efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading we consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object the seller s valuation and the buyer s valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables and each individual s valuation is unknown to the other we characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies for a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade and mechanisms that can maximize a broker s expected profit journal of economic literature classification number 026

information holdouts and land assembly abstract this paper solves for the equilibria of a land assembly game there are multiple perfect bayesian equilibria but only one involves no play of weakly dominated strategies the equilibrium has three important characteristics first the develop s bid is uninformative the counteroffers of the landowners depend therefore only on their priors second there is a holdout problem smaller landowners ask larger per acre prices for their land this means that when there are many landowners the price will be larger if there is an agreement and mutually beneficial agreements will more frequently be missed third when the asking prices of the landowners are strategic complements some landowners can be induced to accept a low bid because this leads other landowners to moderate their own asking prices

holdout existence information and contingent contracting abstractthe holdout problem permeates policy discussions of legal issues involving bargaining for land acquisition and more broadly impacts multilateral bargaining between agents laboratory experiments investigate the scope of the holdout problem the research strategy incorporates as treatment variables available information and the exposure problem arising from the unavailability of contingent contracts an examination reveals that holdout can reliably produce large inefficiencies and lost opportunities for mutually advantageous trade the introduction of contingent contracts facilitates successful bargaining however buyers are not made significantly better off by contingent contracts

land aggregation using contingent and guaranteed payments this article explores the use of alternative payment mechanisms to overcome the holdout problem when multiple parcels of land must be acquired to complete a real estate development project purchase offers contingent upon successful land aggregation are compared to combination offers containing both guaranteed and contingent payments to determine which approach better mitigates holdout the distribution of gains between developers and landowners is also examined the results of a series of economic experiments suggest that contingent offers expedite land aggregation but developer payoffs are higher when combination offers are used the results offer insight to real estate developers participating in land aggregation and inform government entities considering the necessity of public sector intervention in real estate markets to encourage desired development projects

costly external finance corporate investment and the subprime mortgage credit crisis abstract we study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment the crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non financial firms corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis controlling for firm fixed effects and time varying measures of investment opportunities consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short term debt are financially constrained or operate in industries dependent on external finance to address endogeneity concerns we measure firms financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis and confirm that similar results do not follow placebo crises in the summers of 2003 2006 nor do similar results follow the negative demand shock caused by september 11 2001 the effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008 when the demand side effects of the crisis became apparent additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that is generally overlooked in the literature

bargaining and reputation the paper develops a reputation based theory of bargaining the idea is to investigate and highlight the influence of bargaining postures on bargaining outcomes a complete information bargaining model a la rubinstein is amended to accommodate irrational types who are obstinate and indeed for tractability assumed to be completely inflexible in their offers and demands a strong independence of procedures result is derived after initial postures have been adopted the bargaining outcome is independent of the fine details of the bargaining protocol so long as both players have the opportunity to make offers frequently the latter analysis yields a unique continuous time limit with a war of attrition structure in the continuous time game equilibrium is unique and entails delay consequently inefficiency the equilibrium outcome reflects the combined influence of the rates of time preference of the players and the ex ante probabilities of different irrational types as the probability of irrationality goes to zero delay and inefficiency disappear furthermore if there is a rich set of types for both agents the limit equilibrium payoffs are inversely proportional to their rates of time preference

how long do junk bonds spend in default this paper analyzes junk bond defaults during 1980 to 1991 to determine which factors affect the length of time spent in default bondholder holdouts are not a significant problem as firms with proportionately more bonds have shorter default spells in contrast bank debt is associated with slower restructurings bargaining problems arising from contingent liabilities lawsuits and size delay the process although multiple bond classes do not neither information problems nor firm value appear to matter hlts do not resolve their defaults at a significantly faster pace defaults tend to take less time in the 1990s despite drexel s disappearance from the market

optimal capital structure a multi period programming model for use in financial planning abstract this paper describes a multi period chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period the firm s optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt the model assumes that the firm s objective is to maximize total value of the firm and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs finally the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model

seniority and maturity of debt contracts abstract this paper provides a model of how borrowers with private information about their credit prospects choose seniority and maturity of debt increased short term debt leads lenders to liquidate too often it also increases the sensitivity of financing costs to new information although better than average borrowers desire information sensitivity the model implies that short term debt will be senior to long term debt and that long term debt will allow the issue of additional future senior debt the model also has implications on the structure of leveraged buyouts and on how various types of lenders respond to potential defaults

an experimental study of the holdout problem in a multilateral bargaining game abstract when an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange this holdout problem is a common feature of the land assembly literature because development frequently requires the assembly of multiple parcels of land we use experimental methods to examine holdout behavior in a laboratory bargaining game that involves multi person groups complementary exchanges and holdout externalities the results of six treatments that vary the bargaining institution number of bargaining periods and the cost of delay demonstrate that holdout is common across institutions and is on average a payoff improving strategy for responders both proposers and responders take a more aggressive initial bargaining stance in multi period bargaining treatments relative to single period treatments but take a less aggressive bargaining stance when delay is costly nearly all exchanges eventually occur in our multi period treatments leading to higher overall efficiency relative to the single period treatments both with and without delay costs

holdout in the assembly of complements a problem for market design the colombian government s recent efforts to aggregate land for housing and infrastructure have run into holdout problems hundreds of distinct individual sellers must consent to assembly and many have demanded substantial disproportionate shares of the total aggregation surplus the federal communications commission fcc faces comparable challenges in its efforts to repurpose spectrum as profitable reallocation requires large contiguous spectrum blocks but spectrum ownership rights are fragmented among many sellers similar problems arise in a range of other contexts where a buyer attempts to aggregate complementary goods from many self interested sellers while mechanisms that fully respect sellers property rights 1 cannot alleviate these holdout problems traditional solutions such as the use of coercive government powers of eminent domain to expropriate property can encour age wasteful assemblies and undermine both owners property rights and social standards of fairness in section i we discuss the problems

the determinants of the maturity of corporate debt issues we document the determinants of the term to maturity of 7 369 bonds and notes issued between 1982 and 1993 our main finding is that large firms with investment grade credit ratings typically borrow at the short end and at the long end and of the maturity spectrum while firms with speculative grade credit ratings typically borrow in the middle of the maturity spectrum this pattern is consistent with the theory that risky firms do not issue short term debt in order to avoid inefficient liquidation but are screened out of the long term debt market because of the prospect of risky asset substitution traditionally capital structure research has focused on how much of a firm s future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders instead of equityholders an equally important issue is when future cash flows should be paid out to debtholders a firm that finances its projects with short term debt risks serious financial difficulty if the debt cannot be extended similarly a firm that finances its activities with long term debt can sacrifice profits by needlessly risking mismanagement of resources after cash flows are returned from investments but before they are due to debtholders this study investigates the factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their liabilities we document the determinants of the maturity of 7 368 public debt issues made by u s corporations between 1982 and 1993 our empirical tests are based on existing theoretical models that relate the maturity of a firm s borrowings to the riskiness of its cash flows the time until investments pay off the quality of information held by outsiders the expected

the evolution of debt policies new evidence from business startups abstract we investigate the evolution of entrepreneurial firms debt policies over a period of 15 years after startup considering leverage debt specialization debt maturity and debt granularity our analysis is based on a unique sample covering all non financial belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998 we find that the debt policy of entrepreneurial firms is remarkably stable over time the debt policy in the initial year of operation is a very important determinant of future debt policies even after controlling for traditional contemporaneous determinants the founder ceo has an important impact on the stability of debt policies the influence of initial debt policies on future debt policies is significantly reduced when the founder ceo is replaced or when s he dies combined our findings support imprinting theory

on the land assembly problem abstract we consider a segment of the land market where the entire available land stock is needed for the realization of some indivisible development project the stock is shared by several landholders who either collude or negotiate independently with the developer over the prices of their lots investigating the price setting behavior of the landowners and the optimal strategy of the developer we show that landowners set more moderate prices under collusion than when acting independently in the latter case the individual asking price falls with the size of the land share and the total price increases with the number of landowners as regards the optimal strategy we find that the developer will in general not offer the lowest price he expects to be accepted by the landowners

why are us firms using more short term debt abstract we show that corporate use of long term debt has decreased in the us over the past three decades and that this trend is heterogeneous across firms the median percentage of debt maturing in more than 3 years decreased from 53 in 1976 to 6 in 2008 for the smallest firms but did not decrease for the largest firms the decrease in debt maturity was generated by firms with higher information asymmetry and new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s and 1990s finally we show that demand side factors do not fully explain this trend and that public debt markets supply side factors play an important role our findings suggest that the shortening of debt maturity has increased the exposure of firms to credit and liquidity shocks

executive compensation and the maturity structure of corporate debt executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices delta and stock return volatility vega large deltas discourage managerial risk taking while large vegas encourage risk taking theory suggests that short maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences we posit and find evidence of a negative positive relation between ceo portfolio deltas vegas and short maturity debt we also find that short maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega and delta related incentives on bond yields overall our empirical evidence shows that short term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk

developing a social perspective to farm performance analysis abstract this paper examines how traditional farm productivity analysis can be extended to produce a performance measure from the perspective of society a biophysical model is used to measure inputs from the environment which are combined with conventional marketed inputs to develop an environmentally sensitive malmquist productivity index to determine social productivity growth data envelopment analysis dea is used to analyze data collected from selected farms in south east australia and includes a measure of leaching and run off as a proxy measure of the impact the application of fertilizers has on ground and surface water the results show measured productivity growth increases for some farms and decreases for others when environmental factors are considered

on the relevance of debt maturity structure in this paper we present a tax induced framework to analyze debt maturity problems we show that under some modifications of the existing u s tax code debt maturity is irrelevant even in the presence of taxes and bankruptcy costs that yield an optimal capital structure if this restrictive structure is relaxed and assuming the miller 15 equilibrium does not prevail tax reasons would usually imply the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure if there exists a gain from leverage then an increasing term structure of interest rates adjusted for default risk results in long term debt being optimal a decreasing term structure under similar circumstances renders short term debt optimal in the absence of agency costs a miller 15 type result emerges at equilibrium and irrelevance prevails we also argue that agency costs could again reverse the irrelevance and imply a firm specific optimal debt maturity structure there has been extensive discussion in the literature concerning the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure kraus 13 states without proof that efficient capital markets preclude the existence of an optimal debt maturity stiglitz 20 demonstrates the irrelevance of debt maturity but in an economic environment in which the entire financing decision is irrelevant due to the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs in contrast morris 16 argues that the issuance of short term debt can reduce the risk to stockholders and thereby increase equity value if the covariance between the net operating income and future interest rates is positive this result by morris is obtained even in the absence of taxes and when there is no probability of default the discrepancy between morris and stiglitz arises because morris uses the bogue and roll 31 multiperiod capital asset pricing model to incorporate uncertain future interest rates which implicitly assumes that investors cannot diversify away intertem

can buyer mobility reduce aggregation failures in land assembly abstract in this paper we examine whether site development competition can be used to facilitate land assembly in the absence of contingent contracts in particular we attempt to determine 1 whether competition can be induced among prospective sellers 2 whether or not competition increases aggregation rates and 3 what effects competition has on the distribution of surplus among the bargaining parties we also study the incidence with which a buyer endogenously chooses to deal with a single large parcel owner vs multiple small parcel owners to do so we make use of a laboratory experiment where all the relevant information about the project is common knowledge and landowner valuations are private information our results show that competition more than doubles aggregation rates with aggregation rates of approximately 40 in the baseline and at least 84 in the competitive treatments we also find that developers have a strong preference to make transactions with landowners who have consolidated land holdings doing so in 24 27 successful aggregations providing empirical evidence that there is a link between the transactions cost associated with land assembly and suburbanization as suggested by miceli and sirmans 2007

the impact of climate risk on firm performance and financing choices an international comparison increasingly adverse climatic conditions have created greater systematic risk for companies throughout the global economy few studies have directly examined the consequences of climate related risk on financing choices by publicly listed firms across the globe we attempt to do so using the global climate risk index compiled and published by germanwatch kreft eckstein 2014 which captures at the country level the extent of losses from extreme weather events as expected we find the likelihood of loss from major storms flooding heat waves etc to be associated with lower and more volatile earnings and cash flows consistent with policies that attempt to moderate such effects we show that firms located in countries characterized by more severe weather are likelier to hold more cash so as to build financial slack and thereby organizational resilience to climatic threats those firms also tend to have less short term debt but more long term debt and to be less likely to distribute cash dividends in addition we find that certain industries are less vulnerable to extreme weather and so face less climate related risk our results are robust to using an instrumental variable approach a propensity score matched sample and path analysis and remain unchanged when we consider an alternative measure of climate risk finally our conclusions are invariant to the timing of financial crises that can affect different countries at different times

does the source of capital affect capital structure prior work on leverage implicitly assumes capital availability depends solely on firm characteristics however market frictions that make capital structure relevant may also be associated with a firm s source of capital examining this intuition we find firms that have access to the public bond markets as measured by having a debt rating have significantly more leverage although firms with a rating are fundamentally different these differences do not explain our findings even after controlling for firm characteristics that determine observed capital structure and instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of having a rating firms with access have 35 more debt copyright 2006 oxford university press

the maturity structure of corporate debt we provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity our evidence offers strong support for the contracting cost hypothesis firms that have few growth options are large or are regulated have more long term debt in their capital structure we find little evidence that firms use the maturity structure of their debt to signal information to the market the evidence is consistent however with the hypothesis that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short term debt we find no evidence that taxes affect debt maturity

debt maturity and the cost of bank loans abstract this study explores the extent to which a firm s debt maturity structure affects the cost of bank loans by examining the u s syndicated loans from 1990 and 2014 we find that debt maturity structure is a major determinant of loan spreads after accounting for firm and loan specific variables and firm and year fixed effects a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of short term debt to total assets is associated with an increase of 11 44 basis points in loan spread representing an additional 0 644 million in interest expenses the results support the rollover risk hypothesis which predicts that short term debts intensify the shareholder and bondholder conflicts and lead to greater credit risk in addition high growth firms experience significantly smaller increases in their loan spreads than low growth firms when the short term debt ratio increases this finding is consistent with the asset substitution theory that short term debt mitigates the managerial shareholders risk taking incentives leading to a decrease in firm risk our results remain strong when we use alternative short term debt proxies address endogeneity concerns and perform various robustness tests

holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring a theory of negotiation in a weak contractual environment negotiations between a country in default and its international creditors are modeled as a dynamic game in an environment of weak contractual enforcement the country cannot borrow internationally until it settles with all creditors delay arises in equilibrium as creditors engage in strategic hold up the model a rms the conventional wisdom that delay increases with more creditors and with the advent of vulture creditors contrary to conventional wisdom putting collective action clauses into bond contracts may increase delay via free riding on negotiation costs even while preventing strategic holdup and reducing total negotiation costs secondary debt markets consolidate debt with high and disperse debt with low creditor bargaining power whether secondary markets reduce or increase delay depends on the interaction between strategic holdup and debt