optimal supply diversification under general supply risks we analyze a planning model for a firm or public organization that needs to cover uncertain demand for a given item by procuring supplies from multiple sources the necessity to employ multiple suppliers arises from the fact that when an order is placed with any of the suppliers only a random fraction of the order size is usable the model considers a single demand season with a given demand distribution where all supplies need to be ordered simultaneously before the start of the season the suppliers differ from one another in terms of their yield distributions their procurement costs and capacity levels the planning model determines which of the potential suppliers are to be retained and what size order is to be placed with each we consider two versions of the planning model in the first the service constraint model scm the orders must be such that the available supply of usable units covers the random demand during the season with at least a given probability in the second version of the model the total cost model tcm the orders are determined so as to minimize the aggregate of procurement costs and end of the season inventory and shortage costs in the classical inventory model with a single fully reliable supplier these two models are known to be equivalent but the equivalency breaks down under multiple suppliers with unreliable yields for both the service constraint and total cost models we develop a highly efficient procedure that generates the optimal set of suppliers as well as the optimal orders to be assigned to each most importantly these procedures generate a variety of important qualitative insights for example regarding which sets of suppliers allow for a feasible solution both when they have ample supply and when they are capacitated and how various model parameters influence the selected set of suppliers the aggregate order size and the optimal cost values

one switch utility functions and a measure of risk consider the relative attractiveness to a decision maker of two financial gambles as the wealth of that individual varies it may seem reasonable that either one alternative should be preferred for all wealth levels or that there exists a unique critical wealth level at which the decision maker switches from preferring one alternative to the other decreasing risk aversion is not sufficient for this property to hold we identify the small class of utility functions for which it does we show how the property leads naturally to a measure of risk the results of this paper apply equally well to discounting functions for cash flows one switch discount functions permit at most one change in preference between cash flows as all payoffs are deferred in time

does monetary unification lead to excessive debt accumulation abstract if discretionary monetary policy gives rise to an inflation bias monetary unification boosts the accumulation of public debt the additional debt accumulation harms welfare if governments are sufficiently myopic in the presence of myopic governments debt ceilings play a useful role in avoiding excessive debt accumulation in a monetary union and allowing a conservative independent central bank to focus on price stability with supply shocks monetary unification results in excessive variability of public debt a debt target that constrains stabilization policy helps to prevent this

taxing the unobservable the impact of the shadow economy on inflation and taxation summary because the shadow economy cannot be taxed it erodes the tax base and reduces tax revenues forcing governments to resort to other ways to finance their expenditures accordingly a larger shadow economy should give governments an incentive to shift revenue sources from taxes to inflation in line with the public finance motive of inflation in this paper we recall that point in a simple canonical model then empirically test it in a sample of up to 153 developed and developing countries over the 1999 2007 period in line with the model s prediction we indeed observe a positive relation between inflation and the size of the shadow economy and a negative relation between the tax burden and the size of the shadow economy we find that both relations are conditional on central bank independence and on the exchange rate regime implying that it is the strongest in institutional set ups that constrain monetary policy the least both relations are present in the sub sample of developed countries as well as the sub sample of developing countries both relations survive several robustness checks using various sets of control variables including the stock of debt controlling for endogeneity using alternative estimates of the shadow economy and estimating the two relations as a system of equations

dynamic capacity allocation to customers who remember past service we study the problem faced by a supplier deciding how to dynamically allocate limited capacity among a portfolio of customers who remember the fill rates provided to them in the past a customer s order quantity is positively correlated with past fill rates customers differ from one another in their contribution margins their sensitivities to the past and in their demand volatilities by analyzing and comparing policies that ignore goodwill with ones that account for it we investigate when and how customer memory effects impact supplier profits we develop an approximate dynamic programming policy that dynamically rationalizes the fill rates the firm provides to each customer this policy achieves higher rewards than margin greedy and lagrangian policies and yields insights into how a supplier can effectively manage customer memories to its advantage this paper was accepted by martin lariviere operations management

rules and discretion with noncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions thus the issue of how to improve upon the time consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy we present a model with three players the central bark the fiscal authority and wage setters in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled we show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated we also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank

multi resource investment strategies operational hedging under demand uncertainty abstract consider a firm that markets multiple products each manufactured using several resources representing various types of capital and labor and a linear production technology the firm faces uncertain product demand and has the option to dynamically readjust its resource investment levels thereby changing the capacities of its linear manufacturing process the cost to adjust a resource level either up or down is assumed to be linear the model developed here explicitly incorporates both capacity investment decisions and production decisions and is general enough to include reversible and irreversible investment the product demand vectors for successive periods are assumed to be independent and identically distributed the optimal investment strategy is determined with a multi dimensional newsvendor model using demand distributions a technology matrix prices product contribution margins and marginal investment costs our analysis highlights an important conceptual distinction between deterministic and stochastic environments the optimal investment strategy in our stochastic model typically involves some degree of capacity imbalance which can never be optimal when demand is known

central bank independence and public debt policy the various proposals for the institutional design of the european monetary union have drawn fresh attention to the link between monetary and public debt policies this paper explores the strategic interaction between fiscal authorities setting public debt and the central bank controlling monetary policy in the absence of political distortions an optimally designed conservative independent central bank is sufficient to establish the second best in the presence of political distortions or with coordination of monetary and fiscal policy however also a debt target is needed

the choice of exchange rate bands balancing credibility and flexibility abstract this paper develops a framework for the optimal choice of exchange rate bands within an environment in which policymakers dislike nominal exchange rate variability but value the flexibility to adjust the nominal exchange rate in response to shocks in order to attain real exchange rate objectives the paper provides an endogenous characterization of the optimal exchange rate band in terms of the underlying distribution of shocks to the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments and in terms of the commitment reputation of policymakers

managing supply uncertainty under supply chain cournot competition abstract we study the cournot competition between two supply chains that are subject to supply uncertainty each supply chain consists of a retailer and an exclusive supplier which has random yield we examine how the levels of supply uncertainty and competition intensity affect the equilibrium decisions of ordering quantity contract offering and centralization choice we show that a retailer should order more if its competing retailer s supply becomes less reliable or if its own supply becomes more reliable a supply chain with reliable supply can take great advantage of the high supply risk of its competing chain furthermore for decentralized chains we characterize the optimal wholesale price contracts with linear penalty under different supply risks and competition scenarios finally we show that supply chain centralization is a dominant strategy and it always makes the customers better off nevertheless if the supply risk is low and the chain competition is intensive centralization could actually decrease the supply chain profit compared with the case where both chains do not choose centralization this results in a prisoner s dilemma on the other hand if the supply risk is high and or the competition level is low centralization always increases the supply chain profit the desirability of supply chain centralization is enhanced by high supply uncertainty or low chain competition

centralized wage setting and monetary policy in a reputational equilibrium this paper analyzes a repeated game between the central bank and a centralized trade union the central bank would be better off if it could commit to a noninflationary strategy when this commitment is not enforceable a noninflationary equilibrium can still be sustained by a reputational mechanism if the central bank has superior information about its own objective function the qualitative properties of this reputational equilibrium are shown to differ from the cases considered in the existing literature where the central bank was modeled as playing a game against competitive labor markets copyright 1988 by ohio state university press

product portfolio management with production flexibility in agribusiness the acquisition of production flexibility is a well documented strategy pursued by many firms to counteract certain operational constraints however these flexibilities can increase the complexity of a production system and the difficulties in managing increased complexity may hinder exploiting the full benefit of flexibility in this paper we consider one such flexibility paradox at an agribusiness firm for an annual 800 million production decision the firm produces a number of products hybrid seeds using limited inventories of several raw materials parent seeds and a production process that is subject to random variations to handle the raw material availability constraint and to partially mitigate the supply risk the firm invests in a costly second production in south america that can be used if the yield in the first production in north america is low we solve this joint problem of raw material allocation and sequential production by reformulating it as a tractable simultaneous optimization

the structure of periodic review policies in the presence of random yield this work provides a comprehensive analysis of a general periodic review production inventory model with random variable yield existence of an order point whose value does not depend on yield being random is proved in the single period case without specifying the yield model and using a very general cost structure when yield is a random multiple of lot size the nonorder up to optimal policy is characterized for a finite horizon model the finite horizon value functions are shown to converge to the solution of an infinite horizon functional equation and the infinite horizon order point is shown to be no smaller than when yield is certain

structural distortions and decentralized fiscal policies in emu the combination of discretionary monetary policy labor market distortions and nominal wage rigidity yields excessive inflation as monetary policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labor market distortions an inflation target reduces inflation but creates a conflict between monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy if fiscal policy is set at a higher frequency than nominal wages are preventing the associated excessive accumulation of public debt calls for debt ceilings if countries differ substantially in terms of structural distortions uniform debt ceilings must be complemented by country specific debt targets in order to prevent decentralized fiscal authorities from employing debt policy strategically

some macro implications of risk using the capital asset pricing model as the financial sector of a conventional rational expectations macro model an increase in expected inflation reduces the long run capital stock contrary to the usual result this occurs because the induced fall in real balances increases equity s share in the market raises equity s beta and discount rate and reduces investment increases in the variance of disturbances to aggregate demand reduce the capital stock while increases in the variance of inflation raise the stock a proportionate increase in both variances reduces the captial stock copyright 1987 by ohio state university press

carrier portfolio management for shipping seasonal products many seasonal products are transported via ocean carriers from origin to destination markets the shipments arriving earlier in the market may sell at higher prices but faster shipping services can be costly in this paper we study a newsvendor type shipper who transports and sells seasonal products to an overseas market where the selling price declines over time a set of vessels with different schedules and freight rates are available to choose from our analysis demonstrates that a portfolio of vessels has two distinct effects on mitigating uncertainties in both demand and vessels arrival schedules while these two portfolio effects have been previously understood as separate issues in the literature to find the optimal portfolio in our problem we first show that when vessels arrive in a deterministic sequence the optimal portfolio can either be derived in closed form in the single demand setting or computed efficiently with a variation of the shortest path algorithm in the multi demand sett

crucial issues concerning central bank independence abstract this paper argues first that it is inappropriate to presume that central banks will in the absence of any tangible precommitment technology inevitably behave in a discretionary fashion that implies an inflationary bias furthermore there is no necessary tradeoff between flexibility and commitment second to the extent that the absence of any precommitment technology is nevertheless a problem it will apply to a consolidated central bank plus government entity as well as to the central bank alone thus contracts between governments and central banks do not overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency they merely relocate it several implications are discussed

a contextual uncertainty condition for behavior under risk suppose that your choice between uncertain financial prospects is made more difficult by two independent contextual uncertainties concerning the size of your existing wealth one contextual uncertainty has a greater spread than the other if you could resolve one of these contextual uncertainties before making your choice would you rather it be the larger or the smaller in this paper we explore the intuitive notion that it ought to be more advantageous to resolve larger rather than smaller contextual uncertainties the utility function for wealth uw aw be cwa b c 0 is the only utility function that satisfies this condition and that is also increasing and risk averse at all wealth levels

independent monetary policies and social equity monetary policy is formulated as a game between the government and the central bank we show that when fiscal policy has a redistributional component there is a conflict between optimally configured monetary policies and equality consequently inflation averse governments interested in social equity will need to limit their use of fiscal policy

diversification under supply uncertainty supply chain management is becoming an increasingly important issue especially when in most industries the cost of materials purchased comprises 40 60 of the total sales revenue despite the benefits cited for single sourcing in the popular literature there is enough evidence of industries having two three sources for most parts in this paper we address the operational issue of quantity allocation between two uncertain suppliers and its effects on the inventory policies of the buyer based on the type of delivery contract a buyer has with the suppliers we suggest three models for the supply process model i is a one delivery contract with all of the order quantity delivered either in the current period with probability or in the next period with probability 1 model ii is also a one delivery contract with a random fraction of the order quantity delivered in the current period the portion of the order quantity not delivered is cancelled model iii is similar to model ii with the remaining quantity delivered in the next period we derive the optimal ordering policies that minimize the total ordering holding and penalty costs with backlogging we show that the optimal ordering policy in period n for each of these models is as follows for x a n order nothing for vi n x a n use only one supplier and for x vi n order from both suppliers for the limiting case in the single period version of model i we derive conditions under which one would continue ordering from one or the other or both suppliers for model ii we give sufficient conditions for not using the second more expensive supplier when the demand and yield distributions have some special form for the single period version of models ii and iii with equal marginal ordering costs we show that the optimal order quantities follow a ratio rule when demand is exponential and yields are either normal or gamma distributed

optimal production planning with emissions trading emissions trading is a market based mechanism for curbing emissions and it has been implemented in europe north america and several other parts of the world to study its impact on production planning we develop a dynamic production model where a manufacturer produces a single product to satisfy random market demands the manufacturer has access to both a green and a regular production technology of which the former is more costly but yields fewer emissions to comply with the emissions regulations the manufacturer can buy or sell the allowances in each period via forward contracts in an outside market with stochastic trading prices while needing to keep a nonnegative allowance account balance at the end of the planning horizon we first derive several important structural properties of the model and based upon them we characterize the optimal emissions trading and production policies that minimize the manufacturer s expected total discounted cost in particular the optimal emissions trading pol

a standard measure of risk and risk value models in this paper we propose a standard measure of risk that is based on the converted expected utility of normalized lotteries with zero expected values this measure of risk has many desirable properties that characterize the notion of risk it is very general and includes many previously proposed measures of risk as special cases moreover our standard measure of risk provides a preference based and unified method for risk studies since the standard measure of risk is compatible with the measure of expected utility it can be used explicitly or implicitly in an expected utility model under a condition called risk independence a decision could be made by explicitly trading off between risk and value which offers an alternative representation of the expected utility model named the standard risk value model finally we discuss some other applications of the standard measure of risk and extensions of our risk value tradeoff framework for descriptive decision making

the macroeconomics of social pacts in this paper we analyze macroeconomic interactions between trade unions the central bank and the fiscal policymaker we explicitly model unions concern for public expenditure paving the way for an analysis of the potential gains from cooperation between the fiscal policymaker and the unions i e the so called corporatist or social pacts that have characterized economic policies in a number of european countries in the last few decades we also highlight the profoundly different incentives generated by institutional arrangements such as the maastricht criteria and the stability and growth pact the former has unambiguously induced more efficient outcomes the latter is likely to backfire

does insider trading raise market volatility this paper studies the role of insider trading in explaining cross country differences in stock market volatility it introduces a new measure of insider trading the central finding is that countries with more prevalent insider trading have more volatile stock markets even after one controls for liquidity maturity of the market and the volatility of the underlying fundamentals volatility of real output and of monetary and fiscal policies moreover the effect of insider trading is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect of economic fundamentals

diversification under yield randomness in inventory models abstract in this paper we consider the case of random yield and diversification in two different inventory models it is assumed that two sources suppliers exist who ship an amount which is a random function of the amount requisitioned since they may charge different prices and their reliability in terms of the variance of the yield random variable may be different diversification may be more desirable than using a single supplier we analyze this problem for both the eoq model and the newsboy model analytic results for the optimal order quantities and the minimum cost are obtained for the eoq model convexity of the objective function is also discussed we develop the necessary conditions for the newsboy model and propose an approximate solution technique the concavity of the expected profit function is shown numerical examples are provided for both models

seigniorage and political instability the importance of seigniorage relative to other sources of government revenue differs markedly across countries this paper tries to explain this regularity by studying a political model of tax reform the model implies that countries with a more unstable and polarized political system will have more inefficient tax structures and thus will rely more heavily on seigniorage this prediction of the model is tested on cross sectional data for seventy countries the authors find that after controlling for other variables political instability is positively associated with seigniorage copyright 1992 by american economic association

deforestation and seigniorage in developing countries a tradeoff abstract most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries with limited ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets consequently they are amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing namely seigniorage and deforestation revenues first we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues second a panel data econometric analysis over the 1990 2010 period confirms our findings consequently a tighter monetary policy hastens deforestation third we extend the theoretical model and show that international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between tighter monetary policies and deforestation and then discuss the relevance of this finding with respect to recent institutional arrangements

role of risk aversion in price postponement under supply random yield price postponement is an effective mechanism to hedge against the adverse effect of supply random yield however its effectiveness and the resulting production decisions have not been studied for

two moment decision models and expected utility maximization two moment decision models are consistent with expected utility maximization only if the choice set or the agent s preferences are restricted this paper identifies a restriction which is sufficient to ensure this consistency and confirms that it holds in many economic models the implications for economic analysis are then derived two different approaches to representing an agent s preferences over strategies yielding random payoffs are in wide use under the mean standard deviation ms approach the agent is assumed to rank the alternatives according to the value of some function defined over the first two moments of the random payoff while the expected utility eu criterion assumes that the expected value of some utility function defined over payoffs is used instead the fact that there are these two competing approaches has generated a considerable literature some authors are concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of each while others deal with conditions under which the potentially different approaches would yield the same results or at least approximately so space does not

grand corruption instead of commitment reconsidering time inconsistency of monetary policy abstract this paper suggests that inflation may be affected differently by grand corruption compared to its positive nexus with petty corruption in an extended barro and gordon 1983a model grand corruption may serve as a quasi commitment device a cheating expropriating government may actually deter a monetary authority from cheating reneging furthermore rogoff s 1985 conservative central banker has an unambiguously beneficial effect she reduces the inflationary bias even more while also rendering fiscal policy more effective the model nests the standard fiscal monetary interaction logic with and without expropriation as well as the diametrical symbiosis result obtained by dixit and lambertini 2003a

fiscal policy labor market structure and macroeconomic performance recent work on monetary policy design has investigated the interactions between labor market institutions and monetary policies and their implications for macroeconomic performance this paper argues that this link is not independent of the fiscal policymaking structure

returns policy new model introduction and consumer welfare abstract this paper investigates how economic outcomes differ for new model introduction between two extreme contracts outright sales contract and returns policy contract with full credit under the outright sales contract we show that the retailer s incentive to introduce a new model can lead to a reduction of consumer welfare when the retailer is moderately risk averse the primary conclusion from this study is that the returns policy contract resolves this conflict between firms and consumers and that the supply chain introduces the new model only when consumer surplus from the new model is higher than that from the old model

competition under generalized attraction models applications to quality competition under yield uncertainty we characterize the equilibrium behavior in a broad class of competition models in which the competing firms market shares are given by an attraction model and the aggregate sales in the industry depend on the aggregate attraction value according to a general function each firm s revenues and costs are proportional with its expected sales volume with a cost rate that depends on the firm s chosen attraction value according to an arbitrary increasing function whereas most existing competition papers with attraction models can be viewed as special cases of this general model we apply our general results to a new set of quality competition models here an industry has n suppliers of a given product who compete for the business of one or more buyers each of the suppliers encounters an uncertain yield factor with a given general yield distribution the buyers face uncertain demands over the course of a given sales season the suppliers compete by selecting key characteristics of their yield distributions either their means their standard deviations or both these choices have implications for their per unit cost rates

tax rates and tax evasion evidence from missing imports in china tax evasion by its very nature is difficult to observe we quantify the effects of tax rates on tax evasion by examining the relationship in china between the tariff schedule and the evasion gap which we define as the difference between hong kong s reported exports to china at the product level and china s reported imports from hong kong our results imply that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate is associated with a 3 percent increase in evasion furthermore the evasion gap is negatively correlated with tax rates on closely related products suggesting that evasion takes place partly through misclassification of imports from higher taxed categories to lower taxed ones in addition to underreporting the value of imports

inflationary finance under discrepion and rules inflationary finance involves first the tax on cash balances from expected inflation and second a capital levy from unexpected inflation from the standpoint of minimizing distortions these capital levies are attractive ex post to the policymaker in a full equilibrium two conditions hold 1 the monetary authority optimizes subject to people s expectations mechanisms and 2 people form expectations rationally given their knowledge of the policymaker s objectives the outcomes under discretionary policy are contrasted with those generated under rules in a purely discretionary regime the monetary authority can make no meaningful commitments about the future behavior of money and prices under an enforced rule it becomes possible to make some guarantees hence the links between monetary actions and inflationary expectations can be internalized there is a distinction between fully contingent rules and rules of simple form a simple rule allows the internalization of some connections between policy act ion and inflationary expectations but discretion permits some desirable flexibility of monetary growth this abstract was borrowed from another version of this item

interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal policies we consider monetary scal interactions when the monetary authority is more conservative than the scal with both policies discretionary 1 nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher price than the ideal points of both authorities 2 of the two leadership possibilities scal leadership is generally better with scal discretion monetary commitment yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks but scal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion second best outcomes require either joint commitment or identical targets for both authorities output socially optimal and price level appropriately conservative or complete separation of tasks jel e61 e63

fiscal leadership and central bank design this article investigates the impact on economic performance of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives it is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously further it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies jel classification e52 e61 f42

debt inflation and central bank independence abstract increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence although ex ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation would ultimately fail to lower inflation permanently the smaller anticipated policy distortions implemented by a more independent central bank would induce the fiscal authority to decrease current distortions by increasing the deficit over time inflation would increase to accommodate a higher public debt by contrast imposing a strict inflation target would lower inflation permanently and insulate the primary deficit from political distortions

fiscal policy when monetary policy is tied to the mast the paper analyses the time inconsistency problem of both exchange rate and fiscal policy in a small open economy the equilibrium under discretion is characterised by inflation and a deficit comm

inflation targeting fiscal rules and the policy mix cross effects and interactions we examine how inflation targeting it and fiscal rules fr affect inflation and fiscal performance in a large panel of countries during 1990 2009 in line with theory both fr and it appear to shape monetary and fiscal outcomes significant cross effects seem to exist as it strengthens fiscal performance whereas the combination of fr and it tends to be associated with more disciplined macroeconomic policies than if only one of these institutions operates our findings suggest that it and fr affect the coordination of the policy mix and point to potential benefits of reforming macroeconomic frameworks in a holistic fashion

risk value models restrictions and applications abstract sarin and weber european journal of operational research 70 1993 135 and others have argued for the expression of preferences under risk by the use of risk value models which have the intuitively appealing property that absence of certainty enters the decision maker s preference function only through a well defined risk argument the present paper proposes axioms which should be satisfied by any such model and explores the restrictions that the axioms place on the preference function implications for absolute and relative risk aversion are considered and the usefulness of the approach is demonstrated with applications to portfolio theory and the theory of the firm

central bank independence an update of theory and evidence this paper reviews recent research on central bank independence cbi after we have distinguished between independence and conservativeness research in which the inflationary bias is endogenised is reviewed finally the various challenges that have been raised against previous empirical findings on cbi are discussed we conclude that the negative relationship between cbi and inflation is quite robust

infinite horizon strategies for replenishment systems with a general pool of suppliers we consider a general infinite horizon inventory control model that combines demand and supply risks and the firm s ability to mitigate the supply risks by diversifying its procurement orders among a set of n potential suppliers supply risks arise because only a random percentage of any given replenishment order is delivered as useable units the suppliers are characterized by the price they charge and the distribution of their yield factor assuming unsatisfied demand is backlogged the firm incurs as in standard inventory models three types of costs i procurement costs ii inventory carrying costs for units carried over from one period to the next and iii backlogging costs we establish the existence of an optimal stationary policy under both the long run discounted and average cost criteria and characterize its structure assuming each period s inventory level distribution can be approximated as a normal we develop an efficient solution method identifying additional structural properties finally we identify a simple class of heuristic policies that come close to being optimal

fiscal activism under inflation targeting and non atomistic wage setting this paper presents a game between a fiscal authority an independent central bank and non atomistic wage setters the effects of fiscal activism and inflation targeting on labour market outcomes are analysed the results suggest that inflation targeting provides incentive for wage restraint moreover real wages are increasing in the degree of fiscal activism as wage setters exploit the response of a fiscal authority seeking to promote employment numerical results suggest that the benefits of targeting inflation are larger when the government pursues an activist policy and therefore that there is some substitutability between fiscal and monetary rules

bashing and coercion in monetary policy bashing and coercion in monetary policy i introduction we ve got excess plant capacity i don t think that growth is excessive i have not been overly concerned with inflation president bush in a february 14 1989 interview with the wall street journal p a8 with the economy running close to potential the risks seem to be on the side of a further strengthening of price pressure chairman greenspan in testimony before congress on february 21 1989 reprinted from the wall street journal february 22 1989 p a2 many investors appeared to be confused by conflicting statements by bush greenspan and other u s officials wall street journal february 22 1989 p a1 if the fed pushes interest rates significantly higher bush may go public with critism wall street journal march 24 1989 p a1 recent research in macroeconomic policy games by rogoff 1985 alesina 1988 tabellini 1987 and waller 1989a has concentrated on the importance of an independent central bank in a discretionary policymaking environment in the original work on policy games by barro and gordon 1983a 1983b no distinction was made between the monetary authority and the fiscal authority but these researchers argue that because the fiscal authority may have incentives to create excessive inflation giving the powers of money creation to an independent monetary authority whose inflation preferences differ from the current fiscal authority may enable society to reduce the equilibrium inflation rate this results holds even though monetary policy is still chosen in a discretionary fashion therefore backus and driffill 1985a 537 conclude autonomous central banks thus act as a precommitment device which may help to make noninflationary policies more credible and less costly implicit in the term independent is the belief that the central bank is free to choose monetary policy without interference from the fiscal authority administration however this is not generally the case the appointment of central bankers by the legislative or executive branch of the government governmental oversight of policy decisions or political pressure on the central bank by these branches will tend to influence the setting of monetary policy and subsequently the extent to which the central bank is truly independent 1 kane 1984 argues that even if it is not able to directly choose monetary policy the current administration still may be able to achieve its preferred monetary growth path by putting pressure on the monetary authority to do its bidding restricting the powers of the central bank public criticism of central bank performance here after referred to as bashing 2 exclusion from fiscal policy planning which hurts the egos of central bankers or undertaking actions which damage the post central bank income or opportunities of the central bankers are ways he suggests in which the administration can coerce cooperation from the central bank in creating excessive money growth such arguments have given rise to the view that the administration is engaged in a reputation building game with the central bank although the central bank has control of the money supply the administration can threaten to impose a welfare loss by bashing the central bank if it does not generate the monetary policy preferred by the administration the success of this strategy depends on the size of the bashing costs imposed on the central bank and also on the extent to which these threats are credible credibility in turn depends on the benefits and costs incurred by the administration in carrying out its threats as a result the administration may choose to bash the central bank if it does not produce the administration s preferred money inflation outcome by establishing a reputation for bashing the administration may be able to obtain its desired policy outcome in the future

political macroeconomics a survey of recent developments the paper surveys political macroeconomics covering its development from rogoff s conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design topics include the inflation stabilization trade off central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs inflation targets performance contracts for monetary authorities and the consequences of output persistence for these issues further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy the government spending bias and the game theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy all work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework

supply and demand functions in inventory models the central issue in supply chain management is to match supply with demand and the heart of a planning model is the modeling of supply and demand functions to allow for analytical tractability the existing literature often assumes almost surely linear supply and demand functions which greatly limits the applicability of the models the goal of this paper is to provide a unified approach to analyze general random supply and demand functions by transforming the problem into one defined on a higher dimension we show that many of the seemingly highly nonlinear supply and demand functions in the almost sure sense are linear in the stochastic sense with this new notion of linearity called stochastic linearity in midpoint our ability to analyze supply chain problems is much enhanced we are able to prove the concavity of the profit function in the transformed supply and demand decisions for a general class of supply and demand functions that include but are not restricted to the ones studied in the

cooperative monetary and fiscal policies in the euro area this article discusses the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in the euro area though many observers suggest a fiscal union as the next step of euro area constitutional reform a federal fiscal union does not appear politically feasible in the short run we suggest moving forward with cooperative monetary and fiscal institutions and policies that allow for decentralized fiscal decisions while taking federal stabilization policies into account this approach will increase the probability of survival of the euro area compared with the current fiscal arrangements using a dynamic macro model counterfactual simulation paths of our cooperative solution are contrasted with time series data for the euro area

the optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union the paper explores the case for monetary and fiscal unification monetary policy suffers from an inflation bias because the monetary authorities are not able to commit with international risk sharing fiscal discipline suffers from moral hazard an inflation target alleviates the inflation bias but weakens fiscal discipline in a monetary union however this adverse effect on fiscal discipline is weaker this advantage of monetary unification may outweigh the disadvantage of not being able to employ monetary policy to stabilise country specific shocks while monetary unification may thus be optimal international risk sharing may be undesirable because it weakens fiscal discipline

monetary policies for developing countries the role of institutional quality abstract weak public institutions including high levels of corruption characterize many developing countries we demonstrate that this feature has important implications for the design of monetary policymaking institutions we find that a pegged exchange rate or dollarization while sometimes prescribed as a solution to the credibility problem is typically not appropriate for countries with poor institutions such an arrangement is inferior to a rogoff style conservative central banker whose optimal degree of conservatism is proportional to the quality of institutions finally we cast doubt on the notion that a low inflationary framework can induce governments to improve public institutions

money debt and deficits in a dynamic game this paper analyzes a dynamic linear quadratic game between the fiscal and monetary authorities the equilibrium outcome of the game determines the time path of money creation fiscal deficits and public debt the game is solved for different equilibrium concepts the equilibria are then compared and interpreted with reference to alternative institutional arrangements the main results are i coordination increases the speed of adjustment towards the steady state and takes the steady state value of public debt closer to the desired target ii precommitments take the non cooperative equilibrium closer to the coordinated outcome iii increasing the weight that each policymaker assigns to his own private objectives slows down the adjustment process places more burden on the opponent but has ambiguous effects on the steady state value of public debt

selecting a portfolio of suppliers under demand and supply risks we analyze a planning model for a firm or public organization that needs to cover uncertain demand for a given item by procuring supplies from multiple sources each source faces a random yield factor with a general probability distribution the model considers a single demand season all supplies need to be ordered before the start of the season the planning problem amounts to selecting which of the given set of suppliers to retain and how much to order from each so as to minimize total procurement costs while ensuring that the uncertain demand is met with a given probability the total procurement costs consist of variable costs that are proportional to the total quantity delivered by the suppliers and a fixed cost for each participating supplier incurred irrespective of his supply level each potential supplier is characterized by a given fixed cost and a given distribution of his random yield factor the yield factors at different suppliers are assumed to be independent of the season s demand which is described by a general probability distribution determining the optimal set of suppliers the aggregate order and its allocation among the suppliers on the basis of the exact shortfall probability is prohibitively difficult we have therefore developed two approximations for the shortfall probability although both approximations are shown to be highly accurate the first based on a large deviations technique ldt has the advantage of resulting in a rigorous upper bound for the required total order and associated costs the second approximation is based on a central limit theorem clt and is shown to be asymptotically accurate whereas the order quantities determined by this method are asymptotically optimal as the number of suppliers grows most importantly this clt based approximation permits many important qualitative insights

a new keynesian model of policy irrelevance of the developments in macro theory of the last thirty years few have been as far reaching as the introduction of rational expectations in particular to the study of how discretionary use of monetary policy by central bankers affects output and employment by ascribing rational expectations to private agents lucas 11 kydland and prescott 10 barro and gordon 6 alesina and tabellini 1 rogoff 16 and a host of others have demonstrated examples in which agents who understand the motives of the monetary authority will correctly anticipate the monetary authority s actions and render them ineffective in affecting any real variables in these models it is only the innovations in monetary policy which private agents could not forecast that had any real effects systematic use of the tools of monetary policy to achieve an end were ineffective typically these models represented the economy as a reduced form game in which the payoffs to private agents depended on the realizations of actions of the monetary authority agents forecasts of those actions and random shocks imposed by nature it was understood if not always explicitly stated that some general equilibrium model existed whose equilibrium outcomes generated the payoff functions of the game the goal of the monetary authority was to alter the outcome of the game away from the non cooperative equilibrium towards some other outcome which was not consistent with autarkic payoff maximization but superior to the non cooperative outcome each individual agent would maximize his payoff by correctly anticipating the monetary authority s move in the aggregate the result would be that the monetary authority s action would be rendered ineffective

anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in advance economy abstract an economy is constructed in which the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the rate of inflation as a result that is directly opposite the usual conclusion

reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information abstract previous models of rules versus discretion are extended to include uncertainty about the policymaker s type when people observe low inflation they raise the possibility that the policymaker is committed to low inflation type 1 this enhancement of reputation gives the uncommitted policymaker type 2 an incentive to masquerade as the committed type in the equilibrium the policymaker of type 1 delivers surprisingly low inflation with corresponding costs to the economy over an extended interval the type 2 person mimics this outcome for awhile but shifts eventually to high inflation this high inflation is surprising initially but subsequently becomes anticipated

political shocks and public debt the case for a conservative central bank revisited abstract we explore the dynamics of public debt and optimal institutions in the presence of political shocks arising from electoral uncertainty under commitment optimal stabilization is established by combining an inflation target with a debt target the inflation target should be contingent on the political shocks while the debt target forces the government to fully absorb the political shocks in the period in which it occurs in the absence of such inflation and debt targets but with monetary commitment a conservative central bank enhances stabilization an even more conservative central bank is optimal if monetary policy cannot commit

debt contingent inflation contracts and targets abstract this paper analyzes fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a simple policy game with debt and output shocks seigniorage provides revenue for the government but results in an inflation bias we analyze three mechanisms designed to eliminate some or all of the biases in monetary policy an inflation performance contract inflation target both contingent on the stock of debt and a zero inflation rule the performance contract and inflation target result in higher interest rate remove all biases in monetary policy and achieve the pre commitment policy hence they are equivalent the first two solutions also yield a higher expected welfare than a zero inflation policy

choice under uncertainty problems solved and unsolved ffifteen years ago the theory of choice under uncertainty could be considered one of the success stories of economic analysis it rested on solid axiomatic foundations it had seen important breakthroughs in the analytics of risk risk aversion and their applications to economic issues and it stood ready to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the newly emerging information revolution in economics 1 today choice under uncertainty is a field in flux the standard theory is being challenged on several grounds from both within and outside economics the nature of these challenges and of our profession s responses to them is the topic of this paper

loss of monetary discretion in a simple dynamic policy game abstract we analyze a simple policy game featuring monetary credibility problems and argue that loss of monetary discretion is not advantageous two elements form the basis of our analysis firstly we endogenize the source of credibility problems and secondly we consider a dynamic framework where credibility problems are not time invariant by doing this we are able to demonstrate that credibility problems are temporary and in steady state the government has removed these through sound policies a binding policy rule will only serve as an obstacle towards this steady state

nominal exchange rate volatility relative price volatility and the real exchange rate abstract we model real exchange rate nominal exchange rate and relative price volatility using real and nominal factors we analyze these volatility measures across developing and industrialized countries we find that the inclusion of nominal factors achieves a sizable reduction in the real exchange rate volatility spread between developing and industrialized countries in addition we find that nominal factors matter to real exchange rate volatility in the short run and the long run and that for developing countries a higher share of real exchange rate volatility stems from relative price volatility

supply and demand uncertainty reduction efforts and cost comparison abstract in industries like health care consumer goods and agriculture shortages are widely observed and the consequences can be costly one of the main drivers of such shortages is the uncertain nature of supply and demand to reduce uncertainties sufficient information about supply and demand can be obtained by gathering relevant data e g auditing suppliers and conducting market research in this paper we conduct an analysis to examine the impacts of supply uncertainty demand uncertainty and uncertainty reduction efforts on production quantity and total cost we show that in the absence of uncertainty reduction efforts when the financial consequences of shortages are large or when the unit benefit is large supply uncertainty is more costly than demand uncertainty in addition exerting supply uncertainty reduction effort always causes the firm to produce fewer units than exerting demand uncertainty reduction effort although supply uncertainty reduction effort delivers a larger degree of improvement to total cost and hence is more efficient reduced supply uncertainty still leads to a higher system cost than does reduced demand uncertainty

mobile capital domestic institutions and electorally induced monetary and fiscal policy the literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible similarly examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether we develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence we test the model using data from oecd countries we find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed we then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in europe

monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers abstract with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership monetary unification reduces inflation taxes and public spending these disciplining effects of a monetary union which become stronger if the number of participants in the union increases are likely to raise welfare two types of arrangements are considered for the union s common central bank ccb making the ccb more conservative and imposing an inflation target on the ccb in contrast to the results of svensson 1997 svensson l e o 1997 optimal inflation targets conservative central banks and linear inflation contracts american economic review 87 98 114 an optimally designed conservative ccb may outperform inflation targeting finally we find that fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification hence subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare

do we really want an independent central bank the issue of an independent central bank is assessed in the context of experience in the u k economy the historical role of the bank of england is examined revealing that the success of anti inflation policy depends on the exchange rate regime as well as on the institutional arrangements holding between the bank and government inflation targets are discussed but independence is also addressed by seeing how other targets such as nominal gdp might perform the theoretical arguments for and against an independent central bank are discussed in detail it is argued that partial independence where the central bank enjoys autonomy in relatively good states and is overridden in bad states is the preferred form of independence attention is drawn to the costs arising owing to a lack of coordination of policy when the finance ministry may compete against the central bank in the case where the latter is independent copyright 1994 by oxford university press

contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry abstract we investigate a contract setting problem faced by a manufacturer who can procure major modules from an overseas supplier as well as a local supplier the overseas supplier is prime and offers quality products whereas the local supplier is viewed only as a backup and its products are inferior in quality as the local supplier needs to put in additional effort to fulfill the urgent orders it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate this urgent supplier s production cost this asymmetric cost information becomes an obstacle for the manufacturer in managing the urgent supplier in this paper we study two types of contingent contracts one is the common price only contract and the other is a contract menu consisting of a transfer payment and a lead time quotation we construct a stackelberg game model and evaluate how the involvement of an urgent supplier with private cost information affects performances of the prime supplier and the manufacturer in different scenarios with or without the urgent supplier under different contingent contracts we also conduct numerical experiments to show how the parameters of the contracts affect profits of the manufacturer

a risk return model with risk and return measured as deviations from a target return two attribute risk and return models are very popular in the economics and finance literature for analyzing decisions under uncertainty their popularity stems primarily from the intuitive appeal of the dichotomy into risk and return and from the ease with which the concepts can be diagrammed in two dimensions the most commonly used risk return model is the mean variance model in which risk is measured as the variance and return by the mean of the probability distribution over outcomes the mean variance model has a number of shortcomings which are widely known but of particular concern here are the facts that 1 mean variance dominance is neither necessary nor sufficient for second degree stochastic dominance 2 unless the form of the probability distribution is restricted mean variance is consistent with von neumann morgenstern utility theory only if the utility function is quadratic and 3 as peter fishburn has noted

designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a european monetary union this paper explores the conditions under which aeuropean monetary union emu is an optimum currencyarea the scope for an emu increases with theconvergence of structural and fiscal policies smallmoney holdings a conservative european central bank and dependent national central banks how nationalpolicies affect the rest of the union once the emu hasbeen established is also investigated the case forsurveillance of national structural and fiscalpolicies appears to depend mainly on the monetaryarrangements in the union

seigniorage inflation and reputation abstract this paper derives a reputational equilibrium for inflation in a model in which the sovereign obtains valuable seigniorage by issuing fiat money in exchange for real resources with contemporaneous perception of actual sovereign behavior and immediate adjustment of real cash balances to new information the friedman elasticity solution for maximal seigniorage is a reputational equilibrium more generally the objective of maximal seigniorage produces an equilibrium inflation rate equal either to a generalization of the friedman elasticity solution or to the rate at which the sovereign discounts future seigniorage adjusted for the growth rate whichever is larger the model formalizes the conjecture that inflation rates in excess of the friedman solution are attributable to high discount rates for future seigniorage

monetary conservatism and fiscal policy abstract does an inflation conservative central bank a la rogoff 1985 remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy to provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic stochastic sticky price economy with monopolistic distortions monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility we find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending the optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation a conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable when fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal

mean risk analysis with enhanced behavioral content abstract we study a mean risk model derived from a behavioral theory of disappointment with multiple reference points one distinguishing feature of the risk measure is that it is based on mutual deviations of outcomes not deviations from a specific target we prove necessary and sufficient conditions for strict first and second order stochastic dominance and show that the model is in addition a convex risk measure the model allows for richer and behaviorally more plausible risk preference patterns than competing models with equal degrees of freedom including expected utility eu mean variance m v mean gini m g and models based on non additive probability weighting such as dual theory dt in asset allocation the model allows a decision maker to abstain from diversifying in a positive expected value risky asset if its performance does not meet a certain threshold and gradually invest beyond this threshold which appears more acceptable than the extreme solutions provided by either eu and m v always diversify or dt and m g always plunge in asset trading the model provides no trade intervals like dt and m g in some but not all situations an illustrative application to portfolio selection is presented the model can provide an improved criterion for mean risk analysis by injecting a new level of behavioral realism and flexibility while maintaining key normative properties

macroeconomic volatility trade and financial liberalization in africa this paper examines the effects of financial and trade liberalization on growth volatility of real output and consumption in africa our results suggest trade liberalization is associated with greater output and consumption growth volatility while financial liberalization increases the efficacy of consumption smoothing and stabilizes income and consumption growth in addition we find financial market depth and institutional quality operate jointly with trade and financial openness to reduce volatility in output and consumption growth there is also evidence that good institutions which foster low inflation levels and volatility promote consumption and output growth stability