the ambiguous impact of inequality on local resource management abstract the impact of inequality on the ability of human groups to undertake successful collective action is investigated with special reference to overexploitation of common property resources in voluntary provision problems on the one hand inequality has an ambiguous impact on the feasibility of the efficient outcome even though better endowed agents contribute more to collective action in regulated settings on the other hand inequality tends to reduce the acceptability of available regulatory schemes and therefore to make collective action more difficult

multiple objectives in agricultural planning a compromise programming application this article shows how multiobjective programming compromise programming and filtering techniques can be used to tackle some problems found in agricultural planning a real case involving the establishment of workers cooperatives within an agrarian reform program in andalusia spain is studied the underlying problem is to find a compromise between the following objectives employment seasonal labor and business profitability the multiobjective programming approach is used to find the efficient set among these objectives and after a filtering procedure a compromise between the objectives is established based on the compromise programming approach

long run labour market and health effects of individual sports activities abstract this microeconometric study analyzes the effects of individual leisure sports participation on long term labour market variables health and subjective well being indicators for west germany based on individual data from the german socio economic panel study gsoep 1984 2006 econometric problems due to individuals choosing their own level of sports activities are tackled by combining informative data and flexible semiparametric estimation methods with a specific way to use the panel dimension of the data the paper shows that sports activities have sizeable positive long term labour market effects in terms of earnings and wages as well as positive effects on health and subjective well being

cooperative networks altruism group solidarity reciprocity and sanctioning in ugandan producer organizations repeated interaction and social networks are commonly considered viable solutions to collective action problems this article identifies and systematically measures four general mechanisms that is generalized altruism group solidarity reciprocity and the threat of sanctioning and tests which of them brings about cooperation in the context of ugandan producer organizations using an innovative methodological framework that combines lab in the field experiments with survey interviews and complete social networks data the article goes beyond the assessment of a relationship between social networks and collective outcomes to study the mechanisms that favor cooperative behavior the article first establishes a positive relationship between position in the network structure and propensity to cooperate in the producer organization and then uses farmers behavior in dictator and public goods games to test different mechanisms that may account for such a relationship results show that cooperation is induced by patterns of reciprocity that emerge through repeated interaction rather than other regarding preferences like altruism or group solidarity

the nexus between gender collective action for public goods and agriculture evidence from malawi across the developing world public goods exert significant impacts on the local rural economy in general and agricultural productivity and welfare outcomes in particular economic and social cultural heterogeneity have however long been documented as detrimental to collective capacity to provide public goods in particular women are often underrepresented in local leadership and decision making processes as are young adults and minority ethnic groups while democratic principles dictate that broad civic engagement by women and other groups could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of local governance and increase public goods provision the empirical evidence on these hypotheses is scant this article develops a theoretical model highlighting the complexity of constructing a fair schedule of individual contributions given heterogeneity in costs and benefits that accrue to people depending for instance on their gender age ethnicity and education the model demonstrates that representative leadership and broad participation in community organizations can mitigate the negative impacts of heterogeneity on collective capacity to provide public goods nationally representative household survey data from malawi combined with geospatial and administrative information are used to test this hypothesis and to estimate the relationship between collective capacity for public good provision and community median estimates of maize yields and household consumption expenditures per capita the analysis shows that similarities between the leadership and the general population in terms of gender and age and active participation by women and young adult in community groups alleviate the negative effects of heterogeneity and increase collective capacity which in turn improves agriculture productivity and welfare

multicriteria analysis for agricultural resource management a critical survey and future perspectives abstract this paper reviews multicriteria analysis applied to agricultural resource management the applications utilize either methods for selecting multiattribute discrete alternatives including multiattribute utility theory or methods for solving multiobjective planning problems including goal programming our main purpose is to classify and evaluate the criteria attributes objectives used for modeling agricultural systems and to identify the difficulties for practitioners in applying the methodology the fields of study in agricultural decisions requiring further investigation are also discussed

wealth based trust and the development of collective action interpersonal trust is one possible mechanism by which wealth inequality affects the success of efforts in cooperation specifically the presence of perceived economic differences between members of small agricultural cooperatives in northwest ecuador s agricultural frontier encourages trust in the wealthy thus facilitating co op development during the initial stage of cooperative formation but such inequality and exclusive trust may later negatively affect co op success these generalizations are only possible through refinement of frameworks currently used in the study of heterogeneity and common pool resource management this refinement is made possible by paying closer attention to the operationalization of variables and by synthesizing already existing hypotheses

sequential causal models for the evaluation of labor market programs this article reviews inverse selection probability weighting to estimate dynamic causal effects a distribution theory based on sequential generalized method of moments estimation is proposed and the method is applied to a reevaluation of some parts of the swiss active labor market policy to obtain new results and discuss several issues about the implementation of the estimation procedure

the effects of migration on collective action in the commons evidence from rural china summary over the past three decades scholars have studied the effects of more than three dozen factors on collective action in the commons but little is known about the effects of rural to urban migration we examine this question with the case of china which has the world s most extensive levels of rural to urban migration using ols logit and probit models and data from a survey of 1 780 households from 18 provinces we find that migration has a statistically significant adverse effect on collective irrigation controlling for a large number of theoretically relevant variables the effects of migration on collective action in the commons are possibly mediated by a number of factors frequently identified in the literature including leadership social capital sense of community economic heterogeneity and dependence on resources we speculate that massive out migration partly explains the significant drop in the use of collective canal irrigation and exacerbated the significant increase in groundwater irrigation since the start of reforms in 1980s these findings have important policy implications for commons governance in china given that massive rural to urban migration will continue in the next decade because of the increasing rural to urban migration worldwide especially in developing countries the findings could also partly explain the deteriorating state of rural village infrastructure natural common pool resources and ecological systems in many developing countries

economic heterogeneity and the commons effects on collective action and collective goods provisioning summary the question of how economic and socio cultural heterogeneity impacts commons management has been receiving increasing attention but without resolution however the issue is increasingly important in a globalizing world this paper builds upon recent theoretical works to provide a clearer understanding of the conditions under which we might expect economic inequality to have positive or negative effects of critical importance to the argument is the distinction between the problem of collective action and the problem of providing collective goods a synthetic set of predictions is subsequently developed and tested with a comparative analysis of case studies of fisheries and irrigation systems

coping with the tragedy of the commons game structure and design of rules the paper provides an assessment of some recent results of the large amount of new institutional economics analyses investigating a common pool resource setting with a specific focus on game theory models most of the studies have used a non cooperative approach in order to explain how under provision for the resource or its over use the so called tragedy of the commons can be avoided within given management rules they show how the characteristics of the game payoff matrix repetition or of the users group size wealth heterogeneity and moral norms may give incentives for the latter to play in a way that benefits all users by contrast much fewer articles have used a formalized approach to assess the possibility for players to design new rules to overcome the initial tragedy of the commons the article ends with some proposals of directions for future research

addressing global environmental externalities transaction costs considerations is there a way to understand why some global environmental externalities are addressed effectively whereas others are not the transaction costs of defining the property rights to mitigation benefits and costs is a useful framework for such analysis this approach views international cooperation as a contractual process among country leaders to assign those property rights leaders cooperate when it serves domestic interests to do so the demand for property rights comes from those who value and stand to gain from multilateral action property rights are supplied by international agreements that specify resource access and use assign costs and benefits including outlining the size and duration of compensating transfer payments and determining who will pay and who will receive them four factors raise the transaction costs of assigning property rights i scientific uncertainty regarding mitigation benefits and costs ii varying preferences and perceptions across heterogeneous populations iii asymmetric information and iv the extent of compliance and new entry these factors are used to examine the role of transaction costs in the establishment and allocation of property rights to provide globally valued national parks implement the convention on the international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora execute the montreal protocol to manage emissions that damage the stratospheric ozone layer set limits on harvest of highly migratory ocean fish stocks and control greenhouse gas emissions jel d23 p14 q22 q51 q54 q58

interactivity and soft computing in portfolio management should farmers own food and agribusiness stocks this article proposes a fully integrated and interactive elicitation optimization procedure for portfolio management a soft computing approach based on fuzzy logic is developed as an alternative to the traditional mean variance model and compromise programming approach the models are applied to farmers to examine whether they should buy publicly traded food and agribusiness firms stocks rather than invest in a broader market stock portfolio results suggest that investments in publicly traded food and agribusiness stocks allow farmers to capture additional benefits beyond those of simply diversifying in the broader market copyright 2002 oxford university press

inequality and conservation on the local commons a theoretical exercise to analyse the effect of asset inequality on co operation within a group we consider a twoplayer nonco operative model of conservation of a common pool resource overexploitation by one user affects another s payoff by reducing the next period catch we give necessary and sufficient conditions such that conservation is a nash equilibrium and show that increasing inequality does not in general favour full conservation however once inequality is sufficiently great further inequality can raise efficiency thus the relationship between inequality and economic efficiency is u shaped finally we analyse the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons the daily livelihood of vast masses of the rural poor in many countries depends on the success with which common pool resources cprs such as forest resources grazing lands in shore fisheries and irrigation water are managed and on the environmental consequences of their management understanding the factors that lead to success or failure of community management of these resources is thus critical to rural development cpr management is a collective action dilemma a situation in which mutual cooperation is collectively rational for the group as a whole but individual cooperation is not necessarily individually rational for each member one factor that has not always been recognised as critical to the outcome of collective action dilemmas is heterogeneity among the resource users in this paper our attention will be largely restricted to a single but potent kind of heterogeneity inequality in asset ownership olson 1965 hypothesised that inequality might favour the provision of a public good

rural forest management in sierra leone the role of economic in equality in facilitating collective action while significant theoretical developments have been made in the research on common pool resources heterogeneity remains a contested issue focusing on economic inequality one particular aspect o

collective action for local commons management in rural yunnan china empirical evidence and hypotheses using evolutionary game theory this paper presents hypotheses regarding collective actions for irrigation management with the help of evolutionary game theory data for the analysis were collected by the author from the irrigation system of rural yunnan china an econometric analysis reveals that collective action will be forthcoming in rural communities where few nonfarm job opportunities are provided the degree of income disparity is quite small and resource restrictions are moderately problematic the finding that communities without local government intervention outperform those with intervention supports the proverbial view that external agencies should delegate significant parts of the control rights of common pool resources to immediate stakeholders

modeling effort and lobbying in a heterogeneous common pool resource setting extraction from a common pool resource cpr such as a fishery can lead to socially inefficient and undesirable outcomes as a result of appropriation problems through regulation of the cpr users may achieve a more profitable and socially efficient outcome feeny et al land econ 72 2 187 205 1996 delve into some of the assumptions made by traditional cpr models and how use of those assumptions provides an incomplete framework to guide fishery policy in the theoretical models we develop we relax two of those assumptions cpr users are homogeneous and are unable to create or influence management of the resource we note a case where regulation of the individual user can induce others to harvest more and relate this to the slippage effect concept regarding resource sustainability we document situations where incentives exist for cpr users to lobby for tighter regulations and thus increase profits by limiting the tragedy of the commons influence

contracting problems and regulation the case of the fishery the inefficiencies of common property fisheries are of continuing concern to economists the early work by scott gordon 1954 and anthony scott 1955 outlined the problem and later studies by james crutchfield and giulio pontecorvo 1969 and frederick bell 1972 provided empirical estimates of the losses that result those studies were followed by the dynamic models of colin clark 1976 and james quirk and vernon smith 1970 of optimal harvest rates and the use of corrective taxes or quotas to achieve them but in spite of a large and growing literature and the persuasiveness of the outlined efficiency criteria most fisheries retain common property aspects with overcapitalization and excessive labor input why those conditions persist and the failure of the regulatory response to them are the issues addressed in this paper we examine a number of fisheries but focus on the texas shrimp industry which is one of the nation s most valuable fisheries for a single species and which shares the common property characteristics observed elsewhere it is considered overcapitalized and catch per unit of effort is falling 2 examination of the fishery reveals the many margins along which rent dissipation occurs and the nature of the regulations necessary for controlling fishing effort to avoid those losses the regulatory environment in texas is complicated by conflict within the fishery between inshore and offshore fishermen the latter assert that bay shrimping reduces the number of shrimp that successfully migrate to the gulf the inshore fishery is highlighted by another issue the recent resettlement of some 30 45 000 vietnamese refugees including many fishermen along the texas coast marine advisory service paul starr their entry has been met by hostility and violence from existing shrimpers who recognize that they are in an environment characterized by the absence of property rights bay shrimpers have lobbied the texas legislature for broad limits on new entrants yet ironically the sale of additional boats by individual shrimpers to the vietnamese has facilitated entry of the refugees into the fishery regulations in the texas shrimp and other fisheries are incomplete leaving many options for rent dissipation uncontrolled because of high contracting costs among fishermen and political factors that mold government actions contracting costs are high among heterogeneous fishermen who vary principally with regard to fishing skill 3 montana state university and texas a m university respectively we benefitted from comments by terry anderson raymond c battalio gardner brown oscar burt micha gisser wade griffin john r moroney anthony d scott peter temin and participants in workshops at texas a m university and the university of washington research assistance was provided by scott barnhart and phil mizzi funding was provided by sea grant texas a m university throughout this paper we use the terms common property and open access interchangeably here the terms describe a situation where no property rights group or individual exist s for the resource 2catch per unit of effort in the inshore texas gulf and federal gulf waters is presented for 1963 77 by w l griffin c g tydlacka and w e grant they show catch per unit of effort generally falling in inshore and offshore waters while catch per unit of effort fluctuates from year to year it falls from approximately 360 kg shrimp per unit of effort to 220 kg from 1963 to 1977 the common property nature of the fishery is reflected in the following statistics since 1975 the number of vessels has grown by 23 percent nelson swartz for fish houses the record of entry is similar between 1970 a d 1977 the number of firms grew from 259 to 287 though during that period many left the industry as others entered the number of fish houses was calculated from license data supplied by the texas parks and wildlife department the record of entry by fish houses suggests that monopsony as discussed by colin clark and gordon munro is absent in the fishery 3there may be minor differences in labor leisure choices and capital but our statistical evidence and discussions with fishermen indicate that catch variations are largely due to skill government regulations in the texas bays restrict capital and our empirical evidence shows boats to be relatively homogeneous

alcohol and earnings does drinking yield a wage premium this paper examines the relationship between alcohol consumption and earnings for prime age males wage differentials for non moderate and heavy drinkers are estimated using a polychotomous choice model which accounts for the endogenous relationship be tween drinking and earnings we find that moderate alcohol consumption leads to increased earnings relative to abstention however heavy drinking leads to reduced earnings relative to moderate drinking heavy drinkers possess flatter age earnings profiles and attain lower returns for higher education than non and moderate drinkers these results are in contrast to previous research on substance abuse which finds no earnings drop off for heavy users

adding environment to the collective action problem individuals civil society and the mangrove fishery commons in ecuador summary research on the commons suggests a more robust understanding of human resource interactions is needed to strengthen theories about collective action and sustainable governance i combine ethnographic and fishery data to explore how resource characteristics and institutions influence people s behavior toward common pool resources in coastal ecuador this comparative study of the commons at two levels mangroves and the cockle fishery highlights how trust communication and social obligation depend on social histories of resource systems and types of collective action problems largely explaining why local institutions encourage individuals to uphold mangrove forest conservation but have little effect on cooperation in fisheries