the decline of dominant firms 1905 1929 the theory of dynamic limit pricing implies that a firm maximizes its wealth by gradually sacrificing its dominant market share we extend the theory by simulation methods to show that higher structural entry barriers generally result in both higher profits and a slower sacrifice of market share the model is applied to 42 once dominant firms in u s manufacturing to explain jointly the declines of their market shares and the profit rates earned during 1905 1929 the statistical results agree substantially with the hypothesis that these firms behaved consistently with maximizing their wealth through dynamic limit pricing

testing the efficient redistribution hypothesis an application to japanese beef policy we discuss and model the structure of the political economy of japanese beef markets and we apply bullock s statistical test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis to our model to study the pareto efficiency of japanese beef policy in 1990 and 1991 we found that under the hypothesis that our modeled political economy adequately reflects the true japanese beef political economy we could not reject at the 5 significance level that japanese beef policy was inefficient in 1990 and in 1991 however we could reject inefficiency in 1991 at a 7 level of significance

the relative importance of actual and potential competition empirical evidence from the pharmaceuticals market the relative importance of actual and potential competition empirical evidence from the pharmaceuticals market

are judges leading economic theory sunk costs the threat of entry and the competitive process in this paper we attempt to bring theoretical form to a particular entry argument that has found favor in the courts we suggest that sunk costs may not be a major impediment to entry when a group of customers can commit to an entry enhancing strategy buyers have strong incentives to adopt such strategies because they benefit directly from the resulting lower prices the simplest example involves a large buyer that is able to guarantee an entrant a market for its product long term contracts or even informal purchase commitments backed by customer reputation may also allow the entrant to obtain a guarantee of sufficient business to make the entry profitable once entry is thought likely to occur the existing competitors may be unwilling to attempt a price increase of any magnitude thus the threat of entry can maintain competitive prices even in the presence of sunk costs in section ii we motivate the analysis by discussing the current controversy over the role entry conditions play in an antitrust merger review then we discuss the necessary assumptions for a model of how the threat of entry can deter any price increase in the presence of sunk costs we note that these conditions are different from those commonly used in the economic literature

diversifying entry some ex ante explanations for postentry survival and growth links between theoretically determined preentry conditions and the postentry performance of diversifying entries made by large industrial firms are examined industry firm and relatedness variabl

living in the shadow of the past financial profiles and well being we here consider the link between individual financial profiles over time and well being as measured by life satisfaction we in particular look at annual self reported financial worsening and improvement information for over 25 000 individuals in australian panel data from 2002 to 2017 we first find that satisfaction falls rises with a contemporaneous major financial worsening improvement with worsening having the larger influence second the experience of these financial events in the past continues to be linked to current well being last only the order of financial improvement spells relates to well being a given number of past years where finances deteriorated has the same association with current well being whether the deterioration occurred in one continuous spell or was interrupted we last show that these associations are heterogeneous over the distribution of well being

economies of scope and economies of agglomeration abstract agglomeration economies are economies external to the firm and plant but internal to a particular location in this paper the notion of agglomeration economies is formally investigated the implications of the concept for urban structure and industrial organization are then traced under specified considerations weak economies of agglomeration as defined in this paper are shown to be necessary for the existence of an urban area

towards a testable model of entry a study of the us manufacturing industries this paper develops a simple model of firms entry decisions fits it to interindustry data and tests hypotheses related to contestability theory it is shown that entry increases with the profit level of incumbents holding fixed the expected losses that the entrant would suffer in the event of exit these expected losses are greater the higher the probability of a predatory incumbent response and the larger the sunk costs that must be committed by the entrant the effects of sunk costs are significant and incumbents are significantly more likely to react aggressively when they are both profitable and concentrated copyright 1990 by the london school of economics and political science

political coalition breaking and sustainability of policy reform abstract this paper examines the need and potential for coalition breaking in policy reform efforts related to agriculture and the environment the objective is to consider traditional policy tools that can break existing political coalitions given the powerful noncompetitive role of strong interest groups such as government bureaucracy and large trading organizations choice of the policy mix is modeled as a cooperative game a modification of the nash bargaining solution is used to endogenize coalition formation this framework is then used to examine the potential for an external development agency to promote environmental interests in the policy formation process the results explain how in some countries a small increase in strategic aid may achieve a major breakthrough in policy reform even if past activities have been unproductive and how in other countries a major increase in aid may be fruitless

specifying the dynamics of industry concentration previous studies generally explain changes in concentration by its initial determinants or by changes in its determinants little attention is paid to the dynamic structure of the model this study provides a framework to sort out adjustment effects in a systematic manner the empirical model distinguishes long term from short term effects and estimates the rate of adjustment when concentration deviates from its long term equilibrium level considerable attention has focused on industry concentration as a key element of market structure while earlier empirical studies examined determinants of the level of industry concentration a more recent literature focuses on changes in concentration these more recent papers typically explain intertemporal changes in concentration by the past levels of industry growth concentration advertising intensity and minimum efficient plant size however the dynamic relationship between changes in concentration and the levels of the independent variables has not been explicitly specified caves and porter 1980 have argued that explaining changes in concentration by past levels of market structure variables is tantamount to assuming that the sampled industries are in the process of adjusting to a disequilibrium situation as an alternative they adopt a long term equilibrium approach whereby changes in concentration are explained by lagged changes in the relevant market conditions they find that this approach as a whole was unsuccessful exhibiting low levels of significance and a lack of robustness when the cross section regressions were shifted to different time periods

endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model in this paper we simulate a sequential entry of firms in a differentiated industry a la hotelling firms select a product location once for all they are aware of the unique price equilibrium that will take place after entry has occurred and take into account the behaviour of subsequent entrants it is found that early entrants will systematically locate around the centre but in such a way as not to induce later competitors to locate in between them location choices are also investigated as an instrument for entry deterrence which is feasible because of a fixed cost we identify several ranges of fixed cost for which entry is innocently deterred corresponding to a natural monopoly duopoly triopoly entry deterrence is then typically used to stretch the range of fixed cost for which a given number of firms can be sustained deterrence strategies are consistently such that firms locate at more regular intervals

advertising sunk costs and barriers to entry this paper tests hypotheses about the entry deterring effects of advertising the model isolates three separate effects of advertising on entry the effect on the irrecoverable costs of entry the effect on the uncertainty underlying the entry environment and the effect on the measured rates of profit we find that advertising impedes entry since necessary advertising expenditures give rise to a sunk cost which raises the risk of entry however we also find a countervailing force due to advertising in that the entrant perceives a greater likelihood of success in markets where advertising is important our analysis shows that the overall impact of advertising on entry is positive

endogenous price policies and international wheat prices vanzetti and kennedy s herein vk comment on our earlier paper sarris and freebairn gives us the opportunity first to clarify the differences in the models to present a generalization of the analysis that includes their results as well as ours as special cases and then to point out some salient features of our model that seem to have been unnoticed by them consider our model of a homogenous commodity produced consumed and traded by n countries which are characterized by the following linear demand and supply curves notation follows vk except that we maintain the additive random variables and hence keep the time subscript

location choice product proliferation and entry deterrence within a slightly modified version of hotelling s model we reconsider the claim that the threat of entry induces existing firms to produce a larger number of products than they would otherwise we show that entry deterrence although optimal need not be achieved through product proliferation in some cases the incumbent monopolist resorts to an entry deterring strategy based on location choice rather than product proliferation we also show that in some cases the number of products chosen by the incumbent facing the threat of entry is strictly greater than the minimum number required to deter entry

price changes supply elasticities industry organization and dairy output distribution long run price elasticities of milk supply are decomposed into price elasticities of yield herd size and farm population for northeastern u s dairy farms these elasticities are shown to vary with farm size because of size related differences in capital intensity specialization yield and herd size variability and rates of entry exit into dairy in the short run price responsiveness is shown to decrease with farm size in the long run large farms are shown to be most price responsive results suggest that lower milk prices could make revenue distribution less equal in both the short and long run by altering output and population distributions

contestability queues and governmental entry deterrence this paper demonstrates that a perverse kind of entry deterrence can result when government subsidized production is combined with non price rationing in the form of queuing even though queuing leads to a total cost to the consumer not including the tax cost that is higher than the cost of an unsubsidized private supplier and even though the government s money price is rigid the market is not contestable the key to the result is that the waiting cost portion of the consumer s acquisition cost declines immediately upon entry and losses would be forced upon the entrant privatization would negate the entry deterrence thus leading to entry increased output at lower full prices lower average production costs decreased waiting costs increased profits and increased consumer surplus

noncooperative behavior by a cartel as an entry deterring signal recent work has investigated the effect of a potential entrant s uncertainty about postentry profits on the likelihood of his entering the market it has always been assumed that the potential entrant knows the type of postentry solution but lacks information on cost or as to whether the postentry solution will be cooperative or noncooperative we find that entry is more likely the greater is the preentry profit rate in equilibrium the threat of entry then forces the incumbent firms to act more competitively to deter entry

resource allocation to defensive marketing and manufacturing strategies abstract in this paper we investigate the coordinated use of marketing and manufacturing strategies to formulate a defensive business strategy for an incumbent firm upon market entry while defensive marketing strategies have been researched extensively little has been done on defensive manufacturing strategies and even less on coordinating these two we propose a formulation for the joint formation of a defensive strategy by the marketing and production functions under budget constraint considerations the incumbent firm may allocate its resourcesto advertising and distribution expenditures as well as to manufacturing investments to reduce the unit production cost the incumbent firm has also the option of simply allocating all of its resources purely to advertising and distribution we show that while there exist cases where the optimal reaction to entry involves investments in manufacturing improvements there are also cases where defense is in marketing strategies alone we identify the market conditions that promote such reactions to entry and also provide sensitivity analysis

an integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework this paper aims to embed two popular models of trade union behavior the monopoly model and the efficient bargaining model in a more general framework it does this by analyzing sequential bargaining models where wages are determined before employment and the power of the union in the two stages of the bargain differs as well as finding that the monopoly and efficient bargain models are special cases of this model a new class of models is also discovered this framework is used to analyze the relationship between union pow er and efficiency the empirical analysis of trade unions and the effects of trade union legislation copyright 1987 by royal economic society

regulated price and stock policies abstract setting administered domestic prices according to just c i f of f o b border price is advisable only if the direction of trade is certain and all groups interests are weighted equally if the good randomly may be imported of exported prices and stocks should be determined simultaneously on the basis of domestic demand and supply conditions as well as border prices a framework is proposed for testing which optimizing model an ldc government employs when administering price and stock levels the framework suggests zimbabwe policy makers have treated maize as an export crop weighting consumers interests moderately below those of producers and government

capacity outpl t and sequential entry comment two behavioral assumptions that are often made in the industrial organization literature are that an established firm or group may deter entry either through limit pricing the sylos postulate or by holding excess capacity the excess capacity hypothesis in an interesting recent article in this review 1981 daniel spulber examines these behavioral assumptions to see whether they are consistent with rational behavior by an established firm spulber s analysis is based on a two firm two period game model in which the established firm is given a first in advantage by introducing this dynamic element into the model spulber is able to explicitly address the issue of the optimality of entry deterring behavior spulber finds that the use of limit pricing and or excess capacity to deter entry is rational only under a very limited set of circumstances in particular when the second period outcome is determined by a cournot nash equilibrium he derives the following results 1 the first period output of the established firm is always less than or equal to the first period output produced by a firm not anticipating entry the established firm essentially accommodates entry and limit pricing does not occur 2 the established firm never holds more capital than the amount that would minimize its production costs given its output choices in periods one and two this comment takes issue with spulber s conclusions about the cournot nash case it will be shown that the two results cited above may be reversed when the production technology is characterized by variable proportions this reversal hinges on the particular type of nash equilibrium employed in the analysis of the two period model spulber implicitly uses a nash equilibrium that is not subgame perfect 2 it is shown below that when one requires the nash equilibrium to be subgame perfect both limit pricing and excess capital investment outcomes are possible for the variable proportions technology case the subgame perfection property thus seems to capture an important strategic element in decision making for the established firm in some cases this type of strategic behavior leads to entry barriers that would not exist under innocent profit maximization by the established firm strategic entry barriers are discussed by steven salop 1979 spulber s notation and assumptions about demand and costs are adopted below

growth entry and exit of firms a dynamic model of industry equilibrium is presented which shows how growth entry and exit of firms are interrelated by taking into account the fact that a firm s profitability is to some degree subject to random shocks the simultaneous occurrence of entry and exit can be explained formally in addition by also taking internal growth costs into account it is shown that excess profits can persist in long run equilibrium even in perfect competition and with constant returns to scale the model is consistent with the facts that industry growth comes mainly from existing firms and that most firms grow at rates which do not systematically depend on their scale of operations i introduction

excess capacity and entry some empirical evidence recent articles by spence i977 dixit i979 and schmalensee i98i have elaborated on wenders i97i1 proposition that excess capacity can act as a barrier to entry the intent of all of these treatments is to suggest that firms may rationally invest in excess capacity with the expectation that excess capacity will be seen by potential entrants either as a signal of aggressive intent or as a credible threat 2 when excess capacity does not lead to creation of a credible threat it may still act as a barrier to entry by shifting the risk return perceptions of potential entrants enough to divert the potential entrants investments into other industries 3 alternatively investment in excess capacity by incumbent firms may reduce the prospects of an active market for the used equipment of a defunct entrant and thereby help to convert fixed costs into sunk costs consequently raising entry barriers 4 this paper represents an exploratory effort to investigate empirically the prevalence and efficiency of excess capacity in deterring entry first a simple and traditional model of entry is presented this is followed by the description of the data used to explore the excess capacity investment concept a combined results and comments section follows the description of the data

limit price entry prevention when complete information is lacking abstract this paper extends an earlier paper by the author in which there were two economic agents an established firm and a potential entrant operating under complete information each agent being assumed to know the profit functions of both firms the present paper extends some of the results of the earlier work to a model in which it is not known with certainty to either agent what the profit functions would be after the entrant would come into the market

debt and depression we examine the effect of household financial indebtedness on psychological well being using a large household survey of families with children in britain existing studies that find a link between debt and depression tend to utilise small and highly selective samples of people and only self reported measures of financial stress responses to which are likely to correlate with subjective measures of health from additional household data we can construct a variety of objective quantitative measures of financial stress in order to validate self reported measures we show that although there is a positive association between subjective measures of financial well being and psychological well being individuals differ in their psychological response to objective household financial situations we also examine how the potential simultaneity of financial and psychological health might be handled

technological progress and change in market concentration in the u s 1963 77 what effect does r d induced technological progress have on market structure do the concentration ratios the most used indices of market structure increase or decrease in an industry that is faced with a high level of technological opportunity and exploits it through a high rate of r d this paper focusses on a model by nelson and winter as a theoretical starting point to deal with this question in the nelson and winter model concentration increases as a result of dynamic competition in the technologically progressive industries but their model does not allow entry and the effect on concentration may be reversed if the possibility of entry is considered empirically this paper shows that concentration ratios in the high r d industries have decreased in the united states during 1963 77

life satisfaction dynamics with quarterly life event data using life satisfaction responses from australian panel data we examine the questions of when and to what extent individuals are affected by major positive and negative life events including changes in financial situation marital status death of a close relative and being the victim of crime the key advantage of our data is that we are able to identify these events on a quarterly basis rather than on the yearly basis used by previous studies we find evidence that life events are not randomly distributed that individuals anticipate major events to a large extent and that they fully adapt to many events within 12 months the estimates can be used to calculate monetary values needed to compensate individuals for life events using a new valuation methodology that incorporates these dynamic factors produces considerably smaller compensation valuations than those calculated using the standard approach

irresponsible lending with a better informed lender we present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis a vis both potential competitors and households in order to extract more consumer surplus a lender with sufficient market power may engage in irresponsible lending approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household s best interest unless rival lenders are equally well informed competition may reduce welfare this holds in particular if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent s superior screening ability this article proposes a new framework for analysing household or consumer lending using its past experience with borrowers in the same local area or borrowers facing similar economic conditions a sophisticated lender may often have a better estimate of a household s default probability than the household itself i derive the conditions where such information asymmetry can lead to irresponsible or too aggressive lending in which case credit is approved even though this is knowingly against a household s best interest admittedly the more standard approach is to assume that borrowers represent the better informed party while we do not want to dismiss the importance of borrower adverse selection the presumption that sophisticated and experienced lenders can estimate the default probability better than individual borrowers may be particularly suitable if borrowers are households individual households may not have statistically accurate information about the likelihood of say losing their job in an economic downturn or of incurring large medical bills in the future both of which may cause them to default on a loan on the other hand we do not presume that households own estimates are biased on average i borrow the assumption of informed lending from inderst and m ller 2006 where a lender is better informed about the expected cash flow from a newly financed project my current analysis is tailored instead towards household finance and my focus is on whether too aggressive lending can occur in equilibrium this focus is motivated by the particular attention that policy makers have given to this issue for instance in the uk various reports and taskforces on consumer lending practices and more generally on the surge of household debt have brought up

technology debt and the exploitation of growth options abstract this paper analyzes the effect of the firm s technology on the agency costs of debt it is shown that for an important class of technologies agency costs are not a uniformly rising function of leverage for these technologies relatively high leverage can be consistent with a small tax subsidy the effect of technology on the exploitation of real options by a levered firm is examined the analysis provides a framework for a direct test of the agency cost of debt hypothesis using cost data

strategic entry deterrence in analyzing deterrence of large scale entry two classes of entry barriers may be distinguished an innocent entry barrier is unintentionally erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization in contrast a strategic entry barrier is purposely erected to reduce the possibility of entry two types of innocent barriers may also be distinguished a postentry absolute advantage has the property that if entry did occur the established firm would be at a profit advantage over the entrant examples are superior technology or product design patents and lower input prices a preentry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental preentry asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant before the entrant makes his entry decision the established firm has already committed resources this prior existence gives first move advantages the preentry asymmetry is independent of symmetry or asymmetry in the rules the equilibrium concept of the postentry game that might ensue even if the postentry game will be played according to nash cournot or entrant as leader rules the preentry leadership

would hotelling kill the electric car in this paper we show that the potential for endogenous technological change in alternative energy sources may alter the behaviour of resource owning firms when technological progress in an alternative energy source can occur through learning by doing resource owners face competing incentives to extract rents from the resource and to prevent expansion of the new technology we show that in such a context it is not necessarily the case that scarcity driven higher traditional energy prices over time will induce alternative energy supply as resources are exhausted rather we show that as we increase the learning potential in the substitute technology lower equilibrium energy prices prevail and there may be increased resource extraction and greenhouse gas emissions we show that the effectiveness and the incidence of emissions reduction policies may be altered by increased potential for technological change our results suggest that treating finite resource rents as endogenous consequences of both technological progress and policy changes will be important for the accurate assessment of climate change policy

sequential entry and deterrence with competitive spatial price discrimination abstract this paper analyzes sequential entry with perfect foresight in a competitive spatial price discrimination model with both an exogenous and an endogenous number of firms the spne locations do not coincide with the social cost minimizing locations

action characteristics as predictors of competitive responses a central question in competitive dynamics is whether a competitive response can be predicted this study links various characteristics of actions with the total number and the time lag of competitors responses the hypothesized relationships were tested with a sample of competitive moves among u s airlines the results suggested that responses are influenced by the characteristics of the actions that evoked them specifically the total number of competitors affected by an action and the importance to these competitors of the markets under attack by the action increase the number of competitive responses strategic as opposed to tactical actions or actions which require substantial implementation efforts reduce the number and delay the timing of rivals counteractions finally contrary to prediction competitors who have a high stake in the markets under attack by a competitive move react slowly

the role of potential competition in industrial organization potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of j b clark 1902 but it was not until 50 years later that economists most notably joe bain and paolo sylos labini refocused attention on the idea with inputs from the theories of imperfect competition optimal control and dynamic games their work evolved into ever more sophisticated models of the reactions of existing competitors to the threat of new competition although the most appropriate models of competitive interaction are those which begin with a specific industry a number of theories have been proposed which attempt to develop more general conclusions my purpose in this paper is to develop an understanding of the strengths and limitations of these alternative theories by examining the available theoretical empirical and institutional knowledge rather than attempt the sisyphean task of recounting every model which relates conditions of entry and market performance i have partitioned the analysis into four major schools of thought according to their most central propositions these are the traditional model of limit pricing dynamic limit pricing the theory of contestable markets and the market efficiency model traditional limit pricing models rest on the assumption that firms respond to entry but are able to earn persistent profits when the structural characteristics of markets make entry difficult dynamic limit pricing is similar but emphasizes that markets can only be temporarily protected from entry contestability theory in its pure form asserts that potential competition is as effective as actual competition in controlling market performance the efficient markets hypothesis broadly interpreted states that markets are workably competitive and that the market structure reflects differential efficiency not strategic behavior while one can construct many other hypotheses about potential competition these classifications

are government transfers efficient an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis the efficient redistribution hypothesis says that no available government policies are pareto superior to observed government policies efficient redistribution from government policy is a central tenet of much recent theoretical and applied political economy literature in this paper limitations of previous attempts to test the efficient redistribution hypothesis are discussed and an alternative test of the efficient redistribution hypothesis that uses vector optimization theory and bootstrap methodology is presented

adaptation anticipation and social interaction in happiness an integrated error correction approach abstract adaptation anticipation and social reference effects on happiness are strongly interrelated phenomena however in the existing empirical literature these phenomena are mainly studied in isolation from each other therefore using soep panel data for the years 1984 2007 this study offers an integrated investigation of the implications of these three phenomena for the dynamics of individual life satisfaction i focus on the short and long run effects of income and social reference income but i control for similar dynamics with respect to a large set of control variables gmm estimates for instrumented income variables in an error correction model indicate an insignificant future income effect a significant and positive current income effect and an insignificant long run income effect on life satisfaction with significant hedonic adaptation social reference income has a significant negative and strong impact in the long run but not in the short run consequently increasing own income and reference income by the same percentage tends to have an insignificant effect in the long term but a significant and positive effect in the short term adaptation to an income shock and reinforcement of a reference income shock take place for more than 90 within three years on the basis of these results a more comprehensive explanation of the easterlin paradox than those given in the literature is presented

a closer look at the effect of market growth on industries profits everybody talks about the relation of industries profit rates to their markets rates of growth but nobody does anything about it specifically researchers have confirmed the effect of the growth of nominal output on profits in many multivariate studies without specifying closely the hypothesis under test or the measure of demand growth appropriate to test it a profits growth relationship could stem from several mechanisms the lagged adaptation of capacity to unexpected changes in demand reactions of oligopolists to disturbances in their consensus etc these mechanisms how and where they work hold their own normative interest therefore knowing what behavior and what structure lying behind it accounts for the profits growth relationship should do more than improve the specifications of our studies of allocative efficiency it should also expand our knowledge of adaptive processes that are important and hard to observe directly in this paper we shall synthesize the available explanations of why changes in market demand should affect an industry s profits then present a statistical test of the relative significance of the competing explanations

strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the uk abstract the main purpose of this paper is to examine the incidence of strategic behaviour in the uk by means of a questionnaire study performed across three broad manufacturing industries food electrical engineering and chemicals of the strategies which have received substantial theoretical attention r d and advertising appear widely used patenting pricing and excess capacity much less so vertical instruments such as purchasing policy also stand out as important but possibly only a minority of firms in our sample actively pursue strategic instruments

revenue neutral tax policies under price uncertainty comment in an interesting paper in this journal holloway investigated the firm s response to revenue neutral taxation under price uncertainty in his analysis revenue neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant using an assumption of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion he concluded that a reduction in the marginal rate would cause the firm to contract output holloway used the 1986 tax reform act as an example of a revenue neutral policy as a matter of fact the act was intended to be revenue neutral while low

estimation of price policies in senegal an empirical test of cooperative game theory abstract a game theoretic framework rationalizes the political economy of food and agricultural price policies in senegal policies are the outcome of a cooperative bargaining process among three archetypal players a farmer growing cash and staple crops an urban consumer buying imported cereals and a government marketing board intervening in agricultural markets the game is estimated and the bargaining strength of the players is recovered the axioms underlying the game are tested to discriminate among various bargaining game solutions the symmetry and efficiency axioms are rejected

market concentration contestability and sunk costs this paper provides an exploratory assessment of the theory of contestability that is based on a diverse sample of industries and introduces a new important determinant of market concentration the results of the paper indicate that the variables determining the degree of contestability of markets are significant correlates of market concentration sunk costs account for a substantial portion of the sample variance of concentration even after technological factors are controlled for copyright 1990 by mit press

bargaining power fear of disagreement and wage settlements theory and evidence from u s industry the paper develops and estimates a theoretical model of wage determination and union nonunion wage differentials in order to overcome the institutional ctiticisms of the formal bargaining literature the paper generalizes the nash zeuthen harsanyi model by linking the solution to the institutional concepts of bargaining power and fear or cost of disagreement and by making the outcome depend not only on endogenous but also on exogenous factors an operational specification of bargaining power and fear of disagreement allows the model to be estimated with data covering twelve companies and trade unions during the period from mid 1950 s to the late 1970 s while giving limited support to the nashzeuthen harsanyi solution the empirical analysis indicates that the bargaining outcome usually deviates from the nash zeuthen harsanyi point and in accordance with the institutionalist claim that it varies significantly with exogenous factors contrary to the traditional labor economics view the results do not support the general conclusion that the bargaining solution lies on the marginal revenue product curve of labor instead the relevant coefficients suggest that for many firms and unions the outcome might be better characterized by the efficient contract vertical contract curve

strategic deterrence of sequential entry into an industry industrial entry deterrence is typically studied in a setting where an established firm or firms confront and attempt to deter a single potential competitor during the evolution of most industries however a sequence of firms enters or attempts to enter at distinct points in time consideration of issues arising from sequential entry fundamentally alters the qualitative nature of the deterrence decision undertaken by incumbent firms within a sequential setting counterintuitive behavior may be observed specifically numerous government policies designed to decrease industrial concentration penalties for anticompetitive practices subsidization of entry consent decrees restructuring industries may have the opposite effect

the role of sunk costs in the decision to invest in r d we present a dynamic empirical model of a firm s r d decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk r d costs taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms and among different technological regimes we estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm level data of spanish manufacturing for 1990 2000 conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors we find that r d history matters this true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk r d costs associated with performing r d sunk r d costs are found to be higher for large high tech firms

achieving demand side synergy from strategic diversification how combining mundane assets can leverage consumer utilities we explore the overlooked issue of how certain strategic level interindustry diversification options might increase consumer utility discussions of inter industry diversification typically focus on producer synergies obtainable from economies of scope or from skill transfer across business units discussions of intra industry product diversification generally the province of marketing typically focus on synergies obtainable from product bundling which lowers producer costs or provides convenience for consumers we take a different tack by linking interindustry diversification and consumer utility we first separately examine two possible consumer benefits of interindustry diversification 1 facilitating consumers accomplishment of two tasks simultaneously or 2 attracting diverse consumer groups to a common platform when intergroup externalities exist we then assess a simple empirical context that shows potential for simultaneous consumer utilities and two sided market utility together we analyze this context and concurrently develop a mathematical model showing how these demand side synergies can create unique business value we next introduce asymmetric preferences among consumer subgroups and we refine our arguments by comparing their conclusions with the empirical data we learn that combinations of otherwise mundane i e commonplace assets can create consumer value superior assets are not necessary moreover common ownership is necessary for the pricing flexibility required to deliver and capture maximum value through interindustry diversification especially when consumer groups preferences may change the negotiations and settling up required for cooperation through alliances will without common ownership increase costs and reduce responsiveness we discuss the sustainability of demand side advantages and the implications of these ideas for future research and practice

sunk capacity costs long run fixed costs and entry deterrence under complete and incomplete information this article considers a three stage extensive form game where capacity once installed is sunk but where fixed costs are not sunk we show that there may be multiple perfect equilibria of the complete information game when the entrant is incompletely informed about the incumbent s cost the entrant may use the incumbent s capacity choice as a signal of the incumbent s cost we present an example where the incumbent prefers a noninformative capacity signal since this has the effect of reducing the scale of entry we present a second example where the entrant is incompletely informed because the incumbent makes a choice over production technologies that is unobservable to the entrant

dominant firms and their alleged decline abstract by way of a survey of recent literature on the theory of strategic competition this paper focuses on the question of whether dominant firms decline the traditional argument suggesting decline is found to be based on a rather unsatisfactory modelling of dominance and more acceptable conceptualizations suggest that such privileged positions will persist

two economists musings on the stability of locus of control empirical studies of the role of non cognitive skills in driving economic behavior often rely heavily on the assumption that these skills are stable over the relevant time frame we analyze the change in a specific non cognitive skill i e locus of control in order to directly assess the validity of this assumption we find that short and medium run changes in locus of control are rather modest on average are concentrated among the young or very old do not appear to be related to the demographic labor market and health events that individuals experience and are unlikely to be economically meaningful still there is no evidence that locus of control is truly time invariant implying that the use of lagged measures results in an errors in variables problem that could downward bias the estimated wage return to locus of control by as much as 50 percent those researchers wishing to analyze the economic consequences of non cognitive skills should consider i restricting their analysis to the working age population for whom there is little evidence of systematic change in skill levels and ii accounting for error in the skill measures they employ

games of survival in the us newspaper industry 1989 games of survival in the us newspaper industry applied economics vol 21 no 5 pp 631 649

people do not adapt new analyses of the dynamic effects of own and reference income on life satisfaction abstract do people adapt to changes in income in contradiction to much of the previous literature i find no evidence of adaptation to income in gsoep 1984 2015 and ukhls 1996 2017 data furthermore i find that people also do not adapt to changes in reference income instead reference income effects may be subject to reinforcement over time following the empirical approach of vendrik 2013 i obtain these findings by estimating life satisfaction equations in which contemporaneous and lagged terms for a respondent s own household income and their estimated reference income are simultaneously entered additionally i instrument for own income and include lags of a large set of controls what was found to be adaptation to raw household income in previous studies turns out to have been driven by reinforcement of an initially small negative effect of household size that grows large over time implications of this result for the estimation of equivalence scales with subjective data are discussed

caveat innovator strategic and structural characteristics of new product introductions abstract the assumptions underlying models of strategic behavior by incumbents are evaluated using a case study of a ground coffee product introduction the assumption underlying earlier strategic models that the entrant does not know the incumbent s payoffs after strategic have been tested does not appear to apply instead strategic behavior is observed to hinge on ex ante uncertainty about the structure of the payoff matrix and the incremental decision making which this uncertainty spawns in this environment strategies which create noise can slow learning and delay entry

fixed costs sunk costs entry barriers and sustainability of monopoly this paper shows that i fixed costs of sufficient magnitude assure the existence of a vector of sustainable prices for the products of a natural monopolist prices making him invulnerable against entry ii nevertheless fixed costs do not constitute barriers to entry that is they need not have undesirable welfare consequences iii indeed in market forms that we call perfectly contestable large fixed costs are completely compatible with many desirable attributes of competitive equilibrium iv sunk costs do however constitute barriers to entry and v finally the profit and welfare consequences of entry barriers are described formally in this paper it is shown that i fixed costs of sufficient magnitude assure the existence of a vector of sustainable prices a set of product prices that make a natural monopolist invulnerable against successful entry ii nevertheless costs that are truly fixed do not constitute barriers to entry that is they do not have the welfare consequences normally attributed to barriers to entry iii indeed there are markets of a form which we call perfectly contestable markets and whose properties may be approximated in practice in which large fixed costs are completely compatible with many if not most of the desirable attributes of competitive equilibrium iv sunk costs do however constitute barriers to entry and v finally the resource allocation problems that stem from fixed costs are formally identical with those that accompany public goods both their sources and their character are the same thus the rationale for public supply of public goods may be no different from that pertaining to nationalization of natural monopolies

potential competition actual competition and economic welfare though the origins of anti trust legislation at least in the united states undoubtedly lie in late nineteenth century populist sentiments its current intellectual foundations rest on modern welfare economics these intellectual foundations provide more than just rhetoric as courts have increasingly relied on the testimony of economists to interpret and reinterpret the inevitably vague language of the legislation the reliance on modern welfare economics is somewhat paradoxical for the assumptions underlying the fundamental theorem of welfare economics are peculiarly ill suited to deal with competition in the central area to which anti trust is applied the industrial sectors of modern economies these sectors are characterized by important non convexities which admittedly present inherent problems for competition the competition that does take place is as likely to take the form of product and r d competition rather than price competition product competition plays no role in the conventional welfare paradigm which assumes a complete set of commodities and it is not that arrow and debreu simply forgot to include technical change in their formulations the natural assumptions underlying the analysis of the production marketing and utilization of knowledge are basically inconsistent with those underlying the arrow debreu model invited paper european economic association meetings copenhagen august 1987 financtal support from the national science foundation and the hoover institution is gratefully acknowledged the presence of non convexittes in production is central in explaining why only a ftnite subset of the set of possible commodities is in fact produced techmcal change is characterized by non convexities in its production radner and stiglitz 1984 if technology exhibits say constant returns to scale at a fixed technology when inputs devoted to r d are included it exhibits non convexities the value or information may increuse with the scale of production while conventional theory focuses on markets for homogeneous commodities each piece of new knowledge must be dinerent from previously produced knowledge knowledge has many of the properties of public goods it being both dificult and undesirable to exclude markets for knowledge are at best imperfect and as we have argued

adaptation to poverty in long run panel data we consider the link between poverty and subjective well being and focus in particular on potential adaptation to poverty we use panel data on almost 45 800 individuals living in germany from 1992 to 2011 to show first that life satisfaction falls with both the incidence and intensity of contemporaneous poverty we then reveal that there is little evidence of adaptation within a poverty spell poverty starts bad and stays bad in terms of subjective well being we cannot identify any causes of poverty entry which are unambiguously associated with adaptation to poverty

cooperative game theory and the measurement of political power many studies using the political preference function ppf approach to measure the political powers of agricultural interest groups have been criticized for offering little theoretical justification for their methodology zusman p 447 beghin and karp p 51 bullock 1994 it has been claimed that cooperative game theory developed by nash 1950 1953 and harsanyi 1963 1977 provides a formal theoretical basis for ppf methodology zusman rausser and zusman 1992 forthcoming zusman and amiad beghin beghin and karp in this paper i present a brief discussion of the geometry of cooperative game theory and discuss and critique studies that have attempted to apply it to empirical studies of the political economy of agriculture

the persistence of monopoly an investigation of the effectiveness of the united kingdom monopolies commission a sample of twenty eight markets investigated by the uk monopolies and mergers commission is taken and market share changes are analysed for subsequent erosion of dominance the evidence points to a modest erosion for leading firms but only rarely to a loss of leadership although there is no significant difference between the rates of decline for leading firms in the mmc sample and a control group the achievement of some erosion of dominance in markets where entry barriers were reduced may represent some limited success for competition policy