health and democracy in spite of the inexorable march of democracy around the globe just how democratic institutions a ect human well being is open to debate the evidence that democracy promotes prosperity is neither strong nor robust moreover which aspects of policy making and human well being are promoted by democracies is still a subject of debate 1 even if correlations between democracy and outcome measures can be found there is an overriding di culty of interpreting them as causal e ects whether democracy matters per se or simply serves as a proxy for societal and political development presents a di cult problem for research in this area thinkers such as lipset 1959 have argued that democracy can thrive only when conditions are right if this is correct then becoming democratic may only serve as a proxy for these hard to measure cultural and societal preconditions this paper explores these issues further by reconsidering the link between democracy and health using panel data from a cross section of countries the

consumers and the brain drain product and process design and the gains from emigration abstract we consider the welfare effects of skilled worker emigration in a context where skilled labor plays a role in product or process design we show such emigration can benefit the residents left behind even when consumers tastes exhibit a form of home bias this is because emigration improves the design of goods designed by skilled emigrants but consumed in the sending country in contrast to existing models of beneficial brain drain our results do not require agglomeration economies education related externalities remittances return migration or an emigration lottery instead they are driven purely by differences in market size that induce skilled emigrants to design better products or production processes abroad than at home

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

international factor movements in the presence of a fixed factor abstract to the basic model of international factor mobility is added a third immobile factor unlike the basic model the factor flows that result from a policy of free mobility are now uniquely determined additionally a large variety of privately optimal national policies is predicted each dependent upon the country s endowment pattern and the fiscal instruments available to it several of the predicted policies e g subsidies paid to migrant factors and simultaneous restrictions on the export of both factors are incompatible with the basic model

elections coalitions and legislative outcomes predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters beliefs about how parties will perform following an election similarly party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards we develop a multistage game theoretic model of three party competition under proportional representation the final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature this game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election and the parties electoral policy positions at the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome we solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes

electoral competition and local government responsiveness in brazil summary the empirical literature on the effects of competition on the supply of public goods shows controversial results at the local level the main objective of this paper is to investigate this relationship in a federalist country brazil where the political system places few barriers to the entry of competitors and local governments have the independence to establish their own public policy we show that a higher effective number of candidates running for the executive branch increase the supply of local public goods the number of student enrollments teachers and free immunizations

government strength power dispersion in governments and budget deficits in oecd countries a voting power approach we test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inoecd countries from 1970 to 1999 government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by thebanzhaf index of voting power respectivelythe standard deviation of banzhaf indicesof coalition parties we believe that theseare better suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant however coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party

fiscal federalism and economic growth this paper uses an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations to explore the connection between fiscal federalism and economic growth the analysis shows that federalism which allows public good levels to be tailored to suit the differing demands of young and old consumers who live in different jurisdictions increases the incentive to save this stronger incentive in turn leads to an increase in investment in human capital and a byproduct of this higher investment is faster economic growth

perfectly discriminatory policy towards international capital movements in a dynamic world a large country is able to affect its trading partners accumulation of capital and so it can alter future market conditions capital movements can be regulated by perfectly discriminatory policy to maximize the welfare of the large country by exploiting this link this policy implies that resource allocation is efficient along the optimal path in contrast to the use of perfectly discriminatory policy in a static world it is not always optimal for the large country to fully exploit its market power copyright 1989 by economics department of the university of pennsylvania and the osaka university institute of social and economic research association

international narcotics trade foreign aid and enforcement i introduction it is widely accepted that the problems that a country may face as a direct result of narcotics related activities are numerous 1 moreover drug production and trade are intimately tied to other serious international concerns notably the financing of insurgencies and terrorist activities shughart 2006 keefer loayza and soares 2008 intriligator 2010 piazza 2011 a prime example is the involvement of the taliban in afghanistan in the production and trafficking of heroin see blanchard 2009 clemens 2013a 2013b similar issues are observed in colombia and mexico hence the indirect costs of narcotics related activities are also substantial nonetheless the enforcement of prohibitions on the production consumption and movement of narcotics remains among the most controversial issues in international relations not least because the global response has met with somewhat limited success 2 even taking the objective of reducing global consumption of narcotics as given it is unclear which of the available policy tools are likely to be the most effective at meeting the objective the consumption and distribution in narcotics importing countries can be targeted directly although the history of the past one and a half centuries indicates that it is very difficult alternatively and more realistically the supply side can be targeted law enforcement authorities in narcotics exporting countries can be used to eradicate production facilities and to interdict trafficking and alternative production activities can be encouraged by providing technical assistance or by direct subsidization in all cases involving the supply side however it must be recognized that the global production of narcotics is concentrated in developing economies many of these countries lack the enforcement resources to engage effectively against well funded producers and well armed traffickers and their supporting terrorist and rebel groups therefore foreign aid to finance law enforcement activities is essential 3 alternative development policies may also be supported through foreign technical assistance or by directing foreign aid toward alternative production subsidies the effects of these policies on narcotics exporting economies have not however been adequately addressed in the literature our work adds a new dimension to the existing literature on the economics of narcotics 4 we construct a theoretical model that explores the effects of foreign financing of anti narcotics enforcement activities in narcotics producing exporting countries along with other potential policy interventions while previous literature has taken a partial equilibrium approach to analyzing related issues our work differs substantially in adopting general equilibrium methods as martin and symansky 2006 note opium production in afghanistan for example accounted for approximately 27 of economic activity in 2005 2006 given this fact substantial general equilibrium effects must be present and deserve full exploration we focus attention on the consequences of the multitude of severe distortions that narcotics production and enforcement introduce to factor markets we envisage an economy where workers engage in both licit and illicit activities are paid a premium for the risk of incarceration or seizure of their marginal product involved in the latter and a nonproductive law enforcement sector uses real resources to combat illicit activity our work draws on a number of strands of economic theory including tied aid factor market distortions dual economies illicit markets and law enforcement a number of important new results emerge from our analysis foreign aid will increase enforcement activity and will generally lower narcotics production the more market power the narcotics producing country has the less effective foreign aid will be however in fact aid intended for anti narcotics enforcement may effectively be siphoned into the wages of narcotics workers

competition in the political arena and local government performance competition reduces rent extraction in private sector firms in this article we empirically assess whether it similarly disciplines politicians by evaluating local level governments performance in flanders the results indicate that electoral competition measured via the number of parties competing in elections significantly positively affects the productive efficiency of municipal policy intertemporal competition measured as the volatility of election outcomes over time has a similar but weaker positive effect these beneficial effects are mitigated by the fact that competition may lead to more fragmented governments which is shown to work against their productive efficiency overall though the beneficial effects outweigh the unfavourable ones in our sample

the welfare effects of illegal immigration abstract this paper extends the work of ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor importing country in a two country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility we derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax with capital mobility foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country

income inequality and international migration the purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of international factor movements on the personal distribution of income in order to get clearcut results we use a simple model of trade and migration in which there are two traded goods and three factors for any given country one of the traded goods corresponds to exports and the other to imports the three factors include capital and two types of labour skilled and unskilled we focus mainly on the alternative results of international migration of the two types of labour the geographical focus is worldwide excerpt

active and passive waste in government spending evidence from a policy experiment we propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services active waste entails utility for the public decision maker whereas passive waste does not we analyze purchases of standardized goods by italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency we find that i some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods ii differences are correlated with governance structure iii the variation in prices is principally due to variation in passive rather than active waste and iv passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste

a politico economic theory of income redistribution this study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public good nature of redistribution and political scientists who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands we propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the american states the empirical analysis addresses determinants of the aid to families with dependent children guarantee adjusted for medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled we posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables such as per capita income and latent constructs such as liberal party control we specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the lisrel method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients the findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee

why are stabilizations delayed when a stabilization has significant distributional implications e g tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups the process leading to stabilization becomes a war of attrition each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden the authors solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of rational delay and relate it to several political and economic variables they motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes copyright 1991 by american economic association

bidding for brains intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers we introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of nash equilibrium ipr policy choice among countries we show that governments have incentives to use iprs in a bidding war for global talent resulting in nash equilibrium iprs that can be too high rather than too low from a global welfare perspective these incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth thus allowing them to prevent the poaching of their brains by larger wealthier markets

the industrial organization of congress or why legislatures like firms are not organized as markets this paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions like market institutions legislative institutions reflect two key components the goals or preferences of individuals here representatives seeking reelection and the relevant transactions costs we present three conclusions first we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators second we explain why given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange third our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue

the political economy of public goods some evidence from india we are interested in how public goods get allocated by a centralized state we use data on public goods and social structure from parliamentary constituencies in rural india to understand the allocation of these goods over the 1970s and 1980s national policies and political agendas during this period emphasized universal access to basic amenities and financed a rapid expansion in rural infrastructure we find evidence of considerable equalization in many of these facilities reflecting perhaps the importance of these commitments among the historically disadvantaged social groups those that mobilized themselves politically gained relative to the others measures of social heterogeneity that have been emphasized in the recent empirical literature on public goods are relevant but not overwhelming in their importance

temporary emigration and welfare the case of low skilled labor this article studies the implications of temporary emigration for the welfare of a source country the framework is one of general equilibrium where the economy s stocks of both capital and labor are endogenously determined by the saving and migration decisions of optimizing agents simulations of the model suggest that for realistic values of the parameters welfare of nonmigrants of the source country is maximized when the migrants are employed abroad for a period in the range of roughly 8 12 years the ideal duration is found to be an increasing function of the international wage differential migration costs and the degree to which the rights of migrants are protected in the host country

political determinants of budget deficits coalition effects versus minority effects this paper reexamines some recent empirical evidence on the hypothesis that institutional arrangements in the political process affect budget deficits the results of roubini and sachs 1989b are replicated and sensitivity analysis indicate that their results are robust however the main conclusion of roubini and sachs that coalition governments are less capable of budgetary discipline needs to be modified a reformulation of their variable representing political cohesion reveals that it captures the effects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments the data support the hypothesis that it is harder to negotiate in parliament than within a government

lower class mobilization and policy linkage in the u s states theory political participation by lower class voters should create pressures for government to respond with supportive policies hypotheses lower class voting is associated with more generous state welfare policies political forces and institutions structure this relationship methods a pooled time series analysis for the 50 u s states from 1978 to 1990 results we demonstrate an enduring relationship between the degree of mobilization of lower class voters and the generosity of welfare benefits provided by state governments this relationship can be vitiated by remarkable political and economic events such as the new federalism and the economic recession in the early 1980s finally the importance of lower class mobilization for redistributive policy is enhanced by the liberalism and competitiveness of state democratic parties

international factor movements commodity trade and commercial policy in a specific factor model two events in the decade of the 1970s had a major impact on world trade and factor movements the collapse of the bretton woods fixed exchange rate system and opec s success in raising petroleum prices the enormous current account surplus accruing to some of the opec members was successfully recycled by the international capital markets to among others the oil importing developing countries in addition the vastly increased tempo of investment in the capital rich labour poor opec members in west asia attracted migration of labour skilled as well as unskilled to these countries from some of the oil importing developing countries the remittances from these workers in turn eased the problem of the labourexporting countries in adjusting to the increased cost of oil imports thus both borrowing from private capital markets and export of labour became very important elements in cushioning the oil shock for a number of countries the post opec movements of labour and financial capital while dramatic are only the more recent instances of a phenomenon of much greater antiquity the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw vast migration of people out of europe though these movements were the result of conquests and colonization rather than movements from one sovereign state into another but the nineteenth century particularly the latter half saw migration of the latter kind from europe to countries of north and south america as well as capital investment by residents of europe in these

political competition policy and growth theory and evidence from the us this paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth we test the predictions of the model on panel data for the us states in these data we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti growth policies higher taxes lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right to work laws we also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth

public good provision under dictatorship and democracy the allocation of a government budget between a public good and transfers is modeled under different systems of government the relatively even distribution of political power among groups in a democracy favors spending on nonexclusive public goods the more concentrated pattern of political power in a dictatorship favors spending on transfers targeted to powerful groups the hypothesis on public good provision is examined using cross country data on public good provision and empirical indicators of political regime dictatorial governments are found to provide public schooling roads safe water public sanitation and pollution control at levels far below democracies

federal competition and economic growth abstract this paper exploits exogenous variation in the natural topography of the united states to estimate the causal impact of inter jurisdictional competition on income growth we find that doubling the number of county governments in a metropolitan area leads to a 17 increase in the average annual growth rate of earnings per employee over 1969 2006 and a 10 increase in 2006 income per employee decomposing income effects using 2000 census worker level data we find that approximately half of the effect stems from making workers more productive while the other half comes from changing the composition of the workforce and inducing workers to work more hours we also present evidence that inter jurisdictional competition leads local governments to raise more in taxes spend more and issue more debt per capita but does not help them obtain more inter governmental transfers however the additional cost from this increase in expenditures to a median wage employee is much smaller than the increase in that employee s wages due to greater inter jurisdictional competition

the countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents electoral incentives we argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining these countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency typical of many young democracies we provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from mali tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies to explore the generalizability of these findings we analyze cross country panel data and show that political competition leads to better worse public goods provision under high low levels of party system institutionalization the paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas

politics institutions and welfare spending in industrialized democracies 1960 82 electoral turnout as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional and junior coalitional parties and that relatively neocorporatist centralized and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort overall our findings suggest that contrary to many claims both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort

illegal immigration in an efficiency wage model abstract this paper studies illegal immigration using an efficiency wage dual labor market model the illegal immigrants are endogenously sorted completely or incompletely into secondary labor markets the effects of immigration on native workers are more complex than in standard models of factor mobility as illegals first enter the country natives may gain because the number of primary sector jobs rises with enough illegals in the country natives are hurt because the migrants increasingly take those primary sector jobs enforcing immigration laws by deporting migrants who work in primary sector jobs is pareto superior to other forms of enforcement

sensitivity to exogeneity assumptions in program evaluation in many empirical studies of the effect of social programs researchers assume that conditional on a set of observed covariates assignment to the treatment is exogenous or unconfounded aka selection on observables often this assumption is not realistic and researchers are concerned about the robustness of their results to departures from it one approach e g charles manski 1990 is to entirely drop the exogeneity assumption and investigate what can be learned about treatment effects without it with unbounded outcomes and in the absence of alternative identifying assumptions there are no restrictions on the set of possible values for average treatment effects this does not mean however that all evaluations are equally sensitive to departures from the exogeneity assumption in this paper i explore an alternative approach developed by paul rosenbaum and donald rubin 1983 where the assumption of exogeneity is explicitly relaxed by allowing for a limited amount of correlation between treatment and unobserved components of the outcomes the starting point of the sensitivity analysis is the assumption that the exogeneity assumption is satisfied only conditional on an additional unobserved covariate making assumptions about the effect of the unobserved covariate on the outcome and its correlation with the treatment i trace out the set of possible values for the treatment effect of interest by considering a sufficiently large set of possible correlations with outcomes and treatment one can recover the bounds on the treatment effect derived by manski 1990 the approach here in the spirit of rosenbaum and rubin 1983 and rosenbaum 1995 is to allow only a limited amount of correlation and to judge the sensitivity of average treatment effect estimates to such correlations there are two novel features of the proposed analysis first rather than formulate the sensitivity in terms of coefficients on the unobserved covariate the sensitivity results are presented in terms of partial r values which may be easier to interpret second the partial r values of the unobserved covariates are compared to those for the observed covariates in order to facilitate judgments regarding the plausibility of values necessary to substantially change results obtained under exogeneity the proposed sensitivity analysis is conceptually related to the practice of assessing sensitivity of estimates by comparisons with results obtained by discarding one or more observed covariates james heckman and v joseph hotz 1989 rajeev dehejia and sadek wahba 1999 jeffrey smith and petra todd 2001 the attraction of the sensitivity analysis is that it is more directly relevant one is not interested in what would have happened in the absence of covariates actually observed but in biases that are the result from not observing all relevant covariates

international factor mobility and national advantage abstract in this paper we prove rigorously v k ramaswami s proposition that in bilateral trade between two countries sharing the same technology represented by a strictly concave production function with positive marginal productivities of capital and labor the policy active country can gain more by importing monopsonistically the relatively scarce factor than by placing monopolistic restrictions on the export of the relatively abundant one we show that what matters is not the location but the constraints within which maximization takes place hence the monopsonistic results can be replicated by appropriate export arrangements the analysis is extended to consider the welfare implications to the policy passive country

abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences we analyze a model of a two candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences we demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that nevertheless elections effectively aggregate voters private information using examples we show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed however may lead to higher levels of abstention we conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lead to a biased voting population but does not lead to biased outcomes

is democracy good for the poor many scholars claim that democracy improves the welfare of the poor this article uses data on infant and child mortality to challenge this claim cross national studies tend to exclude from their samples nondemocratic states that have performed well this leads to the mistaken inference that nondemocracies have worse records than democracies once these and other flaws are corrected democracy has little or no effect on infant and child mortality rates democracies spend more money on education and health than nondemocracies but these benefits seem to accrue to middle and upper income groups

choice between international capital and labor mobility for diversified economies abstract this paper ranks two international economic regimes free trade plus free international capital mobility and free trade plus free international labor mobility from the viewpoint of two countries which are under diversified production in a two factor two good general equilibrium model in which production technologies are internationally different it shows that a country s preference toward the two regimes is determined by relative factor endowments relative factor intensities and inter country difference in labor productivity and that under some circumstances both countries unanimously prefer the same regime but under other circumstances they prefer different regimes

does political knowledge increase turnout evidence from the 1997 british general election a number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout both information acquisition and turnout however are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables rendering hard the identification of a causal link in empirical investigations available empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations i address this problem by using an intrumental variables approach where the instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on mass media using survey data from the 1997 british general election study i show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in influencing political participation

international factor movements and the ramaswami argument in a succinct but classic article appearing in economica in 1968 ramaswami put forth an argument supporting the superiority of a policy that attracts foreign factors over a policy that allows a relatively abundant factor to emigrate in each case the active home country is assumed to levy taxes on factor flows so as to capture for itself the discrepancy in return to the same factor at home and abroad the asymmetry reflected by this policy ranking rests on a basic propeity of production functions the convexity of technology plus the ability of the active home country to hire or rent out factors at wages or rentals prevailing in the foreign country briefly put the ramaswami argument proceeds as follows suppose the active home country is capital abundant and has levied on optimal tax on earnings of its own capital operating abroad now consider repatriating this capital and allowing for the first time some inflow of foreign labour in particular suppose the home country allows a level of immigration identical to the labour force previously employed with the home capital that is being repatriated such a transfer of home capital and foreign labour out of the foreign country leaves factor proportions abroad undisturbed and thus does not alter the wage that must be paid to attract the requisite bundle of foreign workers although the home country thus avoids any increase in factor costs in foreign markets it can increase output since the capital labour ratiooriginally employed at home at high home wage rates is greater than the ratio in the freshly acquired bundle from abroad by adopting a uniform capital labour ratio over all factors now employed at home output and thus real income rises there may be even further gains to be had by allowing yet a different optimal level of immigration in the home country which has now banned capital exports 2 essential to the ramaswami argument is the ability of the home country to extract a bundle of factors previously employed abroad without disturbing factor prices in that country indeed jones coelho and easton 1983 have suggested that in the context of the ramaswami discussion the original argument could be pursued to suggest that the home country gains not only from repatriating its own capital but from actually encouraging foreign capital to be employed at home such a capital flow is admittedly uphill the home country would have to pay out more in rentals than such capital can earn at home despite this fact such an import of capital and labour in the same proportions found abroad does not alter foreign factor prices but does via the same ramaswami type argument on the convexity of the technology result in gains at home although ramaswami s own discussion starts with a repatriation of home capital previously invested abroad his argument can be applied directly to the foreign autarky factor endowment bundle if technology exhibits constant returns to scale and if all both factors are indeed internationally

american federalism welfare policy and residential choices the relationship between welfare benefit levels and the residential choices of the poor raises two issues for federalism in the united states do state benefit levels affect the residential choices of the poor do residential choices of the poor affect the level at which a state sets its benefit levels empirical studies have seldom studied the interconnection between these two issues this research estimates simultaneously the mutual effects of welfare benefits and poverty rates while controlling for other economic and political variables when benefit levels become high the size of the poverty population increases conversely when poverty rates become high benefit levels are cut the findings are consistent with the claim that state determined benefit levels distort policy and residential choices

international migration versus foreign investment in the presence of unemployment abstract this paper extends the standard two factor one good model of international factor movements to include unemployment due to a minimum income guarantee within the capital abundant country from this country s perspective we establish important departures from previous full employment results most notably our analysis shows that 1 free factor mobility is worse than no mobility 2 the optimal degree of labour migration is zero and 3 national welfare can always be maximized by an optimal flow of capital the analysis is then extended to examine 1 illegal migration 2 subsidization of employment and 3 alternative views of unemployment

the theory of international factor flows the basic model abstract the basic model used to discuss the simultaneous international flow of labor and capital is a one commodity model in which a common technology is shared between countries the ramaswami result wherein an optimal restriction of labor inflows is superior to an optimal restriction on capital outflows for a capital abundant country is extended to reveal that optimality requires inflows of both factors box diagrams and iso welfare contours are used to show how optimal policy rankings are reversed if foreign labor must be paid higher home wages

electoral competition globalization and subnational education spending in mexico 1999 2004 this article examines the determinants of primary education spending among 29 mexican states from 1999 to 2004 there is wide variation in spending despite expectations of policy convergence due to market forces associated with globalization and in spite of the unique potential of education spending to complement economic strategies in achieving equitable growth this study exploits significant advantages of subnational analysis in exploring political and economic variables that have been useful in explaining spending levels cross nationally consistent with these studies this article shows that greater electoral competition leads to increased spending in contrast to other work however this study finds that exposure to the global economy has distinctly mixed effects on education spending these findings thus further highlight the positive returns to higher quality democracy while underscoring the need to examine the effects of many different aspects of globalization representing a wide variety of strategies employed by governments in engaging the international economy

optimal policy toward international factor movements with a country specific factor abstract this paper examines the optimal taxation of factor movements in a three factor model where two factors are potentially mobile results emphasize the role of substitutability or complementarity between factors in determining the optimal pattern of factor flows in particular a result analogous to the ramaswami result on the desirability of factor importing over factor exporting will hold if factors are complements but may not hold if they are substitutes also a capitalexporting country that cannot tax imported labor should allow labor imports when capital and labor are substitutes but may not allow labor imports if they are complements

lower class mobilization and policy linkage in the u s states a correction hill leighley and hinton andersson 1995 report a series of empirical analyses intended to test four hypotheses about the association between lower class mobilization and public policies in the american states those hypotheses are 1 the higher the turnout of the lower class the more liberal is state welfare policy 2 the higher economic and fiscal stress the lower the association between lower class turnout and welfare policy 3 liberal party control of state government is the linkage mechanism that relates lower class mobilization to policy and 4 party competition is the linkage mechanism that relates lower class mobilization to policy in this note we explain how the incorrect handling of missing data in those original analyses led to an erroneous conclusion about the third hypothesis test an incorrect sign reported for one control variable in the first two hypothesis tests and small changes in the significance of a few other control variables we explain the cause of the errors report corrected analyses and close with brief observations about the theoretical and practical implications of the correct empirical results the error in the original analyses arose because missing data codes for three variables in a cross sectional data set originally created in spssx were interpreted as valid values when the data set was expanded into a pooled cross sectional time series design and analyzed with the microcrunch software package those three variables were for state party competition mass political liberalism and state party elite liberalism and the missing data affect four states thus the missing data values biased the coefficients reported for these variables in the original analyses the optimal procedures for handling such missing data problems are unsettled bartels and brady 1991 136 7 for the purposes of this note we report analyses that are conservative by some but not all criteriaanalysis of only those cases with complete data on the variables under study this procedure appears especially appropriate in light of the absence of a consensus on an alternative one and the small percentage of total cases eliminated from consideration by the procedure in the present instance

what wins votes why some politicians opt out of clientelism in a context where clientelism is widespread why do some politicians choose not to condition the delivery of goods and services to citizens on individual political behavior i argue that the answer to this question lies in the heretofore unexamined electoral costs of clientelism clientelism decreases support from nonpoor constituents even while it generates votes from among the poor taking into account these costs and other factors that shape politician incentives i posit that the interaction between political competition and poverty will explain variation in clientelism i test this claim using an original measure of clientelism that assesses mayoral involvement in social policy implementation in argentine municipalities the results of statistical analysis suggest that high levels of political competition are compatible with clientelism when poverty is also high only when high competition is coupled with low rates of poverty does clientelism decline

on the choice between international capital and labor mobility abstract this paper examines the choice of international factor mobility it proves in a two country two factor one commodity model that the policy setter when it maximizes its own welfare by following the ramaswami policy of monopsonistic import of its scarce factor impoverishes the passive country furthermore the paper studies the choice of mobility in a two commodity model and shows that the optimality of the monopsonistic import policy extends to a situation with trade in goods lastly it addresses the welfare effects in the passive country in the two commodity model

political market characteristics and the provision of educational infrastructure in north india in this paper we are concerned with the provision of schools in rural north india particularly with whether such provision is determined by the demographic and economic characteristics of the region or whether local democracy also plays a role we find that the probability that a governing party loses an election has a positive effect on the provision of schooling infrastructure while the margin of victory of the governing party has a negative effect political reservation for members of the scheduled castes scs has a positive effect on schooling infrastructure in villages with a large sc population but a negative effect overall

perspectives on buy outs and the ramaswami effect abstract in a simple two factor one commodity model in which foreign labor can be hired at low foreign wage rates and technology is common to both countries optimal strategy at home involves hiring almost all factors abroad at their autarky prices a buy out strategy this paper shows that when technologies differ partial or times complete buy out of factors from the technologically superior country may still be optimal alternatively a partial buy out may be appropriate when there exists a third internationally immobile productive factor

on the strategic choice between capital and labor mobility abstract this paper analyzes the strategies of two governments when choosing between capital and labor mobility for each type of factor mobility the nash equilibria under both income taxes and quotas on factor flows are derived from each country s point of view an income tax dominates a quota the paper also shows that in a strategic environment ramaswami s result that a country prefers the restricted inflow of a scarce factor to the restricted outflow of an abundant factor continues to hold for some initial factor endowments but the opposite result may obtain for other factor endowments

on the choice between capital and labour mobility trade theorists since the pioneering work of kemp 1966 have considered the question of national advantage from international factor mobility by considering only one factor to be so mobile kemp analyzed elegantly the question of optimal policies in 2 x 2 x 2 model and showed that since monopoly power could exist in both the goods and factor markets in consequence of international capital mobility the optimal policy intervention would generally involve two policy instruments tariffs cum subsidies on goods and duties cum subsidies on international capital flows jones 1967 subsequently extended kemp s argument to the secondbest context by examining the optimal level of one of these instruments when the other was arbitrarily set at zero elsewhere in this issue brecher 1983 shows in an elegant and original contribution that the jones policy problem is in fact a third best rather than a second best problem as generally believed and that if only one of the tariff and capital mobility taxes cumsubsidies can be used it is generally possible to improve welfare further by admitting an altogether different domestic policy instrument namely a production or consumption tax cum subsidy as the case may be the research of bhagwati was supported by the german marshall fund grant no l 34015 the problem analyzed in the paper was posed in bhagwati 1979 and an early ingenious and neglected analysis in ramaswami 1968 was noted by bhagwati we have profited greatly from these contributions also from reading webb 1970 ramaswami 1970 and a recent paper of calvo and wellisz 1983 on this problem this result is in consonance with the results of bhagwati ramaswami and srinivasan 1969 for the case without international capital mobility but the consonance is intuitive only after the result was established for the case with international capital mobility