theoretical and empirical advantages of truncated count data estimators for analysis of deer hunting in california truncated poisson and truncated negative binomial count data models as well as standard count data models ols nonlinear normal and truncated nonlinear normal mle were used to estimate demand for deer hunting in california the truncated count data estimators and their properties are reviewed a large sample n 2223 allowed random segmenting of the data into specification estimation and out of sample prediction portions statistics of interest are therefore unbiased by the specification search and the prediction results allow comparison of the statistical models robustness the new estimators are found to be more appropriate for estimating and predicting demand and social benefits than the alternative estimators based on a variety of criteria

the effect of within season variability on estimates of recreational value for trout anglers in new zealand abstract recreational benefit estimates can be substantially improved by incorporation of data on attributes that are averaged over shorter periods of time so as to better represent within season variability this approach may be advantageous across a wide range of non market valuation settings we use angling survey data that includes bimonthly data on angler demand water quality and fish weight in the rotorua lakes and compare our results with those obtained using attribute data averaged over the year estimates of marginal willingness to pay for catching fish based on annual data are 5 times higher than those based on bimonthly data likewise the estimated welfare gain from a 1 m increase in water clarity is 1 5 times higher in models using annual data we find that within season variability in recreational site attributes can have a statistically significant effect on welfare estimates the effect of seasonal variation in site attributes has rarely been accounted for in travel cost random utility models of recreation we conclude that appropriate treatment of temporal variability can assist environmental managers to design more cost effective policies based on improved estimates of welfare gains

equivalence of auctions and posted prices abstract we determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms auctions and posted prices agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices we show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets posted price markets dominate bargaining markets similarly journal of economic literature classification numbers c78 c73 d44

revenue management with forward looking buyers a seller wishes to sell multiple goods by a deadline for example the end of a season potential buyers enter over time and can strategically time their purchases each period the profit maximizing mechanism awards units to the buyers with the highest valuations exceeding a sequence of cutoffs we show that these cutoffs are deterministic depending only on the inventory and time remaining in the continuous time limit the optimal mechanism can be implemented by posting anonymous prices when incoming demand decreases over time the optimal cutoffs satisfy a one period look ahead property and prices are defined by an intuitive differential equation

comparing revenue from auctions and posted prices i analyze the market for compact discs using an original data set of items listed for sale online over 5000 listings of both new and used compact discs were collected from ebay which provides sellers a choice between two mechanisms auction or posted price and its subsidiary half com which features only posted prices despite the often cited revenue dominance property of auctions many sellers choose to post a fixed price to explain this anomaly i examine empirically the determinants of the revenue earned by sellers in this market i find that posted price goods sell for higher prices while auctioned goods sell with a higher probability further results suggest that the size of a seller s inventory is the key factor in the choice between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price in particular sellers with large inventories are more likely to use the posted price mechanism

optimal auctioning and ordering in an infinite horizon inventory pricing system we consider a joint inventory pricing problem in which buyers act strategically and bid for units of a firm s product over an infinite horizon the number of bidders in each period as well as the individual bidders valuations are random but stationary over time there is a holding cost for inventory and a unit cost for ordering more stock from an outside supplier backordering is not allowed the firm must decide how to conduct its auctions and how to replenish its stock over time to maximize its profits we show that the optimal auction and replenishment policy for this problem is quite simple consisting of running a standard first price or second price auction with a fixed reserve price in each period and following an order up to basestock policy for replenishing inventory at the end of each period moreover the optimal basestock level can be easily computed we then compare this optimal basestock reserve price auction policy to a traditional basestock list price policy we prove that in the limiting case of one buyer per period and in the limiting case of a large number of buyers per period and linear holding cost list pricing is optimal list pricing also becomes optimal as the holding cost tends to zero numerical comparisons confirm these theoretical results and show that auctions provide significant benefits when 1 the number of buyers is moderate 2 holding costs are high or 3 there is high variability in the number of buyers per period

optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management we analyze a dynamic auction in which a seller withc units to sell faces a sequence of buyers separated intot time periods each group of buyers has independent private values for a single unit buyers compete directly against each other within a period as in a traditional auction and indirectly with buyers in other periods through the opportunity cost of capacity assessed by the seller the number of buyers in each period as well as the individual buyers valuations are random the model is a variation of the traditional single leg multiperiod revenue management problem in which consumers act strategically and bid for units of a fixed capacity over time for this setting we prove that dynamic variants of the first price and second price auction mechanisms maximize the seller s expected revenue we also show explicitly how to compute and implement these optimal auctions the optimal auctions are then compared to a traditional revenue management mechanism in which list prices are used in each period together with capacity controls and to a simple auction heuristic that consists of allocating units to each period and running a sequence of standard multiunit auctions with fixed reserve prices in each period the traditional revenue management mechanism is proven to be optimal in the limiting cases when there is at most one buyer per period when capacity is not constraining and asymptotically when the number of buyers and the capacity increases the optimal auction significantly outperforms both suboptimal mechanisms when there are a moderate number of periods capacity is constrained and the total volume of sales is not too large the benefit also increases when variability in the dispersion in buyers valuations or in the number of buyers per period increases

simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices abstract i consider a model in which several identical objects are sold simultaneously via an auction and a posted price mechanism the model explains several empirical regularities regarding bidding behavior in ebay auctions such as the finding that some bidders bid multiple times over the course of the auction and that bidders tend to bid with greater frequency near the end of the auction than the beginning i also show that sellers prefer to simultaneously use auctions and posted prices than to use either mechanism individually

what is consumer s surplus per day of use when is it a constant independent of the number of days of use and what does it tell us about consumers surplus abstract an individual s consumer s surplus per day of use for a change in the price of recreational site is the price change so it is a constant independent of the number of days of use consumer s surplus per day of use for a change in a site s characteristics is not in general a constant when a constant compensating variation per day of use exists it multiplied by the number of days at the site in the original state proposed state bounds the compensating variation cv from below above the average of these two approximations is an almost second order approximation to the cv simulations indicate the approximation biases can be large

measuring welfare changes in settings with imposed quantities abstract an intuitively attractive money metric utility measure is developed which is applicable in settings where individuals receive fixed quantities of one or more goods one use of this measure is in cost benefit analyses of imposed quantity changes the approximate measures typically used are shown to be subject to relatively large approximation errors however techniques are presented which can always be used to numerically evaluate the exact welfare measure provided that one knows the uncompensated demand function s or marginal willingness to pay function s of individuals

optimal selling strategies when to haggle when to hold firm a seller encountering risk neutral buyers one at a time should if commitments are feasible quote a single take it or leave it price to each this strategy is superior to any other for finite or infinite buyer populations whether there is learning or the distribution of buyer prices is known at the outset with one object for sale or many although haggling may offer advantages in terms of price discrimination these gains are more than offset by the losses it generates by encouraging buyers to refuse purchases at high prices

an empirical investigation of the determinants of national interest rates differences abstract under floating exchange rates countries are supposed to be able to follow independent monetary policies while exchange and interest rates are free to adapt to expectations and new information this note investigates over the recent period of floating exchange rates whether interest rate differences are caused by expectations of exchange rate fluctuations international arbitrage model or differences in domestic economic policies domestic model or both simultaneously a domestic interest rate determination model has to be postulated and a classical fisherian relation was selected even with such a simple domestic model the driving force in setting interest rate seems to be domestic rather than international this result could be explained by international market inefficiencies but more probably by the fact that exchange rate variations are so unpredictable that their expectations play a little role in setting differences between national interest rates

auctions versus posted price selling two popular selling methods posted price selling and auctions are compared here in an independent private values model without auctioning costs auctioning is always optimal when auctioning is costly auctions are still preferable if the marginal revenue curve is sufficiently steep the global steepness of the marginal revenue curve is found to coincide with the dispersion around the mean for a number of standard distributions finally the prices of the monopoly seller and of the social optimum are compared copyright 1993 by american economic association

the bidder s curse traditional explanations for the popularity of auctions are efficiency and revenue maximization we argue that another reason is the potential for overbidding i e buyers bidding above their willingness to pay outside the auction the auction mechanism ensures that even if only few buyers overbid they affect prices and allocations we employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field comparing auction prices to simultaneous fixed prices for identical items on the same ebay webpage we argue that fixed prices provide an upper bound for auction bids in a detailed data set of board game auctions we find that the final price exceeds the simultaneous fixed price in 42 percent of the auctions the result is not explained by differences in item quality shipping costs or seller reputation prior auction experience does not eliminate overbidding the finding replicates in a second broad data set of a cross section of auctions 48 percent overbidding the substantial fraction of overbid auctions is induced by a small number of bidders only 17 percent ever bid above the fixed price using a simple model of second price auctions with alternative fixed prices we show that transaction costs of switching between auctions and fixed prices cannot explain the results given that even the expected auction price is higher than the fixed price consistent with limited attention the closer the fixed price is listed relative to an auction the less likely are overbids this effect is strongest for bidders first bids when they are likely to examine the auction and fixed price listings more closely

sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers we analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of private value auctions for differentiated goods new buyers and new objects may arrive at random times since objects are imperfect substitutes buyers values are not persistent instead each buyer s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from the same in this paper we consider a model of dynamic markets in which buyers and sellers arrive randomly to the market and examine the equilibrium behavior of market participants in response to these arrivals in particular we investigate the role of current and anticipated future market conditions in determining endogenous outside options in this setting we characterize the influence of these outside options on equilibrium price determination and study the manner in which equilibrium payoffs and behavior are affected by both current conditions and future dynamics in our model buyers face an infinite sequence of auctions for heterogeneous but stochastically equivalent objects each buyer s private value for a new object is a new independent draw from a fixed distribution that arrive at random times moreover new buyers probabilistically arrive on the market in each period thus in any given auction buyers are presented with the outside option of participating in a future auction for an imperfectly substituted equivalent object but with a potentially different number of competitors we describe the unique symmetric markov equilibrium of this model by deriving a precise characterization of this option value

the welfare impacts of unanticipated trip limitations in travel cost models this paper uses an analysis of the gulf of mexico s recreational red snapper fishery to demonstrate the importance of theoretical behavioral model choice although travel cost models are frequently used in assessing the impact of policy changes on consumer s surplus this study shows that the standard use of consumer s surplus per trip can be inappropriate when the policy change leads to a partial closure of the resource depending on the theoretical behavior model underlying the analysis

political vs currency premia in international real interest differentials a study of forward rates for 24 countries abstract different approaches to quantifying the degree of capital mobility for a cross section of currencies particularly saving investment correlations and tests of real interest parity have appeared to show a surprisingly low degree of financial integration we use a new data set forward rate data for 24 countries including many small industrialized countries and seven ldcs to decompose the real interest differential into two parts the covered interest differential or political premium and the real forward discount or currency premium the latter in turn can be decomposed into the exchange risk premium and expected real depreciation we find a high degree of capital mobility across political boundaries for most of the g 11 countries plus hong kong and singapore for our sample period of 1982 to 1987 even for most of the other ldcs and smaller industrialized countries for which covered interest parity clearly fails the political premium is not as big a component of the real interest differential as the currency premium france would appear to have higher capital mobility than most by the criterion of real interest differentials but is seen in fact to have low capital mobility by the criterion of covered interest differentials a clear example of the superiority of the latter criterion

a structural model of competing sellers auctions and posted prices in an original data set of goods listed for sale online i observe that both auctions and posted prices are popular with buyers and sellers in the compact disc market to explain why these two mechanisms coexist i estimate a structural model of competing sellers who differ in the value of their outside options buyers are allowed to value auctioned and posted price goods differently but the estimated value distributions suggest that differences across buyers do not explain the mechanism coexistence that i observe in contrast differences across sellers outside options are important the value of the outside option segments the market with high outside option sellers choosing to post a fixed price there are two key forces at work that drive this empirical result first competition between sellers favors coexistence over an auction only or a posted price only marketplace because sellers prefer to be in a market with fewer rivals second sellers with more valuable outside options prefer the posted price mechanism because posted price goods sell less often than auctioned goods but at a higher price as a result a larger outside option reduces the loss from not selling and favors the posted price mechanism

internet auctions with many traders abstract we study a multi unit auction environment similar to ebay sellers each with a single unit of a homogeneous good set reserve prices at their own second price auctions each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions we characterize a perfect bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which conditional on reserve prices an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price in a large but finite market the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption so ex post efficiency is achieved buyers strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers valuations or the number of buyers and sellers

dual mechanism for an online retailer abstract while posted price and auction have typically been seen as alternatives to each other we observe web stores selling a product at a posted price and simultaneously running auctions for the identical product a phenomenon that has not been studied fully in this article we study a dual mechanism where an online retailer combines the two conventional mechanisms posted price and auction for multiple units of a product we demonstrate that the dual mechanism can be used to achieve market segmentation when customers discount the expected utility of auctions we characterize the customer s decision rule and formulate a retailer s profit function under the dual mechanism finally we compare the performance of three selling mechanisms posted price auction and dual through computational experiments

buy it now or take a chance price discrimination through randomized auctions increasingly detailed consumer information makes sophisticated price discrimination possible at fine levels of aggregation demand may not obey standard regularity conditions we propose a new randomized sales mechanism for such environments bidders can buy it now at a posted price or take a chance in an auction where the top d 1 bidders are equally likely to win the randomized allocation incentivizes high valuation bidders to buy it now we analyze equilibrium behavior and apply our analysis to advertiser bidding data from microsoft advertising exchange in counterfactual simulations our mechanism increases revenue by 4 4 and consumer surplus by 14 5 compared to an optimal second price auction this paper was accepted by assaf zeevi stochastic models and simulation

selection and recreation demand increased use of on site and user group surveys to estimate travel cost demand models e g caulkins bishop and bowes smith and desvousges has raised inevitable questions about the significance of relying on demand estimates derived solely from surveys of users many of the questions relate to selection effects that is the potential for specification errors and bias caused by an inability to reflect the decisions of nonusers with these types of surveys this issue has received some attention in the recreation literature brown et al bockstael and mcconnell but specific empirical evidence on the implications of alternative approaches for estimating demand models from on site surveys does not exist this article reports the first such evidence using a data set based on a general population sample to compare five methods for estimating travel cost demand models with microdata the findings suggest that the differences in the demand and in the benefit estimates raised by treating the problem using models with either single heckman or double selection catsiapis and robinson ham poirier effects are small however the effects of using alternative estimators for site demands are not these findings are limited because they apply to only one site nonetheless they do highlight the importance of the assumptions used to consider the behavior of nonusers consequently they provide direct motivation for more detailed conceptual and empirical work on the choice processes underlying recreation decisions

buy price english auction abstract consider an english auction for a single object in which there is an option for a bidder to guarantee a purchase at a seller specified buy price b at any time we show that there exist v and v v such that a bidder purchases at the buy price immediately if his valuation v is no less than v or v v v and at least one other bidder is participating in the auction if b v v he purchases at the buy price once the current bid reaches a strategically chosen threshold price a properly set buy price increases expected social welfare and the expected utility of each agent when either buyers or seller are risk averse

opportunity cost inattention and the bidder s curse abstract auction winners sometimes suffer a bidder s curse paying more for an item at auction than the fixed price charged for an identical item by other sellers this seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avoid overpaying would appear to be readily available to bidders yet they seem to ignore it to understand this behavior we consider the bidders decisions whether to acquire information about the fixed price before bidding in the presence of opportunity costs our theory introduces costly information acquisition into an auction model with a fixed price aftermarket selling an identical good when information about the fixed price is costly bidders sometimes remain rationally ignorant and overbid in the auction generating the bidder s curse to assess the empirical validity of our proposed explanation we study the model s predictions in an experiment where subjects have an opportunity cost of looking up a fixed price and bid in an auction we find that information acquisition decreases and overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted most observed lookup behavior is rationalizable and rational ignorance reliably generates the bidder s curse

a theoretical foundation for count data models the paper develops a theoretical foundation for using count data models in travel cost analysis two micro models are developed a restricted choice model and a repeated discrete choice model we show that both models lead to identical welfare measures

mechanism choice and the buy it now auction a structural model of competing buyers and sellers a striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms items on ebay for instance are frequently offered through auctions posted prices and buy it now auctions in this article i study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers i specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets in which i consider both sides of the market on the demand side buyers choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game on the supply side sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices i estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on ebay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed price listings respectively i find that the addition of auctions to fixed price markets hurts sellers and risk averse buyers but benefits risk neutral buyers additionally the consumer surplus increases when buy it now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further i discuss the intuition for the cause of this result

auctions versus posted price selling the case of correlated private valuations two popular selling methods are compared in a one period correlated private values model the seller of an object has to decide whether to sell it by posting a fixed price or by an auction without auctioning costs an auction with a reserve price is always preferable with positive auctioning costs the authors find that an auction is still preferable when the distribution of buyers valuations is sufficiently dispersed or when the object value is sufficiently high the relations between these and previous results are also discussed

short term interest rates as predictors of inflation on testing the hypothesis that the real rate of interest is constant in an innovative and provocative paper in this review eugene fama presents evidence which appears to be consistent with the joint hypothesis that the real rate of interest ignoring taxes is a constant and that the market for u s treasury bills is efficient in the sense of embodying rational expectations those findings are strikingly at variance with a long list of previous studies which seemed to support the view that the real rate of interest varies over time and can be related to economic variables such as real output monetary policy and so forth 2 the methodologies which lead to these contradictory conclusions are quite different previous studies had followed the lead of irving fisher by relating nominal interest rates to distributed lags on past rates of inflation 3 these distributed lags are generally interpreted as approximations to the market s expected rate of inflation and thus any remaining variation is attributed to variation in the real rate 4 fama s methodology on the other hand draws on the fact that the difference between the market interest rate and the subsequently observed rate of inflation the ex post real interest rate consists by definition of the ex ante real interest rate plus a pure forecasting error 5 the hypothesis of market efficiency implies that these forecasting errors must be serially random thus observing ex post real rates is equivalent to observing ex ante real rates with random measurement error these errors of course confound the problem of identifying variation in the ex ante real rate in this paper we will argue that the relative magnitude of these measurement errors is such that the tests carried out by fama were not powerful enough to reject the joint hypothesis that the ex ante real rate is a constant and expectations are rational more powerful tests which are presented in this paper using the same data do lead to rejection of that hypothesis of course rejection

the winner s curse reserve prices and endogenous entry empirical insights from ebay auctions internet auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most successful forms of electronic commerce we examine a unique data set of ebay coin auctions to explore the determinants of bidder and seller behavior we begin by documenting a number of empirical regularities in our data set of ebay auctions next we specify and estimate a structural econometric model of bidding on ebay using our parameter estimates from this model we measure the extent of the winner s curse and simulate seller revenue under different reserve prices