product and price competition in a duopoly this paper examines the role of consumer preferences costs and price competition in determining the competitive product strategy of a firm in the model studied here there are two identical firms competing on product quality and price they face consumers who prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product but differ in how much they are willing to pay for quality the consumers can also choose a substitute if they don t like the product price offerings of the two firms for the firms a higher quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product the paper shows that the equilibrium strategy for each firm should be to differentiate its product from its competitor with the firm choosing the higher quality choosing the higher margin as well this differentiation however is not efficient that is it is possible to choose two other products and offer them at prices that cover their marginal cost and still satisfy consumers needs better in the aggregate a monopolist by contrast would differentiate his product line efficiently this suggests that cannibalization has different effects on product strategy than competition the paper also shows that if one firm enters the market first then it can defend itself from later entrants and gain a first mover advantage by preempting the most desirable product position

inventory and sales effort management under unobservable lost sales a retailer needs to make decisions regarding how much to order and how much sales effort to exert in an environment with uncertain demand one intrinsic complexity in a typical retail environment is caused by the fact that the retailer can obtain information about demand only based on sales as demand itself is unobservable taking a bayesian approach lariviere and porteus 1999 show that in such a setting a retailer should stock more to increase the probability of an exact demand observation in this article we extend their work by allowing the retailer to control both the stocking quantity and sales effort which can be used to affect demand we show that their insights with respect to information stalking carry over to this setting in addition our model allows gaining a better understanding of optimal sales effort strategies we find that demand management has a dual role in supporting information gathering while at the beginning of a product life cycle it is optimal to support learning effects by sharply reducing sales effort at later stages of the product life cycle an aggressive strategy of increased promotional activities can be used to harvest the information gathered in earlier periods

information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace this paper examines the interaction of information provision product quality and pricing decisions by competitive firms to explore the following question in a competitive market where consumers face uncertainty about product quality and or their preference for quality which firms those that sell higher or lower quality products have the higher incentive to provide what type of information we find that while the higher quality firm should always provide information resolving consumer uncertainty on product quality the lower quality firm under certain conditions will have the higher incentive to and will be the one to provide information resolving consumer uncertainty about their quality preferences in the analysis we trace the latter result to competition and to free riding on the information provision specifically in a monopoly market or when consumer free riding is restricted by the costliness of store visits the lower quality firm would have a lower incentive to provide information resolving consumer preference uncertainty than otherwise the model is also adapted to examine product returns as a possible strategy of information provision

can unspanned stochastic volatility models explain the cross section of bond volatilities in fixed income markets volatility is unspanned if volatility risk cannot be hedged with bonds we first show that all affine term structure models with state space m n m can be drift normalized and show when the standard variance normalization can be obtained using this normalization we find conditions for a wide class of affine term structure models to exhibit unspanned stochastic volatility usv we show that the usv conditions restrict both the mean reversions of risk factors and the cross section of conditional yield volatilities the restrictions imply that previously studied affine usv models are unlikely to be able to generate the observed cross section of yield volatilities however more general usv models can match the cross section of bond volatilities this paper was accepted by wei xiong finance

do the electronic books reinforce the dynamics of book supply chain market a theoretical analysis abstract in this paper we develop a set of mathematical models to examine and compare different pricing and launch strategies of electronic books e books under two types of copyright arrangements namely the royalty and buyout arrangements we conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess how various market structure parameters influence the publisher s pricing options in different copyright launch modes and channels of distribution aimed at gaining managerial insights into the complex issues in pricing and launch strategies involving e books we recommend optimal launch strategies and pricing decisions for the e book supply chain

explaining and forecasting bond risk premiums in examining the risk premiums for u s and german 10 year government bond yields the authors found that the decline in bond risk premiums since the 1980s is associated with a decrease in global output variability and an increase in the power of 10 year government bonds to diversify portfolios

technological change rediscovering the engine of productivity growth in china s rural economy abstract this paper focuses on measuring the relative importance of the role of technology versus that of institutional innovation in china s rural economy a six equation rice sector model explaining provincial level technology adoption yield and factor demand are econometrically estimated using data from china s 13 rice growing provinces for the period 1975 1990 growth decomposition analysis identifies technology adoption as the most important determinant of rice yield growth during 1978 1984 accounting for nearly 40 percent the change institutional reform accounted for 35 percent of the growth in 1985 1990 technology accounts for all of the increase in rice yields the study demonstrates earlier studies may have over estimated the impact of decollectivization

profit increasing consumer exit this paper examines the phenomenon of profit increasing consumer exit and the related phenomenon of profit decreasing consumer entry we demonstrate that firms can be better off in shrinking markets and worse off in growing markets even in the absence of competitive entry or exit specifically firms may benefit if a segment of consumers who are relatively indifferent about consuming any product in the category leave the market profits can increase for all firms even if the exiting consumers have strong preferences for only one of the products in the market in shrinking markets it is reasonable to assume that the people who are likely to exit the market first are people who are least committed to the category in particular people who are the least satisfied with the existing offers are the most likely to change their behavior by finding an alternative or adopting a new technology similarly in growing markets consumers who enter the market late are generally the least committed to the category such exiting can relax the competitive pressure between firms and lead to increased profitability our findings provide an explanation for profit growth that has been observed in product industries exhibiting slow and predictable declines over time including vacuum tubes cigarettes and soft drinks

designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers does the number of blocks matter when designing price contracts one of the major questions confronting managers is how many blocks there should be in the contract we investigate this question in the setting of a manufacturer retailer dyad facing a linear deterministic consumer demand theoretical marketing models predict that the manufacturer s profits rise dramatically when the number of blocks in the contract is increased from one to two because both channel efficiency and its share of channel profits increase however increasing the number of blocks to three yields no incremental profits we test these predictions experimentally and find that increasing the number of blocks from one to two raises channel efficiency but not the manufacturer s share of profits surprisingly having three blocks in the contract increases channel efficiency even further and also gives the manufacturer a slightly higher share of profits we show that these results can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which the manufacturer accounts for noisy best response due to nonpecuniary payoff components in the retailer s utility we also show that the retailer is sensitive to the counterfactual profits it could have earned if it were charged a lower marginal price for earlier blocks in the multiple block contract

monetary policy rules macroeconomic stability and inflation a view from the trenches i estimate a forward looking monetary policy reaction function for the federal reserve for the periods before and after paul volcker s appointment as chairman in 1979 using information that was available to the fomc in real time from 1966 to 1995 the results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inflation forecasts during both periods this contradicts the hypothesis based on analysis with ex post constructed data that the instability of the great inflation was the result of weak fomc policy responses to expected inflation a difference is that prior to volcker s appointment policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious drawing on contemporaneous accounts of fomc policy i discuss the implications of the findings for alternative explanations of the great inflation and the improvement in macroeconomic stability since then

spatial structure of agricultural production in china the spatial structure of county level agricultural production in china in 1999 is analysed a convenient simple method that corrects for both spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity in the input output relationships using spatial lag models and an allowance for the response coefficients to vary across relatively homogeneous regions are described empirical results suggest an abundant labour supply and extensive use of agricultural machinery reflected in its declining price although mechanization is relatively new machines have replaced fertilizer in agricultural production in the north northeast northwest and east regions while irrigation and fertilizer are the significantly important inputs in the central and southwest regions

managing channel profits a channel of distribution consists of different channel members each having his own decision variables however each channel member s decisions do affect the other channel members profits and as a consequence actions a lack of coordination of these decisions can lead to undesirable consequences for example in the simple manufacturer retailer consumer channel uncoordinated and independent channel members decisions over margins result in a higher price paid by the consumer than if those decisions were coordinated in addition the ensuing suboptimal volume leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer this paper explores the problems inherent in channel coordination we address the following questions what is the effect of channel coordination what causes a lack of coordination in the channel how difficult is it to achieve channel coordination what mechanisms exist which can achieve channel coordination what are the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanism what is the role of nonprice variables e g manufacturer advertising retailer shelf space in coordination does the lack of coordination affect normative implications from in store experimentation can quantity discounts be a coordination mechanism are some marketing practices actually disguised quantity discounts we review the literature and present a simple formulation illustrating the roots of the coordination problem we then derive the form of the quantity discount schedule that results in optimum channel profits this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 3 pages 239 272 in 1983

the effects of information transparency on suppliers manufacturers and consumers in online markets this paper looks into the effects of information transparency on market participants in an online trading environment we study these effects in business to business electronic markets with firms competing in both upstream and downstream industries the prior literature generally assumes that either the downstream firm buyer or the upstream firm seller is a monopoly it is not clear whether information transparency would still create value if both buyers and sellers face oligopolistic competition where the benefits of information transparency could be competed away to answer this question we first develop a simple two echelon e market model and then extend the model to more general settings we find that information transparency can create value for the overall e market yet it affects buyers and sellers very differently one side will be hurt depending on the competition mode cournot or bertrand in the downstream this suggests that a manufacturer owned a supplier owned and a neutral e market will have different preferences for information transparency finally we find that information transparency can hurt consumers when the downstream industry engages in bertrand competition this is a surprising result given the expectation that online markets create substantial value for consumers

costs and benefits of inducing intrabrand competition the role of limited liability when is inducing intrabrand competition via nonexclusive distribution an optimal strategy to address this issue a static model is developed to examine two settings the manufacturer uses exclusive distributors in the first setting and nonexclusive distributors in the second the analysis indicates that the choice of distribution rests critically on whether the manufacturer can effectively extract surplus from the distributors due to a variety of institutional reasons the distributors liability is often limited in performing on behalf of the manufacturer such limited liability restricts how much of the distributors surplus can be extracted when the distributors surplus cannot be fully extracted the manufacturer may prefer nonexclusive distribution even when distributors can free ride on each other s efforts

who should buy long term bonds according to conventional wisdom long term bonds are appropriate for conservative long term investors this paper develops a model of optimal consumption and portfolio choice for infinite lived investors with recursive utility who face stochastic interest rates solves the model using an approximate analytical method and evaluates conventional wisdom as risk aversion increases the myopic component of risky asset demand disappears but the intertemporal hedging component does not conservative investors hold assets to hedge the risk that real interest rates will decline long term inflation indexed bonds are most suitable for this purpose but nominal bonds may also be used if inflation risk is low

asymmetric wholesale pricing theory and evidence asymmetric pricing or asymmetric price adjustment is the phenomenon where prices rise more readily than they fall we offer and provide empirical support for a new theory of asymmetric pricing in wholesale prices wholesale prices may adjust asymmetrically in the small but symmetrically in the large when retailers face cost of price adjustment such retailers will not adjust prices for small changes in their costs manufacturers then see a region of inelastic demand where small wholesale price changes do not translate into commensurate retail price changes the implication is asymmetrica small wholesale price increase is more profitable because manufacturers will not lose customers from higher retail prices yet a small decrease is less profitable because it will not lower retail prices hence there is no extra revenue from greater sales for larger changes this asymmetry in the behavior of wholesale price vanishes as the price adjustment cost is compensated by the increase in retailers revenue resulting from correspondingly large retail price changes we present a formal economic model of a channel with forward looking retailers and cost of price adjustment test the derived propositions on the behavior of manufacturer prices using a large supermarket scanner data set and find that the results are consistent with the predictions of our theory we then discuss the implications for asymmetric pricing channels and cost of price adjustment literatures as well as public policy

exclusive territories and manufacturers collusion this paper highlights the rationale for exclusive territories in a model of repeated interaction between competing supply chains we show that with observable contracts exclusive territories have two countervailing effects on manufacturers incentives to sustain tacit collusion first granting local monopolies to retailers softens competition in a one shot game hence punishment profits are larger thereby rendering deviation more profitable second exclusive territories stifle deviation profits because retailers of competing brands adjust their prices to the wholesale contract offered by a deviant manufacturer whereas intrabrand competition prevents such instantaneous reaction we show that the latter effect tends to dominate thereby making exclusive territories a more suitable organizational mode to cooperate these insights are robust to endogenous communication between manufacturers we also consider retailers service investments here a novel effect emerges that softens the procollusive value of exclusive territories retailers of a deviant manufacturer increase investments which renders deviation more profitable this paper was accepted by preyas desai marketing

on credible delegation by oligopolists a discussion of distribution channel management several papers in the recent marketing literature have suggested that delegation in distribution e g the use of independent middlemen helps manufacturers to precommit strategically to profit enhancing competitive actions further the literature suggests that the profitability of such actions depends on market structure we challenge these conclusions here this is done in two steps first we perform an analysis of the entire class of models which have been used in the literature using internally consistent assumptions about market structure and contracting the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which all distribution channels have infinitely many levels of delegation obviously this is not what we see in the real world next we relax a key hidden assumption namely that all intra channel agreements are observable to competitors without this assumption the usual results unravel unless channel members can offer credible guarantees that unobservable agreements do not exist the strategic effects of delegation disappear since these guarantees are virtually impossible to maintain credibly we would expect to reject the hypothesis in the earlier literature relating channel structure to competition in an empirical study controlling for observability we conclude that mechanisms other than strategic ones must be responsible for the existence of delegated channels and make some suggestions about promising avenues for future theory research in channel structure

coordinating channels under price and nonprice competition this paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information free repair faster check out or after sales service differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high service retailers and lower price discount retailers therefore how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question yet the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard symmetric contracting assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination i bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation even if the retailers were ex ante identical in their cost and other characteristics the paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers next the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price service competition a manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice versa the paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers the framework that i develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity consumers are heterogeneous in their locations as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation and in their willingness to pay for retail services as in the models of vertical differentiation the model also uses a natural relationship in retail markets between the travel time cost incurred by a consumer and her willingness to pay the more affluent consumers who have a higher willingness to pay for retail services also have a higher cost for their personal time given these market features the paper analyzes the problem faced by a manufacturer who sells to competing retailers the paper shows that the standard notion in the literature of offering similar contracts to all the retailers is sufficient only in markets with substantial locational differentiation relative to the differences in the willingness to pay effective channel management in these markets simply requires mechanisms that ensure that retailer interests are aligned so that they compete by offering a mix of price and service that is desirable from the manufacturer s point of view however in markets with small locational differentiation and substantial diversity in consumer willingness to pay the manufacturer s problem is not just to align retailer interests but to also use the channel contract to induce the correct level of retail differentiation this helps the manufacturer to better cater to the diversity in consumer willingness to pay and to prevent the cut throat competition that the retailers would otherwise have indulged in the manufacturer can achieve this through the use of menu based contracts menu based contracts induce differentiated retailer behavior despite the fact that the retailers are not forced into accepting different terms of trade this aspect can be useful in shielding manufacturers from litigation under the robinson patman act the paper also shows that for relatively high ticket items retailers tend to be excessively biased towards competing in the provision of retail services the correlation between consumer willingness to pay for service and travel costs implies that for high ticket products the competing retailers will focus on the more service sensitive customers at the cost of ignoring the price sensitive consumers in the market the manufacturer is therefore likely to encourage greater price competition among the retailers in contrast for low ticket items the manufacturer prefers to reduce price competition and encourage greater provision of services this provides an endogenous rationale for the use of price ceilings versus floors the basic model is also extended to consider the effect of upstream competition between manufacturers under upstream competition coordinating retail price and service decisions is not always optimal for an individual manufacturer this extension to manufacturer competition provides a basis for understanding the role of retail price service differentiation in the context of a channel duopoly it also shows that a mixed distribution channel a channel in which one manufacturer chooses to be coordinated while the other chooses to be noncoordinated can be an equilibrium in markets with weak brand loyalty

strategic decentralization in channels the purpose of this paper is to understand the effect of strategic interaction on a manufacturer s channel structure decision in the model i analyze if there were no strategic interaction then the manufacturer would prefer vertical integration to decentralization with strategic interaction however decentralization can be a nash equilibrium strategy as mcguire and staein mcguire timothy richard staelin 1983a an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration marketing sci 2spring 161 192 showed so the question arises what is it about strategic interaction that makes decentralization a nash equilibrium strategy the answer i give is that strategic interaction makes it possible for a manufacturer s retail demand curve to rise when he decentralizes i show that this raising of the demand curve on decentralization can happen only if one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied 1 the manufacturers products are demand substitutes at the retail level and strategic complements at the manufacturer or retailer levels 2 the manufacturer s products are demand complements at the retail level and strategic substitutes at the manufacturer or retailer levels strategic complementarity at the retailer manufacturer level means that if one retailer manufacturer raises his price then the other retailer manufacturer would raise his price as well strategic substitutability is just the opposite these results show that what is important for decentralization to occur is not how demand substitutable the two manufacturers products are as one might have thought from earlier works in the literature but rather the nature of coupling between demand dependence and strategic dependence

retail competition and the dynamics of demand for tied goods we present a demand system for tied goods incorporating dynamics arising from the tied nature of the products and the stockpiling induced by storability and durability we accommodate competition across tied good systems and competing downstream retail formats by endogenizing the retail format at which consumers choose to stockpile inventory this facilitates measurement of long run retail substitution effects and yields estimates of complementarities within and substitution across competing systems of tied goods we present an empirical application to an archetypal tied goods category razors and blades we discuss the implications of measured effects for manufacturer pricing when selling the tied products through an oligopolistic downstream retail channel and assess the extent to which retail substitution reduces channel conflict

price matching guarantees are price matching guarantees anticompetitive we examine the incentives for price matching guarantees in markets where information about prices is costly the conventional explanation of price matching as facilitating cartel pricing finds some theoretical support but our model provides an additional explanation a price matching guarantee may be a credible and easily understood means of communicating to uninformed consumers that a firm is low priced the credibility of the signal is assured by the behavior of informed consumers we contrast the testable implications of our model with those arising from two theories of price matching as anticompetitive and show that available evidence supports the signalling theory

price and warranty period decisions for complementary products with horizontal firms cooperation noncooperation strategies abstract the purpose of this paper is to explore the optimal strategies on price and warranty period of two complementary products in a supply chain with two manufacturers and one common retailer from a two stage game theoretic perspective five decentralized models are established by considering the two manufacturers cooperation noncooperation strategies and the firms different bargain powers the corresponding closed form expressions for equilibrium decisions are obtained through a systematic analysis and comparison some interesting and valuable managerial insights are established we find that the retailer always has the advantage to get the higher profit when she is a leader however this is not always valid for two manufacturers for example two manufacturers profits when they are leaders and they adopt the noncooperation strategy in the supply chain are lower than that when two manufacturers and the retailer have the identical market power all channel members as well as consumers benefit from lower retail prices longer warranty periods and larger profits when the two manufacturers adopt cooperation action

evaluating an alternative risk preference in affine term structure models dai and singleton 2002 and duffee 2002 show that there is a tension in affine term structure models between matching the mean and the volatility of interest rates this article examines whether this tension can be solved by an alternative parametrization of the price of risk the empirical evidence suggests that first the examined parametrization is not sufficient to solve the mean volatility tension second the usual result in the estimation of affine models indicating that some of the state variables are extremely persistent may have been caused by the lack of flexibility in the parametrization of the price of risk term structure models have several uses including pricing fixed income derivatives managing the risk of fixed income portfolios and detecting relationships between the term structure of interest rates and macrovariables such as inflation and consumption to perform well in these tasks term structure models must be numerically and econometrically tractable while matching the empirical properties of the term structure movements at least two empirical properties of the term structure of interest rates have been well established by financial economists over the years see dai and singleton 2003 for a survey first the term premium or the expected excess return of treasury bonds has a high time variability second the volatility of interest rates is time varying these two properties are so prominent in the data that they will be referred to as stylized facts while these two stylized facts are very well established in the empirical literature affine term structure models are thoroughly discussed in the theoretical literature affine models are those in which the yield of zero coupon bonds are affine functions of the model state variables classic

vertical control and price versus nonprice competition this paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good the mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the product margin whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins given search or travel costs consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins in considering customers on the wrong margin retailers are therefore biased toward price competition this distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints

advertising in a distribution channel conventional wisdom suggests that one of the goals of manufacturer advertising is to reduce the cross price elasticity between products make one s own and rivals products appear to be less substitutable in the eyes of consumers conventional wisdom also suggests that all else being equal retailers will be able to obtain better terms of trade from manufacturers the more substitutable are the manufacturers products it follows that retailers should be opposed to advertising that has the effect of reducing cross price elasticities and thus that manufacturer advertising can be a source of channel conflict we show that these conventional wisdoms need not hold when only some consumers are exposed to the advertising messages using a hotelling model of demand we show that 1 manufacturers can be worse off from advertising that reduces the cross price elasticities between their products 2 channel conflict need not arise even when the sole purpose of advertising is to affect cross price elasticities and 3 depending on its bargaining power a retailer can be better off when the manufacturers products are perceived to be less substitutable

a bargaining theory of distribution channels abstract a critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties in this article the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer one retailer channel to establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract they show that the institution of bargaining has force and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present the authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination thus there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members the authors rec

research note channel structure with knowledge spillovers we study two main questions in this paper 1 how do spillovers of knowledge created by manufacturers investments in process innovation affect channel structure and effort investment incentives 2 what are the interactions between organizational incentives to form joint ventures and strategic alliances with competitors and coordinate decisions vertically with downstream channel members we focus on situations where spillovers are involuntary firms innovative activities are nonoverlapping and firms benefit directly from the results of competitors innovations under these conditions we find that spillovers in process knowledge increase the likelihood of observing decentralized channel structures surprisingly decentralized manufacturers invest more in process innovation than perfectly coordinated manufacturers do when spillovers are large moreover in industries where large spillovers exist horizontal cooperation among manufacturers induces higher levels of process innovation investments than channel coordination does from a public policy perspective however the desirability of such cooperative arrangements among competitors depends on channel structure joint ventures among decentralized manufacturers are more likely to meet the regulators criteria of raising effort investments than cooperation among integrated manufacturers would be investment incentives are best provided when firms share their process knowledge and are buffered from subsequent price competition by independent retailers

the causal effect of mortgage refinancing on interest rate volatility empirical evidence and theoretical implications this article investigates the effects of mortgage backed security mbs hedging activity on interest rate volatility and proposes a model that takes these effects into account an empirical examination suggests that the inclusion of information about mbss considerably improves model performance in pricing interest rate options and in forecasting future interest rate volatility the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that mbs hedging affects the interest rate volatility implied by both options and the actual interest rate volatility the results also indicate that the inclusion of information about the mbs universe may result in models that better describe the price of fixed income securities

can resale price maintenance and franchise fees correct sub optimal levels of retail service abstract this paper examines resale price maintenance by a monopoly manufacturer who sells its product through monopolistically competitive retailers the retailers also provide service but there is an externality in its provision if the manufacturer sets only a wholesale price the externality results in too little service and the addition of rpm will not correct this maximum rpm is used only to correct the successive monopoly problem with no effect on service however if the manufacturer can also set a franchise fee too little service arises when the externality is large minimum rpm will correct this increasing both profits and consumer surplus this partially confirms the telser 1960 argument for rpm when the externality is small retailers provide too much service and the vertical externality argument is invalid these results suggest that the insights from simple vertical models may not generalize to models which allow other dimensions of non price competition among retailers

multilateral bargaining and downstream competition we examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships that involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers in these relationships the negotiations are interdependent and bargaining externality may arise across the retailers in addition the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important in simultaneous bargaining the retailers negotiate without knowing if an agreement has been reached in the other retail channel whereas in sequential bargaining the retailer in the second negotiation is able to observe whether an agreement was reached in the first negotiation we show that simultaneous bargaining is optimal for the manufacturer when the retail prices and profitability are similar and sequential bargaining is preferred when the dispersion in the retail prices is sufficiently large as a result of ex post renegotiations the manufacturer may strategically stock out the less profitable retailer who charged a relatively low retail price and exclusively supply only the retailer who charged a relatively high retail price and maintained high channel profitability moreover ex post multilateral bargaining can buffer downstream competition and thus lead to positive retail profits even in markets that are close to perfect competition

research note competitive bundling and counterbundling with generalist and specialist firms bundling which is the practice of selling two or more products or services in a package is a pervasive marketing practice and is often used as a strategic competitive tool however there has not been enough consideration of competitive bundling situations in which exit of a competitor is not a concern in this paper we address this issue by identifying conditions under which strategic competitors may or may not resort to bundling when competitor exit considerations are absent we study competition between a multiproduct generalist firm and two single product specialist firms in two product categories one of which has undifferentiated products and the other has differentiated products in our model the specialist firms can form an alliance to bundle their products in competing with the generalist firm in contrast to the previous literature we find that concurrent bundling by competitors if it occurs in equilibrium is profitable we also find that when one competitor bundles and the other does not the bundling firm gains a greater share of customers and makes a higher profit however when conditions favor counterbundling by a competitor such counterbundling helps the competitor retain its customers finally we note that under other market conditions concurrent bundling by competitors escalates price competition to the extent that retaining customers through bundling is not profitable in such a case we show that strategic competitors are better off having asymmetric product lines with one competitor bundling and the other selling unbundled

research notesole entrant co optor or component supplier optimal end product strategies for manufacturers of proprietary component brands we propose the optimal strategies in the end product market for manufacturers of proprietary component brands mpcbs for short mpcbs can pursue one of three end product roles sole entrant as with 3com that until recently offered its palm operating system only as part of its own palm handheld devices co optor as with canon whose specialty motors go into its own and hp laser printers component supplier as with intel which has refrained from making its own pcs applying extant theoretical and modeling perspectives especially from branding spatial competition and channels we show that although each of the three roles has its unique domain of optimality the co optor role is the most widely optimal for the mpcb it is profit maximizing even when the end products are strong but not perfect substitutes an alternative component is available and the downstream market is saturated optimal prices under the co optor role are higher than under the other roles we provide an illustrative application of the model to three real world settings

are there increasing returns to pollution abatement empirical analytics of the environmental kuznets curve in pesticides abstract according to the environmental kuznets curve ekc hypothesis economic growth and the reduction of environmental degradation are compatible goals an inverted u shaped relationship between economic performance and environmental pollution suggests that empirically an economy is associated with smaller levels of pollution after some threshold income point one potential explanation for the empirical evidence of an ekc is increasing returns to pollution abatement where the abatement efficiency rises with an increase in the scale of abatement doubling the clean up efforts more than doubles the abatement of pollution as this efficiency gain makes abatement less expensive pollution might fall as more abatement is undertaken this study tests the hypothesis that there are increasing returns to abating pollution empirical evidence on environmental risks in the us agricultural sector since 1970 support the existence of increasing returns in addition i estimate the productivity of pollution abatement using refined empirical productivity measurement methods and explicitly control the level of technology the results show the importance of including an environmental productivity variable in the ekc framework

macro factors and the term structure of interest rates this paper presents an essentially affine model of the term structure of interest rates making use of macroeconomic factors and their long run expectations the model extends the approach pioneered by kozicki and tinsley 2001 by modeling consistently long run inflation expectations simultaneously with the term structure application to the u s economy shows the importance of long run inflation expectations in the modeling of long term bond yields the paper also provides a macroeconomic interpretation for the latent factors found in standard finance models of the yield curve the level factor represents the long run inflation expectation of agents the slope factor captures business cycle conditions and the curvature factor expresses a clear independent monetary policy factor

the impact of trades on daily volatility this article proposes a trading based explanation for the asymmetric effect in daily volatility of individual stock returns previous studies propose two major hypotheses for this phenomenon leverage effect and time varying expected returns however leverage has no impact on asymmetric volatility at the daily frequency and moreover we observe asymmetric volatility for stocks with no leverage also expected returns may vary with the business cycle that is at a lower than daily frequency trading activity of contrarian and herding investors has a robust effect on the relationship between daily volatility and lagged return consistent with the predictions of the rational expectation models the non informational liquidity driven herding trades increase volatility following stock price declines and the informed contrarian trades reduce volatility following stock price increases the results are robust to different measures of volatility and trading activity jel c30 g11 g12 stock return volatility is fundamental to finance contingent claims pricing risk management asset allocation and market efficiency tests use volatility as a basic building block consequently volatility has been widely studied along several dimensions volatility clustering in financial data has been well documented and extensively modeled by the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity arch of engle 1982 and the generalized arch extension of bollerslev 1986 1 shiller 1981 leroy and porter 1981 roll 1984 1988 french and roll 1986 and cutler poterba and summers 1989 have all documented a significant amount of volatility that cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals and thus may be attributable to mispricing schwert 1989 has studied the variation in stock market volatility over time and has analyzed the

when showrooming increases retailer profit abstractshowrooming the phenomenon of consumers visiting a brick and mortar b m store to learn about products but then buying online to obtain lower prices is attracting increased attention both in business practice and in academic literature it is considered a major threat to the b m retailers and determining how to fight it seems to be the only consideration however the manufacturer s need for retail informational services has always been one of the essential reasons for retailers to exist and is a means for retailers to achieve profitability the popular arguments about the threat of showrooming ignore the strategic role of the manufacturer in the distribution channel this article analytically shows that when the manufacturer s decisions are considered i e when the manufacturer retailer contract is endogenous consumers ability to engage in showrooming may lead to increased rather than decreased profitability for b m retailer s thus retail efforts to restrict showrooming behavior m

exploiting the conditional density in estimating the term structure an application to the cox ingersoll and ross model we propose an empirical method that utilizes the conditional density of the state variables to estimate and test a term structure model with known price formulae using data on both discount and coupon bonds the method is applied to an extension of a two factor model due to cox ingersoll and ross 1985 cir our results show that estimates based on only bills imply unreasonably large price errors for longer maturities we reject the original cir model using a likelihood ratio test and conclude that the extended cir model also fails to provide a good description of the treasury market

price dispersion in the grocery market this paper provides an exploratory study of price dispersion in the grocery market and checks for the consistency of the evidence on this price dispersion with the existing theories of price dispersion due to costly consumer search competition and consumer heterogeneity in the context of the grocery market three dimensions of price dispersion are studied price dispersion for a certain brand across stores price dispersion within a category in a store across brands and price dispersion over time for a certain brand the results show that the standardized price dispersion is positively correlated with consumer search costs competition and consumer heterogeneity

contract design with a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe we show that under some conditions quantity discounts and two part tariffs are equivalent as mechanisms for channel coordination when an upstream firm sells its product in a downstream market that is characterized by a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe we consider a setting in which discriminatory offers are feasible and a setting in which the same menu of options must be offered to all retailers we find that the upstream firm s profit in both settings is independent of whether quantity discounts or two part tariffs are used the implication of this finding is that the firm s choice of contract design may turn on which one is easier to implement

a general theory of pass through in channels with category management and retail competition i provide a general formulation of the channel pass through problem as a comparative static of the retail price equilibrium and i analyze the impact of category management and retail competition on pass through focusing on brand and retailer differences and the nature of the cost change being passed through whether it is brand specific retailer specific both or neither with category management a retailer s response to a brand specific cost change is not limited to that brand in general a retailer will also change the prices of other brands the cross brand effect can be positive or negative and depending on its sign it either enhances or attenuates pass through i explain the cross brand effect as an interaction between two forces a demand substitution force that pushes for a negative cross brand effect and a strategic complementarity force that pushes for a positive cross brand effect retail competition adds another layer of strategic complementarity causing other retailers to respond even for retailer specific cost changes and increasing pass through of categorywide cost changes but its effect for brand specific cost changes is ambiguous i apply the theory to two commonly used demand functions linear demand and nested logit and show that they have significantly different pass through properties the paper concludes with a discussion of how the theory relates to the empirical literature including the companion piece by besanko et al besanko d j p duba s gupta 2005 own brand and cross brand retail pass through marketing sci 24 1 123 137

an industry equilibrium analysis of downstream vertical integration this paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on nash equilibrium distribution structures in a duopoly where each manufacturer distributes its goods through a single exclusive retailer which may be either a franchised outlet or a factory store static linear demand and cost functions are assumed and a number of rules about players expectations of competitors behavior are examined it is found that for most specifications product substitutability does influence the equilibrium distribution structure for low degrees of substitutability each manufacturer will distribute its product through a company store for more highly competitive goods manufacturers will be more likely to use a decentralized distribution system this article was originally published in marketing science volume 2 issue 2 pages 161 191 in 1983

reverse bullwhip effect in pricing price variability is one of the major causes of the bullwhip effect this paper analyzes the impact of procurement price variability in the upstream of a supply chain on the downstream retail prices procurement prices may fluctuate over time for example when the supply chain players deploy auction type procurement mechanisms or if the prices are dictated in market exchanges a game theory framework is used here to model a serial supply chain sequential price game scenarios are investigated to show that there is an increase in retail price variability and an amplified reverse bullwhip effect on prices rbp under certain demand conditions

agency costs in a supply chain with demand uncertainty and price competition in this paper we model a manufacturer that contracts with two retailers who then choose retail prices and stocking quantities endogenously in a bayesian nash equilibrium if the manufacturer designs a contract that is accepted by both retailers it sets the wholesale price as a compromise between two conflicting roles reducing intrabrand retail price competition and inducing retailers to stock closer to first best levels that is optimum for the supply chain as a whole in equilibrium fill rates are less than first best if on the other hand the manufacturer eliminates retail competition by designing a contract accepted by only one retailer the assignment of consumers to retailers is inefficient in either equilibrium the performance of the supply chain is strictly less than first best however the manufacturer achieves first best retail prices and fill rates if it can subsidize the retailers leftover inventory absent such subsidies the two retailer equilibrium arises when the two retailers compete less intensively in that equilibrium numerical results indicate that the value of subsidizing unsold inventory is increasing in demand uncertainty intensity of retail competition and salvage value of inventory and is decreasing in manufacturing cost and opportunity cost of shelf space

when good news about your rival is good for you the effect of third party information on the division of channel profits the internet has led to a large number of third party sources that offer high quality information about firms s products at little or no cost to consumers as a result many of these sources have grown in popularity extending well beyond the usual reach of traditional third parties such asconsumer reports andkelly s blue book for example the online version ofedmunds offers at no cost to consumers information about new products existing products long term tests and buyers guides all relating to the automotive industry avweb com delivers weekly aviation news and new product reviews to its readers and a large number of websites follow developments on computer platforms such as the apple macintosh in this paper we analyze how the provision of third party information affects the division of profits in a multiproduct distribution channel to illustrate consider the competition between microsoft and apple in the operating systems os market and their channel relationship to compusa a retailer that sells both macs and windows based pcs consider two pieces of thirdparty information first suppose that cnet an internet technology site reviews the newest upgrade of the macos and writes that the new user interface is even easier to use than previously second suppose that an article in the technology section of thewall street journal notes that changes in apple s networking support now enable macs to be better integrated into pc networks these two pieces of information are similar in the sense that they both express good news about the macos and thus they both can be expected to benefit apple by increasing consumer demand for macs one might also expect that in both cases compusa will capture some of the gains that come from the increased demand for macs and that microsoft will lose because the good news about the macos will induce some consumers to choose macs over windows based pcs however we will show that this intuition is incorrect the two reviews can have surprisingly different implications for the profits of microsoft and compusa the reason is that the two reviews differ on one crucial dimension the group of customers for whom they are primarily relevant the cnet review talks about improvements in the customer interface precisely what apple score consumers care about thewall street journal review talks about compatibility with prevailing pc standards important to consumers who care relatively more about compatibility and who are thus more likely to prefer windows apple snoncore consumers we show that good news about the macos that is more relevant to apple s core consumers the cnet review benefits microsoft but harms compusa while good news about the macos that is more relevant to apple s noncore consumers thewall street journal review has the opposite effect it harms microsoft but benefits compusa stated more generally our main result is that when third party information affects consumers product valuations the type of information that induces the change is critical to understanding which firms gain and which firms lose in particular depending on the type of third party information we find that 1 a retailer can be harmed by good news about a product that it carries 2 a manufacturer can gain from good news about a rival s product and 3 good news about a product category need not benefit all the manufacturers in that category there are three novel features of the analysis first we derive the equilibrium division of profit among firms when a retailer sells the products of competing manufacturers and we have done so while placing few restrictions on the feasible set of contracts second we show how this equilibrium division of profit lends itself to a simple graphical interpretation that depicts which firms gain and which firms lose from third party information third we provide a taxonomy of information types and identify the key features of each type that cause profit incentives to vary in particular we conceptualize information as having three components namely 1 the products to which the information pertains 2 whether the information is positive or negative and 3 the consumers to whom the information is relevant we show that all three information components play a role in determining the change in each firm s profit our framework can also be used to analyze a variety of other settings of interest for example it can be used to analyze profit incentives when the retailer has bargaining power when there is downstream competition and when there are non information based changes in consumers valuations in addition our framework may be used both to analyze the effects on profits of persuasive advertising and to predict advertising content

a comparison of different quantity discount pricing policies in a two echelon channel with stochastic and asymmetric demand information abstract in this paper we study quantity discount pricing policies in a channel of one manufacturer and one retailer the paper assumes that the channel faces a stochastic price sensitive demand but the retailer can privately observe the realization of an uncertain demand parameter the problem is analyzed as a stackelberg game in which the manufacturer declares quantity discount pricing schemes to the retailer and then the retailer follows by selecting the retail price and associated quantity proposed in the paper are four quantity discount pricing policies regular quantity discount fixed percentage discount incremental volume discount and fixed marginal profit rate discount optimal solutions are derived and numerical examples are presented to illustrate the efficiency of each discount policy

bt cotton in india field trial results and economic projections abstract the performance of bt cotton in india is analyzed on the basis of field trial data from 2001 the amounts of pesticides applied during the trials were reduced to one third of what was used in conventional cotton while under severe pest pressure yield gains were 80 productivity effects are modeled econometrically with a damage control specification the first approval for the commercial cultivation of bt hybrids was given in 2002 by 2005 the technology is expected to cover one quarter of total indian cotton area medium term projections show sizeable welfare gains for the overall economy with farmers being the main beneficiaries

commentaries and rejoinder to measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks by paulo albuquerque and bart j bronnenberg this series of discussions presents commentaries and a rejoinder on strategic and managerial issues arising from albuquerque and bronnenberg albuquerque p b j bronnenberg 2012 measuring the impact of negative demand shocks on car dealer networks marketing sci 31 1 4 23

regime shifts in a dynamic term structure model of u s treasury bond yields this article develops and empirically implements an arbitrage free dynamic term structure model with priced factor and regime shift risks the risk factors are assumed to follow a discrete time gaussian process and regime shifts are governed by a discrete time markov process with state dependent transition probabilities this model gives closed form solutions for zero coupon bond prices an analytic representation of the likelihood function for bond yields and a natural decomposition of expected excess returns to components corresponding to regime shift and factor risks using monthly data on u s treasury zero coupon bond yields we show a critical role of priced state dependent regime shift risks in capturing the time variations in expected excess returns and document notable differences in the behaviors of the factor risk component of the expected returns across high and low volatility regimes additionally the state dependence of the regime switching probabilities is shown to capture an interesting asymmetry in the cyclical behavior of interest rates the shapes of the term structure of volatility of bond yield changes are also very different across regimes with the well known hump being largely a low volatility regime phenomenon jel g12 this article develops and empirically implements an arbitrage free dynamic term structure model dtsm with priced factor and regimeshift risks the risk factors are assumed to follow a discrete time gaussian process and regime shifts are governed by a discrete time markov process with state dependent transition probabilities agents are assumed to know both the current state of the economy and the regime they are currently in this leads to regime dependent risk neutral pricing and an equilibrium term structure that reflects the risks of both changes in the state and shifts in regimes

expectation puzzles time varying risk premia and dynamic models of the term structure abstract linear projections of returns on the slope of the yield curve have contradicted the implications of the traditional expectations theory this paper shows that these findings are not puzzling relative to a large class of richer dynamic term structure models specifically we match all the key empirical findings reported by fama and bliss 1987 american economic review 77 4 680 692 and campbell and shiller 1991 review of economic studies 58 495 514 among others within large subclasses of affine and quadratic gaussian term structure models additionally we show that certain risk premium adjusted projections of changes in yields on the slope of the yield curve recover the coefficients of unity predicted by the models key to this matching are parameterizations of the market prices of risk that let the risk factors affect the market prices of risk directly and not only through factor volatilities the risk premiums have a simple form consistent with fama s findings on the predictability of forward rates and are also shown to be consistent with interest rate feedback rules used by a monetary authority in setting monetary policy

comment managing channel profits comment in a recent paper in this journal jeuland and shugan jeuland a s shugan 1983 managing channel profits marketing sci 2 summer 239 272 proposed a quantity discount schedule as a way of coordinating a channel as they put it on p 253 of their paper a quantity discount schedule which would fix the retailer s and hence the manufacturer s profits to some fixed linear function of total channel profits would lead the channel to maximize profits the purpose of this note is to show that a quantity discount schedule is not necessary for channel coordination

an economic theory of vertical restraints vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices locations and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price mediated exchange of conventional markets in this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints in a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers decisions these externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits we identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient under various conditions to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint profit maximum

hybrid rice innovation in china a study of market demand induced technological innovation in a centrally planned economy this paper uses the innovation of hybrid rice in china as a case study to test the validity of the griliches schmookler hypothesis of market demand induced technological innovation in a centrally planned economy the empirical evidence indicates that the size of rice acreage in a province is the major factor in determining the amount of resource allocation for rice research and the adoption intensity of hybrid rice in that province this evidence is consistent with the implication of the griliches schmookler hypothesis copyright 1992 by mit press

pesticide productivity host plant resistance and productivity in china abstract pesticides are used as the primary method of pest control in asian rice production conditions in china have led to demand for high and increasing rice yields resulting in intensive cultivation and adoption of fertilizer responsive varieties the consequence has been widespread pest infestations many studies have estimated pesticide productivity but few have estimated the productivity of alternative methods of pest control namely host plant resistance none have estimated the substitutability between these methods of pest control the productivity of pesticides and host plant resistance and the substitutability between them is measured using two stage cobb douglas and translog production functions under intensive rice production systems in eastern china pesticide productivity is low compared to the productivity of host plant resistance in fact returns to pesticide use are negative at the margin host plant resistance is an effective substitute for pesticides and substantial reductions in pesticide use could be achieved with no loss in rice production through improvements in host plant resistance these results suggest that pesticides are being overused in eastern china and host plant resistance is being under utilized government policies to promote increased pesticides in rice might be ill advised given the low productivity and negative returns particularly in light of well known negative externalities associated with pesticide use

strategic interactions between channel structure and demand enhancing services in this paper we investigate how opportunities to invest in demand enhancing services for a product line affect the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealer many demand enhancing services e g after sales support warranty repair etc can be provided either by the manufacturer or they can be delegated to the dealer we first show that when a manufacturer retains control of such services the dealer will have an incentive to choose a decentralized organizational structure as a means of committing to non product line pricing since this will encourage the manufacturer to invest more in demand enhancing services we then consider a game that is played between the manufacturer and the dealer in which the dealer chooses between centralized product line pricing or decentralized non product line pricing operations and the manufacturer chooses between insourcing the services i e providing them herself or outsourcing them to the dealer we find that the equilibrium depends on which if any channel partner has the ability to act as a stackelberg leader if the dealer can move first then the equilibrium will always be outsourced services and centralized dealer operations however if either the manufacturer moves first or if neither partner can move first then the equilibrium can be either insourced services and decentralized dealer operations or outsourced service and centralized dealer operations

research note the effects of costs and competition on slotting allowances we consider the optimal two part tariff contract between a manufacturer and a retailer we show that retail competition in the presence of either fixed costs or bargaining power may lead to slotting allowances in an optimal contract even with a monopoly manufacturer and no information asymmetry on the other hand slotting allowances do not arise with a monopoly retailer and no information asymmetry whether the manufacturer is a monopoly or not we also show that more intense retail competition higher retail bargaining power larger retailer fixed costs lower marginal costs of retailing as well as larger relative retailer size whether coming from a location or operating advantage have a positive impact on the incidence and the magnitude of slotting allowances the opposing effects of the fixed and marginal operating costs on slotting allowances as well as the impact of competition and bargaining power on profits underscore the importance of careful definitions of these variables in empirical research

an international examination of affine term structure models and the expectations hypothesis we examine the yield curve behavior and the relative performance of affine term structure models atsms using government bond yield data from canada germany japan the u k and the u s we find strong predictability of forward rates for excess bond returns and reject the expectations hypothesis in all five countries a three factor model is sufficient to capture movements in the yield curve of canada japan the u k and the u s but may not be enough for germany an exhaustive comparison among atsms with no more than three factors reveals that the three factor essential affine model a 1 3 e with only one factor affecting the volatility of the short rate but with all three factors affecting the price of risk performs best in all five countries simulations provide inconclusive evidence on whether this best affine model can successfully generate the rich yield curve behavior observed in the data

going where the ad leads you on high advertised prices and searching where to buy an important role of informative advertising is to inform consumers of the simple fact that the shop that advertises sells a particular product this information may help consumers to save on their search activities instead of wandering around a consumer can simply visit the shop that has advertised knowing that there he can find the commodity he is looking for the implications of this simple fact have not been studied before using game theoretic reasoning in a model that combines consumer search and firms advertising we show that firms may find it optimal to advertise prices that are higher than nonadvertised prices the important mechanism underlying this result is that advertising lowers the expected search cost for consumers through this analysis we provide a new insight into the role of informative advertising

beyond price mechanisms how much can service help manage the competition from gray markets abstract companies operating global supply chains in various industries struggle with parallel importers diverting goods from authorized channels to gray markets while the existing gray market literature mainly focuses on pricing in this paper we develop a model to examine the role of demand enhancing services as non price mechanisms for coping with gray markets we consider a manufacturer that sells a product in two markets and a parallel importer that transfers the product from the low price market to the high price market and competes with the manufacturer on price and service we show that parallel importation forces the manufacturer to provide more service in both markets we explore the value of service and the effects of competition intensity and market responsiveness to service on the manufacturer s policy we find that a little service can go a long way in boosting the profit of the manufacturer investing in service enables the manufacturer to differentiate herself from the parallel importer and to achieve the ideal price discrimination in addition service increases the value of strategic price discrimination when facing parallel importation we also analyze the case when the manufacturer sells through a retailer in the high price market and can delegate service provision to the retailer or provide service herself we find that delegating service to the retailer reduces double marginalization and can simultaneously benefit the manufacturer and the retailer even if the retailer is not as efficient as the manufacturer

accounting for a shift in term structure behavior with no arbitrage and macro finance models this paper examines a shift in the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates in the u s during the mid 1980s we document this shift using standard interest rate regressions and using dynamic a ne no arbitrage models estimated for the pre and post shift subsamples the term structure shift largely appears to be the result of changes in the pricing of risk associated with a level factor using a macro nance model we suggest a link between this shift in term structure behavior and changes in the dynamics and risk pricing of the federal reserve s in ation target as perceived by investors

international diversification with securitized real estate and the veiling glare from currency risk this paper analyzes diversification benefits from international securitized real estate in a mixed asset context we apply regression based mean variance efficiency tests conditional on currency unhedged and fully hedged portfolios to account for foreign exchange risk exposure from the perspective of a us investor it is shown that first international diversification is superior to a us mixed asset portfolio second adding international real estate to an already internationally diversified stock and bond portfolio results in a further significant improvement of the risk return trade off and third considering unhedged international assets could lead to biased asset allocation decisions not realizing the true diversification benefits from international assets our in sample results are quite robust in out of sample analysis and when investment frictions like short selling constraints are introduced