interlinked contracts and moral hazard in investment abstract in agricultural tenancy arrangements the tenant is often required to undertake effort aimed at maintaining and improving the productive stocks this paper investigate the design of contracts which induce optimal investment of such effort it is found that a long term contract which interlinks tenancy with a credit agreement is optimal in equilibrium the tenant obtains credit from the landlord at a rate of interest below the market and is perpetually indebted to the landlord

a liquidity based model of security design we consider the problem of the design and sale of a security backed by specified assets given access to higher return investments the issuer has an incentive to raise capital by securitizing part of these assets at the time the security is issued the issuer s or underwriter s private information regarding the payoff of the security may cause illiquidity in the form of a downward sloping demand curve for the security the severity of this illiquidity depends upon the sensitivity of the value of the issued security to the issuer s private information thus the security design problem involves a tradeoff between the retention cost of holding cash flows not included in the security design and the liquidity cost of including the cash flows and making the security design more sensitive to the issuer s private information we characterize the optimal security design in several cases we also demonstrate circumstances under which standard debt is optimal and show that the riskiness of the debt is increasing in the issuer s retention costs for assets

optimal taxation of flow pollutants when firms may also inflict catastrophic environmental damage in many industries firms affect the environment in two distinct types of ways firstly they emit routine anticipated volumes of flow pollutants secondly they can potentially inflict catastrophic environmental damage liability for which may be overhanging or limited by the law operaters of chemical plants nuclear power stations and oil tankers are three examples if an emissions tax or charge is to be levied on the flow pollutants in these cases how should it be set we use simple dynamic programming techniques to characterise second best optimality we identify contexts in which the tax should be raised above its pigovian level to take account of the catastrophic potential and others where it should be set below that level the analysis has significant implications for how policymakers should go about calibrating ecological taxes in a number of high profile industries

vertical coordination financial structure and the changing theory of the firm developments for evaluating these changes including the relationships to financial structure the theoretical developments include contributions from the economics of organizations stiglitz 1991 agency relationships jensen and meckling transactions cost economics williamson 1979 1985 incomplete contracting hart 1988 asymmetric information and financial contracting 1 these theoretical developments provide rich opportunities to apply new interesting concepts toward understanding and evaluating the changing managerial and organizational environment in agriculture

limited liability and incentive contracting with ex ante action choices abstract this article examines a principal agent model of financial contracting in which a risk neutral entrepreneur agent makes an unobservable ex ante effort choice while employing the investment funds of a risk neutral investor principal the key innovation is that the investment contract is subject to statutory liability limits given these liability limits two settings are considered one in which the investor payoff function is also constrained to be monotonically nondecreasing in firm profit and another in which no such monotonic contract constraint is imposed in the former case a standard debt contract is shown to emerge and a first best effort choice is not achieved in the latter setting the optimum is characterized by a live or die payoff function and a first best effort level may or may not be realized

signal jamming models of fraudulent misreporting and economic prospects an experimental investigation abstract this study uses experimental methodology to examine how the frequency and magnitude with which managers commit fraud varies with economic prospects boom middle and bust the experimental design is based on signal jamming equilibrium sje models of fraud in which managers make potentially inaccurate public reports and investors bid on shares under sje managers always exaggerate reports by a fixed amount up to the maximum possible report independent of the truth shareholders can perfectly correct managers reports except for the maximum possible report in contrast the results of the experiment show four robust deviations from sje predictions 1 managers exaggerate and shareholders correct reports according to dominated mixed strategies with probabilities significantly less than one 2 managers exaggerate more frequently and by more when outcomes are poor 3 shareholders adjust low reports by less than high reports and 4 shareholders correct relatively high reports by more in booms than busts even though managers reporting strategies are invariant to economic prospects

financial constraints and firm post entry performance abstract firms finance production by internally generated funds and external loans the benefits of leverage however come with a cost this cost is related to the uncertainty banks face about the firm s quality and output price as time evolves banks learn about the firm and adjust the terms of the loan contract because of this firms do not have equal access to credit small young firms face greater binding debt constraints than more mature firms with well known prospects the firm survival rate as well as the firm rate of growth are therefore important issues in analyzing firm post entry performance

high frequency analysis of foreign exchange interventions what do we learn abstract the high frequency analysis of foreign exchange dynamics is helpful in order to better identify the impact of central bank interventions evidence robustly shows that interventions do indeed move the exchange rate level in the desired direction interventions increase volatility in the short run as they are regarded as information but they can reduce volatility overall ways of transmission may reach beyond the signalling channel and also include the portfolio balance and a damping channel finally interventions are more successful if they obey certain conditions such as being coordinated among central banks and going with the market and fundamentals

incentives in principal agent relationships this article identifies some of the major issues that have been examined in the literature on incentives the article begins by discussing the frictions that lie at the heart of incentive problems next the principal s optimal response to these frictions is explored taking as given the characteristics of the agents with whom the principal interacts in a nonrepeated setting the design of individualized contracts contests and tournaments is analyzed then the principal s task of selecting the best agent is addressed and repeated agency relationships are considered

central bank interventions and exchange rate band regimes abstract this paper presents an endogenous switching regression model for the exchange rate process where the switch is defined by the central bank criteria functions for intervening we study the signal effect of interventions on the exchange rate using norwegian daily data on official interventions we first find that interventions seemed to have been more effective in moving the exchange rate in the expected desired direction in the regime when the exchange rate was kept away from the edges of the band this type of intervention regime also reduces significantly the conditional volatility of the exchange rate thus when the exchange rate was near the weakest edge of the currency band its conditional variance was significantly larger than when it was moving around its central parity finally we show that in order to obtain consistent estimates intervention variables cannot enter as exogenous variables in the conditional mean or conditional variance of the exchange rate

earnings manipulation and the cost of capital the cost of capital the widespread use of accounting information by investors and financial analysts to help value stocks creates an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings in an attempt to influence short term stock price performance this paper examines the role of earnings management in affecting a firm s cost of capital using an agency model with multiple firms whose cash flows are correlated we demonstrate that the extent of earnings manipulation varies across the business cycle depending on a firm s earnings profile it can have stronger incentives to overstate its performance in good times or in bad times because of this dependence on the state of the economy earnings manipulation can influence a firm s cost of capital despite the forces of diversification

daily effects of foreign exchange intervention evidence from official bank of canada data abstract this paper analyzes the effects of official daily bank of canada intervention in the cad usd exchange rate over the 1995 1998 period using an event study methodology and different criteria for effectiveness some evidence that intervention was systematically associated with both a change in the direction and a smoothing of the exchange rate is presented the results of the analysis however do not suggest that bank of canada intervention succeeded in reducing the volatility of the cad usd exchange rate furthermore the paper shows that the effects of intervention are weakened when adjusting for general currency co movements against the usd

risky debt investment incentives and reputation in a sequential equilibrium the agency relationship of corporate insiders and bondholders is modeled as a dynamic game with asymmetric information the incentive effect of risky debt on the investment policy of a levered firm is studied in this context in a sequential equilibrium of the model a concept of reputation arises endogenously resulting in a partial resolution of the classic agency problem of underinvestment the incentive of the firm to underinvest is curtailed by anticipation of favorable rating of its bonds by the market this anticipated pricing of debt is consistent with rational expectations pricing by a competitive bond market and is realized in equilibrium some empirical implications of the model for bond rating debt covenants and bond price response to investment announcements are explored

contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication abstract this paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment by allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature s common but overly restrictive focus on one shot direct communication in addition general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect commitment first they allow us to identify the local downward incentive constraints as the relevant ones if the agent s preferences satisfy a single crossing property second we show how one may restrict the cardinality of the message spaces of the communication device an example illustrates our arguments and the suboptimality of one shot direct communication

comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract abstract each period a firm must carry out an indivisible project the cost of which depends on the firm s constant efficiency and its variable level of effort only the cost is observed by the regulator who has to choose the incentive scheme the optimal dynamic mechanism is derived under possible commitment of the regulator over time then under non commitment it is shown that there are four types of continuation equilibria also the profile of effort levels is compared to the commitment case finally some numerical comparative statics is performed and it is shown that all types of equilibria can be optimal

how do exchange rates co move a study on the currencies of five inflation targeting countries abstract this paper does three things first it explores the type of asymmetry in exchange rate correlation for five inflation targeting countries we show their currencies co move more closely with the currencies of some influential foreign countries during joint appreciations than joint depreciations against a world currency second it establishes empirically the linkage between interest rate differentials and exchange rate correlation we find evidence that both widening and narrowing interest rate differentials will reduce the correlation third it proposes a new version of the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model the model proves to be capable of providing great insight into the two issues investigated

contractual contingencies and renegotiation in a dynamic model of asymmetric information between the owner of a firm and a manager we investigate the optimal set of contingencies on which an incentive contract should depend when renegotiation is possible in particular we characterize the circumstances in which the contracting parties find it desirable to deliberately restrict what the owner can monitor thereby limiting the contractible contingencies our findings thus provide an endogenous explanation for contract simplicity in contrast to those based on transactions costs or bounded rationality

credit rationing concessionary lending and debt maturity abstract a firm raises capital for a two period investment while creditors observe the project status midstream unobservable managerial perks may consume capital each period when the firm is unfortunate early on short term financing results in either concessionary lending or costly liquidation rolling over short term debt may be problematic because the high risk premium creditors demand when asset value is low relative to debt impares managerial motivation precisely when the incentive to defer perk consumption is weakest long term financing may reduce total agency costs be enabling lenders to charge higher initial premia in effect shifting loan repayments to states in which incentive constraints are non binding

moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game we analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality even without learning or risk aversion long term bank borrower relationships are welfare enhancing the main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization this contract produces first best action choices prior to this stage the borrower gets secured loans with above market borrowing cost the optimal contract thus displays a selective memory feature taking only one of two forms at any given point in time depending on prior history we consider an infinitely repeated bank borrower relationship with moral hazard and universal risk neutrality and explore the ramifications of credit contract duration when the two well known benefits of long term contracting learning and improved risk sharing are absent our objectives are twofold the first is to analyze an infinitely repeated game with discounting in a credit market context we thus relate the theory of repeated games to financial intermediation theory particularly to issues of moral hazard and collateral related distortions the second objective is to understand noteworthy stylized facts of credit markets such as durability in credit relationships lower borrowing costs for established borrowers and unsecured loans for established borrowers versus secured loans for newer borrowers while these practices may be partly due to learning we show that learning is not essential to rationalize them even if information decays rapidly and banks learn nothing about borrowers through time these aspects of credit contracting arise in a repeated game context our main results are as follows first despite universal risk neutrality and the absence of learning a durable bank relationship benefits the borrower 2 the intuition is that the long term contracting permitted by a durable relationship enables the bank to efficiently tax and subsidize the borrower through time to reduce the use of costly collateral second the average welfare loss due to moral hazard per period is positive even as the time horizon goes to infinity third the optimal infinite horizon contract has the striking property that following the period

a friction model of daily bundesbank and federal reserve intervention abstract this paper takes a novel approach to derive a central bank intervention reaction function a garch model for exchange rates is amended to allow interventions to have an effect on both the mean and the variance of exchange rate returns an intervention reaction function is obtained by combining the model with a loss function for the central bank estimation results for the implied friction model reproduce the familiar leaning against the wind policy by the bundesbank and the federal reserve furthermore the central banks appear to have reacted to increases in the conditional variance of daily dm returns

capital requirements monetary policy and aggregate bank lending theory and empirical evidence capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending the model predicts that the bank s decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower s stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital constrained the bank i provide empirical support for this prediction the model explains the recent inability of the federal reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply i show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk the motivation of this article is first to examine the impact of risk based capital requirements namely those that link mandatory capital to asset ratios for banks to their loans on aggregate bank lending these requirements called the basle capital rules or bis guidelines went into effect in march 1989 for banks in the leading industrialized nations these rules initially required banks to maintain capital equal to 7 25 percent of business and most consumer loans with the requirement increasing to 8 percent by the end of 1992 secondly i wish to understand the link between monetary policy and aggregate bank credit in the presence of risk based capital requirements my curiosity is sparked in part by two recent phenomena one is the experience of the u s economy which displayed sluggish growth during 1989 93 despite a monetary policy that attempted to spur bank lending and economic activity and the other is the striking decline in loans relative to security holdings mostly government bonds in the asset portfolios of u s

the economics of workout lending lenders are forced to consider a workout loan when a borrower loses access to financial markets and must seek loans from existing creditors to continue servicing outstanding loans a model of the loan decision is developed that distinguishes socially useful from socially wasteful workout loans the analysis is extended to examine two collective action problems that may arise when many lenders have claims on a troubled borrower the paper concludes with a consideration of the implications of the model for the establishment of prudential lending limits and of policies to stimulate new lending to troubled debtor countries copyright 1989 by ohio state university press

equilibria with communication in a job market example we study costless information transmission from a job applicant to an employer who must decide whether to hire him and if so which position to give him we construct equilibrium payoffs requiring at least two signaling steps or even that no deadline be imposed on the plain conversation the set of communication equilibrium payoffs achieved with the help of a communication device is larger than the set of equilibrium payoffs of the plain conversation game but coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs

adverse selection in dynamic moral hazard this paper studies a multiperiod moral hazard problem under two assumptions i contracts are subject to renegotiations ii the agent s action has long term effects the action is also interpreted as a choice of characteristic or type renegotiation proof contracts that implement various actions including random ones are characterized under appropriate conditions the equilibrium involves the principal implementing a random action therefore the equilibrium has standard properties of adverse selection models

adverse selection and renegotiation in procurement as was shown by dewatripont optimal long term contracts are generally not sequentially optimal the parties ex post renegotiate them to their mutual advantage this paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a simple two period procurement situation and studies the extent to which renegotiation reduces ex ante welfare i a central result is that like in the non commitment case the second period allocation is optimal for the principal conditionally on his posterior beliefs about the agent ii the first period allocation exhibits an increasing amount of pooling when the discount factor grows iii with a continuum of types it is never optimal to induce full separation the paper also analyzes whether renegotiated long term contracts yield outcomes resembling those under either unnegotiated long term contracts or a sequence of short term contracts and it links the analysis with the multiple unit durable good monopoly problem

asymmetry loss aversion and forecasting conditional volatility models such as garch have been used extensively in financial applications to capture predictable variation in the second moment of asset returns however with recent theoretical literature emphasising the loss averse nature of agents this paper considers models which capture time variation in the second lower partial moment utility based evaluation is carried out on several approaches to modelling the conditional second order lower partial moment or semi variance including distribution and regime based models the findings show that when agents are loss averse

the dynamics of incentive contracts the paper studies a simple two period principal agent model in which the principal updates the incentive scheme after observing the agent s first period performance the agent has superior information about his ability the principal offers a first period incentive scheme and observes some measure of the agent s first period performance cost or profit which depends on the agent s ability and unobservable first period effort the relationship is entirely run by short term contracts in the second period the principal updates the incentive scheme and the agent is free to accept the new incentive scheme or to quit the strategies are required to be perfect and updating of the principal s beliefs about the agent s ability follows bayes rule the central theme of the paper is that the ratchet effect leads to much pooling in the first period first for any first period incentive scheme there exists no separating equilibrium second when the uncertainty about the agent s ability is small the optimal scheme must involve a large amount of pooling the paper also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partition equilibria and looks at the effect of cost uncertainty

why do central banks intervene abstract intervention by central banks in terms of buying and selling foreign currency has been a major activity in recent years this paper investigates the motivations for such policy and the evidence for its effectiveness we use high quality daily data on the dollar amounts of intervention by the central banks of the us and germany we also use information on agreed g7 target levels for the dm and yen nominal exchange rates daily nominal dollar exchange rate returns are well described as a martingale garch process and we find little evidence that the different types of intervention have had much effect on the conditional mean of exchange rate returns there is some evidence that intervention is associated with slight increases in the volatility of exchange rate returns while little evidence is found for the effectiveness of intervention the motivations are more clear in particular from the application of probit analysis we find that the probability of intervention is determined by the magnitude of the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the agreed target level and to a lesser extent by the current volatility of exchange rates

corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets inefficient investment allocation induced by corporate fraud where informed insiders strategically manipulate outside investors beliefs has been endemic historically and has recently attracted much attention we reconcile corporate fraud and investment distortions with efficient capital markets building on shareholder manager agency conflicts and investment renegotiation in active takeover markets because investments that are ex post inefficient are not renegotiation proof the optimal renegotiation proof contract induces overstatements by managers accompanied by overinvestment in low return states and underinvestment in high return states by rational investors our framework also helps explain why easy access to external capital appears to facilitate corporate fraud

portfolio optimization in the presence of dependent financial returns with long memory a copula based approach abstract in this paper we seek to examine the effect of the presence of long memory on the dependence structure between financial returns and on portfolio optimization first we focus on the dependence structure using copulas to select the best copula in addition to the goodness of fit tests we employ a graphical method based on visual comparison of the fitted copula density and the smoothed copula density estimated by wavelets moreover we check the stability of the copula parameter the empirical results show that the long memory affects the dependence structure second we analyze the impact of this dependence structure on the optimal portfolio we propose a new approach based on minimizing the conditional value at risk and assuming that the dependence structure is modeled by the copula parameter the empirical results show that our approach outperforms the traditional minimizing variance approach where the dependence structure is represented by the linear correlation coefficient

the incentive effects of dismissals efficiency wages piece rates and profit sharing the relation of several incentive schemes to productivity is studied with a particular emphasis on the effects and determinants of dismissals dismissals turn out to be positively but in a nonlinear way associated with productivity similarly profit sharing raises productivity wages and piece rates are insignificant profit sharing decreases the number of dismissals made by firms copyright 1991 by mit press

the economics of fraudulent accounting we argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences in a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous we show that in equilibrium low productivity firms hire and invest too much in order to pool with high productivity firms this behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources in the economy we test the predictions of the model using firmlevel data we show that during periods of suspicious accounting firms hire and invest excessively while managers exercise options when the misreporting is detected firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves our firm level results hold both before and after the market crash of 2000 in the aggregate our model provides a novel explanation for periods of jobless and investment less growth

is work special justice and the distribution of employment i investigate from an egalitarian welfarist standpoint the issue of whether state guaranteed employment should be offered as a matter of right to able bodied poor citizens who suffer chronic or persistent unemployment an affirmative answer is defended one consideration supporting this right to work is that provision of transfer aid in the form of jobs rather than cash screens nonneedy bohemians from the class of beneficiaries the main conclusion of the essay is defended from one objection based on efficiency wage models of the labor market and from another based on the alleged impossibility of maintaining the self respect and self esteem of able bodied individuals who fail to earn their own keep independently in a market economy

conditional covariances and direct central bank interventions in the foreign exchange markets abstract in this paper we investigate the effects of central bank interventions cbis on the ex post correlation and covariance of exchange rates using a multivariate garch model with time varying conditional covariances we estimate the effects of cbis on both the variances and covariance between the yen and the deutsche mark the euro in terms of the us dollar our results suggest that coordinated cbis not only tend to increase the volatility of exchange rates but also explain a significant amount of the covariance between the major currencies we show that this result can be useful for short run currency portfolio management

evaluating density forecasts with applications to financial risk management density forecasting is increasingly more important and commonplace for example in financial risk management yet little attention has been given to the evaluation of density forecasts the authors develop a simple and operational framework for density forecast evaluation they illustrate the framework with a detailed application to density forecasting of asset returns in environments with time varying volatility finally the authors discuss several extensions copyright 1998 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

credit layering in informal financial markets abstract informal lenders with access to markets or capital often find it attractive to delegate loan provision to downstream lenders who have an information or enforcement advantage in dealing with particular borrowers in this paper we examine the conditions under which such an arrangement is preferred by two informal lenders a landlord and a merchant who compete in loan provision to tenant farmers differentiated by wealth we show that credit layering is preferred only when tenants are sufficiently poor in this case the trader lends to tenant farmers via a contract with their landlord otherwise only the trader lends as a consequence a pattern of borrowing emerges in which relatively wealthy tenants borrow from merchants while poor tenants borrow mainly from their landlords interlinkage between land and credit thus arises only for a subset of tenants and purely as a consequence of credit layering this pattern is shown to be supported empirically

the impact of performance based compensation on misreporting abstract this paper examines the effect of ceo compensation contracts on misreporting we find that the sensitivity of the ceo s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport we do not find that the sensitivity of other components of ceo compensation i e equity restricted stock long term incentive payouts and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport relative to other components of compensation stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in ceo wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting

central bank intervention and foreign exchange rates new evidence from figarch estimations abstract in this paper we investigate the effects of official interventions on the short run evolution and volatility of exchange rates to this aim we rely on a new measure of volatility implied by the figarch model that outperforms the traditionally used garch one it is found that central bank interventions exert an incorrectly signed effect on the levels of exchange rates and tend to increase their volatility in the short run in general our results also show that the traditional garch estimations tend to underestimate the effects in terms of volatility

a utility based comparison of some models of exchange rate volatility abstract when estimates of variances are used to make asset allocation decisions underestimates of population variances lead to lower expected utility than equivalent overestimates a utility based criterion is asymmetric unlike standard criteria such as mean squared error to illustrate how to estimate a utility based criterion we use five bilateral weekly dollar exchange rates 1973 1989 and the corresponding pair of eurodeposit rates of homoskedastic garch autoregressive and non parametric models for the conditional variance of each exchange rate garch models tend to produce the highest utility on average a mean squared error criterion also favors garch but not as sharply

real economy effects of short term equity ownership investor time horizon varies by company industry and economic system in this article we explore the importance of this variation by studying the impact of shareholder time horizon on the investment decisions of the firms they own and externalities on the wider market we demonstrate theoretically that short term shareholders cause boards to care about the path of the stock price rationalising firms pursuit of investments for signalling reasons at the expense of long term value we demonstrate that short termism has spillover effects leading to higher costs of equity capital bubbles in the price of input assets and predictable excess returns we build testable cross country hypotheses and evaluate these using existing evidence coupled with a new dataset on owner duration of us and germanic firms

environmental accidents under moral hazard and limited firm liability we study optimal government policy when firms operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs and the risk is affected by firms efforts which are unobservable to outsiders when firms profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident with a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best with lower subsidies to the firm and a firm effort lower than at the first best solution when firm investments affect both the required accident preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output the first best never involves specific investment subsidies while a second best solution generally always does

collateral and rationing sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets the authors examine how market structure affects credit allocation under universal risk neutrality and asymmetric information about borrowers they consider both monopolistic and perf ectly competitive banks and examine the role of collateral in each ca se when a bank is a monopolist on the loan side they find collatera l is never used and asymmetric information results in reduced bank le nding under perfect competition collateral has a useful sorting rol e moreover rationing is possible even with collateral availability and perfectly elastic deposit supply in this setting the authors sh ow co signers are valuable social welfare properties of the monopoly and competitive equilibria are also compared copyright 1987 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

optimal binary prediction for group decision making we address the problem of optimally forecasting a binary variable for a heterogeneous group of decision makers facing various binary decision problems that are tied together only by the unknown outcome a typical example is a weather forecaster who needs to estimate the probability of rain tomorrow and then report it to the public given a conditional probability model for the outcome of interest e g logit or probit we introduce the idea of maximum welfare estimation and derive conditions under which traditional estimators such as maximum likelihood or nonlinear least squares are asymptotically socially optimal even when the underlying model is misspecified

optimal capital structure and investment with real options and endogenous debt costs we examine the joint optimization of financial leverage and irreversible capacity investment in a real options framework with risky debt and endogenous interest costs higher capacity ceteris paribus increases operating leverage and default probability but lowers ex post adjustment costs and generates larger tax shields a key insight is that financial leverage and capacity are substitutes in the debt market equilibrium we develop novel predictions about the effects of capital adjustment costs operating costs and uncertainty on optimal financial leverage and capacity that may potentially help explain ambiguous empirical results in the literature regarding the determinants of capital structure and investment received march 17 2016 editorial decision july 8 2017 by editor itay goldstein

theoretical foundations for sticky wages abstract the paper compares three different types of theoretical explanation of sticky wages they are implicit contracts efficiency wage models and insider outsider models it then reconsiders keynes rationale for sticky wages which focuses on relative wage issues finally the paper considers possible directions for future research

the market microstructure of central bank intervention abstract how quickly do central bank intervention operations impact the foreign exchange market and do intra daily market conditions influence the effectiveness of central bank interventions this paper uses high frequency intra daily data to examine the relationship between the efficacy of intervention operations and the state of the market at the moment that the operation is made public the results indicate that some traders typically know that the fed is intervening at least 1 h prior to the public release of the information in newswire reports also the evidence suggests that the timing of intervention operations matters interventions that occur during heavy trading volume that are closely timed to scheduled macro announcements and that are coordinated with another central bank are the most likely to have large effects

dynamic microlending under adverse selection can it rival group lending we derive an optimal lending contract in a two period adverse selection model with limited commitment on the borrower side the contract involves penalty interest rates after default and favorable rates after success under some conditions it also charges first time borrowers higher rates than repeat borrowers as in relationship lending because the lender is constrained to keep borrowing attractive while using revealed information to price for risk we compare the efficiency of a group lending contract of the kind popularized by the microcredit movement to the dynamic individual contract both types of contracts reveal the same information but the contracts face different constraints on using the information to improve risk pricing as a result either type of contract can lead to greater efficiency depending on specifics of the environment opening the possibility that dynamic lending has played a role comparable to that of group lending in the success of microcredit we also characterize the optimal dynamic group contract when both lending techniques are feasible and find that it combines both approaches but with varying emphases a recurrent theme is that in more marginal environments dynamic lending performs relatively better than and is prioritized over group lending we also discuss a number of extensions including spatially and serially correlated risk and the effect of competition

peer monitoring and credit markets a major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced one partial solution is peer monitoring having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the grameen bank of bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere but peer monitoring has a cost it transfers risk from the bank which is in a better position to bear risk to the cosigner in a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers welfare

central bank intervention and exchange rate volatility abstract this paper explores the effects of foreign exchange intervention by central banks on the behavior of exchange rates the g 3 central banks have undertaken an unprecedented number of both coordinated and unilateral intervention operations in the last 10 years existing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of intervention is mixed studies using data from the 1970s suggest that intervention operations that do not affect the monetary base have at most a short lived influence on exchange rates but more recent studies indicate that the intervention operations that followed the plaza agreement influenced both the level and variance of exchange rates this paper examines the effects of us german and japanese monetary and intervention policies on dollar mark and dollar yen exchange rate volatility over the 1977 1994 period the results indicate that intervention operations generally increase exchange rate volatility this is particularly true of secret interventions which are those undertaken by central banks without notification of the public overt interventions in the mid 1980s appear to have reduced exchange rate volatility but in other periods and for the 1977 1994 period as a whole central bank intervention is associated with greater exchange rate volatility

posterior predictive and utility based approaches to testing the arbitrage pricing theory abstract to provide a framework for judging the economic significance of departures from the arbitrage pricing theory we adopt a utility based metric based on optimal portfolio choices this measure is examined using both predictive and posterior analysis our predictive analysis shows very large and economically significant departures from the model restrictions however the high level of parameter uncertainty suggests that we cannot conclusively either affirm or reject the apt our conclusions differ markedly from other studies which employ traditional significance testing procedures and in many instances fail to reject the apt restrictions

the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud this study extends the research on corporate financial fraud by developing a new perspective on the deterrence effects of vicarious punishments premised on social learning theory we posit that firms vicariously learn about punishments from their peers by picking up modeling cues environmental cues and social cues in the inhibitive learning process thus being deterred from committing future fraudulence using a matched sample of 604 observations of chinese listed firms between 2002 and 2008 our findings show that an observing firm is deterred from committing fraud if the peers in its industry are caught and punished we further find that such deterrence effects are subject to how the observing firm evaluates the possibility of being caught and the likelihood it will be punished the same way if it violates similar prohibitions in particular inhibitive learning effects are positively moderated by punishments of prominent firms and model observer similarity but negatively attenuated by the development of the legal system our study sheds light on the corporate fraud literature by illuminating the indirect inhibitive learning process from vicarious punishments and identifying the conditions for differential learning deterrence outcomes of the observing firms

short term contracting and strategic oil reserves the effect of short term contracting on resource extraction is studied in a two country model of international trade in oil countries planners are assumed to be fully rational with perfect information and perfect foresight contracts are assumed perfectly enforceable and complete except that short term contracts do not allow commitments to actions taken beyond the contract period we show that short term contracting limits countries opportunities for intertemporal consumption smoothing reducing their collective tolerance for temporal variation in consumption this tends to make them extract more slowly than in the efficient plan that results from long term contracting contractual relationships often outlive the contracts that govern them it is therefore common for a long term relationship to be governed by a sequence of short term contracts when these contracts allow complete control of the organization of the relationship within each contract period any outcome that can be achieved in a long term contract covering the entire life of the relationship is also feasible with a sequence of short term contracts short term contracting can nevertheless have significant effects on resource allocation because each contract must be voluntarily negotiated in the environment created by its predecessors an allocation that is acceptable to both parties as a long term contract might not be voluntarily negotiable as a sequence of short term contracts because short term contracting is so prevalent it is worth asking what sorts of relationship can be organized efficiently only by long term contract and what kinds of distortion are caused by short term contracting two kinds of answers to these questions have been given in the literature one important line of investigation considers the use of memory in contracts designed to control parties incentives under asymmetric information baron and besanko 1985 rubinstein and yaari 1983 sanchez and zapater 1985 stiglitz and weiss 1983 tirole 1986 and townsend 1982 among others have shown how parties can use

information institutions and banking sector development in west africa i introduction banks and other financial intermediaries can perform an important developmental function especially in africa where alternative sources of finance are limited or nonexistent by providing firms with essential finance they help them to take advantage of productive investment opportunities which may not otherwise materialize by screening loan applicants they can help to address adverse selection in the credit market and channel funds toward productive uses by monitoring borrowers they can contain moral hazard behavior for example excessively risky investment activity that could undermine a borrower s ability to repay a loan through long term bank borrower relationships well established banks can address both adverse selection and moral hazard this not only helps banks to remain solvent but also ensures that bank finance is channeled toward productive and sound investments there is a large body of empirical evidence which suggests that the development of banking systems goes hand in hand with economic development see e g levine 2004 although the evidence on causality is mixed see e g demetriades and hussein 1996 there is broad consensus that well functioning banking systems promote economic growth demetriades and andrianova 2005 it is therefore a puzzle that so many countries remain financially underdeveloped this is particularly true of sub saharan africa which remains one of the most financially under developed regions in the world a recent study by the world bank has shown that african banking systems lack depth compared to other regions in the world but are also excessively liquid honohan and beck 2007 according to the world bank banks themselves complain that there is a lack of creditworthy borrowers while at the same time households and firms find finance to be a major constraint the evidence presented by the world bank also suggests that the least developed banking systems are also the most liquid suggesting that excess liquidity is a common feature of financial under development this article aims to shed light on these features of financial under development in africa utilizing a panel data set comprising the banks operating in the west african economic and monetary union uemoa during 2000 2005 the uemoa provides a uniform financial system across eight countries the structure of this system has changed little in the last 15 years therefore we can be sure that the variations in bank behavior we observe within the uemoa are not because of variations in the nature of public financial institutions which the banks face this makes feasible the identification of the institutional sources of the variations in bank behavior which are not correlated with variations in the quality of public financial institutions our data set includes balance sheet information on each bank in the uemoa including bank characteristics such as age and ownership type profitability and the number of urban and rural branches we also utilize country level data on loan defaults which provides information on the average quality of borrowers we use this as a proxy for the severity of information problems faced by banks in the credit market we combine this information with macroeconomic data including institutional quality indices constructed by the world bank our data set enables us to examine the extent to which informational and institutional factors and interactions between different factors can explain a bank s loans to assets ratio which is an inverse measure of bank liquidity our data set is also used to examine the microeconomic and macroeconomic determinants of the total volume of assets of an individual bank which is a good micro level indicator of overall banking sector development our results suggest that to a large extent financial under development including excess liquidity and low banking sector development can be attributed to severe informational problems

optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable this paper analyzes choice theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur an intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions the goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts the paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable theorem 1 in contrast stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex ante optimal decisions theorem 2 the paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect bayesian nash equilibrium

competing lending platforms endogenous reputation and fragility in microcredit markets this paper shows that market fragility and mass default can arise in microcredit markets as a result of the strategic interaction between a microlender using a reputation based mechanism and a traditional lender using physical collateral in our model borrowers solve a dynamic programming problem which induces an endogenous equilibrium distribution of reputational capital because the quality of each lender s pool of borrowers is affected by both lenders interest rates lender reaction curves are non monotonic and discontinuous this can result in knife edge equilibria and mass default on the microlender precipitated by minor parametric perturbations fragility is exacerbated by borrower screening and sovereign risk but ameliorated when microlenders have social welfare goals our results highlight the importance of studying the entire credit market rather than microfinance in isolation

a memory based model of bounded rationality in order to investigate the impact of limited memory on human behavior i develop a model of memory grounded in psychological and biological research i assume that people take their memories as accurate and use them to make inferences the resulting model predicts both over and underreaction but provides enough structure to predict when each effect dominates i then use this framework to study the consumption decision the results match empirical work on consumption predictability as well as differences in the marginal propensity to consume from different income streams most importantly because it ties the extent of bias to a measurable aspect of the stochastic process being forecasted the model makes testable empirical predictions

official central bank interventions and exchange rate volatility evidence from a regime switching analysis in this paper we investigate the effect of central bank interventions on the weekly returns and volatility of the dem usd and yen usd exchange rate returns in contrast with previous analyses we allow for regime dependent specifications and investigate whether official interventions can explain the observed volatility regime switches it is found that depending on the prevailing volatility level coordinated central bank interventions can lead to either a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect our results lead us to challenge the usual view that such interventions always imply increases in volatility c 2002 elsevier b v all rights reserved

are forign exchange intervention and monetary policy related and does it really matter the relationship between foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy underlies the question of whether sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate in this article the author examines this relationship using data on u s foreign exchange interventions from 1985 to 1990 recently made publicly available she examines whether interventions could be viewed as signaling changes in future monetary policy variables the author also considers whether changes in monetary policy may induce interventions in an effort by central bankers to lean against the wind of exchange rate movements interestingly she finds evidence both that interventions help predict monetary policy variables and that monetary variables help predict interventions copyright 1995 by university of chicago press

the life cycle of a microfinance institution the irish loan funds abstract ireland s loan funds were a long lived self sustaining large scale microfinance organization that made millions of loans without collateral to the poor during the first 100 years of their life cycle a period of growth ending in the 1840s they adapted constantly and obtained improvements to their legal structure because they were complementary to the banking system and seen as effective in relieving poverty in their 2nd century they became ossified in part because of competition with commercial banks the loan funds provide an example of sustainable microfinance under harsh economic conditions and illustrate how organizations change incrementally and when successful alter their institutional framework

order flow and exchange rate comovement abstract this paper extends the literature on the linkage between order flows and exchange rates from the univariate to the multivariate framework we examine how order flow differentials drive exchange rate comovements using data on five major exchange rates and at three different intraday frequencies we also control for bid ask spreads and the possible effects of order flow on returns and return volatility and employ alternative order flow measures our results show that the effect of order flow on exchange rate comovements is significantly negative during the tranquil period but can become positive during the turbulet period this negative effect lessens as the intraday frequency lowers generally over the entire sample period exchange rate correlations are stronger during joint appreciations than joint depreciations

optimal design of securities under asymmetric information a firm must decide what security to sell to raise external capital to finance a profitable investment opportunity there is ex ante asymmetry of information regarding the probability distribution of cash flow generated by the investment in this setting we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a security to be optimal uniquely optimal that is for pooling at this security to be an the unique equilibrium outcome using these conditions we show that the debt contract is uniquely optimal if and only if cash flows are ordered by strict conditional stochastic dominance finally we derive an equivalence relationship between optimal security designs and designs that minimize mispricing