but who will monitor the monitor suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a monitor to detect their deviations what about the monitor s deviations to address this question i propose a contract that makes the monitor responsible for monitoring and thereby provides incentives even when the monitor s observations are not only private but costly too i also characterize exactly when such a contract can provide monitors with the right incentives to perform in doing so i emphasize virtual enforcement and suggest its implications for the theory of repeated games jel c78 d23 d82 d86

the role of market forces in assuring contractual performance the conditions under which transactors can use the market repeat purchase mechanism of contract enforcement are examined increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance a necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance this will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm specific assets advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance

payments for pioneers revisiting the role of external rewards for sustainable innovation under heterogeneous motivations abstract acknowledging the diversity of preferences goals and motivations of individuals is key to promote the effectiveness of incentive based conservation interventions this paper analyses the heterogeneity of motivations to adopt silvopastoral practices a social ecological innovation for soil conservation and carbon emission reduction we use q methodology to identify smallholders views with regard to these practices in a community in the forest frontier in chiapas mexico the analysis uncovers three main perspectives self sufficient pioneers environmentally conscious followers and payment dependent conservatives we discuss these perspectives around three topics smallholders predisposition to adopt silvopastoral practices their views about needing external payments to sustain their livelihood and the diffusion of innovative sustainable practices we relate these perspectives with livelihood characteristics and with observed adoption levels under a pilot programme to promote silvopasture our findings suggest that incentives other than payments may be more appropriate for those more likely to adopt and that payments could encourage rent seeking strategies and not necessarily promote permanent behavioural change we suggest ways for designing more effective and adaptive environmental conservation programmes to foster adoption and continuation of social ecological innovations

interfirm relationships and informal credit in vietnam trading relations in vietnam s emerging private sector are shaped by two market frictions the difficulty of locating trading partners and the absence of legal enforcement of contracts examining relational contracting we find that a firm trusts its customer enough to offer credit when the customer finds it hard to locate an alternative supplier a longer duration of trading relationship is associated with larger credit as is prior information gathering customers identified through business networks receive more credit these network effects are enduring suggesting that networks are used to sanction defaulting customers

a theory of participation in elections we analyze a model of participation in elections in which voting is costly and no vote is pivotal ethical agents are motivated to participate when they determine that agents of their type are obligated to do so unlike previous duty based models of participation in our model an ethical agent s obligation to vote is determined endogenously as a function of the behavior of other agents our model predicts high turnout and comparative statics that are consistent with strategic behavior jel d72

relational contracts and the theory of the firm relational contracts informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships are prevalent within and between firms we develop repeated game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms vertical integration differ from those between nonintegration we show that integration affects the parties temptations to renege on a given relational contract and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain in this sense the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties relationship our approach also has implications for joint ventures alliances and networks and for the role of management within and between firms

subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts objective measures of performance are seldom perfect in response incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures this paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in respectively implicit and explicit incentive contracts naturally objective and subjective measures often are substitutes sometimes strikingly so we show that if objective measures are sufficiently close to perfect then no implicit contracts are feasible because the firm s fallback position after reneging on an implicit contract is too attractive we also show however that objective and subjective measures can reinforce each other if objective measures become more accurate then in some circumstances the optimal contract puts more weight on subjective measures because the improved objective measures increase the value of the ongoing relationship and so reduce the firm s incentive to renege we also analyze the use of subjective weights on objective performance measures and provide case study evidence consistent with our analyses

voting technology political responsiveness and infant health evidence from brazil this paper studies the introduction of electronic voting technology in brazilian elections estimates exploiting a regression discontinuity design indicate that electronic voting reduced residual error ridden and uncounted votes and promoted a large de facto enfranchisement of mainly less educated citizens estimates exploiting the unique pattern of the technology s phase in across states over time suggest that as predicted by political economy models it shifted government spending toward health care which is particularly beneficial to the poor positive effects on both the utilization of health services prenatal visits and newborn health low weight births are also found for less educated mothers but not for the more educated

the rise of europe atlantic trade institutional change and economic growth the rise of western europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the atlantic ocean and with substantial trade with the new world africa and asia via the atlantic this trade and the associatedcolonialism affected europe not only directly but also indirectly by inducing institutional change where initial political institutions those established before 1500 placed significant checks on the monarchy the growth of atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights these changes were central to subsequent economic growth

the international transmission of eurodollar and us interest rates a cointegration analysis abstract the relationship between us and eurodollar certificate of deposit cd rates for the period 1981 1988 is examined using an error correction model results indicate that there is a structural change in the cd rates in the earlier sub period 1981 1983 there exists unidirectional causality leading from the domestic to the external markets in the more recent sub period 1984 1988 however significant reverse causality is observed these results are likely due to expansion in the size of the eurodollar market and an increase in the volume of eurodollar futures trading

the formation of risk sharing networks this paper examines the formation of risk sharing networks in the rural philippines we find that geographic proximity possibly correlated with kinship is a major determinant of mutual insurance links among villagers age and wealth differences also play an important role in contrast income correlation and differences in occupation are not determinants of network links reported network links have a strong effect on subsequent gifts and loans gifts between network partners are found to respond to shocks and to differences in health status from this we conclude that intra village mutual insurance links are largely determined by social and geographical proximity and are only weakly the result of purposeful diversification of income risk the paper also makes a methodological contribution to the estimation of dyadic models

fragile states and development policy it is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under development in many parts of the world such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace as of yet mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance this paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states

relational incentive contracts standard incentive theory models provide a rich framework for studying informational problems but assume that contracts can be perfectly enforced this paper studies the design of self enforced relational contracts i show that optimal contracts often can take a simple stationary form but that self enforcement restricts promised compensation and affects incentive provision with hidden information it may be optimal for an agent to supply the same inefficient effort regardless of cost conditions with moral hazard optimal contracts involve just two levels of compensation this is true even if performance measures are subjective in which case optimal contracts terminate following poor performance jel c73 d82 l14

the economics of labor coercion the majority of labor transactions throughout much of history and a significant fraction of such transactions in many developing countries today are coercive in the sense that force or the threat of force plays a central role in convincing workers to accept employment or its terms we propose a tractable principal agent model of coercion based on the idea that coercive activities by employers or guns affect the participation constraint of workers we show that coercion and effort are complements so that coercion increases effort but coercion always reduces utilitarian social welfare better outside options for workers reduce coercion because of the complementarity between coercion and effort workers with a better outside option exert lower effort in equilibrium and thus are coerced less greater demand for labor increases coercion because it increases equilibrium effort we investigate the interaction between outside options market prices and other economic variables by embedding the coercive principal agent relationship in a general equilibrium setup and studying when and how labor scarcity encourages coercion general market equilibrium interactions working through the price of output lead to a positive relationship between labor scarcity and coercion along the lines of ideas suggested by domar while interactions those working through the outside option lead to a negative relationship similar to ideas advanced in neo malthusian historical analyses of the decline of feudalism in net a decline in available labor increases coercion in general equilibrium if and only if its direct partial equilibrium effect is to increase the price of output by more than it increases outside options our model also suggests that markets in slaves make slaves worse off conditional on enslavement and that coercion is more viable in industries that do not require relationship specific investment by workers

endogenous enforcement institutions we model the state as a self enforcing agreement over the use of force powerful individuals punish violations of contracts and property rights and if they shirk or abuse their power society reverts to a low production anarchy stage our model has two implications first improvements in coercion move the optimal enforcement system from private ordering where coercive punishments are not used to centralized state where punihments sanction violations by citizens but not by the ruler to decentralized state where punishments sanction all violations second institutions that reinforce the allegiance of state militias to the law simultaneously insure that contract violations are punished and that the ruler does not expropriate citizens thus they are more productive than judicial institutions which solely facilitate contract enforcement the model is consistent with the historical correlation between technological advances in coercion and the transition from private to state enforcement and with the fact that institutional constraints on the executive affected the long run economic development of nations more than improvements in judicial institutions acemoglu and johnson 2005 we also provide a framework for the optimal sequencing of institutional reforms they should focus first on the binding self enforcement constraint punishment or expropriation and switch to other constraints when the initially binding constraint becomes slack

the folk theorem with imperfect public information the authors study repeated games in which players observe a public outcome that imperfectly signals the actions played they provide conditions guaranteeing that any feasible individually rational payoff vector of the stage game can arise as a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with sufficiently little discounting the central condition requires that there exist action profiles with the property that for any two players no two deviations one by either player give rise to the same probability distribution over public outcomes the results apply to principal agent partnership oligopoly and mechanism design models and to one shot games with transferable utilities copyright 1994 by the econometric society

land and power theory and evidence from chile many employment relationships concede rents to workers depending on the political institutions the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers political behavior such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot we examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in chile in 1958 on voting behavior before the reforms localities with more pervasive patron client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right wing parties traditionally associ ated with the landed oligarchy after the reform however this difference across localities completely disappeared jel d72 n46 o13 o15 o17

barbed wire property rights and agricultural development this paper examines the impact on agricultural development of the introduction of barbed wire fencing to the american plains in the late nineteenth century without a fence farmers risked uncompensated damage by others livestock from 1880 to 1900 the introduction and near universal adoption of barbed wire greatly reduced the cost of fences relative to the predominant wooden fences especially in counties with the least woodland over that period counties with the least woodland experienced substantial relative increases in settlement land improvement land values and the productivity and production share of crops most in need of protection this increase in agricultural development appears partly to reflect farmers increased ability to protect their land from encroachment states inability to protect this full bundle of property rights on the frontier beyond providing formal land titles might have otherwise restricted agricultural development

the international financial market and us interest rates abstract this paper examines the linkages between the eurodollar and us domestic financial markets it is shown that using weekly data allows the isolation of significant fluctuations being transmitted between markets in both directions in particular financial markets in the us are affected significantly by foreign events it is impossible to reach precise conclusions about the causes of historical variation in the rates however this paper provides evidence that at most 40 of the variation in eurodollar interest rates over the 1975 1978 period can be traced to domestic us sources and that between about one fifth and two thirds of the variation in domestic rates can be traced to foreign sources

the demarcation of land and the role of coordinating property institutions we use a natural experiment in nineteenth century ohio to analyze the economic effects of two dominant land demarcation regimes metes and bounds mb and the rectangular system rs mb is decentralized with plot shapes alignment and sizes defined individually rs is a centralized grid of uniform square plots that does not vary with topography we find large initial net benefits in land values from the rs and also that these effects persist into the twenty first century these findings reveal the importance of transaction costs and networks in affecting property rights land values markets and economic growth

but who will guard the guardians a pre recorded version of leonid hurwicz prize lecture was presented on 8 december 2007 at aula magna stockholm university the lecture was introduced by professor jorgen weibull chairman of the economics prize committee this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

autoregressive modelling and money income causality detection abstract a step wise procedure based on granger s concept of causality and abaike s final prediction error criterion is suggested as a practical means to identify the order of lags of each variable in a multivariate autoregressive process the model seems useful because it can serve as a reduced form formulation to avoid imposing often spurious or false restrictions of the model it also provides a reasonably powerful test of causality the idea is applied to u s postwar money and income data it is found that between m1 and gnp a bivariate feedback model fits the data best between m2 and gnp a one way causal model from money to income performs better diagnostic checks applied to our model seem to indicate the adequacy of our approach

managing conflicts in relational contracts a manager and a worker are in an infinitely repeated relationship in which the manager privately observes her opportunity costs of paying the worker we show that the optimal relational contract generates periodic conflicts during which effort and expected profits decline gradually but recover instantaneously to manage a conflict the manager uses a combination of informal promises and formal commitments that evolves with the duration of the conflict finally we show that liquidity constraints limit the manager s ability to manage conflicts but may also induce the worker to respond to a conflict by providing more effort rather than less jel c73 d74 d86 j33 j41 m12 relational contracts often suffer from conflicts during which workers punish managers for broken promises a common cause for such conflicts is disagreement over the availability and efficient use of funds in a typical conflict of this sort workers demand that a bonus be paid while managers insist that the necessary funds are either nonexistent or would be better spent on something else such as an exceptional investment opportunity one source of disagreement over the availability and efficient use of funds is asymmetric information managers are typically better informed about the challenges and opportunities that their firms face and therefore often have private information about the opportunity costs of paying their workers the aim of this article is to explore optimal relational contracts in such a setting for this purpose we examine the repeated relationship between a manager and a worker in which the manager s opportunity costs of paying the worker are stochastic and privately observed by her in the optimal relational contract the manager promises a bonus if opportunity costs are low but none if they are high conflicts therefore arise whenever the manager does not pay the bonus to manage these conflicts the manager relies on a combination of informal promises and formal commitments that evolves with the duration of the conflict as a result effort and expected profits decline during a conflict only gradually and then recover instantaneously the same pattern is repeated over time

the federal funds market and the overnight eurodollar market abstract this paper investigates the effect of daily management of federal reserve accounts by us depository institutions on the interest rate outside the us spindt and hoffmeister journal of financial and quantitative analysis 23 1988 401 griffiths and winters journal of banking and finance 19 1995 1265 and hamilton journal of political economy 104 1996 22 found that the fed funds rate exhibited calendar day effects caused by federal reserve regulations i find that the overnight eurodollar rate shows similar predictable daily changes as does the fed funds rate although the absolute magnitudes are slightly less the empirical results support the hypothesis that the tendencies in daily changes in the two overnight interest rates are caused by the characteristics of the fed funds market

persistence of power elites and institutions we construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti tutions for economic institutions a change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power the model can imply a pattern of captured democracy whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite the model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions and economic institutions them selves will persist over time jel d02 d72 the domination of an organized minority over the unor ganized majority is inevitable the power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor ity at the same time the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority

the colonial origins of comparative development an empirical investigation comment abstract acemoglu johnson and robinson s 2001 seminal article argues property rights institutions powerfully affect national income using estimated mortality rates of early european settlers t

multilateral contracting and the employment relationship this paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations it investigates the trade off firms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole multilateral relational contracts and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees bilateral relational contracts multilateral contracts bind the firm more strongly to implicit commitments improving motivation but are difficult to adjust in response to changes in the environment bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement the framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation why firms rely on temporary employees and the adoption of two tier workforces

socio ecological explanations for crowding out effects from economic field experiments in southern africa abstract economic and psychological literature mentions three conditions under which the crowding out effect of pro social behaviour is likely to occur and to crowd out citizens moral obligations to behave co operatively i use a framed field experiment on joint extraction from a common pool resource cpr where the crowding out effect has already been reported before in combination with the trust game carried out in farming communities of namibia and south africa to replicate these conditions the research design and the cross cultural setting enable to explicitly control for these effects the results of the experiments support that the crowding out effect depends on the nature of the external intervention controlling vs supportive external intervention the degree of participants self determination high vs low self determination in the group a society s norms of trust and reciprocity high vs low trust within the society the results imply that outside regulations aiming to conserve natural resources risk worsening the situation when neglecting democratic legitimization as well as local community norms

trade expansion and contract enforcement consider a world of traders separated in geographic economic or social space honest trade offers larger gains for more distant traders but frequencies of meetings and information flows about cheating have local bias honesty is self enforcing only between pairs of sufficiently close neighbors global honesty prevails only in a sufficiently small world the extent of self enforcing honesty is likely to decrease when the world expands beyond this size costly external enforcement is useful only if the world is sufficiently large and its net payoff need not be larger than that of a self governing small community intermediate size worlds fare worst

the international transmission of interest rates a note on causal relationships between short term external and domestic u s dollar returns abstract this study extends the literature of capital market integration by investigating the relationship between u s dollar yield behavior in the domestic and in the external dollar market recognizing recent increases in world capital market speed of adjustment the analysis is based on daily changes in yields using granger causality tests much of the adjustmemt appears to be contemporaneous if contemporaneous is defined as weekly as opposed to daily changes and the eurodollar market adjusts more rapidly and more completely to changes in the domestic market than the domestic market adjusts to changes in the eurodollar market

coordination commitment and enforcement the case of the merchant guild we interpret historical evidence in light of a repeated game model to conclude that merchant guilds emerged during the late medieval period to allow rulers of trade centers to commit to the security of alien merchants the merchant guild developed the theoretically required attributes secured merchants property rights and evolved in response to crises to extend the range of its effectiveness contributing to the expansion of trade during the late medieval period we elaborate on the relations between our theory and the monopoly theory of merchant guilds and contrast it with repeated game theories that provide no role for formal organization

peer discipline and incentives within groups abstract we investigate how a collusive group can sustain non nash actions by enforcing internal discipline through costly peer punishment we give a simple and tractable characterization of schemes that minimize discipline costs while preserving incentive compatibility we apply the model to a public goods contribution problem we find that if the per capita benefit from the public good is low then regardless of whether peer discipline is feasible or not only small groups will contribute to the good if the public good benefit is significant but peer discipline is infeasible it remains the case that only small groups contribute on the other hand if the public good benefit is significant but peer discipline is feasible then full contribution takes place regardless of group size we reconcile this result with olson s idea that small groups are more effective by considering the case where the per capita benefit of the public good varies with group size

a note on euroyen and domestic yen interest rates abstract this study examines interest rate transmission between the london euroyen market and the japanese domestic cd market the results which span 1984 through the beginning of 1993 indicate that these two interest rate series are cointegrated in the earlier part of the sample period causality is strongest from the euroyen market to domestic yen interest rates however strong feedback effects are observed in both directions in more recent years the use of both vector autoregressive modeling and cointegration analysis for forecasting is supported over random walk models

state capacity and military conflict powerful centralized states controlling a large share of national income only begin to appear in europe after 1500 we build a model that explains their emergence in response to the increasing importance of money for military success when fiscal resources are not crucial for winning wars the threat of external conflict stifles state building as finance becomes critical internally cohesive states invest in state capacity while divided states rationally drop out of the competition causing divergence we emphasize the role of the military revolution a sequence of technological innovations that transformed armed conflict using data from 374 battles we investigate empirically both the importance of money for military success and patterns of state building in early modern europe the evidence is consistent with the predictions of our model

motivation crowding in environmental protection evidence from an artefactual field experiment abstract this paper examines how motivation crowding and social image affect environmental conservation decisions an artefactual field experiment conducted in bolivia is used to reproduce the trade off between individual and social benefits in natural resource use and test the effect of non monetary and non regulatory incentives on pro social behavior for environmental conservation the results show the presence of a social norm prescribing positive contribution towards environmental protection and that external incentives have heterogeneous effects on pro social behavior depending on how they influence reputation and self image the experimental results differ from those of analogous experiments conducted in the laboratory and are instead consistent with those from field experiments on common pool resource management this fact suggests caution in generalizing conclusions reached in the laboratory to different settings and populations

the management of common property resources collective action as an alternative to privatisation or state regulation can locally based collective action be a viable way to manage common property resources many writers on collective action and common property are sweepingly pessimistic about the ability of the people who face problems of common property to organize sustainable patterns of use for themselves this paper shows with reference to prisoners dilemma garett hardin s tragedy of the commons and mancur olson s logic of collective action that the analytical basis for this pessimism is weak in many situations of village based common property resource use there can thus be no general presumption that the collective action route to common property resource management will fail any more than there can be a general presumption that it will work the paper suggests a number of general factors to do with the characteristics of the resources the user group and group state relations on which chances of success depend

using the law to change the custom the custom often acts as a powerful hindrance to equity increasing changes in this paper we present a simple model of legal dualism in which a progressive legal reform can under certain conditions shift the conflicting custom in the direction intended by the legislator formal law then acts as an outside anchor that exerts a magnet effect on the custom we also characterize the conditions under which a moderate reform performs better than a radical one in improving the welfare of the disadvantaged sections of the population we illustrate our insights using examples on inheritance marriage and divorce in sub saharan africa and india

self enforcing democracy author s fearon james abstract if democracy is to have any of the good effects said to justify it it must be self enforcing those who control the government must want to hold regular competitive elections for the highest offices and all parties must be willing to comply with the results i consider a model in which citizens can always protest or rebel against the current ruler but can unseat the ruler only if enough people rebel when individuals privately observe a signal of the government s performance e g their own welfare they face a difficult problem of how to coordinate to pose a credible threat of rebellion necessary to keep the ruler from stealing further if the signals are noisy inefficient rebellions must occur in equilibrium to keep the ruler honest allowing for the possibility of elections makes for equilibria that eliminate both problems the convention of holding elections at particular times provides a public signal for coordinating rebellion in the event that elections are suspended of blatantly rigged the electoral results themselves aggregate private information about the ruler s performance providing the ruler an incentive to stick to the terms int he case of noisy signals of government performance the electoral results act as a cheap talk signal that allows the public to commit to rebel if a losing ruler does not step down avoiding the need for costly rebellions these arguments pose an explanation for self enforcing democracy whereas the several models in the literature do not because they do not explain why anyone would want to use elections to allocate power

causal linkages between us and eurodollar interest rates further evidence this study examines causal linkages between us and eurodollar interest rates during 1983 2002 recursive cointegration analysis shows that a stable cointegration relationship between the two interest rates emerges only since the early 1990s when the fed used federal funds rate targeting and eliminated the reserve requirement on eurocurrency deposits the study further reveals that bidirectional causality exists between the two rates over the period of 1993 to 2002 while unidirectional causality from eurodollar rate to the us rate is found to exist over the period of 1983 to 1991 these findings consistently support increased interest rate linkages especially since the early 1990s

incentives information and organizational form we model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology here consisting of a collection of plants in our framework the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him we argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance in particular we show that under certain assumptions the m form multi divisional form is likely to provide better incentives than the u form unitary form because it promotes yardstick competition i e relative performance evaluation more effectively we conclude by presenting evidence that the assumptions on which this comparison rests are satisfied for chinese data

spite and development in a wide variety of settings spiteful preferences would constitute an obstacle to cooperation trade and thus economic development this paper shows that spiteful preferences the desire to reduce another s material payoff for the mere purpose of increasing one s relative payoff are surprisingly widespread in experiments conducted in one of the least developed regions in india uttar pradesh in a one shot trust game the authors find that a large majority of subjects punish cooperative behavior although such punishment clearly increases inequality and decreases the payoffs of both subjects in experiments to study coordination and to measure social preferences the findings reveal empirical patterns suggesting that the willingness to reduce another s material payoff either for the sake of achieving more equality or for the sake of being ahead is stronger among individuals belonging to high castes than among those belonging to low castes because extreme social hierarchies are typically accompanied by a culture that stresses status seeking it is plausible that the observed social preference patterns are at least partly shaped by this culture thus an exciting question for future research is the extent to which different institutions and cultures produce preferences that are conducive or detrimental to economic development

a multivariate cointegration analysis of interest rates in the eurocurrency market abstract a multivariate cointegration methodology is utilized to analyze relations among interest rates on us dollars uk pounds german marks french francs and japanese yen in the eurocurrency market over a period with major capital market deregulations and increasingly globalized money market trading three major results appear it is appropriate to model these interest rates as a multivariate cointegrated system no interest rate may be excluded from the cointegrating relations a recursive cointegration approach indicates that the number of cointegration vectors increases in the later part of the sample period consequently this study supports the hypothesis of a substantial increase in euromarket interest rate comovements jel e40 f02 1997 elsevier science ltd

price discovery between private and public housing markets public and private housing markets are usually differentiated in terms of price regulations and policies but they are not necessarily segmented any integration as opposed to segmentation between private and public markets implies that the prices of private housing are interrelated with the prices of public housing determined in the open market if so information revealed in one market will be pertinent for making inferences on prices in the other market this paper addresses the price discovery or relation between public and private housing in view of singapore s substantial public housing programme that has an actively traded secondary market implications for the direction of price causality and upward mobility for households between housing price strata are examined

implicit contracts incentive compatibility and involuntary unemployment this paper considers the enforceability of employment contracts when employees performance cannot be verified in court so that piece rate contracts are not legally enforceable part i shows that there exists a variety of self enforcing implicit contracts modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and characterizes all the wage and performance outcomes that can be implemented implementation requires a strictly positive surplus from employment the form of the contract depending on how this surplus is divided between firm and employee piece rate contracts and contracts with an informally agreed bonus can be made self enforcing but the use of severance pay and bonding does not extend the set of implementable allocations the resulting contracts resemble actual labor contracts more than do the contracts in standard principal agent models part ii analyses market equilibrium with these contracts also modelled as perfect equilibria in a repeated game and shows that many such equilibria exist unfilled vacancies and unemployed workers can co exist despite the existence of contracts that are potentially mutually beneficial for those jobs that are filled any division of the potential surplus is possible so that the market can have at the same time involuntary unemployment and vacancies that are unfilled despite filled jobs earning positive profits as a criterion for selecting equilibria a notion of renegotiation proofness is applied then either all workers are employed or all jobs filled but any division of the potential surplus is still possible the paper explores what further restrictions on beliefs give rise to a walrasian outcome in which all the potential surplus goes to the short side of the market and to an efficiency wage type outcome in which the potential surplus goes to the long side

federalism chinese style the political basis for economic success in china china s remarkable economic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a considerable degree of credible commitment to markets this reform reflects a special type of institutionalized decentralization that the authors call federalism chinese style this form of decentralization has three consequences first it fosters competition not only in product markets but also among local governments for labor and foreign capital this competition in turn encourages local government experimentation and learning with new forms of enterprises regulation and economic relationships second it provides incentives for local governments to promote local economic prosperity finally it provides a significant amount of protection to local governments and their enterprises from political intrusion by the central government