equal votes equal money court ordered redistricting and the distribution ofpublic expenditures in the american states a study of the effects of legislative re districting in the states during the 1960 s also contains data file

performance comparisons and dynamic incentives it is well known that comparative performance information cpi can enhance efficiency in static principal agent relationships by improving the trade off between insurance and incentives in the design of explicit contracts in dynamic settings however there may be implicit as well as explicit incentives for example managerial career concerns and the ratchet effect in regulation we show that the dynamic effects of cpi on implicit incentives can either reinforce or oppose the familiar static insurance effect and in either case can be more important for efficiency the overall welfare effects of cpi are thus ambiguous and can be characterized in terms of the underlying information structure

oil prices and the stock prices of alternative energy companies energy security issues coupled with increased concern over the natural environment are driving factors behind oil price movements while it is widely accepted that rising oil prices are good for the financial performance of alternative energy companies there has been relatively little statistical work done to measure just how sensitive the financial performance of alternative energy companies are to changes in oil prices in this paper a four variable vector autoregression model is developed and estimated in order to investigate the empirical relationship between alternative energy stock prices technology stock prices oil prices and interest rates our results show technology stock prices and oil prices each individually granger cause the stock prices of alternative energy companies simulation results show that a shock to technology stock prices has a larger impact on alternative energy stock prices than does a shock to oil prices these results should be of use to investors managers and policy makers

voters as fiscal conservatives voters penalize federal and state spending growth this is the central result of my analysis of voting behavior in presidential senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950 1988 the composition of federal spending growth seems irrelevant the vote loss to the president s party from an extra dollar of defense or nondefense spending is the same however in gubernatorial elections expansion of state welfare spending exacts a disproportionate political price deficit financing of federal or state spending does not appear to matter politically i conclude by discussing the obvious question of why government budgets have grown in the face of this voter hostility

the propensity to return theory and evidence for the italian brain drain abstract return migration is the positive counterpart of the brain drain the effects of the brain drain in italy could be negative this paper shows that highly skilled migrants decide not to return to their native country

the effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers differences in differences estimates for spain abstract in this paper we test the hypothesis that municipalities aligned with upper tier grantor governments i e controlled by the same party will receive more grants than those that are unaligned we use a rich spanish database which provides information on grants received by nearly 900 municipalities during the period 1993 2003 from three different upper tier governments i e central regional and upper local since three elections were held at each tier during this period we have enough within municipality variation in partisan alignment to provide differences in differences estimates of the effects of alignment on the amount of grants coming from each source moreover the fact that a municipality may simultaneously receive grants from aligned and unaligned grantors allows us to use a triple differences estimator which consists of estimating the effects of changing alignment status on the change in grants coming from the aligned grantors relative to the change in grants coming from the unaligned ones the results suggest that partisan alignment has a sizeable positive effect on the amount of grants received by municipalities for example with majority governments at the two layers aligned municipalities receive over 40 more grants than unaligned ones

on home grown ness in politics evidence from the 1998 election for alabama s third congressional district faith and tollison 1983 argue that since itis costly to fire a representative for poor performance voters will rationally prefer local candidates withlongstanding ties to the district such candidates implicitlyput more specific human or other types of capital at risk as aklein and leffler 1981 type of performance bond than doother candidates with lesser ties to the district votersunderstand and appreciate the implied efficiency of castingtheir ballots in favor of someone who has a lot to loselocally from nonperformance as their representative usingprecinct level data from the 1998 election for the thirdcongressional district in alabama we find compelling evidencein support of home grown ness in politics

a political economy theory of partial decentralization we revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization a capital poor median voter chooses to use redistributive capital taxes to provide public goods the expectation of high capital taxes however results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution the median voter therefore wants to commit to a lower level of capital taxes she does so by setting a partial degree of decentralization in the constitution the equilibrium degree of decentralization balances the positive effect of tax competition on capital taxes with the loss in redistribution that results we show that the degree of decentralization is nonmonotonic in inequality increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision and decreasing in capital productivity when public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized

social identification and redistribution in heterogeneous federations evidence from germany and belgium recent evidence of increasing income heterogeneity within developed countries has reignited debates concerning the redistribution of income and wealth in this article we contribute to this debate

taxation and presidential approval separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence previous research has established that taxation may impose significant electoral costs on politicians this literature however focuses exclusively on the effect of the tax burden in this paper we test the hypothesis that both the level of the tax burden and the change in the tax structure affect the us president s approval ratings over the 1959 2006 period our results support this proposition specifically we find a negative impact from the magnitudes of the tax burden and the deficit as well as from changes in the tax structure on presidential approval ratings

mps for sale returns to office in postwar british politics many recent studies show that firms profit from connections to influential politicians but less is known about how much politicians financially benefit from wielding political influence we estimate the returns to serving in parliament using original data on the estates of recently deceased british politicians applying both matching and a regression discontinuity design to compare members of parliament mps with parliamentary candidates who narrowly lost we find that serving in office almost doubled the wealth of conservative mps but had no discernible financial benefits for labour mps conservative mps profited from office largely through lucrative outside employment they acquired as a result of their political positions we show that gaining a seat in parliament more than tripled the probability that a conservative politician would later serve as a director of a publicly traded firm enough to account for a sizable portion of the wealth differential we suggest that labour mps did not profit from office largely because trade unions collectively exerted sufficient control over the party and its mps to prevent members from selling their services to other clients

economic growth and emissions reconsidering the empirical basis of environmental kuznets curves abstract recent empirical research indicates that certain types of emissions follow an inverted u or environmental kuznets curve ekc as income grows this regularity has been interpreted as a possible de linking of economic growth and patterns of certain pollutants for developed economies in this paper the empirical basis of this result is investigated by considering some statistical particularities of the various ekc studies performed it is argued that the inverted u relationship between income and emissions estimated from panel data need not hold for specific individual countries over time based on insights from intensity of use analysis in resource economics an alternative growth model is specified and estimated for three types of emissions co2 nox and so2 in four countries netherlands uk usa and western germany it is found that the time patterns of these emissions correlate positively with economic growth and that emission reductions may have been achieved as a result of structural and technological changes in the economy sustainable growth is defined as the rate of economic growth that does not lead to growth in emissions its rate is calculated for each type of emission and country based on estimated parameter values the resulting indicators reflect a balance between the positive influence of growth and negative influence of structural change and technological progress on emission levels

the vp function a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years vp functions explain the support for the government at votes and polls by economic and political variables most studies analyze macro time series we also cover studies of individual voters socio economic groups and regional cross sections the theory starts from the responsibil ity hypothesis voters hold the government responsible for economic conditions it works in two party block systems but not else voters in most countries are found to be sociotropic egotropic voting also occurs voters myopia is well established voting is retrospective as expectations are static it costs the average government almost 2 of the vote to rule

oil and the macroeconomy since world war ii all but one of the u s recessions since world war ii have been preceded typically with a lag of around three fourths of a year by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum this does not mean that oil shocks caused these recessions evidence is presented however that even over the period 1948 72 this correlation is statistically significant and nonspurious supporting the proposition that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some of the u s recessions prior to 1972 by extension energy price increases may account for much of post opec macroeconomic performance

divided government fiscal institutions and budget deficits evidence from the states does partisan control of american state government have systematic effects on state spending and taxing levels does divided control affect the government s ability to make hard decisions do institutional rules like legal deficit carryover restrictions matter using a formal model of fiscal policy to guide empirical analysis of data covering the american states from 1968 to 1987 we conclude that 1 aggregate state budget totals are driven by different factors under democrats and republicans the net result being that democrats target spending and taxes to higher shares of state level personal income 2 divided government is less able to react to revenue shocks that lead to budget deficits particularly where different parties control each chamber of the legislature and 3 unified party governments with restricted ability to carry deficits into the next fiscal year outside the south have sharper reactions to negative revenue shocks than those without restrictions

do parties matter for economic outcomes a regression discontinuity approach a long standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies this question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities this article uses a regression discontinuity design namely party control changes discontinuously at 50 of the vote share which can produce near experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes the method is applied to a large panel data set from swedish local governments with a number of attractive features the results show that there is an economically significant party effect left wing governments spend and tax 2 3 more than right wing governments left wing governments also have 7 lower unemployment rates which is partly due to that left wing governments employ 4 more workers than right wing governments jel c21 d72 d78 h71 h72

energy policies for managing china s carbon emission abstract the well documented close relationship between economic growth and energy use indicates that the emergence of a country as an economic power cannot occur without increased in energy use but just as the scale of china s rise as an economic power has no clear parallel in history its conflict between economic growth and energy use has also shattered all precedents this planet s future energy scenario hinges on the ability of this decoupling the question this policy forum addressed is how to find the optimum way to accomplish this decoupling through government directive government centered command and control approaches or cac or market forces market based instruments or mbi it concludes that market rather than government can decide the optimum way to decouple china s economic growth from energy use facilitating this decoupling driven by market force requires getting the prices right for energy

intergovernmental political competition in american federalism many policies in the united states are jointly determined by federal and state actions in the game theoretic model offered here politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods in line with peterson s 1995 theory of functional federalism the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments however under a broad set of circumstances both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending and their joint provision leads to a relative oversupply of public goods and services and thus to overtaxation under joint provision states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics

old voters new voters and the personal vote using redistricting to estimate the incumbency advantage we provide new estimates of the size of the personal vote in u s house elections from 1872 to 1990 we take advantage of the natural experiment that attends decennial redistricting every ten years most incumbents are given new districts that contain a combination of old and new territory by contrasting an incombent s vote in the new part of the district with his or her vote in the old part of the district we can estimate the magnitude of the personal vote the vote that the incumbent receives because he or she represented the voters in the past our estimates confirm prior work that shows that a large fraction of the incumbency advantage owes to the personal vote as opposed to challenger quality unlike past research we are able to estimate the relationship between district partisanship and the personal vote we find a significant interaction which shows that incumbents develop larger personal votes in areas where they are electorally most vulnerable here is no doubt that incumbents today have a substantial advantage over nonincumbents in u s house elections the overall size of this advantage has been fairly well established as has the fact that incumbents electoral strength has increased dramatically over the postwar period measured in terms of vote share the overall incumbency advantage grew from a modest 1 3 percentage point edge in the 1940s and early 1950s to a 7 10 percentage point edge in the 1980s and early 1990s 1 there is much less agreement about the sources of the incumbency advantage and the causes of its growth congressional scholars have identified a variety of factors that may be responsible which can be grouped into three broad categories the first and the focus of this paper is electoral advantage that stems from a legislator s homestyle members of the house are reputedly very responsive to their constituents in turn their constituents reward them with their votes mayhew 1974b fenno 1974 and others detail the sorts of activities that legislators do to build a widely known and respected name including casework frequent visits to the district position taking on issues and securing federal benefits a second source of the incumbency advantage is candidate quality incumbents may win because they are the best candidates running and they do noticeably worse when they face state legislators and other experienced challengers finally incumbency may simply act as a voting cue a label which voters rely on because party has become less relevant assessing the importance of these different factors has significant implications for our normative evaluations of the modern congress and our understanding

design of an economically efficient feed in tariff structure for renewable energy development abstract evidence suggests albeit tentatively that feed in tariffs fits are more effective than alternative support schemes in promoting renewable energy technologies rets fits provide long term financial stability for investors in rets which at the prevailing market price of electricity are not currently cost efficient enough to compete with traditional fossil fuel technologies on the other hand if not properly designed fits can be economically inefficient as is widely regarded to have been the case under the public utility regulatory policies act of 1978 purpa under purpa too high a guaranteed price led to the creation of so called purpa machines poorly performing generating units that could survive financially only because of heavy subsidies that came at the expense of retail customers similarly because of their adverse impacts on retail electricity rates german fits have been subject to increasing political pressure from utilities and customers in this paper we propose an innovative two part fit consisting of both a capacity payment and a market based energy payment which can be used to meet the renewables policy goals of regulators our two part tariff design draws on the strengths of traditional fits relies on market mechanisms is easy to implement and avoids the problems caused by distorting wholesale energy markets through above market energy payments the approach is modeled on forward capacity market designs that have been recently implemented by several regional transmission organizations in the usa to address needs for new generating capacity to ensure system reliability

another pass through bites the dust oil prices and inflation el presente articulo presenta evidencia de que el traspaso de los movimientos del precio del petroleo al nivel general de precios ha disminuido en forma importante en las ultimas decadas se encuentra que tal disminucion es generalizada para un amplio conjunto de paises luego de documentar correlaciones entre el indice de precios al consumidor y el precio del petroleo se utilizan dos estrategias de estimacion en un intento por identificar adecuadamente el efecto inflacionario de los shocks del petroleo primero se estima la curva de phillips tradicional para 34 paises aumentada de modo de incluir el petroleo y testear si existe quiebre estructural esta metodologia muestra una caida en el traspaso medio estimado para los paises industrializados y en menor medida para las economias emergentes segundo se estiman vectores autorregresivos en ventanas moviles para una submuestra de paises para los que existen datos suficientes se derivan funciones de impulso respuesta de la inflacion a los shocks petroleros y se interpretan las integrales como estimaciones del traspaso se encuentra que el efecto de los shocks petroleros sobre la inflacion se ha reducido en la mayoria de los doce paises de la muestra entre los factores que podrian explicar esta caida en nuestra opinion los mas importantes son que la intensidad economica del petroleo se ha reducido en el mundo que tambien ha disminuido el traspaso del tipo de cambio que el ambiente inflacionario es mas favorable y que el actual shock del precio del petroleo es el resultado de una solida demanda mundial estos factores ayudan a entender no solo por que el actual shock ha tenido efectos inflacionarios limitados sino asimismo por que sus consecuencias en el producto tambien han sido limitadas

renewable energy policy and electricity restructuring a california case study abstract many countries are in the process of deregulating and restructuring their electric power industries although the introduction of retail competition may have negative impacts on the development of renewable energy a number of countries are establishing new programs to support these clean energy technologies in the united states debate has centered on three primary renewables support mechanisms 1 the renewables portfolio standard 2 programs funded by an electricity distribution surcharge and 3 voluntary renewable energy purchases by electricity customers via green power marketing california provides a good case study of the design of renewables support programs within industry restructuring because policymakers considered all three of these options during the state s restructuring proceedings moreover many of the same policy options design issues and political conflicts that have arisen in california are likely to recur in other states and countries some of the most important lessons from the california experience include 1 renewable energy and environmental advocates must clearly articulate the need and rationale for continued support of renewables 2 cost containment and competitive neutrality concerns must be addressed head on 3 combinations of policies are likely to be far more effective than any single renewables policy and 4 the effectiveness of renewable energy policies developed during the restructuring process will be strongly linked to their duration and stability

party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures this paper examines the effects of party control of state governments on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers across counties from 1957 to 1997 we find that the governing parties skew the distribution of funds in favor of areas that provide them with the strongest electoral support this is borne out in two ways i counties that traditionally give the highest vote share to the governing party receive larger shares of state transfers to local governments ii when control of the state government changes the distribution of funds shifts in the direction of the new governing party we find only weak evidence that parties reward electorally pivotal counties or counties in electorally pivotal legislative districts finally we find that increased spending in a county increases voter turnout in subsequent elections this suggests that parties have an electoral incentive to skew the distribution of funds to influence future election results and the mechanism through which this works is mobilization rather than conversion of voters in a fixed electorate

econometrics and presidential elections this paper discusses an econometric equation that explains votes for president as a function of economic events and incumbency information the history of the equation is reviewed the update after the 1992 election is discussed and a prediction for the 1996 election is made conditional on an economic forecast

decentralisation as an incentive scheme recent changes have introduced more decentralization in a number of traditionally centralized countries 1 in the case of france it is sometimes claimed that the 1982 1983 reform of subcentral government is of historical importance although the principles of that reform are not contested any more by the new majority elected in 1986 opinions still differ on a number of policy issues some of the issues are presented in this introductory section but the main purpose of this paper is not to expose or discuss in detail the problems of decentralization in france as argued in the second part of the introductory section the theoretical framework in which the policy issues of decentralization are usually discussed by economists is somewhat unsatisfactory in particular when applied to unitary states such as britain or france the bulk of the paper is devoted to the exploration of a different approach to decentralization it is not purported however that this approach could completely replace the more traditional one consequently when in the concluding section we return briefly to the policy issues identified here this is to be read as a preliminary attempt to evaluate the relevance of the reasoning developed in the paper

this is what happened to the oil price macroeconomy relationship abstract many of the quarterly oil price increases observed since 1985 are corrections to even bigger oil price decreases the previous quarter when one looks at the net increase in oil prices over the year recent data are consistent with the historical correlation between oil shocks and recessions

the home grown presidency empirical evidence on localism in presidential voting 1972 2000 this builds upon the conceptual framework of lewis beck and rice american journal of political science 27 548 56 1983 in combination with the empirical design of kjar and laband public choice 112 143 50 2002 to investigate home grown ness in us presidential elections from 1972 2000 it found that ceteris paribus home state vote shares for us presidential election winners are 5 19 15 11 percentage points higher due to the home grown ness effect in the eight presidential elections analysed this study confirms two aspects of prior work first the estimate of a home grown ness effect in presidential elections of 5 19 percentage points on average supports the 4 percentage point average found by lewis beck and rice 1983 second that support for the winning president monotonically increases as moves are made away from the opponent s home territory confirms the cascading dummy variable series approach developed by kjar and laband 2002

renewable energy consumption co2 emissions and oil prices in the g7 countries abstract economic and societal issues related to energy security and global warming is placing greater emphasis on the consumption of renewable energy this paper presents and estimates an empirical model of renewable energy consumption for the g7 countries panel cointegration estimates show that in the long term increases in real gdp per capita and co2 per capita are found to be major drivers behind per capita renewable energy consumption these results are robust across two different panel cointegration estimators oil price increases have a smaller although negative impact on renewable energy consumption deviations from equilibrium are driven mostly by the error correction term as opposed to short term shocks short term deviations from the long term equilibrium take anywhere from between 1 3 years france and 7 3 years japan to correct

rethinking and reshaping the climate policy literature review and proposed guidelines abstract addressing climate change represents a governing the climate commons on a global scale the tragedy of the commons might better be described as the failure of governing the commons hardin s solutions were centralized government and private property which have long been criticized as oversimplified however governing the unprecedented climate commons there is only a global federalism of climate policy the kyoto protocol the kyoto cannot keep atmospheric co2 level below 450 ppm rising 2 c some key evidences of the kyoto failures are identified the kyoto failures do not indicate that the kyoto is a wrong tool of centralized government instead the kyoto failures are derived from the fact that the only centralized government cannot effectively govern the commons which have been proven by the efforts of governing the commons last four decades here we propose a wide diversity of governance systems for climate common to addressing global warming the multi level and multi scale governing system includes but is not limited to i starting at home ii emphasizing the local approach iii efforts of global level focusing these top emitters iv improved information sharing v privatizing the property of climate to avoid free riders vi combination mitigation with adaptive vii improved ecology services to expand carbon sinks we argue that the kyoto failures indicate again that reliance on a single solution may result in more of a problem than a solution in governing the common therefore continuing to wait for another global federalism of climate policy may lead to missing the chance to make significant mitigations and adaptations in time to battling the climate change post 2012 multi level and multi scale approaches could make a difference in collective action for governing the climate commons to meet climate challenge

correlations and volatility spillovers between oil prices and the stock prices of clean energy and technology companies abstract in this paper multivariate garch models are used to model conditional correlations and to analyze the volatility spillovers between oil prices and the stock prices of clean energy companies and technology companies four different multivariate garch models bekk diagonal constant conditional correlation and dynamic conditional correlation are compared and contrasted the dynamic conditional correlation model is found to fit the data the best and generates results showing that the stock prices of clean energy companies correlate more highly with technology stock prices than with oil prices on average a 1 long position in clean energy companies can be hedged for 20 cents with a short position in the crude oil futures market

a model of redistribution under social identification in heterogeneous federations abstract redistribution of resources to accommodate income heterogeneity within a federation is often fiercely debated e g belgium germany or the european union to help elucidate potential drivers behind such debates this article builds on social identity theory to develop a theoretical framework linking jurisdictional identification and preferences towards intra federation redistributive financial flows we show that federal rather than local identification can lead individuals to shift their redistribution preferences against their narrowly defined personal economic interest in contrast to predictions of standard models the sign and strength of this effect depends crucially not only upon individuals characteristics but also upon the social groups i e regions to which they belong we furthermore illustrate that federal rather than regional identification should be more widespread in poorer and or more populous regions within a federation but less common in regions which are very homogeneous internally or very dissimilar from the rest of the federation

local favoritism in at large proportional representation systems abstract pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system we estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown using data from norwegian regional governments we still find a hometown bias we document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the regional governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments citizens also tend to vote more often for parties whose gubernatorial candidate is from their own hometown consistent with expectations of particularistic benefits a possible explanation is that regional council members are often recruited from local politics and remain loyal to their roots we find no evidence that regional council experience affects politicians future career prospects at the local level

economic voting and multilevel governance a comparative individual level analysis an important component of incumbent support is the reward punishment calculus of economic voting previous work has shown that clarity of responsibility within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice where clarity is high low economic effects are greater less this article advances the clarity of responsibility argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting in institutional contexts of multilevel governance the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult this article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government individual level data from the comparative study of electoral systems module 1 are used to test this proposition results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance

incumbent behavior vote seeking tax setting and yardstick competition this paper develops a model of the political economy of tax setting in a multijurisdictional world where voters choices and incumbent behavior are determined simultaneously voters are assumed to make comparisons between jurisdictions to overcome political agency problems this forces incumbents into a yardstick competition in which they care about what other incumbents are doing we provide a theoretical framework and empirical evidence using u s state data from 1960 to 1988 the results are encouraging to the view that vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition

accountability and decentralisation in government an incomplete contracts model this paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralisation of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts the model of the paper compares allocations of power to local central and regional government as alternative means of motivating governments to act in the interests of citizens centralisation allows benefits from policy coordination but has costs in terms of diminished accountability which can be precisely defined as the reduced probability that the welfare of a given region can determine the re election of the government the model is extended to allow for conflicts of interest within regions and externalities between central and local governments in a federation it is also applied to determining levels of fiscal transfer between localities and to circumstances where governments may act as leviathans appropriating resources for their own use

electoral competition and special interest politics have fixed positions on some issues but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions in this context we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms we show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests

it s the economy and then some modeling the presidential vote with state panel data using data for the 50 us states for presidential elections from 1972 to 2004 two theories for determining state voting outcomes are considered jointly the economy matters and home grown ness theories fixed effects regressions show that measures of the economy matters real income unemployment and a proxy for inflation have the predicted effects on state voting patterns for presidential elections the home grown theory receives mixed support there is weak evidence that incumbent party candidates garner greater support in their home states there is strong support however for the proposition that incumbent party candidates fare worse in the home state of rival party candidates

investment in the absence of property rights the role of incumbency advantages in many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output this paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest depending on the advantages an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment the results are applied to autocrats investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations

party cues in elections under multilevel governance theory and evidence from us states this is the authors accepted refereed and final manuscript to the article the final publication is available at www elsevier com

impact of cheaper oil on economic system and climate change a swot analysis abstract the drop in crude oil price by nearly half since june 2014 has created new opportunities as well as challenges this study employs the swot method to analyze the impact of cheaper oil on the global economic system and carbon emissions exploring the climatic opportunities and identifying the challenges of lower oil prices in addition it contends that falling oil prices boost economic growth but produce more carbon pollutants thereby accelerating global warming however cheaper oil has provided a window of opportunity to remove fossil fuel subsidies a major development that years of climate shaming has failed to achieve furthermore we argue that social factors are a critical often overlooked threat for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies with declining oil prices exerting downward pressure on gas and coal the removal of subsidies and carbon tax can be introduced without raising the energy prices four policy recommendations are proposed for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies to limit global warming as well as to meet the challenge and opportunity of cheaper oil removal of fossil fuel subsidies should be quickly implemented because this window of opportunity of cheaper oil will not last forever

the role of political parties an analysis based on transaction costs this paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the transaction costs of electoral participation political parties provide a low cost signal of a candidate s policies and personal characteristics and in this way reduce voters information costs with reference to transaction cost economics political parties offer an implicit contract between voters and politicians and thereby reduce the scope for opportunism by politicians this impact on transaction costs is important in any evaluation of public policy towards political parties

parties as political intermediaries this paper argues that parties regulate competition among like minded factions so as to enhance reputation building by and voter trust in the politicians standing for a given cause while intra and interparty competition contributes to keeping politicians on their toes unbridled competition may encourage politicians to challenge good platforms and to wage competition along socially suboptimal dimensions for example by privileging form over content the paper builds a simple model of intraparty competition and studies whether various hierarchical or democratic party institutions constitute an efe cient form of party governance the paper shows that intraparty disagreements when they occur hurt the party s position in the general election but that their possibility enhances party image and that parties must be able to avoid behind the scene allocations of portfolios and spoils in order to be credible last it analyzes the impact of political polarization and interparty competition on the choice of party governance

china s electricity market oriented reform from an absolute to a relative monopoly abstract the market oriented reform in electricity industry has become a global trend since 1980s although china s electricity industry has been reformed since 1978 the substantial reform has not been conducted until 1985 before 1985 china s power industry had been absolutely monopolized by the central state owned companies the absolute monopoly has been broken since 1985 when the chinese government opened doors for non central state owned investment entities and foreign investors in power supplies in order to solve the chronic power shortage in 2002 the comprehensive electricity reform plan entitled scheme of the reform for power industry was enacted however implementation of this plan was delayed due to electricity supply shortages even worse a new kind of monopoly has been developed under the background the state advances the private sector retreats in late years in some sense the former absolute monopoly has transformed the current relative monopoly we contend that the relative monopoly has reversed the market oriented reform in china s electric industry if the relative monopoly remains unchanged it will be harmful to public welfare

using multimember district elections to estimate the sources of the incumbency advantage in this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats within the same district this allows us to identify both the direct office holder benefits and the incumbent quality advantage over nonincumbent candidates from the same party we find that the overall incumbency advantage is of similar magnitude as that found in previous studies we attribute approximately half of this advantage to incumbents quality advantage over open seat candidates and the remainder to direct office holder benefits however we also find some evidence that direct office holder benefits are larger in competitive districts than in safe districts and in states with relatively large legislative budgets per capita