women s land tenure security and household human capital evidence from ethiopia s land certification this paper examines the impact of ethiopia s gendered land certification programs on household consumption of healthcare food education and clothing ethiopia embarked on a land tenure reform program in 1998 after years of communism during which all land was nationalized the reform began in tigray region where land certificates were issued to household heads who were primarily male in a second phase carried out in 2003 2005 three other regions issued land certificates jointly to household heads and spouses presenting variation in land tenure security by gender results using household panel data show that joint land certification to spouses was accompanied by increased household consumption of healthcare and homegrown food and decreased education expenditure compared to household head land certification joint land certification was also accompanied by increased consumption of women s and girls clothing and decreased men s clothing expenditures indicating results may be explained by a shift in the gender balance of power within households analysis on the incidence and duration of illness indicates that increased healthcare expenditures after joint land certification may be due to joint certification households seeking more effective treatment than head only certification households for household members who fell ill or suffered injuries

gender and command over property a critical gap in economic analysis and policy in south asia abstract this paper focuses on a much neglected issue the links between gender inequities and command over property it outlines why in rural south asia where arable land is the most important form of property any significant improvement in women s economic and social situation is crucially tied to their having independent land rights better employment opportunities can complement but not substitute for land but despite progressive legislation few south asian women own land even fewer effectively control any why a complex range of factors social administrative and ideological are found to underlie the persistent gap between women s legal rights and their actual ownership of land and between ownership and control the necessity of collective action by women for overcoming these obstacles and the aspects needing a specific focus for policy and action are also discussed

crop prices and the demand for titled land evidence from uganda abstract i investigate how agricultural prices affect demand for titled land using panel data on ugandan farmers and a price index that weighs international crop prices by the structure of land use at the sub county level higher prices increase farmers share of titled land i also present evidence of a positive impact of prices on agricultural incomes the effect of prices on land tenure is stronger when farmers have access to roads and markets when they have undertaken investment on the land and when households fear land grabbing

property rights and consumption volatility evidence from a land reform in vietnam summary during vietnam s transition from a socialist to a market economy household s property rights over agricultural land were considerably strengthened through a land certification program this resulted in active formal credit and land markets either of which potentially affects consumption levels and volatility this article evaluates the program impact with respect to consumption outcomes in particular it identifies the channel of impact through which improved property rights affect consumption volatility we find that land certification increases consumption levels for rural households but also consumption volatility for a subgroup of households identified by an instrument we show that the certification program affects consumption outcomes of this subgroup through presumably more risky credit based agricultural investment at the intensive margin

endogenous property rights regimes common pool resources and trade a model is developed where opening to trade affects a dynamic common pool resource stock and welfare through a community s voting decision to institute a property rights regime regulating the stock the model finds that resource stock levels can decline even when a markov perfect equilibrium path for labor and property rights regimes are chosen to maximize welfare thus opening to trade can be welfare maximizing even when resource stock declines experimental results show that under certain conditions subjects briefly follow a markov perfect equilibrium path for property rights regime choice but labor allocations are myopically chosen indicating that some resource dynamics may be considered by subjects

ethanol production food and forests this paper investigates the direct and indirect impacts of ethanol production on land use deforestation and food production a partial equilibrium model of a national economy with two sectors and two regions one of which includes a forest is developed it analyses how an exogenous increase in the ethanol price affects input allocation land and labor between sectors energy crop and food the total effect of ethanol prices on food production and deforestation is decomposed into three partial effects first the well documented effect of direct land competition between rival uses arises it increases deforestation and decreases food production second an indirect displacement of food production across regions possibly provoked by the reaction of international food prices increases deforestation and reduces the food sector s output finally labor mobility between sectors and regions tends to decrease food production but also deforestation the total impact of ethanol production on food production is negative while there is an ambiguous impact on deforestation

partial land rights and agricultural outcomes evidence from thailand to disentangle the issue concerning which dimensions of land rights among security tradability and pledgeability affect agricultural outcomes this paper exploits a unique partial land rights entitlement program in thailand that guarantees only security allows a limited access to credit and prohibits any land sale based on an instrumental variables strategy i find that the entitlement increases 1 second rice but not major rice productivity 2 land use intensity and 3 land related investment and leads to 4 better soil quality this suggests that the security dimension alone can play an important role in improving farm activities

dimensions and diversity of property rights in rural china dilemmas on the road to further reform abstract this paper contributes to the debate over land tenure in rural china by conceptualizing and measuring multiple dimensions of property rights in a way that elucidates the competing interests that are affected by the property rights regime utilizing a unique village level data set this paper argues that the regional and temporal variation in rural property rights signals a pattern in which decentralized institutional innovation occurs in response to the competing interests of the national state of local authorities and of present and possible future individual land users unlike the earlier debate concerning the household responsibility system the current property rights dilemma is intrinsically more complex because the potential conflicts of interest between individuals local collectives and the state are greater resolution of that debate will ultimately require careful exploration of the reality and substance of the tradeoffs and competing interests that make further reform of rural property rights so difficult

transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants a market design approach this paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses the idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market including the one that he is currently possessing or continue renting the house he is currently occupying the main contribution is the identification of an individually rational equilibrium selecting and group non manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles in this restricted domain the identified mechanism is the minimum price equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants we also relate the theoretical model and the main findings to the u k housing act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer ownerships of houses to existing tenants

the impact of market friendly reforms on credit and land markets in honduras and nicaragua summary this article explores the impacts on credit access and agrarian structure of land market liberalization policies undertaken in honduras and nicaragua during the 1990s like liberalization efforts pursued in many latin american countries these market friendly reforms were designed to activate land transfers and enhance agricultural efficiency in large part by improving the access of the rural poor to both credit and land markets panel data sets gathered in honduras and nicaragua are used to compare title credit and land access patterns before and after the reforms descriptive nonparametric regression analyses show that despite major gains in titling across the land size spectrum and some increase in land market activity the other hoped for improvements in credit and land access did not occur and appear unlikely to occur without further policy attention to credit markets

insecurity of property rights and matching in the tenancy market this paper analyzes the functioning of land rental markets in the dominican republic using a new data set collected specifically to characterize the entire market we analyze the choice of the landlords and the tenants in the search for the optimal partner we show how insecure property rights leads to segmentation in the tenancy markets along socio economic group and hence severely limits access to land for the rural poor

house allocation with transfers we consider the shapley scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed we characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy proof ex post individually rational ex post budget balanced and collusion proof in these mechanisms the price of each object is fixed in advance and the objects are reallocated according to the unique core assignment of the shapley scarf economy associated with the prices the special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by shapley and scarf our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the groves mechanisms which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion proofness journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c78 d71 d78 d89

house allocation with existing tenants an equivalence abstract we analyze two mechanisms designed to eliminate inefficiencies in house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers the first mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a sister exchange economy constructed by endowing each existing tenant with her current house and each newcomer with a random vacant house the second mechanism chooses an ordering from a given distribution and determines the final outcome as follows assign the agents the best available house one at a time following their ordering in the queue and whenever an agent demands the house of an existing tenant who is still in the line modify the queue by inserting the existing tenant at the top whenever a loop of existing tenants forms assign each of them the house she demands and proceed we show that the first mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the second which favors the newcomers

the censored newsvendor and the optimal acquisition of information this paper investigates the effect of demand censoring on the optimal policy in newsvendor inventory models with general parametric demand distributions and unknown parameter values we show that the newsvendor problem withobservable lost sales reduces to a sequence of single period problems while the newsvendor problem withunobservable lost sales requires a dynamic analysis using a bayesian markov decision process approach we show that the optimalin ventory level in the presence of censored demand ishigher than would be determined using a bayesian myopic policy we explore the economic rationality for this observation and illustrate it with numerical examples

informal urban property markets and poverty alleviation a conceptual framework in the context of increasing urbanisation growth of informal settlements and the urbanisation of poverty this article suggests a conceptual framework to link urban informal property markets and p

the new economic model and marine fisheries development in latin america the new economic model nem has profoundly influenced fisheries development in latin america facilitating the emergence of new and increasingly influential interest groups within the industry it has also stimulated new forms of production and prompted new legislation to regulate fishing in the region s most important fishing countries these changes have coincided with latin america s increasing importance in world fisheries production and trade the nem has not however resolved the sector s fundamental problems such as overfishing overcapitalization and conflict and has arguably exacerbated them

the choice of titling system in land abstract this paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling system assuming rational individual choices about recording assurance and registration decisions it focuses on the enforcement of property rights to land under private titling and the two existing public titling systems recording and registration when the reduction in the expected costs of forfeiture balances the higher cost of initial registration a registration system is more efficient than a recording system implications for title assurance land improvements and transactions are also considered

land policies and farm performance in thailand s forest reserve areas illegal or unregistered occupation and utilization of public lands characterize the practice of large numbers of farmers in many less developed countries economic theory suggests that because squatters lack secure land ownership they will have fewer investment incentives than farmers with secure ownership further because squatters cannot legally use the land as loan collateral their access to institutional credit especially medium and long term credit is inhibited this has negative effects on squatters ability to invest squatters also face short term institutional credit constraints implying a low use of variable inputs consequently theory suggests that squatters land is less productive than titled land 1 one policy frequently adopted with the intention of increasing squatters productivity is the granting of usufruct rights or similar nontradable entitlements such policies are viewed by many policymakers as adequate alternatives to the provision of full unrestricted ownership empirical studies of these issues are scant and no quantitative assessments of the impact of policy measures addressing squatters have been reported this article presents the results of a quantitative research focusing on thailand as a case study in thailand an estimated 5 3 million hectares or about one fifth of the land officially designated as state owned forest reserve is under permanent occupation and cultivation by squatters this is about 21 of the land under cultivation and involves about 1 million farm households much of the encroached area is suitable for permanent agricultural cultivation and its continued exploitation poses no substantial environmental risks

land tenure and property rights theory and implications for development policy this article explores the nature of property rights systems their evolution and their effect on resource allocation it is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets of particular relevance to developing countries the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems an appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices the intensity of cultivation and the use of credit empirical evidence from thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model

strategyproof assignment by hierarchical exchange we give a characterization of the set of group strategyproof pareto optimal and reallocation proof allocation rules for the assignment problem where individuals are assigned at most one indivisible object without any medium of exchange although there are no property rights in the model the rules satisfying the above criteria imitate a trading procedure with individual endowments in which individuals exchange objects from their hierarchically determined endowment sets in an iterative manner in particular these assignment rules generalize gale s top trading cycle procedure the classical rule for the model in which each individual owns an indivisible good

is land titling in sub saharan africa cost effective evidence from madagascar formalizing land rights has been promoted as a way to encourage agricultural investment and stimulate land markets yet little is known about the benefits of such policies in sub saharan africa where the preconditions for success are less favorable the analysis uses a large sample of plots from an intensively titled rice growing area of madagascar and compares land specific investments land productivity and land values for titled and untitled plots cultivated by the same household having a title has no significant effect on plot specific investment and correspondingly little effect on land productivity and land values these results are broadly consistent with a simulation of a theoretical model of investment under expropriation risk calibrated to the same data a cost benefit analysis suggests that the current system of formal titling should not be extended in rural madagascar and that any new system of land registration will have to be quite inexpensive to be worthwhile

population growth and agriculture in poor countries a review of theoretical issues and empirical evidence abstract the paper contributes a critical survey of the very extensive literature dealing with various aspects of the economic and institutional responses of agriculture to population growth in poor countries encompassing a discussion of the main underlying theoretical issues such responses are evaluated in the framework of the general population development debate the main conclusion is that although population growth induces adjustments in agriculture in terms of technical progress intensification and definition of property rights optimism may not be justified in the context of very fast population growth and or already high densities especially when the environmental resource base is taken into account

property rights regimes in complex fishery management systems a choice experiment application the tonle sap wetland fishery was previously divided into 3 different management zones for conservation open access fishing and private fishing rights to the private fishing zone involved auctions for exclusive rights to temporarily designated plots this paper aims to explore the auction based system by investigating how this fishery management system affects different groups of small scale fishermen and how different characteristics of the fishing lots affect the bidding a choice experiment approach was used to model fishermen s choices in a hypothetical auction market by offering fishermen the choice between purchasing different potential fishing lots and a no purchase option implying fishing only in the communal fishing grounds the preferred latent class model with two segments of fishermen showed that the bidding behavior of the more privileged group out competes the other group irrespective of the lot characteristics this result suggests that it is unlikely that the redesign of the auction system itself would be an effective way of securing access to fishing resources for the two observed groups of fishermen this implies that open access fishing grounds and or other regulations may also be needed in future management as they serve an important role for the poorer segments

strategy proofness and essentially single valued cores in this paper we search for solutions to various classes of allocation problems we hand results pertaining to housing markets are much more encouraging roth 1982b shows that in the context of housing markets the core correspondence which is shown to be single valued by roth and postlewaite 1977 is strategy proof moreover ma 1994 shows that it is the only solution that is pareto efficient individually rational and strategy proof

the productivity impacts of formal and informal land rights evidence from madagascar this paper studies the relationship between land rights and agricultural productivity whereas previous studies used proxies for soil quality and instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of land titles the data used here include precise soil quality measurements which in principle allow controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity between plots empirical results suggest that formal land rights i e land titles have no impact on productivity but that informal land rights i e landowners subjective perceptions of what they can and cannot do with their plots have heterogeneous impacts on productivity

peasants against private property rights a review of the literature land is the main if not the only asset for a majority of people in developing countries the definition and allocation of rights over land are thus naturally essential aspects of individuals daily lives as well as critical determinants of social and economic development the privatization of land rights has long been seen as a necessary process enhancing both efficiency and equity however privatized land rights have not always emerged endogenously while exogenously driven programs of land privatization have not always been successful nor popular this has raised questions about the expected benefits of land rights privatization this paper aims at summarizing the main arguments and studies both theoretical and empirical on this issue with a specific focus on the factors that can make privatization inefficient or detrimental for the most concerned individuals

optimal inventory decisions in a multiperiod newsvendor problem with partially observed markovian supply capacities abstract this paper considers a multi period news vendor problem with partially observed supply capacity information which evolves as a markovian process the supply capacity is fully observed by the buyer when the capacity is smaller than the buyer s ordering quantity otherwise the buyer knows that the current period supply capacity is greater than its ordering quantity based on these two observations the buyer updates the future supply capacity forecasting accordingly with a dynamic programming formulation we prove the existence of an optimal ordering policy we also prove that the optimal order quantity is greater than the myopic order quantity

a dynamic option value for institutional change marketable property rights in the sahel in this article we use dynamic programming methods to create an option value measure of the value of the institutional innovation of marketable property rights this measure has two properties that are important to understanding institutional change it is truly dynamic and it allows for agent heterogeneity in the case of west africa we find that the collapse of customary risk management institutions is a vital part of the demand for marketability rights as agents struggle to smooth income and consumption in its wake we find that the social efficiency implications of this demand for institutional innovation are ambiguous

land without opportunity public goods investment and land markets in rural mexico i address the question when do peasants on collectively owned land demand private titles by analyzing a land titling program in mexico i argue mexico s punishment regime in the 20th century influences the capacity of peasants to invest in a private title in the 21st century where commercial farmers were more powerful the state issued fewer land grants to peasants and invested in public goods to capture electoral support from commercial farmers fewer peasants received land in these areas but those who did had access to public goods that reduced socioeconomic marginalization and increased their capacity to invest in a private title using a technique called causal mediation analysis i show that a higher percentage of arable land granted to the peasant sector during the 20th century directly reduces the likelihood of land privatization in the 21st century and indirectly reduces privatization through farm productivity and human development levels

capacity allocation using past sales when to turn and earn consider a supplier selling to multiple retailers demand varies across periods but the supplier s capacity and wholesale price are fixed if demand is high the retailers needs exceed capacity and the supplier must implement an allocation mechanism to dole out production we examine how the choice of mechanism impacts retailer actions and supply chain performance in particular we analyze turn and earn allocation a method commonly used in the automobile industry this scheme bases current allocations on past sales and thus enables retailers to influence their future allocations they compete for scarce capacity even if they do not compete for customers we show that turn and earn induces the retailers to increase their sales when demand is low and the supplier s capacity is otherwise underutilized supplier profits thus increase the impact on the supply chain depends on how restrictive capacity is with mildly tight capacity the retailers higher sales rate does not significantly lower their profits but does reduce the cost of idle capacity supply chain performance improves with extremely tight capacity the retailers intense competition dissipates more profits than the supplier gains and supply chain performance suffers consequently turn and earn does not generally coordinate the system it is best characterized as a means for the supplier to increase her profits at the expense of the retailers and potentially even the supply chain furthermore these results hold even if the retailers can hold inventory in anticipation of scarce capacity

economic history and economics i have in the back of my mind a picture of the sort of discipline economics ought to be or at least the sort of discipline i wish it were if economics were practiced in that way there would be nothing problematical about its reciprocal relationship with economic history it would be pretty clear what it is that economic theory offers to economic history and what economic history offers to economic theory i will try to describe what i mean below for better or worse however economics has gone down a different path not the one i have in mind one consequence not the most important one but the one that matters for this discussion is that economic theory learns nothing from economic history and economic history is as much corrupted as enriched by economic theory i will come to that too later on you will notice that i am using strong language i am prepared to admit right away that i may be dead wrong in my judgements but there is no point in pussyfooting bluntness may lead to an interesting discussion after all no one would remember the old german historical school if it were not for the famous methodenstreit actually no one remembers them anyway there must be a lesson in that to get right down to it i suspect that the attempt to construct economics as an axiomatically based hard science is doomed to fail there are many partially overlapping reasons for believing this but since that is not the topic under discussion today i do not have to lay them out in an orderly way i hope the following hodgepodge will convey what i mean a modern economy is a very complicated system since we cannot conduct controlled experiments on its smaller parts or even observe them in isolation the classical hardscience devices for discriminating between competing hypotheses are closed to us the main alternative device is the statistical analysis of historical time series but then another difficulty arises the competing hypotheses are themselves complex and subtle we know before we start that all of them or at least many of them are capable of fitting the data in a gross sort of way then in order to make more refined distinctions we need long time series observed under stationary conditions unfortunately however economics is a social science it is subject to damon runyon s law that nothing between human beings is more than three to one to express the point more formally much of what we observe cannot be treated as the realization of a stationary stochastic process without straining credulity moreover all narrowly economic activity is embedded in a web of social institutions customs beliefs and attitudes concrete outcomes are indubitably affected by these background factors some of which change slowly and gradually others erratically as soon as time series get long enough to offer hope of discriminating among complex hypotheses the likelihood that they remain stationary dwindles away and the noise level gets correspondingly high under these circumstances a little cleverness and persistence can get you almost any result you want i think that is why so few econometricians have ever been forced by the facts to abandon a firmly held belief indeed some of fortune s favorites have been known to write scores of empirical articles without once feeling obliged to report a result that contradicts their prior prejudices if i am anywhere near right about this the interests of scientific economics would be better served by a more modest approach there is enough for us to do without pretending to a degree of completeness and department of economics massachusetts institute of technology cambridge ma 02139

land tenure security and investment incentives puzzling evidence from burkina faso abstract the commonsense logic associating higher land security and higher incentives to invest has been recently called into question in the case of african agriculture to be meaningful empirical tests have to be carefully designed so as to take account of the possible endogeneity of the land rights variable this is done in this paper by applying suitable econometric methods to the original data collected in burkina faso the results obtained cast doubt on the existence of a systematic influence of land tenure security on investment by reviewing the justifications for scepticism in the recent literature we are able to conclude that the traditional village order where it exists provides the basic land rights required to stimulate small scale investment

community industry contracting over natural resource use in a context of weak property rights the case of indonesia decentralization in indonesia has resulted in an increased influence of local communities over the terms of logging agreements with timber companies the outcomes of such community company negotiations vary significantly across communities what are the conditions that cause this variation and how can the outcomes be more effectively and efficiently influenced by third party actors such as the local government or ngos this paper addresses these questions by developing a game theoretic model to illustrate the strategic interactions between communities and companies the model allows for endogeneity of de facto property rights and bargaining positions we show that third party actions to improve the community s bargaining position by raising its reservation utility may result in an increase in the area logged and thereby harm the environment our results indicate that the strategy of intervention matters in particular strategies that raise the sensitivity of interventions to local logging threats are likely to be more cost effective in supporting communities and reducing forest degradation than more indiscriminatory strategies the model will be relevant to other situations where communities negotiate contracts over natural resource use with outside actors in a context of weak property rights a situation increasingly observed in other developing countries

conflicts over property rights and natural resource exploitation at the frontier abstract competition for land at the frontier is analyzed by considering a game between a first settler and a contestant although the first settler is the legitimate owner of a plot of land his remoteness from the government s administrative center makes it difficult to prove it this creates incentives for a contestant to dispute his claims both contenders will expend resources in order to secure ownership due to transport costs the more remote a plot of land is the lower its output value this tends to discourage appropriative activities land degradation is sometimes used as a substitute to appropriative activities a lower discount rate may encourage land degradation

collateral guaranties and rural credit in developing countries evidence from asia abstract the paper reviews the theory of the impact of loan collateral and in particular land collateral in institutional and non institutional rural credit markets evidence from three asian developing countries is presented showing extensive use of land collateral among institutional lenders in countries where such collateral is legal the use of land collateral is more common than other forms of security except in places where legal inhibitions on mortgaging agricultural land exist non institutional lenders are less inclined to use land collateral however lenders who do not have links to borrowers in matters other than finance are more likely to use loan securities estimates of instutional credit supply and demand in rural thailand confirm that the pledging of land collateral affects the supply of credit more than group guaranty it is also shown that larger farmers are more likely to utilize land collateral the conclusion is that land collateral is preferred by institutional lenders as it reduces creditworthiness assessment costs attempts to ban or limit collateral use by decree are motivated by equity cinsiderations but they will cause loss of efficiency simplification of ownership verification and other policies reducing the transaction cost of collateral pledging will mitigate the negative equity implications of collateral

the thai rural credit system public subsidies private information and segmented markets thailand has sought to increase farmers access to credit by government intervention in 1966 it created a government agricultural bank to lend solely to farm households and beginning in the late 1970s it required commercial banks to lend heavily in the rural sector either directly or by making deposits in the agricultural bank the result was an enormous expansion of credit in the rural sector but because formal lenders were either unable or unwilling to solve the information problems involved in the broad range of rural credit transactions the informal credit sector wbich charged interest rates many times higher than the formal sector continued to thrive using household surveys and surveys of moneylenders this article provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which lenders in the informal sector have solved the information problems of providing credit the authors argue that the informal sector is competitive and that high interest rates reflect high information costs not the scarcity of funds this article reports on a set of investigations of the impact of thai government policies to expand bank lending in the rural sector their purpose was to increase farmers access to capital and reduce their dependence on informal lenders fifteen years after the principal government measures were introduced we hope to be able to answer several questions how has the expansion of formal sector lending affected the informal sector did the increase in the supply of formal credit reduce the business of informal lenders and lower interest rates in the informal market what has been the performance of the formal credit system in terms of coverage efficiency and incidence lacking time series data on the informal sector we cannot give a direct answer to these questions but we can with confidence say that the informal lenders are still very much alive by examining the behavior of the rural credit market at the present time we can throw an indirect light on what transpired over the last fifteen years our main findings are the following on the basis of our 1984 85 survey of households and moneylenders

coalitional strategy proof house allocation abstract we consider house allocation without endowments we show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preferences on which efficiency and coalitional strategy proofness are compatible a preference relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining houses we also show that on this domain mixed dictator pairwise exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and coalitional strategy proofness journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 d63 d71

land tenure differences and investment in land improvement measures theoretical and empirical analyses this article develops a theoretical framework to examine the relationship between land tenure arrangements and households investment in soil improving and conservation measures it then analyzes this relationship with a multivariate probit model based on detailed plot level data from villages in the brong ahafo region of ghana a major hypothesis tested is that investment in productivity enhancing and conservation techniques are influenced by land tenure arrangements the theoretical analysis and empirical results generally reveal that land tenure differences significantly influence farmers decisions to invest in land improving and conservation measures the findings also show that tenure security does affect farm productivity

the economics of cain and abel agro pastoral property rights in the sahel the complementarity of the economic systems of nomads and farmers is often overshadowed by the conflicts inherent in the competition over the control of land the conflict is one of property rights a dynamic programming model of the west african sahel is presented that simulates the emergence of a dual economy based on the comparative advantage of the farmer and the pastoralist the model illustrates that exclusive private property rights have no claim to optimality the analysis of risk in an intertemporal framework suggests the optimality of another type of property right the right to flexible adjustment typically claimed by the pastoralist multiple property regimes provide optimal settings for farmers and pastoralists

village political economy land tenure insecurity and the rural to urban migration decision evidence from china this paper investigates the impact of land tenure insecurity on the migration decisions of china s rural residents a simple model first frames the relationship among these variables and the probability that a reallocation of land will occur in the following year after first demonstrating that a village leader s support for administrative land reallocation carries with it the risk of losing a future election the paper exploits election timing and village heterogeneity in lineage group composition and demographic change to identify the effect of land security in response to an expected land reallocation in the following year the probability that a rural resident migrates out of the county declines by 2 8 percentage points which accounts for 17 5 percent of the annual share of village residents aged 16 to 50 who worked as migrants during the period this finding underscores the potential importance of secure property rights for facilitating labor market integration and the movement of labor out of agriculture

top trading with fixed tie breaking in markets with indivisible goods abstract we study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects when preferences are strict gale s top trading cycles algorithm finds the unique core allocation when preferences are not necessarily strict we use an exogenous profile of tie breakers to resolve any ties in individuals preferences and apply gale s top trading cycles algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences we provide a foundation of these simple extensions of gale s top trading cycles algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences we show that gale s top trading cycles algorithm with fixed tie breaking is characterized by individual rationality strategy proofness weak efficiency non bossiness and consistency our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a good and simple rule for the resulting strict preferences

behavioural and material determinants of production relations in agriculture in this essay we develop a framework for analysing the major institutions governing the production and exchange of output and the primary factors of production in rural areas the analysis incorporates general considerations of risk and information constraints jointly with the principal material attributes of agriculture and of agricultural production factors the framework is used to analyse barriers to the existence of the major intertemporal and factor markets it is applied specifically to land scarce environments for which it provides an internally consistent explanation for many of the well documented institutional features of such settings in addition the analysis provides new implications for among other phenomena the inter relationships among ownership holdings operational scale family size and factor productivity for the scarcity of animal rental markets and use of animals as collateral for the renting out of land by small landowners and for the existence of plantations for certain crops

the political economy of productivity thai agricultural development 1880 1975 the economic history of thailand between 1880 and 1975 contrasts sharply with the development experiences of other third world countries between the opening of trade in 1850 and 1941 when war halted economic activity thailand became a major exporter of rice in the world market although conditions for further growth seemed highly favourable thailand s rapid integration into the world economy failed to improve living standards and rice yields actually declined in examining the causes of the underdevelopment of thai agriculture over the last 100 years feeny introduces supply and demand models of technical and institutional change to analyse why the rice export boom did not result in more development this book much of which is based on primary research in the thai national archives is one of the few quantitative economic histories of a less developed country

property rights and productivity the case of joint land titling in vietnam this paper explores the effect of land titling on agricultural productivity in vietnam and the productivity effects of single versus joint titling for husband and wife using a plot fixed effects approach our results show that obtaining a land title is associated with higher yields for both individually and jointly held titles we conclude that there is no tradeoff between joint titling and productivity and so joint titles are potentially an effective way to improve women s bargaining power within the household with no associated efficiency losses

periodic review production models with variable capacity random yield and uncertain demand we investigate a production planning problem in a periodic review environment with variable production capacity random yields and uncertain demand the implications of random yields and variable capacity for lot sizing previously have been explored separately but not jointly many production environments are likely to be subject to both types of uncertainties to minimize the total discounted expected costs production holding and shortage costs we formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic program for the finite horizon problem we prove that the objective function is quasi convex and that the structure of the optimal policy is characterized by a single critical point for the initial stock level at each period that is if the initial stock is greater than this critical point the optimal planned production is zero otherwise it is greater than zero expressions for solving the critical point and the optimal planned production are obtained we further show that the solution for the finite horizon problem converges to that of the infinite horizon problem

tenure security resource endowments and tree growing evidence from the amhara region of ethiopia we analyze roles of tenure insecurity and household endowments in explaining tree growing in ethiopia where farmers cannot sell or mortgage land and factor markets are imperfect unlike most other studies we use panel data and examine determinants of the decision and intensity of tree growing unlike other studies we compare the decision to keep trees and the decision to plant in the recent past the results suggest that land tenure insecurity influences the decision to grow trees but not the number of trees households grow household endowments time and location also explain tree growing by farmers

on the effects of insecure property consider a contested resource land of size t t for territory that no one clearly possesses and suppose the settling of claims on this resource is primarily determined by the actual or potential use of force we will examine three types of institutional arrangements winner take all conflict with the relative strengths of the contestants determining the winner of t negotiated settlement and division of t under the threat of winner take all conflict and a negotiated division of t with the possibility of trade in other commodities again under the threat of winner take all conflict we suppose the existence of two agents competing for t they can be either individuals or collectivities and are labeled 1 and 2 each agent i

spillovers from high value agriculture for exports on land use in developing countries evidence from madagascar high value agriculture for exports is increasingly important in developing countries in a case study of contract farming for exports of vegetables from madagascar strong spillover effects of these trade opportunities on land use are found to exist using a matched plot sampling design the productivity of rice the main domestically consumed staple is shown to be two thirds higher on fields that were contracted during the off season for the production of vegetables this increase in yields is linked to an increase of soil fertility due to the application of fertilizer and compost which farmers did not use prior to the contracts although agricultural output goes up significantly labor productivity stays the same suggesting that there is greater labor absorption on existing land and the diffusion of this type of technology at a larger scale throughout madagascar would be expected to substantially decrease incentives to deforest by increasing wages and to boost productivity of existing lands relative to newly deforested ones

incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods abstract in a market in which each trader s initial endowment is one unit of an indivisible good there exists an incentive compatible procedure for reaching a competitive allocation this contrasts with some recent results for similar problems

strategy proofness and the core in house allocation problems abstract we study house allocation problems introduced by l shapley and h scarf 1974 j math econ 1 23 28 we prove that a mechanism a social choice function is individually rational anonymous strategy proof and nonbossy but not necessarily pareto efficient if and only if it is either the core mechanism or the no trade mechanism where the no trade mechanism is the one that selects the initial allocation for each profile of preferences this result confirms the intuition that even if we are willing to accept inefficiency there exists no interesting strategy proof mechanism other than the core mechanism journal of economic literature classification numbers c71 c78 d71 d78 d89

capacitated inventory problems with fixed order costs some optimal policy structure abstract almost 40 years ago h scarf the optimality of s s policies in dynamic inventory problems in k arrow s karlin p suppes eds mathematical models in the social sciences stanford university press stanford 1960 established the optimal s s policy structure for the periodic review inventory problem with fixed ordering costs and no capacity constraint since then the capacitated problem has resisted characterization in the present paper we partially bridge this gap using a generalization of scarf s k convexity we show that the optimal capacitated policy has an s s like structure to do so we divide the parameter space into four regions in two of these regions the optimal policy is completely specified while in the other two it is partially specified we complement these findings with a computational study this study suggests that a still simpler optimal policy structure exists