welfare properties of strategic r d investments in hotelling models abstract in linear city models if firms are allowed not allowed to locate outside the linear city they engage in excessive insufficient r d investments from the normative viewpoint this implies that the feasible set of locations drastically affects their investments

semicollusion in the norwegian cement market abstract a model of semicollusion where firms collude on prices and compete on capacities is tailor made to the characteristics of the norwegian cement market and tested on this particular market for the period 1927 1982 the results indicate that the rapid increase in capacity and thereby in exports in the period 1956 1967 the late phase of the price cartel best can be explained by the market sharing agreement each firm overinvested in capacity to receive a large quota in the domestic market

protection lobbying and market structure abstract we look at a model of lobbying by oligopolistic industry where firms allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost reducing activities we ask the following questions i if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost reducing activities ii can lobbying opportunities reverse the profitability ranking among firms iii under what condition is the conventional wisdom that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection valid the answers depend on various measures of comparative advantage in lobbying and on the demand curve

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

the role of fees in patent systems theory and evidence this paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems two main research questions are usually addressed the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application or pre grant fees and renewal or post grant fees depending on the structural context and policy objectives the paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of 30 patent offices worldwide it is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age 2012 john wiley sons ltd

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model revisited abstract this article reexamines sequential entry of firms in a hotelling model of spatial product differentiation as analyzed by neven neven d j 1987 endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model international journal of industrial organization 5 419 434 i show that the pattern of locations is generally asymmetric in the case of a duopoly profits are non monotonic in market size even in the range where the number of firms does not change the firm that bears the burden of entry deterrence gains from lower barriers to entry as long as entry deterrence is possible equilibrium profits of all firms may be larger in situations in which more firms are active

the direction of innovation abstract how do innovation policies affect the direction of research is market based innovation too radical or too incremental we construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of innovation firms pursue inefficient research directions because they race to discover easy yet less valuable projects and because they work on difficult inventions where they can appropriate a larger portion of the social value fixing these inefficiencies requires policy to condition on properties of inventions that could have been discovered but were not policies which do not do so like patents and prizes may fail to encourage firms to research in the efficient direction even if they obtain the optimal quantity of r d

symmetry breaking in two player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity a synthesis abstract this paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure strategy nash equilibria these classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game and relies on the theory of supermodular games the underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition to illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach we present some existing models dealing with r d capacity expansion and information provision which motivated this study

strategic multi store opening under financial constraint abstract this paper analyzes strategic store openings in a situation in which firms can open multiple stores depending on the financial constraints of the firm specifically given any upper limit of the number of store openings that two potentially symmetric firms can open they sequentially determine the number of store openings including their locations to maximize their profits as a result of our analysis in a microeconomic framework we show that the equilibrium strategy can be wholly classified into only two following opposite strategies according to the level of their financial constraints involved when firms can afford to invest significant amounts of money in the market the leader chooses segmentation strategy in which a part of the market can be monopolized by opening a chain of multiple stores and deterring the follower s entry in contrast when the leader has a severe financial constraint so that it can only monopolize less than half of the market the leader chooses minimum differentiation strategy where firms open each of their stores at exactly the same point as the rival s under this strategy the leader necessarily captures just half of the market furthermore we show that regardless of potential symmetry between firms both first and second mover advantages in terms of profit can occur in the equilibrium

standardization and the stability of collusion we characterize the interplay between firms decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour we prove the existence of a nonmonotone relationship between firms decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences c 1998 elsevier science s a

a noncooperative analysis of hotelling s location game abstract we study the location equilibrium in hotelling s model of spatial competition as d aspremont et al have shown with quadratic consumer transportation cost the two sellers will seek to move as far away from each other as possible we show that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy nash equilibria in these equilibria coordination failure invalidates the principle of maximum differentiation and firms may even locate at the same point journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d43 l11

married women s allocation of time to employment and care of elderly parents married women who have been shown in past research to exhibit relatively elastic labor supply constitute a group of particular interest with respect to decisions concerning time spent in parental care and time spent in market work this paper presents estimates of a simultaneousequations model of employment hours of work and the provision of care to an older parent the results provide no evidence of reduced propensities to be employed or of reduced conditional hours of work due to the provision of parent care these findings are consistent with other research on women s allocation of time to competing productive uses

price matching policy and the principle of minimum differentiation this paper shows that if duopolists are allowed to choose their product locations a price matching policy and their prices sequentially and independently both tacit collusion and minimum differentiation occur copyright 1995 by blackwell publishing ltd

the earnings of informal carers wage differentials and opportunity costs a substantial proportion of working age individuals in britain are looking after sick disabled or elderly people often combining their work and caring responsibilities previous research has shown that informal care is linked with substantial opportunity costs for the individual due to forgone wages as a result of non labour market participation in this paper we show that informal carers exhibit further disadvantages even when participating using the british household panel study bhps we decompose wage differentials and show that carers can expect lower returns for a given set of characteristics with this wage penalty varying along the pay distribution and by gender furthermore opportunity costs from forgone wages and wage penalties are estimated and found to be substantial

how valuable is patent protection estimates by technology field i present evidence on the private value of patent rights in france for different technology fields and nationalities of ownership using nonparametric techniques and a parametric model of patent renewal i find that the distribution of the value of patent rights is highly skewed that patent protection is a significant but not the major source of private returns to r d and that these characteristics vary across technology fields i compute the r d cash subsidy that is equivalent to the value of patent rights measure the variations in value of time technology fields and nationalities and show that these differences are correlated with patent grant rates

duopoly delivered pricing and horizontal mergers federal merger guidelines recognize that when sellers are spatially dispersed the closeness of competitors can be crucial in evaluating the welfare consequences of a merger 1 this recognition makes it surprising that more research has not focused on the issue of horizontal mergers in spatial models the spatial setting is particularly interesting since the fact that a merger might occur in the future can alter the location decision made by firms we analyze a spatial duopoly with price discrimination in the first stage firms choose locations noncooperatively along a linear market with the foresight that a merger may occur in a later stage in the second stage firms decide whether to merge delivered price schedules are announced in stage three within this structure we study the effects of simultaneous and sequential entry and conclude that the possibility of merger generally leads to inefficient location choices and higher transport costs levy and reitzes examine the anticompetitive effects of mergers in salop s circular model 9 12 in this model firms are evenly spread around a circle and then a bertrand nash game is played in prices they conclude that if two adjoining firms merge the merged firm will increase prices at both its locations and prices will rise although to a lesser extent at all other locations in related work mcafee simons and williams study a cournot nash model of horizontal mergers between firms that engage in spatial price discrimination 10 their work also yields an estimate of the increases in equilibrium post merger delivered price yet both of these studies treat firm locations as fixed this rules out any influence of future possible merger on the location choices of firms we will show that this influence can be substantial

unpaid work and conformity why care we study the supply of unpaid eldercare in particular caring for parents in the uk focusing on both the division of care and caring tasks by gender and the effect of conformity to social norms in relation to caring we then investigate the effect of the amount of care on the well being of caregivers and whether agreeing with the care norm enhances their well being our results suggest that the eldercare reform neglects important aspects underlying the distribution of care hours and care tasks between caregivers and may potentially worsen intrahousehold inequality in earnings and well being in particular between men and women

sequential product positioning under differential costs this paper examines the product positioning decisions of firms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially different cost structures it shows that if the first mover knows the second mover to have a lower production cost it positions away from the most attractive location in the market further the larger the second mover s cost advantage the farther away the first mover positions from the most attractive location the paper also models uncertainty in the first mover s mind about the later entrant s cost structure and shows that an increase in this uncertainty in the sense of mean preserving spread also makes the first mover position farther from the most attractive location in the market overall this paper suggests that unless the first entrant in a market is certain that the later entrant will not have a superior cost structure it may be better off leaving the best position in the market vacant and having a niche or fringe product

spillover effect of japanese long term care insurance as an employment promotion policy for family caregivers we evaluate a spillover effect of the japanese public long term care insurance ltci as a policy to stimulate family caregivers labor force participation using nationally representative data from 1995 to 2013 we apply difference in difference propensity score matching to investigate the spillover effect in two periods before and after the introduction of the ltci in 2000 and before and after its major amendment in 2006 our results show that the ltci introduction has significant and positive spillover effects on family caregivers labor force participation and the effects vary by gender and age in contrast the ltci amendment is found to have generally negative spillover effects on their labor force participation we draw attention to these spillover effects as expanding labor market supply to sustain the economy would be a priority for japan and other rapidly aging countries in the coming decades

survival at the center the stability of minimum differentiation abstract we model a hotelling market with multidimensional product differentiation in an evolutionary framework both evolutionary stability in the sense of schaffer 1989 and stochastic stability following kandori et al 1993 young 1993 are analyzed it is shown that firms move towards the center in product space i e a principle of minimum differentiation on all dimensions of the product space applies

encouraging private sector research for tropical agriculture summary agricultural needs in poor tropical countries differ significantly from those in temperate rich countries yet little agricultural research is performed on products for the tropics private research is particularly concentrated in rich countries this is a result of significant failures in the market for research and development r d in particular the difficulty of preventing the resale of seed in developing countries to encourage private r d in tropical agriculture traditional funding of research may be usefully supplemented by a commitment to reward developers of specific new agricultural technologies rewards tied to adoption may be especially useful in increasing up take an illustration of how a commitment to reward developers of new agricultural technologies might work is provided

regulating a monopolist with unknown demand and cost functions we consider the design of regulatory policy when the regulator is imperfectly informed about both the firm s cost function and the demand function it faces to some extent the optimal policy here is the natural combination of the optimal policies when there is uncertainty only about either demand or cost important qualitative differences also exist however for example it may be optimal to set prices below marginal cost and the pricing authority delegated to the firm may be more limited when there is uncertainty about both cost and demand

the effects of patent regime changes a case study of the european patent office abstract patent system in europe has undergone significant changes during the 1970s around the establishment of the european patent office epo and this paper tries to quantify the influences of such policy changes on the private value of european patents based on the patent renewal records i estimate the private value of patents in germany france and the uk obtained through the epo patenting route during the early 1980s and compare the estimated value with the patent value in the same three countries before the establishment of the epo as estimated by pakes pakes ariel 1986 patents as options some estimates of the value of holding european patent stocks econometrics 54 4 755 784 the average quality and the private value of the epo patents are substantially higher than those obtained through the national route the uniform examination and granting procedure at the epo has effectively eliminated the inter country differences in the patentability standards and the scope of patents and significantly decreased the differences in the patent value across these countries i also find that the extension of the statutory limit to the maximal length of patent life and changes in the renewal fee schedule only had modest effects on the patent value and that the learning process of the epo patents are much longer than that of the national patents

the economics of invention incentives patents prizes and research contracts though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure many studies concentrate on patents but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis in this paper i analyze the choice between three of the most common alternative means of public intervention in the research market namely patents prizes and direct contracting for research services i show why and under what conditions any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare maximizing administrator in a competitive economy using a model that for the first time pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives in the extensive literature on the economics of patents see arnold plant 1934 fritz machlup 1958 charles taylor and z a silberston 1973 morton kamien and nancy schwartz 1975 and f m scherer 1977 for valuable surveys formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in william nordhaus 1969 scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms an exception is ben yu 1981 who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions but as many writers for example dan usher 1964 yoram barzel 1968 joseph stiglitz 1969 carole kitti 1973 glenn loury 1979 partha dasgupta and stiglitz 1980a have pointed out in various contexts the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive due to the common pool problem discussed further in section i below if the patent administrator and researchers share the same information as implicitly assumed in previous models then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive given the common pool problem but in all such models patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward but monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means for example a minimally efficient tax system appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives if the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research it must possess advantages not captured in existing models informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role to include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives i incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in section ii but this alone is not quite enough it is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before department of economics economic growth center box 1987 yale station yale university new haven ct 06520 i thank with the usual caveat marguerite alejandro wright cindy arfken martin baily nuong brennan steven englander robert evenson richard levin richard nelson susan rose ackerman denis wright and two referees for assistance of various kinds

essential facility financing and market structure abstract the paper analyzes the funding of an infrastructure project when an incumbent operator has private information about market profitability and the regulator does not have access to taxpayers money an open access policy raises welfare but may make the project non viable since funding must be provided by operators capital contributions we characterize the optimal market structure the regulator can ask the incumbent to bear a higher share of investment cost if the latter insists on an exclusive use yet the incumbent is willing to pay more for exclusivity the higher the demand that is precisely when competition yields the highest benefits at the optimum the incumbent s information is not used to determine market structure we further investigate the implications of this basic result in a dynamic context we show that the monopoly franchise policy is time consistent while an open access policy is not we also demonstrate that a threat of regulatory capture creates an open access presumption last we show that when the decision involves multiple projects monopoly segments should cross subsidize open access ones

shared patent rights and technological progress we study how to reward innovators who build on one another rewards come in the form of patents because patent rights are scarce the optimal allocation involves sharing more than one innovator s patent is in force at a given time we interpret such allocations as patents that infringe one another as licensing through an ever growing patent pool and as randomization through litigation we contrast the rate of technological progress under the optimal allocation with the outcome if sharing is prohibitively costly avoiding sharing initially slows progress and leads to a more variable rate of technological progress

openness open source and the veil of ignorance author s scotchmer suzanne abstract the open source movement evolved in the one industrial context where openness is not required by intellectual property law 1 nevertheless openness itself cannot be the driving force behind the open source movement this is because openness can be achieved in many ways other than the gpl for example with proprietary licenses or licenses that are even more permissive than the gpl such as the bsd license early commentators explained this new development model by focussing on the motives of the programmer such as to demonstrate skills see the survey by stephen m maurer and suzanne scotchmer 2006 but firms also participate in open source collaborations sometimes contributing significant resources joachim henkel 2006 dirk riehle 2009 doing so can be profitable even if the contributors are rivals in the market the quality improvements or cost reductions provided by a rival s open source contributions may outweigh the deleterious effect of empowering the rival to be a better competitor

a location model with preference for variety we propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases i e one unit from each firm this model may fit many markets e g newspapers credit cards better than existing models a common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand while others consume more than one product our model yields predictions consistent with this observation if firms are allowed to choose their locations on the interval then spatial differentiation may not be maximal and in some cases it may even be minimal thus under certain conditions we restore hotelling s principle of minimum differentiation

spatial competition and price leadership in the stackelberg price leader price follower model each firm is typically better off as a follower than as a leader in this paper we show that introducing the spatial dimension provides a means of endogenising the role of price leadership furthermore the leader follower framework yields existence of a price and location equilibrium in the hotelling spatial model of competition where none exists under the original specification we first analyse the original hotelling model by determining reaction functions for firms this approach allows the model to be fully characterised and affords an intuitive explanation of the non existence of a price equilibrium for certain locations the reaction functions are then used to determine the solution when one firm adopts the stackelberg leadership role contrary to the existing predictions of the simple spatial duopoly model it is found that the outcome is asymmetric in terms of stackelberg equilibrium locations prices and profits with the first firm in the market enjoying higher profits than the subsequent entrant the equilibrium involves one firm locating at the mid point of the market this outcome is also appealing as it corresponds to the entry deterring and monopoly solutions

the competitive effects of price floors using hotelling s model of locational competition we show that a moderate price floor destroys the maximal differentiation equilibrium resulting in minimum differentiation equilibrium prices are lower than prices in the absence of a floor a low price floor can lead to multiple equilibria with both minimum and maximum differentiation as possible outcomes

the chicken or the egg endogeneity in labour market participation of informal carers in england around 14 of the uk labour force has informal care responsibilities and almost everyone in society will be an informal carer in their lifetime a well known fact in the small economic literature on informal care is the apparent negative relation between care responsibilities and labour market participation yet caring and labour market participation may be endogenous using an instrumental variable approach and panel data techniques and employing data from the british household panel study from 1991 to 2002 this paper shows that not accommodating for endogeneity in the labour market participation equation may significantly overestimate the impact care exhibits on the employment decision of informal carers moreover it is shown that a negative impact on employment only applies to some care types policy implications are derived

product differentiation and collusion sustainability when collusion is costly a widely debated question in recent years by both strategy theorists and antitrust practitioners is what role product differentiation between firms plays in their ability to sustain a collusive agreement in order to reduce the strength of competition and gain higher profits this paper addresses the following question what happens to the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship when setting up and maintaining an agreement is costly we show that introducing collusion costs into the discussion has relevant implications indeed sufficiently high collusion costs modify the underlying market structure thus altering the product differentiation collusion sustainability relationship with respect to the case where collusion costs are absent or low in particular if the gains from collusion are increasing decreasing with the degree of product differentiation the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability is always positive negative whereas if the gains from collusion are inverted u shaped the relationship is inverted u shaped too these results stress the importance of considering those markets where the coordination between firms is sufficiently costly as structurally different from those markets where coordination has no costs for firms

asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition abstract the main purpose of this paper is to study the impact of consumer concentration around the market center on the equilibrium locations of location price games in the case of symmetric triangular density it is shown that no symmetric equilibrium exists however we demonstrate the existence of asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies these equilibria are also characterized our secondary purpose is to study the sequential entry of two firms when the location space is not restricted to the market space this leads us to uncover a substantial first mover advantage which has been neglected in the literature

patent protection in the shadow of infringement simulation estimations of patent value empirical estimates of the private value of patent protection are derived for four technology areas computers textiles combustion engines and pharmaceuticals using new patent data for west germany 1953 1988 patentees must pay renewal fees to keep their patents in force as well as legal expenses in order to enforce them a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model of optimal renewal decisions is developed incorporating both learning and depreciation as well as the potential need to prosecute infringement the evolution of the distribution of returns over the life of a group of patents is calculated for each technology using a minimum distance simulation estimator results indicate that the aggregate value of protection generated per year is on the order of 10 of related r d expenditure

r d in the pharmaceutical industry a world of small innovations it is commonly argued that in recent years pharmaceutical companies have targeted their research and development r d at small improvements of existing compounds instead of riskier drastic innovations in this paper we show that the bias in the pharmaceutical industry toward small innovations might be driven by the low sensitivity of the demand in particular small innovations get a proportionally larger reward because pharmaceutical firms target them at the inelastic segments of the demand as a consequence firms find it relatively more profitable to invest in small innovations we also study the effect on r d incentives of marketing strategies and regulatory instruments aimed at controlling pharmaceutical expenditure

patent office in innovation policy nobody s perfect abstract the number of patent applications and bad patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years based on this trend we study the overload problem within the patent office and its consequences on the firms r d incentives we assume that the examination process of patent applications is imperfect and that its quality is poorer under congestion depending on policy instruments such as submission fees and the toughness of the non obviousness requirement the system may result in a high r d equilibrium in which firms self select in their patent applications or in an equilibrium with low r d opportunistic patent applications and the issuance of bad patents multiple equilibria often co exist which deeply undermines the effectiveness of policy instruments we investigate the robustness of our conclusions as to how the value of patent protection is formalized taking into consideration the introduction of a penalty system for rejected patent applications as well as the role of commitment to a given patent protection policy

a survey of the economics of patent systems and procedures the last several decades have seen increases in patenting activity worldwide as well as growing issues related to patent quality in response to these quality issues a recent patent literature has emerged that investigates the behavior and incentives of patent examiners applicants and third parties in this paper we provide an overview of patent procedures patent systems and a survey of the new economic literature on patent systems both theoretical and empirical papers are considered policy implications coming from this literature are presented

product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty we investigate hotelling s duopoly game of location then price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about the exact location of demand we characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations contrary to the individual level random utility models location uncertainty is a differentiation force in equilibrium increases in the variance of the uncertainty lead to greater differentiation higher expected equilibrium prices and profits and a greater welfare loss

duopoly locations and optimal zoning in a small open city abstract this paper analyzes a duopoly location model with an asymmetric zoning that prohibits firms from locating to a specific interval in a small open linear city it is shown that the maximum differentiation principle presented in d aspremont et al econometrica 47 1979 1145 is still valid under area zoning regulation moreover a zoning regulation can be seen as a policy instrument to limit firms excess profits and a proper regulation may even reduce the distortion in total transportation costs therefore enhancing social welfare specifically the optimal zoning is about 29 5 percent of the city with no amenity effect finally all the land rents raised by zoning are eventually confiscated by the absentee landowner

positioning and pricing in a variety seeking market we study competitive positioning and pricing strategies in markets where consumers seek variety variety seeking behavior is modeled as a decrease in the willingness to pay for the product purchased on the previous purchase occasion using a three stage hotelling type model we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers reduces product differentiation offered in equilibrium thereby explaining some otherwise counterintuitive findings in empirical research we find that firms charge higher prices in period 1 and lower prices in period 2 the lower price in period 2 represents the price incentive that firms need to offer to prevent the variety seeking consumers from switching furthermore we find that the observed switching in a market may not fully capture the true magnitude of the underlying variety seeking tendencies among consumers finally we show that the presence of variety seeking consumers leads to lower firm profits and a higher consumer surplus surplus increases for variety seeking consumers as well as regular consumers therefore the presence of variety seeking consumers benefits everyone in the market

risky quality choice abstract in vertical product differentiation with a stochastic research technology firms should target their research at different quality levels for efficiency in a natural monopoly where the top firm finds it most profitable to sell to the whole market the incentives for risk taking and for firms to differentiate their targeted qualities are optimal in a natural oligopoly which results when there is sufficient dispersion of tastes the relationship between a firm s payoff and its quality improvement over other firms is weakened this diminishes the firms incentives to differentiate and the targeted qualities are too low and too close together

the opportunity costs of informal care does gender matter in this paper we investigate the costs borne by both male and female carers in terms of their forgone formal employment opportunities traditionally informal care was supplied by women but nowadays women are not only more likely to work but also likely to be significant contributors to family finances for women this implies that the size of any forgone earnings cost of informal care is increasing at the same time population ageing is making for increasing numbers requiring care from a policy perspective it is therefore helpful to consider a less traditional but nevertheless important source of informal care men we find that both male and female carers bear indirect costs in that they are less likely to be in paid work than otherwise similar non carers and when they are in paid work they earn significantly less however we find that the motivation for lower employment participation is not the same for men as it is for women

the labour market costs of community care this paper reports an empirical investigation into the influence of informal care responsibilities on the labour supply of women the objective is to examine the argument that the uk policy of caring for the chronic sick in the community involves a nontrivial opportunity cost in the form of the forgone labour supply of the informal carers upon which it relies we find that informal carers who care for less than 20 h per week are in fact more likely to participate in the labour market but tend to work for fewer hours per week than otherwise similar noncarers informal carers who care for 20 h or more a week are less likely to participate but only slightly however when they do undertake formal employment they tend to earn less per hour and work for fewer hours per week

runner up patents is monopoly inevitable exclusive patents sacrifice product competition to provide firms incentives to innovate we characterize an alternative mechanism whereby later inventors are allowed to share the patent if they discover within a certain time period of the first inventor these runner up patents increase social welfare under very general conditions furthermore we show that the time window during which later inventors can share the patent should become a new policy tool at the disposal of the designer this instrument will be used in a socially optimal mix with the breadth and length of the patent and could allow sorting between more or less efficient firms

on the optimality of the patent renewal system the patent system is mainly a renewal system the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees i ask whether such a system can be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research in such a model i show that renewal mechanisms possibly with subsidies are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on regardless of the objective function under plausible circumstances patents should have a uniform life rather than varying in length as typically occurs under a renewal system

the quality factor in patent systems this article develops a methodology to compare the quality of examination services in three major patent systems quality is defined as the extent to which patent systems comply with the patentability conditions in a transparent way the methodology consists of a two layer analytical framework encompassing legal standards ls and their operational design od which includes several interdependent components that affect the stringency and transparency of the filtering process the comparison of patent systems in europe japan and the united states shows that their operational designs differ substantially the european system provides higher quality and more expensive examination services than the united states one while the japanese patent system is in an intermediate position the results illustrate that different system designs lead to different outcomes in terms of backlogs patent propensity and the number of dubious patent rights in force in this respect these findings i provide an empirical validation of the conjecture of a vicious cycle linking the quality of examination and demand for patents and ii highlight the need for a multifaceted convergence of patent systems before mutual recognition is put in place the author 2011 published by oxford university press on behalf of associazione icc all rights reserved

ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information abstract firms reveal private information about the value of investment through their investment decisions as a consequence they may have ex post regret once they see other firms investments we define a notion of rational expectations equilibrium for games which imposes a no regret property in this equilibrium all firms make the same investment decision but despite the absence of ex post regret the investment herd can be inefficient in addition equilibrium might not exist we introduce a notion of probabilistic existence and identify conditions under which if the number of firms is large enough information comes out so that investment herds are first best efficient with high probability and equilibrium exists with high probability journal of economic literatureclassification numbers c7 d8

a theory of grand innovation prizes abstract the past decade has witnessed a resurgence in innovation awards in particular of grand innovation prizes gips which are rewards to innovators developing technologies reaching performance goals and requiring breakthrough solutions gips typically do not preclude the winner also obtaining patent rights this is in stark contrast with mainstream economics of innovation theories where prizes and patents are substitute ways to generate revenue and encourage innovation building on the management of innovation literature which stresses the difficulty to specify ex ante all the technical features of the winning technologies we develop a model in which innovative effort is multi dimensional and only a subset of innovation tasks can be measured and contracted upon we show that in this environment patent rights and cash rewards are complements and that gips are often preferable to patent races or prizes requiring technologies to be placed in the public domain moreover our model uncovers a tendency for patent races to encourage speed of discovery over quality of innovation which can be corrected by gips we explore robustness to endogenous entry costly public funds and incomplete information by gip organizers on the surplus created by the technology

your next of kin or your own career caring and working among the 50 of europe an increasing demand for both formal and informal care is likely to result from the ongoing demographic transition at the same time as there is a further move away from the traditional domestic division of labour public policy making that aims at increasing the supply of informal care necessitates knowledge about the relative importance of various incentives for individual care providers this paper takes as a point of departure that the willingness to supply informal care is partly explained by the extent to which it adversely affects labour market outcomes and analyses the effect on labour market outcomes of providing informal care to one s elderly parent s among the 50 of europe data from share survey of health ageing and retirement in europe was used to examine the association between on the one hand hours of informal care provided and on the other 1 the probability of employment 2 hours worked and 3 wages respectively the results suggest that giving informal care to one s elderly parents is associated with significant costs in terms of foregone labour market opportunities and that these adverse effects vary between countries

do they care too much to work the influence of caregiving intensity on the labour force participation of unpaid caregivers in canada the recent growth of the home care sector combined with societal and demographic changes have given rise to concerns about the adequacy of the supply of family and friend caregivers potential caregivers face competing time pressures that pull them in the direction of the labour market on one hand and towards unpaid caregiving duties on the other this paper examines the influence of unpaid caregiving on the labour supply of a cohort of working aged caregivers in canada with particular emphasis on caregiving intensity results suggest that caregivers are heterogeneous in both their caregiving inputs and associated labour market responses thereby underscoring the importance of controlling for caregiving intensity when measuring labour supply the negative influence of primary caregiving on labour supply appears to be at the level of labour force participation rather than on hours of work or wages

product differentiation with multiple qualities abstract we study subgame perfect equilibria of the classical quality price multistage game of vertical product differentiation each of two firms can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities consumers valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions the unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities we characterize equilibrium prices and the effects of qualities on the rival s equilibrium price in the general model equilibrium qualities depend on what we call the spence and price reaction effects for any equilibrium we characterize conditions for quality differentiation

optimal fiscal regime in a spatial duopoly abstract we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations the policy proposed here is such that welfare maximization is achieved by directly affecting firms location without explicitly modifying their price behavior

minimal and maximal product differentiation in hotelling s duopoly abstract hotelling s 1929 model of duopolistic competition is re examined a family of utility functions is used which has as a special case hotelling s original utility function in a two stage location price game it is shown that an equilibrium exists when the curvature of the utility functions in the space of characteristics is sufficiently high the subgame perfect equilibrium never exhibits minimum product differentiation on the other hand not all equilibria are at maximal product differentiation

mixed duopoly location choice and shadow cost of public funds we examine the relationship between equilibrium and efficient levels of product differentiation in a mixed duopoly where a welfare maximizing public enterprise competes with a profit maximizing private firm we introduce shadow costs of public funding i e the excess burden of taxation the profits of public firms obtained by the government reduce these costs we find that in a mixed duopoly the level of product differentiation is too low for social welfare this result is in sharp contrast to the private oligopoly where the level of product differentiation is too high finally we show that when the shadow cost is high privatizing the public enterprise improves welfare

market segmentation and collusive behavior abstract the recent literature on oligopolistic third degree price discrimination has been primarily concerned with rival firms incentives to acquire customer specific information and the consequences of such information on firm profitability and welfare this literature has taken mostly a static view of the interaction between competing firms in contrast in this paper we investigate the impact of customer specific information on the likelihood of tacit collusion in a dynamic game of repeated interaction this issue is very important because competitive price discrimination usually leads to a cutthroat price competition prisoners dilemma among firms firms therefore may seek ways to soften competition and sustain higher prices our main result is that collusion becomes more difficult as the firms ability to segment consumers improves

partial collusion fosters minimum product differentiation we investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning of time once chosen the locations are fixed forever but the firms will choose prices in each of a countably infinite succession of time periods we are interested in equilibrium behavior when the firms will collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices and will select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue specifically we restrict our attention to prices that support an outcome on the profit possibility frontier at which the ratio of firm 1 s profits to those of firm 2 is positively related to the similar ratio of profits at the single shot noncooperative equilibrium for these profit sharing rules the resulting location equilibrium is unique and involves the pairing of firms at the market center

market power screens willingness to pay what is the best way to reward innovation while prizes avoid deadweight loss intellectual property selects high social surplus projects optimal innovation policy thus trades off the ex ante screening benefit and the ex post distortion it solves a multidimensional screening problem in the private information held by the innovator research cost quality and market size of the innovation the appropriate degree of market power is never full monopoly pricing and is determined by measurable market characteristics the inequality and elasticity of innovation supply making the analysis open to empirical calibration the framework has applications beyond ip policy to the optimal pricing of platforms or the optimal procurement of public infrastructure

newspaper differentiation and investments in journalism the role of tax policy many countries levy reduced rate indirect taxes on newspapers with proclaimed policy goals of stimulating investment in journalism and ensuring low newspaper prices however by taking into account the fact that the media industry operates in two sided markets we find the paradoxical result that the consequences of a low tax regime might be quite the opposite we also show that the low tax regime tends to increase newspaper differentiation if the advertising market is relatively small the newspapers might invest too little in journalism and be too differentiated from a social point of view in this case a tax increase will be welfare enhancing

an economic analysis of deferred examination system evidence from a policy reform in japan we investigate how a deferred patent examination system promotes ex ante screening of patent applications which reduces both the number of granted patents and the use of economic resources for examinations without reducing the return from r d based on a real option theory we develop a model of examination request behaviors exploiting the responses of japanese firms to recent policy reform we find that the shortening of the allowable period for an examination request significantly increases both eventual and early requests controlling for the blocking use of a pending patent application this effect is stronger in technology areas with higher uncertainty these results support the importance of uncertainty for an applicant and of ex ante screening

price competition non price competition and market structure theory and evidence from the uk this paper examines the impact of price competition on advertising r and d expenditure and market structure a general theoretical result is derived which restricts the space of possible outcomes regarding the behaviour of concentration and advertising r and d expenditure following an intensification of price competition the theory is tested using uk data on the evolution of competition concentration and advertising over 1954 77 the econometric results suggest that the introduction of restrictive practices legislation in the uk caused a rise in concentration in previously cartelized high advertising manufacturing industries and probably also a fall in advertising intensity

coordinating research through research joint ventures abstract in a simple model we show that a joint venture can implement the rates of investment that maximize joint profit when firms research abilities are private information this can be done with budget balance even though there are participation constraints there is no conflict between budget balance and participation constraints because firms payoffs can depend on ex post signals of abilities the conflict between budget balance and participation constraints is restored when both abilities and rates of investment are unobservable we give a condition under which the profit maximizing rates of investment can be implemented if we relax budget balance

do patents work thickets trolls and antibiotic resistance this paper connects ideas from recent literature on the economics of intellectual property ip to address the question did the strengthening and broadening of ip rights from important patent policy changes in the us promote greater innovation the analysis rests on the theory of cumulative innovation which shows that if ip rights on a pioneer invention extend to follow on research and impediments to contracting exist then strengthening patents can actually reduce overall innovation recent empirical studies are consistent with the theory patents can significantly deter follow on research in complex technology areas where contracting is difficult computers electronics telecommunications but not in drugs chemicals and human genes i outline remedies from court decisions and antitrust policy for addressing inefficiencies from patent trolling patent thickets and the anti commons of fragmented ownership i then apply the analysis to the antibiotics market drawing on recent research to examine how patent and competition policies can be used to improve incentives for drug development in the battle against antibiotic resistance the literature provides persuasive evidence that the policy changes overreached in broadening and strengthening ip rights and reveals important patent reforms for improving the effectiveness of patent systems in the us and canada

product differentiation with consumer arbitrage abstract we determine the equilibrium to a game where two firms set delivered price schedules and consumers simultaneously declare where they want to take delivery of the product equilibrium pricing policies provide incentives for consumers not to demand their preferred varieties but rather to purchase more standard varieties this behavior may decrease market diversity the demanded varieties tend to agglomerate around the market center we also show that it is efficient for the cost of adapting the product to consumers to be shared through arbitrage but oligopoly gives rise to an inefficient level of personal arbitrage

pricing patterns as outcomes of product positions prior empirical work shows that different markets are characterized by different pricing patterns such as bertrand nash pricing or stackelberg leader follower pricing the author considers a duopolistic market where ex ante identical firms sequentially position their products prior to competing on prices in a single or multiperiod setting and show that the unique equilibrium outcome involves 1 firms choosing stackelberg pricing over bertrand nash pricing and 2 the positioning first mover acting as the price leader an attractive property of this model is that the ex post larger firm acts as the price leader which is consistent with prior empirical evidence copyright 1999 by university of chicago press

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

on hotelling s competition with non uniform customer distributions abstract hotelling s competition in a two stage location price game is examined with increasing densities of consumers towards the centre it is shown that there is a range of rather even distributions for which firms locate at opposite ends of the market as the distribution becomes more concentrated duopolists will tend to move inside the market

spatial price discrimination and merger the n firm case the consequences of merger are analyzed in an n firm model of spatial price discrimination the merger occurs with known probability after location decisions have been made the possibility of merger alters locations generates inefficiency and increases the profit of the merging firms in the case of corner mergers but never in the case of interior mergers the possibility of merger may also reduce the profit of the excluded firms