community development with endogenous land use controls abstract when competitive landowners developers control incorporation and zoning decisions efficient patterns of development emerge when by contrast early arrivals control policy they may impose zoning restrictions that force later entrants to pay via the property tax a disproportionate share of the cost of providing public services if new arrivals are sufficiently poor they may choose to reside outside the community while higher quality land within the community remains unoccupied this inefficient and exclusionary outcome can be an equilibrium if boundaries once drawn are irreversible the ex ante introduction of a seemingly natural compensation scheme may not remedy the problem

excise taxes with multiproduct transactions i examine excise taxes levied on multiproduct retailers excise taxes reduce equilibrium output and decrease equilibrium product variety in the short run but taxes can raise output per product in the long run and induce entry excise taxes are overshifted into prices in a wide range of cases including under linear and concave demand conditions and excise taxes shift less than one for one into prices only when demand is highly convex multiproduct transactions substantively alter the efficiency of ad valorem and specific forms of excise taxes and affect the comparison of relative tax performance over short run and long run time horizons jel h25 h32 l11 l13 l81

market performance with multiproduct firms we revisit the fundamental issue of market provision of variety associated with chamberlin spence and dixit stiglitz when firms sell multiple products both products and firms are horizontally differentiated we propose a general nested demand framework where consumers first decide upon a firm then which variant to buy and how much the nested ces is a special case we use it to determine the market s biases when firms compete in product ranges and prices the market system attracts too many firms with too few products per firm firms restrain product ranges to relax price competition but this exacerbates over entry

a representative consumer theorem for discrete choice models in networked markets we provide an alternative way to model sequential decision processes which is consistent with the random utility maximization hypothesis and the existence of a representative agent our result is stated on terms of a direct utility representation and it does not depend on parametric assumptions

do unionized firms hire better workers i introduction many economists firmly believe that union firms offset higher union wages by hiring better workers the contrasting view that union employers react to higher union wages by hiring poorer quality workers is regarded as impossible 1 yet this contrasting view is highly plausible in the context of standard economic modeling and with what is known about labor markets there is evidence supporting this view the standard story for unionized firms hiring better workers goes like this a union raises wages and the firm foils the union by hiring better quality workers the problem with this myopic story is that it ignores what happens in the future it assumes that unions will sit idly by and let union firms whittle away any union wage differential by hiring better quality workers i would argue that it is more likely that unions would respond to better quality workers by raising wages even more employers anticipating this may respond by hiring lower quality workers this article is the first to consider how unionized firms choose worker quality when they anticipate the future consequences of quality on wages under reasonable conditions these consequences cause employers to hire lower quality workers while i do not contend this always occurs i do argue that there are reasonable grounds for rejecting the better quality proposition in addition there is evidence that unionization often does result in lower quality workers the results presented here suggest that economists should look again at how unions affect wages productivity equality and society this is not the first paper to suggest unions lead to lower quality workers it is however the first to suggest this result is due to employers making profit maximizing decisions when they anticipate the future consequences of their actions there are two other articles that also suggest unions can lead to lower quality workers first robinson 1989 assumes that unionized employers do want higher quality workers but do not hire them because nonunion firms pay them more as the nonunion firms are assumed to have better monitoring technology and a more flexible reward system second bronars and lott 1989 show that unions that seek the maximum dues will want poorer quality workers while these models focus on factors that may prove to be important the model presented here is theoretically more forceful first it is based upon standard economic modeling second using ochkam s razor it assumes the least added factors and finally its central assumption that people anticipate the future has a large body of economic evidence behind it by demonstrating that the better quality proposition is not supported by conventional economic analysis this article shows the better quality proposition should not be given a greater weight in the priors of economists having done this these other models then should and hopefully will be examined more closely ii the case for unions leading to better quality workers in discussing the wage gap between union and nonunion workers h gregg lewis 1986 46 concisely presents the case that union firms select better workers i have strong priors on the direction of the selectivity bias let a union through collective bargaining impose on an employer higher wages for his workers than he otherwise would pay them with worker quality not tightly specified in the collective bargaining agreement the higher wages will lengthen the queue of the applicants for the unionized jobs including some applicants of greater productiveness than otherwise would have applied the employer has an incentive to evade the increase in his labor costs by employing workers of greater quality the evasion will take time and will be impeded by the cost of screening workers imperfect substitution in production among worker quality and employment constraints in the collective bargaining agreements

estimating markups and market conduct with multidimensional product attributes we demonstrate how to estimate a model of oligopoly pricing when products are multi dimensionally differentiated we provide an empirical counterpart to recent theoretical work on product differentiation using specifications informed by economic theory we estimate price cost margins for products differentiated in many dimensions

a computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental aid abstract this paper introduces a theoretical and a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of intergovernmental relations in which heterogeneous agents i are endowed with income and houses ii are fully mobile between multiple jurisdictions and iii vote in both local and state elections to determine local property and state income tax rates three different types of intergovernmental programs are analyzed i redistributive revenue sharing ii district power equalization and iii deductibility of local taxes the approach facilitates a heretofore difficult comparative analysis in that it provides for integrated investigation of these programs in a single general equilibrium model

product diversity in asymmetric oligopoly is the quality of consumer goods too low we analyse an oligopoly model incorporating horizontal differentiation and quality differences high quality goods are overpriced and underproduced when the market is fairly well covered low quality products may be profitable when their net social contribution is negative implying excessive entry in a relatively uncovered market even low quality goods are underproduced and there may be underentry when fixed costs are independent of quality the market tends to select the right firms otherwise the market may produce low quality products when it should produce high quality ones the model is calibrated using market data for yoghurt

tax competition and income redistribution an empirical analysis for switzerland tax competition is supposed to lead to thecollapse of the welfare state because first it willbecome difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy aredistribution tax upon the rich and mobile andsecond such a policy if undertaken in onejurisdiction will attract poor individuals from otherjurisdictions and erode internal redistributionpolicies in this paper the impact of personal incometaxes and transfers on residence decisions oftaxpayers is analyzed with swiss subfederal data therelationship of tax competition and the erosion of theswiss welfare state is tested with aggregate data onincome redistribution

inequality in the local public sector effects on renters welfare of changes in local government spending are examined in a multijurisdiction model in equilibrium each income class chooses the jurisdiction whose combination of local public output and housing price maximizes utility comparative static analysis of this equilibrium is used to show how inequality in local public expenditure benefits low income residents if low income residents are observed to choose jurisdictions with low levels of per capita public expenditure then they may be worse off by outside aid which increases local public expenditure in their jurisdictions the advantages of inequality in the local public sector also exist when a program of tax base equalization is introduced

optimal policy and network effects for the deployment of zero emission vehicles abstract we analyze the impact of indirect network effects in the deployment of zero emission vehicles in a static partial equilibrium model in most theoretical analyses direct and indirect effects are conflated and relatively few authors have explicitly considered indirect network effects we also introduce the market power of vehicle producers and scale effects in the production function the model exhibits a multiplicity of local social critical points and market equilibria suggesting a possibility of lock in the optimal two subsidies for vehicles and stations are derived so that the pareto dominating market equilibrium would coincide with the social optimum configurations associated with different values of the parameters are explored to revisit the policy issues at various stages of deployment of hydrogen and battery electric vehicles

collective bargaining interest arbitration and police salaries previous research and conventional wisdom suggest that the practice of collective bargaining the availability of interest arbitration and the use of arbitration when available all have a positive

free entry and social inefficiency our goal is to provide a simple yet general exposition of the conditions under which the number of entrants in a free entry equilibrium is excessive insufficient or optimal our analysis compares the number of firms that enter a market when there is free entry with the number that would be desired by a social planner who is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market that is we consider the second best problem of choosing the welfare maximizing number of firms while we take as given their noncompetitive behavior after entry we demonstrate that the crucial conditions for establishing the presence of an entry bias can be stated quite simply in terms of the outcome of the postentry game played by entrants in contrast to previous work we do not need to model this postentry game explicitly

product and price competition in a two dimensional vertical differentiation model in this paper the one dimensional vertical differentiation model shaked and sutton shaked a j sutton 1982 relaxing price competition through product differentiation rev econom stud 49 3 13 moorthy moorthy k s 1988 product and price competition in a duopoly marketing sci 7spring 141 168 is extended to two dimensions and an analysis of product and price competition is presented a two stage game theoretic analysis in which two firms compete first on product positions and then on price is conducted closed form equilibrium solutions are obtained for each stage in which competitors are unrestricted in their choices of price or product positions a significant finding of this research is that unlike the one dimensional vertical differentiation model firms do not tend towards maximum differentiation although this solution is possible under certain conditions when the range of positioning options on each of the dimensions is equal maxmin product differentiation occurs that is in equilibrium the two firms tend to choose positions which will represent maximum differentiation on one dimension and minimum differentiation on the other dimension

mobility and redistribution the ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake in this paper we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system we ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax transfer instruments individuals can move freely among jurisdictions and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution while the threat of out migration affects the potential for redistribution our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution

variety pass through an examination of the ready to eat breakfast cereal market abstract we examine variety pass through effects that occur when multiproduct retailers adjust the length of their product lines in response to changes in wholesale prices studying variety pass through is essential to understanding how wholesale price changes transmit into retail prices when variety is endogenous using data from the ready to eat breakfast cereal category we find that retailers jointly adjust retail prices and the length of their product lines in response to changes in wholesale prices we show the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of retailers product line decisions when calculating price pass through rates

union wage differentials in the public and private sectors a simultaneous equations specification the paper attempts to integrate new approaches to estimating union wage effects with the analysis of public private sector wage differentials estimates of the union differential in both public and private sectors allowing for the endogeneity of union status are presented the hypothesis that the recently measured rents to public sector employment primarily reflect the recent increase in unionization in that sector is examined and receives considerable empirical support there was evidence of positive selection into the union sector especially for private sector workers union status appears to be strongly influenced by the expected wage gain from joining the union sector

competition and collusion in the american automobile industry the 1955 price war movements in total quantity and in quality adjusted price suggest a supply side shock in the american automobile market in 1955 this paper tests the hypothesis that the shock was a transitory change in industry conduct a price war the key ingredients of the test are alternative equilibrium models of oligopoly under product differentiation in nonnested cox tests of hypotheses a collusive solution is sustained in 1954 and in 1956 while a competitive solution holds in 1955 the result does not appear to be an artifact since it is robust in tests against alternative specifications copyright 1987 by blackwell publishing ltd

the endogeneity of union status an empirical test an unsettled issue in the literature relating to the relative wage effect of unions is the appropriate treatment of union status in a wage determination model in the context of a three equation model determining union membership and union and nonunion sector wage rates this paper presents an instrumental variables iv procedure for estimating the parameters of the wage equations and a test of the exogeneity of union status using the hausman specification test an advantage of our iv procedure in comparison to the widely used inverse mill s ratio procedure is that our procedure is a distribution free estimator whereas the inverse mill s ratio estimator hinges in the assumption that the error term of the choice equation is normally distributed using data for a sample of middle aged white workers we estimate the parameters of the union and nonunion wage equations with both procedures on the key question of the endogeneity of union status the hausman test decisively rejects the null hypothesis of exo

the tiebout model bring back the entrepreneurs several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in ifiebout mo lels by alssliuim ing an exogenous number of communities inflexible commullity l ou alaries anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and resul1t iin in eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses determinate lon1g run1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets which in turn require giving lantlowners and or entrepreneurial leveloelers an active role in the models the role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed

unions industrial concentration and wages a re examination market structure or industrial concentration has long been recognized as an important influence on industrial output employment and profits it has also been recognized that some proportion of the profits from concentration may be diverted into wages through collective bargaining yet the precise nature of these relationships has received little attention although it has important implications for the evaluation of wage structure and the welfare loss arising from monopoly empirical studies of the impact of unions and industrial concentration on wages weiss 1966 jones and laudadio 1975 dalton and ford 1977 long and link 1983 follow a similar format after a brief verbal justification for the ability of unions to win higher wage increases when the employer is earning oligopoly profits these studies specify a wage equation of the general form

oligopolistic competition and the optimal provision of products this paper considers the theory of market versus optimal product diversity in the light of two recent advances in oligopoly theory the first is the development of discrete choice models to describe heterogeneous consumer tastes and the application of such models to oligopolistic competition the second advance is the proof that logconcavity of the consumer taste density guarantees the existence of a price equilibrium we analyze an oligopoly model with price competition and free entry taking explicit account of the integer constraint under the chamberlinian symmetry assumption that tastes are i i d we first show that logconcavity of the taste density implies there is excessive market provision of variety when each consumer buys one unit of the product from one of the firms we then show that this result extends to price sensitive individual demands by proving that the equilibrium number of firms is at least as great as that which would be provided at the second best social optimum subject to a zero profit constraint for firms our results call into question previous findings for representative consumer models that left open the possibility of insufficient product diversity

property tax financing renting and the level of local expenditures the renter homeowner dichotomy has been systematically ignored in the local public goods literature the conventional justification for ignoring this dichotomy is that the only difference between the two groups of individuals is an innocuous accounting rule owners pay property taxes directly while renters pay property taxes indirectly via their rental payments to landlords 9 consequently when empirical studies after controlling for income and tastes find renter behavior that is discernably different from that of homeowners the explanation commonly offered is that renters are subject to fiscal illusion i e renters support higher levels of expenditures than homeowners because renters are unaware of the actual property tax burdens they bear 2 the fiscal illusion explanation despite its general acceptance is deficient on both empirical and theoretical grounds empirically the fiscal illusion hypothesis has not and probably cannot be directly tested 3 fiscal illusion is not so much a theory of renter behavior as it is a convenient ad hoc explanation for empirical results that are unexpected from the theory a revised theory of renter behavior cum illusion moreover would lack credibility to argue that even if time and again renters expectations are unfulfilled by experience i e they pay as much for increased services as owners when they expect not to yet renters consistently support higher levels of services would simply be untenable there are alternative possible explanations for renters behavior renters might have stronger preferences for public goods e g they may have a larger number of school age children renters

aggregation and imperfect competition on the existence of equilibrium we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result provides general conditions under which there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products this includes products with multi dimen sional attributes in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our analysis covers location models the characteristics approach and probabilistic choice together in a unified framework to prove existence we employ aggregation theorems due to prekopa 1971 and borell 1975 our companion paper caplin and nalebuff 1991 introduces these theorems and develops the application to super majority voting rules we present a new approach to the theory of imperfect competition and apply it to study price competition among differentiated products the central result is that there exists a pure strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms producing any set of products in addition to the proof of existence we provide conditions for uniqueness our model both unites diverse strands of the earlier literature and opens up uncharted areas for future analysis in particular we expand the traditional one dimensional framework to allow for multi dimen sional product differentiation our approach involves twin restrictions on consumer preferences one on individuals preferences the other on the distribution of preferences across society these are generalizations of the restrictions supporting 64 majority rule presented in caplin and nalebuff 1988 to prove existence we apply a new technique of aggregation this technique is valuable in a variety of other problems in the companion paper we use the aggregation result to generalize our earlier work on 64 majority rule and to characterize the relationship between the distribution of human capital and the distribution of income caplin and nalebuff 1991 there are additional applications in statistics and in search theory we begin with a brief review of the early literature on imperfect competition describing in more detail the existence problem and previous solutions section 3 presents our twin assumptions and shows that they cover many standard cases in section 4 we introduce the aggregation theorem and use it in the analysis of demand functions the proof of existence of equilibrium is in section

multiple product firms a nested logit approach this paper proves the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with multiproduct firms using a nested logit model of demand the demand model is parameterized by two variables that characterize different dimensions of preference for variety these reflect intragroup heterogeneity and intergroup heterogeneity a group or nest being the set of products produced by a firm there are then two dimensions to market performance the total number of firms and the range of products produced per firm it is shown that the market equilibrium involves an excessive number of firms but each firm provides too few products copyright 1992 by blackwell publishing ltd

product differentiation and oligopoly in international markets the case of the u s automobile industry this paper develops and estimates a model of the u s automobile industry on the demand side a discrete choice model is adopted that is estimated using micro data from the consumer expenditure survey the estimation results are used in conjunction with population weights to derive aggregate demand on the supply side the automobile industry is modelled as an oligopoly with product differentiation equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions of the profit maximizing firms the estimation results are used in counterfactual simulations to investigate two trade policy issues the effects of the ver and exchange rate pass through