political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas abstract tariffs and quotas are not symmetric under a variety of circumstances this paper pursues the implications of one such circumstance domestic market power for the political choice of protectionist instrument in the context of a political support maximization model tariffs dominate quotas in the political model in the absence of revenue seeking motives in the presence of revenue seeking ambiguity arises but limits can be placed on the range of tariff or quota levels also some welfare implications emerge

the demographic transition and the position of women a marriage market perspective we present international evidence on the marriage market implications of cohort size growth and set out a theoretical model of how marriage markets adjust to imbalances since men marry younger women secular growth in cohort size in the second phase of the demographic transition worsens the position of women this e ect has been substantial in many asian countries earlier and continues to be true in sub saharan africa with fertility decline cohort are now shrinking in east asia improves the position of women these demographic trends can explain the increase and spread in dowries in south asia and the persistence of polygyny in sub saharan africa we show that the age gap at marriage will not adjust in order to equilibrate the marriage market in response to persistent imbalances even though it accommodates transitory shocks jel categories j12 j13 j16

why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation an influential explanation for rising dowry payments is the marriage squeeze the present paper shows this explanation to be internally inconsistent the marriage squeeze argument for inflation relies on the fact that population growth leads to an excess supply of brides in the marriage market this excess supply is resolved by some women postponing marriage so that the average age of brides increases in previous studies the argument is stated informally here a matching model of marriage is developed to formally analyze the link between dowry payments and population growth it is shown that a marriage squeeze cannot yield dowry inflation in fact when women who do not find matches at the desirable marrying age re enter the marriage market as older brides a marriage squeeze is shown to imply dowry deflation population change is therefore not a promising explanation for the observed increases in dowry payments

candidate reputations and the incumbency effect abstract a major shortcoming of the classical median voter model is that its central prediction convergence of platforms to the median voter s ideal is seldom observed one reason is that the classical model neglects the importance of voter expectations as a determinant of votes here we associate voters expectations about candidates with past as well as current candidate pronouncements and assume that incumbents whose actions are consistent with their reputations are perceived as less risky than challengers in equilibrium candidates choose distinct platforms typically neither adopts the median voter s ideal point either candidate may win depending on how well the incumbent s reputation reflects current voter tastes and how relatively risky the electorate perceives the challenger to be

why voluntary export restraints are voluntary the paper presents an analysis of the effect upon an oligopolistic equilibrium of introducing a voluntary export restraint ver upon an importing firm a ver set at the free trade level of imports is shown to raise the profits of all firms within the industry the result follows as the imposition of a ver upon a free trade nash price competition forces the domestic firm to become an industry price leader the ver raises industry prices by facilitating collusion and lowers consumer welfare pourquoi les restrictions volontaires d 1 exportation sont volontaires ce memoire presente une analyse des effets de l introduction de restrictions volontaires a l exportation rve sur une entreprise qui importe dans un monde en equilibre oligopolistique on montre que l introduction de rve approximant le niveau des importations en regime de libre echange devrait augmenter les profits de toutes les entreprises dans l industrie cela decoule du fait que l imposition de rve sur un univers de concurrence par les prix a la nash en regime de libre echange force l entreprise domestique a devenir le leader en prix l introduction de rve augmente le niveau des prix de l industrie en facilitant la collusion et de ce fait reduit le niveau de bien etre des consomrnateurs

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

production capacity planning for multiple products under uncertain demand conditions abstract this study chiefly deliberates issues regarding capacity allocation for multiple products when producing multiple products a manufacturer needs to allocate a favorable production quantity to each product under conditions of uncertain demand since the excess or shortage of a product will in turn cause the loss of profit the proposed model and the corresponding algorithm in this study are used to find out the optimal capacity allocation under the given probability density function of specific demands and to effectively allocate limited capacity to multiple products with an aim to maximize profit finally the numerical example suggests that the marginal profit the inventory holding cost the shortage cost the loss of excess production and market demands should be considered in an effort to discover an optimal capacity allocation with regard to multiple products

terror as a bargaining instrument a case study of dowry violence in rural india this ethnographic study examined the sociocultural context of domestic violence and dowry in india and describes a theoretical model and econometric methodology the model was tested with survey data collected from a sub caste of 149 potter families from 3 villages in karnataka state in south india interviews were conducted among 139 adult married women and 130 married men the case studies demonstrate that violence can be used as a way to redistribute resources bargaining over dowry amounts occurs twice once before the marriage and renegotiations after the wife had moved to the husbands family domestic violence may be a weapon in order to obtain higher transfers at the renegotiation stage the model assumes that the level of dowry and the occurrence of violence are determined simultaneously hypotheses tested whether increases in husbands family wealth in the dowry paid and husbands cost of violent behavior reduces the incidence of violence tests determined whether increases in wifes familys wealth and increases in wifes human capital husbands human capital or wifes cost of violence increase violence 23 reported wife beating at some time a 10000 rupee increase in the wifes parents income increased the risk of violence by 4 a 10000 rupee increase in the husbands parents income reduced the risk of violence by 10 a 10000 rupee increase in dowry reduced the risk by 5 an additional male child reduced the risk by 11 female sterilization increased the risk by 16 findings suggest that husbands beat wives when the wifes family is rich and when dowries are small

election goals and the allocation of campaign resources this paper compares the equilibrium behavior and outcomes in a model of two party competition for legislative seats under two different assumptions about the parties goals 1 parties maximize the expected number of seats won and 2 parties maximize the probability of winning a majority of the seats the two goals may lead to qualitatively different behavior and studying the differences yields insights into the relationship between the goals and the role of assymetries between the parties

political economy of public policies insights from distortions to agricultural and food markets the agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational while others have been gradual but persistent this paper reviews and synthesizes the literature on trends and fluctuations in market distortions and the political economy explanations that have been advanced based on a rich global data set covering a half century of evidence on commodities countries and policy instruments the paper identifies hypotheses that have been explored in the literature on the extent of market distortions and the conditions under which reform may be feasible

a general equilibrium model of congressional voting in this paper we specify a model in which congressmen constituents and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of congressmen congressmen on the other hand want to be elected and vote accordingly we empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model our results indicate that part of the voting behavior of congressmen may be explained by noneconomic factors we also find that unions and businesses as campaign contributors are sometimes influential unions are more often influential than is business ideological factors are also important in explaining voting

the marriage squeeze interpretation of dowry inflation a comment in a recent paper rao 1993 advanced a marriage squeeze explanation to the secular rise in real dowries so called dowry inflation witnessed in india arguing that the relevant ages with respect to marriage are 10 19 for women and 20 29 for men rao found that the ratio of women to men in those age groups had increased over time moreover this sex ratio was found to have a positive and significant impact on dowry when one controls for differences in traits of brides and grooms the empirical results presented here suggest that rao s findings are not robust using the same data i fail to replicate his main result that is that the sex ratio women 10 19 men 20 29 has a positive impact on dowries moreover rao s specification regressing dowries on differences in spouses traits bride s minus groom s imposes the restriction that attributes influence dowries in a symmetrical fashion ignoring compelling evidence against that assumption i find that regressing dowry on individual traits instead of differences improves the model fit considerably

why dowry payments declined with modernization in europe but are rising in india in contrast to most dowry oriented societies in which payments have declined with modernization those in india have undergone significant inflation over the last five decades this paper explains the difference between these two experiences by focusing on the role played by caste the theoretical model contrasts caste and non caste based societies in the former there exists an inherited component to status caste that is independent of wealth and in the latter wealth is the primary determinant of status modernization is assumed to involve two components increasing average wealth and increasing wealth dispersion within status or caste groups the paper shows that in caste based societies the increases in wealth dispersion that accompany modernization necessarily lead to increases in dowry payments whereas in non caste based societies increased dispersion has no real effect on dowry payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline

an economic model of early marriage abstract to explain female adolescent marriage patterns around the world we develop a marriage market model with asymmetric information about prospective marriage partners and a noisy signal about the bride s quality during an engagement in equilibrium there is a negative relationship between the age and perceived quality of women on the marriage market and consistent with available evidence older brides make higher net marriage payments the model also implies path dependence in the evolution of adolescent marriage practices over time and persistent effects on marriage practices from transitory shocks model simulations show interventions which increase the opportunity cost of early marriage attenuates the association between bride quality and age triggering a virtuous cycle of marriage postponement

price and quantity controls as facilitating devices abstract this letter examines three cases in which a regulation imposed on one of two duopolists can increase the profit levels of both firms the regulations examined include a price floor an output quota and a sales tax

the price of marriage net vs gross flows and the south asian dowry debate the rise in dowry payments in india has been taken as evidence that women increasingly are at a disadvantage on the marriage market and must pay for marriage moreover high dowries it is argued add to the plight of parents of daughters and have thus contributed to the scarcity of women brides however the logic is curious and this paper argues flawed the term dowry can mean different things and it may be useful to distinguish between the assets the bride brings at the time of marriage gross dowry and those netted against the groom payments net dowry the former is what is generally meant by dowry while the latter is a concept used mainly by economists i show that there is no evidence of an increase in real net dowries post 1950 in the icrisat data set a data set that has featured prominently in the literature i take this to suggest that the widespread reports of dowry inflation refer to an increase in gross dowry a development which may merely reflect greater parental affluence jel j12 j16

dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders the theory of rent seeking with its origins in the observations of gordon tullock 1967 or to use jagdish bhagwati s 1982 proposed term the theory of directly unproductive profit seeking activities is concerned with the potentially adverse effects on resource allocation of incentives to cap ture and defend artificially contrived rents and transfers the scope for so cial loss proposed by the theory derives from the relation between the value of a contestable prize and the value of the resources attracted into the con test to determine the beneficiary of the prize underlying this social loss is a specification of how rational behavior by optimizing agents links the value of the prize sought to the resources expended it has been traditional to assume competitive behavior in describing the activities of lobbying and influence seeking then if some further condi tions are satisfied l the total value of the resources expended precisely equals the value of the prize sought so dissipation is complete 2 conse quently the social cost associated with contestability of a rent can be in ferred from the value of the rent itself and the detailed and hard to come by information on individual outlays made in the course of the contest be comes unnecessary by basing their analyses on competitive dissipation contributors to the rent seeking literature see the review by robert tollison 1982 have been able to presume that the observed value of a contested rent is an exact measure of the associated social cost of monopoly power or regu lation similarly in the trade theoretic literature where the rights contested are to quota premia or revenues from trade taxes krueger 1974 bhagwati

free entry and efficient rent seeking this paper concerns rent seeking and the extent to which rents are dissipated under various circumstances gordon tullock s 1967 insight that expenditures made to capture an artificially created transfer represent a social waste suggested that the cost to the economy of monopoly and regulation is greater than the simple harberger 1954 deadweight loss indeed under tullock s original formulation and in the extensions of his work by krueger 1974 and posner 1975 rents are exactly dissipated at the social level 1 is spent to capture 1 so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits

monetary incentives on inter caste marriages in india theory and evidence abstract we study the effect of a policy in india that offers monetary incentives to inter caste marriages in which one of the spouses is of historically disadvantaged castes i e scheduled castes and the other is not we show that in theory the monetary incentives increase the incidence of exogamy but may reduce the welfare of certain caste or gender building on our theoretical analysis we estimate the effect of the monetary incentives on the incidence of exogamy the welfare and inter spousal transfers using national family and health survey data we find that a 10 000 rupee increase in the incentive raises the exogamy between scheduled caste men and non scheduled caste women by 4 percent in rural india however we also find that the same increase reduces the welfare of women in rural areas

a multi item newsvendor problem with preseason production and capacitated reactive production abstract given items with short life cycles or seasonal demands one can potentially improve profits by producing during the selling season especially when its production capacity is substantial we develop a two stage multi item model incorporating reactive production that employs a firm s internal capacity production occurs in an uncapacitated preseason stage and a capacitated reactive stage demands occur in the reactive stage reactive capacities are pre allocated to each item in the preseason stage and cannot be changed during the reactive stage reactive production occurs during the selling season with full knowledge of demands the objective is expected profit maximization unsatisfied demand is lost the revenue salvage value and production and lost sales costs are proportional assuming no fixed costs we present a simple algorithm for computing optimal policies for a model with fixed costs for allocating preseason stage production and reactive stage capacity to product families we characterize optimal policies and develop optimal and heuristic algorithms

marriage squeeze marriage age and the household savings rate in china abstract recent influential papers claim that single men s saving competition for marriage intensified by an increase in the male to female ratio in the pre marital cohort explains 60 percent of the rise of china s aggregate household savings rate in this paper we analyze whether the marriage competition remains a first order effect on saving when another margin of adjustment to sex ratio imbalance men s postponement of marriage is considered we construct a theoretical and quantitative life cycle model with a frictionless marriage market where a single man s rank is determined by his wealth and age by calibration we find that with the option to postpone marriage the response of the aggregate savings rate to the rising sex ratio is dampened by 45 percent moreover the model generates an unusual downward sloping age savings rate profile with young households saving more than their middle aged counterparts as observed in the data

the rising price of husbands a hedonic analysis of dowry increases in rural india dowries in south asia have steadily risen over the last 40 years and now often amount to over 50 percent of a household s assets this paper attempts to investigate the reasons behind this increase it adapts rosen s implicit market model to the indian marriage market and tests predictions from the model with data from six villages in south central india and from the indian census it is found that a marriage squeeze caused by population growth resulting in larger younger cohorts and hence a surplus of women in the marriage market has played a significant role in the rise in dowries

environmental protection a theory of direct and indirect competition for political influence how is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying this paper develops a model of direct lobbying the government and indirect persuading the public competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary however an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion or a rise of public environmental awareness induces substitution between the two the findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and growing public environmental awareness the size of its economic stake and hence the associated lobbying effort and the efficiency of its organization in exerting political influence how then can we explain why some environmental groups have been very successful against polluting industries when the latter s economic stakes seem very high and they lobby more and their interests are more efficiently organized some might suggest that the reason for the success of the environmental movement is that environmental groups have large memberships and can provide block votes 2 however according to olson 1965 a large membership of an interest group is not necessarily an advantage and it is still uncertain whether environmental groups are able to mobilize their members to cast votes based on such affiliations this paper suggests an alternative explanation by developing a theory of direct and indirect competition between special interests for political influence rather than marshalling block votes a primary feature of our framework is that two opposing interest groups an environmentalist group and an industrialist group compete directly and indirectly for political influence in a three stage game the indirect competition takes place in the first stage in which interest groups exert effort in persuading the public to indirectly influence government policy the direct competition takes place in the second stage in which interest groups exert effort in

a note on marriage market clearing abstract we provide a formula for marriage sex ratios based on birth sex ratios and dynamic factors like the marriage age gap and gender specific mortality we show that ignoring dynamic considerations can lead to faulty conclusions about scarcity in marriage markets

muslim family law prenuptial agreements and the emergence of dowry in bangladesh we explain trends in dowry levels in bangladesh by drawing attention to an institutional feature of marriage contracts previously ignored in the literature the mehr or traditional islamic brideprice we develop a model of marriage contracts in which mehr serves as a barrier to husbands exiting marriage and a component of dowry as an amount that ex ante compensates the groom for the cost of mehr we investigate how mehr and dowry respond to exogenous changes in the costs of polygamy and divorce and show that our model gives a dierent set of predictions than traditional models we show that major changes in dowry levels took place precisely after the legal changes corresponding to simultaneous changes in levels of mehr

domestic politics foreign interests and international trade policy reply this paper incorporates the foreign interest in the determination of a country s international trade policy into a model of political competition between candidates contesting elective office we envisage foreign and domestic producer interests as expressing political support for a candidate via campaign contributions and candidates as making trade policy pronouncements to maximize political support from producer interests tariffs are divisive but vers are consistent with conciliatory policy positions yielding mutual gain to foreign and domestic interests no candidate has an interest in formulating a trade policy position using a tariff if a ver is a policy option protection in the developed countries has in recent years often taken the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints vers rather than the more traditional unilaterally imposed import restrictions the use of voluntary export restraints has been paralleled by interest in the theoretical literature the effects of vers have been compared with tariffs and quotas and vers have been examined in a political economy framework with a view to identifying the gainers and losers from this form of restric

trade restrictions as facilitating practices abstract the effect of quantitative restrictions in oligopolistic markets is shown to depend on whether imports are substitutes or complements for domestic products in the former case they have profound effects even when set at free trade levels because they impede the ability of the foreign firm to compete in the domestic market thereby acting to facilitate collusion and raise prices and profits for this reason tariffs and quotas are fundamentally non equivalent with substitute goods when goods are complements a voluntary export restriction ver at the free trade level has no effect and tariffs and quotas are equivalent

daughters dowries deliveries the effect of marital payments on fertility choices in india abstract this paper investigates the effect of the differential pecuniary costs of sons and daughters on fertility decisions the focus is on dowries in india which increase the economic returns to sons and decrease the returns to daughters the paper exploits an exogenous shift in the cost of girls relative to boys arising from a revision in anti dowry law which is shown to have decreased dowry transfers markedly the reform is found to have attenuated the widely documented positive association between daughters and their parents fertility the effect is particularly pronounced for more autonomous women and for individuals living in areas characterised by strong preferences for sons

optimal ordering quantities for multi products with stochastic demand return cvar model abstract multi product ordering problem with stochastic demand is often optimized by the expected cost reduction or the expected profit improvement in most of previous works moreover risk preference of decision maker is often ignored evidently this approach is impracticable when the corresponding volatility is larger based on the outstanding characteristics of conditional value at risk cvar as a risk measure the paper proposes an optimal order model for multi product with cvar constraints also the model is finally formulated as a linear programming problem the model is simulated for the case of a newsvendor to analyze to what degree it succeeds the solution in fact is bound consistent fully with the decision maker s intuition on return risk decision making finally results of return cvar model and the classical model are compared and shows that return cvar model is more flexible than the classical model

rent seeking aspects of political advertising political contests have all the usual characteristics of rent seeking games characterized in the recent volume edited by buchanan tollison and tullock 1980 that is to say resources are committed to a distributive contest where the social pie is not necessarily enlarged but rather divided up a policy enacted via a winner take all apportioning since political advertising is one method of influencing electoral outcomes we might expect competitive political advertising to exhibit rent seeking losses of the usual sort the extent of the rent seeking losses associated with political advertising depends upon the extent to which advertising affects voter perceptions of the relative merits of electoral alternatives political proponents may well completely dissipate any electoral rents at stake through their advertising efforts yet still increase social welfare if political advertisments provide sufficiently valuable information to the electorate on the other hand if advertising has no effect on voter perceptions or provides information of dubious value then rent dissipating advertising may generate substantial rent seeking losses

endogeneous protection factor returns and resource allocation we consider a heckscher ohlin samuelson trade model with two lobbies representing the interests of factor owners and two political parties the lobbies contribute resources to politics equating their returns to political and economic activity at the margin while the parties maximize their probability of election trading off general voter dissatisfaction with protection against the electioneering resources that favorable policies attract from the lobbies the equilibrium level of protection of a factor and its expected rate of return increase with its relative endowment if this relative endowment is high low then the factor will be better worse off than under free trade but at intermediate factor endowment ratios both factors will be worse off under parameter changes making lobbies more sensitive to the commodity price the lobbies contribute more resources to politics and can both be worse off even though the parties are proposing lower trade distortions

what s your child worth an analysis of expected dowry payments in rural india abstract this paper introduces a new primary dataset on dowry payments in rural india a novel feature of the data is that in addition to eliciting actual dowry payments we also asked rural indian households how much dowry they expected to pay receive for each of their currently unmarried children these expectations are presumably the basis of household decision making as opposed to actual dowries paid and received with respect to decisions such as human capital investments saving and consumption etc we find that the distribution of dowry forecasts appears to be consistent with the distribution of actual dowry payments suggesting that dowry perceptions may be quite accurate our analysis of dowry forecasts further indicates that i individual specific attributes are significantly more important than household income and wealth in terms of explaining the magnitude of dowry payments and ii bride quality is also a significant determinant of dowry which provides a corrective to the emphasis on groom quality in the literature

economic lot scheduling with uncontrolled co production the aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of uncontrolled co production on the production planning and lot scheduling of multiple products co production occurs when a proportion of a certain production comes out as another product this is typical in the process industry where quality and process specifications can lead to diversified products we assume that there is no demand substitution and each product has its own market furthermore we assume that co production cannot be controlled due to technical and or cost considerations we introduce two models that extend the common cycle economic lot scheduling elsp setting to include uncontrolled co production in the first model we do not allow for shortages and derive the optimal cycle time expression in the second model we allow for planned backorders and characterize the optimal solution in closed form we provide a numerical study to gain insight about co production it seems that the cycle time increases with co production rate and utilization of the system the effect of co production on long term average cost does not exhibit a certain characteristic

random errors dirty information and politics rational voters assessments of candidates and policy proposals are unbiased but affected by random errors clean information decreases these errors while dirty information increases them in politics most voting procedures weigh random individual errors asymmetrically thus such errors do not counterbalance one another in the aggregate they systematically affect politics this illuminates the roles of political propaganda and interest groups it helps to explain various puzzles in public choice e g the frequent use of inefficient policy instruments institutional conditions are identified that shape the aggregate impact of individual errors and the politicians incentives to produce dirty information

single item inventory control under periodic review and a minimum order quantity in this paper we study a periodic review single item single stage inventory system with stochastic demand in each time period the system must order none or at least as much as a minimum order quantity qmin since the optimal structure of an ordering policy with a minimum order quantity is complicated we propose an easy to use policy which we call r s qmin policy assuming linear holding and backorder costs we determine the optimal numerical value of the level s using a markov chain approach in addition we derive simple news vendor type inequalities for near optimal policy parameters which can easily be implemented within spreadsheet applications in a numerical study we compare our policy with others and test the performance of the approximation for three different demand distributions poisson negative binomial and a discretized version of the gamma distribution given the simplicity of the policy and its cost performance as well as the excellent performance of the approximation we advocate the application of the r s qmin policy in practice

the use and effect of political propaganda in democracies this paper examines the influence of political propaganda on voters and analyses the behavior of the interest groups in the face of the influence being exercised by propaganda semi truths are distributed among the electorate the decision taken by a voter results from his basic opinion and from the parts of information he receives the analysis shows that the greater the likelihood of a certain decision being reached by a fully informed electorate the more probable it is that the same decision will be reached by a rationally uninformed electorate the pecuniary interest of an interest group is however also positively correlated with the probability that the electorate reaches a decision which is agreeable to that interest group it has finally become appar ent that the results of the approach concur well with empirical studies

conflict and rent seeking success functions ratio vs difference models of relative success the rent seeking competitions studied by economists fall within a much broader category of conflict interactions that also includes military combats election campaigns industrial disputes lawsuits and sibling rivalries in the rent seeking literature each party s success pi which can be interpreted either as the probability of victory or as the proportion of the prize won has usually been taken to be a function of the ratio of the respective resource commitments alternatively however pi may instead be a function of the difference between the parties commitments to the contest the contest success function csf for the difference from is a logistic curve in which as is consistent with military experience increasing returns apply up to an inflection point at equal resource commitments a crucial flaw of the traditional ratio model is that neither onesided submission nor two sided peace between the parties can ever occur as a cournot equilibrium in contrast both of these outcomes are entirely consistent with a model in which success is a function of the difference between the parties resource commitments

money and votes a simultaneous equation model this paper has specified and estimated a model of the interaction between money and voting in american politics convincingly establishing the identification of a system of equations can be difficult even when theory provides a guide in the study of money in politics however no theoretical perspective has been established in the literature to make the case for identification as unambiguous as possible this paper has done two things first the specification was based in part on theory which has formally been developed elsewhere and which satisfactorily describes data at the economic interest group level welch 1980 second part of the question of identification revolves around the relationship between party strength and socioeconomic variables because there are questions as to the best measurement of party strength results based on two measures were presented for a number of reasons the presidential vote was the preferred measure this study draws four conclusions first money influenced voting in u s house elections in 1972 although its effect was small second patterns of total contributions to a u s house candidate are consistent with the hypothesis that a majority of dollars come from contributors who prefer to support likely winners third the total contributions made to a candidate are a positive function of the district s median years of schooling completed and the gini coefficient total contributions made to a democratic candidate are also a positive function of the median income finally had house campaigns been financed in the early 1970s even to the point of giving each major party candidate 150 000 in 1978 dollars few elections would have been changed it is also worth mentioning some of the things about the financing of political campaigns that we still do not know the above conclusions involve only elections to the u s house there are good reasons for suspecting that money is more influential in u s senate elections ols statistics support this belief and the greater visibility of those races help justify it although money has little effect on house elections we do not know whether contributions affect legislative voting in the house representatives apparently believe that expenditure influences their reelection chances given the complexity of the process it should be no surprise that this belief conflicts with our findings acting on this belief a representative s vote may very well be influenced by the sources of his contributions either directly or indirectly through the giving of access to contributors finally we should be reminded that the above model is static while the electoral process is dynamic the amount contributed to a candidate is affected by his probability of winning in the previous time period e g week month and in turn affects that probability in the following time period as usual what we know is overshadowed by what we do not know the above questions are both interesting in their own right and of interest to policy making

analysis of batch ordering inventory models with setup cost and capacity constraint abstract stochastic periodic review batch ordering inventory problems appear in many industrial settings however few literature deals with the optimal ordering polices for such problems no mention to the inclusion of the fixed ordering cost and the production capacity in this paper we consider a single item periodic review batch ordering inventory system with the consideration of the setup cost and the capacity constraint for each order over a finite planning horizon by proposing several new convex notions we show that a batch based s s policy is optimal for the unlimited ordering capacity case while for the limited ordering capacity case a modified r q policy is optimal for the setting with zero ordering setup cost and a batch based x y band policy for the setting with positive ordering setup cost moreover we analytically study the sensitivity of the policy parameters with respect to the capacity and batch order size and derive the bounds on the optimal policy parameters we further extend our analysis to the infinite horizon setting and show that the structure of the optimal policy remains similar finally the numerical experiments provide some insights into the impact of model parameters on the benefit of reducing the batch size and increasing the ordering capacity and indicate that ignoring batch requirement may lead to a significant cost increment

efficient rents 1 rent seeking behavior in the long run we have analyzed long run behavior in rent seeking under several conditions and behavioral hypotheses the question of interest is whether or not the long run expenditures will exactly equal the value of the rents our results depend on the type of competitive response which is assumed to exist in the long run and on the r value governing the probability of winning

interest groups campaign contributions and probabilistic voting this essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral policy decisions of candidates for office interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates policies and opposing groups donations remain unaltered candidates however recognize that their policy choices affect contributions campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy oriented voters perceptions of candidates positions in this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates electoral policies and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups

risk averse rent seekers and the social cost of monopoly power there is now quite general recognition that the social cost of monopoly power encompasses the resources expended by individuals seeking to become the beneficiaries of monopoly rents however since the activity of rent seeking is generally not observable direct estimates of resources expended in quests to acquire monopoly power are usually impossible to come by 1 as a consequence the indirect approach of taking the observed value of monopoly rents as indicative of the unobserved value of the resources expended in rent seeking is quite generally adopted in approaches to evaluation of the social cost of such activity

long run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent seeking the lure of excess profits or rents associated with monopoly power gives rise to expenditures to obtain these rents competitive rent seeking behavior is recognized as a factor which must be included among the wastes associated with monopoly power tullock 1967 posner 1975 1 the expenditures are aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society how important rent seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits

rent seeking with non identical sharing rules the primary object of this paper is to examine the role of differential sharing rules within a collective rent seeking setting on the possible non existence of nash equilibrium focusing on groups that distribute part of the rent equally among their members and the residual according to relative effort we show that in rent seeking societies applying the two polar sharing rules equilibrium never exists in the general case where groups apply different but not necessarily the polar sharing rules we study the relationship between group variability in distributing rents and the problem of non existence of equilibrium in the rent seeking game

rent seeking rent defending and rent dissipation in the preceding analyses of rent defending the posner model yielded welfare losses in excess of the combined areas of the tullock rectangle and the harberger triangle in only one instance furthermore this particular circumstance necessitated voluntary participation in a game with a negative expected value 13 for the tullock rogerson model the explicit addition of rent defenders had no impact on aggregate dissipation

introduction to development theory abstractthisarticle introduces the symposium on economic development theory 2007 elsevier inc all rights reserved jel classi cation o11 o12keywords development economics development economics a subject that studies institutions growth inequality and povertyin the developing world is a large lively and exciting area of research the objective of thissymposium is to put together some contributions in economic theory with a distinct focus ondevelopment questions much of early development economics as typi ed in the work of paul rosenstein rodan arthurlewis ragnarnurkse tiborscitovsky allynyoung gunnarmyrdal harveyleibenstein alberthirschman amartyasenandothers wastheoretical thoughnotnecessarilyinthesenseofformalmodel building theseauthorsallfelttheneedtobringnewconceptsintoeconomictheory ideas that would capture the essential features of underdevelopment and provide explanationsof the development process existing economic theory with its focus on competitive markets depersonalized exchange steady technical progress and balanced growth simply did not seemrightwhenmatchedwiththegroundrealitiesofunderdevelopment fragmented imperfect orjustplain missing markets highly personalized transactions in credit insurance or agrarian tenancy ambiguousornonexistentpropertyrights andwidespreadevidenceofpovertytrapsandhistoricallock ins a fair bit of modern economic theory was born in some of these early development writings young s article 40 on increasing returns was perhaps the rst systematic study of noncon vexities in economic growth rosenstein rodan s celebrated paper 32 on post war interven tion in europe provided a conceptual foundation for modern thinking on coordination failures

capacity selection under uncertainty with ratio objectives abstract capacity choice or expansion whether organic or via mergers and acquisitions creates firms of widely varying scales the ex post profitability of such a transformed firm relative to its original size will typically be evaluated on ratio rate measures like earnings per share or profits to asset ratio as such are the only meaningful ways to compare profitability of firms of substantially different sizes it thus seems desirable that ex ante capacity selection decisions will also be guided by a ratio objective we explore capacity choice decisions under demand uncertainty through the ratio measures 1 expected newsvendor i e single period costs per unit capacity 2 expected newsvendor profit per unit of capacity 3 expected profit per costs of acquiring capacity 4 a weighted average of a ratio and non ratio objectives we allow the capacity acquisition costs and capacity s production capability to be general non linear functions cost and profit objectives cease to be equivalent when ratio objectives are involved we show that cost ratio optimizers will select a larger capacity than absolute cost optimizers while profit ratio optimizers will select smaller capacities than absolute counterpart we provide examples which show that the difference in optimal capacities and the associated difference in objective value can be substantial we also perform comparative statics analyses of the effect of change in item s shortage cost and of stochastic shifts in demand

the newsvendor problem review and directions for future research in this paper we review the contributions to date for analyzing the newsvendor problem our focus is on examining the specific extensions for analyzing this problem in the context of modeling customer demand supplier costs and the buyer risk profile more specifically we analyze the impact of market price marketing effort and stocking quantity on customer demand how supplier prices can serve as a coordination mechanism in a supply chain setting integrating alternative supplier pricing policies within the newsvendor framework and how the buyer s risk profile moderates the newsvendor order quantity decision for each of these areas we summarize the current literature and develop extensions finally we also propose directions for future research

robust multi item newsboy models with a budget constraint abstract in this paper we present robust newsboy models with uncertain demand the traditional approach to describing uncertainty is by means of probability density functions in this paper we present an alternative approach using deterministic optimization models we describe uncertainty using two types of demand scenarios namely interval and discrete scenarios for interval demand scenarios we only require a lower and an upper bound for the uncertain demand of each item while for discrete demand scenarios we require a set of likely demand outcomes for each item using the above scenarios to describe demand uncertainty we develop several minimax regret formulations for the multi item newsboy problem with a budget constraint for the problems involving interval demand scenarios we develop linear time optimal algorithms we show that the corresponding models with discrete demand scenarios are np hard and that they are solvable by dynamic programming finally we extend the above results to the case of mixed scenarios where the demand of some of the items is described by interval scenarios and the demand of the remaining items is described by discrete scenarios

endogenous choice of trade policy instruments abstract recently developed theories of endogenous trade policy formation have attempted to explain tariffs as the result of economic interest seeking by individuals or groups this note demonstrates that tariffs will not emerge as a policy choice if income is redistributed solely through trade policy induced factor price changes a production tax cum subsidy will be adopted as both gainers and losers are better off than with a tariff

campaign finances and political platforms the economics of political controversy one implication of the widely used median voter model is that candidates have little to gain by disagreement apart from some epsilon of controversy necessary to demonstrate which candidate is closer to the median voter position in the policy dimension in question votes are maximized by taking essentially identical position this is true at the nash median voter equilibrium and is true away from equilibrium as a consequence two candidate competition within one dimensional policy domain is expected to generate considerable agreement about appropriate policy we do in fact observe that in many elections candidate positions converge to very similar positions on matters of broad concern it is largely this convergence that gives the median voter model its considerable credence in spite of the fragility of the underlying theory on the other hand the convergence is rarely as complete as might have been expected and there are elections where candidates take substantively different positions this paper explores the extent to which the campaign contributions of politically active groups may draw candidates away from the median voter position as candidate seek funds to run effective election campaigns candidates gener

regional free trade and social integration this paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective in contrast to most other literature which fails to take into account geographical factors it is argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners a political support maximizing government will consider these factors when balancing political support from free traders and protectionists

transitional politics emerging incentive based instruments in environmental regulation abstract this paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice we study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre specified target the target can be implemented by one of three instruments s uniform emission standards p tradeable permits and t emission taxes the conflict of interest between special interests representing polluters and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician we characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition observed in many countries from s to either p or t can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets

property rights over marital transfers in developing countries the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage focusing on dowry we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intra household bargaining in order to understand the incentives for brides parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom in doing so we clarify and formalize the dual role of dowry as a pre mortem bequest and as a market clearing price identified in the literature we use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that in contrast to other rights women s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development we show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights we also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women

the economics of dowry and brideprice payments between families at the time of marriage existed during the history of most developed countries and are currently pervasive in many areas of the developing world these payments can be substantial enough to affect the welfare of women and a society s distribution of wealth recent estimates document transfers per marriage amounting to six times the annual household income in south asia rao 1993 and four times in sub saharan africa dekker and hoogeveen 2002 this paper first establishes some basic facts about the prevalence and magnitude of marriage payments it then discusses how such patterns vary across countries depending upon economic conditions societal structures institutions and family characteristics such payments have also evolved within societies over time for example in some periods such payments have risen sharply in some cases payments have shifted from the grooms sides to the brides and vice versa also property rights over such payments have sometimes shifted between marrying partners and parental generations economists who have only recently begun to work on the topic have focused on explaining these facts the second part of the paper addresses this economic literature though considerable insight into many of the facts has been gained many of the existing economic explanations are weakly convincing and many puzzles remain one crucial difficulty is that solid data in this field have been extremely rare the descriptions of marriage payments in this paper are synthesized from a patchwork of studies across periods places and even epochs and there are doubtless numerous cases which remain undocumented thus the paper

the economics of consanguineous marriages the institution of consanguineous marriage a marriage contracted between close biological relatives has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world this paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom when marriage contracts are incomplete dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage when these transactions are costly however consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost the paper s model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions it also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity an empirical analysis using data from bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model

service induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium candidates for office are modeled as promising services such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions an electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute the model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests a recognition advantage a high personal valuation of the office a lower cost of providing services and policy alignment with high demand interest groups the model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes

tariffs subsidies and welfare with endogenous policy abstract it is a well established proposition of trade theory that in the absence of directly trade related distortions or policy goals subsidies are superior to tariffs for achieving any economic or non economic objective this paper shows that once the endogeneity of the distortion or non economic objective is allowed for the welfare ranking of various policies can be reversed the particular model analyzed is one where the level of non economic objectives that have to be fulfilled itself depends on the policy tools considered to fulfill them with this arises from the public good nature of tariffs compared to subsidies

efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking in the competition for a monopoly right in which the number of bidders is fixed tullock and others have found the value of the resources spent in the aggregate to capture the transfer to be sometimes less than and sometimes greater than the value of the monopoly we think this approach to be incomplete since it leaves unanswered the question of what determines the number of individuals who will vie for the right to be the monopolist it is unsatisfactory to imagine for example that the franchisor sets the number of contestants one could then foresee that rent seeking would arise to influence the permissible number of bidders and this merely moves the rent seeking dissipation question one step back