learning wage dynamics and firm specific human capital we introduce a dynamic and fully strategic model of wage determination in the presence of firm specific human capital in this model human capital is interpreted as information we show that equilibrium exists and is efficient and that it gives rise to a unique distribution of the social surplus we show further that the equilibrium wage is determined by three factors consideration of these factors allows us to determine when and how the market mechanism enables the worker to capture some of the returns to firm specific human capital we relate our findings to the ongoing empirical debate concerning the return to tenure

wages experience and seniority in this paper we study the sources of wage growth we identify the contribution to such growth of general sector specific and firm specific human capital our results are interpretable within the context of a model where the returns to human capital may be heterogeneous and where firms may offer different combinations of entry level wages and firm specific human capital development we allow for the possibility that wages are match specific and that workers move jobs as a result of identifying a better match to estimate the average returns to experience sector tenure and firm specific tenure within this context we develop an identification strategy which relies on the use of firm closures our data source is a new and unique administrative data set for germany that includes complete work histories as well as individual characteristics we find positive returns to experience and firm tenure for skilled workers the returns to experience for unskilled workers are small and insignificant after 2 years of experience their returns to sector tenure are also zero however their returns to firm tenure are substantial in this paper we study the growth of wages of young workers in germany knowing the extent and reasons for individual wage growth over the life cycle is important for a number of areas in economics just to mention two examples first it is a key element to understanding and designing active labour market programmes many such programmes offer temporary and often subsidized work opportunities examples are the new deal in the u k and the swedish programmes as well as a number of programmes in germany these programmes are based on the assumption that general skills are sufficiently enhanced while working so as to render the workers employable without a wage subsidy thus the success of these programmes depends on how skills improve on the job for the target population and whether this skill enhancement is transferable across jobs second it is a key to understanding the benefits and costs of job mobility this in turn matters for a number of policy issues including the design of pension policies relating for example to final salary schemes as a result of this widespread interest a large body of empirical research has focused on obtaining estimates for the returns of experience and seniority 1 our study uses a new and unique administrative data set with a number of features that are important for our analysis and allow us to avoid many problems encountered in earlier work in this field in our model wages grow due to learning by doing which may be heterogeneous across individuals moreover since firms offer different career profiles and because we allow for match specific effects on wages investments take the form of searching for the firm with the most desirable learning by doing characteristics career structure 2

experimentation and job choice in this article we examine optimal job choices when jobs differ in the rate at which they reveal information about workers skills we then analyze how the optimal level of experimentation changes over a worker s career and characterize job transitions and wage growth over the life cycle using the dictionary of occupational titles merged with the national longitudinal survey of youth 1979 we then construct an index of how much information different occupations reveal about workers skills and document patterns of occupational choice and wage growth that are consistent with a trade off between information and wages

testing for market power in multi product industries across multiple export markets a large body of theoretical literature has developed in the past 15 years incorporating various models of imperfect competition into international trade theory empirical work testing for imperfect competition in export markets however has been much more limited in particular the empirical evidence in support of widespread imperfect competition in u s export and import sectors is somewhat scant and mixed 2 one technique for assessing the existence of market power in export markets has been developed by knetter 33 who estimated a reduced form single equation in which the export price to a specific market for a good was a function of the exchange rate a country specific dummy variable and a time dummy knetter rejected the null hypothesis of perfectly competitive markets in nearly all of the u s and german export markets studied 3 his methodology has been adopted by other researchers who have rejected the perfect competition hypothesis in other u s export markets 4

the effect of work experience on female wages and labour supply this paper develops and implements a semiparametric estimator for investigating with panel data the importance of human capital and time nonseparable preferences to females when aggregate shocks are present it provides a set of conditions for making statistical inferences about agents expectations of their correlated future choices from a short panel under the assumption that observed allocations are pareto optimal a dynamic model of female labour supply and participation is estimated in which experience on the job raises future wages and time spent off the job in the past directly affects current utility or indirectly through productivity in the nonmarket sector

firm size wage gaps job responsibility and hierarchical matching i present the fact that wage gaps due to firm size increase with job responsibility i use swedish data to determine whether wage gaps increase with a direct measure of job responsibility to compare the age patterns of the wage gaps for blue and white collar workers and to compare wages by job responsibility and spans of control with u s data i compare supervisory to nonsupervisory occupations and find that wage gaps increase with job responsibility for most occupational ladders this fact is consistent with hierarchical matching models in which the larger number of subordinates amplifies managerial talent

a study of cartel stability the joint executive committee 1880 1886 this article employs weekly time series data on the joint executive committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model the hypothesis that no switch took place so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions is then tested against this alternative and rejected

intra firm bargaining under non binding contracts we present a new methodology for studying the problem of intra firm bargaining based on the notion that contracts cannot commit the firm and its agents to wages and employment we develop and analyse a general non cooperative multilateral bargaining framework between the firm and its employees and consider outcomes which are immune to renegotiations by any party equilibrium firm profits are characterizable as both a weighted average of a neo classical non bargaining firm s profits and a generalization of shapley value for a corresponding cooperative game furthermore the resulting payoffs induce economically significant distortions in the firm s input and organizational design decisions

the demand for ldc exports of manufactures estimates from hong kong exports of manufactures from developing countries are generally believed to be sensitive to changes in the level of income in the developed countries their major market this belief is grounded on both casual observation especially from the experience of recent recessions and on extensive econometric evidence of low price elasticities and high income elasticities of demand for ldc exports in developed countries this paper argues that both casual observation and previous econometric evidence are misleading the aim of the paper is to show the order of magnitude of the bias contained in previous econometric estimates of price and income elasticities of demand for ldc exports of manufactures due to neglect of supply side influences previous econometric work has neglected the supply side of ldc exports for the simple reason that it is difficult to model it is difficult to model properly the supply of aggregate ldc exports since the determinants of export supply differ from country to country even for a single country modelling export supply is complicated since in addition to foreign demand and domestic supply exports are determined in part by domestic demand for exportables furthermore in most ldcs the incentive to export is strongly influenced by complex and continually changing industrial and trade policy measures there is one major exception hong kong one of the developing world s largest and most successful exporters of manufactured goods the manufacturing sector in hong kong is almost completely specialised exporting 95 of output consequently domestic demand plays no part in determining the volume of exports furthermore factor markets and the manufacturing sector are almost completely free from government intervention the main exception being the textile export restraints imposed at the insistence of importing countries the voluntary restraint agreements vras to which hong kong is subject no doubt affect the composition of exports but not necessarily the volume of aggregate exports if resources in the restrained sectors can easily be redeployed elsewhere in the economy judging from past export growth rates the vras do not appear to have had a significant effect on aggregate export growth in hong kong the results reported below also suggest that hong kong has effectively circumvented the trade barriers it faces the hong kong manufacturing sector in many ways resembles a firm in the

the economics of career concerns part i comparing information structures many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns this paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity the information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives improved information may either increase or reduce incentives the impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model the paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal agent model sufficient statistic impact of a blackwell garbling comparison of inclusive information structures 1999 the review of economic studies limited

measuring quality change in quota constrained import markets the case of u s footwear abstract theoretical models predict that quantitative import restrictions such as orderly marketing agreements omas lead to substitution into higher quality products within the quotaconstrained import category the country specific nature of omas results in further substitution among supplying countries using index number techniques this paper measures the impact of product and country substitution on the price of u s footwear imports in the period surrounding the 1977 1981 footwear oma with korea and taiwan upgrading of the import bundle was observed in most quota categories throughout the oma period and accounted for 12 percent of the observed rise in the average price of footwear imports

risk aversion and incentive effects new data without order effects holt and laury 2002 used a menu of ordered lottery choices to make inferences about risk aversion under various payment conditions the main results of that paper were a subjects are risk averse even for relatively small payments of less than 5 b risk aversion increases sharply with large increases in the scale of cash payoffs and c there is no significant effect from increasing the scale of hypothetical payment with a few exceptions noted in the paper all treatments began with a low payment choice followed by a choice with hypothetical payments that had been scaled up by 20 50 or 90 followed by a real cash decision with the same high payment scale 20 50 or 90 followed by a single final low 1 real payment choice those in the 90 treatment could earn amounts ranging from 9 00 to 346 50 in this task as glenn w harrison et al 2004 correctly note this design confounds order and treatment effects since the high real payment choice was always completed after the low real and high hypothetical payment tasks in a new experiment reported below we first seek to replicate harrison et al s finding that the order effect participating in a low payment choice before making a high payment choice magnifies the scale effect in a second treatment each subject completes the menu of lottery choices under just one payment condition 1 or 20 real or hypothetical thereby eliminating any order effects i new data

price discrimination by u s and german exporters the insensitivity of the u s trade balance to the sharp depreciation of the dollar in the past three years has revived interest in the relationship between exchange rates and the trade balance a central issue in most analyses of the relation between the current account and the exchange rate concerns the price adjustment process the simple integrated competitive market model predicts that local currency prices should change in proportion to the nominal exchange rate for a country too small to influence world prices the relationship between local currency import prices and exchange rates has been referred to as the pass through relationship in the empirical literature in international economics if the proportional relationship between import prices and exchange rates holds pass through is said to be complete accounts of recent u s experience cite the failure of dollar prices of imported goods to rise in proportion to exchange rates i e incomplete pass through as an important factor in explaining the persistence of the trade deficit unfortunately observations on pass through alone provide limited insight into the behavior of markets since incomplete pass through is consistent with at least two fundamentally different paradigms one is the standard competitive model of trade in which the law of one price holds but exchange rate fluctuations are associated with large changes in import demand due to other factors for example if dollar appreciation is correlated with increases in world demand and industry marginal cost is increasing then pass through will be less than complete the other is an imperfectly competitive model in which exporters are capable of price discriminating across destination markets a phenomenon paul krugman 1987 has labeled pricing to market in this model incomplete pass through is typically associated with fluctuations in the markup of price over marginal cost on exports 2 these fluctuations in markups are believed to be countryspecific they do not reflect the behavior of prices to other export destinations both models are plausible explanations of recent u s experience unfortunately it is impossible to distinguish between these competing models using only information on import prices and exchange rates for a single country in order to distinguish between the competing models an empirical analysis of goods prices and exchange rates must be capable of measuring either marginal cost or the markup over marginal cost either of these tasks poses formidable empirical problems much of the empirical literature in industrial organization has been concerned with precisely these issues since markups are an important measure of the competitiveness of industries

is there persistence in the growth of manufactured exports evidence from newly industrializing countries abstract applying cointegration techniques in a panel data setting we document persistent growth of manufactured exports from certain developing countries to complement the investigation of persistence measured by the country fixed effects we analyze asymmetries in income elasticities for all developing countries the decline in exports with world income contraction is sharper than is the rise on the upswing the decline is however especially pronounced for countries with low or negative persistence the results are consistent with long term buyer supplier relationships that create insiders and outsiders in manufactured goods trading exports are also influenced by the transactional infrastructure proxied by telecommunications penetration

promotions and wage growth this article presents evidence that internal mobility defined as a promotion or other position change is an important source of wage growth it accounts for approximately 15 of wage growth over the life cycle for white and black men but less for women the incidence of promotions and other position changes appears tied to the wage level better paid workers are more likely to be promoted the life cycle incidence of internal mobility looks similar to that for conventionally defined job mobility most moves are made early in the career mobility declines both with time in position and with experience

the impressive contribution of canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy the study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of canadian economists since the rowell sirois report to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the canadian economics association it is fitting to take stock of their contributions we focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of canadian economists and economists in canadian universities our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments setting aside related issues in municipal government finance we briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes government commissions and international organizations la contribution impressionnante des economistes canadiens a la theorie et a la politique du federalisme fiscal l etude du federalisme fiscal a ete un element central de la recherche des economistes canadiens depuis la commission rowell sirois au moment de celebrer le 50eme anniversaire de la fondation de l association canadienne d economique le moment est approprie pour prendre la mesure de leurs contributions on se concentre sur la periode apres 1982 et on souligne les principales publications savantes d un ensemble inclusif d economistes canadiens et d economistes dans les universites canadiennes une attention particuliere est portee aux applications dans le contexte federal et provincial mettant de cote les enjeux relies a la finance municipale on discute brievement des instances ou la litterature sur le federalisme fiscal a eclaire les debats de politiques publiques y compris a travers les instituts de recherche sur les politiques publiques les commissions gouvernementales et les organisations internationales

a theory of wage dynamics a dynamic equilibrium model of long term implicit labour contracts under incomplete but symmetric information is developed workers are assumed to be risk averse and of unknown ability or productivity risk neutral firms learn as do workers about each worker s productivity by observing the worker s output over time it is shown that equilibrium contracts provide for wages which never decline with age and increase only when the worker s market value increases above his current wage in addition to characterizing the equilibrium wage contract we also derive some of its implications for the behaviour of aggregate wages across various groups of workers these implications explain some findings in the recent empirical literature on ageearnings profiles in particular our model can explain why earnings may be positively related to experience even after controlling for productivity as some empirical studies have indicated

an empirical model of mark ups in a quality differentiated export market abstract this paper develops an empirical model to allow for imperfect competition in the market for traded goods a simultaneous equation model incorporating the demand for and supply of taiwanese footwear exports to the united states is specified and estimated the model allows the identification of two separate sources of mark ups in export prices the first comes from the u s imposed quantitative restriction on these exports the second comes from imperfect competition in the international market for these exports the results suggest competitive behavior by taiwanese footwear exporters the quantitative restriction resulted in a 16 9 percent mark up of prices over marginal cost

has moral hazard become a more important factor in managerial compensation we estimate a principal agent model of moral hazard with longitudinal data on firms and managerial compensation over two disjoint periods spanning 60 years to investigate increased value and variability in managerial compen sation we find exogenous growth in firm size largely explains these secular trends in compensation in our framework exogenous firm size works through two channels first conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are magnified in large firms so optimal compensation plans are now more

measuring the intensity of competition in export markets abstract this paper develops an approach to measuring the intensity of competition in international markets using readily available data on destination specific values and quantities of exports at the seven digit industry level the intensity of competition a group of exporters faces in a particular export market is measured by the residual demand elasticity the group faces this elasticity is identified by exchange rate shocks which rotate the supply relation of the source country export group relative to competitors located in other countries we apply this method to german exports of beer and us exports of linerboard paper the resulting estimates of market power appear to be plausible and consistent with other indicators of competition e g market shares the number of competitors providing support for the applicability of our framework in measuring competition in international markets

a theory of career mobility this paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the role and significance of occupational mobility in the labor market focusing on individuals careers it provides additional dimensions to the analysis of investment in human capital wage differences across individuals and the relationships among promotions quits and interfirm occupational mobility it is shown that part of the returns to education is in the form of higher probabilities of occupational upgrading within or across firms given an origin occupation schooling increases the likelihood of occupational upgrading furthermore workers who are not promoted despite a high probability of promotion are more likely to quit

short term contracts and long term agency relationships abstract long term contracts are valuable only if optimal contracting requires commitment to a plan today that would not otherwise be adopted tomorrow we show that commitments are unnecessary and hence short term contracts are sufficient if 1 all public information can be used in contracting 2 the agent can acess a bank on equal terms with the principal 3 recontracting takes place with common knowledge about technology and preferences and 4 the frontier of expected utility payoffs generated by the set of incentive compatible contracts is downward sloping at all times

executive compensation and principal agent theory the empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants in contrast this paper analy

the relative inefficiency of quotas the cheese case the nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas under a wide variety of circumstances is well established in economic theory this study considers heterogeneity as a source of nonequivalence and demonstrates its practical importance where restriction is inevitable the bias of economists in favor of price instruments is not thoroughly grounded this study should help provide a foundation the point of departure from the equivalence model is differentiation of products

estimating a dynamic adverse selection model labour force experience and the changing gender earnings gap 1968 1997 this paper addresses two questions what accounts for the gender gap in labour market outcomes what are the driving forces behind the changes in the gender labour market outcomes over the period 1968 1997 it formulates a dynamic general equilibrium model of labour supply occupational sorting and human capital accumulation in which gender discrimination and an earnings gap arise endogenously it uses this model to quantify the driving forces behind the decline in the gender earnings gap and the increase in female labour force participation the proportion of women working in professional occupations and hours worked it finds that labour market experience is the most important factor explaining the gender earnings gap in addition statistical discrimination accounts for a large fraction of the observed gender earnings gap and its decline it also finds that a large increase in aggregate productivity in professional occupations plays a major role in the increase in female labourforce participation number of hours worked and the proportion of females working in professional occupations although of less importance demographic changes account for a substantial part of the increase in female labour force participation and hours worked whereas home production technology shocks do not

the economics of career concerns part ii application to missions and accountability of government agencies the paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies officials incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions a lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy the paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives last the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on government bureaucracies 1999 the review of economic studies limited

the internal economics of the firm evidence from personnel data we analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm the hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable career movements suggest that the employee s rate of learning and the firm s learning about ability are important there are promotion fast tracks exit rates vary little with tenure or salary the firm has personnel policies like those described in the internal labor markets literature although several theoretical preconditions for ilms such as ports of entry and exit are lacking job levels are important to compensation but there is also substantial individual variation in pay within levels our companion paper in this issue explores the wage policy of this firm

identifying and testing models of managerial compensation this article analyses the identification and empirical content of the pure moral hazard pmh and the hybrid moral hazard hmh principal agent models the pmh model has hidden actions while the hmh model has hidden information in addition to hidden actions in both models agents are risk averse and principals are risk neutral the article derives the equilibrium restrictions from the optimal contract and uses the restrictions to show that the models have empirical content for any given risk aversion parameter the models other parameters are non parametrically point identified the risk aversion parameter and hence the model are however only partially identified management s ability to manipulate accounting reports arises endogenously within hmh models but not in all versions of pmh models we use our framework to investigate whether shareholders contract with management recognizing that accounting reports are susceptible to manipulation and therefore endogenous to the incentives offered to management the data reject all models in which accounting reports are verifiable furthermore the version of the pmh in which accounting reports can be manipulated is rejected if expected compensation is restricted to be positive

dynamic labour force participation of married women and endogenous work experience this paper presents and estimates a dynamic model of married women s labour force participation and fertility in which the effect of work experience on wages is explicitly taken into account because current participation alters future potential earnings the investment return to work will be an important factor in the current work decision in any forward looking behavioural model the model is estimated using the national longitudinal surveys mature women s cohort we use the estimates of our model to predict changes in the lifecycle patterns of employment due to changes in schooling fertility husband s income and the magnitude of the experience effect on wages we find that although work experience increases the disutility of further work the effect is overwhelmed by the positive effect of experience on wages leading to persistence in the employment patterns of these women in addition we find that an increase in young children and in husband s income substantially reduces participation while increased schooling has a powerful positive impact on participation this paper presents an estimable structural dynamic model of married women s labour force participation and fertility in which wages are stochastic and work experience or cumulative participation is endogeneous the model is structural in the sense that the parameters which are estimated are contained in the fundamental relationships governing behaviour namely the utility function and the constraints the model is contained in the class of models which describe the life cycle capital accumulation process with endogeneous labour supply such as weiss 1972 and heckman 1976 it is closest in spirit to that of weiss and gronau 1981 1 the basic feature of their model and ours is that labour market participation affects future wages which then affects future participation the investment return to current work will necessarily be taken into account in any forward looking optimizing model as weiss and gronau note estimates of labour supply models have ignored the inherent behavioural dynamics associated with a positive wageexperience profile there is no adequate empirical treatment of the human capital investment dimension of the labour force participation decision in the literature heckman and willis 1977 have studied a sequential discrete choice model of the labour force participation of married women in a reduced form framework their work

price discrimination and markups in export markets abstract imperfect competition in international markets is one of the key explanations for why prices of similar goods might differ among destination countries this paper develops an empirical model to examine the presence of price discrimination stemming from imperfect competition in the international market for a country s exports the model is used to examine the export behavior of taiwanese exporters of footwear the generalized supply relation allows identification of deviations from competitive pricing in each export market in addition the model provides insights into the extent of exchange rate pass through finally the model is modified in order to estimate the effect of the voluntary export restraint imposed in the u s on footwear imports from taiwan

promotion turnover and compensation in the executive labor market this paper develops a generalized roy model with human capital accumulation moral hazard and career concerns we identify and estimate the model with a large panel that matches data on publicly listed firms to information on their executives the structural estimates obtained are used to decompose the firm size pay gap we find that although total compensation and incentive pay increase with firm size certainty equivalent pay decreases with firm size in larger firms and for more highly ranked executives weaker signal quality about effort results in higher risk premiums this risk premium accounts for roughly 80 percent of the firm size gap in total compensation larger firms are also willing to pay more than smaller ones to attract executives finally the estimated coefficients on human capital accumulation from formal education and experience gained from different firms are individually significant but their collective effect on firm size pay differentials nets out

risk aversion and incentive effects comment charles a holt and susan k laury 2002 develop an experimental design to determine the risk attitude of an individual they use their observations to argue that increased incentives appear to change risk attitudes leading to greater risk aversion popular utility functions that do not allow for such effects are therefore misspecified building on this finding they estimate a flexible utility function that characterizes their aggregate data well but that does not assume constant absolute or relative risk aversion the basic holt and laury 2002 hl design should become an important tool for the interpretation and design of experiments in which risk attitudes could play a role however their most important result showing the effect of scaling up the stakes of the lottery choice task is confounded by a possible order effect an order effect occurs when prior experience with one task affects behavior in a subsequent task the primary methodological contribution of experiments in economics is to enhance control ideally such control makes the explanatory variables of interest in this case scale orthogonal to other explanatory variables such as order allowing clearer inferences about behavior than one could get from field econometric data we argue that not controlling for order effects results in a misspecification of utility functions that is as important as that of scale the subjects in the hl design were given sequences of three or four tasks as shown in table 1 task 1 involved choices over lotteries with a baseline level of prizes which we will refer to as the 1 scale task 2 involved hypothetical choices over prizes with a scaled up level of prizes either 20 50 or 90 task 3 repeated task 2 but with choices that involved real payoffs task 4 was a return to the baseline task with real 1 prizes in some sessions subjects were not given task 2 or task 3 what could one infer from the comparison of measured risk attitudes in the 1 and 20 tasks in hl unfortunately any observed difference could be due either to the scale of the prizes involved or the task order or some combination of both thus the effect of scale is intrinsically confounded with the possible effect of task order this is a logical flaw in their design which

do exporters gain from vers previous literature has concentrated on the rent transfer accruing to exporting countries when a voluntary export restraint ver is binding this paper studies the efficiency and distributional effects arising when vers force factors out of industries in which they are most productive a theoretical model of the industry under the ver is developed to establish qualitative conditions under which a ver will result in spillovers of exports to unrestricted markets industry contraction and loss in national welfare key parameters of demand and supply are estimated for leather footwear exports from taiwan subject to the u s orderly marketing agreement and their implications explored in a calibrated simulation exercise the results make a strong indictment of vers for most plausible parameter values vers distort exports reduce industry size and cause overall economic losses especially if the affected industry is large

long term short term and renegotiation on the value of commitment in contracting spot contracting generally involves efficiency losses relative to long term contracting it is proved here that short term contracting and renegotiation allow to achieve long run efficiency when transfers are not limited objectives are conflicting and no relevant asymmetric information appears at recontracting dates this last assumption excludes adverse selection but not moral hazard when technologies and preferences are time separable copyright 1990 by the econometric society

estimating monopoly behavior with competitive recycling an application to alcoa this article develops a structural model of the aluminum industry during the period between world war i and world war ii it takes into account both the intertemporal nature of alcoa s cost minimization problem and the competitive recycling sector the model enables estimation of alcoa s degree of market power while allowing for the effect of competition from recycled aluminum previous work has emphasized alcoa s control over the size of the secondary sector in the long run as a source of market power for alcoa the results here indicate that alcoa could exert little influence in this regard but nonetheless had substantial market power

nonparametric identification and estimation in a roy model with common nonpecuniary returns we consider identification and estimation of a roy model that includes a common nonpecuniary utility component associated with each choice alternative this augmented roy model has broader applications to many polychotomous choice problems in addition to occupational sorting we develop a pair of nonparametric estimators for this model derive asymptotics and illustrate small sample properties with a series of monte carlo experiments we apply one of these models to migration behavior and analyze the effect of roy sorting on observed returns to college education correcting for roy sorting bias the returns to a college degree are cut in half this article has supplementary material online

risk aversion performance pay and the principal agent problem this paper calculates numerical solutions to the principal agent problem and compares the results to the stylized facts of ceo compensation the numerical predictions come from parameterizing the models of grossman and hart and of holmstrom and milgrom while the correct incentives for a ceo can greatly enhance a firm s performance providing such incentives need not be expensive for many parameter values ceo compensation need increase only by about 10 for every 1 000 of additional shareholder value for some values the amount is 0 003 cents

reference point dependence and specification bias abstract issues of specification bias arise in deterministic as well as in econometric models this paper shows that such biases depend on the reference point used to evaluate them using numerical general equilibrium models in which the incorporation of quality upgrading in the competitive case increases or reduces the welfare costs of trade barriers depending upon whether a trade distorted equilibrium or free trade is used as the reference point

intersectoral labor mobility and the growth of the service sector one of the most striking changes in the u s economy over the past 50 years has been the growth in the service sector between 1950 and 2000 service sector employment grew from 57 to 75 percent of total employment however over this time the real hourly wage in the service sector grew only slightly faster than in the goods sector in this paper we assess whether or not the essential constancy of the relative wage implies that individuals face small costs of switching sectors and we quantify the relative importance of labor supply and demand factors in the growth of the service sector we specify and estimate a two sector labor market equilibrium model that allows us to address these empirical issues in a unified framework our estimates imply that there are large mobility costs output in both sectors would have been double their current levels if these mobility costs had been zero in addition we find that demand side factors that is technological change and movements in product and capital prices were responsible for the growth of the service sector

the theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour part i principal agent models are studied in which outcomes conditional on the agent s action are uncertain and the agent s behaviour therefore unobservable for a model with bounded agent s utility conditions are given under which the first best equilibrium can be approximated arbitrarily closely by contracts relating payment to observable outcomes for general models it is shown that the solution may not always be obtained by using the agent s first order conditions as constraint general conditions of lagrangean type are given for problems in which contracts are finite dimensional 1 the moral hazard situation

ability moral hazard firm size and diversification agency problem between the firm s managers and owners the agency relationship together with a span of control managerial technology determines an optimalfirm size and degree of diversification that are increasing in the manager s ability and therefore positively correlated cross sectionally i compare the benefits of merger with those achieved by using compensation contracts based on relative performance and show that for a particular parameterization the relative value of merger is a nonmonotonic function of the correlation between the productivity signals of the two firms neoclassical microeconomic theory has generally treated the firm as being identical to a technologically determined production function nevertheless it is widely recognized that this cost curve approach is more appropriately applied to plants within a firm than to the determination of firm size or structure itself one aspect of firm structure that has received especially little attention in the economic literature is diversification in particular the literature has not succeeded in distinguishing the benefits of efficiently using capital in production from the benefits to common ownership of the capital if joint use of capital creates efficiencies in the production of two or more goods the joint use could in principle be achieved by contracting over the use of the separately owned factors this ownership structure does not preclude the efficient use of factors further even if technological scope economies create incentives to diversify they cannot explain all diversification because much that we observe is between products that are apparently unrelated in production technology or demand the purpose of this article is to analyze the incentives of firms to diversify in an economy comprising managers and capital owners whose interests do not necessarily coincide and in which information is generally not perfect i derive the implications of the principalagent relationship between owners and managers of firms for the optimal structure of the firm in a competitive environment diversification is shown to be an optimal response to

job matching and occupational choice this paper presents a model of job matching the generalizes the existing literature by allowing for different jobs types or occupations such differences affect the value of job specific experience inducing a career profile where certain types are sampled before others more specifically the analysis shows that it is optimal for the young and inexperienced to gravitate toward jobs exhibiting a certain kind of risk then after deriving the equilibrium job turnover rate for an economy in which people do not switch occupations panel data are used to estimate its underlying parameters the hypothesis that people do not switch occupations is rejected against the alternative that they do thus providing empirical support for the theoretical extension undertaken here

self enforcing wage contracts we examine long term wage contracts between a risk neutral firm and a risk averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage a self enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege in the optimum self enforcing contract wages are sticky they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated they are updated by a simple rule around each spot wage is a time invariant interval and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval