the channel of monetary transmission to demand evidence from the market for automobile credit in response to tight money both consumer loans and consumption fall the author asks whether there is any causality running from loans to consumption by focusing on how the composition of automobile finance between bank and nonbank sources of credit changes in response to unanticipated innovations in monetary policy the results indicate that contractionary monetary policy produces a statistically significant reduction in the relative supply of bank consumer loans which in turn produces a decline in real consumption the evidence therefore supports the existence of a credit channel of monetary transmission to aggregate consumption moreover the nature of automobile finance is uniquely suited to identifying which of two possible sub channels of the broader credit channel is relatively more important and suggests the results are more likely consistent with a bank lending channel than with a pure balance sheet channel however the findings also indicate that the quantitative effects of the lending channel on the aggregate economy though precisely estimated may be quite small

mark to market accounting for banks and thrifts lessons from the danish experience university of michigan tharvard university we appreciate helpful suggestions received from participants at the stanford summer camp and the price waterhouse symposium workshop participants at the university of chicago cornell university indiana university the ohio state university university of michigan university of pittsburgh university of rochester university of southern california tulane university and university of utah mary barth bill beaver george benston allen berger fisher black paul healy jack hughes robert kaplan richard leftwich jim leisenring niels nielsen finn ostrup bob ruland pete wilson and an anonymous referee we also appreciate the assistance of our contacts in denmark who shared their time and expertise with us so willingly these include mr ole bjarrum and mr lars nielsen of nykredit mr jesper jesperson and mr aksel olsen of kpmg revisionsfirmaet c jespersen mr lars tonnesen and mr birger schmidt of the danish bankers association mr kim hartvig olsen of the danish financial supervisoryauthority mr jorgen kock of den danske bank and professors jens elling merete christiansen finn ostrup and niels nielson of the copenhagen business school we thank professors dwight crane and bob kaplan of the harvard business school and bob swieringa and jim leisenring of the financial accounting standards board for help in conducting this research we are grateful for financial statement data furnished by the danish financial supervisory authority for access to the account database provided by professors elling and christensen of the copenhagen business school and for excellent research assistance by elizabeth andersen christine botosan marlene plumlee and james myers we also appreciate the willingness

bank loan portfolios and the monetary transmission mechanism abstract we study the portfolio behavior of bank loans following a monetary tightening and find that real estate and consumer loans sharply decrease while commercial and industrial c i loans increase these responses are compared with responses following non monetary shocks which also reduce output but keep interest rates roughly unchanged during such a non monetary downturn c i loans sharply decrease while real estate and consumer loans show no substantial response these responses together with the responses of relevant lending rates are hard to reconcile with a decline in the supply of c i bank loans during a monetary downturn as stressed by the bank lending channel several arguments are presented explaining why the supply of c i loans may actually increase after a monetary contraction

on the political economy of educational vouchers abstract two significant challenges hamper the analyses of the collective choice of educational vouchers one is the multi dimensional choice set arising from the interdependence of the voucher public education spending and taxation second even absent a voucher preferences over public spending are not single peaked a middling level of public school spending may be less attractive to a household than either high public school spending or private education coupled with low public spending we show that besley and coate s 1997 representative democracy model provides a viable approach to overcome these hurdles we provide a complete characterization of equilibria with an endogenous voucher a voucher is adopted in political equilibrium provided the coefficient of variation of income is sufficiently small we undertake a parallel quantitative analysis and we find that no voucher arises in equilibrium for the u s income distribution which exhibits too much heterogeneity for a tighter income distribution including those in douglas county colorado where a voucher was recently adopted our model predicts a positive voucher public support for a not too large voucher arises because the cross subsidy to public school expenditure from those switching to private schools outweighs the subsidy to those who attend private school in the absence of a voucher

detecting earnings management a new approach this paper provides a new approach to test for accrual based earnings management our approach exploits the inherent property of accrual accounting that any accrual based earnings management in one period must reverse in another period if the researcher has priors concerning the timing of the reversal incorporating these priors can significantly improve the power and specification of tests for earnings management our results indicate that tests incorporating reversals increase test power by around 40 and provide a robust solution for mitigating model misspecification arising from correlated omitted variables

earnings management under price regulation empirical evidence from the spanish electricity industry abstract this paper analyses the effect of price regulation on the accounting policy of spanish electricity companies over the period 1991 2001 as predicted by the political costs hypothesis watts and zimmerman 1986 watts r l zimmerman j l 1986 positive accounting theory prentice hall englewood cliffs nj managers artificially reduce reported earnings when the government establishes tariff increases in this way companies attempt to diminish their political visibility and counteract social outcry arising from the government s decision several abnormal accruals models existent in the literature are used to obtain a proxy for managerial accounting discretion on earnings

competition between private and public schools vouchers and peer group effects a theoretical and computational model with tax financed tuition free public schools and competitive tuition financed private schools is developed students differ by ability and income achievement depends on own ability and on peers abilities equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income in private schools high ability low income students receive tuition discounts while low ability high income students pay tuition premia tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high ability students relative to low ability students

household expenditure and the income tax rebates of 2001 using questions expressly added to the consumer expenditure survey we estimate the change in consumption expenditures caused by the 2001 federal income tax rebates and test the permanent income hypothesis we exploit the unique randomized timing of rebate receipt across households households spent 20 to 40 percent of their rebates on nondurable goods during the three month period in which their rebates arrived and roughly two thirds of their rebates cumulatively during this period and the subsequent three month period the implied effects on aggregate consumption demand are substantial consistent with liquidity constraints responses are larger for households with low liquid wealth or low income

nonlinear dynamics in discretionary accruals an analysis of bank loan loss provisions abstract several studies have analyzed discretionary accruals to address earnings smoothing behaviors in the banking industry we argue that the characteristic link between accruals and earnings may be nonlinear since both the incentives to manipulate income and the practical way to do so depend partially on the relative size of earnings given a sample of 15 268 us banks over the period 1996 2011 the main results in this paper suggest that depending on the size of earnings bank managers tend to engage in earnings decreasing strategies when earnings are negative big bath use earnings increasing strategies when earnings are positive and use provisions as a smoothing device when earnings are positive and substantial cookie jar accounting this evidence which cannot be explained by the earnings smoothing hypothesis is consistent with the compensation theory neglecting nonlinear patterns in the econometric modeling of these accruals may lead to misleading conclusions regarding the characteristic strategies used in earnings management

identifying the macroeconomic effect of loan supply shocks the inability to clearly distinguish the effects of shocks to loan supply from those to loan demand has made it difficult to quantify the economic importance of the credit channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy this study provides an innovative approach to identifying loan supply shocks three different results confirm that loan supply shocks have been successfully isolated from shifts in loan demand our measure is particularly important for explaining inventory movements the component of gdp most dependent on bank lending the effect is present even during periods with strong loan demand and the effect remains even when the unpredictable part of the loan supply shock is isolated this identification enables us to show that loan supply shocks have had economically important effects on the u s economy

the disciplinary role of takeovers this paper presents a theory of the disciplinary role of takeovers based on an explicit model of managerial incentive problems stemming from asymmetric information it is argued that an informed raider can reduce incentive problems by making managerial compensation more sensitive to information unavailable to shareholders the paper also highlights the importance of specifying the source of contractual inefficiencies when analyzing the effect of takeovers on incentives

monopoly with incomplete information recent theoretical research on principal agent relationships has emphasized incentive problems that arise when the parties involved are constrained by either asymmetric information or their inability to monitor each other s actions here we concentrate on the former constraint and consider the case of a single principal the monopolist the main contribution is to show that under a separability assumption strong conclusions can be drawn about the nature of optimal incentive schemes although the primary focus is on optimal quantity discounts in a monopolized market the results also shed light on related topics such as optimal income taxation and commodity bundling

debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals abstract this paper examines the abnormal accruals of a sample of 94 firms that reported debt covenant violations in annual reports we expect debt covenant restrictions to influence accounting choices in the year preceding and the year of violation time series and cross sectional models are used to estimate normal accruals in the year prior to violation both models indicate that abnormal total and working capital accruals are significantly positive in the year of violation there is evidence of positive abnormal working capital accruals after controlling for management changes and auditor going concern qualifications

trade credit and the bank lending channel the bank lending channel theory posits that during monetary contractions banks restrict some firms loans thus reducing their desired investment independently of interest rates previous research finds small firms reduce while large firms accelerate loan growth we find that small firms increase trade credit a substitute credit indicating a strong loan demand it supports the bank lending channel they do not voluntarily cut bank loans since they increase a less desirable alternative using trade credit is propitious since unlike commercial paper investigated by previous researchers it is widely used by the small firms suffering the loan decline surprisingly we also find large firms increase trade credit a puzzle since they are typically assumed to have wide access to other credit using individual manufacturing firm data we find the reasons large firms use trade credit are financial in nature those without a bond rating increase trade credit that is without access to open market credit as relatively few firms have this mark of quality it implies that more firms are affected by credit constraints than previously believed

erratum to competition incentives and public school productivity abstract when competition increases it is often presumed that public schools will be forced to become more efficient this paper challenges that presumption showing that in well defined circumstances rent seeking public schools find it optimal to reduce productivity when a voucher is introduced this occurs for incentive reasons alone more generally the productivity effects of vouchers are shown to be non uniform varying systematically according to household and community characteristics and the form the voucher takes when the voucher is targeted perverse productivity outcomes do not arise the analysis has relevance to the policy issue of voucher design

consumer credit liquidity and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy i introduction despite calls for its obsolescence the lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism continues to generate interest among monetary economists recently den haan sumner and yamashiro 2007 find the loan supply effect is evident for consumer lending and real estate loans in data up to 2004 the loan supply effect or lending channel arises in the transmission mechanism if tight monetary policy forces banks to contract the supply of loans independent of a direct interest rate effect i e the liquidity effect and such a contraction has real effects for bank dependent borrowers although some such as perez 1998 and ashcraft 2006 have emphasized the lending channel s lack of relevance for the monetary transmission mechanism den haan sumner and yamashiro s 2007 results support a number of recent papers that offer detailed and disaggregated reasons why the channel is alive and well for certain lenders and borrowers for recent examples see nilsen 2004 and peek rosengren and tootell 2003 den haan sumner and yamashiro s 2007 findings suggest that the role of the consumer in the lending channel may be deserving of more attention 1 this paper asks whether consumer lending is or has become a significant component of the lending channel even if it was not thought crucial in lending channel studies published in the 1990s specifically i take a closer look at the statistical and possible economic significance of the consumer loan supply effect with disaggregated monthly consumer credit data from both commercial bank and nonbank sources and for the nonrevolving and revolving components of consumer credit from each source with this array of data i test the assumptions of the channel by considering whether households are forced to use more expensive nonbank credit as bank credit declines or that a household might switch into more costly revolving credit as installment loans decline to examine the consumer lending channel i estimate impulse response functions for the disaggregated consumer loan components mentioned above with the monthly data spanning 1968 2006 the sources of which are discussed later this strategy follows the examples of numerous lending channel studies that analyze the responses of disaggregated data to a monetary policy shock to discern evidence of the loan supply effect den haan sumner and yamashiro 2007 e g compare the behavior of commercial and industrial loans with real estate and consumer loans i follow the methods of previous studies in order to compare as closely as possible the results of this paper with the rich body of lending channel literature for robustness this paper estimates the impulse response functions from both a typical vector autoregression var model and using jorda s 2005 linear projection technique the latter method provides impulse response functions less prone to misspecification than in a var along with conditional standard errors to aid in the statistical inference of the responses see also jorda 2009 and further discussion in section iii finally for additional robustness i employ den haan sumner and yamashiro s 2007 identification strategy for isolating the loan supply effect in preview of the results ultimately the consumer credit data analyzed in this paper suggest that both the statistical and by extension the economic significance of the consumer loan supply effect is weak in the least the effect has weakened over time although monthly consumer credit data from commercial banks from 1968 through 2006 substantiate previous research on consumer lending matching the decline documented by gertler and gilchrist 1993 and den haan sumner and yamashiro 2007 after 1984 the responses of both nonrevolving and revolving consumer bank credit are not consistent with the lending channel instead both series increase similar to the result found by den haan sumner and yamashiro 2007 for commercial lending in fact total nonrevolving and revolving consumer credit increase for 2 yr after the monetary shock

ability tracking school competition and the distribution of educational benefits abstract to study the effects of ability grouping on school competition we develop a theoretical and computational model of tracking in public and private schools we examine tracking s consequences for the allocation of students of differing abilities and income within and between public and private schools private schools tend to attract the most able and wealthiest students and rarely track in equilibrium public sector schools can maximize attendance by tracking students public schools retain a greater proportion of higher ability students by tracking but lose more wealthy lower ability students to the private sector consequently socioeconomic status is a predictor of track assignment in public schools for the entire population public sector tracking has small aggregate effects on achievement and welfare but results in significant redistribution from lower to higher ability students

accounting information and corporate governance market and analyst reactions to earnings of firms engaged in proxy contests abstract this paper studies market and analyst reactions to earnings i during a proxy contest for board seats and ii after a proxy contest induced management change despite indications of earnings management during the proxy contest market and analyst reactions are more pronounced than in prior periods and earnings surprises explain more of the cross sectional variation in these reactions market and analyst reactions to earnings released after a successful proxy contest are less pronounced than in prior periods and earnings surprises explain less of the variation in these reactions perhaps due to new managements tendency to take an earnings bath

mobility targeting and private school vouchers simulations are derived from a three district model of low middle and highincome school districts calibrated to new york data with housing stocks that vary within and across districts in this model it is demonstrated that school district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to nontargeted vouchers but vastly different from vouchers targeted to low income households furthermore strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs jel 122 128 h73 persistent frustration with the perceived low quality of public education exacerbated by concerns over the inherently unequal levels of public school quality across school districts has caused policy makers courts and researchers to investigate modifications and alternatives to the current public school system one idea that has received increasing academic and public attention is that of private school vouchers with proponents arguing that the competitive pressures of voucher programs would cause improvements in the efficiency of the publicschool system while at the same time addressing equity concerns if vouchers can be targeted to low income households or low income school districts but aside from a few limited experiments in some u s cities our experience with vouchers in the united states remains virtually nonexistent this limits the amount of information researchers can derive from standard empirical analysis in that it forces them to rely on only current nonvoucher induced differences in competition despite important suggestive results such work may not anticipate all the impacts from a large scale policy such as the voucher policies currently under discussion at the same time theoretical models of school finance are also limited in that they often either focus on only one particular aspect of the general equilibrium school finance problem or they are too rich and complex to yield crisp predictions

annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings abstract using confidential data of executive specific short term bonus plans we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings to maximize the present value of bonus plan payments as such this paper extends the work of healy 1985 like healy we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum unlike healy we find no evidence that managers manipulate earnings downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus we demonstrate that healy s results at the lower bound are likely to be induced by his methodology

do liquidity constraints and interest rates matter for consumer behavior evidence from credit card data this paper utilizes a unique new dataset of credit card accounts to analyze how people respond to changes in credit supply the data consist of a panel of thousands of individual credit card accounts from several different card issuers with associated credit bureau data we estimate both marginal propensities to consume mpcs out of liquidity and interest rate elasticities we also evaluate the ability of different models of consumption to rationalize our results distinguishing the permanent income hypothesis pih liquidity constraints precautionary saving and behavioral models we find that increases in credit limits generate an immediate and significant rise in debt counter to the pih the average mpc out of liquidity ddebt dlimit ranges between 10 14 the mpc is much larger for people starting near their limits consistent with binding liquidity constraints however the mpc is significant even for people starting well below their limit we show this response is consistent with buffer stock models of precautionary saving nonetheless there are other results that conventional models cannot easily explain e g why so many people are borrowing on their credit cards and simultaneously holding low yielding assets unlike most other studies we also find strong effects from changes in account specific interest rates the long run elasticity of debt to the interest rate is approximately 1 3 less than half of this elasticity represents balance shifting across cards with most reflecting net changes in total borrowing the elasticity is larger for decreases in interest rates than for increases which can explain the widespread use of temporary promotional rates the elasticity is smaller for people starting near their credit limits again consistent with liquidity constraints

using cost observation to regulate firms the paper emphasizes the use of accounting data in regulatory or procurement contracts when the supplier 1 has superior information about the cost of the project and 2 invests in cost reduction the main result states that under risk neutrality the supplier announces an expected cost and is given an incentive contract linear in cost overruns this optimal contract moves toward a fixed price contract as the announced cost decreases an investment choice is then introduced and the use of a rate of return regulation is studied

optimal bypass and cream skimming this paper develops a normative model of regulatory policy toward bypass and cream skimming it analyzes the effects of bypass on second degree price discrimination on the rent of the regulated firm and on the welfare of low demand customers it shows that pricing under marginal cost may be optimal for the regulated firm excessive cream skimming occurs if access to the bypass technology is not regulated and the prohibition of bypass may increase or decrease the regulated firm s rent jel 026 613 the regulation of natural monopolies is often associated with policies toward competition including restrictions on entry this paper is concerned with a common form of competition which threatens the regulated firm on its most lucrative markets examples abound in the telecommunications industry the development of microwave radio and communication satellites in the 1960 s introduced the possibility that big telecommunication customers might bypass the major common carrier att and the 1978 natural gas policy act in the united states has created the possibility for industrial plants to bypass the local distribution utilities by building direct connections to the pipelines gas producers or intermediaries

educational vouchers welfare effects and voting abstract we analyze the welfare effects and voting equilibrium with vouchers for private schools the analysis shows that vouchers like tuition tax credits martinello and west 1988 frey 1983 may improve the welfare of all families including families whose children remain in public schools if public educational quality is unchanged and publicly financed educational expenditures decrease thus voters will approve a voucher only if it reduces taxes when public educational quality is endogenous a voucher may increase quality by reducing the tax cost of quality and will be approved if it reduce taxes at the pre voucher public education level and increases quality

a complete solution to a class of principal agent problems with an application to the control of a self managed firm this paper considers a class of principal agent problems which have the following features 1 there is adverse selection because the principal ignores the value of one parameter of the agent s true characteristics 2 leaving aside the information parameter the principal s welfare as well as the agent s welfare depend on two types of variables observable to both of them the first ones possibly multidimensional are called action variable s and the second one which is one dimensional has in general the meaning of a money transfer 3 the principal is a stackelberg leader of the two person game he can commit himself to decision rules which are admissible on informational grounds he optimizes within the adequate class taking into account besides the agent s reaction one constraint which has generally the meaning of an individual rationality constraint and sometimes of a feasibility constraint the optimization is limited to the class of non stochastic mechanisms 4 the problem can also receive an alternative interpretation the principal faces a continuum of agents of unknown characteristics the distribution being known however stylized principal agent problems of this type have often been considered in the economic literature in particular the reader will later be able to recognize that the standard income tax model a la mirrlees 1971 the quality or quantity choice model of the monopolist a la mussa and rosen 1978 or maskin and riley 1982 and the model of government regulation of the private monopolist of baron and myerson 1982 all belong to

regulation competition and asymmetric information abstract this article studies a model of regulation under asymmetric information when there exists a competitive fringe of unregulated alternative producers the correlation between the unknown cost parameters of the fringe and of the regulated firm allows the regulator to use the threat of entry by the fringe to reduce the informational cost of regulation the presence of the fringe is welfare enhancing the allocative distortions can be larger or smaller than those in the no fringe case and the optimal contract sometimes allows inefficient entry the optimal contract can exhibit non standard bunching phenomena and discontinuities

regulation competition and liberalization in many countries throughout the world regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to introduce competition into regulated industries this essay examines the complexities involved in the liberalization process while stressing the importance of case specific analyses this essay distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are procompetitive from corresponding anticompetitive liberalization policies

optimality and sustainability regulation and intermodal competition in telecommunications as regulators continue to open utility markets to entry new market contestants may specialize in providing service for the utility s largest customers consequently old utility pricing procedures may no longer be sustainable taking telecommunications regulation as an example this article develops optimal pricing strategies for utilities that have large customers who have other attractive service options i demonstrate that under an optimal nonuniform price schedule utilities can legitimately price high level usage below its associated marginal usage cost furthermore customers will make economically efficient choices when deciding whether to forego utility service

asymmetric stationarity in national stock market indices an mtar analysis a procedure is developed using a momentum threshold autoregressive model and asymmetric stationarity tests designed to identify periods of asymmetric stationary divergences from nonstationary paths in time series and is applied to major national stock indices the results reveal the existence of asymmetric stationary periods in each of these indices these results suggest an explanation for the counterintuitive positive forecasting results of technical traders for various time periods we explore this possibility further by using a representative moving average technical trading strategy and find significantly different results higher returns when information from the procedure is incorporated into a trading rule

causal ordering and the bank lending channel the bank lending channel implies the federal reserve can influence real income by controlling the level of intermediated loans using the notion of causality developed by simon 1953 and the causal order methodology developed by hoover 1990 i test for an operative bank lending channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy i find loans did cause real income there is evidence that a bank lending channel did exist in the 1960s the data appears to show however that by the early 1990s the bank lending channel was no longer operative 1998 john wiley sons ltd

countervailing incentives in agency problems abstract we analyze countervailing incentives in agency problem countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an incentive to understate his private information for some of its realizations and to overstate it for others when countervailing incentives arise pooling generally characterizes the equilibrium contract furthermore performance is distorted both above and below efficient levels in addition the agent s rents generally increase with the realization of his private information over some ranges and decrease over other ranges we demonstate that the creation of countervailing incentives can enhance aggregate welfare

non discretionary conservatism evidence and implications a large body of accounting research finds that various contracting incentives lead managers to engage in conservative accounting practices we extend existing research by modeling the impact of extant accounting rules on conservative accounting accounting rules typically require assets to be written down when their fair values drop sufficiently below their book values we document evidence of the resulting non discretionary conservatism and show that it appears to explain some of the results from previous research on contracting incentives

additional evidence on bonus plans and income management abstract we extend healy 1985 by examining the relation between discretionary accruals and bonus plan bounds for a sample of 102 firms for the 1980 1990 period contrary to healy we find that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound managers select income increasing discretionary accruals and vice versa we believe that our results are more consistent with the income smoothing hypothesis than with healy s bonus hypothesis however mechanical selection bias in portfolio formation cannot be entirely ruled out as an alternative explanation for our results

what motivates managers choice of discretionary accruals abstract the papers by subramanyam 1996 and kasanen kinnunen and niskanen kkn 1996 both consider why managers manipulate accounting accruals subramanyam finds that discretionary accruals are associated with several performance measures and concludes that managers accrual choices increase the informativeness of accounting earnings however a strong competing alternative is that the jones model systematically mismeasures discretionary accruals so that they contain a significant non discretionary component unlike many us studies kkn find strong evidence of earnings management in finland where finnish managers set earnings to satisfy the demand for dividends by keiretsu like institutional investors