knowhow trading as economic exchange abstract knowhow trading is the informal exchange of practical technical knowledge between pairs of engineers and other technicians in different firms this paper explains the advantages and disadvantages of this particular mode of knowledge sharing from an economic perspective under a knowhow trading regime long term self selected partners barter knowledge ex post i e they exchange information already known to one of them the paper explains why barter is better suited to the exchange of ideas than to the exchange of conventional goods and points out advantages of ex post knowledge sharing between firms whose priorities differ it is generally cheaper to acquire knowhow through exchanges than to reinvent the wheel but sharing knowhow can cut into the firm s competitive advantage pairwise exchanges limit although they do not eliminate the firm s loss of competitive advantage when it shares technical knowledge because knowhow trading is informal and off the books such trading is difficult for the firm to evaluate and to manage similarly since it eludes the traditional measures of economic activity knowhow trading is difficult to document and integrate into studies of the general economy

gift giving and the evolution of cooperation gift giving is a practice common to many societies in an evolutionary model the social custom of giving gifts at the beginning of a relationship can lead to trust and cooperation the evolutionary approach makes predictions about the character of the goods that can be used as gifts for example gift goods may have little use value even at low levels of consumption although the gifts themselves are useless the institution is not

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

job matching and on the job training conventional analysis predicts that workers pay part of their on the job training costs by accepting a lower starting wage and subsequently realize a return to this investment in the form of greater wage growth missing from the conventional treatment of on the job training is a discussion of the process by which heterogeneous workers are matched to jobs requiring varying amounts of training this matching process constitutes a key feature of the on the job training model presented in this article and tested with a unique data set containing extensive information concerning on the job training employer search wages and wage and productivity growth

employer search training and vacancy duration we develop a model of optimal employer search strategy when information about match quality is endogenous the model is tested using four data sets two of which have not previously been used as theory predicts we find that when filling positions requiring more training employers search more intensively and extensively employers also search more extensively when hiring workers with more education and with prior experience these findings provide strong evidence of systematic variation in search strategies based on the characteristics of the positions and job applicants factors that influence employer search also affect the duration of a vacancy

unemployment insurance job queues and systematic job search an equilibrium approach the labor market effects of unemployment insurance ui have been viewed in several contexts by economists on the one hand the ui system of jobless benefits and experiencerated taxation of firms is seen as influencing firms decisions to lay off workers 9 10 24 2 key in such analyses is the degree to which firms layoffs are subsidized by an imperfect experience rating a tax system in which employers ui taxes increase by less than their workers benefits increase on the other hand many other studies of ui place primary focus on the worker although employer concern for worker well being plays a role even in the work on the impact of ui on firm layoff decisions each of these worker based studies is concerned with one of two issues 1 ui and compensating wage differentials 14 24 or 2 u i and the job search process first hutchens assumes that workers face a choice in the labor market between high wage high layoff probability firms and low wage low layoff probability firms 14 by reducing the cost of being laid off ui increases one s likelihood of choosing the former kind of job along these lines topel finds evidence that ui generosity substitutes for wages and therefore lowers the compensating differential associated with a high layoff job 23 second several authors have studied the effect of ui on job search this work recognizes that ui lowers the cost of searching and therefore raises the reservation wage expected unemployment duration and expected post unemployment wages 2 previous work on the impact of ui on firm layoff decisions has assumed either a layoff subsidy 9 or demand uncertainty 2 in order to generate layoffs and therefore a u i impact on layoffs in contrast to such work this paper views layoffs in an equilibrium context they occur in our model even with no layoff subsidy and or with no demand uncertainty layoffs are of value to the firm in our model since they correspond to workers rejected from a queue of potential trainees from the firm s point of view a queue of applicants may be desirable in order to lower

new housing supply and the dilution of social capital this paper examines the role of local housing supply conditions for social capital investment using an instrumental variables approach and data from the social capital community benchmark survey it is documented that the positive link between homeownership and individual social capital investment is largely confined to more built up neighborhoods with more inelastic supply of new housing the empirical findings provide support for the proposition that in these localities house price capitalization provides additional incentives for homeowners to invest in social capital the findings are also largely consistent with the proposition that built up neighborhoods provide protection from inflows of newcomers that could upset a mutually beneficial equilibrium involving reciprocal cooperation however the results do not appear to be driven by selection based on inherent differences in social aptitudes or by tiebout sorting

mobility targeting and private school vouchers simulations are derived from a three district model of low middle and highincome school districts calibrated to new york data with housing stocks that vary within and across districts in this model it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to nontargeted vouchers but vastly different from vouchers targeted to low income households furthermore strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs jel 122 128 h73 persistent frustration with the perceived low quality of public education exacerbated by concerns over the inherently unequal levels of public school quality across school districts has caused policy makers courts and researchers to investigate modifications and alternatives to the current public school system one idea that has received increasing academic and public attention is that of private school vouchers with proponents arguing that the competitive pressures of voucher programs would cause improvements in the efficiency of the publicschool system while at the same time addressing equity concerns if vouchers can be targeted to low income households or low income school districts but aside from a few limited experiments in some u s cities our experience with vouchers in the united states remains virtually nonexistent this limits the amount of information researchers can derive from standard empirical analysis in that it forces them to rely on only current nonvoucher induced differences in competition despite important suggestive results such work may not anticipate all the impacts from a large scale policy such as the voucher policies currently under discussion at the same time theoretical models of school finance are also limited in that they often either focus on only one particular aspect of the general equilibrium school finance problem or they are too rich and complex to yield crisp predictions

the relative effects of employed and unemployed job search a lthough many early models of job search assumed that job seekers were unemployed economists have come to recognize the importance of on the job search mattila 1974 for example found that roughly 60 of quitters experienced no unemployment between jobs implying that the majority of voluntary job changers engaged in on the job search the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search has been modelled in the theoretical search literature barron and mccafferty 1977 burdett 1978 however there have been no attempts to estimate empirically the determinants of this choice 2 some researchers have however examined the resulting wages associated with these two types of search and found a greater wage return to employed than to unemployed search mattila 1969 black 1980 however because voluntarily unemployed search involves forgoing income burdett 1978 while employed search does not abstracting from voluntary reductions in hours incomemaximizing job seekers would never quit to search unless the expected net return to unemployed search exceeded that for employed search thus the previously mentioned empirical findings at first glance might appear to contradict the assumption of income maximization by job seekers because some workers do quit into unemployment 3 in this paper it is argued that previous attempts to compare the returns of employed and unemployed job search suffer from a selectivity problem specifically searchers who accept offers without experiencing any unemployment are likely to have unobservable variables such as informal job contacts and ability which will raise the relative return to employed search compared to that of voluntarily unemployed job seekers 4 providing an explanation for higher wages for on the job searchers than for unemployed searchers this paper estimates the relative wage effects of employed and unemployed search and the determinants of the choice of search mode i e employed vs unemployed search unlike earlier work mattila 1969 black 1980 the previously mentioned selectivity problems are accounted for this is the first attempt to estimate the determinants of choice of search mode 5 without adjusting for selectivity bias as regards employed vs unemployed search it is found that employed search is associated with greater expected wage offers than unemployed search controlling for measurable personal characteristics however accounting for selectivity the expected wage offer given unemployed search is greater than that given employed search finally the greater is the difference between the expected offer given unemployed and that given employed search the more likely one is to choose unemployed search these findings suggest that quitting to search unemployed may be a wealth maximizing decision received for publication november 5 1980 revision accepted for publication august 17 1981 university of illinois at urbana champaign and arizona state university respectively professor low is partially supported by a faculty grant from the graduate college at arizona state university the authors thank francine blau wallace hendricks and two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions i for a summary of this literature see lippman and mccall 1976 2 barron and mccafferty 1977 do estimate an aggregate time series model of the log of the proportion of quits entering unemployment as a function of the vacancy rate proxied by the help wanted advertising index however such a model ignores search that does not lead to quits and does not include variables beyond the vacancy rate that influence an individual s choice of search mode i it is also possible that the forgone earnings due to unemployed search could in principle be less than the possible savings in direct search costs due to unemployed search relative to employed search see burdett 1978 in this case a lower wage return to unemployed search could imply that quitting was based on income considerations further individuals may have quit for nonwage reasons 4 black 1980 found that other things equal those who planned to seek new employment but did not quit had significantly lower wage growth than those who did not plan to search and did not quit this finding strongly suggests the likelihood of a selectivity bias black 1980 p 227 black s 1976 1980 data the michigan panel study of income dynamics psid for his work on employed search did not allow him to distinguish employed and unemployed search

equilibrium unemployment and the efficient job finding rate a model of the labor market is constructed in which unemployment is generated by labor turnover and the process of selecting new recruits firms recruitment policies affect workers job finding probabilities and are known to job seekers by reputation the value of visiting a firm thus depends on the probability of being hired as well as on the terms of employment and in equilibrium is equal at all firms the principal results obtained are that the equilibrium unemployment rate is efficient and that there are no external effects of search by workers or recruitment by firms

statistical discrimination and duration dependence in the job finding rate this article models a frictional labour market where employers endogenously discriminate against the long term unemployed the estimated model replicates recent experimental evidence which documents that interview invitations for observationally equivalent workers fall sharply as unemployment duration progresses we use the model to quantitatively assess the consequences of such employer behaviour for job finding rates and long term unemployment and find only modest effects given the large decline in callbacks interviews lost to duration impact individual job finding rates solely if they would have led to jobs we show that such instances are rare when firms discriminate in anticipation of an ultimately unsuccessful application discrimination in callbacks is thus largely a response to dynamic selection with limited consequences for structural duration dependence and long term unemployment

extensive search intensive search and hiring costs new evidence on employer hiring activity this paper presents recent evidence on employer search to fill a position a 1982 employer survey sponsored by the national institute of education and the national center for research in vocational education provides the basis for analyzing employer search and hiring costs the paper examines the effects of such factors as employer size dismissal costs unionization on the job training adjustment costs capital and labor market conditions on intensive employer search extensive employer search and hiring costs intensive employer search is measured by the average number of hours the employer spends recruiting screening and interviewing per applicant extensive search is measured by the number of applicants seen per applicant interviewed and the number interviewed per employment

employment changes the structure of adjustment costs and plant size abstract in this paper we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of norwegian plants the data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size we develop and estimate a simple q model of labor demand allowing for the presence of fixed linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs the econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components unrelated to plant size as a result the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants the quadratic component of costs is also always important in most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions the quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants while this is not true for larger plants

establishment size job satisfaction and the structure of work this paper empirically investigates a the relationship between establishment size and the degree of flexibility in the work environment and b the extent to which establishment size differences in workers satisfaction with their jobs can be accounted for by differences in their work environment the main findings are that large establishments do organize production in a less flexible fashion than do smaller establishments and that observed lower levels of job satisfaction in larger establishments net of wage and fringe benefit effects can largely be explained by the inflexibility in the work environment

unemployment fluctuations over the life cycle abstract in this paper we show that i the volatility of worker flows increases with age in us cps data and ii a search and matching model with life cycle features endogenous separation and search effort is well suited to explain this fact with a shorter horizon on the labor market older workers outside options become less responsive to new employment opportunities thereby making their wages less sensitive to the business cycle their job finding and separation rates are then more volatile along the business cycle the horizon effect cannot explain the significant differences between prime age and young workers as both age groups are far away from retirement a lower bargaining power on the youth labor market brings the model closer to the data

equilibrium and inefficiency in a community model with peer group effects public service output depends on input expenditures on own personal characteristics and on the characteristics of the other residents in the community the peer group effect in a community model with public expenditures set by voting with migration between communities and with land price differentials capitalization it is shown that communities may become heterogeneous in composition and second best inefficient this equilibrium occurs when the peer group effect is neither too strong nor too weak the inefficiency arises because an externality is created by migration the land price differential does not play the part of the price of the better peer group but of a transfer payment

information bilateral negotiations and worker recruitment this paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel in the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers behavior in the past in the bilateral negotiations firms negotiate bilaterally with prospective workers and learn about workers performance in previous jobs we show that the interaction between social preferences the incompleteness of contracts and the existence of information about a worker s past performance provides an explanation for firms forgoing market opportunities and bilaterally negotiating with a worker we observe that approximately 30 of all job contracts were bilaterally negotiated when these contracts are incomplete as opposed to only 10 when contracts were complete the surplus from trade is higher when incomplete contracts can be bilaterally negotiated which can be attributed to the presence of information

know how sharing with stochastic innovations we provide a model of know how sharing between competing firms in which each of two firms gets a stochastic innovation in its stock of know how in every period separately considering the cases when innovations are indivisible and divisible we examine the nature of the subgame perfect sharing agreements that can obtain we discover that both stochasticity and indivisibility undermine the ability to support sharing furthermore we find that there are equilibria in which know how sharing can be intermittent and that small innovations are more likely to be shared than large ones when innovations are divisible but not necessarily when they are indivisible jel classification o30 o33 partage du savoir faire quand les innovations sont stochastiques les auteurs proposent un modele de partage du savoir faire entre entreprises concurrentes dans lequel chacune des deux entreprises obtient une innovation stochastique dans son stock of savoir faire a chaque periode en considerant separement les cas ou les innovations sont divisibles et non divisibles on examine la nature des accords de partage parfait qui peuvent se produire dans le sous jeu on montre que la stochasticite et l indivisibilite minent la possibilite de maintenir le partage de plus on decouvre que des solutions d equilibre avec partage de savoir faire peuvent jouer par intermittence et qu on est davantage susceptible de partager les fruits des petites innovations plus que des grandes quand les innovations sont divisibles mais pas necessairement quand elles sont indivisibles

gender discrimination in job ads evidence from china we study explicit gender discrimination in a population of ads on a chinese internet job board gender targeted job ads are common favor women as often as men and are much less common in jobs requiring higher levels of skill employers relative preferences for female versus male workers on the other hand are more strongly related to the preferred age height and beauty of the worker than to job skill levels almost two thirds of the variation in advertised gender preferences occurs within firms and one third occurs within firmoccupation cells overall these patterns are not well explained by a firm level animus model by a glass ceiling model or by models in which broad occupational categories are consistently gendered across firms instead the patterns suggest a model in which firms have idiosyncratic preferences for particular job gender matches which are overridden in skilled positions by factors such as thinner labor markets or a greater incentive to search broadly for the most qualified candidate jel codes j16 j63 j71 copyright 2013 oxford university press

cyclical variation in vacancy durations and vacancy flows an empirical analysis abstract this paper presents an empirical analysis of vacancy durations and vacancy flows in the netherlands over the years 1980 1988 we distinguish vacancies according to required occupation and educational levels we derive estimates of average vacancy durations and we use these to derive estimates of vacancy flows we find that vacancy durations generally increase with the required educational level moreover vacancy flows tend to be more responsive to the business cycle at lower educational levels while vacancy durations are more responsive at higher educational levels the number of vacancies generated by employers has not decreased during the recession in the early 80s which points to a dominant role of the supply of applicants in explaining the cyclical pattern of vacancy durations

knowledge barter in cities abstract since marshall principles of economics 1890 macmillan london it has been common for economists to model knowledge transfers as exogenous spillovers however there are many instances of knowledge transfers that are deliberate and reciprocal this paper models these endogenous knowledge transfers and shows that endogenous knowledge barter is fundamentally different than exogenous spillovers holding city size fixed we show that knowledge transfers may arise as a kind of barter when the value of knowledge is verifiable ex ante knowledge barter can also take place when the value of the knowledge transferred is verifiable only ex post if the interaction is repeated and if discount rates are not too high however the sustainability of knowledge barter depends crucially on city size when city size is large it is easier for an agent who withholds knowledge to go unpunished this means that the sustainable level of knowledge barter is smaller in a large city this result suggests that the knowledge agglomeration relationship is non monotonic the loss of cooperative knowledge exchange that occurs as city size grows can be a limit to optimum and equilibrium city sizes