real rigidities and the non neutrality of money rigidities in real prices are not sufficient to create rigidities in nominal prices and real effects of nominal shocks and by themselves small frictions in nominal adjustment such as costs of changing prices create only small non neutralities but this paper shows that substantial nominal rigidity can arise from a combination of real rigidities and small nominal frictions the paper shows the connection between real and nominal rigidity given the presence of nominal frictions both in general and for two specific sources of real rigidity one arising from goods market imperfections and the other from labour market imperfections

rigid prices evidence from u s scanner data this paper uses over two years of weekly scanner data from two small us cities to characterize time and state dependence of grocers pricing decisions in these data the probability of a nominal adjustment declines with the time since the last price change even after controlling for heterogeneity across store product cells and replacing sale prices with regular prices we also detect state dependence the probability of a nominal adjustment is highest when a store s price substantially diers from the average of other stores prices however extreme prices typically reflect the selling store s recent nominal adjustments rather than changes in other stores prices

menu costs and phillips curves this paper develops a model of a monetary economy in which individual firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks as well as general inflation sellers can change price only by incurring a real menu cost we calibrate this cost and the variance and autocorrelation of the idiosyncratic shock using a new u s data set of individual prices due to klenow and kryvtsov the prediction of the calibrated model for the effects of high inflation on the frequency of price changes accords well with international evidence from various studies the model is also used to conduct numerical experiments on the economy s response to various shocks in none of the simulations we conducted did monetary shocks induce large or persistent real responses

political biases in lobbying under asymmetric information this paper introduces asymmetric information in a pluralistic model of interest groups competition and analyzes its impact on policy biases lobbying groups are uninformed on a decision maker s preferences and use nonlinear contributions not only to compete for the agent s services but also to learn about his preferences in an otherwise standard common agency model of lobbying asymmetric information can be either on the decision maker s ideal point horizontal differentiation or on the strength of his own preferences for ideology vertical differentiation at equilibrium asymmetric information redistributes bargaining powers between interest groups and the decision maker in non trivial ways that may depend on the kind of informational asymmetry which is postulated asymmetric information tends to mitigate the influence of interest groups and contributions might be significantly reduced interest groups no longer contribute for a change in policy what it is worth to them as under complete information contributions incorporate a discount related to the group s ability to solve the asymmetric information problem jel d72 d82

when do market games have transferable utility a pure exchange economy generates a market game in which the allocations achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its members subject to certain regularity conditions it is shown that for a market game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect utility of all consumers can be represented in the gorman polar form this is the class for which aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer journal of economic literature classification numbers 021 022 cc 1985 academic press inc

from hyperination to stable prices argentina s evidence on menu cost models we review and extend several comparative statics results of xed menu cost models of price setting rms facing real idiosyncratic shocks such as the type studied by golosov and lucas 2007 as well as by many others these results are confronted with their empirical counterparts using the micro data underlying argentina s consumer price index for a time period where ination rates vary from almost 5000 per year

estimating the frequency of price re optimization in calvo style models abstract this paper assesses the empirical performance calvo style models of price re optimization we first show that versions of these models in which firms update non re optimized prices to lagged inflation account well for the statistical behavior of post war u s inflation rates we then investigate whether these models imply plausible degrees of inertia in price setting behavior by firms they do but only if we depart from two standard auxiliary assumptions monopolistically competitive firms face a constant elasticity of demand and capital is homogeneous and can be instantaneously reallocated after a shock we develop a version of the model in which these assumptions are relaxed and show that it is consistent with the view that firms re optimize prices on average once every two quarters

five facts about prices a reevaluation of menu cost models are price decreases 3 the frequency of price increases covaries strongly with inflation whereas the frequency of price decreases and the size of price increases and price decreases do not 4 the frequency of price change is highly seasonal it is highest in the first quarter and then declines 5 we find no evidence of upwardsloping hazard functions of price changes for individual products we show that the first second and third facts are consistent with a benchmark menu cost model whereas the fourth and fifth facts are not

income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy how do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy we analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity our main finding is that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution this result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification our benchmark model whose only difference from the representative agent framework is the existence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk displays far less cross sectional dispersion and skewness in wealth than u s data however an extension that relies on a small amount of heterogeneity in thrift does succeed in replicating the key features of the wealth data furthermore this extension features aggregate time series that depart significantly from permanent income behavior

intermediate goods and business cycles implications for productivity and welfare this paper presents an aggregate demand driven model of business cycles that provides a new explanation for the procyclicality of productivity and simultaneously predicts large welfare losses from monetary nonneutrality the key features of the model are an input output production structure imperfect competition countercyclical markups and for some results state dependent price rigidity true technical efficiency is procyclical even though production takes place with constant returns without technology shocks or technological externalities the paper has observable implications that distinguish it empirically from related work these implications are generally supported by data from u s manufacturing industries copyright 1995 by american economic association

state dependent or time dependent pricing does it matter for recent u s inflation in the 1988 2004 micro data collected by the u s bureau of labor statistics for the cpi price changes are frequent every 4 7 months depending on the treatment of sale prices and large in absolute value on the order of 10 the size and timing of price changes varies considerably for a given item but the size and probability of a price change are unrelated to the time since the last price change movements in aggregate inflation reflect movements in the size of price changes rather than the fraction of items changing price due to offsetting movements in the fraction of price increases and decreases neither leading time dependent models taylor or calvo nor 1 st generation state dependent models match all of these facts some 2 nd generation state dependent models however appear broadly consistent with the empirical patterns

lobbying competition over trade policy counterlobbying over trade policy competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy this paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy the theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well known grossman helpman model of trade policy determination modified suitably to account for the cross sectoral use of inputs in production itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition importantly accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the welfare mindedness of governments in setting trade policy

the magnitude of menu costs direct evidence from large u s supermarket chains we use store level data to document the exact process of changing prices and to directly measure menu costs at five multistore supermarket chains we show that changing prices in these establishments is a complex process requiring dozens of steps and a nontrivial amount of resources the menu costs average 105 887 year per store comprising 0 70 percent of revenues 35 2 percent of net margins and 0 52 price change these menu costs may be forming a barrier to price changes specifically 1 a supermarket chain facing higher menu costs due to item pricing laws that require a separate price tag on each item changes prices two and one half times less frequently than the other four chains 2 within this chain the prices of products exempt from the law are changed over three times more frequently than the products subject to the law in principle fixed costs of changing prices can be observed and measured in practice such costs take disparate forms in different firms and we have no data on their magnitude so the theory can be tested at best indirectly at worst not at all alan blinder 1991 p 90

if you cannot get your friends elected lobby your enemies we incorporate campaign contributions in the citizen candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying of felli and merlo 2006 in equilibrium lobbies contribute to the electoral campaign of candidates whose policy preferences are aligned with their own in the event that their preferred candidate does not win the election lobbies also transfer resources to elected politicians with opposed preferences to induce policy compromise on the other hand lobbies never make post electoral transfers to winning candidates whose electoral campaign they supported

reference prices costs and nominal rigidities we assess the importance of nominal rigidities using a new weekly scanner dataset we find that nominal rigidities take the form of inertia in reference prices and costst defined as the most common prices and costs within a given quarter reference prices are particularly inertial and have an average duration of roughly one year even though weekly prices change roughly once every two weeks we document the relation between prices and costs and find sharp evidence of state dependence in prices we use a simple model to argue that reference prices and costs are useful statistics for macroeconomic

lobbying under political uncertainty abstract this paper considers a model of lobbying described as a common agency game it departs from the current literature by assuming that the special interest groups are not a priori organized or unorganized and that the type of the politician is not common knowledge we characterize equilibria when the choice set of the politician consists of two policies we discuss the conditions leading to efficiency and the characteristics of the groups explaining their relative success in the process of influence we also offer some results for the general case including disjoint necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibria to be efficient

monetary non neutrality in a multisector menu cost model empirical evidence suggests that as much as one third of the u s business cycle is due to nominal shocks we calibrate a multisector menu cost model using new evidence on the cross sectional distribution of the frequency and size of price changes in the u s economy we augment the model to incorporate intermediate inputs we show that the introduction of heterogeneity in the frequency of price change triples the degree of monetary non neutrality generated by the model we furthermore show that the introduction of intermediate inputs raises the degree of monetary non neutrality by another factor of three without adversely affecting the model s ability to match the large average size of price changes a single sector model with a frequency of price change equal to the median rather than the mean generates monetary non neutrality similar to that in our multisector model our multisector model with intermediate inputs generates variation in real output in response to calibrated aggregate nominal shocks that can account for roughly 23 of the u s business cycle

a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence this paper presents a theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence political equilibrium depends on the efficiency of each group in producing pressure the effect of additional pressure on their influence the number of persons in different groups and the deadweight cost of taxes and subsidies an increase in deadweight costs discourages pressure by subsidized groups and encourages pressure by taxpayers this analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful both are produced by the competition for political favors

real rigidities and nominal price changes a large literature seeks to provide microfoundations of price setting for macro models a challenge has been to develop a model in which monetary policy shocks have the highly persistent efiects on real variables estimated by many studies nominal price stickiness has proved helpful but not su cient without some form of real rigidity or strategic complementarity we embed a model with a real rigidity a la kimball 1995 wherein consumers ee from relatively expensive products but do not ock to inexpensive ones we estimate key model parameters using micro data from the u s cpi which exhibit sizable movements in relative prices of substitute products when we impose a signiflcant degree of real rigidity fltting the micro price facts requires very large idiosyncratic shocks and implies large movements in micro quantities

state dependent pricing and the general equilibrium dynamics of money and output economists have long suggested that nominal product prices are changed infrequently because of fixed costs in such a setting optimal price adjustment should depend on the state of the economy yet while widely discussed statedependent pricing has proved difficult to incorporate into macroeconomic models this paper develops a new tractable theoretical state dependent pricing framework we use it to study how optimal pricing depends on the persistence of monetary shocks the elasticities of labor supply and goods demand and the interest sensitivity of money demand

frequency of price adjustment and pass through we empirically document using u s import prices that on average goods with a high frequency of price adjustment have a long run pass through that is at least twice as high as that of low frequency adjusters we show theoretically that this relationship should follow because variable mark ups that reduce long run pass through also reduces the curvature of the proflt function when expressed as a function of the cost shocks making the flrm less willing to adjust its price lastly we quantitatively evaluate a dynamic menu cost model and show that the variable mark up channel can generate signiflcant variation in frequency equivalent to 37 of the observed variation in the data on the other hand the standard workhorse model with constant elasticity of demand and calvo or state dependent pricing has di culty matching the facts

the pluralistic view of politics asymmetric lobbyists ideological uncertainty and political entry abstract the decision maker chooses a policy on behalf of two principals and has private information about his ideology the decision maker s expected rent can be fully extracted by congruent principals but not when principals objectives are too conflicting

conflict and cooperation the structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency abstract this paper is a contribution to the theory of common agency initiated by b d bernheim and m d whinston 1986 quart j econ 101 1 31 by common agency we mean the following an agent decides upon an action which affects its well being as well as the well being of n other individuals the principals each of whom offers a menu of payments contingent on the action chosen under complete information bernheim and whinston prove the existence of an interesting subset of nash equilibria they call truthful provide arguments in defense of this refinement and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs this paper provides a set of theoretical results to identify the structure of equilibrium payoffs with special attention to the payoff of the agent by focusing on complete information we are in a position to evaluate the effects of competition per se on the magnitude of the rent obtained by the agent we illustrate this user guide on a wide and diverse family of applications including auctions competition for an input economic influence and private production of public goods journal of economic literature classification numbers c72 d72