the field in this paper we argue that international business ib research examining the spatial dimension has serious weaknesses stemming from its traditional assumption of the country as the location unit of analysis while border crossing remains the key research context of ib placing it within a general spatial framework that recognizes both international and subnational spatial heterogeneity opens up vast new vistas for research analyzing mnes as border crossing multi location enterprises allows the researcher to distinguish between discrete border effects and continuous distance effects and undertake a more fine grained analysis of location within such analysis national borders may appear as qualitative discontinuities in space that is points at which spatial heterogeneity changes abruptly however subnational spatial heterogeneity is often the characteristic that drives firm strategy as mnes decide to locate in particular agglomerations and not at random locations within a country the complex firms that ib scholars study typically include multiple units within the same country so that a complete analysis requires considering both subnational distance effects as well as international border effects

spatial geography and control in foreign acquisitions this article examines how spatial geography influences firms choice of control in cross border acquisitions cbas building our arguments on the information asymmetry in cbas we argue that geographic distance affects adverse selection and moral hazard problems in cbas geographic distance hinders acquirers efforts to assess the true value of the target firm prompting them to opt for a partial control at the same time geographic distance hampers acquirers ability to manage contractual relationships and integrate target firms prompting them to opt for a full control we argue that the cost and benefit trade off of full vs partial ownership varies at different levels of geographic distance accordingly we propose a curvilinear u shaped relationship between geographic distance and equity ownership this relationship is contingent on acquisition relatedness and the listing status of the acquirer public vs private as the geographic distance between acquirer and target increases acquirers assume higher equity stakes in related acquisitions than in unrelated acquisitions at greater geographic distances public firms acquire more equity ownership than do private firms findings from 10 181 deals across 52 acquiring and 61 target countries provide robust support for these arguments

vertical integration in the presence of upstream competition we analyse vertical integration when there is upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent i e upstream monopoly in so doing we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration first we base industry structure namely the ownership of assets firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries second we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified non cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly given this we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoffs of integrating parties in ex post bargaining however this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly we also consider the potential for integration to internalise competitive externalities in manner that cannot be achieved under non integration we demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and depending upon the strength of downstream competition i e product differentiation the opposite could easily be the case journal of economic literature classification number l42

the effect of cultural distance on entry mode choice international diversification and mne performance a meta analysis although a growing literature indicates that cultural distance that is differences between national cultures is an important determinant of organizational actions and performance both empirical and theoretical concerns abound in this study the relationships of cultural distance with entry mode choice international diversification and mne performance are examined by meta analyzing data from 66 independent samples with cumulative sample sizes ranging from 2 255 to 24 152 regression results failed to provide statistical evidence of significant relationships between cultural distance and entry mode choice international diversification and mne performance the examination of moderator effects however yielded important results we found a strong negative association between cultural distance and entry mode choice for us based mnes the cultural distance international diversification relationship was negative for high technology industries while it was positive for other industries cultural distance also had a strong positive effect on mne performance for developed country investments a similar strong positive relationship was found between cultural distance and international diversification in studies with more recent samples results of this study indicate that substantial additional research is needed before the role of cultural distance is fully understood

opportunism in multilateral vertical contracting nondiscrimination exclusivity and uniformity comment an input supplier selling to competing downstream firms would benefit from publicly committing at the outset to all contracts efficient commitment however would require complete contracts the authors study instead bilateral contracting without commitment regarding others terms each firm then fears that the supplier might opportunistically renegotiate another s contract to increase bilateral profit at the firm s expense the authors show that nondiscrimination clauses generally cannot curb such third party opportunism even with symmetric firms to reassure firms crude forms of commitment may be adopted this could explain the pervasiveness of exclusivity arrangements and the striking uniformity and intertemporal rigidity of franchise contracts copyright 1994 by american economic association

how institutions matter for international business institutional distance effects vs institutional profile effects extant institutional research has failed to make a distinction between the effects of institutional profile and institutional distance on mnes the problem stems from the fact that due to the use of a single reference country variation in institutional distance between the reference country and partner countries is essentially equal to variation in the institutional profiles of these partner countries making institutional distance and institutional profile effects indistinguishable this research begins by demonstrating that the problem of profile distance conflation is relevant for virtually all possible countries as reference points and then showing how this problem is mitigated by using more than one country as reference points from which to calculate institutional distance we conclude that current institutional research in international business is unable to explain how institutions matter for mnes and that a more careful theoretical and empirical distinction between the effects of institutions and institutional distance on cross border business activities is essential for pushing the institutional perspective in international business studies forward multiple reference point research designs are required to achieve this

an institutional view of china s venture capital industry explaining the differences between china and the west abstract institutional theory argues that institutions in general and culture in particular shape the actions of firms and individuals in a number of subtle but substantive ways the theory has been used to explain a number of significant and substantive managerial differences found in different parts of the world to date the examination of venture capital outside the us and europe however has been rather limited institutional theory also suggests that there would be differences in how venture capital may operate in other parts of the world such as asia where the culture is substantially different from the west based on interviews with 36 venture capitalists in 24 venture capital firms investing in china this exploratory research finds that china s institutional environment creates a number of significant differences from the west the article discusses the impact of these findings on future research on asian venture capital theory development and the activities of venture capital professionals in that region

naked exclusion comment the ability of an incumbent firm to deter entry by writing exclusionary contracts with customers has been a subject of contention in the antitrust literature the courts concern with such exclusionary contracts has been challenged by those who argue that an incumbent faced with buyers whose interest is to promote entry and competition would have to pay buyers more for the inclusion of exclusionary provisions than it could possibly gain from exclusion in a provocative article eric b rasmusen et al 1991 henceforth rrw have argued that an incumbent may in fact be able to exclude rivals profitably using such contractual provisions because it can exploit buyers lack of coordination in essence if buyers expect other buyers to sign such provisions then they may see little reason not to do so themselves the rrw argument is potentially an important one because most alleged instances of entry deterrence through exclusionary contracts with customers occur in situations with multiple buyers unfortunately however rrw s two main results contain errors in this note we reconsider the rrw model providing correct characterizations of the likelihood and cost of exclusion for an incumbent firm our results indicate that while the intuition suggested by rrw is valid the equilibrium likelihood and cost of exclusion differ from what rrw derive moreover our analysis illuminates some further aspects of exclusionary contracting with multiple buyers among these issues we focus on how an incumbent can use discriminatory offers to exploit the externalities that exist among buyers in the provision of competition in section i we review the basic assumptions of the rrw model in sections ii and iii we then consider in turn the cases of simultaneous and sequential offers studied by rrw for the simultaneous model we distinguish between settings in which the incumbent can and cannot discriminate in its offers to different buyers this distinction is the source of the problem in rrw s analysis their simultaneous offer model assumes no discrimination but the proof of their proposition 2 assumes at times that discrimination is feasible we show that absent the ability to discriminate the incumbent can exclude profitably only when buyers fail to coordinate on their most preferred continuation equilibrium in contrast we show that when discrimination is possible the incumbent need not rely on a lack of buyer coordination to segal department of economics landau building stanford university stanford ca 94305 e mail ilya segal stanford edu whinston department of economics northwestern university 2003 sheridan road evanston il 60208 e mail mwhinston nwu edu we thank eric rasmusen john wiley and participants in the berkeley stanford iofest the university of copenhagen vertical restraints conference and a seminar at the antitrust division of the u s department of justice for helpful comments we thank federico echenique for excellent research assistance 1 for example a recent department of justice investigation concerned the use of exclusive contracts by the leading provider of computerized ticketing services ticketmaster most major cities have several large concert sports venues in many cities ticketmaster has exclusive contracts with a very large share of these venues 2 the other leading response to the argument that contracts with buyers cannot be a profitable method of exclusion is given in philippe aghion and patrick bolton 1987 section i one factor limiting the applicability of the aghion and bolton theory however is that it involves partial exclusion the contracts signed are not fully exclusionary they involve finite stipulated damages and the profitability of the strategy arises from extracting rents from an entrant when entry occurs indeed in the aghion and bolton model contracts that fully exclude offer no benefits over writing no contract at all in section iii of their paper aghion and bolton also discuss a two buyer version of their model in which externalities arise across buyers in contrast to the analysis here and in rrw they allow the incumbent to make an offer to a buyer i that is conditional on the acceptance decision of the other buyer 3 r innes and r j sexton 1994 also discuss the use of discriminatory offers in the context of a model in which buyers can form coalitions with the entrant

motives for private income transfers private income transfers are becoming increasingly recognized as a key aspect of the u s economy the majority of private income transfers occur inter vivos i e between living persons but very little is known about this type of transfer behavior this paper tests alternative hypotheses concerning motivation for inter vivos transfers two motives are considered altruism and exchange evidence presented here casts doubt on the altruistic model of transfer behavior observed patterns for inter vivos transfers are more consistent with exchange related motives this finding has important implications for the effects of public transfer programs on the distribution of economic well being

competition with exclusive contracts and market share discounts we analyze firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts and market share discounts conditional on the seller s share of customers total purchases with incomplete information about demand firms have a unilateral incentive to use these contractual arrangements to better extract buyers informational rents however exclusive contracts intensify competition thus reducing prices and profits and in all pareto undominated equilibria increasing welfare market share discounts by contrast produce a double marginalization effect that leads to higher prices and harms buyers we discuss the implications of these results for competition policy jel d43 d83 d86 k21 l14 l42 in this paper we study firms that compete by means of exclusive contracts or mar ket share discounts i e discounts that depend on the seller s share of a customer s total purchases these are common yet seldom studied forms of competition the literature has mainly focused on incumbents use of exclusive contracts or marketshare discounts to deter new entrants whilst paying less attention to competitors deploying similar pricing strategies we show that exclusive contracts intensify competition reducing equilibrium prices whereas market share discounts have a double marginalization effect and hence result in higher prices these findings have a bearing on the current lively policy debate 1 fueled by the fact that antitrust authorities view competition by means of exclusive contracts or marketshare discounts with some suspicion to say the least the authorities main concern appears to be that a dominant firm can use exclusivity or market share discounts to eliminate not only potential competitors but also existing ones a prime instance of this is the case of intel intel whose main competitor amd has been operating for years in the microchip sector offered electronics manufacturers discounts that depended on their buying a minimum share of their total purchases of microchips from intel some customers to qualify for the discount had to opt for an exclusive supply contract that

an institutional approach to cross national distance cross national distance is a key concept in the field of management previous research has conceptualized and measured cross national differences mostly in terms of dyadic cultural distance and has used the euclidean approach to measuring it in contrast our goal is to disaggregate the construct of distance by proposing a set of multidimensional measures including economic financial political administrative cultural demographic knowledge and global connectedness as well as geographic distance we ground our analysis and choice of empirical dimensions on institutional theories of national business governance and innovation systems in order to overcome the methodological limitations of the euclidean approach we calculate dyadic distances using the mahalanobis method which is scale invariant and takes into consideration the variance covariance matrix we empirically analyze four different foreign expansion choices of us companies to illustrate the importance of disaggregating the distance construct and the usefulness of our distance calculations which we make freely available to managers and scholars

the effect of social entitlement programs on private transfers new evidence of crowding out working paper 2010 15 september 2010 abstract this paper exploits a natural policy experiment to directly identify the crowding out effects of public transfers on the incidence and level of private transfers the introduction of a large social security program in taiwan is used to estimate the effect of an exogenous increase in government transfer payments to the elderly on the private transfer behavior of their adult children using an instrumental variables strategy that accounts for the endogeneity of receiving public transfers the empirical results show strong evidence of crowding out on the extensive margin the probability of providing a positive transfer and weaker evidence of crowding out on the intensive margin the amount of the transfer conditional on it being positive jel classification h53 h55 h31 key words private transfers crowding out 1 introduction determining the impact of public transfer programs on private transfer behavior is a key issue from both a research and policy perspective if public transfers largely crowd out private transfers then the welfare impact of social redistributive programs will be smaller than perceived economic theory is ambiguous in its predictions about crowding out the altruism model developed in the seminal papers of barro 1974 and becker 1974 predicts essentially complete crowding out the model focuses on transfers from parents to children but can be applied equally well to transfers from adult children to their elderly parents in the model the child s utility is included in an altruistic parent s utility function which gives the parent an incentive to support the child the core of the altruism model is the prediction of redistribution neutrality which posits that the parents will adjust their transfer behavior in response to changes in the child s income for example an increase in the child s income due to welfare subsidies from the government will lower the amount of parental transfers if ricardian equivalence holds and the government subsidy is financed by a tax on the parents income then the parents will reduce their transfer exactly by the tax amount implying complete crowding out in contrast to the altruism model the exchange model of bernheim et al 1985 and cox 1987 argues that a child s services to the parents such as contacts and visits are at least in part financially motivated as the child expects monetary compensation in this model the amount of transfers could be a positive or negative function of the child s income as the child s income increases the opportunity cost of services increases and thus the amount of expected compensation for the services increases in such a setting the relationship between the child s income and the amount of parental transfers is not clear it could be positive if the parents demand for services is inelastic as they would need to increase transfer payments to the child in order to receive the same level of services if this were the case government subsidies would increase the amount of private transfers received and thus there would be no crowding effect on the other hand if the demand for services is highly elastic then parents demand would fall along with monetary compensation which would lead to crowding out 1 as a result of the ambiguous effect of crowding out predicted by theory a relatively large empirical literature has focused on the estimation of both the sign and magnitude of the crowding out effect of public transfer programs however due to data limitations most empirical studies have not been able to directly measure the crowding out effect of public redistribution programs most studies in this literature have attempted to indirectly measure the impact of such programs on beneficiaries by studying the response of private transfers to changes in the recipient s level of income the results from these papers however are not consistent

examining the impact of taiwan s cash allowance program on private households summary to fill the gap of crowding out literature in asia this study analyzes the crowding out impact of taiwan s public old age allowances on familial transfers to poor parents using government data during 1990 2003 we estimate that 1 of public transfers displaces 30 50 cents of inter household transfers one explanation is that the old parents in this analysis were from poor families and they reacted strongly to allowances however the overall consumption especially in luxury goods of the poor individuals has substantially increased this finding indicates that taiwan s old age allowance program does improve the welfare of older individuals

does legal enforcement affect financial transactions the contractual channel in private equity analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments we find that transactions vary with nations legal enforcement whether measured directly or through legal origin investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants in low enforcement and civil law nations private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt and rely on equity and board control transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns while relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy

midweek effect on soccer performance evidence from the german bundesliga the home advantage phenomenon is a well established feature in sports competitions in this study we examine data from 2 013 soccer matches played in the german bundesliga during the seasons from 2007 2008 to 2016 2017 using a very rich data set our econometric analysis that is based on matching methods reveals that the usual home advantage disappears when the game is in the middle of the week instead of being on the weekend our results indicate that as the midweek matches are unevenly allocated among teams the actual schedules of the bundesliga favor teams with fewer home games in midweek the study also shows that these soccer specific findings may have some implications for the design of contests in general jel d00 l00 d20 z20

upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them in this article we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take it or leave it offers to a common manufacturer we find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts and in all equilibria only one retailer buys from the manufacturer these findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments copyright 2007 rand

the regional dimension of mnes foreign subsidiary localization this paper examines the regional effect of mnes foreign subsidiary localization we hypothesize that the number of subsequent foreign subsidiaries in a country is in part determined by a firm s prior foreign subsidiary activity at the regional level we test our hypotheses using data on 1076 japanese mnes that created 3466 foreign subsidiaries 1837 wholly owned fdis and 1629 joint ventures over the period 1996 2001 we use a multilevel negative binomial approach with three levels of analysis localization decisions in a country 49 countries in a region six regions and at the headquarters level in this way we test the regional effects controlling for country and corporate dimensions we also run separate models to differentiate wholly owned and joint venture localization decisions our results strongly support the semi globalization perspective in that the regional level effects are significant and different from the country level effects for all foreign subsidiaries for wholly owned subsidiaries and for jointly owned subsidiaries japanese mnes adopt a regional perspective that complements their decisions at the country and firm levels they seek regional agglomeration benefits and make arbitrage decisions between countries in the same region

bilateral control with vertical contracts when a manufacturer contracts secretly with competing retailers he is subject to opportunism and linear or non linear tariffs may not allow the manufacturer to maintain monopoly prices to analyse the effects of rpm o brien shaffer 1992 use a concept of contract equilibrium which concentrates on pairwise deviations thereby questioning the robustness of the analysis this paper emphasises the distinction between the contract equilibrium and standard non cooperative concepts we advocate for some caution in the use of the former concept as if overlooks an inexistence problem we then confirm the intuition that rpm can help solve the manufacturer s commitment problem this confirms that o brien shaffer s insight is robust and validates the courts reluctance against rpm

does retailer power lead to exclusion this article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers who have no bargaining power from obtaining adequate distribution in contrast to the findings of marx and shaffer 2007 who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution i e exclusion of a retailer we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained provided that full distribution is the industry profit maximizing outcome the key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff

buyer power and intrabrand coordination we analyze the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a contracting situation where rival retailers offer contracts to a manufacturer in contrast to bernheim and whinston 1998 who study the situation in which competing manufacturers offer contracts to a common retailer we find that two part tariffs even if contingent on exclusivity or not do not suffice to implement the monopolyoutcome richer arrangements including e g conditional fixed fees and upfront payments are thus required to internalize all contracting externalities the welfare implications are ambiguous on the one hand richer contracts ensure that no efficient retailer is excluded on the other hand they allow firms to maintain monopoly prices despite intrabrand competition simulations suggest that the latter effect may be more significant

first in first win evidence on schedule effects in round robin tournaments in mega events the order of actions in contests may have a significant effect on performance in this study we examine the role of the schedule in round robin tournaments with sequential games between three and four contestants our empirical analysis based on soccer fifa world cups and uefa european championships and on two olympic wrestling events reveals that there is a substantial advantage to the contestant who competes in the first and third matches our findings are in line with the hypothesis that winning probabilities in multi stage contests with sequential games are endogenously depending on the schedule of contests as predicted by game theoretical models we also discuss possible ways to reduce the effect of the schedule

bertrand without fudge abstract this paper reexamines bertrand competition with homogeneous products and different marginal costs it is shown that the conventional outcome is supported by an equilibrium in the original game under the standard rationing rule

deconstructing the liability of foreignness regulatory enforcement actions against foreign banks it is widely acknowledged that foreign firms are at an institutional disadvantage relative to domestic firms operating in the local market this liability of foreignness typically manifests as inferior performance for foreign firms relative to domestic competitors although myriad studies document the liability of foreignness few demonstrate how individual host country institutions generate specific liabilities in this study we explore the regulatory liabilities that foreign firms face using a sample of 189 foreign banks operating in the united states we find that regulators initiate more enforcement actions on average against foreign banks than they do against domestic banks the effects however vary by regulation type and firm characteristics for example foreign banks are no more likely to receive risk related sanctions but far more likely to receive stakeholder related sanctions foreign banks with higher quality of human capital and more host country experience are less likely to run afoul of all regulations foreign banks with more third country experience are less likely to receive risk related sanctions but more likely to receive stakeholder related sanctions the results highlight the contingent nature of regulatory liabilities the role of information asymmetry versus regulatory bias in enforcement outcomes and the liability reducing effects of resources and capabilities

the effects of information voids on capital flows in emerging markets information voids reflect a lack of publicly available information about a country s investment climate and represent the information problems associated with institutional voids we argue that foreign investors differ in their sensitivity to information voids based on their own private information and their flexibility in responding rapidly to change we predict that foreign banks will be least hampered by information voids due to their privileged access to private information about local conditions and ability to adapt quickly to new information portfolio investors while impeded by information voids due to their severely limited access to local private information are able to quickly respond to new information foreign direct investors have moderate access to local private information yet their inability to adapt quickly creates problems dealing with information voids using time series cross sectional data on local public information and capital flows to the thirty largest emerging markets from 1994 to 2012 we find preliminary support for our hypotheses regarding the sensitivity of different investors to information voids we find that direct investors are most sensitive to information voids and banks are least sensitive while portfolio investors are moderately sensitive

the uppsala internationalization process model revisited from liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership the uppsala internationalization process model is revisited in the light of changes in business practices and theoretical advances that have been made since 1977 now the business environment is viewed as a web of relationships a network rather than as a neoclassical market with many independent suppliers and customers outsidership in relation to the relevant network more than psychic distance is the root of uncertainty the change mechanisms in the revised model are essentially the same as those in the original version although we add trust building and knowledge creation the latter to recognize the fact that new knowledge is developed in relationships

conceptualizing and measuring distance in international business research recurring questions and best practice guidelines distance is a central concept in international business research yet there is debate about the construct as well as its operationalization in this editorial we address three of the most important recurring questions posed by authors editors and reviewers by examining the theory methods and data of distance research we discuss 1 how to theorize on distance and 2 what method and 3 what data to use when constructing a distance index we develop practical recommendations grounded in theory illustrating and supporting them by calculating cross country distance indices for all available country pairs and two of the most used distance indices cultural and institutional we show that whereas a specific method to calculate distance may matter to some extent the choice for a specific cultural or institutional framework to measure cultural or institutional distance has a major impact on country pair distances overall this editorial highlights the importance of matching data and method to the theoretical argument